^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■^^■i ■
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY EECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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Bl
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Vol. LVI, Nos. H.36-H61
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1967
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Date of Issue
1436
Jan.
2, 1967
1437
Jan.
9, 1967
1438
Jan.
16, 1967
1439
Jan.
23, 1967 ]
1440
Jan.
30,1967 ]
1441
Feb.
6,1967 ]
1442
Feb.
13,1967 2
1443
Feb.
20, 1967 2
1444
Feb.
27,1967 3
1445
Mar.
6, 1967 3
1446
Mar.
13,1967 3
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Mar.
27, 1967 4
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Corrections for Volume LVI
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call attention to
the following errors in Volume LVI :
January 23, p. 137, first column, fifth paragraph: The
paragraph should read " — There is doubt that America's
vital interests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to
necessitate the growing commitment there."
May 29, p. 828, second column: The fourth sentence in
the first full paragraph should read "And it is worth noting
that the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act request,
along with other foreign assistance requests such as the
Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contributions to the
International Development Association, total less than .7
percent of our GNP."
June 12, p. 889, first column: The first sentence in the
last paragraph should read "The greatest disservice to
that resolution and to its effective implementation, would
be for us to create an impression in South Africa and in
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided on how
these principles are to be achieved."
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 8274
Released September 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 30 cents
INDEX 2. :r.^ Hd,«^
Volume LVI, Numbers 1436-1461, Jan. 2-June 26, 1967
ACDA. Sec Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Adams, Samuel C, Jr., 732
Aden, self-determination, U.N. role in (Goldberg),
100
Adenauer, Konrad, death of: Johnson, 751, 752;
Kiesinger, 751; Rusk, 752
Advisory Council on African Affairs, 651
Afghanistan :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 626
Pakistan, relations with ( Maiwandwal ) , 631
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 86, 122, 260, 834
U.S. agricultural committee (Johnson) , 629
U.S. aid (Maiwandwal), 631
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 627
Africa (sec also Organization of African Unity and
individual countries) :
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson),
233
Communism, rejection and countermeasures :
Martin, 195; Palmer, 455; W. W. Rostow, 493
Economic progress and problems: Goldberg, 289;
Katzenbach, 954; Palmer, 646, 650; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Human rights: 376; Goldberg, 289
International Coffee Agreement, importance and
effect, 252
North Africa, development, problems, and U.S. in-
terests (Palmer), 806
Political issues: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 959;
Palmer, 646
Regional programs and U.S. support: Goldberg,
293; Johnson, 159, 234, 383, 958 (quoted);
Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 649, 810; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830
South, problems of: Goldberg, 290; Sisco, 67
Southern Rhodesia, importance to: 372, 376;
Palmer, 450, 455
U.S. aid: Johnson, 159, 379, 380, 383; Katzenbach,
958; Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830
U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, advisory panel
named, 651
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
U.S. relations and interests: Goldberg, 291;
Katzenbach, 955; Palmer, 450; Rusk, 830
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach: 756; Katzen-
bach, 954
African Development Bank: 338; Johnson, 334, 379,
568; Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 650; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 831
Agency for International Development:
Africa, programs and policy: Johnson, 383;
Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk, 831
Agriculture improvement programs increased (E.
V. Rostow) , 863
AID-GATT training program (Blumenthal), 435
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232, 233, 297
Community water supply development program,
760, 761
Educational aid, increases, 337
Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson),
16
Reorganization: Johnson, 379, 381; E. V. Rostow,
860
Tunisia, 50-well project (Palmer) , 812
Viet-Nam commodity assistance programs, 1966
management report: Gaud, 200; text of report,
201 ; Rusk, 832
Viet-Nam medical assistance, 665
Aggression {see also China, Communist, Communism,
and Soviet Union) :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict
"Domino" theory: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 169
Infiltration of weapons and armed men (Meeker),
59
Measures against, U.S.: Johnson, 330, 546, 550, 587,
654, 960; W. W. Rostow, 492; Rusk, 363
Must not succeed: Johnson, 161, 535, 593; Martin,
194; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 134, 272, 725;
SEATO, 745; Truman (quoted), 548
U.N. resolution on prohibition of use of force:
Nabrit, 29, 30; text, 32
U.S. position: Goldberg, 872; Johnson, 871; Katzen-
bach, 2
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
World peace, threat to: Johnson, 330; W. W.
Rostow, 491; Rusk, 271, 278, 743; SEATO, 745
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas pro-
grams, agreements with: Afghanistan, 122
Congo (Kinshasa), 642, 733; Ghana, 582, 702
India, 182, 530; Iran, 122; Iraq, 154; Kenya, 834
Korea, 260, 702; Morocco, 834; Pakistan, 182
898; Philippines, 306; Poland, 766; Tunisia, 642
Viet-Nam, 154, 614
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
271-701—67 1
975
Agriculture (see also Agricultural surpluses, Food
and Agriculture Organization, and Food for
Peace) :
AID programs: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 860,
863
CENTO programs, 671
Europe, labor shifts in, 337
FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 859
India, development and problems: Johnson, 298,
334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 830
Kennedy Round negotiations, importance: Blumen-
thal, 433; Roth, 478, 880; E. V. Rostow, 860;
Solomon, 556
Latin America, 713, 887
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
718
U.S. aid (Johnson), 382, 541, 543, 632, 707, 709
Modernization of, importance and need: 109, 337;
Johnson, 160, 295, 298, 381, 543; Katzenbach,
956; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404, 856; W. W. Rostow,
501 ; Rusk, 874
OECD agricultural food fund, U.S. proposal:
Johnson, 297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861
SEATO programs, 747
U.S. agricultural trade mission to Soviet Union
(Trowbridge), 882
Viet-Nam: 212; Johnson, 593, 594
Water for Peace program. See Water for Peace
Agriculture Department, 559
Agronsky, Martin, 126
Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta, 16
AID. See Agency for International Development
Aid Consortia for India and Pakistan: Johnson, 296,
299, 383, 700; E. V. Rostow, 403; W. W. Rostow,
496 ; Rusk, 830
Aiken, George (Goldberg), 512
Albania, U.S. travel restrictions, 102
Aliens. See Nonnationals
Algeria:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests
(Palmer), 806
Soviet military and economic aid (Palmer), 809,
811
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 353
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress
Allen, George V., 322
Alliance for Progress:
Accomplishments and role: Bunker, 472; Johnson,
158, 231, 380, 382, 540, 632, 708, 711; Linowitz,
822; Rusk, 47, 829
Charter, protocol of amendment, resolution re rati-
fication of, 475
Chiefs of State, meeting of :
Declaration of the Presidents of America: 706n;
text, 712
Purpose: Bunker, 472; Johnson, 13, 71, 158, 231,
540, 678, 706 ; W. W. Rostow, 499 ; Rusk, 47, 464
Regional arms control arrangements, 576
Alliance for Progress— Continued
Chiefs of State, meeting of — Continued
Results: 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725, 822,
829
U.S. Congress, position on: Johnson, 545, 707;
Rusk, 723, 829 ■,
U.S. delegation, 721
International Coffee Agreement, importance: 253;
Johnson, 250
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 11th meeting of con-
sultation : Bunker, 472 ; Rusk, 47, 464
Final Act of the 3rd Special Inter- American Con-
ference (excerpts), 474
Resolution (text), 473
U.S. delegation, 472n, 476
Multinational projects: Johnson, 12, 709, 711; Lino-
witz, 730, 823 ; Rusk, 723, 829
Declaration of Presidents of America, 712, 716,
719, 720
Third special Inter-American Congress, final act
(excerpts), 474
U.S. appropriations requests: 887; Johnson, 232,
233, 234, 382, 543, 707; Rusk, 723, 828
U.S. support: Johnson, 334, 707, 708, 709, 710; W.
W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk, 723, 772
Alliluyeva, Mrs. Svetlana: Niven, 774; Rusk, 782
American ideals: Goldberg, 528, 940; Johnson, 14,
163, 301, 385, 593, 654, 708, 960; Martin, 193;
Palmer, 451 ; Pollack, 913
American National Red Cross, 599
Amerika (Katzenbach), 755
Amistad (Friendship) Dam: 13; Johnson, 12
Amity and economic relations, treaty with Togo, 154,
181,182
Anderson, Eugenie, 732
Angola, self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290
Ansary, Hushang, 909
Antarctic Treaty (1959) :
Current actions: Netherlands, including Surinam
and Netherlands Antilles, 641
Importance : 575, 634 ; Johnson, 387, 569
Measures re furtherance of principles and objec-
tives, entrance into force, 392
Outer space treaty, relation to : Goldberg, 603, 608,
609; Rusk, 601
U.S. observers, appointment, 71
Inspection of Antarctic stations, 633
Antigua, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab-
lishment, 182
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), council
meeting, Washington: 517; communique, 749
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302; Sisco,68
Aqaba, Gulf of. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict and names of
individual countries
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Cease-fire, compliance with: 941, 948; Goldberg,
942,943; Johnson, 952
976
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Arab-Israeli conflict — Continued
General Armistice Agreement, need for observ-
ance : Goldberg, 923, 927 ; Johnson, 871
Soviet position : Goldberg, 924 ; Rusk, 950
U.N. role: Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 927, 936, 941,
944, 946 ; Johnson, 870, 935, 951, 952 ; Rusk, 949
Secretary-General, peacekeeping efforts: Gold-
berg, 871, 894, 920, 922, 926, 937, 938, 943, 945,
947 ; Johnson, 870
Security Council resolutions, texts, 947, 948
U.S. aircraft, allegations of use of and U.S. reply:
Goldberg, 935, 938, 940; Rusk, 950, 951
U.S.-Canada discussions (Johnson), 909
U.S. draft resolutions: Goldberg, 944; texts, 927,
941, 948
U.S. position: 949; Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 936,
940, 942, 946; Johnson, 870, 952; Rusk, 949
U.S. ship, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John-
son, 952
U.S. Special Committee of the National Security
Council, establishment and membership (John-
son), 951
U.S.-U.K. talks (Wilson), 963
Argentina :
Economic development (Rusk) , 723
Kennedy Round, importance to (Blumenthal), 432
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353, 613,
701, 702, 733, 834, 898, 930, 967
Armaments (see also Disarmament, Missiles, and
Nuclear weapons) :
Communist arms supply to Viet-Nam : Katzenbach,
753; Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466, 727, 786
Control and reduction of: 576; Johnson, 447; Rusk,
42, 771
Cyprus, importation of arms, U.S. position (Gold-
berg), 180
Economic disadvantages of competition in: 576;
Johnson, 160; Palmer, 811; Rusk, 43, 171, 361,
875
India-Pakistan arms race, possibility of, 688
Latin America, elimination of unnecessary expendi-
tures for: 713, 721 ; Johnson, 711
Middle East arms race (Goldberg), 943
Outer space treaty, significance of provisions:
Dean, 268; Goldberg, 80, 602, 603, 609; John-
son, 266; Rusk, 601
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against sale or
shipment to : 77, 374 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Soviet supply to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811
Soviet-U.S. competition: 575; Humphrey, 489;
Johnson, 160, 445, 569; Katzenbach, 755;
Kohler, 413; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Ros-
tow, 501; Rusk, 171,601
U.S. policy on supply of (Johnson) , 384
North Africa (Palmer), 811
Armed forces :
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position. See Arab-
Israeli conflict
NATO. See NATO
Armed forces — Continued
South Africa forces, withdrawal from Southwest
Africa, U.N. request, 894
Warsaw Pact countries, question of reduction in
(Rusk), 783
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.:
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232
General Advisory Committee member (Neuberger) ,
confirmation, 448
Sixth annual report, excerpts : 570 ; Johnson, 568
Arosemena Gomez, Otto, 706n
Artigas, 706 (quoted)
ASA. See Association of Southeast Asia
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see also
ANZUS council. Association of Southeast Asia,
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and in-
dividual countries) :
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
advisors, 72
Communist activities and goals: 849; Bundy, 791;
U.A. Johnson, 420; Martin, 195; W. W. Ros-
tow, 493; Rusk, 169, 281, 743; SEATO, 745
Asian rejection of: Bundy, 323, 791; Holt, 962;
Rusk, 170 ; Westmoreland, 740
U.S. aid as a countermeasure (Johnson), 383
Economic and social development:
Multilateral aid (Bundy), 326, 793
Problems (Johnson) , 382
U.S. aid : Bundy, 326, 791 ; Rusk, 830
AID budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233,
382, 384
Special authorization request (Johnson), 162
International Coffee Agreement, importance and
effect of, 252
Manila Conference: 748; Bundy, 326, 794; Chung,
552; Holt, 962; Johnson, 960; Thieu, 588
President Johnson's visit, results (Martin), 197
Regional cooperation: 517, 849; Bundy, 325, 791,
793; Goldberg, 506, 509; Holt, 962; Johnson,
162, 380; Martin, 194; W. W. Rostow, 499;
Rusk, 47, 134, 598, 744, 832; SEATO, 745;
Thanat Khoman (quoted) , 197, 854
Pacific Community, proposed, 553
Role of: Australia and New Zealand: (Bundy),
793; Johnson, 961; Japan (Martin), 196;
Korea: Chung, 552; Johnson, 549; Philippines
(Braderman), 660; Thailand: Martin, 853;
Rusk, 597; U.K. (Bundy), 793
U.S. Chiefs of Mission, meeting, Baguio: 517;
Goldberg, 511
U.S. position, objectives, and role: Bundy, 323, 327,
790; Chung, 552; Martin, 193; Rusk, 134, 170;
Yen, 847
U.S.-Soviet complementary interests (Katzen-
bach), 755
USIA activities, increase (Johnson) , 236
Viet-Nam, importance to peace of: 849; Bundy, 323,
327, 792; Holt, 962; Johnson, 160, 534, 678,
961; Kohler, 8, 410; Martin, 195; Middleton
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
977
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia — Continued
Viet-Nam — Continued
(quoted), 851; W. W. Rostow, 499, 503; Rusk,
47, 134, 725, 744, 787, 831, 877; SEATO, 746
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg, 505, 509
Asian and Pacific Council: 849; Bundy, 326, 793;
Chung, 552; Johnson, 380, 549; Martin, 196, 853;
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 47
Asian Development Bank: 338, 849; Bundy, 325, 793;
Chung, 552; Johnson, 162, 334, 380, 469, 549, 568,
847; Martin, 196, 853; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk,
47, 832
Public international organization, U.S. designation
as. Executive order, 563
U.S. nnancial support: Johnson, 379; Rusk, 785
Asian Economic Development, Conference on (Mar-
tin), 196, 854
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196, 854
Association of Southeast Asia : Bundy, 326, 793 ; Mar-
tin, 196, 853 ; W. W. Rostow, 499
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council
Astronauts :
Outer space treaty provisions for assistance and
return: 84, 577; Goldberg, 81, 141, 603, 611,
839; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601
U.S. astronauts, deaths of (Johnson) , 388
Ataturk, Kemal : Johnson, 652 ; Sunay, 653
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Atlantic partnership: Humphrey, 487; E. V. Rostow,
19
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of:
Agreements re application of safeguards. See under
Atomic Energy Agency, International
Civil uses, bilateral agreements concerning co-
operation: Australia, 702, 834; Colombia, 438;
Iran, 438
Desalination, including use of atomic energy, agree-
ment with Soviet Union, 37
Diversion to nuclear weapon uses, danger of: 572;
Pollack, 911 ; Seaborg, 96
Germany, progress in ( McGhee) , 153
Latin America, prospects (Johnson) , 709
Nuclear power developments: 572; Pollack, 910;
Seaborg, 90
Nuclear proliferation treaty, non-application of
(Rusk), 321
Safeguards (see also Atomic Energy Agency, In-
ternational) : 571; Johnson, 448; Pollack, 911;
Rusk, 241
Application of safeguards to existing bilateral
agreements: Brazil, 612; Spain, 85
EURATOM, question of: 572; Rusk, 360
Atomic Energy Agency, International :
Safeg:uards, international safeguard and control
systems, and U.S. support: 572; Johnson, 448,
569; Seaborg, 97
Statute, current actions: Sierra Leone, 967; Singa-
pore, 182
Attwood, William, 651
978
Australia (see also Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion) :
ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749
Asian development, role in: Bundy, 793; Johnson,
961
Economic development (Johnson) , 961
India, grain shipments to (Johnson ) , 299
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 224, 260, 582,
613,674,702,834,898,930
U.S. visit of Prime Minister ( Holt) , 960
"Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740
Austria:
Import liberalizations, 245
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 613, 733, 766
U.S. Ambassador (MacArthur), confirmation, 674
Automotive products, Italian Fiat plant in Soviet
Union: Harriman, 819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon,
522 ; Trowbridge, 883
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st annual
report, transmittal (Johnson), 732
Automotive traffic. See Road trafiic
Aviation :
Aircraft, U.S., allegations of attack on Soviet ship
rejected, 953
Aircraft, U.S., allegations of involvement in Mid-
dle East, U.S. replies: Goldberg, 935, 940;
Rusk, 950, 951
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions re air transport
of exports and sale or supply of aircraft, 77,
374
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Supersonic transport aircraft, prospects and im-
portance (Humphrey), 164
Thailand Air Force, U.S. helicopter training (Mar-
tin), 199, 853
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Air transport agreement (1948) with Italy,
termination, 965, 968
Air transport agreement (1949) with Panama,
amendment, 965
Aircraft, C-47, and related articles and services,
understanding with Mali re delivery of, 702
Aircraft, civil, agreement with U.K. re use of
airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base, 37
Aircraft, offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board, convention (1963) : Denmark,
85, 481; Norway, 481; Saudi Arabia, 765;
Sweden, 481
Aircraft, rights in, convention (1948) on the in-
ternational recognition of: Iceland, 481
Carriage by air, convention (1928) for the uni-
fication of certain rules, protocol: New
Zealand, 765
Civil aviation, international convention (1944) :
Barbados, 701; Guyana, 305; Uganda, 701
Civil aviation, international, convention (1954) :
Protocol re Singapore, 897
Protocol re amendment of article 50(a):
Singapore, 897
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Aviation — Continued
U.S. airlifts to Viet-Nam (Wheeler) , 188
Azerbaijan (Rusk), 877
Bacon, Francis, 916
Balance of payments:
Adjustment policies and processes of other coun-
tries, 345, 347, 788
Import restraints, 245, 337
OECD countries, 27
U.S.:
Foreign aid programs, effect of and efforts to
minimize: 345; Johnson, 233, 379, 381, 659;
E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 827
Military expenditures and aid, effect of:
NATO: 488; E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 783
Viet-Nam: 341, 342, 346; Johnson, 334
Problems of and efforts to improve : 339; Johnson,
334, 708, 886
Tariff policy effect on (Solomon), 556
Voluntary restraint program, effect: 343, 444;
Johnson, 334
Ball, George W., 69, 553, 554
Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani, 688
Bangoura, Mohammed Kassoury, 554
Barbados:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 482, 701, 833, 865
U.N. membership: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67
Barghoorn, Frederick (Rusk), 248
i Barrows, Leland, 651
Baruch, Bernard, 569
Battle, Lucius D., 674
Beavogui, Louis-Lansana, 554
Belaunde, Victor Andres (quoted), 641
Belgium:
NATO headquarters, relocation in, 51
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 305, 306, 582, 613
930
Bell, Philip, 651
Beplat, Tristan E., 70
Berger, Samuel D., 552
Berlin (see also Germany) : Humphrey, 680; Kohler,
8, 410
Visit of Vice-President Humphrey: Humphrey,
680; Johnson (quoted), 680
Berlin crisis (Rusk), 272, 278, 877
Bernardes, Carlos (Goldberg) , 179
Berry, Michael, 274
Big-power responsibility: Goldberg, 513, 873, 895,
938; Humphrey, 486; Johnson, 333, 550, 960;
Katzenbach, 754; Kohler, 406; Martin (quoted),
273; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 770,
784, 879; Solomon, 555; U Thant, 139
Black, Eugene: 69, 667; Johnson, 379, 469; Blartin,
854
Blackie, William, 520
Blair, Frank, 168
Blumenthal, W. Martin, 430, 430n
Bohlen, Charles E., 53
Bolivia:
Alliance for Progress summit conference, position
on, 706n
Communism, threat of (Rusk) , 828
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481
Bonhomme, Arthur, 172
Boonstra, Clarence A., 261
von Borch, Herbert, 358
Botswana:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 260, 967
Bowie, Robert R., 53
Braderman, Eugene M., 660
Bradley, Omar (Rusk) , 770
Brandt, Willy: Humphrey, 680; Rusk, 46, 320
Brazil :
Economic progress (Rusk), 723, 829
Income tax convention, announcement, 581
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 306, 393, 612, 614,
642, 733, 866, 929, 930, 967
U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk,
829
U.S. visit of president-elect Costa e Silva, 242
British (see also United Kingdom)
British Council, 667
British Independent Television interview of Secretary
Rusk, 274
Bronheim, David, 721
Brosio, Manlio, 687
Brovra, George: 747; Goldberg, 28; Rusk, 46, 129
Brown, Winthrop G., 897
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 414, 565
Buffum, William B., 261, 732
Bui Diem, 216
Bui Vien: Johnson, 590; Thieu, 591
Bulgaria:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Political developments (Brzezinski), 417
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 260, 702
U.S. Ambassador (McSweeney), confirmation, 674
U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach) , 5
Bunche, Ralph (Goldberg), 268
Bundy, McGeorge (Johnson), 951
Bundy, William P., 323, 517, 790, 849
Bunker, Ellsworth: 472, 586, 591, 674, 844; Johnson,
538, 587, 588, 589, 593, 594; Thieu, 591
Burlingame, Anson, 848
Burma, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 898
Burnet, Alastair, 274
Burundi :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481, 701
Calif ano, Joseph A., Jr., 659
Cambodia, neutrality: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320,
619, 773
Communist violations (Rusk), 877
Cameroon :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 260, 353, 530
U.S. Ambassador (Payton) , confirmation, 261
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
979
Canada :
Agricultural development (E. V. Rostow), 863
American Falls, Niagara, IJC study requested, 634
Canada Pension Plan, agreement re, 898
Eastern Europe, trade with (Solomon) , 521
EXPO : 67, 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909
Foreign aid programs : Johnson, 334 ; Rusk, 785
"Great Ring of Canada" (Johnson) , 908
India, grain shipments to (Johnson) , 299
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800
St. Lawrence Seaway tolls, 554, 674
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613, 674,
766,834,866,898,930
U.S. Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st
annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 732
Visit of President Johnson: Johnson, 907, 908;
Pearson, 909
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual Re-
port of the President to the Congress on the Im-
plem,entation of the Automotive Products Trade
Act of 1965,12,2x1
Cancino, Cuevas (Goldberg) , 895
Canham, Erwin D., 315
CARE, India, emergency food aid: 701; Johnson,
300, 700
Case, CliflFord P., 42
Cater, Douglass, 16
CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance),
Brzezinski, 416
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc.,
260,967,968
Central America, U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; Rusk, 829
Central American Common Market, 712, 714, 715
U.S. support: 339; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 382,
542; Linowitz, 730; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk,
725,829
Central American Economic Integration Fund: 716;
Johnson, 382
Central Intelligence Agency, private voluntary or-
ganizations, relations, policy review: 665; John-
son, 665
Central Treaty Organization :
Economic Committee, 15th meeting: communique,
670; Gaud, 668
U.S. delegation, 671
Turkey, support of (Johnson) , 547
U.K. aid, 670
Ceylon:
International telecommunications convention
(1965) , with annexes, 613
U.S. Ambassador ( Corry ) , confirmation, 968
Chad, treaties, agreements, etc., 354, 733
Chaffee, Roger (Johnson) , 388
Chemical and biological warfare, U.S. position, 577
Chile:
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 723
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
Reflecting telescope at Cerro Tololo Inter-American
Observatory, 728
Chile — Continued
U.S. economic aid (Johnson) , 382
U.S. visit of President Frei, 71
China, Communist (see also Sino-Soviet relations) :
Asia, threat to: 849; Bundy, 791; Martin, 195;
W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 275
U.S. military assistance as a countermeasure
(Rusk), 827
Economic stagnation: Bundy, 325, 792; W. W.
Rostow, 497, 501
India, threat to (Sisco) , 462
Leadership struggle: 849; Goldberg, 508; Martin,
193; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 495, 501;
Rusk, 47, 170, 280, 785, 788; Taylor, 287
Nuclear tests and nuclear potential: 750; Mc-
Namara, 445 ; Rusk, 132
Taiwan, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper,
693
Thailand, threat to (Rusk) , 275
U.N. membership:
Question of: 849; Goldberg, 100; Popper, 689
"Two Chinas" solution: U. A. Johnson, 423;
Popper, 693
U.S. policy and relations: Goldberg, 100, 310, 840;
U. A. Johnson, 420, 422; Popper, 689, 694;
Rusk, 283, 322
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 564
Viet-Nam, positions on: Goldberg, 508; Kohler,
413; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk,
42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727, 786; Wheeler, 191
World goals: ANZUS, 749; Meeker, 62; Popper,
690, 692; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 169;
Solomon, 519
World relations: Johnson, 162; Martin, 193; Niven,
774; E. V. Rostow, 398; W. W. Rostow, 502;
Rusk, 788
China, Republic of:
Communist China, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423;
Popper, 693
Economic progress: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846,
849
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353
U.N. membership: 849; Goldberg, 100; Johnson,
848; Popper, 689, 693
U.S. commitments : 849 ; Johnson, 848 ; Popper, 683 ;
Rusk, 322
U.S. visit of Vice-President Yen, 846
Viet-Nam, aid to (Johnson) , 847, 849
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 511
Christian, George E., 721
Christian Science Monitor, 798
Chung, II Kwon, 548, 549, 551
Church, Frank, 42
Churchill, Winston: quoted, 486, 489, 490_ 838, 961,
963; Harriman, 815
Civic action programs: 699, 766; Westmoreland, 740
Civil rights (see also Human rights and Racial dis-
crimination) :
980
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Civil rights — Continued
International covenant (U.N.), on civil and polit-
ical rights: Goldberg 99; Harris, 104; text,
111
Political rights of women, convention (1963) :
Afghanistan, 86
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg), 524
U.S. (Goldberg), 289, 524
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson), 590
Claims :
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, FY 1968
budget appropriations request (Johnson), 232
Launching of objects into outer space, liability for
damages: 84; Goldberg, 81, 611; Rusk, 601
Passenger-ship accidents, U.S. legislation re cover-
age of (Miller), 175
Clark, J. Reuben, Jr. (Rusk) , 270
Clark, William Donaldson, 274
Claxton, Philander P., 566
Clayton, Will (Solomon), 555
Cleveland, Harlan, 53
Cocoa, international cocoa agreement, need for
(Blumenthal), 434
Coe, Richard, 854
Coffee:
International Coffee Agreement (1962) : 717; John-
son, 709
Current actions: Honduras, 581; Jamaica, 929;
Kenya, 85
2nd annual report: Johnson, 250; text of report,
251
International coffee diversification: 717; Johnson,
707
Cole, 0. E., 377
Collective security :
Collective self-defense, right of: 571; Meeker, 59
Defensive alliances, importance: Brzezinski, 415;
Bundy, 791; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 271;
Sisco, 65; Truman (quoted), 550
Thai support (Rusk), 597
U.N. role (Sisco), 459
U.S. commitments, importance of dependability:
Meeker, 62; Rusk, 725, 726, 771, 784, 787, 875,
878
Colombia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 701
U.S. aid (Johnson) , 382
Colombo Plan ( W. W. Rostow) , 496
Colonialism (see also name of colony) : Goldberg,
289; Sisco, 67
U.N. resolution and U.S. support (Nabrit) , 32
Comecon, 697
Commodity Credit Corporation : 701 ; Johnson, 300
Communications :
NATO communications, improvement, 51
News media, importance (Martin) , 854
Communications — Continued
Satellites (Humphrey), 164
Global commercial communications satellite, in-
terim arrangements and special agreement:
Korea, 438; Peru, 967
NATO feasibility study, 51
Communism :
Asia. See Asia.
Cold war: Goldberg, 895; Harriman, 817; Johnson,
159; Katzenbach, 754; W. W. Rostow, 500
Ideological differences with free world : Harriman,
820; Sisco, 463
Iron Curtain ( Humphrey) , 486
Measures against: Kohler, 8, 410; E. V. Rostow,
399; W.W. Rostow, 493
U.S. : 103 ; Johnson, 161, 384, 654 ; Kohler, 7, 409 ;
Martin, 193; Rusk, 127, 134, 278, 877; Yen, 847
Nationalism, increases in: Brzezinski, 417; Harri-
man, 817; Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2;
Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon,
519
Peaceful coexistence. See East-West relations
Propaganda : Goldberg, 924 ; Harriman, 820 ; Rusk,
725,775;SEATO,746
Rejection of and countermeasures (see also under
Viet-Nam) : 564; Bundy, 323, 792; Holt, 962;
Johnson, 384, 541; Martin, 195; Palmer, 455;
Popper, 691 ; W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 785,
827, 832; Westmoreland, 740
CIA aid to private organizations, 666
Southern Rhodesia, danger of (Palmer) , 455
Wars of national liberation: Bundy, 790; Martin,
194; W. W. Rostow, 494, 503; Rusk, 272, 787;
SEATO, 746; Taylor (quoted), 514; West-
moreland, 738
World goals: Harriman, 820; Kohler, 7; E. V. Roa-
tow, 398 ; Rusk, 771, 785, 875
Conferences, international, calendar of meetings, 34,
578
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) :
Political development (Palmer), 649
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 642, 733
U.N. role (Sisco), 66
U.S. Ambassador (McBride), confirmation, 968
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agree-
ments, etc., 393, 481
Congress, U.S.:
Alliance for Progress summit meeting, interests:
Johnson, 545, 707; Rusk, 723, 829
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18, 223,
350, 757, 801, 966
Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Economic
Reforms, report (Solomon), 522
Findley and Belcher amendments (Harriman), 818
India, fact-finding committee, results of trip (John-
son), 299
Legislation:
Cotton production, effect of 1965 legislation
(Solomon), 558
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1957
981
Congress, U.S. — Continued
Legislation — Continued
Passenger ship safety: Johnson, 429; Miller, 175
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, financial
support ceiling raised (Johnson) , 599, 865
Legislation, proposed:
African Development Bank, U.S. participation in
special fund (Johnson) , 379, 380
Agency for International Development: John-
son, 879; Palmer, 651
Alliance for Progress, authorization and appro-
priation request (Johnson), 543
Asian development, authorization (Johnson), 162
Asian Development Bank, U.S. pledge (John-
son), 379, 380
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966: 697;
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 160,
334, 659, 696; Katzenbach, 3; Phillips, 677;
Rusk, 875; Solomon, 518; Trowbridge, 881
Export-Import Bank, continuation and expan-
sion, request: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379,
381, 659
Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 (Rusk), 827
Guam, political development (Johnson), 587
India, food aid appropriations and authorization
request (Johnson), 300, 658
Interest Equalization Tax rate adjustment
(Johnson), 335
National Advisory Committee on Self-Help
(Johnson), 379, 380
Joint resolutions, India, emergency food aid, 700
Outer space treaty, support for (Goldberg), 605
Senate advice and consent:
Consular convention v;ith Soviet Union: 614;
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Human rights conventions, U.S. accession recom-
mended (Goldberg), 524
Narcotic drugs, single convention (1961) on,
U.S. accession recommended: Johnson, 671;
Katzenbach, 672
Outer space treaty: Goldberg, 602; Johnson,
386,659; Rusk, 600
SOLAS 1960 Convention, amendments: Johnson,
429; Miller, 178
Senate confirmations, 261, 448, 476n, 482, 523, 674,
765, 968
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 160; Westmore-
land, 738
Conseil de I'Entente (Palmer) , 650
Conservation:
Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966)
for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929
Nature protection and wildlife preservation in the
Western Hemisphere, Convention (1940) :
Costa Rica, 353
U.S.-Soviet fishery discussions, 216, 332
Water resources: Johnson, 903; Solomon, 562
Amistad Dam (Johnson), 12
Conservation — Continued
Water resources — Continued
CENTO programs, 671
Latin Amei-ica, 712, 716
Consular relations:
Soviet-U.S. consular convention: 614, 642; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; Kat-
zenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247
Vienna convention (1963) on: Argentina, 701;
Brazil, Ireland, 967; Madagascar, 530
Optional protocols: Madagascar, 613
Contiguous zone, 178, 424, 919
Cook, Jesse L., 127
Cook, Mercer, 651
Cooper, Charles, 844
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and proto-
cols : Netherlands, 833
Protocol 1, Italy, 481
Corry, Andrew V., 968
Cortada, James N., 218
Costa e Silva, Artur, 243
Costa Mendez, Nicanor: 474; Bunker, 473
Costa Rica:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 642, 702, 930
U.S. Ambassador (Boonstra), confirmation, 261
Cotton :
Analysis of Factors Affecting U.S. Cotton Ex-
ports, 559
Textiles :
Bilateral agreements with: Hong Kong, 929;
India, 36, 182, 702; Israel, 389, 642; Italy,
642; Mexico, 964; Poland, 612, 642; Portugal,
154,674,699
International Cotton Institute, articles of agree-
ment: India, 353; Mexico, 224
Long-term arrangement, extension of: 929;
Blumenthal, 431 ; Roth, 478, 880
World trade, problems and U.S. policies (Solomon) ,
557
Coudert, Frederic R., (quoted), 140
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (excerpts)
336
Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (Brzezinski),
416
Council of Europe: Brzezinski, 419; Johnson, 652
Crisis control: Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 754;
NATO, 51
Crowther, Harold E., 919
Cuba:
Castroism: 565; Rusk, 828
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, 102, 564
Cuban missile crisis: Kohler, 8, 410; W. W. Rostow,
493; Rusk, 168, 272, 278, 621, 778
Cudlipp, Hugh, 274
Cultural relations and programs:
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Moroc-
co, 351, 393; Netherlands, 582; Romania, 479,
482; U.A.R., 642; U.K., 582
982
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cultural relations and programs — Continued
Bilateral agreements with — Continued
Germany, re transfer of paintings for Weimar
Museum, 86
Bulgaria, U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach), 5
CIA assistance, policy review, 667
Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488;
Solomon, 519
International convenant (U.N.) on economic, social,
and cultural rights: Harris, 104; text, 107
North Africa, cultural factors (Palmer), 807
Philippines (Braderman), 660
Soviet Union-U.S.: Katzenbach, 755; Solomon, 519
U.S. travel restrictions, exception of in particular
fields, 103
Customs:
Carnets, ATA, ECS and TIR, conventions (1961)
re: U.S., 481, 833
Containers, convention (1961) on: U.S., 481, 833
Customs administration agreement with Philip-
pines, 261
Mexican products, 70
Professional equipment, convention (1961) on
temporary importation of: U.S., 481, 833
Publication of customs tariffs, convention (1890)
re international union for, and protocol:
Algeria, 85
Road traffic, convention (1954) re facilities for
touring: Singapore, 122
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954)
on the temporary importation of: Australia,
673
Viet-Nam, U.S. advisory activities: 206; Guad, 200
Cyprus :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 930
Turkey, position of : 657; Sunay, 656
UNFICYP, extension of (Goldberg), 179
Soviet position (Sisco),461
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 638; NATO, 50
Czechoslovakia :
Economic development (Katzenbach), 5
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip-
rocal offer, 572
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 224, 260, 305, 898
U.S. citizens, detention of (Kohler), 10
U.S. trade mission (Trowbridge), 882
DAC. See Development Assistance Committee, OECD
Daddario, Emilio Q., 240
Dahomey :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 701, 801, 833
Davies, Merton E., 71, 634
Davis, W. True, Jr., 721
Dawson, Thomas (Rusk), 248
Dayan, Moshe (Wheeler), 189
Dean, Sir Patrick, 268
de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (Humphrey), 168
De Madariaga, Salvador (quoted), 892
Defense :
British Indian Ocean Territory, agreement re avail-
ability of for defense purposes, 225
Inventions relating to and for which patent appli-
cations have been made, agreement for mutual
safeguarding (1960) : Luxembourg, 305
National defense and security:
CIA policy review, 667
Espionage, question of effect of U.S.-Soviet con-
sular convention: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 411;
Rusk, 249
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
establishment and membership (Johnson) , 951
Soviet missile capabilities: 575; Johnson, 160,
569
U.S. nuclear strength: McNamara, 442; Rusk,
272
Watch movements trade and production, national
security aspects, 217
Self-defense, right of: Meeker, 60; Nabrit, 31;
Rusk, 271
U.S. budget : Johnson, 380, 445 ; Rusk, 771
Defense, Department of : Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
Demarcation, international lines of, significance
(Meeker), 60
Democracy and democratic processes: Johnson, 295,
590 ; Katzenbach, 5 ; King Hassan II, 331 ; Rusk,
772; Trowbridge, 885
Bureaucracy (E. V. Rostow),398
Greece (Rusk), 750
Latin America: 713; Johnson, 710
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
South West Africa, 893
Den Toom, Willem, 687
Denmark :
Import liberalizations, 245
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 122, 224, 260, 481,
613, 766
Desalination:
1st International Symposium on Water Desalina-
tion, results (Solomon), 561
Los An,:?eles desalination plant approved: Johnson,
903 ; Pollack, 910
Saudi Arabia desalination plant site at Jidda,
dedication (Solomon), 561
Soviet Union, agreement re cooperation in field
desalination, including use of atomic energy,
37
Water for Peace :
International Conference: 762, 765; Johnson,
903; Solomon, 562
U.S. program, recommendations, 761
Desert Locust Control Authority (Katzenbach), 958
Development and Resources Corporation (Lilienthal),
468
Development Assistance Committee, OECD: 764;
Humphrey, 685 ; E. V. Rostow, 25
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 12
Diehold, John (Humphrey) , 167
Diem, Ngo Dinh (Lodge) , 799
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
983
Diplomatic relations and recognition :
Consular convention with Soviet Union : 614, 642 ;
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Katzenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247
Diplomatic immunity: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 412;
Rusk, 249
Diplomatic relations with U.S. terminated : Algeria,
Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, U.A.R., and
Yemen, 952n
International law, relevance (Goldberg) , 140
Recognition :
Not inferred from signature, ratification or ac-
cession to multilateral agreements (Goldberg) ,
82
Southern Rhodesia, nonrecognition of Smith
regime: 369, 375; Goldberg, 73, 143; Palmer,
458
Rights of legation (Rusk) , 772
Vienna convention (1961) : Dahomey, 833; Ireland,
929; Mongolia, 674; Sweden, 732
Optional protocol re compulsory settlement of dis-
putes: Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613;
Sweden, 732
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign
Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation
of credentials: Afghanistan, 626; Botswana,
Bulgaria, 16; Burundi, 850; Colombia, 172;
Dahomey, 850; Haiti, Indonesia, 172; Iran, 909;
Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 16; Malta, 327; Morocco,
850; Sierra Leone, 377; Singapore, 688; Turkey,
172; Viet-Nam, 216; Yemen, 327; Zambia, 688
Disarmament (see also Armaments, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and Nuclear
weapons) :
Need for: 436, 657; Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 755;
NATO, 50; Rusk, 786; U Thant, 268
Soviet "umbrella" proposal, 576
U.N. role: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 567
Disaster relief. Trust Territory of the Pacific (John-
son), 599
Disputes, compulsory settlement of, optional protocol
to Vienna convention on consular relations
(1963): Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613;
Sweden, 732
Disputes, pacific settlement of: Goldberg, 316, 872,
923; Haile Selassie (quoted), 425; Humphrey,
489 ; W. W. Rostow, 491 ; Rusk, 875
International covenant (U.N.) on civil and polit-
ical rights, optional protocol : Harris, 105 ; text,
120
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 269
Dole, Robert (Johnson) , 299
Dominican Republic : Johnson, 243, 567 ; Rusk, 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 393
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382
Donges-Metz pipeline, agreement with France re
operation, maintenance, and security, 733
Double taxation, income, conventions and agreements
for avoidance of: Brazil, 581, 614; Honduras,
termination, 181 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 84, 122
Downs, Hugh, 168, 172
Drugs :
Adverse drug reaction reporting system, WHO, an-
nouncement, 918
Narcotics:
International Narcotics Control Board, U.S. rep-
resentation (Katzenbach), 673
Single convention (1961) on:
Current actions: Mexico, U.S., 834; Turkey,
U.S., 897
U.S. accession urged: Johnson, 671; Katzen-
bach, 272
Dukes, Ernest F., 71, 634
Dulles, John Foster (Rusk), 271
East-West relations: 657, 697 ; Brzezinski, 414 ; John-
son (quoted), 408, 680; Niven, 774; W. W. Ros-
tow, 495; Rusk, 4 (quoted), 359, 463 (quoted),
772
Currency convertibility recommended, 699
Germany :
Possibility of improved relations with Eastern
Europe: Humphrey, 680; Katzenbach, 755;
Rusk, 360, 363
Reunification, importance to: 52; Brzezinski,
418; Humphrey, 489; Katzenbach, 753; W. W.
Rostow, 500 ; Rusk, 362
NATO role. See under NATO
OECD role : Humphrey, 684 ; E. V. Rostow, 24
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16
Soviet convictions of U.S. citizens, question of effect
(Rusk), 44
Soviet Union, role of ( Humphrey) , 487
Technological gap (Humphrey), 167
Trade. See under Trade
U.N. role: Goldberg, 98; Harriman, 820; E. V. Ros-
tow, 25 ; Sisco, 458
U.S. efforts to improve: 339; Harriman, 815; Hum-
phrey, 682; Johnson, 159; Kohler, 406; Rusk,
47, 169, 360, 786, 875
U.S. national interest considerations: Harriman,
821; Johnson, 696; Kohler, 6; Solomon, 518
Viet-Nam, effect of: Harriman, 821; Kohler, 413;
Rusk, 781, 875; Trowbridge, 883
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966:
Importance: 339, 697; Humphrey, 488; Harriman,
819; Johnson, 160, 334, 659, 696; Katzenbach,
3, 755; Kohler, 10; Phillips, 697; Rusk, 772,
875 ; Solomon, 518 ; Trowbridge, 881
Viet-Nam effect on passage: Rusk, 171; Solomon,
523
ECA. See Economic Commission for Africa
ECAFE. (Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East), Martin, 853
Echavarria Alozaga, Hernan, 172
Economic and Social Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 305, 437
984
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic and Social Council, U.N. — Continued
Narcotic drugs control (Katzenbach) , 673
U.S. representative (Goldschmidt), confirmation,
261
Economic and social development (see also name of
country) :
Afghanistan : 632 ; Maiwandwal, 628, 630
Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 954; Palmer,
646, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 813
Agriculture, health, and education, key sectors:
748, 760; Johnson, 231, 232, 379, 381, 543, 659,
707; E. V. Rostow, 401, 860; Rusk, 828
Agriculture, importance to. See Agriculture: Mod-
ernization
Asia. See Asia
Conditions necessary for (E. V. Rostow) , 857
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex-
cerpts), 336
Eastern Europe, problems: Harriman, 817; Solo-
mon, 519
Education, importance. See Education
Ethiopia (Johnson), 427
Food aid, importance (sec also Food and popula-
tion crisis) , Johnson, 300
Free world progress: E. V. Rostow, 399; W. W.
Rostow, 495
India Pakistan Aid Consortia: Johnson, 296, 299,
383 ; E. V. Rostow, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296,
300, 334, 380; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow, 400,
861; Rusk, 241, 826
International Covenant (U.N.), on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights: Goldberg, 99; Harris,
104; text, 107
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress
Mexico-U.S. border area, agreement on, 86
Near and Middle East, U.S. support (Goldberg),
935
OECD countries: Humphrey, 683; W. W. Rostow,
497
Political stability, relation to: Gaud, 669; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 378, 381, 384; Palmer,
649, 809; E. V. Rostow, 857; Rusk, 826
SEATO programs : 745, 747 ; Rusk, 744
Systems management (McGhee),150
Technological progress: 346; Humphrey, 165, 684
U.N. role (Johnson), 567
U.S. aid (see also Foreign aid programs, U.S.) :
346; Johnson, 230; E. V. Rostow, 400, 857;
Rusk, 273
Self-help principle: 712; Gaud, 669; Johnson,
159, 231, 232, 296, 298, 334, 378, 379, 710;
Palmer, 650, 814; E. V. Rostow, 26, 401, 860;
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 724, 827
U.S. economic strength: E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk,
770, 833
U.S.-Soviet common interests (Katzenbach), 754
Water resources development, 759
Economic and social development — Continued
World half-rich, half -poor: Humphrey, 684; John-
son, 14, 295, 378; E. V. Rostow, 401, 857; Rusk,
241, 771
World order, importance to (W. W. Rostow), 491
Economic assistance, postwar, agreement with Ger-
many re repayment of remaining German debt,
260
Economic Commission for Africa: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 499
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(Martin), 853
Economic Commission for Europe: Brzezinski, 419;
Harriman, 820 ; Humphrey, 488 ; E. V. Rostow, 25
Economic policy and relations, U.S. :
Domestic policy:
Agriculture program changes (E. V. Rostow),
402, 859
Budget message, FY 1968 (Johnson), 230
Cotton production (Solomon), 557
Efficient administration (Johnson), 379, 381
Monetary restraint, programs (E. V. Rostow),
20
Foreign policy:
Council of Economic Advisers, report (excerpts),
336
Eastern Europe, trade policies. See East-West
Trade Relations Act of 1966
Economic Report of the President, excerpts
(Johnson), 333
Economist, The, 192, 495, 697
Ecuador:
Alliance for Progress summit conference declara-
tion, position on, 706n
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 224, 260
Education :
Africa (Katzenbach), 955
Asia, regional coordination (Martin), 196, 854
"Brain drain": McGhee, 152; Pollack, 912
Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey,
164; Johnson, 15
Foreign affairs, relation to (Humphrey), 167
Government, role of (Humphrey) , 165
Illiteracy rates (E. V. Rostow) , 402
Importance: 337; Gaud, 670; Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15; Mann (quoted), 955; E. V.
Rostow, 23, 402
International conference, 1967: Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15
Latin America; U.S. aid: 713, 718, 887; Johnson,
382, 541, 543, 663, 709
North Africa (Palmer) , 808
Philippines, U.S. school-building project, 850
Private institutions, role (Humphrey) , 165
Science and public policy programs (Pollack), 915
SEATO programs, 747
Southern Rhodesia (Palmer), 452
TV and other new media: 719; Johnson, 15, 709;
E. V. Rostow, 405
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
985
Education — Continued
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 108, 109
U.S. financial support: Johnson, 381; Katzenbach,
958
Viet-Nam, 209
Voluntary organizations, CIA relationships: 665;
Johnson, 665
Water resources projects, training for: 762; John-
son, 903
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
U.N., constitution, current actions: Guyana, 897
Educational exchange programs:
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Israel,
702; Italy, 122; Netherlands, 582; Romania,
479; U.A.R., 582, 642
Poland, agreement re use of zlotys in, 766
Volunteers to America (Johnson), 244
EEC. See European Economic Community
EFTA. See European Free Trade Association
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (John-
son), 447
Establishment and status, 570n
1966 conference results, 570
U.S.-Soviet responsibilities (Rusk), 43
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: quoted, 412; Rusk, 270
El Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 930
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (quoted), 654, 881
Esenbel, Melih, 172
Ethiopia :
Agricviltural education (Katzenbach), 957
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. visit of King Haile Selassie, 425
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community),
Johnson, 448
Europe (see aUo North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and names of individual countries) :
Central, Nuclear-free zone, question of (Rusk),
361
Eastern :
Economic and political evolution: Brzezinski,
416; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 486, 681;
Katzenbach, 2, 5; Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Ros-
tow, 495; Solomon, 518
U.S. economic relations. See East-West relations
and Trade
Viet-Nam, position on: Harriman, 821; Kohler,
413; Rusk, 283
Labor, large-scale movements in, 337
North Africa, relations (Palmer), 807
Political development (E. V. Rostow), 399
Unification: 657; Brzezinski, 415; Kohler, 11;
Rusk, 364
Visit to President Johnson, question of (Rusk) , 727
Western :
Economic progress: 336; Humphrey, 486, 679;
McGhee, 148
Europe — Continued
Western^Continued
Technology gap with U.S.: Humphrey, 165, 488;
McGhee, 148
Trade with Eastern Europe: 697; Humphrey,
488; Harriman, 817; Solomon, 518
Unification: Brzezinski, 41G; Humphrey, 487; W.
W. Rostow, 498
U.S. Chiefs of Missions, meeting, Bonn, 599
U.S. commitments: Humphrey, 487, 680; Katzen-
bach, 753; Kohler, 8, 410; Rusk, 727, 782
U.S. interests and relations: Brzezinski, 416;
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 486, 679, 682;
Johnson, 678; Kohler, 7; W. W. Rostow, 498;
Rusk, 358, 364
Viet-Nam situation, lack of effect on (Rusk) , 358,
726, 787, 875
Visit of Vice President Humphrey: Humphrey,
679, 680, 681, 683; Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727
World role (Rusk), 784
European Atomic Energy Community (Johnson), 448
European Common Market. See European Economic
Community
European Economic Community: 337, 697; Brzezinski,
416, 419; Humphrey, 166; Linowitz, 730; Mc-
Ghee, 148; NATO, 50
General agreement on tariffs and trade:
Accession of Korea to, protocol, acceptance, 968
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880
U.K. membership, proposed: Holt, 961; Rusk, 783
European Free Trade Association: 337, 339, 697;
NATO, 50
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880
European Space Research Organization:
Jupiter probe, proposed, NASA cooperation (Mc-
Ghee), 153
Satellite telemetry/telecommand station in Alaska,
agreement re establishment and operation of,
36
European Technological Community, proposed
(Humphrey), 166
Executive orders:
Asian Development Bank, immunities defined
(11334), 563
Trade and other transactions involving Southern
Rhodesia (11322), 146
EXPO 67 : 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909
Export-Import Bank:
Appropriation and authorization request FY 1968
(Johnson), 231, 232, 235
Eastern Europe, extension of commercial credit
guarantees to: 698; Harriman, 819; Johnson,
159; Solomon, 521; Trowbridge, 883
Italian Fiat company, loan to (Trowbridge), 883
Latin American earth stations, proposed loans for
(Johnson), 709
Lending authority, continuation and expansion
needed: 339; Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335
Exports :
Central America (Linowitz), 730
986
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Exports — Continued
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Solomon, 518,
521 ; Trowbridge, 882
Europe, Western (McGhee), 148
International Coffee Agreement, quota controls, 253
Latin America, need for development of: 717;
Johnson, 707, 709; W. W. Kostow, 498
Less developed countries, importance to: 338, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; E. V. Rostow, 404
Presidential "E" Awards for export excellence,
S86n
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77,
374; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
U.S.:
Cotton (Solomon), 558
Council of Economic Advisers, report, 342
Export Control List, further removals of non-
strategic items: 698; Johnson, 159; Trow-
bridge, 883
Increase needed (Johnson) , 335, 756, 886
Technical data: Katzenbach, 755; Trowbridge,
882
World grain export pattern, changes in (E. V.
Rostow) , 402, 859
Extradition, convention (1962) with Israel, under-
standing re certain errors in translation of the
Hebrew text, 766
Fairbank, John (Lodge), 798
FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N.
Far East. See Asia and names of individual countries
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Rusk), 249
Federal Regulations, Code of, 564
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 367
Finland:
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 260, 613, 732,
929, 930
Fish and fisheries:
Fish protein concentrate : 761 ; Goldberg, 101 ; John-
son, 231, 301, 709 ; Rusk, 241
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966)
for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929
Certain fisheries off the coast of U.S., agreements
with Japan, 898
Great Lakes fisheries convention, amendment of,
Canadian note and U.S. reply, 482, 834
King crab fishing, agreement with Soviet Union,
393
North Atlantic fisheries, conduct of fishing opera-
tions in, convention adopted, 635
Northeast Pacific Ocean, agreement with Soviet
Union on certain fishery problems, 393
Northwest Atlantic fisheries, convention (1949),
international, and protocols: Romania, 613
Protocols (1965) re measures of control and
entry into force: France, 438; Norway, 530;
Romania, 613 ; Spain, 642
Fish and fisheries — Continued
U.S. fisheries zone extension, Japan-U.S. discus-
sions, 178, 424
U.S.-Mexican talks, 919
U.S.-Soviet discussions on fishery problems, 216,
331
Viet-Nam, UNDP/FAO fisheries project, U.S.
financial support, 964
Fisher, Adrian S., 573
Flood control, Amistad Dam: 13; Johnson, 12
Flott, Frederick W., 566
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N. ( E. V. Ros-
tow), 859
Constitution, current actions: Botswana, Lesotho,
260
India, food assistance to : 701 ; Johnson, 297 ; Rusk,
48
U.N. Development Program fisheries project in
Viet-Nam, U.S. financial support, 964
U.S. support, 761
World Food Program: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow
861
Food and population crisis: Gaud, 669; Humphrey,
489; Johnson, 329, 381, 567, 658; E. V. Rostow,
26, 856; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 46, 169, 874;
Sisco, 64
FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 402, 859
Marine resources development, U.N. resolution
(Goldberg), 101
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 814
Nuclear power uses as solution to, 572
OECD role (Humphrey), 685
U.S. principles for alleviating: Johnson, 160, 235,
295; E. V. Rostow, 401
Water for Peace Program: 761; Johnson, 902;
Rusk, 905
Food for Freedom, 761
1968 appropriations request (Johnson), 231, 232,
235,297
Food for Peace programs: Johnson, 658; E. V. Ros-
tow, 860
Viet-Nam, increase in: 203; Gaud, 201
Food resources (see also Agriculture) :
Latin America, AID programs (E. V. Rostow),
863
Marine resources: 761; Goldberg, 101; Johnson,
231, 301,709; Rusk, 241
State Department Policy Planning Council, advis-
ory panel, 16
Force, use of. See Aggression
Ford Foundation, 728
Foreign aid programs, U.S.:
Balance of payments, effect on : 345 ; Johnson, 233,
379, 381, 659; E. V. Rostow, 21
Communist aggression, relation to (Johnson), 384
Food production, priority of: Johnson, 231, 296,
297, 700; E. V. Rostow, 858; Solomon, 559
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379,
381, 659
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
987
Foreign aid programs, U.S. — Continued
Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk), 826
Matched-funds principle: 701; Johnson, 544, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 861
Multilateral aid, combined with: 701; Johnson, 162,
231, 232, 234, 295, 296, 297, 298, 378, 380, 384,
659, 707; Katzenbach, 958; E. V. Rostow, 401,
403; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 828, 831
U.N. programs (Sisco), 459
Regional economic development, encouragement
for: Johnson, 231, 379, 380, 544, 659; Katzen-
bach, 958; Palmer, 650; Rusk, 828
Sales agreements, stress on payment in dollars or
local currency (Johnson) , 235
Self-help principles: 701, 760; Gaud, 669; Johnson,
159, 231, 232, 235, 296, 297, 298, 334, 378, 379,
381, 382, 542, 543, 659; Palmer, 650, 814; E. V.
Rostow, 401, 860; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk,
724, 827, 831
"Surplus" concept, aid not restricted by (Johnson) ,
235
U.S. national interest considerations: Johnson,
378, 545; Palmer, 808; E. V. Rostow, 857;
Rusk, 827, 832
Water projects, support for, 758, 760
Foreign aid programs of other countries :
China, Republic of: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846,
848, 849
Increases in: Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 403;
Rusk, 785, 829, 830
Multilateral aid to India (Johnson), 295, 299
Netherlands, 964
OECD countries, 28
Soviet military and economic aid to North Africa
(Palmer), 808, 811
U.K. economic aid to CENTO, 670
Foreign currency:
U.S.-owned local currencies for water development,
recommendations, 761
Zlotys, agreements with Poland re use of, 766
Foreign investment in U.S. (Johnson) , 335
Foreign policy, U.S.:
Briefing conferences:
Educators, 322
Regional: Philadelphia, 565
CIA role, policy review, 666
Congressional documents relating to, lists, 18, 223,
350, 757, 801, 966
Informed public, need for (Kohler) , 406
National interests: Johnson, 546; Palmer, 810;
Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow, 398; Rusk, 250;
Sisco, 459
Nonpartisan nature (Rusk), 770
Peace, central goal of: Johnson, 551; Rusk, 271
Principles, objectives, and problems : Goldberg, 625 ;
Johnson, 158, 231, 232; Palmer, 452; E. V.
Rostow, 856; W. W. Rostow, 491; Rusk, 134,
770, 879
Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued
Responsibilities:
Congress (Rusk), 774, 775
President: Johnson, 298; Rusk, 249, 370, 725, 772,
775
Science and technology as instruments of : Pollack,
911; Rusk, 239
Trade as an instrument of: Johnson, 886; Katzen-
bach, 3 ; Solomon, 555
U.N., role in extending U.S. policy (Sisco), 458
U.S. travel restrictions, 103
Foreign Service (see also State Department) :
Ambassadors, confirmation, 261, 674, 765, 968
Inservice training: Cortada, Hope, 218
Personnel changes, policies (Lodge) , 799
Science training, need for: Pollack, 915; Rusk, 238
Scientific attaches (Pollack), 914
Foreign Service Institute (Rusk), 238
Foreign students in the U.S., Afghanistan (Maiwan-
dwal), 628
Forrestal, James V. (Johnson), 960
Forsyth, John (Rusk), 269
Foster, William C, 571
Fowler, Henry H., meeting, 53
France:
Foreign aid programs (Rusk) , 785, 830
German-French relations (Rusk), 363
Import quota controls reduced, 246
NATO, position on: 51 ; Rusk, 46
Nuclear atmospheric testing, 750
Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93
Nuclear proliferation, position on, 571
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 438, 733, 930,
968
U.N. peacekeeping assessments, position on (Gold-
berg), 101
Frankel, Charles, 322
Frankel, Max, 776
Fredericks, Wayne, 756
Freedom:
South West Africa. See South West Africa
U.N. resolution on self-determination and nonuse
of force: Nabrit, 31 ; text, 32
U.S. support: Johnson, 546, 960; Nabrit, 30; Rusk,
270
Freedom of association, U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Freedom of religion :
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590
Freedom of speech and press : Goldberg, 840 ; Katzen-
bach, 2 ; Rusk, 130
Southern Rhodesia, censorship in: 370; Palmer,
454
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Application to U.S. (Harris), 106
U.S. : Rusk, 725, 777 ; Trowbridge, 885
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590
Freeman, Orville L.: 907; Johnson, 629; Rusk, 46,
874; Solomon, 558
Frei, Eduardo, 71
988
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
:; Fulbright-Hays Act, 244
'■ Fulton, James (Goldberg), 605
Futaih, Abdul Aziz, 327
' Gabon, treaties, agreements, etc., 801, 834
Gambia, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab-
lishment, 122
Garcia Reynoso, Placido, 70
Garcia Robles, 436
Gardner, John W.: 918; Humphrey, 164; Johnson,
15,665
Gaud, William S., 200, 482, 586, 668, 670 721
General Assembly, U.N. :
Constitutional crisis, 1965: Goldberg, 636, 896;
Johnson, 566
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437
International covenants on human rights :
Civil and political rights, and optional protocol,
text. 111
Economic, social, and cultural rights, text, 107
U.S. position: Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104
Korea, Republic of, sole representative of Korean
government, 565
Nuclear proliferation treaty, support for, 571
Peacekeeping operations :
Soviet position (Sisco),461
U.S. position : Goldberg, 101, 640 ; Sisco, 461
Resolutions :
Outer space treaty, endorsement and commenda-
tion, 83
Prohibition of threat or use of force, and right
of peoples to self-determination, text, 32
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office,
14
South West Africa :
Administration of, U.S. position: Goldberg, 99,
292, 888, 892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco,
68
Administration pending independence, 893
Southern Rhodesia, resolutions on and U.S. support.
See Southern Rhodesia
21st session, evaluation: Goldberg, 98; Rusk, 42
U.S. delegation to 5th special session, 732
Geneva accords :
Background : Meeker, 55 ; W. W. Rostow, 493
Communist violations: Johnson, 160, 514; Nabrit,
30 ; Rusk, 281, 282, 743 ; SE ATO, 746
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman: 953;
Rusk, 466, 878
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen-Na-
tion Disarmament Committee
Geneva protocol on chemical and biological warfare,
577
Genocide, convention for prevention and punishment
of (1948) :
Current actions : Mongolia, 641
U.N. support, 113
Geodetic research, 86
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
Germany:
Demarcation lines between East and West Ger-
many, significance (Meeker), 60
Reunification: 657; Brzezinski, 418; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 680; Katzenbach, 753;
Kohler, 11; NATO, 49; E. V. Rostow, 24; W.
W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 362, 771
Four-power conference, question of (Rusk), 360
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Balance-of-payments position, 347, 788
Chancellor Adenauer, death of: Johnson, 751, 752;
Kiesinger, 751 ; Rusk, 752
East Germany, contacts with: 52; Katzenbach,
755; Rusk, 360
Trade: Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 521; Trow-
bridge, 882
Economic progress (McGhee), 148
France, relations (Rusk), 363
NATO nuclear weapons. See under NATO
Nuclear facilities under EURATOM safeguards,
572
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93
Nuclear proliferation treaty, position on (Rusk),
321
Political developments (Rusk), 365
Soviet Union, relations (Rusk), 363
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 306, 701,
733, 930, 968
Trilateral talks (U.S.-U.K.-Germany) concluded,
788
TV interview of Secretary Rusk, transcript, 358
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599
U.S. relations: Johnson, 751; Kiesinger, 751; Rusk,
359, 363
U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee) , 151
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, proposed (John-
son), 751
U.S. visit of Minister Willy Brandt (Rusk), 320
Visit of President Johnson: 751; Kiesinger, 751
Visit of Vice President Humphrey, 680
Gestido, Oscar D., 724
Ghana:
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 582, 613, 702
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach : 756 ; Katzen-
bach, 955
Gharrett, John T., 636
Gibbs, Sir Humphrey, 370
Gilmour, Craddock Matthew (Rusk), 248
Gingland, Richard P., 71
Goldberg, Arthur J :
Addresses, correspondence, remarks and state-
ments :
Aden, 100
Africa, developments and problems, 289
Arab-Israeli dispute, 871
U.N. role, 100, 920, 925, 927, 934, 936, 941, 943,
944, 946
Asia:
Regional development, 506
Visit to, 505, 509
989
Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued
Addresses, correspondence, etc. — Continued
Astronauts, tribute to, 80
Barbados, independence and U.N. membership,
28
Communist China, U.N. membership, question of,
100
Cyprus, U.N. force extended, 179
Food and population crisis, U.N. role, 101
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 98
Human rights, 289
U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged, 524
U.N. covenants, importance and U.S. support,
99
International law, U.N. contributions, 102, 140
Korea, U.N. support for unification, 101
Marine resources, study and development, 101
Nuclear proliferation treaty, need for, and U.S.
support, 99
Outer space law, development, 141
Outer space treaty :
Development, provisions, and importance, 78,
83,98,602,839
Signature ceremony, remarks, 267
Portuguese territories in southern Africa, 290
Self-determination, principles and U.S. support,
290
South Africa, racial discrimination, U.N. coun-
termeasures, 293
South West Africa, U.N. administration, 99, 292,
888, 892
Southern Rhodesia:
U.N. mandatory sanctions and U.S. support,
73, 99, 142
U.S. interests, 290
UNFICYP, U.S. pledge, 180
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 101, 143, 636, 838,
894
U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in
office, 15, 98
Viet-Nam :
Peace talks, prospects for and U.S. position,
137, 506, 512, 619 (quoted), 840
U Thant aid requested, 63, 98
Situation reports, 506, 510, 839
U.N. inability to act, 98, 839
U.S. objectives, 310, 505, 510, 839, 841
Asia, visit to, 505, 509, 517
Outer space treaty, work on: Rusk, 600; Sisco,
461
U.S. delegate to 5th special session of U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, 732
Work of: Johnson, 566; Rusk, 42
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 261
Gordon, Lincoln, 476, 721
Great Society (Johnson), 158, 231, 243
Greece :
Communist subversion, U.S. role against: John-
son, 546, 547; Kohler, 7, 409; Rusk, 877
Greece — Continued
Economic progress: E. V. Rostow, 862; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496
Militai-y takeover, U.S. position (Rusk), 750
NATO position and aid, 50
OECD aid, 28
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 260, 613, 733, 930
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
Greenwald, Joseph A., 70
Grissom, Virgil (Johnson), 388
Guam (Johnson), 587
Guam Conference. See Viet-Nam
Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 930
Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov, 16
Guerrero, Manuel F. L.: 596; (Johnson), 587, 594
Guinea:
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Beavogui, 554
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Guyana, treaties, agreements, etc., 305, 306, 393, 613,
701,897
Haile Selassie 1, 425
Haiti:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260
U.S. Ambassador (Ross) , confirmation, 765
Hammarskjold, Dag (Sisco) , 460
Hand, Learned (quoted) , 545
Harbison, Frederick H., 651
Hare, Raymond A., 221
Harriman, W. Averell : 586, 815 ; (Johnson) , 539
Harris, Patricia R., 104
Harsch, Joseph C, 169, 621
Hart, Parker, 656
Harvey, Mose (Katzenbach) , 3
Hasluck, Paul, 747, 749
Haynes, Ulric, 651
Healey, Denis, 687
Health:
Africa, regional programs: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650
CENTO programs: 670; Gaud, 669
Latin America: 713, 720; Johnson, 541, 543, 632,
709; E. V. Rostow, 863
Malnutrition, problem of (see also Food and popu-
lation crisis) : Gaud, 669; E. V. Rostow, 402
Philippines :
Institute of Tropical Medicine (Martin) , 196
Medical care, agreement re use of Veterans
Memorial Hospital and provision for inpatient,
outpatient care, and treatment of veterans, 802
SEATO programs, 747
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 109
U.S. financial support (Johnson) , 381
Viet-Nam : 209, 211 ; Komer, 470
Civilian hospital capacity increased, 664
Water projects, relation to, 758
990
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Health, Education, and Welfare Department:
Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey,
164; Johnson, 15
Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson) ,
16
Heath, William W., 674
Hellyer, Paul, 687
Helms, Richard M., 586, 665
Henning, John F., 261
Hernandez, Benigno C, 968
Herter, Christian: 217; Johnson, Rusk, 147
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 476
Hightower, John, 723
Hilaly, A., 747
Historical summary:
Communist aggression ( W. W. Rostow) , 492
Communist China, U.S. relations (U. A. Johnson),
420
Eastern Europe, post World War II (Harriman),
815
Southern Rhodesia, 366
U.S. foreign policy (Rusk), 270
Viet-Nam (Meeker), 54
Ho Chi Minh: 596; Rusk, 280, 321
Holdridge, John, 566
Holt, Harold E., 961
Holum, Kenneth, 765
Holy See. See Vatican City State
Holyoake, Keith, 747, 749
Honduras:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 581, 930
U.S. income tax convention terminated, 181
Hong Kong, cotton textile agreement amended, 929
Hoover, J. Edgar (Rusk), 249
Hope, A. Guy, 218
Hornig, Donald F.: 721, 850, 907; Humphrey, 684;
McGhee, 150; Rusk, 238
Hoyt, Henry A., 721
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 566
Hughes, Charles Evans, 840
Hull,Cordell (Rusk), 270
Human rights (see also Civil rights, and Racial dis-
crimination) :
Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 955; Palmer,
646
International covenants (U.N.) on human rights:
Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104; texts, 107, 111
International Year of Human Rights (Goldberg),
528
U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged (Gold-
berg), 524
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 116
U.N. position and role (Sisco), 66
U.S.: Braderman, 664; Harris, 106; Johnson, 14
U.S. support (Rusk), 772
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.,
18th anniversary (Harris), 104
Humphrey, Hubert :
Addresses, remarks and statements:
East-West relations and U.S. efforts to improve,
488, 682
Economic and social development, world prob-
lems, 684
Education, importance, 164
Europe, U.S. relations and aims, 486, 679
Germany, reunification, 680
NATO, 682
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, 683
Science and technology, 164, 238 (quoted), 684
U.N.,489
U.S.-Soviet relations, 488
Meetings, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, Bonn, 599
Visit to Europe: Humphrey, 679, 680, 681, 683;
Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727
Hungary, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481,
930
Huntley, Chet (Wheeler) , 190
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
ICC. See International Control Commission
Iceland :
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 160, 393, 481, 613,
702, 766, 930, 967
U.S. Ambassador (Rolvaag), confirmation, 674
ICY (International Cooperation Year): 568; John-
son, 658
IDA. See International Development Association
IJC (International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada),
634
IMCO. See Maritime Consultative Organization, In-
tergovernmental
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariffs and
trade, general agreements on; and Trade) :
Balance of payments, effect on (E. V. Rostow), 20
Foreign import restrictions removed: 245;
Blumenthal, 433
Import restrictions on goods from Mexico, proposed
liberalization, 70
International Coffee Agreement quantitative im-
port limitations, 256
Private road vehicles, temporary importation of,
customs convention (1954) : Australia, 673
Professional equipment, temporary importation of,
customs convention (1961) : U.S., 481
Sheet glass, modification of escape-clause duty
rates, 216
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77,
373 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
U.S., capital goods, 342
Viet-Nam, AID commercial imports: 202; Gaud,
200
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation, 217
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1957
271-701 — 67 3
991
Income, conventions for the relief of double taxation.
iSee Double taxation
India:
Agriculture, development and problems: Johnson,
298, 334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk,
830
Communism, threat to (Sisco),462
Council for Cultural Relations, 667
Experimental rain-making projects (Johnson), 903
Financing, problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 404
Food crisis:
Multilateral aid: Johnson, 295; Rusk, 46, 48
U.S. proposals: 701; Johnson, 299, 658; E. V.
Rostow, 403, 861
U.S. aid: Johnson, 295, 298, 300, 383, 700; Rusk,
46, 48
Congressional resolution, text, 700
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 182, 224, 353, 481,
530, 701, 702, 733, 930
U.S. aid:
AID programs: Johnson, 159; E. V. Rostow, 863;
Rusk, 830
Military aid terminated, 688
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234, 300; Rusk, 830
U.S. fact-finding committee, results of tour (John-
son), 299
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk,
830
India-Pakistan border dispute, U.N. role: Goldberg,
838 ; Johnson, 567 ; Rusk, 785 ; Sisco, 66
Soviet position (Sisco), 462
Indonesia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Communism, rejection of: Bundy, 325, 791, 792;
Holt, 962; Martin, 196; W. W. Rostow, 493
Economic progress: 750; Johnson, 384; Rusk, 832
Malaysia, relations with: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk,
744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 481, 613,
701,766,929
U.N. membership, participation renewed (Gold-
berg) , 100
Indus River basin (Johnson) , 903
Industrial property, convention (1883, as revised) for
the protection of : Argentina, 353 ; Dahomey, 85,
154; Ireland, 897; Morocco, 765
Soviet accession, importance (Trowbridge) , 885
Information activities and programs :
Adverse drug reaction reporting center, WHO, 918
Amerika (Katzenbach),755
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 232,
236
CIA-assisted programs, 666
Computer technology (Pollack) , 911
Newsmen, exception from U.S. travel restrictions,
103,953
Outer space treaty provisions for public reporting:
Goldberg, 81, 606; Johnson, 388
Infoi-mation activities and programs — Continued
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed,
480, 482
Scientific information: 332; Humphrey, 166
Trade and industrial exhibitions overseas : Johnson,
886; Trowbridge, 884
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519
Water resources information, recommendations for
coordination and expanded programs : 763, 907 ;
Rusk, 905
Institute of International Education (Humphrey),
164
Inter-Agency Council on International Education and
Cultural Affairs, 667
Inter-American Development Bank: 715; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496; Rusk, 829
Fund for Special Operations, appropriations and
authorization request, FY 1968: 887; Johnson,
231,235, 544; Rusk, 723
U.S. alternate governor (Gaud), confirmation, 482
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 334, 382, 540, 709
Interest Equalization Tax, 342
Rate adjustment : 344 ; Johnson, 335
International Bank for Economic Cooperation, 699
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment : Bundy, 325, 793 ; E. V. Rostow, 858 ; W. W.
Rostow, 496
African development, role: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650, 813
Articles of agreement, current actions: Indonesia,
701
East European countries membership, question of:
699; Harriman, 820
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
U.S. Alternate Governor (E. V. Rostow), con-
firmation, 261
U.S. support: Johnson, 383; E. V. Rostow, 403;
Rusk, 772
International Cereals Arrangement: Blumenthal,
297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861; Roth, 880
International Chamber of Commerce, 696
International Conference on Water for Peace: 762,
765; Solomon, 562
International Control Commission: 750; Goldberg,
507; Johnson, 515; Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127, 620,
773,778; U Thant, 625
Laos, inability to function in (Rusk) , 169, 281, 743,
777
International cooperation :
Antarctic Treaty, 71
Desalination development (Solomon), 561
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 885
International Cooperation Year (Johnson), 568,
658
Marine resources, U.N. resolution on study and
development of (Goldberg), 101
Mekong River development: Bundy, 326; John-
son, 903
Nuclear energy development (Seaborg), 97
992
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
International cooperation — Continued
Outer space treaty provisions, prospects and im-
portance: Dean, 268; Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg,
81, 83, 603; Johnson, 387; Rusk, 267; U Thant,
268
Scientific information: Humphrey, 166; Pollack,
911
Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes,
728
U.N. Charter principles: Johnson, 330; Rusk, 875
U.N. covenants, support, 109
U.S. support: Johnson, 13, 231; Pollack, 912; E. V.
Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 267
Water for Peace: 758, 762, 907; Johnson, 902;
Rusk, 905
White House Conference on International Coopera-
tion, recommendations, report of action taken
(Johnson), 658
World community of developed nations (Brzezin-
ski),414
World food supply, obligations to contribute to
(Johnson), 296, 300
International Cotton Advisory Committee (Solomon),
560
International Court of Justice :
South West Africa decision: Goldberg, 144; Pal-
mer, 647
Statute, current actions: Barbados, 36; Malta,
Malawi, 967
International Development Association: 338; Harri-
man, 820; Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 27; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Authorization request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 231,
235
International Education Act of 1966: Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15
International Hydrological Decade, 760, 764
International Institute for Cotton (Solomon), 560
International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, Niag-
ara Falls study requested, 634
International law :
Commission on International Trade Law, U.N.
(Goldberg), 102
Common law of nations (Meeker), 59
International agreements, relation to: Goldberg,
141 ; Meeker, 58
International due process (Rusk), 249
Outer space law, development of: 577; Goldberg,
79, 142, 602; Rusk, 601
Outer space treaty, importance to: Dobrynin, 269;
Goldberg, 79, 99, 141; U Thant, 268
SOLAS 1960 Convention amendments, nature of
(Miller), 176
Treaties, law of, proposed international drafting
conference, U.N. (Goldberg), 102
U.N., advancement of: Goldberg, 140, 896; Rusk,
601
U.N. covenants on human rights, international law
aspects (Harris), 104
U.N. resolutions, legal status (Nabrit), 31
International law — Continued
U.N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, legal
status: 369, 374; Goldberg, 143
Water resources, legal aspects, 764
International monetary system:
Balance of payments. See Balance of payments
Reforms needed: 340, 348; Humphrey, 863; John-
son, 335, 757 ; E. V. Rostow, 19, 23 ; W. W. Ros-
tow, 497
International organizations (see also name of orga-
nization) :
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson).
233
Development and U.S. support: Humphrey, 489;
Johnson, 906; Pollack, 913; W. W. Rostow, 491
Universal copyright convention, protocol 2 re works
of, current actions ; Netherlands, 833
International rivers, development: (see also Mekong
River basin) : 762; Johnson, 903; Katzenbach,
958
International Telecommunications Union (Sisco) , 462
International Tourist Year, 695
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435
International Year for Human Rights (Goldberg),
528
Investment disputes, convention (1965) on the settle-
ment of, between states and nationals of other
states: Burundi, 481; Cameroon, Kenya, 182;
Korea, 481; Morocco, 897; Senegal, 765; Sudan,
613; Sweden, 154; Trinidad and Tobago, 182;
U.K., 122; Yugoslavia, 641
Investment Guaranty Program, agreements with:
Cameroon, 530; Ghana, 582; Indonesia, 438;
Lesotho, 582, 614; Malta, 393; Paraguay, 86
Investment of foreign capital in U.S., 343
Investment of private capital abroad: 337, 346;
Braderman, 664
Africa (Johnson), 383
Agricultural industries, U.S. support for increased
investment: Johnson, 295, 300; E. V. Rostow,
404, 856
AID Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381;
E. V. Rostow, 860
Balance of payments, effect on, 342, 444
Brazil, investment tax credit, 581
Europe, U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee), 151
Korea, 69, 553, 554
Latin America ( Linowitz) , 730, 824
Philippines (Braderman), 662
Rights and responsibilities of overseas investors,
proposed international agreement (E. V.
Rostow), 862
U.S. encouragement: Johnson, 231, 379; E. V.
Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 828
Iran:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 909
Economic progress: 670; Gaud, 669; W. W. Rostow,
496
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 438, 701
U.S. military assistance (Johnson) , 384
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
993
Iraq:
Treaties, a^eements, etc., 154, 481
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481, 897,
929, 967
Israel :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Cotton textile agreement concluded, announcement
and text, 389
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858,
862 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
Syrian border dispute, U.N. role and U.S. support:
Goldberg, 100; Sisco, 66
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 613, 642, 702,
766, 929, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Italy:
Air transport agreement terminated, 965
Balance of payments position, 347
Fiat automotive plant in Soviet Union : Harriman,
819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 522; Trow-
bridge, 883
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 481, 646,
968
Ivanov, Igor, 25
Ivory Coast:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 642, 674, 967
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Jackson, Andrew (Johnson), 534
Jackson, Henry M., 514
Jacoby, Neil H. (Rusk) , 832
Jakobson, Max (Goldberg), 888, 895
Jamaica, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 929
James, William, 63 (quoted)
Japan:
Asian affairs, role: Bundy, 326; Martin, 196
Balance-of -payments position, 347
Eastern Europe, relations and trade (Solomon),
519, 521
Economic progress: 336; Bundy, 324, 791, 793;
McGhee, 150
Foreign aid programs: Johnson, 334; Rusk, 785
Governors, U.S. visit (Johnson) , 917
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Korea, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552
Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93
Political progress (E. V. Rostow) , 399
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 613, 642,
898, 968
U.S.-Japan fishery talks, 178, 424
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509
Jefferson, Thomas: 451; quoted, 160
Johnson, Lyndon B.:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Africa, U.S. aid, 159, 379, 383
Aggression, U.S. record in meeting, 161, 830, 546,
654, 871, 960
Alliance for Progress, 12, 158, 231, 382, 540, 632
Summit meeting, statements, 706, 707, 708, 711
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
American ideals, 163, 301, 385, 654, 960
Amistad Dam, 12
Antiballistic missiles, 160, 569, 659
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 870, 935, 952
Asia, regional cooperation and U.S. support, 162,
380, 382, 469, 549, 960
Astronauts Grissom, Chaffee, and White, deaths
of, 388
Balance of payments, U.S., 233, 334, 381, 886
CIA-private U.S. voluntary organizations, rela-
tionships, report on policy review, 665
Consular convention with Soviet Union, 287, 545,
659
East- West relations, U.S. efforts to improve, 159,
334, 659, 680, 696
Europe, visit of Vice President Humphrey, 678
EXPO 67, 907
Food-population crisis, 160, 295, 902
Foreign aid programs:
1968 budget, 230, 378, 543
Principles, 296, 334, 381, 659, 958 (quoted)
Germany, Federal Republic of. Chancellor Ade-
nauer, regrets at death, 751, 752
Germany, reunification, 680 (quoted)
Guam, 587
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death
of, 147
India, food crisis, U.S. and multilateral aid, 295,
383, 658, 700
International Cooperation Year, report of action
taken on recommendations of White House
Conference, 658
International monetary system, 335
Japan, U.S. relations, 917
Kennedy Round, 333, 756
Negotiations concluded, 879
Korea, U.S. relations, 548
Lincoln's birthday, 452 (quoted)
National Christmas Tree, lighting ceremony, 14
NATO, 159
Near and Middle East {see also Arab-Israeli
conflict),159, 382, 384
Nuclear "blackmail," 572 (quoted)
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, need for and
U.S. support, 447, 569, 659
Outer space treaty, 386, 569, 659
Signature ceremony, 266
President Frei of Chile, U.S. visit, 71
Rio Grande salinity agreement, 428
Soviet Union, nuclear arms race, proposal talks,
445
State of the Union (excerpts) , 158
Trade, 333, 757, 886
Trust Territory of the Pacific, 599 (quoted), 865
Turkey, 383, 547, 652, 653
United Kingdom, U.S. relations, 963
United Nations, 330, 566, 629
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in
office, 14
994
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony,
959
Viet-Nam (for details, sec Viet-Nam) :
Appropriations requests, 233, 236
Economic and political progress, 537
Guam conference, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594
Peace negotiations, 537, 538
Political and economic progress, 589, 590
Tet cease-fire termination, 365
U.S. commitments, 160, 534, 961
U.S. military policy and objectives, 535, 593,
594
Visits of Lilienthal and Komer, 467
War on Hunger, 295, 379, 658
Water for Peace, 902
World peace, U.S. role, 550
World Weather Watch, 658
Appointments:
Educational TV task force, 15
International Conference on Education, hosts, 15
Asian tour, results (Martin) , 197
Correspondence and messages :
East-West trade recommendations of Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, 696
Education, International Conference on, 15
Educational TV, appointment of task force, 15
Memorial Day messages exchanged with General
Thieu, 917
Truman Doctrine, 20th anniversary, 546, 547
Viet-Nam:
Negotiation, proposed for, 595
Tet cease-fire, proposed extension of, 319
Guam Conference: 586; Johnson, 587, 588, 589, 590,
592, 594
Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, re-
marks and joint communiques: Afghanistan,
627; Australia, 960; Brazil, 242; Canada, 908;
China, 846; Ethiopia, 425; Korea, 548; Mexico,
12; Morocco, 328; Turkey, 652; U.K., 963
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 952
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 6th an-
nual report, transmittal, 568
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st an-
nual report, transmittal, 732
Budget, FY 1968, excerpts, 230
Economic Report of the President (excerpts),
333
Foreign aid, program, 1967, 878
International Coffee Agi-eement, 2nd annual re-
port, transmittal, 250
Latin American meeting of Chiefs of State, 540
Narcotic drugs, U.S. accession to single conven-
tion, 1961, recommended, 671
Outer space treaty ratification recommended,
386
Peace Corps, 5th annual report, 529
State of the Union (excerpts) , 158
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Messages, etc. — Continued
U.S. pai-ticipation in the U.N., 20th annual re-
port, transmittal, 566
Viet-Nam:
Supplemental appropriations request, FY
1967, 236
U.S. position on bombing of North Viet-Nam,
514
War on Hunger program, 295
Outer space treaty, work on (Goldberg), 605
Policies: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 903; Katzen-
bach, 955; W. W. Rostow, 504
Press briefing, transcript of, 467
Responsibilities: Johnson, 160, 298; Rusk, 249, 270,
772
Tribute to: Rusk, 131, 270; Silva e Costa, 243
Visit to Canada: Johnson, 907, 908; Pearson, 909
Visit to Europe, question of (Rusk), 727
Visit to Korea, 1966; Chung, 551; Johnson, 550
Visit to Latin America: 678, 721; Humphrey, 680;
Johnson, 706
Visit to North Viet-Nam, question of (Rusk), 283
Johnson, Paul, 274
Johnson, U. Alexis, 420
Jordan :
Israeli military action, U.N. peacekeeping role
(Goldberg), 100
Treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 766
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Judicial or extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters, service abroad, convention
(1965): France, 353; U.S., 732
Kalb, Marvin, 127
Kashmir. See India-Pakistan border dispute
Katzenbach, Nicholas de B.: Johnson, 665; Rusk, 247
Addresses and reports, 2, 671, 753, 954
Meetings, 552, 599
Visit to Africa: 756; Katzenbach, 954
Kaunda, Kenneth (quoted), 955
Kennedy. John F. (quoted), 281-282, 316, 838, 891
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony
(Johnson), 959
Kennedy, Robert F.: Goldberg, 508; Rusk, 322, 516
Kenya :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Political development (Palmer), 456
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 182, 733, 834
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Kenyatta, Jomo, 456
Kenyon, Karl W., 71, 632
Keppel, Francis, 651
Khalatbary, Abbas Ali, 668, 670
Kiesinger, Kurt: 362, 751 ; Humphrey, 680
Kim, Sung Eun, 552
King, David S., 261
King, Martin Luther, 726
King Hassan II, 328, 330
Kohler, Foy D., 6, 247, 406
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
995
Komer, Robert W. : 469, 586, 591 ; Bunker, 845 ; John-
son, 538, 587, 593
Korea, unification and U.N. role (Goldberg), 101
Korea, North, U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565
Korea, Republic of:
AID programs (E. V. Rostow) , 863
Asia, role in: 553; Chung, 552; Johnson, 548
Communist attacks, U.S. and ROK casualties, 553
Economic progress: 69, 337, 552; Bundy, 324, 791,
792; Chung, 551; Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 384,
548, 550; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862; W. W.
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832
Japan, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552
Political development: Bundy, 325; Johnson, 548
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 438, 481, 582, 702,
733, 766, 898, 930, 968
U.N. recognition as sole lawful government of
Korean people, 565
U.S. Ambassador (Porter), confirmation, 968
U.S. investment and trade mission: 69, 554; Chung,
553
U.S. military assistance: 553; Johnson, 384
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Chung, 548
Viet-Nam, military and other aid to: 552; Bundy,
324, 792 ; Chung, 552 ; Johnson, 549, 961 ; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509
Visit of President Johnson (1966): Chung, 551;
Johnson, 550
Korean conflict: Johnson, 161, 547; U. A. Johnson,
421 ; Kohler, 7, 409; Popper, 690; W. W. Rostow,
492; Rusk, 621, 877; Sisco, 66; Truman, 548
(quoted)
Korean Service Corps agreement, 582
Kosygin, Aleksei N. : 444; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 466,
783
Kristensen, Thorkil (E. V. Rostow) , 20
Kuwait, U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Ky, Nguyen Cao; 586; Goldberg, 513
Labor:
Convention on the abolition of forced labor, 1957:
Soviet position (Goldberg), 527
U.S. ratification recommended (Goldberg), 524
Europe, large-scale movement of labor, 337
OECD manpower studies (Rostow), 21
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 108, 115
Labor Organization, International (Goldberg), 527
Constitution, 1946, instrument for the amendment
of, Barbados, 865
Lachs, Manfred (Goldberg), 78
Land-locked states, convention (1965) on transit
trade of: Chad, 733
Lansdale, Edward, 844
Laos:
Communism, threat of (Rusk), 169, 832, 877
Communist use in infiltration of Viet-Nam:
Meeker, 59; Rusk, 281, 282, 743, 777; SEATO,
746
Laos — Continued
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326
Neutrality: 285; Rusk, 281, 282
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. aid program: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
Laos agreement, 1962 (see also Geneva accords),
Communist violations: Johnson, 514, W. W. Ros-
tow, 503; Rusk, 126, 128, 281, 282, 283, 742, 777;
SEATO, 746
Last Revolution (Economist), 495
Latin America:
AID high-protein food studies (E. V. Rostow),
863
Communism:
Rejection and countermeasures : 564; Johnson,
541; Martin, 195
Threat of: 103; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 828
Economic integration: 712; Bunker, 472, Johnson,
542, 708; Linowitz, 822; W. W. Rostow, 498;
Rusk, 723, 829
Alliance for Progress action program, text, 714
Industrial development. See Alliance for Progress
International Coffee Agreement, importance, 252
Leadership (Johnson), 541, 633
Nuclear arms, treaty on the banning of, 436, 576,
713,721
Nuclear-free zone: 575; Rusk, 361
Population control, prospects (Rusk), 724
Self help and internal cooperation (Rusk), 723,
724
States included in, 713n
Ti-ade (see also Latin American Common Market) :
713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 542, 707, 709;
W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
717
U.S. cotton policies, effects of (Solomon), 559
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
U.S. preschool and school lunch programs (John-
son), 709
USIA activities increase (Johnson), 236
Visit of President Johnson : Humphrey, 680 ; John-
son, 678
Latin American Common Market: 712, 714; John-
son, 543, 544, 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725
Latin American Free Trade Association: 338, 712,
714; Blumenthal, 434; Linowitz, 730; Rusk, 725
Laurel-Langley agreement (Braderman), 663
League to Enforce Peace (Rusk) , 270
Lebanon :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 438, 613, 929, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Leddy,JohnM., 17, 599
Lee, Hu Rak, 552
Lee Kuan Yew (Bundy), 324
Lesotho :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 582, 614, 967
996
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Less developed countries (see also Newly independ-
ent nations) :
Agriculture. See Agriculture
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex-
cerpts), 336, 337
Debt problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404
Economic and social development:
Communism, as a countermeasure to: Linovi^itz,
731 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk, 826
Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296,
300, 334, 380, 709; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow,
400, 861; Rusk, 241,826
OECD programs: Humphrey, 684; E. V. Ros-
tow, 25
Education. See Education
Educational TV: Johnson, 15; E. V. Rostow, 405
Food and population crisis. See Food and popula-
tion crisis
Foreign investment capital. See Investment of
private capital abroad
International covenants on human rights (U.N.),
obligations under: 107; Harris, 105
International law, importance to (Goldberg), 145
Latin America (see also Alliance for Progress),
Rusk, 722
Nuclear power, peaceful uses, 572
Soviet and East European aid, need for coopera-
tion with West (Harriman) , 820
State Department Policy Planning Council, ad-
visory panel, 16
Trade :
Kennedy Round, importance to: 28, 70, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; Johnson, 333, 707; E. V.
Rostow, 27, 404 ; Roth, 478, 880
Temporary preferential tariff advantages, pro-
posed: 712; Johnson, 709
U.N. membership, importance (Sisco), 459
U.N. role (Johnson), 567
U.S. aid, objectives and principles: 700; Johnson,
230, 232, 235, 296, 334, 378, 381; E. V. Rostow,
400,857; Rusk, 826
Water projects, importance, 758
Lewin, Nathan, 765
Liberia, AID programs (Rusk) , 831
Libya:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests
(Palmer), 806
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Lilienthal, David E.: 69, 467, 586, 592, 907; Johnson,
467, 537
Lincoln, Abraham: Goldberg, 510, 512, 528, 844;
Johnson, 873 ; quoted, 630
Linowitz, Sol M., 476, 565, 721, 729, 822
Load line, convention, international (1966) : France,
353; Malagasy Republic, 393; Peru, 353; Somali,
732 ; South Africa, 353
Locke, Eugene M.: 586; Bunker, 844; Johnson, 538,
587,589,591,593
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 586, 795; Hightower, 726; John-
son, 161, 538, 587, 588, 589, 594, 674; Rusk, 779;
Taylor 286 ;Thieu, 591
Loeb, James, 651
Lopez Munguia, Agustin, 71
Lord Acton (quoted), 879
Luther, Martin (quoted) , 266
Luxembourg, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 306, 614,
898, 930
MacArthur, Douglas, 674
Macomber, William B., Jr., 482
Maghreb (North Africa) , Palmer, 806
Magnuson, Warren G. (Johnson) , 886
Mailliard, William S., 476
Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim, 627, 630
Makonnen, Lij Endalkatchew, 638
Malagasy Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 530, 613, 898
U.S. Ambassador (King), confirmation, 261
Malawi :
Independence, 367
International Court of Justice, Statute, 967
Malaysia (see also Association of Southeast Asia) :
Asian countries, relations (Martin), 196
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
325, 791; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Indonesia, relations: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk, 744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 898
Maldive Islands:
International telecommunications convention
(1965), viath annexes, 582
U.S. Ambassador (Corry), confirmation, 968
Mali, delivery of two C-47 aircraft and related
articles and services, understanding re, 702
Malikyar, Abdullah, 626
Malta:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 393, 833, 866, 967
Manila Conference: 517, 748; Bundy, 326, 794;
Chung, 552; Goldberg, 311; Holt, 962; Johnson,
960; Thieu, 588
Mann, Horace (quoted), 955
Manpower Utilization and Techniques (Cortada,
Hope), 219
Mansfield, Mike, 951
Marcos, Ferdinand E.: Braderman, 661; Bundy, 324,
325,793
Margain, Hugo B., 919
Marine resources. See Food resources
Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovern-
mental :
Convention (1964), amendments to: Argentina,
85; Brazil, 929; Bulgaria, 85; Burma, 224;
Czechoslovakia, 85; Finland, Indonesia, Israel,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Philippines, 929; Sene-
gal, 85; Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago,
929; U.S., 865
Entry into force, 305
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
997
Maritime Consultative Organization — Continued
Fire safety standards for passenger ships, improve-
ment of international standards: 102; John-
son, 429 ; Miller, 173
Maritime matters {see also Ships and shipping), ex-
ploration of the sea. Convention (1964) for the
International Council of: Netherlands, 733; U.S.,
481, 834
Maritime traffic. See Ships and shipping
Marks, Leonard H., 16, 721
Marriage and family (see also Women), U.N. Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights, provisions,
108, 115
Marshall, George C. (quoted), 271
Martin, Edward, 476
Martin, Graham, 193, 851
Martin, Paul, 750
Martin, William C. (quoted) , 273
Martola, Ilmari (Goldberg), 179
Matthews, Zachariah K., 16
Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 353, 701, 929
McBride, Robert H., 968
McCloskey, Robert J., 950
McConaughy, Walter P., 849
McDermott, Walsh (quoted) , 910
McDougal, Myres: Goldberg, 140; quoted, 144
McGee, GaleW. (Johnson), 299
McGhee, George C, 148
McGovern, George, 48
McKernan, Donald L., 178, 216, 332, 424, 919
McNamara, Robert S. : 586, 686 ; Rusk, 129
Meetings, 53, 687
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
membership (Johnson), 951
Press conference, transcript, 465, 686
TV interview, transcript of, 442
McNaughton, John T., 586
McSweeney, John M., 674
Meeker, Leonard C, 54
Mekong River development: Bundy, 326, 793; John-
son, .334, 903; Lilienthal, 469; Martin, 196, 853;
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 832
Memorial Day, 1967: Johnson, 917; Thieu, 917
Prayer for Peace, proclamation, 873
Menzel, Rolf, 358
Meteorological research :
Rain augmentation experiments: Johnson, 903;
Pollack, 911
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Cooperative meteorological program in the
Cayman Islands, agreement with U.K., 86
Cooperative program for meteorological observa-
tions, agreement with Dominican Republic for
continuation of, 86
Water for Peace programs (Johnson), 903
Mexico :
Aid to other Latin American countries (Rusk), 723
Cotton textile agreement, announcement, 964
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858;
Rusk, 723, 829
Mexico — Continued
Fishery talks held, joint statement and delegations,
919
Joint Mexico-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual
meeting, 70
Radio broadcasting agi'eement talks resumed, 352
Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson), 428 -^
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 182, 224, 260,
261, 354, 481, 834, 930
U.S. relations; 13; Johnson, 13
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the Pacific
Micronesia, Congress of (Johnson), 598
Middleton, Drew, 851
Military assistance:
Appropriations request, FY 1967 (Johnson), 384
Appropriations request, FY 1968 (Rusk), 827
Balance of payments, effect on. See Balance of pay-
ments, U.S.
Civic action program, Indonesia, agreement re
furnishing military equipment, materials, and
services, 766
Equipment and material, agreement with Brazil re
disposition of, 393
India and Pakistan, U.S. military aid terminated,
688
Soviet aid to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811
Thailand, U.S. training missions (Martin) , 199, 853
Military bases:
Outer space treaty prohibition on: Goldberg, 80,
609; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602
Philippines, agreement re relinquishment by U.S.
of right to use of certain land areas within
Camp John Hay, 122
Thailand bases, U.S. use under SEATO framework:
Martin, 198; Rusk, 597
Viet-Nam, permanent U.S. bases, U.S. position:
284; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509; Johnson, 535;
Rusk, 282, 317
Miller, George (Goldberg), 605
Miller, J. Irwin: Katzenbach, 3; Trowbridge, 882
Miller, Jack (Johnson), 299
Miller, William K., 173
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce trade mission
(Trowbridge), 882
Mishari, Hassan (Udall), 561
Missiles (see also Nuclear weapons) :
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition: 575,
687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445, 569,
659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow, 501;
Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875
NATO: 687; McNamara, 686
Poseidon and Polaris (Rusk) , 46
Mobutu, Joseph (Palmer), 649
Mohale, Albert S., 16
Monetary Fund, International: 340; Brzezinski, 419;
Harriman, 820; Johnson, 335; E. V. Rostow, 858;
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772
Articles of agreements: Indonesia, 701
East European countries' membership, question of,
699
998
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Monetary Fund, International — Continued
U.S. Alternate Governor (Rostow), contirmation,
261
U.S. holdings (Johnson), 235
Blongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., 641, 674
Moore, John Bassett, (Rusk) , 270
Morocco:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Cultural agreement with U.S., text, 351
Development, pi-oblems, and U.S. interests : Palmer,
806; Rusk, 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 701, 765, 834,
897, 967
U.S. relations: Johnson, 330; King Hassan II, 329,
331
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
U.S. visit of King Hassan II, 328
Morozov, Platon, 461
Morse, Wayne, 507
Morton, Thruston B., 775
Moss, Frank E. (Johnston) , 299
Mossman, James, 442
Mott, Newcomb : Kohler, 412 ; Rusk, 248
Mozambique :
Halting of oil tankers to Southern Rhodesia, 371
Self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290
Muromcew, Cyril, 71, 634
Murphy, Charles P. (Miller), 174
MUST (Manpower Utilization System and Tech-
niques), Cortada, Hope, 219
Mutual defense :
Agreements with: Australia, reestablishment of
joint defense space research facility, 86; Bel-
gium, 582; Luxembourg, 614
China : 849 ; Johnson, 848
Korea, 553
U.S. military assistance programs (Johnson),
385
Nabrit, James M., Jr., 29, 30
NAC. See North Atlantic Council
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326
Narcotic drugs. See Drugs
NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration
Nasher, Raymond D., 659
National Advisory Committee on Self-Help (John-
son), 379, 380
National Advisory Council on International Monetary
and Financial Policies, 563
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Mc-
Ghee),149,153
National Export Expansion Council, 887
National Governors' Conference (Johnson), 918
National Science Foundation: 728; Pollack, 916
National Student Association, 666
Nationalism :
Eastern Europe: Brzezinski, 417; Harriman, 817;
Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2 ; Kohler, 8, 408;
W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon, 519
Nationalism — Continued
Indonesia (Bundy), 792
Less developed countries (W. W. Rostow), 494
North African states (Palmer), 809
Philippines (Braderman), 660
Western Europe, dangers of (Humphrey), 487
Nationality:
Acquisition of, optional protocol to Vienna con-
vention on consular relations (1963) : Mada-
gascar, 613
Double, military obligations in certain cases, pro-
tocol (1930): Nigeria, 733
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Natural resources, sovereignty of state (Harris) , 105
Near and Middle East (see also Arab-Israeli conflict
and names of individual countries) :
Economic and social development, U.S. support
(Goldberg), 935
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 101, 638, 894;
Sisco, 66
U.S. military and economic aid, U.S. appropriations
request (Johnson), 382, 384
U.S. policy: Goldberg, 100; Johnson, 159, 870
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Nepal, treaties, agreements, etc., 306
Netherlands, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 354,
393, 582, 613, 641, 733, 766, 833, 930, 968
Neuberger, Maurine B., 448
Neutrality and nonalinement:
Afghanistan: 632; Maiwandwal, 628, 631
Cambodia: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619, 773
Southeast Asia (Rusk), 281
U.S. neutrality in Arab-Israeli conflict (Rusk) , 949,
950, 951
Viet-Nam, U.S. position: 285; Goldberg, 61
(quoted) , 509, 841 ; Rusk, 281, 773
New York Times: 466, 776, 851 ; Bundy, 793
New Zealand:
ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749
Asian development, role in (Bundy), 793
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 260, 353, 733,
765, 898, 967, 968
U.S. Ambassador (Henning), confirmation, 261
Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; John-
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland,
740
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed
countries aiid najne of country) :
Africa : Goldberg, 289, Katzenbach, 955
Barbados (Goldberg), 28
Communism, danger of: E. V. Rostow, 857; W. W.
Rostow, 494
North Africa (Palmer), 807
U.N. membership, significance (Sisco) , 67
Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260
Nicolson, Sir Harold (quoted) , 140
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 801, 930
Nigeria :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Political developments (Palmer), 649
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
999
Nigeria — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 481, 613, 733,
801
Niven, Paul, 774
Nkomo, Joshua, 371
Nolte, Richard H., 674
Nonnationals, U.N. international covenants on
human rights: 114; Harris, 105
North Atlantic Council (Humphrey) , 681
Defense ministers meeting, Paris, 1966:
Joint communique and annexes: 49; Rusk, 46
U.S. delegation, 53
North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Armed forces:
Financing of, effect on balance-of-payments posi-
tions: 788; Rusk, 362, 783
1967 commitments and prospects, 51
Size and deployment: 789; Rusk, 362, 782
Civil emergency planning, 50
Deterrent role: 49, 51, 657; Brzezinski, 416; Harri-
man, 820; Humphrey, 682; Rusk, 361; Sunay,
656
East- West relations, role in: 49, 697; Harriman,
819; Humphrey, 487, 681; Rusk, 47, 360;
Sunay, 655
France, position of: 51; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 46
Headquarters, relocation, 51
International developments, study of effects of
changes in, on NATO policies; 50; resolution,
52
Modernization of: Humphrey, 681; E. V. Rostow,
399
Nuclear planning and consultation: 51, 687; Mc-
Namara, 686
Nuclear Planning Group, 1st ministerial meeting:
687; McNamara, 686
Nuclear weapons, Soviet objections to possible Ger-
man use of, 571
Turkey, support of: 627; Johnson, 547, 652; Sun-
ay, 653
U.S. support: Humphrey, 681; Johnson, 159; Rusk,
358, 364, 827
Norway:
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 306, 481, 530, 613,
802, 930
Norwood, William (Johnson), 598
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree-
ments re U.S. liability: Greece, 225
Nsanze, Terence, 850
Nuclear-free zones :
Central Europe, question of: 575; Rusk, 361
Latin America: 436, 575, 713, 721; Rusk, 361
Nuclear proliferation:
Treaty, proposed:
Chinese Communist participation, question of
(Rusk), 132
ENDC 1966 conference results, 570
Nuclear proliferation — Continued
Treaty, proposed — Continued
Need for and U.S. support: 436, 657; Goldberg,
79, 83, 99, 603; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 447,
569, 659; Katzenbach, 755; E. V. Rostow, 399;
W. W. Rostow, 501, 504; Rusk, 48, 132, 169,
601, 786, 875; U Thant, 268
Nonnuclear states, effect on and rights under: "*
572; Johnson, 447; McNamara, 446; E. V.
Rostow, 400
Peaceful uses, question of: Pollack, 911; Rusk,
321
Safeguards, 571
EUR ATOM safeguards, question on (Rusk),
360
Soviet position, review, 571
Nuclear test ban, comprehensive, verification meas-
ures and Soviet rejection, 574
Nuclear test ban treaty, 1963:
Current actions : Nigeria, 481
Importance : Goldberg, 603 ; Rusk, 267
Nuclear tests:
Antarctic Treaty, ban on, 71
Communist China : 750; Rusk, 132
France, 750
Outer space treaty, prohibition of: Goldberg, 80,
609; Rusk, 602
Nuclear war (see also War) , dangers of: McNamara,
443; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 272, 874; Sisco,
463
Nuclear weapons (see also Armaments and Missiles) :
Latin America, treaty on the banning of nuclear
arms in, 436, 576, 713, 721
Outer space treaty, prohibition on use of: 577;
Goldberg, 80, 99, 141, 608, 839; Johnson, 266,
387, 569; Rusk, 601
Production of, U.S. proposals for freezes and lim-
itations on: 574; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 43, 171,
321
Nyasaland, Federation of Rhodesia and, 367
Nyerere, Julius K. (quoted), 958
OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine et
Malagache), 650
Oceanographic Commission, Intergovernmental
(Sisco), 462
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-
operation), 683
Office of Civil Operations : Bunker, 845 ; Komer, 470
Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 8G3
Office of Saline Water (Udall),561
Office of the War on Hunger: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 863
Oil (see also Petroleum), pollution of sea by, inter-
national convention (1954) for prevention of:
Israel, 353; Ivory Coast, 642; U.S., 733
Amendments: Greece, 733
Oliver, Covey T., 968
1000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache
(Palmer), 650
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment :
Accomplishments, role, and U.S. support: 336;
Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 166, 683; E. V.
Rostow, 19; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 359
Agricultural Food Fund, U.S. proposal: Johnson,
297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861
Balance-of-payments report, 345
Development Assistance Committee: 764; Hum-
phrey, 685; E. V. Rostow, 25
Export earnings of less developed countries, special
study (Blumenthal) , 435
India, food aid, question of: 701 ; Rusk, 48
International technological cooperation study
(McGhee), 148
Investment guarantee fund, proposed (Johnson),
301
Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, statements
(Rostow), and text of joint communique, 19
Soviet and Eastern Europe, relations: Harriman,
820; E. V. Rostow, 24
Turkey, aid to : 28 ; Johnson, 383
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(Humphrey), 683
Organization of African Unity: Haile Selassie, 426;
Johnson, 427; Katzenbach, 954, 959; Palmer, 650,
807; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 784
Organization of American States :
Charter, current actions : Trinidad and Tobago, 581
Cuba, policy on, 103, 565
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
712
Dominican Republic crisis (Johnson) , 567
Membership, 713n
Trinidad and Tobago, membership : 464n ; Rusk,
464
U.S. support (Johnson) , 632
Osman, Ahmed, 850
Outer space:
Exploration, world-wide benefits from (Rusk), 241
Jupiter probe, NASA-ESRO, proposed (McGhee),
153
Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes,
728
Space law, development: 577; Goldberg, 142, 602;
Rusk, 601
Treaties, agreements, etc:
Exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, treaty
(1967) governing the activities of states:
Current actions: Afghanistan, Argentina,
Australia, 260; Austria, 438; Belgium,
306; Bolivia, Botswana, 260; Brazil, 306;
Burma, 898; Burundi, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Cyprus, 260;
Czechoslovakia, 260, 898; Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Outer space — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Exploration and use of outer space, etc. — Con.
Current actions — Continued
Ethiopia, Finland, Federal Republic of
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, 260; India, 481; Indo-
nesia, 260; Iraq, 481; Israel, Italy, Japan,
260; Jordan, 306; Korea, Laos, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, 260; Mexico, 260; Nepal,
306; Netherlands, 353; New Zealand,
Nicaragua, 260; Niger, 306, 801; Norway,
306; Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Rwanda, 260; San Marino, 733; Sierra
Leone, 866; South Africa, 481; Somali
Republic, 306; Soviet Union, 260; Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Tur-
key, U.A.R., U.K., 260; U.S., 260, 765, 930;
Upper Volta, 481; Uruguay, Venezuela,
Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 260
Development and background (Goldberg), 605
Installations, outer space treaty provisions for
free access to all parties: 577; Goldberg, 80,
141, 602, 606, 607; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602
Provisions, importance, and U.S. support:
570, 577; Goldberg, 79, 83, 98, 141, 602, 839;
Johnson, 569; NATO, 49; Rusk, 42
Signature ceremony, statements: Dean, 286;
Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg, 267; Johnson, 266;
Rusk, 266; U Thant, 268
U.N. resolution, 83
U.S. ratification: 386; Goldberg, 602; John-
son, 386, 659; Rusk, 600
U.S. -Soviet cooperation: Goldberg, 142, 604,
606; Rusk, 600; Sisco, 460
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree-
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354
Joint defense space research facility, agreement
with Australia re establishment of, 86
Space vehicle tracking stations in U.K., agree-
ment, 225
Antigua, station on, 354
Tracking and telemetry facility in Mahe, Sey-
chelles, agreement with U.K., 225
U.N. conference, proposed, U.N. resolution, 83n
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149
Ovamboland, status of: Goldberg, 888; Palmer, 648
Owen, Wilfred, 651
Pacific Community, 553
Pacific Islands Trust Territory. See Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands
PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) , 721, 761
Pakistan (see also India-Pakistan border dispute) :
Afghanistan, relations with (Maiwandwal), 631
Aid Consortium: Johnson, 383; W. W. Rostow, 496
Economic development: 337, 670; Gaud, 669; John-
son, 383; E. V. Rostow, 401, 862; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496; Rusk, 830
SEATO communique, position on, 747
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1001
Pakistan — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 733, 898, 967, 968
U.S. aid:
Military aid terminated, 688
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830
U.S. and multilateral aid: Gaud, 669; Johnson, 159;
Rusk, 830
Palmer, Joseph, II, 449, 646, 806
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967,
proclamation, 632
Pan American Health Organization, 721, 761
Panama :
Air transport agreement amended, 965
Central American Common Market, relations, 715
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382
Panorama, TV interview of Secretary McNamara,
442
Papadopoulos, George (Rusk), 751
Paraguay:
Economic level of development (Rusk), 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224
U.S. Ambassador (Hernandez), confirmation, 968
Pardo, Arvid, 327
Park, Chung Hee (Chung) , 549
Park, Chung Hun, 552
Patents (see also Industrial property), international
patent cooperation treaty, proposed (Trow-
bridge), 885
Payton, Robert L., 261
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman, 627
Peace Corps programs:
Accomplishments and role, 337
Agreements establishing: Antigua, 182; Dominica,
393; Gambia, 122; Saint Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla, St. Vincent, 306
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232, 235
Expansion, proposed, 244
5th annual report (Johnson), 529
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Johnson),
598, 865
Water resources development activities, recommen-
dations for, 763
Pearson, Lester B.: 908, 909; Johnson, 909
Peccei, Aurelio (Humphrey), 166
Pechel, Peter, 358
Pedersen, Richard F., 261, 732
Perkins, James : 15 ; Huinphrey, 164
Peru:
Communism, threat of (Harriman) , 821
Economic progress: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow,
862
Political progress (Rusk), 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 353, 481, 766,
930, 967
Petroleum:
North Africa, resources of (Palmer), 810, 812
Southern Rhodesia:
U.N. economic sanctions and U.S. support, 370
1002
Petroleum — Continued
North Africa — Continued
U.N. mandatory sanctions against supply of: 77,
374 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Peyrefitte, Alain (McGhee), 152
Philippines (see also Association of Southeast Asia) : >,
Asian Mission Chiefs' meeting: communique, 517;
Goldberg, 511
Communism, threat of (SEATO), 746
Economic and political development: Braderman,
661; Bundy, 325, 791, 793
Educational institutes (Martin), 196
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 261, 306,
802, 929
U.S. relations (Braderman), 660
U.S. school building project, agreement, 850
Viet-Nam, military aid to : Bundy, 324, 792 ; John-
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland,
740
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505,
509
Phillips, Christopher H., 696
Pifer, Alan, 651
Piiiera, Jose (Goldberg), 888
Poage, W. R. (Johnson), 299
Poland :
Cotton textile agreement, 612
Economic and political evolution: Kohler, 9, 408,
Solomon, 519
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip-
rocal offer, 572
Post World War II (Harriman), 816
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 642, 766
U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3
Pollack, Herman, 910
Pollution:
Air pollution (Rusk), 240
Outer space treaty provisions for avoiding pollu-
tion: Goldberg, 81; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601
Pollution of the sea by oil, international conven-
tion (1954) for prevention of: Israel, 353;
Ivory Coast, 642 ; U.S., 733
Amendments: Greece, 733
Water for Peace programs : 761 ; Johnson, 903
Pope Paul VI, 685 (quoted)
Viet-Nam peace efforts and U.S. support: Goldberg,
63; Johnson, 319
Popper, David H., 566, 689
Population growth:
Control needed: 337; Johnson, 295; E. V. Rostow,
402; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 241
Energy consumption forecasts (Seaborg), 90
Family planning programs: Johnson, 160; E. V.
Rostow, 402; Rusk, 830
U.S. aid (Johnson), 381
Food supply, relation to. See Food and population
crisis
Latin America (Rusk), 724
North Africa (Palmer), 810
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Population growth — Continued
Philippines (Braderman), 661
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16
U.N. population control experts, training (Gold-
berg) , 101
Porter, William J.: 968; Goldberg, 513; Taylor, 286
Portugal :
African colonies, need for self-determination (Gold-
berg) , 290
Cotton textile agreement with U.S., announcement,
699
Southern Rhodesia, use of Portuguese ports to
evade oil embargo, 371, 374
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 613, 674, 930
Postal Union, Universal, constitution (1964), with
final protocols:
China, 85; Dahomey, Gabon, 801; Ghana, 613;
Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauritania, 701;
Morocco, 967; New Zealand (including Niue,
the Cook Islands, and the Tokelau Islands),
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (in-
cluding Spanish territories in Africa), 613;
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia,
85; Yugoslavia, 613; Zambia, 701
Potter, Philip, 723
Powell, Robert, 137
Price, Robert I., 102
Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Rusk), 128, 129, 281, 320,
619
Prince Souvanna Phouma (Rusk), 281, 320
Prisoners, political, military takeover in Greece
(Rusk), 751
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Private Resources, Office of: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 863
Proclamations by the President:
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967
(3774), 632
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 (3785), 873
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (3781) , 800
Sheet glass, escape-clause duties modified (3762),
216
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated (3761), 217
World Trade Week, 1967 (3771), 756
Public Law 480 (see also Agricultural surpluses and
Food for Peace) : Johnson, 235 ; E. V. Rostow, 860
Programs in: India, 701; North Africa (Palmer),
814; Viet-Nam (Komer),"470
Publications:
Agriculture Department, Analysis of Factors Af-
fecting U.S. Cotton Exports (Solomon), 559
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual
Report of the President to the Congress on the
Implementation of the Automotive Products
Trade Act of 1965, 732n
Congress :
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18,
223, 350, 757, 801, 966
Publications — Continued
Congress — Continued
Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Eco-
nomic Reforms, report (Solomon), 522
Our Changing Partnership with Europe, 522n
International exchange of, convention (1958):
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929
Obscene, agreement (1910) re repression of cir-
culation of, as amended: Malta, 865
Official publications, agreement with Jamaica for
the exchange of, 154
Official publications and government documents,
exchange between states, convention (1958) :
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929
State Department:
Recent releases, lists, 37, 225, 261, 306, 393, 614,
734, 802, 866, 968
Treaties in Force: A List of Agreements and
Other International Agreements of the United
States in Force on January 1, 1967, released,
288
United Nations, lists of current documents, 36, 181,
305, 437
U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the
President to the Congress for the Year 1965,
566n
Water for Peace: A Report of Background Con-
siderations and Recommendations on the Water
for Peace Program, released, 758
Pulitzer, Joseph (quoted), 186
Rabasa, Oscar, 919
Racial discrimination (see also Human rights) :
Africa, U.S. position (Johnson), 159
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
Convention (1965), international, for the elimi-
nation of: Algeria, 353; Australia, 154;
Burundi, 701 ; Cameroon, 353 ; Costa Rica, 702 ;
Colombia, 701; Cyprus, 353, 930; Czechoslo-
vakia, 154; Dahomey, 701; Finland, 154; Ger-
many, 701; Hungary, 930; Iceland, 154, 702;
India, Iran, 701; Mauritania, 353; Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, 154; Niger, 930;
Norway, 154; Panama, 353; Sierra Leone, 154;
Somalia, 701; Tunisia, 702; U.A.R., 930; U.K.,
154; Uruguay, 701; Vatican, 154
Southern Rhodesia: 367; Goldberg, 73, 144;
Palmer, 450, 646; Sisco, 68
Suppression of, U.N. role: Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66
Radio :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Broadcasting in the standard broadcasting band
(protocol) : Blexico, 182, 224, 261
Consultations resumed, 352
Cultural exchange arrangements with Romania,
renewal, 480, 482
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1003
Radio — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Licensed amateur radio operators, reciprocal
granting of authorizations to operate in either
country, agreements with: Argentina, 702;
Netherlands, 154; Switzerland, 968; Trinidad
and Tobago, 898
Radio communications between Alaska and
British Colombia, agreement with Canada, U.S.
notice of termination, 482
Radio communications between amateur stations
on behalf of third parties, agreement with
Argentina, 702
Radio regulations (1959):
Partial revision re frequency allotment plan
for aeronautical mobile (R) service and re-
lated information: Argentina, 898; Austria,
Canada, Denmark, 766; Luxembourg, Mad-
agascar, Malaysia, 898
Entry into force, 481
Partial revision with annexes and additional
protocol: Malaysia, 898
USIA programs, increase (Johnson), 236
Voice of America (Kohler), 411
Ramos, Narciso, 747, 748
Rapacki Plan (Rusk), 361
Red Sea lights, maintenance, international agreement
(1962) , Soviet Union, 305
Refugees:
Stateless persons and refugees, application (pro-
tocol 1) of the universal copyright convention:
Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833
Viet-Nam: 209; Komer, 470
Voluntary agencies, aid to (Sisco) , 64
Regional cooperation and development: Brzezinski,
415; Blumenthal, 434; W. W. Rostow, 497
Africa. See Africa
Arms control, 576
CENTO: 671; Gaud, 668
Defense. See Collective security
Development banks: 338; E. V. Rostow, 403
SEATO programs: 745, 747; Rusk, 744
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 231, 328, 334, 379,
380, 904; Palmer, 814; Pollack, 913; W. W.
Rostow, 500; Rusk, 772, 828, 906
Water for Peace program : 759, 762 ; Johnson, 904 ;
Rusk, 906
Reifenberg, Jan, 358
Research. See Science and technology
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of, 367
Rimestad, Idar, 261
Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson) , 428
Road traffic:
Convention (1949), with annexes and protocol,
Botswana, 967
Convention (1954) on customs facilities for tour-
ing, Singapore, 122
Customs convention (1954) on the temporary im-
portation of private road vehicles, Australia,
673
Rockwell, Stuart W., 670, 671
Rogers, William P., 292, 302
Rolvaag, Karl F., 674
Romania:
Cultural exchange arrangement renewed, 479, 482
Increasing independence (Solomon), 519
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Johnson, 960; quoted, 270,
289, 963
Roshchin, Alexei A., 571
Ross, Claude G., 765
Rostow, Eugene V., 19, 24, 25, 53, 261, 398, 856
Rostow, W. W., 491, 552, 586, 659, 721; Johnson, 951
Roth, William M., 476, 476n, 523, 879
Ruge, Gerd, 358
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800
Rusk, Dean:
Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and state-
ments :
Africa, U.S. aid, 830
Aggression, prevention, and countermeasures,
271, 278, 363, 771
Alliance for Progress, 464, 723, 828
Summit meeting, prospects from, 722, 829
Antiballistic missiles, questions on, 43, 46, 47,
321, 361, 875
Arab-Israeli conflict, 949, 950
Armaments, control and reduction, 46, 171, 601,
771,786
Asia, U.S. aid, 830, 832
Cambodia, nonalinement, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619,
773
Communism:
Propaganda, 725, 775
Threat of and U.S. role against, 127, 134, 272,
278, 785, 787, 827, 877
Communist China:
Asia, threat to, 169, 275
Leadership struggle, 47, 170, 280, 788
Nuclear potential, 132
U.S. relations, 283, 322
Consular convention with Soviet Union, need for
ratification, 247
East- West relations, 4 (quoted), 47, 169, 360,
363, 463 (quoted), 523 (quoted), 772, 786
Viet-Nam, effect of, 781, 875
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966, 171, 772,
875
Europe, U.S. relations and interests, 358, 364,
726, 784
Food and population crisis, 46, 169, 874
Foreign Assistance Program for 1968, 826
Foreign policy, 134, 270, 770, 784, 879
Freedom of speech and expression, 130, 725, 775
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 42
Germany, reunification, 360, 362, 771
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Chancellor Adenauer, regrets at death of, 752
Political developments, 365
1004
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
Germany, Federal Republic of — Continued
U.S. common interests, 359
U.S. visit of Minister Brandt, 320
Greece, political developments, 750
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death
of, 147
India, U.S. and multilateral food aid, 46, 48, 830
Kennedy Round, 361
Laos, 1962 agreements, 126, 128, 281, 282, 742,
777
Latin American economic integration, 722, 723,
725, 829
Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, U.S. visit, 782
NATO, 358, 360
Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, 1966, 46
U.S. forces, 362, 782
1951-1966, important events of, 168
1966 developments, and prospects from, 47, 128
Nuclear-free zones, 361
Nuclear proliferation:
EURATOM safeguards, 360
Treaty, need for, 48, 132, 321, 601, 786, 875
Outer space treaty, 42, 266, 600
Science and foreign affairs, 238
SEATO council meeting, 742
Secretary of State, work of, 365
Sino-Soviet relations, 132, 168, 781, 785
Viet-Nam, effect of, 44, 283, 727, 786
Soviet Union, U.S. citizens, convictions, 44
Thailand, U.S. air force use of Thai bases, 597
U.K., European Common Market, membership,
proposed, 783
U.S. world commitments, 784, 875
Viet-Nam (for details, see Viet-Nam) :
Cease-fire, proposals and prospects from, 126,
276, 317, 321, 359, 364, 464, 516, 622, 727,
775, 780, 878
Civilian casualties, 130, 135, 274, 276
Communist China and Soviet military support,
275, 727, 786
National reconciliation (pacification) pro-
gram, 129, 779
Peace talks:
Private channels, question of, 280, 321, 623,
624, 778
U Thant proposals, U.S. and Communist
positions, 618
U.S. willingness, 42, 43, 47, 126, 135, 172,
281, 317, 464, 516, 618, 727, 743, 772, 777,
877
Political progress, 131, 279, 779
Situation reports, 44, 274, 726
U.S. commitments, 128, 133, 272, 275, 725, 744,
776, 875
U.S. economic aid, 830
U.S. 14 points, 281, 318
U.S. military targets, 45, 130, 131, 135, 275
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
Viet-Nam — Continued
U.S. objectives, 45, 133, 278, 317
U.S. public opinion, 130, 133, 619, 725, 774
Water for Peace, 904
World peace, importance, 136, 169, 269, 278, 358,
363, 725, 771, 781, 874
Alliance for Progress conferences, U.S. delegate,
472n, 476
CIA special policy committee, chairman (Johnson),
665
Health, 131
Meetings with:
Alliance for Progress summit conference, 721
ANZUS Council, 749
China, Vice President Yen, 849
Guam conference, 586, 594
NATO ministerial council, 53
SEATO Council of Ministers, 516, 747
Turkey, President Sunay, 656
Viet-Nam, 7-nation meeting, 748
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
chairmanship (Johnson), 951
News conferences, transcripts of, 42, 317, 464, 466,
618
TV and radio interviews, transcripts of, 126, 168,
274, 358, 722, 774
Work of, satisfactions and rewards, 365
Rusk, Thomas Jefferson, 269
Rwanda, outer space treaty, signature, 260
Safety of life at sea :
International convention, 1960 :
Amendments to chapter II, U.S., 642, 702
Current actions: Brazil, 642; Ireland, 481;
Somalia, 765
Passenger-ship safety amendments: 102; John-
son, 429; Miller, 173; Romania, 224
International regulations for preventing collisions,
1960: Australia, 581-582; Brazil, 866; China,
353
North Atlantic fisheries, convention on conduct of,
provisions, 635
Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, treaties, agree-
ments, etc., 306
St. Lawrence Seaway, tolls, 554, 674
St. Vincent, treaties, agreements, etc., 306
Salisbury, Harrison: 321; Powell, 137; Rusk, 131
Salzman, Herbert (E. V. Rostow), 860, 863
San Marino, outer space treaty (1967) , 733
Satellites (see also Communications: Satellites,
Meteorological research, and Outer space) :
Communications stations proposed for Latin Amer-
ica (Johnson), 709
Development and importance (Pollack), 910
Surveys of water and related resources, proposed
use in, 763
Tracking facilities, access, outer space treaty pro-
visions for (Goldberg) , 82, 610
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1005
Satellites — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
ESRO Alaska telemetry/telecommand station,
agreement for establishment and operation of,
36
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree-
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354
Satterthwaite, Joseph C, 651
Saudi Arabia:
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft, signature, 765
Jidda desalination plant dedication, U.S. participa-
tion (Udall), 561
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Seaborg, Glenn T., 90, 915 (quoted)
Scherer, Ray, 724
Schlesinger, Arthur (Goldberg), 511
Schroeder, Gerhard, 687, 688
Schultze, Charles L.: 237; Johnson, 659
SCI (International Scientific and Technological Af-
fairs, office of) , Pollack, 913
Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy,
913
Science and technology:
China, U.S. survey team, 849
Europe (McGhee), 152
International cooperation: 657; Brzezinski, 414;
Humphrey, 488; Rusk, 239
Latin America: 713, 719, 887; Johnson, 709
NATO resolution, 50, 52
OECD cooperation: Humphrey, 166, 684; E. V.
Rostow, 22
Science and foreign affairs: Pollack, 910; Rusk,
238; Seaborg (quoted), 915
Soviet-U.S. exchanges, value (Katzenbach), 755
Technical data, exportation to Southern Rhodesia,
prohibition of. Executive order, 146
Technological forecasting: Pollack, 914; Rusk, 239
Technological gaps: 713; Humphrey, 165, 684; Mc-
Ghee, 148; Pollack, 912; Rusk, 238
U.N. role: Pollack, 912; Sisco, 459, 462
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149
Water resources research and development, rec-
ommendations for: 763; Johnson, 903
Security Council, U.N.:
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Meeting called (Goldberg), 871
Role in and U.S. support: Goldberg, 100, 920,
925, 927, 934, 941, 944, 946; Johnson, 935, 951,
952; Rusk, 949
UNEP withdrawn vnthout action by (Johnson),
870
China, membership (Popper), 689
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 437
Israeli-Syrian border dispute (Goldberg), 100
Peacekeeping operations :
Discussion delays, problem of (Goldberg), 944,
945
Primary responsibilities: 375; Goldberg, 143,
640, 872, 928; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 949
Security Council, U.N. — Continued
Peacekeeping operations — Continued
Soviet position (Sisco), 461
Veto, exercise of: Goldberg, 144, 638, 640, 839,
895 ; Sisco, 461
Resolutions :
Arab-Israeli conflict, cease-fire requests, 947, 948 \
Southern Rhodesia, mandatory sanctions against,
77
U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus, 6-month ex-
tension, 180n
Southern Rhodesia:
Mandatory sanctions against, and U.S. support:
373; Goldberg, 73, 99, 142; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation, 145, 377
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support: 369, 375; Pal-
mer, 449, 457; Sisco, 68
U.S. deputy representative (Pedersen), confirma-
tion, 261
U.S. responsibilities as a permanent member
(Rusk), 784
Viet-Nam, role in. See under Viet-Nam
Seismographic research, 574
Selden, Armistead I., Jr., 476
Selective service (Powell), 137
Self-defense. See Defense
Self-determination :
Aden (Goldberg), 100
Africa, southern (Katzenbach), 955
Angola and Mozambique, need for (Goldberg), 290
Asia (see also Viet-Nam) : Bundy, 790; U. A. John-
son, 422
Importance and U.N. role (Sisco) , 67
Independent statehood not necessarily required:
Goldberg, 290 ; Nabrit, 32
Nigeria (Palmer), 649
South- West Africa: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888; Palmer,
648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
Southern Rhodesia: 376; Goldberg, 99, 142;
Palmer, 456
U.N. Charter principles (Rusk) , 170, 875
U.N. covenants, 107, 112
U.N. resolution and U.S. support: Nabrit, 29, 30;
text, 32
U.S. support (Rusk) , 772
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam.
Sender Freies Berlin, 358
Senegal :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 765
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Senghor, Leopold S. (quoted), 959
Sharp, U.S. Grant: 586, 594 ; Holt, 962
Sheet glass, proclamation modifying escape-clause
action, 216
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime Consultative
Organization, Intergovernmental) :
International waterways, U.S. position: Goldberg,
871, 921, 923, 926, 938; Johnson, 870, 922
(quoted) ; U Thant, 920 (quoted) , 921
1006
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Ships and shipping — Continued
Passenger ships, IMCO fire safety standards rec-
ommendations: 102; Johnson, 429; Miller, 173
Southern Rhodesian exports, U.N. sanctions against
shipments of: 77, 374; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation, Executive order, 146
Soviet vessel Turkestan, allegations of U.S. air
attacks and U.S. rejection, 953
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
International waterborne transportation, inter-
American convention (1963), on facilitation
of: U.S., 481, 581,641
Maritime traffic, international convention (1965),
on facilitation of, with annexes: Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, 305; Finland, 732; Iceland,
393; Ivory Coast, 694; Nigeria, 393; Soviet
Union, 85; Trinidad and Tobago, 732; U.S.,
481, 581, 613, 865
Entry into force, 305
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree-
ment re U.S. liability: Greece, 225
Pilotage services on the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence Seaway, agreement with Canada
governing coordination of, 866
USS Cascade (destroyer tender), deployment of,
agreement with Malta, 225
Vessels, loans of, agreements with : New Zealand,
898; Philippines, 802
U.S. military supplies to Viet-Nam (Wheeler), 188
USS John F. Kennedij, christening ceremony
(Johnson), 959
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involvement in Mid-
dle East, and U.S. reply (Goldberg), 935, 940
U.S. vessel, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John-
son, 952
Sierra Leone:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 377
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 866, 930, 967
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom (Rusk) , 128, 129, 281, 619
Sindermann, Carl J., 71
Singapore:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688
Economic progress (Bundy), 325, 791
Indonesia, relations with: Bundy, 792; Rusk, 744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 182, 897
Sino-Soviet relations: Brzezinski, 419; Harriman,
817; Katzenbach, 2; Kohler, 9, 407; W. W.
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 132, 168, 781, 785; Solomon,
519
Viet-Nam, effect of: Rusk, 727, 786; Sisco, 461
Viet-Nam peace talks, effect on (Rusk), 44, 283
Sisco, Joseph J., 64, 458
Siscoe, Frank G., 71, 634
Sithole, Ndabaningi, 371
Skolnikoff, Eugene B., 913
Slavery :
Supplementary convention (1956) for the abolition
of slavery, the slave trade, and practices simi-
lar to : Afghanistan, 85 ; Luxembourg, 930
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524
Slavery — Continued
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
prohibition of, 113
White women, agreement (1949) for the suppres-
sion of trade in, as amended: Malta, 866
Smathers, George A., 476
Smith, Al (quoted), 936
Smith, Willard J. (Miller), 175
Smithsonian Institute, 667
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea
Solomon, Anthony M.: 518, 555, 721; Miller, 174
Somali, Republic of:
AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 306, 438, 701, 702,
732, 765, 802
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
South Africa, Republic of:
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302 ; Sisco, 68
South West Africa mandate, termination: 893;
Goldberg, 888, 889; Palmer, 648; Sisco, 68
Southern Rhodesia, support and aid in evading
sanctions, 374
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 481, 733, 930
South West Africa:
ICJ decision: Goldberg, 144, 292; Palmer, 647;
Rogers, 302
Self-determination for, U.N. role in development
of: Goldberg, 292, 888; Palmer, 648; Rogers,
302; Sisco, 68
U.N. administration of: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888,
892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
U.N. resolution, text, 893
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:
Council of Ministers meeting, Washington: 516,
592; Rusk, 742
Text of communique, 745
U.S. delegation, 516
Military Advisers meeting, Washington, 516, 592
Thai support: Martin, 198, 852; Rusk, 598
Viet-Nam :
Importance of U.S. commitments under: John-
son, 515; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 776,
876
Position and support: Martin, 855; Rusk, 281,
743
Southeast Asian Ministers of Education (Martin),
196, 854
Southern Rhodesia:
Background: 366; Palmer, 449
Independence, U.K. conditions for: 368, 372, 377;
Palmer, 457, 646
U.S., contrasted with (Palmer), 451
International Wheat Agreement, 1967 protocol,
930
Land Apportionment Act (Palmer), 453
Racial discrimination in. See Racial discrimination
Rhodesian Front party (Palmer), 454
Soviet Union, position of, 374
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1007
Southern Rhodesia — Continued
U.K.:
Responsibilities: 369, 375; Goldberg, 74, 143;
Palmer, 455, 647
Use of force against, questions of, 372, 374
U.K.-Rhodesian talks: 368; Goldberg, 76; Sisco, 67
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support, 369
U.N. sanctions:
Economic: 370; Goldberg, 142, 291; Palmer, 647
Legal basis for: 369, 374; Goldberg, 75
Mandatory: 373, 376; Goldberg, 73, 142; Palmer,
449, 647; Sisco, 68
Resolution, text, 77
South Africa and Portugal, importance to en-
forcement of, 371, 374
Sovereignty, equality of states, essential elements of
(Harris), 105
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Communism, and
Sino-Soviet relations) :
Allegations of U.S. air attack on Soviet vessel
rejected, 953
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition in:
575, 687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445,
569, 659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow,
501 ; Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875
Central Europe, nuclear weapons aimed at (Rusk),
361
Consular convention with U.S.: 614, 642; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Katzenbaeh, 755 ; Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Economic problems: Harriman, 818; Katzenbaeh,
754; Kohler, 407; Solomon, 519
Food processing fair, Moscow, U.S. participation,
757
Germany, Federal Republic of, relations (Rusk),
363
ILO charges of forced labor practices (Goldberg),
527
India, grain shipments to (Johnson), 299
Industrial property, international participation
(Trowbridge), 885
INPRODMASH-67 (Trowbridge), 882
Italian Fiat automobile plant: Harriman, 819;
Katzenbaeh, 4 ; Solomon, 522 ; Trowbridge, 883
Leadership (Brzezinski), 417
North Africa, interests and influence (Palmer),
808, 811
Nuclear proliferation treaty, review of position on,
571
Oceanographic survey, cooperation with U.S.
(Sisco), 462
Outer space treaty, position on: Goldberg, 142, 604,
607; Rusk, 600; Sisco 460
Southern Rhodesia, position on, 374
Technological level (Humphrey) , 166
Trade :
Liberalization (Trowbridge), 885
U.S. See East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 85, 224, 260, 305, 393,
614, 642, 930
Soviet Union — Continued
U.N.:
Arena for peaceful East- West engagement:
Humphrey, 489; Sisco, 458
Peacekeeping operations, position on: Goldberg,
101,895; Sisco, 461
U.S. citizens, convention of (Rusk) , 44, 248
U.S. relations:
Efforts to improve: 697; Humphrey, 487, 488,
681; Johnson, 159, 409 (quoted), 757; Katzen-
baeh, 753; Kohler, 8, 406; Niven, 774; E. V.
Rostow, 399, 403 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk,
363, 772
U.S. visit of Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, effect
(Rusk), 782
Viet-Nam, effect on: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 171,
278, 877
U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting nuclear arms race,
proposed: Johnson, 445; BIcNamara, 444
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge) , 882
Viet-Nam, arms supply to: Katzenbaeh, 753;
Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466
World relations, development of: Harriman, 821;
Humphrey, 486; Meeker, 62
Space. See Outer space and Satellites
Spain :
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 354, 613, 642
Spivak, Lawrence E., 722
State Department (see also Foreign Service) :
Advisory panels: Johnson, 660; appointments, 16,
72, 651
Ambassador at Large (Lodge), confirmation, 674
Appointments and designations, 261, 765, 897
Assistant Secretaries of State, confirmation:
Battle, 674; Macomber, 482; Oliver, 968
Bureau of European Affairs, advisory panel, ap-
pointment, 17
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
72
Information and cultural programs, appropriations
request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 232, 236
Publications. See under Publications
Science briefings: Pollack, 916; Rusk, 238
Science office (Pollack), 913
U.S. mission chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599
Water for Peace Office, establishment: Johnson,
904 ; Rusk, 906
Work of (Rusk), 875
State of the Union (Johnson) , 158
Stateless persons and refugees, application (protocol
1) of the universal copyright convention: Italy,
481 ; Netherlands, 833
Steele, Hoyt P., 696, 697
Stevenson, Adlai : Johnson, 566 ; quoted, 293, 839, 896
Stoltenberg, Gerhard (McGhee), 152
Strategic trade controls. See Trade
Sudan:
AID programs (Rusk), 831
1008
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Sudan — Continued
Convention (1965) on the settlement of investment
disputes betvceen states and nationals of other
states, 613
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Sugar, International Sugar Agreement, 1958, proto-
col: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 224; Bolivia,
481; Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, 224; Congo (Brazzaville), 481; Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Ghana,
224; Guyana, 393; Guatemala, 224; Haiti, 224;
Hungary, 224, 481; India, 224, 481; Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Mada-
gascar, 224 ; Mexico, 224, 481 ; Morocco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Para-
guay, 224; Peru, 224, 481; Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, U.K., U.S., 224
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 216, 332
Sullivan, William L., Jr., 636
Sunay, Cevdet, 652, 653, 655
Sunobe, Ryoso, 178, 424
Suwito Kusumowidagdo, 172
Sweden :
Institute for Cultural Relations, 667
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 481, 613, 732,
733, 930
U.S. Ambassador (Heath), confirmation, 674
Swidler, Joseph C, 907
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 393,
613, 733, 929, 930, 967, 968
Syrian Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli conflict) :
Israeli border dispute, U.N. peacekeeping role
(Goldberg), 100
Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final
protocols, 733
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Taft, William Howard (Rusk), 270
Taiwan (see also China, Republic of; and Formosa) :
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
791; Johnson, 848; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862;
W.W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832
U.S. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Self-
Help, and Development, 832n
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505,
509, 511
Talbot, Phillips (Rusk), 751
Tanzania :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Tariff Commission, budget appropriation request,
FY 1968 (Johnson), 232
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic policy and rela-
tions; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on;
and Trade) :
Tariff policy, U.S. — Continued
Most-favored-nation policy: 698; Blumenthal, 435 ;
Katzenbach, 3
National interests: Johnson, 696; Solomon, 556;
Trowbridge, 883
Philippines (Braderman), 663
Presidential discretionary authority: 698; Harri-
man, 819; Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 521, 523
Sheet glass duties modified, proclamation: 216;
Johnson, 333
Watch movements escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation: 217; Johnson, 333
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on:
Agreements, declarations, proces-verbal, and
protocols :
Accessions to, current actions on :
Argentina, provisional: Ivory Coast, 967;
Tunisia, 613
Third proces-verbal: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, 613; Central
African Republic, 967; Denmark, Finland,
613; France, Germany, India, 733; Indo-
nesia, Israel, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733;
Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 967;
Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 967;
South Africa, 733; Sweden, Tunisia, Tur-
key, U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733
Iceland, provisional : Ivory Coast, 967 ; Tunisia,
613
Proces-verbal extending: Central African
Republic, 967; Tunisia, 613
Korea, protocol: Austria, 766; Central African
Republic, European Economic Community,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 968; Korea,
Netherlands, Turkey, 766; U.S., 766, 968
Switzerland, protocol: Central African Re-
public, 967; Germany, 224; Netherlands,
354; New Zealand, 733; Portugal, 613;
Spain, 354
Tunisia, provisional, third proces-verbal : Cen-
tral African Republic, 967
United Arab Republic, provisional: Ivory
Coast, 967
Second proces-verbal: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, 613; Central African Republic,
968; Denmark, Finland, 613; France,
Germany, 733; Greece, 613; India, 733;
Indonesia, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733;
Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 968;
Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 968;
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.A.R.,
U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733
Yugoslavia, protocol: Austria, 733; Central
African Republic, 967; Chad, 354; France,
733; Netherlands, 354; U.S., 260
International trade in cotton textiles, protocol
extending the arrangement on: 929; U.S., 967
1960-1961 Tariff Conference, protocol embodying
results of: Germany, 224, 306; Pakistan, 967
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1009
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued
Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol
amending: Korea, 733
Part IV, entrance into force, prospects from : 70 ;
Blumenthal, 433
Schedule III — Brazil-protocol re negotiations for
the establishment of a new schedule: Korea,
733
Schedules, rectifications and modifications to the
texts of, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th protocols:
Korea, 733
Committee on Trade and Development: Blumenthal,
430; U.S. delegate, 430n
Contrasting party, admission as: Barbados, 482
Eastern European membership, need for: 699;
Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 488
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435
Kennedy Round:
Importance and U.S. support: 28, 70, 245, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; Humphrey, 488, 683; John-
son, 297, 333, 707, 756, 886; NATO, 50; E. V.
Rostow, 23, 27; Roth, 476, 880; Rusk, 359, 361;
Solomon, 556
Negotiations concluded: Johnson, 879; Roth, 879
U.S. participation, problems and conditions:
E. V. Rostow, 403, 860; Roth, 477; Rusk, 772
Yugoslavian membership (Harriman), 818
Taxation:
Double taxation, convention on avoidance of. See
Double taxation
Interest Equalization Tax, 342
Adjustment of rates needed: 344; Johnson, 335
Taylor, Maxwell D., 285, 514 (quoted), 586, 594
Tear gas and military gas, use of, 577
Technical assistance:
CENTO programs, 671
U.N. assistance to South West Africa requested,
894
Technical cooperation programs :
Agreements with: Afghanistan, 834; Somali Re-
public, 225, 438, 702, 802
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson) ,
232
China, Republic of, 849
Latin America, 719
Water for Peace, 761
Technology. See Science and technology
Telecommunications (see also Radio) :
Convention (1965), international, with annexes:
Australia, Ceylon, 613; Congo (Brazzaville),
393; Denmark, 122; Finland, Guyana, 613;
Ireland, 766; Jordan, 766; Korea, 898; Leba-
non, 613; Lesotho, 967; Maldive Islands, 582;
Netherlands, 393; Nigeria, 613; Peru, 766;
Switzerland, 393; Tunisia, Uganda, 898; U.K.,
393; U.S., 733, 801
Educational TV: 719; Johnson, 15, 709; E. V.
Rostow, 405
Latin America, system proposed, 712
Territorial sea and the contiguous zone, convention
(1958), Goldberg, 923
Terry, William M., 919
Thailand (see also Association of Southeast Asia) :
AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196,
854 ^
Asian role: Martin, 196, 851; Rusk, 597
Communism, danger of: Bundy, 325; Martin, 853;
Rusk, 169, 275, 743, 832; SEATO, 746
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
325, 791, 793; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W.
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 598
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. aid: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
U.S. air force use of Thai bases : 746, : Martin, 852 ;
Rusk, 597
U.S. relations: Martin, 198, 851; Thanat Khoman,
852 (quoted)
Viet-Nam, military aid to: 746; Bundy, 324, 792;
Johnson, 961; Martin, 198, 852, 853; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Rusk, 597 ; Westmoreland, 740
Thanat Khoman: 197, 747, 748 (quoted), 852, 854
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 586, 588, 591
Thuc, Nguyen Dang: 69 Lilienthal, 468
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 592
Tlateloleo, Treaty of, 436
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago
Togo:
Regional heavy equipment training center (Katzen-
bach), 958
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 182, 260
Amity and economic relations, treaty of, 181
Toon, Malcolm, 71
Topaloglu, Ahmet, 687, 688
Touring and tourism:
Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 682;
E. V. Rostow, 25
International Tourist Year, 695
North Africa: Palmer, 812; Woods (quoted), 810
Road traffic, convention (1954) re customs facili-
ties: Singapore, 122
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed,
480, 482
U.S.-Soviet tourists, numbers compared: Kohler,
412; Rusk, 247
U.S. visitors visas with indefinite validity, 695
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses; Economic
policy; Exports; Imports; and Tariff policy,
U.S.) :
Cotton. See Cotton
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, trade with
West: 697; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488;
Johnson, 696, 757; Katzenbach, 4, 755; Solo-
mon, 519, 521; Trowbridge, 881
Expansion, importance and U.S. support: 339;
Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 404; W. W.
Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772
1010
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Trade — Continued
Latin America: 713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson,
542, 707, 709; W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
717
Less developed countries, 245, 338
North Africa (Palmer) , 807
OECD countries (Humphrey), 683
Soviet Union, Licensintorg (Trowbridge), 885
Strategic trade controls: 697; Harriman, 817;
Johnson, 696; Katzenbach, 4; Kohler, 10, 413;
Solomon, 518
Trade negotiations, U.S. special representative
(Roth), confirmation, 476n
Transit trade of land-locked states, convention
(1965), Chad, 733
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
(Goldberg), 102
U.S. trade:
Balance on goods and surpluses, 341
Canada, automotive products, 732
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, need to in-
crease (see also East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1966): Harriman, 818; Humphrey,
682; Johnson, 334, 757, 886; Katzenbach, 2;
Kohler, 10, 413 ; E. V. Rostow, 24 ; Rusk, 786 ;
Solomon, 518
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge), 881
Foreign policy considerations: Johnson, 886;
Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 555
Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual
meeting, 70
Korea, investment and trade study: 69, 554;
Chung, 553
Philippines (Braderman), 662
Policy objectives: Johnson, 757, Trowbridge, 881
Southern Rhodesia, prohibition of, Executive
order, 146
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation, 756
Trade Expansion Act: Blumenthal, 433; Roth, 477;
Rusk, 361
Tran Van Do, 745, 747, 748
Transportation :
Africa (Katzenbach), 956
Latin America (Linowitz), 823
Mass urban transit (Johnson), 918
Viet-Nam, importance of: Komer, 469; Westmore-
land, 741
Travel (see also Touring and tourism) :
Foreign travel to U.S., encouragement: 344; John-
son, 335
Middle East, U.S. travel restricted, announcement,
952
U.S. travel restrictions:
Amendments, texts, 564
Extended, 102
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 85, 122, 154, 181, 224,
260, 305, 353, 392, 438, 481, 530, 581, 612, 641, 673,
701, 732, 765, 801, 833, 865, 897, 929, 967
Treaty on treaties, U.N. international conference,
proposed (Goldberg), 102
Treaties in force: A List of Treaties and Other In-
ternational Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1967, released, 288
Tremelloni, Roberto, 687
Trinidad and Tobago:
OAS membership: 464n; Johnson, 632; Rusk, 464
Treaties, agreements, etc., 84, 122, 182, 224, 581,
732, 898, 929
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 881
Truman, Harry S (quoted), 546, 547, 548, 550, 856
Truman Doctrine: E. V. Rostow, 857; 20th anniver-
sary, Johnson, 546, 547, 654; Sunay, 653, 655
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands:
Additional U.S. funds authorized (Johnson), 865
Disaster relief (Johnson) , 599
Economic and political progress (Johnson), 598
Tunisia:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests: Pal-
mer, 806 ; Rusk, 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 613, 642,
702, 898, 967
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Turkel, Harry, 71
Turkestan, Soviet motor vessel, 953
Turkey :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Economic and political development: 337, 656, 670;
Gaud, 669; Johnson, 383, 547, 652, 654; E. V.
Rostow, 401, 858; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk,
830; Sunay, 655
Financing, problems of,' 338
NATO position and aid: 50, 657; Johnson, 652;
Sunay, 653, 655
OECD aid: 28; Johnson, 383
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 613, 766, 897
U.S. aid, 1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830
U.S. military and economic assistance: 657; Gaud,
669; Johnson, 384; Sunay, 656
U.S. visit of President Sunay: 652; Johnson, 547
U Nyun (Martin), 196, 853
U Thant (see also United Nations and Viet-Nam),
Goldberg, 179
Arab-Israeli conflict, peacekeeping efforts. See
Arab-Israeli conflict
Outer space treaty signature ceremony, message,
268
U.N. Secretary-General, continuation in office as:
Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42
Viet-Nam :
Peace proposals: Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622;
U Thant, 138 ; text, 624
Peace talks, role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 138, 839;
Johnson, 629; Rusk, 43, 45, 47, 620; U Thant,
625
Visit to Asia (Goldberg), 507, 513
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
Udall, Stewart L.: 561, 907; Rusk, 906
UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de
I'Afrique Centrale), 650
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1011
Uganda :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 701, 898
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
UNCTAD. See United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development
UNEF. See United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, U.N.), 897
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force in Cyprus
Unger, Leonard C, 586
Union Douaniere et Economique de I'Afrique Cen-
trale (Palmer), 650
United Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli con-
flict) :
Straits of Tiran, restriction of shipping: Goldberg,
871, 921, 923, 938; Johnson, 870; U Thant
(quoted), 920, 921
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 393, 613, 642, 733,
930, 967
U.S. Ambassador (Nolte), confirmation, 674
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
United Kingdom (see also names of self-governing
colonies) :
Aden, future withdrawal from (Goldberg), 100
Asia, role in (Bundy) , 791, 793
Balance-of-payments position, 347
BBC TV interview of Secretary McNamara, 442
British independent TV interview of Secretary
Rusk, 274
CENTO economic aid, 670
Economic problems (McGhee), 149
European Common Market, proposed membership :
Holt, 961 ; Rusk, 783
Foreign aid programs (Rusk), 830
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 92
Rhodesia. Sec Southern Rhodesia
Sir Montague Burton Lecture, University of Leeds
(W. W. Rostow),491
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 86, 122, 154, 224, 225,
260, 354, 393, 582, 613, 834, 930
U.S. NATO forces, deployment, 789
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Wilson, 963
United Nations:
Aden, possible U.N. participation in elections
(Goldberg), 100
Arab-Israeli conflict, role. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Capital development fund resolution (Goldberg),
101
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437
East-West relations, role : Goldberg, 98 ; Harriman,
820 ; E. V. Rostow, 25 ; Sisco, 458
Headquarters of, amendment of supplemental
agreement (1966), 86
Human rights, role in: Goldberg, 524; Sisco, 67
International Covenants on Human Rights, texts,
107, 111
Optional protocol, 120
United Nations — Continued
Korea, supervision of elections (Goldberg), 101
Mekong River development, role: Bundy, 326;
Johnson, 334
Membership :
Barbados: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67
Communist China, question of: 849; Goldberg,
100; U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper, 689
Communist conditions for (Popper), 692
Increases in (Goldberg), 100, 290
Significance of: Goldberg, 872, 895; Sisco, 67
Outer space treaty, role in development of: 84,
577; Goldberg, 78, 98, 267, 602, 839; Rusk, 601;
Sisco, 460
Peacekeeping operations (see also Arab-Israeli
conflict. General Assembly, and Security
Council) :
Financing, problems of and U.S. position:
Goldberg, 101, 180, 636, 638, 895, 896; Johnson,
566
Importance and principles : 657 ; Goldberg, 179,
838, 862, 895, 928, 939; Harriman, 489; John-
son, 567, 629; Rusk, 363, 785; Sisco, 65
Need for improvement: Meeker, 63; W. W. Ros-
tow 502; Sisco, 65
Soviet and French refusal to pay assessments
(Goldberg), 101
Soviet-U.S. differences: Goldberg, 895; Sisco,
461
U.S. support (Rusk) , 271, 950
Racial discrimination, U.N. role in suppression of:
Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66
Secretary-General :
Role of (see also Arab-Israeli conflict and Viet-
Nam) : Goldberg, 637, 640, 895; Sisco, 461
Visit to Near East. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office:
Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42
Soviet Union, utilization of, for propaganda and
other purposes: Goldberg, 924; Sisco, 458
Special Committee on Friendly Relations (Nabrit),
31
Specialized agencies: 894; Goldberg, 839; Johnson,
297, 567; Pollack, 912; Sisco, 462
Turkey, support of (Johnson), 652
U.S. participation in the U.N., 20th annual report
(Johnson), 566
U.S. representatives, confirmation, 261
U.S.-Soviet furtherance of particular aims: Hum-
phrey, 489; Sisco, 458
U.S. support: Goldberg, 289; Johnson, 568; Nabrit,
31; Rusk, 772, 784
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Water development projects, U.S. recommenda-
tions: 762, 764; Johnson, 903; Rusk, 906
United Nations Charter:
Article 109, amendment: Argentina, 834; Hungary,
930; Mexico 834; U.S., 834, 898
1012
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United Nations Charter — Continued
Obligations and responsibilities of member states
under: 107, 112, 375; Goldberg, 76, 100, 142,
291, 839, 895, 923, 927, 945 ; Meeker, 61 ; Nabrit,
31; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 950
Principles: 111; Churchill (quoted), 490; Johnson,
330; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 133, 170, 363,
874
Communist ideology, contrasted with (Sisco) , 463
Outer space treaty, application to: Goldberg 79;
Johnson, 387
Southern Rhodesia, application to: 176, 376;
Goldberg, 75, 142; Palmer, 449
SEATO support, 745
Self-defense, inherent right to: Meeker, 60; Rusk,
271
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 110
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space: 84; Goldberg, 267, 604; Sisco, 461
Resolution endorsing recommendations, 83n
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (Johnson), 567
United Nations Development Decade: 336; John-
son, 567
United Nations Development Program: 762; Gold-
berg, 839 1 Johnson, 567 ; Palmer, 650, 813
U.S. 1967 pledge, 764
Viet-Nam, FAO fisheries project, U.S. financial
support, 964
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(Harriman), 820
United Nations Emergency Force:
Casualties in Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. regrets
(Goldberg), 939, 943
Financing (Goldberg), 638
Middle East:
Extension of (December, 1966) : Goldberg, 101
Withdrawal (May, 1967), U.S. position: Gold-
berg, 947; Johnson, 870
United Nations Force in Cyprus (NATO), 50
Extension (December, 1966), Goldberg, 179
U.S. pledge (Goldberg), 180
United Nations Office of Public Information (Sisco),
461
United Nations Organization for Industrial Develop-
ment (Johnson), 567
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(Sisco), 66
United States citizens and nationals:
Boycotts of Communist goods (Katzenbach), 2
Claims. See Claims
Communist propaganda, effect on (Rusk), 725, 775
Detention by Czechoslovakia (Kohler), 10
Foreign affairs advisory panels: 16; Johnson, 660
Middle East:
Status as neutrals (Rusk), 949, 950, 951
Travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Responsibilities of: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 131, 775
Responsibility of press to keep well informed (Mar-
tin), 851, 854
United States citizens and nationals — Continued
Rights abroad, consular convention with Soviet
Union: Johnson, 287, 545; Katzenbach, 755;
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Selective Service, position on (Powell), 137
U.S. foreign policy based on (Rusk), 879
United States Information Agency, educational TV,
task force assignment (Johnson), 16
United States Travel Service (Johnson), 335
Universal copyright convention (1952), protocol 1 re
application to works of stateless persons and
refugees : Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833
Universal Postal Union, constitution (1964), with
final protocols : China, 85 ; Dahomey, Gabon, 801 ;
Ghana, 613; Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauri-
tania, 701; Morocco, 967; New Zealand (includ-
ing Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands) ,
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (includ-
ing Spanish territories in Africa), 613; Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia, 85; Yugo-
slavia, 613; Zambia, 701
Upper Volta, outer space treaty, signature, 481
Urban development (Johnson), 918
Uruguay:
Economic level of development (Rusk), 723
Kennedy Round, importance to ( Blumenthal ) , 432
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 701
Vandenberg, Arthur, 838
Vatican City State, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 930
Venezuela :
Communism, threat of: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 828
Economic level of development: 337; E. V. Rostow,
401,858; Rusk, 722, 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 260, 930
Viet-Nam:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 216
Amnesty program: 209; Komer, 470; Rusk, 279;
Wheeler, 191
Asia, importance to. See under Asia
Background (Meeker), 54
Baguio Chiefs of Mission meeting, 517
Cambodia, nonalinement: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281,
320, 619, 773
Cease-fire:
Communist infiltration increased during: John-
son, 365, 596; Rusk, 127, 128, 317, 320, 321, 364,
621, 776, 780; Westmoreland, 739
Communist proposals: Goldberg, 313; Ho Chi
Minh, 596; Johnson, 596; Lodge, 795; Rusk,
126, 276, 277, 317, 321, 364, 464, 622, 623, 776,
777, 878
Extensions of, proposed, and prospects from:
Goldberg, 63, 508, 840; Johnson, 537, 567;
Lodge, 798; Powell, 137; Rusk, 44, 277, 317,
320, 364, 516, 727, 776, 777, 780; U Thant, 139
Senator Kennedy proposals: Goldberg, 508;
Rusk, 516
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1013
Viet-Nam — Continued
Cease-fire — Continued
Tet (Lunar New Year): 595; Goldberg, 310;
Johnson, 319; Komer, 471 ; Rusk, 126, 320, 620,
623, 780
Hostilities resumed (Johnson), 365
U Thant proposals: Goldberg, 138; Rusk, 126,
618, 622
U.S. acceptance: 626; U Thant, 139, 624
U.S. willingness for reciprocal ceasefire: 284,
626, 750; Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 63, 138, 313,
508, 841 ; Johnson, 319, 539, 596 ; Rusk, 126, 317,
319, 359, 464, 621, 622, 623, 727, 773, 776, 878
Communism, rejection of: Lodge, 796; Rusk, 279,
282, 619, 779
Communist aggression and subversion :
Casualties: 953; Johnson, 515, 536; Rusk, 45, 274,
727; Westmoreland, 741; Wheeler, 189
Civilian: 665; Johnson, 515, 536, 593, 594;
Rusk, 130, 135, 275, 276
Communist responsibilities: 953; Johnson,
515, 537; Rusk, 136, 275; Westmoreland,
739
Communist: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 466;
Rusk, 278, 727
Vietnamese: Johnson, 535-536; Rusk, 282;
Westmoreland, 741
Communism :
Defectors from: Martin, 194; Rusk, 278, 279,
726, 779; Westmoreland, 741
Communist China, position and support: Gold-
berg, 508; Kohler, 413; Popper, 691; W. W.
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727,
786; Wheeler, 191
Communist position: Ho Chi Minh, 596; Johnson,
629; Lodge, 798; Rusk, 127
Communist reliance on :
U.S. disagreements: Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 130,
620, 725, 744, 775
World opinion (Rusk) , 619, 620, 744
Communist responsibility: 953; Bundy, 790;
Johnson, 514; Nabrit, 30; W. W. Rostow, 503;
Rusk, 45, 127, 135, 272, 274, 282, 743, 776, 780,
876; SEATO, 745; Westmoreland, 738
Compared with (Rusk), 877
Korea: Meeker, 60; Rusk, 621, 778
Malaya, U.K. operations (Rusk), 279, 283
World War 11 (Lodge), 799
Deescalation, mutual {see also Cease-fire) :
Communist rejection (Rusk), 45, 622
U Thant proposals: Rusk, 622; U Thant, 139
U.S. position: 284, 750; Goldberg, 315, 506,
841; Johnson, 539; Rusk, 126, 317, 322, 465,
743, 775, 877
Escalation to major land war, question of:
Powell, 136; Rusk, 364; U Thant, 139
Guerrilla warfare, problems of: Johnson, 535,
593; Komer, 471; Lodge, 795, 799; Rusk, 278,
283,729; Taylor (quoted), 514; Westmoreland,
739
Viet-Nam — Continued
Communist aggression and subversion — Continued
Increases and U.S. responses: McNamara, 465,
466; Rusk, 134, 282, 318, 464, 876; Westmore-
land, 738
International law aspects (Meeker) , 57
Propaganda: 748; Lodge, 796; Martin, 194;
SEATO, 746
Soviet Union, position and support: Harriman,
821; Goldberg, 508, 513, 839; Kohler, 413;
Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 172,
275, 280, 466, 619, 727, 778, 786; Wheeler, 191
Test case for: Bundy, 790; Kohler, 8, 410;
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 494; SEATO, 746;
Thieu, 589; Westmoreland, 738
Demarcation line between North and South, sig-
nificance of (Meeker), 61
Demilitarized zone:
Geneva Accords provisions: Goldberg, 311;
Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 281
10-mile buffer area, U.S. proposal: 750; Rusk,
877
Devastation of country, question of (Rusk), 135
Diem government (Lodge), 799
Economic and social development: Goldberg, 506;
SEATO, 746
AID:
Budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233, 383
Commodity assistance programs, 1966 man-
agement report: Gaud, 200; text of re-
port, 201
Expenditures, 210
Medical assistance, increases, 664
Supplies, distribution (Komer), 469
Revolutionary development: 209, 592, 748; Gaud,
201; Goldberg, 511; Taylor, 286; Westmore-
land, 740
Vietnamese army cadre training program:
Komer, 470; Lodge, 796; Taylor, 287;
Wheeler, 191
U.S. goals and support: 285; Bundy, 325; Gold-
berg, 513; Johnson, 231, 516, 537, 587, 961;
Komer, 469; Lilienthal, 468; Rusk, 317, 831;
Wheeler, 186
U.S. programs, Communist participation: 285;
Goldberg, 311; Johnson, 162, 516, 535; Rusk,
281,317,773,787,877
U.S. study team, 69
Viet-Nam position: Lilienthal, 467; Thieu, 589
Education, 209
Guam conference: 586; Guerrero, 586; Johnson,
538, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594; Thieu, 588,
591
Results, 665
Inflation control: 202; Gaud, 200; Goldberg, 514,
592; Johnson, 233, 589; Komer, 470; Rusk,
831; Taylor, 287
International Control Commission: Johnson, 515;
Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127
1014
DEPAKTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam — Continued
International Control Commission — Continued
Role in and U.S. support: 750; Goldberg, 507;
Rusk, 620, 773, 778; U Thant, 625
Manila Conference, Viet-Nam aims and U.S. sup-
port: 748; Bundy, 794; Goldberg, 311; Thieu,
588
Memorial Day messages exchanged: Johnson,
Thieu, 917
Military and other aid from other countries: 552,
748, 749; Bundy, 324, 792; Chung, 552; John-
son, 549, 961 ; Martin, 198, 199, 852, 853 ; W. W.
Rostow, 503; Rusk, 133, 597; SEATO, 746;
Westmoreland, 740
Baguio meeting of Chiefs of Mission, 517
7-nation meeting of representatives, Washing-
ton: 517, 592; communique, 747; Johnson, 538
National Liberation Front (see also under Negotia-
tions for peaceful settlement) : Goldberg, 312,
842; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 172, 280, 779
National reconciliation (pacification) program:
592, 748; Goldberg, 506, 510, 841-842, 843;
Johnson, 161, 536, 538, 593, 594; Komer, 470,
471; Lodge, 795, 796; Rusk, 129, 726, 779;
SEATO, 746; Taylor, 286; Wheeler, 191
U.S. support reorganized ( Bunker) , 844
Negotiations for peaceful settlement :
ANZUS, 749
Asian proposal (Martin), 196
Communist 4-points: Goldberg, 311, 842; Ho Chi
Minh, 597; Johnson, 537; Rusk, 172, 317, 773,
777
Communist position: 626; Goldberg, 840; Rusk,
126, 131, 277, 283, 322, 618, 622, 728
Communist rejection: 592, 626, 748; Johnson,
537, 538, 594, 630; Rusk, 129, 131, 618, 743, 773
Conferences, Asian or Geneva: 284; Goldberg,
315, 619 (quoted) ; Rusk, 281, 317, 618, 621, 773,
778,878; U Thant, 625
Johnson offer: 595; Johnson, 595; Rusk, 622, 776
Communist rejection: 596; Johnson, 629; Rusk,
618, 623
National Liberation Front:
As sole representative of Viet-Nam: Goldberg,
312, 842 ; Rusk, 277, 322, 777
Participation: Rusk, 622, 773; U Thant, 625
Peace efforts of other countries (Rusk) , 317, 618,
743, 773
Private contacts: Goldberg, 315; Rusk, 280, 317,
321, 623, 624, 778
Private discussion: Goldberg, 507, 513; Johnson,
539, 596; Rusk, 619
SEATO position, 745
Sino-Soviet problems, effect on (Rusk), 44, 132,
283
U Thant:
Proposals: 626; Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622;
U Thant, 624
Role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 839; Rusk, 43, 45, 47,
126, 620, 773 ;U Thant, 625
Viet-Nam — Continued
Negotiations for peaceful settlement — Continued
U.S. 14-points : 284 ; Rusk, 281, 318
U.S. willingness: 570, 592, 626, 632, 657, 750;
Goldberg, 63, 98, 137, 310, 505, 507, 510, 840;
Johnson, 162, 236, 365, 538, 567, 587, 593, 594,
595, 629, 873; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 43, 47, 129,
133, 135, 172, 272, 281, 283, 317, 359, 465, 516,
618, 620, 743, 773, 778, 831, 877
"Apparent contradictions": Goldberg, 316, 512,
840; Powell, 137; Rusk, 135, 321, 619, 623,
777, 878
Without preconditions: 284, 626; Goldberg,
138, 510, 512; Johnson, 162, 535; Rusk, 43,
129, 317, 465, 621, 727, 743, 773, 777
Viet-Cong representation: 285; Goldberg, 312;
Rusk, 126, 135, 172, 280, 281; U Thant, 139
Viet-Nam government participation: 626, 749;
Goldberg, 842; Rusk, 620, 622, 624; U Thant,
625
Neutrality and nonalinement, U.S. position on:
285; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509, 841; Rusk,
281, 773
Pacification (seize-and-hold) efforts. See National
reconciliation program
Peace :
Geneva accords as a basis for: 284, 632; Gold-
berg, 63, 138, 311, 842; Johnson, 539, 630;
Rusk, 136, 281, 283, 466, 619, 778; U Thant,
139
Prospects for: Goldberg, 315, 508, 510, 513, 843;
Lodge, 800; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 128, 726, 779,
780, 876
U.S. objectives: 592; Goldberg, 310, 506, 512,
840; Holt, 962; Johnson, 230, 516, 535, 917;
Katzenbach, 756; Rusk, 130, 272, 277; Thieu,
917
Viet-Nam position, 749
Political development and progress: 592, 748;
Goldberg, 311, 513, 842; Johnson, 589, 590;
Komer, 469; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 279, 619,
779; SEATO, 746; Wheeler, 191
Communists, participation in, question of: 285,
592; Goldberg, 311, 313, 841, 843; Rusk, 279,
773, 779
Constitution: 586, 592, 748; Goldberg, 505, 509,
510, 842; Johnson, 538, 588, 589, 590, 593, 594;
Lodge, 797; Rusk, 131, 780
Elections: 285; Goldberg, 505, 512; Rusk, 317,
773, 779
Communist interference : Goldberg, 843 ; John-
son, 589; Rusk, 128
Leadership: Goldberg, 513; Lodge, 798
NLF candidates, question of: Goldberg, 513;
Lodge, 797
Ports, improvements: 204, 210; Gaud, 200; Komer,
470 ; Rusk, 832 ; Westmoreland, 741 ; Wheeler,
188
Press coverage: Martin, 855; Rusk, 127, 131;
Wheeler, 186
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1015
Viet-Nam — Continued
Prisoners :
Exchange, U.S. willingness: 749; Rusk, 281, 320,
465, 773
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment of , Com-
munist noncompliance, 749, 825
Refugees from Communism: 209, 665; Komer, 470
Reunification, U.S. position: 285; Bundy, 790;
Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 311, 312, 842; John-
son, 539; Meeker, 61; Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 274,
279, 281, 317, 773
Self-determination, 657, 749
U.S. support: 285; Bundy, 323, 790; Goldberg, 62
(quoted), 138, 311, 505, 510, 512, 842; John-
son, 160, 516, 535, 588, 630, 961; Nabrit, 29;
Rusk, 135, 272, 274, 281, 318
Seven-nation meeting of ministers, Washington,
communique, 748
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman of
Geneva Conference: 953; Rusk, 466, 878
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 614
U.N. role:
Communist position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson,
629; Rusk, 42, 619, 778; U Thant, 138
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 98, 839; John-
son, 567; Meeker, 60
U.S. position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 162, 567,
629; Nabrit, 29; Rusk, 42, 618, 773; U Thant,
138
UNDP/FAD fisheries project, U.S. support, 964
U.S. air actions (see also U.S. military operations) :
Ho Chi Minh, 596
Bombing errors: Johnson, 537; Rusk, 135, 275
Military targets only: 953; Johnson, 514, 536;
Rusk,45, 130, 131,135,275
Soviet allegations of U.S. attack on Soviet ves-
sel and U.S. rejection, 953
Thailand, use of bases in: 746; Martin, 852;
Rusk, 597
U.S. position and objectives: Johnson, 514, 536;
McNamara, 465; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 127, 780;
Westmoreland, 739; Wheeler, 190
U.S. Ambassador (Bunker), confirmation: 674;
Johnson, 538, 587, 588
U.S. commitments: Bundy, 790; Goldberg, 505;
Johnson, 158, 161, 516, 534, 539, 587, 588, 873;
Martin, 194 ; W. W. Rostow, 493, 503 ; Rusk, 45,
128, 621, 744, 777, 781, 785; Wheeler, 187, 192
Importance of dependability: Bundy, 323, 792;
Humphrey, 680; Lodge, 800; Martin, 195;
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 503; Rusk, 272,
274, 725, 726, 787, 831, 877, 878
SEATO: Bundy, 790; Johnson, 160, 515; Martin,
852; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 275, 744, 776,
876
U.S. military forces:
Manpower levels: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 465;
Rusk, 129; Wheeler, 187
Viet-Nam — Continued
U.S. military forces — Continued
Morale and successes: Goldberg, 511; Johnson,
161, 236, 593, 594; Westmoreland, 738, 741;
Wheeler, 186, 189
Relations with Vietnamese: Lodge, 797; Martin,
855; Rusk, 282
Withdrawal, conditions necessary for: 284;
Bundy, 323; Goldberg, 313, 842; Meeker, 62;
Rusk, 282, 317
U.S. military intelligence: Johnson, 536; Mc-
Namara, 466; Rusk, 278, 280, 318; Taylor, 286;
Wheeler, 190
U.S. military operations :
FY 1968 budget (Johnson) , 230, 233
Increases: McNamara, 465; Rusk, 134, 464;
Westmoreland, 740
Logistics : Taylor, 286 ; Wheeler, 188
Responsibility for: Johnson, 538, 873; Rusk, 774
Results: 592; Johnson, 14, 515, 536, 594; Komer,
471; Martin, 194; McNamara, 465; Rusk, 276,
278, 726; Westmoreland, 740; Wheeler, 187,
190
Supplemental obligational authority request FY
1967: 236; Schultze, 237
U.S. military policy: Johnson, 161, 236; Rusk, 726;
Taylor, 287 ; Westmoreland, 739
"Hawks V. Doves": Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 363
U.S. national interests (Rusk), 133, 169, 272
U.S. objectives (see also Peace): Bundy, 790;
Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 505, 509; Johnson, 535,
593, 594, 630, 678; Rusk, 45, 278, 281, 318, 877
Congressional support (Johnson) , 160, 534
Political rather than military solution: Goldberg,
62 (quoted), 310, 507, 840; Nabrit, 30
U.S. public opinion and morale: Goldberg, 509, 840;
Guerrero, 596; Johnson, 534; Lodge, 795, 799;
Martin, 193, 855; Powell, 136, 192 (correc-
tion) ; Rusk, 130, 133, 619, 774
Demonstrations (Rusk), 725, 774
Communist influence (Rusk), 725, 775
Senator Wayne Morse, question of views (Gold-
berg) , 507
Viet-Nam Army (see also Economic and social de-
velopment: Revolutionary development):
Johnson, 589; Rusk, 282; Westmoreland, 740
Vietnamese, character and goals: Humphrey, 680;
Johnson, 161, 537, 587; Lilienthal, 467; Lodge,
796; Rusk, 135
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505, 509
Visit of General Taylor (Taylor) , 285
Visit of Komer and Lilienthal : Johnson, 467, 537 ;
Lilienthal, 467
World opinion: Johnson, 515; Martin, 195; Rusk,
273, 276, 619, 726; U Thant, 139; Wheeler, 192
Asia: Baguio meeting, 517; Goldberg, 505, 513;
Holt, 962; Rusk, 726
East European countries: Harriman, 821;
Kohler, 413 ; Rusk, 283
1016
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam, North:
President Johnson, question of visit (Rusk) , 283
U.S. journalists:
Opinions of (Rusk), 131
Visits to (Rusk), 127
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565
Visas :
U.S. passports to Middle East invalidated, an-
nouncement, 953
U.S. visitors' visas, indefinite validity, 695
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519
Voluntary organizations, private, CIA relationships:
665; Johnson, 665
Volunteers to America, 244
Wadsworth, James J., 353
Waldheim, Kurt (Nabrit), 32
Walters, Barbara, 168
War:
Chemical and biological warfare, 577
Dangers of and need for prevention: Brzezinski,
415; Goldberg, 895; Rusk, 134, 170, 271, 363
War on Hunger: Humphrey, 685; Johnson, 231, 235,
295, 298, 329, 379, 381, 658, 700, 849; E. V. Ros-
tow, 403, 856 ; Rusk, 874
AID, office of, establishment (Johnson), 381
War on Poverty (see also Great Society) : Katzen-
bach, 955; Yen, 849
Warsaw Pact countries (Rusk), 283
Washington, George, 328
Watanabe, Takeshi (Bundy), 326
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation, 217
Water for Peace, international conference: 762, 765,
907; Johnson, 902; Rusk, 904; Solomon, 562
Water for Peace; A Report of Background Consider-
ations and Recommendations on the Water for
Peace Program: excerpts, 760; released, 758n
Water resources (see also Conservation, Desalination,
Flood control and Water for Peace), North
Africa (Palmer), 812
Waters, Herbert, 860
Watson, Arthur K., 696, 697
Watson, Barbara M., 765
Wehner, Herbert, 360
Wehrle, Leroy, 844
Western hemisphere, convention on nature protection
and wildlife preservation: Costa Rica, 353
Western Samoa, International Wheat Agreement,
1967 protocol, signature, 930
Westmoreland, William C: 586, 738; Bunker, 845;
Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 161, 467, 535, 538, 539,
593, 594; Rusk, 877; Taylor, 286
Wheat:
International grains agreement, U.S. interests:
432; Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861;
Roth, 880
U.S. shipments to India. See India
Wheat — Continued
Wheat Agreement (1962), International, protocol
for further extension of: Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 930 ; Costa Rica, 642,
930; Cuba, 930; Ecuador, 182; El Salvador,
930; Finland, 86, 930; Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, 930; Guatemala,
122, 930; Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, 930;
Japan, 224; Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
930; Mexico, 86, 930; Netherlands, Norway,
930; Peru, 122, 930; Portugal, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Soviet
Union, Sweden, Switzerland, 930; U.A.R., 393,
930; U.K., U.S., Vatican City, 930; Venezuela,
86, 930; Western Samoa, 930
Wheeler, Earle G., 53, 586, 594, 609; addresses, 186
White, Edward: Goldberg, 80; Johnson, 388
White, John (Thieu), 591
White House Conference on International Coopera-
tion (Johnson), 658
WHO. See World Health Organization
Wilson, Carroll L., 651
Wilson, Harold: 963; Humphrey, 166; quoted, 368,
373; Rusk, 466; Sisco, 67
Wilson, Woodrow (Rusk), 270
WHO. See World Meteorological Organization
Wodajo, Kifle (Goldberg), 888
Women :
Equal rights, U.N. covenants provisions, 107
Political rights of, convention (1953) :
Current actions: Afghanistan, 86; Gabon, U.K.,
834
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524
Wong Lin Ken, 688
Woods, George: Humphrey, 685; quoted, 810; Rusk,
404
World Food Program, U.S. pledge: Johnson, 297;
E. V. Rostow, 861
World Health Organization: 761; Palmer, 650
Constitution (1946), as amended: Barbados, 833
Amendment to article 7 : Morocco, 701
Drug reaction reporting system, announcement, 919
World Meteorological Organization, U.N.: Johnson,
658; Sisco, 462
World order:
Big-power responsibilities : Goldberg, 895 ; Johnson,
546, 550, 917; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856;
Rusk, 770
Institutions and practices contributing to: Kohler,
8, 408 ; Sisco, 64 ; Yen, 849
Interdependence of modern world: Goldberg, 838;
Johnson, 301, 385; Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow,
399, 896; W. W. Rostow, 504; Rusk, 267, 270;
Sisco, 459
International law, importance: Goldberg, 140, 896;
McDougal (quoted), 144
Obligations of community of man : Brzezinski, 414 ;
Goldberg, 896; Hand (quoted), 545; Johnson,
296, 300, 381; E. V. Rostow, 861; W. W.
Rostow, 491
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1017
World peace :
Communism, threat to: ANZUS, 749; Bundy, 791;
Kohler, 7; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 169, 743,
785
Durable peace, importance and U.S. goal: Brzezin-
ski, 415; Chung, 549; Goldberg, 289, 895;
Johnson, 231, 328, 329, 587, 678, 907; Katzen-
bach, 755; Roosevelt (quoted), 963; W. W.
Rostow, 500; Rusk, 136, 169, 267, 269, 278,
358, 363, 725, 771, 781, 784, 874, 787; Sisco,
459
Economic problems, relation to: Humphrey, 489;
E. V. Rostow, 857-858; Rusk, 829
Near East, importance to (Johnson), 870
Nuclear proliferation. See Nuclear entries
Outer space treaty, importance to (Goldberg), 78,
83, 98, 603
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967, proclama-
tion, 873
Southern Rhodesian situation as a threat to: 369,
373, 375; Goldberg, 75, 143, 291; Palmer, 449
U.S.-Soviet interests: 697; Katzenbach, 754
Viet-Nam situation a throat to: ANZUS, 749;
Goldberg, 137; Johnson, 160; Lodge, 800;
Rusk, 42, 136, 359, 781, 787, 831 ; U Thant, 139
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation: 756, John-
son, 886
World Weather Watch : Johnson, 658 ; Sisco, 462
Wortham, Buel (Rusk), 44, 248
Wortzel, Arthur I., 71
Yarmouth Castle disaster: Johnson, 429; Miller, 173
Yemen Arab Republic:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Yen Chia-kan, 847
Yingling, Raymund T., 636, 919
Young Choo Kim, 747 "<
Yugoslavia :
Economic and political development: Brzezinski,
417; Harriman, 817, 820; Katzenbach, 5;
Kohler, 8, 408, 411; Solomon, 519
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 613, 641, 733,
967
U.S. food aid, question of (Rusk) , 46
U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3
Zambia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688
Political and economic development: Goldberg, 73;
Katzenbach, 954
Southern Rhodesian situation, effect on: 367, 372,
374 ; Goldberg, 73, 75
Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final
protocols, 701
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), 371
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) , 371
Zimbabwe African National Union, 371
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, 371
Zollner, Maxime-Leopold, 850
Zorthian, Barry, 844
1018
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
U.S. eOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
PEPARTMENT
~ OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U36
January 2, 1967
THE ISSUES OF EAST-WEST TRADE
by Under Secretary Katzenbach 2
EAST-WEST RELATIONS: SHAPING A STABLE WORLD
by Deputy Under Secretary Kohler 6
OECD MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETS AT PARIS
Statements by Under Secretary Rostow
and Text of Communique 19
For index see inside back cover
The Issues of East-West Trade
by Under Secretary Katzenbach '■
Today, I would like to spend a few minutes
discussing with you the issues of East-West
trade, and I would like to begin by recalling
still another protest cause — ^that of the citi-
zens who have ranged themselves into "Com-
mittees to Warn of the Arrival of Communist
Merchandise on the Local Scene."
Some have gone into groceries to paste
labels on Polish hams. A man in Shreveport,
Louisiana, appeals for funds in the belief that
if we continue to import Yugoslav tobacco for
American cigarette blends, "all the Chris-
tians will be persecuted and the women
raped and the little children sent to slave
camps." A lady in New Jersey is waging a
campaign against the import of carrots from
Canada on the ground that some of the car-
rots are Communist carrots.
Let me make it plain that I have no quar-
rel with the right of such individuals to pro-
test or demonstrate lawfully. Nor is it for
me to object to their ardor on behalf of a
cause. But I would suggest that their patriot-
ism exceeds their understanding, for in such
blanket protest against communism they are
reacting to the facts of the last decade rather
than this one.
Communism surely remains a resolute op-
ponent of free societies. And surely there is
little need, at a time when we are fighting in
Viet-Nam, to repeat our nation's determina-
tion to resist Communist aggression.
But how vastly different is the face of com-
munism in the world today than it was a
decade ago. How much meaning can even the
phrase "world communism" have when Red
Guards riot at the Soviet Embassy in Peking
and the Chinese Conununists charge the
Soviet Union with conspiring with the United
States to betray North Viet-Nam ?
Communism is no longer the monolith of
Stalin's time. Increasingly, we see deep, even
bitter, divisions between Communist nations.
Increasingly, we see Eastern European coun-
tries pursuing individual national interest
and identity. Increasingly, these countries re-
flect grave understanding of the impartial
dangers of destruction.
For both sides these changes create a
channel for contact, for understanding, and
for peace. And this is a channel we have al-
ready begun to travel. Three years ago we
were able to agree on a test ban treaty. Re-
cently, we extended our cultural exchanges
agreement with the Soviet Union,^ and we
have signed an air travel agreement.^ Only
yesterday came word of the agreement
barring nuclear weapons in space.
Two months ago. President Johnson told
a New York audience ^ that:
Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the
East — a shift from the narrow concept of coexist-
ence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.
Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward
' Address made before the National Association of
Manufacturers' 71st annual Congress of American
Industry at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 9 (press re-
lease 289).
^ For text of a joint communique of Mar. 19, 1966,
see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 543.
= For text, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.
* For an advance text of President Johnson's
address before the National Conference of Editorial
Writers, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviet Union has been the same. Where neces-
sary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we
shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.
We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-
Nam or elsewhere ever prevent us from exploring
all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and
the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and
our allies shall go step by step with them just as
far as they are willing to advance.
In short, the winds of change in Eastern
Europe are freeing the ice floes of the cold
war. They can be warm winds. They can also
be trade winds.
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
Trade with Eastern Europe is a subject in
which the NAM has exhibited sustained and
responsible interest, as exemplified by the ex-
tensive study by Dr. Mose Harvey which you
commissioned. As I think Dr. Harvey would
agree, this is a time when increasing trade
with Eastern Europe, under careful and selec-
tive direction, can be both good business and
good policy.
But the Government does not now have the
authority to free that trade or to apply selec-
tive direction. It is not now possible for the
United States to take full advantage of the
opportunities presented by trade.
The core of the problem is that only Yugo-
slavia and Poland now receive the same tariflf
treatment we give to the other countries of
the world. The President may not extend it
to the other countries of Eastern Europe.
This is the most-favored-nation treatment,
which for 40 years has been central to our
foreign commercial policy. (I might add,
however, that I have never understood the
reason for the phrase. All that "most fa-
vored" means is "nondiscriminatory" treat-
ment.)
We gave most-favored-nation treatment to
Eastern Europe for many years. In 1951,
however, at the height of the cold war, we
withdrew it, imposing on the products of
these countries the very high rates of the old
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
This was a rational distinction to make in
1951. But is it rational today? Should not the
President have authority to negotiate with
any of these countries for the advantages we
can gain by offering them the same tariff
rates we apply to the rest of the world ?
The President's inability to negotiate in
this manner now sharply limits our capacity
to use our great economic power of trade as
an instrument of foreign policy. And more
obviously, it sharply limits trade. This is a
self-imposed restriction, and we are the only
major free-world nation to so tie our hands.
The Miller Committee Recommendations
Recognizing the potential of a freer hand,
the President sought to explore both the
policy and trade benefits. In early 1965 he
appointed a study committee of distinguished
business, labor, and academic leaders, includ-
ing members of this association, and chaired
by J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the Cummins
Engine Company.
The Miller committee conducted an ex-
haustive study, which was based on full
access to our defense and intelligence infor-
mation. In its superb report it concluded
that the United States, having built the most
powerful defense system the world has ever
seen, could and should seek practical means
of reducing areas of conflict.^
Peaceful, nonstrategic trade, the commit-
tee said, "can be an important instrument of
national policy in our country's relations
with individual Communist nations of
Europe" and we should use trade negotia-
tions with those countries more actively, ag-
gressively, and confidently "in the pursuit of
our national welfare and world peace."
And the single most important- step, the
committee concluded, is to give the President
discretionary authority to grant — or with-
draw— nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to
individual countries of Eastern Europe.
The proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act,* based on the Miller committee recom-
mendations, would do exactly that. Congress
did not act on this measure last year, but as
the President said in October, we intend to
press for it in the coming Congress.
= For text, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 845.
' For background and text of the proposed legisla-
tion, see ibid., p. 838.
JANUARY 2, 1967
T have so far only suggested the adminis-
tration's reasoning in supporting this meas-
ure. Let me now analyze it in somewhat
greater detail on the framework of three
basic questions.
Three Basic Questions
The first is: Why should we send goods to
Communist countries — opponents of our sys-
tem— and thus either directly or indirectly
strengthen their military capacity?
Unlike the blanket condemnation of pro-
testers who paste labels on hams in markets,
this is not only a sensible question but a basic
question. There are three answers to it.
1. At present, the export of strategic goods
— goods closely or directly related to military
use — is strictly controlled. In seeking this
act we would not abandon such independent
controls.
2. The Soviet Union's military capability
is not based on imports. On the contrary, as
the world knows, it has developed advanced
weapons and space technology from its own
resources.
3. It is not likely that trade with the
United States would release Soviet resources
for additional military spending. The Soviet
Union already gives highest priority to mili-
tary spending. Larger imports* from the
United States would almost certainly expand
the consumer sector of the Soviet economy,
not the military. As the Miller committee
noted, any change in Soviet resource availa-
bility would "affect its civilian economy, not
its military budget."
The basic point, after all, is that we are
talking about trade, not aid. The Soviet
Union and the other East European coun-
tries would have to pay for increased imports
either with gold or by increased exports —
and those would require diversion of re-
sources to produce.
The effect of all three of these points
was summarized by the Miller committee:
". . . total Western nonstrategic trade, let
alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to
alter the fundamental relationship between
East- West militaiy capabilities."
Accepting that conclusion, it is still fair
to ask the second question: Would expanded
East-West trade really amount to very much
economically; is it really good busijiess?
The total amount of trade potential in the
East European countries should not be exag-
gerated. They are not among the great trad-
ing nations, nor are they soon likely to
become so.
Nevertheless, their trade could be mean-
ingful. The rocketing success of the free
economies in the West is exerting a major
influence on the economic planners of the
East.
In the past 15 years East European trade
has increased fivefold. Last year the free
world sold more than $6 billion in goods to
Eastern Europe and bought almost the same
amount.
The United States has not shared in this
growth. West Germany, for example, exports
more than half a billion dollars' worth of
goods each year, five times our present total.
Earlier this year, the Fiat company of Italy
entered into an agreement to build an $800
million compact car plant in the Soviet
Union.
In other words, East European trade with
the West is going to expand, with us or with-
out us. If we do not participate, however, we
will lose more than business opportunities.
We will have forfeited a major opportunity
to achieve policy gains, and this raises the
third question: Would expanded East-West
trade really amount to very much diplo-
matically; is it really good policy?
This, in the administration's view, is by far
the most important aspect of East-West
trade. Where reasons of economic gain might
justify it, reasons of policy require it.
As Secretary Rusk observed last week: ''
It is too late in history to maintain intractable
hostility across the entire range of relationships.
. . . even at a time when there are difficult and
painful and even dangerous issues between us, it
is necessary in the interest of Homo sapiens for the
leaders on both sides to explore the possibilities of
pointr, of agreement. . . .
Enlarged trade can be a significant frame-
' In an address before the Executives Club of
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
work for such exploration — if the countries
of Eastern Europe want trade, as surely they
do. Life magazine this week describes a trade
fair in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The American
pavilion was small compared with the Soviet
and German displays, but it was stocked with
such items as a cropdusting plane, data proc-
essing machines, a tire-recapping machine,
and an electronic "car doctor."
The magazine quotes one American official
as saying, "They try to do everything here
with one pair of pliers. When we showed
them 20 different kinds of pliers, not to men-
tion all those screwdrivers — well, my God."
In less than 2 weeks the pavilion had
attracted 650,000 people, three times the
population of the city.
At the most specific level, the enlarged
trade would give us the influence to secure
satisfactoiy economic concessions, such as
patent protections or trade and tourist pro-
motion offices or assurances concerning arbi-
tration of commercial disputes.
Reassertjon of National Identities
A larger benefit relates to the continuing
movement of these countries away from the
rigidities of the past. Politically, they are
reasserting their national identities. Eco-
nomically, they are turning increasingly
away from centralized direction and increas-
ingly toward greater use of the profit incen-
tive.
Yugoslavia is the model example. After
breaking away from the Cominform in 1948,
Yugoslavia began economic decentralization,
giving considerable autonomy to individual
enterprises. This has continued to the point
that Yugoslavia is now a member of the great
international economic institutions like the
World Bank, GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade], and the International
Monetary Fund.
This change is not isolated. Almost all the
countries of Eastern Europe are working to
overcome the clumsiness and inefficiencies of
overcentralized economic direction.
Next January 1 Czechoslovakia embarks on
a major economic reform program placing
new responsibilities on the plant managers
and placing new stress on the market and the
price system in determining the success or
failure of individual enterprises.
A year later Hungary is scheduled to put
even more radical changes into effect. New
experiments are underway in Bulgaria and
Poland. And you are familiar with the experi-
ments in using the profit motive underway in
the Soviet Union.
In most of these countries efficiency is re-
placing ideology as the guide in economic
matters, and the demands of the ordinary
consumer for more goods and a better stand-
ard of living are being listened to with new
respect.
What is most striking in this process of
change is that in no two Eastern European
countries are the changes identical. Each is
going its own way, reflecting growing feel-
ings of national identity and independence
which are coming to the surface throughout
the area.
But by acting on these changes, we can
advance our own interests and advance the
prospects of peace. Through trade we can
encourage them to rebuild their historical
friendly ties to the West. Through trade we
can increase their contacts with American
businessmen — and tourists. Through trade
we can encourage their participation in inter-
national institutions— and international re-
sponsibilities. Through trade we can increase
their stake in peaceful relations with the
West.
And, finally, basic to all of these benefits
is our demonstration of faith in the strength
of the free society. We do not fear the tests
to which the future will put such a society.
We have not sought to seal it behind an Iron
Curtain or a Berlin wall — nor should we seal
it behind a rigid tariff blockade.
That blockade should be removed. On
behalf of good business, good policy, and good
sense I invite and welcome your support.
JANUARY 2, 1967
East-West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
by Foy D. Kohler
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs i
I am glad to be with you today. It seems
very appropriate to me that my first appear-
ance outside of Washington since my return
from the Soviet Union should be in Florida,
for it is the State my wife and I are in the
process of adopting, having originated, re-
spectively, in North Carolina and Ohio. This
background, I take it, will make us feel very
much at home among our fellow Floridians.
Just a few weeks ago, we returned from
Moscow after living there for nearly 41/2
years. Maybe as a result of that experience
and of previous assignments in Eastern Eu-
rope, I can cast some light for you on the
problems of East-West relations, a subject
which is vital — I was about to say a matter
of life and death — to all of us.
A century ago a voyage to Russia con-
sumed months. When we came back by com-
bination of plane and ship it took us 7 days.
When direct air communications are estab-
lished next year, a flight from Moscow to
New York will take about 8 hours. But even
today a missile can make it in 30 minutes.
For a good many years American Presi-
dents have been concerned that the traffic
between these two particular points on the
globe should go by sea and land and in the
atmosphere, rather than on a ballistic trajec-
tory through space. I have had the privilege
of working with several administrations —
with President Eisenhower, with President
Kennedy, with President Johnson — on this
' Made before the Florida Department of the
American Legion at Orlando, Fla., on Dec. 11 (press
release 290 dated Dec. 10).
question. I found that each of these Presi-
dents, looking at the problem from the point
of view of the national interest, of the well-
being and security of all Americans, came to
hold essentially the same views and reached
essentially the same conclusions. The policies
which have issued from their profound con-
sideration of how to insure a peaceful world
have been set forth by all of them, most
recently, of course, by President Johnson.
Speaking last August at the National Re-
actor Testing Center for the Atomic Energy
Commission at Idaho Falls, the President,
after hailing the peaceful potential of atomic
power, said: ^
But there is another — and a darker — side of the
nuclear age that we should never forget. That is
the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons.
. . . uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear
crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation
in which the world is capable of extinction in a
moment of error, or madness, or anger. . . .
Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts
to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We
did so because our conviction and our interests de-
manded it; and we shall continue to do so.
But we have never sought war or the destruction
of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought in-
stead to increase our knowledge and our under-
standing of the Russian people with whom we share
a common feeling for life, a love of song and story,
and a sense of the land's vast promises.
After talking of our differences with the
Soviet Union, the President posed the ques-
tion as to what practical step could be taken
forward toward peace. He answered himself:
» For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I think it is to recognize that while differing
principles and differing values may always divide us,
they should not, and they must not, deter us from
rational acts of common endeavor. . . .
This does not mean that we have to become bed-
fellows. It does not mean that we have to cease
competition. But it does mean that we must both
want — and work for and long for — that day when
"nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn. war any more."
In October, just before he left for his trip
to the Far East, President Johnson spelled
all this out a bit further in a speech in New
York reviewing U.S. policy toward Europe
as a whole.^
The Atlantic allies (he said) have always tried
to maintain (a healthy balance) between strength
and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility,
between resolution and hope. . . .
A just peace remains our goal. . . . the world is
changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of
today — not yesterday. . . .
Our purpose is not to overturn other governments
but to help the people of Europe to achieve:
A continent in which the peoples of Eastern and
Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together
for the common good.
A continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a
framework in which West and East can act together
in order to assure the security of all.
The President then listed some new meas-
ures he intends to take to strengthen the
prospects for improved relations with the
Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Eu-
rope in trade and other fields, and he wel-
comed comparable measures on the part of
our Atlantic allies.
Why have a succession of Presidents of
different political persuasion reached essen-
tially the same conclusions? Why did Presi-
dent Johnson state our policy in the terms I
have quoted? These are questions I should
like to explore with you this morning.
I think we can start by agreeing that the
free world continues to be challenged by a
hostile political system whose leaders claim
that only that system, materialistic in con-
cept, authoritarian in character, is capable
of solving the problems besetting mankind.
They proclaim as a matter of historical in-
For advance text, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
evitability that their system is destined to
rule the world. It is a fact that Communist
regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe pursue an ideology fundamentally
opposed to our own.
Since 1945 the conflict between the two
systems has sometimes taken the form of
trials of strength and periods of military
conflict; more often, it has been conducted
by less violent methods. That confrontation,
in broader terms, has its "defensive" and
"oflfensive" aspects, if I may use these mili-
tary terms. I propose to speak to you today
about both aspects.
Meeting Force With Force
In the course of the last 20 years the
United States has had to confront Commu-
nist violence in many parts of the world.
This we have done, and this we will do, if
necessary, again. We firmly believe that in
the nuclear age no power has the right to
impose its ideas or its system on others
through the use of arms. This is a funda-
mental lesson which all nations must learn
and abide by. We have striven to drive that
lesson home.
Accordingly, when Greece was threatened
by Communist subversion in the immediate
postwar years, the United States did not
hesitate to come to the aid of Greece. At that
time, there were many who argued that we
should not. They said that Greece was under
a conservative, indeed even a reactionary,
system not worthy of our assistance. Today,
20 years later, Greece is a thriving democ-
racy, and even the severest critics of Presi-
dent Truman's policy now agree that our
eflforts in Greece contributed to peace and
stability in the Balkans.
I need not speak to you at length about the
Korean war. Many of you assembled here to-
day took part in that conflict, and you know
well what was at stake. The United States
did not hesitate to send its young men and to
commit its resources in order to insure that
peace and stability would prevail in the
Northern Pacific. Because we did not hesi-
tate. Communist China as well as Stalin's
Russia learned, painfully and at some cost to
JANUARY 2, 1967
them, that the United States is unflinching
when faced with the threat of force.
In Europe we have made it clear to our
friends and foes that we stand by our com-
mitments. They have been tested twice in
BerUn. The United States is still in West
Berlin, and no citizen of West Berlin need
fear about his future.
There was a time during the postwar con-
frontation when the Soviet leadership, be-
cause of misguided assumptions, concluded
that the balance of power could be turned in
its favor and that the United States could be
stared down in a nuclear confrontation. So-
viet missiles were implanted not far from
here— in Cuba. But precisely because we
stood firm and fast, wisdom prevailed and
the Soviet missiles are there no longer.
Thus, painfully and gradually, a measure
of restraint has come into American-Soviet
relations. This has come about because the
Soviets have no illusions about our determi-
nation to meet force with force.
We are in the process of establishing the
same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there
is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of
Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind
of strategy international communism will
follow in this decade. Having learned that
overt force does not pay, some Communists
concluded that covert force may open the
gates. We are keeping them shut. It is no
secret that we believe that in keeping them
shut we are aiding not only the cause of
peace but also the arguments of those Com-
munists who have already learned that vio-
lence is not the way to global supremacy.
Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would
have helped the arguments of the more radi-
cal Communists who contend that covert vio-
lence is something to which the United States
cannot effectively respond. If we had not re-
sponded, we would have proven the radical
Communists right.
These periods of violence have thus dem-
onstrated— and are demonstrating in Viet-
Nam — that Communist attempts to expand
their systems by force can and will be con-
tained by the determination of the free
world. But, as I have suggested, these re-
sponses have been essentially "defensive."
And these contests have also demonstrated
that force is not a solution to the basic con-
flict between political systems.
Evolutionary Developments
In many respects the more important and
long-lasting aspect of the struggle is the one
I would describe as "offensive," despite its
less spectacular nature. I have in mind active
promotion of a process of gradual change
designed to shape the kind of world we
would all like to live in: a world of coopera-
tive communities in which ideological divi-
sions no longer create fundamental gulfs be- •
tween men and societies; a world in which |
violence gives way to the rule of law; a world
in which poverty and suffering are overcome
by worldwide efforts to improve the well-
being of man. |
Indeed, this quieter and more subtle proc-
ess has already brought about some funda-
mental evolutionary developments in the
Communist world. And the action of such
natural forces as nationalism has been en-
couraged by positive programs of developing
constructive relationships with the countries
of Eastern Europe carried on by the United
States and other Western countries for the
past decade.
The Communist world is no longer mono-
lithic. We can no longer talk of a Sino-Soviet
bloc. The first crack appeared in 1948, with
the Soviet-Yugoslav split. One- of the great
decisions in American foreign policy was
President Truman's prompt and immediate
support of the Yugoslav declaration of na-
tional independence by the provision of
large-scale military and economic aid to sup-
port this Yugoslav position.
Since then Yugoslavia has gone its own
independent way and is experimenting \vith
changes in its economic and political system
that are of importance for the Communist
world as a whole. As you probably know,
Yugoslavia has gone a long way toward a
market economy, and today the Yugoslav
leaders are debating what role the Commu-
nist party should be playing in this society,
how much dissent ought to be permitted,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
what forms of human liberty should be in-
troduced into a system that once was a totali-
tarian one. Just 4 days ago, for the first time
in Communist history the g-overnment of one
of the Yugoslav provinces, Slovenia, was
forced to resign in the face of opposition in
its own parliament.
Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary
challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the
Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed,
Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its
government has not broken with the Soviet
Union, and we should have no illusions about
that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of Pol-
ish life are free of Communist control. More
than 80 percent of Polish farmland is pri-
vately owned and cultivated. Collectivization
has been abandoned altogether. A measure
of freedom of expression is tolerated. Exten-
sive contacts with the West have been devel-
oped. Hundreds of young Poles are studying
in Western institutions, many of them in the
United States.
More generally, the process of fragmenta-
tion in the Communist world has been ac-
centuated by the Si no-Soviet dispute. That
dispute has dissipated the illusion of unity
which has been one of the sources of strength
of Communist ideology. It has proven not
only to the world at large but to the Com-
munists themselves that their ideology does
not insure global unity; it has proven that
national aspirations and feelings are more
powerful than doctrinal formulas.
Today the Soviet people can take little
comfort in having a Communist neighbor to
the East of them. That Communist neighbor,
with nearly four times the population of the
Soviet Union, makes no secret of its hostility
ind contempt for the Soviet Union. I often
.vonder how we would feel if one of our
leighbors had close to 700 million people,
vas developing nuclear weapons and rockets,
vas condemning our social system and laying
'laims to major portions of our territory. I
leed not recall how concerned we were about
he Soviet missiles on the small island of
]uba. Magnify that threat many times and
'ou may get a sense of how an average Rus-
ian feels.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has served to in-
crease the margin of autonomy for the East
Europeans. While generally siding with the
Soviet Union, with the notable exception of
Albania, the East Europeans have also taken
advantage of the dispute to assert greater
autonomy for themselves. This is a normal
and understandable eft^ect, typical of the in-
ternational game: Whenever a major partner
is preoccupied elsev/here, the minor partners
become more eflPective in asserting their in-
terests. In that respect the East Europeans
are no different from anyone else.
Desire for Closer Relations With the West
If I may generalize broadly, today the
East Europeans are increasingly desirous of
developing relations with the West. They
realize that the crisis they face in their econ-
omies, the need they have for more advanced
forms of science and technology, their quest
for cultural self-expression can only be satis-
fied through closer relations with the West.
This, to a large extent, is also true of the
Soviet Union. I have in mind here the Soviet
people rather than the Soviet leadership. The
leadership itself is still governed by ideologi-
cal considerations which color its approach to
the West. It is still more interested in pur-
suing the goal of fragmenting Western unity
than in seeking a general accommodation
with the West. But we should keep in mind
that Communist rule in these countries, by
their own definition, represents a monopoly
of political power in the hands of a single
party which includes only a small minority
of the population. And Russian society at
large, as I can testify through countless con-
tacts, desires to participate in the Western
civilization; it wishes to develop closer con-
tacts with the United States; it does not de-
sire to be cut off from the world by an ideo-
logical curtain.
I would be misleading you if I created the
impression that everything is rosy in the
Communist world — and I do not mean to
make a bad pun by that remark. There are
many things taking place there which we can
justly classify as retrogressive. We are un-
happy over the fact that, in the context of our
ANUARY 2, 1967
efforts to improve relations with the East, the
Czechoslovak Government has seen fit to kid-
nap a U.S. citizen who was not even in
Czechoslovakia voluntarily but was brought
in by a Soviet aircraft not scheduled to stop
there.
We are also dismayed, as are all free men,
by the sight of distinguished Soviet writers
being tried and sent to prison because they
dared to publish in the West the products of
their creative talent. We are indignant when
American tourists in the Soviet Union are
subjected to harsh and arbitrary procedures
for trivial offenses. We are concerned by the
conflict with the Catholic Church and by
other forms of intellectual intolerance re-
cently manifested in Poland.
All of these manifestations, however, have
to be seen in their broad perspective. And the
trend, to me, seems clear : It involves a decline
in the ideological passions which have
dominated mankind in the last 100 years.
Without going into tedious historical
analysis, I think it is fair to say that the age
of ideologies has been a peculiar phenomenon
in history. It was the product of a very spe-
cial phase of European development. Many
nations, going through similar social and in-
dustrial revolutionary changes, became in-
fected by ideological attitudes.
Those of you who travel to Europe must be
struck how much less ideological the Euro-
peans have become. The same is true, I can
tell you on the basis of my personal experi-
ence, of the East Europeans and the Rus-
sians. Indeed, precisely because they were
exposed to a pernicious and dogmatic
ideology, in some respects they are even less
ideological than their West European
brothers. I remember talking not long ago to
an East European Communist professor,
whom I asked, "Why did your ideology die
so quickly?" To which he responded — and, I
repeat, he is a Communist — "Die so quickly?
I think it took too long to die." His attitude
is symptomatic of many others who, disil-
lusioned by Stalinism, embittered by per-
sistent economic and social failures of the
system, are turning to more pragmatic solu-
tions.
10
I think it is our role in the world today to
take advantage of the trends of thought and
of the developments which I have discussed
to shape a larger and more stable relation-
ship with some of the Communist states and "<
to encourage constructive change within. We
should not lower our guard, but we should
take advantage of every opportunity to de-
velop closer contacts and wider relations with
them in order to shape a stable world.
Our efforts to that end have not been with-
out their rewards. We helped save Yugoslav
independence during its hour of danger, and
anyone familiar with East Europe knows
that in the years that followed Yugoslavia
has had a major liberalizing impact on the
rest of the Soviet world. Under President
Eisenhower we extended economic assistance
to the Poles, and we made it easier for them
to preserve their free-enteii^rise agricultural
system.
Trade a Two-Way Street
Taking advantage of the opportunities
which are now opening, we wish to expand
our relations with the Communist states.
Some of the restrictions on East- West trade
adopted during the earlier, more intense
phase of the cold war have now outlived their
usefulness. In proposing to Congress the
East-West Trade Relations Act,^ the Presi-
dent has taken an action designed to give
greater flexibility to the United States in
dealing with the Communist countries. The
export of military or militarily useful items
to Communist countries is effectively pro-
hibited by Allied agreement. Further restric-
tions on our trade with these states do not in
the long run deny the Communists anything;
they can obtain most of the goods concerned
in West Europe or elsewhere. Added restric-
tions do make it more difficult for us to de-
velop relations designed to shape patterns of
development that we consider favorable in
the Eastern states. At the same time they
punish our own farmers and manufacturers
unnecessarily.
■* For text of the proposed legislation, see ibid.,
May 30, 1966, p. 843.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I do not think I need to tell you that our
purpose is not a series of giveaways; rather,
our intent is to create such commercial rela-
tions that the Communist states develop
closer ties with the West, such relations that
they will increasingly be encouraged to evolve
domestically along the lines we desire. I can
assure you that the people in these countries
know how we and the Western Europeans
live. They know it is much better than the
way they live. They want to live as we do, to
have cars, adequate housing, and better
clothing.
It is clear to me that it is in our interest
to take actions which help bring about a
diversion of their resources from military
and space programs to consumer goods.
Trade is not just commercial, but also po-
litical. It is a two-way street and one of the
channels of communications with these coun-
tries. Let me put it to you this way. Who
here would not sooner have people in Yugo-
slavia growing tobacco rather than produc-
ing munitions? Who among us would not
rather have Soviet workers making passen-
ger cars instead of missiles? Isn't it better
for us all for Poland to devote increased re-
sources to production of high-quality pork
and ham? Who does not think it useful that
Romanian resources be devoted to an auto-
mobile-tii'e industry rather than to produc-
tion of jet fuel?
In sum, we must be able to use our vast
power and our resources to shape the kind
of world we would want to see our children
live in. In his recent major speech on East-
West relations, the President called for a
"broader vision of peaceful engagement."
This was not a call for an immediate accom-
modation with the Soviet Union, nor was it
an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on
the basis of the status quo. It is rather a
commitment on the part of the United States
to continue seeking a new Europe in which
a more durable settlement can eventually be
attained.
As the President said, the present division
of Europe and of Germany will be ended
through a long process of change, which re-
quires the emergence of new conditions and
attitudes both in the East and in the West.
There are no rapid breakthroughs waiting
in the wings.
As we look to the future, we believe that
progress toward European unity and Atlan-
tic cooperation provides a foundation stone
for a stable East-West reconciliation. We'll
continue to build such a Europe, and we'll
continue to seek such a reconciliation.
Eventually, we hope to see emerge an East-
ern Europe of more independent states, with
governments more responsive to domestic
needs and pressures, participating more fully
in a larger structure of bilateral and multi-
lateral East-West cooperation in Europe — a
cooperation that includes also the United
States and the Soviet Union. In seeking such
East-West reconciliation, in the words of
Secretary of State Rusk,^
Ours is not an effort to subvert the Eastern
European governments nor to make those states
hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No
one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is
again balkanized.
We approach this task in a spirit of self-
reliance and optimism. We know that we
have the means to repel aggression wher-
ever it occurs. We know that we have the
will to do so. Of this, let no one have any
doubt. But it is not enough simply to react
to Conununist challenges. If we are to win
this contest, we must remain on the "offen-
sive"; we must take positive and constructive
initiatives. We know that our citizens, intel-
ligently perceiving the realities of this age,
will support an East-West policy that uses to
the fullest the wealth and diversity of this
nation to shape an enduring peace.
' For text of Secretary Rusk's address at New
York, N.Y., on Aug. 22, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 12,
1966, p. 362.
JANUARY 2, 1967
11
President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect Amistad Dam
President Johnson and President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz of Mexico on December 3 made
a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam con-
struction site near Del Rio, Tex., and Ciudad
Acuna, Mexico. Follmving are texts of Presi-
dent Johnson's statement of November 29,
his remarks at Ciudad Acuna on December 3,
and a joint statement issued by the two
Presidents at the close of the visit.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Statement of November 29
Whit« House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 29
President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico has asked
me to join him on Saturday [December 3]
for a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam
construction site on the Rio Grande.
I will be accompanied by Mrs. Johnson,
Secretary [of the Interior] Stewart Udall,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- Ameri-
can Affairs Lincoln Gordon, and Ambassador
Fulton Freeman.
Some of you may know that Amistad Dam
is the second major international storage
dam to be built by our two Governments on
the Rio Grande pursuant to the 1944 water
treaty.
The dam will prevent floods originating in
rivers on both sides of the boundary from
causing loss of life and great property dam-
age such as occurred in the floods of 1954
and 1958. It will also assist in water conser-
vation and offer potential power generation.
It will enable the two Governments for the
first time to control the waters of the Rio
Grande throughout its international section.
Remarks at the Civic Plaza, Ciudad Acuna,
IVIexico, December 3
Whit^ House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated December 3
Last April we met in your beautiful capital
city to pay homage to a hero of the past.^
Today we meet here on the frontier to in-
spect a monument to the future.
The work that we see going on around us
tells us the dramatic story of what two
peoples working together can accomplish:
— Here we see the decisions of President
Eisenhower and President [Adolfo] Lopez
Mateos to embark on this joint enterprise.^
— Here we will see the action of two Con-
gresses in voting the funds to build the dam.
^Here we see the Mexican and the United
States technicians and laborers working side
by side throwing up the earth embankments
and erecting the concrete structures.
— And looking into the future, Mr. Presi-
dent, we will see millions of farmers and
towTispeople on both sides of this great river
enjoying the protection which this great dam
will afford and the resources and recreation
which this great lake will provide.
What we are accomplishing along this
river, Mr. President, sets a pattern which I
hope will be increasingly repeated by neigh-
boring countries throughout this hemisphere.
The future of Latin America's progress de-
pends in considerable measure on the develop-
ment of multinational projects such as we
have here at the Amistad Dam:
' For background, see Bulletin of May 9, 1966,
p. 726.
' For backgiound, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1960, p. 742,
and Dec. 5, 1960, p. 851.
12
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
— There are river basins like the River
Plate system to be harnessed.
— There are roads like the Eastern Andean
Highway to be built.
— There are petroleum and gas pipelines
to be laid.
— There are satellite telecommunications
systems to be designed.
— There are electric power grids, as in
Central America, yet to be connected.
— There are basic industries like fertilizer,
paper, and petrochemicals that are to be de-
veloped.
— And there are still inner frontiers in
both Central and South America yet to be ex-
plored.
We have other frontiers to cross together:
There are children to be educated, minds to
be developed, bodies to be healed, health to be
preserved. These, too, are worthy goals for
good neighbors who share a common dedica-
tion to human progress and to social justice.
At the forthcoming meeting of Presidents
of the American Republics there will be op-
portunity for all of us to give the multina-
tional project movement added impetus.
For only by working across frontiers and
pooling human and material resources, as we
have done here, can a strong and an inte-
grated Latin America be achieved.
Our common frontier, Mr. President,
stretches for almost 2,000 miles from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean.
Amistad Dam is another link in the bridge
of mutual trust, friendship, and progress
which unite our two peoples.
Everyone here today in his own way has
contributed to the building of Amistad Dam.
You can be very proud of your contribution.
I am very happy and very grateful to my
good friend President Diaz Ordaz for the op-
portunity to share with him — and with you —
the pleasure of this moment of fellowship
and the excitement of the construction of a
great project like Amistad Dam.
Long live the friendship between the peo-
ple of the United States and the people of
Mexico.
JOINT STATEMENT, DECEMBER 3
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 3
The Presidents of the United States of
America and the United Mexican States have
come together here, because of the common
interest of their governments in the progress
of construction of the Amistad (Friendship)
Dam which is being constructed jointly by
the two governments on the Rio Grande near
Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila,
under the Treaty of 1944.
The Presidents have expressed their pleas-
ure at the satisfactory progress of the con-
struction which will assure completion of the
Dam by the Spring of 1969, on schedule.
The International Dam is a multi-purpose
project: It will control the River's floods and
thereby prevent the loss of life and devastat-
ing property damage as have occurred in the
past on both sides of the River from Del Rio
and Ciudad Acuiia to Brownsville, Texas, and
Matamoros, Tamaulipas.
With Falcon Dam, it will conserve the
greatest quantity of annual flow of the river
in a way to insure the continuance of exist-
ing uses and development of the optimum
feasible future uses within the water allot-
ments to each countiy. It will enable develop-
ments of hydroelectric energy which will be
divided equally between the two countries. It
will enable development of a great inland
water recreational facility for the benefiit of
this region in the two countries.
The Presidents recognize that the construc-
tion of the Amistad Dam stems from the good
understanding and frank and cordial spirit of
international cooperation which happily exist
between the United States and Mexico, and
that it constitutes an outstanding example of
how two neighbor countries can resolve their
common boundary problems with benefit to
both.
The Presidents expressed pleasure that this
joint visit to the site of the Dam has afforded
them opportunity to strengthen even more
their personal friendship which will undoubt-
edly be reflected in greater understanding
between the two nations.
JANUARY 2, 1967
13
President Johnson Lights
the Nation's Christmas Tree
Remarks by President Johnson i
Tonight, with prayerful hope for the
future, we have come here to light the Na-
tion's Christmas tree.
Exactly 175 years ago today America sent
another light out into the world. That light —
and that promise — was America's Bill of
Rights. Few documents in all the history of
freedom have ever so illuminated the paths
of men. Today, the light of that great charter
guides us yet.
I know, as you know, that we face an un-
certain future. Grave problems threaten us
all. As your President, I struggle with these
problems every waking moment of every day.
Here at home, in our own land, more than
20 million Negroes still yearn for the rights
and the dignity that the rest of us take for
granted.
Abroad, half of the world's people struggle
daily against hunger, disease, and poverty.
And tonight, even as we speak, American
men are fighting in a strange land, a half a
world away.
And yet, at this time of Christmas, there
are signs of hope.
In the United States, we have made more
progress in human rights in the past 6 years
than we have made in all of the previous 100
years. And, if the goal of true equality is still
far down the road, the barriers before that
goal are falling every day.
Throughout the world old quarrels are be-
ing forgotten, and nation is joining nation in
a common effort to try to improve the lot of
man.
And finally, in Viet-Nam, the tide of battle
has turned. No one can say just how long
that war will last. But we can say that ag-
gression has been blunted and that peace,
with honor, will surely follow.
The months ahead will not be easy ones.
They will require great sacrifice, patience,
understanding, and tolerance from each of
' Made at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 15 (White
House press release) .
us. But let us here tonight dedicate this
Christmas tree with hope and great confi-
dence. And let us rededicate ourselves to the
principles of our Bill of Rights "to give light
to them that sit in darkness and in the
shadow of death, to guide our feet into the
way of peace."
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment
of U.N. Secretary-General
On December 2 the U.N. General Assenv-
bly unanimously approved the reappoint-
ment of U Thant to another term of office
as Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Follo^ving is the text of a letter from Presi^
dent Johnson to Secretary-General U Thant,
together ivith a statement by Arthur J.
Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON
U.S./U.N. press release 6001 dated December 4
December 3, 1966
My dear Mr. Secretary General: The
American people join me in warmest con-
gratulations on your reappointment for an
additional five-year term. Your selfless deci-
sion to continue to serve the organization
will, I am sure, inspire the membership to
strengthen the United Nations in discharging
the great purposes of the Charter.
In these troubled times, the devotion of the
best talents, energies and efforts of men of
good will to the cause of world peace is more
indispensable than ever before. We are
therefore especially pleased that you have re-
dedicated yourself to this great task.
You may depend on my continuing closest
personal attention to the problems confront-
ing the organization in its search for peace.
In the years ahead, it is my greatest hope
that your rededicated faith and skills will
charge the United Nations with new
strength, and the human family vdth new
hope, and so give new substance to the
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
promise of the Charter. As you enter on your
new teiTn of office, you carry with you my
best personal wishes.
Lyndon B. Johnson
statement by ambassador goldberg
U.S./ U.N. press release 5000 dated December 2
The United States is immensely gratified
at the decision of the Secretary-General to
accept another full term in this most im-
portant oflSce.
His high sense of duty led him to accede
to the unanimous wishes of the Security
Council, in spite of his personal desire to re-
turn to private life. The United Nations
sorely needs his experience, integrity, and
the trust he commands from the entire mem-
bership of the organization. By accepting
another term he brings new strength, pur-
pose, and confidence to the United Nations
and to the high office of the Secretary-Gen-
eral itself.
My Government pledges him its full sup-
port in this role which is so vital to the cause
of world peace and security.
International Conference
on Education
Folloiving is the text of a letter from.
President Johnson to Dr. James Perkins,
"president of Cornell University, regarding
preparations for the International Confer-
ence on Education to be held in 1967.
White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 24
November 24, 1966
Dear Dr. Perkins : As you know, we are
deeply concerned about the role of education
in fostering social and economic development
throughout the world. That concern underlies
the new International Education Act of
1966. It is the reason for the Center for
Educational Cooperation which we are plan-
ning to establish in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.
I believe it is highly important to stimu-
late deeper mutual understanding among na-
tions of the major education problems facing
the world. For this reason, I have asked you
and Secretary Gardner to serve as hosts to an
International Conference on Education to be
held in 1967. It should provide a forum for
lively discussion of future goals of educa-
tional policy in the participating countries.
Prior to this conference, I hope you will
bring together the most knowledgeable edu-
cators and administrators from the United
States and from other nations to develop a
meaningful agenda.
I am grateful to you for undertaking this
important project.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Group To Study Educational TV
for Use in Aid Program
Following is the text of a memorandum
from President Johnson to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, the Director of the United
States Information Agency, the Director of
the Agency for International Development,
and the Director of the Peace Corps.
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated November 26
November 26, 1966
During my recent trip to the Far East,
I visited the educational television station in
Pago Pago, American Samoa, and saw how
television is being used to improve the level
of learning in elementary and secondary
schools.
I believe that educational television can
play a vital role in assisting less-developed
countries in their educational effort. These
stations can be used for adult education and
information programs during evening hours.
Community leaders can use these channels
for discussion of important public issues.
For these reasons, I am appointing a task
force with the following assignment:
JANUARY 2, 1967
15
1. Assess the value of educational televi-
sion broadcasting for primary and secondary
schools in less-developed countries.
2. Report on plans being made for educa-
tional television outside the United States
and how the United States may participate
most effectively in this effort.
3. Advise whether AID education pro-
grams and other foreign assistance can be
better concentrated on this effort within their
present limits.
Representatives of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Department of
State, U. S. Information Agency, Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, and
the Peace Corps are designated as members
of the task force. Leonard H. Marks, Direc-
tor of the U. S. Information Agency, is to
act as Chairman of the task force and Doug-
lass Cater of my staff as liaison with the
various departments or governmental agen-
cies involved.
This task force should commence its work
immediately and submit a preliminary report
within 90 days and a final report on or be-
fore July 1, 1967.
Lyndon B. Johnson
Letters of Credence
Botsumna
The first Ambassador of the Republic of
Botswana, Zachariah K. Matthews, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on December 14. For text of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated De-
cember 14.
Bulgaria
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Luben Nikolov
Guerassimov, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on December 14. For text
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated December 14.
Ivory Coast
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Ivory Coast, Timonthee N'Guetta
Ahoua, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on December 14. For text of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated December 14.
Lesotho
The first Ambassador of the Kingdom of
Lesotho, Albert S. Mohale, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on December
14. For text of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated December 14.
Policy Planning Council, European
Affairs Bureau Advisers Named
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
The Department of State announced on
December 9 (press release 288) the forma-
tion of two panels of advisers for the Policy
Planning Council. The establishment of these
panels is part of a general effort, made public
on October 18, ^ to seek the advice of private
American citizens interested in foreign rela-
tions.
One panel will advise the Council on long-
term problems of growth in less developed
areas, with particular emphasis on the prob-
lem of food resources in relation to popula-
tion growth.
The other will advise on long-term prob-
lems relating to the developed nations, with
particular attention to (a) relations among
the developed non-Communist nations; (b)
East-West relations, involving both Com-
munist and non-Communist nations; (c)
North-South relations, between developed
and developing countries.
Of the 22 members of the panels, 15 are
currently associated with universities and 7
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721.
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
are affiliated with research, public service,
and business organizations.
The panels will meet several times a year,
and the Department may be in touch with
individual members at other times on specific
matters.
The members of the two advisory panels
to the Policy Planning Council are:
Panel A — Economic Development, Food,
and Population Problems
Thomas K. Burch, director, demographic division.
Center for Population Research, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
Paul G. Clark, chairman. Center for Development
Economics, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
Jonathan Garst, agricultural consultant and author,
Berkeley, Calif.
Everett E. Hagen, professor of economics, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Earl O. Heady, professor of agricultural economics,
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
D. Gayle Johnson, profes.sor of economics, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Chicago, 111.
Bruce F. Johnston, professor. Food Research Insti-
tute, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
Carl Kaysen, president. Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, N.J.
Dudley Kirk, president, Population Council, New
York, N.Y.
Gustav F. Papanek, Center for International Af-
fairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Hugh T. Patrick, acting associate director, Economic
Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn.
Panel B — Developed Countries
Abram Bergson, director, Russian Research Center,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Harold Van Buren Cleveland, vice president. First
National City Bank, New York, N.Y.
William E. Griffith, professor of political science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Stanley H. Hoffmann, professor of political science.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Charles P. Kindelberger, professor of economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Paul F. Langer, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
Calif.
Leon Lindberg, professor of political science, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
John Newhouse, associate, Twentieth Century Fund,
New York, N.Y.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., assistant professor of
political science, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pa.
Richard E. Pipes, professor of history. Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Henry S. Rowen, president-designate, Rand Corpo-
ration, Santa Monica, Calif.
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
The Department of State announced on
December 15 (press release 293) the forma-
tion of a panel of advisers for the Bureau of
European AflFairs.
This is the sixth panel of advisers an-
nounced by the Department in accordance
with the general plan made public on October
18 for the creation of several panels of civil-
ian specialists from outside government to
serve as advisers to the Department on a
broad range of foreign policy matters. Ad-
visory panels for the Bureaus of Interna-
tional Organization Affairs ^ and East Asian
and Pacific Affairs,^ including a separate
panel on China,^ and two advisory panels for
the Policy Planning Council were announced
earlier.
The 22 members of the European panel
have been drawn chiefly from the academic
community, private foundations, and re-
search institutions. Other advisers may be
added as required.
Panel members will meet with the Assist-
ant Secretary for European Affairs, John
Leddy, individually or in small groups to dis-
cuss specific aspects of policy. Mr. Leddy has
told the panel members that he will look for-
ward to receiving their thoughts at any time
regarding existing policies and possibilities
for new initiatives. This procedure began ear-
lier this month when Mr. Leddy met with a
small group from the panel.
The members of the advisory panel to the
Bureau of European Affairs are:
Frank Altschul, vice president. Council on Foreig^n
Relations, New York, N. Y.
John A. Armstrong, professor of political science,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
« Ibid., p. 722.
' Ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 868.
* Ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966.
JANUARY 2, 1967
17
Cyril E. Black, professor of history, Princeton Uni-
versity, Princeton, N. J.
John C. Campbell, senior research fellow. Council
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y.
Mrs. Miriam Camps, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, N. Y.
Melvin Conant, Government Relations Department,
Standard Oil Company, New York, N. Y.
Harold C. Deutsch, professor of history. University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
William Diebold, Jr., senior research fellow, Council
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y.
Merle Fainsod, professor of history and political sci-
ence. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Werner B. Feld, chairman, Department of Govern-
ment, Louisiana State University, New Orleans,
La.
William E. Griffith, professor of political science.
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Ernest B. Haas, professor of international law and
organization. University of California, Berkeley,
Calif.
Henry A. Kissinger, associate professor of govern-
ment, Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Philip E. Mosely, director, European Institute, Co-
lumbia University, New York, N. Y.
Robert Osgood, director, Washington Center of For-
eign Policy Research, Washington, D. C.
Thomas C. Schelling, professor of economics, Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.
Warner R. Schilling, acting director. Institute of
War and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.
Paul Seabury, provost. College IV, University of
California, Santa Cruz, Calif.
Marshall D. Shulman, professor of international
politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, Medford, Mass.
Eric Stein, professor of law, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Shepard Stone, director, International Affairs Pro-
gram, The Ford Foundation, New York, N. Y.
Raymond Vernon, director. Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
News Policies in Vietnam. Hearings before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 17-
31, 1966. 161 pp. [Committee print.]
Communist Threat to the United States Through
the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Septem-
ber 13-15, 1966. 42 pp. [Committee print]
Florence Agreement Implementation Legislation.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance
on H.R. 8664. September 30, 1966. 87 pp. [Com-
mittee print.]
An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military
Assistance Programs in Vietnam. Forty-second
report by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions. H. Rept. 2257. October 12, 1966. 133 pp.
International Education Act of 1966. Report to ac-
company H.R. 14643. S. Rept. 1715. October 12,
1966. 21 pp.
Fur Seal Act of 1966. Conference report to accom-
pany S.2102. H. Rept. 2274. October 13, 1966.
4 pp.
Tariff Classification of Chinese Gooseberries. Report
to accompany H.R. 16160. H. Rept. 2282. October
14, 1966. 2 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Television
and Radio Receiving Tubes. Report to accompany
H.R. 16092. October 14, 1966. 3 pp.
Safety of Life at Sea. Conference report to accom-
pany H.R. 10327. H. Rept. 2285. October 14, 1966.
8 pp.
Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Canada-United
States Interparliamentary Group, May 18-22, 1966,
Washington, D.C., by Representative Cornelius E.
Gallagher, chairman of the House of Representa-
tives delegation. H. Rept. 2291. October 17, 1966.
16 pp.
Duty Treatment of Limestone for Cement. Report
to accompany H.R. 5950. H. Rept. 2293. October
17, 1966. 2 pp.
Duty Treatment of Dicyandiamide. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 16077. H. Rept. 2294. October 17, 1966.
2 pp.
Tariff Treatment of Certain Articles. Conference re-
port to accompany H.R. 11216. H. Rept. 2297.
October 17, 1966. 4 pp.
Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings. Report
to accompany H.R. 13116. H. Rept. 2303. October
18, 1966. 4 pp.
Footl for Peace. Conference report to accompany
H.R. 14929. H. Rept. 2304. October 18, 1966. 22 pp.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
OECD Ministerial Council IVIeets at Paris
The Ministerial Council of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment met at Paris November 2i-25. Follow-
ing are three statements made by Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs, who 7vas head of the U.S. delegation,
and the text of a commiinique issued at the
close of the meeting on November 25.
STATEMENT ON ECONOMIC POLICY,
NOVEMBER 24
I am pleased both personally and profes-
sionally that my first appearance at an inter-
national organization in my new post is at
this meeting of the OECD. We are happy as
a government to pay tribute to the OECD
on its fifth anniversary, which marks almost
20 years of constructive and sagacious work
by this agency and its predecessor.
I should like, if I may, to add a personal
tribute to what I have said oflicially. Every
student of economics and of international
affairs is in your debt for a solid and quiet
achievement, imaginative in its perspectives
and original in its intellectual strength. Your
studies and reports have been indispensable
tools of study and of action, both for gov-
ernments and international organizations
and for scholars in many fields all over the
world.
Those of you who have read President
Johnson's speech of October 7 ^ will appre-
'For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
ciate the importance our Government at-
taches to the future of the Atlantic relation-
ship. That speech announces a policy of
vigorous initiative in the many cooperative
programs which have done so much to vital-
ize the free world and knit it together.
If we look back to the bleak days of the
late forties, when this organization had its
beginnings, we can realize what stupendous
deeds have been accomplished. The economies
and societies of the free world have been
restored — indeed, more than restored, they
have been transformed. The nations repre-
sented here have never in their histories
known so long a period of sustained growth
nor a period so rich in progress toward social
justice. Their achievement is truly the great
social revolution of the 20th century, a revo-
lution accomplished peacefully and without
destructive conflict and one which dramati-
cally improved the welfare of all our peoples.
In this process the OECD has played a
significant part from the days when its pred-
ecessor helped to organize the eff"ort of the
Marshall Plan in ways which contributed to
the reconstruction both of national economies
and of the international economy which is
the decisive matrix of our respective national
economies.
If we look forward in the perspective of
this achievement, we can, I think, define one
of the vital functions which the OECD can
and should perform in guiding the relation-
ships between our national economies and the
international economy, from which they
[JANUARY 2, 1967
19
draw so much of their capacity for develop-
ment.
The decisive fact about our economic ex-
perience since 1945 is that each of us, in our
own ways, has created and mastered methods
for effectively managing our national eco-
nomic lives. We now take it for granted that
the great trade cycles of the past, the great
swings of unemployment and inflation, are
matters of economic history. It has been one
of the basic purposes of this organization to
help coordinate the policies of governments
and international agencies in this regard,
through the powerful influence of regular
consultations based on serious studies. We
take it for granted also that governments and
public agencies can and should anticipate the
future and help to direct flows of capital and
the development of crucial techniques. We
take it for granted that we should have poli-
cies directed at targets for growth, an inno-
vation in policy which this body has helped
to establish.
Some of the control measures developed in
this period have worked better than others.
Some are restrictive rather than expansive in
their effects. Many are incomplete or in need
of reform. For present purposes, the impor-
tant fact is that we have reason to be confi-
dent that our economic systems can be effec-
tively directed as systems and that we c?n
act effectively to improve and reform the
devices of guidance and control which we use
to manage different sectors of our economies,
and those economies viewed in their totality.
One of the shortcomings of the interna-
tional economy of the free world, as com-
pared with our several national economies, is
that we have not yet developed procedures of
international economic oversight as compre-
hensive and as effective as those used in na-
tional economic management. The OECD has
made an important and most useful begin-
ning in this regard. As we are all aware, one
of its great tasks for the future is to develop
this organization as an international coun-
cil of economic advice which could help na-
tional governments and other international
agencies of action to establish the policies
and programs we all need in order to main-
tain an international economy of wide hori-
zons through which mankind can be helped
to realize the potentials of modern technique
and to overcome the curse of poverty.
One of the major tools of economic man-
agement in all countries is that of the eco-
nomic review — ^the attempt to examine the
performance of the economy as a whole, and
the performance of its several parts and
sectors, in the light of our anticipations of
the future. With that thought in mind, I turn
now to the Secretary General's [Thorkil
Kristensen] excellent and candid annual re-
port to this Council, upon which he has just
commented.
U.S. Economic Policy
I shall note first the several references in
his report to the economic performance of the
United States.
As the Secretary General remarked, our
recent budgetary actions and programs of
monetaiy restraint have slowed down what
might have become an untenably rapid rise
in economic activity. We agree with his con-
clusion that both the level of internal demand
and the pressures of militaiy spending in the
United States raise the possibility that fur-
ther restrictive measures might become de-
sirable, depending upon the response of the
economy to the programs of limitation which
have already been applied and the new budg-
et. As he says, a flexible fiscal policy may be
called for in the months ahead. I can assure
you that the issue is on our agenda.
We will not have a recession in 1967. Nor
shall we have anything that could properly
be described as an inflation. All recent indi-
cations are that we are making the transition
to a sustainable full employment growth pat-
tern, despite the burden of our military re-
sponsibilities and all that they have involved
in recent years.
If we have not made further progress in
our balance-of-payments position this year,
the chief reasons are the increase in our im-
ports, due to the high rate of economic activ-
ity at home, and the continuing direct foreign
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
exchange costs of our inteniational commit-
ments— two factors which are interrelated.
These trends have been offset to a certain ex-
tent by capital movements influenced by the
level of interest rates in the United States.
The United States has, at present, a net
international payments deficit on military ac-
count of $2.6 billion. This is not the budget-
ary cost, but the foreign exchange drain. We
have a net deficit on foreign aid account —
after tying — of about three-quarters of a bil-
lion dollars. The total of these twa items
taken together is about 2i/o times our liquid-
ity deficit.
It is our policy to make further progress
toward equilibrium in our balance of pay-
ments, through the modification and continu-
ance of our present actions. The limiting
factor in that process, of course, is the need
to maintain military forces both in Europe
and in the Far East, where their presence is
required by overriding considerations of col-
lective security.
And there should be no doubt, finally, that
the United States is prepared to adjust its
fiscal, monetary, and other policies as neces-
sary to assure a growing, balanced economy.
Need for Productivity Gains
r Turning now to other aspects of economic
policy, I join in the general commendation of
Working Party II for its excellent review of
progress toward the economic growth target.
The policy lessons of the growth report are
plain.
We can agree with the Secretary General
that economic growth and price stability are
not always easy partners in a free society. If
we are to achieve both goals, we need to blend
fiscal, monetary, and income policies for flexi-
ble demand management and appropriate re-
straint on costs.
But new, bold policies will be needed to
supplement those which have already become
familiar. During the first 5 years of this
decade, labor markets in most of our coun-
tries were relieved of excessive pressures by
the availability of new workers. They came
into the labor market by immigration.
through a reduction of unemployment, or
through movements from farm to industry.
For the next 5 years, and for the longer run,
many of these sources may diminish in im-
portance. Meanwhile, the trend will continue
toward shorter hours, longer vacations, ear-
lier retirement, later school-leaving ages. If
present manpower policies continue, we shall
be lucky in many countries if the effective
labor force can be held stable — which would
mean that the entire burden of economic
growth wall depend on increases in produc-
tivity.
This prospect should tell us how necessary
will be policy measures aimed at steady and
substantial productivity gains. Many of the
issues that arise are being considered in the
bodies of this organization. We need to pur-
sue these lines of work with all possible ex-
pedition and vigor.
Higher productivity requires some reallo-
cation of resources and increased attention to
investment, as was so well pointed out in the
growth report.
For this reason, as well as for reasons of
simple social justice, we attach great impor-
tance to the manpower studies of OECD. We
have much to learn from each other's experi-
ence in this vital field. New and imaginative
methods have been adopted in recent years
in education, in retraining, and in encourag-
ing labor mobility. More is to be done, both
directly and through appropriate tax meas-
ures, to encourage the employment of older
people who prefer work to retirement and to
facilitate the training of migrants from so-
cieties which have not been part of the world
of modern technology. We are far from hav-
ing exhausted the range of wise and humane
actions that governments can take to raise
the income-producing capacities of their
citizens.
The United States has taken many of its
ideas in this general area from European ex-
perience, but we are still comparatively back-
ward in this significant area. We think that
continuing systematic exchanges on man-
power policy in the OECD can be of real
value to all of us in the pursuit of more
IJANUARY 2, 1967
21
mobile and more equitable societies.
Another key to higher productivity is ad-
vancing technology — the fruits of research
and development and investment in new
plant and equipment.
The Pace of Technological Change
I know that there is concern in Europe —
and understandable concern — that the pace
of technological change is lagging here in
comparison with the United States. In some
areas these disparities of technique produce
anxiety about a possible loss of economic
control, or a sense of coercive pressure.
I suggest that if these problems are ex-
amined in wider perspective, anxieties should
be allayed. If we look at the entire range of
our industries and not only at the few in-
dustries which have been propelled forward
by new techniques generated in or near
the defense sector, we see at once that there
are many technological gaps and not simply
one. The principle of comparative advantage
has not vanished as a force in economic life.
No one can ride on an American railroad
coach and conclude that all technical dispari-
ties are in one direction.
The problem of using science in technology
is a universal one and an old one. All coun-
tries have much to contribute if advance is to
be maintained. And advance requires many
modes of cooperative effort, from which we
have as much to learn as to contribute.
We are therefore ready, as President
Johnson said recently,^ to join with you in
a systematic examination of these problems
and in cooperative programs to further the
advance of science and technology. I have no
doubt that the work just begun by the
Science Policy Committee will illuminate this
whole complex area and will point to ways
in which we can cooperate to foster an opti-
mum rate of technological development
throughout the OECD community.
If we are to realize our full potential in
technological advancement, we shall need
more investment and the reallocation of re-
'Ibid.
sources that I referred to earlier. We are
persuaded that much can be done in all our
economies, and in the international economy,
to improve our machinery for mobilizing
savings and making them available for the ^
basic work of cost reduction through invest-
ment. This, I believe, is where the role of
our capital markets is fundamental to the
growth process.
As you know, the United States attaches
great importance to the capital-markets
study now before us and to the recommenda-
tions we expect to see emerge from further
work. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that later
today you call upon Mr. Silberstein [Murray
Silberstein, of Oppenheimer and Co., New
York] of the American delegation for some
further observations about this important
matter.
Restrictive Business Practices
Similarly, I trust that you are in agree-
ment that the organization should actively
pursue its work on restrictive business prac-
tices. Private arrangements to share mar-
kets, to fix prices, and otherwise to evade
the discomforts of competition are destined
by their nature to inhibit the growth of pro-
ductivity. When extended beyond one coun-
try they tend to frustrate and offset the
economic benefits of lower trade barriers.
Our Committee of Experts is considering
a recommendation to member governments
on international cooperation in the field of
restrictive business practices. We support
the recommendation and hope that it will
lead to further cooperative steps in this im-
portant field. The whole area is one of fun-
damental importance to the development of a
truly effective international economy. There
have been changes in law and practice in
this field in many countries in recent years
and in the European Economic Community.
Whether an international agreement is
needed to supplement national law in pro-
tecting the international economy as a whole
is a question which in our view merits seri-
ous consideration.
22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Continuing work on investment in educa-
tion, on curriculm building, and on teach-
ing teachers also deserves our support.
Nothing is more important for the future
of the OECD community than an expanding
flow of teachers and students in both direc-
tions across the Atlantic and Pacific.
Let me close this intervention with some
brief remarks on the bearing of certain other
international economic policies on economic
growth.
One is trade policy. We are not here to
debate the issues of the Kennedy Round.
But as we move into an economic situation
in which manpower and other resources be-
come progressively tighter, we are going to
need to improve the efficiency with which
we use these factors of production. Trade
policy offers the most immediate and prac-
tical way we have to expose our economies
to the fresh air of competition.
The forces of protection and restriction
are always with us, always seeking to es-
tablish comfortable enclaves of monopoly.
If we hope to hold a line against that pres-
sure and to find out where we can produce
most profitably, we shall need pressures
from outside as well as from inside our
countries. Our basic interests should lead us
not only to take advantage of the Kennedy
Round to achieve the greatest reduction of
tariff and other trade barriers in the post-
war period but also to take a long look ahead
at the needs of the OECD community for the
trade policy that will promote economic
growth.
International Monetary Policy
Finally, I turn to international monetary
policy.
Beyond the immediate problems of deficits
and surpluses is the question of the interna-
tional monetary system itself.
The system under which we have lived
since the end of the war has gone hand in
hand with the longest period of steady eco-
nomic growth and the greatest expansion of
trade in the history of our countries. It has
been developed and maintained by a series
of ingenious and imaginative devices of co-
operation, which have supplemented and fur-
thered the invaluable influence of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. No tribute can be
excessive to the devoted work of the various
groups of experts in this field who have
solved successive threats to the monetary
system in a spirit of admirable solidarity.
Our Economic Policy Committee and its
Working Party III have also been notable
participants in this endeavor. Without these
international efforts the progress of the
world economy in investment, trade, and
growth would have been impossible.
The assurance of relative stability and
openness in our monetary arrangements has
been a major factor in the structure of the
economy, a factor favoring and facilitating
growth on a world scale.
Nonetheless, the monetary system is not
yet perfectly adapted to the economic needs
of the next generation. If by common con-
sent we now wish to modify it, we should
do so in the spirit of building on what has
been accomplished for positive and carefully
defined goals.
Essentially, we should seek to improve the
system in many ways that will continue to
provide the monetary basis for high and sus-
tained rates of growth of production and
trade. We wish, of course, to maintain the
discipline of external reality in our internal
programs of costs, prices, and investment.
But we do not want the monetary system
to work in such fashion that ijiembers of the
system encountering temporary balance-of-
payments deficits are driven to unduly dis-
ruptive internal and external policies.
Recent trends in the accumulation and dis-
position of reserve assets make it clear that
we need a new and assured source of
liquidity which can be employed responsibly
and under proper safeguards when needed.
This is, I believe, the objective of the Group
of Ten.3 And we need to adopt and adapt on
^ The 10 countries which participate in the Gen-
eral Arrangements To Borrow, designed to provide
the IMF with additional currencies.
JANUARY 2, 1967
23
a practical basis the sensible suggestions of
Working Party III in its report on the ad-
justment process. Other improvements in the
monetary system may well be considered.
As the fruitful and promising proposals of
recent years approach the point of decision
through the tested machinery of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, these possibilities
should also be examined.
The debate over monetary policy, like
many other aspects of economics, sometimes
takes on a moral cast.. We have gotten over
the puritanical conviction that periods of
depression and unemployment were good for
our characters. But we still sometimes talk
as if the balance of payments were a totem
to be worshipped, not an economic reality
like others to be controlled in the interest
of the general welfare. Not all balance-of-
payments deficits or surpluses are sinful or
harmful to the legitimate economic interests
of other countries. I hope and believe we are
learning to confront this fact as a fact with-
out raising the temperature of international
relations.
STATEMENT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS,
NOVEMBER 24
Press release 280 dated November 25
I should like to say a few words now
about East-West relations or more specifi-
cally about the part the OECD might play
in the task of closing the breach that has ex-
isted between Western and Eastern Europe
for nearly 20 years.
President Johnson on October 7 in a basic
statement of policy on American relations
with Europe said: "Our task is to achieve a
reconciliation with the East — a shift from
the narrow concept of coexistence to the
broader vision of peaceful engagement." He
observed in the course of his remarks that
"The OECD can . . . play an important part
in trade and contact with the East."
There is nothing new in this announce-
ment. What is new in the President's speech
is the feeling that for many reasons the time
may have come for the Eastern countries to
accept our overtures. We can hope so and
try, separately and together.
Two facts about the situation in Europe
are plain, as the President made clear: There
can be no detente in Europe without German '
reunification, but no peaceful reunification of
Germany can be imagined without detente,
without the consent of the Soviet Union and
the East European countries.
You will all recall that Secretary Marshall
in 1947 called for a European-wide coopera-
tive effort to restore the whole continent to
economic health.* It was the choice of the
Soviet Union and not of the United States
that made the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation a purely Western en-
terprise. It would be entirely fitting, as we
approach the 20th anniversary of the Mar-
shall Plan, for the OECD to have a part in
the unfinished task of fostering the recon-
ciliation of the two Europes. I
What might the OECD do to foster this
process? In the first instance, it seems to us
the OECD offers a place where we could
have a fruitful systematic exchange of
views about our peaceful economic relations
with Eastern Europe. If we begin with the
proposition that our interest is in expanding
and strengthening those relationships, then
we could use the several bodies of the OECD
for an examination of ways and means to
prosecute that interest. For example, we
should be interested in your experience with,
and appraisal of, the possibilities for invest-
ment in Eastern Europe, including joint ven-
tures.
We are not suggesting, I emphasize, that
we should promote a common position with
which to confront the countries of Eastern
Europe. Rather we should work for a shared
view about practical steps which might be
taken separately and together to extend and
advance the area of peaceful economic en-
gagement.
Trade is a case in point. The United States
has not traditionally had a large trade with
■* For an address by Secretary of State George C.
Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947,
see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
24
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviet Union and the countries of East-
ern Europe. In both the prewar and postwar
periods other OECD countries have had
much more ex])erience in this field. In this
respect, we are simply following the lead of
all the countries of Western Europe. Trad-
ing with centrally planned and state-trading
countries calls for diflferent methods than
those which apply in trade with Western
countries, at least at this stage in the evolu-
tion of the economies of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries. We believe there is much to
be learned from your experience and feel
that it could be extremely useful for the
Trade Committee to undertake an exchange
of views about the modalities of trade with
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
In the second instance, it seems to us
that there are certain activities within the
OECD that might be made more productive
for us all if we were eventually to associate
some or all of the Eastern European coun-
tries with them. One thinks, for example, of
tourism, which has become the single largest
European industry. Our citizens are breach-
ing frontiers everywhere, in the peaceful
pursuit of sunshine, scenery, and culture, to
say nothing of souvenirs. Now that the tour-
ist has found Eastern Europe, it might be
appropriate for OECD's Tourism Committee
to consider how its activities might be
broadened to cover additional countries; sim-
ilarly, we might consider inviting Eastern
European representatives to such activities
as the OECD-sponsored Conference on Road
Research.
These are suggestive, not exhaustive, of
possibilities that might be explored.
It would be prudent, of course, to move
ahead carefully. We recognize the need to
take fully into account the activities and po-
tential of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope and of other organizations in the U.N.
family. For many purposes they will be pref-
erable institutions to the OECD as forums
for promoting improved East- West relations.
Following the sage advice this morning of
the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, we
should not waste our budget in duplicative
projects. Taking this aspect of the problem
fully into account, I urge that this ministerial
meeting endorse the proposal that the Sec-
retary General in consultation with heads of
delegations be asked to explore within the
organization the possibilities for a construc-
tive OECD role in the reconciliation of East
and West.
I further urge that a statement to this
effect be included in the communique.
STATEMENT ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
AND TRADE, NOVEMBER 25
The evolution of our agenda reflects the
changing pattern of world politics and of
world economics. For a few years — a very
few years only — Europe was our preoccupa-
tion. But the task of order and progress in
the world at large quickly forced itself upon
us. Our membership and our agenda were
enlarged.
Today we turn to one of the key issues,
on which, it is not too much to say, the
future of peace and progress depend.
Article I of our convention assigns a high
priority to development assistance policies.
We have just heard the somber and powerful
exposition of Secretary General Kristensen.
My Government agrees with his analysis. We
believe that in the years ahead of us we
shall have to take a great leap forward in
this field if we hope to avert social catas-
trophe on an unimaginable scale.
Our view of the nature of the development
process in nonindustrialized countries recalls
prevailing opinion about the problem of re-
construction in Europe at the end of the war.
At first we thought a few small reconstruc-
tion loans would do the job. We gradually
began to realize that the task was of a com-
pletely different order of magnitude, that it
required national and international efforts
on a very much larger scale: the Marshall
Plan and OEEC and EPU [European Pay-
ments Union] , productivity missions and re-
training programs — a long list of efforts
which were in fact sociological as well as
economic in their effect.
Development assistance is quite possibly
JANUARY 2, 1967
25
the most complex undertaking that our
countries have ever embarked upon. We are
only beginning to achieve a comprehensive
notion of how our resources can best be used
to further the cause of development. We shall
continue for a long time to need an active
and creative Development Assistance Com-
mittee to consider our respective experiences
and for the planning of new programs and
actions.
So far as the United States is concerned,
we see several areas for urgent DAC atten-
tion. They are:
First, the world food problem;
Second, self-help performance standards;
and
Third, the growing burden of indebtedness
on developing countries.
The Secretary General has referred to the
gravity of the world food problem, and Sec-
retary Schnittker [John A. Schnittker, Un-
der Secretary of Agriculture] will wish to
comment on this crucial issue.
My own view is that we face here a situa-
tion of potential disaster. We cannot afford
to pass over any opportunity to do something
about it now, while we still have a margin of
time.
Secretary Rusk last July at the DAC high-
level meeting asked for "openminded exami-
nation" by OECD members of a number of
proposals and questions for dealing with the
problem,^ all of which we hope the OECD
will consider. In the meantime our thinking
has progressed further.
In our judgment, one way we might col-
lectively mark the 20th anniversary of the
Marshall Plan would be for OECD members
more tangibly to demonstrate their willing-
ness to help the developing countries.
Agricultural Development Fund
We believe that OECD members should
carefully consider establishment of a fund
to stimulate agricultural development. Such
a fund could encourage investors in OECD
countries to invest in agriculture and in ag-
riculturally related industry in developing
■ Ibid., Aug. 8, 1966, p. 199.
countries. Perhaps it could guarantee invest-
ment in facilities located in developing coun-
tries producing fertilizer and other agricul-
tural inputs and it could provide an interest
rate subsidy on approved private loans for
agricultural development in developing coun-
tries.
We hope that you will wish to give the
most serious consideration to such possibili-
ties. Indeed, we should particularly welcome
proposals from you for an even more far-
reaching demonstration of the organization's
willingness to help meet the capital needs of
the developing countries. However, since we
all have budgetary problems, it is the under-
lying thought of the American suggestion
that we should try to use limited public re-
sources in such a way as to promote the
maximum flow of private capital to develop-
ing countries and particularly into the agri-
cultural sector.
A year or two ago the DAC devoted a
good bit of attention to the question of self-
help performance and recommended in July
1965 that member countries take account of
the self-help efforts of developing countries
in determining the level and composition of
their assistance. We believe that it is now
time for the DAC to return to the question
of development performance: How can we
employ our aid to elicit and support the best
efforts of the developing countries? This will
call for a closer look at what is going on
within the developing countries than we have
hitherto taken. And this need raises ques-
tions of procedures and organizational rela-
tionships which Secretary Schnittker will dis-
cuss in a moment.
Debt Problem of the Developing Countries
A thii'd subject for the DAC is the increas-
ingly sizable debt problem of the developing
countries.
A recent study by a DAC working party
gave some indication of its dimensions: Eight
countries with a total indebtedness of about
$7 billion are in near critical situations; an-
other 15 countries with a proportionately
large debt burden can be classified as serious
cases likely calling for urgent action by their
I
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
creditors in the near future. We believe fur-
ther study looking to ways of forestalling
impending debt crises is urgently needed. But
debt is the result of the volume and terms of
past lending. To increase the net transfer of
resources to developing countries, we must
increase the volume of aid and greatly im-
prove the terms of lending.
We hope the DAC will continue its efforts
in this field in close relationship with the
IMF and the IBRD [International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development].
Let me mention briefly the financial re-
quirements of the International Development
Association. Last July the President of the
Bank outlined his proposals for the replenish-
ment of IDA at a significantly higher amount
in order to provide resources needed to carry
on IDA'S critical role in providing develop-
ment capital. My own Government has stated
its willingness to increase its contribution to
IDA under suitable arrangements dealing
with the transfer problem,* and I hope that
other OECD member countries also will
promptly support IDA replenishment.
Finally, I believe that any OECD discus-
sion of trade policy in November 1966 must
give priority attention to the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariff's and Trade] negotia-
tions now entering their decisive stage at
Geneva. Full success of the Kennedy Round
can make a major contribution to improving
the export prospects of the developing coun-
tries. This will require, however, greater
efforts than heretofore to put together a
special package of particular interest to the
developing countries. We intend to do our
I part.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Special
Group, my delegation is pleased to support
the recommendation of the Trade Committee
and the Secretary General that the group
continue its work.
The Special Group has done a useful job
in beginning an exploration of various al-
ternative policies to provide improved op-
portunities for the developing countries to
expand their export earnings. This is an im-
portant, complex, and difficult subject, and
the full implications of any possible new ap-
proaches have to be carefully studied and
weighed. In particular, our effort to achieve
harmonized and constructive trade policies to
aid the developing countries should take full
account, in my view, of the importance of
continuing the process of reducing tariffs on
a global basis.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
1. The Council of the OECD met at Ministerial
level in Paris on 24th and 25th November 1966,
under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Gun-
nar Lange, Minister of Commerce and Industry of
Sweden, and reviewed the economic situation of its
Member countries, their economic relations with the
rest of the world, and the work of the Organisation
itself.
2. Five years ago Ministers set the collective tar-
get to be achieved between 1960 and 1970 of a 50
per cent growth in real gross national product for
Member countries as a whole.' Ministers welcomed
the Report on Economic Growth in the decade 1960-
70 which shows that progress so far has been satis-
factory and has even exceeded the rate needed to
meet this target. The growth prospects for the re-
mainder of the decade continue to be good, but the
problem of containing inflationary tendencies while
maintaining full employment is still in the fore-
ground. Member countries will have to pursue their
efforts to ensure the effective control of demand, the
increase of productive resources and the optimum
use of available manpower. Ministers therefore in-
structed the Organisation to continue its work on
these problems.
3. Concerning international payments Ministers
noted that, because of the strong measures taken in
the United Kingdom, a substantial improvement can
now be expected in the balance of payments of this
country. France, Italy and Japan, which recently
had large surpluses, are now also moving slowly
towards a more equilibrated position but a new
surplus appears to be arising in Germany. In the
United States' payments situation, encouraging prog-
ress has been made, although the deficit in the
global balance has not yet disappeared. Increasing
defence expenditure has contributed to a reduction of
the current surplus but the net capital outflow has
been reduced considerably because of higher interest
rates in the country and governmental measures. In
general the differences in interest rates between
Member countries are smaller than last year.
'For background, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 633.
' Ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
FAlSrUARY 2, 1967
27
Ministers instructed the Organisation to continue
to keep under surveillance the payments relations of
its Member countries taking into account the recom-
mendations contained in its Report on the Adjust-
ment Process.
4. Ministers agreed that the Organisation should
continue its work directed to improving the opera-
tion of capital markets; this work has given valu-
able indications about the mechanisms for mobilising
savings to finance investment. The Organisation will
also pursue actively the work already begun on the
nature and the economic consequences of differences
in scientific and technical levels between countries.
5. The developing Member countries have dur-
ing the period 1960/65 on the whole had a faster
economic growth than other Members but being
societies in transformation they have special prob-
lems that are being dealt with in the Organisation
and will call for continued attention.
Concerning the Consortia for Greece and Turkey,
it was stressed that appropriate aid in forms cor-
responding to the needs of the two countries con-
tinued to be necessary.
6. Despite some increase in 1965 the total flow
of aid from Member countries to developing coun-
tries in general is still unsatisfactory and the pay-
ments difficulties of a number of developing coun-
tries are increasing. Ministers stressed that the
volume of aid should be increased in the years to
come and its terms and conditions improved.
The Ministers took note of various suggestions
for improving the development assistance efforts of
OECD countries.
Agricultural production in a number of develop-
ing countries is growing slowly, while demand is
rising fast, partly because of the rapid population
grrowth. Greater emphasis should therefore be given
to agricultural development in the aid programmes
of Member countries and possible ways should be
studied of stimulating private investment in agri-
culture and agriculture-related industries in the de-
veloping countries.
The various aspects of the food problems are now-
taken up by the Organisation in co-operation with
other international organisations.
7. Ministers stressed the importance of a success-
ful conclusion of the current multilateral tariff nego-
tiations (Kennedy Round).
8. The Special Group set up to examine trade re-
lations with developing countries pursuant to a de-
cision by the Council meeting at Ministerial level in
November 1965 was asked by Ministers to continue
its work.
9. Finally, Ministers expressed interest in widen-
ing the area of east-west economic relations. They
agreed that the Secretary-General, in consultation
with Permanent Representatives, should consider
within the Organisation possibilities of action.
28
Barbados Admitted
to United Nations
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg \
U. S. Representative in the Security Council ' -^.
As the representative of my country I join
my colleagi'es who have spoken in expressing
great pleasure in the opportunity to vote to
recommend the admission of the newly inde-
pendent state of Barbados to membership in
the United Nations.
Barbados last month became the 26th in-
dependent nation in this hemisphere. We
congratulate both Barbados and the United
Kingdom for the peaceful and friendly
manner in which the transition to independ-
ence was accomplished. And this congratula-
tion I am very glad to extend in person to
the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Great
Britain, my old friend George Brown, who
graces us with his presence here today.
At the ceremonies in Bridgetown on No-
vember 30, Barbados became the 28th British
dependent territory to be granted independ-
ence after World War II. Quite a record !
Our Chief Justice and a delegation of
prominent Americans were privileged to par-
ticipate in the impressive independence-day
ceremonies in Barbados, to which Chief
Adebo [S. 0. Adebo, representative of
Nigeria] just made reference. They enjoyed
the hospitality and the balmy climate of this
island, just as many Americans have enjoyed
it with the great cordiality they have always
received from the citizens of Barbados. And
I wish to take this occasion to assure the citi-
zens of Barbados that as fellow ex-colonists
we shall receive them with similar cordiality
if they visit the friendly shores of Massa-
chusetts.
We believe that Barbados enters the family
of nations with a proud heritage which will
serve it well as it faces the challenges of in-
dependence. Lord Caradon [representative of
the United Kingdom] has made reference to
' Made in the Security Council on Dec. 7 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5005).
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
their great democratic tradition. Indeed, it is
well to remind ourselves that the Barbados
House of Assembly, established in 1639, is
the third oldest parliament in the Common-
wealth of Nations and also the third oldest in
the Western Hemisphere. The Barbados Dec-
laration of Rights of 1651 was well known
to the framers of our Declaration of Inde-
pendence and to the framers of our Consti-
tution. Indeed, many of the rights which
were proclaimed in the Barbados Declaration
of Rights were later echoed in these great
American documents of independence and
equality.
The people of Barbados have enjoyed full
internal self-government since 1961, and
their government was chosen in free demo-
cratic elections under universal suffrage. So
this country is well prepared to take its place
in the family of nations as a sovereign state.
Reference has already been made, and I
shall not repeat what has been said, about the
commendable advances that the people of
Barbados have made in the economic and
social spheres.
In conclusion, I wish to convey on behalf
of the United States our sincere congratula-
tions to the distinguished Prime Minister of
Barbados, Mr. Errol Walton Barrow, and
His Excellency the Governor General of
Barbados, Sir John Stow, who played such an
important part in this peaceful transition to
independence.
Mr. President, the United States welcomes
the application of Barbados and looks for-
ward to close association with its representa-
tives here, and we gladly support the resolu-
tion submitted here today by its sponsors.^
* The Council on Dec. 7 unanimously recommended
that Barbados be admitted to membership in the
United Nations. On Dec. 9 the General Assembly
admitted Barbados by acclamation.
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right
of Peoples to Self-Determination
Following are statements made by U.S.
Representative James M. Nabrit, Jr., in the
U.N. General Assembly during debate on the
agenda item entitled "Strict observance of
the prohibition of the threat or use of force
in international relations, and of the right of
peoples to self-determination," together with
the text of a tivo-part resolution adopted on
November 30.
STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 9
U.S. delesration press release 4970
I had not intended to participate in the
discussion this morning but some of the un-
founded and sweeping statements made have
led me to intervene.
I do not intend to speak at length. I can-
not refrain from noting, however, that the
willingness of certain delegates to use this
and every other U.N. forum to talk about
Viet-Nam, combined with their unwilling-
ness to let any U.N. organ try to do any-
thing about Viet-Nam, shows a cynical dis-
respect for the role and responsibility of the
United Nations and its members which my
delegation cannot share.
Viet-Nam is, of course, vitally related to
one of the rights touched upon in the speech
by the Czechoslovakian delegate this morn-
ing, the right of self-determination. Indeed,
this is the very core of the Vietnamese con-
flict. For what we seek in Viet-Nam, and
what the people of South Viet-Nam are fight-
ing for, is what any people anywhere have
the right to: the right to determine their own
political destiny free from interference.
No amount of polemics or invective or dis-
JANUARY 2, 1967
29
tortion of the record can alter the fact that
North Viet-Nam is so far unwilling to per-
mit the people of South Viet-Nam to exercise
that right. Surely, the representative of
Czechoslovakia — from the past bitter experi-
ence of his own people in both the postwar
and the prewar period — must have a deep
appreciation of the strong yearning of peo-
ples to choose their own political, economic,
and social system, free of external force and
intervention.
The essential facts of the Viet-Nam con-
flict can be stated briefly:
Viet-Nam today remains divided along the
demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in
1954. To the north and south of that line are
North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Pro-
visional though they may be, pending a deci-
sion on the peaceful reunification of Viet-
Nam by the process of self-determination,
they are nonetheless political realities in the
international community.
The Geneva accord which established the
demarcation line is so thorough in its prohi-
bition of the use of force that it forbids mili-
tary interference of any sort by one side in
the aff"airs of the other. It even forbids ci-
vilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In
1962, at the Geneva conference held that
year, military infiltration through Laos was
?.lso forbidden.
Yet, despite those provisions South Viet-
Nam is under an attack, already several
years old, by forces directed and supplied
from the North and reinforced by regular
units — currently some 17 identified regi-
ments— of the North Vietnamese Army. The
manifest purpose of this attack is to force
upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system
which they have not chosen by any peaceful
process.
The prohibition of the use of force in the
charter itself must apply with full vigor to
international demarcation lines that have
been established by solemn international
agreements. This is true not only in Viet-
Nam but also in all divided states, where the
recourse to force between the divided parts
can have far-reaching consequences. Further-
more, solemn international agreements, spe-
cifically the Geneva accord, explicitly pro-
hibit recourse to force as a means of reuni-
fying Viet-Nam.
It is because of the attempt to upset by
violence the situation in Viet-Nam, and its
far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the
United States and other countries have re-
sponded to appeals from South Viet-Nam
for military assistance.
We want a political solution, not a military
solution, to this conflict. By the same token,
we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has
the right to impose a military solution.
We seek to assure for the people of South
Viet-Nam the same right of self-determina-
tion— to decide its own political destiny free
of force — that the United Nations Charter
aflfirms for all.
As Ambassador Goldberg stated to the As-
sembly on September 23: ^ When it comes to
Viet-Nam, "what counts ... is not prowess in
the art of invective but prowess in the art
of peacemaking."
STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 30
U.S. delegation press release 4992
The United States, as a cosponsor of draft
resolution A/L.495, has participated vigor-
ously in the long and complex negotiations
from which the new draft, in document A/L.
501 just introduced by Ambassador [Kurt]
Waldheim of Austria, has emerged.
It is hardly necessary to recall the impor-
tant role which the United States has played
throughout its history in the evolution of
self-determination and freedom. One need
only refer to the Fourteen Points of Presi-
dent Wilson in this connection.
In this century my country has devoted
much of its human and material resources to
the protection of many nations and peoples
throughout the world from the ravages of
the threat and use of force. We hope that all
nations and authorities will heed the call of
this text to refrain from the unjustified use
of armed force and put aside attacks on
For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 609.
30
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
peoples who wish to be free and live in peace.
The United States warmly supports the
emphasis of the new text on freedom. For
our part, we consider that the right of every
people to freedom deserves special attention
and is something more than, and different
from, the principle of self-determination or
the combined "principle" of self-determina-
tion and independence. We are glad that this
compromise text recognizes the right of peo-
ples "to self-determination and freedom and
independence."
The draft resolution thus clearly applies
to the unhappy instances of those who have
been deprived of their freedom or autonomy
since the Second World War. The resolution
thus usefully reminds us that the depriva-
tion of the freedom of a people is as much a
violation of the principle of self-determina-
tion as the failure to permit a dependent
people to achieve self-government or inde-
pendence, as may be appropriate.
Second, this resolution is, of course, not a
statement of international law. While it
speaks in terms of rights and duties, it rep-
resents essentially a political statement by
the General Assembly of the importance of
freedom and self-determination and reminds
states of the critical importance that all
should comply with the requirement of arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, of the charter, which
prohibits "the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." Certainly the compromise text
does not — and could not — affect obligations
of member states under the charter.
From the beginning of the debate on
agenda item 92, the Assembly has considered
only the prohibition of the threat or use of
force insofar as it relates to self-determina-
tion. Obviously, therefore, even if this text
were a statement of the law — which it is not
— it could not be an exhaustive one.
To give but two examples, in formulating
legal texts stating the principles concerning
the threat or use of force, the Special Com-
mittee on Friendly Relations will have to
JANUARY 2, 1967
articulate the fact that under article 2, para-
graph 4, of the charter indirect aggression —
subversion, infiltration, and terrorism — is as
equally prohibited as conventional forms of
armed attack. It will also have to elaborate
on the right of self-defense, which article 51
of the charter preserves, and its application
to all uses of armed force, direct and indirect
alike.
The compromise text does touch upon as-
pects of indirect aggression insofar as they
relate to self-determination. In adopting this
resolution, the General Assembly will once
again draw to the attention of the world the
gravity of indirect aggression. The resolu-
tion refers expressly to General Assembly
Resolution 2131 (XX), which this body
adopted on December 21, 1965.^ That decla-
ration specifically calls upon states not to
"organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activi-
ties directed towards the violent overthrow
of the regime of another State, or interfere
in civil strife in another State."
The compromise text now before us builds
upon this condemnation of subversion in all
its forms. Operative paragraph l(n) points
out that "the use of force in any other form
contrary to the Charter" is impermissible.
This political pronouncement by the General
Assembly is especially appropriate at a time
when unremitting efforts at illegal subver-
sion, infiltration, terrorism, sabotage, and
the clandestine supply of arms are endan-
gering the peace in many parts of the world.
I wish to make it clear that the United
States has participated fully in the negotia-
tions which have led to this compromise text.
We have also participated fully in the
work of the Special Committee on Friendly
Relations and will continue to do so. It is that
committee to which the General Assembly
has entrusted the task of the progressive de-
velopment of international law and its codi-
fication with regard to the principles of
friendly relations and cooperation among
states in accordance with the charter. That
' For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 124.
31
work is juridical work and requires partici-
pation by skilled jurists.
The legal character of the work of the
Special Committee on Friendly Relations and
the Sixth Committee has been expressly rec-
ognized by all three groups of cosponsors
who have authorized Ambassador Waldheim
to say, as he has, that ". . . these committees
are the bodies which deal with the foiTnula-
tion of legal principles" and that "It is for
use in that task that these materials are
referred." Indeed, the compromise text does
not purport to impose its statement of politi-
cal principle and exhortation as "the law"
on the principles of threat or use of force
and self-detei-mination.
Third, in the negotiations on the compro-
mise text particular attention was concen-
trated on preambular paragraph 4 which
reads: "Recognizing that peoples subjected to
colonial oppression are entitled to seek and
receive all support in their struggle which is
in accordance with the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter."
This formulation is a vast improvement
over the proposal originally put forward in
A/L.493 which would have purported to rec-
ognize a "right" to seek and receive support
and assistance — without any qualifications
whatsoever. Obviously, such a right is sub-
ject to the provisions of the charter, particu-
larly the prohibition on the threat or use of
force in article 2, paragraph 4. The text of
the compromise properly reflects relevant
charter limitations on furnishing material
and other support.
Fourth, Mr. President, the United States
delegation notes that the reference to "inde-
pendence" in operative paragraph 1(b) of
the compromise text does not require inde-
pendence in the sense of independent state-
hood. As my Government has consistently
maintained, and as the General Assembly
has recognized in Resolution 1541 (XV), the
charter-based principles of self-determina-
tion can be fulfilled when a people freely
chooses independent statehood, free associa-
tion with another state, or integration with
another state.
In view of what I have said, the cosponsors
of draft resolution A/L.495 will not press it
to a vote and, instead, will vote for the com-
promise text in document A/L.501. We un-
derstand that Czechoslovakia and the other
cosponsors of A/L.493 support the compro-
mise and are not pressing their original pro-
posal to a vote and that Italy and the other
cosponsors of A/L.498 are doing likewise.
As I have said, this compromise text is the
result of a series of meetings between the
three groups of cosponsors of draft resolu-
tions on this item. These meetings, often pro-
tracted and difficult, have resulted in a
compromise text largely because of the
efforts of Ambassador Waldheim, who pre-
sided over them. In concluding, we want to
pay tribute to his untiring efforts to reach
a resolution acceptable to the three groups of
cosponsors.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION^
Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the
Threat or Use of Force in International Re-
lations, AND of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination
The General Assembly,
A
Drawing the attention of States to the funda-
mental obligations incumbent upon them in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations to
refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations and to develop friendly re-
lations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples.
Deeply concerned at the existence of dangerous
situations in the world constituting a direct threat
to universal peace and security, due to the arbitrary
use of force in international relations.
Reaffirming the right of peoples under colonial
rule to exercise their right to self-determination and
independence and the right of every nation, large
'U.N. doc. A/RES/2160 (XXI) (A/L.501 and
A/L.501/Corr.l) ; adopted by the General Assembly
on Nov. 30, 1966, by a vote of 98 (U.S.) to 2, with
8 abstentions.
32
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
or small, to choose freely and without any external
interference its political, social and economic system.
Recognizing that peoples subjected to colonial
oppression are entitled to seek and receive all sup-
port in their struggle which is in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter,
Firmly convinced that it is within the power and
in the vital interest of the nations of the world to
establish genuinely sound relations between States,
based on justice, equality, mutual understanding and
co-operation.
Recalling the declarations contained in its resolu-
tions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2131
(XX) of 21 December 1965,
1. Reaffirms that:
(a) States shall strictly observe, in their inter-
national relations, the prohibition of the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. Accordingly, armed attack by one State
against another or the use of force in any other
form contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
constitutes a violation of international law giving
rise to international responsibility;
(6) Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which
deprives peoples under foreign domination of their
right to self-determination and freedom and inde-
pendence and of their right to determine freely their
political status and pursue their economic, social
and cultural development constitutes a violation of
the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, the
use of force to deprive peoples of their national
identity, as prohibited by the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their In-
dependence and Sovereignty contained in General
Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), constitutes a vio-
lation of their inalienable rights and of the principle
of non-intervention ;
2. Urgently appeals to States:
(a) To renounce and to refrain from any action
contrary to the above-stated fundamental principles
and to assure that their activities in international
relations are in full harmony with the interests of
international peace and security;
(6) To make every effort and to undertake all
necessary measures with a view to facilitating the
exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples
under colonial rule, lessening international tension,
strengthening peace and promoting friendly rela-
tions and co-operation among States;
3. Reminds all Member States of their duty to
give their fullest support to the endeavours of the
United Nations to ensure respect for and the ob-
servance of the principles enshrined in the Charter
and to assist the Organization in discharging its
responsibilities as assigned to it by the Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and
security ;
B
Considering that the above principles, together
with the other five principles concerning friendly
relations and co-operation among States, have been
the object of a study with a view to their progres-
sive development and codification,'' on the basis of
General Assembly resolutions 1815 (XVII) of 18
December 1962, 1966 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963
and 2103 (XX) of 20 December 1965,
Requests the Secretary-General to include the
present resolution and the records of the debate on
the item entitled "Strict observance of the prohibi-
tion of the threat or use of force in international
relations, and of the right of peoples to self-deter-
mination" in the documentation to be considered in
the further study of the principles of international
law concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, with a view to the early adop-
tion of a declaration containing an enunciation of
these principles.
U.N. doc. A/6320.
IJANUARY 2, 1967
33
Calendar of International Conferences'
In Recess as of January 1, 1967
Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- Geneva Mar. 14, 1962
cessed Aug. 25, 1966; to be resumed Feb. 21, 1967).
Scheduled January Through March 1967
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution Geneva Jan. 4-6
NATO Allied Radio Frequency Agency London Jan. 4-6
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Problems of Nationality and Dakar Jan. 4-17
Registration of Aircraft.
ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and New York .... Jan. 4-23
Protection of Minorities.
ECE Electric Power Committee Geneva Jan. 9-12
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Jan. 10 (1 day)
UNDP Governing Council: 3d Session New York .... Jan. 10-27
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 10-27
OECD Trade Committee Paris Jan. 12-13
FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Food Production Paris Jan. 12-13
FAO International Conference on Weed Control Washington .... Jan. 15-Feb. 13
FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Review .... Rome Jan. 16 (1 or 2 days)
ECE Expert Group on Market Trends and Prospects for Geneva Jan. 16-18
Chemical Products.
ECE Inland Transport Committee Geneva Jan. 16-19
IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution: 2d Session London Jan. 16-20
ECA Conference of Industrialists and Financiers Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 16-21
GATT Trade and Development Committee Punta del Este . . Jan. 16-20
WHO Executive Board: 39th Session Geneva Jan. 17-Feb. 7
ICAO Special Panel of Experts on Limits of Liability Under Montreal Jan. 19-30
the Warsaw Convention as Amended by The Hague Protocol.
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . Paris Jan. 23 (1 day)
FAO Working Party on the Rational Utilization of the Fishery Rome Jan. 23-25
Resources of the Indian Ocean: 1st Session.
ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Jan. 23-27
ECAFE Working Party of Telecommunications Experts . . New Delhi .... Jan. 23-31
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, 1966,
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period
January-March 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Per-
sons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the
Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT,
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization;
ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE,
Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture
Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy
Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- American Economic and Social Council; lANEC, Inter- American Nuclear
Energy Commission; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses;
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP,
United Nations Development Program; WHO, World Health Organization. ,
34 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ITU/CCITT Plan Committee for Africa Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 23-Feb. 8
CENTO Economic Experts Ankara Jan. 24-26
8th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East Khartoum .... Jan. 24-Feb 2
ECOSOC Working Group To Study the Proposal To Create New York .... Jan. 24-Feb. 3
the Institution of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
OECD Special Committee for Oil: General Working Group . Paris Jan. 25 (1 day)
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: Working Group . London Jan. 25-26
FAO Subcommittee on the Development of Cooperation Rome Jan. 25-28
With Other International Organizations Concerned With
Fisheries.
ECAFE Mekong Committee Vientiane .... Jan. 25-30
OECD Energy Committee Paris Jan. 26-27
ECE Gas Committee Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 3
UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 10
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session .... Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 15
OECD Turkish Consortium: Pledging Session Paris January
OECD Tourism Committee Paris January
ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Typhoons Manila January-February
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Feb. 1-3
NATO Science Committee Paris Feb. 2-3
ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Coordination Committee New Delhi .... Feb. 2-9
on Railway Research.
ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human New York .... Feb. 6-8
Rights.
IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures: 3d Session . London Feb. 6-10
International Coffee Organization : High-Level Working Group London Feb. 6-10
on Basic Quotas.
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission : 10th Annual Meeting . Washington .... Feb. 6-17
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Feb. 7-9
PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety: 3d Montevideo .... Feb. 10-12
Meeting.
Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Meeting .... Montevideo .... Feb. 13-22
Economic Commission for Africa: 8th Plenary Session . . . Lagos Feb. 13-25
ILO Governing Body: 168th Session Geneva Feb. 13-Mar. 3
ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women New York .... Feb. 13-Mar. 6
ECAFE Committee on Trade: 10th Session Bangkok Feb. 15-24
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee London Feb. 20-Mar. 3
ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 23d Session .... Geneva Feb. 20-Mar. 23
UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Session Geneva Feb. 21-Mar. 8
ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human Geneva Feb. 27-Mar. 3
Rights.
ITU/CCIR Study Group The Hague .... Feb. 27-Mar. 3
ECAFE Intraregional Talks on Trade Promotion Bangkok February
lANEC Special Legal Committee Mexico City .... February
IBE Executive Committee: 44th Meeting Geneva February
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna February
ECOSOC Commission for Social Development New York .... Mar. 6-22
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 19th Bangkok Mar. 7-14
Session.
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Mar. 8-10
5th ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and Canberra .... Mar. 8-22
the Far East.
ILO Committee of Experts on Application of Convention and Geneva Mar. 9-22
Recommendations: 37th Session.
OECD Committee for Science Policy Paris Mar. 13-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 7th Session . London Mar. 13-17
ECE Coal Committee: Group of Rapporteurs on Fly Ash . . Pittsburgh .... Mar. 13 and 17
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Mar. 14-15
CENTO Economic Committee Washington .... Mar. 14-16
OECD Committee for Research Cooperation Paris Mar. 15-17
ICAO Conference on Charges for Airports and Air Naviga- Montreal Mar. 29-Apr. 18
tion Facilities.
U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression .... New York .... March
CENTO Liaison Committee London March
5th lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Ministerial and Expert Viiia del Mar . . . March
Level.
Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meet- Vina del Mar . . . March
ing of the Permanent Technical Committee on Labor Affairs.
JANUARY 2, 1967 85
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Report by the Secretary-General on the Present Sta-
tus of the Demilitarized Zone Set Up by the Gen-
eral Armistice Agreement Between Israel and
Syria (Part A). S/7573. November 2, 1966. 5 pp.
Letter dated November 15 from the representatives
of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and the United States of America and from
the permanent observers of the Republic of Korea
and the Republic of Viet- Nam transmitting the
texts of the three statements issued at the Manila
Summit Conference on October 25. S/7591. No-
vember 16, 1966. 12 pp.
Note verbale dated November 25 from the perma-
nent mission of the U.S.S.R. in reply to the note
dated November 7 addressed to the Secretary-
General by the permanent missions of France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States regarding
the "German Democratic Republic." S/7599. No-
vember 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Note by the Secretary-General concerning means of
strengthening the effectiveness of the United Na-
tions Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.
S/7603. November 29, 1966. 3 pp.
Letter dated November 30 from the Prime Minister
of Barbados making application for membership
of the United Nations. S/7607. December 2, 1966.
Ip.
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Operation in Cyprus for the period June 11-
December 5, 1966. S/7611. December 8, 1966. 61 pp.
Letter dated December 7 from the Deputy Secre-
tary-General of the Organization of African
Unity transmitting the text of a resolution on
Southern Rhodesia which was adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU held at Addis Ababa November 5-9.
S/7614. December 7, 1966. 3 pp.
General Assembly
Population Grovjrth and Economic Development. Re-
port of the Secretary-General. A/6466. October 14,
1966. 11 pp.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. Report of the Trade and Development Board
(31 October 1965-24 September 1966). A/6315.
October 17, 1966. 205 pp.
Letter dated October 20 from the representative of
South Africa transmitting a memorandum in am-
plification of his statement on October 7 in the
General Assembly in right of reply during the
debate on South West Africa. A/6480. October 20,
1966. 33 pp.
Personnel Questions. Composition of the Secretariat.
Report of the Secretary-General. A/6487. October
26, 1966. 41 pp.
Technical Assistance to Promote the Teaching,
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of
International Law. Report of the Secretary-
General. A/6492. November 1, 1966. 42 pp.
Report of the Executive Director of the United Na-
tions Institute for Training and Research. A/6500.
November 8, 1966. 51 pp.
Activities in the Field of Industrial Development:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the United^
Nations Organization for Industrial Development.
Report of the Second Committee. A/6508. Novem-
ber 11, 1966. 26 pp.
Reports of the International Law Commission on
the second part of its seventeenth session and on
its eighteenth session. Report of the sixth com-
mittee. A/6516. November 21, 1966. 63 pp.
United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Re-
port by the Secretary-General. A/6494. December
1, 1966. 11 pp.
The Korean Question. Letter dated December 2 from
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Korea transmitting a memorandum of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Korea dated November
30. A/C.1/936. December 2, 1966. 12 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Sig^ned at San
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Octo-
ber 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership : Barbados, December 9,
1966.
BILATERAL
Botswana
Agreement relating to treaty obligations assumed
by Botswana upon its independence. Effected by
exchange of notes at Gaberones September 30,
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966.
European Space Research Organization
Agreement relating to the establishment and opera-
tion of a satellite telemetry/telecommand station
near Fairbanks, Alaska. Effected by exchange of
notes at Paris November 28, 1966. Entered into
force November 28, 1966.
India
Agreement extending the cotton textiles agreement
of April 15, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5559, 5664).
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi Octo-
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force October 21, 1966.
36
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement extending- the agreement of November
18, 1964 (TIAS 5697), on cooperation in the field
of desalination, including the use of atomic
energ>'. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into
force December 3, 1966.
United Kingdom
Agreement providing for the use by civil aircraft of
the airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base on
Grand Turk Island. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington December 2 and 8, 1966. Enters
into force on a date to be mutually agreed upon.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
201)02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5^ each.
Ceylon. Pub. 7757. 8 pp.
Chad. Pub. 7669. 8 pp.
Hong Kong. Pub. 8126. 4 pp.
South Africa. Pub. 8021. 8 pp.
Tunisia. Pub. 8142. 4 pp.
How Foreign Policy Is Made (Revised). Illustrated
pamphlet reviews, in the context of today's prob-
lems, the roles that the President, the Secretary of
State and other Presidential advisers, the Congress,
and the American people play in the vital policy-
making process. Includes a basic statement of the
five fundamental goals of U.S. foreign policy. Pub.
7707. General Foreign Policy Series 195. 24 pp. 30<f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with British
Guiana — Signed at Georgetown May 29, 1965. En-
tered into force August 18, 1965. TIAS 5942. 3
pp. 5<f.
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with
Belgium, modifying and supplementing the conven-
;ion of October 28, 1948, as amended by the supple-
mentary conventions of September 9, 1952, and
August 22, 1957— Signed at Brussels May 21, 1965.
Entered into force August 29, 1966. With exchange
)f notes — Dated at Brussels September 27 and No-
vember 19, 1965. TIAS 6073. 25 pp. 15<S.
Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Sweden— Signed at Washington July 28,
1966. Entered into force September 15, 1966. TIAS
6076. 12 pp. 10«f.
Tracking Stations. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
extending the agreement of January 20, 1961, as
extended. Exchange of notes — Signed at London
July 19, 1966. Entered into force July 19, 1966. TIAS
6077. 2 pp. 5«'.
Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, ex-
tending the agreement of May 9, 1961, as extended.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Canberra August 9,
1966. Entered into force August 9, 1966. TIAS 6078
2 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon,
amending the agreement of March 12, 1966. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Colombo August 25,
1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. TIAS
6079. 2 pp. 5(f.
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Peru,
amending the agreement of December 27, 1946, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
March 2, 1966. Entered into force March 2, 1966.
TIAS 6080. 6 pp. 5<f.
Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agree-
ment. Agreement with the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank — Signed at Washington September 7,
1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966. TIAS
6081. 2 pp. 5«(.
Boundary Waters — Loan of Waters of the Colorado
River. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Mexico August 24, 1966. Entered into
force August 24, 1966. TIAS 6082. 4 pp. 5<f.
Defense — Establishment of Petroleum Products Pipe-
line. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Manila August 26, 1966. Entered
into force August 26, 1966. TIAS 6083. 5 pp. 5^.
Military Bases in the Philippines. Agreement with
the Philippines, amending the agreement of March
14, 1947, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Washington September 16, 1966. Entered into force
September 16, 1966. TIAS 6084. 3 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Jordan — Signed at Amman August
25, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. With
exchange of notes. TIAS 6085. 8 pp. 100.
Trade. Agreement with Argentina, relating to the
status of the agreements of October 14, 1941, and
July 24, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at Buenos
Aires August 3 and 8, 1966. Entered into force Au-
gust 8, 1966. TIAS 6086. 5 pp. 50.
Visas — Waiver of Nonimmigrant Visa Fees. Agree-
ment with Japan. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Tokyo August 9 and 23, 1966. Entered into force
September 22, 1966. TIAS 6087. 14 pp. 100.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong
Kong. Exchange of notes. — Signed at Hong Kong
August 26, 1966. Entered into force August 26, 1966.
Effective October 1, 1965. With related notes. TIAS
6088. 12 pp. 100.
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Supplementary
protocol with the United Kingdom of Great Britain
TANUARY 2, 1967
37
and Northern Ireland, amending the convention of
April 16, 1945, as modified by the supplementary
protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, and Aug:ust
19, 1957— SigTied at London March 17, 1966. Entered
into force September 9, 1966. TIAS 6089. 16 pp. 10«».
Settlement of Investment Disputes. Convention with
Other Governments approved March 18, 1965, by the
Executive Directors of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), at Wash-
ington, for submission to member governments.
Open for signature at IBRD, and signed in behalf
of the United States of America August 27, 1965.
Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 95
pp. SOff.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Israel, amending the agreement of July
12, 1955, as amended — Signed at Washington Au-
gust 23, 1966. Entered into force September 22, 1966.
TIAS 6091. 3 pp. 5<t.
Study of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, sup-
plementing and modifying the agreement of May 9,
1961, as extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Canberra September 1, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1966. TIAS 6092. 4 pp. 50.
Defense: Transfer of Aircraft and Equipment.
Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Jidda May 16 and November 11, 1965.
Entered into force November 11, 1965. TIAS 6095.
3 pp. 50.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Nor-
way, amending annex C to the agreement of Jan-
uary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Dated at Oslo
August 29 and September 6, 1966. Entered into force
September 6, 1966. TIAS 6096. 3 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with the Republic of Korea.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul September 14,
1966. Entered into force September 14, 1966. With
agreed understanding. TIAS 6097. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia,
amending the agreement of July 30, 1966. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Tunis September 19, 1966. En-
tered into force September 19, 1966. TIAS 6098. 3
pp. 50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Republic of China, amending the
agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended — Signed at
Washington August 25, 1966. TIAS 6099. 5 pp. 50.
Continental Radar Defense System — Phaseout of
Certain Stations. Agreement with Canada. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Washing^ton September 30, 1966.
Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6102.
2 pp. 50.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1436 PUBLICATION 8181 JANUARY 2, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developmenta in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, bb well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin la for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Oflfice, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreian 116:
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
38
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 2, 1967 Vol LVI, No. U36
Agriculture. OECD Ministerial Council Meets
at Paris (Rostow, communique) 22
Barbados. Barbados Admitted to United Na-
tions (Goldberg) 28
Botswana. Letters of Credence (Matthews) . .16
Bulgaria. Letters of Credence (Guerassimov) . 16
Communism. East-West Relations: Shaping a
Stable Worid (Kohler) 6
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreigrn Policy 18
Department and Foreign Service. Policy Plan-
ning Council, European Affairs Bureau Ad-
visers Named 16
Developing Countries. OECD Ministerial Coun-
cil Meets at Paris (Rostow, communique) . . 22
Economic Affairs
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu-
reau Advisers Named 16
President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect
Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) . . 12
Educational and Cultural Affairs
Group To Study Educational TV for Use in
Aid Program (Johnson) 15
International Conference on Education (John-
son) 15
Europe
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu-
reau Advisers Named 16
Foreign Aid. Group To Study Educational TV
for Use in Aid Program (Johnson) .... 15
Human Rights. President Johnson Lights the
Nation's Christmas Tree 14
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences .... 34
3ECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
[very Coast. Letters of Credence (Ahoua) . . 16
^atin America. President Johnson Visits Mex-
ico To Inspect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint
statement) 12
^esotho. Letters of Credence (Mohale) . . . . 16
riexico. President Johnson Visits Mexico To In-
spect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) 12
'fon-Self-Governing Territories. U.N. Urges No
Interference With Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination (Nabrit, text of resolution) . . 29
'residential Documents
Iroup To Study Educational TV for Use in Aid
Program 15
ntemational Conference on Education ... 15
'resident Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ-
mas Tree 14
resident Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect
Amistad Dam 12
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre-
tary-General 14
Publications. Recent Releases 37
Trade
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East- West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 36
U.S.S.R.
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
United Nations
Barbados Admitted to United Nations (Gold-
berg) 28
Current U.N. Documents 36
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of
resolution) 29
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre-
tary-General (Goldberg, Johnson) 14
Viet-Nam
President Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ-
mas Tree 14
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of
resolution) 29
Name Index
Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta 16
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 12
Goldberg, Arthur J 14, 28
Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov 16
Johnson, President 12, 14, 15
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 2
Kohler, Foy D 6
Matthews, Zachariah K 16
Mohale, Albert S 16
Nabrit, James M., Jr 29
Rostow, Eugene V 19
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 12-18
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 12 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
280 of November 24, 288 and 289 of December
9, and 290 of December 10.
No. Date Subject
t291 12/12 U.S. delegation to NATO minis-
terial meeting.
t292 12/13 Meeker: "Viet-Nam and the In-
ternational Law of Self-
Defense."
293 12/15 Advisory panel for Bureau of
European Affairs.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
i^U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/26
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Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Tasic
The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fir
to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integrati'
of the Western European community; and, third, to quicken progress in East-West relation!
President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers
New York, N.Y., on October 7, 1966, discussed the new steps being taken, and those under cc
sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STAGES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. US7
January 9, 1967
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 21 A2
VIET-NAM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser 5A
SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES MANDATORY SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 73
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENDORSES OUTER SPACE TREATY
Statements by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 78
For index see inside back cover
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 21
Press release 297 dated December 21
My season's compliments to the dis-
tinguished and talented members of the press
corps that covers and sometimes discovers
the Department of State. And I hope you
have a very prosperous and successful new
year.
Yesterday afternoon the 21st General As-
sembly concluded. As you by now are well
aware, a General Assembly constitutes a ma-
jor review of most of the international
issues of the day. You might be interested
that, with 98 items on the agenda and 121
members through most of the Assembly —
one country was added at the end — that
meant that there were almost 12,000 primary
votes cast in the General Assembly this year.
We are very grateful to Ambassador
[Arthur J.] Goldberg for his distinguished
leadership. He was ably assisted by Senator
[Frank] Church of Idaho and Senator
[Clifford P.] Case of New Jersey and a very
competent delegation up there.
Ambassador Goldberg just shortly — just
a few minutes ago made an extended com-
ment on the work of this General Assembly.
And you will be interested in reviewing that.
We will try to have copies of his statement
for you in the course of the afternoon here.
I must say that I was very much encour-
aged that the General Assembly was able to
bring the space treaty to a conclusion as far
as international discussions are concerned.*
We believe that this was a very positive step
forward, as a result of President Johnson's
initiative earlier in the year.
Outer space may seem a long way away,
but its activities very much involve us here
on this earth; and the application of the gen-
eral principles of the Antarctic Treaty to
outer space, I think, is a substantial step for-
ward and may help us in the never-ending
task of trying to put some ceiling on the arms
race.
We are very pleased that the Secretary-
General consented to accept an additional
term and carries with him into his new term
the solidarity of the support of the member-
ship of the U.N. And we wish him the very
best of success in his new term of office.
Viet-Nam was discussed in many ways at
the General Assembly — although it was not
formally on the agenda. It was discusj:ed at
the table and in the corridors. And it obvi-
ously is the major and most dangerous issue
in building a durable peace.
We have regretted that the United Nations
has not been permitted to take hold of that
question and try to find a solution to it. That
results primarily from the attitude of Hanoi
and Peking, who have repeatedly insisted
that this question is not an appropriate mat-
ter for the United Nations to deal with. That
attitude on their part has led many delega-
tions to believe that formal action by the
United Nations might get in the way of a
settlement of the matter by other means, for
example, the use of the Geneva machinery
or through other types of discussion or
negotiation.
We, as you know, have suggested to the
Secretary-General that he use his utmost
effort to bring this matter into a forum of
discussion,^ and we hope very much that
some progress can be made in that direction.
By and large, it was a constructive meet-
ing of the General Assembly, and we were
pleased and encouraged by the general re-
* See p. 78.
' See p. 63.
42
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
suits — although obviously there is still some
unfinished business, both in the housekeep-
ing of the U.N. itself, the unfinished business
of making proper arrangements for peace-
keeping.
But, nevertheless, we were pleased by the
course of the Assembly as a whole.
Now I am ready for your questions.
Antiballistic Missiles and the Arms Race
Q. Mr. Secretary, since Secretary [of De-
fense Robert S.] McNamara last month dis-
closed that the Russians are deploying some
antiballistic missiles, there has been consid-
erable speculation that this 7vas likely to
touch off another spiral in the arms race, and
there has been spectilation as to what the
United States can do about this in its discus-
sions with Russia. Would you care to address
yourself to that subject for a moment?
A. Well, there is not very much that I can
say on that today. You have seen what Secre-
tary McNamara has said.
We would regret very much the lifting of
the arms race to an entirely new plateau of
major expenditures.
As you know, we made earlier to the
Geneva conference proposals for freezes and
limitations on the further production of
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.
We would like to see some means developed
by which both sides would not have to go into
wholly new and unprecedented levels of mili-
tary expenditure, with perhaps no percep-
tible result in the total strategic situation.
This is a matter that is before the Geneva
conference. We and the Soviet Union are co-
chairmen.
I presume that there will be further con-
tacts on this matter. But I cannot go into that
in more detail at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, is one pos-
sible means to deal with this problem to
ipproach the Soviet Union on a moratorium
jn deployment of ballistic missile defense
systems ?
A. Well, implicit in the idea of a freeze is
:hat there will be an agreement that certain
imitations will be accepted, that those limi-
tations could be relied upon with assurance
by all sides, and that in that way both sides
could be relieved from the burdens of moving
to wholly new and major levels of expendi-
ture.
But this has been before the Geneva con-
ference. There has been no progress on it
thus far in that conference. The two cochair-
men^ we and the Soviet Union, have reviewed
the agenda from time to time to see where
we might make progress. That conference
will be meeting again in February. I just
cannot anticipate at this point just what
might be the result of the contacts that are
implicit in a matter of that sort, in a con-
ference of that sort.
VIet-Nam Negotiations
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to what Am-
bassador Goldberg said in his letter to the
Secretary-General, he made — he used some
rather siveeping language in saying that he
requests "that you will take whatever steps
you consider necessary to bring about the
necessary discussions." Does this represent
any policy change as far as the United States
is concerned in that one might read it as wide
enough to allow for some negotiations with
the National Liberation Front ?
A. I would not read detail into it. When 17
nonalined nations last year indicated that
they thought there should be negotiations
without preconditions, we said, yes, we
thought that was a good idea. The other side
turned it down.
We are prepared to talk about the problem
without preconditions of any sort from either
side. We are prepared to have preliminary
discussions with the other side about precon-
ditions, if they want to talk about those. We
are prepared to come to a conference. We are
prepared to have bilateral discussions. We
are prepared to use intermediaries. We are
prepared to have discreet and private con-
tacts.
But it is very hard to find someone on the
other side who is prepared to talk seriously
about bringing this matter to a peaceful con-
clusion.
The Secretary-General has a new term of
FANUARY 9, 1967
43
office with the overwhelming unanimous sup-
port of the United Nations. As you know, he
is very much concerned in this major prob-
lem affecting the peace of the world. And so
we would be glad to see the Secretary-
General use the widest powers available to
him to probe the possibilities of a serious dis-
cussion about a peaceful conclusion of this
matter.
Q. Do you use the term "other side" ex-
clusively to mean Hanoi, or does it include
the National Liberation Front?
A. Well, we have not talked about pre-
conditions of any sort with the Secretary-
General, and so I don't suppose I need talk
about them here.
President Johnson has made some com-
ments— in July of last year — about the
Liberation Front.*
But let's see what the Secretary-General
might be able to accomplish in his contacts
with those who are directly involved in this
and might bring it to a conclusion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some keen
observers of this situation that think that so
long as Russia and Communist China are on
opposite sides, with their split, it ivould be
very difficult for Hanoi to sit down at the
conference table, tvith this conflicting advice
on either side of them. Do you think this is a
factor in holding up peace talks ?
A. I would prefer not to comment pre-
cisely on your exact question.
I think that undoubtedly the various capi-
tals in the Communist world tend to look over
their shoulders at each other in a matter of
this sort, and this somewhat complicates the
problem of responsible contacts and respon-
sible discussions with a view to winding this
matter up.
In that sense, there is no single place, there
is no single point of view with whom one can
enter into talks in order to bring it to a con-
clusion.
So I think the complexity on the other side
does complicate the technical procedures, the
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.
diplomatic procedures, by which one can
establish contact and move this thing for-
ward.
Q. Do you see any interest, Mr. Secretary,
on the part of Hanoi or the National Libera-^
tion Front in arriving at a longer Christmas
truce or talking about conditions for an
extended truce running into the new year?
A. No, I have not. From the statements
they made, it would point rather in the other
direction.
Americans Convicted in Soviet Union
Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that
the United States Government can do to try
to effect the release of Mr. [BueV] Wortham,
who was convicted to 3 years of labor today
by a Leningrad court ?
A. Well, we will continue to pursue this
matter. We did feel that, although these two
young men acknowledged the offenses for
which — with which they were charged, the
punishment was more harsh than the viola-
tions themselves would seem to warrant.
There are procedures of appeal and
clemency that are available, and we expect
that those will be utilized.
I do not myself wish to condone these par-
ticular actions, but I think, as the Soviet
Union moves into a period in which they are
trying to encourage tourism and have maxi-
mum contacts with other countries, that they
might recognize that on occasion minor inci-
dents of this sort may occur and that it will
be in their interest to resolve them in
accordance with the general practice of most
governments when temporary foreign guests
pull pranks of this sort — or whatever you
want to call it — that would be a violation of
local law.
I would hope that the Soviet authorities
would take cognizance of this sort of thing
and take action to mitigate the punishment
that has been meted out to these two men.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, Buel
Wortham's mother has expressed the hope
that he might be exchanged for the man
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
; named Igor Ivanov, who is being held in this
j coiintry under a 20-year sentence. Has any-
"> thing been done to negotiate such an ex-
] change?
. A. No.
Q. Mr. Secretary, going back for a moment
to your comment about the Secretary-
General, where you say that he has a neiv
mandate and that you ivould be very glad to
see him, use the widest powers available to
probe the prospects of peaceful negotiations,
does that mean that if he should succeed in
doing what he did once before, in arranging
for the other side to send representatives to
Rangoon or someplace else, that we would
this time accept the offer and also go our-
selves ?
A. Well, I don't want to go into the ques-
tion of whether or not there was a previous
incident of the sort that you talked about in
exactly those terms.
Q. He has said so.
A. Well, I think that when the full record
is out some day that will take on a somewhat
different context, and I think it is not good
for the future for me to intrude into the past
on that particular point.
But he has a maximum latitude here, as
far as we are concerned in the situation, to
see what can be worked out on the other side
in terms of responsible discussions.
No Indication of Deescalation From Hanoi
Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some
misunderstanding of our motives in seeking
a truce or an extended armistice, while, at the
same time, ive seem to tighten the noose and
hit harder ivith bombs in North Viet-Nam.
Cozild you put this in perspective for us?
A. Well, we have a military interest in hit-
ting military targets in North Viet-Nam to
try to impede, slow down, or interfere with
the steady movement of men and supplies
into the South. We have had nothing in the
way of reciprocity from the North in terms
of pulling back on their violence in South
Viet-Nam.
We have tried over many, many months
now, since the pause of January, to try to
get some indication from the other side as to
whether they would be willing to talk about
deescalation or enter into deescalation, in
fact, without any formal agreements, on
some basis of reciprocity. We have not been
able to do that.
These particular incidents, I think, have
to be looked at against the background of
what is responsible for the fighting and who
would be glad to see it wound up. As far as
we are concerned, we regret every person
that has been lost in South Viet-Nam, and in
North Viet-Nam. And there should not have
been any of these casualties if these people
in North Viet-Nam had undertaken to live
at peace with their southern neighbors and
not launched their Liberation Front, for
which they are now celebrating the sixth
birthday, and not sent their cadres and their
men and their arms and their regiments into
South Viet-Nam to seize that country by
force.
Now, all of this is unnecessary from our
point of view. And it could be brought to con-
clusion very quickly if that central ambition
on the part of Hanoi were abandoned. Now,
that's what is lacking here in this situation.
Now, in a struggle of this sort there are
going to be those who are injured by acci-
dent, or otherwise, or going to be those who
suffer from the struggle. But I should think
we ought to concentrate on why it started
and how it could be brought to a conclusion.
And, on that, I think the responsibility rests
very heavily with Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event no negotia-
tions for peace are upcoming, are we pre-
pared for a military victory in both North
and South?
A. Well, our objectives there have been
very clearly defined. We are trying to pro-
tect South Viet-Nam, under treaty commit-
ments, from this aggression by means of
armed attack from the North, from the in-
filtration of these men and arms into the
South. We have no desire to destroy North
JANUARY 9, 1967
45
Viet-Nam, or insist upon changing their
regime, or any of those things. We are trying
to meet our commitments to South Viet-Nam.
And, on that basis, this matter could be
wound up very quickly.
The NATO Council Meeting
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you assess for us,
please, the last week's NATO conference?
The reports from Paris were rather favor-
able. The French appear to be cooperative.
Brandt's [Willy Brandt, German Foreign
Minister'] debut got favorable reviews. I won-
der horv you feel about it ?
A. This was my 12th NATO meeting of
ministers, and I must say I thought it was
one of the most businesslike and most pro-
ductive of those that I have attended for
some time. I think there has been a rather
broad understanding between the Fourteen
on the one side and France on the other as
to the boundaries that now arise between
the Fourteen and France as to who would
take care of what kind of business.
The Fourteen met as the Defense Commit-
tee and transacted a good deal of business
affecting the military arrangements in the
alliance, including the nuclear committee
that was established. Those were referred to,
I think, in paragraphs 15 to 21 of the com-
munique.'' In the communique France pointed
out that they had not participated in those
discussions and did not associate themselves
with it. But as far as the other discussions
were concerned, France was present and we
had a good exchange among all 15 on such
questions as the East-West relations.
I must say that there was a general feeling
that two of our eminent new members among
the ministers, Mr. George Brown of Britain
and Mr. Willy Brandt of Germany, both
made very strong impressions on the Council.
So I think on the whole it was a very, very
encouraging and a very good meeting.
Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the qiies-
tion of a missile freeze, Secretary McNamara
has also told us that the administration plans
to ask Congress for appropriations for the
* For text, see p. 49.
Poseidon missile and improvement on the
Polaris missile. Would the administration be
willing to put off deployment of this missile if
there could be some agreement ?
A. No, I wouldn't want to get into that
kind of question. That is a problem for the
Secretary of Defense, and these are matters
that the administration is considering in
connection with his presentation to the Con-
gress. It's a matter on which there will be
full discussion with the appropriate congres-
sional committees. I wouldn't want to point
to the future in that way today.
International Effort on Food Problem
Q. Mr. Secretary, on tivo food decisions
facing the administration, will the shipments
to Yugoslavia that Congressman [Paul]
Findley has objected to be released, and will
grain be released for India in the near
future ?
A. As far as India is concerned, very sub-
stantial quantities of grain will be arriving
in India during January. As you know, we
have been concerned that this food problem
be taken up as a general international prob-
lem in which all countries who are in a posi-
tion to contribute will do so. It is not true
that we have been putting pressure on par-
ticular countries, as I have seen reported in
the last day or so. But, nevertheless, we are
glad that some other countries are taking up
this matter seriously and are making some
significant contributions.
The prospect is that over the next decade
there is going to be a major crisis in the food
situation and all countries, including those
who are going to need the food and those who
are in a position to contribute in whatever
way, must make a concerted and sustained
effort to deal with it. Otherwise, there is
going to be considerable hunger in the world.
You saw Secretary [of Agriculture Orville
L.] Freeman's remarks yesterday on that
subject, and I would expect and hope that
appropriate international action will be
taken to assist the Indians in their critical
problem.
At the present time I am not actually sure
just what the situation is with Yugoslavia,
46
DEPARTMEINT OF STATE BULLETIN
and I wouldn't want to comment on that
today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the
•^ current upheaval in China in terms of the
\ possibility of change in our relationship with
j Peiping?
I A. Well, we have not tried to analyze the
significance of what is going on in China. We
have the feeling that it is important, these
events there. But I think we would be fool-
ing you if we said that we fully understood
exactly what is happening. My guess is that
some of the leaders in China don't know
exactly what is happening. So our present
ignorance doesn't embarrass us too much.
But we have seen no indications thus far
that what is happening there has any signifi-
cant bearing on their relations with us or
their attitudes toward us.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your appraisal that
the Soviet Union has made a com,mitment to
an all-out deployment of the antiballistic mis-
^ sile system ?
I A. No. I have no information on that one
way or the other. We just don't know that.
Developments of 1966
Q. Mr. Secretary, now that it's getting
^ toward the close of the year, I wonder if you
. could summarize what you think have been
, the main gains and setbacks during the year
and what do you see in the year ahead?
A. Well, I would almost need some notice
on that question because that is a rather com-
: prehensive question.
I think that during this past year we have
„ seen continuing increase of contacts between
'J the East and West as far as Eastern Europe
i! is concerned. We had in front of us at NATO
t a little summation of the East- West contacts
I in the last few months among the NATO
countries, and I think there were about 185
items on that list, which is available to you.
There seems to be an interest in trying to
keep these East- West divisions under control
' and to try to find points of agreement if pos-
sible, whether in the arms field or in the
trade field, or cultural exchanges, or what-
ever. I would hope that that represents a
trend which will continue and that we can
begin to see some reduction of tension on a
more permanent basis between these two
great systems of states.
I think out in Asia we know now that
South Viet-Nam is not going to be overrun
by force by North Viet-Nam. And we see a
recovery of confidence and hope among the
free nations of Asia.
I think this past year has seen a very ex-
citing demonstration of the intention of the
free nations of Asia to get on with their jobs,
not only nationally but in groups, in coopera-
tion with each other. We have had such dra-
matic developments as the founding of the
Asian Development Bank and the formation
of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council]
group that recently met in Seoul, Korea. We
have a feeling that free Asia is on the move.
They are demonstrating a capacity to move
ahead economically and socially and with
more competence in the political field. Those
are all very much to the good.
We have been encouraged by the per-
formance of the Alliance for Progress and
the discussions which have been anticipating
the meeting of the foreign ministers in
February and a meeting of the heads of gov-
ernment in April here in this hemisphere. I
think in the broadest terms the general
trends have been in a constructive and
promising direction.
The most significant failure in 1966 has
been the failure to find a means to bring this
Vietnamese problem to the conference table
or to a peaceful solution. And I would hope
very much that the year 1967 would be a
time when that will become possible.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection ivith that
and in connection ivith the recent statement
to Secretary-General U Thant, are we saying
that ive will accept a cease-fire, a simple
cease-fire, which is lengthy or semipermor
nent ?
A. Well, we are saying that we believe
that the Secretary-General should exercise
his office to the fullest to explore all possibili-
ties of a responsible discussion with the other
side to bring this matter to a peaceful con-
JANUARY 9, 1967
47
elusion. I wouldn't want to elaborate that
matter in detail any more than is contained
in Ambassador Goldberg's letter, because
the Secretary-General himself ought to have
a maximum freedom of maneuver at this
point.
Food Assistance to India
Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to this
India food problem which has got to the
point, as I understand it, ivhere the United
States can't carry the bicrden alone — in
handling their financial and development
problems, why, recourse nms had to a con-
sortium, with the machinery to bring this
cooperation on the problem. I think it's Sena-
tor IGeorgel McGovern that is advocating
the possibility of some sort of thing like that
to work on food. What do you think of this?
A. Well, we have raised this food problem
in such organizations as the OECD [Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment]-— we did that here in Washing-
ton; ^ and in the FAO, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions. The Indian Government itself is in
touch with a considerable number of govern-
ments to find out what assistance might be
forthcoming, not only from the food pro-
ducers but from those who might contribute
fertilizer or funds or other types of
assistance.
I do think that a group of nations will
have to do what is necessary in a situation
of this sort. Whether it would be a formal
consortium or simply an informal arrange-
ment by governments dealing directly with
the Indian Government, I wouldn't want to
say at this point, but the OECD organiza-
tion and the FAO and other bodies will have
to give systematic and serious attention to
the food problem if, in fact, the problem is
going to be met here over the next few years,
and we strongly urge that they do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any
progress on the nonproliferation treaty in
the last couple of months ?
' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1966,
p. 199.
A. I think what we last said on that re-
mains the situation, that certain underbrush
has been perhaps cleared away, but there still
are important problems to be resolved. This
is a matter in which allies on both sides pre-
sumably are in touch with each other. I'
would hope that this next year — that we are
not too long delayed in the next year, that
we might find some way to resolve this mat-
ter. It would be a major step forward if it
could be brought to a conclusion, but I can-
not today report that we have reached that
point. It is a matter of discussion among
many governments at the present time, and
we would hope some progress could be made.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the India
food problem for a moment, there is still
pending on the President's desk the request
of India for 2 million additioyial tons of food
grains beyond the very large quantities that
we have committed ourselves to send, and 1
believe they wanted this to arrive in Febi~u-
ary to tide them over until the March harvest
has come in. I think in the past you have said
that this request nms under urgent considera-
tion by our Government. Does what you have
just said now indicate that tve would hope
that other countries would share this btirden
with us so that we would not have to supply
all the 2 million tons by ourselves?
A. I believe some announcements have al-
ready been made from some other govern-
ments, and Secretary Freeman indicated that
there would be a million tons of wheat arriv-
ing in India in January.
Q. In January? But what about February?
A. Well, that would be for distribution in
the month, presumably during the month of
February, and arrangements are being dis-
cussed about what might be done beyond that.
But there is no specific word today about
action taken beyond those already an-
nounced, and when the action — when any de-
cisions are made on this, they will be
announced.
The press: Mr. Secretary, we wish you a
Merry Christmas, and we hope you will be
able to take the whole day off. Thank you
very much.
48
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
North Atlantic Council IVIeets at Paris
The North Atlantic Council held its regular
ministerial meeting at Paris December 15-16.
Following are texts of the final communique
and three annexes which were released by the
Council at the close of the meeting on Decem-
ber 16, together ivith a list of the members of
the U.S. delegation.
TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE
1. Ministers of member governments of the
Atlantic Alliance have met in Paris.
2. The North Atlantic Council, meeting on
15th and 16th December, reaffirmed the pur-
poses and principles of the Alliance, and their
resolve to ensure stability and well-being in
the North Atlantic area, and to unite their
efforts for the preservation of peace and se-
curity for their peoples.
3. The Alliance has demonstrated its value
by successfully averting threats to peace and
safeguarding the security of the Atlantic
area. By its defensive strength including its
effective means of deterrence, as well as by
maintaining its solidarity, the Alliance has
produced the basis for the present marked
reduction of tension in Europe. This basis
remains essential for the security of the Alli-
ance and for progress towards a peaceful
solution of outstanding problems, including
the problem of Germany.
4. The Council associated itself with the
views expressed in the Declaration by the
Governments of France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States which appears as an Annex to
this Communique. With regard to Berlin, the
Council stands by its declaration of 16th De-
cember, 1958.*
5. Ministers agreed on the need for con-
tinued efforts to achieve a peaceful solution
of the German problem to meet the German
people's fundamental right to reunification.
So long as Germany continues to be divided
there cannot be a genuine and stable settle-
ment in Europe. The peaceful progress of
Europe must proceed from reciprocal confi-
dence and trust, which will take time to grow
from sustained policies of co-operative effort
and better understanding on both sides. It
means especially removing barriers to freer
and more friendly reciprocal exchanges be-
tween countries of different social and eco-
nomic systems.
6. For their part, the members of the At-
lantic Alliance have confirmed their intention
to continue their efforts to secure better rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the states of
Eastern Europe in the political, economic,
social, scientific and cultural fields. Ministers
examined the report on East/West relations
prepared in accordance with the instructions
given at the last Ministerial meeting in June
1966.2 They welcomed the wide range of sug-
gestions in the report and emphasised their
willingness to explore ways of developing co-
operation with the Soviet Union and the
states of Eastern Europe in tasks of interest
and benefit to all concerned. They, moreover,
noted that contacts, conversations and agree-
ments have recently increased. In the field of
East/West relations there are clearly differ-
ent approaches which can be adopted,
whether between individual countries or in a
wider international framework.
7. Ministers welcomed the approval by the
United Nations Outer Space Committee of a
draft treaty on the peaceful use of outer
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.
' For text of a communique issued on June 8, 1966,
see ibid., June 27, 1966, p. 1001.
JANUARY 9, 1967
49
space.' Encourag-ed by this, they affirmed
their determination to continue to consult ac-
tively on problems of disarmament, to keep
under review the progress of international
discussions on measures to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, and to seek
agreement on satisfactory arms control meas-
ures which might contribute to the improve-
ment of European security and the relaxation
of tension. In so doing, they hoped to bring
about conditions which could permit a grad-
ual and balanced revision in force levels on
both sides. At the same time, they reaffirmed
their conviction that no acceptable permanent
solution to the question of European security
is possible without agreement on the most
critical political problems.
8. Turning to economic questions. Minis-
ters noted that the gap between the most ad-
vanced and the less-developed countries had
widened further. They reaffirmed that all ad-
vanced countries, whatever their economic
systems, had a responsibility to offer assist-
ance to developing countries.
9. Ministers expressed the hope that the
present multilateral tariff negotiations (Ken-
nedy Round) would be carried to a successful
conclusion and would promote the expansion
of trade to the greater benefit of all. They
also attached great importance to the initia-
tives designed to overcome the existence of
two trading areas in Western Europe and to
facilitate technical co-operation between the
European countries concerned.
10. On the initiative of the Italian Govern-
ment there was an exchange of views on ques-
tions arising out of the uneven technological
development of different countries. Ministers,
after stressing the importance and complex-
ity of this problem, invited the Permanent
Representatives to study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and to report their findings to the Spring
Ministerial meeting. A Resolution on this
subject was adopted and is attached.
• See p. 78.
11. The Council reaffirmed the importance
of continuing to assist Greece and Turkey
within the framework of the Alliance in or-
der to maintain the effectiveness of their con-
tribution to the common defense. Recom-
mending wide participation in the aid
programme, the Council agreed that this pro-
gramme should be extended to cover the pe-
riod 1966-1970.
12. Ministers took note of the Secretary
General's report on his "Watching Brief"
concerning Greek-Turkish relations and re-
affirmed their support for the continuation
of his activities in this respect. They ex-
pressed their firm hope that the continuing
exchanges of views between Turkey and
Greece on the Cyprus question and on Greek-
Turkish relations would contribute to bring-
ing about positive results. They reiterated
their appreciation of the presence of the
United Nations Force in Cyprus and the hope
that an improvement in the situation in the
island would be achieved. They stressed that
no action should be taken which could worsen
the situation in the island and increase the
tension.
13. On the proposal of the Belgian Govern-
ment and recalling the initiative taken by
Canada in December 1964, the Council re-
solved to undertake a broad analysis of in-
ternational developments since the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its pur-
pose would be to determine the influence of
such developments on the Alliance and to
identify the tasks which lie before it, in or-
der to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for
a durable peace. A Resolution on this subject
was adopted and is attached.
14. Ministers approved a report on Civil
Emergency Planning. They noted that a re-
appraisal of these activities within NATO
had been completed and they reaffirmed the
importance of such planning for the protec-
tion of civil populations and in the support
of overall defence.
15. Ministers met as the Defence Planning
Committee on 14th December, 1966. As a fur-
ther step in the process initiated at Athens
50
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in 1962, they approved recommendations re-
garding nuclear planning and consultation,
submitted by the Special Committee of De-
fence Ministers. They agreed to establish in
NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear
planning — a policy body called the Nuclear
Defence Affairs Committee, open to all
NATO countries, and, subordinate to it, a
Nuclear Planning Group of seven members
which will handle the detailed work.
16. To improve the ability of NATO to
engage in timely consultation in the event of
crisis, Ministers approved the development
of new arrangements for the rapid exchange
and the more effective use of relevant infor-
mation and data. To facilitate such exchange
of data, Ministers approved in principle the
establishment of a new NATO-wide commu-
nications scheme along the lines recom-
mended by the Special Committee. They also
examined a report from the Special Commit-
tee on possible improved procedures for con-
sultation. They agreed that further studies
and planning in this important area should
be undertaken, and requested the Secretary
General and Permanent Representatives to
consider how this work could most usefully
be carried forward. The Special Committee,
set up in June 1965, has now completed its
task.
17. Ministers reviewed reports on the pres-
ent status of NATO's military effort and
noted the force commitments undertaken by
governments for 1967 under the NATO Force
Plan adopted by Defence Ministers in July
1966.
18. After a comprehensive review of ques-
tions of strategy, force requirements, and
resources, in the course of which they dis-
cussed the military capabilities and intentions
of the Soviet Union, Ministers considered the
political, strategic and economic guidance
to be given to the NATO Militaiy Authorities
for their appreciation of the military situa-
tion as it will affect NATO up to and includ-
ing 1975. They gave instructions for further
studies in these fields in the light of this dis-
cussion.
19. On the basis of the results of numer-
ous studies conducted since July 1966, Min-
isters gave instructions for further work to
be carried out within the framework of the
new defence planning review procedures due
to be initiated in January 1967 for the regu-
lar projection of NATO force planning five
years ahead. This work will be directed, pri-
marily, towards securing the best balance of
forces and the most effective use of the re-
sources made available by NATO govern-
ments for defence.
20. Ministers underlined the importance of
the defence of the flank regions of the North
Atlantic Treaty area and issued further guid-
ance regarding the provision of external rein-
forcements in defence emergencies. They also
gave instructions concerning the improve-
ment of the local forces in the South-Eastern
Region. Substantial progress was made to-
wards agreement upon the common funding
of the exercises of the Allied Command Eu-
rope Mobile Force.
21. Ministers agreed to study whether a
NATO satellite communication programme
should be established which would provide
for a co-operative effort by member nations
in the new and developing field of space tech-
nology and its application to NATO's vital
communications needs. Meanwhile, an experi-
mental project was agreed which will provide
a link between SHAPE [Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe] at its new head-
quarters and AFSOUTH [Allied Forces
Southern Europe] at Naples.
22. France did not take part in the discus-
sions referred to in paragraphs 15-20 and
did not associate herself with the correspond-
ing decisions.
23. The Council decided that a new perma-
nent headquarters should be constructed at
the Heysel in Brussels, and a new temporary
headquarters at Evere, also in Brussels. The
Council expressed its gratitude to the Belgian
Government for having made available these
two sites.
24. The regular Spring Ministerial Meet-
ing will be held in Luxembourg in 1967.
JANUARY 9, 1967
51
ANNEXES TO COMMUNIQUE
Annex A
Declaration on Germany
The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United
States met on 14th December, 1966, on the
eve of the Ministerial Meetings of the North
Atlantic Alliance, in Paris in order to discuss
the situation in Germany. The meeting took
place exactly eight years after the four For-
eign Ministers had met in Paris on 14th De-
cember, 1958, when Foreign Minister [Willy]
Brandt, then Governing Mayor of Berlin, re-
ported on the situation of Berlin. The Foreign
Ministers confirmed that their governments
would continue to be responsible for the se-
curity and viability of a free Berlin.
The Foreign Ministers of France, the
United Kingdom and the United States took
note of the intention of the Federal Republic
of Germany to develop human, economic and
cultural contacts between the two parts of
Germany. These contacts aim in particular at
alleviating the human misery which is a
result of the partition of the German people.
The three Ministers share the views of the
Federal Government and will support these
efforts within the framework of the responsi-
bilities incumbent on their governments.
The Ministers re-emphasised that the solu-
tion of the German question is one of the es-
sential problems in the relations between East
and West. This solution can only be achieved
by peaceful methods, on the basis of the right
of self-determination, and through the crea-
tion of an atmosphere of detente on the con-
tinent, under conditions guaranteeing the
security of all countries.
Annex B
Resolution on International
Technological Co-operation
(Adopted by the Council on 16th December,
1966)
The North Atlantic Council :
Recognising the need for continued pro-
motion of economic co-operation within the
spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty;
Having noted proposals submitted by the
Italian Government on 5th October and 7th
December, 1966, the additional comments
provided to the Council by the Italian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, and the statements of
other Ministers in the course of the debate;
Convinced that it is important that con-
sideration be given to the Italian proposals
so that measures can be applied as soon as
possible to give renewed impetus to interna-
tional co-operation in the technological field;
and to such other measures as will serve to
raise the general level of scientific and tech-
nological achievement;
Recommends that the Council in Perma-
nent Session study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and report its findings to the Spring Minis-
terial Meeting;
Instructs the Secretary General to submit
shortly to the Council in Permanent Session,
a report on the scientific and technological
programmes already underway in NATO in
view of the contributions these activities can
make toward a reduction of technological dis-
parities.
Annex C
Resolution of the North Atlantic
Council
The Council, desirous of achieving the
fundamental purposes of the North Atlantic
Treaty in the spirit of cohesion and solidarity
between the signatories of the Treaty:
Considers it essential to analyse the politi-
cal events which have occurred since the
Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertain-
ing their influence on international relations
and on the Alliance itself;
Accordingly, the Council Undertakes to
study the future tasks which face the Alli-
ance, and its procedures for fulfilling them,
in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor
for a durable peace. It will examine ways of
improving consultation within the Alliance,
including the European member countries.
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In carrying out this study at a hig-h politi-
cal level, the Council will Utilise the most
appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling
its mandate.
A preliminary report will be examined at
the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the
Ministerial Council at its meeting in Decem-
ber 1967 will draw the appropriate conclu-
sions that emerge from the enquiry.
U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 291 dated December 12
Representatives
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, chairman
Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
Harlan Cleveland
Members of the Delegation
Department of State
Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France
Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State
Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State
Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic
Political-Military Affairs
Samuel T. Parelman, secretary of delegation. Deputy
Director, Office of International Conferences
Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Andrew L. Steigman, Staff Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State
George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of NATO
and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Department of the Treasury
Douglass Hunt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury
James F. King, Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury
Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury
Department of Defense
Maj. Gen. Russell Dougherty, USAF, Director, Euro-
pean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security Affairs
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs
Adm. A. G. Ward, U.S. Representative to the Mili-
tary Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation
Gen. Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation and European Regional Organizations
Dwight Dickinson, Director, Office of Political Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Deputy U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Rep-
resentative
Timothy W. Stanley, Director, United States NATO
Force Planning Group
JANUARY 9, 1967
53
Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense
by Leonard C. Meeker
Legal Adviser ^
Throughout this land, the war in Viet-
Nam weighs heavy on the minds of Ameri-
cans. It is again and again the subject of our
talk, under the pressing flow of news dis-
patches and under the thousand impacts this
war has on our lives. It is never far from our
thoughts.
Fighting a war is never cheap, never easy.
The Viet-Nam war is a particularly difficult
one. As President Johnson has said, this is a
new kind of war. It is not a war of major
battles to be won or lost. It calls for courage
and fortitude to stick it out, over a long
period of time if need be.
There are few who would not be rid of the
war. It impinges directly on the lives of
American young men by the tens and hun-
dreds of thousands. Most Americans are
anxious to turn our full resources to another
great war — a war on poverty and hunger at
home and throughout the world. Some believe
the Viet-Nam war divides the world at a
time when we are most impelled to seek world
cooperation.
One cannot but be concerned about these
problems. No one can say that debate is
unnecessary — quite the contrary. We are
dealing with great issues. There are risks to
be weighed and roads that must be chosen.
It is my purpose, in the hour we have to-
gether this evening, to locate the Viet-Nam
war in the great river of time: first, to indi-
' 1966 Louis Caplan Lecture in Law at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law School, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
on Dec. 13 (press release 292).
cate something of how it arose; then, to relate
it to the existing framework of international
law; finally, to consider the place of this con-
flict in the building of a more stable and just
world order as nations move along the high-
road of history.
Origins of the Viet-Nam Conflict
Viet-Nam has a very short political his-
tory under that name — one that does not go
back even 20 years. Viet-Nam is made up
of three areas that were included in what
France called, for purposes of colonial admin-
istration, Indochina. Those areas were:
Tonkin in the Red River Delta of the north,
Annam along the central coast, and Cochin
China in the south around Saigon. In the
19th century France ruled these areas as pro-
tectorates and colonies, along with Laos and
Cambodia; all together, they made up Indo-
china.
The colonial picture was a typical one: ad-
ministrators from France to govern; French
armed forces to keep order; colonists to direct
agriculture and trade; native gentry and
leaders who were clients of the French and
profited from the relationship; finally, the
Indochinese majority, who performed the
labor of the country and received relatively
little return for their toil.
Japan's military leaders, as part of their
program of expansion and conquest, occupied
Indochina in 1940. The colonial administra-
tion and the European residents of Indochina
by and large collaborated with the Japanese.
54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
They hoiked thereby to keep the political, eco-
nomic, and social situation under control.
It was in World War II that the recent his-
tory of Viet-Nam began. Dissidents who
opposed the French and the Japanese carried
on a resistance movement. Ho Chi Minh was
the acknowledged leader of this movement
from the beginning. By 1945 the drive for
independence had become a significant politi-
cal force. The sense of nationalism and the
ideas of self-detennination were at work in
Indochina, as they were elsewhere in Asia
and soon came to be in Africa.
But France in the postwar period did not
follow the course of independence soon taken
by Britain for India, Bumia, and other
Commonwealth territories. France sought
instead to restore and reinforce its colonial
administration in Indochina. What had been
wartime resistance by the Viet Minh orga-
nization continued and grew as a struggle to
rid the country of colonial rule. In 1949
France sought to stem the tide by setting up
indigenous governments of limited authority
in Cambodia, in Laos, and in a new State of
Viet-Nam. France kept control of foreign
affairs, defense, and financial matters.
The guerrilla campaign of the Viet Minh
grew into a major war with the French
colonial forces. At the end of 5 years the bat-
tle of Dien Bien Phu had been lost by the
French, and Paris had decided to seek a po-
litical settlement. This was the origin of the
Geneva conference of 1954, in which the five
great world powers took part, along with
Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Viet-
Nam — each of which by then had its own
regime. The Government in the South had
been created by and was alined with France.
Hanoi was the seat of the rebel Viet Minh
regime which had been fighting the French.
Its concentration of militaiy and political
power was in the North, but it had guerrilla
units operating throughout the countiy. The
participants in the Geneva conference did not
have to produce any agreement at all. They
were free to continue all the existing dis-
agreements. The French and Viet Minh mili-
tary forces could have gone on with the
fighting, to whatever conclusion it would
yield. Since, however, they did reach a series
of international agreements, we are entitled
to look at them as binding legal instruments.
We will want first to see what contracts
were made. We will want to see what provi-
sion was made for insuring compliance. We
will want to look at what happened in fact.
We will want to examine the legal rights of
the- parties in the circumstances of 1956 to
1966.
The Geneva Accords
The 1954 Geneva conference produced
agreements on Cambodia and Laos as well as
on Viet-Nam, but for present purijoses we
shall consider only the instruments relating
to Viet-Nam.2 The chief of these was the
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Viet-Nam. It was signed on behalf of the
commander in chief of the French Union
forces in Indochina and on behalf of the com-
mander in chief of the People's Army of
Viet-Nam.
The very first article of the Viet-Nam
cease-fire agreement fixed a demarcation line,
near the 17th parallel in central Viet-Nam,
"on either side of which the forces of the
two parties shall be regrouped after their
withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army
of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the
forces of the French Union to the south."
Under article 19 of the same agreement, the
two parties were bound to insure that the
zones assigned to them "are not used for the
resumption of hostilities or to further an ag-
gressive policy." And under article 24 each
party was obligated to "commit no act and
undertake no operation against the other
party." Articles 16 and 17 of the agreement
prohibited the introduction into Viet-Nam of
additional armed forces or weapons, but per-
mitted the rotation of troops and the replace-
ment of wornout or used-up materiel. Article
18 prohibited the establishment of new mili-
tary bases throughout Viet-Nam territory.
In a separate document, known as the
^ For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State
publication 6446, p. 750.
JANUARY 9, 1967
55
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference,^
the conference powers agreed that the settle-
ment of political problems in Viet-Nam
should "permit the Viet-Namese people to
enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed
by democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret bal-
lot." There were to be general elections in
July 1956 under the supervision of the Inter-
national Control Commission. Consultations
on this subject were to be held between repre-
sentatives of the two zones beginning in July
1955.
Here, then, were the basic undertakings of
the Geneva accords. If observed, they should
have kept the peace in Viet-Nam. What was
to insure that the parties would live up to
these undertakings ? The agreement sought to
provide some machinery for international
supervision.
There was to be an International Control
Commission, made up of representatives of
India, Canada, and Poland. The Commission
was to oversee fulfillment of all the obliga-
tions of the agreement. It was to have inspec-
tion teams at its disposal and access to any
and all places in both zones of Viet-Nam.
Some of the Commission's decisions could be
made by majority vote; others, including
those dealing with violations or threats of
violations which might lead to a resumption
of hostilities, would require a unanimous vote
of all members.
In this respect, the arrangement was
flawed from the beginning. Any member of
the Commission could veto a decision on a
question of compliance with the agreement.
On other matters, even a majority might be
unobtainable because the representative of
India, in carrying out his Government's
policy of nonalinement, could remain aloof
and equivocal on important matters. Vetoes
were in fact cast, and the Indian chairman
of the Commission often pursued his national
policy of neutralism and nonalinement. The
Commission had other difficulties, too. The
zonal authorities, and particularly those in
North Viet-Nam, denied access to the inspec-
tion teams of the Commission.
' Ibid., p. 785.
As a result of this state of aflFairs, the
world has not had an eff"ective, authoritative,
and impartial reporting mechanism on the
facts in Viet-Nam. There could and did arise
disputes about the facts in Viet-Nam. For
example, who lived up to the cease-fire
agreement, and who broke it? Was the sub-
sequent conflict indigenous and essentially a
civil war, or was there the intervention of
substantial and perhaps crucial external
force ?
Events in Viet-Nam Since 1954
Issues like these have a bearing on the
international legal rights of the parties. Be-
cause they are an essential part of the legal
analysis, we must try to deal with them.
Since, for the most part, we do not have avail-
able authoritative findings by an impartial
international body, it is necessaiy to work
with the best evidence that can be gathered.
I should like to set out what the United
States Government believes happened after
July 1954 and to set these events beside the
provisions of the Geneva accords. I shall, of
course, discuss what the Government of
South Viet-Nam and the Government of the
United States did after July 1954. But be-
cause their actions were in the nature of a
response to events directed from Hanoi, it
seems most logical to examine first what the
other side was doing.
Despite the obligation of regroupment in
the cease-fire agreement, some effective Com-
munist guerrilla units continued to operate in
areas of South Viet-Nam where they had
been during the hostilities with France.
Large numbers of the southern Viet Minh
troops who were withdrawn north of the
demarcation line were retained by Hanoi in
military or security units; others received
further training in guerrilla warfare.
The North Vietnamese regime began to
infiltrate these ethnic Southerners into South
Viet-Nam as early as 1957. Up to the conclud-
ing months of 1964, approximately 40,000
infiltrators moved south, to join the guerrillas
already there who had been supported with
arms and supplies by Hanoi since 1956. Once
in South Viet-Nam. the infiltrators were as-
56
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
signed to existing combat units or used to
form new units, frequently in their original
home provinces. All of this activity — the
training, the equipping, the transporting, the
assigning — was directed from Hanoi. It did
not just happen within South Viet-Nam.
As the infiltration from the North con-
tinued, Hanoi began to exhaust its supply of
ethnic Southerners who could be sent into the
South for guerrilla warfare. Beginning in
late 1964, the infiltrating units consisted es-
sentially of North Vietnamese soldiers or-
ganized in regular army units. Upward of
80,000 of these troops have infiltrated from
the North during the last 2 years. The
Northerners have frequently entered in large
units, rather than in small groups, and have
retained their military organization. After
allowing for casualties from all causes, it is
estimated that there are today about 45,000
North Vietnamese army regulars in South
Viet-Nam. This represents nearly half of the
main force of Communist combat troops in
the South — a force currently estimated at
100,000. Of the remaining 55,000, many are
irregulars who earlier infiltrated from the
North; almost all the rest have been re-
cruited from Communist-held areas in the
South — there has been no rallying to the
Communist cause from Government-held
areas.
Let us now look at what the Communists
have been doing with their forces in South
Viet-Nam during the last 10 years. They
began their operations with terrorism and
assassination aimed at local government
officials. From 1957 to 1959 more than 1,000
civilians were assassinated or kidnaped by
Communist guerrillas in the South. In the
ensuing 2 years their attacks were intensi-
fied and began to be conducted by battalion-
size units against the military and security
forces of the Government in the South. The
level of military activity increased progres-
sively.
With the arrival of regular North Viet-
namese army units, beginning in the conclud-
ing months of 1964, sizable military engage-
ments have taken place almost continuously
in many different parts of South Viet-Nam.
Unlike Korea, where the Communists
launched openly an invasion in broad day-
light across an international demarcation
line, the Communists in Viet-Nam have re-
sorted to covert and clandestine tactics. This
is the strategy of what Communist ideology
and propaganda call the "war of national
liberation."
On the basis of the evidence which has
been accumulated over a period of time, it
seems beyond dispute that from the begin-
ning the conflict in South Viet-Nam has not
been simply an indigenous rebellion. Much of
the military manpower came from the North.
So also with weapons and supplies. And, per-
haps most important of all, the planning, the
direction, the orders, have come from Hanoi.
International Law in Relation
to the Viet-Nam Conflict
How does one apply international law to
this kind of problem?
It is necessary to begin by finding out what
international law is. We have a fairly clear
idea of what it is not. It is not a framework
of government such as our own and other
democratic countries have at home. There is
no international legislature to make the rules
of the game for all to accept and follow.
There is no system of courts. There is no
police force.
What is a government to do in the face of
so imperfect a world, in the face of so chaotic
a scene, such as that created by large-scale
violence and hostilities in Southeast Asia?
Some have suggested that it is best to
acknowledge there is no real law to deal with
such a situation of conflict and that the
proper course is to proceed with whatever
practical actions will most advance the mili-
tary power, the security position, and the
general interests of the United States. I won-
der if such a view does not beg an important
question. Will this country's security be en-
hanced, will its interests be served, without
our making an honest and determined at-
tempt to develop international law and live
by it?
We may feel the absence today of a law-
giver outside national governments, who
JANUARY 9, 1967
57
could, to our comfort and security, give and
enforce law among the nations. That absence
does not relieve us of moral and political
obligations. It means instead that govern-
ments will have to go on working very hard
if there are to be functioning and effective
processes and institutions of world law in the
future.
Let us remember, too, that the shape of
things to come is in no small way determined
by the actions of great powers. This is an
aspect of the responsibility that the United
States, along with other countries, bears in
the modem world. I have no doubt myself
that the road of pragmatism and the road of
idealism run together as we consider the
needs and the possibilities for developing
effective world law.
International Agreements
1. There are many ways of making law.
One powerful means of lawmaking available
to governments is to join in making interna-
tional agreements and then to act in con-
formity with them.
In the case of Viet-Nam we have the
Geneva accords as a starting point and legal
framework for dealing with the situation.
Although the United States did not sign the
accords, from the beginning it undertook to
respect them, and President Eisenhower said
that "any renewal of Communist aggression
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave
concern." *
The United States began as early as 1954
to arrange for aid to South Viet-Nam to pro-
mote its viability and development. For
nearly 7 years United States forces and mate-
rial in the South stayed within the limits set
by the Geneva accords for external military
assistance, despite the fact that North Viet-
Nam had been violating these accords from
the start and despite the gradual escalation of
these violations. Not until late 1961 did the
number of United States military personnel
in the South rise above 900. When the United
■" For a statement made by President Eisenhower
on July 21, 1954, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954,
p. 163.
States made the decision to exceed the limits
laid down by the Geneva accords, it was on
the basis of a principle of international law
similar to the doctrine of fundamental breach
in the domestic law of contracts. North Viet-
Nam had violated seriously the obligation to
prevent the northern zone from being "used
for the resumption of hostilities or to further
an aggressive policy." In these circum-
stances. South Viet-Nam was relieved from
the obligation to comply with the cease-fire
agreement's limitations on military man-
power and materiel when the South needed
additional strength for its own defense
against aggression from the North.
Here it is noteworthy that in June 1962 the
Indian and Canadian members of the Inter-
national Control Commission found it pos-
sible to agree as follows in a report:
. . . there is evidence to show that armed and
unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other sup-
plies have been sent from the Zone in the North
to the Zone in the South with the object of support-
ing, organizing and carrying out hostile activities,
including armed attacks, directed against the Armed
Forces and Administration of the Zone in the
South. . . .
. . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN
[People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the
Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encourag-
ing and supporting hostile activities in the Zone
in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Ad-
ministration in the South.
The Commission also cited the Republic of
Viet-Nam for its activities in importing mili-
tary equipment and personnel above the
limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords.
However, these actions were taken by South
Viet-Nam as part of its effort to defend itself
against aggression and subversion from the
North. And at no time did South Viet-Nam
undertake to overrun the North by force.
I have mentioned this report of the Inter-
national Control Commission because it
shows that the international machinery set
up by the Geneva accords agreed with the
legal analysis of the situation made by the
United States, when that machinery was able
to function. But for most of the last dozen
years, it has been unable to function as in-
tended.
58
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Government Actions and Precedents
They Create
2. Another way in which international law
is made is through the actions of govern-
ments and the precedents they create. If a
government acts consistently with a series of
coherent principles, it may make a contribu-
tion to the common law of nations. The
United States Government has tried to do
this in the case of Viet-Nam, both with re-
spect to situations not envisioned by the
Geneva accords and in giving practical in-
terpretations and applications to the general
rules laid down by the Charter of the United
Nations.
Some commentators, in talking about Viet-
Nam, have set up three categories of situa-
tions for their legal analysis of the problem:
The first is the category of wholly indigenous
rebellion. The second category is one in which
there is large-scale intervention from outside
short of armed attack. The third is the cate-
gory of armed attack, in which one country
employs its regular miUtary forces to gain
control of another country.
The evidence does not allow for the con-
clusion that the war in Viet-Nam was ever
a simple category-one situation. It was prob-
ably, fpv quite some period of time, a cate-
gory-two situation. By the end of 1964,
however, it had become very clearly a cate-
gory-three situation.
Critics of United States Gk)vernment policy
have argued that, if there was North Viet-
namese intervention in the South, any United
States assistance to South Viet-Nam that
might be justified would have to be confined
geographically to South Viet-Nam. Even if
one were to concede that such a rule applies
in the case of a category-two situation, it cer-
tainly does not apply to a case of armed
attack. Legitimate defense includes military
action against the aggressor wherever such
action is needed to halt the attack.
During the decade after Geneva, the
United States did confine its assistance to
South Viet-Nam to military personnel, sup-
plies, and activities in the South. The United
States took no action against the source of
aggression in the North. Then, in late 1964,
as I have already indicated. North Viet-Nam
moved into a new phase of its aggression and
began dispatching southward whole units of
its regular armed forces. The tempo of the
war had increased by early 1965, and addi-
tional measures of defense were required.
Infiltration — Current Mode
of "Armed Attack"
3. I have heard and read arguments by
some that Viet-Nam does not present a situa-
tion of "armed attack" because invading
armies were not massed at a border and did
not march across it in broad daylight. To be
sure, that is the way armed attacks occurred
in 1914, at the beginning of World War II,
and even in Korea. But strategies and tactics
have changed. The current mode of armed
aggression in Viet-Nam is by the infiltration
of military units and the weapons of war
under cover of darkness, through jungle
areas, and across the territory of a neighbor-
ing state — Laos.
The law, if it is to be a living and working
force, must concern itself with the substance
and the reality of what is going on. The
answer to a question of law cannot properly
turn on the mere form or appearance that a
protagonist may give to its action. The judg-
ment whether North Viet-Nam has engaged
in "armed attack" against the South cannot
depend on the form or appearance of its con-
duct. The crucial consideration is that North
Viet-Nam has marshaled the resources of the
state and has sent instrumentalities of the
state, including units of its regular armed
forces, into South Viet-Nam to achieve state
objectives by force — in this case to subject
the South to its rule.
Measures of Collective Defense
4. United States and South Vietnamese
airstrikes and other military actions against
North Viet-Nam have been based on the legal
proposition that they are measures of collec-
tive defense against armed attack from the
North. I would like to take up some of the
arguments that have been made against this
proposition. First, it has been argued that,
JANUARY 9, 1967
59
while the United States says South Viet-Nam
is under armed attack, no international body,
such as the United Nations, has made such a
finding-. The United States Government re-
grets that neither the Security Council nor
the General Assembly of the United Nations
has been able or seen fit to express itself on
Viet^Nam. But ought we to adopt the view
that if the United Nations makes no finding,
there is therefore no armed attack and the
aggressor must accordingly be permitted to
pursue his ambitions without being subjected
to effective countermeasures?
Certainly the United Nations Charter does
not say this. Article 51 of the charter, dealing
with armed attack, says that "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense"
may be exercised "until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security." Thus
it is for a defender to claim and assert that
armed attack has taken place, justifying
measures of defense. The defender does not
have to await action by the Security Council.
His duty, as is made clear by the remainder
of article 51, is to report to the Council. Then
the Council will, in the end, decide what has
happened, who is right, and what measures
must be taken.
The United States has several times re-
ported to the Council in the last 2 years on
military actions in Viet-Nam. The Council
has taken no action. In January and Febru-
ary 1966 the Council elected not to debate the
situation in Viet-Nam, although the United
States had once again raised the whole ques-
tion. In September of this year Ambassador
[Arthur J.] Goldberg made a full presenta-
tion to the General Assembly on Viet-Nam.^
The subject was a central topic in the month-
long general debate that was held in New
York during October. Again, no United Na-
tions action was taken.
International Lines of Demarcation
5. Another argument made against the
United States legal position on collective self-
' Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
defense is that Viet-Nam is a single country
and that the regime in the North is not
legally precluded from taking steps, includ-
ing the use of force, to unify North and
South Viet-Nam under a single Communist
regime. Any such argument ignores the plain
provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954. It
also suggests a view of international law that
would operate to undermine peace and se-
curity in many parts of the world.
The Geneva accords are very clear in draw-
ing a demarcation line between North and
South Viet-Nam. This line was to be re-
spected by the opposing armed forces, includ-
ing all elements — regular or irregular — under
their control. It divided Viet-Nam into two
zones which would be administered by dif-
ferent authorities. The line was set by an
international agreement negotiated at a con-
ference in Geneva of the principal powers
concerned.
The fact that the demarcation line was not
intended as a permanent boundary surely did
not give either side license to disregard it.
The very purpose of the line was to end hos-
tilities and separate the fighting forces. Mov-
ing troops from one zone to the other to
engage them in hostilities was clearly in
breach of the international agreement
reached at Geneva in 1954.
It was also true in the Korea of 1950 that
the 38th parallel was not a permanent bound-
ary but instead an international demarca-
tion line established at the end of World War
II. Like the line in Viet-Nam, the line in
Korea was not intended to last; it was hoped
that the country could be unified. But all of
this made the North Korean invasion of that
year no less an armed attack under interna-
tional law.
The importance of respecting interna-
tional lines of demarcation is evident in
Europe also. The lines of demarcation be-
tween East and West Germany and around
West Berlin have never been intended as
permanent boundaries. However, they are
lines of great importance, and any moves to
disregard them would have the gravest con-
sequences.
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Question of "Free Elections"
6. Still another argnment has been ad-
vanced by some to justify the actions of
Hanoi. It runs as follows: The Geneva ac-
cords looked forward to a political settlement
as the result of which Viet-Nam would be
unified; elections were to be held in the sum-
mer of 1956, and during the preceding year
consultations were to be held between the
authorities of North and South concerning
the elections; South Viet-Nam declined to
take part in consultations, and there have
been no elections; hence, North Viet-Nam had
freedom to proceed in its own way with re-
unification of the country.
This argument has no merit. The elections
referred to in the Geneva accords were to be
"free general elections by secret ballot." Even
the North Vietnamese Defense Minister in
effect admitted long ago that such elections
would have been impossible in North Viet-
Nam. Speaking at the 10th Congress of the
North Vietnamese Communist Party Central
Committee in October 1956 General [Vo
Nguyen] Giap said:
We have made too many deviations and executed
too many honest people. We attacked on too large
a front and seeing enemies everywhere, resorted
to terror, which became far too widespread.
Thus it cannot properly be said that there
was any breach of agreement by South Viet-
Nam when it declined to proceed toward elec-
tions that could not possibly have been mean-
ingful.
Defense Measures Proportional to Attack
7. Before concluding this review of the
United States legal position, I would like to
refer to the principle that measures of de-
fense must be proportional to the attack. The
United States program of airstrikes against
North Viet-Nam has been designed for the
purpose of interfering with transport to the
South; destroying supplies intended for ship-
ment to the South; in short, to halt the con-
tinuing aggression by North Viet-Nam. As
Ambassador Goldberg said 2 months ago:
It is because of the attempt to upset by violence
JANUARY 9, 1967
the situation in Viet-Nam, and its far-reaching
implications elsewhere, that the United States and
other countries have responded to appeals from
South Viet-Nam for military assistance.
Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly
limited.
We are not engaged in a "holy war" against com-
munism.
We do not seek to establish an American empire or
a sphere of influence in Asia.
We seek no permanent military bases, no per-
manent establishment of troops, no permanent al-
liances, no permanent American presence of any
kind in South Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement
on South Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to overthrow the Government of
North Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to do any injury to mainland
China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.
We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an uncondi-
tional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything
that belongs to it.
Efforts To Find a Peaceful Settlement
I have been setting forth reasons in sup-
port of United States military actions against
North Viet-Nam. Justification for these ac-
tions in no way displaces a continuing obliga-
tion we have under the United Nations
Charter to seek a peaceful settlement. It has
long been said that nations must try to settle
their disputes by peaceful means before any
resort to force. But it is no less true that the
participants in armed conflict are bound to go
on seeking a settlement by peaceful means
even while hostilities are in progress.
Particularly in the last 2 years, the United
States has made major efforts to negotiate an
end to the war in Viet-Nam. In April 1965
President Johnson, in response to the appeal
of 17 nonalined countries, offered to com-
mence negotiations without precondition.*
This was not acceptable to Hanoi. A year ago
the United States conducted a concentrated
peace offensive for over 5 weeks. Again there
was no affirmative answer from the other
side.
At the General Assembly this fall, Ambas-
' For text of President Johnson's address at Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., see ibid., Apr.
26, 1965, p. 606.
61
sador Goldberg summed up our aims in the
following way:
We want a political solution, not a military solu-
tion, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject
the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to im-
pose a military solution.
We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-
Nam the same right of self-determination — to decide
its own political destiny, free of force — that the
United Nations Charter affirms for all.
And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam
should be decided upon through a free choice by the
peoples of both the North and the South without
outside interference, the results of which choice we
are fully prepared to support.
. . . We are prepared to order a cessation of all
bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are
assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be
answered promptly by a corresponding and appro-
priate deescalation on the other side.
Prospects Into the Future
It is not given to us to foresee in what way
the Viet-Nam war will end. It is possible that
the protagonists will meet at the conference
table and settle the conflict by negotiation.
The United States will continue to press its
efforts toward peaceful settlement.
It is also possible that, over time, North
Viet-Nam will gradually reduce and ulti-
mately cease its intervention in the South,
having found that force does not pay and that
the relationships between North and South
must be worked out on the levels of economic
intercourse and political accommodation.
Other possibilities have been urged by
some: for example, outright withdrawal of
United States forces from Viet-Nam or with-
drawal of those forces to a few coastal bases.
I cannot see that any such ending to the war
in Viet-Nam would be acceptable from the
point of view of the world community interest
in peace and justice among nations. Such an
ending would gravely impair the effectiveness
of the international law that we have today.
For one thing, withdrawal and abandon-
ment of South Viet-Nam would be to sacrifice
the Geneva accords and advertise for all to
see that an international agreement can with
impunity be treated by an aggressor as a
mere scrap of paper. Moreover, withdrawal
and abandonment of South Viet-Nam would
undermine the faith of other countries in
United States defense treaty commitments
and would encourage would-be aggressors to
suppose they could successfully and even
freely impose on their weaker neighbors by
force.
In less than 2 months after the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina, the United
States and other Pacific countries signed the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. By
a unanimously agreed protocol, that treaty
covers South Viet-Nam. The parties to the
treaty have engaged jointly and severally to
"act to meet the common danger" if there is
"aggression by means of armed attack"
against any of the parties or any protocol
state. To disengage from this commitment
could have no other effect than to undermine
the assurance of all concerned that the United
States will live up to its commitments. Politi-
cal and military stability will not be achieved
but could instead be destroyed by a policy of
making agreements and then not carrying
them out.
We have seen in Europe, during the two
decades since World War II, the success of a
policy of insisting that the integrity of inter-
national settlements not be upset by force.
The strengthening of Western Europe
through the Marshall Plan and the North At-
lantic Treaty put an effective curb on Soviet
expansionism. We have seen a favorable de-
velopment in the increased maturity of Soviet
conduct toward the rest of the world. With a
growing stake in preserving and developing
what has already been achieved at home, the
Soviet Government plainly pursues a very
different course from that of the younger and
still more violent revolution in China.
It is an important part of the task of build-
ing a more secure and just world to weight
the balances of other governments' processes
of calculation, so far as we are able, in the
direction of discussion and reason and away
from violence and force. This is part of the
meaning of the Viet-Nam war today. The use
of external force to gain political ends must
not turn out to be profitable.
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The course of history shows that the
temptation to prey upon weaker nations has
often been too strong. In 1910 William James
foresaw: "The war against war is going to
be no holiday excursion or camping party."
He emphasized the vast difficulty involved in
abolishing war. "Extravagant ambitions," he
wrote, "will have to be replaced by reasonable
claims, and nations must make common cause
against them."
This process of making common cause goes
on even in the troubled world of 1966. For
all the disappointments, shortcomings, and
sometimes retrograde motion, the institution
of the United Nations has recorded progress
in the long world campaign for peace with
justice. The processes and machinery of
world organization will have to be strength-
ened and developed. Governments will have
to learn and act upon the conviction that
change is necessary to justice but that it must
be ordered and peaceful change, without vio-
lence.
James' essay from which I quoted was di-
rected to finding a "moral equivalent of war"
— a constructive activity that could take over
war's historic function of offering challenge
to man's ambitions and binding peoples to-
gether against a common foe. If it is chal-
lenge we need, the world scene is abundant.
There are no apparent limits to the resources
and energies that nations could put into the
exploration of space or into the improvement
of man's condition on earth. The pressure of
exploding population on food resources in the
world is as threatening as any invasion from
outer space could be.
The world still has time in which to adjust
and redirect man's activities toward survival
and growth. Will we not have the wit and the
will to make this effort? It seems a necessity
in this time when, as President Kennedy said:
"man holds in his mortal hands the power to
abolish all forms of human poverty and all
forms of human life." ''
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General
for Help in Seeking Peace
Following is the text of a letter delivered
to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant by
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, on December 19.
U.S. /U.N. press release B03B
December 19, 1966
My dear Mr. Secretary General: Two
world leaders who command the respect of
the entire international community have re-
cently voiced the desire for a cease-fire in
Vietnam. On December 8, Pope Paul VI
noted the temporary Christmas truce ar-
ranged in Vietnam and beseeched all con-
cerned to transform this temporary truce
into a cessation of hostilities which would
become the occasion for sincere negotiations.
And you, Mr. Secretary General, expressed
the sincere hope on the same day that the
parties directly concerned would heed the
Pope's appeal.
In the fourteen points my Government has
put forward as elements of a peaceful set-
tlement in Vietnam, you will recall, the
United States has explicitly stated: ^ A cessa-
tion of hostilities could be the first order of
business at a conference or could be the sub-
ject of preliminary discussions. I herewith
reaffirm our commitment to that proposal —
a proix)sal which is in keeping with the ap-
peal of the Pope as endorsed by you. Our
objective remains the end of all fighting, of
all hostilities and of all violence in Vietnam
— and an honorable and lasting settlement
there, for which, as we have repeatedly said,
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962
would be a satisfactory basis.
President Johnson has time and again
stressed his desire for a peaceful settlement
of the Vietnam conflict. Other United States
leaders have spoken in a similar vein. In
speaking before the General Assembly on be-
half of my Government on September 22,^
' For text of President Kennedy's inaugural ad-
dress, see ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
• For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.
*Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
JANUARY 9, 1967
63
I noted there are differences between our
aims as to the basis for such a settlement
and the stated position of North Vietnam.
I went on to say that: ". . . no differences
can be resolved without contact, discussion
or negotiations." This holds equally true with
regard to arrangements for a mutual cessa-
tion of hostilities.
We turn to you, therefore, with the hope
and the request that you will take whatever
steps you consider necessary to bring about
the necessary discussions which could lead
to such a cease-fire. I can assure you that the
Government of the United States will co-
operate fully with you in getting such dis-
cussions started promptly and in bringing
them to a successful completion.
I request that this letter be circulated as
an official document of the Security Ck)uncil.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldberg
Institutions for Order
by Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^
I am happy to be with you tonight because
of my admiration for the Joint Distribution
Committee. For over 50 years your organiza-
tion has been dedicated to the advancement
of human welfare. You have practiced the
highest kind of humanitarianism in a coldly
practical and realistic world.
You have brought hope and assistance and
security to millions of persecuted and under-
privileged members of the Jewish faith
wherever you could reach them. When neces-
sary, you have moved them to safe havens
where they could once again take up a nor-
mal existence as parts of larger communities.
You have done this through a nongovern-
mental effort which has won the applause of
men of good will everywhere and which has
served as an example for the welfare work
of many other groups and denominations.
I would like to suggest that this type of
practical idealism is needed not only in the
' Address made before the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee at New York, N.Y., on Dec.
7 (TJ.S./U.N. press release 5006).
field of human welfare, narrowly defined, but
throughout the entire range of international
relations. As man gains greater power not
only to alter his environment but to destroy
his fellow man, it becomes plainer than ever
that the world needs at least minimum
ground rules of good conduct. In the past,
when the destructive capabilities of men and
nations were smaller, our level of tolerance
for antisocial behavior in international af-
fairs was a good deal greater than it is today.
We could afford a certain measure of irre-
sponsibility. But the inexorable advances of
science and technology, with their enormous
destructive potential, have changed all that
for good.
Nor is the power of the atom the only
dangerous new force confronting our genera-
tion. All governments today, whatever their
ideology, are affected not only by the nuclear
threat but by the development of the race be-
tween population growth and the food sup-
ply and by explosive political, racial, eco-
nomic, and social problems. The solutions to
these problems are on the agenda of man-
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
kind not for just a year or two but for a
generation to come.
But I believe our greatest problem is none
of these. There may be keys that will unlock
all these doors, but what we need still more
is a master key which can open them all. I
submit that this key is a set of institutions,
of procedures, of habits of cooperation
among nations, strong enough to contain any
technical or political or economic or popula-
tion problem and move us toward a solution.
The building of such institutions and habits
of cooperation among nations is, I truly be-
lieve, the assignment of the century.
The nation-state has afforded us protection
in the past and has enabled us to make im-
mense material progress, but it is increas-
ingly clear that it alone cannot do so in the
future. No matter how strong, how vast, how
wealthy, how populous, a country may be, it
no longer lays claim to any absolute security.
It must look to alliances and regional associ-
ations; and, beyond even these, it must look
to some overarching entity embracing every
peace-loving state.
The United Nations is that entity. Fragile
as it is, the U.N. is the principal guardian of
the general interest of man that we have. It
was created to bring that interest to bear on
the great problems of our time. As guardian
of the general interest, the United Nations
functions as the keeper of the world's
conscience.
The U.N. "Peace Machine"
On what principles can this machinery be
constructed ? One answer is to be found in the
preamble and the statement of purposes and
principles contained in articles 1 and 2 of the
United Nations Charter. These famous words
call on the nations to maintain international
peace and security by preventing aggression
and other breaches of the peace; to
strengthen the rule of law in the world; to
promote the self-determination of peoples,
the realization of human rights, and economic
and social progress for people everywhere.
They state the determination of the peoples
of the world "to practice tolerance" — and
what a tremendous idea is expressed in that
one word "tolerance" — and to "live together
in peace with one another as good neigh-
bors."
If all the world were to live by these rules
our troubles would be largely over. But the
framers of the charter had much too good a
grip on reality to expect that. They knew that
international conflicts would still occur. They
knew, too, that these conflicts do not always
arise out of a simple confrontation between
the angels who are right and the devils who
are wrong. Much more often, the problem is
less one of right against wrong than of "my
right" against "your right." The problem
then is to find some reasonable settlement
which will give at least minimal satisfaction
to the equitable claims of each party. And a
great deal of the work of the U.N. involves
exactly that kind of search for mutually ac-
ceptable arrangements — not satisfactory to
any party but bearable by all.
I will tell you frankly that the U.N.'s
efforts to fulfill even this more realistic aim
have been only moderately successful. There
have been successes and failures, and there
will be in the future.
This is because the U.N. is after all no
more than the totality of its member states
acting individually. Each of these members
is likely to be an interested party in many
of the problems at issue.
But however imperfect the record may be,
the fact is that the machinery itself, the
United Nations as an institution, is still run-
ning. It is in use for the purpose for which
it was created: as the charter itself puts it,
"to be a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations" in pursuit of their common aims
of peace and progress. When we consider the
depth of international discord in the world,
it is little wonder that the machine shows
signs of strain and wear and tear !
But don't be fooled. History is not made in
neat and tidy places but in the heat and dust
of conflict. This worn and battered "peace
machine" on the East River is, I submit, the
most original creation of man in our century.
It must be made to work effectively, because
JANUARY 9, 1967
65
with modern arms we will not have the
chance ag'ain to learn the lessons of World
War II.
Fundamental Settlements Take Time
And to balance its failures, the U.N. has
compiled a record of successes which provide
proof that it is an effective institution: again
and again it has damped down brush-fire
disputes that could have led to a world con-
flagration. The case of Korea was the U.N.'s
greatest confrontation with aggressors, but it
is only one item on the list. In a broad arc
extending from New Guinea to the Congo,
U.N. missions have helped to prevent fighting
or to bring it to an end where it has started.
In Kashmir, the U.N. stabilized a danger-
ously fragile demarcation line for 17 years
and restabilized it after the new outbreak of
1965. In the Congo, the U.N. prevented total
anarchy in a new nation and creation of a
chaotic vacuum which could have brought
great-power rivalry into the heart of Africa.
In the Middle East and in Cyprus, U.N. blue
helmets stand guard to this day over political
quarrels which remain dangerously explosive.
Unfortunately, this kind of peacekeeping
after the fact has been more effective than
the U.N.'s attempts to settle disputes before
they reach the stage of violence.
This is a pity, but it is a fact, a fact which
is easily explained. People are not too well
endowed with foresight. They will do a lot
of drastic things in the heat of crisis. They
will act heroically when the building catches
on fire, but you can't get them to clean out all
those oily rags in the basement. The problems
of peacemaking are very much the same.
It is far harder to persuade the parties to
negotiate out differences through mutual ad-
justment of passionately maintained claims
and views, and equally hard to induce antago-
nists to accept impartial outside judgment.
Even where U.N. peace forces patrol today —
in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and along the borders
of Israel — the embers of war are still alive;
and the U.N. is still unable to extinguish the
embers by producing fundamental solutions.
We have little basis for believing that this
situation will soon be changed in any very
substantial way. The opportunities for peace-
ful settlement will remain open; the varied
machinery the U.N. has at its disposal to set-
tle disputes will continue to be available;
but breakthroughs to fundamental settle-
ments will be rare and hard to come by.
Many governments — not only the United
States — work hard, but this will take time.
Meanwhile, we can perhaps do something
to improve the peacekeeping process itself.
On the "hottest" U.N.-guarded frontier, for
example, the frontier around Israel, there is
an urgent need for better security conditions.
The violence of recent days is deplorable;
violence tends to breed more violence.
The states concerned can themselves
satisfy some of the need for greater security
through better border controls and through
the internal control of raiding parties. These
states can also, and indeed should, recognize
that in their own interest they should aid and
not hamper the work of U.N. observers; they
should permit the access and provide the fa-
cilities which observers may reasonably re-
quest. Only in this way can the most accurate
summary of events be reported to the U.N.,
and only thus can the responsibility for what
has happened be most clearly fixed. For this
reason the United States welcomes and sup-
ports the Secretary-General's recent recom-
mendation to strengthen the U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization.
standards To Protect Individual Rights
While the organization continues to be
deeply concerned with maintaining the peace,
its members have increasingly come to re-
gard certain other aspects of the U.N.'s work
as of equal importance.
The "new look" at the United Nations
gives ever greater prominence to those mat-
ters which weigh most heavily on the minds
of the great nonwhite majority of nations
and populations now represented in the orga-
nization. Problems of human rights are very
much in the forefront, particularly those that
involve race discrimination. The manifold
problems of self-determination and economic
and social development are also high on the
agenda.
im
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Let me say a word about human rights. To
a degree never before achieved, the idea that
a state can do as it pleases with its own na-
tionals or with other individuals within its
territory is steadily losing ground. In con-
trast with the pre-World War II period, more
and more countries are recognizing that the
international community of the United Na-
tions has an interest in establishing and
maintaining standards to protect individual
rights^ — that this, too, is one of the ingredi-
ents of peace.
Beginning with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948, we have seen a
steady flow of declarations and conventions
designed to induce states — which alone can
take such action — to protect the rights of in-
dividuals. Piece by piece, the U.N. is con-
structing a code of desirable international
conduct in the human rights area. The range
*" it covers is extremely wide, as it must be if
it is to bridge the gap that separates ad-
vanced from primitive societies and free from
controlled social systems. U.N. standards
cover: the prevention of slavery and forced
labor; the political rights of women; general
civil and political and economic, social, and
cultural rights; discrimination in education;
and discrimination on grounds of race and
religion. These standards are accepted by
many governments, but there is still a long,
long way to go.
For various reasons, not all states will
i ratify those U.N. human rights documents
, which take treaty form. In our own case, for
example, where the observance of individual
rights is deeply rooted in our tradition, some
of the U.N. standards are less advanced than
our own, and we would be loath to risk com-
promising the latter. We must, and do, never-
^: theless, encourage others to improve their
standards and practices; and if treaties
worked out within the U.N. are a useful way
for doing so, the United States will continue
to cooperate.
If the U.N. is to fulfill its basic purposes,
our attention to individual rights must be
matched by progress toward equality and
self-determination for whole nations and
peoples.
We know from our own anticolonial tradi-
tion how important these principles are for
peoples who have only recently gained their
independence or who are still seeking it. For
such peoples, the United Nations is a source
of aid and protection. U.N. membership is a
badge of equal status in a world of sovereign
states.
Thanks in large part to the U.N., over 50
new states have been created out of old
colonial territories since 1945, with a sur-
prising lack of violent opposition. The process
proves the adage that nothing is more power-
ful than an idea whose time has come.
This process still continues. The Security
Council this afternoon recommended the ad-
mission of Barbados to U.N. membership,
and the General Assembly is expected to vote
Barbados into the organization as its 122d
member by the end of the week.^
The few remaining pockets of resistance
stand out as glaring exceptions to the gen-
eral trend. Where colonial domination is
linked with race discrimination, the incon-
sistency is even more evident and the pres-
sure from those who have already gained
their freedom is the most impassioned.
If nothing is done in the areas where race
repression is sanctioned, race tensions could
erupt into violence both inside and outside
today's problem areas. It might then prove
impossible to forestall a downward drift into
anarchy and totalitarian dictatorship.
This is a problem no single nation can
handle alone. We are already confronted
with the question how far the U.N. should
go, and how far we as its strongest member
should go, to bring about the fulfillment of
U.N. objectives.
stubborn Problems of Southern Africa
At the moment this question is centered
on Rhodesia. This week Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson made a dramatic and su-
preme effort to reach agreement with the
illegal regime of Ian Smith which would re-
store constitutional government and guaran-
tee the rights of the African majority. That
effort, as you know, collapsed when the
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1967,
p. 28.
JANUARY 9, 1967
67
Rhodesian leadership refused to agree. To-
morrow the United Kingdom will be asking
the Security Council to consider the imposi-
tion of selective mandatory sanctions against
the Rhodesian regime.'
The United Kingdom is now being pressed
to crush the rebellion by force in order to
end white domination. The African states
want independence for Rhodesia, and they
want the British to grant it only when the
4 million black men in Rhodesia are guaran-
teed the enjoyment of their rights. They
oppose independence on any other terms.
It would not be proper for me to antici-
pate what the U.N. Security Council may de-
cide to do in this situation. But it is note-
worthy that the Council a year ago with our
full support called for voluntary sanctions
against Rhodesia, and even went so far as to
authorize a British blockade of oil shipments
by sea through Portuguese Mozambique.^
President Johnson has long since pledged
United States support for the freedom of all
the people of Rhodesia, "not just 6 percent
of them." 5
South West Africa also presents an urgent
self-determination question. Last October the
U.N. General Assembly decided that South
Africa had in effect forfeited its old League
of Nations mandate to administer that terri-
tory, largely because South Africa main-
tained its apartheid policy there.^ The Assem-
bly is now seeking, through a special
committee created by an overwhelming vote,
to induce the Government of South Africa to
permit the establishment of an international
administration designed to lead South West
Africa toward self-determination.
This approach to a solution was accepted
in the Assembly by the United States and 113
other countries — virtually the entire interna-
tional community. Thus we know what we
want the U.N. to do, though we are not yet
clear on how it can be done.
' See p. 7.3.
■* For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965,
p. 908, and May 2, 1966, p. 713.
"■Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.
' For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution,
see ihid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.
The Assembly's approach is wisely prag-
matic in this new and difficult situation. Its
committee has broad latitude to recommend
practical means by which South West Africa
should be administered for the desired ends.
When that committee reports next spring,
the time will have come for the U.N. to con-
sider what more can be done to move this
matter toward a just and satisfactory out-
come.
These problems of southern Africa are
tough and stubborn. It will be exceedingly
difficult to induce those who hold power in
that area to comply with U.N. resolutions
designed to bring about political change.
Some of the U.N.'s weapons, such as moral
suasion and the power of world opinion,
have already been employed to no avail. The
alternatives are not without risks. Voices
will be heard calling for broad mandatory
economic sanctions, for the necessary steps
to make those sanctions effective, and for the
use of force. What the U.N. must determine
is the degree of sacrifice its members are
willing to contemplate, individually and col-
lectively, in order to achieve reasonable solu-
tions. Discussions of the use of economic and
military pressure by the U.N. lead us into
new and largely uncharted waters. The ques-
tions which are raised are vital for the future
of Africa, for the future of the U.N., and per-
haps ultimately for the future of every na-
tion which may someday stake its existence
on the rule of law in the world.
In this talk I have tried to give you a
glimpse of a few of the tough problems with
which we deal in the United Nations. The
U.N. didn't create these problems, any more
than a hospital creates the diseases and in-
juries with which it deals. Quite the reverse
is true: The U.N. was created to cope with
just such difficulties as these.
Some jieople used to suppose that the U.N.
was intended by its founders to do away with
all these problems overnight. Any such ex-
pectation was certain to end in disillusion-
ment. Whoever truly believes in human
progress must expect to pay the price in slow
and frustrating human effort.
The troubles of our age are many and pro-
68
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
found. We shall conquer some of them, step
by step, in our time; others, in all likelihood,
will still be around for our children and
grandchildren to wrestle with.
But if these jiroblems are not to overwhelm
us, the nations which make up the human
family must have the means to cope with
them together, as members of one human
family.
The means exist today in the institutions
of international order, however primitive
they may be. The capstone of these institu-
tions is the United Nations. Let us use it for
all it is worth, because our willingness to do
so may well spell the difference between
catastrophe and a world in which human
freedom is possible.
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team
Studying Vietnamese Development
The White House announced on December
16 that, in response to a request from Prime
Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky, the United
States Government will join with the Gov-
ernment of Viet-Nam in sponsoring a joint
planning effort on the long-run development
of the Vietnamese economy.
In the opinion of the two Governments it
is time now to prepare for the problems and
jpportunities of peace.
With the concurrence of the Vietnamese
overnment, the United States Government
las asked Mr. David E. Lilienthal to lead a
longoveiTimental U.S. study and planning
;eam which will report to the two Govern-
nents. Mr. Lilienthal has agreed to put to-
gether a team drawn from his Development
md Resources Corporation and other U.S.
ources with broad experience in develop-
nental planning. It will operate under con-
;ract to the Agency for International De-
velopment. Mr. Lilienthal's experience and
ligh qualifications are widely known, and the
i'resident is grateful that he has agreed to
mdertake this task.
The United States team will work closely
vith a counterpart Vietnamese development
)lanning team led by Professor Nguyen
ANUARY 9, 1967
Dang Thuc of the University of Saigon.
The Government of Viet-Nam stressed at
the Manila Conference i its plans for the
building of an expanded postwar economy,
including plans for the conversion of mili-
tary installations when appropriate.
Eugene Black, after his recent tour of
Southeast Asia, has reported to the Presi-
dent that, even in the midst of war, the
foundations of future economic progress are
being laid in Viet-Nam. The outlook for the
Vietnamese economy once peace returns is
highly favorable, Mr. Black told the Presi-
dent.
U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea
for Investment, Trade Studies
The White House announced on December
15 that George W. Ball, former Under Sec-
retary of State, mil head a privately orga-
nized delegation of U.S. businessmen to
Korea during the week of March 20 to stimu-
late American private investment and to pro-
mote increased U.S.-Korean trade.
The mission was originally proposed dur-
ing discussions between President Johnson
and Korean President Chung Hee Park in
Seoul early in November. The Presidents
agreed then that the Korean economy's cur-
rent progress should make possible a sub-
stantial expansion of U.S. investment in
Korea and in trade between the two nations.^
The Korean economy has grown at a rate
of 8 percent per year in the last 3 years.
During the same period, exports have tripled
and are expected to reach the equivalent of
$250 million in 1966.
Delegation members will be selected dur-
ing the next month. Each will be a leader
in his industry or in the financial community.
It is planned to include representatives of
' For texts of the documents issued at the close of
the Manila Conference, see Bulletin of Nov. 14,
1966, p. 730.
' For text of a joint statement issued at Seoul,
Korea, on Nov. 2 at the conclusion of President
Johnson's state visit, see Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1966,
p. 777.
69
large and small industry, banking, and trade
from major business centers of the United
States who will be interested in specific areas
of industry or trade in Korea.
Mr. Ball, presently associated with the in-
vestment banking firm of Lehman Brothers,
is chairman of Lehman International, Ltd.,
and counsel to the law firm of Cleary, Gott-
lieb, Steen and Hamilton.
Tristan E. Beplat, senior vice president of
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and president
of the Korean-American Commercial and In-
dustrial Association in New York, has agreed
to assist Mr. Ball.
Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee
Holds Second Meeting
Joint Communique
Press release 296 dated December 21
The Joint Mexican-United States Trade
Committee ^ held its second annual meeting
from December 15 to 17, 1966, in Mexico
City to discuss matters concerning United
States-Mexican trade. The Delegation of
Mexico was headed by Mr. Placido Garcia
Reynoso, Subsecretary of Industry and Com-
merce, and the United States Delegation by
Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Trade
Policy.
This joint committee is a continuing forum
created by the two governments for the
regular exchange of views on issues involved
in trade between the two countries and to
consider recommendations for possible ac-
tions to facilitate trade to the advantage of
both nations. The meetings of the committee
have been characterized by frankness and
cordiality.
The committee considered general trade
trends and specific commercial problems re-
garding Mexican-U.S. trade. The U.S. Dele-
' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p.
738.
gation welcomed steps that had been taken
by the Government of Mexico in the interval
between the first and second meetings to
liberalize and improve the administration of
Mexican import controls.
The Delegation of Mexico noted with
great interest steps that had been taken by
the U.S. Government since the initial meeting
of the Committee to liberalize access to the
U.S. market for certain exports from
Mexico. These steps included elimination by
the United States of some import restrictions
in addition to certain tariff and customs
measures of benefit to Mexican trade.
The hope was expressed that further steps
might be taken by the governments of both
countries to facilitate the mutual trade,
taking into consideration the difference in the
levels of development between them and the
necessity for Mexico to take internal
measures to stimulate the development of its
economy.
The two delegations took note of recent
developments in the GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade], especially the
formal entry into force of the new part IV
on trade and development, in which, among
other things, the developed countries agreed
not to require full reciprocity from less
developed countries in trade negotiations.
The two delegations also noted the
progress of the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations. The U.S. Delegation pointed
out that even countries not members of
GATT stand to receive benefits from these
negotiations through the application of the
most-favored-nation rule.
There was an exchange of views regarding
the Mexican Government program of indus-
trialization and related measures concerning
the domestic ownership of enterprises in
certain economic areas.
In considering concrete cases, the Mexican
delegation pointed out certain problems
which arise from U.S. customs duties and
which hinder the sale of Mexican products
in the U.S. market. The Mexican delegation
suggested the elimination or reduction of
such duties.
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The U.S. Delegation mentioned concrete
cases in which the reduction of duties and
import restrictions would permit greater
access for U.S. products to the Mexican
market and explained how increased imports
of these products might benefit the Mexican
economy as well as that of the United
States.
A special aspect of the meeting was a
presentation of progress achieved by Ambas-
sador Harry Turkel and Mr. Agustin Lopez
Munguia, who were appointed by the Govern-
ments of the United States and Mexico
respectively to study problems and make
recommendations regarding facilitating trade
in the U.S.-Mexico border areas.
The committee also discussed a U.S. pro-
posal for a bilateral agreement to facilitate
the transit of the U.S.-Mexican border by
truck carriers as a means of improving trade
between the two countries.
President Frei of Chile
To Visit the United States
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 20
I have invited President Eduardo Frei of
Chile to make an official visit to Washington
on February 1 and 2. He has accepted, and
arrangements are being worked out.
I look forward to this visit with special
interest. During the past 2 years President
Frei and I have communicated by letter on
I several occasions. The visit will give us the
■ opportunity to talk further about issues af-
fecting our respective countries, the hemi-
sphere, and the world. I am particularly in-
terested in learning more from President
Frei about the achievements of his great ex-
periment of revolution in freedom. Natu-
rally, we will also review the future course
of the Alliance for Progress in relation to
preparation for the meeting of Presidents
of the American Republics.
U.S. Appoints Observers
for Antarctic Inspections
The Department of State announced on
December 23 (press release 299) the appoint-
ment of nine Antarctic observers, replacing
those who were appointed in 1963, to carry
out any inspections which the United States,
as a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, may
decide to undertake in accord with provisions
of that treaty.
The names of persons appointed as ob-
servers are: Merton E. Davies, Ernest F.
Dukes, Richard P. Gingland, Karl W.
Kenyon, Cyril Muromcew, Carl J. Sinder-
mann, Frank G. Siscoe, Malcolm Toon, and
Arthur I. Wortzel.i
The Antarctic Treaty 2 provides that in
the Antarctic area there shall be freedom of
scientific investigation and continued inter-
national cooperation and that the area shall
be used for peaceful purposes only. It bans
nuclear explosions and the disposal of atomic
waste in Antarctica pending general inter-
national agreement on the subject (but does
not prohibit the use of nuclear reactors).
While implying neither renunciation nor
recognition of rights or asserted claims, it
prohibits for the duration of the treaty the
making of new claims, the enlarging of exist-
ing claims, and the use of activities in
Antarctica as a basis for asserting, support-
ing, or denying territorial claims. It grants
to the signatories of the treaty the right of
inspection and aerial observation in all areas
of Antarctica and obligates them to exert
approjjriate eflforts, consistent with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, to the end that no
one should engage in any activity in
Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the treaty.
The 12 signatory powers of the Antarctic
Treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
' For biographic details, see press release 299
dated Dec. 23.
^For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.
JANUARY 9, 1967
71
South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Inspections have taken place in Antarctica
every year since 1963. In that year New
Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom
inspected United States stations. In 1964 the
United States inspected stations of Argen-
tina, Chile, France, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. In 1965
and 1966 Argentina inspected the United
States Palmer station.
Advisers Named for Near Eastern
and South Asian Bureau
Press release 295 dated December 20
The Department of State announced on
December 20 the formation of a panel of
advisers for the Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs. ^ The advisers will make
available to the Department on a continuing
basis a variety of talent and experience.
Many of the advisers have longstanding con-
nections or interests in the Near East and
South Asia. The panel includes distinguished
leaders from the fields of education, science,
business, and labor, and from nonprofit
institutions concerned with foreign affairs.
Among its members are several former
ambassadors and others with eminent records
of past service with the U.S. Government.
Individual members of the panel will con-
sider issues of key concern to the Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It
is expected that the advisers not only will
apply their special insight to problems and
proposals placed before them by the Bureau
' For announcements of other advisory panels, see
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966, p.
868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; and Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16.
but also will initiate new policy ideas. Con-
sultation on any given issue will be with one
or several members of the panel, depending
on the subject in question and the particular
background of the advisers. Additional ad-
visers may be added to the panel from time
to time.
The members of the panel are:
John S. Badeau, director, Middle East Institute,
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, N.Y.
John H. Davis, New York, N.Y.; former vice chair-
man, board of trustees of American University of
Beirut.
John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Robert F. Goheen, president, Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J.
Raymond A. Hare, president. Middle East Institute,
Washingrton, D.C.
Joseph E. Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York, N.Y.
Joseph D. Keenan, international secretary, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; vice
president, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.
David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the board. Develop-
ment and Resources Corp., New York, N.Y.
D. W. Lockard, associate director, Center for Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University.
Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor,
Harvard University.
Grinnell Morris, president. Empire Trust Co., New
York, N.Y. ; chairman, board of trustees, Robert
College, Istanbul, Turkey.
Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government and
director of the Institute of Politics, Harvard Uni-
versity.
Richard L. Park, professor of political science. Uni-
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Frederick Seitz, president. National Academy of Sci-
ences, Washington, D.C.
Francis O. Wilcox, dean. School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, The Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D.C.
Wayne Wilcox, associate professor of government,
Columbia University.
Charles W. Yost, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York, N.Y.
72
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia
Following is a statement made by U.S.
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the
U.N. Security Council on December 12, to-
gether with the text of a resolution adopted
by the Council on December 16.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S./U.N. press release B021
The Council has met to consider further
the question of Southern Rhodesia, a question
which once again has been brought before us
by the country that bears the heaviest and
most direct responsibility in this matter, the
United Kingdom.
This problem, as was made clear at the
irecent Commonwealth Conference and before
then at Lagos, is not only of concern to the
United Kingdom but "of wider concern to
Africa, the Commonwealth and the world."
Now, why has this problem of Southern
Rhodesia become a matter of such worldwide
concern ?
A clue to the answer, I think, can be found
in the fact that the regime in Salisbury,
headed by Mr. [Ian] Smith, which declared
itself independent and sovereign over a year
ago, has yet to be recognized as such by a
single government.
There is a solid reason why this unilateral
action of the Smith regime has been rejected
while the independence of a score of other
states has been acclaimed and recognized by
the world community. In all cases in which
solonial peoples, during the life of the United
N^ations, have acceded to independence, this
accession has never been tainted with the
application of principles of racial superiority.
Just the opposite is the case in the regime
of Mr. Smith. Whatever that regime may as-
sert in its propaganda, its legislative enact-
ments and its whole course of conduct have
clearly been designed to thwart majority rule
and perpetuate racial superiority.
Indeed, the claim of independence by the
Smith regime is a false and spurious claim,
made by and on behalf of a small white mi-
nority for the purposes of assuming control
in a country 94 percent of whose people are
nonwhite. It is contrary to the spirit of the
United Nations Charter and to principles en-
shrined therein, including "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedom for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion."
On behalf of my Government, I reiterate
that we shall not recognize this regime. The
objective which the United States supports
is that stated last May by President John-
son: 1 "To open the full power and responsi-
bility of nationhood to all the people of Rho-
desia— not just 6 percent of them."
We well understand the apprehensions of
the other nations of Africa, particularly
Southern Rhodesia's neighbor Zambia, con-
cerning the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Zam-
bia is seeking to make its way in the world
on the only basis which can possibly promise
peace, freedom, and progress; namely, a mul-
tiracial society in which the majority rules
and the rights of minorities are protected.
We understand and share the concern of the
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
JANUARY 9, 1967
73
leaders of Zambia at the prospect of a neigh-
boring regime which in its 1 year of so-called
independence has already intensified its dis-
crimination against the African majority
and introduced new decrees under the ex-
tended Emergency Powers Act which are
anathema to all who care about civil liber-
ties— laws conferring the broadest powers of
arrest, censorship, and other curtailments of
fundamental rights.
U.S. Support of U.K. Proposal
The refusal of the United Kingdom — the
constitutional authority — to recognize the il-
legal act of the Smith regime in attempting
to throw off British authority is no denial of
freedom for the people of Southern Rho-
desia. Rather, it is a decision not to permit
a small element in that country to deny free-
dom to the great majority.
This decision is not that of a power which
obstinately stands in the way of granting
genuine independence to colonial territories.
Since the founding of the United Nations, it
is pertinent to recall, Great Britain has ac-
corded independence to 28 nations — nearly a
quarter of the membership of this organiza-
tion.
This is a record of substantial achievement
in peaceful decolonization and one which does
credit both to the United Kingdom and to
the people who were formerly under its au-
thority but who are now independent. It
helps to explain why the Council has recog-
nized that the main responsibility for action
is in the hands of the United Kingdom which
has, in the words of the Commonwealth com-
munique, "constitutional authority and re-
sponsibility for guiding Rhodesia to inde-
pendence."
The United States believes that the exer-
cise of this responsibility remains a wise
policy. I do not say that if we had been the
constituted authority we would have done
everything exactly as it has been done, every
step of the way, by the British Government.
No nation could say that. But we do respect
the fact that it is the United Kingdom that
has borne and still bears this responsibility
and that this has been affirmed by the Com-
monwealth and recognized by the Council.
We, as members of the Council, have our
own responsibilities in this matter. But in
all fairness we must recognize the difficulties-
confronting the United Kingdom and respect
the strenuous efforts it has made to find an
agreed solution compatible with the principle
of majority rule and acceptability of the de-
cision to the Rhodesian people as a whole.
Certainly a negotiated settlement conform-
ing to these criteria would have been the best
solution.
Now, unhappily, the effort to achieve that
settlement has not been successful. As a re-
sult, the United Kingdom has again come
here to obtain the backing of the Council,
and thereby the cooperation of all members
of the United Nations, for the next step. It
is right and wise that this should be done.
For if the problem is to be resolved in peace
— and surely we all share a common obliga-
tion to see that it is resolved in peace — the
cooperation of all other nations will be re-
quired. Under the charter this Council is the
body through which that cooperation can
best be assured.
It is no light action which the Foreign
Secretary of the United Kingdom has asked
the Council to endorse through the draft
resolution now before us.^ We are asked to
impose under chapter VII mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions of a substantial nature
against the Smith regime. If this resolution
is adopted, as we believe it should be, it will
be the first time in the 21 years of the United
Nations that the Council has taken this type
of far-reaching action.
The United States considers these sanc-
tions have one purpose and one purpose only:
to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
Rhodesian problem. We do not look upon
them as punitive or vengeful. We support
them in the honest conviction that they are
now necessary in order to drive home to the
illegal regime that the international commu-
nity will not tolerate the existence of a dis-
criminatory system based on minority rule
' U.N. doc. S/7621.
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in defiance of the United Nations and its
principles.
In considering this serious step, my Gov-
ernment has taken into account the problems
that it will have to face because of the loss
of a source for certain materials critical to
our industrial economy. In the discharge of
our charter responsibilities we are prepared
to assume this cost. We are well aware, more-
over, that the impact of the requested sanc-
tion will fall heavily on Zambia — whose
economy my country has taken substantial
steps to support — on other nearby countries
of Africa, and, to a very substantial degree,
on the United Kingdom itself.
Legal Basis for Proposed Action
We know also that, aside from economic
problems, questions are raised as to the legal
basis for this proposed action. In particular,
it is asserted that the question of Southern
Rhodesia is an internal matter of sole con-
cern to the administering authority. But
while we recognize that responsibility for
action lies on the United Kingdom, the rec-
ord shows that the United Nations, over the
years, has also recognized Southern Rhodesia
as falling within the provisions of chapter
XI of the charter. Under this chapter, and
specifically under article 73(b), the adminis-
tering authority accepts the responsibility
"to develop self-government, to take due ac-
count of the political aspirations of the peo-
ples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institu-
tions. . . ."
Therefore, so far as the United Nations is
concerned, the administering authority has
always had an international responsibility to
the United Nations in regard to Southern
Rhodesia. And it is precisely the exercise of
this responsibility that the Smith regime
seeks to frustrate and obstruct.
But the question may also be raised
whether the situation constitutes a threat to
the peace, which is the condition under which
sanctions can be imposed under chapter VII
of the charter.
We in the United States learned over 100
years ago that any attempt to institutionalize
and legitimize a political principle of racial
superiority in a new state was unacceptable.
The effort to do so created an inflammatory
situation, and our nation had to rid itself
of this false and hateful doctrine at great
cost. It should not be necessary for me to
emphasize that what could not be accepted by
the United States in the mid-19th century
can surely not be accepted by the interna-
tional community in the late 20th century.
Any person familiar with recent history
would have to be blind and deaf not to per-
ceive the danger in the course of action of
the Smith regime. Some will nevertheless ask
why is it proper, for example, to impose
mandatory sanctions in this case and not in
others.
The answer to this, in our judgment, lies
in the fact that there are a number of unique
elements in the Southern Rhodesian situa-
tion. Here we have witnessed an illegal sei-
zure of power by a minority bent on perpet-
uating the political subjugation of the vast
majority. That act itself is bound to create a
dangerous and inflammatory situation. More-
over, Southern Rhodesia, as I have said, is a
territory whose population is subject to pro-
tection under chapter XI of the charter,
which, among other things, calls for the de-
velopment of self-government to take account
of the political aspiration of the peoples.
What we have seen in Rhodesia under the
Smith regime has been precisely the con-
trary.
All of this has happened, I would empha-
size, against the express will of the sovereign
authority for that territory, the United King-
dom. Regrettably, the efl!"ort of the United
Kingdom to negotiate a settlement on the
basis of the charter in recent days has failed.
Now the United Kingdom comes to this
Council asking for a Council decision under
article 41 to apply mandatory sanctions in
order to cope with the situation which has
developed.
None of us should be surprised by this
request. The Security Council has already
found in previous sessions, particularly on
JANUARY 9, 1967
75
November 20, 1965, that the continuance in
time of such a situation was likely to lead to
a threat to peace.' This situation has not only
continued; since negotiations have failed, it
has obviously grown more acute, especially
since the rejection by the Smith regime of
the recent direct effoi-t of the British Prime
Minister to find an honorable solution.
Situation Not Static But Deteriorating
We thus have a situation in a colony where
a small minority seeks to subjugate the ma-
jority— we have an effort by a small minor-
ity to suppress the political rights of a ma-
jority, to extend into a non-self-governing
territory practices of racial discrimination
which have been found abhorrent by the
United Nations — and where the sovereign
authority for the territory voluntarily comes
to the United Nations and asks it to take
measures which will permit the restoration
of the full rights of the people of Southern
Rhodesia under the United Nations Charter.
What we have here, in short, is not a static
but a deteriorating situation in which the
danger to peace is obviously growing and to
which the Council must address itself.
Resolute and prompt action by the Secu-
rity Council to deal with this problem in a
peaceful but effective way will lessen the
danger of more drastic developments, from
whatever quarter they may threaten to come.
I am well aware that, whereas some criti-
cize the proposed action as too strong, others
complain that it is too mild to achieve its
purpose. These latter critics point out that
the measures which the Security Council has
recommended in the past have not proved
sufficient to rectify the situation.
Whatever views there may be about the
efficacy of these economic measures already
taken, there is a key difference between them
and what is now proposed.
' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on
Nov. 12 and Nov. 20, 1965, and Apr. 9, 1966, and
texts of resolutions adopted on those dates, see
Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 912, and May 2, 1966,
p. 713.
Unlike the voluntary sanctions which the
Council approved a year ago, those now re-
quested are mandatory. Under article 25 of
the charter all members are obliged to carry
them out — and indeed all nonmembers are
also called upon to do so in the resolution, a&
the organization is authorized to insure by
virtue of article 2, paragraph 6, of the char-
ter. If any member or nonmember should
substantially fail to carry out the Council's
decision, this failure would be a violation of
charter provisions and obligations.
It has been asserted also that the League
of Nations failed in its attempt to impose
effective economic sanctions. But surely this
fact should not discourage us. The United
Nations is different from the League of Na-
tions not only in the breadth of its member-
ship but in the fact that it has already done
successfully many things which the League
found impossible to do. While it is apparent
that success in the present enterprise cannot
be guaranteed in advance, the probabilities
of success will be greatest if all of us in good
faith bend our efforts to assure its success —
as indeed we are obligated to do.
For my own country, I wish to say cate-
gorically that if the Council decides to take
the action pursuant to article 41, which we
anticipate, the United States will apply the
full force of our law to implementing this
decision in accordance with the authority es-
tablished under the United Nations Partici-
pation Act of 1945.
Mr. President, the Rhodesian situation
presents a grave practical problem with
great moral implications. It is sometimes
said that moral considerations are irrelevant
in the practical affairs of nations. But my
Government takes the contrary view, and so
does the United Nations Charter. The law of
the charter is based on many moral consider-
ations. The day that law is held to be irrele-
vant, or to be available to some members and
not available to others, will be a tragic day
for world peace.
If, however, we are to act effectively for
the charter's principles, we must practice the
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
art of the possible. We must decide upon
those measures which we can implement —
and to implement thoroughly those measures
on which we have decided. The greater the
unanimity of the Council in making its deci-
sion, the greater will be our assurance of
worldwide support for it.
It is an unhappy fact that some situations
exist in the world in which the Council is
unable to act effectively. Here is a situation
in which we can act. If every state does its
duty in the work that now lies before us, our
action will not only exert a profound effect in
Salisbury; it will do much to build respect
for the United Nations as a force for peace
and justice in Africa and throughout the
world.
It is for all these reasons that the United
States supports the course of action proposed
by the United Kingdom.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 No-
vember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and
221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its
appeal to all States to do their utmost in order to
break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,
Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far
and the measures taken by the administering Power
have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rho-
desia to an end.
Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in
this resolution, the measures provided for in reso-
lution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, as well as
those initiated by Member States in implementation
of that resolution, shall continue in effect.
Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of
the United Nations Charter,
1. Determines that the present situation in South-
ern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security;
2. Decides that all States Members of the United
Nations shall prevent:
(a) the import into their territories of asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper.
*U.N. doc. S/RES/232 and Corr. 1 (1966) (S/
7621/Rev. 1, as amended) ; adopted by the Council on
Dec. 16, 1966, by a vote of 11 (U.S.) to 0, with 4 ab-
stentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, and U.S.S.R.).
JANUARY 9, 1967
meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather
originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported
therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(6) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the export of these commodities from Southern
Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in
their territories in any of these commodities origi-
nating in Southern Rhodesia and exported there-
from after the date of this resolution, including in
particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rho-
desia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis-
tration of any of these commodities originating in
Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the
date of this resolution ;
(d) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of
arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft,
military vehicles, and equipment and materials for
the manufacture and maintenance of arms and am-
munition in Southern Rhodesia;
(e) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other
aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and
materials for the manufacture, assembly or main-
tenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of
their registration of any such goods destined for
Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their na-
tionals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly
of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
(/) participation in their territories or territories
under their administration or in land or air trans-
port facilities or by their nationals or vessels of
their registration in the supply of oil or oil products
to Southern Rhodesia;
notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
licenses granted before the date of this resolution;
3. Reminds Member States that the failure or re-
fusal by any of them to implement the present reso-
lution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of
the Charter;
4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people
of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence
in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
contained in General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) ; and recognizes the legitimacy of their strug-
gle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or
other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in
Southern Rhodesia;
6. Calls upon all States Members of the United
77
Nations to carry out this decision of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United
Nations Charter;
7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated
in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States
not Members of the United Nations to act in accord-
ance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the pres-
ent resolution;
8. Calls upon States Members of the United Na-
tions or of the specialized agencies to report to the
Secretary-General the measures each has taken in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the
present resolution ;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on the progress of the implementation of
the present resolution, the first report to be submit-
ted not later than 1 March 1967;
10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for
further action as appropriate in the light of develop-
ments.
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space Treaty
Following are statements made in Commit-
tee I (Political and Security) and in plenary
session by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the General Assembly, together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
Assembly on December 19.
STATEMENT IN COMMITTEE I,
DECEMBER 17
U.S. delegation press release 5034
The treaty on outer space which now lies
before this committee is an achievement in
which all of us here, I am sure, find cause for
great satisfaction and great hope.' We are
happy to be a cosponsor of the resolution
commending this treaty. We hope and trust
that it will command the virtually unanimous
support of the committee and the General
Assembly. We share the wish that the treaty
will be opened for signature very soon and
will gain the widest possible adherence.
I should like to take this occasion to pay
tribute to our distinguished colleague who
opened this debate. Judge Manfred Lachs
of Poland. He has shown admirable skill and
' For a statement made by President Johnson on
Dec. 8 and text of the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, see Bulletin of Dec. 26,
1966, p. 952.
78
impartiality in his role as chairman of the
Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, within whose
framework this treaty was negotiated in
Geneva last July and more recently here in
New York. Much of the credit for the success
of our negotiations is due to him. We are
also greatly indebted to Ambassador Kurt
Waldheim of Austria, the chairman of the
parent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, who played an outstanding role
in bringing this project to fruition. There is
no need for me to repeat what Professor
Lachs has just now so ably explained about
the history and procedural status of this
treaty. But, speaking for the United States,
which takes a very great interest in the ex-
ploration of outer space, and in recognition
of all that this implies for the peace of the
world, I do wish to make some general obser-
vations.
We of the United States regard this treaty
as an important step toward peace. We do
not wish to exaggerate its significance, but
neither do we underrate it. It will greatly re-
duce the danger of international conflict and
promote the prospects of international coop-
eration for the common interest in the newest
and most unfamiliar of all realms of human
activity, a realm in which the actions of na-
tions are sure to be fateful for good or ill.
The greatest danger facing us in outer
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
space comes not from the physical environ-
ment, however cold and hostile it may be, but
from our own human nature and from the
discords that trouble our relationship here
on earth. Therefore, as we stand on the
threshold of the space age, our first respon-
sibility as governments is clear: We must
make sure that man's earthly conflicts will
not be carried into outer space.
We know that not all these conflicts are
easily or quickly ended. But it has for years
been the deep desire and hope of many coun-
tries, my own included, that the danger which
they pose might be reduced; that the exten-
sion of them into new realms might be pre-
vented; and that this might be achieved in
ways which would advance the interests of
all nations.
This treaty responds to that desire and
hope. It thus takes its place in a historic
progression: First was the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959, reserving that large area of the
world for exclusively peaceful activity; sec-
ond was the limited test ban treaty of 1963;
and third is the treaty which now lies before
this committee.
We hope and believe this series of peace-
building agreements will continue to grow.
Nothing would make us happier than if the
treaty against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons should soon be added as the fourth
item on this historic list.
Thus step by step, we may manage to re-
lieve our fellow man of the increasingly
heavy burden of conflict and armaments and
danger he has borne for so long. And, step
by step, we may also advance the rule of law
into further areas of the relations between
states.
Record of the Negotiations
In this great endeavor we can take much
encouragement from the record of the nego-
tiations on this treaty, which took place in
the Legal Subcommittee, beginning last July
12 in Geneva, and were completed here in
New York. These negotiations were remark-
able for their speed and for the businesslike
and reasonable attitude of all concerned.
In such a successful negotiation no party
gains all that it wanted, but no party's major
interests are injured, and every party gains
something as the areas of common interest
are discovered and defined. It was in this
spirit of reasonable compromise that the
negotiators reached agreement on a number
of points of difference, not only between the
two principal space powers but also between
them and the other powers. The result is a
treaty which reflects a very fair balance of
interests and obligations from the standpoint
of all concerned, including the countries
which as yet have little or no space program
of their own.
The aim of the negotiators of this treaty
was riot to provide in detail for every con-
tingency that might arise in the exploration
and use of outer space, many of which are
unforeseeable, but rather to establish a set
of basic principles. The treaty's provisions
are purposely broad. But they are provisions
which should be welcomed by the United Na-
tions and particularly by the General As-
sembly, for a great many of them derive
from the recommendations which the Assem-
bly made in two of its important resolutions
of 1963: the Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing Activities in Outer Space,^ and
the "no bombs in orbit" resolution.^ More-
over, the treaty responds to some of the most
important concerns assigned to the General
Assembly by the charter: disarmament and
the regulation of armaments; international
cooperation in the political and other fields;
and, by no means least in importance, the
progressive development of international law.
Indeed, one of the most important prin-
ciples in the treaty is that contained in article
III, which binds all parties to carry on their
activities in outer space "in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations." As man steps into the
void of outer space, he will depend for his
survival not only on his amazing technology
but also on this other gift which is no less
precious: the rule of law among nations.
I shall not detain the committee with a full
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 7.54.
JANUARY 9, 1967
79
discussion of the treaty's provisions. But I do
wish to comment both on its arms control
provisions and on those relating to peaceful
cooperation.
Arms Control Provisions
The United States view of the significance
of the treaty's provisions on arms control
was summed up by President Johnson in his
statement a week ago, when he welcomed
this treaty as "the most important arms con-
trol development since the limited test ban
treaty of 1963." The substance of the arms
control provisions is in article IV. This arti-
cle restricts military activities in two ways:
First, it contains an undertaking not to
place in orbit around the earth, install on the
moon or any other celestial body, or other-
wise station in outer space, nuclear or any
other weapons of mass destruction.
Second, it limits the use of the moon and
other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful
purposes and expressly prohibits their use
for establishing military bases, installations
or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind,
or conducting military maneuvers.
Quite as important as these arms control
provisions are the means available for assur-
ing each party that the others are living up
to them. I wish to call attention particularly
to articles I, II, and XII. The principle used
is similar to that embodied in the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959; namely, free access by all
parties to one another's installations.
This principle finds expression first in arti-
cle I, which provides that "there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies." It is
reinforced by the prohibition in article II
against national appropriation of outer
space or of celestial bodies. And it is further
reinforced as regards celes.tial bodies by arti-
cle XII, under which "All stations, installa-
tions, equipment and space vehicles on the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open
to representatives of other States Parties to
the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity."
The words "on a basis of reciprocity" in
article XII do not confer, or imply the ex-
istence of, any right or power to veto pro-
posed visits to other countries' facilities on a
celestial body. As I said on this point in the
Legal Subcommittee in Geneva last August
A veto is not compatible with the idea of reci-
procity and reciprocal rights. If there is a veto,
there are no meaningrful rights; without the exist-
ence of rights there can be no reciprocity.
The meaning of the words "on the basis of
reciprocity" in article XII is in fact the mean-
ing which common sense would dictate — and
which was fully accepted by all the members
of the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva;
namely, that representatives of a state party
to the treaty conducting activities on celestial
bodies will have a right of access to the sta-
tions, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles of another state party on a celestial
body, regardless of whether the second state
has ever claimed, or has ever exercised, a
right of access itself. The fact that the second
state may not have asserted such a right, or
may not have exercised it, in no way impairs
the first state's right to access. However, if
the first state has denied access to repre-
sentatives of the second state, then the latter
is not required, on the principle of reciproci-
ty, to grant access to representatives of the
first state. Indeed, the same logical result
would follow whether or not this treaty pro-
vision contained any express mention of reci-
procity.
Moreover, any denial of access to facilities
contemplated in this article would entitle the
other party to exercise such other remedies
as it would have under international law.
In my statement of August 3 to the sub-
committee, I made clear that the United
States delegation was prepared to agree to
inclusion of the words "on a basis of
reciprocity" if the understanding I have just
outlined, and have just repeated here, Mr.
Chairman, was generally shared — and, in
particular, was shared by the Soviet Union —
and if the remaining provisions in the article
were consistent with the idea of reciprocity
and meaningful treaty rights. I stated ex-
plicitly that the veto clause was not con-
sistent and not acceptable. Nor does the re-
* Ibid., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.
80
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quirement of advance notice of a projected
visit suggest any veto right or power. The
United States accepted the advance notice
provision on the suggestion of our friends
from Japan, who pointed out at an early date
that concern for the safety of our astronauts
and the integrity of our facilities on celestial
bodies requires that a visitor be asked to give
reasonable advance notice of his intended
visit. The restricted purpose of this notice
requirement is expressly stated in article XII
to be "in order that appropriate consultations
may be held and that maximum precautions
may be taken to assure safety and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited." There is no veto.
Peaceful Cooperation Provisions
Now I turn to the more affirmative pro-
visions of the treaty — those which lay down
some basic ground rules for peaceful coopera-
tion among nations in the exploration and use
of outer space.
The keynote is struck in the very first
operative words of the treaty, in article I:
The exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.
The same article goes on to make clear that
the exploration and use of outer space shall
be the right of all states without any dis-
crimination and on a basis of equality. This
and other provisions, particularly that which
prohibits claims of territorial sovereignty,
make clear the intent of the treaty that
outer space and celestial bodies are open not
just to the big powers or the first arrivals but
shall be available to all, both now and in the
future. This principle is a strong safeguard
for the interests of those states which have,
at the present time, little or no active space
program of their own. Their interests are
also protected by other provisions, for ex-
ample:
Article VII, which fixes on the launching
state the responsibility for any damage
caused by objects launched by or for them or
from their territory;
Article IX, which requires states to con-
duct their space activities "with due regard
to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the Treaty." This includes
a specific obligation to avoid harmful con-
tamination of outer space or of celestial
bodies and also to avoid adverse changes in
the terrestrial environment;
And Article XI, which requires the fullest
practicable public reporting, by parties con-
ducting space activities, of "the nature, con-
duct, locations and results of such activities"
— a practice which my own country has vol-
untarily followed since the space age began.
This provision seeks to assure that the full
scientific harvest from space research will be
available to all the world, not just to the par-
ties that do most of the exploring.
It is wise and proper that the treaty should
secure these rights and benefits to all parties,
including the nonlaunching nations. For their
cooperation also is necessary in many re-
spects, some of which the treaty also provides
for, such as assistance to and return of any
astronauts who may make emergency land-
ings on their territory and return to the
owner of objects launched into outer space
which fall on their territory. In addition,
maximum benefits from the exploration of
outer space depend on the cooperation of the
international scientific and technical com-
munity in all nations, large and small alike.
We are all in this venture together, and we
need one another's cooperation.
The same spirit of cooperation, let me say
emphatically, should prevail also among the
major space countries, specifically my own
country and the Soviet Union — and any
others that may later develop comparable
programs of space launchings and manned
flight. Two provisions of the treaty con-
cretely illustrate this desirable relationship.
Article IX calls for international cooperation
and mutual assistance and includes a provi-
sion for consultation in the case of potentially
harmful experiments. Article V requires that
the same universal respect for life and limb
JANUARY 9, 1967
81
which has been traditional among mariners
at sea for many centuries shall also govern
among astronauts in outer space. In all space
activities, under this article, "the astronauts
of one State Party shall render all possible
assistance to the astronauts of other States
Parties." And any party which discovers con-
ditions in outer space that could endanger
the life or health of astronauts is obliged to
report this to the other parties or to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
As the space age proceeds, and particularly
as manned space flights develop, many forms
of cooperation beween astronauts of major
space powers are sure to develop which today
cannot be foreseen. The framers of this
treaty did not try to peer into the unfore-
seeable; but rather we tried to insure, by lay-
ing down broad principles, that all concerned
will enter this unknown realm as friends and
partners in peace.
Tracking Facilities, Accession
Before concluding, I wish to make brief
additional comments on two of the articles of
the treaty.
The first of these is article X, dealing with
the granting of tracking facilities. In this I
speak on behalf of a large number of states,
some of which have granted tracking facili-
ties and some of which have not.
We welcome the revised form in which this
article appears in the final text of the treaty.
The article requires that if a party has
granted tracking facilities to another party,
it is obliged, on an equal basis, to consider
a request for tracking facilities by a third
party. It is quite clear from the text of the
article, however, that there must be agree-
ment between the parties concerned for the
establishment of a tracking facility. The
article as thus revised recognizes that the
elements of mutual benefit and acceptability
are natural and necessary parts of the deci-
sion whether to enter into an agreement con-
cerning such a facility, and it properly
incorporates the principle that each state
which is asked to cooperate has the right to
consider its legitimate interests in reaching
its decision.
Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the
accession clause in article XIV of the treaty.
The adoption of the accession clause now
included in the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space — urged because
of exceptional circumstances favoring a very
broad geographical coverage for the space
treaty — does not, of course, bring about the
recognition or otherwise alter the status of
an unrecognized regime or entity which may
seek to file an instrument of accession to the
space treaty. Under international law and
practice, recognition of a government or
acknowledgement of the existence of a state
is brought about as the result of a deliberate
decision and course of conduct on the part
of a government intending to accord recogni-
tion. Recognition of a regime or acknowl-
edgement of an entity cannot be inferred
from signature, ratification, or accession to a
multilateral agreement. The United States
believes that this viewpoint is generally
accepted and shared, and it is on this basis
that we join in supporting the present final
clauses of the space treaty.
"Envoys of Manlcind"
Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can best express
my country's feelings about this treaty by
recalling an encounter which several of us,
including the Secretary-General, shared here
at the United Nations last year with an
American astronaut. He is Colonel Edward
White, and he had then only recently
returned from a 4-day Gemini mission in
which he had carried out the first American
"walk in space."
Colonel White had carried with him on this
flight a memento which he was eager to
present to the United Nations — a United
Nations flag, probably the first ever to fly in
space. The Secretary-General very graciously
agreed to accept this flag for the United
Nations.
We had a little ceremony in which the
colonel made a short speech, and in that
speech he said something I shall never forget.
He said that, as he looked down from space
at the earth passing below and recognized
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the familiar shapes of the oceans and
continents moving past, one thing that struck
him very forcefully was something he did
not see. He saw no national boundaries.
Most of us who sit in this room as envoys
of our respective governments will probably
never see that sight, which history has
reserved for a younger generation than ours.
But perhaps it is not too much to hope that
we will see it in our mind's eye and that in
the work we have to do we, too, will be able
to serve also, in some small measure, as
"envoys of mankind."
On behalf of the United States I have the
privilege of commending this treaty to the
First Committee of the General Assembly
and urge that the resolution which will speed
it forward be promptly unanimously ap-
proved.
STATEMENT IN PLENARY, DECEMBER 19
U.S. delegation press release 6037
It is indeed fitting that the treaty on outer
space should come before the General
Assembly as the 21st session draws to a close,
for that extraordinary document provides at
the same time a momentous finale to the
work pf this session and a note of progress
and cooperation and hope from which future
sessions may derive inspiration and light.
On this historic occasion the United States
would like to join the other nations that have
acknowledged a special debt to the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to the
space and nonspace powers alike, without
whose contributions this treaty would never
have been possible. And, of course, I should
like to acknowledge our thanks and apprecia-
tion to Ambassador Waldheim and Professor
Lachs for their leadership in this great
effort.
This, in every sense of the word, is a
United Nations treaty in which all member
nations can justly take great pride. It has
been negotiated under the auspices of the
organization and is the instrument of its
labor. The treaty furthers the aims of the
charter by greatly reducing the danger of
international conflict and by promoting the
JANUARY 9, 1967
prospects of international cooperation for
the common interests in the newest realm of
human activity.
This treaty is an important step toward
peace. It takes its place in a historic progres-
sion: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the
limited test ban treaty of 1963, and now this
treaty. We hope and trust this series of
peacebuilding agreements will continue to
grow. Nothing would make the United States
happier than if a treaty against the prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons should soon be
added as the fourth compact on this historic
list. Thus, step by step, we shall advance the
rule of law into further areas of the relations
between states.
Mr. President, it is with great satisfaction
that the United States will vote for Draft
Resolution II, which commends the treaty on
outer space and expresses the hope for the
widest possible adherence to this treaty, a
hope we share in full measure and full con-
fidence.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION °
Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies
The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ' covering its work
during 1966, and in particular the work accom-
plished by the Legal Sub-Committee during its fifth
session, held at Geneva from 12 July through 4
Aug^ust and at New York from 12 September
through 16 September,
Noting further the progress achieved through sub-
sequent consultations among States Members of the
United Nations,
'U.N. doc. A/RES/2222 (XXI); adopted unani-
mously by the Assembly on December 19. Two other
resolutions on the subject of outer space were
adopted on the same day and also were supported
by the United States; A/RES/2221 (XXI) calling
for a United Nations conference on the exploration
and peaceful uses of outer space to be held at Vienna
in September 1967; and A/RES/2223 (XXI) endors-
ing a number of other recommendations in the report
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
« U.N. doc. A/6431.
83
Reaffirming the importance of international co-
operation in the field of activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and the importance
of developing the rule of law in this new area of
human endeavour,
1. Commends the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, the text of which is annexed to this
resolution ;
2. Requests the depositary Governments to open
the Treaty for signature and ratification at the
earliest possible date ;
3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible ad-
herence to this Treaty;
4. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space :
(a) To continue its work on the elaboration of an
agreement on liability for damages caused by the
launching of objects into outer space and an agree-
ment on assistance to and return of astronauts and
space vehicles, which are on the agenda of the Com-
mittee ;
(b) To begin at the same time the study of ques-
tions relative to the definition of outer space and the
utilization of outer space and celestial bodies, includ-
ing the various implications of space communica-
tions ;
(c) To report to the twenty-second session of the
General Assembly on the progress of its work. '
TREATY INFORMATION
Income Tax Convention Signed
With Trinidad and Tobago
Department Statement
Press release 302 dated December 23
On December 22, 1966, the American Am-
bassador at Port of Spain and the Minister
of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago signed
a convention between the United States and
Trinidad and Tobago for the avoidance of
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion with respect to taxes on income and
the encouragement of international trade
and investment.
The income tax convention of April 16,
1945, between the United States and the
United Kingdom, a^ modified by supplemen-
tary protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954,
and August 19, 1957,^ was extended in its
application to Trinidad and Tobago as of
January 1, 1959, pursuant to the procedure
prescribed in article XXII of that conven-
tion. Trinidad and Tobago became an inde-
pendent nation on August 31, 1962. In 1965,
in accordance with provisions in the 1945
convention for that purpose, the Govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago gave notice
to the United States Government of an in-
tention to terminate the application of the
convention as between it and the United
States.
The new convention is limited in scope;
and it is anticipated that it will be replaced
by a more comprehensive income tax con-
vention between the two countries, negotia-
tions for which will be commenced during
1967.
The new convention is designed primarily
as an interim measure to permit corpora-
tions of one of the countries to receive divi-
dends from their subsidiary corporations op-
erating in the other country (a subsidiary
for this purpose being a corporation at least
10 percent of the outstanding shares of vot-
ing stock of which is owned by the recipient
corporation) at a reduced rate of withhold-
ing tax. Under existing internal law of each
country, dividends paid by a corporation of
one country to a resident of the other coun-
try are subject to a 30 percent withholding
tax. Subject to prescribed conditions, the
convention will have the effect of reducing
this withholding rate to 5 percent with re-
spect to such dividends.
In addition to its corporation tax, which
is imposed at a rate of 44 percent, Trinidad
and Tobago imposes, under its Finance Act
of 1966, a tax of 30 percent on profits (after
' The text of the treaty was printed as an annex
to this resolution.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
1546, 3165, 4124.
84
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 111
payment of the corporation tax) derived in
Trinidad and Tobago by a permanent estab-
lishment of a United States corporation un-
less such profits are invested within Trinidad
and Tobago. Subject to prescribed conditions,
the convention will have the effect of reduc-
ing the rate of this "branch profits" tax to
5 percent.
In general, therefore, the convention pre-
scribes a 5 percent rate limitation on the tax
that can be imposed by the source country
on dividends derived from sources within
that country to certain corporations of the
other country. It prescribes a 25 percent rate
limitation on the tax that can be imposed by
the source country on dividends derived from
sources within that country to other corpo-
rations and individual residents of the other
country.
The convention also contains articles des-
ignating the taxes that are the subject of the
convention, defining various terms found in
the convention, and prescribing the foreign
tax credit.
The convention will enter into force upon
the exchange of instruments of ratification,
but it is agreed that all necessary steps will
be taken to make the provisions effective as
of January 1, 1966. The convention shall
terminate on December 31, 1967, but may
be continued in effect from year to year by
an exchange of notes for that purpose on or
before December 31 of any taxable year.
The convention will be transmitted to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilat-
eral agreement between the United States and
Spain of August 16, 1957, as amended (TIAS
3988, 5990), for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna December 9,
1966. Entered into force December 9, 1966.
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963.'
Signature : Denmark, November 21, 1966.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquar-
ters, New York, September 28 through November
30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963.
TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Kenya, December 15, 1966.
Customs
Convention concerning the International Union for
the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brus-
sels July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1891.
26 Stat. 1518.
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966.
Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels
July 5, 1890, relating to the creation of an Inter-
national Union for the Publication of Customs
Tariffs (26 Stat. 1518). Done at Brussels Decem-
ber 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950; for
the United States September 15, 1957. TIAS 3922.
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966.
IMaritime Matters
Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.'
Acceptances received: Argentina, September 30,
1966; Bulgaria, September 29, 1966; Czechoslo-
vakia, October 3, 1966; Senegal, September 28,
1966.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.'
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (vdth a statement), October 25, 1966.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final proto-
col, and convention with final protocol and regula-
tions of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964.
Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratifications deposited: China, September 6, 1966;
Tunisia, September 13, 1966.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into
force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Dahomey, December 10,
1966.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956.*
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16,
1966.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966 for part I
' Not in force.
• Not in force for the United States.
JANUARY 9, 1967
85
and parts III to VII; Augiist 1, 1966 for part II.
Acceptances deposited: Finland, December 14,
1966; Mexico, December 22, 1966; Venezuela,
December 19, 1966.
Women — Political Rights
Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
July 7, 1954."
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16,
1966.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a joint
defense space research facility. Signed at Can-
berra December 9, 1966. Entered into force De-
cember 9, 1966.
Dominican Republic
Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative pro-
grram for meteorological observations. Effected by
exchange of notes at Santo Domingo June 17 and
July 21, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1966;
effective June 30, 1965.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement relating to the transfer of three paint-
ings to the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Weimar Museum. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington December 9 and 16, 1966. Entered
into force December 16, 1966.
Japan
Agreement relating to the establishment of a geo-
detic satellite observation station at Kanoya. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September
12 and 19, 1966. Entered into force September 19,
1966.
Mexico
Agrreement relating to creation of a joint commis-
sion to study economic and social development of
the border area. Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico and Tlatelolco November 30 and Decem-
ber 3, 1966. Entered into force December 3, 1966.
Paraguay
Agreement amending the agreement of October 28,
1955 (TIAS 3558), relating to investment guaran-
ties. Signed at Asuncion August 11, 1966.
Entered into force : November 16, 1966.
United Kingdom
Agreement relating to a cooperative meteorological
program in the Cayman Islands. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington November 23 and
December 12, 1966. Entered into force December
12, 1966; effective July 1, 1962.
United Nations
Agreement amending the supplemental agreement
of February 9, 1966, regarding the headquarters
of the United Nations (TIAS 5961). Effected by
exchange of notes at New York December 8, 1966.
Entered into force December 8, 1966.
' Not in force for the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1437 PUBLICATION 8183 JANUARY 9, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, aa well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the Held of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10. foreign $16;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.
86
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 9, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 14S7
I
I
Africa. Institutions for Order (Sisco) .... 64
Antarctica. U.S. Appoints Observers for Ant-
arctic Inspections 71
Asia. Advisers Named for Near Eastern and
South Asian Bureau 72
Chile. President Frei of Chile To Visit the United
States (Johnson) 71
Department and Foreign Service. Advisers
Named for Near Eastern and South Asian
Bureau 72
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of December 21 42
Economic Affairs.
Income Tax Convention Sigrned With Trinidad
and Tobago 84
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying
Vietnamese Development 69
Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting 70
U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for Investment,
Trade Studies 69
Europe. North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris
(communique) 49
Foreign Aid. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of December 21 42
Human Rights. Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of De-
cember 21 42
International Law. Viet-Nam and the Interna-
tional Law of Self-Defense (Meeker) ... 54
Korea. U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for In-
vestment, Trade Studies 69
Mexico. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds
Second Meeting 70
Military Affairs. North Atlantic Council Meets
at Paris (communique) 49
Near East
Advisers Named for Near Eastern and South
Asian Bureau 72
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris (com-
munique) 49
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
Presidential Documents. President Frei of Chile
To Visit the United States 71
Science. U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer
Space Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) . 78
South West Africa. Institutions for Order
(Sisco) 64
Southern Rhodesia
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text
of resolution) 73
Trade. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds
Second Meeting 70
Treaty Information
Current Actions 85
Income Tax Convention Signed With Trinidad
and Tobago 84
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space
Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78
Trinidad and Tobago. Income Tax Convention
Signed With Trinidad and Tobago . ... 84
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
December 21 42
United Kingdom. Security Council Votes Man-
datory Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 73
United Nations
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text
of resolution) 73
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space
Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help in
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63
Viet-Nam
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying
Vietnamese Development 69
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help iii
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63
Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-
Defense (Meeker) 54
Name Index
Ball, George W 69
Goldberg, Arthur J 63,73,78
Johnson, President "71
Lilienthal, David E 69
Meeker, Leonard C 54
Rusk, Secretary 42
Sisco, Joseph J 64
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 18 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
291 of December 12 and 292 of December 13.
No.
»294
Date
12/19
295 12/20
Sabjeet
NATO communique (original
NATO document printed here-
in).
Advisory panel for Bureau of
Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs.
Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Com-
mittee meeting.
Rusk: news conference of De-
cember 21.
Termination of income tax con-
vention with Honduras.
U.S. observers under Antarctic
Treaty (rewrite).
IMCO Subcommittee recommends
new passenger-ship standards.
Travel restrictions.
Income tax convention with
Trmidad and Tobago.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Buixetin.
296
12/21
297
12/21
t298
12/22
299
12/23
t300
12/23
t301
302
12/23
12/23
it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/27
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington, d.c., 20402
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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U38
January 16, 1967
THE WORK OF THE 21st SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 98
U.N. ADOPTS INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Statement by Ambassador Patricia R. Harris and Texts of Covenants lOi
WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR POWER— PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
Article by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioii 90
For index see inside back cover
By 1980, Dr. Seuborg predicts, fissionable material will be
produced over the face of the globe "siifficient for the poten-
tial production of a substantial amount of the world's
electrical power — or, alternatively, sxifficient for tens of
nuclear weapons a day." This article, in which Dr. Seaborg
discusses the importance of miclear power to a rapidly
expanding population, is based on a lecture he delivered in
London on October 2 A, 1966, before the British Nuclear
Energy Society.
Worldwide Nuclear Power— Progress and Problems
by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Before one can discuss the future of power
with any realism, one must first tal]< about
people — people in terms of population and
the ever-growing pressure of population. This
is a subject of overwhelming importance
today, and I am sure that many are familiar
with the infonnation in figure 1 showing the
exponential growth of the world's population
projected to the year 2000. The cui-ve on this
graph bears a simple but most relevant mes-
sage: Between the year 1960 and the year
2000, the world's population will about
double. It will rise from 3 billion to 6 billion
people. Now, if all the other aspects of civili-
zation as we know it were to remain the
same and proportionally each individual
consumed the same amount of energy tomor-
row as today, the energy demand should also
double.
But we know that this will not be the case,
and figure 2 shows the actual situation. This
graph of past and projected annual world-
wide energy consumption covers the same
period as the previous population curve. The
previous curve, noi-malized to the worldwide
energy consumption curve at the year 1950,
has also been included for comparison's sake.
Tliis makes obvious the fact that the con-
sumption of energy by individuals does not
have a constant value. In highly technological
societies, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, there has been and will be
a significant increase in energy consumption
per capita. In the emerging nations, however,
there probably will be a startling increase.
The consumption of energy in these countries
today is almost nil compared to what it might
be tomorrow.
It is difficult to comprehend fully the
energy demands of a world of double today's
population with all its people enjoying living
standards approaching those of the people of
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Think of the magnitude of energy that may
be required some day if we were to air-
condition much of Africa and the subcon-
tinent of Asia and heat population centers
that will be growing up in subarctic regions.
What would it mean to provide the power
required to transport people and materials
to the remote ijarts of the globe to satisfy
the needs of an ever-expanding population
and provide sufficient power and fresh water
for home, industry, and agriculture? Imagine
the future energy needs involved in growing,
processing, and distributing food, from land
90
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and sea, for a world i^opulation double that
of today — and demanding an adequate diet
for all. These are only a few of the energy
challenges we face.
Recognizing the great importance of
energy for future global social and economic
well-being — perhaps for our veiy survival —
consider one important form of energy —
electricity. The past and projected worldwide
annual electricity production is represented
in figure 3. Again, the worldwide annual
energy consumption as sho^vn in the previous
figure has been normalized to the worldwide
electricity production cui've at the year 1950
and projected to the year 2000. I believe it is
particularly evident that electricity will pro-
vide an even greater fraction of the energy
consumed by man in the ensuing decades than
it does today. This should not be a surprising
fact when one realizes that many parts of the
world are just being ushered into the electric
age. Further, electricity is a particularly
easily managed forni of energy. It can be
simply transported by wire, conveniently and
economically generated in large blocks, and
it is capable of being produced from a number
of independent energy sources, that is, hydro,
fossil fuels, or the heat generated from
nuclear fission. It is electricity produced by
this last means that I would like to turn to
next and examine in some detail.
Advantages of Nuclear Power
In general, the future of nuclear electric
power looks bright indeed, but we who are
in this field know that we have many
obstacles to overcome and that much hard
work remains ahead of us to make the most
of the atom's great potential power.
When we look at the nuclear electrical pro-
duction throughout the world from the year
1950 to the turn of the centuiy, as seen in
figure 4, again we have a familiar pattern
of rapid exponential gi'o^vth. In this case,
because of the newness of this energy
source — nuclear generating capacity was
clearly zero in 1960 — the annual world\vide
electricity production cui've has been nor-
malized to the worldwide nuclear production
curve at the year 1970. It is genei'ally agreed
FIGURE 1
6000
WORLD POPULATION /
SOOO
^
y
4000
-
y^
3000
-
^^.^
2000
;
_^ — ^^"^
1000
-
0
1
— 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 1 1
that nuclear energy will take an ever-increas-
ing share of the electrical generating capacity
until the turn of the century. By that time,
it is predicted that essentially all new elec-
trical powerplants to be built will be nuclear
powerplants.
This then brings us to the importance of
nuclear power. As I indicated before, a
rapidly expanding global population, its
increasing appetite for energy, and the satis-
faction of an increasingly larger share of this
energy appetite by electricity make nuclear
electric power a key element in the future
well-being and progress of man.
Assuming continued improvements in
nuclear power technology, the building of
veiy large size plants, and the absence of cer-
tain financial restraints, nuclear power has
the potential for a significant reduction in
the cost of electricity. A reduction large
enough to cause rather dramatic changes in
energy utilization is foreseen by some. There
is no doubt that large-scale, low-cost sources
of energy will determine more than any other
single resource the availability and cost of
other basic resources such as food, water,
and industrial materials. With very low cost
power, desalted water would be a reality.
Our nitrogenous fertilizers and many of our
basic chemicals would be produced by new
routes and from raw materials such as water,
air, and coal. Electricity would widely be
used to reduce most ores to metals. The
world of tomorrow will certainly be far dif-
ferent from that of today if these promises
of very low cost nuclear power do come true.
There are, I might add, other obvious ad-
JANUARY 16, 1967
91
FIGURE 2
TOTAl ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
IV«0 2000
vantages to nuclear power today. It is a clean
source of power and does not add to the
burden of pollution in the air. It is relatively
independent of geography because of the
extreme compactness and long life of nuclear
fuels, and therefore nuclear powerplants can
be constructed far from their sources of raw
material — uranium and thorium ores — with-
out a significant economic penalty. And,
finally, it lends itself well toward generation
in large blocks of ix)wer so that enonnous,
very economical, central power stations can
be built.
Economic Requirements
But if nuclear energy is actually to be used
in this important role, it must be capable of
meeting at least two criteria. First, it must
be economic wherever it is used. Otherwise
nuclear power stations will not be built in any
significant numbers. Second, sufficient re-
serves of nuclear fuel must be available to
provide the enormous amounts of energy
which will be required, not only through the
year 2000 but also beyond, as our energy
consumption ever increases.
Recent Trends
Turning now to the present status of nu-
clear power in the world, let me point out
that the tyijes of reactors being constructed
today are being built for current and near-
term economic use, and their design does not
in general take into consideration the long-
term future resources of nuclear fuel. At
present this long-term concern is really not
a necessary condition of reactor construction
because nuclear energy represents but a
minor fraction of the annual global energy
consumption and uranium resources are
ample to meet near-term requirements.
As is generally known, the current reactor
types have achieved economical competitive-
ness— remarkably so in countries such as the
United States. In fact, in my tenure as
Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission I have witnessed a remarkable evolu-
tion of nuclear power. When I first took office
the entire program was questioned on the
ground that the expenditures of vast sums
of public funds seemed to be for naught, that
nuclear power would not be economic for
several decades to come. Today I find some
people at the other extreme beginning to
question whether any additional government
funding of advanced nuclear power programs
is necessaiy, since so many nuclear power-
plants are being sold by the nuclear industiy
that the industry has reached the point of
being self-supporting. In the United States
alone, firm commitments for the construction
of nuclear powerplants went from 2 million
kilowatts in 1963-64 to 5 million kilowatts
in 1965 to 15 million kilowatts for the first
9 months of 1966. A similar increase in reac-
tor construction is expected to occur in other
countries.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the
FIGURE 3
ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE
ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION
WITH WORLD-WIDE ANNUAL TOTAL ENERGY
CONSUMPTION NORMALIZED AT 19S0
92
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
second nuclear power program, adopted in
1965, planned a program of 5 million kilo-
watts of nuclear generating capacity during
the period 1970-75. This program was in-
creased to 8 million kilowatts by the end of
1975.
The French civil program, as another ex-
ample, is the largest in continental Europe.
According to the French Government's "fifth
plan," the French foresee 2.5 million to 4
million kilowatts installed from 1966 to 1970
utilizing gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, and
natural-uranium-fueled plants of 500,000
kilowatts or more. At the present time, about
1 percent of France's electrical energy is of
nuclear origin; by 1970 it is expected to reach
5 percent and by 1975, 12 percent.
The installation of nuclear power in Japan
is expected to total from 4.3 million to 5.3
million kilowatts by 1975 and approximately
10 million kilowatts by 1980. Seven central
stations are in various stages of planning in
Japan, with two plants now operating.
Sweden also plans a long-range construction
program of six nuclear i)lants totaling 2.5
million kilowatts of power by 1978. In the
Federal Republic of Germany two plants are
now producing electricity, two are being
built, and plans are going forward on several
others. It is apparent that nuclear power will
have a rapid growth in Germany during the
next decade. Canada, India, Italy, Switzer-
land, and Spain also have substantial
nuclear power plans.
One of the reasons given for this abrupt
change in events has been the ability of the
electric producers to begin utilizing very
large blocks of electrical generation. As a re-
sult, it has become possible to take advantage
of the savings incurred through scaling
nuclear powerplants to very large sizes.
Uranium Prices
A fixed price of uranium equal to $8 per
pound of UsOg has been a general level which
has been attained through extensive national
and international procurement of uranium
ores over the past decade. Recently, prices a
FIGURE 4
ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE
NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION
WITH ANNUAL WORID-WIDE
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION
NORMALIZED AT 1970
H70 1980
YEARS
few dollars below the $8 level have been
negotiated due to the temporary surplus of
uranium ore supphes. However, if one views
this question of uranium ore resources from
a long-term viewpoint, the price will probably
slowly escalate as the higher grade ores are
consumed and as the general cost of labor
and materials increases. For the present
moment the figure of about $8 a pound of
UaOs is a fair and perhaps a somewhat con-
servative one not likely to change drastically
for the next decade.
What degree of urgency must be given to
increasing uranium prices ? This should have
a direct eff"ect on the future planning and pro-
grams leading to the development of ad-
vanced and improved reactors. As an
extreme, if the world could be assured that
from here to the turn of the century the
price for UaOs would remain at today's level,
there might be considerably less pressure
and urgency for the development through
government sponsorship of newer and more
efficient reactors. Nonetheless, there would
remain some important incentives for the
continued development of newer reactor
types which might promise to be more eco-
nomical than the current round of reactors.
JANUARY 16, 1967
93
FIGURE 5
URANIUM RESERVES
ESTIMATED WORLD TOTAL
(ULSR, CHINA AND lASTIRN lUIOPE NOT INCLUDiO)
lOO
E
15.000.000
-
MtUift INOICIItS
CtPtCIIT (Mat)
WHICH COUID If MtlNTIIHED
FOR )a T[«RS WITH THE
INOICtltD FUd
5.500,000
1
ID
1
J
}M.m
1,000.000
jilH
1
1
0-IS 0-30 0-50 0-100
COST OF URANIUM ORE - DOLLARS/LB.
In the United Kingdom this has been exempli-
fied in the progress from the magnox reac-
tors to the advanced gas-cooled reactors.
Uranium Reserves
To offer some appreciation of the time
scale which should lie factored into these
programmatic decisions, figure 5 shows the
known and estimated uranium resources.
These uranium resources are shown as mil-
lions of tons of UsOs as well as the I'elated
megawatts of nuclear generating caimbility.
The figures are based on the assumption of
sufficient fuel for a 30-year lifetime for
nuclear powerplants of the current light
water and advanced gas-cooled reactor types.
Combining the infoiTnation presented on this
chart with that on the earlier one (figure 4)
showing a very rapid exponential growth of
nuclear power generating capability, one can
predict that the known or estimated world-
wide ore resources costing $10 per pound or
less are sufficient to supply about 300,000
megawatts of nuclear generating capability,
which will be contracted for, with the conse-
quent commitment of the indicated amount
of uranium, by 1980. If one considers
uranium ore resources of $15 per pound or
less, the reserves, both known and estimated,
are sufficient to support power stations
generating about 550,000 megawatts of
nuclear power, a capacity which will be
reached by about the year 1985. Using
uranium ore resources of $30 per pound or
less, the reserves are sufficient for about 1
million megawatts of nuclear power, which
will be reached by about the year 1990. A
very important fact sho\\Ti by this chart
(figure 5) is that there are enormous re-
sources of uranium available if one is not
limited by cost of the ore.
I might also add a word of warning about
these figures. They do not reflect the in-
creased activity during the past months
toward new uranium exploration in the
United States, Canada, and elsewhere. They
represent the facts as we know them today.
I am certain, however, that additional ore
supplies will be found, in similar fashion to
the new fossil fuel resources found yearly,
and that this figure represents a conservative
view of things.
In addition to these resources of uranium
ere, vast quantities of thorium ore will be
found, quantities similar in magnitude to
that of the uranium ores. Thorium can also
be considered a nuclear energy resource al-
though it itself is not fissionable. Thorium-
232, the isotope of thorium found in these
ores, like the nonfissionable isotope uranium-
238 which is the very abundant isotope of
uranium found in nature, can be converted
to useful fissionable form by nuclear trans-
mutation. As you know, in the case of
uranium-238 the small fraction of the natu-
rally fissionable isotope uranium-235 pro-
vides the fission reaction neutrons which,
when captured by uranium-238, cause it to
undergo a transmutation eventually leading
to plutonium-239, an isotope which is fission-
able. Similarly, thorium-232 upon capturing
a neutron can be transmuted to uranium-233,
another fissionable isotope. Thus, plutonium-
239 and uranium-233 are the keys to unlock-
ing the vast energies stored in uranium-238
and thorium-232. Unfortunately, the current
reactor types do not take full advantage of
this situation.
We presently know that it is quite feasible
to increase the efficiency of utilization of our
uranium ore resources. The heavy water
moderated and cooled reactor and certain ad-
vanced reactors indicate one direction in
94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which to proceed. Increasing the thermal
efficiency of nuclear powerplants is another
direction.
Breeder Reactors
In general temis it appears readily possible
to more than double the energy which can be
extracted from a pound of uranium by going
to reactors with higher conversion ratios than
the currently available light water and ad-
vanced gas-cooled reactors. I refer to the near
breeders. The effect of this increased effi-
ciency is reflected in the fact that with the
installation of these near breeder reactors in
place of the current reactors the period of use
of the known uranium ore resources can be
extended for about a decade.
The actual effect of near breeder reactors
is even more dramatic since some of these
would utilize the thorium-uranium-233 fuel
cycle to supplement and replace the uranium-
plutomum-239 fuel cycle. But whatever fuel
cycle is in fact used, near breeder reactors
must provide improved nuclear efficiencies in
order to make a significant contribution.
There is an obvious incentive for getting
near or into a breeding regime. By breeding
I mean — as many of you know — a reactor
where more fissionable fuel is produced from
the fertile uranium-238 or thorium-232 than
is consumed in the fission chain reaction. If
one gets to a conversion or breeding ratio of
1.1 or greater, tremendous gains can be ob-
tained. Rather than utilizing only a few per-
cent of the energy present in the nuclear fuel,
more than 50 percent can be usefully har-
nessed. This fact also means that even
though the current reactors inefficiently uti-
lize the uranium and thorium fuels, these
fuels are not wasted. The large fraction of
uranium-238 and thorium-232 not consumed
in these reactors can serve eventually as fuel
for future breeder reactors.
This has an immediate compound effect.
Assuming one is able to build economic
breeder reactors, the nuclear generating
capacity capable of being ultimately fueled
with today's low-cost ore resources is greatly
increased. Second, the high efficiency of these
reactors means that they should be less sensi-
tive to increases in the future costs of nuclear
fuel.
Unfortunately, as we all know, govern-
ment life and service are not so simple as to
permit one to say "Let there be a breeder re-
actor," and, lo, there is a breeder reactor.
There are many real scientific and techno-
logical hurdles which must be crossed. In
addition there are other tyi3es of advanced
reactors — near breeders — which for the near-
term have considerable economic promise. If
one looks about the world today, one can see
several types of advanced reactors, including
breeder reactors, under intensive develop-
ment.
The breeder reactors, representing a some-
what more difficult technology than the near
breeder tyiies, will be more expensive to con-
struct. The near breeder reactor types, after
all, are built on technology closer at hand.
The operating costs of the low-gain breeder
and the near breeder reactors based on jires-
ent uranium fuel prices are not too different.
These near breeder and breeder reactors,
from a simple economic viewpoint, all
promise to have remarkably low operating
costs reflecting efficient fuel cycles. This also
indicates that there is some incentive for de-
veloping these advanced reactors regardless
of whether the price of uranium should in-
crease— for they may be more economical
than current types.
Of importance from a national and world-
wide viewpoint is the built-in insurance
policy which one can purchase with these
near breeder reactors and breeder reactors.
This insurance policy is reflected in the insen-
sitivity of the total generating cost to the
price of natural uranium. Doubling the price
of natural uranium increases the generating
costs of the near breeder reactors about two-
tenths of a mill per kilowatt hour or less, and
of the fast breeders perhaps one-tenth of a
mill or even less. The fast breeder reactor, in
fact, may prove so efficient that ore costing
$100 or more per pound of UaOs, available in
virtually unlimited quantities, could still be
used without a sizable economic penalty.
One other important consideration that
must be borne in mind in analyzing the
JANUARY 16, 1967
95
future trend of reactor development and its
impact on nuclear fuel resources and the
economy of electric power generation is the
specific power of these future reactors. The
specific power, that is, the power generated
per kilogram of fuel placed in the reactor,
can perhaps be viewed more simply in terms
of the inventory of fuel required by a given
size reactor. The higher the specific power,
the lower the inventoiy. A low inventoiy has
the effect of lowering the generating costs
because the fuel carrying charges are less;
that is, less capital funds are tied up in fuel
inventory. Further, considering a breeder re-
actor economy, a smaller reactor inventory
affects the doubling time, that is, the time re-
quired before a breeder reactor could refuel
a carbon copy of itself. Also a smaller reactor
inventory in any type of nuclear plant means
that the resource requirements are less.
Therefore, there is considerable incentive to
develop near breeders and breeder reactors
with high specific power and therefore low
fuel inventoi-y requii'ements.
Any future reactor economy will probably
be a mixed reactor economy. We will prob-
ably always have several types of reactors,
with new reactor construction determined,
among other factors, by the projected rate of
growth of electric power demands, the price
of natural uranium, and the price of bred
fissionable material at the time the decision
to go ahead with a reactor unit is made.
Large-Scale Plutonium Production
In conclusion, let me focus on an important
point: the plethora of fissionable material.
Whether or not near breeder reactors and
breeder reactors are, in fact, developed, built,
and operated, significant amounts of fission-
able materials, especially plutonium, will be
bred throughout the world. And, as you know,
plutonium can be used as the explosive in-
gredient of nuclear weapons. Figure 6 sum-
marizes the cumulative quantities of plu-
tonium that would be produced by the years
1980 and 2000 — astonishing amounts indeed.
This plutonium will be produced throughout
FIGURE 6
YEAR
CUMULATIVE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCED WORLD-WIDE
TOTAL KGS. OF PLUTONIUM
1970
1980
2000
10,000
180,000
4,000,000
the world by 1980, if our projections are cor-
rect, at the rate of more than 100 kilograms
a day! In other words, material will be pro-
duced over the face of the globe sufficient for
the potential production of a substantial
amount of the world's electrical power — or,
alternatively, sufficient for tens of nuclear
weapons a day.
The cumulative figures are striking: We
calculate that the worldwide stock of plu-
tonium by 1970 will be 10,000 kilograms. By
1980 this will have increased almost twenty-
fold— to 180,000 kilograms. Just 20 years
later this figure will have mounted to the
almost unbelievable total of 4 million kilo-
grams !
In the light of this, there are some who
would say that the only rational course is to
bring an abrui^t and complete halt to the de-
velopment of nuclear power here and now,
that the price we pay for a little additional
energy is much too high for the risk of nu-
clear annihilation, and that no adequate
means of control can be developed to insure,
in fact, that these nuclear fuels will not be
misused.
But most of us know that such thinking is
not fully realistic. Even in the early days of
nuclear development, while there were some i
who felt we could hold back all our infonna-
tion and discoveries on this new form of
energy, thus keeping others from obtaining
nuclear weapons, most of us knew that it was
only a matter of time before other countries
96
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
could achieve a nuclear capability independ-
ently of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and
the United King-dom. The major seci'et of the
atomic bomb was, of course, that it worked —
and this had been revealed to the world.
Many countries of the world had their own
supplies of natural uranium and, ])erhaps
more important, their own scientists. We
also considered that if we failed to cooperate
in sharing: our peaceful nuclear technology
and nuclear materials, there would be other
countries which might be willing to provide
nuclear materials and technology without a
firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful
end use.
Choosing, therefore, a more positive and
constructive approach, the task has thus be-
come not a matter of forbidding the further
spread of nuclear science but rather one of
helping one another to develop the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under conditions
which assure the peaceful use of the nuclear
equipment and materials which are supplied.
An org'anization already playing a very
significant role in guaranteeing that the
peaceful atom will remain peaceful through-
out the world is an agency whose existence is
hardly known to the general public. This
organization is the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), with its headquar-
ters in Vienna and its current membership
of 96 nations, with 3 additional member na-
tions about to be admitted. We have in the
work of the International Atomic Energy
Agency perhaps the forerunner of a fully in-
ternational safeguards and control system.
The essence of this system lies in the right to
inspect facilities and materials supplied
through international agreement. Such in-
spections are carried out by IAEA interna-
tional inspection teams at facilities in
countries which have agreed to accept inter-
national safeguards.
In addition to its present activities relat-
ing to the inspection of reactors, the IAEA
has recently considered and developed appro-
priate safeguards and controls for chemical
reprocessing plants to assure that none of the
materials separated and purified in these
plants are diverted to nonpeaceful uses.
I am hopeful that the future will show a
continued increase in the application of these
IAEA safeguards and controls and that
eventually we may have a worldwide system
of safeguards and controls under which all
nations will be able to develop and share the
peaceful atom free from the fear of a poten-
tial nuclear threat.
JANUARY 16, 1967
97
The Work of the 21st Session of the U.N. General Assembly
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations '
At the conclusion of the 21st General
Assembly of the United Nations it is fitting
that its actions should be evaluated in the
light of the only meaningful standard: the
purposes of the charter and, above all, the
cause of peace.
Judged by this standard, the record of the
session — and of the Security Council during
the same period — shows many constructive
achievements and some regrettable short-
comings.
In addition to the specific actions discussed
below, the session was also significant for its
atmosphere. Issues raised for propaganda
purposes did not make much headway. A
searching for bridges between East and West
was more evident this year than a year ago
or in some previous sessions. The strength of
this apparent desire for greater cooperation
and accommodation must of course be tested
by concrete action. Some evidences of posi-
tive action were present in this session, and
we hoije to see more in times to come.
1. The Secretary-General
A highly important achievement was the
unanimous reappointment of U Thant as
Secretary-General for a second 5-year term.
His willingness to serve again in response
to the unanimous wish of the membership
demonstrated anew his devotion to the ideals
of the organization. It is greatly to be hoped
that the resounding new vote of confidence
> Released at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 21 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5044).
98
in him will enable him to apply those ideals
with renewed effectiveness even to the most
difl^cult problems confronting the interna-
tional community.
2. Viet-Nam
The continued inability of the United Na-
tions to work eff"ective]y in the conflict in
Viet-Nam has been a failure not of the orga-
nization but of key members and govern-
ments which have been unwilling to consent
to such action. We were encouraged by the
fact that a majority of speakers who referred
to Viet-Nam in the Assembly's general debate
took note of our significant proposals of
September 22 ^ and supported, as does the
United States, discussions looking toward a
peaceful settlement. We continue to hope the
United Nations may play a more positive
role. We especially hope that the Secretary-
General will find it possible, in response to
our appeal to him on Monday,' to help bring
about discussions which could lead to a mu-
tual cessation of hostilities and an honorable
settlement.
3. Outer Space
A most significant Assembly action was
the unanimous vote commending the outer
space treaty and urging the widest possible
adherence to it.^ The treaty was negotiated in
^ Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
' Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63.
* For background, see ibid., p. 78 ; for text of the
treaty, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
i
the United Nations Outer Space Committee
in Geneva and this autumn at the United Na-
tions in New York. It is a pioneerinof exten-
sion of international law into the newly
entered realm of outer space. It embodies the
most important aiTns control measure since
the imrtial test ban treaty of 1963, as well as
principles for peaceful cooperation in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space, including-
the moon and other celestial bodies. The con-
clusion of this treaty at the present time is
a major step tow^ard peace and an encourag-
ing sign that the actions of nations, in the
charter's words, can be harmonized in
significant fields even while major discords
in other fields remain unresolved.
4. Nonproliferation
It is greatly to be hojjed that the outer
space treaty will quickly be followed by the
conclusion of the long-sought nonprolifera-
tion treaty, banning the further spread of
nuclear weapons. The seriousness of the de-
bate in the First Committee on this subject,
and the resolution urging an early agree-
ment,^ are hopeful auguries for this vitally
important arms control measure, which we
hope may pave the way for still further dis-
armament agreements.
5. Human Rights Covenants
In a field equally important to peace — that
of human rights — the General Assembly took
another jiioneering step when it ovenvhelm-
ingly approved two instruments long in the
making: the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.'' The United States
voted for these documents. Whatever their
imperfections, they will be remembered in
histoiy as the first major attempt by the
community of nations to extend to the entire
range of human rights the protection of bind-
ing international agreements. The day is sure
to come when no government can any longer
ignore its obligation, implicit in the United
Nations Charter, to respect at least the mini-
mum standards of human rights which these
covenants seek to define.
6. South West Africa
Of the numerous difiicult colonial issues
that faced this Assembly session, the one on
which the most important action was taken
was the dispute over the territory of South
West Africa. The Assembly created an Ad
Hoc Committee for South West Africa to
recommend practical means by which the ter-
ritory can be administered so as to enable the
people to exercise their right of self-deter-
mination.''
This resolution, adopted by a nearly unani-
mous vote, was strongly supported by the
United States as a realistic, practical, and
important foi-ward step. We will serve on the
new committee, which is to report by next
April to a special session of the Assembly.
The teiTus of the resolution, and the nearly
unanimous support which it received, give
grounds for hope that it may lead toward a
solution of this thorny problem which will be
both just and peaceful and will lie within the
capacity of the United Nations.
7. Southern Rhodesia
The General Assembly considered the prob-
lem of Southern Rhodesia, but it was the
Security Council's unprecedented action in
imposing mandatory sanctions on key expoi-ts
and on oil imports into the territory that was
the most significant.^ While no one can guar-
antee the success of this undertaking in
advance, the probabilities will be greatest if
all of us undertake good-faith eflForts to make
it succeed. I repeat that the United States will
apply this decision with the full force of law.
We hope it will contribute to a peaceful solu-
tion and to the essential goal of assuring that
all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not just
the 6 percent of European ancestry, achieve
the right to control their own destiny.
^ For text of Resolution 2153, see ibid., Dec. 19,
1966, p. 936.
•^ See p. 107.
' For text of Resolution 2145, see Bulletin of Dec.
5, 1966, p. 871.
* For background and text of a resolution, see ibid.,
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
JANUARY 16, 1967
99
8. Middle East
Border disturbances in the Middle East
also came before the Security Council twice
during the session. Against a background of
incursions into Israel stemming from Syrian
territory, 10 members of the Council, includ-
ing the United States, voted for a resolution
asking Syria to strengthen its measures to
prevent incidents in violation of the Anni-
stice Agreement.9 Subsequently, again with
our support, the Council firmly denounced
the Israeli military action in November on
Jordanian territory.^o On both occasions the
United States expressed its opposition to all
use of violence across existing Middle East-
ern frontiers, regardless of the direction in
which it occurs.
We believe that the discussions demon-
strated the Council's desire that all such vio-
lence cease, and we regret that one of these
resolutions met a Soviet veto, which con-
tributed to instability in the area. Our own
basic policy of respecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all countries in
the Middle East is unchanged and was reaf-
firmed during these debates.
9. Aden
In the difficult case of Aden, the Assembly
took another important step to assist in a
peaceful settlement. The imminent with-
drawal of Britain from Aden leaves the politi-
cal future of the area uncertain. The Assem-
bly, with full support from the United
Kingdom, asked the Secretary-General to
send a special mission to Aden to recommend
practical steps for self-determination by the
people, including possible United Nations
participation in elections there. This step
should help to stabilize an area which could
easily become one of the world's danger
spots.
10. other Issues in Africa
Several other resolutions, while reflecting
the Assembly's deep concern over colonialism
« For U.S. statements and text of the resolution,
see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969.
'» For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see ibid., p. 974.
and denial of human rights in southern
Africa — a concern which we share — were, we
felt, unrealistic in method, and the United
States was unable to give them full support.
Sweeping resolutions which do not reflect a
broad intention of practical support can only
in the long nm diminish the influence of the
Assembly.
11. Membership
With the end of colonial rule in still fur-
ther territories of Africa and the Caribbean,
the General Assembly increased its member-
ship to 122 with the admission of four new
members: Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, and
Barbados. The return of Indonesia to active
participation in the United Nations was also
widely welcomed.
12. Chinese Representation
This year, as previously, the Assembly
gave thoughtful consideration to the issue of
the representation of China in the United Na-
tions. The proposal of Albania to expel the
Republic of China in order to seat repre-
sentatives of Communist China was rejected
by a solid majority of 57 to 46. Once again,
too, the Assembly affirmed, also by an in-
creased majority, that any proposal to change
the representation of China is an important
question and thus, under the charter, requires
a two-thirds vote for decision."
Although the Italian study-committee pro-
posal was not adoiJted, the United States sup-
ported it, noting that its mandate did not
prejudge the results of the proposed study.
As I indicated in my statement to the As-
sembly, the United States does not seek to
isolate mainland China. We were prepared
for the United Nations to ask Peking its atti-
tude on key questions involved: whether it
would drop its unacceptable demands, espe-
cially for the expulsion of the Republic of
China, and whether it would assume the
obligations of the charter— including the
obligation to refrain from the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
" For a U.S. statement and texts of resolutions,
see ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 926.
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
independence of any state. Only Peking can
answer these questions.
13. Korea
On another longstanding Asian issue, the
Assembly clearly reaffirmed United Nations
support for the peaceful unification of Korea
through free U.N.-supervised elections and
rebuffed a major Soviet effort to end the
United Nations role in Korea.
This double failure to act on the related
issues of peacekeeping and financing must be
set down among the chief shortcomings of
this session. Great powers can take care of
their own interests, but the ability of the
United Nations to function as a keeper of the
peace is vital to the interests of the great ma-
jority of members, particularly the smaller
ones, and, indeed, to the eflFectiveness of the
organization under the charter.
14. Peacekeeping
Although a constructive Canadian resolu-
tion on the highly important issue of peace-
keeping was approved by a large majority
in committee, the Assembly, to our regret,
put off final action on this measure until its
resumed session in April. The Canadian reso-
lution's most important provisions are those
reaffirming the role of the General Assembly
in peacekeeping in circumstances where the
Security Council is unable to act and sug-
gesting a model scale for the broad and
equitable sharing of the costs of expensive
peacekeeping forces.
We continue to believe that it is highly im-
portant for the Assembly to take prompt and
positive action on this question and not to
allow the recalcitrance of a few members to
impair the capacity of the United Nations to
fulfill its peacekeeping role.
A favorable development in peacekeeping
was the much improved vote by which the As-
sembly extended for another year the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle
East. This resolution provides for sharing
the cost of UNEF along the lines of the model
scale of assessments embodied in the
Canadian resolution.
15. Financing
As of the date of this report, it is also to be
regretted that the Soviet Union and France,
both of whom have refused to pay assess-
ments on past peacekeeping operations, have
still not made the substantial voluntary con-
tributions which were contemplated in the
consensus arrived at last year and which are
necessary to restore the United Nations to
financial health.
16. Population Growth
For the first time, the General Assembly
specifically recognized and took concrete ac-
tion on the urgent and important problem of
rapidly expanding pvopulations and their
pressure both on limited food supplies and on
other requirements of economic and social
progress. At the request of member states.
United Nations agencies are now authorized
to train population control experts. The
United States, which has a deep interest in
world food supplies and in the development
of nations, strongly supported this resolution.
We hope its adoption will encourage nations
in which this problem exists to move more
energetically to solve it.
17. iVIarine Resources
On the initiative of the United States, the
Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote
a resolution to promote international coopera-
tion in the study and development of marine
resources, including very great untapped pro-
tein resources of the oceans, which are likely
to play an increasing part in the world's food
supplies.
18. Capital Development Resolution
Over the dissenting votes of the United
States and the other major capital-exporting
countries, the Assembly adopted a resolution
to establish a United Nations capital develop-
ment fund which is supix)sed to begin func-
tioning in 1968. Such a fund would duplicate
longstanding and more soundly designed
machinery for international capital assist-
ance. It is most unlikely that enough funds
will be forthcoming to put this fund into
operation. This resolution demonstrates anew
JANUARY 16, 1967
101
that economic decisions taken even by larg-e
majorities are sterile unless they include the
concurrence of those who must furnish the
resources.
19. International Law
The Assembly acted to strengthen interna-
tional law in two significant areas. It estab-
lished a Commission on International Trade
Law to unify and hannonize divergent na-
tional laws in this important field. And it
decided to convene a major international
conference in 1968 and 1969 to draft a
"treaty on treaties," a set of rules governing
the law of treaties, their validity, interpre-
tation, and effect. Both these steps are of
great potential significance for the develop-
ment of the rule of law among nations.
IMCO Subcommittee Recommends
New Passenger-Ship Standards
Press release 300 dated December 23
A further significant step has been taken
in the improvement of international stand-
ards for the safety of passeng-er ships: The
Subcommittee on Fire Protection of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) has successfully com-
pleted its assignment to recommend new fire
safety standards for future ships before the
end of 1966. This work supplements activi-
ties which culminated in November on meas-
ures to improve fire safety in existing ships
following recent disastrous casualties caused
by fire at sea.^
In its third and final session, held in
London, the committee considered many
specific problems in fire protection, including
crew training and equipment for firefighting.
ships cariying motor vehicles with fuel in
their tanks, fire insulation of bulkheads and
decks, and the precautions to be taken in the
design of machinery spaces.
Eighteen countries took part in the dis-
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966,
p. 965.
cussions. The chief product of the com-
mittee's work is a body of proposed regula-
tions on a new unified method of fire
protection, detection, and extinction in
passenger ships to be built in future.
The proposed new method permits two
vai'iants for fire protection, detection, and
extinction in the accommodation and service
spaces of future passenger ships. These
variants may be described broadly as follows:
(a) Within the main zone fire-resist-
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided
by incombustible fire-retarding divisions, and
an automatic fire detection and fire alarm
system will be provided.
(b) Within the main zone fire-resist-
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided
by incombustible divisions which may have
a lesser degree of fire integrity than is
required for variant (a) above, and an auto-
matic sprinkler and fire detection and fire
alarm system will be provided.
The committee agreed that each of these
variants would provide an equal standard of
fire safety in passenger ships of the future.
The next stage will be consideration of
these proposals by IMCO's Maritime Safety
Committee in February 1967. Amendments
adopted by the Committee would receive final
consideration by the IMCO Assembly in
October 1967.
The United States delegation was headed
by Comdr. Robert I. Price, U.S. Coast
Guard.
Present Travel Restrictions
Extended Tlirough IVIarch 15
Press release 301 dated December 23
The State Department published in the
Federal Register dated December 16 an
amendment to the passport regulations ex-
tending all present area restrictions until
March 15, 1967, unless modified sooner.
The United States maintains passport
restrictions on travel by American citizens
to five areas: Albania, Cuba, and the
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Communist-controlled areas of Korea, China,
and Viet-Nam.
American passports are not valid for
travel to or through these areas. However,
they may be specially validated by the De-
pai'tment of State if the pros])ective traveler
shows that the purpose of his trip justifies
exception to tlie travel ban. The conditions
for such approval are set forth in the new
passport regulations published on October
20, 1966.'
The State Department can apply a travel
ban to a given country in only three situa-
tions: when that country is at war with the
United States, when amied hostilities are in
progress there, or when travel must be re-
stricted in the national interest because it
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S.
foreign affairs.
In years past the State Department
gi-anted only a few excei^tions to its travel
restrictions. Such exceptions as were made
generally were available only to applicants
in a limited number of occupations and pro-
fessions or for travel required for compelling
humanitarian reasons.
Gradually the policies have been revised
and the eligible categories broadened.
Now persons in certain professional and
occupational categories are entitled to special
validation of their passports when the pur-
pose of their travel is directly related to their
professional responsibilities. Included here
are newsmen, doctors and scientists in public
health, scholars with postgraduate degrees,
and American Red Cross representatives.
A second broad "discretionary" category
exists. At his discretion, and judging each
case individually on its merits, the Secretary
of State may make exceptions to the travel
restrictions for persons in cultural, athletic,
commercial, educational, professional, or
other fields or in public affairs, as well as
for persons who will be writing or reporting
for ])ublic media about their travels although
they are not professional reporters.
In these discretionary categories the State
Department will take several factors into
consideration in making its decision. One is
the potential benefit to the United States of
the pi-oposed visit, another the applicant's
need to make the visit, and a third the cur-
rent situation with regard to the area to be
visited.
Similar categories and considerations are
applied to resident aliens applying for per-
mission to travel to a restricted area under
22 CFR 46.5(e).
Violation of the travel restrictions — that
is, traveling- to one of the restricted areas
without proper validation or without pass-
port— is grounds for the State Department
to revoke or cancel the violator's passport.
Such infraction may also be punishable un-
der Federal law (8 U.S.C. 1185 and/or 18
U.S.C. 1544).
No further passport will be issued to the
violator until the Secretary of State receives
formal assurance and is satisfied that the
person will not again violate travel restric-
tions.
The Department's ix)wer to regulate the
passport field goes back to early days of our
nation and has been i-eflected in congres-
sional legislation for more than a century.
The restrictions help to assure that ordi-
nary American citizens will not become in-
nocent victims of the hostile policies of for-
eign powers in areas where our Government
can offer little protection.
These measures may also have important
effects in promoting the U.S. national in-
terest and achieving our foreign policy goals.
For example, in accordance with the resolu-
tions of the Organization of American
States and the judgment of that body that
the Communist regime in Cuba is openly
committed to subversion in the hemisphere,
U.S. policy toward Cuba has been one of
political, economic, and social isolation. Our
travel restrictions to this area have been
an important element in this policy.
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 723.
JANUARY 16, 1967
103
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Human Rights
On December 16 the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly unanimously adopted the
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Interyiational
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with
an optional protocol. Following is a state-
ment made in Committee III (Social,
Humanitarian and Cultural) by U.S. Alter-
nate Representative Patricia R. Harris on
December 12, together with the texts of the
hrcman rights covenants.
STATEMENT BY MRS. HARRIS
U.S. delegation press release 6008
The United States delegation has voted in
favor of the international covenants on
human rights because we beheve that after
20 years of consideration, the United Nations
must, in 1966, move forward in promulgating
a broadly acceptable codification of human
rights.
The covenants represent the culmination of
almost 20 years of work on what was de-
signed to be an international bill of rights.
The historical importance of the first step in
that process — the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ' — is well known. Concluding
steps have been taken by our committee
today.
It is appropriate that preparation of the
covenants has been concluded at the time
when we are about to mark the 18th anni-
versary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
However, while the Universal Declaration
is an authoritative statement of principle, it
is not a binding legal agreement. The inter-
national covenants on himian rights testify to
our efforts to translate the principles set
forth in the Universal Declaration into rights
recognized in law. The importance of such
efforts cannot be overemphasized if we are to
fulfill the hope voiced by Eleanor Roosevelt
when she said that the Universal Declaration
might well become the "international Magna
Carta of all mankind." ^
Nonetheless, the United States delegation
has, from the beginning of our deliberations
on these covenants, voiced doubts about the
formulation of certain ideas, which in their
final form continue to cause us grave con-
cern. I would like to explain our votes and set
forth our understanding of various provisions
in the covenants.
Throughout, the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights speaks of "rights"
that in fact are objectives which no govern-
ment, no matter what its human and financial
resources, could implement immediately upon
assuming the obligation to insure them. This
is recognized in ai-ticle 2, paragraph 1, which
contains qualifying language to the effect
that each state party "undertakes to take
steps . . . with a view to achieving progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means. . . ."
Article 2, paragraph 1, also speaks of an
undertaking by states parties "to take steps,
individually and through international assist-
ance and co-operation especially economic
' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1948, p. 752.
■ Ibid., p. 751.
104
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and technical, to the maximum of its avail-
able resources. . . ." My Government is
liledged to international economic and social
cooperation under the Charter of the United
Nations, and it vigorously suppoi-ts efforts to
cooperate with other nations, particularly
with the developing nations. Its record in ex-
tending assistance through international co-
operation speaks for itself. Article 2, para-
graph 1, however, might be construed by
some to impose a foiTnal legal obligation upon
the states jiarties to give economic, technical,
or other assistance. We must reject such an
interpretation. In our view, it is not appro-
])riate to specify in a covenant on human
rights and in such detail the forms which
international cooperation might take.
"Double Standard" Unacceptable
The most discriminatory provision in the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is article 2, paragraph 3, which was
adopted by this committee by a vote of 41 in
favor, 38 against, and 21 abstentions. Para-
graph 3 provides that developing countries
may determine the extent to which they
would guarantee the economic rights recog-
nized in the covenant to nonnationals.
The covenant should not contain a pro-
vision such as this, which authorizes in vir-
tually unqualified terms discriminatory
treatment of nonnationals by a certain group
of states parties. Paragraph 3 creates a
vague double standard between developing
and developed countries and is difficult to
reconcile with the spirit of universality of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
paragraph is also inconsistent with accepted
principles of international law. It runs coun-
ter to the undertaking of states parties in
paragraph 2 of the same article "to guarantee
that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without dis-
crimination of any kind. . . ."
Furthermore, paragraph 3 seems to imply
that developed countries may not distinguish
between their own nationals and aliens,
whereas there is a generally accepted inter-
national practice to make certain distinctions
between nationals and aliens, with due i-e-
gard to international law.
If such a provision was to be included in
the covenant, it should have recognized that
all states have the right to make the deter-
mination, not merely "developing countries"
— a term, incidentally, not yet defined in the
covenant — and should have reflected the re-
quirement that states parties, in making such
a determination, have due regard to inter-
national law.
Madam Chairman, I have already men-
tioned the narrow vote by which paragraph
3 of article 2 was adopted. My delegation
voted against the paragraph in this commit-
tee, and we still find it unacceptable.
My delegation wishes also to point out that
we have a continuing concern about article
25 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which is repeated as article
47 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. My Government fully supports the
principle expressed therein, namely, that
peiTnanent sovereignty over natural wealth
and resources is an inherent right of all
peoples and an essential element of the
sovereign equality of states. However, article
1, paragraph 2, of the covenant provides the
effective substantive formulation on this
question, and it cannot be impaired by article
25, as many other delegations have said, in-
cluding some of the sponsors of article 25.
In addition, this repetition of the principle
of article 1, paragraph 2, has no valid place
among the implementation clauses.
Madam Chairman, we joined other dele-
gations in voting in favor of the civil and
political covenant and the optional protocol
annexed thereto. This vital document defines
civil and political rights and obligations
which states undertake to respect and insure
upon becoming parties to the covenant. Its
implementation machinery provides for in-
suring respect for the covenant in three ways:
states parties are to submit reports for con-
sideration by the Human Rights Committee
established under the covenant; a conciliation
mechanism is available to assist in settling
differences among states parties regarding
respect for the covenant, provided that the
JANUARY 16, 1967
105
states parties concerned have made a declara-
tion accepting the procedure; and the optional
protocol enables a state paity to agree that
individuals subject to its jurisdiction may
submit communications to the Human Rights
Committee established by the covenant re-
garding alleged violations by that state of the
rights set forth in the covenant.
My delegation voted for the optional proto-
col because we think that those states parties
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which are prepared to do so should have the
opportunity to accept the right of individual
petition beyond their national frontiers.
Freedom of Speech in U.S.
We applaud many of the provisions of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, par-
ticularly the confii-mation of the right to lib-
erty and security of person, the right to a free
and fair trial, and freedom of association.
On the other hand, article 20 of that
covenant provides for the prohibition by law
of "any propaganda for war" and "any advo-
cacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence."
One of the principles embodied in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the covenant is freedom of speech. It is the
view of the United States that article 20 of
the covenant does not obligate a state to take
any action that would i)rohibit its citizens
from freely and fully expressing their views
on any subject, no matter how obnoxious they
may be or whether they are in accord with
government policy or not. The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized the distinc-
tion between "advocacy of abstract doctrine
and advocacy directed at promoting unlawi'ul
action." In our view, therefore, a state should
not act under article 20 unless the dissemina-
tion of the obnoxious ideas mentioned therein
is accompanied by, or threatens imminently
to promote, illegal acts. Under our law, there
must be an imminent danger of illegal action
before speech becomes unlaud'ul. We have
similar problems with articles 19 and 21,
which fall below the standards established by
our Constitution and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
Article 5, common to both covenants, ex-
pressly provides that there shall be no re-
striction upon or derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or
existing in any state on the pretext that the
covenant does not recognize such rights or
that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. My
Government is particularly pleased with the
inclusion of these provisions, since the consti-
tutional protection of human rights in the
United States is truly extensive and compre-
hensive, in large measure l>ecause of the con-
stant vigilance of our citizens. In respect of
many rights guaranteed in the covenant, the
standard established by law in the United
States is higher than that in the covenant,
and no action under this covenant could re-
strict the enjoyment of any right enjoyed in
the United States.
The United States understands that none
of the three instruments which the committee
has adopted would impose an obligation on
any state party to take measures not fully
consistent with its own constitutional guaran-
tees or with established constitutional
framework of federal-state relationships.
To summarize the position of my delega-
tion, I would say simply that, in each instance
where we question these instruments, our
concern is that they do not go far enough in
protecting the rights of all individuals. Our
fear is that some may see opportunities for
and support of discriminatory action detri-
mental to the achievement of the very rights
guaranteed in the covenants.
Madam Chairman, there can be no doubt,
whatever may be the concern which any of
us may express about particular portions of
these instruments, that we are participating
in an historic moment. The adoption of these
covenants and the protocol by this committee
will stand as a watershed of human rights
development.
My delegation is convinced that we face a
new day in which no government and no
people can be free of a sense of obligation to
meet the demands of the standards of human
freedom enumerated in these covenants. The
106
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States has from its inception imposed
upon itself the highest standards, and we
welcome the opportunity both to test and to
enhance that standard in the context of the
promulgation of the human rights covenants.
Although none of our votes, including that
of my delegation, carries any implication
with regard to signature or ratification of the
covenants, it can safely be said that the com-
pletion of these covenants and, hopefully,
their early entry into force will add a new
dimension to the protection of the rights of
man.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS^
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world.
Recognizing that these rights derive from the in-
herent dignity of the human person.
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want
can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and
cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms.
Realizing that the individual, having duties to
other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and observance of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
Part I
Article 1
1. ^11 peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of the right they freely determine their
' U.N. doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (Annex) ; adopted
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16.
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dis-
pose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the princi-
ple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the pre.sent Covenant, in-
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-
tration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in con-
formity with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter.
Part II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to take steps, individually and through in-
ternational assistance and co-operation especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its avail-
able resources, with a view to achieving progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated
in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human
rights and their national economy, may determine
to what extent they would guarantee the economic
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-
nationals.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant under-
take to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural
rights set forth in this Covenant.
Article U
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize that in the enjoyment of those rights provided
by the State in conformity with the present Cove-
nant, the State may subject such rights only to such
limitations as are determined by law only in so far
as this may be compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person,
any right to engage in any activity or to perform
JANUARY 16, 1967
107
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres-
ent Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of
the fundamental human rights recognized or existing
in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regula-
tions or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that
the present Covenant does not recognize such rights
or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
Part III
Article G
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right to work, which includes the right
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by
work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of
this right shall include technical and vocational guid-
ance and training programmes, policies and tech-
niques to achieve steady economic, social and cul-
tural development and full and productive employ-
ment under conditions safeguarding fundamental
political and economic freedoms to the individual.
Article 7
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just
and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in
particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers as
a minimum vdth:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work
of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work ; and
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their
families in accordance with the provisions of the
present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be pro-
moted in his employment to an appropriate higher
level, subject to no considerations other than those
of seniority and competence;
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of
working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as
well as remuneration for public holidays.
Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to ensure :
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions
and join the trade union of his choice subject only
to the rules of the organization concerned, for the
promotion and protection of his economic and social
interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exer-
cise of this right other than those prescribed by law
and which are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public order or
for the protection of the rights and freedom of
others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish na-
tional federations or confederations and the right
of the latter to form or join international trade-
union organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely
subject to no limitations other than those pre-
scribed by law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or
public order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exer-
cised in conformity with the laws of the particular
country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, or of the police, or of
the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States
Parties to the International Labour Convention of
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Rights to Organize to take legislative measures
which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a
manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided
for in that Convention.
Article 9
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone to social security includ-
ing social insurance.
Article 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize that:
1. The widest possible protection and assistance
should be accorded to the family, which is the nat-
ural and fundamental group unit of society, particu-
larly for its establishment and while it is responsible
for the care and education of dependent children.
Marriage must be entered into with the free consent
of the intending spouses;
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers
during a reasonable period before and after child-
birth. During such period working mothers should
be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social
security benefits;
3. Special measures of protection and assistance
should be taken on behalf of all children and young
persons without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage or other conditions. Children and young
persons should be protected from economic and social
exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to
their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely
to hamper their normal development should be pun-
108
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ishable by law. States should also set age limits
below which the paid employment of child labour
should be prohibited and punishable by law.
Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, .and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-opera-
tion based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant,
recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger, shall take, individually and
through international co-operation, the measures, in-
cluding specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, consei-va-
tion and distribution of food by making full use of
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by de-
veloping or refoiTning agrarian systems in such a
way as to achieve the most efficient development and
utilization of natural resources ; and
(b) Take into account the problems of both food-
importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure
an equitable distribution of world food supplies in
relation to need.
Article 12
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization
of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the still-
birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the
healthy development of the child ;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environ-
mental and industrial hygiene ;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epi-
demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure
to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness.
Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to education. They
agree that education shall be directed to the full
development of the human personality and the sense
of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They fur-
ther agree that education shall enable all persons to
participate efltectively in a free society, promote un-
derstanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups,
and further the activities of the United Nations for
the maintenance of peace.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize that, with a view to achieving the full
realization of this right :
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and
available free to all ;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms,
including technical and vocational secondary educa-
tion, shall be made generally available and accessible
to all by every appropriate means, and in particular
by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally ac-
cessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the pro-
gressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged
or intensified as far as possible for those persons
"who have not received or completed the whole period
of their primary education ;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all
levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellow-
ship system shall be established, and the material
conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously im-
proved.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to choose for
their children schools other than those established
by the public authorities which conform to such
minimum educational standards as may be laid down
or approved by the State and to ensure the religious
and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions.
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as
to interfere with the liberty of individuals and
bodies to establish and direct educational institu-
tions, subject always to the observance of the prin-
ciples set forth in paragraph 1 and to the require-
ment that the education given in such institutions
shall conform to such minimum standards as may
be laid down by the State.
Article H
Each State Party to the present Covenant which,
at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able
to secure in its metropolitan territory or other ter-
ritories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary
education, free of charge, undertakes, within two
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of
action for the progressive implementation, within
a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the
plan, of the principle of compulsory education free
of charge for all.
Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone :
JANUARY 16, 1967
109
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization
of this right shall include those necessary for the
conservation, the development and the diffusion of
science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for
scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the benefits to be derived from the encour-
agement and development of international contacts
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.
Part IV
Article 16
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit in confoiTnity with this part of
the Covenant reports on the measures which they
have adopted and the progress made in achieving
the observance of the rights recognized herein.
2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations who shall trans-
mit copies to the Economic and Social Council for
consideration in accordance with the provisions of
the present Covenant.
(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall also transmit to the specialized agencies copies
of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom,
from States Parties to the present Covenant which
are also members of these specialized agencies in so
far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to
any matters which fall within the responsibilities of
the said agencies in accordance with their constitu-
tional instniments.
Article 17
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance
with a programme to be established by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council within one year of the
entry into force of the present Covenant after con-
sultation with the States Parties and the specialized
agencies concerned.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difiicultios
affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations
under the present Covenant.
3. Where relevant information has previously been
furnished to the United Nations or to any special-
ized ageticy by any State Party to the i)resent Co\-
enant it will not be necessary to reproduce that
infoi-mation but a precise reference to the informa-
tion so furnished will .suffice.
Article 18
Pur.suant to its re.sponsibilities under the Charter
in the field of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, the Economic and Social Council may make
arrangements with the specialized agencies in re-
spect of their reporting to it on the progress made
in achieving the observance of the provisions of the
present Covenant falling within the scope of their
activities. These reports may include particulars of
decisions and recommendations on such implementa-
tion adopted by their competent organs.
Article 19
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to
the Commission on Human Rights for study and
general recommendation or as appropriate for infor-
mation the reports concerning human rights sub-
mitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and
17, and those concerning human rights submitted by
the specialized agencies in accordance with arti-
cle 18.
Article 20
The States Parties to the present Covenant and
the specialized agencies concerned may submit com-
ments to the Economic and Social Council on any
general recommendation under article 19 or ref-
erence to such general recommendation in any report
of the Commission or any documentation referred to
therein.
Article 21
The Economic and Social Council may submit
from time to time to the General Assembly reports
with recommendations of a general nature and a
summary of the information received from the
States Parties to the present Covenant and the spe-
cialized agencies on the measures taken and the
progress made in achieving general observance of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Article 22
The Economic and Social Council may bring to
the attention of other organs of the United Nations,
their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies con-
cerned with furnishing technical assistance, any
matters arising out of the reports referred to in
this part of the present Covenant which may assist
such bodies in deciding each within its field of com-
petence, on the advisability of international meas-
ures likely to contribute to the effective progressive
implementation of the present Covenant.
Article 23
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree
that international action for the achievement of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant includes
such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the
adoption of i-ecommendalions, the furnishing of tech-
nical assistance and the holding of regional meetings
and technical meetings for the purpose of consulta-
110
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BILLETIN
tion and study organized in conjunction with the
Governments concerned.
Article 3i
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of
the specialized agencies which define the respective
responsibilities of the various organs of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to
the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 25
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples
to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources.
Part V
Article 26
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by
any State Member of the United Nations or member
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State
Party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State which has been
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession
by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall infoi-m all States which have signed the pres-
ent Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each
instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 27
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument
of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession,
the present Covenant shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit of its own in-
strument of ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 28
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-
tations or exceptions.
Article 29
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may
propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations shall thereupon commu-
nicate any proposed amendments to the States
Parties to the present Covenant with a request that
they notify him whether they favour a conference of
States Parties for the purpose of considering and
voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least
one third of the States Parties favours such a con-
ference the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene the conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a
majority of the States Parties present and voting
at the conference shall be submitted to the General
Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they
have been approved by the General Assembly and
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have ac-
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any
earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 30
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti-
cle 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall infoiTn all States referred to
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following
particulars :
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under
article 26;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present
Covenant under article 27 and the date of the entry
into force of any amendments under article 29.
Article 31
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove-
nant to all States referred to in article 26.
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the
inherent dignity of the human person,
JANUARY 16, 1967
111
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom
and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as
his economic, social and cultural rights.
Considering the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms.
Realizing that the individual, having duties to
other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and observance of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles :
Part I
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of the right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their ovm ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources with-
out prejudice to any obligations arising out of inter-
national economic co-operation, based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, in-
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-
tration of Non-Self-Goveraing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in con-
formity with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter.
Part II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.
2. Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the neces-
sary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other meas-
ures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity ;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative au-
thorities, or by any other competent authority pro-
vided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant under-
take to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
forth in the present Covenant.
Article i
1. In time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the pres-
ent Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situ-
ation, provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with their other obligations under interna-
tional law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this
provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant avail-
ing itself of the right of derogation shall inform
immediately the other States Parties to the present
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations of the provisions
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by
which it was actuated. A further communication
shall be made, through the same intermediary, on
the date on which it terminates such derogation.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres-
ent Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or deroga-
tion from any of the fundamental human rights
recognized or existing in any State Party to the
present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regu-
lations or custom on the pretext that the present
Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it
recognizes them to a lesser extent.
112
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Part III
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime and
not contrary to the provisions of the present Cove-
nant and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judge-
ment rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime
of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this
article shall authorize any State Party to the pres-
ent Covenant to derogate in any way from any obli-
gation assumed under the provisions of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence
of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay
or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by
any State Party to the present Covenant.
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In
particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and
the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced
or compulsory labour ;
(b) The preceding sub-paragraph shall not be
held to preclude in countries where imprisonment
with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment
for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pur-
suance of a sentence to such punishment by a com-
petent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term
"forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in sub-
paragraph (b), normally required of a person who
is under detention in consequence of a lawful order
of a court, or of a person during conditional release
from such detention ;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in
countries where conscientious objection is recognized,
any national service required by law of conscientious
objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or
calamity threatening the life or well-being of the
community ;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of
normal civil obligations.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at
the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and
shall be promptly informed of any charges against
him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reason-
able time or to release. It shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution
of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
before a court, in order that such court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right
to compensation.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional
circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons,
and shall be subject to separate treatment appropri-
ate to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated
from adults and brought as speedily as possible for
adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treat-
ment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall
be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Ju-
venile offenders shall be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and
legal status.
Article 11
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
JANUARY 16, 1967
113
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a
State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his resi-
dence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order ("ordre public"), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.
Article 13
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State
Party to the present Covenant may be expelled
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached
in accordance with law and shall, except where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise
require, be allowed to submit the reasons against
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and
be represented for the purpose before, the compe-
tent authority or a person or persons especially
designated by the competent authority.
Article H
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial
for reasons of morals, public order ("ordre public")
or national security in a democratic society, or when
the interest of the private lives of the parties so re-
quires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;
but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or
in a .suit at law shall be made public except where
the interest of juveniles otherwise requires or the
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the
guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the follow-
ing minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of the nature and
cause of the charge against him ;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and ex-
amination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter
if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself,
or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of juveniles, the procedure shall be
such as will take account of their age and the de-
sirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the
right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed
by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been
convicted of a criminal offence and when subse-
quently his conviction has been reversed or he has
been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly
discovered fact shows conclusively that there has
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction
shall be compensated according to law, unless it is
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact
in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished
again for an offence for which he has already been
finally convicted or acquitted in accordance vnth the
law and penal procedure of each country.
Article 15
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was commit-
ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time when the crimi-
nal offence was committed. If, subsequently to the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law
for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender
shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial
and punishment of any person for any act or omis-
sion which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.
Article 16
Evei-yone shall have the right to recognition every-
where as a person before the law.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or un-
lawful interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom either individually
or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
may be subject only to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of par-
ents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to ensure
the religious and moral education of their children
in confoiinity with their own convictions.
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writ-
ing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in the
foregoing paragraph carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as
are provided by law and are necessary, (1) for re-
spect of the rights or reputations of others, (2) for
the protection of national security or of public order
("ordre public"), or of public health or morals.
Article 20
1. Any pi'opaganda for war shall be prohibited by
law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recog-
nized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise
of this right other than those imposed in conformity
with the law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order ("ordre public"), the pro-
tection of public health or morals or the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
association with others, including the right to foiTn
and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise
of this right other than those prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public
order ("ordre public"), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent
the imposition of lawful re.strictions on members of
the anned forces and of the police in their exercise
of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States
Parties to the International Labour Convention of
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise to take legislative measures
which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such
a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided
for in the Convention.
Article 23
1. The family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable
age to marry and to found a family shall be recog-
nized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the
free and full consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall
take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights
and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, dur-
ing marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of
dissolution, provision shall be made for the neces-
sary protection of any children.
Article 2J^
1. Every child shall have, wthout any discrimina-
tion as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, na-
tional or social origin, property or birth, the right
to such measures of protection as required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, the
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have a name.
3. Evei-y child has the right to acquire a na-
tionality.
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the oppor-
tunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
JANUARY 16, 1967
115
directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guarantee-
ing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality,
to public service in his country.
Article S6
All persons are equal before the law and are en-
titled without any discrimination to equal protection
of the law. In this respect the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in com-
munity with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, or to use their own language.
Part IV
Article 28
1. There shall be established a Human Rights
Committee (hereafter referred to in the present
Covenant as "the Committee"). It shall consist of
eighteen members and shall carry out the functions
hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals
of the States Parties to the present Covenant who
shall be persons of high moral character and recog-
nized competence in the field of human rights, con-
sideration being given to the usefulness of the par-
ticipation of some persons having legal experience.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected
and shall serve in their personal capacity.
Article 29
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected
by secret ballot from a list of persons possessing the
qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated
for the purpose by the States Parties to the present
Covenant.
2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may
nominate not more than two persons. These persons
shall be nationals of the nominating State.
3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.
Article SO
1. The initial election shall be held no later than
six months after the date of the entry into force of
the present Covenant.
2. At least four months before the date of each
election of the Committee, other than an election to
fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
address a written invitation to the States Parties to
the present Covenant to submit their nominations
for membership of the Committee within three
months.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the
persons thus nominated, with an indication of the
States Parties which have nominated them, and
shall submit it to the States Parties to the present
Covenant no later than one month before the date
of each election.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee
shall be held at a meeting of the States Parties to
the present Covenant convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations at the Headquarters
of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which
two thirds of the States Parties to the present Cove-
nant shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected
to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain
the largest number of votes and an absolute major-
ity of the votes of the representatives of States
Parties present and voting.
Article 31
1. The Committee may not include more than one
national of the same State.
2. In the election of the Committee consideration
shall be given to equitable geographical distribution
of membership and to the representation of the dif-
ferent forms of civilization as well as of the princi-
pal legal systems.
Article 32
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected
for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for
re-election if renominated. However, the terms of
nine of the members elected at the first election
shall expire at the end of two years; immediately
after the first election the names of these nine mem-
bers shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the
meeting referred to in paragraph 4 of article 30.
2. Elections at the expiry of oflice shall be held
in accordance with the preceding articles of this
part of the present Covenant.
Article 33
1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other mem-
bers, a member of the Committee has ceased to
carry out his functions for any cause other than
absence of a temporary character, the ChaiiTnan of
the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of
the United Nations who shall then declare the seat
of that member to be vacant.
2. In the event of the death or the resignation of
a member of the Committee, the Chairman shall im-
mediately notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations who shall declare the seat vacant from the
date of death or the date on which the resignation
takes effect.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Article Si
1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with
article 33 and if the temi of office of the member to
be replaced does not expire within six months of the
declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall notify each of the States
Parties to the present Covenant which may within
two months submit nominations in accordance with
article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the per-
sons thus nominated and shall submit it to the
States Parties to the present Covenant. The election
to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accord-
ance with the relevant provisions of this part of the
present Covenant.
3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a
vacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shall
hold ofl^ce for the remainder of the term of the
member who vacated the seat on the Committee
under the provisions of that article.
Article 35
The members of the Committee shall, with the
approval of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations
resources on such terms and conditions as the Gen-
eral Assembly may decide having regard to the
importance of the Committee's responsibilities.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
provide the necessary staff and facilities for the
eflFective perfonnance of the functions of the Com-
mittee under this Covenant.
Article 37
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at
the Headquarters of the United Nations.
2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall
meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules
of procedure.
3. The Committee shall normally meet at the
Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United
Nations Office at Geneva.
Article 38
Every member of the Committee shall, before tak-
ing up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open
committee that he will perform his functions im-
partially and conscientiously.
Article 39
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term
of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of
procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia,
that:
(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by
a majoi-ity vote of the members present.
Article UO
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit reports on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recog-
nized herein and on the progress made in the enjoy-
ment of those rights; (a) within one year of the
entry into force of the present Covenant for the
States Parties concerned and (b) thereafter when-
ever the Committee so requests.
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations who shall transmit
them to the Committee for consideration. Reports
shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any,
affecting the implementation of the present Cove-
nant.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
may after consultation with the Committee transmit
to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such
parts of the reports as may fall within their field of
competence.
4. The Committee shall study the reports submit-
ted by the States Parties to the present Covenant.
It shall transmit its reports and such general com-
ments as it may consider appropriate to the States
Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the
Economic and Social Council these comments along
with the copies of the reports it has received from
States Parties to the present Covenant.
5. The States Parties to the pi-esent Covenant may
submit to the Committee observations on any com-
nients that may be made in accordance with para-
graph 4 of this article.
Article Ul
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at
any time declare under this article that it recognizes
the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State
Party claims that another State Party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the present Covenant.
Communications under this article may be received
and considered only if submitted by a State Party
which has made a declaration recognizing in regard
to itself the competence of the Committee. No com-
munication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party which has not made such a
declaration. Communications received under this ar-
ticle shall be dealt with in accordance with the
following procedure:
(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant con-
siders that another State Party is not giving effect
to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may,
by written communication, bring the matter to the
attention of that State Party. Within three months
after the receipt of the communication, the receiving
State shall afford the State which sent the commu-
JANUARY 16, 1967
117
nication an explanation or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter, which should include,
to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to
domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending,
or available in the matter.
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfac-
tion of both States Parties concerned within six
months after the receipt by the receiving State of
the initial communication, either State shall have
the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by
notice given to the Committee and to the other
State.
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter re-
ferred to it only after it has ascertained that all
available domestic remedies have been invoked and
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the
generally recognized principles of international law.
This shall not be the rule where the application of
the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings
when examining communications under this article.
(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph
(c), the Committee shall make available its good
offices to the States Parties concerned with a view
to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis
of respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms as recognized in this Covenant.
(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee
may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred
to in sub-paragraph (b), to supply any relevant
infoiTnation.
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in
sub-paragraph (b), shall have the right to be repre-
sented when the matter is being considered in the
Committee and to make submissions orally and/or
in writing.
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months
after the date of receipt of notice under sub-para-
graph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of sub-para-
graph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine
its report to a brief statement of the facts and of
the solution reached ;
(ii) If a solution is not reached, within the tei-ms
of sub-paragraph (e), the Committee shall confine
its report to a brief statement of the facts; the
written submissions and record of the oral submis-
sions made by the States Parties concerned shall be
attached to the report.
In every matter the report shall be communicated
to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into
force when ten States Parties to the present Cove-
nant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of
this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by
the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations who shall transmit copies thereof
to the other States Parties. A declaration may be
withdravim at any time by notification to the Secre-
tary-Greneral. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice
the considei'ation of any matter which is the subject
of a communication already transmitted under this
article; no further communication by any State
Party shall be received after the notification of
vidthdrawal of the declaration has been received by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations unless
the State Party concerned had made a new declara-
tion.
Article 42
1. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in
accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the
Committee may, with the prior consent of the States
Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Com-
mission"). The good offices of the Commission shall
be made available to the States Parties concerned
with a view to an amicable solution of the matter
on the basis of respect for the present Covenant;
(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons
acceptable to the States Parties concerned. If the
States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement
within three months on all or part of the composi-
tion of the Commission the members of the Commis-
sion concerning whom no agreement was reached
shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds
majority vote of the Committee from among its
members.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in
their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals
of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not
party to the present Covenant, or of a State Party
which has not made a declaration under article 41.
3. The Commission shall elect its ovm Chairman
and adopt its own rules of procedure.
4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally
be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations
or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However,
they may be held at such other convenient places as
the Commission may determine in consultation with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the
States Parties concerned.
5. The secretariat provided in accordance with
article 36 shall also service the Commissions ap-
pointed under this article.
6. The information received and collated by the
Committee shall be made available to the Commis-
sion and the Commission may call upon the States
Parties concerned to supply any other relevant in-
formation.
7. When the Commission has fully considered the
matter, but in any event not later than twelve
months after having been seized of the matter, it
shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a
report for communication to the States Parties con-
cerned.
118
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its
consideration of the matter within twelve months, it
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
status of its consideration of the matter.
(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on the
basis of respect for human rights as recognized in
the present Covenant is reached, the Commission
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts and of the solution reached.
(c) If a solution within the terms of sub-para-
graph (b) is not reached, the Commission's report
shall embody its findings on all questions of fact
relevant to the issues between the States Parties
concerned, as well as its views on the possibilities of
amicable solution of the matter. This report shall
also contain the written submissions and a record
of the oral submissions made by the States Parties
concerned.
(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under
sub-paragraph (c), the States Parties concerned
shall, within three months of the receipt of the
report, infonn the Chairman of the Committee
whether or not they accept the contents of the report
of the Commission.
8. The provisions of this article are without prej-
udice to the responsibilities of the Committee under
article 41.
9. The States Parties concerned shall share
equally all the expenses of the members of the Com-
mission in accordance with estimates to be provided
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the mem-
bers of the Commission, if necessary, before reim-
bursement by the States Parties concerned in ac-
cordance with paragraph 9 of this article.
Article 1,3
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc
conciliation commissions which may be appointed
under article 41, shall be entitled to the facilities,
privileges and immunities of experts on mission for
the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sec-
tions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations.
Article 4-4
The provisions for the implementation of the pres-
ent Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the
procedures prescribed in the field of human rights
by or under the constituent instruments and the con-
ventions of the United Nations and of the special-
ized agencies and shall not prevent the States Par-
ties to the present Covenant from having recourse
to other procedures for settling a dispute in accord-
ance with general or special international agree-
ments in force between them.
Article Ji.5
The Committee shall submit to the General As-
sembly, through the Economic and Social Council,
an annual report on its activities.
Part V
Article U6
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the
specialized agencies which define the respective re-
sponsibilities of the various organs of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard
to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 1,7
Nothing in the Covenant shall be interpreted as
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy
and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources.
Part VI
Article 18
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by
any State Member of the United Nations or member
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State
Party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State which has been
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to acces-
sion by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall inform all States which have signed this Cove-
nant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instru-
ment of ratification or accession.
Article i9
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
thirty-fifth instiniment of ratification or instrument
of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-
fifth instniment of ratification or instrument of ac-
cession, the present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit of its own
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 50
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-
tations or exceptions.
JANUARY 16, 1967
119
Article 51
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may
propose an amendment and file it with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall thereupon
communicate any proposed amendments to the
States Parties to the present Covenant with a re-
quest that they notify him whether they favour a
conference of States Parties for the purpose of con-
sidering' and voting upon the proposal. In the event
that at least one third of the States Parties favours
such a conference the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall convene the conference under
the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment
adopted by a majority of the States Parties pi-esent
and voting at the conference shall be submitted to
the General Assembly of the United Nations for
approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they
have been approved by the General Assembly and
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have ac-
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any
earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 52
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti-
cle 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall inform all States referred to
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following
particulars :
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under
article 48 ;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the pres-
ent Covenant under article 49 and the date of the
entry into force of any amendments under arti-
cle 51.
Article 53
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove-
nant to all States referred to in article 48.
Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that in order further to achieve the
purposes of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Covenant")
and the implementation of its provisions it would
be appropriate to enable the Human Rights Com-
mittee set up in part IV of the Covenant (herein-
after referred to as "the Committee") to receive and
consider, as provided in the present Protocol, com-
munications from individuals claiming to be victims
of violations of any of the rights set forth in the^
Covenant,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a
party to the present Protocol recognizes the compe-
tence of the Committee to receive and consider com-
munications from individuals, subject to its
jurisdiction, claiming to be victims of a violation by
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in
the Covenant. No communication shall be received
by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the
Covenant which is not a Party to the present Pro-
tocol.
Article 2
Subject to the provision of article 1, individuals
claiming that any of their rights enumerated in the
Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted
all available domestic remedies may submit a written
communication to the Committee for consideration.
Article 3
The Committee shall consider inadmissible any
communication under this Protocol which is anony-
mous, or which it considers to be an abuse of the
right of submission of such communications or to be
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.
Article i
1. Subject to the provisions of article 3, the Com-
mittee shall bring any communications submitted to
it under the present Protocol to the attention of the
State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be vio-
lating any provision of the Covenant.
2. Within six months, the receiving State shall
submit to the Committee written explanations or
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if
any, that may have been taken by that State.
Article 5
1. The Committee shall consider communications
received under the present Protocol in the light of
all written information made available to it by the
individual and by the State Party concerned.
2. The Committee shall not consider any communi-
cation from an individual unless it has ascertained
that:
(a) the same matter is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or
settlement ;
(b) the individual has exhausted all available
domestic i-emedies. This shall not be the rule where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably pro-
longed.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
3. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when
examining communications under the present Pro-
tocol.
4. The Committee shall forward its views to the
State Party concerned and to the individual.
Article 6
The Committee shall include in its annual report
under article 45 of the Covenant a summary of its
activities under the present Protocol.
Article 7
Pending the achievement of the objectives of Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December
1960 concerning the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the
provisions of the present Protocol shall in no way
limit the right of petition granted to these peoples
by the Charter of the United Nations and other
international conventions and instruments under the
United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Article 8
1. The present Protocol is open for signature by
any State which has signed the Covenant.
2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the
Covenant. Instruments of ratification shall be de-
posited vidth the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. The present Protocol shall be open to accession
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the
Covenant.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall inform all States which have signed the present
Protocol or acceded to it of the deposit of each in-
strument of ratification or accession.
Article 9
1. Subject to the entry into force of the Covenant,
the present Protocol shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations of the tenth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol
or acceding to it after the deposit of the tenth instru-
ment of ratification or instrument of accession, the
present Protocol shall enter into force three months
• after the date of the deposit of its own instrument
I of ratification or instrument of accession.
I Article 10
The provision of the present Protocol shall extend
to all parts of federal States without any limitations
or exceptions.
Article 11
1. Any State Party to the present Protocol may
propose an amendment and file it viath the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall thereupon com-
municate any proposed amendments to the States
Parties to the present Protocol with a request that
they notify him whether they favour a conference of
States Parties for the purpose of considering and
voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least
one third of the States Parties favours such a con-
ference the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene the conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a
majority of the States Parties present and voting at
the conference shall be submitted to the General
Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they
have been approved by the General Assembly and
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Protocol in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have
accepted them, other States Parties being still bound
by the provisions of the present Protocol and any
earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 12
1. Any State Party may denounce the present
Protocol at any time by written notification ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. Denunciation shall take effect three months
after the date of receipt of the notification by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Denunciation shall be without prejudice to the
continued application of the provisions of the present
Protocol to any communication submitted under
article 2 before the eff'ective date of denunciation.
Article 13
Irrespective of the notifications made under article
8, paragraph 5, of the present Protocol, the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations shall inform all
States referred to in article 48, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant of the following particulars:
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under
article 8 ;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the pres-
ent Protocol under article 9 and the date of the
entry into force of any amendments under article 11;
(c) Denunciations under article 12.
Article H
1. The present Protocol, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall transmit certified copies of the present Protocol
to all States referred to in article 48 of the
Covenant.
JANUARY 16, 1967
121
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Singa-
pore, December 14, 1966.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, December
19, 1966.'
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.^
Ratification deposited : Denmark, November 9, 1966.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I
and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II.
Acceptance deposited: Peru, December 21, 1966.
Approval deposited: Guatemala, December 28, 1966.
' Excluding Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Southern
Rhodesia, Brunei, Aden, Protectorate of South Ara-
bia, Kamaran, Kuria Muria Islands, and Perim.
" Not in force.
BILATERAL
Afghanistan
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C."^
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at
Kabul December 22, 1966. Entered into force
December 22, 1966.
Gambia
Agreement for the establishment of a Peace Corps
program in The Gambia. Effected by exchange of
notes at Bathurst November 26 and December 5,
1966. Entered into force December 5, 1966.
Iran
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C.
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at
Tehran December 20, 1966. Entered into force
December 20, 1966.
Italy
Agrreement amending the agreement of December 18,
1948, as amended (TIAS 1864, 3148, 3278, 4254),
for financing certain educational exchange pro-
grams. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome
October 5, 1966. Entered into force October 5,
1966.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the relinquishment to the
Philippines by the United States of its right to
the use of certain land areas within Camp John
Hay. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
December 13, 1966. Entered into force December
13, 1966.
Trinidad and Tobago
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to
taxes on income and the encouragement of inter-
national trade and investment. Signed at Port of
Spain December 22, 1966. Enters into force upon
the exchange of ratifications.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL LVI, NO. 1438
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concemingr treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
PUBLICATION 8185
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publi'ration issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addressee made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
Publications of the Department, United
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JANUARY 16, 1967
intendent of Documents. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 :
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
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note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.
122
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 16, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U38
Atomic Energy
Worldwide Nuclear Power — Progress and Prob-
lems (Seaborg) 90
Economic Affairs
IMCO Subcommittee Recommends New Passen-
ger-Ship Standards 102
Human Rights
U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Human
Rights (Harris, texts of covenants) .... 104
International Organizations and Conferences
IMCO Subcommittee Recommends New Pas-
senger-Ship Standards 102
Passports
Present Travel Restrictions Extended Through
March 15 102
Science
Worldwide Nuclear Power — Progress and Prob-
lems (Seaborg) 90
Treaty Information
Current Actions 122
United Nations
U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Hu-
man Rights (Harris, texts of covenants) . . 104
The Work of the 21st Session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly (Goldberg) 98
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J gg
Harris, Patricia R * jo4
Seaborg, Glenn T \ qq
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Dec. 26-Jan. 1
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 26 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos
300 and 301 of December 23.
No.
*303
Date
12/27
t304 12/29
t305
1306
12/29
12/31
Subject
Thompson sworn in as Ambas-
sador to the USSR (bio-
graphic details).
Goldberg: "International Law in
the United Nations."
U.S.-Japan fishery discussions.
Rusk: death of former Secre-
tary Christian A. Herter.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■ji-U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/28
Superintendent of Documents
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. USB
January 23, 1967
ECRETARY RUSK DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR 1967 ON "FACE THE NATION"
Transcript of Interview 126
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg HO
EUROPE AND AMERICA— PARTNERS IN TECHNOLOGY
by Ambassador George C. McGhee H8
1
For index see inside hack cover
Secretary Rusk Discusses Prospects for 1967
on "Face the Nation''
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk on the Columbia Broad-
casting System's television and radio pro-
gram "Face the Nation" on January 1.
Interviewing the Secretary were Martin
Agronsky and Marvin Kalb of CBS News
and Jesse L. Cook of Time magazine.
Mr. Agronsky: First, Mr. Secretary, may
I wish you a happy new year.
Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, the Commu-
nist Viet Cong today proposed a week-long-
truce from February 8 to 15 in Viet-Nam.
Will we accept it?
Secretary Rusk: Well, that will be a mat-
ter of consultation among all of the govern-
ments that have troops in South Viet-Nam,
particularly with the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, but with the others. It would not be
for me to say at this particular moment what
their attitude will be, because that requires
consultation.
As you know, they took the initiative in
suggesting a 4-day truce at Tet.
[Announcement.]
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, in a letter to
our U.N. Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, the
U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, yesterday
again called on the United States to make an
unconditional hold of bombing in Viet-Nam
as a first step toward a lasting peace.'
Now, Mr. Goldberg immediately answered
that he could not make — we could not accept
a unilateral cessation of bombing unless there
was some sign from Hanoi that they were
prepared to meet with us for truce negotia-
tions.
Is that now the American position? Could
' See p. 137.
we not under any circumstances end the*
bombing unilaterally, and will we not?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the Secretary-
General's first point was that we ourselves
stop the bombing. He has in his briefcase,
publicly as well as privately, a commitment
by us that we are prepared to stop the bomb-
ing as a step toward peace.
His second point was a mutual deescala-
tion of the violence by both sides. So far as
we know, he has nothing in his briefcase or
that subject from the other side.
Now, the present position is that on his
three points, Hanoi has rejected points 2 anc
3. On the matter of negotiations with al
those taking part in the fighting, Hanoi ha.'
said that the Viet Cong must be accepted a;
the sole representative of the South Vietnam
ese people.
Now, we hope the Secretary-General, witl
very wide authority as far as we are con
cerned, will be able to probe the other sid
to find out what the effect would be if w
stopped the bombing.
You see, Mr. Agronsky, we went througl
5 years without any bombing of North Viet
Nam, during which we went to the Laotiai
conference and signed an agreement whicl
was not performed in any respect by th
other side — 5 years during which we hai
hundreds of contacts with other government
trying to bring the entire Southeast Asia)
problem to a peaceful settlement.
Then we had a brief 5-day pause, and oi
the third day we had the message from al
interested Communist governments that the;
had no interest in this.
Then over the turn of the year we had '<
37-day pause, much longer than had beei
suggested by some of those on the other sid
126
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIl
&
as a pause to explore the possibilities of
peaceful settlement.
Now, we are prepared, as President John-
son has made it clear over and over again,
i:o take the first steps and to go more than
halfway to bring this matter to a peaceful
conclusion. But what we feel that we are
entitled to know is what would happen if we
iid; and no one, literally no one, has been
ible to give us the slightest suggestion as to
ivhat would happen if we stopped the bomb-
ng, other than that men and arms would
30ur in from the North against the South.
Now, if anyone can tell us that that would
lot be the case, we would be very glad to
lear about it.
tombing of North Viet-Nam
Mr. Cook: There are important psycho-
ogical costs, though, that the bombing is
ausing us, Mr. Secretary. Does the air war
ave a logic of its own ? Do we not stop now
ecause it would lead the other side simply
) think that we are too weak to continue?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Cook, let us take
look at what would happen if we stopped
le bombing and then nothing else whatever
ould happen.
North Viet-Nam would be safe and secure
nd comfortable, and meanwhile they would
e sending their regiments and their divi-
ons into South Viet-Nam to try to take over
outh Viet-Nam by force.
Now, the bombing of North Viet-Nam is
rectly related to what they are doing in the
3uth. The key point in this is that this could
op literally this afternoon at sundown if
le other side would let us know that they
•e holding their hand from the effort to seize
)uth Viet-Nam by force.
Now, we have had a long and tortuous road
nee 1945 in trying to build some peace in
e world. And we have not come to where
,'ie are by giving away Iran to Mr. Stalin's
. :j'rces, or the eastern provinces of Turkey,
'jI- welcoming the guerrillas into Greece, or
ving away Berlin, or giving away South
orea. This has been a tough struggle, to
•ganize a peace in the world. And that is
1 we are interested in.
Now, the problem there is: Can the stop-
ping of the bombing lead toward peace?
If someone — you or the Secretary-General
or anyone from the other side — can give us
any suggestions, any indication, any infor-
mation, we will look at it very quickly. The
President has emphasized over and over
again that we will go more than halfway.
But you cannot stop this war just by stop-
ping a half of it, if the other side is going
to pursue it.
Need for Serious Response From Hanoi
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in this very spirit,
sir, within the last couple of weeks the North
Vietnamese have allowed and have indicated
that they will allow a handful of American
journalists into Hanoi to cover the war.
There are about four American women there
now who are interested in trying to get
peace. The VC radio announces today that
they will go Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao]
Ky 3 days more on a Tet period — he asked
for 4, and they are ready to go 7.
Is it possible that all of this together might
be regarded as the indication that we are all
seeking ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the indication that
is important is the indication that can be
specific and can be private and can be serious.
I must say — and I regret this — that we do
not yet see an indication from the other side,
by the channels that are readily available,
that they are prepared to move this matter
toward peace.
Now, we have ourselves approved pass-
ports for a considerable number of gentlemen
in your profession, and only a very few of
them have been able to get into Hanoi. We
would be glad to have others go and to ask
some of the searching questions about the
question of peace.
That is: What about their more than 20
regiments in South Viet-Nam? What about
their refusal to come to a Geneva conference
on Viet-Nam or on Laos or Cambodia ? What
about their refusal to demilitarize the demili-
tarized zone along the 17th parallel? What
about their opposition to efforts by the ICC
[International Control Commission] to as-
IIlNUARY 23, 1967
127
sure Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia that his
country can remain neutral and uninvolved
in this situation, or the steady refusals of
negotiations proposed by 17 nonalined na-
tions, by President Johnson, by His Holiness
the Pope, by the Secretary-General, by all
sorts of — by the Prime Ministers of the
Commonwealth ?
These are the questions that ought to be
asked. And thus far we have had answers^ —
we know what they are. But they ought to
be probed further.
Mr. Kalb: If I understand you, then, sir,
what you are saying is that it is a specific
and, as you put it, serious kind of indication
that you want from the other side, rather
than any kind of cosmetics —
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a serious mat-
ter, this is a serious matter.
Mr. Kalb: We are trying to get at a defi-
nition—
Secretary Rusk: We are entitled to be seri-
ous about it. After all, we know that during
these two truces we just had — the Christmas
and New Year's truce — that the other side
is undertaking — has undertaken — substantial
resupply operations. We know that in certain
instances they have maneuvered their forces
like Olympic dash men at the starting gate to
take off just as soon as the truce is over.
These are serious matters. And we cannot
approach them in terms of vagueness or sen-
timentality or just hopes.
There are plenty of ways open in which
we can be — we are in touch with the other
side seriously and serious responses can be
exchanged.
Prospects for Peace in Viet-Nam
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, pessimism
permeates everything you have said about
the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam in 1967.
You don't think, then, do you, that there is a
possibility of ending the war under the pres-
ent circumstances ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I think there is a pos-
sibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed
on the basis of optimism. And I never close
the door to the possibility that this situation
will change.
128
I do believe that one basis for optimism is i
that the other side must surely now under-
stand that they are not going to succeed in
seizing South Viet-Nam by force. Now,
maybe that will bring about a significant
change in their political approach to this
question.
But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because
we have not yet seen any indication from the
other side that they are prepared to give up i
their idea of seizing South Viet-Nam by I
force.
You see, they opposed the free elections in i
South Viet-Nam for a constituent assembly; ;
they won't let the question of reunification
be decided by the free choice of the peoples
concerned. They refuse conferences and ne-
gotiations and all those devices by which
crises of this sort have been solved in years j
past.
We haven't had one iota of response or
compliance by them with the Laotian agree-
ment of 1962, for example, which they signed, j,,.
along with the rest of us. ■pi
So there does need to be a change of pur-
pose and a change of ambition in Hanoi, be-
cause otherwise at the end of the day, Mr.
Agronsky, someone has to make a very
simple decision: Here come two more regi-
ments of North Vietnamese down the road
across the 17th parallel; now, do you oppose
them or do you get out of their way? Now,
so long as that occurs, somebody has to make
that decision. And our decision is that undei
our treaty commitments we must meet them,
along with our allies, and not get out of their
way.
Mr. Agronsky: Our commander in Viet-
Nam, General [William C] Westmoreland
has indicated that it may be a matter of years,
as he puts it, rather than months — this wai
will go on for a matter of years rather than
months, and everything you say seems tc
reflect the same estimate. Is that correct?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we oughl
to be prepared, here at home and over there
to do what is required to be done for what
ever time it is required. That does not mean
however, that there may not be some possi-
bility that this crisis, along with other crises
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
may be resolved before anyone really expects
it. In other words, we are trying to resolve
this problem literally tomorrow.
This is why we said to Foreign Secretary
'Brown — George Brown, of Britain: If you
can get the others to come to a meeting of
North and South Viet-Nam and the United
States, we will be there, we will be there.
That is why we have given the Secretary-
General of the United Nations carte blanche
to see what he can work out in his contacts
with the other side to bring this matter to a
peaceful settlement. That is why we have
said "negotiations without preconditions" to
;he 17 neutral countries, or why President
Johnson talked about unconditional discus-
sions.
We will take a look at all of it with
;he other side — or even a part of it.
There is no reason on earth, for example,
vhy the nations involved here on both sides
!Ould not agree with Prince Sihanouk's re-
luest for assistance in maintaining the neu-
rality and the territorial integrity of
Cambodia. And if there is seriousness on the
ther side, there is no reason why we cannot
tisure the demilitarization of the demili-
arized zone between North and South Viet-
nam. If we cannot solve the whole problem,
^e are prepared to try to solve a part of it.
But you gentlemen know that there has
een no response from the other side.
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, what about
ttempts in 1967 to resolve — to push the
latter a little farther by heavier military
ction of our own? As you know, you are
acing a more hawkish Congress than you
id in the last session. There have been sug-
estions that the administration will use the
ist year before the next presidential election
ear to try and achieve some kind of settle-
lent. And if diplomatic channels are as
ogged as you suggest, perhaps a more pow-
rful military action is the only course.
Secretary Rusk: Well, first let me say that
16 diplomatic channels are not clogged. The
oint is that, with diplomatic channels, we
0 not find a basis for peace here.
But in any event, on the matter of military
irces, Secretary [of Defense Robert S.]
».:
NUARY 23, 1967
McNamara has pointed out that there will be
additional forces in South Viet-Nam during
1967, although the rate of increase will not
be as high as it was during 1966 unless there
is some unforeseen circumstance that we are
not now at the moment taking into account.
I myself believe that there must come a
time when the authorities in Hanoi will
recognize that what they are trying to do is
not on, and therefore either de facto, by
action on the ground, or in some sort of nego-
tiation or conference, their effort must be
brought to a halt. And we are prepared to
take that up in either way, either by recipro-
cal action taken on the ground or by some
sort of discussion or negotiation.
The Pacification Effort
Mr. Cook: On that score, Mr. Secretary, it
has been suggested in Washington that they
won't reach that decision until progress is
made on the pacification task, until the infra-
structure of the Viet Cong is destroyed or
seriously damaged. And yet only a few weeks
ago Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge was
here in Washington and conceded, despite all
the efforts of the year — the Honolulu Con-
ference, the Manila Conference — as he put it,
that isn't rolling as yet. Are there any pros-
pects for improvement in the next year?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is recog-
nized this is a very important point in terms
of not only what happens in South Viet-
Nam but in the attitude of the other side.
When it becomes clear that that infrastruc-
ture of subversion and the guerrilla structure
in the countryside is not able to maintain
itself, I think this will be the signal to the
other side that what they are trying to do
is not on.
As you know, the South Vietnamese forces
are now being turned more and more to this
pacification effort, which is basically a seize-
and-hold protection for the villagers so that
they can get on with their work without
harassment by the Viet Cong. It has taken
some time to move into that stage, because
there were other very urgent issues, such as
the operations of the main force regiments
and battalions of the Viet Cong. But that is
129
moving, and we hope to make some signifi-
cant headway on that during 1967.
Organizing a Durable Peace
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, a couple of days
ago you spent about an hour and 45 minutes
talking with religious leaders. There have
been letters sent to the President almost
warning that young people may not choose
to serve, even if they have to go to jail to
stay with that conviction. And there is at
least the appearance of a ground swell of
public opinion riding against the administra-
tion's policy in Viet-Nam.
Two questions on this, sir: One, do you
regard this as a serious diplomatic problem
in terms of how Hanoi sees this all? And,
secondly, do you regard it as a ground swell,
and if so, how do you ride against it? I am
trying to gage your own estimate of this.
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the
first place there is a diplomatic problem for
which we cannot offer much of a remedy,
because it is quite clear that Hanoi would like
to lean on evidences of disagreement here at
home to encourage their own hopes. But
nevertheless, we are a free society and we
must have a vigorous public discussion
of these issues here at home.
The other question: We are at the present
time in a situation where about half the
American people can no longer remember
World War H and the events that led up to
it. And the overriding issue for us and the
new generation is: How do you organize a
durable peace in the world?
Now, when I was a student they said:
Don't worry about this place out here; it is
too far away; or, this is not our business; or,
give them another bite and perhaps the ag-
gressor will be satisfied. And that led an
entire generation into World War H, with
frightful catastrophe for the entire world.
We came out of that, and we tried to set
down what was necessary to organize a peace
— and we should all read article 1 of the
United Nations Charter on that, because
those are the lessons of World War H. And
let me say in parentheses that we better hold
on to those lessons, because we are not going
130
to have any chance to draw the lessons from
world war HI.
So the overriding issue is how to organize
a durable peace. And at the heart of that is
the right of all nations, large and small, to
live at peace without being molested by their
neighbors. It is just as simple as that, al- ||
though some people are inclined to call that
kind of language trite. The notion that we
leave the aggressor free to follow his appetite
is a notion that leads us straight into war.
This is where the warmongering is these days
— those who refuse to face the necessity of
organizing a durable peace. That is our cen-
tral question.
Mr. Cook: Those who accept this strategy
of the administration still have some ques-
tions about tactics. Do you think in retrospect
it was wise to bomb so close to Hanoi during
the Christmas season, with all its overtones,
or to continue to land troops —
Secretary Rusk: President Johnson spoke
yesterday at his press conference about our
bombing policy. We are bombing military
targets. Our Armed Forces are under almost
unprecedented instructions with respect tc
avoiding civilian casualties. And we know
that they go to great lengths to carry oul
those instructions in the spirit in which th«
instructions were given.
Quite frankly, Mr. Cook, what I could d(
with is more compassion and more sympathj
with those tens of thousands of civilians ii
South Viet-Nam who have been killed an(
kidnaped by the Viet Cong and North Viet
namese forces as a matter of deliberate policj
and the far larger tens of thousands of Soutl
Vietnamese military who have been kille(
and wounded simply because North Viet-Nan
is trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force
Now, the President has indicated what oui
policy is on this, and we will continue to pur i
sue that policy.
But one of the things that is missing hen
in some discussion is any notion of reci
procity. |
You mentioned one of the groups that cami
to see me. I try to see different groups fron
time to time who want to express differen
views. But I say to them privately ver;
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIJ
M
often: What do you want Hanoi to do as a
contribution toward peace in this situation?
And they say: Well, we want them to take
their troops home; or, we want them to stop
their infiltration. And I say: But why don't
you say that? Why don't you say that when
you write me an open letter? Because if that
is your position, you ought to make your posi-
tion known.
The problem is that some groups, I think,
would feel embarrassed because they know
that Hanoi would tell them — would reject
what they have to suggest.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, would you
regard the dispatches of Harrison Salisbury
from Hanoi to the New York Times as dis-
torting the perspective in which we should
be seeing the war, as being unfair to our
position and to our policies?
Secretary Rusk: No, I don't want to get
into the particular personal argument with
a particular reporter. He presumably will be
3ut of North Viet-Nam one of these days,
md you gentlemen can put to him all the
questions you want to — and that is your job;
t is not mine. I do observe that from his dis-
patches you can draw the conclusion that we
ire not going after the civilian population
>f North Viet-Nam. Hanoi is there. Hanoi is
here. And you have to look pretty hard to
ind some damage inside Hanoi — and a good
leal of speculation about whether it was
aused by SAM's or by antiaircraft or what
night have actually caused it. But you will
lave your chance presumably to go over
hese matters with him when he comes out
f North Viet-Nam.
.ey to Negotiations Lies in Hanoi
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, do you see any
opes for peace or at least negotiations in the
cheduled emergence late this year of a
ivilian government in Viet-Nam ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the constituent as-
embly has been making very good progress
1 drafting its constitution. We would hope
erhaps by March or April that that con-
titution would be proclaimed, following
'hich there would be national elections for
civilian government.
I think the question of negotiations — again,
some people may think I am being much too
simple about this — turns on what the attitude
of the North is toward its attempt to take
over South Viet-Nam by force. There is no
problem of negotiations if they are willing to
negotiate. Now, this would be the problem
faced by a civilian government or by us or
by anybody else. So the key to this lies in
Hanoi.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, you used the ex-
pression that some people may feel that you
are "putting it in somewhat simple form."
You said before that some people say this is
a "trite expression," when you talked about
the neighbor idea.
There has been over the past years some
criticism leveled quite directly at you, sir, and
very recently a respected columnist from the
New York Times said that you were "a tired
man." I am wondering,, sir, how all of this
criticism strikes you and how you yourself
respond to it.
Secretary Rusk: It doesn't bother me very
much. I would regret it if everybody older
than I am should leave what they are doing
now. This would include a good many col-
umnists and other distinguished figures. No,
there are times when it is noon halfway
around the world and midnight here in
Washington, and sometimes there are long
days. But I feel fine. And I am greatly stimu-
lated and inspired by President Johnson's
own example and by the privilege I have in
trying to help him build a peace in the world.
This is the important thing. And if I can
contribute anything to it, I am at his disposal.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, could we
anticipate, then, that you would be in a posi-
tion to accept an invitation on January 1,
1968, to "face the nation" ?
Secretary Rtisk: Well, if you invite me, I
will take it under consideration if I am in a
position to receive that invitation at that
time. As you know, the Secretary of State
serves at the pleasure of the President, and
this is a matter for him. But I think every
American ought to be at his disposal if he
wants them to serve.
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, the Chinese have
A.NUARY 23, 1967
131
been suggesting of late that we and the
Soviets are on a "collusion course." Is there
enough collusion here to expect any prolifera-
tion treaty within the next —
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a very inter-
esting ideological factor that comes into it.
You see, for many, many years both the
Soviet Union and Communist China have sort
of branded us as Enemy Number One. Now
they are in a considerable to-do with each
other. And so it is rather natural for Peking
to charge that somehow Moscow and Wash-
ington are in a conspiracy and for Moscow
to be suspicious about whether we and
Peking are not in some sort of conspiracy,
because Moscow says that Peking is stand-
ing in the way of the unity of the Communist
world in dealing with the imperialists. I
think this is an internal ideological point. As
a matter of fact, we are not in a conspiracy
either with Moscow or with Peking, and both
capitals can relax on that point as far as I
am concerned.
Hope for Nortproliferation Treaty
Mr. Cook: On the antiproliferation treaty,
sir, the President said yesterday, I believe,
that in recent weeks there have been some
signs of progress. What is that progress ? Do
you expect an early draft of the treaty?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope very
much in 1967 — among the great hopes would
be that we get peace in Viet-Nam, that we
get a nonproliferation treaty, and that the
nations of the world can take some strong
steps toward meeting the emerging food
crisis which is going to be with us for the
next decade.
On the nonproliferation treaty, there have
been discussions. These matters are being
discussed among our allies, as well as with the
members of the Geneva conference. Some of
the underbrush has been cleared away. But
we still do not have an agreement yet, as the
President indicated. We hope very much we
could come to an agreement during 1967.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, how realis-
tic could any such antiproliferation treaty be
that did not include Communist China?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the question would
be who proliferates and to whom? Now, in
a purely technical sense, even though Peking
may not be a party to such an agreement, if
everybody else is, there is no one with whom
to proliferate.
I personally believe that existing nuclear
powers have a strong interest in a nonpro-
liferation treaty because it is almost in the
nature of this weapon that they do not look
with favor on its further spread throughout
the world.
But in any event, we are working at it. We
would hope very much that Peking would
take part in it, although on past performance
we have no reason to think that they will. But
it is a matter that the rest of the world has
to grapple with.
You know our basic attitude has been that
one nuclear power is too many. One of the
great tragedies is that the Baruch proposals
of 1946 were not accepted. And if one is too
many, then five are too many. But certainly
10, 15, would be too many.
We can take some comfort from the fact
that we have had 21 years now in which a
nuclear weapon has not been fired in anger
But we had better be very careful about try-
ing to limit that possibility for the future.
Mr. Cook: Well, the Chinese just firec
another test this week, Mr. Secretary. Hav<
you revised your estimate of their timetable
when they will have an ICBM that coulc
threaten us ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I have not. Mr. McNa-
mara has dealt with that. It will take somt
time yet. But there is no question this is an
ominous development in the world situation
Mr. Agronsky: Thank you very much, Mrr
Secretary — I wish we had time to go on — fow|
being here to "face the nation."
Secretary Rusk: Thank you.
«
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
h\
Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Policy
on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders
Following are texts of a letter from Sec-
retary Rusk to 100 student leaders and the
students' letter of December 29 addressed to
President Johnson. Secretary Rusk's letter
was forwarded to Robert Powell, president
of the student body, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
I
SECRETARY RUSK'S LETTER
Press release 2 dated January 6
January 4, 1967
Dear Stxjdent Leaders: I have received
,nd read carefully your thoughtful letter to
e President about our policy in Viet-Nam.
Your interest and your concern are shared
•y most thinking Americans. No one desires
ore strongly to bring an early and honor-
able conclusion to the conflict in Viet-Nam
than those who are working day and night,
both here and in Viet-Nam, to achieve that
end.
The questions you have raised are among
those that have been asked and discussed re-
peatedly in the councils of your Government.
If some of these matters continue, as you
say, to agitate the academic community, it
is certainly not because answers have not
been provided. It is more, I think, because
the answers to great and complex questions
can never fully satisfy all the people in a
free and questioning society.
Nevertheless, I am glad to have the chance
to address myself to the four specific ques-
tions about which you stated you and others
.felt doubt or concern.
(First, you asked if America's vital in-
srests are sufficiently threatened in Viet-
*
JANUARY 23, 1967
Nam to necessitate the growing commitment
there.
There is no shadow of doubt in my mind
that our vital interests are deeply involved in
Viet-N^jn and in Southeast Asia.
We are involved because the nation's word
has been given that we would be involved.
On February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1
the United States Senate passed the South-
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That
Treaty stated that aggression by means of
armed attack in the treaty area would en-
danger our own peace and safety and, in that
event, "we would act to meet the common
danger." There is no question that an ex-
panding armed attack by North Viet-Nam on
South Viet-Nam has been under way in re-
cent years; and six nations, with vital inter-
ests in the peace and security of the region,
have joined South Viet-Nam in defense
against that armed attack.
Behind the words and the commitment of
the Treaty lies the lesson learned in the
tragic half century since the First World
War. After that war our country withdrew
from eff'ective world responsibility. When ag-
gressors challenged the peace in Manchuria,
Ethiopia, and then Central Europe during
the 1930's, the world community did not act
to prevent their success. The result was a
Second World War — which could have been
prevented.
That is why the Charter of the United
Nations begins with these words: "We the
peoples of the United Nations determined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." And
the Charter goes on to state these objectives:
1S3
"to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained . . . and to unite our
strength to maintain international peace and
security. . . ."
This was also the experience President
Truman had in mind when — at a period
when the United Nations was incapable of
protecting Greece and Turkey from aggres-
sion— he said:' "We shall not realize our ob-
jectives unless we are willing to help free
peoples to maintain their free institutions
and their national integrity against aggres-
sive movements that seek to impose upon
them totalitarian regimes."
These are the memories which have in-
spired the four postwar American Presidents
as they dealt with aggressive pressures and
thrusts from Berlin to Korea, from the Car-
ibbean to Viet-Nam.
In short, we are involved in Viet-Nam be-
cause we know from painful experience that
the minimum condition for order on our
planet is that aggression must not be per-
mitted to succeed. For when it does succeed,
the consequence is not peace, it is the further
expansion of aggression.
And those who have borne responsibility
in our country since 1945 have not for one
moment forgotten that a third world war
would be a nuclear war.
The result of this conviction and this
policy has been a generation's effort which
has not been easy for the United States. We
have borne heavy burdens. We have had to
face some conflict and a series of dangerous
situations.
But the hard and important fact is that
in the postwar world external aggression has
not been permitted to develop its momentum
into general war.
Look back and imagine the kind of world
we now would have if we had adopted a dif-
ferent course. What kind of Europe would
now exist if there had been no commitment
to Greece and Turkey? No Marshall Plan?
No NATO? No defense of BerUn? Would
Europe and the world be better off or worse?
• Bulletin Supplement, May 4, 1947, p. 829.
Would the possibilities of detente be on the
present horizon?
Then turn the globe and look at Asia. If
we had made no commitments and offered no
assistance, what kind of Asia would there^
now be? Would there be a confident and vital
South Korea? A prosperous and peaceful
Japan? Would there be the new spirit of
regional cooperation and forward movement
now developing throughout Asia?
If you were to talk to the leaders of Asia
as I have, you would know what Asians
really think of our commitment in Viet-
Nam. You would know that the new vigor
in Asia, the new hope and determination, are
based in part on the conviction that the
United States will continue to support the
South Vietnamese in their struggle to build
a life of their own within the framework of
the Geneva Accords in 1954 and 1962 — that
we shall see it through to an honorable peace.
Second, you wonder whether our vital in-
terests are best protected by our growing
commitment.
We must always weigh what we are doing
against the requirements of the situation and
what the other side is doing. You are aware,
I am sure, that the flow of men and material
from North Viet-Nam into the South rad-
ically increased towards the end of 1964 and
continued at a high level in the next two
years. It was to meet that escalation, de-
signed to achieve military victory by the
North against the South, that we sent our
men in large numbers and began an air cam-
paign against military targets in North Viet-
Nam.
At the other end of the scale, one must
contrast what we are doing with what we
could be doing. You know the power that is
available to us — in men, resources and
weaponry.
We have done both more than some people
would wish, and less than others advocate.
We have been guided both by the demands
imposed upon us by increased aggression and
by the need for restraint in the application
of force. We have been doing what the Presi-
dent judges to be necessary to protect the
nation's vital interests, after hearing the
views of the government's military and civil-
134
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ian experts. We shall continue to do what is
necessary to meet the threat the Vietnamese
and their allies face.
Third, you raise the question whether a
war that may devastate much of the country-
side can lead to the stable and prosperous
Viet-Nam we hope for.
First, it is an error to suggest that the
fighting in Viet-Nam has devastated "much
of the countryside." There has been too much
destruction and disruption — as there is in
any war. And we deeply regret the loss of
life that is involved — in the South and in the
North, among both soldiers and civilians.
But devastation has been far less than on
the conventional battlefields of World War
II and Korea. If peace could come to South
Viet-Nam today, I think most people would
be amazed at its rapid recovery. For the
Vietnamese are intelligent, energetic and am-
bitious people. And they are determined to
see their country prosper. I am confident that
they can achieve that end — if they but have
the chance to do so, in peace and in their
own way.
That day cannot come too soon.
You also suggest that there are "apparent
jontradictions" in the American position on
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.
We have said that there will be no diffi-
culty in having the views of the Viet Cong
presented at any serious negotiation. The de-
:ails of how this might be done can be dis-
cussed with the other side; there is little
joint in negotiating such details with those
A^ho cannot stop the fighting.
We have made it clear that .we cannot ac-
;ept the Liberation Front as the "sole" or
'only legitimate voice" of the Vietnamese
people. Yet that is what the Front has said
t is. The Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa
ilao, ethnic Cambodians, the almost a mil-
ion refugees who fled from North Viet-Nam
;o the South in 1954-55, and the Monta-
?nards are not prepared to have the Libera-
ion Front as their spokesman. The capacity
)f the Government and people of South Viet-
"^am to conduct the election of the Constitu-
ional Assembly in September 1966, despite
he opposition of the Viet Cong, made it clear
that the VC are a small minority in the coun-
try, detei-mined to convert their ability to
organize for terror into domination over the
majority. Those now enrolled with the Viet
Cong should be turning their minds in a
diflferent direction. They should be asking:
"How can we end this war and join as free
citizens in the making of a modern nation in
South Viet-Nam?"
We know that the effort at armed conquest
which we oppose in Viet-Nam is organized,
led, and supplied by the leaders in Hanoi. We
know that the struggle will not end until
those leaders decide that they want it to end.
So we stand ready — now and at any time
in the future — to sit down with representa-
tives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret,
to work out arrangements for a just solu-
tion.
You state correctly that we have a com-
mitment to the right of self-determination
of the people of South Viet-Nam. There is
no ambiguity whatsoever. We shall abide by
the decision of the Vietnamese people as they
make their wishes known in free and demo-
cratic elections. Hanoi and the Liberation
Front do not agree.
You also suggest that there is disparity
between our statements and our actions in
Viet-Nam, and you refer to recent reports
of the results of our bombing in North Viet-
Nam.
It is our policy to strike targets of a mili-
tary nature, especially those closely related
to North Viet-Nam's efforts to conquer the
South. We have never deliberately attacked
any target that could legitimately be called
civilian. We have not bombed cities or di-
rected our efforts against the population of
North Viet-Nam.
We recognize that there has been loss of
life. We recognize that people living or work-
ing in close proximity to military targets may
have suffered. We recognize, too, that men
and machines are not infallible and that some
mistakes have occurred.
But there is a vast difference between such
unintentional events and a deliberate policy
of attacking civilian centers. I would remind
you that tens of thousands of civilians have
ANUARY 23, 1967
135
been killed, wounded, or kidnapped in South
Viet-Nam, not by accident but as the result
of a deliberate policy of terrorism and intim-
idation conducted by the Viet Cong.
We regret all the loss of life and property
that this conflict entails. We regret that a
single person, North or South, civilian or
soldier, American or Vietnamese, must die.
And the sooner this conflict can be settled,
the happier we and the Vietnamese people
will be.
Meantime, we shall continue to do what
is necessary — to protect the vital interests
of the United States, to stand by our allies
in Asia, and to work with all our energy
for a peaceful, secure and prosperous South-
east Asia. Only by meeting these commit-
ments can we keep on this small and vulner-
able planet the minimum conditions for peace
and order.
Only history will be able to judge the
wisdom and the full meaning of our present
course — in all its dimensions.
But I would close by sharing with you a
hope and a belief. I believe that we are com-
ing towards the end of an era when men can
believe it is profitable and, even, possible to
change the status quo by applying external
force. I believe those in Hanoi who persist
in their aggressive adventure — and those who
support them — represent ideas and methods
from the past, not the future. Elsewhere in
the world those committed to such concepts
have faded or are fading from the scene.
I believe, therefore, that if we and our
allies have the courage, will, and durability
to see this struggle through to an honorable
peace, based on the reinstallation of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, we have
a fair chance of entering quieter times in
which all of us will be able to turn more of
our energies to the great unfinished tasks
of human welfare and to developing the arts
of conciliation and peaceful change.
The overriding question for all of mankind
in this last third of the Twentieth Century is
how to organize a durable peace. Much of the
experience which has gone into answers to
that question has been largely forgotten —
perhaps some of it should be. But the ques-
tion remains — and remains to be answered.
I should much enjoy discussing this with you
if we can find a way to do so.
I would value a chance to discuss the is-
sues posed in your letter with a representa-
tive group of signatories or with as many
as could conveniently join me in Washing-
ton at a mutually agreeable time.
With best wishes and thanks for your seri-
ous concern.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk
STUDENT LEADERS' LETTER
December 29, 1966
Dear Mr. President: In your talk to the student
interns last summer,' as on other occasions, you
have recognized and discussed problems that have
been troubling members of our generation. We have
been grateful for your concern and encouraged by
your invitation to express some of our thoughts.
Since many of these thoughts center increasingly
on the situation in Vietnam, the New Year's re-
newal of the truce seems a suitable occasion to report
to you that significant and growing numbers of our
contemporaries are deeply troubled about the pos-
ture of their Government in Vietnam. We believe
the state of mind of these people, though largely
unreported, is of great importance, because there
are many who are deeply troubled for every one who
has been outspoken in dissent.
A great many of those faced with the prospect
of military duty find it hard to square performance
of that duty with concepts of personal integrity and
conscience. Even more are torn by reluctance to
participate in a war whose toll in property and life
keeps escalating, but about whose purpose and value
to the United States they remain unclear.
The truces have highlighted a growing conviction
on American campuses that if our objective in the
fighting in Vietnam is a negotiated settlement
rather than a military "victory," continued escala-
tion cannot be justified by the failure of the other
side to negotiate. If, on the other hand, our objective
is no longer a negotiated settlement, the nature and
attainability of our objectives in Vietnam raise seri-
ous new doubts. There is thus increasing confusion
about both our basic purpose and our tactics, and
there is increasing fear that the course now being
pursued may lead us irrevocably into a major land
war in Asia — a war which many feel could not be
won without recourse to nuclear weapons, if then.
* Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
Aug. 22, 1966, p. 1083.
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In this context there is widespread support for the
suggestion of the Pope and others that the resumed
truce be extended de facto by restraint on both sides,
even if no formal agreement is achieved. And there
is hope that if fighting must be resumed in 1967 it
will be resumed on a reduced scale.
In short, Mr. President, a great many of our con-
temporaries, raised in the democratic tradition of
thinking for themselves, are finding a growing con-
flict between their own observations on the one hand,
and statements by Administration leaders about the
war on the other. These are people as devoted to the
Constitution, to the democratic process, and to law
and order as were their fathers and brothers who
served willingly in two World Wars and in Korea.
Unless this conflict can be eased, the United States
will continue to find some of her most loyal and cou-
rageous young people choosing to go to jail rather
than to bear their country's arms, while countless
others condone or even utilize techniques for evading
their legal obligations. Contributing to this situation
is the almost universal conviction that the present
Selective Service Law operates unfairly.
We write in the hope that this letter will encour-
age a frank discussion of these problems. If such a
discussion clarified American objectives in Vietnam,
it might help reverse the drift, which is now from
confusion toward disaffection. To this end, we submit
for your consideration some of the questions now
agitating the academic community:
— There is doubt that such vital interests as may
be threatened are best protected by this growing
:ommitment.
— There is doubt that such vital interests as may
oe threatened are best protected by this growing
commitment.
— There is doubt that a war which may devastate
nuch of the countryside can lead to the stable and
prosperous Vietnam we once hoped our presence
ivould help create.
— There is considerable concern about apparent
contradictions in the American position on certain
joints basic to any efforts to negotiate a settlement.
High Government officials reiterate our eagerness to
legotiate "unconditionally," but we remain unclear
ibout our willingness to accept full participation by
he Viet Cong as an independent party to negotia-
ions. Similarly, Administration spokesmen reiterate
lur commitment to self-determination for South
/ietnam, but we remain unclear about our willing-
less to accept a coalition (or pro-communist) govem-
nent should the people of Vietnam eventually choose
uch a government under adequate international
lupervision.
Finally, Mr. President, we must report a growing
«nse — reinforced by Mr. Harrison Salisbury's re-
cent reports from Hanoi — that too often there is a
vide disparity between American statements about
Vietnam and American actions there.
We hope you will find it possible to share your
thoughts with us about these matters. The rising
confusion about national purposes can undermine
mutual trust and respect among our people. This
seems to us as urgent a problem as any that con-
fronts the Nation today.
We are grateful for your interest and send our
best wishes for the New Year.
Sincerely,
Robert Powell
Student Body President
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N.C.
on behalf of himself and [99] other elected
heads of student government organizations
and editors of college newspapers, all sign-
ing in their own individual capacities
U.S. Reaffirms Desire
for Peace in Viet-Nam
Following is an exchange of letters be-
tween Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representa-
tive to the United Nations, and U.N.
Secretary-General U Thant.
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S LETTER
U.S. /U.N. press release B04B
December 31, 1966
My Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I ap-
preciate your thoughtful reply to my letter of
December 19 1 concerning Vietnam. The
subject at issue — peace in Vietnam — is of
such vital importance to my Government and
to world peace that we have given your reply
immediate attention and are sending you
herewith our reply.
We share your deep concern about the de-
velopment and effects of the conflict in Viet-
nam: the risk it poses to international
peace, the ill effects upon relations between
states, and — more than anything else — the
tragic toll in death and destruction.
I can assure you without reservation that
the preeminent desire of the United States
Government is to bring all hostilities in Viet-
nam to a prompt and honorable end con-
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63.
ANUARY 23, 1967
137
sistent with the United Nations Charter,
which affirms for all peoples the right of self-
determination, the right to decide their own
destiny free of force.
We have carefully reflected on your ideas,
expressed in your December 30 letter and on
previous occasions, about the cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. As you rightly
point out, Mr. Secretary-General, our size and
power impose special responsibilities upon us.
And it is with these responsibilities in mind
that I wish to assure you categorically that
my Government is prepared to take the first
step toward peace: specifically, we are ready
to order a prior end to all bombing of North
Vietnam the moment there is an assurance,
private or otherwise, that there would be a
reciprocal response toward peace from North
Vietnam.
I am, thus, reaffirming herewith an offer
made before the General Assembly — on
September 22 ^ and again on October 18.^ We
hope and trust that you will use every means
at your disposal to determine what tangible
response there would be from North Viet-
nam in the wake of such a prior step toward
peace on our part.
While reaffirming our offer, I would also
express our conviction that the goal which,
I am sure, we both share — an end to all
fighting, to all hostilities, to all organized
terror and violence — cannot be attained by
either appeals for or the exercise of restraint
by only one side in the Vietnam conflict.
We therefore welcome the idea in your letter
that there be an extended cease-fire, which
would obviously include a cessation of the
bombing of North Vietnam as well as an
end to all hostilities and organized violence
in the south. We believe the temporary
truces already arranged in Vietnam offer
opportunities for initiatives in that direction
— though we cannot but regret that the other
parties concerned have shown no interest so
far in such a cease-fire.
We continue to believe that peace can come
to Vietnam in one of two ways: through
deeds, such as a mutual cessation or reduction
» Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
'Ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 757.
of hostilities, or through discussions. We
agree with you fully that the ultimate basis
for a peaceful settlement could be the Geneva
Accords. We are, however, entirely flexible
in our approach to the discussions we have
sought to promote, whether they be format"
negotiations or informal contacts. In this con-
nection we would be prepared, as President !
Johnson publicly stated this morning,* to
meet promptly with the Governments of
North and South Vietnam as proposed by .
the United Kingdom on December 30. As my
Government has stated before on many occa-
sions, we are prepared to discuss all proposals
and points which any interested party may
wish to put forward. I am sure that your de-
sire for a first step to bring about peace is
accompanied by a strong interest on your part
in what the subsequent step would be.
I would conclude, Mr. Secretary-General,
by expressing our certainty that you — as all
men of good will — agree it is the war in all its
facets which must be brought to an end. We
are thus heartened — and believe all who de- 1
sire peace in Vietnam will share the feeling
— by your assurance that you will continue
to exert your efforts and explore every avenue I
toward a peaceful solution of the Vietnam
conflict.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldberg
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER
U.N. doc. S/7668
30 December 1966
My dear Ambassador, I have very carefully
studied your letter to me dated 19 December 1966
on the subject of Viet-Nam. May I say how apprecia-
tive I am of your Government's request that I might
take whatever steps I "consider necessary to bring
about the necessary discussions which could lead to
such a cease-fire", and especially of the assurance
that "the Government of the United States will co-
operate fully ... in getting such discussions started
promptly and in bringing them to a successful com-
pletion".
You are, of course, aware of my preoccupation
with the question of Viet-Nam during the last three
years. This preoccupation stems not merely from
' In reply to a question at a nevirs conference.
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ny recognition of the serious risk that the continua-
;ion of this war poses to international peace and
security. To a very large extent it is influenced even
nore by my deep sympathy, and indeed anguish, over
;he untold suffering of the people of Viet-Nam who
Tiave known no peace for a generation, the tragic
oss of lives on all sides, the increasing number of
:ivilian casualties, the appalling destruction of prop-
erty and the vast and mounting sums being spent
)n the prosecution of the war.
In this context may I also stress my strong feei-
ng, publicly expressed more than once, that what is
•eally at stake in Viet-Nam, unless an early end to
he hostilities is brought about, is the independence,
he identity and the survival of the country itself.
I have already referred to the serious risk to in-
ernational peace and security that the continuance
f the war in Viet-Nam poses. There is an ever pres-
nt danger that the war in Viet-Nam may spread,
nd even spill over its frontiers. Already the war
as poisoned relations amongst States and has, as I
aid earlier, brought to a halt the great enterprise
f co-operation and understanding between nations
?hich had barely made a modest start in recent
ears.
This is how I see the over-all situation. It is a
ituation in which a powerful nation like the United
tates should take the initiative in the quest for
eace and show an enlightened and humanitarian
pirit. I believe that in the circumstances only action
eliberately undertaken in such spirit which, because
f its power and position, the United States can
fford to undertake, can halt the escalation and
ilargement of this war, and thus bring about a
irning of the tide towards peace.
Let me take this opportunity of reiterating my
iree-point programme, to which I still firmly ad-
ere:
1. The cessation of the bombing of North Viet-
am;
2. The scaling down of all military activities by
II sides in South Viet-Nam;
3. The willingness to enter into discussions with
lose who are actually fighting.
I strongly believe that this three-point programme,
' which the cessation of the bombing of North
iet-Nam is the first and essential part, is necessary
I create the possibility of fruitful discussions lead-
ig to a just and honourable settlement of the prob-
m of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agree-
lents of 1954.
I also wish to recall that in the course of the
twenty-first session, in the debate of the General
Assembly, the majority of the delegations have en-
dorsed the three-point programme. Many more heads
of delegations also specifically pleaded for the cessa-
tion of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It seems
to me that this is a very clear indication of the
public opinion of the world at large on this issue.
Leaders of religious faiths all over the world have
also expressed their anxiety about the continuance
and escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. Only a few
days ago the General Secretary of the World Coun-
cil of Churches expressed a similar concern.
When His Holiness the Pope made his plea for
an extended cease-fire, I endorsed it and I urged all
parties to heed his appeal. In my statement of 2
December I said: "Is it too much to hope that what
is made possible for just a couple of days by the
occurrence of common holidays may soon prove
feasible for a longer period by the new commitments
that peace requires, so that an atmosphere may be
created which is necessary for meaningful talks to
be held in the quest for a peaceful solution?"
This is what I have in mind when I refer to the
need for a humanitarian approach. If action in such
a spirit could be undertaken, even without condi-
tions, by the United States to stop the bombing
of North Viet-Nam, and if the New Year cease-fire
could be extended by all the parties, I feel hopeful
that thereafter some favourable developments may
follow. I am reminded in this context that in 1954
negotiations for a peaceful settlement were con-
ducted even without a formal cease-fire and while
fighting was going on. Even though there may be
sporadic breaches of the cease-fire on account of
lack of control and communication, I believe that
this would provide a welcome respite for private
contacts and diplomatic explorations so that, in time,
formal discussions can take place on the basis of
the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
I am writing this letter to you after long delibera-
tion. I would like to close by assuring you and your
Government that, in my personal and private ca-
pacity, I shall continue to exert my utmost efforts
and to explore every avenue which may lead to a
just, honourable and peaceful solution of the prob-
lem of Viet-Nam.
As your letter under reply was issued as a Se-
curity Council document [S/7641], I am arranging
for this reply also to be issued as a document of the
Security Council.
Yours sincerely,
U Thant
INUARY 23, 1967
139
International Law in the United Nations
by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
All of us recognize that the practice and
teaching of law have undergone a profound
revolution in the last generation. No aspect of
this revolution has been more striking than
the growing involvement of American
lawyers and law schools with international
legal problems.
A generation ago international law was
considered a specialty so divorced from the
normal run of practice that Frederic R.
Coudert, a leading member of the New York
Bar, could complain, upon being elevated to
the presidency of the American Society of
International Law: "Those colleagues who
describe me as an international lawyer are
just trying to take away my best domestic
clients !"
Today the effective representation of cli-
ents in our major urban centers requires the
ability to deal with the legal aspects of inter-
national transactions. And, of course, there
is hardly a Federal agency in which the
lawyer does not find himself concerned with
international legal problems.
The curricula of our major law schools re-
flect this development. I understand that two-
thirds of the students at some of our major
law schools now take at least one course in
the field of international law.
This is as it should be. Indeed, I wonder
whether the trend in our law schools has gone
far enough. In the light of the revolutionary
developments which are increasing the inter-
' Address made before the Association of American
Law Schools at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 29 (press
release 304).
140
national influences on our national life — de-
velopments in science and technology, politics
and economics, in mass communications — one
may well ask whether today's law student
should not be expected to take at least one
course in international law, just as he takes
one course in torts, contracts, or property. If
this seems like an extreme suggestion, let us
remember that today's law student will be
reaching the peak of his professional career
in the year 2000.
When we speak of the international role
of our law schools, of course, we think of
research as well as teaching. Two centuries
ago the High Court of the Admiralty could
dismiss the work of scholars in international
law by saying: "A pedantic man in his closet
dictates the laws of nations; everybody
quotes, and nobody minds him." Today oui
scholars in international law are not onlj
quoted but minded. And I can think of no bet-
ter example than Professor McDougai
[Myres McDougai, president, Association ol
American Law Schools] himself and his
monumental works on the law of outer space,
the oceans, and the use of force — not to men-
tion many other scholars who are in this
room today.
But what of law in relation to diplomacy^
What is its relevance in dealing with the
problems of mankind as we face them in the
United Nations?
Sir Harold Nicolson once wrote that "the
worst kind of diplomats are missionaries,
fanatics and lawyers." Needless to say, we dc
not believe that at the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations. Sir Harold might be shocked
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
;o learn that the large majority of our dele-
gates and senior advisers at this last General
Assembly session were lawyers. In fact, we
lad the full-time services of one law school
lean and one law school professor, both of
hem on leave, and the part-time services of
I professor of international law. One of the
'ew nonlawyers on the delegation was the
"oreign Service officer whose title is Coun-
elor.
There are many Americans, I know, who
luestion the relevance of law in diplomacy
.nd in a political institution like the United
Nations. This skepticism results, I believe,
rom a number of misconceptions. Some peo-
ile think that law is only concerned with the
lechanical application of principles found in
ases and textbooks. Some see law and poli-
ics as antithetical concepts that operate in
'atertight compartments. And some believe
lat the differences between East and West
nd North and South have destroyed the basis
)r international law.
I regard these views as profoundly mis-
iken. After 18 months and two General As-
?mblies, I am impressed by the significance
f law and legal skills in diplomacy and in the
ork of the United Nations.
Perhaps a good way to illustrate this is to
ok at two subjects with which the United
ations has recently been involved: outer
)ace and Rhodesia.
le Development of Space Law
As you all know, one of the principal mat-
ers which engaged our attention during re-
;nt months was the negotiation of a treaty
werning the exploration and use of outer
)ace, including the moon and other celestial
3dies.2 The negotiations were successfully
mcluded in early December, and the General
ssembly has recommended that all states
gn and ratify the treaty.
This treaty is an important step in the
rogressive development of international law.
reduces the danger of conflict and promotes
le prospects of cooperation in the newest
id most unfamiliar of all realms of human
' For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966,
952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
activity. Among other things, the treaty pro-
vides that:
— Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be free for ex-
ploration and use by all states on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international
law.
— Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.
— Nuclear weapons and other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction shall not be sta-
tioned in space or on celestial bodies.
The treaty also provides for international
liability for space vehicle accidents, for the
rescue and return of astronauts and equip-
ment, for the avoidance of harmful contami-
nation of celestial bodies from earth and vice
versa, for the exchange of information on
space activities through the United Nations
and other bodies, and for access to stations
on the moon and other celestial bodies upon
reasonable advance notice.
This treaty did not spring full blown from
the minds of a few U.N. delegates. It repre-
sented the culmination not only of negotia-
tions which began in Geneva last summer but
of years of consideration in the U.N. and
elsewhere. This record reveals, I think, a
number of significant things about the role
of international law in diplomacy and in the
United Nations.
First, the record shows that the develop-
ment of international law is possible even in
the midst of deep divergencies of ideology
and national interest. Even between ad-
versary powers there can be agreements con-
taining mutual restraints and reciprocal con-
cessions which serve the interests of both
sides. The incentive for the negotiation of
such agreements and for compliance with
them is the hope of reciprocity; the sanction
is the fear of reprisal. For example, it would
have been difficult for either the Soviet
Union or the United States to commit itself
unilaterally not to station nuclear weapons
in space, but such commitments could be ex-
changed to the net advantage of both.
^NUARY 23, 1967
141
Second, the record shows the evolutionary
character of international law in gradually
codifying ground rules which are perceived
by states to be in their common interests. In
space as on earth, the life of the law has not
been logic but experience. Consider the fol-
lowing chronology:
— In 1959, year two of the space age, a
committee appointed by the U.N. could refer
to a developing practice that space could be
used for orbiting satellites without objection
from subjacent states.
— In 1961, year four of the space age, this
principle could be recommended to states in
a General Assembly resolution, together with
the related principle, on which there had
been no practice, that there could be no sov-
ereign claims on celestial bodies.
— In 1963, year six of the space age, both
these principles could be included in a
Declaration of Legal Principles by the Gen-
eral Assembly asserted to have the force of
law.
— And in 1966, year nine of the space age.
these principles could be included in a for-
mal treaty instrument.
This history provides the most recent illus-
tration of how international law is developed
in the world today: how states gradually per-
ceive common interests on the basis of experi-
ence and how these common interests are
gradually crystallized into binding rules of
law.
In the course of the recent negotiations I
was struck by the fact that the Soviet Union
and ourselves both followed the same prag-
matic approach to the development of space
law. Both countries were prepared to reach
agreement on those matters where experience
had demonstrated a sufficient measure of
common interest, and both countries resisted
the injection of questions which, though im-
portant and logically related to the agreed
principles, were not ripe for international
negotiation — such as the delimitation of outer
space and the exploitation of resources on
celestial bodies.
Third, the record demonstrates the effec-
tiveness of the United Nations as a vehicle
for the development of international law. The
process of discussion and negotiation of legal
principles governing outer space naturally
focused on the two great space powers. But
the fact that these negotiations were carried
on in the multilateral framework of the U.Nr^
undoubtedly encouraged the space powers to
be more forthcoming than they otherwise
might have been — and obliged them to take
account of the legitimate interests of other
countries, which also took part in the negotia-
tions all along the way. Moreover, in the light
of the Viet-Nam war and the Sino-Soviet
split, the fact that the space negotiations took
place in the United Nations made it less dif-
ficult for the Soviet Union to make the agree-
ment.
Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia
Even as we were completing our work on
the space treaty, we were involved in the Se-
curity Council with another important sub-
ject which can also tell us something about
the relevance of law in the United Nations. I
refer, of course, to Rhodesia.
Earlier this month, the Security Council
took an unprecedented step with respect to
Rhodesia.^ It imposed mandatory sanctions
on key exports from Rhodesia and on oil ex-
ports to that territory.
This was the first time in the history of the
United Nations that such sanctions had been
imposed. All members of the United Nations
are legally obligated to apply these sanctions
in accordance with article 25 of the charter.
For the first time in history, our Government
will be prohibiting activities in international
trade by American individuals and corpora-
tions pursuant to a U.N. order under the au-
thority of our United Nations Participation
Act.^
A number of individuals in our country
have attacked, on both legal and policy
grounds, this action of the Security Council
and the support which the United States has
given it.
First, it is said that the United Nations
action represents a denial of the principle of
self-determination.
' For background, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
' See p. 145.
142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The simple answer to this argument is that
the Smith regime is not asserting the right
of self-determination for all the Rhodesian
people but merely the right of 6 percent of
Y the Rhodesian people who are white to rule
j lover 94 percent who are black. The refusal of
j Ithe United Kingdom to recognize the illegal
1 sseizure of power by the Smith regime, far
jfrom being a denial of self-determination, is
, |an attempt to implement that objective for
jthe Rhodesian people as a whole.
Second, it is argued that the action of the
Security Council involves a violation of article
12, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter. This
iprovision reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall au-
thorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Char-
ter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli-
cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
The fallacy of this argument can be seen
when the facts in the case are tested against
the provisions I have just quoted:
— Rhodesia is not a "state" and has not
been recognized as such by a single govern-
ment or international organization.
— The situation in Rhodesia is not "domes-
tic," since it involves the international re-
sponsibilities of the United Kingdom under
chapter XI of the charter relating to non-self-
governing territories.
— The action of the Security Council does
not constitute "intervention," since the Coun-
cil has acted at the request and with the con-
currence of the legitimate sovereign, the
United Kingdom.
— Article 2, paragraph 7, by its own terms,
does not apply to the application of enforce-
ment measures such as the mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions imposed by the Council in
this case.
Third, it is argued that there is here no
threat to international peace justifying resort
to mandatory sanctions.
Under article 39 of the charter, it is the
responsibility of the Security Council to "de-
termine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion" and to "make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and
security."
This determination by the Council in the
exercise of its charter powers is conclusive
and may not be contested by any member.
The Council has made a judgment as to what
is likely to happen in the future if the seizure
of power by the white minority is not brought
to an end. The judgment can hardly be
termed unreasonable. The attempt of 220,000
whites to rule 4 million nonwhites in a con-
tinent of nonwhite governments which have
recently achieved independence involves great
risks of violence.
Fourth, it is argued that sanctions cannot
logically be applied against Rhodesia since
the "threat to the peace" originates else-
where. This legal conclusion, it is added, is
not affected by the morality or lack of
morality of the actions taken by the Smith
government.
This argument involves still more funda-
mental misconceptions. Under chapter VII of
the charter, the Security Council is author-
ized to order sanctions without the necessity
of determining which party to a dispute is
the source of a threat to international peace.
This should not be surprising. A similar prac-
tice is followed in our country in major labor-
management disputes affecting the national
health and safety, where Federal powers can
be employed to preserve the economy without
judgment on the merits of controversy.
But the principal fallacy in this argument
is the failure to recognize that the threat to
the peace inherent in the Rhodesian situation
is the seizure of power by the Smith regime
rather than the potential response to it.
It is in this sense that the actions of the
Smith regime raise legal as well as moral
issues. Some say that moral considerations
are irrelevant in the practical affairs of na-
tions. But the United Nations Charter, like
the United States Constitution, embodies
moral principles. One of the principal pur-
poses of the United Nations is to promote
"respect for human rights and for funda-
JANUARY 23, 1967
143
mental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion." The
attempt of the Smith regime to alter the
status quo in Rhodesia and create a new state
committed to the violation of these world
community standards is the real source of
the threat to the peace.
Finally, it is argued that the application of
mandatory sanctions to Rhodesia constitutes
a dangerous precedent for similar U.N. action
wherever any violations of human rights may
be involved.
This argument overlooks a number of
unique elements in the Rhodesian situation.
Here we have witnessed an illegal seizure of
power by a small minority bent on perpetuat-
ing the subjugation of the vast majority.
Moreover, in this situation the sovereign au-
thority with international responsibility for
the territory has asked the United Nations
to take measures which will permit the
restoration of the full rights of the people
of this territory under the charter.
We in the United States learned over 100
years ago that any attempt to institutionalize
and legitimize a political principle of racial
superiority in a new state was unacceptable.
The effort to do so created an inflammatory
situation, and our nation had to rid itself of
this false and hateful doctrine at great cost.
What could not be accepted by the United
States in the mid-19th century cannot be ac-
cepted by the international community in the
late 20th century.
Law in the United Nations, as in our own
society, is often developed on a case-by-case
basis. We should analyze each action of U.N.
political organs with due regard for the facts
of each case and be careful of hasty generali-
zations.
Because the Security Council considers the
situation in Rhodesia, with its unique legal
and factual elements, as constituting a threat
to the peace requiring thp application of
mandatory sanctions, does not absolve it from
an independent exercise of judgment in dif-
ferent situations. Moreover, each of the
permanent members of the Security Council
has the power to prevent the use of enforce-
ment measures in other situations where it
may deem them to be inappropriate.
[(llllilX
Fori
irityo:
jlstil
a]
Kllttl
In the short time available to me I hav If'P""
given but two examples of the relevance o; iis''''^
law and legal skills to problems before th( iJis"''
United Nations. Even from my brief tenun iilSi *'
at the U.N., I could have cited many others
— the status of South West Africa follow
ing the regrettable decision of the Interna '°°
tional Court of Justice;
— the constitutional questions surrounding
the authorizing, managing, and financing of
peacekeeping operations;
— the consideration of improved procel
dures for factfinding, mediation, and concilia- *'^''
tion;
— the strengthening of U.N. machinery in
trade and aid to less developed countries; ani
— the examination of procedures to imple-|Wif
ment human rights standards through th(
human right covenants ^ and the proposed
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Creative Values in International Law
The building of these institutions for th(
promotion of peaceful change, justice, eco-
nomic development, and human rights is as
much the work of the lawyer as the elabora
tion of legal norms for the prevention of viO'
lence.
As Professor McDougal said yesterday Im
his presidential address:
In our contemporary community . . . people have
largely ceased to think of law as serving only the
rather primitive function of maintaining minimum
order, in preserving the peace and minimizing un-
authorized coercion, and have come generally to think
of it as a positive instrument for promoting optimum
order, in security and the greater production and
wider distribution of all community values.
I have no doubt from my work at the U.N.
that this is true of international as well a.';
domestic law. The aspect that says "Thou
shalt not" — essential though it is — is only
half the story. Law is more than prohibitions
on the use of force. It is also, and equally
essentially, an affirmative concept: a force
for justice and equal opportunity and for the
redress of legitimate grievances. Law must
operate to eliminate discrimination, to assure
human rights, to feed the hungry, to educate
'' For texts, see ibid., Jan. 16, 1966, p. 107.
tgai
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144
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ItaJ
:he ignorant, to raise up the oppressed. It
^. must foster in the international realm the
'^'"'s tij same creative and positive values which na-
ions, at their best, have fulfilled in their
)wn domestic life.
This creative approach to the role of inter-
laational law reflects not merely idealism but
realism as well. Today more than ever, it
ijl«rould be unrealistic to talk about peace with-
out addressing ourselves to these positive
/alues.
For one of the dominant facts of the
emerging world community is that the ma-
jority of its members are still extremely poor
and still have vivid recollections of what it is
like to live under colonial rule. They are pre-
occupied with economic and social develop-
ment and with human rights. Their commit-
ment to the law of nations, and to the peace
which it seeks to build, will deepen only as
the law helps them to realize these legitimate
►aspirations.
If American law schools can provide our
■future leadership with an understanding of
this larger role of international law — and if
"they can provide the intellectual tools to act
upon it effectively — they will have performed
an historic service not just for the United
States but for the world.
Mi
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IIU.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions
iAgainst Southern Rhodesia
IWHITE HOUSE ANNOUKCEMENT
White House press release dated January 5
The President on January 5 signed Execu-
tive Order No. 11322 implementing the
United Nations Security Council's Resolution
No. 232 of December 16, 1966,i which im-
posed selective mandatory economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia.
The President acted under the United Na-
tions Participation Act of 1945, as amended.
Section 5 of the act empowers the President
to implement Security Council decisions
adopted pursuant to article 41 of the United
Nations Charter. In its Resolution No. 232,
JANUARY 23, 1967
the Council decided that all member states
shall prohibit imports of Rhodesian asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco,
copper, meat and meat products, and hides,
skins, and leather, as well as dealing by their
nationals or in their territories in such prod-
ucts originating in Southern Rhodesia. The
resolution also obligates members to embargo
shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles,
and petroleum and petroleum products to
Southern Rhodesia.
This Executive order prohibits the activi-
ties proscribed by the resolution, including
transactions involving commodities exported
from Southern Rhodesia after December 16,
the date of the resolution, and delegates to
the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the
Treasury the authority to promulgate regula-
tions necessary to carry out the order. These
regulations will be issued by the Departments
shortly and will be effective as of January 5.
A violation of the Executive order is a
criminal offense. Provision will be made in
the regulations to deal with cases of undue
hardship arising from transactions com-
menced before the date of the order.
The selective mandatory sanctions imposed
by the Security Council's resolution of
December 16 supplement earlier voluntary
measures taken by a large majority of U.N.
members in response to the Council's appeal,
contained in its resolution of November 20,
1965,2 that they break off economic relations
with Southern Rhodesia. This resolution was
adopted a few days after the Smith regime
in Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally de-
clared its independence on November 11,
1965. The United States joined with other
states in implementing the voluntary meas-
ures called for by the Security Council by
embargoing the shipment to Southern Rho-
desia of all arms, military equipment, and
related items and by suspending the 1965 and
1966 U.S. import quotas for Rhodesian sugar.
Since early 1966,. the United States has called
upon U.S. firms to cooperate with the volun-
tary Security Council sanctions and has
• For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan.
9, 1967, p. 73.
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.
145
recommended that U.S. firms comply with
British Orders-in-Council by avoiding trade
in commodities of significant importance to
the Southern Rhodesian economy, including
petroleum, as well as Rhodesian exports of
chrome, asbestos, and tobacco.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11322 "
Relating to Trade and Other Transactions
Involving Southern Rhodesia
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, includ-
ing section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States
Code, and as President of the United States, and
considering the measures which the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations, by Security Council
Resolution No. 232 adopted December 16, 1966, has
decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter
of the United Nations, and which it has called upon
all members of the United Nations, including the
United States, to apply, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. The following are prohibited effective
immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered
into or licenses granted before the date of this
Order:
(a) The importation into the United States of
asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco,
copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and
leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex-
ported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or prod-
ucts made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or else-
where.
(b) Any activities by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote or
are calculated to promote the export from Southern
Rhodesia after December 16, 1966, of any of the
commodities specified in subsection (a) of this section
originating in Southern Rhodesia, and any dealings
by any such person in any such commodities or in
products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or
elsewhere, including in particular any transfer of
funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such
activities or dealings: Provided, however, that the
prohibition against the dealing in commodities ex-
ported from Southern Rhodesia or products made
therefrom shall not apply to any such commodities
or products which, prior to the date of this Order,
had been imported into the United States.
(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of United
States registration of any of the commodities speci-
fied in subsection (a) of this section originating
'32 Fed. Reg. 119.
St
ill
(I
i
in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom afte
December 16, 1966, or products made therefrom i
Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere.
(d) Any activities by any person subject to th
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o
are calculated to promote the sale or shipment -t
Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types
military aircraft, military vehicles and equipmen
and materials for the manufacture and maintenanc
of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia.
(e) Any activities by any person subject to th
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o
are calculated to promote the supply to Southeri
Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles
and of equipment and materials for the manufac
ture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft or moto
vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in ves
sels or aircraft of United States registration of an;
such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and an;
activities by any person subject to the jurisdictio]
of the United States, which promote or are calcu
lated to promote the manufacture or assembly o
aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia.
(f) Any participation in the supply of oil or oil
products to Southern Rhodesia (i) by any persoi
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
or (ii) by vessels or aircraft of United States reg
istration, or (iii) by the use of any land or ai
transport facility located in the United States.
Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for thi
enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions are dele
gated as follows:
(a) To the Secretary of State, the function am
responsibility of enforcement relating to the im
portation into, or exportation from the United State:
of articles, including technical data, the control o:
the importation or exportation of which is providec
for in section 414 of the Mutual Security Act o:
1954 (68 Stat. 848), as amended (22 U.S.C. 1934)
and has been delegated to the Secretary of State by
section 101 of Executive Order No. 10973 of No-
vember 3, 1961.*
(b) To the Secretary of Commerce, the functior
and responsibility of enforcement relating to —
(i) the exportation from the United States oi
articles other than the articles, including technical
data, referred to in subsection (a) of this section;
and
(ii) the transportation in vessels or aircraft of
United States registration of any commodities the
transportation of which is prohibited by section 1
of this Order.
(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the func-
tion and responsibility of enforcement to the extent
not delegated under subsections (a) or (b) of this
section.
»
i
146
* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
^ Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of
' he Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall
^ xercise any authority which such officer may have
J part from the United Nations Participation Act
jf 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this
(rder and Security Council Resolution No. 232.
Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective func-
ions and responsibilities under this Order, the Sec-
" etary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Com-
lerce shall consult with the Secretary of State.
ach such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate,
ath other government agencies and private persons,
(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such regu-
itions, licenses, or other authorizations as he con-
iders necessary to carry out the purposes of this
irder and Security Council Resolution No. 232.
Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States", as used in
lis Order in a geographical sense, means all terri-
)ry subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
(b) The term "person" means an individual, part-
ership, association, or other unincorporated body
f individuals, or corporation.
Yf~
HE White House,
anuary 5, 1967.
< ''resident Johnson, Secretary Rusk
Ijllourn Death of Christian Herter
n-ATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
"hite House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 31
It is with great personal sorrow that I
!arned that Christian Herter, a great Ameri-
an, died last night.
His life and career spanned a period which
aw this nation emerge from a century of iso-
ition to take a place of leadership on the
'^orld scene. From the day in 1916 when he
x)k up a post as attache in the American
Imbassy in Berlin to the leadership of the
Kennedy Round negotiations to expand and
beralize world trade — which he was exercis-
(ig to the day of his death — he participated
!i the events of our time and shaped them.
He was with President Wilson at the
ANUARY 23, 1967
Versailles Peace Conference in 1918-19.
He was at the side of Herbert Hoover in
his work in European relief in 1920-21.
He then turned to journalism and teaching
and to public service in Massachusetts. He
lectured on international relations at Har-
vard. He rose to be speaker in the Massa-
chusetts Legislature; and then for 10 years
was a Member of Congress.
As a Member of Congress, he led the fa-
mous Herter committee, whose report helped
bring to life the Marshall Plan. For 4 years,
he was Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and then Under Secretary of
State and Secretary of State.
Throughout his life he stood for an Amer-
ica that would assume its full responsibilities
on the world scene in conformity with the
highest values of our national tradition.
Christian Herter was a wise, gentle, and
wholly dedicated patriot. He will be missed
greatly by all of us, but his life and work
will always be remembered as an important
part of the half century which has trans-
formed this nation's place in the world com-
munity.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 306 dated December 31
The death of Governor Christian Herter is
a source of deep grief to me and to his many
friends and colleagues in the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
During a lifetime of selfless and brilliant
service as legislator, diplomat. Governor,
Under Secretary and then Secretary of State,
Governor Herter was one of America's great-
est public servants.
During his most recent activity as the
President's Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, he performed a most difficult
and intricate duty with great skill and devo-
tion.
Those of us who knew him have suffered a
great personal loss. Our country will sorely
miss his talent and dedication.
147
Europe and America— Partners in Technology
by George C. McGhee
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^
III
lit
In Germany and other European countries
concern has been expressed in recent months
about diiTerences in the level and rates of
technological development between Europe
and the United States. There has been dis-
cussion of what has come to be called the
"technology gap." A belief appears to exist
that critical sectors of the European economy
are not participating sufficiently in the re-
search that leads to advanced technological
development.
This is fed by statements implying that
America's greater size, its greater capital re-
sources, and particularly its large-scale
official support of industrial research and de-
velopment, will result in technological superi-
ority that no European competitor can
match. It is said that American-owned firms
operating in Europe do not engage in an ap-
propriate amount of basic research, but im-
port their research "full blown" from the
United States for use by their European
manufacturing subsidiaries.
This subject is of great political and eco-
nomic interest to both of our countries. To-
night I want to consider some of the facts,
try to place them in perspective, and make
clear the intention of the United States to
work with Europe in alleviating the causes
of its concern.
A symposium on international technologi-
cal cooperation examined this subject in de-
tail during the Hannover Fair. The Science
a
• Address made at the Wirtschafthochschule at
Mannheim, Germany, on Nov. 10.
Policy Committee of the OECD [Organiza
tion of Economic Cooperation and Develop
ment] has begun a study of this developmeni
including its causes and its significance ii
relation to other aspects of economic growth
More has to be done; many more discussion
must be held. We can, however, attempt ai
analysis. Let us begin with a general obser
vation.
One important aim of both research an«
technological development is economic prog
ress. The conclusion is inescapable thai
Western Europe, in terms of gross national
product, productivity, and industrial produc
tion, has more than kept pace with the eco>
nomic growth of the United States over th-
past 15 years. Even in production for export
where Europe is often said to be at an in
creasing disadvantage, the record shows tha
Europe has done substantially better than wt
have.
Between 1953 and 1964 the Federal Repub
lie's gross national product grew at an an
nual average rate in real terms of 6.3 per-
cent; the figure for the United States was 3.11
percent. During the same period the Euro-
pean Common Market area grew 5.5 percent
a year.
EEC [European Economic Community]!
and German exports also developed more
rapidly than those of the United States. Be-
tween 1957 and 1964 U.S. exports expanded
25 percent; during the same period German
exports increased 88 percent and the EEC as
a group, 90 percent.
It would be a different story if European
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
irms were unable to compete with Ameri-
;ans; however, the United States and Ger-
nany at present have approximately equiva-
ent growth rates of about 4 percent in real
;erms. And, although progress in Western
Europe has not been even, the only signifi-
cant exception to the generally favorable
;rend has been Great Britain. It is interest-
ing that — of five countries surveyed in a re-
cent OECD study — Great Britain made the
greatest research and development effort on
all four counts of measurement: amount of
funds invested, percentage of gross national
product, per capita expenditure, and per-
zi centage of manpower employed. Yet it
loI^showed the poorest record in the past 15
ent years in gross national product growth, in-
: dustry growth, and increase in productivity
!l; and exports.
Trends in the Technological "Spin Off"
There is a belief in Europe that the strong
technological and commercial position of
American industry has resulted largely from
research contracts provided by the United
States Government. It is true that in recent
years our Government expenditures for re-
search and development have increased
markedly. At present they total $15 billion
a year; in addition, American industry
spends $7 billion of its own. The total re-
search and development outlay in the United
States equals about 3.1 percent of the gross
national product. This compares with about
1.8 percent in Germany.
Although about 60 percent of United
States Federal funds for research and devel-
opment have gone to American industry, it
is important to understand that they were
not provided as subsidies for mass-produc-
tion industries in competition with foreign
producers. They went to develop products
which the U.S. Government has bought. The
United States Government has, moreover,
been a specialized type of customer, setting
standards and placing orders in such a way
as to meet politically determined U.S. na-
tional objectives.
The largest area of research and develop-
ment support has been in defense — and quite
logically so, since the basis of all advanced
weapons systems is a sophisticated technol-
ogy. In second place is space research. These
two fields alone presently consume some $12
billion yearly of Federal funds out of $15
billion allotted to research and development.
It is not easy to identify the extent of the
"spin off" process; that is, the benefits that
civilian technology derives from military or
space programs. More studies are necessary.
Several trends, however, seem clear.
When the products of the military and
space programs coincide with the demands of
the civilian economy, the technological trans-
fer is demonstrated in its most dramatic
form. Take, as an example, jet aircraft and
computers. A requirement for a military jet
tanker led to the development of the Boeing
707. Because the Defense Department and
the space agencies needed computers, their
advance was accelerated. Civil and military
aircraft development have traditionally gone
hand in hand.
But in other fields the transfer has been
slower in coming. The limitation for civilian
market production is cost; the defense or
government market frequently sets perform-
ance limits. Different approaches and differ-
ent production philosophies are required to
meet the needs of the two different markets.
Civilian production requires a large adver-
tising, distribution, sales promotion, and
market development organization. But Gov-
ernment requires none of this.
One additional point must be made. The
space program, costing the American tax-
payer about $5 billion a year, results in much
technical knowledge which, it is believed,
should be widely applicable in American in-
dustry. In the past the civilian economy has,
however, been slow to absorb this technology.
The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration has created a special division
of technology utilization, which collects and
disseminates new technical information to
private firms. This has been enthusiastically
welcomed by American industry; it will be
interesting to see how successful it is in gain-
ing wider application of new technical knowl-
edge. In this connection I might say that
JANUARY 23, 1967
149
NASA, in certain cases, now issues royalty-
producing licenses to foreign firms interested
in NASA-sponsored developments.
I wish to be fully understood. Certainly
the general economy benefits from these Gov-
ernment-supported research activities, but
their nature is, I think, often misunderstood.
If we overemphasize their benefits, the result
may be to obscure the real causes of the so-
called "technology gap" which we are con-
sidering.
There have been several important results
of the U.S. Government commitment to re-
search and development. One has been to
dramatize the role of science and technology
in national development. Space has fired the
imagination of many young people. Federal
support has provided training for young sci-
entists in many areas of basic research, and
these people have later found their way into
industry. In a more direct sense the defense
and particularly the space programs in the
United States have resulted in new concepts
of project direction and control.
A "Management Gap"
The concept of "systems management" — a
kind of mathematical formalization of good
"horse sense" as applied to complicated tech-
nical systems — has made it possible to con-
trol large projects involving hundreds of
companies and thousands of people to ex-
tremely high tolerances of reliability, within
rigid time limits and with maximum effi-
ciency. Successful application of these meth-
ods permits the most economical use of raw
materials and of expensive personnel. It
means more and better products at lower
prices — which is the secret of meeting busi-
ness competition.
But new methods are available to all who
will accept them. Their adoption, however,
depends on management initiative. I have
heard it said that the European problem is
not so much a "technology gap" as it is a
"management gap."
It is generally assumed that research and
development means innovation — and that in-
i
i
1
I
novation means economic growth. This is
oversimplification. A new invention can I
applied only with enterprise supported I
sufficient investment capital where there e:
ists a broad market. We need to know moi
about the relation between research and di
velopment as it relates to economic growtl:
however, it is clear that they do not neces
sarily follow one another automatically
Dr. Donald Hornig, President Johnson'
Science Adviser, at an OECD science minij
ters meeting, pointed out that an essentia
ingredient is the proper environment for er
couragement of innovative application. Gov
ernments may help to create this enviror
ment through their policies in the fields o
patents, taxation, capital development, an'
wages and prices. These are often more im
portant than the policy toward science o
research. The laboratory is only one aspec1>-
and not necessarily the most important — ii
the complex structure of an expanding indus
trial society.
Japan is an example. With research ant
development roughly equal to Germany's
Japan's growth rates in recent years hav(
been twice the German and three times th(
French rate. Japan leads the world in ship
building. She is second only to the Unite<i
States in plastics production, although sh«
originated but few of the new plastics mate*
rials herself.
Look for a minute at Sony, the outstanding
Japanese electronics firm. I have been tolc
that $100 invested in Sony in 1946 woulc
now yield $7 million. Sony's development ol
miniaturized radios, tape recorders, and tele
vision sets for the civilian market is based oni
the application of a patented American in
vention, the transistor, which was largely
neglected in the United States until Japanese
enterprise showed the way. Even more sig-
nificant is the fact that Sony's largest market
is the United States.
Japan has been particularly successful in
exploiting the results of foreign research and
development through two kinds of arrange-
ments; namely, purchase of technical know-
how and production by jointly owned foreign
150
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Jubsidiaries. Japan has used its limited re-
lources very skillfully indeed.
It is often said that the growth of Ameri-
an subsidiaries endangers the European
iconomy. When I spoke before the Rhein-
luhr Club in Duesseldorf in June, I at-
empted to make one point clear: that Ameri-
an business firms operating in Germany are
Jerman firms or joint U.S.-German under-
lakings in every sense of the word. The point
8 important. It has also been said that
i^merican firms here are only producers, that
Ihey do no research of their own in Europe
md hence are making Europe increasingly
lependent on American technology. This can
ilso be viewed in another light.
Survey of U.S. Subsidiaries in Germany
A marked characteristic of German science
and technology is a shortage of qualified per-
sonnel. If U.S. firms opened large research
'acilities here, they would compete for an
already scarce commodity; namely, the re-
,earch scientist. But, assuming that U.S. de-
velopment of research facilities here is de-
drable, let us look at the facts. The Embassy
'ecently surveyed U.S. subsidiaries operating
n the Federal Republic to learn the extent
and magnitude of their research operations.
In reply, some pointed out the nature of
;heir operations called for no research. This
s also true of many German firms. Some
American firms were only recently estab-
ished. But, out of the 74 firms which have
replied so far, 32 reported that they were
carrying on research and development in this
country — with expenditures averaging be-
tween 2 and 6 percent of total turnover. Six
others stated that most of their research was
being done in laboratories established by par-
ent organizations in other Common Market
countries. Two other respondents said that
they planned to begin research work in Ger-
many in 1968. In sum, the replies showed
American subsidiaries devoting steadily
greater expenditures to research and develop-
ment in Germany.
American subsidiaries carrying out re-
search in Germany include IBM Deutschland,
Deutsche ITT Industries, and Kaiser Alumin-
ium-Werke, to mention only a few. IBM is
operating six development and research lab-
oratories in Europe alone. The laboratories
in Germany employ 700 scientists and tech-
nicians. During the period 1964-1965, IBM
donated $15 million to German universities
for the promotion of science and research.
Fifty of its employees lecture regularly at
German universities and technical institutes.
Kaiser Aluminium is spending approxi-
mately 3 percent of its turnover for research
and development in Germany, developing
new and improved alloys for cryogenic and
ballistic applications, as well as for architec-
tural use. Deutsche ITT Industries has a re-
search program amounting to 7 percent of its
sales turnover; the program is directed to-
ward development of semiconductor compo-
nents.
Opel also conducts an independent research
and development program in this country. In-
deed, the Opel Kadett was completely de-
signed and developed in Germany. The
millionth car in this series rolled oflf the as-
sembly line last month. On an average, Opel's
research expenditures come to about 2 per-
cent of its annual sales turnover; this would
be about 72 million deutsche marks for 1965.
Besides the research these organizations
are doing here, we should also keep in mind
the knowledge German scientists, employed
by these firms, bring back from their fre-
quent assignments and trips to the United
States. To this should be added the access
these firms obtain to research results and
information developed in the United States —
or in laboratories elsewhere. In research and
development the payoff is in the application,
not in the research itself. And in this respect
Europe is profiting directly from investments
made elsewhere. This is a net gain.
Let us extend this reasoning. Even if a
firm begins abroad as a producer, it must
eventually become an innovator too — and a
developer as well — if it is to compete in an
active consumer market. This means re-
search and product development, and it
means research done not only in America but
JANUARY 23, 1967
151
directly in the marketing area. This means
research designed to meet the competition on
its own ground, carried out by people who
know and can evaluate local conditions.
Europe as a Research Entity
In developing their European facilities
many American firms are looking at Europe
not as a group of independent countries but
as a unit. A regional laboratory in one coun-
try often performs research for subsidiaries
throughout Europe. Gulf Oil, for instance,
has just established a new research center in
Rotterdam; Esso, in addition to its long-
standing facility in Hamburg, will centralize
its petrochemical research for Europe at a
new center in Brussels next year.
Several U.S. chemical companies have
maintained research operations in Europe
for some time: Union Carbide in Brussels
and Monsanto Chemical and American Cy-
anamid in Switzerland. Eastman Kodak
does research in Paris. IBM has a basic re-
search operation in Zurich. In short, U.S.
firms are beginning to look upon Europe as a
research entity. They realize that a localized
or fractionalized approach is uneconomical,
just as they have realized that research done
only in the United States cannot meet the
needs of the European market.
Some observers have questioned the quality
of European research and development.
There is no foundation for this. European
research is of the highest quality. It is so
good, in fact, that the United States Govern-
ment agencies are still obtaining basic re-
search through grants and contracts to
European laboratories. Despite concern over
the balance-of-payments deficit, U.S. outlays
for research in Europe approach $10 million
a year — more than $700,000 of which is
spent in Germany.
European governments could do more to
support research and development. I am con-
vinced, as I look at the efforts of Science
Minister [Gerhard] Stoltenberg or at the
work of Minister [Alain] Peyrefitte in Paris,
that research budgets in these two countries
will continue to increase. It must be recog-
(
nized, however, that a greater problem tha;
money is scientific manpower. To prepare fo
researchers of the future, European school
must stimulate the imagination of their stu
dents. In 1962 there were 6.2 researel
workers per 1,000 population in the Unite
States, compared with 2.9 in Western Eu
rope. Europe's educational programs must b
oriented to narrow this gap.
Considerable concern has been voiced ii
Europe about the so-called "brain drain": tb
loss of trained scientists through emigratioi
to the United States. It is difficult to obtaii
accurate data, and the situation differs fron
country to country. The French do not seen
to enjoy working in America; if they go a
all, they rarely stay. A decade ago Germai
scientists were leaving for the United States
at the rate of several hundred a year. Al
though American institutions — universitie;
and colleges as well as industries — will al
ways welcome well-trained professionals
from Europe, I can assure you that it is noi
our desire to rob Europe of her research
scientists and engineers.
To assure that she keeps her scientists Ea
rope herself must create the proper working
environment, be it through investment ir
new projects and programs, or through in
creased opportunities for individual develop-
ment and advancement in the universities. A
large, mobile pool of technical manpower
exists in the United States. Competition
among Government, private firms, and uni-
versities for outstanding people has raised
the scientist's status as well as his salary
and career opportunities. In sum, personnel
policy is an important aspect of national sci-
ence policy. Recognizing this, the Federal
Republic's "Science Cabinet" only the other
day announced salary increases for scientists
working in federally supported research in-
stitutes.
It has been suggested that America initiate
a "technological Marshall Plan" for Europe.
But technical capability is not to be had for
the asking — or the giving. Europe must co-
ordinate her own research and development
priorities, define her technological goals, and
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rovide the funds needed to assure their
ealization.
Much of America's technological knowl-
dge is in the hands of private industry,
imerican organizations are eager to partici-
late in joint projects or in exchanges of
inow-how with European counterparts. Of-
en the cheapest way to acquire technical
inow-how is through purchase of a license,
lany United States firms have acquired Ger-
lan licenses. This is often cheaper than per-
orming the research. But Europeans will
nd American firms much more interested in
rading one idea for another — in a swap
ather than a sale. The good contract negoti-
tor seeks to acquire useful new knowledge,
,ot merely to sell a license. One of the
trongest arguments for an independent com-
any research program is the bargaining
ower thus acquired.
ireas for Government-Sponsored Research
While I have emphasized that the solution
3 the so-called "technology gap" cannot be
ought exclusively in government-sponsored
esearch, there are, nevertheless, areas in the
o-called big sciences where costs exceed the
apacities of individual firms — even large
nes. In such areas as atomic energy, space
■esearch, oceanography, high energy physics,
,ir and water pollution research, and de-
alination of sea water, government initiative
an be important in stimulating technological
dvance.
Some of these costs may exceed even na-
ional capabilities. But since we pursue the
ame goals, why should we not collaborate
hrough a combination of government and
)rivate initiative to achieve them? During
Ilhancellor [Ludwig] Erhard's recent visit
,0 the United States, he and President John-
son discussed technological advance. The
President expressed American willingness to
;onsider European ideas.^ The Italian Gov-
irnment has already made a proposal which
s currently under study in Western capitals.
N'ASA has been discussing a coordinated
* For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966,
p. 578.
U.S.-European program with ESRO, the
European Space Research Organization. A
specific proposal for a highly sophisticated
probe to the planet Jupiter is on the table.
We hope the Europeans will be able to par-
ticipate. Besides producing valuable data on
the solar system, the project promises major
technological benefits for European industry.
I would, before closing, like to point to
the achievement of the Federal Republic's
nuclear program, particularly for the benefit
of those who argue that there is no hope of
Europe's forging ahead in the technological
race. In 1955 the Federal Republic made its
bow in the realm of atomic energy. Thanks
to a policy of Government assistance for pri-
vate initiative, with a core of distinguished
physicists, with the expenditure of $825 mil-
lion, and in cooperation with EURATOM as
well as the United States and Great Britain,
German nuclear science has advanced to
world levels. In the present program of co-
operation with Europe and the United States
for faster breeder reactor development, Ger-
many is playing with distinction the role of
an original contributor as well as a benefici-
ary.
Thus, a national initiative, plus the setting
of a national priority and coupled with inter-
national cooperation, has paid great divi-
dends. There is no reason why this cannot be
repeated in other areas as well.
But these are decisions for Europe to
make. It is not, I believe, appropriate for us
to prescribe solutions. I wish only to reiterate
my Government's willingness to consider Eu-
ropean suggestions for a cooperative resolu-
tion of our technological and industrial dif-
ferences. The historical, economic, and
cultural fates of Western Europe and the
United States are inextricably entwined. We
must collaborate to strengthen this fabric.
There will be problems and differing view-
points, but the dialog between us must con-
tinue. As a contribution to that dialog, I am
grateful to have had the opportunity to come
here this evening to set forth American views
on a subject of economic and political con-
cern to all of us.
JANUARY 23, 1967
153
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, December 29, 1966.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. En-
tered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States
March 6, 1931. TS 834.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Da-
homey, September 22, 1966.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signatures: Australia, October 13, 1966; Czecho-
slovakia (with a reservation and declaration),
October 7, 1966; Finland, October 6, 1966; Holy
See, November 21, 1966; Iceland, November 14,
1966; Mexico, November 1, 1966; Netherlands,
October 24, 1966; New Zealand, October 25,
1966; Norway, November 21, 1966; Sierra Le-
one, November 17, 1966; United Kingdom (with
a reservation and interpreting statements),
October 11, 1966.
BILATERAL
Iraq
Agricultural commodities agreement under title '
of the Agricultural Trade Development and J-
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S„
1731-36), with exchange of notes. Signed t
Baghdad December 19, 1966. Entered into fois
December 19, 1966.
Jamaica
Agreement for the exchange of official publicatioi.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Dece ■
ber 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 19t.
Netherlands
Agreement relating to the granting of authorizatio;
to permit licensed amateur radio operators '
either country to operate their stations in t
other country. Effected by exchange of notes ,
The Hague June 22, 1966.
Entered into force: December 21, 1966.
Portugal
Agreement extending the arrangement concerni ■
trade in cotton textiles of March 12, 1964 (TL''
5741). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisb.
December 19, 1966. Entered into force Decemb
19, 1966.
Togo
Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sig:ned
Lome February 8, 1966.
Ratifications exchanged: January 5, 1967.
Enters into force : February 5, 1967.
Viet-Nam
Agricultural commodities agreement under title
of the Agricultural Trade Development and A
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.'
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed i
Saigon December 15, 1966. Entered into fori
December 15, 1966.
Not in force.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of- foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
VOL. LVI, NO. 1439
the Department, afl -^/ell as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
PUBLICATION 8187 JANUARY 23, 1967
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Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20401
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi
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NOTE : Contents of this publication ar
not copyrighted and items contained hereii
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart
ment of State Bulletin as the source wll
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed ii
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 23, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1439
Department and Foreign Service. President
Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mouni Death of
Christian Herter 147
lEconomic AfiFairs
[Europe and America — Partners in Technology
(McGhee) 148
U.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
Europe. Europe and America — Partners in
Technology (McGhee) 148
Germany. Europe and America — Partners in
Technology (McGhee) 148
Presidential Documents
President Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mourn
Death of Christian Herter 147
US. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia 145
Science
[Europe and America — Partners in Technology
(McGhee) 148
International Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
southern Rhodesia
International Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
J/S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 154
Jnited Nations
international Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
J.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
J.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam
(Goldberg, U Thant) 137
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Discusses Prospects for 1967
on "Face the Nation" 126
Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Pol-
icy on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders (Pow-
ell, Rusk) 133
U.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam
(Goldberg, U Thant) 137
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 137, 140
Johnson, President 145, 147
McGhee, George C 148
Powell, Robert 133
Rusk, Secretary 126, 133, 147
U Thant 137
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to January 2 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
304 of December 29 and 306 of January 9.
No. Date Subject
fl 1/5 U.S. and Togo exchange instru-
ments of ratification on com-
mercial treaty.
2 1/6 Rusk: letter to student leaders.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■ti U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/29
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Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task
The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fii
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President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers
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sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. lUO
January SO, 1967
THE STATE OF THE UNION
Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts) 158
THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND THE WORLD OF THE 1970's
Address by Vice President Humphrey ISA
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON "TODAY" PROGRAM
Transcript of Interview 168
NEW INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR PASSENGER-SHIP SAFETY
Article by William K. Miller 173
For index see inside back cover
The State of the Union
ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)^
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, distin-
guished Members of the Congress:
I have come here tonight to report to you
that this is a time of testing for our Nation.
At home, the question is whether we will
continue working for better opportunities
for all Americans, when most Americans are
already living better than any people m his-
tory.
Abroad, the question is whether we have
the staying power to fight a very costly M^ar,
when the objective is limited and the danger
to us is seemingly remote.
So our test is not whether we shrink from
our country's cause when the dangers to us
are obvious and close at hand but, rather,
whether we carry on when they seem ob-
scure and distant — and some think that it
is safe to lay down our burdens.
I have come tonight to ask this Congress
and this Nation to resolve that issue: to
meet our commitments at home and abroad
— to continue to build a better America — and
to reaffirm this Nation's allegiance to free-
dom.
As President Abraham Lincoln said, "We
must ask where we are, and whither we are
tending."
' Delivered on Jan. 10 (Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Jan. 16, 1967); also
available as H. Doc. 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess.
Abroad, as at home, there is also risk in
change. But abroad, as at home, there is a
greater risk in standing still. No part of our
foreign policy is so sacred that it ever re-
mains beyond review. We shall be flexible
where conditions in the world change — and
where man's efforts can change them for the
better.
Transition to International Partnership
We are in the midst of a great transition
— a transition from narrow nationalism to
international partnership; from the harsh
spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of
common humanity on a troubled and a
threatened planet.
In Latin America the American chiefs of
state will be meeting very shortly to give our
hemispheric policies new direction.
We have come a long way in this hemi-
sphere since the inter- American effort in eco-
nomic and social development was launched
by the conference at Bogota in 1960 under
the leadership of President Eisenhower. The
Alliance for Progress moved dramatically
forward under President Kennedy. There is
new confidence that the voice of the people
is being heard, that the dignity of the indi-
vidual is stronger than ever in this hemi-
sphere, and we are facing up to and meeting
many of the hemispheric problems together.
In this hemisphere that reform under de-
mocracy can be made to happen — because it
has happened. So together, I think, we must
158
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
now move to strike down the barriers to full
cooperation among the American nations
and to free the energ:ies and the resources of
two great continents on behalf of all of our
citizens.
Africa stands at an earlier stage of de-
velopment than Latin America. It has yet to
develop the transportation, communications,
agriculture, and, above all, the trained men
and women without which growth is impos-
sible. There, too, the job will best be done if
the nations and peoples of Africa cooperate
on a regional basis. More and more our pro-
grams for Africa are going to be directed
toward self-help.
The future of Africa is shadowed by un-
solved racial conflicts. Our policy will con-
tinue to reflect our basic commitments as a
people to support those who are prepared to
work toward cooperation and harmony be-
tween races and to help those who demand
change but reject the fool's gold of violence.
In the Middle East the spirit of good will
toward all unfortunately has not yet taken
hold. An already tortured peace seems to be
constantly threatened. We shall try to use
our influence to increase the possibilities of
improved relations among the nations of that
region. We are working hard at that task.
In the great subcontinent of South Asia
live more than a sixth of the earth's popula-
tion. Over the years we — and others — have
invested very heavily in capital and food for
the economic development of India and
Pakistan.
We are not prepared to see our assistance
wasted, however, in conflict. It must
strengthen their capacity to help themselves.
It must help these two nations— both our
friends — to overcome poverty, to emerge as
self-reliant leaders, and find terms for
reconciliation and cooperation.
In Western Europe we shall maintain in
NATO an integrated common defense. But
we also look forward to the time when
greater security can be achieved through
measures of arms control and disarmament
and through other forms of practical agree-
ment.
Relations With Eastern Europe
We are shaping a new future of enlarged
partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic
and technical cooperation, in trade negotia-
tions, in political consultation, and in work-
ing together with the governments and
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
The emerging spirit of confidence is pre-
cisely what we hoped to achieve when we
went to work a generation ago to put our
shoulder to the wheel and try to help rebuild
Europe. We faced new challenges and oppor-
tunities then and there — and we faced also
some dangers. But I believe that the peoples
on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as both
sides of this Chamber, wanted to face them
together.
Our relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are also in transition. We
have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric
of the cold war. When we have differed with
the Soviet Union, or other nations for that
matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with
courtesy and without venom.
Our objective is not to continue the cold
war but to end it.
We have reached an agreement at the
United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer
space: ^
We have agreed to open direct air flights
with the Soviet Union.'
We have removed more than 400 nonstra-
tegic items from export control.
We are determined that the Export-
Import Bank can allow commercial credits to
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslo-
vakia, as well as to Romania and Yugoslavia.
We have entered into a cultural agreement
with the Soviet Union for another 2 years.*
We have agreed with Bulgaria and
Hungary to upgrade our legations to embas-
sies.
^ For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966,
p. 952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
' For text of an agreement signed on Nov. 4, see
ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.
■* For text of a joint communique, see ibid., Apr. 4,
1966, p. 543.
JANUARY 30, 1967
159
We have started discussions with interna-
tional agencies on ways of increasing con-
tacts with Eastern European countries.
This administration has taken these steps
even as duty compelled us to fulfill and exe-
cute alliances and treaty obligations through-
out the world that were entered into before
I became President.
So, tonight I now ask and urge this Con-
gress to help our foreign and our commercial
trade policies by passing an East- West trade
bill and by approving our consular conven-
tion with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has in the past year in-
creased its long-range missile capabilities.
It has begun to place near Moscow a limited
antimissile defense. My first responsibility to
our people is to assure that no nation can
ever find it rational to launch a nuclear at-
tack or to use its nuclear power as a credible
threat against us or against our allies.
I would emphasize that that is why an im-
portant link between Russia and the United
States is in our common interest, in arms
control and in disarmament. We have the
solemn duty to slow down the arms race be-
tween us, if that is at all possible, in both
conventional and nuclear weapons and de-
fenses. I thought we were making some
progress in that direction the first few
months I was in office. I realize that any ad-
ditional race would impose on our peoples,
and on all mankind for that matter, an addi-
tional waste of resources with no gain in
security to either side.
I expect in the days ahead to closely con-
sult and seek the advice of the Congress
about the possibilities of international
agreements bearing directly upon this prob-
lem.
The Food-Population Problem
Next to the pursuit of peace, the really
greatest challenge to the human family is the
race between food supply and population in-
crease. That race tonight is being lost.
The time for rhetoric has clearly passed.
The time for concerted action is here and
we must get on with the job.
We believe that three principles must pre-
vail if our policy is to succeed:
First, the developing nations must give
highest priority to food production, including
the use of technology and the capital of-
private enterprise.
Second, nations with food deficits must put
more of their resources into voluntary family
planning programs.
And third, the developed nations must all
assist other nations to avoid starvation in the
short run and to move rapidly toward the
ability to feed themselves.
Every member of the world community
now bears a direct responsibility to help
bring our most basic human account into
balance.
Why We Are in Viet-Nam
I come now finally to Southeast Asia — and
to Viet-Nam in particular. Soon I will sub-
mit to the Congress a detailed report on that
situation. Tonight I want to just review the
essential points as briefly as I can.
We are in Viet-Nam because the United
States of America and our allies are com-
mitted by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet
the common danger" of aggression in South-
east Asia.
We are in Viet-Nam because an interna-
tional agreement signed by the United
States, North Viet-Nam, and others in 1962
is being systematically violated by the Com-
munists. That violation threatens the inde-
pendence of all the small nations in Southeast
Asia and threatens the peace of the entire
region and perhaps the world.
We are there because the people of South
Viet-Nam have as much right to remain non-
Communist — if that is what they choose —
as North Viet-Nam has to remain Commu-
nist.
We are there because the Congress has
pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary
measures to prevent further aggression.
No better words could describe our pres-
ent course than those once spoken by the
great Thomas Jefferson: "It is the melan-
choly law of human societies to be compelled
160
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
sometimes to choose a great evil in order to
ward off a greater."
We have chosen to fight a Hmited war in
Viet-Nam in an attempt to prevent a larger
war — a war almost certain to follow, I be-
lieve, if the Commimists succeed in overrun-
ning and taking over South Viet-Nam by
aggression and by force. I believe, and I am
supported by some authority, that if they are
not checked now the world can expect to pay
a greater price to check them later.
That is what our statesmen said when they
debated this treaty, and that is why it was
ratified 82 to 1 by the Senate many years
ago.
You will remember that we stood in West-
ern Europe 20 years ago. Is there anyone in
this Chamber tonight who doubts that the
course of freedom was not changed for the
better because of the courage of that stand?
Sixteen years ago we and others stopped
another kind of aggression — ^this time it was
in Korea. Imagine how different Asia might
be today if we had failed to act when the
Communist army of North Korea marched
south. The Asia of tomorrow will be far dif-
ferent because we have said in Viet-Nam, as
we said 16 years ago in Korea: "This far and
no further."
I think I reveal no secret when I tell you
that we are dealing with a stubborn adver-
sary who is committed to the use of force
and terror to settle political questions.
I wish I could report to you that the con-
flict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face
more cost, more loss, and more agony. For
the end is not yet. I cannot promise you that
it will come this year — or come next year.
Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight,
that he can go on fighting longer than we
can and longer than we and our allies will
be prepared to stand up and resist.
Our men in that area — there are nearly
500,000 now — have borne well "the burden
and the heat of the day." Their efforts have
deprived the Communist enemy of the vic-
tory that he sought and that he expected a
year ago. We have steadily frustrated his
main forces. General [William C] West-
moreland reports that the enemy can no
longer succeed on the battlefield.
So I must say to you that our pressure
must be sustained — and will be sustained —
until he realizes that the war he started is
costing him more than he can ever gain.
I know of no strategy more likely to at-
tain that end than the strategy of "accumu-
lating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of
material resource" — of "laboriously teaching
troops the very elements of their trade."
That, and patience — and I mean a great deal
of patience.
Our South Vietnamese allies are also being
tested tonight. Because they must provide
real security to the people living in the coun-
tryside. And this means reducing the ter-
rorism and the armed attacks, which kid-
naped and killed 26,900 civilians in the last
32 months, to levels where they can be suc-
cessfully controlled by the regular South
Vietnamese security forces. It means bring-
ing to the villagers an effective civilian gov-
ernment that they can respect, and that they
can rely upon, and that they can participate
in, and that they can have a personal stake
in. We hope that government is now begin-
ning to emerge.
While I cannot report the desired progress
in the pacification effort, the very distin-
guished and able Ambassador, Henry Cabot
Lodge, reports that South Viet-Nam is turn-
ing to this task with a new sense of urgency.
We can help, but only they can win this part
of the war. Their task is to build and protect
a new life in each rural province.
Spirit of Hope Rising in Asia
One result of our stand in Viet-Nam is
already clear.
It is this: The peoples of Asia now know
that the door to independence is not going to
be slammed shut. They know that it is pos-
sible for them to choose their own national
destinies — without coercion.
The performance of our men in Viet-Nam
— backed by the American people — has
created a feeling of confidence and unity
among the independent nations of Asia and
JANUARY 30, 1967
161
the Pacific. I saw it in their faces in the 19
days that I spent in their homes and in their
countries. Fear of external Communist con-
quest in many Asian nations is already sub-
siding— and with this, the spirit of hope is
rising. For the first time in history, a com-
mon outlook and common institutions are
already emerging.
This forward movement is rooted in the
ambitions and the interests of Asian nations
themselves. It was precisely this movement
that we hoped to accelerate when I spoke at
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore in April 1965,^
and I pledged "a much more massive effort
to improve the life of man" in that part of
the world, in the hope that we could take
some of the funds that we were spending on
bullets and bombs and spend it on schools and
production.
Twenty months later our efforts have pro-
duced a new reality: The doors of the billion-
dollar Asian Development Bank that I
recommended to the Congress, and you en-
dorsed almost unanimously, I am proud to
tell you, are already open. Asians are en-
gaged tonight in regional efl^orts in a dozen
new directions. Their hopes are high. Their
faith is strong. Their confidence is deep.
And even as the war continues, we shall
play our part in carrying forward this con-
structive historic development. As recom-
mended by the Eugene Black mission, and
if other nations will join us, I will seek a spe-
cial authorization from the Congress of $200
million for East Asian regional programs.
Because we are eager to turn our re-
sources to peace. Our eflForts in behalf of
humanity I think need not be restricted by
any parallel or by any boundary line. The
moment that peace comes, as I pledged in
Baltimore, I will ask the Congress for funds
to join in an international program of recon-
struction and development for all the people
of Viet-Nam — and their deserving neighbors
who wish our help.
' rbid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
We shall continue to hope for a reconcilia-
tion between the people of mainland China
and the world community — including work-
ing together in all the tasks of arms control,
security, and progress on which the fate of-
the Chinese people, like their fellow men
elsewhere, depends.
We would be the first to welcome a China
which decided to respect her neighbors'
rights. We would be the first to applaud her
were she to apply her great energies and in-
telligence to improving the welfare of her
people. And we have no intention of trying
to deny her legitimate needs for security and
friendly relations with her neighboring coun-
tries.
Our hope that all of this will some day hap-
pen rests on the conviction that we, the
American people and our allies, vdll and are
going to see Viet-Nam through to an honor-
able peace.
We will support all appropriate initiatives
by the United Nations, and others, which can
bring the several parties together for uncon-
ditional discussions of peace — anywhere, any
time. And we will continue to take every pos-
sible initiative ourselves to constantly probe
for peace.
The Course of Wisdom for This Country
Until such efforts succeed, or until the
infiltration ceases, or until the conflict sub-
sides, I think the course of wisdom for this
country is that we just must firmly pursue
our present course. We will stand firm in
Viet-Nam.
I think you know that our fighting men
there tonight bear the heaviest burden of
all. With their lives they serve their Nation.
We must give them nothing less than our
full support — and we have given them that —
nothing less than the determination that
Americans have always given their fighting
men. Whatever our sacrifice here, even if it
is more than $5 a month, it is small compared
to their own.
162
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
How long it will take I cannot prophesy. I
only know that the will of the American
people, I think, is tonight being tested.
Whether we can fight a war of limited ob-
jectives over a period of time, and keep alive
the hope of independence and stability for
people other than ourselves; whether we can
continue to act with restraint when the
temptation to "get it over with" is inviting
but dangerous; whether we can accept the
necessity of choosing "a great evil in order
to ward off a greater"; whether we can do
these without arousing the hatreds and the
passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of
war — on all these questions so much turns.
The answers will determine not only where
we are, but "whither we are tending."
A time of testing — yes. And a time of
transition. The transition is sometimes slow;
sometimes unpopular; almost always very
painful; and often quite dangerous.
But we have lived with danger for a long
time before, and we shall live with it for a
long time yet to come. We know that "man is
born unto trouble." We also know that this
Nation was not forged and did not survive
and grow and prosper without a great deal of
sacrifice from a great many men.
For all the disorders that we must deal
with and all the frustrations that concern us
and all the anxieties that we are called upon
to resolve, for all the issues that we must
face with the agony that attends them, let
us remember that "those who expect to reap
the blessings of freedom must, like men,
undergo the fatigues of supporting it."
But let us also count not only our burdens
but our blessings — for they are many.
And let us give thanks to the One who
governs us all.
Let us draw encouragement from the signs
of hope — for they, too, are many.
Let us remember that we have been tested
before and America has never been found
wanting.
So with your understanding, I would hope
your confidence, and your support, we are
going to persist — and we are going to suc-
ceed.
JANUARY 30, 196?
163
The Technological Revolution and the World of the 1970's
Address by Vice President Humphrey
The Institute of International Education
is a place where intellect and power have
been brought together— and long before
Franklin Roosevelt's "brain trust" or the era
of the Washington in-and-outer.
The Institute of International Education
has been in existence now almost half a cen-
tury. Its initiatives preceded the Fulbright
Act, the Smith-Mundt Act, the Mutual Edu-
cational and Cultural Exchange Act, the
International Education Act, and the range
of highly important programs which form
the base of our efforts in international
education today. And these programs came
none too soon. But without the work of the
Institute of International Education they
might not have come at all.
In the past two decades we have seen sci-
ence and technology shrink our neighborhood
so that today the moral unity and interde-
pendence of man (which for centuries has
been the basis of Western civilization) has
now become a physical fact of our lives. Iso-
lationism has been replaced by a global
consciousness.
Yet we are today only at the primitive
stages of the scientific and technological de-
velopment which will shrink our human
neighborhood still further.
The prospect of a supersonic transport
plane — a few years ago a matter of "if" — is
today only a matter of "who first?" I doubt
that we have full grasp of what the SST
' Made before the Institute of International Edu-
cation at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6.
will mean in terms of increased exchange of
people and goods.
And the communications satellites — Buck
Rogers items through most of our lifetimes —
will soon be bringing mass communication,
in the real sense, to our planet. They bear
with them, too, the implications cf the crea-
tion of a one-world classroom.
Tlie sky is no longer the limit!
strengthening International Education
In such an age, our position of world lead-
ership demands that we go far beyond our
present efforts in international education.
The International Education Act will make
a i-eal difference in helping improve the
faculties, facilities, and libraries of our col-
leges and universities. Its impact will be felt
at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels.
The new Center for Educational Coopera-
tion, among its other functions, will serve as
a Government manpower resources head-
quarters in the entire field.
These things give us a framework upon
which we can build.
Next year the President will convene an
international conference on education. Its
purpose will be to look beyond the programs
presently underway or even contemplated —
in fact, to take international education into
century 21. Planning meetings for the con-
ference will begin in the next few weeks,
under the chairmanship of Secretary [of
Health, Education, and Welfare John W.]
Gardner and Dr. James Perkins of Cornell.
164
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
But we all should remember that the de-
termination of the Government to do its part
to strengthen international education in no
way diminishes the need for continued lead-
ership in this field by private institutions of
all kinds, foundations, universities, colleges,
churches, and others.
The role of the Government in this field
must always be to supplement, never to sup-
plant, the efforts of private groups and indi-
viduals. The bold experiments, the expanded
programs that should come from private in-
stitutions— like the Institute of International
Education — can be carried out only with the
continued support of American private bene-
factors. So take the initiative — do your job —
lead.
Indeed, one of the urgent tasks of our
American democracy is to find new ways and
means to mobilize and allocate both public
and private resources to the priorities of our
time without either destroying private initia-
tive or unduly enhancing public power.
The Second Industrial Revolution
Tonight I would like to address myself to
the next decade, to the world of the 1970's.
I would like to take advantage of the pres-
ence of so many illustrious figures from the
world of education and finance, foundations
and business, the communications media and
the arts, to raise certain questions which you
and your children must answer. And it is
appropriate that these questions be put to
you.
Governments — and government officials —
must deal with immediate problems. This
often clouds their perception of the future.
But you are less inhibited by these restraints
and better situated to anticipate what is com-
ing as well as to respond to what is here.
In speculating on the world of the 1970's
(and what I suggest here tonight can only
be considered as speculation by an amateur)
I would like to raise several questions about
the consequences of what has been called
the second industrial revolution.
The first industrial revolution was charac-
terized by the invention of powerful
machines which multiply man's capacity for
physical work. The second industrial revolu-
tion, which is coming upon us long before the
problems of the first have been solved, is
characterized by the invention of new elec-
tronic machines which are destined to mul-
tiply the capacity of the human mind.
Differences Between Developed Areas
One important consequence of the second
industrial revolution involves the techno-
logical gap which today separates the world's
most developed country, the United States,
from the other developed areas of the world
— yes, even Europe.
This unique gap exists in large part be-
cause the second industrial revolution has
developed in the United States far more than
in any other area. It results, in part, from
the difl'ering levels of technological progress
and organizational efficiency, which are also
affected by the factor of optimum size.
These can lead to the creation of dif-
ferences between two developed areas — "de-
veloped" in the sense of the first industrial
revolution — just as there are differences
which now exist between the so-called de-
veloped areas of the Northern Hemisphere
and the developing or underdeveloped na-
tions of the South.
Scientific and technical progress is con-
tinuing at an accelerated rate with no pros-
pect of reaching a saturation point. Dis-
coveries are based on previous knowledge and
in turn generate progress in other fields.
Progress becomes self-propelling.
Only four areas of the world — the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, and the
Soviet Union — have the educational and re-
search resources and other elements of a
technological base to deal with the current
pace of scientific discoveries. But none of the
four has the resources today to deal effec-
tively with the entire spectrum of these dis-
coveries, although the United States comes
closest to it.
Scientific and technological progress de-
pends greatly on the rate of investment in
research and development.
JANUARY 30, 1967
165
Recent Common Market estimates show
the total of scientists and research workers
in the United States to be 4 times greater
than in all the countries of the EEC [Euro-
pean Economic Community] and 3I/2 times
greater than in the Soviet Union.
According to the same estimates, research
expenditures in the United States are 7 times
greater than in the Common Market and 3V^
times those of the Soviet Union.
And U.S. per capita investment is six
times as much as in the Common Market and
four times that of the Soviet Union.
Organizational Structure and Capacity
Beyond the statistics, however, we are told
by European entrepreneurs that this dis-
parity in scientific research capacity is
widened by the difference in organizational
capacity between the United States and
Europe.
Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti, for one, believes
that only the United States possesses the
highly developed modern organization re-
quired to profit appreciably from the techno-
logical discoveries of today.
This is especially important in the new and
complex field of electronic data processing,
where organization is the decisive factor in
exploiting the potential capacity of highly
refined machines.
To translate the amazing potential of com-
puters into concrete benefits for society re-
quires an accumulation of skills which few
nations have. It requires, as Mr. Peccei
points out, "evolved user techniques, knowl-
edge of machine languages, advanced meth-
odology, rich program libraries, access to the
cross-fertilizing experiences of a vast net-
work of users, plus a competent array of
mathematicians, analysts and programmers."
What is relevant here is that the material
advantages which exist in an advanced
society such as the United States or Western
Europe are multiplied by the organizational
structure and capacity of the country or
region.
Western European countries today have j
neither the size required for such efficient
organization nor adequate basic infrastruc-
ture, such as fully sufficient communication
linkage essential to transmission of elec- -
tronic data. The end of the present fragmen-
tation of Europe is considered a necessity.
Technology and Unity
But, fortunately, on both sides of the
Atlantic we are beginning to face up to this
problem.
We have already taken steps to remove
barriers to the flow of scientific and techni-
cal information and instruments to and from
our country.''
As a United States Senator I proposed that
NATO, in meeting the new challenges facing
the alliance, should take concrete steps to-
ward narrowing the technological gap.
Proposals for such cooperative actions are
now formally before the NATO ministers.'
The OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] ministers
have recently authorized an analytical study
of the gap.''
One promising proposal has been Prime
Minister Wilson's [British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson] for a European Technologi-
cal Community. If Europe — which has
already seen the benefits of a Euroi)ean Eco-
nomic Community, a Coal and Steel Com-
munity, and an Atomic Energy Community
— were to pool her technology in a similar
way, I have no doubt that the gap would in
the next decade begin to close.
The fundamental question which I would
like to leave with you is: What are the impli-
cations of this second industrial revolution
for the international relations of the 1970's,
especially the late 1970's?
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966,
p. 894.
' For text of a resolution adopted by the NATO
Council of Ministers on Dec. 16, 1966, see ibid., Jan.
9, 1967, p. 52.
* For U.S. statements and text of a communique
dated Nov. 25, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1967, p. 19.
166
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I do not know the answer. But already
serious men are concerned that it could re-
sult not in greater unity, not in the cement-
ing of a long-cherished Atlantic partnership,
but in estrangement between Europe and the
United States.
Yes, it could release forces which would
widen the gap between the United States and
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a
time when the ideological and military com-
petition between them might be diminishing.
If these are legitimate concerns, should
not men of vision and foresight seek to plan
for these eventualities and by decisive action
influence their development?
We must guide the technological revolu-
tion so that it can enhance our unity rather
than cause alienation and division.
This means that some way must be found
to insure a continuous exchange of techno-
logical and organizational experience be-
tween Europe and the United States which
will achieve an equilibrium that can be main-
tained and possibly someday expanded to in-
clude Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
If this seems fanciful, I would repeat that
I am discussing the next decade — which ends
in 1980 — not the present.
New Realities of a New Era
Reflecting on the problems which this sec-
ond industrial revolution will bring to our
own country in the next decade, a young
American pioneer in the second industrial
revolution, Mr. John Diebold, has proposed
the creation of "an institute for the con-
tinued assessment of the human consequences
of technological change."
Perhaps what is needed in the interna-
tional field is some equivalent forum which
would bring together under nongovernmental
auspices men of wisdom and experience from
the universities and foundations, science and
industry, politics and the professions, who
could systematically assess the implications
of this second industrial revolution for the
world of the 1970's. Their recommendations
would invariably become an important guide
to governmental decisionmaking.
Yes, we must have a global policy which
fits the new realities of a new era.
With such a policy, we shall be better pre-
pared not only to deal with the relations be-
tween the technologically advanced areas of
the world and the problems of survival and
peace which affect all countries, but also with
those areas where the first industrial revolu-
tion is still taking hold.
I refer to the problems of hunger and over-
population, education and social justice, and
distribution of wealth.
We shall be better prepared to strengthen
and enlarge the area of prosperity in the
world.
Building a Truly Human World
In the next decade, even more than the
present, the relationship between foreign
affairs and education will be important.
The scholar and the businessman, the
foundation and the university, will play a
significant role in accelerating the techno-
logical revolution and assisting mankind to
deal with its consequences.
But the closeness of their relationship, in
this decade or the next, in no way implies
that the university and the scholars and the
scientists should cease to independently pur-
sue their own ends. Chief among these is the
pursuit and dissemination of truth. Govern-
ment— at home or abroad — should not deflect
them from pursuing this end.
But in the next decade, as in this one,
scientific and technological education will not
be enough to sustain the spirit of civilization
or the functioning of a democratic society.
The vision of the poet and the philosopher,
the humanist and the historian, is needed to
stimulate what Shakespeare called the "bet-
ter angels of our nature."
Without these to guide us, the technologi-
cal revolution in the next decade can bring
the faceless men of an Orwellian world, men
whose sole distinction lies in their similarity
to one another.
JANUARY 30, 1967
167
The vision we need as we face the 1970's is
that of a great man who died in this city a
decade ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.
For him the marvels of modem science
and technology provided man with a new op-
portunity to build a truly human world.
Through his vision we can come to under-
stand that the growing interdependence of
mankind caused by the technological revolu-
tion can lead to a world civilization in which
both persons and nations find their individu-
ality enhanced, find their mutual dependence
and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed
rather than a threat to be feared.
If the men of talent and vision seize the
opportunity to plan now for the world of the
1970's, your children and mine at the turn
of the next decade can look forward with
hope and confidence to 1984.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today'' Program
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk on the National Broad-
casting System's television program "Today"
on Jantmry 12. Interviewing the Secretary
were Hugh Downs from New York and
Joseph C. Harsch in Washington.
Mr. Downs: You know, so much of the Na-
tion and, indeed, the world is concerned
these days over our current foreign policy.
So it seems most appropriate to invite Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk into our Washing-
ton studios this morning
Mr. Secretary, before we start on some of
the more immediate problems, and since this
is, as you may know, "Today" — the "Today"
program's 15th anniversary week, I wonder
if you'd tell us what you consider to be some
of the most important events that have oc-
curred over the past 15 years?
Secretary Rusk: Good morning, Hugh. I
think I would like to start by congratulating
you, and Barbara [Walters], and Frank
[Blair] on the "Today" program. It's a great
show, and I see it almost every day.
Mr. Doivns: Thank you.
Secretary Rusk: These 15 years have been
filled with important events. They began with
the winding up of the Korean war on the
basis of a rejection of North Korea's at-
tempts to seize South Korea by force.
This period has seen the multiplication
of nuclear weapons and the development of
competitive nuclear weapon systems, raising
for the first time in man's history the opera-
tional issue of the survival of the human race
— although, I think we can take more confi-
dence from — than we think from the fact
that it's been 21 years now since a nuclear
weapon has been fired in anger. That's a far
more important fact than most people
suppose.
It does point to the tragedy that the
Baruch proposals were not accepted back in
1946, under which there would have been no
nuclear power.
I think the historians will say that one of
the most dramatic aspects of this 15 years
has been the doubling of the membership of
the United Nations, the emergence of 60 or
more new nations into the world community
by — largely by peaceful means.
We have seen the second generation come
to power in the Soviet Union.
We've seen major division within the
Communist world because the authorities in
Peking have isolated themselves, even in the
Communist world, by their doctrines of mili-
tancy and aggressiveness.
We've had the experience of the Cuban
missile crisis in which men had to look down
the long cannon's mouth of great catastrophe.
168
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
And I think everybody came away from
that more prudent, a little more cautious
about how they conduct themselves in world
affairs.
We wind up this 15 years with some big
problems on our hands, the central one being
how we organize a durable peace.
I think in the next decade we're going to
face a critical food situation throughout the
world to which all nations must address
themselves.
But I think also that we can see that com-
mon sense is making some headway.
President Kennedy took to the Senate the
nuclear test ban treaty.
President Johnson has moved on the civil
air agreement with the Soviet Union, the
consular agreement, his East- West trade pro-
posals, the space treaty. We hope that we'll
be able to find some answer to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
So there's a full agenda ahead. But when
we look back on these 15 years, I think we
can see some steady progress toward peace
and reason in the world.
Mr. Downs: Thank you. And on that note,
I'll turn the questioning now over to NBC
diplomatic correspondent Joseph C. Harsch,
who I see is sitting in the studio alongside
you.
Aggression in Southeast Asia
Mr. Harsch: Thank you, Hugh. I'm glad
I am here.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start it out by
going back to the news conference that Sec-
retary-General U Thant of the United Na-
tions did 2 days ago. In that there appeared
to be considerable differences with American
policy. For example, he said, "I do not sub-
scribe to the generally held view that if South
Viet-Nam falls, then country X, then coun-
try Y, then country Z will follow. I do not
agree with this so-called domino theory." Is
this a matter of difference with our policy?
Secretary Rxisk: Well, I myself have never
subscribed to something called the domino
theory, because that suggests that we're
merely playing games with little wooden
blocks with dots on them. Actually, the prob-
lem is the old problem of the phenomenon of
aggression.
Country X, if you like, is South Viet-Nam.
North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South
Viet-Nam by force.
Country Y is, perhaps, Laos. We had an
agreement on Laos in 1962 under which there
would be no North Vietnamese forces in
Laos. And Laos would not be used as a route
of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. That
has not been performed. And the govern-
ment that we agreed on in Geneva in 1962
has not been permitted to exercise authority
throughout Laos. And the International Con-
trol Commission has not been permitted to
exercise its functions in the Communist-held
areas of Laos. So, undoubtedly, there are
appetites with respect to Laos.
Country Z is, perhaps, already Thailand.
The other side has announced that they are
going after Thailand. There are subversive
guerrilla elements in northeast Thailand
trained outside. There's a Thai training camp
now in North Viet-Nam preparing additional
guerrillas to go into Thailand.
So, there's no need for something called
the domino theory.
The theory is that proclaimed in Peking
repeatedly, that the world revolution of com-
munism must be advanced by militant means.
Now, if they can be brought toward an atti-
tude of peaceful coexistence, if the second
generation in China can show some of the
prudence that the second generation in the
Soviet Union has shown, then, maybe, we can
begin to build a durable peace there.
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-
General of the U.N. also in that same news
conference said, "I do not subscribe to the
view that South Viet-Nam is strategically
vital to Western interests and Western se-
curity." What are our vital strategic interests
in the area? Do you regard Viet-Nam as
vital?
Secretary Rusk: Well, there are important
geographical features, natural resources,
large numbers of people in Southeast Asia.
I think the heart of the matter is, again,
JANUARY 30, 1967
169
the phenomenon of aggression. And if the
momentum of aggression should begin to roll
in that part of the world, stimulated or sup-
ported or engaged in by those who are com-
mitted to the spread of the world revolution
by violence, then that seems to put us back
on the trail that led us into World War II.
What is important is that all nations, large
and small, have a chance to live unmolested
by their neighbors, as provided in the United
Nations Charter.
Article 1 of the charter deals with acts of
aggression, breaches of the peace, the neces-
sity for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Article 2 of the charter is about the self-
determination of people. These are very im-
portant lessons derived from the events
which led us into World War II. We feel that
we've got to hang on to those lessons, be-
cause if they lead us into world war III,
there won't be much left from which we can
draw lessons and start over again.
Threat to Durable Peace
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, is it not the
question so much of our vital interests, as of
the threat to our vital interests?
Now, you said yesterday i that four Presi-
dents have identified this area as being stra-
tegically important to us. At the time that
process started — we're talking about Presi-
dent Truman now and then President
Eisenhower's time — there certainly did seem
to be a major threat to our interests in that
area.
What has happened to the nature of that
threat? During the last year I had in mind
the breach between Moscow and Peking. Is
there not a diminution in the threat to our
interests in that area because Moscow and
Peking are no longer close together?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Peking has the capa-
bility of maintaining a major threat there,
de])ending upon both its policy and its action.
You see, we have a very strong interest
in the organization of peace in the Pacific,
just as we have in the Atlantic. We have
' In an informal press interview.
alliances with Korea and Japan and the Re-
public of China and the Philippines, Thai-
land, Australia, New Zealand. So, we are
very much interested in the stability of the
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and in East
Asia.
Now, if these aggressive pressures from
Hanoi, with the support of Peking, should
move into Southeast Asia, not only are hun-
dreds of millions of people involved and vital
resources involved, but the prospects for a
durable peace dissolve.
And so we have a tremendous interest in
establishing in that area of the world, as we
have done in the NATO area, the notion that
the nations must be left alone and be allowed
to live in peace, as the Charter of the United
Nations provides.
Leadership Struggle in Mainland China
Mr. Harsch: But the danger 2 years ago
was much greater than it is now, surely.
Secretary Rtisk: Well, I'm not sure what is
going to be the reaction of the authorities in
Peking when they get all of these present
troubles sorted out. What are they going to
do about their doctrine of militant support
of the world revolution ?
They've had a series of setbacks in the last
2 years, a major setback in Indonesia,
catastrophe in the Afro-Asian conference.
They put in an ultimatum to India during the
India-Pakistan fighting and had to back
away from it. They've been almost expelled
from the world Communist movement.
They've been expelled from four or five coun-
tries in Africa.
Now, these have undoubtedly put great
pressures on the leadership there. And my
guess is that one of the reasons why there
is considerable turmoil at the top in main-
land China today is that there must have
been some important policy discussions there
about whether or not they're on the right
track and that this has led to differences
among the leadership which are being re-
flected in some of the events that we hear
about from day to day now.
Mr. Harsch: What is your reading, as of
170
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
this — right now, on what's going on in
Peking ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that it is fair
to suspend judgment on that.
If I say that I don't really know, it doesn't
embarrass me very much, because I suspect
that Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Ch'en I, and
these other people out there don't really know
exactly what is happening there. But there
seems to be an authentic struggle of leader-
ship among the top 12 or 15 people in that
system. There seems to be a considerable de-
bate on policy going on beneath the surface.
Some of that debate might well have
precipitated this present struggle. But I
think it might be well to discount, in part,
some of the day-to-day news there. We
are watching it very closely. But I think we
ought not to jump to premature conclusions
about how it's going to come out. Frankly,
we just don't know.
Mr. Harsch: And you only go so far as to
recognize it as being an internal struggle for
power?
Secretary Rusk: I think that's at the heart
of it, yes.
Mr. Harsch: Might it affect the whole posi-
tion of China? Could it lead to a civil war in-
side China, do you think ?
Secretary Riisk: It's possible, although I
think that we ought to be very cautious about
saying that it's headed that way at the pres-
ent time.
This is basically, I think, a struggle among
the leadership elite. They may be able to find
ways to work this out among themselves
through compromise, or one group may find
itself in full control at the expense of another
group. We just don't know, quite frankly,
what that means.
Need for Ceilings on Arms Race
Mr. Harsch: I want to change to another
subject now. In the President's state of the
Union last night,^ he said that the Soviet
Union has begun to place near Moscow a
limited antimissile defense. And he deplored
this and expressed the hope that something
might be done about it. Is this a subject
which can best be handled in a sort of general
group in Geneva, or is this something that is
best handled directly between ourselves and
the Soviet Union?
Secretary Rusk: I think the two are not
necessarily contradictory, because we and the
Soviet Union are the cochairmen of the
group in Geneva. Therefore, we're in fre-
quent touch with each other about the agenda
of that conference.
Quite some time ago we put proposals be-
fore the Geneva conference for a freeze on
the further development of both offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons. We hope very
much that that can be taken up and some
conclusions reached, because we could move
simply to new plateaus of enormous expendi-
ture on both sides without basically changing
the overriding strategic situation but thereby
diverting very large resources away from the
unfinished business which both of us face
for our own people.
So that we're very serious about finding
some way to put some ceilings on the arms
race and try to turn it down. And this is one
of the important elements in that.
Mr. Harsch: Are you hopeful ?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think diplomacy
must always proceed on the basis of hope
and optimism, because that's our business.
And we hope very much that there can be
some progress made on this matter.
Mr. Harsch: The President says that he
urges Congress to help our foreign commer-
cial trade policies by passing an East-West
trade bill. That is going to be a difficult prob-
lem with the new Congress, is it not?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the atmos-
phere associated with the struggle in Viet-
Nam will make it difficult. But we do believe
that, despite Viet-Nam, we should continue
to gnaw away at any points where we can
improve our relations between East and
West, and try to build a little peace in the
world.
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, I know that
Hugh Downs back in New York has another
question he wants to put to you. What little
' See p. 158.
JANUARY 30, 1967
171
time we have I reluctantly yield back to you,
Hugh.
Basis for Peace in Viet-Nam
Mr. Downs: On either or both sides of the
Viet-Nam war forces is there the desire not
toend that war?
Secretary Rtisk: I think that both sides
would like to end it but they differ in views
about the basis on which it can be ended.
The authorities in Hanoi continue to insist
upon their four points as a basis for the set-
tlement, and the third of those points is that
South Viet-Nam be organized on the program
of the National Liberation Front without re-
gard to the views of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the South Vietnamese.
I believe that we must keep in contact both
privately and publicly in order to explore
every possibility of a move toward peace,
whether at a conference table or, in fact,
whether with a general settlement or even a
partial settlement, because the situation is
too dangerous to permit it to go on indefi-
nitely in its present condition.
Mr. Downs: I wasn't speaking of official
policy, sir, on the — I know there f.re forces
that do desire to end the war on both sides.
I wondered if you thought there were signifi-
cant forces that desired not to end it on
either side.
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think so, unless —
unless they can achieve particular — particu-
lar goals.
I think there are those in North Viet-Nam
who don't want to end it without having
achieved their purposes in South Viet-Nam.
And it may be that the authorities in Peking,
for example, would like to see this go on
indefinitely as a part of their general mili-
tant approach to international affairs.
But I don't believe that that, at the end of
the day, will prove to be the decisive problem
as far as peace is concerned. The problem is:
On what basis can peace be achieved? And
we're constantly probing that in every pos-
sible way.
Mr. Dotvns: Very good. And our thanks to
you for being with us this morning. Thanks
to Joseph C. Harsch, NBC diplomatic corre-
spondent.
Letters of Credence
Colombia
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Colombia, Hernan Echavarria Olozaga,
presented his credentials to President John-
son on January 13. For text of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
January 13.
Haiti
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Haiti, Arthur Bonhomme, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on January
13. For text of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department
of State press release dated January 13.
Indonesia
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Indonesia, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on January 13. For text of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
January 13.
Turkey
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Turkey, Melih Esenbel, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on January 13.
For text of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated January 13.
172
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In this article written especially for the Bulletin, WiUiam
K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, dis-
cusses the actions taken in the past year to update interruv-
tional safety standards for passenger ships. Mr. Miller was
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Extraordinary As-
sembly of IMCO, which approved the new standards in
November 1966.
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship Safety
by William K. Miller
Early morning radio listeners on Novem-
ber 13, 1965, were shocked to hear the news
that the cruise ship Yarmouth Castle, with
376 passengers aboard, was ablaze at sea
between Miami and Nassau. Later reports
brought the tragic news that 88 of the
ship's passengers, most of them American
citizens, and 2 of the crew — 90 persons in
all — had lost their lives.
The Yarmouth Castle was a ship of 5,000
tons operating under Panamanian registry.
On the cruise on which she burned, as on the
other cruises, her passengers were nearly
all American citizens, and so, consequently,
were most of the casualties. The tragedy
occurred less than 2 years after the Lakonia,
also a passenger vessel, had burned at sea
with the loss of 125 lives.
In the United States there was, very
naturally, an immediate and intense public
demand for Government action to improve
the safety standards of passenger ships
which sail from U.S. ports, particularly of
old ships like the Yarmouth Castle.
It was clear that the international rules
governing safety of life at sea had to be
upgraded. To do this the United States
turned to the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), the 64-
member specialized agency of the United
Nations which deals particularly with tech-
nical matters affecting shipping and has
special responsibility for safety of life at
sea. IMCO has had a notably successful
record of cooperative efforts by its members
in agreeing on and improving international
standards in its area of competence.
IMCO responded to the United States' call
for a cooperative effort, and on November
30, 1966, the Third Extraordinary IMCO
Assembly approved a series of amendments
to the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) that will improve the fire-safety
standards for passenger vessels, particularly
for the older ships that constitute the great-
est risks.
Approval of these amendments just a year
after the Yarmouth Castle disaster repre-
sents unusually rapid handling of a matter
involving so many countries. The action
culminated a year of intensive effort by U.S.
Government agencies, assisted by maritime
safety experts of major maritime nations
and by the machinery of IMCO.
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
The international requirements for fire
safety have been established in a series of
conventions for safety of life at sea, the
first of which was signed in 1929, with
subsequent conventions signed in 1948 and
1960.
JANUARY 30, 1967
173
Each convention represented a substantial
improvement over the predecessor conven-
tion, and each did much to improve safety-
standards around the world; but even the
newer conventions, those of 1948 and 1960,
had major weaknesses. These were escape
clauses or "grandfather" clauses, which pro-
vided that ships existing when the 1948
convention came into force need not comply
with the new requirements beyond the extent
that each government considered "reason-
able and practicable." Hence the two
conventions meant major safety improve-
ments for new ships — the 1948 convention
notably for fire safety and the 1960 con-
vention notably for subdivision and stabil-
ity— but they did not do much about many
of the oldest ships and worst risk cases.
Currently 57 governments are parties to
the 1960 SOLAS Convention, which became
effective May 26, 1965, including the govern-
ments of all of the principal maritime
nations of the world. A satisfactory amend-
ment of the convention, therefore, means
adequate safety rules in most of the world's
maritime traffic.
The convention provides for its own
amendment through the machinery of IMCO.
Under the most practical amendment proce-
dure, there are at least three major steps:
First, recommendations must be adopted by
the Maritime Safety Committee, IMCO's
principal technical body, by a two-thirds
majority; second, the recommended amend-
ments must be adopted by the IMCO As-
sembly, again by a two-thirds majority;
and third, the amendments must be accepted
by two-thirds of the contracting govern-
ments to the SOLAS Convention.
Amendments so approved may be deter-
mined to be of such an important nature
that any contracting government that
declares it does not accept them must cease
to be a party to the convention. This pro-
vision does not mean that a government
which does not act on the amendments
automatically ceases to be a party; a specific
negative action is needed. A determination
of an "important nature" in this sense also
requires approval by a two-thirds majority
in the IMCO Assembly and two-thirds of the
contracting governments to the SOLAS Con-
vention.
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee Action
Immediately after the Yarmouth Castle
fire, the State Department, in the closest
cooperation with other Government agencies,
called for the earliest possible meeting of
the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee to
consider proposals for new fire-safety stand-
ards. At its regular January meeting the
Committee scheduled a special meeting solely
for this purpose at London May 3-10, 1966.
This allowed time for preparation of tech-
nical proposals, among which was a paper
drawn up by the U.S. Coast Guard and cir-
culated in March to other governments for
consideration before the meeting.
In preparation for the meeting Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Anthony M. Solomon, accompanied by Rear
Adm. Charles P. Murphy, USCG, traveled
to a number of European capitals to explain
the importance the United States attached to
these proposals and to ask support for them.
When the Maritime Safety Committee met
in May, Ambassador at Large W. Averell
Harriman made a key opening statement ^
on behalf of the U.S. proposals.
The Committee adopted a series of amend-
ments to the SOLAS Convention, incorpo-
rating most of the substance of the U.S.
proposals as they related to existing passen-
ger ships. There were some improvements
resulting from the interchange of expert
views, and there were some compromises;
but the overall result was satisfactory.
The Committee also recommended a few
changes in the regulations applying to new
ships to be constructed in the future, but
left this job, for the most part, to a second
stage and assigned its Fire Safety Subcom-
' For text, see Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 952.
174
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mittee the task of developing comprehensive
recommendations.
Following the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee's action, the IMCO Council arranged
for a special session of the IMCO Assembly,
the organization's plenary body, to be con-
vened November 28, 1966, nearly a year
before the next regular Assembly, scheduled
for October 1967. An earlier date could not
be set since the SOLAS Convention provides
that prospective amendments must be com-
municated to the Contracting Governments
at least 6 months before Assembly consider-
ation.
United States Legislation
Before IMCO's action was completed, the
U.S. Congress passed legislation comple-
menting the proposed SOLAS amendments.
The Yarmouth Castle disaster was fol-
lowed in 1966 by two more ship fires, the
Viking Princess on a cruise from Florida
and the Hanseatic at her pier in New York.
Fortunately, there was no loss of life directly
due to the fires in these incidents, but they
did further emphasize the need to make
ships safer.
The administration, early in 1966, pro-
posed legislation including provisions for
disclosure and notice to the public of safety
standards of U.S. and foreign passenger
ships leaving U.S. ports, financial responsi-
bility of operators against death and per-
sonal injury and against nonperformance of
the voyage, removal of the present low ship-
owner liability limits, ajid higher minimum
safety standards for U.S. passenger ships
on inland waters. (All U.S. oceangoing
passenger ships already meet very high
safety standards.) Senate and House com-
mittees held hearings on these proposals in
April, June, and October and ultimately
approved most of the measures proposed by
the administration.
Basically, with the exception of the pro-
posal to remove the liability limits, all of the
specific recommendations of the executive
agencies were incorporated in the new law,
P.L. 89-777, enacted November 6, 1966.
One new provision was added. This re-
quires that passenger ships which do not
comply with the safety standards of SOLAS
1960, as modified by the amendments pro-
posed in May, shall not depart U.S. ports
with passengers who are U.S. nationals and
who embarked at those ports. This provision
is to be effective when the amendments
proposed by the IMCO Maritime Safety
Committee last May come into force, but in
any case not later than November 2, 1968.
The new law will require all passenger-
ship operators to give notice of a ship's
safety standards to prospective passengers,
both in promotional literature and in adver-
tising, under regulations which the Coast
Guard is now preparing. It was made clear
both in the Senate Commerce Committee's
report and in the testimony of Adm. Willard
J. Smith, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, before the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, that the safety
standards here in question are international
standards. The Senate committee report
specifically contemplated the use of SOLAS
1960 standards, as modified by the IMCO
Maritime Safety Committee's proposals, as
guides in establishing disclosure regulations.
These are the same standards to which the
direct safety provisions of the legislation
are related.
Hence it is clear that the Congress ac-
cepted the concept of international standards
with resi>ect to disclosure of safety stand-
ards as well as with respect to the actual
ship safety rules that will apply.
Regulations implementing the financial
responsibility provisions of the new law are
to be issued by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, the U.S. Government's regulatory
agency for ocean shipping. This legislation
is intended to insure that funds will be avail-
able to meet claims of persons injured or
the estates of those killed in passenger-ship
accidents and for refunds when a sailing is
canceled.
JANUARY 30, 1967
175
The Federal Maritime Commission, like
the Coast Guard, has already held meetings
with interested parties, domestic and for-
eign, to hear and consider their ideas on
implementing regulations in order to insure
that specific requirements as ultimately
determined will not only be meaningful but
will be reasonable and not unduly burden-
some.
As noted above, the new law makes no
change in legal provisions on shipowners'
liability. Stated simply, this liability now
may be limited under U.S. law to the value
of the vessel after the accident or $60 per
ton of the vessel's tonnage if the vessel's
value is not enough to meet claims. There
is widespread agreement that the present
limits are too low, if there should be limits
at all, and the President has stated that
the administration will make another effort
this year to repeal the present outmoded
limitations.
IMCO Assembly Action
The Third Extraordinary Assembly of the
Intergovenmiental Maritime Consultative
Organization, which was held at London
November 28-30, 1966, approved without
significant change the recommendations of
the Maritime Safety Committee to amend
SOLAS 1960 and upgrade the international
fire-safety standards for passenger ships.
There were several minor changes, mostly
for clarification, but the U.S. delegation was
satisfied that none of them significantly
depart from the Committee's recommenda-
tions or reduce the level of safety standards.
Similarly, the delegation was satisfied that
there is no conflict or inconsistency in sub-
stance between the new regulations ap-
proved by the IMCO Assembly and the
safety standards established by U.S. law.
The substantive content of the new regu-
lations was approved by overwhelming
majorities. The closest vote on a directly
substantive issue was 35 to 2, clearly
reflecting the strong consensus for the
recommended improvements.
The most controversial question at the
Assembly was whether the proposed amend-
ments are, in the terms of article IX (e) of
the SOLAS 1960 Convention, of such an
important nature that any contracting
government which declares it does not accept
them shall cease to be a party to the con-
vention 12 months after they come into
force.
The United States and nearly all the
Western maritime countries supported such
a finding. Opposition came from a few coun-
tries which apparently were concerned with
the prospective effects on their older ships.
Several delegations stated that they con-
sidered the amendments important but were
opposed to a finding in the sense of article
IX (e) because it might force some countries
out of the convention. Some of these dele-
gations argued that the exercise of the
"important nature" clause was contrary to
generally accepted concepts of international
law and prejudicial to sovereign rights. The
U.S. delegation, in response to these argu-
ments, pointed out that the Assembly was
following a procedure cleai'ly defined in the
convention and that the contracting govern-
ments accepted this procedure in accepting
the convention.
One representative urged the impor-
tance of crew training as opposed to struc-
tural requirements. The U.S. representative
agreed that crew training is important and
should be stressed, but expressed the belief
that it cannot be controlled through inter-
national rules as readily as structure can.
He noted that passenger ships operate on
cruises from U.S. ports, carrying nearly all
American passengers, in some cases never
returning to the country of registry. If
this type of trafl^c is to continue, it is not
acceptable to the United States to rely on
crew-training requirements of other coun-
tries without adequate fire-safety structural
provisions.
The Assembly decided that the amend-
ments are of an "important nature" in the
sense of the convention by a vote of 26 to
176
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
8, with 5 abstentions. The vote on the final
resolution of the Assembly, which was 29
to 2, with 12 abstentions, reflected the objec-
tions of several countries to the "important
nature" finding.
A second issue which required serious
attention was the question of the legality of
the amendments. One delegation stated
doubts whether the Assembly was competent
to apply amendments relating to the struc-
ture of existing ships in view of the pro-
vision of article IX (f) of the SOLAS 1948
and 1960 Conventions, which state that
amendments relating to the structure of
ships shall apply only to ships the keels of
which are laid after the date on which the
amendment comes into force. It was argued
that if the Assembly wished to enforce such
amendments with respect to existing ships,
it would first have to amend article IX (f)
and that such amendments to the regulations
could only be approved by a subsequent
Assembly after the amendment to article
IX (f) came into force.
The U.S. delegation and several other
delegations disagreed with this conclusion
and took the position that amendments to
structural provisions could be applied to
existing ships with or without amendment
of article IX (f), provided that the necessary
two-thirds of the Assembly approved and
the amendments were accepted by two-thirds
of the contracting governments.
It was pointed out that the question had
been discussed by the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee and that no delegation had expressed
any doubt as to the legality of applying
structural amendments to existing ships,
article IX (f) notwithstanding. A passage
from the record of the SOLAS 1948 confer-
ence was cited, supporting the view that the
authors of that convention intended that
article IX (f) could be overridden by amend-
ments to the regulations. Ultimately it be-
came apparent that almost all delegations
considered it clear that structural amend-
ments can legally be applied to existing ships
without amendment of article IX (f).
Mr. Miller's article is one of a series being
written especially for the Bulletin by oflBcers
of the Department and the Foreign Service.
Officers who may be interested in submitting
original bylined articles are invited to call
Jewell Wilson in the Bulletin office, extension
5806.
The purpose of the amendments adopted
by the Assembly was to bring all passenger
ships up to an acceptable modern standard
of fire safety by eliminating the effects of
the grandfather clauses of the SOLAS 1948
and 1960 Conventions.
Effect of Amendments
Specifically, the proposals adopted by the
Assembly will eliminate vessels with wooden
hulls, decks, and deckhouses. All basic
structure will be of steel. Ships will be
divided by steel fire barriers not more than
131 feet apart to isolate any fire that may
start. In a like manner, the accommodation
spaces will be separated by steel bulkheads
and decks from such hazardous areas as
galleys, cargo space, and machinery space.
Within the accommodation spaces, the
various rooms, if not constructed of incom-
bustible materials, will be protected by an
automatic sprinkler system or other protec-
tive measures will be taken. In any event,
stairways and passageways will be specially
constructed to off"er a safe avenue of escape
in the event of a fire.
Vessels built before SOLAS 1948 came
into force in 1952 will have to meet the
1948 requirements for fire-extinguishing
systems. Fire pumps will have to be so
located and arranged that the whole system
will not be put out of action by a fire in
any one space. In some cases more fire
pumps will be required.
Many other details adopted by the As-
sembly will improve the fire safety of exist-
ing passenger vessels.
The effects of the amendments will vary
widely. Owners of the most modern and
JANUARY 30, 1967
177
safest ships will not have to do anything
very difficult or very expensive to conform
to the new rules. Owners of most older
ships will have to go to greater expense,
and in many cases major rebuilding will be
involved. A number of old ships doubtless
will have to be scrapped.
The job is not yet finished, even in a pro-
cedural sense. The amendments must now be
accepted by two-thirds of the contracting
governments to the SOLAS Convention and
will not come into force legally until 12
months later.
Recognizing the need for rapid action, the
IMCO Assembly approved, without dissent,
the Maritime Safety Committee's recom-
mendation that the amendments are so vital
to safety of life at sea that contracting gov-
ernments should not await formal entry
into force but should act immediately to put
the recommended measures into effect to the
maximum extent and as soon as possible.
For the United States, acceptance of the
amendments requires the advice and consent
of the Senate. There is reason to hope that
the Senate will act promptly, particularly
in the light of the great concern shown by
the Congress and the conformity of the pro-
posed standards to those incorporated in the
new U.S. law.
The Congress has shown serious concern
with the whole problem, not only in legisla-
tive action but also in close attention to the
action of the executive branch in the inter-
national forum. Members of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
attended the sessions of the Maritime Safety
Committee in January and May and were
present at every session of the special
Assembly in November.
IMCO's work on improvements in stand-
ards for new ships also requires further
action. After several meetings, the IMCO
Subcommittee on Fire Protection agreed in
December on a series of recommendations
which are to be considered by the Maritime
Safety Committee in February. If all goes
well, these amendments to the convention
will be approved by the Assembly at its
regular session next October, and we can-
expect further improvements in the level
of fire safety in passenger ships newly built
around the world.
U.S., Japan Discuss Operations
in New U.S. Fisheries Zone
Press release 305 dated December 29
U.S. and Japanese fishery delegations be-
gan preliminary discussions in Washington
December 28 on the question of the continu-
ation of Japanese fishing operations in the
new U.S. fisheries zone established by the
enactment of Public Law 89-658 last October.
The new law extends United States juris-
diction over fisheries to 9 miles from the 3-
mile territorial sea, or a total of 12 miles
from the shoreline. It provides for continua-
tion of traditional foreign fishing in the new
zone as may be recognized by the United
States.
The United States has notified govern-
ments likely to be concerned, including Japan,
of its willingness to consider such views as
those governments desire to advance regard-
ing the law and continuation of their fisheries
in the new zone. The current talks are ex-
ploratory in nature and are expected to be
followed by a second round of talks early in
the new year.i
The U.S. delegation is led by Donald L.
McKeman, Special Assistant for Fisheries
and Wildlife to the Secretary of State; the
Japanese delegation is led by Ryozo Sunobe,
Minister, Embassy of Japan.
' The exploratory talks concluded Jan. 3. Discus-
sions are expected to be resumed Feb. 6.
178
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended Through June 1967
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^
Mr. President, I should first like to express
my appreciation to our distingoiished Secre-
tary-General for his lucid and thorough
report on the United Nations Force in
Cyprus,^ on the basis of which report we have
again extended UNFICYP for a further
period of 6 months.
In thanking the Secretary-General and his
staff, I think it appropriate at this time to
recall that the Secretary-General has labored
long and hard in carrying out his far-
reaching responsibilities in this situation. His
report of December 8. together with its
addendum, continues to illustrate the close
and faithful execution of the Council's
mandate by the Secretary-General and the
Secretary-General's distinguished representa-
tive, our distinguished former colleague,
Ambassador Carlos Bemardes, and by the
men of the United Nations Force, commanded
by the very able General Ilmari Martola.
In pursuit of its efforts to restore normal
conditions, we note with satisfaction that
during the past 6 months UNFICYP has con-
cluded an arrangement with the Government
of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader-
ship which has restored postal services in the
Turkish sector of Nicosia and Lefka. And we
express appreciation to the Goveitmient of
• Made in the Security Council on Dec. 15 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5030).
=> U.N. doc. S/7611 and Corr. 1.
Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots for this
cooperation. UNFICYP's efforts have also
led to an agreement covering the method for
processing and registering land transactions.
This is all good.
With regard to the efforts of the United
Nations Force to contribute to the mainte-
nance of law and order, we are, however,
disturbed at the increase in the number of
incidents, including what the Secretary-
General calls — and I quote him — "frequent
breaches of the cease-fire," many of which
are deliberate bomb explosions and other
terrorist actions, and the establishment of
new fortified positions, as described by the
Secretary-General's report, in a manner con-
trary to the accepted understanding that the
extension of existing positions is detrimental
to the interests of peace on the island. My
delegation believes that those responsible for
the conditions described in the Secretary-
General's report, which have caused deep con-
cern to the Force commander, should take all
necessary measures to assure that the situa-
tion rapidly changes for the better.
We are also concerned by the Secretary-
General's supplementary report which was
issued December 13.* The United Nations
Force, manned by excellent contingents from
Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden,
' U.N. doc. S/7611/Add. 1.
JANUARY 30, 1967
179
Denmark, United Kingdom, New Zealand,
and Australia, has done a remarkably fine
job of maintaining peace on the island in the
best tradition of the United Nations. We be-
lieve peace and order can only be achieved by
an even greater degree of cooperation with
UNFICYP. The importation of additional
arms in violation of the spirit and intent of
the Council's March 4, 1964, resolution ■* will
not achieve greater peace and security. On
the contrary, their very presence cannot be
other than a source of insecurity and strife.
We welcome the agreement of the Govern-
ment of Cyprus to allow UNFICYP to in-
spect those arms. But we would hope further
that these arms can be neutralized, and this
could occur if the Cypriot Government
agreed to place the arms which have already
arrived under the continuing custody of the
United Nations Force.
Mr. President, this Council has today met
for the third time this year on the question
of Cyprus.^ As others have noted, it has for
the 10th time since March 1964 extended the
mandate of UNFICYP. Given the conditions
on the island, my Government believes that
these actions have been necessary and that
the stated objectives of the Council's resolu-
tion merit our moral and material support.
But we must remind ourselves again of
what the Secretary-General has pointed out
to us, and what has been adverted to by
others, that the financial base for UNFICYP
is a narrow and uncertain one. His remarks
highlight the fact that this organization
cannot expect a peacekeeping operation such
as UNFICYP to succeed, however dedicated
and energetic its personnel, unless we col-
lectively provide the required support. This
is our obligation, not the Secretary-General's.
This Council owes its appreciation to those
countries, unfortunately too limited in num-
ber, which have continued to support
UNFICYP financially since its creation
nearly 3 years ago. These countries have
showm a high degree of responsibility for
carrying out this vital U.N. peacekeeping
function. My Government hopes that they
will find it possible to continue their volun-
tary contributions to sustain UNFICYP, de-
spite the long and at times discouraging
deadlock over the Cyprus issue. And we also
hope that members who have not yet con-
tributed will be able to do so on this
occasion.
My Government, having voted for the reso-
lution, feels that it must match its vote by a
concrete demonstration of its support for
the resolution, and therefore I wrish to an-
nounce that the United States pledges $4
million toward the $9,675,000 cash budget for
UNFICYP for the 10th period, December
27, 1966, to June 26, 1967. And our ultimate
contribution against this pledge will, as in
the past, depend upon contributions of
other governments and continuation of
UNFICYP's cost estimates.
Our willingness to continue supporting
UNFICYP is based on the necessity for the
parties concerned to explore every conceiv-
able avenue which may lead toward accom-
modation. And we have heard with interest
wlvat our colleague. Ambassador [Alexis S.]
Liatis of Greece, has said, and we express
appreciation, too, for what we have heard of
the Turkish Government in this connection.
And likewise we invite and welcome the good
spirit of the Cypriot Government to the same
end. The responsibility to show progress to-
ward an agreed solution increases with the
passage of time. For this reason I believe, as
others have pointed out, that the final opera-
tive paragraph of the resolution is most
apposite to the situation and accurately ex-
presses our expectation as to the future
course of events.®
* For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964,
p. 465.
° For U.S. statements, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p.
718, and July 11, 1966, p. 63.
•In a resolution (S/RES/231 (1966)) adopted
unanimously on Dec. 15, the Security Council ex-
tended "the stationing in Cyprus of the United Na-
tions Peace-keeping Force . . . for a further period
of six months ending 26 June 1967, in the expectation
that sufficient progress toward a solution by then
will make possible a withdrawal or substantial re-
duction of the Force."
180
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I have adverted to the talks between the
Governments of Turkey and Greece, and the
Secretary-General has noted them. We share
his hope that these talks will be one of the
means by which a peaceful solution can be
found. The fact that these talks have con-
tinued in secrecy for 6 months shows how
seriously the two Governments take their re-
sponsibilities in attempting to settle this most
difficult problem. This problem has seriously
affected their relations for more than a
decade. Its settlement, we know, is not easy.
We know the settlement needs time and it
above all needs peace on the island. This can
best be achieved if UNFICYP receives, as I
have said earlier, the fullest cooperation of
all parties concerned, and in particular the
Government of Cyprus, which has such a
vital stake in this area.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letters dated December 14 from the Deputy Secre-
tary General of the Organization of African Unity
transmitting text of resolutions adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government
of the OAU held at Addis Ababa November
5-9: resolution respecting the policies of apartheid
and racial discrimination of the Republic of South
Africa, S/7637, December 15, 1966, 3 pp.; resolu-
tion respecting the territories under Portuguese
administration, S/7638, December 15, 1966, 2 pp.;
resolution respecting South West Africa, S/7639,
December 15, 1966, 2 pp.
General Assembly
The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa. Report of the Special
Political Committee. A/6579. December 13, 1966.
10 pp.
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. Report of the Third Committee.
A/6586. December 13, 1966. 9 pp.
World Campaign for Universal Literacy. Report of
the Second Committee. A/6592. December 14, 1966.
5 pp.
Progressive Development of the Law of International
Trade. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/6594.
December 15, 1966. 23 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Ratifications Exchanged With
Togo on Commercial Treaty
Press release 1 dated January 5
Instruments of ratification of the treaty of
amity and economic relations between the
United States and Togo, signed at Lome on
February 8, 1966, were exchanged on Jan-
uary 5 in Washington. The exchange was
made by Secretary Rusk and the Togolese
Ambassador, Robert Ajavon, in a brief for-
mal ceremony at the Department of State.
This action completes the procedures re-
quired for bringing the treaty into force. By
its terms, the treaty will enter into force on
February 5, 1967, 1 month after the exchange
of ratifications.
The treaty contains provisions covering
such subjects as entry and sojourn, personal
freedoms, access to courts, just compensation
in the event of expropriation, rights with re-
spect to carrying on business activities, prop-
erty rights, taxation, exchange controls,
treatment of imports and exports, treatment
of shipping, and other matters affecting the
status and activities of citizens of one coun-
try within the territories of the other.
U.S.-Honduras income Tax
Convention Terminated
Department Statement
Press release 298 dated December 22
The convention of June 25, 1956, between
the United States and Honduras for the
avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes
on income will cease to be in force with
respect to taxable years beginning on or
after January 1, 1967.
JANUARY 30, 1967
181
In accordance with the terms of the con-
vention, the Government of Honduras has
given notice of intention to terminate the
convention at the end of 1966.
Discussions from time to time between
United States and Honduran officials with a
view to effecting amendments in the con-
vention have not resulted in agreement on
such amendments. It is expected that there
will be further discussions with a view to
the conclusion, as soon as practicable, of a
new income tax convention.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energ^y
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 5, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Kenya, and
Trinidad and Tobago, January 3, 1967.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I
and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II.
Approval deposited: Ecuador, January 4, 1967.
BILATERAL
Antigua
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Antigua. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Antigua December
19 and 28, 1966. Entered into force December 28,
1966.
India
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913,
5965, 6032, 6113, 6146). Effected by an exchange
of notes at New Delhi December 23, 1966. En-
tered into force December 23, 1966.
Agreement extending the agreement of April 15,
1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559,
5664, 6151), concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi De-
cember 30, 1966. Entered into force December 30,
.1966; effective October 1, 1966.
iVIexico
Protocol amending the agreement of January 29,
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcasting
in the standard broadcast band. Signed at Mexico
April 13, 1966.
Ratifications exchanged : January 12, 1967.
Entered into force: January 12, 1967.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6052, 6074). Effected by an exchange of notes at
Rawalpindi and Islamabad December 28, 1966.
Entered into force December 28, 1966.
Togo
Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sigfned at
Lome February 8, 1966. Enters into force Febru-
ary 5, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: January 11, 1967.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1440 PUBLICATION 8189 JANUARY 30. 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price; 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15:
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the sotlrce will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
182
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 30, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. lUO
Africa. The State of the Union (excerpts from
President Johnson's address) 158
Asia
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
grram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
China
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
gram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
Colombia. Letters of Credence (Echavarria) . . 172
Congress. New International Rules for Passen-
ger-Ship Safety (Miller) 173
Cyprus. United Nations Force in Cyprus Ex-
tended Through June 1967 (Goldberg) ... 179
Developing Countries. The Technological Revo-
lution and the World of the 1970's (Hum-
phrey) 164
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on
"Today" Program 168
Economic Affairs
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship
Safety (Miller) 173
Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com-
mercial Treaty 181
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi-
nated 181
U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New U.S.
Fisheries Zone 178
Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Techno-
logical Revolution and the World of the
1970's (Humphrey) 164
Europe
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
The Technological Revolution and the World
of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164
Haiti. Letters of Credence (Bonhomme) . . . 172
Honduras. U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Conven-
tion Terminated 181
Indonesia. Letters of Credence (Suwito) . . . 172
International Organizations and Conferences.
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship
Safety (Miller) 173
Japan. U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New
U.S. Fisheries Zone 178
Latin America. The State of the Union (ex-
cerpts from President Johnson's address) . . 158
Middle East. The State of the Union (excerpts
from President Johnson's address) .... 158
Presidential Documents. The State of the Union 158
Science. The Technological Revolution and the
World of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164
Toga Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on
Commercial Treaty 181
Treaty Information
Current Actions 182
Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com-
mercial Treaty 181
U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi-
nated 181
Turkey. Letters of Credence (Esenbel) ... 172
U.S.S.R. The State of the Union (excerpts from
President Johnson's address) 158
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 181
United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended
Through June 1967 (Goldberg) 179
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
gram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
Name Index
Bonhomme, Arthur 172
Echavarria Olozaga, Heman 172
Esenbel, Rxelih 172
Goldberg, Arthur J 179
Humphrey, Vice President 164
Johnson, President 158
Miller, William K 173
Rusk, Secretary 168
Suwito Kusumowidagdo 172
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 9-15
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to January 9 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
298 of December 22, 305 of December 29, and
1 of January 5.
No. Date fetbjett
t3 1/12 Exchange of ratifications of proto-
col to U.S.-Mexican standard-
band broadcasting agreement.
*4 1/12 Program for visit of President
Frei of Chile.
t5 1/12 National policy statement on in-
ternational book and library ac-
tivities (rewrite).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■CrU.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-932/30
Superintendent of documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402
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Viet-Nam in Brief
What peace initiatives have the United States and other governments taken to bring the
:onflict in Viet-Nam to an early and honorable end? What is being achieved in the "other war"
in Viet-Nam? Who fights in Viet-Nam? Why is the United States there? These and other pertinent
juestions affecting every American's stake in a secure future are answered in this 21-page
pamphlet.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. lUl
February 6, 1967
THE U.S. ACHIEVEMENTS IN VIET-NAM
by General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 186
THAILAND AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Ambassador Graham Martin 193
AID REPORT ON VIET-NAM COMMODITY PROGRAMS
SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Text of Report 200
THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE:
PATTERNS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Special Article by James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope 218
For index see inside back cover
The U.S. Achievements in Viet-Nam
by General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff '
Five days ago, I returned from Viet-Nam.
There, for the eighth time in the past 4 years,
I visited those men and women of our Armed
Forces who are most dangerously involved
with the protection of freedom and the se-
curity interests of the United States. As al-
ways, I returned with deep respect for them
and renewed conviction that they fight in a
high cause. And more than ever before, I
came home with profound pride in what
these brave men and women have achieved.
I might add that I was also impressed with
the energy and courage of the newsmen in
Viet-Nam. Some 500 of them are making this
the best covered war in history. With these
impressions fresh in mind, I propose to talk
tonight about Viet-Nam.
It is clear to me why we are in Viet-Nam
and why we should be there. Therefore,
rather than entering the lists of policy de-
bate, I propose to report on an aspect of
Viet-Nam which is less well known and ap-
preciated— what we have achieved there.
In speaking of achievements I do so as a
military man, reporting mainly on military
matters. Nevertheless, I am fully aware of
the importance and difficulty of the political,
economic, and social problems which must
be mastered if we are to achieve success in
Viet-Nam. I have no illusions that I can fol-
low the injunction of Tennyson to "Charm
us, orator, till the lion look no larger than
the cat." I would not wish to. Rather, I hope
' Address made before the Washington Profes-
sional Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi at Washington,
D.C., on Jan. 17.
to take the advice of Joseph Pulitzer when
he said: "Put it before them briefly so they
will read it, clearly so they will appreciate
it, picturesquely so they will remember it,
and, above all, accurately so they will be
guided by its light."
In discussing our military accomplish-
ments, both accuracy and comprehension de-
pend upon proper context. With this in mind,
I should like to emphasize these facts: Less
than 2 years have passed since our first,
retaliatory airstrike in North Viet-Nam; only
IV2 years have gone by since, we began to
deploy major combat forces in South Viet-
Nam; and little more than a year has tran-
spired since our first major ground battle in
the la Drang Valley. As wars go, these are
short periods of time. It is within this con-
text of time that we Americans should judge
what we have achieved.
As a backdrop, it is also instructive to
remember what the critics of our policy had
to say, just yesterday, about military opera-
tions in Asia. Do you recall these Cassandra-
like pronouncements ?
— The American soldier can't stand the
rigors of jungle combat.
— American units are too large, cumber-
some, and roadbound to do battle in under-
developed areas.
— U.S. materiel — the B-52, jet fighters,
artillery, ships, and electronic equipment —
is too sophisticated to be useful.
— Supply lines to Asia are too long, and
we lack the logistic bases from which to
operate.
186
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
— Guerrilla warfare is alien to American
Armed Forces. We can't understand the peo-
ple, speak their language, or gain their con-
fidence; we aren't trained in counterguerrilla
tactics; we lack the patience; and we can't
find the enemy or come to grips with him.
— It is suicidal optimism to think that we
can fight on the mainland of Asia.
— And massive Chinese Communist inter-
vention is certain.
A Hard Task Well Done
These prophets, some still active and pro-
pounding new theses of doom, sold short the
courage, decency, ingenuity, energy, knowl-
edge, and judgment of their fellow Ameri-
cans. They were wrong on every count, and
the record bears this out. Let me oite you
examples, not to say that the lion looks "no
larger than the cat," not to glory in the
statistics of combat, not to forget the sorrow
and hell which is war, but simply to tell you
of a hard but necessary task well done.
You will recall where we stood 2 years ago.
Our mission in Viet-Nam was the same as
now, but we were trying to accomplish it
through aid, advice, and logistic help alone.
In February of 1965, in retaliation for Com-
munist attacks against U.S. forces, we
launched our first, limited airstrikes against
North Viet-Nam. By the late spring of that
year, due to a combination of causes, the
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army was
threatening to overwhelm the armed foi'ces
of South Viet-Nam. That summer, at the
request of the South Vietnamese, the United
States made the decision to commit major
forces to halt aggression. I doubt that any
decision by any President has been more
difficult or more honorable.
What was needed, without delay, was a
transfusion of spirit and power and mate-
riel which would give heart to our Vietnam-
ese allies and put up the first, clear stoplight
to aggression. Almost incredibly, the United
States moved nearly 200,000 men and almost
21/2 million tons of supplies over thousands
of miles to Southeast Asia between July and
October 1965. This alone, in my judgment,
was a magnificent feat of arms. No other
nation could have achieved it. And I doubt
that any other nation would have committed
itself so strongly to a principle.
But this massive infusion would not suf-
fice. We were at grips with a stubborn and
bitter enemy. We had to sustain the morale
of the South Vietnamese, hunt down the en-
emy's regular forces, guard against his guer-
rillas, strike at the military sources of his
aggression, and, all the while, help with the
political and economic development of South
Viet-Nam.
In the face of such problems, what have
we accomplished since that short time ago?
In brief, much. Let me cite a part of the
record.
Record of U.S. Accomplishments
On the 1st of July 1965, only some 60,000
men of all services were deployed ashore
in Viet-Nam. Relatively few of these were
in combat units. By the first week of Janu-
ary 1967, 395,000 were ashore, with a very
great increase in fighting power and combat
support. For example: Army and Marine
Corps strengths alone had increased by some
266,000 men; combat maneuver elements had
gone up more than 400 percent; helicopter
maneuver capability had increased at least
fourfold; ground fire support was up by 600
percent; airstriking power had doubled; and
military engineer support had quadrupled.
The total numerical increase is impres-
sive in itself — nearly 330,000 — but much
more so when you recall that these are highly
trained men, fully prepared for their hard
and unique tasks. Many of them were civil-
ians a year and a half ago. Beyond this,
many of their units, including major ones,
did not exist in 1965 but are now fighting
in South Viet-Nam.
To give an idea of what is involved in put-
ting such numbers of skilled and dedicated
men into Viet-Nam, consider the following:
The total Armed Forces have increased in
strength by more than 650,000 men in the
past 18 months to support Viet-Nam and
our other commitments as well; the training
base in the United States — and this includes
major facilities and the men to operate them
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
187
— has been greatly expanded; in addition to
giving all men basic and specialist training,
creating some units, and bringing all units
to a high state of readiness, nearly 1 million
U.S. military personnel have received in-
struction in counterinsurgency and thou-
sands study the Vietnamese language each
year. Remember, too, that when our men
arrive in Viet-Nam, they are not only trained
and physically hardened, but they are also
specially supplied and equipped to cope with
the enemy they will face and the environ-
ment in which they will work or fight.
Difficult as it was to raise, train, equip,
and organize these forces, perhaps even
harder tasks were involved in moving them
and in preparing logistically for their em-
ployment. It was as if one were to move a
major American city some 10,000 miles,
place it in a radically new environment, and
expect that every aspect of its existence —
public and private — would be provided for
without delay or confusion and in the face
of dangers and difficulties such as its citizens
had never confronted before.
In the time frame I have cited, to move
more than 300,000 people over such a dis-
tance, somewhat more than half by sea and
the rest by air, involved major feats of plan-
ning, organization, and operation. We have
quite literally operated continual air and sea
trains from the United States for this pur-
pose and for resupply. Requirements have
been large. For example, passenger sealift
in support of Viet-Nam has increased fifteen-
fold, and commercial airlift to augment our
military means has expanded fourfold over
the same brief period.
In terms of military cargo, the effort is
equally impressive. Extrapolating from the
records we now have for the first 10 months
of 1966, in that year alone we airlifted some
200,000 short tons of supplies into Viet-Nam
and transported well over 8 million measure-
ment tons by sea. The sealift, from January
to October 1966 alone, amounted to over
1,000 shiploads, exceeding the cargo shipped
to Korea in 1951 during the height of that
war.
Meeting the Logistic Challenges
Despite these major successes, however,
perhaps the greatest logistic challenges of
all lay within Viet-Nam. From ports to air-
fields, from depots to maintenance facilities,
and from headquarters to troop cantonment
areas, virtually all of the modern structures
needed to support an operation of this mag-
nitude had to be constructed from near
scratch. The achievements in this field will be
the subject of future books. Let me sketch
just some of the outlines.
In the beginning there was essentially but
one port, Saigon. This, as you know, posed
serious problems for us. As someone said, in
the early days we proved conclusively that 10
ports in the United States can load ships
faster than 1 port can unload them in Viet-
Nam. By now, however, we have 10 ports of
various sizes, in various stages of develop-
ment, from Hue in the north to Can Tho
in the south. Saigon now handles only 31
percent of our cargo, while Da Nang and
Cam Ranh Bay, for example, handle 22 per-
cent and 19 percent, respectively.
Along with ports, a great need existed for
tactical and logistic airbases. At this time,
important airbases are being constructed or
improved at 24 locations, and the work on
air facilities to handle anything from heli-
copters up to jet transports has been prodi-
gious over the past year and a half.
The project at Cam Ranh Bay, with which
I am sure you are familiar, is representative
of the magnitude of effort. From a tiny
coastal port for primitive craft has now
evolved the largest logistic complex in Viet-
Nam, already including a major deep-water
port, large supply and maintenance facilities,
troop cantonments, and an airfield with a
10,000-foot permanent runway. Additionally,
three other associated tactical airbases, jet
capable, have been put in operation, and
much other construction goes forward.
As one other particularly graphic case in
point, a rice paddy 2 miles north of Saigon
was selected as a prospective deep-draft port.
Operational use began last October; this
month the first of the deep-draft berths
188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
should be operational, and by August of this
year the last of the four berths should be
completed.
Across the land, a vast variety of other
critical facilities have been completed or are
well advanced. Primary logistic depots are
underway at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam
Ranh, and Saigon. Brigade or equivalent
cantonments are being provided at 40 dif-
ferent locations. These works, all together,
now make it possible for us to support our
troops on a scope, and with an efficiency and
dispatch, hardly conceivable for one who saw
Viet-Nam in early days.
This logistic support can be measured in
many ways:
— There is the equipment which our men
use, largely new, unexcelled, in ample supply
with rare and temporary exception, and fit-
ted to the task at hand. (This is, I might
observe, the first war in my ken in which the
fruits of modern research and development
have appeared on the battlefield of the cur-
rent, rather than a future, conflict.)
— There is the modern-day Red Ball Ex-
press, a special Air Force lift of priority
items to Southeast Asia, which flew some
9,400 critically needed tons in its first year
of operation.
— There is the lifesaving air evacuation of
medical patients from South Viet-Nam —
over 25,000 in 1966.
— There are the millions of tons which
processed through the ports I have men-
tioned, 97 percent of all the supplies and
equipment sent to Viet-Nam.
— But perhaps most graphically of all,
there is the weight of firepower which we
have been able to employ to save American
and Allied lives. For example. General
[Moshe] Dayan, former Israeli Army Chief
of Staff, observed one small and brief battle
in which a Viet Cong regiment attacked a
South Korean company of 130 men. To pro-
tect that unit until help could arrive, Ameri-
can fire-support units laid down 21,000 shells
along a 200-yard-wide strip between jungle
and wire. That was, as General Dayan
pointed out, "more than the total volume of
artillery fire expended by the Israeli Army
during the Sinai campaign and the War of
Independence together."
Combat Operations
I have talked at length of logistic achieve-
ments because it is these which seem to be
least well known. But mention of fire sup-
port brings up the subject of combat opera-
tions. Young Americans, the much-maligned
products of our affluent society, have proved
their dedication, toughness, remarkable
valor, great good humor, and deep compas-
sion under the harshest, most complex cir-
cumstances. And the American Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps — and let's not
forget the Coast Guard — have demonstrated
a collective professional skill which is per-
haps without parallel in the history of war-
fare.
These operations have exacted a toll: Over
6,700 Americans have died in battle in Viet-
Nam, and more than 38,000 have been
wounded in action. By the standards of other
wars, these are not heavy casualties. But in
terms of individual sacrifice, and by any
gage of human compassion, these are figures
of sorrow, heavily underlining the debt
which many men, in many lands, owe to the
young and the few of America.
At the same time, I would remind you that
people in other free nations — the Republic
of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and
New Zealand, for example — also have cause
for personal grief. And above all, there are
the sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese
in the defense of their homeland. Since Jan-
uary 1961, their military alone have lost
more men in action, in equivalent population
terms, than the total of American battle
deaths from the Revolutionary War to the
present day.
Like their allies, our men have fought with
great bravery. From July 1962 until mid-
December 1966, some 29,000 of them had re-
ceived awards for valor in Viet-Nam, and
more than 40,000 had received the Purple
Heart. Included among the highest decora-
tions were 11 Medals of Honor and 201
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
189
awards of the Distinguished Service Cross,
Navy Cross, and Air Force Cross.
While these men fought, many more were
engaged in the onerous, unsung jobs of sup-
port— supply, transportation, maintenance,
construction, communication, and so on.
Others engaged officially, or on their own
time, in the manifold tasks of advising the
Vietnamese and helping them with military
and civilian problems alike. As Chet Huntley
noted in a recent broadcast: "The American
soldier in Viet-Nam spends only a small por-
tion of his time in combat; many are never
in combat; but the major portion of his time
is spent in rescuing people, patching up peo-
ple, picking up kids, building irrigation sys-
tems, schools, dispensaries, roads, houses,
and whole villages. The American soldier in
Viet-Nam is a builder."
U.S. Gains Reflected in Many Ways
What has all this effort, sacrifice, bravery,
and dedication achieved? Not a final victory,
even on the battlefield, but a turnaround of
pessimism, an end to unimpeded invasion,
and a long forward step. These gains are re-
flected in many ways.
One of our primary needs was to improve
our intelligence, our knowledge of who and
where the enemy was. Sun Tze observed long
ago, "Know your enemy . . . and you can
fight a hundred battles without disaster."
Since 1965, there has been a dramatic im-
provement in the quality and quantity of our
intelligence. Actions extending from long-
range infantry patrols, to vastly expanded
aerial surveillance, to the use of new scien-
tific devices, and on to the institution of a
centralized automatic data processing sys-
tem have enabled us to find the enemy, an-
ticipate his actions, and make full use of our
mobility and firepower.
Our forces, increasingly strong, mobile,
well supplied, and armed with better intelli-
gence, have hunted down the enemy's main
units and fought "a hundred battles without
disaster." I have mentioned the early battle
in the la Drang Valley in which the newly
arrived 1st Cavalry Division fought the first
major North Vietnamese units to enter com-
bat. Those young, untested troopers inflicted
more than 1,500 fatalities on the enemy and
drove him out of Viet-Nam for the time.
Since then, all of our ground units have
pursued the aggressors, giving them no ha-
ven, no rest, and no chance to mount a single
major attack. As an example of many ac-
tions, the Marines last year, in Operations
Hastings and Prairie alone, inflicted over
2,000 confirmed fatalities on the North Viet-
namese Army. And last fall, in the former
sanctuary of Tay Ninh Province, the largest
ground operation of the war — Attleboro —
took place. The 1st Infantry Division, ele-
ments of the 25th Division, and the 196th
Brigade badly defeated three regiments of
tough Viet Cong. Over 1,100 enemy were
killed or captured, and vast quantities of en-
emy foodstuffs and war materiel were de-
stroyed.
In the air in South Viet-Nam, Air Force,
Marine, and Navy pilots gave the ground
soldier the greatest, most responsive, and
most effective air support in history. Every-
thing from the B-52 bomber to the single-
engine 0-1 observation plane has literally
been integrated with the actions of platoons,
companies, and battalions on the ground.
In the air over North Viet-Nam, gallant
airmen, attacking with great restraint and
precision in the face of intense antiaircraft
fire, have struck at the military facilities
supporting aggression.
And on the rivers and seas, naval ships
and craft have contributed their airpower
and gunpower and greatly reduced the
enemy's ability to move, reinforce, or resup-
ply-
How do we assess what these and many
other operations have achieved? Here are
some of the ways:
— Since the fall of 1965, enemy attacks
have fallen off in size, frequency, and dura-
tion. Where regimental attacks were once
common, and division attacks clearly pended,
we now find ourselves fighting mostly com-
panies and battalions. We estimate that their
battalions are now averaging only 1 day's
190
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
fighting per month. And where once the
enemy could sustain combat for a month at
a time, as in the la Drang, he now hits and
runs to avoid disaster.
— In the past year, in hundreds of engage-
ments, the enemy won no single major battle.
— Enemy captured on the battlefield rose
from 6,000 in 1965 to more than 9,000 in
1966.
— Enemy killed in action — confirmed fa-
talities— increased a minimum of 35 percent
in 1966.
— Enemy defectors under the Chieu Hoi
amnesty program increased in 1966 by 82
percent over the preceding year.
— Weapons captured on the battlefield in-
creased some 35 percent in 1966.
— Enemy supplies were captured or de-
stroyed in large quantities — for example, in
1966, enough rice to support nearly 80,000
men for a year.
— For the first time, farmers in the I and
II Corps areas were able to harvest and keep
most of their crops.
— Thousands of enemy trucks, railroad
cars, and vessels have been destroyed from
the air and sea. Much of his POL has gone
up in flames. Approximately 20 percent of
his total military forces are engaged in de-
fensive programs. Some 300,000 of his men
are engaged in repair, reconstruction, and
relocation. The effectiveness of our air cam-
paign is made increasingly clear by enemy
propaganda complaints. And now, to escape
it and to seek more propaganda fuel, he is
apparently turning his own population into
hostages by placing military materiel and
installations in the midst of heavily peopled
towns and areas.
— Even "revolutionary development," paci-
fication, that program whose success is cru-
cial to enduring security and progress for the
Vietnamese, has taken forward steps. First
of all, there is the relatively recent military
protection which we have been able to give
to this effort. Secondly, a major Vietnamese
cadre training program is in full swing, and
457 cadre teams of 59 men each are already
at work. Thirdly, elements of the Vietnamese
Army are being trained to complement the
cadre teams and provide a shield behind
which they can function. And finally, the
enemy tide is beginning to recede.
In this latter regard, recall the situation
in 1965, when major U.S. units were first in-
troduced. In the I Corps area, the Viet Cong
had moved into the coastal lowlands and
were beginning to isolate Da Nang and Hue.
In the II Corps region, the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese units moved with total
freedom and were on the verge of overrun-
ning several provincial capitals. In III and
IV Corps, the Viet Cong were moving unim-
peded between war zones C and D, then
sanctuaries, and the critical delta areas. In
each of these areas now the tide is running
out on the enemy and the people are begin-
ning, tentatively, to sense and respond to
some degree of security.
Much remains to be done in revolutionary
development — a great part of the job, in fact
— but when a million South Vietnamese refu-
gees elect to leave Viet Cong areas and seek
safe haven with the Government of Viet-
Nam, as they have since our troops arrived
in 1965, the signs of the future look promis-
ing.
This has been a long recitation of success.
For each unit or effort I have mentioned, I
could have cited others equally important
and praiseworthy. On the other hand, I could
have detailed the problems unsolved, some
discouragements, and some failures. But
there has been more than enough of pessi-
mism, and I wanted to balance the ledger.
Making It Possible for Freedom To Triumph
What does it all mean, in sum ?
First of all, it does not mean that we have
won in Viet-Nam, or even that victory is
close at hand. The enemy is bitterly deter-
mined and supported by major outside
powers. And military success is only one in-
gredient of ultimate victory.
In other, nonmilitary, spheres there have
been achievements, too. The Government it-
self has shown energy and relative stability
after surviving the stress of political turmoil
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
191
in the spring of 1966. The free election and
the subsequent deliberations of the constitu-
ent assembly are hopeful omens. The Manila
Conference brought a new measure of unity,
resolve, and purpose to free Asia. But major
barriers, internal and external, still stand in
the way of prosperous peace for the Viet-
namese.
To me, our military achievements mean
these things:
— The enemy's chance for military victory
is gone.
— The enemy's freedom to steal, bully, and
terrorize has been reduced.
— The North Vietnamese have now learned
that there is an increasing toll to pay for
aggression.
— The South Vietnamese now know that
security is more than a dream, and tangible
opportunities for a promising future have
come into view.
— Americans have committed themselves
to a principle in Viet-Nam. They have
worked with success and fought with honor
to sustain it. In a brief span of time, they
have achieved much militarily — the first task
— and the door is now open to success in
other fields. In an editorial last fall. The
Economist discussed the influence which
America was successfully exerting against
the Communists in Asia, particularly in
Viet-Nam. That distinguished British
journal observed: "Five years ago a stable
south-east Asia looked like a pipe dream.
Now there may be a chance of bringing peace
to that shattered region." The Economist
added that ". . . the greatest contribution
has been made by the American deployment
in Vietnam." I think there is this chance for
stability and peace, and I agree that this is
largely the achievement of our men in Viet-
Nam.
The need, now and in the future, is for
persistence and determination. There is a bit
of old Arabic philosophy which is pertinent:
Nothing in the world can take the place of per-
sistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common
than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not;
unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education
will not; the world is full of educated derelicts.
Persistence and determination are omnipotent.
What we have done in Viet-Nam, espe-
cially in the past year and a half, is to make
it possible for freedom to triumph. If we de-
termine to persist, the recent past can be
prolog to victory.
Correction
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call
attention to the following printer's error in
the issue of January 23, 1967.
The fifth paragraph in the first column on
page 137 should read:
" — There is doubt that America's vital inter-
ests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to
necessitate the growing commitment there."
192
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Thailand and Southeast Asia
by Graham Martin
Ambassador to Thailand ^
It is very pleasant to be invited to talk
with you again at the beginning of the New-
Year. It is also appropriate to respond to the
request of this peculiarly representative in-
stitution, the American Chamber of Com-;
merce, to again review with you the year
that has closed. Also, at the request of some
of you, I will again venture a tentative ap-
praisal of what is ahead of us in the year
now beginning.
I am quite conscious of the necessity — as
the senior American in Thailand, carrying
the responsibility, as the President's repre-
sentative, for all that the United States does
here in its civilian and military programs —
to give as complete a report and as honest an
appraisal as I possibly can.
It is a very dii!icult thing, and it is often
an occupationally dangerous thing, to at-
tempt too much precision in one's estimates
of future events. For example, the phrase of
Winston Churchill, "a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma," is certainly ap-
plicable to the convulsions we are witnessing
today in mainland China. One can only hope
that out of this agony of a people, with whom
our own nation has historic bonds of friend-
ship and mutual respect, may soon come a
regime which will permit the pragmatic and
creative genius of the Chinese people and
the vast richness of the Chinese cultural her-
itage to again become engaged in the cooper-
ative progress of the rest of mankind. It is
' Address made before the American Chamber of
Commerce at Bangkok, Thailand, on Jan. 18 (press
release 11 dated Jan. 23).
certain that this will happen eventually. It
may happen sooner than we now dare to an-
ticipate.
One can speak with much more certainty
about the underlying deep convictions of
one's own country and the courses of action
which will certainly flow from those convic-
tions. And this is possible despite the
stridency of the debate within our open
society which may momentarily obscure the
inevitability of our actions. Last year I said
we could accept certain basic realities as
constant. And as we look back, we find this
to have been true.
As you may recall, the stridency of a
highly vocal minority within our own coun-
try then had, in the minds of some of you,
brought into question the validity of the
American commitment in Southeast Asia.
I said last January that the American com-
mitment to assist the peoples of Southeast
Asia was a determined commitment, a solidly
dependable commitment, a commitment sup-
ported by the great majority of our people,
a commitment supported now even by those
who may have doubted, a decade ago, the
wisdom of our making it. For deeply in-
grained in our American heritage, as a part
of the fiber of our very being, is the memory
of that small and gallant band who, in
declaring their independence from an op-
pressive colonial rule, pledged not only their
lives and their fortunes but threw into the
scales another perhaps even more precious
possession, their "sacred Honor."
It is no more conceivable today than it
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
193
was in 1776 that our country would dishonor
such a commitment. We will grumble about
it. We will complain that we would much
rather be doing more constructive things,
but, as we have always done, in the end we
will do what is necessary to be done. We will
keep our word. We will honor the commit-
ment.
I also said last year aggression would not
be tolerated or accommodated in the inter-
ests of convenience and expediency. We have
made no such accommodation. I also said
that Mao's theory of "the people's war," or
as formulated elsewhere, "wars of just liber-
ation," could not prevail against our country
and its allies. It has not, and it will not. And
I ventured to forecast that as these realities
of the constancy of the American commit-
ment and of the American performance be-
came evident, we could anticipate that the
engagement of Asian energies in increasingly
effective patterns of regional cooperation
would startle all of us by their rapidly ac-
celerating momentum. And this we have cer-
tainly seen in full measure.
Failure of Hanoi's Propaganda Campaign
In the course of the past year we have
seen in Viet-Nam a maximum effort by the
North Vietnamese to inflict a Dien Bien Phu
type of victory on the forces of the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam and its allies. The
forces of Hanoi and the Viet Cong had de-
luded themselves into thinking that the time
had come to move to the classic third phase.
Having attempted to destroy the very fabric
of government and of society itself by an
incredibly callous and brutal campaign of
assassination and terror, one could move to
defeat the main forces of one's enemy. But
it just didn't work out that way.
Instead, South Vietnamese and American
forces crushed the North Vietnamese regular
forces and the Viet Cong wherever they
would stand and do battle. More than that,
the so-called redoubt areas, which had here-
tofore been their safe havens and their
storehouses of vast quantities of muni-
tions and rice, were progressively denied to
them. Their rice ration grows smaller and
their munitions more scarce. Instead of be-
ing welcomed, they are vigorously resisted
by the South Vietnamese. The result is an
increasing number of defectors each telling
his tale of the malnutrition, the hardships,
and the disillusionment that is setting in.
Whether under such circumstances it is
possible to gear back down to a lower phase
of insurgency is doubtful indeed. It is in-
creasingly evident that more and more of
the North Vietnamese soldiers in the South
are realizing the impossibility of attaining
the goal of their doctrinaire masters in
Hanoi.
When their masters in Hanoi will reach
the same conclusion is not yet clear. It seems
they are still counting on the efficacy of
their primary weapon: a propaganda cam-
paign so cleverly orchestrated on a world-
wide basis that some sincere and well-
meaning people have unwittingly become
involved in spreading an absurd collection
of distortions. Here again one can venture
a conclusion with confidence. It is that this
campaign cannot succeed. Our people have
an instinctive ability to cut through such
technique and to reject the phony. It takes
a little time, but in the end the reaction is
to cut through to the truth.
I do not, therefore, see in the propaganda
campaign a serious danger to the validity
of our commitment to Southeast Asia. I do,
however, see in it a source of encouragement
to Hanoi to hang on to what is clearly a
losing cause in the hope that propaganda will
persuade us to grasp defeat out of the mouth
of victory.
Validity of U.S. Goals in Asia
I have often thought that a curious side
effect of these distortions is that they some-
times obscure the validity of much simpler
goals of American policy than those of utter
perfection that are sometimes set for us by
commentators who do not have the responsi-
bility for achieving them.
This is best illustrated by a long conver-
sation I had recently with an eminent Euro-
pean journalist I had come to know well in
my 10 years in Europe. He had just returned
194
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
from a journey through Asia, including a
stay in Saigon. He said he never ceased to
be fascinated with the peculiar masochistic
attitude Americans adopted about their en-
gagement abroad. I started to bristle. He
said, "Don't argue yet — just listen." He went
on to say that listening from Europe to the
public dialog in the United States, one could
only conclude that Americans were on the
verge of disaster in South Viet^Nam, that
Americans were vastly unpopular in Asia,
that there was no clear aim to American
policy, that we were determined on an esca-
lation that would be uncontrollable. He said
that he could go on with such a list, but I
probably knew more items to include than
did he. I said I had heard a few more items.
He said most of the rest of the world
looked at it quite differently. He said the rest
of the world assumed our primary objective
to be the denial of Southeast Asia to Com-
munist Chinese hegemony. He said it was
quite clear to everyone except ourselves, and
possibly Hanoi and Peking, that we had
already achieved this objective. He said he
thought historians would quite likely regard
what we had done in Viet-Nam as the crucial
turning point in the life of the developing
two-thirds of the world. He said that if Com-
munist China had succeeded in this attempt,
it would have led to such a complete valida-
tion of "the thought of Mao Tse^tung" that
a nuclear confrontation might have become
inevitable. He said that our firm stand in
South Viet-Nam has led directly to the al-
most complete elimination of Communist
Chinese influence from Africa and Latin
America. He said that Mao believed that the
techniques of the "war of just liberation"
could not be contained by the most powerful
nation the world had ever known. Had Mao
been proved correct, then Africa and Latin
America as well as Asia would have certainly
been engulfed by this technique.
Anyway, he said, whether Americans real-
ize they have already achieved this goal or
not, it is quite evident that all Asia realizes
it and is already acting on this conviction in
the creation of a new Asia — a free Asia with
increasingly effective patterns of cooperation
in economic and social fields. These would, he
thought, lead inevitably to a closer political
cohesion which in turn would provide the
patterns for an Asian security arrangement
that would allow them to handle their own
security.
He went on to say that American policy in
Asia and the Pacific was on the verge of a
success as great as in Europe in the fifties.
He reminded me that the same sort of at-
tacks were made by Americans on American
policy then as are being made now. He said
he still found it fascinating that while Amer-
icans were sometimes irritating in their in-
sistence on their superiority in so many
ways, they consistently underrated their ac-
complishments abroad. As a matter of fact,
he said, America has handled its unequaled
power with great imagination, its vast mili-
tary strength with ingenuity and with enor-
mous restraints. Its leaders have somehow
begun to master the most difficult lesson of
those who are chosen to govern — the ability
to tightly control a vast mechanism which,
historically, has often developed a momentum
and direction of its own.
The most important thing of all, he said,
is that in validating your commitment in full
as you are doing, you are insuring the credi-
bility of your commitments elsewhere. And
in so doing it is obvious that your people
have acquired the patience to see the job
through. He concluded his monolog by saying
that destiny has apparently chosen your
country to lead, for a while at least. And it
begins to look as if you might be worthy
of the choice.
• • • • •
I agree with him that the last year has
brought a great change to the situation in
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. The Commu-
nist aggressor once struggled for a victory
which he could not obtain. He is now strug-
gling to avert a defeat he cannot avoid.
While there is much grim work still to be
done in South Viet-Nam, the issue is now
certain. And those of us who live in Bangkok
have had the good fortune to watch the birth
of the new Asia of which my friend spoke.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
195
Asian Cooperative Efforts
I believe history will record more fully
than do our media the important contribu-
tion made by our friend and colleague here
in Bangkok, His Excellency U Nyun, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of ECAFE. Among his
many accomplishments for the welfare of
the peoples of Asia will be recorded his pa-
tient, determined, and persistent diplomacy
which was primarily responsible for bringing
into being the new Asian Development Bank
and which is now pushing the Mekong de-
velopment scheme into an accelerating mo-
mentum.
Within the year, we saw here in Bangkok
the months of patient work by the Commit-
tee of Ambassadors under the leadership of
the Thai Foreign Minister which led to the
meeting in Seoul where nine Asian nations
formed the Asian and Pacific Council. We
shall see this new organization hold its
second meeting here in Bangkok this year.
It was here in Bangkok that we saw the re-
activation of the Association of Southeast
Asia, founded in 1961 but interrupted by the
difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia.
That meeting could not have taken place
without the prior settlement of these difficul-
ties which had also led to strained relations
between Malaysia and the Philippines. The
reconciliation of Indonesia and Malaysia, pro-
moted by the patient, infinitely skillful and
selfless diplomacy of Thailand, climaxed In-
donesia's rejection of communism and the
return of reason to that nation's internal
and foreign affairs.
It was here in Bangkok this year that the
Foreign Minister of Thailand, joined by his
colleagues from the Philippines and Malay-
sia, launched the first wholly Asian move to
settle the Vietnamese war. It was in this con-
text that there was the first Asian call for
Japan to begin to assume a political role in
Asian regional affairs commensurate with its
abilities and economic strength.
In April the Conference on Asian Develop-
ment was convened in Tokyo at Japanese
initiative. It, like the Asian and Pacific
Council, will continue to meet regularly in
other Asian capitals. It is characteristic of
virtually all these newly organized regional
projects to broaden participation by sharing
responsibility for the planning and hosting
of conferences.
It was in Bangkok, for example, that the
first group of Southeast Asian Ministers of
Education met during November of 1965 to
explore the possibilities of regional coordi-
nation of educational programs and the shar-
ing of facilities. They met again last month
in Manila, where they approved formation of
a permanent secretariat. The dozen cooper-
ative educational projects which they voted
to support include the creation of an Asian
Institute of Technology, to be located in
Thailand; an Agricultural Institute, to be
located in the Philippines; and an Institute
of Tropical Medicine.
These are but a few of the many coopera-
tive projects which have been instituted or
given new momentum under Asian leadership
during the past year. Some, like the gigantic
Mekong River development project, are well
established. Others are but exploratory stir-
rings of the rising Asian urge to get on with
the business of orderly regional growth
through the collective engagement of Asian
resources. The breadth of these activities is
as impressive as it is little known. These new
cooperative efforts extend not only into such
fields as irrigation, hydroelectric power,
transportation, communication, natural re-
sources exploration, scientific and technical
research, experimental agriculture, and qual-
ity manufacturing controls but also into the
fields of coordinated economic planning and
cooperative fiscal policies.
I know of no more succinct assessment of
the meaning of these developments than that
voiced last July by the President of the
United States. In a speech reviewing Asia's
remarkable rate of recent progress, Presi-
dent Johnson said: ^
. . . this is the new Asia, and this is the new
spirit we see taking shape behind our defense of
South Viet-Nam. Because we have been firm, be-
cause we have committed ourselves to the defense
' For text, see BtiLLETiN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.
196
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of one small country, others have taken new heart.
... we never intend to let [them] down. America's
word will always be good.
The trend has been revealed with great
clarity also by His Excellency Thanat Kho-
man, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, who
last October, in New York City, said:
The smaller nations in Southeast Asia have felt
the need of getting closer with one another. If
division has been the characteristic of the past and
had brought about g^rievous losses of freedom and
independence and had allowed interference and
pressure by outside powers, the future aims should
be for closer and more fruitful cooperation and
integration. While such cooperation should be basi-
cally regional, it is not in our interest to make it
exclusive. Outside elements may have a role to play
but not a domineering or dominating role. If any-
thing, it will be a cooperation on the basis of equal-
ity and partnership.
If this then is the prevailing mood and
outlook of the new Asia, let us give credit
where credit is most assuredly due:
First, to the people and the leaders of
Asia, because they have upheld both their
values and their resolve through long years
of uncertainty and disorder.
Second, to those American leaders who
have perceived that Asians want nothing
more from us than the opportunity to deliver
themselves not only from the age-old, im-
mobilizing fear of Chinese exploitation but
from poverty, illiteracy, sickness, and shriv-
eled opportunities.
There is no mistaking what accounts for
the upsurge in feelings of good will and con-
fidence toward the United States throughout
the Asian region. It has been America's ex-
tension of more imaginative, more meaning-
ful assistance and support for Asia's own
initiatives, Asia's own solutions, Asia's own
priorities, and Asia's own defenses.
Nothing illustrates better the effect of this
approach than the responsiveness evoked in
the course of President Johnson's recent
Asian tour. For it brought forth from mil-
lions in this region great waves of spon-
taneous affection toward the man whose
words and actions have come to be associated
with their own advances toward a better life.
The President's visit gave the people of
Asia an opportunity to confirm the essential
rightness of American policy in Asia. They
seized that opportunity by rendering him a
unique welcome. I do not hesitate to predict
that historians will record it as an illumi-
nating, catalytic event which raised the cur-
tain on an era of unprecedented, mutually
advantageous cooperation between Asia and
the West. For what was demonstrated by the
warmth and public enthusiasm of the Presi-
dent's reception everywhere, and what was
underscored repeatedly for all the world to
see, is that the forces of neutralism, anti-
colonialism, and regional dissension are no
longer significant factors in Asian affairs.
The argument, by Americans oddly enough,
that U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese war
would make it hated throughout Asia was
shown to be wholly false.
The reality of the situation, as we have
seen, is quite the contrary. The trend is
toward greater willingness to move in con-
cert with others to devise a lasting, essen-
tially Asian counterweight to Chinese power
in the area. The motivating force for this is
not Asian self-aggrandizement. It is simply
the impatience of Asians for a peace in which
to build their nations, provide for their fam-
ilies, plot more satisfying lives, and lift the
horizons of future generations.
Asian efforts to unify and fortify the re-
gion have begun to move so fast, in fact, that
the danger now exists that American and
Western adjustments to such dramatic and
constructive change will fall behind. Free
Asia has reached the point where it is pre-
pared to associate itself with new Western
initiatives which complement its own. But
how many nations are prepared to propose
and follow through on the wholly equitable
terms a self-reliant and united Asia right-
fully will demand ? Westerners cannot expect
to operate in Asia in the future on terms
that existed in the past. But it would be a
pessimist indeed who could not see the newly
compelling opportunities for fruitful coopera-
tion which Asians are providing in the course
of coordinated regional reformation and de-
velopment. The question now is whether
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
197
America and others have mastered the tech-
nique of full and equal partnership in Asia.
Pattern of Thai-American Relations
As America and others in the West look
for answers to that question, I would hold
that the pattern of Thai-American relations
offers a sound basis on which effective for-
mulas can be devised. It has been the tradi-
tion of Thai-American relations, for over a
century and a half, to set exemplary stand-
ards in terms of the mutual understanding
and respect which are essential in contacts
between nations, particularly between those
whose disparities in their size and power
are significant.
As the Foreign Minister of Thailand ob-
served last May, "Our relationship stands
out as a remarkable example of how a small
nation can work with a great power without
being dominated or indeed losing its iden-
tity."
It was his hope, he emphasized, that Thai-
American collaboration would become what
the Foreign Minister termed "a model to an
orderly and peaceful development of the rela-
tionship between nations, large and small, in
this part of the world — relationships which
will not entail subservience of one to the
other, but rather mutually trustworthy and
fruitful partnership and cooperation."
I share completely the opinions of my Thai
colleague on the techniques of enlightened
diplomacy and international cooperation.
Nothing is more important in the modern
world than the psychological relations be-
tween nations, particularly the patterns of
style, attitude, and behavior which become es-
tablished in the solution of common problems
through intimate, complex, and sensitive as-
sociations. The basis on which Thailand and
the United States conduct their relations
takes those considerations into full account.
We practice earnest solicitation and consider-
ation of each other's opinions on all matters
of common concern. We acknowledge mutual
responsibility for the outcome of joint efforts.
And, most importantly, we cultivate an at-
mosphere of full trust within a genuinely
equitable partnership.
Now, there are no doubts among you here
in Bangkok as to whether Thailand brings as
much to that partnership as she receives.
There are a great many voluntary and recip-
rocal actions which could . be cited. To ex-
amine only one of them, we might choose
Thailand's contribution to the military effec-
tiveness of her American and South Viet-
namese allies, which is a part of her ongoing
heavy support of SEATO objectives.
As you know, the Royal Thai Government
has permitted the use of its bases by ele-
ments of the United States Armed Forces en-
gaged in carrying out defensive measures
under the obligations both Governments had
assumed under the SEATO treaty. These
bases at Korat, Ubon, Nakom Phanon,
Udorn, Takhli, and U-Tapao have been a
major contribution to the Allied war effort.
It is impossible to estimate how many thou-
sand Allied lives have been saved in South
Viet-Nam as a direct result of Thailand's co-
operation. But one needs only to sample the
enraged stream of propaganda protests
beamed at Thailand by Peking and Hanoi to
conclude that our concerted actions hurt them
painfully.
The Thai facilities which have played such
a critical role in the defense of South Viet-
Nam did not appear miraculously or mysteri-
ously, simply because of the free world's ur-
gent need for them. Those installations were
put in place by Thailand much earlier, in
the course of long-term military prepared-
ness efforts undertaken in its own defense
and in response to its obligations as a highly
conscientious member of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization.
The complex of modern military logistical
facilities now available in Thailand is the
result of a combined effort that has been
made within the SEATO framework to pro-
vide for the defense of the treaty area. The
United States continues to play its role with-
in SEATO by taking an active part in the
maintenance and improvement of those facil-
ities. Thus, among the 35,283 members of the
American Armed Forces in Thailand, as of
January 5 there were some 8,000 engaged in
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the construction and maintenance of strategic
roadways, communications networks, port
facilities, military supply depots, and other
installations which have been judged by
SEATO members to be essential for the
security of this area.
At the same time, the U.S. continues its
16-year-old program to assist in the training
and equipment of Thailand's armed forces.
As long-range Communist plans for Thai-
land's subversion, announced by Peking some
time ago, are accelerated, Thai-U.S. coopera-
tion under the military assistance program
has taken these new tactics into account. An
American Special Forces unit has been de-
ployed here on a training mission which will
give Thailand additional military units
skilled in counterinsurgency operations. At
Thai request, a company of unarmed Ameri-
can helicopters has been temporarily operat-
ing in the northeast to provide the all-
important elements of mobility and logistical
flexibility for Thai security units. The
American unit's mission is best described as
a "taxi service," which has been available to
Thai civilian and military authorities en-
gaged in the numerous economic, social, and
security development programs Thailand
has organized to protect and benefit its
people in the remote areas. In the next 2
weeks these airlift missions will be taken
over by the Thai Government, using its own
new aircraft, flown and serviced by newly
graduated helicopter pilots and ground
maintenance crews.
I might add for the record that neither
the Special Forces and other American train-
ing personnel nor these temporarily provided
helicopters have participated in actual coun-
terinsurgency combat operations. The Thai
have insisted that this is their responsibility
which they will meet with their own armed
forces. The helicopters are therefore being
assigned to other duties by the Secretary of
Defense at the end of this month in accord-
ance with arrangements made on their ar-
rival last August.
It is in these and other unsensational ways
that the United States has moved to help
strengthen this country militarily and to as-
sist a government deeply conscious of its
responsibilities for protecting its own and
neighboring people.
As you know, the Royal Thai Government
has decided to add to the Royal Thai Air
Force and Royal Thai Navy units, now en-
gaged with their other free- wo rid allies in
resisting aggression in South Viet-Nam, an
additional fighting force from the Royal Thai
Army. They will be warmly welcomed by
their other SEATO allies, who learned of
their courage and valor when they fought
as allies in the United Nations command in
Korea.
In summary, our mission here is not to
oversee or involve ourselves in the internal
military and civilian aff'airs which are the
exclusive business of the Thai themselves.
Our mission is to perform as trusted friend,
discreet confidant, and dependable ally and
where we can to make available from our
experience and resources those things which
Thailand judges to be applicable and bene-
ficial to its own development and security.
And it is a similar approach, I submit,
that will enable America to associate itself
most fully with the new order that has begun
to emerge so rapidly within free Asia. The
old order is passing. Its death rattle can be
heard in the jungles of Viet-Nam, just as the
new era can be glimpsed in Asia's busy con-
ference halls.
The United States has traveled a long,
challenging, and burdensome way to reach
this point. The final miles may prove to be
a bit rough because they feature a bitter,
complicated struggle against fanatical ex-
tremists. But we now know what our role
entails. We know that it need not overtax
our resources. We do know that the Amer-
ican people have the patience and the deter-
mination we will need to carry out our com-
mitments. If there is any important element
still missing from the American commitment
to keep Southeast Asia secure, I would sug-
gest that it is confidence in ourselves, con-
fidence in the future of Asia, and pride that
we have made that future possible by meet-
ing our commitments, not only to Asia but
to our ancient obligation to freedom.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
199
AID Report on Viet-Nam Commodity Programs
Submitted to President Johnson
Folloiving is a letter of transmittal to
President Johnson from William S. Gaud,
Administrator of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, together with the text
of a report on the management of AID com-
modity programs in Viet-Nam in 1966.
letter of transmittal
9 January 1967
Dear Mr. President: I submit here-
with a year-end report on the management
of AID commodity assistance programs in
Vietnam and what we are doing to improve
their effectiveness and prevent their misuse.
Such a special report seemed desirable to
me because of the magnitude of our Vietnam
aid program and the difficult wartime cir-
cumstances under which it must be admin-
istered, unique in AID's experience. Effective
management of such large and complex pro-
grams would be a demanding task in any
developing country. It has been especially
demanding in a country whose economy,
social structure, communications and trans-
portation have been dislocated by a long war.
Rapid expansion of these programs to meet
urgent requirements in 1966 compounded
the management task.
The U.S. has provided about $455 million
in food, equipment and other civil aid sup-
plies during 1966 to support "revolutionary
development" activities in the rural areas,
fight inflation throughout the country, estab-
lish the foundation for long-term develop-
ment, and provide medical and relief supplies
to the victims of communist terror and ag-
gression.
To administer this expanding program, the
AID Mission staff had to be doubled during
the year. New systems, procedures and con-
trols were adopted to strengthen safeguards
against abuses and facilitate handling of sup-
plies. These include exchange devaluation
and reforms in import procedures made by
the Government of Vietnam, major changes
in AID'S Commercial Import Program opera-
tions, expansion and improvement of phys-
ical facilities and management of the Viet-
namese ports, a large increase in U.S. ad-
visory services and auditing staffs, and
improvements in documentation and infor-
mation systems.
Among the most important specific actions
taken were:
— assignment of the U.S. Army's 1st
Logistic Command to supervise the handling
of almost all AID project commodities from
ship discharge to Government warehouses;
— assignment of the 125th Terminal Com-
mand as an advisory unit to the Vietnamese
director of the Port of Saigon;
— doubling the AID Mission's auditing
staff and the assignment of controllers and
traveling auditors to all regions;
— assignment of a U.S. Bureau of Customs
team to assist the Vietnamese Customs Office
in improving its procedures and spot-check-
ing AID-financed commercial imports;
— a decision to station American logistics
advisors in provincial and regional ware-
houses; and
— development of an automated arrival ac-
counting system for AID's commercial im-
ports.
Nonetheless, as generally happens in war-
time, there has been some illegal diversion
or other loss of aid supplies to Vietnam.
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Any such loss is deplorable, even in wartime,
and I know that you have been concerned, as
have I and my staff, with the necessity of
assuring that large amounts of AID-financed
commodities are not stolen or otherwise di-
verted. This report summarizes our work
on that problem. It reviews the AID Mis-
sion's estimates of the recent and current
rates of loss in the major program categories
and measures to reduce these losses.
These estimates, which are the most com-
prehensive and carefully reviewed findings
available, indicate that in recent months no
more than 5-6% of all U.S. economic assist-
ance commodities delivered to Vietnam were
stolen or otherwise diverted.
Though these rates of loss are comparable
to or lower than losses in other war zones
under less difficult conditions, they are by no
means acceptable and we are doing our best
to reduce them further. Management im-
provements now in force or being initiated
are expected to reduce losses substantially
over the coming year. I am confident that my
next report to you will reflect further im-
provement in the management and effective-
ness of the AID commodity programs.
Sincerely yours,
William S. Gaud
TEXT OF REPORT
I. Introduction
AID has undertaken in Vietnam a war-
time economic assistance program unprece-
dented in its magnitude and intensity.
In late 1965, it became necessary to in-
crease vastly the AID and Food for Peace
commodity programs in order to bolster the
Vietnamese economy against inflationary
pressures resulting from the U.S. and Viet-
namese military buildup, to provide greater
support to the "revolutionary development"
program in the rural areas, and to furnish
relief and medical supplies to refugees and
other victims of the "shooting war."
To be effective, our response to these ur-
gent requirements had to be full and fast.
Obligation of funds and the initiation of or-
ders for the programs had to be started at
once, even before all the personnel needed to
manage them were on the job in Vietnam.
The AID American staff of "direct-hire" per-
sonnel stationed in Vietnam or in training
on January 1, 1966, numbered about 700; by
December 31, 1966, it had nearly doubled. At
the same time, AID and the Government of
Vietnam undertook a variety of economic
measures, reforms and procedures to man-
age more effectively this massive and com-
plex flow of commodities.
During calendar year 1966, the period cov-
ered in this report, actual disbursements for
AID and Food for Peace program goods
shipped to Vietnam totaled $455 million,
compared with $266 million in 1965. Opera-
tion and control of a program of this size
in a less developed country would be diffi-
cult in time of peace under relatively stable
social and economic conditions. South Viet-
nam in 1966 presented far greater problems.
It was in every sense disjointed by war, its
modest transportation capacity disrupted
and insecure, its public and private manage-
ment ranks thinned, its system of deterring
corruption inadequate.
To meet the requirements of the Viet-
namese economy and civil counterinsurgency
effort, well over 150,000 different commod-
ities had to be procured, shipped and dis-
tributed— items as large as huge gas tur-
bine generators and manufacturing plant
machinery and as small as sewing needles,
as complex as specially designed industrial
engines and as "simple" as shiploads of rice.
Nearly 3 million tons of economic assistance
goods were shipped to Vietnam during 1966
— the equivalent of 900 shiploads.
This report summarizes the nature and
purposes of the AID commodity programs,
describes the economic, managerial and logis-
tical problems that have had to be overcome,
and enumerates the economic measures,
physical facilities and operational systems
which have been or are being created to cope
with these problems. The report deals sepa-
rately with commodities which are intended
for sale in Vietnam's commercial markets
(part II) and those which are intended for
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
201
use in projects or relief programs (part III).
In both sections, the flow of goods is ex-
amined from arrival in Vietnam to the pro-
gram destinations.
Special attention is directed throughout
to the problems of loss, theft or other diver-
sion of AID-funded commodities and correc-
tive measures. Losses of economic assistance
goods in Vietnam are estimated by our
Mission at no more than .5 to 6 percent over-
all in recent months. This aggregate is de-
rived from estimates, using several separate
methods, of between 2 and 5 percent of com-
mercial imports (which accounted in 1966
for 85 percent of the total commodity flow),
and estimates of between 10 and 15 percent
of the far smaller amount of project and
relief commodities which must be distributed
to every province, often through insecure
territory. These rates of loss are believed to
be no more, and perhaps less, than that suf-
fered in other wartime conditions. However,
such losses are unacceptable to AID. They
are being reduced now by new measures in
the Saigon port and will be reduced through-
out the internal logistic system by other
measures recently adopted. The physical con-
trol and management systems already in-
stalled or decided upon are outlined below.
A separate section addresses economic war-
fare, the effort to frustrate the Viet Cong ex-
ploitation of local supply sources including
U.S. economic and military aid supplies.
II. strengthening the Vietnamese Economy:
The Commercial Import and Food for
Peace Programs
A. Combating Inflation
About 85 percent of the economic aid
goods sent to Vietnam in 1966 were com-
mitted to the fight against destructive infla-
tion. To the extent that imports could
moderate domestic shortages, this AID com-
mei-cial import program and Food for Peace
program succeeded.
With over two-thirds of its able-bodied
men in the 20-30 year age group absorbed
by the war eff'ort, cities swollen by refugees,
internal transportation disrupted and much
of the agricultural area a battleground.
South Vietnam's capacity to provide goods
and services for its own population has been
drastically reduced. The shortage of domestic
goods and services was compounded by an
increase of over 130 percent during 1965-
1966 in the amount of piasters in circulation,
funds spent primarily in support of the war
eff'ort for salaries and expenditures of Viet-
namese soldiers, policemen, civil servants
and construction workers, and of U.S. troops
and military contractors. If this increase in
purchasing power were not offset by an in-
crease in the inflow of goods, prices of scarce
commodities would be bid up rapidly and a
runaway inflation would undermine morale
and cause extreme social inequity, jeopard-
izing the whole defense effort.
U.S. provision of commodities through the
commercial import and Food for Peace pro-
grams gives the disrupted South Vietnamese
economy additional dollar resources to fi-
nance more imports, supplementing the
foreign currency resources it earns through
normal financial transactions. These pro-
grams provide food, fertilizer, construction
materials, machinery — thousands of items
needed to keep the economy operating and
expanding. The sale of these imported goods
and domestic and customs revenue collections
absorb piasters and reestablish the balance
between money and goods in the marketplace.
In late 1965 the existing AID commercial
import program (CIP) and Title I sales of
the Food for Peace program were rapidly
expanded to meet this critical need.
B. Hoiv the CIP and Title I Programs Func-
tion
The Government of Vietnam (GVN) con-
trols imports of commodities for commercial
sale in the country through a licensing sys-
tem. After a license has been issued by the
GVN and before AID approves U.S. funding
of the import under the CIP, an AID com-
modity analyst reviews the order with special
attention to four factors:
— Is the applicant an authorized importer
not under suspension?
— Is the commodity a nonluxury item ?
— Could the enemy adapt such commodity
202
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to use as an item of critical importance?
— Is the size of the order reasonable in
terms of the current Vietnamese market de-
mand?
If the order is approved, the AID analyst
assists the importer in preparing an invita-
tion for proposals. The importer then entei's
into an agreement with the most qualified
responsive bidder, who ships the goods to the
importer. The supplier is paid by AID in
dollars. The importer deposits the piaster
equivalent of the cost of the goods in a
"counterpart fund," which is jointly admin-
istered by the U.S. and Vietnamese Govern-
ments to support sections of the GVN mili-
tary and civil budgets.
The goods themselves are received by the
importer through customs, almost always at
the Port of Saigon, and disseminated
throughout the Vietnamese economy. The
presence of AID's "clasped hands" symbol
on these commodities sold in shops through-
out Vietnam has frequently been misin-
terpreted as an indication of the diversion
of AID material meant for free distribution
or use in projects. It is, on the contrary,
tangible evidence that the CIP effort is
succeeding.
Most Food for Peace commodities brought
to Vietnam for sale under Title I of that
program are handled in precisely the same
manner as other CIP goods. Title I rice,
however, is treated differently. Approxi-
mately 59 percent of the rice is off-loaded at
the Port of Saigon by the U.S. Army's 4th
Terminal Command and placed in a GVN
rice warehouse, while the remaining 41 per-
cent is landed at the ports of Da Nang, Qui
Nhon and Nha Trang. The Vietnamese
Government then distributes the rice as
follows:
— Most is sold to merchants for local cur-
rency. They, in turn, distribute it in the rice
deficit areas in normal commercial channels.
— About 10 percent is turned over to the
Vietnamese armed forces to supplement
their diets.
— A small amount is sold directly by the
GVN to the public.
During calendar 1966, 422,000 metric tons
of rice, valued at approximately $58 million,
were exported to Vietnam under the Title I
program.
C. Reforms of the System
Vietnamese importers active in the CIP
and Food for Peace program, like business-
men elsewhere, strive to make the largest
sustainable profit.
Before 1965 it was not especially easy for
importers to manipulate the market because
the foreign exchange rate was fairly realistic
and smaller incomes and limited purchasing
power kept the demand for imports stable.
Following the rapid buildup of 1965, how-
ever, a combination of increased purchasing
power, saturated logistic facilities, increased
VC interdiction of internal distribution, an
exchange rate which had become unrealistic
and war-thinned civil government adminis-
tration created a situation in which importers
could collude with one another and with un-
scrupulous suppliers to generate windfall or
monopoly profits. Administrative price con-
trols proved ineffective or positively harmful.
In effect, the institutions of the import sec-
tor, operating under a body of regulations
adopted several years ago during a period of
relative stability, were shown in some in-
stances to be inadequate or counterproduc-
tive.
In the spring and summer of 1966 the
Governments of Vietnam and the United
States agreed on import reforms. Coupled
with the economic stabilization measures rec-
ommended by the International Monetary
Fund, these reforms, each discussed below,
reduced opportunities for profiteering and
corrected other abuses that had taken place
under the CIP.
1. Devaluation. On June 18 the Vietnam-
ese Government announced a new system of
exchange rates which raised the effective
cost of foreign exchange for imports from
60 to 118 piasters per dollar, plus duties.
While the primary purpose of devaluation
was to absorb excess liquidity and keep in-
flation within tolerable limits, additional
benefits were derived from the effect the new
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
203
exchange rate had on CIP transactions.
Doubling the piaster cost of foreign exchange
made illegal reexportation of CIP commodi-
ties unattractive and reduced the profit pos-
sibilities in such practices as overinvoicing.
2. Expavded Competition in the Commer-
cial Import Sector. Open general licensing
was adopted for the licensing of most im-
ports financed under the CIP, and with
Vietnamese-owned foreign exchange, and the
former system of administrative allocation of
foreign exchange on the basis of importer
quotas was abolished. New importers were
permitted to enter the previously closed im-
port community if they could demonstrate
that they were responsible firms, 70 percent
Vietnamese owned, and had at least 15 mil-
lion piasters of paid-in capital. They had to
prove that they had warehouse facilities
available, and they were required to deposit
1 million piasters with the Ministry of Na-
tional Economy as a surety bond against
illegal activities. To date the applications of
more than 170 new importers have been au-
thorized or are in process. This increase in
competition has been a healthy stimulus to
the economy.
3. Consolidated Procurement. As a de-
terrent to possible collusion between sup-
pliers and importers, to achieve economies in
procurement and to improve logistic manage-
ment, both Governments agreed to consoli-
dated procurement procedures for several
bulk commodities, including galvanized iron
sheet, white cement, newsprint, tinplate,
fertilizer and jute bags. These commodities,
and others which may be added in the future,
are now purchased by the U.S. General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA) acting as agent.
GSA procures under standard U.S. Govern-
ment procedures and arranges ocean trans-
portation— usually on vessels provided by
the U.S. Military Sea Transportation Serv-
ice.
Since GSA buys in large quantities, econ-
omies can be achieved in both procurement
and transportation. Consolidated shipments
help to relieve port congestion and expedite
customs clearance.
4. Broader Advertising of Procurement.
Under CIP regulations any transaction of
more than $10,000 must be advertised in a
circular published by the AID Office of Small
Business. This permits American suppliers
to learn of requirements and off'er bids. To
reduce the possibility of importers who want
to import more than $10,000 worth of goods
evading this requirement by applying for
separate import licenses of less than $10,000,
each general importer is now allowed only
three licenses under $10,000 in any 3-month
period.
The resulting increase in small business
advertising should bring about lower prices
due to increased competition. By reducing the
volume of import transactions this innova-
tion should also reduce the time required to
process import licenses and consolidate the
movement of commercial shipments through
the Port of Saigon.
5. Elimination of Agents' Commissions. In
the past, local agents' commissions have been
eligible for dollar financing under the CIP.
In order to reduce possible U.S. balance of
payments drain and the opportunity for
abuses such as illegal capital flight, AID has
made arrangements to cease financing of
commissions for any agents except those who
are U.S. citizens maintaining residence in
the United States.
D. Physical Control of Commercial Imports
in Saigon Port Area.
Nowhere has the military and civilian im-
port buildup which began in the summer of
1965 caused greater strains than at the Port
of Saigon. The port's physical equipment,
security facilities and documentation sys-
tems, though adequate to handle the flow
of cargo prior to 1965, were not designed
to cope with the extraordinary demands of
1966. Designed to handle 1.5 million tons of
cargo a year, the port was operating at an
annual rate of 3.5 million tons by Januaiy
1966 and had reached an annual level of al-
most 5 million tons by November 1966.
The decision to strain port facilities be-
cause of the urgency of the military and eco-
nomic efforts was made with knowledge that
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
confusion and congestion would result until
new facilities and systems could be estab-
lished.
By niid-1966 the specific measures, dis-
cussed in detail later in this section, had
begun discernibly to relieve port congestion,
and present conditions, while not yet satis-
factory, reflect very substantial improve-
ment.
Control of the CIP and Title I programs is
largely a problem limited to the Saigon area
and, more often than not, to the port itself.
Once these goods have cleared customs and
have been delivered to the importer, AID's
commodity import mission has essentially
been accomplished. Thereafter they flow,
through commercial channels within the local
economy to meet the needs of the people and
hold down inflation.
Nevertheless, the U.S. AID Mission to
Vietnam, together with other U.S. agencies
and the Government of Vietnam, maintains
a continuing interest in these and all other
commodities available in the marketplace in
an eff'ort to limit the ability of Viet Cong
military units to obtain critical supplies. This
eff'ort is described in detail in chapter IV.
Since most CIP commodities are not
shipped to Vietnam separately from other
commercial cargoes, the efforts to improve
their handling must in most cases be directed
at the operation of the entire port. The steps
which have been and are being taken toward
this end fall into five categories: (1) expan-
sion of physical facilities, (2) improved port
management, (3) increasing U.S. advisory
activities, (4) improvement of documenta-
tion procedures, and (5) tightening of port
security.
1. Expansion of Physical Facilities. Sai-
gon Port's handling of commercial cargo has
been increased from 295,000 metric tons a
month in January 1966 to 415,000 metric
tons in November 1966 principally because
of the following measures:
— 14 additional deep draft buoy sites have
been prepared and a floating dock for roU-
on, roll-off unloading has been put into op-
eration.
— Roads and open storage areas have been
repaired or constructed. More efficient traffic
patterns have been laid out.
— More barge discharge and transit fa-
cilities have been opened. Sheet steel piling
has been provided for constructing LST and
barge landing sites in Saigon.
— Obstructions to navigation in the Saigon
River have been removed.
— Five heavy-duty hydraulic dredges for
use in port construction have been sent to
Vietnam.
— AID has procured or contracted for 552
trucks, 156 barges, 13 tugs and 213 pieces
of handling equipment (e.g., cranes and fork
lifts) to facilitate port operations, and more
equipment is being procured — all additional
to port equipment used by the U.S. military.
— Steel plate for constructing 47 new
barges in Vietnam and rehabilitating 40 ex-
isting barges has recently arrived (these are
included in the 156 barges referred to
above).
— 10 coastal vessels and a 3,000-ton-per-
month junk fleet have been chartered to help
move cargo from Saigon to other ports.
— The major New Port project, which is
creating an entire new section of the Saigon
port, is partially constructed and in use by
the U.S. military. It is scheduled for com-
pletion in the spring of 1967.
— A new fish market pier, south of the
main port area, is now in operation.
— A fresh water facility for ships in port
has been finished.
— 676,000 square feet of new civil ware-
house space at Thu Due, close to Saigon, is
being built. It is partially in use now and is
expected to be fully operational by April
1967. This facility possesses double the ca-
pacity of existing port transit warehouses
for civil cargo.
— Other Saigon area warehouse facilities
have been expanded to expedite port clear-
ance.
— The load on the Port of Saigon has been
reduced by the expansion of facilities at a
number of other Vietnamese ports including
Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Da Nang
and Cam Ranh Bay. The capacity of these
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
205
ports has been increased more than threefold,
from 125,000 metric tons per month in Au-
gust 1965 to more than 400,000 metric tons
at present.
2. Improved Port Management
— The Vietnamese Army has been given re-
sponsibiHty for management of the port. The
Port Director, General Lan, is responsible
directly to the Prime Minister.
— To reduce congestion, the GVN has de-
creed that all cargo must be removed from
port warehouses within 30 days or be con-
fiscated and auctioned by the government.
(This decree was not being enforced satis-
factorily at the close of the year, but con-
gestion in port warehouses had been re-
duced.)
3. Increasing U.S. Advisory Activities
— Since March 1966 a U.S. Customs Bu-
reau advisory team detailed to AID has been
increased from 1 to 10 and will be expanded
to 20 by February 1967. This team is work-
ing closely with the Vietnamese Customs
Bureau in improving its procedures and sys-
tems.
— A four-man U.S. Census Bureau team,
serving with AID since August 1966, is as-
sisting the Vietnamese Customs Bureau and
the Ministry of Finance in developing auto-
mated data processing systems to provide
rapid and accurate financial and logistical
information.
— U.S. civilian and military port advisers
are assisting the port authorities of Vietnam
in improving reporting and inventory control
systems. A group of port management ex-
perts is advising on port operations.
— An eight-member team from the Inter-
national Longshoremen's Union worked with
the Saigon stevedoring companies during
most of 1966 to advise on techniques for in-
creasing cargo handling capability.
—In September 1966, the U.S. Army's
125th Terminal Command arrived in Viet-
nam to supplement the services of the AID
technical advisers to the Director of the Port
of Saigon and his staff. All of its 187 officers
and enlisted men are assigned to the com-
mercial area and working in scheduling of
ships, unloading and warehousing proce-
dures, imix)rter notification, etc. The unit
has set up its own documentation system, dis-
cussed in the next section, to provide checks
on the existing system.
4. Improvement of Documentation Proce-
dures. When tramp ships carrying bulk com-
mercial cargo are ready to unload, the con-
signee selects a stevedoring company to
assume responsibility for discharging his
cargo. Liners are called to berth and dis-
charged by stevedores hired by the steamship
companies. Ships carrying cargo of high
value are normally discharged directly into
customs controlled transit sheds in the port
area. Ships containing bulk cargoes are gen-
erally moored at buoys mid-stream in the
Saigon River and discharged into barges. In
many cases, customs officials are able to clear
such cargo as it is off-loaded, in which case
the barge can take its cargo directly to the
importer's warehouse. In other instances the
barge becomes, in effect, a floating bonded
warehouse waiting its turn to discharge the
cargo into a customs transit shed for clear-
ance. Disorderly use of barges for tempo-
rary storage is one of the major current
causes of congestion in the port.
The 125th Terminal Command has set up
a documentation system for commercial
cargo parallel to the combined coverage of
the four separate and distinct Vietnamese
systems maintained by the Saigon Port Di-
rector, the ship's agent, the stevedore and
the Customs Bureau.
When the 125th's system becomes fully op-
erational, a copy of each arriving ship's man-
ifest will be forwarded to the unit's docu-
mentation section which will prepare a
separate set of control documents for each
consignment on board. These documents will
then follow the goods from off-loading,
through intermediate stages — e.g., a barge
or a transit warehouse — ^to delivery to the
importer. The control documents will then be
returned to the documentation section. At
each step checkers will have compared the
quantity and condition of the goods with the
206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
notations on the document, so that a com-
plete record of each consignment will be
available.
The AID Mission's automated arrival ac-
counting system for commercial imports, be-
gun in July 1966, will produce reports early
this year on goods cleared through customs
related to records of U.S. Government pay-
ments to American suppliers for the period
July through December 1966. Later in the
spring, the system will be modified to assimi-
late input from the 125th Terminal Command
documentation section, and will then auto-
matically follow CIP imports from the orig-
inal license request through all intermediate
steps to customs clearance.
To assist AID/Washington in advance re-
views of import transactions, a system for
sorting all CIP letters of credit opened in
favor of suppliers in the U.S. or abroad, re-
gardless of amount, is being established; the
electronic sorting program is expected to be
ready very soon. Thereafter, AID/Washing-
ton commodity analysts, logisticians, con-
trollers, and economic warfare experts will
have a weekly statement available (better
than data now used) which shows all letters
of credit issued, arranged by importer, sup-
plier, and commodity involved. The review
of this information in Washington prior to
shipment will permit corrective action on
major problems much earlier than is possible
under AID's normal port audit procedures.
5. Tightening of Port Security. As the
efficiency of Saigon port operations declined
in late 1965 and early 1966 under the great
surge of military and civilian commodities,
the need for more elaborate security pre-
cautions to protect incoming cargoes in-
creased. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese Gov-
ernments have taken a number of significant
steps to this end.
Direct U.S. actions in the security field —
principally the U.S. Customs team's inspec-
tion of 10 to 20 percent of the CIP consign-
ments, the presence of several hundred U.S.
military police in the port area, and the 1st
Logistical Command's increased responsi-
bility in the commercial sector of the port —
have played an important role in recent
months in reducing loss in the port area. In
the months ahead their efforts will have an
increasingly significant impact.
Four Vietnamese organizations are in-
volved in some phase of port security — the
Navy, the military police, the Customs
Bureau and the harbor police.
The military police are responsible for con-
trolling Vietnamese military personnel in
the port area and the Vietnamese Navy main-
tains security in the shipping channel be-
tween the port of Saigon and Vung Tau at the
mouth of the Saigon River.
The Customs Bureau has 1,700 employees,
1,300 of whom work in the Saigon port.
Their enforcement operations include the
use of several large launches and 12 smaller
assault boats provided by AID in September
1966.
The harbor police, a branch of the national
police, has responsibility for physical secu-
rity in the port area. The force now stands
at 600 men, an increase of over 100 since
January 1966. It will grow by another 100
men in the next few months. The harbor
police has established checkpoints at a num-
ber of strategic port locations (see chart 2
in the appendix) i and mounts regular water
patrols covering 96 kilometers of waterways
containing up to 1,400 barges, junks, lighters,
and other miscellaneous small boats, many of
which double as homes for one or more
families. Movement of craft in the port area
is strictly controlled. Officers of the harbor
police, in patrols and at checkpoints, inspect
personal identity cards and movement per-
mits, check barge cargo manifests against
cargo on board, and detain the suspects when-
ever these inspections reveal apparent irreg-
ularities.
Harbor police water-borne operations are
conducted in 4 patrol boats and 18 smaller
assault boats provided by AID, an increase
of 16 in the past year. The group's new main-
tenance staff, advised and augmented by
three expert Filipino mechanics, has tripled
the effective usage of harbor police craft in
less than a year. The boats are linked by an
' Not printed here.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
207
efficient radio communications network. The
harbor police forces are advised by a reg-
ularly assigned AID public safety adviser.
The harbor police director also controls
the activities of a 167-man police field force
unit recently assigned to the An Khanh area
directly across the Saigon River from the
main piers.
Until recently, the Vietnamese Navy, the
military police, the Customs officials and the
harbor police operated independently. A
major step was taken in September 1966 to-
ward integrating the efforts of all of these
groups and the U.S. Military Police with the
establishment of joint marine and land pa-
trols. The members of these patrols, acting
together, now possess the aggregate of each
of their members' limited jurisdictions.
Heightened security efforts are reflected in
the fact that port area arrests for improper
documentation, trespassing, theft and other
offenses rose from a rate of 150 per month
in early 1966 to 500 a month by end of 1966,
while reports of major crimes dropped
sharply.
E. Theft of Commercial Imports
Theft in port areas is a problem in the
less congested ports of many countries at
peace. High value, low bulk goods of a sort
not financed by AID are the thieves' prin-
cipal targets.
The AID Mission's best current estimate,
based on resurveys and spot checks over the
last few months and the judgment of the
U.S. technical experts working with the com-
mercial program, is that the recent rate of
theft of CIP and Title I commodities from
off-loading through port clearance in Saigon
is between 2 and 5 percent of the total of
all such commercial imports. The loss rate
is now believed to be near the lower end of
that range. This estimate is based on the
following sources:
— The U.S. Customs Bureau advisory
team, whose primary assignment is advising
the Vietnamese Customs Bureau, also spot
checks between 10 and 20 percent of all CIP
cargoes. These professional inspectors esti-
mate losses of CIP imports as no more than
2 to 5 percent and believe that the more ac-
curate current figure is closer to 2 percent.
— -The Vietnamese Insurance Agent's As-
sociation, comprising all insurance companies -
operating in Vietnam, reports that all-risk
coverage of CIP and other commercial goods
is available to Vietnamese importers for
losses prior to off-loading. Premiums run be-
tween 0.4 and 10 percent of the cargo's
value, with the average, however, close to 2
percent. Most of the companies also offer
their regular customers limited coverage for
a period of 30 days after off-loading (which
includes a restriction of coverage to 15 days
while the commodities are in barges) for an
additional premium of up to 0.3 percent. The
insurer may also agree to grant up to two
further 2-week periods of coverage at double
the additional premium.
Insurance coverage is fairly wide, though
selective. The local banks, which finance most
of the importers, insist on maximum insur-
ance coverage and the association itself esti-
mates that 90 to 95 percent of all CIP
cargoes are insured at some or all stages of
their voyage. The association reports that
claims paid out by all of its members for
losses during 1966 will aggregate about 1
percent of the value of goods insured. As
noted, however, this figure is subject to qual-
ification since coverage of high risks is lim-
ited and matters of proof often impede col-
lection of claims.
— Societe de Surveillance (Geneve) S.A., a
private Swiss international shipping inspec-
tion company, experienced in Vietnam, is un-
der contract to the AID Mission to review
deliveries of several types of CIP and Title
I commodities, as well as to check rice ship-
ments arriving in the ports of Qui Nhon and
Nha Trang. The goods spot checked by the
company are representative of 60 percent of
the dollar value of AID-financed commercial
imports. The company's first report, cover-
ing the period from March 1966 to October
1966, shows total shortages of "less than one
percent." Technically, this is a measure of
208
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
loss from time of shipment to the time the
vessel arrives at the port of Saigon. How-
ever, while food supplies are nonnally
checked in the hold of the ship, pharma-
ceuticals and general CIP cargo are moni-
tored in the transit warehouse and machin-
ery is inspected at its end-use location.
Therefore, while not a comprehensive deter-
mination of total loss, this report has con-
siderable bearing on the matter.
— Officials of the Food for Peace program,
the 4th Terminal Command, and others
working closely with the program state that
there is little theft of Title I rice.
— Despite the fact that AID-financed com-
mercial imports achieve their purposes when
they have passed through customs to the
market, frequent audits are conducted by
the AID Mission's Financial Management
Staff to determine the ultimate use made of
selected commercial imports. These audits
are primarily to determine whether goods
are reaching the enemy, to -determine the
effectiveness of importing these commodities
and the reliability of importers. Audits are
currently in progress on the end use of over
$100 million worth of commercial imports,
or about 25 percent of total shipments. This
increased auditing program has been made
possible by expansion of the AID Mission
audit staff from 17 to 34 since May 1966. A
survey of audits recently completed, includ-
ing one on $4 million worth of textiles, indi-
cates that over 95 percent of the examined
AID-financed commercial imports shipped
to Vietnam are properly used in the economy.
The losses noted in these audits — less than
5 percent of the total shipped — include diver-
sion and theft in the port as well as loss,
breakage, theft and improper use after the
commodities are delivered to the importer
and thence to the Vietnamese economy.
The measures recently initiated should be-
come fully effective early in 1967 and further
reduce theft of commercial cargo in the
poits. Our new data systems will provide
more accurate measures of these losses
shortly.
III. strengthening the Vietnamese Society:
AID Project Assistance
A. Growth of the Program
The AID project program is a complex of
many technical assistance, social develop-
ment, refugee assistance, institutional devel-
opment and relief activities. The great ma-
jority of these projects are planned and
executed in the rural areas in direct support
of the Government of Vietnam's revolution-
ary development program. Revolutionary
development is an integrated military and
civil effort to liberate the people of Vietnam
from Viet Cong control, provide security,
initiate political, economic and social devel-
opment, and win the support of the people
for their government. AID's role, on the
civil side, is vital to success in this "other
war" — the indispensable partner of the mili-
tary effort to defeat communist aggression
and insurgency.
AID's support takes the form of technical
advisers for the planning and execution of
projects, the training of Vietnamese, and the
provision of construction materials, many
types of equipment, seeds, fertilizer and med-
ical and relief supplies. These goods and
services are provided under projects jointly
planned and executed by both governments.
They include over 30 different agricultural
activities, irrigation and water management,
fishery activities and forestry projects; about
50 education activities — construction of
hamlet schools, provision of textbooks and
other educational materials, teacher training,
support of vocational and agricultural
schools in the rural areas and adult training
programs; a massive public health program,
including the construction, equipping and
staffing of provincial hospitals, a large-scale
immunization program, nursing education
and training and a variety of sanitation and
public health programs; refugee programs to
construct and equip camps, carry out educa-
tional and self-help activities within the
camps, and relocate refugees or return them
to their villages; the Chieu Hoi or "open
arms" program, designed to attract defectors
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
209
from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
forces, screen, assist and reorient them, and
reintegrate them as far as possible into the
Vietnamese mihtary forces or into the civil
society; roadbuilding, electrification, water
supply and other-public works projects; pro-
grams in public administration; in labor and
trade union development; and relief pro-
grams using U.S. agriculture products under
Titles II and III of P.L. 480.
To carry out these activities, project com-
modities must be transported from the ports
through the logistic systems of the appropri-
ate Vietnamese ministries to regional and
provincial warehouses and then to project
sites in thousands of villages and hamlets
rarely reached in the past, where transporta-
tion and security are poor and the Viet Cong
are near or present.
It is important for the political and social
objectives of the program that the Viet-
namese Government at all levels be directly
involved in conducting these projects, in-
cluding the distribution of supplies. It is for
this reason that AID's commodity manage-
ment programs are directed toward improve-
ment of Vietnamese systems.
In fiscal year 1965 the U.S. Government
obligated over $63 million for project com-
modities including P.L. 480 Title II and III
supplies. Because of the necessity to expand
the agriculture and education efforts in the
provinces, to meet the needs of a greatly in-
creased flow of refugees, and to extend direct
medical services to all provinces the project
program had to be greatly expanded. Obliga-
tions for the project program and relief com-
modities in fiscal year 1966 more than
doubled to $135 million. Actual expenditures
against shipments in calendar year 1966
were $68 million.
Along with the project program's growth,
AID has sought to increase the efficiency of
distribution of project commodities and to
reduce loss and wastage under wartime con-
ditions. Since many of these pi'ograms are
designed to support the revolutionary devel-
opment efforts in the countryside, where in-
security and lack of government control is
greatest, the loss rates in these programs
have necessarily been greater than those ex-
perienced in the commercial import program.
B. Project Commodity Procedures and Con-
trols
1. Improved Port Handling. Until July
1966 project commodities and CIP cargoes
were handled in the same way in the Port
of Saigon. The only distinction between the
two lay in that project goods were consigned
to a Vietnamese Government agency rather
than to a private importer. Importation of
project commodities was therefore likewise
impeded by port congestion. While steps
taken to improve port facilities, handling
and security mentioned in the previous
chapter benefited the project program as
well, further action was necessary and feasi-
ble with respect to project goods.
In July 1966 the U.S. Army's 1st Logis-
tical Command was given operational re-
sponsibility for discharging all project com-
modities landed in the Saigon area (90
percent of the total) and moving them to
ministry warehouses. The 1st Logistical
Command assigned operational responsibility
to the Army's 4th Terminal Command, a
unit of 809 officers and men highly skilled in
port operations, which also handles military
cargo in the Port of Saigon.
The 4th Terminal Command has set up a
system of tight physical and documentary
controls over project cargo which have re-
duced losses between the port and the min-
istry warehouses to a documented six-tenths
of 1 percent during the month of November.
The 4th Terminal Command estimates that
figures for December will be just as good or
lower than for November. Similar procedures
are now being installed at the ports of Da
Nang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, which to-
gether handle all of the project commodities
not passing through Saigon.
2. Movement from the Ports to the Prov-
inces. The 4th Terminal Command has estab-
lished an extremely effective system for get-
ting the goods to Vietnamese Government
warehouses, but their movement forward
210
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
from the warehouses in Saigon is handled
separately by the several ministries, most of
which have their own logistics systems, and
directly by the AID Mission. Each of these
systems is described in the sections that fol-
low. The current estimated percentage of loss
is noted for each. As graphically illustrated
in chart 1 ^ in the appendix to this report,
all project commodities account for only 15
percent of the total expenditures on commod-
ities, and each of these individual systems
represents only a portion of the total project
commodity program. Therefore, while the
loss rate in some areas is relatively high, it
is applied to only a small portion of the total
program.
(a) Public Safety. The national police
logistics system is well conceived and run. It
is monitored closely at all levels by 10 AID
public safety logistics advisers, an increase
of 2 since May 1966. These logistics advisers
have their office with their Vietnamese coun-
terparts in the national police logistics sys-
tem headquarters, where they are able to
monitor all supply movements. AID public
safety field advisers working with the na-
tional police in their assigned areas actually
check on the location of weapons by serial
number. Movement between Saigon and the
field is normally handled by air using the
facilities of Air America, an airline under
contract to AID.
These controls restrict loss or illegal diver-
sion to an amount now estimated at less than
1 percent by AID advisers.
(b) Public Health. The public health logis-
tics system was established under American
military procedures and is closely supervised
by 14 AID logistical advisers to the Ministry
of Health, an increase of 8 since May 1966.
These advisers maintain control over the
records system of the Health Ministry's cen-
tral warehouse at Phu Tho near Saigon and
supervise the inspection of project medical
supplies from the time of their delivery by
the 4th Terminal Command until they are
shipped to the provincial hospitals. Com-
modities are normally transported to prov-
' Not printed here.
ince hospitals and health services by Air
America or by a military airlift. Controls
are good in most hospitals, but petty theft
occurs.
Some project medical supplies are sent to
district and local health clinics which are
under the direction of the Vietnamese prov-
ince chief of medicine. Members of U.S. and
free-world medical teams as well as AID
public health logistical advisers stationed in
the area are able to perform only occasional
spot checks on such supplies.
AID advisers estimate that about 10-15
percent of public health project commodities
are lost. By far the greater part of this loss
occurs among the medical supplies which are
distributed from the provincial level to dis-
trict and local health clinics. Further im-
provements in supply handling are expected
to result from a program of regional ware-
houses scheduled for construction in 1967.
(c) Public Works. The Ministry of Public
Works logistics system is reasonably efficient.
Moreover, 90 percent of the dollar value of
AID public works project assistance comes
in the form of bulky heavy equipment and
vehicles which AID logisticians are able to
monitor by serial number. Very little theft of
this equipment is reported. Losses of goods
such as construction materials and spare
parts, which comprise the remaining 10 per-
cent of dollar value, are relatively high be-
cause they are transported in small con-
tainers to the provinces by truck, coastal
vessel or other relatively insecure means and
pass through many hands.
The AID Mission is adding two public
works warehouse advisers to its staff and is
working with the Ministry of Public Works
to improve and modernize its procedures.
The Mission estimates that well under 5
percent of all public works project commod-
ities are lost.
(d) The Central Purchasing Agency. The
Vietnamese Government's Central Purchas-
ing Agency (CPA) logistics system services
the programs of the Commissariat for Refu-
gees and the Commissariat General for Revo-
lutionary Development. The latter agency is
responsible for supporting the village-level
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
211
self-help, hamlet schools, dispensary and
other construction programs, as well as a
variety of security and development projects.
Commodities required in these programs in-
clude cement and other building materials,
clothing, blankets, and food products such as
bulgar wheat, cooking oil, and dehydrated
milk imported under the Food for Peace
program (Public Law 480, Titles II and III).
AID logistical advisers to the CPA system
report that the warehouse operation is rea-
sonably well conceived and administered; the
major area of loss is in the transportation
and field distribution systems. Goods brought
to the central CPA warehouse in Saigon by
the 4th Terminal Command are called for-
ward to replenish each provincial ware-
house's stocks as the quantities on hand fall
below certain predetermined stocking levels.
The provincial warehouses are under direct
control of the Vietnamese province chiefs, but
requisitions against the Saigon warehouse
must be authorized by the U.S. provincial
representative as well as the province chief.
The requisition form sent to Saigon from
the provinces designates a specific local use
for the goods ordered and becomes the basic
control document for the shipment. The des-
ignated recipient and the hauler inspect the
goods on arrival, note any discrepancies on
the requisition form, and return the form to
CPA in Saigon.
Goods are issued out of the provincial
warehouse by the province chief. However,
should the U.S. provincial representative fail
to concur in an issuance order he is re-
quired to report the disagreement directly
to the Commissioner General for Revolu-
tionary Development, who then requires the
province chief to explain his decision.
While some of the CPA goods are trans-
ported from Saigon to the provinces by Air
America or U.S. military aircraft, most are
moved by truck or coastal vessel and there-
fore are more susceptible to Viet Cong
seizure or other diversion. As a result, the
AID Mission estimates a total loss rate of up
to 20 percent of CPA project commodities.
Welfare and relief supplies provided to the
needy under AID or Food for Peace pro-
grams are sometimes exchanged for rice or
other traditional foods they prefer. Such
transactions are technically diversions and
are included in these estimates even though
the needy person has received assistance — the
basic intention of the welfare program. The
following innovations are now being or will
shortly be instituted which are expected to
reduce these losses of CPA commodities sub-
stantially:
— A standard warehouse inventory and ac-
counting procedure has been established for
all province warehouses. Training sessions
have been held to instruct all Vietnamese
warehouse supervisors in the new system,
and English translation overlays have been
prepared for all warehouse records to enable
U.S. personnel in the field to review them as
required.
— In recent months 17 new logistics ad-
visers have been added to the 26 directly
concerned with the movement and storage of
CPA goods; 14 more are scheduled to arrive
in the near future.
— Additional U.S. personnel will shortly be
assigned to each provincial warehouse. They
are to provide Vietnamese warehouse oper-
ators with on-the-job training in the new
systems being installed and observe opera-
tions.
— CPA regional warehouses, under the
control of an AID logistics adviser and a
CPA official, have been set up in Regions I
and II, the northern and central regions, and
will shortly be established in the country's
delta region. Resultant consolidation of ship-
ments from Saigon will, in turn, improve
security and control. Convoys will be used
wherever possible.
(e) Agriculture. The greater part of proj-
ect imports for the Ministry of Agriculture
consists of fertilizer which is sold to farmers
at lower than market price. It is consigned to
the National Agriculture Credit Organiza-
tion (NACO) for distribution through 39
warehouses maintained by agricultural co-
operatives or farmers' associations through-
out the country. NACO deducts its operating
212
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
costs and sales agents' fees from the gross
proceeds of fertilizer sales, and deposits the
net in a special trust fund for agricultural
projects which is jointly administered by the
Vietnamese and United States Governments.
There are no U.S. logistics advisers in-
volved in this system now, but three will be
assigned within the next few months. The
only data now available on the effectiveness
of the NACO distribution system comes from
its own accounting records. These records for
the period March 1-October 31, 1966, in-
dicate that cash has been received for almost
70 percent of the total fertilizer available
for sale, about 25 percent of the fertilizer
was in warehouses or in transit, and the
remainder was used in demonstration proj-
ects or lost. These records have not yet been
audited by U.S. advisers and are therefore
not conclusive. Unlike all other project im-
ports, fertilizers are not received at the Port
of Saigon by the 4th Terminal Command, but
are handled exclusively by NACO.
The Mission has surveyed its agricultural
advisers and provincial representatives who
estimate that losses or illegal sales of agri-
cultural project commodities range from 5
to 20 percent. Most diverted fertilizer, com-
prising the bulk of these estimated agricul-
tural commodity losses, is illegally sold, at
prices above the approved government rate,
to South Vietnamese farmers who use it to
increase crop production. The three AID
logistics advisers soon to be assigned will play
a major role in determining the actual situa-
tion and recommending improvements.
(f) Other Fields. Of the remaining proj-
ect commodities brought into the country,
heavy materials handling equipment for port
operations and portable warehouses repre-
sent the largest single group. These items are
not easily lost or stolen; materially no losses
have been reported.
Technical support commodities brought in-
to Vietnam to support AID employees in
their assignments are consigned to the AID
Mission and are handled directly by Ameri-
cans. Less than 5 percent of the goods are
lost.
The remaining project commodities (for
education, public administration, labor, and
other miscellaneous programs) are handled
in much the same manner as the refugee
and revolutionary development items in the
CPA system and are subject to about the
same rates of loss and diversion. Two logis-
tics and warehouse advisers are scheduled
to arrive in early 1967 to work with the
Ministry of Education, and one is expected
to be assigned to supply problems in the
public administration area.
C. The Overall Project Commodity Situa-
tion
After resurvey and reanalysis, the U.S.
AID Mission estimates that the total loss rate
for all types of project commodities in recent
months was 10 to 15 percent. This estimate
will be further refined as reporting and con-
trol procedures improve.
Within the past few months, the AID Mis-
sion has assigned controllers to each of the
four regions of South Vietnam. They are re-
sponsible for maintaining financial account-
ing records on project activities carried out
in the field. In addition, auditors are being
assigned for the first time to make systematic
end-use checks in the provinces on project
commodities. This effort will be expanded in
the next few months to cover an increasingly
large part of the project program. Cargo air-
lift capacity of Air America has increased
from 1,300 metric tons per month in January
1966 to a current level of 3,500 metric tons.
This is supplemented by U.S. military air-
lifts. 121 new and more secure warehouses
have been constructed throughout the country
during the past year.
A task force formed by the Director of the
AID Mission in Saigon in November 1966 is
currently studying all of the Vietnamese
project commodity logistics systems in depth.
A preliminary report submitted to the Direc-
tor on December 1st is now under study. The
report made several recommendations, some
of which have been mentioned above. Others
include the development of a single Vietnam-
ese national logistics system and the consoli-
FEBRUAKY 6, 1967
213
dation of trucking and coastal vessel
contracts and improved communications
networks for notifying a province official in
advance of the arrival of shipments of com-
modities.
IV. Economic Warfare and General Inspection
Economic warfare, simply stated, means
denying the enemy access to goods which he
needs to sustain his war effort. However,
since the enemy in Vietnam is not limited to
definable territories behind a fixed front and
is not readily distinguishable from other
Vietnamese, the struggle to deny him sup-
plies is as complicated and difficult as the
struggle to eliminate the guerrillas them-
selves. The Viet Cong have so infiltrated the
country that it is not possible to deny com-
pletely their access to AID-financed goods
except by stopping the supply of these goods
to the economy. But we can selectively limit
their access to strategic supplies. Our tech-
niques of selective denial include: (A) detect-
ing and halting the activities of importers
and merchants who act as procurement chan-
nels for the enemy; (B) applying strict con-
trols to selected strategic commodities; (C)
interdicting VC supply lines and restricting
the movement of commodities in selected
areas where VC control predominates.
A. Monitoring the Import Community
Both the U.S. AID Mission and the Viet-
namese Ministry of Commerce have devel-
oped procedures to attempt to identify and
suspend importers engaged in illicit trans-
actions. In serious cases the Ministry may
also try a person so charged for a criminal
offense. U.S. personnel reviewing license ap-
plications, studying market conditions and
selectively auditing the records of wholesalers
and retailers include 8 commodity analysts,
all newly arrived since the spring of 1966;
34 auditors, an increase of 17 since early
1966; and 14 other specialists, an increase of
11 since March 1966.
In Washington, the Office of the Special
Assistant for Commodity Analysis, which
backstops the Office of Special Projects in
Vietnam, is now staffed with five experienced
specialists who review CIP transactions on
a selective basis in an attempt to identify ir-
regular importer-supplier relationships and
suspicious trade patterns.
A separate office, which is to be staffed
with commodity analysts and international
trade advisers, is presently being established
in AID/Washington. These technicians will
backstop the Commercial Import Division in
Saigon. They will be supplier-oriented, so
as not to duplicate the work of technicians
in Saigon who are importer-oriented. Com-
modity analysts in Washington will assure
that quality standards are maintained, will
engage in special intensive studies relative
to type and quantity of commodity imports
in Vietnam, and will supplement the prior re-
view activities of the AID Controller in
Washington.
The AID Controller now concentrates much
of the efforts of his office on the Vietnam
program. The Controller conducts an inten-
sive review of CIP documents after the trans-
action has been completed; this review re-
mains one of aid's most effective tools for
assuring that unauthorized use of AID funds
is kept to a minimum. Detailed post audits
sometimes lead to criminal or civil proceed-
ings against suppliers who have violated re-
quirements contrary to the certifications of
compliance which are prerequisites to pay-
ment by AID. Post audits also lead to refund
claims against the GVN, which can in turn
lead to criminal action against importers in
Vietnam.
The Agency's independent investigative
arm, i.e., the Management Inspection Staff
(MIS), has increased its onboard strength
in Saigon from two to six during the calen-
dar year. This staff is supplemented from
time to time by additional, Washington-
based inspectors. These inspectors have all
had extensive experience in the FBI, other
Government investigative agencies or in the
fields of law or accounting. Their major re-
sponsibility in Vietnam is to receive, analyze
and investigate all allegations of criminal
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
fraud or other irregularities involving AID
financing-. They maintain close liaison with
the Office of Special Projects, the Office of
the Controller and the U.S. AID contractor,
Societe de Surveillance (Geneve) S.A., men-
tioned above. The MIS staff in Saigon also
maintains a continuing relationship with the
business community, including American,
throughout the Far East. These contacts
greatly assist in insuring that all available
infonnation regarding irregularities in the
AID program are properly received and
acted upon.
Those cases which reveal prima facie evi-
dence of criminality are referred to the U.S.
Department of Justice or foreign courts for
appropriate civil or criminal action. As a
result of information developed by these in-
vestigations, consideration is also given by
AID to such actions as suspension, debar-
ment or prosecution by local Government
agencies of importers involved in irregulari-
ties.
In addition to the U.S. AID Mission and
GVN procedures for suspending importers,
AID/Washington has procedures for tempo-
rarily suspending suppliers pending further
investigation which may lead to formal hear-
ings and possible debarment or criminal ac-
tion. These procedures for suspending and
for debarring commodity suppliers preclude
such suppliers from participating in AID-
financed transactions. Several suppliers have
been suspended and are no longer eligible to
participate in commodity transactions fi-
nanced by AID. There is, in addition, a
"prior review" system in which a supplier is
notified that his transactions are subject to
prior review by AID/Washington before
they are eligible for AID financing.
B. Controlling Strategic Commodities
The Economic Warfare Committee of the
U.S. Mission in Saigon has developed a list
of goods critical to the enemy's war effort.
Particular efforts are made to monitor im-
port license applications and the movement
of these commodities through the com-
mercial community.
C. Cutting Enemy Su^pply Lines
The principal force interdicting enemy
supply lines is the U.S. military. As free-
world forces strike deeper into VC strong-
holds, bombing, shelling and overrunning VC
staging areas and main supply depots, the
volume of enemy goods captured and de-
stroyed continues to mount.
The resources control program of the na-
tional police is the most effective civilian
effort to frustrate the Viet Cong procurement
system. About 7,000 policemen at ahnost 700
checkpoints on land and water monitor the
flow of goods in and between cities. They
seize contraband items and shipments lack-
ing proper documentation, but without clog-
ging the vital lines of communication. Prog-
ress during the last year can be measured
by a 20 percent increase in the number of
arrests made and an 80 percent increase in
confiscations. The national police have added
about 1,000 men to this activity during 1966
and plan to double the number in 1967.
A new river police force, now 400 strong,
was created in 1966. Using 12 36-foot boats
and 255 16-foot assault craft supplied
through AID, they patrol the major water-
ways of South Vietnam, particularly in the
Mekong Delta. Planned increase in strength
to 2,000 men and the delivery of 70 more
40-foot boats and 707 16-foot craft will make
the river police a much more effective force
in economic warfare during 1967. Members
of the Vietnamese national police also have
been detailed to U.S. Navy patrol boats op-
erating in three major rivers in order to
augment the strength of the river police dur-
ing its organizational period. Since water
traffic is a major means of transportation
in South Vietnam's delta area, control of the
waterways by an effective inspection and en-
forcement organization will be especially im-
portant in safeguarding and marketing rice
grown in that area.
In addition to the measures outlined above,
Vietnamese Navy and customs officers main-
tain surveillance of the country's land and
sea boundaries in an attempt to control the
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
215
illegal flow of goods to the enemy from out-
side sources. They are assisted in this effort
by the U.S. Navy and free-world forces.
V. Conclusion
The vast majority of U.S. aid commodities
provided to bolster South Vietnam's economy
and improve its social structure are being
put to their intended use. Losses which have
occurred must be viewed in the perspective
of a wartime situation. Civilian and military
supply losses were heavy during wartime op-
erations in Korea and in Europe. To a much
greater degree than in these earlier, con-
ventional wars, we are attempting to meet
civil needs throughout Vietnam in a war
which infects every province. Even so, sub-
stantial losses cannot be tolerated. The U.S.
AID Mission and the U.S. military command
are working with the Government of Viet-
nam on a very intensive program to cut these
losses to an absolute minimum. We expect to
be able to report further significant progress
in this effort during 1967.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks
on Fishery Problems
Press release 6 dated January 16
Representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union began discussions on Jan-
uary 16 on various fishery problems between
the two countries. These include the question
of future arrangements for Soviet fishing
for king crab on the U.S. continental shelf
in the eastern Bering Sea, which has been
governed for the past 2 years by an agree-
ment between the two countries.
Also to be discussed are various matters
related to Soviet fishing off the Pacific and
Atlantic coasts of the United States. These
will include consideration of the economic
interests of both countries in the fisheries,
the conservation of fishery resources, and
problems arising out of fishing operations
by vessels of the two countries in close prox-
imity.
The United States delegation is led by
Ambassador Donald L. McKeman, Special
Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the
Secretary of State. M. N. Sukhoruchenko,
Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.,
heads the Soviet delegation.
Letters of Credence
Viet-Nam
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, Bui Diem, presented
his credentials to President Johnson on Jan-
uary 19. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated January
19.
President Modifies Escape-Clause
Duty Rates on Sheet Glass
The White House announced on January
11 that President Johnson had that day
issued a proclamation modifying the escape-
clause action on sheet glass which has been
in effect since 1962.i
As a result of the President's action,
escape-clause increases in duties on specified
types of sheet glass, principally window
glass, will be rolled back part of the way to
the pre-1962 trade agreement levels and on
the remaining types will be rolled back
fully to those trade agreement levels. Im-
ports in 1965 of items on which there will
be full removal of the escape-clause duty
increases were $14 million out of total
sheet glass imports of $26 million.
The President's decision for this action
was taken following the receipt of a report
by the Tariff Commission on the probable
effect on the industry of terminating or
modifjdng the escape-clause rates and rec-
' Proclamation 3762 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg.
361.
216
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ommendations of the late Christian A.
Herter, the President's Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations. The recommen-
dations were formulated after studies
carried out by interested Government agen-
cies.
The tariffs on sheet glass were increased
as of June 17, 1962, by the President under
section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, as amended, and following
findings initially made by the Tariff Com-
mission under the "peril point" procedures
that applied to U.S. Government prepara-
tions for trade negotiations which opened
at Geneva in 1960. The increases were
deemed necessary to prevent serious injury
to the domestic industry from increased
imports due to tariff concessions.
The tariff changes proclaimed by the
President will become effective immediately.
Escape-Clause Duty Rates
on Watch Movements Terminated
The White House announced on January
11 that President Johnson had that day pro-
claimed the termination of escape-clause
rates of duty on imports of watch move-
ments.i By restoring the rates of duty pre-
vailing before escape-clause action was
taken 12 years ago, the proclamation will
have the immediate effect of reducing U.S.
tariffs on watch movements by about one-
third. The changes in the many particular
rates of duty will vary according to the size
and type of watch movement. The reductions
in rates of duty from the escape-clause levels
will apply to watch movements of pin-lever
construction or of jewel-lever construction
but containing not more than 17 jewels.
The escape-clause rates of duty that are
• Proclamation 3761 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg.
367.
being terminated have been in force since
mid-1954. At that time. President Eisen-
hower increased the tariffs from the levels
established in 1936 in the U.S. trade agree-
ment with Switzerland. The 1954 increases
were declared necessary to avoid serious
injury to the domestic watch industry as the
result of increased imports attributable to
the trade agreement concessions.
The President's decision to terminate the
1954 increases was based on a recommenda-
tion by the late Christian A. Herter, his
Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, and concurred in by the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, and the
"heads of other Government agencies. Gov-
ernor Herter submitted his recommendation
to the President upon the completion of a
review that his office and other Government
agencies had undertaken following the sub-
mission in March 1965 of a Tariff Commis-
sion report on the escape-clause case. In
that report, the Tariff Commission gave its
judgment as to the probable economic effects
on the U.S. watch industry of a reduction or
termination of the escape-clause rates of
duty.
During the period of the interagency
review of the escape-clause case, the Office
of Emergency Planning, at the request of
the President in April 1965 and with the
assistance of Goveriunent defense agencies
and the Departments of Commerce and
Labor, examined the national security
aspects of trade and production in watch
movements. As a result of OEP's investiga-
tion, under section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act, the Director of the Office of
Emergency Planning, Farris Bryant, re-
ported that watches, watch movements, and
watch parts were not being imported in a
manner which threatened to impair the
national security and that horological-type
defense items will continue to be available
without regard to the level of imports of
watches, movements, and parts.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
217
In this article prepared especially for the Bulletin, James
N. Cortada, Dean of the School of Professional Studies at
the Foreign Service Institute, and A. Guy Hope, a coTisultant
to the Department of State and lecturer at the Maxwell
Graduate School, Syracuse University, examine the trends^
in FSI training programs contributing "toward a greater
professionalization of officers in the foreign affairs commu-
nity."
The Foreign Service Institute: Patterns
of Professional Development
by James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope
In recent months the staff of the Foreign
Service Institute, under its new Director,
George V. Allen, has been examining criti-
cally the role and performance of the Insti-
tute in the professional preparation of
American diplomats and other members of
the Government's foreign affairs community.
Consultants from the academic community
and from within the Government are partic-
ipating in extensive and intensive evalua-
tions of FSI activities and directions.
The Institute's tasks are complicated by
the fact that as a unit of the Department of
State it has direct and absorbing responsi-
bilities for Departmental and Foreign Serv-
ice training problems. At the same time, the
Foreign Service Act of 1946 contains a man-
date for the Institute which extends beyond
these responsibilities, extensive though they
are, to the large and rapidly growing foreign
affairs concerns of other Washington agen-
cies.
While interesting and promising steps
have been taken to accommodate the needs
and interests of American foreign affairs
personnel of many types, perhaps the best
evidence of the Institute's increasingly ma-
ture and sophisticated outlook toward its
mission relates to recent innovations in the
formal training of Foreign Service officers.
To describe Foreign Service officer train-
ing as a difficult administrative task would
be to indulge in understatement. The prob-
lem is compounded by the necessity of keying
formal development plans, whether at the
Institute or in universities, to the Depart-
ment's assignment policies, to budgetary
realities, and to availability of personnel.
The last point is particularly important be-
cause in a highly competitive organization
such as the Foreign Service, the only civilian
agency of the Government with promotion-up
or selection-out procedures, promising offi-
cers fear that their careers will be affected
if they are removed from the policymaking
mainstream. The fact that promotions in re-
cent years tend to disprove the myth is in-
sufficient to fully offset the reluctance of of-
ficers to leave fascinating "hot" jobs for
prolonged periods of study.
Proposals to make general and broad
training programs mandatory throughout
the midcareer and senior officer levels are
not realistic. The Foreign Service Officer
218
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Corps, totaling over 3,500 as of July 1, 1966,
has remained relatively unchanged in size
over the past few years despite the opening
of many posts throughout the world. Press-
ing operational needs would mean that ex-
emptions from extensive training would be
sought on a wholesale basis for promising
officers. Other officers with less cheerful ca-
reer prospects would probably discharge the
training quotas.
Furthermore, the heterogeneous back-
grounds of Foreign Service officers in terms
of functional specialization and levels of edu-
cation complicate the training problem con-
siderably.
In reassessing its training programs the
Institute recognized the need to consider in-
dividual differences and to meet varying
personal requirements for its student offi-
cers.
A further consideration was awareness
that the Institute could most efficiently deal
with the specialized application of academic
disciplines to foreign affairs, leaving to the
universities the task of solid education in the
traditional disciplines. The Institute staff
was mindful of the increasingly sophisticated
academic training characterizing recent en-
trants into the Foreign Service Officer Corps,
many of whom have received graduate de-
grees.
A third important consideration was the
realization that the Foreign Service, in
order to execute its tasks in the complex
world of the 1960's, had to move more ener-
getically toward high levels of professional-
ization. While the requirement was felt to
fall on the Service itself, the effort clearly
had far-reaching implications for the Insti-
tute's programs and philosophy.
Toward an Overall Training Philosophy
The first question to come under close
scrutiny was the training of junior Foreign
Service officers. It was patent that junior
officer training had to respond to the basic
training philosophy applicable to the Foreign
Service as a whole. This linkage led the In-
stitute, in close coordination with the Departs
ment's career development and placement
officers, to examine the goals of formal train-
ing at various levels and the relationship of
training to both experience and position re-
quirements.
Some months earlier the Department's
Office of Management Planning had reached
tentative conclusions in a project which es-
tablished all Department of State functions
at four major levels of responsibility. The
project developed within each group simpli-
fied title designations which corresponded to
specializations. This project, known as Man-
power Utilization System and Techniques
(MUST), enabled the Institute and its col-
leagues in the Department to develop a train-
ing grid related to the groups established in
MUST. Furthermore, since the MUST pro-
posal tentatively built in as job requirements
certain formal and practical training perqui-
sites, the search for an overall training
philosophy was simplified.
A training committee, chaired by the Di-
rector General of the Foreign Service and
comprising, in addition to the Director of the
Institute, geographic and functional bureau
representation at the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary level, was established to examine the
problem of training philosophies and pro-
grams. In this fashion a mechanism was
created for total Departmental involvement
in training questions.
The training committee concluded that In-
stitute programs for Foreign Service offi-
cers, whether at junior, middle, or senior
levels, should be concerned with the applica-
tion of skills or disciplines to Foreign Serv-
ice situations. With this view as a guiding
principle, the Institute's junior officer train-
ing programs were pointed toward job-
related preparation.
Some advisers from both outside and
inside the Department of State had argued
vigorously for a lengthy stay for junior offi-
cers in the Foreign Service Institute, during
which a wide range of university-type sub-
jects and instruction would be given in fields
normally dealt with in university graduate
schools. This approach was consistent with
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
219
concepts underlying the preparation of offi-
cers in the pre-World War II period. As
Ambassador Allen once observed, in that era
officers were considered to have accumulated
in their university education knowledge
which could be eked out as required over the
years. In contrast to this piecemeal concept,
the Institute and the training committee
eventually adopted the principle that because
of the speed of changing events at home and
abroad affecting the practice of modern di-
plomacy, it was preferable to return officers
at regular intervals throughout their careers
for up-to-date training either at the Institute
or in the universities or military colleges.
Meeting Specific Needs of Junior Officers
An examination by the Institute faculty of
the kinds of responsibilities which junior of-
ficers would encounter following initial Insti-
tute training, during a 2-year on-the-job
training period, pointed to certain specific
needs. New officers, since they would serve
during the 2-year probationary period in
each of the four major sections of an em-
bassy— economic, political, consular, and ad-
ministrative— needed help in the early devel-
opment of certain managerial and specific
skills, awareness of important American
foreign policy directions, examination of ele-
ments related to world tensions which have a
bearing on political and economic reporting
and other responsibilities, and at least mini-
mal understanding of the Washington policy
process.
The course developed as Part I for the
new officers extends over an 8-week period
which includes 2 weeks of preparation for
consular responsibilities. Role playing, case
studies, lectures, and individual research
projects are among the techniques employed.
Following the initial phase of the course, the
junior officers receive 3 weeks of intensive
training in area studies related to their first
posts of assignment. Officers who do not
speak the language of their first posts also
receive an additional 16 to 24 weeks of lan-
guage training. Intensive 6-hour-a-day
220
courses enable officers to proceed to their
posts with reasonable language competence.
Part II of the junior officer program has
been developed to meet the needs of junior
officers who return to the Department after .
their first service abroad, which normally
consists of a 2-year training assignment and
a 2-year assignment to a regular position.
The training committee had particularly rec-
ommended job-related preparation for these
officers prior to their Washington assign-
ments, most of which are concerned with the
first levels of policy coordination.
The new 4-week course, offered for the
first time in the fall of 1966, comprises in-
tensive training in executive development, a
broad review of problems of international
communism and other forms of extremist
political movements, examination of outside
pressures on the policy process, and inten-
sive analysis of problems of interagency
policy coordination. Case-study and role-
playing techniques are introduced early in
the course, and its final week culminates in
simulations in which the students are given
an opportunity to apply the principles which
they have studied.
The Segmented Midcareer Program
After reorganization of the junior officer
programs, the next step facing the Institute
and the training committee was what to do
about midcareer training. For nearly two
decades training for Foreign Service officers
was based on the principle that functional
and area/language specialization corre-
sponded to the midcareer phase and that for
senior officers broad general exposure was
indicated.
Translated in career terms, this meant
that in theory an officer started in a general-
ist capacity and developed as a specialist; for
those who survived the selection-out process,
generalist responsibilities would be their lot
in the top echelons of the Service. What has
actually occurred is that many officers
reached the senior grades as specialists and,
although exposed to broadening in the mili-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tary colleges or the Foreign Service Insti-
tute's Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy,
nevertheless finished out their careers in spe-
cialist capacities or became ambassadors
almost directly from their fields of special-
ization.
Crossing this pattern of development,
there had been injected almost since the cre-
ation of the Foreign Service Institute the
additional concept that specialization at mid-
career level should be balanced by participa-
tion in a broad integrated program designed
to round out specialists. The problem w^ith
this concept was that by the time most oflS-
cers were ready for the midcareer course,
they had already become specialists either
through formal training or on-the-job expe-
rience. While they had acquired certain
strengths, their intellectual equipment also
reflected important gaps arising from the
fact of their specialization. Since the inte-
grated midcareer course presented a uni-
form curriculum regardless of individual dif-
' ferences of officers, a dysfunctional tone
persisted in the midcareer training pattern.
In an effort to resolve this problem, the
Institute "disintegrated" the midcareer pro-
gram into eight basic segments. The seg-
ments were then refined into short high-im-
pact courses. Promising officers were offered
opportunities on an invitational basis to take
those segments which balanced out their
strengths and helped eliminate weaknesses.
For example, a midcareer officer with a
strong background in political work and
Communist problems but with a weak back-
ground in economics was invited to partici-
pate in the economic segment and in any
other which he needed to complement his spe-
cialization. The eight segments, which could
be taken separately, concerned Communist
strategy; science, technology, and foreign
affairs; executive studies; Americana; mod-
ern economic concepts; international labor
affairs; problems of underdeveloped coun-
tries; and political science.
The revised segmented plan, after favor-
able recommendation of the training commit-
This article by Mr. Cortada and Dr. Hope is
one of a series being written especially for the
Bulletin by officers of the Department and the
Foreign Service. Officers who may be inter-
ested in submitting original bylined articles
are invited to call Jewell Wilson in the Bul-
letin office, extension 5806.
tee, was approved by the Deputy Under Sec-
retary for Administration and became
operative during 1966.
Language and Area Training
For many years, actually since long before
World War II, special language and area
preparation has been an established practice
for selected officers according to their Service
needs. For example. Ambassador Raymond
A. Hare, who retired in November 1966 after
some 40 years of service, had been an Arabic
and Turkish student language officer in Paris
in 1929. Others studied Chinese and Russian.
Such distinguished diplomats as Ambassa-
dors George Kennan and Charles Bohlen un-
derwent similar training. In the post-World
War II period, formal training in language
and area specialization underwent a marked
increase, particularly in the development of
specialists for service in the Far East, Mid-
dle East, and more recently, Africa. Formal
training for European and Latin American
specialists, particularly the former, is a rela-
tively recent development.
Originally the concept underlying area
specialization was concentration on the lan-
guage, with the area-study component on a
somewhat hit-or-miss basis. Student officers
in the earlier days were sent to universities
for 1 or 2 years of language study; they took
such area courses as were available and
seemed appropriate.
In the early Institute days the need for
language specialists became so great that a
new pattern of assignment and training had
to be found because the Service simply could
not afford to have large numbers of officers
out of circulation for long periods at univer-
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
221
sities. Thus, in its first 20 years, the Institute
devoted about half of its resources to up-
grading the language proficiency of foreign
affairs personnel.
The Foreign Service Institute responded
to the task by developing intensive language
training capabilities in its own quarters for
some 60 languages. For Japanese and Chi-
nese language training, there are Institute
schools in Yokohama and Taichung, respec-
tively. For Arabic, there are Institute schools
in Beirut and Tangier.
The Institute continued to depend on the
universities for the area component of lan-
guage-and-area specialization under close
monitoring by the Institute's faculty. This
formula is still followed, although serious
consideration is being given to developing on
an experimental basis one or two area spe-
cialization programs in the Institute. In the
meantime, the Institute is also continuing a
series of short interdisciplinary introductory
area courses.
Functional Specialization
The question of training for functional
specialization in fields such as economics,
petroleum, labor, consular affairs, and ad-
ministration was more difficult to resolve.
In the case of economics, for example, uni-
versities plan that undergraduate majors be
taken over a 2- or 3-year period. Graduate
schools presuppose a 2- or 3-year stay on
campus. Again, the Foreign Service came up
against the hard fact that it could not spare
officers for the length of time required by the
universities for a good grounding in eco-
nomics. Furthermore, a manpower survey
completed in 1965 showed that the Foreign
Service needed over the years 1966-1970
approximately 200 officers with training in
economics at least equal to an undergraduate
major.
Acting on the advice of distinguished acad-
emicians, the Institute was encouraged to
develop its own program and adapt it to par-
ticular Foreign Service needs. Accordingly,
in January 1966 a 5V2-inonth course was
started for carefully selected officers having
no background in economics, during which
the equivalent of an undergraduate major in
the subject was covered. To test the efficacy
of the course, the Graduate Record examina-
tion in economics prepared by the Educa-
tional Testing Service at Princeton, N.J.,
normally taken by university seniors who
aspire to enter graduate school, was admin-
istered to the first graduates of the Insti-
tute's economics course. They scored well
above the national mean, thus demonstrating
that functional specialized training tailored
to meet Foreign Service requirements could
be successfully given in a relatively short
period.
After the initial experiment, the training
of economic officers in the Institute is now
an established practice. On the other hand,
both the Institute and the personnel officers
in the Department agreed on the advisability
of continuing to send to the universities a
small number of officers for preparation in
economics at the master's or doctoral degree
level.
A certain amount of formal training is
given in the Institute in administration and
consular affairs as specializations, but they
may be refined further. While both the Insti-
tute and universities are used in the training
of officers in the administrative and area
fields and other specialties, present ap-
proaches to these problems are currently un-
dergoing careful scrutiny to see whether
formulas such as the one adopted in the case
of economics should be followed. Probably in
certain fields, such as petroleum and com-
mercial specialization, a mix of inhouse
training and temporary assignments to pri-
vate companies may be the answer. In
others, perhaps an Institute-university ar-
rangement may be preferable. The problem
of how to develop broad executive capability
is one under constant review and experimen-
tation.
A very difficult problem is whether se-
lected officers engaged in political work
222
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
should undergo intensive refresher courses
in political science techniques and methods.
The problem is not easy to resolve because of
the considerable changes in the political sci-
ence profession in recent years and the diver-
sity of judgments among political scientists
as to what kind of preparation is indicated
for experienced political analysts, whether in
or outside Government. It seems likely that
the Institute will undertake some training in
this field, but content, duration, and direction
are still undecided.
It has been a longstanding practice to
round out the formal training of officers who
ultimately will occupy key positions by send-
ing them to military colleges, universities, or
the Institute's Senior Seminar in Foreign
Policy. The theory behind these assignments
is that at that point in his career, a senior
officer should catch his breath and take a
look at developments in the United States
,and their effect on the foreign policy issues
(Confronting the Nation.
A new field being explored by the Foreign
Service Institute and the United States In-
formation Agency is the training of Govern-
ment officers engaged in overseas informa-
tional and cultural activities. The task is not
simple because, while there has been consid-
erable advance with respect to communica-
tions in general in the universities, little
attention has been given to the question of
crossnational and crosscultural communica-
tions. This field is an important one for all
people involved in overseas service, particu-
larly in the new nations.
In summary, the trend in the Foreign
Sei-vice Institute over the past 20 years has
been in the direction of training programs
contributing toward a greater professionali-
zation of officers in the foreign affairs com-
munity. The Institute is now moving steadily
in this direction not only by drawing on its
own resources but also by seeking faculty as-
sistance and advice from universities. Close
to 400 academicians contribute to the Insti-
tute's activities through lectures, direct
teaching, or consultations on curriculum and
methodology.
It is the philosophy of the Institute that,
regardless of how carefully developed train-
ing programs may be, they must complement,
not substitute for, professional experience
under competent and conscientious superiors.
Only to the extent that supervisors in the
Foreign Service, in the Department of State,
and in related foreign affairs agencies are
conscious of their responsibilities for person-
nel development can short- or long-term
training succeed. Programs with a formal
training content can only act as catalytic
agents to assist officers who are motivated to
improve their skills and understanding of
the complex tasks of a modern foreign policy
establishment. The developmental job is up
to the people who are doing the work and to
those who supervise their activities and
careers.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group.
Report on the ninth meeting, held at Washington,
D.C., May 18-22, 1966, by Senator George D.
Aiken, chairman of the Senate delegation. S. Doc.
119. October 19, 1966. 11 pp.
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services made by its Subcommittee on the Opera-
tion of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. S. Rept. 1881. October 19, 1966. 15 pp.
Border Highway — El Paso, Tex. Conference report
to accompany H.R. 11555. H. Rept. 2322. October
19, 1966. 4 pp.
An Investigation of U.S. Participation in the NATO
Common Infrastructure Program. Forty-fifth re-
port by the Committee on Government Operations.
H. Rept. 2323. October 19, 1966. 30 pp.
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Conference re-
port to accompany H.R. 13103. H. Rept. 2327.
October 19, 1966. 16 pp.
Status of Cuban Refugees. Conference report to ac-
company H.R. 15183. H. Rept. 2334. October 21,
1966. 4 pp.
Second Report on U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies
(With Special Reference to Poland and Yugo-
slavia). Forty-sixth report by the House Committee
on Government Operations. H. Rept. 2336. October
21, 1966. 20 pp.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
223
TREATY INFORMATION
Protocol to U.S.-Mexico Radio
Agreement Enters Into Force
Press release 3 dated January 12
On January 12, Secretary of State Rusk
and the Mexican Ambassador, Hugo B.
Margain, exchanged the instruments of rati-
fication of the protocol between the United
States and Mexico signed at Mexico City on
April 13, 1966, amending the agreement of
January 29, 1957, concerning radio broad-
casting in the standard broadcast band. The
protocol was brought into force by the ex-
change of instruments of ratification.
The 1957 agreement entered into force on
June 9, 1961, effective for 5 years. It expired
by its own terms on June 9, 1966. The
protocol of April 13, 1966, upon entry into
force has the effect of reviving and continu-
ing in force the 1957 agreement. The proto-
col has one substantive article, by which the
duration provision of the 1957 agreement
is amended so that the agreement will
remain effective until December 31, 1967,
unless, before that date, it is terminated by
a notice of denunciation by either party
pursuant to the terms of the agreement or is
replaced by a new agreement. Steps are
being taken to negotiate a new agreement to
replace that of 1957.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Insti-
tute. Open for signature at Washington January
17 through February 28, 1966. Entered into force
February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, December 30, 1966.'
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15,
1964.'
Acceptance received: Burma, September 27, 1966.
Safety at Sea ^
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.
Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Romania (with a state-
ment), December 12, 1966.
Sugar
Protocol for the further prolongation of the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Done at London November 14, 1966. Open for
signature at London November 14 to December
30, 1966, inclusive. Entered into force January 1,
1967.'
Signatures: Argentina,'' Australia, Belgium,*
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia,'' Costa Rica,''
Cuba,'' Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public,* Ecuador,'' El Salvador, France, Federal
Republic of Germany,'' Ghana, Haiti, Hungary,
India, Indonesia,'' Ireland, Italy,'' Jamaica,
Japan, Lebanon,'' Madagascar,'' Mexico, Morocco,
Netherlands,* New Zealand, Nicaragua,''
Nigeria,'' Paraguay,* Peru,* Philippines,* Po-
land,* Portugal,* Republic of South Africa,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,* Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United
States.*
Notifications of intention to seek ratification, ac-
ceptance, approval, or accession deposited:
Argentina, Belgium, Colombia, Costa Rica,
iCuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federal
Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Italy, Lebanon, Madagascar, Netherlands,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, Tunisia, United States.
Trade
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs a-''
Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 Tariff
Conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. En-
tered into force for the United States December
31, 1962. TIAS 5253.
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, December 13, 1966.
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force
August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Acceptance: Federal Republic of Germany,
November 22, 1966.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29.
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part
I and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part
II.
Acceptance deposited: Japan, January 16, 1967.
' With statement on interpretation of Article VI,
Section 2, paragraph (ii).
' Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.
* Subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval.
224
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
BILATERAL
Greece
Agreement relating to United States liability dur-
ing operation of the NS Savannah by a private
company. Effected by exchange of notes at
Athens November 22, 1966, and January 12, 1967.
Entered into force January 12, 1967.
Malta
Agreement relating to the deployment of the
destroyer tender U.S.S. Cascade to Malta. Effected
by exchange of notes at Valletta December 22
and 28, 1966. Entered into force December 28,
1966.
Somali Republic
Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4,
1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738,
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mogadiscio December 27 and 29, 1966. Entered
into force December 29, 1966.
United Kingdom
Agreement relating to the availability of the British
Indian Ocean Territory for defense purposes, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at London
December 30, 1966. Entered into force December
30, 1966.
Agreement relating to the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of a tracking and telemetry
facility in the island of Mahe, in the Seychelles,
with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes
at London December 30, 1966. Entered into force
December 30, 1966.
Agreement providing for the establishment and op-
eration of space vehicle tracking and communica-
tions stations in the United Kingdom. Effected
by exchange of notes at London December 28,
1966, and January 1, 1967. Entered into force
January 1, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S..
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20i02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Social Power and Social Change in Contemporary
America. Text of an address by Kenneth B. Clark,
professor of psychology at the City University
of New York and a consultant to the Foreign Affairs
Scholars Program, made in July 1966 before an
audience of summer interns working in the State
Department, AID, and USIA. This is the first in
a series of publications prepared under the auspices
of the Department of State's Equal Employment Op-
portumty Program. Pub. 8125. Department and
Foreign Service Series 134. 20 pp. 15^.
The United States and the World: An Introduction
to Our Foreign Relations — Teacher's Manual. Narra-
tion for 53-frame color filmstrip produced by the
Department of State and designed to introduce
secondary school students to basic U.S foreign
policy including the global scope of our interests
and the major problems we face in relations with
other countries. Brief bibliography included. Pub
8146. 17 pp. Limited distribution.
The Outlook for Freedom. This pamphlet contains
the text of an address by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk made on September 21, 1966, before the Na-
tional Industrial Conference Board at New York,
N.Y. In his address Secretary Rusk describes the
effect of American economic strength on our position
in international affairs. Pub. 8150. General Foreign
Policy Series 216. 13 pp. 20^.
Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task. This
pamphlet contains the t«xt of remarks by President
Johnson on October 7, 1966, to the National Con-
ference of Editorial Writers at New York, N.Y.
Pub. 8155. European and British Commonwealth
Series 69. 12 pp. 15^.
The Computer and Foreign Affairs: Some First
Thoughts. Center for International Systems Research
(CISR) Occasional Papers Number 1. In this paper
Fisher Howe, a Foreign Service officer who recently
completed a year's assignment as a Department of
State senior fellow at the University of Utah, looks
at the relationship the "Information Revolution" has
to "the State Department, the Foreign Service, the
management of our international affairs, and the
planning and formulation of foreign policy." Pub.
8156. 88 pp. 350.
Organizing the Peace. This pamphlet is the tesxt of
an address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk
before the George C. Marshall Memorial Dinner of
the Association of the United States Army at Wash-
ington, D.C., on October 12, 1966. Pub 8163. General
Foreign Policy Series 217. 20 pp. 15((.
The Promise of The New Asia. United States Policy
in the Far East as stated by President Johnson on
his Pacific Journey. A 72-page illustrated pamphlet
containing major portions of the text of statements
and addresses by President Johnson during his visit
to Asia in October 1966. Also contains the texts of
the three principal documents issued at the Manila
Conference. Pub. 8166. Far Eastern Series 152. 72
pp. $1.
Trade — Automotive Products. Agreement with Cana-
da— Signed at Johnson City, Texas, January 16, 1965.
Entered into force provisionally January 16, 1965,
and definitively September 16, 1966. With exchange
of notes — Signed at Washington March 9, 1965.
TIAS 6093. 12 pp. 10(f.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Chad. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Fort Lamy August 31, 1966. En-
tered into force August 31, 1966. TIAS 6094. 6 pp.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
225
Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement with Peru.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Lima June 22 and
August 24, 1966. Entered into force August 24, 1966.
TIAS 6100. 3 pp. 5#.
Oceanographic Research — Mediterranean Marine
Sorting Center. Agreement with Tunisia. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Tunis September 26, 1966. En-
tered into force September 26, 1966. TIAS 6101.
4 pp. 5^.
Asian Development Bank. Agreement with other
governments. Done at Manila December 4, 1963. En-
tered into force August 22, 1966. TIAS 6103. 5'2 pp.
20«f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Zambia. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Lusaka August 11, 1966.
Entered into force August 11, 1966. TIAS 6104.
6 pp. 5^.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Arrangement with Singa-
pore. Exchange of letters — Signed at Singapore Au-
gust 30, 1966. Entered into force August 30, 1966.
EflFective April 1, 1966. TIAS 6105. 9 pp. 10(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Indonesia — Signed at Washington
September 30, 1966. Entered into force September 30,
1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6107. 6 pp. 5#.
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil — Amend-
ments to the Convention of 1954. Agreement with
other governments. Amendments adopted by the
Conference of Contracting Governments to the Con-
vention of 1954, held at London, April 4-11, 1962.
Dates of entry into force: May 18, 1967, for amend-
ments to Articles I-X, XVI, and XVTII and Annexes
A and B; June 28, 1967, for amendment to Article
XIV. TIAS 6109. 29 pp. 15(f.
Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with
Korea. Exchange of notes — Dated at Seoul April 18
and September 24, 1966. Entered into force Septem-
ber 24, 1966. TIAS 6110. 5 pp. 5^.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Philip-
pines, supplementing the agrreement of February 18
and 19, 1952. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila
February 25, 1965, and August 15, 1966. Entered
into force August 15, 1966. TIAS 6111. 3 pp. 5^
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Nicaragxia. Exchange of notes — Signed at Managua
September 3 and 20, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 20, 1966. TIAS 6112. 4 pp. 5(t.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India
amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
October 14, 1966. Entered into force October 14, 1966.
TIAS 6113. 2 pp. 5(f.
Claims — Establishment of International Arbitral Tri-
bunal to Dispose of United States Claims Relating
to Gut Dam. Agreement with Canada — Signed at
Ottawa March 25, 1965. Entered into force October
11, 1966. TIAS 6114. 8 pp. lOif.
Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations
on Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with
Uruguay. Exchange of notes — Dated at Montevideo
September 12, 1961. Entered into force September
26, 1966. TIAS 6115. 4 pp. 5«».
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1441 PUBLICATION 8192 FEBRUARY 6, 1967
TIm Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developmenta in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the worlt of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin Includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secratary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign |16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1866).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may i>e reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
226
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX February 6, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. lUl
Asia
Thailand and Southeast Asia (Martin) . . . 193
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 223
Department and Foreign Service
The Foreign Service Institute: Patterns of Pro-
fessional Development (Cortada, Hope) . . 218
Economic Affairs
Escape-Clause Duty Rates on Watch Move-
ments Terminated 217
President Modifies Escape-Clause Duty Rates
on Sheet Glass 216
Thailand and Southeast Asia (Martin) . . . 193
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Fishery
Problems 216
Foreign Aid
AID Report on Viet-Nam Commodity Pro-
grams Submitted to FVesident Johnson (let-
ter of transmittal, text of report) . . . 200
Mexico
iProtocol to U.S.-Mexico Radio Agreement
Enters Into Force 224
Military Affairs
The U.S. Achievements in Viet-Nam (Wheeler) 186
Publications
iRecent Releases 225
Telecommunications
Protocol to U.S.-Mexico Radio Agreement
Enters Into Force 224
Thailand
Thailand and Southeast Asia (Martin) . . . 193
Trade
Escape-Clause Duty Rates on Watch Move-
ments Terminated 217
President Modifies Escape-Clause Duty Rates
on Sheet Glass 216
Treaty Information
Current Actions 224
Protocol to U.S.-Mexico Radio Agreement
Enters Into Force 224
U.S.S.R.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Fishery
Problems 216
Viet-Nam
AID Report on Viet-Nam Commodity Programs
Submitted to President Johnson (letter of
transmittal, text of report) 200
Letters of Credence (Diem) 216
The U.S. Achievements in Viet-Nam (Wheeler) 186
Name Index
Cortada, James N 218
Diem, Bui 216
Gaud, William S 200
Hope, A. Guy 218
Martin, Graham 193
Wheeler, Gen. Earle G 186
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 16-22
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Release issued prior to January 16 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 3
of January 12.
No.
6
*7
Date
1/16
1/18
•8 1/20
•9 1/20
Subject
U.S.-Soviet fishery discussions.
Program for visit of President-
elect of Brazil.
Bundy: "East Asia Today" (ad-
vance text).
Rusk, Hoover: exchange of letters
on Consular Convention with
U.S.S.R.
Not printed.
a U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/31
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, DC. 20402
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The Promise of the New Asia
U.S. Policy in the Far East as Stated by President Johnson on His Pacific Journe]
This 72-page illustrated pamphlet contains the major statements and addresses made by Pres
dent Johnson during his 17-day journey, October 17-November 2, to seven Asian and Pacific nj
tions. The pamphlet also includes a statement by General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. con
mander in Viet-Nam, made before the chiefs of state and heads of government of the seven allie
nations at the Manila Summit Conference, as well as the texts of the three historic documen'
issued at the close of the Manila Conference: the Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, an
the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific.
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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
HPh-
Vol. LVI, No. 1U2
Fehniary 13, 1967
THE BUDGET MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT (EXCERPTS) 2.J0
SCIENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Address by Secretary Rusk 2fl8
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COFFEE AGREEMENT TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS
President's Letter of Transmittal and Text of Report 250
SECRETARY RUSK URGES CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT
FOR CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2A7
For index see inside bax^k cover
The Budget Message of the President (Excerpts)'
To the Congress of the United States:
A Federal budget lays out a two-part plan
of action:
• It proposes particular programs, mili-
tary and civilian, desired to promote na-
tional security, international cooperation,
and domestic progress.
• It proposes total exqienditures and reve-
nues designed to help maintain stable eco-
nomic prosperity and growth.
This budget for fiscal year 1968 reflects
three basic considerations:
• In Vietnam, as throughout the world,
we seek peace but will provide all the re-
sources needed to combat aggression.
• In our urgent domestic programs we will
continue to press ahead, at a controlled and
reasoned pace.
• In our domestic economy we seek to
achieve a 7th year of uninterrupted growth,
adopting the fiscal measures needed to
finance our expenditures responsibly, permit
lower interest rates, and achieve a more
balanced economy.
In recent years, the American economy
has performed superbly. Since 1963, our
Nation's output has risen at an average rate
of 5.5% a year. 5.3 million more people are
employed and 1.2 million fewer unemployed.
' H. Doc. 15, Part 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; trans-
mitted on Jan. 24. Reprinted here are the introduc-
tory paragraphs and conclusion from part 1 and the
sections on international affairs and finance from
parts 1 and 4 of the 478-page volume entitled The
Budget of the United Statea Government for the
Fiscal Year Endinc/ June 30, 19liS, for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 ($1.50).
Industrial capacity has grown by 18%, and
far less of it is idle than was the case 3
years ago.
During this past calendar year alone:
• Our Nation's gross national product —
apart from price changes — has grown by
nearly 5.4%.
• The unemployment rate has remained
at or below 4% for the first time in 13 years.
• More than 3 million additional jobs were
found in nonagricultural employment, the
largest yearly gain experienced since 1942.
• Corporate profits and personal income
have each grown about 8% to record levels.
We have at the same time become engaged
in a major effort to deter aggression in
Southeast Asia. Some $19.9 billion of the
Nation's resources will go to support that
eff'ort in the current fiscal year and $22.4
billion in 1968. This past year our economy
met these requirements with minimum strain
and disruption.
Federal Programs and Expenditures
International affairs and finance. — In the
long run, greater opportunities and security
for our own citizens will be possible only if
other peoples also share in progress toward
a better and more secure life. To this end,
our international programs in the coming
year will emphasize helping the less de-
veloped nations to increase their food pro-
duction, expand their educational opportuni-
ties, and improve the health of their citizens.
Based on a thorough review of our eco-
nomic assistance objectives and programs, I
230
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
will recommend new legislation and specific
actions to:
• Require more effective self-help meas-
ures by recipient countries as a condition for
U.S. aid;
• Increase the amount of assistance for
the key sectors of agriculture, health, and
education;
• Supiiort regional arrangements and
make greater use of multilateral channels
through which other nations cooperatively
share the costs of economic development;
• Encourage greater participation by
private enterprise in the development proc-
ess; and
• Concentrate our aid in those countries
where successful development is most
probable.
We are gratified by the achievements of
the Alliance for Progress and shall continue
to work closely with our hemispheric neigh-
bors to help build schools and homes, create
new jobs, and improve health and nutrition.
But much remains to be done. I shall be
meeting shortly with the chief executives of
the other American governments to review
the goals and progress of the Alliance. At
that time we will consider new cooperative
programs to accelerate growth in critical
areas.
In South Vietnam, we will increase our
economic assistance for projects directly aid-
ing people in the villages and hamlets. This
stepped-up effort is urgently needed to help
these people construct their farms and
houses in safety and build the foundations
for a better life in that strife-torn country.
To pursue the War on Hunger more
effectively, our assistance to agriculture and
our Food for Freedom shipments will en-
courage and support efforts by the develop-
ing nations to increase their own food pro-
duction. In cooperation with other nations,
we will also carry out a pioneer program to
find ways to utilize the vast unexploited food
resources of the sea.
The International Development Associa-
tion, which is managed by the World Bank,
has proven an effective means of interna-
tional cooperation to promote economic de-
velopment. Its current resources, however,
will soon be exhausted. Following the suc-
cessful conclusion of negotiations between
the IDA and the developed nations of the
world, I will request authorization for the
United States to pledge its fair share to-
wards an additional contribution to this orga-
nization in ways consistent with our balance
of payments policy. I also intend to propose
legislation which will permit us to join other
members in a replenishment of the Inter-
American Development Bank's Fund for Spe-
cial Operations.
To enable the Export-Import Bank to ful-
fill its role of assisting our export trade,
which is so vital to our balance of payments,
I am recommending that its lending authority
be increased and its life extended for another
five years.
Conclusion
Our Nation is stronger today than ever
before. We need not, indeed we dare not, for-
sake our basic goals of peace, prosperity, and
progress.
• The pursuit of peace is essential for the
continued advancement of our Nation and all
mankind.
• Prosperity and progress will lead us to-
ward a society where all can share in the
bounty of nature and the products of man's
ingenuity and creativity.
At various times in the past, democracies
have been criticized for their seeming in-
ability to make hard choices — for seeking
soft, easy answers to critical problems. This
Nation has proven the doubters wrong time
and again, and will not fall prey to such
weakness now.
We can afford to achieve our goals. Let us
not retreat from the task, no matter how
demanding it may be.
This budget represents a careful balance
of our abundant resources and our awesome
responsibilities. As President, I have weighed
the alternatives and made the hard choices
FEBRUAKY 13, 1967
231
as best I could. The responsibility for simi-
lar action now rests with the Congress. I
urge your support for the goals and programs
embodied in this budget for the coming fiscal
year.
Lyndon B. Johnson
January 24, 1967.
International Affairs and Finance
United States leadership in the world com-
munity requires that our international poli-
cies and programs be responsive to political
and economic change. In a world of awesome
military power, made ever smaller by ad-
vances in transportation and communication,
our efforts to promote world peace and pros-
perity are essential to the security and wel-
fare of America.
Economic and social progress in the less-
developed areas of the world is a major goal
of our foreign policy. However, our economic
aid can provide only a small part of the de-
velopment resources required for this enor-
mous task. The major effort must come from
the countries themselves and our aid must
increasingly support and be conditioned on
these self-help efforts. To this end, new for-
eign assistance legislation will be proposed
which will tie our aid more closely to the
adoption of effective self-help measures by
the recipient nations, particularly in the key
sectors of agriculture, health, and education.
At the same time, we will encourage in-
creased contributions by other nations and
agencies to the development effort, and will
seek to integrate our aid programs more
closely with theirs. In 1968, about 90% of
our development lending (including Alliance
for Progress loans) will be coordinated with
the efforts of the other developed nations
through consortia and other such multilateral
arrangements.
With the elimination of the large U.S. food
surpluses, the Food for Freedom program
will aim at greatly increasing food produc-
tion in the developing nations and more
effectively utilizing our agricultural resources
in the global War on Hunger.
international affairs and finance
[Fiscal years. In millions]
Payments to the
Recom-
public
mended
new obli-
Prosrram or agency
^ational
1966
1967
1968
author-
actual
esti-
esti-
ity for
mate
mate
1968
Administrative Budget
Funds:
Conduct of foreign
affairs :
Department of State
$301
$320
$332
$333
U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament
Agency
9
9
9
10
Tariff Commission
3
4
4
4
Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Conimls.sion
2
2
1
1
Economic and financial
programs :
Agency for Interna-
tional Development :
Development loans
677
710
695
774
Technical
cooperation
224
196
212
243
Alliance for
Progress
4.59
593
588
543
Supporting
as.sistance
500
604
680
720
Contingencies and
other
280
313
255
251
Subtotal, Agency
for International
Development
2,141
2,415
2,430
2,5.30
Subtotal, Agency
for International
Development, ex-
cluding special
Vietnam.
(l,8.-)9)
(1,882)
(1,884)
(1,980)
International finan-
cial institutions
-336
100
128
212
112
-365
104
Peace Corps
'94
-.385
124
Expoi-t-Import Bank...
Other
14
15
15
13
Food for Freedom.
1,784
1,710
1,799
1,772
Foreign information and
exchange activities:
United States Infor-
mation Agency
167
184
192
194
Department of State
61
58
.56
55
Subtotal, adminis-
trative budget
4,191
4,608
4,797
'.5,142
Subtotal, adminis-
trative budget, ex-
cluding special
Vietnam
(3.909)
(4,075)
(4,251)
(4„592)
Trust Funds
171
111
22! ►
'45
Intragovernmental
transactions and ad-
.instment for net ca.sh
issuances or with-
drawals by interna-
tional financial
instituti(ms (de<hict)__.
-101
-.545
38
Total
4.463
5,264
4,988
Total, excluding
special Vietnam
(4.1.S1)
(4,731)
(4,442)
' Compares with new oblipational authority for 1966 and
1967, as follows: Administrative budget funds: I9G6, $5,517
million; 1967. $4,794 million. Trust funds: 1966, $158 million;
1967. $14 million.
232
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Total payments for international affairs
and finance are expected to be $5.0 billion in
1968. $276 million less than in 1967. The esti-
mated decrease is primarily the result of
higher loan repayments and sales of certifi-
cates of participation in loans of the Export-
Import Bank.
Agency for International Development. —
The budo:et pi'ovides for only the highest
priority objectives and reflects a continuing
effort to increase the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our assistance programs. In the
year ahead, these programs will require
greater assurance and evidence from the de-
veloping nations that they are taking the
difficult steps necessaiy to stimulate and sus-
tain economic growth and social progress.
This emphasis will further strengthen the
substantial efforts which are being made by
many countries themselves to remove tradi-
tional and deeply entrenched barriers to de-
velopment.
Total expenditures of the Agency for Inter-
national Development are estimated at $2.4
billion in 1968, about the same as in 1967.
The AID budget program is summarized in
the table below in terms of total obligational
authority. This includes primarily new obli-
gational authority granted each year by the
Congress, plus the obligational authority
granted in earlier years which is not re-
quired to complete prior year programs.
The regional amounts shown summarize
mainly the individual country programs
which are the basic AID programing units.
The AID program level for 1968 is estimated
at $2.7 billion, the same as the effective pro-
gram level for 1967, which is $2.4 billion plus
$320 million of 1966 funds available for 1967
programs because aid to India and Pakistan
was suspended during the Kashmir crisis.
Continued attention will be given to mini-
mizing the effect of assistance programs on
the U.S. balance of payments. More than 85%
of AID expenditures in 1968 will be for pur-
chases of U.S. goods and services, compared
with 42% in 1960. Moreover, the foreign aid
program promotes the long-term growth of
U.S. exports by stimulating new trade pat-
terns and opportunities.
Far East (excluding Vietnam). — AID
provides loan and grant assistance to six
countries in the Far East to help them mobi-
lize resources for economic and social devel-
opment and to preserve political stability,
often in a hostile environment. Over 40%
of the $262 million total obligational author-
ity estimated for this region in 1968 is for
supporting assistance which helps to main-
tain security and stability in these countries
but also contributes directly to growth and
development.
Vietnam. — Total obligational authority es-
timated for Vietnam in 1968 is $550 million,
$25 million above 1967. Two important
objectives of our economic assistance pro-
grams in South Vietnam are to assist the
government of that country to combat infla-
tion and improve economic and social con-
ditions in the countryside. The 1968 program
focuses on projects to help the people of
South Vietnam to build in safety their farms,
schools, hospitals, water systems, and other
institutions and resources. Continued im-
provement of the economic situation in 1968
is expected to permit increased emphasis on
SUMMARY OF THE AID BUDGET PROGRAM
[Fiscal years. In millions]
Major assistance prosrranas
Far East (excluding Vietnam) _
Vietnam
Near East and South Asia
Africa
Alliance for Progress (Latin
America)
Contribution to international
organizations
Contingency fund (unallocated) .
General support
Total obligational authority
Of which:
New obligational authority
Prior year and other funds
Total obligational
authority
1966
actual
$264
591
■664
176
693
138
140
2,666
2,463
203
1967
esti-
mate
$266
525
'516
199
609
148
140
2,403
2,143
259
1968
esti-
mate
$262
550
758
195
624
141
60
157
2,747
2,530
217
1 $320 million of funds shown in the 1966 program were avail-
able to support 1967 programs in India and Paitistan because aid
to those countries was suspended during the Kashmir crisis.
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
233
Asency for International Development — Program Trends
$ Billions
3.0-
Latin America
International Organizations
1961
Fiscal Years
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966 1967 1968
Estimate
building the foundations for long-range de-
velopment.
Near East and South Asia. — The United
States will provide development assistance
to 10 nations in this region in 1968, mostly
in the form of long-term development loans,
repayable in dollars. Despite the apparent in-
crease from 1967 to 1968, the effective pro-
gram level will decrease slightly between the
two years because of the India-Pakistan
financing adjustment described above. Over
90% of the $758 million total obligational
authority estimated for 1968 will be concen-
trated in the three most populous nations —
India, Pakistan, and Turkey. American as-
sistance programs in these countries are
directly integrated into overall plans involv-
ing the World Bank, the International De-
velopment Association, the International
Monetary Fund, United Nations agencies,
and other donor countries. Programs to
increase agricultural production will be ex-
panded.
Africa. — In 1968, greater effectiveness
will be achieved in U.S. assistance to Africa
through increasing multilateral coordination
and emphasis on regional programs. Total
obligational authority in 1968 is estimated
at $195 million, about the same as in 1967.
In 1968, most of our assistance will be con-
centrated in regional projects and countries
which now have the best prospects for eco-
nomic development.
Alliance for Progress. — This program is
a cooperative, long-term effort among the na-
tions of the Americas to promote economic
and social reform and development. U.S. par-
ticipation consists largely of development
loans and technical assistance, which supple-
ment the self-help efforts of the recipients.
234
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Total obligational authority for the Alliance
for Progress in 1968 is estimated at $624 mil-
lion, an increase of $15 million above 1967.
Increased emphasis will be given to programs
in the agriculture and education sectors.
Further measures will be considered in light
of the review of Alliance policies and pro-
grams scheduled to be undertaken by the
American Presidents at a summit meeting in
the near future.
Other economic and financial programs. —
The 1968 budget provides for the payment
of $104 million as the final installment of the
3-year, $312 million increase authorized in
1964 in the U.S. subscription to the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA), an
affiliate of the World Bank. This contribution
will be matched by contributions of $146
million from other developed countries.
The net receipts anticipated in 1967 for
international financial institutions primarily
reflect a reduction in the holdings of U.S.
non-interest-bearing notes by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). These matur-
ing securities, which were counted as expend-
itures when issued, have been exchanged
for letters of credit, under which expendi-
tures are only recorded when funds are
actually disbursed.
Both the IDA and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) have been highly
effective in providing greatly needed financial
resources to less-developed countries. In 1968,
legislation will be sought to permit us to join
other members in a further contribution to
the IDB's Fund for Special Operations. Upon
successful completion of negotiations between
the IDA and donor nations, legislation will
also be sought to authorize an additional con-
tribution to IDA.
The Export-Import Bank will continue its
efforts to expand U.S. exports through its
direct loan and insurance and guarantee pro-
grams. In 1968, proceeds from increased
loan repayments and from the sale of $1 bil-
lion of certificates of participation are ex-
pected to produce $365 million of net budget
receipts for the Bank compared with net
budget expenditures of $128 million in 1967.
Legislation will be proposed to extend the
life of the Bank and to increase the statutory
limitations on lending authority and out-
standing guarantees and insurance.
The Peace Corps will continue to grow as
our schools and colleges graduate more
young people willing to serve overseas. Peace
Corps volunteers are expected to be active
in 60 countries in 1968. By August 1968
there will be 19,240 volunteers in training
and service, nearly double the number in
1964. Equally important, Peace Corps pro-
grams will place greater emphasis on the
critical areas of agriculture and community
development.
In 1968 the Peace Corps program will:
• Assist over 400,000 farmers to enlarge
food supplies;
• Teach over 700,000 school children and
help train 55,000 teachers;
• Provide health services to more than
200,000 persons;
• Assist more than 75,000 persons by help-
ing to establish credit unions, co-ops, small
business counseling services, and savings
and loan associations.
Food for Freedom. — The 1966 amend-
ments to the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954 (often re-
ferred to as Public Law 480) provide for
several major new directions in the programs
providing food assistance abroad.
These new provisions are incorporated in
the proposed 1968 Food for Freedom pro-
gram included in this budget:
(1) The Secretary of Agriculture is no
longer restricted to the "surplus" concept in
determining commodities to be available.
(2) Self-help activities on the part of the
recipient countries are emphasized.
(3) Sales agreements will increasingly
stress payment in dollars or local currency
convertible to dollars.
(4) Food aid and economic assistance to
agriculture in the developing countries will
be closely linked in the War on Hunger.
Although joint efforts to increase food pro-
duction in the developing countries will be
greatly stepped up by 1968, these measures
cannot be expected to offset in the short run
FEBRUAEY 13, 1967
235
increased demand resulting from population
and income growth. Accordingly, increased
shipments of U.S. agricultural commodities
will help fill the gap. Expenditures will rise
by an estimated $89 million over 1967 to a
total of $1.8 billion in 1968. Over two-thirds
of total Food for Freedom expenditures will
be for sales for foreign currencies or for dol-
lar credit; the remainder will be for an ex-
panded donation program partly through
private voluntary agencies.
Foreign information and exchange activi-
ties.— Expenditures in fiscal year 1968 for
the educational and cultural exchange activi-
ties of the Department of State are estimated
at $56 million. A new program, being tried on
a pilot basis, will enable about 100 volunteers
from overseas to participate in community
and educational development projects in the
United States.
United States Information Agency activi-
ties will increase in Southeast Asia and Latin
America, partly through reallocation of re-
sources. New obligational authority is in-
cluded to operate a new radio facility for
Southeast Asia and to complete the construc-
tion of a large new transmitting facility in
Greece.
President Urges Action on Funds
for Southeast Asia Operations
Following is the text of a letter from Pres-
ident Johnson to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives , together with the text of
a letter to the President from Charles L.
Schultze, Director of the Bureau of the
Budget.
THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER
White House press release dated January 24
January 24, 1967
Sir : Herewith is submitted a supplemental
request to the Congress for new obligational
authority in the amount of $12,275,870,000
for the support of military operations in
Southeast Asia to help finance an increase
of $9.1 billion in fiscal 1967 expenditures
over our earlier estimates.
These funds are needed to sustain our com-
bat operations and to supply our field forces
with the aircraft, weapons, ammunition, and
equipment they must have to fight aggression
in Vietnam.
The Congress will, I believe, want to act
promptly to provide these funds.
One year ago, we were in the midst of the
most rapid and efficient military response in
our Nation's history. The uncertainties were
such that it was impossible to forecast ac-
curately our requirements for either men or
material a full 18 months or more in ad-
vance. The Secretary of Defense fully
informed the Congress of this fact and em-
phasized that a supplemental appropriation
would be necessary unless the conflict ended
by June 30, 1967.
Today, we are taking every initiative in
our search for peace. But as yet, our offers
to negotiate have not been accepted. We will
persist in these eff"orts to bring an honorable
peace to Vietnam.
At the same time, we must — and will —
sustain our pressure on the battlefield until
the enemy realizes that the war he started is
costing him more than he can ever gain.
Thus, I know that you will want to con-
tinue your finn support of the nearly 500,000
American fighting men who are bravely de-
fending the cause of freedom in South East
Asia.
Never have we had more cause to be proud
of our armed forces. When I visited Cam
Ranh Bay last October, General William
Westmoreland, the Commander of our forces
in Vietnam, told me that our troops — in the
air, on the sea, and on the land — were the
finest the United States had ever fielded.
We should in the Congress and the Execu-
tive Branch match the magnificent morale of
these men with the means they require to
carry out their mission.
Last year, we pledged to the Nation that
we would give our fighting men what they
must have, every gun and every dollar and
every decision, whatever the cost or what-
ever the challenge.
236
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We mu^ demonstrate our continuing sup-
port of these young Americans so that we
may prove to them — half a world away — that
our determination is no less than theirs.
The new obligational authority requested
for fiscal 1967 will provide:
— $6,841,000,000 to equip military units
and to replace aircraft, ordnance, ammuni-
tion, and material lost or consumed in com-
bat, with expenditures of $850,000,000.
—$3,311,500,000 for operating costs to
support additional military units and the in-
tensified level of field operations, with ex-
penditures of $2,900,000,000.
— $1,363,870,000 for pay and allowances of
additional military personnel and training
additional Reserve enlistees, with expendi-
tures of $1,310,000,000.
— $624,500,000 for the construction or im-
provement of needed airfields, roads, troop
housing and other facilities, with expendi-
tures of $110,000,000.
—$135,000,000 for research and develop-
ment efforts related to Vietnam, with ex-
penditures of $20,000,000.
These expenditures total $5.2 billion. When
added to the $3.9 billion in expenditures from
funds previously made available, the total
fiscal 1967 expenditure increase over the esti-
mate published in January 1966 totals $9.1
billion.
The Congress and the country will support
our troops who bear the burden of combat
by providing the funds they need to do the
job.
Respectfully yours,
Lyndon B. Johnson
mr. schultze to the president
White House press release dated January 24
January 24, 1967
Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith
for your consideration proposed supplemen-
tal appropriations for Fiscal Year 1967 for
the Department of Defense for support of
military operations in Southeast Asia. These
proposed supplemental appropriations total
$12,275,870,000.
The 1967 budget was developed and sub-
mitted in the midst of the most rapid phase
of our military buildup in Southeast Asia. It
was impossible at that time to forecast our
requirements for the ensuing 18 months with
any degree of accuracy. Indeed, within the
course of four months our deployments to
Vietnam increased by some 100,000 men. Nor
■was it at all clear at what rates aircraft,
munitions, and other materiel would be lost
or consumed. For these and other reasons,
Congress was advised that the situation in
Southeast Asia was "fraught with uncer-
tainties." Rather than request an amount not
based upon firm requirements, it was decided
to request funds based on the assumption
that combat oi^erations would terminate on
June 30, 1967.
After careful assessment of further 1967
needs, based upon the most recent experience,
the Secretary of Defense has recommended
that supplemental appropriations be re-
quested in the amount of $12,275,870,000. I
concur in that recommendation. These funds
are vital to our operations in Southeast Asia,
and they are needed promptly. They will pro-
vide:
$6,841,000,000 for initial equipment of ad-
ditional military units and replacement of
aircraft, ordnance, ammunition, and materiel
lost or consumed in combat.
$3,311,500,000 for operating costs to sup-
port the additional units and intensified level
of field operations.
$1,363,870,000 for pay and allowances of
added military personnel and training addi-
tional Reserve component enlistees.
$624,500,000 for construction or improve-
ment of needed troop housing, roads, air-
fields, and other facilities.
$135,000,000 for research and development
efforts related to Vietnam.
I recommend that the attached proposed
supplemental appropriations be transmitted
to the Congress in the amounts specified,
with your recommendation that the Congress
act speedily in providing these funds.
Respectfully yours,
Charles L. Schultze
FEBRUAHY 13, 1967
237
Science and Foreign Affairs
by Secretary Rtisk '
The uncharted region where the interests
of science and foreign policy meet is of great
import in a world increasingly devoted to
understanding and control of our total physi-
cal environment. The United States is one of
several nations trying to chart that region,
and until it is mapped we cannot intelligently
choose our routes. In foreign affairs we pool
our knowledge of history, politics, economics,
science, and technology to arrive at new syn-
theses.
Science and technology are, in the United
States today, a part of the fabric of life itself.
We have, in the past 20 years, entered a new
phase of the great American adventure.
Throughout the world, technology and the
science which supports it have provided new
means of education, new sources of power,
new ways of processing data, and fast, reli-
able transportation and communication. Man
is extending his reach beyond this earth and
into the vast reaches of space. The new
knowledge and concepts, even the very tools
of the new technology, promise ever more
intensive investigations in the years ahead.
We have learned how to pool our resources
in coordinated efforts to develop new devices
and to exploit new fields. We are supporting
science and technology on a scale undreamed
of even two decades ago.
We are all familiar with the so-called cul-
ture gap between science and the humanities
and, more recently, with the "technological
' Keynote address made before the eighth annual
Panel on Science and Technology of the House Com-
mittee on Science and Astronautics on Jan. 24
(pressrelease 12).
gap" between the United States and Europe.
Last year Vice President Humphrey said to
this committee:
I think there is dang'er of another gap — a gap
between public policy and advancing science and
technology. It is in government that we must face
the task of closing that gap. ... It is only in re-
cent years that we have really understood the close
relationship between public policy at the govern-
mental level and science and technology.
In the interest of closing that gap, the De-
partment of State began a program at the
Foreign Service Institute in 1965 designed to
equip Foreign Service officers with some
competence to handle science as a part of
foreign affairs. For the most part, we se-
lected officers who will be assuming the for-
eign affairs burdens over the next decade.
We followed this with a program for the
exchange of officers with the scientific agen-
cies to provide direct experience in scientific
programs.
We have been holding a series of science
briefings and more informal "science lunch-
eons" for high-level Department officers. Our
last science briefing was on the implications
of the worldwide use of nuclear power. The
latest science luncheon was held yesterday,
and it was my pleasure to host this commit-
tee's distinguished guests from abroad. Dr.
Hornig [Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant
to the President], who will speak to you to-
morrow, was also our guest at a recent
science luncheon; and our subject was the
impact of computers on society. I have found
these discussions with eminent men of science
to be invaluable.
238
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
For any American involved in public
affairs today, scientific literacy is a must; and
that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We
are firmly convinced that the Foreign Service
officer should be familiar with the ways, the
concepts, and the purposes of science. He
should understand the sources of our tech-
nological civilization. He should be able to
grasp the social and economic implications
of cuiTent scientific discoveries and engi-
neering accomplishments. I think it is
feasible for nonscientists to be, in the phrase
of H. G. Wells, "men of science" with real
awareness of this aspect of man's advance.
But the burden is not all on one side. Scien-
tists and engineers must, of course, recognize
very real progress in many fields outside
their own specialties, and they should be
conscious of the difference between the values
of society and the verifiable truths of the
natural sciences. For such men there is a role
in the foreign policy process. I think that
perhaps scientists have been a little more
willing to wade in the turbulent pond of for-
eign policy and that we in foreign affairs
must be more willing and better prepared to
dip in the waters of science. That science is
international in character has come to be re-
garded as a truism, but it is no more true
of science than it is of the humanities or the
social sciences. The larger truth is that bil-
lions must live together successfully on this
planet and that we are making common cause
in vast areas of human competence and
search for knowledge.
This committee has pioneered in equipping
men of public affairs to deal intelligently with
policies involving science and technology. As
a byproduct of that goal, scientists and
philosophers of science have also had their
horizons stretched, not only through presence
at these seminars — the committee's reports
are widely read. A valuable new channel has
been established between public affairs and
the scientific community with this committee
at the crossroads.
We have in the State Department a small
group of scientists and Foreign Service offi-
cers working with the science agencies and
with the scientific community on policies and
programs for international scientific and
technical cooperation. We do not administer
those programs, but we guide them and re-
tain the foreign policy decisions. The Depart-
ment's International Scientific and Techno-
logical Affairs Bureau has the resources of
the Government at its disposal in the United
States and a network of scientific attaches in
17 capitals on the other end. At some major
posts, our science agencies support their own
representatives to assist in specialized coop-
erative programs. It is not a question of pre-
paring to move in new dimensions; science
and technology are already important ele-
ments in our international relations and, in-
deed, have emerged as instruments of foreign
policy.
Scientific and Technological Forecasting
To some extent, we can extrapolate from
politics, economics, and science in projecting
future policy. In a way, science is the least
predictable of these three major fields. There
are few "breakthroughs" in politics and eco-
nomics; these are evolutionary fields. Broad
patterns, such as a United Nations Organiza-
tion, the rise of nationalism in Africa, and
the movement of Europe toward economic
integration, are discernible far in advance.
To a lesser degree this also holds for the
products of known technology. We foresee the
wide use of nuclear electric power and satel-
lite communications, and we can predict some
of the uses to which computer technology will
be put, for example.
However, we cannot foresee the break-
throughs in basic understandings to come.
Let me illustrate this point.
Thirty years ago President Roosevelt estab-
lished a blue-ribbon science committee to look
into "technological trends and their social
implications." The committee was accurate
in predicting increased development and use
of helicopters and conventional aircraft.
Autogiros and dirigibles were reported as on
the way out. The committee predicted color
television (and commercials), stereo FM
radio, our modern high-speed highway sys-
tem and urban traffic congestion. Air con-
ditioning, plastics, frozen foods, infrared
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
239
and radio air navigation, microfilm, and ac-
counting card machines were also predicted.
All of these extrapolations were based upon
then-known technology.
But where were the microcircuit, the com-
puter, radar and sonics, the jet engine and
rocketry, radioactivity, and underwater
breathing gases ? The top three scientific and
technical fields of major foreign policy in-
terest today were almost completely ignored
by that eminent committee. Space technology
or even rudimentary investigations of our
solar system were not mentioned. In oceanog-
raphy mention was made only of the pos-
sibility of extracting minerals from sea
water. In spite of predicted future needs for
oil, none of these experts considered the con-
tinental shelves as new sources. Investigation
of the sea as a source of fresh water, for
fish protein, or simply because of man's
native curiosity, was not considered. The sole
reference to the third area, nuclear energy,
was by a chemist of some vision, in these
words:
Much has been said and written about releasing
atomic energy and utilizing the vast forces that it
represents. While we see no immediate possibility of
doing this economically, who shall say that it will
not be achieved, and once achieved, how shall we
estimate the social implications resulting from the
use of such energy?
How indeed? This same man of vision ad-
vised that:
It is the unexpected turn, when some little detail
has been perfected after long search, that brings
such things to pass, just as occasionally a promis-
ing development must be dropped when some un-
expected defect develops. These are what make
prophecy difficult.
And so they do. The year after that report
was written, nuclear fission was discovered;
and in 4 years more the world's first nuclear
reactor reached criticality in Chicago, open-
ing the nuclear era. In our turn, we cannot
now predict if we will harness the thermo-
nuclear reaction nor would we be able to gage
its social and economic implications.
Nevertheless, an occasional look ahead is of
great value. Although the President's ad hoc
science committee back in 1937 did not fore-
see some major innovations soon to come, it
was fairly successful in predicting the future
uses of technical devices and methods then
known or just coming into use. The value of
this type of forecasting to policy judgments
is obvious. In most cases a true technological
innovation does not reach full bloom for some
years — the first basic patent on the transistor
was, after all, issued in 1930. Sometimes it
may be telegraphed in advance, as are the
new energy storage devices — but in these
cases the specifications for an end product
are set forth in the beginning; it is directed
research.
Congressman [Emilio Q.] Daddario re-
cently called for consideration of an "early
warning system" to apprise us of the poten-
tial dangers of certain technologies. If this
call is heeded, as I hope it is, we can be be1>
ter prepared to cope with the problems posed
by our advancing technology. The system
could perhaps even be extended to provide
useful forecasts for the foreseeable future. I
would think that a distinguished committee
drawn from the natural sciences, the social
sciences, and industry could be impaneled
about every 5 years to explore our techno-
logical future. This could satisfy the need for
expert opinion on the directions of science
and technology so far as it can be foreseen,
within acceptable time limits and without a
permanent "watchdog" group. After all,
technological forecasting is much more
sophisticated than it was in 1937, and we
should take advantage of the new techniques.
International Efforts Needed in Science
Although scientific prediction seems to me
to remain a chancy business, we can usefully
examine some aspects of the changing modem
environment which are of direct concern to
foreign affairs, many of which can only be
dealt with internationally.
The increasing pollution of our atmosphere,
particularly in large urban complexes, is of
common interest to the advanced nations. The
industrialization and urbanization of the de-
veloping nations will further contaminate the
atmosphere. An international cooperative
effort to cure our air, followed by interna-
tional conventions to keep it clean, would be
240
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
a long step toward meeting our responsibili-
ties to our own future.
Population pressures can be relieved by
means more civilized than war, disease, or
famine. Recent discoveries make possible
effective population control, and information
and assistance for family planning are widely
available. The barriers are those of convic-
tion and communication. The governments of
the world must first be convinced of the neces-
sity for a program of concerted and immedi-
ate action. They must act in time to prevent
the mass starvation predicted within the next
15 years. We shall need more food, but more
food is not the long-term solution. We must
continue development of better instrumen-
talities for population control; we need better
means for reaching billions of people; and
we must recognize that a crisis is at hand.
Changes in mores are in process in many
parts of the world, and the approach is be-
coming international. In the President's
words: ^ "Every member of the world com-
munity now bears a direct responsibility to
help bring our most basic human account
into balance."
The spread of nuclear power reactors re-
quires reliable and credible safeguards over
the use of nuclear fuels and equipment to
prevent their diversion to military uses.
The further prohferation of nuclear weap-
ons programs not only increases the hazard
to peace but diverts material and human
resources from more constructive goals. We
have a good beginning on effective inter-
national safeguards, but much remains to
be done. Some of the remaining tasks are
political and some are technical. We must
act in good faith and with resolution to try
to assure the world that the doorway to
nuclear warfare can be locked.
A cooperative assault on the treasure
chest of the seas would prevent the waste of
talent and money through unnecessary dupli-
cation.
The challenges of our space environment
require a truly international response. It
^ For excerpts from President Johnson's address
on the state of the Union, see Bulletin of Jan. 30,
1967, p. 158.
is already clear that there are benefits to
be derived from the use of space which are
worldwide in application. The agreement
last month on a draft treaty on the peace-
ful use of outer space ^ makes this a
propitious moment to consider again whether
we cannot respond even more effectively to
this challenge.
All of these possibilities for cooperative
programs with other nations call for an
advanced technology. But we have not for-
gotten our own growing pains.
Most of the world's population lives in
the developing nations, and not all of these
are making sufficient material progress.
There is an ever-widening gap between the
advanced and those struggling to keep their
heads above water. The advanced nations
must assist the developing countries in
building a base for technological competence.
We cannot overlay advanced technology on
an insufficient base. That base must first be
prepared through intelligent planning to-
ward rational goals.
Alliance of Natural and Social Sciences
Our world has acquired a new orientation
over the past 20 years. Science and tech-
nology are advancing the clock of civihza-
tion at an ever-increasing rate. Science has
become accustomed to its place at the fron-
tiers of man's knowledge. But we do not
forget the older frontiers where man meets
man, and we welcome the alliance of the
natural sciences with the social sciences in
meeting new facets of old problems in the
world laboratory.
The political significance of strong na-
tional programs in science and technology
expands steadily. Political-scientific areas
such as disarmament, nuclear safeguards,
ocean exploitation, space technology and
communications, and water management are
areas in which the natural and the social
sciences meet, and they offer major oppor-
tunities for international programs. Wider
use of forums such as this today to bring
' For background, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952,
and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
241
the international problems of science and
technology before learned men from both
broad areas can assist in finding the solu-
tions.
As to our approach to this kind of inter-
national cooperation, my points were three.
We can make better use of new techniques
for technological forecasting as an input to
foreign policy judgments. New understand-
ings and mutual respect between the physi-
cal sciences and the social sciences are pre-
requisites if the gap between them is to be
completely closed. We must have programs
of international scientific and technical coop-
eration on two levels: with the advanced
nations in understanding and controlling the
total environment, and with those nations
in assisting the material progress of the de-
veloping nations.
Our future no longer stands in the wings.
Man's needs and his competence have both
reached dimensions which can no longer be
ignored. The scientific revolution has ar-
rived— ^live, and in color. We cannot clearly
foresee the advances, discoveries, and inno-
vations which lie ahead, but the uses to
which we put the new knowledge in our
human relationships may well be critical.
[At the conclusion of his prepared text, Secretary
Rusk made the following extemporaneous remarks.]
As the scientists put their minds to the
problems of the future, it is just as im-
portant that the social sciences and the
humanities do the same. The old notion that
somehow the future is not the business of
the humanities and the social sciences is
rapidly disappearing, because the other half
of our great universities is hurling us into
the future at a breathtaking pace. Unless
those who think about the problems of man
similarly address themselves to the future,
and not merely to some remote past nor to
the views spoken somewhere else at an
earlier stage, then we will have vast prob-
lems confronting us in the future. This joint
action among all groups, and here in this
committee between legislators and private
citizens, is indispensable if we are to move
ahead as rational human beings into this un-
charted future.
President-Elect of Brazil
Visits the United States
Artur da Costa e Silva, President-elect of
Brazil, made an informal visit to the United
States Janwary 18-31. He was received by
President Johnson and other U.S. Govern-
ment officials in Washington January 25-28.
Following is an exchange of toasts between
President Johnson and President-elect Costa
e Silva at a White House luncheon on Janu-
ary 26.
White House press release dated January 26
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
President-elect Costa e Silva, Madam
Costa e Silva, Excellencies, distinguished
guests: It is a good day for us when one of
our fellow Americans comes to visit us in
this house. It inspires us to feel again how
very much we have in common in this hemi-
sphere, how interdependent we really are,
and how very closely our destinies are woven
together.
We even try to bring the weather into Line
— so that a Washington winter day will not
be many degrees removed from a Brazilian
summer.
Very soon now, sir, you and I will have
even more to share. I mean, what our Presi-
dent Thomas Jeff'erson said, "the splendid
misery" of national leadership. After March
15 that mixture of splendor and miseiy will
be your daily fare, as it is mine.
You will know splendor as you work for a
more abundant life for your jDeople.
And you will certainly know misery as you
try hard to discover not only how to do what
is right but to discover what is really right.
The only certainty, Mr. President-elect, is
that you will have to act.
Fortunately for you and me, our countries
are blessed with great natural wealth. They
are blessed with confident and vigorous peo-
ple. We are big. We ai'e still growing. We can
still experiment. We can still make mistakes
and still survive.
The assurance that our people seek is not
242
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
that we make no mistakes but that we shall
really never tire of seeking education for our
children, better health for all of our families,
better housing for all of our people, and equal
justice for every man. They can tolerate hon-
est error, but they cannot abide indifference.
Mr. President-elect. I know the goals that
you seek for the good people of Brazil. For
our part, we here in America shall do all that
we can do to tiy to help you attain those
goals. The United States, today as in the
past, has much at stake in Brazil.
You were our comrades in the Second War.
I shall not forget that you were the first to
join us in helping the Dominican iieople re-
sist totalitarian rule — in making it possible
for them to freely choose their own destiny
instead of having it imposed upon them.
That, sir, was an act of res]X)nsible states-
manship for which every free nation of
America should be grateful.
Sir, we welcome you to this Capital and to
this house. Know that as geography has
made us neighbors, history and hope have
made us friends.
Our good and delightful friends who have
honored us with your presence today, I
should like to ask all of you to join with me
in a toast to His Excellency President-elect
Costa e Silva and to the great nation of
Brazil.
PRESIDENT-ELECT COSTA E SILVA
Mr. President: I would like to confess that
as a military man I may not be endowed
with your rhetorical skill and the practice
that has just been displayed by the illus-
trious man whom now I might call my
friend, the President of the United States.
Starting with the weather, we found out
today that here is a man who really
rules over the heavens. In my country when
we say that a man rules over the heavens,
that means that he is indeed a powerful man.
That expression applies very well to what
has happened here today as we are greeted
with an ideal spring day.
Therefore, I am indeed very grateful. I
must say that I am convinced, however, that
the magnificent day that we are enjoying
today is indeed the work of a Supreme Being
that reigns above all of us, be it nature, or
in my own belief it is the work of the Lord.
I want to say that throughout my trip all
over the world we have been blessed with a
great deal of luck and good fortune. I con-
sider that this fortime is really a harbinger
of better things to come. I envisage them in
a most favorable manner, and I envisage
them in a climate of very good fortune in my
forthcoming administration in the govern-
ment which I am about to assume.
I consider myself very fortunate to have
had this interval which was perhaps a mat-
ter of controversy. I mean this interval be-
tween my election and my forthcoming inau-
guration. This intei-val, this break, gave me
an unequaled opportunity to study, to look
into, and to endeavor to know the problems
not only of my country but also of the world.
Just a few moments ago, I received from
a really true statesman a magnificent lesson
in what lies ahead for me. Now I feel more
able to endure with equanimity and fortitude
that "splendid misery" to which you just
made a reference, Mr. President, and of
which I already have had a foretaste in the
3 years that have followed our revolution.
I am, therefore, most grateful to you, Mr.
President, because I have just heard a voice
of a man who carries on his shoulders a tre-
mendous responsibility, not only before this
greatest country of all but before the entire
world. I have received and heard your sug-
gestions and your voice, and I consider them
a most valuable contribution to my govern-
ment task that lies ahead.
I am convinced that I am going to endure
some suffering and some difficulties, as I
have already endured; but I am going to con-
tinue to do eveiything in my power to main-
tain in the people of my nation a certain
state of mind with regard to the United
States, so that together our two nations may
form and build a true barrier against those
who are trying to violate and subvert justice,
press, and freedom.
In my closing words, I want to say that
this luncheon and this meeting which were
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
243
of such an intimate and congenial nature
were also highlighted by your attitude of a
few moments ago, Mr. President, when you
greeted, one by one, the journalists of the
Brazilian press. I can assure you that
through that gesture you have endeared
yourself to the very heart of the Brazilian
people. I can also assure you that in our
press you are going to feel very shortly that
genuine warmth that you radiated, the
warmth of a kind man, a man who has a
genuine human feeling and a feeling which
is very close to ours.
Both of us have said, and we mean it, that
we want to give to our peoples better condi-
tions of life, more abundant food, more ade-
quate housing. Those are, as a matter of
fact, the main programs of the platform
which I presented to the party that elected
me. The main goal in my party, in my plal^
form, was men.
I mean by that a three-pronged attack
and a series of achievements in the fields of
education, health, better food, housing, and
social well-being. What you have said, Mr.
President, was a very vital lesson to me. I
am very grateful and very pleased to say
that our views coincide on such important
issues.
Once more I thank you very much for your
very inspiring and kind words.
Let us toast the personal health of the
President and Mrs. Johnson, and particularly
a toast to the greatness of the United States,
this country which is the foremost defender
of human freedom.
"Volunteers to America"
Program Gets Underway
The Department of State announced on
January 25 (press release 13) that a number
of its embassies abroad have been asked to
discuss with other governments the possi-
bility of sending young citizens to participate
in a "Volunteers to America" pilot project
beginning next summer. Approximately 100
young men and women from Latin America,
the Near East, Asia, and Africa will be se-
lected to teach in U. S. schools and serve in
community programs for 1 to 2 yeai-s.
President Johnson recommended such a
program in his message to Congress on in-
ternational education in February 1966.
The Department of State is acting under
its existing authorization to conduct ex-
change programs, contained in the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of
1961 (Fulbrighi^Hays Act). The Peace
Corps, which is advising the Department on
the program, last spring sought authority for
a larger operation. Congressional committees
hearing the proposal noted, however, that in
the Fulbright^-Hays Act authority already
exists for the State Department's Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs to test the
idea with a pilot project.
The U. S. Office of Education is assisting
the State Department in placing the volun-
teers, working primarily through the Sup-
plementary Centers and Services Program
created under title III of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965. A re-
cent survey indicated wide interest in the
project.
Most of the volunteers in the pilot project
will serve in schools throughout the United
States as teachers and resource persormel
in classes in modem languages, area and so-
cial studies, music, art, and physical educa-
tion. It is expected that they will also become
involved in local community activities and
development projects. Other volunteers will
work primarily in neighborhood centers or
in rural or urban community action pro-
grams alongside U.S. volunteers.
Participants will be selected jointly by
their own governments and representatives
of American embassies. They will generally
be young, unmarried, English-speaking grad-
uates of normal schools or universities in
their home countries.
Governments of the countries sending vol-
unteers will cover the costs of reciniitmenit
and interTiational transportation, while the
schools and agencies receiving volunteers
here will provide the living allowances. The
244
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
total cost to the U.S. Government, which will
cover 4-week training programs after arrival
in this country, domestic transpoitation, and
administration, has been budgeted at
$200,000.
United States Achieves Removal
of Foreign Import Restrictions
Press release 15 dated January 26
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
In 1966 and early 1967 the trading part-
ners of the United States took further im-
portant steps to liberalize their import trade
by removing quantitative imix)rt restrictions.
As in former years. United States efforts
to gain easier and expanded access to foreign
markets have been undertaken, on both a
bilateral and multilateral basis, primarily
within the framework of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
GATT provides a general prohibition against
quantitative import restrictions but recog-
nizes that certain exceptions must be ac-
corded, in particular where a country's for-
eign exchange reserves are threatened by
balance-of-payments difficulties.
In the post^World War II period many con-
tracting parties found it necessary to main-
tain restraints on their imports for balance-
of-payments reasons. Since 1960-61, how-
ever, our major trading partners have gen-
erally had no balance-of-payments justifica-
tion to restrict imports, and their indus-
trial import trade is now practically
I free of quota controls. The agricultural
sector, however, has proven more difficult
to liberalize. Fui-ther, the important liber-
alization of trade which has come about
in the developed countries has not yet oc-
curred in the developing countries which, at
their present stage of economic development,
find quantitative import controls necessaiy
in protecting their low level of foreign ex-
change reserves and in directing the avail-
able foreign exchange to the purchase of
imixnis considered most essential to the
sound development of their economies.
Over the past year, the Department of
State and other agencies of the United States
Government have continued common efforts
to reduce obstacles to international trade. In
1966 discussions were held in Oslo under
GATT consultative procedures on a range of
agricultural restrictions of considerable
trade interest to the United States. Our Em-
bassy in Paris continued GATT consultations
begun in 1962 on certain agricultural restric-
tions impeding United States exports to
France. Both of these efforts led to further
relaxation of barriers.
The United States also continued to play a
leading ix)le in Geneva in regular GATT con-
sultations, where quantitative imix)rt restric-
tions maintained for balance-of-payments
reasons are examined by a committee of in-
terested GATT contracting parties. A num-
ber of consulting countries took important
steps to free part of their import trade from
quantitative controls; others moved to in-
crease the size of their quotas; and still
others stated their resolve to move in the
direction of further liberalization.
Listed below in summary form are the
more significant liberalization actions our
trading partners have taken over the past
year and in early 1967.
IMPORT LIBERALIZATIONS
Austria
At the beginning of 1967 Austria removed import
quota restrictions from 11 tariff items or subitems.
Included in the Austrian action were: carpeting,
wooden and plastic furniture, wool blankets, and
certain types of electric accumulators and parts.
Denmark
Eleven tariff items or subitems were removed
from quota control in January 1966. These items
included certain fish, sugar confectionery, marma-
lade, certain glues, friction material, and certain
lifts. In a further 1966 move Denmark lifted quan-
titative import restrictions from six tariff subitems,
including biscuits and rusks, flour and meal of sago
and arrowroot, certain marmalades and fruit jellies
and puree, basketwork and wickerwork, footwear
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
245
with uppers of rubber, and footwear with rubber
soles. Denmark also liberalized a number of items,
mostly in the agricultural area, in January 1967.
Dried apples and mixtures of dried fruits contain-
ing dried apples; fresh cod, plaice, and herring;
fresh asparagus; grits and flour of buckwheat and
millet are among the items no longer subject to
quantitative control.
intermediate iron and steel products. At the begin-
ning of 1967 Iceland made an adjustment-in its
quota controls, the net effect of which was to in-
crease the amount of imports which are free of any
quantitative control to 86.5 percent of total im-
ports based on 1965 trade. In this move quotas
were removed from unroasted coffee, electric motors,
glass, hollow plates, and veneer.
Finland
Since freeing over 170 tariff items or subitems
from quantitative restriction on January 1, 1966,'
Finland brought about another important liberaliza-
tion of its import trade in January of this year. This
latest action removed quotas covering 144 tariff
items or subitems including certain food products,
articles of leather, certain textiles, machinery and
equipment, and TV and radio receivers. On the basis
of Finland's 1964 import trade, these two liberaliza-
tions freed imports valued at some $60 million.
France
France increased quotas on certain agricultural
items of trade interest to us, and quantitative con-
trols which had formerly been maintained over more
than a dozen food items when imported from the
United States were removed. Quotas were also elimi-
nated from imports of certain preserved vegetables,
grape juices, orange juices, apple juices, certain
other juices, and coffee extracts. Another step taken
in late 1966 freed such manufactured items as cot-
ton terry fabrics, knitted or crocheted socks and
stockings, certain sewing machines and needles, elec-
tric cells and batteries, and lighters from quantita-
tive restriction.
Japan
The Government of Japan took two import trade
liberalization steps in 1966. The first freed cocoa
powder in small containers, streptomycin, and cer-
tain yarn of manmade continuous fibers from quan-
titative restrictions; the second freed penicillin,
tantalum and articles thereof, and certain outboard
motors.
Norway
Noi-way removed import quota controls from a
number of agricultural items of considerable trade
interest to the United States at the beginning of
1967. These included canned mixed fruit and fruit
cocktail, canned sour cherries, canned fruit juice
mixtures, certain canned vegetable juices, frozen
corn, and precooked (minute) rice.
Spain
In 1966 Spain lifted quantitative import restric-
tions from some 75 tariff items. These included vari-
ous coated textile fabrics and garments, various
household goods and appliances, certain cutlery
items, nails, dyes, tanning extracts, and a range of
paper products.
Iceland
In 1966 Iceland removed quantitative controls
from a range of products which accounted for about
7 percent of imports into Iceland in 1964. This im-
portant liberalization covered a wide range of items
such as malt, glucose, coniferous wood, carpets, knit-
ted or crocheted stockings, undergarments, piping,
glass articles, bottles, electric accumulators, wire,
certain tube and pipe fittings, and a variety of
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1966,
p. 624.
Yugoslavia
On January 1, 1967, Yugoslavia embarked on a
bold and promising program of trade liberalization
affecting an important segment of Yugoslavian im-
port trade. According to some estimates, the amount
of 1967 imports which will be freely imported may
reach 50 percent. Among the items removed from
quantitative restriction are certain types of electri-
cal equipment, appliance components, signaling
equipment, stationery and other paper products,
most building materials, wood products, leather and
footwear, fruit juices, and many metals and min-.
erals.
246
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
Secretary Rusk Urges Congressional Support
for Consular Convention With the Soviet Union
Statement by Secretary Rusk '■
I come today to urge this committee and
the Senate to act favorably on the consular
convention \vith the Soviet Union.^
This convention was proposed by the
United States.
It is a step carried to agreement in 1964
after 5 years of painstaking effort.
It is a step proposed and endorsed by
three administrations representing both
political parties.
It is a step reported favorably by this com-
mittee 18 months ago.
It is a step which, at little cost, would be
very much in the national interest.
Why then has the Senate not so far acted
on this treaty? I believe this has been largely
because of misunderstanding.
There are a number of detailed aspects of
the convention, which the committee ex-
plored at length in 1965. You may wish to
raise these aspects with the two distin-
guished gentlemen who have come here with
me: Under Secretary of State [Nicholas
deB.] Katzenbach, who can discuss these
questions with the expertise of a former At-
torney General, and Ambassador Foy Kohler,
Deputy Under Secretary of State, who can
respond from his long experience as Ambas-
' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Jan. 23 (press release 10). The com-
plete hearings will be published by the committee.
= S. Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; for text, see Bul-
letin of June 22, 1964, p. 979.
sador in Moscow. (It was Ambassador Koh-
ler, you will recall, who signed this conven-
tion in Moscow in 1964.)
But whatever the details of the convention,
I would like to spend a few minutes dis-
cussing a single, simple, central fact of this
matter — a fact which has been misunder-
stood.
It has been argued — and widely thought —
that the purpose of this convention is to au-
thorize the opening of consulates by both
countries. That is not its basic puriJOse.
What this convention is primarily intended
to do, immediately upon going into effect, is
to permit the United States promptly to pro-
test and assist its citizens when they are
arrested and detained in the Soviet Union.
Even if no consulates were ever to be
opened by the two countries, this convention
would give American citizens in the Soviet
Union more rights than any Soviet citizen
possesses — rights which any Soviet citizen
already has in our open society without such
a treaty.
The importance of this result would be
considerable, both quantitatively and quali-
tatively. It must not be underestimated.
Quantitatively, the importance of the pro-
tections this convention would afford to
Americans increases every year. The number
of Soviet tourists and visitors to this country
is small and has remained fairly constant in
the past 5 years. It was about 900 in 1962,
FEBRUAHY 13, 1967
247
and it was about 900 in 1966. But the num-
ber of American tourists and visitoi-s in the
Soviet Union has increased steadily during
the same period. In 1962, 10,000 American
travelers went to the Soviet Union. In 1966
there were 18,000.
Let me supply the full figures for the
record:
U.S. Travelen to V.S.S.R. Soviet Travders to U.S.
TonriBta
Exchanfre
Exchange
(approx)3
Visitor
Tourists
Visitors
1962
9,000
1,161
77
952
1963
10,000
537
140
589
1964
15,000
874
204
646
1965
17,000
916
114
832
1966
15,000
3,074 *
106
786
The convention thus would benefit both
countries, but on simply a numerical basis —
comparing 900 with 18,000 — it is more valu-
able to the United States.
At least as important, however, is the
qualitative argument — the fact that this con-
vention would allow the United States to
take protective action in those incidents
when American citizens have been detained
for long periods with little or delayed assist-
ance from their Government.
To those accustomed to the vigilance of
American courts in protecting the rights of
arrested individuals, it is jarring to recog-
nize that, under Soviet law, access to an ar-
rested person can be refused while the case
is under investigation — for a period of weeks
or even longer, up to 9 months.
There is not even a present requirement
that the United States must be notified of an
arrest.
Such treatment is not only unjust by our
standards but must have wounding impact
on the individuals involved. Surely such inci-
' No exact count is available of the number of U.S.
tourists visiting the Soviet Union; so the figures in
this first column are approximate. You will notice
that we have revised upward, from 12,000 to 15,000,
our 1964 estimate in this category. This we did
after checking data from all available sources, in-
cluding Soviet sources as well as our own passport
offices. [Footnote in original.]
■* The sharp increase in U.S. exchange visitors to
the U.S.S.R. in 1966 was largely attributable to
heavy U.S. attendance at a number of major inter-
national conferences. [Footnote in original.]
dents have serious public impact in this
country. Without rules of the kind this
convention would provide, the arrest of an
individual quickly becomes an international
incident.
That I am not exaggerating is evident
from recalling even briefly a few of the
recent cases. One was the case of the RB^7
flyers in 1960 and 1961. Another was the
case of Professor [Frederick] Barghoom,
whose arrest in 1963 we learned of only
after 12 days, and whom we were never per-
mitted to see in prison.
Another was the tragic 1965 case of New-
comb Mott, in which 9 days elapsed before
any American official was allowed access to
him, and then only for 1 hour. Only three
other consular meetings were allowed in the
next 10 weeks prior to trial. Mott was sen-
tenced to 18 months in prison. Apparently in
a state of despondency very likely related to
the isolation in which he had been held, he
died shortly afterward in circumstances that
have yet not been fully explained.
Thomas Dawson, a Peace Corps volunteer,
was apprehended by Soviet border guards
on September 11, 1966, while gathering sea-
shells barefoot near the Soviet-Iranian bor-
der. Our Embassy was never notified of his
arrest, and it was not until September 20
that consular access was accorded.
And the most recent instance, which is still
unresolved, is that of the arrest of Buell Ray
Wortham and Craddock Matthew Gilmour
on October 1, 1966, for currency violations
and theft.
In just the 30 months since the convention
was signed, we know of at least 20 cases
where Americans have been detained by the
Soviet police. Some of these Americans acted
foolishly — or worse. Some committed acts
which are regarded as criminal under Soviet
but not American law; some apparently com-
mitted acts which would be criminal in both
countries. In none of these cases did the
Soviet authorities adhere to the standards of
notification and access provided for by this
convention.
I cannot assure you that, if this consular
convention had been in force, we could have
248
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
prevented the tragic outcome of the Mott
case or prevented these other Americans
from being jailed. But the standai-ds pro-
vided by tliis convention would have greatly-
assisted us in our efforts to assure them the
protection that is normal among most states.
Equally important, this convention could
well have eliminated the need for the United
States to make repeated representations, at
very high political levels, in order to secure
even late and limited access to our citizens.
The rights of international due process
which this convention would provide should
be available without question, \vithout delay,
and without the need for continuous and
insistent high-level diplomacy. They should
be accoixled as a matter of course.
That goal — the maximum possible protec-
tion and assistance for American citizens
on a regular and routine basis — is our cen-
tral purpose in this convention, a purpose
about which I cannot imagine any serious
question.
This convention is not necessary to au-
thorize the reestablishment of consulates
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The President's foreign policy re-
sponsibilities under the Constitution already
give him the authority to permit the estab-
lishment of foreign consulates in this coun-
try.
That is an authority which has been acted
on repeatedly, not only with a number of
other countries but specifically with the So-
viet Union. Soviet consulates were estab-
lished in New York and San Francisco in
1934 and in Los Angeles in 1937. The United
States established a consulate in Vladivostok
in 1941 and was prepared to open another
in Leningrad in 1948, when both countries
withdrew their consuls.
What this convention would do, however,
through its various technical protections, is
to provide the basis on which we believe we
could prudently reestablish consulates on a
reciprocal basis.
Given these protections, we would like to
open a consulate with 10 or 15 American
employees, probably in Leningrad, to provide
better protection for our citizens in the So-
viet Union. In return, we would permit the
Soviets to open a parallel consulate in a com-
parable American city.
Some have expressed the fear that such
an office, coupled with the reciprocal crimi-
nal immunity provisions of the convention,
would encourage Soviet espionage and sub-
version. They have argued that this danger
outweighs the benefits which the convention
might bring to the United States.
The possibility they fear must not be ig-
nored, but I do not see how this consular
convention can add significantly to the risk
of espionage. Let me outline my reasons for
these conclusions:
First, the anticipated increase in the num-
ber of Soviet personnel in this country is
small. At present, there are 1,018 Soviet
citizens in this country, 452 of them with
diplomatic immunity. One Soviet consulate
would add only 10 or 15.
Second, the immunity provisions' of this
convention would give these added represent-
atives no exemptions which Soviet diplo-
matic personnel do not already have — and
in fact would provide less, since they would
not be immune from civil action.
Third, we are all aware of the excellent
work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in controlling possible espionage by foreign
representatives and agents in this country
over the years. I believe they can cope with
a few more — a belief with which, as you
know, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is in basic agree-
ment. Our confidence in the FBI's work in
this field reduces even further the already
small risk involved in the establishment of
such a Soviet office.
Fourth, adoption of the criminal immunity
provision in this convention could affect bi-
lateral agreements with 27 other countries
and could result in similar immunity for 290
consular personnel — none of them from bloc
counti-ies. But this is not a large number
when compared with the total of 9,400 per-
sons in the United States with full diplo-
matic immunity. Nor is it a dangerous prece-
dent. According to a State Department
survey, between 1939 and 1964 there were 11
consular officers charged with crimes. Five
PEBRUAEY 13, 1967
249
of these were for traffic offenses. Two of the
eleven were convicted.
Fifth, under the convention all persons en-
joying inununity are under a duty to respect
the receiving country's laws, including traf-
fic laws. To enforce this obligation, the con-
vention expressly provides for the unre-
stricted right to declare an individual
persona non grata.
I have discussed, Mr. Chairman, the merits
of the convention. Like every other treaty,
this convention must, of course, be judged
on its merits. However, we should be mindful,
too, of its place in our overall relations with
the Soviet Union.
As President Johnson said in his state of
the Union message to the Congress: "Our
objective is not to continue the cold war but
to end it." ^
I should like to reiterate our national
policy of expanding our contacts with the
U.S.S.R. so as to end the mutual isolation of
our two societies. Increased contacts can re-
duce misunderstandings between our two
countries and lead, in time, to international
cooperation in areas where we are able to find
common interests and mutual advantage.
Mr. Chairman, I firmly believe this conven-
tion would serve our national interests. It
would support and promote imjyortant objec-
tives of our foreign iwlicy. More tangibly, it
would substantially strengthen the capacity
of the United States to protect a large and
increasing number of its citizens who travel
to the Soviet Union. And I believe that this
practical gain justifies support of the conven-
tion by those who may not share our view
about larger objectives.
In practice, the possible risks of espionage
and of enlarged criminal immunity are both
small and controllable.
In short, committee and Senate approval
of this consular convention would benefit the
Nation, and I urge your support.
Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress
PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
White House prese release d&ted January 19
To the Congress of the United States:
I am transmitting to you my Second An-
nual Report on the operation of the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement as required by P.L.
89-23.
During the past year the International
Coffee Agreement has successfully served
both coffee producers and consumers in a
changing market situation. New measures
have made the Agreement more flexible and
responsive to consumer wants. Coffee prices
continued to be reasonably stable, at levels
fair to consuming and producing countries
alike.
Nevertheless, major problems remain. Un-
til production is brought into balance with
demand, countries heavily dependent on
earnings from their production of coffee will
face a continuing threat of instability. The
Coffee Agreement provides time to work out
solutions. It has already encouraged produc-
ing countries to pay more attention to the
need to diversify their economies.
With cooperation from all members, the
Coffee Agreement will continue to operate
as a stabilizing force in the world coffee mar-
ket. It is an important adjunct to the Alliance
for Progress in Latin America and to our
economic assistance programs in other parts
of the world.
Lyndon B. Johnson
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
The White House,
January 19, 1967
250
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
FIGURE 1
S. Cints Ptr Poiinil, Ntw Vork
GREEN COFFEE SPOT PRICES
ANNUAL AVERAGES - 1951-1966
.'Colombia MAMS
Brazil SANTOS 4 S'\ \
\
;*—
Uganda W I C
_L
1960
'62
'ES Est 1966 '67
TEXT OF REPORT
Introduction
This report is submitted in accordance
with Section 5 of the International Coffee
Agreement Act of 1965.
The International Coffee Agreement was
negotiated at the United Nations during July,
August and September 1962 and signed by
the United States on September 28, 1962. The
Senate gave its advice and consent to the
ratification of the Agreement on May 21,
1963, and on December 27, 1963, the United
States deposited its instniment of ratifica-
tion. The Agreement entered into force pro-
visionally in the summer of 1963 and defin-
itively in December 1963. The implementing
legislation— the International Coffee Agree-
ment Act of 1965 — -to enable the United
States to meet all its obligations under the
Agreement, came into effect on May 22, 1965.
The objectives of the Agreement, as set
out in Article 1, are as follows:
1. to achieve a reasonable balance between
supply and demand on a basis which will
assure adequate supplies of coffee to consum-
ers and markets for coffee to producers at
equitable prices, and which will bring about
long-term equilibrium between production
and consumption;
2. to alleviate the serious hardship caused
by burdensome surpluses and excessive fluc-
tuations in the prices of coffee to the detri-
ment of the interests of both producers and
consumers;
3. to contribute to the development of pro-
ductive resources and to the promotion and
maintenance of employment and income in
the member countries, thereby helping to
bring about fair wages, higher living stand-
ards, and better working conditions;
4. to assist in increasing the purchasing
power of coffee exporting countries by keep-
ing prices at equitable levels and by increas-
ing consumption;
5. to encourage the consumption of coffee
by eveiy possible means; and
6. in general, in recognition of the rela-
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
251
FICURE 2
IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE EXPORTS TO 13 COFFEE ■ PRODUCING COUNTRIES^
1963-1965 Average
VALUE OP COFFEE EXPORTS AS PER CENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS
68%
COLOMBIA
wmm//m/////m////mmmm/mm/mm^^^^^^^
ETHIOPIA
w/mmm//////mm////////m^^^^^
EL SALVADOR
mmmmm/mm/M/m/m
BRAZIL
w/m//mm/M/m/Mmm^^^^^
UGANDA
y//////////////////////////////////M//M^^^^^^
GUATEMALA
m///////////M////////////////////////M
HAITI
W///////MM///////////////////M///M
COSTA RICA
w/mmm/mmm/m/Mm/A 44% ^
IVORY COAST
m///mmm///mMm////M^^ 41% *<^ L.
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
7///mm/mM////////////\ 29% V^Vfe
KENYA
7/mm/mm/mm 26% ] y
CAMEROON
'/////////////////////MM 24% if
TOGO
W/////////////////////////A 24%
Source: lolernaliona! Monetary Fond
tionship of the trade in coffee to the economic
stability of markets for industrial products,
to further international cooperation in con-
nection with world coffee problems.
The world coffee economy of the past has
been aptly characterized as a "boom-or-bust"
economy. Coffee is a tree crop; the trees start
bearing about five years after they are
planted. Thus, the production response to in-
creased demand is inevitably delayed. On the
other hand, farmers have tended to over-
respond to demand by planting more trees
than needed. These factors have largely been
responsible for the sharp fluctuation in cof-
fee prices in the past 15 years as shown in
the chart [figure 1].
In the first ten years following World War
II, demand for coffee was strong, prices rose
as demand outstripped supply, and as a re-
sult there were substantial new plantings.
A short crop and peak prices in 1954 led
farmers throughout the coffee growing
'These 13 Coffee-Eiportlne Countries, ol 34 whicli Eiport, Produce ?6°i> of Eiportable World Collee.
world to undertake another new wave of
plantings. By 1959-60, total world export-
able production had reached 62 million bags
(one bag equals 132 pounds) whereas world
consumption outside the producing countries
was only 37 million bags. In the face of such
surpluses, prices fell sharply and the pros-
pects of any improvement in prices were
dim. Coffee growers were in difficulty and
the economies of many producing countries
were under pressure.
Fluctuating coffee prices hurt many of the
developing countries of Latin America,
Africa and Asia in two ways. First, sharp
declines can be disastrous to all those con-
nected with the coffee economy, and espe-
cially to farmers, many of whom operate
small holdings. Second, because so many of
the countries are heavily dependent on cof-
fee exports for earning foreign exchange,
sharp fluctuations in coffee prices can seri-
ously disrupt economic development pro-
grams. Thus, the efforts of the United
252
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
states under the Alliance for Progress and
other aid programs have sometimes been
hindered by this historic pattern of sharp
price changes. The chart [figure 2] shows
the extent to which 13 countries depend
upon coffee for foreign exchange earnings.
A major aim of the International Coffee
Agreement is to smooth out price fluctua-
tions so as (i) to provide a steady and grow-
ing earnings base to the coffee producing
countries as world consumption rises, (ii) to
maintain reasonable prices for coffee con-
sumers, and (iii) to enlarge the role of the
coffee economy in contributing to the growth
of the overall economy. In addition, it is
hoped that the stabilization of the coffee
market will encourage the transfer of re-
sources from the production of excess cof-
fee to other crops for which there is an un-
filled demand.
Both because of our concern for the steady
economic development of the coffee growing
countries and because we are far and away
the largest coffee consuming country, the
United States has an important role to play
in maintaining the effectiveness of the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement. The United
States' share of world coffee imports is
demonstrated in the chart [figure 3] .
I. Operation of the International Coffee
Agreement
The Coffee Situation
From the negotiation of the Agreement
in the summer of 1962 through the summer
of 1963, large surpluses overhung the mar-
ket and depressed prices continued. In
August 1963 prices reached a level lower
than at any time since 1948, with serious
strains on the economies of the producing
countries.
In the autumn of 1963, the situation
changed abruptly as news of severe frosts
and drought in the principal growing regions
of Brazil started to come in. Buyers all over
the world feared that they might not be able
to obtain the quantities of coffee they would
need when the Brazilian crop was harvested
in summer 1964. They started a scramble for
FIGURE 3
WORLD IMPORTS OF COFFEE
MIILIONS OF BUGS
unci ,si, I DDiiiiii
\ll /lis
OINIt KillltlS " 1 3
TOTAL 47,392,000 BAGS
coffee, first for Brazilian coffee, and then for
coffee of all types in order to build up inven-
tories. The United States feared that the
wildfire price increase of 1954 might be re-
peated. Therefore, we moved promptly
within the framework of the Agreement to
do all that could be done to assure buyers
that adequate supplies would be available.
As a result, the price rise was halted by
March 1964 and the Agreement had met
its first serious test. Thereafter it has been
clear to all that supplies of coffee were more
than ample to meet the world's needs and
that only the restraint on exports provided
by the Agreement prevented a disastrous
general price decline. Annex C^ sets out the
' Included in the report are five annexes, which
are not printed here. They are:
Annex A: U.S. Customs Regulations: Import
Quotas on Coffee From Non-member Countries of
International Coffee Organization.
Annex B: Composition and Voting of the Execu-
tive Board for 1966-67.
Annex C: Green Coffee: World Exportable Pro-
duction for the Marketing Year 1966-67, with Com-
parisons— USDA Estimates.
Annex D: Coffee Year 1966-67, Annual Quotas,
Waivers and Special Export Authorizations.
Annex E: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Data on
Retail Prices, 1964-66.
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
253
FIGURE 4
GREEN COFFEE SPOT PRICES
MONTHLY AVERAGES - 1964-1966
U.S. Cents Pic Pound. Naw Totk
.90
.80
.?0
.60
.50
.40
,<S^
^Brazil SANTOS 4
I I I I L_L
/
Colombia MUMS
^Guatemala PRIME n"
Uganda W ( C
I I I I I I I I I I I
I I I \ \ L_L
I4N FEB Mtll IPR M«y lUN lUl AUG SEP OCT KOV DEC ItN FEB M«ll APR MtT lUN lUl tUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ItN FEB M«R (PR M«y iUN lUl tUC SEP OCT NOV DEC
1964 1965 1966
U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates of
production in recent years. Annex D shows
export quotas for the current year. Since
accumulated stocks in the producing coun-
tries in 1964 amounted to at least 50 mil-
lion bags, the addition of 150 million bags
in production in three years has obviously
made the problem of surpluses even more
serious. Since quotas totaled 135 milhon
bags for the three years, there was again a
net addition to surpluses. Throughout 1964
the prices of most Latin American coffee
varied between 45 and 50 cents per pound.
African Robusta coffees began a long decline
as the sellers engaged in strong price com-
petition with each other as a result of large
crops expected and drove prices down.
In 1965 with a large Brazilian crop again
there was some weakness in Latin American
prices. African prices rose back to more
normal levels as, working through the Inter-
African Coffee Organization, the principal
African producing countries effectively coor-
dinated their marketing policies in an atmos-
phere of mutual trust.
Weakness in prices again became general
in 1966 and was somewhat accentuated to-
ward the end of the year. It is generally
attributed to uncertainty as to whether cof-
fee would be shipped in excess of the agreed
quotas. Consequently, steps were taken dur-
ing the year both to reduce shipments in
excess of quotas and to begin to deal with
the long-range problem of overproduction.
Price movements 1964-66 are shovim in
the chart [figure 4].
Mechanics of the Agreement
The principal governing body established
by the Agreement is the International Coffee
Council, composed of the representatives of
all the member governments. Preliminary
work for Council decisions is performed by a
14-member Executive Board (see Annex B)
254
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in which all members are represented by
delegates they have elected. On the Council
at present are 37 exporting members, which
account for about 97 percent of the world's
I'xports, and 22 importing countries, which
import about 92 percent of the coffee traded
internationally. Italy and Kenya joined the
Agreement in 1966. Several more producing
countries have applied for accession.
The exporting members together hold
1,000 votes and the importing members 1,000
votes and no one member may hold more
than 400 votes. The exporting members are
assigned votes in proportion to their indi-
vidual basic export quotas. The importing
members are assigned votes in proportion to
their respective imports of coffee. The
United States holds 400 votes.
Important Council decisions are taken by
a two-thirds distributed majority, that is, by
a two-thirds vote of importing members and
exporting members voting separately. The
United States, with its 400 votes, of neces-
sity exercises an important role in the opera-
tion of the Agreement.
The Executive Director of the Organiza-
tion is selected by the Council. He is the
chief administrative officer of the Organiza-
tion. He directs the staff of the Secretariat
and helps to coordinate all the activities of
the Organization. The Executive Director is
Joao Oliveiro Santos, an international civil
servant with long years of experience in
intergovernmental coffee consultations.
The Organization implements Council and
Board decisions, maintains the records of ex-
ports and imports, carries out independent
studies of coffee problems, and provides staff
for meetings of the Council and Board. The
total of annual contributions for 1966-67 is
$748,000; the United States share is 20 per-
cent.
Procedures for Setting Quotas
The heart of the Coffee Agreement is the
system of export quotas for producing coun-
tries. The Council meets each year in August
to estimate world demand for coffee in the
following year. In the light of that estimate
and an estimate of what non-member coun-
tries will export, the Council sets the total
annual export quota. The total is divided
among the member countries according to
the percentage (basic quotas) negotiated in
the Agreement (see Annex D). If the mem-
ber countries ship no more coffee than per-
mitted by their export quotas and the
estimated demand has been accurately fore-
cast, prices should stay reasonably stable.
In practice, it has been found necessary
to make arrangements for altering export
quotas during the year and to adopt addi-
tional measures to adjust supplies to market
demands. The present selective method for
adjusting quotas in response to price changes
is described in detail in Section II of this
report, "Summary of Actions to Protect
U.S. Consumers."
Administrative Measures
Under the export quota system, each cof-
fee producing member of the Agreement is
given authorization to export to traditional
markets a certain quantity of coffee — and no
more — each year. A graduated series of
penalties, culminating in expulsion, was
provided for violators. In practice, it has
proved difficult to assure rigid compliance
with quotas. Some countries took advantage
of loopholes in the Agreement, while others
lacked export control arrangements adequate
to prevent overshipment. By the summer of
1966 it was clear that considerable quantities
of above-quota coffee were reaching the
world's markets through such means as:
(a) shipment of member country coffee
via non-member producing countries as if it
had been produced in the non-member
country;
(b) diversion en route of member country
coffee ostensibly destined for sale in non-
quota consuming countries (shipments for
certain traditionally non-coffee-drinking
countries are not charged against quotas in
order to encourage promotional sales that
will eventually increase coffee consumption);
(c) acknowledged overshipment beyond
allotted quotas.
The Council in 1966, therefore, had to ad-
dress itself to new measures to ensure that
FEBRUAEY 13, 1967
255
the Agreement continued to work effec-
tively.
In 1965 considerable shipments of mem-
ber country coffee were escaping export
quota controls by being transshipped through
ports in certain non-member importing
countries; regulations under the Agreement
did not then require export certificates from
the country of origin for such coffee. In
April 1966 all the importing members intro-
duced regulations in response to a Council
resolution requiring that member country
coffee transshipped through a non-member
country must be accompanied by a proper
Certificate of Origin issued by the quota con-
trol authorities in the country of true origin.
After this loophole was closed, however,
traders began to ship member country cof-
fee through non-member producing coun-
tries, claiming that it was produced in the
non-member country.
The Agreement provides that all members
shall set up quantitative import limitations
on coffee from non-member countries if such
shipments are disturbing the exports of
members. The Council had not previously in-
voked this provision because shipments from
non-members had been minimal. When, how-
ever, it was clear that shipments far in ex-
cess of production were appearing from
some countries, the Council in September
decided to invoke this section of the Agree-
ment (Article 45). Importing countries were
to restrict their imports from non-members
"as soon as practicable and in any event not
later than January 1, 1967." The U.S. regu-
lations to implement the Council's resolution
appear in Aimex A.
The import limitations are not expected
to cause any significant change in the way
U.S. coffee buyers carry out their business.
The quantities involved are small — amount-
ing to less than one-half of one percent of
U.S. coffee imports. Further, as soon as any
of the non-members accede to the Agree-
ment, the import limitations will be lifted.
Kenya, for example, is being removed from
the list following its accession. United
States representatives to the Coffee Council
have suggested to other non-members, such
as Paraguay and Liberia, that they consider
applying for accession to the Agreement so
that they will no longer be subject to import
Umitations in any country.
In order to prevent coffee destined for
"new markets" from reaching the tradi-
tional coffee importing countries, the Coun-
cil in September changed its instructions to
these importing members to authorize them
to regard Certificates of Origin marked for
new markets as not valid for import into
their countries. The United States issued
regulations under this authority on Novem-
ber 18, 1966.
The Agreement provides for a post-check
on member exports by requiring a Certifi-
cate of Origin to accompany all exports. As
shipments of coffee reach the Customs au-
thorities of importing countries, they collect
the Certificates and send them to Coffee
Organization headquarters for tabulation.
Since these arrangements could not prevent
overshipments of quotas, some further
change was necessary. After careful study
with the U.S. coffee industry, the United
States supported a Council resolution to
introduce Coffee Export Stamps to validate
shipments within quotas. Under this plan,
effective April 1, 1967, Certificates of
Origin, in order to be valid for entry, must
bear stamps in units corresponding with the
declared weight of the shipment. The Cof-
fee Organization will issue stamps only up
to the amount of the country's quota. Thus,
there will be effective control of the quan-
tities of coffee reaching the traditional mar-
kets.
Well before the Council's action on new
administrative controls, the National Coffee
Association had called upon our representa-
tives to work for effective and uniform en-
forcement of the Agreement. The United
States industry's practical and forthright
suggestions were a major factor in obtaining
international agreement to the measures
adopted. None of the new measures should
cause any significant change in the U.S. in-
dustry's trade practices. Except for the
256
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
almost nominal limitation on imports from
non-member countries, many of which will
be removed as they become members, buyers
remain free to buy wherever they wish and
to compete freely for the quantities all the
producing countries wish to sell within their
worldwide export quotas.
Measures to Increase Consumption
In recognition of the importance of pro-
motional activities in increasing consump-
tion, the producing members of the Agree-
ment make regular contributions to the
World Coffee Promotion Committee estab-
lished by the Agreement. Major campaigns
at an annual cost of nearly $8 million began
in 1966 in the principal coffee consuming
countries. A broad program in the United
States will concentrate on television adver-
tising with the "Think Drink" campaign.
The program also includes research and edu-
cation in brewing a better cup of coffee.
Nearly $6 million will be spent this year in
the United States and Canada. The President
of the U.S. National Coffee Association
serves as Chairman of the U.S.-Canadian
Coffee Promotion Committee.
II. Summary of Actions To Protect Consumers
A primary concern of consumers is that
the Coffee Agreement operate so as to pro-
vide adequate supplies of coffee at a reason-
able price. Actions taken during the year
add to assurances that this will continue to
be the case.
In broad outline, the Agreement provides
for assuring supplies through an annual set-
ting of the total quantity of export quotas by
the Council. Since demand is fairly predict-
able and changes slowly, fixing the available
supply roughly estabhshes a price range for
the year. Experience demonstrated, however,
that supply adjustments were frequently
needed during the year.
In order to have a mechanism more re-
sponsive to changing market conditions, the
Council in March 1965 established a semi-
automatic quota adjustment system based on
changes in the overall price level. In sum-
mary, the system provided that if the aver-
age daily price on the New York market
remained outside a 38-44 cent price bracket
for 15 days, export quotas would be raised
or lowered in an attempt to bring supplies
back into reasonable balance with demand.
The average daily price was computed by
taking equal weights of key varieties in the
following groups:
(a) Mild Arabica coffee (from Colombia,
Central America and a few African coun-
tries)
(b) Unwashed Arabica coffee (from Bra-
zil and Ethiopia)
(c) Robusta coffee (from Ivory Coast,
Uganda and Angola, and several other
African countries).
This system was an improvement but it
was not sufficiently sensitive to the market
situation for specific types of coffee. For
example, while the prices of other types
were reasonably stable, the price of Robusta
coffee varied by as much as 12 cents a pound
during the 1965-66 coffee year. In order to
make the system more flexible and respon-
sive to consumers' needs, the United States
representatives to the Coffee Council early
in 1966 began to work with the U.S. coffee
industry to improve the quota adjustment
mechanism.
By the time of the Coffee Council meeting
in August 1966, there had been general dis-
cussion in the United States and other con-
suming countries and in most of the
producing countries of a more flexible, "se-
lective system." Under this system export
quotas for each of four different types would
be adjusted by 21/2 percent upward or down-
ward if the price of key varieties for that
group remained above or below the price
bracket for the group for 15 days. The new
brackets 2 effective October 1, 1966, are:
Colombian milds — 43.5-47.5 cents
Other mild coffees — 40.0-44.5 cents until
^ If computed on the same basis as the former
overall 38-44 cent price bracket arrangement, the
range under the present system would be 36% cents
to 40% cents per pound. [Footnote in original.]
FEBRUAHY 13, 1967
257
December 31, 1966; 40.5-44.5 cents there-
after
Unwashed Arabica coflfees — 37.5-41.5 cents
Robusta coffees — 30.5-34.5 cents
In the future as buyers express their
preference for different types of coffee on
the market, the quotas for countries pro-
ducing the particular type will be adjusted
if supplies prove to be out of line — either too
short or in surplus. In December 1966, for
example, the export quotas of the countries
producing "other mild" coffees were reduced
by 21/2 percent after prices had fallen below
40 cents because there was a surplus of of-
ferings of that type of coffee.
As consumers of coffee, the United States
interest is in being assured of additional
supplies of the various types of coffee as we
need them. The new arrangements are well
suited to our changing needs. Whenever
effective demand for one type causes prices
to be above the ceiling for 15 days, export
quotas for the countries producing the type
demanded will be raised. If the price remains
above the ceiling for further 15-day periods,
additional quota increases will be auto-
matically forthcoming.
Experience in operation of the Agreement
indicates that producing countries do not
wish to "gouge" consuming countries by
seeking to set quotas so as to force prices to
unreasonable levels. Both consuming and
producing countries have in fact sought to
work together to achieve market stability
through assuring that supplies would be in
reasonable balance with demand. With the
new selective system of quota adjustment by
type of coffee, the annual quota should be
even easier to negotiate than it has in the
past. The selective system provides for con-
tinual adjustment throughout the year.
Therefore the annual quota should tend to
become a base point from which adjust-
ments are made automatically as market
forces dictate.
The United States, by virtue of its 400
votes in the Council, retains the power to in-
sist that annual quotas are set at reasonable
levels and that the price brackets are satis-
factory to consumers. Under the provisions
of the Agreement, the decision on the an-
nual export quota is taken by a distributed"
two-thirds majority vote of the importers
and exporters groups voting separately.
Since the United States has 400 votes, and
may veto any decision with the support of
only one other country, we have a powerful
voice in setting quotas. Indeed, unless the
United States concurs in the annual quota
decision, the entire quota mechanism would
not be operative for that year.
III. Problems and Prospects
Revision of Basic Quotas
Collectively, all the producing member
countries recognize the need for exercising
mutual restraint in holding surplus coffee
if they are to achieve stability in the coffee
market. Nonetheless, individually, each
country wishes to sell as much of its own
crop as it can. For this reason it was very
difficult to negotiate the country basic export
quotas in 1962, and the decision was taken
then on the understanding that quotas would
be reviewed in 1965 and revised if possible.
The Council tried at two meetings in 1965
to reach agreement on changes, but was un-
able to do so. Again in 1966 it proved impos-
sible to resolve this important question. A
high-level Working Group of the Coffee
Organization is now preparing statistical
and other information for further considera-
tion of the problem.
The adoption of the selective system of
quota adjustments may somewhat ease the
problem of revising basic quotas. With ex-
perience, coffee producers and their govern-
ments should come to realize that in a sur-
plus situation they cannot expect to enjoy
both good prices and unrestrained sales.
Nevertheless, since basic quotas determine
the share of the world market each country
enjoys, revision of basic quotas will in-
evitably be one of the key issues in the re-
negotiation of the Agreement. The renegoti-
258
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ation will probably begin in the latter part
of 1967.
Diversification and Production Controls
The United States has a clear interest in
assuring that the Coffee Agreement is used
to bring about an orderly adjustment of pro-
duction to foreseeable demand. As con-
sumers, we wish to avoid the periods of low
prices that in the past have caused produc-
tion to fall so low it triggers subsequent
runaway price increases. Our general in-
terest in the economic and political health
of the developing countries that grow
coffee further dictates that we encourage
wise long-range production policies.
The Coffee Agreement clearly recognizes
that the price stability it creates will be
undermined if production continues to ex-
ceed foreseeable demand. Persistent accu-
mulation of surpluses will create uneasiness
no matter how closely quotas are observed.
In addition, the resources devoted to produc-
ing coffee that cannot be sold are wasted.
And coffee growing countries can ill afford
such waste.
The period of relative price stability
brought about by the International Coffee
Agreement gives the producing countries
time to diversify away from surplus coffee
production and into more productive activi-
ties. In the absence of the Agreement ad-
justment would have to take place through a
drastic fall in prices which would be painful
to the coffee farmer and gravely disruptive
of the development programs of the coffee
producing countries.
In recognition of these facts, the drafters
of the Coffee Agreement included specific
provisions by which all the producing mem-
bers undertook to adjust their production to
world market demand. The Coffee Council
was to project world demand for the years
ahead and on this basis recommend produc-
tion goals for individual countries. There-
after countries were to submit regular re-
ports on their compliance with their produc-
tion goals. Unfortunately, it has not been
possible to implement this section of the
Agreement. Most countries hesitated to
agree to the Council's setting production
controls so long as there was a chance that
they might negotiate for themselves such an
increase in their basic quota that they would
not have to curb production.
Several countries, however, have not
waited for the Council to act. They have
recognized that they cannot afford to go on
producing surplus coffee. The largest pro-
ducer in Africa, the Ivory Coast, for exam-
ple, has banned all new coffee plantings and
is devoting its agricultural development
funds to encouraging substitute crops like
rice and oilseeds. Brazil, the largest producer
in the world, has started a massive $70 mil-
lion diversification program. Brazil has al-
ready begun to uproot 400 million coffee
trees in order to reduce production by as
much as 5 million bags per year. In addition
to measures to discourage surplus coffee pro-
duction, Brazil is actively encouraging the
growing of foods, fibers and other raw ma-
terials essential to its food needs and eco-
nomic development.
The Coffee Council has begun to move to
stimulate international action on diversifi-
cation and the elimination of surplus coffee
production. In past years under the Agree-
ment several countries have been granted
special export quota increases (designated
as waivers) that permit them to export more
coffee than their normal quotas. Waivers
have usually been granted in recognition of
special problems like physical inability to
store surpluses and the existence of an un-
usually large crop. The permission to sell
coffee above quotas, however, frequently
served to make coffee production in these
countries more remunerative and to en-
courage further expansion. From a global
point of view, it tended to add to, rather
than diminish, world coffee difficulties.
In 1966, the Council adopted the im-
portant principle that waivers would be
granted on the basis that part of the pro-
ceeds would be used to solve the inten-elated
FEBRUAKY 13, 1967
259
problem of overproduction and excessive
stock accumulation. SpecificaUy, the coun-
tries that received waivers in the 1966-67
coifee year will be permitted to use them only
if they agree to set aside 20 percent of the
proceeds for diversification programs or to
freeze an equivalent amount of coffee stocks.
In addition, the Council inaugurated in-
tense international study of a draft proposal
for an International Coffee Diversification
and Development Fund. Representatives of
the major producing and consuming coun-
tries met at the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development in Washing-
ton in November 1966 with the African
Development Bank, the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization. They agreed to circulate
to all the member countries of the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement the outlines of a
Fund to be used to carry out diversification
activities, to be financed by the producing
countries as a cooperative self-help measure.
Consideration was given to the possibility
that international organizations like the
IBRD and the regional development banks
might take over substantial parts of the ad-
ministration of the Fund. The technical fa-
cilities and development programs of the
international organizations and the bilateral
economic assistance programs of the United
States and other industrial countries could
also be woven into the producing countries'
mutual efforts to help each other by develop-
ing alternative opportunities to surplus cof-
fee production.
Countries are now considering the basic
elements of the Fund and how it would work.
Action on this proposal will have high pri-
ority in 1967.
Renegotiation of the Agreement
The Agreement will expire September 30,
1968. In order for all the member countries
to have time to consider the text of a new
agreement and take necessary legislative
action to ratify and implement it, formal
renegotiation should begin during 1967.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Agriculture
Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations, as amended (TIAS
1554, 4803, 5229, 5506, 5987). Signed at Quebec
October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16,
1945.
Acceptances deposited: Botswana, November 1,
1966; Lesotho, November 7, 1966.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967. Enters into force upon
the deposit of instruments of ratification by five
governments, including depositary governments.'
Signatures in Washington: Afghanistan, Argen-
tina, Australia, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria,
Bur-undi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Kin-
shasa) , Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethi-
opia, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ice-
land, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mexico,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Re-
public, United Kingdom, United States, Uru-
guay, Venezuela, Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia.
Trade
Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force August
25, 1966.
Signature: United States, January 17, 1967.
BILATERAL
Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement relating to prepayment of the remaining
German debt to the United States resulting from
postwar economic assistance (excluding surplus
property). Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn
and Bonn/Bad Godesberg December 29, 1966. En-
tered into force December 29, 1966.
Korea
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
Not in force.
260
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
agreement of March 7, 1966 (TIAS 5973). Ef-
fected by an exchange of notes at Seoul December
5, 1966. Entered into force December 5, 1966.
Mexico
Protocol to amend the agreement of January 29,
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcasting
in the standard band. Signed at Mexico April 13,
1966. Entered into force January 12, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: January 18, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement concerning matters of customs adminis-
tration, with annexes. Sigrned at Washington Jan-
uary 4, 1967. Entered into force January 4, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on January 26 confirmed the following
nominations :
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa
Rica. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 21 dated February 3.)
William B. Buffum to be the deputy representative
of the United States to the United Nations.
Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be the U.S. representa-
tive to the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated December 13.)
John F. Henning to be Ambassador to New Zea-
land. (J*or biographic details, see White House press
release dated January 12.)
David S. King to be Ambassador to the Malagasy
Republic. (For biogi'aphic details, see White House
press release dated January 12.)
Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Cameroon. (For biographic details, see
White House press release dated January 12.)
Richard F. Pedersen to be the deputy representa-
tive of the United States in the Security Council of
the United Nations. (For biographic details; see
White House press release dated January 13.)
Idar Rimestad to be Deputy Under Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 22 dated February 3.)
Eugene Victor Rostow to be U.S. Alternate Gov-
ernor of the International Monetary Fund for a
term of 5 years and U.S. Alternate Governor of the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment for a term of 5 years.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20i02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Trade — Renegotiation of Schedule XX (United
States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Interim agreement with Japan signed at
Geneva September 6, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 6, 1966. TIAS 6106. 30 pp. 15«f.
Aviation — Joint Financing of Certain Air Naviga-
tion Services in Iceland. Agreement with other gov-
ernments amending the agreement done at Geneva
September 25, 1956, as amended. Adopted by the
Council of the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, Montreal, May 19, 1966. Entered into force May
19, 1966. TIAS 6108. 2 pp. f,^.
Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Character.
Agreement and protocol with other governments
opened for signature at Lake Success July 15, 1949
— Signed on behalf of the United States of America
September 13, 1949. Date of entry into force with
respect to the United States of America January 12,
1967. TIAS 6116. 34 pp. 15«}.
Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Australia Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Australia and the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency — Signed at
Vienna September 26, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 26, 1966. TIAS 6117. 10 pp. 10(f.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Philippines amending the agreement
of July "27, 1955, as amended — Signed at Washing-
ton June 27, 1966. Entered into force October 21,
1966. TIAS 6119. 5 pp. h^.
Whaling. Amendments to the schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention — Signed at Washing-
ton December 2, 1946. Adopted at the eighteenth
meeting of the International Whaling Commission,
London, June 27-July 1, 1966. Entered into force
October 5, 1966. TIAS 6120. 2 pp. 5«f.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Spain
amending the agreement of July 16, 1963, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
September 14, 1966. Entered into force September
14, 1966. TIAS 6121. 2 pp. 5(«.
Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as ex-
tended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Kabul July 16,
and October 5 and 8, 1966. Entered into force Octo-
ber 8, 1966. Effective June 30, 1966. TIAS 6123. 4
pp. 5^.
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
261
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Indonesia amending the agreement of
June 8, 1960 — Signed at Washington January 12,
1966. Entered into force October 31, 1966. TIAS
6124. 2 pp. 5<>.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Paki-
stan amending the agreement of May 26, 1966, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi
October 6, 1966. Entered into force October 6, 1966.
And exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi Oc-
tober 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.
TIAS 6125. 5 pp. 5<J.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Brazil — Signed at Washington July 8,
1965. Entered into force November 9, 1966. TIAS
6126. 17 pp. 10«!.
Meteorological Research by Means of Rockets.
Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Dated
at Ottawa September 29 and October 6, 1966. En-
tered into force October 6, 1966. TIAS 6128. 3 pp. 5^.
Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Materials (Florence Agreement). Agreement and
protocol with other governments opened for signa-
ture at Lake Success November 22, 1950 — Signed on ,
behalf of the United States of America June 24,
1959. Entered into force with respect to the United
States of America November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129.
30 pp. 15«(.
Defense — System of Communications and Depots in
Metropolitan France. Agreement with France —
Signed at Paris December 8, 1958. Entered into force
December 8, 1958. TIAS 6132. 8 pp. lOif.
Air Transport Services. Agreement, with annex, sup-
plementary agreement, and exchange of notes with
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — Signed at
Washington November 4, 1966. Entered into force
November 4, 1966. TIAS 6135. 52 pp. 20!?.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1442 PUBLICATION 8194
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releasee on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international a^rreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and lefirislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Supers
FEBRUARY 13, 1967
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Pbice: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign |16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.
262
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX February 13, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U2
261
236
238
250
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
President Urges Action on Funds for South-
east Asia Operations (Johnson, Schultze) . . 236
Brazil. President-Elect of Brazil Visits the
United States (Costa e Silva, Johnson) . . 242
Cameroon. Payton confirmed as Ambassador . 261
Congress
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
Confirmations (Boonstra, Buffum, Goldschmidt,
Henning, King, Payton, Pedersen, Rimestad,
Rostow)
President Urges Action on Funds for South-
east Asia Operations (Johnson, Schultze) .
Science and Foreign Aff'airs (Rusk) ....
Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress
(Johnson, text of report)
Secretary Rusk Urges Congressional Support
for Consular Convention With the Soviet
Union 247
Costa Rica. Boonstra confirmed as Ambassador 261
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Boonstra, Buffum, Goldschmidt,
Henning, King, Payton, Pedersen, Rimestad,
Rostow) 261
Science and Foreign Affairs (Rusk) .... 238
Economic AfiFairs
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
Rostow confirmed as U.S Alternate Governor
of the International Monetary Fund and U.S.
Alternate Governor of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development . . . 261
Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress
(Johnson, text of report) 250
United States Achieves Removal of Foreign
Import Restrictions 245
Educational and Cultural Affairs. "Volunteers
to America" Program Gets Underway . . . 244
Foreign Aid
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
President Urges Action on Funds for South-
east Asia Operations (Johnson, Schultze) . 236
International Organizations and Conferences.
Rostow confirmed as U.S. Alternate Governor
of the International Monetary Fund and U.S.
Alternate Governor of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development . . . 261
Malagasy Republic. King confirmed as Ambas-
sador 261
Military Affairs. President Urges Action on
Funds for Southeast Asia Operations (John-
son, Schultze) 236
New Zealand. Henning confirmed as Ambas-
sador 261
Presidential Documents
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
President-Elect of Brazil Visits the United
States 242
President Urges Action on Funds for South-
east Asia Operations 236
Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress 250
Publications. Recent Releases 261
Science. Science and Foreign Affairs (Rusk) . 238
Trade. United States Achieves Removal of
Foreign Import Restrictions 245
Treaty Information
Current Actions 260
Second Annual Report on the International
Coffee Agreement Transmitted to Congress
(Johnson, text of report) 250
Secretary Rusk Urges Congressional Support
for Consular Convention With the Soviet
Union 247
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk Urges Congressional
Svipport for Consular Convention With the
Soviet Union 247
United Nations
Buffum confirmed as U.S. Deputy Representa-
tive to the United Nations 261
Goldschmidt confirmed as U.S. Representative
to the U.N. Economic and Social Council . 261
Pedersen confirmed as U.S. Deputy Representa-
tive in the U.N. Security Council 261
Viet-Nam
The Budget Message of the President (Ex-
cerpts) 230
President Urges Action on Funds for South-
east Asia Operations (Johnson, Schultze) . 236
Name Index
Boonstra, Clarence A 261
Buffum, William B 261
Costa e Silva, Artur 242
Goldschmidt, Arthur E 261
Henning, John P 261
Johnson, President 230, 236, 242, 250
King, David S 261
Payton, Robert L 261
Pedersen, Richard F 261
Rimestad, Idar 261
Rostow, Eugene Victor 261
Rusk, Secretary 238, 247
Schultze, Charles L 236
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 23-29
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
10 1/23 Rusk: Consular Convention with
Soviet Union.
11 1/23 Martin: American Chamber of
Commerce, Bangkok (printed
in Bulletin of February 6).
12 1/24 Rusk: Panel on Science and Tech-
nology, House Committee on
Science and Astronautics.
13 1/25 "Volunteers to America" pilot
program (rewrite).
*14 1/25 Battle Act report released.
15 1/26 Removal of import restrictions in
U.S. foreign markets.
tl6 1/26 Rusk: Texas State Legislature,
Austin (excerpts).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
•d U.S. Government Printing Office: 1957—251-933/32
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
S. 1 i^ ■Sr-
Vol. LVI, No. 1U3
February 20, 1967
OUTER SPACE TREATY SIGNED BY 60 NATIONS
AT WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY 266
BUILDING A DURABLE PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 269
THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 289
THE WAR ON HUNGER: FOOD FOR INDIA
President Johnson's Message to Congress 295
SECRETARY RUSK DISCUSSES VIET-NAM IN INTERVIEW
FOR BRITISH TELEVISION 27i
For index see inside back cover
Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60 Nations
at Wliite House Ceremony
The Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies,^ was opened for signa-
ture at Washington, London, and Moscotv on
January 27. Representatives of 60 nations
signed the treaty at Washington at a cere-
mony held at the White House. Following are
statements made on that occasion by Presi-
dent Johnson; Secretary Rusk; U.S. Repre-
sentative to the United Nations Arthur J.
Goldberg, ivho read a message addressed to
President Johnson from U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant; Sir Patrick Dean, British
Ambassador to the United States; and
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to
the United States.
white House press release dated January 27
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Secretary Rusk, Mr. Vice President, Mr.
Chief Justice, Your Excellencies, ladies and
gentlemen: This is an inspiring moment in
the history of the human race.
We are taking the first firm step toward
keeping outer space free forever from the
implements of war.
It was more than 400 years ago when
Martin Luther said:
Cannons and firearms are cruel and damnable
machines. I believe them to have been the direct
suggestion of the Devil. If Adam had seen in a
vision the horrible instruments that his children
were to invent, he would have died of grief.
I wonder what he would have thought of
the far more terrible weapons that we have
today.
We have never succeeded in freeing our
planet from the implements of war. But if
we cannot yet achieve this goal here on earth,
we can at least keep the virus from
spreading.
We can keep the ugly and wasteful weap-
ons of mass destruction from contaminating
space. And that is exactly what this treaty
does.
This treaty means that the moon and our
sister planets will serve only the purposes of
peace and not of war. It means that orbiting
manmade satellites will remain free of
nuclear weapons. It means that astronaut
and cosmonaut will meet someday on the
surface of the moon as brothers and not as
warriors for competing nationalities or
ideologies.
It holds promise that the same wisdom and
good will which gave us this space treaty
will continue to guide us as we seek solutions
to the many problems that we have here on
this earth.
It is a hopeful and a very promising sign.
We are so pleased that we could be joined
here today by the representatives of so many
of the other nations of the world.
I now take great pleasure in presenting to
you our distinguished Secretary of State —
Mr. Dean Rusk.
SECRETARY RUSK
Mr. President, Excellencies, distinguished
guests: This day today, Mr. President, must
give you some special satisfaction.
As chairman of the Senate Committee on
Aeronautics and Space Science under the
Eisenhower administration, as Chairman of
the Space Council in the Kennedy adminis-
' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.
266
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tration, and as President, you have labored
long and hard to let the nations of the earth
cooperate in the exploration of the vast
reaches of outer space, in using space for the
benefit of man.
Today a treaty which marks the peaceful
uses of outer space may be the next step on
that road upon which you embarked a long
time ago.
The nations of the world these days must
keep ever in mind the importance of working
steadily to make new gains in the quest for
peace and security and justice for all nations,
large and small. For cooperation among the
nations is an imperative for the age in which
we live.
So we have constantly sought, we and
other nations, to extend that cooperation
through the United Nations and in many
other ways, constantly seeking areas of com-
mon interest in which to arrive at agree-
ments benefiting all of us.
This is a long, difficult, and often undra-
matic process simply of trying to make
civilization work.
The fact that serious differences among
nations and, indeed, conflicts among them
still persist in some areas of deep concern
to all of us cannot be allowed to deflect us
from that course. Instead they emphasize how
indispensable it is for governments to take
even a short step wherever possible, on any
day, at any place, if it will benefit our
increasingly interdependent family of na-
tions.
Over 3 years ago governments represented
in this room and many others joined together
to conclude the nuclear test ban treaty. This
was a vital measure in the continuing search
for ways to bring the arms race under con-
trol and to turn it back.
Today we are gathered for the signing of
a treaty designed to apply in the new environ-
ment of outer space into which man has ven-
tured during the last 10 years.
Ten years ago the Soviet Union launched
its first sputnik, and outer space is becoming
rather crowded now. Many, many nations in
all parts of the earth are cooperating in that
great venture. There is great satisfaction in
being able to present this treaty within 10
years after the launching of that first sputnik.
For this treaty reflects the need to agree on
rules that will be followed as exploration is
carried on in outer space. It is an outgrowth
of much work in the United Nations Outer
Space Committee.
It is the purpose and hope of all concerned
that the treaty will avoid conflicts by giving
law and will promote international coopera-
tion for the benefit of all mankind in this
new realm.
This occasion today marks the successful
completion of one phase in a process of work
that never ends. The treaty we are about to
sign is a product of faithful and sustained
and skillful effort by many devoted officials
from many nations.
So let us take from this moment of reflec-
tion determination and confidence to go on
with other steps to follow. The unfinished
business in the nations commands all the
energy and the intelligence we can bring to
the task.
Now I would like to call upon my colleague,
Ambassador Goldberg, to present a message
from the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, Mr. Vice
President and Mrs. Humphrey, the Chief
Justice of the United States and Mrs. War-
ren, Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk,
distinguished Members of the Congress and
of the United Nations, ladies and gentlemen:
This treaty was successfully concluded as a
result of the discussions among members of
the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space, consisting of 28
members. But it is indeed a product of all of
the United Nations, who voted for it unani-
mously at the last Assembly.^
I want to express my appreciation first of
all to the President for initiating this effort
* For background and text of a resolution adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 19, see ibid.,
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
267
on behalf of our country and to all of my
colleagues on the Committee for the coopera-
tion which made this historic treaty possible,
and to welcome here the representatives from
the U.N., headed by that great international
civil servant and the American of whom we
take the greatest pride, our Nobel Prize win-
ner, Ralph Bunche, and Mrs. Bunche.
Mr. President, if you will permit, I also
want to express appreciation for the mem-
bers of the American delegation whom you
provided me in the course of these negotia-
tions from all departments of the Govern-
ment who did so well to represent their own
country's interests and that great patriotism
to the United States which is patriotism for
the whole world.
It is the spirit of accommodation which
prevailed throughout our negotiations that
has led to the successful conclusion of our
deliberations. It is this spirit of accommoda-
tion, Mr. President, that I know you want to
see prevail on all the many problems that
face the world today.
It is a great pleasure and honor for me, Mr.
President, to read to you and to this dis-
tinguished group a message from the dis-
tinguished Secretary-General of the United
Nations, U Thant.s
The message reads:
I wish it were possible for me to be present in
Washington, London and Moscow at the same time
on the auspicious occasion of the signing of the
Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
May I convey to you my sincere congratulations
and express my feeling of deep satisfaction at this
historic event in international relations — a feeling
which, I am certain, is shared by all peoples every-
where. I am particularly gratified that the United
Nations was able to make a significant contribution
towards this major achievement.
The conquest of space gives rise to many new
problems, because of the terrifying military poten-
tialities involved, and, also because of the impact
of space technology on, our physical environment.
' The Secretary-General's message was addressed
to President Johnson. He sent similar messages to
Prime Minister Harold Wilson of the United King-
dom and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Soviet Union.
As man ventures into space, he cannot rely solely
on his scientific and technological knowledge, great
as it may be. He must equally depend on legally ■
binding universal standards of conduct, progres-
sively developed as science unravels the mysteries
of space. '^
It is both urgent and necessary that the powerful
forces generated by human ingenuity be kept under
control and utilized for the benefit of humanity
and the strengrthening of peace. It is most gratify-
ing to see that the problems of exploring outer space
are being solved through positive and sustained
international action and measures within the frame-
work of the United Nations.
I have no doubt that this Treaty will not only
greatly reduce the danger of conflict in space, but
also improve international co-operation and the
prospects of peace on our own planet. The Antarctic
Treaty of 1959, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and
the present Treaty are true landmarks in man's
march towards international peace and security.
I fervently hope that these achievements will be
shortly followed by similar agreements on non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other steps
towards general and complete disarmament.
Highest consideration.
U Thant
Secretary-General of the United Nations
AMBASSADOR DEAN
Mr. President, Secretary of State, ladies
and gentlemen: It is indeed a great honor to
be here to sign this treaty on behalf of the
British Government.
We all take today an important step
towards our ultimate goal: the creation of a
world in which men can live together in har-
mony, free from the fear of war.
Those who have worked so hard to create
this agreement indeed deserve our gratitude
and admiration. It is their combination of
vision and persistence which has made this
possible.
My Government believes that those same
qualities of vision and persistence can and
must enable us to take further steps along
the road to peaceful cooperation between all
nations.
This treaty is far from being exclusively
a measure of arms control, but its significance
for arms control is very real. It is open to
signature by all nations, but it will have been
268
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
signed immediately by the two nations which
lead the world in both the exploration of
space and the development of military power.
It is, above all, the signature by the United
States and the Soviet Union of a treaty with
such importance for arms control that will
give fresh encouragement and new hope to
the world.
We must resolve that that hope will not be
disappointed.
AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN
Mr. President, Mr. Secretary, Excellencies,
ladies and gentlemen: It is my honor and
privilege on behalf of the Soviet Union to
sign here in Washington a treaty which for
the first time in history establishes principles
of international law governing the activities
of states in outer space.
Outer space presents a great new challenge
to mankind. International cooperation in this
field on the basis of equality provided for in
the treaty will allow all countries to actively
participate in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space for the benefit of all people,
of all nations.
Space age of human history began only 10
years ago, but we have already included in
the present treaty an important provision
which prohibits placing nuclear weapons in
orbit around the earth or on celestial bodies.
Let us hope that we shall not wait long for
the solution of similar important earthly
problems.
We believe that the treaty we are signing
today will be an important step in further
development of cooperation and understand-
ing among states and peoples and wll con-
tribute to the settlement of other major
international problems facing humanity here
on this planet.
Building a Durable Peace
Address by Secretary Rusk ^
It is a high privilege to address a joint ses-
sion of the Legislature of the great State of
Texas. I regard your invitation as an excep-
tional compliment.
I have long felt a special tie with Texas
through my kinsman Thomas Jefferson Rusk.
Through the influence of John C. Calhoun, he
studied law and was admitted to the bar in
South Carolina. Later he moved to Georgia.
He came to Texas in pursuit of some men who
had absconded with some of his money. But
he decided to stay, signed the Declaration of
Independence of 1836, and served the Lone
Star Republic as a general. Secretary of War,
' Made before a joint session of the Legislature
of Texas at Austin, Tex., on Jan. 26 (press release
16).
Chief Justice, and Chairman of the Conven-
tion of 1845.
A year or two ago, I learned through a
diligent historian that, as a general, my kins-
man was responsible for a tense period in the
relations between Texas and the United
States. In November 1838, "at the head of one
hundred men," he "entered the United States
and proceeded as far as Shreveport." The
American Legation in Houston sharply de-
manded an explanation of that "extraordi-
nary conduct." And at the direction of my
distinguished predecessor, John Forsyth, who
also came from Georgia, there ensued a series
of vigorous but elegant diplomatic exchanges
with two successive Texas Secretaries of
State. General Rusk's defense was, in essence:
"Who, me? I was just chasing a bunch of
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
269
Indians." In the end, the President of the
Republic of Texas promised that it wouldn't
happen again. So my kinsman was not
allowed to occupy the United States !
I think today, of course, of the two native
sons of Texas who have borne uniquely high
responsibilities: Dwight D. Eisenhower and
Lyndon B. Johnson. Both have dealt with the
paramount questions of defense and foreign
policy not as partisans but as patriots who
put the national interest first.
I am proud to be President Johnson's
Secretary of State. And I believe that the
American people, and all men everywhere
who love freedom, are very fortunate to have
as President of the United States a man of
his courage, fortitude, and seasoned judg-
ment.
The President of the United States holds
an office which is sometimes described as
lonely. And, indeed, it is. He alone must make
great decisions — decisions on which our sur-
vival as a nation may depend. But, in another
way, he is not lonely. For, when the President
is in his Oval Room, pondering the issues of
war and peace, thinking hard about how best
to protect liberty, he knows that nearly 200
million Americans are in that room with him
— and that many hundreds of millions of
other people around the world wish him well,
because they know that their own liberty de-
pends heavily upon the commitment of the
United States to freedom.
There are many ways in which the central
purpose of our foreign policy can be stated,
but I know of none better than the familiar
words from the preamble of our Constitution,
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity."
We know that we can no longer preserve
our nation and our way of life by standing
apart from the world — by the defenses and
policies confined to this continent, or the
Western Hemisphere, or the North Atlantic
basin. And we know that we can't preserve
our way of life satisfactorily through another
great war, at least not one in which thermo-
nuclear weapons make life impossible or
intolerable for most of the human race.
So our supreme objective must be, and is,
peace, a durable world peace. But a durable
peace cannot be achieved just by wishing for
it, or by slogans or rhetoric, or by passing
resolutions or signing pledges, or by negotiat-
ing a pact renouncing war. There was great -,
rejoicing in many countries in 1928 when
the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed, re-
nouncing war as an instrument of national
policy. But that parchment meant nothing to
Hitler or Mussolini or the Japanese mili-
tarists. Only a dozen years later Hitler's
Wehrmacht captured the very city in which
that pact had been signed.
Over the years, many Americans, in
groups or as individuals, have thought deeply
about the organization of a durable peace. In
1915 William Howard Taft, John Bassett
Moore, J. Reuben Clark, Jr., and other lead-
ing citizens formed a nonpartisan organiza-
tion to advocate a League to Enforce Peace.
At the end of "the war to end war" and
"make the world safe for democracy," a far-
sighted American President took the lead in
creating the League of Nations. But we
didn't join it. Instead, we withdrew into
isolation, disarmed, and turned our back —
until it was almost too late. We and the world
paid the costly penalty that Woodrow Wilson
had foreseen if peace were not enforced.
Postwar Planning During World War II
The Second World War gave new impetus
to thinking about the organization of a
reliable peace. On September 3, 1939, the
very day that war began. President Roosevelt
said: ". . . it seems to me clear, even at the
outbreak of this great war, that the influence
of America should be consistent in seeking
for humanity a final peace which will elimi-
nate, as far as it is possible to do so, the
continued use of force between nations."
A few days later Secretary of State Cordell
Hull appointed a special assistant to work on
problems of peace. This work was carried
forward with the help of committees, first
within the Government, then including
advisers from outside the Government. On
December 23, 1939, President Roosevelt ad-
dressed messages to the president of the
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in
270
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
America, the president of the Jewish Theo-
log:ical Seminary of America, and Pope Pius
XII. He said that while no spiritual or civil
leader could move yet forward on a specific
plan for a new order of things, "the time for
that will surely come." He expressed his
desire to "encourage a closer association
between those in every part of the world —
those in religion and those in government —
who have a common purpose."
Only a few days after Pearl Harbor,
President Roosevelt requested Secretary Hull
to expand the study of postwar foreign
policy. An enlarged advisory committee was
created, and in May 1942 it began to include
Members of Congress of both parties.
Parallel studies were undertaken by vari-
ous private organizations. One of the most
important was that of the Commission to
Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace
set up by the Federal Council of Churches in
December 1940. The work of that commis-
sion led to two national study conferences
on "The Churches and a Just and Durable
Peace" and to many thoughtful analyses and
conclusions. And its chairman was to become
a very distinguished Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles.
One of the chief results of those studies,
both in the Government and outside it, was
the decision to create a new international
organization to preserve peace. While the
greatest war in history still raged, the
United Nations Charter was drafted and
signed. Its first great objective was, in the
words of its preamble, "to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war. . . ."
At that time long-range airplanes were
already slicing through the distance and
time which had contributed to our national
safety in the past. Then came the atomic
bomb. A few weeks later, in his final report
as Chief of Staff, General George C.
Marshall pointed out that the new techniques
of war had changed fundamentally the
problem of national defense: that the war
just concluded was the last great war in
which the United States could expect to
escape destructive bombardment. From now
on, he said, "the United States, its homes and
factories," are in "the front line of world
conflict." Therefore, "We are now concerned
with the peace of the entire world."
That conclusion was made inescapable
within a few years by the development of
long-range missiles and multimegaton ther-
monuclear warheads.
We must do our best to prevent another
great war, not only because war is what
General Sherman said it was but because
the safety of our nation requires it.
So today the primary task of our Armed
Forces is to prevent another great war, and
the supreme goal of our foreign policy is a
durable peace.
Preventing and Repelling Aggression
Obviously, the first essential in building
a durable peace is to eliminate aggression —
by preventing it, if possible, and by repeUing
it when it occurs or is threatened. The
authors of the United Nations Charter knew
that. They had seen one aggression lead to
another until the world went up in flames.
So they stated that the first purpose of the
United Nations was "to take eflfective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace. . . ." Unfortunately,
some members of the United Nations have
not been willing to honor that primary obli-
gation.
The United Nations has helped to make
and keep peace in many situations. We con-
tinue to support it and to seek ways of
strengthening it. But because it has been
unable to function in some of the most
dangerous situations, the main job of pre-
venting and repelling aggression has been
accomplished by the defensive alliances of
the free world — defensive alliances orga-
nized and conducted in complete harmony
with the U.N. Charter, which expressly
recognizes the right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense and also provides for
regional organizations or agencies to main-
tain international peace and security.
Under those alliances, the United States
is specifically pledged to assist in the de-
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
271
fense of more than 40 nations. Those com-
mitments, and the power that lies behind
them, are the backbone of world peace.
We maintain a formidable nuclear deter-
rent. I believe it is generally understood
that a nuclear attack on us or any of our
allies would be sheer insanity. I think it is
also realized generally, if not universally,
that aggression by the mass movement of
troops across frontiers would involve
extremely grave risks to the aggressor. But
the principal Communist states remain
publicly committed to what they call "wars
of liberation" — the infiltration of arms dnd
trained men. That is the type of aggression
by which Communist North Viet-Nam set
out to conquer South Viet-Nam. It is an
aggression which has become less and less
indirect since the closing months of 1964,
when North Viet-Nam began to move an
entire division of its regular army into
South Viet-Nam.
Four successive Presidents of the United
States, after extended study in consultation
with their chief advisers on defense and
foreign policy, have concluded that the secu-
rity of Southeast Asia, and of South Viet-
Nam in particular, is very important to the
security of the United States. Those who
take a different view are at odds with the
men who have borne the highest responsi-
bility for the defense of the United States
and the free world since the Second World
War.
U.S. Commitments in Southeast Asia
In accordance with our national interest
in the security of South Viet-Nam, the Gov-
ernment of the United States made com-
mitments, of which the most solemn was the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
That treaty was approved by the United
States Senate in 1955 with only one
dissenting vote. It bound us to take action
in the event of an armed attack on South
Viet-Nam, among other nations. And Secre-
tary of State Dulles told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that that commitment
included the case of an attack by "the
regime of Ho Chi Minh in North Viet-Nam."
The United States cannot run away from
its commitments. If either our adversaries
or our friends should begin to doubt that the
United States will honor its alliances, the s,
result could be catastrophe.
We are fighting in Viet-Nam because also
we have not forgotten the lesson of the
tragic 1930's, the lesson that was foremost
in the minds of the authors of the U.N.
Charter: the lesson that one aggression leads
to another. Once again we are hearing that
it's a long way off and none of our business.
That's what was said about Manchuria and
Ethiopia — and, by some, about Czechoslo-
vakia. Once again we are hearing it said that
if you let the aggressor have one more bite,
maybe he will be satisfied.
Some say this is just a "civil war." That's
what some claimed about the aggression
against the Republic of Korea. No Com-
munist state would call it just a civil war
if the Federal Republic of Germany were to
send 20 regiments of its regular army into
East Germany.
The military conquest of South Viet-Nam
will not occur. But there remains the hard
job of rooting out what Ho Chi Minh has
called "the guerrilla infrastructure."
While we and our allies are resolved to
preserve the freedom of the South Viet-
namese to make their own future under
institutions and leaders of their own free
choice, we have made every effort to seek a
peaceful solution.
It has been the consistent policy of the
United States during the last 20 years to
apply its power only to the extent necessary
to accomplish the essential purpose. When
Berlin was blockaded, we and our allies
resorted to an airlift. When Khrushchev
placed strategic missiles in Cuba, President
Kennedy applied a limited naval quarantine.
He was prepared to do more if necessary,
but the Kremlin got the message.
The point I am emphasizing was set
forth admirably in February 1953 by the
president of the National Churches of Christ
in the United States of America, in his ofR-
272
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cial call to the fourth national study con-
ference on "The Churches and World
Order." I quote:
In the past turbulent decade the United States
has been thrust into a position of world leadership.
Our country has become the most powerful nation
in the free world. This power carries with it great
responsibility. In a world threatened by tyranny, by
rising nationalism, and by unrest in the less devel-
oped areas, the power of a great nation like ours
must be exercised with restraint and humility to
avoid appeasement on one side and total war on the
other.
The author of that statement is an
eminent Texan, Bishop William C. Martin of
the Methodist Episcopal Church.
It has been asserted that the United
States is suffering, or in danger of suffering,
from the "arrogance of power." That recalls
Lord Acton's dictum that power tends to
corrupt and absolute power tends to corrupt
absolutely. I don't believe the American
people have been corrupted by power. We
have borne heavy burdens because we believe
in liberty and want peace. We have sought
nothing for ourselves except what we seek
for all other peoples on this planet: the right
to live in freedom and peace.
And I believe that most people all around
the world understand the decent purposes of
the American people and that most of them
want the same kind of world we want.
While we help to eliminate aggression we
search for areas of common interest and
agreement with our adversaries, especially
arrangements or understandings to reduce
the danger of a great war. And we work
continuously at the manifold tasks of build-
ing the economic, social, and political
strength of the free world: by ever closer
partnerships wath the economically advanced
nations, by aid to the developing nations in
modernizing themselves in freedom, by
strengthening and expanding useful intemar
tional institutions, by cultural and scientific
exchanges.
Brick by brick, the structure of world
peace is being built. When all would-be ag-
gressors come to realize, as they must, that
aggression will not be tolerated, there will
be peace. And if those who want peace and
covet nothing from their neighbors remain
strong and alert, that peace will become the
enduring peace for which mankind has long
yearned.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
273
Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam
in Interview for British Television
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk videotaped in Wash-
ington on January 31 for Associated
Television, Ltd., and broadcast by the
British Independent Television network on
February 1. Interviewing the Secretary
were Michael Berry, chairman and editor
in chief, The Sunday Telegraph and The
Daily Telegraph, London; Alastair Burnet,
editor, The Economist; Hugh Cudlipp, chair-
man. Daily Mirror and Sunday Mirror,
London; and Paul Johnson, editor. The New
Statesman. William Donaldson Clark, direc-
tor. Overseas Devehxpnnent Institute, London,
was the moderator.
Moderator: Mr. Rusk, first of all, may I
thank you very much for putting aside time
to receive us. We've flown in here from
England to put some of the questions that
are worrying us very considerably about
the Vietnamese war, and perhaps some of
our hopes about the Vietnamese peace, too.
Recently, particularly, we've been worried
by the reports in your papers about the
effects on civilian life and injuries as the
result of bombing in the North, and perhaps
our hopes have been roused by the news of a
truce next week and the visit to Great
Britain of Mr. Kosygin [Alexsei N. Kosygin,
Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers'] , who
possibly may be raising matters of peace in
that area. Can we put our problems and our
hopes to you frankly, and expect frank
answers ?
A. Yes indeed, and I want to welcome
you gentlemen to Washington. I'm looking
forward to this conversation. So let's have
at it.
Q. Mr. Rusk, what particularly perturbs
the people of Britain is that this is an ugly
and cruel war, more ugly and cruel than
some of the bigger wars in our time. And
it's a 7var of tremendous confusion. In the
Vatican we have the Pope praying for peace,
and in the United States we have Cardinal
Spellman praying for victory and saying
that anything but victory is inconceivable.
We're perturbed about the bombing of inno-
cent people. First there is the bombing and
then the apology. On Sunday, as you kyww,
31 South Vietnamese were killed when flee-
ing in their sampans. Now, I'm well aware
that you deplore all this as much as we do;
but I'm sure if British people could hear
from, your own lips your moral justification
for all this, ive might be able to understand
your attitude a little clearer.
A. Well, in the first place, you're quite
right in saying that we regret every
casualty in this war — in North and South,
Vietnamese and foreign. And we regret the
fact that it has not been possible to bring
this war to an early conclusion. It is a war
that need never have started had the 1954
and 1962 agreements been honored, par-
ticularly in their military aspects. We believe
that it is very important that our own treaty
commitments be met, and we believe that the
South Vietnamese people have a right to
determine their own government and that
the South Vietnamese people have a right to
decide for themselves whether they will par-
ticipate in a reunification of Viet-Nam.
I would not agree that this is an uglier
war than some of the larger wars. We're not
seeing in North Viet-Nam the kind of blitz,
for example, that you people had during
274
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
World War II. If you want to visit Hanoi
today, you can land in a normal airport, you
can go into the city, live in a hotel, wander
around the city. You'd have to look pretty
hard to find damage in Hanoi.
We have not been attacking civilians as
such. Some civilians have, unfortunately,
been killed. A good many civilians them-
selves are a part of the war operation; that
is, driving trucks to the South with men and
arms on board, manning the barges, loco-
motives— things of that sort. But our pilots
have been instructed not to hit civilian
targets. Some military targets have been
taken off the list because they do involve a
substantial risk of civilian casualties. The
pilots go to extraordinary effort to avoid
civilian casualties. Nevertheless there have
been some.
There have been far larger civilian
casualties in South Viet-Nam, and we know
that those are acts of deliberate policy. You
don't go around assassinating village chiefs
and schoolteachers and public health officers
and people of thajt sort or kidnaping entire
villages by accident. And so we have to take
that into account as well. Such a mistake
as you mentioned, about bombing some
refugees, thinking that they were Viet
Cong — that occurs in all military opera-
tions— we regret that very much.
But the point I would like to emphasize
is that this fighting could be brought to an
end very quickly indeed — very quickly indeed
if the North Vietnamese were prepared to
keep their armed forces at home and leave
their immediate neighbors alone in Laos and
South Viet-Nam. It's just as simple as that.
Peking and Southeast Asia
Q. Mr. Rusk, could we look at the objects
of this war? There appears to us in Britain
to be a certain confusion in your war aims.
Is this a war for the containment of China,
or is it simply a war for the independence
of South Viet-Nam? Could you tell us pre-
cisely what your war aims are?
A. I don't know that there is a choice
between those two objectives. My guess is
that if the authorities in Peking were to
throw their weight behind peace in South-
east Asia, there would be peace in Southeast
Asia.
But, nevertheless, the immediate events
which brought our Armed Forces into South
Viet-Nam were the movement of substantial
numbers of North Vietnamese men in arms,
including some now 20 regiments of their
North Vietnamese regular army, into South
Viet-Nam for the purpose of imposing a
political settlement on the South by force.
Now, this cuts right across our commitments
under the SEATO Treaty. Under article IV
of that treaty, each signatory determines
what steps it will take to meet the common
danger in the event of an aggression by
means of armed attack; and it was specifi-
cally understood at the time that that would
apply to an aggression by Ho Chi Minh, as
well as to others.
Now, the Chinese are not actively involved
in this situation in South Viet>Nam. We do
know that they are trying to stir up prob-
lems for the Thais in the northeast section
of Thailand. China has publicly announced
that Thailand is next on the list; but the
key point is that if these countries would
live at peace, we would be the first to give
that our full support — leave these countries
alone ourselves, get out of there.
Q. But are you saying that Peking could
stop the South Viet-Nam war if it wanted
to?
A. I'm saying that if Peking were to
throw its full weight behind an immediate
peace in Southeast Asia, that would have
very immediate results; because if they were
to cut off the supplies that they are sending
to Hanoi and would insist to Hanoi that
Hanoi return to the provisions of the 1954
and 1962 agreements, there could be peace
very promptly.
Q. Your Senate was given evidence only
the other day that 85 percent of the war
supplies in the North came from the Soviet
Union, not from Peking.
A. I don't accept that in those terms,
except for the sophisticated weapons. The
small arms and small-arms ammunition and
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
275
foodstuffs and normal supplies typically
come from China. The Soviet Union has sent
the more sophisticated weapons sudh as the
SAM missiles, certain kinds of antiaircraft,
radar, and some MIG's — things of that sort.
But in terms of bulk, I would think the bulk
of it would continue to come from China.
Q. But it is nevertheless your contention
that if Peking cut off aid, the war would
automatically end.
A. Oh, I think it would end very quickly —
that's not automatically, but very quickly
indeed.
Results of Bombing North Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Ru^k, in bombing North Viet-
Nam, America has brought a great deal of
moral obloquy upon herself around the
world. Do you think that this military game
is really worth the candle?
A. I don't know what you mean by
"moral obloquy around the world." I was out
in Asia myself at the time of the bombing
of the POL in Hanoi and Haiphong, talking
to Asians, Asian governments, Asian news-
papermen. I didn't sense any moral obloquy
out there from those who live on the firing
line, from those who have a stake in the
outcome — and that includes most of the free
nations of Asia. The point is that the moral
obloquy ought to rest with those who have
started this affair and who refuse to bring
it to an end.
Q. But are you getting any military bene-
fit from this bombing now? As one under-
stands it, the buildup of the North Viet-
namese forces in South Viet-Nam is even
greater now than it was before the bombing
began.
A. Oh, I think it's no accident that the
other side is concentrating now on trying to
get an unconditional and permanent cessa-
tion of the bombing. I think that would not
be their main object unless it were hurting.
We have knocked out trucks, railway
wagons, barges, by the thousands bringing
men and arms to the South; and I have no
doubt at all that the bombing has made it
much more difficult for them to lay on their
effort and sustain it and certainly more
difficult for them to increase it.
So from a military point of view, it is
important. But also there's a political aspect
of this as well. If North Viet-Nam could sit
there indefinitely, safe and comfortable,
while it sends its men and arms into South
Viet-Nam, what would be their incentive to
ever make peace?
Q. The people say in Britain, where we
do understand a bit about bombing —
A. Yes—
Q. — that bombing attacks of this nature
merely stiffen people's backs and make them
resolve to go on until they do win.
A. Well, Germany didn't go on until they
won.
Q. It wasn't the bombing, was it, Mr.
Ru^k, that held Germany down?
A. It helped.
Q. May I ask, on the sam,e subject, in
weaponry you have a concept of cost-effec-
tiveness. Have you in the bombing of Viet-
Nam any concept of "life-effectiveness"?
That is to say, can you balance the advan-
tages you are likely to get from a particular
bombing operation against the likely civilian
casualties — to some civilian casualties?
A. Well, as I said earlier, we take the
iwssibility of civilian casualties very much
into account when we designate targets and
there have been targets that have not been
hit simply because they do involve high
risk of substantial civilian casualties — this
despite the fact that the North Vietnamese,
having learned that this is our policy, do
put their SAM missiles and their antiair-
craft in populated areas and use populated
areas as a sort of cover for some of their
military installations. Nevertheless, we do
our best to avoid civilian casualties.
But in terms of cost-effectiveness, we
don't use a slide rule or computer on that.
Here come 12 trucks down the road, headed
South with men and arms on board. Now,
do you strike them, or do you wait until they
276
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
get into the South and pick the metal out of
the bodies of your own troops? We think we
have to hit them.
Q. I'm talking about the bombing of in-
stallations on the ground which are near
residential areas.
Need for Reciprocity
Q. Mr. Riisk, there is general feeling in
the world, and I should say -certainly among
intellectuals and academics in the States,
that you should deescalate, stop the bombing
in the North, and move into a position from
which negotiation would at any rate be
possible — and the feeling is that you will not
do this because of what was originally an
exclusive oriental fear, that fear of loss of
face. Is there anything in this?
A. No, this is not a question of loss of
face. The other side is now saying that we
must stop the bombing unconditionally and
permanently. This is a rather different thing
than the notion of suspending the bombing.
Last autumn, a year ago, we had many sug-
gestions from the other side that if we
stopped the bombing for a period something
might hapi)en — we might be able to get some
talks started and find a way to bring this
matter to a conclusion. Well, in fact we
stopped the bombing for twice as long as had
been suggested by the other side, and the only
thing we got for it was a demand that we
take Hanoi's four points — get out of South
Viet-Nam, and accept the Liberation Front
as the sole spokesman for the South Viet-
namese people. Now they've changed the
view on this. We must now, they say, stop
permanently and unconditionally, because a
suspension is somehow an ultimatum.
So this makes it important for us to know
what would happen. I don't believe, for
example, that you could tell me what would
happen if we stopped the bombing — perhaps
you do have some information that we don't
have — but we need to know what is going to
happen if we stop the bombing. I find it
rather curious that the notion of reciprocity
seems to drop out of this discussion in many
people's minds. Suppose that we on our side.
we and the South Vietnamese and the others
who have troops in Viet-Nam, were to say,
Well, of course we will not have any discus-
sions with anybody at any time unless the
violence in the South stops. Everyone would
say. Well, you're being very belligerent. But
the tendency is to say — when the North
Vietnamese say. There'll be no discussion so
long as you're bombing North Viet-Nam —
everybody seems to say. Well, that sounds
perfectly natural, that's obvious. You see, if
we were to take that same view, you would
condemn us rather severely, I should think.
Q. But on the other hand, Mr. Rusk, I
think it is generally accepted that the Rus-
sians and Poles, and some people in the
Communist half of the world, do rather think
that if this bombing could be stopped, the
weight of their pressure in Hanoi would be
much greater than the pressure which you
attribute to Peking.
A. Well, you see, we've never had from
anybody what they would do if we stopped
the bombing. Now, for example, I wonder if
the minds of any of you here would be
changed, from whatever it is, if we stopped
the bombing and there was no response. I
have not had anyone — private citizen, gov-
ernment— tell me what they would do if we
stopped the bombing, even if they could not
tell us what Hanoi would do. So we need to
know more than that about the effect; other-
wise, as I say. North Viet-Nam would sit
there safe and comfortable, perhaps for the
next 50 years, continuing its effort to send in
men and supplies. We need some peace in
this part of the world, and we're going to get
it — we're going to insist upon it.
IVIilitary Situation in Viet-Nam
Q. Leaving the moral issue of the bombing
for a moment, Mr. Rusk, could we look a bit
closer at the military situation. You now have
JtOO,000 men out there, and your budget has
gone rocketing up — it's over 73 billion
now — aTid your own Great Society program
is being damaged, I believe, because of the
cost of this war. Are you satisfied this
enormous cost is being bought by real tangi-
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
277
ble military gains ? I mean, are you confident
you're getting the right kind of military
advice in Viet-Nam?
A. I have no doubt about the skill and the
professional judgment and the capabilities of
our military leaders, as well as the men in
uniform out there — it's a most extraordinary
performance. What we're trying to do is to
prevent North Viet>Nam's achieving a mili-
tary victory. Now, there is therefore a mili-
tary component in this situation; because
after all is said and done, at the end of the
day here come two regiments down the road
from the North. Someone has to decide: Do
you get out of their way or do you meet
them? We feel that we must meet them. Now,
that is a decision that we cannot avoid. After
everyone has said everything there is to say
on this subject, here come the two regiments.
What do you do about them ? Now, of course
it is an expensive war, but we do believe that
what happens here has something to do with
the prospects of general peace. We are at the
beginning, perhaps, of the possibilities of
detente with the Soviet Union, but we didn't
come to that point by forgetting Azerbaijan,
by giving away the eastern provinces of
Turkey, by welcoming the Greek guerrillas
into Athens, by giving away Berlin, by for-
getting Korea, by being negligent about the
Congo, by having no concern with Southeast
Asia, or by welcoming the missiles into Cuba
as good neighbors. This has been a long, dif-
ficult, costly affair, and we have only just
made it.
The United States alone since 1947 has
had to spend about $900 billion in its defense
budget, and yet we're only 5 years away from
two very critical crises involving the security
of the West, one the Berlin crisis of 1961 and
'62 and one the Cuban missile crisis. So the
question is, How do you build a durable
peace? And one of the problems in my mind
is that half the American people, half the
British people, can no longer remember
World War II — and fewer of them can re-
member the events that led up to World War
II. And therefore the question which was the
great preoccupation of all of us in 1945, How
do you organize a durable peace? is begin-
ning to recede into the background — people
are getting forgetful of that question,
negligent about it. Now, I don't see how
we're going to come to peace by allowing
people to overrun their neighbors by force.
Q. That isn't quite the question, Mr. Rusk.
I mean, let's get back to the military situa-
tion in South Viet-Nam. You've jiist referred
to an astonishing performance by your
generals, and so on. What are the precise
indications of this performance, what
progress have you actually made, in a
strictly military sense, in the last year?
A. Well, in the first place, the effort of
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces
to cut the country in two has been frus-
trated. They have not been able to move this
war to the third stage of the guerrilla tactics;
that is, to the conventional stage; organized
forces of battalion and regimental size are
not the pattern of their action at the present
time in general, because in those engage-
ments the firepower and the force that are
present there inflict very severe casualties
upon them and they have therefore been
pulling away from that. The problem still
is the tactical problem of the guerrilla situ-
ation. We captured documents the other day,
in operations in the Iron Triangle, in which
the other side had reported to their own
higher command that they'd lost a million
peasants to the Government in the most
recent months.
Q. Are you going to publish these?
A. They were published this morning. We
know from prisoners that the other side
is having severe difficulties of supply, of
feeding themselves, of medical care for their
wounded — things of that sort. So we think
that we are making headway, but the typical
guerrilla problem is still there — that is a
mean and difficult kind of thing to deal with.
Q. — political problems, are you satisfied
with the kind of political advance which may
be taking place, or should be taking place, in
South Viet-Nam — things like land reform
and that kind of thing?
278
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A. Well, I think the most important polit-
ical development this past year has been the
election of the constituent assembly to draft
a constitution under which elections will be
held for a national government. This was
begun on the initiative of the present mili-
tary directorate in January of 1966. This
was repeated by ' this leadership at the
Honolulu meeting, ^ and we put ourselves
behind it because we thought it was a very
good idea. Now, we'll know by the end of
March, early April, what the shape of that
constitution will be. We do believe that the
South Vietnamese leadership is fully com-
mitted to that transition to an elective gov-
ernment. We were encouraged by the num-
bers of those who turned out to elect a
constituent assembly. Many of the govern-
ment candidates failed in the election. They
do represent the various elements in the
population, the Buddhists and the Catholics
and the Montagnards and the other sects,
and so we think there is now in the making
a representative government on the way.
Now, it's not going to be easy, and there will
be perhaps some nervous moments along the
way; but we believe that that is the most
important political advance.
You see, these various groups that I have
mentioned in South Viet-Nam have a genius
for disagreeing among themselves on some
matters, but they do seem to agree with each
other on the one point that they do not
want Hanoi and they do not want the Libera-
tion Front. Now, they are represented in the
constituent assembly, and we would hope
that there would be in this process a sort of
basic political treaty among the different
elements there under which they could
finally get themselves a government which
they themselves have chosen and which
would fairly represent the difi'erent elements
in the population.
Q. Mr. Rusk, is this entirely a fair
analysis? After all, there are the Viet Cong,
and I think most of us are really looking, in
the present situation in South Viet-Nam, for
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966,
p. 302.
the kind of peace settlement that the United
States is prepared to accept. What kind of
political life in a peaceful South Viet-Nam
tvould the United States concede to the
National Liberation Front?
Question of Viet Cong's Political Role
A. I think that if the Viet Cong were to
lay down their arms and take part in the
normal political processes of the country,
there are ways that could be found to permit
them to do so — that is, for political partici-
pation, things of that sort. I don't know — I
don't recall — ^that you and Malaya made
special arrangements for the insurgents
there to have a political role when you
moved into a period when you could have
elections there, but these people can take
part in the politics of the country if they're
willing to. But they bitterly resisted the
elections, the recent elections. Hanoi thus
far has not accepted the notion that the
South Vietnamese people can elect their own
government and themselves decide on what
their attitude is toward the reunification of
the country.
We'd like to see these matters settled by
the people concerned. Now, this can be done
if people lay dovni their arms and adopt
political tactics.
Q. But these are your only terms, and it's
very difficult for people who have been
fighting just simply to lay down their arms
in the presence of a very difficult govern-
ment like Marshal [Nguyen Cao'] Ky's, and
ivith American troops still in the territory.
You'd think they would have guarantees
that there tvould be political freedom for
them, particularly against the South Viet-
namese.
A. Well, this is something that can be
discussed and worked out. As you know,
about 20,000 of these people did come over
officially to Government areas during the
past year. I have no doubt that the present
Government or its successor government will
work out amnesty and arrangements which
would let these people take a part in the
peaceful processes of the country — but that's
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
279
something that can be discussed at the right
time.
Q. But you have contacts with the NLF
in Algiers, I understand. Did anything come
of this?
A. Well, there have been discussions of
prisoners, but I have little to report on that.
Q. Will you be prepared to negotiate
directly with the Viet Cong or Hanoi, if
both do so?
A. President Johnson said some time ago
that having the views of the Viet Cong
represented would not create an insuperable
obstacle if the problem of aggression were
removed from the picture. Now on that —
excuse me, go ahead.
Q. Sir, do you regard the recent estab-
lishment of headquarters of the Viet Cong
in Hanoi as a sign of their increasing inde-
pendence from Hanoi?
A. No, I don't at all. The leadership of
the Viet Cong in the South is made up of
North Vietnamese generals, men that we
know by name. One of them is a four-star
general who gives the political and the mili-
tary direction to the National Liberation
Front. And we have this on a basis of a
great deal of information, ranging from
captured documents to the testimony of
high-ranking prisoners to other forms of
more esoteric information. So we're not very
much impressed with this alleged difference
between the Liberation Front and Hanoi,
quite frankly.
Q. / did see a report of a fairly senior
Viet Cong officer in the South ivho, being
interrogated, said they had very little com-
munication with Hanoi, which seemed to
suggest to us some independence.
A. No, they have a great deal of com-
munication with Hanoi, I assure you.
Q. Could you say .whether the changes
that have been taking place rather obscurely
in China over the last few weeks have made
any greater likelihood of peaceable change?
A. It's very hard to assess that. We are
well aware that what is happening in China
is of the greatest importance. Quite frankly,
we don't quite fully understand its signifi-
cance. Ignorance on this doesn't embarrass
us particularly, because we suspect that Mr.
Ho Chi Minh doesn't fully understand what
is going on there and Mao Tse-tung doesn't
fully understand. It may be that the events
in China may give Hanoi somewhat more
freedom of action than they might have felt
they had a little earlier. And so we're explor-
ing the possibilities here to find out whether
or not that is possibly the case, but we just
don't know yet.
Q. So it's not your contention that Ho Chi
Minh takes orders from Peking?
A. Not necessarily, no, no. He is strongly
influenced by Peking and has been for some
time; and we think that perhaps, on balance,
the influence of Moscow in Hanoi has been
somewhat less than that of Peking — but
these are matters that change from month
to month.
Q. But in this situation, where there is a
possibility that the events in Peking could
have a positive effect, or likely to bring the
tvar to an end, isn't this an added incentive
for ending the bombing — just trying it out?
A. No, we need to know what will hap-
pen— we need to know what will happen. It
isn't — when you look back at the other crises
that we've all faced since 1945, it is not
beyond the reach of diplomacy, or private
channels or otherwise, to find out these
things in advance and not just rely upon
hope. Most of the crises in this postwar
period have been brought to conclusion by
very discreet private contacts in which the
two sides would know approximately what
would happen if the matter moved toward a
peaceful conclusion, and that is not beyond
the possibilities here.
Basis for Peace Settlement
Q. Are you satisfied that the other side
knows precisely what the United States
wants in a peace settlement?
A. I think so. We, over and over again.
280
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
have made essential points public — the 14
points that we put out at the beginning of
1966 have been developed somewhat further
in detail during the year.^ But basically it is
that we accept the Geneva agreements of
1954 and 1962 as a basis for peace in South-
east Asia; that we let the South Vietnamese
make up their own minds about their own
government and about the question of re-
unification; that we're prepared to enter into
any kind of discussions, conferences, formal
negotiations, private contacts, on the total
problem or any part of it; and that if there
can be peace, we would be glad to partici-
pate in a very far-reaching development pro-
gram for all of Southeast Asia in which
North Viet-Nam can participate.
Now, we're prepared to take up the entire
problem or any part of it. For example, we'd
like to see the Geneva machinery give some
aid and assistance to Prince Sihanouk
[Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State
of Cambodia] , who has been asking for help
in keeping his own country neutral and un-
involved in this struggle. The other side
won't accept that. We would like to see the
demilitarized zone between North and South
Viet-Nam demilitarized. The other side won't
do that. We'd like to have an exchange of
prisoners — no interest. We'd like to see 1,000
percent compliance with the Laos agreement
of 1962 — no interest.
You see, one must not forget that we were
very bitterly disappointed that the Laos
agreement proved to be so futile. We went
to that conference — you and the Russians
were cochairmen of that conference. We ac-
cepted the man who was, in effect, the Soviet
nominee as Prime Minister at that time,
Prince Souvanna Phouma. We accepted the
coalition government that had been worked
out by discussions among the three factions,
so-called, in Laos. What was the result?
North Viet-Nam did not withdraw their
forces from Laos. They did not stop using
Laos as an infiltration route to the South.
The coalition government was not permitted
to function in the Pathet Lao-held areas of
' See p. 284.
Laos, and the ICC [International Control
Commission] was not permitted to function
in those areas.
Now, we had thought at the time that that
agreement could represent a major step to-
ward peace in Southeast Asia, and we are
very disappointed that this did not have that
result. It called for neutralization of Laos.
Laos has not been permitted to be neutral.
Q. But there isn't a full-scale war in Laos,
is there ?
A. North Viet-Nam's major effort now is
against Viet-Nam, but they still have thou-
sands of their troops in Laos and have never
pulled them out of there; and they're still
using Laos, despite the precise requirements
of the Laos agreement, for infiltration into
South Viet-Nam.
Q. In those lU points you've just men-
tioned, Mr. Rusk, are you now prepared to
include the NLF as a full negotiating .party?
A. We have said these 14 points include
President Johnson's statement on that sub-
ject, which cast it in terms of not being an
insuperable obstacle. Quite frankly, I'll be
prepared to discuss that with someone who
can end the shooting; I don't see much point
in negotiating that point with you, because
you can't stop the shooting. But it's perfectly
— it's been made known that we're prepared
to discuss that problem with the other side.
Q. Would you settle for a neutralist South
Viet-Nam government?
A. Well we have said in our 14 points
that as far as we are concerned, the nations
of Southeast Asia can be neutral or non-
alined if that is their desire; and as a matter
of fact, as you know. South Viet-Nam was
a protocol state to the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization rather than a signatory, be-
cause they were in a position of neutrality
under those arrangements. We're prepared
to see Southeast Asia neutral if that is what
they want to be. What we would like to
know is whether those in the North — Hanoi,
Peking, the rest of them — would permit
Southeast Asia to be neutral.
Q. Mr. Rusk, John F. Kennedy said in
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
281
1951 — I'll read his exact words, this sen-
tence: "Without the support of the native
population there is no hope of success in any
of the countries of Southeast Asia." Can you
really say that you have that support ?
A. Oh, I think there's no question that
the general population in South Viet-Nam
does not want what Hanoi's trying to do to
them. They are still carrying the main bur-
den of the war in terms of casualties and
in terms of military operations. Press at-
tention has tended to focus more upon the
Americans and what we do out there, be-
cause American reporters concentrate on
American forces quite naturally. But on any
given day, two-thirds of the operations of
battalion size or larger would be conducted
by the South Vietnamese. Their casualties
are larger than ours.
But more important than that, we have
Americans scattered all through the country-
side doing a great variety of jobs in ones
and fours and fives and tens, outside of
regular military formations. We have not
had instances of treachery on the part of
the South Vietnamese among whom these
people are living. Now the Viet Cong some-
times come in and raid, but if there were
any serious view among the South Viet-
namese that we and they were not in there
for a common purpose, undoubtedly you'd
have repeated acts of treachery among these
exposed Americans living all over the
countryside. It just doesn't occur.
But in any event, on all of these questions,
we're prepared to let the South Vietnamese
make the decisions. We made it very clear
that as far as we're concerned, we're not in-
terested in bases in Southeast Asia, we're
not interested in keeping our forces there
after peace is achieved; we've said that we'll
bring them out within 6 months after a
peace is achieved, that we'll put in a time-
table if the other side will put in a time-
table. We want to know what's going to hap-
pen to those 20 regiments of the North
Vietnamese regular forces in South Viet-
Nam.
282
Q. But do you contend, Mr. Busk, that it
is only the North Vietnamese regiments
that's keeping the revolution in South Viet-
Nam on the present scale?
A. It was only the movement of men and ^
arms from North Viet-Nam that brought
American combat forces into South Viet-
Nam. Now, I believe, myself, that if North
Viet-Nam really pulls out of this situation,
takes their troops back home, makes it clear
that they're not going to persist in what they
publicly announced in 1960 that they were
going to do, namely, go after South Viet-
Nam by force, the South Vietnamese would
sort out their own affairs very quickly after
that.
Continued North Vietnamese Infiltration
Q. Why weren't you able to terminate the
war before North Viet-Nam intervened in
the first place — if what you say is correct?
A. Well, I didn't have much of a chance
to do that, because when I became Secretary
of State they were already intervening. They
began sending men and arms into South
Viet-Nam, 1959, 1960 — publicly indicated in
1960 that they were going to do so, and that
infiltration has steadily been building up all
along.
We went to the Geneva conference on Laos
in 1962 determined to get an agreement that
would provide for a neutral Laos. You see,
President Kennedy and Chainnan Khru-
shchev had agreed in Vienna in June 1961
that the solution to Laos ought to be that
everyone get out of Laos— everyone — and
leave these 2 million landlocked people to
manage, or mismanage, their own affairs
and that under those circumstances they
would be a threat to no one else.
So we thought that a Laos agreement,
genuinely accepted by all sides and with full
performance on all sides, would be a major
step toward peace in Southeast Asia and
could affect also peace in Viet-Nam. We were
disappointed in that, and the infiltration has
continued.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Q. But can you seriously maintain that a
tiny country like Viet-Nam could hold at
bay the entire armed forces of the United
States, the most powerful power in history,
if those local forces in Viet-Nam did not have
very considerable stipport?
A. Well, you had, what? — ^troop superior-
ity of 10 to 1 in Malaya, and it took about
7 years for it. The guerrilla problem is a
very difficult one with which to deal, because
you cannot really bring your power fully to
bear on people you can't find, and so if s — it
tends to be — a long-drawn-out, difficult
problem.
Q. You have little more than parity at
the moment. Does that mean you have to
increase your troops to a minimum of —
A. No, no, because I think the combina-
tions of greater mobility than you had in
Malaya, for example, a greater firepower,
such factors as that, reduce that requirement
very considerably.
Influence of Peking and Moscow in Hanoi
Q. May I change the subject for a mo-
ment: What do you think Russia wants to
come out of this situation ? She surely doesn't
want Hanoi and China to win; because if
she did, she would lose her infkience in
Southeast Asia and perhaps be forced to be-
come more aggressive in other parts of the
world, and she doesn't want to do it.
A. You may remember that the Warsaw
Pact countries had a meeting in Bucharest
last year, I think in July. In their commu-
nique, after saying some very rude things
about us in Viet-Nam, they did say that
they wanted us to comply completely with
the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.
Our reply was: All right, we agree, let's get
started. It is my impression that the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe are prepared to see
peace in Southeast Asia on the basis of the
1954 and 1962 agreements.
But one of the problems is that it's very
hard to get something started, to get a po-
litical process started, to come to that result.
This is partly, I suspect, because Peking has
been attacking Moscow almost every day for
being in some conspiracy with United States
to betray Hanoi — I must say from our point
of view we see no evidence of that conspiracy
— also because Moscow does not have de-
cisive influence in Hanoi.
My own guess is that one of the reasons
that the Laos agreement proved ineffective
was that Moscow, as well as the rest of us,
had no effective influence in Hanoi to insist
upon Hanoi's compliance with the 1962
agreement. I'm inclined to think that the
Soviet Union signed that agreement in good
faith in 1962; so there are some complica-
tions on their side, as well as on ours.
We've been trying to find any possible way
to get something started, however small it
might be, whether it's through the ICC or
the two cochairmen or otherwise, in order to
begin a process that might lead into a serious
discussion of peace throughout Southeast
Asia generally.
Q. Mr. Rusk, one of the things that seems
to be apparent is that you don't have a hot
line to either Peking or to Hanoi. Some of us
the other day met some of the religious
leaders who had come back from Hanoi
reporting unofficially an invitation to Presi-
dent Johnson to go there. If an official
invitation could in any way be maneuvered
out of Hanoi, as Secretary of State do you
think you would advise the President to go
to Hanoi on some conditions? Would it be
worthivhile to try that way of achieving some
settlement ?
A. We don't anticipate such an invitation.
The one to which you refer apparently sup-
posed that we would withdraw from South
Viet-Nam first. I would not think that that
would be the better way to establish contact.
As a matter of fact, I've said many times
that there has never been a problem arising
out of lack of contact with the other side. We
have had more discussions of more serious
matters with Peking than anyone who has
diplomatic relations with them, with the pos-
sible exception of the Soviet Union. We had
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
283
our 132d talk with them in Warsaw the
other day. There has never been a problem of
contact with the other side. The problem is
that, with contact, we don't see a desire for
peace.
Moderator: Well, Mr. Rusk, we've "put an
awful lot of questions to you, and you've
given its a very large number of answers. I
think on behalf of us all, we're really very
grateful to you for coming here and submit-
ting to this inquisition today.
A. Well, thank you very much, gentlemen.
I've enjoyed seeing you very much and hope
you have a pleasant journey home.
Moderator: Thank you very much indeed.
Fourteen Points for Peace
in Southeast Asia
Secretary Ru^k on January 27 approved
the release of the following elaboration of the
Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia,
which were previously made public by the De-
partment of State on January 7, 1966 >
1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and
1962 are an adequate basis for peace in
Southeast Asia.
2. We would welcome a conference on
Southeast Asia or any part thereof:
— We are ready to negotiate a settlement
based on a strict observance of the 1954
and 1962 Geneva Agreements, which ob-
servance was called for in the declaration
on Viet-Nam of the meeting of the Warsaw
Pact countries in Bucharest on July 6,
1966. And we will support a reconvening
of the Geneva Conference, or an Asian
conference, or any other generally accept-
able forum.
3. We would welcome "negotiations with-
out preconditions" as called for by 17 non-
alined nations in an appeal delivered to Sec-
retary Rusk on April 1, 1965.^
4. We would welcome "unconditional dis-
cussions" as called for by President Johnson
on April 7, 1965: «
284
— If the other side will not come to a
conference, we are prepared to engage in
direct discussions or discussions through
an intermediary.
5. A cessation of hostilities could be the ""
first order of business at a conference or
could be the subject of preliminary discus-
sions:
— We have attempted, many times, to en-
gage the other side in a discussion of a
mutual deescalation of the level of violence,
and we remain prepared to engage in such
a mutual deescalation.
— We stand ready to cooperate fully in
getting discussions which could lead to a
cessation of hostilities started promptly
and brought to a successful completion.
6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed
along with other points which others may
wish to propose:
— We would be prepared to accept pre-
liminary discussions to reach agreement on
a set of points as a basis for negotiations.
7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast
Asia:
— We are prepared to assist in the con-
version of these bases for peaceful uses that
will benefit the peoples of the entire area.
8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops
in South Viet-Nam after peace is assured:
— We seek no permanent military bases,
no permanent establishment of troops, no
permanent alliances, no permanent Amer-
ican "presence" of any kind in South Viet-
Nam.
— We have pledged in the Manila Com-
munique * that "Allied forces are in the Re-
public of Vietnam because that country is
the object of aggression and its govern-
ment requested support in the resistance of
its people to aggression. They shall be with-
drawn, after close consultation, as the other
' Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.
' For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ihii,., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
» Ibid., p. 606.
♦ For text, see ihii., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
side withdraws its forces to the North,
ceases infiltration, and the level of violence
thus subsides. Those forces will be with-
drawn as soon as possible and not later
than six months after the above conditions
have been fulfilled."
9. We support free elections in South Viet-
Nam to give the South Vietnamese a govern-
ment of their own choice:
— We support the development of
broadly based democratic institutions in
South Viet-Nam.
— We do not seek to exclude any segment
of the South Vietnamese people from
peaceful participation in their country's
future.
10. The question of reunification of Viet-
Nam should be determined by the Vietnamese
through their own free decision:
— It should not be decided by the use of
force.
— We are fully prepared to support the
decision of the Vietnamese people.
11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be
nonalined or neutral if that be their option:
— We do not seek to impose a policy of
alinement on South Viet-Nam.
— We support the neutrality policy of the
Royal Government of Laos, and we support
the neutrality and territorial integrity of
Cambodia.
12. We would much prefer to use our re-
sources for the economic reconstruction of
Southeast Asia than in war. If there is peace.
North Viet-Nam could participate in a re-
gional effort to which we would be prepared
to contribute at least one billion dollars:
— We support the growing efforts by the
nations of the area to cooperate in the
achievement of their economic and social
goals.
13. The President has said "The Viet Cong
would have no difficulty in being represented
and having their views presented if Hanoi for
a moment decides she wants to cease aggres-
sion. And I would not think that would be an
insurmountable problem at all."
14. We have said publicly and privately
that we could stop the bombing of North
Viet-Nam as a step toward peace although
there has not been the slightest hint or sug-
gestion from the other side as to what they
would do if the bombing stopped:
— We are prepared to order a cessation
of all bombing of North Viet-Nam the mo-
ment we are assured — privately or other-
wise— that this step will be answered
promptly by a corresponding and appro-
priate deescalation of the other side.
— We do not seek the unconditional sur-
render of North Viet-Nam; what we do
seek is to assure for the people of South
Viet-Nam the right to decide their own
political destiny, free of force.
General Taylor Discusses Recent
Developments in Viet-Nam
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, who is a Special
Consultant to President Johnson, met with
the President on Janimry 30 to report on
his trip to Southeast Asia. Following is his
opening statement at a press conference held
at the White House after the meeting.
Ladies and gentlemen, I have just re-
ported to the President on my rather short
and intensive visit to Southeast Asia which
I have just completed.
I was gone about 11 days and returned
Saturday night. The primary purpose for
going out was for my own individual reori-
entation and updating of my acquaintance
with the problems of Southeast Asia. I think
perhaps, also, to get out of the sometimes
gloomy atmosphere of Washington and see
what the feeling is in the front lines, where
this struggle is being conducted.
I did the usual things in South Viet-Nam.
I talked to our leading officials, numbers of
Vietnamese, traveled as much as I could,
visited most of our principal headquarters.
Overall, I would say that it is, to me, a
very, very exciting thing to see the progress
made in the last year and a half. I have
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
285
not been back since I left as Ambassador
just a year and a half ago.
I had perhaps the feeling of an architect
who has worked over a blueprint and a year
or so later sees the building that actually
came from the blueprint. The American con-
tribution out there in the military, political,
and economic fields is certainly impressive
and certainly reflects credit upon Ambas-
sador [Heni-y Cabot] Lodge, General [Wil-
liam C] Westmoreland, and all of their
many able assistants.
Just tripping quickly across the front of
American activities, I might give a broad
comment and then expose myself to your
questions.
I think the military sector has been cov-
ered extremely well by our reporting, and
probably very little needs to be said at this
time. There is an air of confidence among
our units which didn't exist when I was
there. So many of our difficulties a year and
a half ago, or 2 years ago, arose from the
inadequacy of military resources to cope
with the increasing threat of the Viet Cong
and also the infiltration of the armed forces
of North Viet-Nam to the South.
By virtue of our own buildup and also
the continued growth of the Vietnamese
forces, I would say that particular problem
is well under control.
The logistic successes of our people in
building ports, harbors, roads, airfields, of
course, is to me — not having seen this as it
went on — very impressive indeed.
I might mention the field of intelligence,
where so much visible progress has been
made in the last year and a half. When I
was Ambassador it was very rare to capture
a prisoner or to capture a document, and
when we got one, we handled it or him as
if made of gold.
In the recent Iron Triangle operation,
some 184,000 pages of useful intelligence
was taken. I visited the intelligence proc-
essing center in Saigon, and, literally in
basketsful, they were sorting out the doc-
uments which had been taken.
Just what the net take in intelligence
value will be is not yet determined, but that
is simply indicative of the fact that our in-
telligence people, one, have more material
to work on, and, secondly, they have a pro-
fessionalism in the organization which, as I
say, I never saw when I was there and which
is very encouraging to me.
In the field of pacification — ^that word
which is described illy, the oi^eration "revo-
lutionary development" is the preferred term
in Viet-Nam — ^this, of course, has been the
area where progress has not been satisfac-
tory. It is uneven at best.
The basic problems there remain and are
likely to remain for a long time. There is
the absence of security, or levels of security,
throughout the provinces which does not
allow reconstruction efforts to be carried on
uniformly.
I often remind my American friends that
we found we couldn't plant the com outside
of the stockade as long as the Indians were
around. And we still have a lot of "Indians"
around in the provinces of South Viet-Nam.
The other major problem is the adminis-
trative complexity of this task, a complexity
that would baffle the most skilled adminis-
trative con^s. And, unfortunately, skilled
administrators are very much in short sup-
ply in South Viet-Nam.
The provincial chief is the unsung hero
of this war. He sits in his war-torn pro\ince
and has to deal with two Americans, a mili-
tary and a civilian, and then with his own
military and with eight or nine ministers
in Saigon. I think just to describe this re-
lationship suggests the complexities of the
problem.
At least two good things are taking place,
two encouraging new factors in the develop-
ment of the program. The first is the con-
summation of a program which has been in
existence for some time: to pool all the
American civil activities under an office
called the Office of Civilian Operation, under
Deputy Ambassador [William J.] Porter. It
is now in effect and in the field and certainly
should have a simplifying and consolidating
effect upon the American civil contribution.
The other, on the military side, is the
decision by the Vietnamese high command
286
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to emphasize the role of the ARVN, the
Vietnamese Anny, in revolutionaiy develop-
ment. As a result, it has been decided that
approximately half of the infantry battalions
will be put in this kind of work in the prov-
inces, working under the province chief.
This, again, is a new development which
is just moving forward. But I would hope
that when the battalions are retrained and
in the field that for the first time there will
be a militaiy force to bridge the gap between
the successful search-and-destroy operation
and the follow-on civil operations which are
either paramilitary or police insofar as their
security aspects are concerned.
On the governmental side, I think all you
ladies and gentlemen know where we stand.
When I was Ambassador, of course, I had
to deal with five different governments. A
3-month government was a normal duration.
Now the Ky administration has been in office
since, well, over a year and a half, and it
looks as if they are well on the road to con-
stitutional government.
It is expected that the constitution will be
promulgated in March and presidential elec-
tions held probably around August or Sep-
tember. There are still obstacles along all of
these patlis, but none of them seems to be
insuperable.
On the economic front, the economists
have worked well — both the Americans and
the Vietnamese — in restraining inflation. We
could foresee the inflationary trends even
when I was Ambassador. As the American
forces came in, obviously we would create
problems for the economy. I would certainly
not suggest that this danger of inflation has
been licked, but it seems to be reasonably
under control.
All in all, I would say that a great deal
of progress has been made, but there are
sitill residual problems which will always be
with us. I think the principal one is in the
field of pacification — tlie development of the
provinces. I think that is going to be a long,
slow process.
On the military side, I would expect that
we can continue to retain the initiative and
to continue to inflict the same kind of heavy
casualties on the Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese forces as we did in 1966.
But there is a new atmosphere out there,
a feeling that the log jam may be breaking a
little bit. The events of China are certainly
giving one cause to think as to the possible
repercussions in North Viet-Nam of these
events.
So, in summaiy, I came back tremendously
impressed with progress, but also impressed
with the fact that there is unfinished busi-
ness; that the end is not in sight, but there
are cei-tainly indications that something is
starting to move and i>erhaps we can see
some change, some new development, in the
course of this year.
President Urges Ratification
of Consular Pact With U.S.S.R.
statement by President Johnson^
I have been asked to give a statement
about the Consular Convention that is pend-
ing before the United States Senate.^
I should like to say very briefly that T hope
the Senate will give its advice and consent to
the proposed convention with the U.S.S.R. I
feel very strongly that the ratification of this
treaty is very much in our national interest.
I feel this way for two principal reasons:
First, we need this treaty to protect the
18,000 American citizens who each year
travel from this country to the Soviet Union.
The convention requires immediate notifi-
cation to us whenever an American citizen
is arrested in the Soviet Union. It insures
our right to visit that citizen within 4 days
and as often thereafter as is desirable.
We need these rights to help to protect
American citizens. These are rights which
the Soviet citizens already have who travel
* Read at the opening of a news conference at the
White House on Feb. 2.
^ For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before
the Senate Committee on Foreigfn Relations on Jan.
23, see Bulletin of Feb. 13, 1967, p. 247.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
287
in this country, because they are guaranteed
by our Constitution.
Second, the convention does not require the
opening of consulates in this country or in
the Soviet Union. It does provide that should
any such consulate be opened, the officials
would have diplomatic immunity.
The Secretary of State informs me that no
negotiations for consulates are underway and
that the most that he can envision in the
foreseeable future is the opening of one con-
sulate in each country, to be manned by from
10 to 15 people.
There are presently 452 Soviet officials in
the United States who have diplomatic im-
munity. If an additional consulate were
opened and if another 10 were added to the
452, Mr. Hoover has assured me that this
small increment would raise no problems
which the FBI cannot effectively and
efficiently deal mth.
In short, I think we very much need this
convention to protect American interests and
to protect American citizens abroad. In my
judgment, it raises no problem with respect
to our national security. Therefore, I hope
very much that the Senate, in its wisdom,
after full debate, will see fit to ratify it.
Department Issues 1967 Edition
of ''Treaties in Force"
Press release 19 dated February 2
The Department of State on February 2
released for publication Treaties in Force: A
List of Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States in Force
on January 1, 1967.
This is a collection showing the bilateral
relations of the United States with 145 states
or other entities and the multilateral rights
and obligations of the contracting parties to
more than 365 treaties and agreements on
75 subjects. The 1967 edition includes some
300 new treaties and agreements, including
the air transport agreements with Austria,
Canada, and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics; the "Gut Dam" claims agreement
with Canada; the status of forces agree-
ments with China and Korea; the treaty of
amity and economic relations with Togo; the
agreement concerning the availability of
certain Indian Ocean islands for defense
purposes with the United Kingdom; the Law
of the Sea convention on fisheries; and the
convention on settlement of investment dis-
putes between states and nationals of other
states.
The bilateral treaties and other agree-
ments are arranged by country or other
political entity, and the multilateral treaties
and other agreements are arranged by sub-
ject with names of countries which have be-
come parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and
citations to texts are furnished for each
agreement.
The publication provides information con-
cerning treaty relations with numerous
newly independent States, indicating wher-
ever possible the provisions of their constitu-
tions and independence arrangements re-
garding assumption of treaty obligations.
Information on current treaty actions,
supplementing the information contained in
Treaties in Force, is published weekly in the
Department of State Bulletin.
The 1967 edition of Treaties in Force (336
pp.; Department of State publication 8188)
is for sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 20402, for $1.50.
288
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United States, the United Nations, and Southern Africa
by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
It is entirely proper that Africa should be
a special concern of the Negro community
in this country. In our diverse and pluralistic
society we are all, as President Franklin D.
Roosevelt said on a famous occasion, "fellow
immigrants" — and it is both traditional and
right that we should take an interest in
events in the lands of our respective an-
cestors. To do so does not raise any question
of divided loyalties; indeed, it is a source
of sitrength for our country that these ties
exist and are kept alive.
This is particularly true today in the case
of the interest which the American Negro
community takes in Africa. It so happens,
by historical coincidence, that the independ-
ence movement in Africa and the great civil
rights movement among the Negro citizens
of the United States have come to fruition
at the same time — a double harvest of free-
dom. It is no wonder that these two move-
ments have felt a relationship to one another.
But in a broader sense Africa today is of
concern to every American. The entire con-
tinent is evolving in a charged atmosphere
of great expectations and profound difficul-
ties. The way in which this tension is re-
solved cannot fail to touch the interests of
the United States as a leading world power,
the most fundamental of which is our in-
terest in building a peaceful and stable
world.
As we witness the efforts of African
peoples to achieve political equality and per-
sonal dignity and to eliminate racial dis-
crimination, we do well to recall President
Kennedy's observation that "peace, in the
last analysis," is "basically a matter of hu-
man rights." 2 As we also witness their
efforts to achieve economic and social devel-
opment, we do well to recall President John-
son's admonition that "rich nations can
never live as an island of plenty in a sea
of poverty." ^ Two main concerns of Africa
today, human rights and economic progress,
have a very direct bearing on our search
for the kind of world peace in which Amer-
ican freedom will be secure.
To further these great purposes in Africa
calls for many kinds of action — govern-
mental and private; bilateral and multi-
lateral; diplomatic, economic, technical, ed-
ucational— far more than I could begin to
describe in these few minutes. Instead, I
would like to concentrate on a few of the
burning political issues of Africa today,
issues whose outcome can make or break the
hopes of progress for the entire continent.
The issues I shall discuss have arisen in
the southern part of Africa. They all revolve
around the basic principle which heads the
list of African aspirations: the ending of
colonialism and of racial discrimination.
' Address made before the American Negro Lead-
ership Conference on Africa at Washington, D.C.,
on Jan. 27 (U.S./U.N. press release 5/Corr. 1).
^ For President Kennedy's address at American
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see
Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.
' For an advance text of President Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see ibid.,
Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
289
We all know with what dramatic speed
the independence movement has swept
through the greatest part of Africa in the
last decade. The changing membership of
the United Nations reflects this story. In the
United Nations' first decade, only 4 of its 60
members were African; and of these only 2,
Ethiopia and Liberia, were from black
Africa. With these exceptions, Africa re-
mained the Dark Continent, submerged in
colonialism.
Then, in the past 10 years, the number of
independent African nations rose from 4 to
39, nearly a third of the membership of the
United Nations. From the Mediterranean
southward through three-quarters of the
continent, political independence in Africa is
nearly complete. There has been no more
dramatic political development in modern
times.
Today the last major part of the con-
tinent in which this movement for self-
determination and racial equality remains
largely unfulfilled is southern Africa. It is
this region which has come to the top of the
agenda at the United Nations. I would like
to comment on four situations with which
the United Nations has been dealing and
which are of important concern to the
United States: those in the Portuguese ter-
ritories. Southern Rhodesia, South West
Africa, and the Republic of South Africa.
Portuguese Territories in Southern Africa
Let me begin with the Portuguese terri-
tories of Angola and Mozambique. Portugal
is a longstanding friend and NATO ally of
the United States. But, regrettably, our
close association is clouded by our diflFerences
over the future of these territories.
This matter has been debated at length in
various bodies of the United Nations, includ-
ing the Security Council. Speaking for the
United States, I have made it clear, as have
my predecessors, that we unequivocally sup-
port the right of the peoples of Angola and
Mozambique to self-determination.^
Unfortunately, thus far there has been
little peaceful progress toward the exercise
of that right. It is over 3 years since con-
tacts on this issue have taken place between
Portugal and representatives of the African
states. These contacts ended without prog-
ress. The basic issue remains what it was:
to find a formula by which the peoples of
Angola and Mozambique can exercise the
right of self-determination in the spirit of
the United Nations Charter. Such a for-
mula should allow them to choose among all
the meaningful options: emergence as sov-
ereign independent states, or free association
with an independent state, or integration
with an independent state.
The first step, in our view, is for the
parties to commence a genuine dialog on
the basis of recognition of the principle of
self-determination. This is the indispensable
way to a peaceful solution of the troubles
which afflict these two territories. The United
States, as a friend of Portugal and of the
peoples of Angola and Mozambique and as a
nation deeply concerned for peace and sta-
bility in Africa, will continue to do all it can,
both in and out of the United Nations, to
facilitate such a dialog and help it to reach
a successful conclusion. Here, as in all these
African disputes, the same observation ap-
plies that I made last September before the
United Nations General Assembly about our
own search for peace in Viet-Nam: ". . . no
differences can be resolved witliout contact,
discussion, or negotiations." ^
Southern Rhodesia and U.S. Interests
Next we come to the grave situation in
Southern Rhodesia, one of the two remaining
colonies in Africa, where a white minority
is attempting to pei^petuate its rule over the
nonwhite 94 percent under the cover of a
spurious independence.
I will not review the long history of this
" For background, see ibid., Aug. 19, 1963, p. 303,
and Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1034.
= Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
290
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
issue leading up to the United Nations de-
cision last month to impose mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions against the Smith regime."
Nor do I need to detain you with the legal
justification of the United Nations actions,
which I have twice discussed at length right
here in Washington within the past month,
once in a siieech '' and once in a letter to
the Washingioh Post. The legal soundness
of this position is attested to not only by the
United States Government but also by the
other governments, including Western pow-
ers, who joined in voting for the Security
Council resolutions on this issue.
Today I want to concentrate not on these
legal aspects but on the reasons of national
self-interest which led the United States to
support United Nations action in this situa-
tion. Contraiy to propaganda assertions, we
have not been engaged in pulling British
chestnuts out of the fire. We have acted,
and shall continue to act, for good Ameri-
can reasons of our own. These reasons can
be summed up in five points.
1. First and foremost, it is a basic in-
terest of the United States to promote peace
and stability in the world. Tlie "good neigh-
bor" principle in international affairs is not
confined to the Western Hemisphere; it is in
the United Nations Charter, and it applies
to every part of the world, including Africa.
And experience demonstrates that in Africa
today peace and stability are inseparable
from orderly progress toward self-deteiTni-
nation and equality for all the peoples of
that continent. If the attempt to deny these
rights to the African majority in Rhodesia
were to succeed, this would inevitably
strengthen the hand of violence, extremism,
racism, and instability in the heart of Africa.
The moderating and res]X)nsible participa-
tion by the United States in an international
approach to the Rhodesian problem is es-
^ For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution
adopted by the U.N. Security Council on Dec. 16,
1966, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
' Ibid., Jan. 23, 1967, p. 140.
sential to the resolution of that problem by
l)eaceful means.
2. Second, much of the standing of the
United States in world affairs derives from
our historic stance as an anticolonial power.
Throughout the great decolonizing era since
World War II we have been faithful to the
cause of self-determination and independ-
ence for colonial peoples. In supporting U.N.
action in Rhodesia we are pursuing the con-
sistent goal of all American administrations
since World War II.
The Smith regime is not asserting the
right of self-determination for all the people
of Rhodesia, but merely the right of the 6
percent who are white to rule over the 94
percent who are black. That is the whole pur-
pose of their illegal seizure of power; and
when we oppose such acts we do not thereby
deny self-determination or independence, we
support and affirm the:m.
3. Third, as a founding member of the
United Nations we have a particular obliga-
tion to prove that when we ratified the
charter with its pledge of supiwrt for "hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race," we meant
what we said. These charter provisions are
more than mere pious exhortations; they set
standards and goals which are consistent
with American values and objectives.
4. Moreover, our domestic position on
civil rights weighs on the same side of the
scale. Our country — founded on the proposi-
tion that all men are created equal and have
equal rights before the law, and currently
engaged in a vigorous nationwide program
to make that equality real for all citizens —
cannot adopt a double standard on what is
happening in Rhodesia.
5. Finally, we have practical interests in
all of Africa. Many assume that our eco-
nomic interests are limited to the southern
tip of the continent alone. These are indeed
substantial. But our current economic and
other material interests in the rest of Africa
are even more substantial, and in terms of
the future our stake is potentially even
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
291
greater. We thus have a practical interest
in maintaining good relations with the new
nations, with whom we have important, mu-
tually advantageous, and gi-owing economic
relations, and who cooperate with us in our
outer space and other peaceful activities, and
for whom the Rhodesian question is of the
highest importance.
Make no mistake about it, the basic in-
terests in the Rhodesian crisis are interests
in which America is deeply involved. We
cannot ignore that crisis without being faith-
less to our principles, impairing the good
name of our countiy before the world, and
isolating ourselves from the predominant
opinion of virtually the entire world com-
munity.
U.N. Action on South West Africa
Now I come to South West Africa, where
the same problem of racial injustice exists
in a different form. Although South Africa's
administering authority in this territory
arose from a League of Nations mandate.
South Africa has denied any international
accountability for its conduct in South West
Africa. Furthermore, South Africa has failed
in its obligation as the mandatory power to
promote the well-being and social progress
of the African population in the territory.
In fact, it has moved in the opposite direc-
tion, even applying against its people cer-
tain of the repressive mpartheid laws of
South Africa itself.
The international responsibilities of South
Africa respecting South West Africa were
long ago reaffirmed by advisory opinions of
the International Court of Justice. The
Court's decision last summer,* refusing by
a narrow majority, and on procedural
grounds, to pass on the adversaiy case be-
fore it, did not disturb these prior opinions
at all and was by no means a victory for
South Africa on the merits of the case.
The result of the Court's decision, of
course, was to bring, the whole issue to an
acute political stage. Last fall it was the
first question debated in the U.N. General As-
sembly.» The United States worked energet-
ically, and with some success, to help bring
about a constructive action in the Assembly.
We joined with a group of countries, both
African and non-African, in persuading the
Assembly to avoid an immediate confronta-
tion with South Africa. The Assembly
created a 14-nation committee charged with
recommending practical means by which
South West Africa should be administered
so that the people can exercise their right
of self-determination and achieve independ-
ence. The Assembly is scheduled to meet in
special session before the end of April to
consider the committee's recommendations.
The committee has already begun its
work. The United States is a member of it,
and our representative is the very able
foi-mer United States Attorney General, Am-
bassador William P. Rogers.'" We strongly
hope the committee's recommendations will
help to plot the course toward self-determi-
nation for the people of the territory. Here
again, our goal is to make progress by peace-
ful means — and to make sure the decisions
taken are within the capacity of the United
Nations to achieve.
It is the earnest hope of the United States
that South Africa, as a founding member of
the United Nations, will cooperate with this
committee. As I have already indicated, the
best way to solve difficult problems is not by
dramatic confrontations but by patient dia-
log. Whatever public statements have been
made, it is not too late for all concenied to
work together for a peaceful and practical
solution to this problem consistent with the
General Assembly's resolution.
Racism in South Africa
Finally, I come to the problem of racial
discrimination in South Africa itself. No-
where else in the world does a society of
several million people of the white race, with
an advanced economic and technical system,
' For background, see ibid., Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.
" For background, see ibid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690,
and Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.
'» See p. 302.
292
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
use the power of goveniment to impose strict
separation — and consequent subordination —
on the much largrer nonwhite majority in its
own midst. The policy is rigidly enforced.
Its domestic oiijwnents, white and black
alike, are prosecuted as criminals. Yet the
opposition does not cease and in fact is in-
creasing.
I need hardly restate the attitude of the
United States toward this phenomenon. We
find it, as my predecessor Adlai Stevenson
said, "racist in its orig'ins, arrogant in its
implementation, and, in its consequences,
potentially dangerous for all." " Our duty,
and that of the United Nations, as Governor
Stevenson also said, "is not only to help the
majority of the peoples of South Africa to
fulfill their legitimate aspirations but also
to avoid a racial conflict which could seri-
ously trouble peace and progress in Africa
and throughout the world."
In the face of this situation, over the years
the United Nations — and the United States
— has sought in various ways to influence
this situation for the better. In 1964 the Se-
curity Council, with our support, appealed
to South Africa to repeal its oppressive laws
and to release persons jailed for opiwsing
apartheid. It appealed for some process of
consultation among the various elements of
the South African population. It ordered,
and received, an expert study of the practi-
cality of economic sanctions against South
Africa. It set up an educational and train-
ing program for South Africans abroad, to
which the United States and other countries
have made contributions. This, of course, is
in addition to considerable educational aid
to South Africans abroad which the United
States Government has been carrying on in
its own right.
And, finally, the Security Council called
upon all states to embargo the sale to South
Africa of arms, ammunition, military vehi-
cles and equipment, and materials for the
" For statements by Ambassador Stevenson and
text of a resolution adopted by the U.N. Security
Council on June 18, 1964, see Bulletin of July 6,
1964, p. 29.
manufacture and maintenance of arms and
ammunition. The United States has strictly
enforced this embargo. We are hopeful that,
in some other countries where the enforce-
ment has been less strict, it will be tightened
up.
Clearly these steps have not been enough
to bring about a real change in the situa-
tion. I said last September in the General
Assembly in talking about South West
Africa that "Continued violation by South
Africa of its plain obligations to the inter-
national community would necessarily re-
quire all nations, including my own, to take
such an attitude into account in their rela-
tionships with South Africa." ^^ We of the
United States want to avoid such an even-
tuality. The United States, with other United
Nations members, will not cease its search
for peaceful and practical means to impress
upon the South African Government the
need for a policy of justice and equity for
all its peoples.
Problems of New African Nations
Such, then, are the major political prob-
lems in southern Africa today, problems
which have as their common denominator the
continuation of white racial domination.
It should be candidly recognized that
Africa has other problems, too, and that
even if the last vestiges of white racism
were to disappear tomorrow these other
problems would still exist.
There are, for one thing, the tremendous
needs of the African nations for all kinds
of economic and technical development: in
agriculture, industry, urban aff"airs, trans-
port, health, nutrition, education, and man-
power training.
There is the necessity for regional coop-
eration in many aspects of this African de-
velopment process, such as communications,
transportation, electric power. Yet today
such regional cooperation is more an aspira-
tion than a reality.
There are instances of lawless violence, and
'^ Ihid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
293
even of tribal and racial conflict, which every
friend of Africa must deplore.
It is not the part of friendship to be silent
about such tendencies. But neither is it the
part of wisdom or fairness to exaggerate
them or to be self-righteous about them.
What new nation, throughout history,
seeking its place in the world, has not dis-
played some of these same shortcomings?
Even today, surely we in the United States
have little cause to feel superior, since after
190 years our country is still putting its own
house in order in the field of human rights
and the rights of minority groups. And even
if we had no such problem, it is neither wise
nor admirable for the swimmer who has
made it to the shore to stand and mock those
who are still stnaggling in the water.
Like all peoples, we Americans like to re-
call our glorious past history — and it is right
that we should remind ourselves of the best
things in our heritage. But let us also recall
that America's relations with Africa have
not been altogether glorious. Our early rela-
tionships with that continent consisted
chiefly of our being a leading participant in
the slave trade. Even today we as a nation
are still working to purge ourselves of the
evil results of that episode in our history.
Now, in our time, we are engaged in a
great eflfort to redress, to balance, both at
home and abroad: at home by seeing to it
that every citizen enjoys the full rights and
opportunities of an American; and abroad
by building a new, affiiTnative, constructive
relationship with the freedom-seeking na-
tions of Africa.
The key to such a relationship, I suggest,
is a policy founded in the best American tra-
dition of pragmatic idealism. To those who
are impatient, let us show that we under-
stand and sympatliize with their impatience,
while at the same time we pursue the re-
sponsible path of orderly and realistic prog-
ress. To those who, on the other hand, resist
all changes, let us show that the way to
preserve peace is the timely redress of
legitimate grievances, not the submergence
of them.
The ultimate strength of our nation lies
in our fidelity to our liistoric values and
ideals, for which Africa today is a major
testing ground. Negro organizations and
Negro leaders do the whole Nation a service
by concerning themselves with Africa's
afl'airs. In a larger sense these affairs must
involve us all; and there is no better cause
that any Ameiican can serve.
294
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
The War on Hunger: Food for India
Message From President Johnson to the Congress ■
To the Congress of the United States:
Last February I proposed that all mankind
join in a war against man's oldest enemy:
hunger.2
Last March I proposed that the United
States take part in an urgent international
effort to help the Government of India stave
off the threat of f amine.^
I address you today to report progress in
organizing the war against hunger and to
seek your counsel on steps still to be taken.
For again this year, drought in India — as in
other nations — underlines the cruel mathe-
matics of hunger and calls for action.
The problem is immense. It cannot be
solved unless each country reaches a con-
sidered judgment on the course to be
pursued. The greatest power on earth is the
will of free peoples, expressed through the
deliberative processes of their national as-
semblies. I ask you today to take the lead in
a vital act of democratic affirmation.
India is not alone in facing the specter of
near famine. One-half of the world's people
confront this same problem.
India's plight reminds us that our genera-
tion can no longer evade the growing
imbalance between food production and
' White House press release dated Feb. 2 (also
published as H. Doc. 51, 90th Cong., 1st sess.).
' Bulletin, Feb. 28, 1966, p. 336.
' Ibid., Apr. 18, 1966, p. 605.
population growth. India's experience
teaches that something more must be done
about it.
From our own experience and that of
other countries, we know that something can
be done. We know that an agricultural revo-
lution is within the capacity of modern
science.
We know that land can be made to produce
much more food — enough food for the
world's population, if reasonable population
policies are pursued. Without some type of
voluntary population program, however, the
nations of the world — no matter how
generous — will not be able to keep up with
the food problem.
We know, too, that failure to act — and to
act now — will multiply the human suffering
and political unrest, not only in our genera-
tion but in that of our children and their
children.
The aim of the war against hunger is to
help developing nations meet this challenge.
It is the indispensable first step on the road
to progress.
If we are to succeed, all nations — rich and
poor alike — must join together and press the
agricultural revolution with the same spirit,
the same energy, and the same sense of
urgency that they apply to their own national
defense. Nothing less is consistent with the
human values at stake.
Last year, many responded to India's
emergency. Canada was particularly gener-
ous in sending food aid. Each member of the
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
295
India Aid Consortium made a special effort
to meet India's need. Non-members, Austra-
lia among others, also helped. The private
contributions of the Italian and Dutch people
were especially heartwarming. But the bleak
facts require a sustained international eifort
on a greater scale. Today I propose that all
nations make the new Indian emergency the
occasion to start a continuing worldwide
campaign against hunger.
II.
The first obligation of the community of
man is to provide food for all of its members.
This obligation overrides political differences
and differences in social systems.
No single nation or people can fulfill this
common obligation. No nation should be ex-
pected to do so. Every country must partici-
pate to insure the future of all. Every
country that makes a determined effort to
achieve sufficiency in food will find our gov-
ernment, our technical experts and our
people its enthusiastic partners. The United
States is prepared to do its share.
In pursuing the War on Hunger, the world
must face up to stark new facts about food
in our times.
— Food is scarce. Nowhere is there a real
surplus. Food aid must be allocated according
to the same priorities that govern other
development assistance.
— Per capita food production in many
parts of the less-developed world is not in-
creasing. In some cases, it is even declining.
This grim fact reflects both a rising curve of
population and a lagging curve of agricul-
tural production.
— There is no substitute for self-help. The
first responsibility of each nation is to sup-
ply the food its people needs. The war against
hunger can only be won by the efforts of the
developing nations themselves.
— Food aid is a stop-gap, not a permanent
cure. It must be viewed as part of a nation's
effort to achieve sufficiency in food, not as a
substitute for it.
— Agriculture must receive a much higher
priority in development plans and programs.
The developing nations can no longer take
food supplies for granted, while they con-
centrate on industrial development alone, or
si>end vitally needed resources on unneces-
sary military equipment.
— Agriculttiral development must be
planned as part of a nation's overall eco-
nomic and social program. Achieving a bal-
ance between population and resources is as
important as achieving a balance between in-
dustrial and agricultural growth.
— Fertilizer, seed, and pesticides must be
provided in much greater quantities than
ever before. Their use increases food produc-
tion and permanently changes the productive
capability of farmers. A ton of fertilizer
properly used this year can mean several
tons of grain next year.
— All advanced nations — including those
which import food — must share the burden
of feeding the hungry and building their ca-
pacity to feed themselves.
— The War on Hunger is too big for gov-
ernments alone. Victory cannot come unless
businessmen, universities, foundations, vol-
untary agencies and cooperatives join the
battle.
— Developing nations with food deficits
mtist put more of their resources into volun-
tary family planning .programs.
These are the facts your Government has
been stressing throughout the world. Many
of them are unpleasant. But our lives are
pledged to the conviction that free people
meet their responsibilities when they face
the truth.
These facts draw into bold relief the two
main thrusts in the offensive against hun-
ger:
First, the hungry nations of the world
must be helped to achieve the capacity to
grow the food their people need or to buy
what they cannot grow.
Second, until they can achieve this goal,
the developed nations must help meet their
needs by food shipments on generous terms.
The level of food aid will decline as self-
help measures take hold. Until that point is
reached, food aid is an inescapable duty of
the world community.
296
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
III.
During the past year the advanced nations
have made progress in preparing the ground
for the international War on Hunger.
First, the pattern of international coopera-
tion has steadily improved.
Last July w.e were pleased to act as host
to a high-level meeting of the Development
Assistance Committee of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
which focused primarily on the world food
problem.^
We encouraged greater contributions to
the World Food Program by increasing our
pledge to that program and by offering to
match with commodities contributions in both
cash and commodities from other countries.
We co-sponsored a resolution in the United
Nations that launched a UN-Food and Agri-
culture Organization study of whether and
how to organize a multilateral food aid pro-
gram of vastly larger proportions.
In the Kennedy Round of trade negotia-
tions, we have advanced a proposal to make
available from all sources ten million tons
of food grains annually for food aid, to be
supported by grain exporters and importers
alike. This proposal is now being discussed
in Geneva as part of an International Ce-
reals Arrangement.
We are now participating in a study ini-
tiated by the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation— in cooperation with the World Bank,
the UN and the OECD — to examine how
multilateral action might increase the avail-
ability and effective use of fertilizers and
other materials needed to speed up agricul-
tural production.
At the OECD Ministerial Meeting this
fall, we advanced a proposal to develop an
Agricultural Food Fund to encourage pri-
vate investment in the basic agricultural in-
dustries of the developing countries.^
Second, the United States encouraged a
*For background, see ibid., Aug. 8, 1966, p. 199.
* For U.S. statements and text of a communique
issued at the close of the meeting of the OECD
Ministerial Council on Nov. 25, 1966, see ibid., Jan.
2, 1967, p. 19.
multilateral response to last year's emer-
gency in India.
The worst drought of the century threat-
ened millions with starvation and countless
more with disease bom of malnutrition. As
a result, I recommended, and you in the
Congress, approved a program to send over
8 million tons of food grain to India. In an
unprecedented display of common concern,
governments, private organizations and in-
dividuals in 42 other nations joined in pro-
viding $180 million in food and other com-
modities to meet the needs of that country.
Over-all, India imported almost 11 million
tons of grain and used several million tons
from its own emergency food reserves.
The fact that India did not experience
famine ranks among the proudest chapters
in the history of international cooperation.
But last year's effort— heartening as it was
— ^was hasty and improvised. The world must
organize its response to famine — both today
and for the years ahead.
Third, this year's economic aid program
makes agricultural development a primary
objective.
The AID program which I will shortly
send to the Congress, includes funds to fi-
nance imports of fertilizer, irrigation pumps,
and other American equipment and know-
how necessary to improve agriculture in the
developing countries.
Fourth, I proposed and the Congress erv-
acte.d far-reaching legislation which provides
the strong foundation for the new Food for
Freedom program.
The central theme of the program is self-
help. The legislation authorized concessional
sales of food to countries which prove their
determination to expand their own food pro-
duction.
IV.
All of us know where the real battle is
fought. Whatever the efforts in world capi-
tals, the real tale is told on the land. It is
the man behind the mule — or the bullock —
or the water buffalo — who must be reached.
Only his own government and his own people
can reach him.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
297
Thus, the most important progress of the
past year has occurred in the developing
countries themselves. And there is progress
to report.
India — the largest consumer of food aid —
perhaps provides the best example.
This has been a year of innovation in
Indian agriculture. Agricultural development
now has top priority in India's economic
plan. Much remains to be done. But the
evidence is unmistakable. India has started
on the right path. India has:
— Imposed a food rationing system to make
efficient use of existing supplies.
— Streamlined its transportation system to
improve distribution.
— Increased prices paid to the farmer, thus
providing new incentives to use fertilizer,
improved seeds and other modern materials.
— Begun large-scale operations with new
varieties of rice introduced from Taiwan and
with large quantities of high-yielding wheat
seed imported from Mexico.
— Approved plans to increase public in-
vestment in agriculture by more than 100%
during the new Five Year Plan.
— Started to expand rural credit, improve
water supply and accelerate the distribution
of fertilizer to remote areas.
—Stepped up family planning.
— Negotiated an agreement for the first of
several externally financed fertilizer plants
to expand India's supply of home-produced
fertilizers.
India is off to a good start. But it is only
a start. As Indian officials have warned, hard
work remains in reaching targets they have
set and in improving cooperation among
state governments. India's economic prob-
lems are enormous. But they can be solved.
What India has begun to do represents the
growing realization in the developing world
that long-term economic growth is dependent
on growth in agriculture. Not every country
has made an effort as great as India's. But
in some countries, production has improved
more rapidly.
Everywhere there is an air of change. No
longer does industrial development alone at-
tract the best minds and talents. Agricul-
ture is now attracting the young and more
enterprising economists, administrators and
entrepreneurs in the developing world.
This is the best measure of progress in the
War on Hunger and the best assurance of
success.
India's food problem requires a major
commitment of our resources and those of
other advanced countries. India's population
is equal to that of 66 members of the United
Nations.
Broad authority exists under our legisla-
tion for national action by Executive deci-
sion alone. But the issues presented here are
of such moment, and on such a scale, as to
make it important that we act together, as
we do on other great issues, on the firm
foundation of a Joint Resolution of Congress.
I ask you to support the broad approach
we have proposed to the international com-
munity as a basic strategy for the War on
Hunger. That strategy rests on three essen-
tial principles:
1. Self help. The War on Hunger can be
won only by the determined efforts of the
developing nations themselves. International
aid can help them. But it can only help if
they pursue well-conceived and well-executed
long-range plans of their own.
2. Multilateral participation. The assist-
ance of the international conununity must be
organized in a coalition of the advanced and
the developing nations.
3. Comprehensive planning. The interna-
tional community must develop a comprehen-
sive plan to assist India to fulfill its program
of achieving food sufficiency, not only during
this year, but for the next few years as well.
Most of you are familiar with the events
of the past year. Drought limited India's
food grain production to 72 million tons in
the 1965-66 crop year, compared with a rec-
298
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ord 88 million tons the previous year. A mas-
sive international emergency program met
tlie immediate crisis. But India had to use
precious food reserves — that are thus not
available to meet the shortages created by a
second successive bad crop.
The weather since then has brought little
relief. The general outlook is slightly im-
proved, and over-all production may reach
79 million tons this year. But late last sum-
mer a severe drought hit heavily-populated
areas in north-central India. Unless Indian
production is supplemented by substantial
imports — perhaps 10 million tons by present
estimates for calendar 1967 — ^more than 70
million people will experience near famine.
The GoveiTunent of India has already
taken internal measures to move grain from
its more fortunate areas to the drought
areas. Imports of 2.3 million tons of grain
are now in the pipeline to meet India's needs
for the first two or three months of 1967.
India has purchased some 200,000 tons of
this grain with her own scarce foreign ex-
change. Canada with 185,000 tons, Australia
with 150,000 tons and the Soviet Union with
200,000 tons have already joined the United
States with its 1.6 million tons, in an im-
pressive multilateral eifort to help.
India's immediate problem — and the
world's problem — is to fill the remaining gap
for the balance of this year.
Because these facts bear heavily on the
extent of US food shipments, I have re-
quested and received careful verification
from our Ambassador in New Delhi, from
the Secretary of Agriculture and from mem-
bers of Congress, who have recently been in
India, including Senator [Gale W.] McGee
and Senator [Frank E.] Moss.
I am particularly grateful to Representa-
tive [W. R.] Poage and Representative
[Robert] Dole and Senator [Jack] Miller,
who at my request made a special trip to
India in December to assess the situation on
the ground. Their careful and thorough anal-
ysis of the situation in India and their rec-
ommendations to me have been of great
value.
During the last two weeks, the Under Sec-
retary of State for Political Affairs and the
Under Secretary of Agriculture have con-
sulted in New Delhi and with most members
of the World Bank's India Consortium.
The work of all these men and the diplo-
matic efforts of the Government of India
have laid the foundation for the steps we
must now take.
The United States cannot — and should not
— approach this problem alone or on an im-
provised basis. We must support the Indian
Government's efforts to enlist the aid of
other nations in developing a systematic and
international approach to the problems of
Indian agriculture. Our long term objective
is to help India achieve its goal of virtual
self-sufficiency in grain by the early 1970's.
Meanwhile, as part of that effort, we must
help India meet its immediate food needs.
VI.
In line with policies established by the
Congress, and after promising consultations
with the Government of India and other gov-
ernments involved, I recommend the follow-
ing steps to achieve these objectives:
First: Our basic policy is to approach the
problem of Indian food through the India
Aid Consortium organized under the chair-
manship of the World Bank. That Consor-
tium has already developed a multilateral ap-
proach to economic assistance for India.
Now, we propose to make food aid a part
of that multilateral assistance program. We
seek effective multilateral arrangements to
integrate Indian food aid with broader pro-
grams of economic assistance and with cap-
ital and technical assistance for agricultural
development.
In a preliminary way, we have consulted
with the Government of India and with
other members of the Consortium. There is
substantial agreement among Consortium
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
299
members on the major points of our pro-
posal:
— Meeting food needs of India during this
emergency should be accepted as an inter-
national responsibility in which each nation
should share;
— Emergency food and food-related aid
should be coordinated through the World
Bank Consortium;
— This aid should not diminish the flow
of resources for other development pro-
grams. It should be in addition to the targets
for each country suggested by the World
Bank.
Adding food aid to the responsibilities of
the Consortium is sound economics and fair
burden-sharing. The Consortium provides a
proper channel for the food and food-related
aid of donors who have not previously been
involved in the food field. It will make clear
that food provided from outside is as much
a real contribution to Indian development as
capital for specific projects or foreign ex-
change assistance for import programs.
Second: Should this program be estab-
lished, we will support the Indian Con-
sortium as it:
— Undertakes a detailed projection of In-
dian food production and food aid require-
ments;
— Prepares a program for non-food im-
ports required to meet food production tar-
gets, as the basis for determining the equi-
table share of each donor;
— Reviews India's self-help efforts, reports
regularly on progress and identifies areas for
future concentation of energies.
Third: We must take prompt action to help
India meet its emergency food needs. Our
best present estimate is that India needs
deliveries of 10 million tons of food grains
this year or roughly $725 million worth of
food. 2.3 million tons, worth roughly $185
million, are already in the pipeline from a
number of countries, including our own. To
keep food in the pipeline, I am making an
immediate allocation of 2 million tons, worth
nearly $150 million, to tide India over while
the Congress acts.
I recommend that Congress approve a
commitment to share fully in the interna-
tional eff'ort to meet India's remaining food^'
grain deficit of 5.7 million tons — worth about
$400 million. To that end, I recommend a
U.S. allocation of an additional amount of
food grain, not to exceed 3 million tons, pro-
vided it is appropriately matched by other
countries. I recommend that approximately
$190 million available to the Commodity
Credit Corporation in calendar 1967 be used
for this purpose. These funds, if allotted, will
have to be replenished by appropriation in
Fiscal 1968.
Fourth: I recommend your approval of an
allocation of $25 million in food commodities
for distribution by CARE [Cooperative for
American Relief Everywhere] and other
American voluntary agencies, to assist the
Government of India in an emergency feed-
ing program in the drought areas of Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh.
Fifth: We hope other donors vdll acceler-
ate their exports of fertilizers to India.
Unless the application of chemical fertil-
izers rises sharply in India, she will not be
able to meet her food grain targets. Those
fertilizer targets are ambitious, yet they
must be met and if possible, exceeded.
Marshalling more fertilizer imports is as im-
portant to meeting India's emergency as
gathering additional grain. India herself
must take prompt steps to increase her fer-
tilizer investment and production and im-
prove its distribution.
Sixth: I propose for the longer run to
continue encouraging U.S. private investors
to participate in India's program to expand
production of chemical fertilizers. We will
urge other governments to encourage their
own producers.
Seventh: We intend to pursue other initia-
tives in the broader context of world agri-
cultural development:
— We shall continue to press for multilat-
eral eflforts in every international forum in
300
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ilj vhich we participate, including- the current
legotiations to establish a food aid program
3 IS part of an International Cereals Arrange-
j.inent.
I — We shall continue our policy of en-
jouraging private capital and technology to
ioin the War on Hunger.
— We shall press for the creation of an
nvestment guarantee fund by the OECD to
jncourage private investment in the agri-
ultural industries of developing countries.
— We shall make available to food deficit
nations the technology our scientists have
low developed for producing fish protein
oncentrate.
— We shall look to the study by the Presi-
dent's Science Advisory Committee on the
problems of food production to supply fur-
;her and more definitive guidelines for near-
term action and for long-range planning.
None of these steps can be as important
as Indian resolve and Indian performance.
The Indian Government is committed to a
bold program of agricultural modernization.
That program is the foundation for the en-
tire international effort to help India. We be-
lieve that a self-reinforcing process of im-
provement is under way in India, affecting
both agricultural techniques and government
administration. On the basis of that convic-
tion, we can move forward to do our share
under the Food for Freedom Program of
1966.
VII.
I believe these proijosals are in our na^
tional interest. I believe that they reflect the
deepest purposes of our national spirit.
I am asking the Congress, and the Amer-
ican people, to join with me in this effort
and in an appeal to all the nations of the
world that can help. I am asking the Con-
gress to consider thoroughly my recommen-
dations and to render its judgment. The Ex-
ecutive Branch, this Nation and other
nations will give full attention to the con-
tributions that Congressional debate may
produce.
There are many legitimate claims on our
resources. Some may question why we devote
a substantial portion to a distant country.
The history of this century is ample reply.
We have never stood idly by while famine or
pestilence raged among any part of the hu-
man family. America would cease to be
America if we walked by on the other side
when confronted by such catastrophe.
The great lesson of our time is the inter-
dependence of man. My predecessors and I
have recognized this fact. All that we and
other nations have sought to accomplish in
behalf of world peace and economic growth
would be for naught if the advanced coun-
tries failed to help feed the hungry in their
day of need.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, February 2, 1967.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
301
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa
Statement by William P. Rogers
Mr. Chairman, the question before us is
complex, and the time before the next meet-
ing of the General Assembly is short. All
delegations are familiar with the long and
frustrating search of the world community
to find a just and pacific solution for the
question of South West Africa. We agree
with Chief Adebo [S.O. Adebo, representa-
tive of Nigeria] and Ambassador Makonnen
[Lij Endalkatchew Makonnen, representative
of Ethiopia] and others that we need not
review the histoiy of United Nations con-
sideration of this question.
Indeed, as the United States Representa-
tive, Ambassador Goldberg, observed in his
statement during the General Assembly
debate,^ virtually all the membership, with
only a few exceptions, agreed on the inter-
national status of South West Africa, on the
continuing responsibility of the United Na-
tions, on the failure of the Government of
South Africa to meet its mandatory obliga-
tions, and on the right of the people of South
West Africa to exercise the right of self-
determination as that term is universally
understood. With but one exception the com-
munity of nations speaks with unanimity in
the rejection of the imposition on the ter-
' Made before the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee for
South West Africa on Jan. 26 (U.S./U.N. press re-
lease 4). Mr. Rogers is U.S. Representative on the
committee.
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.
ritory of the policy of apartheid. This
general agreement has a firm legal basis
deriving from the original mandate, the
League covenant, the advisory opinions of the
International Court of Justice, and the
resolutions of the General Assembly.
We are not asked to and, as others have
said, should not repeat here the debate of
last fall. The resolution which grew out of
the debate, after significant modification of
the original draft, reflected the desire of the
General Assembly to translate broad agree-
ment on essential principles into similarly
broad agreement on practical means for giv-
ing effect to the Assembly's decision.'
This ad hoc committee is the instrumen-
tality to develop those practical means. Its
task is to recommend to a special session of
the General Assembly what has been termed
"a considered blueprint for united and peace-
ful action for the benefit of the people of
South West Africa." * I believe, Mr. Chair-
man, the resolution itself and the subsequent
representative composition of this committee
are indications of the determination of the
General Assembly that a sincere eff'ort
should be made to achieve broad agreement
on a realistic plan of action.
There are three general principles which I
would like to allude to as we approach our
^ For text of General Assembly Resolution 2145
(XXI), see ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 871.
* Ibid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.
302
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
task. First, until the committee formulates
more definite conclusions based on verified
facts, we should not foreclose any course of
action which might lead us toward the at-
tainment of our objective. Second, my dele-
gation sympathizes fully with the desire for
speed, but it would be most unwise to ignore
the fact that we are dealing with a highly
complex problem. The desii-e for speed must
be reconciled with the imperative necessity
for accuracy, wisdom, and balance. History
will judge the work of this committee by its
success in meeting these criteria. Finally,
the overriding consideration of the com-
mittee in carrying out its mission must be to
contribute in the most effective way to the
permanent welfare of the people of South
West Africa.
For its part, the United States welcomes
the opportunity to serve on this committee.
We are not unmindful of the challenge of the
task before us nor of the differing views
members of this group and other United
Nations members may have as to how the
United Nations should now discharge its
responsibilities. We accept the general guid-
ance provided by the Assembly, and we are
confident that other committee members do
also.
Our task is clear. It is the highly respon-
sible task of recommending what paragraph
6 of the General Assembly's resolution calls
"practical means by which South West
Africa should be administered, so as to en-
able the people of the Territory to exercise
the right of self-determination and to
achieve independence." In fulfilling this task,
we must take care that we do not stray from
the specific guidance given us by the Assem-
bly. And in any decision regarding the future
of the people of South West Africa our fore-
most concern should be whether they will
have any practical effect in assisting the pop-
ulation to realize self-determination and in-
dependence.
Having made these general remarks, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to turn to some
thoughts on the organization of the commit-
tee's work. First, I would like to say that
my delegation listened carefully to the state-
ments made by Chief Adebo and Ambassador
Makonnen, as well as those by Ambassador
Ignatieff [George Ignatieff , representative of
Canada] and Ambassador Pinera [Jose
Pifiero Carvallo, representative of Chile].
We shall study carefully the memorandum
submitted by the delegation of Nigeria on
behalf of our African colleagues, as I am
certain will other members of the committee.
To their suggestions I would like to add our
own considerations, which have centered
around three basic questions:
1. What are the facts about the adminis-
trative requirements in South West Africa,
that is to say, what are the geographic,
ethnic, social, economic, and political factors
which are essential to an informed opinion
on the administrative requirements of the
territory?
2. What administrative and other changes
should occur to assure fulfillment of the re-
quirements of the mandate — material and
moral well-being and social progress — and
of the 1966 resolution — self-determination
and independence?
3. On the basis of the foregoing, who
should administer the territory and what
"practical means" can the committee rec-
ommend to the General Assembly?
These considerations will of themselves
bring forth further questions. Thus, when
we consider the availability of information
on the territory, we should perhaps seek to
find out what sources of information can
provide the most accurate and necessary ma-
terial for us to pursue our work. We should
consider the possibility of utilizing as much
as possible the resources of the Secretariat.
It might be worthwhile to examine the ex-
tent to which we can obtain reports already
available as well as information from
scholars and reliable persons who have up-
to-date knowledge about the territory.
In seeking this information, we should,
of course, bear in mind the time limitations
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
308
in which this committee must work. In
gathering these facts, we should take into
account particularly the present system of
administration, the economy, the state of
education and communication, and the rela-
tionship among various groups in a popula-
tion which is known to be heterogeneous.
Other questions relating to information
will undoubtedly arise as we progress in our
work and as we seek to assure ourselves
that our views regarding the administration
of the territory have fully considered the
essential facts about the territory and the
wishes and desires of its people.
In connection with this aspect of our work,
Mr. Chairman, the United States Mission to
the United Nations, along with other per-
manent missions and international organi-
zations, received a note dated December 8,
1966, from the permanent representative of
the Republic of South Africa, enclosing a
statement by his Foreign Minister announc-
ing the intention of the South African Gov-
ernment to furnish interested governments
and organizations information on certain
aspects of South West Africa.
Such information would, of course, be of
particular value in this committee as the
U.N. body presently principally concerned
with the territory. It is our hope that
methods can be devised for receipt of infor-
mation by the United Nations, particularly
in areas where available information may
be insufficient or inaccurate.
Turning to the second basic aspect of our
considerations, relating to necessary admin-
istrative and other changes, we should direct
our attention to the developmental needs that
might exist economically, socially, politically,
and educationally, as well as to the type of
financial, technical, and administrative re-
sources that must be at the disposal of the
administrator. Further attention might well
be directed to the types of resources available
to supplement those of the territory. Serious
attention should be given the prospects for
improvement in the relations among the
various groups in South West Africa.
Finally, in examining further this second
question, we might well wish to determine
the extent to which improved education, com-
munications, and transportation systems are
necessary for the establishment of a gov-
ernmental structure that would take into
account a heterogeneous population. We
might also seek to find out what changes are
necessary to meet the economic and fiscal
needs should they prove insufficient to sup-
port needed development programs.
As to the third basic question, Mr. Chair-
man, the question of who should administer
the territory and what practical means we
can recommend to the General Assembly, my
delegation recalls that the General Assembly
had before it several proposals for the admin-
istration of the territory, including a proposal
for direct administration by the United Na-
tions. The Assembly neither endorsed nor re-
jected those proposals. Rather, after deciding
that henceforth the territory comes under
the direct responsibility of the United Na-
tions, it established this committee to recom-
mend practical means for the administration
of the territory.
In our view, therefore, the task of this com-
mittee includes the consideration of possible
alternative administration and the develop-
ment of some technique for determining
which of the alternative administrators is, in
fact, capable of fulfilling the administrative
requirements of the territory. Perhaps it
might prove necessary to consider other alter-
natives in addition to those discussed in the
General Assembly. However, in doing so, we
should avoid any expedient which would not
necessarily benefit the people of the territory.
In seeking a final solution we should bear in
mind the extent to which the United Nations
can fulfill its responsibility either through
direct administration or through some other
form of administration in order to assure
the welfare and basic rights of the inhabit-
ants of the territory and to provide for self-
determination and independence.
We would ourselves like to give further
thought to the questions which we have raised
304
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
during this general debate. Undoubtedly
other questions will arise during the course
of our discussions. The questions which have
been raised indicate the desire of the mem-
bers of this committee to explore thoroughly
thofee factors which may reasonably be con-
sidered if we are to fulfill our responsibility.
Recommendations which will lead to the in-
stitution of practical relief for the inhabi1>
ants of the territoiy — and which are there-
fore realistic and within the capacity of the
U.N. to achieve — must be based on a careful
exploration and evaluation of all avenues to
peaceful change. It is in this spirit that my
delegation approaches the task of this com-
mittee.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from, the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. Note by the Secretary-General. A/6595.
December 14, 1966. 7 pp.
United Nations Development Decade. Report of the
Second Committee. A/6602. December 16, 1966.
13 pp.
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of
Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects.
Report of the Special Political Committee. A/6603.
December 15, 1966. 19 pp.
World Social Situation. Report of the Third Com-
mittee. A/6614. December 16, 1966. 9 pp.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Information furnished by the United States on
objects launched into orbit or beyond. A/
AC.105/INF.148-149. December 29, 1966.
Economic and Social Council
Measures Taken in Implementation of the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Texts of (or ex-
tracts from) decisions taken by United Nations
organs containing provisions relevant to the ques-
tion of the violation of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms. E/4662. June 30, 1966. 124 pp.
Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the Ex-
traordinary Joint Meeting of the EC A Working
Party on Intra- African Trade and OAU Ad Hoe
Committee of Fourteen on Trade and Development,
Geneva, August 22-26, 1966. E/CN.14/361. August
29, 1966. 39 pp.
United Nations Children's Fund.
Digest of UNICEF Projects Currently Aided in
Asia. E/ICEF/551. September 1, 1966. 97 pp.
Digest of UNICEF Projects Currently Aided in
the Americas. E/ICEF/550. September 2, 1966.
140 pp.
Digest of Interregional Projects Aided by
UNICEF. E/ICEF/553. October 17, 1966. 20 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women. Economic
Rights and Opportunities for Women. ILO Stand-
ards Relating to Women's Employment. Report by
the International Labour Office. E/CN.6/465. Oc-
tober 10, 1966. 22 pp.
Implementation of a Five-Year Survey Programme
for the Development of Natural Resources. Report
of the Secretary-General. E/4281. November 4,
1966. 33 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women. Information
Concerning the Status of Women in Non-Self-
Governing Tei-ritories. Report of the Secretaiy-
General. E/CN.6/464. November 17, 1966. 22 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Guyana, February 3, 1967.
Maritime Matters
International agreement regarding the maintenance
of certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London
February 20, 1962. Entered into force October 28,
1966. TIAS 6150.
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, December 16, 1966.
Amendment to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.
Enters into force: October 6, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, January 4, 1967.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, December 19,
1966.
Enters into force: March 5, 1967.'
Patents
Agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy
of inventions relating to defense and for which
applications for patents have been made. Done at
• Not in force for the United States.
FEBRUARY 20, 1967
305
Paris September 21, 1960. Entered into force
January 12, 1961. TIAS 4672.
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, February 1,
1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Signatures: Belgium, Brazil, February 2, 1967;
Guyana, February 3, 1967; Jordan, February
2, 1967; Nepal, February 3, 1967; Niger, Feb-
ruary 1, 1967; Norway, February 3, 1967;
Somali Republic, February 2, 1967.
Trade
Protocol supplementary to the protocol to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade embodying
results of the 1960-61 Tariff Conference. Done at
Geneva May 6, 1963. Entered into force July 7,
1963.>
Acceptance: Federal Republic of Germany, De-
cember 13, 1966.
BILATERAL
Philippines
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), vrith exchange of notes.
Signed at Manila December 22, 1966. Entered into
force December 22, 1966.
Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguitia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in St. Kitts. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and St. Kitts December
19, 1966, and January 10, 1967. Entered into force
January 10, 1967.
St. Vincent
Agreement establishing a Peace Corps program in
St. Vincent. Effected by exchange of notes at
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
Bridgetown and St. Vincent December 16, 1966,
and January 18, 1967. Entered into force Janu-
ary 18, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20102. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Civil Rights and Race Relations: A Seminar. The
Universality of Race Relations, by Elliott P. Skin-
ner, Ambassador to Upper Volta; Civil Rights in the
United States, by Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States; and Implications for
Human Development in the Whole Civil Rights
Movement, by The Very Reverend Monsignor Rob-
ert J. Fox. Three addresses made at a seminar held
on June 23, 1966, as part of a predeparture briefing
program for U.S. students going to Latin American
universities on Fulbright-Hays grants. The second in
a series of publications prepared under the auspices
of the State Department's Equal Employment Op-
portunity Program. Pub. 8157. Department and For-
eign Service Series 135. 40 pp., illus., 20^.
Educational and Cultural Diplomacy — 1965. Annual
report on the Department's International Educa-
tional and Cultural Exchange Program and the
progress made in advancing mutual understanding
between the people of the United States and the
people of other countries. Appendixes contain statis-
tical tables and definitions of terms. Pub. 8160.
International Information and Cultural Series 92.
100 pp., illus., 35^.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1443 PUBLICATION 8200
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
,
NDEX February 20, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U3
4inerican Principles. Building a Durable Peace
(Rusk) 269
Angola. The United States, the United Nations,
and Southern Africa (Goldberg) 289
Asia
Building a Durable Peace (Rusk) 269
Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia 284
Congress. The War on Hunger: Food for India
(President's message to Congress) .... 295
Foreign Aid. The War on Hunger: Food for
India (President's message to Congress) . 295
Human Rights. The United States, the United
Nations, and Southern Africa (Goldberg) . 289
India. The War on Hunger: Food for India
(President's message to Congress) .... 295
Mozambique. The United States, the United
Nations, and Southern Africa (Goldberg) . 289
Outer Space. Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60
Nations at White House Ceremony (state-
ments at ceremony) 266
Portugal. The United States, the United Na-
tions, and Southern Africa (Goldberg) . . 289
Presidential Documents
Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60 Nations at
White House Ceremony 266
President Urges Ratification of Consular Pact
With U.S.S.R 287
The War on Hunger: Food for India (Presi-
dent's message to Congress) 295
Publications
Department Issues 1967 Edition of "Treaties
in Force" 288
Recent Releases 306
South Africa. The United States, the United
Nations, and Southern Africa (Goldberg) . 289
South West Africa
Tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee for South
West Africa (Rogers) 302
The United States, the United Nations, and
Southern Africa (Goldberg) 289
Southern Rhodesia. The United States, the
United Nations, and Southern Africa (Gold-
berg) 289
Treaty Information
Current Actions 305
Department Issues 1967 Edition of "Treaties in
Force" 288
Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60 Nations at
White House Ceremony (statements at cere-
mony) 266
President Urges Ratification of Consular Pact
With U.S.S.R 287
U.S.S.R.
Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60 Nations at
White House Ceremony (statements at cere-
mony) 266
President Urges Ratification of Consular Pact
With U.S.S.R 287
United Kingdom. Outer Space Treaty Signed
by 60 Nations at White House Ceremony
(statements at ceremony) 266
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 305
Outer Space Treaty Signed by 60 Nations at
White House Ceremony (statements at cere-
mony) 266
Tasks of the Ad Hoc Committee for South
West Africa (Rogers) 802
The United States, the United Nations, and
Southern Africa (Goldberg) 289
Viet-Nam
Building a Durable Peace (Rusk) 269
Fourteen Points for Peace in Southeast Asia . 284
General Taylor Discusses Recent Developments
in Viet-Nam 285
Secretary Rusk Discusses Viet-Nam in Inter-
view for British Television 274
Name Index
Dean, Sir Patrick 266
Dobrynin, Anatoliy 266
Goldberg, Arthur J 266, 289
Johnson, President 266, 287, 295
Rogers, William P 302
Rusk, Secretary 266, 269, 274
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D 285
U Thant 266
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases; Jan. 30-Feb. 5
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D. C, 20520.
Release issued prior to January 30 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No.
16 of January 26.
Subject
U.S. programs in international
education.
Books on Pakistani law presented
to Department.
Treaties in Force . . . 1967 re-
leased.
Cotton textile agreement with Is-
rael.
Boonstra sworn in as Ajnbassa-
dor to Costa Rica (biographic
details) .
Rimestad sworn in as Deputy
Under Secretary for Adminis-
tration (biographic details).
No.
Date
*17
2/1
*18
2/2
19
2/2
t20
2/2
*21
2/3
•22 2/3
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
tr U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/33
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Foreign Relations of the United States
1944, Volume I, General
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Volume I is concerned with the multilateral diplomacy of the United States. Of particula:
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
(VjAP ? ':\ jHR?
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF FEBRUARY 9 317
EAST ASIA TODAY
hy Assistant Secretary Bundy 323
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
Excerpts From the President's Economic' Report and the
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers 333
UNITED STATES PEACE AIMS IN VIET-NAM
hy Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 310
For index see inside back cover
United States Peace Aims in Viet-Nam
by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
Our effort to open the door to peace in
Viet-Nam has been continuous. In recent
weeks public attention has been focused on
this effort by an unusual number of state-
ments, reports, and events: pronouncements
by the governments involved, appeals by
world leaders including Pope Paul and Secre-
tary-General Thant, news stories and inter-
views with various personalities — and the
perplexing events in mainland China. Right
now we are in the midst of another pause
in the fighting, the Lunar New Year truce.
Thus this may be a good moment to assess
the present status of our efforts for peace.
In such an assessment a responsible oflficial
must, in all that he says in public, avoid
damaging the hopes for progress through
private diplomacy. But in a free society he
must also accept the inescapable respon-
sibility to keep the public adequately
informed. It is difficult to deal on both levels
at once, but it is essential to do so as well
as we can.
Let me begin, then, by recalling the basic
American peace aims in Viet-Nam. These
aims have been stated many times by Presi-
dent Johnson and other responsible spokes-
men of the United States. They have been
stated over a span of 2 years, but the ebb and
flow of the military situation during that
time has not made them any less valid as
guidelines for peace negotiations. We do not
subscribe to the false notion that a strong
military position obviates the desirability of
seeking peace through negotiations. Today,
therefore, I wish to review the essence of
these American aims.
The United States seeks a political solution
in Viet-Nam. We do not seek the uncondi-
tional surrender of our adversaries. We seek
a settlement whose terms will result not
from dictation but from genuine negotiations,
a settlement whose terms will not sacrifice
the vital interest of any party. In the words
of the Manila communique: ^ ". . . the settle-
ment of the war in Vietnam depends on the
readiness and willingness of the parties con-
cerned to explore and work out together a
just and reasonable solution." As President
Johnson said a week ago here in Washing-
tion: ^ Such a solution "will involve . . . con-
cessions on both parts."
We are not engaged in a "holy war"
against communism. We do not seek an
American sphere of influence in Asia, nor a
permanent American "presence" of any
kind — military or otherwise — in Viet-Nam,
nor the imposition of a military alliance on
South Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to do any injury to main-
' Address made at a special convocation at How-
ard University, Washington, D.C., on Feb. 10 (U.S./
U.N. press release 13).
' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
^ At a news conference at the White House on
Feb. 2.
310
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
land China nor to threaten any of its legiti-
mate interests.
We seek to assure to the people of South
Viet-Nam the affirmative exercise of the
right of self-determination, the right to de-
cide their o\vn political destiny free of ex-
ternal interference and force and through
democratic processes. In keeping with the
announced South Vietnamese Government's
policy of national reconciliation, we do not
seek to exclude any segment of the South
Vietnamese people from peaceful participa-
tion in their country's future. We are pre-
pared to accept the results of that decision,
whatever it may be. We support the early
consummation of a democratic constitutional
system in South Viet-Nam and welcome the
progress being made to this end.
As regards North Viet-Nam, we have no
designs on its territory, and we do not seek
to overthrow its government, whatever its
ideology. We are prepared fully to respect its
sovereignty and territorial integrity and to
enter into specific undertakings to that end.
We believe the reunification of Viet-Nam
should be decided upon through a free choice
by the peoples of both the North and the
South without any outside interference; and
the results of that choice also will have our
full support.
Finally, when peace is restored we are
willing to make a major commitment of
money, talent, and resources to a multilateral
cooperative effort to bring to all of Southeast
Asia, including North Viet-Nam, the benefits
of economic and social reconstruction and
development which that area so sorely needs.
These, then, are the peace aims of the
United States. They parallel the objectives
stated by the South Vietnamese Government
at Manila. Our aims are strictly limited, and
we sincerely believe they contain nothing
inconsistent with the interests of any party.
Our public pronouncements of them — both in
Washington and at the United Nations — are
solemn commitments by the United States.
Our adversaries have also placed their
aims and objectives on the public record over
the past 2 years. The major statement of
these aims is the well-known four points of
Hanoi, which I will summarize without
departing too much from their own ter-
minology.
Hanoi's Four Points
The first point calls for recognition of the
basic national rights of the Vietnamese
people: peace, independence, sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity. It also calls
for the cessation of all acts of war against
the North; the ending of United States inter-
vention in the South; the withdrawal of all
United States troops, military personnel, and
weapons of all kinds; the dismantling of
American bases; and the cancellation of what
they term the United States "military alli-
ance" with South Viet-Nam.
The United States would not find any
essential difficulty with a reasonable inter-
pretation of any of the terms included in this
point. Our chief concern is what it does not
include: namely, that North Viet-Nam also
cease its intervention in the South, end all of
its acts of war against the South, and with-
draw its forces from the South. Such a
requirement is obviously essential to the
"peace" to which this first point refers.
The second point relates to the military
clauses of the Geneva agreements. It pro-
vides that, pending the peaceful reunification
of Viet-Nam, both the North and the South
must refrain from joining any military
alliance and that there should be no foreign
bases, troops, or military personnel in their
respective territories.
Here again, the only real difficulty is the
omission of any obligation on the North to
withdraw its military forces from the South
— although the Geneva accords, which estab-
lished the demarcation line in Viet-Nam,
forbid military interference of any sort by
one side in the affairs of the other and even
go so far as to forbid civilians to cross the
demilitarized zone.
The third point calls for the settlement of
the South's internal affairs in accordance
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
311
with the program of the National Liberation
Front for South Viet-Nam. This point, of
course, was not a part of the Geneva accords
at all. It introduces a new element which I
shall discuss later in this analysis.
The fourth point calls for the peaceful
reunification of Viet-Nam, to be settled by
the people of both zones without any foreign
interference. We have no difficulty with this
point, as was indicated in my speech to the
General Assembly on September 22. *
There has apparently been added a fifth
point — put forward and repeatedly endorsed
by both Hanoi and the National Liberation
Front since the enunciation of the four points
in April 1965. This fifth point was stated by
Ho Chi Minh in January 1966, when he said
that if the United States really wants peace,
it must recognize the National Liberation
Front as the "sole genuine representative" of
the people of South Viet-Nam and engage in
negotiation with it. This, like the third of
the four points, introduces a new element
which was not part of the Geneva accords.
Now, from this brief summation of our
aims and those declared by Hanoi, it is clear
that there are areas of agreement and areas
of disagreement. Recent public statements
by Hanoi have been helpful in certain
aspects, but how great the disagreements are
is still uncertain, because the stated aims of
Hanoi still contain a number of ambiguities.
I would like to discuss some of these ambigui-
ties because they relate to very consequential
matters.
Ambiguities in Hanoi's Stated Aims
There is ambiguity, for example, on the
role of the National Liberation Front in
peace negotiations. I have already noted the
statement of Ho Chi Minh and other spokes-
men for our adversaries who have said that
we must recognize the Front as "the sole
genuine representative" of the South Viet-
namese people and negotiate with it. If this
means that we are asked to cease our recogni-
tion of the Government in Saigon and deal
only with the Front, insistence on this point
would imperil the search for peace. For the
Front has not been chosen by any democratic
process to represent the people of South Viet>
Nam. Nor has the Front been recognized by
the world community. It is pertinent to recall
that more than 60 nations recognize the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam in
Saigon, whereas none recognizes the National
Liberation Front as a government.
On the other hand, some public statements
seem to call for the National Liberation
Front to be given a place or voice at the
negotiating table. If this were the position
of our adversaries, the prospects would be
brighter; for President Johnson, as long ago
as July 1965,5 said that "The Viet Cong
would have no difficulty in being represented
and having their views presented if Hanoi
for a moment decides she wants to cease
aggression." He added that this did not seem
to him to be "an insurmountable problem,"
and that "I think that could be worked out."
A further ambiguity relates to the role of
the National Liberation Front in the future
political life of South Viet-Nam. Hanoi asks
that the affairs of South Viet-Nam be
settled "in accordance with the program of
the National Liberation Front." Our adver-
saries, in their various comments on this
point, take no notice of the internationally
recognized Government of South Viet-Nam
or of the steps which the South Vietnamese
leaders have taken and have currently under
way and the institutions they are now creat-
ing for the purpose of providing their
country with a constitutional and representa-
tive government. Nor would their statements
seem to leave any place for the South Viet-
namese who have participated in and pro-
moted such steps. Such an interpretation
would pose serious obstacles to a settlement.
However, some claim that what the
National Liberation Front really seeks is no
more than the opportunity to advance its pro-
* For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.
312
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gram peacefully along with other elements
and groupings in the South in a free political
environment.
We have already made it clear that we do
not wish to exclude any segment of the South
Vietnamese people from peaceful participa-
tion in their country's future and that we
support a policy of national reconciliation
endorsed by the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment in the Manila communique. Indeed, as
Secretary Rusk said in an interview last
week,* if the Viet Cong were to lay down
their arms, ways could be found to permit
them to take part in the normal political
processes in South Viet- Nam.
Further ambiguities arise concerning the
question of foreign troops in South Viet-Nam.
What does Hanoi mean by "foreign troops"?
They clearly include in this term the forces
of the United States and other countries aid-
ing the South, but they have never admitted
the presence of their own forces in the South.
Of course, a one-sided withdrawal by our side
would not lead to an acceptable peace. All
external forces must withdraw, those of
Hanoi as well as ours, if peace is to be
achieved.
There is ambiguity also in Hanoi's position
on the timing of the withdrawal of external
forces. Do our adversaries consider with-
drawal of forces as a precondition to negotia-
tions, as some of their statements imply? If
so, this again would raise a serious obstacle
to progress. But if they look on withdrawal
of forces as a provision to be incorporated in
a settlement, this clearly could be worked out.
The United States and its allies are already
on record in the Manila communique that
their forces "shall be withdrawn ... as the
other side withdraws its forces to the North,
ceases infiltration, and the level of violence
thus subsides. Those forces will be with-
drawn as soon as possible and not later than
six months after the above conditions have
been fulfilled." Further, we have indicated
our willingness to join in a phased and super-
vised withdrawal of forces by both sides.
Next, there is ambiguity in Hanoi's posi-
tion on the cessation of bombing of North
Viet-Nam. At times their public statements
have demanded that the bombing be ended
unconditionally, without any reference to a
possible response from their side. On the
other hand, quite recently a spokesman of
Hanoi said that "if, after the definitive and
unconditional cessation of the bombardments,
the American Government proposes to enter
into contact with the [North Vietnamese]
Government, . . . this proposal will be ex-
amined and studied." And just this week we
have seen a further statement, in an inter-
view by the North Vietnamese Foreign
Minister, that cessation of the bombings
"could lead to talks between North Viet Nam
and the U.S." Many of their statements in-
sisting that the bombing cease have also
contained other expressions, such as that the
American military presence in South Viet-
Nam be completely withdrawn and that the
four points of Hanoi must be recognized and
accepted as "the" basis — or possibly as "a"
basis — for settlement of the conflict. This
creates an additional ambiguity as to whether
Hanoi means to add still other prenegotiat-
ing conditions.
The position of the United States on this
bombing question has been stated by a num-
ber of administration spokesmen, including
me at the United Nations. The United States
remains prepared to take the first step and
order a cessation of all bombing of North
Viet-Nam the moment we are assured,
privately or otherwise, that this step will be
answered promptly by a tangible response
toward peace from North Viet-Nam. In his
letter of February 8 to His Holiness Pope
Paul, President Johnson said: ''
... I know you would not expect us to reduce
military action unless the other side is willing to
do likewise.
We are prepared to discuss the balanced reduction
in military activity, the cessation of hostilities, or
any practical arrangements which could lead to
these results.
' Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 274.
' See p. 319.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
313
We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful and
honorable settlement until they are crowned with
success.
U.S. Ready To Negotiate in Good Faith
Some analysts contend that our terms of
settlement should be more precisely defined.
But it is very difficult to be more precise in
advance of negotiation and particularly in
light of the substantive ambiguities on the
other side. But whatever questions may be
raised, they should and can best be resolved
in discussions between the parties who have
the power to resolve them. For our part, we
stand ready to negotiate in good faith uncon-
ditionally to resolve all outstanding questions.
The United States approach to negotiations
is flexible. We and our allies do not ask our
adversaries to accept, as a precondition to
discussions or negotiations, any point of ours
to which they may have objections. Nor do
we rule out the discussion of any points of
theirs, however difficult they might appear to
us. We are willing to discuss and negotiate
not only our own points but Hanoi's four
points, and points emanating from any other
source, including the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
It remains to be seen whether our adver-
saries share this concept of negotiations. As
I have already pointed out, their various pub-
lic declarations of peace aims have often been
coupled with statements that the goals they
put forward must, for example, be "accepted"
or "recognized" as the "sole basis" or "the
most correct basis" or "the only sound basis"
or "the basis for the most correct political
solution."
Such statements contain still further
ambiguity — in one sense the most funda-
mental of all, since it relates to the concept of
negotiation itself. Do these statements mean
that Hanoi is willing to enter negotiations
only if there is an assurance in advance that
the outcome wiW be on their terms and will,
in effect, simply ratify the goals they have
already stated? Such an attitude would not
be conducive to peace and would make the
outlook for a settlement bleak indeed.
If, on the other hand. North Viet-Nam
were to say that their points are not precon-
ditions to discussions or negotiations, then
the prospects should be more promising.
Our negotiating approach would permit s,
each side to seek clarification of the other
side's position. It does not require the
acceptance in advance of any points, least of
all those whose meaning may be in need of
clarification. We do not ask that of Hanoi —
and progress toward a settlement will be
facilitated if Hanoi does not ask it of us.
In this situation, how can we best move
toward a settlement ?
One essential early step is to analyze the
positions of all parties in order to ascertain
whether there is some element or some
kernel common to all. Many students of the
subject have pointed to one fact which may
prove to be such a kernel, namely, the fact
that both sides have pointed to the Geneva
agreements of 1954 and 1962 as an acceptable
basis for a peaceful settlement.
But I must add quickly that this does not
necessarily indicate a real meeting of the
minds, because of doubts that all sides inter-
pret the Geneva agreements in the same light.
Hanoi has said that the essence of the Geneva
agreements is contained in its four points.
But the four points would not put Hanoi
under any restraint or obligations in its
hostile activities against the South, which the
Geneva accords explicitly prohibit. Besides,
as I already pointed out, these points insist
that the South's future be regulated in ac-
cordance with the program of a group which
was not referred to in the Geneva accords
and did not even exist when they were writ-
ten. And in any case, if the Geneva accords
were to serve as a basis for settlement, it
would obviously be necessary to revitalize
the international machinery which they pro-
vided for supervision, which is presently
operating under severe limitations; to in-
corporate effective international guarantees;
and to update other provisions of the ac-
cords which on their face are clearly out of
date.
Despite these problems of interpretation.
314
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
it can be said that if the meaning of the
Geneva agreements were accepted as a mat-
ter for genuine negotiation, then the constant
reference to these agreements by both sides
would be more than a verbal similarity; it
would be a significant and hopeful sign of
the prospects for settlement.
Methods for Seeking a Political Settlement
From all this analysis, there emerges one
basic and practical question, and it is this:
How are all these apparent obstacles to a
settlement to be overcome ?
The first and essential prerequisite is the
will to resolve them, not by unconditional
surrender or by the dictation of terms but
through a process of mutual accommodation
whereby nobody's vital interests are injured,
which would be a political solution. Speaking
for the United States Government, I affirm
without reservation the willingness of the
United States to seek and find a political
solution.
The next question, then, is by what proce-
dure such a political settlement can be
reached. One well-tested and time-proven
way is the conference table. President John-
son has repeatedly stated our readiness to
join in a conference in Geneva, in Asia, or in
any other suitable place. We remain prepared
today to go to the conference table as soon as,
and wherever, our adversaries are prepared
to join us.
There is also a second procedure by which
to pursue a political settlement: namely,
private negotiations — either by direct contact
or through an intermediary. There is much
to be said for this private method, for in a
situation as grave as this, with its complex
historical background and its present politi-
cal crosscurrents, it would be exceedingly dif-
ficult to negotiate in a goldfish bowl.
I therefore affirm that the United States
Government stands ready to take this route
also toward a political settlement. And we
give our assurance that the secrecy and
security of such private explorations would
be safeguarded on our side. Of course, we do
not and should not ask that freedom of ex-
pi-ession be curtailed in the slightest degree.
Nevertheless, as that conspicuous champion
of free expression. Dr. Erwin D. Canham,
recently reminded us, no one's credibility
ought to suffer because of what is better left
unsaid under such circumstances.
Let me quickly add that at this juncture
I do not want to raise any false hopes by this
remark. I am simply stating a principle which
is inherent in the concept of the secrecy and
security of private explorations.
Such then is my analysis of the problems
involved and the methods to be employed in
seeking a negotiated solution of the Vietnam-
ese conflict. Nor should we overlook the pos-
sibility that negotiations, private or public,
might be preceded or facilitated by the
process of mutual deescalation or a scaling
down of the conflict without a formally
negotiated cease-fire. This, of course, would
be welcome on our part.
It is altogether possible, too, that there will
be no negotiations culminating in a formal
agreement, that our adversaries will sooner
or later find the burden of the war too ex-
hausting and that the conflict will gradually
come to an end.
Perhaps this will, indeed, prove to be the
outcome. But our most respected military
authorities have cautioned us not to expect
that this will happen quickly and that we
must face the possibility of a long struggle.
Surely, if there is any contribution that
diplomacy can make to hastening a just and
honorable end of this struggle, we cannot in
all conscience spare any effort or any labor,
day or night, to make that contribution — no
matter how difficult and frustrating the
effort may be or how many false starts and
failures and new beginnings it may entail.
As students of history know, one obstacle
to a negotiated end of any war can be psycho-
logical. The frame of mind appropriate to
fighting and the frame of mind appropriate
to peacemaking are by nature very different.
And yet a stage inevitably comes when both
these seemingly contradictory efforts must
go on side by side.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
315
Many citizens, viewing this complex dual
process, are likely to be confused and dis-
tressed by what seems like an inconsistency
in their leaders' policies. Some complain that
the talk of peace suggests a weakening of our
resolve and of our will to win. Simultaneously
others complain that the continued military
effort suggests an attempt to bring the ad-
versary to his knees, to break his will, and
thus casts doubt on the sincerity of our will
to peace.
The great difficulty of achieving peace
should serve to remind us that there are sub-
stantial conflicting interests at stake which
stubbornly resist solution; that peace cannot
be bought at any price, nor can real conflicts
of purpose be waved away with a magic
wand. By the same token, the ferocity of war
should not be an incitement to hatred but
rather a stern discipline, a reminder of the
imperative duty to define responsibly the lim-
ited interests for which our soldiers fight and
which a peace settlement must protect.
The effort to make such a responsible defi-
nition and to carry it through the process of
peace negotiations is piled high with diffi-
culty. A genuine meeting of the minds may
never be wholly achieved. It is unlikely that
terms of settlement for this stubborn conflict
can be found which would be wholly pleasing
to either side. But it is in our highest national
interest that an acceptable, livable solution
should be found.
Let no one suppose that patriotism, which
is so inspiringly displayed on the battlefield,
is not also present at the negotiating table.
All our recent Presidents have testified to our
country's dedication to negotiation as a means
of peacefully bridging differences.
President Eisenhower said in 1955, on the
eve of the first summit conference with the
Soviet leadership: * "We shall work with all
others ... so that peaceful and reasonable
negotiations may replace the clash of the
battlefield."
President Kennedy, in his inaugural
address, said: "Let us never negotiate out of
fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."
And President Johnson has summed up the
true value of negotiation as follows : ^
To negotiate is never to admit failure. To nego-
tiate is to show good sense. We believe that collec-
tive bargaining is working as long as parties stay
in the negotiation stage. Only when bargaining
breaks off do we speak of failure.
And so also is it in foreign policy. There, too,
the rule of law and the resort to the bargaining
table are the hallmarks of success.
And to these words the President added
specifically:
. . . this rule applies without qualification to Viet-
Nam. We shall count it a mark of success when all
the parties to that dispute come to a conference
table. We Americans are experienced in bargaining;
we have nothing to fear from negotiation. And we
Americans know the nature of a fair bargain. No
people ever need fear negotiating with Americans.
I am sure all three of these Presidents
would agree today that the effort to discover
through negotiation the common ground on
which to build a just and honorable peace is
worthy of our most sincere and dedicated
efforts.
' For an address by President Eisenhower at the
10th anniversary meeting of the United Nations at
San Francisco, Calif., on June 20, 1955, see Bulle-
tin of July 4, 1955, p. 3.
" For an address by President Johnson at the Uni-
versity of Denver on Aug. 26, 1966, see ibid., Sept.
19, 1966, p. 406.
316
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of February 9
Press release 27 dated February 9
Secretary Rusk: There has been a good deal
of discussion in recent days about the pros-
pects for peace in Viet-Nam. President John-
son has pressed for peace in Southeast Asia
in capitals all over the world over and over
again. He has demonstrated that he is pre-
pared to meet the other side more than half
way. He has urged a conference, uncondi-
tional discussions, or private and discreet
contacts in order to move ahead with talks
which might open the way to peace. He has
responded affirmatively to the efforts of 17
nonalined nations, of the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers, of Asian nations, of the
British cochairman, of members of the Inter-
national Control Commission, of leading per-
sonalities.
The United States has made it clear that
Hanoi's four points could be discussed along
with points which others might wish to pro-
pose or that we would engage in preliminary
discussions to attempt to find an agreed set
of points as a basis for negotiation. We have
made it clear that we want no bases in South-
east Asia and do not wish to retain United
States troops in Viet-Nam after peace is
assured. At Manila, the Allies stated that they
would withdraw their forces not later than 6
months after the other side "withdraws its
forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and
the level of violence thus subsides." ^ We
have affirmed our full support for free elec-
tions in South Viet-Nam to give the South
Vietnamese a government of their own
choice and have stated that we believe that
the question of reunification should be deter-
' For text of a communique issued at the close of
the Manila Conference on Oct. 25, 1966, see Bulletin
of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
mined by the Vietnamese through their own
free decision. We have emphasized that we
would much prefer to use our resources for
the economic reconstruction of Southeast
Asia, rather than war, and that peace could
permit North Viet-Nam to participate in a
regional effort to which we would be pre-
pared to contribute at least $1 billion.
On the military side, we have on two occa-
sions stopped the bombing of North Viet-
Nam to discover whether there might be some
constructive reaction from the other side. In
May 1965 a pause was limited to 51/2 days
because it was rejected by the principal Com-
munist capitals during the first 3 days. At
the beginning of 1966 there was a cessation
for 37 days — a period much longer than had
been indicated might produce some construc-
tive result. It elicited no response other than
the continuation of the movement of men and
arms into the South and an assertion that
Viet-Nam must be settled on Communist
terms. We have emphasized that we would be
prepared to discuss steps of mutual deescala-
tion or would indeed take note of any de-
escalation on the ground and would respond
accordingly.
But for some time now there has been evi-
dent a systematic campaign by the Commu-
nist side to bring about an unconditional and
permanent cessation of the bombing of North
Viet-Nam, without any corresponding mili-
tary action on their side, in exchange for the
possibility of talks — talks which are thus far
formless and without content. We cannot
accept a situation in which men and arms
move, without interruption by us, to cross the
17th parallel and attack Allied armed forces
and Vietnamese civilians in the South. We
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
317
must know the military consequences of such
a military action on our part. They must not
expect us to stop our military action by bomb-
ing while they continue their military action
by invasion. No one has been able or willing
to give us any information on this subject.
It is entirely within the resources of the
quiet diplomacy of both sides to talk about
peace and to discuss mutual steps to reduce
the violence. We have been trying in every
way known to us to invite and to engage in
such talks. Unfortunately I cannot report to
you today any tangible forward movement in
this direction. All channels remain open and
are being utilized.
As the President said yesterday in his let-
ter to His Holiness the Pope:
We are prepared to talk at any time and place,
in any forum, with the object of bringing peace to
Vietnam; however I know you would not expect
us to reduce military action unless the other side
is willing to do likewise.
We are prepared (the President said) to discuss
the balanced reduction in military activity, the ces-
sation of hostilities, or any practical arrangements
which could lead to these results.
Our objective in Viet-Nam is and always
has been a limited one — a South Viet-Nam
able to determine its own future without
external interference. I need hardly repeat
that this and this alone is our objective; but
for the benefit of members of the press who
may not be fully familiar with all our state-
ments, I am today making available points we
made last year under 14 different headings,
annotated to reflect developments in 1966.^
These are, and remain, not in any sense pre-
conditions for discussions but rather state-
ments of the elements that we believe could
produce peace in Viet-Nam.
Let me say quietly and sincerely to all capi-
tals on the other side:
Let good sense take charge for all of us in
this situation. Recognize the necessity for
elementary reciprocity. Join with us in a com-
mon search for peace. Let us make use of the
means available to us to exchange views and
to search for those common interests upon
which peace can be built. Let us relieve all
^Ibid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 284.
the peoples concerned of the burdens of this
struggle. Let us turn our hand to the urgent
unfinished business of assuring a more decent
future for those who have been caught up in
this violence for so long.
I am now ready for your questions.
Atmosphere for Peace Negotiations
Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the 14
points that were put out a year ago. Would
you say that the atmosphere or the climate
for peace negotiations has im,proved in any
way since that time, particularly since the
conflict in China has become so intense?
A. It is hard to judge atmosphere, because
what we really must coiint upon is specific,
tangible indications of a readiness to move
toward peace.
We are exploring in every way that we
know what those possibilities might be.
The President has said that we would meet
the other side more than half way.
So what the atmosphere really will amount
to turns upon whether we can in fact engage
the other side at points where we and they
together can move this matter toward the
conference table or toward a peaceful settle-
ment.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some
idea of the rate of infiltration these days? Is
it significantly lower noiv than it was last
year?
A. There is some time lag in our current
information on exact numbers.
We know that the infiltration continues.
We see the trucks moving south; we see the
men moving south. We have other sources of
information. We do get from prisoners, from
captured documents, and from other sources
of information rather accurate figures, after
a bit of time, on what happens in a particular
period.
But I do not know of any information indi-
cating that the infiltration has stopped or that
they have themselves undertaken a level of
infiltration that bears with it political con-
sequences.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have talked about
the need to recognize the principle of ele-
318
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mentary reciprocity. Since so much of the
current discussion seems to hang on this, sir,
could you give us some idea of whether by
this yoti mean a specific promise to negotiate
if we stop the bombing or specific military
action ?
A. Well, I have pointed out in my state-
ment that we cannot stop our military actions
involving the bombing while they continue
their military actions of invasion.
Now let me illustrate the question of
reciprocity just for a moment, because that
element has dropped out of a good deal of
public discussion of this subject.
If we were to say that we would not talk
unless all violence stops in the South while
our bombing continues in the North, everyone
would say, "Well, that is absurd."
Now, why is. it absurd for us and reason-
able for the other side ?
We have had no indication that they will
adopt corresponding or reciprocal military
moves if we stop the bombing of North Viet-
Nam.
We have some operational questions. Those
trucks just north of the 17th parallel headed
south with men and arms — are we to say that
they are free to come to the gates with
impunity, safety, and then suddenly unload
themselves and have those men attack our
Marines just across the 17th parallel while
we pick this ammunition out of our men,
instead of dealing with those trucks as a part
of the battle where we find them?
I think some elementary reciprocity is
required, and common fairness would require
that if there is an interest toward peace, both
sides help move toward it, because you cannot
stop this war simply by stopping a half of it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, it is being frequently
said these days that — in the two Burchett
interviews and in what Mr. Kosygin [Soviet
Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin"] said yes-
terday— that the position of North Viet-Nam
has been changed; that instead of asserting
four preconditions, there is only noiv one pre-
condition, and it is therefore concluded that
there is movement in their position. Do you
accept the fact of movement in their position?
President Reaffirms U.S. Desire
for Peace in Viet-Nam
Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson to His Holiness Pope
Paul VI.
white House press release dated February 8
February 8, 1967
Your Holiness: I deeply appreciate your
message,' which is a great source of spiritual
support. I devoutly share your wish that the
suspension of hostilities over the Lunar New
Year may be extended and may open the way
to negotiations for a just and stable peace.
The Governments of the United States and
the Republic of Vietnam, together with others,
are devoting intensive efforts to this end. As
you know, the Government of Vietnam has
twice signified its readiness to discuss an ex-
tension of the truce with representatives of
the other side.
We are prepared to talk at any time and
place, in any forum, with the object of bring-
ing peace to Vietnam; however I know you
would not expect us to reduce military action
unless the other side is willing to do likewise.
We are prepared to discuss the balanced
reduction in military activity, the cessation of
hostilities, or any practical arrangements
which could lead to these results.
We shall continue our efforts for a peaceful
and honorable settlement until they are
crowned with success.
With great respect,
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Not printed here.
A. Well, these are matters which can be
fully explored through existing channels, with
existing contacts, with the help of other
governments, if that seems desirable, in order
to find out whether there in fact is a basis of
peace.
But what has not been said by the Foreign
Minister of North Viet-Nam or by the Prime
Minister of the Soviet Union is what the mili-
tary consequences would be if we stopped the
bombing — what would the other side do. That
is a point which has been ignored; that is a
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
319
point on which we have had no response. And
we need some response on that.
Now, let me make it clear. We do not con-
sider that any action in the military field
need be a precondition for discussions. We
are prepared today to have talks with those
on the other side, to talk about either the
prospects for peace or to talk about the
mutual steps which the two sides can take to
reduce the violence and move this closer
toward peace.
We are prepared to talk about any point,
any handle which can be grasped, which
might make a difference in this situation.
For example, the demilitarization of the
demilitarized zone along the 17th parallel;
assistance to Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia,
in assuring the neutrality and the territorial
integrity of his country; the exchange of
prisoners — we are prepared to talk about any
point which could indicate some constructive
step forward.
Now, if we are faced with a major condi-
tion on the military side as a precondition for
discussion, then we are prepared to enter into
preliminary discussions with the other side
about what action can and should be taken
by the two sides in the military field.
But there needs to be some correspondence,
some reciprocity in these matters, if in fact
we are to move this toward a peaceful solu-
tion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the absence of these
discussions, if the decreased infiltration has
not reached what you call a "politically"
significant level, how do we measure mutual
deescalation steps on their part? What tech-
niques do we have for determining that this
has happened ?
A. Well, I think we would know rather
soon in the field whether there was a cessa-
tion of activity in and just north of the de-
militarized zone. There are many ways in
which we could get impressions as to the
intentions of the other side.
Now, one matter that bears upon the ques-
tion of intentions. As you know, we are now
in the middle of a Tet cease-fire. It's a 4-day
cease-fire, as far as we are concerned. There
320
have been a disturbing number of violations
of that cease-fire, and we have seen large
numbers of boats and other vessels dashing
south along the coast of North Viet-Nam to
resupply their forces in the southern part of ^
North Viet-Nam and in the demilitarized
zone.
Now, this indicates that it is their intention
to continue the operations, and the large num-
ber of incidents indicates that they are not
particularly interested in an actual cease-fire.
So, we have to weigh these things in trying
to assess the intentions and the motives of the
other side.
. Q. May I ask yoti another question, Mr.
Secretary? Are there any contacts or discus-
sions of any kind going on to extend that It-
day cease-fire to the 7-day cease-fire they say
they are going to honor?
A. Well, Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky
has indicated some time ago that he would
be prepared to discuss with the North Viet-
namese authorities the question of an exten-
sion of that cease-fire. This is something
which can be discussed, which can be looked
into. But I could not give you any details to-
day as to whether or not there are discussions
pointing in that direction. There are some
difficult operational questions about that.
Visit of Foreign IMinister of Germany
Q. Mr. Secretary, may I change the sub-
ject for a minute? Did the visit of Minister
[Willy'] Brandt eliminate some of the dif-
ferences which apparently exist between the
two countries on the interpretation of the
nonproliferation treaty?
A. Well, I very much welcomed the visit
of the Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister
of the Federal Republic. Mr. Brandt and I
have met each other many times before, but
this was my second meeting with him in his
new capacity; and, as you would suppose,
when the two of us get together, we range
pretty widely over a good many subjects of
international importance.
I think it will be possible to meet some of
the particular points that have been raised
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
in the Federal Republic on the nonprolifera-
tion treaty. For example, on the industrial
impact of a nonproliferation treaty, the fact
is that the nonproliferation treaty has noth-
ing to do whatever with the use of nuclear
materials for peaceful purposes, and that in-
cludes a wide range of industrial application.
The actual industrial spin-off from so-called
weaponry, that is, those items which are
limited to the gadgetry of weapons, is very
small, indeed, infinitesimal. And I think ex-
changes on the technical level will clarify that
point.
But it was a legitimate point to raise, and
I hope that further exchanges will clarify it
to everybody's satisfaction.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in his news conference
this morning, Premier Kosygin defended —
apparently defended — the Soviet construc-
tion of an ABM system. I ivondered what you
thought of this, in the light of efforts on our
side to get a freeze ?
A. Well, I think that we might note that
Prime Minister Kosygin referred both to
offensive and defensive weapons in his press
conference.
We have placed before the Geneva con-
ference, some time ago, proposals for a freeze
in both these fields. And we are prepared to
discuss both offensive and defensive weapons
with the Soviet Union.
I would not myself interpret what he said
this morning as their last word on this sub-
ject.
Q. Mr. Secretary, the administration's
good faith in trying to reach discussions
while bombing and other military activities
still go on, has been cast into some doubt by
stories about the bombing that occurred in
mid-December, and arrangements, sup-
posedly, had been made for a meeting in
Warsaw. And I think Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson referred to this in Parlia-
ment this iveek and called it a "misunder-
standing" on both sides. Could you elucidate
what that misunderstanding was?
A. No, because to do so would, in my judg-
ment, get in the way of the possibilities of
using existing channels to try to move this
matter toward peace. It is not for me to talk
about reports of particular channels that
might have existed at one time or another or
were speculated about. When the full story
comes out some day, it will be rather dif-
ferent than some of the things you have
heard.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you accept his impli-
cation that part of the blame lies on the
United States?
A. I am not accepting or rejecting any-
thing at the moment. I am saying I am not
getting into the question of a particular chan-
nel that somebody said might have existed.
Yes?
Q. Mr. Secretary, do we know a great deal
about the character and life of Ho Chi Minh,
which seems to be relevant now? Mr. Salis-
bury [Harrison Salisbwy of the New York
Times] said he thought he had been a waiter
for 2 years in Nerv York City, which might
explain — [Laughter.]
A. Yes, we have had a good deal of bio-
graphic information on Mr.' ' Ho Chi Minh.
We, quite frankly, at the moment are more
interested in his future than his past.
[Laughter.] And we would like to have that
future be a peaceful one and that he would
work with us to make some peace in South-
east Asia.
U.S. Position on Bombing Pause
Q. Mr. Secretary, a year ago you recall we
offered to maintain our bombing pause if the
other side would only come and talk. In fact,
we sent envoys around the world looking for
some signal from Hanoi of a ivillingness to
talk. Why is it that noiv we are umvilling to
make such an offer during the current pause ?
A. Well, let me point out that the other side
is not talking about a pause. The other side
is demanding an unconditional and perma-
nent cessation of the bombing. Now, that is a
very significant military step for us to take.
And unless it is accompanied by military
action on their part, it would create a situa-
tion in which they would be safe and secure
and comfortable, while sending their men and
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
321
their arms down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
across the 17th parallel to attack South Viet-
Nam. So they have put this matter into a
somewhat different context.
As you recall, during the last pause in the
bombing, on the 34th day, instead of coming
back with counterproposals or countersugges-
tions, they simply publicly required that we
accept the notion that the Liberation Front
should be the sole spokesman for the South
Vietnamese people, that we accept their four
points and get out of South Viet-Nam. Now,
that was obviously impossible.
Q. In other words, sir, it is the shift in
position on Hanoi's side on the terms for a
bombing cessation that has caused a shift in
our position ?
A. Well, there is no shift in our position
in the sense that we are prepared to take up
political questions through political channels.
We are prepared to deal with military mat-
ters as military matters, and we are prepared
to discuss with the other side what actions
each side might take of a military character
that would move this matter toward peace.
Now, that has been true — this was in the
14 points at the beginning of last year. We
would be prepared to discuss the question of
mutual deescalation, that we would be pre-
pared to stop the bombing as a step toward
peace, but we can't stop the bombing simply
as a step toward closing off one-half of the
war while the rest of it goes on full force.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you think of
Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy's proposals
last night for a new policy toivard Red
China?
A. Well, I saw his speech. I think, if one
thinks of these problems over a very long
run, that he had some interesting things to
say. And I commented on some of these mat-
ters myself before the Zablocki committee.
He did not get into the question which is the
central question in the short run; namely,
are you prepared to surrender Taiwan? Be-
cause in all of our contacts with Peiping and
since I have been Secretary of State they
have insisted that unless we are prepared to
surrender Taiwan, there is nothing to dis-
cuss. And so many of the efforts which we
have made to open up exchanges and to find
some means to improve relations with main-
land China, to reestablish contacts with the
great Chinese people on that mainland, have
not been of any avail because we cannot, of
course, surrender these 13 or 14 million
people on Taiwan to the mainland.
Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
A. Thank you.
Department Holds Conferences
for Educators in California
The Department of State announced on
February 10 (press releases 29 and 30) that
it was cosponsoring two foreign policy con-
ferences for educators in California, one at
San Jose State College on February 25 and
the other at the University of Southern Cali-
fornia, Los Angeles, on February 24 and 25.
Invitations were sent to faculty and admin-
istrators of educational programs for both
secondary and higher education.
Department of State officers expected to
participate were: George V. Allen, Director,
Foreign Service Institute, and former Am-
bassador to Iran, Yugoslavia, India, and
Greece; Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Walter
J. Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs and former Deputy Chief
of Mission in Moscow; Gregory B. Wolfe,
Director, Office of Research and Analysis for
the American Republics; John K. Emmerson,
diplomat-in-residence at Stanford University
and former Deputy Chief of Mission in
Tokyo; and Philander P. Claxton, Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Pop-
ulation Matters.
322
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
East Asia Today
by William P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^
I want to talk today about what is going
on throughout East Asia. Viet-Nam is what
is on all of our minds, but I think it is impor-
tant to put that situation into the context of
what, in historic terms, I think are very
major and, in many ways, very promising
developments throughout the area.
One of those developments is what increas-
ingly in the last year and a half many ob-
servers and all of us in the Government have
come to see as a new atmosphere of hope and
confidence throughout East Asia and the
Pacific — a psychological change of the very
greatest importance. For 2 years ago many
Asian nations, particularly those in South-
east Asia, thought that the wave of the future
would be Red. They recognized, of course,
that the United States had the power to play
a major helping role in turning back that
wave, but they doubted that we would be
willing to use our power to preserve an Asia
of free and independent nations. There was a
belief that we were too rich, too far away,
too secure, perhaps too soft, too different in
race and culture, too Europe-oriented, for
them to depend on our willingness to make
the sacrifices of blood and treasure necessary
to preserve that peace in Asia, which is a
vital national interest of this country.
There spread throughout the area an emas-
culating hope that since the future appeared
' Address made before the Commonwealth Club of
California at San Francisco, Calif., on Jan. 20, as-
delivered text; an advance text was issued as press
release 8.
to lie with the Chinese dragon and with the
other Communist nations with similar and
more specific local designs, perhaps behaving
well toward that dragon would at least induce
him to choose to eat you last. That debili-
tating feeling — that a prime goal of foreign
policy must be to af^pease the dragon — has
now virtually vanished. It is held, I think, in
few, if any, of the nations that stretch from
India in the west around the whole crescent
to Japan and Korea. And a main reason — if
not the main reason — for the new feeling of
confidence is what we have shown we are
prepared to do in seeing the conflict through
in Viet-Nam: that we will continue to use
our power as long as it is needed to help
preserve Viet-Nam's right to determine its
own destiny free from external interference
and to help preserve — for only they can do it
in the last analysis — the right of other
nations to do the same.
At the same time, the free nations of Asia,
nations working out their own destinies in
their own way, realize — and the Manila com-
munique ^ underscored it — that our military
presence will be withdrawn just as soon as it
is no longer needed. So there has been a
sharp decline in anticolonialism and an ac-
ceptance of a cooperative role for Western
nations and for the United States in the
future of Asia. There are those who suspect
our motives, but I think the vast majority
of Asians accept our willingness to partici-
pate in the future of Asia in the spirit of
• For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
823
cooperation expressed by the President in his
Honolulu speech. ^
What our stand in Viet-Nam has done —
and this is quite explicit in the words of a
nonalined Asian statesman, the extremely
able, Oxford-educated Chinese Socialist, Lee
Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore
— is to "buy time" for the rest of the area.
And the galvanic effect of our stand is per-
haps most dramatically illustrated by the
change in the position that President
[Ferdinand E.] Marcos of the Philippines
has taken. In 1965 he did not favor the send-
ing of Philippine troops to Viet-Nam. After
his election he successfully advocated and
finally got the approval of his Congress for
the dispatch of an engineer battalion to Viet-
Nam. Explaining his apparent change of
position, he put it very simply. In 1965, as
he said, according to the information avail-
able, "the United States did not seem com-
mitted to protect Viet-Nam, and that, as in
Dien Bien Phu, South Viet-Nam was already
lost. But today," he continued, "in view of
the resolution of the United States Govern-
ment to help protect the freedom-loving
peoples of Asia, the least the peoples of Asia
can do is to fulfill their own part and that
is to demonstrate their own love for freedom
by fighting with their own men, with their
own complement and their own soldiers, for
freedom." The Philippine contingent is now
in Viet-Nam, as are forces from Korea in
very large numbers; from Thailand, which
has just committed a battalion of combat
ground forces; and from Australia and New
Zealand.
So what we have done in Viet-Nam, I
think, has made a contribution, a major con-
tribution, to this very palpable confidence
factor in the area. Behind it lies a much more
basic thing, for the future of Asia will of
course be determined by the energy, the drive,
the cohesion, and the capacity of the Asian
nations themselves to work for the welfare
of their people. The key question is what are
they doing with what Lee Kuan Yew called
the bought time. For, as he said, "If we just
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 28, 1966, p. 812.
sit down and believe people are going to buy
time forever after for us, then we deserve
to perish." So what I am talking about today
is an accounting of what the Asian nations
are doing — were doing to a very major degree
already but are now doing with increased
energy and cooperation in the climate of con-
fidence that increasingly exists in the area.
There is no doubt that East Asia is one of
the great centers of world civilization, that
the people have the potential and the talent
to make progress if they may have security.
Constructive Developments in East Asia
A quick survey of what major countries in
the area have done, and are doing, gives clear
evidence of the potential and of the promise.
The Japanese economic success story is
well known. Yet the scale of their success
is hard to exaggerate. The less than 100
million people of Japan have a gross national
product roughly as large as the more than
700 million people of mainland China. Some
economic forecasts indicate that by 1975 the
figure may be two to one in Japan's favor.
Within a short time Japan may be the third
largest economic power in the world, ranking
ahead of any country except ourselves and
the Soviet Union.
In nearby Korea you can see the beginning
of what could turn quite rapidly into a
smaller scale but dramatic success story. In
1964 and 1965 Korea's growth rate was over
8 percent. For 1966, figures which have just
been received, and I think are correct, indi-
cate a real growth increase of 12 percent.
This growing prosperity can be seen dramat-
ically. The President's stop in Seoul was an
eye opener, particularly to those who had not
seen Korea for many years. Every observer
who gets out to the countryside agrees that
the progress extends very deeply throughout
the country and is not a showcase operation
confined to the cities. You just cannot help but
be struck by the drive, the passion for educa-
tion, and the sense of real progress on every
side in that country. When you consider the
tremendous devastation, the virtual destruc-
tion of Seoul during the Korean conflict, the
over 1 million Korean casualties in that war,
324
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
one can at least take hope for what can be
done in Viet-Nam after the end of the con-
flict, for there— although any destruction is
to be deplored — the scale of destruction has in
fact been very much less. The Korean political
system is settling down, and the presidential
election scheduled for April should be an-
other milestone of political maturity.
On Taiwan, the Republic of China has had
a sustained growth rate averaging 10 percent
annually over the past 3 years. It is now able
to offer on a small but still very significant
scale technical assistance, mainly in agricul-
ture, to 22 African and Asian nations. In
contrast to that performance and to the per-
formances of Hong Kong and Singapore,
where Chinese people have shown what they
can do, mainland China's growth from 1958
through 1965 appears to have been just about
on an average of zero per year, and its GNP
may have actually declined.
In the Philippines President Marcos enjoys
a prestige that gives him a greater oppor-
tunity for achievement than any Philippine
President since the death of Magsaysay.
With our help, that of the World Bank, and
we hope others, he is working on the key
problems of his country — smuggling, land
reform, agricultural productivity.
In Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, we
find extremely rapid economic growth. Singa-
pore and Malaysia, next to Japan, enjoy the
highest per capita income in Asia. They are
attempting to diversify their economies and
at the same time to create multinational
societies.
Thailand has averaged a 7 percent annual
growth over the last 10 years, and projec-
tions indicate that that rate will be sustained
or even possibly increased. Thailand has a
significant insurgency problem in the north-
east, an area which was until recently left
out of the progress of the rest of the nation.
But the great majority of the Thai are loyal
to their Government and to the royal family,
and the Thai leaders are aware of the re-
forms that must be made and are moving in
that direction. The proper measures are un-
der way. Though the Thai insurgency is
backed by mainland China and North Viet-
Nam, there is no reason to anticipate that
the problem in Thailand will reach the level
in South Viet-Nam, even in the earlier years
of '59, '60, and '61.
As we continue to go around the area, we
come to Indonesia, where the change in the
past year and a half must be bracketed with
our action in- Viet-Nam, with all the support
that South Viet-Nam has received in holding
its head above water, and with the cultural
revolution on the mainland of China as one
of the most significant events in the area.
Indonesia is the fifth most populous country
in the world and the most populous in South-
east Asia. Two years ago the odds favored
a Communist Indonesia by the end of 1966
.or even sooner. Instead, an ill-timed and
poorly executed attempt by the Communists
to accelerate their seizure of power back-
fired and brought into being the current
strongly nationalist, nonalined, non-Commu-
nist government. That government is now
concentrating on the chaotic economic situa-
tion which is the legacy of years of misman-
agement. If that government, with the help of
the debt rescheduling already agreed upon
and with the necessary aid from the United
States and other nations concerned with In-
donesia— Japan and European nations —
working together on a multilateral basis can
get over the hump of the next year or two,
then we may hope to see an increasing re-
alization of Indonesia's great economic po-
tential and the settling down of a moderate,
highly nationalistic government there.
Gfowth of Regional Cooperation
I have been reviewing the progress of in-
dividual nations, but equally important has
been the increasing grovrth of regional or-
ganization and cooperation. There is a long
checklist here, and much of it has come into
being or grown dramatically in the past 2
years.
— The establishment of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, joining together 19 Asian and
Pacific nations as well as key nations of
Europe. Over two-thirds of its authorized
capital is coming from within the region.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
325
— Japan's increasing efforts to assist other
Asian nations, reflected in the commitment
of 1 percent of its gross national product to
foreign aid, particularly in Southeast Asia,
and in its leadership in regional economic
planning, symbolized by the election of a
Japanese, Mr. [Takeshi] Watanabe, to head
the Asian Development Bank.
— The convening in Seoul last June of a
10-nation Asian and Pacific Council, which
appeared hopelessly visionary 2 years ago
when it was proposed by the Foreign Minis-
ter of Korea. The nations of this broad re-
gional grouping primarily concerned with
economic affairs stated in June their full
sympathy and support for our aid in helping
South Viet-Nam defend its right to deter-
mine its future. The likelihood is that more
nations will join ASPAC.
— The Association of Southeast Asia —
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand —
which was moribund 3 years ago, has now
revived and may be the nucleus of a new
regional grouping in Southeast Asia.
This is only a partial listing. There are a
great many other initiatives, such as the
Mekong Committee — which was in being but
which has come into action with the building
of the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos — which is
bringing together the often rival nations of
the area — Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and
South Viet-Nam — in the joint development
of the Mekong River. The United Nations is
playing a large role, and many nations are
cooperating.
These have been major developments in
historic terms, and with them have come
the diminution of old regional tensions. In
December of 1965 Japan and Korea con-
cluded a treaty that ended a long period of
hostility between the two and provided Jap-
anese funds for the Korean development
which is going forward with extraordinary
smoothness today. Similarly, the confronta-
tion between Indonesia and Malaysia has
been ended, with Thailand playing a very
hopeful role.
I do not mean to exaggerate the signifi-
cance of the new groupings. They will not
provide the tremendous action impetus that
similar institutions in Europe have had in
the period since World War II, but they do
represent a pulling together of the nations
of the area, a sense of common purpose, a ■>
desire to share experience, which is reflected
also in a flow of visits and a sharing of this
or that aspect of their life that goes on
among Asian states at a rate that must be 10
times what it was 5 years ago.
Increase in Multilateral Aid
A colleague of mine used to say that 10
years ago too many nations in Asia were like
spokes of a wheel, with the United States at
the hub, because by and large we were the
sole source of assistance for a great many
nations. And he said that wheel had no rim
because the Asian nations had little connec-
tion with each other. Two things have hap-
pened to that figure of speech in the last 10
years: The rim has been created and
strengthened at a very ra^jidly accelerating
pace, and the hub is becoming not merely the
United States but a shared effort, with Euro-
pean nations entering at least on the eco-
nomic side. I think on the security side our
role must be major for at least some years
to come. And we see emerging a greater
role in economic assistance and cooperation
for the European and other developed na-
tions and, of course, the tremendously en-
larged role of Japan.
Multilateral aid, I am sure, will be fur-
nished in an increasing number of situa-
tions, with the World Bank, the Asian De-
velopment Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and the cooperative consultative
groups among the nations in a position to
give aid. Multilateral aid has been predomi-
nant in Thailand for some years. It is a mode
for Malaysia, and it is the way that things
are being handled in Indonesia.
So it is against this background of prog-
ress that the Asian nations are making that
the declaration at the Manila Conference *
stated four simple principles: that aggres-
sion must be stopped; that hunger, illiteracy,
" For text, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 734.
326
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
disease must be tackled and eventually con-
quered; that a region of security, order, and
progress must be built; and that the ultimate
objective must be a peace of reconciliation
throughout Asia and the Pacific. It is against
the background of the efforts that I have
described that these principles struck a re-
sponsive chord not only among the nations
represented at Manila, on whose initiative
that declaration was framed, but throughout
the area. For these principles were some-
thing that they could accept, something not,
as surely would have been the case even a
very short time ago, remote and unattainable
but realistic goals — over a long period, and
with unremitting effort, goals worthy of
stating and of pursuing.
Now, there are difficulties in the picture
and in the future that could offset the kind
of favorable trends I have been describing.
Promising leaders may make mistakes or lose
office, national rivalries may come to the
fore again in local areas or on a wider scale,
economies may faltf.r. But I would sum it
up by saying the favorable possibilities are
greater than they have ever been and that
in historic terms the area is moving ex-
tremely rapidly.
The Confidence Factor
Now, in this broad picture I have already
referred to our stand in Viet-Nam as having
made a major contribution to the confidence
factor. I will not review here the current
situation in Viet-Nam, because I think the
interpretive reporting you get is on the
whole good.
I come back to the central point: that what
we have done in Viet-Nam did have a major
part in developing the confidence factor, the
sense that progress is possible, the sense that
security can be maintained in the nations
of free Asia. To virtually all the non-Com-
munist governments of the area — and they
often say this as bluntly as President Marcos
did in his opening address at the Manila
Conference — that security requires a con-
tinued United States ability to act, not neces-
sarily an American presence, although that,
too, may be required in individual cases, but
an ability to act for a long time. And that we
must — and, I think, shall — provide, and we
shall keep on in Viet-Nam, as the President
has made completely clear. Without what we
have done in Viet-Nam, without the regener-
ation of the spirit of cooperation among the
Western nations, ourselves included, and the
nations of Asia, I doubt very much if the
favorable developments I have described
could have taken place on anything like the
scale that has in fact been happening. And I
think that is the very strongly felt judg-
ment of responsible people, in government
and out, throughout East Asia.
If that vast area with its talents and its
capacity were to fall under domination by a
hostile power or group of powers, or if it
were to fall into chaos and instability, the
result would be vast human misery and pos-
sibly a wider war. However, today, I think,
more than at any time in the 15 years that I
have personally been associated with the
area. East Asia offers the hope of becoming
a region of stable nations, developing in their
own way, each according to its own strong
national and cultural heritage. And that is
our hope and our fundamental national in-
terest, both in Asia and throughout the rest
of the world.
Letters of Credence
Malta
The first Ambassador of Malta, Arvid
Pardo, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on February 7. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated February 7.
Yemen Arab Republic
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Yemen Arab Republic, Abdul Aziz Futaih,
presented his credentials to President John-
son on February 7. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
February 7.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
327
King Hassan II of Morocco
Visits the United States
King Hassan 11 of Morocco visited the
United States February 8-17. He met with
President Johnson and other U.S. Govern-
ment officials in Washington on February 9
and 10. FoUoiving is an exchange of greetings
betiveen President Johnson and King Hassan
at a ceremony in the East Room of the White
House on February 9, together with an ex-
change of toasts at a dinner at the White
House that evening.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated Februai-y 9
President Johnson
Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, dis-
tinguished friends: I am very happy — on
behalf of the people of the United States — ^to
welcome you once more to these shores. This
is not your first visit, but this is the first
time that I have had the pleasure as President
to welcome you. I am very honored.
It has always seemed to me that our two
countries have much in common. Our history
and our cultures are very different. Yet in
all matters that are vital to human dignity
and happiness, we speak with one voice.
Both nations are dedicated to the ideals of
freedom — for ourselves and for all others.
Both nations are devoted to orderly progress
and to equal justice for all people.
Your nation was one of the very first to
give formal recognition to our young country
when our success was still in doubt and there
were many who hoped to see us fail.
In modern times, the American people have
followed with great interest Your Majesty's
own efforts on behalf of the people of
Morocco. We have watched intently your
nation's struggle for progress in the decade
since regaining your independence.
We meet here today in the White House as
friends. I hope that in all of our talks we will
reaffirm our common desire to improve the
lot of all men. Certainly I am pleased at the
opportunity to discuss with you the great
issues of our day.
The greatest of all such issues is the
question of peace and of reconciliation among
nations and peoples: not peace at any price;
not peace where one nation dominates an-
other; but peace where all nations accept
the rule that their differences shall be settled
by discussion and compromise, and not by
force of arms, and a peace where they turn
from hostility to working together on behalf
of their own peoples and the other people of
the world.
You in North Africa have a chance in the
days and years ahead to turn this corner. I
understand that, despite other problems you
may have, your economic ministers are meet-
ing regularly to explore what you can do to-
gether to develop your nations. I know the
path of regional cooperation is never an easy
one; but I have seen with my own eyes in
Asia how old quarrels and suspicions can sub-
side and give way to joint ventures to teach
the young; to improve people's health; to
raise the standards of living for all. I know
the same healing process is under way in
this hemisphere.
In many parts of the world it is being
demonstrated that it is by this route that
nations — loyal to their culture and tradition,
loyal to their own ambitions — yet can find
a place of dignity and strength in the modern
world.
We look forward with great pleasure to
knowing Your Majesty better. May your
visit be the symbol of our people's determina-
tion to walk together, to pursuing together
an entire world of peace and abundance.
King Hassan II '
Mr. President, I thank you most cordially
for the words of welcome you have just
spoken on the occasion of my arrival in Wash-
ington.
The very mention of the word "Washing-
ton" brings back to my mind the image of
the great hero who liberated his country and
' As translated from the Arabic language.
328
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
made possible the emergence of his people's
genius, that genius which has greatly influ-
enced human civilization.
My family takes pride in the fact
that George Washington and my ancestor,
Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah, were
close friends. We take pride, also, in the fact
that they both, together, laid the cornerstone
of the friendship between our two peoples —
that friendship which has become strong and
which, as the years go by, only grows in
strength and becomes increasingly character-
ized by truthfulness, sincere cooperation, and
mutual respect.
Despite my tender age at that time, I con-
tinue to retain in my mind the most glorious
recollections of my late father's meeting with
President Franklin Roosevelt at Casablanca
in 1943.
I also remember their discussion of the
various problem.s of that critical hour in the
history of the human race. The most out-
standing of the problems they discussed were
those of peoples eager to achieve their inde-
pendence and eager to shake off the yoke
of slavery and exploitation under which they
had long suffered.
Ever since that day, when I was still of
tender age, I have been sure that the United
States cherishes lofty ideals and upholds the
highest principles and is motivated by a true
and sincere desire to see nations become free
and equal and willing to cooperate in all en-
deavors serving their mutual benefit.
Fortunately, many of the ideas and ideals
which my father and the President of the
United States discussed at that time were
achieved at the end of the war, or shortly
thereafter. It is also fortunate that my father
was able to visit the United States as King
of the fully sovereign state and that I have
since visited the United States once, and here
I am again at this time in order to continue
discussions and consultations within the
framework of our strong friendship on mat-
ters that concern both our countries in par-
ticular and matters that concern the inter-
national community in general.
You have mentioned, Mr. President, that
you have not as yet become personally ac-
quainted with my country, although you have
undoubtedly heard much about it. There is
a proverb that says, "He who has seen is
not the same as the one who has only heard."
We hope, therefore, that you may soon
find it possible to visit Morocco and to be-
come personally acquainted with its people.
Mr. President, speaking for myself and on
behalf of my people and government, I wish
to express again our gratitude for your wel-
come to us and for the kind reception you
have accorded us. We also wish to address
to the people of the United States — through
you, Mr. President — our warmest greetings,
together with our affection and respect.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated February 9
President Johnson
Your Majesty, Your Royal Highness, dis-
tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen:
Morocco is among America's oldest friends,
one of the vei-y first to recognize us as a free
nation.
His Majesty and I are continuing a very
old tradition.
The messages of our first President and
His Majesty's illustrious ancestor, handwrit-
ten messages, carried between our two coun-
tries by a sailing ship, are very treasured in
our National Archives.
Thus, we are ancient friends.
We are also modem partners — ready to
stand together before the challenges that
face us in modem times.
There is the widening gap between popula-
tion and food supply.
The United States has proposed that all
nations unite in a worldwide war on hunger.
From our talks today, I am more confident
than ever that our friends in Morocco are
committed to that struggle.
As I said this moming in receiving His
Majesty, our ultimate task is to create among
the nations of the world a community of
peace.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
329
I often read and reread ai-ticle 1 of the
United Nations Charter. I believe all of us —
and especially those of you who are too young
to know how the world felt in 1945 — should
come to know it line by line.
Its principles govern the actions of Amer-
ican foreign policy from day to day:
— collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace;
— collective measures for the suppression
of acts of aggression;
— adjustment or settlement of interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means;
— the development of friendly relations
among nations based upon respect for the
principle of equal rights and the self-deter-
mination of peoples;
— international cooperation in solving in-
ternational problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character; and in
promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.
These words were written 22 years ago. In
those years Americans have taken more than
200,000 casualties in collective measures to
suppress acts of aggression.
All of us, working together, at different
times and in different places, have made sure
that aggression did not succeed.
The chances for world security are larger,
the hope for world peace is nearer, because
tonight aggression has not succeeded.
Meanwhile, in lands and nations through-
out the world much has been done to lift the
standards of living.
In Western Europe, Latin America,
Africa, and Asia, cooperation in economic
and social progress is no longer just a mat-
ter of words. It is a fact.
So I tell you tonight that despite the ter-
rible war in Southeast Asia, I am confident
that we will pass along to the next genera-
tion the gifts of hope and opportunity to
illuminate article 1 of the United Nations
Charter,
I think I speak for all of my countrymen.
Your Majesty, in expressing this hope, in
making this prediction, and also in express-
ing to you our best wishes for your long life
and your good health. ^
It is our fervent prayer that our two coun- j
tries will continue to do what is right, to con-
tinue to do what is needed to guide us to the
peace and progress which our talks re-
afRiTned today.
Ladies and gentlemen, His Majesty the
King.
King Hassan II ^
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: We
are extremely pleased to have visited the
United States once again to meet this coun-
try's President, its leading citizens, and to
become acquainted with its great people.
We are happy to meet on this occasion, in
particular this select group of important
men whose responsibilities cover all the vari-
ous fields of politics, government, and eco-
nomics.
At the present time, the time characterized
by an increase in problems which are so
great and serious that they seem sometimes
very difficult to solve, we deem it most bene-
ficial that Chiefs of State should get together
from time to time. This we deem essential
because we believe that as a result of their
meetings and direct discussions, bonds of
cooperation among nations grow stronger on
the one hand and, on the other, the chances
for peace in the world become greater.
It is this belief which has prompted us
ever since our accession to the throne to visit
on a number of continents the Chiefs of State
whose systems and customs differ from ours.
We have seen that differences in systems and
differences between races and cultures do not
necessarily make it impossible to bring about
a rapprochement of points of view, nor do
they necessarily prevent the achievement of
desired objectives.
'■ As translated from the Arabic language.
330
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
It is our pleasure to be visiting again today
this friendly countiy and to meet His Excel-
lency, the President, Mr. Johnson, knowing
that our meeting each other will definitely
open up before us wider and greater horizons
for a free collaboration and cooperation in
the interest of our two peoples.
We aspire to benefit from the experience of
the people of the United States, which has
become an example and an ideal in progress
in the economic, agricultural, and industrial
development fields.
We also wish to emulate the American
techniques and methods which have resulted
in prosperity and abundance, particularly as
we have been for some years waging a re-
lentless war on underdevelopment. We have
been striving with all the power at our com-
mand to assure each of our people a life of
dignity and value.
Mr, President, you are undoubtedly aware
of the fact that along with the efforts we are
putting forth for development in our coun-
try, we are doing our utmost to strengthen
the bases of democracy in our country and
to assure our people their freedoms.
In so doing, we believe that any system
that does not protect the dignity of the indi-
vidual, and any system that does not guaran-
tee the freedom of the individual and the
freedom of the community, is a system that
does not serve the interest of peace and
stability in the world.
Mr. President, the deliberations we have
had, and continue to have, in connection with
problems affecting our two countries, and
also in connection with international prob-
lems, are only an extension of the series of
deliberations and consultations, both written
and oral, which our two countries have had
for almost two centuries.
These deliberations are characterized by
truthfulness and frankness as far as both
the word and the tone are concerned. That
is the case because it has always been our
custom to talk in such manner.
Just as the encounters of the past have
been successful, we are sure that our en-
counter today will be successful. That is be-
cause all of us are determined that our rela-
tions shall always move from good to better.
Mr. President, permit me, in concluding
these remarks, to express my warmest and
most sincere best wishes for your personal
health and well-being, and for further hap-
piness, prosperity, and progress for the
people of the United States.
Ladies and gentlemen, will you join me
in standing and rendering respect to His
Excellency, the President of the United
States, Mr. Johnson.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Conclude
Talks on Fishery Problems
Press release 23 dated February 6
Representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union on February 6 concluded
3 weeks of discussions on fishery problems
with approval of the texts of draft agree-
ments on the king crab fishery in the eastern
Bering Sea and on a number of other mat-
ters regarding the fisheries of both countries
off the U.S. Pacific coast. The two delega-
tions reviewed certain fishery problems off
the U.S. Atlantic coast and agreed that these
matters should be considered further at a
meeting to be held in late May, just prior
to the annual meeting of the International
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries.
One of the draft agreements provides for
extension for another 2 years of the United
States-U.S.S.R. agreement on king crab fish-
ing on the U.S. Continental Shelf in the
eastern Bering Sea,i with a reduction in the
quota for the U.S.S.R. from 118,600 cases of
canned crab to 100,000 cases.
With respect to other problems, a separate
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5752.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
331
draft agreement of 1 year's duration speci-
fies several areas seaward of 12 miles from
the Oregon-Washin^on coast in which Soviet
vessels would either refrain from fishing or
from concentrating their efforts. In certain
other areas off the Oregon-Washington coast
measures would be taken, jointly and sepa-
rately, to protect stocks of fish. Additional
protection would be provided for the fishing
gear of U.S. halibut fishermen in areas near
Kodiak Island, Alaska, early in the halibut
season. Under the agreement, Soviet vessels
would transfer cargoes in several designated
areas off Washington and Oregon and off
Alaska in the 9-mile zone contiguous to the
U.S. territorial sea. Soviet vessels would
also continue to fish within the 9-mile zone
for the duration of the agreement in two
areas of the central and western Aleutians
and a smaller area in the northern Gulf of
Alaska.
The agreement also provides for coopera-
tion in scientific research, exchange of scien-
tific data and personnel, exchanges of fisher-
men or their representatives aboard vessels
of the two countries, and general proce-
dures for reducing conflicts between vessels
and gear of the two countries.
The draft agreements are now under con-
sideration by governments. It is expected
that formal signature may take place within
2 weeks.
The U.S. delegation for the talks was
headed by Ambassador Donald L. McKernan,
Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife
to the Secretary of State. The Soviet delega-
tion, consisting of six persons, was headed
by Deputy Minister of Fisheries M. N.
Sukhoruchenko. Ambassador McKernan was
assisted by advisers from Federal and State
fishery agencies and from the sport and com-
mercial fisheries of Alaska, Washington,
Oregon, California, Rhode Island, New York,
and New Jersey.
332
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
International Economic Policies
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS (EXCERPTS)
Folloiving are the introductory paragraphs
(page 3) and the section entitled "Interna-
tional Economic Policies" (pages 13-16)
from the Economic Report of the President,^
together with the portion of the Anmcal Re-
port of the Council of Economic Advisers
which deals with growth and balance in the
world economy (chapter 5, pages 170-197).
affluence. The sacrifices required of most of
today's generation are not of income or
security; rather we are called on to renounce
prejudice, impatience, apathy, weakness, and
weariness.
In purely material terms, most Americans
are better off than ever before. That fact
expands our responsibilities, as it enlarges
our resources to meet them.
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
To the Congress of the United States:
A healthy and productive economy is a bul-
wark of freedom.
Around the world and here at home, our
trials of strength, our works of peace, our
quest for justice, our search for knowledge
and understanding, our efforts to enrich our
environment are buttressed by an amazing
productive power.
Americans have confronted many chal-
lenges in this century. The ones we face in
1967 are as trying of men's spirits as any we
have known. But the overwhelming majority
of us face our challenges in comfort, if not
' Economic Report of the President Transmitted
to the Congress January 1967, Together With the
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
(H. Doc. 28, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; transmitted on
Jan. 26), for sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20402 ($1.25).
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
The current year is a critical one for our
international economic policies and for the
economic progress of the world community.
As the largest single market and source of
capital, the United States carries special
responsibilities.
Trade
This Administration is committed to re-
ducing barriers to international trade, as
demonstrated by my recent action terminat-
ing the 1954 escape clause action on watches,^
and rolling back the special tariff on imports
of glass.8
The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations
is now entering its final and most critical
' Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1967, p. 217.
»76id.,p. 216.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
333
phase. I emphasize once more how important
this great attempt to liberalize world trade is
for all the developed and developing nations
of the free world.
After more than 4 years of discussion, it
is essential that the participants now resolve
the many complex problems that still remain.
It would indeed be a tragedy if the wide
authority granted to the President by the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were allowed
to lapse unused. Never before has there been
such a splendid opportunity to increase world
trade. It must not be lost.
But the Kennedy Round is not the end of
the road. We must look beyond the negotia-
tions in Geneva to further progress in the
years ahead. \Ye must begin to shape a trade
policy for the next decade that is responsive
to the needs of both the less developed and
the advanced countries.
We should seize every opportunity to build
and enlarge bridges of peaceful exchange
with the countries of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. We should have the ability to
adapt our policies to whatever political cir-
cumstances or commercial opportunities may
present themselves. I again urge the Congress
to provide authority to expand our trade re-
lations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
Aid
Although 1966 was a relatively good year
for world economic growth, average output
in developing countries rose by less than $3
a person.
There were, however, encouraging signs of
progress. Developing nations demonstrated
a willingness to take difficult but necessary
steps to help themselves. India, for example,
revised her foreign exchange and agricultural
policies to promote more rapid growth.
Among the wealthier nations, stronger
efforts were made to assist the development
of the poorer countries. Canada and Japan
increased their assistance programs. Major
free world aid donors joined in new groups
to coordinate their flow of aid.
The United States will continue to respond
constructively to the aspirations of the de-
veloping nations. We will give first priority
to fighting the evils of hunger, disease, and
ignorance in those free world countries which
are resolutely committed to helping them-
selves.
There should, however, be increasing
efforts to make both the receiving and giving
of aid a matter for creative international
partnership. We shall therefore
— continue to support enthusiastically, in a
manner consistent with our balance of pay-
ments position, such promising cooperative
regional efforts as the Alliance for Progress,
the Inter-American, the Asian, and the Afri-
can Development Banks, and the Mekong
Development Fund of the United Nations;
— further encourage the coordinated exten-
sion and expansion of aid by the major donor
countries in ways that result in an equitable
sharing of the burden;
— seek the cooperation of other major
donor countries this year in replenishing the
resources of the International Development
Association.
Balance of Payments
We can take some satisfaction in the fact
that our balance of payments in 1966 may
prove to have been in surplus on official re-
serve settlements. Despite the added costs of
the war in Vietnam and the rapid growth of
imports, our deficit on a liquidity basis
increased only slightly in 1966.
But we cannot relax our efforts to seek
further improvement.
Our goal in the coming year is to continue
to move toward balance of payments equi-
librium as rapidly as the foreign exchange
costs of the Vietnam conflict may permit.
This goal will be supported through measures
and policies consistent with healthy growth
at home and our responsibilities abroad.
We already have extended and reinforced
the voluntary restraint programs for corpo-
rate investment abroad and for foreign lend-
ing by financial institutions. I am counting on
334
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the continued full cooperation of businesses
and banks with these programs in 1967. And
I have instructed all agencies of the Govern-
ment to intensify their efforts to limit the
dollar drain resulting from their activities.
But more is needed. I now recommend the
following steps:
1. The Congress should extend the Interest
Equalization Tax, in strengthened form, to
July 31, 1969. This tax has proved extremely
useful in limiting the borrowing of developed
countries in our capital markets and in rein-
forcing the Federal Reserve voluntary pro-
gram. As we move toward easier money in
the United States, foreign borrowing in our
financial markets may tend to increase. I am
therefore requesting authority to adjust the
rates of the Interest Equalization Tax as
monetary conditions warrant, so that the
effective impact on interest costs can be
varied between zero and 2 percent. This
would replace the present flat 1-percent im-
pact.
Moreover, to ensure against possible
anticipatory increases in foreign borrowing, I
am also requesting that the tax be imposed
at rates which provide an impact of 2 percent
on interest costs while the legislation is under
consideration by Congress.
2. The most satisfactory way to arrest the
increasing gap between American travel
abroad and foreign travel here is not to limit
the former but to stimulate and encourage
the latter. I shall appoint in the near future
a special industry-Government task force to
make specific recommendations by May 1,
1967, on how the Federal Government can
best stimulate foreign travel to the United
States. After a careful review of their advice,
I shall ask the U.S. Travel Service and other
appropriate agencies to take the steps that
seem most promising.
3. As part of our long-run balance of pay-
ments program, I shall also
— request continuation and expansion by
$4.5 billion of the lending authority of the
Export-Import Bank in order to support the
expansion of exports;
— continue to urge other countries to par-
ticipate in the development of better means
both of sharing the resource burdens and of
neutralizing the balance of payments effect
arising from the common defense and foreign
assistance efforts.
4. For the longer run strength of our pay-
ments balance, we should intensify efforts to
— stimulate exporters' interest in supply-
ing foreign markets;
— enlist the support of the financial com-
munity to attract additional foreign invest-
ment in the United States;
— encourage further development of foreign
capital markets.
'Improving the International Monetary System
In 1966, significant progress was made
toward a better international monetary sys-
tem. Through close consultation and coopera-
tion among the financial authorities of major
countries, temporary strains were met
promptly and effectively.
Two large forward steps were taken on the
road to international monetary reform: wide
consensus was reached on basic principles for
the deliberate creation of additional reserve
assets; and the negotiations advanced to a
second stage in which all members of the
International Monetary Fund are par-
ticipating.
An even greater effort must be made in
the coming year to improve our monetary
system. In particular, I urge that
— all countries participate in the continu-
ing task of strengthening the basic monetary
arrangements that have served the world so
well;
— both surplus and deficit countries assume
their full responsibility for proper adjust-
ment of international payments imbalances,
and cooperate in efforts to lower world
interest rates;
— full agreement be reached on a construc-
tive contingency plan for the adequate and
orderly growth of world monetary reserves.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
335
REPORT OF COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
Chapter 5 — Growth and Balance in the World
Economy
World economic expansion in the first half of the
1960's has been sustained and rapid. The pace has
probably been surpassed only during the period of
recovery from World War II. Moreover, since the
end of the war, the extreme fluctuations of earlier
years have not been repeated.
But continued economic progress is not assured.
Many problems remain. The most difficult and im-
portant is that of overcoming poverty in many of
the less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. A major problem for the developed
countries is to cope with international financial im-
balances in ways which do not inhibit sound eco-
nomic growth.
This chapter records the economic progress in
both the developed and less developed countries dur-
ing the first part of the 1960's and outlines some
major issues for international consideration during
the remainder of this decade. It deals especially with
the policy issues facing the United States and other
developed countries in their efforts to achieve a bet-
ter international balance and to pursue national
policies that promote world economic progress. The
worldwide economic impact of their national policies
places a special responsibility on the major devel-
oped countries.
WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1960's
Two quantitative goals for economic growth in
the 1960's have been fixed by international organiza-
tions :
The United Nations has set 5 percent a year as
the minimum growth rate for the less developed
countries over the 1960's, calling this the "Develop-
ment Decade."
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which includes the countries
of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and
Japan, has called for an increase in aggregate out-
put of all member countries combined, amounting to
50 percent over the decade or an average annual
growth rate of 4.1 percent.
As can be seen from Table 29, the expansion of
real output in the less developed countries, estimated
at 4% percent a year, so far has fallen somewhat
short of the UN target on average, and far below it
in several of the largest of these countries. How-
ever, the table also shows that output in the OECD
countries has been exceeding the growth rate of the
OECD target.
Table 29. — Changes in total and per capita real
GNP in OECD and less developed countries
since 1955
Country
OECD countries: Total
United States
Total excluding United
States
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Japan
Italy
Spain
Greece
Less developed countries :
Total
Africa
Nigeria
Ghana
Latin America
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
Asia
Middle East _
Other Asia __
India
Pakistan —
Share
of
total
output
(per-
cent) 1
100.0
63.3
46.7
8.6
7.7
7.3
5.4
4.1
1.4
.4
100.0
12.5
1.3
.7
50.1
11.6
10.7
10.7
37.4
6.4
31.0
16.3
3.7
Percentage increase per year
Total real
GNP
1955
to
1960
3.2
2.2
5.0
2 6.3
2.8
4.6
9.7
5.5
4.3
5.4
< 4.5
(5)
(S)
6.1
4.8
5.8
2.6
6.1
4.&
6.1
4.2
4.4
3.5
1960
to
1965
5.0
4.7
5.3
3 4.8
3.3
5.1
9.7
6.1
9.2
8.7
4.6
3.3
5.0
4.0
4.4
3.3
3.0
6.9
3.9
6.1
3.4
2.9
5.4
Per capita
real GNP
1955
to
1960
2.0
.4
3.7
2 5.1
2.2
3.7
8.9
4.9
3.4
4.3
(5)
(5)
3.5
2.0
2.7
.9
3.0
2.4
3.7
2.1
2.3
1.2
1960
to
1966
3.7
3.2
4.2
33.6
2.6
3.7
8.5
4.3
8.3
8.1
2.2
1.1
3.0
1.3
1.5
.2
1.3
2.8
1.6
3.7
1.0
.4
2.8
< Share in 1963 for OECD countries and in 1960 for less de-
veloped countries.
~ Excludes Saar and West Berlin.
3 Includes Saar and West Berlin.
■* Estimates.
5 Not available.
Note. — Totals include countries not shown separately.
Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.
Sources : Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD). Agency for International Development (AID),
and Council of Economic Advisers.
Developed Countries
In the first half of the 1960's, real output in
Western Europe and Japan increased by more than
5 percent a year. Contributing to the rapid expan-
sion were government policies directed toward
achieving and maintaining high levels of employ-
ment with reasonable price stability, stimulating the
movement of labor from low to high productivity
employment, reducing barriers to foreign trade, and
encouraging the more efficient utilization of re-
sources in other ways.
A high rate of capital formation helped to
achieve this rapid growth. Investment averaged 18
percent of gross national product (GNP) in the
OECD countries other than the United States; it
336
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ranged from almost 30 percent in Japan to less than
14 percent in the United Kingdom. While much of
the increase in output comes from investment in
physical capital and from the incorporation of tech-
nological advances, a good deal also comes from in-
vestment in human capital — in raising the education,
skills, and health of the population.
The growth of output is also benefiting from the
movement of labor out of activities of low produc-
tivity to those of higher productivity. There has been
a large-scale movement of labor from Southern Eu-
rope to Northwestern Europe — from areas of low
productivity, low incomes, and high unemployment
to areas where productivity and incomes are high
and unemployment low. Within countries, the major
shift has been out of employment in agriculture. The
OECD estimates that this latter shift alone ac-
counted for between 10 and 15 percent of the in-
crease in productivity during the first half of the
1960's in France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The
United Kingdom, which by 1960 already had only a
small agricultural sector, did not have this source
of expanding productivity.
Internal shifts of labor have been stimulated and
facilitated by the expansion of foreign trade, which
has far exceeded the growth of output. The rapid
growth of trade has resulted, in part, from the re-
duction of trade barriers, especially vdthin the two
regional groupings — the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (EFTA).
For a number of European countries and Japan,
a rapid rise in exports has also directly stimulated
the grovvi,h of GNP. In addition, when domestic ex-
pansion is led by export growth, the resulting rise in
imports can be readily financed; there is less chance
that the government will need to apply the brakes
to reverse a developing balance of payments deficit.
Less Developed Countries
The achievement of an adequate rate of self-
sustaining growth in the less developed countries
remains an urgent world economic problem. Over
half of the 4% percent annual growth of total out-
put for the less developed areas has been needed just
to maintain their low level of living, since their
populations have been rising by 2V^ percent an-
nually. The yearly increase in per capita output has
been only 2 percent, or barely $3 a person.
Achieving rapid and sustainable growth in these
countries is by no means a hopeless task, however.
Self-sustaining growth has been attained in certain
less developed countries — including Israel, Malaysia,
Mexico, Taiwan, Venezuela, and some Central Amer-
ican countries. Others — such as Pakistan, South
Korea, Thailand, and Turkey — are approaching that
objective.
But the problems are formidable. Further efforts
by both the developed and the less developed coun-
tries are required. The rapid growth of population
in many less developed countries, already over-
populated in relation to their economic resources,
must be slowed. A number of these nations have
adopted measures to induce their citizens to limit
the size of their families. Some of these programs —
in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan — have al-
ready shown signs of success. Nevertheless, the
growth rate of population in the less developed coun-
tries as a group is still rising.
Another major problem area is agriculture. Agri-
cultural output has grown so slowly that food out-
put per person in many countries is below pre- World
War II levels. Unless a vigorous effort is made to
redress the situation, it is likely to deteriorate fur-
ther as population and need for food continue to
grow rapidly. Moreover, in at least some of the less
developed countries, agricultural development may
be a key to general economic growth. The applica-
tion of improved farming techniques can substan-
tially improve agricultural productivity with rela-
tively small increments of capital; increased agri-
cultural output can be a major substitute for im-
ports; rising farm income can provide an expanding
market for domestic industrial output.
The developed countries can do much to help by
providing technical assistance, food, fertilizers, agri-
cultural equipment, and financing. But the basic
responsibility rests on the less developed countries
themselves. They must, among other things, improve
the incentives for farmers to increase output.
Education also is a major field in which improve-
ment is essential. Economic progress requires liter-
acy. A modern and expanding economy needs much
more — people trained to operate farm machinery,
run a lathe, operate a retail store, and keep ac-
counts. In recognition of the importance of educa-
tion, the less developed countries have in recent
years increased their education budgets by 15 per-
cent annually. This effort has long been supported
by the United States. More Agency for International
Development (AID) technicians working abroad are
employed in educational projects than in any other
field. Moreover, beginning in fiscal year 1967, AID
is sharply increasing its educational aid effort, as
well as its work in agriculture and health. The edu-
cational efforts of our Peace Corps workers are also
welcomed throughout the less developed world.
The Need for Capital
The developing countries also need capital. About
one-fourth of their domestic investment is financed
by capital imports. From 1961 to 1965, the net
amount of this capital inflow rose by only 5 percent
a year in money terms and less in real terms. Some
increase continued into 1966. Since 1963, the entire
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
337
increase from abroad has been in private capital
flows.
This investment, to be sure, benefits the recipient
countries, and the United States has taken steps to
encourage it. But it has gone mainly to the extrac-
tive industries, particularly oil. Thus, it is unevenly
distributed among countries. Further, investment in
technologically advanced, sometimes highly auto-
mated, extractive processes does not have the same
stimulating effects on general economic activity as
does investment in local manufacturing. It does,
however, provide much needed foreign exchange and
technological know-how for those countries fortunate
enough to be well-endowed vvrith minerals.
For many developing nations, a growing burden
of interest and amortization payments on external
debt absorbs a large and rising proportion of gross
aid receipts. In 1960, debt service charges amounted
to 13 percent of the official bilateral aid receipts of
less developed countries; today the figure is 19 per-
cent. India's debt service charges on government
assistance for the period of its Third Plan amounted
to 26 percent of its foreign aid. In Turkey, debt serv-
ice during 1963-66 was more than half as large as
gross foreign aid.
For the net inflow of aid merely to remain con-
stant, the gross inflow must rise to cover growing
debt service. In fact, the gross flow of government
aid from the developed countries has been rising just
enough to keep net aid inflow on a plateau since
1963. Future prospects are even less encouraging.
Bilateral aid commitments— pledges of actual aid
disbursements to be made in the future — declined in
1965. This could foreshadow a decline in net and
even in gross official aid disbursements in the years
to come.
The stagnation in the net flow of official capital
to the less developed countries has come at the very
time that the industrial countries have reached new
heights of prosperity. And it comes at a time when
the pace of economic expansion achieved by the less
developed countries as a group is encouraging. They
are developing the skills required for a modern econ-
omy. They are capable of using more capital than
they can raise domestically or borrow abroad on com-
mercial terms. For this and other reasons, foreign
aid, both bilateral and multilateral, should have a
high priority claim on the resources of high-income
countries.
One of the most fruitful avenues for increased aid
to the less developed countries is through the multi-
lateral lending agencies — the World Bank family
and the regional development banks. The United
States firmly supports these agencies as mechanisms
for mobilizing both e.xternal capital and domestic
resources of the developing countries themselves.
Replenishment of the resources of the International
Development Association (IDA), which lends on
easy terms, ought to be high on the agenda of the
developed countries. The IDA's resources should be
substantially increased in ways which take into
account the balance of payments situation of the
contributing countries. The recently established
Asian Development Bank represents a new stage in
Asian economic cooperation, in which the United ^
States is participating with other non-Asian coun-
tries. For Latin America, the United States con-
tinues its strong support of the Inter-American
Development Bank, which serves as the financial
arm of the Alliance for Progrress and is helping to
draw funds from inside and outside the hemisphere
into Latin American development. The African De-
velopment Bank, which has recently begun opera-
tions, will perform similar functions in its area.
Foreign aid and private foreign investment
finance only one-fifth of the foreign exchange ex-
penditures of the developing countries. The remain-
ing four-fifths is financed by their own export
earnings. After near stagnation in the late 1950's,
these earnings rose by about 6 percent a year during
the first half of the 1960's. The increase was pro-
duced by many factors, including strengthened prices
for many primary commodities, the growing ability
of the less developed countries to supply these com-
modities, and the rapidly expanding markets in the
United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Only
with continued vigorous grrowth in the developed
world and improved access to its markets can the
less developed countries earn the foreign exchange
needed to support their own continuing g^rowth.
Trade Policies
The less developed countries obviously have much
to gain from reductions in tariffs, quotas, and other
barriers to trade in primary products, since such
products constitute 85 percent of their exports. Over
the longer run, satisfactory growth in the export
earnings of the less developed countries will require
relatively less reliance on sales of primary products
and continuation of the sharp expansion in exports
of manufactured goods. Such diversification will also
be important for their internal grovrth. Reductions
in tariffs and other trade barriers in developed
countries can contribute much to the needed growth
of manufactured exports from developing countries.
In most of the less developed countries, internal
markets are too small to support efficient modem
industrial plants. It is not geographic size or popu-
lation but effective purchasing power that deter-
mines the size of a market. Regional cooperation can
create larger markets so that the enterprises of the
developing countries can benefit from the economies
of scale and of specialization on which growth and
efficiency depend.
Encouraging progress toward regional integration
is being made in a number of areas. The Latin
American Free Trade Association, despite handicaps.
338
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
can form the basis for a true Latin American com-
mon market. Particular progress has been made in
the Central American Common Market. The United
States supports outward-looking regional integra-
tion.
The importance of trade expansion as a factor in
economic growth in all countries argues strongly
for more rapid trade liberalization. This proposition
is effectively demonstrated by the recent experience
in the new free-trade areas of Europe, just as it
■was earlier demonstrated in the great common mar-
ket of the United States. Thus, it is essential that
success be achieved in the current multilateral trade
negotiations, by far the most comprehensive in his-
tory.
Kennedy Round
This success is important to both the developed
and less developed countries. The substantial reduc-
tion in tariif barriers which the United States and
other countries are seeking to achieve in the Ken-
nedy Round negotiations should make an important
contribution to increased world trade.
Expanding world trade encourages capital and
labor to move out of those economic activities which
are better supplied from abroad and into those fields
which provide higher real income through greater
productivity. By permitting countries to produce ef-
ficiently and on a large scale, freer trade makes a
contribution to higher incomes everywhere. And
through reduction of artificial shelters to laggard
domestic industries, the lowering of barriers to im-
ports spurs innovation and efficiency.
In the Kennedy Round, the major reductions in
barriers to world trade are expected to be made by
the developed countries — the United States, EEC,
EFTA, and Japan. EFTA has now virtually elimi-
nated barriers to industrial trade among its mem-
bers while the EEC will do so for both industrial
and agricultural products by July 1968. The reduc-
tion of barriers to trade with nonmember countries
would now help these groups to continue their rapid
pace of growth, and would avoid distortion of the
normal pattern of European trade in particular and
world trade generally. The less developed countries
are not being asked to grant tariflf concessions that
would endanger their economic development pro-
grams.
Longer-Run Tasks
A successful Kennedy Round will be a great
achievement, and will promote rapid and healthy
economic expansion throughout the world. But the
Kennedy Round cannot be the end of the road for
the liberalization of world trade. In the year ahead,
further study and international consultation should
be directed at four remaining tasks in the trade
field:
(1) Continuing efforts to liberalize those tariff
and nontariff barriers which will remain after the
Kennedy Round;
(2) Developing a better international pattern of
agricultural production and trade to speed economic
growth;
(3) Achieving more stable export prices and rais-
ing the export volume of developing countries;
(4) Improving economic relations between the
countries of Eastern Europe — including the Soviet
Union — and the United States.
President Johnson has emphasized the importance
of this last task on several occasions. In his recent
State of the Union Message,* he noted that the
Export-Import Bank can now extend commercial
credits to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland, as well as to Rumania and Yugoslavia. He
called again for legislative authority to extend most-
favored-nation — i.e., nondiscriminatory' — tariff treat-
ment to the countries of Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. Their trade with Western Europe has
increased steadily in recent years, while U.S. trade
with these countries has been stagnant, and consti-
tutes less than 1 percent of all U.S. foreign trade.
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
A country's foreign trade and payments are its
main points of economic contact with the rest of the
world. The balance of payments of any nation is
intimately dependent on policies and developments in
the outside world. U.S. exports depend heavily on
European, Canadian, and Japanese growth and the
foreign exchange receipts of the less developed coun-
tries as well as on U.S. growth and price stability.
The flow of capital from the United States depends
on profit opportunities and monetary conditions
abroad as well as on those in the United States.
For most of the decade following World War II,
U.S. balance of payments deficits provided needed
international currency to support the rapid expan-
sion of world trade and economic growth. Other
countries were eager to hold more dollars; indeed,
it was commonly known as a period of "dollar short-
age." Recently, however, as foreign reserves have
increased, U.S. deficits have been less welcome.
These deficits do not, of course, contradict the
unmatched strength and productivity of the U.S.
economy; neither' do they mean that our competitive
position in world markets is weak. The United
States is not living beyond its means, increasing its
net debt to foreign countries, or using up its inter-
national capital. U.S. ownership of assets abroad
continues to grow faster than foreign ownership of
assets in the United States. U.S. assets abroad, net
of foreign assets in the United States, increased
* Ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
339
U.S. Balance of International Payments
BILLION? OF DOLURS
_ EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF CjOOS AHO SERVICES
AO
30
,1
J L
1966'^
CAPITAL FLOWS
FOREIGN V
1946^/
10
BALANCE
OFFICIAL BESERVE TRANSACTIOhS BASIS
\
-
s
1— ^9»-
-
-
Liouioni' e*si*
-10
1
1 I.I 1 . i
1
1
)9S8
I960
1962
J/FIRST 3 OUARIEfiS *1 SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATES
i/EXCLUOlNC OFFICIAL HESEBVE TRANSACTIONS
J/EXCLUOIHC LICUlO CAPITAL
SOURCE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
from $7 billion in 1935 to $14 billion in 1950; by
1961 they had risen to $28 billion; and in 1965 they
were $47 billion.
The deficits have, however, resulted in a steady
erosion of the U.S. stock of reserve assets, which are
needed to maintain a stable value of the dollar in
international transactions. At the same time, there
have been steady increases in U.S. liabilities to for-
eigners that may be considered potential claims
against our reserve assets. This combination implies
a continuing decline in liquidity; it is clearly not
indefinitely sustainable if confidence in the safety
and stability of the dollar is to be maintained.
The U.S. balance of payments performance is now
evaluated in terms of two alternative accounting
definitions. Both measure an over-all U.S. deficit or
surplus in terms of what is currently happening to
(1) U.S. reserves and (2) certain types of claims
against the United States. Both count as an increase
or decrease in reserves any change in the sum of
U.S. holdings of monetary gold, U.S. "gold tranche"
claims on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ,
and U.S. official holdings of convertible foreign cur-
rencies. They differ in how they treat changes in
various outstanding claims against the United
States.
One measure — the "official reserve transactions" "^
balance — treats any increase in foreign private
claims on the United States, liquid or illiquid, as an
ordinary capital inflow. Only the change in claims
on the United States held by foreign official agencies
is counted, along with the change in U.S. reserves,
as a measure of the U.S. deficit or surplus. Foreign
official monetary agencies have the privilege of con-
verting claims on the United States into gold at the
U.S. Treasury; their net purchases thus add to the
direct claims on U.S. reserves. Moreover, they are
charged with maintaining stable exchange rates for
their national currencies. They usually do this by
buying or selling dollars to close any gap between
normal supply and demand for dollars which might
otherwise upset the exchange rate between the dollar
and their currency. In this sense, the net balance of
such transactions by other countries, together with
changes in our own reserves, is one indicator of the
size of the imbalance in U.S. payments.
The alternative "liquidity" balance attempts an
assessment of changes in the U.S. liquidity position.
It takes account of the fact that liquid dollar hold-
ings of private foreigners may be readily sold to
foreign central banks. It therefore treats only in-
creases in foreign non-liquid claims on the United
States as ordinary capital inflows. Changes in all
liquid claims are included along with changes in U.S.
reserve assets as a measure of the U.S. balance,
regardless of whether the claims are acquired or
sold by an official agency or by a private individual,
bank, or business.
While these measures of balance are important,
they must be viewed as indicators, rather than defi-
nitions, of equilibrium. In part, the limitation arises
because any measure of balance must arbitrarily
divide dollar assets into two distinct groups — those
which are claims against our reserves and those
which are not. Such a clear division does not exist
in reality. To a degree, any marketable dollar asset
can be indirectly exercised as a claim against U.S.
reserves. Moreover, the likelihood that assets will
be used as a claim against U.S. reserves depends not
only on their marketability and maturity but also
on the motivation and attitude of current and pro-
spective holders. Evidence on such attitudes, includ-
ing the performance of the dollar in foreign ex-
change markets, helps to interpret the U.S. position.
But, however that position is assessed, the U.S.
balance of payments clearly has not been in sustain-
able equilibrium in recent years and must be im-
proved.
Where a sustainable equilibrium may lie over the
long run is not completely clear. The expansion of
international transactions — ^most of which are set-
340
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tied in dollars — suggests that some growth of for-
eign private holdings of dollars is natural and
desirable and may be perfectly sustainable. Some
increase in official claims on the United States may
also occur over the long run, given the preference
of many countries to hold all or some of their official
reserves in dollars, and the fact that transactions
needs of official agencies will continue to expand.
Regardless of the movement of dollar holdings
abroad, however, continuing U.S. reserve losses
would not be compatible with sustained equilibrium.
On the other hand, any growth of either official, or
official plus private liquid, holdings of dollars need
not be precisely equaled by growth of U.S. reserve
assets in order that sustainable equilibrium be
achieved.
Recent Developments
The U.S. liquidity deficit vridened slightly in 1966
while the official settlements balance registered a
small surplus for the first time since 1957.
The liquidity deficit had improved markedly in
1965 and showed a slight further improvement
through the first three quarters of 1966. Preliminary
evidence points to a somewhat larger fourth quarter
liquidity deficit which will bring the year's total
slightly ab<jve the $1.3 billion deficit of 1965. During
the year, there was an extraordinary buildup of
foreign private dollar holdings, which resulted in a
small surplus on official settlements.
Despite the surplus on official settlements, net gold
sales continued as foreign monetary authorities re-
duced their dollar claims on the United States. While
sales to France were $601 million in 1966, the net
reduction in the U.S. gold stock for the year was
$571 million.
Full data on the U.S. balance of payments are
available only for the first three quarters of 1966.
Unless otherwise noted, all figures for 1966 used
below represent the total of these first three quarters
at a seasonally adjusted annual rate.
The structure of the balance of payments in 1965
and 1966 was markedly different from that of previ-
ous years. The surplus on goods and services, which
had been rising from 1959 to 1964, dropped sharply
in 1965 and 1966. On the other hand, the net outflow
on capital account was also g^reatly reduced in both
years (Chart 16 and Table 30).
These developments can in large measure be at-
tributed to (1) the increase in the direct costs of the
war in Vietnam, (2) the sharp rise in imports in-
duced by the rapid economic expansion and the
heightened pressure on domestic resources, (3) the
exceptionally tight monetary conditions of 1966, and
(4) the balance of payments programs inaugurated
in 1965. The last two factors were important in
accomplishing a large reduction in U.S. bank lend-
ing abroad and in attracting an exceptional inflow
of foreigfn capital.
Table 30. — United States balance of payments,
1960-66
[Billions of dollan]
TjTW of transaction
1960
\ 1
1961
1962
1963
1964
1966
1966 >
Balance on goods and
services
4.0
B.6
5.1
6.9
8.6
7.0
6.6
Balance on mer-
chandise trade. _^
4.8
6.4
4.4
6.1
6.7
4.8
3.7
Military expendi-
tures, net
—2.7
—2.6
-2.4
-2.3
—2.1
-2.0
-2.7
Balance on other
servicea
2.0
2.8
3.1
3.1
3.9
4.2
4.6
Remittances and pen-
sions
— .7
— .7
-.8
— .9
-.9
-1.0
— 1.0
Government grants and
capital, net
-2.8
-2.8
—3.0
—3.6
-3.6
-3.4
-3.6
U.S. private capital.
net
—3.9
—4.2
—3.4
—4.6
6.5
3.7
—3.6
Foreign nonliquid
capital, net
.4
.7
1.0
.7
.7
.2
2.0
Errors and omissions-.
— .9
— 1.0
—1.2
— .4
-1.0
-.4
-.6
BALANCB ON LIQUIDITY
Basis
—3.9
-2.4
-2.2
—2.7
-2.8
— 1.3
-1.2
Plus: Foreign private
liquid capital, net2__
.5
1.0
-.2
.6
1.6
.1
2.3
Less : Increases in non-
liquid liabilities to
foreign monetary
authorities 3
.3
(M
.3
.1
.6
Balance on Official
Reserve Trans-
actions Basis
—3.4
— 1.3
-2'.7
—2.0
-1.6
-1.3
.7
Gold (decrease -|-)_-
1.7
.9
.9
.5
.1
1.7
5.6
Convertible cur-
rencies (de-
crease -1-) 1
— .1
(^)
-.1
-.2
-.3
5-.6
IMF gold tranche
position (de-
crease + )
.4
— .1
.6
(*>
.3
— .1
5.7
Foreign monetary
official claims
(increase -|-)___
1.3
.7
1.2
1.7
1.4
.1
5-1.4
' First 3 quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rates, except
as noted.
2 Includes changes in Treasury liabdlities to certain foreign
military agencies during 1960-62.
3 Included above under foreign nonliquid capital.
■* Lffis than $50 million.
5 First 3 quarters at unadjusted annual rates.
Note. — Detail will not neccBsariJy add to totals because of
rounding.
Source: Department of Commerce.
The Balance on Goods and Services
The U.S. surplus on goods and services more than
doubled from 1960 to 1964, reaching an exceptional
peak of $8% billion. Subsequently, however, the sur-
plus declined. As the combined result of a narrowing
trade surplus and sharply increased military ex-
penditures in 1966, it fell to $5% billion.
Trade. The trade surplus fell through the first
three quarters of 1966, to the lowest level since 1959.
The most striking factor in this deterioration was
the sharp acceleration in the growth of merchandise
imports beginning in 1965, to an annual rate of
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
841
about 20 percent. In 1966, imports rose to about 3.5
percent of GNP — the highest in the postwar period
— from about 3.2 percent in 1965 and an average of
less than 3 percent in previous years of the 1960's.
Imports of capital goods rose by about 50 percent,
and accounted for more than 20 percent of the in-
crease in imports in 1966. For the second consecutive
year they rose sharply as a percentage of total do-
mestic purchases of capital goods. As the increasing
demand for capital goods began to strain domestic
capacity in 1965, and even more in 1966, purchasers
increasingly turned to foreign suppliers to get
prompt delivery. While less than 3 percent of domes-
tic requirements was imported in 1964, about 9
percent of the increase in domestic purchases of
capital equipment between 1964 and 1965, and over
12 percent between 1965 and 1966, was accounted
for by additional imports. The earlier strains and
pressures continued to affect imports, especially for
long lead-time items, in the second half of 1966,
after the pace of over-all economic advance had
moderated.
Export performance in 1966 was healthy despite
domestic demand pressures. Exports were more than
10 percent greater than in 1965, even after adjust-
ment for the effects of the 1965 dock strike. The U.S.
share of world exports (excluding exports to the
United States) remained stable, while the U.S. share
of world exports of manufactured goods rose
slightly.
A major source of the strength of U.S. exports in
the 1960's has been the stability of the U.S. cost-
price structure, while costs and prices have been
rising elsewhere. Recent price developments in the
United States, however, brought this relative im-
provement to a halt. Even so, unit labor costs in
manufacturing have risen less rapidly in the United
States during 1966 than in most other industrial
countries. On the whole, it appears that the U.S.
competitive position with respect to prices and costs
was essentially unchanged in 1966.
Other Goods and Services. Overseas military ex-
penditures increased in 1966 by more than $700 mil-
lion, after having been relatively stable for several
years. The war in Vietnam, of course, was the cause
of the increase. Expenditures in Europe still account
for about 45 percent of the total, but have been
largely offset by purchases of U.S. military equip-
ment and by various financial transactions.
Other items in the goods and services balance be-
haved normally. Investment income receipts, expand-
ing by 6 percent, showed continued strength. U.S.
travel expenditures abroad also continued to in-
crease. Foreign travel expenditures in the United
States rose faster on a percentage basis, but by less
in dollar amount, than the expenditures of U.S. na-
tionals abroad.
The deterioration of the U.S. balance on goods and
services during 1966, in summary, reflected pri- .'
marily pressures stemming from the rapid advance I'
of the domestic economy and the foreign exchange
costs of the hostilities in Vietnam.
The Capital Account
As shown in Table 31, net U.S. private capital
outflows fell from a record $6.5 billion in 1964 to
$3.7 billion in 1965 and remained essentially un-
changed in 1966.
U.S. Purchases of Foreign Securities. After a sharp
rise in new issues of foreign securities in U.S. mar-
kets beginning in 1962, the United States in July
1963 imposed an Interest Equalization Tax (lET)
on purchases from foreigners of securities of issuers
in developed economies other than Canada. The lET
was designed as a partial offset to the lower interest
rates which prevailed in U.S. capital markets as a
result of better organization and greater competi-
tiveness, and of the need for the United States to
press toward full employment of its resources
through expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.
The lET has worked well. Prom 1964 through
1966, U.S. net purchases of foreign securities aver-
aged about $700 million annually, down from the
average of $1.1 billion of 1962 and 1963. U.S. pur-
chases of new issues have stabilized near $1.2 bil-
lion; virtually all new issues have been by Canadians
and other borrowers not covered by the tax.
U.S. Direct Investment and Bank Lending. The
outflow of direct investment funds from the United
States began to accelerate in 1963. By 1965, the
flow was more than double that in 1960-62. The
years 1963 and 1964 also saw a sharp rise in loans
abroad by U.S. banks. The total outflow of U.S.
capital in 1964 was more than $2% billion in excess
of its average in 1960-61.
Although the outflow of portfolio capital and
bank loans is largely explained by differentials in
the cost of borrowing and the efficiency of U.S.
financial markets, the increase in direct foreign in-
vestment by U.S. corporations in the last few years
is somewhat more difficult to explain. The rapid
increase in investment in Europe generally reflects,
of course, a desire to participate in a large and
rapidly expanding new market.
Earnings on investments in Europe, however,
have fallen since 1962. Between 1955 and 1962,
rates of return on investments of U.S. manufactur-
ing affiliates in Europe, at 14 to 19 percent, were
significantly higher each year than the 10 to 15
percent earned ' by U.S. manufacturers at home.
However, since 1962, earnings on direct investments
in Europe have varied between 12 and 14 percent,
about the same as, or — in 1965 — even below, those
in the United States. It is possible that long-term
plans for expansion of foreign operations decided
342
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
upon in the earlier period have dictated the large
investment outflows of recent years.
Whatever the reasons for the sharp increase in
direct investment and bank lending in 1963-64, it
clearly was imposing an intolerable strain on the
U.S. balance of payments.
Consequently, early in 1965, the United States in-
troduced a program of voluntary restraint on for-
eign investment by U.S. corporations and banks.
This program was designed to moderate the capital
outflow to the developed countries, while not inter-
fering with the flow to the less developed. The Fed-
eral Reserve program requested that banks limit
their increase in claims on foreig^ners in 1965 to 5
percent of the outstanding claims at the start of
the year; a further 4 percent increase was the sug-
gested limit in 1966. Banks were asked to give pri-
ority to export financing and credits to less devel-
oped countries. Similar guidelines were applied to
foreign lending by other financial institutions. This
program — together with the effects of tight money
— achieved a $2^/i billion favorable swing in bank
lending from 1964 to 1965 and a further $200 mil-
lion improvement in 1966.
The Department of Commerce, early in 1965,
asked large nonfinancial corporations to make a
maximum effort to expand their net payments bal-
ances and to repatriate liquid funds. Late in 1965,
corporations were asked to limit their average an-
nual direct investment outflows (including rein-
vested earnings, but net of U.S. corporate borrow-
ing abroad) for 1965^66 to specified developed and
oil exporting countries to no more than 135 percent
of the average annual flow in 1962-64.
Under the Commerce program, firms have been
encouraged to obtain maximum foreign financing.
An indication of the program's success is the sharp
surge in U.S. corporate borrowing abroad. In par-
ticular, U.S. corporations issued more than $500
million of securities in foreign capital markets dur-
ing the first three quarters of 1966. (These issues
are included in Table 31 under foreign investment
in U.S. securities; it offsets a part of the debit on
direct investment.) In addition, borrowing by for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations has increased,
reducing the need for outflows from the United
States.
With these adjustments in financing, U.S. cor-
porations continued their extraordinary expansion
of plant and equipment expenditures abroad. Out-
lays in 1965 were more than 20 percent higher than
in 1964; a further substantial increase is estimated
for 1966, to an amount nearly double the outlays in
1962. The increase from 1965 to 1966 in U.S. manu-
factuiing investment in EEC countries may have
been more than one-third.
Foreign Capital. Higher yields on U.S. securities
in 1966 attracted a large inflow of foreign capital.
Table 31. — United States balance of payments:
Capital transactions, 1960-66
[Billions of dollars]
Type of capital
transaction
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966 1
U.S. private capital.
net --
-3.9
—4.2
-3.4
— 4.B
-6.B
-8.7
-3.6
Direct investments.
-1.7
— 1.6
-1.7
-2.0
-2.4
—3.4
-3.2
New foreign secur-
ity issues
-.6
-.B
-1.1
—1.3
— 1.1
-1.2
— 1.2
Other transactions
in foreign
securities*
— .1
-.2
.1
.1
.4
.4
.7
U.S. bank claims--
-1.2
-1.3
— .B
-l.B
-2.B
.1
.3
Other claims
—.4
-.6
— .4
.2
-1.0
.3
-.8
Foreign nonliquid
capital, net
.4
.7
1.0
.7
.7
.2
2.0
Direct investment- _
.1
.1
.1
(3)
(')
.1
— .1
U.S. securities
(excluding
Treasury
issues)
.3
.3
.1
.3
— .1
— .4
1.1
Long-term U.S.
bank liabilities--
(=>)
(3)
(3)
.1
.2
.2
.8
Other-i
— .1
.3
.8
.4
.B
.4
.3
Foreign nonliquid
capita], net
0.4
0.7
1.0
0.7
0.7
0.2
2.0
Plus: Foreign private
liquid capital, net
.B
1.0
-.2
.6
1.6
.1
2.3
Less: Increases in non-
liquid liabilities to
foreign monetary
authorities'
.3
(3)
.3
.1
.6
Equals: Foreign cap-
ital excluding offi-
cial reserve trans-
actions, net
.8
1.7
.B
1.3
1.9
.2
3.9
1 First 3 quarters at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
2 Includes redemptions.
3 Less than $B0 million.
■* Includes certain special government transactions.
^ Included above under foreign nonliquid capital.
Note, — Detail will not necessarily add to totals because of
rounding.
Source : Defpartment of Commerce,
particularly into Government agency obligations and
certificates of deposit issued by U.S. banks. Foreign
official agencies and international organizations
shifted a substantial volume of liquid dollar claims
into these instruments.
The inflow of foreign private liquid capital that
occurred in the third quarter of 1966 was particu-
larly large. U.S. monetary tightness provided a
strong pull to such funds. Some of the inflow clearly
reflected a movement out of sterling during the pe-
riod of acute pressure in July and August. Although
an upward trend in private foreign demand for dol-
lar balances is to be expected, the surge that
occurred in the third quarter will obviously not con-
tinue and may be partly reversed in the future.
Most of the inflow represented borrowing by U.S.
banks from their foreign branches as the home of-
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
348
fices of U.S. banks responded to tightness in their
reserve positions. The foreign branches, able to offer
higher rates to depositors than those allowed in the
United States, gathered a substantial volume of
short-term funds abroad. Although this flow of
funds did not reduce the U.S. deficit on liquidity
account, it did prevent what would otherwise have
been a larger flow of dollars into the hands of for-
eign official monetary agencies, and thereby placed
the official settlements account in substantial surplus
in the third quarter. It probably held down the loss
in U.S. reserve assets at a time when there was
temporary deterioration in other parts of the bal-
ance of payments.
Prospects and Policies for 1967
The U.S. trade surplus should resume its growth
in 1967. Indeed, improvement may have begun in
the fourth quarter of 1966. Success of the domestic
economic policies described in Chapter 1 will be es-
sential to improvement of the trade surplus. A mod-
erate pace and more balanced pattern of domestic
economic advance should lower the ratio of imports
to domestic income from the peak recorded in 1966.
While imports grow at a slower rate, export expan-
sion should continue to be strong, given favorable
growth rates in foreign markets and the increase in
dollar earnings enjoyed by foreigners in 1966. The
easing of domestic demand pressures and more
stable prices should enable U.S. producers to take
full advantage of export opportunities.
In addition, the U.S. Government will undertake
further active efforts to promote exports, in part
through expanded credit facilities of the Export-
Import Bank. Steps are also being taken to attract
a substantially larger number of tourists to the
United States. The special task force on travel
which the President will appoint in the near future
should lay the groundwork for a greatly intensified
long-run effort in this area.
Military expenditures abroad will continue to be
large, although they will probably grow at a slower
rate than in 1966. At the same time, the excess of
investment income receipts over payments should
show a substantial growth. The surplus on goods
and services, then, should improve in 1967.
Just as the capital account of the U.S. balance of
payments last year benefited greatly from the sharp
tightening of monetary conditions, relaxation of
credit could create pressures in 1967 for increased
private capital outflows and reduced foreign in-
flows. This makes it especially important that the
programs to limit capital outflows be continued and
strengthened.
Strengthened Voluntary Programs
The 1967 guidelines for the Federal Reserve and
the Department of Commerce voluntary restraint
programs, issued last December, reflect these con-
siderations. Commercial banks by late 1966 were
more than $1.2 billion under their Federal Reserve
guideline ceilings. To limit the potential increase ins,
total foreign lending during 1967, the Federal Re-
serve asked each bank to continue to observe,
throughout 1967, its existing ceiling of 109 percent
of the claims outstanding as of the end of 1964.
Banks were also asked to use their leeway under
the ceiling only gradually — not more than one-fifth
of it per quarter — beginning with the fourth quar-
ter of 1966. Moreover, to assure that such credits
as are extended will be devoted primarily to the
financing of exports or to meet the credit needs of
developing countries, any increase in nonexpert
credits to developed countries is to be limited to 10
percent of the leeway existing on September 30,
1966. New and greatly simplified guidelines were
also issued for nonbank financial institutions.
The guidelines for the Department of Commerce
voluntary program to restrain direct investment
outlays of business firms abroad were also strength-
ened. The ceiling on direct investment outflow plus
overseas retained earnings for the average of the
two years 1966-67 was lowered to 120 percent of
the 1962-64 average. With the strengthened pro-
gram, the total of direct investment outflows — net
of borrowings abroad — and retained overseas earn-
ings in 1967 is expected to be below the actual level
now estimated for 1966. The program will continue
to permit the expansion of U.S. plant and equip-
ment expenditures in those countries covered to the
extent that the expansion can be financed from for-
eign sources. It also remains a fully voluntary pro-
gram, confined to investments in developed and oil
exporting countries.
Extension of lET
As a further measure to strengthen existing pro-
grams, the President is requesting a 2-year exten-
sion of the lET, now scheduled to expire in mid-
1967, and is asking for authority to vary the
effective rate of the tax between zero and 2 percent
a year. By present law, the tax adds 1 percentage
point, in effect, to the annual interest costs of those
foreigners subjfct to the tax who borrow at long
term in the United States or who sell securities
to U.S. citizens.
The discretionary authority sought by the Presi-
dent would permit a rapid and flexible response to
changing monetary conditions at home and abroad.
Although the present 1 percent rate has virtually
eliminated new security issues of countries which
are not exempted, the current rate could prove in-
effective, if foreign countries do not lower their high
interest rates while U.S. monetary conditions ease.
344
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
ADJUSTMENT POLICIES
As countries grow at different rates and in dif-
ferent ways, payments imbalances are bound to
arise. The adjustment policies of each country will
directly affect not only its payments balance but its
own internal economic performance and the pay-
ments balances of other countries. Therefore, pay-
ments adjustment should be pursued in ways com-
patible with each country's major domestic
objectives and with the broad interests of the entire
international community.
Report on the Adjustment Process
During 1966, important progress was made to-
ward developing a greater international consensus
on policies best suited for adjusting payments im-
balances. A report by Working Party 3 of the
OECD, prepared by representatives of the ten major
industrial countries, carefully explored the nature
of the adjustment process and pointed to various
possibilities for improving it.
The report recommended various ways of
strengthening national policy instruments and out-
lined a set of informal guidelines regarding appro-
priate adjustment policies. In addition, it suggested
a number of steps to improve adjustment procedures
through greater international cooperation, including
collective reviews of countries' balance of payments
aims; the setting up of an "early warning" system
for prompter identification and better diagnosis of
payments imbalances; and the strengthening of in-
ternational consultations with respect to the shar-
ing of responsibilities for adjustment. These sug-
gestions stemmed from the report's major
conclusions, which included the following:
First, countries need to formulate their balance
of payments aims more clearly and base their indi-
vidual and joint policies on aims that are mutually
consistent as well as desirable from the viewpoint
of a healthy world economy.
Second, responsibility for adjustment must fall on
both surplus and deficit countries.
Third, countries need to have available and make
use of a wider range of policy instruments — both
general and selective — and to tailor such instru-
ments more finely to the requirements of different
circumstances and multiple policy goals. There is
particular need in many cases to place greater reli-
ance on fiscal policies, and less on monetary policies,
in achieving internal economic balance, because of
the important international ramifications of changes
in monetary policy.
Fourth, the proper combination of policy instru-
ments depends on the situations encountered and
the particular characteristics of the country con-
cerned. No single policy prescription is appropriate
in all cases.
Fifth, countries must take continuous account of
the impact of their actions on other countries. A
special need for international consultation exists in
the field of monetary policy to avoid inappropriate
levels of interest rates.
U.S. Adjustment Policies
The strategy adopted by the United States to
improve its international payments position can be
viewed in the light of the adjustment principles out-
lined by Working Party 3. U.S. policy has been
designed to minimize interference with basic domes-
tic and international objectives of this Nation and
with the healthy development of the world economy.
Monetary and fiscal policies were used in 1966 to
restrain demand in the light of both domestic and
balance of payments considerations. The United
States has continued to pursue a liberal trade pol-
icy. It has maintained its flow of economic assist-
ance to the less developed countries. Direct inter-
ference with international transactions has been
essentially limited to Government transactions and
restraints on the outflow of capital to the developed
countries of the world.
Policy on Goods and Services
Resort to controls over private international
transactions in goods and services has been avoided
as harmful to both the United States and the world
economy. The long and steady progress toward trade
liberalization could well be reversed by even "tem-
porary" restrictions, which could threaten to become
permanent shelters of protection for economic inter-
est groups. Thus, U.S. actions to deal with the
balance of payments problem have maintained the
trend toward trade liberalization in which the
United States has taken strong and consistent lead-
ership since 1934.
On the other hand, vigorous action has been taken
to minimize the foreign exchange costs of U.S. Gov-
ernment programs. There is no precedent for the
economic and military assistance extended to foreign
countries and the military expenditures made abroad
by the U.S. Government since World War II. The
acceptance of these responsibilities has involved a
major balance of payments drain.
U.S. nonmilitary foreign aid programs — which,
net of loan repayments, currently amount to $3.6
billion a year — now have only a limited net bal-
ance of payments impact. This has been achieved
by tying aid so far as feasible to purchases of U.S.
goods and services. Although tying is already
broadly applied and probably cannot be usefully
extended in any major degree, continuing effort is
required to assure the effectiveness of the techniques
employed.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
345
U.S. offshore military expenditures have been sub-
stantial during the entire postwar period, reflecting
national security requirements and commitments to
allies in an unsettled world. The impact of these
expenditures on the U.S. balance of payments was re-
duced from a 1958 high of $3.4 billion to less than
$2.9 billion in 1965; the Vietnam war caused a
sharp increase, to $3.6 billion, in 1966 (first three
quarters at annual rate). At the same time, deliv-
eries of military equipment sold to foreign countries
rose from about $300 million a year in 1960 to about
$1.1 billion for the full year 1966.
The foreign exchange costs of the security pro-
gram, even excluding Vietnam, remain high. The
United States is prepared to play its full part in
supplying the necessary real resources for the com-
mon defense. But it seems reasonable to expect those
allied countries whose payments positions benefit
from U.S. expenditures for the common defense to
adopt measures to neutralize their "windfall" for-
eign exchange gains — especially when their reserve
positions are strong. This could be done in many
ways. Specific arrangements could be worked out
within the framework of the alliance itself. Such
arrangements could relieve strategic planning from
balance of payments constraints which, in the ex-
treme, could jeopardize our national security and
that of our allies.
Policy on Capital Flows
Over the years, the outflow of U.S. capital has
made a major contribution to world economic
growth. By providing capital to areas where it is
relatively scarce, U.S. foreign investment raises for-
eign incomes and often leads to a more efficient use
of world capital resources. U.S. direct investment
has provided a vehicle for the spread of advanced
technology and management skills. U.S. foreign in-
vestment also has yielded handsome returns to
American investors and substantial investment in-
come receipts for the balance of payments.
Despite the advantages of U.S. foreign investment
both to the recipient countries and to the United
States, it can — like every good thing — be overdone.
And it was being overdone in the early 1960's. Just
as a person must weigh and balance opportunities
for investment that will be highly profitable in the
future against his current wants, so must a nation
weigh the benefits of future foreign exchange in-
come against current requirements. The costs of
adjusting other elements in the balance of pay-
ments may be greater than the costs of sacrificing
future investment income.
It is often true that U.S. investment abroad gen-
erates not only a flow of investment income but also
additional U.S. exports. From a balance of pay-
ments standpoint, this is an additional dividend. Yet
it is also true, in some cases, that U.S. plants
abroad supply markets that would otherwise have
been supplied from the United States, with a con-
sequent adverse direct effect on U.S. exports.
It is sometimes held that the international flow
of capital occurs always and automatically in just
the economically "correct" amount, and that any
eff'ort to affect this flow through government meas-
ures constitutes a subtraction from the economic
welfare of the country of origin, the country of
receipt, and the entire world community. Such a
position cannot be sustained.
While much of the large flow of U.S. capital to
the developed countries is no doubt a response to a
shortage of real capital there relative to the United
States, the flow is also influenced by many other
factors. These may include cyclical differences in
capacity utilization, differences in monetary condi-
tions and financial structure, speculation on ex-
change rates, tax advantages, and opportunities for
tax evasion — none of which necessarily leads to a
more rational pattern of international investment.
High prospective returns on investment in a par-
ticular country may reflect a particular choice of
policies in the recipient country that is quite unre-
lated to any underlying shortage of capital. If a
country chooses to channel the bulk of its private
saving into low productivity uses, if it employs a
tight monetary policy, if it limits access of its own
nationals to its capital market, it will attract for-
eign capital. Restraint on such capital flows may
therefore merely mean that more of the adverse
effect of such domestic policies on economic growth
will rest — as perhaps it should — on the country that
made the policy choice.
Trade restrictions may also lead to a flow of
capital that would not otherwise take place. U.S.
investment in the EEC has, at least in part, been
induced by the desire to get within the tariff walls
erected around a large and growing market. If, how-
ever, a continued movement toward trade liberaliza-
tion may be expected, the economic justification for
some part of these capital flows is lessened.
One major stimulant for direct investment abroad
is undoubtedly the substantial advantage in tech-
nology and managerial skills which U.S. firms often
possess. The international transfer of these factors
may be embodied in a capital outflow independent
of the relative scarcity of capital. Action would thus
be appropriate, not necessarily to curtail the invest-
ment itself, which would interfere with the benefi-
cial transfer of the scarce technology and skills, but
to transfer the source of financing to the area re-
ceiving the direct investment. This, indeed, is the
primary intention and the result of the present vol-
untary program on direct investment.
Finally, differential monetary conditions among
countries can induce capital flows. But monetary
policy is an important and useful instrument of do-
mestic stabilization and growth as well as of balance
of payments adjustment. During 1960-65, U.S. mone-
346
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tary policy was oriented to serve domestic expan-
sion. In 1966, it contributed to a desirable restraint
on internal demand and to an improved balance of
payments. In 1967, relaxation of U.S. monetary policy
has begun in order to help obtain a better balance of
internal demand. Appropriate use of restraints on
capital outflows in such forms as the voluntary pro-
grams and the lET can usefully supplement mone-
tary policy in promoting domestic and international
goals.
In summary, it is clear that balance of payments
policy should not exempt capital flows from its
compass. It is equally clear that the United States
should be a major capital exporter. The U.S. pro-
grams have been designed to maintain a reasonable
flow of capital, especially to the less developed coun-
tries. Given the alternatives and the need to improve
its payments position, the United States has re-
strained the outflow of capital as preferable to cut-
ting essential international commitments, limiting
international trade, or restricting domestic — and
world — economic gfrowth.
Adjustment Policies of Other
Developed Countries
Actions by the United States to improve its pay-
ments position cannot by themselves assure that the
world payments pattern will be either sustainable
or desirable from an international point of view.
Such a result is only possible through appropriate
efforts of both deficit and surplus countries.
In 1966, various other countries pursued policies
to reduce payments imbalances. The most dramatic
measures were taken by the United Kingdom, fol-
lowing renewed severe speculative attacks on the
pound in the summer, which were initially met by
drawings on swaps and other short-term interna-
tional credit facilities cooperatively provided by the
financial authorities of the major industrial coun-
tries and the Bank for International Settlements.
The British increased the bank rate to 7 percent,
provided a strong dose of over-all fiscal restraint,
adopted selective tax measures to encourage in-
creased productivity, and imposed a temporary
freeze on wages and prices. These measures mark-
edly reduced the earlier deficit, and the United
Kingdom may soon move into surplus.
In Italy and Japan, resumption of more rapid
growth in domestic economic activity, together with
policies favorable to increased capital exports, suc-
ceeded in reducing payments surpluses as the year
progressed. Industrial expansion in France similarly
led to a shrinkage in that country's over-all surplus
as the trade balance narrowed; however, there con-
tinued to be a net capital inflow.
Germany, which had a payments deficit in 1965
for the first time in several years, swung back to
a sizable surplus in 1966. Monetary policy was tight-
ened mainly to contain inflation. As a result, do-
mestic investment slowed markedly, and the trade
surplus increased sharply. The payments surplus
was still expanding at year end. In January 1967,
Germany took a welcome step toward monetary ease
by lowering the central bank discount rate.
Although somewhat reduced from the preceding
year, payments imbalances continued large in 1966.
In some countries, corrective policies are clearly
needed to prevent imbalances from g;rowing still
larger in the current year. Moreover, considerable
que.stion remains whether the pattern of adjustment
in 1967 will permit a fully satisfactory rate of eco-
nomic growth in the industrial countries, and an
adequate flow of capital to the less developed world.
The United States will be actively pursuing poli-
cies to strengthen its payments position in 1967.
But reduction of U.S. deficits must have a counter-
part in reduced surpluses or increased deficits else-
where. If the impact of the U.S. payments improve-
ment were to fall largely on the United Kingdom
or the less developed countries, the international
payments system would suffer rather than benefit.
From the viewpoint of a viable international pay-
ments pattern, consequently, there is no real alterna-
tive: it is the countries with strong underlying
payments positions and large reserves which must
absorb a major share of the impact of reduced U.S.
and U.K. deficits. In particular, a marked reduction
is needed in the chronic over-all surplus of the ma-
jor industrial countries of Continental Europe.
The surplus countries also bear a significant share
of the responsibility for assuring that the manner
in which adjustment takes place is, to the greatest
extent possible, consistent with the broad objectives
of the international economic community as a whole.
Most importantly, adjustment policies should not,
in the aggregate, prevent a healthy rate of world-
wide economic growth compatible with reasonably
stable price levels. In the United States, demand
policies aiming at a slower rate of growth than that
of 1966 are, of course, entirely appropriate on
purely domestic grounds. But an even more marked
slowdown in demand than is needed for proper
domestic balance would entail serious social and
economic costs at home and could risk a recession.
Given the massive weight of the United States in
the world economy, such a policy would risk a slow-
down in trade and economic g^rowth on a worldwide
basis.
On the other hand, the objectives of international
economic expansion and payments adjustment are
simultaneously served when surplus countries with
lagging internal demand take effective steps to spur
the pace of economic activity — as was, for example,
true of France, Italy, and Japan during the past
year. In 1967, a number of surplus countries will be
in a good position to contribute significantly to bet-
ter international payments equilibrium in this fash-
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
347
ion, without running serious risks of engendering
inflationary pressures.
Surplus countries also have a special responsi-
bility for fostering relative freedom in international
transactions. As the report of Working Party 3
pointed out, it is desirable— wherever possible — that
adjustment take place "through the relaxation of
controls and restraints over international trade and
capital movements by surplus countries, rather than
by the imposition of new restraints by deficit coun-
tries." In the past year, Italy and Japan generally
followed policies that facilitated capital outflows;
the recently announced intention of the French Gov-
ernment to liberalize capital controls is also a hope-
ful development. There is, however, scope for fur-
ther measures by various surplus countries to liber-
alize the regulations that govern capital outflows
and also to ease restrictions on imports. More liberal
import policies would both improve payments bal-
ance and counter domestic inflation.
In 1966, there was an escalation of monetary
restraint. The sharp tightening of monetary policies
in the United States, undertaken largely for domes-
tic reasons, did help significantly to contain the U.S.
payments deficit during the year. Monetary action
also was a key feature in the program to defend
the British pound. But countries in a strong reserve
position also placed heavy reliance on restrictive
monetary policies to contain domestic demand. The
net effect of all these actions, and of the failure of
most other countries to take active steps to avoid
monetary stringency, was a dramatic upward move-
ment in interest rates on a worldwide basis (Chart
17). Between September 1965 and September 1966,
rates on 90-day Eurodollar deposits increased from
4.4 percent to 6.7 percent; yields on long-term in-
ternational bond issues rose by more than a full
percentage point; and there were marked increases
in long-term government bond yields in all major
industrial countries.
The extent to which the present worldvdde level
of interest rates aids the process of balance of pay-
ments adjustment is doubtful. The substantial benefit
to the U.S. balance of payments from the tightening
of U.S. monetary conditions stemmed from differ-
ential monetary conditions here and abroad. The
potential magnitude of such effects is reduced when
surplus countries simultaneously permit or even en-
courage their own interest rates to rise.
From the standpoint of world economic growth,
it would be preferable if payments adjustment took
place at a lower average level of interest rates than
has recently prevailed. Precisely what level is ap-
propriate is a matter that deserves continuing in-
ternational discussion.
Given the key role of the United States in interna-
tional financial markets, a general easing in inter-
national monetary conditions would be greatly aided
by a lessening of monetary tightness in the United
States. A move in this direction, already under way,
will have major benefits for domestic economic bal-
ance. But if credit relaxation were confined to the
United States, it would not promote a better balance '
of payments adjustment either for this country or
for the major surplus countries of Europe. Moreover,
at least in some important European economies,
monetary easing would help to facilitate needed
domestic economic growth. It would appear, there-
fore, that movement toward easier credit conditions
by the countries of Western Europe would promote
their own and the general welfare. Where necessary
for domestic reasons, demand restraint could be main-
tained by greater reliance on fiscal policy.
If the major surplus countries adjust mainly by
permitting their trade surpluses to decline, this can
lead to a substantially improved trade surplus for
the United States and permit it to maintain and
even augment its role as a major capital exporter.
Alternatively, if the large surplus countries — and
particularly the EEC countries — wish to continue to
maintain a substantial surplus on current account,
they should assume a larger share of the responsi-
bility for providing financial capital where it is
needed.
Some progress in this direction has, in fact, re-
cently been made, partly under the spur of the more
restricted access to U.S. capital markets. New inter-
national bond issues in Europe during the first
three quarters of 1966, for example, were at an
annual rate of about $1.4 billion — four times the
$360 million level in 1962, the year preceding the
introduction of the Interest Equalization Tax. It is
highly desirable, however, that the surplus countries
take stronger steps to enlarge the capacity of their
capital marlcets and to assure an adequate volume
of long-term capital exports (including foreign aid),
especially to the less developed countries.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM
The avoidance or appropriate correction of large-
scale payments imbalances is of key importance in
facilitating sound world economic growth and rela-
tively unfettered international trade and payments.
But better adjustment alone is not sufficient to at-
tain these objectives.
In the long run, most countries seek some steady
increase in their international reserves. With grow-
ing world transactions, this has meant that they have
generally sought to have surpluses rather than defi-
cits in their balances of payments. Obviously, how-
ever, all countries cannot attain such a goal simul-
taneously. At present, only the flow of new gold
348
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
into monetary reserves can permit a steady accumu-
lation of reserve assets by some countries without
corresponding deficits for others.
This flow of new gold has, for many years, been
inadequate. For much of the postwar period, dollars
supplied through U.S. deficits served as the major
supplement to gold in new reserve creation. For rea-
sons already cited, however, the dollar can no longer
be expected to perform this task in the same way;
nor can it be assumed that adequate new reserves
will accrue in the form of automatic drawing rights
at the IMF, as the byproduct of the Fund's normal
lending operations. To satisfy desires for rising offi-
cial monetary reserves over the longer run and to
eliminate dependence of the world economy on the
vagaries of gold production, deliberate generation
of new reserve assets is needed on a cooperative
international basis.
In 1966, significant progress was made toward
setting up a mechanism for such deliberate reserve
creation. Representatives of the major industrial
countries known as the Group of Ten agreed that it
is prudent to begin the preparation of a contin-
gency plan now. They also agreed that deliberate
reserve creation should be tailored to global needs
rather than the financing of individual balance of
payments deficits; that decisions on the amount of
reserves to be created should be made for some
years ahead; and that reserve assets should be dis-
tributed to all members of the Fund, on the basis of
IMF quotas or comparable objective standards.
While the negotiations in the Group of Ten, and
parallel deliberations by the Executive Directors of
the Fund, did not result in complete accord on the
precise form and use of new reserve assets, the
exploration of technical details produced substantial
agreement regarding the nature of alternative
"building blocks" that might be incorporated in the
final contingency plan.
A major accomplishment in 1966 was the initia-
tion of a second stage of international monetary
negotiations late in the year, involving joint discus-
sions of the Executive Directors of the Fund and
the Deputies of the Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors of the Group of Ten. It is hoped
that these meetings, which have already shown
great promise, will by the time of the next Annual
Meeting of the Fund lead to a wide consensus on
the key remaining points at issue.
Differences of view on two of these points already
seem to be narrowing. There now appears to be
a widespread feeling that the needs of the inter-
national monetary system can best be served if
deliberate reserve creation is effected through the
development of an entirely new reserve unit, dis-
tributed to all Fund members. At the same time,
there is increasing recognition that satisfactory pro-
cedures can be developed to make the new reserve
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
Interest Rates in Selected Countries
8
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATESi f
/
/
h / ./v
6
CLRMWf *^--
•■■" OKlTcO KINGOOU
-
UM'TEO iTilES^ ^^y ^ ^-.
1 ^ .-..y\
— -"" SWITZERLAND -
?
1 1 1 i i . . 1 1 1 ■ 1 1 : ■ 1 1 1 ^.
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
i/u i AND UK , mONTH TREASURY BILLS. CERMANY J-MOKT" iMTERBAMIt LOAWS. SWITZERLAND V
MONTH BANK DEPOSITS
^U S 10 YEAR TAXABLE BONOS U K , KAR LOANS. CERMANT PUBLIC AUTnORITY BONDS SKITIERLAND,
GOVERNMENT BONDS
NOTE -DATA PLOTTED ARE ANNUAL THROUGH H6l, OUARTERLY THEREAFTER
SOURCES TREASURY OEPARTMENT AND BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
asset generally acceptable without linking its use
to specified payments of gold.
Probably the most important outstanding issue
is the precise manner in which decisions on reserve
creation are to be made. There is good reason to
expect, however, that this question can be resolved
in a way that takes account of the legitimate needs
and interests of all the countries represented in the
negotiations.
While the progress made in the negotiations thus
gives ground for considerable satisfaction, it is also
true that the need for developing a contingency
plan for deliberate reserve creation has become more
urgent.
One reason is that it can no longer be assumed
that U.S. deficits will automatically increase world
reserves. These deficits, which for much of the post-
war period were the main element in new reserve
creation, have since the end of 1964 made no net
contribution to the rise in world reserves. Indeed,
349
in September 1966, the dollar holdings in the official
reserves of other countries were actually smaller
than 21 months earlier, both in absolute terms and
after a rough adjustment for seasonal influences.
Over this period, total U.S. gold sales to other
countries were more than twice as large as the
accumulated U.S. balance of payments deficit on
official settlements. Thus, the manner in which the
U.S. deficit was financed has tended to reduce,
rather than augment, the total of world reserves.
Second, the flow of gold into monetary channels
has been sharply reduced recently. While final esti-
mates for 1966 are not yet available, it is likely
that there was virtually no net addition of gold
to monetary reserves during the year. In 1965, only
$240 million of new gold entered into monetary
stocks. This contrasts vnth an annual average of
about $600 million in the decade ended in 1964.
Third, it is significant that the modest increase
in over-all world reserves that did occur in the
recent past reflected very special circumstances.
During the 21-month period from the end of 1964
through September 1966, world reserves increased
by about $1.8 billion. But the largest part of this
increase was a byproduct of the difficulties expe-
rienced by the British pound, which caused the U.K.
authorities to draw $1.4 billion from the IMF; a
large portion of this drawing, in turn, increased
reserve claims on the Fund by other countries. Not
only can transactions of this kind no longer be
counted upon to add to world reserves as the British
situation improves, but repayment of Britain's debt
could actually lead to a contraction of reserves.
These considerations suggest that the time when
deliberately created reserves are needed may be
closer at hand than is often realized. In any event,
continued uncertainty regarding the nature of a
contingency plan and the timing of its adoption can
be a growing source of uneasiness in international
financial markets and interfere with the smooth
working of the adjustment process. Clear agree-
ment on a contingency plan, on the other hand,
would be a major factor in strengthening confidence
in the world monetary system and in reducing gold
hoarding and would help lessen the tendency of
countries to pursue unattainable balance of pay-
ments aims.
The essential tasks for 1967 thus are to improve
the process of payments adjustment through in-
creased international cooperation and to move deci-
sively toward establishing a mechanism for deliber-
ate reserve creation. The two tasks are intimately
interwoven; success in both is necessary to provide
a sound climate for world economic growth and rela-
tive freedom in trade and capital transactions, as
well as to assure an adequate flow of long-term^
capital from the developed to the less developed
countries.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
A Collection of Excerpts and a Bibliography Relating
to the National Collegiate Debate Topic, 1966-1967,
Resolved : That the United States Should Substan-
tially Reduce Its Foreign Policy Commitments.
Compiled by the Foreign Affairs Division, Legis-
lative Reference Service, Library of Congress.
H. Doc. 503. October 1966. 237 pp.
Aspects of Intellectual Ferment in the Soviet Un-
ion. Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service
of the Library of Congress. S. Doc. 130. October
17, 1966. 33 pp.
90th Congress, 1st Session
Fourth Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on International Educational and Cultural
Affairs. H. Doc. 32. January 10, 1967. 14 pp.
ILO [International Labor Organization] Recom-
mendation No. 123. Letter from Assistant Secre-
tary for Congressional Relations, Department of
State, Transmitting the Text of ILO Recom-
mendation No. 123 Concerning the Employment
of Women With Family Responsibilities. H. Doc.
45. January 25, 1967. 13 pp.
Investigation of Immigration and Naturalization
Matters. Report to accompany S. Res. 32. S. Rept.
14. February 1, 1967. 9 pp.
Study of Certain Aspects of National Security and
International Operations. Report to accompany
S. Res. 54. S. Rept. 20. February 1, 1967. 4 pp.
Study of Problems Created by the Flow of Refugees
and Escapees. Report to accompany S. Res. 38.
S. Rept. 35. February 2, 1967. 5 pp.
Review of the Administration of the Trading With
the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. Res. 41.
S. Rept. 37. February 2, 1967. 4 pp.
Study of Foreign Aid Expenditures. Report to ac-
company S. Res. 57. S. Rept. 44. February 2, 1967.
14 pp.
Study of U.S. Foreign Policies. Report to accompany
S. Res. 67. S. Rept. 47. February 2, 1967. 4 pp.
350
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Morocco Sign Cultural Agreement
Following is the text of the cultural agree-
ment bettveen the United States and Mo-
rocco, which ivas signed at Washington on
February 10 by Secretary Rusk and Moroc-
can Foreign Minister Mohamed Cherkaoui.
Press release 33 dated February 10
The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the King-
dom of Morocco,
In' consideration of the bonds of friend-
ship and understanding existing between the
peoples of the United States of America and
of the Kingdom of Morocco;
In view of the expressed desire of both
Governments for an agreement which would
encourage and further stimulate the present
educational and cultural program between
the two countries;
Inspired by the determination to increase
mutual understanding between the peoples
of the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Morocco;
Agree as follows:
Article I
Each Government shall encourage the ex-
tension within its own territory of a better
knowledge of the history, civilization, insti-
tutions, literature and other cultural accom-
pUshments of the people of the other coun-
try by such means as promoting and facil-
itating the exchange of books, periodicals
and other publications; the exchange of
musical, dramatic, dance and athletic groups
and performers; the exchange of fine art and
other exhibitions; the exchange of radio and
television programs, films, phonograph rec-
ords and tapes; and the establishment of uni-
versity courses and chairs and language in-
struction.
Article II
Each Government shall encourage and fa-
cilitate in its territory the conduct of cultural
activities and the establishment of libraries,
educational and scientific institutions, lan-
guage centers and film libraries by the Gov-
ernment and non-governmental organiza-
tions of the other country. The scope and
field of the aforementioned activities shall
be mutually agreed upon by the concerned
authorities of both Governments.
Article III
The two Governments shall promote and
facilitate the interchange between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Mo-
rocco of prominent persons, professors,
teachers, technicians, students and other
qualified individuals from all walks of life.
Article IV
Each Government shall, in order to facil-
itate the interchange of the persons referred
to in Article III, look with favor on the estab-
lishment of scholarships, travel grants and
other forms of assistance in the schools, col-
leges, universities and cultural and scientific
institutions within its territory.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
351
Article V
Each Government shall assist, insofar as
possible, in the placement of qualified na-
tionals of the other country in its higher
educational institutions and shall endeavor
to provide information with regard to facil-
ities, courses of instruction and other oppor-
tunities which may be of interest to na-
tionals of the other country.
Article VI
The two Governments shall encourage co-
operation between the learned and profes-
sional societies and the educational, scientific
and cultural institutions of the two countries.
Article VII
Each Government shall encourage and fa-
cilitate access, on the part of scholars and
students, to its monuments, collections,
archives, libraries, laboratories and other in-
stitutions of learning. The two Governments
undertake to facilitate archaeological mis-
sions in carrying out archaeological field
work and excavations and to encourage the
exchange of duplicates, copies and casts of
antiquities and other works of art. The ex-
change of photographic copies of manu-
scripts and books shall also be encouraged.
Article VIII
With agreement of both Governments a
committee or committees comprised of repre-
sentatives of the two countries will be con-
vened as necessary to consult on means to
further the general purpose of this agree-
ment.
Article IX
Each Government shall use its best efforts
to extend to citizens of the other country
engaged in activities pursuant to the present
agreement such favorable treatment with
respect to entry, travel, residence and exit
as is consistent with its national laws and
regulations.
Article X
This agreement shall not have the effect
of changing the domestic law of either coun-
try, and the responsibilities assumed by each^
Government under this agreement shall be
subject to its Constitution and applicable
laws and regulations and will be executed
within the framework of domestic policy and
procedures and practices defining internal
jurisdiction of governmental and other agen-
cies within their respective territories.
Article XI
The present agreement shall come into
force on the date of signature and shall re-
main in force indefinitely, but may be termi-
nated by one year's notice of intention to
terminate from either Government to the
other.
In witness whereof the respective repre-
sentatives, duly authorized for the purpose,
have signed this agreement.
Done in dupUcate at Washington this 10th
day of February, 1967, in the English and
French languages, both equally authentic.
For the Government of the United States of
America:
Dean Rusk
For the Government of the Kingdom of
Morocco:
MOHAMED GHERKAOUI
U.S. and Mexico Resume Talks
on Radio Broadcasting Agreement
Press release 28 dated February 10
Delegations representing Mexico and the
United States will resume formal negotia-
tions in Mexico City on February 14 on an
agreement concerning radio broadcasting in
the standard broadcast band. The negotia-
tions look toward an agreement to replace one
which expired on June 9, 1966, but which was
352
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ixtended until the end of 1967 by a protocol
igned in Mexico City on April 13, 1966.i The
current agreement governs relationships in
the use of radio frequencies in the standard
Droadcast band with the aim of minimizing
larmful interference to the parties concerned.
The Mexican delegation for these negotia-
bions is headed by Lazaro Barajas Gutierrez,
Permanent Mexican Representative on the
Administrative Council of the International
Telecommunication Union, assisted by Mexi-
an officials from the Ministry of Transport
and Communications. The United States dele-
gation is headed by Commissioner James J.
Wadsworth of the Federal Communications
Commission, assisted by officials of the De-
partment of State and the Federal Communi-
cations Commission.
The negotiating sessions in Mexico City are
expected to continue for about 2 weeks. The
first formal negotiation was held in Washing-
ton September 6-13, 1966, and with sub-
sequent informal exchanges formed the
basis for these negotiations in Mexico City.
In the United States an industry advisory
group has been formed to assist the U.S.
delegation in its negotiations. Representatives
of the group will accompany the delegation
to Mexico City and will be continuously iiT-
formed on the status of the negotiations.
•Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Conservation
Convention on nature protection and wildlife pres-
ervation in the Western Hemisphere, with annex.
Done at the Pan American Union October 12,
1940. Entered into force April 30, 1942. TS 981.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, January 12,
1967.
Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Insti-
tute. Open for signature at Washington January
17 through February 28, 1966. Entered into force
' Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1967, p. 224.
February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Ratification deposited: India, February 3, 1967.
Judicial Procedures
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters. Opened for signature at The Hague
November 15, 1965.>
Signature : France, January 12, 1967.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done
at London April 5, 1966.'
Acceptances deposited: France, November 30,
1966; Peru, January 18, 1967; South Africa,
December 14, 1966.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pol-
lution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for the
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Withdrawal of reservation: Israel, November 9,
1966.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final
protocol, and convention with final protocol and
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Ratifications deposited: India, November 8, 1966;
New Zealand (including the Cook Islands, Niue,
and the Tokelau Islands), October 21, 1966.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into
force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Argentina, January 10,
- 1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signatures: Algeria, December 9, 1966;
Cameroon, December 12, 1966; Cyprus, Decem-
ber 12, 1966; Mauritania, December 21, 1966;
Panama, December 8, 1966.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions
at sea. Approved by the International Conference
on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17^une
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Republic of China, Novem-
ber 21, 1966.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
' Not in force.
FEBRUARY 27, 1967
353
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow, January 27, 1967.'
Signature: Netherlands, February 10, 1967.
Trade
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force
August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Acceptances: Netherlands, December 22, 1966;
Spain, January 4, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force
August 25, 1966.
Acceptances: Chad, December 19, 1966; Nether-
lands, December 22, 1966.
BILATERAL
Mexico
Agreement relating to the establishment of a geo-
detic satellite observation station at Isla Socorro.
Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and ,
Tlatelolco January 27 and 28, 1967. Entered into
force January 28, 1967.
United Kingdom
Agreement concerning the establishment and opera-
tion of a space vehicle tracking and communica-
tions station on Antigua. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington January 17 and 23, 1967.
Entered into force January 23, 1967.
' Not in force.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1444 PUBLICATION 8204 FEBRUARY 27, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the OflSce of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela^
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the ForeiBn Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well aa special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international a^eements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of genera] international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966),
NOTE: Contents of this publication art
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source wil
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed ir
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature
354
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Index February 27, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. lAU
Lsia. East Asia Today (Bundy) 323
hina. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
1| February 9 317
ongress
Concessional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 350
ntemational Economic Policies (excerpts from
the President's Economic Report and the An-
nual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers) 333
j)conoinic Affairs
Dast Asia Today (Bundy) 323
ntemational Economic Policies (excerpts from
the President's Economic Report and the An-
nual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers) 333
J.S. and U.S.S.R. Conclude Talks on Fishery
Problems 331
Educational and Cultural Affairs. United States
and Morocco Sign Cultural Agreement (text
of agreement) 351
Jermany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of February 9 317
Walta. Letters of Credence (Pardo) .... 327
Wexico. U.S. and Mexico Resume Talks on
Radio Broadcasting Agreement 352
Morocco
Sing Hassan II of Morocco Visits the United
States (King Hassan II, Johnson) .... 328
United States and Morocco Sign Cultural
Agreement (text of agreement) 351
Presidential Documents
[ntemational Economic Policies . . . . . . 333
King Hassan II of Morocco Visits the United
States 328
President Reaffirms U.S. Desire for Peace
in Viet-Nam 319
Public Affairs. Department Holds Conferences
for Educators in California 322
Telecommunications. U.S. and Mexico Resume
Talks on Radio Broadcasting Agreement . . 352
Trade. International Economic Policies (ex-
cerpts from the President's Economic Report
and the Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers) 333
Treaty Information
Current Actions 353
U.S. and Mexico Resume Talks on Radio
Broadcasting Agreement 352
United States and Morocco Sign Cultural
Agreement (text of agreement) 351
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Conclude Talks on Fishery
Problems 331
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 9 317
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Conclude Talks on Fishery
Problems 331
Viet-Nam
East Asia Today (Bundy) 323
President Reaffirms U.S. Desire for Peace in
Viet-Nam (message to Pope Paul VI) . . . 319
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Febru-
ary 9 317
United States Peace Aims in Viet-Nam (Gold-
berg) 310
Yemen. Letters of Credence (Futaih) .... 327
Name Index
Bundy, William P 323
Futaih, Abdul Aziz 327
Goldberg, Arthur J 310
King Hassan II 328
Johnson, President 319, 328, 333
Pardo, Arvid 327
Rusk, Secretary 317
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 6-12
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
23 2/6 U.S.-U.S.S.R. fishery talks con-
cluded.
*24 2/7 King sworn in as Ambassador
to the Malagasy Republic (bio-
graphic details).
*25 2/7 Program for visit of King Has-
san II of Morocco.
*26 2/9 Payton sworn in as Ambassador
to Cameroon (biographic de-
tails).
27 2/9 Rusk: news conference of Feb-
ruary 9.
28 2/10 Negotiations on U.S.-Mexico ra-
dio broadcasting agreement.
29 2/10 Foreign policy conference for
educators, San Jose, Calif, (re-
write).
30 2/10 Foreign policy conference for
educators, Los Angeles, Calif,
(rewrite).
t31 2/10 3d Special Inter-American Con-
ference and 11th Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Aflfairs (U.S. delega-
tion).
*32 2/10 Program for visit of Emperor
Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia.
33 2/10 U.S.-Morocco cultural agreement.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
•Ci U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/34
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402
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BULLETIN
FOREIGN AID
President Johnson's Message to Congress 378
SECRETARY RUSK DISCUSSES EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND VIET-NAM
IN INTERVIEW FOR GERMAN TELEVISION 358
SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE U.S. POSITION
A Special Background Paper 366
For index see inside back cover
Secretary Rusk Discusses European Affairs and Viet-Nam
in Interview for German Television
Follorving is the transcript of an interview
tvith Secretary Rusk videotaped in Washing-
ton on February 10 for broadcast over the
national television network in the Federal
Republic of Germany on February 12.
Peter Pechel, editor in chief, Sender Freies
Berlin (moderator): Good evening, ladies and
gentlemen. This televised intervietv originates
today in Washington. It was scheduled for the
day folloiving the visit of Foreign Minister
Willy Brandt. This first German-American
meeting at the ministerial level since the con-
stitution of the new Federal Government is
the reason why we have asked you to be with
us; and we thank you, sir, for, in spite of your
many occupations, you are ready to answer
our questions for the benefit of the German —
Secretary Rusk: Thank you. I am delighted
to be here with these distinguished repre-
sentatives of the German press and through
you to visit with my friends in the Federal
Republic of Germany. I am delighted to be
here.
Mr. Pechel: May I now in the first place
present my colleagues: Herbert von Borch,
correspondent of the Sueddeutsche Zeitung in
your Capital; Gerd Ruge, Washington cor-
respondent of the German television; Jan
Reifenberg, correspondent of the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung in Paris — we have asked
him to be with us today so as to make it pos-
sible to take into account the French point of
vieiv in these questions and ansiuers; and
Rolf Menzel, representative of a number of
German television chains in Washington.
And now my first question:
Mr. Secretary, you once said that this
world power, the United States, is wedded to
tivo world oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific.
In other words, you are living in a state of
bigamy. Many Europeans have today the
impression that Washington prefers today its
Pacific wife rather than its Atlantic wife —
in other words, that Europe, because of Viet-
Nam, has lost interest for the American
Government and is being neglected. Is this
impression correct ?
A. Well, Mr. Willy Brandt said that he was
not coming here as a young lady who would
ask her boy friend, "Do you still love me?"
Actually, we do spend a good deal of
thought these days on the problem of peace in
Viet-Nam. This is a problem which could
affect the peace of the world. We are very
much interested in peace in the Pacific, just
as we are in peace in the Atlantic.
When I first became Secretary of State in
1961, 1962, there were many people in other
parts of the world who thought that I was
thinking only of Berlin, because at that time
it was Berlin that threatened the peace of the
world.
Now, it is very important that we look
upon the problem of organizing a permanent
peace as a worldwide problem. And I am
quite sure that our friends in Europe under-
stand that it is not possible for us to be loyal
to our alliances in the Atlantic and disloyal
to our alliances in the Pacific.
But this does not mean that we are neglect-
ing our relations with Europe or the prob-
lems of the North Atlantic. We are very
active in NATO, along with your Govern-
358
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ment; as a member of the Fourteen. We are
taking a full pai't in the Kennedy Round
negotiations, which we hope will come to a
very early conclusion. We are in the Commit-
tee of Ten on liquidity problems. We are very
active in the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development]. And
we are taking our part in East- West relations
these days.
And beyond that, we are trying to play a
constructive role in very important areas that
are within 30 minutes' flying time of Western
Europe where there are some troubles. I am
thinking of the Middle East, and I am think-
ing of Africa.
So our problems with Viet-Nam are those
that you in your country must surely wish
that we would pay attention to, because if we
do not this problem could well affect the gen-
eral peace.
But we are also spending a lot of thought
and effort and attention on matters in the
North Atlantic.
Basic Interests of U.S. and West Germany
Q. You know that the Foreign Minister has
undertaken a number of initiatives which
seem to indicate a new independence on the
part of the German policy. Are you happy
with this fact, or do you consider it bother-
some ?
A. We have no problem on that at all. We
don't want the Federal Republic to be a satel-
lite of the United States, and we do not wish
the United States to be a satellite of the
Federal Republic.
The problem is not that of one of us giving
undue attention to the attitude of the other.
I think that if you in the Federal Republic
were to sit down and think like Germans —
what kind of world do you want to see, what
kind of Europe do you want to see, what do
you think about the problems of peace, how
do you think world trade ought to be orga-
nized, what do you think about the processes
of peaceful settlement of disputes? — I think
that if you were to determine what is in your
own national interest as the Federal Republic
of Germany and we were to do the same thing
as Americans and determine what is in our
interest as the United States of America,
when we put these together, we would find, I
am sure, that your and our basic interests
are very much in common, and that we would
find ourselves moving together on almost all
of the important questions that are in front
of the world today.
Cessation of Bombing of North Viet-Nam
Q. You said on Thursday ^ that the United
States expects counte7'measures on the part
of North Viet-Nam. What do you intend hy
that — do you speak of diminution of infiltra-
tion, or is it something more that you expect ?
A. Mr. Ruge, if you will forgive a remark
which is not intended to be personal to you,
this is a matter which we are prepared to dis-
cuss with Hanoi. If I were to negotiate that
with you, you could not stop the shooting.
What we are saying to the other side is:
We will talk with you about the political
settlement, or if you are thinking about mili-
tary action we will take corresponding mili-
tary action to reduce the violence. We will
talk about how one stops the bombing and
how one stops the military action in order to
move this matter toward peace. Or if they
prefer to do so, we will talk about the shape
of an eventual political solution.
But what we cannot do is to stop the bomb-
ing on our side and have them continue the
invasion on the other.
You see, if we were to say on our side that
we will not talk unless all of the violence in
South Viet-Nam stops while we continue the
bombing of North Viet-Nam, everyone would
say, "But that is ridiculous, that is absurd."
But that is what Hanoi is asking from us at
the present time. They are saying the war
will continue, the infiltration will continue,
"Perhaps if you stop the bombing there could
be talks."
Well, we need to know more about it than
that. There are diplomatic means available to
' For Secretary Rusk's news conference of Feb. 9,
see Bulletin of Feb. 27, 1967, p. 317.
MARCH 6, 1967
359
find out what the results would be if we
stopped the bombing'.
We have said many times that we could
stop the bombing as a step toward peace.
Now, surely it could be understood that we
are interested in knowing whether stopping
the bombing would in fact be a step toward
peace.
Nonproliferation Treaty Safeguards
Q. Mr. Secretary, if — should the nonpro-
liferation treaty be controlled by EURATOM,
or by the international agency in Vienna? In
February 1966 you said before a Senate com-
mittee that both systems are equivalent and
effective.^ Is that still your opinion?
A. Well, this is a troublesome question, be-
cause if a nonproliferation treaty becomes
general throughout the world, there may be a
good many who would sign that treaty who
would not be completely happy about relying
upon the safeguards which EURATOM has
adopted internally. Further than that, there
could be other groupings in other parts of the
world who might wish to put together a little
family group which would inspect itself and
deny outside inspection on the grounds that
it is up to each regional group to provide its
own inspection.
Now, this suggests to some of us that the
IAEA in Vienna might be able to work out
arrangements with national governments as
well as groups so that there could be general
assurances to all of those who signed the
treaty that the activities are in fact peaceful
and that weapons are not being made within
those limitations.
I have no doubt at all that the safeguards
in EURATOM insure that the activities of
EURATOM will not be abused. I have no
problem about that myself.
The problem is. How do you persuade 120
other nations that that is the case? We have
not found an answer to this question yet.
Q. The Minister for All German Affairs,
Mr. Herbert Wehner, has suggested that a
'■ Ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 406.
four-power conference could discuss the rela-
tions between the parts of Germany. Do you
consider this a possibility?
A. Well, I believe that other ministers have
also commented on that particular problem.
There is now no active proposal before the
four governments that there be a four-power
conference.
I think that one would want to consider
what a conference would accomplish, whether
there was a reasonable chance that it could
succeed, and whether there might not be
certain dangers in calling a four-power con-
ference which could not agree.
We are perfectly prepared to examine this
question, but it is not my impression that we
are moving very rapidly toward a four-power
conference at the moment.
East-West Relations
Q. Mr. Brandt has asked us to explain to
the Soviet diplomacy about the peaceful char-
acter of the German Eastern policy and has
asked you to help him. Could you ansiver that
request ?
A. Oh, yes, I think so. As a matter of fact,
for the past 6 years we ourselves have made
it clear that we have confidence in the demo-
cratic character of the Federal Republic and
in its attitudes toward peace and toward
peaceful solutions of outstanding questions.
We have been very much interested in the
general movement throughout NATO,
throughout the North Atlantic, to search for
possibilities for improving relations with
Eastern Europe. And we have tried to partici-
pate in that ourselves with the conclusion of
a civil air agreement, a consular agreement
with the Soviet Union, a space treaty, and
we have made proposals to our Congress hav-
ing to do with possibilities of trade between
the United States and Eastern Europe.
And we have noticed with interest the
steps which the Federal Republic has taken in
this direction.
We had before us at the last NATO meeting
a list of the contacts, the bilateral contacts
between the members of NATO and the vari-
ous countries of Eastern Europe, say in the
360
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
last 6 to 8 months. And there were some 180
of such contacts on that list.
So there is a good deal of movement, a good
deal of motion. And you can be sure in the
Federal Republic that if you find there are
points where agreements can be reached,
there will be no problem here in the United
States. We would like to do the same thing.
We do believe that we must be prudent
and that we should not take too much for
granted, that we must maintain the solidarity
and the unity and the prudent strength of
the NATO countries in order to encourage
the continuation of a certain prudence in
Eastern Europe.
Q. The Kennedy Round about tariff reduc-
tions on both sides of the Atlantic is now in
a critical state. How do you consider this
matter ?
A. Well, we still have some very hard
bargaining in front of us, and we would hope
that all of those participating would be in a
position whereby through flexible positions
in bargaining we could come to an important
agreement.
We are concerned because we have a special
problem with time. Our Trade Expansion Act,
which is our legislative authority for partici-
pating in the Kennedy Round, expires at the
end of June of this year. And we are very
much concerned that if there is not substan-
tial progress in the Kennedy Round very
shortly, in the next 2 months, that it might
become very difficult for us to obtain from
our Congress the additional authorization
that we might need. So for us there is a
certain urgency here. And we would hope that
all, including the Common Market group,
could step up intensive effort in this field and
bring it to a successful conclusion.
It is very important that the Kennedy
Round succeed — on economic grounds, but I
think also on political grounds.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if the United States and
the Soviet Union were to agree about the
armaments race in connection with an anti-
ballistic-missiles system, ivhich security
would then be offered European states ?
A. Well, it is a little hard to answer the
second part of your question, because we are
a long way yet from the first part of your
question.
The essential problem is that if both sides
go down the path of establishing a network
of defensive antiballistic missiles and then
necessarily multiply their offensive missiles
for the purpose of saturating those defensive
missiles, then we have an arms race which
lifts us all into new plateaus of expenditure —
tens upon tens of billions of dollars on both
sides — with no great change in the under-
lying strategic situation.
So we would hope that ways and means
could be found to bring this under control.
Whatever the possibilities are, you can be
sure that we will be in very close consultation
with our allies on this problem, because we
understand fully that our allies have a big
interest in it, too.
Q. In Bonn there is much qtiestion of an
opening toivard the East. Does that mean
that, in connection rvith an atom-free zone in
Central Europe, the Rapacki Plan could be-
come actual again ?
A. Well, this plan, this type of plan, has
had a very important difficulty in it from the
very beginning.
One could imagine that the continent of
South America could be atom free in the sense
that there would be no nuclear weapons there
and South America might not then become
the target of nuclear weapons. In other
words, it might be removed from the military
aspects of nuclear war.
But Central Europe is the target of many
nuclear weapons and would remain the target
of nuclear weapons so long, for example, as
the Soviet Union has MRBM's and IRBM's in
its own territory aimed at Central Europe.
Technology has made a nuclear-free zone in
Central Europe very difficult to imagine. I
would suppose that in that respect the
solution lies in the general field of the reduc-
tion of nuclear weapons themselves, because
in these East-West relations that is crucial.
And we would hope that we could make some
progress toward the reduction of nuclear
MARCH 6, 1967
361
weapons. But a nuclear-free zone is not really
nuclear free if in fact it is the bull's-eye of
hundreds of nuclear weapons.
Q. Mr. Secretary, President Johnson said
on 7 October in New York^ that there is a
considerable change in the U.S. policy con-
cerning the reunification of Germany, which
would come at the end of a long process of
detente. Do you consider that it is really an
important change in United States policies?
A. Well, I am not at all sure that he des-
ignated that as a change at the time that he
made his speech.
I think we have had now 20 years of rather
harsh confrontation between East and West
Europe. And during those 20 years we have
not moved one inch toward the reunification
of Germany. I think one of the reasons for
that is that an attempt to solve that problem
by force would mean general war and prob-
ably general nuclear war.
So the question arises as to whether the
German people might not strengthen their
ties and move perceptibly closer to the possi-
bilities of reunification if the general rela-
tions between Western Europe and Eastern
Europe were improved.
I would think that it is worth finding out,
because we know that 20 years of harsh con-
frontation has not solved the problem. So
let's find out.
Burden Sharing in NATO
Q. Of course, if the Federal Government
could not comply with United States demands
as regards monetary arrangement or to sim-
ilar amount, would then the United States be
compelled to reduce its troops in Germany
and — which is even more actual — would you
see the possibility that a unilateral with-
drawal of British troops could be compen-
sated by purchases to be made by the United
States?
A. Well, that matter is now being dis-
cussed among governments. I think there
have been some misunderstandings on the
matter.
' Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
We are not asking the Federal Republic to
pay for the costs of stationing American
forces in Germany. Those costs are very
large indeed. We have been concerned about
the special problem of balance of payments, ■^
which arises from the fact that we have a
very large number of forces in Europe; and
it just happens that the largest number of
those forces are in the Federal Republic.
It might have been wise at the very begin-
ning, when NATO was organized, to work out
arrangements — perhaps a payments union of
some soi-t — which would insure that defense
considerations and the deployment of forces
would not in themselves bring about changes
in the balance-of-payments position of the
different members of the alliance.
But we have wanted to find some balancing
factors because of the very special balance-of-
payments problems that we have. You see,
we would not have these problems if it were
not for the fact that we have some million
men in uniform all over the world, and have
carried a very substantial foreign aid
problem.
Now, we have met this in part with the
help of your Government through some arms
purchases which you have made in the
United States. There may be other ways in
which this special balance-of-payments prob-
lem can be met. I do not at the present time
want to talk about the connection between
that and levels of forces. Among other things,
I think that NATO forces should be based
upon a NATO-wide agreement on the nature
of the threat to NATO and a general agree-
ment on what is prudent for NATO as a
whole to do with respect to such a threat
and finally upon agreement among ourselves
as to the equitable sharing of the burdens of
what we all should do together.
I would hope we could find an answer to all
of these questions — the balance-of-payments
issues that you mentioned, as well as a
thoughtful and wise determination as to the
levels of forces NATO requires.
Q. Chancellor [Kiirf] Kiesinger conscious-
ly tries to avoid having to choose between
Washington and Paris. Would the United
States promote the new direction of the Ger-
362
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
''
man policy even if Bonn were to undertake
a direct diplomatic advance toward Moscow ?
A. Well, you have asked two questions
having to do with both East and West there.
First, let me say that the United States
has an interest, a very serious interest, in
good relations between the Federal Republic
and France. After all, we ourselves were
drawn into two World Wars in this century
which began with fighting between those two
countries, and we do not wish to see that
happen again.
That does not mean, however, that we do
not believe that you and we have certain
fundamental common interests, such as
NATO and Atlantic cooperation, which ought
not be sacrificed in that respect.
Now, as far as East-West relations are
concerned, I suppose that you will be probing
those, including the possibilities in Moscow.
I can assure you we do not sit here as jealous
friends. If you can make progress in your
relations with France, good. If you can make
progress in your relations with the Soviet
Union, good. But let's continue to work to-
gether on those matters which are of common
interest.
Toward a Durable Peace
Q. There is much talk of a new era in
European politics. One says that the cold war
is finished. What kind of function is then left
for NATO?
A. You know, I think we are in danger of
forgetting too much. Half your people, half
our people, can no longer remember World
War II. And one result of that is that the
central question which is before mankind
begins to recede into the background, and
that central question is. How do you organize
a durable peace in the world? And in 1945,
when we drafted the Charter of the United
Nations, we said that this requires collective
security for suppression of breaches of the
peace and acts of aggression and the settle-
ment of disputes by peaceful means. Now,
these questions we must not forget.
I gather that you feel in Europe that we are
beginning something like a detente, all of us,
with Eastern Europe. Well, let us just pause
for a moment and recall that if that is true —
and I hope it is true — if that is true, we did
not get to that point by sacrificing Azerbaijan
in Iran, by sacrificing the eastern provinces
of Turkey, by sacrificing Greece to the guer-
rillas, by sacrificing Berlin, or Korea, or the
Congo, or Southeast Asia — nor by saying to
the Cuban missiles, "Oh, come, welcome, you
are good neighbors."
This has been a long, difficult, costly, and
sometimes bloody path to get to a point where
there is some prudence on both sides.
So I would hope that all of us, including our
young people in both countries, would think
hard about that central question, How do you
organize a durable peace? Because if article
1 of the United Nations Charter represents
the lessons learned from World War II, the
important thing to remember is that we can-
not draw lessons from world war III — there
won't be enough left. And so we must never,
never forget this question: How do you or-
ganize a peace in the world as compared with
letting us all slip down the slippery slope into
a general war that nobody can want and that
no one can survive?
Q. As regards the Viet-Nam policy, it has
been said that — do you accept this differenti-
ation in the concept about it ?
A. I didn't quite get what you said about
the differentiation — excuse me.
Q. I mean what importance would you give
to this differentiation between these two sym-
bols of animals, the hawks and the doves?
A. Oh. Well, I think those two expres-
sions are becoming passe a bit now, because
I think people have begun to understand that
the differences are not as great as at one time
people supposed.
Those who are determined to meet our
commitment in South Viet-Nam are those
who take seriously the question of organizing
a durable peace.
The United States, Mr. von Borch, has
taken 200,000 casualties since 1945, in killed
and wounded, in various parts of the world —
200,000 — for the purpose of trying to stabi-
lize the peace. We have lost men in Greece
MARCH 6, 1967
363
and in the Berlin airlift and in Korea and in
Southeast Asia and in other places.
So that the hawks are not people who want
war. Most of them are people who are trying
to organize the peace.
Now, the doves, I think, may feel that you
can take chances and take gambles with this
question. My own view, quite frankly, is
perhaps in between the extreme doves and the
extreme hawks. I believe that we must quietly
do what is necessary to insure that a country
to whom we are committed is not overrun
by force by someone else and at the same
time act with prudence so that we ourselves
do not move this problem from a restricted
war into a general war.
Q. Mr. Secretary, don't you believe that
such a strong power, such as the U.S.A.,
could temporarily at least cease the bombing
of North Viet-Nam if direct negotiations
could be made possible?
A. Well, if we were to put North Viet-Nam
in a position where it could be safe and com-
fortable while it sends its armies and its arms
into South Viet-Nam, they could do that for
50 years.
Now, we have an operational question as
well. Here come 50 trucks down the road,
just north of the 17th parallel, loaded with
men and ammunition. Now, do we say to our
men just south of the 17th parallel, "We don't
hit them there, in the North, so you will just
have to pick that ammunition out of your
bodies tomorrow afternoon." We cannot do
that — we cannot do that.
Now, I think it has also been overlooked
that the demand by the other side has in-
creased. They say that a suspension of the
bombing, a temporary cessation, is an ulti-
matum. And they are calling now for an un-
conditional and permanent cessation of the
bombing.
All right, we are prepared to consider that
if they will tell us what the result of that will
be. And no one has been able to tell us yet
what the result of that would be.
So this is not a question of a large country
and a small country — as far as these men who
get killed out there are concerned, the enemy
could be representative of as large a country
as there is. We can't do that to our men in
the field.
The other side knows how they can tell us ^,
what the result would be if we stopped the
bombing.
So surely we have a right to know that.
Surely someone, somewhere in the world,
some day, will be willing to tell us that "if '.
you stop the bombing, x, y, or z will happen."
So we are listening.
U.S. Responsibilities In Europe
Q. Mr. Secretary, General de Gaulle be-
lieves that a continental independent Europe
from the Atlantic to the Urals can be
achieved, ivhich would put an end to the cold
war. Is this, in your opinion, possible without
the United States ?
A. Well, I don't think it is possible with
the Soviet Union up to the Urals. I suspect the
Soviet Union will not wish to be divided in
two in that fashion.
I think the question of our participation in
the North Atlantic arrangements is a ques-
tion that is to be shared and to be answered
by our friends in Europe in terms of "What
do you think about it?"
We have some very important interests in
our relations with Western Europe. We have
some responsibilities which resulted in part
from World War II, which we expect to take
seriously. And I can tell you that we do not
expect to have those responsibilities, on such
questions as Berlin, for example, determined
without the participation of the United
States. We didn't fight World War II for
nothing.
Now, in t«rms of other arrangements, I
think those would be for everybody to think
about. I don't myself anticipate that for the
next 50 years that there will be a political
unification of Europe from the Atlantic to the
Urals.
Q. The Soviet Government argues — and
this is heard in this country, too — that in the
Federal Republic nationalists, not to say Na-
364
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tional Socialists, may come back to potver.
How do you judge the democratic stability of
the Federal Republic?
A. I don't share that concern. Of course,
you who live in the Federal Republic are
more expert on that than I am. But it is
my impression that there is a very strong
democratic commitment among the people of
the Fedei'al Republic and that the most ex-
treme right, the National Socialist kind of
tradition, will have little influence to play
there. I gather that there are many among
you who think that this is not a serious
problem, but it is a problem which must be
watched a bit. But we are not concerned
about that over here. We are interested, of
course, and there would be concern if it got to
be a problem. But this is not on our minds
at the present time.
Moderator: Ladies and gentlemen, we are
at the end of this — may I ask you a personal
question? Five years ago my colleague in this
program asked you how you liked your job
as Secretary of State of the most powerful
nation in the world. At that time, you
answered in a positive sense. The 5 last years
have been extremely important and very tir-
ing years. Your answer to the question —
would it be the same today? How do you like
your job now ?
A. Oh, I think so. As far as my age is con-
cerned— and I am aware of it because I had a
birthday yesterday — most of my problems
come from people who are older than I am.
But in any event, in these very interesting
and exciting years through which I have
lived, I have felt real satisfaction in being
able to serve men like President Kennedy and
President Johnson and in one situation or
another to be able to help a little bit in trying
to establish some peace in the world.
Moderator: This is the end of our confer-
ence toith the Secretary of State.
May I thank you once again for having
found the time to be here with us and answer
our questions.
Viet-Nam Hostilities Resumed
Following Tet Cease-Fire
Statement by President Johnson ^
It had been our hope that the truce periods
connected with Christmas, New Year's, and
Tet might lead to some abatement of hostil-
ities and to moves toward peace. Unfor-
tunately, the only response we have had from
the Hanoi government was to use the periods
for major resupply efforts of their troops in
South Viet-Nam. Despite our efforts, and
those of third parties, no other response has
as yet come from Hanoi.
Under these circumstances, in fairness to
our own troops and those of our allies, we
had no alternative but to resume full-scale
hostilities after the cease-fire. But the door
to peace is, and will remain, open, and we
are prepared at any time to go more than
half way to meet any equitable overture from
the other side.
' Read to news correspondents by George Christian,
Press Secretary to the President, on Feb. 13.
MARCH 6, 1967
365
". . . the reasons behind strong U.S. support of U.N.
actions against Southern Rhodesia are several and pro-
found." This background paper, prepared in the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, outlines the crisis in
Southern Rhodesia and defines the moral and legal impera- ^
tives and practical considerations which are the basis of U.S.
support for the U.N. actions against Southern Rhodesia.
Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations: The U.S. Position
Southern Rhodesia is a landlocked territory
in south-central Africa, bounded by Zambia
on the north, Portuguese Mozambique on the
east, South Africa on the south, and newly
independent Botswana on the west. It is
150,333 square miles in area, about the
size of California. Southern Rhodesia's alti-
tude— most of its territory is between 3,000
and 5,000 feet above sea level — gives it a
pleasant, even climate despite its tropical
location. Its population includes about 4,105,-
000 Africans, 224,000 whites, and 21,000 of
other ethnic groups.
The principal agricultural products of
Southern Rhodesia are tobacco, sugar, cotton,
and citrus fruits; and cattle raising is an
important industry. It is rich in asbestos,
gold, chrome ore, coal, and manganese.
Southern Rhodesia is surprisingly new. It
was founded by British empire builder Cecil
Rhodes, who in 1889 obtained a charter con-
ferring commercial privileges and adminis-
trative responsibilities in the territory on his
British South Africa Company. White settle-
ment began the following year. Rhodes' com-
pany ran the colony until 1922, when the
British Government offered the white settlers
a choice of becoming a self-governing colony
or forming a union with South Africa. They
chose the former, and in 1923 Southern Rho-
desia was formally annexed by Great Britain.
The 1923 constitution provided for a Gov-
ernor to represent the British Crown and a
single house of Parliament with 30 members.
The franchise was open to adult British sub-
jects having an annual income of over £200,
regardless of race. Although the British Gov-
ernment retained certain reserve powers over
any legislation which discriminated against
Africans or amended the constitution and
could disallow any act of the legislature
within a year of enactment, it never exer-
cised these powers directly during the 38
years in which the constitution remained in
effect.
The People
The first white settlers beckoned to South-
em Rhodesia by Rhodes were Boers and
British of varying trades and background
who founded Salisbury and other small com-
munities.
As their descendants proved insufficient in
number to supply the skilled manpower re-
quired to support the territory's growing
economy, especially the rapid expansion
brought about by the two World Wars, the
Southern Rhodesian Government offered
strong incentives to encourage immigration.
The new immigrants, mostly skilled blue-
366
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
collar workers, were able to earn high wages
and live in a fine climate with many comforts
and amenities. The white population has
quadrupled since 1936, when it was only
55,000. Thus, most of the whites now in
Southern Rhodesia are fairly recent arrivals,
and the economic stake for most of them is
a job in an urban center rather than land
or property.
The Africans in Southern Rhodesia belong
to the great family of Bantu-speaking peoples
who inhabit central and southern Africa and
whose many languages are related. The two
principal groupings are the Mashona and the
Matabele, who at one time warred on each
other. Differences between the two groups
have diminished over the years, and the main
split among Africans now is between the
urban dweller and the tribally oriented rural
native.
Only about half of Southern Rhodesia's
Africans live in the rural reserves set up
under the Land Apportionment Act. which
designated special areas to be used by whites
and Africans. The rural reserves are popu-
lated largely by women, children, and elderly
persons, who are usually assisted by their
wage-earning kinsmen in the towns. Detrib-
alized Africans are migrating in increasing
numbers to the African townships in and
around urban areas, which are reserved pri-
marily for whites. The urban African popula-
tion, though predominantly Rhodesian-bom,
includes many Africans from Malawi, Zam-
bia, and Mozambique.
Until recent years the mass of the African
population was politically inert, partly be-
cause of the traditions of the Mashona tribe,
which placed great value on moderation and
patience. The increasing regulation intro-
duced by the whites and their technological
society disrupted the African's traditional
patterns and beliefs and upset his social rela-
tionships without offering usable substitutes.
White values made the African eager for in-
creased political rights and economic advance-
ment, but white restrictions denied them,
resulting in frustration and bitterness.
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland was formed out of Southern Rho-
desia and the British protectorates of North-
ern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, with powers di-
vided among the central government and the
three territorial governments. The Federal
Government consisted of a Governor General
representing the Crown, a Prime Minister, aa
Executive Council, and a 59-member Federal
Assembly which included 12 Africans and
3 Europeans representing African interests.
The Federation, promoted by Southern
Rhodesian whites hoping to benefit from the
exploitation of Northern Rhodesian copper
while at the same time heading off the drive
for independence by Africans in the two pro-
tectorates, proved an outstanding economic
success. But the Federation's political pros-
pects foundered on the rocks of heightened
African political awareness and desire for
independence. Rioting broke out in Nyasa-
land in 1959, and African territorial govern-
ments came to power in both Northern Rho-
desia and Nyasaland within the next 2 years.
Britain accepted the right of individual terri-
tories to secede from the Federation, and in
December 1963 the Federation was formally
dissolved. Nyasaland became the independent
state of Malawi in July 1964; and Northern
Rhodesia, the independent state of Zambia
in October 1964,
Zambia
The breakup of the Federation ended hopes
for political union of the three territories,
but it left the economies of Malawi and
Zambia closely entwined with Southern Rho-
desia's. Zambia, a nation rich in natural re-
sources and with the potential for healthy
economic development, remained especially
dependent on Southern Rhodesia. Its thriving
copper industry, the mainstay of its economy,
looks to Southern Rhodesia for skilled white
labor and its essential supplies of coal, petro-
leum, and electric power as well as railway
access to southern African ports. In 1964 one-
fourth of total Southern Rhodesian exports
MARCH 6, 1967
367
went to Zambia, including two-thirds of its
exports of manufactured goods. Many Rho-
desian private businesses service Zambia, and
international corporations selling in both
countries generally operate out of Salisbury.
Negotiations for a new Southern Rhodesian
constitution began well before the formal
breakup of the Federation. A conference in
February 1961 drafted its provisions, and it
was approved in a referendum of enfran-
chised (largely white) Rhodesians in Decem-
ber 1961. The Crown's powers to reject con-
stitutional amendments were limited to acts
affecting the position of the sovereign or the
governor, international obligations, and obli-
gations taken under certain Southern Rho-
desian Government loans. In addition, the
Crown could reject under certain procedures
any changes in the several "entrenched" pro-
visions of the constitution, which were de-
signed primarily to protect the rights of
Africans. They included a lengthy Declara-
tion of Rights and a Constitutional Council to
safeguard those rights.
Negotiations for Independence
Soon after the fall of the Federation, white
Rhodesians began to pressure Great Britain
for complete independence. Long and strenu-
ous negotiations took place over a period of
2 years, with the Conservative government
headed by Sir Alec Douglas-Home insisting
that independence could come only with firm
guarantees of progress toward majority rule.
Within 2 weeks of coming to power at the
head of a new Labor government, Prime
Minister Harold Wilson made clear that
Britain's position remained unchanged. In
a statement to Parliament on October 27,
1964, Wilson said:
The decision to grant independence rests entirely
with the British Government and Parliament and
they have a solemn duty to be satisfied that before
granting independence it would be acceptable to the
people of the country as a whole.
The only way Southern Rhodesia can become a
sovereign state is by an act of the British Parlia-
ment. A declaration of independence would be an
open act of defiance and rebellion and it would be
treasonable to take steps to give effect to it.
The British set forth five principles in their
negotiations with the Rhodesians which
"would need to be satisfied before we were
able to contemplate the grant of independ-
ence." A sixth principle was added by Prime
Minister Wilson in a statement to Parliament
on January 26, 1966. The principles are:
1. The principle and intention of unim-
peded progress to majority rule, already en-
shrined in the 1961 constitution, would have
to be maintained and guaranteed.
2. Guarantees against retrogressive amend-
ment of the constitution.
3. Immediate improvement in the political
status of the African population.
4. Progress toward ending racial discrimi-
nation.
5. The British Government would need to
be satisfied that any basis proposed for inde-
pendence was acceptable to the people of Rho-
desia as a whole.
6. The need to insure that, regardless of
race, there is no oppression of majority by
minority or of minority by majority.
The negotiations finally broke down in
October 1965, after Southern Rhodesia's
Prime Minister, Ian Smith, had gone to
London for talks and Prime Minister Wilson
had paid a visit to Salisbury. Mr. Smith de-
manded that the Southern Rhodesian white
regime have the right to determine and con-
trol the pace of transition to majority rule.
He insisted, at the same time, that Rhodesia's
1961 constitution already incorporated the
essence of the five principles.
Unilateral Declaration of Independence
During this time the United States re-
peatedly asserted its determination to oppose
vigorously a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence (UDI) by Southern Rhodesia. On
October 5, President Johnson asked Prime
Minister Wilson to inform the Rhodesian
Prime Minister of the American position.
Three days later the U.S. Charge d' Affaires
in London delivered a message to Mr. Smith
stating that the United States could not con-
done any settlement unresponsive to the in-
368
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
terests and rig^hts of the vast majority of the
Rhodesian population.
On October 29, President Johnson sent a
personal message to Prime Minister Smith
in Salisbury once again stressing American
support for a solution satisfactory to the
entire population. The President said that
while grave and difficult issues remained to
be worked out, a unilateral declaration of
independence would be a "tragic mistake"
serving no one's true interests.
The position of Southern Rhodesia's gov-
ernment had, however, hardened following
Prime Minister Wilson's return to London.
On November 11, 1965, in defiance of strong
feelings and opinions in most of the world,
the Smith government unilaterally declared
Southern Rhodesia independent. It was, as
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
Arthur Goldberg told an emergency meeting
of the Security Council the following day, a
"shocking" event "fraught with the gravest
of consequences." ^
The U.N. Response
Shocking thought it was, Southern Rho-
desia's unilateral declaration of independence
hardly came as a surprise at the United
Nations. U.N. bodies had been calling for a
solution to the Rhodesian problem since 1962.
In the months preceding the unilateral decla-
ration of independence both the General
Assembly and the Security Council had ex-
plicitly asked the British to take all neces-
sary action to prevent it. As late as November
5, 1965, the General Assembly adopted a reso-
lution calling on Great Britain to suspend the
1961 constitution and convene a new consti-
tutional convention to arrange independence
based on universal suffrage.^
With the unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence now a reality, the General Assembly
on November 11 ^ and the Security Council
on November 12 '' passed resolutions con-
■ Bulletin, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 912.
' Ibid., p. 910.
' Ibid., p. 912.
* Ibid., p. 915.
demning the action. On November 20, the
Security Council — all members voting affirm-
atively except France, which abstained — fol-
lowed up its condemnation with more im-
portant action. Terming the declaration "an
act of rebellion" the continuance of which
"constitutes a threat to international peace
and security" the Council called on all states
to refrain from recognizing the illegal re-
gime, to avoid any action assisting and en-
couraging it, and "in particular, to desist
from providing it with arms, equipment and
military material, and to do their utmost in
order to break all economic relations with
Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on
oil and petroleum products." ^
The action taken against Southern Rho-
desia and its support by the United States
and other nations rested on a continuing
recognition of British sovereignty and legal
authority over the territory. In seeking U.N.
assistance in dealing with the rebellion, the
United Kingdom stressed its intention to re-
tain special responsibility for Southern Rho-
desian affairs. It has maintained this posi-
tion consistently throughout the rebellion.
Southern Rhodesia has not become an inde-
pendent state and has not been recognized as
such by a single government. The measures
directed against it were thus not measures
against an independent nation but against an
illegal regime which had usurped power. As
Ambassador Goldberg told the Security Coun-
cil on November 12: *
A small, stubborn, and sadly mistaken minority
has seized sole power in an effort to dominate the
lives of the vast and unwilling majority of the popu-
lation of Southern Rhodesia. Defying the stern warn-
ings of the sovereign authority, the United Kingdom,
this white minority regime, in a desperate and what
will certainly prove to be a futile gesture, has
unilaterally declared the independence of Southern
Rhodesia, not in the interests of a majority of the
people upon which a genuine declaration of inde-
pendence might depend but in the interests of a
privileged minority, making this a spurious declara-
tion of independence.
= For text of Security Council Resolution 217, see
ibid., p. 916.
« Ibid., p. 912.
MARCH 6, 1967
369
UMited States Measures
The United States, feeling keenly that the
Southern Rhodesian rebellion could result in
a serious threat to peace on the African Con-
tinent and to its own interests, moved quickly
in support of the British action. The follow-
ing measures were instituted the day after
the independence declaration:
— The U.S. consul general in Salisbury was
recalled, and the consulate staff was re-
duced.
— Diplomatic status was withdrawn from
the Minister for Southern Rhodesian Affairs
in the British Embassy in Washington and
from his staff.
— A comprehensive embargo was placed on
the shipment of all arms and military equip-
ment to Southern Rhodesia.
— American private travel to Southern
Rhodesia was discouraged. Americans were
advised they could no longer be assured of
normal protective services and that they must
have British, not Southern Rhodesian, visas.
— U.S. sugar quotas for the importation of
Southern Rhodesian sugar for 1965 and 1966
were suspended.
— Action on all applications for U.S. Gov-
ernment loans and credit and investment
guarantees to Southern Rhodesia was sus-
pended.
Further action followed those initial steps:
— The United States recognized the British
action appointing a new board of directors
in London for the Reserve Bank of Rhode-
sia.' The new board was recognized as the
legal authority over official Southern Rho-
desian accounts in the United States.
— American importers of Southern Rho-
desian asbestos and lithium agreed to find
other sources.
— American companies were informed that
the United States recognized the legal author-
ity of the British Order-in-Council prohibit-
ing the export of tobacco and chromite from
Southern Rhodesia and were requested to
comply.*
— Controls were instituted on exports to
Southern Rhodesia, cutting off all exports of
significance to its economy.^
— With the cooperation of American oil
companies, a total embargo was placed on
shipment of all U.S. petroleum and petroleum
products to Southern Rhodesia.
In addition to these direct measures the
United States joined the British and
Canadians in airlifting oil to Zambia.^" Cut
off from its supply of refined oil products,
which had been supplied largely by the
Southern Rhodesian refinery at Umtali,
Zambia desperately needed petroleum to
maintain its economy. The American contri-
bution to the airlift, which began on January
4 and ended on April 30, 1966, carried over
3.6 million gallons of petroleum products.
The American airlift ended as other supply
routes, by road, rail, and lake, plus a con-
tinuing British airlift, were sufficiently de-
veloped to meet Zambia's emergency needs.
The United States also assisted in emergency
repairs and maintenance of the Great North
Road from Tanzania to Zambia.
As a result of the economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia, major U.S. ex-
ports to Rhodesia (mainly foodstuffs, petro-
leum products, chemicals, manufactured
goods, machinery, and transport equipment)
were reduced from a total of $23 million in
1965 to $6.51 million in the first 10 months
of 1966. American imports from Rhodesia
also suffered.
Repression and Censorship
At the time of the illegal declaration of in-
dependence, the British officially dismissed
the Smith government and announced that
Governor Sir Humphrey Gibbs was the sole
representative of the Queen in Salisbury.
The British High Commissioner was with-
drawn, and Rhodesian passports were not
recognized as valid by the United Kingdom.
Great Britain, however, made clear that it
would not use force to end the rebellion.
' For an announcement, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1965,
p. 1028.
° For a Department statement, see ibid., Feb. 21,
1966, p. 267.
' For a Department of Commerce announcement,
see ibid.. Mar. 21, 1966, p. 466.
" For background, see ibid., Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.
370
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
For their part, the Rhodesians placed Gov-
ernor Gibbs under restrictions and promul-
gated a new constitution. Although generally
following the lines of the 1961 constitution, it
deleted references to Rhodesia's colonial
status and made several other important
changes. On the theory that the governorship
was vacant, a Rhodesian was illegally ap-
pointed Officer Administering the Govern-
ment and Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces. The amendment of "entrenched"
clauses protecting the rights of Africans was
also made easier.
Shortly before its unilateral declaration of
independence, the Smith government had de-
clared a "state of emergency" as a means of
instituting various repressive measures
against African opponents of the regime.
Censorship powers, affecting printing, pub-
lishing, radio broadcasts, and cable traffic,
were invoked on the day of the unilateral
declaration of independence. Regulations in-
stituted on December 7, 1965, also provided
fines for persons permitting "subversive and
seditious" broadcasts from other countries to
be heard in public. Newspapers reacted by
leaving blank spaces to show where they had
been censored. On February 8, 1966, the press
was further curtailed with regulations
making it an offense for newspapers to indi-
cate when they are being subjected to cen-
sorship. Censors were given powers to order
any printed material removed or altered.
Until 1959, when the original black na-
tionalist group in Southern Rhodesia, the
African National Congress (ANC), was
banned by the government and its leaders
placed in detention, there had been little
specifically antiwhite feeling in the territory.
Few Africans thought of getting the white
man out of Southern Rhodesia or challenged
his right to be there. With the outlawing of
African political organizations and the enact-
ment of increasingly drastic security laws,
African grievances against the white man
mounted rapidly.
The system of land allocation and control
has been another source of bitterness. Almost
as much acreage is owned by whites as is
allocated for Tribal Trust Lands. In addition,
the land allocated to African use is relatively
poor while much land owned by whites lies
rich and unused.
African nationalists have vowed to over-
throw the government by force if necessary.
The two major nationalist organizations, both
of which evolved from the ANC, are now
based in exile. They are the Zimbabwe
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), led by
Joshua Nkomo, and the rival Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU), led by
Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. ZAPU was banned
in 1962 and ZANU, formed by ZAPU mem-
bers dissatisfied with Mr. Nkomo's leadership,
was banned the year following. The leaders of
both organizations have been in detention in
Rhodesia since before the independence decla-
ration.
In an attempt to counter the African na-
tionalist groups, the regime has made a
major effort to bolster the position of the
tribal chiefs. The chiefs' traditional position
has eroded, but successive white-controlled
governments and the present regime have at-
tempted to use them as a bridge between the
African and white communities. They often
act as local administrators on behalf of the
government. The Africans expect the chiefs
to resist measures against their interests, and
the chiefs are often squeezed between oppos-
ing sides. Recently the regime has sought to
build up the prestige of the chiefs by in-
creasing their salaries and allowances and
providing technical training and overseas
tours. The nationalists regard the chiefs paid
by the regime as dupes or stooges.
Halting of Tankers at Beira
A new crisis arose in early April 1966. A
tanker arriving in the Portuguese Mozam-
bique port of Beira with crude oil for
Southern Rhodesia and another heading in
that direction thi'eatened to breach the U.N.-
approved oil sanctions The British immedi-
ately requested a meeting of the Security
Council to empower them to halt the vessels.
On April 9 the Security Council adopted a
resolution ^^ which, expressing concern "that
" For text, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 718.
MARCH 6, 1967
371
substantial supplies of oil may reach Rho-
desia" and determining "that the resulting
situation constitutes a threat to the peace,"
called upon Britain "to prevent by the use
of force if necessary the arrival at Beira of
vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil
destined for Rhodesia."
With the backing of this resolution the
British were able to prevent any other such
vessels from entering Beira. The tanker
already in the port subsequently left without
being permitted to discharge its cargo. How-
ever, petroleum continued to flow to Southern
Rhodesia from neighboring countries, the
bulk of it passing through Mozambique by
rail from South Africa.
The African Attitude
With voluntary economic sanctions show-
ing no signs of bringing an early end to the
rebel regime, impatience mounted in most of
the independent African countries. Even the
more moderate African governments, con-
tending that Great Britain's refusal to use
force to end the rebellion weakened its capac-
ity to deal effectively with the problem, ex-
hibited an increasing distrust of its policy.
The Smith regime's success in defying
legality and international opinion also
threatened to stimulate latent racial tensions
in Zambia's copperbelt. Zambia's position
was especially difficult. Southern Rhodesia's
political philosophy was inimical to its most
basic beliefs, yet Zambia remained extremely
vulnerable to economic measures directed
against the rebel regime of its neighbor. The
moderate Zambian leadership, frustrated by
this dilemma, came under great pressure to
join in further action against the Southern
Rhodesian regime.
In early May 1966, Mali, Nigeria, and
Uganda introduced a resolution in the Secu-
rity Council which, among other things,
called upon "the United Kingdom govern-
ment to take all necessary measures includ-
ing the use of force, to abolish the racist
minority regime in Southern Rhodesia." The
United States and Britain, believing the
move premature and the use of force, in any
case, too extreme, refrained from supporting
the resolution. In the vote, which came on
May 23, the resolution failed to get the re-
quired majority of nine votes. The vote was ""
6 in favor (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria,
Uganda, U.S.S.R.) and 1 opposed (New Zea-
land), with 8 abstentions (United States,
United Kingdom, Argentina, China, France,
Japan, Netherlands, Uruguay).
During May, talks resumed in London be-
tween Great Britain and the Smith govern-
ment and were continued there the following
month, and again in August in Salisbury.
The summer also brought disturbances, dis-
sident activity, and the continuing infiltra-
tion of militant nationalists who had pre-
viously been forced to leave the country. On
July 16, Africans demonstrating at Salis-
bury's university clashed with police, result-
ing in the arrest 10 days later of 10 students,
the deportation of 9 lecturers, and the tem-
porary closing of the university.
Commonwealth Conference
In September the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers Conference in London added to
the mounting pressures on Great Britain to
end the Southern Rhodesian rebellion. Most
of the heads of government in attendance,
according to the official communique issued
on September 14, "expressed their firm opin-
ion that force was the only sure means of
bringing down the illegal regime in Rho-
desia." Faced by these intense feelings, the
British agreed that if the illegal regime did
not take steps to restore executive authority
to the Governor the following related con-
sequences would ensue:
(a) The British Government will withdraw all
previous proposals for a constitutional settlement
which have been made; in particular they will not
thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Par-
liament any settlement which involves independence
before majority nile.
(b) Given the full support of Commonwealth rep-
resentatives at the United Nations, the British Gov-
ernment will be prepared to join in sponsoring in the
Security Council of the United Nations before the
372
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
end of this year a resolution providing for effective
and selective mandatory economic sanctions against
Rhodesia.
A Lost Opportunity
British Commonwealth Secretary Herbert
Bowden visited Salisbury in September, be-
ginning another round of negotiations be-
tween the two Governments. On October 13,
Britain sent "final proposals" for a settle-
ment to Mr. Smith.
Southern Rhodesia was, of course, a major
issue before the General Assembly as it con-
vened in September. The Assembly adopted
two resolutions, on October 22 and Novem-
ber 17, the United States abstaining on both.
The earlier resolution condemned "any ar-
rangement reached between the administer-
ing Power and the illegal racist minority
regime which will not recognize the inalien-
able rights of the people of Zimbabwe [the
African name for Southern Rhodesia] to
self-determination and independence." The
other resolution again called on Britain to
"take all necessary measures, including in
particular the use of force" to end the il-
legal regime.
The United States did not support these
resolutions because of their immoderate lan-
guage and because they impugned Great
Britain's motives in holding talks with the
Smith regime. The resolution of November
17, in calling for the use of force, also ex-
ceeded the carefully measured response to
the rebellion regarded as desirable.
Mr. Bowden traveled to Salisbury again
in November. The intensive negotiations
reached a climax on December 2 in a face-
to-face meeting between Prime Minister
Wilson and Mr. Smith aboard the British
cruiser Tiger in the Mediterranean. During
the 2-day encounter, the leaders worked out
a draft document which they agreed to sub-
mit to their respective Cabinets. It called for
measures which would give the African
majority and moderate whites at least some
representation in a broadened government
under Mr. Smith as Prime Minister. It also
called for constitutional changes which,
though preserving white rule for a number
of years, would assure progress to majority
rule. The Rhodesian Parliament would be dis-
solved, with the British Governor exercising
authority with Mr. Smith and his broadened
interim government until a new election was
held within a period of 4 months.
The British Cabinet quickly approved the
draft document. In Salisbury, however, as in
November of the previous year, opinions had
hardened. On December 5 Mr. Smith's Cabi-
net, under the influence of its extreme right
wing, rejected the document.
"Never in my lifetime," Prime Minister
Wilson told the British people over television,
"has Britain been prepared to offer inde-
pendence to a country before it had reached
the stage of majority rule. In the long his-
tory of lost opportunities, I find it hard to
discover one more tragic than that which
Mr. Smith rejected."
Mandatory Sanctions
After the Smith regime's final rejection
of a settlement, the United Kingdom found
no alternative but to press for yet harder
measures to end illegal minority rule. On
December 8 Foreign Secretary George
Brown asked the Security Council to invoke
mandatory economic sanctions. The Security
Council complied on December 16, by a mar-
gin of 11 to 0 (the Soviet Union, France,
Bulgaria, and Mali abstaining). i^ It was the
first vote for such mandatory sanctions in
United Nations history.
The resolution, after determining that "the
present situation in Southern Rhodesia con-
stitutes a threat to international peace and
security," says that all states shall prevent
the following:
(a) the import into their territories of asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper,
meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather
originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported there-
from after the date of this resolution ;
MARCH 6, 1967
" For a U.S. statement and text of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 232, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
373
(b) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the export of these commodities from Southern
Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in
their territories in any of these commodities originat-
ing in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom
after the date of this resolution, including in partic-
ular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for
the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis-
tration of any of these commodities originating in
Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the
date of this resolution ;
(d) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of
arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft,
military vehicles, and equipment and materials for
the manufacture and maintenance of arms and am-
munition in Southern Rhodesia ;
(e) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other
aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and
materials for the manufacture, assembly or mainte-
nance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of
their registration of any such goods destined for
Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their na-
tionals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly
of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
(/) participation in their territories or territories
under their administration or in land or air trans-
port facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their
registration in the supply of oil or oil products to
Southern Rhodesia;
notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
licenses granted before the date of this resolution.
A Measured Response
The language of the resolution follows
very closely the draft Britain presented to
the Security Council. The only significant
changes, made by the Council with British
agreement, were the addition of oil, motor
vehicles, and aircraft to the list of embargoed
items.
Great Britain cautioned the Council
against allowing the situation to develop into
an economic or military confrontation with
the whole of southern Africa. Accepting the
British appeal for a moderate approach, the
Council turned down proposals for more
radical solutions. Amendments proposed by
African states and rejected by the Council
included a call for Great Britain to use all
means, including force, to end the rebellion,
as well as a condemnation of South Africa
and Portugal for their support of the illegal
regime.
The Soviet Union backed these amend-
ments and abstained on the final resolution
on the ground that it did not go far enough.
Having few responsibilities on the African
Continent, the Soviet Union risks little in
pushing for radical measures on Southern
Rhodesia. The course adopted by the Security
Council, however, reflects an admirable effort
to assure a response appropriately tailored
to the threat.
South Africa and Portugal
Because of the geographical location of
South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique,
the success of the sanctions program will, to
an important degree, depend on the future
willingness of Portugal and South Africa to
comply.
South Africa has thus far represented a
major obstacle to the success of the volun-
tary sanctions program. Its Government has
consistently declared the official neutrality of
South Africa in the controversy.
Portugal's role is also important to the out-
come of U.N. action. Contrary to the views
of the bulk of the international community,
its Government contends that the Security
Council's resolution of December 16 is in-
valid.
Economic Problems of Sanctions
The application of sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia could result in serious
economic repercussions for its neighbors,
notably Zambia. Although the Security Coun-
cil resolution of December 16 was carefully
worded to avoid aflfecting ti'ade in commodi-
ties essential to Zambia's economy, there
remains the ])ossibility of damage through
Rhodesian retaliation. Article 50 of the U.N.
Charter provides that any state facing special
374
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
economic problems that stem from measu;-es
instituted by the Security Council shall have
the right to consult with the Council about a
solution.
The failure of member states to comply
with the Security Council's decision to apply
mandatory sanctions would not only violate
solemn treaty obligations; it would jeopard-
ize the success of the sanctions program.
And if the sanctions are not successful, the
result could be a situation of increasing vio-
lence, more costly and difficult to deal with.
It was in the hope of avoiding such a tragic
outcome that the Security Council limited its
action to moderate though firm measures
which all members could accept and observe.
Legal Considerations
In ordering mandatory economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia, the Security
Council acted on solid legal grounds. Because
a number of attacks have been launched
against the action, however, its legal founda-
tions are reviewed here.
1. It is argued that the situation in South-
ern Rhodesia poses no threat to international
peace, as is required before mandatory sanc-
tions can be applied, or that if there is a
threat it is posed not by the actions of the
Smith regime but by the possibility of action
against that regime by African states.
Under the U.N. Charter, the members have
entrusted to the Security Council the power
to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace" and to "decide what measures
shall be taken ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security." This is
what the Council has done in the Rhodesian
case, and under article 25 of the charter all
U.N. members are obligated to accept and
carry out the Council's decisions.
The Council had ample basis on which to
make a finding of a threat to the peace. The
illegal rebellion of the Smith regime in Rho-
desia has obstructed political development in
that territory toward independence on the
basis of majority rule, in defiance of the
principles and obligations of the U.N. Char-
ter. In the political context of the African
Continent, such action could lead to civil
strife that might involve other parties on
one or both sides of the conflict. This does
not necessarily presuppose deliberate forci-
ble action by other African states against
Rhodesia, although some states might very
well become involved in such conflict eventu-
ally whether they wished to or not.
The Council thus concluded that the
Smith regime's rebellion posed a threat to
stability, security, and peace in the area,
with which it must seek to deal effectively.
2. It is argued that the Security Council's
action violates article 2, paragraph 7, of the
charter, which prohibits U.N. intervention
in "matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."
There is no basis for this contention. First
of all. Southern Rhodesia is not a "state"
and has not been recognized as such by a
single government or international organiza-
tion.
Secondly, the Security Council's move can-
not be considered "intervention" since the
Council acted at the specific request of the
legitimate sovereign, the United Kingdom.
Third, the situation in Southern Rhodesia
can in no way be considered a matter of
"domestic jurisdiction." The U.N. has con-
sistently recognized that Southern Rhodesia
falls under the provisions of article 73. This
article calls on members administering a ter-
ritory "whose peoples have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government ... to de-
velop self-government, to take due account
of the political aspirations of the peoples,
and to assist them in the progressive devel-
opment of their free political institutions.
. . ." Therefore, Rhodesia is the subject of
international responsibilities owed by Great
Britain on behalf of the peoples of Rhodesia
to the international community. It is the dis-
charge of these responsibilities which the
Smith regime is trying to frustrate and ob-
struct.
Fourth, article 2, paragraph 7, specifically
MARCH 6, 1967
375
provides that the principle of noninterven-
tion shall not prejudice enforcement meas-
ures under chapter VII. Economic sanctions
are such measures.
American Support for U.N. Action
Beyond the legal grounds, the reasons be-
hind strong U.S. support of U.N. actions
against Southern Rhodesia are several and
profound. Any other policy would deny our
owTi democratic heritage and the struggle
for equal rights both at home and abroad.
President Johnson expressed this thought in
his address on May 26, 1966, marking the
third anniversary of the Organization of
African Unity, when he said:^*
As a basic part of our national tradition we sup-
port self-determination and an orderly transition
to majority rule in every quarter of the globe. These
principles . . . g:uide our policy today toward
Rhodesia. . . .
The foreign policy of the United States is rooted
in its life at home. We will not permit human rights
to be restricted in our own country. And we will not
support policies abroad which are based on the rule
of minorities or the discredited notion that men are
unequal before the law. We will not live by a double
standard- — professing abroad what we do not practice
at home or venerating at home what we ignore
abroad.
Other reasons for U.S. support of firm
measures against Southern Rhodesia are
equally compelling. The birth of our own
nation gives us a natural sympathy for
peoples seeking self-determination — tnie self-
determination, not self-determination for a
small ruling clique. As a founding member
of the United Nations and a principal archi-
tect of the U.N. Charter, we also have a
special obligation to see its purposes upheld.
Article 1 names as a purpose of the U.N. the
development of friendly relations among na-
tions "based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of
peoples."
U.S. support for U.N. action is not based
" Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.
solely on moral and legal imperatives, how-
ever. It is equally grounded in practical con-
siderations. The American national interest
is furthered if we can maintain friendly re- ^
lations with the world's newly independent
countries, for whom the Rhodesian issue is
of the greatest emotional and symbolic sig-
nificance.
The great majority of newly independent
African states have sought to achieve multi-
racial societies and to protect the rights of
minorities. The success of a rebellion based
on white supremacy would seriously under-
mine their efforts. It would etch deeper the
lines of political conflict and strengthen the
hand of extremism and racism throughout
the continent. In so doing it could pave the
way for catastrophic racial violence. Pres-
sures in other African countries to support
violent measures against the white regime
in Southern Rhodesia would grow and
"armies of liberation" might be formed. De-
velopments of this kind would open a world
of opportunity to powers who believe their
interests are best served by international un-
rest.
Such events would hardly be in the interest
of peaceful development and certainly not in
the interest of the United States.
American policy of support for a measured
U.N. response to end the rebellion and bring
about majority rule in Southern Rhodesia
steers a course between those who advocate
the use of force and those who advocate a
hands-off policy. It is a narrow course, and
not without perils, but the only one which
offers promise. To use force now would bring
immediately the disruption and chaos we
seek to avoid. To do nothing would end in
the same result.
As 1966 drew to a close, the possibilities
for a negotiated compromise seemed to nar-
row. Until the Rhodesian rejection of the
agreement worked out on the Tiger, the
British had never insisted on majority rule
as a precondition for a transition. On De-
cember 20, however, Prime Minister Wilson
376
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
told the House of Commons that he would
adhere to the policy expressed in the Com-
monwealth communique of September;
namely, that he would not again submit to
Parliament a settlement with Southern Rho-
desia involving independence before majority
rule.
On January 5, 1967, President Johnson
signed Executive Order No. 11322, officially
implementing mandatory economic sanc-
tions.^^ Violation of the Executive order is a
criminal offense. The President acted under
the United Nations Participation Act, passed
by Congress on December 20, 1945, and
amended in 1949 and 1965, which authorizes
the President to apply sanctions voted by
the Security Council.
Section 5(a) of the act says:
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,
whenever the United States is called upon by the
Security Council to apply measures which said Coun-
cil has decided, pursuant to Article 41 of said Chap-
ter, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions
under said Charter, the President may, to the extent
necessary to apply such measures, through any
agency which he may designate, and under such
orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed
by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or
in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communica-
tion between any foreign country or any national
thereof, or any person therein and the United States
or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States.
The problem of Southern Rhodesia thus
remains to be solved. Failure on the part of
the international community to assist in re-
solving it in a just and peaceful manner
would not only endanger the principles of the
United Nations Charter; it would entail
grave consequences, both for the United Na-
tions and for our own interest in the stability
of Africa.
" For text, see ibid., Jan. 23, 1967, p. 146.
Letters of Credence
Sierra Leone
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Sierra Leone, Christopher 0. E. Cole, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on February 17. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated Feb-
ruary 17.
MARCH 6, 1967
377
THE CONCRESS
Foreign Aid
Message From President Johnson to the Congress '
To the Congress of the United States:
Twenty years ago, President Truman set
forth the basic proposition underlying the
foreign aid program when he told the Con-
gress: 2
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way. I believe
that our help should be primarily through economic
and financial aid which is essential to economic sta-
bility and orderly political processes.
This judgment was shared by Presidents
Eisenhower and Kennedy and by every Con-
gress since the 79th in 1946. It is my judg-
ment today. I believe it is the judgment of
most Americans.
Our commitment to assist the economic
growth and security of developing nations is
grounded in the hard realities of the postwar
world. We know that want is the enemy of
peace and hopelessness the mother of vio-
lence.
We know that —
In the long run, the wealthy nations can-
not survive as islands of abundance in a
world of hunger, sickness, and despair.
The threat to our security posed by in-
'H. Doc. 55, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (White House
press release dated Feb. 9).
' For President Truman's message to Congress
dated Mar. 12, 1947, concerning aid to Greece and
Turkey, see Bulletin Supplement, May 4, 1947, p.
829.
ternal subversion and insurgency cannot be
countered by withdrawal, isolation, or indif-
ference.
Men — acting together — have the power to
shape their destiny. Around the world, from
Mexico to Greece to Taiwan, we have seen
the energy and determination of the emerg-
ing peoples transform our aid into the seeds
of prosperity.
Abroad, as at home, the true national in-
terest of the American people goes hand in
hand with their sense of freedom, justice,
and compassion.
Precisely because foreign assistance pro-
grams are so vital to our national interest,
they must reflect the circumstances of the
late sixties, not those of the past. They must
respond to the ideas which move men in the
emerging nations today. They must draw
upon the lessons of experience. They must
take account of the growing wealth of other
advanced countries.
The proposals in this message reflect the
experience of our aid activities over two
decades. They emphasize the six guiding
principles on which our programs must be
based:
1. Self-help. — Nations develop primarily
through their own efforts. Our programs can
only be supplements, not substitutes. This is
the overriding principle.
2. Multilateralism. — Every advanced na-
378
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ion has a duty to contribute its share of the
:ost.
3. Regionalism. — The future of many
[countries depends upon sound development
|of resources shared with their neighbors.
4. Agriculture, health, and education. —
These key sectors are the critical elements
of advancement everywhere in the under-
developed world.
5. Balance of payments. — We cannot help
others grow unless the American dollar is
strong and stable.
6. Efficient administration. — Every Amer-
ican citizen is entitled to know that his tax
dollar is spent wisely.
New Directions
To carry out these principles, I propose —
A new Foreign Assistance Act, stating in
clear language our objectives, our standards,
and our program techniques.
A statutory National Adt^isory Committee
on Self-Help, to advise the Congress, the
President, the Secretaiy of State, and the
AID Administrator on how effectively re-
cipient nations are mobilizing their own re-
sources under the self-help criteria of the act.
A statutory objective that at least 85 per-
cent of our development loan funds he spent
in a regional or multilateral framework.
More than $1 billion in programs to im-
prove agriculture, education, and health, a
25-percent increase over last year.
A shift in emphasis in our aid policy in
Africa, to concentrate our help increasingly
on regional and multi-national projects.
Sympathetic consideration of a U.S. con-
tribution to a new special fund of the African
Development Bank.
A $200 million U.S. contribution to new
special funds of the Asian Development
Bank, in accord with the recommendations
of the Black mission, headed by Mr. Eugene
Black, my special representative on Asian de-
velopment.
A reorganization of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, to better carry on the
War on Hunger and to promote private in-
vestment and the growth of private enter-
prise in the less-developed world.
My proposals for programs authorized by
the Foreign Assistance Act in fiscal 1968
will require total appropriations of slightly
over $3.1 billion. Of this, some $2.5 billion
will be devoted to economic aid. Almost $600
million will be for military assistance. Funds
for the regional development banks would be
authorized by separate legislation.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967
Foreign aid now rests on a legislative
foundation enacted in 1961. This pathfinding
statute has served the Nation well. But the
experience we have gathered over the past
several years should now be codified in a
new law.
/ propose the Foreign Assistance Act of
1967.
This act will contain a clear statement of
the philosophy which underlies our programs
and the criteria to be used in this administra-
tion. To provide the continuity needed for
sound management, it will contain authoriza-
tions covering 2 years. Most important, it
will provide a framework for each of the
basic thrusts of our aid policy.
1. Self-help
Self-help is the lifeblood of economic de-
velopment. No sustained progress is possible
without it. Aid provided as a substitute is
aid wasted.
Waste is a luxury none of us can afford.
The only obligation tied to our aid is the
recipient's obligation to itself — to mobilize
its own resources as efficiently as possible.
I will not ask any American citizen to con-
tribute his tax dollars to support any coun-
try which does not meet this test.
• Accordingly, the act will make it clear that
the development job is primarily the respon-
sibility of the developing countries them-
selves. In no case will the United States un-
dertake to do for any country what it should
do for itself. Nor will we assist in any ven-
MARCH 6, 1967
379
1
ture which we believe has received less than
full support from the recipient country. The
United States will insist on the general eco-
nomic policies necessary to make our aid
effective.
We are now applying strict and effective
self-help standards. The results are evident
in the fact that, on the average, each citizen
in the major aid-receiving countries is sav-
ing 1 of every 8 dollars he earns. These sav-
ings become investments. For every dollar
the United States and other donors provide,
these local sources invest $10.
Still, there is an urgent need for a per-
manent, nonpartisan, public body to evaluate
self-help performance.
Thus, the act I propose will authorize the
President to establish a National Advisory
Committee on Self-Help. This Committee will
consist of members from both parties, from
the business community, from labor, from
universities, and from other walks of life. It
will review and evaluate our aid programs
in as many countries as it sees fit. It will ex-
amine our programs to see whether the re-
cipients are extending their best efforts and
whether we are making the best possible use
of our aid. Its findings will be available to
the Congress.
2. Multilateralism and burden sharing
Development is a world problem. No single
country has all of the resources required.
Equity demands that no single country be
asked to carry the bulk of the load.
/ propose that the act set as an objective
that 85 percent of our development loans be
undertaken in a regional or multilateral
framework.
This action fits the trend of recent years,
as advanced nations have increasingly ac-
cepted the responsibilities associated with
their growing wealth. The combined value
of our economic and food aid is less than
seven-tenths of 1 percent of our national in-
come, only slightly more than the average
for all advanced countries. We devote smaller
shares to foreign assistance than such coun-
tries as France and Belgium.
But these figures do not tell the whole
story. Our defense expenditures far exceed
those of all other free nations combined and
serve their common interest. This burden
too must be counted in the balance.
Thus, we must redouble our efforts to get
other donors to enlarge their commitments.
3. Regionalism
Resources know no national boundaries.
Rivers flow through many countries, trans-
portation and communication networks serve
different peoples, sources of electric power
must be shared by neighbors. Economic ad-
vance in every part of the world has required
joint enterprises to develop shared sources
of wealth.
These facts underlie the growing movement
toward regional cooperation:
The Alliance for Progress has transformed
the inter-American system of institutions into
a reliable and dynamic engine of change.
Asian initiatives have created the frame-
work for cooperation of all kinds. Such insti-
tutions as the Asian and Pacific Council and
the Asian Development Bank are clear evi-
dence of the new will to press forward.
/ propose that the act state that the United
States ivill encourage regional economic de-
velopment to the maximum extent consistent
ivith the economic and political realities in
each region.
I propose three steps to carry out this
policy:
First, in most African countries, we will
gradually shift to cooperative projects which
involve more than one donor or more than
one recipient.
Second, we will seek an appropriate means
of responding to the recent request of the
African Development Bank for U.S. partici-
pation in a special fund to finance worthy
projects which are beyond the means of the
Bank's ordinary capital.
Third, we will respond favorably to the
request for special funds for the Asian De-
velopment Bank. Preliminary explorations
suggest a U.S. share of $200 million, to be
380
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
contributed over a number of years with
matching arrangements and balance of pay-
ments safeguards.
These proposals spring from a philosophy
of pragmatic regionalism. They reflect the
facts of economic life.
Political unity is neither required nor ex-
pected. But the resources available for devel-
opment are too scarce to scatter among many
countries when greater promise lies in joint
action. We must take full advantage of the
benefits of cooperation.
4. Agriculture, health, and education
The fundamentals of a decent life are suffi-
cient food, freedom from disease, and an op-
portunity to absorb as much knowledge as
individual capacities permit.
These are the first goals of all societies.
They must be the first objects of our aid.
/ -propose that the act establish agriculture,
health, and education as our primary con-
cerns and that investment in these areas be
substantially expanded.
I propose that our investment in —
Agriculture rise from $504 million last year
to $668 million in 1968.
Education rise from $166 million to $228
million.
Health rise from $192 million to $202
million.
In particular, we will wage war on hunger.
Together, the world must find ways to bring
food production and population growth into
balance. My proposals make clear our deter-
mination to help expand food supplies. We
must be equally ready to assist countries
which decide to undertake voluntarily popu-
lation programs.
5. Balance of payments
Our foreign assistance programs rest on
the basic strength of the dollar and our bal-
ance of payments. This administration will
continue to see that our aid programs have
the least possible adverse effect on our balance
of payments.
A New Course for Foreign Aid
Remarks by President Johnson *
I have today asked the Congress to help
chart a new course for American foreign aid.
We know that aid is indispensable to our quest
for world order. We know that poverty is the
enemy of peace and hopelessness is the mother
of violence. But the world is changed since our
aid began, some 20 years ago. And our think-
ing should change with it.
Our primary objective must be to help those
nations which are willing to help themselves.
I will not ask a single American citizen to
contribute his tax dollars to support any coun-
try which does not meet this test. Because no
sustained progress is possible without the spirit
of self-help.
Aid provided as a substitute is aid that is
wasted. And waste is a luxury that none of us
can afford.
' Recorded for radio and television on Feb. 9.
Almost 90 percent of our economic assist-
ance and over 95 percent of our military as-
sistance is now spent in the United States.
These programs serve to expand U.S. trade
abroad. They help develop new trading pat-
terns.
6. Efficient administration
The Agency for International Development
is a sound, well-run instrument of public
policy. But, like all arms of government, AID
can be improved. It can add further to its
economy record — a record which includes $33
million in cost reduction last year alone, and a
20-percent cut in personnel, apart from south-
east Asia, since 1963.
I am establishing two new offices in AID:
An Office of the War on Hunger to con-
solidate all AID activities relating to hunger,
population problems, and nutrition.
An Office of Private Resources to concen-
trate on marshaling private investment and
the expansion of private sectors in the less-
developed world — the best long-term route to
rapid growth.
MARCH 6, 1967
381
Both of these steps are consolidations —
they will require no new appropriations or
personnel. They will focus the attention and
energy of the Agency directly upon two pri-
ority aroas. They are significant steps for-
ward.
Economic Assistance
Latin America
For Latin America, I recommend an eco-
nomic aid program of $624 million.
This amount is clearly justified by our own
interests and the recent performance of our
Latin American partners. The program I pro-
pose is lean and concentrated. Nearly 70 per-
cent of it will be committed in four countries
—Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Chile. In each
case, we will make certain that the amount
actually spent is in accord with clear needs
and meets the strict self-help criteria of the
act.
The outlook for a solid return from these
expenditures is promising:
Brazil shows greater economic dynamism
than at any time in her recent history. She
has forced inflation down from the 1964 high
of 140 percent to 40 percent — still far too
high, but an enormous improvement. Her
balance-of-payments situation is well under
control. Agricultural production has been in-
creased. Per capita income is up. In general,
the economic situation is more hopeful than
the most favorable predictions of 3 years
ago.
Peru continues its steady economic climb.
Per capita income last year was $378, com-
pared to $325 5 years before. The critical
job now is to bring more people into the eco-
nomic mainstream, while further stimulating
the developed coastal areas. U.S. contribu-
tions will be heavy in the areas of agricul-
ture and education.
In Chile, the favorable copper market will
make possible a reduction in our aid. We will
concentrate our help in the crucial rural area
to increase agricultural production and ex-
ports.
In Colombia, economic trends are also en-
couraging. Our contributions will be made
through a group of donors led by the World
Bank. We will concentrate on agriculture and
education.
Our program for Central America — Nica-
ragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, "^
and Honduras — is tailored to support the
Central American Common Market. This
market is one of the most promising inno-
vations in the developing world. The spirit it
reflects has already increased trade within
the Central America region by 400 percent
over the past 5 years. We will make modest
contributions to the Central American Inte-
gration Fund to continue and accelerate this
pace.
The balance of my request is largely for
the Dominican Republic and Panama. It is
essential that we maintain strong programs
in these countries, although they will cost
slightly less than in the past.
The vision and hard work of 450 million
people in this hemisphere have made the Alli-
ance for Progress into one of the great tools
for human betterment. Its success is by no
means assured. There will be disappointments
as well as achievements along the way. But it
is a vehicle for the hopes and energies of a
continent. The program I propose will carry
it forward.
Meetings among the governments of the
Western Hemisphere during the year may
produce further proposals, such as replenish-
ment of the resources of the Inter- American
Development Bank. Where these proposals
merit our consideration and support and
require action by the Congress, I will submit
my recommendations to you at the appropri-
ate time.
Near East-South Asia
For the Near East^south Asia, I recom-
mend a program of $758 million.
This region provides the harshest test of
free institutions:
Nowhere else in the free world are there
so many people — as many as the combined
populations of North and South America
and Western Europe.
Nowhere else do so many people live in
382
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
such dire poverty — per capita income for
nine out of every 10 persons is under $100
per year.
Nowhere else are divisive forces so poised
to take advantage of any misstep.
Several advanced nations have banded to-
gether, under the leadership of the World
Bank, to form an Aid Consortia for India
and Pakistan. A similar group has been
formed for Turkey, chaired by the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. These groups determine the share each
member will contribute and provide a forum
for continuing discussions with recipient
countries. They have served the interests of
all parties.
In my message on food for India,^ I pro-
posed that food and related aid be added to
the agenda of the consortium for India as
an additional area of assistance in which all
donors should join. We will exert the full
extent of our influence to insure that this con-
sortium becomes the primary vehicle for all
aspects of development aid to India — from
grants of funds to evaluation of performance.
Despite the shadow of famine and the
ever-present danger of renewed frictions, the
situation in the three countries — India, Paki-
stan, and Turkey— which will receive 91 per-
cent of our aid to the Near East^south Asia
gives reason for hope:
India is trying to regain the lead in the
race between her expanding population and
her food supply. She plans to double her out-
lays for agriculture in the next 5 years and
to quadruple her voluntary population pro-
gram. India has increased fertilizer purchases
by 85 percent and has started crash programs
in fai-mland development. She has begun cam-
paigns to increase supplies of better seeds and
pesticides. But Indian performance is not
confined to agriculture. In early 1966 she
liberalized her system of import controls and
devalued her currency. All advanced nations
must come to her aid if these hard-won op-
portunities are to be realized.
Pakistan has an outstanding economic
For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295.
record. Her future is brighter still. From
1960 to 1965, her gross national product grew
at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent
compared to 2.5 percent previously, agricul-
tural production grew at an average annual
rate of 3.5 percent compared to 1.6 percent
previously, local private investment grew by
54 percent, and total private investment was
63 percent over planned targets.
Turkey also has a remarkable record. We
and other Western nations are determined to
help Turkey meet its goal of self-sustaining
economic growth by 1973. She is already well
on her way. In 1966, her gross national prod-
uct grew by 8.3 percent, industry by 9.5 per-
cent, agricultural production by 11 percent,
and the use of fertilizer by 40 percent. The
percentage of children of school age enrolled
in primary schools increased to almost 80
percent.
If it cannot be demonstrated that hard
work, coupled with relatively modest amounts
of our aid, will produce better lives for the
countless millions of this region, our cause
will surely fail. The programs I propose will
enable us to continue meeting this challenge.
Africa
For Africa, I recommend a program of
$195 million.
Africa is undergoing the historic growing
pains of attaining stable independence; 35 of
her 39 nations have gained their freedom
since World War II, many in the past 5
years. The inevitable strains are evident in
the headlines of the world's newspapers.
The most hopeful sign of growing African
maturity is the increased support for co-
operative economic enterprises. With 14 coun-
tries of less than 5 million people each, this
attitude is essential for progress.
Our AID policy toward Africa will —
Encourage the African activities of the
World Bank and its affiliates.
Direct a greater part of our resources into
projects and programs which involve more
than one African country.
Seek new breakthroughs in private invest-
ment in Africa, particularly the current
MARCH 6, 1967
883
efforts by private American banks and other
financial institutions.
East Asia
For east Asia, I recommend a program of
$812 million.
Nearly 85 percent of our assistance to this
region is directly or indirectly related to our
effort to block Communist aggression.
My recent visit to Asia confirmed my deep
conviction that foreign assistance funds for
Vietnam and surrounding countries are just
as important as military appropriations.
They are vital to a successful war effort. They
permit us to build for the future.
Most of these funds — about $650 million —
will be used in Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.
The $550 million planned for Vietnam is in-
dispensable to military success, economic sta-
bility, and continued political progress. It
will stimulate and support measures to bind
the people and Government of South Viet-
nam together in a common cause. It will help
to begin the task of reconstruction and de-
velopment. It will relieve wartime suffering
for millions of Vietnamese.
In Laos and Thailand, these funds will
finance economic development and security
which will assure that armed conflict will not
engulf all of southeast Asia.
Our assistance to Thailand will be chan-
neled through a new consultative group of 13
donors, chaired by the World Bank. In Laos,
five other countries will join the United
States with significant contributions.
Elsewhere in free Asia, the tide of history
clearly favors progress:
In Korea, the economy is now growing at
the rapid annual rate of 8 percent. Indus-
trial production is rising at a 14-percent rate
annually, agricultural production at a 6-per-
cent rate. In the few short years since the
Korean war, the Republic of South Korea has
become strong enough not only to maintain
its internal advance, but to help in the de-
fense of freedom in Vietnam.
In Indonesia, the new Government has com-
mitted itself to a program of economic re-
habilitation and recovery. We are joining
with other European and Asian nations to
provide urgently needed help to the stricken i
Indonesian economy. We are also partici-
pating in arrangements with other nations to
reschedule Indonesian debts.
The road ahead in east Asia is long and
dangerous. But these accomplishments are
hopeful signs. We will encourage the vital
and progressive spirit that has stimulated
them.
Military Assistance
For military assistance, I recommend ap-
propriations of $596 million.
This is the smallest request since the pro-
gram began in 1950. In part, this fact re-
flects transfer of appropriations for military
assistance for Laos, Thailand, NATO infra-
structure and international military head-
quarters to the budget of the Department of
Defense.
But this request also represents a substan-
tial reduction. Military assistance outside
southeast Asia is now only 45 percent of what
it was in 1960.
For the Near East-south Asia, I recom-
mend $234 million, down 50 percent from
1963. Virtually all this will be used in Greece,
Turkey, and Iran, three countries which have
shared the burden of mutual security for 20
years.
For east Asia, I recommend $282 million,
almost entirely for Korea and Taiwan. We
will use these funds to strengthen these out-
posts against further Communist expansion
in Asia.
For Latin America, I recommend $45.5
million, largely for internal security and
training.
For Africa, I recommend $31 million,
heavily concentrated in countries where we
have major interests and where there are
problems of internal security.
It is not the policy of the United States to
provide sophisticated arms to countries which
could better use their resources for more pro-
ductive purposes.
It is the policy of the United States to
help —
384
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Where we are asked.
Where the threat of invasion or subversion
is real.
Where the proposal is militarily and eco-
nomically sound.
Where it is consistent with our interests
and our limited means.
This will continue to be our policy.
The Challenge Ahead
The programs I propose represent the
minimum contribution to mutual security and
international development which we can
safely make.
There are some who say that even this
request should be foregone in view of needs
at home and the costs of the struggle in
Vietnam.
Nothing could be more shortsighted and
self-defeating. This country — the wealthiest
in human history — can well afford to devote
less than seven-tenths of 1 percent of its
national income to reduce the chances of
future Vietnams.
Some would have us renege on our com-
mitments to the developing countries on the
ground that "charity begins at home."
To them, let me emphasize that I have
recommended no charity, nor have I sug-
gested that we stray from home. The ines-
capable lesson of our century, inscribed in
blood on a hundred beaches from Normandy
to Vietnam, is that our home is this planet
and our neighbors 3 billion strong.
Still others have grown weary of the long.
hard struggle to bring the majority of the
world's population out of the shadows of
poverty and ignorance.
To them, let me say that we are dealing in
decades with the residue of centuries. There
is no shortcut. There is no easy way around.
The only effective tools are ingenuity, capital,
and, above all, the will to succeed.
All of us sometimes find ourselves sympa-
thizing with these complaints. All of us are
subject to the frustrations, disappointments,
and shattered hopes which accompany a sup-
porting role in a task which must funda-
mentally be performed by others. But, in the
cold light of reason, our responsibility to our-
selves and our children reasserts itself and
we return to the task with renewed vigor.
I am confident that the American people
have not lost the will and the dedication
which have made them the most powerful
and responsible nation on earth.
I am confident that they will go forward
into the new era of world progress for which
their past efforts have prepared the way.
I am confident that their vision will tran-
scend the narrow horizons of those who
yearn for a simpler age.
The proposals I offer today are the prac-
tical requirements of that vision. To do less
would endanger all we have accomplished in
the past two decades.
I know that this test shall not find us
wanting.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, February 9, 1967.
MARCH 6, 1967
385
President Calls for Senate Ratification
of Treaty on Outer Space
Message From President Johnson to the Senate
White House press release dated February 7
To the Senate of the United States:
I am today transmitting to the Senate, for
your advice and consent, the first Treaty on
Outer Space.i
The provisions of this Treaty reflect the
will and desire of the signatory states,
already numbering more than half the
nations of the world, that the realms of space
should forever remain realms of peace.
The privilege of transmitting this mile-
stone agreement to you before the end of the
first decade of space exploration is especially
gratifying for me.
Only ten years ago, as a Senator, I chaired
the first Congressional hearings called to
determine what response our national policy
should make to the challenges of the explora-
tion of outer space. The hearings and the
events of those times seem now a world away
for us all. Yet I remember — and I know you
do— the climate of great awe and greater
anxiety in which Senators addressed them-
selves to their responsibilities. At that time:
— No American satellite had yet been
orbited.
— The readiness of our rockets was much
in question.
— There was no NASA [National Aero-
' S. Ex. D, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see Bul-
letin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.
nautics and Space Administration], no vast
complex at what is now Cape Kennedy, no
Manned Spaceflight Center at Houston. The
very word, "astronaut," was not in our
vocabulary.
— Men questioned the capacity of our edu-
cational system to yield up the incalculably
valuable resource of minds trained for the
great tasks of the space age.
— The stature of our advanced technology
and our ability to participate as leaders in the
explorations of the universe was far from
being established with certainty.
In that uncertain climate, our concerns
about space were quite different from now.
We were rightly concerned for the safety of
our nation and for the survival of human-
kind. We directed our concern to the orga-
nization of our society and to the priority of
our values as free men.
In November 1958, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower asked me to appear before the
United Nations to present the United States
resolution urging that the exploration of
outer space be undertaken for peaceful pur-
poses, as an enterprise of international
cooperation among all member nations.
On that occasion, speaking for the United
States, I said:
Today, outer space is free. It is unscarred by con-
flict. No nation holds a concession there. It must
remain this way. We of the United States do not
acknowledge that there are landlords of outer space
who can presume to bargain with the nations of
386
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
e Earth on the price of access to this domain.
e must not — and we need not — corrupt this great
opportunity by bringing to it the very antagonisms
hich we may, by courage, overcome and leave
t)ehind forever if we proceed with this joint adven-
nire into this new realm.
We know the gains of cooperation. We know the
losses of the failure to cooperate. If we fail now
to apply the lessons we have learned, or even if we
ielay their application, we know that the advances
into space may only mean adding a new dimension
to warfare. If, however, we proceed along the or-
derly course of full cooperation we shall, by the
very fact of cooperation, make the most substantial
contribution toward perfecting peace.
Men who have worked together to reach the stars
are not likely to descend together into the depths of
war and desolation.
I believe those words remain valid today.
The "very fact of cooperation" in the evo-
lution of this Treaty is to be taken as a
"substantial contribution toward perfecting
peace." As long ago as 1958, President Eisen-
hower initiated an exchange of letters with
the leadership of the Soviet Union, seeking
agreements binding the uses of outer space to
peaceful purposes. President Kennedy repeat-
edly reaffirmed our willingness to cooperate
toward these ends.
In October 1963, the General Assembly of
the United Nations called on nations of the
world not to station nuclear or other weapons
of mass destruction in outer space. Two
months later the Assembly adopted a Declara-
tion of Legal Principles to govern activities
in space. On May 7, last year, I repeated, and
Ambassador Goldberg reiterated many times
thereafter, our view of the urgency of doing
all that we could to assure that exploration of
outer space would take place in peace, for
peaceful ends.
In July 1966, negotiations on the Treaty
were formally begun at Geneva in the 28-
member United Nations Outer Space Com-
mittee. Accord was subsequently reached at
renewed negotiations in New York. The
Treaty was unanimously endorsed by the
Twenty-first Session of the General Assembly
just over a month ago.^
' For background, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
MARCH 6, 1967
On January 27, the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was
opened for signature in Washington, London
and Moscow. The United States, United King-
dom and Soviet Union were among the sixty
countries signing the Treaty in Washington.
Other nations are expected to add their signa-
tures in the near future.
The climate in which such accord has been
reached is clearly an encouraging omen for
continuing in other realms our constant quest
for understandings that will strengthen the
chances for peace.
II
In the diplomacy of space, as in the tech-
nology of space, it is essential always that
interim achievements not be mistaken for
final success. This Treaty I transmit to the
Senate today is such an interim achievement
— a significant, but not a final step forward.
It carries forward the thrust of the past
decade to enlarge the perimeters of peace by
shrinking the arenas of potential conflict.
This is a thi ust to which the Senate has given
its support by ratifying the four Geneva
Conventions on the Law of the Sea in 1958,
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Limited
Test Ban Treaty of 1963.
As we have dealt with the sea, the atmos-
phere and the vast unpopulated continent of
Antarctica, now in this Treaty we extend
reason to the activities of nations in the end-
less realm of outer space.
The Treaty lays down fundamental prin-
ciples:
— No nation can claim sovereignty to outer
space, to the moon or to other celestial bodies.
— All nations have the right to conduct
space activities.
— No one may use outer space or celestial
bodies to begin a war. The rules of the United
Nations Charter apply to space activities.
— No country may station in space or orbit
around the Earth nuclear or other weapons
of mass destruction.
387
— No country may install such weapons on
a celestial body.
— No nation may establish military bases,
installations or fortifications, on a celestial
body. Nor may any weapons be tested or mili-
tary maneuvers be conducted there. The right
to visit another country's installations and
space vehicles on a celestial body is guaran-
teed.
— Astronauts are "envoys of mankind." If
an astronaut lands on another country's soil,
he must be returned safely, promptly and
unconditionally.
— Space activities and their results are to
be reported for the benefit of all.
— Each country is to avoid harmfully con-
taminating outer space and adversely chang-
ing the environment of the Earth by intro-
ducing extra-terrestrial matter.
These and other provisions of the Treaty
are described in detail in the accompanying
report of the Secretary of State.^
Ill
Space exploration has become an intimate
part of our lives. The exploits of men and
machines in outer space excite and thrill us
all. The valiant young men who have become
symbolic of our national effort as Astronauts
are close to every American family. The
deaths in line of duty of Lieutenant Colonel
Virgil Grissom, Lieutenant Colonel Edward
White and Lieutenant Commander Roger
Chaffee touched every American home and
heart.
Yet, we must remember that these are only
primitive years in the epoch of space explora-
tion and utilization — an epoch that will run
to the end of time. In the next decade and in
all the decades to come, the capabilities of
nations in space will multiply far beyond our
comprehension today. If we should flag or
falter in our support of this great extension
of human knowledge, the concern and anxiety
' Not printed here.
we felt so keenly a decade ago would be
known again to other Americans in future
times.
When we ask what this nation or any na-
tion expects to find from exploration in space, ^'
the answer is one word: knowledge — knowl-
edge we shall need to maintain Earth as a
habitable environment for man.
The resources of this planet are already
taxed to support human existence. Now and
even more each day, as the family of man
increases so rapidly, fertile soil, clear water,
clean air and a safe atmosphere all become
more precious to men and nations than the
metals and jewels of ages past.
The quest for gold and silver, and dia-
monds and rubies, once led men to explore the
Earth seeking enrichment for themselves and
their nations. So now the realities of this and
future ages require that nations pursue
together the exploration of space within this
galaxy, seeking new knowledge and new
capabilities to enrich the life of all mankind.
The future leaves no option. Responsible
men must push forward in the exploration of
space, near and far. Their voyages must be
made in peace for purposes of peace on
earth. This Treaty is a step — a first step, but
a long step — toward assuring the peace es-
sential for the longer journey.
I strongly recommend — in appropriate
commemoration of the Senate's own role in
charting the course that the world now seems
willing to follow — that the Senate act
promptly in giving consent to the ratification
of this Treaty. I hope that I may be able to
afiirm as President of the United States, what
I said as a Senator to the United Nations in
1958:
"On the goal of dedicating outer space to
peaceful purposes for the benefit of all man-
kind, there are no differences within our gov-
ernment, between our parties or among our
people."
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, February 7, 1967.
388
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Israel Conclude
New Cotton Textile Agreement
Press release 20 dated February 3
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The text of a new 4-year bilateral cotton
textile agreement covering the exports of
Israel's cotton textiles to the United States
for the period October 1, 1966, through
September 30, 1970, which was signed on
January 27, 1967, in Washington, was made
public on February 2. This agreement re-
places the bilateral cotton textile agreement
effected by an exchange of notes on November
5, 1963, and November 22, 1963.i The new
agreement was effected by an exchange of
notes signed by Assistant Secretary for Eco-
nomic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon for the
U.S. Government and the Ambassador of
Israel, Avraham Harman, for the Govern-
ment of Israel.
The main features of the new agreement
are:
1. The aggregate limit for the first year
of the agreement is 23 million square yards
equivalent. This limit as well as other limits
in the agreement will be increased by 5 per-
cent for the second and subsequent years of
the agreement.
2. The group limit applicable for the first
agreement year for yarns (group I, cate-
gories 1-4) is 11.5 million square yards
equivalent; for fabrics and miscellaneous
(group II, categories 5-38 and 64), 7.5 mil-
lion square yards equivalent ; and for apparel
(group III, categories 39-63), 4 million
square yards equivalent.
3. Specific ceilings have been provided for
carded yarn, singles and plied; combed yarn.
singles; carded and combed sheeting; carded
and combed twills and sateens; carded and
combed woven fabrics in categories 26 and
27; raincoats; knit wearing apparel; and cate-
gory 64, miscellaneous.
4. Other provisions on flexibility, undue
concentration, spacing, exchange of statistics,
categories and conversion factors, consulta-
tion, administrative arrangements, equity,
termination, relationship to the Geneva
Long-Term Arrangement, and some special
provisions are also included.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE
January 27, 1967
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to recent
discussions held in Washington between representa-
tives of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Israel concerning
the cotton textiles agreement between our two Gov-
ernments effected by an exchange of notes signed
at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem November 5 and 22,
1963, an amendment to that agreement effected by
an exchange of notes signed at Washington June 30,
1966,'' and the Long Term Arrangements Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at
Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as the Long Term Arrangements). In accordance
with these discussions, the Government of the United
States of America understands that the agreement,
but not the amendment, which provides a one-time
allowance extending through December 31, 1966, is
replaced as of October 1, 1966 with the following
new agreement:
1. The term of this agreement shall be from
October 1, 1966 through September 30, 1970. Dur-
ing the term of this agreement the Government of
Israel shall limit annual exports of cotton textiles
from Israel to the United States to aggregate, group
and specific limits at the levels specified in the fol-
lowing parag^raphs.
2. For the first agreement year, constituting the
12-month period beginning October 1, 1966, the ag-
gregate limit shall be 23 million square yards equiv-
alent.
3. Within the aggregate limit, the following group
limits shall apply for the first agreement year:
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5491.
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 189.
MARCH 6, 1967
389
In Million
Square Yards
Equivalent
Group I Yarn (Categories 1-4) 11.5
Group II Fabric and Miscellaneous
(Categories 5-38 and 64) 7.5
Group III Apparel (Categories 39-63) 4
4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable
group limits, the following specific limits shall apply
for the first agreement year:
Group I Yam
Category 1/2
2,150,000
pounds (9,890,000 square
yards equivalent)
(of which exports
in Category 2
may not exceed
100,000 pounds)
(460,000 square
yards equiva-
lent).
Category 3
350,000
pounds (1,610,000 square
yards equiva-
lent).
Group II Fabrics and
Miscellaneous
Category 9/10
1 million square yards
Category 22/23
2
t H «
Category 26/27
2.5
( (t tl
(of which ex-
ports in duck
may not exceed
1.75 million
square yards)
Category 64
220,000
pounds (1,012,000 square
yards equiva-
lent).
In Square Yards
Equivalent
Group III Apparel
Category 48
30,098
dozens 1,504,900
Category 52
25,000
363,250
Category 53
10,000
453,000
Category 62
220,000
pounds 1,012,000
Category 63
100,000
pounds 460,000
5. Within the aggregate limit, the limits for
Groups I and II may be exceeded by not more than
10 percent, and the limit for Group III may be
exceeded by not more than 5 percent. Within the
applicable group limit, as it may be adjusted under
this provision, specific limits may be exceeded by
not more than 5 percent.
6. Within group limits for each group the square
yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring in ex-
ports in the categories given specific limits may be
used in any category not given a specific limit. In
the event the Government of Israel desires to per-
mit exports during any agreement year of more
390
than the level of the consultation limit in any cate-
gory not having a specific limit, the Government of
Israel shall request consultations with the Govern-
ment of the United States of America on this ques-
tion. For the first agreement year the level of the
consultation limit for Category 4 and for each cate-
gory in Group II not having a specific limit shall
be 500,000 square yards equivalent, and for each
category in Group III not having a specific limit
shall be 300,000 square yards equivalent. The Gov-
ernment of the United States of America shall enter
into such consultations and, during the course
thereof, shall provide the Government of Israel with
information on the condition of the United States
market in the category in question. Until agreement
is reached, the Government of Israel shall continue
to limit exports in that category for that agreement
year to the consultation limit.
7. The Government of Israel shall use its best
efforts to space exports from Israel to the United
States within each category evenly throughout the
agreement year, taking into consideration normal
seasonal factors.
8. Ir, the second and succeeding 12-month periods
for which any limitations are in force under this
agreement, the level of exports permitted under
such limitations shall be increased by 5 percent of
the corresponding levels for the preceding 12-month
period, the latter levels not to include any adjust-
ments under paragraph 5 above.
9. The two Governments recognize that the suc-
cessful implementation of this agreement depends
in large part upon mutual cooperation on statistical
questions. The Government of the United States of
America shall promptly supply the Government of
Israel vidth monthly data on the import of cotton
textiles from Israel. The Government of Israel shall
promptly supply the Government of the United
States of America with data on monthly exports of
cotton textiles to the United States. Each Govern-
ment agrees to supply promptly any other avail-
able relevant statistical data requested by the other
Government.
10. In the implementation of this agreement, the
system of categories and the rates of conversion
into square yard equivalents listed in Annex A
hereto shall apply. In any situation where the de-
termination of an article to be a cotton textile
would be affected by whether the criterion provided
for in Article 9 of the Long Term Arrangements
is used or the ciiterion provided for in paragraph
2 of Annex E of the Long Term Arrangements is
used, the criterion provided for in the latter shall
apply.
11. The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Israel agree to
consult on any question arising in the implementa-
tion of the agreement.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
;
12. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange-
.ents or adjustments may be made to resolve minor
oblems arising in the implementation of this
ment including differences in points of pro-
idures or operation.
13. If the Government of Israel considers that as
result of limitations specified in this agreement,
irael is being placed in an inequitable position vis-
■vis a third country, the Government of Israel may
jquest consultation with the Government of the
' nited States of America with the view to taking
■' ppropriate remedial action such as reasonable
'■ edification of this agreement.
" 14. During the t«rm of this agreement, the Gov-
rnment of the United States of America will not
jquest restraint on the export of cotton textiles
rom Israel to the United States under the provi-
ions of Article 3 of the Long Term Arrangements,
he applicability of the Long Tei-m Arrangements
) trade in cotton textiles between Israel and the
Tnited States shall otherwise be unaffected by this
jreement.
15. In view of the special circumstances that ex-
ited in 1966 the following special provisions apply:
(a) For the first agreement year only, exports
1 Categories 9/10, 22/23 and 26/27 up to 60 per-
jnt in excess of the specific limit for each such set
f these categories and the sublimit in duck:
(i) shall not be counted against the specific limits
pecified in paragraph 4 or the Group II limit speci-
ed in paragraph 3, but
(ii) shall be counted against the aggregate limit
pecified in paragraph 2.
'he figures stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 for group
nd specific limits shall be used without any adjust-
lents authorized under paragraph 5 for the pur-
ose of calculating the amount of these exports that
re not to be counted against specific and g^oup
mits.
(b) During each of the second, third and fourth
greement years, the two Governments will charge
gainst the specific, group and aggregate limits ap-
licable for each such year the following quantities
s compensation for overshipments during the 12-
lonth period beginning October 1, 1965:
ill
jl 'ategory
itl
pi 3
:2
6
duck)
2
TOTAL
2nd Srd Uh
Agreement Year Agreement Year Agreement Year
( In Square Yards Equivalent )
780,000
(169,565 lbs)
160,000
240,000
780,000
(169,565 lbs)
160,000
240,000
50,000
780,000
(169,565 lbs)
160,000
240,000
50,000
1,230,000
1,230,000
50,000
1,230,000
The figures in this paragraph (15b) shall, at the
request of the Government of the United States of
America, be adjusted by amendment of this agree-
ment if the December, 1966 statistics of the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America indicate
that these figures would not provide appropriate
compensation for these overshipments.
16. Either Government may terminate this agree-
ment, effective at the end of an agreement year, by
written notice to the other Government to be given
at least 90 days prior to the end of such agreement
year. Either Government may at any time propose
revisions in the terms of the agreement.
If these proposals are acceptable to your Gov-
ernment, this note and your Excellency's note of
acceptance on behalf of the Government of Israel '
shall constitute an agreement between our Govern-
ments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State:
Anthony M. Solomon
His Excellency
AVRAHAM HAKMAN
Ainbassador of Israel
ANNEX A
Cotton Textile Catexjories
Factors
AND Conversion
C(mver8ion
Factor
(Square
Category Description
Unit
Yards)
1
Yarn, carded, singles
Lb,
4.6
2
Yarn, carded, plied
Lb.
4.6
3
Yarn, combed, singles
Lb.
4.6
4
Yam, combed, plied
Lb.
4.6
5
Gingham, carded
Syd.
1.0
6
Gingham, combed
Syd.
1.0
7
Velveteen
Syd.
1.0
8
Corduroy
Syd.
1.0
9
Sheeting, carded
Syd.
1.0
10
Sheeting, combed
Syd.
1.0
11
Lawn, carded
Syd.
1.0
12
Lawn, combed
Syd.
1.0
13
Voile, carded
Syd.
1.0
14
Voile, combed
Syd.
1.0
15
Poplin and broadcloth,
carded
Syd.
1.0
16
Poplin and broadcloth,
combed
Syd.
1.0
17
Typewriter ribbon cloth
Syd.
1.0
18
Print cloth, shirting type,
80 X 80 type, carded
Syd,
1.0
' Not printed here.
S MARCH 6, 1967
391
Category
Description
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
Print cloth, shirting type,
other than 80 x 80
type, carded
Shirting, Jacquard or
dobby, carded
Shirting, Jacquard or
dobby, combed
Twill and sateen, carded
Twill and sateen, combed
Woven fabric, n.e.s., yam
dyed, carded
Woven fabric, n.e.s., yam
dyed, combed
Woven fabric, other,
carded
Woven fabric, other,
combed
Pillowcases, carded
Pillowcases, combed
Dish towels
Other towels
Handkerchiefs, whether
or not in the piece
Table damask and
manufactures
Sheets, carded
Sheets, combed
Bedspreads and quilts
Braided and woven
elastics
Fishing nets and fish
netting
Gloves and mittens
Hose and half hose
T-shirts, all white, knit,
men's and boys'
T-shirts, other, knit
Shirts, knit, other than
T-shirts and sweat-
shirts
Sweaters and cardigans
Shirts, dress, not knit,
men's and boys'
Shirts, sport, not knit,
men's and boys'
Shirts, work, not knit,
men's and boys'
Raincoats, % length or
longer, not knit
Other coats, not knit
Trousers, slacks and
shorts (outer) , not
knit, men's and boys'
Conversion
Factor
(Square
Unit Yards)
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
Syd.
No.
No.
No.
No.
Doz.
Lb.
No.
No.
No.
Lb.
Lb.
Doz. Prs.
Doz. Prs.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.084
1.084
.348
.348
1.66
3,17
6.2
6.2
6.9
4.6
4.6
3.527
4.6
7.234
7.234
7.234
36.8
22.186
24.457
22.186
50.0
32.5
17.797
Category
51
Description
Unit
Trousers, slacks and
shorts (outer) , not
knit, women's, girls'
and infants'
Blouses, not knit
Dresses (including uni-
forms) , not knit
Playsuits, washsuits,
sunsuits, creepers,
rompers, etc., not
knit, n.e.s.
Dressing gowns, includ-
ing bathrobes, beach
robes, lounge robes,
housecoats and dust-
ers, not knit
Undershirts, knit, men's
and boys'
Briefs and undershorts,
men's and boys'
Drawers, shorts and
briefs, knit, n.e.s.
All other underwear,
not knit
Pajamas and other
nightwear
Brassieres and other
body-supporting
garments
Wearing apparel, knit,
n.e.s.
Wearing apparel, not
knit, n.e.s.
All other cotton textiles
Apparel items exported in
under separate categories of
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Doz.
Conversion
Factor
(Square
Yards)
17.797
14.53
45.3
25.0
61.0
\
«
Doz.
9.2
Doz.
11.25
Doz.
5.0
Doz.
16.0
Doz.
51.96
Doz.
4.75
Lb.
4.6
Lb.
4.6
Lb. 4.6
sets shall be recorded
the component items.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
Measures relating to the furtherance of the principles
and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at
Santiago November 18, 1966, at the Fourth Con-,
sultative Meeting. Enters into force when approved
by all the Contracting Parties entitled to partici-
pate in meeting held to consider measures.
392
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
>ad Lines
ternational convention on load lines, 1966. Done at
London April 5, 1966.*
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, January
16, 1967.
aritime Matters
mvention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.'
Accessions deposited: Iceland and Nigeria, Janu-
ary 24, 1967.
ugar
otocol for the further prolongation of the Interna-
tional Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
I Done at London November 14, 1966. Open for sig-
nature at London November 14 to December 30,
1966, inclusive. Entered into force January 1,
1967."
Accession deposited: Guyana, January 1, 1967.
Mecommunications
itemational telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967."
Ratifications deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), De-
cember 21, 1966; Netherlands (including Sur-
inam and Netherlands Antilles), December 27,
1966; Switzerland, January 5, 1967; United
Kingdom (including Channel Islands and Isle of
Man), January 4, 1967.
rheat
rotocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I
and parts III to VII ; August 1, 1966, for part II.
Approval deposited : United Arab Republic, Febru-
ary 15, 1967.
BILATERAL
razil
Lgreement relating to the disposition of equipment
and materiel furnished under the military assist-
ance agreement of March 15, 1952 (TIAS 2776).
Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro
January 27, 1967. Entered into force January 27,
1967.
lominica
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Dominica. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Dominica December
16, 1966, and January 11, 1967. Entered into force
January 11, 1967.
Malta
Lgreement relating to investment guaranties. Signed
at Washington November 16, 1966.
Entered into force: January 26, 1967.
' Not in force.
* Not in force for the United States.
Morocco
Cultural agreement. Signed at Washington February
10, 1967. Entered into force February 10, 1967.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement for extending the validity of the agree-
inent of February 5, 1965, relating to fishing for
king crab, with exchange of notes. Signed at
Washington February 13, 1967. Entered into force
February 13, 1967.
Agreement on certain fishery problems in the north-
eastern part of the Pacific Ocean off the coast of
the United States of America, with exchange of
notes. Signed at Washington February 13, 1967.
Entered into force February 13, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
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Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
201t02. Address requests direct to the Superintend-
ent of Documents except in the case of free publi-
cations, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.
Viet-Nam in Brief. Pamphlet briefly summarizing
the basic facts about the war in Viet-Nam. Emphasis
is on our role in South Viet-Nam, our efforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement, and progress toward
economic and political objectives. Pub. 8173. Far
Eastern Series 153. 21 pp. 15«*.
Some Causes of Organizational Ineffectiveness With-
in the Department of State. Center for International
Systems Research (CISR) Occasional Papers Num-
ber 2. Dr. Chris Argyris, Yale University professor
of organizational behavior and noted author, sum-
marizes some of the major findings from three 1965
Airlie House management conferences attended by
senior Foreign Service officers. Using excerpts from
the conference tapes. Dr. Argyris analyzes the most
significant management problems developed by the
FSO's during the sessions. Some conclusions are
critical of certain "norms of the living system" of
the Foreign Service which the author states are also
characteristic of other large organizations. But the
author stresses that this "analysis focuses on the
State Department as a social system and not upon
the Foreign Service officers as individuals." Pub.
8180. 52 pp. 2h<t.
The Battle Act Report, 1966. Nineteenth report to
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act). Pub.
8175. General Foreign Policy Series 218. 101 pp. 35(J.
MARCH 6, 1967
393
Defense — Air Depot at Deols-La Martinerie. Agree-
ment with France — Signed at Paris February 27,
1951. Entered into force February 27, 1951. TIAS
6130. 8 pp. 10^.
Defense — Use of Certain Air Bases and Facilities in
Metropolitan France. Agreement with France —
SigTied at Paris October 4, 1952. Entered into force
October 4, 1952. TIAS 6131. 17 pp. 10^
Headquarters of the Deputy Commander, Allied
Forces in Europe. Agreement with France. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Paris June 17, 1953. Entered into
force June 17, 1953. TIAS 6134. 3 pp. 5^.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Ciyil Uses. Agree-
ment with Austria, amending the agreement of July
22, 1959— Signed at Washington June 11, 1965.
Entered into force November 16, 1966. TIAS 6136. 2
pp. 5^.
Extension of Loan of Vessel. Agreement with the
Philippines. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila
November 4, 1966. Entered into force November 4,
1966. TIAS 6137. 12 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India,
amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi
November 21, 1966. Entered into force November 21,
1966. TIAS 6146. 3 pp. 5^.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1445
PUBLICATION 8208
MARCH 6, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
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Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addressee made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
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and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international a^eements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
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Publications of the Department, United
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394
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX March 6, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U5
k
ongress
oreign Aid (President's message to Congress) 378
. New Course for Foreign Aid (Johnson) . . 381
'resident Calls for Senate Ratification of
Treaty on Outer Space (message to the
Senate) 386
)isarmament. Secretary Rusk Discusses Euro-
pean Affairs and Viet-Nam in Interview for
German Television 358
Beonomic Affairs. Secretary Rusk Discusses
European Affairs and Viet-Nam in Interview
for German Television 358
Burope. Secretary Rusk Discusses European
Affairs and Viet-Nam in Interview for Ger-
man Television 358
Foreign Aid
Foreign Aid (President's message to Congress)
A. New Course for Foreign Aid (Johnson) . .
Israel. U.S. and Israel Conclude New Cotton
Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . .
Military Affairs. Viet-Nam Hostilities Resumed
Following Tet Cease-Fire (Johnson) . . .
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk Discusses European Affairs and Viet-
Nam in Interview for German Television . .
Outer Space. President Calls for Senate Ratifi-
cation of Treaty on Outer Space (message
to the Senate)
Presidential Documents
Foreign Aid
A New Course for Foreign Aid
President Calls for Senate Ratification of
Treaty on Outer Space
Viet-Nam Hostilities Resumed Following Tet
Cease-Fire
Publications. Recent Releases 393
Science. President Calls for Senate Ratification
of Treaty on Outer Space (message to the
Senate) 386
Sierra Leone. Letters of Credence (Cole) . . . 377
Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The U.S. Position (back-
ground paper) 366
Treaty Information
Current Actions 392
378
381
389
365
358
386
378
381
386
365
President Calls for Senate Ratification of
Treaty on Outer Space (message to the
Senate) 386
U.S. and Israel Conclude New Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 389
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk Discusses European
Affairs and Viet-Nam in Interview for Ger-
man Television 353
United Kingdom. Southern Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The U.S. Position (back-
ground paper) 366
Unit«d Nations. Southern Rhodesia and the
United Nations: The U.S. Position (back-
ground paper) 366
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Discusses European Affairs and
Viet-Nam in Interview for German Television 358
Viet-Nam Hostilities Resumed Following Tet
Cease-Fire (Johnson) 365
Name Index
Cole, Christopher 0. E 377
Johnson, President 365, 378, 381, 386
Rusk, Secretary 358
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 13-19
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Release issued prior to February 13 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 20
of February 3.
No. Date Subject
*34 2/13 Amendment to schedule for visit
of Emperor Haile Selassie I.
135 2/14 Freeman: Latin American nu-
clear free zone treaty.
136 2/16 Kohler: Cincinnati Council on
World Affairs.
t37 2/18 U.S.-Romanian cultural exchange
program.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
liU.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/35
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The letter from the students, addressed to President Johnson on December 29, 1966, was
sponded to in a point-by-point reply by Secretary Rusk on January 4, 1967. In his reply,
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riding question for all mankind in this last third of the Twentieth Century — how to organize
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS
by Under Secretary Rostov) 398
CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
by Deputy Under Secretary Kohler 4-06
COMMUNIST CHINA
by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson A20
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF THE DEVELOPED NATIONS
Article by Zbigniew Brzezinski ^H
For index see inside back cover
The Politics of Progress
by Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
I am glad to be with you today to under-
take some reflections on my first few months
in this new round of my experience as a
bureaucrat.
The first and perhaps most revealing obser-
vation I can report is that I managed to get
here today. This is my fourth or fifth speak-
ing engagement since I went to Washington
in October. It is the first which has not been
canceled at the last moment by a trip abroad
or a pilgrimage to Capitol Hill.
In the second place, I can assure you that
Washington has not changed much, in atmos-
phere or in substance, since I worked there
as a humble writer of first drafts during the
war. The rule still obtains, generally speak-
ing, that no bureaucrat signs a paper he has
written or writes one he signs. There is still
a condition of — what should I call it? —
creative tension among the various depart-
ments of the executive branch and between
the executive branch and the Congress. And
I don't have to tell you that there is also still
a comparable tension, perhaps even more
creative, between the Government as a whole
and the fourth estate, whose skeptical, sus-
picious probing we find such a bracing
feature of bureaucratic life. While my faith
in Jefferson's dictum about the importance
of a free press to democracy is sometimes
challenged, I never waver. Perhaps, however.
' Address made before the Overseas Press Club at
New York, N.Y., on Feb. 20, as-delivered text; an
advance text was issued as press release 39.
my piety is a measure of the fact that I have
been on the job for only 4 months.
Our foreign policy, too, shows strong signs
of continuity.
The goal of our foreign policy has been
constant since the first days of the Republic:
to make American democracy safe, to assure
the freedom of our people in a society of
ample horizons. The needle of our compass
always points to this lodestar.
But successive governments have to reach
for this goal in a world which never stops
changing. The task of protecting our national
interests today hardly resembles the agenda
of foreign policy at any earlier period of our
history. The system of world politics is being
transformed by deep changes in the political
and social order and by the revolutionary
impact of science on the military arts. No
previous generation faced the imperative of
bringing unthinkably dangerous weapons
under international control. None before us
confronted the challenge we call development
aid — a challenge to human solidarity and to
the possibility of world peace.
In the aftermath of two World Wars many
empires have dissolved, leaving vulnerable
states behind.
Communist parties have seized power in
another third of the world, and in some cases
they still seek to spread their gospel by the
sword.
The rise of mainland China is in itself an
event to define a century. It imposes new per-
spectives on world politics and is leading to
398
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
far-reaching shifts in the relations of states.
The advanced countries of the free world
have made great gains since the war in every
branch of life. Their economies have never
been stronger, and they have all achieved
striking social progress. Our social revolution
is the outstanding achievement of the 20th
century and has advanced human welfare far
more effectively than any rival system.
In Europe and in Japan political life has
made comparable progress. The leading na-
tions of Europe, and Japan, have completed
the process of recovering from the war and
are now moving beyond the political shocks
of the period of decolonization. With these
experiences behind them, one should antici-
pate that they will shoulder an increasing
measure of responsibility for the stability and
welfare of the world community.
This was the essential theme of President
Johnson's speech last October on our relations
with Europe.2 In that speech he announced
a series of initiatives to modernize the
Atlantic alliance, the cornerstone of our
security. That alliance, he said, is a "living
organism" which should adapt itself to the
realities of today, not yesterday. "In every
part of the world," he continued, "new forces
are at the gates: new countries, new aspira-
tions, new men. In this spirit, let us look
ahead to the tasks that confront the Atlantic
nations."
These proposals rest on a history of suc-
cess. Since 1945 we and our allies have helped
to safeguard our freedom against aggression
in a long series of crises, stretching from Iran
and Greece to Berlin, Korea, and Viet-Nam.
In that process we have forged habits of
cooperation and mutual aid, which are and
should be the firm foundation for the world's
hope of stability and progress.
In the last third of the 20th century, more
than in any other age, the key to effective
action is joint action, both in keeping the
peace and in helping to assure world economic
development. No state, however powerful,
can meet the needs of the day alone. Our duty.
' Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
and that of the other advanced countries,
arises for the simplest of reasons: Without
us, the task could not be carried out. Our
wealth and experience are indispensable to
the chance of success. As President Truman
said, "The buck stops here."
"Fission and Fusion" in World Politics
To borrow words from another discipline,
the process of world politics as seen from the
State Department looks like a race between
fission and fusion. Strong forces propel some
countries to adopt destructive and self-
defeating policies which tend to fragment the
world community and threaten the equi-
librium of peace. Other forces work in the
direction of harmony. We are drawn together
by our interests, by our common values, by
man's general preference for living within
his tribe and according to its rules. And we
are driven apart by pride and suspicions and
failure of communication as well — the great-
est influence in human affairs and the one
whose very existence we tend to deny or
forget.
It would be idle to profess a false optimism
about the outcome of the race.
The best harbinger of peace is that the
Soviet Union — we can hope — has come
gradually to accept the indispensable prin-
ciple of the Truman doctrine: that unilateral
change by force in the frontiers of the two
systems is too dangerous to be tolerated. That
principle, which we can hope other Commu-
nist countries, too, will come to accept, is the
best possible basis on which we could work
for detente, and then for coexistence, on this
small planet we all must share.
As the ordeal of Viet-Nam attests, it is not
a simple matter to maintain this basic rule of
the Truman doctrine, without which order in
the world is inconceivable. Yet we must per-
severe, for the alternative is a chaotic disin-
tegration of the political system, from which
general war could easily come.
Let me mention another aspect of world
politics which works in the direction both of
fission and of fusion: the problem of the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. As you know.
MARCH 13, 1967
399
we are seeking agreement on this subject
with the Soviet Union and with other nations,
an agreement which should help to remove an
intolerable threat from the future of man.
The issue presents genuinely difficult choices
for many of the nonnuclear states. If they
move away from the promise of the agree-
ment, the world could become appreciably
more dangerous and more dangerously
divided. If the treaty were to be negotiated
without full respect for the legitimate con-
cerns of the nonnuclear states, the damage to
the fabric of world politics could be irrepa-
rable.
But if we recognize the real political prob-
lems the issue presents — problems of achiev-
ing agreement on the basis of a recognition
of the shared interests of all nations, nuclear
and nonnuclear alike — the effort could be-
come one of the powerful factors binding the
world together in collaborative enterprises of
great promise.
The political consequences of the effort to
bring nuclear weapons under control depend
on the spirit in which it is approached. No
task is more fundamental to the prospect of
peace than the control of nuclear weapons.
That proposition, which all nations can ac-
cept, could lead us toward solutions which
should unite the free world and, we can hope,
not only the free world but the whole world
in a new set of relationships — relationships
of cooperation and dignity so close, and so
fundamental to all aspects of national life,
as to make fission virtually impossible.
This is the purpose of President Johnson
in undertaking this fateful series of negotia-
tions: "to banish all nuclear weapons — and
war itself." ^
I want to concentrate today, however, on
another aspect of our work: the politics of
progress in the developing world.
A generation ago, development assistance
was not part of the job of our State Depart-
ment or of other Foreign Offices. With the
end of empire, however, and the acceptance
everywhere of the liberating principle of
'Ibid.
400
equality, the world defined a revolutionary*
new idea: that the governments of the de-
veloped countries had an obligation to help
the new countries master the secrets of mod-
ern wealth. The obligation was explained on~^
many grounds — on considerations of pru-
dence, of order, and of self-interest. In the
end, however, as Secretary Acheson once
said, we undertake this task for a much
simpler reason: Because we have to shave
every morning.
Lessons of Development Assistance
We have come a long way since President
Truman — 18 years ago — asked Americans to
help build a better way of life for those mil-
lions overseas who live in poverty, ignorance,
sickness, and despair. Our response to the
challenge was immediate, but we were sur-
prised at the meagerness of results. Few
then realized just how vast the difference
was between what we then called Point 4
and the task of European recovery, which
was largely completed within 5 years. In most
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America the job
is still not done — far from it. But through 18
years of experience and experiment, the
world has learned many lessons about the
process of development, lessons which will
stand us in good stead in the years ahead.
Indeed, I venture to guess that if we succeed
in maintaining peace in the world, the prob-
lem of food, education, and growth for two-
thirds of humanity will hold the world's cen-
ter stage for the second postwar generation
just as the cold war held center stage for
the first.
First, we have learned just how hard the
challenge is. It is one thing to be faced, as we
were under the Marshall Plan, with a prob-
lem of recovery involving 16 nations and 260
million people and quite another to confront
the task of helping over 70 countries and l^/o
billion people start on the road of economic
and social progress.
We learned, too, that it was one task to
encourage the revival and reconstruction of
developed countries which had a solid human
and technical foundation for flourishing and
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
dvanced industrial life — and quite another
« assist fundamental development in coun-
tries without a middle class, without entre-
jreneurs, and without the experience of mod-
ern economic life, with an illiteracy rate of
rO percent or more and a per capita income
)f $100 or less.
Second, we have learned that — despite the
iifficulty of the task — our purposes today
nust remain what they were in 1949 when
'resident Truman proposed Point 4. As
'resident Kennedy put it 6 years ago,^ we
nust pledge "to those people in the huts and
/illages of half the globe struggling to break
;he bonds of mass misery . . . our best efforts
to help them help themselves, for whatever
period is required — not because the Commu-
nists may be doing it, not because we seek
their votes, but because it is right."
Third, we have learned that for all our
seal and energy, our role in the process of
development is a secondary one. The chief
responsibility for development rests on the
developing nations themselves. Unless they
adopt realistic policies and programs capable
af encouraging growth, no amount of outside
i! assistance can impose modernity upon them.
Only their will and their acceptance of
11 reality can transform their static, rural
societies into modern ones.
Finally, we have learned that, though the
>ltask is difficult, it is far from hopeless. Com-
>|mendable records of growth have been
attained in certain less developed countries,
including Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan,
and Venezuela. Others, such as Pakistan,
South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey, are
approaching that objective.
Our aid program has been transformed in
the light of experience. The President's
recent messages on the subject ^ squarely
face the basic problems which have emerged
in the course of these years of trial and error.
They stress the stark primacy of the problem
of hunger and the international character of
the task of development. They state over and
over again that these problems transcend
ideology: They concern the human family as
a whole.
MARCH 13, 1967
Development, he has said, is too large a
problem for governments alone. Success
requires a mobilization of all available ener-
gies, those of business, of education, of
foundations, of cooperatives, of voluntary
agencies and other private groups.
Above all, he has urged, development
requires concentration on those tasks which
are fundamental. In the coming fiscal year,
we plan to use over a billion dollars of de-
velopment assistance funds for programs in
the fields of agriculture, health, and educa-
tion, programs that underscore our decision
to help other nations build up — first and fore-
most— their human resources.
I do not suggest that because we have
refined our aid techniques, we can indulge in
self-congratulation. For all the aid efforts of
the United States, Western Europe, and
Japan over the last 20 years, the prosperous
few are still islands of affluence in a sea of
appalling poverty. The disparity between rich
and poor continues to grow. Our growth in
national income in 1 year is greater than the
whole national income of India, which must
support a population of almost 500 million
people.
Pressures of the Population Explosion
The world food crisis presents even more
somber perspectives. "Next to the pursuit of
peace," President Johnson said in his state
of the Union message,* the "greatest chal-
lenge to the human family is the race between
food supply and population increase. That
race tonight is being lost."
Is this an overstatement? Consider these
facts:
The developing countries, despite the fact
that they have 60 to 80 percent of their work-
ing force in agriculture, are losing the ability
to feed themselves. These nations, which
■* For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see
ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
"■Ibid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295, and Mar. 6, 1967,
p. 378.
« /hid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
401
until World War II were exporters of grain,
this year will import over 30 million tons of
grain from the industrialized world. Indeed,
for the past 6 years, the world has consumed
more grain than it produced, filling the gap
largely with stored surpluses from North
America.
Now these surpluses are gone, and the
United States has taken the step of putting
half our unused acreage back into production
to help meet world food needs, needs which
are increasing at the rate of 4 percent a year.
But our unused capacity is limited, and so is
that of the other great grain-producing coun-
tries. Our best estimate is that the available
land resources of the world give us about a
decade to bring the equation between food
and people into balance. After that date, there
will be no inexhaustible reservoirs of food
grains for the hungry of the world.
On the demand side, population growth in
the developing countries, as a result of
sharply reduced death rates and increased
birth rates, has been nothing short of spec-
tacular, frequently exceeding 3 percent a
year, or treble that of the industrialized
countries. At this rate, by 1980 there will be
more than another billion people in the world
to feed, most of them in the food-short coun-
tries of the world. Based on these trends, the
FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization]
estimates that cereals deficits in these coun-
tries would total around 42 million tons by
1975, a deficit greater than the current entire
U.S. wheat crop. At that rate the deficit could
exceed 80 million tons by 1985, or greater
than total U.S. capacity, even if all con-
ceivable acreage were brought back into pro-
duction and technological improvement
continued at its present rate.
Even now, estimates are that 10,000
people, mostly children, die every day from
malnutrition. If the gap continues to grow,
what will this figure be in 1975 or 1985?
Humanitarian considerations aside, how can
we hope for stability or progress in a world
where a few must practice diet control while
the many live in misery and starvation ?
402
The facts before us project the same dis-
turbing future in education.
If the people of the developing world are
to participate effectively in their country's
economic development and government, there ^
must be a dramatic expansion in basic gen-
eral education. At present, literacy is more
the exception than the rule — only 25 percent
in the Near East and South Asia, where more
than half the world's people live, and only 60
percent in Latin America and the Far East.
Still more distressing, the pressures of the
population explosion are making matters
worse. Recent United Nations statistics indi-
cate that illiteracy in the developing countries
appears to have grown by some 200 million
people in the past 6 years. It is estimated, for
example, that there are more illiterates in
certain Latin American countries today than
their total population in 1940. And in India,
132 million young people are not receiving
any formal education at all. The construction
of new schools and the training of more
teachers in many countries is proceeding at
a vigorous rate but not enough to keep pace
with population growth. If population growth
is not slowed, there would seem to be little
chance of overcoming illiteracy.
It is such facts as these that make it clear
that effective family planning programs can-
not be put off if developing nations are to
avert disastrous famines and to sustain rates
of economic growth sufficient to forestall
widespread social unrest and political up-
heavals. These programs are certainly not
substitutes for economic assistance, and we
have no intention of suggesting that they
should be. But in the long run they are a
necessity if programs for economic develop-
ment are to have a meaningful impact.
I have emphasized population policy
because it deeply affects the future of whole
nations and of the world. But when we speak
of "population programs" and "family plan-
ning programs" we must never lose sight of
two facts. First, we are talking about matters
which are for the decision of individual coun-
tries and individual families. Second, we are
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
thinking of the health and welfare of many
flesh-and-blood mothers and fathers, of their
children, and of the strength of their family
life. Our concern is not that the developing
countries should adopt special measures of
population control but only that they should
provide their people with choices comparable
to those which exist in our own country and
other advanced nations.
Multilateral Aid Programs
A fresh start — a great leap forward in
these vast projects — will be one of the main
tasks of the second postwar generation: to
develop the strategies and tactics for the war
against hunger, illiteracy, and disease; and
to develop the international will and the
international machinery essential to wage
and win these great battles.
For we know today that no country, how-
ever powerful, can win these battles alone.
This is the principle underlying the empha-
sis on multilateralism in our aid programs.
In fiscal 1968 over 85 percent of U.S. develop-
ment lending will flow through a multilateral
framework — through the World Bank and
its affiliates and consortia and through the
regional development banks. In this way, we
hope to promote the continued cooperation of
other aid donors to insure an equitable shar-
ing of the development burden. This is not to
say that other advanced countries are not
accepting their equitable part of the task.
This may have been true in the early postwar
years. It is not true today.
Economic assistance from other developed
countries has doubled in the last 9 years. By
comparison with other nations, the United
States does not provide a larger amount of
foreign assistance in relation to its economic
strength and capacity. As a whole, other aid-
giving nations of the free world spend a per-
centage of national income not much smaller
than the United States — even though their
average per capita income is far less than
ours. Indeed, some of them — the United
Kingdom, France, and Australia — spend as
much or more.
Our objectives reach beyond the measure-
ment of equity. There is, after all, little point
in apportioning among nations fair shares of
an effort that is itself inadequate or irrele-
vant. We are searching for ways to systema-
tize and coordinate international efforts and
to enlarge them, while we still have a margin
of time. Why? First, to increase the effective-
ness of our collective contributions — and to
share plans and problems; second, to insure
that aid efforts, both ours and others', are
not permitted to flag — for if that happens,
defeat is inescapable.
Collective Responsibility and Action
We are seeking to develop the habits of
collective responsibility and collective action.
We seek the development of peaceful coali-
tions for specific tasks and in specific regions,
each with objectives which transcend simple
nationalism and ideology. In this task, we
invite and welcome the cooperation of the
Soviet Union and other advanced Communist
countries in a labor of fraternity that should
acknowledge no boundaries.
These international efforts take a variety
of forms.
In the war on hunger, for example, Presi-
dent Johnson, in support of India's efforts to
feed its population in the face of severe
drought, has taken a new initiative to make
food aid an international responsibility
managed through the World Bank India Aid
Consortium.
To form the basis for a long-range
approach to the world food problem, the
United States is proposing in the Kennedy
Round negotiations an international grains
agreement containing a multilateral food aid
program to be supported by grain exporters
and importers alike.
And to facilitate the flow of fertilizer and
other agricultural inputs so essential to
increasing production in the developing
world, the United States has urged the estab-
lishment of a food fund supported by OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] members and designed to
MARCH 13, 1967
403
encourage private investors in OECD coun-
tries to invest in agriculture and agriculture-
related industries in the developing world.
George Woods, the President of the World
Bank, has estimated that the developing
world has foreign exchange shortages of $3
billion to $4 billion each year. Exchange
shortages are about $1 billion in Latin Amer-
ica alone. Foreign exchange shortages in
India threaten to disrupt the trade and in-
vestment liberalization programs which are
essential to India's progress. And meanwhile,
the debt problems of the developing countries
continue to grow. The outstanding public
debt of the developing countries rose from
$10 billion in 1955 to at least $36 billion by
1965.
To dampen this accelerating growth in
debt over the long run, the volume of aid
must be increased and the terms of lending
improved. In the short run the many impend-
ing debt crises must be forestalled. Here
again, this requires collective action by the
creditor nations. Such action is already
underway with respect to Indonesia and
Ghana and is likely for several others.
Forums for effective collective action are
already well developed in the trade field. We
are approaching the end of the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations now taking place
in Geneva, the most extensive and elaborate
multilateral trade negotiations ever under-
taken. We shall know in the next few weeks
whether our efforts will yield significant
results.
But in any case, the Kennedy Round is not
the end of the road for the liberalization of
world trade. Indeed, our Government is
already looking beyond the Kennedy Round,
devoting special attention to the trade prob-
lems of the developing world. As the barriers
to trade have been lowered, world trade has
soared. But the trade of the developing coun-
tries has not kept pace with their rising im-
port needs. After the Kennedy Round is over,
the great challenge will be to find ways to
expand exports of developing countries so
that they can finance more imports and
achieve the economic growth they need to pro-
vide their citizens with decent living stand-
ards. Whatever the policies adopted to meet
these needs, these policies can be deemed suc-
cessful only if they are fully accepted and
implemented by the major trading nations of
the world.
Contributions of the Private Sector
Up to now, I have spoken of the collective
tasks which confront governments. I should
be remiss if I failed to take note of the con-
tribution of the private sector of the
developed world as well as from emerging
private institutions within the developing
world itself.
The task of development is not a task for
governments alone. The capital gap itself is
somewhere between $5 billion and $20 billion
annually; and the great bulk of the knowl-
edge, managerial experience, and capital
required for development rests with our busi-
ness and professional communities. The
international companies, large and small,
which do business in the countries of the de-
veloping world are among the most important
agents of economic progress. Success in
development depends in substantial measure
upon our ability to mobilize these resources
and talents. This is the lesson we have
learned from the history of our own develop-
ment, and it is also the experience of the de-
veloping world. Those developing countries
which have experienced the most rapid
growth and the most broadly based progress
have been countries where national and
international private enterprise, encouraged
by public policy and investment, has
flourished.
Perhaps the greatest contribution private
enterprise can make lies in the realm of agri-
culture. Most of the increase in world food
needs for the foreseeable future must be met
by increasing agricultural production in the
developing countries. This will require mas-
sive inputs of capital and technology — inputs
404
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which are not presently available within
these countries, but which exist in the great
agribusiness complexes of North America,
Western Europe, and Japan. The problem is
how to transfer these resources to the areas
where they are needed, and in time. Develop-
ments that took decades must occur in these
countries within a few years if mass starva-
tion is to be avoided.
One of the great tests of the politics of
progress for the next few years will be the
ability of governments and business firms,
both within and without the developing
world, to find the policies to bridge the gap
which presently exists in agricultural busi-
ness investment between risk and reward.
This may well require the development of new
kinds of consortium arrangements, both
private and public, working together in
totally new and imaginative ways toward a
common objective. It will require govern-
mental policies and programs to make risk-
taking more attractive, within the agreed
rules of a new legal system for the conduct
of international business. This is a new fron-
tier in government-business relationships.
Still another frontier is being created by
the great advances recently made in educa-
tional technology. The potential market for
such technology in the developing world is
beyond measure, and the uses of teaching
machines and educational TV for accelerated
learning appear unlimited.
I have touched today on a few of the major
problems and opportunities of the politics of
progress. Peaceful coalitions such as I have
described, among governments and between
governments and businesses, will in my judg-
ment be a dominant characteristic of the next
decade. For every region and in every per-
spective, these problems require close coop-
eration between the advanced countries and
the developing countries, between Europe,
the United States, and Japan — and hopefully,
the Soviet Union and other advanced Com-
munist countries as well — on one side and the
developing countries on the other.
We live in a world which no longer knows
regional problems. The unity of the world is
a fact^in peacekeeping, in development aid,
in trade, in education. The only question is
whether man has wit enough to accept this
fact as the major premise of his policy.
Great common adventures like this should
confirm a greater sense of our collective re-
sponsibility for humanity's future — a height-
ened appreciation of "fraternity," that
neglected aspect of the great revolutionary
slogan of the 18th century. Such an apprecia-
tion of fraternity, of international partner-
ship, and of common humanity, is indispens-
able to the success of the politics of progress.
MARCH 13, 1967
405
Constructive Initiatives in East-West Relations
by Foy D. Kofiler
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
Thank you for your friendly welcome to
Cincinnati. I am glad to be with you this
evening. As a Buckeye born and educated,
I feel very much at home and among
friends. More than that, I might say it is
high time for me to come back here, because
my last visit was over 35 years ago. In July
of 1931 I came down from Columbus for a
few days to take the written examinations
to enter the American Foreign Service. I
suppose the 15 young hopefuls scribbling
away that summer in the hot, stuffy attic of
your old Post Office Building were about the
only persons in the city who were then par-
ticularly concerned with the foreign rela-
tions of the United States.
It is impressive to come back 35 years
later and find this large group, brought
together by a vigorous organization concen-
trating on foreign affairs, meeting to devote
a full day to international concerns. Perhaps
those of you who have continued to live here
at home are hardly conscious of the extent
of the changes which have taken place in
your lives and attitudes as the United States
moved from isolationism to world power.
But as I have returned to my native State
from time to time, I have invariably been
reassured to find that my fellow Ohioans
have kept up with the times and with the
changes — that you have sought to under-
stand the increasing complexities of today's
world and are prepared to face up to the
tremendous responsibilities which have fall-
' Address made before the Cincinnati Council on
World Affairs at Cincinnati, Ohio, on Feb. 17 (press
release 36 dated Feb. 16).
en upon the United States in that complex
world.
This growth in interest and understand-
ing is fundamental. Professional diplomats
sometimes wish they could conduct their
business in the good old Machiavellian way,
out of the glare of publicity and free from
public pressures. This would have some
advantages, it is true — advantages which
some of our opponents enjoy. However, in
our democracy there can be no foreign
policy which is not understood and sup-
ported by the people at large, particularly as
reflected by their elected representatives in
Washington. We thoroughly understand
this; and despite occasional abuse of our
American freedoms by extremists or self-
serving interests, we would not have it
otherwise. Indeed, we must all realize that
the easy way to lose the contests between
open and closed societies is to remake our-
selves in the image of our opponents. So it
is a privilege as well as a pleasure for me to
be with this representative and responsible
group of my fellow citizens tonight and to
have an opportunity to talk with you about
a subject which is vital to us all, East-West
relations.
In one way or another, this question of
our relations with the Communist countries
has preoccupied me during much of the 35
years since I left Ohio; and, as our chair-
man has pointed out, my service abroad has
involved two periods of residence in the
Soviet Union- — 21/4 years just after the war
as Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in
Moscow and the last 41/2 years as Ambas-
sador.
406
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
The longer I liave been associated with
the Soviet Union, the more I have been
impressed by the increasing complexities of
its society and the many facets of its life.
This is a country of great contradictions:
contradictions between the old and the new,
differences between what the Soviets say
and what they really believe, contrasts
between the accomplishments of advanced
technology and the poverty of everyday life.
I would like to discuss some of these contra-
dictions with you in a little more detail.
Contrasts in Soviet System
On the one hand, we are told by the
Soviet leaders that theirs is a modern soci-
ety based on a new and revolutionary
ideology. Elaborate plans have already been
announced to celebrate the 50th anniversary
of the Soviet Revolution. But anyone who
has lived in the Soviet Union quickly be-
comes aware that so much of what is said
and done, so many of the attitudes people
have can be traced back to the myths and
the traditions and the experiences of their
long and turbulent history. Let me take just
one example: The profound antipathy which
a Russian feels toward the Chinese does not
arise from a differing interpretation of
Communist ideology or from the struggle
for power and influence between the two
countries within the Communist world.
Rather, it is an ingrained prejudice which
goes back to the Mongol-Tatar invasions
seven centuries ago and Tatar occupation
and despoliation of the Russian lands for
the next three centuries.
Another contrast is striking. Soviet sci-
ence and technology at its best is on a level
with the most advanced in the world. Soviet
accomplishments in space bear witness to
this fact. Yet the average Russian lives
without the benefit of most of the applied
technology which is so readily available to
Americans and to West Europeans, ranging
from superhighways to nylon stockings. The
mechanization and automation of so much
of our working and leisure life is largely
absent in the Soviet Union. One cannot help
being struck by the remarkable contrast of
a society which produces better cosmonauts
than mechanics, more sophisticated elec-
tronics than plumbing, better sputniks than
cars.
You have all heard the boast that there
is no unemployment in the Soviet Union,
and in a technical sense that is not far
wrong. There are few persons who do not
have some gainful occupation. This is ac-
complished in a command economy by
simply assigning to industrial and agricul-
tural enterprises quotas of workers and fixed
wage funds. The observable result is that
instead of a few percent of unemployment
they have many times that much under-
employment. Moreover, the economy is
forced to operate in a strait jacket. Much of
the debate about economic reform you read
about in the Soviet Union today reflects a
realization that their economy must be
released from such strait jackets if it is to
operate efficiently and effectively.
Communist ideology still provides the
basic guidelines for Soviet leadership. It
forms the intellectual rationale for the polit-
ical and economic system. Official Soviet
spokesmen go to great pains to justify their
actions in terms of Communist dogma, and
castigate their enemies for failing to con-
foiTn to its teachings. Yet the very fact that
Stalin and Khrushchev, the leaders who
dominated and personified that system for
more than 40 of its 50 years of existence,
have been rejected and discredited is a good
measure of the decline of the basic ideology.
It is no longer an effective instrument of
political power and clearly has little to do
with the daily life of the people. On the
basis of my personal experience, I believe
the East Europeans and Russians are in
some respects even less ideologically oriented
than their West European brothers. I
remember talking not long ago to an East
European Communist professor, whom I
asked, "Why did your ideology die so
quickly?" To which he responded, "Die so
quickly? I think it took too long to die!"
His attitude is symptomatic of many others
who, disillusioned by Stalinism, embittered
by persistent economic and social failures
MARCH 13, 1967
407
of the system, are turning to more prag-
matic solutions.
In this situation, the revolution of rising
expectations which has already affected so
much of the world has penetrated the Soviet
Union and is producing profound effects.
The Russians are becoming increasingly
aware of the way we live in the West and
the benefits which are available to us. They
are demanding some of the same things for
themselves and are building up irresistible
pressures on their rulers.
Any progress in satisfying this demand,
however, is going to require some very
tough decisions. There is a simple mathe-
matical formula involved here. The gross
national product of the Soviet Union was
about $330 billion last year; on a compa-
rable basis, less than half that of the United
States, which was about $740 billion. With
such a relatively small economic base, the
Soviet Union still tries to rival us in space
and military programs. The fact that the
new Soviet leadership is nearly 2 years late
producing the 5-year plan it promised bears
testimony to the difficulty it is having mak-
ing the necessary decisions on allocations of
resources among guns, butter, and sputniks.
Fragmentation in the Communist World
I would like to make one final observation
about my experience in the Communist
world. When I first went to Moscow in 1947,
it was the headquarters of world com-
munism, dominating the entire world move-
ment. Today we can no longer talk of a
Sino-Soviet bloc. Indeed, we cannot properly
refer to a Soviet bloc. The Communist world
has ceased to be a monolithic entity. Every
day brings new evidence of increasingly
independent actions by governments which
once were completely subservient to Mos-
cow. Doctrinal communism has proved no
match for the powerful forces of national
aspirations in our century. The most recent
manifestation of this has been, of course,
the Soviet-Chinese dispute. But the first
crack in the machinery appeared in 1948
with the Soviet- Yugoslav split. Since then
Yugoslavia has continued to go its own
independent way and is experimenting with
changes in its economic and political system
that are of importance for the Communist
world as a whole. It has made significant
moves toward the market economy and is to-
day debating the role the Communist party
should play in its political life, how much
dissent should be permitted, and what forms
of liberty should be introduced into a sys-
tem that was once completely totalitarian.
Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary
challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the
Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed,
Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its
government has not broken with the Soviet
Union; we should have no illusions about
that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of
Polish life are free of Communist control.
More than 80 percent of Polish farmland is
privately owned and cultivated. Collectiviza-
tion has been abandoned altogether. A
measure of freedom of expression is toler-
ated. Extensive contacts with the West have
been developed. Hundreds of young Poles
are studying in Western institutions, many
of them in the United States.
In the last few years, the process of frag-
mentation in the Communist world has been
accentuated by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
preoccupation of Moscow and Peking with
their increasingly bitter struggle has given
the smaller Communist powers and parties
the opportunity to go their own ways, free
from the constrictions of an agreed doctrine
or the domination of a central authority.
With this background of a many-faceted,
contrasting society whose people are demand-
ing more goods for themselves and whose
world is increasingly being dominated by na-
tional considerations, we must ask ourselves
what policies seem best designed to achieve
United States objectives? What policies will
aid in creating the kind of world we want to
live in: a world of cooperative communities in
which ideological divisions no longer create
fundamental gulfs between men and socie-
ties, a world in which violence giVes way to
the rule of law, a world in which poverty and
suffering are overcome by worldwide efforts
to improve the well-being of man?
408
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I have had the ]irivilege of working on
these questions with several administrations,
particularly with President Eisenhower, with
President Kennedy, and with President John-
son. This succession of Presidents, of diifer-
ing political persuasion, have all reached
essentially the same conclusions regarding
our relations with the Soviet Union and the
Communist world. Each of them, looking at
the problem from the point of view of the
national interest, of the well-being and
security of all Americans, came to hold essen-
tially the same views. The policies which have
issued from their profound consideration of
how to insure a peaceful world have been set
forth by all of them, most recently, of course,
by President Johnson.
Speaking last August at the National Reac-
tor Testing Site for the Atomic Energy Com-
mission at Idaho Falls, the President, after
hailing the peaceful potential of atomic
power, said: ^
But there is another — and a darker — side of the
nuclear age that we should never forget. That is
the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons.
. . . uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear
crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation
in which the world is capable of extinction in a
moment of error, or madness, or anger. . . .
Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts
to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We
did so because our convictions and our interests de-
manded it; and we shall continue to do so.
But we have never sought war or the destruction
of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought in-
stead to increase our knowledge and our under-
standing of the Russian people, with whom we share
a common feeling for life, a love of song and story,
and a sense of the land's vast promises.
After talking of our diffei-ences with the
Soviet Union the President posed the ques-
tion as to what practical step could be taken
forward toward peace. He answered himself:
I think it is to recognize that while differing prin-
ciples and differing values may always divide us,
they should not, and they must not, deter us from
rational acts of common endeavor. . . .
This does not mean that we have to become bed-
fellows. It does not mean that we have to cease
competition. But it does mean that we must both
want — and work for and long for — that day when
"nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more."
Since 1945, the conflict between the two
systems has sometimes taken the form of
trials of strength and periods of military con-
flict; more often, it has been conducted by less
violent methods. That confrontation, in
broader terms, has its "defensive" and
"offensive" aspects, to use military terms. I
propose to speak to you tonight about both
aspects.
Force Not a Solution
On the "defensive" side we have reacted
to a series of threats of force on the part of
the Communists. Time and time again during
the course of the last 20 years, the United
States has had to confront Communist vio-
lence. Each time we have resolutely met this
challenge by bold actions which left no doubt
that we were willing to fight if necessary to
oppose Communist expansion by force of
arms; first in Iran, then in Greece, Berlin,
Malaya, the Philippines, Korea, Cuba, and,
of course, most recently in Viet-Nam. We
firmly believe that in the nuclear age no
power has the right to impose its ideas or its
system on others by the use of arms. This is
a fundamental lesson which all nations must
learn to live by. We have striven to drive that
lesson home.
Accordingly, when Greece was threatened
by Communist subversion in the immediate
postwar years, the United States did not hesi-
tate to come to its aid. At that time, there
were many who argued that we should not.
They said that Greece was under a conserva-
tive, indeed even a reactionary system, not
worthy of our assistance. Today, 20 years
later, Greece is a thriving democracy, and
even the severest critics of President Tru-
man's policy now agree that our efforts in
Greece contributed to peace and stability in
the Balkans.
A few years later we were confronted by
the invasion of Korea. The United States did
not hesitate to send its young men and to
commit its resources in order to insure that
peace and stability prevail in the Northern
Pacific. Because we did not hesitate, Commu-
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.
MARCH 13, 1967
409
nist China as well as Stalin's Russia learned,
painfully and at some cost to them, that the
United States is unflinching when faced with
the threat of force.
In Europe we have made it clear to our
friends and foes alike that we stand by our
commitments. They have been tested twice in
Berlin. The United States is still in West Ber-
lin, and no citizen of West Berlin need fear
about his future.
There was a time during the postwar con-
frontation when the Soviet leadership, be-
cause of misguided assumptions, concluded
that the balance of power could be turned in
its favor and that the United States could be
stared down in a nuclear confrontation.
Soviet missiles were implanted in Cuba. But
precisely because we stood firm and fast, wis-
dom prevailed and the Soviet missiles are
there no longer.
Thus painfully and gradually, a measure of
restraint has come into American-Soviet
relations. This has come about because the
Soviets have no illusions about our deter-
mination to meet force with force.
We are in the process of establishing the
same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there
is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of
Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind
of strategy international communism will fol-
low in this decade. Having learned that overt
force does not pay, some Communists con-
cluded that covert force may open the gates.
We are keeping them shut. It is no secret that
we believe that in keeping them shut we are
aiding not only the cause of peace but also
the arguments of those Communists who have
already learned that violence is not the way
to global supremacy.
Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would
have helped the arguments of the more radi-
cal Communists who contend that covert vio-
lence is something to which the United States
cannot effectively respond. If we had not
responded, we would have proven the radical
Communists right.
These periods of violence have thus demon-
strated— and are demonstrating in Viet-Nam
— that Communists attempts to expand their
system by force can and will be contained by
the determination of the free world. But, as
I have suggested, these responses have been
essentially "defensive." And these contests
have also demonstrated that force is not a
solution to the basic conflict between political
systems.
In many respects the more important and
long-lasting aspect of our struggle with the
Communist world is the one I would describe
as "offensive," even though it is less spectacu-
lar. I have in mind active promotion of the
process of gradual change designed to shape
the kind of world we would all like to live in.
This quiet, subtle process has already brought
about fundamental evolutionary develop-
ments in the Communist world. We have
encouraged the powerful forces of nation-
alism by positive programs of developing
constructive relations with the countries of
Eastern Europe. Today the East Europeans
are increasingly desirous of developing rela-
tions with the West. Even Russian society at
large, as I can testify through countless con-
tacts, desires to participate in Western civili-
zation. It wishes to develop closer contacts
with the United States. It does not want to
be cut off from the Western World by an Iron
Curtain or an ideological curtain or any
other kind of a curtain.
I think it is our role in the world today to
take advantage of the trends of thought and
of the developments which I discussed to de-
velop a broader and more solid relationship
with some of the Communist states and to
encourage constructive change within. We
should not lower our guard, but we should
take advantage of every opportunity to
develop closer contacts and wider relations
with them, in order to shape a stable world.
In saying this, I would point out that I am
not suggesting anything really new. I am
rather proposing the active pursuit of a
policy which can be said to be nearly 20 years
old and already proven by positive results.
One of the great milestones in the history of
American foreign policy was President
Truman's decision in 1948 to provide immedi-
ate military and economic aid to support the
Yugoslav declaration of independence from
Soviet domination. Anyone familiar with
410
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Eastern Europe knows that in the years that
followed Yuofoslavia has had a major
liberalizing impact on the rest of the Commu-
nist world. Under President Eisenhower we
N extended economic assistance to the Poles and
made it easier for them to preserve their free-
enterprise agricultural system. In 1958 we
signed an exchange agreement with the
Soviet Union which, in spite of some very
real problems, has worked remarkably well.
We have programs for the exchange of scien-
tists and scholars, cultural leaders and
exhibits, all of which have had a significant
influence. Since jamming ended in 1963, the
Voice of America has become a Russian insti-
tution.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention
Freedom is a contagious thing. Those ex-
posed to it have found the virus grows
rapidly. There has been an awakening to the
accomplishments of the West and to the
atmosphere of free investigation here by the
many Soviet citizens who have visited Europe
and the United States. I have talked to many
who returned to their country greatly im-
pressed by their visit to ours. The vitality of
Americans who have visited the Soviet Union
and the information about the exciting things
being done in the West which they carry with
them has created a pool of respect and good
will among thousands of Soviet participants.
In recent years we have concluded the
nuclear test ban treaty and limited agree-
ments for cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union in such fields as
outer space, peaceful uses of atomic energy,
and desalination of sea water. In 1964 we
negotiated and signed a consular convention
which constituted an unprecedented break-
through in arrangements to protect American
citizens and American consular oflficials in the
Soviet Union.
In his state of the Union message last
month 3 President Johnson called on the Con-
gress to approve that consular convention
and to pass an East-West trade bill.
The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions initiated hearings on the consular con-
vention on January 23, when Secretary of
State Dean Rusk urged ratification.** These
hearings are continuing. Wittingly or unwit-
tingly, opponents of the agreement have con-
fused the issues by charging it is a "license"
for Soviet espionage — and in so doing they
have, in my view, cast some unjustified asper-
sions on the capabilities of our own internal
security agencies.
Perhaps I can help to clear up any mis-
understanding you may have as a result of
the confusing charges and confused reporting
on the Senate hearings. The proposed consu-
lar convention does not authorize, propose,
suggest, or provide for the opening of any
American consulates in the Soviet Union or
of any Soviet consulates in the United States.
That would be a separate question, subject to
separate negotiation and agreement between
the two Governments on a reciprocal and
mutually satisfactory basis. The consular con-
vention is designed to regulate consular
activities, above all to enable the United
States better to protect and assist its citizens
in the Soviet Union. This agreement would be
to the interest of the United States, even if
no new consulates were ever opened. It is
essential to understand that all states handle
routine matters involving their citizens and
their commercial and other interests through
consular channels. Such channels exist today
between the Soviet Union and the United
States in the form of consular sections in our
respective Embassies in Washington and in
Moscow.
Troubles have arisen over the years be-
tween the two Governments because of the
different nature of the police and court pro-
cedures in the two countries: Under Soviet
law a person who is arrested is normally held
incommunicado, without access from the out-
side, while his case is under investigation —
and this investigative process can last up to 9
months. Under this consular convention we
have secured a commitment from the Soviet
Government to notify us within 1 to 3 days of
the arrest of any American citizen and to
allow us to see him within 2 to 4 days and
'Ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
* Ibid., Feb. 6, 1967, p. 247.
MARCH 13, 1967
411
frequently thereafter. If we had had such
early and continued access to the late New-
comb Mott, his tragic death might well have
been avoided.
Just since I signed this treaty in Moscow
21/2 years ago, 20 American citizens have
been detained by the Soviet police. We would
have been able to protect each of these Amer-
icans more effectively if this treaty had been
in force. The overwhelming quantitative ad-
vantage of this provision to the United States
may be appreciated from the fact that 18,000
Americans visited the Soviet Union last year
while less than 1,000 Soviet citizens visited
the United States. This ratio increases every
year as the number of American tourists
going to the U.S.S.R. grows, while the num-
ber of Soviet visitors to the United States
remains constant.
As for the controversial article providing
immunity for consular officers and employees,
I can say flatly that I would not want Ameri-
cans in these sensitive positions in the Soviet
Union without the protection of this immu-
nity. The distinction between diplomatic and
consular officers, in any event, has long been
obsolete. It dates back centuries, to a period
when international relations were handled
very differently than they are today. The
United States itself ended the distinction over
40 years ago by abolishing its separate diplo-
matic and consular services and establishing
a single, integrated Foreign Service of the
United States.
President Eisenhower, under whose ad-
ministration the negotiations were initiated,
said some days ago: "I have not changed my
belief that such a convention is in our na-
tional interest, that it will not impair our
national security, that it should enlarge our
opportunities to learn more about the Soviet
people, and that it is necessary to assure bet-
ter protection for the many thousands of
Americans who visit the Soviet Union each
year."
Now let us turn to the question of trade. I
suppose none of us in this room doubts the
effectiveness of our economic organization in
this country. It has produced the most re-
markably well supplied society in history. The
412
Communist leadership is well aware of this,
too, and has for years been exhorting the
Soviet peoples with the slogan: "Overtake
and surpass the United States." There is
accordingly a readymade admiration and re- '^
ceptivity to American products — and possi-
bilities of benefits for our farmers and
industrialists.
Practical Aspects of East-West Trade
But trade is not just commercial; it is also
political. And our aim should therefore be the
creation of such commercial relations that the
Communist states develop closer ties with the
West, such relations that they will increas-
ingly be encouraged to evolve domestically
along the lines we desire. I can assure you
that the people in these countries know how
we and the Western Europeans live. They
know it is much better than the way they
live. They want to live as we do, to have cars,
adequate housing, and better clothing.
It is clear to me that it is in our interest
to take actions which help bring about a
diversion of their resources from military
and space programs to consumer goods. Let
me put it to you this way. Who here would
not sooner have people in Yugoslavia grow-
ing tobacco rather than producing munitions ?
Who among us would not rather have Soviet
workers making passenger cars instead of
missiles? Isn't it better for us all that Poland
devote increased resources to production of
high-quality pork and ham? Who does not
think it useful that Romanian resources be
devoted to an automobile-tire industry rather
than to production of jet fuel?
Now, even if you agree that the answer to
the question should be affirmative, some will
still ask: "Why should we encourage trade
with the Communists, when they are supply-
ing the weapons being used to kill American
soldiers in Viet-Nam?" Well, this is a difficult
question, charged with emotion, even to me.
It deserves a frank answer, but that answer
cannot be as simple as the question, because
the world is not that simple. I think what I
have already said to you tonight — about the
evolution of the Communist world, about the
true nature of the "defensive" as against the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
"offensive" aspects of the contest between
that world and ours — that these observations
ah-eady go a long way in providing the basic
answer. However, leaving aside the broader
problem, let us examine some practical
?spects.
The kind of East- West trade we are talking
about would have no material relationship
with the Communist effort in Viet-Nam.
Trade in strategic goods has long been banned
by Western allied agreements and would re-
main banned. Neither the present level of our
trade nor any foreseeable growth in it could
have a measurable effect on the military
goods supplied to Viet-Nam.
The basic fact is that the Soviet Union is
not only self-sufficient in military production;
it is also a major supplier of conventional
arms outside its borders. The same is true of
the United States. The Soviet Union has
allies. So have we. Armed forces from the
opposing sides have been engaged from time
to time in various theaters in the past. In
Viet-Nam itself the arms situation is com-
plex. In the earlier years of the struggle in
South Viet-Nam, much of the equipment of
the Viet Cong was American, captured from
the French and Government forces.
In the past couple of years the bulk of the
enemy equipment is Chinese in origin, with
Soviet supplies being a relatively minor com-
ponent. The big Soviet military aid has gone
to North Viet-Nam in the form of antiair-
craft guns and missiles and radar and fighter
planes, items the Soviets describe as "defen-
sive." There seems in fact to have been some
element of restraint here, perhaps regarded
by Moscow as paralleling our own limited
purposes in Viet-Nam. Even so, I am not
trying to suggest that all this is not a bad
business. I am trying to suggest that these
questions of supplies and distribution of arms
are broader than Viet-Nam and that the
remedy must be sought in international
agreements limiting and bringing under con-
trol traffic in arms. How do you suppose a
Soviet citizen feels today about the vast quan-
tities of arms his Government supplied to
Red China?
In these circumstances, it seems clear that
even a complete ban on trade with the Com-
munists would have no effect upon their con-
tinuing to supply arms to the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese. If anything, it could
encourage them to use less restraint in their
relations with the Vietnamese Communists,
because they would have less to lose if they
did pull out all the stops. In fact, we have
reason to believe that neither the Eastern
European countries nor the Soviets are par-
ticularly comfortable in their present position
and that they would welcome a decision by
the North Vietnamese to seek a settlement
of that conflict.
Trade is thus not a weapon which could
be effectively employed in the conflict in Viet-
Nam. On the other hand, we can have in trade
another useful instrument to maintain
leverage on the Communist world and to en-
courage the demands within the Communist
countries for greater availability in consumer
goods.
In sum, we must be able to use our vast
power and our resources to shape the kind
of world we would want to see our children
live in. The President recently called for "a
broader vision of peaceful engagement." ^
This was not a call for an immediate accom-
modation with the Soviet Union, nor was it
an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on
the basis of the status quo. It is rather a com-
mitment on the part of the United States to
continue seeking a new Europe in which a
more durable settlement can eventually be
attained.
We approach this task in a spirit of self-
reliance and optimism. We know we have the
means to repel aggression wherever it occurs.
We know we have the will to do so. Of this,
let no one have any doubt. But it is not
enough simply to react to Communist chal-
lenges. If we are to win this contest, we must
remain on the "offensive"; we must take posi-
tive and constructive initiatives. We know
that our citizens, intelligently perceiving the
realities of this age, will support an East-
West policy that uses to the fullest the wealth
and diversity of this nation to shaoe an
enduring peace.
= Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
MARCH 13, 1967
413
In this article, based on a speech he made at Carlton Uni-
versity in Ottaiva, Canada, on January 20, Mr. Brzezinshi,
one of the newest members of the Department's Policy
Planning Council, discusses the need to "emphasize what
really unites the more developed nations of the East and
the West." "It is up to us," he concludes, "to point with con-
fidence to the emergence of a new Europe, one which can
link America and Russia in a cooperative endeavor and one
which is no longer divided within itself."
Toward a Community of the Developed Nations
by Zbigniew Brzezinski
Before discussing more specifically the
relationship between the United States and
the Eastern half of Europe, let me begin
by outlining — as I see them — some of the
more fundamental assumptions that guide
U.S. thinking about international affairs.
It is our fundamental belief that in our
age we must seek to construct a world of
cooperative communities. These communities
need not be of one mold; there is no single
prescription for them. Some may reflect
similarities in development and in ways of
life. Some may be regional; others may cut
across regional boundaries. But the basic
point is that today the profoundest problems
we face are too great for the nation-state,
the traditional unit of international affairs,
to handle.
This does not mean that the nation-state
has outlived its usefulness or that we seek
to create a world of supranational political
cartels. The nation-state will, for a very long
time, remain the primary focus of civic
loyalty, the basic source of historical and
cultural diversity, and the prime force for
mobilizing the individual's commitment.
However, today the world needs more than
the nation-state to organize global peace, to
promote global welfare, to diffuse globally |
the fruits of science and technology. All of |
these things can be done more effectively and
more rationally if nation-states cooperate
with one another in the setting of larger com- '
munities, of cooperative communities that
reflect what unites them and submerge what
has traditionally divided them.
It is to the promotion of such a world
of cooperative communities that the United
States is globally committed. That commit-
ment is in keeping with broader historical
trends.
The thrust of history clearly points to the
emergence of larger units as an inevitable
consequence of social and political develop-
ment. The nature of economic organization
increasingly involves wider and wider pat-
terns of interrelationships. Modem economic
organization can no longer be confined to
small national entities. Science and modern
weapons technology increasingly require a
broad and highly complicated continental
industrial base. (The recent Italian proposal
for a common effort to close the so-called
technological gap is symptomatic of a widen-
414
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ing realization of this fact.) Modem com-
munications put men in continuous contact
with one another on a scale unprecedented
in history, and they completely eliminate the
notion of distance as a factor inhibiting
human relations.
A Wider Sense of Self-Identification
All these factors together shape man's
subjective conception of reality, and they
give him a broader and larger vision of that
reality. Through time, man's self-identifica-
tion and his perception of the world around
him have moved from family to city to
province to nation and now increasingly to
regional cooperation. None of this means
that nations are fading — but like city-states
in their turn, they are no longer the ultimate
repositories of sovereignty and they no
longer define the outer limits of man's
horizons.
It is, morever, clear that the creation of
a world of cooperative communities is the
real imperative of our search for a stable
peace. Today, for the first time in the history
of mankind, our world is united — but it is
united by fear. Fear of a nuclear funeral
pyre has linked mankind in a single emotion,
something never before experienced. Surely
we all agree that we have to do better than
that.
Paradoxically, there is hope in the thought
that violence may have reached its zenith.
Through history, as means of violence be-
came more extensive, violence became less
and less the nonri of human conduct. To be
sure, acts of individual violence persist —
but they are now viewed as aberrations in
human affairs, as crimes subject to social
sanction. Wars, too, continue — but the world
increasingly views them as a threat to all
of mankind and as a departure from a com-
mon standard that all nations ought to ob-
serve.
This change in attitude has been prompted
by increasing recognition of our interde-
pendence. People now identify themselves
with larger units than ever before, with
larger societies, with larger goals and
broader aspirations. This mounting sense of
social" and national interdependence is a
buffer against international violence. It
leaves less room for national wars; it creates
greater international pressure for the ob-
servation of common standards of behavior.
In time, existing alliance systems might
logically develop into a common world secu-
rity system. Surely that, too, would be in
keeping with historical experience, which
shows us how alliances among cities even-
tually became the foundations of larger
national unity. Indeed, it may not be pre-
mature to contemplate the implications of
the fundamental change in the function of
alliances: In the past they served to wage
war; in our age they deter war; tomorrow
they must shift collectively to the promotion
of peace.
All of that is in keeping with our basic
notion of the imiwrtance of man as the ulti-
mate value of our existence. Man can fulfill
himself never by war but only by peaceful
endeavor, never by seeking to impose uni-
versal ideologies on others but only by ac-
cepting universal responsibilities. By seeking
in our time to build a world of cooperative
communities, we may make it possible for
our children to live in a world that is truly
a human community.
Greater Unity in the West
United States policies, it seems to me, are
designed in keeping with that general frame-
work. I believe that they are also compatible
with the trend of events.
Today a new Europe is emerging. Some-
day— and that day will come sooner than
many of us yesterday dared to hope — Europe
will embrace an entire continent of reunited
peoples. It will be a continent no longer
divided by rusted barbed wire or sterile
ideological conflicts. It will be a continent
that links the United States and the Soviet
Union — and, indeed, even Japan — in a larger
community of the developed nations, sharing
a common recognition of the moral absolute
that in our age technological advancement
and material well-being impose a funda-
MARCH 13, 1967
415
mental obligation toward the rest of man-
kind.
But if that day is nearing — as I firmly
believe it is — it is nearing because we have
persisted, and will persist, in two more im-
mediate and mutually reinforcing tasks:
seeking ever-closer Western unity and striv-
ing to attain a true European settlement
through an East-West reconciliation.
In seeking Western unity through closer
Atlantic cooperation and greater Western
European integration, the United States is
not motivated by the delusion that a united
Western Europe would be a replica of the
United States. We are aware of the enormous
cultural diversity, the linguistic wealth, the
historical variety, of the European peoples.
A united Europe would not be one country,
nor would it be a melting pot. It would be
a continental mosaic, the richer for its
diversity, the stronger for its unity.
All that is surely in Europe's interest. It
is in ours, too — even though a united Eu-
rope may not only be a stronger partner but
conceivably, and in all candor, also a poten-
tial competitor. That risk we are prepared
to face, for it is a lesser risk than the main-
tenance of old national antipathies. There is
simply no room in contemporaiy Europe for
the anarchy of an international order based
on the supremacy of the national ego.
In speaking of greater unity in the West,
I believe it will no longer suffice to repeat
routinely the ideas that motivated us during
the fifties. Europe has taken the first steps
on the road to greater unity, and this hope-
ful beginning calls for new thoughts and
new aspirations. Precisely because the Com-
mon Market has taken shape and has sur-
vived a storm or two, precisely because
NATO has deterred war, precisely because
the European and the American peoples have
accepted the notion of interdependence, it
is time to ask, What new goals shall link
us, what is it that we must do next? Unity
grows out of common efforts and shared
goals; unity is never preserved by ritual and
cant.
The Political Elite in Eastern Europe
A major objective of the United States,
defined recently by President Johnson in his
October 7th speech,^ is to end the partition
of Europe. Today, to be sure, the Soviet
Union and East Europe are not fully a part
of Europe. They are detached from it be-
cause of political, security, and ideological
considerations. Moreover, the East today is
ruled largely by a political eUte composed
of newly risen social classes, in large meas-
ure recruited from the peasantry, whose own
sense of political identification tends to take
a nationalistic expression. Its perception of
the world tends to be defined in terms of
land, territory, and space. All this gives the
East today a strong nationalistic tinge, in
addition to the Communist ideological pre-
occupations, and serves to perpetuate the
division of Europe.
But the East, in spite of this, is also seek-
ing broader cooperative solutions. Leaving
the Soviet hegemonistic aspects aside, I be-
lieve this is a good development, in some re-
spects. It shows that larger unity and larger
organization are recognized there as well,
both as a need and as a factor of stability.
For example, CEMA, the Council of Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance, began as an es-
sentially ideological, political organization.
It included even Mongolia. Now increasingly
we find subregional cooi>eration becoming
acceiDted in the East in place of the more
pohtically motivated CEMA framework. As
CEMA fades, more genuinely East Euroi^ean
forms of cooperation are already beginning
to develop. This is progress, this is a recog-
nition even on the part of the intensely
nationalistic Eastern elites of the need for
larger scale collaboration.
The development of broader forms of
international cooperation is particularly im-
portant there, because it will provide, in the
long run, an alternative to growing internal
bureaucratic sterility and political parochi-
' Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
416
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
alism. In the Soviet Union, the internation-
ahst-minded inteUigentsia was replaced,
under Stalin, by a parochial-minded genera-
tion of increasingly nationalistic leaders.
Bureaucratic, narrow-minded, conservative
Communists, they are today most interested
in holding on to power. Increasingly, the
Soviet political elite is interested in con-
trolling power, in holding on to its position,
in maintaining an effective system of ruling-
class domination.
Gap Between Social and Political Systems
In consequence of this, there is developing
in the Soviet Union a widening gap between
the social and the political systems. The
political system came into being to create a
new society, an industrial society. Today that
society has taken shape, and the political
system is lagging behind it and has become,
to some extent, an impediment to further
social change. This creates pressures point-
ing to broad social alienation from the
political system.
In the future these tensions may be ac-
centuated by the problem of nationalities in
the Soviet Union. This problem is rising in
intensity, and the Chinese are beginning to
exploit it. When we think of the Soviet
Union, we only too often tend to forget that
50 percent of the Soviet population is not
Russian; increasingly these peoples are be-
ginning to have a sense of national identity
and national desire for self-expression. I
submit that tliis will become a major do-
mestic problem in the Soviet Union in the
decades to come.
In Eastern Europe we note some similar
general tendencies. Nationalism in East
Europe is now becoming a conservative force
and is exploited by the new elites in order
to maintain themselves in power, to protect
the status quo. The political expression of
this new political elite is bureaucratic, dic-
tatorial rule. The consequence of this, again,
is a separation of the social and political in
the life of these communities. In some coun-
tries you note the dearth of problematic
politics, absence of discussion of the larger
issues, no sense of the alternative.
In the long run, 1 am inclined to think
that the new functional intelligentsia in
East Europe, keenly interested in ties with
the West, will make itself felt. This func-
tional intelligentsia is quite different from
the intellectuals who shaped the Hungarian
uprising of October 1956, the 10th anniver-
sary of which we observed a few months ago.
These intellectuals of 1956 were to some ex-
tent a reflection of the past, intellectuals of
the humanist-generalist type, typical of a
preindustrial society. Today they are being
replaced by a functional intelhgentsia which
no longer performs the overall humanizing-
integrating role of their antecedents but
which in some ways is much more important
and much more relevant to the future of
their countries. Its members, I believe, will
make themselves felt in the long run, prob-
ably sooner in Czechoslovakia and Hungary
than elsewhere.
In Yugoslavia, of course, for different
reasons, we already see extremely interest-
ing political experiments being undertaken.
But the future significance of Yugoslavia
may be determined by the system's capacity
to cope with the instability likely to follow
after Tito's death and particularly by the
nationality problem which is likely to sur-
face. The outcome, if it is democratic, could
have significant implications for the political
character of the East European regimes as
a whole.
In the meantime, in some countries in the
East we find the army again becoming im-
portant. We have seen signs of that in Bul-
garia; I think there's rising evidence for the
same conclusion in relationship to Yugo-
slavia. Elsewhere the state bureaucracy will
become again more important and begin to
provide more momentum to social develop-
ment, to have greater influence in shaping
the policies of the nations.
All these changes in the East involve a
very gradual development from an inter-
national revolutionary orientation increas-
MARCH 13, 1967
417
ingly toward a new parochial conservative
nationalism with a Communist tinge.
Hence, in general I am inclined to think
that the Eastern political elite will not be
an active and positive force in shaping the
new European environment. It is much more
likely to be a conservative force interested
in preserving the status quo, including the
division of Germany.
Search for Security Arrangements
It is therefore up to us to think crea-
tively how to shape the new Europe and to
try to set in motion a process of change in
order to bring it about.
In the long run, it seems to me, the parti-
tion of Germany will not endure, for it can
only endure in an artificially divided Europe.
There are also internal reasons for the
instability of the East German regime; it
is impossible to create a nation artificially
in 20 or 30 or even 40 years, particularly
through foreign intervention. Certainly
Soviet presence seems to be a prerequisite
for the further maintenance of East Ger-
many. Hence, it is essential to think of
conditions which will change both of these
factors, which will promote internal evolu-
tion and the removal of external domination.
In my view, this cannot be done by headlong
assault, political or otherwise; the problem
therefore has to be skirted around. A new
environment has to be created, including
eventual security arrangements.
In the search for such security arrange-
ments, it is terribly important not to de-
stabilize the existing condition nor to set
in motion unnecessary political fears. More-
over, it is necessary to create a broader
framework of all-European economic co-
operation and relate economic to security
arrangements. I was struck in the course of
a recent trip to Europe that the East Euro-
peans, by and large, do not understand that
Western integration is a factor of stability
as of itself. They fear it unless it is accom-
panied by progress in the security field.
Recently the President made a speech
in which he spelled out the broad strategic
418
concept of the American point of view
toward Europe.^ As I understand it, this
concept involves the following major points:
First of all, he emphasized the interde-
pendence of further promotion of Western "*
unity with better East-West relations. His
speech provides a synthesis of what has
turned out to be the two predominant schools
of thought in Europe of recent years. The
United States holds that further building
of Western unity creates stability in Europe
and is therefore in keeping with the thrust
of history; East-West policies must be com-
patible with this thrust if they are to re-
solve the European problem.
Secondly, when he spoke of peaceful en-
gagement with the East, he did not mean a
search for accommodation with the Soviet
Union over the heads of the Europeans, nor
an immediate settlement. What he had in
mind, I think, was a creative building proc-
ess, a process of building a larger European
framework which lends itself to resolving the
existing problems. It is therefore a commit-
ment, an engagement to a process of change,
and not a quest for an immediate settlement,
particularly over the heads of the Europeans.
Thirdly, it involved the thought that East
Europe and Russia both have to be involved
in that process. I am convinced it would be
idle, and probably counterproductive, to
concentrate on stimulating East European
nationalism or hostility to the Soviet Union;
to be sure, the more independence there is
in the East, the better — but as a means and
not as an end in itself. Some East European
countries can act as transmission belts by
moving ahead of the Soviet Union, but not
for the purpose of separating themselves en-
tirely from the Soviet Union — rather for the
purpose of promoting a different kind of
East-West relationship.
Fourthly, a growing reconciliation in
Europe and some form of reunification of
Germany are consequentially linked. Hence
this larger reconciliation of Europe in-
trinsically contributes to the reunification
of Germany.
' Ibid.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Finally, the President aiiaculated the
proposition that respect for territorial in-
tegrity and progress in the field of security,
perhaps on the basis of tacit reciprocity on
the part of East and West, could help
exentually to create a new political environ-
ment.
Beyond Bilateralism
All this in the long run could perhaps
lead to a general change in the character
(if East-West relations. It seems to me that
the time has come to think also beyond
purely bilateral relations. After all, in the
final analysis, bilateralism is purely a tech-
nical term for a European Europe articu-
hited by General de Gaulle. It seems to me
tliat we have passed the first phase — con-
frontation; we are completing the second
pliase — the exploration of bilateral relation-
ships; and we are on the eve of a third
jihase — trying to build, multilaterally, an
East-West relationship.
In this respect, there are already a num-
ber of existing bodies which lend themselves
to that end. The Economic Commission for
Europe, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the Council of
Europe, eventually even the European Eco-
nomic Community, are institutions which
might be adapted to that end, given suf-
ficient interest by the European members.
The life of an institution has to be judged,
after all, by larger purposes than its ovni
vested institutional interests. For some of
these institutions readjustment may be dif-
ficult, but the utility of such readjustment
must be judged in terms of its ultimate end.
I believe that through such cooperation new
East-West relationships could be established
and, beyond that, additional new East-West
bodies could also be created in response to
specific needs or to promote common new
ventures in Europe, involving all of Europe,
including to the extent possible the United
States and the Soviet Union.
In the security field, in my view, such
cooperation could eventually begin to extend
MARCH 13, 1967
to the alliance systems themselves, not in
order to dissolve them rapidly, thereby
creating instability, but in order to reduce
the level of the confrontation, thereby creat-
ing an easier political environment.
Moreover, multilateral economic coopera-
tion in the long run runs counter to central-
ized direction of individual Communist
states, and therefore this kind of multilateral
cooperation could provide the missing link
between the technological progress of the
Eastern society and the liberal political
evolution of the Communist system. In addi-
tion, the more intelligent East Europeans
realize that multilateral cooperation is in-
creasingly necessary to cope with such things
as the technology gap. For example, the
Czechoslovak Vice Foreign Minister recently
in Rude Pravo, the Communist Party news-
paper in Prague, very explicitly linked
Czechoslovak technological and economic
needs with the promotion of multilateral
Western economic cooperation.
Ending the "European Civil War"
Eventually, through such processes of
growing together these societies may be
transformed into something more compatible
to the democratic and humanist point of
view. I personally doubt that they will con-
verge with the West in the sense of acquiring
identical political systems or, indeed, even
similar political systems. But they could
become, through this process, semidictator-
ships of increasingly Socialist character
(and of less Communist dictatorial kind),
including more internal social pluralism.
Here I think Yugoslavia is a relevant
pioneer.
The Sino-Soviet dispute, moreover, has
had an accelerating impact on this process.
The East Europeans and the Russians in-
creasingly describe China as Fascist; and
the Russians, in my recent private conver-
sations in Moscow, were already fearful of
what may seem to be a fanciful illusion, fear-
ful of a Chinese-American alliance directed
against them. But even though this may be
fanciful, it could have a Europeanizing im-
419
pact on them, for it encourages a process of
deradicalization, it encourages a process of
adjustment to existing realities. It forces
them in the direction of ideological ecu-
menism. This was the historical experience
of the Social Democratic parties, and we
should not forget that 60 years ago the
Social Democratic parties were the most
revolutionary parties in Europe; today they
are hardly revolutionary.
In the long run therefore, it seems to me,
the return of East Europe and Russia to a
larger European fold would bring to an end
"the European civil war" which has devas-
tated the Continent and destroyed it in the
course of the last 100 years. In that setting
the German problem will lose its intensity
and will become susceptible to resolution.
Moreover, such a return will be the begin-
ning of a process of creating a larger com-
munity of the developed nations, which
seems to me to be terribly needed and very
important. Such a community must emerge
if the developed societies are to be able to
deal with the chaos which the world is
likely to face in the underdeveloped regions
of our globe. Such a community is also
needed if man and society are to face ef-
fectively the unprecedented problems which
science and technology will impose on modern
society in the next several decades.
As we look ahead at problems men and
society will face in the course of the next
several decades, it becomes increasingly
clear to me that none of the existing ideo-
logical systems are relevant and pertinent
to our needs. It is therefore increasingly
important — particularly for the West, which
has always been the pioneer in human
thought — to look beyond the ideological
cleavages of the past and to begin to empha-
size what really unites the more developed
nations of the East and the West. In the
final analysis, we must not forget that
Marxism is a child of our own tradition; it
is up to us to point with confidence to the
emergence of a new Europe, one which can
link America and Russia in a cooperative
endeavor and one which is no longer divided
within itself.
Communist China
by U. Alexis Johnson
Ambassador- to Japan i
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with
such a distinguished and thoughtful group
as this the subject of my country's policy
toward Communist China. The question of
Communist China is of such overwhelming
importance to both of our countries that it
deserves the most thoughtful consideration
and the avoidance of demagogic statements
on either one side of the question or the other.
It also is not possible to talk about Commu-
nist China without talking about the Pacific
area and Asia as a whole, for what China is
or is not does so much to determine what the
rest of the Pacific and Asia is going to be.
One cannot discuss American policy and
attitudes toward Communist China, any more
than one can discuss Japanese policy and
attitudes, without reference to the historical
background.
While during the first century and a half
of our existence as a country we took little
interest or part in world affairs, China was
always somewhat of an exception. In 1784,
almost immediately following our treaty of
peace with Great Britain, the first American
trading vessel called at Canton, and the
second consulate we established in the world
was at Canton in 1787. By 1800, 30 to 40
vessels were engaged in trade with China.
In addition to American interest in trade
with China, the American people were
fascinated by Chinese history and culture,
which they greatly admired. At the same
time, they were genuinely moved by the
poverty and hardships endured by the masses
of China. There is scarcely a child of my or
earlier generations that did not each week at
Sunday school give his pennies for the sup-
port of a missionary in China or for the relief
of a famine in China. Returning missionaries
gave talks and showed pictures. so that even
as children we felt a sympathetic concern
' Address made before the Asian Affairs Research
Council at Tokyo, Japan, on Feb. 13.
420
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
with respect to China quite different from
that toward any other part of the outside
world. This impulse found its outlet not only
in purely religious and relief activities, but
on a larger scale with the millions of dollars
that private American individuals and foun-
dations poured into educational institutions
and medical facilities throughout China.
Thus, while our interest in China was a
compound of hardheaded business and of con-
cern mixed with admiration, this latter aspect
was for many years uppermost in the mind
of the average American. I would not argue
if you were to say that we tended to be senti-
mental about China.
It is against this background that we re-
turned the Boxer indemnity to be used for
the education of Chinese in the United States.
It was also out of these fundamental Ameri-
can attitudes toward China that John Hay
propounded the Open Door doctrine in 1899
when it appeared that China was to be carved
up among the then colonial powers; that great
strains were introduced into our relationship
with Japan in 1915 when the Okuma Cabinet
delivered its 21 demands on China; and ulti-
mately, that the Manchurian incident in 1931
set in motion the chain of events that led in
1941 to the direct clash between Japan and
the United States.
The Postwar Period
In the postwar period you are all familiar
with the extraordinary efforts that the
United States made to bring about a cessa-
tion of hostilities and a rapprochement be-
tween the Nationalist and Communist ele-
ments in China. You are aware that there are
many in my own country who charged (I
think falsely) that in these efforts we were
overly sympathetic to and solicitous of the
Communist elements.
When these efforts broke down and the
Communists resumed offensive military
action we did what one traditionally does in
revolutionary situations of this kind. We kept
open our consulates in the territory they occu-
pied, and the American Ambassador was one
of the few ambassadors to remain in Nanking
when the Communists occupied that city.
Normally in such a situation the incoming
revolutionary forces respect diplomatic and
consular establishments, de facto contacts
are established, and ultimately formal rela-
tions are established.
However, even if we had considered estab-
lishing formal relations, the Communists
made such a course of action impossible by,
in effect, refusing to recognize the United
States. They violated our establishments and
arrested our consuls in Mukden and Shang-
hai. In Nanking they refused even to permit
the delivery of telegrams addressed to the
American Ambassador and actually sum-
moned him to appear before a so-called
"People's Court" on charges of mistreating
his servants. In fact, their whole attitude
seemed to be one of seeking to expel any and
all American presence in China, rather than
maintaining some relationship. Thus, I do
not think it a distortion to say that given the
history of that period. Communist China re-
fused to recognize the United States rather
than the other way around.
Many Americans, with their traditional
sympathy for the Chinese people, were baffled
and deeply disturbed by these developments.
Many felt that even Communists could not
be that unreasonable and that somehow or
other a substantial element of fault must lie
on the side of the U.S. Government. However,
when we see the efforts in China today to cut
even the few small remaining ties they have
had with those formerly so closely alined with
them ideologically, their actions at that time
with respect to the United States do not seem
so exceptional.
The unprovoked and unexpected attack
upon the Republic of Korea by Korean Com-
munist forces in June 1950 immediately
aroused American apprehensions about the
future course the Chinese Communists would
take. The attack in Korea, coming as it did
soon after the acceleration of Communist
insurgency in Burma, Malaya, and the
Philippines and concurrently with Chinese
Communist operations in Tibet, indicated a
grave danger that there would be an effort to
take over all of Asia by military force. The
action of the United States, which met the
MARCH 13, 1967
421
threat by sending its troops to Korea and
placing the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait
to prevent the widening of the war, together
with the great sacrifices made by other mem-
bers of the United Nations and, most impor-
tantly, of the Koreans themselves, prevented
any such takeover. The subsequent direct
entry of Communist China into the Korean
war even though it was evident that the
United States was not threatening China
aroused the bitter resentment of the Ameri-
can people. Despite intense pressure, how-
ever, the United States never carried the war
into China, though it was the base of supply
of men and materials.
Channels of Communication With Peking
Americans representing the United Na-
tions forces sat for hundreds of hours at
Panmunjom with a delegate from Peking as
one of the parties on the other side of the
table negotiating the armistice in Korea.
Then a political representative of the United
States, Arthur Dean, spent more hours at
Panmunjom with a political representative
of Peking seeking to negotiate arrangements
for a political conference on Korea.
Then in the spring of 1954 at Geneva a con-
ference on Korea was held with Secretary of
State Dulles representing the United States
and Chou En-lai, Communist China. This was
followed by the conference on Indochina.
It was at this time but outside these con-
ferences that I represented the United States
in direct bilateral discussions with a repre-
sentative of Peking's Foreign Office. When
those conferences were finished, contact was
maintained through our respective consular
officers in Geneva. Beginning on August 1,
1955, I again represented the United States
in direct and private conversations with a
representative of Peking until my departure
for Thailand in December 1957. The conver-
sations were then moved to Warsaw, where
they are still continuing, the 152d meeting
being held on January 25, 1967. In 1962, with
Ambassador [W. Averell] Harriman as the
U.S. representative and Foreign Minister
422
Chen Yi representing Peking, months of
negotiations were held by the 14 parties to
the Geneva conference on Laos.
My point in mentioning all of this is simply
that whatever the difficulties and problems
that have arisen between Communist China
and the United States, they have not been due
to any unwillingness on the part of Washing-
ton to talk to Peking or any lack of channels
of communication between the two Govern-
ments. Considering the isolation maintained
around diplomatic representatives in Peking,
I have often made the assertion — and it has
not been challenged — that the United States
has had more in the way of the direct diplo-
matic-level conversation with the Chinese
Communists than any non-Communist coun-
try that has formally recognized them and
established representation in Peking. As far
as Communist countries are concerned, I sus-
pect that the situation has been much the
same, at least during the past few months.
U.S. Policy Toward Communist China
What have we been doing in all of these
conversations, and what has been our policy
toward Communist China ?
First, I want to make clear what our policy
is not. Much as we regret seeing the great
Chinese people subjected to harsh and tyran-
nical rule and their undoubted genius smoth-
ered by an old-fashioned doctrinaire regime,
it has never been any part of our policy to
seek any occasion to use force to overthrow
the regime.
At the same time, we have very deeply felt
that, in pursuance of the principle of creating
a political order in Asia which permits a true
freedom of national choice for the peoples of
Asia, we were obliged to assist those who
wanted to resist Chinese Communist efforts,
whether direct or indirect, to overthrow
established governments by violence and im-
pose by force regimes subservient to Peking.
Related to this is keeping the door open to
participation by China in the great construc-
tive tasks that lie ahead at such time as
Peking may turn from a policy of destructive
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
hostility to a policy of constructive coopera-
tion with its neighbors and the rest of the
world.
My first bilateral conversations in Geneva
in 1954 concerned the many Americans who
were in prison in China, for the most part
simply because they were Americans, and the
Peking allegations that we were preventing
the return to China of the some 5,000 stu-
dents who had gone to the United States
between the end of World War II and the
Communist takeover. Peking's representative
at these and my subsequent talks beginning
in 1955 was Wang Ping-nan, then Secretary
General of their Foreign Office and, the last
I heard, now Vice Foreign Minister. At those
talks in 1954, we succeeded in obtaining the
release of a few Americans.
The first order of business in 1955 was also
these prisoners, and on September 10, 1955,
we issued a formal public agreement on the
subject 2 — the first and only bilateral agree-
ment ever reached between the two Govern-
ments. I will not go into the details of this
agreement except to say that now, 12 years
later, four Americans are still in prison in
China in clear and direct violation of the
agreement.
Peking's Attitude Toward Taiwan
However, the main theme of much of our
discussion was the proposal that I put for-
ward to the effect that we agree to disagree
with respect to Taiwan but agree not to go
to war about it. For shorthand, the term "re-
nunciation of force" was used. That is, I pro-
posed that while fully maintaining whatever
principles they desired with respect to Tai-
wan, they would simply say that they would
not use force in the situation, and I offered
to make a reciprocal statement on behalf of
the United States.
Ambassador Wang resisted then and
Peking still stoutly resists this proposition,
taking the position in effect that if they
decide to do so they are fully entitled to seize
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.
Taiwan by force. They insisted then and still
insist that the people of Taiwan and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of China on Taiwan
have no rights except what Peking chooses to
give them and that the only answer is for the
United States to withdraw its recognition and
treaty commitments with regard to Taiwan
so that Peking can have a free hand to settle
questions in any way it chooses.
Incidentally, it was after some months of
discussion around this theme that I, for the
first time, heard the phrase "two Chinas."
The allegation was made that the proposition
that I was putting forward was a "plot by
the United States to establish a 'two China'
policy."
It thus became very clear that Peking was
not interested in any understanding or modics
Vivendi with the United States, however lim-
ited, except on the basis of turning Taiwan
over to them. This has become increasingly
clear over the years, not only with respect to
the United States but with respect to other
countries, as well as the United Nations. It
became very clear with respect to the United
Nations at the last General Assembly, when
Peking vehemently denounced any implica-
tion that Taiwan was even entitled to exist.
Thus, I have long said that those who advo-
cate this policy or that policy with respect to
Peking, either bilaterally or in the United
Nations, must answer the question as to
what they would propose to do \vith respect
to Taiwan. This is not because we or anyone
else says so, but because Peking says so. That
is, one must either accept Peking's principle
that the Government of the Republic of
China is not a government ahd that Taiwan
is not a state and not entitled to the protec-
tion of the United Nations or anyone else, or
not accept Peking's point of view. If the
answer is that you are not willing to accept
Peking's position, as Dean Rusk says, "They
hang up the telephone."
We've experienced this even in discussing
the proposals we made for an exchange of
press correspondents. Peking replied that it
was not willing to accept American corre-
spondents unless they would agree in advance
MARCH 13, 1967
423
not to write or say anything contrary to
Peking's point of view on this question.
Over the years we have made various other
proposals to reestablish at least some mean-
ingful contacts between the American people
and the Chinese people, such as to permit the
travel of doctors, scholars, and so on, but the
uniform answer has always been that the
United States must withdraw its protection
from Taiwan before anything else can be
discussed.
The Goal for the Future
I do not want to leave the impression that
I can only see ahead of us a future of perma-
nent and unremitting hostility and tension
between Communist China and other coun-
tries of the Pacific. Personally, I do not be-
lieve that this is necessarily the shape of the
future. I have too much faith in the basic
pragmatic good sense of the Chinese people.
I, for one, see no reason to regard the pres-
ent attitudes of the Chinese Communists,
which have been largely responsible for the
tensions of the past, as immutable. I would
like to pay tribute today to the Japanese cor-
respondents on the mainland, whose reports
are a main source of information about the
turmoil that is now in progress there. How-
ever, not even they can tell us what the future
is likely to hold. Certainly many ideas, atti-
tudes, and institutions that had seemed very
permanent are being shaken to their foun-
dations.
I would hope and expect that those forces
in China which want to move from a reliance
on outworn shibboleths and doctrines, which
have repeatedly demonstrated failure, to
dealing with their own internal problems and
external relations in a practical way will ulti-
mately prevail. When their day comes, I can
assure you that they will find the United
States responsive. Indeed, this is our goal.
This goal was most recently stated by the
President in his January state of the Union
message: ^
We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation
between the people of mainland China and the world
community — including working together in all the
tasks of arms control, security, and progress on
which the fate of the Chinese people, like the rest of
us, depends.
We would be the first to welcome a China which
decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We would
be the first to applaud were she to apply her great
energies and intelligence to improving the welfare
of her people. And we have no intention of trying
to deny her legitimate needs for security and
friendly relations with her neighboring countries.
I am sure that you must share my hope
that the day will soon come when this goal
can be realized.
I
U.S. and Japan Adjourn Talks
on Fishing in New U.S. Zone
Press release 40 dated February 23
U.S. and Japanese delegations on Febru-
ary 21 adjourned their discussions which be-
gan on February 6 regarding the problems
related to fishing in the U.S. contiguous
fishery zone extending 9 miles from the U.S.
territorial sea.^ It was agreed to reconvene
the discussions in mid-April at a time con-
venient to both Governments. Although con-
siderable progress was made toward a solu-
tion of the problems through the frank ex-
change of views during the discussions, it
became apparent that no final agreement
could be reached at this time.
An understanding was reached that, in the
interim period prior to May 1, both Govern-
ments will voluntarily take such measures
as are practicable in order to avoid the oc-
currence of problems with respect to fish-
eries in the contiguous zone.
The U.S. delegation was headed by Am-
bassador Donald L. McKernan, Special As-
sistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Sec-
retary of State. The Japanese delegation was
headed by Minister Ryozo Sunobe of the
Japanese Embassy at Washington.
I
' Ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
' The new U.S. fisheries zone was established by
the enactment of P.L. 89-658, approved Oct. 14,
1966.
424
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Emperor of Ethiopia
I Visits the United States
Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia
visited the United States February 13-17. He
met tvith President Johnson and other U.S.
Government officials in Washington on Feb-
ruary 13-15. Folloiving is an exchange of
greetings betiveen President Johnson and the
Emperor at a ceremony in the East Room of
the White House on February 13, together
with an exchange of toasts at a dinner at the
White House the next evening.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated February 13
President Johnson
Your Imperial Majesty: It is a very great
honor this afternoon to welcome His Imperial
Majesty once again to American shores.
He has been our firm and cherished friend
for more than five decades. He and his people
have inspired us by their heroic example in
time of war. And they have impressed us by
the wisdom of their advice in time of peace.
The most destructive war in human history
might well have been prevented if the world
had only listened 30 years ago to the Em-
peror of Ethiopia. Mankind has seldom been
offered so accurate a prophecy. And it has
never paid a grimmer price for ignoring one
of its prophets.
I would like to repeat a statement His
Majesty made to the world in those dark days
before the Second World War. "Apart from
the Kingdom of God," he said, "there is not
on this earth any nation that is higher than
any other."
No one has ever offered a better prescrip-
tion for destroying the cancer of war.
Only when this simple moral truth is
finally accepted by all the leaders of every
land can we truly hope for lasting peace.
His Imperial Majesty has never raised his
voice in the halls of nations except to coun-
sel wisdom, restraint, and justice. He once
described the foreign policy of his own land
in these words:
We believe that war has become too dangerous a
method for solving international disputes. Man must
be as wise as he is advanced. He must allow his
wisdom and common sense to prevail over tempta-
tions that can only lead to the destniction of civiliza-
tion itself . . . the only safe way for the settlement of
international disputes is the method of peaceful nego-
tiation, conducted in good faith, and with the aim of
insuring peace and justice for all.
Your Majesty, I am told that in your coun-
try there is a proverb which says: "Truth,
and the morning, become light with time."
Much time has already passed. Your Maj-
esty, since you first tried to light our way
toward a better, more peaceful world. I hope
and believe that men are closer to reaching
that long-sought destination than ever before
in history. And our voyage has been guided
in no small part by the courage, the example,
and the wisdom of Ethiopia.
Your Majesty, we are greatly honored to
have you with us in the White House this
afternoon. We look forward with great an-
ticipation to your visit with us in the days
ahead.
Emperor Haile Selassie 1^
Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, distinguished
guests: First of all, Mr. President, I wish to
state my satisfaction on the fact you have re-
covered as spiritedly from your recent diffi-
culty with your health. It is nice to see you in
the state that I find you today.
Each generation thinks that the situation
it faces is the most serious one, the most
difficult one than that which was faced by
generations of the past. However, this may
be true today. I believe when we say the task
of this generation is burdensome we mean it.
Because of the progress mankind has
achieved and because of the diflSculties that
are at times part and parcel of progress and
prosperity, we find ourselves at a crossroad
where we might make the world safe for our
As translated from the Amharic language.
MARCH 13, 1967
425
future generations or we might all perish to-
gether.
The friendship between the United States
and Ethiopia is one of long standing. Our
association in the past many decades, I hope,
has been fruitful for both our peoples. Be-
cause the United States and Ethiopia believe
in the same fundamental and essential goals,
it is necessary that we should put our efforts
together so that we may make maximum con-
tribution for the safety and prosperity of the
generations to come.
In our discussions, Mr. President, I hope
we will have the occasion of considering the
certain questions of mutual concern, of ex-
changing views in a frank and open manner,
and arriving, I am confident, at a consensus
of understanding.
I believe that leaders must from time to
time come together, face each other, and dis-
cuss problems they share in common. It is
not enough that we deal through diplomatic
channels.
Mr. President, I know of the hard work
that you have in your country. I know of the
immense responsibility you carry for the
safety of mankind, for the maintenance of
peace. I know also of your splendid effort in
maintaining national peace and security. I
am glad, under the circumstances, that you
are able to consider my coming to the United
States for the purpose of dealing with mat-
ters of mutual interest.
Ethiopia and Ethiopians are laboring to-
day not only for the peace and prosperity of
our people, but also realizing the fundamental
common interest which we share with other
African people, we have dedicated ourselves
to building a united and a more prosperous
Africa. We found that the interest that af-
fects Africa affects also Ethiopia and vice
versa, because our destiny with the African
Continent is a common one.
We have to put up a common effort to see
that the continent's interests are protected.
As it is well known, the Organization of
African Unity was established in Addis
Ababa. I believe this organization has made
a good beginning in the interest of all of the
African people.
I hope, Mr. President, during our private
conversations I will have an opportunity of '^
exchanging views with you about matters of
mutual concern, as well as matters that re-
late to the Organization of African Unity.
Let me say again that I am glad to be in
the United States today and I pray that our
discussions will bear fruit. Thank you.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated February 14
President Johnson
Your Imperial Majesty, Mr. Vice Presi-
dent, Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen: It is a high privilege
tonight to honor one of this century's most
courageous, farsighted, and respected states-
men, who has earned an indelible place in the
hearts of men everywhere.
Monarch of the oldest Christian kingdom
and an ancient civilization, you. Your Maj-
esty, personify to us the eternal spirit of de-
votion to freedom and independence of your
Ethiopian people.
The essence of the Ethiopian character was
put in your stirring words many years ago:
"With God's help, we have always stood
proud and free upon our native mountains."
It is difficult for me to express to you to-
night the very special place that you occupy
in our tradition — indeed, in the tradition of
all mankind.
Many of us in this room tonight recall the
night of June 28, 1936, when the Emperor of
Ethiopia made a plea to the League of Na-
tions— a plea for his suffering people which
was also a very moving appeal to the con-
science of humanity.
Your Majesty's final question to the League
has echoed down the years with prophetic
impact:
I ask the 52 nations who have given the Ethiopian
426
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
leople a promise to help them in their resistance to
h.' aggressor, what are they willing to do for
Ethiopia?
And the great powers who have promised the
ruarantee of collective security to small States on
vliom weighs the threat that they may one day
niffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask, what measures do
ou intend to take?
Representatives of the world, I have come to
3eneva to discharge in your midst the most painful
)f the duties of the head of a State.
What reply shall I have to take back to my people?
We all know — to our shame — the reply
i'our Majesty received.
The betrayal of Ethiopia was in truth the
;urning point on the road to aggression and
.var. Its lesson has been etched into our
nemory and has spurred us in building a
,vorld where solid commitments to resist op-
pression are no longer just scraps of paper.
Your Majesty, we also recall with great
pleasure your triumphant return to Addis
\baba and your remarkable reconstruction
)f your nation as you put into action your
ong-held and long-frustrated ideals of mod-
ernization:
— building schools, a fine university, hos-
pitals, dams, airports, factories;
— turning Addis Ababa into a dynamic,
)eautiful modern city;
— proclaiming a revised constitution and
egal system;
— training young Ethiopians for the tasks
)f the future in the 20th century.
Your Majesty has not confined your con-
cern just to your people.
We have all witnessed, and can testify to
vith admiration, your striking performance
IS a leader of Africa's many and diverse
peoples and as a mediator in potentially ex-
plosive confrontations between various
\f rican states.
(The Organization of African Unity — which
your initiative in 1963 was instrumental in
creating — is one of the most hopeful institu-
;ions in the movement toward peace, reason,
and unity in the great continent of Africa.
It has always been a unique privilege and
pleasure for me to have an opportunity to ex-
change views on international affairs with
one whom I consider to be one of the world's
greatest elder statesmen.
Today, as in 1963 when we last talked, we
had an immediate sense of the great mutual
understanding and respect that our people
entertain for each other.
Your Majesty, we treasure deeply this re-
lationship. It is my genuine and most earnest
hope that succeeding generations of our
peoples will continue to reinforce the solid
edifice of American-Ethiopian amity and un-
derstanding.
On this happy occasion, here tonight in the
first house of this land, Mrs. Johnson and I,
on behalf of our distinguished guests, all of
those who are privileged to come here and be
together tonight, and certainly on behalf of
all of the American people, I propose a toast
to Your Majesty — respected statesman,
peacemaker in the world, and most honored
and trusted friend.
Emperor Haile Selassie i'
Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, honored
guests: We are deeply touched by the kind
words which you, Mr. President, have just
said about us and the people of Ethiopia. We
are equally grateful for the warm welcome
and immense hospitality accorded us during
our present as well as our previous visits to
this great country.
This visit, among other things, also gives
us the opportunity to carry with us the warm-
est greeting and admiration of the Ethiopian
people to yourself and your family, Mr. Presi-
dent, and through you to the talented people
of America.
From the time we have been chosen to lead
our beloved people to the present years of the
space era, Ethiopians have been watching
with keen interest the gigantic technological
strides and the immense economic advance-
ment that the American way of life has
brought about to mankind.
The democratic party politics practiced in
^ As translated from the Amharic language.
MARCH 13, 1967
427
America has always been regarded by Ethio-
pians as a shining example of free expression
of man who has governed his own destiny
along the avenues he freely chooses.
Ethiopia, for one, is certain that in this
great country of the United States she has
real and lasting friendship. Such a relation-
ship exists not as a matter of accident. It is
rather the result of many similar views and
principles which both Ethiopia and the
U.S.A. share and uphold toward the mainte-
nance of enduring peace for the world.
For without peace, whether on the conti-
nental scope or on a regional level, no nation
can progress. The great concern which we at
times manifest over the events developing
around the eastern part of Africa might
make us Ethiopians look more vigilant and
sensitive than our friends wish us to be.
Yet some of the sad reminiscences of our
own history, the peculiar position which we
occupy in world geography, a delicate situa-
tion which is found on the periphery of an
area which is always fraught with turbu-
lence, leaves us together with the other fellow
Africans to face similar situations with no
alternative but to be extra cautious to safe-
guard our national integrity.
At the same time, however, we shall not, as
always, falter to continue strengthening our
friendship with all our neighbors and
friendly countries on the basis of mutual re-
spect.
We always pray to the Almighty that
peace and understanding reign among all na-
tions on earth. We should also take this op-
portune moment, Mr. President, to express
our deep gratitude for the numerous forms
of assistance which Ethiopia has benefited
from your Government, be it in the form of
technical know-how or in human resource in
all walks of our country's endeavor for na-
tional development.
It is, therefore, with this feeling of our
appreciation that we ask the distinguished
guests to toast the health of the President and
his family and to the lasting amity between
our two countries.
Agreement To Solve Rio Grande
Salinity Problem Approved
Statement by President Johnson
white House press release dated February 10
The Governments of the United States
and Mexico have approved an agreement for
a solution to the Rio Grande salinity prob-
lem recommended by the International
Boundary and Water Commission, United
States and Mexico.
President [Gustavo] Diaz Ordaz of Mexico
joined with me in December 1965 in an-
nouncing the recommendations made by the
Commission.! The project consists of a canal
to be constructed through the territory of
Mexico to convey highly saline drainage from
its Morillo drain to existing drainage chan-
nels in that country and thence to the Gulf
of Mexico. The two countries will divide
equally the costs of construction, operation,
and maintenance and supervise the project
through the International Commission.
Both of our Governments moved quickly
to adopt the recommendations and start con-
struction. Within less than a year. Congress
enacted and I approved authorizing legisla-
tion,2 funds were appropriated for this coun-
try's half of the construction costs, and I was
able to inform the Mexican Government that
the United States was ready to proceed.
Meanwhile, Mexico completed its arrange-
ments. Since construction will be entirely in
Mexico, that Government made the detailed:
designs, arranged for rights of way, and or-
ganized construction work. Mexico has beguni
initial construction and plans to complete the
project early in 1968.
When the new works are in operation, the
harmful drainage will no longer enter the
river. Those who make their homes on both
sides of the river will have better water.
' Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 118.
^ For a statement by President Johnson made upon
signing Public Law 89-584 on Sept. 19, 1966, see
ibid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 686.
428
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN:
Their crops and lands will be free from dan-
gerous concentrations of salts.
I personally thank the many members of
;he Congress who made it possible for us to
nove so quickly in the adoption of this solu-
ion to a difficult international problem. I
;ongratulate the people in the Lower Rio
iJrande Valley of Texas who waited pa-
;iently while this solution was being devel-
)ped, who responded so readily to the call
for their advice and money, and who will
soon enjoy the fruits of our joint labors
with their neighbors to the south.
President Urges Ratification
of New Ship Safety Rules
White House Announcement
White House press release dated February 15
The President sent to the Senate on Feb-
ruary 15, for its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation, a series of amendments to the Interna-
tional Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
of 1960 1 which will tighten drastically the
international safety standards for passenger
ships.
In his message to the Senate ^ the Presi-
dent said the amendments are the result of
thorough and expeditious negotiations within
an international organization to meet a
tragically demonstrated need for better fire
protection for passenger ships. He urged the
Senate to give early and favorable considera-
tion.
The amendments to the safety convention
were proposed by the United States in the
aftermath of the Yarmouth Castle disaster
and were approved by a special Assembly of
the 64-nation Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO) on No-
vember 30, 1966.3 They still require ratifica-
tion by two-thirds of the governments which
are parties to the convention. When the
amendments enter into force they will re-
quire older passenger ships, previously ex-
empted from modern safety standards, to be
substantially rebuilt or withdrawn from serv-
ice. The IMCO Assembly also recommended
immediate implementation of the new stand-
ards before they formally enter into force.
The amendment of the safety convention
complements legislation enacted by the 89th
Congress and signed by the President on No-
vember 6 establishing higher standards for
passenger ships leaving United States ports
and providing for disclosure of safety stand-
ards and financial responsibility of ship op-
erators (P.L. 89-777).
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5780.
^ Not printed here.
' For an article by William K. Miller entitled
"New International Rules for Passenger Ship Safe-
ty," see Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 173.
MARCH 13, 1967
429
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Improving Export Earnings off Developing Countries
Statement by W. Michael BlumenthaV
Mr. Chairman, my delegation considers
this meeting of the Committee on Trade and
Development to be of great importance. We
are meeting at an important time. The Ken-
nedy Round has entered into its final crucial
stages. The work of our Committee can do
much by focusing, at this moment, on the
major issues and opportunities for develop-
ing countries in the Kennedy Round and by
surveying the other aspects of developing
country trade problems on our agenda. By
meeting for the first time in Latin America,
an area of the world where the need for
rapid economic development is constantly in
the forefront of Government thinking and
where the struggle for better earnings from
trade as a means of speeding economic de-
velopment goes on unabated, we are indeed
underlining in a most effective manner the
sum and substance of the work of this Com-
mittee.
The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] has, I believe, made considerable
contributions in helping the trading prob-
lems of the developing countries. Through
the Kennedy Round and a number of other
activities presently underway, more can and
' Made before the eighth session of the GATT
Committee on Trade and Development at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, on Jan. 18. Mr. Blumenthal, who is
the President's Deputy Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, was U.S. delegate to the Com-
mittee, which met Jan. 16-20.
430
must be done in the future. The GATT is
young. It is not yet 20 years old. It has al-
most reached the age of discretion. It is still
growing. It is still impressionable, and it
shows every sign of being able to learn from
experience. Here in Punta del Este we have
an opportunity to step back a minute from
the flurry of our Geneva meetings and nego-
tiations and to assess some of the more sig-
nificant of our activities from the unusual
perspective afforded us by our presence here.
One of the most important ways in which
the GATT can contribute to the solution of
the trade problems of developing countries
is to promote the rapid removal of trade bar-
riers. For it is these barriers which frustrate
efforts to diversify exports, hinder raising
the volume of trade, and inhibit the growth
of export earnings. And the most effective
way in which to lower trade barriers is bj
comprehensive multilateral negotiation.
The Contracting Parties already have
much experience in this field. In successive
tariff conferences levels of protection have
been considerably reduced. The Kennedj
Round now offers the opportunity to take i
further giant step.
The magnitude of this step can perhaps
be appreciated by a comparison with the rec
ord of the past. In a series of negotiations
spread over three decades the United States
reduced its tariff to about half its original
level. Now, in the Kennedy Round, we ar«
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
egotiating- for the reduction of tariffs,
gain by half — but this time over a period
E 5, rather than 30, years.
Specifically, looking at access to the U.S.
larket, what is the stake of the developing
>untries in a successful negotiation?
First: The United States has tabled a sum
)tal of offers on all different types of com-
lodities and manufactured goods — agricul-
iral and industrial, temperate and tropical
involving duty reductions or eliminations
r the binding of unbound free items on $1.1
illion of imports from all less developed
ountries in 1964.
Second: This means, for example, that if
ur Kennedy Round offer is fully taken up,
tie 50 percent of United States 1964 imports
rem developing countries participating in
le Kennedy Round which entered the U.S.
uty-free, bound and guaranteed, would rise
a figure of 63 percent. The 1964 figure on
uty-free imports represents the results of
aluable concessions given in early GATT
legotiations. The new figure would reflect
he added Kennedy Round concessions.
Third: As a part of its total offers, the
Jnited States has tabled offers to accord
mmediate duty-free entry to tropical com-
nodities accounting for more than $300 mil-
ion of our 1964 imports from less developed
ountries participating in the Kennedy
lound. If this offer is taken up we shall have
reed from duty about 70 percent of our total
mports of tropical products from all coun-
ries.
Our tropical products offer reflects our
all sympathy for the view that developed
ountries should make every effort to elim-
nate all duties and other internal barriers
vhich restrict the consumption of tropical
)roducts not generally produced in the devel-
)ped nations of the world. Our Congress
ully shared this view and included special
)rovisions to this effect in the Trade Expan-
ion Act of 1962, thus enabling us to make
)ur far-reaching tropical products offer to
ivhich I have just referred. The offer is com-
prehensive. If implemented, it would add to
the duty-free treatment already accorded by
the United States for key commodities, such
as coffee, cocoa, and bananas, a number of
other important tropical product groups, in-
cluding tropical woods, certain oils, nuts,
spices, and many more.
Our law requires, however, that our offer
on tropical products can only be fully imple-
mented if other major industrialized part-
ners in the negotiations take parallel action.
The United States hopes that it will be pos-
sible for them to do so. We urge all countries
to make a major effort in this field. We in-
tend to exert every effort to insure that
major liberahzation of remaining trade bar-
riers on tropical products results f.om the
negotiations.
Foiirth: The U.S. Kennedy Round offers
cover more than 90 percent of our dutiable
imports of manufactured goods from develop-
ing countries participating in the negotia-
tions. Our imports of such items amounted
to more than $300 million in 1964. Our offers
on them are in the main for duty reductions
of 50 percent, the maximum we are author-
ized to offer by law. We consider this to be
of major importance for the trade prospects
of our developing country negotiating
partners.
Fifth: It follows from what I have just
said that the United States has made every
effort to keep items of interest to partici-
pating less developed countries off its excep-
tions lists and on its offers lists. Moreover,
we have offered deeper than 50 percent reduc-
tions and the implementation of reductions
without staging wherever possible under our
legislation.
Sixth: We are making every effort to as-
sure trade liberalization and enlarged trading
opportunities for products where the level
of imports is not always inhibited by tariff
protection alone. For example, we have ac-
tively engaged in bilateral negotiations with
cotton textile exporting countries and as a
part of the Kennedy Round we have sought,
in the context of a renewed Long-Term
Cotton Textile Arrangement, to agree about
MARCH 13, 1967
431
action on tariff as well as nontariff barriers.
The result can be a maximum growth in
cotton textile trade compatible with an
orderly development of our domestic market.
By working out certain bilateral understand-
ings on our cotton textile trade, we think that
exporting countries can look toward growing
export earnings from this vital sector. At the
same time, our domestic industry can be as-
sured of a continuation of necessary, limited
levels of protection to safeguard their health
and well-being.
Cotton textiles are a vital export item for
many developing nations. The Kennedy
Round can and should be used as the means
for similar negotiations between other coun-
tries exporting and importing cotton textiles.
Seventh: The United States, together with
other exporting countries, has proposed the
addition of a multilateral food aid component
as a part of a world grains arrangement
under negotiation in the Kennedy Round. My
country is willing to undertake a significant
share of the responsibility for such a pro-
gram, and we hope that all major partici-
pating nations, exporters and importers alike,
will assume a share of the burden.
The whole effort of seeking in the Kennedy
Round to work out comprehensive arrange-
ments for important temperate commodities,
such as cereals, meats, and dairy products, is
of vital interest not only to developed coun-
tries like my own but also to those developing
nations who rely heavily on export earnings
in this field. I am thinking particularly of
Argentina and Uruguay, Mr. Chairman, who
have a heavy stake in the successful outcome
of our negotiations in this area. For those
countries in particular, the success of the
Kennedy Round will in no small measure
be determined by the extent to which the
negotiations on temperate agricultural prod-
ucts can assure them continued access to
major world markets and reasonable prices
for their products.
Mr. Chairman, these are a few of the prin-
cipal elements of that part of the U.S. Ken-
nedy Round offer which is of particular in-
432
terest to developing countries. They show
why these negotiations are so important and
why so much is at stake for the developing
countries' trade. The United States is, of
course, not the only developed country
participating in the Kennedy Round. All the
other major world trading nations are negoti-
ating partners in Geneva. The offers of many
of these countries would, if taken up, be of
equal importance in promoting developing
countries' export trade. The sum total of what
is at stake in the Kennedy Round is impres-
sive indeed.
Kennedy Round Contributions
We are, however, merely talking about
offers at this point. The next few months will
be critical; they will determine how exten-
sively the offers presently on the table can
be implemented and, indeed, to what extent
they can be further improved. To achieve the
best possible result, it is now time for each
participant to review its position in the light
of the positions of others and to make a
major effort to overcome discrepancies and
imbalance. For example, we have all agreed
that the developing countries in the Ken-
nedy Round need not provide full reciprocity
for the important benefits they are likely tc
receive. Yet it has been clear all along thai
developing countries also should, partly in
their own interest, make some contributions
to the Kennedy Round — contributions con-
sonant with their economic developmeni
needs.
The present picture in this regard is noi
a satisfactory one. At this point there an
few concrete tariff offers from participating
developing countries on the table. It is essen-
tial that every effort be made to remedy this
situation. For while full reciprocity is no1
necessary, if the gap cannot be reduced tht
end effect may well be adverse for developed
and developing countries alike. Unless devel-
oping countries' contributions are included ir
the final settlement, developed countries are
less likely to be able to give the most effectivt
consideration to the needs of the less devel-
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
ped nations. In particular, this could ad-
ersely affect their decisions on final adjust-
lent of offers among each other.
Secondly, in the absence of some effort by
16 developing nations, the likelihood that
ome of the major consuming countries will
urther improve their offers — or, indeed, that
ley will implement all offers presently on the
able — is reduced. As I mentioned earlier, the
bility of the United States to implement a
ood many of its tropical products offers de-
ends on like action by other advanced coun-
ries. Moreover, the Trade Expansion Act
rovides that we can best utilize our powers
or trade liberalization only if all countries
lake contributions to the final negotiating
esults.
Volution of GATT Assistance
The GATT, from the beginning, was de-
igned to raise standards of living and to
romote the economic development of its
embers. At its inception there were 23 Con-
racting Parties, of which 11 were less devel-
iped countries. Now there are 70 Contracting
'arties and a total of 84 countries who par-
icipate in the GATT; 60 of these are less
leveloped countries, and over two-thirds of
oday's Contracting Parties fall into this
ategory. This growth in membership is per-
laps the best indication of the importance of
he work of the GATT to the less developed
jarts of the world.
In order to make the General Agreement
nore responsive to the needs of the less
leveloped countries, the GATT was revised
n certain aspects in 1954-55. More recently,
;he three new articles which constitute part
[V were added, and this Committee was
jstablished. Part IV of the General Agree-
nent is now in effect among the Contracting
Parties which have subscribed to the relevant
protocol. Some 50 Contracting Parties, in-
zluding the United States, have already done
30. We strongly urge that all the remaining
Contracting Parties adhere to it as soon as
possible.
It follows from this brief reference to the
evolution of the GATT in its work on develop-
ing country trade that the Kennedy Round is
by no means the only forum in which im-
portant work on such problems is going for-
ward. Indeed, my country is gratified to note
the many activities of this Committee and
other GATT bodies designed to promote de-
veloping country trade. I should like to com-
ment briefly on a few of these here.
Special Efforts To Lower Trade Barriers
Even before the General Agreement con-
tained the provisions of part IV, the Con-
tracting Parties did a great deal to> open the
major markets of the world to the products
of developing countries. In 1947 and for some
years thereafter, many developed countries
were still experiencing postwar balance-of-
payments difficulties. They applied temporary
quantitative import restrictions to safeguard
their reserves. When these economies had re-
covered and international currency converti-
bility had been restored, the justification for
continuing the systematic application of
quantitative import restrictions disappeared.
The situation of each country applying these
restrictions was discussed in consultation
with the IMF [International Monetary Fund]
and with the GATT Contracting Parties, and
the great majority of the restrictive quotas
were discontinued.
However, there are still a limited number
of quantitative restrictions applicable to
items of export interest to developing coun-
tries. Most of these so-called residual restric-
tions apply to agricultural products, are in-
tended to protect domestic agriculture, and
are inconsistent with the GATT. My delega-
tion urges countries which maintain such re-
strictions to move now to eliminate them. We
support appropriate procedure in the GATT
to bring about further progress in the reduc-
tion and elimination of the remaining re-
sidual restrictions on products of interest to
developing countries.
The principal export interest of the de-
veloping countries today remains in primary
commodities: minerals, tropical and non-
MARCH 13, 1967
433
tropical foodstuffs and fibers, and forestry
products. In general, duties on such products
are relatively low, pai'ticularly since many
countries have removed or suspended duties
on several of these products unilaterally,
acting in the spirit of part IV.
The United States, for example, has sus-
pended duties on copper, manganese, bauxite,
nickel, graphite, certain hardwoods (includ-
ing tropical hardwood), istle, cork insulating
board, silla yarn, tanning extracts, palm nuts
and kernels, and palm oil. Most industrialized
countries have eliminated or suspended duties
on tea and tropical timber, and the documen-
tation for this committee meeting notes that
since the adoption of part IV developed coun-
tries have eliminated duties on over 30 items
of interest to less developed countries, have
reduced duties on several others, and have
temporarily suspended duties on over 20
more.
My delegation hopes that this trend can
be continued. The Kennedy Round may pre-
sent a particular opportunity to make
progress in this regard. We urge all countries
to do their utmost in this regard.
Developing as well as developed countries
are succeeding in lowering barriers in cus-
toms areas and free trade areas. The Central
American Common Market and the Latin
American Free Trade Association afford in-
teresting examples of what developing coun-
tries are doing to further the development of
their trade and their economies on the basis
of regional cooperation. As the GATT survey,
"International Trade 1965," notes, intra-
Latin American trade increased by almost
one-fifth in 1965. Intra-Central American
trade increased by about 14 percent in that
year. In the period 1960-1965 the total trade
of the Central American Common Market
countries increased about 1%. times; trade
among these countries, however, grew nearly
three times as rapidly and in 1965 was 41/2
times what it was in 1960.
The United States continues to be a strong
supporter of these regional common markets
in Latin America. We believe that a study of
their experience might be of great benefit to
434
developing countries in other parts of the
world. We would encourage the Latin Ameri-
can countries to disseminate through the Con-
tracting Parties fuller knowledge of the tech-
niques they have found useful in lowering'
trade barriers and furthering economic de-
velopment.
The Contracting Parties, in article XXIV
of the GATT, established guidelines for the
formation and operation of regional customs
unions and free trade areas so that they
may contribute on the one hand to the
advancement of national planning for trade
and development and on the other to the
worldwide interchange of resources through
trade. The United States has proposed that
the GATT be amended to permit the estab-
lishment, when certain criteria are met, of
regional arrangements other than customs-
unions or free trade areas for trade lib-
eralization among developing countries.
Negotiating Workable Commodity Agreements
Mr. Chairman, the problems of trade ini
primary commodities have two general aS'
pects. There is the question of removing tarifl(
and nontariff barriers which impede trade iij
these products. There is also the question oli
negotiating workable commodity agreements!
for certain of them. My delegation considera
it important and in the interest of develop
ing countries exporting primary products t(
progress on both fronts.
On the one hand, for some products of de
veloping countries— coffee and cocoa ar«
examples of such commodities — commodity
agreements could be useful. The Unitec
States hopes that the International Coffe*
Agreement may be supplemented by a work
able cocoa agreement and perhaps by othei
commodity agreements as well. However
there do not appear to be many commoditie;
for which comprehensive commodity agree
ments could be negotiated, and the complex
task of dealing with proposals for such nego
tiations falls largely outside the GATT.
On the other hand, in the GATT we cai
negotiate the reduction of tariff and non
tariff barriers not only for the relatively fev
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIM
3Ut important commodities that migfht sooner
)r later be the subject of commodity agree-
ments but also for the whole range of com-
modities which, for one reason or another,
may never be dealt with in such agreements.
Tariff Preferences for Manufactured Products
As we indicated when we were considering
the status of the Kennedy Round, we sub-
scribe fully to the objective of maximum re-
ductions in trade barriers to facilitate in-
creased LDC earnings. We consider that cuts
in the Kennedy Round can do much to achieve
this aim.
Many countries have suggested that in
addition to such most-favored-nation cuts, we
go further and reduce barriers to developing
countries even in cases where developed coun-
tries are not prepared at the time to reduce
"duties among themselves. A number of spe-
cific suggestions as to how this would be done
have been put forward. As you know, the
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] Ministerial Council
asked for a special study to try to arrive at a
harmonized, constructive position designed
to promote the export earnings of the devel-
o]iing countries. While this study has not
been completed, we believe that good progress
has been made and that the work will be
inessed forward with all participants show-
i| ing flexibility and an openminded willingness
I to give fair consideration to all suggestions
I put forward.
The question of special tariff treatment for
developing countries raises a number of basic
policy issues. In the first place, the continued
progress toward the reduction of trade bar-
riers on a worldwide basis should not in any
way be hindered. And the maintenance of
trading rules which minimize interference
with the free flow of goods is essential. There
are also questions about the relationship of
any new scheme to existing special arrange-
ments. These, and many other considerations,
add up to a major policy issue, and we in the
United States Government are looking at
them very carefully.
The GATT Trade Information Center and
the program of GATT trade and development
plan studies are two areas of special activity
in behalf of developing countries which we
can all endorse. We believe that the Con-
tracting Parties have done well in establish-
ing the International Trade Center and in
gradually expanding it with the advice of the
Group of Experts on Trade Promotion.
In view of the growing demand for the
services offered by the center and the endorse-
ment by developing countries of the useful-
ness of these services, I have been authorized
to inform this meeting that my Government,
for its part, expects to be able to lend to the
center in 1967 an experienced trade promo-
tion officer from the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce. We hope that this will
further strengthen the center's work and will
complement the assistance given by other
governments which have contributed per-
sonnel and technical assistance to the center.
Furthermore, the U.S. Agency for Inter-
national Development and the GATT are cur-
rently working on a new training program to
help developing countries expand export
trade. A pilot project, which we hope to initi-
ate within a few months, would be focused on
developing of export potential in selected
countries and on meeting requirements for in-
ternational marketing. It would bring to-
gether governmental oflficials and entrepre-
neurs from developing countries in a training
partnership. The plan under consideration
would bring five teams of two participants
each to the United States. It would be aimed
at analyzing the extent to which the ingredi-
ents for a successful development of exports
for food processing industries were present
in the participants' countries, at studying
effective techniques for marketing such prod-
ucts abroad and for necessary action at home
so as to improve the viability of export activi-
ties.
We see this new program as a link between
promoting the growth of export earnings of
participating countries and of their economic
development. This of course is one of the
key objectives of part IV of the GATT.
Mr. Chairman, the many varied activities
MARCH 13, 1967
435
of the GATT and of the Committee on Trade
and Development make, in my view, an im-
portant contribution toward helping to lift
the level of export earnings of the developing
countries. As I have indicated in my survey of
the present situation, the United States has
in the past sought to play its part in collabo-
rating with this effort. We shall continue to
do so in the future. We believe that the
Kennedy Round and the many parallel activi-
ties of the GATT provide opportunities which
should not be missed. My delegation will fol-
low with interest the work of this Committee
during the coming days. We are confident
that this meeting in Punta del Este will go
down as another important milestone in the
history of the General Agreement.
Latin American Nations Conclude
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
A treaty to prohibit nuclear tveapons in
Latin America {Treaty of Tlatelolco) was
signed by H Latin American nations at
Mexico City on Fehrrtary 14. The United
States ivas not a signatory but expects, along
tvith other non-Latin American nations, to
receive a formal request to sign additional
protocols. Follotving is a statement present-
ing the United States' initial vietvs on the
treaty, which ivas submitted to Alfonso
Garcia Robles, Chairman of the Preparatory
Commission for the Denuclearization of
Latin America, by Ambassador Fulton Free-
man, U.S. Observer to the Preparatory Com-
mission, and read at a plenary meeting on
Febmary 13.
Press release 35 dated February 14
The United States Government has fol-
lowed with interest the deliberations of the
Preparatory Commission for the Denuclear-
ization of Latin America, particularly with
respect to the question of peaceful nuclear
explosions.
It is our understanding of the text of the
treaty that, based on present and foreseeable
436
technology, contracting parties are prohib-
ited from acquiring nuclear explosive de-
vices for peaceful purposes, as well as de-
vices identified as nuclear weapons. This'^
follows from the provisions of articles 1 and
5 of the treaty.
We understand article 18 to permit the
carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions
by contracting parties themselves only if and
when future advances in technology permit
the development of devices for peaceful ex-
plosions which are not susceptible of use for
weapons purposes. This is shown by the
concluding proviso in paragraph 1 of
article 18.
However, we understand article 18 per-
mits, as of the present time, the carrying out
of peaceful nuclear explosions through ap-
propriate international arrangements with
countries now possessing nuclear explosive
devices. This is shown by paragraph 4 of
article 18.
The foregoing understanding of the effect
of the treaty is fundamental to the United
States Government's position concerning it.
The United States considers the conclusion
of this first international instrument estab-
lishing a nuclear free zone to be an event of
unique significance, and the U.S. will study
the detailed provisions of the treaty with
great interest. We hope that the treaty will
constitute a milestone on the road to general
and complete disarmament and in particular
that it will lead in the near future to the
conclusion of a worldwide treaty prohibiting
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
We therefore wish to extend to you, Mr.
Chairman, and to the representatives of the
nations participating in the Preparatory
Commission, the congratulations of the
United States Government on the achieve-
ment of the treaty.
In view of the restrictions that the mem-
bers of the Preparatory Commission have
agreed to accept on the development of nu-
clear explosive devices for peaceful purposes
— and which we hope other non-nuclear-
weapon countries will eventually also accept
— the United States believes that at such
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I) time as nuclear explosive devices for peace-
ful purposes may become technologically
dJfeasible and economically practical, their pos-
lii! sible benefits should be made available on
M( an equitable basis to all countries, regardless
of the stage of their technological achieve-
ment. Appropriate international arrange-
ments to this end will, of course, have to be
considered in a wider context than the Pre-
paratory Commission affords.
,
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purcliased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Reports on compliance with Security Council Reso-
lution 232 regarding Southern Rhodesia. Mexico,
S/7646, New Zealand, S/7647, December 27, 1966;
U.S.S.R., S/7672, January 10, 1967; Brazil,
S/7676, January 12, 1967; Algeria, S/7693, Janu-
ary 20, 1967; Gabon, S/7700, January 26, 1967;
United States, S/7701, Niger, S/7702, Ivory
Coast, S/7703, January 27, 1967; Bulgaria, S/7706,
January 30, 1967; India, S/7709, January 31,
1967; Australia, S/7710, Denmark, S/7711,
Greece, S/7712, February 1, 1967; Guinea, S/7714,
February 2, 1967; Poland, S/7715, February 3,
1967; Hungary, S/7716, Mongolia, S/7717, Ethi-
opia, S/7719, February 6, 1967.
Letter dated January 5, 1967, from the Secretary-
General to governments containing a further ap-
peal for voluntary contributions for the financing
of the U.N. Force in Cyprus. S/7669. January
9, 1967. 3 pp.
Note by the Secretary-General concerning technical
consultants to visit Zambia to study certain needs
for technical assistance which originated from the
application of mandatory sanctions against
Southern Rhodesia. S/7720. February 6, 1967. 2 pp.
General Assembly
UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees] Programme for 1967. A/AC.96/342.
October 4, 1966. 100 pp.
Work of the Main Committees During the Twenty-
first Session of the General Assembly. Note by
the Secretary-General. A/6633. December 30,
1966. 15 pp.
Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa. Infor-
mation on South West Africa. Working Paper
prepared by the Secretariat. A/AC.129/L.2. Feb-
ruary 3, 1967. 100 pp.
MARCH 13, 1967
Economic and Social Council
Economic Commission for Africa:
Report of the Sub-Regional Meeting on Economic
Co-operation in North Africa, Tangier, June
20-24, 1966. E/CN. 14/354. June 24, 1966. 55 pp.
Report of the Governing Council of the African
Institute for Economic Development and Plan-
ning. E/CN.14/367. November 8, 1966. 58 pp.
Report of the Sub-Regional Meeting on Economic
Co-operation in West Africa, Niamey, October
10-22, 1966. E/CN. 14/366. November 11, 1966.
91 pp.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:
Summary records of 22d session. New Delhi,
March 22-April 4, 1966. E/CN.11/740. July 5,
1966. 287 pp.
Commission for Social Development:
Land Reform. Conclusions of the 1966 World
Land Reform Conference in Relation to Social
Development. Note by the Secretary-General. E/
CN.5/411. January 10, 1967. 12 pp.
Technical Co-operation Activities in Social Devel-
opment. Report of the Secretary-General. E/
CN.5/412. January 23, 1967. 32 pp.
Progress Report on Programmes in the Field of
Social Development. Implementation of United
Nations social development programmes during
the period January 1, 1965-December 31, 1966.
Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/409.
January 31, 1967. 29 pp.
Commission on Human Rights :
Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities. Study of Dis-
crimination Against Persons Born Out of Wed-
lock. E/CN.4/Sub.2/262. November 7, 1966.
296 pp.
Working Group To Study the Proposal To Create
the Institution of a United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. Analytical and
Technical Study Prepared by the Secretary-
General Under Paragraph 3 of Resolution 4
(XXII) of the Commission on Human Rights.
E/CN.4/AC.21/L.1. December 30, 1966. 87 pp.
Draft Declaration and Draft International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance. Note by the Secretary-
General. E/CN.4/920. January 11, 1967. 29 pp.
Question of Punishment of War Criminals and
of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes
Against Humanity. Preliminary draft conven-
tion on the non-applicability of statutory limi-
tation to war crimes and crimes against
humanity, submitted by the Secretary-General.
E/CN.4/928. January 25, 1967. 23 pp.
Report of the Nineteenth Session of the Sub-com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, New York, January
4-23, 1967. E/CN.4/930. January 27, 1967.
127 pp.
Measures Taken in Implementation of the United
Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Texts of (or
extracts from) decisions taken by United Nations
organs containing provisions relevant to the
question of the violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial
discrimination and segregation and of apartheid
in all countries, with particular reference to
colonial and other dependent countries and ter-
ritories. First annual supplement prepared by
the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/923. February 1,
1967. 56 pp.
437
1
TREATY INFORMATION
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and ||
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Signatures : Austria, February 20, 1967; Lebanon,
February 23, 1967; Malaysia, February 20, *
1967.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by
the Commission. Done at Washington November
29, 1965.'
Approval deposited: France, February 15, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington
November 29, 1965.'
Approval deposited: France, February 15, 1967.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite system.
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered
into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Korea, February 24, 1967.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.
Signature: Ministry of Communications of Korea,
February 24, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
BILATERAL
Colombia
Amendment to the agreement of April 9, 1962
(TIAS 5330), for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February
24, 1967. Enters into force on the date on which
each Government shall have received from the
other written notification that it has complied with
all statutory and constitutional requirements for
entry into force.
Indonesia
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Djakarta January
7, 1967. Enters into force on the date of a note
from Indonesia stating that agreement has been
approved in conformity with Indonesian constitu-
tional procedures.
Iran
Amendment to the agreement of March 5, 1957
(TIAS 4207), for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8,
1964.
Entered into force: January 26, 1967.
Somali Republic
Agreement extending the technical cooperation
program agreement of January 28 and February
4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738,
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mogadiscio January 31, 1967. Entered into force
February 1, 1967.
' Not in force.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1446 PUBLICATION 8212 MARCH 13, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the OflBce of
Media Servicee. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developmenta in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releasee on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTB; Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.
438
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Index March 13, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U6
.tomic Energy. Latin American Nations Con-
clude Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (U.S. state-
ment) 436
Ihina. Communist China (U. Alexis Johnson) . 420
Jongress. President Urges Ratification of New
Ship Safety Rules 429
)eveloping Countries
mproving Export Earnings of Developing
Countries (Blumenthal) 430
'he Politics of Progress (Rostow) 398
Nsarmament
jatin American Nations Conclude Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty (U.S. statement) ... 436
'he Politics of Progress (Rostow) 398
tconomic Affairs
greement To Solve Rio Grande Salinity Prob-
lem Approved (Johnson) 428
Constructive Initiatives in East-West Rela-
tions (Kohler) 406
mproving Export Earnings of Developing
Countries (Blumenthal) 430
The Politics of Progress (Rostow) 398
President Urges Ratification of New Ship
Safety Rules 429
'oward a Community of the Developed Na-
tions (Brzezinski) 414
J.S. and Japan Adjourn Talks on Fishing in
New U.S. Zone 424
BSthiopia. Emperor of Ethiopia Visits the United
States (Emperor Haile Selassie I, Johnson) . 425
Burope
lonstructive Initiatives in East-West Rela-
tions (Kohler) 406
Toward a Community of the Developed Na-
tions (Brzezinski) 414
Foreign Aid. The Politics of Progress (Rostow) 398
International Organizations and Conferences.
Improving Export Earnings of Developing
Countries (Blumenthal) ► 430
Japan. U.S. and Japan Adjourn Talks on
Fishing in New U.S. Zone 424
Latin America. Latin American Nations Con-
clude Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (U.S. state-
ment) 436
Mexico. Agreement To Solve Rio Grande Salin-
ity Problem Approved (Johnson) 428
Population. The Politics of Progress (Rostow) 398
Presidential Documents
Agreement To Solve Rio Grande Salinity Prob-
lem Approved 428
Emperor of Ethiopia Visits the United States 425
Trade. Improving Export Earnings of Devel-
oping Countries (Blumenthal) 430
Treaty Information
Current Actions 438
President Urges Ratification of New Ship
Safety Rules 429
U.S.S.R.
Constructive Initiatives in East- West Relations
(Kohler) 406
Toward a Community of the Developed Na-
tions (Brzezinski) 414
United Nations. Current U.N. Documents . . 437
Name Index
Blumenthal, W. Michael 430
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 414
Freeman, Fulton 436
Emperor Haile Selassie I 425
Johnson, President 425, 428
Johnson, U. Alexis 420
Kohler, Foy D 406
Rostow, Eugene V 398
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: February 20-26
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D. C, 20520.
Release issued prior to February 20 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No.
36 of Febniary 16.
No. Date Subject
'*38 2/20 U.S.-Italian civil aviation nego-
tiations.
39 2/20 Rostow: "The Politics of Prog-
ress."
40 2/23 U.S.^apanese fisheries discus-
sions adjourn.
t41 2/23 Sisco: "The United Nations: An
Arena for Peaceful East-West
Engagement."
■* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■ir U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/36
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2040Z
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The letter from the students, addressed to President Johnson on December 29, 1966, 1
responded to in a point-by-point reply by Secretary Rusk on January 4, 1967. In his reply,|
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riding question for all mankind in this last third of the Twentieth Century — how to organi
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. 1U7
March 20, 1967
SOUTHERN RHODESIA: THE ISSUE OF MAJORITY RULE
by Assistant Secretary Palmer M9
THE U.N.: AN ARENA FOR PEACEFUL EAST-WEST ENGAGEMENT
by Assistant Secretary Sisco 458
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
MEET AT BUENOS AIRES 472
SECRETARY McNAMARA COMMENTS ON RISKS
OF ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEM
Transcript of BBC Interview UU2
For index see inside back cover
Secretary McNamara Comments on Risks
of Anti-Ballistic-Missile System
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa-
mara by James Mossman of the British
Broadcasting Company's television program
"Panorama," which was videotaped at Wash-
ington on February 15. Portions of the inter-
view were televised on "Panorama" on Feb-
ruary 20.
Q. Mr. McNamara, is it your opinion the
introduction of an ABM system in America
and Russia would destabilize the nuclear
relationship ?
A. No, certainly not. I don't believe it
would have any significant effect on the nu-
clear balance of power. I don't believe that
either nation, if it has the technical and
financial capability to prevent such an ef-
fect, could tolerate that eff"ect. And therefore
I don't believe it would be destabilizing.
Q. Well, why do you oppose its implemen-
tation then ?
A. Because I think that it would require a
very large investment, that it would not sig-
nificantly change the balance of power; it
would not protect our people, and therefore
it would be wasteful. That's my primary rea-
son for objecting to it.
But beyond that, I believe it would ac-
tually increase the risk to both of the parties
were they to deploy anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tems. And I say that, paradoxical though
it may sound, because of my strong feeling
that each of us, the Soviets and the West,
must, to the extent it is technically and finan-
cially capable of doing so, erect a deterrent
against a potential strike by the other.
We have that deterrent capability today; in
442
a very real sense the Soviets have it as well.
We feel we must keep it. I don't know of
any reason why they should think differently
than we in this point. The question is. Would
the deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile
system make it impossible to keep it? and I
think the answer is "No."
Were the other side to fail to react to the
deployment of an anti-ballistic-missile sys-
tem, the deterrent balance would be changed.
But if the other side has the necessity to
react and the capability of reacting, one must
assume it will. And I think it would.
Q. But you're saying —
A. But therein lies the problem of addi-
tional risk and a paradox. Because each of
us is operating with uncertain knowledge of
the other, and, hence, when we react, we
react on the basis of uncertain knowledge.
Because we know our knowledge is uncertain,
in effect we overreact, because we forecast
the most extreme set of circumstances. We
credit the other side with a much greater ca-
pability than in all likelihood it has. We react
to that much greater capability than exists,
and, hence, after the deployment, we are in
effect worse off than we were before. And
the world is facing a greater risk.
Q. Did either side — if either side starts
deploying ABM's, the other side will then
step up its offensive capacity?
A. Yes, yes —
Q. And both sides will do this?
A. — yes, exactly. And, in effect, this has
happened already.
Q. You've responded to them?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A. We have started to respond to them.
We knew a year or two or three ago that
;hey were beginning to move toward deploy-
ment of ABM's, and last year we presented
to the Congress a program of reaction; and
jecause our knowledge of the Soviet ABM
deployment was uncertain and incomplete, I
estimated the worst possible set of circum-
stances, circumstances almost surely beyond
what we will actually face. We reacted to that
greater-than-expected threat — if you will,
greater-than-probable threat — and therefore
the Soviets in a very literal sense are worse
off today and will be worse off in the future
than had they never started to deploy an
anti-ballistic-missile system.
Balance of Offensive-Defensive Actions
Q. You would prefer to react by building
up the offensive side of your capacity and
not by competing in the defensive?
A. Why yes, because if their action is to
^protect their people, it reduces our deterrent
unless we build up our offensive force to
have the power to penetrate that defense.
So it isn't an either/or situation. It isn't we
either build our offense or we build a defense
to protect our people. The only logical and
rational reaction to a Soviet defensive move
is for us to strengthen our offense. Now, that
doesn't mean we shouldn't also consider a
defensive move. But if we do so consider it,
it's for reasons other than as a reaction to
their defensive move.
Q. Well, what would those reasons be then?
A. We might wish to protect our own peo-
ple and reduce the loss to this nation in the
event deterrence fails. We must have, or
must try to have, two capabilities in our nu-
clear forces. One is a capability to deter a
Soviet attack on the West and the other is
a capability to limit damage to the West in
the event deterrence fails. It's this second
capability which we might seek to obtain by
deploying an anti-ballistic-missile system.
Q. Do you think —
A. I say, "seek to obtain" because I don't
believe we can attain it.
Q. If one did deploy that system, do you
think it would make people, in a sort of
ghastly sense, prepared for a war which they
might overcome. Hence, endanger — accelerat-
ing the possibility —
A. No. No, I don't think so. And the reason
I say that is I don't believe any responsible
group of people in this country or any re-
sponsible leader, scientific or political or
military, believes that any anti-ballistic-
missile defense we could presently contem-
plate would so reduce damage to this nation
as to make nuclear war acceptable —
Q. Do you think the Russians —
A. — or desirable.
Q. Do you think the Russians believe their
system would work ?
A. No, I — I think they believe it would
work in the sense of being to their advan-
tage to deploy it, reducing the damage to
their people in the event of war, but I don't
believe they think it would work to the extent
of making nuclear war acceptable. The rea-
son I say that is that they have been almost
fanatical on the subject of defense for years;
over the past decade or decade and a half
they have spent perhaps 214 times as much
as we have spent on air defense. And yet,
they must know that that air defense was
sievelike, and I mean literally sievelike, be-
cause we always had the capability to pene-
trate it. There was never any doubt in our
minds, and I don't believe there was any
doubt in their minds.
At no time during that decade and a half,
when they were spending 21/2 times as much
as we, did they ever indicate that they
thought we lacked a capability to deter their
strike against us. And if we had that capa-
bility to deter it, it simply meant that we
could penetrate their defenses. So they were
in effect by their action admitting we could
penetrate their defense.
Q. Why did they make this tremendous de-
fensive buildup? Is that just their own na-
ture?
A. It's their psychology. It's their strong
MARCH 20, 1967
443
emotional reaction to the need to defend
Mother Russia.
Q. Mr. Rosy gin [Aleksei N. Rosy gin,
Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers]
said in London that it is better to build de-
fense weapons than offensive ones. Is that a
valid distinction ?
A. No. No. They're not alternatives. As I
mentioned a moment ago, we must build
more offense because he's building more de-
fense.
Nature of Bargaining Factor
Q. Oh, yes, I see that. I'm very confused by
this distinction. I must say that I think
you've made it pretty clear. I have been told
by supporters of the ABM system here that
it will give you a strong bargaining factor
with the Russians if you started one now to
lotv level before negotiations.
A. Well, it depends on how rational they
are. If they really believe that a move to
deploy a defense is in no way a warlike move,
they probably would not react adversely to
our deployment of a defense, and in that
event our statement, "We would deploy if
they deployed," would not give us a bargain-
ing lever to move them to restrict their de-
ployment.
If they believe that our reaction will be,
as it will be, to increase our offensive force
and that, because we have uncertain knowl-
edge of the power of their defense, we must
in effect overreact, then I would think that's
the strongest —
Q. Stronger bargaining factor —
A. — bargaining position from which we
may negotiate. And that's exactly the fact.
That's what we're doing, and that's what
we're going to continue to do, and the risk
is great to them; the risk of loss to their
people will be greater as a result of this
action than it would be otherwise, and the
cost to them of financial — in financial terms
of diversion of resources will be very high
indeed.
Q. If you look at the world through the
Russian eyes for a moment, they're building
up a defensive system. They say you have a
vastly superior striking force. Doesn't that
make sense if you say you fear that they may
even believe that this thing would be effec-
tive to some extent? Aren't they in fact
literally responding to what apj)ears to be
a vastly superior offensive force?
A. Well, if they are, they are responding
in an erroneous way. I — in a sense, if I were
they, I wouldn't consider our force vastly
superior. It is superior in numbers for rea-
sons we needn't go into, but we're quite pre-
pared to say, and I've stated publicly, that
we with our force, superior as it is in num-
bers, do not have sufficient power to destroy
them without in effect destroying ourselves
in the process. So what we are really saying
is that they have power to deter large-scale
nuclear attack initiated by the U.S., and we
have power to deter large-scale nuclear at-
tack initiated by the Soviet Union.
Q. This is the plateau you want to freeze?
A. Well, no, no, I'm not suggesting I want
to freeze it; I'm just saying that is a fact,
and technically it's a relationship that's very
difficult for either of us to move out of un-
less the other simply fails to act in a rational
fashion.
Q. In your testimony, Mr. McNamara, you
seem to hint that the story ivasn't ahvays in
terms of numerical superiority. Were you
hinting that their payloads might be bigger
than yours, that —
A. No, no, no. Certainly not, because I
don't think a difference in payload is of great
significance here. No, I was simply saying
that numerical superiority today in these
weapons does not bring with it the political
advantage that numerical superiority in mili-
tary forces brought with it over the past two
or three centuries.
Q. Would your talks with the Russians on
disarmament be limited to the ABM?
A. Perhaps not. I think it would depend on
their interest in other subjects. It might very
well move into offensive weapons as well.
Q. Can I ask if, as part of an arrangement,
you would expect them to dismantle an ABM
444
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
system if you weren't going to build one
yourself ?
A. Well, it's much too early to —
Q. Well, let me put it this way: Hypothet-
ically, if the Russians pushed on ivith an
ABM system, you couldn't afford not to do
the same ?
A. No, I won't even state that liypothet-
ically. Our position at present is that we
believe it's disadvantageous to the parties to
engage in deployment of ABM's against each
other.
We do wish to engage in conversations
with the Soviets to seek to limit ABM de-
ployments. We are anxious to avoid any arms
race in strategic nuclear weapons. We do
recognize the talks may be unsuccessful, how-
ever. We have provided, therefore, in our
new financial program, now lying before our
Congress, for the appropriation of $377
million as a small initial payment on the
deployment of an ABM system in this coun-
try, should that later prove desirable.
I've said publicly I don't believe it would
be desirable, if its purpose were the defense
of our cities against Soviet attacks. But it
might be desirable for other reasons. For ex-
ample, the protection of our offensive weap-
ons. Because we can strengthen our offensive
weapons force which move is required as an
offset to their defensive move by either add-
ing weapons or protecting the weapons we
have in it. And for the latter purpose, we
might wish to deploy an anti-ballistic-missile
system.
Question of Chinese Nuclear Threat
Q. Is there any logic in having an ABM —
anti-ballistic-missile system — at a low level
both for you and Russia, perhaps to counter
a Chinese nuclear threat in the seventies?
A. There may be. Yes, there may well be.
We haven't made a decision on that yet; it
isn't necessary for us to do so, because the
lead time required by the Chinese to develop
and produce and deploy any substantial
offensive force is greater than the lead time
we require to deploy a defensive force. So
this is a matter for the future.
U.S., U.S.S.R. To Exchange Views
on Limiting Nuclear Arms Race
statement by President Johnson '
I have a brief announcement to make. I have
received a reply from Chairman Kosygin to
my letter of January 27." This reply confirmed
the willingness of the Soviet Government to
discuss means of limiting the arms race in
offensive and defensive nuclear missiles.
This exchange of views is expected to lead
to further discussions of this subject in Mos-
cow and with our allies. It is my hope that
a means can be found to achieve construc-
tive results.
' Made at the opening of a news confer-
ence at the White House on Mar. 2.
' Not printed.
Q. Some of the military men seem to be
rather aghast about your cool assumption
that you have a lot of time to decide these
things.
A. Well, we don't have perhaps a lot of
time, but we have more time than requires
the forces of decision this year.
Q. Would you say that an ABM system
would make your ability to protect your
allies more credible, as also is being argued?
A. No, no. No, because we would have to
say what was the truth, and that is that an
ABM system, assuming the Soviets react to
it, as I believe they must, will not protect
either our population or our allies' popula-
tion.
Q. When you worked with President
Kennedy, Mr. McNamara, you — betiveen
you — created a much wider set of options for
offensive possibilities; you opened up a lot of
options. Noiv, wouldn't the ABM system just
be adding another option?
A. Not if it's — not if it's reacted to by
one's opponent.
Q. You must think I'm very stupid, but
I'm getting the point.
A. No, this is exactly the point. You see,
MARCH 20, 1967
445
we start with the assumption that the U.S.
must be able to deter a large-scale Soviet
attack on Western Europe or the continental
U.S. I think everyone would agree that this
is the foundation of our security. We must
have that capability.
But if we accept that, I think we're forced
to accept that the Soviets must have a
similar requirement. They must be capable
of deterring a large-scale Western or U.S.
attack — NATO attack, if you will — upon the
Soviet Union. I don't know anyone who
would really disagree with that, as being to
them a requirement.
Do they have the technical and financial
capability to achieve that requirement? I
think they do. If we deploy an anti-ballistic-
missile system and give, as you call it, pro-
tection to our allies and/or ourselves, to the
extent that they don't react they have lost
a part of their deterrent. They're failing to
meet this requirement which is absolutely
essential to their security. And therefore, I
think we must assume they will react to our
defensive move if they have the technical
and financial capability to do so. And we
believe they have.
Effect on Nuclear Proliferation
Q. Do you think the deployment with an
ABM system either here or in Russia and
both places would encourage a (proliferation
of nuclear weapons elsewhere in the world?
This is also said —
A. Well, I don't think so. I've read com-
ments made by the political leaders of some
of the neutral states and some of the — par-
ticularly some of the states that have no
nuclear weapons of their own — which say in
effect they're going to cut off their nose to
spite their face, because they're not going to
sign any nonproliferation treaty unless par-
ticularly the Soviet and the U.S. agree not to
deploy any antiballistic missiles, for example.
Completely non sequitur — no relationship
whatsoever to the problem of the nonnuclear
states —
Q. Do you have
A. — and I don't believe that when it
comes down to the point of actually accept-
ing the treaty, this will be an important
factor. In fact I'm very sympathetic to their
desire to see what they consider to be a
nuclear arms race brought to a halt. But I
don't believe that failure to sign a non-
proliferation treaty — or refusal to sign a
nonproliferation treaty — is a move toward
deescalating the nuclear arms race. Quite
the contrary.
Q. One is in the midstream of a great arms
race, really, isn't one ?
A. Yes, but it's not between the two
nuclear powers. It's the potential arms race
between the nonnuclear powers, a race to
obtain nuclear weapons. And this is the race
that must be called to a halt, in the interest
of all of us, not just in the interest of the
nuclear powers but particularly in the in-
terest of the nonnuclear powers.
Q. Hoiv do you effectively try in the future
to stop the — you say it isn't an arms race
betiveen you and the Russians, but how do
yoti try to deescalate your position?
A. Well, I think we try to do so by the
kind of discussion you and I are having
right now — to try to make clear to our own
people that beyond a certain point there is
no gain from increasing the size of one's
nuclear forces; to try to make it clear there's
no gain by deploying antiballistic missiles;
and to try to make it clear, not only to one's
own people but also to one's opponents — and
that, of course, is the reason why we're so
very interested in engaging in a discussion
on this subject with the Soviets.
Q. But, do you think there's any realistic
possibility of having a sort of rollback which
would give public parity to you and the Rus-
sians, literal rparity?
A. Well, I don't want to speculate on —
Q. Do you think it's possible —
A. — on what's possible. We haven't en-
gaged in substantive discussions of this ABM
subject and associated subjects as yet with
446
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviets. We're very anxious to do so, but
I don't want to predict how the discussions
will evolve —
Q. I'm not thinking of your specific dis-
cussions. I'm just thinking of the general
psychological truth. Wouldn't it be a mx>re
stable relationship ?
A. Well, it depends on how they react. If
they react in an unfavorable fashion, it
wouldn't be more stable.
Q. I've got one more personal question. Do
you find it extremely difficult to ivalk a tight-
rope between all the different pressure
groups over an issue like this — the pros and
cons ? Is your job very difficult ?
A. No, I don't^
Q. — or do you say what should be done?
A. No, I don't find it difficult, but I don't
mean to say there aren't pressure groups
either. There are very strong pressure
groups, but perhaps the word "pressure
group" is the wrong designation for them.
Emotions run high on this subject, and for
that reason the argument is fierce. But I
don't find it difficult to argue fiercely when I
believe in what I'm doing.
Q. Thank you very much.
President Johnson Renews Call
for Nonproliferation Treaty
The Conference of the 18-Nation Commit-
tee on Disarmament reconvened at Geneva
on February 21. Following is the text of a
message from, President Johnson which was
read at the opening session of the conference
by William C. Foster, U.S. Representative to
the conference.
Wliite House press release dated February 21
The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee reconvenes today in a time of renewed
hope. Conclusion of a treaty banning weapons
of mass destruction in outer space, and a
treaty for a Latin American nuclear free
zone, give new impetus to the effort to bring
the arms race under control.
The Disarmament Committee now faces
a great opportunity — a treaty to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. I earnestly hope
that it will soon be possible to recommend
draft provisions of a non-proliferation treaty
for the consideration of the Committee.
As I pointed out to the Congress in my
State of the Union Message,^ the world is
"in the midst of a great transition, a transi-
tion from narrow nationalism to interna-
tional partnership; from the harsh spirit of
the cold war to the hopeful spirit of com-
mon humanity on a troubled and threatened
planet."
Our deepest obligation to ourselves and to
our children is to bring nuclear weapons
under control. We have already made con-
siderable progress. The next step is to pre-
vent the further spread of these weapons.
If we fail to act now, nation after nation
will be driven to use valuable resources to
acquire them. Even local conflicts will involve
the danger of nuclear war. Nuclear arms will
spread to potentially unstable areas where
open warfare has taken place during the last
decade. Indeed, all the progress of the past
few years toward a less dangerous world
may well be undone.
A non-proliferation treaty must be equi-
table as between the nuclear and the non-
nuclear-weapon powers. I am confident that
we can achieve such equity and that the secu-
rity of all nations will be enhanced.
Such a treaty will help free the non-nuclear
nations from the agonizing decision of
whether to pursue a search for security
through nuclear arms. Freed from the fear
that non-nuclear neighbors may develop such
weapons, nations can devote their efforts in
the field of atomic energy to developing
strong, peaceful programs.
I have instructed our negotiators to exer-
cise the greatest care that the treaty not
hinder the non-nuclear powers in their de-
velopment of nuclear energy for peaceful
1 Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
MARCH 20, 1967
447
purposes. We believe in sharing the benefits
of scientific progress and we will continue to
act accordingly. Through IAEA [Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency], through
EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Com-
munity], and through other international
channels, we have shared — and will continue
to share — the knowledge we have gained
about nuclear energy. There will be no bar-
rier to effective cooperation among the sig-
natory nations.
I am sure we all agree that a non-prolifera-
tion treaty should not contain any provisions
that would defeat its major purpose. The
treaty must, therefore, cover nuclear explo-
sive devices for peaceful as well as military
purposes. The technology is the same. A
peaceful nuclear explosive device would, in
eflfect, also be a highly sophisticated weapon.
However, this will not impose any techno-
logical penalty on the participating nations.
The United States is prepared to make avail-
able nuclear explosive services for peaceful
purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under
appropriate international safeguards. We are
prepared to join other nuclear states in a
commitment to do this.
More generally, we recommend that the
treaty clearly state the intention of its sig-
natories to make available the full benefits of
peaceful nuclear technology — including any
benefits that are the bjrproduct of weapons
research.
To assure that the peaceful atom remains
peaceful, we must work toward a broad
international system of safeguards satisfac-
tory to all concerned. The treaty provides a
unique opportunity for progress to this end.
Agreement on a treaty to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons will be an historic turn-
ing point in the long effort to bring the atom
to heel. It will, I am confident, permit further
cooperative steps to reduce nuclear arma-
ments. Plain sanity calls for a halt to the
competition in nuclear arms.
There is nothing to choose here between
the interests of the nuclear and the non-
nuclear nations: there is a terrible and ines-
capable equity in our common danger. I wish
you Godspeed in your work.
Mrs. Neuberger Appointed
to ACDA Advisory Committee
The Senate on February 28 confirmed the
nomination of Maurine B. Neuberger to be a
member of the General Advisory Committee
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated February 20.)
448
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Southern Rhodesia: The Issue of Majority Rule
by Joseph Palmer 2d
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
The question of Southern Rhodesia has
lately attracted a great deal of attention here
in the United States, as is appropriate for a
matter of such paramount concern to the
world community. But the problem is not a
new one. More than a year has now passed
since November 11, 1965, when the Rho-
desian regime illegally declared its independ-
ence from Great Britain. In that time, the
Security Council, acting at the request of the
United Kingdom — the sovereign authority
responsible for the welfare and progress of
the people of Southern Rhodesia — attempted
to assist in resolving the controversy by
measures involving the voluntary coopera-
tion of member states. Why, we may ask
ourselves, has this issue now taken on such
added importance, and how has it become a
focus for the attention of virtually the entire
international community?
The most immediate and dramatic reason
for this is the fact that on December 16,
1966, the Security Council of the United
Nations, exercising its responsibility as the
world body primarily concerned with the
maintenance of international peace and
security, adopted a resolution 2 declaring
that the situation in Southern Rhodesia had
become a "threat to the peace," under the
terms of article 39 of the U.N. Charter. To
cope with this situation, it imposed against
' Special public affairs lecture sponsored by the
California Institute of Technology faculty commit-
tee on programs, at Pasadena, Calif., on Feb. 28
(press release 44).
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 77.
that territory limited mandatory economic
sanctions in accordance with article 41 of the
charter, which authorizes the Security
Council to "decide what measures not involv-
ing the use of armed force are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions," and
to "call upon the Members of the United
Nations to apply such measures."
It is noteworthy that this marked the first
time in the 21-year history of the United
Nations that the Security Council applied the
measures called for in article 41. In so doing,
it decided that all member states shall pro-
hibit imports of Rhodesian asbestos, iron
ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, copper,
meat and meat products, and hides, skins,
and leather, as well as dealing by their
nationals or in their territories in such
products originating in Southern Rhodesia.
The resolution also obligates U.N. members
to embargo shipments of arms, aircraft,
motor vehicles, and petroleum and petroleum
products to Southern Rhodesia.
These are indeed serious measures; they
are, nonetheless, limited. There were many
demands in the United Nations and else-
where for more comprehensive sanctions or
for the use of force to bring down the Smith
regime. The Security Council, however, in
line with the desire of the majority of its
members to find a peaceful solution to the
problem, decided on more limited measures.
Under article 25 of the charter, the mem-
bers of the U.N. have agreed to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security
Council. This is a solemn treaty obligation
MARCH 20, 1967
449
binding on all members. Accordingly, the
President of the United States, acting under
the authority granted to him by the Congress
in section 5 of the United Nations Participa-
tion Act of 1945, issued an Executive order
on January 5 of this year* to prohibit U.S.
firms and individuals from engaging in the
activities proscribed by the Security Council
resolution, including transactions involving
the commodities described therein.
It is primarily this action that has at-
tracted the attention that we find in the
United States today. This interest has been
reflected in widespread comment, much of
which is favorable. However, much is also
critical. Doubts have been cast on the legality
of the action as well as on its wisdom. The
line between informed opinion and misinfor-
mation or misunderstanding has often be-
come blurred. For example, we hear that
U.S. support for the Security Council action
derogates from our own sovereignty, that it
constitutes misguided support of the British,
and that its purpose is to curry favor with
some members of the international com-
munity at the expense of others.
U.S. Interest in Africa's Stability
We are all aware of the fact that the
United States as a permanent member of the
Security Council has the power under article
27, paragraph 3, of the charter to prevent
the Council from taking any action in any
situation where we may deem it inappro-
priate. But in the case of Southern Rhodesia,
we considered that the Council's finding of a
threat to the peace and its decision to impose
mandatory sanctions were appropriate and
necessary. We voted for them only on the
basis of a considered judgment that it was
clearly in our national interest to do so.
This raises the question of the U.S. inter-
est in the Rhodesian problem. As the leading
free-world power and as a member of the
United Nations, we have a direct interest in
contributing responsibly to stability and
' For text of Executive Order 11322, see ibid., Jan.
23, 1967, p. 145.
progress in Africa, as in many other areas
of the world.
The situation in Southern Rhodesia, where
a racial minority has seized power illegally
and attempts to continue its domination over
the vast majority of Rhodesians, forms a
basic threat to that stability. It has already
served to heighten racial tensions in and
around Rhodesia itself. In time, there is a
real danger that it could develop into a con-
frontation along racial lines between the
African countries north of the Zambezi
River and the white-dominated nations of
southern Africa. Black Africans, frustrated
and embittered by vestiges of colonial or
racial repression, are understandably con-
cerned by the state of aff"airs in Rhodesia. At
the same time, the continued defiance by the
white minority regime of Ian Smith of legal
authority and international opinion in South-
em Rhodesia could serve to consolidate and
extend the strength and attitudes of white
supremacists in southern Africa. The result
of such a continued polarization in Africa of
extremist racial philosophies can only be
instability, strife, and chaos.
To do nothing to avert such a confronta-
tion would play into the hands of those
forces seeking to undermine the stability and
progress of Africa as a whole. Our national
interest therefore dictates that we play our
proper role in doing what we can to
strengthen the forces of moderation among
white and black alike, to try to minimize
those conditions of instability that create the
opportunity for Communist penetration and
subversion, and above all to encourage peace-
ful and responsible change. Our policy on
Southern Rhodesia supports these ends.
I will not dwell tonight on the detailed
legal arguments in support of the Security
Council's decision to impose mandatory
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Am-
bassador Goldberg has eloquently and force-
fully expounded them in his recent speeches
and letters on that subject. I intend instead
to concentrate on the nature of the problem
the international community faces in South-
em Rhodesia itself.
450
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U776 and 1965: The Contrast
Only twice in history have British terri-
»ries unilaterally declared their independ-
mce of Great Britain: the American Colonies
in 1776 and Southern Rhodesia in 1965. Rho-
desian spokesmen have chosen to equate
these two events and have carried on a
vigorous campaign to try to convince the
world of the identity of these two acts.
Central to this effort has been their deliber-
ate attempt to model the Rhodesian declara-
tion of independence after our own. Both
documents contain bills of particulars. More-
over, the Rhodesian declaration begins:
' Whereas, in the course of human affairs, history
ihas shown that it may become necessary for a people
to resolve the political affiliations which have con-
nected them with another people. . . .
Perhaps we should be charitable and
attribute this pallid formulation to a general
decline in style over the intervening 190
years. But if we look more closely at the
substance of the two documents, we find that
any superficial parallel breaks down in one
very vital respect: The Rhodesian declaration
is completely silent on human rights. There
is no attempt to state or even to rephrase the
ringing words of the American Declaration:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men ere created equal; that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights; that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness. That to secure these rights. Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just pow-
ers from the consent of the governed. . . .
Here is the heart of the difference. Very
few remember the details of our bill of par-
ticulars against the King of England. But
every child has learned the words of these
self-evident truths. Without a passionate
commitment to their realization, our Revolu-
tion might have been just another national
conflict, important to the participants but
not significant for the future of mankind.
But instead our forefathers chose to place
themselves in the broad stream of human
aspirations and progress. They justified their
bold, enlightened rebellion in a way that lit
_ fires in men's minds and hearts. They
reaffirmed the validity of man's age-old
search for justice and equality and gave
direction and substance to our national
development. They set forth a broad view of
human aspirations, charting such an imagi-
native course that it subsumed the immediate
act of rebellion.
The authors of the Rhodesian declaration
sought to assert an historical parallel. I sug-
gest that they missed the point completely.
Seldom in history have two such superficially
similar acts been so vastly different in pur-
pose and meaning. The Rhodesian document
makes glancing references to "ci\nlization"
and the "principles of Western democracy,"
but its aims are narrow and its direction is
a retreat from the main currents of the times
and from the international community of
nations. No broad vision emerges to inspire
mankind; rather, an obstinate defense of
narrow privilege, based on racial bias and
minority rule. The Rhodesian document is
inward-looking and static, holding no prom-
ise either for progress for the majority or
for creativity for the minority.
Different Principles, Different Directions
The decisive difference in the American
and Rhodesian experience lies in the direc-
tion of each society. I do not wish to suggest
that we were or are perfect. Man is a fallible
being, and perfection will probably always be
a distant goal as mores change. But the con-
ceptions underlying the American experi-
ment were and are bold, imaginative, and
liberating, providing a built-in dynamic for
the achievement of the American promise.
They remain responsive to the needs and
aspirations of the American people and in ac-
cord with the principles of the United
Nations Charter, which were laid down 170
years later.
Thus Jefferson, after his work on the
Declaration, returned to Virginia to give
meaning to his beliefs by plunging into polit-
ical war with the ruling oligarchy of the
day. He crusaded for a more equitable
distribution of land, the expansion of limited
MARCH 20, 1967
451
educational opportunities, reform of the
penal code, broadening of the franchise, and
the abolition of slavery. He succeeded in
some of his efforts, partly succeeded in
others, and failed in others. But he took a
stand, based on principles of enduring
validity. His acts as well as his words
charted a course for the democracy of the
future not only for our America but for
many diverse peoples, providing clear proof
of the universality of his beliefs and of a
common humanity.
Each generation of Americans has joined
in this adventure and enlarged the frontiers
of freedom. It has not been an easy, nor a
straight, nor an uninterrupted path. We have
been steadily, if too slowly, removing dis-
criminations due to religion, sex, national
origin, and race. We have continuously re-
examined our concepts in order to broaden
the contents and limits of human rights.
Underlining the continuity of this concept in
American history. President Johnson stated
this month on Lincoln's Birthday, "So
Lincoln began his troubled journey ... to
the establishment of a multiracial com-
munity— in which a man's pride in his racial
origins would be wholly consistent with his
conmiitment to the common endeavor."
There could be no greater contrast than
exists between the words and deeds of 1776
and those of 1965. Jefferson spoke out
against British tyranny and gave meaning to
his words by waging political war against
the entrenched minority ruling Virginia. The
Rhodesian Front attacks the British for
supporting the principle of government
deriving from the just powers of the
governed. The Front seeks to perpetuate
minority rule, using almost exactly the same
instruments of power in Southern Rhodesia
that Jefferson tried to destroy in Virginia.
In 20th-century Southern Rhodesia, by com-
parison with 18th-century America, the roles
of rebel and constituted authority are re-
versed.
At the time of our Revolution, America
produced leaders who were more modem in
452
their political and social thought by 20th-
century standards than the men who rule
Southern Rhodesia today, nearly 200 years
later. We set out on our road inspired by i
principles that continue to lead us forward
and attracted millions to America to these
shores to share in this great adventure. What
promise does the Rhodesian declaration hold
for its own people and the world? Even leav-
ing aside what cannot be left aside — the 4
million Africans in Southern Rhodesia —
what course is charted for the 220,000 white
minority? Can they really hope to find
creative expression by trying to isolate them-
selves from the continent in which they live
and by incurring rejection by the rest of the
world ? Can they hope to continue indefinitely
to defy world opinion and really create a
narrow sanctuary of privilege and domina-
tion ? I think not.
Continuity in American Policy
There is a continuity between the princi-
ples enunciated in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence and our present policy toward the
Rhodesian situation. President Johnson
spoke in the authentic American tradition
when he stated to the ambassadors of the
member nations of the Organization of
African Unity last May: *
As a basic part of our national tradition, we sup-
port self-determination and an orderly transition to
majority rule in every quarter of the globe. These
principles have guided our policy from India to the
Philippines, from Viet-Nam to Pakistan. They guide
our policy today toward Rhodesia.
We are giving every encouragement and support
to the efforts of the United Kingdom and the United
Nations to restore legitimate government in Rho-
desia. Only when this is accomplished can steps be
taken to open the full power and responsibility of
nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia — not just 6
percent of them. . . .
The foreign policy of the United States is rooted
in its life at home. We will not permit human rights
to be restricted in our own country. And we will not
support policies abroad which are based on the rule
* Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lof minorities or the discredited notion that men are
lunequal before the law.
Let US now examine the situation in South-
lern Rhodesia. How does it appear in practice?
iRhodesian Realities: Land and Education
i| Despite the racial disproportion in the
'■population, the Land Apportionment Act
divides the land roughly equally between the
white and the African communities. Accord-
ing to the Rhodesian Ministry of Informa-
tion, there are approximately 44 million acres
for 2,400,000 Africans and 36 million acres
for 220,000 Europeans. The Ministry does
not add, incidentally, that the acreage re-
served for the white minority consists of the
best land, much of which lies unused. I lived
for 2 years in Southern Rhodesia and vividly
recall an instance in the rural area in which
the African population was required by the
Government to destroy part of its cattle
wealth because of the fact that the pasture
land was overgrazed. Meanwhile down the
road a white farmer was burning off his sur-
plus grazing land ! Need one look more deeply
for one basic cause of discontent?
Let us look at education. Southern Rho-
desia spends roughly equal amounts on the
education of white children and of African
children, although the latter greatly outnimi-
ber the former. Upper secondary and college
education is available to more whites than
Africans. Although it is true that a higher
proportion of Africans receives education in
Southern Rhodesia than in African-ruled
countries, the fact remains that relatively few
Rhodesian Africans are permitted the facili-
ties to complete the highest secondary grade
or to go to college. They are trained for a
place in society determined by the ruling
minority, not by themselves.
I A few statistics will reveal the dis-
' parity: In 1965 there were 638,000 Afri-
can children and 32,000 white children
in primary school. In the same year there
were some 15,000 African children and
20,000 white children in secondary schools.
Thus only 21/3 percent of the African chil-
dren continue from elementary to secondary
school as compared with 621/2 percent of
white children. Nor do these figures really
tell the whole story, since many additional
white children receive their secondary educa-
tion at boarding schools outside the country.
These circumscribed educational opportu-
nities have an obvious relationship to political
expression in a country in which the fran-
chise is severely limited on the basis of prop-
erty, wages, and educational qualifications
laid down by the white minority.
Racial Trends in Southern Rhodesia
Even before the illegal declaration of inde-
pendence, the direction of the Rhodesian
governments had become increasingly repres-
sive and racially motivated. Each succeeding
government has moved further to the right.
Prime Minister Garfield Todd was removed
by the minority-dominated electorate because
he favored the liberalization of the African
franchise. His successor, Sir Edgar White-
head, was considered too liberal because he
favored some modification of the Land
Apportionment Act to benefit the African,
even though he had also introduced the Pre-
ventive Detention Bill to curb African politi-
cal expression. He was succeeded as Prime
Minister by Winston Field, the head of the
new Rhodesian Front. And Field, in turn,
was replaced by Ian Smith. And now reports
are current that some elements in the Rho-
desian Front consider Smith as too soft on
African advancement. Must this trend con-
tinue, and where will it end ?
The Rhodesian regime is at pains to pre-
sent the image of a successful rebellion by
a united people. And yet not even its geo-
graphically and philosophically closest neigh-
bors have recognized it. Within the country,
3,000 white Rhodesians recently took their
courage in their hands to sign the book of the
Governor, who still represents the Crown, as
an apparent gesture of displeasure that the
regime failed to reach agreement during the
Tiger negotiations. There is also evidence that
the business community would prefer to
MARCH 20, 1967
453
negotiate a settlement and end this anomalous
situation.
But despite these and other encouraging
signs, it would be premature in the super-
heated and controlled atmosphere of Salis-
bury to conclude that the voices of reason and
moderation can yet give effective expression
to their doubts, much less their dissent. On
the contrary, there are elements on the right
who are demanding an even more extreme
course. In accusing the present illegal Smith
regime of moderation, a recent Rhodesian
Front Party document asks rhetorically:
Where in the Party Principles is it stated that
we, the Rhodesian Front, favor a multi-racial soci-
ety or even a multi-racial state?
Where in the Party Principles is it stated that
we accept "majority rule"?
Where is it stated that we accept full integra-
tion?
Thus, the present leaders of the white
minority have embarked on a course which
increasingly leads them to separate them-
selves from the majority of the people in their
own country and to isolate themselves from
the world community of nations. One seeks in
vain some principle that would justify such
a course of action. Whatever the deficiencies
of the policy of "partnership" pursued by the
predecessors of the Rhodesian Front, there
was at least the possibility of a continuing
dialog and the prospect for conciliation
among the races and orderly progress toward
majority rule. All the evidence indicates that
the dialog has been broken off and that there
has been an increasing polarization of politi-
cal life. There is a growth of suspicion, which
inhibits even whites from expressing any
doubts. For more than a year, there has been
censorship of the newspapers and of mail of
anyone considered unsympathetic to the
Smith regime. Smith himself has said that he
will lift censorship only if "satisfactory
alternatives to safeguard our national secu-
rity can be devised." Under the Emergency
Powers Act the Rhodesian Front regime has
established regulations which provide for
"the summary arrest or detention of any
person whose arrest or detention appears to
the Minister (of Law and Order) to be ex-
pedient in the public interest." Detainees are
placed in distant camps without trial or
hearing.
The effect is to develop a closed society
which feeds on myths and rumors and main-
tains an unnatural stability enforced by police
control. These repressive measures have their
effect not only on the African but also on the
white community. As long as these circum-
stances prevail, there is little prospect of an
accommodation between the races.
The regime itself is apparently aware of
its vulnerability to charges of repression of
the African majority and has been at pains
to enlist the support of the African chiefs.
But there is serious question as to the repre-
sentative character of a group that is paid
by the regime and is part of its administra-
tive arm at the same time that the leaders of
the African political parties remain under
detention.
Rhodesian Front spokesmen have at times
indicated that they favor majority rule ulti-
mately. If they really accepted this premise,
within a reasonable timespan, it should be
possible to reach a satisfactory resolution of
the Rhodesian problem. But hear what Ian
Smith himself had to say when he was ques-
tioned in an interview in Newsweek of
December 19, 1966:
Q. Are you an advocate of eventual majority rule
in this country?
A. No, I cannot in all honesty claim that I am
an advocate of majority rule. When one sees the
evidence of Africa to the north of us, this is the
last thing I would advocate — in fact quite the re-
verse. But I am a realist. I accept that our present
constitution, whether I advocate it or not, is one
that was planned for majority rule. . . .
Q. How long do you think majority rule might
take?
A. This I find very difficult to try and predict.
I have heard predictions that have varied from five
years to 50 or even 75 years. . . .
All of the evidence suggests that Smith's
"realism" would place him with those who
favor the long term, the very long term,
rather than the short term of expectations.
The Rhodesian Front viewpoint is clearly
reflected in a South African article quoted
approvingly in the January 13, 1967, issue of
454
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Rhodesian Commentary, published by the
Rhodesian Ministry of Information, which
states: "Democracy, in the popular sense that
Jack is as good as his masters, is not the
divinely ordained method of government. It
is not a method at all."
Here you have the true feelings of the Rho-
desian leaders. If they resist meaningful
progress toward democracy and majority
rule, what do they envisage — the eternal rule
of a minority whose only distinction is their
color?
The Issue of Communism
There is abundant evidence that the policy
of the Smith regime is pushing it increasingly
in a racial direction. There is less talk of a
" multiracial society or pretensions of partner-
ship. There have been intimations of the
acceptance by the white community of
apartheid. In a recent speech, Ian Smith
stated, "I believe that ideal after which we
are striving is a system which acknowledges
our different communities and provides safe-
guards which will enable the different com-
munities to live according to their own wishes
and \vith adequate protection for their rights
and freedoms." We wonder if the white com-
munity understands the implications of this
position and where this road will lead them.
The Smith regime has attempted to enlist
sympathy and support by proclaiming itself
the defender of Western civilization and a
bulwark against communism. But a system
whose purpose is to exclude majority rule is
a mockery of accepted Western principles
and a travesty of an effective defense against
communism.
Yet one of the most persistent themes of
the Rhodesian Front leaders is that they are
building a dike against communism and
chaos. This becomes a justification for police
measures, the use of force, the detentions at
Gonakudzingwa and Wha-Wha, and the con-
stricting political and emotional atmosphere.
By neutralizing the possibility of a free
exchange of views and fruitful negotiations,
they have helped to deprive the African
nationalists of their options and to create a
situation which encourages resort to illegal
activity and assistance from foreign, includ-
ing Communist, sources. The Rhodesian
minority is thus encouraging the very insta-
bility it professes to wish to avoid. In the
long run it is frustration and loss of hope
that creates the climate for Communist influ-
ence. It is pertinent to this problem that,
despite energetic efforts, the Soviets and
Chinese Communists have not succeeded in
making any significant inroads against true
independence in Africa. But they could suc-
ceed if Africans believed that the West would
not support legitimate African aspirations
for self-determination.
The Rhodesian Front spokesmen assert
their right to independence on the basis of
self-government, which Southern Rhodesia
first acquired in 1923. But they overlook one
important fact: that Britain always reserved
constitutionally the right to veto any dis-
criminatory legislation directed at the indige-
nous population and that Britain never
yielded these reserved rights. Britain was the
ultimate sovereign authority; and when Rho-
desia adopted the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence, the powers of government over
Rhodesia reverted to the British. The white
Rhodesians have always had the option of
fruitful collaboration with the Africans and
the support of Britain, but instead they have
progressively resorted to a policy of repres-
sion, the dissolution of African nationalist
parties, the detention of their leaders, the
expulsion of religious figures and university
professors, the suppression of newspapers,
the censorship of press media, and finally
UDI.
Role of the African Community
In this sad chain of events, one must also
consider the question of African responsi-
bility. The leadership of the African com-
munity in Rhodesia is deeply divided and
even in exile tends to be more concerned with
its factional conflicts than with the true
needs of the society. It is often maintained
that this division in ranks led the nationalists
to oppose taking full advantage of the fran-
chise provisions of the 1961 constitution and
MARCH 20, 1967
455
that if the African nationalists had been more
flexible and statesmanlike they might have
been able, with British support, to achieve a
minimal power base which would have
hindered the shift of each succeeding gov-
ernment to the right. There is undoubtedly
some validity to these contentions, and the
Southern Rhodesian Africans might well
have been in a better moral position today if
they had shown more disposition to cooperate.
At the same time, the African nationalist de-
cision to boycott the 1962 elections must be
viewed against the pedestrian rate of African
advancement until that time, the highly lim-
ited franchise provisions of the constitution
of 1961, and the general African suspicion
of the chasm between what the minority gov-
ernment professed and the implementation of
its professions.
Whatever the merits of its past positions,
however, the African community of Rhodesia
must find means of submerging its differences
and of presenting a strong and wise leader-
ship which will cooperate to insure the
interests of the country. We have seen this
happen in other countries. In Kenya, a na-
tional leadership has emerged under the
guidance of President Jomo Kenyatta which
is providing a bond of unity among all seg-
ments of the population and uniting them in
the spirit of Harrambee; i.e., working
together. It is significant, in this connection,
that there are now more Western business
interests and representatives in Kenya than
before independence.
During the period I lived in Southern Rho-
desia, I came to know a number of the men
now in power, as well as many others who
support them. Like all of us, they are condi-
tioned by the environment; and we must
acknowledge that the environment is almost
■unique — one of the very few places in the
world where an outmoded political structure
based on colonial principles of race repression
fights to preserve itself even after colonialism
has been generally discredited and has all but
disappeared. They refuse to come to terms
with the realities of 20th-century social and
political change, and they have been too iso-
lated to understand this obvious truth. In a
very real sense, our policy is designed to
bring them into the contemporary world, not
remove them from it.
Fundamentally this must mean acceptance
of the inevitability of majority rule. There is
an honorable place for the white minority in
Southern Rhodesia — a place where the white
man can live and prosper and contribute to
the healthy development of his country. The
realization of the rights of the majority,
which we accept as a social and political im-
perative, can certainly be attained without
the destruction or deprivation of the
minority. The white minorities in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Zambia have learned this. And
it must be emphasized that there are white
men of good will in Southern Rhodesia who
are aware of the enormous potential of
cooperation among the races. Some of them
have carried their convictions to the point
that they are now in prison along with their
African compatriots. There is every valid
reason for other white Rhodesians to heed
these lessons.
A Unique Problem
But why do we agree that the U.N. should
press this issue of principle with Southern
Rhodesia to a point beyond that we have
taken with respect to other places in the
world ? Why do we assert the universal appli-
cation of self-determination but not take
active measures to give effect to it every-
where? And further, if we support steps
against Southern Rhodesia, won't we have to
agree to similar steps in the future when they
are proposed to combat denial of self-
determination elsewhere?
The answer to these questions lies in the
uniqueness of the Rhodesian problem. We
acknowledge this uniqueness and consider
that our policy on Southern Rhodesia creates
no precedents or obligations with respect to
similar measures elsewhere either now or in
the future. Southern Rhodesia is a colony in
rebellion against the universally acknowl-
edged sovereign. Great Britain. It is not an
independent state in whose internal affairs
the United Nations is intervening. Further-
more, the sovereign authority. Great Britain,
456
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
has asked the international community,
including the United States, to help it in its
task of restoring legitimate constitutional
authority in Southern Rhodesia. In terms of
the U.N. Charter, Southern Rhodesia is a
non-self-governing territory and Great Brit-
ain is the administering authority, obligated
"to develop self-government, to take due
account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institu-
tions." The illegal regime is obstructing the
carrying out of these responsibilities of the
administering power in the territory. In no
other place in the world that I can think of
do these conditions apply. Therefore, the
mode of our response to the challenge of
illegal independence creates no problem of
corollary obligations. We are free to continue
our support of self-determination and our
opposition to racial discrimination elsewhere
in ways appropriate to each different case.
What the British seek, and what most of
the world would find acceptable, in Southern
Rhodesia is a settlement that assures an
orderly but reasonable transition to majority
rule, with minority rights fully protected. The
British have never and do not now demand
immediate majority rule. Neither does the
British Commonwealth, the U.N., nor the
United States. The issue is not independence
under minority rule versus immediate
majority rule. Even now, after the present
British Government has committed itself not
to seek a settlement that involves inde-
pendence before majority rule, these are not
the choices facing Southern Rhodesia. If the
white minority were willing to accept what
the outside world sees as both right and
inevitable, it should be possible to reach a
settlement that provides for a restoration of
constitutional authority and for a transitional
period before legal independence in which
African educational opportunities were con-
siderably broadened and African training in
government accomplished by actual partici-
pation. The alternative to such a settlement,
if most of the white minority persists in its
efforts to hold back history, is a gradual
deterioration of the Rhodesian economy, a
continuing and probably increasing net
emigration of whites, mounting dissidence
and political activism, radicalization of the
African approach to the whole problem,
facilitation of Communist penetration of the
opposition movement, and, eventually, the
danger of organized violence on a scale that
the present regime will be unable to contain —
not a welcome prospect but one for which the
intransigent white minority in Southern Rho-
desia would bear a heavy responsibility.
If the rebel regime leads the Rhodesian
people into this tragic morass, more and more
of Africa will be affected. Racial tensions will
mount, reasoned counsels of restraint on the
part of responsible African leaders will spell
their political suicide, and proponents of mod-
eration outside Africa will be discredited in
the eyes of Africans.
There are sincere and honestly motivated
Americans who say that the Rhodesian rebel-
lion is of no concern to this country and that
we should not become involved in the inter-
national community's efforts to resolve this
problem. But we cannot ignore the conse-
quences of inaction. We can — and will —
determine the extent of our involvement, but
we cannot escape our responsibility to act
with others on a problem that has engaged
the concern of the world. Even if we were
not obligated to concern ourselves with these
issues by virtue of our responsibility under
the U.N. Charter, we would inevitably be
morally involved because of our national tra-
ditions and principles.
As we have developed our measured re-
sponse to this threat, we have stayed within
the confines of what is clearly authorized
under American law and the U.N. Charter.
The assertion from some quarters that the
executive branch of our Government is acting
illegally in pursuit of the Government's Rho-
desian policy is wholly without foundation.
Everything that has and will be done will
adhere scrupulously to the letter, as well as
the spirit, of the law.
Within this framework, let me summarize:
First, we believe that the efforts of the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia to per-
MARCH 20, 1967
457
petuate minority rule contributes to insta-
bility in that area. Therefore, we intend to
continue to work with the United Kingdom
as the administering authority and with the
international community in an effort peace-
fully to restore constitutional authority and
thus open the way to an orderly transition
to majority rule.
Second, we accept the obligation imposed
upon us by the U.N. Security Council resolu-
tion of December 16 providing for selective
mandatory economic sanctions against South-
ern Rhodesia. We hope that this program of
sanctions will convince the illegal regime in
Southern Rhodesia that it faces nearly uni-
versal opposition and convince it of the
wisdom of agreeing to a settlement accept-
able to the international community. We hope,
too, that all members of the U.N. will simi-
larly accept their obligation under the charter
to comply with the Security Council resolu-
tion.
Third, we continue to recognize the
sovereign authority of Great Britain in the
British colony of Southern Rhodesia and, like
every other government in the world, we re-
fuse to recognize Rhodesia as an independent
state.
Finally, we have adopted this policy toward
Southern Rhodesia because it is right in
terms of principle, because it strengthens our
position in the world, and because it helps
promote our objectives of stability and
orderly development in Africa. Surely a
policy that meets these tests is in the national
interest of the United States.
The U.N.: An Arena for Peaceful East-West Engagement
by Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs^
Obscured by the thunder of loud and fre-
quently acrimonious debate, a quiet, almost
unnoticed development of some importance
has been taking place at the U.N. We are
witnessing at the world organization an
occasional convergence of Soviet-American
interests and a limited parallelism of policies.
We are far from the peace and reconcilia-
tion between Communist and non-Communist
states of which President Johnson spoke
recently.2 But the U.N. in recent months has
provided opportunity for something more
than the narrow concept of coexistence. It
has provided the opportunity for modest,
peaceful engagement of both the United
States and the Soviet Union on issues where
our interests converge, this despite continu-
ing differences over Viet-Nam. The original
charter concept of big power unanimity is
still only a distant illusion, but at least small
steps toward consensus are being taken.
Such steps are faltering and incomplete,
for fundamental differences remain between
the United States and the U.S.S.R. regarding
world order and the proper place of the U.N.
in the scheme of things. These steps reflect
the changing relations between East and
West and between Peking and Moscow. They
reflect also our efforts to utilize the United
■ Address made before the foreign policy confer-
ence for educators at Los Angeles, Calif., on Feb. 24
and at San Jose, Calif., on Feb. 25 (pre.ss release 41
dated February 23).
^ For an advance text of President Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N. Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
458
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Nations to help cany forward President
Johnson's policy — to build bridges between
East and West, to achieve arrangements
which are mutually advantageous and which
in the long run could revitalize some of the
woi'k of the U.N. And perhaps more funda-
mentally, these steps mirror the cold hard
fact of nuclear stalemate and danger that
moves the largest and strongest powers of
the world to pursue parallel policies where
mutual interests are served.
It is about the role of the U.N. in promot-
ing parallel U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests that I
wish to speak to you today.
The United Nations serves the national
interests of the United States in many ways:
in helping us share our security responsibili-
ties around the world, in providing a frame-
work for organizing a durable peace, in regu-
lating for the good of mankind the global
effects of the scientific and technological
revolutions of our time, in providing an
efficient way of channeling some of our
foreign aid.
Beyond this, the United Nations offers a
political environment for peaceful East-West
engagement, a place where certain parallel
interests of the great powers, including
those we share with the Soviets, can be pur-
sued to everyone's benefit.
The possibility of engaging the U.S.S.R.
in cooperative action in the U.N. has been
complicated by a certain ambivalence in the
Soviet attitude toward the U.N. and inter-
national organizations. Its revolutionary doc-
trine assumed that old forms of international
relationships, including "bourgeois" interna-
tional law, were parts of a passing old order
that would be replaced by a new interna-
tional system when the "revolution" spread
to other countries. International institutions
were to be manipulated and subverted; they
were not to be objects of joint Conununist
and non-Communist cooperation.
At the same time, however, the Soviet
Government has come to realize that the
"bourgeois" international order will not soon
pass away and that there are opportunistic
advantages to be derived from being an
insider within international institutions. In
recent years this development has been forti-
fied by the mutual recognition that third-
area conflicts can embroil the two major
colossi and that in an interdependent world
living in an era of nuclear stalemate the
U.S.S.R. has a stake, within certain limits,
in promoting order and stability.
This two-sidedness helps to explain the
often contradictory and vacillating Soviet
behavior in the U.N. They see the U.N. as a
propaganda forum, as an arena of political
competition, particularly in the "third
world." But they also see the U.N. as an
international institution which offers limited
opportunities for at least minimal coopera-
tion with the United States in the context of
multilateral dealings.
Let us look more carefully at this two-sided
Soviet approach to the U.N.
The U.N. as a Propaganda Forum
The U.N., and particularly the General
Assembly, serves all members, including the
United States and the U.S.S.R., as a platform
for getting national messages across to the
world. The Assembly — with 122 members, all
but 26 considered as economically less de-
veloped member states who account for less
than 18 percent of the contributions to the
regular budget — has become an important
diplomatic stage for the smaller countries.
Here they play a role in world affairs. Here
they can together assert their views and
exert political pressures on matters which
interest them most, notably decolonization,
human rights, and economic development.
Since the U.N. is a center stage for the
small countries, it has become an important
arena for wooing their political support.
Soviet strategy in the U.N., for example,
is increasingly aimed at allying itself with
third-world majorities to marshal support for
its foreign policy aims and counter the
United States' policies abroad — in Viet-Nam,
in Europe, and in Asia and Africa.
The recently concluded Assembly illus-
trates how the Soviets seek to use the U.N.
as a prime arena for political warfare against
the United States and the West.
MARCH 20, 1967
459
— In its yearend review of actions at the
21st General Assembly the Soviet delegation
on December 22 issued a sweeping attack on
American policy both inside and outside
the U.N.
— ^It introduced or supported ineffectual
propagandistic resolutions on nonintei'ven-
tion, the use of force, and chemical and bio-
logical warfare, directed against our actions
in Viet-Nam, and sought unsuccessfully to
brand the United States as an aggressor.
— It tried to undermine U.N. support for
the Republic of Korea but was resoundingly
defeated.
— It pegged out the most extreme positions
on colonial and racial issues, irrespective of
their practical utility in advancing self-
determination and human rights.
There is nothing unusual about such
propaganda thrusts. They were very similar
to those made by the Soviets in several pre-
vious Assemblies; they were played in
accordance with well-established rules of the
game. They were largely unsuccessful be-
cause the smaller nations are reluctant to
become political footballs between major
powers. Moreover, on issues which are of
direct concern to the Africans — Southern
Rhodesia, South West Africa, economic de-
velopment— there is more interest in the
Assembly in deeds than in oratory. Thus, the
limited parallelism does not mean that the
litany of invective hurled at the United
States by the Soviet delegation will abate
or that sharp differences over key policy
issues will disappear.
The United States, of course, uses the U.N.
platform to counter hostile propaganda, to
explain our policies, and to advance our own
objectives in the political, social, and eco-
nomic fields.
What is more important in the long run
is the possibility of exploring opportunities
for employing the U.N. as an instrument for
bridging differences and promoting interests
we hold with other major powers, particu-
larly the U.S.S.R.
This requires tactics of opportunity. The
convergence of U.S. and Soviet interests is
often random, temporary, or minimal. There
appears to be no grand U.S.S.R. design in
this area. Consequently, we do not work to
any predetermined pattern. But we can and
do exploit all situations in which cooperation
can take place on a basis of mutual benefit.
Three principal parallelisms have been
discernible in recent months.
Contact and Negotiation at the U.N.
At the last General Assembly, Secretary
of State Rusk once again met with Foreign
Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko for quiet
talks. These two leaders have met more often
at the U.N. than anywhere else. Such meet-
ings are routine practice during the opening
days of the Assembly, and they can take
place without ringing alarm bells or stimu-
lating undue expectations.
This is an important institutional develop-
ment; it is precisely the sort of quiet diplo-
macy the late Dag Hammarskjold saw as a
primary function of the U.N. Its importance
usually cannot be measured by dramatic re-
sults; but such quiet talks, at a minimum,
contribute to better understanding between
the two major military powers in this pre-
carious nuclear era. There is no substitute for
first-hand exchanges and direct discussions;
the U.N.'s existence facilitates such talks,
and in the words of Churchill, it is better
"to jaw, jaw than war, war."
Similarly, we have come to appreciate the
advantages of the U.N.'s multilateral frame-
work for accormnodating differences and
making adjustments in what might other-
wise be even more difl!icult direct negotia-
tions.
Outer space shows the possibilities. In
1963, the Assembly adopted a resolution ban-
ning the use of weapons of mass destruction
in outer space.^ While this was a unanimous
action of the membership, it was also a re-
flection in the first instance of quiet bilateral
discussions and agreement between the
United States and the U.S.S.R.
The first step ultimately led to the dra-
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.
460
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
niatic and successful negotiation of a treaty
on principles to guide states in the explora-
tion and use of outer space,^ which was
endorsed by the General Assembly in Decem-
ber ^ and already has been signed by over
70 nations in Washington, Moscow, and
London. U.S.-Soviet agreement was a pre-
lequisite for subsequent unanimity of the
world body. Ambassador [Arthur J.] Gold-
berg, armed with broad authority from Presi-
dent Johnson, put his negotiating talents to
effective use in quiet, patient, detailed talks
with Soviet Ambassador Platon Morozov.
The treaty resei-ves the moon for peaceful
uses only and bans weapons of mass destruc-
tion in space, provides free access to all
installations on celestial bodies, and provides
for fullest public reporting by governments
of their space activities.
The multilateral framework of the 28-
member U.N. Outer Space Committee pro-
vided an excellent negotiating forum for all
concerned, including the Soviets and our-
selves. Not for the first time, the U.N. pro-
vided suitable "political space" for accom-
modation on politically sensitive issues.
It is an overstatement to say that such an
agreement could not have been successfully
negotiated without the U.N. framework. But
it is fair to say that U.N. machinery facili-
tated very materially U.S.-U.S.S.R. accom-
modation on the space issue in a period of
deep differences over Viet-Nam and of Chi-
nese Communist propaganda broadsides
against alleged Soviet collaboration with the
United States.
Use of the U.N. in the Peacekeeping Field
It is a remarkable tribute to the essential
purposes the U.N. serves that there should
be any convergence of U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests
in peacekeeping activities of the U.N., given
the deep-seated constitutional differences
which continue to exist over the peacekeeping
role of the organization.
The U.S.S.R. continues to insist that the
Security Council has the sole and exclusive
responsibility to organize, manage, and
finance peacekeeping operations. It wants no
role for the General Assembly apart from
discussion. It wants no strong U.N. execu-
tive or strong Secretariat. The unwarranted
Soviet attack last week on the highly circum-
spect United Nations Office of Public Infor-
mation is the latest evidence of this policy.
Conscious of the imbalance of real power
between large and small in the 122-nation
General Assembly, the United States has
long been ready to make even greater use of
the Security Council. But the United States
is not vdlling to subject all future peacekeep-
ing actions to the veto, to eliminate the re-
sidual power of the Assembly under article
10 to make recommendations in the peace-
keeping field, nor to weaken the Secretary-
General as the executive ann of the U.N. or
to reduce him to a glorified clerk.
The U.S.-Soviet differences are deep-
rooted and basic and are apt to remain over
the foreseeable future.
But they have not prevented limited con-
vergences in peacekeeping where U.S.S.R.
interests paralleled our own. Doctrinaire
Soviet ideological and constitutional scruples
have had to be subordinated. Recent U.N.
experience points up the situation.
The U.N. Force in Cyprus
Since early 1964, the U.N. Force has been
helping to maintain an uneasy quiet in
Cyprus. Last December the Security Council
again extended its mandate for another 6
months.* This action was taken unanimously.
Why did the Soviets not veto the establish-
ment of the Force, and why do they acquiesce
in the maintenance of the Force? For one
thing, Cyprus clearly wishes to keep the
Force on the island. Moreover, the Force has
the strong political backing of the unalined
Africans and Asians. Perhaps most im-
portant, the U.N. operation in Cyprus re-
flects the parallel U.S.-U.S.S.R. interests in
keeping a lid on factional fighting so that
this small island does not become a point of
direct military confrontation.
•• For text, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.
= Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
« For background, see ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 179.
MARCH 20, 1967
461
The Soviet position regarding the U.N.
presence there is carefully circumscribed.
The U.S.S.R. abstained on the original reso-
lution establishing the U.N. Force and has
contributed nothing to its financial support.
Soviet support for the U.N. presence has
been limited to voting for authorizing reso-
lutions. The Soviet position does not signify
a fundamental change toward U.N. peace-
keeping; it is a pragmatic, carefully hedged
response to circumstances in the eastern
Mediterranean which make the U.N. a use-
ful diplomatic instrument to achieve a limited
goal of containing third-party conflicts — a
goal that in this instance parallels our own.
U.N. Observers in Kashmir
Kashmir is another case in point.
At the outset of the flareup in the sub-
continent in August 1965, both the U.S.S.R.
and the United States saw the importance of
containing the conflict and ending the fight-
ing. Soviet interest at this stage paralleled
ours in enlisting U.N. efforts to bring about
a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Indian and
Pakistani forces that had crossed interna-
tional lines.
There was unanimous support for resolu-
tions in the Security Council in September
1965 which provided for the enlargement of
the existing U.N. observer corps and its de-
ployment along the international boundary.''
Everyone recognized that unless the conflict
was localized, it could provide a dangerous
temptation for the Chinese Communists to
press further against Indian borders and
thus increase the risk of a larger war.
However, there were limits to Soviet coop-
eration. Once the cease-fire took hold and the
danger of escalation receded, Soviet and
American interests began to diverge again.
Moscow began raising questions about the
conduct of the U.N. operation. It sniped at
the Secretary-General, maintaining that he
had exceeded his authority in recruiting and
deploying the enlarged observer force with-
out specific, detailed approval of the Security
Council. It raised problems with regard to
' For background, see ibid., Sept. 27, 1965, p. 526.
financing. These doctrinal considerations
proved secondary, however, to the need to
achieve concerted action to end the hostili-
ties.
All this illustrates that Communist
ideology and doctrine often takes a back seat
when overriding Soviet national interests are
involved.
Science and Technology
Parallelism has been spurred by the scien-
tific and technical imperatives of our times,
leading to East-West cooperation in a wide
range of multilateral undertakings. The
U.S.S.R. participates with other scientifically
advanced countries in international scien-
tific and technical programs.
I have mentioned outer space: We have
been cooperating on technical and legal
aspects of space in the U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
We are moving ahead in numerous other
cooperative ventures. In the World Meteoro-
logical Organization we have taken the lead
with others, including the Soviet Union, in
planning the World Weather Watch, a world-
wide cooperative venture to improve man's
ability to predict the course of weather. In
the International Telecommunication Union,
we cooperate in allocating frequencies.
The United States and the Soviet Union
have participated in three major ocean-
ographic surveys: in the Indian Ocean, the
tropical Atlantic, and Kuroshio in the Pacific,
the latter two under the auspices of the Inter-
governmental Oceanographic Commission.
As science and technology develop, there
will be additional opportunities to engage the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern European countries in
international cooperative action of this kind.
But it is important to keep politics and
political invective out of international meet-
ings and programs on scientific and technical
matters. Unfortunately, the other side has
not always been able to resist the temptation
to exploit the occasion of technical meetings
for political ends by injecting extraneous
political issues into the discussion of techni-
cal matters. Moreover, their financial sup-
462
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
port of various voluntary programs in
convertible moneys has been minimal, and
this has been an obstacle to greater Soviet
cooperation in U.N. economic and scientific
activities.
These, then, are three principal areas of
limited parallelism which have emerged in
the U.N. system, convergences which sei-ve
mutual Soviet-American interests despite the
continuing wide ideological gulf.
There remains a fundamental incompati-
bility between Communist ideology and
charter principles. Communist theory en-
visages a monolithic world built by coercion;
we see one of diversity based on free choice.
Communist ideology distrusts international
organizations that Communists cannot con-
trol. The charter is based on the assumption
that international organization is beyond con-
trol of any one state.
Despite the clash of doctrine, we stand
ready to explore the possibilities of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. parallelism. In the long run, peace-
ful engagement in international cooperative
action is in the interest of East and West.
There is a fundamental reason for this. What
is influencing the policy of all great powers,
including the U.S.S.R., is the growing aware-
ness that the technological and weapons
revolutions have changed the basic terms of
reference of international order and of na-
tional security policies. And Communist
society itself is becoming more varied and
less monolithic under the impact of modem
technology and modern thought. Secretary
Rusk said recently in the context of East-
West relations: * "It is too late in history to
maintain intractable hostility across the en-
tire range of relationships. . . ."
In this period of history certain vital
national interests can best be achieved
through common endeavors and through par-
ticipation in international mechanisms for
peace and development. To this end, as the
President noted in his state of the Union mes-
sage last month,9 "We are shaping a new
future of enlarged partnership in nuclear
affairs, in economic and technical coopera-
tion, in trade negotiations, in political con-
sultation, and in working together with the
governments and peoples of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union." This is also our policy
at the United Nations.
A sobering look at the abyss of nuclear
war, the stake both we and the U.S.S.R. have
in keeping the peace, the realization of our
common vulnerabihty to disease and starva-
tion and disorder, the imperatives of techni-
cal endeavors in an age of technological
revolution — all these impress on Moscow and
Washington and other capitals persuasive
reasons for international cooperation and for
engagement in international processes that
make possible adjustments and the promotion
of our respective national interests without
war.
The clash of ideologies in the U.N. — inso-
far as East-West relations are concerned —
remains too sharp to permit agreement on
basic philosophic values. Attempts to define
common philosophic goals could divide
rather than unite us. Progress toward a
peaceful and cooperative order is more likely
if we drop abstractions — including cold war
abstractions and Utopian abstractions — and
seek out areas where practical interests are
parallel.
The practical step toward peace, the
President has noted, is "to recognize that
while differing principles and differing
values may always divide us, they should not,
and they must not, deter us from rational
acts of common endeavor." i"
' In an address before the Executives Club of
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966.
' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
' Ibid., Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.
MARCH 20, 1967
463
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara Discuss
Developments in Latin America and Viet-Nam
Folloiving is the transcript of a press con-
ference held at the White House by Secretary
Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara at the conclusion of a Cabinet
meeting on February 28.
White House press release dated February 28
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
We just had a Cabinet meeting at which I
reported to the President and the Cabinet in
more detail on our Foreign Ministers meeting
in the Western Hemisphere at Buenos Aires
the other day.'
We feel it was a very successful meeting
with a high degree of solidarity on the great
objectives here in the hemisphere, particu-
larly in the economic field.
The Foreign Ministers have recommended
to the Presidents of the hemisphere that the
Presidents themselves meet in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, on April 12 and 14 and there
take up such great issues as the economic
integration of the hemisphere, the trade prob-
lems of the hemisphere, the war on hunger
and the increase in agricultural productivity,
scientific and medical improvement, a limita-
tion on unnecessary defense expenditures,
and some other important matters.
We were very pleased that the Foreign
Ministers admitted a new member, Trinidad
and Tobago.2 That makes 22 members now
' See p. 472.
' While the Foreign Ministers were in Buenos
Aires, the Council of the Organization of American
States met in special session there on Feb. 23 and ap-
proved Trinidad and Tobago's application for OAS
membership.
in the inter-American system, although
Cuba's membership is in suspense.
We have been very encouraged by what has
happened at that meeting. I think the Presi-
dents will have a good meeting in April.
I also reported on the present state of
affairs with respect to peace in Viet-Nam.
There was a very important interview in
Paris recently with Mr. Mai Van Bo, the
North Vietnamese representative in Paris.
He underlined that what is required by them
of us is a permanent and unconditional
cessation of bombing in the North and that
there would not be any corresponding mili-
tary moves taken on their side to deescalate
the military action.
As you know, we have indicated many
times, to the Secretary-General of the U.N.
and to others, including Hanoi, that we would
be prepared to stop the bombing if they would
take corresponding military moves on their
side but that we cannot stop half the war.
We have seen evidence recently of in-
creased supply activity along the coast, rein-
forcing their troops in South Viet-Nam,
increased numbers of trucks, and so we have
taken additional measures to stop that infil-
tration or to impair it or to slow it down.
Those measures have included artillery fire
into the DMZ and across it; action by our
naval ships, particularly at night and in bad
weather, to interrupt that traffic along the
coast; and a certain mining of internal water-
ways.
We are determined to do our best to sup-
port our men out there and to make it com-
pletely clear to the other side that they
cannot succeed in seizing South Viet-Nam by
464
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
force — at the same time to invite them to
enter into discussions.
We have repeated over and over again,
both publicly and privately, that we will
\ negotiate without conditions or we will
negotiate about conditions or that we will dis-
cuss a final settlement and that we will be
prepared to take up any part of this problem,
such as the deescalation of military activity
or the demilitarization of the demilitarized
zone or the exchange of prisoners or any part
of it which might move us a little step toward
peace.
We cannot report today that we see those
moves by the other side pointing toward a
r peaceful solution.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY McNAMARA
I As Secretary Rusk said, we reported to
the Cabinet on both the diplomatic and mili-
tary situation in Southeast Asia.
I pointed out that the military operations
in South Viet-Nam have increased both in
tempo and intensity in the past 60 to 90 days.
In part, this is a reflection of the continuing
increase in the number of U.S. military per-
sonnel in South Viet-Nam.
We today have about 415,000 U.S. military
men there. This has permitted a very sub-
stantial increase in the rate of U.S. opera-
tions and the pressure of U.S. and South Viet-
namese and friendly operations against the
Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese.
This is evidenced in a number of ways.
Areas of South Viet-Nam that include the
bases of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces are now under attack, areas that
haven't been penetrated by friendly forces
for more than 20 years.
One of these, for example, in Tay Ninh
Province, is today the subject of a 23-
I battalion attack by U.S. forces. The increase
I in U.S. strength has also permitted the reas-
signment of certain of the South Vietnamese
military forces to the pacification effort in
order to increase the progress in that area.
Beyond that, as you know, we have
modified somewhat the character of our mili-
tary operations against the lines of commu-
nication from North Viet-Nam to South
Viet-Nam — roads, railroads, inland water-
ways— over which the North Vietnamese are
moving the men and materiel that are funda-
mental to the Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese operations in the South.
In September last year, for example, we
ran about 12,000 attack sorties against these
lines of communication in North Viet-Nam.
A period of bad weather has forced us to cut
that to about 6,600 or 6,800 sorties per
month.
To supplement the air operations, we have
initiated the mining of the inland waterways
and the estuaries, along which and through
which pass a very substantial percentage of
the men and materiel from north to south.
We have added naval gunfire to air bom-
bardment of these lines of communication,
and we have authorized artillery fire from
emplacements in South Viet-Nam against the
concentrations of men and supplies in the
demilitarized zone and just north of that.
All of these actions, as I say, are supple-
ments to the air campaign, an air campaign
which has been penalized in recent weeks by
periods of bad weather, an air campaign
which is of great importance to us as we see
signs of North Vietnamese efforts to raise
the level of supply from north to south.
I think it is very important to recognize
the weight of this air campaign, recognize
the price that it is imposing upon the North
for their continued support of the South. It
is quite clear that the air campaign hasn't
stopped the infiltration. We never believed it
would.
But it is also quite clear that it has forced
the diversion from other activities in the
North of some 300,000 men to repair the
roads, the railroads, the bridges, the depots,
that are the foundations of the lines of com-
munication from north to south. It has forced
the diversion from other activities of about
125,000 men to the air defenses of North
Viet-Nam and the diversion of tens of
thousands of others to coastal defenses.
Roughly a half a million men, therefore, that
would otherwise be occupied, many of them
MARCH 20, 1967
465
in raising the level of military pressure from
north to south, have been diverted to offset
the effects of our air campaign against the
military targets.
And the magnitude of this price to the
North, I think, is recognized by them and it
has been translated into their worldwide
campaign to force us to stop this.
I think when you recognize the effects of
this, you will understand why we don't
believe we can stop it without reciprocal
military action on their part.
In conclusion, I reported that the increased
tempo of operations in the South, the addi-
tional weight of the effort in the South, has
very substantially increased the fatalities
being suffered by the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese. They are roughly 40 to 50 per-
cent higher in the last 90 days than they were
during 1966.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Q. Could I ask, Mr. McNamara, on this
step-tip of the level of support from north to
south, does this mean that they are actually
moving more people across the border, that
the infiltration is up, or only that the activity
in the North is up ?
Secretary McNamara: The activity in the
North is up. We can't tell, and won't be able
to tell for many months, the level of infiltra-
tion of men at the present time, because we
can only measure that by information re-
ceived from intelligence sources in South
Viet-Nam, and it takes perhaps 4 to 6 months
to correlate the sources of information and
come up with reasonably accurate figures.
But we can measure every day, through
our reconnaissance activities, reconnaissance
aircraft operating in North Viet-Nam and
the movement of trucks from north to south
over the roads both in North Viet-Nam and
over the pass leading from North Viet-Nam
into Laos and hence the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Q. Mr. Secretai~y, the interview that you
referred to, was that a newspaper intervieiv
or someone other of the North Vietnamese
diplomats ?
Secretary Rusk: It was an interview pub-
lished, I think, in the New York Times on
February 23.
Q. Secretary Rusk, there is an assumption
in this city that the Russians noiv really ^
ivant the war in Viet-Nam stopped. How does
this square with the other side's starting to
use Soviet 140-mm. rockets?
Secretary Rtisk: We hope that the Soviet
Union, as one of the two cochairmen, will
support the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords.
And in the joint communique of Mr. Kosygin
[Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers] and Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson in London the other day,
they both reaffirmed their support of those
accords.
We know that the Soviet Union has been
supporting Hanoi, particularly in some of the
more sophisticated weapons. Most of those
have been used in North Viet-Nam itself, but
some of them have turned up in the South.
It is true that we and the Soviet Union
have important differences of view on this.
But we would hope that all sides could take
the 1954 and 1962 accords as a basis for a
settlement and that somehow the two cochair-
men, despite some of the complications that
they might see in it — M^e could move this
situation to a conference or to a settlement
based on those accords.
Q. Mi: McNamara, is the use of the water-
ways something new, of the North Viet-
namese, and if not, why have we waited this
long to mine those?
Secretary McNamara: The North Vietnam-
ese moved, first, from rails to highways. As
we attacked the rail routes, they were forced
to use the land routes. As we attacked the
land routes, they moved a higher percentage
of their traffic to the water routes. As I men-
tioned earlier, as bad weather affected our air
sorties and reduced them by perhaps 50 per-
cent from September to January of this year,
we felt it necessary to supplement our attacks
on the water routes by naval gunfire.
Q. Thank you.
466
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic Situation in Viet-Nam
Following is the transcript of a press
briefing held at the White House on Febru-
ary 27 by President Johnson, David E. Lilien-
thal, a)id Robert W. Koiner, Special Assistant
to the President.
White House press release dated February 27
President Johnson: You all know Mr.
David Lilienthal. For a good long time I have
been wanting Mr. Lilienthal to spend some
time in Viet-Nam in connection with our
'other war" out there. From the early stage
of the TVA I have looked forward to and
admired the novel, constructive, and far-
reaching thoughts and programs which he
has inaugurated on behalf of people in a
democratic way and in a democratic society.
We finally prevailed on him to go out and
do some studying there.i I have asked him
for his counsel. He has given it to me — just
as General [William C] Westmoreland has
and as the Marines that are out there at Da
Nang have. He has given us his help. I think
it will have far-reaching results and effects.
It is going to be essential to our success in
that area.
This goes back to what was said in
Baltimore in April of 1965,^ if you want to
take that platform.
Mr. Komer and Mr. Lilienthal have just
come back. They have just finished report-
ing to me. In case you are interested in any
of their thoughts or their recommendations
or their views, they are available to you.
Q. Could you tell us what your recommen-
dations to the President are, Mr. Lilienthal?
Mr. Lilienthal: This is just the beginning
of a study of the long-term future of Viet-
Nam. The first 10 or 11 days were really a
preliminary look. But I must say I learned a
lot that I didn't know about Viet-Nam, and
almost all of it was encouraging.
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967,
p. 69.
' For an address by President Johnson at Johns
Hopkins University on Apr. 7, 1965, see ibid., Apr.
26, 1965, p. 606.
It was encouraging in that a wide range
of people that I talked to, all of the way
from graduate students at the University of
Saigon to the President of the Tenant Farm-
ers Union and everything in between, as-
sume a future for their country that is much
deeper than I had any idea would be true.
This assumption was felt through so much
of the Vietnamese society. I suppose I saw
15 provinces and 250 Vietnamese. The great
consensus — if I can borrow a fairly familiar
expression — among them was that the long-
term future of the country is in their hands,
and they are not being Americanized, and
that the military problems are ones that will
be overcome.
They, themselves, by their own conduct,
by the way they invest in their farms and
the way they are electing village leaders, the
way the trade union organizations are mov-
ing, the way the industrialists are spending
money, indicate that they think that they
know how this is all going to come out.
Whether they are right or not is some-
thing that I am not competent to say, but
without that kind of assumption any long-
term economic development would be quite
impossible. With that, it will be.
The second thing that I have spoken to the
President about was also something that I
wasn't prepared for. That is that these are
very hard-working people. In underdevel-
oped countries that I am familiar with this
is not by any means invariably the case.
These are devilishly hard-working individ-
uals, and competent.
I talked to the heads of these big civilian
construction outfits. Ordinarily, a construc-
tion guy always runs down his local labor
— that they are just no good. The contrary
was the case in talking to these big construc-
tion outfits. These fellows come right out of
a rice farm, a paddy, and learn machinery
quickly.
I saw a 75-year-oId farmer who a week be-
fore had bought a tractor and had learned
to run it in 3 days. I have never heard of
anything of this kind. He had spare parts.
These are extraordinary people. To have
MARCH 20, 1967
467
been through 20 years of war and still have
this amount of "zip" almost insures their
long-term economic development. Without it
you could have plans a mile high, and beauti-
ful plans, and nothing would have happened.
Well, these are some of the things which I
think are essential.
I am head of a company which I founded
some 12 years ago, engaged in the develop-
ment of various parts of the world, called
Development and Resources Corporation.
This is not going to be a personal enterprise
of mine but a corporate enterprise; so I am
going to draw on quite a team of people. An-
other group will be going out about the 15th
of March. We will have a great deal of coop-
eration from people within the Government,
but it will be a nongovernmental effort.
This is not a part of the Government of
the United States. This is one of the condi-
tions under which I was willing to under-
take this commitment, which is a very heavy
commitment, a moral commitment and phys-
ical commitment: that it should not be a part
of the operations of the Government.
On the other side, Prime Minister
[Nguyen Cao] Ky has appointed Professor
[Nguyen Dang] Thuc, a very remarkable
man who was brought up in Hanoi, a North
Vietnamese originally, who is also going to
head a nongovernmental group.
The reason for its being nongovernmen-
tal, Ky explained to me, was that he believed
that the long-term development of his coun-
try would not be possible unless this group
of planners and developers were not to be
interrupted from time to time by possible
changes in the government.
This is a pretty sophisticated point of view
— and you will not find it anywhere in Latin
America, I might say — to realize that you
have to separate out economic development
from the necessarily changing tides of elec-
tions.
Bob Komer has a lot more specific things
to say, but I do come back to surprise at
my own ignorance, which is based upon what
I had been able to read and see here at home,
and I am greatly encouraged.
Q. Mr. Lilienthal, what was the name of ■
your company which will be involved?
Mr. Lilienthal: It is Development and Re-
sources Corporation. Its main headquarters
are in New York City. I am chairman of it. '
This will be built out of the people of this
company and other people we will bring in,
who will conduct what will look like a study,
but it is a study that is intended to produce
some results as early as we can. It is an
attempt to picture the long-term future of
the country.
Q. Sir, do you have an idea or timetable
on this survey?
Mr. Lilienthal: Well, I can bracket it in
this way: The contract between the Gov-
ernment of the United States and Develop-
ment and Resources Corporation is for a
3-year period. This means it is not a
"quickie." It is not something where you go
out in a week and come back and be a Viet-
namese expert. I am not an expert, and if
I were there 10 years instead of 10 days,
I wouldn't be.
But the people on the Vietnamese side are,
and they are considering this in terms of a
minimum of 3 years. I think the effort itself
will probably run through a decade. It in-
volves the whole future of that country. I
think the Vietnamese are prepared for a
10-year effort.
We are only committed to a 3-year period.
I think our first recommendations, specific
ones, will be something like 8 or 9 months
from now.
Q. Those recommendations, sir, will be
made to the Vietnamese counterpart or the
U.S. Government?
Mr. Lilienthal: To both. It will be made on
the Vietnamese side to a special council
which, while I was there, Prime Minister
Ky created to receive these reports. Here it
will be made, of course, to the President and
to Mr. Komer and others working in this
Government, and to the AID group.
It will be the Vietnamese group and our-
selves. His people have reached such a com-
plete accord about how to go at this thing;
468
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
they are very practical, hard-headed people.
They are really remarkable in being con-
crete. This is a very unusual thing in this
country.
So we decided we would just live together,
and have offices in the same building. In fact,
we are going to have one big office, in which
both of us will function. This may sound like
a housekeeping business, but it is not. The
temper of this whole enterprise is a joint
one, and this encourages me a great deal.
Q. What are you going to tackle first, sir?
Mr. Lilienthal: It is hard to say. There
are so many things, but there are some that
are obvious. In the long run, and that is
what we are trying to think of first — the
long-term future — there are some fantasti-
cally productive resources of that country
that could change the whole complexion.
One of them is the Delta, so-called, the
Delta of the Mekong River. That may well
be the first, to look at the long-term future
of that area which is producing enormous
amounts of rice, but at one time produced
even more and is now producing vegetables
— the most beautiful vegetables I ever saw.
This river has water resources that are
almost unmanageable. I thought I knew
rivers, but I have never seen a river with
such fertile land stretching out as far as the
eye can see. This is like Texas with a lot
of water and no oil. And there may be oil,
too, for all we know. This would be one of
the first things.
Q. Is there any way to say hotv much this
project is going to cost? What is your con-
tract ?
Mr. Lilienthal: Our contract is a relatively
small sum. In the 3-year period initially it is
something like $1,500,000 for the costs of
people. This may be upped or it may be
down. But the substantial costs, you can't
envision.
I don't see any grandiose projects involved
in this, at this juncture, for the next few
years. But I would like to examine that. It
may be a very good investment to recom-
mend a fair amount of money in such a
potentially enormously productive area as
this vast plain, the Mekong Delta, or some of
the highlands.
President Johnson: Some of this thinking
is reflected in the Baltimore speech of April
of 1965. That will be brought up to date. We
have worked some with some of the United
Nations people and some of our own eco-
nomic people since that time. Of course, we
talked to Mr. [Eugene] Black about the
agreed deal with the Asian Development
Bank and the economic development of that
whole part of the world.
Q. Mr. Komer, would you tell us something
about your report?
Mr. Komer: Yes, I won't give you my rec-
ommendations to the President, but he has
said that I could give you the seven main
conclusions that I just gave him from my
report.
It is based on 11 days in the country with
Dave Lilienthal. I visited all four of the
Corps' areas, and I visited 10 provinces. My
report is the most encouraging one that I
have been able to give so far.
Of particular benefit to us in the "other
war," it was impressive to see the solid re-
sults in opening roads. This isn't dramatic,
but the roads are the economic lifeline of
Viet-Nam. Some 77 percent of the main
roads are now largely open.
As one result, we are not forced to rely
on airlift to get AID supplies around. In the
last 6 months, for example, we have 39 per-
cent more truck traffic for AID distribution.
Twelve percent more went by coaster. Ten
percent more is even going on the railroad.
Second, the political process is gaining mo-
mentum. It is there for all to see. The con-
stitution should be finished, I was told in
Saigon, by late March or early April at the
latest. Elections might come as soon as 3
months thereafter, and I wouldn't neglect
the village and hamlet elections, which are
now scheduled to start in April. Democracy
is coming from the bottom as well as at the
top.
Third, the economic outlook is much bet-
ter at the beginning of 1967 than I found
MARCH 20, 1967
469
it in early 1966. We have stopped runaway
inflation. Although prices are still rising
gradually, there is plenty of financing avail-
able for imports from both Vietnamese and
American sources.
Tax collections were up 50 percent in 1966,
and adequate rice appears available to sta-
bilize the Vietnamese diet, mostly from P.L.
480 imports; so we don't anticipate any
critical rice shortage in 1967.
President Johnson: We have one in this
country, I might say, on rice acreage allow-
ances.
Mr. Komer: The Saigon port congestion is
easing. It is still a mess, but there has been
a big increase in port through-put in Janu-
ary and the first 2 weeks of February.
In fact, 465,000 tons came through Saigon
port in January alone, which is about dou-
ble what it was, say, in November of 1965,
when we had the big port crisis. These are
short tons in January of 1967, the last full
month on which I had a report.
Most encouraging to me, personally, I
think, is that the solid pacification program
is finally beginning to roll. It still lags be-
hind the big war and it is much too early
to see many concrete results on the ground.
But I would just make three points about
pacification: We now have a reorganized U.S.
civilian organization in the field. OCO, the
OflSce of Civil Operations, is now a going
concern. Its morale is high. I visited fre-
quently in the field, and all of the U.S. civil-
ian agencies are now pulling together.
The GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] is
serious about putting the bulk of the ARVN
[Army of the Republic of Viet-Nam] into
pacification, which is what is necessary to
provide the indispensable local security for
the pacification effort. Around 60 battalions
of the ARVN, I believe, out of a total of 120,
have been assigned, under the corps and
province plans for 1967, to pacification roles.
We have 400 RD [revolutionary develop-
ment] cadre teams now in the field, and it
will go up to 675 during 1967. We are also
trying out with the Vietnamese, in partic-
ular, field expedients to put together teams
on a local basis where Vung Tau cadre teams
are not available.
On the revamping of the ARVN, some 14
mobile training teams have already trained
21 battalions, in 2-week training cycles, and s
they are now beginning to train, in late Feb-
ruary, 14 more.
A retraining cycle for the regional and
popular forces is underway — a joint general
staff operation.
I personally come back believing that the
VC [Viet Cong] in the South are going to
have real trouble in maintaining their
strength during 1967. I base this not just on
intelligence reports but on what to me are
two prime indicators: first, the Chieu Hoi
returnee rate is still way up for the first 2
months of 1967 — I should say the first 6
weeks.
We got about 3,450 returnees in the first 6
weeks of 1967, which is roughly double what
we got in the same period in 1966. Of course,
the 1966 Chieu Hoi rate was double what we
got in 1965; that is, roughly speaking.
Second, the refugee flow from insecure
areas to secure areas is still high. About 684,-
000 refugees came into the more secure areas
in 1966. This just helps to deprive the Viet
Cong of their recruiting base, and so, too,
does it increase the movement of people
from the countryside into the cities.
There were some 758,000 in 1966, many of
whom were refugees and others of whom
were people just coming into the cities where
real incomes are up and the economy is be-
ginning to boom. All of this is going to cut
down the strength of the VC in 1967, in
my view.
Last, but not least, I must say that I sensed,
just like David Lilienthal — and we talked to
largely different people — an increasing mood
of confidence among Vietnamese officials, high
and low. Everywhere I traveled in the coun-
try there was a feeling that the outcome of
this conflict was no longer in doubt. Now, I
think that this is an intangible but nonethe-
less very important one. I don't want to
overstate it and I don't want to indulge in
speculation, but there is a growing mood of
confidence in South Viet-Nam.
470
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
So, to end as I began, I really returned
quite encouraged. We may still face a long,
hard fight. Pacification is still lagging, and
I think will continue to lag behind our mili-
tary eff"ort in 1967. There are plenty of diffi-
culties ahead, but I think we are indisput-
ably gaining real momentum in the South.
Q. Mr. Komer, did your trip come after
the Tet cease-fire?
Mr. Komer: Yes. I arrived toward the end.
Q. Do you associate the timing of your
talks there with the mood of confidence that
you found?
Mr. Komer: No, I wouldn't. Nobody specif-
ically linked the resumption of the bomb-
ing to this mood of confidence, because I
was there talking about quite different mat-
ters than the bombing of the North.
Q. Mr. Komer, someone who returned re-
cently in the last feiv months said that the
VC don't control the night any more. Could
you tell us about that, and how big are their
operations ?
Mr. Komer: I wish I could be that optimis-
tic, but in many areas of the countryside,
Charley still controls the night. Even where
the roads are open and you can travel un-
restrictedly during the day, it is still quite
unsafe at night, which is one good indicator.
Now, as a part of this AKVN retraining pro-
gram, much greater emphasis is being placed
on the night operations and things like that,
but I would be the last one to say that
Charley no longer controls the night.
Q. Mr. Komer, 77 percent of the main
roads are now open, compares with what and
when ?
Mr. Komer: These figures keep changing,
and I can't give you, unfortunately, a stand-
ard of comparison. I can give you one later
if you like. I will have to look it up. But
there is, I believe, a higher percentage of
roads open than at any time in the last 18
months.
Q. Mr. Komer, what percentage of the
population now is in securely held areas?
Mr. Komer: The figures I was given in
Saigon, and I believe the figures which Am-
bassador Lodge has most recently reported,
are about 58 percent. That is in reasonably
secure areas. You know security is a rela-
tive thing in Viet-Nam.
Q. How about the land?
Mr. Komer: The land I just don't know
off-hand. It is less, because large areas of
land that are thinly populated are the areas
which are still under VC control and it is
not that important to take over land in the
central highlands which is relatively unpopu-
lated.
Q. Last year you had a goal of H percent
of the population to bring into securely held
areas. Is there any goal this year for the per-
cent of population?
Mr. Komer: We are getting more realistic
about goals, and I am not aware of that.
There may be one, but I am not aware that
we have a goal for bringing a specific per-
centage of population into secure areas in
1967.
Q. Doesn't the 58 at this point reflect 8
percent, about, over the beginning of 1966,
and, if so, is that a shortfall under your goal
for last year?
Mr. Komer: I think you are broadly cor-
rect and that there was a shortfall from
some very ambitious goals set last year. This
is why we are recalculating and trying to
build more solidly in 1967 and stay away
from statistical goals that are either reached
statistically and not accurately, or which re-
sult in shortfalls of that sort.
Q. Was this 58 percent translated into mil-
lions of people?
Mr. Komer: You can figure Viet-Nam's
population at between 15 million and 16 mil-
lion. They haven't had a census in a long
time; so all population statistics are suspect.
I notice, by the way, we get different fig-
ures from different agencies, and the GVN
itself has three different figures. It is like the
number of villages in India, which I was
never able to tack down in 5 years.
MARCH 20, 1967
471
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics IVIeet at Buenos Aires
The Third Special Inter-American Con-
ference and the Eleventh Meeting of Con-
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of
the American Republics were held at Buenos
Aires, Argentina, February 15-27 and Feb-
ruary 16-26, respectively. Following are
texts of a statement made at the closing
session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers
on February 26 by Ambassador at Large
Ellsworth Bunker, ^ a resolution adopted by
the Meeting of Foreign Ministers recom-
mending that the American Chiefs of State
meet at Punta del Este April 12-H, and the
introductory section and Resolution I of the
Final Act of the Third Special Inter-Ameri-
can Conference, together with a Department
announcement of the members of the U.S.
delegations to the two meetings.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BUNKER
As we close this historic phase of the
Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of the
Ministers of Foreign Aifairs, I wish to ex-
press on behalf of my delegation the great
pleasure and satisfaction we feel at what has
been accomplished here.
Our labors represent the most intensive
phase of preparations for an event of
extraordinary importance in inter-American
affairs. We are preparing for the meeting of
American Presidents to serve two closely
related purposes:
' Ambassador Bunker replaced Secretary Rusk on
Feb. 21 as head of the U.S. delegations to the meet-
ings.
First, to give new impulse to that great
cooperative effort launched 6 years ago to
accelerate social and economic progress in
the hemisphere — the Alliance for Progress;
and
Second, to give specific meaning to com-
mitments regarding that effort through the
amendments which we in Buenos Aires this
week have been writing into the basic
charter of our inter-American system.
We have taken truly significant strides in
preparing the way for our Presidents to
make their final decisions. Our meeting here
has been exceedingly fruitful in areas of
great importance to the hemisphere. This is
especially true in what we have done to lay
the groundwork for our Presidents to take a
major step toward economic integration,
which may well prove to be the most im-
portant development in the hemisphere since
the American nations achieved independence.
In other fields as well — in agriculture, in
education, in science and technology — we
have taken initiatives which in the years
ahead will, I am confident, bear fruit of
great importance to all our people.
In a most positive atmosphere, foreign
ministers and delegates have dedicated them-
selves unceasingly to conscientious and
detailed consideration of problems of great
complexity. Differences have been few; that
there has been an undercurrent of basic
agreement has become evident in the sub-
stantial consensus with which we are pre-
pared to move ahead with specific recom-
mendations toward a meeting at the highest
level in Punta del Este.
472
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Both the atmosphere which has prevailed
here and the promising results of this meet-
ing represent, I believe, a new spirit that is
alive today in the Americas, a spirit eager to
face up to the great challenges and tasks
before us and to get on with the job. As
President Johnson has said, "Time is not
our ally." ^ Solutions to the urgent problems
of our hemisphere cannot be delayed. We are
at a crossroads of history, and if we vigor-
ously pursue our way along the route pro-
jected this week by the men in this room,
we shall live to see our vast effort — ^the
great adventure on which we are embarked
together — to seek a better life for all the
inhabitants of the hemisphere become a
reality.
The effectiveness of this meeting has been
due in large part to our hosts, to the splen-
did arrangements made for our convenience
and comfort, but especially to the very able
and skillful leadership of the distinguished
Foreign Minister of Argentina [Nicanor
Costa Mendez] . Under his guidance our work
has proceeded apace. On behalf of my dele-
gation I wish to express to him and to his
Government our deep appreciation.
Senores, vamos adelante.
RESOLUTION OF MEETING OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS
February 26, 1967
Whereas :
During its first period of sessions it was decided
that the reaching of a decision on the date and site
of the Meeting of Chiefs of State would be trans-
ferred to this second period; on the same occasion it
was decided that the date and site would be set once
the corresponding agenda was approved; and that
undertaking has been accomplished at this second
period of sessions;
The Eleventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs,
Resolves :
1. To recommend that the Meeting of Chiefs of
State of American co^lntries be held at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, from April 12 to 14 of this year.
2. To approve the following agenda for the Meet-
ing:
Intensification of inter-American cooperation in
order to accelerate the economic and social develop-
ment of Latin America and reaffirmation of the
Charter of Punta del Este
I. Latin American economic integration and indus-
trial development.
IL Multinational action for infrastructure proj-
ects.
III. Measures to improve international trade con-
ditions in Latin America.
IV. Modernization of rural life and increase of
agricultural productivity, principally of food.
V. Educational, technological, and scientific devel-
opment and intensification of health programs.
VI. Elimination of unnecessary military expendi-
ture.
3. To approve document No. 33 ' of this Meeting
of Consultation which contains the annotated agenda
for the Meeting of Chiefs of State of the American
countries.
4. To form a Special Committee which will have
as terms of reference for the carrying out of its
functions the guidelines contained in the document
mentioned in the previous paragraph and to rec-
ommend that each of the Chiefs of State appoint a
personal representative plus the number of advisers
deemed suitable.
5. The Special Committee will begin its work on
March 13 next in Montevideo, Uruguay, to prepare
drafts of documents for the Meeting of Chiefs of
State of American countries on the basis of the
guidelines agreed upon during this meeting. The
Committee must present those drafts by March 27,
1967, at the latest.
6. To hold, in the Republic of Uruguay, a third
period of sessions of the Eleventh Meeting of Con-
sultation of Ministers of Foreign AflFairs to con-
sider the draft documents presented by the Special
Committee. The date for the beginning of this period
of sessions will be determined by the Council of the
Organization of American States.
7. To request the Secretary General of the Orga-
nization of American States to make available all
the technical and administrative services necessary
for the organization of the convoked meetings.
8. To request the Council of the Organization of
American States to consider and approve, in consul-
tation with the Uruguayan Government, the protocol
regulations for the Meeting of Chiefs of State.
» Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.
' Guidelines for the Preparation of the Agenda
of the Meeting of Chiefs of State, adopted by the
Eleventh Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
on Feb. 26.
MARCH 20, 1967
473
FINAL ACT OF THE THIRD SPECIAL
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE
Introductory Section
The Third Special Inter- American Conference,
made up of delegations of the governments of Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States of
America, Uruguay, and Venezuela, met in the city
of Buenos Aires from February 15 to 27, 1967.
The Second Special Inter-American Conference,
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in November 1965,
approved the Act of Rio de Janeiro in which it was
decided, in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the
resolution, "To convoke, in accordance with articles
36 and 111 of the Charter of the Organization of
American States the Third Special Inter-American
Conference, to be held in the city of Buenos Aires.
The Council of the Organization, in agreement with
the host country, shall set a day in July 1966 for
the opening of the conference." ■*
The Conference could not be held at the time indi-
cated, and on December 19, 1966, the Council of
the Organization, in agreement with the government
of the host country, set February 15, 1967, as the
opening date.
The delegations accredited, in the order of prece-
dence established by lot at the preparatory session
in accordance with Article 23 of the Regulations of
the Conference, were the following:
Guatemala
Peru
Colombia
Brazil
Paraguay
Nicaragua
El Salvador
Venezuela
Ecuador
United States of America
Honduras
Dominican Republic
Panama
Bolivia
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Haiti
Mexico
Chile
Argentina
Dr. Jose A. Mora, Secretary General of the Or-
ganization of American States, and Mr. William
■* For background and text of the Act of Rio de
Janeiro, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.
Sanders, Assistant Secretary General, also partici- '
pated in the Conference.
In accordance with Article 8 of the Regulations, '
the governments of Canada, Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados were represented at
the Conference by observers.
The Conference was also attended by observers
representing the Inter- American Specialized Organi-
zations, the Secretary General and specialized agen-
cies of the United Nations, and representatives of
other official inter-American organizations and en-
tities, in accordance with Article 7 of the Regula-
tions of the Conference.
Non-American countries and other international
agencies were also represented at the Conference
and were granted facilities and courtesies so that
they could follow the course of its work in accord-
ance with Articles 9 and 10 of the Regfulations of the
Conference.
The Regulations and Agenda of the Third Special
Inter-American Conference were prepared by the
Council of the Organization of American States as
Draft Regulations and Draft Agenda, and on De-
cember 7, 1966, were submitted to the consideration
of the Member States, in accordance with Article
38 of the Charter of the Organization of American
States. They were approved by the Third Special
Inter-American Conference at the first plenary ses-
sion.
The Government of Argentina appointed His Ex-
cellency Nicanor Costa Mendez, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, as
temporary President of the Conference pursuant to
Article 11 of the Regulations.
In accordance with Article 23 of the Regulations
of the Conference, the chaiiTnen of the delegations
held a preparatory session to deal with the mat-
ters indicated in that article.
His Excellency the President of Argentina, Gen-
eral Juan Carlos Ongania, foiTnally installed the
Conference at the inaugural session held at the
Teatro Municipal General San Martin, on February
15, 1967.
In accordance with an agreement reached during
the preparatory session, His Excellency Nicanor
Costa Mendez, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Worship of the Argentine Republic, was elected
President of the Third Special Inter-American Con-
ference. In accordance with Article 13 of the Regu-
lations, the chainnen of delegations were ex-officio
Vice Presidents of the Conference in the order of
precedence established at the preparatory session.
Under the terms of Article 15 of the Regulations,
the Government of Argentina appointed as Secre-
tary General of the Conference His Excellency Luis
Santiago Sanz.
In accordance with the provisions of the Agree-
ment concluded between the Government of Argen-
tina and the General Secretariat of the Organiza-
474
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion of American States, the said Government ap-
pointed Mr. Guillermo de la Plaza as Assistant Sec-
retary General and the Secretary General of the
Organization appointed Mr. Santiago Ortiz as
Assistant Secretary General of the Conference.
The inaugural session, held on February 15, 1967,
was addressed by His Excellency Juan Carlos
Ongania, President of the Argentine Republic, and
His Excellency Juracy Magalhaes, Minister of For-
eign Affairs of Brazil, speaking on behalf of the
participating delegations.
In accordance with articles 26, 27, and 28 of the
Regulations, respectively, the Steering Committee
was made up of the chairmen of the delegations and
presided over by the President of the Conference;
the Committee on Credentials was composed of the
delegations of Honduras (Chairman), Argentina
(Rapporteur), Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
and Mexico; and the Style Committee was composed
of the Delegations of Colombia (Chairman), Brazil,
Haiti, and the United States of America.
The Conference also established working commit-
tees, listed below, that studied the various topics
included in the Conference Agenda, which consisted
of the amendment of the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, taking into account the
Preliminary Draft Proposal on Amendments, pre-
pared by the Special Committee, that met in
Panama, together with the observations made by
the Council of the Organization.
The Agenda and Regulations were formally ap-
proved by the Conference at the first plenary ses-
sion, held on February 16, 1967.
Working Committees:
Committee A — This Committee was entrusted with
the study of Parts I and III of the Charter, which
included chapters I through IX and XXII through
XXV of the Preliminary Draft Proposal on Amend-
ments to the Charter of the OAS.
Committee B — This Committee was entnisted with
the study of Part II of the Charter, which included
chapters X through XXI of the Preliminary Draft
Proposal on Amendments to the Charter of the OAS.
I The Working Committees were installed by the
' President of the Conference on February 16, with
the following officers :
Working Committee A
Chairman: Mr. Fernando Ortuno Sobrado,
Delegate of Costa Rica.
Vice Chairman : Mr. Galo Leoro, Delegate of
Ecuador.
Rapporteur: Mr. Remberto Capriles R., Dele-
gate of Bolivia.
Working Committee B
Chairman: His Excellency Raul Sapena
Pastor, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Paraguay.
Vice Chairman: His Excellency Ignacio Iribar-
ren Borges, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Venezuela.
Rapporteur: Mr. Jorge Luis Zelaya Coro-
nado. Delegate of Guatemala.
In accordance with Article 26 of the Regulations,
at the first plenary session, held on Febniary 16,
1967, it was decided to establish a Subcommittee on
Coordination, working under the Steering Commit-
tee. The Subcommittee was entrusted with the work
of coordinating the texts approved by the working
committees and the preparation of the draft Pro-
tocol of Amendment to the Charter. The Subcom-
mittee was composed of the following: Chairman,
His Excellency Vicente Sanchez Gavito (Mexico) ;
Vice Chairman, His Excellency Armando Peiia Que-
zada (El Salvador) ; Rapporteur, Mr. Juan Miguel
Bakula Patino (Peru) ; and representatives of Co-
lombia, Brazil, the United States, Panama, Uruguay
and Haiti.
During the session held on February 26, 1967, the
Conference considered and approved the Draft Pro-
tocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, which was signed by dele-
gates of the Member States, invested with powers
for that purpose, at the closing session held on
February 27, 1967.
At the same closing session this Final Act was
signed. The session was addressed by His Excellency
Emilio Arenales Catalan, Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs of Guatemala, who spoke on behalf of the
participating delegations, and by His Excellency
Nicanor Costa Mendez, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Worship of the Argentine Republic and Presi-
dent of the Third Special Inter-American Confer-
ence.
As a result of its deliberations, the Conference
adopted the following declarations, resolutions, and
recommendations :
Resolution I
Ratification of the Protocol op Amendment to
THE Charter and Measures To Be Taken Until
it Enters into Force
Whereas :
As the Second Special Inter-American Conference
pointed out in its Resolution I, "it is essential to
forge a new dynamism for the inter-American sys-
tem and to avoid duplication of efforts and con-
flicts of jurisdiction among its organs, in order to
facilitate cooperation between the American states
and obtain a more rational utilization of the re-
sources of the Organization" ;
In accordance with Article 33 of the Charter now
in force, the Inter-American Conference is the su-
preme organ of the Organization of American States
and, as such, it is expressly authorized by that arti-
MARCH 20, 1967
475
cle to decide the general action and policy of the
Organization and determine the structure and func-
tions of its organs ; and
It is desirable, during the period preceding the
entry into force of the Protocol of Amendment to
the Charter of the Organization of American States,^
that the functioning of the Councils be adapted to
the spirit of the aforesaid Protocol, insofar as the
Charter of the Organization permits.
The Third Special Inter-American Conference
Resolves:
1. To urge the Member States to ratify the Pro-
tocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States as soon as possible, in
accordance with their constitutional procedures.
2. To the extent that it is consistent with the
Charter now in force and, during the interval be-
tween the signing of the Protocol of Amendment and
its entry into force, the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council and the Inter-American Cul-
tural Council, as well as the Inter-American Com-
mittee on the Alliance for Progress and the Com-
mittee for Cultural Action, shall adapt their func-
tioning to the spirit of the Protocol of Amendment,
especially in regard to the holding of annual meet-
ings at the ministerial level, as well as to their
capacity to evaluate the regional development proc-
ess and the development of the Member States.
3. In preparing the proposed program-budget of
the Organization, the General Secretariat shall take
into account the recommendations made by the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council and the
Inter-American Cultural Council, during their meet-
ings, within their respective spheres of competence.
The chairmen of the Inter-American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress and the Committee for
Cultural Action, or their representatives, may par-
ticipate, without vote, in the deliberations of the
Program and Budget Committee of the Council of
the Organization of American States.
U.S. DELEGATIONS
The Department of State announced on
February 11 (press release 31 dated Febru-
ary 10) that Secretary Rusk would head the
U.S. delegations to the Third Special Inter-
American Conference and the Eleventh Meet-
ing of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs.
Other U.S. delegates to the Inter- American
Conference were Edwin Martin, Ambassador
to Argentina; Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the Organization of American
States; and Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
They also served as principal advisers to Sec-
retary Rusk at the Meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters.
Congressional advisers to both meetings
were Senator George A. Smathers, Senator
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Representative
Armistead I. Selden, Jr., and Representative
William S. Mailliard.«
I
THE CONGRESS
Kennedy Round Enters
Decisive Phase
statement by William M. Roth i
The Kennedy Round of trade negotiations
is fast approaching its decisive moment. Be-
tween now and the end of March the out-
come of this long effort will be determined.
These negotiations, involving some 50 na-
tions, represent the most ambitious multi-
lateral attempt to lower trade barriers in
this century. In his recent economic message
to the Congress, President Johnson said: ^
I emphasize once more how important this g^reat
attempt to liberalize world trade is for all the
developed and developing nations of the free world.
After more than 4 years of discussion, it is es-
sential that the participants now resolve the many
" The protocol will enter into force upon ratifica-
tion by two-thirds of the OAS member states.
° For names of other members of the U.S. delega-
tions to the two meetings, see press release 31.
' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on Feb 15. Mr. Roth was then Acting
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; his
nomination to be Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations was confirmed by the Senate on Feb.
28.
» Bulletin of Feb. 27, 1967, p. 333.
476
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
complex problems that still remain. . . . Never be-
fore has there been such a splendid opportunity to
ncrease world trade. It must not be lost.
I must acknowledge that the briefness of
the remaining time, when considered against
the magnitude of the unresolved problems,
challenges optimism. An extraordinary effort
will be required to achieve success. The con-
sequences of failure, however, are recog-
nized by the major participants. A trip to
Europe last week reassured me that none
of our trading partners wants to risk fail-
ure in Geneva.
The principal purpose of my European
meetings was to impress on the other Geneva
negotiators the urgent need to agree on a
schedule of conclusive negotiations on the
remaining issues that divide us. Although we
have repeatedly stressed that our negotiat-
ing authority expires on June 30 of this
year, the implications of this fact have not
been fully recognized in Geneva. We must
substantially conclude our bargaining by
Easter if we are to have a fully delineated
multilateral trade agreement to sign by the
end of June.
We believe that 3 months is the minimum
time required, first, to translate the results
of the bargaining into legal documentation;
second, to permit thorough analysis of this
documentation by all interested Government
agencies; and, third, to secure Presidential
approval of the results. Other governments
must follow similar procedures.
If the United States is to enter into any
trade agreement involving the use of the
tariff cutting authority of the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 (TEA), it must do so no
later than June 30, 1967. That is to say, a
document which spells out all the conces-
sions to which the parties commit themselves
must be signed by that date.
Before the President authorizes signature
of the final Kennedy Round agreement, he
must satisfy himself that the agreement is
in the national interest and that the TEA
requirement of reciprocity is met.
It will therefore be necessary to present
the President with a detailed analysis of the
concessions to be exchanged and a judgment
of their significance in terms of United
States exports and imports. He will expect
to be advised of the views of all the inter-
ested agencies of the United States Govern-
ment.
Both the technicians of the participating
countries and the Secretariat of the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
will need adequate time to translate the re-
sult of the bargaining into a fully annotated
multilateral agreement, authenticated in
both English and French. In the case of
those countries which have been negotiat-
ing on the basis of exceptions to a 50 percent
linear cut, this means the application of the
cut to every tariff item in their schedules
not explicitly excepted.
Where negotiations have involved other
than tariff cuts — an international cereals
agreement, an antidumping code, changes in
customs valuation procedures, elimination or
reduction of specific nontariff barriers, for
example — details of proposed agreements
will have to be elaborated and confirmed in
legal terms.
Some of these agreements, if reached, will
require action by Congress before they can
be honored by the United States. We are
insisting that any agreement that is contin-
gent on implementing legislation must be set
aside from the overall Kennedy Round set-
tlement and must, therefore, contain its own
balance of concessions. No such agreement
will be used as hostage to the signing of the
main Kennedy Round result, or vice versa.
The demand for intensive effort in the
next 6 weeks is obvious, then. While we are
alarmed by the size and scope of the tasks
before us and our negotiating partners, we
are not altogether surprised to find the Ken-
nedy Round in this critical state. It is in
the nature of a major negotiation such as
this that the toughest decisions cannot be
taken until the final bargaining phase be-
gins. The preceding months and years have
clarified the vast detail of offers and pro-
posals. Nothing, however, has been definitely
decided, nor will there be any binding deci-
MARCH 20, 1967
477
sions until all the elements are assembled in
a final balanced package to which all par-
ticipants can agree.
On the industrial side of the negotiations,
serious imbalances exist. The United States
and other participants have indicated their
intention to withdraw some of their offers
unless improvements are made in the offers
of some other major participants. The offers
of the European Economic Community
[EEC] on products of particular importance
to EEC-EFTA trade fall short of justifying
those of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion [EFTA] countries. The EEC Commis-
sion is under obvious pressure to rectify
this imbalance to forestall extensive with-
drawals of EFTA offers.
Steel, aluminum, and pulp and paper pose
particularly knotty problems in the talks
EEC Commission negotiators are opening
with representatives of the various EFTA
countries.
The United States has, of course, a vital
concern with the outcome of these talks be-
cause we are important suppliers to Europe
of many of the products involved. The de-
gree to which we can maintain our own
offers, particularly to the EEC, is at stake.
Discussions on chemicals continue to cen-
ter on the question of whether or not the
United States will negotiate on the elimina-
tion of the American Selling Price system
of customs valuation which is applied to cer-
tain classes of chemical products. The United
States has made it clear that any conversion
of ASP to the normal valuation system would
require special counterconcessions and that
Congress would have to approve such a con-
version.
Regarding cotton textiles, we believe that
a decision to extend in its present form the
Long-Term Arrangement, which governs
cotton textile trade, is overdue. To this end,
we are hopeful that the EEC will rapidly
conclude the arrangements it must make
with its suppliers.
Finally, the prospects appear reasonably
good that negotiations are entering the con-
clusive stage on the writing of a code which
will establish uniform national practices to
control injurious dumping.
The United States continues its adamant
insistence on the inclusion in the Kennedy
Round agreement of provisions for the im-
provement of the conditions of agricultural
trade. There appears to be a distinct possi-
bility that we will succeed in negotiating
an international grains agreement. Prices
that are fair for producers and consumers,
measures to curb uneconomic overproduc-
tion, improvement of access to markets, and
provisions for sharing food aid responsibility
are the central objectives of such an agree-
ment.
On other agricultural products, the picture
and prospects appear mixed. Particularly
with the EEC, substantial differences of ap-
proach prevail. EEC offers are, in general,
veiy inadequate and, in some cases, actually
retrogressive. Useful possibilities do exist in
our agricultural negotiations with other
countries, however.
While the battles being waged at the bar-
gaining tables appear largely to involve the
principal trading nations, much of impor-
tance in terms of trading opportunities is at
stake for the developing countries. Their own
offers, so far, have not reflected full realiza-
tion of the benefit they can derive from
a successful I'ound of trade barrier reduc-
tions.
The confidential nature of the negotiations
prevents me from giving more than this
superficial account of the state of the Ken-
nedy Round. From what I have said, it will
be evident that Herculean efforts are needed
to bring the negotiations to a fruitful conclu-
sion.
In a number of critical areas, the Euro-
pean Economic Community has not in the
past shown the capacity for negotiating flexi-
bility and rapid decisionmaking that will be
absolutely necessaiy from now on. We are
fully cognizant of the internal complexities
of the Community. However, the urgency of
overcoming the final hurdles in the brief few
weeks ahead requires extraordinary efforts
on the part of all participants.
478
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
I.S., Romania Complete 1967-68
Cultural Exchange Arrangement
■^ress release 37 dated February 18
3EPARTIVIENT ANNOUNCEMENT
J Richard H. Davis, American Ambassador
■n Bucharest, and Vasile Gliga, Deputy
'Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist
Republic of Romania, representing their
Gl^overnments, on February 18 in Bucharest
exchanged diplomatic notes which provide a
framework for arranging visits and ex-
changes between the two countries for the
calendar years 1967 and 1968. Letters set-
ting forth a concrete program for 1967 ^
were exchanged at the same time.
This marks the fourth consecutive renewal
of the exchanges arrangement established in
1960.2
On the occasion of the exchange of docu-
ments. Ambassador Davis expressed the
belief that the continued expansion in the
exchanges program serves to facilitate a
freer flow of information between the two
countries and thereby contributes to a bet-
ter understanding between the American and
Romanian peoples.
The notes provide for exchanges in the
fields of education, science, technology, pub-
lic health, performing and creative arts,
exhibits, films, radio and television, books
and publications, sports, and tourism.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE
Bucharest, February IS, 1967
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the re-
cent discussions in Bucharest between representa-
tives of the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Socialist Re-
public of Romania regarding the program of ex-
changes in cultural, educational, scientific and other
fields for the calendar years 1967 and 1968.
In this connection, I wish to inform you that the
Government of the United States of America ap-
proves the following provisions which were agreed
upon in the discussions:
1. Education Exchanges
a. The Parties will provide for the exchange of
graduate students, young instructors, and research
scholars for the purposes of advanced study and
specialization in United States and Romanian uni-
versities and other institutions of higher learning,
including scientific institutes.
b. The Parties will provide for exchanges between
United States and Romanian universities of profes-
sors and instructors for lectures, Romanian and
English language instruction and study, consulta-
tions and seminars.
2. Scientific, Technical and Industrial Exchanges
a. The Parties will encourage the development of
exchanges in the field of science, including such
exchanges as may be carried out between the acad-
emies of sciences of both countries.
To this end, each Party will facilitate visits of
scientists from the other country for the purpose
of delivering lectures and addresses at scientific in-
stitutes and institutions of higher learning, and for
specialization.
b. The Parties will encourage the exchange of
group visits of specialists and technicians to study
various aspects of technical and industrial activity
in the other country.
c. Through diplomatic channels or appropriate au-
thorized organizations, and on a mutual basis, the
Parties will continue to invite scientists and tech-
nicians to participate in national scientific meetings,
congresses and conferences with international par-
ticipation.
3. Exchanges in Performing and Creative Arts
a. The Parties will encourage and facilitate ex-
changes in the field of performing arts, including
artistic, musical and theatrical groups and individ-
ual artists.
The Parties will facilitate the attendance of in-
vitees at national musical competitions and other
similar events with international participation which
may be organized in each country.
b. The Parties will encourage and facilitate ex-
changes in the field of creative arts, including writ-
ers, journalists who are specialists in cultural prob-
lems, composers, artists, and others.
4. Exchanges in Sports
Each Party will encourage and facilitate invita-
tions from its appropriate organizations to athletes
' Not printed here.
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1960,
p. 969; Apr. 29, 1963, p. 661; and Jan. 18, 1965,
p. 87.
MARCH 20, 1967
479
of the other country to participate in sports and
athletic events in its own country.
5. Exchanges of Books and Publications and Cooper-
ation in the Field of Publishing
a. The Parties will encourage and facilitate ex-
changes of books, pamphlets, periodical literature,
scholarly and scientific studies, microfilms and other
printed and duplicated materials devoted to educa-
tional, scientific, technical, cultural and other sub-
jects between university, public and specialized
libraries and other appropriate institutions of both
countries.
Educational materials and publications may
include university catalogues, textbooks, study pro-
grrams, curricula, syllabi, visual aids and docu-
mentary materials in various fields of study.
b. The Parties will use their good oflfices to en-
courage the sale through commercial channels of
books and other publications in the Romanian
language in the United States and in the English
language in the Socialist Republic of Romania.
c. The Parties will encourage, subject to the
consent of the authors or other parties in interest,
the translation and publication in one country of
scientific and literary works, including anthologies,
dictionaries and other compilations, as well as sci-
entific studies, reports and articles published in the
other country.
6. Radio and Television Exchanges
a. The Parties will facilitate the exchange of
radio and television companies and organizations.
The details of these exchanges will be worked
out between the representatives of American radio
and television companies designated by the Depart-
ment of State and Romanian radio and television
organizations designated by the Romanian author-
ities, or between the Parties,
b. Each Party will facilitate appearances, either
recorded or in person, over radio and television by
government officials, artists and public figures of
the other country.
c. The Parties will encourage radio and television
broadcasts devoted to the national holidays of the
two countries (July 4 for the United States of
America and August 23 for the Socialist Republic
of Romania).
7. Exhibits
The Parties will provide for showings in several
cities of exhibits from the other country during
each of the two years these arrangements are in
effect.
8. Cooperation in the Field of Motion Pictures
a. The Parties will encourage the conclusion of
commercial contracts between American film com-
panies designated by the Department of State and
Romanian film organizations designated by the
Romanian authorities for the purchase and sale
of mutually acceptable feature films.
480
b. The Parties will encourage the exchange of ap-
proved documentary and scientific films between
corresponding organizations and assist their distri-
bution through appropriate distribution channels.
c. The Parties will seek to arrange annual gala
performances in their respective capitals and othei:||
cities of representative films to which film personal-
ities from the other country may be invited.
d. The Parties agree that all of the films ex-
changed, purchased, or sold in accordance with this
section will be released in dubbed or subtitled ver-
sions. The contents of the films will be preserved
and any changes must be agreed to by the supply-
ing Party. Prior to its distribution, the release ver-
sion of each film must be agreed to by a representa-
tive designated by the supplying Party.
e. Both Parties will facilitate and encourage joint
production of art and documentary films, as well as
cooperation in the field of motion pictures through
other means that may be agreed upon between the
two Parties.
9. Tourism
The Parties will facilitate the development of tour-
ism between the two countries and agree to take
measures, on the basis of equality of opportunity,
to satisfy the requests of tourists to acquaint them-
selves with the way of life, work and culture of the
respective peoples.
Specific details and programs of the above-men-
tioned visits and exchanges will be agreed upon
through diplomatic channels or between authorized
organizations.
The Parties agree that visitors will pay their own
round-trip transportation from capital to capital.
Whenever mutually advantageous the Parties will
seek to arrange for the payment by the receiving
side of the local expenses of the visitors.
The arrangements agreed upon do not exclude the
possibility of additional visits and exchanges which
may be mutually acceptable to the Parties and which
may be undertaken by interested United States and
Romanian organizations or private citizens, it being
understood that arrangements for additional ex-
changes, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior
agreement in diplomatic channels or between author-
ized organizations.
It is understood that the arrangements provided
for above shall be subject to the constitutional re-
quirements and applicable laws and regulations of
the two countries.
The Government of the United States of America
takes note of the approval by the Government of
the Socialist Republic of Romania of these under-
standings as confirmed in your Note of today's date.'
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
Richard H. Davis
' Not printed here.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
.
furrent Actions
MULTILATERAL
viation
onveiition on the international recognition of
rights in aircraft. Opened for signature at Geneva
June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17,
1953. TIAS 2847.
Ratification deposited: Iceland, February 6, 1967.
onvention on oifenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Sep-
tember 14, 1963.'
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden, January 17, 1967.
'Opyright
rotocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright Con-
vention concerning the application of that con-
vention to the works of stateless persons and
refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.
Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS
3324.
Ratification deposited: Italy, December 19, 1966.
customs
ustoms convention on the temporary importation
of professional equipment. Done at Brussels June
8, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1962.^
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
;ustoms convention on the ATA camet for the
temporary admission of goods. Done at Brussels
December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30,
1963.=
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
lustoms convention regarding ECS camets for
commercial samples. Done at Brussels March 1,
1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957.=^
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
Customs convention on the international transport
of goods under cover of TIR carnets with modi-
fications of annexes. Done at Geneva January 15,
1959. Entered into force January 7, 1960.^
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
lustoms convention on containers. Done at Geneva
May 18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, igsg.''
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
;;onvention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature : Burundi, February 17, 1967.
Ratification: Korea, February 21, 1967.
fisheries
International convention for the conservation of
Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14,
1966."
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter-
national waterborne transportation. Signed at
Mar del Plata Jure 7, 1963.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.=^
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Octo-
ber 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, February 28, 1967.
Publications
Convention concerning the international exchange
of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3,
1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.*
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, January 10,
1967.
Convention concerning the exchange of official pub-
lications and government documents between
states. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.
Entered into force May 30, 1961."
Acceptance deposited: Indonesia, January 10, 1967.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Ireland, February 14, 1967.
Sea
Convention for the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen
September 12, 1964.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Signatures: India, March 3, 1967; Iraq, February
27, 1967; South Africa, March 1, 1967; Upper
Volta, March 3, 1967.
Sugar
Protocol for the further prolongation of the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Done at London November 14, 1966. Open for
signature at London November 14 to December
30, 1966, inclusive. Entered into force January
1, 1967."
Ratification deposited: Peru, January 30, 1967.
Accessions deposited: Bolivia, January 9, 1967;
Congo (Brazzaville), January 1, 1967.
Notifications of intention to seek ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession deposited:
Hungary, India, Mexico.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959 (TIAS
4893, 5603), to put into effect a revised fre-
quency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile
(R) service and related information, vdth an-
nexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966. Enters into
force July 1, 1967, except the frequency allot-
' Not in force.
" Not in force for the United States.
MARCH 20, 1967
481
ment plan contained in Appendix 27, which enters
into force April 10, 1970.
Trade
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with an-
nexes and schedules and protocol of provisional
application. Concluded at Geneva October 30,
1947. TIAS 1700.
Admitted as contracting party (with rights and
obligations dating from independence) : Bar-
bados, February 15, 1967.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement regarding radio communications between
Alaska and British Colombia. Effected by ex-
changes of notes at Washington June 9, July 11
and 18, August 22, September 27, October 4,
November 16, and December 20, 1938. Entered
into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 2092.
Notification of termination: United States, Feb-
ruary 28, 1967.
Canadian note of April 5, 1966, and proposed
United States reply concerning amendment of
the convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (TIAS
3326).'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
1, 1967.
' Not in force.
Til
Romania
Arrangement relating to a program of exchanges
in cultural, educational, scientific and other fields
for the calendar years 1967 and 1968. Effected
by exchange of notes at Bucharest February 18,
1967. Entered into force February 18, 1967.
s
i
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on February 28 confirmed the follow-
ing nominations:
William S. Gaud to be U.S. Alternate Governor
of the Inter-American Development Bank for a
term of 5 years and until his successor has been
appointed.
William B. Macomber, Jr., to be an Assistant
Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see De-
partment of State press release 47 dated March 7.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1447 PUBLICATION 8216 MARCH 20, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides tbe public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently. '
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington. D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11. 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
482
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX March 20, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U7
Atomic Energy
[^resident Johnson Renews Call for Nonprolif-
eration Treaty (message to 18-Nation Dis-
armament Committee) 447
Secretary McNamara Comments on Risks of
Anti-Ballistic-Missile System (transcript of
BBC interview) 442
U.S., U.S.S.R. To Exchange Views on Limiting
Nuclear Arms Race (Johnson) 445
Congress
Confirmations (Gaud, Macomber) 482
Kennedy Round Enters Decisive Phase (Roth) . 476
Mrs. Neuberger Appointed to ACDA Advisory
Committee 448
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Gaud, Macomber) 482
Disarmament
Mrs. Neuberger Appointed to ACDA Advisory
Committee 448
[President Johnson Renews Call for Nonprolif-
eration Treaty (message to 18-Nation Dis-
armament Committee) 447
I U.S., U.S.S.R. To Exchange Views on Limiting
Nuclear Arms Race (Johnson) 445
Economic Affairs
Economic Situation in Viet-Nam (Johnson,
Komer, Lilienthal) 467
Kennedy Round Enters Decisive Phase (Roth) . 476
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S., Romania
Complete 1967-68 Cultural Exchange Ar-
rangement (text of U.S. note) 479
International Organizations and Conferences
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics
Meet at Buenos Aires (Bunker, conference
documents) 472
Gaud confirmed as U.S Alternate Governor of
Inter-American Development Bank .... 482
President Johnson Renews Call for Nonprolif-
eration Treaty (message to 18-Nation Dis-
armament Committee) 447
Latin America
Foreign Ministers of the American Republics
Meet at Buenos Aires (Bunker, conference
documents) 472
Gaud confirmed as U.S. Alternate Governor of
Inter-American Development Bank .... 482
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara Dis-
cuss Developments in Latin America and
Viet-Nam (transcript of press conference) . 464
Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Com-
ments on Risks of Anti-Ballistic-Missile Sys-
tem (transcript of BBC interview) .... 442
Presidential Documents
Economic Situation in Viet-Nam 467
President Johnson Renews Call for NonprolLf-
eration Treaty 447
U.S., U.S.S.R. To Exchange Views on Limit-
ing Nuclear Arms Race 445
Romania. U.S., Romania Complete 1967-68 Cul-
tural Exchange Arrangement (text of U.S.
note) 479
Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia: The
Issue of Majority Rule (Palmer) 449
Trade. Kennedy Round Enters Decisive Phase
(Roth) 476
Treaty Information
Current Actions 481
U.S., Romania Complete 1967-68 Cultural Ex-
change Arrangement (text of US. note) . . 479
Trinidad and Tobago. Secretary Rusk and Sec-
retary McNamara Discuss Developments in
Latin America and Viet-Nam (transcript of
press conference) 464
U.S.S.R.
Secretary McNamara Comments on Risks of
Anti-Ballistic-Missile System (transcript of
BBC interview) 442
The U.N.: An Arena for Peaceful East-West
Engagement (Sisco) 458
U.S., U.S.S.R. To Exchange Views on Limiting
Nuclear Arms Race (Johnson) 445
United Nations
Southern Rhodesia: The Issue of Majority Rule
(Palmer) 449
The U.N.: An Arena for Peaceful East- West
Engagement (Sisco) 458
Viet-Nam
Economic Situation in Viet-Nam (Johnson,
Komer, Lilienthal) 467
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara Dis-
cuss Developments in Latin America and
Viet-Nam (transcript of press conference) . 464
Name Index
Bunker, Ellsworth 472
Gaud, William S 482
Johnson, President 445, 447, 467
Komer, Robert W 467
Lilienthal, David E 467
Macomber, William B., Jr 482
McNamara, Robert S 442, 464
Neuberger, Maurine B 448
Palmer, Joseph 2d 449
Roth, William M 476
Rusk, Secretary 464
Sisco, Joseph J 468
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Feb. 27-IVIar. 5
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to February 27 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
31 of February 10, 37 of February 18, and
41 of February 23.
No. Date Subject
*42 3/2 Henning sworn in as Ambas-
sador to New Zealand (bio-
graphic details)
oToi
t43 3/2 Solomon: "Why the United
States Should Expand Peace-
Trade With Eastern Europe."
44 2/28 Palmer: California Institute of
Technology, Pasadena, Calif.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
ir U.S. Governinent Printing Office: 1967—251-933/37
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
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WASHINGTON, D.C., 20402
POSTAai AND PCS* PAID
U.S. eOVIRNMKNT PRINTINO OPP
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Viet-Nam Information Notes
The first three pamphlets of a new series of background papers on various aspects of
Viet-Nam conflict have been published by the Department of State. Basic Data on South Vi
Nam (publication 8195) summarizes the history, geography, government, and economy of t
country. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (publication 8196) reviews peace efforts by t
United States and the United Nations and other diplomatic initiatives. Communist-Directed Fort
in South Viet-Nam (publication 8197) reviews the growth of Viet Minh and Viet Cong fon^
Communist objectives, strengths, and weaknesses.
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Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Basic Data on South Viet-Na/m
(8195) ; The Sea/rch for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Com-
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. 1U8
March 27, 1967
FROM THE IRON CURTAIN TO THE OPEN DOOR
Address by Vice President Humphrey 486
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG REPORTS ON HIS TRIP TO ASIA
Transcripts of Netvs Conferences 505
THE GREAT TRANSITION: TASKS OF THE FIRST
AND SECOND POSTWAR GENERATIONS
Lecture at the University of Leeds
by W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President A91
For index see inside back cover
From the Iron Curtain to the Open Door
Address by Vice President Humphrey '
Exactly 21 years ago today, Winston
Churchill spoke these well-remembered
words: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste
in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has de-
scended across the Continent."
"The Continent," of course, was Europe.
When Churchill spoke here, a new phase
in history had begun: that postwar conflict,
centered in Europe, which was to become
known as the cold war.
It is my belief that we stand today upon
the threshold of a new era in our relations
with the peoples of Europe — a period of new
engagement. And I believe that this new
period, if we do not lose our wits or our nerve
or our patience, can see the replacement of
the Iron Curtain by the Open Door.
When Churchill spoke here on March 5,
1946, there were many in this country — and
elsewhere — who would not accept his stark
characterization of the state of affairs in
Europe.
But Churchill was right. And he was right
to speak out. The beginning of wisdom, the
foundation of sound policy and action, is to
face the facts.
What were the facts in March of 1946 ?
Western Europe lay helpless and prostrate
after a terrible war, literally dependent for
her survival on the protection and good will
of the United States. The political institu-
tions, the economies, the peoples, of Westera
' Made at Westminster College, Fulton, Mo., on
Mar. 5.
Europe stood helpless — save for the United
States — in face of the imperialist impulses
emanating from the East.
There, Stalin had literally erected an Iron
Curtain between the nations and peoples of
Eastern Europe and those of the West. On
his side of that curtain he saw all as occu-
pied territory — the spoils of war. And his
further intentions were declared and clear.
What are the facts of March of 1967?
Western Europe stands today second only
to the United States as a free and powerful
center of economic and social well-being.
Because of their brave initiatives — and with
our help — the nations of Western Europe
stand able once again to assert their own
role in the world.
In Eastern Europe the captive states of 21
years ago are once again reaching toward
their own identities. The monolithic control
which smothered and held them in the grip
of terror is today diminishing.
The Iron Curtain itself — although firm
and impenetrable in many places, as in Ber-
lin— has become increasingly permeable in
others. Goods, ideas, and people have begun
to crisscross the European Continent.
The essence of the situation today is this:
The European family — long separated, long
set against each other, yet still a family —
is becoming reacquainted and is moving
toward more normal relationships.
The Soviet Union, recovering by heroic
effort from the frightful loss of human life
and resources which it suffered in the war,
486
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
las grown greatly in its capacity and its
nclination to satisfy the material needs of
;he Russian i^eople. No one who cares about
;he human condition can fail to rejoice at
;his fact. And its aggressive behavior has
jeen tempered.
(Vestern European Unity
All these things have happened. Yet they
iid not happen by accident.
They have happened because we followed
the course Winston Churchill counseled 21
Srears ago.
They have happened in large part because,
in the face of Stalinist tyranny, we in Amer-
ica brought our power and protection to the
ebuilding European Continent.
They have happened because we helped
d encouraged our European partners in
heir increasing efforts toward self-renewal.
They have happened because — in Berlin,
;n Greece and Turkey, yes, and in Cuba —
e Soviet Union came to recognize that
brute force or its threat could no longer be
an acceptable means of attaining political
goals.
If today the Soviet Union takes a more
prudent and cautious course, it is — for more
than any other reason — because together we
and our Western partners have in these two
decades stood firm and fast.
During this time, too, a constructive force
has been at work in Western Europe releas-
ing the constraining bonds of old hostilities
and closed institutions to the fresh stimula-
tion of competition and cooperation across
national boundaries. That constructive force
lias been the will of the peoples of Western
Europe that they should unite.
Their desire for unity has been most
manifest in the building of the European
Communities and in the initiatives of an
increasing number of nations to join those
Communities.
This, too, has had a powerful influence on
the positive changes which have taken place.
And we have supported it.
Some today see Western European unity
endangered by a rising wave of nationalism
there. And there are those who fear that the
renewal of a narrower nationalism in West-
ern Europe must be accepted as an inevitable
and immutable fact, that we must resign our-
selves to the abandonment of our support for
unity and to the acceptance of a return to
power politics among nations.
There are a small few in other countries
who conclude that the "realistic" next step
toward a settlement of European problems
can therefore only be by bilateral agree-
ment between the Soviet Union and the
United States over the heads of our Western
partners.
I do not believe this is "realism." Neither
do I believe a realistic settlement of Euro-
pean problems can be achieved by Euro-
pean nations without our participation and
that of the Soviet Union. It is precisely now,
at the time when new opportunities lie ahead,
that we must retain cohesion with our West-
ern partners — and they with us. If the cold
war is to end, if the Iron Curtain is to be
lifted, we shall need them and they shall
need us.
The task now, in light of a new situation,
is not to throw away what has been success-
ful but to build constructively upon it.
Equal Partnership With Western Europe
I believe that the people of Western
Europe will reject concepts of narrow na-
tionalism and of national adventure and will
continue to move forward toward unity —
toward a unified Western Europe open to
expansion and conscious of its need to
strengthen its ties with the nations of East-
ern Europe.
I believe, too, that they vdll reject any
severing of their ties across the Atlantic,
ties built firmly on common cultural heritage,
on common experience, on common interest.
For our part, we do not mean either to
abandon our friends or to dominate them.
We know that American power continues to
be necessary to stability in Central Europe.
We know that difficult and intractable prob-
MARCH 27, 1967
487
lems, such as arms control and the reunifica-
tion of Germany, must continue to involve
both American and European effort.
In our alliance, the task is this: to trans-
form what was built on fear and common
threat into a vital, working instrument built
on hope and common opportunity and com-
mon responsibility.
It must be an alliance for peace and peace-
ful progress, not simply against the specter
of invasion from the East. It must be an alli-
ance for promotion of social and economic
welfare, not simply against a Communist
threat.
For, as the President has said, the times
require "a shift from the narrow concept
of coexistence to the broader vision of peace-
ful engagement." ^
To strengthen the alliance, we in America
must be determined to treat our Western
European partners as equal partners — to
consult with them, in the true sense of that
word, in every area of common interest, and
to practice forbearance as they find their way
to new forms of cooperation and unity
among themselves.
I cannot overemphasize the importance of
open and honest consultation and discussion
among the members of the Atlantic alliance.
For it is precisely now, when there is
movement and ferment in Europe, that the
temptations are greatest for unilateral action
by the individual partners. As I have said, it
is imperative that we retain our solidarity.
And to do so, we must all take the extra step
to insure that no action should be undertaken
by any one of the partners which might
jeopardize the welfare and security of all.
We cannot afford the luxury of division.
We cannot afford it in matters of military
security. Nor can we afford it in matters of
high economic and social concern.
That is why:
We must, and we shall, be forthcoming in
response to the initiatives taken by our
' For an advance text of Pre.sident Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
Atlantic partners toward narrowing the
"technology gap" between us. For if we can-
not narrow this gap between ourselves, how
can we ever hope to narrow the far greater
gap between the Atlantic nations and the
poor nations to the south ?
We must, and we shall, persevere in our
efforts to bring the Kennedy Round trade
negotiation to a successful conclusion — one
in which there is true reciprocity, one in
which arbitrary and artificial restraints to
trade may be removed and from which a far
more efficient allocation of resources may
result.
Achieving the Goal of the Open Door
The goals of Western European unity and
of Atlantic partnership are not in opposition
to the goal of the Open Door. They are a
first necessity in reaching it. They are the
key to that door.
As we strive toward these former goals,
how shall we proceed toward the latter?
First, we mJist ivork together toith our
Western European partners in encouraging
a further development of trade, technologi-
cal, and cultural contacts with Eastern
Europe.
This is why it is imperative that we seize
each opportunity — such as the East-West
trade bill now before the Congress — to
increase the flow of people and trade to and
from these previously closed societies.
We look, for example, toward the time
when the nations of Eastern Europe may
become members of the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and full
participants in the work of the U.N. Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe.
Second, we rmist encourage the continued
evolution of Soviet policy beyond the
ambiguities of "peaceful coexistence" toward
more substantial forms of cooperation.
We have negotiated a treaty banning
nuclear weapons from outer space.
We are working with others to bring about
a treaty banning the proliferation of nuclear
weapons — a treaty acceptable and beneficial
to the nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike.
488
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We have concluded an air agreement with
the Soviet Union and have signed a new
U.S.-Soviet cultural agreement.
Through liberalization of credit and easing
of travel restrictions, we hope to accelerate
the exchange of goods and people.
We seek early Senate ratification of the
United States-Soviet consular agreement.
We shall actively work toward closer coop-
eration between the Soviet Union and the
nations of the West in space, in medicine, in
peaceful technology.
We have not responded to the Soviet de-
ployment of a limited anti-ballistic-missile
system by immediately beginning to build
one of our own. Instead, we seek to convince
the Soviet leaders that this would merely
mean yet another costly round in the arms
race. After the expenditure of many billions
of dollars, neither of us would be more secure
than when we started.
Our obiective is not to step up the arms
race but to slow it down or halt it, to the
mutual interest of all nations.
Third, we must work toivard a settlement
of those European 'problems ^vhich have
been left unresolved in the aftermath of the
war.
At the heart of this is the reunification of
Germany.
As I said earlier, this is a matter which
concerns not only Europeans but America
and the Soviet Union as well.
It is a matter, too — and this sometimes
seems nearly forgotten — important for the
people of Germany.
Thus reunification can only take place
after the most thorough and careful consul-
tations among all parties involved. Reunifi-
cation is a difficult goal. But it is a necessary
one, if stability and peace are finally to be
achieved in Central Europe.
Fourth, no nation can hope to be an island
of security in a turbulent world. We must
therefore consider hoiv the resources of the
industrialized parts of the tvorld can usefully
assist the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America so that progress and stability and
hope may overcome despair and violence.
It does not require much foresight to
realize that the widening gap between grow-
ing populations and diminishing food sup-
plies is approaching a time of explosion.
Shall we sit in complacency, lulled by
creature comforts, until we are engulfed in
chaos? Or shall we act, now and together?
It is Europe's problem — and the Soviet
Union's — as much as it is ours; we must con-
sult together, plan together, and combine our
wisdom and resources to help work toward
security and peaceful development in the
poverty-stricken parts of the world.
Those who have launched the technological
revolution — a revolution without ideology —
have the responsibility to see that its bene-
fits are more widely shared by others.
For poverty breeds disorder, and hunger
breeds violence. And it has been the lesson of
these past few years that it is precisely in
the poverty-stricken and hungry parts of the
world where a conflict might arise which
would draw the superpowers into disastrous
confrontation.
Fifth, we must continue to develop and
strengthen international institutions which
will provide a frameivork of law and order
in the world, in which nations of all ideolo-
gies may find common and peaceful grounds
for settlement of disputes.
Churchill said aptly that "jaw, jaw is bet-
ter than war, war."
Most important of such institutions is the
United Nations.
The United Nations, among other things,
is an unmatched buffer zone between con-
flicting interests and ideologies. It is a place
where reason and compromise may interpose
themselves before major nations reach the
point of no return. It is the invaluable mid-
dleman, the honest broker necessary when
normal contacts fail.
And it is also an invaluable instrument of
peacekeeping in places around the world
where major powers might otherwise feel it
necessary to inject themselves.
There is no denying that the Soviet Union,
as our Western partners and ourselves, has
a vital interest in the strength and health of
MARCH 27, 1967
489
an institution which may serve as a force for
order and restraint among us.
Let us examine these things:
— Greater exchange at all levels with the
nations of Eastern Europe;
— Active pursuit and encouragement of
"peaceful coexistence" with the Soviet
Union;
— A European settlement including the re-
unification of Germany;
— Joint efforts with our former adver-
saries in helping the developing countries;
— Building a system of international order
in which these same former adversaries are
our partners.
Would any of these things have been at
all imaginable when Winston Churchill stood
here 21 years ago?
When the final realization sank in on the
last doubter that an Iron Curtain indeed was
being erected across the heart of Europe,
how many of us had reason for hope that in
1967 — so short a time later — it might be pos-
sible to begin replacing it with an Open
Door?
In the center of free Berlin there stands
today a stark ruin — the skeleton of a church,
preserved to symbolize eternally the deprav-
ity of war.
It is our hope that the Iron Curtain may
one day, too, lie in ruins, its remnants a sym-
bol of a time mercifully ended.
A great act in the human drama lies at
hand: Through a new engagement in Europe
we have the chance to shape a commonwealth
of progress dedicated not to war but to
peace, not to doctrinal conflict but to con-
structive reconciliation.
We have the chance, as President Johnson
has expressed it,* to help the people of
Europe to achieve together:
— a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and
Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together
for the common good ;
— a continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a
framework in which West and East can act together
in order to assure the security of all.
Therefore, I leave you with this: Who is to
say, if we in the West stand together and in
unity, where the next two decades may lead?
Who is to say, if our rich and powerful
nation exerts the enlightened leadership of
which it is capable, what bright new fulfill-
ment may lie ahead for the human family?
Our guide could be no better than that set
forth here 21 years ago by Churchill:
"If we adhere faithfully to the Charter of
the United Nations and walk forward in
sedate and sober strength, seeking no one's
land or treasure, seeking to lay no arbitrary
control upon the thoughts of men . . . the
highroads of the future will be clear, not
only for us, but for all, not only for our time,
but for the century to come."
America is ready to play its role.
' Ibid.
490
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Rostoio, in this Sir Montague Burton Lecture given at
the University of Leeds in England on February 23, looks
backivard over the ttvo postwar decades and forward to the
agenda which is emerging for the next generation. He dis-
cusses Viet-Nam in this perspective and sees Hanoi's con-
cept of "wars of national liberation" as "old-fashioned."
"If we have the common will to hold together and get on
with the job," he concludes, "the struggle in Viet-Nam
might be the last great confrontation of the postivar era."
* The Great Transition: Tasks of the First
and Second Postwar Generations
by W. W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
In his state of the Union address on Jan-
uary 10 of this year, President Johnson
said: ^
We are in the midst of a great transition — a
transition from narrow nationalism to international
partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war
to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a
troubled and a threatened planet.
It is this theme that I should like to elab-
orate today by looking backward over the
two postwar decades and looking forward to
the agenda which is emerging for the next
generation.
History is rarely clean-cut in its lines of
demarcation. Wars, revolutions, and other
traumatic events do leave their mark on the
calendar; but their clarity is sometimes illu-
sory, distorting the timing of more profound
changes they reflect. Nevertheless, I believe
we are now — potentially — in a true water-
shed period. We can make some shape out
of the major experiences through which we
all have passed since 1945. We can define
some of the dangers, challenges, and possi-
bilities which are beginning to grip the world
' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
community and which will increasingly en-
gage it in the years ahead.
To elaborate this theme, I have chosen to
review the evolution of international affairs
under four major headings, each of which
represents a dimension of our common cen-
tral task — the building of a viable world
order:
First, aggression; that is, deterring or
dealing with efforts to alter the territorial or
political status quo by one form or another
of violence applied across international fron-
tiers.
Second, economic and social progress in the
world community as a whole and in the de-
veloping regions in particular.
Third, international organization, which
has assumed not merely global forms,
through the United Nations and related in-
stitutions, but also (as Churchill foresaw)
developed increasing vitality in the various
regions.
Fourth, reconciliation — the search for and
the discovery of areas of agreement across
ancient and recent barriers so as to reduce
the dangers of conflict, to give to the world
MARCH 27, 1967
491
community a growing framework of unity
and order, and to fulfill the injunctions of
article 1 of the United Nations Charter.
I shall try briefly to examine how each of
these four continuing strands of policy and
experience has evolved in the past 20 years
and suggest the tasks which will confront us
in the days ahead.
The postwar world was shaped by
two quite arbitrary processes. First, there
emerged de facto or de jure lines of de-
marcation between the Communist and non-
Communist worlds. These lines resulted prin-
cipally from the disposition of military forces
at the end of the Second World War, al-
though they were also affected by events in
the early postwar years — notably Stalin's
consolidation of his position in Eastern
Europe and the Chinese Communist victory
on the mainland.
Second, a series of new states emerged
from the process of decolonization. Most of
these were the product of colonial history;
but in the Indian subcontinent, the Middle
East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, the
birth of new nations produced new lines on
the map.
A great deal of the first postwar genera-
tion's history consists of eff'orts to frustrate
those who sought to alter these international
boundaries by force: Communists because
they felt that they had the historical right
and duty to move their power forward be-
yond them, certain new nations because they
felt a sense of grievance over the lines which
had emerged. And at certain points the two
efforts interwove, as Communists acted to
exploit postcolonial ambitions, frictions, and
discontents.
Three Phases of Communist Aggression
The postwar Communist offensive had a
certain shape and rhythm. There was Stalin's
thrust of 1946-51, in association with Mao
from 1949; Khrushchev's of 1958-62; finally,
the offensive conducted over the past 4 years
by Mao and those who accepted his activist
doctrines and policies with respect to so-
called "wars of national liberation."
Starting in early 1946, Stalin consolidated
into Communist states the countries of
Eastern Europe where Soviet troop positions
provided leverage, while pressing hard
against Iran, Greece, Turkey; then via the
Communist parties in Italy and France. His
effort reached its climax in the Berlin block-
ade of 1948-49.
The West responded with the Truman doc-
trine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of
NATO. A stalemate developed after the suc-
cess of the Berlin airlift in 1949.
As this duel in the west proceeded, Stalin,
working through the Cominform, launched
an offensive in the east, which can roughly
be dated from Zhdanov's speech of Septem-
ber 1947. It involved guerrilla warfare in
Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. And after the Chinese Com-
munists came to power in November 1949,
the offensive in Asia reached its climax in
the invasion of South Korea. It ended in
May 1951 with the successful United Nations
defense at the 38th parallel against a massive
assault by the Chinese Communists, although
costly fighting continued for 2 further pain-
ful years.
From the opening of truce talks in the
summer of 1951 to the launching of the
first Soviet Sputnik in October 1957, there
emerged what passes in postwar history as
a relatively quiet interval. It was, of course,
interrupted by the Suez and Hungarian crises
in 1956; but these resulted less from the ten-
sions of the cold war than from the dynamics
of change within the non-Communist world
and within the Communist bloc, respectively.
During this time, the Soviet Union was
mainly engaged in its post-Stalin redisposi-
tions, political, economic, and military.
Meanwhile, Communist China turned pri-
marily to tasks of domestic development.
Only in Indochina did local conditions favor
major Communist momentum; but the North
Vietnamese settled in 1954 for half of the'
victory they had sought.
Khrushchev's domestic changes represented!
a significant softening of Stalin's harsh re-
gime; and for Soviet citizens, historic gains,,
His foreign policy style, too, was diflferentJ
and, in its way, more flexible. Nevertheless,,
492
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
considerable ambitions remained embedded
in Moscow's foreign policy.
And with the launching of Sputnik, a new
phase of attempted Communist expansion got
under way.
Khrushchev had consolidated by that time
unambiguous control over the machinery of
the Soviet Government as well as over the
Communist Party. He looked to the exploita-
tion of two new facts on the world scene:
first, the emerging Soviet capacity to deliver
thermonuclear weapons over long distances
as a means of forcing the West to make
limited diplomatic concessions; second, the
marked acceleration of nationalism and mod-
ernization in Asia, the Middle East, Africa,
and Latin America, yielding an environment
of endemic turbulence on those continents.
The Post-Sputnik Period
It was in this post-Sputnik period that
Moscow laid down its ultimatum on Berlin;
the Communist Party in Hanoi announced
it would undertake to revive guerrilla war-
fare in South Viet-Nam; Castro took over
in Cuba; and Soviet military and economic
aid arrangements were extended to increase
their leverage not only in the Middle East,
where the process had begun earlier, but
also in Indonesia and elsewhere. It was then
that Mao announced: "The East Wind is pre-
vailing over the West Wind," and, in that
spirit, initiated in 1958 the crisis in the Tai-
wan Straits.
There was a good deal of opportunistic
enterprise in all this rather than a majestic
grand design, but it was clearly a phase of
Communist confidence and attempted for-
ward movement.
In 1961-62, Khrushchev's offensive was
met by the West as a whole at Berlin and a
further dramatic test of nuclear blackmail
was faced down in the Cuba missile crisis by
President Kennedy. For the time being, at
least, that latter crisis answered a question
which had greatly engaged Khrushchev:
whether the free world would surrender vi-
tal interests through diplomacy under the
threat of nuclear war.
The answer to the second question — con-
cerning the ability of the West to avoid
successful Communist exploitation of the in-
herent vulnerability of the developing area
— had to be given at many points by many
devices:
— In Laos, by an evident determination to
frustrate a Communist takeover, yielding
the Geneva accords of 1962;
— In Viet-Nam, by President Kennedy's
decision in December 1961 to enlarge our
support for the South Vietnamese;
— In Africa, by the whole cast of Euro-
pean and American approaches to the new
African nations, and in particular, support
for the United Nations effort in the Congo;
— In Latin America, by the isolation of
Castro's Cuba.
By the end of the Cuba missile crisis in
the autumn of 1962, the momentum had
largely drained out of Khrushchev's post-
Sputnik offensive; but Moscow's move
toward moderation, symbolized by the nego-
tiation of the atmospheric test ban treaty in
1963, had no echo in Peiping.
The Sino-Soviet split was gravely aggra-
vated after the Cpba missile crisis and be-
came increasingly overt as recriminations
were exchanged and inter-Party documents
revealed.
Cliinese Communist Tlirust for Leadership
The Chinese Communists sought to seize
the leadership of the Communist movement,
notably in the developing areas, and to unite
it with the radical nationalists of Asia and
Africa. They thrust hard against Soviet in-
fluence within Communist parties on every
continent, fragmenting some of them; sought
to bring Castro aboard; moved boldly, over-
playing their hand, in Africa; probably
played some role in triggering the attempted
Communist takeover in Indonesia; and pos-
tured aggressively during the India-Pakistan
war of 1965. As a result of the prob-
lems they created, the Afro-Asian confer-
ence at Algiers in 1965 never materialized.
At one point after another this Chinese
Communist offensive in the developing world
fell apart, leaving the war in Viet-Nam per-
MARCH 27, 1967
493
haps the last major stand of Mao's doctrine
of guerrilla warfare.
There is a certain historical legitimacy in
this outcome.
For the better part of a decade, an im-
portant aspect of the struggle within the
Communist movement between the Soviet
Union and Communist China had focused on
the appropriate method for Communist par-
ties to seize power. The Soviet Union had
argued that the transit of frontiers with
arms and men should be kept to a minimum
and the effort to seize power should be pri-
marily internal. They argued that it was the
essence of "wars of national liberation" to
expand Communist power without causing
major confrontation with the United States
and other major powers. The Chinese Com-
munists defended a higher risk policy, but
they were militarily cautious themselves.
Nevertheless, they urged others to accept the
risks of confrontation with United States
and Western strength against which the
Soviet Union warned.
Although Hanoi's effort to take over Laos
and South Viet-Nam proceeded from im-
pulses which were substantially independent
of Communist China, its technique consti-
tuted an important test of whether Mao's
method would work even under the optimum
circumstances provided by the history of the
area. As General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap,
North Vietnamese Minister of Defense] has
made clear, Hanoi is conscious of this link:
South Viet-Nam is the model of the national lib-
eration movement in our time ... if the special
warfare that the United States imperialists are test-
ing in South Viet-Nam is overcome, this means that
it can be defeated everywhere in the world.
These Communist efforts to extend their
power and influence beyond the truce lines
of the cold war interwove, as I suggested
earlier, with a second set of problems: the
dissatisfaction of various ex-colonial na-
tions with the frontiers — and other arrange-
ments— which had emerged from the
passing of colonialism. The list is long of con-
flicts based on real or believed grievances
of this kind: the Arab-Israeli dispute; Suez;
Somalia-Ethiopia; Algeria-Morocco; Kash-
mir; West Irian; the Indonesian confronta-
tion of Malaysia; Cyprus; et cetera. In addi-
tion, older quarrels were exacerbated by the
mood of rising nationalism which swept the
developing world; for example, Peru-Ecua-
dor, Thailand-Cambodia. The Communist
powers sought to exploit a number of these
conflicts in order to expand their leverage in
the developing world via diplomacy, subver-
sion, arms, and economic aid agreements.
But their roots mainly lay in an extension of
anticolonial attitudes and doctrines from the
days of struggle to the early years of inde-
pendence, in a continuity of policy from re-
bellion to governmental policy. It seemed
easier for some leaders of the new nations
to create a sense of nationhood by continu-
ing to evoke the rhetoric and methods of ^
anticolonialism — and xenophobic nationalism
— than to turn immediately to the more mun-
dane concepts and tasks demanded for the
successful building of a viable nation.
Passing of Romantic Revolutionaries
Looking back over this whole sequence,
certain general observations are possible.
First, the postwar international bound-
aries and truce lines have proved remarkably
resistant to efforts to alter them by force.
In this first postwar generation the non-
Communist powers did not achieve a peace-
ful world community under law. But we did
maintain the minimum condition for build-
ing such a community; namely, that aggres-
sion not be successful. And through persist-
ent effort in the United Nations we have
de-fused many small crises and choked off
many episodes of violence which could have
provoked major conflict.
Second, as the two postwar decades ended,
some of the aggressive, romantic revolution-
aries— Communist and non-Communist —
were passing from the scene or entering a
phase of protracted frustration, for the time
being at least. We have been dealing with
leaders obsessed by ambitious maps of
their region (or of the world) which they
tried to bring to reality: from Mao's map of
the area where China has, in the remote or
recent past, wielded power or influence to
494
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Nkrumah's vision of a united black Africa
led from Accra; from Castro's vision of the
Andes as the Sierra Maestra of South Amer-
ica to Ho's image of the former French col-
onial empire in Asia run from Hanoi. Each
has confronted both other people's national-
ism, at the expense of which these maps
would be fulfilled, and a more general resist-
ance to changes in the territorial or political
status quo by external violence. Resistance
to the achievement of these visions, com-
bined with the growing demand of people
throughout the world for economic and so-
cial progress, has eroded both ideological
and nationalist aggressive romanticism.
One sees this in the Soviet Union and
throughout Eastern Europe; it is a central
issue in the struggle within mainland China.
This is the essence of the pragmatic tide
rising through the developing nations, sup-
planting the slogans derived from Lenin's
"Imperialism" and the struggle against co-
lonialism with the more austere rhetoric of
economic and social development. A new
generation is emerging, skeptical of the ex-
pansionist and geopolitical concepts and vi-
sions that engaged their elders.
In an interesting leader of January 14,
1967, "The Last Revolution," The Econo-
mist recently advanced the proposition that
the end of Mao would be the end of a line
of romantic revolutionaries reaching back
to 1789. I would put the proposition this
way:
There have been three major types of war
in modern history: colonial wars, wars of re-
gional aggression, and massive wars to alter
the Eurasian balance of power — the latter
attempted by industrially mature powers. In
the first postwar generation we have had
to deal with the threat of the latter, as un-
dertaken by Stalin and Khrushchev, under
inhibitions set by the nuclear age. But we
have also seen a good many acts of regional
aggression arising from the dilemmas and
the exuberance of newly formed national
states, as they looked backward to past hu-
miliation and forward to new opportunity,
while confronting the choices open to them
in the early stages of modernization. Despite
their global pretensions, I would place Mao's
efforts in the latter category.
Given the rhythm of modernization, with
vast continents entering the early stages of
modernization after the Second World War,
it is natural that we should have seen a
phase of regional aggression. From the rec-
ord of history we should be in reasonably
good heart about this phase. For these early,
limited external adventures, associated with
late preconditions or early takeoff periods,
appear generally to have given way to a
phase of absorption in the adventure of mod-
ernizing the economy and the society as a
whole. But, as I shall later emphasize, this
underlying hopeful trend is potential, not
inevitable, and it could be transitory.
If these aggressive impulses have dim-
inished in the technologically mature Soviet
Union and in most of the less developed na-
tions, we should be able to go forward in
the generation ahead from the frustration
of aggression and the absence of major hos-
tilities toward settlement, reconciliation, and
cooperation. This, surely, should be the ob-
ject of policy in Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa; as it is already the object of policy
in the West with respect to the Soviet Union,
Eastern Europe, and mainland China.
International Economic Policy
We have had to allocate in the first post-
war generation an enormous amount of our
energy, talents, and resources to the frustra-
tion of aggression and the avoidance of ma-
jor war. Despite this environment of tension
and to some extent because of it, the world
community has also launched programs of
economic and social development on an in-
ternational basis which are truly revolu-
tionary when compared to what was done
during the interwar years or deeper in the
past.
We began, of course, with the Marshall
Plan and Western Europe. So quickly did
Western Europe respond that — although the
job was by no means completed — minds were
beginning to turn to more systematic efforts
in the developing areas in the winter of
1948-49; for example, at the United Nations
MARCH 27, 1967
495
General Assembly meeting in Paris. Presi-
dent Truman's Point 4 proposal in January
1949 was an important benchmark in this
transition. In the United States a Presiden-
tial commission was working to systematize
and enlarge this turn in policy when the
attack was made in June 1950 on South
Korea. The Korean war both postponed a
focusing of public attention and resources
on the problems of development and, through
a sharp rise in raw material prices, appeared
to diminish somewhat its urgency.
Multilateral Support
It was in the post-Korea phase that
thought and policy began to crystallize
around the problem of accelerating economic
growth in developing nations. In the early
1950's the best work on development by the
United States was done in places in which
we had major security commitments; for
example, Turkey, Taiwan, and Korea. The
substantial and sustained assistance provided
for security purposes was gradually put to
good advantage in terms of development.
But toward the end of the 1950's, doctrines
took hold and institutions emerged aimed at
development itself — outside a narrow secu-
rity context — notably the Development Loan
Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Wise
Men's study of India and Pakistan for the
World Bank, and the creation of the World
Bank's soft loan window, the International
Development Association.
Evidently the United States was not alone
in this transition. As colonies moved toward
independence, the metropolitan powers be-
gan to provide systematic aid to the new
nations for which they formerly had borne
a direct responsibility. The Colombo Plan
organization was set up, for example, as
early as 1950.
But only in the first half of the 1960's
did the world community begin to bring de-
velopment policy toward the center of the
stage: with the consortia arrangements of
the World Bank for India and Pakistan; the
Alliance for Progress; and a variety of other
international consultative institutions. In the
United States this transition assumed — put-
ting aside Viet-Nam — the form of a shift
from military to economic support and from
generalized supporting assistance to pur-
poseful development aid. Economic assist-
ance of nations other than the United States
rose by 18 percent from 1960 to 1965.
This barely noticed expansion in the multi-
lateral machinery and resources available for
support of developing nations was accompa-
nied by a learning process within those
nations which has been quite dramatic. One
after another success story in development
emerged in the sense that nations learned
the trick of generating sustained and reason-
ably balanced growth at rates which substan-
tially outstripped population increase. The
list is now quite long: Greece, Turkey, Israel,
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Paki-
stan, Iran, Turkey, and nations in Latin
America containing perhaps three-quarters
of the population of that continent.
The problems of development are, of
course, by no means solved. Large parts of
Africa, for example, have not yet developed
the human and physical infrastructure and
sufficient political unity required for a sus-
tained takeoff. And in each of the other de-
veloping regions some countries have not yet
established the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions— economic and political — for takeoff.
Finally, India, with 500 million human be-
ings, is not yet stably on the road to sus-
tained growth. But many of the prerequisites
exist, and beneath the surface of the present
political and agricultural situation, important
new elements of agricultural and industrial
vitality give solid grounds for hope.
In general, we have made great but uneven
progress thus far in the 1960's. Many of the
old contentious debates have subsided as men
perceived their irrelevance; for example, ar-
guments concerning private versus public
enterprise, industry versus agriculture. They
have given way to a pragmatic synthesis.
New concepts, working methods, and institu-
tions have emerged which should permit
vigorous growth in the developing nations
in the generation ahead.
But a lion stands in the path: the food-
population problem. The solution to this
496
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
problem will certainly be central to the
agenda of the coming generation.
The elementary facts are these. If present
trends continue, the world's population will
, grow from some 3.4 billion today to about
4.5 billion by 1980. Nearly three-fourths of
this tremendous expansion will be in the
population of the developing world. Popula-
tion control measures instituted over this
period could damp this increase somewhat;
but they could have a profound effect by
the year 2000. To feed this increased popula-
tion at existing levels of consumption — and
allowing for the impact of urbanization and
' income increases on effective food demand —
will require an annual rate of increase of at
least 4 percent of food production in the de-
veloping world. The overwhelming portion
of this increase will have to be met from in-
creased production in the developing world.
The average rate of increase in food produc-
tion over the past 5 years has been only
slightly over 2 percent. To avoid mass star-
vation— in President Johnson's phrase, ^ "to
help bring our most basic human account
into balance" — the whole world community
will have to apply to its solution every device
at its command. Moreover, sometime during
the coming generation, mainland China will
have to acknowledge more fully and act on
the proposition that agriculture and popula-
tion control is its fundamental problem; and
it may need the help of the world community
to avoid mass starvation.
As work on development moved forward,
a parallel and related evolution occurred in
cooperation among the industrialized nations.
The OEEC [Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation], which managed Euro-
pean revival, was converted to the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] in 1961, embracing Japan in
1964. It gradually became a forum for exam-
ining the economic relations among the more
advanced states, generating a spirit of ac-
knowledged interdependence among the in-
dustrialized nations which has also suffused
monetary and trade poUcy in such world
'Ibid.
organizations as the IMF [International
Monetary Fund] and GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] .
Much in postwar security pohcy was
rooted in a consciousness of our tragic com-
mon failure to stop aggression in time during
the 1930's. Similarly, postwar economic
policy reflected the memory of the nationalis-
tic policies which converted the recession
after 1929 into a convulsive global catas-
trophe.
We have clearly done better in interna-
tional economic policy during the first post-
war generation than we did during the inter-
war years, although at least four major mat-
ters remain on the agenda for the years
ahead:
— An international aid policy geared to
self-help measures but sufficiently expanded
in scale to permit high and steady rates of
growth in those developing nations prepared
to take the necessary parallel domestic
action.
— A satisfactory international monetary
system which recognizes and relates problems
of liquidity to problems of international capi-
tal sources and movements and the
realities of the balance-of -payments adjust-
ment process.
— A reconciliation of agricultural policies
in the light of the overwhelming fact of the
food-population problem, and the adoption
of, and support for, voluntary programs of
population control in the developing world.
— A satisfactory trade policy embracing
the legitimate interests of developed and de-
veloping nations.
The Movement Toward Regionalism
The tasks of economic cooperation have
combined with a movement toward organized
interdependence in the world community —
especially in regional groups — -whose roots
go deeper than economics. The nations of the
Western Hemisphere had successfully pressed
for a formal recognition of its regional
grouping at the United Nations Charter
Conference in San Francisco in 1945; but the
postwar movement toward regionalism be-
gan, of course, in Western Europe.
MARCH 27, 1967
497
Essentially, the movement toward Western
European unity recognized three facts:
— As many Western European leaders
looked ahead, starting from the devastation
of the Second World War and the acute de-
pendence on the United States of the post-
war days, they reached out for a method of
organization which would give them a larger
voice in their own destiny.
— They perceived, however, that in mili-
tary, economic, and other matters, a measure
of interdependence with the United States
would be required for the indefinite future;
and
— They accepted the fact that the nation-
state — even nation-states of 50 million com-
manding the best in modern science and tech-
nology— could not deal effectively either with
the United States as a partner or with the
scale of the problems which were emerging
on the world scene, whether East-West or
North-South.
Western European regionalism was con-
ceived by Europeans as a method for solving
this three-sided dilemma. And it had the
steady support of the United States which in
1947 made — and has sustained — a conscious
decision that a strong, unified Western
Europe was mere in its longrun interest
than fragmented but less capable European
partners.
In the first postwar generation. Western
European unity moved forward substantially,
goaded by the Soviet threat but inhibited by
an understandable reluctance to surrender
deeply rooted national concepts. Today — de-
spite evident and grave problems — that move-
ment is still alive and active despite the ris-
ing sense of security since the Berlin crisis
and the Cuba missile crisis of 1961 and 1962.
And as one contemplates the agenda for the
coming generation, as nearly as it can now be
defined, the case remains valid, strengthened
by evidence that it is difficult to absorb and
apply certain types of new technology with-
out investments in research and development
and markets beyond the reach of nations of
50 million. Western Europe is unlikely to
make the maximum contribution that it
could make to the tasks of security, human
welfare, reconciliation, and institution-build-
ing in the world community unless it con-
tinues to move toward unity.
Meanwhile, in the course of the 1960's,
forces similar to those which have initiated
economic regionalism in Western Europe be-
gan to take hold in other parts of the world,
notably in Latin America and, most recently,
in Asia.
Economic Cooperation in Latin America
Latin American unity is an old dream, dat-
ing from the days of Bolivar. It has taken on
a new vitality as Latin Americans have
moved from the first stage of their indus-
trialization, focused on the production of con-
sumer goods in substitution for imports, to
growth centered on medium and heavy indus-
try. In terms of stages of growth, the more
advanced countries of Latin America — Mex-
ico, the southern regions of Brazil, and
Argentina, for example — are emerging from
takeoff and moving toward technological ma-
turity. In Mexico, at least, that transition has
been successfully made, although throughout
Latin America industrialization is hobbled
by an overly protective system which has di-
minished competition, efficiency, and full
utilization of capacity. Powerful vested in-
terests are embedded in those national pro-
tective systems.
But as the Latin Americans move into in-
dustries of higher and more sophisticated
technology, they are beginning to try to over-
come this heritage of takeoff. They feel
acutely the constriction of national markets
and the irrationality of building steel, auto-
mobile, chemical, and other industries on a
national basis. They are also being pushed
toward economic integration by an aware-
ness that their traditional exports are un-
likely to earn the foreign exchange needed
for their further development. They must
therefore cultivate industrial exports. But at
the present time they must go through a
transitional stage of regional protectionism
before they can emerge with competitive ef-
ficiency on the world scene.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Meanwhile, the Central American Com-
mon Market has demonstrated that countries
at a much earlier stage of development can
profit greatly from a common market ar-
, rangement — a lesson worth the serious atten-
tion of Africa, the Middle East, and South-
east Asia.
Finally, the Latin Americans are beginning
to look inward from the coastal cities, which
have historically been the basis for their
modernization. They are beginning to recog-
nize expanding needs and possibilities for
international collaboration in developing the
inner frontiers of South America.
These convergent and palpable economic
forces making for economic cooperation and
integration are supported by a sense — not
unlike that which continues to motivate the
European unity movement — that in the world
of the present and the future the voice of
Latin America will be strengthened to the
extent that Latin Americans can find com-
mon ground and common policies.
It is natural, therefore, that the currently
discussed meeting of the Presidents of the
American Republics should focus primary at-
tention on economic integration and multi-
national projects.
Surge of Regionalism in Asia and Africa
In Western Europe and Latin America
those pressing toward unified action could
build on a substantially common tradition.
But in Asia, history offered a less promising
initial base. Nevertheless, we have seen in the
past 2 years a quite remarkable surge of
regional enterprise in Asia.
From South Korea to Australia, from Ja-
pan to Singapore, there are solid and par-
ticular national reasons why the nations of
Asia and the Pacific should begin to group
together in mutual support. These under-
lying considerations were strengthened by
the American commitment of major forces in
Viet-Nam in 1965, which has given to the
region confidence that it has a future to de-
sign.
As in Europe and Latin America, the ini-
tial expression of this movement has been in
the form of economic institutions: the rapid
negotiation of the Asian Development Bank,
the new vitality of the Mekong Committee,
gatherings to survey the possibilities of re-
gional action in education, agriculture, et
cetera. It remains to be seen how the en-
couraging political impulses which underlay
the Asian and Pacific Council in Seoul and
the Association of Southeast Asia will evolve.
In Africa, too, where regional cooperation
has existed in some regions, such as east
Africa, one can detect other beginnings, at
least, of the same mixture of economic and
political impulses that have led to regional-
ism elsewhere. The Organization of African
Unity has existed since May 1963. Despite
political schisms, regional and ideological, it
undertook to deal with two substantial
African disputes — Somalia-Ethiopia and
Morocco-Algeria — thus avoiding the inter-
vention of extra-African powers. On the eco-
nomic side, the African Development Bank
has been launched and subregional economic
communities are being formed in eastern
and west Africa as a result of planning by
the EC A [Economic Commission for Africa].
Most of Africa, as noted earlier, is in a pre-
industrial stage, building slowly the precon-
ditions for takeoff. It makes good sense to try
to create the essential physical and institu-
tional infrastructure, in this pliant early
phase of development, on a regional and sub-
regional basis. This was a major considera-
tion that led to the reshaping of the Ameri-
can aid program to Africa over the past year
to give greater emphasis to multinational
cooperation.
As the evolution of the movement toward
Western European unity indicates, the build-
ing of regionalism is a long, slow process. At
every stage the case for moving forward
must overcome the inherent attraction and
inertia of staying with familiar national
modes of operation. Moreover, regionalism is
no substitute for building solid national struc-
ture. Nevertheless, the next generation is
likely to see real, if irregular, progress to-
ward regional cooperation, because the po-
litical and economic impulses which underlie
it are compelling. Regional cooperation —
within a framework of global collective secu-
MARCH 27, 1967
499
rity and common efforts in development — is
likely to grow, as it must, if the desires of
men and governments to take a larger hand
in their own destiny are to be reconciled with
the inadequacies of the nation-state on the
one hand and the imperatives of interdepend-
ence on the other.
For the United States, this move toward
regionalism has a particular meaning. We
were drawn into world responsibility after
the Second World War by the need to fill
certain vacuums of power. The cost of not
helping in Greece, Turkey, Western Europe,
Korea, and elsewhere was self-evident; and
it was judged, case by case, to outweigh the
burden of engagement. But postwar America
was not interested in building a network of
satellites. It looked forward to the earliest
time when other nations could stand on their
own feet and deal with us as partners in as
safe and orderly and progressive a world
community as we all could achieve.
Regionalism, in Western Europe and else-
where, has thus commended itself to the
United States as a way of permitting us to
shift away from the disproportionate bi-
lateral relations inherent in a large power
working with smaller powers.
We see in regionalism a way not of return-
ing to isolation but of leaving the nations of
the various regions to do as much for them-
selves as they can — and more with the pas-
sage of time — while preserving the ties of
interdependence where they are judged on
both sides to be in the common interest.
Key Problems of the Cold War
The central lesson we have drawn from
our experience — and from the whole sweep
of events since 1914 — is that our main task
is the organization of a durable peace. We
tend, looking back, to share Churchill's judg-
ment of the Second World War as "unneces-
sary." We are conscious that in a nuclear age
the human race cannot afford another world
war. Therefore, whatever the frustrations
and difficulties, we are committed to look be-
yond the non-Communist islands of security,
progress, and order to a settlement of the
cold war itself and the shaping of something
like a true global community.
The first condition for such a community
is, I would say again, that alterations of the
international status quo by force not be per-
mitted to succeed. The status quo is, of
course, not sacrosanct. It is always changing.
And in the past two decades it has altered
in major ways through changes within na-
tions and by international agreement. We
now have, for example, a fairly promising
prospect before us in relations between the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on the one
hand and the West on the other. But we shall
forget at our peril that this prospect was
created mainly by the strength and unity of
the West when confronted by the challenges
of Stalin and Khrushchev.
Looking ahead, we can define one aspect
of the challenge of the next generation as
this: whether we can in this timespan solve
the three problems which from the early
postwar years onward have virtually defined
the cold war:
— Ending the division of Germany and
Europe;
— Preventing further nuclear proliferation
and damping the arms race in strategic nu-
clear weapons systems between the United
States and the Soviet Union;
— Bringing mainland China into a normal
relation to the world community.
In diflferent ways, each of these issues is now
active.
The Division of Germany
There is a growing consensus in the West
that our task with respect to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe is to make the
most of the forces of moderation which have
emerged since 1953, and especially since the
Cuba missile crisis, and gradually to create
an environment in which the East-West con-
frontation is so reduced that the problem of
Germany can be peacefully resolved.
No one can now perceive the time or the
shape of such a resolution. But there is a
common will to create an environment in
which the major unresolved question of the
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cold war in Europe can be settled. Under-
lying this process is a dilution, at least, of
the Communist commitment that they must
help impose their doctrines on others; the
' rising tide of national and regional assertive-
ness in both Eastern and Western Europe;
and the washing away, under the tests of
performance, of the Conmiunist conviction
that their systems for organizing society are
inherently superior to those of the West.
The process will not move forward auto-
matically. It could easily be disrupted if the
West fragmented and presented opportuni-
ties for renewed pressure from the East; but
right now it is in at least slow motion with
virtually universal support in the West.
Whereas the moment of truth in East- West
relations, centering on a resolution of the
German problem, may not come upon us for
some time, we face in the months ahead an
urgent and critical question with respect to
the nuclear arms race.
Nuclear Arms Race
We are all actively trying to find the terms
for a nonproliferation agreement, and the
emergence of an anti-ballistic-missile defense
for Moscow has posed for the United States
and the Soviet Union the question of whether
the nuclear arms race shall be brought under
control or go into a vast and expensive round
of escalation on both sides with respect to
both offensive and defensive weapons.
The two issues are partially linked. It may
well be argued that it will be more difficult
for the nonnuclear powers to accept a non-
proliferation agreement if its context is
believed to be a heightening of the bilateral
arms race in strategic systems between the
United States and the Soviet Union. And
there will be other searching questions raised
by the non-nuclear-weapons states in the cur-
rent meeting of the Eighteen Nation Disar-
mament Conference at Geneva and beyond
which require response.
But if we failed to create a world of non-
proliferation, the result would not merely be
more national nuclear systems and the insta-
bilities that might accompany such a situa-
tion but also a fragmenting of political re-
lations within the non-Communist world. But
if we should succeed — as we must try very
hard to do — the world community will be
drawn closer together.
What is at stake, therefore, in the discus-
sions and negotiations that are upon us in
these days, are issues which will set much
of the framework for the organization of the
world community over the next generation.
Communist China
In Communist China we are seeing one of
the great dramas of modem history. The
Long March veterans, who worked for more
than 30 years in what appeared to be re-
markable unity, have now split and are en-
gaged in an open struggle for power. Beneath
the surface of the struggle for power is a
debate on policy between revolutionary ro-
mantics and pragmatists. The resolution of
this debate will shape mainland policy and
Communist China's relations for many years
ahead.
This judgment reaches back to the nature
and roots of the Chinese crisis. It is clear
that after their remarkable victory in 1949,
Chinese Communist leaders made two gran-
diose errors.
First, they set in motion a pattern of eco-
nomic development focused on heavy industry
and the modernization of their armed forces
which was historically inappropriate. They
behaved as if they were at a stage similar
to Stalin's Soviet Union of 1930; in fact, they
were closer to that of Japan near the turn
of the century. Like Japan at that time, they
needed to develop in modern China — as a
foundation for industrialization — an agricul-
tural system based on strong peasant incen-
tives, combined with the massive application
of chemical fertilizers. They chose collectiv-
ization and inadequate investment in agri-
culture. Despite some shift in recent years
toward a higher priority for agriculture, the
result is a food-population position which is
incompatible with rapid economic develop-
ment.
Second, they chose to move out onto the
MARCH 27, 1967
501
Asian and world scene with objectives that
disregarded the realities of power in the
world arena. They sought an expansion of
control and influence beyond their capacity —
and they failed.
In the face of these failures, the future of
Chinese domestic and foreign policy is evi-
dently now at stake as well as the future of
the leaders engaged.
No one can confidently predict the timing
and the sequence of the outcome. There is a
decent hope, however, that soon or late, a
mainland China will emerge which will ac-
cept as its primary task the modernization
of the life of the nation and accept also the
proposition that the international frontiers
of the region shall not be changed by the use
of force.
So far as the United States is concerned.
President Johnson has made clear on a num-
ber of occasions that we look forward to
that day and to welcoming that kind of main-
land China into the community of nations.
Shaping Historical Possibilities
What I have asserted thus far is that the
tasks of the second postwar generation may
consist in:
First, moving from the mere frustration
of aggression to a phase of settlement, recon-
ciliation, and cooperation with respect to
endemic disputes arising either with Com-
munist regimes or between non-Conamunist
states;
Second, moving forward in the tasks of
growth in the developing regions and espe-
cially coming to grips, as a world community,
with the food-population problem;
Third, carrying forward, refining, and con-
solidating the movements toward regionalism
— in Western Europe and elsewhere — as well
as global cooperative enterprises in the fields
of aid, trade, money, and in various tech-
nical fields which lend themselves best to
universal effort;
Fourth, moving toward a liquidation of key
issues of the cold war in Europe and toward
arms control, while working to bring a more
moderate Communist China into a normal
relationship to Asia and the world.
Taken together they offer expanding scope
for the United Nations in the years ahead.
In the past two decades the U.N. has contrib-
uted to each major dimension of international
policy, but the inherent schisms and conflicts
of those years often bypassed the U.N. or
permitted it only a secondary or marginal
role. If we can move forward on the agenda
I have outlined, the U.N. may begin more
nearly to fulfill the functions envisaged for
it in 1945.
Having held up this challenging but essen-
tially hopeful vision of what may lie ahead,
I would now wish to underline a general
proposition: On occasion it may be proper to
regard the course of history as inevitable,
ex post; but not ex ante.
There was nothing inevitable about what
we achieved in the first postwar generation:
the revival of Western Europe; the preserva-
tion of freedom in Turkey, Greece, and West
Berlin; the saving of South Korea and Ma-
laya; the Alliance for Progress; the removal
of Soviet missiles from Cuba; and all the
rest. These enterprises took brave, and often
visionary, men and women of many nations.
They did not rely on inevitable historical
trends: They shaped historical possibilities
by their commitment.
Nor were our failures over these years in-
evitable— explicable, as always, but not in-
evitable.
And there is no inevitability built into the
projection I have outlined for the second
postwar generation, only possibilities. And
these constructive possibilities will not be
made good unless we work as hard at them
as we have worked in the past 20 years on
a somewhat different agenda.
It would, in fact, not be difficult — survey-
ing the forces at work within Western
Europe, in East-West relations, in the dy-
namics of the developing regions, in the
forces at play within Communist China — to
project a quite different prospect: a prospect
of progressive movement not toward order
502
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and reconciliation and progress but toward
disruption, fragmentation, mass hunger, and
renewed danger.
For example, the great hopes for progress
in East-West relations depend on the main-
tenance of an adequate, flexible, and inte-
grated defense system in the West, as well
as on an imaginative and creative approach
to the East. There is no reason to believe that
a failure of the West to stay together might
not tempt Moscow again toward adventure.
Similarly, a failure of the Vietnamese and
their allies to see through the engagement to
an honorable peace could destroy the emerg-
ing foundation for confidence and regional
cooperation in Asia, with further adverse
consequences on every continent.
The Confrontation in Viet-Nam
I have said little thus far about the Ameri-
can position on Viet-Nam because I wished
to expose one American's view of the broad
tasks of foreign policy that lie before us all.
President Johnson is conducting a policy
which, in fact, is already at grips with many
of what I have called second-generation tasks.
I come from a Government which, contrary
to a widespread view, is not overwhelmed
and obsessed by the problem of Viet-Nam.
On the other hand, we are confident that
what we are seeking to accomplish in Viet-
Nam is right and essential if we are to move
successfully through the great transition.
We are honoring a treaty which committed
us to "act to meet the common danger" in
the face of "aggression by means of armed
attack" in the treaty area.^ And this commit-
ment is also being honored by Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand — as
well as by the remarkable action of South
Korea, which was not bound by treaty in
this matter.
We are also dealing with the gross and
systematic violation of an agreement,^ signed
' For text of the SEATO treaty, see ibid., Sept. 20,
1954, p. 393.
' For background and text, see ibid., Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.
in 1962, which committed all parties, includ-
ing Hanoi, to withdraw their military forces
from Laos, to refrain from reintroducing
such forces, and to refrain from using the
territory of Laos for interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries.
We are also encouraged by the efforts of
the people of South Viet-Nam to make a
transition to orderly constitutional govern-
ment of the kind which the people of South
Korea have accomplished with such notable
success since 1961.
And we are answering, as we have had
to answer on other occasions, the question:
Are the word and commitment of the United
States reliable? For the United States cannot
be faithful to its alliances in the Atlantic and
unfaithful to its alliances in the Pacific.
I know that some of the younger genera-
tion in the United States — and, I daresay, in
Great Britain — believe that we in the Ameri-
can Government are old-fashioned in our ap-
proach to Viet-Nam. It is true that we recall
often the lessons of the 1930's; we recall ex-
periences in Greece and Berlin and Korea
which are not part of the living memory of
those now in universities. That is, I think,
because our experience has forced us to con-
template the chaos since 1914 and the reality
of the task of building a durable peace. A
new generation will, of course, decide what
in its experience is to be remembered and set
its own goals and priorities.
But in the perspective I have presented
tonight, what is old-fashioned about Viet-
Nam is the effort by the leaders in Hanoi
to make their lifelong dream of achieving
control over Southeast Asia come to reality
by the use of force.
It is their concept of "wars of national
liberation" that is old-fashioned. It is being
overtaken not merely by the resistance of
the seven nations fighting there but also by
history and by increasingly pervasive atti-
tudes of pragmatism and moderation.
History, I deeply believe, will show in
Southeast Asia, as it has displayed in many
other parts of the world, that the interna-
tional status quo cannot be altered by use of
MARCH 27, 1967
503
external force. That demonstration is costing
the lives of many South Vietnamese, Ameri-
cans, Koreans, Australians, and others who
understand the danger to them of permitting
a change in the territorial or political status
quo by external violence, who cherish the
right of self-determination for themselves
and for others.
If the argument I have laid before you is
correct — and if we have the common will to
hold together and get on with the job — the
struggle in Viet-Nam might be the last great
confrontation of the postwar era.
If the Cuba missile crisis was the Gettys-
burg of the cold war, Viet-Nam could be the
Wilderness; for, indeed, the cold war has
been a kind of global civil conflict. Viet-Nam
could be made the closing of one chapter in
modem history and the opening of another.
Dealing With the New Agenda
As befits a world in transition, then, we in
the American Government, under President
Johnson's leadership, are dealing with ele-
ments from the old agenda while doing what
we can to define, grip, and move forward the
new agenda.
President Johnson is honoring a treaty
placed before the Senate by President Eisen-
hower in 1954 and overwhelmingly approved.
He is insisting on compliance with an inter-
national agreement made in Geneva in 1962,
by the administration of President Kennedy.
But his thrust is forward. He has placed be-
fore the Congress a space treaty; proposals
to expand East-West trade, to create the
Asian Development Bank; a consular conven-
tion with the Soviet Union; a request for a
resolution to multilateralize the American
contribution to a sustained effort to win the
race between food supplies and population
increase.
It is clearly his hope to be able to present
to the Senate a nonproliferation agreement;
and we are prepared to put our best and most
constructive minds to work in negotiations to
head off, if possible, another major round in
the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons.
In all this we are conscious that there is
little we can accomplish by ourselves. The
nation-state — whatever its size and resources
— cannot solve the vast problems now before
us or foreseeable. Nor is this any longer a
bipolar world, despite the continued dispro-
portionate concentration of nuclear power in
the United States and the Soviet Union. The
dynamics of the lively first postwar genera-
tion has yielded a world arena of diverse
nations determined to take a hand in their
own destiny.
We shall achieve arrangements of authen-
tic partnership — based on mutual respect and
acknowledgement of interdependence, or we
shall not deal successfully with the new
agenda.
America is now — and, I believe, will con-
tinue to be — ready to play its proper role in
such partnerships.
I concluded my last survey of American
foreign policy from a British university plat-
form 20 years ago with this injunction from
one of our poets.
One thought ever at the fore —
That in the Divine Ship, the World,
breasting Time and Space,
All peoples of the globe together sail,
sail the same voyage,
Are bound to the same destination.
That, I believe, will remain the spirit of
America's foreign policy in the generation
ahead.
604
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to Asia
At the request of President Johnson, U.S.
Representative to the United Nations Arthur
J. Goldberg visited five Asian countries
Febi^uai-y 23-March 6. Following are tran-
scripts of news conferences he held at Ken-
nedy International Airport, New York, N.Y.,
upon his return from the trip on March 6
and at the White House after making his
report to the President on March 8.
NEWS CONFERENCE AT KENNEDY AIRPORT,
MARCH 6
U.S./U.N. press release 24 dated March 6
Opening Statement by Ambassador Goldberg
My colleagues, I am glad to be back. I have
a very brief statement that I would like to
read and then I shall be very glad to respond
to questions.
I have completed the first leg of a more
extended trip which President Johnson asked
me to make to Asian capitals. The first leg
has taken me to five countries — Japan,
Korea, the Republic of China on Taiwan,
South Viet-Nam, and the Philippines. In
each country I had the opportunity for
friendly and candid exchanges of views with
chiefs of state, with foreign ministers, and
other leading officials and personalities, as
well as for discussions with representatives
of our own Government stationed in these
countries.
I intend, of course, to report to the Presi-
dent in detail on the discussions I have held,
as well as some of my own observations and
impressions. At this time, all that is appro-
priate are some very general observations.
I have sought to make clear from the very
outset that this trip has not been undertaken
as a mission related to any new proposals or
initiatives for peace in Viet-Nam. I say this
regretfully. Given the intense interest in
Viet-Nam throughout Asia, as well as my
own vital concern as the United States Rep-
resentative to the U.N. with the prospects for
a possible and peaceful settlement, it was
quite natural that the situation in Viet-Nam
was one of the principal topics discussed in
the five countries I visited.
While I would not pretend to speak for any
other government than my own, I can report
to you that I found in all these countries
understanding of three facets of our policy:
the limited nature of our objective; that the
people of South Viet-Nam must be left alone
to determine their own political destiny
under conditions of freedom and without any
external interference and our resolve to help
them achieve this objective and abide by
commitments we have undertaken; and our
equal resolve to keep the door open and to
persevere in achieving a full and honorable
peace through unconditional negotiations.
While in Viet-Nam, I had the opportunity
to discuss at length with the leaders of the
Government and the members of the con-
stituent assembly the vitally important
process of establishing a constitutional gov-
ernment. I was encouraged to learn of the
progress already made toward completing a
constitution and to find a common determina-
tion on the part of both the Government and
constituent assembly to consummate the
creation of a constitutional government and
proceed with national elections at an early
date. And our Government places the highest
premium on this, and I can say to you that
MARCH 27, 1967
505
the word I had in Saigon would look toward
the consummation of this process perhaps
within the next 10 days.
I also had an opportunity for wide-ranging
discussion about two other processes which
have a vital and direct bearing to the pros-
pects for peace: the economic and social pro-
grams now underway and the process of
national reconciliation in South Viet-Nam,
as described in the Manila communique.
While I learned much of the progress al-
ready achieved in all these areas in this
limited period, as well as in the military
situation, I do not minimize the obstacles
and difficulties ahead. Indeed, one of the
strongest impressions I bring back is a sense
of realistic appraisal of the problems which
still have to be overcome to heal the wounds
of that tragic conflict and to achieve social
and economic justice for the people of South
Viet-Nam.
In Asian countries I visited I was par-
ticularly impressed by the interest shown in
regional development or, in other words, col-
lective Asian efforts — by their growing con-
viction that if each country in the area can
concert its skills and energies with the other,
they can all make better use of assistance
from non-Asian sources, use their own skills
and resources to better advantage, and make
more progress in resolving many problems
they face in common. This is a most wel-
come development and should be encouraged
and supported.
I shall begin tomorrow to testify before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
fulfill my responsibilities in connection with
the Outer Space Treaty. There are, in addi-
tion, other U.N. matters of immediate con-
cern that will require my closest attention.
As a result, I do not know when it will be
possible for me to continue on the trip to
other capitals in Asia which the President
asked me to visit. I hope I shall not be too
long delayed and that the second leg of my
Asian tour will be as fruitful as that I have
just completed.
Now, this is my statement. I shall be glad
to answer questions.
Questions and Answers
Q. Ambassador, yesterday U Thant came
back and gave us the feeling that the war
was going to be prolonged and bloody. Did
you come back with the same impression?
A. I am neither an optimist nor a pessi-
mist. We have a difficult conflict, as I said
in my statement. We never know what the
ultimate outcome will be, but the important
thing for our own country is a very simple
principle, and that is to reassert that the
door is open for peace. It must be an honor-
able and just peace. It must be a peace be-
tween the parties. No one can make peace
unilaterally.
I do not come in dismayed by what I saw.
I do not come in optimistic about what I saw.
I come in with resolve that the world needs
an end to this tragic conflict, and for that end
we need the cooperation of everybody con-
cerned.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, U Thant also said
that the North Vietnamese do not consider
a bombing pause to be a concession. Might
the United States consider a form of deesca-
lation which would be larger than a bombing
pause ?
A. Well, I have always said that the way
to get this war over with is a simple formula,
and that is that all violence ought to stop —
which means deescalation on all sides. The
war cannot stop by one party taking an
action which is not reciprocated. This will
mean that only part of the war will be over.
What I would look for personally is a
mutual deescalation so that the fighting, the
violence, the tragedy, the conflict, can be
over with. That's the only way we can assure
peace in the country.
Q. Are we considering making a greater
first move than a bombing pause?
A. Well, we said at the U.N. and, as far
as I know, that position still is the position
of our Government, we are prepared to take
the first step the moment we receive assur-
ances that there will be deescalation on the
other side.
506
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Q. Mr. Ambassador, Senator Wayne
Morse said today he thought that the people
had been sold out by the Government and
Congress and that the only resort they had
notv to a reasonable peaceful settlement in
the fairly near future was to use their only
check which they have now, which is their
vote, and to vote the administration out of
office. Do you have any reaction to that?
A. I do not comment on senatorial state-
ments except before the Senate, where I will
appear tomorrow.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, tvhen will you see
the Secretary-General?
A. Well, obviously I am very anxious to
see the Secretary-General, U Thant, and I
have to go to Washington late tonight. I am
going to change clothes, luggage, and then
proceed to Washington, and I would hope
for the very earliest opportunity —
Q. Would that be tonight?
A. — to see the Secretary-General, be-
cause obviously I am very anxious to find out
his own impressions of what took place in
Rangoon.
Q. Will that be tonight?
Q. Mr. Ambassador, ivhat do you figure
is the best possible way to stop this war
right no7v ?
A. Well, I think myself, based on my
experience, that the best way to stop the
war is to engage in private dialog, which
would lead to an understanding of each
other's peace terms, and then I think the pro-
cedures by which we could come to this end
could be arranged.
Q. Is there anybody at all that would be
strong enough and powerful enough to make
the other side stop ?
A. Well, I hope that the realization that
this is a long and bloody conflict, with great
injury to the people of the North and the
people of the South, will sink in. And per-
haps that's the best way — to get all con-
cerned to feel that we ought to replace this
battlefield for the conference table.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, on your tnp did you
have contact %vith anyone who had recently
been in Hanoi and could give you a current
impression of their thinking in North Viet-
Nam?
A. No, not immediately, but of course in
Saigon are members of the ICC [Interna-
tional Control Commission] , and I saw every-
body that, in the limitations of time, I could
see in Saigon.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, did anybody during
your trip offer to act as an intermediary be-
tween the United States and North Viet-
Nam?
A. No.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, would you just say
generally that you do agree with the impres-
sions of Secretary Thant, who said really not
much more than he really came back with
very little optimism for a settlement in the
near future ?
A. Well, I am your representative at the
United Nations, and I am not a prophet.
What we have to do is persevere in the effort
to get the war over with. Strange things
happen in the world. Who could have pre-
dicted that the Indonesian thing would have
materialized the way it did?
So I do not come back optimistic. I do not
come back pessimistic. I do not want to raise
false hopes. All I assert is that the sine qua
non, to use a lawyer's term, of settlement of
the conflict is a will to resolve the conflict.
We have that will. And when that will is
matched on the other side, then the promise
of peace will be more promising.
Q. Will you be talking to Mr. Thant be-
fore you see the President, sir?
A. I do not know exactly. I have to leave
here tonight. I have to go home and get my
papers and pick up my personal effects. We
have been traveling around pretty rapidly. I
will see the Secretary-General at any time —
at an early opportunity that affords itself so
that I can get the benefit of his views in the
matter.
MARCH 27, 1967
507
Q. Would you say that the chances for
peace talks are at an impasse ? Would you say
that the chances for peace talks between the
United States and Hanoi are at an impasse
at the moment?
A. No, no, no. In negotiations there are
many false starts and stops. I would say that
at the moment no serious proposal has been
made. That does not mean that a serious
proposal would not be made tomorrow. The
important thing is, from the standpoint of
our country, that the door to peace be kept
open; and when the door to peace is kept
open, any time may be a suitable time to
carry on peace discussions.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, the door to peace is
open. Why don't we just walk right through
it?
A. Pardon me?
Q. You say that the door to peace is open.
Why don't we walk through it? You say here
today peace cannot be made unilaterally. You
mean, if tve stop fighting, they'd go on fight-
ing ?
A. Well, the only way you can get any
conflict over, in my opinion, based upon long
experience, is that both parties stop fighting.
A war cannot get over by any act that one
person does. What is required is the ground-
ing of arms, a cessation of violence. The
fighting has to stop.
Q. Why don't loe just stop fighting? You
say the fighting must stop. If we stop fight-
ing, you mean they'd go on fighting?
A. Well, we have no assurances —
Q. Is there a historical example for that ?
A. We have no assurances if we stopped
bombing that we will get reciprocity on the
other side.
Q. What have we got to lose by trying?
Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy says you just
have to stop bombing.
A. I know, I know; but my experience
has been that the way to stop fighting is for
everybody to stop fighting.
Q. Mr. Justice, did you hear any reac-
tion to Senator Kennedy's proposal during
your trip ?
A. Yes. It was in the newspapers. But by
and large, the feeling in the area in which I
visited is that what is required is mutual de-
escalation on both sides — on the part of our
country, on the part of North Viet-Nam, on
the part of all the adversaries in the field.
And this is the most promising way to get
the war over with, an objective which we all
share, which we would all hope for; and this
is the talk in Southeast Asia.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, did you get any evi-
dence as to how much of an effort China is
making on the side of Ho Chi Minh in North
Viet-Nam?
A. Well, the Chinese situation is a great
riddle wrapped up in an enigma, to use an-
other phrase. I don't think anybody can
properly appraise what is happening in
mainland China. Obviously, important things
are happening, and, obviously, the important
things that are happening have had impact
on the war in Viet-Nam. But thus far at
least, they have not had such an impact that
we can say to ourselves that the stage is set
for a peaceful negotiation.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, in your opinion,
could that war be ended in the next few
weeks or few months ?
A. I am not a prophet, again. I occupy
the role of our Representative at the U.N.
I would fervently hope that the prospects for
peace are increasing, but I cannot give you
any solemn assurance, as I said in the open-
ing statement, that in the next few weeks,
in the next few months, even in the next
longer period, that the war can come to an
end. I said in Saigon, and I repeated it at
other Asian capitals, that I cannot say when
peace will come to Viet-Nam.
This is beyond my capacity. After all, I
have been there only a relatively few days,
and I do not profess to be the greatest expert
on this subject. All I can report to you is
what I saw, what I sensed. The war is going
on. The peace efforts have not materialized.
The road ahead is still rocky and difficult.
508
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The conflict is prolonged. This has been going
on for 20 years.
The two things we have to watch out for,
it seems to me, are these: One is that we
must recognize that the roots of the conflict
are deep rooted and difficult and not easy to
resolve; and, on the other hand, we must
guard against the hatreds, the impatience,
which comes out of any war. There is a
natural tendency in all countries to try to
bring things quickly to an end. I don't see
that happening quickly, but I am confident
that over the long run — and I do not know
how long this will be — I am confident that in
the long run peace will be restored to that
troubled section of the world.
Q. Is there a possibility, sir, that the
American people may get impatient with the
war?
A. I have been away, you know, for 10
days, but I do not believe so. I believe that
our people, as I said in my statement, are
resolved. This does not mean we are mono-
lithic people. The nature of democracy pre-
cludes that, but I think by and large our
people are anxious to subscribe to certain
elementary principles.
The principles are clear. We covet no ter-
ritory. We do not want to be a colonial power.
We do not want our bases there any longer
than is necessary to subside the violence in
Viet-Nam. We have no designs upon the
North. We are perfectly willing, regardless of
ideology, to have that regime carried on. We
operate on a very simple principle, as I said
earlier, and that principle is that every peo-
ple, whether the lines drawn are permanent
or provisional, every people is entitled, to use
a phrase from Justice Brandeis, to be left
alone.
The dominant impression I got in Asia is
a simple impression, and that is this one:
Every Asian country now is on the march;
they have many problems, mostly social and
economic. They would like to join other
Asian countries with the assistance of non-
Asian countries and the United Nations to
make progress for their people so they can
live in dignity and in freedom. And this is
the key issue. If we can resolve this issue, I
think we can resolve the modalities which
would lead to that result.
There has been in my opinion too much
concentration on procedures and not enough
on substance. If we were all in agreement
today that the viable solution for Viet-Nam
was that the North can settle its own fate,
the South can settle its own fate, that we
would not impose upon the South a policy of
alinement. We are ready to take their choice,
and whatever their choice is, we are ready to
accept. That's the key issue.
And that is particularly why I stress the
progress which is being made toward consti-
tutional government in South Viet-Nam. And
I think this is a promising development. We
will have, I am told, within a very short
period a constitution perfected. I am told
coming back from Viet-Nam that the Gov-
ernment and the assembly will not have diflS-
culty in resolving differences which arise
between the directorate and the assembly. If
this is the case, and if South Viet-Nam moves
toward constitutional government, toward
democratic elections, then I see in this great
promise for the future development of the
country.
Q. Thank you very much, sir.
NEWS CONFERENCE AT THE WHITE HOUSE,
MARCH 8
White House press release dated March 8
Opening Statement by Ambassador Goldberg
As you know, I went on this trip to South-
east Asia at the request of the President. I
have reported to him on the leg of the trip
which I have just completed which took me
to several countries — Japan, Korea, South
Viet-Nam, Taiwan, and the Philippines.
I gave the President a rundown of what
I saw and observed and heard in this very
short trip.
I say at the outset that a trip of this
character does not make you an expert. I do
not pretend to be. I could only report to the
President the impressions that I had.
I tried to make it clear at the outset of the
trip, and wish to reaffirm, that I did not
MARCH 27, 1967
509
undertake this mission related to any new-
proposals or initiatives for peace in Viet-
Nam. I hasten to add that this does not mean
that I, as the United States Representative
to the United Nations, am not vitally and
daily concerned with the prospects for and
the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. It
was, thus, quite natural that this was a mat-
ter of discussion between the officials of all
of the governments I visited and myself.
Since they were all Asian countries, this
was a matter that vitally entered into the
discussions that I had with the leaders of the
governments that I visited. I should say that
I met with the heads of all of those states as
well as the foreign ministers of all of those
states.
In these discussions, relating specifically
to Viet-Nam, I reviewed with them the many
efforts and expressions by onr Government
aimed at achieving an honorable settlement
through unconditional negotiations. I empha-
sized the desire of our Government to keep
the door open for such a settlement, and the
door to a just and honorable peace is and
remains open.
Now, I left the area, and particularly Sai-
gon, with this basic conviction which I re-
ported to the President: The great difficulty
of achieving peace — and it is a great diffi-
culty— should serve to remind us that there
are substantial conflicting interests at stake
which stubbornly resist solution, that peace
cannot be bought at any price, nor can real
conflicts of interest — and there are real con-
flicts of interest — be waved away with a
magic wand — as much as we would like to
wave them away.
By the same token, I was reinforced by my
trip in the conviction that the ferocity of war
should not be an incitement of hatred but
rather a stern discipline, a reminder of the
duty to define and to reaffirm the limited in-
terest for which we fight and which a peace
settlement must protect.
This limited interest, I think, can be stated
simply as follows:
The people of South Viet-Nam should be
left alone to determine their own political
destiny under conditions of freedom and
without any external interference.
Now, coming back from the trip I tell you
that I am not a prophet. I do not come back
either optimistic or pessimistic. I do not
know, nor could I say to the President, when
a peace based upon these principles will
come to Viet-Nam. But I do know that it is
necessary with patience and fortitude to per-
severe in the effort to bring peace to the
people of Southeast Asia.
I noted progress, however, in an area
which is relevant to that objective, and that
progress was the progress which is being
made in Saigon toward constitutional gov-
ernment. It was one of the principal ob-
jectives of my going to Viet-Nam to meet
both with the government and members of
the constituent assembly so that I could
assess and report to the President my own
reaction to how this process was going.
I reported to the President that this proc-
ess is going very well. This is an affirmative
report that I can make with assurance.
I anticipate, on the basis of everything
that I was told by the leaders of the assembly
and the leaders of the Government, that the
constitution should be perfected hopefully
within the next 10 days. This is the date men-
tioned by all. Then national elections would
proceed within an early period thereafter.
The machinery has to be set up, and that
machinery, I am told, will be set up as soon
as the constitution is perfected. This consti-
tutional government will be an important
adjunct toward a peaceful solution in Viet-
Nam. It will also lay the basis for national
reconciliation in Viet-Nam.
You may be interested in knowing that one
of my favorite expressions, which I made to
all concerned in Viet-Nam, was to recall
what Abraham Lincoln said in the midst of
our great conflict in his second inaugural
address, and this reflects my permanent
philosophy and I reflected it to the people.
That is: There should be malice toward none,
and charity toward all, and that the wounds
of the conflict should be healed.
I think that is the basis on which a pro-
510
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gram of national reconciliation can be
achieved.
I paid particular attention in the very
brief period I could, which is natural in light
of my own background, to the social and eco-
nomic problems involved in all of the coun-
tries.
The key to a peaceful settlement in Viet-
Nam will also be social and economic justice
for the people of South Viet-Nam. A very
great effort is underway in this direction
with the support of the United States.
I don't want to minimize or gloss over the
problems involved in that area. They are
very, very substantial. They require a recon-
stitution of an old society.
In fact, one of the main impressions I took
away is a realistic appraisal, which I re-
ported to the President, of the problems that
still have to be overcome to achieve the social
and economic justice for the people of the
country. Pacification of the country depends
upon this. This is the key to pacification of
the country. People have a stake in the coun-
try when their social and economic problems
are solved.
So I would not want to minimize the diffi-
culties ahead, although there is progress in
this area. The progress that can be made in
this area is evidenced by what has happened
elsewhere in the area.
I would cite, for example, Korea. In my
very brief visit there, I was very much im-
pressed by the progress which has been made
in South Korea in economic development and
in achieving social and economic betterment
for the people of that country.
Of course, it is better known that that
exists in Japan.
I discussed in all of these countries many
U.N. problems. We have problems with all of
these countries in the U.N. The Korean issue
always comes up in the U.N.
In Taiwan I discussed the problem of Chi-
nese representation with the officials of that
Government, which is a perennial problem
there. I listened more than I talked, because
I wanted to give to the President the benefit
of the views which these statesmen discussed.
Finally, I would like to say this: No one
who visits the area, and particularly no one
who visits South Viet-Nam, can fail to be im-
pressed with the Americans serving in South
Viet-Nam, both civilians and military. I
think our country can take justifiable pride
in being represented in that war-torn coun-
try by a group of men with high motives,
resolve, ability, and dedication.
I had the opportunity, of course, to meet
with General [William C.] Westmoreland
and the members of his staff, of course with
our Embassy group, with all Americans — I
made it a practice in all countries to meet
with our own people and have a candid dis-
cussion with them.
Finally, as you know, I had the benefit of
meeting with all of our ambassadors from
the whole area of Southeast Asia, who were
meeting at Baguio in the Philippines.! i
spent an afternoon and evening with the
ambassadors in a very candid roundup of
developments in the whole area of South-
east Asia.
This, as you know, was not my first visit.
When I was on the Supreme Court, 2 years
ago, I went on a lecture tour to countries
other than those I visited, except Japan.
I was in India, Malaysia, Ceylon, and Japan
on that trip. Our ambassadors covered the
whole range of the area.
This is what I reported to the President
today.
I shall be glad to respond to questions.
Questions and Answers
Q. Mr. Ambassador, while you were
making that report to the President, Arthur
Schlesinger held a news conference in which
he said the President and the State Depart-
ment are deliberately falsifying Hanoi's po-
sition that in fact we don't tvant peace ne-
gotiations. Would you comment again in
the light of these statements what Hanoi's
position is?
A. I have not seen this press statement
» See p. 517.
MARCH 27, 1967
511
of Mr. Schlesinger; so I don't want to relate
it to anything he may have said.
As far as our Government's position is
concerned, I reaffirmed to every head of
state and publicly stated in every capital,
including Saigon — and as far as I am aware
there is no difference of opinion in this area
— that as far as we are concerned our stand-
ing commitment to seek an honorable peace
without imposing any conditions is a firm
commitment which has not been altered or
changed.
In fact, the sentence that I read you about
the door being open, I gave in Saigon in my
departing statement.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, the Schlesinger
statement ties in ivith talk, though, that has
picked up considerably recently that we don't
want negotiations at the present time, at
least until after the constitution is approved
and an election is held. Can you comment on
that?
A. That is untrue. We are ready for un-
conditional negotiations today, and that still
remains our position.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, in your discussion
with the heads of state in South Viet-Nam,
particularly in reference to your quotation
from Lincoln, "With malice toward none,"
how did you and they envision the National
Liberation Front, which represents some de-
gree of population in the South, being
brought into this new government?
A. I did not discuss, because I did not
deem it appropriate to tell a government
how to constitute its own government, par-
ticularly when a constitution was being de-
veloped which would lead to national elec-
tions.
The philosophy I was expressing was the
same philosophy Lincoln expressed, and it
was directed toward the individuals, the peo-
ple involved. He was talking to people and
he was expressing the concept that you must
not let the — as I stated in my own words —
ferocity of war bar you from reconciling
differences and healing the wounds of a con-
flict. That is what I was referring to.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, why has the United
States rejected the Polish proposals for a
troika government in South Viet-Nam com-
posed of one-third of the present Ky regime,
one-third National Liberation Front, and
one-third Catholic-Buddhist ?
A. I think the basic concept is that we
do not reject those proposals. What we do
say is: It is for the people of the South to
make their own determination of the type
of government they want in a democratic
way. I have always subscribed to the view
that a great United States Senator has,
George Aiken, which he expressed, that we
are not the ones to tailor a government for
South Viet-Nam. We are not a colonial
power. We are not to do that. The people
themselves are to do that by constitutional
processes.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you think free
elections are possible in South Viet-Nam
when war is going on, when half a million
troops are in South Viet-Nam?
A. Yes, I do. I say this for two reasons:
First, the elections that were held for the
constituent assembly by the verdict of all of
the press in South Viet-Nam, at least I met
with the whole press corps, and I did —
maybe, perhaps, "all" is a big word, but I
met with the press corps — and the press
corps is largely of the opinion that the
elections that were held were free elections.
Secondly, I was told by the Government of
South Viet-Nam that they would welcome
the most maximum observation of the elec-
tions that would be held after the constitu-
tion was adopted and that there was an
open-door policy to the press, to diplomats,
to the U.N., to any reputable international
organization, to observe the election which
is being held.
As far as our troops' being present, I
have not heard a single accusation that our
troops, in any way, interfered with the elec-
tion that was held for the constituent as-
sembly.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, along the same line,
do you think that the elections coming up
512
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
will be free, if the voters of South Viet-Nam
are not allowed to vote for a National Lib-
eration Front candidate, if those candidates
are barred from the ballot?
A. We still don't know what the final con-
stitution will provide. I would rather not
comment today upon what the constitution
will provide as far as their being candidates
until they come out with their constitution.
They have not yet settled that problem.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, you say tvithin an
early period thereafter of the constitution's
being adopted you expect an election. Could
you be more precise ? Do you expect it in the
fall or in the summer?
A. The general time given was 6 months.
It is hoped to expedite that. Machinery will
have to be established for the election. I
found a very common desire, both on the part
of the Government and on the part of the
constituent assembly, to hold elections at an
early date.
Q. Do you think General [Nguyen Cao]
Ky will run ?
A. I am not competent to speculate about
that. I have read the speculation. I didn't
think it was my province to ask him that
question, and I did not ask him.
Q. U Thant, Mr. Ambassador, said in Cal-
cutta, I believe it i<;as, that peace talks are
impossible because we don't trust the Com-
munists and they don't triist us at this point.
Did you discuss the general attitude with the
Secretary-General?
A. I saw the Secretary-General, as you
know, the evening of my return. He and I
carried on a continuous dialog on this subject.
Obviously, when you are in a great conflict,
all individuals are careful. I have personal
convictions that a peace settlement will come
about through private discussion, in highly
secure conditions, when there is a common
will to achieve a peaceful settlement. I am
convinced our country has this will. I hope
that it develops on the other side. Their dis-
trust will have to be overcome. That is the
only way you arrive at an agreement.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, I believe U Thant
said that the Americans and the North Viet-
namese were simply poles apart in under-
standing as much as distrust. Could you com-
ment on that?
A. Yes. The best way to eliminate mis-
understanding— poles apart or shorter than
poles apart — in my experience, is dialog. The
opening for such a dialog is present.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, along this line of
distrust, tvhat is your present assessment of
the Soviet attitude on peace talks?
A. It is very hard for an American offi-
cial to assess the Soviet attitude. They have
to express it themselves. I do take some en-
couragement on the fact that the Soviets dis-
played some readiness to help the process.
I think that it would help considerably if
they would continue and do more. But it is
very difficult for me to assess their attitude.
I think that really would have to come
from them. I said at the United Nations —
and it is a matter of public record — that I
conceive the greater the power to be, the
greater the responsibility to be to help bring
about a peaceful settlement.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, what reaction did
you get from officials of other countries to
the recent intensification of the war in Viet-
Nam?
A. I think the general attitude that I dis-
covered was what really has to be viewed is
the peace settlement; that the military opera-
tions are only an aspect of the situation; that
the real gist of the matter is what the terms
of settlement may be; and that if there were
a meeting of the minds on the terms of the
settlement, then — as they used the expression
— the modalities of how you get about it
could be arranged.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned social
and economic reforms as a key to peace and
progress. Do you have anything specific in
mind — standards of living, inflation?
A. Yes. Many problems are being very
vigorously attacked. Ambassador Porter
[Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter] is
MARCH 27, 1967
513
in our Embassy in Saigon. We have a sepa-
rate additional Ambassaor who coordinates
all of our efforts in this area. Inflation is a
big factor. People have to have a stake and a
stability in their government; the sense that
grievances will be justly handled — that must
be established; the existence of a democratic
government so that people feel that the gov-
ernment represents their interest and that
it is governed by their consent, which has
never really been prevalent and which the
constitution would insure — these are all ele-
ments which enter into what I mean by social
and economic justice.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
President Reviews U.S. Position
on Bombing of North Viet-Nam
Following is the text of a letter from Pres-
ident Johnson to Senator Henry M. Jackson,
which was released by the White House on
March 2.^
March 1, 1967
Dear Senator Jackson: In further ref-
erence to our discussions at dinner on the
evening of the 18th concerning the reasons
for and effects of bombing, I wish to review
for you the following.
We are bombing North Viet Nam because
it is violating two solemn international
agreements. In 1954 Hanoi agreed that
North Viet Nam would not be "used for the
resumption of hostilities or to further an
aggressive policy."
In 1962 Hanoi agreed to withdraw all its
military forces from Laos; to refrain from
reintroducing such forces; and not to use the
' Weekly Corapilation of Presidential Documents
dated Mar. 6; the letter was read to the Senate by
Senator Jackson on Mar. 2.
territory of Laos to interfere in the internal
affairs of other countries.
Let me quote to you the recommendation
made by General Maxwell Taylor to Presi-
dent Kennedy in his report of November 3,
1961, after Hanoi had violated the Geneva
Declaration of 1954 but before the Geneva
Declaration of 1962 was finally negotiated.
While we feel that the program recommended
represents those measures which should be taken in
our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast
Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word.
Future needs beyond this program will depend upon
the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the
manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its con-
duct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to
continue the irregular war declared on South Viet-
Nam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert
support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our
ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept
as legitimate the continued guidance, training and
support of a guerrilla war across an international
boundary, while the attacked react only inside their
borders. . . .
It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that
the United States must decide how it will cope with
Khrushchev's "wars of liberation" which are really
para-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and
dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our
traditional political and military responses. While
the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report,
it is clear to me that the time may come in our
relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our
intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggres-
sion in North Viet-Nam and impose on the Hanoi
Government a price for participating in the current
war which is commensurate with the damage being
inflicted on its neighbors to the south.
Not for one day after the Geneva Dec-
laration of 1962 was signed did Hanoi meet
its commitment or honor its earlier commit-
ment of 1954. Aggression against South Viet
Nam was continued throughout 1962, 1963,
and 1964. Its forces were never withdrawm
from Laos and Laos was violated in order
to attack South Viet Nam.
When I became President and surveyed
the problem faced by our nation, I reserved
judgment on the decision which General
Taylor forecast in 1961 we might have to
make. But the fact was that the North
Vietnamese continued illegally to infiltrate
514
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
arms and men across international frontiers.
And in 1964 they radically expanded this
course of action. The trails became roads.
Bands of infiltrators became regular mili-
' tary units.
Neither of the co-chairmen of the Geneva
Conference — Great Britain and the Soviet
Union — proved able to stop this violation;
nor did the three members of the Interna-
tional Control Commission — India, Canada,
and Poland.
With this failure of the international ma-
chinery designed to enforce the Geneva
agreements we were thrown back, therefore,
on our treaty responsibilities. Under the
SEATO Treaty, presented to the Senate by
President Eisenhower and ratified over-
whelmingly, we had agreed that in the face
of "armed attack in the treaty area" we
would "act to meet the common danger."
By February 1965 it was unmistakably
clear there was armed attack in the most
literal sense: South Viet Nam was almost
lost to that armed attack. And in that month,
on the recommendation of the National Se-
curity Council, I decided that we had to
"meet the common danger" by bringing our
air power to bear against the source of the
aggression.
We never believed aerial attack on North
Viet Nam would, alone, end the war. We
did, however, have three objectives.
The first was to back our fighting men and
our fighting allies by demonstrating that the
aggressor could not illegally bring hostile
arms and men to bear against them from
the security of a sanctuary.
Second, we sought to impose on North Viet
Nam a cost for violating its international
agreements.
Third, we sought to limit or raise the cost
of bringing men and supplies to bear against
the South.
All three of these important objectives
have been achieved.
First, you should note that the military
leaders now responsible for the safety and
morale of our men in the field, without ex-
ception, back our bombing of the North. The
same, is true of the military and political
leaders of those fighting side by side with us;
that is to say, the leaders of Australia,
Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand,
and Viet Nam. They all know that it is right
and necessary for us to refuse to accept
North Viet Nam as a sanctuary at a time
when the government in Hanoi is explicitly
violating its international commitments and
conducting aggression across international
borders.
Second, we are, with remarkably limited
cost in civilian lives, imposing a major cost
on North Viet Nam for its violation of inter-
national agreements.
Our attacks on military targets in North
Viet Nam have diverted about half a million
men to cope with eflfects of our attacks. They
are repairing the lines of supply and are
engaged in anti-aircraft and coastal defense.
This figure approximates the total number of
men we now have fighting in Southeast Asia.
It is not much less than the number of men
South Viet Nam has had to mobilize to deal
with the guerrilla attack in the South.
At the cost of about 500 gallant American
airmen killed, captured, or missing, we are
bringing to bear on North Viet Nam a bur-
den roughly equivalent to that which the
Communists are imposing through guerrilla
warfare on the South — and we are doing it
with far fewer civilian casualties in the
North.
Finally, the bombing of North Viet Nam
has raised the cost of bringing an armed
man or a ton of supplies illegally across the
border from the North to the South. Sub-
stantial casualties are inflicted on infiltrators
and substantial tonnages of supplies are
destroyed en route. Those who now reach the
South arrive after harassment which lowers
their effectiveness as reinforcements.
The bombing in the North is an action
undertaken by your Government only after
the most careful reflection. It is a response
to a serious and systematic and protracted
violation of international agreements. It is
MARCH 27, 1967
515
having significant consequences for those
who chose to violate the agreements. It is
an integral part of our total policy which
aims not to destroy North Viet Nam but to
force Hanoi to end its aggression so that the
people of South Viet Nam can determine
their own future without coercion.
Both the reasons for- — and the results of —
the bombing of North Viet Nam make it im-
perative that we continue to use this instru-
ment of support for our men and our allies.
It will end when the other side is willing to
take equivalent action as part of a serious
effort to end this war and bring peace to the
people of Southeast Asia.
I take no satisfaction from the number of
infiltrators killed on their way to South Viet
Nam, from the number of trucks or of boats
or of railroad cars destroyed or the tons of
supplies destroyed. I take no satisfaction
from the suffering of the people of North
Viet Nam. I take no satisfaction from the
fact that they have had to abandon their
plans for economic and social development.
I repeat what I said in Baltimore in April
1965 2 — I look forward to the day when the
government and people of North Viet Nam
can join, in peace, their fellows in Southeast
Asia in developing and modernizing that
region so full of energy and resources and
promise. And on that day they will have —
if they wish — the support of the United
States in providing for their people an en-
vironment of progress. But right now I wish
friend and neutral and adversary to know
that we shall persist with our operations in
the South — we shall persist with our opera-
tions in the North — until those who launched
this aggression are prepared to move seri-
ously to reinstall the agreements whose viola-
tion has brought the scourge of war to
Southeast Asia.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Secretary Rusk Comments
on Hanoi's Attitude
Statement by Secretary Rusk *
Proposals substantially similar to those
put forward by Senator [Robert F.] Ken-
nedy [in a speech in the Senate on March 2]
were explored prior to, during, and since the
Tet truce — all without result.
We have had bombing pauses of 5 days
in 1965; 37 days in December-January 1965-
66; and 6 days just 2 weeks ago — and we
encountered only hostile actions in response.
There is, therefore, no reason to believe at
this time that Hanoi is interested in pro-
posals for mutual deescalation such as those
put forward by Senator Kennedy.
The President has consistently made clear
that the door to peace is and will remain
open and we are prepared at any time to
go more than half way to meet any equitable
overture from the other side.
SEATO and ANZUS Councils
To IVIeet in Washington in April
Department Announcement
Press release 51 dated March 8
The United States Government takes
pleasure in announcing that the 12th annual
meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers
will take place in Washington April 18-20.
Last year in Canberra, Australia, the
SEATO Council accepted the United States
offer to host this year's meeting. It is antici-
pated that Secretary Rusk will head the
United States delegation.
The SEATO Military Advisers will also
meet in Washington April 14-15. It is
customary for the Military Advisers to hold
one of their two semiannual conferences
' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
' Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman on Mar. 2.
516
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
shortly before the annual Council meeting.
Immediately following the SEATO Council
meeting, representatives of the seven coun-
tries making military contributions to the
defense of the Republic of Viet-Nam will
also meet in Washington on the afternoon
of April 20 and the morning of April 21.
This meeting is one of a continuing series
of consultations provided for by the com-
munique issued by the Seven-Nation Con-
ference in Manila last year.
The ANZUS Council Meeting this year
will also be held in Washington on the after-
noon of April 21 and morning of April 22.
The Council discussions will cover matters
involving security interests of the three
partners therein. The last Council meeting
took place in Canberra on June 30 and July
1, 1966.
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Asian
and Pacific Area Meet at Baguio
Folloiving is the text of a communique
issued at Baguio, the Philippines, on March
7 at the conclusion of a meeting of the chiefs
of U.S. missions in the East Asian and
Pacific area.
Press release 49 dated March 7
Fourteen United States Chiefs of Mission
in the East Asian and Pacific area today
(March 7) concluded four days of talks at
Baguio, the Republic of the Philippines. This
sixth such conference at Baguio was chaired
by the Honorable William F. Bundy, Assist-
ant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific AflTairs. Ambassador Goldberg [U.S.
Representative to the United Nations Ar-
thur J. Goldberg] joined the conference for
the first day, and various Washington offi-
cials and military representatives were also
present.
The participants were deeply appreciative
for the hospitality of the Government of the
Philippines.
The participants reviewed developments in
the area as related to the United States policy
of working with the countries of the area
toward the inter-related goals of security,
progress and cooperation.
The conferees were encouraged by the
progress which has been made in South Viet-
Nam in both military and non-military fields
through the collective efforts of South Viet-
Nam, the United States and other countries.
They unanimously hoped that a stable and
honorable peace could soon be achieved, and
welcomed all constructive steps toward this
end. At the same time, they reaffirmed their
belief that any slackening of the collective
military effort or of the policies and pro-
grams in non-military fields would lengthen
rather than shorten the road to that goal,
and thus detract from rather than contribute
to the broader aims which the United States
shares with the countries of the area.
The conferees noted the impressive prog-
ress which is being made by many countries
of the area toward sound political, economic
and social goals. Such progress is necessarily
based on the efforts and talents of the coun-
tries themselves, but the conferees recog-
nized the desire of these countries for con-
tinued assistance from countries outside the
area. The conferees were also impressed by
the continuing development of regional coop-
eration in the area.
Over the longer term, the conferees looked
forward to the day v/hen all countries of the
area could live in peace and could devote
their talents and resources, individually and
cooperatively, towards meeting those basic
aspirations which are shared by all peoples.
MARCH 27, 1967
517
Why the United States Should Expand Peaceful Trade
With Eastern Europe
by Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
I want to talk to you today on an impor-
tant and controversial subject, one that is
high on the President's agenda, that is un-
der active consideration in the Congress,
that has been widely discussed in business
forums, and that concerns you, both as busi-
nessmen in this great trading capital of
Chicago and as citizens of the United States.
The subject is expanding peaceful trade
between the United States and the Com-
munist countries of Europe.
The United States restricts trade with
Eastern Europe to a far greater extent than
do other Western countries. Our controls
over exports to Communist Europe are more
extensive than those of our Western allies,
and we subject imports from Communist
Europe to higher — in many cases prohibi-
tively higher — customs duties than those we
apply to imports from the rest of the world.
The restrictions we impose had their or-
igin in the late 1940's when Stalin ruled the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union ruled the
Communist world, and the Communist world
was a unified, hostile, overtly aggressive em-
pire.
Our allies joined with us in those days in
denying virtually all industrial equipment
and materials to the Communists. But over
the past decade as the Communist world has
changed, our allies have modified their prac-
' Address made before the Chicago Automobile
Trade Show luncheon at Chicago, 111., on Mar. 2
(press release 43; as-delivered text).
tices. Our NATO allies and Japan still join
us in embargoing trade in strategic goods —
in goods that would enhance the military po-
tential of the Communists — but they do not
maintain special restrictions on other ex-
ports to the Communist world. Neither do
they maintain discriminatory tariff's on
goods imported from these countries of
Eastern Europe.
The question we should consider is wheth-
er the controls and restrictions we impose
in isolation from our friends and allies con-
tinue to serve our national interest today as
they did two decades ago or whether changes
have occurred in the Communist world and
in the world at large that require changes
in our policy and practices.
We — from the President and the Secretary
of State down through all of us in the execu-
tive branch who study and work with these
problems — believe strongly that changes
have indeed occurred and are now in process
in the Communist world that are favorable
to our interests and that it is clearly to our
advantage to modify our policies so as to
reinforce and promote this process of change.
What are these changes that have oc-
curred and are taking place in the Com-
munist world? In the early postwar years the
Soviet Union, under Stalin's ruthless regime,
and the dominated small countries of East-
ern Europe, linked solidly with Communist
China, presented an ugly and menacing pic-
ture. It was the image of a giant, powerful,
totalitarian bloc of countries subscribing to a
518
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
single centralized brand of communism made
in the Kremlin and aggressively threatening
the rest of the world. We created a series of
defensive alliances to contain this aggressive
force and together with our allies we de-
feated it in Greece, in Berlin, in Korea.
Changes in the Communist World
Today there is no longer a single united
Communist world. You know, as well as I,
how the once arrogant Moscow-Peking axis
has fallen to pieces. The Communist world
is split down the middle. On one side is
Communist China, paranoid in its hostility
to the United States, wedded to the doctrine
of inevitable conflict between the Commu-
nist and the capitalist worlds, and proclaim-
ing that "power comes out of the barrel of
the gun." On the other side is the U.S.S.R.,
accused of revisionism by the Chinese be-
cause it has faced up to the awesome conse-
quences of direct military confrontation in
today's nuclear world and is moving slowly
and cautiously to increased peaceful inter-
course with the West.
The split between the Soviet Union and
Communist China and the gradual loosening
of Kremlin controls after the death of Stalin
have had important repercussions in Eastern
Europe. The small countries of Eastern
Europe that in Stalin's day were mere sat-
ellite appendages of the U.S.S.R. are today
increasingly able to adopt internal and ex-
ternal policies appropriate to their interests
as they see them. They have expanded trade
and cultural relations with Western Europe,
Japan, and other industrialized countries
from which Stalin had isolated them behind
the Iron Curtain. Poland was the first War-
saw Pact country to reduce Soviet domina-
tion over its internal affairs. Romania has
been pursuing independent initiatives in the
area of foreign policy and has actively re-
sisted Moscow's efforts to influence the
course of her economic development. The
ferment of change is at work in other East-
em European countries. Their governments
are still Communist, of course, and they are
tied to the U.S.S.R. by geography and ideo-
logical bonds; but they are neither ruled
from Moscow nor excommunicated when
they follow divergent lines.
Contrast the situation now with what it
was in 1948 when Tito tried to follow an in-
dependent course and Moscow mobilized the
Communist world to try to whip Tito into
line. Moscow did not succeed, as you know.
Indeed, Yugoslavia's successful breakaway
was the first major crack in the Communist
monolith.
The split between Moscow and Peking and
the loosening of Moscow's control over the
countries of Eastern Europe are not the only
important changes we have seen in the Com-
munist world in the past decade. Political
and economic changes of some significance
are also taking place within the Communist
countries of Europe. In most of these coun-
tries the hand of the police has become less
apparent and less heavy. Compared with the
Stalinist period, these peoples live more free-
ly. There is a greater freedom of speech, a
freer exchange of ideas, and a growing
knowledge of what life is like in the Western
World.
We ourselves have official exchange agree-
ments with the Soviet Union and Romania
and informal arrangements with the other
Eastern European countries. A growing
number of persons — well over 1,000 a year —
are moving in each direction between the
United States and Eastern Europe in these
exchanges. The Voice of America no longer
is jammed anywhere in Eastern Europe ex-
cept in Bulgaria. Not only is it listened to
for news and information about our country,
but it has one of the largest and most enthu-
siatic American-jazz audiences in the world
— stretching more than 5,000 miles from
Pilsen to Vladivostok.
Trade and Economic Reform
Changes also are underway in the orga-
nization of their economies. The countries of
Communist Europe recognize that they have
major economic problems, and the U.S.S.R.
and some of the smaller countries are ex-
perimenting with economic reforms. They
are trying, in capitalistic style, to relate pro-
duction to demand, price to cost, and style
MARCH 27, 1967
519
and design to consumer taste. "Profit" is no
longer a dirty word. They are moving in
varying degrees and by slow stages away
from centralized political planning and con-
trol over every feature of economic life to-
ward looser forms of organization which
give some modest scope to individual initia-
tive down the line.
Eastern Europe's trade with the free
world has been an important factor in this
movement toward economic reform. These
countries have had to submit their goods to
the competitive test of the world market
when they have wanted to trade, and they
have found their products wanting in qual-
ity and technical modernity. This has put
into question among the peoples and leaders
of those countries the economic institutions
behind their products and Communist eco-
nomic dogma itself.
Commenting on these economic reforms,
one of your State's leading industrialists,
William Blackie, chairman of Caterpillar
Tractor Company, noted in a recent address
that the economic changes being proposed
or adopted in Eastern Europe, such as more
flexible pricing, retained profits, interest on
capital advances, "involve movement toward
some of the most basic elements of free en-
terprise capitalism."
As one might expect, Yugoslavia, which
was the first country to break out of Stalin-
ist control, has gone furthest down the road
in opening her economy to the freer play of
market forces. But the winds of change are
sweeping all of Eastern Europe, and the
direction of change is good. The direction is
away from iron discipline and tight central
control in completely closed societies toward
greater contact with the West, exposure to
Western ideas, and internal liberalization.
What is the significance of these changes
for United States policy? Should we encour-
age increased contact and communication
with Eastern Europe, the freer movement
of people between East and West, a wider
exchange of goods and of ideas, or should
we stand frozen on the policy we adopted 20
years ago? Can increased contact and in-
creased peaceful trade contribute to the fur-
ther favorable evolution of Communist so-
ciety in Europe?
We believe strongly that it can. Our re-
sponse to the challenge of the Communist
world must reflect the changing realities
within that world. That is exactly what Pres-
ident Johnson's East- West trade proposals
are designed to do. The President has said
eloquently that we should try to build bridges
to Eastern Europe: bridges of ideas, educa-
tion, culture, and trade.
To some of our people the very idea of in-
creasing peaceful trade and contact with
Communist Europe is anathema. They see
it as a snare and a delusion, indeed as fun-
damentally immoral. Our answer to them is
that in this nuclear age it would be both im-
moral and irresponsible not to try to find
areas of agreement, not to try to reduce
suspicion, tensions, and hostility that can
spill over into violence, not to try to encour-
age the further opening of the Iron Curtain
and the movement toward economic and
political liberalization in Communist Europe.
Perspective on Role of Trade
And this is where trade has an impor-
tant role to play. I think it is fair to say that
affirmative action on the President's pro-
posal to increase peaceful trade would be the
one most important signal to the Commu-
nist world that the United States really
wants normal relations and peaceful com-
petition, that we are sincerely interested in
increased intercourse, in finding and enlarg-
ing areas of agreement. Such action would
strengthen the hands of those in the Com-
munist world who favor constructive rela-
tions with the West and would undercut
those who look to the barrel of the gun. To
that extent, it would directly contribute to
our objectives in Viet-Nam. On the other
hand, rejection of the President's proposal
for increased trade and peaceful engagement
would chill the atmosphere and strengthen
the hands of the Stalinists in the internal
Communist struggle who are resisting
change.
What are the President's proposals for in-
520
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
creasing peaceful trade with Communist
Europe? They are in two parts: The first has
to do with liberalization of our export con-
trols; the second, with modification of our
restrictions on imports. The President has
already acted to modify our export controls.
He announced last October that hundreds of
nonstrategic items formerly requiring spe-
cific license would now be freely exportable
to Communist Europe.^ In addition he au-
thorized the Export-Import Bank to extend
its normal guarantees of commercial credits
on our exports to Eastern Europe.
Action on our import restrictions, how-
ever, is not a matter for executive decision
alone. It requires congressional authoriza-
tion. The President has proposed that he be
authorized to extend nondiscriminatory tar-
iff treatment to imports from countries in
Communist Europe in return for equivalent
benefits to us. At the present time, imports
from the Communist countries of Europe,
other than Yugoslavia and Poland, are sub-
ject to the prohibitively high tariffs that
were in force here in 1930. Removal of this
discriminatory feature in our trade relations
with Communist Europe would be a signifi-
cant political gesture. It would also have
salutary economic effects because it would
enable the countries of Eastern Europe to
earn dollars to buy United States products.
It would facilitate thereby that two-way flow
of trade that is a feature of normal interna-
tional relations.
To place in perspective the role trade
plays — and might play — in our relations
with Eastern Europe, we should examine the
basic facts. The most outstanding character-
istic of our present trade with Eastern Eu-
rope is its extremely low level. This is true
whether measured in relative or absolute
terms.
In 1966 we sold to Eastern Europe goods
worth $200 million. Other countries of the
free world sold to those same countries goods
worth more than $6 billion. Germany's ex-
' For text of President Johnson's address at New
York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see Bulletin of Oct.
24, 1966, p. 622.
ports to Eastern Europe are six times ours;
France and Canada each sell more than twice
as much as we do; and even Japan, geo-
graphically more distant, sells more than
the United States.
Agricultural Sales to Eastern Europe
A second important characteristic of our
present trade with Eastern Europe is the
large proportion of agricultural products
in our total exports. In 1965 five commod-
ities made up more than half of the total:
tallow, hides, soybeans, grain sorghum, and
other feedstuffs.
We are, of course, not alone in our sales
of agricultural commodities to Eastern Eu-
rope. Our good neighbor to the north, Can-
ada, sold in 1965 an amount of wheat alone
worth almost twice our total exports to these
countries. A considerable portion of this
wheat, incidentally, was shipped out over
that great common waterway, the St. Law-
rence Seaway, which is making Chicago one
of the most important ports in the United
States.
While agriculture makes up the bulk of
our exports and those of Canada to Eastern
Europe, other countries find their principal
markets in the East in machinery, in trans-
port equipment, in chemicals, in artificial
fibers, and in iron and steel.
The market in Eastern Europe is large
and growing. Since 1960 it has roughly
doubled. It is a highly diversified market,
purchasing everything from foodstuffs and
primary products to fairly sophisticated in-
dustrial equipment. Our share of this mar-
ket is very small indeed, barely 3 percent,
narrow in product coverage, and declining in
relative terms.
It is clear from these facts that the United
States is not an important factor in trade
with Eastern Europe. Even if all our trade
were cut off, it would not affect in any sig-
nificant way the economic position of East-
ern Europe. It is also clear that, with few
exceptions, the only economic effect of our
restrictions is to cede the business to our
competitors.
MARCH 27, 1967
521
So much for the present. What about the
future? What are the possibilities for in-
creased trade with Eastern Europe?
Growing Market for Consumer Durable Goods
While I doubt our trade with Eastern
Europe will ever be vast, I believe a signifi-
cant increase from present levels is possible.
Given active promotional efforts and removal
of present barriers, I believe it is quite rea-
sonable to expect a level of United States ex-
ports of around $500 million within several
years. Exports at this level would still be
very small in relation to our total exports,
which this year will probably exceed $30
billion. But even in this age of astronomical
figures, $500 million is hardly in the category
of petty cash.
In this connection I should note that the
market for consumer durable goods and for
plants to make such goods is growing vigor-
ously in Communist Europe. The most strik-
ing example is the Soviet contract with the
Italian Fiat Company for construction of an
$800 million passenger automobile plant in
the Soviet Union. This in itself represents
a sizable allocation of resources for peaceful
uses, but more will follow to provide the
roads, service stations, repair facilities, and
the like to keep the cars running. We have
only to look at the vast automobile show in
progress here in this amphitheater to ap-
preciate the profound effects on the use of a
nation's resources that follow over time from
putting consumers on wheels. This growing
attention to consumer needs is a heartening
development in the Communist countries, one
that we welcome and should support through
trade.
Only yesterday a unanimous report was
published on "The Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant
and Communist Economic Reforms" by four
members — two from each party — of the
House of Representatives Subcommittee on
International Trade. The report was made
after 3 months of intensive study, including
on-the-spot investigation in Italy, Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet
Union. In evaluating the potential sale of as
much as $50 million of United States ma-
chine tools and equipment to the Fiat Com-
pany for the Soviet plant, the report stated:
From the standpoint of the United States, an ex-
port of this kind has to be viewed in light of the
following facts: (a) machine tools of this type, how-
ever sophisticated in design, are special-purpose
equipment that will represent a considerable expense
and will have to be assigned directly to automotive
production; (b) these tools will be utilized to help
broaden the commitment of the Soviet Union to the
production of a resource-intensive, highly popular
consumer product; (c) direct Soviet expenditures
on the expansion of auto production must be recog-
nized as perhaps only the beginning of that Govern-
ment's involvement in an enlarged outlay of re-
sources in the consumer sector.
Case for Modifying U.S. Trade Controls
Significantly, another congressional group
only 2 weeks ago reported on its findings fol-
lowing a study mission to Europe. This re-
port was made by six members of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs.^ I should like
to read to you one brief section that I think
admirably sums up the case for modifying
our trade controls. The statement expresses
the views of five of the six members, three
Democrats and two Republicans.
Our policy of trade restraints does, however, deny
American farmers and manufacturers the opportu-
nity to compete for markets in Eastern Europe. It
restricts American presence in that part of the
world and isolates us from contact with the people
of Eastern Europe. And, by doing this, it diminishes
whatever influence we could exert to promote the
development of those countries in the direction of
economic and political liberalization. For although
the volume of our exports to Eastern Europe is un-
likely to rise dramatically, the opportunity for a
moderate expansion of trade in nonstrategic com-
modities is there. And we believe that grreater ex-
posure to American goods, personnel, and methods,
can help to stimulate demand for consumer goods in
Eastern Europe and put increased pressure on the
governments of that area to reduce the portion of
their national resources being devoted to military
purposes.
The East-West trade legislation we are
proposing for enactment by the Congress
would not automatically extend nondiscrim-
' "Our Changing Partnership With Europe," re-
port of the Special Study Mission to Europe, 1966
(H. Doc. 26, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 22, 1967).
522
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
inatory tariff treatment to Communist
Europe.* It would authorize the President to
negotiate for the extension of such treatment
only when he believes it to be in the national
interest and when he can obtain adequate
return benefits.
The kinds of reciprocal benefits we would
seek through such bilateral commercial
agreements would vary from country to
country. In addition to direct trade benefits,
they might include provisions for the settle-
ment of commercial disputes; the facilitation
of travel by United States businessmen; the
protection of United States copyrights, tech-
nology, and other industrial property rights;
assurances to prevent trade practices injuri-
ous to United States labor and industry. At
the same time, the ability to expand trade
relations would facilitate our efforts to obtain
settlement of financial claims and more satis-
factory arrangements in cultural and infor-
mation programs.
We believe there is a compelling case both
on the broadest political grounds and on the
narrower grounds of economic self-interest
to expand peaceful trade with Communist
Europe. Some American firms, however, are
holding back from trade with Eastern Eu-
rope because of the fear of possible criticism
damaging to their domestic markets and cor-
porate reputation when they contemplate
such trade. In order to make this Govern-
ment's position perfectly clear to American
businessmen, the Secretaries of State, De-
fense, and Commerce joined in a statement
that has been given wide circulation.^ They
stated:
. . . your Government regards commerce in peace-
ful goods with the countries of Eastern Europe, in-
eluding the Soviet Union, as completely compatible
with our national interest. No American business
enterprise should be penalized for purchasing or
selling such goods. In fact, any individuals or groups
that seek to intimidate, boycott, blacklist, use or
threaten economic reprisals against such American
enterprises for carrying on lawful trade with East-
ern European countries act harmfully and irrespon-
sibly. To yield to such groups is to encourage capri-
cious interference with the vital processes of our
Constitutional Government — interference that could
at the end of the road make it impossible for our
country to conduct a coherent foreign policy.
We have lived with the cold war for some
two decades, and it is difficult to modify atti-
tudes even in the face of change. It is even
more difficult at this moment in time when we
are fighting in Viet-Nam and the countries of
Communist Europe are giving support to our
opponents. But we believe it is just in this
situation that we should do everything we can
to demonstrate to the Soviet Union and the
other countries of Eastern Europe that their
true interests lie not in attempts at aggres-
sive expansion but in seeking the well-being
of their people through peaceful means.
As Secretary Rusk has said: ^ "It is too
late in history to maintain intractable hos-
tility across the entire range of relationships.
. . . even at a time when there are difficult
and painful and even dangerous issues be-
tween us, it is necessary in the interest of
Homo sapiens for the leaders on both sides
to explore the possibilities of points of agree-
ment, whether in small matters or large, to
see whether some progress might be made
even when total progress is denied us."
■* For background and text of the proposed legis-
lation, see Bulletin of May 30, 1966, p. 838.
» Ibid., Nov. 1, 1965, p. 700.
Mr. Roth Named Representative
for Trade Negotiations
The Senate on February 28 confirmed the
nomination of William Matson Roth to be
Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated January 26.)
' In an address before the Executives Club of
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966.
MARCH 27, 1967
523
THE CONGRESS
Human Rights Conventions
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
It is a great pleasure to be here today. I
very much appreciate the chance to take
part in the opening hearings on three im-
portant international conventions on human
rights: those concerning slavery, forced
labor, and the political rights of women.^ The
United States participated in the drafting
of all three conventions and has lent them
its support at various stages of their prepa-
ration. It was only after a careful review by
the executive branch that they were sub-
mitted to the Senate in July of 1963.
As you know, the administration strongly
supports ratification of these conventions. It
believes them to be important agreements to
which the United States should adhere. For
they not only are consistent with the tra-
ditional values and ideals of this country;
they express the same profound concern for
human rights that has come to be recognized
everywhere as the hallmark of the United
States. I believe we should welcome the op-
portunity to participate in agreements re-
flecting our high standards on an interna-
tional scale.
Indeed, adherence to these conventions
would underscore the fact that the United
' Submitted to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Hu-
man Rights of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Feb. 23 (U.S./U.N. press release 18).
The complete hearings will be published by the
committee.
' For texts of the conventions, see Bulletin of
Aug. 26, 1963, p. 323.
States is concerned with the realization of
human rights not only within its shores but
throughout the world. In recent years we in
this country have been engaged domestically
in a tremendous effort to advance the rights
of our citizens through the processes of
law. And that effort, which quite rightly has
held the attention of men everywhere, has
reaped tremendous gains for the people of
the United States. I do not believe, however,
that we can now rest upon these domestic
victories and disclaim interest in the same
evils abroad that we have abrogated at home.
It is only fitting that a country which has
taken such great strides should play a lead-
ing role in the attempt to see human rights
respected in all sectors of the globe.
I would point out, too, that ratification of
these conventions would accord with our
commitment to the Charter of the United
Nations and to the principles for which it
stands. Indeed, one of the main purposes of
the United Nations is to achieve interna-
tional cooperation in solving the kinds of
problems with which these conventions are
concerned. Countless times the United States
has spoken publicly in support of the charter ,
and specifically in support of its human ||
rights provisions. Why should we hesitate
to ratify conventions that give such pro-
visions a real meaning and force?
I must emphasize that I am not speaking
of purely altruistic reasons for ratification
524
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
but in teiins of our immediate national in-
terest. Concern for the welfare of all peoples
is a principal feature of our foreign policy.
1 But if the United States is not interested
enough in human rights to participate in
even modest and broadly supported interna-
tional conventions, what will be the attitude
of those many countries who look to us for
guidance and advice? Our views and our
declarations will not be taken seriously.
And there is a practical consideration of
perhaps even greater importance. Experience
has taught us to seek the roots of most po-
litical frictions and disputes in social abuses
— 'discrimination, arbitrariness, inhumanity.
We have learned that until these abuses are
eradicated, until a high minimum standard
for the observance of human rights prevails
throughout the world, we shall not see the
dawn of a truly peaceful day. It was Presi-
dent Kennedy who so eloquently put this
thought in the form of a question: ^
... is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a
matter of human rights — the right to live out our
lives without fear of devastation — the right to
breathe air as nature provided it, the right of future
generations to a healthy existence?
I do not say that these present conventions
are a panacea or even that they will guaran-
tee complete solutions for the problems to
which they are addressed. But I do say that
they constitute steps in the proper direction
and that the United States has a strong in-
terest in taking such steps.
It is sometimes forgotten that the United
States has already taken such steps in the
past, that it is a party to two significant
international human rights agreements.
These are the convention on slavery,^ which
we ratified during the administration of
President Herbert Hoover, and the agree-
ment on the nationality of women ,5 ratified
during the administration of President
Franklin Roosevelt. I submit that the United
' For President Kennedy's address at American
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see
ibid., July 1, 1963, p. 2.
■* 46 Stat. 2183 and Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Acts Series 3532.
' 49 Stat. 2957.
States, the greatest power in the world,
should build upon these precedents in joining
worthwhile international efforts in the hu-
man rights field.
It is the part of totalitarian states, not that
of a great democratic nation, to shy away
from human rights conventions. They have
reason for difficulty with such conventions.
But I do not conceive that, in light of our
Constitution, we have any reason that is sub-
stantial.
Before I comment specifically upon each
of these agreements, two points are worth
emphasis: first, that the provisions of these
conventions coincide with fundamental rights
already guaranteed by our Federal Constitu-
tion. To find the domestic sources of these
rights, one need look no further than the
1st, 5th, 13th, 14th, and 19th amendments.
There is thus no question of conflict between
the provisions of the conventions and State
law and no possibility of these conventions'
altering the existing balance between the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government and
the jurisdiction of the States. There is noth-
ing in these conventions that is not already
within the ambit of Federal constitutional
protections. There is nothing in these con-
ventions that in any way contravenes any
provision of our Constitution. And there is
nothing in these conventions that in any way
runs counter to the valid enactment of any
State.
Second, it is important to note that each
of the constitutional rights in question either
requires no implementing legislation or has
already been translated into such legislation.
Ratification of these conventions by the
United States would require no domestic laws
other than those we already have.
These two general points will reappear in
my discussion of the contents of each con-
vention.
I shall first deal with the Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, which was opened for
signature at Geneva on September 7, 1956.
On January 1, 1967, 68 states were parties
to this convention.
MARCH 27, 1967
525
As its name indicates, the agreement is
supplementary to the earlier convention on
slavery that was concluded in 1926 and rati-
fied by the United States in 1929. Under
article 1 of the present convention, states
parties are to take all practicable and neces-
sary legislative and other measures to bring
about the abolition or abandonment of cer-
tain institutions and practices akin to
slavery, where they still exist. These institu-
tions and practices are: debt bondage, serf-
dom, delivery of children by parents or
guardians to others for purposes of exploita-
tion, involuntary marriage or transfer of
women for a consideration, and transfer of
widows as inherited property. In states
parties where these last practices — relating
to the status of women — still exist, those
states undertake in article 2 to prescribe
suitable minimum ages of marriage, to en-
courage the use of facilities whereby the
consent of both parties to a marriage may
be freely expressed, and to promote the prac-
tice of enregistering marriages. Of course,
article 2 has no application in the United
States, since we have long ago banished the
practices against which the article is aimed.
Other articles of the convention provide
that the slave trade should be prohibited,
that the act of enslaving another person
should be a criminal offense, and that any
slave taking refuge on board a vessel of a
state party to this convention shall be free.
To the ears of Americans, all of these
provisions have a familiar ring. The 13th
amendment to our Constitution, ratified in
1865, abolished slavery as an institution and
gave Congress the power to enforce its terms
by appropriate legislation. Under this au-
thority Congress has enacted a number of
laws, such as the Slave Trade Prohibition
Act (46 U.S.C. 1355) and the Peonage Laws
(18 U.S.C. 1581, 42 U.S.C. 1994), which
proscribe the practices forbidden by the
convention.
The second agreement that I shall briefly
describe, the Convention on the Abolition of
Forced Labor, was adopted by the Interna-
tional Labor Organization in Geneva on June
25, 1957. As of January 1, 1967, 75 states
were parties.
This convention requires ratifying states
to suppress and not to make use of any form
of forced or compulsory labor for certain
specific purposes: namely, as a means of
political coercion or education or as a punish-
ment for holding or expressing particular
social, economic, or political views; as a
means of mobilizing labor for purposes of
economic development; as a means of labor
discipline; as punishment for having par-
ticipated in strikes; or as a means of racial,
social, national, or religious discrimination.
Ratifying states are required to take ef-
fective measures to secure immediate and
complete abolition of these proscribed uses
of force or compulsory labor.
These undertakings are wholly within the
Federal competence and, indeed, are already
contained in our laws. No new legislation is
necessary as a result of ratifying the con-
vention. The use or tolerance of forced labor
by the Government, except as a punishment
for crime, would run squarely into the terms
of our 13th amendment. The use of forced
labor as a punishment for crime would not
be constitutionally permissible in the cases
enumerated in the convention, because the
particular areas in question have the protec-
tion of constitutional guarantees. Thus, a
statute providing for forced labor for violat-
ing an arbitrary rule of racial, social, or
religious discrimination would contravene
the 5th or 14th amendment. Forced labor
imposed as a means of punishing the mere
expression of political views would not be
possible, because any criminal statute pro-
viding for this would run afoul of the first
amendment. Of course, the convention, like
the first amendment, applies only to the
holding or expressing of views. There is
no immunity for those who advocate or
attempt the violent overthrow of the Gov-
ernment.
A word of explanation in regard to the
provisions of the convention relating to labor
526
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
strikes and labor discipline may be in order.
It is apparent from the drafting history that
the agreement was not intended to preclude
the application of penal sanctions for certain
kinds of labor activities. Thus, the conven-
tion would have no application to criminal
sanctions for violations of coui't orders, such
as those commonly issued under the National
Labor Relations Act. Nor would it cast any
doubt on punishments for illegal activities,
for example, assaults, in connection with a
strike. Nor, finally, would the convention ap-
ply to sanctions imposed for having partici-
pated in an illegal strike or for other illegal
labor activities. The convention merely es-
tablishes that forced labor shall not be used
as a punishment for those labor activities
that are the inherent right of men every-
where and that are protected by our own
Constitution and laws.
It is axiomatic that forced labor cannot
be imposed in this country as a result of
labor strikes or activities that are legal.
Forced labor can in no event be tolerated
in the United States except as punishment
for an act that has validly been classified as
criminal.
Parenthetically, you may be interested to
know that the Soviet Union, which has rati-
fied the other two conventions under consid-
eration, has not ratified this one. The concern
of the ILO [International Labor Organiza-
tion] with charges of forced labor in the
Soviet Union is a matter of record.
The third convention, adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in late
1952 and opened for signature in 1953, deals
with the political rights of women. As of
January 1, 1967, there were 51 states parties
to this convention.
Here again, there is no doubt that consti-
tutional guarantees and legislation now in
force already reflect the aims and purport of
the convention. We need no additional laws
to insure that women shall, on equal terms
with men, be entitled to vote in all elections,
be eligible for election to all publicly elected
bodies established by national law, and be en-
titled to hold public office and exercise all
public functions established by national law.
The first of these rights, the right of
women to vote on equal terms with men, is
the precise mandate of the 19th amendment
to our Constitution. The Supreme Court, in
Breedlove v. Stittles (303 U.S. 277, 283
(1937)), has ruled that the amendment "by
its own force supersedes inconsistent meas-
ures whether federal or state." Thus there
can be no question of any divergence in this
country from the standard set out in the
convention.
The other rights provided for in the
agreement relate to publicly elected bodies,
public office, and public functions "estab-
lished by national law." In the United States
the term "national law," as it appears in this
convention can only be taken to mean Fed-
eral law. The history of, and official United
Nations commentary on, the convention fully
support this interpretation of the term.
That the Constitution bars arbitrary dis-
crimination against women in their eligibil-
ity for Federal elected bodies and in their
right to hold Federal office or to exercise
functions in the Federal Government cannot
be doubted. On the other hand, categoriza-
tions dependent upon the natural differences
between women and men are permitted un-
der our Constitution, and I understand such
categorizations to be permissible under the
present convention. Thus, for example, the
history of the convention establishes that
the terms "public office" and "public func-
tions" were not intended to apply to military
service. In voting for the convention, the
United States delegate, Mrs. Eleanor Roose-
velt, stated the understanding of the United
States in this regard, adding that we under-
stood the term "public office" to be cotermi-
nous with "public function." ^
If the Senate were to decide to give its
advice and consent to United States accession
to the convention, it might wish to indicate
its understanding on these two points. Al-
' For backgfround, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1953, p.
29.
MARCH 27, 1967
527
though I personally believe that this is not
necessary in light of Mrs. Roosevelt's state-
ment, I would note that President Kennedy
recommended such an understanding when
he submitted the convention to the Senate
in 1963.
As you can see, then, each of these con-
ventions coincides very closely with the ex-
pressed principles and values of the United
States. Each is a simple, forthright docu-
ment aimed at the achievement of a com-
mon international standard on matters of
interest to the international community. And
each is concerned with the eradication of so-
cial abuses that could, and that have at
times, become sources of bitter differences
among the nations. In my view there is no
doubt that these agreements are valid and
proper subjects of the treaty power.
Before concluding, however, I wish to lay
before you several further considerations
that seem to me to indicate the advisability
of United States ratification of these agree-
ments.
The first is that there is a widely shared
view in this country that we should take im-
mediate steps to live up to our public pro-
fessions of interest in the human rights
field. Judging by the expressions of opinion
that have come to the attention of the ad-
ministration, ratification would appear to
fulfill the wishes of the American people.
The second point I want to make is that
now is a particularly appropriate time for
favorable consideration of these conventions.
The General Assembly of the United Nations
has proclaimed 1968 as the International
Year for Human Rights, a year for new
achievements and progress in this most
important of areas of international concern.
In my view we would usher in the Interna-
tional year for Human Rights most felici-
tously by adherence to these conventions. For
in so doing, we would demonstrate that this
nation will not stand aloof from a major
world effort to elevate human rights stand-
ards everywhere.
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly,
there are the tremendous consequences of
our decision whether to ratify these conven-
tions. I do not mean solely the consequences
for the United States, which I have previous-
ly mentioned. I am referring, also, to the
consequences for the conventions themselves,
for their effectiveness, and for the respect
their provisions can command. Without the
support of the United States, these agree-
ments may appear insignificant to many
other countries. If we do not consider it im-
portant to sign the conventions, why should
they? And more importantly, why should
they implement the conventions ?
With United States ratification, on the
other hand, these conventions would have a
new life. In expressing our acceptance and
in faithfully implementing the provisions
of these agreements, we would encourage
states that have thus far withheld adher-
ence to reconsider their position. When there
are departures from the standards that the
conventions lay down, the United States
would be able, as a state party, to exert its
influence to bring about renewed observance
of those standards.
A tremendous impetus would thus be pro-
vided for the worldwide battle for human
rights. And the solemn human rights pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter would
receive some real content. I believe that the
United States, with its profound commit-
ment to the rule of law, can only contemplate
such a prospect with approval.
We are, after all, a nation that stands for
something in world history. "Certain un-
alienable rights" were proclaimed in 1776
as the heritage of "all men" — not just Amer-
icans. Abraham Lincoln said there was
"something in that Declaration giving lib-
erty not alone to the people of this country,
but hope for the world, for all future time."
It is deep in our American character to
believe in it. And the influence of those
brave words of 1776 in country after coun-
try, generation after generation down to our
own day, is solid proof that these ideas are
universal and that they can move men to
action on a very large scale. When such ideas
come to the surface anywhere in the world,
528
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
our national conscience does not allow us to
be indifferent to them.
I would urge your committee to recom-
,mend to the Senate that it advise and con-
sent to all three of the conventions before
you.
President Transmits Fifth Annual
Report of Peace Corps to Congress
Whito House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated March 6
To the Congress of the United States:
Of the many efforts undertaken by this
Nation to advance peace, prosperity and
understanding, few have inspired greater
admiration among the people of the world
than the Peace Corps. In five years, it has
?iven new purpose to thousands of Amer-
icans, and new hope to millions abroad.
In 1968 Peace Corps volunteers will:
— -Assist more than 400,000 farmers in
;heir struggle against hunger.
— Help educate more than 700,000 school
children.
— Help train 55,000 teachers.
— Provide health services to more than
iOO,000 persons.
— Help 75,000 men and women help them-
selves through private enterprise.
— Bring greater opportunity to thousands
)f people through community development.
By August 1967 we will have more than
L 6,000 volunteers serving in 53 countries
md one territory. By August 1968 there
vill be more than 19,000 volunteers — nearly
louble the number in 1964 — active in 60
countries.
The Peace Corps has captured the imag-
nation of our youth. Two hundred and ten
chools in 30 nations are operating today
)ecause American students have voluntarily
issisted them under the School Partnership
'rogram which we initiated in 1964. Their
upport, together with the help of Peace
]orps volunteers, and with labor and land
donated by the host country, is providing a
home for learning for a great many children
around the world. We hope to build 500
schools by mid-1967 and at least 1,000
schools in 45 countries by mid-1968.
The Peace Corps has provided an oppor-
tunity for tens of thousands of idealistic
and able Americans, young and old, to serve
their fellow men — with little thought of self
or comfort, and with little recompense other
than the reward of seeing human lives made
better by their efforts.
It is building a growing reserve of capa-
ble and tested citizens devoted to public
service. By 1970, there will be some 50,000
returned volunteers in the United States.
Many of them, directly or after completing
their education, plan to enter Government
service. Some have already returned to train
new volunteers, and others are helping to
administer programs throughout the world.
The Peace Corps produces a high yield
in results, at a low budgetary cost. The num-
ber of volunteers has increased at a much
faster rate than the Peace Corps budget.
Over the years, the average cost of the pro-
gram per volunteer has declined steadily —
from a high of $9,074 in fiscal 1963 to an
estimated $7,400 in 1967.
Today, the Peace Corps idea — the idea of
voluntary public service abroad — is spread-
ing to other countries. Already 18 "Peace
Corps", most of them based on the U.S.
model, have been established by other in-
dustrialized nations. This is testimony, not
only to the soundness of Peace Corps princi-
ples, but also to the living example of Peace
Corps volunteers.
I am pleased to transmit to the Congress
the Fifth Annual Report of the Peace Corps, i
It will be gratifying reading to all who are
interested in this pioneering and humane
endeavor.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, March 6, 1967.
\
ARCH 27, 1967
' Single copies of the report are available upon
request from the Peace Corps, Washington, D.C.,
20525.
529
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17,
1967.
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to measures of control ;
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by
the Commission.
Done at Washington November 29, 1965.^
Ratification deposited: Norway, March 9, 1967.
BILATERAL
Cameroon
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington, March
7, 1967. Entered into force March 7, 1967.
India
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex.
Signed at New Delhi February 20, 1967. Entered
into force February 20, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 6-12
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Release issued prior to March 6 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 43
of March 2.
Subject
Visit of Louis-Lansana Beavogui,
Foreign Minister of Guinea (re-
write).
Rusk: statement on the Outer
Space Treaty before the Senate
Foreigrn Relations Committee.
Macomber sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Re-
lations (biographic details).
Braderman: "U.S.-Philippine Re-
lations— Where We Stand To-
day."
U.S. Chiefs of Mission conference,
Baguio, Philippines.
Program for visit of II Kwon
Chung, Prime Minister of
Korea.
SEATO Council of Ministers,
SEATO Military Advisers, and
ANZUS Council to meet in
Washington in April.
Visit of Mohammed Hashim Mai-
wandwal. Prime Minister of
Afghanistan.
Solomon: "Cotton in the World
Trade Arena."
Visit of Cevdet Sunay, President
of Turkey.
Amendment to program for the
visit of the Prime Minister of
Korea.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
145
3/6
t46
3/7
*47
3/7
t48
3/8
49
3/7
*50
3/8
51 3/8
*52 3/9
t53
3/9
*54
3/10
*55
3/11
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
VOL. LVI, NO. 1448 PUBLICATION 8218 MARCH 27, 1967
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11. 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
530
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX March 27, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U8
Asia
Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to
' Asia (transcripts of news conferences) . . . 505
SEATO and ANZUS Councils To Meet in
Washington in April 516
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Asian and Pacific Area
Meet at Baguio (communique) 517
Australia. SEATO and ANZUS Councils To
Meet in Washington in April 516
China. The Great Transition: Tasks of the First
and Second Postwar Generations (Rostow) . 491
iCongress
Human Rights Conventions (Goldberg) . . . 524
President Reviews U.S. Position on Bombing of
North Viet-Nam (letter to Senator Jackson) 514
President Transmits Fifth Annual Report of
Peace Corps to Congress 529
Mr. Roth Named Representative for Trade
Negotiations 523
Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Mission
Chiefs in Asian and Pacific Area Meet at
Baguio (communique) 517
iJeveloping Countries. The Great Transition:
Tasks of the First and Second Postwar Gen-
erations (Rostow) 491
Genomic Affairs
^rom the Iron Curtain to the Open Door
(Humphrey) 486
?he Great Transition: Tasks of the First and
Second Postwar Generations (Rostow) . . . 491
Vhy the United States Should Expand Peace-
ful Trade With Eastern Europe (Solomon) . 518
ilurope
from the Iron Curtain to the Open Door
(Humphrey) 486
'he Great Transition: Tasks of the First and
Second Postwar Generations (Rostow) . . 491
Vhy the United States Should Expand Peaceful
Trade With Eastern Europe (Solomon) . . 518
1 '"oreign Aid. President Transmits Fifth Annual
Report of Peace Corps to Congress .... 529
luman Rights. Human Rights Conventions
(Goldberg) 524
International Organizations and Conferences.
SEATO and ANZUS Councils To Meet in
Washington in April 516
New Zealand. SEATO and ANZUS Councils To
Meet in Washington in April 516
Presidential Documents
President Reviews U.S. Position on Bombing of
North Viet-Nam 514
President Transmits Fifth Annual Report of
Peace Corps to Congress 529
Trade
Mr. Roth Named Representative for Trade Ne-
gotiations 523
Why the United States Should Expand Peace-
ful Trade With Eastern Europe (Solomon) . 518
Treaty Information
Current Actions 530
Human Rights Conventions (Goldberg) . . . 524
U.S.S.R.
Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to
Asia (transcripts of news conferences) . . 505
From the Iron Curtain to the Open Door
(Humphrey) 486
The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and
Second Postwar Generations (Rostow) . . 491
United Nations
Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to
Asia (transcripts of news conferences) . . 505
Human Rights Conventions (Goldberg) . . . 524
Viet-Nam
Ambassador Goldberg Reports on His Trip to
Asia (transcripts of news conferences) . . 505
The Great Transition: Tasks of the First and
Second Postwar Generations (Rostow) . . 491
President Reviews U.S. Position on Bombing of
North Viet-Nam (letter to Senator Jackson) . 514
Secretary Rusk Comments on Hanoi's Attitude 516
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 505, 524
Humphrey, Vice President 486
Johnson, President 514, 529
Rostow, W. W 491
Roth, William Matson 523
Rusk, Secretary 516
Solomon, Anthony M 518
•d U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/38
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