^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^■^^■i ■
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY EECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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Bl
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Vol. LVI, Nos. H.36-H61
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1967
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Date of Issue
1436
Jan.
2, 1967
1437
Jan.
9, 1967
1438
Jan.
16, 1967
1439
Jan.
23, 1967 ]
1440
Jan.
30,1967 ]
1441
Feb.
6,1967 ]
1442
Feb.
13,1967 2
1443
Feb.
20, 1967 2
1444
Feb.
27,1967 3
1445
Mar.
6, 1967 3
1446
Mar.
13,1967 3
1447
Mar.
20, 1967 4
1448
Mar.
27, 1967 4
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Corrections for Volume LVI
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call attention to
the following errors in Volume LVI :
January 23, p. 137, first column, fifth paragraph: The
paragraph should read " — There is doubt that America's
vital interests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to
necessitate the growing commitment there."
May 29, p. 828, second column: The fourth sentence in
the first full paragraph should read "And it is worth noting
that the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act request,
along with other foreign assistance requests such as the
Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contributions to the
International Development Association, total less than .7
percent of our GNP."
June 12, p. 889, first column: The first sentence in the
last paragraph should read "The greatest disservice to
that resolution and to its effective implementation, would
be for us to create an impression in South Africa and in
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided on how
these principles are to be achieved."
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 8274
Released September 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 30 cents
INDEX 2. :r.^ Hd,«^
Volume LVI, Numbers 1436-1461, Jan. 2-June 26, 1967
ACDA. Sec Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Adams, Samuel C, Jr., 732
Aden, self-determination, U.N. role in (Goldberg),
100
Adenauer, Konrad, death of: Johnson, 751, 752;
Kiesinger, 751; Rusk, 752
Advisory Council on African Affairs, 651
Afghanistan :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 626
Pakistan, relations with ( Maiwandwal ) , 631
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 86, 122, 260, 834
U.S. agricultural committee (Johnson) , 629
U.S. aid (Maiwandwal), 631
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 627
Africa (sec also Organization of African Unity and
individual countries) :
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson),
233
Communism, rejection and countermeasures :
Martin, 195; Palmer, 455; W. W. Rostow, 493
Economic progress and problems: Goldberg, 289;
Katzenbach, 954; Palmer, 646, 650; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Human rights: 376; Goldberg, 289
International Coffee Agreement, importance and
effect, 252
North Africa, development, problems, and U.S. in-
terests (Palmer), 806
Political issues: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 959;
Palmer, 646
Regional programs and U.S. support: Goldberg,
293; Johnson, 159, 234, 383, 958 (quoted);
Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 649, 810; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830
South, problems of: Goldberg, 290; Sisco, 67
Southern Rhodesia, importance to: 372, 376;
Palmer, 450, 455
U.S. aid: Johnson, 159, 379, 380, 383; Katzenbach,
958; Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830
U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, advisory panel
named, 651
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
U.S. relations and interests: Goldberg, 291;
Katzenbach, 955; Palmer, 450; Rusk, 830
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach: 756; Katzen-
bach, 954
African Development Bank: 338; Johnson, 334, 379,
568; Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 650; W. W.
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 831
Agency for International Development:
Africa, programs and policy: Johnson, 383;
Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk, 831
Agriculture improvement programs increased (E.
V. Rostow) , 863
AID-GATT training program (Blumenthal), 435
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232, 233, 297
Community water supply development program,
760, 761
Educational aid, increases, 337
Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson),
16
Reorganization: Johnson, 379, 381; E. V. Rostow,
860
Tunisia, 50-well project (Palmer) , 812
Viet-Nam commodity assistance programs, 1966
management report: Gaud, 200; text of report,
201 ; Rusk, 832
Viet-Nam medical assistance, 665
Aggression {see also China, Communist, Communism,
and Soviet Union) :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict
"Domino" theory: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 169
Infiltration of weapons and armed men (Meeker),
59
Measures against, U.S.: Johnson, 330, 546, 550, 587,
654, 960; W. W. Rostow, 492; Rusk, 363
Must not succeed: Johnson, 161, 535, 593; Martin,
194; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 134, 272, 725;
SEATO, 745; Truman (quoted), 548
U.N. resolution on prohibition of use of force:
Nabrit, 29, 30; text, 32
U.S. position: Goldberg, 872; Johnson, 871; Katzen-
bach, 2
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
World peace, threat to: Johnson, 330; W. W.
Rostow, 491; Rusk, 271, 278, 743; SEATO, 745
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas pro-
grams, agreements with: Afghanistan, 122
Congo (Kinshasa), 642, 733; Ghana, 582, 702
India, 182, 530; Iran, 122; Iraq, 154; Kenya, 834
Korea, 260, 702; Morocco, 834; Pakistan, 182
898; Philippines, 306; Poland, 766; Tunisia, 642
Viet-Nam, 154, 614
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
271-701—67 1
975
Agriculture (see also Agricultural surpluses, Food
and Agriculture Organization, and Food for
Peace) :
AID programs: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 860,
863
CENTO programs, 671
Europe, labor shifts in, 337
FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 859
India, development and problems: Johnson, 298,
334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 830
Kennedy Round negotiations, importance: Blumen-
thal, 433; Roth, 478, 880; E. V. Rostow, 860;
Solomon, 556
Latin America, 713, 887
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
718
U.S. aid (Johnson), 382, 541, 543, 632, 707, 709
Modernization of, importance and need: 109, 337;
Johnson, 160, 295, 298, 381, 543; Katzenbach,
956; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404, 856; W. W. Rostow,
501 ; Rusk, 874
OECD agricultural food fund, U.S. proposal:
Johnson, 297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861
SEATO programs, 747
U.S. agricultural trade mission to Soviet Union
(Trowbridge), 882
Viet-Nam: 212; Johnson, 593, 594
Water for Peace program. See Water for Peace
Agriculture Department, 559
Agronsky, Martin, 126
Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta, 16
AID. See Agency for International Development
Aid Consortia for India and Pakistan: Johnson, 296,
299, 383, 700; E. V. Rostow, 403; W. W. Rostow,
496 ; Rusk, 830
Aiken, George (Goldberg), 512
Albania, U.S. travel restrictions, 102
Aliens. See Nonnationals
Algeria:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests
(Palmer), 806
Soviet military and economic aid (Palmer), 809,
811
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 353
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress
Allen, George V., 322
Alliance for Progress:
Accomplishments and role: Bunker, 472; Johnson,
158, 231, 380, 382, 540, 632, 708, 711; Linowitz,
822; Rusk, 47, 829
Charter, protocol of amendment, resolution re rati-
fication of, 475
Chiefs of State, meeting of :
Declaration of the Presidents of America: 706n;
text, 712
Purpose: Bunker, 472; Johnson, 13, 71, 158, 231,
540, 678, 706 ; W. W. Rostow, 499 ; Rusk, 47, 464
Regional arms control arrangements, 576
Alliance for Progress— Continued
Chiefs of State, meeting of — Continued
Results: 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725, 822,
829
U.S. Congress, position on: Johnson, 545, 707;
Rusk, 723, 829 ■,
U.S. delegation, 721
International Coffee Agreement, importance: 253;
Johnson, 250
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 11th meeting of con-
sultation : Bunker, 472 ; Rusk, 47, 464
Final Act of the 3rd Special Inter- American Con-
ference (excerpts), 474
Resolution (text), 473
U.S. delegation, 472n, 476
Multinational projects: Johnson, 12, 709, 711; Lino-
witz, 730, 823 ; Rusk, 723, 829
Declaration of Presidents of America, 712, 716,
719, 720
Third special Inter-American Congress, final act
(excerpts), 474
U.S. appropriations requests: 887; Johnson, 232,
233, 234, 382, 543, 707; Rusk, 723, 828
U.S. support: Johnson, 334, 707, 708, 709, 710; W.
W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk, 723, 772
Alliluyeva, Mrs. Svetlana: Niven, 774; Rusk, 782
American ideals: Goldberg, 528, 940; Johnson, 14,
163, 301, 385, 593, 654, 708, 960; Martin, 193;
Palmer, 451 ; Pollack, 913
American National Red Cross, 599
Amerika (Katzenbach), 755
Amistad (Friendship) Dam: 13; Johnson, 12
Amity and economic relations, treaty with Togo, 154,
181,182
Anderson, Eugenie, 732
Angola, self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290
Ansary, Hushang, 909
Antarctic Treaty (1959) :
Current actions: Netherlands, including Surinam
and Netherlands Antilles, 641
Importance : 575, 634 ; Johnson, 387, 569
Measures re furtherance of principles and objec-
tives, entrance into force, 392
Outer space treaty, relation to : Goldberg, 603, 608,
609; Rusk, 601
U.S. observers, appointment, 71
Inspection of Antarctic stations, 633
Antigua, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab-
lishment, 182
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), council
meeting, Washington: 517; communique, 749
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302; Sisco,68
Aqaba, Gulf of. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict and names of
individual countries
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Cease-fire, compliance with: 941, 948; Goldberg,
942,943; Johnson, 952
976
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Arab-Israeli conflict — Continued
General Armistice Agreement, need for observ-
ance : Goldberg, 923, 927 ; Johnson, 871
Soviet position : Goldberg, 924 ; Rusk, 950
U.N. role: Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 927, 936, 941,
944, 946 ; Johnson, 870, 935, 951, 952 ; Rusk, 949
Secretary-General, peacekeeping efforts: Gold-
berg, 871, 894, 920, 922, 926, 937, 938, 943, 945,
947 ; Johnson, 870
Security Council resolutions, texts, 947, 948
U.S. aircraft, allegations of use of and U.S. reply:
Goldberg, 935, 938, 940; Rusk, 950, 951
U.S.-Canada discussions (Johnson), 909
U.S. draft resolutions: Goldberg, 944; texts, 927,
941, 948
U.S. position: 949; Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 936,
940, 942, 946; Johnson, 870, 952; Rusk, 949
U.S. ship, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John-
son, 952
U.S. Special Committee of the National Security
Council, establishment and membership (John-
son), 951
U.S.-U.K. talks (Wilson), 963
Argentina :
Economic development (Rusk) , 723
Kennedy Round, importance to (Blumenthal), 432
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353, 613,
701, 702, 733, 834, 898, 930, 967
Armaments (see also Disarmament, Missiles, and
Nuclear weapons) :
Communist arms supply to Viet-Nam : Katzenbach,
753; Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466, 727, 786
Control and reduction of: 576; Johnson, 447; Rusk,
42, 771
Cyprus, importation of arms, U.S. position (Gold-
berg), 180
Economic disadvantages of competition in: 576;
Johnson, 160; Palmer, 811; Rusk, 43, 171, 361,
875
India-Pakistan arms race, possibility of, 688
Latin America, elimination of unnecessary expendi-
tures for: 713, 721 ; Johnson, 711
Middle East arms race (Goldberg), 943
Outer space treaty, significance of provisions:
Dean, 268; Goldberg, 80, 602, 603, 609; John-
son, 266; Rusk, 601
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against sale or
shipment to : 77, 374 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Soviet supply to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811
Soviet-U.S. competition: 575; Humphrey, 489;
Johnson, 160, 445, 569; Katzenbach, 755;
Kohler, 413; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Ros-
tow, 501; Rusk, 171,601
U.S. policy on supply of (Johnson) , 384
North Africa (Palmer), 811
Armed forces :
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position. See Arab-
Israeli conflict
NATO. See NATO
Armed forces — Continued
South Africa forces, withdrawal from Southwest
Africa, U.N. request, 894
Warsaw Pact countries, question of reduction in
(Rusk), 783
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.:
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232
General Advisory Committee member (Neuberger) ,
confirmation, 448
Sixth annual report, excerpts : 570 ; Johnson, 568
Arosemena Gomez, Otto, 706n
Artigas, 706 (quoted)
ASA. See Association of Southeast Asia
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see also
ANZUS council. Association of Southeast Asia,
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and in-
dividual countries) :
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
advisors, 72
Communist activities and goals: 849; Bundy, 791;
U.A. Johnson, 420; Martin, 195; W. W. Ros-
tow, 493; Rusk, 169, 281, 743; SEATO, 745
Asian rejection of: Bundy, 323, 791; Holt, 962;
Rusk, 170 ; Westmoreland, 740
U.S. aid as a countermeasure (Johnson), 383
Economic and social development:
Multilateral aid (Bundy), 326, 793
Problems (Johnson) , 382
U.S. aid : Bundy, 326, 791 ; Rusk, 830
AID budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233,
382, 384
Special authorization request (Johnson), 162
International Coffee Agreement, importance and
effect of, 252
Manila Conference: 748; Bundy, 326, 794; Chung,
552; Holt, 962; Johnson, 960; Thieu, 588
President Johnson's visit, results (Martin), 197
Regional cooperation: 517, 849; Bundy, 325, 791,
793; Goldberg, 506, 509; Holt, 962; Johnson,
162, 380; Martin, 194; W. W. Rostow, 499;
Rusk, 47, 134, 598, 744, 832; SEATO, 745;
Thanat Khoman (quoted) , 197, 854
Pacific Community, proposed, 553
Role of: Australia and New Zealand: (Bundy),
793; Johnson, 961; Japan (Martin), 196;
Korea: Chung, 552; Johnson, 549; Philippines
(Braderman), 660; Thailand: Martin, 853;
Rusk, 597; U.K. (Bundy), 793
U.S. Chiefs of Mission, meeting, Baguio: 517;
Goldberg, 511
U.S. position, objectives, and role: Bundy, 323, 327,
790; Chung, 552; Martin, 193; Rusk, 134, 170;
Yen, 847
U.S.-Soviet complementary interests (Katzen-
bach), 755
USIA activities, increase (Johnson) , 236
Viet-Nam, importance to peace of: 849; Bundy, 323,
327, 792; Holt, 962; Johnson, 160, 534, 678,
961; Kohler, 8, 410; Martin, 195; Middleton
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
977
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia — Continued
Viet-Nam — Continued
(quoted), 851; W. W. Rostow, 499, 503; Rusk,
47, 134, 725, 744, 787, 831, 877; SEATO, 746
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg, 505, 509
Asian and Pacific Council: 849; Bundy, 326, 793;
Chung, 552; Johnson, 380, 549; Martin, 196, 853;
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 47
Asian Development Bank: 338, 849; Bundy, 325, 793;
Chung, 552; Johnson, 162, 334, 380, 469, 549, 568,
847; Martin, 196, 853; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk,
47, 832
Public international organization, U.S. designation
as. Executive order, 563
U.S. nnancial support: Johnson, 379; Rusk, 785
Asian Economic Development, Conference on (Mar-
tin), 196, 854
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196, 854
Association of Southeast Asia : Bundy, 326, 793 ; Mar-
tin, 196, 853 ; W. W. Rostow, 499
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council
Astronauts :
Outer space treaty provisions for assistance and
return: 84, 577; Goldberg, 81, 141, 603, 611,
839; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601
U.S. astronauts, deaths of (Johnson) , 388
Ataturk, Kemal : Johnson, 652 ; Sunay, 653
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Atlantic partnership: Humphrey, 487; E. V. Rostow,
19
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of:
Agreements re application of safeguards. See under
Atomic Energy Agency, International
Civil uses, bilateral agreements concerning co-
operation: Australia, 702, 834; Colombia, 438;
Iran, 438
Desalination, including use of atomic energy, agree-
ment with Soviet Union, 37
Diversion to nuclear weapon uses, danger of: 572;
Pollack, 911 ; Seaborg, 96
Germany, progress in ( McGhee) , 153
Latin America, prospects (Johnson) , 709
Nuclear power developments: 572; Pollack, 910;
Seaborg, 90
Nuclear proliferation treaty, non-application of
(Rusk), 321
Safeguards (see also Atomic Energy Agency, In-
ternational) : 571; Johnson, 448; Pollack, 911;
Rusk, 241
Application of safeguards to existing bilateral
agreements: Brazil, 612; Spain, 85
EURATOM, question of: 572; Rusk, 360
Atomic Energy Agency, International :
Safeg:uards, international safeguard and control
systems, and U.S. support: 572; Johnson, 448,
569; Seaborg, 97
Statute, current actions: Sierra Leone, 967; Singa-
pore, 182
Attwood, William, 651
978
Australia (see also Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion) :
ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749
Asian development, role in: Bundy, 793; Johnson,
961
Economic development (Johnson) , 961
India, grain shipments to (Johnson ) , 299
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 224, 260, 582,
613,674,702,834,898,930
U.S. visit of Prime Minister ( Holt) , 960
"Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740
Austria:
Import liberalizations, 245
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 613, 733, 766
U.S. Ambassador (MacArthur), confirmation, 674
Automotive products, Italian Fiat plant in Soviet
Union: Harriman, 819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon,
522 ; Trowbridge, 883
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st annual
report, transmittal (Johnson), 732
Automotive traffic. See Road trafiic
Aviation :
Aircraft, U.S., allegations of attack on Soviet ship
rejected, 953
Aircraft, U.S., allegations of involvement in Mid-
dle East, U.S. replies: Goldberg, 935, 940;
Rusk, 950, 951
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions re air transport
of exports and sale or supply of aircraft, 77,
374
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Supersonic transport aircraft, prospects and im-
portance (Humphrey), 164
Thailand Air Force, U.S. helicopter training (Mar-
tin), 199, 853
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Air transport agreement (1948) with Italy,
termination, 965, 968
Air transport agreement (1949) with Panama,
amendment, 965
Aircraft, C-47, and related articles and services,
understanding with Mali re delivery of, 702
Aircraft, civil, agreement with U.K. re use of
airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base, 37
Aircraft, offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board, convention (1963) : Denmark,
85, 481; Norway, 481; Saudi Arabia, 765;
Sweden, 481
Aircraft, rights in, convention (1948) on the in-
ternational recognition of: Iceland, 481
Carriage by air, convention (1928) for the uni-
fication of certain rules, protocol: New
Zealand, 765
Civil aviation, international convention (1944) :
Barbados, 701; Guyana, 305; Uganda, 701
Civil aviation, international, convention (1954) :
Protocol re Singapore, 897
Protocol re amendment of article 50(a):
Singapore, 897
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Aviation — Continued
U.S. airlifts to Viet-Nam (Wheeler) , 188
Azerbaijan (Rusk), 877
Bacon, Francis, 916
Balance of payments:
Adjustment policies and processes of other coun-
tries, 345, 347, 788
Import restraints, 245, 337
OECD countries, 27
U.S.:
Foreign aid programs, effect of and efforts to
minimize: 345; Johnson, 233, 379, 381, 659;
E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 827
Military expenditures and aid, effect of:
NATO: 488; E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 783
Viet-Nam: 341, 342, 346; Johnson, 334
Problems of and efforts to improve : 339; Johnson,
334, 708, 886
Tariff policy effect on (Solomon), 556
Voluntary restraint program, effect: 343, 444;
Johnson, 334
Ball, George W., 69, 553, 554
Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani, 688
Bangoura, Mohammed Kassoury, 554
Barbados:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 482, 701, 833, 865
U.N. membership: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67
Barghoorn, Frederick (Rusk), 248
i Barrows, Leland, 651
Baruch, Bernard, 569
Battle, Lucius D., 674
Beavogui, Louis-Lansana, 554
Belaunde, Victor Andres (quoted), 641
Belgium:
NATO headquarters, relocation in, 51
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 305, 306, 582, 613
930
Bell, Philip, 651
Beplat, Tristan E., 70
Berger, Samuel D., 552
Berlin (see also Germany) : Humphrey, 680; Kohler,
8, 410
Visit of Vice-President Humphrey: Humphrey,
680; Johnson (quoted), 680
Berlin crisis (Rusk), 272, 278, 877
Bernardes, Carlos (Goldberg) , 179
Berry, Michael, 274
Big-power responsibility: Goldberg, 513, 873, 895,
938; Humphrey, 486; Johnson, 333, 550, 960;
Katzenbach, 754; Kohler, 406; Martin (quoted),
273; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 770,
784, 879; Solomon, 555; U Thant, 139
Black, Eugene: 69, 667; Johnson, 379, 469; Blartin,
854
Blackie, William, 520
Blair, Frank, 168
Blumenthal, W. Martin, 430, 430n
Bohlen, Charles E., 53
Bolivia:
Alliance for Progress summit conference, position
on, 706n
Communism, threat of (Rusk) , 828
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481
Bonhomme, Arthur, 172
Boonstra, Clarence A., 261
von Borch, Herbert, 358
Botswana:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 260, 967
Bowie, Robert R., 53
Braderman, Eugene M., 660
Bradley, Omar (Rusk) , 770
Brandt, Willy: Humphrey, 680; Rusk, 46, 320
Brazil :
Economic progress (Rusk), 723, 829
Income tax convention, announcement, 581
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 306, 393, 612, 614,
642, 733, 866, 929, 930, 967
U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk,
829
U.S. visit of president-elect Costa e Silva, 242
British (see also United Kingdom)
British Council, 667
British Independent Television interview of Secretary
Rusk, 274
Bronheim, David, 721
Brosio, Manlio, 687
Brovra, George: 747; Goldberg, 28; Rusk, 46, 129
Brown, Winthrop G., 897
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 414, 565
Buffum, William B., 261, 732
Bui Diem, 216
Bui Vien: Johnson, 590; Thieu, 591
Bulgaria:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Political developments (Brzezinski), 417
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 260, 702
U.S. Ambassador (McSweeney), confirmation, 674
U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach) , 5
Bunche, Ralph (Goldberg), 268
Bundy, McGeorge (Johnson), 951
Bundy, William P., 323, 517, 790, 849
Bunker, Ellsworth: 472, 586, 591, 674, 844; Johnson,
538, 587, 588, 589, 593, 594; Thieu, 591
Burlingame, Anson, 848
Burma, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 898
Burnet, Alastair, 274
Burundi :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481, 701
Calif ano, Joseph A., Jr., 659
Cambodia, neutrality: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320,
619, 773
Communist violations (Rusk), 877
Cameroon :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 260, 353, 530
U.S. Ambassador (Payton) , confirmation, 261
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
979
Canada :
Agricultural development (E. V. Rostow), 863
American Falls, Niagara, IJC study requested, 634
Canada Pension Plan, agreement re, 898
Eastern Europe, trade with (Solomon) , 521
EXPO : 67, 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909
Foreign aid programs : Johnson, 334 ; Rusk, 785
"Great Ring of Canada" (Johnson) , 908
India, grain shipments to (Johnson) , 299
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800
St. Lawrence Seaway tolls, 554, 674
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613, 674,
766,834,866,898,930
U.S. Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st
annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 732
Visit of President Johnson: Johnson, 907, 908;
Pearson, 909
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual Re-
port of the President to the Congress on the Im-
plem,entation of the Automotive Products Trade
Act of 1965,12,2x1
Cancino, Cuevas (Goldberg) , 895
Canham, Erwin D., 315
CARE, India, emergency food aid: 701; Johnson,
300, 700
Case, CliflFord P., 42
Cater, Douglass, 16
CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance),
Brzezinski, 416
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization
Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc.,
260,967,968
Central America, U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; Rusk, 829
Central American Common Market, 712, 714, 715
U.S. support: 339; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 382,
542; Linowitz, 730; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk,
725,829
Central American Economic Integration Fund: 716;
Johnson, 382
Central Intelligence Agency, private voluntary or-
ganizations, relations, policy review: 665; John-
son, 665
Central Treaty Organization :
Economic Committee, 15th meeting: communique,
670; Gaud, 668
U.S. delegation, 671
Turkey, support of (Johnson) , 547
U.K. aid, 670
Ceylon:
International telecommunications convention
(1965) , with annexes, 613
U.S. Ambassador ( Corry ) , confirmation, 968
Chad, treaties, agreements, etc., 354, 733
Chaffee, Roger (Johnson) , 388
Chemical and biological warfare, U.S. position, 577
Chile:
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 723
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
Reflecting telescope at Cerro Tololo Inter-American
Observatory, 728
Chile — Continued
U.S. economic aid (Johnson) , 382
U.S. visit of President Frei, 71
China, Communist (see also Sino-Soviet relations) :
Asia, threat to: 849; Bundy, 791; Martin, 195;
W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 275
U.S. military assistance as a countermeasure
(Rusk), 827
Economic stagnation: Bundy, 325, 792; W. W.
Rostow, 497, 501
India, threat to (Sisco) , 462
Leadership struggle: 849; Goldberg, 508; Martin,
193; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 495, 501;
Rusk, 47, 170, 280, 785, 788; Taylor, 287
Nuclear tests and nuclear potential: 750; Mc-
Namara, 445 ; Rusk, 132
Taiwan, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper,
693
Thailand, threat to (Rusk) , 275
U.N. membership:
Question of: 849; Goldberg, 100; Popper, 689
"Two Chinas" solution: U. A. Johnson, 423;
Popper, 693
U.S. policy and relations: Goldberg, 100, 310, 840;
U. A. Johnson, 420, 422; Popper, 689, 694;
Rusk, 283, 322
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 564
Viet-Nam, positions on: Goldberg, 508; Kohler,
413; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk,
42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727, 786; Wheeler, 191
World goals: ANZUS, 749; Meeker, 62; Popper,
690, 692; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 169;
Solomon, 519
World relations: Johnson, 162; Martin, 193; Niven,
774; E. V. Rostow, 398; W. W. Rostow, 502;
Rusk, 788
China, Republic of:
Communist China, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423;
Popper, 693
Economic progress: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846,
849
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353
U.N. membership: 849; Goldberg, 100; Johnson,
848; Popper, 689, 693
U.S. commitments : 849 ; Johnson, 848 ; Popper, 683 ;
Rusk, 322
U.S. visit of Vice-President Yen, 846
Viet-Nam, aid to (Johnson) , 847, 849
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 511
Christian, George E., 721
Christian Science Monitor, 798
Chung, II Kwon, 548, 549, 551
Church, Frank, 42
Churchill, Winston: quoted, 486, 489, 490_ 838, 961,
963; Harriman, 815
Civic action programs: 699, 766; Westmoreland, 740
Civil rights (see also Human rights and Racial dis-
crimination) :
980
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Civil rights — Continued
International covenant (U.N.), on civil and polit-
ical rights: Goldberg 99; Harris, 104; text,
111
Political rights of women, convention (1963) :
Afghanistan, 86
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg), 524
U.S. (Goldberg), 289, 524
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson), 590
Claims :
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, FY 1968
budget appropriations request (Johnson), 232
Launching of objects into outer space, liability for
damages: 84; Goldberg, 81, 611; Rusk, 601
Passenger-ship accidents, U.S. legislation re cover-
age of (Miller), 175
Clark, J. Reuben, Jr. (Rusk) , 270
Clark, William Donaldson, 274
Claxton, Philander P., 566
Clayton, Will (Solomon), 555
Cleveland, Harlan, 53
Cocoa, international cocoa agreement, need for
(Blumenthal), 434
Coe, Richard, 854
Coffee:
International Coffee Agreement (1962) : 717; John-
son, 709
Current actions: Honduras, 581; Jamaica, 929;
Kenya, 85
2nd annual report: Johnson, 250; text of report,
251
International coffee diversification: 717; Johnson,
707
Cole, 0. E., 377
Collective security :
Collective self-defense, right of: 571; Meeker, 59
Defensive alliances, importance: Brzezinski, 415;
Bundy, 791; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 271;
Sisco, 65; Truman (quoted), 550
Thai support (Rusk), 597
U.N. role (Sisco), 459
U.S. commitments, importance of dependability:
Meeker, 62; Rusk, 725, 726, 771, 784, 787, 875,
878
Colombia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 701
U.S. aid (Johnson) , 382
Colombo Plan ( W. W. Rostow) , 496
Colonialism (see also name of colony) : Goldberg,
289; Sisco, 67
U.N. resolution and U.S. support (Nabrit) , 32
Comecon, 697
Commodity Credit Corporation : 701 ; Johnson, 300
Communications :
NATO communications, improvement, 51
News media, importance (Martin) , 854
Communications — Continued
Satellites (Humphrey), 164
Global commercial communications satellite, in-
terim arrangements and special agreement:
Korea, 438; Peru, 967
NATO feasibility study, 51
Communism :
Asia. See Asia.
Cold war: Goldberg, 895; Harriman, 817; Johnson,
159; Katzenbach, 754; W. W. Rostow, 500
Ideological differences with free world : Harriman,
820; Sisco, 463
Iron Curtain ( Humphrey) , 486
Measures against: Kohler, 8, 410; E. V. Rostow,
399; W.W. Rostow, 493
U.S. : 103 ; Johnson, 161, 384, 654 ; Kohler, 7, 409 ;
Martin, 193; Rusk, 127, 134, 278, 877; Yen, 847
Nationalism, increases in: Brzezinski, 417; Harri-
man, 817; Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2;
Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon,
519
Peaceful coexistence. See East-West relations
Propaganda : Goldberg, 924 ; Harriman, 820 ; Rusk,
725,775;SEATO,746
Rejection of and countermeasures (see also under
Viet-Nam) : 564; Bundy, 323, 792; Holt, 962;
Johnson, 384, 541; Martin, 195; Palmer, 455;
Popper, 691 ; W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 785,
827, 832; Westmoreland, 740
CIA aid to private organizations, 666
Southern Rhodesia, danger of (Palmer) , 455
Wars of national liberation: Bundy, 790; Martin,
194; W. W. Rostow, 494, 503; Rusk, 272, 787;
SEATO, 746; Taylor (quoted), 514; West-
moreland, 738
World goals: Harriman, 820; Kohler, 7; E. V. Roa-
tow, 398 ; Rusk, 771, 785, 875
Conferences, international, calendar of meetings, 34,
578
Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) :
Political development (Palmer), 649
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 642, 733
U.N. role (Sisco), 66
U.S. Ambassador (McBride), confirmation, 968
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agree-
ments, etc., 393, 481
Congress, U.S.:
Alliance for Progress summit meeting, interests:
Johnson, 545, 707; Rusk, 723, 829
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18, 223,
350, 757, 801, 966
Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Economic
Reforms, report (Solomon), 522
Findley and Belcher amendments (Harriman), 818
India, fact-finding committee, results of trip (John-
son), 299
Legislation:
Cotton production, effect of 1965 legislation
(Solomon), 558
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1957
981
Congress, U.S. — Continued
Legislation — Continued
Passenger ship safety: Johnson, 429; Miller, 175
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, financial
support ceiling raised (Johnson) , 599, 865
Legislation, proposed:
African Development Bank, U.S. participation in
special fund (Johnson) , 379, 380
Agency for International Development: John-
son, 879; Palmer, 651
Alliance for Progress, authorization and appro-
priation request (Johnson), 543
Asian development, authorization (Johnson), 162
Asian Development Bank, U.S. pledge (John-
son), 379, 380
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966: 697;
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 160,
334, 659, 696; Katzenbach, 3; Phillips, 677;
Rusk, 875; Solomon, 518; Trowbridge, 881
Export-Import Bank, continuation and expan-
sion, request: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379,
381, 659
Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 (Rusk), 827
Guam, political development (Johnson), 587
India, food aid appropriations and authorization
request (Johnson), 300, 658
Interest Equalization Tax rate adjustment
(Johnson), 335
National Advisory Committee on Self-Help
(Johnson), 379, 380
Joint resolutions, India, emergency food aid, 700
Outer space treaty, support for (Goldberg), 605
Senate advice and consent:
Consular convention v;ith Soviet Union: 614;
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Human rights conventions, U.S. accession recom-
mended (Goldberg), 524
Narcotic drugs, single convention (1961) on,
U.S. accession recommended: Johnson, 671;
Katzenbach, 672
Outer space treaty: Goldberg, 602; Johnson,
386,659; Rusk, 600
SOLAS 1960 Convention, amendments: Johnson,
429; Miller, 178
Senate confirmations, 261, 448, 476n, 482, 523, 674,
765, 968
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 160; Westmore-
land, 738
Conseil de I'Entente (Palmer) , 650
Conservation:
Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966)
for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929
Nature protection and wildlife preservation in the
Western Hemisphere, Convention (1940) :
Costa Rica, 353
U.S.-Soviet fishery discussions, 216, 332
Water resources: Johnson, 903; Solomon, 562
Amistad Dam (Johnson), 12
Conservation — Continued
Water resources — Continued
CENTO programs, 671
Latin Amei-ica, 712, 716
Consular relations:
Soviet-U.S. consular convention: 614, 642; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; Kat-
zenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247
Vienna convention (1963) on: Argentina, 701;
Brazil, Ireland, 967; Madagascar, 530
Optional protocols: Madagascar, 613
Contiguous zone, 178, 424, 919
Cook, Jesse L., 127
Cook, Mercer, 651
Cooper, Charles, 844
Copyright convention (1952), universal, and proto-
cols : Netherlands, 833
Protocol 1, Italy, 481
Corry, Andrew V., 968
Cortada, James N., 218
Costa e Silva, Artur, 243
Costa Mendez, Nicanor: 474; Bunker, 473
Costa Rica:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 642, 702, 930
U.S. Ambassador (Boonstra), confirmation, 261
Cotton :
Analysis of Factors Affecting U.S. Cotton Ex-
ports, 559
Textiles :
Bilateral agreements with: Hong Kong, 929;
India, 36, 182, 702; Israel, 389, 642; Italy,
642; Mexico, 964; Poland, 612, 642; Portugal,
154,674,699
International Cotton Institute, articles of agree-
ment: India, 353; Mexico, 224
Long-term arrangement, extension of: 929;
Blumenthal, 431 ; Roth, 478, 880
World trade, problems and U.S. policies (Solomon) ,
557
Coudert, Frederic R., (quoted), 140
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (excerpts)
336
Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (Brzezinski),
416
Council of Europe: Brzezinski, 419; Johnson, 652
Crisis control: Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 754;
NATO, 51
Crowther, Harold E., 919
Cuba:
Castroism: 565; Rusk, 828
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, 102, 564
Cuban missile crisis: Kohler, 8, 410; W. W. Rostow,
493; Rusk, 168, 272, 278, 621, 778
Cudlipp, Hugh, 274
Cultural relations and programs:
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Moroc-
co, 351, 393; Netherlands, 582; Romania, 479,
482; U.A.R., 642; U.K., 582
982
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cultural relations and programs — Continued
Bilateral agreements with — Continued
Germany, re transfer of paintings for Weimar
Museum, 86
Bulgaria, U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach), 5
CIA assistance, policy review, 667
Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488;
Solomon, 519
International convenant (U.N.) on economic, social,
and cultural rights: Harris, 104; text, 107
North Africa, cultural factors (Palmer), 807
Philippines (Braderman), 660
Soviet Union-U.S.: Katzenbach, 755; Solomon, 519
U.S. travel restrictions, exception of in particular
fields, 103
Customs:
Carnets, ATA, ECS and TIR, conventions (1961)
re: U.S., 481, 833
Containers, convention (1961) on: U.S., 481, 833
Customs administration agreement with Philip-
pines, 261
Mexican products, 70
Professional equipment, convention (1961) on
temporary importation of: U.S., 481, 833
Publication of customs tariffs, convention (1890)
re international union for, and protocol:
Algeria, 85
Road traffic, convention (1954) re facilities for
touring: Singapore, 122
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954)
on the temporary importation of: Australia,
673
Viet-Nam, U.S. advisory activities: 206; Guad, 200
Cyprus :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 930
Turkey, position of : 657; Sunay, 656
UNFICYP, extension of (Goldberg), 179
Soviet position (Sisco),461
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 638; NATO, 50
Czechoslovakia :
Economic development (Katzenbach), 5
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip-
rocal offer, 572
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 224, 260, 305, 898
U.S. citizens, detention of (Kohler), 10
U.S. trade mission (Trowbridge), 882
DAC. See Development Assistance Committee, OECD
Daddario, Emilio Q., 240
Dahomey :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 701, 801, 833
Davies, Merton E., 71, 634
Davis, W. True, Jr., 721
Dawson, Thomas (Rusk), 248
Dayan, Moshe (Wheeler), 189
Dean, Sir Patrick, 268
de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (Humphrey), 168
De Madariaga, Salvador (quoted), 892
Defense :
British Indian Ocean Territory, agreement re avail-
ability of for defense purposes, 225
Inventions relating to and for which patent appli-
cations have been made, agreement for mutual
safeguarding (1960) : Luxembourg, 305
National defense and security:
CIA policy review, 667
Espionage, question of effect of U.S.-Soviet con-
sular convention: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 411;
Rusk, 249
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
establishment and membership (Johnson) , 951
Soviet missile capabilities: 575; Johnson, 160,
569
U.S. nuclear strength: McNamara, 442; Rusk,
272
Watch movements trade and production, national
security aspects, 217
Self-defense, right of: Meeker, 60; Nabrit, 31;
Rusk, 271
U.S. budget : Johnson, 380, 445 ; Rusk, 771
Defense, Department of : Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
Demarcation, international lines of, significance
(Meeker), 60
Democracy and democratic processes: Johnson, 295,
590 ; Katzenbach, 5 ; King Hassan II, 331 ; Rusk,
772; Trowbridge, 885
Bureaucracy (E. V. Rostow),398
Greece (Rusk), 750
Latin America: 713; Johnson, 710
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
South West Africa, 893
Den Toom, Willem, 687
Denmark :
Import liberalizations, 245
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 122, 224, 260, 481,
613, 766
Desalination:
1st International Symposium on Water Desalina-
tion, results (Solomon), 561
Los An,:?eles desalination plant approved: Johnson,
903 ; Pollack, 910
Saudi Arabia desalination plant site at Jidda,
dedication (Solomon), 561
Soviet Union, agreement re cooperation in field
desalination, including use of atomic energy,
37
Water for Peace :
International Conference: 762, 765; Johnson,
903; Solomon, 562
U.S. program, recommendations, 761
Desert Locust Control Authority (Katzenbach), 958
Development and Resources Corporation (Lilienthal),
468
Development Assistance Committee, OECD: 764;
Humphrey, 685 ; E. V. Rostow, 25
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 12
Diehold, John (Humphrey) , 167
Diem, Ngo Dinh (Lodge) , 799
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
983
Diplomatic relations and recognition :
Consular convention with Soviet Union : 614, 642 ;
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Katzenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247
Diplomatic immunity: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 412;
Rusk, 249
Diplomatic relations with U.S. terminated : Algeria,
Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, U.A.R., and
Yemen, 952n
International law, relevance (Goldberg) , 140
Recognition :
Not inferred from signature, ratification or ac-
cession to multilateral agreements (Goldberg) ,
82
Southern Rhodesia, nonrecognition of Smith
regime: 369, 375; Goldberg, 73, 143; Palmer,
458
Rights of legation (Rusk) , 772
Vienna convention (1961) : Dahomey, 833; Ireland,
929; Mongolia, 674; Sweden, 732
Optional protocol re compulsory settlement of dis-
putes: Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613;
Sweden, 732
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign
Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation
of credentials: Afghanistan, 626; Botswana,
Bulgaria, 16; Burundi, 850; Colombia, 172;
Dahomey, 850; Haiti, Indonesia, 172; Iran, 909;
Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 16; Malta, 327; Morocco,
850; Sierra Leone, 377; Singapore, 688; Turkey,
172; Viet-Nam, 216; Yemen, 327; Zambia, 688
Disarmament (see also Armaments, Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and Nuclear
weapons) :
Need for: 436, 657; Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 755;
NATO, 50; Rusk, 786; U Thant, 268
Soviet "umbrella" proposal, 576
U.N. role: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 567
Disaster relief. Trust Territory of the Pacific (John-
son), 599
Disputes, compulsory settlement of, optional protocol
to Vienna convention on consular relations
(1963): Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613;
Sweden, 732
Disputes, pacific settlement of: Goldberg, 316, 872,
923; Haile Selassie (quoted), 425; Humphrey,
489 ; W. W. Rostow, 491 ; Rusk, 875
International covenant (U.N.) on civil and polit-
ical rights, optional protocol : Harris, 105 ; text,
120
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 269
Dole, Robert (Johnson) , 299
Dominican Republic : Johnson, 243, 567 ; Rusk, 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 393
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382
Donges-Metz pipeline, agreement with France re
operation, maintenance, and security, 733
Double taxation, income, conventions and agreements
for avoidance of: Brazil, 581, 614; Honduras,
termination, 181 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 84, 122
Downs, Hugh, 168, 172
Drugs :
Adverse drug reaction reporting system, WHO, an-
nouncement, 918
Narcotics:
International Narcotics Control Board, U.S. rep-
resentation (Katzenbach), 673
Single convention (1961) on:
Current actions: Mexico, U.S., 834; Turkey,
U.S., 897
U.S. accession urged: Johnson, 671; Katzen-
bach, 272
Dukes, Ernest F., 71, 634
Dulles, John Foster (Rusk), 271
East-West relations: 657, 697 ; Brzezinski, 414 ; John-
son (quoted), 408, 680; Niven, 774; W. W. Ros-
tow, 495; Rusk, 4 (quoted), 359, 463 (quoted),
772
Currency convertibility recommended, 699
Germany :
Possibility of improved relations with Eastern
Europe: Humphrey, 680; Katzenbach, 755;
Rusk, 360, 363
Reunification, importance to: 52; Brzezinski,
418; Humphrey, 489; Katzenbach, 753; W. W.
Rostow, 500 ; Rusk, 362
NATO role. See under NATO
OECD role : Humphrey, 684 ; E. V. Rostow, 24
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16
Soviet convictions of U.S. citizens, question of effect
(Rusk), 44
Soviet Union, role of ( Humphrey) , 487
Technological gap (Humphrey), 167
Trade. See under Trade
U.N. role: Goldberg, 98; Harriman, 820; E. V. Ros-
tow, 25 ; Sisco, 458
U.S. efforts to improve: 339; Harriman, 815; Hum-
phrey, 682; Johnson, 159; Kohler, 406; Rusk,
47, 169, 360, 786, 875
U.S. national interest considerations: Harriman,
821; Johnson, 696; Kohler, 6; Solomon, 518
Viet-Nam, effect of: Harriman, 821; Kohler, 413;
Rusk, 781, 875; Trowbridge, 883
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966:
Importance: 339, 697; Humphrey, 488; Harriman,
819; Johnson, 160, 334, 659, 696; Katzenbach,
3, 755; Kohler, 10; Phillips, 697; Rusk, 772,
875 ; Solomon, 518 ; Trowbridge, 881
Viet-Nam effect on passage: Rusk, 171; Solomon,
523
ECA. See Economic Commission for Africa
ECAFE. (Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East), Martin, 853
Echavarria Alozaga, Hernan, 172
Economic and Social Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 305, 437
984
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic and Social Council, U.N. — Continued
Narcotic drugs control (Katzenbach) , 673
U.S. representative (Goldschmidt), confirmation,
261
Economic and social development (see also name of
country) :
Afghanistan : 632 ; Maiwandwal, 628, 630
Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 954; Palmer,
646, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 813
Agriculture, health, and education, key sectors:
748, 760; Johnson, 231, 232, 379, 381, 543, 659,
707; E. V. Rostow, 401, 860; Rusk, 828
Agriculture, importance to. See Agriculture: Mod-
ernization
Asia. See Asia
Conditions necessary for (E. V. Rostow) , 857
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex-
cerpts), 336
Eastern Europe, problems: Harriman, 817; Solo-
mon, 519
Education, importance. See Education
Ethiopia (Johnson), 427
Food aid, importance (sec also Food and popula-
tion crisis) , Johnson, 300
Free world progress: E. V. Rostow, 399; W. W.
Rostow, 495
India Pakistan Aid Consortia: Johnson, 296, 299,
383 ; E. V. Rostow, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296,
300, 334, 380; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow, 400,
861; Rusk, 241, 826
International Covenant (U.N.), on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights: Goldberg, 99; Harris,
104; text, 107
Latin America. See Alliance for Progress
Mexico-U.S. border area, agreement on, 86
Near and Middle East, U.S. support (Goldberg),
935
OECD countries: Humphrey, 683; W. W. Rostow,
497
Political stability, relation to: Gaud, 669; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 378, 381, 384; Palmer,
649, 809; E. V. Rostow, 857; Rusk, 826
SEATO programs : 745, 747 ; Rusk, 744
Systems management (McGhee),150
Technological progress: 346; Humphrey, 165, 684
U.N. role (Johnson), 567
U.S. aid (see also Foreign aid programs, U.S.) :
346; Johnson, 230; E. V. Rostow, 400, 857;
Rusk, 273
Self-help principle: 712; Gaud, 669; Johnson,
159, 231, 232, 296, 298, 334, 378, 379, 710;
Palmer, 650, 814; E. V. Rostow, 26, 401, 860;
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 724, 827
U.S. economic strength: E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk,
770, 833
U.S.-Soviet common interests (Katzenbach), 754
Water resources development, 759
Economic and social development — Continued
World half-rich, half -poor: Humphrey, 684; John-
son, 14, 295, 378; E. V. Rostow, 401, 857; Rusk,
241, 771
World order, importance to (W. W. Rostow), 491
Economic assistance, postwar, agreement with Ger-
many re repayment of remaining German debt,
260
Economic Commission for Africa: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 499
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(Martin), 853
Economic Commission for Europe: Brzezinski, 419;
Harriman, 820 ; Humphrey, 488 ; E. V. Rostow, 25
Economic policy and relations, U.S. :
Domestic policy:
Agriculture program changes (E. V. Rostow),
402, 859
Budget message, FY 1968 (Johnson), 230
Cotton production (Solomon), 557
Efficient administration (Johnson), 379, 381
Monetary restraint, programs (E. V. Rostow),
20
Foreign policy:
Council of Economic Advisers, report (excerpts),
336
Eastern Europe, trade policies. See East-West
Trade Relations Act of 1966
Economic Report of the President, excerpts
(Johnson), 333
Economist, The, 192, 495, 697
Ecuador:
Alliance for Progress summit conference declara-
tion, position on, 706n
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 224, 260
Education :
Africa (Katzenbach), 955
Asia, regional coordination (Martin), 196, 854
"Brain drain": McGhee, 152; Pollack, 912
Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey,
164; Johnson, 15
Foreign affairs, relation to (Humphrey), 167
Government, role of (Humphrey) , 165
Illiteracy rates (E. V. Rostow) , 402
Importance: 337; Gaud, 670; Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15; Mann (quoted), 955; E. V.
Rostow, 23, 402
International conference, 1967: Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15
Latin America; U.S. aid: 713, 718, 887; Johnson,
382, 541, 543, 663, 709
North Africa (Palmer) , 808
Philippines, U.S. school-building project, 850
Private institutions, role (Humphrey) , 165
Science and public policy programs (Pollack), 915
SEATO programs, 747
Southern Rhodesia (Palmer), 452
TV and other new media: 719; Johnson, 15, 709;
E. V. Rostow, 405
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
985
Education — Continued
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 108, 109
U.S. financial support: Johnson, 381; Katzenbach,
958
Viet-Nam, 209
Voluntary organizations, CIA relationships: 665;
Johnson, 665
Water resources projects, training for: 762; John-
son, 903
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
U.N., constitution, current actions: Guyana, 897
Educational exchange programs:
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Israel,
702; Italy, 122; Netherlands, 582; Romania,
479; U.A.R., 582, 642
Poland, agreement re use of zlotys in, 766
Volunteers to America (Johnson), 244
EEC. See European Economic Community
EFTA. See European Free Trade Association
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (John-
son), 447
Establishment and status, 570n
1966 conference results, 570
U.S.-Soviet responsibilities (Rusk), 43
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: quoted, 412; Rusk, 270
El Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 930
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (quoted), 654, 881
Esenbel, Melih, 172
Ethiopia :
Agricviltural education (Katzenbach), 957
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. visit of King Haile Selassie, 425
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community),
Johnson, 448
Europe (see aUo North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion and names of individual countries) :
Central, Nuclear-free zone, question of (Rusk),
361
Eastern :
Economic and political evolution: Brzezinski,
416; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 486, 681;
Katzenbach, 2, 5; Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Ros-
tow, 495; Solomon, 518
U.S. economic relations. See East-West relations
and Trade
Viet-Nam, position on: Harriman, 821; Kohler,
413; Rusk, 283
Labor, large-scale movements in, 337
North Africa, relations (Palmer), 807
Political development (E. V. Rostow), 399
Unification: 657; Brzezinski, 415; Kohler, 11;
Rusk, 364
Visit to President Johnson, question of (Rusk) , 727
Western :
Economic progress: 336; Humphrey, 486, 679;
McGhee, 148
Europe — Continued
Western^Continued
Technology gap with U.S.: Humphrey, 165, 488;
McGhee, 148
Trade with Eastern Europe: 697; Humphrey,
488; Harriman, 817; Solomon, 518
Unification: Brzezinski, 41G; Humphrey, 487; W.
W. Rostow, 498
U.S. Chiefs of Missions, meeting, Bonn, 599
U.S. commitments: Humphrey, 487, 680; Katzen-
bach, 753; Kohler, 8, 410; Rusk, 727, 782
U.S. interests and relations: Brzezinski, 416;
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 486, 679, 682;
Johnson, 678; Kohler, 7; W. W. Rostow, 498;
Rusk, 358, 364
Viet-Nam situation, lack of effect on (Rusk) , 358,
726, 787, 875
Visit of Vice President Humphrey: Humphrey,
679, 680, 681, 683; Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727
World role (Rusk), 784
European Atomic Energy Community (Johnson), 448
European Common Market. See European Economic
Community
European Economic Community: 337, 697; Brzezinski,
416, 419; Humphrey, 166; Linowitz, 730; Mc-
Ghee, 148; NATO, 50
General agreement on tariffs and trade:
Accession of Korea to, protocol, acceptance, 968
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880
U.K. membership, proposed: Holt, 961; Rusk, 783
European Free Trade Association: 337, 339, 697;
NATO, 50
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880
European Space Research Organization:
Jupiter probe, proposed, NASA cooperation (Mc-
Ghee), 153
Satellite telemetry/telecommand station in Alaska,
agreement re establishment and operation of,
36
European Technological Community, proposed
(Humphrey), 166
Executive orders:
Asian Development Bank, immunities defined
(11334), 563
Trade and other transactions involving Southern
Rhodesia (11322), 146
EXPO 67 : 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909
Export-Import Bank:
Appropriation and authorization request FY 1968
(Johnson), 231, 232, 235
Eastern Europe, extension of commercial credit
guarantees to: 698; Harriman, 819; Johnson,
159; Solomon, 521; Trowbridge, 883
Italian Fiat company, loan to (Trowbridge), 883
Latin American earth stations, proposed loans for
(Johnson), 709
Lending authority, continuation and expansion
needed: 339; Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335
Exports :
Central America (Linowitz), 730
986
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Exports — Continued
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Solomon, 518,
521 ; Trowbridge, 882
Europe, Western (McGhee), 148
International Coffee Agreement, quota controls, 253
Latin America, need for development of: 717;
Johnson, 707, 709; W. W. Kostow, 498
Less developed countries, importance to: 338, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; E. V. Rostow, 404
Presidential "E" Awards for export excellence,
S86n
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77,
374; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
U.S.:
Cotton (Solomon), 558
Council of Economic Advisers, report, 342
Export Control List, further removals of non-
strategic items: 698; Johnson, 159; Trow-
bridge, 883
Increase needed (Johnson) , 335, 756, 886
Technical data: Katzenbach, 755; Trowbridge,
882
World grain export pattern, changes in (E. V.
Rostow) , 402, 859
Extradition, convention (1962) with Israel, under-
standing re certain errors in translation of the
Hebrew text, 766
Fairbank, John (Lodge), 798
FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N.
Far East. See Asia and names of individual countries
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Rusk), 249
Federal Regulations, Code of, 564
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 367
Finland:
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 260, 613, 732,
929, 930
Fish and fisheries:
Fish protein concentrate : 761 ; Goldberg, 101 ; John-
son, 231, 301, 709 ; Rusk, 241
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966)
for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929
Certain fisheries off the coast of U.S., agreements
with Japan, 898
Great Lakes fisheries convention, amendment of,
Canadian note and U.S. reply, 482, 834
King crab fishing, agreement with Soviet Union,
393
North Atlantic fisheries, conduct of fishing opera-
tions in, convention adopted, 635
Northeast Pacific Ocean, agreement with Soviet
Union on certain fishery problems, 393
Northwest Atlantic fisheries, convention (1949),
international, and protocols: Romania, 613
Protocols (1965) re measures of control and
entry into force: France, 438; Norway, 530;
Romania, 613 ; Spain, 642
Fish and fisheries — Continued
U.S. fisheries zone extension, Japan-U.S. discus-
sions, 178, 424
U.S.-Mexican talks, 919
U.S.-Soviet discussions on fishery problems, 216,
331
Viet-Nam, UNDP/FAO fisheries project, U.S.
financial support, 964
Fisher, Adrian S., 573
Flood control, Amistad Dam: 13; Johnson, 12
Flott, Frederick W., 566
Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N. ( E. V. Ros-
tow), 859
Constitution, current actions: Botswana, Lesotho,
260
India, food assistance to : 701 ; Johnson, 297 ; Rusk,
48
U.N. Development Program fisheries project in
Viet-Nam, U.S. financial support, 964
U.S. support, 761
World Food Program: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow
861
Food and population crisis: Gaud, 669; Humphrey,
489; Johnson, 329, 381, 567, 658; E. V. Rostow,
26, 856; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 46, 169, 874;
Sisco, 64
FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 402, 859
Marine resources development, U.N. resolution
(Goldberg), 101
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 814
Nuclear power uses as solution to, 572
OECD role (Humphrey), 685
U.S. principles for alleviating: Johnson, 160, 235,
295; E. V. Rostow, 401
Water for Peace Program: 761; Johnson, 902;
Rusk, 905
Food for Freedom, 761
1968 appropriations request (Johnson), 231, 232,
235,297
Food for Peace programs: Johnson, 658; E. V. Ros-
tow, 860
Viet-Nam, increase in: 203; Gaud, 201
Food resources (see also Agriculture) :
Latin America, AID programs (E. V. Rostow),
863
Marine resources: 761; Goldberg, 101; Johnson,
231, 301,709; Rusk, 241
State Department Policy Planning Council, advis-
ory panel, 16
Force, use of. See Aggression
Ford Foundation, 728
Foreign aid programs, U.S.:
Balance of payments, effect on : 345 ; Johnson, 233,
379, 381, 659; E. V. Rostow, 21
Communist aggression, relation to (Johnson), 384
Food production, priority of: Johnson, 231, 296,
297, 700; E. V. Rostow, 858; Solomon, 559
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379,
381, 659
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
987
Foreign aid programs, U.S. — Continued
Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk), 826
Matched-funds principle: 701; Johnson, 544, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 861
Multilateral aid, combined with: 701; Johnson, 162,
231, 232, 234, 295, 296, 297, 298, 378, 380, 384,
659, 707; Katzenbach, 958; E. V. Rostow, 401,
403; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 828, 831
U.N. programs (Sisco), 459
Regional economic development, encouragement
for: Johnson, 231, 379, 380, 544, 659; Katzen-
bach, 958; Palmer, 650; Rusk, 828
Sales agreements, stress on payment in dollars or
local currency (Johnson) , 235
Self-help principles: 701, 760; Gaud, 669; Johnson,
159, 231, 232, 235, 296, 297, 298, 334, 378, 379,
381, 382, 542, 543, 659; Palmer, 650, 814; E. V.
Rostow, 401, 860; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk,
724, 827, 831
"Surplus" concept, aid not restricted by (Johnson) ,
235
U.S. national interest considerations: Johnson,
378, 545; Palmer, 808; E. V. Rostow, 857;
Rusk, 827, 832
Water projects, support for, 758, 760
Foreign aid programs of other countries :
China, Republic of: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846,
848, 849
Increases in: Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 403;
Rusk, 785, 829, 830
Multilateral aid to India (Johnson), 295, 299
Netherlands, 964
OECD countries, 28
Soviet military and economic aid to North Africa
(Palmer), 808, 811
U.K. economic aid to CENTO, 670
Foreign currency:
U.S.-owned local currencies for water development,
recommendations, 761
Zlotys, agreements with Poland re use of, 766
Foreign investment in U.S. (Johnson) , 335
Foreign policy, U.S.:
Briefing conferences:
Educators, 322
Regional: Philadelphia, 565
CIA role, policy review, 666
Congressional documents relating to, lists, 18, 223,
350, 757, 801, 966
Informed public, need for (Kohler) , 406
National interests: Johnson, 546; Palmer, 810;
Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow, 398; Rusk, 250;
Sisco, 459
Nonpartisan nature (Rusk), 770
Peace, central goal of: Johnson, 551; Rusk, 271
Principles, objectives, and problems : Goldberg, 625 ;
Johnson, 158, 231, 232; Palmer, 452; E. V.
Rostow, 856; W. W. Rostow, 491; Rusk, 134,
770, 879
Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued
Responsibilities:
Congress (Rusk), 774, 775
President: Johnson, 298; Rusk, 249, 370, 725, 772,
775
Science and technology as instruments of : Pollack,
911; Rusk, 239
Trade as an instrument of: Johnson, 886; Katzen-
bach, 3 ; Solomon, 555
U.N., role in extending U.S. policy (Sisco), 458
U.S. travel restrictions, 103
Foreign Service (see also State Department) :
Ambassadors, confirmation, 261, 674, 765, 968
Inservice training: Cortada, Hope, 218
Personnel changes, policies (Lodge) , 799
Science training, need for: Pollack, 915; Rusk, 238
Scientific attaches (Pollack), 914
Foreign Service Institute (Rusk), 238
Foreign students in the U.S., Afghanistan (Maiwan-
dwal), 628
Forrestal, James V. (Johnson), 960
Forsyth, John (Rusk), 269
Foster, William C, 571
Fowler, Henry H., meeting, 53
France:
Foreign aid programs (Rusk) , 785, 830
German-French relations (Rusk), 363
Import quota controls reduced, 246
NATO, position on: 51 ; Rusk, 46
Nuclear atmospheric testing, 750
Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93
Nuclear proliferation, position on, 571
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 438, 733, 930,
968
U.N. peacekeeping assessments, position on (Gold-
berg), 101
Frankel, Charles, 322
Frankel, Max, 776
Fredericks, Wayne, 756
Freedom:
South West Africa. See South West Africa
U.N. resolution on self-determination and nonuse
of force: Nabrit, 31 ; text, 32
U.S. support: Johnson, 546, 960; Nabrit, 30; Rusk,
270
Freedom of association, U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Freedom of religion :
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590
Freedom of speech and press : Goldberg, 840 ; Katzen-
bach, 2 ; Rusk, 130
Southern Rhodesia, censorship in: 370; Palmer,
454
U.N. covenant provisions, 115
Application to U.S. (Harris), 106
U.S. : Rusk, 725, 777 ; Trowbridge, 885
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590
Freeman, Orville L.: 907; Johnson, 629; Rusk, 46,
874; Solomon, 558
Frei, Eduardo, 71
988
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
:; Fulbright-Hays Act, 244
'■ Fulton, James (Goldberg), 605
Futaih, Abdul Aziz, 327
' Gabon, treaties, agreements, etc., 801, 834
Gambia, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab-
lishment, 122
Garcia Reynoso, Placido, 70
Garcia Robles, 436
Gardner, John W.: 918; Humphrey, 164; Johnson,
15,665
Gaud, William S., 200, 482, 586, 668, 670 721
General Assembly, U.N. :
Constitutional crisis, 1965: Goldberg, 636, 896;
Johnson, 566
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437
International covenants on human rights :
Civil and political rights, and optional protocol,
text. 111
Economic, social, and cultural rights, text, 107
U.S. position: Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104
Korea, Republic of, sole representative of Korean
government, 565
Nuclear proliferation treaty, support for, 571
Peacekeeping operations :
Soviet position (Sisco),461
U.S. position : Goldberg, 101, 640 ; Sisco, 461
Resolutions :
Outer space treaty, endorsement and commenda-
tion, 83
Prohibition of threat or use of force, and right
of peoples to self-determination, text, 32
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office,
14
South West Africa :
Administration of, U.S. position: Goldberg, 99,
292, 888, 892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco,
68
Administration pending independence, 893
Southern Rhodesia, resolutions on and U.S. support.
See Southern Rhodesia
21st session, evaluation: Goldberg, 98; Rusk, 42
U.S. delegation to 5th special session, 732
Geneva accords :
Background : Meeker, 55 ; W. W. Rostow, 493
Communist violations: Johnson, 160, 514; Nabrit,
30 ; Rusk, 281, 282, 743 ; SE ATO, 746
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman: 953;
Rusk, 466, 878
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen-Na-
tion Disarmament Committee
Geneva protocol on chemical and biological warfare,
577
Genocide, convention for prevention and punishment
of (1948) :
Current actions : Mongolia, 641
U.N. support, 113
Geodetic research, 86
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
Germany:
Demarcation lines between East and West Ger-
many, significance (Meeker), 60
Reunification: 657; Brzezinski, 418; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 680; Katzenbach, 753;
Kohler, 11; NATO, 49; E. V. Rostow, 24; W.
W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 362, 771
Four-power conference, question of (Rusk), 360
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Balance-of-payments position, 347, 788
Chancellor Adenauer, death of: Johnson, 751, 752;
Kiesinger, 751 ; Rusk, 752
East Germany, contacts with: 52; Katzenbach,
755; Rusk, 360
Trade: Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 521; Trow-
bridge, 882
Economic progress (McGhee), 148
France, relations (Rusk), 363
NATO nuclear weapons. See under NATO
Nuclear facilities under EURATOM safeguards,
572
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93
Nuclear proliferation treaty, position on (Rusk),
321
Political developments (Rusk), 365
Soviet Union, relations (Rusk), 363
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 306, 701,
733, 930, 968
Trilateral talks (U.S.-U.K.-Germany) concluded,
788
TV interview of Secretary Rusk, transcript, 358
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599
U.S. relations: Johnson, 751; Kiesinger, 751; Rusk,
359, 363
U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee) , 151
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, proposed (John-
son), 751
U.S. visit of Minister Willy Brandt (Rusk), 320
Visit of President Johnson: 751; Kiesinger, 751
Visit of Vice President Humphrey, 680
Gestido, Oscar D., 724
Ghana:
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 582, 613, 702
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach : 756 ; Katzen-
bach, 955
Gharrett, John T., 636
Gibbs, Sir Humphrey, 370
Gilmour, Craddock Matthew (Rusk), 248
Gingland, Richard P., 71
Goldberg, Arthur J :
Addresses, correspondence, remarks and state-
ments :
Aden, 100
Africa, developments and problems, 289
Arab-Israeli dispute, 871
U.N. role, 100, 920, 925, 927, 934, 936, 941, 943,
944, 946
Asia:
Regional development, 506
Visit to, 505, 509
989
Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued
Addresses, correspondence, etc. — Continued
Astronauts, tribute to, 80
Barbados, independence and U.N. membership,
28
Communist China, U.N. membership, question of,
100
Cyprus, U.N. force extended, 179
Food and population crisis, U.N. role, 101
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 98
Human rights, 289
U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged, 524
U.N. covenants, importance and U.S. support,
99
International law, U.N. contributions, 102, 140
Korea, U.N. support for unification, 101
Marine resources, study and development, 101
Nuclear proliferation treaty, need for, and U.S.
support, 99
Outer space law, development, 141
Outer space treaty :
Development, provisions, and importance, 78,
83,98,602,839
Signature ceremony, remarks, 267
Portuguese territories in southern Africa, 290
Self-determination, principles and U.S. support,
290
South Africa, racial discrimination, U.N. coun-
termeasures, 293
South West Africa, U.N. administration, 99, 292,
888, 892
Southern Rhodesia:
U.N. mandatory sanctions and U.S. support,
73, 99, 142
U.S. interests, 290
UNFICYP, U.S. pledge, 180
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 101, 143, 636, 838,
894
U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in
office, 15, 98
Viet-Nam :
Peace talks, prospects for and U.S. position,
137, 506, 512, 619 (quoted), 840
U Thant aid requested, 63, 98
Situation reports, 506, 510, 839
U.N. inability to act, 98, 839
U.S. objectives, 310, 505, 510, 839, 841
Asia, visit to, 505, 509, 517
Outer space treaty, work on: Rusk, 600; Sisco,
461
U.S. delegate to 5th special session of U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly, 732
Work of: Johnson, 566; Rusk, 42
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 261
Gordon, Lincoln, 476, 721
Great Society (Johnson), 158, 231, 243
Greece :
Communist subversion, U.S. role against: John-
son, 546, 547; Kohler, 7, 409; Rusk, 877
Greece — Continued
Economic progress: E. V. Rostow, 862; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496
Militai-y takeover, U.S. position (Rusk), 750
NATO position and aid, 50
OECD aid, 28
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 260, 613, 733, 930
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
Greenwald, Joseph A., 70
Grissom, Virgil (Johnson), 388
Guam (Johnson), 587
Guam Conference. See Viet-Nam
Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 930
Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov, 16
Guerrero, Manuel F. L.: 596; (Johnson), 587, 594
Guinea:
U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Beavogui, 554
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Guyana, treaties, agreements, etc., 305, 306, 393, 613,
701,897
Haile Selassie 1, 425
Haiti:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260
U.S. Ambassador (Ross) , confirmation, 765
Hammarskjold, Dag (Sisco) , 460
Hand, Learned (quoted) , 545
Harbison, Frederick H., 651
Hare, Raymond A., 221
Harriman, W. Averell : 586, 815 ; (Johnson) , 539
Harris, Patricia R., 104
Harsch, Joseph C, 169, 621
Hart, Parker, 656
Harvey, Mose (Katzenbach) , 3
Hasluck, Paul, 747, 749
Haynes, Ulric, 651
Healey, Denis, 687
Health:
Africa, regional programs: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650
CENTO programs: 670; Gaud, 669
Latin America: 713, 720; Johnson, 541, 543, 632,
709; E. V. Rostow, 863
Malnutrition, problem of (see also Food and popu-
lation crisis) : Gaud, 669; E. V. Rostow, 402
Philippines :
Institute of Tropical Medicine (Martin) , 196
Medical care, agreement re use of Veterans
Memorial Hospital and provision for inpatient,
outpatient care, and treatment of veterans, 802
SEATO programs, 747
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 109
U.S. financial support (Johnson) , 381
Viet-Nam : 209, 211 ; Komer, 470
Civilian hospital capacity increased, 664
Water projects, relation to, 758
990
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Health, Education, and Welfare Department:
Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey,
164; Johnson, 15
Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson) ,
16
Heath, William W., 674
Hellyer, Paul, 687
Helms, Richard M., 586, 665
Henning, John F., 261
Hernandez, Benigno C, 968
Herter, Christian: 217; Johnson, Rusk, 147
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 476
Hightower, John, 723
Hilaly, A., 747
Historical summary:
Communist aggression ( W. W. Rostow) , 492
Communist China, U.S. relations (U. A. Johnson),
420
Eastern Europe, post World War II (Harriman),
815
Southern Rhodesia, 366
U.S. foreign policy (Rusk), 270
Viet-Nam (Meeker), 54
Ho Chi Minh: 596; Rusk, 280, 321
Holdridge, John, 566
Holt, Harold E., 961
Holum, Kenneth, 765
Holy See. See Vatican City State
Holyoake, Keith, 747, 749
Honduras:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 581, 930
U.S. income tax convention terminated, 181
Hong Kong, cotton textile agreement amended, 929
Hoover, J. Edgar (Rusk), 249
Hope, A. Guy, 218
Hornig, Donald F.: 721, 850, 907; Humphrey, 684;
McGhee, 150; Rusk, 238
Hoyt, Henry A., 721
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 566
Hughes, Charles Evans, 840
Hull,Cordell (Rusk), 270
Human rights (see also Civil rights, and Racial dis-
crimination) :
Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 955; Palmer,
646
International covenants (U.N.) on human rights:
Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104; texts, 107, 111
International Year of Human Rights (Goldberg),
528
U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged (Gold-
berg), 524
U.N. Human Rights Committee, 116
U.N. position and role (Sisco), 66
U.S.: Braderman, 664; Harris, 106; Johnson, 14
U.S. support (Rusk), 772
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.,
18th anniversary (Harris), 104
Humphrey, Hubert :
Addresses, remarks and statements:
East-West relations and U.S. efforts to improve,
488, 682
Economic and social development, world prob-
lems, 684
Education, importance, 164
Europe, U.S. relations and aims, 486, 679
Germany, reunification, 680
NATO, 682
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, 683
Science and technology, 164, 238 (quoted), 684
U.N.,489
U.S.-Soviet relations, 488
Meetings, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, Bonn, 599
Visit to Europe: Humphrey, 679, 680, 681, 683;
Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727
Hungary, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481,
930
Huntley, Chet (Wheeler) , 190
IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development
ICC. See International Control Commission
Iceland :
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 160, 393, 481, 613,
702, 766, 930, 967
U.S. Ambassador (Rolvaag), confirmation, 674
ICY (International Cooperation Year): 568; John-
son, 658
IDA. See International Development Association
IJC (International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada),
634
IMCO. See Maritime Consultative Organization, In-
tergovernmental
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariffs and
trade, general agreements on; and Trade) :
Balance of payments, effect on (E. V. Rostow), 20
Foreign import restrictions removed: 245;
Blumenthal, 433
Import restrictions on goods from Mexico, proposed
liberalization, 70
International Coffee Agreement quantitative im-
port limitations, 256
Private road vehicles, temporary importation of,
customs convention (1954) : Australia, 673
Professional equipment, temporary importation of,
customs convention (1961) : U.S., 481
Sheet glass, modification of escape-clause duty
rates, 216
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77,
373 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
U.S., capital goods, 342
Viet-Nam, AID commercial imports: 202; Gaud,
200
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation, 217
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1957
271-701 — 67 3
991
Income, conventions for the relief of double taxation.
iSee Double taxation
India:
Agriculture, development and problems: Johnson,
298, 334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk,
830
Communism, threat to (Sisco),462
Council for Cultural Relations, 667
Experimental rain-making projects (Johnson), 903
Financing, problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 404
Food crisis:
Multilateral aid: Johnson, 295; Rusk, 46, 48
U.S. proposals: 701; Johnson, 299, 658; E. V.
Rostow, 403, 861
U.S. aid: Johnson, 295, 298, 300, 383, 700; Rusk,
46, 48
Congressional resolution, text, 700
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 182, 224, 353, 481,
530, 701, 702, 733, 930
U.S. aid:
AID programs: Johnson, 159; E. V. Rostow, 863;
Rusk, 830
Military aid terminated, 688
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234, 300; Rusk, 830
U.S. fact-finding committee, results of tour (John-
son), 299
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk,
830
India-Pakistan border dispute, U.N. role: Goldberg,
838 ; Johnson, 567 ; Rusk, 785 ; Sisco, 66
Soviet position (Sisco), 462
Indonesia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Communism, rejection of: Bundy, 325, 791, 792;
Holt, 962; Martin, 196; W. W. Rostow, 493
Economic progress: 750; Johnson, 384; Rusk, 832
Malaysia, relations with: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk,
744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 481, 613,
701,766,929
U.N. membership, participation renewed (Gold-
berg) , 100
Indus River basin (Johnson) , 903
Industrial property, convention (1883, as revised) for
the protection of : Argentina, 353 ; Dahomey, 85,
154; Ireland, 897; Morocco, 765
Soviet accession, importance (Trowbridge) , 885
Information activities and programs :
Adverse drug reaction reporting center, WHO, 918
Amerika (Katzenbach),755
Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 232,
236
CIA-assisted programs, 666
Computer technology (Pollack) , 911
Newsmen, exception from U.S. travel restrictions,
103,953
Outer space treaty provisions for public reporting:
Goldberg, 81, 606; Johnson, 388
Infoi-mation activities and programs — Continued
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed,
480, 482
Scientific information: 332; Humphrey, 166
Trade and industrial exhibitions overseas : Johnson,
886; Trowbridge, 884
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519
Water resources information, recommendations for
coordination and expanded programs : 763, 907 ;
Rusk, 905
Institute of International Education (Humphrey),
164
Inter-Agency Council on International Education and
Cultural Affairs, 667
Inter-American Development Bank: 715; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496; Rusk, 829
Fund for Special Operations, appropriations and
authorization request, FY 1968: 887; Johnson,
231,235, 544; Rusk, 723
U.S. alternate governor (Gaud), confirmation, 482
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 334, 382, 540, 709
Interest Equalization Tax, 342
Rate adjustment : 344 ; Johnson, 335
International Bank for Economic Cooperation, 699
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment : Bundy, 325, 793 ; E. V. Rostow, 858 ; W. W.
Rostow, 496
African development, role: Katzenbach, 958;
Palmer, 650, 813
Articles of agreement, current actions: Indonesia,
701
East European countries membership, question of:
699; Harriman, 820
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700;
E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
U.S. Alternate Governor (E. V. Rostow), con-
firmation, 261
U.S. support: Johnson, 383; E. V. Rostow, 403;
Rusk, 772
International Cereals Arrangement: Blumenthal,
297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861; Roth, 880
International Chamber of Commerce, 696
International Conference on Water for Peace: 762,
765; Solomon, 562
International Control Commission: 750; Goldberg,
507; Johnson, 515; Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127, 620,
773,778; U Thant, 625
Laos, inability to function in (Rusk) , 169, 281, 743,
777
International cooperation :
Antarctic Treaty, 71
Desalination development (Solomon), 561
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 885
International Cooperation Year (Johnson), 568,
658
Marine resources, U.N. resolution on study and
development of (Goldberg), 101
Mekong River development: Bundy, 326; John-
son, 903
Nuclear energy development (Seaborg), 97
992
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
International cooperation — Continued
Outer space treaty provisions, prospects and im-
portance: Dean, 268; Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg,
81, 83, 603; Johnson, 387; Rusk, 267; U Thant,
268
Scientific information: Humphrey, 166; Pollack,
911
Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes,
728
U.N. Charter principles: Johnson, 330; Rusk, 875
U.N. covenants, support, 109
U.S. support: Johnson, 13, 231; Pollack, 912; E. V.
Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 267
Water for Peace: 758, 762, 907; Johnson, 902;
Rusk, 905
White House Conference on International Coopera-
tion, recommendations, report of action taken
(Johnson), 658
World community of developed nations (Brzezin-
ski),414
World food supply, obligations to contribute to
(Johnson), 296, 300
International Cotton Advisory Committee (Solomon),
560
International Court of Justice :
South West Africa decision: Goldberg, 144; Pal-
mer, 647
Statute, current actions: Barbados, 36; Malta,
Malawi, 967
International Development Association: 338; Harri-
man, 820; Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 27; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Authorization request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 231,
235
International Education Act of 1966: Humphrey, 164;
Johnson, 15
International Hydrological Decade, 760, 764
International Institute for Cotton (Solomon), 560
International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, Niag-
ara Falls study requested, 634
International law :
Commission on International Trade Law, U.N.
(Goldberg), 102
Common law of nations (Meeker), 59
International agreements, relation to: Goldberg,
141 ; Meeker, 58
International due process (Rusk), 249
Outer space law, development of: 577; Goldberg,
79, 142, 602; Rusk, 601
Outer space treaty, importance to: Dobrynin, 269;
Goldberg, 79, 99, 141; U Thant, 268
SOLAS 1960 Convention amendments, nature of
(Miller), 176
Treaties, law of, proposed international drafting
conference, U.N. (Goldberg), 102
U.N., advancement of: Goldberg, 140, 896; Rusk,
601
U.N. covenants on human rights, international law
aspects (Harris), 104
U.N. resolutions, legal status (Nabrit), 31
International law — Continued
U.N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, legal
status: 369, 374; Goldberg, 143
Water resources, legal aspects, 764
International monetary system:
Balance of payments. See Balance of payments
Reforms needed: 340, 348; Humphrey, 863; John-
son, 335, 757 ; E. V. Rostow, 19, 23 ; W. W. Ros-
tow, 497
International organizations (see also name of orga-
nization) :
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson).
233
Development and U.S. support: Humphrey, 489;
Johnson, 906; Pollack, 913; W. W. Rostow, 491
Universal copyright convention, protocol 2 re works
of, current actions ; Netherlands, 833
International rivers, development: (see also Mekong
River basin) : 762; Johnson, 903; Katzenbach,
958
International Telecommunications Union (Sisco) , 462
International Tourist Year, 695
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435
International Year for Human Rights (Goldberg),
528
Investment disputes, convention (1965) on the settle-
ment of, between states and nationals of other
states: Burundi, 481; Cameroon, Kenya, 182;
Korea, 481; Morocco, 897; Senegal, 765; Sudan,
613; Sweden, 154; Trinidad and Tobago, 182;
U.K., 122; Yugoslavia, 641
Investment Guaranty Program, agreements with:
Cameroon, 530; Ghana, 582; Indonesia, 438;
Lesotho, 582, 614; Malta, 393; Paraguay, 86
Investment of foreign capital in U.S., 343
Investment of private capital abroad: 337, 346;
Braderman, 664
Africa (Johnson), 383
Agricultural industries, U.S. support for increased
investment: Johnson, 295, 300; E. V. Rostow,
404, 856
AID Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381;
E. V. Rostow, 860
Balance of payments, effect on, 342, 444
Brazil, investment tax credit, 581
Europe, U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee), 151
Korea, 69, 553, 554
Latin America ( Linowitz) , 730, 824
Philippines (Braderman), 662
Rights and responsibilities of overseas investors,
proposed international agreement (E. V.
Rostow), 862
U.S. encouragement: Johnson, 231, 379; E. V.
Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 828
Iran:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 909
Economic progress: 670; Gaud, 669; W. W. Rostow,
496
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 438, 701
U.S. military assistance (Johnson) , 384
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
993
Iraq:
Treaties, a^eements, etc., 154, 481
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481, 897,
929, 967
Israel :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Cotton textile agreement concluded, announcement
and text, 389
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858,
862 ; W. W. Rostow, 496
Syrian border dispute, U.N. role and U.S. support:
Goldberg, 100; Sisco, 66
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 613, 642, 702,
766, 929, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Italy:
Air transport agreement terminated, 965
Balance of payments position, 347
Fiat automotive plant in Soviet Union : Harriman,
819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 522; Trow-
bridge, 883
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 481, 646,
968
Ivanov, Igor, 25
Ivory Coast:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 642, 674, 967
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Jackson, Andrew (Johnson), 534
Jackson, Henry M., 514
Jacoby, Neil H. (Rusk) , 832
Jakobson, Max (Goldberg), 888, 895
Jamaica, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 929
James, William, 63 (quoted)
Japan:
Asian affairs, role: Bundy, 326; Martin, 196
Balance-of -payments position, 347
Eastern Europe, relations and trade (Solomon),
519, 521
Economic progress: 336; Bundy, 324, 791, 793;
McGhee, 150
Foreign aid programs: Johnson, 334; Rusk, 785
Governors, U.S. visit (Johnson) , 917
Import quota controls reduced, 246
Korea, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552
Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93
Political progress (E. V. Rostow) , 399
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 613, 642,
898, 968
U.S.-Japan fishery talks, 178, 424
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509
Jefferson, Thomas: 451; quoted, 160
Johnson, Lyndon B.:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Africa, U.S. aid, 159, 379, 383
Aggression, U.S. record in meeting, 161, 830, 546,
654, 871, 960
Alliance for Progress, 12, 158, 231, 382, 540, 632
Summit meeting, statements, 706, 707, 708, 711
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
American ideals, 163, 301, 385, 654, 960
Amistad Dam, 12
Antiballistic missiles, 160, 569, 659
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 870, 935, 952
Asia, regional cooperation and U.S. support, 162,
380, 382, 469, 549, 960
Astronauts Grissom, Chaffee, and White, deaths
of, 388
Balance of payments, U.S., 233, 334, 381, 886
CIA-private U.S. voluntary organizations, rela-
tionships, report on policy review, 665
Consular convention with Soviet Union, 287, 545,
659
East- West relations, U.S. efforts to improve, 159,
334, 659, 680, 696
Europe, visit of Vice President Humphrey, 678
EXPO 67, 907
Food-population crisis, 160, 295, 902
Foreign aid programs:
1968 budget, 230, 378, 543
Principles, 296, 334, 381, 659, 958 (quoted)
Germany, Federal Republic of. Chancellor Ade-
nauer, regrets at death, 751, 752
Germany, reunification, 680 (quoted)
Guam, 587
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death
of, 147
India, food crisis, U.S. and multilateral aid, 295,
383, 658, 700
International Cooperation Year, report of action
taken on recommendations of White House
Conference, 658
International monetary system, 335
Japan, U.S. relations, 917
Kennedy Round, 333, 756
Negotiations concluded, 879
Korea, U.S. relations, 548
Lincoln's birthday, 452 (quoted)
National Christmas Tree, lighting ceremony, 14
NATO, 159
Near and Middle East {see also Arab-Israeli
conflict),159, 382, 384
Nuclear "blackmail," 572 (quoted)
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, need for and
U.S. support, 447, 569, 659
Outer space treaty, 386, 569, 659
Signature ceremony, 266
President Frei of Chile, U.S. visit, 71
Rio Grande salinity agreement, 428
Soviet Union, nuclear arms race, proposal talks,
445
State of the Union (excerpts) , 158
Trade, 333, 757, 886
Trust Territory of the Pacific, 599 (quoted), 865
Turkey, 383, 547, 652, 653
United Kingdom, U.S. relations, 963
United Nations, 330, 566, 629
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in
office, 14
994
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony,
959
Viet-Nam (for details, sec Viet-Nam) :
Appropriations requests, 233, 236
Economic and political progress, 537
Guam conference, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594
Peace negotiations, 537, 538
Political and economic progress, 589, 590
Tet cease-fire termination, 365
U.S. commitments, 160, 534, 961
U.S. military policy and objectives, 535, 593,
594
Visits of Lilienthal and Komer, 467
War on Hunger, 295, 379, 658
Water for Peace, 902
World peace, U.S. role, 550
World Weather Watch, 658
Appointments:
Educational TV task force, 15
International Conference on Education, hosts, 15
Asian tour, results (Martin) , 197
Correspondence and messages :
East-West trade recommendations of Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, 696
Education, International Conference on, 15
Educational TV, appointment of task force, 15
Memorial Day messages exchanged with General
Thieu, 917
Truman Doctrine, 20th anniversary, 546, 547
Viet-Nam:
Negotiation, proposed for, 595
Tet cease-fire, proposed extension of, 319
Guam Conference: 586; Johnson, 587, 588, 589, 590,
592, 594
Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, re-
marks and joint communiques: Afghanistan,
627; Australia, 960; Brazil, 242; Canada, 908;
China, 846; Ethiopia, 425; Korea, 548; Mexico,
12; Morocco, 328; Turkey, 652; U.K., 963
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 952
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 6th an-
nual report, transmittal, 568
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st an-
nual report, transmittal, 732
Budget, FY 1968, excerpts, 230
Economic Report of the President (excerpts),
333
Foreign aid, program, 1967, 878
International Coffee Agi-eement, 2nd annual re-
port, transmittal, 250
Latin American meeting of Chiefs of State, 540
Narcotic drugs, U.S. accession to single conven-
tion, 1961, recommended, 671
Outer space treaty ratification recommended,
386
Peace Corps, 5th annual report, 529
State of the Union (excerpts) , 158
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Messages, etc. — Continued
U.S. pai-ticipation in the U.N., 20th annual re-
port, transmittal, 566
Viet-Nam:
Supplemental appropriations request, FY
1967, 236
U.S. position on bombing of North Viet-Nam,
514
War on Hunger program, 295
Outer space treaty, work on (Goldberg), 605
Policies: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 903; Katzen-
bach, 955; W. W. Rostow, 504
Press briefing, transcript of, 467
Responsibilities: Johnson, 160, 298; Rusk, 249, 270,
772
Tribute to: Rusk, 131, 270; Silva e Costa, 243
Visit to Canada: Johnson, 907, 908; Pearson, 909
Visit to Europe, question of (Rusk), 727
Visit to Korea, 1966; Chung, 551; Johnson, 550
Visit to Latin America: 678, 721; Humphrey, 680;
Johnson, 706
Visit to North Viet-Nam, question of (Rusk), 283
Johnson, Paul, 274
Johnson, U. Alexis, 420
Jordan :
Israeli military action, U.N. peacekeeping role
(Goldberg), 100
Treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 766
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Judicial or extrajudicial documents in civil or com-
mercial matters, service abroad, convention
(1965): France, 353; U.S., 732
Kalb, Marvin, 127
Kashmir. See India-Pakistan border dispute
Katzenbach, Nicholas de B.: Johnson, 665; Rusk, 247
Addresses and reports, 2, 671, 753, 954
Meetings, 552, 599
Visit to Africa: 756; Katzenbach, 954
Kaunda, Kenneth (quoted), 955
Kennedy. John F. (quoted), 281-282, 316, 838, 891
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony
(Johnson), 959
Kennedy, Robert F.: Goldberg, 508; Rusk, 322, 516
Kenya :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Political development (Palmer), 456
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 182, 733, 834
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Kenyatta, Jomo, 456
Kenyon, Karl W., 71, 632
Keppel, Francis, 651
Khalatbary, Abbas Ali, 668, 670
Kiesinger, Kurt: 362, 751 ; Humphrey, 680
Kim, Sung Eun, 552
King, David S., 261
King, Martin Luther, 726
King Hassan II, 328, 330
Kohler, Foy D., 6, 247, 406
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
995
Komer, Robert W. : 469, 586, 591 ; Bunker, 845 ; John-
son, 538, 587, 593
Korea, unification and U.N. role (Goldberg), 101
Korea, North, U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565
Korea, Republic of:
AID programs (E. V. Rostow) , 863
Asia, role in: 553; Chung, 552; Johnson, 548
Communist attacks, U.S. and ROK casualties, 553
Economic progress: 69, 337, 552; Bundy, 324, 791,
792; Chung, 551; Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 384,
548, 550; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862; W. W.
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832
Japan, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552
Political development: Bundy, 325; Johnson, 548
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 438, 481, 582, 702,
733, 766, 898, 930, 968
U.N. recognition as sole lawful government of
Korean people, 565
U.S. Ambassador (Porter), confirmation, 968
U.S. investment and trade mission: 69, 554; Chung,
553
U.S. military assistance: 553; Johnson, 384
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Chung, 548
Viet-Nam, military and other aid to: 552; Bundy,
324, 792 ; Chung, 552 ; Johnson, 549, 961 ; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509
Visit of President Johnson (1966): Chung, 551;
Johnson, 550
Korean conflict: Johnson, 161, 547; U. A. Johnson,
421 ; Kohler, 7, 409; Popper, 690; W. W. Rostow,
492; Rusk, 621, 877; Sisco, 66; Truman, 548
(quoted)
Korean Service Corps agreement, 582
Kosygin, Aleksei N. : 444; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 466,
783
Kristensen, Thorkil (E. V. Rostow) , 20
Kuwait, U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Ky, Nguyen Cao; 586; Goldberg, 513
Labor:
Convention on the abolition of forced labor, 1957:
Soviet position (Goldberg), 527
U.S. ratification recommended (Goldberg), 524
Europe, large-scale movement of labor, 337
OECD manpower studies (Rostow), 21
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
provisions, 108, 115
Labor Organization, International (Goldberg), 527
Constitution, 1946, instrument for the amendment
of, Barbados, 865
Lachs, Manfred (Goldberg), 78
Land-locked states, convention (1965) on transit
trade of: Chad, 733
Lansdale, Edward, 844
Laos:
Communism, threat of (Rusk), 169, 832, 877
Communist use in infiltration of Viet-Nam:
Meeker, 59; Rusk, 281, 282, 743, 777; SEATO,
746
Laos — Continued
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326
Neutrality: 285; Rusk, 281, 282
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. aid program: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
Laos agreement, 1962 (see also Geneva accords),
Communist violations: Johnson, 514, W. W. Ros-
tow, 503; Rusk, 126, 128, 281, 282, 283, 742, 777;
SEATO, 746
Last Revolution (Economist), 495
Latin America:
AID high-protein food studies (E. V. Rostow),
863
Communism:
Rejection and countermeasures : 564; Johnson,
541; Martin, 195
Threat of: 103; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 828
Economic integration: 712; Bunker, 472, Johnson,
542, 708; Linowitz, 822; W. W. Rostow, 498;
Rusk, 723, 829
Alliance for Progress action program, text, 714
Industrial development. See Alliance for Progress
International Coffee Agreement, importance, 252
Leadership (Johnson), 541, 633
Nuclear arms, treaty on the banning of, 436, 576,
713,721
Nuclear-free zone: 575; Rusk, 361
Population control, prospects (Rusk), 724
Self help and internal cooperation (Rusk), 723,
724
States included in, 713n
Ti-ade (see also Latin American Common Market) :
713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 542, 707, 709;
W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
717
U.S. cotton policies, effects of (Solomon), 559
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
U.S. preschool and school lunch programs (John-
son), 709
USIA activities increase (Johnson), 236
Visit of President Johnson : Humphrey, 680 ; John-
son, 678
Latin American Common Market: 712, 714; John-
son, 543, 544, 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725
Latin American Free Trade Association: 338, 712,
714; Blumenthal, 434; Linowitz, 730; Rusk, 725
Laurel-Langley agreement (Braderman), 663
League to Enforce Peace (Rusk) , 270
Lebanon :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 438, 613, 929, 930
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Leddy,JohnM., 17, 599
Lee, Hu Rak, 552
Lee Kuan Yew (Bundy), 324
Lesotho :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 582, 614, 967
996
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Less developed countries (see also Newly independ-
ent nations) :
Agriculture. See Agriculture
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex-
cerpts), 336, 337
Debt problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404
Economic and social development:
Communism, as a countermeasure to: Linovi^itz,
731 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk, 826
Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman,
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296,
300, 334, 380, 709; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow,
400, 861; Rusk, 241,826
OECD programs: Humphrey, 684; E. V. Ros-
tow, 25
Education. See Education
Educational TV: Johnson, 15; E. V. Rostow, 405
Food and population crisis. See Food and popula-
tion crisis
Foreign investment capital. See Investment of
private capital abroad
International covenants on human rights (U.N.),
obligations under: 107; Harris, 105
International law, importance to (Goldberg), 145
Latin America (see also Alliance for Progress),
Rusk, 722
Nuclear power, peaceful uses, 572
Soviet and East European aid, need for coopera-
tion with West (Harriman) , 820
State Department Policy Planning Council, ad-
visory panel, 16
Trade :
Kennedy Round, importance to: 28, 70, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; Johnson, 333, 707; E. V.
Rostow, 27, 404 ; Roth, 478, 880
Temporary preferential tariff advantages, pro-
posed: 712; Johnson, 709
U.N. membership, importance (Sisco), 459
U.N. role (Johnson), 567
U.S. aid, objectives and principles: 700; Johnson,
230, 232, 235, 296, 334, 378, 381; E. V. Rostow,
400,857; Rusk, 826
Water projects, importance, 758
Lewin, Nathan, 765
Liberia, AID programs (Rusk) , 831
Libya:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests
(Palmer), 806
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Lilienthal, David E.: 69, 467, 586, 592, 907; Johnson,
467, 537
Lincoln, Abraham: Goldberg, 510, 512, 528, 844;
Johnson, 873 ; quoted, 630
Linowitz, Sol M., 476, 565, 721, 729, 822
Load line, convention, international (1966) : France,
353; Malagasy Republic, 393; Peru, 353; Somali,
732 ; South Africa, 353
Locke, Eugene M.: 586; Bunker, 844; Johnson, 538,
587,589,591,593
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 586, 795; Hightower, 726; John-
son, 161, 538, 587, 588, 589, 594, 674; Rusk, 779;
Taylor 286 ;Thieu, 591
Loeb, James, 651
Lopez Munguia, Agustin, 71
Lord Acton (quoted), 879
Luther, Martin (quoted) , 266
Luxembourg, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 306, 614,
898, 930
MacArthur, Douglas, 674
Macomber, William B., Jr., 482
Maghreb (North Africa) , Palmer, 806
Magnuson, Warren G. (Johnson) , 886
Mailliard, William S., 476
Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim, 627, 630
Makonnen, Lij Endalkatchew, 638
Malagasy Republic:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 530, 613, 898
U.S. Ambassador (King), confirmation, 261
Malawi :
Independence, 367
International Court of Justice, Statute, 967
Malaysia (see also Association of Southeast Asia) :
Asian countries, relations (Martin), 196
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
325, 791; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W.
Rostow, 496
Indonesia, relations: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk, 744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 898
Maldive Islands:
International telecommunications convention
(1965), viath annexes, 582
U.S. Ambassador (Corry), confirmation, 968
Mali, delivery of two C-47 aircraft and related
articles and services, understanding re, 702
Malikyar, Abdullah, 626
Malta:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 393, 833, 866, 967
Manila Conference: 517, 748; Bundy, 326, 794;
Chung, 552; Goldberg, 311; Holt, 962; Johnson,
960; Thieu, 588
Mann, Horace (quoted), 955
Manpower Utilization and Techniques (Cortada,
Hope), 219
Mansfield, Mike, 951
Marcos, Ferdinand E.: Braderman, 661; Bundy, 324,
325,793
Margain, Hugo B., 919
Marine resources. See Food resources
Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovern-
mental :
Convention (1964), amendments to: Argentina,
85; Brazil, 929; Bulgaria, 85; Burma, 224;
Czechoslovakia, 85; Finland, Indonesia, Israel,
Lebanon, Mauritania, Philippines, 929; Sene-
gal, 85; Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago,
929; U.S., 865
Entry into force, 305
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
997
Maritime Consultative Organization — Continued
Fire safety standards for passenger ships, improve-
ment of international standards: 102; John-
son, 429 ; Miller, 173
Maritime matters {see also Ships and shipping), ex-
ploration of the sea. Convention (1964) for the
International Council of: Netherlands, 733; U.S.,
481, 834
Maritime traffic. See Ships and shipping
Marks, Leonard H., 16, 721
Marriage and family (see also Women), U.N. Inter-
national Covenants on Human Rights, provisions,
108, 115
Marshall, George C. (quoted), 271
Martin, Edward, 476
Martin, Graham, 193, 851
Martin, Paul, 750
Martin, William C. (quoted) , 273
Martola, Ilmari (Goldberg), 179
Matthews, Zachariah K., 16
Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 353, 701, 929
McBride, Robert H., 968
McCloskey, Robert J., 950
McConaughy, Walter P., 849
McDermott, Walsh (quoted) , 910
McDougal, Myres: Goldberg, 140; quoted, 144
McGee, GaleW. (Johnson), 299
McGhee, George C, 148
McGovern, George, 48
McKernan, Donald L., 178, 216, 332, 424, 919
McNamara, Robert S. : 586, 686 ; Rusk, 129
Meetings, 53, 687
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
membership (Johnson), 951
Press conference, transcript, 465, 686
TV interview, transcript of, 442
McNaughton, John T., 586
McSweeney, John M., 674
Meeker, Leonard C, 54
Mekong River development: Bundy, 326, 793; John-
son, .334, 903; Lilienthal, 469; Martin, 196, 853;
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 832
Memorial Day, 1967: Johnson, 917; Thieu, 917
Prayer for Peace, proclamation, 873
Menzel, Rolf, 358
Meteorological research :
Rain augmentation experiments: Johnson, 903;
Pollack, 911
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Cooperative meteorological program in the
Cayman Islands, agreement with U.K., 86
Cooperative program for meteorological observa-
tions, agreement with Dominican Republic for
continuation of, 86
Water for Peace programs (Johnson), 903
Mexico :
Aid to other Latin American countries (Rusk), 723
Cotton textile agreement, announcement, 964
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858;
Rusk, 723, 829
Mexico — Continued
Fishery talks held, joint statement and delegations,
919
Joint Mexico-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual
meeting, 70
Radio broadcasting agi'eement talks resumed, 352
Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson), 428 -^
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 182, 224, 260,
261, 354, 481, 834, 930
U.S. relations; 13; Johnson, 13
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the Pacific
Micronesia, Congress of (Johnson), 598
Middleton, Drew, 851
Military assistance:
Appropriations request, FY 1967 (Johnson), 384
Appropriations request, FY 1968 (Rusk), 827
Balance of payments, effect on. See Balance of pay-
ments, U.S.
Civic action program, Indonesia, agreement re
furnishing military equipment, materials, and
services, 766
Equipment and material, agreement with Brazil re
disposition of, 393
India and Pakistan, U.S. military aid terminated,
688
Soviet aid to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811
Thailand, U.S. training missions (Martin) , 199, 853
Military bases:
Outer space treaty prohibition on: Goldberg, 80,
609; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602
Philippines, agreement re relinquishment by U.S.
of right to use of certain land areas within
Camp John Hay, 122
Thailand bases, U.S. use under SEATO framework:
Martin, 198; Rusk, 597
Viet-Nam, permanent U.S. bases, U.S. position:
284; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509; Johnson, 535;
Rusk, 282, 317
Miller, George (Goldberg), 605
Miller, J. Irwin: Katzenbach, 3; Trowbridge, 882
Miller, Jack (Johnson), 299
Miller, William K., 173
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce trade mission
(Trowbridge), 882
Mishari, Hassan (Udall), 561
Missiles (see also Nuclear weapons) :
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition: 575,
687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445, 569,
659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow, 501;
Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875
NATO: 687; McNamara, 686
Poseidon and Polaris (Rusk) , 46
Mobutu, Joseph (Palmer), 649
Mohale, Albert S., 16
Monetary Fund, International: 340; Brzezinski, 419;
Harriman, 820; Johnson, 335; E. V. Rostow, 858;
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772
Articles of agreements: Indonesia, 701
East European countries' membership, question of,
699
998
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Monetary Fund, International — Continued
U.S. Alternate Governor (Rostow), contirmation,
261
U.S. holdings (Johnson), 235
Blongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., 641, 674
Moore, John Bassett, (Rusk) , 270
Morocco:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850
Cultural agreement with U.S., text, 351
Development, pi-oblems, and U.S. interests : Palmer,
806; Rusk, 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 701, 765, 834,
897, 967
U.S. relations: Johnson, 330; King Hassan II, 329,
331
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
U.S. visit of King Hassan II, 328
Morozov, Platon, 461
Morse, Wayne, 507
Morton, Thruston B., 775
Moss, Frank E. (Johnston) , 299
Mossman, James, 442
Mott, Newcomb : Kohler, 412 ; Rusk, 248
Mozambique :
Halting of oil tankers to Southern Rhodesia, 371
Self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290
Muromcew, Cyril, 71, 634
Murphy, Charles P. (Miller), 174
MUST (Manpower Utilization System and Tech-
niques), Cortada, Hope, 219
Mutual defense :
Agreements with: Australia, reestablishment of
joint defense space research facility, 86; Bel-
gium, 582; Luxembourg, 614
China : 849 ; Johnson, 848
Korea, 553
U.S. military assistance programs (Johnson),
385
Nabrit, James M., Jr., 29, 30
NAC. See North Atlantic Council
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326
Narcotic drugs. See Drugs
NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration
Nasher, Raymond D., 659
National Advisory Committee on Self-Help (John-
son), 379, 380
National Advisory Council on International Monetary
and Financial Policies, 563
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Mc-
Ghee),149,153
National Export Expansion Council, 887
National Governors' Conference (Johnson), 918
National Science Foundation: 728; Pollack, 916
National Student Association, 666
Nationalism :
Eastern Europe: Brzezinski, 417; Harriman, 817;
Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2 ; Kohler, 8, 408;
W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon, 519
Nationalism — Continued
Indonesia (Bundy), 792
Less developed countries (W. W. Rostow), 494
North African states (Palmer), 809
Philippines (Braderman), 660
Western Europe, dangers of (Humphrey), 487
Nationality:
Acquisition of, optional protocol to Vienna con-
vention on consular relations (1963) : Mada-
gascar, 613
Double, military obligations in certain cases, pro-
tocol (1930): Nigeria, 733
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Natural resources, sovereignty of state (Harris) , 105
Near and Middle East (see also Arab-Israeli conflict
and names of individual countries) :
Economic and social development, U.S. support
(Goldberg), 935
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 101, 638, 894;
Sisco, 66
U.S. military and economic aid, U.S. appropriations
request (Johnson), 382, 384
U.S. policy: Goldberg, 100; Johnson, 159, 870
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Nepal, treaties, agreements, etc., 306
Netherlands, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 354,
393, 582, 613, 641, 733, 766, 833, 930, 968
Neuberger, Maurine B., 448
Neutrality and nonalinement:
Afghanistan: 632; Maiwandwal, 628, 631
Cambodia: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619, 773
Southeast Asia (Rusk), 281
U.S. neutrality in Arab-Israeli conflict (Rusk) , 949,
950, 951
Viet-Nam, U.S. position: 285; Goldberg, 61
(quoted) , 509, 841 ; Rusk, 281, 773
New York Times: 466, 776, 851 ; Bundy, 793
New Zealand:
ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749
Asian development, role in (Bundy), 793
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 260, 353, 733,
765, 898, 967, 968
U.S. Ambassador (Henning), confirmation, 261
Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; John-
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland,
740
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed
countries aiid najne of country) :
Africa : Goldberg, 289, Katzenbach, 955
Barbados (Goldberg), 28
Communism, danger of: E. V. Rostow, 857; W. W.
Rostow, 494
North Africa (Palmer), 807
U.N. membership, significance (Sisco) , 67
Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260
Nicolson, Sir Harold (quoted) , 140
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 801, 930
Nigeria :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Political developments (Palmer), 649
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
999
Nigeria — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 481, 613, 733,
801
Niven, Paul, 774
Nkomo, Joshua, 371
Nolte, Richard H., 674
Nonnationals, U.N. international covenants on
human rights: 114; Harris, 105
North Atlantic Council (Humphrey) , 681
Defense ministers meeting, Paris, 1966:
Joint communique and annexes: 49; Rusk, 46
U.S. delegation, 53
North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
Armed forces:
Financing of, effect on balance-of-payments posi-
tions: 788; Rusk, 362, 783
1967 commitments and prospects, 51
Size and deployment: 789; Rusk, 362, 782
Civil emergency planning, 50
Deterrent role: 49, 51, 657; Brzezinski, 416; Harri-
man, 820; Humphrey, 682; Rusk, 361; Sunay,
656
East- West relations, role in: 49, 697; Harriman,
819; Humphrey, 487, 681; Rusk, 47, 360;
Sunay, 655
France, position of: 51; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 46
Headquarters, relocation, 51
International developments, study of effects of
changes in, on NATO policies; 50; resolution,
52
Modernization of: Humphrey, 681; E. V. Rostow,
399
Nuclear planning and consultation: 51, 687; Mc-
Namara, 686
Nuclear Planning Group, 1st ministerial meeting:
687; McNamara, 686
Nuclear weapons, Soviet objections to possible Ger-
man use of, 571
Turkey, support of: 627; Johnson, 547, 652; Sun-
ay, 653
U.S. support: Humphrey, 681; Johnson, 159; Rusk,
358, 364, 827
Norway:
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 306, 481, 530, 613,
802, 930
Norwood, William (Johnson), 598
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree-
ments re U.S. liability: Greece, 225
Nsanze, Terence, 850
Nuclear-free zones :
Central Europe, question of: 575; Rusk, 361
Latin America: 436, 575, 713, 721; Rusk, 361
Nuclear proliferation:
Treaty, proposed:
Chinese Communist participation, question of
(Rusk), 132
ENDC 1966 conference results, 570
Nuclear proliferation — Continued
Treaty, proposed — Continued
Need for and U.S. support: 436, 657; Goldberg,
79, 83, 99, 603; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 447,
569, 659; Katzenbach, 755; E. V. Rostow, 399;
W. W. Rostow, 501, 504; Rusk, 48, 132, 169,
601, 786, 875; U Thant, 268
Nonnuclear states, effect on and rights under: "*
572; Johnson, 447; McNamara, 446; E. V.
Rostow, 400
Peaceful uses, question of: Pollack, 911; Rusk,
321
Safeguards, 571
EUR ATOM safeguards, question on (Rusk),
360
Soviet position, review, 571
Nuclear test ban, comprehensive, verification meas-
ures and Soviet rejection, 574
Nuclear test ban treaty, 1963:
Current actions : Nigeria, 481
Importance : Goldberg, 603 ; Rusk, 267
Nuclear tests:
Antarctic Treaty, ban on, 71
Communist China : 750; Rusk, 132
France, 750
Outer space treaty, prohibition of: Goldberg, 80,
609; Rusk, 602
Nuclear war (see also War) , dangers of: McNamara,
443; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 272, 874; Sisco,
463
Nuclear weapons (see also Armaments and Missiles) :
Latin America, treaty on the banning of nuclear
arms in, 436, 576, 713, 721
Outer space treaty, prohibition on use of: 577;
Goldberg, 80, 99, 141, 608, 839; Johnson, 266,
387, 569; Rusk, 601
Production of, U.S. proposals for freezes and lim-
itations on: 574; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 43, 171,
321
Nyasaland, Federation of Rhodesia and, 367
Nyerere, Julius K. (quoted), 958
OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine et
Malagache), 650
Oceanographic Commission, Intergovernmental
(Sisco), 462
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-
operation), 683
Office of Civil Operations : Bunker, 845 ; Komer, 470
Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 8G3
Office of Saline Water (Udall),561
Office of the War on Hunger: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 863
Oil (see also Petroleum), pollution of sea by, inter-
national convention (1954) for prevention of:
Israel, 353; Ivory Coast, 642; U.S., 733
Amendments: Greece, 733
Oliver, Covey T., 968
1000
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache
(Palmer), 650
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment :
Accomplishments, role, and U.S. support: 336;
Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 166, 683; E. V.
Rostow, 19; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 359
Agricultural Food Fund, U.S. proposal: Johnson,
297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861
Balance-of-payments report, 345
Development Assistance Committee: 764; Hum-
phrey, 685; E. V. Rostow, 25
Export earnings of less developed countries, special
study (Blumenthal) , 435
India, food aid, question of: 701 ; Rusk, 48
International technological cooperation study
(McGhee), 148
Investment guarantee fund, proposed (Johnson),
301
Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, statements
(Rostow), and text of joint communique, 19
Soviet and Eastern Europe, relations: Harriman,
820; E. V. Rostow, 24
Turkey, aid to : 28 ; Johnson, 383
Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(Humphrey), 683
Organization of African Unity: Haile Selassie, 426;
Johnson, 427; Katzenbach, 954, 959; Palmer, 650,
807; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 784
Organization of American States :
Charter, current actions : Trinidad and Tobago, 581
Cuba, policy on, 103, 565
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
712
Dominican Republic crisis (Johnson) , 567
Membership, 713n
Trinidad and Tobago, membership : 464n ; Rusk,
464
U.S. support (Johnson) , 632
Osman, Ahmed, 850
Outer space:
Exploration, world-wide benefits from (Rusk), 241
Jupiter probe, NASA-ESRO, proposed (McGhee),
153
Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes,
728
Space law, development: 577; Goldberg, 142, 602;
Rusk, 601
Treaties, agreements, etc:
Exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, treaty
(1967) governing the activities of states:
Current actions: Afghanistan, Argentina,
Australia, 260; Austria, 438; Belgium,
306; Bolivia, Botswana, 260; Brazil, 306;
Burma, 898; Burundi, Cameroon, Canada,
Central African Republic, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Cyprus, 260;
Czechoslovakia, 260, 898; Denmark, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Outer space — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Exploration and use of outer space, etc. — Con.
Current actions — Continued
Ethiopia, Finland, Federal Republic of
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, 260; India, 481; Indo-
nesia, 260; Iraq, 481; Israel, Italy, Japan,
260; Jordan, 306; Korea, Laos, Lesotho,
Luxembourg, 260; Mexico, 260; Nepal,
306; Netherlands, 353; New Zealand,
Nicaragua, 260; Niger, 306, 801; Norway,
306; Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Rwanda, 260; San Marino, 733; Sierra
Leone, 866; South Africa, 481; Somali
Republic, 306; Soviet Union, 260; Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Tur-
key, U.A.R., U.K., 260; U.S., 260, 765, 930;
Upper Volta, 481; Uruguay, Venezuela,
Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 260
Development and background (Goldberg), 605
Installations, outer space treaty provisions for
free access to all parties: 577; Goldberg, 80,
141, 602, 606, 607; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602
Provisions, importance, and U.S. support:
570, 577; Goldberg, 79, 83, 98, 141, 602, 839;
Johnson, 569; NATO, 49; Rusk, 42
Signature ceremony, statements: Dean, 286;
Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg, 267; Johnson, 266;
Rusk, 266; U Thant, 268
U.N. resolution, 83
U.S. ratification: 386; Goldberg, 602; John-
son, 386, 659; Rusk, 600
U.S. -Soviet cooperation: Goldberg, 142, 604,
606; Rusk, 600; Sisco, 460
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree-
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354
Joint defense space research facility, agreement
with Australia re establishment of, 86
Space vehicle tracking stations in U.K., agree-
ment, 225
Antigua, station on, 354
Tracking and telemetry facility in Mahe, Sey-
chelles, agreement with U.K., 225
U.N. conference, proposed, U.N. resolution, 83n
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149
Ovamboland, status of: Goldberg, 888; Palmer, 648
Owen, Wilfred, 651
Pacific Community, 553
Pacific Islands Trust Territory. See Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands
PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) , 721, 761
Pakistan (see also India-Pakistan border dispute) :
Afghanistan, relations with (Maiwandwal), 631
Aid Consortium: Johnson, 383; W. W. Rostow, 496
Economic development: 337, 670; Gaud, 669; John-
son, 383; E. V. Rostow, 401, 862; W. W. Ros-
tow, 496; Rusk, 830
SEATO communique, position on, 747
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1001
Pakistan — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 733, 898, 967, 968
U.S. aid:
Military aid terminated, 688
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830
U.S. and multilateral aid: Gaud, 669; Johnson, 159;
Rusk, 830
Palmer, Joseph, II, 449, 646, 806
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967,
proclamation, 632
Pan American Health Organization, 721, 761
Panama :
Air transport agreement amended, 965
Central American Common Market, relations, 715
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382
Panorama, TV interview of Secretary McNamara,
442
Papadopoulos, George (Rusk), 751
Paraguay:
Economic level of development (Rusk), 722
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224
U.S. Ambassador (Hernandez), confirmation, 968
Pardo, Arvid, 327
Park, Chung Hee (Chung) , 549
Park, Chung Hun, 552
Patents (see also Industrial property), international
patent cooperation treaty, proposed (Trow-
bridge), 885
Payton, Robert L., 261
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman, 627
Peace Corps programs:
Accomplishments and role, 337
Agreements establishing: Antigua, 182; Dominica,
393; Gambia, 122; Saint Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla, St. Vincent, 306
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson),
232, 235
Expansion, proposed, 244
5th annual report (Johnson), 529
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Johnson),
598, 865
Water resources development activities, recommen-
dations for, 763
Pearson, Lester B.: 908, 909; Johnson, 909
Peccei, Aurelio (Humphrey), 166
Pechel, Peter, 358
Pedersen, Richard F., 261, 732
Perkins, James : 15 ; Huinphrey, 164
Peru:
Communism, threat of (Harriman) , 821
Economic progress: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow,
862
Political progress (Rusk), 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 353, 481, 766,
930, 967
Petroleum:
North Africa, resources of (Palmer), 810, 812
Southern Rhodesia:
U.N. economic sanctions and U.S. support, 370
1002
Petroleum — Continued
North Africa — Continued
U.N. mandatory sanctions against supply of: 77,
374 ; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146
Peyrefitte, Alain (McGhee), 152
Philippines (see also Association of Southeast Asia) : >,
Asian Mission Chiefs' meeting: communique, 517;
Goldberg, 511
Communism, threat of (SEATO), 746
Economic and political development: Braderman,
661; Bundy, 325, 791, 793
Educational institutes (Martin), 196
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 261, 306,
802, 929
U.S. relations (Braderman), 660
U.S. school building project, agreement, 850
Viet-Nam, military aid to : Bundy, 324, 792 ; John-
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland,
740
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505,
509
Phillips, Christopher H., 696
Pifer, Alan, 651
Piiiera, Jose (Goldberg), 888
Poage, W. R. (Johnson), 299
Poland :
Cotton textile agreement, 612
Economic and political evolution: Kohler, 9, 408,
Solomon, 519
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip-
rocal offer, 572
Post World War II (Harriman), 816
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 642, 766
U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3
Pollack, Herman, 910
Pollution:
Air pollution (Rusk), 240
Outer space treaty provisions for avoiding pollu-
tion: Goldberg, 81; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601
Pollution of the sea by oil, international conven-
tion (1954) for prevention of: Israel, 353;
Ivory Coast, 642 ; U.S., 733
Amendments: Greece, 733
Water for Peace programs : 761 ; Johnson, 903
Pope Paul VI, 685 (quoted)
Viet-Nam peace efforts and U.S. support: Goldberg,
63; Johnson, 319
Popper, David H., 566, 689
Population growth:
Control needed: 337; Johnson, 295; E. V. Rostow,
402; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 241
Energy consumption forecasts (Seaborg), 90
Family planning programs: Johnson, 160; E. V.
Rostow, 402; Rusk, 830
U.S. aid (Johnson), 381
Food supply, relation to. See Food and population
crisis
Latin America (Rusk), 724
North Africa (Palmer), 810
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Population growth — Continued
Philippines (Braderman), 661
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16
U.N. population control experts, training (Gold-
berg) , 101
Porter, William J.: 968; Goldberg, 513; Taylor, 286
Portugal :
African colonies, need for self-determination (Gold-
berg) , 290
Cotton textile agreement with U.S., announcement,
699
Southern Rhodesia, use of Portuguese ports to
evade oil embargo, 371, 374
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 613, 674, 930
Postal Union, Universal, constitution (1964), with
final protocols:
China, 85; Dahomey, Gabon, 801; Ghana, 613;
Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauritania, 701;
Morocco, 967; New Zealand (including Niue,
the Cook Islands, and the Tokelau Islands),
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (in-
cluding Spanish territories in Africa), 613;
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia,
85; Yugoslavia, 613; Zambia, 701
Potter, Philip, 723
Powell, Robert, 137
Price, Robert I., 102
Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Rusk), 128, 129, 281, 320,
619
Prince Souvanna Phouma (Rusk), 281, 320
Prisoners, political, military takeover in Greece
(Rusk), 751
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Private Resources, Office of: Johnson, 381; E. V.
Rostow, 860, 863
Proclamations by the President:
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967
(3774), 632
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 (3785), 873
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (3781) , 800
Sheet glass, escape-clause duties modified (3762),
216
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated (3761), 217
World Trade Week, 1967 (3771), 756
Public Law 480 (see also Agricultural surpluses and
Food for Peace) : Johnson, 235 ; E. V. Rostow, 860
Programs in: India, 701; North Africa (Palmer),
814; Viet-Nam (Komer),"470
Publications:
Agriculture Department, Analysis of Factors Af-
fecting U.S. Cotton Exports (Solomon), 559
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual
Report of the President to the Congress on the
Implementation of the Automotive Products
Trade Act of 1965, 732n
Congress :
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18,
223, 350, 757, 801, 966
Publications — Continued
Congress — Continued
Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Eco-
nomic Reforms, report (Solomon), 522
Our Changing Partnership with Europe, 522n
International exchange of, convention (1958):
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929
Obscene, agreement (1910) re repression of cir-
culation of, as amended: Malta, 865
Official publications, agreement with Jamaica for
the exchange of, 154
Official publications and government documents,
exchange between states, convention (1958) :
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929
State Department:
Recent releases, lists, 37, 225, 261, 306, 393, 614,
734, 802, 866, 968
Treaties in Force: A List of Agreements and
Other International Agreements of the United
States in Force on January 1, 1967, released,
288
United Nations, lists of current documents, 36, 181,
305, 437
U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the
President to the Congress for the Year 1965,
566n
Water for Peace: A Report of Background Con-
siderations and Recommendations on the Water
for Peace Program, released, 758
Pulitzer, Joseph (quoted), 186
Rabasa, Oscar, 919
Racial discrimination (see also Human rights) :
Africa, U.S. position (Johnson), 159
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
Convention (1965), international, for the elimi-
nation of: Algeria, 353; Australia, 154;
Burundi, 701 ; Cameroon, 353 ; Costa Rica, 702 ;
Colombia, 701; Cyprus, 353, 930; Czechoslo-
vakia, 154; Dahomey, 701; Finland, 154; Ger-
many, 701; Hungary, 930; Iceland, 154, 702;
India, Iran, 701; Mauritania, 353; Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, 154; Niger, 930;
Norway, 154; Panama, 353; Sierra Leone, 154;
Somalia, 701; Tunisia, 702; U.A.R., 930; U.K.,
154; Uruguay, 701; Vatican, 154
Southern Rhodesia: 367; Goldberg, 73, 144;
Palmer, 450, 646; Sisco, 68
Suppression of, U.N. role: Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66
Radio :
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Broadcasting in the standard broadcasting band
(protocol) : Blexico, 182, 224, 261
Consultations resumed, 352
Cultural exchange arrangements with Romania,
renewal, 480, 482
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1003
Radio — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued
Licensed amateur radio operators, reciprocal
granting of authorizations to operate in either
country, agreements with: Argentina, 702;
Netherlands, 154; Switzerland, 968; Trinidad
and Tobago, 898
Radio communications between Alaska and
British Colombia, agreement with Canada, U.S.
notice of termination, 482
Radio communications between amateur stations
on behalf of third parties, agreement with
Argentina, 702
Radio regulations (1959):
Partial revision re frequency allotment plan
for aeronautical mobile (R) service and re-
lated information: Argentina, 898; Austria,
Canada, Denmark, 766; Luxembourg, Mad-
agascar, Malaysia, 898
Entry into force, 481
Partial revision with annexes and additional
protocol: Malaysia, 898
USIA programs, increase (Johnson), 236
Voice of America (Kohler), 411
Ramos, Narciso, 747, 748
Rapacki Plan (Rusk), 361
Red Sea lights, maintenance, international agreement
(1962) , Soviet Union, 305
Refugees:
Stateless persons and refugees, application (pro-
tocol 1) of the universal copyright convention:
Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833
Viet-Nam: 209; Komer, 470
Voluntary agencies, aid to (Sisco) , 64
Regional cooperation and development: Brzezinski,
415; Blumenthal, 434; W. W. Rostow, 497
Africa. See Africa
Arms control, 576
CENTO: 671; Gaud, 668
Defense. See Collective security
Development banks: 338; E. V. Rostow, 403
SEATO programs: 745, 747; Rusk, 744
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 231, 328, 334, 379,
380, 904; Palmer, 814; Pollack, 913; W. W.
Rostow, 500; Rusk, 772, 828, 906
Water for Peace program : 759, 762 ; Johnson, 904 ;
Rusk, 906
Reifenberg, Jan, 358
Research. See Science and technology
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of, 367
Rimestad, Idar, 261
Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson) , 428
Road traffic:
Convention (1949), with annexes and protocol,
Botswana, 967
Convention (1954) on customs facilities for tour-
ing, Singapore, 122
Customs convention (1954) on the temporary im-
portation of private road vehicles, Australia,
673
Rockwell, Stuart W., 670, 671
Rogers, William P., 292, 302
Rolvaag, Karl F., 674
Romania:
Cultural exchange arrangement renewed, 479, 482
Increasing independence (Solomon), 519
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Johnson, 960; quoted, 270,
289, 963
Roshchin, Alexei A., 571
Ross, Claude G., 765
Rostow, Eugene V., 19, 24, 25, 53, 261, 398, 856
Rostow, W. W., 491, 552, 586, 659, 721; Johnson, 951
Roth, William M., 476, 476n, 523, 879
Ruge, Gerd, 358
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800
Rusk, Dean:
Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and state-
ments :
Africa, U.S. aid, 830
Aggression, prevention, and countermeasures,
271, 278, 363, 771
Alliance for Progress, 464, 723, 828
Summit meeting, prospects from, 722, 829
Antiballistic missiles, questions on, 43, 46, 47,
321, 361, 875
Arab-Israeli conflict, 949, 950
Armaments, control and reduction, 46, 171, 601,
771,786
Asia, U.S. aid, 830, 832
Cambodia, nonalinement, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619,
773
Communism:
Propaganda, 725, 775
Threat of and U.S. role against, 127, 134, 272,
278, 785, 787, 827, 877
Communist China:
Asia, threat to, 169, 275
Leadership struggle, 47, 170, 280, 788
Nuclear potential, 132
U.S. relations, 283, 322
Consular convention with Soviet Union, need for
ratification, 247
East- West relations, 4 (quoted), 47, 169, 360,
363, 463 (quoted), 523 (quoted), 772, 786
Viet-Nam, effect of, 781, 875
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966, 171, 772,
875
Europe, U.S. relations and interests, 358, 364,
726, 784
Food and population crisis, 46, 169, 874
Foreign Assistance Program for 1968, 826
Foreign policy, 134, 270, 770, 784, 879
Freedom of speech and expression, 130, 725, 775
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 42
Germany, reunification, 360, 362, 771
Germany, Federal Republic of:
Chancellor Adenauer, regrets at death of, 752
Political developments, 365
1004
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
Germany, Federal Republic of — Continued
U.S. common interests, 359
U.S. visit of Minister Brandt, 320
Greece, political developments, 750
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death
of, 147
India, U.S. and multilateral food aid, 46, 48, 830
Kennedy Round, 361
Laos, 1962 agreements, 126, 128, 281, 282, 742,
777
Latin American economic integration, 722, 723,
725, 829
Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, U.S. visit, 782
NATO, 358, 360
Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, 1966, 46
U.S. forces, 362, 782
1951-1966, important events of, 168
1966 developments, and prospects from, 47, 128
Nuclear-free zones, 361
Nuclear proliferation:
EURATOM safeguards, 360
Treaty, need for, 48, 132, 321, 601, 786, 875
Outer space treaty, 42, 266, 600
Science and foreign affairs, 238
SEATO council meeting, 742
Secretary of State, work of, 365
Sino-Soviet relations, 132, 168, 781, 785
Viet-Nam, effect of, 44, 283, 727, 786
Soviet Union, U.S. citizens, convictions, 44
Thailand, U.S. air force use of Thai bases, 597
U.K., European Common Market, membership,
proposed, 783
U.S. world commitments, 784, 875
Viet-Nam (for details, see Viet-Nam) :
Cease-fire, proposals and prospects from, 126,
276, 317, 321, 359, 364, 464, 516, 622, 727,
775, 780, 878
Civilian casualties, 130, 135, 274, 276
Communist China and Soviet military support,
275, 727, 786
National reconciliation (pacification) pro-
gram, 129, 779
Peace talks:
Private channels, question of, 280, 321, 623,
624, 778
U Thant proposals, U.S. and Communist
positions, 618
U.S. willingness, 42, 43, 47, 126, 135, 172,
281, 317, 464, 516, 618, 727, 743, 772, 777,
877
Political progress, 131, 279, 779
Situation reports, 44, 274, 726
U.S. commitments, 128, 133, 272, 275, 725, 744,
776, 875
U.S. economic aid, 830
U.S. 14 points, 281, 318
U.S. military targets, 45, 130, 131, 135, 275
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
Viet-Nam — Continued
U.S. objectives, 45, 133, 278, 317
U.S. public opinion, 130, 133, 619, 725, 774
Water for Peace, 904
World peace, importance, 136, 169, 269, 278, 358,
363, 725, 771, 781, 874
Alliance for Progress conferences, U.S. delegate,
472n, 476
CIA special policy committee, chairman (Johnson),
665
Health, 131
Meetings with:
Alliance for Progress summit conference, 721
ANZUS Council, 749
China, Vice President Yen, 849
Guam conference, 586, 594
NATO ministerial council, 53
SEATO Council of Ministers, 516, 747
Turkey, President Sunay, 656
Viet-Nam, 7-nation meeting, 748
National Security Council, Special Committee of,
chairmanship (Johnson), 951
News conferences, transcripts of, 42, 317, 464, 466,
618
TV and radio interviews, transcripts of, 126, 168,
274, 358, 722, 774
Work of, satisfactions and rewards, 365
Rusk, Thomas Jefferson, 269
Rwanda, outer space treaty, signature, 260
Safety of life at sea :
International convention, 1960 :
Amendments to chapter II, U.S., 642, 702
Current actions: Brazil, 642; Ireland, 481;
Somalia, 765
Passenger-ship safety amendments: 102; John-
son, 429; Miller, 173; Romania, 224
International regulations for preventing collisions,
1960: Australia, 581-582; Brazil, 866; China,
353
North Atlantic fisheries, convention on conduct of,
provisions, 635
Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, treaties, agree-
ments, etc., 306
St. Lawrence Seaway, tolls, 554, 674
St. Vincent, treaties, agreements, etc., 306
Salisbury, Harrison: 321; Powell, 137; Rusk, 131
Salzman, Herbert (E. V. Rostow), 860, 863
San Marino, outer space treaty (1967) , 733
Satellites (see also Communications: Satellites,
Meteorological research, and Outer space) :
Communications stations proposed for Latin Amer-
ica (Johnson), 709
Development and importance (Pollack), 910
Surveys of water and related resources, proposed
use in, 763
Tracking facilities, access, outer space treaty pro-
visions for (Goldberg) , 82, 610
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1005
Satellites — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
ESRO Alaska telemetry/telecommand station,
agreement for establishment and operation of,
36
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree-
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354
Satterthwaite, Joseph C, 651
Saudi Arabia:
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft, signature, 765
Jidda desalination plant dedication, U.S. participa-
tion (Udall), 561
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Seaborg, Glenn T., 90, 915 (quoted)
Scherer, Ray, 724
Schlesinger, Arthur (Goldberg), 511
Schroeder, Gerhard, 687, 688
Schultze, Charles L.: 237; Johnson, 659
SCI (International Scientific and Technological Af-
fairs, office of) , Pollack, 913
Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy,
913
Science and technology:
China, U.S. survey team, 849
Europe (McGhee), 152
International cooperation: 657; Brzezinski, 414;
Humphrey, 488; Rusk, 239
Latin America: 713, 719, 887; Johnson, 709
NATO resolution, 50, 52
OECD cooperation: Humphrey, 166, 684; E. V.
Rostow, 22
Science and foreign affairs: Pollack, 910; Rusk,
238; Seaborg (quoted), 915
Soviet-U.S. exchanges, value (Katzenbach), 755
Technical data, exportation to Southern Rhodesia,
prohibition of. Executive order, 146
Technological forecasting: Pollack, 914; Rusk, 239
Technological gaps: 713; Humphrey, 165, 684; Mc-
Ghee, 148; Pollack, 912; Rusk, 238
U.N. role: Pollack, 912; Sisco, 459, 462
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149
Water resources research and development, rec-
ommendations for: 763; Johnson, 903
Security Council, U.N.:
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Meeting called (Goldberg), 871
Role in and U.S. support: Goldberg, 100, 920,
925, 927, 934, 941, 944, 946; Johnson, 935, 951,
952; Rusk, 949
UNEP withdrawn vnthout action by (Johnson),
870
China, membership (Popper), 689
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 437
Israeli-Syrian border dispute (Goldberg), 100
Peacekeeping operations :
Discussion delays, problem of (Goldberg), 944,
945
Primary responsibilities: 375; Goldberg, 143,
640, 872, 928; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 949
Security Council, U.N. — Continued
Peacekeeping operations — Continued
Soviet position (Sisco), 461
Veto, exercise of: Goldberg, 144, 638, 640, 839,
895 ; Sisco, 461
Resolutions :
Arab-Israeli conflict, cease-fire requests, 947, 948 \
Southern Rhodesia, mandatory sanctions against,
77
U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus, 6-month ex-
tension, 180n
Southern Rhodesia:
Mandatory sanctions against, and U.S. support:
373; Goldberg, 73, 99, 142; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation, 145, 377
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support: 369, 375; Pal-
mer, 449, 457; Sisco, 68
U.S. deputy representative (Pedersen), confirma-
tion, 261
U.S. responsibilities as a permanent member
(Rusk), 784
Viet-Nam, role in. See under Viet-Nam
Seismographic research, 574
Selden, Armistead I., Jr., 476
Selective service (Powell), 137
Self-defense. See Defense
Self-determination :
Aden (Goldberg), 100
Africa, southern (Katzenbach), 955
Angola and Mozambique, need for (Goldberg), 290
Asia (see also Viet-Nam) : Bundy, 790; U. A. John-
son, 422
Importance and U.N. role (Sisco) , 67
Independent statehood not necessarily required:
Goldberg, 290 ; Nabrit, 32
Nigeria (Palmer), 649
South- West Africa: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888; Palmer,
648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
Southern Rhodesia: 376; Goldberg, 99, 142;
Palmer, 456
U.N. Charter principles (Rusk) , 170, 875
U.N. covenants, 107, 112
U.N. resolution and U.S. support: Nabrit, 29, 30;
text, 32
U.S. support (Rusk) , 772
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam.
Sender Freies Berlin, 358
Senegal :
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 765
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Senghor, Leopold S. (quoted), 959
Sharp, U.S. Grant: 586, 594 ; Holt, 962
Sheet glass, proclamation modifying escape-clause
action, 216
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime Consultative
Organization, Intergovernmental) :
International waterways, U.S. position: Goldberg,
871, 921, 923, 926, 938; Johnson, 870, 922
(quoted) ; U Thant, 920 (quoted) , 921
1006
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Ships and shipping — Continued
Passenger ships, IMCO fire safety standards rec-
ommendations: 102; Johnson, 429; Miller, 173
Southern Rhodesian exports, U.N. sanctions against
shipments of: 77, 374; Palmer, 449
U.S. implementation, Executive order, 146
Soviet vessel Turkestan, allegations of U.S. air
attacks and U.S. rejection, 953
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
International waterborne transportation, inter-
American convention (1963), on facilitation
of: U.S., 481, 581,641
Maritime traffic, international convention (1965),
on facilitation of, with annexes: Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, 305; Finland, 732; Iceland,
393; Ivory Coast, 694; Nigeria, 393; Soviet
Union, 85; Trinidad and Tobago, 732; U.S.,
481, 581, 613, 865
Entry into force, 305
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree-
ment re U.S. liability: Greece, 225
Pilotage services on the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence Seaway, agreement with Canada
governing coordination of, 866
USS Cascade (destroyer tender), deployment of,
agreement with Malta, 225
Vessels, loans of, agreements with : New Zealand,
898; Philippines, 802
U.S. military supplies to Viet-Nam (Wheeler), 188
USS John F. Kennedij, christening ceremony
(Johnson), 959
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involvement in Mid-
dle East, and U.S. reply (Goldberg), 935, 940
U.S. vessel, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John-
son, 952
Sierra Leone:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 377
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 866, 930, 967
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom (Rusk) , 128, 129, 281, 619
Sindermann, Carl J., 71
Singapore:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688
Economic progress (Bundy), 325, 791
Indonesia, relations with: Bundy, 792; Rusk, 744
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 182, 897
Sino-Soviet relations: Brzezinski, 419; Harriman,
817; Katzenbach, 2; Kohler, 9, 407; W. W.
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 132, 168, 781, 785; Solomon,
519
Viet-Nam, effect of: Rusk, 727, 786; Sisco, 461
Viet-Nam peace talks, effect on (Rusk), 44, 283
Sisco, Joseph J., 64, 458
Siscoe, Frank G., 71, 634
Sithole, Ndabaningi, 371
Skolnikoff, Eugene B., 913
Slavery :
Supplementary convention (1956) for the abolition
of slavery, the slave trade, and practices simi-
lar to : Afghanistan, 85 ; Luxembourg, 930
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524
Slavery — Continued
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights,
prohibition of, 113
White women, agreement (1949) for the suppres-
sion of trade in, as amended: Malta, 866
Smathers, George A., 476
Smith, Al (quoted), 936
Smith, Willard J. (Miller), 175
Smithsonian Institute, 667
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea
Solomon, Anthony M.: 518, 555, 721; Miller, 174
Somali, Republic of:
AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 306, 438, 701, 702,
732, 765, 802
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
South Africa, Republic of:
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455;
Rogers, 302 ; Sisco, 68
South West Africa mandate, termination: 893;
Goldberg, 888, 889; Palmer, 648; Sisco, 68
Southern Rhodesia, support and aid in evading
sanctions, 374
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 481, 733, 930
South West Africa:
ICJ decision: Goldberg, 144, 292; Palmer, 647;
Rogers, 302
Self-determination for, U.N. role in development
of: Goldberg, 292, 888; Palmer, 648; Rogers,
302; Sisco, 68
U.N. administration of: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888,
892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68
U.N. resolution, text, 893
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization:
Council of Ministers meeting, Washington: 516,
592; Rusk, 742
Text of communique, 745
U.S. delegation, 516
Military Advisers meeting, Washington, 516, 592
Thai support: Martin, 198, 852; Rusk, 598
Viet-Nam :
Importance of U.S. commitments under: John-
son, 515; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 776,
876
Position and support: Martin, 855; Rusk, 281,
743
Southeast Asian Ministers of Education (Martin),
196, 854
Southern Rhodesia:
Background: 366; Palmer, 449
Independence, U.K. conditions for: 368, 372, 377;
Palmer, 457, 646
U.S., contrasted with (Palmer), 451
International Wheat Agreement, 1967 protocol,
930
Land Apportionment Act (Palmer), 453
Racial discrimination in. See Racial discrimination
Rhodesian Front party (Palmer), 454
Soviet Union, position of, 374
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1007
Southern Rhodesia — Continued
U.K.:
Responsibilities: 369, 375; Goldberg, 74, 143;
Palmer, 455, 647
Use of force against, questions of, 372, 374
U.K.-Rhodesian talks: 368; Goldberg, 76; Sisco, 67
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support, 369
U.N. sanctions:
Economic: 370; Goldberg, 142, 291; Palmer, 647
Legal basis for: 369, 374; Goldberg, 75
Mandatory: 373, 376; Goldberg, 73, 142; Palmer,
449, 647; Sisco, 68
Resolution, text, 77
South Africa and Portugal, importance to en-
forcement of, 371, 374
Sovereignty, equality of states, essential elements of
(Harris), 105
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Communism, and
Sino-Soviet relations) :
Allegations of U.S. air attack on Soviet vessel
rejected, 953
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition in:
575, 687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445,
569, 659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow,
501 ; Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875
Central Europe, nuclear weapons aimed at (Rusk),
361
Consular convention with U.S.: 614, 642; Hum-
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659;
Katzenbaeh, 755 ; Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Economic problems: Harriman, 818; Katzenbaeh,
754; Kohler, 407; Solomon, 519
Food processing fair, Moscow, U.S. participation,
757
Germany, Federal Republic of, relations (Rusk),
363
ILO charges of forced labor practices (Goldberg),
527
India, grain shipments to (Johnson), 299
Industrial property, international participation
(Trowbridge), 885
INPRODMASH-67 (Trowbridge), 882
Italian Fiat automobile plant: Harriman, 819;
Katzenbaeh, 4 ; Solomon, 522 ; Trowbridge, 883
Leadership (Brzezinski), 417
North Africa, interests and influence (Palmer),
808, 811
Nuclear proliferation treaty, review of position on,
571
Oceanographic survey, cooperation with U.S.
(Sisco), 462
Outer space treaty, position on: Goldberg, 142, 604,
607; Rusk, 600; Sisco 460
Southern Rhodesia, position on, 374
Technological level (Humphrey) , 166
Trade :
Liberalization (Trowbridge), 885
U.S. See East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 85, 224, 260, 305, 393,
614, 642, 930
Soviet Union — Continued
U.N.:
Arena for peaceful East- West engagement:
Humphrey, 489; Sisco, 458
Peacekeeping operations, position on: Goldberg,
101,895; Sisco, 461
U.S. citizens, convention of (Rusk) , 44, 248
U.S. relations:
Efforts to improve: 697; Humphrey, 487, 488,
681; Johnson, 159, 409 (quoted), 757; Katzen-
baeh, 753; Kohler, 8, 406; Niven, 774; E. V.
Rostow, 399, 403 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk,
363, 772
U.S. visit of Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, effect
(Rusk), 782
Viet-Nam, effect on: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 171,
278, 877
U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting nuclear arms race,
proposed: Johnson, 445; BIcNamara, 444
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge) , 882
Viet-Nam, arms supply to: Katzenbaeh, 753;
Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466
World relations, development of: Harriman, 821;
Humphrey, 486; Meeker, 62
Space. See Outer space and Satellites
Spain :
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 354, 613, 642
Spivak, Lawrence E., 722
State Department (see also Foreign Service) :
Advisory panels: Johnson, 660; appointments, 16,
72, 651
Ambassador at Large (Lodge), confirmation, 674
Appointments and designations, 261, 765, 897
Assistant Secretaries of State, confirmation:
Battle, 674; Macomber, 482; Oliver, 968
Bureau of European Affairs, advisory panel, ap-
pointment, 17
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
72
Information and cultural programs, appropriations
request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 232, 236
Publications. See under Publications
Science briefings: Pollack, 916; Rusk, 238
Science office (Pollack), 913
U.S. mission chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599
Water for Peace Office, establishment: Johnson,
904 ; Rusk, 906
Work of (Rusk), 875
State of the Union (Johnson) , 158
Stateless persons and refugees, application (protocol
1) of the universal copyright convention: Italy,
481 ; Netherlands, 833
Steele, Hoyt P., 696, 697
Stevenson, Adlai : Johnson, 566 ; quoted, 293, 839, 896
Stoltenberg, Gerhard (McGhee), 152
Strategic trade controls. See Trade
Sudan:
AID programs (Rusk), 831
1008
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Sudan — Continued
Convention (1965) on the settlement of investment
disputes betvceen states and nationals of other
states, 613
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Sugar, International Sugar Agreement, 1958, proto-
col: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 224; Bolivia,
481; Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, 224; Congo (Brazzaville), 481; Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Ghana,
224; Guyana, 393; Guatemala, 224; Haiti, 224;
Hungary, 224, 481; India, 224, 481; Indonesia,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Mada-
gascar, 224 ; Mexico, 224, 481 ; Morocco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Para-
guay, 224; Peru, 224, 481; Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, U.K., U.S., 224
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 216, 332
Sullivan, William L., Jr., 636
Sunay, Cevdet, 652, 653, 655
Sunobe, Ryoso, 178, 424
Suwito Kusumowidagdo, 172
Sweden :
Institute for Cultural Relations, 667
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 481, 613, 732,
733, 930
U.S. Ambassador (Heath), confirmation, 674
Swidler, Joseph C, 907
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 393,
613, 733, 929, 930, 967, 968
Syrian Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli conflict) :
Israeli border dispute, U.N. peacekeeping role
(Goldberg), 100
Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final
protocols, 733
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Taft, William Howard (Rusk), 270
Taiwan (see also China, Republic of; and Formosa) :
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
791; Johnson, 848; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862;
W.W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832
U.S. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Self-
Help, and Development, 832n
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505,
509, 511
Talbot, Phillips (Rusk), 751
Tanzania :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
Tariff Commission, budget appropriation request,
FY 1968 (Johnson), 232
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic policy and rela-
tions; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on;
and Trade) :
Tariff policy, U.S. — Continued
Most-favored-nation policy: 698; Blumenthal, 435 ;
Katzenbach, 3
National interests: Johnson, 696; Solomon, 556;
Trowbridge, 883
Philippines (Braderman), 663
Presidential discretionary authority: 698; Harri-
man, 819; Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 521, 523
Sheet glass duties modified, proclamation: 216;
Johnson, 333
Watch movements escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation: 217; Johnson, 333
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on:
Agreements, declarations, proces-verbal, and
protocols :
Accessions to, current actions on :
Argentina, provisional: Ivory Coast, 967;
Tunisia, 613
Third proces-verbal: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, 613; Central
African Republic, 967; Denmark, Finland,
613; France, Germany, India, 733; Indo-
nesia, Israel, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733;
Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 967;
Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 967;
South Africa, 733; Sweden, Tunisia, Tur-
key, U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733
Iceland, provisional : Ivory Coast, 967 ; Tunisia,
613
Proces-verbal extending: Central African
Republic, 967; Tunisia, 613
Korea, protocol: Austria, 766; Central African
Republic, European Economic Community,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 968; Korea,
Netherlands, Turkey, 766; U.S., 766, 968
Switzerland, protocol: Central African Re-
public, 967; Germany, 224; Netherlands,
354; New Zealand, 733; Portugal, 613;
Spain, 354
Tunisia, provisional, third proces-verbal : Cen-
tral African Republic, 967
United Arab Republic, provisional: Ivory
Coast, 967
Second proces-verbal: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, 613; Central African Republic,
968; Denmark, Finland, 613; France,
Germany, 733; Greece, 613; India, 733;
Indonesia, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733;
Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 968;
Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 968;
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.A.R.,
U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733
Yugoslavia, protocol: Austria, 733; Central
African Republic, 967; Chad, 354; France,
733; Netherlands, 354; U.S., 260
International trade in cotton textiles, protocol
extending the arrangement on: 929; U.S., 967
1960-1961 Tariff Conference, protocol embodying
results of: Germany, 224, 306; Pakistan, 967
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1009
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued
Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol
amending: Korea, 733
Part IV, entrance into force, prospects from : 70 ;
Blumenthal, 433
Schedule III — Brazil-protocol re negotiations for
the establishment of a new schedule: Korea,
733
Schedules, rectifications and modifications to the
texts of, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th protocols:
Korea, 733
Committee on Trade and Development: Blumenthal,
430; U.S. delegate, 430n
Contrasting party, admission as: Barbados, 482
Eastern European membership, need for: 699;
Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 488
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435
Kennedy Round:
Importance and U.S. support: 28, 70, 245, 339;
Blumenthal, 430; Humphrey, 488, 683; John-
son, 297, 333, 707, 756, 886; NATO, 50; E. V.
Rostow, 23, 27; Roth, 476, 880; Rusk, 359, 361;
Solomon, 556
Negotiations concluded: Johnson, 879; Roth, 879
U.S. participation, problems and conditions:
E. V. Rostow, 403, 860; Roth, 477; Rusk, 772
Yugoslavian membership (Harriman), 818
Taxation:
Double taxation, convention on avoidance of. See
Double taxation
Interest Equalization Tax, 342
Adjustment of rates needed: 344; Johnson, 335
Taylor, Maxwell D., 285, 514 (quoted), 586, 594
Tear gas and military gas, use of, 577
Technical assistance:
CENTO programs, 671
U.N. assistance to South West Africa requested,
894
Technical cooperation programs :
Agreements with: Afghanistan, 834; Somali Re-
public, 225, 438, 702, 802
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson) ,
232
China, Republic of, 849
Latin America, 719
Water for Peace, 761
Technology. See Science and technology
Telecommunications (see also Radio) :
Convention (1965), international, with annexes:
Australia, Ceylon, 613; Congo (Brazzaville),
393; Denmark, 122; Finland, Guyana, 613;
Ireland, 766; Jordan, 766; Korea, 898; Leba-
non, 613; Lesotho, 967; Maldive Islands, 582;
Netherlands, 393; Nigeria, 613; Peru, 766;
Switzerland, 393; Tunisia, Uganda, 898; U.K.,
393; U.S., 733, 801
Educational TV: 719; Johnson, 15, 709; E. V.
Rostow, 405
Latin America, system proposed, 712
Territorial sea and the contiguous zone, convention
(1958), Goldberg, 923
Terry, William M., 919
Thailand (see also Association of Southeast Asia) :
AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196,
854 ^
Asian role: Martin, 196, 851; Rusk, 597
Communism, danger of: Bundy, 325; Martin, 853;
Rusk, 169, 275, 743, 832; SEATO, 746
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy,
325, 791, 793; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W.
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 598
Outer space treaty, signature, 260
U.S. aid: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827
U.S. air force use of Thai bases : 746, : Martin, 852 ;
Rusk, 597
U.S. relations: Martin, 198, 851; Thanat Khoman,
852 (quoted)
Viet-Nam, military aid to: 746; Bundy, 324, 792;
Johnson, 961; Martin, 198, 852, 853; W. W.
Rostow, 503 ; Rusk, 597 ; Westmoreland, 740
Thanat Khoman: 197, 747, 748 (quoted), 852, 854
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 586, 588, 591
Thuc, Nguyen Dang: 69 Lilienthal, 468
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 592
Tlateloleo, Treaty of, 436
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago
Togo:
Regional heavy equipment training center (Katzen-
bach), 958
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 182, 260
Amity and economic relations, treaty of, 181
Toon, Malcolm, 71
Topaloglu, Ahmet, 687, 688
Touring and tourism:
Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 682;
E. V. Rostow, 25
International Tourist Year, 695
North Africa: Palmer, 812; Woods (quoted), 810
Road traffic, convention (1954) re customs facili-
ties: Singapore, 122
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed,
480, 482
U.S.-Soviet tourists, numbers compared: Kohler,
412; Rusk, 247
U.S. visitors visas with indefinite validity, 695
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses; Economic
policy; Exports; Imports; and Tariff policy,
U.S.) :
Cotton. See Cotton
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, trade with
West: 697; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488;
Johnson, 696, 757; Katzenbach, 4, 755; Solo-
mon, 519, 521; Trowbridge, 881
Expansion, importance and U.S. support: 339;
Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 404; W. W.
Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772
1010
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Trade — Continued
Latin America: 713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson,
542, 707, 709; W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text,
717
Less developed countries, 245, 338
North Africa (Palmer) , 807
OECD countries (Humphrey), 683
Soviet Union, Licensintorg (Trowbridge), 885
Strategic trade controls: 697; Harriman, 817;
Johnson, 696; Katzenbach, 4; Kohler, 10, 413;
Solomon, 518
Trade negotiations, U.S. special representative
(Roth), confirmation, 476n
Transit trade of land-locked states, convention
(1965), Chad, 733
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law
(Goldberg), 102
U.S. trade:
Balance on goods and surpluses, 341
Canada, automotive products, 732
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, need to in-
crease (see also East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1966): Harriman, 818; Humphrey,
682; Johnson, 334, 757, 886; Katzenbach, 2;
Kohler, 10, 413 ; E. V. Rostow, 24 ; Rusk, 786 ;
Solomon, 518
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge), 881
Foreign policy considerations: Johnson, 886;
Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 555
Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual
meeting, 70
Korea, investment and trade study: 69, 554;
Chung, 553
Philippines (Braderman), 662
Policy objectives: Johnson, 757, Trowbridge, 881
Southern Rhodesia, prohibition of, Executive
order, 146
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation, 756
Trade Expansion Act: Blumenthal, 433; Roth, 477;
Rusk, 361
Tran Van Do, 745, 747, 748
Transportation :
Africa (Katzenbach), 956
Latin America (Linowitz), 823
Mass urban transit (Johnson), 918
Viet-Nam, importance of: Komer, 469; Westmore-
land, 741
Travel (see also Touring and tourism) :
Foreign travel to U.S., encouragement: 344; John-
son, 335
Middle East, U.S. travel restricted, announcement,
952
U.S. travel restrictions:
Amendments, texts, 564
Extended, 102
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 85, 122, 154, 181, 224,
260, 305, 353, 392, 438, 481, 530, 581, 612, 641, 673,
701, 732, 765, 801, 833, 865, 897, 929, 967
Treaty on treaties, U.N. international conference,
proposed (Goldberg), 102
Treaties in force: A List of Treaties and Other In-
ternational Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1967, released, 288
Tremelloni, Roberto, 687
Trinidad and Tobago:
OAS membership: 464n; Johnson, 632; Rusk, 464
Treaties, agreements, etc., 84, 122, 182, 224, 581,
732, 898, 929
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 881
Truman, Harry S (quoted), 546, 547, 548, 550, 856
Truman Doctrine: E. V. Rostow, 857; 20th anniver-
sary, Johnson, 546, 547, 654; Sunay, 653, 655
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands:
Additional U.S. funds authorized (Johnson), 865
Disaster relief (Johnson) , 599
Economic and political progress (Johnson), 598
Tunisia:
Development, problems, and U.S. interests: Pal-
mer, 806 ; Rusk, 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 613, 642,
702, 898, 967
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Turkel, Harry, 71
Turkestan, Soviet motor vessel, 953
Turkey :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172
Economic and political development: 337, 656, 670;
Gaud, 669; Johnson, 383, 547, 652, 654; E. V.
Rostow, 401, 858; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk,
830; Sunay, 655
Financing, problems of,' 338
NATO position and aid: 50, 657; Johnson, 652;
Sunay, 653, 655
OECD aid: 28; Johnson, 383
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 613, 766, 897
U.S. aid, 1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830
U.S. military and economic assistance: 657; Gaud,
669; Johnson, 384; Sunay, 656
U.S. visit of President Sunay: 652; Johnson, 547
U Nyun (Martin), 196, 853
U Thant (see also United Nations and Viet-Nam),
Goldberg, 179
Arab-Israeli conflict, peacekeeping efforts. See
Arab-Israeli conflict
Outer space treaty signature ceremony, message,
268
U.N. Secretary-General, continuation in office as:
Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42
Viet-Nam :
Peace proposals: Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622;
U Thant, 138 ; text, 624
Peace talks, role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 138, 839;
Johnson, 629; Rusk, 43, 45, 47, 620; U Thant,
625
Visit to Asia (Goldberg), 507, 513
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
Udall, Stewart L.: 561, 907; Rusk, 906
UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de
I'Afrique Centrale), 650
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1011
Uganda :
AID programs (Rusk), 831
Treaties, agreements, etc., 701, 898
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
UNCTAD. See United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development
UNEF. See United Nations Emergency Force
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, U.N.), 897
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force in Cyprus
Unger, Leonard C, 586
Union Douaniere et Economique de I'Afrique Cen-
trale (Palmer), 650
United Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli con-
flict) :
Straits of Tiran, restriction of shipping: Goldberg,
871, 921, 923, 938; Johnson, 870; U Thant
(quoted), 920, 921
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 393, 613, 642, 733,
930, 967
U.S. Ambassador (Nolte), confirmation, 674
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
United Kingdom (see also names of self-governing
colonies) :
Aden, future withdrawal from (Goldberg), 100
Asia, role in (Bundy) , 791, 793
Balance-of-payments position, 347
BBC TV interview of Secretary McNamara, 442
British independent TV interview of Secretary
Rusk, 274
CENTO economic aid, 670
Economic problems (McGhee), 149
European Common Market, proposed membership :
Holt, 961 ; Rusk, 783
Foreign aid programs (Rusk), 830
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 92
Rhodesia. Sec Southern Rhodesia
Sir Montague Burton Lecture, University of Leeds
(W. W. Rostow),491
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 86, 122, 154, 224, 225,
260, 354, 393, 582, 613, 834, 930
U.S. NATO forces, deployment, 789
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Wilson, 963
United Nations:
Aden, possible U.N. participation in elections
(Goldberg), 100
Arab-Israeli conflict, role. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Capital development fund resolution (Goldberg),
101
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437
East-West relations, role : Goldberg, 98 ; Harriman,
820 ; E. V. Rostow, 25 ; Sisco, 458
Headquarters of, amendment of supplemental
agreement (1966), 86
Human rights, role in: Goldberg, 524; Sisco, 67
International Covenants on Human Rights, texts,
107, 111
Optional protocol, 120
United Nations — Continued
Korea, supervision of elections (Goldberg), 101
Mekong River development, role: Bundy, 326;
Johnson, 334
Membership :
Barbados: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67
Communist China, question of: 849; Goldberg,
100; U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper, 689
Communist conditions for (Popper), 692
Increases in (Goldberg), 100, 290
Significance of: Goldberg, 872, 895; Sisco, 67
Outer space treaty, role in development of: 84,
577; Goldberg, 78, 98, 267, 602, 839; Rusk, 601;
Sisco, 460
Peacekeeping operations (see also Arab-Israeli
conflict. General Assembly, and Security
Council) :
Financing, problems of and U.S. position:
Goldberg, 101, 180, 636, 638, 895, 896; Johnson,
566
Importance and principles : 657 ; Goldberg, 179,
838, 862, 895, 928, 939; Harriman, 489; John-
son, 567, 629; Rusk, 363, 785; Sisco, 65
Need for improvement: Meeker, 63; W. W. Ros-
tow 502; Sisco, 65
Soviet and French refusal to pay assessments
(Goldberg), 101
Soviet-U.S. differences: Goldberg, 895; Sisco,
461
U.S. support (Rusk) , 271, 950
Racial discrimination, U.N. role in suppression of:
Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66
Secretary-General :
Role of (see also Arab-Israeli conflict and Viet-
Nam) : Goldberg, 637, 640, 895; Sisco, 461
Visit to Near East. See Arab-Israeli conflict
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office:
Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42
Soviet Union, utilization of, for propaganda and
other purposes: Goldberg, 924; Sisco, 458
Special Committee on Friendly Relations (Nabrit),
31
Specialized agencies: 894; Goldberg, 839; Johnson,
297, 567; Pollack, 912; Sisco, 462
Turkey, support of (Johnson), 652
U.S. participation in the U.N., 20th annual report
(Johnson), 566
U.S. representatives, confirmation, 261
U.S.-Soviet furtherance of particular aims: Hum-
phrey, 489; Sisco, 458
U.S. support: Goldberg, 289; Johnson, 568; Nabrit,
31; Rusk, 772, 784
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Water development projects, U.S. recommenda-
tions: 762, 764; Johnson, 903; Rusk, 906
United Nations Charter:
Article 109, amendment: Argentina, 834; Hungary,
930; Mexico 834; U.S., 834, 898
1012
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United Nations Charter — Continued
Obligations and responsibilities of member states
under: 107, 112, 375; Goldberg, 76, 100, 142,
291, 839, 895, 923, 927, 945 ; Meeker, 61 ; Nabrit,
31; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 950
Principles: 111; Churchill (quoted), 490; Johnson,
330; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 133, 170, 363,
874
Communist ideology, contrasted with (Sisco) , 463
Outer space treaty, application to: Goldberg 79;
Johnson, 387
Southern Rhodesia, application to: 176, 376;
Goldberg, 75, 142; Palmer, 449
SEATO support, 745
Self-defense, inherent right to: Meeker, 60; Rusk,
271
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 110
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space: 84; Goldberg, 267, 604; Sisco, 461
Resolution endorsing recommendations, 83n
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (Johnson), 567
United Nations Development Decade: 336; John-
son, 567
United Nations Development Program: 762; Gold-
berg, 839 1 Johnson, 567 ; Palmer, 650, 813
U.S. 1967 pledge, 764
Viet-Nam, FAO fisheries project, U.S. financial
support, 964
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(Harriman), 820
United Nations Emergency Force:
Casualties in Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. regrets
(Goldberg), 939, 943
Financing (Goldberg), 638
Middle East:
Extension of (December, 1966) : Goldberg, 101
Withdrawal (May, 1967), U.S. position: Gold-
berg, 947; Johnson, 870
United Nations Force in Cyprus (NATO), 50
Extension (December, 1966), Goldberg, 179
U.S. pledge (Goldberg), 180
United Nations Office of Public Information (Sisco),
461
United Nations Organization for Industrial Develop-
ment (Johnson), 567
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
(Sisco), 66
United States citizens and nationals:
Boycotts of Communist goods (Katzenbach), 2
Claims. See Claims
Communist propaganda, effect on (Rusk), 725, 775
Detention by Czechoslovakia (Kohler), 10
Foreign affairs advisory panels: 16; Johnson, 660
Middle East:
Status as neutrals (Rusk), 949, 950, 951
Travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Responsibilities of: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 131, 775
Responsibility of press to keep well informed (Mar-
tin), 851, 854
United States citizens and nationals — Continued
Rights abroad, consular convention with Soviet
Union: Johnson, 287, 545; Katzenbach, 755;
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247
Selective Service, position on (Powell), 137
U.S. foreign policy based on (Rusk), 879
United States Information Agency, educational TV,
task force assignment (Johnson), 16
United States Travel Service (Johnson), 335
Universal copyright convention (1952), protocol 1 re
application to works of stateless persons and
refugees : Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833
Universal Postal Union, constitution (1964), with
final protocols : China, 85 ; Dahomey, Gabon, 801 ;
Ghana, 613; Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauri-
tania, 701; Morocco, 967; New Zealand (includ-
ing Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands) ,
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (includ-
ing Spanish territories in Africa), 613; Sweden,
Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia, 85; Yugo-
slavia, 613; Zambia, 701
Upper Volta, outer space treaty, signature, 481
Urban development (Johnson), 918
Uruguay:
Economic level of development (Rusk), 723
Kennedy Round, importance to ( Blumenthal ) , 432
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 701
Vandenberg, Arthur, 838
Vatican City State, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 930
Venezuela :
Communism, threat of: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 828
Economic level of development: 337; E. V. Rostow,
401,858; Rusk, 722, 829
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 260, 930
Viet-Nam:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 216
Amnesty program: 209; Komer, 470; Rusk, 279;
Wheeler, 191
Asia, importance to. See under Asia
Background (Meeker), 54
Baguio Chiefs of Mission meeting, 517
Cambodia, nonalinement: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281,
320, 619, 773
Cease-fire:
Communist infiltration increased during: John-
son, 365, 596; Rusk, 127, 128, 317, 320, 321, 364,
621, 776, 780; Westmoreland, 739
Communist proposals: Goldberg, 313; Ho Chi
Minh, 596; Johnson, 596; Lodge, 795; Rusk,
126, 276, 277, 317, 321, 364, 464, 622, 623, 776,
777, 878
Extensions of, proposed, and prospects from:
Goldberg, 63, 508, 840; Johnson, 537, 567;
Lodge, 798; Powell, 137; Rusk, 44, 277, 317,
320, 364, 516, 727, 776, 777, 780; U Thant, 139
Senator Kennedy proposals: Goldberg, 508;
Rusk, 516
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1013
Viet-Nam — Continued
Cease-fire — Continued
Tet (Lunar New Year): 595; Goldberg, 310;
Johnson, 319; Komer, 471 ; Rusk, 126, 320, 620,
623, 780
Hostilities resumed (Johnson), 365
U Thant proposals: Goldberg, 138; Rusk, 126,
618, 622
U.S. acceptance: 626; U Thant, 139, 624
U.S. willingness for reciprocal ceasefire: 284,
626, 750; Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 63, 138, 313,
508, 841 ; Johnson, 319, 539, 596 ; Rusk, 126, 317,
319, 359, 464, 621, 622, 623, 727, 773, 776, 878
Communism, rejection of: Lodge, 796; Rusk, 279,
282, 619, 779
Communist aggression and subversion :
Casualties: 953; Johnson, 515, 536; Rusk, 45, 274,
727; Westmoreland, 741; Wheeler, 189
Civilian: 665; Johnson, 515, 536, 593, 594;
Rusk, 130, 135, 275, 276
Communist responsibilities: 953; Johnson,
515, 537; Rusk, 136, 275; Westmoreland,
739
Communist: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 466;
Rusk, 278, 727
Vietnamese: Johnson, 535-536; Rusk, 282;
Westmoreland, 741
Communism :
Defectors from: Martin, 194; Rusk, 278, 279,
726, 779; Westmoreland, 741
Communist China, position and support: Gold-
berg, 508; Kohler, 413; Popper, 691; W. W.
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727,
786; Wheeler, 191
Communist position: Ho Chi Minh, 596; Johnson,
629; Lodge, 798; Rusk, 127
Communist reliance on :
U.S. disagreements: Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 130,
620, 725, 744, 775
World opinion (Rusk) , 619, 620, 744
Communist responsibility: 953; Bundy, 790;
Johnson, 514; Nabrit, 30; W. W. Rostow, 503;
Rusk, 45, 127, 135, 272, 274, 282, 743, 776, 780,
876; SEATO, 745; Westmoreland, 738
Compared with (Rusk), 877
Korea: Meeker, 60; Rusk, 621, 778
Malaya, U.K. operations (Rusk), 279, 283
World War 11 (Lodge), 799
Deescalation, mutual {see also Cease-fire) :
Communist rejection (Rusk), 45, 622
U Thant proposals: Rusk, 622; U Thant, 139
U.S. position: 284, 750; Goldberg, 315, 506,
841; Johnson, 539; Rusk, 126, 317, 322, 465,
743, 775, 877
Escalation to major land war, question of:
Powell, 136; Rusk, 364; U Thant, 139
Guerrilla warfare, problems of: Johnson, 535,
593; Komer, 471; Lodge, 795, 799; Rusk, 278,
283,729; Taylor (quoted), 514; Westmoreland,
739
Viet-Nam — Continued
Communist aggression and subversion — Continued
Increases and U.S. responses: McNamara, 465,
466; Rusk, 134, 282, 318, 464, 876; Westmore-
land, 738
International law aspects (Meeker) , 57
Propaganda: 748; Lodge, 796; Martin, 194;
SEATO, 746
Soviet Union, position and support: Harriman,
821; Goldberg, 508, 513, 839; Kohler, 413;
Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 172,
275, 280, 466, 619, 727, 778, 786; Wheeler, 191
Test case for: Bundy, 790; Kohler, 8, 410;
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 494; SEATO, 746;
Thieu, 589; Westmoreland, 738
Demarcation line between North and South, sig-
nificance of (Meeker), 61
Demilitarized zone:
Geneva Accords provisions: Goldberg, 311;
Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 281
10-mile buffer area, U.S. proposal: 750; Rusk,
877
Devastation of country, question of (Rusk), 135
Diem government (Lodge), 799
Economic and social development: Goldberg, 506;
SEATO, 746
AID:
Budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233, 383
Commodity assistance programs, 1966 man-
agement report: Gaud, 200; text of re-
port, 201
Expenditures, 210
Medical assistance, increases, 664
Supplies, distribution (Komer), 469
Revolutionary development: 209, 592, 748; Gaud,
201; Goldberg, 511; Taylor, 286; Westmore-
land, 740
Vietnamese army cadre training program:
Komer, 470; Lodge, 796; Taylor, 287;
Wheeler, 191
U.S. goals and support: 285; Bundy, 325; Gold-
berg, 513; Johnson, 231, 516, 537, 587, 961;
Komer, 469; Lilienthal, 468; Rusk, 317, 831;
Wheeler, 186
U.S. programs, Communist participation: 285;
Goldberg, 311; Johnson, 162, 516, 535; Rusk,
281,317,773,787,877
U.S. study team, 69
Viet-Nam position: Lilienthal, 467; Thieu, 589
Education, 209
Guam conference: 586; Guerrero, 586; Johnson,
538, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594; Thieu, 588,
591
Results, 665
Inflation control: 202; Gaud, 200; Goldberg, 514,
592; Johnson, 233, 589; Komer, 470; Rusk,
831; Taylor, 287
International Control Commission: Johnson, 515;
Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127
1014
DEPAKTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam — Continued
International Control Commission — Continued
Role in and U.S. support: 750; Goldberg, 507;
Rusk, 620, 773, 778; U Thant, 625
Manila Conference, Viet-Nam aims and U.S. sup-
port: 748; Bundy, 794; Goldberg, 311; Thieu,
588
Memorial Day messages exchanged: Johnson,
Thieu, 917
Military and other aid from other countries: 552,
748, 749; Bundy, 324, 792; Chung, 552; John-
son, 549, 961 ; Martin, 198, 199, 852, 853 ; W. W.
Rostow, 503; Rusk, 133, 597; SEATO, 746;
Westmoreland, 740
Baguio meeting of Chiefs of Mission, 517
7-nation meeting of representatives, Washing-
ton: 517, 592; communique, 747; Johnson, 538
National Liberation Front (see also under Negotia-
tions for peaceful settlement) : Goldberg, 312,
842; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 172, 280, 779
National reconciliation (pacification) program:
592, 748; Goldberg, 506, 510, 841-842, 843;
Johnson, 161, 536, 538, 593, 594; Komer, 470,
471; Lodge, 795, 796; Rusk, 129, 726, 779;
SEATO, 746; Taylor, 286; Wheeler, 191
U.S. support reorganized ( Bunker) , 844
Negotiations for peaceful settlement :
ANZUS, 749
Asian proposal (Martin), 196
Communist 4-points: Goldberg, 311, 842; Ho Chi
Minh, 597; Johnson, 537; Rusk, 172, 317, 773,
777
Communist position: 626; Goldberg, 840; Rusk,
126, 131, 277, 283, 322, 618, 622, 728
Communist rejection: 592, 626, 748; Johnson,
537, 538, 594, 630; Rusk, 129, 131, 618, 743, 773
Conferences, Asian or Geneva: 284; Goldberg,
315, 619 (quoted) ; Rusk, 281, 317, 618, 621, 773,
778,878; U Thant, 625
Johnson offer: 595; Johnson, 595; Rusk, 622, 776
Communist rejection: 596; Johnson, 629; Rusk,
618, 623
National Liberation Front:
As sole representative of Viet-Nam: Goldberg,
312, 842 ; Rusk, 277, 322, 777
Participation: Rusk, 622, 773; U Thant, 625
Peace efforts of other countries (Rusk) , 317, 618,
743, 773
Private contacts: Goldberg, 315; Rusk, 280, 317,
321, 623, 624, 778
Private discussion: Goldberg, 507, 513; Johnson,
539, 596; Rusk, 619
SEATO position, 745
Sino-Soviet problems, effect on (Rusk), 44, 132,
283
U Thant:
Proposals: 626; Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622;
U Thant, 624
Role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 839; Rusk, 43, 45, 47,
126, 620, 773 ;U Thant, 625
Viet-Nam — Continued
Negotiations for peaceful settlement — Continued
U.S. 14-points : 284 ; Rusk, 281, 318
U.S. willingness: 570, 592, 626, 632, 657, 750;
Goldberg, 63, 98, 137, 310, 505, 507, 510, 840;
Johnson, 162, 236, 365, 538, 567, 587, 593, 594,
595, 629, 873; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 43, 47, 129,
133, 135, 172, 272, 281, 283, 317, 359, 465, 516,
618, 620, 743, 773, 778, 831, 877
"Apparent contradictions": Goldberg, 316, 512,
840; Powell, 137; Rusk, 135, 321, 619, 623,
777, 878
Without preconditions: 284, 626; Goldberg,
138, 510, 512; Johnson, 162, 535; Rusk, 43,
129, 317, 465, 621, 727, 743, 773, 777
Viet-Cong representation: 285; Goldberg, 312;
Rusk, 126, 135, 172, 280, 281; U Thant, 139
Viet-Nam government participation: 626, 749;
Goldberg, 842; Rusk, 620, 622, 624; U Thant,
625
Neutrality and nonalinement, U.S. position on:
285; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509, 841; Rusk,
281, 773
Pacification (seize-and-hold) efforts. See National
reconciliation program
Peace :
Geneva accords as a basis for: 284, 632; Gold-
berg, 63, 138, 311, 842; Johnson, 539, 630;
Rusk, 136, 281, 283, 466, 619, 778; U Thant,
139
Prospects for: Goldberg, 315, 508, 510, 513, 843;
Lodge, 800; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 128, 726, 779,
780, 876
U.S. objectives: 592; Goldberg, 310, 506, 512,
840; Holt, 962; Johnson, 230, 516, 535, 917;
Katzenbach, 756; Rusk, 130, 272, 277; Thieu,
917
Viet-Nam position, 749
Political development and progress: 592, 748;
Goldberg, 311, 513, 842; Johnson, 589, 590;
Komer, 469; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 279, 619,
779; SEATO, 746; Wheeler, 191
Communists, participation in, question of: 285,
592; Goldberg, 311, 313, 841, 843; Rusk, 279,
773, 779
Constitution: 586, 592, 748; Goldberg, 505, 509,
510, 842; Johnson, 538, 588, 589, 590, 593, 594;
Lodge, 797; Rusk, 131, 780
Elections: 285; Goldberg, 505, 512; Rusk, 317,
773, 779
Communist interference : Goldberg, 843 ; John-
son, 589; Rusk, 128
Leadership: Goldberg, 513; Lodge, 798
NLF candidates, question of: Goldberg, 513;
Lodge, 797
Ports, improvements: 204, 210; Gaud, 200; Komer,
470 ; Rusk, 832 ; Westmoreland, 741 ; Wheeler,
188
Press coverage: Martin, 855; Rusk, 127, 131;
Wheeler, 186
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1015
Viet-Nam — Continued
Prisoners :
Exchange, U.S. willingness: 749; Rusk, 281, 320,
465, 773
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment of , Com-
munist noncompliance, 749, 825
Refugees from Communism: 209, 665; Komer, 470
Reunification, U.S. position: 285; Bundy, 790;
Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 311, 312, 842; John-
son, 539; Meeker, 61; Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 274,
279, 281, 317, 773
Self-determination, 657, 749
U.S. support: 285; Bundy, 323, 790; Goldberg, 62
(quoted), 138, 311, 505, 510, 512, 842; John-
son, 160, 516, 535, 588, 630, 961; Nabrit, 29;
Rusk, 135, 272, 274, 281, 318
Seven-nation meeting of ministers, Washington,
communique, 748
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman of
Geneva Conference: 953; Rusk, 466, 878
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 614
U.N. role:
Communist position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson,
629; Rusk, 42, 619, 778; U Thant, 138
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 98, 839; John-
son, 567; Meeker, 60
U.S. position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 162, 567,
629; Nabrit, 29; Rusk, 42, 618, 773; U Thant,
138
UNDP/FAD fisheries project, U.S. support, 964
U.S. air actions (see also U.S. military operations) :
Ho Chi Minh, 596
Bombing errors: Johnson, 537; Rusk, 135, 275
Military targets only: 953; Johnson, 514, 536;
Rusk,45, 130, 131,135,275
Soviet allegations of U.S. attack on Soviet ves-
sel and U.S. rejection, 953
Thailand, use of bases in: 746; Martin, 852;
Rusk, 597
U.S. position and objectives: Johnson, 514, 536;
McNamara, 465; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 127, 780;
Westmoreland, 739; Wheeler, 190
U.S. Ambassador (Bunker), confirmation: 674;
Johnson, 538, 587, 588
U.S. commitments: Bundy, 790; Goldberg, 505;
Johnson, 158, 161, 516, 534, 539, 587, 588, 873;
Martin, 194 ; W. W. Rostow, 493, 503 ; Rusk, 45,
128, 621, 744, 777, 781, 785; Wheeler, 187, 192
Importance of dependability: Bundy, 323, 792;
Humphrey, 680; Lodge, 800; Martin, 195;
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 503; Rusk, 272,
274, 725, 726, 787, 831, 877, 878
SEATO: Bundy, 790; Johnson, 160, 515; Martin,
852; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 275, 744, 776,
876
U.S. military forces:
Manpower levels: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 465;
Rusk, 129; Wheeler, 187
Viet-Nam — Continued
U.S. military forces — Continued
Morale and successes: Goldberg, 511; Johnson,
161, 236, 593, 594; Westmoreland, 738, 741;
Wheeler, 186, 189
Relations with Vietnamese: Lodge, 797; Martin,
855; Rusk, 282
Withdrawal, conditions necessary for: 284;
Bundy, 323; Goldberg, 313, 842; Meeker, 62;
Rusk, 282, 317
U.S. military intelligence: Johnson, 536; Mc-
Namara, 466; Rusk, 278, 280, 318; Taylor, 286;
Wheeler, 190
U.S. military operations :
FY 1968 budget (Johnson) , 230, 233
Increases: McNamara, 465; Rusk, 134, 464;
Westmoreland, 740
Logistics : Taylor, 286 ; Wheeler, 188
Responsibility for: Johnson, 538, 873; Rusk, 774
Results: 592; Johnson, 14, 515, 536, 594; Komer,
471; Martin, 194; McNamara, 465; Rusk, 276,
278, 726; Westmoreland, 740; Wheeler, 187,
190
Supplemental obligational authority request FY
1967: 236; Schultze, 237
U.S. military policy: Johnson, 161, 236; Rusk, 726;
Taylor, 287 ; Westmoreland, 739
"Hawks V. Doves": Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 363
U.S. national interests (Rusk), 133, 169, 272
U.S. objectives (see also Peace): Bundy, 790;
Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 505, 509; Johnson, 535,
593, 594, 630, 678; Rusk, 45, 278, 281, 318, 877
Congressional support (Johnson) , 160, 534
Political rather than military solution: Goldberg,
62 (quoted), 310, 507, 840; Nabrit, 30
U.S. public opinion and morale: Goldberg, 509, 840;
Guerrero, 596; Johnson, 534; Lodge, 795, 799;
Martin, 193, 855; Powell, 136, 192 (correc-
tion) ; Rusk, 130, 133, 619, 774
Demonstrations (Rusk), 725, 774
Communist influence (Rusk), 725, 775
Senator Wayne Morse, question of views (Gold-
berg) , 507
Viet-Nam Army (see also Economic and social de-
velopment: Revolutionary development):
Johnson, 589; Rusk, 282; Westmoreland, 740
Vietnamese, character and goals: Humphrey, 680;
Johnson, 161, 537, 587; Lilienthal, 467; Lodge,
796; Rusk, 135
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505, 509
Visit of General Taylor (Taylor) , 285
Visit of Komer and Lilienthal : Johnson, 467, 537 ;
Lilienthal, 467
World opinion: Johnson, 515; Martin, 195; Rusk,
273, 276, 619, 726; U Thant, 139; Wheeler, 192
Asia: Baguio meeting, 517; Goldberg, 505, 513;
Holt, 962; Rusk, 726
East European countries: Harriman, 821;
Kohler, 413 ; Rusk, 283
1016
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam, North:
President Johnson, question of visit (Rusk) , 283
U.S. journalists:
Opinions of (Rusk), 131
Visits to (Rusk), 127
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565
Visas :
U.S. passports to Middle East invalidated, an-
nouncement, 953
U.S. visitors' visas, indefinite validity, 695
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519
Voluntary organizations, private, CIA relationships:
665; Johnson, 665
Volunteers to America, 244
Wadsworth, James J., 353
Waldheim, Kurt (Nabrit), 32
Walters, Barbara, 168
War:
Chemical and biological warfare, 577
Dangers of and need for prevention: Brzezinski,
415; Goldberg, 895; Rusk, 134, 170, 271, 363
War on Hunger: Humphrey, 685; Johnson, 231, 235,
295, 298, 329, 379, 381, 658, 700, 849; E. V. Ros-
tow, 403, 856 ; Rusk, 874
AID, office of, establishment (Johnson), 381
War on Poverty (see also Great Society) : Katzen-
bach, 955; Yen, 849
Warsaw Pact countries (Rusk), 283
Washington, George, 328
Watanabe, Takeshi (Bundy), 326
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi-
nated, proclamation, 217
Water for Peace, international conference: 762, 765,
907; Johnson, 902; Rusk, 904; Solomon, 562
Water for Peace; A Report of Background Consider-
ations and Recommendations on the Water for
Peace Program: excerpts, 760; released, 758n
Water resources (see also Conservation, Desalination,
Flood control and Water for Peace), North
Africa (Palmer), 812
Waters, Herbert, 860
Watson, Arthur K., 696, 697
Watson, Barbara M., 765
Wehner, Herbert, 360
Wehrle, Leroy, 844
Western hemisphere, convention on nature protection
and wildlife preservation: Costa Rica, 353
Western Samoa, International Wheat Agreement,
1967 protocol, signature, 930
Westmoreland, William C: 586, 738; Bunker, 845;
Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 161, 467, 535, 538, 539,
593, 594; Rusk, 877; Taylor, 286
Wheat:
International grains agreement, U.S. interests:
432; Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861;
Roth, 880
U.S. shipments to India. See India
Wheat — Continued
Wheat Agreement (1962), International, protocol
for further extension of: Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 930 ; Costa Rica, 642,
930; Cuba, 930; Ecuador, 182; El Salvador,
930; Finland, 86, 930; Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, 930; Guatemala,
122, 930; Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, 930;
Japan, 224; Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
930; Mexico, 86, 930; Netherlands, Norway,
930; Peru, 122, 930; Portugal, Sierra Leone,
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Soviet
Union, Sweden, Switzerland, 930; U.A.R., 393,
930; U.K., U.S., Vatican City, 930; Venezuela,
86, 930; Western Samoa, 930
Wheeler, Earle G., 53, 586, 594, 609; addresses, 186
White, Edward: Goldberg, 80; Johnson, 388
White, John (Thieu), 591
White House Conference on International Coopera-
tion (Johnson), 658
WHO. See World Health Organization
Wilson, Carroll L., 651
Wilson, Harold: 963; Humphrey, 166; quoted, 368,
373; Rusk, 466; Sisco, 67
Wilson, Woodrow (Rusk), 270
WHO. See World Meteorological Organization
Wodajo, Kifle (Goldberg), 888
Women :
Equal rights, U.N. covenants provisions, 107
Political rights of, convention (1953) :
Current actions: Afghanistan, 86; Gabon, U.K.,
834
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524
Wong Lin Ken, 688
Woods, George: Humphrey, 685; quoted, 810; Rusk,
404
World Food Program, U.S. pledge: Johnson, 297;
E. V. Rostow, 861
World Health Organization: 761; Palmer, 650
Constitution (1946), as amended: Barbados, 833
Amendment to article 7 : Morocco, 701
Drug reaction reporting system, announcement, 919
World Meteorological Organization, U.N.: Johnson,
658; Sisco, 462
World order:
Big-power responsibilities : Goldberg, 895 ; Johnson,
546, 550, 917; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856;
Rusk, 770
Institutions and practices contributing to: Kohler,
8, 408 ; Sisco, 64 ; Yen, 849
Interdependence of modern world: Goldberg, 838;
Johnson, 301, 385; Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow,
399, 896; W. W. Rostow, 504; Rusk, 267, 270;
Sisco, 459
International law, importance: Goldberg, 140, 896;
McDougal (quoted), 144
Obligations of community of man : Brzezinski, 414 ;
Goldberg, 896; Hand (quoted), 545; Johnson,
296, 300, 381; E. V. Rostow, 861; W. W.
Rostow, 491
INDEX, JANUARY TO JUNE 1967
1017
World peace :
Communism, threat to: ANZUS, 749; Bundy, 791;
Kohler, 7; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 169, 743,
785
Durable peace, importance and U.S. goal: Brzezin-
ski, 415; Chung, 549; Goldberg, 289, 895;
Johnson, 231, 328, 329, 587, 678, 907; Katzen-
bach, 755; Roosevelt (quoted), 963; W. W.
Rostow, 500; Rusk, 136, 169, 267, 269, 278,
358, 363, 725, 771, 781, 784, 874, 787; Sisco,
459
Economic problems, relation to: Humphrey, 489;
E. V. Rostow, 857-858; Rusk, 829
Near East, importance to (Johnson), 870
Nuclear proliferation. See Nuclear entries
Outer space treaty, importance to (Goldberg), 78,
83, 98, 603
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967, proclama-
tion, 873
Southern Rhodesian situation as a threat to: 369,
373, 375; Goldberg, 75, 143, 291; Palmer, 449
U.S.-Soviet interests: 697; Katzenbach, 754
Viet-Nam situation a throat to: ANZUS, 749;
Goldberg, 137; Johnson, 160; Lodge, 800;
Rusk, 42, 136, 359, 781, 787, 831 ; U Thant, 139
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation: 756, John-
son, 886
World Weather Watch : Johnson, 658 ; Sisco, 462
Wortham, Buel (Rusk), 44, 248
Wortzel, Arthur I., 71
Yarmouth Castle disaster: Johnson, 429; Miller, 173
Yemen Arab Republic:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952
Yen Chia-kan, 847
Yingling, Raymund T., 636, 919
Young Choo Kim, 747 "<
Yugoslavia :
Economic and political development: Brzezinski,
417; Harriman, 817, 820; Katzenbach, 5;
Kohler, 8, 408, 411; Solomon, 519
Import quota controls removed, 246
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 613, 641, 733,
967
U.S. food aid, question of (Rusk) , 46
U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3
Zambia :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688
Political and economic development: Goldberg, 73;
Katzenbach, 954
Southern Rhodesian situation, effect on: 367, 372,
374 ; Goldberg, 73, 75
Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final
protocols, 701
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), 371
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) , 371
Zimbabwe African National Union, 371
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, 371
Zollner, Maxime-Leopold, 850
Zorthian, Barry, 844
1018
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
U.S. eOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
PEPARTMENT
~ OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U36
January 2, 1967
THE ISSUES OF EAST-WEST TRADE
by Under Secretary Katzenbach 2
EAST-WEST RELATIONS: SHAPING A STABLE WORLD
by Deputy Under Secretary Kohler 6
OECD MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETS AT PARIS
Statements by Under Secretary Rostow
and Text of Communique 19
For index see inside back cover
The Issues of East-West Trade
by Under Secretary Katzenbach '■
Today, I would like to spend a few minutes
discussing with you the issues of East-West
trade, and I would like to begin by recalling
still another protest cause — ^that of the citi-
zens who have ranged themselves into "Com-
mittees to Warn of the Arrival of Communist
Merchandise on the Local Scene."
Some have gone into groceries to paste
labels on Polish hams. A man in Shreveport,
Louisiana, appeals for funds in the belief that
if we continue to import Yugoslav tobacco for
American cigarette blends, "all the Chris-
tians will be persecuted and the women
raped and the little children sent to slave
camps." A lady in New Jersey is waging a
campaign against the import of carrots from
Canada on the ground that some of the car-
rots are Communist carrots.
Let me make it plain that I have no quar-
rel with the right of such individuals to pro-
test or demonstrate lawfully. Nor is it for
me to object to their ardor on behalf of a
cause. But I would suggest that their patriot-
ism exceeds their understanding, for in such
blanket protest against communism they are
reacting to the facts of the last decade rather
than this one.
Communism surely remains a resolute op-
ponent of free societies. And surely there is
little need, at a time when we are fighting in
Viet-Nam, to repeat our nation's determina-
tion to resist Communist aggression.
But how vastly different is the face of com-
munism in the world today than it was a
decade ago. How much meaning can even the
phrase "world communism" have when Red
Guards riot at the Soviet Embassy in Peking
and the Chinese Conununists charge the
Soviet Union with conspiring with the United
States to betray North Viet-Nam ?
Communism is no longer the monolith of
Stalin's time. Increasingly, we see deep, even
bitter, divisions between Communist nations.
Increasingly, we see Eastern European coun-
tries pursuing individual national interest
and identity. Increasingly, these countries re-
flect grave understanding of the impartial
dangers of destruction.
For both sides these changes create a
channel for contact, for understanding, and
for peace. And this is a channel we have al-
ready begun to travel. Three years ago we
were able to agree on a test ban treaty. Re-
cently, we extended our cultural exchanges
agreement with the Soviet Union,^ and we
have signed an air travel agreement.^ Only
yesterday came word of the agreement
barring nuclear weapons in space.
Two months ago. President Johnson told
a New York audience ^ that:
Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the
East — a shift from the narrow concept of coexist-
ence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.
Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward
' Address made before the National Association of
Manufacturers' 71st annual Congress of American
Industry at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 9 (press re-
lease 289).
^ For text of a joint communique of Mar. 19, 1966,
see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 543.
= For text, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.
* For an advance text of President Johnson's
address before the National Conference of Editorial
Writers, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviet Union has been the same. Where neces-
sary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we
shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.
We do not intend to let our differences on Viet-
Nam or elsewhere ever prevent us from exploring
all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and
the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and
our allies shall go step by step with them just as
far as they are willing to advance.
In short, the winds of change in Eastern
Europe are freeing the ice floes of the cold
war. They can be warm winds. They can also
be trade winds.
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
Trade with Eastern Europe is a subject in
which the NAM has exhibited sustained and
responsible interest, as exemplified by the ex-
tensive study by Dr. Mose Harvey which you
commissioned. As I think Dr. Harvey would
agree, this is a time when increasing trade
with Eastern Europe, under careful and selec-
tive direction, can be both good business and
good policy.
But the Government does not now have the
authority to free that trade or to apply selec-
tive direction. It is not now possible for the
United States to take full advantage of the
opportunities presented by trade.
The core of the problem is that only Yugo-
slavia and Poland now receive the same tariflf
treatment we give to the other countries of
the world. The President may not extend it
to the other countries of Eastern Europe.
This is the most-favored-nation treatment,
which for 40 years has been central to our
foreign commercial policy. (I might add,
however, that I have never understood the
reason for the phrase. All that "most fa-
vored" means is "nondiscriminatory" treat-
ment.)
We gave most-favored-nation treatment to
Eastern Europe for many years. In 1951,
however, at the height of the cold war, we
withdrew it, imposing on the products of
these countries the very high rates of the old
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
This was a rational distinction to make in
1951. But is it rational today? Should not the
President have authority to negotiate with
any of these countries for the advantages we
can gain by offering them the same tariff
rates we apply to the rest of the world ?
The President's inability to negotiate in
this manner now sharply limits our capacity
to use our great economic power of trade as
an instrument of foreign policy. And more
obviously, it sharply limits trade. This is a
self-imposed restriction, and we are the only
major free-world nation to so tie our hands.
The Miller Committee Recommendations
Recognizing the potential of a freer hand,
the President sought to explore both the
policy and trade benefits. In early 1965 he
appointed a study committee of distinguished
business, labor, and academic leaders, includ-
ing members of this association, and chaired
by J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the Cummins
Engine Company.
The Miller committee conducted an ex-
haustive study, which was based on full
access to our defense and intelligence infor-
mation. In its superb report it concluded
that the United States, having built the most
powerful defense system the world has ever
seen, could and should seek practical means
of reducing areas of conflict.^
Peaceful, nonstrategic trade, the commit-
tee said, "can be an important instrument of
national policy in our country's relations
with individual Communist nations of
Europe" and we should use trade negotia-
tions with those countries more actively, ag-
gressively, and confidently "in the pursuit of
our national welfare and world peace."
And the single most important- step, the
committee concluded, is to give the President
discretionary authority to grant — or with-
draw — nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to
individual countries of Eastern Europe.
The proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act,* based on the Miller committee recom-
mendations, would do exactly that. Congress
did not act on this measure last year, but as
the President said in October, we intend to
press for it in the coming Congress.
= For text, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 845.
' For background and text of the proposed legisla-
tion, see ibid., p. 838.
JANUARY 2, 1967
T have so far only suggested the adminis-
tration's reasoning in supporting this meas-
ure. Let me now analyze it in somewhat
greater detail on the framework of three
basic questions.
Three Basic Questions
The first is: Why should we send goods to
Communist countries — opponents of our sys-
tem — and thus either directly or indirectly
strengthen their military capacity?
Unlike the blanket condemnation of pro-
testers who paste labels on hams in markets,
this is not only a sensible question but a basic
question. There are three answers to it.
1. At present, the export of strategic goods
— goods closely or directly related to military
use — is strictly controlled. In seeking this
act we would not abandon such independent
controls.
2. The Soviet Union's military capability
is not based on imports. On the contrary, as
the world knows, it has developed advanced
weapons and space technology from its own
resources.
3. It is not likely that trade with the
United States would release Soviet resources
for additional military spending. The Soviet
Union already gives highest priority to mili-
tary spending. Larger imports* from the
United States would almost certainly expand
the consumer sector of the Soviet economy,
not the military. As the Miller committee
noted, any change in Soviet resource availa-
bility would "affect its civilian economy, not
its military budget."
The basic point, after all, is that we are
talking about trade, not aid. The Soviet
Union and the other East European coun-
tries would have to pay for increased imports
either with gold or by increased exports —
and those would require diversion of re-
sources to produce.
The effect of all three of these points
was summarized by the Miller committee:
". . . total Western nonstrategic trade, let
alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to
alter the fundamental relationship between
East- West militaiy capabilities."
Accepting that conclusion, it is still fair
to ask the second question: Would expanded
East-West trade really amount to very much
economically; is it really good busijiess?
The total amount of trade potential in the
East European countries should not be exag-
gerated. They are not among the great trad-
ing nations, nor are they soon likely to
become so.
Nevertheless, their trade could be mean-
ingful. The rocketing success of the free
economies in the West is exerting a major
influence on the economic planners of the
East.
In the past 15 years East European trade
has increased fivefold. Last year the free
world sold more than $6 billion in goods to
Eastern Europe and bought almost the same
amount.
The United States has not shared in this
growth. West Germany, for example, exports
more than half a billion dollars' worth of
goods each year, five times our present total.
Earlier this year, the Fiat company of Italy
entered into an agreement to build an $800
million compact car plant in the Soviet
Union.
In other words, East European trade with
the West is going to expand, with us or with-
out us. If we do not participate, however, we
will lose more than business opportunities.
We will have forfeited a major opportunity
to achieve policy gains, and this raises the
third question: Would expanded East-West
trade really amount to very much diplo-
matically; is it really good policy?
This, in the administration's view, is by far
the most important aspect of East-West
trade. Where reasons of economic gain might
justify it, reasons of policy require it.
As Secretary Rusk observed last week: ''
It is too late in history to maintain intractable
hostility across the entire range of relationships.
. . . even at a time when there are difficult and
painful and even dangerous issues between us, it
is necessary in the interest of Homo sapiens for the
leaders on both sides to explore the possibilities of
pointr, of agreement. . . .
Enlarged trade can be a significant frame-
' In an address before the Executives Club of
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
work for such exploration — if the countries
of Eastern Europe want trade, as surely they
do. Life magazine this week describes a trade
fair in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The American
pavilion was small compared with the Soviet
and German displays, but it was stocked with
such items as a cropdusting plane, data proc-
essing machines, a tire-recapping machine,
and an electronic "car doctor."
The magazine quotes one American official
as saying, "They try to do everything here
with one pair of pliers. When we showed
them 20 different kinds of pliers, not to men-
tion all those screwdrivers — well, my God."
In less than 2 weeks the pavilion had
attracted 650,000 people, three times the
population of the city.
At the most specific level, the enlarged
trade would give us the influence to secure
satisfactoiy economic concessions, such as
patent protections or trade and tourist pro-
motion offices or assurances concerning arbi-
tration of commercial disputes.
Reassertjon of National Identities
A larger benefit relates to the continuing
movement of these countries away from the
rigidities of the past. Politically, they are
reasserting their national identities. Eco-
nomically, they are turning increasingly
away from centralized direction and increas-
ingly toward greater use of the profit incen-
tive.
Yugoslavia is the model example. After
breaking away from the Cominform in 1948,
Yugoslavia began economic decentralization,
giving considerable autonomy to individual
enterprises. This has continued to the point
that Yugoslavia is now a member of the great
international economic institutions like the
World Bank, GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade], and the International
Monetary Fund.
This change is not isolated. Almost all the
countries of Eastern Europe are working to
overcome the clumsiness and inefficiencies of
overcentralized economic direction.
Next January 1 Czechoslovakia embarks on
a major economic reform program placing
new responsibilities on the plant managers
and placing new stress on the market and the
price system in determining the success or
failure of individual enterprises.
A year later Hungary is scheduled to put
even more radical changes into effect. New
experiments are underway in Bulgaria and
Poland. And you are familiar with the experi-
ments in using the profit motive underway in
the Soviet Union.
In most of these countries efficiency is re-
placing ideology as the guide in economic
matters, and the demands of the ordinary
consumer for more goods and a better stand-
ard of living are being listened to with new
respect.
What is most striking in this process of
change is that in no two Eastern European
countries are the changes identical. Each is
going its own way, reflecting growing feel-
ings of national identity and independence
which are coming to the surface throughout
the area.
But by acting on these changes, we can
advance our own interests and advance the
prospects of peace. Through trade we can
encourage them to rebuild their historical
friendly ties to the West. Through trade we
can increase their contacts with American
businessmen — and tourists. Through trade
we can encourage their participation in inter-
national institutions— and international re-
sponsibilities. Through trade we can increase
their stake in peaceful relations with the
West.
And, finally, basic to all of these benefits
is our demonstration of faith in the strength
of the free society. We do not fear the tests
to which the future will put such a society.
We have not sought to seal it behind an Iron
Curtain or a Berlin wall — nor should we seal
it behind a rigid tariff blockade.
That blockade should be removed. On
behalf of good business, good policy, and good
sense I invite and welcome your support.
JANUARY 2, 1967
East-West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
by Foy D. Kohler
Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs i
I am glad to be with you today. It seems
very appropriate to me that my first appear-
ance outside of Washington since my return
from the Soviet Union should be in Florida,
for it is the State my wife and I are in the
process of adopting, having originated, re-
spectively, in North Carolina and Ohio. This
background, I take it, will make us feel very
much at home among our fellow Floridians.
Just a few weeks ago, we returned from
Moscow after living there for nearly 41/2
years. Maybe as a result of that experience
and of previous assignments in Eastern Eu-
rope, I can cast some light for you on the
problems of East-West relations, a subject
which is vital — I was about to say a matter
of life and death — to all of us.
A century ago a voyage to Russia con-
sumed months. When we came back by com-
bination of plane and ship it took us 7 days.
When direct air communications are estab-
lished next year, a flight from Moscow to
New York will take about 8 hours. But even
today a missile can make it in 30 minutes.
For a good many years American Presi-
dents have been concerned that the traffic
between these two particular points on the
globe should go by sea and land and in the
atmosphere, rather than on a ballistic trajec-
tory through space. I have had the privilege
of working with several administrations —
with President Eisenhower, with President
Kennedy, with President Johnson — on this
' Made before the Florida Department of the
American Legion at Orlando, Fla., on Dec. 11 (press
release 290 dated Dec. 10).
question. I found that each of these Presi-
dents, looking at the problem from the point
of view of the national interest, of the well-
being and security of all Americans, came to
hold essentially the same views and reached
essentially the same conclusions. The policies
which have issued from their profound con-
sideration of how to insure a peaceful world
have been set forth by all of them, most
recently, of course, by President Johnson.
Speaking last August at the National Re-
actor Testing Center for the Atomic Energy
Commission at Idaho Falls, the President,
after hailing the peaceful potential of atomic
power, said: ^
But there is another — and a darker — side of the
nuclear age that we should never forget. That is
the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons.
. . . uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear
crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation
in which the world is capable of extinction in a
moment of error, or madness, or anger. . . .
Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts
to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We
did so because our conviction and our interests de-
manded it; and we shall continue to do so.
But we have never sought war or the destruction
of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought in-
stead to increase our knowledge and our under-
standing of the Russian people with whom we share
a common feeling for life, a love of song and story,
and a sense of the land's vast promises.
After talking of our differences with the
Soviet Union, the President posed the ques-
tion as to what practical step could be taken
forward toward peace. He answered himself:
» For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I think it is to recognize that while differing
principles and differing values may always divide us,
they should not, and they must not, deter us from
rational acts of common endeavor. . . .
This does not mean that we have to become bed-
fellows. It does not mean that we have to cease
competition. But it does mean that we must both
want — and work for and long for — that day when
"nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn. war any more."
In October, just before he left for his trip
to the Far East, President Johnson spelled
all this out a bit further in a speech in New
York reviewing U.S. policy toward Europe
as a whole.^
The Atlantic allies (he said) have always tried
to maintain (a healthy balance) between strength
and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility,
between resolution and hope. . . .
A just peace remains our goal. . . . the world is
changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of
today — not yesterday. . . .
Our purpose is not to overturn other governments
but to help the people of Europe to achieve:
A continent in which the peoples of Eastern and
Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together
for the common good.
A continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a
framework in which West and East can act together
in order to assure the security of all.
The President then listed some new meas-
ures he intends to take to strengthen the
prospects for improved relations with the
Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Eu-
rope in trade and other fields, and he wel-
comed comparable measures on the part of
our Atlantic allies.
Why have a succession of Presidents of
different political persuasion reached essen-
tially the same conclusions? Why did Presi-
dent Johnson state our policy in the terms I
have quoted? These are questions I should
like to explore with you this morning.
I think we can start by agreeing that the
free world continues to be challenged by a
hostile political system whose leaders claim
that only that system, materialistic in con-
cept, authoritarian in character, is capable
of solving the problems besetting mankind.
They proclaim as a matter of historical in-
For advance text, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
evitability that their system is destined to
rule the world. It is a fact that Communist
regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe pursue an ideology fundamentally
opposed to our own.
Since 1945 the conflict between the two
systems has sometimes taken the form of
trials of strength and periods of military
conflict; more often, it has been conducted
by less violent methods. That confrontation,
in broader terms, has its "defensive" and
"oflfensive" aspects, if I may use these mili-
tary terms. I propose to speak to you today
about both aspects.
Meeting Force With Force
In the course of the last 20 years the
United States has had to confront Commu-
nist violence in many parts of the world.
This we have done, and this we will do, if
necessary, again. We firmly believe that in
the nuclear age no power has the right to
impose its ideas or its system on others
through the use of arms. This is a funda-
mental lesson which all nations must learn
and abide by. We have striven to drive that
lesson home.
Accordingly, when Greece was threatened
by Communist subversion in the immediate
postwar years, the United States did not
hesitate to come to the aid of Greece. At that
time, there were many who argued that we
should not. They said that Greece was under
a conservative, indeed even a reactionary,
system not worthy of our assistance. Today,
20 years later, Greece is a thriving democ-
racy, and even the severest critics of Presi-
dent Truman's policy now agree that our
eflforts in Greece contributed to peace and
stability in the Balkans.
I need not speak to you at length about the
Korean war. Many of you assembled here to-
day took part in that conflict, and you know
well what was at stake. The United States
did not hesitate to send its young men and to
commit its resources in order to insure that
peace and stability would prevail in the
Northern Pacific. Because we did not hesi-
tate. Communist China as well as Stalin's
Russia learned, painfully and at some cost to
JANUARY 2, 1967
them, that the United States is unflinching
when faced with the threat of force.
In Europe we have made it clear to our
friends and foes that we stand by our com-
mitments. They have been tested twice in
BerUn. The United States is still in West
Berlin, and no citizen of West Berlin need
fear about his future.
There was a time during the postwar con-
frontation when the Soviet leadership, be-
cause of misguided assumptions, concluded
that the balance of power could be turned in
its favor and that the United States could be
stared down in a nuclear confrontation. So-
viet missiles were implanted not far from
here— in Cuba. But precisely because we
stood firm and fast, wisdom prevailed and
the Soviet missiles are there no longer.
Thus, painfully and gradually, a measure
of restraint has come into American-Soviet
relations. This has come about because the
Soviets have no illusions about our determi-
nation to meet force with force.
We are in the process of establishing the
same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there
is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of
Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind
of strategy international communism will
follow in this decade. Having learned that
overt force does not pay, some Communists
concluded that covert force may open the
gates. We are keeping them shut. It is no
secret that we believe that in keeping them
shut we are aiding not only the cause of
peace but also the arguments of those Com-
munists who have already learned that vio-
lence is not the way to global supremacy.
Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would
have helped the arguments of the more radi-
cal Communists who contend that covert vio-
lence is something to which the United States
cannot effectively respond. If we had not re-
sponded, we would have proven the radical
Communists right.
These periods of violence have thus dem-
onstrated — and are demonstrating in Viet-
Nam — that Communist attempts to expand
their systems by force can and will be con-
tained by the determination of the free
world. But, as I have suggested, these re-
sponses have been essentially "defensive."
And these contests have also demonstrated
that force is not a solution to the basic con-
flict between political systems.
Evolutionary Developments
In many respects the more important and
long-lasting aspect of the struggle is the one
I would describe as "offensive," despite its
less spectacular nature. I have in mind active
promotion of a process of gradual change
designed to shape the kind of world we
would all like to live in: a world of coopera-
tive communities in which ideological divi-
sions no longer create fundamental gulfs be- •
tween men and societies; a world in which |
violence gives way to the rule of law; a world
in which poverty and suffering are overcome
by worldwide efforts to improve the well-
being of man. |
Indeed, this quieter and more subtle proc-
ess has already brought about some funda-
mental evolutionary developments in the
Communist world. And the action of such
natural forces as nationalism has been en-
couraged by positive programs of developing
constructive relationships with the countries
of Eastern Europe carried on by the United
States and other Western countries for the
past decade.
The Communist world is no longer mono-
lithic. We can no longer talk of a Sino-Soviet
bloc. The first crack appeared in 1948, with
the Soviet-Yugoslav split. One- of the great
decisions in American foreign policy was
President Truman's prompt and immediate
support of the Yugoslav declaration of na-
tional independence by the provision of
large-scale military and economic aid to sup-
port this Yugoslav position.
Since then Yugoslavia has gone its own
independent way and is experimenting \vith
changes in its economic and political system
that are of importance for the Communist
world as a whole. As you probably know,
Yugoslavia has gone a long way toward a
market economy, and today the Yugoslav
leaders are debating what role the Commu-
nist party should be playing in this society,
how much dissent ought to be permitted,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
what forms of human liberty should be in-
troduced into a system that once was a totali-
tarian one. Just 4 days ago, for the first time
in Communist history the g-overnment of one
of the Yugoslav provinces, Slovenia, was
forced to resign in the face of opposition in
its own parliament.
Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary
challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the
Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed,
Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its
government has not broken with the Soviet
Union, and we should have no illusions about
that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of Pol-
ish life are free of Communist control. More
than 80 percent of Polish farmland is pri-
vately owned and cultivated. Collectivization
has been abandoned altogether. A measure
of freedom of expression is tolerated. Exten-
sive contacts with the West have been devel-
oped. Hundreds of young Poles are studying
in Western institutions, many of them in the
United States.
More generally, the process of fragmenta-
tion in the Communist world has been ac-
centuated by the Si no-Soviet dispute. That
dispute has dissipated the illusion of unity
which has been one of the sources of strength
of Communist ideology. It has proven not
only to the world at large but to the Com-
munists themselves that their ideology does
not insure global unity; it has proven that
national aspirations and feelings are more
powerful than doctrinal formulas.
Today the Soviet people can take little
comfort in having a Communist neighbor to
the East of them. That Communist neighbor,
with nearly four times the population of the
Soviet Union, makes no secret of its hostility
ind contempt for the Soviet Union. I often
.vonder how we would feel if one of our
leighbors had close to 700 million people,
vas developing nuclear weapons and rockets,
vas condemning our social system and laying
'laims to major portions of our territory. I
leed not recall how concerned we were about
he Soviet missiles on the small island of
]uba. Magnify that threat many times and
'ou may get a sense of how an average Rus-
ian feels.
The Sino-Soviet dispute has served to in-
crease the margin of autonomy for the East
Europeans. While generally siding with the
Soviet Union, with the notable exception of
Albania, the East Europeans have also taken
advantage of the dispute to assert greater
autonomy for themselves. This is a normal
and understandable eft^ect, typical of the in-
ternational game: Whenever a major partner
is preoccupied elsev/here, the minor partners
become more eflPective in asserting their in-
terests. In that respect the East Europeans
are no different from anyone else.
Desire for Closer Relations With the West
If I may generalize broadly, today the
East Europeans are increasingly desirous of
developing relations with the West. They
realize that the crisis they face in their econ-
omies, the need they have for more advanced
forms of science and technology, their quest
for cultural self-expression can only be satis-
fied through closer relations with the West.
This, to a large extent, is also true of the
Soviet Union. I have in mind here the Soviet
people rather than the Soviet leadership. The
leadership itself is still governed by ideologi-
cal considerations which color its approach to
the West. It is still more interested in pur-
suing the goal of fragmenting Western unity
than in seeking a general accommodation
with the West. But we should keep in mind
that Communist rule in these countries, by
their own definition, represents a monopoly
of political power in the hands of a single
party which includes only a small minority
of the population. And Russian society at
large, as I can testify through countless con-
tacts, desires to participate in the Western
civilization; it wishes to develop closer con-
tacts with the United States; it does not de-
sire to be cut off from the world by an ideo-
logical curtain.
I would be misleading you if I created the
impression that everything is rosy in the
Communist world — and I do not mean to
make a bad pun by that remark. There are
many things taking place there which we can
justly classify as retrogressive. We are un-
happy over the fact that, in the context of our
ANUARY 2, 1967
efforts to improve relations with the East, the
Czechoslovak Government has seen fit to kid-
nap a U.S. citizen who was not even in
Czechoslovakia voluntarily but was brought
in by a Soviet aircraft not scheduled to stop
there.
We are also dismayed, as are all free men,
by the sight of distinguished Soviet writers
being tried and sent to prison because they
dared to publish in the West the products of
their creative talent. We are indignant when
American tourists in the Soviet Union are
subjected to harsh and arbitrary procedures
for trivial offenses. We are concerned by the
conflict with the Catholic Church and by
other forms of intellectual intolerance re-
cently manifested in Poland.
All of these manifestations, however, have
to be seen in their broad perspective. And the
trend, to me, seems clear : It involves a decline
in the ideological passions which have
dominated mankind in the last 100 years.
Without going into tedious historical
analysis, I think it is fair to say that the age
of ideologies has been a peculiar phenomenon
in history. It was the product of a very spe-
cial phase of European development. Many
nations, going through similar social and in-
dustrial revolutionary changes, became in-
fected by ideological attitudes.
Those of you who travel to Europe must be
struck how much less ideological the Euro-
peans have become. The same is true, I can
tell you on the basis of my personal experi-
ence, of the East Europeans and the Rus-
sians. Indeed, precisely because they were
exposed to a pernicious and dogmatic
ideology, in some respects they are even less
ideological than their West European
brothers. I remember talking not long ago to
an East European Communist professor,
whom I asked, "Why did your ideology die
so quickly?" To which he responded — and, I
repeat, he is a Communist — "Die so quickly?
I think it took too long to die." His attitude
is symptomatic of many others who, disil-
lusioned by Stalinism, embittered by per-
sistent economic and social failures of the
system, are turning to more pragmatic solu-
tions.
10
I think it is our role in the world today to
take advantage of the trends of thought and
of the developments which I have discussed
to shape a larger and more stable relation-
ship with some of the Communist states and "<
to encourage constructive change within. We
should not lower our guard, but we should
take advantage of every opportunity to de-
velop closer contacts and wider relations with
them in order to shape a stable world.
Our efforts to that end have not been with-
out their rewards. We helped save Yugoslav
independence during its hour of danger, and
anyone familiar with East Europe knows
that in the years that followed Yugoslavia
has had a major liberalizing impact on the
rest of the Soviet world. Under President
Eisenhower we extended economic assistance
to the Poles, and we made it easier for them
to preserve their free-enteii^rise agricultural
system.
Trade a Two-Way Street
Taking advantage of the opportunities
which are now opening, we wish to expand
our relations with the Communist states.
Some of the restrictions on East- West trade
adopted during the earlier, more intense
phase of the cold war have now outlived their
usefulness. In proposing to Congress the
East-West Trade Relations Act,^ the Presi-
dent has taken an action designed to give
greater flexibility to the United States in
dealing with the Communist countries. The
export of military or militarily useful items
to Communist countries is effectively pro-
hibited by Allied agreement. Further restric-
tions on our trade with these states do not in
the long run deny the Communists anything;
they can obtain most of the goods concerned
in West Europe or elsewhere. Added restric-
tions do make it more difficult for us to de-
velop relations designed to shape patterns of
development that we consider favorable in
the Eastern states. At the same time they
punish our own farmers and manufacturers
unnecessarily.
■* For text of the proposed legislation, see ibid.,
May 30, 1966, p. 843.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I do not think I need to tell you that our
purpose is not a series of giveaways; rather,
our intent is to create such commercial rela-
tions that the Communist states develop
closer ties with the West, such relations that
they will increasingly be encouraged to evolve
domestically along the lines we desire. I can
assure you that the people in these countries
know how we and the Western Europeans
live. They know it is much better than the
way they live. They want to live as we do, to
have cars, adequate housing, and better
clothing.
It is clear to me that it is in our interest
to take actions which help bring about a
diversion of their resources from military
and space programs to consumer goods.
Trade is not just commercial, but also po-
litical. It is a two-way street and one of the
channels of communications with these coun-
tries. Let me put it to you this way. Who
here would not sooner have people in Yugo-
slavia growing tobacco rather than produc-
ing munitions? Who among us would not
rather have Soviet workers making passen-
ger cars instead of missiles? Isn't it better
for us all for Poland to devote increased re-
sources to production of high-quality pork
and ham? Who does not think it useful that
Romanian resources be devoted to an auto-
mobile-tii'e industry rather than to produc-
tion of jet fuel?
In sum, we must be able to use our vast
power and our resources to shape the kind
of world we would want to see our children
live in. In his recent major speech on East-
West relations, the President called for a
"broader vision of peaceful engagement."
This was not a call for an immediate accom-
modation with the Soviet Union, nor was it
an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on
the basis of the status quo. It is rather a
commitment on the part of the United States
to continue seeking a new Europe in which
a more durable settlement can eventually be
attained.
As the President said, the present division
of Europe and of Germany will be ended
through a long process of change, which re-
quires the emergence of new conditions and
attitudes both in the East and in the West.
There are no rapid breakthroughs waiting
in the wings.
As we look to the future, we believe that
progress toward European unity and Atlan-
tic cooperation provides a foundation stone
for a stable East-West reconciliation. We'll
continue to build such a Europe, and we'll
continue to seek such a reconciliation.
Eventually, we hope to see emerge an East-
ern Europe of more independent states, with
governments more responsive to domestic
needs and pressures, participating more fully
in a larger structure of bilateral and multi-
lateral East-West cooperation in Europe — a
cooperation that includes also the United
States and the Soviet Union. In seeking such
East-West reconciliation, in the words of
Secretary of State Rusk,^
Ours is not an effort to subvert the Eastern
European governments nor to make those states
hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No
one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is
again balkanized.
We approach this task in a spirit of self-
reliance and optimism. We know that we
have the means to repel aggression wher-
ever it occurs. We know that we have the
will to do so. Of this, let no one have any
doubt. But it is not enough simply to react
to Conununist challenges. If we are to win
this contest, we must remain on the "offen-
sive"; we must take positive and constructive
initiatives. We know that our citizens, intel-
ligently perceiving the realities of this age,
will support an East-West policy that uses to
the fullest the wealth and diversity of this
nation to shape an enduring peace.
' For text of Secretary Rusk's address at New
York, N.Y., on Aug. 22, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 12,
1966, p. 362.
JANUARY 2, 1967
11
President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect Amistad Dam
President Johnson and President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz of Mexico on December 3 made
a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam con-
struction site near Del Rio, Tex., and Ciudad
Acuna, Mexico. Follmving are texts of Presi-
dent Johnson's statement of November 29,
his remarks at Ciudad Acuna on December 3,
and a joint statement issued by the two
Presidents at the close of the visit.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Statement of November 29
Whit« House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 29
President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico has asked
me to join him on Saturday [December 3]
for a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam
construction site on the Rio Grande.
I will be accompanied by Mrs. Johnson,
Secretary [of the Interior] Stewart Udall,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- Ameri-
can Affairs Lincoln Gordon, and Ambassador
Fulton Freeman.
Some of you may know that Amistad Dam
is the second major international storage
dam to be built by our two Governments on
the Rio Grande pursuant to the 1944 water
treaty.
The dam will prevent floods originating in
rivers on both sides of the boundary from
causing loss of life and great property dam-
age such as occurred in the floods of 1954
and 1958. It will also assist in water conser-
vation and offer potential power generation.
It will enable the two Governments for the
first time to control the waters of the Rio
Grande throughout its international section.
Remarks at the Civic Plaza, Ciudad Acuna,
IVIexico, December 3
Whit^ House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated December 3
Last April we met in your beautiful capital
city to pay homage to a hero of the past.^
Today we meet here on the frontier to in-
spect a monument to the future.
The work that we see going on around us
tells us the dramatic story of what two
peoples working together can accomplish:
— Here we see the decisions of President
Eisenhower and President [Adolfo] Lopez
Mateos to embark on this joint enterprise.^
— Here we will see the action of two Con-
gresses in voting the funds to build the dam.
^Here we see the Mexican and the United
States technicians and laborers working side
by side throwing up the earth embankments
and erecting the concrete structures.
— And looking into the future, Mr. Presi-
dent, we will see millions of farmers and
towTispeople on both sides of this great river
enjoying the protection which this great dam
will afford and the resources and recreation
which this great lake will provide.
What we are accomplishing along this
river, Mr. President, sets a pattern which I
hope will be increasingly repeated by neigh-
boring countries throughout this hemisphere.
The future of Latin America's progress de-
pends in considerable measure on the develop-
ment of multinational projects such as we
have here at the Amistad Dam:
' For background, see Bulletin of May 9, 1966,
p. 726.
' For backgiound, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1960, p. 742,
and Dec. 5, 1960, p. 851.
12
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
— There are river basins like the River
Plate system to be harnessed.
— There are roads like the Eastern Andean
Highway to be built.
— There are petroleum and gas pipelines
to be laid.
— There are satellite telecommunications
systems to be designed.
— There are electric power grids, as in
Central America, yet to be connected.
— There are basic industries like fertilizer,
paper, and petrochemicals that are to be de-
veloped.
— And there are still inner frontiers in
both Central and South America yet to be ex-
plored.
We have other frontiers to cross together:
There are children to be educated, minds to
be developed, bodies to be healed, health to be
preserved. These, too, are worthy goals for
good neighbors who share a common dedica-
tion to human progress and to social justice.
At the forthcoming meeting of Presidents
of the American Republics there will be op-
portunity for all of us to give the multina-
tional project movement added impetus.
For only by working across frontiers and
pooling human and material resources, as we
have done here, can a strong and an inte-
grated Latin America be achieved.
Our common frontier, Mr. President,
stretches for almost 2,000 miles from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean.
Amistad Dam is another link in the bridge
of mutual trust, friendship, and progress
which unite our two peoples.
Everyone here today in his own way has
contributed to the building of Amistad Dam.
You can be very proud of your contribution.
I am very happy and very grateful to my
good friend President Diaz Ordaz for the op-
portunity to share with him — and with you —
the pleasure of this moment of fellowship
and the excitement of the construction of a
great project like Amistad Dam.
Long live the friendship between the peo-
ple of the United States and the people of
Mexico.
JOINT STATEMENT, DECEMBER 3
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 3
The Presidents of the United States of
America and the United Mexican States have
come together here, because of the common
interest of their governments in the progress
of construction of the Amistad (Friendship)
Dam which is being constructed jointly by
the two governments on the Rio Grande near
Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila,
under the Treaty of 1944.
The Presidents have expressed their pleas-
ure at the satisfactory progress of the con-
struction which will assure completion of the
Dam by the Spring of 1969, on schedule.
The International Dam is a multi-purpose
project: It will control the River's floods and
thereby prevent the loss of life and devastat-
ing property damage as have occurred in the
past on both sides of the River from Del Rio
and Ciudad Acuiia to Brownsville, Texas, and
Matamoros, Tamaulipas.
With Falcon Dam, it will conserve the
greatest quantity of annual flow of the river
in a way to insure the continuance of exist-
ing uses and development of the optimum
feasible future uses within the water allot-
ments to each countiy. It will enable develop-
ments of hydroelectric energy which will be
divided equally between the two countries. It
will enable development of a great inland
water recreational facility for the benefiit of
this region in the two countries.
The Presidents recognize that the construc-
tion of the Amistad Dam stems from the good
understanding and frank and cordial spirit of
international cooperation which happily exist
between the United States and Mexico, and
that it constitutes an outstanding example of
how two neighbor countries can resolve their
common boundary problems with benefit to
both.
The Presidents expressed pleasure that this
joint visit to the site of the Dam has afforded
them opportunity to strengthen even more
their personal friendship which will undoubt-
edly be reflected in greater understanding
between the two nations.
JANUARY 2, 1967
13
President Johnson Lights
the Nation's Christmas Tree
Remarks by President Johnson i
Tonight, with prayerful hope for the
future, we have come here to light the Na-
tion's Christmas tree.
Exactly 175 years ago today America sent
another light out into the world. That light —
and that promise — was America's Bill of
Rights. Few documents in all the history of
freedom have ever so illuminated the paths
of men. Today, the light of that great charter
guides us yet.
I know, as you know, that we face an un-
certain future. Grave problems threaten us
all. As your President, I struggle with these
problems every waking moment of every day.
Here at home, in our own land, more than
20 million Negroes still yearn for the rights
and the dignity that the rest of us take for
granted.
Abroad, half of the world's people struggle
daily against hunger, disease, and poverty.
And tonight, even as we speak, American
men are fighting in a strange land, a half a
world away.
And yet, at this time of Christmas, there
are signs of hope.
In the United States, we have made more
progress in human rights in the past 6 years
than we have made in all of the previous 100
years. And, if the goal of true equality is still
far down the road, the barriers before that
goal are falling every day.
Throughout the world old quarrels are be-
ing forgotten, and nation is joining nation in
a common effort to try to improve the lot of
man.
And finally, in Viet-Nam, the tide of battle
has turned. No one can say just how long
that war will last. But we can say that ag-
gression has been blunted and that peace,
with honor, will surely follow.
The months ahead will not be easy ones.
They will require great sacrifice, patience,
understanding, and tolerance from each of
' Made at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 15 (White
House press release) .
us. But let us here tonight dedicate this
Christmas tree with hope and great confi-
dence. And let us rededicate ourselves to the
principles of our Bill of Rights "to give light
to them that sit in darkness and in the
shadow of death, to guide our feet into the
way of peace."
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment
of U.N. Secretary-General
On December 2 the U.N. General Assenv-
bly unanimously approved the reappoint-
ment of U Thant to another term of office
as Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Follo^ving is the text of a letter from Presi^
dent Johnson to Secretary-General U Thant,
together ivith a statement by Arthur J.
Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON
U.S./U.N. press release 6001 dated December 4
December 3, 1966
My dear Mr. Secretary General: The
American people join me in warmest con-
gratulations on your reappointment for an
additional five-year term. Your selfless deci-
sion to continue to serve the organization
will, I am sure, inspire the membership to
strengthen the United Nations in discharging
the great purposes of the Charter.
In these troubled times, the devotion of the
best talents, energies and efforts of men of
good will to the cause of world peace is more
indispensable than ever before. We are
therefore especially pleased that you have re-
dedicated yourself to this great task.
You may depend on my continuing closest
personal attention to the problems confront-
ing the organization in its search for peace.
In the years ahead, it is my greatest hope
that your rededicated faith and skills will
charge the United Nations with new
strength, and the human family vdth new
hope, and so give new substance to the
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
promise of the Charter. As you enter on your
new teiTn of office, you carry with you my
best personal wishes.
Lyndon B. Johnson
statement by ambassador goldberg
U.S./ U.N. press release 5000 dated December 2
The United States is immensely gratified
at the decision of the Secretary-General to
accept another full term in this most im-
portant oflSce.
His high sense of duty led him to accede
to the unanimous wishes of the Security
Council, in spite of his personal desire to re-
turn to private life. The United Nations
sorely needs his experience, integrity, and
the trust he commands from the entire mem-
bership of the organization. By accepting
another term he brings new strength, pur-
pose, and confidence to the United Nations
and to the high office of the Secretary-Gen-
eral itself.
My Government pledges him its full sup-
port in this role which is so vital to the cause
of world peace and security.
International Conference
on Education
Folloiving is the text of a letter from.
President Johnson to Dr. James Perkins,
"president of Cornell University, regarding
preparations for the International Confer-
ence on Education to be held in 1967.
White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 24
November 24, 1966
Dear Dr. Perkins : As you know, we are
deeply concerned about the role of education
in fostering social and economic development
throughout the world. That concern underlies
the new International Education Act of
1966. It is the reason for the Center for
Educational Cooperation which we are plan-
ning to establish in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare.
I believe it is highly important to stimu-
late deeper mutual understanding among na-
tions of the major education problems facing
the world. For this reason, I have asked you
and Secretary Gardner to serve as hosts to an
International Conference on Education to be
held in 1967. It should provide a forum for
lively discussion of future goals of educa-
tional policy in the participating countries.
Prior to this conference, I hope you will
bring together the most knowledgeable edu-
cators and administrators from the United
States and from other nations to develop a
meaningful agenda.
I am grateful to you for undertaking this
important project.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Group To Study Educational TV
for Use in Aid Program
Following is the text of a memorandum
from President Johnson to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, the Director of the United
States Information Agency, the Director of
the Agency for International Development,
and the Director of the Peace Corps.
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated November 26
November 26, 1966
During my recent trip to the Far East,
I visited the educational television station in
Pago Pago, American Samoa, and saw how
television is being used to improve the level
of learning in elementary and secondary
schools.
I believe that educational television can
play a vital role in assisting less-developed
countries in their educational effort. These
stations can be used for adult education and
information programs during evening hours.
Community leaders can use these channels
for discussion of important public issues.
For these reasons, I am appointing a task
force with the following assignment:
JANUARY 2, 1967
15
1. Assess the value of educational televi-
sion broadcasting for primary and secondary
schools in less-developed countries.
2. Report on plans being made for educa-
tional television outside the United States
and how the United States may participate
most effectively in this effort.
3. Advise whether AID education pro-
grams and other foreign assistance can be
better concentrated on this effort within their
present limits.
Representatives of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, the Department of
State, U. S. Information Agency, Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, and
the Peace Corps are designated as members
of the task force. Leonard H. Marks, Direc-
tor of the U. S. Information Agency, is to
act as Chairman of the task force and Doug-
lass Cater of my staff as liaison with the
various departments or governmental agen-
cies involved.
This task force should commence its work
immediately and submit a preliminary report
within 90 days and a final report on or be-
fore July 1, 1967.
Lyndon B. Johnson
Letters of Credence
Botsumna
The first Ambassador of the Republic of
Botswana, Zachariah K. Matthews, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on December 14. For text of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated De-
cember 14.
Bulgaria
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Luben Nikolov
Guerassimov, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on December 14. For text
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated December 14.
Ivory Coast
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Ivory Coast, Timonthee N'Guetta
Ahoua, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on December 14. For text of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated December 14.
Lesotho
The first Ambassador of the Kingdom of
Lesotho, Albert S. Mohale, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on December
14. For text of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated December 14.
Policy Planning Council, European
Affairs Bureau Advisers Named
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
The Department of State announced on
December 9 (press release 288) the forma-
tion of two panels of advisers for the Policy
Planning Council. The establishment of these
panels is part of a general effort, made public
on October 18, ^ to seek the advice of private
American citizens interested in foreign rela-
tions.
One panel will advise the Council on long-
term problems of growth in less developed
areas, with particular emphasis on the prob-
lem of food resources in relation to popula-
tion growth.
The other will advise on long-term prob-
lems relating to the developed nations, with
particular attention to (a) relations among
the developed non-Communist nations; (b)
East-West relations, involving both Com-
munist and non-Communist nations; (c)
North-South relations, between developed
and developing countries.
Of the 22 members of the panels, 15 are
currently associated with universities and 7
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721.
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
are affiliated with research, public service,
and business organizations.
The panels will meet several times a year,
and the Department may be in touch with
individual members at other times on specific
matters.
The members of the two advisory panels
to the Policy Planning Council are:
Panel A — Economic Development, Food,
and Population Problems
Thomas K. Burch, director, demographic division.
Center for Population Research, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C.
Paul G. Clark, chairman. Center for Development
Economics, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass.
Jonathan Garst, agricultural consultant and author,
Berkeley, Calif.
Everett E. Hagen, professor of economics, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Earl O. Heady, professor of agricultural economics,
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
D. Gayle Johnson, profes.sor of economics, Univer-
sity of Chicago, Chicago, 111.
Bruce F. Johnston, professor. Food Research Insti-
tute, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.
Carl Kaysen, president. Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, N.J.
Dudley Kirk, president, Population Council, New
York, N.Y.
Gustav F. Papanek, Center for International Af-
fairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Hugh T. Patrick, acting associate director, Economic
Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn.
Panel B — Developed Countries
Abram Bergson, director, Russian Research Center,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Harold Van Buren Cleveland, vice president. First
National City Bank, New York, N.Y.
William E. Griffith, professor of political science,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Stanley H. Hoffmann, professor of political science.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Charles P. Kindelberger, professor of economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Mass.
Paul F. Langer, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
Calif.
Leon Lindberg, professor of political science, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
John Newhouse, associate, Twentieth Century Fund,
New York, N.Y.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., assistant professor of
political science, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pa.
Richard E. Pipes, professor of history. Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Henry S. Rowen, president-designate, Rand Corpo-
ration, Santa Monica, Calif.
BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
The Department of State announced on
December 15 (press release 293) the forma-
tion of a panel of advisers for the Bureau of
European AflFairs.
This is the sixth panel of advisers an-
nounced by the Department in accordance
with the general plan made public on October
18 for the creation of several panels of civil-
ian specialists from outside government to
serve as advisers to the Department on a
broad range of foreign policy matters. Ad-
visory panels for the Bureaus of Interna-
tional Organization Affairs ^ and East Asian
and Pacific Affairs,^ including a separate
panel on China,^ and two advisory panels for
the Policy Planning Council were announced
earlier.
The 22 members of the European panel
have been drawn chiefly from the academic
community, private foundations, and re-
search institutions. Other advisers may be
added as required.
Panel members will meet with the Assist-
ant Secretary for European Affairs, John
Leddy, individually or in small groups to dis-
cuss specific aspects of policy. Mr. Leddy has
told the panel members that he will look for-
ward to receiving their thoughts at any time
regarding existing policies and possibilities
for new initiatives. This procedure began ear-
lier this month when Mr. Leddy met with a
small group from the panel.
The members of the advisory panel to the
Bureau of European Affairs are:
Frank Altschul, vice president. Council on Foreig^n
Relations, New York, N. Y.
John A. Armstrong, professor of political science,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.
« Ibid., p. 722.
' Ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 868.
* Ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966.
JANUARY 2, 1967
17
Cyril E. Black, professor of history, Princeton Uni-
versity, Princeton, N. J.
John C. Campbell, senior research fellow. Council
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y.
Mrs. Miriam Camps, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, N. Y.
Melvin Conant, Government Relations Department,
Standard Oil Company, New York, N. Y.
Harold C. Deutsch, professor of history. University
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.
William Diebold, Jr., senior research fellow, Council
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y.
Merle Fainsod, professor of history and political sci-
ence. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Werner B. Feld, chairman, Department of Govern-
ment, Louisiana State University, New Orleans,
La.
William E. Griffith, professor of political science.
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass.
Ernest B. Haas, professor of international law and
organization. University of California, Berkeley,
Calif.
Henry A. Kissinger, associate professor of govern-
ment, Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Philip E. Mosely, director, European Institute, Co-
lumbia University, New York, N. Y.
Robert Osgood, director, Washington Center of For-
eign Policy Research, Washington, D. C.
Thomas C. Schelling, professor of economics, Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.
Warner R. Schilling, acting director. Institute of
War and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
New York, N. Y.
Paul Seabury, provost. College IV, University of
California, Santa Cruz, Calif.
Marshall D. Shulman, professor of international
politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, Medford, Mass.
Eric Stein, professor of law, University of Michigan
Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Shepard Stone, director, International Affairs Pro-
gram, The Ford Foundation, New York, N. Y.
Raymond Vernon, director. Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
News Policies in Vietnam. Hearings before the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 17-
31, 1966. 161 pp. [Committee print.]
Communist Threat to the United States Through
the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Septem-
ber 13-15, 1966. 42 pp. [Committee print]
Florence Agreement Implementation Legislation.
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance
on H.R. 8664. September 30, 1966. 87 pp. [Com-
mittee print.]
An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military
Assistance Programs in Vietnam. Forty-second
report by the Committee on Government Opera-
tions. H. Rept. 2257. October 12, 1966. 133 pp.
International Education Act of 1966. Report to ac-
company H.R. 14643. S. Rept. 1715. October 12,
1966. 21 pp.
Fur Seal Act of 1966. Conference report to accom-
pany S.2102. H. Rept. 2274. October 13, 1966.
4 pp.
Tariff Classification of Chinese Gooseberries. Report
to accompany H.R. 16160. H. Rept. 2282. October
14, 1966. 2 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Television
and Radio Receiving Tubes. Report to accompany
H.R. 16092. October 14, 1966. 3 pp.
Safety of Life at Sea. Conference report to accom-
pany H.R. 10327. H. Rept. 2285. October 14, 1966.
8 pp.
Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Canada-United
States Interparliamentary Group, May 18-22, 1966,
Washington, D.C., by Representative Cornelius E.
Gallagher, chairman of the House of Representa-
tives delegation. H. Rept. 2291. October 17, 1966.
16 pp.
Duty Treatment of Limestone for Cement. Report
to accompany H.R. 5950. H. Rept. 2293. October
17, 1966. 2 pp.
Duty Treatment of Dicyandiamide. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 16077. H. Rept. 2294. October 17, 1966.
2 pp.
Tariff Treatment of Certain Articles. Conference re-
port to accompany H.R. 11216. H. Rept. 2297.
October 17, 1966. 4 pp.
Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings. Report
to accompany H.R. 13116. H. Rept. 2303. October
18, 1966. 4 pp.
Footl for Peace. Conference report to accompany
H.R. 14929. H. Rept. 2304. October 18, 1966. 22 pp.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
OECD Ministerial Council IVIeets at Paris
The Ministerial Council of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment met at Paris November 2i-25. Follow-
ing are three statements made by Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs, who 7vas head of the U.S. delegation,
and the text of a commiinique issued at the
close of the meeting on November 25.
STATEMENT ON ECONOMIC POLICY,
NOVEMBER 24
I am pleased both personally and profes-
sionally that my first appearance at an inter-
national organization in my new post is at
this meeting of the OECD. We are happy as
a government to pay tribute to the OECD
on its fifth anniversary, which marks almost
20 years of constructive and sagacious work
by this agency and its predecessor.
I should like, if I may, to add a personal
tribute to what I have said oflicially. Every
student of economics and of international
affairs is in your debt for a solid and quiet
achievement, imaginative in its perspectives
and original in its intellectual strength. Your
studies and reports have been indispensable
tools of study and of action, both for gov-
ernments and international organizations
and for scholars in many fields all over the
world.
Those of you who have read President
Johnson's speech of October 7 ^ will appre-
'For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
ciate the importance our Government at-
taches to the future of the Atlantic relation-
ship. That speech announces a policy of
vigorous initiative in the many cooperative
programs which have done so much to vital-
ize the free world and knit it together.
If we look back to the bleak days of the
late forties, when this organization had its
beginnings, we can realize what stupendous
deeds have been accomplished. The economies
and societies of the free world have been
restored — indeed, more than restored, they
have been transformed. The nations repre-
sented here have never in their histories
known so long a period of sustained growth
nor a period so rich in progress toward social
justice. Their achievement is truly the great
social revolution of the 20th century, a revo-
lution accomplished peacefully and without
destructive conflict and one which dramati-
cally improved the welfare of all our peoples.
In this process the OECD has played a
significant part from the days when its pred-
ecessor helped to organize the eff"ort of the
Marshall Plan in ways which contributed to
the reconstruction both of national economies
and of the international economy which is
the decisive matrix of our respective national
economies.
If we look forward in the perspective of
this achievement, we can, I think, define one
of the vital functions which the OECD can
and should perform in guiding the relation-
ships between our national economies and the
international economy, from which they
[JANUARY 2, 1967
19
draw so much of their capacity for develop-
ment.
The decisive fact about our economic ex-
perience since 1945 is that each of us, in our
own ways, has created and mastered methods
for effectively managing our national eco-
nomic lives. We now take it for granted that
the great trade cycles of the past, the great
swings of unemployment and inflation, are
matters of economic history. It has been one
of the basic purposes of this organization to
help coordinate the policies of governments
and international agencies in this regard,
through the powerful influence of regular
consultations based on serious studies. We
take it for granted also that governments and
public agencies can and should anticipate the
future and help to direct flows of capital and
the development of crucial techniques. We
take it for granted that we should have poli-
cies directed at targets for growth, an inno-
vation in policy which this body has helped
to establish.
Some of the control measures developed in
this period have worked better than others.
Some are restrictive rather than expansive in
their effects. Many are incomplete or in need
of reform. For present purposes, the impor-
tant fact is that we have reason to be confi-
dent that our economic systems can be effec-
tively directed as systems and that we c?n
act effectively to improve and reform the
devices of guidance and control which we use
to manage different sectors of our economies,
and those economies viewed in their totality.
One of the shortcomings of the interna-
tional economy of the free world, as com-
pared with our several national economies, is
that we have not yet developed procedures of
international economic oversight as compre-
hensive and as effective as those used in na-
tional economic management. The OECD has
made an important and most useful begin-
ning in this regard. As we are all aware, one
of its great tasks for the future is to develop
this organization as an international coun-
cil of economic advice which could help na-
tional governments and other international
agencies of action to establish the policies
and programs we all need in order to main-
tain an international economy of wide hori-
zons through which mankind can be helped
to realize the potentials of modern technique
and to overcome the curse of poverty.
One of the major tools of economic man-
agement in all countries is that of the eco-
nomic review — ^the attempt to examine the
performance of the economy as a whole, and
the performance of its several parts and
sectors, in the light of our anticipations of
the future. With that thought in mind, I turn
now to the Secretary General's [Thorkil
Kristensen] excellent and candid annual re-
port to this Council, upon which he has just
commented.
U.S. Economic Policy
I shall note first the several references in
his report to the economic performance of the
United States.
As the Secretary General remarked, our
recent budgetary actions and programs of
monetaiy restraint have slowed down what
might have become an untenably rapid rise
in economic activity. We agree with his con-
clusion that both the level of internal demand
and the pressures of militaiy spending in the
United States raise the possibility that fur-
ther restrictive measures might become de-
sirable, depending upon the response of the
economy to the programs of limitation which
have already been applied and the new budg-
et. As he says, a flexible fiscal policy may be
called for in the months ahead. I can assure
you that the issue is on our agenda.
We will not have a recession in 1967. Nor
shall we have anything that could properly
be described as an inflation. All recent indi-
cations are that we are making the transition
to a sustainable full employment growth pat-
tern, despite the burden of our military re-
sponsibilities and all that they have involved
in recent years.
If we have not made further progress in
our balance-of-payments position this year,
the chief reasons are the increase in our im-
ports, due to the high rate of economic activ-
ity at home, and the continuing direct foreign
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
exchange costs of our inteniational commit-
ments — two factors which are interrelated.
These trends have been offset to a certain ex-
tent by capital movements influenced by the
level of interest rates in the United States.
The United States has, at present, a net
international payments deficit on military ac-
count of $2.6 billion. This is not the budget-
ary cost, but the foreign exchange drain. We
have a net deficit on foreign aid account —
after tying — of about three-quarters of a bil-
lion dollars. The total of these twa items
taken together is about 2i/o times our liquid-
ity deficit.
It is our policy to make further progress
toward equilibrium in our balance of pay-
ments, through the modification and continu-
ance of our present actions. The limiting
factor in that process, of course, is the need
to maintain military forces both in Europe
and in the Far East, where their presence is
required by overriding considerations of col-
lective security.
And there should be no doubt, finally, that
the United States is prepared to adjust its
fiscal, monetary, and other policies as neces-
sary to assure a growing, balanced economy.
Need for Productivity Gains
r Turning now to other aspects of economic
policy, I join in the general commendation of
Working Party II for its excellent review of
progress toward the economic growth target.
The policy lessons of the growth report are
plain.
We can agree with the Secretary General
that economic growth and price stability are
not always easy partners in a free society. If
we are to achieve both goals, we need to blend
fiscal, monetary, and income policies for flexi-
ble demand management and appropriate re-
straint on costs.
But new, bold policies will be needed to
supplement those which have already become
familiar. During the first 5 years of this
decade, labor markets in most of our coun-
tries were relieved of excessive pressures by
the availability of new workers. They came
into the labor market by immigration.
through a reduction of unemployment, or
through movements from farm to industry.
For the next 5 years, and for the longer run,
many of these sources may diminish in im-
portance. Meanwhile, the trend will continue
toward shorter hours, longer vacations, ear-
lier retirement, later school-leaving ages. If
present manpower policies continue, we shall
be lucky in many countries if the effective
labor force can be held stable — which would
mean that the entire burden of economic
growth wall depend on increases in produc-
tivity.
This prospect should tell us how necessary
will be policy measures aimed at steady and
substantial productivity gains. Many of the
issues that arise are being considered in the
bodies of this organization. We need to pur-
sue these lines of work with all possible ex-
pedition and vigor.
Higher productivity requires some reallo-
cation of resources and increased attention to
investment, as was so well pointed out in the
growth report.
For this reason, as well as for reasons of
simple social justice, we attach great impor-
tance to the manpower studies of OECD. We
have much to learn from each other's experi-
ence in this vital field. New and imaginative
methods have been adopted in recent years
in education, in retraining, and in encourag-
ing labor mobility. More is to be done, both
directly and through appropriate tax meas-
ures, to encourage the employment of older
people who prefer work to retirement and to
facilitate the training of migrants from so-
cieties which have not been part of the world
of modern technology. We are far from hav-
ing exhausted the range of wise and humane
actions that governments can take to raise
the income-producing capacities of their
citizens.
The United States has taken many of its
ideas in this general area from European ex-
perience, but we are still comparatively back-
ward in this significant area. We think that
continuing systematic exchanges on man-
power policy in the OECD can be of real
value to all of us in the pursuit of more
IJANUARY 2, 1967
21
mobile and more equitable societies.
Another key to higher productivity is ad-
vancing technology — the fruits of research
and development and investment in new
plant and equipment.
The Pace of Technological Change
I know that there is concern in Europe —
and understandable concern — that the pace
of technological change is lagging here in
comparison with the United States. In some
areas these disparities of technique produce
anxiety about a possible loss of economic
control, or a sense of coercive pressure.
I suggest that if these problems are ex-
amined in wider perspective, anxieties should
be allayed. If we look at the entire range of
our industries and not only at the few in-
dustries which have been propelled forward
by new techniques generated in or near
the defense sector, we see at once that there
are many technological gaps and not simply
one. The principle of comparative advantage
has not vanished as a force in economic life.
No one can ride on an American railroad
coach and conclude that all technical dispari-
ties are in one direction.
The problem of using science in technology
is a universal one and an old one. All coun-
tries have much to contribute if advance is to
be maintained. And advance requires many
modes of cooperative effort, from which we
have as much to learn as to contribute.
We are therefore ready, as President
Johnson said recently,^ to join with you in
a systematic examination of these problems
and in cooperative programs to further the
advance of science and technology. I have no
doubt that the work just begun by the
Science Policy Committee will illuminate this
whole complex area and will point to ways
in which we can cooperate to foster an opti-
mum rate of technological development
throughout the OECD community.
If we are to realize our full potential in
technological advancement, we shall need
more investment and the reallocation of re-
'Ibid.
sources that I referred to earlier. We are
persuaded that much can be done in all our
economies, and in the international economy,
to improve our machinery for mobilizing
savings and making them available for the ^
basic work of cost reduction through invest-
ment. This, I believe, is where the role of
our capital markets is fundamental to the
growth process.
As you know, the United States attaches
great importance to the capital-markets
study now before us and to the recommenda-
tions we expect to see emerge from further
work. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that later
today you call upon Mr. Silberstein [Murray
Silberstein, of Oppenheimer and Co., New
York] of the American delegation for some
further observations about this important
matter.
Restrictive Business Practices
Similarly, I trust that you are in agree-
ment that the organization should actively
pursue its work on restrictive business prac-
tices. Private arrangements to share mar-
kets, to fix prices, and otherwise to evade
the discomforts of competition are destined
by their nature to inhibit the growth of pro-
ductivity. When extended beyond one coun-
try they tend to frustrate and offset the
economic benefits of lower trade barriers.
Our Committee of Experts is considering
a recommendation to member governments
on international cooperation in the field of
restrictive business practices. We support
the recommendation and hope that it will
lead to further cooperative steps in this im-
portant field. The whole area is one of fun-
damental importance to the development of a
truly effective international economy. There
have been changes in law and practice in
this field in many countries in recent years
and in the European Economic Community.
Whether an international agreement is
needed to supplement national law in pro-
tecting the international economy as a whole
is a question which in our view merits seri-
ous consideration.
22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Continuing work on investment in educa-
tion, on curriculm building, and on teach-
ing teachers also deserves our support.
Nothing is more important for the future
of the OECD community than an expanding
flow of teachers and students in both direc-
tions across the Atlantic and Pacific.
Let me close this intervention with some
brief remarks on the bearing of certain other
international economic policies on economic
growth.
One is trade policy. We are not here to
debate the issues of the Kennedy Round.
But as we move into an economic situation
in which manpower and other resources be-
come progressively tighter, we are going to
need to improve the efficiency with which
we use these factors of production. Trade
policy offers the most immediate and prac-
tical way we have to expose our economies
to the fresh air of competition.
The forces of protection and restriction
are always with us, always seeking to es-
tablish comfortable enclaves of monopoly.
If we hope to hold a line against that pres-
sure and to find out where we can produce
most profitably, we shall need pressures
from outside as well as from inside our
countries. Our basic interests should lead us
not only to take advantage of the Kennedy
Round to achieve the greatest reduction of
tariff and other trade barriers in the post-
war period but also to take a long look ahead
at the needs of the OECD community for the
trade policy that will promote economic
growth.
International Monetary Policy
Finally, I turn to international monetary
policy.
Beyond the immediate problems of deficits
and surpluses is the question of the interna-
tional monetary system itself.
The system under which we have lived
since the end of the war has gone hand in
hand with the longest period of steady eco-
nomic growth and the greatest expansion of
trade in the history of our countries. It has
been developed and maintained by a series
of ingenious and imaginative devices of co-
operation, which have supplemented and fur-
thered the invaluable influence of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund. No tribute can be
excessive to the devoted work of the various
groups of experts in this field who have
solved successive threats to the monetary
system in a spirit of admirable solidarity.
Our Economic Policy Committee and its
Working Party III have also been notable
participants in this endeavor. Without these
international efforts the progress of the
world economy in investment, trade, and
growth would have been impossible.
The assurance of relative stability and
openness in our monetary arrangements has
been a major factor in the structure of the
economy, a factor favoring and facilitating
growth on a world scale.
Nonetheless, the monetary system is not
yet perfectly adapted to the economic needs
of the next generation. If by common con-
sent we now wish to modify it, we should
do so in the spirit of building on what has
been accomplished for positive and carefully
defined goals.
Essentially, we should seek to improve the
system in many ways that will continue to
provide the monetary basis for high and sus-
tained rates of growth of production and
trade. We wish, of course, to maintain the
discipline of external reality in our internal
programs of costs, prices, and investment.
But we do not want the monetary system
to work in such fashion that ijiembers of the
system encountering temporary balance-of-
payments deficits are driven to unduly dis-
ruptive internal and external policies.
Recent trends in the accumulation and dis-
position of reserve assets make it clear that
we need a new and assured source of
liquidity which can be employed responsibly
and under proper safeguards when needed.
This is, I believe, the objective of the Group
of Ten.3 And we need to adopt and adapt on
^ The 10 countries which participate in the Gen-
eral Arrangements To Borrow, designed to provide
the IMF with additional currencies.
JANUARY 2, 1967
23
a practical basis the sensible suggestions of
Working Party III in its report on the ad-
justment process. Other improvements in the
monetary system may well be considered.
As the fruitful and promising proposals of
recent years approach the point of decision
through the tested machinery of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, these possibilities
should also be examined.
The debate over monetary policy, like
many other aspects of economics, sometimes
takes on a moral cast.. We have gotten over
the puritanical conviction that periods of
depression and unemployment were good for
our characters. But we still sometimes talk
as if the balance of payments were a totem
to be worshipped, not an economic reality
like others to be controlled in the interest
of the general welfare. Not all balance-of-
payments deficits or surpluses are sinful or
harmful to the legitimate economic interests
of other countries. I hope and believe we are
learning to confront this fact as a fact with-
out raising the temperature of international
relations.
STATEMENT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS,
NOVEMBER 24
Press release 280 dated November 25
I should like to say a few words now
about East-West relations or more specifi-
cally about the part the OECD might play
in the task of closing the breach that has ex-
isted between Western and Eastern Europe
for nearly 20 years.
President Johnson on October 7 in a basic
statement of policy on American relations
with Europe said: "Our task is to achieve a
reconciliation with the East — a shift from
the narrow concept of coexistence to the
broader vision of peaceful engagement." He
observed in the course of his remarks that
"The OECD can . . . play an important part
in trade and contact with the East."
There is nothing new in this announce-
ment. What is new in the President's speech
is the feeling that for many reasons the time
may have come for the Eastern countries to
accept our overtures. We can hope so and
try, separately and together.
Two facts about the situation in Europe
are plain, as the President made clear: There
can be no detente in Europe without German '
reunification, but no peaceful reunification of
Germany can be imagined without detente,
without the consent of the Soviet Union and
the East European countries.
You will all recall that Secretary Marshall
in 1947 called for a European-wide coopera-
tive effort to restore the whole continent to
economic health.* It was the choice of the
Soviet Union and not of the United States
that made the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation a purely Western en-
terprise. It would be entirely fitting, as we
approach the 20th anniversary of the Mar-
shall Plan, for the OECD to have a part in
the unfinished task of fostering the recon-
ciliation of the two Europes. I
What might the OECD do to foster this
process? In the first instance, it seems to us
the OECD offers a place where we could
have a fruitful systematic exchange of
views about our peaceful economic relations
with Eastern Europe. If we begin with the
proposition that our interest is in expanding
and strengthening those relationships, then
we could use the several bodies of the OECD
for an examination of ways and means to
prosecute that interest. For example, we
should be interested in your experience with,
and appraisal of, the possibilities for invest-
ment in Eastern Europe, including joint ven-
tures.
We are not suggesting, I emphasize, that
we should promote a common position with
which to confront the countries of Eastern
Europe. Rather we should work for a shared
view about practical steps which might be
taken separately and together to extend and
advance the area of peaceful economic en-
gagement.
Trade is a case in point. The United States
has not traditionally had a large trade with
■* For an address by Secretary of State George C.
Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947,
see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
24
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviet Union and the countries of East-
ern Europe. In both the prewar and postwar
periods other OECD countries have had
much more ex])erience in this field. In this
respect, we are simply following the lead of
all the countries of Western Europe. Trad-
ing with centrally planned and state-trading
countries calls for diflferent methods than
those which apply in trade with Western
countries, at least at this stage in the evolu-
tion of the economies of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries. We believe there is much to
be learned from your experience and feel
that it could be extremely useful for the
Trade Committee to undertake an exchange
of views about the modalities of trade with
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
In the second instance, it seems to us
that there are certain activities within the
OECD that might be made more productive
for us all if we were eventually to associate
some or all of the Eastern European coun-
tries with them. One thinks, for example, of
tourism, which has become the single largest
European industry. Our citizens are breach-
ing frontiers everywhere, in the peaceful
pursuit of sunshine, scenery, and culture, to
say nothing of souvenirs. Now that the tour-
ist has found Eastern Europe, it might be
appropriate for OECD's Tourism Committee
to consider how its activities might be
broadened to cover additional countries; sim-
ilarly, we might consider inviting Eastern
European representatives to such activities
as the OECD-sponsored Conference on Road
Research.
These are suggestive, not exhaustive, of
possibilities that might be explored.
It would be prudent, of course, to move
ahead carefully. We recognize the need to
take fully into account the activities and po-
tential of the Economic Commission for Eu-
rope and of other organizations in the U.N.
family. For many purposes they will be pref-
erable institutions to the OECD as forums
for promoting improved East- West relations.
Following the sage advice this morning of
the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, we
should not waste our budget in duplicative
projects. Taking this aspect of the problem
fully into account, I urge that this ministerial
meeting endorse the proposal that the Sec-
retary General in consultation with heads of
delegations be asked to explore within the
organization the possibilities for a construc-
tive OECD role in the reconciliation of East
and West.
I further urge that a statement to this
effect be included in the communique.
STATEMENT ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
AND TRADE, NOVEMBER 25
The evolution of our agenda reflects the
changing pattern of world politics and of
world economics. For a few years — a very
few years only — Europe was our preoccupa-
tion. But the task of order and progress in
the world at large quickly forced itself upon
us. Our membership and our agenda were
enlarged.
Today we turn to one of the key issues,
on which, it is not too much to say, the
future of peace and progress depend.
Article I of our convention assigns a high
priority to development assistance policies.
We have just heard the somber and powerful
exposition of Secretary General Kristensen.
My Government agrees with his analysis. We
believe that in the years ahead of us we
shall have to take a great leap forward in
this field if we hope to avert social catas-
trophe on an unimaginable scale.
Our view of the nature of the development
process in nonindustrialized countries recalls
prevailing opinion about the problem of re-
construction in Europe at the end of the war.
At first we thought a few small reconstruc-
tion loans would do the job. We gradually
began to realize that the task was of a com-
pletely different order of magnitude, that it
required national and international efforts
on a very much larger scale: the Marshall
Plan and OEEC and EPU [European Pay-
ments Union] , productivity missions and re-
training programs — a long list of efforts
which were in fact sociological as well as
economic in their effect.
Development assistance is quite possibly
JANUARY 2, 1967
25
the most complex undertaking that our
countries have ever embarked upon. We are
only beginning to achieve a comprehensive
notion of how our resources can best be used
to further the cause of development. We shall
continue for a long time to need an active
and creative Development Assistance Com-
mittee to consider our respective experiences
and for the planning of new programs and
actions.
So far as the United States is concerned,
we see several areas for urgent DAC atten-
tion. They are:
First, the world food problem;
Second, self-help performance standards;
and
Third, the growing burden of indebtedness
on developing countries.
The Secretary General has referred to the
gravity of the world food problem, and Sec-
retary Schnittker [John A. Schnittker, Un-
der Secretary of Agriculture] will wish to
comment on this crucial issue.
My own view is that we face here a situa-
tion of potential disaster. We cannot afford
to pass over any opportunity to do something
about it now, while we still have a margin of
time.
Secretary Rusk last July at the DAC high-
level meeting asked for "openminded exami-
nation" by OECD members of a number of
proposals and questions for dealing with the
problem,^ all of which we hope the OECD
will consider. In the meantime our thinking
has progressed further.
In our judgment, one way we might col-
lectively mark the 20th anniversary of the
Marshall Plan would be for OECD members
more tangibly to demonstrate their willing-
ness to help the developing countries.
Agricultural Development Fund
We believe that OECD members should
carefully consider establishment of a fund
to stimulate agricultural development. Such
a fund could encourage investors in OECD
countries to invest in agriculture and in ag-
riculturally related industry in developing
■ Ibid., Aug. 8, 1966, p. 199.
countries. Perhaps it could guarantee invest-
ment in facilities located in developing coun-
tries producing fertilizer and other agricul-
tural inputs and it could provide an interest
rate subsidy on approved private loans for
agricultural development in developing coun-
tries.
We hope that you will wish to give the
most serious consideration to such possibili-
ties. Indeed, we should particularly welcome
proposals from you for an even more far-
reaching demonstration of the organization's
willingness to help meet the capital needs of
the developing countries. However, since we
all have budgetary problems, it is the under-
lying thought of the American suggestion
that we should try to use limited public re-
sources in such a way as to promote the
maximum flow of private capital to develop-
ing countries and particularly into the agri-
cultural sector.
A year or two ago the DAC devoted a
good bit of attention to the question of self-
help performance and recommended in July
1965 that member countries take account of
the self-help efforts of developing countries
in determining the level and composition of
their assistance. We believe that it is now
time for the DAC to return to the question
of development performance: How can we
employ our aid to elicit and support the best
efforts of the developing countries? This will
call for a closer look at what is going on
within the developing countries than we have
hitherto taken. And this need raises ques-
tions of procedures and organizational rela-
tionships which Secretary Schnittker will dis-
cuss in a moment.
Debt Problem of the Developing Countries
A thii'd subject for the DAC is the increas-
ingly sizable debt problem of the developing
countries.
A recent study by a DAC working party
gave some indication of its dimensions: Eight
countries with a total indebtedness of about
$7 billion are in near critical situations; an-
other 15 countries with a proportionately
large debt burden can be classified as serious
cases likely calling for urgent action by their
I
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
creditors in the near future. We believe fur-
ther study looking to ways of forestalling
impending debt crises is urgently needed. But
debt is the result of the volume and terms of
past lending. To increase the net transfer of
resources to developing countries, we must
increase the volume of aid and greatly im-
prove the terms of lending.
We hope the DAC will continue its efforts
in this field in close relationship with the
IMF and the IBRD [International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development].
Let me mention briefly the financial re-
quirements of the International Development
Association. Last July the President of the
Bank outlined his proposals for the replenish-
ment of IDA at a significantly higher amount
in order to provide resources needed to carry
on IDA'S critical role in providing develop-
ment capital. My own Government has stated
its willingness to increase its contribution to
IDA under suitable arrangements dealing
with the transfer problem,* and I hope that
other OECD member countries also will
promptly support IDA replenishment.
Finally, I believe that any OECD discus-
sion of trade policy in November 1966 must
give priority attention to the GATT [General
Agreement on Tariff's and Trade] negotia-
tions now entering their decisive stage at
Geneva. Full success of the Kennedy Round
can make a major contribution to improving
the export prospects of the developing coun-
tries. This will require, however, greater
efforts than heretofore to put together a
special package of particular interest to the
developing countries. We intend to do our
I part.
Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Special
Group, my delegation is pleased to support
the recommendation of the Trade Committee
and the Secretary General that the group
continue its work.
The Special Group has done a useful job
in beginning an exploration of various al-
ternative policies to provide improved op-
portunities for the developing countries to
expand their export earnings. This is an im-
portant, complex, and difficult subject, and
the full implications of any possible new ap-
proaches have to be carefully studied and
weighed. In particular, our effort to achieve
harmonized and constructive trade policies to
aid the developing countries should take full
account, in my view, of the importance of
continuing the process of reducing tariffs on
a global basis.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
1. The Council of the OECD met at Ministerial
level in Paris on 24th and 25th November 1966,
under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Gun-
nar Lange, Minister of Commerce and Industry of
Sweden, and reviewed the economic situation of its
Member countries, their economic relations with the
rest of the world, and the work of the Organisation
itself.
2. Five years ago Ministers set the collective tar-
get to be achieved between 1960 and 1970 of a 50
per cent growth in real gross national product for
Member countries as a whole.' Ministers welcomed
the Report on Economic Growth in the decade 1960-
70 which shows that progress so far has been satis-
factory and has even exceeded the rate needed to
meet this target. The growth prospects for the re-
mainder of the decade continue to be good, but the
problem of containing inflationary tendencies while
maintaining full employment is still in the fore-
ground. Member countries will have to pursue their
efforts to ensure the effective control of demand, the
increase of productive resources and the optimum
use of available manpower. Ministers therefore in-
structed the Organisation to continue its work on
these problems.
3. Concerning international payments Ministers
noted that, because of the strong measures taken in
the United Kingdom, a substantial improvement can
now be expected in the balance of payments of this
country. France, Italy and Japan, which recently
had large surpluses, are now also moving slowly
towards a more equilibrated position but a new
surplus appears to be arising in Germany. In the
United States' payments situation, encouraging prog-
ress has been made, although the deficit in the
global balance has not yet disappeared. Increasing
defence expenditure has contributed to a reduction of
the current surplus but the net capital outflow has
been reduced considerably because of higher interest
rates in the country and governmental measures. In
general the differences in interest rates between
Member countries are smaller than last year.
'For background, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 633.
' Ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014.
FAlSrUARY 2, 1967
27
Ministers instructed the Organisation to continue
to keep under surveillance the payments relations of
its Member countries taking into account the recom-
mendations contained in its Report on the Adjust-
ment Process.
4. Ministers agreed that the Organisation should
continue its work directed to improving the opera-
tion of capital markets; this work has given valu-
able indications about the mechanisms for mobilising
savings to finance investment. The Organisation will
also pursue actively the work already begun on the
nature and the economic consequences of differences
in scientific and technical levels between countries.
5. The developing Member countries have dur-
ing the period 1960/65 on the whole had a faster
economic growth than other Members but being
societies in transformation they have special prob-
lems that are being dealt with in the Organisation
and will call for continued attention.
Concerning the Consortia for Greece and Turkey,
it was stressed that appropriate aid in forms cor-
responding to the needs of the two countries con-
tinued to be necessary.
6. Despite some increase in 1965 the total flow
of aid from Member countries to developing coun-
tries in general is still unsatisfactory and the pay-
ments difficulties of a number of developing coun-
tries are increasing. Ministers stressed that the
volume of aid should be increased in the years to
come and its terms and conditions improved.
The Ministers took note of various suggestions
for improving the development assistance efforts of
OECD countries.
Agricultural production in a number of develop-
ing countries is growing slowly, while demand is
rising fast, partly because of the rapid population
grrowth. Greater emphasis should therefore be given
to agricultural development in the aid programmes
of Member countries and possible ways should be
studied of stimulating private investment in agri-
culture and agriculture-related industries in the de-
veloping countries.
The various aspects of the food problems are now-
taken up by the Organisation in co-operation with
other international organisations.
7. Ministers stressed the importance of a success-
ful conclusion of the current multilateral tariff nego-
tiations (Kennedy Round).
8. The Special Group set up to examine trade re-
lations with developing countries pursuant to a de-
cision by the Council meeting at Ministerial level in
November 1965 was asked by Ministers to continue
its work.
9. Finally, Ministers expressed interest in widen-
ing the area of east-west economic relations. They
agreed that the Secretary-General, in consultation
with Permanent Representatives, should consider
within the Organisation possibilities of action.
28
Barbados Admitted
to United Nations
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg \
U. S. Representative in the Security Council ' -^.
As the representative of my country I join
my colleagi'es who have spoken in expressing
great pleasure in the opportunity to vote to
recommend the admission of the newly inde-
pendent state of Barbados to membership in
the United Nations.
Barbados last month became the 26th in-
dependent nation in this hemisphere. We
congratulate both Barbados and the United
Kingdom for the peaceful and friendly
manner in which the transition to independ-
ence was accomplished. And this congratula-
tion I am very glad to extend in person to
the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Great
Britain, my old friend George Brown, who
graces us with his presence here today.
At the ceremonies in Bridgetown on No-
vember 30, Barbados became the 28th British
dependent territory to be granted independ-
ence after World War II. Quite a record !
Our Chief Justice and a delegation of
prominent Americans were privileged to par-
ticipate in the impressive independence-day
ceremonies in Barbados, to which Chief
Adebo [S. 0. Adebo, representative of
Nigeria] just made reference. They enjoyed
the hospitality and the balmy climate of this
island, just as many Americans have enjoyed
it with the great cordiality they have always
received from the citizens of Barbados. And
I wish to take this occasion to assure the citi-
zens of Barbados that as fellow ex-colonists
we shall receive them with similar cordiality
if they visit the friendly shores of Massa-
chusetts.
We believe that Barbados enters the family
of nations with a proud heritage which will
serve it well as it faces the challenges of in-
dependence. Lord Caradon [representative of
the United Kingdom] has made reference to
' Made in the Security Council on Dec. 7 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5005).
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
their great democratic tradition. Indeed, it is
well to remind ourselves that the Barbados
House of Assembly, established in 1639, is
the third oldest parliament in the Common-
wealth of Nations and also the third oldest in
the Western Hemisphere. The Barbados Dec-
laration of Rights of 1651 was well known
to the framers of our Declaration of Inde-
pendence and to the framers of our Consti-
tution. Indeed, many of the rights which
were proclaimed in the Barbados Declaration
of Rights were later echoed in these great
American documents of independence and
equality.
The people of Barbados have enjoyed full
internal self-government since 1961, and
their government was chosen in free demo-
cratic elections under universal suffrage. So
this country is well prepared to take its place
in the family of nations as a sovereign state.
Reference has already been made, and I
shall not repeat what has been said, about the
commendable advances that the people of
Barbados have made in the economic and
social spheres.
In conclusion, I wish to convey on behalf
of the United States our sincere congratula-
tions to the distinguished Prime Minister of
Barbados, Mr. Errol Walton Barrow, and
His Excellency the Governor General of
Barbados, Sir John Stow, who played such an
important part in this peaceful transition to
independence.
Mr. President, the United States welcomes
the application of Barbados and looks for-
ward to close association with its representa-
tives here, and we gladly support the resolu-
tion submitted here today by its sponsors.^
* The Council on Dec. 7 unanimously recommended
that Barbados be admitted to membership in the
United Nations. On Dec. 9 the General Assembly
admitted Barbados by acclamation.
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right
of Peoples to Self-Determination
Following are statements made by U.S.
Representative James M. Nabrit, Jr., in the
U.N. General Assembly during debate on the
agenda item entitled "Strict observance of
the prohibition of the threat or use of force
in international relations, and of the right of
peoples to self-determination," together with
the text of a tivo-part resolution adopted on
November 30.
STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 9
U.S. delesration press release 4970
I had not intended to participate in the
discussion this morning but some of the un-
founded and sweeping statements made have
led me to intervene.
I do not intend to speak at length. I can-
not refrain from noting, however, that the
willingness of certain delegates to use this
and every other U.N. forum to talk about
Viet-Nam, combined with their unwilling-
ness to let any U.N. organ try to do any-
thing about Viet-Nam, shows a cynical dis-
respect for the role and responsibility of the
United Nations and its members which my
delegation cannot share.
Viet-Nam is, of course, vitally related to
one of the rights touched upon in the speech
by the Czechoslovakian delegate this morn-
ing, the right of self-determination. Indeed,
this is the very core of the Vietnamese con-
flict. For what we seek in Viet-Nam, and
what the people of South Viet-Nam are fight-
ing for, is what any people anywhere have
the right to: the right to determine their own
political destiny free from interference.
No amount of polemics or invective or dis-
JANUARY 2, 1967
29
tortion of the record can alter the fact that
North Viet-Nam is so far unwilling to per-
mit the people of South Viet-Nam to exercise
that right. Surely, the representative of
Czechoslovakia — from the past bitter experi-
ence of his own people in both the postwar
and the prewar period — must have a deep
appreciation of the strong yearning of peo-
ples to choose their own political, economic,
and social system, free of external force and
intervention.
The essential facts of the Viet-Nam con-
flict can be stated briefly:
Viet-Nam today remains divided along the
demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in
1954. To the north and south of that line are
North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Pro-
visional though they may be, pending a deci-
sion on the peaceful reunification of Viet-
Nam by the process of self-determination,
they are nonetheless political realities in the
international community.
The Geneva accord which established the
demarcation line is so thorough in its prohi-
bition of the use of force that it forbids mili-
tary interference of any sort by one side in
the aff"airs of the other. It even forbids ci-
vilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In
1962, at the Geneva conference held that
year, military infiltration through Laos was
?.lso forbidden.
Yet, despite those provisions South Viet-
Nam is under an attack, already several
years old, by forces directed and supplied
from the North and reinforced by regular
units — currently some 17 identified regi-
ments — of the North Vietnamese Army. The
manifest purpose of this attack is to force
upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system
which they have not chosen by any peaceful
process.
The prohibition of the use of force in the
charter itself must apply with full vigor to
international demarcation lines that have
been established by solemn international
agreements. This is true not only in Viet-
Nam but also in all divided states, where the
recourse to force between the divided parts
can have far-reaching consequences. Further-
more, solemn international agreements, spe-
cifically the Geneva accord, explicitly pro-
hibit recourse to force as a means of reuni-
fying Viet-Nam.
It is because of the attempt to upset by
violence the situation in Viet-Nam, and its
far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the
United States and other countries have re-
sponded to appeals from South Viet-Nam
for military assistance.
We want a political solution, not a military
solution, to this conflict. By the same token,
we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has
the right to impose a military solution.
We seek to assure for the people of South
Viet-Nam the same right of self-determina-
tion — to decide its own political destiny free
of force — that the United Nations Charter
aflfirms for all.
As Ambassador Goldberg stated to the As-
sembly on September 23: ^ When it comes to
Viet-Nam, "what counts ... is not prowess in
the art of invective but prowess in the art
of peacemaking."
STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 30
U.S. delegation press release 4992
The United States, as a cosponsor of draft
resolution A/L.495, has participated vigor-
ously in the long and complex negotiations
from which the new draft, in document A/L.
501 just introduced by Ambassador [Kurt]
Waldheim of Austria, has emerged.
It is hardly necessary to recall the impor-
tant role which the United States has played
throughout its history in the evolution of
self-determination and freedom. One need
only refer to the Fourteen Points of Presi-
dent Wilson in this connection.
In this century my country has devoted
much of its human and material resources to
the protection of many nations and peoples
throughout the world from the ravages of
the threat and use of force. We hope that all
nations and authorities will heed the call of
this text to refrain from the unjustified use
of armed force and put aside attacks on
For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 609.
30
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
peoples who wish to be free and live in peace.
The United States warmly supports the
emphasis of the new text on freedom. For
our part, we consider that the right of every
people to freedom deserves special attention
and is something more than, and different
from, the principle of self-determination or
the combined "principle" of self-determina-
tion and independence. We are glad that this
compromise text recognizes the right of peo-
ples "to self-determination and freedom and
independence."
The draft resolution thus clearly applies
to the unhappy instances of those who have
been deprived of their freedom or autonomy
since the Second World War. The resolution
thus usefully reminds us that the depriva-
tion of the freedom of a people is as much a
violation of the principle of self-determina-
tion as the failure to permit a dependent
people to achieve self-government or inde-
pendence, as may be appropriate.
Second, this resolution is, of course, not a
statement of international law. While it
speaks in terms of rights and duties, it rep-
resents essentially a political statement by
the General Assembly of the importance of
freedom and self-determination and reminds
states of the critical importance that all
should comply with the requirement of arti-
cle 2, paragraph 4, of the charter, which
prohibits "the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." Certainly the compromise text
does not — and could not — affect obligations
of member states under the charter.
From the beginning of the debate on
agenda item 92, the Assembly has considered
only the prohibition of the threat or use of
force insofar as it relates to self-determina-
tion. Obviously, therefore, even if this text
were a statement of the law — which it is not
— it could not be an exhaustive one.
To give but two examples, in formulating
legal texts stating the principles concerning
the threat or use of force, the Special Com-
mittee on Friendly Relations will have to
JANUARY 2, 1967
articulate the fact that under article 2, para-
graph 4, of the charter indirect aggression —
subversion, infiltration, and terrorism — is as
equally prohibited as conventional forms of
armed attack. It will also have to elaborate
on the right of self-defense, which article 51
of the charter preserves, and its application
to all uses of armed force, direct and indirect
alike.
The compromise text does touch upon as-
pects of indirect aggression insofar as they
relate to self-determination. In adopting this
resolution, the General Assembly will once
again draw to the attention of the world the
gravity of indirect aggression. The resolu-
tion refers expressly to General Assembly
Resolution 2131 (XX), which this body
adopted on December 21, 1965.^ That decla-
ration specifically calls upon states not to
"organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activi-
ties directed towards the violent overthrow
of the regime of another State, or interfere
in civil strife in another State."
The compromise text now before us builds
upon this condemnation of subversion in all
its forms. Operative paragraph l(n) points
out that "the use of force in any other form
contrary to the Charter" is impermissible.
This political pronouncement by the General
Assembly is especially appropriate at a time
when unremitting efforts at illegal subver-
sion, infiltration, terrorism, sabotage, and
the clandestine supply of arms are endan-
gering the peace in many parts of the world.
I wish to make it clear that the United
States has participated fully in the negotia-
tions which have led to this compromise text.
We have also participated fully in the
work of the Special Committee on Friendly
Relations and will continue to do so. It is that
committee to which the General Assembly
has entrusted the task of the progressive de-
velopment of international law and its codi-
fication with regard to the principles of
friendly relations and cooperation among
states in accordance with the charter. That
' For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 124.
31
work is juridical work and requires partici-
pation by skilled jurists.
The legal character of the work of the
Special Committee on Friendly Relations and
the Sixth Committee has been expressly rec-
ognized by all three groups of cosponsors
who have authorized Ambassador Waldheim
to say, as he has, that ". . . these committees
are the bodies which deal with the foiTnula-
tion of legal principles" and that "It is for
use in that task that these materials are
referred." Indeed, the compromise text does
not purport to impose its statement of politi-
cal principle and exhortation as "the law"
on the principles of threat or use of force
and self-detei-mination.
Third, in the negotiations on the compro-
mise text particular attention was concen-
trated on preambular paragraph 4 which
reads: "Recognizing that peoples subjected to
colonial oppression are entitled to seek and
receive all support in their struggle which is
in accordance with the purposes and princi-
ples of the Charter."
This formulation is a vast improvement
over the proposal originally put forward in
A/L.493 which would have purported to rec-
ognize a "right" to seek and receive support
and assistance — without any qualifications
whatsoever. Obviously, such a right is sub-
ject to the provisions of the charter, particu-
larly the prohibition on the threat or use of
force in article 2, paragraph 4. The text of
the compromise properly reflects relevant
charter limitations on furnishing material
and other support.
Fourth, Mr. President, the United States
delegation notes that the reference to "inde-
pendence" in operative paragraph 1(b) of
the compromise text does not require inde-
pendence in the sense of independent state-
hood. As my Government has consistently
maintained, and as the General Assembly
has recognized in Resolution 1541 (XV), the
charter-based principles of self-determina-
tion can be fulfilled when a people freely
chooses independent statehood, free associa-
tion with another state, or integration with
another state.
In view of what I have said, the cosponsors
of draft resolution A/L.495 will not press it
to a vote and, instead, will vote for the com-
promise text in document A/L.501. We un-
derstand that Czechoslovakia and the other
cosponsors of A/L.493 support the compro-
mise and are not pressing their original pro-
posal to a vote and that Italy and the other
cosponsors of A/L.498 are doing likewise.
As I have said, this compromise text is the
result of a series of meetings between the
three groups of cosponsors of draft resolu-
tions on this item. These meetings, often pro-
tracted and difficult, have resulted in a
compromise text largely because of the
efforts of Ambassador Waldheim, who pre-
sided over them. In concluding, we want to
pay tribute to his untiring efforts to reach
a resolution acceptable to the three groups of
cosponsors.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION^
Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the
Threat or Use of Force in International Re-
lations, AND of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination
The General Assembly,
A
Drawing the attention of States to the funda-
mental obligations incumbent upon them in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations to
refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations and to develop friendly re-
lations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples.
Deeply concerned at the existence of dangerous
situations in the world constituting a direct threat
to universal peace and security, due to the arbitrary
use of force in international relations.
Reaffirming the right of peoples under colonial
rule to exercise their right to self-determination and
independence and the right of every nation, large
'U.N. doc. A/RES/2160 (XXI) (A/L.501 and
A/L.501/Corr.l) ; adopted by the General Assembly
on Nov. 30, 1966, by a vote of 98 (U.S.) to 2, with
8 abstentions.
32
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
or small, to choose freely and without any external
interference its political, social and economic system.
Recognizing that peoples subjected to colonial
oppression are entitled to seek and receive all sup-
port in their struggle which is in accordance with
the purposes and principles of the Charter,
Firmly convinced that it is within the power and
in the vital interest of the nations of the world to
establish genuinely sound relations between States,
based on justice, equality, mutual understanding and
co-operation.
Recalling the declarations contained in its resolu-
tions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2131
(XX) of 21 December 1965,
1. Reaffirms that:
(a) States shall strictly observe, in their inter-
national relations, the prohibition of the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. Accordingly, armed attack by one State
against another or the use of force in any other
form contrary to the Charter of the United Nations
constitutes a violation of international law giving
rise to international responsibility;
(6) Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which
deprives peoples under foreign domination of their
right to self-determination and freedom and inde-
pendence and of their right to determine freely their
political status and pursue their economic, social
and cultural development constitutes a violation of
the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, the
use of force to deprive peoples of their national
identity, as prohibited by the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their In-
dependence and Sovereignty contained in General
Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), constitutes a vio-
lation of their inalienable rights and of the principle
of non-intervention ;
2. Urgently appeals to States:
(a) To renounce and to refrain from any action
contrary to the above-stated fundamental principles
and to assure that their activities in international
relations are in full harmony with the interests of
international peace and security;
(6) To make every effort and to undertake all
necessary measures with a view to facilitating the
exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples
under colonial rule, lessening international tension,
strengthening peace and promoting friendly rela-
tions and co-operation among States;
3. Reminds all Member States of their duty to
give their fullest support to the endeavours of the
United Nations to ensure respect for and the ob-
servance of the principles enshrined in the Charter
and to assist the Organization in discharging its
responsibilities as assigned to it by the Charter
for the maintenance of international peace and
security ;
B
Considering that the above principles, together
with the other five principles concerning friendly
relations and co-operation among States, have been
the object of a study with a view to their progres-
sive development and codification,'' on the basis of
General Assembly resolutions 1815 (XVII) of 18
December 1962, 1966 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963
and 2103 (XX) of 20 December 1965,
Requests the Secretary-General to include the
present resolution and the records of the debate on
the item entitled "Strict observance of the prohibi-
tion of the threat or use of force in international
relations, and of the right of peoples to self-deter-
mination" in the documentation to be considered in
the further study of the principles of international
law concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, with a view to the early adop-
tion of a declaration containing an enunciation of
these principles.
U.N. doc. A/6320.
IJANUARY 2, 1967
33
Calendar of International Conferences'
In Recess as of January 1, 1967
Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- Geneva Mar. 14, 1962
cessed Aug. 25, 1966; to be resumed Feb. 21, 1967).
Scheduled January Through March 1967
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution Geneva Jan. 4-6
NATO Allied Radio Frequency Agency London Jan. 4-6
ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Problems of Nationality and Dakar Jan. 4-17
Registration of Aircraft.
ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and New York .... Jan. 4-23
Protection of Minorities.
ECE Electric Power Committee Geneva Jan. 9-12
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Jan. 10 (1 day)
UNDP Governing Council: 3d Session New York .... Jan. 10-27
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 10-27
OECD Trade Committee Paris Jan. 12-13
FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Food Production Paris Jan. 12-13
FAO International Conference on Weed Control Washington .... Jan. 15-Feb. 13
FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Review .... Rome Jan. 16 (1 or 2 days)
ECE Expert Group on Market Trends and Prospects for Geneva Jan. 16-18
Chemical Products.
ECE Inland Transport Committee Geneva Jan. 16-19
IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution: 2d Session London Jan. 16-20
ECA Conference of Industrialists and Financiers Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 16-21
GATT Trade and Development Committee Punta del Este . . Jan. 16-20
WHO Executive Board: 39th Session Geneva Jan. 17-Feb. 7
ICAO Special Panel of Experts on Limits of Liability Under Montreal Jan. 19-30
the Warsaw Convention as Amended by The Hague Protocol.
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . Paris Jan. 23 (1 day)
FAO Working Party on the Rational Utilization of the Fishery Rome Jan. 23-25
Resources of the Indian Ocean: 1st Session.
ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Jan. 23-27
ECAFE Working Party of Telecommunications Experts . . New Delhi .... Jan. 23-31
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, 1966,
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period
January-March 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Per-
sons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the
Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT,
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization;
ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE,
Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture
Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy
Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- American Economic and Social Council; lANEC, Inter- American Nuclear
Energy Commission; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Orga-
nization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi-
zation; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses;
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP,
United Nations Development Program; WHO, World Health Organization. ,
34 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ITU/CCITT Plan Committee for Africa Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 23-Feb. 8
CENTO Economic Experts Ankara Jan. 24-26
8th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East Khartoum .... Jan. 24-Feb 2
ECOSOC Working Group To Study the Proposal To Create New York .... Jan. 24-Feb. 3
the Institution of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights.
OECD Special Committee for Oil: General Working Group . Paris Jan. 25 (1 day)
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: Working Group . London Jan. 25-26
FAO Subcommittee on the Development of Cooperation Rome Jan. 25-28
With Other International Organizations Concerned With
Fisheries.
ECAFE Mekong Committee Vientiane .... Jan. 25-30
OECD Energy Committee Paris Jan. 26-27
ECE Gas Committee Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 3
UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 10
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session .... Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 15
OECD Turkish Consortium: Pledging Session Paris January
OECD Tourism Committee Paris January
ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Typhoons Manila January-February
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Feb. 1-3
NATO Science Committee Paris Feb. 2-3
ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Coordination Committee New Delhi .... Feb. 2-9
on Railway Research.
ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human New York .... Feb. 6-8
Rights.
IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures: 3d Session . London Feb. 6-10
International Coffee Organization : High-Level Working Group London Feb. 6-10
on Basic Quotas.
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission : 10th Annual Meeting . Washington .... Feb. 6-17
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Feb. 7-9
PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety: 3d Montevideo .... Feb. 10-12
Meeting.
Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Meeting .... Montevideo .... Feb. 13-22
Economic Commission for Africa: 8th Plenary Session . . . Lagos Feb. 13-25
ILO Governing Body: 168th Session Geneva Feb. 13-Mar. 3
ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women New York .... Feb. 13-Mar. 6
ECAFE Committee on Trade: 10th Session Bangkok Feb. 15-24
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee London Feb. 20-Mar. 3
ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 23d Session .... Geneva Feb. 20-Mar. 23
UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Session Geneva Feb. 21-Mar. 8
ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human Geneva Feb. 27-Mar. 3
Rights.
ITU/CCIR Study Group The Hague .... Feb. 27-Mar. 3
ECAFE Intraregional Talks on Trade Promotion Bangkok February
lANEC Special Legal Committee Mexico City .... February
IBE Executive Committee: 44th Meeting Geneva February
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna February
ECOSOC Commission for Social Development New York .... Mar. 6-22
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 19th Bangkok Mar. 7-14
Session.
OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Mar. 8-10
5th ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and Canberra .... Mar. 8-22
the Far East.
ILO Committee of Experts on Application of Convention and Geneva Mar. 9-22
Recommendations: 37th Session.
OECD Committee for Science Policy Paris Mar. 13-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 7th Session . London Mar. 13-17
ECE Coal Committee: Group of Rapporteurs on Fly Ash . . Pittsburgh .... Mar. 13 and 17
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Mar. 14-15
CENTO Economic Committee Washington .... Mar. 14-16
OECD Committee for Research Cooperation Paris Mar. 15-17
ICAO Conference on Charges for Airports and Air Naviga- Montreal Mar. 29-Apr. 18
tion Facilities.
U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression .... New York .... March
CENTO Liaison Committee London March
5th lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Ministerial and Expert Viiia del Mar . . . March
Level.
Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meet- Vina del Mar . . . March
ing of the Permanent Technical Committee on Labor Affairs.
JANUARY 2, 1967 85
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica-
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Report by the Secretary-General on the Present Sta-
tus of the Demilitarized Zone Set Up by the Gen-
eral Armistice Agreement Between Israel and
Syria (Part A). S/7573. November 2, 1966. 5 pp.
Letter dated November 15 from the representatives
of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and the United States of America and from
the permanent observers of the Republic of Korea
and the Republic of Viet- Nam transmitting the
texts of the three statements issued at the Manila
Summit Conference on October 25. S/7591. No-
vember 16, 1966. 12 pp.
Note verbale dated November 25 from the perma-
nent mission of the U.S.S.R. in reply to the note
dated November 7 addressed to the Secretary-
General by the permanent missions of France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States regarding
the "German Democratic Republic." S/7599. No-
vember 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Note by the Secretary-General concerning means of
strengthening the effectiveness of the United Na-
tions Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.
S/7603. November 29, 1966. 3 pp.
Letter dated November 30 from the Prime Minister
of Barbados making application for membership
of the United Nations. S/7607. December 2, 1966.
Ip.
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Operation in Cyprus for the period June 11-
December 5, 1966. S/7611. December 8, 1966. 61 pp.
Letter dated December 7 from the Deputy Secre-
tary-General of the Organization of African
Unity transmitting the text of a resolution on
Southern Rhodesia which was adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of
the OAU held at Addis Ababa November 5-9.
S/7614. December 7, 1966. 3 pp.
General Assembly
Population Grovjrth and Economic Development. Re-
port of the Secretary-General. A/6466. October 14,
1966. 11 pp.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment. Report of the Trade and Development Board
(31 October 1965-24 September 1966). A/6315.
October 17, 1966. 205 pp.
Letter dated October 20 from the representative of
South Africa transmitting a memorandum in am-
plification of his statement on October 7 in the
General Assembly in right of reply during the
debate on South West Africa. A/6480. October 20,
1966. 33 pp.
Personnel Questions. Composition of the Secretariat.
Report of the Secretary-General. A/6487. October
26, 1966. 41 pp.
Technical Assistance to Promote the Teaching,
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of
International Law. Report of the Secretary-
General. A/6492. November 1, 1966. 42 pp.
Report of the Executive Director of the United Na-
tions Institute for Training and Research. A/6500.
November 8, 1966. 51 pp.
Activities in the Field of Industrial Development:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the United^
Nations Organization for Industrial Development.
Report of the Second Committee. A/6508. Novem-
ber 11, 1966. 26 pp.
Reports of the International Law Commission on
the second part of its seventeenth session and on
its eighteenth session. Report of the sixth com-
mittee. A/6516. November 21, 1966. 63 pp.
United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Re-
port by the Secretary-General. A/6494. December
1, 1966. 11 pp.
The Korean Question. Letter dated December 2 from
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic
of Korea transmitting a memorandum of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Korea dated November
30. A/C.1/936. December 2, 1966. 12 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
United Nations
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Sig^ned at San
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Octo-
ber 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.
Admission to membership : Barbados, December 9,
1966.
BILATERAL
Botswana
Agreement relating to treaty obligations assumed
by Botswana upon its independence. Effected by
exchange of notes at Gaberones September 30,
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966.
European Space Research Organization
Agreement relating to the establishment and opera-
tion of a satellite telemetry/telecommand station
near Fairbanks, Alaska. Effected by exchange of
notes at Paris November 28, 1966. Entered into
force November 28, 1966.
India
Agreement extending the cotton textiles agreement
of April 15, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5559, 5664).
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi Octo-
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force October 21, 1966.
36
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Agreement extending- the agreement of November
18, 1964 (TIAS 5697), on cooperation in the field
of desalination, including the use of atomic
energ>'. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into
force December 3, 1966.
United Kingdom
Agreement providing for the use by civil aircraft of
the airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base on
Grand Turk Island. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington December 2 and 8, 1966. Enters
into force on a date to be mutually agreed upon.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
201)02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5^ each.
Ceylon. Pub. 7757. 8 pp.
Chad. Pub. 7669. 8 pp.
Hong Kong. Pub. 8126. 4 pp.
South Africa. Pub. 8021. 8 pp.
Tunisia. Pub. 8142. 4 pp.
How Foreign Policy Is Made (Revised). Illustrated
pamphlet reviews, in the context of today's prob-
lems, the roles that the President, the Secretary of
State and other Presidential advisers, the Congress,
and the American people play in the vital policy-
making process. Includes a basic statement of the
five fundamental goals of U.S. foreign policy. Pub.
7707. General Foreign Policy Series 195. 24 pp. 30<f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with British
Guiana — Signed at Georgetown May 29, 1965. En-
tered into force August 18, 1965. TIAS 5942. 3
pp. 5<f.
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with
Belgium, modifying and supplementing the conven-
;ion of October 28, 1948, as amended by the supple-
mentary conventions of September 9, 1952, and
August 22, 1957— Signed at Brussels May 21, 1965.
Entered into force August 29, 1966. With exchange
)f notes — Dated at Brussels September 27 and No-
vember 19, 1965. TIAS 6073. 25 pp. 15<S.
Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Sweden— Signed at Washington July 28,
1966. Entered into force September 15, 1966. TIAS
6076. 12 pp. 10«f.
Tracking Stations. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
extending the agreement of January 20, 1961, as
extended. Exchange of notes — Signed at London
July 19, 1966. Entered into force July 19, 1966. TIAS
6077. 2 pp. 5«'.
Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, ex-
tending the agreement of May 9, 1961, as extended.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Canberra August 9,
1966. Entered into force August 9, 1966. TIAS 6078
2 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon,
amending the agreement of March 12, 1966. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Colombo August 25,
1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. TIAS
6079. 2 pp. 5(f.
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Peru,
amending the agreement of December 27, 1946, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
March 2, 1966. Entered into force March 2, 1966.
TIAS 6080. 6 pp. 5<f.
Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agree-
ment. Agreement with the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank — Signed at Washington September 7,
1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966. TIAS
6081. 2 pp. 5«(.
Boundary Waters — Loan of Waters of the Colorado
River. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Mexico August 24, 1966. Entered into
force August 24, 1966. TIAS 6082. 4 pp. 5<f.
Defense — Establishment of Petroleum Products Pipe-
line. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Manila August 26, 1966. Entered
into force August 26, 1966. TIAS 6083. 5 pp. 5^.
Military Bases in the Philippines. Agreement with
the Philippines, amending the agreement of March
14, 1947, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Washington September 16, 1966. Entered into force
September 16, 1966. TIAS 6084. 3 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Jordan — Signed at Amman August
25, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. With
exchange of notes. TIAS 6085. 8 pp. 100.
Trade. Agreement with Argentina, relating to the
status of the agreements of October 14, 1941, and
July 24, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at Buenos
Aires August 3 and 8, 1966. Entered into force Au-
gust 8, 1966. TIAS 6086. 5 pp. 50.
Visas — Waiver of Nonimmigrant Visa Fees. Agree-
ment with Japan. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Tokyo August 9 and 23, 1966. Entered into force
September 22, 1966. TIAS 6087. 14 pp. 100.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong
Kong. Exchange of notes. — Signed at Hong Kong
August 26, 1966. Entered into force August 26, 1966.
Effective October 1, 1965. With related notes. TIAS
6088. 12 pp. 100.
Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Supplementary
protocol with the United Kingdom of Great Britain
TANUARY 2, 1967
37
and Northern Ireland, amending the convention of
April 16, 1945, as modified by the supplementary
protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, and Aug:ust
19, 1957— SigTied at London March 17, 1966. Entered
into force September 9, 1966. TIAS 6089. 16 pp. 10«».
Settlement of Investment Disputes. Convention with
Other Governments approved March 18, 1965, by the
Executive Directors of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), at Wash-
ington, for submission to member governments.
Open for signature at IBRD, and signed in behalf
of the United States of America August 27, 1965.
Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 95
pp. SOff.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Israel, amending the agreement of July
12, 1955, as amended — Signed at Washington Au-
gust 23, 1966. Entered into force September 22, 1966.
TIAS 6091. 3 pp. 5<t.
Study of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, sup-
plementing and modifying the agreement of May 9,
1961, as extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Canberra September 1, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 1, 1966. TIAS 6092. 4 pp. 50.
Defense: Transfer of Aircraft and Equipment.
Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Jidda May 16 and November 11, 1965.
Entered into force November 11, 1965. TIAS 6095.
3 pp. 50.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Nor-
way, amending annex C to the agreement of Jan-
uary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Dated at Oslo
August 29 and September 6, 1966. Entered into force
September 6, 1966. TIAS 6096. 3 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with the Republic of Korea.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul September 14,
1966. Entered into force September 14, 1966. With
agreed understanding. TIAS 6097. 5 pp. 50.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia,
amending the agreement of July 30, 1966. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Tunis September 19, 1966. En-
tered into force September 19, 1966. TIAS 6098. 3
pp. 50.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with the Republic of China, amending the
agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended — Signed at
Washington August 25, 1966. TIAS 6099. 5 pp. 50.
Continental Radar Defense System — Phaseout of
Certain Stations. Agreement with Canada. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Washing^ton September 30, 1966.
Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6102.
2 pp. 50.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1436 PUBLICATION 8181 JANUARY 2, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developmenta in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, bb well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin la for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Oflfice, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreian 116:
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
38
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 2, 1967 Vol LVI, No. U36
Agriculture. OECD Ministerial Council Meets
at Paris (Rostow, communique) 22
Barbados. Barbados Admitted to United Na-
tions (Goldberg) 28
Botswana. Letters of Credence (Matthews) . .16
Bulgaria. Letters of Credence (Guerassimov) . 16
Communism. East-West Relations: Shaping a
Stable Worid (Kohler) 6
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreigrn Policy 18
Department and Foreign Service. Policy Plan-
ning Council, European Affairs Bureau Ad-
visers Named 16
Developing Countries. OECD Ministerial Coun-
cil Meets at Paris (Rostow, communique) . . 22
Economic Affairs
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu-
reau Advisers Named 16
President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect
Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) . . 12
Educational and Cultural Affairs
Group To Study Educational TV for Use in
Aid Program (Johnson) 15
International Conference on Education (John-
son) 15
Europe
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu-
reau Advisers Named 16
Foreign Aid. Group To Study Educational TV
for Use in Aid Program (Johnson) .... 15
Human Rights. President Johnson Lights the
Nation's Christmas Tree 14
International Organizations and Conferences
Calendar of International Conferences .... 34
3ECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
[very Coast. Letters of Credence (Ahoua) . . 16
^atin America. President Johnson Visits Mex-
ico To Inspect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint
statement) 12
^esotho. Letters of Credence (Mohale) . . . . 16
riexico. President Johnson Visits Mexico To In-
spect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) 12
'fon-Self-Governing Territories. U.N. Urges No
Interference With Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination (Nabrit, text of resolution) . . 29
'residential Documents
Iroup To Study Educational TV for Use in Aid
Program 15
ntemational Conference on Education ... 15
'resident Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ-
mas Tree 14
resident Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect
Amistad Dam 12
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre-
tary-General 14
Publications. Recent Releases 37
Trade
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East- West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros-
tow, communique) 22
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 36
U.S.S.R.
East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World
(Kohler) 6
The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2
United Nations
Barbados Admitted to United Nations (Gold-
berg) 28
Current U.N. Documents 36
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of
resolution) 29
U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre-
tary-General (Goldberg, Johnson) 14
Viet-Nam
President Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ-
mas Tree 14
U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of
resolution) 29
Name Index
Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta 16
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 12
Goldberg, Arthur J 14, 28
Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov 16
Johnson, President 12, 14, 15
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 2
Kohler, Foy D 6
Matthews, Zachariah K 16
Mohale, Albert S 16
Nabrit, James M., Jr 29
Rostow, Eugene V 19
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 12-18
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 12 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
280 of November 24, 288 and 289 of December
9, and 290 of December 10.
No. Date Subject
t291 12/12 U.S. delegation to NATO minis-
terial meeting.
t292 12/13 Meeker: "Viet-Nam and the In-
ternational Law of Self-
Defense."
293 12/15 Advisory panel for Bureau of
European Affairs.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
i^U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/26
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Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Tasic
The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fir
to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integrati'
of the Western European community; and, third, to quicken progress in East-West relation!
President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers
New York, N.Y., on October 7, 1966, discussed the new steps being taken, and those under cc
sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STAGES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. US7
January 9, 1967
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 21 A2
VIET-NAM AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser 5A
SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES MANDATORY SANCTIONS
AGAINST SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 73
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENDORSES OUTER SPACE TREATY
Statements by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 78
For index see inside back cover
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 21
Press release 297 dated December 21
My season's compliments to the dis-
tinguished and talented members of the press
corps that covers and sometimes discovers
the Department of State. And I hope you
have a very prosperous and successful new
year.
Yesterday afternoon the 21st General As-
sembly concluded. As you by now are well
aware, a General Assembly constitutes a ma-
jor review of most of the international
issues of the day. You might be interested
that, with 98 items on the agenda and 121
members through most of the Assembly —
one country was added at the end — that
meant that there were almost 12,000 primary
votes cast in the General Assembly this year.
We are very grateful to Ambassador
[Arthur J.] Goldberg for his distinguished
leadership. He was ably assisted by Senator
[Frank] Church of Idaho and Senator
[Clifford P.] Case of New Jersey and a very
competent delegation up there.
Ambassador Goldberg just shortly — just
a few minutes ago made an extended com-
ment on the work of this General Assembly.
And you will be interested in reviewing that.
We will try to have copies of his statement
for you in the course of the afternoon here.
I must say that I was very much encour-
aged that the General Assembly was able to
bring the space treaty to a conclusion as far
as international discussions are concerned.*
We believe that this was a very positive step
forward, as a result of President Johnson's
initiative earlier in the year.
Outer space may seem a long way away,
but its activities very much involve us here
on this earth; and the application of the gen-
eral principles of the Antarctic Treaty to
outer space, I think, is a substantial step for-
ward and may help us in the never-ending
task of trying to put some ceiling on the arms
race.
We are very pleased that the Secretary-
General consented to accept an additional
term and carries with him into his new term
the solidarity of the support of the member-
ship of the U.N. And we wish him the very
best of success in his new term of office.
Viet-Nam was discussed in many ways at
the General Assembly — although it was not
formally on the agenda. It was discusj:ed at
the table and in the corridors. And it obvi-
ously is the major and most dangerous issue
in building a durable peace.
We have regretted that the United Nations
has not been permitted to take hold of that
question and try to find a solution to it. That
results primarily from the attitude of Hanoi
and Peking, who have repeatedly insisted
that this question is not an appropriate mat-
ter for the United Nations to deal with. That
attitude on their part has led many delega-
tions to believe that formal action by the
United Nations might get in the way of a
settlement of the matter by other means, for
example, the use of the Geneva machinery
or through other types of discussion or
negotiation.
We, as you know, have suggested to the
Secretary-General that he use his utmost
effort to bring this matter into a forum of
discussion,^ and we hope very much that
some progress can be made in that direction.
By and large, it was a constructive meet-
ing of the General Assembly, and we were
pleased and encouraged by the general re-
* See p. 78.
' See p. 63.
42
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
suits — although obviously there is still some
unfinished business, both in the housekeep-
ing of the U.N. itself, the unfinished business
of making proper arrangements for peace-
keeping.
But, nevertheless, we were pleased by the
course of the Assembly as a whole.
Now I am ready for your questions.
Antiballistic Missiles and the Arms Race
Q. Mr. Secretary, since Secretary [of De-
fense Robert S.] McNamara last month dis-
closed that the Russians are deploying some
antiballistic missiles, there has been consid-
erable speculation that this 7vas likely to
touch off another spiral in the arms race, and
there has been spectilation as to what the
United States can do about this in its discus-
sions with Russia. Would you care to address
yourself to that subject for a moment?
A. Well, there is not very much that I can
say on that today. You have seen what Secre-
tary McNamara has said.
We would regret very much the lifting of
the arms race to an entirely new plateau of
major expenditures.
As you know, we made earlier to the
Geneva conference proposals for freezes and
limitations on the further production of
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons.
We would like to see some means developed
by which both sides would not have to go into
wholly new and unprecedented levels of mili-
tary expenditure, with perhaps no percep-
tible result in the total strategic situation.
This is a matter that is before the Geneva
conference. We and the Soviet Union are co-
chairmen.
I presume that there will be further con-
tacts on this matter. But I cannot go into that
in more detail at this point.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, is one pos-
sible means to deal with this problem to
ipproach the Soviet Union on a moratorium
jn deployment of ballistic missile defense
systems ?
A. Well, implicit in the idea of a freeze is
:hat there will be an agreement that certain
imitations will be accepted, that those limi-
tations could be relied upon with assurance
by all sides, and that in that way both sides
could be relieved from the burdens of moving
to wholly new and major levels of expendi-
ture.
But this has been before the Geneva con-
ference. There has been no progress on it
thus far in that conference. The two cochair-
men^ we and the Soviet Union, have reviewed
the agenda from time to time to see where
we might make progress. That conference
will be meeting again in February. I just
cannot anticipate at this point just what
might be the result of the contacts that are
implicit in a matter of that sort, in a con-
ference of that sort.
VIet-Nam Negotiations
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to what Am-
bassador Goldberg said in his letter to the
Secretary-General, he made — he used some
rather siveeping language in saying that he
requests "that you will take whatever steps
you consider necessary to bring about the
necessary discussions." Does this represent
any policy change as far as the United States
is concerned in that one might read it as wide
enough to allow for some negotiations with
the National Liberation Front ?
A. I would not read detail into it. When 17
nonalined nations last year indicated that
they thought there should be negotiations
without preconditions, we said, yes, we
thought that was a good idea. The other side
turned it down.
We are prepared to talk about the problem
without preconditions of any sort from either
side. We are prepared to have preliminary
discussions with the other side about precon-
ditions, if they want to talk about those. We
are prepared to come to a conference. We are
prepared to have bilateral discussions. We
are prepared to use intermediaries. We are
prepared to have discreet and private con-
tacts.
But it is very hard to find someone on the
other side who is prepared to talk seriously
about bringing this matter to a peaceful con-
clusion.
The Secretary-General has a new term of
FANUARY 9, 1967
43
office with the overwhelming unanimous sup-
port of the United Nations. As you know, he
is very much concerned in this major prob-
lem affecting the peace of the world. And so
we would be glad to see the Secretary-
General use the widest powers available to
him to probe the possibilities of a serious dis-
cussion about a peaceful conclusion of this
matter.
Q. Do you use the term "other side" ex-
clusively to mean Hanoi, or does it include
the National Liberation Front?
A. Well, we have not talked about pre-
conditions of any sort with the Secretary-
General, and so I don't suppose I need talk
about them here.
President Johnson has made some com-
ments — in July of last year — about the
Liberation Front.*
But let's see what the Secretary-General
might be able to accomplish in his contacts
with those who are directly involved in this
and might bring it to a conclusion.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some keen
observers of this situation that think that so
long as Russia and Communist China are on
opposite sides, with their split, it ivould be
very difficult for Hanoi to sit down at the
conference table, tvith this conflicting advice
on either side of them. Do you think this is a
factor in holding up peace talks ?
A. I would prefer not to comment pre-
cisely on your exact question.
I think that undoubtedly the various capi-
tals in the Communist world tend to look over
their shoulders at each other in a matter of
this sort, and this somewhat complicates the
problem of responsible contacts and respon-
sible discussions with a view to winding this
matter up.
In that sense, there is no single place, there
is no single point of view with whom one can
enter into talks in order to bring it to a con-
clusion.
So I think the complexity on the other side
does complicate the technical procedures, the
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.
diplomatic procedures, by which one can
establish contact and move this thing for-
ward.
Q. Do you see any interest, Mr. Secretary,
on the part of Hanoi or the National Libera-^
tion Front in arriving at a longer Christmas
truce or talking about conditions for an
extended truce running into the new year?
A. No, I have not. From the statements
they made, it would point rather in the other
direction.
Americans Convicted in Soviet Union
Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that
the United States Government can do to try
to effect the release of Mr. [BueV] Wortham,
who was convicted to 3 years of labor today
by a Leningrad court ?
A. Well, we will continue to pursue this
matter. We did feel that, although these two
young men acknowledged the offenses for
which — with which they were charged, the
punishment was more harsh than the viola-
tions themselves would seem to warrant.
There are procedures of appeal and
clemency that are available, and we expect
that those will be utilized.
I do not myself wish to condone these par-
ticular actions, but I think, as the Soviet
Union moves into a period in which they are
trying to encourage tourism and have maxi-
mum contacts with other countries, that they
might recognize that on occasion minor inci-
dents of this sort may occur and that it will
be in their interest to resolve them in
accordance with the general practice of most
governments when temporary foreign guests
pull pranks of this sort — or whatever you
want to call it — that would be a violation of
local law.
I would hope that the Soviet authorities
would take cognizance of this sort of thing
and take action to mitigate the punishment
that has been meted out to these two men.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, Buel
Wortham's mother has expressed the hope
that he might be exchanged for the man
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
; named Igor Ivanov, who is being held in this
j coiintry under a 20-year sentence. Has any-
"> thing been done to negotiate such an ex-
] change?
. A. No.
Q. Mr. Secretary, going back for a moment
to your comment about the Secretary-
General, where you say that he has a neiv
mandate and that you ivould be very glad to
see him, use the widest powers available to
probe the prospects of peaceful negotiations,
does that mean that if he should succeed in
doing what he did once before, in arranging
for the other side to send representatives to
Rangoon or someplace else, that we would
this time accept the offer and also go our-
selves ?
A. Well, I don't want to go into the ques-
tion of whether or not there was a previous
incident of the sort that you talked about in
exactly those terms.
Q. He has said so.
A. Well, I think that when the full record
is out some day that will take on a somewhat
different context, and I think it is not good
for the future for me to intrude into the past
on that particular point.
But he has a maximum latitude here, as
far as we are concerned in the situation, to
see what can be worked out on the other side
in terms of responsible discussions.
No Indication of Deescalation From Hanoi
Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some
misunderstanding of our motives in seeking
a truce or an extended armistice, while, at the
same time, ive seem to tighten the noose and
hit harder ivith bombs in North Viet-Nam.
Cozild you put this in perspective for us?
A. Well, we have a military interest in hit-
ting military targets in North Viet-Nam to
try to impede, slow down, or interfere with
the steady movement of men and supplies
into the South. We have had nothing in the
way of reciprocity from the North in terms
of pulling back on their violence in South
Viet-Nam.
We have tried over many, many months
now, since the pause of January, to try to
get some indication from the other side as to
whether they would be willing to talk about
deescalation or enter into deescalation, in
fact, without any formal agreements, on
some basis of reciprocity. We have not been
able to do that.
These particular incidents, I think, have
to be looked at against the background of
what is responsible for the fighting and who
would be glad to see it wound up. As far as
we are concerned, we regret every person
that has been lost in South Viet-Nam, and in
North Viet-Nam. And there should not have
been any of these casualties if these people
in North Viet-Nam had undertaken to live
at peace with their southern neighbors and
not launched their Liberation Front, for
which they are now celebrating the sixth
birthday, and not sent their cadres and their
men and their arms and their regiments into
South Viet-Nam to seize that country by
force.
Now, all of this is unnecessary from our
point of view. And it could be brought to con-
clusion very quickly if that central ambition
on the part of Hanoi were abandoned. Now,
that's what is lacking here in this situation.
Now, in a struggle of this sort there are
going to be those who are injured by acci-
dent, or otherwise, or going to be those who
suffer from the struggle. But I should think
we ought to concentrate on why it started
and how it could be brought to a conclusion.
And, on that, I think the responsibility rests
very heavily with Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event no negotia-
tions for peace are upcoming, are we pre-
pared for a military victory in both North
and South?
A. Well, our objectives there have been
very clearly defined. We are trying to pro-
tect South Viet-Nam, under treaty commit-
ments, from this aggression by means of
armed attack from the North, from the in-
filtration of these men and arms into the
South. We have no desire to destroy North
JANUARY 9, 1967
45
Viet-Nam, or insist upon changing their
regime, or any of those things. We are trying
to meet our commitments to South Viet-Nam.
And, on that basis, this matter could be
wound up very quickly.
The NATO Council Meeting
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you assess for us,
please, the last week's NATO conference?
The reports from Paris were rather favor-
able. The French appear to be cooperative.
Brandt's [Willy Brandt, German Foreign
Minister'] debut got favorable reviews. I won-
der horv you feel about it ?
A. This was my 12th NATO meeting of
ministers, and I must say I thought it was
one of the most businesslike and most pro-
ductive of those that I have attended for
some time. I think there has been a rather
broad understanding between the Fourteen
on the one side and France on the other as
to the boundaries that now arise between
the Fourteen and France as to who would
take care of what kind of business.
The Fourteen met as the Defense Commit-
tee and transacted a good deal of business
affecting the military arrangements in the
alliance, including the nuclear committee
that was established. Those were referred to,
I think, in paragraphs 15 to 21 of the com-
munique.'' In the communique France pointed
out that they had not participated in those
discussions and did not associate themselves
with it. But as far as the other discussions
were concerned, France was present and we
had a good exchange among all 15 on such
questions as the East-West relations.
I must say that there was a general feeling
that two of our eminent new members among
the ministers, Mr. George Brown of Britain
and Mr. Willy Brandt of Germany, both
made very strong impressions on the Council.
So I think on the whole it was a very, very
encouraging and a very good meeting.
Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the qiies-
tion of a missile freeze, Secretary McNamara
has also told us that the administration plans
to ask Congress for appropriations for the
* For text, see p. 49.
Poseidon missile and improvement on the
Polaris missile. Would the administration be
willing to put off deployment of this missile if
there could be some agreement ?
A. No, I wouldn't want to get into that
kind of question. That is a problem for the
Secretary of Defense, and these are matters
that the administration is considering in
connection with his presentation to the Con-
gress. It's a matter on which there will be
full discussion with the appropriate congres-
sional committees. I wouldn't want to point
to the future in that way today.
International Effort on Food Problem
Q. Mr. Secretary, on tivo food decisions
facing the administration, will the shipments
to Yugoslavia that Congressman [Paul]
Findley has objected to be released, and will
grain be released for India in the near
future ?
A. As far as India is concerned, very sub-
stantial quantities of grain will be arriving
in India during January. As you know, we
have been concerned that this food problem
be taken up as a general international prob-
lem in which all countries who are in a posi-
tion to contribute will do so. It is not true
that we have been putting pressure on par-
ticular countries, as I have seen reported in
the last day or so. But, nevertheless, we are
glad that some other countries are taking up
this matter seriously and are making some
significant contributions.
The prospect is that over the next decade
there is going to be a major crisis in the food
situation and all countries, including those
who are going to need the food and those who
are in a position to contribute in whatever
way, must make a concerted and sustained
effort to deal with it. Otherwise, there is
going to be considerable hunger in the world.
You saw Secretary [of Agriculture Orville
L.] Freeman's remarks yesterday on that
subject, and I would expect and hope that
appropriate international action will be
taken to assist the Indians in their critical
problem.
At the present time I am not actually sure
just what the situation is with Yugoslavia,
46
DEPARTMEINT OF STATE BULLETIN
and I wouldn't want to comment on that
today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the
•^ current upheaval in China in terms of the
\ possibility of change in our relationship with
j Peiping?
I A. Well, we have not tried to analyze the
significance of what is going on in China. We
have the feeling that it is important, these
events there. But I think we would be fool-
ing you if we said that we fully understood
exactly what is happening. My guess is that
some of the leaders in China don't know
exactly what is happening. So our present
ignorance doesn't embarrass us too much.
But we have seen no indications thus far
that what is happening there has any signifi-
cant bearing on their relations with us or
their attitudes toward us.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your appraisal that
the Soviet Union has made a com,mitment to
an all-out deployment of the antiballistic mis-
^ sile system ?
I A. No. I have no information on that one
way or the other. We just don't know that.
Developments of 1966
Q. Mr. Secretary, now that it's getting
^ toward the close of the year, I wonder if you
. could summarize what you think have been
, the main gains and setbacks during the year
and what do you see in the year ahead?
A. Well, I would almost need some notice
on that question because that is a rather com-
: prehensive question.
I think that during this past year we have
„ seen continuing increase of contacts between
'J the East and West as far as Eastern Europe
i! is concerned. We had in front of us at NATO
t a little summation of the East- West contacts
I in the last few months among the NATO
countries, and I think there were about 185
items on that list, which is available to you.
There seems to be an interest in trying to
keep these East- West divisions under control
' and to try to find points of agreement if pos-
sible, whether in the arms field or in the
trade field, or cultural exchanges, or what-
ever. I would hope that that represents a
trend which will continue and that we can
begin to see some reduction of tension on a
more permanent basis between these two
great systems of states.
I think out in Asia we know now that
South Viet-Nam is not going to be overrun
by force by North Viet-Nam. And we see a
recovery of confidence and hope among the
free nations of Asia.
I think this past year has seen a very ex-
citing demonstration of the intention of the
free nations of Asia to get on with their jobs,
not only nationally but in groups, in coopera-
tion with each other. We have had such dra-
matic developments as the founding of the
Asian Development Bank and the formation
of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council]
group that recently met in Seoul, Korea. We
have a feeling that free Asia is on the move.
They are demonstrating a capacity to move
ahead economically and socially and with
more competence in the political field. Those
are all very much to the good.
We have been encouraged by the per-
formance of the Alliance for Progress and
the discussions which have been anticipating
the meeting of the foreign ministers in
February and a meeting of the heads of gov-
ernment in April here in this hemisphere. I
think in the broadest terms the general
trends have been in a constructive and
promising direction.
The most significant failure in 1966 has
been the failure to find a means to bring this
Vietnamese problem to the conference table
or to a peaceful solution. And I would hope
very much that the year 1967 would be a
time when that will become possible.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection ivith that
and in connection ivith the recent statement
to Secretary-General U Thant, are we saying
that ive will accept a cease-fire, a simple
cease-fire, which is lengthy or semipermor
nent ?
A. Well, we are saying that we believe
that the Secretary-General should exercise
his office to the fullest to explore all possibili-
ties of a responsible discussion with the other
side to bring this matter to a peaceful con-
JANUARY 9, 1967
47
elusion. I wouldn't want to elaborate that
matter in detail any more than is contained
in Ambassador Goldberg's letter, because
the Secretary-General himself ought to have
a maximum freedom of maneuver at this
point.
Food Assistance to India
Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to this
India food problem which has got to the
point, as I understand it, ivhere the United
States can't carry the bicrden alone — in
handling their financial and development
problems, why, recourse nms had to a con-
sortium, with the machinery to bring this
cooperation on the problem. I think it's Sena-
tor IGeorgel McGovern that is advocating
the possibility of some sort of thing like that
to work on food. What do you think of this?
A. Well, we have raised this food problem
in such organizations as the OECD [Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment]- — we did that here in Washing-
ton; ^ and in the FAO, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions. The Indian Government itself is in
touch with a considerable number of govern-
ments to find out what assistance might be
forthcoming, not only from the food pro-
ducers but from those who might contribute
fertilizer or funds or other types of
assistance.
I do think that a group of nations will
have to do what is necessary in a situation
of this sort. Whether it would be a formal
consortium or simply an informal arrange-
ment by governments dealing directly with
the Indian Government, I wouldn't want to
say at this point, but the OECD organiza-
tion and the FAO and other bodies will have
to give systematic and serious attention to
the food problem if, in fact, the problem is
going to be met here over the next few years,
and we strongly urge that they do so.
Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any
progress on the nonproliferation treaty in
the last couple of months ?
' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1966,
p. 199.
A. I think what we last said on that re-
mains the situation, that certain underbrush
has been perhaps cleared away, but there still
are important problems to be resolved. This
is a matter in which allies on both sides pre-
sumably are in touch with each other. I'
would hope that this next year — that we are
not too long delayed in the next year, that
we might find some way to resolve this mat-
ter. It would be a major step forward if it
could be brought to a conclusion, but I can-
not today report that we have reached that
point. It is a matter of discussion among
many governments at the present time, and
we would hope some progress could be made.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the India
food problem for a moment, there is still
pending on the President's desk the request
of India for 2 million additioyial tons of food
grains beyond the very large quantities that
we have committed ourselves to send, and 1
believe they wanted this to arrive in Febi~u-
ary to tide them over until the March harvest
has come in. I think in the past you have said
that this request nms under urgent considera-
tion by our Government. Does what you have
just said now indicate that tve would hope
that other countries would share this btirden
with us so that we would not have to supply
all the 2 million tons by ourselves?
A. I believe some announcements have al-
ready been made from some other govern-
ments, and Secretary Freeman indicated that
there would be a million tons of wheat arriv-
ing in India in January.
Q. In January? But what about February?
A. Well, that would be for distribution in
the month, presumably during the month of
February, and arrangements are being dis-
cussed about what might be done beyond that.
But there is no specific word today about
action taken beyond those already an-
nounced, and when the action — when any de-
cisions are made on this, they will be
announced.
The press: Mr. Secretary, we wish you a
Merry Christmas, and we hope you will be
able to take the whole day off. Thank you
very much.
48
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
North Atlantic Council IVIeets at Paris
The North Atlantic Council held its regular
ministerial meeting at Paris December 15-16.
Following are texts of the final communique
and three annexes which were released by the
Council at the close of the meeting on Decem-
ber 16, together ivith a list of the members of
the U.S. delegation.
TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE
1. Ministers of member governments of the
Atlantic Alliance have met in Paris.
2. The North Atlantic Council, meeting on
15th and 16th December, reaffirmed the pur-
poses and principles of the Alliance, and their
resolve to ensure stability and well-being in
the North Atlantic area, and to unite their
efforts for the preservation of peace and se-
curity for their peoples.
3. The Alliance has demonstrated its value
by successfully averting threats to peace and
safeguarding the security of the Atlantic
area. By its defensive strength including its
effective means of deterrence, as well as by
maintaining its solidarity, the Alliance has
produced the basis for the present marked
reduction of tension in Europe. This basis
remains essential for the security of the Alli-
ance and for progress towards a peaceful
solution of outstanding problems, including
the problem of Germany.
4. The Council associated itself with the
views expressed in the Declaration by the
Governments of France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the
United States which appears as an Annex to
this Communique. With regard to Berlin, the
Council stands by its declaration of 16th De-
cember, 1958.*
5. Ministers agreed on the need for con-
tinued efforts to achieve a peaceful solution
of the German problem to meet the German
people's fundamental right to reunification.
So long as Germany continues to be divided
there cannot be a genuine and stable settle-
ment in Europe. The peaceful progress of
Europe must proceed from reciprocal confi-
dence and trust, which will take time to grow
from sustained policies of co-operative effort
and better understanding on both sides. It
means especially removing barriers to freer
and more friendly reciprocal exchanges be-
tween countries of different social and eco-
nomic systems.
6. For their part, the members of the At-
lantic Alliance have confirmed their intention
to continue their efforts to secure better rela-
tions with the Soviet Union and the states of
Eastern Europe in the political, economic,
social, scientific and cultural fields. Ministers
examined the report on East/West relations
prepared in accordance with the instructions
given at the last Ministerial meeting in June
1966.2 They welcomed the wide range of sug-
gestions in the report and emphasised their
willingness to explore ways of developing co-
operation with the Soviet Union and the
states of Eastern Europe in tasks of interest
and benefit to all concerned. They, moreover,
noted that contacts, conversations and agree-
ments have recently increased. In the field of
East/West relations there are clearly differ-
ent approaches which can be adopted,
whether between individual countries or in a
wider international framework.
7. Ministers welcomed the approval by the
United Nations Outer Space Committee of a
draft treaty on the peaceful use of outer
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.
' For text of a communique issued on June 8, 1966,
see ibid., June 27, 1966, p. 1001.
JANUARY 9, 1967
49
space.' Encourag-ed by this, they affirmed
their determination to continue to consult ac-
tively on problems of disarmament, to keep
under review the progress of international
discussions on measures to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons, and to seek
agreement on satisfactory arms control meas-
ures which might contribute to the improve-
ment of European security and the relaxation
of tension. In so doing, they hoped to bring
about conditions which could permit a grad-
ual and balanced revision in force levels on
both sides. At the same time, they reaffirmed
their conviction that no acceptable permanent
solution to the question of European security
is possible without agreement on the most
critical political problems.
8. Turning to economic questions. Minis-
ters noted that the gap between the most ad-
vanced and the less-developed countries had
widened further. They reaffirmed that all ad-
vanced countries, whatever their economic
systems, had a responsibility to offer assist-
ance to developing countries.
9. Ministers expressed the hope that the
present multilateral tariff negotiations (Ken-
nedy Round) would be carried to a successful
conclusion and would promote the expansion
of trade to the greater benefit of all. They
also attached great importance to the initia-
tives designed to overcome the existence of
two trading areas in Western Europe and to
facilitate technical co-operation between the
European countries concerned.
10. On the initiative of the Italian Govern-
ment there was an exchange of views on ques-
tions arising out of the uneven technological
development of different countries. Ministers,
after stressing the importance and complex-
ity of this problem, invited the Permanent
Representatives to study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and to report their findings to the Spring
Ministerial meeting. A Resolution on this
subject was adopted and is attached.
• See p. 78.
11. The Council reaffirmed the importance
of continuing to assist Greece and Turkey
within the framework of the Alliance in or-
der to maintain the effectiveness of their con-
tribution to the common defense. Recom-
mending wide participation in the aid
programme, the Council agreed that this pro-
gramme should be extended to cover the pe-
riod 1966-1970.
12. Ministers took note of the Secretary
General's report on his "Watching Brief"
concerning Greek-Turkish relations and re-
affirmed their support for the continuation
of his activities in this respect. They ex-
pressed their firm hope that the continuing
exchanges of views between Turkey and
Greece on the Cyprus question and on Greek-
Turkish relations would contribute to bring-
ing about positive results. They reiterated
their appreciation of the presence of the
United Nations Force in Cyprus and the hope
that an improvement in the situation in the
island would be achieved. They stressed that
no action should be taken which could worsen
the situation in the island and increase the
tension.
13. On the proposal of the Belgian Govern-
ment and recalling the initiative taken by
Canada in December 1964, the Council re-
solved to undertake a broad analysis of in-
ternational developments since the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its pur-
pose would be to determine the influence of
such developments on the Alliance and to
identify the tasks which lie before it, in or-
der to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for
a durable peace. A Resolution on this subject
was adopted and is attached.
14. Ministers approved a report on Civil
Emergency Planning. They noted that a re-
appraisal of these activities within NATO
had been completed and they reaffirmed the
importance of such planning for the protec-
tion of civil populations and in the support
of overall defence.
15. Ministers met as the Defence Planning
Committee on 14th December, 1966. As a fur-
ther step in the process initiated at Athens
50
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in 1962, they approved recommendations re-
garding nuclear planning and consultation,
submitted by the Special Committee of De-
fence Ministers. They agreed to establish in
NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear
planning — a policy body called the Nuclear
Defence Affairs Committee, open to all
NATO countries, and, subordinate to it, a
Nuclear Planning Group of seven members
which will handle the detailed work.
16. To improve the ability of NATO to
engage in timely consultation in the event of
crisis, Ministers approved the development
of new arrangements for the rapid exchange
and the more effective use of relevant infor-
mation and data. To facilitate such exchange
of data, Ministers approved in principle the
establishment of a new NATO-wide commu-
nications scheme along the lines recom-
mended by the Special Committee. They also
examined a report from the Special Commit-
tee on possible improved procedures for con-
sultation. They agreed that further studies
and planning in this important area should
be undertaken, and requested the Secretary
General and Permanent Representatives to
consider how this work could most usefully
be carried forward. The Special Committee,
set up in June 1965, has now completed its
task.
17. Ministers reviewed reports on the pres-
ent status of NATO's military effort and
noted the force commitments undertaken by
governments for 1967 under the NATO Force
Plan adopted by Defence Ministers in July
1966.
18. After a comprehensive review of ques-
tions of strategy, force requirements, and
resources, in the course of which they dis-
cussed the military capabilities and intentions
of the Soviet Union, Ministers considered the
political, strategic and economic guidance
to be given to the NATO Militaiy Authorities
for their appreciation of the military situa-
tion as it will affect NATO up to and includ-
ing 1975. They gave instructions for further
studies in these fields in the light of this dis-
cussion.
19. On the basis of the results of numer-
ous studies conducted since July 1966, Min-
isters gave instructions for further work to
be carried out within the framework of the
new defence planning review procedures due
to be initiated in January 1967 for the regu-
lar projection of NATO force planning five
years ahead. This work will be directed, pri-
marily, towards securing the best balance of
forces and the most effective use of the re-
sources made available by NATO govern-
ments for defence.
20. Ministers underlined the importance of
the defence of the flank regions of the North
Atlantic Treaty area and issued further guid-
ance regarding the provision of external rein-
forcements in defence emergencies. They also
gave instructions concerning the improve-
ment of the local forces in the South-Eastern
Region. Substantial progress was made to-
wards agreement upon the common funding
of the exercises of the Allied Command Eu-
rope Mobile Force.
21. Ministers agreed to study whether a
NATO satellite communication programme
should be established which would provide
for a co-operative effort by member nations
in the new and developing field of space tech-
nology and its application to NATO's vital
communications needs. Meanwhile, an experi-
mental project was agreed which will provide
a link between SHAPE [Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe] at its new head-
quarters and AFSOUTH [Allied Forces
Southern Europe] at Naples.
22. France did not take part in the discus-
sions referred to in paragraphs 15-20 and
did not associate herself with the correspond-
ing decisions.
23. The Council decided that a new perma-
nent headquarters should be constructed at
the Heysel in Brussels, and a new temporary
headquarters at Evere, also in Brussels. The
Council expressed its gratitude to the Belgian
Government for having made available these
two sites.
24. The regular Spring Ministerial Meet-
ing will be held in Luxembourg in 1967.
JANUARY 9, 1967
51
ANNEXES TO COMMUNIQUE
Annex A
Declaration on Germany
The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United
States met on 14th December, 1966, on the
eve of the Ministerial Meetings of the North
Atlantic Alliance, in Paris in order to discuss
the situation in Germany. The meeting took
place exactly eight years after the four For-
eign Ministers had met in Paris on 14th De-
cember, 1958, when Foreign Minister [Willy]
Brandt, then Governing Mayor of Berlin, re-
ported on the situation of Berlin. The Foreign
Ministers confirmed that their governments
would continue to be responsible for the se-
curity and viability of a free Berlin.
The Foreign Ministers of France, the
United Kingdom and the United States took
note of the intention of the Federal Republic
of Germany to develop human, economic and
cultural contacts between the two parts of
Germany. These contacts aim in particular at
alleviating the human misery which is a
result of the partition of the German people.
The three Ministers share the views of the
Federal Government and will support these
efforts within the framework of the responsi-
bilities incumbent on their governments.
The Ministers re-emphasised that the solu-
tion of the German question is one of the es-
sential problems in the relations between East
and West. This solution can only be achieved
by peaceful methods, on the basis of the right
of self-determination, and through the crea-
tion of an atmosphere of detente on the con-
tinent, under conditions guaranteeing the
security of all countries.
Annex B
Resolution on International
Technological Co-operation
(Adopted by the Council on 16th December,
1966)
The North Atlantic Council :
Recognising the need for continued pro-
motion of economic co-operation within the
spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty;
Having noted proposals submitted by the
Italian Government on 5th October and 7th
December, 1966, the additional comments
provided to the Council by the Italian Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, and the statements of
other Ministers in the course of the debate;
Convinced that it is important that con-
sideration be given to the Italian proposals
so that measures can be applied as soon as
possible to give renewed impetus to interna-
tional co-operation in the technological field;
and to such other measures as will serve to
raise the general level of scientific and tech-
nological achievement;
Recommends that the Council in Perma-
nent Session study the procedure which
might be followed for further examination
and implementation of the Italian proposals,
and report its findings to the Spring Minis-
terial Meeting;
Instructs the Secretary General to submit
shortly to the Council in Permanent Session,
a report on the scientific and technological
programmes already underway in NATO in
view of the contributions these activities can
make toward a reduction of technological dis-
parities.
Annex C
Resolution of the North Atlantic
Council
The Council, desirous of achieving the
fundamental purposes of the North Atlantic
Treaty in the spirit of cohesion and solidarity
between the signatories of the Treaty:
Considers it essential to analyse the politi-
cal events which have occurred since the
Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertain-
ing their influence on international relations
and on the Alliance itself;
Accordingly, the Council Undertakes to
study the future tasks which face the Alli-
ance, and its procedures for fulfilling them,
in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor
for a durable peace. It will examine ways of
improving consultation within the Alliance,
including the European member countries.
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In carrying out this study at a hig-h politi-
cal level, the Council will Utilise the most
appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling
its mandate.
A preliminary report will be examined at
the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the
Ministerial Council at its meeting in Decem-
ber 1967 will draw the appropriate conclu-
sions that emerge from the enquiry.
U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 291 dated December 12
Representatives
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, chairman
Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
Harlan Cleveland
Members of the Delegation
Department of State
Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France
Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State
Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State
Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic
Political-Military Affairs
Samuel T. Parelman, secretary of delegation. Deputy
Director, Office of International Conferences
Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs
George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Andrew L. Steigman, Staff Assistant to the Secre-
tary of State
George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of NATO
and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Department of the Treasury
Douglass Hunt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury
James F. King, Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasury
Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant to the Secretary of
the Treasury
Department of Defense
Maj. Gen. Russell Dougherty, USAF, Director, Euro-
pean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security Affairs
Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs
Adm. A. G. Ward, U.S. Representative to the Mili-
tary Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation
Gen. Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation and European Regional Organizations
Dwight Dickinson, Director, Office of Political Affairs
Philip J. Farley, Deputy U.S. Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Rep-
resentative
Timothy W. Stanley, Director, United States NATO
Force Planning Group
JANUARY 9, 1967
53
Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense
by Leonard C. Meeker
Legal Adviser ^
Throughout this land, the war in Viet-
Nam weighs heavy on the minds of Ameri-
cans. It is again and again the subject of our
talk, under the pressing flow of news dis-
patches and under the thousand impacts this
war has on our lives. It is never far from our
thoughts.
Fighting a war is never cheap, never easy.
The Viet-Nam war is a particularly difficult
one. As President Johnson has said, this is a
new kind of war. It is not a war of major
battles to be won or lost. It calls for courage
and fortitude to stick it out, over a long
period of time if need be.
There are few who would not be rid of the
war. It impinges directly on the lives of
American young men by the tens and hun-
dreds of thousands. Most Americans are
anxious to turn our full resources to another
great war — a war on poverty and hunger at
home and throughout the world. Some believe
the Viet-Nam war divides the world at a
time when we are most impelled to seek world
cooperation.
One cannot but be concerned about these
problems. No one can say that debate is
unnecessary — quite the contrary. We are
dealing with great issues. There are risks to
be weighed and roads that must be chosen.
It is my purpose, in the hour we have to-
gether this evening, to locate the Viet-Nam
war in the great river of time: first, to indi-
' 1966 Louis Caplan Lecture in Law at the Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law School, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
on Dec. 13 (press release 292).
cate something of how it arose; then, to relate
it to the existing framework of international
law; finally, to consider the place of this con-
flict in the building of a more stable and just
world order as nations move along the high-
road of history.
Origins of the Viet-Nam Conflict
Viet-Nam has a very short political his-
tory under that name — one that does not go
back even 20 years. Viet-Nam is made up
of three areas that were included in what
France called, for purposes of colonial admin-
istration, Indochina. Those areas were:
Tonkin in the Red River Delta of the north,
Annam along the central coast, and Cochin
China in the south around Saigon. In the
19th century France ruled these areas as pro-
tectorates and colonies, along with Laos and
Cambodia; all together, they made up Indo-
china.
The colonial picture was a typical one: ad-
ministrators from France to govern; French
armed forces to keep order; colonists to direct
agriculture and trade; native gentry and
leaders who were clients of the French and
profited from the relationship; finally, the
Indochinese majority, who performed the
labor of the country and received relatively
little return for their toil.
Japan's military leaders, as part of their
program of expansion and conquest, occupied
Indochina in 1940. The colonial administra-
tion and the European residents of Indochina
by and large collaborated with the Japanese.
54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
They hoiked thereby to keep the political, eco-
nomic, and social situation under control.
It was in World War II that the recent his-
tory of Viet-Nam began. Dissidents who
opposed the French and the Japanese carried
on a resistance movement. Ho Chi Minh was
the acknowledged leader of this movement
from the beginning. By 1945 the drive for
independence had become a significant politi-
cal force. The sense of nationalism and the
ideas of self-detennination were at work in
Indochina, as they were elsewhere in Asia
and soon came to be in Africa.
But France in the postwar period did not
follow the course of independence soon taken
by Britain for India, Bumia, and other
Commonwealth territories. France sought
instead to restore and reinforce its colonial
administration in Indochina. What had been
wartime resistance by the Viet Minh orga-
nization continued and grew as a struggle to
rid the country of colonial rule. In 1949
France sought to stem the tide by setting up
indigenous governments of limited authority
in Cambodia, in Laos, and in a new State of
Viet-Nam. France kept control of foreign
affairs, defense, and financial matters.
The guerrilla campaign of the Viet Minh
grew into a major war with the French
colonial forces. At the end of 5 years the bat-
tle of Dien Bien Phu had been lost by the
French, and Paris had decided to seek a po-
litical settlement. This was the origin of the
Geneva conference of 1954, in which the five
great world powers took part, along with
Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Viet-
Nam — each of which by then had its own
regime. The Government in the South had
been created by and was alined with France.
Hanoi was the seat of the rebel Viet Minh
regime which had been fighting the French.
Its concentration of militaiy and political
power was in the North, but it had guerrilla
units operating throughout the countiy. The
participants in the Geneva conference did not
have to produce any agreement at all. They
were free to continue all the existing dis-
agreements. The French and Viet Minh mili-
tary forces could have gone on with the
fighting, to whatever conclusion it would
yield. Since, however, they did reach a series
of international agreements, we are entitled
to look at them as binding legal instruments.
We will want first to see what contracts
were made. We will want to see what provi-
sion was made for insuring compliance. We
will want to look at what happened in fact.
We will want to examine the legal rights of
the- parties in the circumstances of 1956 to
1966.
The Geneva Accords
The 1954 Geneva conference produced
agreements on Cambodia and Laos as well as
on Viet-Nam, but for present purijoses we
shall consider only the instruments relating
to Viet-Nam.2 The chief of these was the
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Viet-Nam. It was signed on behalf of the
commander in chief of the French Union
forces in Indochina and on behalf of the com-
mander in chief of the People's Army of
Viet-Nam.
The very first article of the Viet-Nam
cease-fire agreement fixed a demarcation line,
near the 17th parallel in central Viet-Nam,
"on either side of which the forces of the
two parties shall be regrouped after their
withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army
of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the
forces of the French Union to the south."
Under article 19 of the same agreement, the
two parties were bound to insure that the
zones assigned to them "are not used for the
resumption of hostilities or to further an ag-
gressive policy." And under article 24 each
party was obligated to "commit no act and
undertake no operation against the other
party." Articles 16 and 17 of the agreement
prohibited the introduction into Viet-Nam of
additional armed forces or weapons, but per-
mitted the rotation of troops and the replace-
ment of wornout or used-up materiel. Article
18 prohibited the establishment of new mili-
tary bases throughout Viet-Nam territory.
In a separate document, known as the
^ For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State
publication 6446, p. 750.
JANUARY 9, 1967
55
Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference,^
the conference powers agreed that the settle-
ment of political problems in Viet-Nam
should "permit the Viet-Namese people to
enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed
by democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret bal-
lot." There were to be general elections in
July 1956 under the supervision of the Inter-
national Control Commission. Consultations
on this subject were to be held between repre-
sentatives of the two zones beginning in July
1955.
Here, then, were the basic undertakings of
the Geneva accords. If observed, they should
have kept the peace in Viet-Nam. What was
to insure that the parties would live up to
these undertakings ? The agreement sought to
provide some machinery for international
supervision.
There was to be an International Control
Commission, made up of representatives of
India, Canada, and Poland. The Commission
was to oversee fulfillment of all the obliga-
tions of the agreement. It was to have inspec-
tion teams at its disposal and access to any
and all places in both zones of Viet-Nam.
Some of the Commission's decisions could be
made by majority vote; others, including
those dealing with violations or threats of
violations which might lead to a resumption
of hostilities, would require a unanimous vote
of all members.
In this respect, the arrangement was
flawed from the beginning. Any member of
the Commission could veto a decision on a
question of compliance with the agreement.
On other matters, even a majority might be
unobtainable because the representative of
India, in carrying out his Government's
policy of nonalinement, could remain aloof
and equivocal on important matters. Vetoes
were in fact cast, and the Indian chairman
of the Commission often pursued his national
policy of neutralism and nonalinement. The
Commission had other difficulties, too. The
zonal authorities, and particularly those in
North Viet-Nam, denied access to the inspec-
tion teams of the Commission.
' Ibid., p. 785.
As a result of this state of aflFairs, the
world has not had an eff"ective, authoritative,
and impartial reporting mechanism on the
facts in Viet-Nam. There could and did arise
disputes about the facts in Viet-Nam. For
example, who lived up to the cease-fire
agreement, and who broke it? Was the sub-
sequent conflict indigenous and essentially a
civil war, or was there the intervention of
substantial and perhaps crucial external
force ?
Events in Viet-Nam Since 1954
Issues like these have a bearing on the
international legal rights of the parties. Be-
cause they are an essential part of the legal
analysis, we must try to deal with them.
Since, for the most part, we do not have avail-
able authoritative findings by an impartial
international body, it is necessaiy to work
with the best evidence that can be gathered.
I should like to set out what the United
States Government believes happened after
July 1954 and to set these events beside the
provisions of the Geneva accords. I shall, of
course, discuss what the Government of
South Viet-Nam and the Government of the
United States did after July 1954. But be-
cause their actions were in the nature of a
response to events directed from Hanoi, it
seems most logical to examine first what the
other side was doing.
Despite the obligation of regroupment in
the cease-fire agreement, some effective Com-
munist guerrilla units continued to operate in
areas of South Viet-Nam where they had
been during the hostilities with France.
Large numbers of the southern Viet Minh
troops who were withdrawn north of the
demarcation line were retained by Hanoi in
military or security units; others received
further training in guerrilla warfare.
The North Vietnamese regime began to
infiltrate these ethnic Southerners into South
Viet-Nam as early as 1957. Up to the conclud-
ing months of 1964, approximately 40,000
infiltrators moved south, to join the guerrillas
already there who had been supported with
arms and supplies by Hanoi since 1956. Once
in South Viet-Nam. the infiltrators were as-
56
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
signed to existing combat units or used to
form new units, frequently in their original
home provinces. All of this activity — the
training, the equipping, the transporting, the
assigning — was directed from Hanoi. It did
not just happen within South Viet-Nam.
As the infiltration from the North con-
tinued, Hanoi began to exhaust its supply of
ethnic Southerners who could be sent into the
South for guerrilla warfare. Beginning in
late 1964, the infiltrating units consisted es-
sentially of North Vietnamese soldiers or-
ganized in regular army units. Upward of
80,000 of these troops have infiltrated from
the North during the last 2 years. The
Northerners have frequently entered in large
units, rather than in small groups, and have
retained their military organization. After
allowing for casualties from all causes, it is
estimated that there are today about 45,000
North Vietnamese army regulars in South
Viet-Nam. This represents nearly half of the
main force of Communist combat troops in
the South — a force currently estimated at
100,000. Of the remaining 55,000, many are
irregulars who earlier infiltrated from the
North; almost all the rest have been re-
cruited from Communist-held areas in the
South — there has been no rallying to the
Communist cause from Government-held
areas.
Let us now look at what the Communists
have been doing with their forces in South
Viet-Nam during the last 10 years. They
began their operations with terrorism and
assassination aimed at local government
officials. From 1957 to 1959 more than 1,000
civilians were assassinated or kidnaped by
Communist guerrillas in the South. In the
ensuing 2 years their attacks were intensi-
fied and began to be conducted by battalion-
size units against the military and security
forces of the Government in the South. The
level of military activity increased progres-
sively.
With the arrival of regular North Viet-
namese army units, beginning in the conclud-
ing months of 1964, sizable military engage-
ments have taken place almost continuously
in many different parts of South Viet-Nam.
Unlike Korea, where the Communists
launched openly an invasion in broad day-
light across an international demarcation
line, the Communists in Viet-Nam have re-
sorted to covert and clandestine tactics. This
is the strategy of what Communist ideology
and propaganda call the "war of national
liberation."
On the basis of the evidence which has
been accumulated over a period of time, it
seems beyond dispute that from the begin-
ning the conflict in South Viet-Nam has not
been simply an indigenous rebellion. Much of
the military manpower came from the North.
So also with weapons and supplies. And, per-
haps most important of all, the planning, the
direction, the orders, have come from Hanoi.
International Law in Relation
to the Viet-Nam Conflict
How does one apply international law to
this kind of problem?
It is necessary to begin by finding out what
international law is. We have a fairly clear
idea of what it is not. It is not a framework
of government such as our own and other
democratic countries have at home. There is
no international legislature to make the rules
of the game for all to accept and follow.
There is no system of courts. There is no
police force.
What is a government to do in the face of
so imperfect a world, in the face of so chaotic
a scene, such as that created by large-scale
violence and hostilities in Southeast Asia?
Some have suggested that it is best to
acknowledge there is no real law to deal with
such a situation of conflict and that the
proper course is to proceed with whatever
practical actions will most advance the mili-
tary power, the security position, and the
general interests of the United States. I won-
der if such a view does not beg an important
question. Will this country's security be en-
hanced, will its interests be served, without
our making an honest and determined at-
tempt to develop international law and live
by it?
We may feel the absence today of a law-
giver outside national governments, who
JANUARY 9, 1967
57
could, to our comfort and security, give and
enforce law among the nations. That absence
does not relieve us of moral and political
obligations. It means instead that govern-
ments will have to go on working very hard
if there are to be functioning and effective
processes and institutions of world law in the
future.
Let us remember, too, that the shape of
things to come is in no small way determined
by the actions of great powers. This is an
aspect of the responsibility that the United
States, along with other countries, bears in
the modem world. I have no doubt myself
that the road of pragmatism and the road of
idealism run together as we consider the
needs and the possibilities for developing
effective world law.
International Agreements
1. There are many ways of making law.
One powerful means of lawmaking available
to governments is to join in making interna-
tional agreements and then to act in con-
formity with them.
In the case of Viet-Nam we have the
Geneva accords as a starting point and legal
framework for dealing with the situation.
Although the United States did not sign the
accords, from the beginning it undertook to
respect them, and President Eisenhower said
that "any renewal of Communist aggression
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave
concern." *
The United States began as early as 1954
to arrange for aid to South Viet-Nam to pro-
mote its viability and development. For
nearly 7 years United States forces and mate-
rial in the South stayed within the limits set
by the Geneva accords for external military
assistance, despite the fact that North Viet-
Nam had been violating these accords from
the start and despite the gradual escalation of
these violations. Not until late 1961 did the
number of United States military personnel
in the South rise above 900. When the United
■" For a statement made by President Eisenhower
on July 21, 1954, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954,
p. 163.
States made the decision to exceed the limits
laid down by the Geneva accords, it was on
the basis of a principle of international law
similar to the doctrine of fundamental breach
in the domestic law of contracts. North Viet-
Nam had violated seriously the obligation to
prevent the northern zone from being "used
for the resumption of hostilities or to further
an aggressive policy." In these circum-
stances. South Viet-Nam was relieved from
the obligation to comply with the cease-fire
agreement's limitations on military man-
power and materiel when the South needed
additional strength for its own defense
against aggression from the North.
Here it is noteworthy that in June 1962 the
Indian and Canadian members of the Inter-
national Control Commission found it pos-
sible to agree as follows in a report:
. . . there is evidence to show that armed and
unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other sup-
plies have been sent from the Zone in the North
to the Zone in the South with the object of support-
ing, organizing and carrying out hostile activities,
including armed attacks, directed against the Armed
Forces and Administration of the Zone in the
South. . . .
. . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN
[People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the
Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encourag-
ing and supporting hostile activities in the Zone
in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Ad-
ministration in the South.
The Commission also cited the Republic of
Viet-Nam for its activities in importing mili-
tary equipment and personnel above the
limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords.
However, these actions were taken by South
Viet-Nam as part of its effort to defend itself
against aggression and subversion from the
North. And at no time did South Viet-Nam
undertake to overrun the North by force.
I have mentioned this report of the Inter-
national Control Commission because it
shows that the international machinery set
up by the Geneva accords agreed with the
legal analysis of the situation made by the
United States, when that machinery was able
to function. But for most of the last dozen
years, it has been unable to function as in-
tended.
58
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Government Actions and Precedents
They Create
2. Another way in which international law
is made is through the actions of govern-
ments and the precedents they create. If a
government acts consistently with a series of
coherent principles, it may make a contribu-
tion to the common law of nations. The
United States Government has tried to do
this in the case of Viet-Nam, both with re-
spect to situations not envisioned by the
Geneva accords and in giving practical in-
terpretations and applications to the general
rules laid down by the Charter of the United
Nations.
Some commentators, in talking about Viet-
Nam, have set up three categories of situa-
tions for their legal analysis of the problem:
The first is the category of wholly indigenous
rebellion. The second category is one in which
there is large-scale intervention from outside
short of armed attack. The third is the cate-
gory of armed attack, in which one country
employs its regular miUtary forces to gain
control of another country.
The evidence does not allow for the con-
clusion that the war in Viet-Nam was ever
a simple category-one situation. It was prob-
ably, fpv quite some period of time, a cate-
gory-two situation. By the end of 1964,
however, it had become very clearly a cate-
gory-three situation.
Critics of United States Gk)vernment policy
have argued that, if there was North Viet-
namese intervention in the South, any United
States assistance to South Viet-Nam that
might be justified would have to be confined
geographically to South Viet-Nam. Even if
one were to concede that such a rule applies
in the case of a category-two situation, it cer-
tainly does not apply to a case of armed
attack. Legitimate defense includes military
action against the aggressor wherever such
action is needed to halt the attack.
During the decade after Geneva, the
United States did confine its assistance to
South Viet-Nam to military personnel, sup-
plies, and activities in the South. The United
States took no action against the source of
aggression in the North. Then, in late 1964,
as I have already indicated. North Viet-Nam
moved into a new phase of its aggression and
began dispatching southward whole units of
its regular armed forces. The tempo of the
war had increased by early 1965, and addi-
tional measures of defense were required.
Infiltration — Current Mode
of "Armed Attack"
3. I have heard and read arguments by
some that Viet-Nam does not present a situa-
tion of "armed attack" because invading
armies were not massed at a border and did
not march across it in broad daylight. To be
sure, that is the way armed attacks occurred
in 1914, at the beginning of World War II,
and even in Korea. But strategies and tactics
have changed. The current mode of armed
aggression in Viet-Nam is by the infiltration
of military units and the weapons of war
under cover of darkness, through jungle
areas, and across the territory of a neighbor-
ing state — Laos.
The law, if it is to be a living and working
force, must concern itself with the substance
and the reality of what is going on. The
answer to a question of law cannot properly
turn on the mere form or appearance that a
protagonist may give to its action. The judg-
ment whether North Viet-Nam has engaged
in "armed attack" against the South cannot
depend on the form or appearance of its con-
duct. The crucial consideration is that North
Viet-Nam has marshaled the resources of the
state and has sent instrumentalities of the
state, including units of its regular armed
forces, into South Viet-Nam to achieve state
objectives by force — in this case to subject
the South to its rule.
Measures of Collective Defense
4. United States and South Vietnamese
airstrikes and other military actions against
North Viet-Nam have been based on the legal
proposition that they are measures of collec-
tive defense against armed attack from the
North. I would like to take up some of the
arguments that have been made against this
proposition. First, it has been argued that,
JANUARY 9, 1967
59
while the United States says South Viet-Nam
is under armed attack, no international body,
such as the United Nations, has made such a
finding-. The United States Government re-
grets that neither the Security Council nor
the General Assembly of the United Nations
has been able or seen fit to express itself on
Viet^Nam. But ought we to adopt the view
that if the United Nations makes no finding,
there is therefore no armed attack and the
aggressor must accordingly be permitted to
pursue his ambitions without being subjected
to effective countermeasures?
Certainly the United Nations Charter does
not say this. Article 51 of the charter, dealing
with armed attack, says that "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense"
may be exercised "until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to main-
tain international peace and security." Thus
it is for a defender to claim and assert that
armed attack has taken place, justifying
measures of defense. The defender does not
have to await action by the Security Council.
His duty, as is made clear by the remainder
of article 51, is to report to the Council. Then
the Council will, in the end, decide what has
happened, who is right, and what measures
must be taken.
The United States has several times re-
ported to the Council in the last 2 years on
military actions in Viet-Nam. The Council
has taken no action. In January and Febru-
ary 1966 the Council elected not to debate the
situation in Viet-Nam, although the United
States had once again raised the whole ques-
tion. In September of this year Ambassador
[Arthur J.] Goldberg made a full presenta-
tion to the General Assembly on Viet-Nam.^
The subject was a central topic in the month-
long general debate that was held in New
York during October. Again, no United Na-
tions action was taken.
International Lines of Demarcation
5. Another argument made against the
United States legal position on collective self-
' Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
defense is that Viet-Nam is a single country
and that the regime in the North is not
legally precluded from taking steps, includ-
ing the use of force, to unify North and
South Viet-Nam under a single Communist
regime. Any such argument ignores the plain
provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954. It
also suggests a view of international law that
would operate to undermine peace and se-
curity in many parts of the world.
The Geneva accords are very clear in draw-
ing a demarcation line between North and
South Viet-Nam. This line was to be re-
spected by the opposing armed forces, includ-
ing all elements — regular or irregular — under
their control. It divided Viet-Nam into two
zones which would be administered by dif-
ferent authorities. The line was set by an
international agreement negotiated at a con-
ference in Geneva of the principal powers
concerned.
The fact that the demarcation line was not
intended as a permanent boundary surely did
not give either side license to disregard it.
The very purpose of the line was to end hos-
tilities and separate the fighting forces. Mov-
ing troops from one zone to the other to
engage them in hostilities was clearly in
breach of the international agreement
reached at Geneva in 1954.
It was also true in the Korea of 1950 that
the 38th parallel was not a permanent bound-
ary but instead an international demarca-
tion line established at the end of World War
II. Like the line in Viet-Nam, the line in
Korea was not intended to last; it was hoped
that the country could be unified. But all of
this made the North Korean invasion of that
year no less an armed attack under interna-
tional law.
The importance of respecting interna-
tional lines of demarcation is evident in
Europe also. The lines of demarcation be-
tween East and West Germany and around
West Berlin have never been intended as
permanent boundaries. However, they are
lines of great importance, and any moves to
disregard them would have the gravest con-
sequences.
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Question of "Free Elections"
6. Still another argnment has been ad-
vanced by some to justify the actions of
Hanoi. It runs as follows: The Geneva ac-
cords looked forward to a political settlement
as the result of which Viet-Nam would be
unified; elections were to be held in the sum-
mer of 1956, and during the preceding year
consultations were to be held between the
authorities of North and South concerning
the elections; South Viet-Nam declined to
take part in consultations, and there have
been no elections; hence, North Viet-Nam had
freedom to proceed in its own way with re-
unification of the country.
This argument has no merit. The elections
referred to in the Geneva accords were to be
"free general elections by secret ballot." Even
the North Vietnamese Defense Minister in
effect admitted long ago that such elections
would have been impossible in North Viet-
Nam. Speaking at the 10th Congress of the
North Vietnamese Communist Party Central
Committee in October 1956 General [Vo
Nguyen] Giap said:
We have made too many deviations and executed
too many honest people. We attacked on too large
a front and seeing enemies everywhere, resorted
to terror, which became far too widespread.
Thus it cannot properly be said that there
was any breach of agreement by South Viet-
Nam when it declined to proceed toward elec-
tions that could not possibly have been mean-
ingful.
Defense Measures Proportional to Attack
7. Before concluding this review of the
United States legal position, I would like to
refer to the principle that measures of de-
fense must be proportional to the attack. The
United States program of airstrikes against
North Viet-Nam has been designed for the
purpose of interfering with transport to the
South; destroying supplies intended for ship-
ment to the South; in short, to halt the con-
tinuing aggression by North Viet-Nam. As
Ambassador Goldberg said 2 months ago:
It is because of the attempt to upset by violence
JANUARY 9, 1967
the situation in Viet-Nam, and its far-reaching
implications elsewhere, that the United States and
other countries have responded to appeals from
South Viet-Nam for military assistance.
Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly
limited.
We are not engaged in a "holy war" against com-
munism.
We do not seek to establish an American empire or
a sphere of influence in Asia.
We seek no permanent military bases, no per-
manent establishment of troops, no permanent al-
liances, no permanent American presence of any
kind in South Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement
on South Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to overthrow the Government of
North Viet-Nam.
We do not seek to do any injury to mainland
China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests.
We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an uncondi-
tional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything
that belongs to it.
Efforts To Find a Peaceful Settlement
I have been setting forth reasons in sup-
port of United States military actions against
North Viet-Nam. Justification for these ac-
tions in no way displaces a continuing obliga-
tion we have under the United Nations
Charter to seek a peaceful settlement. It has
long been said that nations must try to settle
their disputes by peaceful means before any
resort to force. But it is no less true that the
participants in armed conflict are bound to go
on seeking a settlement by peaceful means
even while hostilities are in progress.
Particularly in the last 2 years, the United
States has made major efforts to negotiate an
end to the war in Viet-Nam. In April 1965
President Johnson, in response to the appeal
of 17 nonalined countries, offered to com-
mence negotiations without precondition.*
This was not acceptable to Hanoi. A year ago
the United States conducted a concentrated
peace offensive for over 5 weeks. Again there
was no affirmative answer from the other
side.
At the General Assembly this fall, Ambas-
' For text of President Johnson's address at Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., see ibid., Apr.
26, 1965, p. 606.
61
sador Goldberg summed up our aims in the
following way:
We want a political solution, not a military solu-
tion, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject
the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to im-
pose a military solution.
We seek to assure for the people of South Viet-
Nam the same right of self-determination — to decide
its own political destiny, free of force — that the
United Nations Charter affirms for all.
And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam
should be decided upon through a free choice by the
peoples of both the North and the South without
outside interference, the results of which choice we
are fully prepared to support.
. . . We are prepared to order a cessation of all
bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are
assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be
answered promptly by a corresponding and appro-
priate deescalation on the other side.
Prospects Into the Future
It is not given to us to foresee in what way
the Viet-Nam war will end. It is possible that
the protagonists will meet at the conference
table and settle the conflict by negotiation.
The United States will continue to press its
efforts toward peaceful settlement.
It is also possible that, over time, North
Viet-Nam will gradually reduce and ulti-
mately cease its intervention in the South,
having found that force does not pay and that
the relationships between North and South
must be worked out on the levels of economic
intercourse and political accommodation.
Other possibilities have been urged by
some: for example, outright withdrawal of
United States forces from Viet-Nam or with-
drawal of those forces to a few coastal bases.
I cannot see that any such ending to the war
in Viet-Nam would be acceptable from the
point of view of the world community interest
in peace and justice among nations. Such an
ending would gravely impair the effectiveness
of the international law that we have today.
For one thing, withdrawal and abandon-
ment of South Viet-Nam would be to sacrifice
the Geneva accords and advertise for all to
see that an international agreement can with
impunity be treated by an aggressor as a
mere scrap of paper. Moreover, withdrawal
and abandonment of South Viet-Nam would
undermine the faith of other countries in
United States defense treaty commitments
and would encourage would-be aggressors to
suppose they could successfully and even
freely impose on their weaker neighbors by
force.
In less than 2 months after the 1954
Geneva conference on Indochina, the United
States and other Pacific countries signed the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. By
a unanimously agreed protocol, that treaty
covers South Viet-Nam. The parties to the
treaty have engaged jointly and severally to
"act to meet the common danger" if there is
"aggression by means of armed attack"
against any of the parties or any protocol
state. To disengage from this commitment
could have no other effect than to undermine
the assurance of all concerned that the United
States will live up to its commitments. Politi-
cal and military stability will not be achieved
but could instead be destroyed by a policy of
making agreements and then not carrying
them out.
We have seen in Europe, during the two
decades since World War II, the success of a
policy of insisting that the integrity of inter-
national settlements not be upset by force.
The strengthening of Western Europe
through the Marshall Plan and the North At-
lantic Treaty put an effective curb on Soviet
expansionism. We have seen a favorable de-
velopment in the increased maturity of Soviet
conduct toward the rest of the world. With a
growing stake in preserving and developing
what has already been achieved at home, the
Soviet Government plainly pursues a very
different course from that of the younger and
still more violent revolution in China.
It is an important part of the task of build-
ing a more secure and just world to weight
the balances of other governments' processes
of calculation, so far as we are able, in the
direction of discussion and reason and away
from violence and force. This is part of the
meaning of the Viet-Nam war today. The use
of external force to gain political ends must
not turn out to be profitable.
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The course of history shows that the
temptation to prey upon weaker nations has
often been too strong. In 1910 William James
foresaw: "The war against war is going to
be no holiday excursion or camping party."
He emphasized the vast difficulty involved in
abolishing war. "Extravagant ambitions," he
wrote, "will have to be replaced by reasonable
claims, and nations must make common cause
against them."
This process of making common cause goes
on even in the troubled world of 1966. For
all the disappointments, shortcomings, and
sometimes retrograde motion, the institution
of the United Nations has recorded progress
in the long world campaign for peace with
justice. The processes and machinery of
world organization will have to be strength-
ened and developed. Governments will have
to learn and act upon the conviction that
change is necessary to justice but that it must
be ordered and peaceful change, without vio-
lence.
James' essay from which I quoted was di-
rected to finding a "moral equivalent of war"
— a constructive activity that could take over
war's historic function of offering challenge
to man's ambitions and binding peoples to-
gether against a common foe. If it is chal-
lenge we need, the world scene is abundant.
There are no apparent limits to the resources
and energies that nations could put into the
exploration of space or into the improvement
of man's condition on earth. The pressure of
exploding population on food resources in the
world is as threatening as any invasion from
outer space could be.
The world still has time in which to adjust
and redirect man's activities toward survival
and growth. Will we not have the wit and the
will to make this effort? It seems a necessity
in this time when, as President Kennedy said:
"man holds in his mortal hands the power to
abolish all forms of human poverty and all
forms of human life." ''
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General
for Help in Seeking Peace
Following is the text of a letter delivered
to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant by
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, on December 19.
U.S. /U.N. press release B03B
December 19, 1966
My dear Mr. Secretary General: Two
world leaders who command the respect of
the entire international community have re-
cently voiced the desire for a cease-fire in
Vietnam. On December 8, Pope Paul VI
noted the temporary Christmas truce ar-
ranged in Vietnam and beseeched all con-
cerned to transform this temporary truce
into a cessation of hostilities which would
become the occasion for sincere negotiations.
And you, Mr. Secretary General, expressed
the sincere hope on the same day that the
parties directly concerned would heed the
Pope's appeal.
In the fourteen points my Government has
put forward as elements of a peaceful set-
tlement in Vietnam, you will recall, the
United States has explicitly stated: ^ A cessa-
tion of hostilities could be the first order of
business at a conference or could be the sub-
ject of preliminary discussions. I herewith
reaffirm our commitment to that proposal —
a proix)sal which is in keeping with the ap-
peal of the Pope as endorsed by you. Our
objective remains the end of all fighting, of
all hostilities and of all violence in Vietnam
— and an honorable and lasting settlement
there, for which, as we have repeatedly said,
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962
would be a satisfactory basis.
President Johnson has time and again
stressed his desire for a peaceful settlement
of the Vietnam conflict. Other United States
leaders have spoken in a similar vein. In
speaking before the General Assembly on be-
half of my Government on September 22,^
' For text of President Kennedy's inaugural ad-
dress, see ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
• For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.
*Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
JANUARY 9, 1967
63
I noted there are differences between our
aims as to the basis for such a settlement
and the stated position of North Vietnam.
I went on to say that: ". . . no differences
can be resolved without contact, discussion
or negotiations." This holds equally true with
regard to arrangements for a mutual cessa-
tion of hostilities.
We turn to you, therefore, with the hope
and the request that you will take whatever
steps you consider necessary to bring about
the necessary discussions which could lead
to such a cease-fire. I can assure you that the
Government of the United States will co-
operate fully with you in getting such dis-
cussions started promptly and in bringing
them to a successful completion.
I request that this letter be circulated as
an official document of the Security Ck)uncil.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldberg
Institutions for Order
by Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^
I am happy to be with you tonight because
of my admiration for the Joint Distribution
Committee. For over 50 years your organiza-
tion has been dedicated to the advancement
of human welfare. You have practiced the
highest kind of humanitarianism in a coldly
practical and realistic world.
You have brought hope and assistance and
security to millions of persecuted and under-
privileged members of the Jewish faith
wherever you could reach them. When neces-
sary, you have moved them to safe havens
where they could once again take up a nor-
mal existence as parts of larger communities.
You have done this through a nongovern-
mental effort which has won the applause of
men of good will everywhere and which has
served as an example for the welfare work
of many other groups and denominations.
I would like to suggest that this type of
practical idealism is needed not only in the
' Address made before the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee at New York, N.Y., on Dec.
7 (TJ.S./U.N. press release 5006).
field of human welfare, narrowly defined, but
throughout the entire range of international
relations. As man gains greater power not
only to alter his environment but to destroy
his fellow man, it becomes plainer than ever
that the world needs at least minimum
ground rules of good conduct. In the past,
when the destructive capabilities of men and
nations were smaller, our level of tolerance
for antisocial behavior in international af-
fairs was a good deal greater than it is today.
We could afford a certain measure of irre-
sponsibility. But the inexorable advances of
science and technology, with their enormous
destructive potential, have changed all that
for good.
Nor is the power of the atom the only
dangerous new force confronting our genera-
tion. All governments today, whatever their
ideology, are affected not only by the nuclear
threat but by the development of the race be-
tween population growth and the food sup-
ply and by explosive political, racial, eco-
nomic, and social problems. The solutions to
these problems are on the agenda of man-
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
kind not for just a year or two but for a
generation to come.
But I believe our greatest problem is none
of these. There may be keys that will unlock
all these doors, but what we need still more
is a master key which can open them all. I
submit that this key is a set of institutions,
of procedures, of habits of cooperation
among nations, strong enough to contain any
technical or political or economic or popula-
tion problem and move us toward a solution.
The building of such institutions and habits
of cooperation among nations is, I truly be-
lieve, the assignment of the century.
The nation-state has afforded us protection
in the past and has enabled us to make im-
mense material progress, but it is increas-
ingly clear that it alone cannot do so in the
future. No matter how strong, how vast, how
wealthy, how populous, a country may be, it
no longer lays claim to any absolute security.
It must look to alliances and regional associ-
ations; and, beyond even these, it must look
to some overarching entity embracing every
peace-loving state.
The United Nations is that entity. Fragile
as it is, the U.N. is the principal guardian of
the general interest of man that we have. It
was created to bring that interest to bear on
the great problems of our time. As guardian
of the general interest, the United Nations
functions as the keeper of the world's
conscience.
The U.N. "Peace Machine"
On what principles can this machinery be
constructed ? One answer is to be found in the
preamble and the statement of purposes and
principles contained in articles 1 and 2 of the
United Nations Charter. These famous words
call on the nations to maintain international
peace and security by preventing aggression
and other breaches of the peace; to
strengthen the rule of law in the world; to
promote the self-determination of peoples,
the realization of human rights, and economic
and social progress for people everywhere.
They state the determination of the peoples
of the world "to practice tolerance" — and
what a tremendous idea is expressed in that
one word "tolerance" — and to "live together
in peace with one another as good neigh-
bors."
If all the world were to live by these rules
our troubles would be largely over. But the
framers of the charter had much too good a
grip on reality to expect that. They knew that
international conflicts would still occur. They
knew, too, that these conflicts do not always
arise out of a simple confrontation between
the angels who are right and the devils who
are wrong. Much more often, the problem is
less one of right against wrong than of "my
right" against "your right." The problem
then is to find some reasonable settlement
which will give at least minimal satisfaction
to the equitable claims of each party. And a
great deal of the work of the U.N. involves
exactly that kind of search for mutually ac-
ceptable arrangements — not satisfactory to
any party but bearable by all.
I will tell you frankly that the U.N.'s
efforts to fulfill even this more realistic aim
have been only moderately successful. There
have been successes and failures, and there
will be in the future.
This is because the U.N. is after all no
more than the totality of its member states
acting individually. Each of these members
is likely to be an interested party in many
of the problems at issue.
But however imperfect the record may be,
the fact is that the machinery itself, the
United Nations as an institution, is still run-
ning. It is in use for the purpose for which
it was created: as the charter itself puts it,
"to be a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations" in pursuit of their common aims
of peace and progress. When we consider the
depth of international discord in the world,
it is little wonder that the machine shows
signs of strain and wear and tear !
But don't be fooled. History is not made in
neat and tidy places but in the heat and dust
of conflict. This worn and battered "peace
machine" on the East River is, I submit, the
most original creation of man in our century.
It must be made to work effectively, because
JANUARY 9, 1967
65
with modern arms we will not have the
chance ag'ain to learn the lessons of World
War II.
Fundamental Settlements Take Time
And to balance its failures, the U.N. has
compiled a record of successes which provide
proof that it is an effective institution: again
and again it has damped down brush-fire
disputes that could have led to a world con-
flagration. The case of Korea was the U.N.'s
greatest confrontation with aggressors, but it
is only one item on the list. In a broad arc
extending from New Guinea to the Congo,
U.N. missions have helped to prevent fighting
or to bring it to an end where it has started.
In Kashmir, the U.N. stabilized a danger-
ously fragile demarcation line for 17 years
and restabilized it after the new outbreak of
1965. In the Congo, the U.N. prevented total
anarchy in a new nation and creation of a
chaotic vacuum which could have brought
great-power rivalry into the heart of Africa.
In the Middle East and in Cyprus, U.N. blue
helmets stand guard to this day over political
quarrels which remain dangerously explosive.
Unfortunately, this kind of peacekeeping
after the fact has been more effective than
the U.N.'s attempts to settle disputes before
they reach the stage of violence.
This is a pity, but it is a fact, a fact which
is easily explained. People are not too well
endowed with foresight. They will do a lot
of drastic things in the heat of crisis. They
will act heroically when the building catches
on fire, but you can't get them to clean out all
those oily rags in the basement. The problems
of peacemaking are very much the same.
It is far harder to persuade the parties to
negotiate out differences through mutual ad-
justment of passionately maintained claims
and views, and equally hard to induce antago-
nists to accept impartial outside judgment.
Even where U.N. peace forces patrol today —
in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and along the borders
of Israel — the embers of war are still alive;
and the U.N. is still unable to extinguish the
embers by producing fundamental solutions.
We have little basis for believing that this
situation will soon be changed in any very
substantial way. The opportunities for peace-
ful settlement will remain open; the varied
machinery the U.N. has at its disposal to set-
tle disputes will continue to be available;
but breakthroughs to fundamental settle-
ments will be rare and hard to come by.
Many governments — not only the United
States — work hard, but this will take time.
Meanwhile, we can perhaps do something
to improve the peacekeeping process itself.
On the "hottest" U.N.-guarded frontier, for
example, the frontier around Israel, there is
an urgent need for better security conditions.
The violence of recent days is deplorable;
violence tends to breed more violence.
The states concerned can themselves
satisfy some of the need for greater security
through better border controls and through
the internal control of raiding parties. These
states can also, and indeed should, recognize
that in their own interest they should aid and
not hamper the work of U.N. observers; they
should permit the access and provide the fa-
cilities which observers may reasonably re-
quest. Only in this way can the most accurate
summary of events be reported to the U.N.,
and only thus can the responsibility for what
has happened be most clearly fixed. For this
reason the United States welcomes and sup-
ports the Secretary-General's recent recom-
mendation to strengthen the U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization.
standards To Protect Individual Rights
While the organization continues to be
deeply concerned with maintaining the peace,
its members have increasingly come to re-
gard certain other aspects of the U.N.'s work
as of equal importance.
The "new look" at the United Nations
gives ever greater prominence to those mat-
ters which weigh most heavily on the minds
of the great nonwhite majority of nations
and populations now represented in the orga-
nization. Problems of human rights are very
much in the forefront, particularly those that
involve race discrimination. The manifold
problems of self-determination and economic
and social development are also high on the
agenda.
im
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Let me say a word about human rights. To
a degree never before achieved, the idea that
a state can do as it pleases with its own na-
tionals or with other individuals within its
territory is steadily losing ground. In con-
trast with the pre-World War II period, more
and more countries are recognizing that the
international community of the United Na-
tions has an interest in establishing and
maintaining standards to protect individual
rights^ — that this, too, is one of the ingredi-
ents of peace.
Beginning with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948, we have seen a
steady flow of declarations and conventions
designed to induce states — which alone can
take such action — to protect the rights of in-
dividuals. Piece by piece, the U.N. is con-
structing a code of desirable international
conduct in the human rights area. The range
*" it covers is extremely wide, as it must be if
it is to bridge the gap that separates ad-
vanced from primitive societies and free from
controlled social systems. U.N. standards
cover: the prevention of slavery and forced
labor; the political rights of women; general
civil and political and economic, social, and
cultural rights; discrimination in education;
and discrimination on grounds of race and
religion. These standards are accepted by
many governments, but there is still a long,
long way to go.
For various reasons, not all states will
i ratify those U.N. human rights documents
, which take treaty form. In our own case, for
example, where the observance of individual
rights is deeply rooted in our tradition, some
of the U.N. standards are less advanced than
our own, and we would be loath to risk com-
promising the latter. We must, and do, never-
^: theless, encourage others to improve their
standards and practices; and if treaties
worked out within the U.N. are a useful way
for doing so, the United States will continue
to cooperate.
If the U.N. is to fulfill its basic purposes,
our attention to individual rights must be
matched by progress toward equality and
self-determination for whole nations and
peoples.
We know from our own anticolonial tradi-
tion how important these principles are for
peoples who have only recently gained their
independence or who are still seeking it. For
such peoples, the United Nations is a source
of aid and protection. U.N. membership is a
badge of equal status in a world of sovereign
states.
Thanks in large part to the U.N., over 50
new states have been created out of old
colonial territories since 1945, with a sur-
prising lack of violent opposition. The process
proves the adage that nothing is more power-
ful than an idea whose time has come.
This process still continues. The Security
Council this afternoon recommended the ad-
mission of Barbados to U.N. membership,
and the General Assembly is expected to vote
Barbados into the organization as its 122d
member by the end of the week.^
The few remaining pockets of resistance
stand out as glaring exceptions to the gen-
eral trend. Where colonial domination is
linked with race discrimination, the incon-
sistency is even more evident and the pres-
sure from those who have already gained
their freedom is the most impassioned.
If nothing is done in the areas where race
repression is sanctioned, race tensions could
erupt into violence both inside and outside
today's problem areas. It might then prove
impossible to forestall a downward drift into
anarchy and totalitarian dictatorship.
This is a problem no single nation can
handle alone. We are already confronted
with the question how far the U.N. should
go, and how far we as its strongest member
should go, to bring about the fulfillment of
U.N. objectives.
stubborn Problems of Southern Africa
At the moment this question is centered
on Rhodesia. This week Prime Minister
[Harold] Wilson made a dramatic and su-
preme effort to reach agreement with the
illegal regime of Ian Smith which would re-
store constitutional government and guaran-
tee the rights of the African majority. That
effort, as you know, collapsed when the
' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1967,
p. 28.
JANUARY 9, 1967
67
Rhodesian leadership refused to agree. To-
morrow the United Kingdom will be asking
the Security Council to consider the imposi-
tion of selective mandatory sanctions against
the Rhodesian regime.'
The United Kingdom is now being pressed
to crush the rebellion by force in order to
end white domination. The African states
want independence for Rhodesia, and they
want the British to grant it only when the
4 million black men in Rhodesia are guaran-
teed the enjoyment of their rights. They
oppose independence on any other terms.
It would not be proper for me to antici-
pate what the U.N. Security Council may de-
cide to do in this situation. But it is note-
worthy that the Council a year ago with our
full support called for voluntary sanctions
against Rhodesia, and even went so far as to
authorize a British blockade of oil shipments
by sea through Portuguese Mozambique.^
President Johnson has long since pledged
United States support for the freedom of all
the people of Rhodesia, "not just 6 percent
of them." 5
South West Africa also presents an urgent
self-determination question. Last October the
U.N. General Assembly decided that South
Africa had in effect forfeited its old League
of Nations mandate to administer that terri-
tory, largely because South Africa main-
tained its apartheid policy there.^ The Assem-
bly is now seeking, through a special
committee created by an overwhelming vote,
to induce the Government of South Africa to
permit the establishment of an international
administration designed to lead South West
Africa toward self-determination.
This approach to a solution was accepted
in the Assembly by the United States and 113
other countries — virtually the entire interna-
tional community. Thus we know what we
want the U.N. to do, though we are not yet
clear on how it can be done.
' See p. 7.3.
■* For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965,
p. 908, and May 2, 1966, p. 713.
"■Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.
' For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution,
see ihid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.
The Assembly's approach is wisely prag-
matic in this new and difficult situation. Its
committee has broad latitude to recommend
practical means by which South West Africa
should be administered for the desired ends.
When that committee reports next spring,
the time will have come for the U.N. to con-
sider what more can be done to move this
matter toward a just and satisfactory out-
come.
These problems of southern Africa are
tough and stubborn. It will be exceedingly
difficult to induce those who hold power in
that area to comply with U.N. resolutions
designed to bring about political change.
Some of the U.N.'s weapons, such as moral
suasion and the power of world opinion,
have already been employed to no avail. The
alternatives are not without risks. Voices
will be heard calling for broad mandatory
economic sanctions, for the necessary steps
to make those sanctions effective, and for the
use of force. What the U.N. must determine
is the degree of sacrifice its members are
willing to contemplate, individually and col-
lectively, in order to achieve reasonable solu-
tions. Discussions of the use of economic and
military pressure by the U.N. lead us into
new and largely uncharted waters. The ques-
tions which are raised are vital for the future
of Africa, for the future of the U.N., and per-
haps ultimately for the future of every na-
tion which may someday stake its existence
on the rule of law in the world.
In this talk I have tried to give you a
glimpse of a few of the tough problems with
which we deal in the United Nations. The
U.N. didn't create these problems, any more
than a hospital creates the diseases and in-
juries with which it deals. Quite the reverse
is true: The U.N. was created to cope with
just such difficulties as these.
Some jieople used to suppose that the U.N.
was intended by its founders to do away with
all these problems overnight. Any such ex-
pectation was certain to end in disillusion-
ment. Whoever truly believes in human
progress must expect to pay the price in slow
and frustrating human effort.
The troubles of our age are many and pro-
68
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
found. We shall conquer some of them, step
by step, in our time; others, in all likelihood,
will still be around for our children and
grandchildren to wrestle with.
But if these jiroblems are not to overwhelm
us, the nations which make up the human
family must have the means to cope with
them together, as members of one human
family.
The means exist today in the institutions
of international order, however primitive
they may be. The capstone of these institu-
tions is the United Nations. Let us use it for
all it is worth, because our willingness to do
so may well spell the difference between
catastrophe and a world in which human
freedom is possible.
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team
Studying Vietnamese Development
The White House announced on December
16 that, in response to a request from Prime
Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky, the United
States Government will join with the Gov-
ernment of Viet-Nam in sponsoring a joint
planning effort on the long-run development
of the Vietnamese economy.
In the opinion of the two Governments it
is time now to prepare for the problems and
jpportunities of peace.
With the concurrence of the Vietnamese
overnment, the United States Government
las asked Mr. David E. Lilienthal to lead a
longoveiTimental U.S. study and planning
;eam which will report to the two Govern-
nents. Mr. Lilienthal has agreed to put to-
gether a team drawn from his Development
md Resources Corporation and other U.S.
ources with broad experience in develop-
nental planning. It will operate under con-
;ract to the Agency for International De-
velopment. Mr. Lilienthal's experience and
ligh qualifications are widely known, and the
i'resident is grateful that he has agreed to
mdertake this task.
The United States team will work closely
vith a counterpart Vietnamese development
)lanning team led by Professor Nguyen
ANUARY 9, 1967
Dang Thuc of the University of Saigon.
The Government of Viet-Nam stressed at
the Manila Conference i its plans for the
building of an expanded postwar economy,
including plans for the conversion of mili-
tary installations when appropriate.
Eugene Black, after his recent tour of
Southeast Asia, has reported to the Presi-
dent that, even in the midst of war, the
foundations of future economic progress are
being laid in Viet-Nam. The outlook for the
Vietnamese economy once peace returns is
highly favorable, Mr. Black told the Presi-
dent.
U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea
for Investment, Trade Studies
The White House announced on December
15 that George W. Ball, former Under Sec-
retary of State, mil head a privately orga-
nized delegation of U.S. businessmen to
Korea during the week of March 20 to stimu-
late American private investment and to pro-
mote increased U.S.-Korean trade.
The mission was originally proposed dur-
ing discussions between President Johnson
and Korean President Chung Hee Park in
Seoul early in November. The Presidents
agreed then that the Korean economy's cur-
rent progress should make possible a sub-
stantial expansion of U.S. investment in
Korea and in trade between the two nations.^
The Korean economy has grown at a rate
of 8 percent per year in the last 3 years.
During the same period, exports have tripled
and are expected to reach the equivalent of
$250 million in 1966.
Delegation members will be selected dur-
ing the next month. Each will be a leader
in his industry or in the financial community.
It is planned to include representatives of
' For texts of the documents issued at the close of
the Manila Conference, see Bulletin of Nov. 14,
1966, p. 730.
' For text of a joint statement issued at Seoul,
Korea, on Nov. 2 at the conclusion of President
Johnson's state visit, see Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1966,
p. 777.
69
large and small industry, banking, and trade
from major business centers of the United
States who will be interested in specific areas
of industry or trade in Korea.
Mr. Ball, presently associated with the in-
vestment banking firm of Lehman Brothers,
is chairman of Lehman International, Ltd.,
and counsel to the law firm of Cleary, Gott-
lieb, Steen and Hamilton.
Tristan E. Beplat, senior vice president of
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and president
of the Korean-American Commercial and In-
dustrial Association in New York, has agreed
to assist Mr. Ball.
Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee
Holds Second Meeting
Joint Communique
Press release 296 dated December 21
The Joint Mexican-United States Trade
Committee ^ held its second annual meeting
from December 15 to 17, 1966, in Mexico
City to discuss matters concerning United
States-Mexican trade. The Delegation of
Mexico was headed by Mr. Placido Garcia
Reynoso, Subsecretary of Industry and Com-
merce, and the United States Delegation by
Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for International Trade
Policy.
This joint committee is a continuing forum
created by the two governments for the
regular exchange of views on issues involved
in trade between the two countries and to
consider recommendations for possible ac-
tions to facilitate trade to the advantage of
both nations. The meetings of the committee
have been characterized by frankness and
cordiality.
The committee considered general trade
trends and specific commercial problems re-
garding Mexican-U.S. trade. The U.S. Dele-
' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p.
738.
gation welcomed steps that had been taken
by the Government of Mexico in the interval
between the first and second meetings to
liberalize and improve the administration of
Mexican import controls.
The Delegation of Mexico noted with
great interest steps that had been taken by
the U.S. Government since the initial meeting
of the Committee to liberalize access to the
U.S. market for certain exports from
Mexico. These steps included elimination by
the United States of some import restrictions
in addition to certain tariff and customs
measures of benefit to Mexican trade.
The hope was expressed that further steps
might be taken by the governments of both
countries to facilitate the mutual trade,
taking into consideration the difference in the
levels of development between them and the
necessity for Mexico to take internal
measures to stimulate the development of its
economy.
The two delegations took note of recent
developments in the GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade], especially the
formal entry into force of the new part IV
on trade and development, in which, among
other things, the developed countries agreed
not to require full reciprocity from less
developed countries in trade negotiations.
The two delegations also noted the
progress of the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations. The U.S. Delegation pointed
out that even countries not members of
GATT stand to receive benefits from these
negotiations through the application of the
most-favored-nation rule.
There was an exchange of views regarding
the Mexican Government program of indus-
trialization and related measures concerning
the domestic ownership of enterprises in
certain economic areas.
In considering concrete cases, the Mexican
delegation pointed out certain problems
which arise from U.S. customs duties and
which hinder the sale of Mexican products
in the U.S. market. The Mexican delegation
suggested the elimination or reduction of
such duties.
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The U.S. Delegation mentioned concrete
cases in which the reduction of duties and
import restrictions would permit greater
access for U.S. products to the Mexican
market and explained how increased imports
of these products might benefit the Mexican
economy as well as that of the United
States.
A special aspect of the meeting was a
presentation of progress achieved by Ambas-
sador Harry Turkel and Mr. Agustin Lopez
Munguia, who were appointed by the Govern-
ments of the United States and Mexico
respectively to study problems and make
recommendations regarding facilitating trade
in the U.S.-Mexico border areas.
The committee also discussed a U.S. pro-
posal for a bilateral agreement to facilitate
the transit of the U.S.-Mexican border by
truck carriers as a means of improving trade
between the two countries.
President Frei of Chile
To Visit the United States
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 20
I have invited President Eduardo Frei of
Chile to make an official visit to Washington
on February 1 and 2. He has accepted, and
arrangements are being worked out.
I look forward to this visit with special
interest. During the past 2 years President
Frei and I have communicated by letter on
I several occasions. The visit will give us the
■ opportunity to talk further about issues af-
fecting our respective countries, the hemi-
sphere, and the world. I am particularly in-
terested in learning more from President
Frei about the achievements of his great ex-
periment of revolution in freedom. Natu-
rally, we will also review the future course
of the Alliance for Progress in relation to
preparation for the meeting of Presidents
of the American Republics.
U.S. Appoints Observers
for Antarctic Inspections
The Department of State announced on
December 23 (press release 299) the appoint-
ment of nine Antarctic observers, replacing
those who were appointed in 1963, to carry
out any inspections which the United States,
as a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, may
decide to undertake in accord with provisions
of that treaty.
The names of persons appointed as ob-
servers are: Merton E. Davies, Ernest F.
Dukes, Richard P. Gingland, Karl W.
Kenyon, Cyril Muromcew, Carl J. Sinder-
mann, Frank G. Siscoe, Malcolm Toon, and
Arthur I. Wortzel.i
The Antarctic Treaty 2 provides that in
the Antarctic area there shall be freedom of
scientific investigation and continued inter-
national cooperation and that the area shall
be used for peaceful purposes only. It bans
nuclear explosions and the disposal of atomic
waste in Antarctica pending general inter-
national agreement on the subject (but does
not prohibit the use of nuclear reactors).
While implying neither renunciation nor
recognition of rights or asserted claims, it
prohibits for the duration of the treaty the
making of new claims, the enlarging of exist-
ing claims, and the use of activities in
Antarctica as a basis for asserting, support-
ing, or denying territorial claims. It grants
to the signatories of the treaty the right of
inspection and aerial observation in all areas
of Antarctica and obligates them to exert
approjjriate eflforts, consistent with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, to the end that no
one should engage in any activity in
Antarctica contrary to the principles or
purposes of the treaty.
The 12 signatory powers of the Antarctic
Treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium,
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
' For biographic details, see press release 299
dated Dec. 23.
^For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.
JANUARY 9, 1967
71
South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.
Inspections have taken place in Antarctica
every year since 1963. In that year New
Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom
inspected United States stations. In 1964 the
United States inspected stations of Argen-
tina, Chile, France, New Zealand, the
United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. In 1965
and 1966 Argentina inspected the United
States Palmer station.
Advisers Named for Near Eastern
and South Asian Bureau
Press release 295 dated December 20
The Department of State announced on
December 20 the formation of a panel of
advisers for the Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs. ^ The advisers will make
available to the Department on a continuing
basis a variety of talent and experience.
Many of the advisers have longstanding con-
nections or interests in the Near East and
South Asia. The panel includes distinguished
leaders from the fields of education, science,
business, and labor, and from nonprofit
institutions concerned with foreign affairs.
Among its members are several former
ambassadors and others with eminent records
of past service with the U.S. Government.
Individual members of the panel will con-
sider issues of key concern to the Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It
is expected that the advisers not only will
apply their special insight to problems and
proposals placed before them by the Bureau
' For announcements of other advisory panels, see
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966, p.
868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; and Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16.
but also will initiate new policy ideas. Con-
sultation on any given issue will be with one
or several members of the panel, depending
on the subject in question and the particular
background of the advisers. Additional ad-
visers may be added to the panel from time
to time.
The members of the panel are:
John S. Badeau, director, Middle East Institute,
Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, N.Y.
John H. Davis, New York, N.Y.; former vice chair-
man, board of trustees of American University of
Beirut.
John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Robert F. Goheen, president, Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J.
Raymond A. Hare, president. Middle East Institute,
Washingrton, D.C.
Joseph E. Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, New York, N.Y.
Joseph D. Keenan, international secretary, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; vice
president, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.
David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the board. Develop-
ment and Resources Corp., New York, N.Y.
D. W. Lockard, associate director, Center for Middle
Eastern Studies, Harvard University.
Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor,
Harvard University.
Grinnell Morris, president. Empire Trust Co., New
York, N.Y. ; chairman, board of trustees, Robert
College, Istanbul, Turkey.
Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government and
director of the Institute of Politics, Harvard Uni-
versity.
Richard L. Park, professor of political science. Uni-
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Frederick Seitz, president. National Academy of Sci-
ences, Washington, D.C.
Francis O. Wilcox, dean. School of Advanced Inter-
national Studies, The Johns Hopkins University,
Washington, D.C.
Wayne Wilcox, associate professor of government,
Columbia University.
Charles W. Yost, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York, N.Y.
72
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia
Following is a statement made by U.S.
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the
U.N. Security Council on December 12, to-
gether with the text of a resolution adopted
by the Council on December 16.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S./U.N. press release B021
The Council has met to consider further
the question of Southern Rhodesia, a question
which once again has been brought before us
by the country that bears the heaviest and
most direct responsibility in this matter, the
United Kingdom.
This problem, as was made clear at the
irecent Commonwealth Conference and before
then at Lagos, is not only of concern to the
United Kingdom but "of wider concern to
Africa, the Commonwealth and the world."
Now, why has this problem of Southern
Rhodesia become a matter of such worldwide
concern ?
A clue to the answer, I think, can be found
in the fact that the regime in Salisbury,
headed by Mr. [Ian] Smith, which declared
itself independent and sovereign over a year
ago, has yet to be recognized as such by a
single government.
There is a solid reason why this unilateral
action of the Smith regime has been rejected
while the independence of a score of other
states has been acclaimed and recognized by
the world community. In all cases in which
solonial peoples, during the life of the United
N^ations, have acceded to independence, this
accession has never been tainted with the
application of principles of racial superiority.
Just the opposite is the case in the regime
of Mr. Smith. Whatever that regime may as-
sert in its propaganda, its legislative enact-
ments and its whole course of conduct have
clearly been designed to thwart majority rule
and perpetuate racial superiority.
Indeed, the claim of independence by the
Smith regime is a false and spurious claim,
made by and on behalf of a small white mi-
nority for the purposes of assuming control
in a country 94 percent of whose people are
nonwhite. It is contrary to the spirit of the
United Nations Charter and to principles en-
shrined therein, including "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedom for all without distinc-
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion."
On behalf of my Government, I reiterate
that we shall not recognize this regime. The
objective which the United States supports
is that stated last May by President John-
son: 1 "To open the full power and responsi-
bility of nationhood to all the people of Rho-
desia — not just 6 percent of them."
We well understand the apprehensions of
the other nations of Africa, particularly
Southern Rhodesia's neighbor Zambia, con-
cerning the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Zam-
bia is seeking to make its way in the world
on the only basis which can possibly promise
peace, freedom, and progress; namely, a mul-
tiracial society in which the majority rules
and the rights of minorities are protected.
We understand and share the concern of the
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
JANUARY 9, 1967
73
leaders of Zambia at the prospect of a neigh-
boring regime which in its 1 year of so-called
independence has already intensified its dis-
crimination against the African majority
and introduced new decrees under the ex-
tended Emergency Powers Act which are
anathema to all who care about civil liber-
ties — laws conferring the broadest powers of
arrest, censorship, and other curtailments of
fundamental rights.
U.S. Support of U.K. Proposal
The refusal of the United Kingdom — the
constitutional authority — to recognize the il-
legal act of the Smith regime in attempting
to throw off British authority is no denial of
freedom for the people of Southern Rho-
desia. Rather, it is a decision not to permit
a small element in that country to deny free-
dom to the great majority.
This decision is not that of a power which
obstinately stands in the way of granting
genuine independence to colonial territories.
Since the founding of the United Nations, it
is pertinent to recall, Great Britain has ac-
corded independence to 28 nations — nearly a
quarter of the membership of this organiza-
tion.
This is a record of substantial achievement
in peaceful decolonization and one which does
credit both to the United Kingdom and to
the people who were formerly under its au-
thority but who are now independent. It
helps to explain why the Council has recog-
nized that the main responsibility for action
is in the hands of the United Kingdom which
has, in the words of the Commonwealth com-
munique, "constitutional authority and re-
sponsibility for guiding Rhodesia to inde-
pendence."
The United States believes that the exer-
cise of this responsibility remains a wise
policy. I do not say that if we had been the
constituted authority we would have done
everything exactly as it has been done, every
step of the way, by the British Government.
No nation could say that. But we do respect
the fact that it is the United Kingdom that
has borne and still bears this responsibility
and that this has been affirmed by the Com-
monwealth and recognized by the Council.
We, as members of the Council, have our
own responsibilities in this matter. But in
all fairness we must recognize the difficulties-
confronting the United Kingdom and respect
the strenuous efforts it has made to find an
agreed solution compatible with the principle
of majority rule and acceptability of the de-
cision to the Rhodesian people as a whole.
Certainly a negotiated settlement conform-
ing to these criteria would have been the best
solution.
Now, unhappily, the effort to achieve that
settlement has not been successful. As a re-
sult, the United Kingdom has again come
here to obtain the backing of the Council,
and thereby the cooperation of all members
of the United Nations, for the next step. It
is right and wise that this should be done.
For if the problem is to be resolved in peace
— and surely we all share a common obliga-
tion to see that it is resolved in peace — the
cooperation of all other nations will be re-
quired. Under the charter this Council is the
body through which that cooperation can
best be assured.
It is no light action which the Foreign
Secretary of the United Kingdom has asked
the Council to endorse through the draft
resolution now before us.^ We are asked to
impose under chapter VII mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions of a substantial nature
against the Smith regime. If this resolution
is adopted, as we believe it should be, it will
be the first time in the 21 years of the United
Nations that the Council has taken this type
of far-reaching action.
The United States considers these sanc-
tions have one purpose and one purpose only:
to bring about a peaceful settlement of the
Rhodesian problem. We do not look upon
them as punitive or vengeful. We support
them in the honest conviction that they are
now necessary in order to drive home to the
illegal regime that the international commu-
nity will not tolerate the existence of a dis-
criminatory system based on minority rule
' U.N. doc. S/7621.
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in defiance of the United Nations and its
principles.
In considering this serious step, my Gov-
ernment has taken into account the problems
that it will have to face because of the loss
of a source for certain materials critical to
our industrial economy. In the discharge of
our charter responsibilities we are prepared
to assume this cost. We are well aware, more-
over, that the impact of the requested sanc-
tion will fall heavily on Zambia — whose
economy my country has taken substantial
steps to support — on other nearby countries
of Africa, and, to a very substantial degree,
on the United Kingdom itself.
Legal Basis for Proposed Action
We know also that, aside from economic
problems, questions are raised as to the legal
basis for this proposed action. In particular,
it is asserted that the question of Southern
Rhodesia is an internal matter of sole con-
cern to the administering authority. But
while we recognize that responsibility for
action lies on the United Kingdom, the rec-
ord shows that the United Nations, over the
years, has also recognized Southern Rhodesia
as falling within the provisions of chapter
XI of the charter. Under this chapter, and
specifically under article 73(b), the adminis-
tering authority accepts the responsibility
"to develop self-government, to take due ac-
count of the political aspirations of the peo-
ples, and to assist them in the progressive
development of their free political institu-
tions. . . ."
Therefore, so far as the United Nations is
concerned, the administering authority has
always had an international responsibility to
the United Nations in regard to Southern
Rhodesia. And it is precisely the exercise of
this responsibility that the Smith regime
seeks to frustrate and obstruct.
But the question may also be raised
whether the situation constitutes a threat to
the peace, which is the condition under which
sanctions can be imposed under chapter VII
of the charter.
We in the United States learned over 100
years ago that any attempt to institutionalize
and legitimize a political principle of racial
superiority in a new state was unacceptable.
The effort to do so created an inflammatory
situation, and our nation had to rid itself
of this false and hateful doctrine at great
cost. It should not be necessary for me to
emphasize that what could not be accepted by
the United States in the mid-19th century
can surely not be accepted by the interna-
tional community in the late 20th century.
Any person familiar with recent history
would have to be blind and deaf not to per-
ceive the danger in the course of action of
the Smith regime. Some will nevertheless ask
why is it proper, for example, to impose
mandatory sanctions in this case and not in
others.
The answer to this, in our judgment, lies
in the fact that there are a number of unique
elements in the Southern Rhodesian situa-
tion. Here we have witnessed an illegal sei-
zure of power by a minority bent on perpet-
uating the political subjugation of the vast
majority. That act itself is bound to create a
dangerous and inflammatory situation. More-
over, Southern Rhodesia, as I have said, is a
territory whose population is subject to pro-
tection under chapter XI of the charter,
which, among other things, calls for the de-
velopment of self-government to take account
of the political aspiration of the peoples.
What we have seen in Rhodesia under the
Smith regime has been precisely the con-
trary.
All of this has happened, I would empha-
size, against the express will of the sovereign
authority for that territory, the United King-
dom. Regrettably, the efl!"ort of the United
Kingdom to negotiate a settlement on the
basis of the charter in recent days has failed.
Now the United Kingdom comes to this
Council asking for a Council decision under
article 41 to apply mandatory sanctions in
order to cope with the situation which has
developed.
None of us should be surprised by this
request. The Security Council has already
found in previous sessions, particularly on
JANUARY 9, 1967
75
November 20, 1965, that the continuance in
time of such a situation was likely to lead to
a threat to peace.' This situation has not only
continued; since negotiations have failed, it
has obviously grown more acute, especially
since the rejection by the Smith regime of
the recent direct effoi-t of the British Prime
Minister to find an honorable solution.
Situation Not Static But Deteriorating
We thus have a situation in a colony where
a small minority seeks to subjugate the ma-
jority — we have an effort by a small minor-
ity to suppress the political rights of a ma-
jority, to extend into a non-self-governing
territory practices of racial discrimination
which have been found abhorrent by the
United Nations — and where the sovereign
authority for the territory voluntarily comes
to the United Nations and asks it to take
measures which will permit the restoration
of the full rights of the people of Southern
Rhodesia under the United Nations Charter.
What we have here, in short, is not a static
but a deteriorating situation in which the
danger to peace is obviously growing and to
which the Council must address itself.
Resolute and prompt action by the Secu-
rity Council to deal with this problem in a
peaceful but effective way will lessen the
danger of more drastic developments, from
whatever quarter they may threaten to come.
I am well aware that, whereas some criti-
cize the proposed action as too strong, others
complain that it is too mild to achieve its
purpose. These latter critics point out that
the measures which the Security Council has
recommended in the past have not proved
sufficient to rectify the situation.
Whatever views there may be about the
efficacy of these economic measures already
taken, there is a key difference between them
and what is now proposed.
' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on
Nov. 12 and Nov. 20, 1965, and Apr. 9, 1966, and
texts of resolutions adopted on those dates, see
Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 912, and May 2, 1966,
p. 713.
Unlike the voluntary sanctions which the
Council approved a year ago, those now re-
quested are mandatory. Under article 25 of
the charter all members are obliged to carry
them out — and indeed all nonmembers are
also called upon to do so in the resolution, a&
the organization is authorized to insure by
virtue of article 2, paragraph 6, of the char-
ter. If any member or nonmember should
substantially fail to carry out the Council's
decision, this failure would be a violation of
charter provisions and obligations.
It has been asserted also that the League
of Nations failed in its attempt to impose
effective economic sanctions. But surely this
fact should not discourage us. The United
Nations is different from the League of Na-
tions not only in the breadth of its member-
ship but in the fact that it has already done
successfully many things which the League
found impossible to do. While it is apparent
that success in the present enterprise cannot
be guaranteed in advance, the probabilities
of success will be greatest if all of us in good
faith bend our efforts to assure its success —
as indeed we are obligated to do.
For my own country, I wish to say cate-
gorically that if the Council decides to take
the action pursuant to article 41, which we
anticipate, the United States will apply the
full force of our law to implementing this
decision in accordance with the authority es-
tablished under the United Nations Partici-
pation Act of 1945.
Mr. President, the Rhodesian situation
presents a grave practical problem with
great moral implications. It is sometimes
said that moral considerations are irrelevant
in the practical affairs of nations. But my
Government takes the contrary view, and so
does the United Nations Charter. The law of
the charter is based on many moral consider-
ations. The day that law is held to be irrele-
vant, or to be available to some members and
not available to others, will be a tragic day
for world peace.
If, however, we are to act effectively for
the charter's principles, we must practice the
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
art of the possible. We must decide upon
those measures which we can implement —
and to implement thoroughly those measures
on which we have decided. The greater the
unanimity of the Council in making its deci-
sion, the greater will be our assurance of
worldwide support for it.
It is an unhappy fact that some situations
exist in the world in which the Council is
unable to act effectively. Here is a situation
in which we can act. If every state does its
duty in the work that now lies before us, our
action will not only exert a profound effect in
Salisbury; it will do much to build respect
for the United Nations as a force for peace
and justice in Africa and throughout the
world.
It is for all these reasons that the United
States supports the course of action proposed
by the United Kingdom.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 No-
vember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and
221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its
appeal to all States to do their utmost in order to
break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,
Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far
and the measures taken by the administering Power
have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rho-
desia to an end.
Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in
this resolution, the measures provided for in reso-
lution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, as well as
those initiated by Member States in implementation
of that resolution, shall continue in effect.
Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of
the United Nations Charter,
1. Determines that the present situation in South-
ern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security;
2. Decides that all States Members of the United
Nations shall prevent:
(a) the import into their territories of asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper.
*U.N. doc. S/RES/232 and Corr. 1 (1966) (S/
7621/Rev. 1, as amended) ; adopted by the Council on
Dec. 16, 1966, by a vote of 11 (U.S.) to 0, with 4 ab-
stentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, and U.S.S.R.).
JANUARY 9, 1967
meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather
originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported
therefrom after the date of this resolution;
(6) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the export of these commodities from Southern
Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in
their territories in any of these commodities origi-
nating in Southern Rhodesia and exported there-
from after the date of this resolution, including in
particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rho-
desia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;
(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis-
tration of any of these commodities originating in
Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the
date of this resolution ;
(d) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of
arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft,
military vehicles, and equipment and materials for
the manufacture and maintenance of arms and am-
munition in Southern Rhodesia;
(e) any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to pro-
mote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other
aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and
materials for the manufacture, assembly or main-
tenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of
their registration of any such goods destined for
Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their na-
tionals or in their territories which promote or are
calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly
of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;
(/) participation in their territories or territories
under their administration or in land or air trans-
port facilities or by their nationals or vessels of
their registration in the supply of oil or oil products
to Southern Rhodesia;
notwithstanding any contracts entered into or
licenses granted before the date of this resolution;
3. Reminds Member States that the failure or re-
fusal by any of them to implement the present reso-
lution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of
the Charter;
4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people
of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence
in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
contained in General Assembly resolution 1514
(XV) ; and recognizes the legitimacy of their strug-
gle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set
forth in the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or
other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in
Southern Rhodesia;
6. Calls upon all States Members of the United
77
Nations to carry out this decision of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United
Nations Charter;
7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated
in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States
not Members of the United Nations to act in accord-
ance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the pres-
ent resolution;
8. Calls upon States Members of the United Na-
tions or of the specialized agencies to report to the
Secretary-General the measures each has taken in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the
present resolution ;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on the progress of the implementation of
the present resolution, the first report to be submit-
ted not later than 1 March 1967;
10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for
further action as appropriate in the light of develop-
ments.
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space Treaty
Following are statements made in Commit-
tee I (Political and Security) and in plenary
session by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the General Assembly, together
with the text of a resolution adopted by the
Assembly on December 19.
STATEMENT IN COMMITTEE I,
DECEMBER 17
U.S. delegation press release 5034
The treaty on outer space which now lies
before this committee is an achievement in
which all of us here, I am sure, find cause for
great satisfaction and great hope.' We are
happy to be a cosponsor of the resolution
commending this treaty. We hope and trust
that it will command the virtually unanimous
support of the committee and the General
Assembly. We share the wish that the treaty
will be opened for signature very soon and
will gain the widest possible adherence.
I should like to take this occasion to pay
tribute to our distinguished colleague who
opened this debate. Judge Manfred Lachs
of Poland. He has shown admirable skill and
' For a statement made by President Johnson on
Dec. 8 and text of the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, see Bulletin of Dec. 26,
1966, p. 952.
78
impartiality in his role as chairman of the
Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, within whose
framework this treaty was negotiated in
Geneva last July and more recently here in
New York. Much of the credit for the success
of our negotiations is due to him. We are
also greatly indebted to Ambassador Kurt
Waldheim of Austria, the chairman of the
parent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, who played an outstanding role
in bringing this project to fruition. There is
no need for me to repeat what Professor
Lachs has just now so ably explained about
the history and procedural status of this
treaty. But, speaking for the United States,
which takes a very great interest in the ex-
ploration of outer space, and in recognition
of all that this implies for the peace of the
world, I do wish to make some general obser-
vations.
We of the United States regard this treaty
as an important step toward peace. We do
not wish to exaggerate its significance, but
neither do we underrate it. It will greatly re-
duce the danger of international conflict and
promote the prospects of international coop-
eration for the common interest in the newest
and most unfamiliar of all realms of human
activity, a realm in which the actions of na-
tions are sure to be fateful for good or ill.
The greatest danger facing us in outer
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
space comes not from the physical environ-
ment, however cold and hostile it may be, but
from our own human nature and from the
discords that trouble our relationship here
on earth. Therefore, as we stand on the
threshold of the space age, our first respon-
sibility as governments is clear: We must
make sure that man's earthly conflicts will
not be carried into outer space.
We know that not all these conflicts are
easily or quickly ended. But it has for years
been the deep desire and hope of many coun-
tries, my own included, that the danger which
they pose might be reduced; that the exten-
sion of them into new realms might be pre-
vented; and that this might be achieved in
ways which would advance the interests of
all nations.
This treaty responds to that desire and
hope. It thus takes its place in a historic
progression: First was the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959, reserving that large area of the
world for exclusively peaceful activity; sec-
ond was the limited test ban treaty of 1963;
and third is the treaty which now lies before
this committee.
We hope and believe this series of peace-
building agreements will continue to grow.
Nothing would make us happier than if the
treaty against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons should soon be added as the fourth
item on this historic list.
Thus step by step, we may manage to re-
lieve our fellow man of the increasingly
heavy burden of conflict and armaments and
danger he has borne for so long. And, step
by step, we may also advance the rule of law
into further areas of the relations between
states.
Record of the Negotiations
In this great endeavor we can take much
encouragement from the record of the nego-
tiations on this treaty, which took place in
the Legal Subcommittee, beginning last July
12 in Geneva, and were completed here in
New York. These negotiations were remark-
able for their speed and for the businesslike
and reasonable attitude of all concerned.
In such a successful negotiation no party
gains all that it wanted, but no party's major
interests are injured, and every party gains
something as the areas of common interest
are discovered and defined. It was in this
spirit of reasonable compromise that the
negotiators reached agreement on a number
of points of difference, not only between the
two principal space powers but also between
them and the other powers. The result is a
treaty which reflects a very fair balance of
interests and obligations from the standpoint
of all concerned, including the countries
which as yet have little or no space program
of their own.
The aim of the negotiators of this treaty
was riot to provide in detail for every con-
tingency that might arise in the exploration
and use of outer space, many of which are
unforeseeable, but rather to establish a set
of basic principles. The treaty's provisions
are purposely broad. But they are provisions
which should be welcomed by the United Na-
tions and particularly by the General As-
sembly, for a great many of them derive
from the recommendations which the Assem-
bly made in two of its important resolutions
of 1963: the Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing Activities in Outer Space,^ and
the "no bombs in orbit" resolution.^ More-
over, the treaty responds to some of the most
important concerns assigned to the General
Assembly by the charter: disarmament and
the regulation of armaments; international
cooperation in the political and other fields;
and, by no means least in importance, the
progressive development of international law.
Indeed, one of the most important prin-
ciples in the treaty is that contained in article
III, which binds all parties to carry on their
activities in outer space "in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations." As man steps into the
void of outer space, he will depend for his
survival not only on his amazing technology
but also on this other gift which is no less
precious: the rule of law among nations.
I shall not detain the committee with a full
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 7.54.
JANUARY 9, 1967
79
discussion of the treaty's provisions. But I do
wish to comment both on its arms control
provisions and on those relating to peaceful
cooperation.
Arms Control Provisions
The United States view of the significance
of the treaty's provisions on arms control
was summed up by President Johnson in his
statement a week ago, when he welcomed
this treaty as "the most important arms con-
trol development since the limited test ban
treaty of 1963." The substance of the arms
control provisions is in article IV. This arti-
cle restricts military activities in two ways:
First, it contains an undertaking not to
place in orbit around the earth, install on the
moon or any other celestial body, or other-
wise station in outer space, nuclear or any
other weapons of mass destruction.
Second, it limits the use of the moon and
other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful
purposes and expressly prohibits their use
for establishing military bases, installations
or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind,
or conducting military maneuvers.
Quite as important as these arms control
provisions are the means available for assur-
ing each party that the others are living up
to them. I wish to call attention particularly
to articles I, II, and XII. The principle used
is similar to that embodied in the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959; namely, free access by all
parties to one another's installations.
This principle finds expression first in arti-
cle I, which provides that "there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies." It is
reinforced by the prohibition in article II
against national appropriation of outer
space or of celestial bodies. And it is further
reinforced as regards celes.tial bodies by arti-
cle XII, under which "All stations, installa-
tions, equipment and space vehicles on the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open
to representatives of other States Parties to
the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity."
The words "on a basis of reciprocity" in
article XII do not confer, or imply the ex-
istence of, any right or power to veto pro-
posed visits to other countries' facilities on a
celestial body. As I said on this point in the
Legal Subcommittee in Geneva last August
A veto is not compatible with the idea of reci-
procity and reciprocal rights. If there is a veto,
there are no meaningrful rights; without the exist-
ence of rights there can be no reciprocity.
The meaning of the words "on the basis of
reciprocity" in article XII is in fact the mean-
ing which common sense would dictate — and
which was fully accepted by all the members
of the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva;
namely, that representatives of a state party
to the treaty conducting activities on celestial
bodies will have a right of access to the sta-
tions, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles of another state party on a celestial
body, regardless of whether the second state
has ever claimed, or has ever exercised, a
right of access itself. The fact that the second
state may not have asserted such a right, or
may not have exercised it, in no way impairs
the first state's right to access. However, if
the first state has denied access to repre-
sentatives of the second state, then the latter
is not required, on the principle of reciproci-
ty, to grant access to representatives of the
first state. Indeed, the same logical result
would follow whether or not this treaty pro-
vision contained any express mention of reci-
procity.
Moreover, any denial of access to facilities
contemplated in this article would entitle the
other party to exercise such other remedies
as it would have under international law.
In my statement of August 3 to the sub-
committee, I made clear that the United
States delegation was prepared to agree to
inclusion of the words "on a basis of
reciprocity" if the understanding I have just
outlined, and have just repeated here, Mr.
Chairman, was generally shared — and, in
particular, was shared by the Soviet Union —
and if the remaining provisions in the article
were consistent with the idea of reciprocity
and meaningful treaty rights. I stated ex-
plicitly that the veto clause was not con-
sistent and not acceptable. Nor does the re-
* Ibid., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.
80
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quirement of advance notice of a projected
visit suggest any veto right or power. The
United States accepted the advance notice
provision on the suggestion of our friends
from Japan, who pointed out at an early date
that concern for the safety of our astronauts
and the integrity of our facilities on celestial
bodies requires that a visitor be asked to give
reasonable advance notice of his intended
visit. The restricted purpose of this notice
requirement is expressly stated in article XII
to be "in order that appropriate consultations
may be held and that maximum precautions
may be taken to assure safety and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited." There is no veto.
Peaceful Cooperation Provisions
Now I turn to the more affirmative pro-
visions of the treaty — those which lay down
some basic ground rules for peaceful coopera-
tion among nations in the exploration and use
of outer space.
The keynote is struck in the very first
operative words of the treaty, in article I:
The exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried
out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic or
scientific development, and shall be the province of
all mankind.
The same article goes on to make clear that
the exploration and use of outer space shall
be the right of all states without any dis-
crimination and on a basis of equality. This
and other provisions, particularly that which
prohibits claims of territorial sovereignty,
make clear the intent of the treaty that
outer space and celestial bodies are open not
just to the big powers or the first arrivals but
shall be available to all, both now and in the
future. This principle is a strong safeguard
for the interests of those states which have,
at the present time, little or no active space
program of their own. Their interests are
also protected by other provisions, for ex-
ample:
Article VII, which fixes on the launching
state the responsibility for any damage
caused by objects launched by or for them or
from their territory;
Article IX, which requires states to con-
duct their space activities "with due regard
to the corresponding interests of all other
States Parties to the Treaty." This includes
a specific obligation to avoid harmful con-
tamination of outer space or of celestial
bodies and also to avoid adverse changes in
the terrestrial environment;
And Article XI, which requires the fullest
practicable public reporting, by parties con-
ducting space activities, of "the nature, con-
duct, locations and results of such activities"
— a practice which my own country has vol-
untarily followed since the space age began.
This provision seeks to assure that the full
scientific harvest from space research will be
available to all the world, not just to the par-
ties that do most of the exploring.
It is wise and proper that the treaty should
secure these rights and benefits to all parties,
including the nonlaunching nations. For their
cooperation also is necessary in many re-
spects, some of which the treaty also provides
for, such as assistance to and return of any
astronauts who may make emergency land-
ings on their territory and return to the
owner of objects launched into outer space
which fall on their territory. In addition,
maximum benefits from the exploration of
outer space depend on the cooperation of the
international scientific and technical com-
munity in all nations, large and small alike.
We are all in this venture together, and we
need one another's cooperation.
The same spirit of cooperation, let me say
emphatically, should prevail also among the
major space countries, specifically my own
country and the Soviet Union — and any
others that may later develop comparable
programs of space launchings and manned
flight. Two provisions of the treaty con-
cretely illustrate this desirable relationship.
Article IX calls for international cooperation
and mutual assistance and includes a provi-
sion for consultation in the case of potentially
harmful experiments. Article V requires that
the same universal respect for life and limb
JANUARY 9, 1967
81
which has been traditional among mariners
at sea for many centuries shall also govern
among astronauts in outer space. In all space
activities, under this article, "the astronauts
of one State Party shall render all possible
assistance to the astronauts of other States
Parties." And any party which discovers con-
ditions in outer space that could endanger
the life or health of astronauts is obliged to
report this to the other parties or to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
As the space age proceeds, and particularly
as manned space flights develop, many forms
of cooperation beween astronauts of major
space powers are sure to develop which today
cannot be foreseen. The framers of this
treaty did not try to peer into the unfore-
seeable; but rather we tried to insure, by lay-
ing down broad principles, that all concerned
will enter this unknown realm as friends and
partners in peace.
Tracking Facilities, Accession
Before concluding, I wish to make brief
additional comments on two of the articles of
the treaty.
The first of these is article X, dealing with
the granting of tracking facilities. In this I
speak on behalf of a large number of states,
some of which have granted tracking facili-
ties and some of which have not.
We welcome the revised form in which this
article appears in the final text of the treaty.
The article requires that if a party has
granted tracking facilities to another party,
it is obliged, on an equal basis, to consider
a request for tracking facilities by a third
party. It is quite clear from the text of the
article, however, that there must be agree-
ment between the parties concerned for the
establishment of a tracking facility. The
article as thus revised recognizes that the
elements of mutual benefit and acceptability
are natural and necessary parts of the deci-
sion whether to enter into an agreement con-
cerning such a facility, and it properly
incorporates the principle that each state
which is asked to cooperate has the right to
consider its legitimate interests in reaching
its decision.
Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the
accession clause in article XIV of the treaty.
The adoption of the accession clause now
included in the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space — urged because
of exceptional circumstances favoring a very
broad geographical coverage for the space
treaty — does not, of course, bring about the
recognition or otherwise alter the status of
an unrecognized regime or entity which may
seek to file an instrument of accession to the
space treaty. Under international law and
practice, recognition of a government or
acknowledgement of the existence of a state
is brought about as the result of a deliberate
decision and course of conduct on the part
of a government intending to accord recogni-
tion. Recognition of a regime or acknowl-
edgement of an entity cannot be inferred
from signature, ratification, or accession to a
multilateral agreement. The United States
believes that this viewpoint is generally
accepted and shared, and it is on this basis
that we join in supporting the present final
clauses of the space treaty.
"Envoys of Manlcind"
Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can best express
my country's feelings about this treaty by
recalling an encounter which several of us,
including the Secretary-General, shared here
at the United Nations last year with an
American astronaut. He is Colonel Edward
White, and he had then only recently
returned from a 4-day Gemini mission in
which he had carried out the first American
"walk in space."
Colonel White had carried with him on this
flight a memento which he was eager to
present to the United Nations — a United
Nations flag, probably the first ever to fly in
space. The Secretary-General very graciously
agreed to accept this flag for the United
Nations.
We had a little ceremony in which the
colonel made a short speech, and in that
speech he said something I shall never forget.
He said that, as he looked down from space
at the earth passing below and recognized
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the familiar shapes of the oceans and
continents moving past, one thing that struck
him very forcefully was something he did
not see. He saw no national boundaries.
Most of us who sit in this room as envoys
of our respective governments will probably
never see that sight, which history has
reserved for a younger generation than ours.
But perhaps it is not too much to hope that
we will see it in our mind's eye and that in
the work we have to do we, too, will be able
to serve also, in some small measure, as
"envoys of mankind."
On behalf of the United States I have the
privilege of commending this treaty to the
First Committee of the General Assembly
and urge that the resolution which will speed
it forward be promptly unanimously ap-
proved.
STATEMENT IN PLENARY, DECEMBER 19
U.S. delegation press release 6037
It is indeed fitting that the treaty on outer
space should come before the General
Assembly as the 21st session draws to a close,
for that extraordinary document provides at
the same time a momentous finale to the
work pf this session and a note of progress
and cooperation and hope from which future
sessions may derive inspiration and light.
On this historic occasion the United States
would like to join the other nations that have
acknowledged a special debt to the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to the
space and nonspace powers alike, without
whose contributions this treaty would never
have been possible. And, of course, I should
like to acknowledge our thanks and apprecia-
tion to Ambassador Waldheim and Professor
Lachs for their leadership in this great
effort.
This, in every sense of the word, is a
United Nations treaty in which all member
nations can justly take great pride. It has
been negotiated under the auspices of the
organization and is the instrument of its
labor. The treaty furthers the aims of the
charter by greatly reducing the danger of
international conflict and by promoting the
JANUARY 9, 1967
prospects of international cooperation for
the common interests in the newest realm of
human activity.
This treaty is an important step toward
peace. It takes its place in a historic progres-
sion: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the
limited test ban treaty of 1963, and now this
treaty. We hope and trust this series of
peacebuilding agreements will continue to
grow. Nothing would make the United States
happier than if a treaty against the prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons should soon be
added as the fourth compact on this historic
list. Thus, step by step, we shall advance the
rule of law into further areas of the relations
between states.
Mr. President, it is with great satisfaction
that the United States will vote for Draft
Resolution II, which commends the treaty on
outer space and expresses the hope for the
widest possible adherence to this treaty, a
hope we share in full measure and full con-
fidence.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION °
Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies
The General Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ' covering its work
during 1966, and in particular the work accom-
plished by the Legal Sub-Committee during its fifth
session, held at Geneva from 12 July through 4
Aug^ust and at New York from 12 September
through 16 September,
Noting further the progress achieved through sub-
sequent consultations among States Members of the
United Nations,
'U.N. doc. A/RES/2222 (XXI); adopted unani-
mously by the Assembly on December 19. Two other
resolutions on the subject of outer space were
adopted on the same day and also were supported
by the United States; A/RES/2221 (XXI) calling
for a United Nations conference on the exploration
and peaceful uses of outer space to be held at Vienna
in September 1967; and A/RES/2223 (XXI) endors-
ing a number of other recommendations in the report
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space.
« U.N. doc. A/6431.
83
Reaffirming the importance of international co-
operation in the field of activities in the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and the importance
of developing the rule of law in this new area of
human endeavour,
1. Commends the Treaty on Principles Govern-
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, the text of which is annexed to this
resolution ;
2. Requests the depositary Governments to open
the Treaty for signature and ratification at the
earliest possible date ;
3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible ad-
herence to this Treaty;
4. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space :
(a) To continue its work on the elaboration of an
agreement on liability for damages caused by the
launching of objects into outer space and an agree-
ment on assistance to and return of astronauts and
space vehicles, which are on the agenda of the Com-
mittee ;
(b) To begin at the same time the study of ques-
tions relative to the definition of outer space and the
utilization of outer space and celestial bodies, includ-
ing the various implications of space communica-
tions ;
(c) To report to the twenty-second session of the
General Assembly on the progress of its work. '
TREATY INFORMATION
Income Tax Convention Signed
With Trinidad and Tobago
Department Statement
Press release 302 dated December 23
On December 22, 1966, the American Am-
bassador at Port of Spain and the Minister
of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago signed
a convention between the United States and
Trinidad and Tobago for the avoidance of
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal
evasion with respect to taxes on income and
the encouragement of international trade
and investment.
The income tax convention of April 16,
1945, between the United States and the
United Kingdom, a^ modified by supplemen-
tary protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954,
and August 19, 1957,^ was extended in its
application to Trinidad and Tobago as of
January 1, 1959, pursuant to the procedure
prescribed in article XXII of that conven-
tion. Trinidad and Tobago became an inde-
pendent nation on August 31, 1962. In 1965,
in accordance with provisions in the 1945
convention for that purpose, the Govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago gave notice
to the United States Government of an in-
tention to terminate the application of the
convention as between it and the United
States.
The new convention is limited in scope;
and it is anticipated that it will be replaced
by a more comprehensive income tax con-
vention between the two countries, negotia-
tions for which will be commenced during
1967.
The new convention is designed primarily
as an interim measure to permit corpora-
tions of one of the countries to receive divi-
dends from their subsidiary corporations op-
erating in the other country (a subsidiary
for this purpose being a corporation at least
10 percent of the outstanding shares of vot-
ing stock of which is owned by the recipient
corporation) at a reduced rate of withhold-
ing tax. Under existing internal law of each
country, dividends paid by a corporation of
one country to a resident of the other coun-
try are subject to a 30 percent withholding
tax. Subject to prescribed conditions, the
convention will have the effect of reducing
this withholding rate to 5 percent with re-
spect to such dividends.
In addition to its corporation tax, which
is imposed at a rate of 44 percent, Trinidad
and Tobago imposes, under its Finance Act
of 1966, a tax of 30 percent on profits (after
' The text of the treaty was printed as an annex
to this resolution.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
1546, 3165, 4124.
84
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 111
payment of the corporation tax) derived in
Trinidad and Tobago by a permanent estab-
lishment of a United States corporation un-
less such profits are invested within Trinidad
and Tobago. Subject to prescribed conditions,
the convention will have the effect of reduc-
ing the rate of this "branch profits" tax to
5 percent.
In general, therefore, the convention pre-
scribes a 5 percent rate limitation on the tax
that can be imposed by the source country
on dividends derived from sources within
that country to certain corporations of the
other country. It prescribes a 25 percent rate
limitation on the tax that can be imposed by
the source country on dividends derived from
sources within that country to other corpo-
rations and individual residents of the other
country.
The convention also contains articles des-
ignating the taxes that are the subject of the
convention, defining various terms found in
the convention, and prescribing the foreign
tax credit.
The convention will enter into force upon
the exchange of instruments of ratification,
but it is agreed that all necessary steps will
be taken to make the provisions effective as
of January 1, 1966. The convention shall
terminate on December 31, 1967, but may
be continued in effect from year to year by
an exchange of notes for that purpose on or
before December 31 of any taxable year.
The convention will be transmitted to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilat-
eral agreement between the United States and
Spain of August 16, 1957, as amended (TIAS
3988, 5990), for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna December 9,
1966. Entered into force December 9, 1966.
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963.'
Signature : Denmark, November 21, 1966.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquar-
ters, New York, September 28 through November
30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963.
TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Kenya, December 15, 1966.
Customs
Convention concerning the International Union for
the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brus-
sels July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1891.
26 Stat. 1518.
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966.
Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels
July 5, 1890, relating to the creation of an Inter-
national Union for the Publication of Customs
Tariffs (26 Stat. 1518). Done at Brussels Decem-
ber 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950; for
the United States September 15, 1957. TIAS 3922.
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966.
IMaritime Matters
Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.'
Acceptances received: Argentina, September 30,
1966; Bulgaria, September 29, 1966; Czechoslo-
vakia, October 3, 1966; Senegal, September 28,
1966.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.'
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (vdth a statement), October 25, 1966.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final proto-
col, and convention with final protocol and regula-
tions of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964.
Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratifications deposited: China, September 6, 1966;
Tunisia, September 13, 1966.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into
force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Dahomey, December 10,
1966.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956.*
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16,
1966.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966 for part I
' Not in force.
• Not in force for the United States.
JANUARY 9, 1967
85
and parts III to VII; Augiist 1, 1966 for part II.
Acceptances deposited: Finland, December 14,
1966; Mexico, December 22, 1966; Venezuela,
December 19, 1966.
Women — Political Rights
Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
July 7, 1954."
Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16,
1966.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to the establishment of a joint
defense space research facility. Signed at Can-
berra December 9, 1966. Entered into force De-
cember 9, 1966.
Dominican Republic
Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative pro-
grram for meteorological observations. Effected by
exchange of notes at Santo Domingo June 17 and
July 21, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1966;
effective June 30, 1965.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement relating to the transfer of three paint-
ings to the Federal Republic of Germany for the
Weimar Museum. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington December 9 and 16, 1966. Entered
into force December 16, 1966.
Japan
Agreement relating to the establishment of a geo-
detic satellite observation station at Kanoya. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September
12 and 19, 1966. Entered into force September 19,
1966.
Mexico
Agrreement relating to creation of a joint commis-
sion to study economic and social development of
the border area. Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico and Tlatelolco November 30 and Decem-
ber 3, 1966. Entered into force December 3, 1966.
Paraguay
Agreement amending the agreement of October 28,
1955 (TIAS 3558), relating to investment guaran-
ties. Signed at Asuncion August 11, 1966.
Entered into force : November 16, 1966.
United Kingdom
Agreement relating to a cooperative meteorological
program in the Cayman Islands. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington November 23 and
December 12, 1966. Entered into force December
12, 1966; effective July 1, 1962.
United Nations
Agreement amending the supplemental agreement
of February 9, 1966, regarding the headquarters
of the United Nations (TIAS 5961). Effected by
exchange of notes at New York December 8, 1966.
Entered into force December 8, 1966.
' Not in force for the United States.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1437 PUBLICATION 8183 JANUARY 9, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, aa well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the Held of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10. foreign $16;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.
86
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 9, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 14S7
I
I
Africa. Institutions for Order (Sisco) .... 64
Antarctica. U.S. Appoints Observers for Ant-
arctic Inspections 71
Asia. Advisers Named for Near Eastern and
South Asian Bureau 72
Chile. President Frei of Chile To Visit the United
States (Johnson) 71
Department and Foreign Service. Advisers
Named for Near Eastern and South Asian
Bureau 72
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of December 21 42
Economic Affairs.
Income Tax Convention Sigrned With Trinidad
and Tobago 84
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying
Vietnamese Development 69
Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting 70
U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for Investment,
Trade Studies 69
Europe. North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris
(communique) 49
Foreign Aid. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of December 21 42
Human Rights. Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of De-
cember 21 42
International Law. Viet-Nam and the Interna-
tional Law of Self-Defense (Meeker) ... 54
Korea. U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for In-
vestment, Trade Studies 69
Mexico. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds
Second Meeting 70
Military Affairs. North Atlantic Council Meets
at Paris (communique) 49
Near East
Advisers Named for Near Eastern and South
Asian Bureau 72
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris (com-
munique) 49
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
Presidential Documents. President Frei of Chile
To Visit the United States 71
Science. U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer
Space Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) . 78
South West Africa. Institutions for Order
(Sisco) 64
Southern Rhodesia
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text
of resolution) 73
Trade. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds
Second Meeting 70
Treaty Information
Current Actions 85
Income Tax Convention Signed With Trinidad
and Tobago 84
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space
Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78
Trinidad and Tobago. Income Tax Convention
Signed With Trinidad and Tobago . ... 84
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
December 21 42
United Kingdom. Security Council Votes Man-
datory Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 73
United Nations
Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text
of resolution) 73
U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space
Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help in
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63
Viet-Nam
Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying
Vietnamese Development 69
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem-
ber 21 42
U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help iii
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63
Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-
Defense (Meeker) 54
Name Index
Ball, George W 69
Goldberg, Arthur J 63,73,78
Johnson, President "71
Lilienthal, David E 69
Meeker, Leonard C 54
Rusk, Secretary 42
Sisco, Joseph J 64
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 18 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
291 of December 12 and 292 of December 13.
No.
»294
Date
12/19
295 12/20
Sabjeet
NATO communique (original
NATO document printed here-
in).
Advisory panel for Bureau of
Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs.
Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Com-
mittee meeting.
Rusk: news conference of De-
cember 21.
Termination of income tax con-
vention with Honduras.
U.S. observers under Antarctic
Treaty (rewrite).
IMCO Subcommittee recommends
new passenger-ship standards.
Travel restrictions.
Income tax convention with
Trmidad and Tobago.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Buixetin.
296
12/21
297
12/21
t298
12/22
299
12/23
t300
12/23
t301
302
12/23
12/23
it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/27
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington, d.c., 20402
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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U38
January 16, 1967
THE WORK OF THE 21st SESSION OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 98
U.N. ADOPTS INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Statement by Ambassador Patricia R. Harris and Texts of Covenants lOi
WORLDWIDE NUCLEAR POWER— PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS
Article by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioii 90
For index see inside back cover
By 1980, Dr. Seuborg predicts, fissionable material will be
produced over the face of the globe "siifficient for the poten-
tial production of a substantial amount of the world's
electrical power — or, alternatively, sxifficient for tens of
nuclear weapons a day." This article, in which Dr. Seaborg
discusses the importance of miclear power to a rapidly
expanding population, is based on a lecture he delivered in
London on October 2 A, 1966, before the British Nuclear
Energy Society.
Worldwide Nuclear Power— Progress and Problems
by Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Before one can discuss the future of power
with any realism, one must first tal]< about
people — people in terms of population and
the ever-growing pressure of population. This
is a subject of overwhelming importance
today, and I am sure that many are familiar
with the infonnation in figure 1 showing the
exponential growth of the world's population
projected to the year 2000. The cui-ve on this
graph bears a simple but most relevant mes-
sage: Between the year 1960 and the year
2000, the world's population will about
double. It will rise from 3 billion to 6 billion
people. Now, if all the other aspects of civili-
zation as we know it were to remain the
same and proportionally each individual
consumed the same amount of energy tomor-
row as today, the energy demand should also
double.
But we know that this will not be the case,
and figure 2 shows the actual situation. This
graph of past and projected annual world-
wide energy consumption covers the same
period as the previous population curve. The
previous curve, noi-malized to the worldwide
energy consumption curve at the year 1950,
has also been included for comparison's sake.
Tliis makes obvious the fact that the con-
sumption of energy by individuals does not
have a constant value. In highly technological
societies, such as the United States and the
United Kingdom, there has been and will be
a significant increase in energy consumption
per capita. In the emerging nations, however,
there probably will be a startling increase.
The consumption of energy in these countries
today is almost nil compared to what it might
be tomorrow.
It is difficult to comprehend fully the
energy demands of a world of double today's
population with all its people enjoying living
standards approaching those of the people of
the United Kingdom and the United States.
Think of the magnitude of energy that may
be required some day if we were to air-
condition much of Africa and the subcon-
tinent of Asia and heat population centers
that will be growing up in subarctic regions.
What would it mean to provide the power
required to transport people and materials
to the remote ijarts of the globe to satisfy
the needs of an ever-expanding population
and provide sufficient power and fresh water
for home, industry, and agriculture? Imagine
the future energy needs involved in growing,
processing, and distributing food, from land
90
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and sea, for a world i^opulation double that
of today — and demanding an adequate diet
for all. These are only a few of the energy
challenges we face.
Recognizing the great importance of
energy for future global social and economic
well-being — perhaps for our veiy survival —
consider one important form of energy —
electricity. The past and projected worldwide
annual electricity production is represented
in figure 3. Again, the worldwide annual
energy consumption as sho^vn in the previous
figure has been normalized to the worldwide
electricity production cui've at the year 1950
and projected to the year 2000. I believe it is
particularly evident that electricity will pro-
vide an even greater fraction of the energy
consumed by man in the ensuing decades than
it does today. This should not be a surprising
fact when one realizes that many parts of the
world are just being ushered into the electric
age. Further, electricity is a particularly
easily managed forni of energy. It can be
simply transported by wire, conveniently and
economically generated in large blocks, and
it is capable of being produced from a number
of independent energy sources, that is, hydro,
fossil fuels, or the heat generated from
nuclear fission. It is electricity produced by
this last means that I would like to turn to
next and examine in some detail.
Advantages of Nuclear Power
In general, the future of nuclear electric
power looks bright indeed, but we who are
in this field know that we have many
obstacles to overcome and that much hard
work remains ahead of us to make the most
of the atom's great potential power.
When we look at the nuclear electrical pro-
duction throughout the world from the year
1950 to the turn of the centuiy, as seen in
figure 4, again we have a familiar pattern
of rapid exponential gi'o^vth. In this case,
because of the newness of this energy
source — nuclear generating capacity was
clearly zero in 1960 — the annual world\vide
electricity production cui've has been nor-
malized to the worldwide nuclear production
curve at the year 1970. It is genei'ally agreed
FIGURE 1
6000
WORLD POPULATION /
SOOO
^
y
4000
-
y^
3000
-
^^.^
2000
;
_^ — ^^"^
1000
-
1
— 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 1 1
that nuclear energy will take an ever-increas-
ing share of the electrical generating capacity
until the turn of the century. By that time,
it is predicted that essentially all new elec-
trical powerplants to be built will be nuclear
powerplants.
This then brings us to the importance of
nuclear power. As I indicated before, a
rapidly expanding global population, its
increasing appetite for energy, and the satis-
faction of an increasingly larger share of this
energy appetite by electricity make nuclear
electric power a key element in the future
well-being and progress of man.
Assuming continued improvements in
nuclear power technology, the building of
veiy large size plants, and the absence of cer-
tain financial restraints, nuclear power has
the potential for a significant reduction in
the cost of electricity. A reduction large
enough to cause rather dramatic changes in
energy utilization is foreseen by some. There
is no doubt that large-scale, low-cost sources
of energy will determine more than any other
single resource the availability and cost of
other basic resources such as food, water,
and industrial materials. With very low cost
power, desalted water would be a reality.
Our nitrogenous fertilizers and many of our
basic chemicals would be produced by new
routes and from raw materials such as water,
air, and coal. Electricity would widely be
used to reduce most ores to metals. The
world of tomorrow will certainly be far dif-
ferent from that of today if these promises
of very low cost nuclear power do come true.
There are, I might add, other obvious ad-
JANUARY 16, 1967
91
FIGURE 2
TOTAl ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE ENERGY CONSUMPTION
IV«0 2000
vantages to nuclear power today. It is a clean
source of power and does not add to the
burden of pollution in the air. It is relatively
independent of geography because of the
extreme compactness and long life of nuclear
fuels, and therefore nuclear powerplants can
be constructed far from their sources of raw
material — uranium and thorium ores — with-
out a significant economic penalty. And,
finally, it lends itself well toward generation
in large blocks of ix)wer so that enonnous,
very economical, central power stations can
be built.
Economic Requirements
But if nuclear energy is actually to be used
in this important role, it must be capable of
meeting at least two criteria. First, it must
be economic wherever it is used. Otherwise
nuclear power stations will not be built in any
significant numbers. Second, sufficient re-
serves of nuclear fuel must be available to
provide the enormous amounts of energy
which will be required, not only through the
year 2000 but also beyond, as our energy
consumption ever increases.
Recent Trends
Turning now to the present status of nu-
clear power in the world, let me point out
that the tyijes of reactors being constructed
today are being built for current and near-
term economic use, and their design does not
in general take into consideration the long-
term future resources of nuclear fuel. At
present this long-term concern is really not
a necessary condition of reactor construction
because nuclear energy represents but a
minor fraction of the annual global energy
consumption and uranium resources are
ample to meet near-term requirements.
As is generally known, the current reactor
types have achieved economical competitive-
ness — remarkably so in countries such as the
United States. In fact, in my tenure as
Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission I have witnessed a remarkable evolu-
tion of nuclear power. When I first took office
the entire program was questioned on the
ground that the expenditures of vast sums
of public funds seemed to be for naught, that
nuclear power would not be economic for
several decades to come. Today I find some
people at the other extreme beginning to
question whether any additional government
funding of advanced nuclear power programs
is necessaiy, since so many nuclear power-
plants are being sold by the nuclear industiy
that the industry has reached the point of
being self-supporting. In the United States
alone, firm commitments for the construction
of nuclear powerplants went from 2 million
kilowatts in 1963-64 to 5 million kilowatts
in 1965 to 15 million kilowatts for the first
9 months of 1966. A similar increase in reac-
tor construction is expected to occur in other
countries.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the
FIGURE 3
ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE
ELECTRIC ENERGY CONSUMPTION
WITH WORLD-WIDE ANNUAL TOTAL ENERGY
CONSUMPTION NORMALIZED AT 19S0
92
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
second nuclear power program, adopted in
1965, planned a program of 5 million kilo-
watts of nuclear generating capacity during
the period 1970-75. This program was in-
creased to 8 million kilowatts by the end of
1975.
The French civil program, as another ex-
ample, is the largest in continental Europe.
According to the French Government's "fifth
plan," the French foresee 2.5 million to 4
million kilowatts installed from 1966 to 1970
utilizing gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, and
natural-uranium-fueled plants of 500,000
kilowatts or more. At the present time, about
1 percent of France's electrical energy is of
nuclear origin; by 1970 it is expected to reach
5 percent and by 1975, 12 percent.
The installation of nuclear power in Japan
is expected to total from 4.3 million to 5.3
million kilowatts by 1975 and approximately
10 million kilowatts by 1980. Seven central
stations are in various stages of planning in
Japan, with two plants now operating.
Sweden also plans a long-range construction
program of six nuclear i)lants totaling 2.5
million kilowatts of power by 1978. In the
Federal Republic of Germany two plants are
now producing electricity, two are being
built, and plans are going forward on several
others. It is apparent that nuclear power will
have a rapid growth in Germany during the
next decade. Canada, India, Italy, Switzer-
land, and Spain also have substantial
nuclear power plans.
One of the reasons given for this abrupt
change in events has been the ability of the
electric producers to begin utilizing very
large blocks of electrical generation. As a re-
sult, it has become possible to take advantage
of the savings incurred through scaling
nuclear powerplants to very large sizes.
Uranium Prices
A fixed price of uranium equal to $8 per
pound of UsOg has been a general level which
has been attained through extensive national
and international procurement of uranium
ores over the past decade. Recently, prices a
FIGURE 4
ANNUAL WORLD-WIDE
NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION
WITH ANNUAL WORID-WIDE
ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION
NORMALIZED AT 1970
H70 1980
YEARS
few dollars below the $8 level have been
negotiated due to the temporary surplus of
uranium ore supphes. However, if one views
this question of uranium ore resources from
a long-term viewpoint, the price will probably
slowly escalate as the higher grade ores are
consumed and as the general cost of labor
and materials increases. For the present
moment the figure of about $8 a pound of
UaOs is a fair and perhaps a somewhat con-
servative one not likely to change drastically
for the next decade.
What degree of urgency must be given to
increasing uranium prices ? This should have
a direct eff"ect on the future planning and pro-
grams leading to the development of ad-
vanced and improved reactors. As an
extreme, if the world could be assured that
from here to the turn of the century the
price for UaOs would remain at today's level,
there might be considerably less pressure
and urgency for the development through
government sponsorship of newer and more
efficient reactors. Nonetheless, there would
remain some important incentives for the
continued development of newer reactor
types which might promise to be more eco-
nomical than the current round of reactors.
JANUARY 16, 1967
93
FIGURE 5
URANIUM RESERVES
ESTIMATED WORLD TOTAL
(ULSR, CHINA AND lASTIRN lUIOPE NOT INCLUDiO)
lOO
E
15.000.000
-
MtUift INOICIItS
CtPtCIIT (Mat)
WHICH COUID If MtlNTIIHED
FOR )a T[«RS WITH THE
INOICtltD FUd
5.500,000
1
ID
1
J
}M.m
1,000.000
jilH
1
1
0-IS 0-30 0-50 0-100
COST OF URANIUM ORE - DOLLARS/LB.
In the United Kingdom this has been exempli-
fied in the progress from the magnox reac-
tors to the advanced gas-cooled reactors.
Uranium Reserves
To offer some appreciation of the time
scale which should lie factored into these
programmatic decisions, figure 5 shows the
known and estimated uranium resources.
These uranium resources are shown as mil-
lions of tons of UsOs as well as the I'elated
megawatts of nuclear generating caimbility.
The figures are based on the assumption of
sufficient fuel for a 30-year lifetime for
nuclear powerplants of the current light
water and advanced gas-cooled reactor types.
Combining the infoiTnation presented on this
chart with that on the earlier one (figure 4)
showing a very rapid exponential growth of
nuclear power generating capability, one can
predict that the known or estimated world-
wide ore resources costing $10 per pound or
less are sufficient to supply about 300,000
megawatts of nuclear generating capability,
which will be contracted for, with the conse-
quent commitment of the indicated amount
of uranium, by 1980. If one considers
uranium ore resources of $15 per pound or
less, the reserves, both known and estimated,
are sufficient to support power stations
generating about 550,000 megawatts of
nuclear power, a capacity which will be
reached by about the year 1985. Using
uranium ore resources of $30 per pound or
less, the reserves are sufficient for about 1
million megawatts of nuclear power, which
will be reached by about the year 1990. A
very important fact sho\\Ti by this chart
(figure 5) is that there are enormous re-
sources of uranium available if one is not
limited by cost of the ore.
I might also add a word of warning about
these figures. They do not reflect the in-
creased activity during the past months
toward new uranium exploration in the
United States, Canada, and elsewhere. They
represent the facts as we know them today.
I am certain, however, that additional ore
supplies will be found, in similar fashion to
the new fossil fuel resources found yearly,
and that this figure represents a conservative
view of things.
In addition to these resources of uranium
ere, vast quantities of thorium ore will be
found, quantities similar in magnitude to
that of the uranium ores. Thorium can also
be considered a nuclear energy resource al-
though it itself is not fissionable. Thorium-
232, the isotope of thorium found in these
ores, like the nonfissionable isotope uranium-
238 which is the very abundant isotope of
uranium found in nature, can be converted
to useful fissionable form by nuclear trans-
mutation. As you know, in the case of
uranium-238 the small fraction of the natu-
rally fissionable isotope uranium-235 pro-
vides the fission reaction neutrons which,
when captured by uranium-238, cause it to
undergo a transmutation eventually leading
to plutonium-239, an isotope which is fission-
able. Similarly, thorium-232 upon capturing
a neutron can be transmuted to uranium-233,
another fissionable isotope. Thus, plutonium-
239 and uranium-233 are the keys to unlock-
ing the vast energies stored in uranium-238
and thorium-232. Unfortunately, the current
reactor types do not take full advantage of
this situation.
We presently know that it is quite feasible
to increase the efficiency of utilization of our
uranium ore resources. The heavy water
moderated and cooled reactor and certain ad-
vanced reactors indicate one direction in
94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which to proceed. Increasing the thermal
efficiency of nuclear powerplants is another
direction.
Breeder Reactors
In general temis it appears readily possible
to more than double the energy which can be
extracted from a pound of uranium by going
to reactors with higher conversion ratios than
the currently available light water and ad-
vanced gas-cooled reactors. I refer to the near
breeders. The effect of this increased effi-
ciency is reflected in the fact that with the
installation of these near breeder reactors in
place of the current reactors the period of use
of the known uranium ore resources can be
extended for about a decade.
The actual effect of near breeder reactors
is even more dramatic since some of these
would utilize the thorium-uranium-233 fuel
cycle to supplement and replace the uranium-
plutomum-239 fuel cycle. But whatever fuel
cycle is in fact used, near breeder reactors
must provide improved nuclear efficiencies in
order to make a significant contribution.
There is an obvious incentive for getting
near or into a breeding regime. By breeding
I mean — as many of you know — a reactor
where more fissionable fuel is produced from
the fertile uranium-238 or thorium-232 than
is consumed in the fission chain reaction. If
one gets to a conversion or breeding ratio of
1.1 or greater, tremendous gains can be ob-
tained. Rather than utilizing only a few per-
cent of the energy present in the nuclear fuel,
more than 50 percent can be usefully har-
nessed. This fact also means that even
though the current reactors inefficiently uti-
lize the uranium and thorium fuels, these
fuels are not wasted. The large fraction of
uranium-238 and thorium-232 not consumed
in these reactors can serve eventually as fuel
for future breeder reactors.
This has an immediate compound effect.
Assuming one is able to build economic
breeder reactors, the nuclear generating
capacity capable of being ultimately fueled
with today's low-cost ore resources is greatly
increased. Second, the high efficiency of these
reactors means that they should be less sensi-
tive to increases in the future costs of nuclear
fuel.
Unfortunately, as we all know, govern-
ment life and service are not so simple as to
permit one to say "Let there be a breeder re-
actor," and, lo, there is a breeder reactor.
There are many real scientific and techno-
logical hurdles which must be crossed. In
addition there are other tyi3es of advanced
reactors — near breeders — which for the near-
term have considerable economic promise. If
one looks about the world today, one can see
several types of advanced reactors, including
breeder reactors, under intensive develop-
ment.
The breeder reactors, representing a some-
what more difficult technology than the near
breeder tyiies, will be more expensive to con-
struct. The near breeder reactor types, after
all, are built on technology closer at hand.
The operating costs of the low-gain breeder
and the near breeder reactors based on jires-
ent uranium fuel prices are not too different.
These near breeder and breeder reactors,
from a simple economic viewpoint, all
promise to have remarkably low operating
costs reflecting efficient fuel cycles. This also
indicates that there is some incentive for de-
veloping these advanced reactors regardless
of whether the price of uranium should in-
crease — for they may be more economical
than current types.
Of importance from a national and world-
wide viewpoint is the built-in insurance
policy which one can purchase with these
near breeder reactors and breeder reactors.
This insurance policy is reflected in the insen-
sitivity of the total generating cost to the
price of natural uranium. Doubling the price
of natural uranium increases the generating
costs of the near breeder reactors about two-
tenths of a mill per kilowatt hour or less, and
of the fast breeders perhaps one-tenth of a
mill or even less. The fast breeder reactor, in
fact, may prove so efficient that ore costing
$100 or more per pound of UaOs, available in
virtually unlimited quantities, could still be
used without a sizable economic penalty.
One other important consideration that
must be borne in mind in analyzing the
JANUARY 16, 1967
95
future trend of reactor development and its
impact on nuclear fuel resources and the
economy of electric power generation is the
specific power of these future reactors. The
specific power, that is, the power generated
per kilogram of fuel placed in the reactor,
can perhaps be viewed more simply in terms
of the inventory of fuel required by a given
size reactor. The higher the specific power,
the lower the inventoiy. A low inventoiy has
the effect of lowering the generating costs
because the fuel carrying charges are less;
that is, less capital funds are tied up in fuel
inventory. Further, considering a breeder re-
actor economy, a smaller reactor inventory
affects the doubling time, that is, the time re-
quired before a breeder reactor could refuel
a carbon copy of itself. Also a smaller reactor
inventory in any type of nuclear plant means
that the resource requirements are less.
Therefore, there is considerable incentive to
develop near breeders and breeder reactors
with high specific power and therefore low
fuel inventoi-y requii'ements.
Any future reactor economy will probably
be a mixed reactor economy. We will prob-
ably always have several types of reactors,
with new reactor construction determined,
among other factors, by the projected rate of
growth of electric power demands, the price
of natural uranium, and the price of bred
fissionable material at the time the decision
to go ahead with a reactor unit is made.
Large-Scale Plutonium Production
In conclusion, let me focus on an important
point: the plethora of fissionable material.
Whether or not near breeder reactors and
breeder reactors are, in fact, developed, built,
and operated, significant amounts of fission-
able materials, especially plutonium, will be
bred throughout the world. And, as you know,
plutonium can be used as the explosive in-
gredient of nuclear weapons. Figure 6 sum-
marizes the cumulative quantities of plu-
tonium that would be produced by the years
1980 and 2000 — astonishing amounts indeed.
This plutonium will be produced throughout
FIGURE 6
YEAR
CUMULATIVE PLUTONIUM
PRODUCED WORLD-WIDE
TOTAL KGS. OF PLUTONIUM
1970
1980
2000
10,000
180,000
4,000,000
the world by 1980, if our projections are cor-
rect, at the rate of more than 100 kilograms
a day! In other words, material will be pro-
duced over the face of the globe sufficient for
the potential production of a substantial
amount of the world's electrical power — or,
alternatively, sufficient for tens of nuclear
weapons a day.
The cumulative figures are striking: We
calculate that the worldwide stock of plu-
tonium by 1970 will be 10,000 kilograms. By
1980 this will have increased almost twenty-
fold— to 180,000 kilograms. Just 20 years
later this figure will have mounted to the
almost unbelievable total of 4 million kilo-
grams !
In the light of this, there are some who
would say that the only rational course is to
bring an abrui^t and complete halt to the de-
velopment of nuclear power here and now,
that the price we pay for a little additional
energy is much too high for the risk of nu-
clear annihilation, and that no adequate
means of control can be developed to insure,
in fact, that these nuclear fuels will not be
misused.
But most of us know that such thinking is
not fully realistic. Even in the early days of
nuclear development, while there were some i
who felt we could hold back all our infonna-
tion and discoveries on this new form of
energy, thus keeping others from obtaining
nuclear weapons, most of us knew that it was
only a matter of time before other countries
96
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
could achieve a nuclear capability independ-
ently of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and
the United King-dom. The major seci'et of the
atomic bomb was, of course, that it worked —
and this had been revealed to the world.
Many countries of the world had their own
supplies of natural uranium and, ])erhaps
more important, their own scientists. We
also considered that if we failed to cooperate
in sharing: our peaceful nuclear technology
and nuclear materials, there would be other
countries which might be willing to provide
nuclear materials and technology without a
firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful
end use.
Choosing, therefore, a more positive and
constructive approach, the task has thus be-
come not a matter of forbidding the further
spread of nuclear science but rather one of
helping one another to develop the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy under conditions
which assure the peaceful use of the nuclear
equipment and materials which are supplied.
An org'anization already playing a very
significant role in guaranteeing that the
peaceful atom will remain peaceful through-
out the world is an agency whose existence is
hardly known to the general public. This
organization is the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), with its headquar-
ters in Vienna and its current membership
of 96 nations, with 3 additional member na-
tions about to be admitted. We have in the
work of the International Atomic Energy
Agency perhaps the forerunner of a fully in-
ternational safeguards and control system.
The essence of this system lies in the right to
inspect facilities and materials supplied
through international agreement. Such in-
spections are carried out by IAEA interna-
tional inspection teams at facilities in
countries which have agreed to accept inter-
national safeguards.
In addition to its present activities relat-
ing to the inspection of reactors, the IAEA
has recently considered and developed appro-
priate safeguards and controls for chemical
reprocessing plants to assure that none of the
materials separated and purified in these
plants are diverted to nonpeaceful uses.
I am hopeful that the future will show a
continued increase in the application of these
IAEA safeguards and controls and that
eventually we may have a worldwide system
of safeguards and controls under which all
nations will be able to develop and share the
peaceful atom free from the fear of a poten-
tial nuclear threat.
JANUARY 16, 1967
97
The Work of the 21st Session of the U.N. General Assembly
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations '
At the conclusion of the 21st General
Assembly of the United Nations it is fitting
that its actions should be evaluated in the
light of the only meaningful standard: the
purposes of the charter and, above all, the
cause of peace.
Judged by this standard, the record of the
session — and of the Security Council during
the same period — shows many constructive
achievements and some regrettable short-
comings.
In addition to the specific actions discussed
below, the session was also significant for its
atmosphere. Issues raised for propaganda
purposes did not make much headway. A
searching for bridges between East and West
was more evident this year than a year ago
or in some previous sessions. The strength of
this apparent desire for greater cooperation
and accommodation must of course be tested
by concrete action. Some evidences of posi-
tive action were present in this session, and
we hoije to see more in times to come.
1. The Secretary-General
A highly important achievement was the
unanimous reappointment of U Thant as
Secretary-General for a second 5-year term.
His willingness to serve again in response
to the unanimous wish of the membership
demonstrated anew his devotion to the ideals
of the organization. It is greatly to be hoped
that the resounding new vote of confidence
> Released at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 21 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5044).
98
in him will enable him to apply those ideals
with renewed effectiveness even to the most
difl^cult problems confronting the interna-
tional community.
2. Viet-Nam
The continued inability of the United Na-
tions to work eff"ective]y in the conflict in
Viet-Nam has been a failure not of the orga-
nization but of key members and govern-
ments which have been unwilling to consent
to such action. We were encouraged by the
fact that a majority of speakers who referred
to Viet-Nam in the Assembly's general debate
took note of our significant proposals of
September 22 ^ and supported, as does the
United States, discussions looking toward a
peaceful settlement. We continue to hope the
United Nations may play a more positive
role. We especially hope that the Secretary-
General will find it possible, in response to
our appeal to him on Monday,' to help bring
about discussions which could lead to a mu-
tual cessation of hostilities and an honorable
settlement.
3. Outer Space
A most significant Assembly action was
the unanimous vote commending the outer
space treaty and urging the widest possible
adherence to it.^ The treaty was negotiated in
^ Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
' Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63.
* For background, see ibid., p. 78 ; for text of the
treaty, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
i
the United Nations Outer Space Committee
in Geneva and this autumn at the United Na-
tions in New York. It is a pioneerinof exten-
sion of international law into the newly
entered realm of outer space. It embodies the
most important aiTns control measure since
the imrtial test ban treaty of 1963, as well as
principles for peaceful cooperation in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space, including-
the moon and other celestial bodies. The con-
clusion of this treaty at the present time is
a major step tow^ard peace and an encourag-
ing sign that the actions of nations, in the
charter's words, can be harmonized in
significant fields even while major discords
in other fields remain unresolved.
4. Nonproliferation
It is greatly to be hojjed that the outer
space treaty will quickly be followed by the
conclusion of the long-sought nonprolifera-
tion treaty, banning the further spread of
nuclear weapons. The seriousness of the de-
bate in the First Committee on this subject,
and the resolution urging an early agree-
ment,^ are hopeful auguries for this vitally
important arms control measure, which we
hope may pave the way for still further dis-
armament agreements.
5. Human Rights Covenants
In a field equally important to peace — that
of human rights — the General Assembly took
another jiioneering step when it ovenvhelm-
ingly approved two instruments long in the
making: the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights.'' The United States
voted for these documents. Whatever their
imperfections, they will be remembered in
histoiy as the first major attempt by the
community of nations to extend to the entire
range of human rights the protection of bind-
ing international agreements. The day is sure
to come when no government can any longer
ignore its obligation, implicit in the United
Nations Charter, to respect at least the mini-
mum standards of human rights which these
covenants seek to define.
6. South West Africa
Of the numerous difiicult colonial issues
that faced this Assembly session, the one on
which the most important action was taken
was the dispute over the territory of South
West Africa. The Assembly created an Ad
Hoc Committee for South West Africa to
recommend practical means by which the ter-
ritory can be administered so as to enable the
people to exercise their right of self-deter-
mination.''
This resolution, adopted by a nearly unani-
mous vote, was strongly supported by the
United States as a realistic, practical, and
important foi-ward step. We will serve on the
new committee, which is to report by next
April to a special session of the Assembly.
The teiTus of the resolution, and the nearly
unanimous support which it received, give
grounds for hope that it may lead toward a
solution of this thorny problem which will be
both just and peaceful and will lie within the
capacity of the United Nations.
7. Southern Rhodesia
The General Assembly considered the prob-
lem of Southern Rhodesia, but it was the
Security Council's unprecedented action in
imposing mandatory sanctions on key expoi-ts
and on oil imports into the territory that was
the most significant.^ While no one can guar-
antee the success of this undertaking in
advance, the probabilities will be greatest if
all of us undertake good-faith eflForts to make
it succeed. I repeat that the United States will
apply this decision with the full force of law.
We hope it will contribute to a peaceful solu-
tion and to the essential goal of assuring that
all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not just
the 6 percent of European ancestry, achieve
the right to control their own destiny.
^ For text of Resolution 2153, see ibid., Dec. 19,
1966, p. 936.
•^ See p. 107.
' For text of Resolution 2145, see Bulletin of Dec.
5, 1966, p. 871.
* For background and text of a resolution, see ibid.,
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
JANUARY 16, 1967
99
8. Middle East
Border disturbances in the Middle East
also came before the Security Council twice
during the session. Against a background of
incursions into Israel stemming from Syrian
territory, 10 members of the Council, includ-
ing the United States, voted for a resolution
asking Syria to strengthen its measures to
prevent incidents in violation of the Anni-
stice Agreement.9 Subsequently, again with
our support, the Council firmly denounced
the Israeli military action in November on
Jordanian territory.^o On both occasions the
United States expressed its opposition to all
use of violence across existing Middle East-
ern frontiers, regardless of the direction in
which it occurs.
We believe that the discussions demon-
strated the Council's desire that all such vio-
lence cease, and we regret that one of these
resolutions met a Soviet veto, which con-
tributed to instability in the area. Our own
basic policy of respecting the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of all countries in
the Middle East is unchanged and was reaf-
firmed during these debates.
9. Aden
In the difficult case of Aden, the Assembly
took another important step to assist in a
peaceful settlement. The imminent with-
drawal of Britain from Aden leaves the politi-
cal future of the area uncertain. The Assem-
bly, with full support from the United
Kingdom, asked the Secretary-General to
send a special mission to Aden to recommend
practical steps for self-determination by the
people, including possible United Nations
participation in elections there. This step
should help to stabilize an area which could
easily become one of the world's danger
spots.
10. other Issues in Africa
Several other resolutions, while reflecting
the Assembly's deep concern over colonialism
« For U.S. statements and text of the resolution,
see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969.
'» For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see ibid., p. 974.
and denial of human rights in southern
Africa — a concern which we share — were, we
felt, unrealistic in method, and the United
States was unable to give them full support.
Sweeping resolutions which do not reflect a
broad intention of practical support can only
in the long nm diminish the influence of the
Assembly.
11. Membership
With the end of colonial rule in still fur-
ther territories of Africa and the Caribbean,
the General Assembly increased its member-
ship to 122 with the admission of four new
members: Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, and
Barbados. The return of Indonesia to active
participation in the United Nations was also
widely welcomed.
12. Chinese Representation
This year, as previously, the Assembly
gave thoughtful consideration to the issue of
the representation of China in the United Na-
tions. The proposal of Albania to expel the
Republic of China in order to seat repre-
sentatives of Communist China was rejected
by a solid majority of 57 to 46. Once again,
too, the Assembly affirmed, also by an in-
creased majority, that any proposal to change
the representation of China is an important
question and thus, under the charter, requires
a two-thirds vote for decision."
Although the Italian study-committee pro-
posal was not adoiJted, the United States sup-
ported it, noting that its mandate did not
prejudge the results of the proposed study.
As I indicated in my statement to the As-
sembly, the United States does not seek to
isolate mainland China. We were prepared
for the United Nations to ask Peking its atti-
tude on key questions involved: whether it
would drop its unacceptable demands, espe-
cially for the expulsion of the Republic of
China, and whether it would assume the
obligations of the charter— including the
obligation to refrain from the use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
" For a U.S. statement and texts of resolutions,
see ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 926.
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
independence of any state. Only Peking can
answer these questions.
13. Korea
On another longstanding Asian issue, the
Assembly clearly reaffirmed United Nations
support for the peaceful unification of Korea
through free U.N.-supervised elections and
rebuffed a major Soviet effort to end the
United Nations role in Korea.
This double failure to act on the related
issues of peacekeeping and financing must be
set down among the chief shortcomings of
this session. Great powers can take care of
their own interests, but the ability of the
United Nations to function as a keeper of the
peace is vital to the interests of the great ma-
jority of members, particularly the smaller
ones, and, indeed, to the eflFectiveness of the
organization under the charter.
14. Peacekeeping
Although a constructive Canadian resolu-
tion on the highly important issue of peace-
keeping was approved by a large majority
in committee, the Assembly, to our regret,
put off final action on this measure until its
resumed session in April. The Canadian reso-
lution's most important provisions are those
reaffirming the role of the General Assembly
in peacekeeping in circumstances where the
Security Council is unable to act and sug-
gesting a model scale for the broad and
equitable sharing of the costs of expensive
peacekeeping forces.
We continue to believe that it is highly im-
portant for the Assembly to take prompt and
positive action on this question and not to
allow the recalcitrance of a few members to
impair the capacity of the United Nations to
fulfill its peacekeeping role.
A favorable development in peacekeeping
was the much improved vote by which the As-
sembly extended for another year the United
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle
East. This resolution provides for sharing
the cost of UNEF along the lines of the model
scale of assessments embodied in the
Canadian resolution.
15. Financing
As of the date of this report, it is also to be
regretted that the Soviet Union and France,
both of whom have refused to pay assess-
ments on past peacekeeping operations, have
still not made the substantial voluntary con-
tributions which were contemplated in the
consensus arrived at last year and which are
necessary to restore the United Nations to
financial health.
16. Population Growth
For the first time, the General Assembly
specifically recognized and took concrete ac-
tion on the urgent and important problem of
rapidly expanding pvopulations and their
pressure both on limited food supplies and on
other requirements of economic and social
progress. At the request of member states.
United Nations agencies are now authorized
to train population control experts. The
United States, which has a deep interest in
world food supplies and in the development
of nations, strongly supported this resolution.
We hope its adoption will encourage nations
in which this problem exists to move more
energetically to solve it.
17. iVIarine Resources
On the initiative of the United States, the
Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote
a resolution to promote international coopera-
tion in the study and development of marine
resources, including very great untapped pro-
tein resources of the oceans, which are likely
to play an increasing part in the world's food
supplies.
18. Capital Development Resolution
Over the dissenting votes of the United
States and the other major capital-exporting
countries, the Assembly adopted a resolution
to establish a United Nations capital develop-
ment fund which is supix)sed to begin func-
tioning in 1968. Such a fund would duplicate
longstanding and more soundly designed
machinery for international capital assist-
ance. It is most unlikely that enough funds
will be forthcoming to put this fund into
operation. This resolution demonstrates anew
JANUARY 16, 1967
101
that economic decisions taken even by larg-e
majorities are sterile unless they include the
concurrence of those who must furnish the
resources.
19. International Law
The Assembly acted to strengthen interna-
tional law in two significant areas. It estab-
lished a Commission on International Trade
Law to unify and hannonize divergent na-
tional laws in this important field. And it
decided to convene a major international
conference in 1968 and 1969 to draft a
"treaty on treaties," a set of rules governing
the law of treaties, their validity, interpre-
tation, and effect. Both these steps are of
great potential significance for the develop-
ment of the rule of law among nations.
IMCO Subcommittee Recommends
New Passenger-Ship Standards
Press release 300 dated December 23
A further significant step has been taken
in the improvement of international stand-
ards for the safety of passeng-er ships: The
Subcommittee on Fire Protection of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative
Organization (IMCO) has successfully com-
pleted its assignment to recommend new fire
safety standards for future ships before the
end of 1966. This work supplements activi-
ties which culminated in November on meas-
ures to improve fire safety in existing ships
following recent disastrous casualties caused
by fire at sea.^
In its third and final session, held in
London, the committee considered many
specific problems in fire protection, including
crew training and equipment for firefighting.
ships cariying motor vehicles with fuel in
their tanks, fire insulation of bulkheads and
decks, and the precautions to be taken in the
design of machinery spaces.
Eighteen countries took part in the dis-
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966,
p. 965.
cussions. The chief product of the com-
mittee's work is a body of proposed regula-
tions on a new unified method of fire
protection, detection, and extinction in
passenger ships to be built in future.
The proposed new method permits two
vai'iants for fire protection, detection, and
extinction in the accommodation and service
spaces of future passenger ships. These
variants may be described broadly as follows:
(a) Within the main zone fire-resist-
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided
by incombustible fire-retarding divisions, and
an automatic fire detection and fire alarm
system will be provided.
(b) Within the main zone fire-resist-
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided
by incombustible divisions which may have
a lesser degree of fire integrity than is
required for variant (a) above, and an auto-
matic sprinkler and fire detection and fire
alarm system will be provided.
The committee agreed that each of these
variants would provide an equal standard of
fire safety in passenger ships of the future.
The next stage will be consideration of
these proposals by IMCO's Maritime Safety
Committee in February 1967. Amendments
adopted by the Committee would receive final
consideration by the IMCO Assembly in
October 1967.
The United States delegation was headed
by Comdr. Robert I. Price, U.S. Coast
Guard.
Present Travel Restrictions
Extended Tlirough IVIarch 15
Press release 301 dated December 23
The State Department published in the
Federal Register dated December 16 an
amendment to the passport regulations ex-
tending all present area restrictions until
March 15, 1967, unless modified sooner.
The United States maintains passport
restrictions on travel by American citizens
to five areas: Albania, Cuba, and the
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Communist-controlled areas of Korea, China,
and Viet-Nam.
American passports are not valid for
travel to or through these areas. However,
they may be specially validated by the De-
pai'tment of State if the pros])ective traveler
shows that the purpose of his trip justifies
exception to tlie travel ban. The conditions
for such approval are set forth in the new
passport regulations published on October
20, 1966.'
The State Department can apply a travel
ban to a given country in only three situa-
tions: when that country is at war with the
United States, when amied hostilities are in
progress there, or when travel must be re-
stricted in the national interest because it
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S.
foreign affairs.
In years past the State Department
gi-anted only a few excei^tions to its travel
restrictions. Such exceptions as were made
generally were available only to applicants
in a limited number of occupations and pro-
fessions or for travel required for compelling
humanitarian reasons.
Gradually the policies have been revised
and the eligible categories broadened.
Now persons in certain professional and
occupational categories are entitled to special
validation of their passports when the pur-
pose of their travel is directly related to their
professional responsibilities. Included here
are newsmen, doctors and scientists in public
health, scholars with postgraduate degrees,
and American Red Cross representatives.
A second broad "discretionary" category
exists. At his discretion, and judging each
case individually on its merits, the Secretary
of State may make exceptions to the travel
restrictions for persons in cultural, athletic,
commercial, educational, professional, or
other fields or in public affairs, as well as
for persons who will be writing or reporting
for ])ublic media about their travels although
they are not professional reporters.
In these discretionary categories the State
Department will take several factors into
consideration in making its decision. One is
the potential benefit to the United States of
the pi-oposed visit, another the applicant's
need to make the visit, and a third the cur-
rent situation with regard to the area to be
visited.
Similar categories and considerations are
applied to resident aliens applying for per-
mission to travel to a restricted area under
22 CFR 46.5(e).
Violation of the travel restrictions — that
is, traveling- to one of the restricted areas
without proper validation or without pass-
port — is grounds for the State Department
to revoke or cancel the violator's passport.
Such infraction may also be punishable un-
der Federal law (8 U.S.C. 1185 and/or 18
U.S.C. 1544).
No further passport will be issued to the
violator until the Secretary of State receives
formal assurance and is satisfied that the
person will not again violate travel restric-
tions.
The Department's ix)wer to regulate the
passport field goes back to early days of our
nation and has been i-eflected in congres-
sional legislation for more than a century.
The restrictions help to assure that ordi-
nary American citizens will not become in-
nocent victims of the hostile policies of for-
eign powers in areas where our Government
can offer little protection.
These measures may also have important
effects in promoting the U.S. national in-
terest and achieving our foreign policy goals.
For example, in accordance with the resolu-
tions of the Organization of American
States and the judgment of that body that
the Communist regime in Cuba is openly
committed to subversion in the hemisphere,
U.S. policy toward Cuba has been one of
political, economic, and social isolation. Our
travel restrictions to this area have been
an important element in this policy.
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 723.
JANUARY 16, 1967
103
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Human Rights
On December 16 the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly unanimously adopted the
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the Interyiational
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with
an optional protocol. Following is a state-
ment made in Committee III (Social,
Humanitarian and Cultural) by U.S. Alter-
nate Representative Patricia R. Harris on
December 12, together with the texts of the
hrcman rights covenants.
STATEMENT BY MRS. HARRIS
U.S. delegation press release 6008
The United States delegation has voted in
favor of the international covenants on
human rights because we beheve that after
20 years of consideration, the United Nations
must, in 1966, move forward in promulgating
a broadly acceptable codification of human
rights.
The covenants represent the culmination of
almost 20 years of work on what was de-
signed to be an international bill of rights.
The historical importance of the first step in
that process — the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ' — is well known. Concluding
steps have been taken by our committee
today.
It is appropriate that preparation of the
covenants has been concluded at the time
when we are about to mark the 18th anni-
versary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
However, while the Universal Declaration
is an authoritative statement of principle, it
is not a binding legal agreement. The inter-
national covenants on himian rights testify to
our efforts to translate the principles set
forth in the Universal Declaration into rights
recognized in law. The importance of such
efforts cannot be overemphasized if we are to
fulfill the hope voiced by Eleanor Roosevelt
when she said that the Universal Declaration
might well become the "international Magna
Carta of all mankind." ^
Nonetheless, the United States delegation
has, from the beginning of our deliberations
on these covenants, voiced doubts about the
formulation of certain ideas, which in their
final form continue to cause us grave con-
cern. I would like to explain our votes and set
forth our understanding of various provisions
in the covenants.
Throughout, the Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights speaks of "rights"
that in fact are objectives which no govern-
ment, no matter what its human and financial
resources, could implement immediately upon
assuming the obligation to insure them. This
is recognized in ai-ticle 2, paragraph 1, which
contains qualifying language to the effect
that each state party "undertakes to take
steps . . . with a view to achieving progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant by all
appropriate means. . . ."
Article 2, paragraph 1, also speaks of an
undertaking by states parties "to take steps,
individually and through international assist-
ance and co-operation especially economic
' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1948, p. 752.
■ Ibid., p. 751.
104
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and technical, to the maximum of its avail-
able resources. . . ." My Government is
liledged to international economic and social
cooperation under the Charter of the United
Nations, and it vigorously suppoi-ts efforts to
cooperate with other nations, particularly
with the developing nations. Its record in ex-
tending assistance through international co-
operation speaks for itself. Article 2, para-
graph 1, however, might be construed by
some to impose a foiTnal legal obligation upon
the states jiarties to give economic, technical,
or other assistance. We must reject such an
interpretation. In our view, it is not appro-
])riate to specify in a covenant on human
rights and in such detail the forms which
international cooperation might take.
"Double Standard" Unacceptable
The most discriminatory provision in the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights is article 2, paragraph 3, which was
adopted by this committee by a vote of 41 in
favor, 38 against, and 21 abstentions. Para-
graph 3 provides that developing countries
may determine the extent to which they
would guarantee the economic rights recog-
nized in the covenant to nonnationals.
The covenant should not contain a pro-
vision such as this, which authorizes in vir-
tually unqualified terms discriminatory
treatment of nonnationals by a certain group
of states parties. Paragraph 3 creates a
vague double standard between developing
and developed countries and is difficult to
reconcile with the spirit of universality of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The
paragraph is also inconsistent with accepted
principles of international law. It runs coun-
ter to the undertaking of states parties in
paragraph 2 of the same article "to guarantee
that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without dis-
crimination of any kind. . . ."
Furthermore, paragraph 3 seems to imply
that developed countries may not distinguish
between their own nationals and aliens,
whereas there is a generally accepted inter-
national practice to make certain distinctions
between nationals and aliens, with due i-e-
gard to international law.
If such a provision was to be included in
the covenant, it should have recognized that
all states have the right to make the deter-
mination, not merely "developing countries"
— a term, incidentally, not yet defined in the
covenant — and should have reflected the re-
quirement that states parties, in making such
a determination, have due regard to inter-
national law.
Madam Chairman, I have already men-
tioned the narrow vote by which paragraph
3 of article 2 was adopted. My delegation
voted against the paragraph in this commit-
tee, and we still find it unacceptable.
My delegation wishes also to point out that
we have a continuing concern about article
25 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, which is repeated as article
47 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. My Government fully supports the
principle expressed therein, namely, that
peiTnanent sovereignty over natural wealth
and resources is an inherent right of all
peoples and an essential element of the
sovereign equality of states. However, article
1, paragraph 2, of the covenant provides the
effective substantive formulation on this
question, and it cannot be impaired by article
25, as many other delegations have said, in-
cluding some of the sponsors of article 25.
In addition, this repetition of the principle
of article 1, paragraph 2, has no valid place
among the implementation clauses.
Madam Chairman, we joined other dele-
gations in voting in favor of the civil and
political covenant and the optional protocol
annexed thereto. This vital document defines
civil and political rights and obligations
which states undertake to respect and insure
upon becoming parties to the covenant. Its
implementation machinery provides for in-
suring respect for the covenant in three ways:
states parties are to submit reports for con-
sideration by the Human Rights Committee
established under the covenant; a conciliation
mechanism is available to assist in settling
differences among states parties regarding
respect for the covenant, provided that the
JANUARY 16, 1967
105
states parties concerned have made a declara-
tion accepting the procedure; and the optional
protocol enables a state paity to agree that
individuals subject to its jurisdiction may
submit communications to the Human Rights
Committee established by the covenant re-
garding alleged violations by that state of the
rights set forth in the covenant.
My delegation voted for the optional proto-
col because we think that those states parties
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which are prepared to do so should have the
opportunity to accept the right of individual
petition beyond their national frontiers.
Freedom of Speech in U.S.
We applaud many of the provisions of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, par-
ticularly the confii-mation of the right to lib-
erty and security of person, the right to a free
and fair trial, and freedom of association.
On the other hand, article 20 of that
covenant provides for the prohibition by law
of "any propaganda for war" and "any advo-
cacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence."
One of the principles embodied in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights and in
the covenant is freedom of speech. It is the
view of the United States that article 20 of
the covenant does not obligate a state to take
any action that would i)rohibit its citizens
from freely and fully expressing their views
on any subject, no matter how obnoxious they
may be or whether they are in accord with
government policy or not. The United States
Supreme Court has emphasized the distinc-
tion between "advocacy of abstract doctrine
and advocacy directed at promoting unlawi'ul
action." In our view, therefore, a state should
not act under article 20 unless the dissemina-
tion of the obnoxious ideas mentioned therein
is accompanied by, or threatens imminently
to promote, illegal acts. Under our law, there
must be an imminent danger of illegal action
before speech becomes unlaud'ul. We have
similar problems with articles 19 and 21,
which fall below the standards established by
our Constitution and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
Article 5, common to both covenants, ex-
pressly provides that there shall be no re-
striction upon or derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or
existing in any state on the pretext that the
covenant does not recognize such rights or
that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. My
Government is particularly pleased with the
inclusion of these provisions, since the consti-
tutional protection of human rights in the
United States is truly extensive and compre-
hensive, in large measure l>ecause of the con-
stant vigilance of our citizens. In respect of
many rights guaranteed in the covenant, the
standard established by law in the United
States is higher than that in the covenant,
and no action under this covenant could re-
strict the enjoyment of any right enjoyed in
the United States.
The United States understands that none
of the three instruments which the committee
has adopted would impose an obligation on
any state party to take measures not fully
consistent with its own constitutional guaran-
tees or with established constitutional
framework of federal-state relationships.
To summarize the position of my delega-
tion, I would say simply that, in each instance
where we question these instruments, our
concern is that they do not go far enough in
protecting the rights of all individuals. Our
fear is that some may see opportunities for
and support of discriminatory action detri-
mental to the achievement of the very rights
guaranteed in the covenants.
Madam Chairman, there can be no doubt,
whatever may be the concern which any of
us may express about particular portions of
these instruments, that we are participating
in an historic moment. The adoption of these
covenants and the protocol by this committee
will stand as a watershed of human rights
development.
My delegation is convinced that we face a
new day in which no government and no
people can be free of a sense of obligation to
meet the demands of the standards of human
freedom enumerated in these covenants. The
106
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States has from its inception imposed
upon itself the highest standards, and we
welcome the opportunity both to test and to
enhance that standard in the context of the
promulgation of the human rights covenants.
Although none of our votes, including that
of my delegation, carries any implication
with regard to signature or ratification of the
covenants, it can safely be said that the com-
pletion of these covenants and, hopefully,
their early entry into force will add a new
dimension to the protection of the rights of
man.
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS^
International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world.
Recognizing that these rights derive from the in-
herent dignity of the human person.
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want
can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and
cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms.
Realizing that the individual, having duties to
other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and observance of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
Part I
Article 1
1. ^11 peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of the right they freely determine their
' U.N. doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (Annex) ; adopted
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16.
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dis-
pose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna-
tional economic co-operation, based upon the princi-
ple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the pre.sent Covenant, in-
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-
tration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in con-
formity with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter.
Part II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to take steps, individually and through in-
ternational assistance and co-operation especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its avail-
able resources, with a view to achieving progres-
sively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the present Covenant by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative
measures.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated
in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.
3. Developing countries, with due regard to human
rights and their national economy, may determine
to what extent they would guarantee the economic
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-
nationals.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant under-
take to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural
rights set forth in this Covenant.
Article U
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize that in the enjoyment of those rights provided
by the State in conformity with the present Cove-
nant, the State may subject such rights only to such
limitations as are determined by law only in so far
as this may be compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person,
any right to engage in any activity or to perform
JANUARY 16, 1967
107
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres-
ent Covenant.
2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of
the fundamental human rights recognized or existing
in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regula-
tions or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that
the present Covenant does not recognize such rights
or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
Part III
Article G
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right to work, which includes the right
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by
work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of
this right shall include technical and vocational guid-
ance and training programmes, policies and tech-
niques to achieve steady economic, social and cul-
tural development and full and productive employ-
ment under conditions safeguarding fundamental
political and economic freedoms to the individual.
Article 7
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just
and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in
particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers as
a minimum vdth:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work
of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work ; and
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their
families in accordance with the provisions of the
present Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be pro-
moted in his employment to an appropriate higher
level, subject to no considerations other than those
of seniority and competence;
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of
working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as
well as remuneration for public holidays.
Article 8
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to ensure :
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions
and join the trade union of his choice subject only
to the rules of the organization concerned, for the
promotion and protection of his economic and social
interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exer-
cise of this right other than those prescribed by law
and which are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public order or
for the protection of the rights and freedom of
others;
(b) The right of trade unions to establish na-
tional federations or confederations and the right
of the latter to form or join international trade-
union organizations;
(c) The right of trade unions to function freely
subject to no limitations other than those pre-
scribed by law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or
public order or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others;
(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exer-
cised in conformity with the laws of the particular
country.
2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, or of the police, or of
the administration of the State.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States
Parties to the International Labour Convention of
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Rights to Organize to take legislative measures
which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a
manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided
for in that Convention.
Article 9
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone to social security includ-
ing social insurance.
Article 10
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize that:
1. The widest possible protection and assistance
should be accorded to the family, which is the nat-
ural and fundamental group unit of society, particu-
larly for its establishment and while it is responsible
for the care and education of dependent children.
Marriage must be entered into with the free consent
of the intending spouses;
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers
during a reasonable period before and after child-
birth. During such period working mothers should
be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social
security benefits;
3. Special measures of protection and assistance
should be taken on behalf of all children and young
persons without any discrimination for reasons of
parentage or other conditions. Children and young
persons should be protected from economic and social
exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to
their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely
to hamper their normal development should be pun-
108
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ishable by law. States should also set age limits
below which the paid employment of child labour
should be prohibited and punishable by law.
Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, .and to the
continuous improvement of living conditions. The
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect
the essential importance of international co-opera-
tion based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant,
recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be
free from hunger, shall take, individually and
through international co-operation, the measures, in-
cluding specific programmes, which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, consei-va-
tion and distribution of food by making full use of
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by de-
veloping or refoiTning agrarian systems in such a
way as to achieve the most efficient development and
utilization of natural resources ; and
(b) Take into account the problems of both food-
importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure
an equitable distribution of world food supplies in
relation to need.
Article 12
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization
of this right shall include those necessary for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the still-
birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the
healthy development of the child ;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environ-
mental and industrial hygiene ;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epi-
demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure
to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness.
Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to education. They
agree that education shall be directed to the full
development of the human personality and the sense
of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They fur-
ther agree that education shall enable all persons to
participate efltectively in a free society, promote un-
derstanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups,
and further the activities of the United Nations for
the maintenance of peace.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize that, with a view to achieving the full
realization of this right :
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and
available free to all ;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms,
including technical and vocational secondary educa-
tion, shall be made generally available and accessible
to all by every appropriate means, and in particular
by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally ac-
cessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the pro-
gressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged
or intensified as far as possible for those persons
"who have not received or completed the whole period
of their primary education ;
(e) The development of a system of schools at all
levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellow-
ship system shall be established, and the material
conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously im-
proved.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to choose for
their children schools other than those established
by the public authorities which conform to such
minimum educational standards as may be laid down
or approved by the State and to ensure the religious
and moral education of their children in conformity
with their own convictions.
4. No part of this article shall be construed so as
to interfere with the liberty of individuals and
bodies to establish and direct educational institu-
tions, subject always to the observance of the prin-
ciples set forth in paragraph 1 and to the require-
ment that the education given in such institutions
shall conform to such minimum standards as may
be laid down by the State.
Article H
Each State Party to the present Covenant which,
at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able
to secure in its metropolitan territory or other ter-
ritories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary
education, free of charge, undertakes, within two
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of
action for the progressive implementation, within
a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the
plan, of the principle of compulsory education free
of charge for all.
Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone :
JANUARY 16, 1967
109
(a) To take part in cultural life;
(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production of which he is the
author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization
of this right shall include those necessary for the
conservation, the development and the diffusion of
science and culture.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for
scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the benefits to be derived from the encour-
agement and development of international contacts
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields.
Part IV
Article 16
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit in confoiTnity with this part of
the Covenant reports on the measures which they
have adopted and the progress made in achieving
the observance of the rights recognized herein.
2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations who shall trans-
mit copies to the Economic and Social Council for
consideration in accordance with the provisions of
the present Covenant.
(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall also transmit to the specialized agencies copies
of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom,
from States Parties to the present Covenant which
are also members of these specialized agencies in so
far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to
any matters which fall within the responsibilities of
the said agencies in accordance with their constitu-
tional instniments.
Article 17
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance
with a programme to be established by the Eco-
nomic and Social Council within one year of the
entry into force of the present Covenant after con-
sultation with the States Parties and the specialized
agencies concerned.
2. Reports may indicate factors and difiicultios
affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations
under the present Covenant.
3. Where relevant information has previously been
furnished to the United Nations or to any special-
ized ageticy by any State Party to the i)resent Co\-
enant it will not be necessary to reproduce that
infoi-mation but a precise reference to the informa-
tion so furnished will .suffice.
Article 18
Pur.suant to its re.sponsibilities under the Charter
in the field of human rights and fundamental free-
doms, the Economic and Social Council may make
arrangements with the specialized agencies in re-
spect of their reporting to it on the progress made
in achieving the observance of the provisions of the
present Covenant falling within the scope of their
activities. These reports may include particulars of
decisions and recommendations on such implementa-
tion adopted by their competent organs.
Article 19
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to
the Commission on Human Rights for study and
general recommendation or as appropriate for infor-
mation the reports concerning human rights sub-
mitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and
17, and those concerning human rights submitted by
the specialized agencies in accordance with arti-
cle 18.
Article 20
The States Parties to the present Covenant and
the specialized agencies concerned may submit com-
ments to the Economic and Social Council on any
general recommendation under article 19 or ref-
erence to such general recommendation in any report
of the Commission or any documentation referred to
therein.
Article 21
The Economic and Social Council may submit
from time to time to the General Assembly reports
with recommendations of a general nature and a
summary of the information received from the
States Parties to the present Covenant and the spe-
cialized agencies on the measures taken and the
progress made in achieving general observance of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Article 22
The Economic and Social Council may bring to
the attention of other organs of the United Nations,
their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies con-
cerned with furnishing technical assistance, any
matters arising out of the reports referred to in
this part of the present Covenant which may assist
such bodies in deciding each within its field of com-
petence, on the advisability of international meas-
ures likely to contribute to the effective progressive
implementation of the present Covenant.
Article 23
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree
that international action for the achievement of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant includes
such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the
adoption of i-ecommendalions, the furnishing of tech-
nical assistance and the holding of regional meetings
and technical meetings for the purpose of consulta-
110
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BILLETIN
tion and study organized in conjunction with the
Governments concerned.
Article 3i
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of
the specialized agencies which define the respective
responsibilities of the various organs of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to
the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 25
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples
to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural
wealth and resources.
Part V
Article 26
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by
any State Member of the United Nations or member
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State
Party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State which has been
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession
by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall infoi-m all States which have signed the pres-
ent Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each
instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 27
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument
of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession,
the present Covenant shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit of its own in-
strument of ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 28
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-
tations or exceptions.
Article 29
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may
propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations shall thereupon commu-
nicate any proposed amendments to the States
Parties to the present Covenant with a request that
they notify him whether they favour a conference of
States Parties for the purpose of considering and
voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least
one third of the States Parties favours such a con-
ference the Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene the conference under the auspices of
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a
majority of the States Parties present and voting
at the conference shall be submitted to the General
Assembly of the United Nations for approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they
have been approved by the General Assembly and
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have ac-
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any
earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 30
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti-
cle 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall infoiTn all States referred to
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following
particulars :
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under
article 26;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the present
Covenant under article 27 and the date of the entry
into force of any amendments under article 29.
Article 31
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove-
nant to all States referred to in article 26.
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the
inherent dignity of the human person,
JANUARY 16, 1967
111
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom
and freedom from fear and want can only be
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as
his economic, social and cultural rights.
Considering the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms.
Realizing that the individual, having duties to
other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the
promotion and observance of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles :
Part I
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of the right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their ovm ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources with-
out prejudice to any obligations arising out of inter-
national economic co-operation, based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no
case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, in-
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis-
tration of Non-Self-Goveraing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in con-
formity with the provisions of the United Nations
Charter.
Part II
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, with-
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus.
2. Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State Party to
the present Covenant undertakes to take the neces-
sary steps, in accordance with its constitutional
processes and with the provisions of the present
Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other meas-
ures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant un-
dertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity ;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative au-
thorities, or by any other competent authority pro-
vided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant under-
take to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
forth in the present Covenant.
Article i
1. In time of public emergency which threatens
the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the pres-
ent Covenant may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situ-
ation, provided that such measures are not incon-
sistent with their other obligations under interna-
tional law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion
or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this
provision.
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant avail-
ing itself of the right of derogation shall inform
immediately the other States Parties to the present
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations of the provisions
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by
which it was actuated. A further communication
shall be made, through the same intermediary, on
the date on which it terminates such derogation.
Article 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter-
preted as implying for any State, group or person
any right to engage in any activity or perform any
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres-
ent Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or deroga-
tion from any of the fundamental human rights
recognized or existing in any State Party to the
present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regu-
lations or custom on the pretext that the present
Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it
recognizes them to a lesser extent.
112
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Part III
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes in accordance with law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime and
not contrary to the provisions of the present Cove-
nant and to the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judge-
ment rendered by a competent court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime
of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this
article shall authorize any State Party to the pres-
ent Covenant to derogate in any way from any obli-
gation assumed under the provisions of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence
of death may be granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay
or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by
any State Party to the present Covenant.
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In
particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
Article 8
1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and
the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.
2. No one shall be held in servitude.
3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced
or compulsory labour ;
(b) The preceding sub-paragraph shall not be
held to preclude in countries where imprisonment
with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment
for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pur-
suance of a sentence to such punishment by a com-
petent court;
(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term
"forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:
(i) Any work or service, not referred to in sub-
paragraph (b), normally required of a person who
is under detention in consequence of a lawful order
of a court, or of a person during conditional release
from such detention ;
(ii) Any service of a military character and, in
countries where conscientious objection is recognized,
any national service required by law of conscientious
objectors;
(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or
calamity threatening the life or well-being of the
community ;
(iv) Any work or service which forms part of
normal civil obligations.
Article 9
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security
of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedures as are established by law.
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at
the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and
shall be promptly informed of any charges against
him.
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reason-
able time or to release. It shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution
of the judgement.
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings
before a court, in order that such court may decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right
to compensation.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person.
2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional
circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons,
and shall be subject to separate treatment appropri-
ate to their status as unconvicted persons;
(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated
from adults and brought as speedily as possible for
adjudication.
3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treat-
ment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall
be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Ju-
venile offenders shall be segregated from adults and
be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and
legal status.
Article 11
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
JANUARY 16, 1967
113
Article 12
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a
State shall, within that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his resi-
dence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own.
3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject
to any restrictions except those which are provided
by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order ("ordre public"), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.
Article 13
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State
Party to the present Covenant may be expelled
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached
in accordance with law and shall, except where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise
require, be allowed to submit the reasons against
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and
be represented for the purpose before, the compe-
tent authority or a person or persons especially
designated by the competent authority.
Article H
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair
and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial
for reasons of morals, public order ("ordre public")
or national security in a democratic society, or when
the interest of the private lives of the parties so re-
quires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;
but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or
in a .suit at law shall be made public except where
the interest of juveniles otherwise requires or the
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the
guardianship of children.
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law.
3. In the determination of any criminal charge
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the follow-
ing minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of the nature and
cause of the charge against him ;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence and to communicate with
counsel of his own choosing;
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the
interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses
against him and to obtain the attendance and ex-
amination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter
if he cannot understand or speak the language used
in court;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself,
or to confess guilt.
4. In the case of juveniles, the procedure shall be
such as will take account of their age and the de-
sirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the
right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed
by a higher tribunal according to law.
6. When a person has by a final decision been
convicted of a criminal offence and when subse-
quently his conviction has been reversed or he has
been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly
discovered fact shows conclusively that there has
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction
shall be compensated according to law, unless it is
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact
in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished
again for an offence for which he has already been
finally convicted or acquitted in accordance vnth the
law and penal procedure of each country.
Article 15
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which did
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was commit-
ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the
one that was applicable at the time when the crimi-
nal offence was committed. If, subsequently to the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law
for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender
shall benefit thereby.
2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial
and punishment of any person for any act or omis-
sion which, at the time when it was committed, was
criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by the community of nations.
Article 16
Evei-yone shall have the right to recognition every-
where as a person before the law.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Article 17
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or un-
lawful interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his
honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice, and freedom either individually
or in community with others and in public or pri-
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
may be subject only to such limitations as are pre-
scribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to have respect for the liberty of par-
ents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to ensure
the religious and moral education of their children
in confoiinity with their own convictions.
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writ-
ing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in the
foregoing paragraph carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as
are provided by law and are necessary, (1) for re-
spect of the rights or reputations of others, (2) for
the protection of national security or of public order
("ordre public"), or of public health or morals.
Article 20
1. Any pi'opaganda for war shall be prohibited by
law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recog-
nized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise
of this right other than those imposed in conformity
with the law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, public order ("ordre public"), the pro-
tection of public health or morals or the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
association with others, including the right to foiTn
and join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise
of this right other than those prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security or public safety, public
order ("ordre public"), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent
the imposition of lawful re.strictions on members of
the anned forces and of the police in their exercise
of this right.
3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States
Parties to the International Labour Convention of
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organise to take legislative measures
which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such
a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided
for in the Convention.
Article 23
1. The family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by
society and the State.
2. The right of men and women of marriageable
age to marry and to found a family shall be recog-
nized.
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the
free and full consent of the intending spouses.
4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall
take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights
and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, dur-
ing marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of
dissolution, provision shall be made for the neces-
sary protection of any children.
Article 2J^
1. Every child shall have, wthout any discrimina-
tion as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, na-
tional or social origin, property or birth, the right
to such measures of protection as required by his
status as a minor, on the part of his family, the
society and the State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately
after birth and shall have a name.
3. Evei-y child has the right to acquire a na-
tionality.
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the oppor-
tunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
JANUARY 16, 1967
115
directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guarantee-
ing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality,
to public service in his country.
Article S6
All persons are equal before the law and are en-
titled without any discrimination to equal protection
of the law. In this respect the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 27
In those States in which ethnic, religious or lin-
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in com-
munity with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise
their own religion, or to use their own language.
Part IV
Article 28
1. There shall be established a Human Rights
Committee (hereafter referred to in the present
Covenant as "the Committee"). It shall consist of
eighteen members and shall carry out the functions
hereinafter provided.
2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals
of the States Parties to the present Covenant who
shall be persons of high moral character and recog-
nized competence in the field of human rights, con-
sideration being given to the usefulness of the par-
ticipation of some persons having legal experience.
3. The members of the Committee shall be elected
and shall serve in their personal capacity.
Article 29
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected
by secret ballot from a list of persons possessing the
qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated
for the purpose by the States Parties to the present
Covenant.
2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may
nominate not more than two persons. These persons
shall be nationals of the nominating State.
3. A person shall be eligible for renomination.
Article SO
1. The initial election shall be held no later than
six months after the date of the entry into force of
the present Covenant.
2. At least four months before the date of each
election of the Committee, other than an election to
fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
address a written invitation to the States Parties to
the present Covenant to submit their nominations
for membership of the Committee within three
months.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the
persons thus nominated, with an indication of the
States Parties which have nominated them, and
shall submit it to the States Parties to the present
Covenant no later than one month before the date
of each election.
4. Elections of the members of the Committee
shall be held at a meeting of the States Parties to
the present Covenant convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations at the Headquarters
of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which
two thirds of the States Parties to the present Cove-
nant shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected
to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain
the largest number of votes and an absolute major-
ity of the votes of the representatives of States
Parties present and voting.
Article 31
1. The Committee may not include more than one
national of the same State.
2. In the election of the Committee consideration
shall be given to equitable geographical distribution
of membership and to the representation of the dif-
ferent forms of civilization as well as of the princi-
pal legal systems.
Article 32
1. The members of the Committee shall be elected
for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for
re-election if renominated. However, the terms of
nine of the members elected at the first election
shall expire at the end of two years; immediately
after the first election the names of these nine mem-
bers shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the
meeting referred to in paragraph 4 of article 30.
2. Elections at the expiry of oflice shall be held
in accordance with the preceding articles of this
part of the present Covenant.
Article 33
1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other mem-
bers, a member of the Committee has ceased to
carry out his functions for any cause other than
absence of a temporary character, the ChaiiTnan of
the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of
the United Nations who shall then declare the seat
of that member to be vacant.
2. In the event of the death or the resignation of
a member of the Committee, the Chairman shall im-
mediately notify the Secretary-General of the United
Nations who shall declare the seat vacant from the
date of death or the date on which the resignation
takes effect.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Article Si
1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with
article 33 and if the temi of office of the member to
be replaced does not expire within six months of the
declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-General
of the United Nations shall notify each of the States
Parties to the present Covenant which may within
two months submit nominations in accordance with
article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the per-
sons thus nominated and shall submit it to the
States Parties to the present Covenant. The election
to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accord-
ance with the relevant provisions of this part of the
present Covenant.
3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a
vacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shall
hold ofl^ce for the remainder of the term of the
member who vacated the seat on the Committee
under the provisions of that article.
Article 35
The members of the Committee shall, with the
approval of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations
resources on such terms and conditions as the Gen-
eral Assembly may decide having regard to the
importance of the Committee's responsibilities.
Article 36
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
provide the necessary staff and facilities for the
eflFective perfonnance of the functions of the Com-
mittee under this Covenant.
Article 37
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at
the Headquarters of the United Nations.
2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall
meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules
of procedure.
3. The Committee shall normally meet at the
Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United
Nations Office at Geneva.
Article 38
Every member of the Committee shall, before tak-
ing up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open
committee that he will perform his functions im-
partially and conscientiously.
Article 39
1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term
of two years. They may be re-elected.
2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of
procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia,
that:
(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum;
(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by
a majoi-ity vote of the members present.
Article UO
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
undertake to submit reports on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the rights recog-
nized herein and on the progress made in the enjoy-
ment of those rights; (a) within one year of the
entry into force of the present Covenant for the
States Parties concerned and (b) thereafter when-
ever the Committee so requests.
2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations who shall transmit
them to the Committee for consideration. Reports
shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any,
affecting the implementation of the present Cove-
nant.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
may after consultation with the Committee transmit
to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such
parts of the reports as may fall within their field of
competence.
4. The Committee shall study the reports submit-
ted by the States Parties to the present Covenant.
It shall transmit its reports and such general com-
ments as it may consider appropriate to the States
Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the
Economic and Social Council these comments along
with the copies of the reports it has received from
States Parties to the present Covenant.
5. The States Parties to the pi-esent Covenant may
submit to the Committee observations on any com-
nients that may be made in accordance with para-
graph 4 of this article.
Article Ul
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at
any time declare under this article that it recognizes
the competence of the Committee to receive and
consider communications to the effect that a State
Party claims that another State Party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the present Covenant.
Communications under this article may be received
and considered only if submitted by a State Party
which has made a declaration recognizing in regard
to itself the competence of the Committee. No com-
munication shall be received by the Committee if it
concerns a State Party which has not made such a
declaration. Communications received under this ar-
ticle shall be dealt with in accordance with the
following procedure:
(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant con-
siders that another State Party is not giving effect
to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may,
by written communication, bring the matter to the
attention of that State Party. Within three months
after the receipt of the communication, the receiving
State shall afford the State which sent the commu-
JANUARY 16, 1967
117
nication an explanation or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter, which should include,
to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to
domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending,
or available in the matter.
(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfac-
tion of both States Parties concerned within six
months after the receipt by the receiving State of
the initial communication, either State shall have
the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by
notice given to the Committee and to the other
State.
(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter re-
ferred to it only after it has ascertained that all
available domestic remedies have been invoked and
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the
generally recognized principles of international law.
This shall not be the rule where the application of
the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.
(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings
when examining communications under this article.
(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph
(c), the Committee shall make available its good
offices to the States Parties concerned with a view
to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis
of respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms as recognized in this Covenant.
(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee
may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred
to in sub-paragraph (b), to supply any relevant
infoiTnation.
(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in
sub-paragraph (b), shall have the right to be repre-
sented when the matter is being considered in the
Committee and to make submissions orally and/or
in writing.
(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months
after the date of receipt of notice under sub-para-
graph (b), submit a report:
(i) If a solution within the terms of sub-para-
graph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine
its report to a brief statement of the facts and of
the solution reached ;
(ii) If a solution is not reached, within the tei-ms
of sub-paragraph (e), the Committee shall confine
its report to a brief statement of the facts; the
written submissions and record of the oral submis-
sions made by the States Parties concerned shall be
attached to the report.
In every matter the report shall be communicated
to the States Parties concerned.
2. The provisions of this article shall come into
force when ten States Parties to the present Cove-
nant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of
this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by
the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations who shall transmit copies thereof
to the other States Parties. A declaration may be
withdravim at any time by notification to the Secre-
tary-Greneral. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice
the considei'ation of any matter which is the subject
of a communication already transmitted under this
article; no further communication by any State
Party shall be received after the notification of
vidthdrawal of the declaration has been received by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations unless
the State Party concerned had made a new declara-
tion.
Article 42
1. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in
accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the
Committee may, with the prior consent of the States
Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Com-
mission"). The good offices of the Commission shall
be made available to the States Parties concerned
with a view to an amicable solution of the matter
on the basis of respect for the present Covenant;
(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons
acceptable to the States Parties concerned. If the
States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement
within three months on all or part of the composi-
tion of the Commission the members of the Commis-
sion concerning whom no agreement was reached
shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds
majority vote of the Committee from among its
members.
2. The members of the Commission shall serve in
their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals
of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not
party to the present Covenant, or of a State Party
which has not made a declaration under article 41.
3. The Commission shall elect its ovm Chairman
and adopt its own rules of procedure.
4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally
be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations
or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However,
they may be held at such other convenient places as
the Commission may determine in consultation with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the
States Parties concerned.
5. The secretariat provided in accordance with
article 36 shall also service the Commissions ap-
pointed under this article.
6. The information received and collated by the
Committee shall be made available to the Commis-
sion and the Commission may call upon the States
Parties concerned to supply any other relevant in-
formation.
7. When the Commission has fully considered the
matter, but in any event not later than twelve
months after having been seized of the matter, it
shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a
report for communication to the States Parties con-
cerned.
118
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its
consideration of the matter within twelve months, it
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
status of its consideration of the matter.
(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on the
basis of respect for human rights as recognized in
the present Covenant is reached, the Commission
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the
facts and of the solution reached.
(c) If a solution within the terms of sub-para-
graph (b) is not reached, the Commission's report
shall embody its findings on all questions of fact
relevant to the issues between the States Parties
concerned, as well as its views on the possibilities of
amicable solution of the matter. This report shall
also contain the written submissions and a record
of the oral submissions made by the States Parties
concerned.
(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under
sub-paragraph (c), the States Parties concerned
shall, within three months of the receipt of the
report, infonn the Chairman of the Committee
whether or not they accept the contents of the report
of the Commission.
8. The provisions of this article are without prej-
udice to the responsibilities of the Committee under
article 41.
9. The States Parties concerned shall share
equally all the expenses of the members of the Com-
mission in accordance with estimates to be provided
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the mem-
bers of the Commission, if necessary, before reim-
bursement by the States Parties concerned in ac-
cordance with paragraph 9 of this article.
Article 1,3
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc
conciliation commissions which may be appointed
under article 41, shall be entitled to the facilities,
privileges and immunities of experts on mission for
the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sec-
tions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations.
Article 4-4
The provisions for the implementation of the pres-
ent Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the
procedures prescribed in the field of human rights
by or under the constituent instruments and the con-
ventions of the United Nations and of the special-
ized agencies and shall not prevent the States Par-
ties to the present Covenant from having recourse
to other procedures for settling a dispute in accord-
ance with general or special international agree-
ments in force between them.
Article Ji.5
The Committee shall submit to the General As-
sembly, through the Economic and Social Council,
an annual report on its activities.
Part V
Article U6
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter-
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the
specialized agencies which define the respective re-
sponsibilities of the various organs of the United
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard
to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant.
Article 1,7
Nothing in the Covenant shall be interpreted as
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy
and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and
resources.
Part VI
Article 18
1. The present Covenant is open for signature by
any State Member of the United Nations or member
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State
Party to the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, and by any other State which has been
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions to become a party to the present Covenant.
2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification.
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. The present Covenant shall be open to acces-
sion by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall inform all States which have signed this Cove-
nant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instru-
ment of ratification or accession.
Article i9
1. The present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
thirty-fifth instiniment of ratification or instrument
of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-
fifth instniment of ratification or instrument of ac-
cession, the present Covenant shall enter into force
three months after the date of the deposit of its own
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
Article 50
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex-
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi-
tations or exceptions.
JANUARY 16, 1967
119
Article 51
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may
propose an amendment and file it with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall thereupon
communicate any proposed amendments to the
States Parties to the present Covenant with a re-
quest that they notify him whether they favour a
conference of States Parties for the purpose of con-
sidering' and voting upon the proposal. In the event
that at least one third of the States Parties favours
such a conference the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall convene the conference under
the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment
adopted by a majority of the States Parties pi-esent
and voting at the conference shall be submitted to
the General Assembly of the United Nations for
approval.
2. Amendments shall come into force when they
have been approved by the General Assembly and
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
3. When amendments come into force they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have ac-
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any
earlier amendment which they have accepted.
Article 52
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti-
cle 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall inform all States referred to
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following
particulars :
(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under
article 48 ;
(b) The date of the entry into force of the pres-
ent Covenant under article 49 and the date of the
entry into force of any amendments under arti-
cle 51.
Article 53
1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives
of the United Nations.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove-
nant to all States referred to in article 48.
Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that in order further to achieve the
purposes of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Covenant")
and the implementation of its provisions it would
be appropriate to enable the Human Rights Com-
mittee set up in part IV of the Covenant (herein-
after referred to as "the Committee") to receive and
consider, as provided in the present Protocol, com-
munications from individuals claiming to be victims
of violations of any of the rights set forth in the^
Covenant,
Have agreed as follows:
Article 1
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a
party to the present Protocol recognizes the compe-
tence of the Committee to receive and consider com-
munications from individuals, subject to its
jurisdiction, claiming to be victims of a violation by
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in
the Covenant. No communication shall be received
by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the
Covenant which is not a Party to the present Pro-
tocol.
Article 2
Subject to the provision of article 1, individuals
claiming that any of their rights enumerated in the
Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted
all available domestic remedies may submit a written
communication to the Committee for consideration.
Article 3
The Committee shall consider inadmissible any
communication under this Protocol which is anony-
mous, or which it considers to be an abuse of the
right of submission of such communications or to be
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant.
Article i
1. Subject to the provisions of article 3, the Com-
mittee shall bring any communications submitted to
it under the present Protocol to the attention of the
State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be vio-
lating any provision of the Covenant.
2. Within six months, the receiving State shall
submit to the Committee written explanations or
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if
any, that may have been taken by that State.
Article 5
1. The Committee shall consider communications
received under the present Protocol in the light of
all written information made available to it by the
individual and by the State Party concerned.
2. The Committee shall not consider any communi-
cation from an individual unless it has ascertained
that:
(a) the same matter is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or
settlement ;
(b) the individual has exhausted all available
domestic i-emedies. This shall not be the rule where
the application of the remedies is unreasonably pro-
longed.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
3. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when
examining communications under the present Pro-
tocol.
4. The Committee shall forward its views to the
State Party concerned and to the individual.
Article 6
The Committee shall include in its annual report
under article 45 of the Covenant a summary of its
activities under the present Protocol.
Article 7
Pending the achievement of the objectives of Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December
1960 concerning the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the
provisions of the present Protocol shall in no way
limit the right of petition granted to these peoples
by the Charter of the United Nations and other
international conventions and instruments under the
United Nations and its specialized agencies.
Article 8
1. The present Protocol is open for signature by
any State which has signed the Covenant.
2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the
Covenant. Instruments of ratification shall be de-
posited vidth the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. The present Protocol shall be open to accession
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the
Covenant.
4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations
shall inform all States which have signed the present
Protocol or acceded to it of the deposit of each in-
strument of ratification or accession.
Article 9
1. Subject to the entry into force of the Covenant,
the present Protocol shall enter into force three
months after the date of the deposit with the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations of the tenth
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession.
2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol
or acceding to it after the deposit of the tenth instru-
ment of ratification or instrumentry to take over
outh Viet-Nam by force.
Now, the bombing of North Viet-Nam is
rectly related to what they are doing in the
3uth. The key point in this is that this could
op literally this afternoon at sundown if
le other side would let us know that they
•e holding their hand from the effort to seize
)uth Viet-Nam by force.
Now, we have had a long and tortuous road
nee 1945 in trying to build some peace in
e world. And we have not come to where
,'ie are by giving away Iran to Mr. Stalin's
. :j'rces, or the eastern provinces of Turkey,
'jI- welcoming the guerrillas into Greece, or
ving away Berlin, or giving away South
orea. This has been a tough struggle, to
•ganize a peace in the world. And that is
1 we are interested in.
Now, the problem there is: Can the stop-
ping of the bombing lead toward peace?
If someone — you or the Secretary-General
or anyone from the other side — can give us
any suggestions, any indication, any infor-
mation, we will look at it very quickly. The
President has emphasized over and over
again that we will go more than halfway.
But you cannot stop this war just by stop-
ping a half of it, if the other side is going
to pursue it.
Need for Serious Response From Hanoi
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in this very spirit,
sir, within the last couple of weeks the North
Vietnamese have allowed and have indicated
that they will allow a handful of American
journalists into Hanoi to cover the war.
There are about four American women there
now who are interested in trying to get
peace. The VC radio announces today that
they will go Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao]
Ky 3 days more on a Tet period — he asked
for 4, and they are ready to go 7.
Is it possible that all of this together might
be regarded as the indication that we are all
seeking ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the indication that
is important is the indication that can be
specific and can be private and can be serious.
I must say — and I regret this — that we do
not yet see an indication from the other side,
by the channels that are readily available,
that they are prepared to move this matter
toward peace.
Now, we have ourselves approved pass-
ports for a considerable number of gentlemen
in your profession, and only a very few of
them have been able to get into Hanoi. We
would be glad to have others go and to ask
some of the searching questions about the
question of peace.
That is: What about their more than 20
regiments in South Viet-Nam? What about
their refusal to come to a Geneva conference
on Viet-Nam or on Laos or Cambodia ? What
about their refusal to demilitarize the demili-
tarized zone along the 17th parallel? What
about their opposition to efforts by the ICC
[International Control Commission] to as-
IIlNUARY 23, 1967
127
sure Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia that his
country can remain neutral and uninvolved
in this situation, or the steady refusals of
negotiations proposed by 17 nonalined na-
tions, by President Johnson, by His Holiness
the Pope, by the Secretary-General, by all
sorts of — by the Prime Ministers of the
Commonwealth ?
These are the questions that ought to be
asked. And thus far we have had answers^ —
we know what they are. But they ought to
be probed further.
Mr. Kalb: If I understand you, then, sir,
what you are saying is that it is a specific
and, as you put it, serious kind of indication
that you want from the other side, rather
than any kind of cosmetics —
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a serious mat-
ter, this is a serious matter.
Mr. Kalb: We are trying to get at a defi-
nition —
Secretary Rusk: We are entitled to be seri-
ous about it. After all, we know that during
these two truces we just had — the Christmas
and New Year's truce — that the other side
is undertaking — has undertaken — substantial
resupply operations. We know that in certain
instances they have maneuvered their forces
like Olympic dash men at the starting gate to
take off just as soon as the truce is over.
These are serious matters. And we cannot
approach them in terms of vagueness or sen-
timentality or just hopes.
There are plenty of ways open in which
we can be — we are in touch with the other
side seriously and serious responses can be
exchanged.
Prospects for Peace in Viet-Nam
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, pessimism
permeates everything you have said about
the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam in 1967.
You don't think, then, do you, that there is a
possibility of ending the war under the pres-
ent circumstances ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I think there is a pos-
sibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed
on the basis of optimism. And I never close
the door to the possibility that this situation
will change.
128
I do believe that one basis for optimism is i
that the other side must surely now under-
stand that they are not going to succeed in
seizing South Viet-Nam by force. Now,
maybe that will bring about a significant
change in their political approach to this
question.
But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because
we have not yet seen any indication from the
other side that they are prepared to give up i
their idea of seizing South Viet-Nam by I
force.
You see, they opposed the free elections in i
South Viet-Nam for a constituent assembly; ;
they won't let the question of reunification
be decided by the free choice of the peoples
concerned. They refuse conferences and ne-
gotiations and all those devices by which
crises of this sort have been solved in years j
past.
We haven't had one iota of response or
compliance by them with the Laotian agree-
ment of 1962, for example, which they signed, j,,.
along with the rest of us. ■pi
So there does need to be a change of pur-
pose and a change of ambition in Hanoi, be-
cause otherwise at the end of the day, Mr.
Agronsky, someone has to make a very
simple decision: Here come two more regi-
ments of North Vietnamese down the road
across the 17th parallel; now, do you oppose
them or do you get out of their way? Now,
so long as that occurs, somebody has to make
that decision. And our decision is that undei
our treaty commitments we must meet them,
along with our allies, and not get out of their
way.
Mr. Agronsky: Our commander in Viet-
Nam, General [William C] Westmoreland
has indicated that it may be a matter of years,
as he puts it, rather than months — this wai
will go on for a matter of years rather than
months, and everything you say seems tc
reflect the same estimate. Is that correct?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we oughl
to be prepared, here at home and over there
to do what is required to be done for what
ever time it is required. That does not mean
however, that there may not be some possi-
bility that this crisis, along with other crises
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
may be resolved before anyone really expects
it. In other words, we are trying to resolve
this problem literally tomorrow.
This is why we said to Foreign Secretary
'Brown — George Brown, of Britain: If you
can get the others to come to a meeting of
North and South Viet-Nam and the United
States, we will be there, we will be there.
That is why we have given the Secretary-
General of the United Nations carte blanche
to see what he can work out in his contacts
with the other side to bring this matter to a
peaceful settlement. That is why we have
said "negotiations without preconditions" to
;he 17 neutral countries, or why President
Johnson talked about unconditional discus-
sions.
We will take a look at all of it with
;he other side — or even a part of it.
There is no reason on earth, for example,
vhy the nations involved here on both sides
!Ould not agree with Prince Sihanouk's re-
luest for assistance in maintaining the neu-
rality and the territorial integrity of
Cambodia. And if there is seriousness on the
ther side, there is no reason why we cannot
tisure the demilitarization of the demili-
arized zone between North and South Viet-
nam. If we cannot solve the whole problem,
^e are prepared to try to solve a part of it.
But you gentlemen know that there has
een no response from the other side.
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, what about
ttempts in 1967 to resolve — to push the
latter a little farther by heavier military
ction of our own? As you know, you are
acing a more hawkish Congress than you
id in the last session. There have been sug-
estions that the administration will use the
ist year before the next presidential election
ear to try and achieve some kind of settle-
lent. And if diplomatic channels are as
ogged as you suggest, perhaps a more pow-
rful military action is the only course.
Secretary Rusk: Well, first let me say that
16 diplomatic channels are not clogged. The
oint is that, with diplomatic channels, we
not find a basis for peace here.
But in any event, on the matter of military
irces, Secretary [of Defense Robert S.]
».:
NUARY 23, 1967
McNamara has pointed out that there will be
additional forces in South Viet-Nam during
1967, although the rate of increase will not
be as high as it was during 1966 unless there
is some unforeseen circumstance that we are
not now at the moment taking into account.
I myself believe that there must come a
time when the authorities in Hanoi will
recognize that what they are trying to do is
not on, and therefore either de facto, by
action on the ground, or in some sort of nego-
tiation or conference, their effort must be
brought to a halt. And we are prepared to
take that up in either way, either by recipro-
cal action taken on the ground or by some
sort of discussion or negotiation.
The Pacification Effort
Mr. Cook: On that score, Mr. Secretary, it
has been suggested in Washington that they
won't reach that decision until progress is
made on the pacification task, until the infra-
structure of the Viet Cong is destroyed or
seriously damaged. And yet only a few weeks
ago Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge was
here in Washington and conceded, despite all
the efforts of the year — the Honolulu Con-
ference, the Manila Conference — as he put it,
that isn't rolling as yet. Are there any pros-
pects for improvement in the next year?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is recog-
nized this is a very important point in terms
of not only what happens in South Viet-
Nam but in the attitude of the other side.
When it becomes clear that that infrastruc-
ture of subversion and the guerrilla structure
in the countryside is not able to maintain
itself, I think this will be the signal to the
other side that what they are trying to do
is not on.
As you know, the South Vietnamese forces
are now being turned more and more to this
pacification effort, which is basically a seize-
and-hold protection for the villagers so that
they can get on with their work without
harassment by the Viet Cong. It has taken
some time to move into that stage, because
there were other very urgent issues, such as
the operations of the main force regiments
and battalions of the Viet Cong. But that is
129
moving, and we hope to make some signifi-
cant headway on that during 1967.
Organizing a Durable Peace
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, a couple of days
ago you spent about an hour and 45 minutes
talking with religious leaders. There have
been letters sent to the President almost
warning that young people may not choose
to serve, even if they have to go to jail to
stay with that conviction. And there is at
least the appearance of a ground swell of
public opinion riding against the administra-
tion's policy in Viet-Nam.
Two questions on this, sir: One, do you
regard this as a serious diplomatic problem
in terms of how Hanoi sees this all? And,
secondly, do you regard it as a ground swell,
and if so, how do you ride against it? I am
trying to gage your own estimate of this.
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the
first place there is a diplomatic problem for
which we cannot offer much of a remedy,
because it is quite clear that Hanoi would like
to lean on evidences of disagreement here at
home to encourage their own hopes. But
nevertheless, we are a free society and we
must have a vigorous public discussion
of these issues here at home.
The other question: We are at the present
time in a situation where about half the
American people can no longer remember
World War H and the events that led up to
it. And the overriding issue for us and the
new generation is: How do you organize a
durable peace in the world?
Now, when I was a student they said:
Don't worry about this place out here; it is
too far away; or, this is not our business; or,
give them another bite and perhaps the ag-
gressor will be satisfied. And that led an
entire generation into World War H, with
frightful catastrophe for the entire world.
We came out of that, and we tried to set
down what was necessary to organize a peace
— and we should all read article 1 of the
United Nations Charter on that, because
those are the lessons of World War H. And
let me say in parentheses that we better hold
on to those lessons, because we are not going
130
to have any chance to draw the lessons from
world war HI.
So the overriding issue is how to organize
a durable peace. And at the heart of that is
the right of all nations, large and small, to
live at peace without being molested by their
neighbors. It is just as simple as that, al- ||
though some people are inclined to call that
kind of language trite. The notion that we
leave the aggressor free to follow his appetite
is a notion that leads us straight into war.
This is where the warmongering is these days
— those who refuse to face the necessity of
organizing a durable peace. That is our cen-
tral question.
Mr. Cook: Those who accept this strategy
of the administration still have some ques-
tions about tactics. Do you think in retrospect
it was wise to bomb so close to Hanoi during
the Christmas season, with all its overtones,
or to continue to land troops —
Secretary Rusk: President Johnson spoke
yesterday at his press conference about our
bombing policy. We are bombing military
targets. Our Armed Forces are under almost
unprecedented instructions with respect tc
avoiding civilian casualties. And we know
that they go to great lengths to carry oul
those instructions in the spirit in which th«
instructions were given.
Quite frankly, Mr. Cook, what I could d(
with is more compassion and more sympathj
with those tens of thousands of civilians ii
South Viet-Nam who have been killed an(
kidnaped by the Viet Cong and North Viet
namese forces as a matter of deliberate policj
and the far larger tens of thousands of Soutl
Vietnamese military who have been kille(
and wounded simply because North Viet-Nan
is trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force
Now, the President has indicated what oui
policy is on this, and we will continue to pur i
sue that policy.
But one of the things that is missing hen
in some discussion is any notion of reci
procity. |
You mentioned one of the groups that cami
to see me. I try to see different groups fron
time to time who want to express differen
views. But I say to them privately ver;
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIJ
M
often: What do you want Hanoi to do as a
contribution toward peace in this situation?
And they say: Well, we want them to take
their troops home; or, we want them to stop
their infiltration. And I say: But why don't
you say that? Why don't you say that when
you write me an open letter? Because if that
is your position, you ought to make your posi-
tion known.
The problem is that some groups, I think,
would feel embarrassed because they know
that Hanoi would tell them — would reject
what they have to suggest.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, would you
regard the dispatches of Harrison Salisbury
from Hanoi to the New York Times as dis-
torting the perspective in which we should
be seeing the war, as being unfair to our
position and to our policies?
Secretary Rusk: No, I don't want to get
into the particular personal argument with
a particular reporter. He presumably will be
3ut of North Viet-Nam one of these days,
md you gentlemen can put to him all the
questions you want to — and that is your job;
t is not mine. I do observe that from his dis-
patches you can draw the conclusion that we
ire not going after the civilian population
>f North Viet-Nam. Hanoi is there. Hanoi is
here. And you have to look pretty hard to
ind some damage inside Hanoi — and a good
leal of speculation about whether it was
aused by SAM's or by antiaircraft or what
night have actually caused it. But you will
lave your chance presumably to go over
hese matters with him when he comes out
f North Viet-Nam.
.ey to Negotiations Lies in Hanoi
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, do you see any
opes for peace or at least negotiations in the
cheduled emergence late this year of a
ivilian government in Viet-Nam ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the constituent as-
embly has been making very good progress
1 drafting its constitution. We would hope
erhaps by March or April that that con-
titution would be proclaimed, following
'hich there would be national elections for
civilian government.
I think the question of negotiations — again,
some people may think I am being much too
simple about this — turns on what the attitude
of the North is toward its attempt to take
over South Viet-Nam by force. There is no
problem of negotiations if they are willing to
negotiate. Now, this would be the problem
faced by a civilian government or by us or
by anybody else. So the key to this lies in
Hanoi.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, you used the ex-
pression that some people may feel that you
are "putting it in somewhat simple form."
You said before that some people say this is
a "trite expression," when you talked about
the neighbor idea.
There has been over the past years some
criticism leveled quite directly at you, sir, and
very recently a respected columnist from the
New York Times said that you were "a tired
man." I am wondering,, sir, how all of this
criticism strikes you and how you yourself
respond to it.
Secretary Rusk: It doesn't bother me very
much. I would regret it if everybody older
than I am should leave what they are doing
now. This would include a good many col-
umnists and other distinguished figures. No,
there are times when it is noon halfway
around the world and midnight here in
Washington, and sometimes there are long
days. But I feel fine. And I am greatly stimu-
lated and inspired by President Johnson's
own example and by the privilege I have in
trying to help him build a peace in the world.
This is the important thing. And if I can
contribute anything to it, I am at his disposal.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, could we
anticipate, then, that you would be in a posi-
tion to accept an invitation on January 1,
1968, to "face the nation" ?
Secretary Rtisk: Well, if you invite me, I
will take it under consideration if I am in a
position to receive that invitation at that
time. As you know, the Secretary of State
serves at the pleasure of the President, and
this is a matter for him. But I think every
American ought to be at his disposal if he
wants them to serve.
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, the Chinese have
A.NUARY 23, 1967
131
been suggesting of late that we and the
Soviets are on a "collusion course." Is there
enough collusion here to expect any prolifera-
tion treaty within the next —
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a very inter-
esting ideological factor that comes into it.
You see, for many, many years both the
Soviet Union and Communist China have sort
of branded us as Enemy Number One. Now
they are in a considerable to-do with each
other. And so it is rather natural for Peking
to charge that somehow Moscow and Wash-
ington are in a conspiracy and for Moscow
to be suspicious about whether we and
Peking are not in some sort of conspiracy,
because Moscow says that Peking is stand-
ing in the way of the unity of the Communist
world in dealing with the imperialists. I
think this is an internal ideological point. As
a matter of fact, we are not in a conspiracy
either with Moscow or with Peking, and both
capitals can relax on that point as far as I
am concerned.
Hope for Nortproliferation Treaty
Mr. Cook: On the antiproliferation treaty,
sir, the President said yesterday, I believe,
that in recent weeks there have been some
signs of progress. What is that progress ? Do
you expect an early draft of the treaty?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope very
much in 1967 — among the great hopes would
be that we get peace in Viet-Nam, that we
get a nonproliferation treaty, and that the
nations of the world can take some strong
steps toward meeting the emerging food
crisis which is going to be with us for the
next decade.
On the nonproliferation treaty, there have
been discussions. These matters are being
discussed among our allies, as well as with the
members of the Geneva conference. Some of
the underbrush has been cleared away. But
we still do not have an agreement yet, as the
President indicated. We hope very much we
could come to an agreement during 1967.
Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, how realis-
tic could any such antiproliferation treaty be
that did not include Communist China?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the question would
be who proliferates and to whom? Now, in
a purely technical sense, even though Peking
may not be a party to such an agreement, if
everybody else is, there is no one with whom
to proliferate.
I personally believe that existing nuclear
powers have a strong interest in a nonpro-
liferation treaty because it is almost in the
nature of this weapon that they do not look
with favor on its further spread throughout
the world.
But in any event, we are working at it. We
would hope very much that Peking would
take part in it, although on past performance
we have no reason to think that they will. But
it is a matter that the rest of the world has
to grapple with.
You know our basic attitude has been that
one nuclear power is too many. One of the
great tragedies is that the Baruch proposals
of 1946 were not accepted. And if one is too
many, then five are too many. But certainly
10, 15, would be too many.
We can take some comfort from the fact
that we have had 21 years now in which a
nuclear weapon has not been fired in anger
But we had better be very careful about try-
ing to limit that possibility for the future.
Mr. Cook: Well, the Chinese just firec
another test this week, Mr. Secretary. Hav<
you revised your estimate of their timetable
when they will have an ICBM that coulc
threaten us ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I have not. Mr. McNa-
mara has dealt with that. It will take somt
time yet. But there is no question this is an
ominous development in the world situation
Mr. Agronsky: Thank you very much, Mrr
Secretary — I wish we had time to go on — fow|
being here to "face the nation."
Secretary Rusk: Thank you.
«
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
h\
Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Policy
on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders
Following are texts of a letter from Sec-
retary Rusk to 100 student leaders and the
students' letter of December 29 addressed to
President Johnson. Secretary Rusk's letter
was forwarded to Robert Powell, president
of the student body, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C.
I
SECRETARY RUSK'S LETTER
Press release 2 dated January 6
January 4, 1967
Dear Stxjdent Leaders: I have received
,nd read carefully your thoughtful letter to
e President about our policy in Viet-Nam.
Your interest and your concern are shared
•y most thinking Americans. No one desires
ore strongly to bring an early and honor-
able conclusion to the conflict in Viet-Nam
than those who are working day and night,
both here and in Viet-Nam, to achieve that
end.
The questions you have raised are among
those that have been asked and discussed re-
peatedly in the councils of your Government.
If some of these matters continue, as you
say, to agitate the academic community, it
is certainly not because answers have not
been provided. It is more, I think, because
the answers to great and complex questions
can never fully satisfy all the people in a
free and questioning society.
Nevertheless, I am glad to have the chance
to address myself to the four specific ques-
tions about which you stated you and others
.felt doubt or concern.
(First, you asked if America's vital in-
srests are sufficiently threatened in Viet-
*
JANUARY 23, 1967
Nam to necessitate the growing commitment
there.
There is no shadow of doubt in my mind
that our vital interests are deeply involved in
Viet-N^jn and in Southeast Asia.
We are involved because the nation's word
has been given that we would be involved.
On February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1
the United States Senate passed the South-
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That
Treaty stated that aggression by means of
armed attack in the treaty area would en-
danger our own peace and safety and, in that
event, "we would act to meet the common
danger." There is no question that an ex-
panding armed attack by North Viet-Nam on
South Viet-Nam has been under way in re-
cent years; and six nations, with vital inter-
ests in the peace and security of the region,
have joined South Viet-Nam in defense
against that armed attack.
Behind the words and the commitment of
the Treaty lies the lesson learned in the
tragic half century since the First World
War. After that war our country withdrew
from eff'ective world responsibility. When ag-
gressors challenged the peace in Manchuria,
Ethiopia, and then Central Europe during
the 1930's, the world community did not act
to prevent their success. The result was a
Second World War — which could have been
prevented.
That is why the Charter of the United
Nations begins with these words: "We the
peoples of the United Nations determined to
save succeeding generations from the scourge
of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." And
the Charter goes on to state these objectives:
1S3
"to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained . . . and to unite our
strength to maintain international peace and
security. . . ."
This was also the experience President
Truman had in mind when — at a period
when the United Nations was incapable of
protecting Greece and Turkey from aggres-
sion — he said:' "We shall not realize our ob-
jectives unless we are willing to help free
peoples to maintain their free institutions
and their national integrity against aggres-
sive movements that seek to impose upon
them totalitarian regimes."
These are the memories which have in-
spired the four postwar American Presidents
as they dealt with aggressive pressures and
thrusts from Berlin to Korea, from the Car-
ibbean to Viet-Nam.
In short, we are involved in Viet-Nam be-
cause we know from painful experience that
the minimum condition for order on our
planet is that aggression must not be per-
mitted to succeed. For when it does succeed,
the consequence is not peace, it is the further
expansion of aggression.
And those who have borne responsibility
in our country since 1945 have not for one
moment forgotten that a third world war
would be a nuclear war.
The result of this conviction and this
policy has been a generation's effort which
has not been easy for the United States. We
have borne heavy burdens. We have had to
face some conflict and a series of dangerous
situations.
But the hard and important fact is that
in the postwar world external aggression has
not been permitted to develop its momentum
into general war.
Look back and imagine the kind of world
we now would have if we had adopted a dif-
ferent course. What kind of Europe would
now exist if there had been no commitment
to Greece and Turkey? No Marshall Plan?
No NATO? No defense of BerUn? Would
Europe and the world be better off or worse?
• Bulletin Supplement, May 4, 1947, p. 829.
Would the possibilities of detente be on the
present horizon?
Then turn the globe and look at Asia. If
we had made no commitments and offered no
assistance, what kind of Asia would there^
now be? Would there be a confident and vital
South Korea? A prosperous and peaceful
Japan? Would there be the new spirit of
regional cooperation and forward movement
now developing throughout Asia?
If you were to talk to the leaders of Asia
as I have, you would know what Asians
really think of our commitment in Viet-
Nam. You would know that the new vigor
in Asia, the new hope and determination, are
based in part on the conviction that the
United States will continue to support the
South Vietnamese in their struggle to build
a life of their own within the framework of
the Geneva Accords in 1954 and 1962 — that
we shall see it through to an honorable peace.
Second, you wonder whether our vital in-
terests are best protected by our growing
commitment.
We must always weigh what we are doing
against the requirements of the situation and
what the other side is doing. You are aware,
I am sure, that the flow of men and material
from North Viet-Nam into the South rad-
ically increased towards the end of 1964 and
continued at a high level in the next two
years. It was to meet that escalation, de-
signed to achieve military victory by the
North against the South, that we sent our
men in large numbers and began an air cam-
paign against military targets in North Viet-
Nam.
At the other end of the scale, one must
contrast what we are doing with what we
could be doing. You know the power that is
available to us — in men, resources and
weaponry.
We have done both more than some people
would wish, and less than others advocate.
We have been guided both by the demands
imposed upon us by increased aggression and
by the need for restraint in the application
of force. We have been doing what the Presi-
dent judges to be necessary to protect the
nation's vital interests, after hearing the
views of the government's military and civil-
134
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ian experts. We shall continue to do what is
necessary to meet the threat the Vietnamese
and their allies face.
Third, you raise the question whether a
war that may devastate much of the country-
side can lead to the stable and prosperous
Viet-Nam we hope for.
First, it is an error to suggest that the
fighting in Viet-Nam has devastated "much
of the countryside." There has been too much
destruction and disruption — as there is in
any war. And we deeply regret the loss of
life that is involved — in the South and in the
North, among both soldiers and civilians.
But devastation has been far less than on
the conventional battlefields of World War
II and Korea. If peace could come to South
Viet-Nam today, I think most people would
be amazed at its rapid recovery. For the
Vietnamese are intelligent, energetic and am-
bitious people. And they are determined to
see their country prosper. I am confident that
they can achieve that end — if they but have
the chance to do so, in peace and in their
own way.
That day cannot come too soon.
You also suggest that there are "apparent
jontradictions" in the American position on
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement.
We have said that there will be no diffi-
culty in having the views of the Viet Cong
presented at any serious negotiation. The de-
:ails of how this might be done can be dis-
cussed with the other side; there is little
joint in negotiating such details with those
A^ho cannot stop the fighting.
We have made it clear that .we cannot ac-
;ept the Liberation Front as the "sole" or
'only legitimate voice" of the Vietnamese
people. Yet that is what the Front has said
t is. The Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa
ilao, ethnic Cambodians, the almost a mil-
ion refugees who fled from North Viet-Nam
;o the South in 1954-55, and the Monta-
?nards are not prepared to have the Libera-
ion Front as their spokesman. The capacity
)f the Government and people of South Viet-
"^am to conduct the election of the Constitu-
ional Assembly in September 1966, despite
he opposition of the Viet Cong, made it clear
that the VC are a small minority in the coun-
try, detei-mined to convert their ability to
organize for terror into domination over the
majority. Those now enrolled with the Viet
Cong should be turning their minds in a
diflferent direction. They should be asking:
"How can we end this war and join as free
citizens in the making of a modern nation in
South Viet-Nam?"
We know that the effort at armed conquest
which we oppose in Viet-Nam is organized,
led, and supplied by the leaders in Hanoi. We
know that the struggle will not end until
those leaders decide that they want it to end.
So we stand ready — now and at any time
in the future — to sit down with representa-
tives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret,
to work out arrangements for a just solu-
tion.
You state correctly that we have a com-
mitment to the right of self-determination
of the people of South Viet-Nam. There is
no ambiguity whatsoever. We shall abide by
the decision of the Vietnamese people as they
make their wishes known in free and demo-
cratic elections. Hanoi and the Liberation
Front do not agree.
You also suggest that there is disparity
between our statements and our actions in
Viet-Nam, and you refer to recent reports
of the results of our bombing in North Viet-
Nam.
It is our policy to strike targets of a mili-
tary nature, especially those closely related
to North Viet-Nam's efforts to conquer the
South. We have never deliberately attacked
any target that could legitimately be called
civilian. We have not bombed cities or di-
rected our efforts against the population of
North Viet-Nam.
We recognize that there has been loss of
life. We recognize that people living or work-
ing in close proximity to military targets may
have suffered. We recognize, too, that men
and machines are not infallible and that some
mistakes have occurred.
But there is a vast difference between such
unintentional events and a deliberate policy
of attacking civilian centers. I would remind
you that tens of thousands of civilians have
ANUARY 23, 1967
135
been killed, wounded, or kidnapped in South
Viet-Nam, not by accident but as the result
of a deliberate policy of terrorism and intim-
idation conducted by the Viet Cong.
We regret all the loss of life and property
that this conflict entails. We regret that a
single person, North or South, civilian or
soldier, American or Vietnamese, must die.
And the sooner this conflict can be settled,
the happier we and the Vietnamese people
will be.
Meantime, we shall continue to do what
is necessary — to protect the vital interests
of the United States, to stand by our allies
in Asia, and to work with all our energy
for a peaceful, secure and prosperous South-
east Asia. Only by meeting these commit-
ments can we keep on this small and vulner-
able planet the minimum conditions for peace
and order.
Only history will be able to judge the
wisdom and the full meaning of our present
course — in all its dimensions.
But I would close by sharing with you a
hope and a belief. I believe that we are com-
ing towards the end of an era when men can
believe it is profitable and, even, possible to
change the status quo by applying external
force. I believe those in Hanoi who persist
in their aggressive adventure — and those who
support them — represent ideas and methods
from the past, not the future. Elsewhere in
the world those committed to such concepts
have faded or are fading from the scene.
I believe, therefore, that if we and our
allies have the courage, will, and durability
to see this struggle through to an honorable
peace, based on the reinstallation of the
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, we have
a fair chance of entering quieter times in
which all of us will be able to turn more of
our energies to the great unfinished tasks
of human welfare and to developing the arts
of conciliation and peaceful change.
The overriding question for all of mankind
in this last third of the Twentieth Century is
how to organize a durable peace. Much of the
experience which has gone into answers to
that question has been largely forgotten —
perhaps some of it should be. But the ques-
tion remains — and remains to be answered.
I should much enjoy discussing this with you
if we can find a way to do so.
I would value a chance to discuss the is-
sues posed in your letter with a representa-
tive group of signatories or with as many
as could conveniently join me in Washing-
ton at a mutually agreeable time.
With best wishes and thanks for your seri-
ous concern.
Sincerely yours,
Dean Rusk
STUDENT LEADERS' LETTER
December 29, 1966
Dear Mr. President: In your talk to the student
interns last summer,' as on other occasions, you
have recognized and discussed problems that have
been troubling members of our generation. We have
been grateful for your concern and encouraged by
your invitation to express some of our thoughts.
Since many of these thoughts center increasingly
on the situation in Vietnam, the New Year's re-
newal of the truce seems a suitable occasion to report
to you that significant and growing numbers of our
contemporaries are deeply troubled about the pos-
ture of their Government in Vietnam. We believe
the state of mind of these people, though largely
unreported, is of great importance, because there
are many who are deeply troubled for every one who
has been outspoken in dissent.
A great many of those faced with the prospect
of military duty find it hard to square performance
of that duty with concepts of personal integrity and
conscience. Even more are torn by reluctance to
participate in a war whose toll in property and life
keeps escalating, but about whose purpose and value
to the United States they remain unclear.
The truces have highlighted a growing conviction
on American campuses that if our objective in the
fighting in Vietnam is a negotiated settlement
rather than a military "victory," continued escala-
tion cannot be justified by the failure of the other
side to negotiate. If, on the other hand, our objective
is no longer a negotiated settlement, the nature and
attainability of our objectives in Vietnam raise seri-
ous new doubts. There is thus increasing confusion
about both our basic purpose and our tactics, and
there is increasing fear that the course now being
pursued may lead us irrevocably into a major land
war in Asia — a war which many feel could not be
won without recourse to nuclear weapons, if then.
* Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
Aug. 22, 1966, p. 1083.
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In this context there is widespread support for the
suggestion of the Pope and others that the resumed
truce be extended de facto by restraint on both sides,
even if no formal agreement is achieved. And there
is hope that if fighting must be resumed in 1967 it
will be resumed on a reduced scale.
In short, Mr. President, a great many of our con-
temporaries, raised in the democratic tradition of
thinking for themselves, are finding a growing con-
flict between their own observations on the one hand,
and statements by Administration leaders about the
war on the other. These are people as devoted to the
Constitution, to the democratic process, and to law
and order as were their fathers and brothers who
served willingly in two World Wars and in Korea.
Unless this conflict can be eased, the United States
will continue to find some of her most loyal and cou-
rageous young people choosing to go to jail rather
than to bear their country's arms, while countless
others condone or even utilize techniques for evading
their legal obligations. Contributing to this situation
is the almost universal conviction that the present
Selective Service Law operates unfairly.
We write in the hope that this letter will encour-
age a frank discussion of these problems. If such a
discussion clarified American objectives in Vietnam,
it might help reverse the drift, which is now from
confusion toward disaffection. To this end, we submit
for your consideration some of the questions now
agitating the academic community:
— There is doubt that such vital interests as may
be threatened are best protected by this growing
:ommitment.
— There is doubt that such vital interests as may
oe threatened are best protected by this growing
commitment.
— There is doubt that a war which may devastate
nuch of the countryside can lead to the stable and
prosperous Vietnam we once hoped our presence
ivould help create.
— There is considerable concern about apparent
contradictions in the American position on certain
joints basic to any efforts to negotiate a settlement.
High Government officials reiterate our eagerness to
legotiate "unconditionally," but we remain unclear
ibout our willingness to accept full participation by
he Viet Cong as an independent party to negotia-
ions. Similarly, Administration spokesmen reiterate
lur commitment to self-determination for South
/ietnam, but we remain unclear about our willing-
less to accept a coalition (or pro-communist) govem-
nent should the people of Vietnam eventually choose
uch a government under adequate international
lupervision.
Finally, Mr. President, we must report a growing
«nse — reinforced by Mr. Harrison Salisbury's re-
cent reports from Hanoi — that too often there is a
vide disparity between American statements about
Vietnam and American actions there.
We hope you will find it possible to share your
thoughts with us about these matters. The rising
confusion about national purposes can undermine
mutual trust and respect among our people. This
seems to us as urgent a problem as any that con-
fronts the Nation today.
We are grateful for your interest and send our
best wishes for the New Year.
Sincerely,
Robert Powell
Student Body President
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, N.C.
on behalf of himself and [99] other elected
heads of student government organizations
and editors of college newspapers, all sign-
ing in their own individual capacities
U.S. Reaffirms Desire
for Peace in Viet-Nam
Following is an exchange of letters be-
tween Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representa-
tive to the United Nations, and U.N.
Secretary-General U Thant.
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S LETTER
U.S. /U.N. press release B04B
December 31, 1966
My Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I ap-
preciate your thoughtful reply to my letter of
December 19 1 concerning Vietnam. The
subject at issue — peace in Vietnam — is of
such vital importance to my Government and
to world peace that we have given your reply
immediate attention and are sending you
herewith our reply.
We share your deep concern about the de-
velopment and effects of the conflict in Viet-
nam: the risk it poses to international
peace, the ill effects upon relations between
states, and — more than anything else — the
tragic toll in death and destruction.
I can assure you without reservation that
the preeminent desire of the United States
Government is to bring all hostilities in Viet-
nam to a prompt and honorable end con-
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63.
ANUARY 23, 1967
137
sistent with the United Nations Charter,
which affirms for all peoples the right of self-
determination, the right to decide their own
destiny free of force.
We have carefully reflected on your ideas,
expressed in your December 30 letter and on
previous occasions, about the cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. As you rightly
point out, Mr. Secretary-General, our size and
power impose special responsibilities upon us.
And it is with these responsibilities in mind
that I wish to assure you categorically that
my Government is prepared to take the first
step toward peace: specifically, we are ready
to order a prior end to all bombing of North
Vietnam the moment there is an assurance,
private or otherwise, that there would be a
reciprocal response toward peace from North
Vietnam.
I am, thus, reaffirming herewith an offer
made before the General Assembly — on
September 22 ^ and again on October 18.^ We
hope and trust that you will use every means
at your disposal to determine what tangible
response there would be from North Viet-
nam in the wake of such a prior step toward
peace on our part.
While reaffirming our offer, I would also
express our conviction that the goal which,
I am sure, we both share — an end to all
fighting, to all hostilities, to all organized
terror and violence — cannot be attained by
either appeals for or the exercise of restraint
by only one side in the Vietnam conflict.
We therefore welcome the idea in your letter
that there be an extended cease-fire, which
would obviously include a cessation of the
bombing of North Vietnam as well as an
end to all hostilities and organized violence
in the south. We believe the temporary
truces already arranged in Vietnam offer
opportunities for initiatives in that direction
— though we cannot but regret that the other
parties concerned have shown no interest so
far in such a cease-fire.
We continue to believe that peace can come
to Vietnam in one of two ways: through
deeds, such as a mutual cessation or reduction
» Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
'Ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 757.
of hostilities, or through discussions. We
agree with you fully that the ultimate basis
for a peaceful settlement could be the Geneva
Accords. We are, however, entirely flexible
in our approach to the discussions we have
sought to promote, whether they be format"
negotiations or informal contacts. In this con-
nection we would be prepared, as President !
Johnson publicly stated this morning,* to
meet promptly with the Governments of
North and South Vietnam as proposed by .
the United Kingdom on December 30. As my
Government has stated before on many occa-
sions, we are prepared to discuss all proposals
and points which any interested party may
wish to put forward. I am sure that your de-
sire for a first step to bring about peace is
accompanied by a strong interest on your part
in what the subsequent step would be.
I would conclude, Mr. Secretary-General,
by expressing our certainty that you — as all
men of good will — agree it is the war in all its
facets which must be brought to an end. We
are thus heartened — and believe all who de- 1
sire peace in Vietnam will share the feeling
— by your assurance that you will continue
to exert your efforts and explore every avenue I
toward a peaceful solution of the Vietnam
conflict.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldberg
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER
U.N. doc. S/7668
30 December 1966
My dear Ambassador, I have very carefully
studied your letter to me dated 19 December 1966
on the subject of Viet-Nam. May I say how apprecia-
tive I am of your Government's request that I might
take whatever steps I "consider necessary to bring
about the necessary discussions which could lead to
such a cease-fire", and especially of the assurance
that "the Government of the United States will co-
operate fully ... in getting such discussions started
promptly and in bringing them to a successful com-
pletion".
You are, of course, aware of my preoccupation
with the question of Viet-Nam during the last three
years. This preoccupation stems not merely from
' In reply to a question at a nevirs conference.
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ny recognition of the serious risk that the continua-
;ion of this war poses to international peace and
security. To a very large extent it is influenced even
nore by my deep sympathy, and indeed anguish, over
;he untold suffering of the people of Viet-Nam who
Tiave known no peace for a generation, the tragic
oss of lives on all sides, the increasing number of
:ivilian casualties, the appalling destruction of prop-
erty and the vast and mounting sums being spent
)n the prosecution of the war.
In this context may I also stress my strong feei-
ng, publicly expressed more than once, that what is
•eally at stake in Viet-Nam, unless an early end to
he hostilities is brought about, is the independence,
he identity and the survival of the country itself.
I have already referred to the serious risk to in-
ernational peace and security that the continuance
f the war in Viet-Nam poses. There is an ever pres-
nt danger that the war in Viet-Nam may spread,
nd even spill over its frontiers. Already the war
as poisoned relations amongst States and has, as I
aid earlier, brought to a halt the great enterprise
f co-operation and understanding between nations
?hich had barely made a modest start in recent
ears.
This is how I see the over-all situation. It is a
ituation in which a powerful nation like the United
tates should take the initiative in the quest for
eace and show an enlightened and humanitarian
pirit. I believe that in the circumstances only action
eliberately undertaken in such spirit which, because
f its power and position, the United States can
fford to undertake, can halt the escalation and
ilargement of this war, and thus bring about a
irning of the tide towards peace.
Let me take this opportunity of reiterating my
iree-point programme, to which I still firmly ad-
ere:
1. The cessation of the bombing of North Viet-
am;
2. The scaling down of all military activities by
II sides in South Viet-Nam;
3. The willingness to enter into discussions with
lose who are actually fighting.
I strongly believe that this three-point programme,
' which the cessation of the bombing of North
iet-Nam is the first and essential part, is necessary
I create the possibility of fruitful discussions lead-
ig to a just and honourable settlement of the prob-
m of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agree-
lents of 1954.
I also wish to recall that in the course of the
twenty-first session, in the debate of the General
Assembly, the majority of the delegations have en-
dorsed the three-point programme. Many more heads
of delegations also specifically pleaded for the cessa-
tion of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It seems
to me that this is a very clear indication of the
public opinion of the world at large on this issue.
Leaders of religious faiths all over the world have
also expressed their anxiety about the continuance
and escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. Only a few
days ago the General Secretary of the World Coun-
cil of Churches expressed a similar concern.
When His Holiness the Pope made his plea for
an extended cease-fire, I endorsed it and I urged all
parties to heed his appeal. In my statement of 2
December I said: "Is it too much to hope that what
is made possible for just a couple of days by the
occurrence of common holidays may soon prove
feasible for a longer period by the new commitments
that peace requires, so that an atmosphere may be
created which is necessary for meaningful talks to
be held in the quest for a peaceful solution?"
This is what I have in mind when I refer to the
need for a humanitarian approach. If action in such
a spirit could be undertaken, even without condi-
tions, by the United States to stop the bombing
of North Viet-Nam, and if the New Year cease-fire
could be extended by all the parties, I feel hopeful
that thereafter some favourable developments may
follow. I am reminded in this context that in 1954
negotiations for a peaceful settlement were con-
ducted even without a formal cease-fire and while
fighting was going on. Even though there may be
sporadic breaches of the cease-fire on account of
lack of control and communication, I believe that
this would provide a welcome respite for private
contacts and diplomatic explorations so that, in time,
formal discussions can take place on the basis of
the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
I am writing this letter to you after long delibera-
tion. I would like to close by assuring you and your
Government that, in my personal and private ca-
pacity, I shall continue to exert my utmost efforts
and to explore every avenue which may lead to a
just, honourable and peaceful solution of the prob-
lem of Viet-Nam.
As your letter under reply was issued as a Se-
curity Council document [S/7641], I am arranging
for this reply also to be issued as a document of the
Security Council.
Yours sincerely,
U Thant
INUARY 23, 1967
139
International Law in the United Nations
by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
All of us recognize that the practice and
teaching of law have undergone a profound
revolution in the last generation. No aspect of
this revolution has been more striking than
the growing involvement of American
lawyers and law schools with international
legal problems.
A generation ago international law was
considered a specialty so divorced from the
normal run of practice that Frederic R.
Coudert, a leading member of the New York
Bar, could complain, upon being elevated to
the presidency of the American Society of
International Law: "Those colleagues who
describe me as an international lawyer are
just trying to take away my best domestic
clients !"
Today the effective representation of cli-
ents in our major urban centers requires the
ability to deal with the legal aspects of inter-
national transactions. And, of course, there
is hardly a Federal agency in which the
lawyer does not find himself concerned with
international legal problems.
The curricula of our major law schools re-
flect this development. I understand that two-
thirds of the students at some of our major
law schools now take at least one course in
the field of international law.
This is as it should be. Indeed, I wonder
whether the trend in our law schools has gone
far enough. In the light of the revolutionary
developments which are increasing the inter-
' Address made before the Association of American
Law Schools at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 29 (press
release 304).
140
national influences on our national life — de-
velopments in science and technology, politics
and economics, in mass communications — one
may well ask whether today's law student
should not be expected to take at least one
course in international law, just as he takes
one course in torts, contracts, or property. If
this seems like an extreme suggestion, let us
remember that today's law student will be
reaching the peak of his professional career
in the year 2000.
When we speak of the international role
of our law schools, of course, we think of
research as well as teaching. Two centuries
ago the High Court of the Admiralty could
dismiss the work of scholars in international
law by saying: "A pedantic man in his closet
dictates the laws of nations; everybody
quotes, and nobody minds him." Today oui
scholars in international law are not onlj
quoted but minded. And I can think of no bet-
ter example than Professor McDougai
[Myres McDougai, president, Association ol
American Law Schools] himself and his
monumental works on the law of outer space,
the oceans, and the use of force — not to men-
tion many other scholars who are in this
room today.
But what of law in relation to diplomacy^
What is its relevance in dealing with the
problems of mankind as we face them in the
United Nations?
Sir Harold Nicolson once wrote that "the
worst kind of diplomats are missionaries,
fanatics and lawyers." Needless to say, we dc
not believe that at the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations. Sir Harold might be shocked
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
;o learn that the large majority of our dele-
gates and senior advisers at this last General
Assembly session were lawyers. In fact, we
lad the full-time services of one law school
lean and one law school professor, both of
hem on leave, and the part-time services of
I professor of international law. One of the
'ew nonlawyers on the delegation was the
"oreign Service officer whose title is Coun-
elor.
There are many Americans, I know, who
luestion the relevance of law in diplomacy
.nd in a political institution like the United
Nations. This skepticism results, I believe,
rom a number of misconceptions. Some peo-
ile think that law is only concerned with the
lechanical application of principles found in
ases and textbooks. Some see law and poli-
ics as antithetical concepts that operate in
'atertight compartments. And some believe
lat the differences between East and West
nd North and South have destroyed the basis
)r international law.
I regard these views as profoundly mis-
iken. After 18 months and two General As-
?mblies, I am impressed by the significance
f law and legal skills in diplomacy and in the
ork of the United Nations.
Perhaps a good way to illustrate this is to
ok at two subjects with which the United
ations has recently been involved: outer
)ace and Rhodesia.
le Development of Space Law
As you all know, one of the principal mat-
ers which engaged our attention during re-
;nt months was the negotiation of a treaty
werning the exploration and use of outer
)ace, including the moon and other celestial
3dies.2 The negotiations were successfully
mcluded in early December, and the General
ssembly has recommended that all states
gn and ratify the treaty.
This treaty is an important step in the
rogressive development of international law.
reduces the danger of conflict and promotes
le prospects of cooperation in the newest
id most unfamiliar of all realms of human
' For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966,
952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
activity. Among other things, the treaty pro-
vides that:
— Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be free for ex-
ploration and use by all states on a basis of
equality and in accordance with international
law.
— Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to na-
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty,
by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.
— Nuclear weapons and other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction shall not be sta-
tioned in space or on celestial bodies.
The treaty also provides for international
liability for space vehicle accidents, for the
rescue and return of astronauts and equip-
ment, for the avoidance of harmful contami-
nation of celestial bodies from earth and vice
versa, for the exchange of information on
space activities through the United Nations
and other bodies, and for access to stations
on the moon and other celestial bodies upon
reasonable advance notice.
This treaty did not spring full blown from
the minds of a few U.N. delegates. It repre-
sented the culmination not only of negotia-
tions which began in Geneva last summer but
of years of consideration in the U.N. and
elsewhere. This record reveals, I think, a
number of significant things about the role
of international law in diplomacy and in the
United Nations.
First, the record shows that the develop-
ment of international law is possible even in
the midst of deep divergencies of ideology
and national interest. Even between ad-
versary powers there can be agreements con-
taining mutual restraints and reciprocal con-
cessions which serve the interests of both
sides. The incentive for the negotiation of
such agreements and for compliance with
them is the hope of reciprocity; the sanction
is the fear of reprisal. For example, it would
have been difficult for either the Soviet
Union or the United States to commit itself
unilaterally not to station nuclear weapons
in space, but such commitments could be ex-
changed to the net advantage of both.
^NUARY 23, 1967
141
Second, the record shows the evolutionary
character of international law in gradually
codifying ground rules which are perceived
by states to be in their common interests. In
space as on earth, the life of the law has not
been logic but experience. Consider the fol-
lowing chronology:
— In 1959, year two of the space age, a
committee appointed by the U.N. could refer
to a developing practice that space could be
used for orbiting satellites without objection
from subjacent states.
— In 1961, year four of the space age, this
principle could be recommended to states in
a General Assembly resolution, together with
the related principle, on which there had
been no practice, that there could be no sov-
ereign claims on celestial bodies.
— In 1963, year six of the space age, both
these principles could be included in a
Declaration of Legal Principles by the Gen-
eral Assembly asserted to have the force of
law.
— And in 1966, year nine of the space age.
these principles could be included in a for-
mal treaty instrument.
This history provides the most recent illus-
tration of how international law is developed
in the world today: how states gradually per-
ceive common interests on the basis of experi-
ence and how these common interests are
gradually crystallized into binding rules of
law.
In the course of the recent negotiations I
was struck by the fact that the Soviet Union
and ourselves both followed the same prag-
matic approach to the development of space
law. Both countries were prepared to reach
agreement on those matters where experience
had demonstrated a sufficient measure of
common interest, and both countries resisted
the injection of questions which, though im-
portant and logically related to the agreed
principles, were not ripe for international
negotiation — such as the delimitation of outer
space and the exploitation of resources on
celestial bodies.
Third, the record demonstrates the effec-
tiveness of the United Nations as a vehicle
for the development of international law. The
process of discussion and negotiation of legal
principles governing outer space naturally
focused on the two great space powers. But
the fact that these negotiations were carried
on in the multilateral framework of the U.Nr^
undoubtedly encouraged the space powers to
be more forthcoming than they otherwise
might have been — and obliged them to take
account of the legitimate interests of other
countries, which also took part in the negotia-
tions all along the way. Moreover, in the light
of the Viet-Nam war and the Sino-Soviet
split, the fact that the space negotiations took
place in the United Nations made it less dif-
ficult for the Soviet Union to make the agree-
ment.
Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia
Even as we were completing our work on
the space treaty, we were involved in the Se-
curity Council with another important sub-
ject which can also tell us something about
the relevance of law in the United Nations. I
refer, of course, to Rhodesia.
Earlier this month, the Security Council
took an unprecedented step with respect to
Rhodesia.^ It imposed mandatory sanctions
on key exports from Rhodesia and on oil ex-
ports to that territory.
This was the first time in the history of the
United Nations that such sanctions had been
imposed. All members of the United Nations
are legally obligated to apply these sanctions
in accordance with article 25 of the charter.
For the first time in history, our Government
will be prohibiting activities in international
trade by American individuals and corpora-
tions pursuant to a U.N. order under the au-
thority of our United Nations Participation
Act.^
A number of individuals in our country
have attacked, on both legal and policy
grounds, this action of the Security Council
and the support which the United States has
given it.
First, it is said that the United Nations
action represents a denial of the principle of
self-determination.
' For background, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
' See p. 145.
142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The simple answer to this argument is that
the Smith regime is not asserting the right
of self-determination for all the Rhodesian
people but merely the right of 6 percent of
Y the Rhodesian people who are white to rule
j lover 94 percent who are black. The refusal of
j Ithe United Kingdom to recognize the illegal
1 sseizure of power by the Smith regime, far
jfrom being a denial of self-determination, is
, |an attempt to implement that objective for
jthe Rhodesian people as a whole.
Second, it is argued that the action of the
Security Council involves a violation of article
12, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter. This
iprovision reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall au-
thorize the United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit
such matters to settlement under the present Char-
ter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli-
cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
The fallacy of this argument can be seen
when the facts in the case are tested against
the provisions I have just quoted:
— Rhodesia is not a "state" and has not
been recognized as such by a single govern-
ment or international organization.
— The situation in Rhodesia is not "domes-
tic," since it involves the international re-
sponsibilities of the United Kingdom under
chapter XI of the charter relating to non-self-
governing territories.
— The action of the Security Council does
not constitute "intervention," since the Coun-
cil has acted at the request and with the con-
currence of the legitimate sovereign, the
United Kingdom.
— Article 2, paragraph 7, by its own terms,
does not apply to the application of enforce-
ment measures such as the mandatory eco-
nomic sanctions imposed by the Council in
this case.
Third, it is argued that there is here no
threat to international peace justifying resort
to mandatory sanctions.
Under article 39 of the charter, it is the
responsibility of the Security Council to "de-
termine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion" and to "make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main-
tain or restore international peace and
security."
This determination by the Council in the
exercise of its charter powers is conclusive
and may not be contested by any member.
The Council has made a judgment as to what
is likely to happen in the future if the seizure
of power by the white minority is not brought
to an end. The judgment can hardly be
termed unreasonable. The attempt of 220,000
whites to rule 4 million nonwhites in a con-
tinent of nonwhite governments which have
recently achieved independence involves great
risks of violence.
Fourth, it is argued that sanctions cannot
logically be applied against Rhodesia since
the "threat to the peace" originates else-
where. This legal conclusion, it is added, is
not affected by the morality or lack of
morality of the actions taken by the Smith
government.
This argument involves still more funda-
mental misconceptions. Under chapter VII of
the charter, the Security Council is author-
ized to order sanctions without the necessity
of determining which party to a dispute is
the source of a threat to international peace.
This should not be surprising. A similar prac-
tice is followed in our country in major labor-
management disputes affecting the national
health and safety, where Federal powers can
be employed to preserve the economy without
judgment on the merits of controversy.
But the principal fallacy in this argument
is the failure to recognize that the threat to
the peace inherent in the Rhodesian situation
is the seizure of power by the Smith regime
rather than the potential response to it.
It is in this sense that the actions of the
Smith regime raise legal as well as moral
issues. Some say that moral considerations
are irrelevant in the practical affairs of na-
tions. But the United Nations Charter, like
the United States Constitution, embodies
moral principles. One of the principal pur-
poses of the United Nations is to promote
"respect for human rights and for funda-
JANUARY 23, 1967
143
mental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion." The
attempt of the Smith regime to alter the
status quo in Rhodesia and create a new state
committed to the violation of these world
community standards is the real source of
the threat to the peace.
Finally, it is argued that the application of
mandatory sanctions to Rhodesia constitutes
a dangerous precedent for similar U.N. action
wherever any violations of human rights may
be involved.
This argument overlooks a number of
unique elements in the Rhodesian situation.
Here we have witnessed an illegal seizure of
power by a small minority bent on perpetuat-
ing the subjugation of the vast majority.
Moreover, in this situation the sovereign au-
thority with international responsibility for
the territory has asked the United Nations
to take measures which will permit the
restoration of the full rights of the people
of this territory under the charter.
We in the United States learned over 100
years ago that any attempt to institutionalize
and legitimize a political principle of racial
superiority in a new state was unacceptable.
The effort to do so created an inflammatory
situation, and our nation had to rid itself of
this false and hateful doctrine at great cost.
What could not be accepted by the United
States in the mid-19th century cannot be ac-
cepted by the international community in the
late 20th century.
Law in the United Nations, as in our own
society, is often developed on a case-by-case
basis. We should analyze each action of U.N.
political organs with due regard for the facts
of each case and be careful of hasty generali-
zations.
Because the Security Council considers the
situation in Rhodesia, with its unique legal
and factual elements, as constituting a threat
to the peace requiring thp application of
mandatory sanctions, does not absolve it from
an independent exercise of judgment in dif-
ferent situations. Moreover, each of the
permanent members of the Security Council
has the power to prevent the use of enforce-
ment measures in other situations where it
may deem them to be inappropriate.
[(llllilX
Fori
irityo:
jlstil
a]
Kllttl
In the short time available to me I hav If'P""
given but two examples of the relevance o; iis''''^
law and legal skills to problems before th( iJis"''
United Nations. Even from my brief tenun iilSi *'
at the U.N., I could have cited many others
— the status of South West Africa follow
ing the regrettable decision of the Interna '°°
tional Court of Justice;
— the constitutional questions surrounding
the authorizing, managing, and financing of
peacekeeping operations;
— the consideration of improved procel
dures for factfinding, mediation, and concilia- *'^''
tion;
— the strengthening of U.N. machinery in
trade and aid to less developed countries; ani
— the examination of procedures to imple-|Wif
ment human rights standards through th(
human right covenants ^ and the proposed
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Creative Values in International Law
The building of these institutions for th(
promotion of peaceful change, justice, eco-
nomic development, and human rights is as
much the work of the lawyer as the elabora
tion of legal norms for the prevention of viO'
lence.
As Professor McDougal said yesterday Im
his presidential address:
In our contemporary community . . . people have
largely ceased to think of law as serving only the
rather primitive function of maintaining minimum
order, in preserving the peace and minimizing un-
authorized coercion, and have come generally to think
of it as a positive instrument for promoting optimum
order, in security and the greater production and
wider distribution of all community values.
I have no doubt from my work at the U.N.
that this is true of international as well a.';
domestic law. The aspect that says "Thou
shalt not" — essential though it is — is only
half the story. Law is more than prohibitions
on the use of force. It is also, and equally
essentially, an affirmative concept: a force
for justice and equal opportunity and for the
redress of legitimate grievances. Law must
operate to eliminate discrimination, to assure
human rights, to feed the hungry, to educate
'' For texts, see ibid., Jan. 16, 1966, p. 107.
tgai
IHIT
Hill
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to
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144
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ItaJ
:he ignorant, to raise up the oppressed. It
^. must foster in the international realm the
'^'"'s tij same creative and positive values which na-
ions, at their best, have fulfilled in their
)wn domestic life.
This creative approach to the role of inter-
laational law reflects not merely idealism but
realism as well. Today more than ever, it
ijl«rould be unrealistic to talk about peace with-
out addressing ourselves to these positive
/alues.
For one of the dominant facts of the
emerging world community is that the ma-
jority of its members are still extremely poor
and still have vivid recollections of what it is
like to live under colonial rule. They are pre-
occupied with economic and social develop-
ment and with human rights. Their commit-
ment to the law of nations, and to the peace
which it seeks to build, will deepen only as
the law helps them to realize these legitimate
►aspirations.
If American law schools can provide our
■future leadership with an understanding of
this larger role of international law — and if
"they can provide the intellectual tools to act
upon it effectively — they will have performed
an historic service not just for the United
States but for the world.
Mi
mm
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imple-
irthe
MO-
is
k
Mo-
mini
IIU.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions
iAgainst Southern Rhodesia
IWHITE HOUSE ANNOUKCEMENT
White House press release dated January 5
The President on January 5 signed Execu-
tive Order No. 11322 implementing the
United Nations Security Council's Resolution
No. 232 of December 16, 1966,i which im-
posed selective mandatory economic sanctions
against Southern Rhodesia.
The President acted under the United Na-
tions Participation Act of 1945, as amended.
Section 5 of the act empowers the President
to implement Security Council decisions
adopted pursuant to article 41 of the United
Nations Charter. In its Resolution No. 232,
JANUARY 23, 1967
the Council decided that all member states
shall prohibit imports of Rhodesian asbestos,
iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco,
copper, meat and meat products, and hides,
skins, and leather, as well as dealing by their
nationals or in their territories in such prod-
ucts originating in Southern Rhodesia. The
resolution also obligates members to embargo
shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles,
and petroleum and petroleum products to
Southern Rhodesia.
This Executive order prohibits the activi-
ties proscribed by the resolution, including
transactions involving commodities exported
from Southern Rhodesia after December 16,
the date of the resolution, and delegates to
the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the
Treasury the authority to promulgate regula-
tions necessary to carry out the order. These
regulations will be issued by the Departments
shortly and will be effective as of January 5.
A violation of the Executive order is a
criminal offense. Provision will be made in
the regulations to deal with cases of undue
hardship arising from transactions com-
menced before the date of the order.
The selective mandatory sanctions imposed
by the Security Council's resolution of
December 16 supplement earlier voluntary
measures taken by a large majority of U.N.
members in response to the Council's appeal,
contained in its resolution of November 20,
1965,2 that they break off economic relations
with Southern Rhodesia. This resolution was
adopted a few days after the Smith regime
in Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally de-
clared its independence on November 11,
1965. The United States joined with other
states in implementing the voluntary meas-
ures called for by the Security Council by
embargoing the shipment to Southern Rho-
desia of all arms, military equipment, and
related items and by suspending the 1965 and
1966 U.S. import quotas for Rhodesian sugar.
Since early 1966,. the United States has called
upon U.S. firms to cooperate with the volun-
tary Security Council sanctions and has
• For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan.
9, 1967, p. 73.
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.
145
recommended that U.S. firms comply with
British Orders-in-Council by avoiding trade
in commodities of significant importance to
the Southern Rhodesian economy, including
petroleum, as well as Rhodesian exports of
chrome, asbestos, and tobacco.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11322 "
Relating to Trade and Other Transactions
Involving Southern Rhodesia
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, includ-
ing section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act
of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c),
and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States
Code, and as President of the United States, and
considering the measures which the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations, by Security Council
Resolution No. 232 adopted December 16, 1966, has
decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter
of the United Nations, and which it has called upon
all members of the United Nations, including the
United States, to apply, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. The following are prohibited effective
immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered
into or licenses granted before the date of this
Order:
(a) The importation into the United States of
asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco,
copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and
leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex-
ported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or prod-
ucts made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or else-
where.
(b) Any activities by any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote or
are calculated to promote the export from Southern
Rhodesia after December 16, 1966, of any of the
commodities specified in subsection (a) of this section
originating in Southern Rhodesia, and any dealings
by any such person in any such commodities or in
products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or
elsewhere, including in particular any transfer of
funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such
activities or dealings: Provided, however, that the
prohibition against the dealing in commodities ex-
ported from Southern Rhodesia or products made
therefrom shall not apply to any such commodities
or products which, prior to the date of this Order,
had been imported into the United States.
(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of United
States registration of any of the commodities speci-
fied in subsection (a) of this section originating
'32 Fed. Reg. 119.
St
ill
(I
i
in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom afte
December 16, 1966, or products made therefrom i
Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere.
(d) Any activities by any person subject to th
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o
are calculated to promote the sale or shipment -t
Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types
military aircraft, military vehicles and equipmen
and materials for the manufacture and maintenanc
of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia.
(e) Any activities by any person subject to th
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o
are calculated to promote the supply to Southeri
Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles
and of equipment and materials for the manufac
ture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft or moto
vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in ves
sels or aircraft of United States registration of an;
such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and an;
activities by any person subject to the jurisdictio]
of the United States, which promote or are calcu
lated to promote the manufacture or assembly o
aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia.
(f) Any participation in the supply of oil or oil
products to Southern Rhodesia (i) by any persoi
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
or (ii) by vessels or aircraft of United States reg
istration, or (iii) by the use of any land or ai
transport facility located in the United States.
Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for thi
enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions are dele
gated as follows:
(a) To the Secretary of State, the function am
responsibility of enforcement relating to the im
portation into, or exportation from the United State:
of articles, including technical data, the control o:
the importation or exportation of which is providec
for in section 414 of the Mutual Security Act o:
1954 (68 Stat. 848), as amended (22 U.S.C. 1934)
and has been delegated to the Secretary of State by
section 101 of Executive Order No. 10973 of No-
vember 3, 1961.*
(b) To the Secretary of Commerce, the functior
and responsibility of enforcement relating to —
(i) the exportation from the United States oi
articles other than the articles, including technical
data, referred to in subsection (a) of this section;
and
(ii) the transportation in vessels or aircraft of
United States registration of any commodities the
transportation of which is prohibited by section 1
of this Order.
(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the func-
tion and responsibility of enforcement to the extent
not delegated under subsections (a) or (b) of this
section.
»
i
146
* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
^ Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of
' he Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall
^ xercise any authority which such officer may have
J part from the United Nations Participation Act
jf 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this
(rder and Security Council Resolution No. 232.
Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective func-
ions and responsibilities under this Order, the Sec-
" etary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Com-
lerce shall consult with the Secretary of State.
ach such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate,
ath other government agencies and private persons,
(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such regu-
itions, licenses, or other authorizations as he con-
iders necessary to carry out the purposes of this
irder and Security Council Resolution No. 232.
Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States", as used in
lis Order in a geographical sense, means all terri-
)ry subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,
(b) The term "person" means an individual, part-
ership, association, or other unincorporated body
f individuals, or corporation.
Yf~
HE White House,
anuary 5, 1967.
< ''resident Johnson, Secretary Rusk
Ijllourn Death of Christian Herter
n-ATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
"hite House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 31
It is with great personal sorrow that I
!arned that Christian Herter, a great Ameri-
an, died last night.
His life and career spanned a period which
aw this nation emerge from a century of iso-
ition to take a place of leadership on the
'^orld scene. From the day in 1916 when he
x)k up a post as attache in the American
Imbassy in Berlin to the leadership of the
Kennedy Round negotiations to expand and
beralize world trade — which he was exercis-
(ig to the day of his death — he participated
!i the events of our time and shaped them.
He was with President Wilson at the
ANUARY 23, 1967
Versailles Peace Conference in 1918-19.
He was at the side of Herbert Hoover in
his work in European relief in 1920-21.
He then turned to journalism and teaching
and to public service in Massachusetts. He
lectured on international relations at Har-
vard. He rose to be speaker in the Massa-
chusetts Legislature; and then for 10 years
was a Member of Congress.
As a Member of Congress, he led the fa-
mous Herter committee, whose report helped
bring to life the Marshall Plan. For 4 years,
he was Governor of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, and then Under Secretary of
State and Secretary of State.
Throughout his life he stood for an Amer-
ica that would assume its full responsibilities
on the world scene in conformity with the
highest values of our national tradition.
Christian Herter was a wise, gentle, and
wholly dedicated patriot. He will be missed
greatly by all of us, but his life and work
will always be remembered as an important
part of the half century which has trans-
formed this nation's place in the world com-
munity.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 306 dated December 31
The death of Governor Christian Herter is
a source of deep grief to me and to his many
friends and colleagues in the Department of
State and the Foreign Service.
During a lifetime of selfless and brilliant
service as legislator, diplomat. Governor,
Under Secretary and then Secretary of State,
Governor Herter was one of America's great-
est public servants.
During his most recent activity as the
President's Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, he performed a most difficult
and intricate duty with great skill and devo-
tion.
Those of us who knew him have suffered a
great personal loss. Our country will sorely
miss his talent and dedication.
147
Europe and America— Partners in Technology
by George C. McGhee
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^
III
lit
In Germany and other European countries
concern has been expressed in recent months
about diiTerences in the level and rates of
technological development between Europe
and the United States. There has been dis-
cussion of what has come to be called the
"technology gap." A belief appears to exist
that critical sectors of the European economy
are not participating sufficiently in the re-
search that leads to advanced technological
development.
This is fed by statements implying that
America's greater size, its greater capital re-
sources, and particularly its large-scale
official support of industrial research and de-
velopment, will result in technological superi-
ority that no European competitor can
match. It is said that American-owned firms
operating in Europe do not engage in an ap-
propriate amount of basic research, but im-
port their research "full blown" from the
United States for use by their European
manufacturing subsidiaries.
This subject is of great political and eco-
nomic interest to both of our countries. To-
night I want to consider some of the facts,
try to place them in perspective, and make
clear the intention of the United States to
work with Europe in alleviating the causes
of its concern.
A symposium on international technologi-
cal cooperation examined this subject in de-
tail during the Hannover Fair. The Science
a
• Address made at the Wirtschafthochschule at
Mannheim, Germany, on Nov. 10.
Policy Committee of the OECD [Organiza
tion of Economic Cooperation and Develop
ment] has begun a study of this developmeni
including its causes and its significance ii
relation to other aspects of economic growth
More has to be done; many more discussion
must be held. We can, however, attempt ai
analysis. Let us begin with a general obser
vation.
One important aim of both research an«
technological development is economic prog
ress. The conclusion is inescapable thai
Western Europe, in terms of gross national
product, productivity, and industrial produc
tion, has more than kept pace with the eco>
nomic growth of the United States over th-
past 15 years. Even in production for export
where Europe is often said to be at an in
creasing disadvantage, the record shows tha
Europe has done substantially better than wt
have.
Between 1953 and 1964 the Federal Repub
lie's gross national product grew at an an
nual average rate in real terms of 6.3 per-
cent; the figure for the United States was 3.11
percent. During the same period the Euro-
pean Common Market area grew 5.5 percent
a year.
EEC [European Economic Community]!
and German exports also developed more
rapidly than those of the United States. Be-
tween 1957 and 1964 U.S. exports expanded
25 percent; during the same period German
exports increased 88 percent and the EEC as
a group, 90 percent.
It would be a different story if European
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
irms were unable to compete with Ameri-
;ans; however, the United States and Ger-
nany at present have approximately equiva-
ent growth rates of about 4 percent in real
;erms. And, although progress in Western
Europe has not been even, the only signifi-
cant exception to the generally favorable
;rend has been Great Britain. It is interest-
ing that — of five countries surveyed in a re-
cent OECD study — Great Britain made the
greatest research and development effort on
all four counts of measurement: amount of
funds invested, percentage of gross national
product, per capita expenditure, and per-
zi centage of manpower employed. Yet it
loI^showed the poorest record in the past 15
ent years in gross national product growth, in-
: dustry growth, and increase in productivity
!l; and exports.
Trends in the Technological "Spin Off"
There is a belief in Europe that the strong
technological and commercial position of
American industry has resulted largely from
research contracts provided by the United
States Government. It is true that in recent
years our Government expenditures for re-
search and development have increased
markedly. At present they total $15 billion
a year; in addition, American industry
spends $7 billion of its own. The total re-
search and development outlay in the United
States equals about 3.1 percent of the gross
national product. This compares with about
1.8 percent in Germany.
Although about 60 percent of United
States Federal funds for research and devel-
opment have gone to American industry, it
is important to understand that they were
not provided as subsidies for mass-produc-
tion industries in competition with foreign
producers. They went to develop products
which the U.S. Government has bought. The
United States Government has, moreover,
been a specialized type of customer, setting
standards and placing orders in such a way
as to meet politically determined U.S. na-
tional objectives.
The largest area of research and develop-
ment support has been in defense — and quite
logically so, since the basis of all advanced
weapons systems is a sophisticated technol-
ogy. In second place is space research. These
two fields alone presently consume some $12
billion yearly of Federal funds out of $15
billion allotted to research and development.
It is not easy to identify the extent of the
"spin off" process; that is, the benefits that
civilian technology derives from military or
space programs. More studies are necessary.
Several trends, however, seem clear.
When the products of the military and
space programs coincide with the demands of
the civilian economy, the technological trans-
fer is demonstrated in its most dramatic
form. Take, as an example, jet aircraft and
computers. A requirement for a military jet
tanker led to the development of the Boeing
707. Because the Defense Department and
the space agencies needed computers, their
advance was accelerated. Civil and military
aircraft development have traditionally gone
hand in hand.
But in other fields the transfer has been
slower in coming. The limitation for civilian
market production is cost; the defense or
government market frequently sets perform-
ance limits. Different approaches and differ-
ent production philosophies are required to
meet the needs of the two different markets.
Civilian production requires a large adver-
tising, distribution, sales promotion, and
market development organization. But Gov-
ernment requires none of this.
One additional point must be made. The
space program, costing the American tax-
payer about $5 billion a year, results in much
technical knowledge which, it is believed,
should be widely applicable in American in-
dustry. In the past the civilian economy has,
however, been slow to absorb this technology.
The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration has created a special division
of technology utilization, which collects and
disseminates new technical information to
private firms. This has been enthusiastically
welcomed by American industry; it will be
interesting to see how successful it is in gain-
ing wider application of new technical knowl-
edge. In this connection I might say that
JANUARY 23, 1967
149
NASA, in certain cases, now issues royalty-
producing licenses to foreign firms interested
in NASA-sponsored developments.
I wish to be fully understood. Certainly
the general economy benefits from these Gov-
ernment-supported research activities, but
their nature is, I think, often misunderstood.
If we overemphasize their benefits, the result
may be to obscure the real causes of the so-
called "technology gap" which we are con-
sidering.
There have been several important results
of the U.S. Government commitment to re-
search and development. One has been to
dramatize the role of science and technology
in national development. Space has fired the
imagination of many young people. Federal
support has provided training for young sci-
entists in many areas of basic research, and
these people have later found their way into
industry. In a more direct sense the defense
and particularly the space programs in the
United States have resulted in new concepts
of project direction and control.
A "Management Gap"
The concept of "systems management" — a
kind of mathematical formalization of good
"horse sense" as applied to complicated tech-
nical systems — has made it possible to con-
trol large projects involving hundreds of
companies and thousands of people to ex-
tremely high tolerances of reliability, within
rigid time limits and with maximum effi-
ciency. Successful application of these meth-
ods permits the most economical use of raw
materials and of expensive personnel. It
means more and better products at lower
prices — which is the secret of meeting busi-
ness competition.
But new methods are available to all who
will accept them. Their adoption, however,
depends on management initiative. I have
heard it said that the European problem is
not so much a "technology gap" as it is a
"management gap."
It is generally assumed that research and
development means innovation — and that in-
i
i
1
I
novation means economic growth. This is
oversimplification. A new invention can I
applied only with enterprise supported I
sufficient investment capital where there e:
ists a broad market. We need to know moi
about the relation between research and di
velopment as it relates to economic growtl:
however, it is clear that they do not neces
sarily follow one another automatically
Dr. Donald Hornig, President Johnson'
Science Adviser, at an OECD science minij
ters meeting, pointed out that an essentia
ingredient is the proper environment for er
couragement of innovative application. Gov
ernments may help to create this enviror
ment through their policies in the fields o
patents, taxation, capital development, an'
wages and prices. These are often more im
portant than the policy toward science o
research. The laboratory is only one aspec1>-
and not necessarily the most important — ii
the complex structure of an expanding indus
trial society.
Japan is an example. With research ant
development roughly equal to Germany's
Japan's growth rates in recent years hav(
been twice the German and three times th(
French rate. Japan leads the world in ship
building. She is second only to the Unite<i
States in plastics production, although sh«
originated but few of the new plastics mate*
rials herself.
Look for a minute at Sony, the outstanding
Japanese electronics firm. I have been tolc
that $100 invested in Sony in 1946 woulc
now yield $7 million. Sony's development ol
miniaturized radios, tape recorders, and tele
vision sets for the civilian market is based oni
the application of a patented American in
vention, the transistor, which was largely
neglected in the United States until Japanese
enterprise showed the way. Even more sig-
nificant is the fact that Sony's largest market
is the United States.
Japan has been particularly successful in
exploiting the results of foreign research and
development through two kinds of arrange-
ments; namely, purchase of technical know-
how and production by jointly owned foreign
150
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Jubsidiaries. Japan has used its limited re-
lources very skillfully indeed.
It is often said that the growth of Ameri-
an subsidiaries endangers the European
iconomy. When I spoke before the Rhein-
luhr Club in Duesseldorf in June, I at-
empted to make one point clear: that Ameri-
an business firms operating in Germany are
Jerman firms or joint U.S.-German under-
lakings in every sense of the word. The point
8 important. It has also been said that
i^merican firms here are only producers, that
Ihey do no research of their own in Europe
md hence are making Europe increasingly
lependent on American technology. This can
ilso be viewed in another light.
Survey of U.S. Subsidiaries in Germany
A marked characteristic of German science
and technology is a shortage of qualified per-
sonnel. If U.S. firms opened large research
'acilities here, they would compete for an
already scarce commodity; namely, the re-
,earch scientist. But, assuming that U.S. de-
velopment of research facilities here is de-
drable, let us look at the facts. The Embassy
'ecently surveyed U.S. subsidiaries operating
n the Federal Republic to learn the extent
and magnitude of their research operations.
In reply, some pointed out the nature of
;heir operations called for no research. This
s also true of many German firms. Some
American firms were only recently estab-
ished. But, out of the 74 firms which have
replied so far, 32 reported that they were
carrying on research and development in this
country — with expenditures averaging be-
tween 2 and 6 percent of total turnover. Six
others stated that most of their research was
being done in laboratories established by par-
ent organizations in other Common Market
countries. Two other respondents said that
they planned to begin research work in Ger-
many in 1968. In sum, the replies showed
American subsidiaries devoting steadily
greater expenditures to research and develop-
ment in Germany.
American subsidiaries carrying out re-
search in Germany include IBM Deutschland,
Deutsche ITT Industries, and Kaiser Alumin-
ium-Werke, to mention only a few. IBM is
operating six development and research lab-
oratories in Europe alone. The laboratories
in Germany employ 700 scientists and tech-
nicians. During the period 1964-1965, IBM
donated $15 million to German universities
for the promotion of science and research.
Fifty of its employees lecture regularly at
German universities and technical institutes.
Kaiser Aluminium is spending approxi-
mately 3 percent of its turnover for research
and development in Germany, developing
new and improved alloys for cryogenic and
ballistic applications, as well as for architec-
tural use. Deutsche ITT Industries has a re-
search program amounting to 7 percent of its
sales turnover; the program is directed to-
ward development of semiconductor compo-
nents.
Opel also conducts an independent research
and development program in this country. In-
deed, the Opel Kadett was completely de-
signed and developed in Germany. The
millionth car in this series rolled oflf the as-
sembly line last month. On an average, Opel's
research expenditures come to about 2 per-
cent of its annual sales turnover; this would
be about 72 million deutsche marks for 1965.
Besides the research these organizations
are doing here, we should also keep in mind
the knowledge German scientists, employed
by these firms, bring back from their fre-
quent assignments and trips to the United
States. To this should be added the access
these firms obtain to research results and
information developed in the United States —
or in laboratories elsewhere. In research and
development the payoff is in the application,
not in the research itself. And in this respect
Europe is profiting directly from investments
made elsewhere. This is a net gain.
Let us extend this reasoning. Even if a
firm begins abroad as a producer, it must
eventually become an innovator too — and a
developer as well — if it is to compete in an
active consumer market. This means re-
search and product development, and it
means research done not only in America but
JANUARY 23, 1967
151
directly in the marketing area. This means
research designed to meet the competition on
its own ground, carried out by people who
know and can evaluate local conditions.
Europe as a Research Entity
In developing their European facilities
many American firms are looking at Europe
not as a group of independent countries but
as a unit. A regional laboratory in one coun-
try often performs research for subsidiaries
throughout Europe. Gulf Oil, for instance,
has just established a new research center in
Rotterdam; Esso, in addition to its long-
standing facility in Hamburg, will centralize
its petrochemical research for Europe at a
new center in Brussels next year.
Several U.S. chemical companies have
maintained research operations in Europe
for some time: Union Carbide in Brussels
and Monsanto Chemical and American Cy-
anamid in Switzerland. Eastman Kodak
does research in Paris. IBM has a basic re-
search operation in Zurich. In short, U.S.
firms are beginning to look upon Europe as a
research entity. They realize that a localized
or fractionalized approach is uneconomical,
just as they have realized that research done
only in the United States cannot meet the
needs of the European market.
Some observers have questioned the quality
of European research and development.
There is no foundation for this. European
research is of the highest quality. It is so
good, in fact, that the United States Govern-
ment agencies are still obtaining basic re-
search through grants and contracts to
European laboratories. Despite concern over
the balance-of-payments deficit, U.S. outlays
for research in Europe approach $10 million
a year — more than $700,000 of which is
spent in Germany.
European governments could do more to
support research and development. I am con-
vinced, as I look at the efforts of Science
Minister [Gerhard] Stoltenberg or at the
work of Minister [Alain] Peyrefitte in Paris,
that research budgets in these two countries
will continue to increase. It must be recog-
(
nized, however, that a greater problem tha;
money is scientific manpower. To prepare fo
researchers of the future, European school
must stimulate the imagination of their stu
dents. In 1962 there were 6.2 researel
workers per 1,000 population in the Unite
States, compared with 2.9 in Western Eu
rope. Europe's educational programs must b
oriented to narrow this gap.
Considerable concern has been voiced ii
Europe about the so-called "brain drain": tb
loss of trained scientists through emigratioi
to the United States. It is difficult to obtaii
accurate data, and the situation differs fron
country to country. The French do not seen
to enjoy working in America; if they go a
all, they rarely stay. A decade ago Germai
scientists were leaving for the United States
at the rate of several hundred a year. Al
though American institutions — universitie;
and colleges as well as industries — will al
ways welcome well-trained professionals
from Europe, I can assure you that it is noi
our desire to rob Europe of her research
scientists and engineers.
To assure that she keeps her scientists Ea
rope herself must create the proper working
environment, be it through investment ir
new projects and programs, or through in
creased opportunities for individual develop-
ment and advancement in the universities. A
large, mobile pool of technical manpower
exists in the United States. Competition
among Government, private firms, and uni-
versities for outstanding people has raised
the scientist's status as well as his salary
and career opportunities. In sum, personnel
policy is an important aspect of national sci-
ence policy. Recognizing this, the Federal
Republic's "Science Cabinet" only the other
day announced salary increases for scientists
working in federally supported research in-
stitutes.
It has been suggested that America initiate
a "technological Marshall Plan" for Europe.
But technical capability is not to be had for
the asking — or the giving. Europe must co-
ordinate her own research and development
priorities, define her technological goals, and
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rovide the funds needed to assure their
ealization.
Much of America's technological knowl-
dge is in the hands of private industry,
imerican organizations are eager to partici-
late in joint projects or in exchanges of
inow-how with European counterparts. Of-
en the cheapest way to acquire technical
inow-how is through purchase of a license,
lany United States firms have acquired Ger-
lan licenses. This is often cheaper than per-
orming the research. But Europeans will
nd American firms much more interested in
rading one idea for another — in a swap
ather than a sale. The good contract negoti-
tor seeks to acquire useful new knowledge,
,ot merely to sell a license. One of the
trongest arguments for an independent com-
any research program is the bargaining
ower thus acquired.
ireas for Government-Sponsored Research
While I have emphasized that the solution
3 the so-called "technology gap" cannot be
ought exclusively in government-sponsored
esearch, there are, nevertheless, areas in the
o-called big sciences where costs exceed the
apacities of individual firms — even large
nes. In such areas as atomic energy, space
■esearch, oceanography, high energy physics,
,ir and water pollution research, and de-
alination of sea water, government initiative
an be important in stimulating technological
dvance.
Some of these costs may exceed even na-
ional capabilities. But since we pursue the
ame goals, why should we not collaborate
hrough a combination of government and
)rivate initiative to achieve them? During
Ilhancellor [Ludwig] Erhard's recent visit
,0 the United States, he and President John-
son discussed technological advance. The
President expressed American willingness to
;onsider European ideas.^ The Italian Gov-
irnment has already made a proposal which
s currently under study in Western capitals.
N'ASA has been discussing a coordinated
* For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966,
p. 578.
U.S.-European program with ESRO, the
European Space Research Organization. A
specific proposal for a highly sophisticated
probe to the planet Jupiter is on the table.
We hope the Europeans will be able to par-
ticipate. Besides producing valuable data on
the solar system, the project promises major
technological benefits for European industry.
I would, before closing, like to point to
the achievement of the Federal Republic's
nuclear program, particularly for the benefit
of those who argue that there is no hope of
Europe's forging ahead in the technological
race. In 1955 the Federal Republic made its
bow in the realm of atomic energy. Thanks
to a policy of Government assistance for pri-
vate initiative, with a core of distinguished
physicists, with the expenditure of $825 mil-
lion, and in cooperation with EURATOM as
well as the United States and Great Britain,
German nuclear science has advanced to
world levels. In the present program of co-
operation with Europe and the United States
for faster breeder reactor development, Ger-
many is playing with distinction the role of
an original contributor as well as a benefici-
ary.
Thus, a national initiative, plus the setting
of a national priority and coupled with inter-
national cooperation, has paid great divi-
dends. There is no reason why this cannot be
repeated in other areas as well.
But these are decisions for Europe to
make. It is not, I believe, appropriate for us
to prescribe solutions. I wish only to reiterate
my Government's willingness to consider Eu-
ropean suggestions for a cooperative resolu-
tion of our technological and industrial dif-
ferences. The historical, economic, and
cultural fates of Western Europe and the
United States are inextricably entwined. We
must collaborate to strengthen this fabric.
There will be problems and differing view-
points, but the dialog between us must con-
tinue. As a contribution to that dialog, I am
grateful to have had the opportunity to come
here this evening to set forth American views
on a subject of economic and political con-
cern to all of us.
JANUARY 23, 1967
153
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Sweden, December 29, 1966.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. En-
tered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States
March 6, 1931. TS 834.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Da-
homey, September 22, 1966.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signatures: Australia, October 13, 1966; Czecho-
slovakia (with a reservation and declaration),
October 7, 1966; Finland, October 6, 1966; Holy
See, November 21, 1966; Iceland, November 14,
1966; Mexico, November 1, 1966; Netherlands,
October 24, 1966; New Zealand, October 25,
1966; Norway, November 21, 1966; Sierra Le-
one, November 17, 1966; United Kingdom (with
a reservation and interpreting statements),
October 11, 1966.
BILATERAL
Iraq
Agricultural commodities agreement under title '
of the Agricultural Trade Development and J-
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S„
1731-36), with exchange of notes. Signed t
Baghdad December 19, 1966. Entered into fois
December 19, 1966.
Jamaica
Agreement for the exchange of official publicatioi.
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Dece ■
ber 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 19t.
Netherlands
Agreement relating to the granting of authorizatio;
to permit licensed amateur radio operators '
either country to operate their stations in t
other country. Effected by exchange of notes ,
The Hague June 22, 1966.
Entered into force: December 21, 1966.
Portugal
Agreement extending the arrangement concerni ■
trade in cotton textiles of March 12, 1964 (TL''
5741). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisb.
December 19, 1966. Entered into force Decemb
19, 1966.
Togo
Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sig:ned
Lome February 8, 1966.
Ratifications exchanged: January 5, 1967.
Enters into force : February 5, 1967.
Viet-Nam
Agricultural commodities agreement under title
of the Agricultural Trade Development and A
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.'
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed i
Saigon December 15, 1966. Entered into fori
December 15, 1966.
Not in force.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of- foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
VOL. LVI, NO. 1439
the Department, afl -^/ell as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
PUBLICATION 8187 JANUARY 23, 1967
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govemmer
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20401
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi
cation approved by the Director of th
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966)
NOTE : Contents of this publication ar
not copyrighted and items contained hereii
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart
ment of State Bulletin as the source wll
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed ii
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 23, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1439
Department and Foreign Service. President
Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mouni Death of
Christian Herter 147
lEconomic AfiFairs
[Europe and America — Partners in Technology
(McGhee) 148
U.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
Europe. Europe and America — Partners in
Technology (McGhee) 148
Germany. Europe and America — Partners in
Technology (McGhee) 148
Presidential Documents
President Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mourn
Death of Christian Herter 147
US. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia 145
Science
[Europe and America — Partners in Technology
(McGhee) 148
International Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
southern Rhodesia
International Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
J/S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 154
Jnited Nations
international Law in the United Nations
(Goldberg) 140
J.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against
Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145
J.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam
(Goldberg, U Thant) 137
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Discusses Prospects for 1967
on "Face the Nation" 126
Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Pol-
icy on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders (Pow-
ell, Rusk) 133
U.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam
(Goldberg, U Thant) 137
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 137, 140
Johnson, President 145, 147
McGhee, George C 148
Powell, Robert 133
Rusk, Secretary 126, 133, 147
U Thant 137
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to January 2 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
304 of December 29 and 306 of January 9.
No. Date Subject
fl 1/5 U.S. and Togo exchange instru-
ments of ratification on com-
mercial treaty.
2 1/6 Rusk: letter to student leaders.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■ti U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/29
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Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task
The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fii
to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integi'ati
of the Western European community; and, third, to quicken progress in East-West relation
President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers
New York, N.Y., on October 7, 1966, discussed the new steps being taken, and those under c(
sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. lUO
January SO, 1967
THE STATE OF THE UNION
Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts) 158
THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND THE WORLD OF THE 1970's
Address by Vice President Humphrey ISA
SECRETARY RUSK INTERVIEWED ON "TODAY" PROGRAM
Transcript of Interview 168
NEW INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR PASSENGER-SHIP SAFETY
Article by William K. Miller 173
For index see inside back cover
The State of the Union
ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE CONGRESS (EXCERPTS)^
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, distin-
guished Members of the Congress:
I have come here tonight to report to you
that this is a time of testing for our Nation.
At home, the question is whether we will
continue working for better opportunities
for all Americans, when most Americans are
already living better than any people m his-
tory.
Abroad, the question is whether we have
the staying power to fight a very costly M^ar,
when the objective is limited and the danger
to us is seemingly remote.
So our test is not whether we shrink from
our country's cause when the dangers to us
are obvious and close at hand but, rather,
whether we carry on when they seem ob-
scure and distant — and some think that it
is safe to lay down our burdens.
I have come tonight to ask this Congress
and this Nation to resolve that issue: to
meet our commitments at home and abroad
— to continue to build a better America — and
to reaffirm this Nation's allegiance to free-
dom.
As President Abraham Lincoln said, "We
must ask where we are, and whither we are
tending."
' Delivered on Jan. 10 (Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents dated Jan. 16, 1967); also
available as H. Doc. 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess.
Abroad, as at home, there is also risk in
change. But abroad, as at home, there is a
greater risk in standing still. No part of our
foreign policy is so sacred that it ever re-
mains beyond review. We shall be flexible
where conditions in the world change — and
where man's efforts can change them for the
better.
Transition to International Partnership
We are in the midst of a great transition
— a transition from narrow nationalism to
international partnership; from the harsh
spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of
common humanity on a troubled and a
threatened planet.
In Latin America the American chiefs of
state will be meeting very shortly to give our
hemispheric policies new direction.
We have come a long way in this hemi-
sphere since the inter- American effort in eco-
nomic and social development was launched
by the conference at Bogota in 1960 under
the leadership of President Eisenhower. The
Alliance for Progress moved dramatically
forward under President Kennedy. There is
new confidence that the voice of the people
is being heard, that the dignity of the indi-
vidual is stronger than ever in this hemi-
sphere, and we are facing up to and meeting
many of the hemispheric problems together.
In this hemisphere that reform under de-
mocracy can be made to happen — because it
has happened. So together, I think, we must
158
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
now move to strike down the barriers to full
cooperation among the American nations
and to free the energ:ies and the resources of
two great continents on behalf of all of our
citizens.
Africa stands at an earlier stage of de-
velopment than Latin America. It has yet to
develop the transportation, communications,
agriculture, and, above all, the trained men
and women without which growth is impos-
sible. There, too, the job will best be done if
the nations and peoples of Africa cooperate
on a regional basis. More and more our pro-
grams for Africa are going to be directed
toward self-help.
The future of Africa is shadowed by un-
solved racial conflicts. Our policy will con-
tinue to reflect our basic commitments as a
people to support those who are prepared to
work toward cooperation and harmony be-
tween races and to help those who demand
change but reject the fool's gold of violence.
In the Middle East the spirit of good will
toward all unfortunately has not yet taken
hold. An already tortured peace seems to be
constantly threatened. We shall try to use
our influence to increase the possibilities of
improved relations among the nations of that
region. We are working hard at that task.
In the great subcontinent of South Asia
live more than a sixth of the earth's popula-
tion. Over the years we — and others — have
invested very heavily in capital and food for
the economic development of India and
Pakistan.
We are not prepared to see our assistance
wasted, however, in conflict. It must
strengthen their capacity to help themselves.
It must help these two nations— both our
friends — to overcome poverty, to emerge as
self-reliant leaders, and find terms for
reconciliation and cooperation.
In Western Europe we shall maintain in
NATO an integrated common defense. But
we also look forward to the time when
greater security can be achieved through
measures of arms control and disarmament
and through other forms of practical agree-
ment.
Relations With Eastern Europe
We are shaping a new future of enlarged
partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic
and technical cooperation, in trade negotia-
tions, in political consultation, and in work-
ing together with the governments and
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
The emerging spirit of confidence is pre-
cisely what we hoped to achieve when we
went to work a generation ago to put our
shoulder to the wheel and try to help rebuild
Europe. We faced new challenges and oppor-
tunities then and there — and we faced also
some dangers. But I believe that the peoples
on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as both
sides of this Chamber, wanted to face them
together.
Our relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are also in transition. We
have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric
of the cold war. When we have differed with
the Soviet Union, or other nations for that
matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with
courtesy and without venom.
Our objective is not to continue the cold
war but to end it.
We have reached an agreement at the
United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer
space: ^
We have agreed to open direct air flights
with the Soviet Union.'
We have removed more than 400 nonstra-
tegic items from export control.
We are determined that the Export-
Import Bank can allow commercial credits to
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslo-
vakia, as well as to Romania and Yugoslavia.
We have entered into a cultural agreement
with the Soviet Union for another 2 years.*
We have agreed with Bulgaria and
Hungary to upgrade our legations to embas-
sies.
^ For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966,
p. 952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
' For text of an agreement signed on Nov. 4, see
ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791.
■* For text of a joint communique, see ibid., Apr. 4,
1966, p. 543.
JANUARY 30, 1967
159
We have started discussions with interna-
tional agencies on ways of increasing con-
tacts with Eastern European countries.
This administration has taken these steps
even as duty compelled us to fulfill and exe-
cute alliances and treaty obligations through-
out the world that were entered into before
I became President.
So, tonight I now ask and urge this Con-
gress to help our foreign and our commercial
trade policies by passing an East- West trade
bill and by approving our consular conven-
tion with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union has in the past year in-
creased its long-range missile capabilities.
It has begun to place near Moscow a limited
antimissile defense. My first responsibility to
our people is to assure that no nation can
ever find it rational to launch a nuclear at-
tack or to use its nuclear power as a credible
threat against us or against our allies.
I would emphasize that that is why an im-
portant link between Russia and the United
States is in our common interest, in arms
control and in disarmament. We have the
solemn duty to slow down the arms race be-
tween us, if that is at all possible, in both
conventional and nuclear weapons and de-
fenses. I thought we were making some
progress in that direction the first few
months I was in office. I realize that any ad-
ditional race would impose on our peoples,
and on all mankind for that matter, an addi-
tional waste of resources with no gain in
security to either side.
I expect in the days ahead to closely con-
sult and seek the advice of the Congress
about the possibilities of international
agreements bearing directly upon this prob-
lem.
The Food-Population Problem
Next to the pursuit of peace, the really
greatest challenge to the human family is the
race between food supply and population in-
crease. That race tonight is being lost.
The time for rhetoric has clearly passed.
The time for concerted action is here and
we must get on with the job.
We believe that three principles must pre-
vail if our policy is to succeed:
First, the developing nations must give
highest priority to food production, including
the use of technology and the capital of-
private enterprise.
Second, nations with food deficits must put
more of their resources into voluntary family
planning programs.
And third, the developed nations must all
assist other nations to avoid starvation in the
short run and to move rapidly toward the
ability to feed themselves.
Every member of the world community
now bears a direct responsibility to help
bring our most basic human account into
balance.
Why We Are in Viet-Nam
I come now finally to Southeast Asia — and
to Viet-Nam in particular. Soon I will sub-
mit to the Congress a detailed report on that
situation. Tonight I want to just review the
essential points as briefly as I can.
We are in Viet-Nam because the United
States of America and our allies are com-
mitted by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet
the common danger" of aggression in South-
east Asia.
We are in Viet-Nam because an interna-
tional agreement signed by the United
States, North Viet-Nam, and others in 1962
is being systematically violated by the Com-
munists. That violation threatens the inde-
pendence of all the small nations in Southeast
Asia and threatens the peace of the entire
region and perhaps the world.
We are there because the people of South
Viet-Nam have as much right to remain non-
Communist — if that is what they choose —
as North Viet-Nam has to remain Commu-
nist.
We are there because the Congress has
pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary
measures to prevent further aggression.
No better words could describe our pres-
ent course than those once spoken by the
great Thomas Jefferson: "It is the melan-
choly law of human societies to be compelled
160
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
sometimes to choose a great evil in order to
ward off a greater."
We have chosen to fight a Hmited war in
Viet-Nam in an attempt to prevent a larger
war — a war almost certain to follow, I be-
lieve, if the Commimists succeed in overrun-
ning and taking over South Viet-Nam by
aggression and by force. I believe, and I am
supported by some authority, that if they are
not checked now the world can expect to pay
a greater price to check them later.
That is what our statesmen said when they
debated this treaty, and that is why it was
ratified 82 to 1 by the Senate many years
ago.
You will remember that we stood in West-
ern Europe 20 years ago. Is there anyone in
this Chamber tonight who doubts that the
course of freedom was not changed for the
better because of the courage of that stand?
Sixteen years ago we and others stopped
another kind of aggression — ^this time it was
in Korea. Imagine how different Asia might
be today if we had failed to act when the
Communist army of North Korea marched
south. The Asia of tomorrow will be far dif-
ferent because we have said in Viet-Nam, as
we said 16 years ago in Korea: "This far and
no further."
I think I reveal no secret when I tell you
that we are dealing with a stubborn adver-
sary who is committed to the use of force
and terror to settle political questions.
I wish I could report to you that the con-
flict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face
more cost, more loss, and more agony. For
the end is not yet. I cannot promise you that
it will come this year — or come next year.
Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight,
that he can go on fighting longer than we
can and longer than we and our allies will
be prepared to stand up and resist.
Our men in that area — there are nearly
500,000 now — have borne well "the burden
and the heat of the day." Their efforts have
deprived the Communist enemy of the vic-
tory that he sought and that he expected a
year ago. We have steadily frustrated his
main forces. General [William C] West-
moreland reports that the enemy can no
longer succeed on the battlefield.
So I must say to you that our pressure
must be sustained — and will be sustained —
until he realizes that the war he started is
costing him more than he can ever gain.
I know of no strategy more likely to at-
tain that end than the strategy of "accumu-
lating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of
material resource" — of "laboriously teaching
troops the very elements of their trade."
That, and patience — and I mean a great deal
of patience.
Our South Vietnamese allies are also being
tested tonight. Because they must provide
real security to the people living in the coun-
tryside. And this means reducing the ter-
rorism and the armed attacks, which kid-
naped and killed 26,900 civilians in the last
32 months, to levels where they can be suc-
cessfully controlled by the regular South
Vietnamese security forces. It means bring-
ing to the villagers an effective civilian gov-
ernment that they can respect, and that they
can rely upon, and that they can participate
in, and that they can have a personal stake
in. We hope that government is now begin-
ning to emerge.
While I cannot report the desired progress
in the pacification effort, the very distin-
guished and able Ambassador, Henry Cabot
Lodge, reports that South Viet-Nam is turn-
ing to this task with a new sense of urgency.
We can help, but only they can win this part
of the war. Their task is to build and protect
a new life in each rural province.
Spirit of Hope Rising in Asia
One result of our stand in Viet-Nam is
already clear.
It is this: The peoples of Asia now know
that the door to independence is not going to
be slammed shut. They know that it is pos-
sible for them to choose their own national
destinies — without coercion.
The performance of our men in Viet-Nam
— backed by the American people — has
created a feeling of confidence and unity
among the independent nations of Asia and
JANUARY 30, 1967
161
the Pacific. I saw it in their faces in the 19
days that I spent in their homes and in their
countries. Fear of external Communist con-
quest in many Asian nations is already sub-
siding — and with this, the spirit of hope is
rising. For the first time in history, a com-
mon outlook and common institutions are
already emerging.
This forward movement is rooted in the
ambitions and the interests of Asian nations
themselves. It was precisely this movement
that we hoped to accelerate when I spoke at
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore in April 1965,^
and I pledged "a much more massive effort
to improve the life of man" in that part of
the world, in the hope that we could take
some of the funds that we were spending on
bullets and bombs and spend it on schools and
production.
Twenty months later our efforts have pro-
duced a new reality: The doors of the billion-
dollar Asian Development Bank that I
recommended to the Congress, and you en-
dorsed almost unanimously, I am proud to
tell you, are already open. Asians are en-
gaged tonight in regional efl^orts in a dozen
new directions. Their hopes are high. Their
faith is strong. Their confidence is deep.
And even as the war continues, we shall
play our part in carrying forward this con-
structive historic development. As recom-
mended by the Eugene Black mission, and
if other nations will join us, I will seek a spe-
cial authorization from the Congress of $200
million for East Asian regional programs.
Because we are eager to turn our re-
sources to peace. Our eflForts in behalf of
humanity I think need not be restricted by
any parallel or by any boundary line. The
moment that peace comes, as I pledged in
Baltimore, I will ask the Congress for funds
to join in an international program of recon-
struction and development for all the people
of Viet-Nam — and their deserving neighbors
who wish our help.
' rbid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
We shall continue to hope for a reconcilia-
tion between the people of mainland China
and the world community — including work-
ing together in all the tasks of arms control,
security, and progress on which the fate of-
the Chinese people, like their fellow men
elsewhere, depends.
We would be the first to welcome a China
which decided to respect her neighbors'
rights. We would be the first to applaud her
were she to apply her great energies and in-
telligence to improving the welfare of her
people. And we have no intention of trying
to deny her legitimate needs for security and
friendly relations with her neighboring coun-
tries.
Our hope that all of this will some day hap-
pen rests on the conviction that we, the
American people and our allies, vdll and are
going to see Viet-Nam through to an honor-
able peace.
We will support all appropriate initiatives
by the United Nations, and others, which can
bring the several parties together for uncon-
ditional discussions of peace — anywhere, any
time. And we will continue to take every pos-
sible initiative ourselves to constantly probe
for peace.
The Course of Wisdom for This Country
Until such efforts succeed, or until the
infiltration ceases, or until the conflict sub-
sides, I think the course of wisdom for this
country is that we just must firmly pursue
our present course. We will stand firm in
Viet-Nam.
I think you know that our fighting men
there tonight bear the heaviest burden of
all. With their lives they serve their Nation.
We must give them nothing less than our
full support — and we have given them that —
nothing less than the determination that
Americans have always given their fighting
men. Whatever our sacrifice here, even if it
is more than $5 a month, it is small compared
to their own.
162
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
How long it will take I cannot prophesy. I
only know that the will of the American
people, I think, is tonight being tested.
Whether we can fight a war of limited ob-
jectives over a period of time, and keep alive
the hope of independence and stability for
people other than ourselves; whether we can
continue to act with restraint when the
temptation to "get it over with" is inviting
but dangerous; whether we can accept the
necessity of choosing "a great evil in order
to ward off a greater"; whether we can do
these without arousing the hatreds and the
passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of
war — on all these questions so much turns.
The answers will determine not only where
we are, but "whither we are tending."
A time of testing — yes. And a time of
transition. The transition is sometimes slow;
sometimes unpopular; almost always very
painful; and often quite dangerous.
But we have lived with danger for a long
time before, and we shall live with it for a
long time yet to come. We know that "man is
born unto trouble." We also know that this
Nation was not forged and did not survive
and grow and prosper without a great deal of
sacrifice from a great many men.
For all the disorders that we must deal
with and all the frustrations that concern us
and all the anxieties that we are called upon
to resolve, for all the issues that we must
face with the agony that attends them, let
us remember that "those who expect to reap
the blessings of freedom must, like men,
undergo the fatigues of supporting it."
But let us also count not only our burdens
but our blessings — for they are many.
And let us give thanks to the One who
governs us all.
Let us draw encouragement from the signs
of hope — for they, too, are many.
Let us remember that we have been tested
before and America has never been found
wanting.
So with your understanding, I would hope
your confidence, and your support, we are
going to persist — and we are going to suc-
ceed.
JANUARY 30, 196?
163
The Technological Revolution and the World of the 1970's
Address by Vice President Humphrey
The Institute of International Education
is a place where intellect and power have
been brought together— and long before
Franklin Roosevelt's "brain trust" or the era
of the Washington in-and-outer.
The Institute of International Education
has been in existence now almost half a cen-
tury. Its initiatives preceded the Fulbright
Act, the Smith-Mundt Act, the Mutual Edu-
cational and Cultural Exchange Act, the
International Education Act, and the range
of highly important programs which form
the base of our efforts in international
education today. And these programs came
none too soon. But without the work of the
Institute of International Education they
might not have come at all.
In the past two decades we have seen sci-
ence and technology shrink our neighborhood
so that today the moral unity and interde-
pendence of man (which for centuries has
been the basis of Western civilization) has
now become a physical fact of our lives. Iso-
lationism has been replaced by a global
consciousness.
Yet we are today only at the primitive
stages of the scientific and technological de-
velopment which will shrink our human
neighborhood still further.
The prospect of a supersonic transport
plane — a few years ago a matter of "if" — is
today only a matter of "who first?" I doubt
that we have full grasp of what the SST
' Made before the Institute of International Edu-
cation at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6.
will mean in terms of increased exchange of
people and goods.
And the communications satellites — Buck
Rogers items through most of our lifetimes —
will soon be bringing mass communication,
in the real sense, to our planet. They bear
with them, too, the implications cf the crea-
tion of a one-world classroom.
Tlie sky is no longer the limit!
strengthening International Education
In such an age, our position of world lead-
ership demands that we go far beyond our
present efforts in international education.
The International Education Act will make
a i-eal difference in helping improve the
faculties, facilities, and libraries of our col-
leges and universities. Its impact will be felt
at both the undergraduate and graduate
levels.
The new Center for Educational Coopera-
tion, among its other functions, will serve as
a Government manpower resources head-
quarters in the entire field.
These things give us a framework upon
which we can build.
Next year the President will convene an
international conference on education. Its
purpose will be to look beyond the programs
presently underway or even contemplated —
in fact, to take international education into
century 21. Planning meetings for the con-
ference will begin in the next few weeks,
under the chairmanship of Secretary [of
Health, Education, and Welfare John W.]
Gardner and Dr. James Perkins of Cornell.
164
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
But we all should remember that the de-
termination of the Government to do its part
to strengthen international education in no
way diminishes the need for continued lead-
ership in this field by private institutions of
all kinds, foundations, universities, colleges,
churches, and others.
The role of the Government in this field
must always be to supplement, never to sup-
plant, the efforts of private groups and indi-
viduals. The bold experiments, the expanded
programs that should come from private in-
stitutions — like the Institute of International
Education — can be carried out only with the
continued support of American private bene-
factors. So take the initiative — do your job —
lead.
Indeed, one of the urgent tasks of our
American democracy is to find new ways and
means to mobilize and allocate both public
and private resources to the priorities of our
time without either destroying private initia-
tive or unduly enhancing public power.
The Second Industrial Revolution
Tonight I would like to address myself to
the next decade, to the world of the 1970's.
I would like to take advantage of the pres-
ence of so many illustrious figures from the
world of education and finance, foundations
and business, the communications media and
the arts, to raise certain questions which you
and your children must answer. And it is
appropriate that these questions be put to
you.
Governments — and government officials —
must deal with immediate problems. This
often clouds their perception of the future.
But you are less inhibited by these restraints
and better situated to anticipate what is com-
ing as well as to respond to what is here.
In speculating on the world of the 1970's
(and what I suggest here tonight can only
be considered as speculation by an amateur)
I would like to raise several questions about
the consequences of what has been called
the second industrial revolution.
The first industrial revolution was charac-
terized by the invention of powerful
machines which multiply man's capacity for
physical work. The second industrial revolu-
tion, which is coming upon us long before the
problems of the first have been solved, is
characterized by the invention of new elec-
tronic machines which are destined to mul-
tiply the capacity of the human mind.
Differences Between Developed Areas
One important consequence of the second
industrial revolution involves the techno-
logical gap which today separates the world's
most developed country, the United States,
from the other developed areas of the world
— yes, even Europe.
This unique gap exists in large part be-
cause the second industrial revolution has
developed in the United States far more than
in any other area. It results, in part, from
the difl'ering levels of technological progress
and organizational efficiency, which are also
affected by the factor of optimum size.
These can lead to the creation of dif-
ferences between two developed areas — "de-
veloped" in the sense of the first industrial
revolution — just as there are differences
which now exist between the so-called de-
veloped areas of the Northern Hemisphere
and the developing or underdeveloped na-
tions of the South.
Scientific and technical progress is con-
tinuing at an accelerated rate with no pros-
pect of reaching a saturation point. Dis-
coveries are based on previous knowledge and
in turn generate progress in other fields.
Progress becomes self-propelling.
Only four areas of the world — the United
States, Western Europe, Japan, and the
Soviet Union — have the educational and re-
search resources and other elements of a
technological base to deal with the current
pace of scientific discoveries. But none of the
four has the resources today to deal effec-
tively with the entire spectrum of these dis-
coveries, although the United States comes
closest to it.
Scientific and technological progress de-
pends greatly on the rate of investment in
research and development.
JANUARY 30, 1967
165
Recent Common Market estimates show
the total of scientists and research workers
in the United States to be 4 times greater
than in all the countries of the EEC [Euro-
pean Economic Community] and 3I/2 times
greater than in the Soviet Union.
According to the same estimates, research
expenditures in the United States are 7 times
greater than in the Common Market and 3V^
times those of the Soviet Union.
And U.S. per capita investment is six
times as much as in the Common Market and
four times that of the Soviet Union.
Organizational Structure and Capacity
Beyond the statistics, however, we are told
by European entrepreneurs that this dis-
parity in scientific research capacity is
widened by the difference in organizational
capacity between the United States and
Europe.
Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti, for one, believes
that only the United States possesses the
highly developed modern organization re-
quired to profit appreciably from the techno-
logical discoveries of today.
This is especially important in the new and
complex field of electronic data processing,
where organization is the decisive factor in
exploiting the potential capacity of highly
refined machines.
To translate the amazing potential of com-
puters into concrete benefits for society re-
quires an accumulation of skills which few
nations have. It requires, as Mr. Peccei
points out, "evolved user techniques, knowl-
edge of machine languages, advanced meth-
odology, rich program libraries, access to the
cross-fertilizing experiences of a vast net-
work of users, plus a competent array of
mathematicians, analysts and programmers."
What is relevant here is that the material
advantages which exist in an advanced
society such as the United States or Western
Europe are multiplied by the organizational
structure and capacity of the country or
region.
Western European countries today have j
neither the size required for such efficient
organization nor adequate basic infrastruc-
ture, such as fully sufficient communication
linkage essential to transmission of elec- -
tronic data. The end of the present fragmen-
tation of Europe is considered a necessity.
Technology and Unity
But, fortunately, on both sides of the
Atlantic we are beginning to face up to this
problem.
We have already taken steps to remove
barriers to the flow of scientific and techni-
cal information and instruments to and from
our country.''
As a United States Senator I proposed that
NATO, in meeting the new challenges facing
the alliance, should take concrete steps to-
ward narrowing the technological gap.
Proposals for such cooperative actions are
now formally before the NATO ministers.'
The OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] ministers
have recently authorized an analytical study
of the gap.''
One promising proposal has been Prime
Minister Wilson's [British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson] for a European Technologi-
cal Community. If Europe — which has
already seen the benefits of a Euroi)ean Eco-
nomic Community, a Coal and Steel Com-
munity, and an Atomic Energy Community
— were to pool her technology in a similar
way, I have no doubt that the gap would in
the next decade begin to close.
The fundamental question which I would
like to leave with you is: What are the impli-
cations of this second industrial revolution
for the international relations of the 1970's,
especially the late 1970's?
' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966,
p. 894.
' For text of a resolution adopted by the NATO
Council of Ministers on Dec. 16, 1966, see ibid., Jan.
9, 1967, p. 52.
* For U.S. statements and text of a communique
dated Nov. 25, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1967, p. 19.
166
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I do not know the answer. But already
serious men are concerned that it could re-
sult not in greater unity, not in the cement-
ing of a long-cherished Atlantic partnership,
but in estrangement between Europe and the
United States.
Yes, it could release forces which would
widen the gap between the United States and
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a
time when the ideological and military com-
petition between them might be diminishing.
If these are legitimate concerns, should
not men of vision and foresight seek to plan
for these eventualities and by decisive action
influence their development?
We must guide the technological revolu-
tion so that it can enhance our unity rather
than cause alienation and division.
This means that some way must be found
to insure a continuous exchange of techno-
logical and organizational experience be-
tween Europe and the United States which
will achieve an equilibrium that can be main-
tained and possibly someday expanded to in-
clude Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
If this seems fanciful, I would repeat that
I am discussing the next decade — which ends
in 1980 — not the present.
New Realities of a New Era
Reflecting on the problems which this sec-
ond industrial revolution will bring to our
own country in the next decade, a young
American pioneer in the second industrial
revolution, Mr. John Diebold, has proposed
the creation of "an institute for the con-
tinued assessment of the human consequences
of technological change."
Perhaps what is needed in the interna-
tional field is some equivalent forum which
would bring together under nongovernmental
auspices men of wisdom and experience from
the universities and foundations, science and
industry, politics and the professions, who
could systematically assess the implications
of this second industrial revolution for the
world of the 1970's. Their recommendations
would invariably become an important guide
to governmental decisionmaking.
Yes, we must have a global policy which
fits the new realities of a new era.
With such a policy, we shall be better pre-
pared not only to deal with the relations be-
tween the technologically advanced areas of
the world and the problems of survival and
peace which affect all countries, but also with
those areas where the first industrial revolu-
tion is still taking hold.
I refer to the problems of hunger and over-
population, education and social justice, and
distribution of wealth.
We shall be better prepared to strengthen
and enlarge the area of prosperity in the
world.
Building a Truly Human World
In the next decade, even more than the
present, the relationship between foreign
affairs and education will be important.
The scholar and the businessman, the
foundation and the university, will play a
significant role in accelerating the techno-
logical revolution and assisting mankind to
deal with its consequences.
But the closeness of their relationship, in
this decade or the next, in no way implies
that the university and the scholars and the
scientists should cease to independently pur-
sue their own ends. Chief among these is the
pursuit and dissemination of truth. Govern-
ment — at home or abroad — should not deflect
them from pursuing this end.
But in the next decade, as in this one,
scientific and technological education will not
be enough to sustain the spirit of civilization
or the functioning of a democratic society.
The vision of the poet and the philosopher,
the humanist and the historian, is needed to
stimulate what Shakespeare called the "bet-
ter angels of our nature."
Without these to guide us, the technologi-
cal revolution in the next decade can bring
the faceless men of an Orwellian world, men
whose sole distinction lies in their similarity
to one another.
JANUARY 30, 1967
167
The vision we need as we face the 1970's is
that of a great man who died in this city a
decade ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.
For him the marvels of modem science
and technology provided man with a new op-
portunity to build a truly human world.
Through his vision we can come to under-
stand that the growing interdependence of
mankind caused by the technological revolu-
tion can lead to a world civilization in which
both persons and nations find their individu-
ality enhanced, find their mutual dependence
and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed
rather than a threat to be feared.
If the men of talent and vision seize the
opportunity to plan now for the world of the
1970's, your children and mine at the turn
of the next decade can look forward with
hope and confidence to 1984.
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today'' Program
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk on the National Broad-
casting System's television program "Today"
on Jantmry 12. Interviewing the Secretary
were Hugh Downs from New York and
Joseph C. Harsch in Washington.
Mr. Downs: You know, so much of the Na-
tion and, indeed, the world is concerned
these days over our current foreign policy.
So it seems most appropriate to invite Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk into our Washing-
ton studios this morning
Mr. Secretary, before we start on some of
the more immediate problems, and since this
is, as you may know, "Today" — the "Today"
program's 15th anniversary week, I wonder
if you'd tell us what you consider to be some
of the most important events that have oc-
curred over the past 15 years?
Secretary Rusk: Good morning, Hugh. I
think I would like to start by congratulating
you, and Barbara [Walters], and Frank
[Blair] on the "Today" program. It's a great
show, and I see it almost every day.
Mr. Doivns: Thank you.
Secretary Rusk: These 15 years have been
filled with important events. They began with
the winding up of the Korean war on the
basis of a rejection of North Korea's at-
tempts to seize South Korea by force.
This period has seen the multiplication
of nuclear weapons and the development of
competitive nuclear weapon systems, raising
for the first time in man's history the opera-
tional issue of the survival of the human race
— although, I think we can take more confi-
dence from — than we think from the fact
that it's been 21 years now since a nuclear
weapon has been fired in anger. That's a far
more important fact than most people
suppose.
It does point to the tragedy that the
Baruch proposals were not accepted back in
1946, under which there would have been no
nuclear power.
I think the historians will say that one of
the most dramatic aspects of this 15 years
has been the doubling of the membership of
the United Nations, the emergence of 60 or
more new nations into the world community
by — largely by peaceful means.
We have seen the second generation come
to power in the Soviet Union.
We've seen major division within the
Communist world because the authorities in
Peking have isolated themselves, even in the
Communist world, by their doctrines of mili-
tancy and aggressiveness.
We've had the experience of the Cuban
missile crisis in which men had to look down
the long cannon's mouth of great catastrophe.
168
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
And I think everybody came away from
that more prudent, a little more cautious
about how they conduct themselves in world
affairs.
We wind up this 15 years with some big
problems on our hands, the central one being
how we organize a durable peace.
I think in the next decade we're going to
face a critical food situation throughout the
world to which all nations must address
themselves.
But I think also that we can see that com-
mon sense is making some headway.
President Kennedy took to the Senate the
nuclear test ban treaty.
President Johnson has moved on the civil
air agreement with the Soviet Union, the
consular agreement, his East- West trade pro-
posals, the space treaty. We hope that we'll
be able to find some answer to the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
So there's a full agenda ahead. But when
we look back on these 15 years, I think we
can see some steady progress toward peace
and reason in the world.
Mr. Downs: Thank you. And on that note,
I'll turn the questioning now over to NBC
diplomatic correspondent Joseph C. Harsch,
who I see is sitting in the studio alongside
you.
Aggression in Southeast Asia
Mr. Harsch: Thank you, Hugh. I'm glad
I am here.
Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start it out by
going back to the news conference that Sec-
retary-General U Thant of the United Na-
tions did 2 days ago. In that there appeared
to be considerable differences with American
policy. For example, he said, "I do not sub-
scribe to the generally held view that if South
Viet-Nam falls, then country X, then coun-
try Y, then country Z will follow. I do not
agree with this so-called domino theory." Is
this a matter of difference with our policy?
Secretary Rxisk: Well, I myself have never
subscribed to something called the domino
theory, because that suggests that we're
merely playing games with little wooden
blocks with dots on them. Actually, the prob-
lem is the old problem of the phenomenon of
aggression.
Country X, if you like, is South Viet-Nam.
North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South
Viet-Nam by force.
Country Y is, perhaps, Laos. We had an
agreement on Laos in 1962 under which there
would be no North Vietnamese forces in
Laos. And Laos would not be used as a route
of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. That
has not been performed. And the govern-
ment that we agreed on in Geneva in 1962
has not been permitted to exercise authority
throughout Laos. And the International Con-
trol Commission has not been permitted to
exercise its functions in the Communist-held
areas of Laos. So, undoubtedly, there are
appetites with respect to Laos.
Country Z is, perhaps, already Thailand.
The other side has announced that they are
going after Thailand. There are subversive
guerrilla elements in northeast Thailand
trained outside. There's a Thai training camp
now in North Viet-Nam preparing additional
guerrillas to go into Thailand.
So, there's no need for something called
the domino theory.
The theory is that proclaimed in Peking
repeatedly, that the world revolution of com-
munism must be advanced by militant means.
Now, if they can be brought toward an atti-
tude of peaceful coexistence, if the second
generation in China can show some of the
prudence that the second generation in the
Soviet Union has shown, then, maybe, we can
begin to build a durable peace there.
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary-
General of the U.N. also in that same news
conference said, "I do not subscribe to the
view that South Viet-Nam is strategically
vital to Western interests and Western se-
curity." What are our vital strategic interests
in the area? Do you regard Viet-Nam as
vital?
Secretary Rusk: Well, there are important
geographical features, natural resources,
large numbers of people in Southeast Asia.
I think the heart of the matter is, again,
JANUARY 30, 1967
169
the phenomenon of aggression. And if the
momentum of aggression should begin to roll
in that part of the world, stimulated or sup-
ported or engaged in by those who are com-
mitted to the spread of the world revolution
by violence, then that seems to put us back
on the trail that led us into World War II.
What is important is that all nations, large
and small, have a chance to live unmolested
by their neighbors, as provided in the United
Nations Charter.
Article 1 of the charter deals with acts of
aggression, breaches of the peace, the neces-
sity for peaceful settlement of disputes.
Article 2 of the charter is about the self-
determination of people. These are very im-
portant lessons derived from the events
which led us into World War II. We feel that
we've got to hang on to those lessons, be-
cause if they lead us into world war III,
there won't be much left from which we can
draw lessons and start over again.
Threat to Durable Peace
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, is it not the
question so much of our vital interests, as of
the threat to our vital interests?
Now, you said yesterday i that four Presi-
dents have identified this area as being stra-
tegically important to us. At the time that
process started — we're talking about Presi-
dent Truman now and then President
Eisenhower's time — there certainly did seem
to be a major threat to our interests in that
area.
What has happened to the nature of that
threat? During the last year I had in mind
the breach between Moscow and Peking. Is
there not a diminution in the threat to our
interests in that area because Moscow and
Peking are no longer close together?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Peking has the capa-
bility of maintaining a major threat there,
de])ending upon both its policy and its action.
You see, we have a very strong interest
in the organization of peace in the Pacific,
just as we have in the Atlantic. We have
' In an informal press interview.
alliances with Korea and Japan and the Re-
public of China and the Philippines, Thai-
land, Australia, New Zealand. So, we are
very much interested in the stability of the
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and in East
Asia.
Now, if these aggressive pressures from
Hanoi, with the support of Peking, should
move into Southeast Asia, not only are hun-
dreds of millions of people involved and vital
resources involved, but the prospects for a
durable peace dissolve.
And so we have a tremendous interest in
establishing in that area of the world, as we
have done in the NATO area, the notion that
the nations must be left alone and be allowed
to live in peace, as the Charter of the United
Nations provides.
Leadership Struggle in Mainland China
Mr. Harsch: But the danger 2 years ago
was much greater than it is now, surely.
Secretary Rtisk: Well, I'm not sure what is
going to be the reaction of the authorities in
Peking when they get all of these present
troubles sorted out. What are they going to
do about their doctrine of militant support
of the world revolution ?
They've had a series of setbacks in the last
2 years, a major setback in Indonesia,
catastrophe in the Afro-Asian conference.
They put in an ultimatum to India during the
India-Pakistan fighting and had to back
away from it. They've been almost expelled
from the world Communist movement.
They've been expelled from four or five coun-
tries in Africa.
Now, these have undoubtedly put great
pressures on the leadership there. And my
guess is that one of the reasons why there
is considerable turmoil at the top in main-
land China today is that there must have
been some important policy discussions there
about whether or not they're on the right
track and that this has led to differences
among the leadership which are being re-
flected in some of the events that we hear
about from day to day now.
Mr. Harsch: What is your reading, as of
170
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
this — right now, on what's going on in
Peking ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that it is fair
to suspend judgment on that.
If I say that I don't really know, it doesn't
embarrass me very much, because I suspect
that Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Ch'en I, and
these other people out there don't really know
exactly what is happening there. But there
seems to be an authentic struggle of leader-
ship among the top 12 or 15 people in that
system. There seems to be a considerable de-
bate on policy going on beneath the surface.
Some of that debate might well have
precipitated this present struggle. But I
think it might be well to discount, in part,
some of the day-to-day news there. We
are watching it very closely. But I think we
ought not to jump to premature conclusions
about how it's going to come out. Frankly,
we just don't know.
Mr. Harsch: And you only go so far as to
recognize it as being an internal struggle for
power?
Secretary Rusk: I think that's at the heart
of it, yes.
Mr. Harsch: Might it affect the whole posi-
tion of China? Could it lead to a civil war in-
side China, do you think ?
Secretary Riisk: It's possible, although I
think that we ought to be very cautious about
saying that it's headed that way at the pres-
ent time.
This is basically, I think, a struggle among
the leadership elite. They may be able to find
ways to work this out among themselves
through compromise, or one group may find
itself in full control at the expense of another
group. We just don't know, quite frankly,
what that means.
Need for Ceilings on Arms Race
Mr. Harsch: I want to change to another
subject now. In the President's state of the
Union last night,^ he said that the Soviet
Union has begun to place near Moscow a
limited antimissile defense. And he deplored
this and expressed the hope that something
might be done about it. Is this a subject
which can best be handled in a sort of general
group in Geneva, or is this something that is
best handled directly between ourselves and
the Soviet Union?
Secretary Rusk: I think the two are not
necessarily contradictory, because we and the
Soviet Union are the cochairmen of the
group in Geneva. Therefore, we're in fre-
quent touch with each other about the agenda
of that conference.
Quite some time ago we put proposals be-
fore the Geneva conference for a freeze on
the further development of both offensive
and defensive nuclear weapons. We hope very
much that that can be taken up and some
conclusions reached, because we could move
simply to new plateaus of enormous expendi-
ture on both sides without basically changing
the overriding strategic situation but thereby
diverting very large resources away from the
unfinished business which both of us face
for our own people.
So that we're very serious about finding
some way to put some ceilings on the arms
race and try to turn it down. And this is one
of the important elements in that.
Mr. Harsch: Are you hopeful ?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think diplomacy
must always proceed on the basis of hope
and optimism, because that's our business.
And we hope very much that there can be
some progress made on this matter.
Mr. Harsch: The President says that he
urges Congress to help our foreign commer-
cial trade policies by passing an East-West
trade bill. That is going to be a difficult prob-
lem with the new Congress, is it not?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the atmos-
phere associated with the struggle in Viet-
Nam will make it difficult. But we do believe
that, despite Viet-Nam, we should continue
to gnaw away at any points where we can
improve our relations between East and
West, and try to build a little peace in the
world.
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, I know that
Hugh Downs back in New York has another
question he wants to put to you. What little
' See p. 158.
JANUARY 30, 1967
171
time we have I reluctantly yield back to you,
Hugh.
Basis for Peace in Viet-Nam
Mr. Downs: On either or both sides of the
Viet-Nam war forces is there the desire not
toend that war?
Secretary Rtisk: I think that both sides
would like to end it but they differ in views
about the basis on which it can be ended.
The authorities in Hanoi continue to insist
upon their four points as a basis for the set-
tlement, and the third of those points is that
South Viet-Nam be organized on the program
of the National Liberation Front without re-
gard to the views of the overwhelming ma-
jority of the South Vietnamese.
I believe that we must keep in contact both
privately and publicly in order to explore
every possibility of a move toward peace,
whether at a conference table or, in fact,
whether with a general settlement or even a
partial settlement, because the situation is
too dangerous to permit it to go on indefi-
nitely in its present condition.
Mr. Downs: I wasn't speaking of official
policy, sir, on the — I know there f.re forces
that do desire to end the war on both sides.
I wondered if you thought there were signifi-
cant forces that desired not to end it on
either side.
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think so, unless —
unless they can achieve particular — particu-
lar goals.
I think there are those in North Viet-Nam
who don't want to end it without having
achieved their purposes in South Viet-Nam.
And it may be that the authorities in Peking,
for example, would like to see this go on
indefinitely as a part of their general mili-
tant approach to international affairs.
But I don't believe that that, at the end of
the day, will prove to be the decisive problem
as far as peace is concerned. The problem is:
On what basis can peace be achieved? And
we're constantly probing that in every pos-
sible way.
Mr. Dotvns: Very good. And our thanks to
you for being with us this morning. Thanks
to Joseph C. Harsch, NBC diplomatic corre-
spondent.
Letters of Credence
Colombia
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Colombia, Hernan Echavarria Olozaga,
presented his credentials to President John-
son on January 13. For text of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
January 13.
Haiti
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Haiti, Arthur Bonhomme, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on January
13. For text of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department
of State press release dated January 13.
Indonesia
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Indonesia, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on January 13. For text of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
January 13.
Turkey
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Turkey, Melih Esenbel, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on January 13.
For text of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated January 13.
172
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In this article written especially for the Bulletin, WiUiam
K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, dis-
cusses the actions taken in the past year to update interruv-
tional safety standards for passenger ships. Mr. Miller was
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Extraordinary As-
sembly of IMCO, which approved the new standards in
November 1966.
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship Safety
by William K. Miller
Early morning radio listeners on Novem-
ber 13, 1965, were shocked to hear the news
that the cruise ship Yarmouth Castle, with
376 passengers aboard, was ablaze at sea
between Miami and Nassau. Later reports
brought the tragic news that 88 of the
ship's passengers, most of them American
citizens, and 2 of the crew — 90 persons in
all — had lost their lives.
The Yarmouth Castle was a ship of 5,000
tons operating under Panamanian registry.
On the cruise on which she burned, as on the
other cruises, her passengers were nearly
all American citizens, and so, consequently,
were most of the casualties. The tragedy
occurred less than 2 years after the Lakonia,
also a passenger vessel, had burned at sea
with the loss of 125 lives.
In the United States there was, very
naturally, an immediate and intense public
demand for Government action to improve
the safety standards of passenger ships
which sail from U.S. ports, particularly of
old ships like the Yarmouth Castle.
It was clear that the international rules
governing safety of life at sea had to be
upgraded. To do this the United States
turned to the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), the 64-
member specialized agency of the United
Nations which deals particularly with tech-
nical matters affecting shipping and has
special responsibility for safety of life at
sea. IMCO has had a notably successful
record of cooperative efforts by its members
in agreeing on and improving international
standards in its area of competence.
IMCO responded to the United States' call
for a cooperative effort, and on November
30, 1966, the Third Extraordinary IMCO
Assembly approved a series of amendments
to the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) that will improve the fire-safety
standards for passenger vessels, particularly
for the older ships that constitute the great-
est risks.
Approval of these amendments just a year
after the Yarmouth Castle disaster repre-
sents unusually rapid handling of a matter
involving so many countries. The action
culminated a year of intensive effort by U.S.
Government agencies, assisted by maritime
safety experts of major maritime nations
and by the machinery of IMCO.
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea
The international requirements for fire
safety have been established in a series of
conventions for safety of life at sea, the
first of which was signed in 1929, with
subsequent conventions signed in 1948 and
1960.
JANUARY 30, 1967
173
Each convention represented a substantial
improvement over the predecessor conven-
tion, and each did much to improve safety-
standards around the world; but even the
newer conventions, those of 1948 and 1960,
had major weaknesses. These were escape
clauses or "grandfather" clauses, which pro-
vided that ships existing when the 1948
convention came into force need not comply
with the new requirements beyond the extent
that each government considered "reason-
able and practicable." Hence the two
conventions meant major safety improve-
ments for new ships — the 1948 convention
notably for fire safety and the 1960 con-
vention notably for subdivision and stabil-
ity — but they did not do much about many
of the oldest ships and worst risk cases.
Currently 57 governments are parties to
the 1960 SOLAS Convention, which became
effective May 26, 1965, including the govern-
ments of all of the principal maritime
nations of the world. A satisfactory amend-
ment of the convention, therefore, means
adequate safety rules in most of the world's
maritime traffic.
The convention provides for its own
amendment through the machinery of IMCO.
Under the most practical amendment proce-
dure, there are at least three major steps:
First, recommendations must be adopted by
the Maritime Safety Committee, IMCO's
principal technical body, by a two-thirds
majority; second, the recommended amend-
ments must be adopted by the IMCO As-
sembly, again by a two-thirds majority;
and third, the amendments must be accepted
by two-thirds of the contracting govern-
ments to the SOLAS Convention.
Amendments so approved may be deter-
mined to be of such an important nature
that any contracting government that
declares it does not accept them must cease
to be a party to the convention. This pro-
vision does not mean that a government
which does not act on the amendments
automatically ceases to be a party; a specific
negative action is needed. A determination
of an "important nature" in this sense also
requires approval by a two-thirds majority
in the IMCO Assembly and two-thirds of the
contracting governments to the SOLAS Con-
vention.
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee Action
Immediately after the Yarmouth Castle
fire, the State Department, in the closest
cooperation with other Government agencies,
called for the earliest possible meeting of
the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee to
consider proposals for new fire-safety stand-
ards. At its regular January meeting the
Committee scheduled a special meeting solely
for this purpose at London May 3-10, 1966.
This allowed time for preparation of tech-
nical proposals, among which was a paper
drawn up by the U.S. Coast Guard and cir-
culated in March to other governments for
consideration before the meeting.
In preparation for the meeting Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Anthony M. Solomon, accompanied by Rear
Adm. Charles P. Murphy, USCG, traveled
to a number of European capitals to explain
the importance the United States attached to
these proposals and to ask support for them.
When the Maritime Safety Committee met
in May, Ambassador at Large W. Averell
Harriman made a key opening statement ^
on behalf of the U.S. proposals.
The Committee adopted a series of amend-
ments to the SOLAS Convention, incorpo-
rating most of the substance of the U.S.
proposals as they related to existing passen-
ger ships. There were some improvements
resulting from the interchange of expert
views, and there were some compromises;
but the overall result was satisfactory.
The Committee also recommended a few
changes in the regulations applying to new
ships to be constructed in the future, but
left this job, for the most part, to a second
stage and assigned its Fire Safety Subcom-
' For text, see Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 952.
174
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mittee the task of developing comprehensive
recommendations.
Following the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee's action, the IMCO Council arranged
for a special session of the IMCO Assembly,
the organization's plenary body, to be con-
vened November 28, 1966, nearly a year
before the next regular Assembly, scheduled
for October 1967. An earlier date could not
be set since the SOLAS Convention provides
that prospective amendments must be com-
municated to the Contracting Governments
at least 6 months before Assembly consider-
ation.
United States Legislation
Before IMCO's action was completed, the
U.S. Congress passed legislation comple-
menting the proposed SOLAS amendments.
The Yarmouth Castle disaster was fol-
lowed in 1966 by two more ship fires, the
Viking Princess on a cruise from Florida
and the Hanseatic at her pier in New York.
Fortunately, there was no loss of life directly
due to the fires in these incidents, but they
did further emphasize the need to make
ships safer.
The administration, early in 1966, pro-
posed legislation including provisions for
disclosure and notice to the public of safety
standards of U.S. and foreign passenger
ships leaving U.S. ports, financial responsi-
bility of operators against death and per-
sonal injury and against nonperformance of
the voyage, removal of the present low ship-
owner liability limits, ajid higher minimum
safety standards for U.S. passenger ships
on inland waters. (All U.S. oceangoing
passenger ships already meet very high
safety standards.) Senate and House com-
mittees held hearings on these proposals in
April, June, and October and ultimately
approved most of the measures proposed by
the administration.
Basically, with the exception of the pro-
posal to remove the liability limits, all of the
specific recommendations of the executive
agencies were incorporated in the new law,
P.L. 89-777, enacted November 6, 1966.
One new provision was added. This re-
quires that passenger ships which do not
comply with the safety standards of SOLAS
1960, as modified by the amendments pro-
posed in May, shall not depart U.S. ports
with passengers who are U.S. nationals and
who embarked at those ports. This provision
is to be effective when the amendments
proposed by the IMCO Maritime Safety
Committee last May come into force, but in
any case not later than November 2, 1968.
The new law will require all passenger-
ship operators to give notice of a ship's
safety standards to prospective passengers,
both in promotional literature and in adver-
tising, under regulations which the Coast
Guard is now preparing. It was made clear
both in the Senate Commerce Committee's
report and in the testimony of Adm. Willard
J. Smith, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, before the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, that the safety
standards here in question are international
standards. The Senate committee report
specifically contemplated the use of SOLAS
1960 standards, as modified by the IMCO
Maritime Safety Committee's proposals, as
guides in establishing disclosure regulations.
These are the same standards to which the
direct safety provisions of the legislation
are related.
Hence it is clear that the Congress ac-
cepted the concept of international standards
with resi>ect to disclosure of safety stand-
ards as well as with respect to the actual
ship safety rules that will apply.
Regulations implementing the financial
responsibility provisions of the new law are
to be issued by the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, the U.S. Government's regulatory
agency for ocean shipping. This legislation
is intended to insure that funds will be avail-
able to meet claims of persons injured or
the estates of those killed in passenger-ship
accidents and for refunds when a sailing is
canceled.
JANUARY 30, 1967
175
The Federal Maritime Commission, like
the Coast Guard, has already held meetings
with interested parties, domestic and for-
eign, to hear and consider their ideas on
implementing regulations in order to insure
that specific requirements as ultimately
determined will not only be meaningful but
will be reasonable and not unduly burden-
some.
As noted above, the new law makes no
change in legal provisions on shipowners'
liability. Stated simply, this liability now
may be limited under U.S. law to the value
of the vessel after the accident or $60 per
ton of the vessel's tonnage if the vessel's
value is not enough to meet claims. There
is widespread agreement that the present
limits are too low, if there should be limits
at all, and the President has stated that
the administration will make another effort
this year to repeal the present outmoded
limitations.
IMCO Assembly Action
The Third Extraordinary Assembly of the
Intergovenmiental Maritime Consultative
Organization, which was held at London
November 28-30, 1966, approved without
significant change the recommendations of
the Maritime Safety Committee to amend
SOLAS 1960 and upgrade the international
fire-safety standards for passenger ships.
There were several minor changes, mostly
for clarification, but the U.S. delegation was
satisfied that none of them significantly
depart from the Committee's recommenda-
tions or reduce the level of safety standards.
Similarly, the delegation was satisfied that
there is no conflict or inconsistency in sub-
stance between the new regulations ap-
proved by the IMCO Assembly and the
safety standards established by U.S. law.
The substantive content of the new regu-
lations was approved by overwhelming
majorities. The closest vote on a directly
substantive issue was 35 to 2, clearly
reflecting the strong consensus for the
recommended improvements.
The most controversial question at the
Assembly was whether the proposed amend-
ments are, in the terms of article IX (e) of
the SOLAS 1960 Convention, of such an
important nature that any contracting
government which declares it does not accept
them shall cease to be a party to the con-
vention 12 months after they come into
force.
The United States and nearly all the
Western maritime countries supported such
a finding. Opposition came from a few coun-
tries which apparently were concerned with
the prospective effects on their older ships.
Several delegations stated that they con-
sidered the amendments important but were
opposed to a finding in the sense of article
IX (e) because it might force some countries
out of the convention. Some of these dele-
gations argued that the exercise of the
"important nature" clause was contrary to
generally accepted concepts of international
law and prejudicial to sovereign rights. The
U.S. delegation, in response to these argu-
ments, pointed out that the Assembly was
following a procedure cleai'ly defined in the
convention and that the contracting govern-
ments accepted this procedure in accepting
the convention.
One representative urged the impor-
tance of crew training as opposed to struc-
tural requirements. The U.S. representative
agreed that crew training is important and
should be stressed, but expressed the belief
that it cannot be controlled through inter-
national rules as readily as structure can.
He noted that passenger ships operate on
cruises from U.S. ports, carrying nearly all
American passengers, in some cases never
returning to the country of registry. If
this type of trafl^c is to continue, it is not
acceptable to the United States to rely on
crew-training requirements of other coun-
tries without adequate fire-safety structural
provisions.
The Assembly decided that the amend-
ments are of an "important nature" in the
sense of the convention by a vote of 26 to
176
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
8, with 5 abstentions. The vote on the final
resolution of the Assembly, which was 29
to 2, with 12 abstentions, reflected the objec-
tions of several countries to the "important
nature" finding.
A second issue which required serious
attention was the question of the legality of
the amendments. One delegation stated
doubts whether the Assembly was competent
to apply amendments relating to the struc-
ture of existing ships in view of the pro-
vision of article IX (f) of the SOLAS 1948
and 1960 Conventions, which state that
amendments relating to the structure of
ships shall apply only to ships the keels of
which are laid after the date on which the
amendment comes into force. It was argued
that if the Assembly wished to enforce such
amendments with respect to existing ships,
it would first have to amend article IX (f)
and that such amendments to the regulations
could only be approved by a subsequent
Assembly after the amendment to article
IX (f) came into force.
The U.S. delegation and several other
delegations disagreed with this conclusion
and took the position that amendments to
structural provisions could be applied to
existing ships with or without amendment
of article IX (f), provided that the necessary
two-thirds of the Assembly approved and
the amendments were accepted by two-thirds
of the contracting governments.
It was pointed out that the question had
been discussed by the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee and that no delegation had expressed
any doubt as to the legality of applying
structural amendments to existing ships,
article IX (f) notwithstanding. A passage
from the record of the SOLAS 1948 confer-
ence was cited, supporting the view that the
authors of that convention intended that
article IX (f) could be overridden by amend-
ments to the regulations. Ultimately it be-
came apparent that almost all delegations
considered it clear that structural amend-
ments can legally be applied to existing ships
without amendment of article IX (f).
Mr. Miller's article is one of a series being
written especially for the Bulletin by oflBcers
of the Department and the Foreign Service.
Officers who may be interested in submitting
original bylined articles are invited to call
Jewell Wilson in the Bulletin office, extension
5806.
The purpose of the amendments adopted
by the Assembly was to bring all passenger
ships up to an acceptable modern standard
of fire safety by eliminating the effects of
the grandfather clauses of the SOLAS 1948
and 1960 Conventions.
Effect of Amendments
Specifically, the proposals adopted by the
Assembly will eliminate vessels with wooden
hulls, decks, and deckhouses. All basic
structure will be of steel. Ships will be
divided by steel fire barriers not more than
131 feet apart to isolate any fire that may
start. In a like manner, the accommodation
spaces will be separated by steel bulkheads
and decks from such hazardous areas as
galleys, cargo space, and machinery space.
Within the accommodation spaces, the
various rooms, if not constructed of incom-
bustible materials, will be protected by an
automatic sprinkler system or other protec-
tive measures will be taken. In any event,
stairways and passageways will be specially
constructed to off"er a safe avenue of escape
in the event of a fire.
Vessels built before SOLAS 1948 came
into force in 1952 will have to meet the
1948 requirements for fire-extinguishing
systems. Fire pumps will have to be so
located and arranged that the whole system
will not be put out of action by a fire in
any one space. In some cases more fire
pumps will be required.
Many other details adopted by the As-
sembly will improve the fire safety of exist-
ing passenger vessels.
The effects of the amendments will vary
widely. Owners of the most modern and
JANUARY 30, 1967
177
safest ships will not have to do anything
very difficult or very expensive to conform
to the new rules. Owners of most older
ships will have to go to greater expense,
and in many cases major rebuilding will be
involved. A number of old ships doubtless
will have to be scrapped.
The job is not yet finished, even in a pro-
cedural sense. The amendments must now be
accepted by two-thirds of the contracting
governments to the SOLAS Convention and
will not come into force legally until 12
months later.
Recognizing the need for rapid action, the
IMCO Assembly approved, without dissent,
the Maritime Safety Committee's recom-
mendation that the amendments are so vital
to safety of life at sea that contracting gov-
ernments should not await formal entry
into force but should act immediately to put
the recommended measures into effect to the
maximum extent and as soon as possible.
For the United States, acceptance of the
amendments requires the advice and consent
of the Senate. There is reason to hope that
the Senate will act promptly, particularly
in the light of the great concern shown by
the Congress and the conformity of the pro-
posed standards to those incorporated in the
new U.S. law.
The Congress has shown serious concern
with the whole problem, not only in legisla-
tive action but also in close attention to the
action of the executive branch in the inter-
national forum. Members of the House Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
attended the sessions of the Maritime Safety
Committee in January and May and were
present at every session of the special
Assembly in November.
IMCO's work on improvements in stand-
ards for new ships also requires further
action. After several meetings, the IMCO
Subcommittee on Fire Protection agreed in
December on a series of recommendations
which are to be considered by the Maritime
Safety Committee in February. If all goes
well, these amendments to the convention
will be approved by the Assembly at its
regular session next October, and we can-
expect further improvements in the level
of fire safety in passenger ships newly built
around the world.
U.S., Japan Discuss Operations
in New U.S. Fisheries Zone
Press release 305 dated December 29
U.S. and Japanese fishery delegations be-
gan preliminary discussions in Washington
December 28 on the question of the continu-
ation of Japanese fishing operations in the
new U.S. fisheries zone established by the
enactment of Public Law 89-658 last October.
The new law extends United States juris-
diction over fisheries to 9 miles from the 3-
mile territorial sea, or a total of 12 miles
from the shoreline. It provides for continua-
tion of traditional foreign fishing in the new
zone as may be recognized by the United
States.
The United States has notified govern-
ments likely to be concerned, including Japan,
of its willingness to consider such views as
those governments desire to advance regard-
ing the law and continuation of their fisheries
in the new zone. The current talks are ex-
ploratory in nature and are expected to be
followed by a second round of talks early in
the new year.i
The U.S. delegation is led by Donald L.
McKeman, Special Assistant for Fisheries
and Wildlife to the Secretary of State; the
Japanese delegation is led by Ryozo Sunobe,
Minister, Embassy of Japan.
' The exploratory talks concluded Jan. 3. Discus-
sions are expected to be resumed Feb. 6.
178
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended Through June 1967
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^
Mr. President, I should first like to express
my appreciation to our distingoiished Secre-
tary-General for his lucid and thorough
report on the United Nations Force in
Cyprus,^ on the basis of which report we have
again extended UNFICYP for a further
period of 6 months.
In thanking the Secretary-General and his
staff, I think it appropriate at this time to
recall that the Secretary-General has labored
long and hard in carrying out his far-
reaching responsibilities in this situation. His
report of December 8. together with its
addendum, continues to illustrate the close
and faithful execution of the Council's
mandate by the Secretary-General and the
Secretary-General's distinguished representa-
tive, our distinguished former colleague,
Ambassador Carlos Bemardes, and by the
men of the United Nations Force, commanded
by the very able General Ilmari Martola.
In pursuit of its efforts to restore normal
conditions, we note with satisfaction that
during the past 6 months UNFICYP has con-
cluded an arrangement with the Government
of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader-
ship which has restored postal services in the
Turkish sector of Nicosia and Lefka. And we
express appreciation to the Goveitmient of
• Made in the Security Council on Dec. 15 (U.S./
U.N. press release 5030).
=> U.N. doc. S/7611 and Corr. 1.
Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots for this
cooperation. UNFICYP's efforts have also
led to an agreement covering the method for
processing and registering land transactions.
This is all good.
With regard to the efforts of the United
Nations Force to contribute to the mainte-
nance of law and order, we are, however,
disturbed at the increase in the number of
incidents, including what the Secretary-
General calls — and I quote him — "frequent
breaches of the cease-fire," many of which
are deliberate bomb explosions and other
terrorist actions, and the establishment of
new fortified positions, as described by the
Secretary-General's report, in a manner con-
trary to the accepted understanding that the
extension of existing positions is detrimental
to the interests of peace on the island. My
delegation believes that those responsible for
the conditions described in the Secretary-
General's report, which have caused deep con-
cern to the Force commander, should take all
necessary measures to assure that the situa-
tion rapidly changes for the better.
We are also concerned by the Secretary-
General's supplementary report which was
issued December 13.* The United Nations
Force, manned by excellent contingents from
Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden,
' U.N. doc. S/7611/Add. 1.
JANUARY 30, 1967
179
Denmark, United Kingdom, New Zealand,
and Australia, has done a remarkably fine
job of maintaining peace on the island in the
best tradition of the United Nations. We be-
lieve peace and order can only be achieved by
an even greater degree of cooperation with
UNFICYP. The importation of additional
arms in violation of the spirit and intent of
the Council's March 4, 1964, resolution ■* will
not achieve greater peace and security. On
the contrary, their very presence cannot be
other than a source of insecurity and strife.
We welcome the agreement of the Govern-
ment of Cyprus to allow UNFICYP to in-
spect those arms. But we would hope further
that these arms can be neutralized, and this
could occur if the Cypriot Government
agreed to place the arms which have already
arrived under the continuing custody of the
United Nations Force.
Mr. President, this Council has today met
for the third time this year on the question
of Cyprus.^ As others have noted, it has for
the 10th time since March 1964 extended the
mandate of UNFICYP. Given the conditions
on the island, my Government believes that
these actions have been necessary and that
the stated objectives of the Council's resolu-
tion merit our moral and material support.
But we must remind ourselves again of
what the Secretary-General has pointed out
to us, and what has been adverted to by
others, that the financial base for UNFICYP
is a narrow and uncertain one. His remarks
highlight the fact that this organization
cannot expect a peacekeeping operation such
as UNFICYP to succeed, however dedicated
and energetic its personnel, unless we col-
lectively provide the required support. This
is our obligation, not the Secretary-General's.
This Council owes its appreciation to those
countries, unfortunately too limited in num-
ber, which have continued to support
UNFICYP financially since its creation
nearly 3 years ago. These countries have
showm a high degree of responsibility for
carrying out this vital U.N. peacekeeping
function. My Government hopes that they
will find it possible to continue their volun-
tary contributions to sustain UNFICYP, de-
spite the long and at times discouraging
deadlock over the Cyprus issue. And we also
hope that members who have not yet con-
tributed will be able to do so on this
occasion.
My Government, having voted for the reso-
lution, feels that it must match its vote by a
concrete demonstration of its support for
the resolution, and therefore I wrish to an-
nounce that the United States pledges $4
million toward the $9,675,000 cash budget for
UNFICYP for the 10th period, December
27, 1966, to June 26, 1967. And our ultimate
contribution against this pledge will, as in
the past, depend upon contributions of
other governments and continuation of
UNFICYP's cost estimates.
Our willingness to continue supporting
UNFICYP is based on the necessity for the
parties concerned to explore every conceiv-
able avenue which may lead toward accom-
modation. And we have heard with interest
wlvat our colleague. Ambassador [Alexis S.]
Liatis of Greece, has said, and we express
appreciation, too, for what we have heard of
the Turkish Government in this connection.
And likewise we invite and welcome the good
spirit of the Cypriot Government to the same
end. The responsibility to show progress to-
ward an agreed solution increases with the
passage of time. For this reason I believe, as
others have pointed out, that the final opera-
tive paragraph of the resolution is most
apposite to the situation and accurately ex-
presses our expectation as to the future
course of events.®
* For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964,
p. 465.
° For U.S. statements, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p.
718, and July 11, 1966, p. 63.
•In a resolution (S/RES/231 (1966)) adopted
unanimously on Dec. 15, the Security Council ex-
tended "the stationing in Cyprus of the United Na-
tions Peace-keeping Force . . . for a further period
of six months ending 26 June 1967, in the expectation
that sufficient progress toward a solution by then
will make possible a withdrawal or substantial re-
duction of the Force."
180
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I have adverted to the talks between the
Governments of Turkey and Greece, and the
Secretary-General has noted them. We share
his hope that these talks will be one of the
means by which a peaceful solution can be
found. The fact that these talks have con-
tinued in secrecy for 6 months shows how
seriously the two Governments take their re-
sponsibilities in attempting to settle this most
difficult problem. This problem has seriously
affected their relations for more than a
decade. Its settlement, we know, is not easy.
We know the settlement needs time and it
above all needs peace on the island. This can
best be achieved if UNFICYP receives, as I
have said earlier, the fullest cooperation of
all parties concerned, and in particular the
Government of Cyprus, which has such a
vital stake in this area.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letters dated December 14 from the Deputy Secre-
tary General of the Organization of African Unity
transmitting text of resolutions adopted by the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government
of the OAU held at Addis Ababa November
5-9: resolution respecting the policies of apartheid
and racial discrimination of the Republic of South
Africa, S/7637, December 15, 1966, 3 pp.; resolu-
tion respecting the territories under Portuguese
administration, S/7638, December 15, 1966, 2 pp.;
resolution respecting South West Africa, S/7639,
December 15, 1966, 2 pp.
General Assembly
The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa. Report of the Special
Political Committee. A/6579. December 13, 1966.
10 pp.
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees. Report of the Third Committee.
A/6586. December 13, 1966. 9 pp.
World Campaign for Universal Literacy. Report of
the Second Committee. A/6592. December 14, 1966.
5 pp.
Progressive Development of the Law of International
Trade. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/6594.
December 15, 1966. 23 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Ratifications Exchanged With
Togo on Commercial Treaty
Press release 1 dated January 5
Instruments of ratification of the treaty of
amity and economic relations between the
United States and Togo, signed at Lome on
February 8, 1966, were exchanged on Jan-
uary 5 in Washington. The exchange was
made by Secretary Rusk and the Togolese
Ambassador, Robert Ajavon, in a brief for-
mal ceremony at the Department of State.
This action completes the procedures re-
quired for bringing the treaty into force. By
its terms, the treaty will enter into force on
February 5, 1967, 1 month after the exchange
of ratifications.
The treaty contains provisions covering
such subjects as entry and sojourn, personal
freedoms, access to courts, just compensation
in the event of expropriation, rights with re-
spect to carrying on business activities, prop-
erty rights, taxation, exchange controls,
treatment of imports and exports, treatment
of shipping, and other matters affecting the
status and activities of citizens of one coun-
try within the territories of the other.
U.S.-Honduras income Tax
Convention Terminated
Department Statement
Press release 298 dated December 22
The convention of June 25, 1956, between
the United States and Honduras for the
avoidance of double taxation and the pre-
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes
on income will cease to be in force with
respect to taxable years beginning on or
after January 1, 1967.
JANUARY 30, 1967
181
In accordance with the terms of the con-
vention, the Government of Honduras has
given notice of intention to terminate the
convention at the end of 1966.
Discussions from time to time between
United States and Honduran officials with a
view to effecting amendments in the con-
vention have not resulted in agreement on
such amendments. It is expected that there
will be further discussions with a view to
the conclusion, as soon as practicable, of a
new income tax convention.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energ^y
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 5, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Kenya, and
Trinidad and Tobago, January 3, 1967.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I
and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II.
Approval deposited: Ecuador, January 4, 1967.
BILATERAL
Antigua
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Antigua. Effected by exchange
of notes at Bridgetown and Antigua December
19 and 28, 1966. Entered into force December 28,
1966.
India
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913,
5965, 6032, 6113, 6146). Effected by an exchange
of notes at New Delhi December 23, 1966. En-
tered into force December 23, 1966.
Agreement extending the agreement of April 15,
1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559,
5664, 6151), concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi De-
cember 30, 1966. Entered into force December 30,
.1966; effective October 1, 1966.
iVIexico
Protocol amending the agreement of January 29,
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcasting
in the standard broadcast band. Signed at Mexico
April 13, 1966.
Ratifications exchanged : January 12, 1967.
Entered into force: January 12, 1967.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6052, 6074). Effected by an exchange of notes at
Rawalpindi and Islamabad December 28, 1966.
Entered into force December 28, 1966.
Togo
Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sigfned at
Lome February 8, 1966. Enters into force Febru-
ary 5, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: January 11, 1967.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1440 PUBLICATION 8189 JANUARY 30. 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price; 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15:
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the sotlrce will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
182
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX January 30, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. lUO
Africa. The State of the Union (excerpts from
President Johnson's address) 158
Asia
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
grram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
China
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
gram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
Colombia. Letters of Credence (Echavarria) . . 172
Congress. New International Rules for Passen-
ger-Ship Safety (Miller) 173
Cyprus. United Nations Force in Cyprus Ex-
tended Through June 1967 (Goldberg) ... 179
Developing Countries. The Technological Revo-
lution and the World of the 1970's (Hum-
phrey) 164
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on
"Today" Program 168
Economic Affairs
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship
Safety (Miller) 173
Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com-
mercial Treaty 181
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi-
nated 181
U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New U.S.
Fisheries Zone 178
Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Techno-
logical Revolution and the World of the
1970's (Humphrey) 164
Europe
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
The Technological Revolution and the World
of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164
Haiti. Letters of Credence (Bonhomme) . . . 172
Honduras. U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Conven-
tion Terminated 181
Indonesia. Letters of Credence (Suwito) . . . 172
International Organizations and Conferences.
New International Rules for Passenger-Ship
Safety (Miller) 173
Japan. U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New
U.S. Fisheries Zone 178
Latin America. The State of the Union (ex-
cerpts from President Johnson's address) . . 158
Middle East. The State of the Union (excerpts
from President Johnson's address) .... 158
Presidential Documents. The State of the Union 158
Science. The Technological Revolution and the
World of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164
Toga Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on
Commercial Treaty 181
Treaty Information
Current Actions 182
Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com-
mercial Treaty 181
U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi-
nated 181
Turkey. Letters of Credence (Esenbel) ... 172
U.S.S.R. The State of the Union (excerpts from
President Johnson's address) 158
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 181
United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended
Through June 1967 (Goldberg) 179
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro-
gram 168
The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi-
dent Johnson's address) 158
Name Index
Bonhomme, Arthur 172
Echavarria Olozaga, Heman 172
Esenbel, Rxelih 172
Goldberg, Arthur J 179
Humphrey, Vice President 164
Johnson, President 158
Miller, William K 173
Rusk, Secretary 168
Suwito Kusumowidagdo 172
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: January 9-15
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to January 9 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
298 of December 22, 305 of December 29, and
1 of January 5.
No. Date fetbjett
t3 1/12 Exchange of ratifications of proto-
col to U.S.-Mexican standard-
band broadcasting agreement.
*4 1/12 Program for visit of President
Frei of Chile.
t5 1/12 National policy statement on in-
ternational book and library ac-
tivities (rewrite).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■CrU.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-932/30
Superintendent of documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402
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Viet-Nam in Brief
What peace initiatives have the United States and other governments taken to bring the
:onflict in Viet-Nam to an early and honorable end? What is being achieved in the "other war"
in Viet-Nam? Who fights in Viet-Nam? Why is the United States there? These and other pertinent
juestions affecting every American's stake in a secure future are answered in this 21-page
pamphlet.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. lUl
February 6, 1967
THE U.S. ACHIEVEMENTS IN VIET-NAM
by General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 186
THAILAND AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
by Ambassador Graham Martin 193
AID REPORT ON VIET-NAM COMMODITY PROGRAMS
SUBMITTED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Text of Report 200
THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE:
PATTERNS OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Special Article by James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope 218
For index see inside back cover
The U.S. Achievements in Viet-Nam
by General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff '
Five days ago, I returned from Viet-Nam.
There, for the eighth time in the past 4 years,
I visited those men and women of our Armed
Forces who are most dangerously involved
with the protection of freedom and the se-
curity interests of the United States. As al-
ways, I returned with deep respect for them
and renewed conviction that they fight in a
high cause. And more than ever before, I
came home with profound pride in what
these brave men and women have achieved.
I might add that I was also impressed with
the energy and courage of the newsmen in
Viet-Nam. Some 500 of them are making this
the best covered war in history. With these
impressions fresh in mind, I propose to talk
tonight about Viet-Nam.
It is clear to me why we are in Viet-Nam
and why we should be there. Therefore,
rather than entering the lists of policy de-
bate, I propose to report on an aspect of
Viet-Nam which is less well known and ap-
preciated — what we have achieved there.
In speaking of achievements I do so as a
military man, reporting mainly on military
matters. Nevertheless, I am fully aware of
the importance and difficulty of the political,
economic, and social problems which must
be mastered if we are to achieve success in
Viet-Nam. I have no illusions that I can fol-
low the injunction of Tennyson to "Charm
us, orator, till the lion look no larger than
the cat." I would not wish to. Rather, I hope
' Address made before the Washington Profes-
sional Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi at Washington,
D.C., on Jan. 17.
to take the advice of Joseph Pulitzer when
he said: "Put it before them briefly so they
will read it, clearly so they will appreciate
it, picturesquely so they will remember it,
and, above all, accurately so they will be
guided by its light."
In discussing our military accomplish-
ments, both accuracy and comprehension de-
pend upon proper context. With this in mind,
I should like to emphasize these facts: Less
than 2 years have passed since our first,
retaliatory airstrike in North Viet-Nam; only
IV2 years have gone by since, we began to
deploy major combat forces in South Viet-
Nam; and little more than a year has tran-
spired since our first major ground battle in
the la Drang Valley. As wars go, these are
short periods of time. It is within this con-
text of time that we Americans should judge
what we have achieved.
As a backdrop, it is also instructive to
remember what the critics of our policy had
to say, just yesterday, about military opera-
tions in Asia. Do you recall these Cassandra-
like pronouncements ?
— The American soldier can't stand the
rigors of jungle combat.
— American units are too large, cumber-
some, and roadbound to do battle in under-
developed areas.
— U.S. materiel — the B-52, jet fighters,
artillery, ships, and electronic equipment —
is too sophisticated to be useful.
— Supply lines to Asia are too long, and
we lack the logistic bases from which to
operate.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
— Guerrilla warfare is alien to American
Armed Forces. We can't understand the peo-
ple, speak their language, or gain their con-
fidence; we aren't trained in counterguerrilla
tactics; we lack the patience; and we can't
find the enemy or come to grips with him.
— It is suicidal optimism to think that we
can fight on the mainland of Asia.
— And massive Chinese Communist inter-
vention is certain.
A Hard Task Well Done
These prophets, some still active and pro-
pounding new theses of doom, sold short the
courage, decency, ingenuity, energy, knowl-
edge, and judgment of their fellow Ameri-
cans. They were wrong on every count, and
the record bears this out. Let me oite you
examples, not to say that the lion looks "no
larger than the cat," not to glory in the
statistics of combat, not to forget the sorrow
and hell which is war, but simply to tell you
of a hard but necessary task well done.
You will recall where we stood 2 years ago.
Our mission in Viet-Nam was the same as
now, but we were trying to accomplish it
through aid, advice, and logistic help alone.
In February of 1965, in retaliation for Com-
munist attacks against U.S. forces, we
launched our first, limited airstrikes against
North Viet-Nam. By the late spring of that
year, due to a combination of causes, the
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army was
threatening to overwhelm the armed foi'ces
of South Viet-Nam. That summer, at the
request of the South Vietnamese, the United
States made the decision to commit major
forces to halt aggression. I doubt that any
decision by any President has been more
difficult or more honorable.
What was needed, without delay, was a
transfusion of spirit and power and mate-
riel which would give heart to our Vietnam-
ese allies and put up the first, clear stoplight
to aggression. Almost incredibly, the United
States moved nearly 200,000 men and almost
21/2 million tons of supplies over thousands
of miles to Southeast Asia between July and
October 1965. This alone, in my judgment,
was a magnificent feat of arms. No other
nation could have achieved it. And I doubt
that any other nation would have committed
itself so strongly to a principle.
But this massive infusion would not suf-
fice. We were at grips with a stubborn and
bitter enemy. We had to sustain the morale
of the South Vietnamese, hunt down the en-
emy's regular forces, guard against his guer-
rillas, strike at the military sources of his
aggression, and, all the while, help with the
political and economic development of South
Viet-Nam.
In the face of such problems, what have
we accomplished since that short time ago?
In brief, much. Let me cite a part of the
record.
Record of U.S. Accomplishments
On the 1st of July 1965, only some 60,000
men of all services were deployed ashore
in Viet-Nam. Relatively few of these were
in combat units. By the first week of Janu-
ary 1967, 395,000 were ashore, with a very
great increase in fighting power and combat
support. For example: Army and Marine
Corps strengths alone had increased by some
266,000 men; combat maneuver elements had
gone up more than 400 percent; helicopter
maneuver capability had increased at least
fourfold; ground fire support was up by 600
percent; airstriking power had doubled; and
military engineer support had quadrupled.
The total numerical increase is impres-
sive in itself — nearly 330,000 — but much
more so when you recall that these are highly
trained men, fully prepared for their hard
and unique tasks. Many of them were civil-
ians a year and a half ago. Beyond this,
many of their units, including major ones,
did not exist in 1965 but are now fighting
in South Viet-Nam.
To give an idea of what is involved in put-
ting such numbers of skilled and dedicated
men into Viet-Nam, consider the following:
The total Armed Forces have increased in
strength by more than 650,000 men in the
past 18 months to support Viet-Nam and
our other commitments as well; the training
base in the United States — and this includes
major facilities and the men to operate them
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
187
— has been greatly expanded; in addition to
giving all men basic and specialist training,
creating some units, and bringing all units
to a high state of readiness, nearly 1 million
U.S. military personnel have received in-
struction in counterinsurgency and thou-
sands study the Vietnamese language each
year. Remember, too, that when our men
arrive in Viet-Nam, they are not only trained
and physically hardened, but they are also
specially supplied and equipped to cope with
the enemy they will face and the environ-
ment in which they will work or fight.
Difficult as it was to raise, train, equip,
and organize these forces, perhaps even
harder tasks were involved in moving them
and in preparing logistically for their em-
ployment. It was as if one were to move a
major American city some 10,000 miles,
place it in a radically new environment, and
expect that every aspect of its existence —
public and private — would be provided for
without delay or confusion and in the face
of dangers and difficulties such as its citizens
had never confronted before.
In the time frame I have cited, to move
more than 300,000 people over such a dis-
tance, somewhat more than half by sea and
the rest by air, involved major feats of plan-
ning, organization, and operation. We have
quite literally operated continual air and sea
trains from the United States for this pur-
pose and for resupply. Requirements have
been large. For example, passenger sealift
in support of Viet-Nam has increased fifteen-
fold, and commercial airlift to augment our
military means has expanded fourfold over
the same brief period.
In terms of military cargo, the effort is
equally impressive. Extrapolating from the
records we now have for the first 10 months
of 1966, in that year alone we airlifted some
200,000 short tons of supplies into Viet-Nam
and transported well over 8 million measure-
ment tons by sea. The sealift, from January
to October 1966 alone, amounted to over
1,000 shiploads, exceeding the cargo shipped
to Korea in 1951 during the height of that
war.
Meeting the Logistic Challenges
Despite these major successes, however,
perhaps the greatest logistic challenges of
all lay within Viet-Nam. From ports to air-
fields, from depots to maintenance facilities,
and from headquarters to troop cantonment
areas, virtually all of the modern structures
needed to support an operation of this mag-
nitude had to be constructed from near
scratch. The achievements in this field will be
the subject of future books. Let me sketch
just some of the outlines.
In the beginning there was essentially but
one port, Saigon. This, as you know, posed
serious problems for us. As someone said, in
the early days we proved conclusively that 10
ports in the United States can load ships
faster than 1 port can unload them in Viet-
Nam. By now, however, we have 10 ports of
various sizes, in various stages of develop-
ment, from Hue in the north to Can Tho
in the south. Saigon now handles only 31
percent of our cargo, while Da Nang and
Cam Ranh Bay, for example, handle 22 per-
cent and 19 percent, respectively.
Along with ports, a great need existed for
tactical and logistic airbases. At this time,
important airbases are being constructed or
improved at 24 locations, and the work on
air facilities to handle anything from heli-
copters up to jet transports has been prodi-
gious over the past year and a half.
The project at Cam Ranh Bay, with which
I am sure you are familiar, is representative
of the magnitude of effort. From a tiny
coastal port for primitive craft has now
evolved the largest logistic complex in Viet-
Nam, already including a major deep-water
port, large supply and maintenance facilities,
troop cantonments, and an airfield with a
10,000-foot permanent runway. Additionally,
three other associated tactical airbases, jet
capable, have been put in operation, and
much other construction goes forward.
As one other particularly graphic case in
point, a rice paddy 2 miles north of Saigon
was selected as a prospective deep-draft port.
Operational use began last October; this
month the first of the deep-draft berths
188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
should be operational, and by August of this
year the last of the four berths should be
completed.
Across the land, a vast variety of other
critical facilities have been completed or are
well advanced. Primary logistic depots are
underway at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam
Ranh, and Saigon. Brigade or equivalent
cantonments are being provided at 40 dif-
ferent locations. These works, all together,
now make it possible for us to support our
troops on a scope, and with an efficiency and
dispatch, hardly conceivable for one who saw
Viet-Nam in early days.
This logistic support can be measured in
many ways:
— There is the equipment which our men
use, largely new, unexcelled, in ample supply
with rare and temporary exception, and fit-
ted to the task at hand. (This is, I might
observe, the first war in my ken in which the
fruits of modern research and development
have appeared on the battlefield of the cur-
rent, rather than a future, conflict.)
— There is the modern-day Red Ball Ex-
press, a special Air Force lift of priority
items to Southeast Asia, which flew some
9,400 critically needed tons in its first year
of operation.
— There is the lifesaving air evacuation of
medical patients from South Viet-Nam —
over 25,000 in 1966.
— There are the millions of tons which
processed through the ports I have men-
tioned, 97 percent of all the supplies and
equipment sent to Viet-Nam.
— But perhaps most graphically of all,
there is the weight of firepower which we
have been able to employ to save American
and Allied lives. For example. General
[Moshe] Dayan, former Israeli Army Chief
of Staff, observed one small and brief battle
in which a Viet Cong regiment attacked a
South Korean company of 130 men. To pro-
tect that unit until help could arrive, Ameri-
can fire-support units laid down 21,000 shells
along a 200-yard-wide strip between jungle
and wire. That was, as General Dayan
pointed out, "more than the total volume of
artillery fire expended by the Israeli Army
during the Sinai campaign and the War of
Independence together."
Combat Operations
I have talked at length of logistic achieve-
ments because it is these which seem to be
least well known. But mention of fire sup-
port brings up the subject of combat opera-
tions. Young Americans, the much-maligned
products of our affluent society, have proved
their dedication, toughness, remarkable
valor, great good humor, and deep compas-
sion under the harshest, most complex cir-
cumstances. And the American Army, Navy,
Air Force, and Marine Corps — and let's not
forget the Coast Guard — have demonstrated
a collective professional skill which is per-
haps without parallel in the history of war-
fare.
These operations have exacted a toll: Over
6,700 Americans have died in battle in Viet-
Nam, and more than 38,000 have been
wounded in action. By the standards of other
wars, these are not heavy casualties. But in
terms of individual sacrifice, and by any
gage of human compassion, these are figures
of sorrow, heavily underlining the debt
which many men, in many lands, owe to the
young and the few of America.
At the same time, I would remind you that
people in other free nations — the Republic
of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and
New Zealand, for example — also have cause
for personal grief. And above all, there are
the sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese
in the defense of their homeland. Since Jan-
uary 1961, their military alone have lost
more men in action, in equivalent population
terms, than the total of American battle
deaths from the Revolutionary War to the
present day.
Like their allies, our men have fought with
great bravery. From July 1962 until mid-
December 1966, some 29,000 of them had re-
ceived awards for valor in Viet-Nam, and
more than 40,000 had received the Purple
Heart. Included among the highest decora-
tions were 11 Medals of Honor and 201
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
189
awards of the Distinguished Service Cross,
Navy Cross, and Air Force Cross.
While these men fought, many more were
engaged in the onerous, unsung jobs of sup-
port — supply, transportation, maintenance,
construction, communication, and so on.
Others engaged officially, or on their own
time, in the manifold tasks of advising the
Vietnamese and helping them with military
and civilian problems alike. As Chet Huntley
noted in a recent broadcast: "The American
soldier in Viet-Nam spends only a small por-
tion of his time in combat; many are never
in combat; but the major portion of his time
is spent in rescuing people, patching up peo-
ple, picking up kids, building irrigation sys-
tems, schools, dispensaries, roads, houses,
and whole villages. The American soldier in
Viet-Nam is a builder."
U.S. Gains Reflected in Many Ways
What has all this effort, sacrifice, bravery,
and dedication achieved? Not a final victory,
even on the battlefield, but a turnaround of
pessimism, an end to unimpeded invasion,
and a long forward step. These gains are re-
flected in many ways.
One of our primary needs was to improve
our intelligence, our knowledge of who and
where the enemy was. Sun Tze observed long
ago, "Know your enemy . . . and you can
fight a hundred battles without disaster."
Since 1965, there has been a dramatic im-
provement in the quality and quantity of our
intelligence. Actions extending from long-
range infantry patrols, to vastly expanded
aerial surveillance, to the use of new scien-
tific devices, and on to the institution of a
centralized automatic data processing sys-
tem have enabled us to find the enemy, an-
ticipate his actions, and make full use of our
mobility and firepower.
Our forces, increasingly strong, mobile,
well supplied, and armed with better intelli-
gence, have hunted down the enemy's main
units and fought "a hundred battles without
disaster." I have mentioned the early battle
in the la Drang Valley in which the newly
arrived 1st Cavalry Division fought the first
major North Vietnamese units to enter com-
bat. Those young, untested troopers inflicted
more than 1,500 fatalities on the enemy and
drove him out of Viet-Nam for the time.
Since then, all of our ground units have
pursued the aggressors, giving them no ha-
ven, no rest, and no chance to mount a single
major attack. As an example of many ac-
tions, the Marines last year, in Operations
Hastings and Prairie alone, inflicted over
2,000 confirmed fatalities on the North Viet-
namese Army. And last fall, in the former
sanctuary of Tay Ninh Province, the largest
ground operation of the war — Attleboro —
took place. The 1st Infantry Division, ele-
ments of the 25th Division, and the 196th
Brigade badly defeated three regiments of
tough Viet Cong. Over 1,100 enemy were
killed or captured, and vast quantities of en-
emy foodstuffs and war materiel were de-
stroyed.
In the air in South Viet-Nam, Air Force,
Marine, and Navy pilots gave the ground
soldier the greatest, most responsive, and
most effective air support in history. Every-
thing from the B-52 bomber to the single-
engine 0-1 observation plane has literally
been integrated with the actions of platoons,
companies, and battalions on the ground.
In the air over North Viet-Nam, gallant
airmen, attacking with great restraint and
precision in the face of intense antiaircraft
fire, have struck at the military facilities
supporting aggression.
And on the rivers and seas, naval ships
and craft have contributed their airpower
and gunpower and greatly reduced the
enemy's ability to move, reinforce, or resup-
ply-
How do we assess what these and many
other operations have achieved? Here are
some of the ways:
— Since the fall of 1965, enemy attacks
have fallen off in size, frequency, and dura-
tion. Where regimental attacks were once
common, and division attacks clearly pended,
we now find ourselves fighting mostly com-
panies and battalions. We estimate that their
battalions are now averaging only 1 day's
190
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
fighting per month. And where once the
enemy could sustain combat for a month at
a time, as in the la Drang, he now hits and
runs to avoid disaster.
— In the past year, in hundreds of engage-
ments, the enemy won no single major battle.
— Enemy captured on the battlefield rose
from 6,000 in 1965 to more than 9,000 in
1966.
— Enemy killed in action — confirmed fa-
talities — increased a minimum of 35 percent
in 1966.
— Enemy defectors under the Chieu Hoi
amnesty program increased in 1966 by 82
percent over the preceding year.
— Weapons captured on the battlefield in-
creased some 35 percent in 1966.
— Enemy supplies were captured or de-
stroyed in large quantities — for example, in
1966, enough rice to support nearly 80,000
men for a year.
— For the first time, farmers in the I and
II Corps areas were able to harvest and keep
most of their crops.
— Thousands of enemy trucks, railroad
cars, and vessels have been destroyed from
the air and sea. Much of his POL has gone
up in flames. Approximately 20 percent of
his total military forces are engaged in de-
fensive programs. Some 300,000 of his men
are engaged in repair, reconstruction, and
relocation. The effectiveness of our air cam-
paign is made increasingly clear by enemy
propaganda complaints. And now, to escape
it and to seek more propaganda fuel, he is
apparently turning his own population into
hostages by placing military materiel and
installations in the midst of heavily peopled
towns and areas.
— Even "revolutionary development," paci-
fication, that program whose success is cru-
cial to enduring security and progress for the
Vietnamese, has taken forward steps. First
of all, there is the relatively recent military
protection which we have been able to give
to this effort. Secondly, a major Vietnamese
cadre training program is in full swing, and
457 cadre teams of 59 men each are already
at work. Thirdly, elements of the Vietnamese
Army are being trained to complement the
cadre teams and provide a shield behind
which they can function. And finally, the
enemy tide is beginning to recede.
In this latter regard, recall the situation
in 1965, when major U.S. units were first in-
troduced. In the I Corps area, the Viet Cong
had moved into the coastal lowlands and
were beginning to isolate Da Nang and Hue.
In the II Corps region, the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese units moved with total
freedom and were on the verge of overrun-
ning several provincial capitals. In III and
IV Corps, the Viet Cong were moving unim-
peded between war zones C and D, then
sanctuaries, and the critical delta areas. In
each of these areas now the tide is running
out on the enemy and the people are begin-
ning, tentatively, to sense and respond to
some degree of security.
Much remains to be done in revolutionary
development — a great part of the job, in fact
— but when a million South Vietnamese refu-
gees elect to leave Viet Cong areas and seek
safe haven with the Government of Viet-
Nam, as they have since our troops arrived
in 1965, the signs of the future look promis-
ing.
This has been a long recitation of success.
For each unit or effort I have mentioned, I
could have cited others equally important
and praiseworthy. On the other hand, I could
have detailed the problems unsolved, some
discouragements, and some failures. But
there has been more than enough of pessi-
mism, and I wanted to balance the ledger.
Making It Possible for Freedom To Triumph
What does it all mean, in sum ?
First of all, it does not mean that we have
won in Viet-Nam, or even that victory is
close at hand. The enemy is bitterly deter-
mined and supported by major outside
powers. And military success is only one in-
gredient of ultimate victory.
In other, nonmilitary, spheres there have
been achievements, too. The Government it-
self has shown energy and relative stability
after surviving the stress of political turmoil
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
191
in the spring of 1966. The free election and
the subsequent deliberations of the constitu-
ent assembly are hopeful omens. The Manila
Conference brought a new measure of unity,
resolve, and purpose to free Asia. But major
barriers, internal and external, still stand in
the way of prosperous peace for the Viet-
namese.
To me, our military achievements mean
these things:
— The enemy's chance for military victory
is gone.
— The enemy's freedom to steal, bully, and
terrorize has been reduced.
— The North Vietnamese have now learned
that there is an increasing toll to pay for
aggression.
— The South Vietnamese now know that
security is more than a dream, and tangible
opportunities for a promising future have
come into view.
— Americans have committed themselves
to a principle in Viet-Nam. They have
worked with success and fought with honor
to sustain it. In a brief span of time, they
have achieved much militarily — the first task
— and the door is now open to success in
other fields. In an editorial last fall. The
Economist discussed the influence which
America was successfully exerting against
the Communists in Asia, particularly in
Viet-Nam. That distinguished British
journal observed: "Five years ago a stable
south-east Asia looked like a pipe dream.
Now there may be a chance of bringing peace
to that shattered region." The Economist
added that ". . . the greatest contribution
has been made by the American deployment
in Vietnam." I think there is this chance for
stability and peace, and I agree that this is
largely the achievement of our men in Viet-
Nam.
The need, now and in the future, is for
persistence and determination. There is a bit
of old Arabic philosophy which is pertinent:
Nothing in the world can take the place of per-
sistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common
than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not;
unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education
will not; the world is full of educated derelicts.
Persistence and determination are omnipotent.
What we have done in Viet-Nam, espe-
cially in the past year and a half, is to make
it possible for freedom to triumph. If we de-
termine to persist, the recent past can be
prolog to victory.
Correction
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call
attention to the following printer's error in
the issue of January 23, 1967.
The fifth paragraph in the first column on
page 137 should read:
" — There is doubt that America's vital inter-
ests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to
necessitate the growing commitment there."
192
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Thailand and Southeast Asia
by Graham Martin
Ambassador to Thailand ^
It is very pleasant to be invited to talk
with you again at the beginning of the New-
Year. It is also appropriate to respond to the
request of this peculiarly representative in-
stitution, the American Chamber of Com-;
merce, to again review with you the year
that has closed. Also, at the request of some
of you, I will again venture a tentative ap-
praisal of what is ahead of us in the year
now beginning.
I am quite conscious of the necessity — as
the senior American in Thailand, carrying
the responsibility, as the President's repre-
sentative, for all that the United States does
here in its civilian and military programs —
to give as complete a report and as honest an
appraisal as I possibly can.
It is a very dii!icult thing, and it is often
an occupationally dangerous thing, to at-
tempt too much precision in one's estimates
of future events. For example, the phrase of
Winston Churchill, "a riddle wrapped in a
mystery inside an enigma," is certainly ap-
plicable to the convulsions we are witnessing
today in mainland China. One can only hope
that out of this agony of a people, with whom
our own nation has historic bonds of friend-
ship and mutual respect, may soon come a
regime which will permit the pragmatic and
creative genius of the Chinese people and
the vast richness of the Chinese cultural her-
itage to again become engaged in the cooper-
ative progress of the rest of mankind. It is
' Address made before the American Chamber of
Commerce at Bangkok, Thailand, on Jan. 18 (press
release 11 dated Jan. 23).
certain that this will happen eventually. It
may happen sooner than we now dare to an-
ticipate.
One can speak with much more certainty
about the underlying deep convictions of
one's own country and the courses of action
which will certainly flow from those convic-
tions. And this is possible despite the
stridency of the debate within our open
society which may momentarily obscure the
inevitability of our actions. Last year I said
we could accept certain basic realities as
constant. And as we look back, we find this
to have been true.
As you may recall, the stridency of a
highly vocal minority within our own coun-
try then had, in the minds of some of you,
brought into question the validity of the
American commitment in Southeast Asia.
I said last January that the American com-
mitment to assist the peoples of Southeast
Asia was a determined commitment, a solidly
dependable commitment, a commitment sup-
ported by the great majority of our people,
a commitment supported now even by those
who may have doubted, a decade ago, the
wisdom of our making it. For deeply in-
grained in our American heritage, as a part
of the fiber of our very being, is the memory
of that small and gallant band who, in
declaring their independence from an op-
pressive colonial rule, pledged not only their
lives and their fortunes but threw into the
scales another perhaps even more precious
possession, their "sacred Honor."
It is no more conceivable today than it
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
193
was in 1776 that our country would dishonor
such a commitment. We will grumble about
it. We will complain that we would much
rather be doing more constructive things,
but, as we have always done, in the end we
will do what is necessary to be done. We will
keep our word. We will honor the commit-
ment.
I also said last year aggression would not
be tolerated or accommodated in the inter-
ests of convenience and expediency. We have
made no such accommodation. I also said
that Mao's theory of "the people's war," or
as formulated elsewhere, "wars of just liber-
ation," could not prevail against our country
and its allies. It has not, and it will not. And
I ventured to forecast that as these realities
of the constancy of the American commit-
ment and of the American performance be-
came evident, we could anticipate that the
engagement of Asian energies in increasingly
effective patterns of regional cooperation
would startle all of us by their rapidly ac-
celerating momentum. And this we have cer-
tainly seen in full measure.
Failure of Hanoi's Propaganda Campaign
In the course of the past year we have
seen in Viet-Nam a maximum effort by the
North Vietnamese to inflict a Dien Bien Phu
type of victory on the forces of the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam and its allies. The
forces of Hanoi and the Viet Cong had de-
luded themselves into thinking that the time
had come to move to the classic third phase.
Having attempted to destroy the very fabric
of government and of society itself by an
incredibly callous and brutal campaign of
assassination and terror, one could move to
defeat the main forces of one's enemy. But
it just didn't work out that way.
Instead, South Vietnamese and American
forces crushed the North Vietnamese regular
forces and the Viet Cong wherever they
would stand and do battle. More than that,
the so-called redoubt areas, which had here-
tofore been their safe havens and their
storehouses of vast quantities of muni-
tions and rice, were progressively denied to
them. Their rice ration grows smaller and
their munitions more scarce. Instead of be-
ing welcomed, they are vigorously resisted
by the South Vietnamese. The result is an
increasing number of defectors each telling
his tale of the malnutrition, the hardships,
and the disillusionment that is setting in.
Whether under such circumstances it is
possible to gear back down to a lower phase
of insurgency is doubtful indeed. It is in-
creasingly evident that more and more of
the North Vietnamese soldiers in the South
are realizing the impossibility of attaining
the goal of their doctrinaire masters in
Hanoi.
When their masters in Hanoi will reach
the same conclusion is not yet clear. It seems
they are still counting on the efficacy of
their primary weapon: a propaganda cam-
paign so cleverly orchestrated on a world-
wide basis that some sincere and well-
meaning people have unwittingly become
involved in spreading an absurd collection
of distortions. Here again one can venture
a conclusion with confidence. It is that this
campaign cannot succeed. Our people have
an instinctive ability to cut through such
technique and to reject the phony. It takes
a little time, but in the end the reaction is
to cut through to the truth.
I do not, therefore, see in the propaganda
campaign a serious danger to the validity
of our commitment to Southeast Asia. I do,
however, see in it a source of encouragement
to Hanoi to hang on to what is clearly a
losing cause in the hope that propaganda will
persuade us to grasp defeat out of the mouth
of victory.
Validity of U.S. Goals in Asia
I have often thought that a curious side
effect of these distortions is that they some-
times obscure the validity of much simpler
goals of American policy than those of utter
perfection that are sometimes set for us by
commentators who do not have the responsi-
bility for achieving them.
This is best illustrated by a long conver-
sation I had recently with an eminent Euro-
pean journalist I had come to know well in
my 10 years in Europe. He had just returned
194
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
from a journey through Asia, including a
stay in Saigon. He said he never ceased to
be fascinated with the peculiar masochistic
attitude Americans adopted about their en-
gagement abroad. I started to bristle. He
said, "Don't argue yet — just listen." He went
on to say that listening from Europe to the
public dialog in the United States, one could
only conclude that Americans were on the
verge of disaster in South Viet^Nam, that
Americans were vastly unpopular in Asia,
that there was no clear aim to American
policy, that we were determined on an esca-
lation that would be uncontrollable. He said
that he could go on with such a list, but I
probably knew more items to include than
did he. I said I had heard a few more items.
He said most of the rest of the world
looked at it quite differently. He said the rest
of the world assumed our primary objective
to be the denial of Southeast Asia to Com-
munist Chinese hegemony. He said it was
quite clear to everyone except ourselves, and
possibly Hanoi and Peking, that we had
already achieved this objective. He said he
thought historians would quite likely regard
what we had done in Viet-Nam as the crucial
turning point in the life of the developing
two-thirds of the world. He said that if Com-
munist China had succeeded in this attempt,
it would have led to such a complete valida-
tion of "the thought of Mao Tse^tung" that
a nuclear confrontation might have become
inevitable. He said that our firm stand in
South Viet-Nam has led directly to the al-
most complete elimination of Communist
Chinese influence from Africa and Latin
America. He said that Mao believed that the
techniques of the "war of just liberation"
could not be contained by the most powerful
nation the world had ever known. Had Mao
been proved correct, then Africa and Latin
America as well as Asia would have certainly
been engulfed by this technique.
Anyway, he said, whether Americans real-
ize they have already achieved this goal or
not, it is quite evident that all Asia realizes
it and is already acting on this conviction in
the creation of a new Asia — a free Asia with
increasingly effective patterns of cooperation
in economic and social fields. These would, he
thought, lead inevitably to a closer political
cohesion which in turn would provide the
patterns for an Asian security arrangement
that would allow them to handle their own
security.
He went on to say that American policy in
Asia and the Pacific was on the verge of a
success as great as in Europe in the fifties.
He reminded me that the same sort of at-
tacks were made by Americans on American
policy then as are being made now. He said
he still found it fascinating that while Amer-
icans were sometimes irritating in their in-
sistence on their superiority in so many
ways, they consistently underrated their ac-
complishments abroad. As a matter of fact,
he said, America has handled its unequaled
power with great imagination, its vast mili-
tary strength with ingenuity and with enor-
mous restraints. Its leaders have somehow
begun to master the most difficult lesson of
those who are chosen to govern — the ability
to tightly control a vast mechanism which,
historically, has often developed a momentum
and direction of its own.
The most important thing of all, he said,
is that in validating your commitment in full
as you are doing, you are insuring the credi-
bility of your commitments elsewhere. And
in so doing it is obvious that your people
have acquired the patience to see the job
through. He concluded his monolog by saying
that destiny has apparently chosen your
country to lead, for a while at least. And it
begins to look as if you might be worthy
of the choice.
• • • • •
I agree with him that the last year has
brought a great change to the situation in
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. The Commu-
nist aggressor once struggled for a victory
which he could not obtain. He is now strug-
gling to avert a defeat he cannot avoid.
While there is much grim work still to be
done in South Viet-Nam, the issue is now
certain. And those of us who live in Bangkok
have had the good fortune to watch the birth
of the new Asia of which my friend spoke.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
195
Asian Cooperative Efforts
I believe history will record more fully
than do our media the important contribu-
tion made by our friend and colleague here
in Bangkok, His Excellency U Nyun, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of ECAFE. Among his
many accomplishments for the welfare of
the peoples of Asia will be recorded his pa-
tient, determined, and persistent diplomacy
which was primarily responsible for bringing
into being the new Asian Development Bank
and which is now pushing the Mekong de-
velopment scheme into an accelerating mo-
mentum.
Within the year, we saw here in Bangkok
the months of patient work by the Commit-
tee of Ambassadors under the leadership of
the Thai Foreign Minister which led to the
meeting in Seoul where nine Asian nations
formed the Asian and Pacific Council. We
shall see this new organization hold its
second meeting here in Bangkok this year.
It was here in Bangkok that we saw the re-
activation of the Association of Southeast
Asia, founded in 1961 but interrupted by the
difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia.
That meeting could not have taken place
without the prior settlement of these difficul-
ties which had also led to strained relations
between Malaysia and the Philippines. The
reconciliation of Indonesia and Malaysia, pro-
moted by the patient, infinitely skillful and
selfless diplomacy of Thailand, climaxed In-
donesia's rejection of communism and the
return of reason to that nation's internal
and foreign affairs.
It was here in Bangkok this year that the
Foreign Minister of Thailand, joined by his
colleagues from the Philippines and Malay-
sia, launched the first wholly Asian move to
settle the Vietnamese war. It was in this con-
text that there was the first Asian call for
Japan to begin to assume a political role in
Asian regional affairs commensurate with its
abilities and economic strength.
In April the Conference on Asian Develop-
ment was convened in Tokyo at Japanese
initiative. It, like the Asian and Pacific
Council, will continue to meet regularly in
other Asian capitals. It is characteristic of
virtually all these newly organized regional
projects to broaden participation by sharing
responsibility for the planning and hosting
of conferences.
It was in Bangkok, for example, that the
first group of Southeast Asian Ministers of
Education met during November of 1965 to
explore the possibilities of regional coordi-
nation of educational programs and the shar-
ing of facilities. They met again last month
in Manila, where they approved formation of
a permanent secretariat. The dozen cooper-
ative educational projects which they voted
to support include the creation of an Asian
Institute of Technology, to be located in
Thailand; an Agricultural Institute, to be
located in the Philippines; and an Institute
of Tropical Medicine.
These are but a few of the many coopera-
tive projects which have been instituted or
given new momentum under Asian leadership
during the past year. Some, like the gigantic
Mekong River development project, are well
established. Others are but exploratory stir-
rings of the rising Asian urge to get on with
the business of orderly regional growth
through the collective engagement of Asian
resources. The breadth of these activities is
as impressive as it is little known. These new
cooperative efforts extend not only into such
fields as irrigation, hydroelectric power,
transportation, communication, natural re-
sources exploration, scientific and technical
research, experimental agriculture, and qual-
ity manufacturing controls but also into the
fields of coordinated economic planning and
cooperative fiscal policies.
I know of no more succinct assessment of
the meaning of these developments than that
voiced last July by the President of the
United States. In a speech reviewing Asia's
remarkable rate of recent progress, Presi-
dent Johnson said: ^
. . . this is the new Asia, and this is the new
spirit we see taking shape behind our defense of
South Viet-Nam. Because we have been firm, be-
cause we have committed ourselves to the defense
' For text, see BtiLLETiN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.
196
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of one small country, others have taken new heart.
... we never intend to let [them] down. America's
word will always be good.
The trend has been revealed with great
clarity also by His Excellency Thanat Kho-
man, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, who
last October, in New York City, said:
The smaller nations in Southeast Asia have felt
the need of getting closer with one another. If
division has been the characteristic of the past and
had brought about g^rievous losses of freedom and
independence and had allowed interference and
pressure by outside powers, the future aims should
be for closer and more fruitful cooperation and
integration. While such cooperation should be basi-
cally regional, it is not in our interest to make it
exclusive. Outside elements may have a role to play
but not a domineering or dominating role. If any-
thing, it will be a cooperation on the basis of equal-
ity and partnership.
If this then is the prevailing mood and
outlook of the new Asia, let us give credit
where credit is most assuredly due:
First, to the people and the leaders of
Asia, because they have upheld both their
values and their resolve through long years
of uncertainty and disorder.
Second, to those American leaders who
have perceived that Asians want nothing
more from us than the opportunity to deliver
themselves not only from the age-old, im-
mobilizing fear of Chinese exploitation but
from poverty, illiteracy, sickness, and shriv-
eled opportunities.
There is no mistaking what accounts for
the upsurge in feelings of good will and con-
fidence toward the United States throughout
the Asian region. It has been America's ex-
tension of more imaginative, more meaning-
ful assistance and support for Asia's own
initiatives, Asia's own solutions, Asia's own
priorities, and Asia's own defenses.
Nothing illustrates better the effect of this
approach than the responsiveness evoked in
the course of President Johnson's recent
Asian tour. For it brought forth from mil-
lions in this region great waves of spon-
taneous affection toward the man whose
words and actions have come to be associated
with their own advances toward a better life.
The President's visit gave the people of
Asia an opportunity to confirm the essential
rightness of American policy in Asia. They
seized that opportunity by rendering him a
unique welcome. I do not hesitate to predict
that historians will record it as an illumi-
nating, catalytic event which raised the cur-
tain on an era of unprecedented, mutually
advantageous cooperation between Asia and
the West. For what was demonstrated by the
warmth and public enthusiasm of the Presi-
dent's reception everywhere, and what was
underscored repeatedly for all the world to
see, is that the forces of neutralism, anti-
colonialism, and regional dissension are no
longer significant factors in Asian affairs.
The argument, by Americans oddly enough,
that U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese war
would make it hated throughout Asia was
shown to be wholly false.
The reality of the situation, as we have
seen, is quite the contrary. The trend is
toward greater willingness to move in con-
cert with others to devise a lasting, essen-
tially Asian counterweight to Chinese power
in the area. The motivating force for this is
not Asian self-aggrandizement. It is simply
the impatience of Asians for a peace in which
to build their nations, provide for their fam-
ilies, plot more satisfying lives, and lift the
horizons of future generations.
Asian efforts to unify and fortify the re-
gion have begun to move so fast, in fact, that
the danger now exists that American and
Western adjustments to such dramatic and
constructive change will fall behind. Free
Asia has reached the point where it is pre-
pared to associate itself with new Western
initiatives which complement its own. But
how many nations are prepared to propose
and follow through on the wholly equitable
terms a self-reliant and united Asia right-
fully will demand ? Westerners cannot expect
to operate in Asia in the future on terms
that existed in the past. But it would be a
pessimist indeed who could not see the newly
compelling opportunities for fruitful coopera-
tion which Asians are providing in the course
of coordinated regional reformation and de-
velopment. The question now is whether
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
197
America and others have mastered the tech-
nique of full and equal partnership in Asia.
Pattern of Thai-American Relations
As America and others in the West look
for answers to that question, I would hold
that the pattern of Thai-American relations
offers a sound basis on which effective for-
mulas can be devised. It has been the tradi-
tion of Thai-American relations, for over a
century and a half, to set exemplary stand-
ards in terms of the mutual understanding
and respect which are essential in contacts
between nations, particularly between those
whose disparities in their size and power
are significant.
As the Foreign Minister of Thailand ob-
served last May, "Our relationship stands
out as a remarkable example of how a small
nation can work with a great power without
being dominated or indeed losing its iden-
tity."
It was his hope, he emphasized, that Thai-
American collaboration would become what
the Foreign Minister termed "a model to an
orderly and peaceful development of the rela-
tionship between nations, large and small, in
this part of the world — relationships which
will not entail subservience of one to the
other, but rather mutually trustworthy and
fruitful partnership and cooperation."
I share completely the opinions of my Thai
colleague on the techniques of enlightened
diplomacy and international cooperation.
Nothing is more important in the modern
world than the psychological relations be-
tween nations, particularly the patterns of
style, attitude, and behavior which become es-
tablished in the solution of common problems
through intimate, complex, and sensitive as-
sociations. The basis on which Thailand and
the United States conduct their relations
takes those considerations into full account.
We practice earnest solicitation and consider-
ation of each other's opinions on all matters
of common concern. We acknowledge mutual
responsibility for the outcome of joint efforts.
And, most importantly, we cultivate an at-
mosphere of full trust within a genuinely
equitable partnership.
Now, there are no doubts among you here
in Bangkok as to whether Thailand brings as
much to that partnership as she receives.
There are a great many voluntary and recip-
rocal actions which could . be cited. To ex-
amine only one of them, we might choose
Thailand's contribution to the military effec-
tiveness of her American and South Viet-
namese allies, which is a part of her ongoing
heavy support of SEATO objectives.
As you know, the Royal Thai Government
has permitted the use of its bases by ele-
ments of the United States Armed Forces en-
gaged in carrying out defensive measures
under the obligations both Governments had
assumed under the SEATO treaty. These
bases at Korat, Ubon, Nakom Phanon,
Udorn, Takhli, and U-Tapao have been a
major contribution to the Allied war effort.
It is impossible to estimate how many thou-
sand Allied lives have been saved in South
Viet-Nam as a direct result of Thailand's co-
operation. But one needs only to sample the
enraged stream of propaganda protests
beamed at Thailand by Peking and Hanoi to
conclude that our concerted actions hurt them
painfully.
The Thai facilities which have played such
a critical role in the defense of South Viet-
Nam did not appear miraculously or mysteri-
ously, simply because of the free world's ur-
gent need for them. Those installations were
put in place by Thailand much earlier, in
the course of long-term military prepared-
ness efforts undertaken in its own defense
and in response to its obligations as a highly
conscientious member of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization.
The complex of modern military logistical
facilities now available in Thailand is the
result of a combined effort that has been
made within the SEATO framework to pro-
vide for the defense of the treaty area. The
United States continues to play its role with-
in SEATO by taking an active part in the
maintenance and improvement of those facil-
ities. Thus, among the 35,283 members of the
American Armed Forces in Thailand, as of
January 5 there were some 8,000 engaged in
198
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the construction and maintenance of strategic
roadways, communications networks, port
facilities, military supply depots, and other
installations which have been judged by
SEATO members to be essential for the
security of this area.
At the same time, the U.S. continues its
16-year-old program to assist in the training
and equipment of Thailand's armed forces.
As long-range Communist plans for Thai-
land's subversion, announced by Peking some
time ago, are accelerated, Thai-U.S. coopera-
tion under the military assistance program
has taken these new tactics into account. An
American Special Forces unit has been de-
ployed here on a training mission which will
give Thailand additional military units
skilled in counterinsurgency operations. At
Thai request, a company of unarmed Ameri-
can helicopters has been temporarily operat-
ing in the northeast to provide the all-
important elements of mobility and logistical
flexibility for Thai security units. The
American unit's mission is best described as
a "taxi service," which has been available to
Thai civilian and military authorities en-
gaged in the numerous economic, social, and
security development programs Thailand
has organized to protect and benefit its
people in the remote areas. In the next 2
weeks these airlift missions will be taken
over by the Thai Government, using its own
new aircraft, flown and serviced by newly
graduated helicopter pilots and ground
maintenance crews.
I might add for the record that neither
the Special Forces and other American train-
ing personnel nor these temporarily provided
helicopters have participated in actual coun-
terinsurgency combat operations. The Thai
have insisted that this is their responsibility
which they will meet with their own armed
forces. The helicopters are therefore being
assigned to other duties by the Secretary of
Defense at the end of this month in accord-
ance with arrangements made on their ar-
rival last August.
It is in these and other unsensational ways
that the United States has moved to help
strengthen this country militarily and to as-
sist a government deeply conscious of its
responsibilities for protecting its own and
neighboring people.
As you know, the Royal Thai Government
has decided to add to the Royal Thai Air
Force and Royal Thai Navy units, now en-
gaged with their other free- wo rid allies in
resisting aggression in South Viet-Nam, an
additional fighting force from the Royal Thai
Army. They will be warmly welcomed by
their other SEATO allies, who learned of
their courage and valor when they fought
as allies in the United Nations command in
Korea.
In summary, our mission here is not to
oversee or involve ourselves in the internal
military and civilian aff'airs which are the
exclusive business of the Thai themselves.
Our mission is to perform as trusted friend,
discreet confidant, and dependable ally and
where we can to make available from our
experience and resources those things which
Thailand judges to be applicable and bene-
ficial to its own development and security.
And it is a similar approach, I submit,
that will enable America to associate itself
most fully with the new order that has begun
to emerge so rapidly within free Asia. The
old order is passing. Its death rattle can be
heard in the jungles of Viet-Nam, just as the
new era can be glimpsed in Asia's busy con-
ference halls.
The United States has traveled a long,
challenging, and burdensome way to reach
this point. The final miles may prove to be
a bit rough because they feature a bitter,
complicated struggle against fanatical ex-
tremists. But we now know what our role
entails. We know that it need not overtax
our resources. We do know that the Amer-
ican people have the patience and the deter-
mination we will need to carry out our com-
mitments. If there is any important element
still missing from the American commitment
to keep Southeast Asia secure, I would sug-
gest that it is confidence in ourselves, con-
fidence in the future of Asia, and pride that
we have made that future possible by meet-
ing our commitments, not only to Asia but
to our ancient obligation to freedom.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
199
AID Report on Viet-Nam Commodity Programs
Submitted to President Johnson
Folloiving is a letter of transmittal to
President Johnson from William S. Gaud,
Administrator of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development, together with the text
of a report on the management of AID com-
modity programs in Viet-Nam in 1966.
letter of transmittal
9 January 1967
Dear Mr. President: I submit here-
with a year-end report on the management
of AID commodity assistance programs in
Vietnam and what we are doing to improve
their effectiveness and prevent their misuse.
Such a special report seemed desirable to
me because of the magnitude of our Vietnam
aid program and the difficult wartime cir-
cumstances under which it must be admin-
istered, unique in AID's experience. Effective
management of such large and complex pro-
grams would be a demanding task in any
developing country. It has been especially
demanding in a country whose economy,
social structure, communications and trans-
portation have been dislocated by a long war.
Rapid expansion of these programs to meet
urgent requirements in 1966 compounded
the management task.
The U.S. has provided about $455 million
in food, equipment and other civil aid sup-
plies during 1966 to support "revolutionary
development" activities in the rural areas,
fight inflation throughout the country, estab-
lish the foundation for long-term develop-
ment, and provide medical and relief supplies
to the victims of communist terror and ag-
gression.
To administer this expanding program, the
AID Mission staff had to be doubled during
the year. New systems, procedures and con-
trols were adopted to strengthen safeguards
against abuses and facilitate handling of sup-
plies. These include exchange devaluation
and reforms in import procedures made by
the Government of Vietnam, major changes
in AID'S Commercial Import Program opera-
tions, expansion and improvement of phys-
ical facilities and management of the Viet-
namese ports, a large increase in U.S. ad-
visory services and auditing staffs, and
improvements in documentation and infor-
mation systems.
Among the most important specific actions
taken were:
— assignment of the U.S. Army's 1st
Logistic Command to supervise the handling
of almost all AID project commodities from
ship discharge to Government warehouses;
— assignment of the 125th Terminal Com-
mand as an advisory unit to the Vietnamese
director of the Port of Saigon;
— doubling the AID Mission's auditing
staff and the assignment of controllers and
traveling auditors to all regions;
— assignment of a U.S. Bureau of Customs
team to assist the Vietnamese Customs Office
in improving its procedures and spot-check-
ing AID-financed commercial imports;
— a decision to station American logistics
advisors in provincial and regional ware-
houses; and
— development of an automated arrival ac-
counting system for AID's commercial im-
ports.
Nonetheless, as generally happens in war-
time, there has been some illegal diversion
or other loss of aid supplies to Vietnam.
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Any such loss is deplorable, even in wartime,
and I know that you have been concerned, as
have I and my staff, with the necessity of
assuring that large amounts of AID-financed
commodities are not stolen or otherwise di-
verted. This report summarizes our work
on that problem. It reviews the AID Mis-
sion's estimates of the recent and current
rates of loss in the major program categories
and measures to reduce these losses.
These estimates, which are the most com-
prehensive and carefully reviewed findings
available, indicate that in recent months no
more than 5-6% of all U.S. economic assist-
ance commodities delivered to Vietnam were
stolen or otherwise diverted.
Though these rates of loss are comparable
to or lower than losses in other war zones
under less difficult conditions, they are by no
means acceptable and we are doing our best
to reduce them further. Management im-
provements now in force or being initiated
are expected to reduce losses substantially
over the coming year. I am confident that my
next report to you will reflect further im-
provement in the management and effective-
ness of the AID commodity programs.
Sincerely yours,
William S. Gaud
TEXT OF REPORT
I. Introduction
AID has undertaken in Vietnam a war-
time economic assistance program unprece-
dented in its magnitude and intensity.
In late 1965, it became necessary to in-
crease vastly the AID and Food for Peace
commodity programs in order to bolster the
Vietnamese economy against inflationary
pressures resulting from the U.S. and Viet-
namese military buildup, to provide greater
support to the "revolutionary development"
program in the rural areas, and to furnish
relief and medical supplies to refugees and
other victims of the "shooting war."
To be effective, our response to these ur-
gent requirements had to be full and fast.
Obligation of funds and the initiation of or-
ders for the programs had to be started at
once, even before all the personnel needed to
manage them were on the job in Vietnam.
The AID American staff of "direct-hire" per-
sonnel stationed in Vietnam or in training
on January 1, 1966, numbered about 700; by
December 31, 1966, it had nearly doubled. At
the same time, AID and the Government of
Vietnam undertook a variety of economic
measures, reforms and procedures to man-
age more effectively this massive and com-
plex flow of commodities.
During calendar year 1966, the period cov-
ered in this report, actual disbursements for
AID and Food for Peace program goods
shipped to Vietnam totaled $455 million,
compared with $266 million in 1965. Opera-
tion and control of a program of this size
in a less developed country would be diffi-
cult in time of peace under relatively stable
social and economic conditions. South Viet-
nam in 1966 presented far greater problems.
It was in every sense disjointed by war, its
modest transportation capacity disrupted
and insecure, its public and private manage-
ment ranks thinned, its system of deterring
corruption inadequate.
To meet the requirements of the Viet-
namese economy and civil counterinsurgency
effort, well over 150,000 different commod-
ities had to be procured, shipped and dis-
tributed — items as large as huge gas tur-
bine generators and manufacturing plant
machinery and as small as sewing needles,
as complex as specially designed industrial
engines and as "simple" as shiploads of rice.
Nearly 3 million tons of economic assistance
goods were shipped to Vietnam during 1966
— the equivalent of 900 shiploads.
This report summarizes the nature and
purposes of the AID commodity programs,
describes the economic, managerial and logis-
tical problems that have had to be overcome,
and enumerates the economic measures,
physical facilities and operational systems
which have been or are being created to cope
with these problems. The report deals sepa-
rately with commodities which are intended
for sale in Vietnam's commercial markets
(part II) and those which are intended for
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
201
use in projects or relief programs (part III).
In both sections, the flow of goods is ex-
amined from arrival in Vietnam to the pro-
gram destinations.
Special attention is directed throughout
to the problems of loss, theft or other diver-
sion of AID-funded commodities and correc-
tive measures. Losses of economic assistance
goods in Vietnam are estimated by our
Mission at no more than .5 to 6 percent over-
all in recent months. This aggregate is de-
rived from estimates, using several separate
methods, of between 2 and 5 percent of com-
mercial imports (which accounted in 1966
for 85 percent of the total commodity flow),
and estimates of between 10 and 15 percent
of the far smaller amount of project and
relief commodities which must be distributed
to every province, often through insecure
territory. These rates of loss are believed to
be no more, and perhaps less, than that suf-
fered in other wartime conditions. However,
such losses are unacceptable to AID. They
are being reduced now by new measures in
the Saigon port and will be reduced through-
out the internal logistic system by other
measures recently adopted. The physical con-
trol and management systems already in-
stalled or decided upon are outlined below.
A separate section addresses economic war-
fare, the effort to frustrate the Viet Cong ex-
ploitation of local supply sources including
U.S. economic and military aid supplies.
II. strengthening the Vietnamese Economy:
The Commercial Import and Food for
Peace Programs
A. Combating Inflation
About 85 percent of the economic aid
goods sent to Vietnam in 1966 were com-
mitted to the fight against destructive infla-
tion. To the extent that imports could
moderate domestic shortages, this AID com-
mei-cial import program and Food for Peace
program succeeded.
With over two-thirds of its able-bodied
men in the 20-30 year age group absorbed
by the war eff'ort, cities swollen by refugees,
internal transportation disrupted and much
of the agricultural area a battleground.
South Vietnam's capacity to provide goods
and services for its own population has been
drastically reduced. The shortage of domestic
goods and services was compounded by an
increase of over 130 percent during 1965-
1966 in the amount of piasters in circulation,
funds spent primarily in support of the war
eff'ort for salaries and expenditures of Viet-
namese soldiers, policemen, civil servants
and construction workers, and of U.S. troops
and military contractors. If this increase in
purchasing power were not offset by an in-
crease in the inflow of goods, prices of scarce
commodities would be bid up rapidly and a
runaway inflation would undermine morale
and cause extreme social inequity, jeopard-
izing the whole defense effort.
U.S. provision of commodities through the
commercial import and Food for Peace pro-
grams gives the disrupted South Vietnamese
economy additional dollar resources to fi-
nance more imports, supplementing the
foreign currency resources it earns through
normal financial transactions. These pro-
grams provide food, fertilizer, construction
materials, machinery — thousands of items
needed to keep the economy operating and
expanding. The sale of these imported goods
and domestic and customs revenue collections
absorb piasters and reestablish the balance
between money and goods in the marketplace.
In late 1965 the existing AID commercial
import program (CIP) and Title I sales of
the Food for Peace program were rapidly
expanded to meet this critical need.
B. Hoiv the CIP and Title I Programs Func-
tion
The Government of Vietnam (GVN) con-
trols imports of commodities for commercial
sale in the country through a licensing sys-
tem. After a license has been issued by the
GVN and before AID approves U.S. funding
of the import under the CIP, an AID com-
modity analyst reviews the order with special
attention to four factors:
— Is the applicant an authorized importer
not under suspension?
— Is the commodity a nonluxury item ?
— Could the enemy adapt such commodity
202
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to use as an item of critical importance?
— Is the size of the order reasonable in
terms of the current Vietnamese market de-
mand?
If the order is approved, the AID analyst
assists the importer in preparing an invita-
tion for proposals. The importer then entei's
into an agreement with the most qualified
responsive bidder, who ships the goods to the
importer. The supplier is paid by AID in
dollars. The importer deposits the piaster
equivalent of the cost of the goods in a
"counterpart fund," which is jointly admin-
istered by the U.S. and Vietnamese Govern-
ments to support sections of the GVN mili-
tary and civil budgets.
The goods themselves are received by the
importer through customs, almost always at
the Port of Saigon, and disseminated
throughout the Vietnamese economy. The
presence of AID's "clasped hands" symbol
on these commodities sold in shops through-
out Vietnam has frequently been misin-
terpreted as an indication of the diversion
of AID material meant for free distribution
or use in projects. It is, on the contrary,
tangible evidence that the CIP effort is
succeeding.
Most Food for Peace commodities brought
to Vietnam for sale under Title I of that
program are handled in precisely the same
manner as other CIP goods. Title I rice,
however, is treated differently. Approxi-
mately 59 percent of the rice is off-loaded at
the Port of Saigon by the U.S. Army's 4th
Terminal Command and placed in a GVN
rice warehouse, while the remaining 41 per-
cent is landed at the ports of Da Nang, Qui
Nhon and Nha Trang. The Vietnamese
Government then distributes the rice as
follows:
— Most is sold to merchants for local cur-
rency. They, in turn, distribute it in the rice
deficit areas in normal commercial channels.
— About 10 percent is turned over to the
Vietnamese armed forces to supplement
their diets.
— A small amount is sold directly by the
GVN to the public.
During calendar 1966, 422,000 metric tons
of rice, valued at approximately $58 million,
were exported to Vietnam under the Title I
program.
C. Reforms of the System
Vietnamese importers active in the CIP
and Food for Peace program, like business-
men elsewhere, strive to make the largest
sustainable profit.
Before 1965 it was not especially easy for
importers to manipulate the market because
the foreign exchange rate was fairly realistic
and smaller incomes and limited purchasing
power kept the demand for imports stable.
Following the rapid buildup of 1965, how-
ever, a combination of increased purchasing
power, saturated logistic facilities, increased
VC interdiction of internal distribution, an
exchange rate which had become unrealistic
and war-thinned civil government adminis-
tration created a situation in which importers
could collude with one another and with un-
scrupulous suppliers to generate windfall or
monopoly profits. Administrative price con-
trols proved ineffective or positively harmful.
In effect, the institutions of the import sec-
tor, operating under a body of regulations
adopted several years ago during a period of
relative stability, were shown in some in-
stances to be inadequate or counterproduc-
tive.
In the spring and summer of 1966 the
Governments of Vietnam and the United
States agreed on import reforms. Coupled
with the economic stabilization measures rec-
ommended by the International Monetary
Fund, these reforms, each discussed below,
reduced opportunities for profiteering and
corrected other abuses that had taken place
under the CIP.
1. Devaluation. On June 18 the Vietnam-
ese Government announced a new system of
exchange rates which raised the effective
cost of foreign exchange for imports from
60 to 118 piasters per dollar, plus duties.
While the primary purpose of devaluation
was to absorb excess liquidity and keep in-
flation within tolerable limits, additional
benefits were derived from the effect the new
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
203
exchange rate had on CIP transactions.
Doubling the piaster cost of foreign exchange
made illegal reexportation of CIP commodi-
ties unattractive and reduced the profit pos-
sibilities in such practices as overinvoicing.
2. Expavded Competition in the Commer-
cial Import Sector. Open general licensing
was adopted for the licensing of most im-
ports financed under the CIP, and with
Vietnamese-owned foreign exchange, and the
former system of administrative allocation of
foreign exchange on the basis of importer
quotas was abolished. New importers were
permitted to enter the previously closed im-
port community if they could demonstrate
that they were responsible firms, 70 percent
Vietnamese owned, and had at least 15 mil-
lion piasters of paid-in capital. They had to
prove that they had warehouse facilities
available, and they were required to deposit
1 million piasters with the Ministry of Na-
tional Economy as a surety bond against
illegal activities. To date the applications of
more than 170 new importers have been au-
thorized or are in process. This increase in
competition has been a healthy stimulus to
the economy.
3. Consolidated Procurement. As a de-
terrent to possible collusion between sup-
pliers and importers, to achieve economies in
procurement and to improve logistic manage-
ment, both Governments agreed to consoli-
dated procurement procedures for several
bulk commodities, including galvanized iron
sheet, white cement, newsprint, tinplate,
fertilizer and jute bags. These commodities,
and others which may be added in the future,
are now purchased by the U.S. General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA) acting as agent.
GSA procures under standard U.S. Govern-
ment procedures and arranges ocean trans-
portation — usually on vessels provided by
the U.S. Military Sea Transportation Serv-
ice.
Since GSA buys in large quantities, econ-
omies can be achieved in both procurement
and transportation. Consolidated shipments
help to relieve port congestion and expedite
customs clearance.
4. Broader Advertising of Procurement.
Under CIP regulations any transaction of
more than $10,000 must be advertised in a
circular published by the AID Office of Small
Business. This permits American suppliers
to learn of requirements and off'er bids. To
reduce the possibility of importers who want
to import more than $10,000 worth of goods
evading this requirement by applying for
separate import licenses of less than $10,000,
each general importer is now allowed only
three licenses under $10,000 in any 3-month
period.
The resulting increase in small business
advertising should bring about lower prices
due to increased competition. By reducing the
volume of import transactions this innova-
tion should also reduce the time required to
process import licenses and consolidate the
movement of commercial shipments through
the Port of Saigon.
5. Elimination of Agents' Commissions. In
the past, local agents' commissions have been
eligible for dollar financing under the CIP.
In order to reduce possible U.S. balance of
payments drain and the opportunity for
abuses such as illegal capital flight, AID has
made arrangements to cease financing of
commissions for any agents except those who
are U.S. citizens maintaining residence in
the United States.
D. Physical Control of Commercial Imports
in Saigon Port Area.
Nowhere has the military and civilian im-
port buildup which began in the summer of
1965 caused greater strains than at the Port
of Saigon. The port's physical equipment,
security facilities and documentation sys-
tems, though adequate to handle the flow
of cargo prior to 1965, were not designed
to cope with the extraordinary demands of
1966. Designed to handle 1.5 million tons of
cargo a year, the port was operating at an
annual rate of 3.5 million tons by Januaiy
1966 and had reached an annual level of al-
most 5 million tons by November 1966.
The decision to strain port facilities be-
cause of the urgency of the military and eco-
nomic efforts was made with knowledge that
204
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
confusion and congestion would result until
new facilities and systems could be estab-
lished.
By niid-1966 the specific measures, dis-
cussed in detail later in this section, had
begun discernibly to relieve port congestion,
and present conditions, while not yet satis-
factory, reflect very substantial improve-
ment.
Control of the CIP and Title I programs is
largely a problem limited to the Saigon area
and, more often than not, to the port itself.
Once these goods have cleared customs and
have been delivered to the importer, AID's
commodity import mission has essentially
been accomplished. Thereafter they flow,
through commercial channels within the local
economy to meet the needs of the people and
hold down inflation.
Nevertheless, the U.S. AID Mission to
Vietnam, together with other U.S. agencies
and the Government of Vietnam, maintains
a continuing interest in these and all other
commodities available in the marketplace in
an eff'ort to limit the ability of Viet Cong
military units to obtain critical supplies. This
eff'ort is described in detail in chapter IV.
Since most CIP commodities are not
shipped to Vietnam separately from other
commercial cargoes, the efforts to improve
their handling must in most cases be directed
at the operation of the entire port. The steps
which have been and are being taken toward
this end fall into five categories: (1) expan-
sion of physical facilities, (2) improved port
management, (3) increasing U.S. advisory
activities, (4) improvement of documenta-
tion procedures, and (5) tightening of port
security.
1. Expansion of Physical Facilities. Sai-
gon Port's handling of commercial cargo has
been increased from 295,000 metric tons a
month in January 1966 to 415,000 metric
tons in November 1966 principally because
of the following measures:
— 14 additional deep draft buoy sites have
been prepared and a floating dock for roU-
on, roll-off unloading has been put into op-
eration.
— Roads and open storage areas have been
repaired or constructed. More efficient traffic
patterns have been laid out.
— More barge discharge and transit fa-
cilities have been opened. Sheet steel piling
has been provided for constructing LST and
barge landing sites in Saigon.
— Obstructions to navigation in the Saigon
River have been removed.
— Five heavy-duty hydraulic dredges for
use in port construction have been sent to
Vietnam.
— AID has procured or contracted for 552
trucks, 156 barges, 13 tugs and 213 pieces
of handling equipment (e.g., cranes and fork
lifts) to facilitate port operations, and more
equipment is being procured — all additional
to port equipment used by the U.S. military.
— Steel plate for constructing 47 new
barges in Vietnam and rehabilitating 40 ex-
isting barges has recently arrived (these are
included in the 156 barges referred to
above).
— 10 coastal vessels and a 3,000-ton-per-
month junk fleet have been chartered to help
move cargo from Saigon to other ports.
— The major New Port project, which is
creating an entire new section of the Saigon
port, is partially constructed and in use by
the U.S. military. It is scheduled for com-
pletion in the spring of 1967.
— A new fish market pier, south of the
main port area, is now in operation.
— A fresh water facility for ships in port
has been finished.
— 676,000 square feet of new civil ware-
house space at Thu Due, close to Saigon, is
being built. It is partially in use now and is
expected to be fully operational by April
1967. This facility possesses double the ca-
pacity of existing port transit warehouses
for civil cargo.
— Other Saigon area warehouse facilities
have been expanded to expedite port clear-
ance.
— The load on the Port of Saigon has been
reduced by the expansion of facilities at a
number of other Vietnamese ports including
Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Da Nang
and Cam Ranh Bay. The capacity of these
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
205
ports has been increased more than threefold,
from 125,000 metric tons per month in Au-
gust 1965 to more than 400,000 metric tons
at present.
2. Improved Port Management
— The Vietnamese Army has been given re-
sponsibiHty for management of the port. The
Port Director, General Lan, is responsible
directly to the Prime Minister.
— To reduce congestion, the GVN has de-
creed that all cargo must be removed from
port warehouses within 30 days or be con-
fiscated and auctioned by the government.
(This decree was not being enforced satis-
factorily at the close of the year, but con-
gestion in port warehouses had been re-
duced.)
3. Increasing U.S. Advisory Activities
— Since March 1966 a U.S. Customs Bu-
reau advisory team detailed to AID has been
increased from 1 to 10 and will be expanded
to 20 by February 1967. This team is work-
ing closely with the Vietnamese Customs
Bureau in improving its procedures and sys-
tems.
— A four-man U.S. Census Bureau team,
serving with AID since August 1966, is as-
sisting the Vietnamese Customs Bureau and
the Ministry of Finance in developing auto-
mated data processing systems to provide
rapid and accurate financial and logistical
information.
— U.S. civilian and military port advisers
are assisting the port authorities of Vietnam
in improving reporting and inventory control
systems. A group of port management ex-
perts is advising on port operations.
— An eight-member team from the Inter-
national Longshoremen's Union worked with
the Saigon stevedoring companies during
most of 1966 to advise on techniques for in-
creasing cargo handling capability.
—In September 1966, the U.S. Army's
125th Terminal Command arrived in Viet-
nam to supplement the services of the AID
technical advisers to the Director of the Port
of Saigon and his staff. All of its 187 officers
and enlisted men are assigned to the com-
mercial area and working in scheduling of
ships, unloading and warehousing proce-
dures, imix)rter notification, etc. The unit
has set up its own documentation system, dis-
cussed in the next section, to provide checks
on the existing system.
4. Improvement of Documentation Proce-
dures. When tramp ships carrying bulk com-
mercial cargo are ready to unload, the con-
signee selects a stevedoring company to
assume responsibility for discharging his
cargo. Liners are called to berth and dis-
charged by stevedores hired by the steamship
companies. Ships carrying cargo of high
value are normally discharged directly into
customs controlled transit sheds in the port
area. Ships containing bulk cargoes are gen-
erally moored at buoys mid-stream in the
Saigon River and discharged into barges. In
many cases, customs officials are able to clear
such cargo as it is off-loaded, in which case
the barge can take its cargo directly to the
importer's warehouse. In other instances the
barge becomes, in effect, a floating bonded
warehouse waiting its turn to discharge the
cargo into a customs transit shed for clear-
ance. Disorderly use of barges for tempo-
rary storage is one of the major current
causes of congestion in the port.
The 125th Terminal Command has set up
a documentation system for commercial
cargo parallel to the combined coverage of
the four separate and distinct Vietnamese
systems maintained by the Saigon Port Di-
rector, the ship's agent, the stevedore and
the Customs Bureau.
When the 125th's system becomes fully op-
erational, a copy of each arriving ship's man-
ifest will be forwarded to the unit's docu-
mentation section which will prepare a
separate set of control documents for each
consignment on board. These documents will
then follow the goods from off-loading,
through intermediate stages — e.g., a barge
or a transit warehouse — ^to delivery to the
importer. The control documents will then be
returned to the documentation section. At
each step checkers will have compared the
quantity and condition of the goods with the
206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
notations on the document, so that a com-
plete record of each consignment will be
available.
The AID Mission's automated arrival ac-
counting system for commercial imports, be-
gun in July 1966, will produce reports early
this year on goods cleared through customs
related to records of U.S. Government pay-
ments to American suppliers for the period
July through December 1966. Later in the
spring, the system will be modified to assimi-
late input from the 125th Terminal Command
documentation section, and will then auto-
matically follow CIP imports from the orig-
inal license request through all intermediate
steps to customs clearance.
To assist AID/Washington in advance re-
views of import transactions, a system for
sorting all CIP letters of credit opened in
favor of suppliers in the U.S. or abroad, re-
gardless of amount, is being established; the
electronic sorting program is expected to be
ready very soon. Thereafter, AID/Washing-
ton commodity analysts, logisticians, con-
trollers, and economic warfare experts will
have a weekly statement available (better
than data now used) which shows all letters
of credit issued, arranged by importer, sup-
plier, and commodity involved. The review
of this information in Washington prior to
shipment will permit corrective action on
major problems much earlier than is possible
under AID's normal port audit procedures.
5. Tightening of Port Security. As the
efficiency of Saigon port operations declined
in late 1965 and early 1966 under the great
surge of military and civilian commodities,
the need for more elaborate security pre-
cautions to protect incoming cargoes in-
creased. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese Gov-
ernments have taken a number of significant
steps to this end.
Direct U.S. actions in the security field —
principally the U.S. Customs team's inspec-
tion of 10 to 20 percent of the CIP consign-
ments, the presence of several hundred U.S.
military police in the port area, and the 1st
Logistical Command's increased responsi-
bility in the commercial sector of the port —
have played an important role in recent
months in reducing loss in the port area. In
the months ahead their efforts will have an
increasingly significant impact.
Four Vietnamese organizations are in-
volved in some phase of port security — the
Navy, the military police, the Customs
Bureau and the harbor police.
The military police are responsible for con-
trolling Vietnamese military personnel in
the port area and the Vietnamese Navy main-
tains security in the shipping channel be-
tween the port of Saigon and Vung Tau at the
mouth of the Saigon River.
The Customs Bureau has 1,700 employees,
1,300 of whom work in the Saigon port.
Their enforcement operations include the
use of several large launches and 12 smaller
assault boats provided by AID in September
1966.
The harbor police, a branch of the national
police, has responsibility for physical secu-
rity in the port area. The force now stands
at 600 men, an increase of over 100 since
January 1966. It will grow by another 100
men in the next few months. The harbor
police has established checkpoints at a num-
ber of strategic port locations (see chart 2
in the appendix) i and mounts regular water
patrols covering 96 kilometers of waterways
containing up to 1,400 barges, junks, lighters,
and other miscellaneous small boats, many of
which double as homes for one or more
families. Movement of craft in the port area
is strictly controlled. Officers of the harbor
police, in patrols and at checkpoints, inspect
personal identity cards and movement per-
mits, check barge cargo manifests against
cargo on board, and detain the suspects when-
ever these inspections reveal apparent irreg-
ularities.
Harbor police water-borne operations are
conducted in 4 patrol boats and 18 smaller
assault boats provided by AID, an increase
of 16 in the past year. The group's new main-
tenance staff, advised and augmented by
three expert Filipino mechanics, has tripled
the effective usage of harbor police craft in
less than a year. The boats are linked by an
' Not printed here.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
207
efficient radio communications network. The
harbor police forces are advised by a reg-
ularly assigned AID public safety adviser.
The harbor police director also controls
the activities of a 167-man police field force
unit recently assigned to the An Khanh area
directly across the Saigon River from the
main piers.
Until recently, the Vietnamese Navy, the
military police, the Customs officials and the
harbor police operated independently. A
major step was taken in September 1966 to-
ward integrating the efforts of all of these
groups and the U.S. Military Police with the
establishment of joint marine and land pa-
trols. The members of these patrols, acting
together, now possess the aggregate of each
of their members' limited jurisdictions.
Heightened security efforts are reflected in
the fact that port area arrests for improper
documentation, trespassing, theft and other
offenses rose from a rate of 150 per month
in early 1966 to 500 a month by end of 1966,
while reports of major crimes dropped
sharply.
E. Theft of Commercial Imports
Theft in port areas is a problem in the
less congested ports of many countries at
peace. High value, low bulk goods of a sort
not financed by AID are the thieves' prin-
cipal targets.
The AID Mission's best current estimate,
based on resurveys and spot checks over the
last few months and the judgment of the
U.S. technical experts working with the com-
mercial program, is that the recent rate of
theft of CIP and Title I commodities from
off-loading through port clearance in Saigon
is between 2 and 5 percent of the total of
all such commercial imports. The loss rate
is now believed to be near the lower end of
that range. This estimate is based on the
following sources:
— The U.S. Customs Bureau advisory
team, whose primary assignment is advising
the Vietnamese Customs Bureau, also spot
checks between 10 and 20 percent of all CIP
cargoes. These professional inspectors esti-
mate losses of CIP imports as no more than
2 to 5 percent and believe that the more ac-
curate current figure is closer to 2 percent.
— -The Vietnamese Insurance Agent's As-
sociation, comprising all insurance companies -
operating in Vietnam, reports that all-risk
coverage of CIP and other commercial goods
is available to Vietnamese importers for
losses prior to off-loading. Premiums run be-
tween 0.4 and 10 percent of the cargo's
value, with the average, however, close to 2
percent. Most of the companies also offer
their regular customers limited coverage for
a period of 30 days after off-loading (which
includes a restriction of coverage to 15 days
while the commodities are in barges) for an
additional premium of up to 0.3 percent. The
insurer may also agree to grant up to two
further 2-week periods of coverage at double
the additional premium.
Insurance coverage is fairly wide, though
selective. The local banks, which finance most
of the importers, insist on maximum insur-
ance coverage and the association itself esti-
mates that 90 to 95 percent of all CIP
cargoes are insured at some or all stages of
their voyage. The association reports that
claims paid out by all of its members for
losses during 1966 will aggregate about 1
percent of the value of goods insured. As
noted, however, this figure is subject to qual-
ification since coverage of high risks is lim-
ited and matters of proof often impede col-
lection of claims.
— Societe de Surveillance (Geneve) S.A., a
private Swiss international shipping inspec-
tion company, experienced in Vietnam, is un-
der contract to the AID Mission to review
deliveries of several types of CIP and Title
I commodities, as well as to check rice ship-
ments arriving in the ports of Qui Nhon and
Nha Trang. The goods spot checked by the
company are representative of 60 percent of
the dollar value of AID-financed commercial
imports. The company's first report, cover-
ing the period from March 1966 to October
1966, shows total shortages of "less than one
percent." Technically, this is a measure of
208
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
loss from time of shipment to the time the
vessel arrives at the port of Saigon. How-
ever, while food supplies are nonnally
checked in the hold of the ship, pharma-
ceuticals and general CIP cargo are moni-
tored in the transit warehouse and machin-
ery is inspected at its end-use location.
Therefore, while not a comprehensive deter-
mination of total loss, this report has con-
siderable bearing on the matter.
— Officials of the Food for Peace program,
the 4th Terminal Command, and others
working closely with the program state that
there is little theft of Title I rice.
— Despite the fact that AID-financed com-
mercial imports achieve their purposes when
they have passed through customs to the
market, frequent audits are conducted by
the AID Mission's Financial Management
Staff to determine the ultimate use made of
selected commercial imports. These audits
are primarily to determine whether goods
are reaching the enemy, to -determine the
effectiveness of importing these commodities
and the reliability of importers. Audits are
currently in progress on the end use of over
$100 million worth of commercial imports,
or about 25 percent of total shipments. This
increased auditing program has been made
possible by expansion of the AID Mission
audit staff from 17 to 34 since May 1966. A
survey of audits recently completed, includ-
ing one on $4 million worth of textiles, indi-
cates that over 95 percent of the examined
AID-financed commercial imports shipped
to Vietnam are properly used in the economy.
The losses noted in these audits — less than
5 percent of the total shipped — include diver-
sion and theft in the port as well as loss,
breakage, theft and improper use after the
commodities are delivered to the importer
and thence to the Vietnamese economy.
The measures recently initiated should be-
come fully effective early in 1967 and further
reduce theft of commercial cargo in the
poits. Our new data systems will provide
more accurate measures of these losses
shortly.
III. strengthening the Vietnamese Society:
AID Project Assistance
A. Growth of the Program
The AID project program is a complex of
many technical assistance, social develop-
ment, refugee assistance, institutional devel-
opment and relief activities. The great ma-
jority of these projects are planned and
executed in the rural areas in direct support
of the Government of Vietnam's revolution-
ary development program. Revolutionary
development is an integrated military and
civil effort to liberate the people of Vietnam
from Viet Cong control, provide security,
initiate political, economic and social devel-
opment, and win the support of the people
for their government. AID's role, on the
civil side, is vital to success in this "other
war" — the indispensable partner of the mili-
tary effort to defeat communist aggression
and insurgency.
AID's support takes the form of technical
advisers for the planning and execution of
projects, the training of Vietnamese, and the
provision of construction materials, many
types of equipment, seeds, fertilizer and med-
ical and relief supplies. These goods and
services are provided under projects jointly
planned and executed by both governments.
They include over 30 different agricultural
activities, irrigation and water management,
fishery activities and forestry projects; about
50 education activities — construction of
hamlet schools, provision of textbooks and
other educational materials, teacher training,
support of vocational and agricultural
schools in the rural areas and adult training
programs; a massive public health program,
including the construction, equipping and
staffing of provincial hospitals, a large-scale
immunization program, nursing education
and training and a variety of sanitation and
public health programs; refugee programs to
construct and equip camps, carry out educa-
tional and self-help activities within the
camps, and relocate refugees or return them
to their villages; the Chieu Hoi or "open
arms" program, designed to attract defectors
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
209
from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
forces, screen, assist and reorient them, and
reintegrate them as far as possible into the
Vietnamese mihtary forces or into the civil
society; roadbuilding, electrification, water
supply and other-public works projects; pro-
grams in public administration; in labor and
trade union development; and relief pro-
grams using U.S. agriculture products under
Titles II and III of P.L. 480.
To carry out these activities, project com-
modities must be transported from the ports
through the logistic systems of the appropri-
ate Vietnamese ministries to regional and
provincial warehouses and then to project
sites in thousands of villages and hamlets
rarely reached in the past, where transporta-
tion and security are poor and the Viet Cong
are near or present.
It is important for the political and social
objectives of the program that the Viet-
namese Government at all levels be directly
involved in conducting these projects, in-
cluding the distribution of supplies. It is for
this reason that AID's commodity manage-
ment programs are directed toward improve-
ment of Vietnamese systems.
In fiscal year 1965 the U.S. Government
obligated over $63 million for project com-
modities including P.L. 480 Title II and III
supplies. Because of the necessity to expand
the agriculture and education efforts in the
provinces, to meet the needs of a greatly in-
creased flow of refugees, and to extend direct
medical services to all provinces the project
program had to be greatly expanded. Obliga-
tions for the project program and relief com-
modities in fiscal year 1966 more than
doubled to $135 million. Actual expenditures
against shipments in calendar year 1966
were $68 million.
Along with the project program's growth,
AID has sought to increase the efficiency of
distribution of project commodities and to
reduce loss and wastage under wartime con-
ditions. Since many of these pi'ograms are
designed to support the revolutionary devel-
opment efforts in the countryside, where in-
security and lack of government control is
greatest, the loss rates in these programs
have necessarily been greater than those ex-
perienced in the commercial import program.
B. Project Commodity Procedures and Con-
trols
1. Improved Port Handling. Until July
1966 project commodities and CIP cargoes
were handled in the same way in the Port
of Saigon. The only distinction between the
two lay in that project goods were consigned
to a Vietnamese Government agency rather
than to a private importer. Importation of
project commodities was therefore likewise
impeded by port congestion. While steps
taken to improve port facilities, handling
and security mentioned in the previous
chapter benefited the project program as
well, further action was necessary and feasi-
ble with respect to project goods.
In July 1966 the U.S. Army's 1st Logis-
tical Command was given operational re-
sponsibility for discharging all project com-
modities landed in the Saigon area (90
percent of the total) and moving them to
ministry warehouses. The 1st Logistical
Command assigned operational responsibility
to the Army's 4th Terminal Command, a
unit of 809 officers and men highly skilled in
port operations, which also handles military
cargo in the Port of Saigon.
The 4th Terminal Command has set up a
system of tight physical and documentary
controls over project cargo which have re-
duced losses between the port and the min-
istry warehouses to a documented six-tenths
of 1 percent during the month of November.
The 4th Terminal Command estimates that
figures for December will be just as good or
lower than for November. Similar procedures
are now being installed at the ports of Da
Nang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, which to-
gether handle all of the project commodities
not passing through Saigon.
2. Movement from the Ports to the Prov-
inces. The 4th Terminal Command has estab-
lished an extremely effective system for get-
ting the goods to Vietnamese Government
warehouses, but their movement forward
210
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
from the warehouses in Saigon is handled
separately by the several ministries, most of
which have their own logistics systems, and
directly by the AID Mission. Each of these
systems is described in the sections that fol-
low. The current estimated percentage of loss
is noted for each. As graphically illustrated
in chart 1 ^ in the appendix to this report,
all project commodities account for only 15
percent of the total expenditures on commod-
ities, and each of these individual systems
represents only a portion of the total project
commodity program. Therefore, while the
loss rate in some areas is relatively high, it
is applied to only a small portion of the total
program.
(a) Public Safety. The national police
logistics system is well conceived and run. It
is monitored closely at all levels by 10 AID
public safety logistics advisers, an increase
of 2 since May 1966. These logistics advisers
have their office with their Vietnamese coun-
terparts in the national police logistics sys-
tem headquarters, where they are able to
monitor all supply movements. AID public
safety field advisers working with the na-
tional police in their assigned areas actually
check on the location of weapons by serial
number. Movement between Saigon and the
field is normally handled by air using the
facilities of Air America, an airline under
contract to AID.
These controls restrict loss or illegal diver-
sion to an amount now estimated at less than
1 percent by AID advisers.
(b) Public Health. The public health logis-
tics system was established under American
military procedures and is closely supervised
by 14 AID logistical advisers to the Ministry
of Health, an increase of 8 since May 1966.
These advisers maintain control over the
records system of the Health Ministry's cen-
tral warehouse at Phu Tho near Saigon and
supervise the inspection of project medical
supplies from the time of their delivery by
the 4th Terminal Command until they are
shipped to the provincial hospitals. Com-
modities are normally transported to prov-
' Not printed here.
ince hospitals and health services by Air
America or by a military airlift. Controls
are good in most hospitals, but petty theft
occurs.
Some project medical supplies are sent to
district and local health clinics which are
under the direction of the Vietnamese prov-
ince chief of medicine. Members of U.S. and
free-world medical teams as well as AID
public health logistical advisers stationed in
the area are able to perform only occasional
spot checks on such supplies.
AID advisers estimate that about 10-15
percent of public health project commodities
are lost. By far the greater part of this loss
occurs among the medical supplies which are
distributed from the provincial level to dis-
trict and local health clinics. Further im-
provements in supply handling are expected
to result from a program of regional ware-
houses scheduled for construction in 1967.
(c) Public Works. The Ministry of Public
Works logistics system is reasonably efficient.
Moreover, 90 percent of the dollar value of
AID public works project assistance comes
in the form of bulky heavy equipment and
vehicles which AID logisticians are able to
monitor by serial number. Very little theft of
this equipment is reported. Losses of goods
such as construction materials and spare
parts, which comprise the remaining 10 per-
cent of dollar value, are relatively high be-
cause they are transported in small con-
tainers to the provinces by truck, coastal
vessel or other relatively insecure means and
pass through many hands.
The AID Mission is adding two public
works warehouse advisers to its staff and is
working with the Ministry of Public Works
to improve and modernize its procedures.
The Mission estimates that well under 5
percent of all public works project commod-
ities are lost.
(d) The Central Purchasing Agency. The
Vietnamese Government's Central Purchas-
ing Agency (CPA) logistics system services
the programs of the Commissariat for Refu-
gees and the Commissariat General for Revo-
lutionary Development. The latter agency is
responsible for supporting the village-level
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
211
self-help, hamlet schools, dispensary and
other construction programs, as well as a
variety of security and development projects.
Commodities required in these programs in-
clude cement and other building materials,
clothing, blankets, and food products such as
bulgar wheat, cooking oil, and dehydrated
milk imported under the Food for Peace
program (Public Law 480, Titles II and III).
AID logistical advisers to the CPA system
report that the warehouse operation is rea-
sonably well conceived and administered; the
major area of loss is in the transportation
and field distribution systems. Goods brought
to the central CPA warehouse in Saigon by
the 4th Terminal Command are called for-
ward to replenish each provincial ware-
house's stocks as the quantities on hand fall
below certain predetermined stocking levels.
The provincial warehouses are under direct
control of the Vietnamese province chiefs, but
requisitions against the Saigon warehouse
must be authorized by the U.S. provincial
representative as well as the province chief.
The requisition form sent to Saigon from
the provinces designates a specific local use
for the goods ordered and becomes the basic
control document for the shipment. The des-
ignated recipient and the hauler inspect the
goods on arrival, note any discrepancies on
the requisition form, and return the form to
CPA in Saigon.
Goods are issued out of the provincial
warehouse by the province chief. However,
should the U.S. provincial representative fail
to concur in an issuance order he is re-
quired to report the disagreement directly
to the Commissioner General for Revolu-
tionary Development, who then requires the
province chief to explain his decision.
While some of the CPA goods are trans-
ported from Saigon to the provinces by Air
America or U.S. military aircraft, most are
moved by truck or coastal vessel and there-
fore are more susceptible to Viet Cong
seizure or other diversion. As a result, the
AID Mission estimates a total loss rate of up
to 20 percent of CPA project commodities.
Welfare and relief supplies provided to the
needy under AID or Food for Peace pro-
grams are sometimes exchanged for rice or
other traditional foods they prefer. Such
transactions are technically diversions and
are included in these estimates even though
the needy person has received assistance — the
basic intention of the welfare program. The
following innovations are now being or will
shortly be instituted which are expected to
reduce these losses of CPA commodities sub-
stantially:
— A standard warehouse inventory and ac-
counting procedure has been established for
all province warehouses. Training sessions
have been held to instruct all Vietnamese
warehouse supervisors in the new system,
and English translation overlays have been
prepared for all warehouse records to enable
U.S. personnel in the field to review them as
required.
— In recent months 17 new logistics ad-
visers have been added to the 26 directly
concerned with the movement and storage of
CPA goods; 14 more are scheduled to arrive
in the near future.
— Additional U.S. personnel will shortly be
assigned to each provincial warehouse. They
are to provide Vietnamese warehouse oper-
ators with on-the-job training in the new
systems being installed and observe opera-
tions.
— CPA regional warehouses, under the
control of an AID logistics adviser and a
CPA official, have been set up in Regions I
and II, the northern and central regions, and
will shortly be established in the country's
delta region. Resultant consolidation of ship-
ments from Saigon will, in turn, improve
security and control. Convoys will be used
wherever possible.
(e) Agriculture. The greater part of proj-
ect imports for the Ministry of Agriculture
consists of fertilizer which is sold to farmers
at lower than market price. It is consigned to
the National Agriculture Credit Organiza-
tion (NACO) for distribution through 39
warehouses maintained by agricultural co-
operatives or farmers' associations through-
out the country. NACO deducts its operating
212
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
costs and sales agents' fees from the gross
proceeds of fertilizer sales, and deposits the
net in a special trust fund for agricultural
projects which is jointly administered by the
Vietnamese and United States Governments.
There are no U.S. logistics advisers in-
volved in this system now, but three will be
assigned within the next few months. The
only data now available on the effectiveness
of the NACO distribution system comes from
its own accounting records. These records for
the period March 1-October 31, 1966, in-
dicate that cash has been received for almost
70 percent of the total fertilizer available
for sale, about 25 percent of the fertilizer
was in warehouses or in transit, and the
remainder was used in demonstration proj-
ects or lost. These records have not yet been
audited by U.S. advisers and are therefore
not conclusive. Unlike all other project im-
ports, fertilizers are not received at the Port
of Saigon by the 4th Terminal Command, but
are handled exclusively by NACO.
The Mission has surveyed its agricultural
advisers and provincial representatives who
estimate that losses or illegal sales of agri-
cultural project commodities range from 5
to 20 percent. Most diverted fertilizer, com-
prising the bulk of these estimated agricul-
tural commodity losses, is illegally sold, at
prices above the approved government rate,
to South Vietnamese farmers who use it to
increase crop production. The three AID
logistics advisers soon to be assigned will play
a major role in determining the actual situa-
tion and recommending improvements.
(f) Other Fields. Of the remaining proj-
ect commodities brought into the country,
heavy materials handling equipment for port
operations and portable warehouses repre-
sent the largest single group. These items are
not easily lost or stolen; materially no losses
have been reported.
Technical support commodities brought in-
to Vietnam to support AID employees in
their assignments are consigned to the AID
Mission and are handled directly by Ameri-
cans. Less than 5 percent of the goods are
lost.
The remaining project commodities (for
education, public administration, labor, and
other miscellaneous programs) are handled
in much the same manner as the refugee
and revolutionary development items in the
CPA system and are subject to about the
same rates of loss and diversion. Two logis-
tics and warehouse advisers are scheduled
to arrive in early 1967 to work with the
Ministry of Education, and one is expected
to be assigned to supply problems in the
public administration area.
C. The Overall Project Commodity Situa-
tion
After resurvey and reanalysis, the U.S.
AID Mission estimates that the total loss rate
for all types of project commodities in recent
months was 10 to 15 percent. This estimate
will be further refined as reporting and con-
trol procedures improve.
Within the past few months, the AID Mis-
sion has assigned controllers to each of the
four regions of South Vietnam. They are re-
sponsible for maintaining financial account-
ing records on project activities carried out
in the field. In addition, auditors are being
assigned for the first time to make systematic
end-use checks in the provinces on project
commodities. This effort will be expanded in
the next few months to cover an increasingly
large part of the project program. Cargo air-
lift capacity of Air America has increased
from 1,300 metric tons per month in January
1966 to a current level of 3,500 metric tons.
This is supplemented by U.S. military air-
lifts. 121 new and more secure warehouses
have been constructed throughout the country
during the past year.
A task force formed by the Director of the
AID Mission in Saigon in November 1966 is
currently studying all of the Vietnamese
project commodity logistics systems in depth.
A preliminary report submitted to the Direc-
tor on December 1st is now under study. The
report made several recommendations, some
of which have been mentioned above. Others
include the development of a single Vietnam-
ese national logistics system and the consoli-
FEBRUAKY 6, 1967
213
dation of trucking and coastal vessel
contracts and improved communications
networks for notifying a province official in
advance of the arrival of shipments of com-
modities.
IV. Economic Warfare and General Inspection
Economic warfare, simply stated, means
denying the enemy access to goods which he
needs to sustain his war effort. However,
since the enemy in Vietnam is not limited to
definable territories behind a fixed front and
is not readily distinguishable from other
Vietnamese, the struggle to deny him sup-
plies is as complicated and difficult as the
struggle to eliminate the guerrillas them-
selves. The Viet Cong have so infiltrated the
country that it is not possible to deny com-
pletely their access to AID-financed goods
except by stopping the supply of these goods
to the economy. But we can selectively limit
their access to strategic supplies. Our tech-
niques of selective denial include: (A) detect-
ing and halting the activities of importers
and merchants who act as procurement chan-
nels for the enemy; (B) applying strict con-
trols to selected strategic commodities; (C)
interdicting VC supply lines and restricting
the movement of commodities in selected
areas where VC control predominates.
A. Monitoring the Import Community
Both the U.S. AID Mission and the Viet-
namese Ministry of Commerce have devel-
oped procedures to attempt to identify and
suspend importers engaged in illicit trans-
actions. In serious cases the Ministry may
also try a person so charged for a criminal
offense. U.S. personnel reviewing license ap-
plications, studying market conditions and
selectively auditing the records of wholesalers
and retailers include 8 commodity analysts,
all newly arrived since the spring of 1966;
34 auditors, an increase of 17 since early
1966; and 14 other specialists, an increase of
11 since March 1966.
In Washington, the Office of the Special
Assistant for Commodity Analysis, which
backstops the Office of Special Projects in
Vietnam, is now staffed with five experienced
specialists who review CIP transactions on
a selective basis in an attempt to identify ir-
regular importer-supplier relationships and
suspicious trade patterns.
A separate office, which is to be staffed
with commodity analysts and international
trade advisers, is presently being established
in AID/Washington. These technicians will
backstop the Commercial Import Division in
Saigon. They will be supplier-oriented, so
as not to duplicate the work of technicians
in Saigon who are importer-oriented. Com-
modity analysts in Washington will assure
that quality standards are maintained, will
engage in special intensive studies relative
to type and quantity of commodity imports
in Vietnam, and will supplement the prior re-
view activities of the AID Controller in
Washington.
The AID Controller now concentrates much
of the efforts of his office on the Vietnam
program. The Controller conducts an inten-
sive review of CIP documents after the trans-
action has been completed; this review re-
mains one of aid's most effective tools for
assuring that unauthorized use of AID funds
is kept to a minimum. Detailed post audits
sometimes lead to criminal or civil proceed-
ings against suppliers who have violated re-
quirements contrary to the certifications of
compliance which are prerequisites to pay-
ment by AID. Post audits also lead to refund
claims against the GVN, which can in turn
lead to criminal action against importers in
Vietnam.
The Agency's independent investigative
arm, i.e., the Management Inspection Staff
(MIS), has increased its onboard strength
in Saigon from two to six during the calen-
dar year. This staff is supplemented from
time to time by additional, Washington-
based inspectors. These inspectors have all
had extensive experience in the FBI, other
Government investigative agencies or in the
fields of law or accounting. Their major re-
sponsibility in Vietnam is to receive, analyze
and investigate all allegations of criminal
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
fraud or other irregularities involving AID
financing-. They maintain close liaison with
the Office of Special Projects, the Office of
the Controller and the U.S. AID contractor,
Societe de Surveillance (Geneve) S.A., men-
tioned above. The MIS staff in Saigon also
maintains a continuing relationship with the
business community, including American,
throughout the Far East. These contacts
greatly assist in insuring that all available
infonnation regarding irregularities in the
AID program are properly received and
acted upon.
Those cases which reveal prima facie evi-
dence of criminality are referred to the U.S.
Department of Justice or foreign courts for
appropriate civil or criminal action. As a
result of information developed by these in-
vestigations, consideration is also given by
AID to such actions as suspension, debar-
ment or prosecution by local Government
agencies of importers involved in irregulari-
ties.
In addition to the U.S. AID Mission and
GVN procedures for suspending importers,
AID/Washington has procedures for tempo-
rarily suspending suppliers pending further
investigation which may lead to formal hear-
ings and possible debarment or criminal ac-
tion. These procedures for suspending and
for debarring commodity suppliers preclude
such suppliers from participating in AID-
financed transactions. Several suppliers have
been suspended and are no longer eligible to
participate in commodity transactions fi-
nanced by AID. There is, in addition, a
"prior review" system in which a supplier is
notified that his transactions are subject to
prior review by AID/Washington before
they are eligible for AID financing.
B. Controlling Strategic Commodities
The Economic Warfare Committee of the
U.S. Mission in Saigon has developed a list
of goods critical to the enemy's war effort.
Particular efforts are made to monitor im-
port license applications and the movement
of these commodities through the com-
mercial community.
C. Cutting Enemy Su^pply Lines
The principal force interdicting enemy
supply lines is the U.S. military. As free-
world forces strike deeper into VC strong-
holds, bombing, shelling and overrunning VC
staging areas and main supply depots, the
volume of enemy goods captured and de-
stroyed continues to mount.
The resources control program of the na-
tional police is the most effective civilian
effort to frustrate the Viet Cong procurement
system. About 7,000 policemen at ahnost 700
checkpoints on land and water monitor the
flow of goods in and between cities. They
seize contraband items and shipments lack-
ing proper documentation, but without clog-
ging the vital lines of communication. Prog-
ress during the last year can be measured
by a 20 percent increase in the number of
arrests made and an 80 percent increase in
confiscations. The national police have added
about 1,000 men to this activity during 1966
and plan to double the number in 1967.
A new river police force, now 400 strong,
was created in 1966. Using 12 36-foot boats
and 255 16-foot assault craft supplied
through AID, they patrol the major water-
ways of South Vietnam, particularly in the
Mekong Delta. Planned increase in strength
to 2,000 men and the delivery of 70 more
40-foot boats and 707 16-foot craft will make
the river police a much more effective force
in economic warfare during 1967. Members
of the Vietnamese national police also have
been detailed to U.S. Navy patrol boats op-
erating in three major rivers in order to
augment the strength of the river police dur-
ing its organizational period. Since water
traffic is a major means of transportation
in South Vietnam's delta area, control of the
waterways by an effective inspection and en-
forcement organization will be especially im-
portant in safeguarding and marketing rice
grown in that area.
In addition to the measures outlined above,
Vietnamese Navy and customs officers main-
tain surveillance of the country's land and
sea boundaries in an attempt to control the
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
215
illegal flow of goods to the enemy from out-
side sources. They are assisted in this effort
by the U.S. Navy and free-world forces.
V. Conclusion
The vast majority of U.S. aid commodities
provided to bolster South Vietnam's economy
and improve its social structure are being
put to their intended use. Losses which have
occurred must be viewed in the perspective
of a wartime situation. Civilian and military
supply losses were heavy during wartime op-
erations in Korea and in Europe. To a much
greater degree than in these earlier, con-
ventional wars, we are attempting to meet
civil needs throughout Vietnam in a war
which infects every province. Even so, sub-
stantial losses cannot be tolerated. The U.S.
AID Mission and the U.S. military command
are working with the Government of Viet-
nam on a very intensive program to cut these
losses to an absolute minimum. We expect to
be able to report further significant progress
in this effort during 1967.
U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks
on Fishery Problems
Press release 6 dated January 16
Representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union began discussions on Jan-
uary 16 on various fishery problems between
the two countries. These include the question
of future arrangements for Soviet fishing
for king crab on the U.S. continental shelf
in the eastern Bering Sea, which has been
governed for the past 2 years by an agree-
ment between the two countries.
Also to be discussed are various matters
related to Soviet fishing off the Pacific and
Atlantic coasts of the United States. These
will include consideration of the economic
interests of both countries in the fisheries,
the conservation of fishery resources, and
problems arising out of fishing operations
by vessels of the two countries in close prox-
imity.
The United States delegation is led by
Ambassador Donald L. McKeman, Special
Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the
Secretary of State. M. N. Sukhoruchenko,
Deputy Minister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R.,
heads the Soviet delegation.
Letters of Credence
Viet-Nam
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, Bui Diem, presented
his credentials to President Johnson on Jan-
uary 19. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated January
19.
President Modifies Escape-Clause
Duty Rates on Sheet Glass
The White House announced on January
11 that President Johnson had that day
issued a proclamation modifying the escape-
clause action on sheet glass which has been
in effect since 1962.i
As a result of the President's action,
escape-clause increases in duties on specified
types of sheet glass, principally window
glass, will be rolled back part of the way to
the pre-1962 trade agreement levels and on
the remaining types will be rolled back
fully to those trade agreement levels. Im-
ports in 1965 of items on which there will
be full removal of the escape-clause duty
increases were $14 million out of total
sheet glass imports of $26 million.
The President's decision for this action
was taken following the receipt of a report
by the Tariff Commission on the probable
effect on the industry of terminating or
modifjdng the escape-clause rates and rec-
' Proclamation 3762 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg.
361.
216
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ommendations of the late Christian A.
Herter, the President's Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations. The recommen-
dations were formulated after studies
carried out by interested Government agen-
cies.
The tariffs on sheet glass were increased
as of June 17, 1962, by the President under
section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension
Act of 1951, as amended, and following
findings initially made by the Tariff Com-
mission under the "peril point" procedures
that applied to U.S. Government prepara-
tions for trade negotiations which opened
at Geneva in 1960. The increases were
deemed necessary to prevent serious injury
to the domestic industry from increased
imports due to tariff concessions.
The tariff changes proclaimed by the
President will become effective immediately.
Escape-Clause Duty Rates
on Watch Movements Terminated
The White House announced on January
11 that President Johnson had that day pro-
claimed the termination of escape-clause
rates of duty on imports of watch move-
ments.i By restoring the rates of duty pre-
vailing before escape-clause action was
taken 12 years ago, the proclamation will
have the immediate effect of reducing U.S.
tariffs on watch movements by about one-
third. The changes in the many particular
rates of duty will vary according to the size
and type of watch movement. The reductions
in rates of duty from the escape-clause levels
will apply to watch movements of pin-lever
construction or of jewel-lever construction
but containing not more than 17 jewels.
The escape-clause rates of duty that are
• Proclamation 3761 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg.
367.
being terminated have been in force since
mid-1954. At that time. President Eisen-
hower increased the tariffs from the levels
established in 1936 in the U.S. trade agree-
ment with Switzerland. The 1954 increases
were declared necessary to avoid serious
injury to the domestic watch industry as the
result of increased imports attributable to
the trade agreement concessions.
The President's decision to terminate the
1954 increases was based on a recommenda-
tion by the late Christian A. Herter, his
Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, and concurred in by the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, and the
"heads of other Government agencies. Gov-
ernor Herter submitted his recommendation
to the President upon the completion of a
review that his office and other Government
agencies had undertaken following the sub-
mission in March 1965 of a Tariff Commis-
sion report on the escape-clause case. In
that report, the Tariff Commission gave its
judgment as to the probable economic effects
on the U.S. watch industry of a reduction or
termination of the escape-clause rates of
duty.
During the period of the interagency
review of the escape-clause case, the Office
of Emergency Planning, at the request of
the President in April 1965 and with the
assistance of Goveriunent defense agencies
and the Departments of Commerce and
Labor, examined the national security
aspects of trade and production in watch
movements. As a result of OEP's investiga-
tion, under section 232 of the Trade Expan-
sion Act, the Director of the Office of
Emergency Planning, Farris Bryant, re-
ported that watches, watch movements, and
watch parts were not being imported in a
manner which threatened to impair the
national security and that horological-type
defense items will continue to be available
without regard to the level of imports of
watches, movements, and parts.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
217
In this article prepared especially for the Bulletin, James
N. Cortada, Dean of the School of Professional Studies at
the Foreign Service Institute, and A. Guy Hope, a coTisultant
to the Department of State and lecturer at the Maxwell
Graduate School, Syracuse University, examine the trends^
in FSI training programs contributing "toward a greater
professionalization of officers in the foreign affairs commu-
nity."
The Foreign Service Institute: Patterns
of Professional Development
by James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope
In recent months the staff of the Foreign
Service Institute, under its new Director,
George V. Allen, has been examining criti-
cally the role and performance of the Insti-
tute in the professional preparation of
American diplomats and other members of
the Government's foreign affairs community.
Consultants from the academic community
and from within the Government are partic-
ipating in extensive and intensive evalua-
tions of FSI activities and directions.
The Institute's tasks are complicated by
the fact that as a unit of the Department of
State it has direct and absorbing responsi-
bilities for Departmental and Foreign Serv-
ice training problems. At the same time, the
Foreign Service Act of 1946 contains a man-
date for the Institute which extends beyond
these responsibilities, extensive though they
are, to the large and rapidly growing foreign
affairs concerns of other Washington agen-
cies.
While interesting and promising steps
have been taken to accommodate the needs
and interests of American foreign affairs
personnel of many types, perhaps the best
evidence of the Institute's increasingly ma-
ture and sophisticated outlook toward its
mission relates to recent innovations in the
formal training of Foreign Service officers.
To describe Foreign Service officer train-
ing as a difficult administrative task would
be to indulge in understatement. The prob-
lem is compounded by the necessity of keying
formal development plans, whether at the
Institute or in universities, to the Depart-
ment's assignment policies, to budgetary
realities, and to availability of personnel.
The last point is particularly important be-
cause in a highly competitive organization
such as the Foreign Service, the only civilian
agency of the Government with promotion-up
or selection-out procedures, promising offi-
cers fear that their careers will be affected
if they are removed from the policymaking
mainstream. The fact that promotions in re-
cent years tend to disprove the myth is in-
sufficient to fully offset the reluctance of of-
ficers to leave fascinating "hot" jobs for
prolonged periods of study.
Proposals to make general and broad
training programs mandatory throughout
the midcareer and senior officer levels are
not realistic. The Foreign Service Officer
218
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Corps, totaling over 3,500 as of July 1, 1966,
has remained relatively unchanged in size
over the past few years despite the opening
of many posts throughout the world. Press-
ing operational needs would mean that ex-
emptions from extensive training would be
sought on a wholesale basis for promising
officers. Other officers with less cheerful ca-
reer prospects would probably discharge the
training quotas.
Furthermore, the heterogeneous back-
grounds of Foreign Service officers in terms
of functional specialization and levels of edu-
cation complicate the training problem con-
siderably.
In reassessing its training programs the
Institute recognized the need to consider in-
dividual differences and to meet varying
personal requirements for its student offi-
cers.
A further consideration was awareness
that the Institute could most efficiently deal
with the specialized application of academic
disciplines to foreign affairs, leaving to the
universities the task of solid education in the
traditional disciplines. The Institute staff
was mindful of the increasingly sophisticated
academic training characterizing recent en-
trants into the Foreign Service Officer Corps,
many of whom have received graduate de-
grees.
A third important consideration was the
realization that the Foreign Service, in
order to execute its tasks in the complex
world of the 1960's, had to move more ener-
getically toward high levels of professional-
ization. While the requirement was felt to
fall on the Service itself, the effort clearly
had far-reaching implications for the Insti-
tute's programs and philosophy.
Toward an Overall Training Philosophy
The first question to come under close
scrutiny was the training of junior Foreign
Service officers. It was patent that junior
officer training had to respond to the basic
training philosophy applicable to the Foreign
Service as a whole. This linkage led the In-
stitute, in close coordination with the Departs
ment's career development and placement
officers, to examine the goals of formal train-
ing at various levels and the relationship of
training to both experience and position re-
quirements.
Some months earlier the Department's
Office of Management Planning had reached
tentative conclusions in a project which es-
tablished all Department of State functions
at four major levels of responsibility. The
project developed within each group simpli-
fied title designations which corresponded to
specializations. This project, known as Man-
power Utilization System and Techniques
(MUST), enabled the Institute and its col-
leagues in the Department to develop a train-
ing grid related to the groups established in
MUST. Furthermore, since the MUST pro-
posal tentatively built in as job requirements
certain formal and practical training perqui-
sites, the search for an overall training
philosophy was simplified.
A training committee, chaired by the Di-
rector General of the Foreign Service and
comprising, in addition to the Director of the
Institute, geographic and functional bureau
representation at the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary level, was established to examine the
problem of training philosophies and pro-
grams. In this fashion a mechanism was
created for total Departmental involvement
in training questions.
The training committee concluded that In-
stitute programs for Foreign Service offi-
cers, whether at junior, middle, or senior
levels, should be concerned with the applica-
tion of skills or disciplines to Foreign Serv-
ice situations. With this view as a guiding
principle, the Institute's junior officer train-
ing programs were pointed toward job-
related preparation.
Some advisers from both outside and
inside the Department of State had argued
vigorously for a lengthy stay for junior offi-
cers in the Foreign Service Institute, during
which a wide range of university-type sub-
jects and instruction would be given in fields
normally dealt with in university graduate
schools. This approach was consistent with
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
219
concepts underlying the preparation of offi-
cers in the pre-World War II period. As
Ambassador Allen once observed, in that era
officers were considered to have accumulated
in their university education knowledge
which could be eked out as required over the
years. In contrast to this piecemeal concept,
the Institute and the training committee
eventually adopted the principle that because
of the speed of changing events at home and
abroad affecting the practice of modern di-
plomacy, it was preferable to return officers
at regular intervals throughout their careers
for up-to-date training either at the Institute
or in the universities or military colleges.
Meeting Specific Needs of Junior Officers
An examination by the Institute faculty of
the kinds of responsibilities which junior of-
ficers would encounter following initial Insti-
tute training, during a 2-year on-the-job
training period, pointed to certain specific
needs. New officers, since they would serve
during the 2-year probationary period in
each of the four major sections of an em-
bassy — economic, political, consular, and ad-
ministrative — needed help in the early devel-
opment of certain managerial and specific
skills, awareness of important American
foreign policy directions, examination of ele-
ments related to world tensions which have a
bearing on political and economic reporting
and other responsibilities, and at least mini-
mal understanding of the Washington policy
process.
The course developed as Part I for the
new officers extends over an 8-week period
which includes 2 weeks of preparation for
consular responsibilities. Role playing, case
studies, lectures, and individual research
projects are among the techniques employed.
Following the initial phase of the course, the
junior officers receive 3 weeks of intensive
training in area studies related to their first
posts of assignment. Officers who do not
speak the language of their first posts also
receive an additional 16 to 24 weeks of lan-
guage training. Intensive 6-hour-a-day
220
courses enable officers to proceed to their
posts with reasonable language competence.
Part II of the junior officer program has
been developed to meet the needs of junior
officers who return to the Department after .
their first service abroad, which normally
consists of a 2-year training assignment and
a 2-year assignment to a regular position.
The training committee had particularly rec-
ommended job-related preparation for these
officers prior to their Washington assign-
ments, most of which are concerned with the
first levels of policy coordination.
The new 4-week course, offered for the
first time in the fall of 1966, comprises in-
tensive training in executive development, a
broad review of problems of international
communism and other forms of extremist
political movements, examination of outside
pressures on the policy process, and inten-
sive analysis of problems of interagency
policy coordination. Case-study and role-
playing techniques are introduced early in
the course, and its final week culminates in
simulations in which the students are given
an opportunity to apply the principles which
they have studied.
The Segmented Midcareer Program
After reorganization of the junior officer
programs, the next step facing the Institute
and the training committee was what to do
about midcareer training. For nearly two
decades training for Foreign Service officers
was based on the principle that functional
and area/language specialization corre-
sponded to the midcareer phase and that for
senior officers broad general exposure was
indicated.
Translated in career terms, this meant
that in theory an officer started in a general-
ist capacity and developed as a specialist; for
those who survived the selection-out process,
generalist responsibilities would be their lot
in the top echelons of the Service. What has
actually occurred is that many officers
reached the senior grades as specialists and,
although exposed to broadening in the mili-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tary colleges or the Foreign Service Insti-
tute's Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy,
nevertheless finished out their careers in spe-
cialist capacities or became ambassadors
almost directly from their fields of special-
ization.
Crossing this pattern of development,
there had been injected almost since the cre-
ation of the Foreign Service Institute the
additional concept that specialization at mid-
career level should be balanced by participa-
tion in a broad integrated program designed
to round out specialists. The problem w^ith
this concept was that by the time most oflS-
cers were ready for the midcareer course,
they had already become specialists either
through formal training or on-the-job expe-
rience. While they had acquired certain
strengths, their intellectual equipment also
reflected important gaps arising from the
fact of their specialization. Since the inte-
grated midcareer course presented a uni-
form curriculum regardless of individual dif-
' ferences of officers, a dysfunctional tone
persisted in the midcareer training pattern.
In an effort to resolve this problem, the
Institute "disintegrated" the midcareer pro-
gram into eight basic segments. The seg-
ments were then refined into short high-im-
pact courses. Promising officers were offered
opportunities on an invitational basis to take
those segments which balanced out their
strengths and helped eliminate weaknesses.
For example, a midcareer officer with a
strong background in political work and
Communist problems but with a weak back-
ground in economics was invited to partici-
pate in the economic segment and in any
other which he needed to complement his spe-
cialization. The eight segments, which could
be taken separately, concerned Communist
strategy; science, technology, and foreign
affairs; executive studies; Americana; mod-
ern economic concepts; international labor
affairs; problems of underdeveloped coun-
tries; and political science.
The revised segmented plan, after favor-
able recommendation of the training commit-
This article by Mr. Cortada and Dr. Hope is
one of a series being written especially for the
Bulletin by officers of the Department and the
Foreign Service. Officers who may be inter-
ested in submitting original bylined articles
are invited to call Jewell Wilson in the Bul-
letin office, extension 5806.
tee, was approved by the Deputy Under Sec-
retary for Administration and became
operative during 1966.
Language and Area Training
For many years, actually since long before
World War II, special language and area
preparation has been an established practice
for selected officers according to their Service
needs. For example. Ambassador Raymond
A. Hare, who retired in November 1966 after
some 40 years of service, had been an Arabic
and Turkish student language officer in Paris
in 1929. Others studied Chinese and Russian.
Such distinguished diplomats as Ambassa-
dors George Kennan and Charles Bohlen un-
derwent similar training. In the post-World
War II period, formal training in language
and area specialization underwent a marked
increase, particularly in the development of
specialists for service in the Far East, Mid-
dle East, and more recently, Africa. Formal
training for European and Latin American
specialists, particularly the former, is a rela-
tively recent development.
Originally the concept underlying area
specialization was concentration on the lan-
guage, with the area-study component on a
somewhat hit-or-miss basis. Student officers
in the earlier days were sent to universities
for 1 or 2 years of language study; they took
such area courses as were available and
seemed appropriate.
In the early Institute days the need for
language specialists became so great that a
new pattern of assignment and training had
to be found because the Service simply could
not afford to have large numbers of officers
out of circulation for long periods at univer-
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
221
sities. Thus, in its first 20 years, the Institute
devoted about half of its resources to up-
grading the language proficiency of foreign
affairs personnel.
The Foreign Service Institute responded
to the task by developing intensive language
training capabilities in its own quarters for
some 60 languages. For Japanese and Chi-
nese language training, there are Institute
schools in Yokohama and Taichung, respec-
tively. For Arabic, there are Institute schools
in Beirut and Tangier.
The Institute continued to depend on the
universities for the area component of lan-
guage-and-area specialization under close
monitoring by the Institute's faculty. This
formula is still followed, although serious
consideration is being given to developing on
an experimental basis one or two area spe-
cialization programs in the Institute. In the
meantime, the Institute is also continuing a
series of short interdisciplinary introductory
area courses.
Functional Specialization
The question of training for functional
specialization in fields such as economics,
petroleum, labor, consular affairs, and ad-
ministration was more difficult to resolve.
In the case of economics, for example, uni-
versities plan that undergraduate majors be
taken over a 2- or 3-year period. Graduate
schools presuppose a 2- or 3-year stay on
campus. Again, the Foreign Service came up
against the hard fact that it could not spare
officers for the length of time required by the
universities for a good grounding in eco-
nomics. Furthermore, a manpower survey
completed in 1965 showed that the Foreign
Service needed over the years 1966-1970
approximately 200 officers with training in
economics at least equal to an undergraduate
major.
Acting on the advice of distinguished acad-
emicians, the Institute was encouraged to
develop its own program and adapt it to par-
ticular Foreign Service needs. Accordingly,
in January 1966 a 5V2-inonth course was
started for carefully selected officers having
no background in economics, during which
the equivalent of an undergraduate major in
the subject was covered. To test the efficacy
of the course, the Graduate Record examina-
tion in economics prepared by the Educa-
tional Testing Service at Princeton, N.J.,
normally taken by university seniors who
aspire to enter graduate school, was admin-
istered to the first graduates of the Insti-
tute's economics course. They scored well
above the national mean, thus demonstrating
that functional specialized training tailored
to meet Foreign Service requirements could
be successfully given in a relatively short
period.
After the initial experiment, the training
of economic officers in the Institute is now
an established practice. On the other hand,
both the Institute and the personnel officers
in the Department agreed on the advisability
of continuing to send to the universities a
small number of officers for preparation in
economics at the master's or doctoral degree
level.
A certain amount of formal training is
given in the Institute in administration and
consular affairs as specializations, but they
may be refined further. While both the Insti-
tute and universities are used in the training
of officers in the administrative and area
fields and other specialties, present ap-
proaches to these problems are currently un-
dergoing careful scrutiny to see whether
formulas such as the one adopted in the case
of economics should be followed. Probably in
certain fields, such as petroleum and com-
mercial specialization, a mix of inhouse
training and temporary assignments to pri-
vate companies may be the answer. In
others, perhaps an Institute-university ar-
rangement may be preferable. The problem
of how to develop broad executive capability
is one under constant review and experimen-
tation.
A very difficult problem is whether se-
lected officers engaged in political work
222
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
should undergo intensive refresher courses
in political science techniques and methods.
The problem is not easy to resolve because of
the considerable changes in the political sci-
ence profession in recent years and the diver-
sity of judgments among political scientists
as to what kind of preparation is indicated
for experienced political analysts, whether in
or outside Government. It seems likely that
the Institute will undertake some training in
this field, but content, duration, and direction
are still undecided.
It has been a longstanding practice to
round out the formal training of officers who
ultimately will occupy key positions by send-
ing them to military colleges, universities, or
the Institute's Senior Seminar in Foreign
Policy. The theory behind these assignments
is that at that point in his career, a senior
officer should catch his breath and take a
look at developments in the United States
,and their effect on the foreign policy issues
(Confronting the Nation.
A new field being explored by the Foreign
Service Institute and the United States In-
formation Agency is the training of Govern-
ment officers engaged in overseas informa-
tional and cultural activities. The task is not
simple because, while there has been consid-
erable advance with respect to communica-
tions in general in the universities, little
attention has been given to the question of
crossnational and crosscultural communica-
tions. This field is an important one for all
people involved in overseas service, particu-
larly in the new nations.
In summary, the trend in the Foreign
Sei-vice Institute over the past 20 years has
been in the direction of training programs
contributing toward a greater professionali-
zation of officers in the foreign affairs com-
munity. The Institute is now moving steadily
in this direction not only by drawing on its
own resources but also by seeking faculty as-
sistance and advice from universities. Close
to 400 academicians contribute to the Insti-
tute's activities through lectures, direct
teaching, or consultations on curriculum and
methodology.
It is the philosophy of the Institute that,
regardless of how carefully developed train-
ing programs may be, they must complement,
not substitute for, professional experience
under competent and conscientious superiors.
Only to the extent that supervisors in the
Foreign Service, in the Department of State,
and in related foreign affairs agencies are
conscious of their responsibilities for person-
nel development can short- or long-term
training succeed. Programs with a formal
training content can only act as catalytic
agents to assist officers who are motivated to
improve their skills and understanding of
the complex tasks of a modern foreign policy
establishment. The developmental job is up
to the people who are doing the work and to
those who supervise their activities and
careers.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group.
Report on the ninth meeting, held at Washington,
D.C., May 18-22, 1966, by Senator George D.
Aiken, chairman of the Senate delegation. S. Doc.
119. October 19, 1966. 11 pp.
Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services made by its Subcommittee on the Opera-
tion of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement. S. Rept. 1881. October 19, 1966. 15 pp.
Border Highway — El Paso, Tex. Conference report
to accompany H.R. 11555. H. Rept. 2322. October
19, 1966. 4 pp.
An Investigation of U.S. Participation in the NATO
Common Infrastructure Program. Forty-fifth re-
port by the Committee on Government Operations.
H. Rept. 2323. October 19, 1966. 30 pp.
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Conference re-
port to accompany H.R. 13103. H. Rept. 2327.
October 19, 1966. 16 pp.
Status of Cuban Refugees. Conference report to ac-
company H.R. 15183. H. Rept. 2334. October 21,
1966. 4 pp.
Second Report on U.S.-Owned Foreign Currencies
(With Special Reference to Poland and Yugo-
slavia). Forty-sixth report by the House Committee
on Government Operations. H. Rept. 2336. October
21, 1966. 20 pp.
FEBRUARY 6, 1967
223
TREATY INFORMATION
Protocol to U.S.-Mexico Radio
Agreement Enters Into Force
Press release 3 dated January 12
On January 12, Secretary of State Rusk
and the Mexican Ambassador, Hugo B.
Margain, exchanged the instruments of rati-
fication of the protocol between the United
States and Mexico signed at Mexico City on
April 13, 1966, amending the agreement of
January 29, 1957, concerning radio broad-
casting in the standard broadcast band. The
protocol was brought into force by the ex-
change of instruments of ratification.
The 1957 agreement entered into force on
June 9, 1961, effective for 5 years. It expired
by its own terms on June 9, 1966. The
protocol of April 13, 1966, upon entry into
force has the effect of reviving and continu-
ing in force the 1957 agreement. The proto-
col has one substantive article, by which the
duration provision of the 1957 agreement
is amended so that the agreement will
remain effective until December 31, 1967,
unless, before that date, it is terminated by
a notice of denunciation by either party
pursuant to the terms of the agreement or is
replaced by a new agreement. Steps are
being taken to negotiate a new agreement to
replace that of 1957.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cotton
Articles of agreement of International Cotton Insti-
tute. Open for signature at Washington January
17 through February 28, 1966. Entered into force
February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.
Acceptance deposited: Mexico, December 30, 1966.'
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15,
1964.'
Acceptance received: Burma, September 27, 1966.
Safety at Sea ^
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.
Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Romania (with a state-
ment), December 12, 1966.
Sugar
Protocol for the further prolongation of the Inter-
national Sugar Agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Done at London N 
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