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N. i 

Vol. LVI, Nos. H.36-H61 

Return volume, when bound, to odV <Jh j 


Author UiS 

Z^^' ' or o A > l^ 






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Call No. 

■^-^ ri , 1 *^ 3 

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Date of Issue 



2, 1967 



9, 1967 



16, 1967 



23, 1967 ] 



30,1967 ] 



6,1967 ] 



13,1967 2 



20, 1967 2 



27,1967 3 



6, 1967 3 



13,1967 3 



20, 1967 4 



27, 1967 4 

Volume incomplete. Rind with stub 


Volume incomplete. Bind without 


Color 13 U-^. 

Form No 1236 

Corrections for Volume LVI 

The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call attention to 
the following errors in Volume LVI : 

January 23, p. 137, first column, fifth paragraph: The 
paragraph should read " — There is doubt that America's 
vital interests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to 
necessitate the growing commitment there." 

May 29, p. 828, second column: The fourth sentence in 
the first full paragraph should read "And it is worth noting 
that the fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act request, 
along with other foreign assistance requests such as the 
Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contributions to the 
International Development Association, total less than .7 
percent of our GNP." 

June 12, p. 889, first column: The first sentence in the 
last paragraph should read "The greatest disservice to 
that resolution and to its effective implementation, would 
be for us to create an impression in South Africa and in 
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided on how 
these principles are to be achieved." 



Publication 8274 

Released September 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price 30 cents 

INDEX 2. :r.^ Hd,«^ 

Volume LVI, Numbers 1436-1461, Jan. 2-June 26, 1967 

ACDA. Sec Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

Adams, Samuel C, Jr., 732 

Aden, self-determination, U.N. role in (Goldberg), 

Adenauer, Konrad, death of: Johnson, 751, 752; 

Kiesinger, 751; Rusk, 752 
Advisory Council on African Affairs, 651 
Afghanistan : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 626 
Pakistan, relations with ( Maiwandwal ) , 631 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 86, 122, 260, 834 
U.S. agricultural committee (Johnson) , 629 
U.S. aid (Maiwandwal), 631 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Maiwandwal, 627 
Africa (sec also Organization of African Unity and 
individual countries) : 
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson), 

Communism, rejection and countermeasures : 
Martin, 195; Palmer, 455; W. W. Rostow, 493 
Economic progress and problems: Goldberg, 289; 
Katzenbach, 954; Palmer, 646, 650; W. W. 
Rostow, 496 
Human rights: 376; Goldberg, 289 
International Coffee Agreement, importance and 

effect, 252 
North Africa, development, problems, and U.S. in- 
terests (Palmer), 806 
Political issues: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 959; 

Palmer, 646 
Regional programs and U.S. support: Goldberg, 
293; Johnson, 159, 234, 383, 958 (quoted); 
Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 649, 810; W. W. 
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830 
South, problems of: Goldberg, 290; Sisco, 67 
Southern Rhodesia, importance to: 372, 376; 

Palmer, 450, 455 
U.S. aid: Johnson, 159, 379, 380, 383; Katzenbach, 
958; Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; W. W. 
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 830 
U.S. Bureau of African Affairs, advisory panel 

named, 651 
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384 
U.S. relations and interests: Goldberg, 291; 

Katzenbach, 955; Palmer, 450; Rusk, 830 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach: 756; Katzen- 
bach, 954 

African Development Bank: 338; Johnson, 334, 379, 
568; Katzenbach, 958; Palmer, 650; W. W. 
Rostow, 499; Rusk, 831 
Agency for International Development: 

Africa, programs and policy: Johnson, 383; 

Palmer, 650; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk, 831 
Agriculture improvement programs increased (E. 

V. Rostow) , 863 
AID-GATT training program (Blumenthal), 435 
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 

232, 233, 297 
Community water supply development program, 

760, 761 
Educational aid, increases, 337 
Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson), 

Reorganization: Johnson, 379, 381; E. V. Rostow, 

Tunisia, 50-well project (Palmer) , 812 
Viet-Nam commodity assistance programs, 1966 
management report: Gaud, 200; text of report, 
201 ; Rusk, 832 
Viet-Nam medical assistance, 665 
Aggression {see also China, Communist, Communism, 
and Soviet Union) : 
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict 
"Domino" theory: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 169 
Infiltration of weapons and armed men (Meeker), 

Measures against, U.S.: Johnson, 330, 546, 550, 587, 

654, 960; W. W. Rostow, 492; Rusk, 363 
Must not succeed: Johnson, 161, 535, 593; Martin, 
194; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 134, 272, 725; 
SEATO, 745; Truman (quoted), 548 
U.N. resolution on prohibition of use of force: 

Nabrit, 29, 30; text, 32 
U.S. position: Goldberg, 872; Johnson, 871; Katzen- 
bach, 2 
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam 

World peace, threat to: Johnson, 330; W. W. 
Rostow, 491; Rusk, 271, 278, 743; SEATO, 745 
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use in overseas pro- 
grams, agreements with: Afghanistan, 122 
Congo (Kinshasa), 642, 733; Ghana, 582, 702 
India, 182, 530; Iran, 122; Iraq, 154; Kenya, 834 
Korea, 260, 702; Morocco, 834; Pakistan, 182 
898; Philippines, 306; Poland, 766; Tunisia, 642 
Viet-Nam, 154, 614 

271-701—67 1 


Agriculture (see also Agricultural surpluses, Food 
and Agriculture Organization, and Food for 
Peace) : 
AID programs: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 860, 

CENTO programs, 671 
Europe, labor shifts in, 337 
FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 859 
India, development and problems: Johnson, 298, 

334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 830 
Kennedy Round negotiations, importance: Blumen- 
thal, 433; Roth, 478, 880; E. V. Rostow, 860; 
Solomon, 556 
Latin America, 713, 887 

Declaration of the Presidents of America, text, 


U.S. aid (Johnson), 382, 541, 543, 632, 707, 709 

Modernization of, importance and need: 109, 337; 

Johnson, 160, 295, 298, 381, 543; Katzenbach, 

956; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404, 856; W. W. Rostow, 

501 ; Rusk, 874 

OECD agricultural food fund, U.S. proposal: 

Johnson, 297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 
SEATO programs, 747 
U.S. agricultural trade mission to Soviet Union 

(Trowbridge), 882 
Viet-Nam: 212; Johnson, 593, 594 
Water for Peace program. See Water for Peace 
Agriculture Department, 559 
Agronsky, Martin, 126 
Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta, 16 
AID. See Agency for International Development 
Aid Consortia for India and Pakistan: Johnson, 296, 
299, 383, 700; E. V. Rostow, 403; W. W. Rostow, 
496 ; Rusk, 830 
Aiken, George (Goldberg), 512 
Albania, U.S. travel restrictions, 102 
Aliens. See Nonnationals 

Development, problems, and U.S. interests 

(Palmer), 806 
Soviet military and economic aid (Palmer), 809, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 353 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Alianza para el Progreso. See Alliance for Progress 
Allen, George V., 322 
Alliance for Progress: 

Accomplishments and role: Bunker, 472; Johnson, 
158, 231, 380, 382, 540, 632, 708, 711; Linowitz, 
822; Rusk, 47, 829 
Charter, protocol of amendment, resolution re rati- 
fication of, 475 
Chiefs of State, meeting of : 

Declaration of the Presidents of America: 706n; 

text, 712 
Purpose: Bunker, 472; Johnson, 13, 71, 158, 231, 
540, 678, 706 ; W. W. Rostow, 499 ; Rusk, 47, 464 
Regional arms control arrangements, 576 

Alliance for Progress— Continued 

Chiefs of State, meeting of — Continued 

Results: 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725, 822, 

U.S. Congress, position on: Johnson, 545, 707; 

Rusk, 723, 829 ■, 

U.S. delegation, 721 
International Coffee Agreement, importance: 253; 

Johnson, 250 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 11th meeting of con- 
sultation : Bunker, 472 ; Rusk, 47, 464 
Final Act of the 3rd Special Inter- American Con- 
ference (excerpts), 474 
Resolution (text), 473 
U.S. delegation, 472n, 476 
Multinational projects: Johnson, 12, 709, 711; Lino- 
witz, 730, 823 ; Rusk, 723, 829 
Declaration of Presidents of America, 712, 716, 
719, 720 
Third special Inter-American Congress, final act 

(excerpts), 474 
U.S. appropriations requests: 887; Johnson, 232, 

233, 234, 382, 543, 707; Rusk, 723, 828 
U.S. support: Johnson, 334, 707, 708, 709, 710; W. 
W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk, 723, 772 
Alliluyeva, Mrs. Svetlana: Niven, 774; Rusk, 782 
American ideals: Goldberg, 528, 940; Johnson, 14, 
163, 301, 385, 593, 654, 708, 960; Martin, 193; 
Palmer, 451 ; Pollack, 913 
American National Red Cross, 599 
Amerika (Katzenbach), 755 
Amistad (Friendship) Dam: 13; Johnson, 12 
Amity and economic relations, treaty with Togo, 154, 

Anderson, Eugenie, 732 

Angola, self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290 
Ansary, Hushang, 909 
Antarctic Treaty (1959) : 

Current actions: Netherlands, including Surinam 

and Netherlands Antilles, 641 
Importance : 575, 634 ; Johnson, 387, 569 
Measures re furtherance of principles and objec- 
tives, entrance into force, 392 
Outer space treaty, relation to : Goldberg, 603, 608, 

609; Rusk, 601 
U.S. observers, appointment, 71 

Inspection of Antarctic stations, 633 
Antigua, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab- 
lishment, 182 
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.), council 

meeting, Washington: 517; communique, 749 
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455; 

Rogers, 302; Sisco,68 
Aqaba, Gulf of. See Arab-Israeli conflict 
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict and names of 

individual countries 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 

Cease-fire, compliance with: 941, 948; Goldberg, 
942,943; Johnson, 952 



Arab-Israeli conflict — Continued 

General Armistice Agreement, need for observ- 
ance : Goldberg, 923, 927 ; Johnson, 871 

Soviet position : Goldberg, 924 ; Rusk, 950 

U.N. role: Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 927, 936, 941, 
944, 946 ; Johnson, 870, 935, 951, 952 ; Rusk, 949 
Secretary-General, peacekeeping efforts: Gold- 
berg, 871, 894, 920, 922, 926, 937, 938, 943, 945, 
947 ; Johnson, 870 
Security Council resolutions, texts, 947, 948 

U.S. aircraft, allegations of use of and U.S. reply: 
Goldberg, 935, 938, 940; Rusk, 950, 951 

U.S.-Canada discussions (Johnson), 909 

U.S. draft resolutions: Goldberg, 944; texts, 927, 
941, 948 

U.S. position: 949; Goldberg, 871, 920, 925, 936, 
940, 942, 946; Johnson, 870, 952; Rusk, 949 

U.S. ship, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John- 
son, 952 

U.S. Special Committee of the National Security 
Council, establishment and membership (John- 
son), 951 

U.S.-U.K. talks (Wilson), 963 
Argentina : 

Economic development (Rusk) , 723 

Kennedy Round, importance to (Blumenthal), 432 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353, 613, 
701, 702, 733, 834, 898, 930, 967 
Armaments (see also Disarmament, Missiles, and 
Nuclear weapons) : 

Communist arms supply to Viet-Nam : Katzenbach, 
753; Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466, 727, 786 

Control and reduction of: 576; Johnson, 447; Rusk, 
42, 771 

Cyprus, importation of arms, U.S. position (Gold- 
berg), 180 

Economic disadvantages of competition in: 576; 
Johnson, 160; Palmer, 811; Rusk, 43, 171, 361, 

India-Pakistan arms race, possibility of, 688 

Latin America, elimination of unnecessary expendi- 
tures for: 713, 721 ; Johnson, 711 

Middle East arms race (Goldberg), 943 

Outer space treaty, significance of provisions: 
Dean, 268; Goldberg, 80, 602, 603, 609; John- 
son, 266; Rusk, 601 

Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against sale or 
shipment to : 77, 374 ; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146 

Soviet supply to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811 

Soviet-U.S. competition: 575; Humphrey, 489; 
Johnson, 160, 445, 569; Katzenbach, 755; 
Kohler, 413; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 501; Rusk, 171,601 

U.S. policy on supply of (Johnson) , 384 
North Africa (Palmer), 811 
Armed forces : 

Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position. See Arab- 
Israeli conflict 


Armed forces — Continued 

South Africa forces, withdrawal from Southwest 

Africa, U.N. request, 894 
Warsaw Pact countries, question of reduction in 
(Rusk), 783 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.: 

Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 

General Advisory Committee member (Neuberger) , 

confirmation, 448 
Sixth annual report, excerpts : 570 ; Johnson, 568 
Arosemena Gomez, Otto, 706n 
Artigas, 706 (quoted) 
ASA. See Association of Southeast Asia 
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia (see also 
ANZUS council. Association of Southeast Asia, 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and in- 
dividual countries) : 
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 

advisors, 72 
Communist activities and goals: 849; Bundy, 791; 
U.A. Johnson, 420; Martin, 195; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 493; Rusk, 169, 281, 743; SEATO, 745 
Asian rejection of: Bundy, 323, 791; Holt, 962; 

Rusk, 170 ; Westmoreland, 740 
U.S. aid as a countermeasure (Johnson), 383 
Economic and social development: 
Multilateral aid (Bundy), 326, 793 
Problems (Johnson) , 382 
U.S. aid : Bundy, 326, 791 ; Rusk, 830 

AID budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233, 

382, 384 
Special authorization request (Johnson), 162 
International Coffee Agreement, importance and 

effect of, 252 
Manila Conference: 748; Bundy, 326, 794; Chung, 

552; Holt, 962; Johnson, 960; Thieu, 588 
President Johnson's visit, results (Martin), 197 
Regional cooperation: 517, 849; Bundy, 325, 791, 
793; Goldberg, 506, 509; Holt, 962; Johnson, 
162, 380; Martin, 194; W. W. Rostow, 499; 
Rusk, 47, 134, 598, 744, 832; SEATO, 745; 
Thanat Khoman (quoted) , 197, 854 
Pacific Community, proposed, 553 
Role of: Australia and New Zealand: (Bundy), 
793; Johnson, 961; Japan (Martin), 196; 
Korea: Chung, 552; Johnson, 549; Philippines 
(Braderman), 660; Thailand: Martin, 853; 
Rusk, 597; U.K. (Bundy), 793 
U.S. Chiefs of Mission, meeting, Baguio: 517; 

Goldberg, 511 
U.S. position, objectives, and role: Bundy, 323, 327, 
790; Chung, 552; Martin, 193; Rusk, 134, 170; 
Yen, 847 
U.S.-Soviet complementary interests (Katzen- 
bach), 755 
USIA activities, increase (Johnson) , 236 
Viet-Nam, importance to peace of: 849; Bundy, 323, 
327, 792; Holt, 962; Johnson, 160, 534, 678, 
961; Kohler, 8, 410; Martin, 195; Middleton 



Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia — Continued 
Viet-Nam — Continued 

(quoted), 851; W. W. Rostow, 499, 503; Rusk, 
47, 134, 725, 744, 787, 831, 877; SEATO, 746 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg, 505, 509 
Asian and Pacific Council: 849; Bundy, 326, 793; 
Chung, 552; Johnson, 380, 549; Martin, 196, 853; 
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 47 
Asian Development Bank: 338, 849; Bundy, 325, 793; 
Chung, 552; Johnson, 162, 334, 380, 469, 549, 568, 
847; Martin, 196, 853; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 
47, 832 
Public international organization, U.S. designation 

as. Executive order, 563 
U.S. nnancial support: Johnson, 379; Rusk, 785 
Asian Economic Development, Conference on (Mar- 
tin), 196, 854 
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196, 854 
Association of Southeast Asia : Bundy, 326, 793 ; Mar- 
tin, 196, 853 ; W. W. Rostow, 499 
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council 
Astronauts : 

Outer space treaty provisions for assistance and 
return: 84, 577; Goldberg, 81, 141, 603, 611, 
839; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601 
U.S. astronauts, deaths of (Johnson) , 388 
Ataturk, Kemal : Johnson, 652 ; Sunay, 653 
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Atlantic partnership: Humphrey, 487; E. V. Rostow, 

Atomic energy, peaceful uses of: 

Agreements re application of safeguards. See under 

Atomic Energy Agency, International 
Civil uses, bilateral agreements concerning co- 
operation: Australia, 702, 834; Colombia, 438; 
Iran, 438 
Desalination, including use of atomic energy, agree- 
ment with Soviet Union, 37 
Diversion to nuclear weapon uses, danger of: 572; 

Pollack, 911 ; Seaborg, 96 
Germany, progress in ( McGhee) , 153 
Latin America, prospects (Johnson) , 709 
Nuclear power developments: 572; Pollack, 910; 

Seaborg, 90 
Nuclear proliferation treaty, non-application of 

(Rusk), 321 
Safeguards (see also Atomic Energy Agency, In- 
ternational) : 571; Johnson, 448; Pollack, 911; 
Rusk, 241 
Application of safeguards to existing bilateral 

agreements: Brazil, 612; Spain, 85 
EURATOM, question of: 572; Rusk, 360 
Atomic Energy Agency, International : 

Safeg:uards, international safeguard and control 
systems, and U.S. support: 572; Johnson, 448, 
569; Seaborg, 97 
Statute, current actions: Sierra Leone, 967; Singa- 
pore, 182 
Attwood, William, 651 


Australia (see also Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- 
tion) : 
ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749 
Asian development, role in: Bundy, 793; Johnson, 

Economic development (Johnson) , 961 
India, grain shipments to (Johnson ) , 299 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 224, 260, 582, 

U.S. visit of Prime Minister ( Holt) , 960 
"Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; W. W. 
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740 

Import liberalizations, 245 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 613, 733, 766 
U.S. Ambassador (MacArthur), confirmation, 674 
Automotive products, Italian Fiat plant in Soviet 
Union: Harriman, 819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 
522 ; Trowbridge, 883 
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st annual 

report, transmittal (Johnson), 732 
Automotive traffic. See Road trafiic 
Aviation : 

Aircraft, U.S., allegations of attack on Soviet ship 

rejected, 953 
Aircraft, U.S., allegations of involvement in Mid- 
dle East, U.S. replies: Goldberg, 935, 940; 
Rusk, 950, 951 
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions re air transport 
of exports and sale or supply of aircraft, 77, 
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146 
Supersonic transport aircraft, prospects and im- 
portance (Humphrey), 164 
Thailand Air Force, U.S. helicopter training (Mar- 
tin), 199, 853 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

Air transport agreement (1948) with Italy, 

termination, 965, 968 
Air transport agreement (1949) with Panama, 

amendment, 965 
Aircraft, C-47, and related articles and services, 

understanding with Mali re delivery of, 702 
Aircraft, civil, agreement with U.K. re use of 
airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base, 37 
Aircraft, offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board, convention (1963) : Denmark, 
85, 481; Norway, 481; Saudi Arabia, 765; 
Sweden, 481 
Aircraft, rights in, convention (1948) on the in- 
ternational recognition of: Iceland, 481 
Carriage by air, convention (1928) for the uni- 
fication of certain rules, protocol: New 
Zealand, 765 
Civil aviation, international convention (1944) : 

Barbados, 701; Guyana, 305; Uganda, 701 
Civil aviation, international, convention (1954) : 
Protocol re Singapore, 897 
Protocol re amendment of article 50(a): 
Singapore, 897 


Aviation — Continued 

U.S. airlifts to Viet-Nam (Wheeler) , 188 
Azerbaijan (Rusk), 877 

Bacon, Francis, 916 
Balance of payments: 
Adjustment policies and processes of other coun- 
tries, 345, 347, 788 
Import restraints, 245, 337 
OECD countries, 27 

Foreign aid programs, effect of and efforts to 
minimize: 345; Johnson, 233, 379, 381, 659; 
E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 827 
Military expenditures and aid, effect of: 

NATO: 488; E. V. Rostow, 21; Rusk, 362, 783 
Viet-Nam: 341, 342, 346; Johnson, 334 
Problems of and efforts to improve : 339; Johnson, 

334, 708, 886 
Tariff policy effect on (Solomon), 556 
Voluntary restraint program, effect: 343, 444; 
Johnson, 334 
Ball, George W., 69, 553, 554 
Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani, 688 
Bangoura, Mohammed Kassoury, 554 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 482, 701, 833, 865 
U.N. membership: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67 
Barghoorn, Frederick (Rusk), 248 
i Barrows, Leland, 651 
Baruch, Bernard, 569 
Battle, Lucius D., 674 
Beavogui, Louis-Lansana, 554 
Belaunde, Victor Andres (quoted), 641 
NATO headquarters, relocation in, 51 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 305, 306, 582, 613 
Bell, Philip, 651 
Beplat, Tristan E., 70 
Berger, Samuel D., 552 

Berlin (see also Germany) : Humphrey, 680; Kohler, 
8, 410 
Visit of Vice-President Humphrey: Humphrey, 
680; Johnson (quoted), 680 
Berlin crisis (Rusk), 272, 278, 877 
Bernardes, Carlos (Goldberg) , 179 
Berry, Michael, 274 

Big-power responsibility: Goldberg, 513, 873, 895, 
938; Humphrey, 486; Johnson, 333, 550, 960; 
Katzenbach, 754; Kohler, 406; Martin (quoted), 
273; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 770, 
784, 879; Solomon, 555; U Thant, 139 
Black, Eugene: 69, 667; Johnson, 379, 469; Blartin, 

Blackie, William, 520 
Blair, Frank, 168 
Blumenthal, W. Martin, 430, 430n 
Bohlen, Charles E., 53 


Alliance for Progress summit conference, position 
on, 706n 

Communism, threat of (Rusk) , 828 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481 
Bonhomme, Arthur, 172 
Boonstra, Clarence A., 261 
von Borch, Herbert, 358 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 260, 967 
Bowie, Robert R., 53 
Braderman, Eugene M., 660 
Bradley, Omar (Rusk) , 770 
Brandt, Willy: Humphrey, 680; Rusk, 46, 320 
Brazil : 

Economic progress (Rusk), 723, 829 

Income tax convention, announcement, 581 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 306, 393, 612, 614, 
642, 733, 866, 929, 930, 967 

U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk, 

U.S. visit of president-elect Costa e Silva, 242 
British (see also United Kingdom) 
British Council, 667 
British Independent Television interview of Secretary 

Rusk, 274 
Bronheim, David, 721 
Brosio, Manlio, 687 

Brovra, George: 747; Goldberg, 28; Rusk, 46, 129 
Brown, Winthrop G., 897 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 414, 565 
Buffum, William B., 261, 732 
Bui Diem, 216 

Bui Vien: Johnson, 590; Thieu, 591 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16 

Political developments (Brzezinski), 417 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 260, 702 

U.S. Ambassador (McSweeney), confirmation, 674 

U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach) , 5 
Bunche, Ralph (Goldberg), 268 
Bundy, McGeorge (Johnson), 951 
Bundy, William P., 323, 517, 790, 849 
Bunker, Ellsworth: 472, 586, 591, 674, 844; Johnson, 

538, 587, 588, 589, 593, 594; Thieu, 591 
Burlingame, Anson, 848 
Burma, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 898 
Burnet, Alastair, 274 
Burundi : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 481, 701 

Calif ano, Joseph A., Jr., 659 

Cambodia, neutrality: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320, 
619, 773 
Communist violations (Rusk), 877 

Cameroon : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 260, 353, 530 
U.S. Ambassador (Payton) , confirmation, 261 



Canada : 

Agricultural development (E. V. Rostow), 863 

American Falls, Niagara, IJC study requested, 634 

Canada Pension Plan, agreement re, 898 

Eastern Europe, trade with (Solomon) , 521 

EXPO : 67, 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909 

Foreign aid programs : Johnson, 334 ; Rusk, 785 

"Great Ring of Canada" (Johnson) , 908 

India, grain shipments to (Johnson) , 299 

Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800 

St. Lawrence Seaway tolls, 554, 674 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613, 674, 

U.S. Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st 

annual report, transmittal (Johnson), 732 
Visit of President Johnson: Johnson, 907, 908; 
Pearson, 909 
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual Re- 
port of the President to the Congress on the Im- 
plem,entation of the Automotive Products Trade 
Act of 1965,12,2x1 
Cancino, Cuevas (Goldberg) , 895 
Canham, Erwin D., 315 
CARE, India, emergency food aid: 701; Johnson, 

300, 700 
Case, CliflFord P., 42 
Cater, Douglass, 16 
CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance), 

Brzezinski, 416 
CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization 
Central African Republic, treaties, agreements, etc., 

Central America, U.S. aid: Johnson, 382; Rusk, 829 
Central American Common Market, 712, 714, 715 
U.S. support: 339; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 382, 
542; Linowitz, 730; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 
Central American Economic Integration Fund: 716; 

Johnson, 382 
Central Intelligence Agency, private voluntary or- 
ganizations, relations, policy review: 665; John- 
son, 665 
Central Treaty Organization : 

Economic Committee, 15th meeting: communique, 
670; Gaud, 668 
U.S. delegation, 671 
Turkey, support of (Johnson) , 547 
U.K. aid, 670 

International telecommunications convention 

(1965) , with annexes, 613 
U.S. Ambassador ( Corry ) , confirmation, 968 
Chad, treaties, agreements, etc., 354, 733 
Chaffee, Roger (Johnson) , 388 
Chemical and biological warfare, U.S. position, 577 

Economic level of development (Rusk) , 723 
Outer space treaty, signature, 260 
Reflecting telescope at Cerro Tololo Inter-American 
Observatory, 728 

Chile — Continued 

U.S. economic aid (Johnson) , 382 
U.S. visit of President Frei, 71 
China, Communist (see also Sino-Soviet relations) : 
Asia, threat to: 849; Bundy, 791; Martin, 195; 
W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 275 
U.S. military assistance as a countermeasure 
(Rusk), 827 
Economic stagnation: Bundy, 325, 792; W. W. 

Rostow, 497, 501 
India, threat to (Sisco) , 462 

Leadership struggle: 849; Goldberg, 508; Martin, 
193; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 495, 501; 
Rusk, 47, 170, 280, 785, 788; Taylor, 287 
Nuclear tests and nuclear potential: 750; Mc- 

Namara, 445 ; Rusk, 132 
Taiwan, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper, 

Thailand, threat to (Rusk) , 275 
U.N. membership: 

Question of: 849; Goldberg, 100; Popper, 689 
"Two Chinas" solution: U. A. Johnson, 423; 
Popper, 693 
U.S. policy and relations: Goldberg, 100, 310, 840; 
U. A. Johnson, 420, 422; Popper, 689, 694; 
Rusk, 283, 322 
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 564 
Viet-Nam, positions on: Goldberg, 508; Kohler, 
413; Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 
42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727, 786; Wheeler, 191 
World goals: ANZUS, 749; Meeker, 62; Popper, 
690, 692; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 169; 
Solomon, 519 
World relations: Johnson, 162; Martin, 193; Niven, 
774; E. V. Rostow, 398; W. W. Rostow, 502; 
Rusk, 788 
China, Republic of: 

Communist China, position on: U. A. Johnson, 423; 

Popper, 693 
Economic progress: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 353 
U.N. membership: 849; Goldberg, 100; Johnson, 

848; Popper, 689, 693 
U.S. commitments : 849 ; Johnson, 848 ; Popper, 683 ; 

Rusk, 322 
U.S. visit of Vice-President Yen, 846 
Viet-Nam, aid to (Johnson) , 847, 849 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 511 
Christian, George E., 721 
Christian Science Monitor, 798 
Chung, II Kwon, 548, 549, 551 
Church, Frank, 42 
Churchill, Winston: quoted, 486, 489, 490_ 838, 961, 

963; Harriman, 815 
Civic action programs: 699, 766; Westmoreland, 740 
Civil rights (see also Human rights and Racial dis- 
crimination) : 



Civil rights — Continued 

International covenant (U.N.), on civil and polit- 
ical rights: Goldberg 99; Harris, 104; text, 
Political rights of women, convention (1963) : 
Afghanistan, 86 
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg), 524 
U.S. (Goldberg), 289, 524 
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson), 590 
Claims : 
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, FY 1968 
budget appropriations request (Johnson), 232 
Launching of objects into outer space, liability for 

damages: 84; Goldberg, 81, 611; Rusk, 601 
Passenger-ship accidents, U.S. legislation re cover- 
age of (Miller), 175 
Clark, J. Reuben, Jr. (Rusk) , 270 
Clark, William Donaldson, 274 
Claxton, Philander P., 566 
Clayton, Will (Solomon), 555 
Cleveland, Harlan, 53 
Cocoa, international cocoa agreement, need for 

(Blumenthal), 434 
Coe, Richard, 854 

International Coffee Agreement (1962) : 717; John- 
son, 709 
Current actions: Honduras, 581; Jamaica, 929; 

Kenya, 85 
2nd annual report: Johnson, 250; text of report, 
International coffee diversification: 717; Johnson, 
Cole, 0. E., 377 
Collective security : 

Collective self-defense, right of: 571; Meeker, 59 
Defensive alliances, importance: Brzezinski, 415; 
Bundy, 791; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 271; 
Sisco, 65; Truman (quoted), 550 
Thai support (Rusk), 597 
U.N. role (Sisco), 459 

U.S. commitments, importance of dependability: 
Meeker, 62; Rusk, 725, 726, 771, 784, 787, 875, 
Colombia : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172 
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 701 
U.S. aid (Johnson) , 382 
Colombo Plan ( W. W. Rostow) , 496 
Colonialism (see also name of colony) : Goldberg, 
289; Sisco, 67 
U.N. resolution and U.S. support (Nabrit) , 32 
Comecon, 697 

Commodity Credit Corporation : 701 ; Johnson, 300 
Communications : 

NATO communications, improvement, 51 
News media, importance (Martin) , 854 

Communications — Continued 
Satellites (Humphrey), 164 

Global commercial communications satellite, in- 
terim arrangements and special agreement: 
Korea, 438; Peru, 967 
NATO feasibility study, 51 
Communism : 
Asia. See Asia. 
Cold war: Goldberg, 895; Harriman, 817; Johnson, 

159; Katzenbach, 754; W. W. Rostow, 500 
Ideological differences with free world : Harriman, 

820; Sisco, 463 
Iron Curtain ( Humphrey) , 486 
Measures against: Kohler, 8, 410; E. V. Rostow, 
399; W.W. Rostow, 493 
U.S. : 103 ; Johnson, 161, 384, 654 ; Kohler, 7, 409 ; 
Martin, 193; Rusk, 127, 134, 278, 877; Yen, 847 
Nationalism, increases in: Brzezinski, 417; Harri- 
man, 817; Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2; 
Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon, 
Peaceful coexistence. See East-West relations 
Propaganda : Goldberg, 924 ; Harriman, 820 ; Rusk, 

Rejection of and countermeasures (see also under 
Viet-Nam) : 564; Bundy, 323, 792; Holt, 962; 
Johnson, 384, 541; Martin, 195; Palmer, 455; 
Popper, 691 ; W. W. Rostow, 493 ; Rusk, 785, 
827, 832; Westmoreland, 740 
CIA aid to private organizations, 666 
Southern Rhodesia, danger of (Palmer) , 455 
Wars of national liberation: Bundy, 790; Martin, 
194; W. W. Rostow, 494, 503; Rusk, 272, 787; 
SEATO, 746; Taylor (quoted), 514; West- 
moreland, 738 
World goals: Harriman, 820; Kohler, 7; E. V. Roa- 
tow, 398 ; Rusk, 771, 785, 875 
Conferences, international, calendar of meetings, 34, 

Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa) : 
Political development (Palmer), 649 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 642, 733 
U.N. role (Sisco), 66 

U.S. Ambassador (McBride), confirmation, 968 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 393, 481 
Congress, U.S.: 

Alliance for Progress summit meeting, interests: 

Johnson, 545, 707; Rusk, 723, 829 
Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18, 223, 

350, 757, 801, 966 
Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Economic 

Reforms, report (Solomon), 522 
Findley and Belcher amendments (Harriman), 818 
India, fact-finding committee, results of trip (John- 
son), 299 

Cotton production, effect of 1965 legislation 
(Solomon), 558 



Congress, U.S. — Continued 
Legislation — Continued 

Passenger ship safety: Johnson, 429; Miller, 175 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, financial 
support ceiling raised (Johnson) , 599, 865 
Legislation, proposed: 

African Development Bank, U.S. participation in 

special fund (Johnson) , 379, 380 
Agency for International Development: John- 
son, 879; Palmer, 651 
Alliance for Progress, authorization and appro- 
priation request (Johnson), 543 
Asian development, authorization (Johnson), 162 
Asian Development Bank, U.S. pledge (John- 
son), 379, 380 
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966: 697; 
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 160, 
334, 659, 696; Katzenbach, 3; Phillips, 677; 
Rusk, 875; Solomon, 518; Trowbridge, 881 
Export-Import Bank, continuation and expan- 
sion, request: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379, 

381, 659 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 (Rusk), 827 
Guam, political development (Johnson), 587 
India, food aid appropriations and authorization 

request (Johnson), 300, 658 
Interest Equalization Tax rate adjustment 

(Johnson), 335 
National Advisory Committee on Self-Help 
(Johnson), 379, 380 
Joint resolutions, India, emergency food aid, 700 
Outer space treaty, support for (Goldberg), 605 
Senate advice and consent: 

Consular convention v;ith Soviet Union: 614; 
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; 
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247 
Human rights conventions, U.S. accession recom- 
mended (Goldberg), 524 
Narcotic drugs, single convention (1961) on, 
U.S. accession recommended: Johnson, 671; 
Katzenbach, 672 
Outer space treaty: Goldberg, 602; Johnson, 

386,659; Rusk, 600 
SOLAS 1960 Convention, amendments: Johnson, 
429; Miller, 178 
Senate confirmations, 261, 448, 476n, 482, 523, 674, 

765, 968 
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 160; Westmore- 
land, 738 
Conseil de I'Entente (Palmer) , 650 

Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966) 

for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929 
Nature protection and wildlife preservation in the 
Western Hemisphere, Convention (1940) : 
Costa Rica, 353 
U.S.-Soviet fishery discussions, 216, 332 
Water resources: Johnson, 903; Solomon, 562 
Amistad Dam (Johnson), 12 

Conservation — Continued 
Water resources — Continued 
CENTO programs, 671 
Latin Amei-ica, 712, 716 
Consular relations: 

Soviet-U.S. consular convention: 614, 642; Hum- 
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; Kat- 
zenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247 
Vienna convention (1963) on: Argentina, 701; 
Brazil, Ireland, 967; Madagascar, 530 
Optional protocols: Madagascar, 613 
Contiguous zone, 178, 424, 919 
Cook, Jesse L., 127 
Cook, Mercer, 651 
Cooper, Charles, 844 

Copyright convention (1952), universal, and proto- 
cols : Netherlands, 833 
Protocol 1, Italy, 481 
Corry, Andrew V., 968 
Cortada, James N., 218 
Costa e Silva, Artur, 243 
Costa Mendez, Nicanor: 474; Bunker, 473 
Costa Rica: 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 642, 702, 930 
U.S. Ambassador (Boonstra), confirmation, 261 
Cotton : 
Analysis of Factors Affecting U.S. Cotton Ex- 
ports, 559 
Textiles : 

Bilateral agreements with: Hong Kong, 929; 
India, 36, 182, 702; Israel, 389, 642; Italy, 
642; Mexico, 964; Poland, 612, 642; Portugal, 
International Cotton Institute, articles of agree- 
ment: India, 353; Mexico, 224 
Long-term arrangement, extension of: 929; 
Blumenthal, 431 ; Roth, 478, 880 
World trade, problems and U.S. policies (Solomon) , 
Coudert, Frederic R., (quoted), 140 
Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (excerpts) 

Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (Brzezinski), 

Council of Europe: Brzezinski, 419; Johnson, 652 
Crisis control: Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 754; 

NATO, 51 
Crowther, Harold E., 919 

Castroism: 565; Rusk, 828 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 930 
U.S. travel restrictions, 102, 564 
Cuban missile crisis: Kohler, 8, 410; W. W. Rostow, 

493; Rusk, 168, 272, 278, 621, 778 
Cudlipp, Hugh, 274 
Cultural relations and programs: 

Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236 
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Moroc- 
co, 351, 393; Netherlands, 582; Romania, 479, 
482; U.A.R., 642; U.K., 582 



Cultural relations and programs — Continued 
Bilateral agreements with — Continued 

Germany, re transfer of paintings for Weimar 

Museum, 86 
Bulgaria, U.S. trade fair (Katzenbach), 5 
CIA assistance, policy review, 667 
Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488; 

Solomon, 519 
International convenant (U.N.) on economic, social, 

and cultural rights: Harris, 104; text, 107 
North Africa, cultural factors (Palmer), 807 
Philippines (Braderman), 660 
Soviet Union-U.S.: Katzenbach, 755; Solomon, 519 
U.S. travel restrictions, exception of in particular 

fields, 103 

Carnets, ATA, ECS and TIR, conventions (1961) 

re: U.S., 481, 833 
Containers, convention (1961) on: U.S., 481, 833 
Customs administration agreement with Philip- 
pines, 261 
Mexican products, 70 
Professional equipment, convention (1961) on 

temporary importation of: U.S., 481, 833 
Publication of customs tariffs, convention (1890) 

re international union for, and protocol: 

Algeria, 85 
Road traffic, convention (1954) re facilities for 

touring: Singapore, 122 
Road vehicles, private, customs convention (1954) 

on the temporary importation of: Australia, 

Viet-Nam, U.S. advisory activities: 206; Guad, 200 
Cyprus : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 930 
Turkey, position of : 657; Sunay, 656 
UNFICYP, extension of (Goldberg), 179 

Soviet position (Sisco),461 
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 638; NATO, 50 
Czechoslovakia : 

Economic development (Katzenbach), 5 
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip- 
rocal offer, 572 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 224, 260, 305, 898 
U.S. citizens, detention of (Kohler), 10 
U.S. trade mission (Trowbridge), 882 

DAC. See Development Assistance Committee, OECD 

Daddario, Emilio Q., 240 

Dahomey : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 154, 701, 801, 833 

Davies, Merton E., 71, 634 

Davis, W. True, Jr., 721 

Dawson, Thomas (Rusk), 248 

Dayan, Moshe (Wheeler), 189 

Dean, Sir Patrick, 268 

de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (Humphrey), 168 

De Madariaga, Salvador (quoted), 892 

Defense : 

British Indian Ocean Territory, agreement re avail- 
ability of for defense purposes, 225 
Inventions relating to and for which patent appli- 
cations have been made, agreement for mutual 
safeguarding (1960) : Luxembourg, 305 
National defense and security: 
CIA policy review, 667 

Espionage, question of effect of U.S.-Soviet con- 
sular convention: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 411; 
Rusk, 249 
National Security Council, Special Committee of, 
establishment and membership (Johnson) , 951 
Soviet missile capabilities: 575; Johnson, 160, 

U.S. nuclear strength: McNamara, 442; Rusk, 

Watch movements trade and production, national 
security aspects, 217 
Self-defense, right of: Meeker, 60; Nabrit, 31; 

Rusk, 271 
U.S. budget : Johnson, 380, 445 ; Rusk, 771 
Defense, Department of : Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827 
Demarcation, international lines of, significance 

(Meeker), 60 
Democracy and democratic processes: Johnson, 295, 
590 ; Katzenbach, 5 ; King Hassan II, 331 ; Rusk, 
772; Trowbridge, 885 
Bureaucracy (E. V. Rostow),398 
Greece (Rusk), 750 
Latin America: 713; Johnson, 710 

U.N. covenant provisions, 115 
South West Africa, 893 
Den Toom, Willem, 687 
Denmark : 

Import liberalizations, 245 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 122, 224, 260, 481, 
613, 766 

1st International Symposium on Water Desalina- 
tion, results (Solomon), 561 
Los An,:?eles desalination plant approved: Johnson, 

903 ; Pollack, 910 
Saudi Arabia desalination plant site at Jidda, 

dedication (Solomon), 561 
Soviet Union, agreement re cooperation in field 
desalination, including use of atomic energy, 
Water for Peace : 

International Conference: 762, 765; Johnson, 

903; Solomon, 562 
U.S. program, recommendations, 761 
Desert Locust Control Authority (Katzenbach), 958 
Development and Resources Corporation (Lilienthal), 

Development Assistance Committee, OECD: 764; 

Humphrey, 685 ; E. V. Rostow, 25 
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 12 
Diehold, John (Humphrey) , 167 
Diem, Ngo Dinh (Lodge) , 799 



Diplomatic relations and recognition : 

Consular convention with Soviet Union : 614, 642 ; 
Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; 
Katzenbach, 755; Kohler, 411; Rusk, 247 
Diplomatic immunity: Johnson, 288; Kohler, 412; 

Rusk, 249 
Diplomatic relations with U.S. terminated : Algeria, 
Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, U.A.R., and 
Yemen, 952n 
International law, relevance (Goldberg) , 140 
Recognition : 

Not inferred from signature, ratification or ac- 
cession to multilateral agreements (Goldberg) , 
Southern Rhodesia, nonrecognition of Smith 
regime: 369, 375; Goldberg, 73, 143; Palmer, 
Rights of legation (Rusk) , 772 
Vienna convention (1961) : Dahomey, 833; Ireland, 
929; Mongolia, 674; Sweden, 732 
Optional protocol re compulsory settlement of dis- 
putes: Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613; 
Sweden, 732 
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See Foreign 


Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., presentation 

of credentials: Afghanistan, 626; Botswana, 

Bulgaria, 16; Burundi, 850; Colombia, 172; 

Dahomey, 850; Haiti, Indonesia, 172; Iran, 909; 

Ivory Coast, Lesotho, 16; Malta, 327; Morocco, 

850; Sierra Leone, 377; Singapore, 688; Turkey, 

172; Viet-Nam, 216; Yemen, 327; Zambia, 688 

Disarmament (see also Armaments, Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, and Nuclear 

weapons) : 

Need for: 436, 657; Johnson, 569; Katzenbach, 755; 

NATO, 50; Rusk, 786; U Thant, 268 
Soviet "umbrella" proposal, 576 
U.N. role: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 567 
Disaster relief. Trust Territory of the Pacific (John- 
son), 599 
Disputes, compulsory settlement of, optional protocol 
to Vienna convention on consular relations 
(1963): Dahomey, 833; Madagascar, 613; 
Sweden, 732 
Disputes, pacific settlement of: Goldberg, 316, 872, 
923; Haile Selassie (quoted), 425; Humphrey, 
489 ; W. W. Rostow, 491 ; Rusk, 875 
International covenant (U.N.) on civil and polit- 
ical rights, optional protocol : Harris, 105 ; text, 
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 269 
Dole, Robert (Johnson) , 299 

Dominican Republic : Johnson, 243, 567 ; Rusk, 829 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 393 
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382 
Donges-Metz pipeline, agreement with France re 
operation, maintenance, and security, 733 

Double taxation, income, conventions and agreements 
for avoidance of: Brazil, 581, 614; Honduras, 
termination, 181 ; Trinidad and Tobago, 84, 122 
Downs, Hugh, 168, 172 
Drugs : 

Adverse drug reaction reporting system, WHO, an- 
nouncement, 918 

International Narcotics Control Board, U.S. rep- 
resentation (Katzenbach), 673 
Single convention (1961) on: 

Current actions: Mexico, U.S., 834; Turkey, 

U.S., 897 
U.S. accession urged: Johnson, 671; Katzen- 
bach, 272 
Dukes, Ernest F., 71, 634 
Dulles, John Foster (Rusk), 271 

East-West relations: 657, 697 ; Brzezinski, 414 ; John- 
son (quoted), 408, 680; Niven, 774; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 495; Rusk, 4 (quoted), 359, 463 (quoted), 
Currency convertibility recommended, 699 
Germany : 

Possibility of improved relations with Eastern 
Europe: Humphrey, 680; Katzenbach, 755; 
Rusk, 360, 363 
Reunification, importance to: 52; Brzezinski, 
418; Humphrey, 489; Katzenbach, 753; W. W. 
Rostow, 500 ; Rusk, 362 
NATO role. See under NATO 
OECD role : Humphrey, 684 ; E. V. Rostow, 24 
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16 
Soviet convictions of U.S. citizens, question of effect 

(Rusk), 44 
Soviet Union, role of ( Humphrey) , 487 
Technological gap (Humphrey), 167 
Trade. See under Trade 

U.N. role: Goldberg, 98; Harriman, 820; E. V. Ros- 
tow, 25 ; Sisco, 458 
U.S. efforts to improve: 339; Harriman, 815; Hum- 
phrey, 682; Johnson, 159; Kohler, 406; Rusk, 
47, 169, 360, 786, 875 
U.S. national interest considerations: Harriman, 

821; Johnson, 696; Kohler, 6; Solomon, 518 
Viet-Nam, effect of: Harriman, 821; Kohler, 413; 
Rusk, 781, 875; Trowbridge, 883 
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966: 

Importance: 339, 697; Humphrey, 488; Harriman, 
819; Johnson, 160, 334, 659, 696; Katzenbach, 
3, 755; Kohler, 10; Phillips, 697; Rusk, 772, 
875 ; Solomon, 518 ; Trowbridge, 881 
Viet-Nam effect on passage: Rusk, 171; Solomon, 
ECA. See Economic Commission for Africa 
ECAFE. (Economic Commission for Asia and the 

Far East), Martin, 853 
Echavarria Alozaga, Hernan, 172 
Economic and Social Council, U.N.: 
Documents, lists of, 305, 437 



Economic and Social Council, U.N. — Continued 

Narcotic drugs control (Katzenbach) , 673 

U.S. representative (Goldschmidt), confirmation, 
Economic and social development (see also name of 
country) : 

Afghanistan : 632 ; Maiwandwal, 628, 630 

Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 954; Palmer, 
646, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 813 

Agriculture, health, and education, key sectors: 
748, 760; Johnson, 231, 232, 379, 381, 543, 659, 
707; E. V. Rostow, 401, 860; Rusk, 828 

Agriculture, importance to. See Agriculture: Mod- 

Asia. See Asia 

Conditions necessary for (E. V. Rostow) , 857 

Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex- 
cerpts), 336 

Eastern Europe, problems: Harriman, 817; Solo- 
mon, 519 

Education, importance. See Education 

Ethiopia (Johnson), 427 

Food aid, importance (sec also Food and popula- 
tion crisis) , Johnson, 300 

Free world progress: E. V. Rostow, 399; W. W. 
Rostow, 495 

India Pakistan Aid Consortia: Johnson, 296, 299, 
383 ; E. V. Rostow, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 

Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman, 
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296, 
300, 334, 380; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow, 400, 
861; Rusk, 241, 826 

International Covenant (U.N.), on Economic, So- 
cial and Cultural Rights: Goldberg, 99; Harris, 
104; text, 107 

Latin America. See Alliance for Progress 

Mexico-U.S. border area, agreement on, 86 

Near and Middle East, U.S. support (Goldberg), 

OECD countries: Humphrey, 683; W. W. Rostow, 

Political stability, relation to: Gaud, 669; Hum- 
phrey, 489; Johnson, 378, 381, 384; Palmer, 
649, 809; E. V. Rostow, 857; Rusk, 826 

SEATO programs : 745, 747 ; Rusk, 744 

Systems management (McGhee),150 

Technological progress: 346; Humphrey, 165, 684 

U.N. role (Johnson), 567 

U.S. aid (see also Foreign aid programs, U.S.) : 
346; Johnson, 230; E. V. Rostow, 400, 857; 
Rusk, 273 
Self-help principle: 712; Gaud, 669; Johnson, 
159, 231, 232, 296, 298, 334, 378, 379, 710; 
Palmer, 650, 814; E. V. Rostow, 26, 401, 860; 
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 724, 827 

U.S. economic strength: E. V. Rostow, 863; Rusk, 
770, 833 

U.S.-Soviet common interests (Katzenbach), 754 

Water resources development, 759 

Economic and social development — Continued 

World half-rich, half -poor: Humphrey, 684; John- 
son, 14, 295, 378; E. V. Rostow, 401, 857; Rusk, 
241, 771 
World order, importance to (W. W. Rostow), 491 
Economic assistance, postwar, agreement with Ger- 
many re repayment of remaining German debt, 
Economic Commission for Africa: Katzenbach, 958; 

Palmer, 650 ; W. W. Rostow, 499 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East 

(Martin), 853 
Economic Commission for Europe: Brzezinski, 419; 
Harriman, 820 ; Humphrey, 488 ; E. V. Rostow, 25 
Economic policy and relations, U.S. : 
Domestic policy: 

Agriculture program changes (E. V. Rostow), 

402, 859 
Budget message, FY 1968 (Johnson), 230 
Cotton production (Solomon), 557 
Efficient administration (Johnson), 379, 381 
Monetary restraint, programs (E. V. Rostow), 
Foreign policy: 

Council of Economic Advisers, report (excerpts), 

Eastern Europe, trade policies. See East-West 

Trade Relations Act of 1966 
Economic Report of the President, excerpts 
(Johnson), 333 
Economist, The, 192, 495, 697 

Alliance for Progress summit conference declara- 
tion, position on, 706n 
Economic level of development (Rusk) , 722 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 224, 260 
Education : 

Africa (Katzenbach), 955 

Asia, regional coordination (Martin), 196, 854 
"Brain drain": McGhee, 152; Pollack, 912 
Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey, 

164; Johnson, 15 
Foreign affairs, relation to (Humphrey), 167 
Government, role of (Humphrey) , 165 
Illiteracy rates (E. V. Rostow) , 402 
Importance: 337; Gaud, 670; Humphrey, 164; 
Johnson, 15; Mann (quoted), 955; E. V. 
Rostow, 23, 402 
International conference, 1967: Humphrey, 164; 

Johnson, 15 
Latin America; U.S. aid: 713, 718, 887; Johnson, 

382, 541, 543, 663, 709 
North Africa (Palmer) , 808 
Philippines, U.S. school-building project, 850 
Private institutions, role (Humphrey) , 165 
Science and public policy programs (Pollack), 915 
SEATO programs, 747 
Southern Rhodesia (Palmer), 452 
TV and other new media: 719; Johnson, 15, 709; 
E. V. Rostow, 405 



Education — Continued 

U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights, 

provisions, 108, 109 
U.S. financial support: Johnson, 381; Katzenbach, 

Viet-Nam, 209 
Voluntary organizations, CIA relationships: 665; 

Johnson, 665 
Water resources projects, training for: 762; John- 
son, 903 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
U.N., constitution, current actions: Guyana, 897 
Educational exchange programs: 

Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 236 
Bilateral agreements with: Australia, 898; Israel, 
702; Italy, 122; Netherlands, 582; Romania, 
479; U.A.R., 582, 642 
Poland, agreement re use of zlotys in, 766 
Volunteers to America (Johnson), 244 
EEC. See European Economic Community 
EFTA. See European Free Trade Association 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (John- 
son), 447 
Establishment and status, 570n 
1966 conference results, 570 
U.S.-Soviet responsibilities (Rusk), 43 
Eisenhower, Dwight D.: quoted, 412; Rusk, 270 
El Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 930 
Emerson, Ralph Waldo (quoted), 654, 881 
Esenbel, Melih, 172 
Ethiopia : 

Agricviltural education (Katzenbach), 957 
AID programs (Rusk), 831 
Outer space treaty, signature, 260 
U.S. visit of King Haile Selassie, 425 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community), 

Johnson, 448 
Europe (see aUo North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion and names of individual countries) : 
Central, Nuclear-free zone, question of (Rusk), 

Eastern : 

Economic and political evolution: Brzezinski, 

416; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 486, 681; 

Katzenbach, 2, 5; Kohler, 8, 408; W. W. Ros- 

tow, 495; Solomon, 518 

U.S. economic relations. See East-West relations 

and Trade 
Viet-Nam, position on: Harriman, 821; Kohler, 
413; Rusk, 283 
Labor, large-scale movements in, 337 
North Africa, relations (Palmer), 807 
Political development (E. V. Rostow), 399 
Unification: 657; Brzezinski, 415; Kohler, 11; 

Rusk, 364 
Visit to President Johnson, question of (Rusk) , 727 
Western : 

Economic progress: 336; Humphrey, 486, 679; 
McGhee, 148 

Europe — Continued 

Technology gap with U.S.: Humphrey, 165, 488; 

McGhee, 148 
Trade with Eastern Europe: 697; Humphrey, 

488; Harriman, 817; Solomon, 518 
Unification: Brzezinski, 41G; Humphrey, 487; W. 

W. Rostow, 498 
U.S. Chiefs of Missions, meeting, Bonn, 599 
U.S. commitments: Humphrey, 487, 680; Katzen- 
bach, 753; Kohler, 8, 410; Rusk, 727, 782 
U.S. interests and relations: Brzezinski, 416; 
Harriman, 819; Humphrey, 486, 679, 682; 
Johnson, 678; Kohler, 7; W. W. Rostow, 498; 
Rusk, 358, 364 
Viet-Nam situation, lack of effect on (Rusk) , 358, 

726, 787, 875 
Visit of Vice President Humphrey: Humphrey, 
679, 680, 681, 683; Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727 
World role (Rusk), 784 
European Atomic Energy Community (Johnson), 448 
European Common Market. See European Economic 

European Economic Community: 337, 697; Brzezinski, 
416, 419; Humphrey, 166; Linowitz, 730; Mc- 
Ghee, 148; NATO, 50 
General agreement on tariffs and trade: 

Accession of Korea to, protocol, acceptance, 968 
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880 
U.K. membership, proposed: Holt, 961; Rusk, 783 
European Free Trade Association: 337, 339, 697; 
NATO, 50 
Kennedy Round negotiations (Roth), 478, 880 
European Space Research Organization: 

Jupiter probe, proposed, NASA cooperation (Mc- 
Ghee), 153 
Satellite telemetry/telecommand station in Alaska, 
agreement re establishment and operation of, 
European Technological Community, proposed 

(Humphrey), 166 
Executive orders: 

Asian Development Bank, immunities defined 

(11334), 563 
Trade and other transactions involving Southern 
Rhodesia (11322), 146 
EXPO 67 : 800 ; Johnson, 907, 909 
Export-Import Bank: 

Appropriation and authorization request FY 1968 

(Johnson), 231, 232, 235 

Eastern Europe, extension of commercial credit 

guarantees to: 698; Harriman, 819; Johnson, 

159; Solomon, 521; Trowbridge, 883 

Italian Fiat company, loan to (Trowbridge), 883 

Latin American earth stations, proposed loans for 

(Johnson), 709 
Lending authority, continuation and expansion 
needed: 339; Harriman, 819; Johnson, 335 
Exports : 

Central America (Linowitz), 730 



Exports — Continued 

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Solomon, 518, 

521 ; Trowbridge, 882 
Europe, Western (McGhee), 148 
International Coffee Agreement, quota controls, 253 
Latin America, need for development of: 717; 

Johnson, 707, 709; W. W. Kostow, 498 
Less developed countries, importance to: 338, 339; 

Blumenthal, 430; E. V. Rostow, 404 
Presidential "E" Awards for export excellence, 

Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77, 
374; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146 

Cotton (Solomon), 558 
Council of Economic Advisers, report, 342 
Export Control List, further removals of non- 
strategic items: 698; Johnson, 159; Trow- 
bridge, 883 
Increase needed (Johnson) , 335, 756, 886 
Technical data: Katzenbach, 755; Trowbridge, 
World grain export pattern, changes in (E. V. 
Rostow) , 402, 859 
Extradition, convention (1962) with Israel, under- 
standing re certain errors in translation of the 
Hebrew text, 766 

Fairbank, John (Lodge), 798 

FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N. 

Far East. See Asia and names of individual countries 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (Rusk), 249 

Federal Regulations, Code of, 564 

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 367 


Import quota controls reduced, 246 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 260, 613, 732, 
929, 930 
Fish and fisheries: 

Fish protein concentrate : 761 ; Goldberg, 101 ; John- 
son, 231, 301, 709 ; Rusk, 241 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

Atlantic tunas, international convention (1966) 

for the conservation of: U.S., 481, 833, 929 
Certain fisheries off the coast of U.S., agreements 

with Japan, 898 
Great Lakes fisheries convention, amendment of, 

Canadian note and U.S. reply, 482, 834 
King crab fishing, agreement with Soviet Union, 

North Atlantic fisheries, conduct of fishing opera- 
tions in, convention adopted, 635 
Northeast Pacific Ocean, agreement with Soviet 

Union on certain fishery problems, 393 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries, convention (1949), 
international, and protocols: Romania, 613 
Protocols (1965) re measures of control and 
entry into force: France, 438; Norway, 530; 
Romania, 613 ; Spain, 642 

Fish and fisheries — Continued 

U.S. fisheries zone extension, Japan-U.S. discus- 
sions, 178, 424 
U.S.-Mexican talks, 919 
U.S.-Soviet discussions on fishery problems, 216, 

Viet-Nam, UNDP/FAO fisheries project, U.S. 
financial support, 964 
Fisher, Adrian S., 573 

Flood control, Amistad Dam: 13; Johnson, 12 
Flott, Frederick W., 566 

Food and Agriculture Organization, U.N. ( E. V. Ros- 
tow), 859 
Constitution, current actions: Botswana, Lesotho, 

India, food assistance to : 701 ; Johnson, 297 ; Rusk, 

U.N. Development Program fisheries project in 

Viet-Nam, U.S. financial support, 964 
U.S. support, 761 

World Food Program: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow 


Food and population crisis: Gaud, 669; Humphrey, 

489; Johnson, 329, 381, 567, 658; E. V. Rostow, 

26, 856; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 46, 169, 874; 

Sisco, 64 

FAO study: Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 402, 859 

Marine resources development, U.N. resolution 

(Goldberg), 101 
North Africa (Palmer) , 810, 814 
Nuclear power uses as solution to, 572 
OECD role (Humphrey), 685 
U.S. principles for alleviating: Johnson, 160, 235, 

295; E. V. Rostow, 401 
Water for Peace Program: 761; Johnson, 902; 
Rusk, 905 
Food for Freedom, 761 

1968 appropriations request (Johnson), 231, 232, 
Food for Peace programs: Johnson, 658; E. V. Ros- 
tow, 860 
Viet-Nam, increase in: 203; Gaud, 201 
Food resources (see also Agriculture) : 

Latin America, AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 

Marine resources: 761; Goldberg, 101; Johnson, 

231, 301,709; Rusk, 241 
State Department Policy Planning Council, advis- 
ory panel, 16 
Force, use of. See Aggression 
Ford Foundation, 728 
Foreign aid programs, U.S.: 

Balance of payments, effect on : 345 ; Johnson, 233, 

379, 381, 659; E. V. Rostow, 21 
Communist aggression, relation to (Johnson), 384 
Food production, priority of: Johnson, 231, 296, 

297, 700; E. V. Rostow, 858; Solomon, 559 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (Johnson), 379, 
381, 659 



Foreign aid programs, U.S. — Continued 

Foreign Assistance Program for 1968 (Rusk), 826 
Matched-funds principle: 701; Johnson, 544, 700; 

E. V. Rostow, 861 
Multilateral aid, combined with: 701; Johnson, 162, 

231, 232, 234, 295, 296, 297, 298, 378, 380, 384, 

659, 707; Katzenbach, 958; E. V. Rostow, 401, 

403; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 828, 831 
U.N. programs (Sisco), 459 
Regional economic development, encouragement 

for: Johnson, 231, 379, 380, 544, 659; Katzen- 
bach, 958; Palmer, 650; Rusk, 828 
Sales agreements, stress on payment in dollars or 

local currency (Johnson) , 235 
Self-help principles: 701, 760; Gaud, 669; Johnson, 

159, 231, 232, 235, 296, 297, 298, 334, 378, 379, 

381, 382, 542, 543, 659; Palmer, 650, 814; E. V. 

Rostow, 401, 860; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 

724, 827, 831 
"Surplus" concept, aid not restricted by (Johnson) , 

U.S. national interest considerations: Johnson, 

378, 545; Palmer, 808; E. V. Rostow, 857; 

Rusk, 827, 832 
Water projects, support for, 758, 760 
Foreign aid programs of other countries : 

China, Republic of: Bundy, 325, 791; Johnson, 846, 

848, 849 
Increases in: Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 403; 

Rusk, 785, 829, 830 
Multilateral aid to India (Johnson), 295, 299 
Netherlands, 964 
OECD countries, 28 
Soviet military and economic aid to North Africa 

(Palmer), 808, 811 
U.K. economic aid to CENTO, 670 
Foreign currency: 

U.S.-owned local currencies for water development, 

recommendations, 761 
Zlotys, agreements with Poland re use of, 766 
Foreign investment in U.S. (Johnson) , 335 
Foreign policy, U.S.: 
Briefing conferences: 
Educators, 322 
Regional: Philadelphia, 565 
CIA role, policy review, 666 
Congressional documents relating to, lists, 18, 223, 

350, 757, 801, 966 
Informed public, need for (Kohler) , 406 
National interests: Johnson, 546; Palmer, 810; 

Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow, 398; Rusk, 250; 

Sisco, 459 
Nonpartisan nature (Rusk), 770 
Peace, central goal of: Johnson, 551; Rusk, 271 
Principles, objectives, and problems : Goldberg, 625 ; 

Johnson, 158, 231, 232; Palmer, 452; E. V. 

Rostow, 856; W. W. Rostow, 491; Rusk, 134, 

770, 879 

Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued 

Congress (Rusk), 774, 775 

President: Johnson, 298; Rusk, 249, 370, 725, 772, 
Science and technology as instruments of : Pollack, 

911; Rusk, 239 
Trade as an instrument of: Johnson, 886; Katzen- 
bach, 3 ; Solomon, 555 
U.N., role in extending U.S. policy (Sisco), 458 
U.S. travel restrictions, 103 
Foreign Service (see also State Department) : 
Ambassadors, confirmation, 261, 674, 765, 968 
Inservice training: Cortada, Hope, 218 
Personnel changes, policies (Lodge) , 799 
Science training, need for: Pollack, 915; Rusk, 238 
Scientific attaches (Pollack), 914 
Foreign Service Institute (Rusk), 238 
Foreign students in the U.S., Afghanistan (Maiwan- 

dwal), 628 
Forrestal, James V. (Johnson), 960 
Forsyth, John (Rusk), 269 
Foster, William C, 571 
Fowler, Henry H., meeting, 53 

Foreign aid programs (Rusk) , 785, 830 

German-French relations (Rusk), 363 

Import quota controls reduced, 246 

NATO, position on: 51 ; Rusk, 46 

Nuclear atmospheric testing, 750 

Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93 

Nuclear proliferation, position on, 571 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 438, 733, 930, 

U.N. peacekeeping assessments, position on (Gold- 
berg), 101 
Frankel, Charles, 322 
Frankel, Max, 776 
Fredericks, Wayne, 756 

South West Africa. See South West Africa 

U.N. resolution on self-determination and nonuse 

of force: Nabrit, 31 ; text, 32 
U.S. support: Johnson, 546, 960; Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 
Freedom of association, U.N. covenant provisions, 115 
Freedom of religion : 

U.N. covenant provisions, 115 
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590 
Freedom of speech and press : Goldberg, 840 ; Katzen- 
bach, 2 ; Rusk, 130 
Southern Rhodesia, censorship in: 370; Palmer, 

U.N. covenant provisions, 115 

Application to U.S. (Harris), 106 
U.S. : Rusk, 725, 777 ; Trowbridge, 885 
Viet-Nam constitution (Johnson) , 590 
Freeman, Orville L.: 907; Johnson, 629; Rusk, 46, 

874; Solomon, 558 
Frei, Eduardo, 71 



:; Fulbright-Hays Act, 244 
'■ Fulton, James (Goldberg), 605 
Futaih, Abdul Aziz, 327 

' Gabon, treaties, agreements, etc., 801, 834 

Gambia, Peace Corps program, agreement for estab- 
lishment, 122 
Garcia Reynoso, Placido, 70 
Garcia Robles, 436 
Gardner, John W.: 918; Humphrey, 164; Johnson, 

Gaud, William S., 200, 482, 586, 668, 670 721 
General Assembly, U.N. : 

Constitutional crisis, 1965: Goldberg, 636, 896; 

Johnson, 566 
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437 
International covenants on human rights : 

Civil and political rights, and optional protocol, 

text. 111 
Economic, social, and cultural rights, text, 107 
U.S. position: Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104 
Korea, Republic of, sole representative of Korean 

government, 565 
Nuclear proliferation treaty, support for, 571 
Peacekeeping operations : 
Soviet position (Sisco),461 
U.S. position : Goldberg, 101, 640 ; Sisco, 461 
Resolutions : 

Outer space treaty, endorsement and commenda- 
tion, 83 
Prohibition of threat or use of force, and right 
of peoples to self-determination, text, 32 
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office, 

South West Africa : 
Administration of, U.S. position: Goldberg, 99, 
292, 888, 892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 
Administration pending independence, 893 
Southern Rhodesia, resolutions on and U.S. support. 

See Southern Rhodesia 
21st session, evaluation: Goldberg, 98; Rusk, 42 
U.S. delegation to 5th special session, 732 
Geneva accords : 

Background : Meeker, 55 ; W. W. Rostow, 493 
Communist violations: Johnson, 160, 514; Nabrit, 

30 ; Rusk, 281, 282, 743 ; SE ATO, 746 
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman: 953; 
Rusk, 466, 878 
Geneva Disarmament Conference. See Eighteen-Na- 

tion Disarmament Committee 
Geneva protocol on chemical and biological warfare, 

Genocide, convention for prevention and punishment 
of (1948) : 
Current actions : Mongolia, 641 
U.N. support, 113 
Geodetic research, 86 



Demarcation lines between East and West Ger- 
many, significance (Meeker), 60 
Reunification: 657; Brzezinski, 418; Harriman, 
820; Humphrey, 489, 680; Katzenbach, 753; 
Kohler, 11; NATO, 49; E. V. Rostow, 24; W. 
W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 362, 771 
Four-power conference, question of (Rusk), 360 
Germany, Federal Republic of: 

Balance-of-payments position, 347, 788 

Chancellor Adenauer, death of: Johnson, 751, 752; 

Kiesinger, 751 ; Rusk, 752 
East Germany, contacts with: 52; Katzenbach, 
755; Rusk, 360 
Trade: Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 521; Trow- 
bridge, 882 
Economic progress (McGhee), 148 
France, relations (Rusk), 363 
NATO nuclear weapons. See under NATO 
Nuclear facilities under EURATOM safeguards, 

Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93 
Nuclear proliferation treaty, position on (Rusk), 

Political developments (Rusk), 365 
Soviet Union, relations (Rusk), 363 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 306, 701, 

733, 930, 968 
Trilateral talks (U.S.-U.K.-Germany) concluded, 

TV interview of Secretary Rusk, transcript, 358 
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599 
U.S. relations: Johnson, 751; Kiesinger, 751; Rusk, 

359, 363 
U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee) , 151 
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, proposed (John- 
son), 751 
U.S. visit of Minister Willy Brandt (Rusk), 320 
Visit of President Johnson: 751; Kiesinger, 751 
Visit of Vice President Humphrey, 680 
Gestido, Oscar D., 724 

AID programs (Rusk), 831 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 582, 613, 702 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach : 756 ; Katzen- 
bach, 955 
Gharrett, John T., 636 
Gibbs, Sir Humphrey, 370 
Gilmour, Craddock Matthew (Rusk), 248 
Gingland, Richard P., 71 
Goldberg, Arthur J : 

Addresses, correspondence, remarks and state- 
ments : 
Aden, 100 

Africa, developments and problems, 289 
Arab-Israeli dispute, 871 

U.N. role, 100, 920, 925, 927, 934, 936, 941, 943, 
944, 946 

Regional development, 506 
Visit to, 505, 509 


Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued 

Addresses, correspondence, etc. — Continued 
Astronauts, tribute to, 80 
Barbados, independence and U.N. membership, 

Communist China, U.N. membership, question of, 

Cyprus, U.N. force extended, 179 
Food and population crisis, U.N. role, 101 
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 98 
Human rights, 289 

U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged, 524 
U.N. covenants, importance and U.S. support, 
International law, U.N. contributions, 102, 140 
Korea, U.N. support for unification, 101 
Marine resources, study and development, 101 
Nuclear proliferation treaty, need for, and U.S. 

support, 99 
Outer space law, development, 141 
Outer space treaty : 

Development, provisions, and importance, 78, 

Signature ceremony, remarks, 267 
Portuguese territories in southern Africa, 290 
Self-determination, principles and U.S. support, 

South Africa, racial discrimination, U.N. coun- 

termeasures, 293 
South West Africa, U.N. administration, 99, 292, 

888, 892 
Southern Rhodesia: 

U.N. mandatory sanctions and U.S. support, 

73, 99, 142 
U.S. interests, 290 
UNFICYP, U.S. pledge, 180 
U.N. peacekeeping operations, 101, 143, 636, 838, 

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in 

office, 15, 98 
Viet-Nam : 

Peace talks, prospects for and U.S. position, 
137, 506, 512, 619 (quoted), 840 
U Thant aid requested, 63, 98 
Situation reports, 506, 510, 839 
U.N. inability to act, 98, 839 
U.S. objectives, 310, 505, 510, 839, 841 
Asia, visit to, 505, 509, 517 

Outer space treaty, work on: Rusk, 600; Sisco, 

U.S. delegate to 5th special session of U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly, 732 
Work of: Johnson, 566; Rusk, 42 
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 261 
Gordon, Lincoln, 476, 721 
Great Society (Johnson), 158, 231, 243 
Greece : 

Communist subversion, U.S. role against: John- 
son, 546, 547; Kohler, 7, 409; Rusk, 877 

Greece — Continued 

Economic progress: E. V. Rostow, 862; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 496 

Militai-y takeover, U.S. position (Rusk), 750 

NATO position and aid, 50 

OECD aid, 28 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 260, 613, 733, 930 

U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384 
Greenwald, Joseph A., 70 
Grissom, Virgil (Johnson), 388 
Guam (Johnson), 587 
Guam Conference. See Viet-Nam 
Guatemala, treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 930 
Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov, 16 
Guerrero, Manuel F. L.: 596; (Johnson), 587, 594 

U.S. visit of Foreign Minister Beavogui, 554 

Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
Guyana, treaties, agreements, etc., 305, 306, 393, 613, 

Haile Selassie 1, 425 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260 
U.S. Ambassador (Ross) , confirmation, 765 
Hammarskjold, Dag (Sisco) , 460 
Hand, Learned (quoted) , 545 
Harbison, Frederick H., 651 
Hare, Raymond A., 221 

Harriman, W. Averell : 586, 815 ; (Johnson) , 539 
Harris, Patricia R., 104 
Harsch, Joseph C, 169, 621 
Hart, Parker, 656 
Harvey, Mose (Katzenbach) , 3 
Hasluck, Paul, 747, 749 
Haynes, Ulric, 651 
Healey, Denis, 687 
Africa, regional programs: Katzenbach, 958; 

Palmer, 650 
CENTO programs: 670; Gaud, 669 
Latin America: 713, 720; Johnson, 541, 543, 632, 

709; E. V. Rostow, 863 
Malnutrition, problem of (see also Food and popu- 
lation crisis) : Gaud, 669; E. V. Rostow, 402 
Philippines : 

Institute of Tropical Medicine (Martin) , 196 

Medical care, agreement re use of Veterans 

Memorial Hospital and provision for inpatient, 

outpatient care, and treatment of veterans, 802 

SEATO programs, 747 

U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights, 

provisions, 109 
U.S. financial support (Johnson) , 381 
Viet-Nam : 209, 211 ; Komer, 470 

Civilian hospital capacity increased, 664 
Water projects, relation to, 758 



Health, Education, and Welfare Department: 

Center for Educational Cooperation: Humphrey, 
164; Johnson, 15 

Educational TV, task force assignment (Johnson) , 
Heath, William W., 674 
Hellyer, Paul, 687 
Helms, Richard M., 586, 665 
Henning, John F., 261 
Hernandez, Benigno C, 968 
Herter, Christian: 217; Johnson, Rusk, 147 
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 476 
Hightower, John, 723 
Hilaly, A., 747 
Historical summary: 

Communist aggression ( W. W. Rostow) , 492 

Communist China, U.S. relations (U. A. Johnson), 

Eastern Europe, post World War II (Harriman), 

Southern Rhodesia, 366 

U.S. foreign policy (Rusk), 270 

Viet-Nam (Meeker), 54 
Ho Chi Minh: 596; Rusk, 280, 321 
Holdridge, John, 566 
Holt, Harold E., 961 
Holum, Kenneth, 765 
Holy See. See Vatican City State 
Holyoake, Keith, 747, 749 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 581, 930 

U.S. income tax convention terminated, 181 
Hong Kong, cotton textile agreement amended, 929 
Hoover, J. Edgar (Rusk), 249 
Hope, A. Guy, 218 
Hornig, Donald F.: 721, 850, 907; Humphrey, 684; 

McGhee, 150; Rusk, 238 
Hoyt, Henry A., 721 
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 566 
Hughes, Charles Evans, 840 
Hull,Cordell (Rusk), 270 

Human rights (see also Civil rights, and Racial dis- 
crimination) : 

Africa: Goldberg, 289; Katzenbach, 955; Palmer, 

International covenants (U.N.) on human rights: 
Goldberg, 99; Harris, 104; texts, 107, 111 

International Year of Human Rights (Goldberg), 

U.N. conventions, U.S. ratification urged (Gold- 
berg), 524 

U.N. Human Rights Committee, 116 

U.N. position and role (Sisco), 66 

U.S.: Braderman, 664; Harris, 106; Johnson, 14 

U.S. support (Rusk), 772 

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N., 
18th anniversary (Harris), 104 

Humphrey, Hubert : 

Addresses, remarks and statements: 

East-West relations and U.S. efforts to improve, 

488, 682 
Economic and social development, world prob- 
lems, 684 
Education, importance, 164 
Europe, U.S. relations and aims, 486, 679 
Germany, reunification, 680 
NATO, 682 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment, 683 
Science and technology, 164, 238 (quoted), 684 

U.S.-Soviet relations, 488 
Meetings, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, Bonn, 599 
Visit to Europe: Humphrey, 679, 680, 681, 683; 
Johnson, 678; Rusk, 727 
Hungary, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481, 

Huntley, Chet (Wheeler) , 190 

IBRD. See International Bank for Reconstruction 

and Development 
ICC. See International Control Commission 
Iceland : 

Import quota controls reduced, 246 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 160, 393, 481, 613, 

702, 766, 930, 967 
U.S. Ambassador (Rolvaag), confirmation, 674 
ICY (International Cooperation Year): 568; John- 
son, 658 
IDA. See International Development Association 
IJC (International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada), 

IMCO. See Maritime Consultative Organization, In- 
Imports (see also Customs; Exports; Tariffs and 
trade, general agreements on; and Trade) : 
Balance of payments, effect on (E. V. Rostow), 20 
Foreign import restrictions removed: 245; 

Blumenthal, 433 
Import restrictions on goods from Mexico, proposed 

liberalization, 70 
International Coffee Agreement quantitative im- 
port limitations, 256 
Private road vehicles, temporary importation of, 

customs convention (1954) : Australia, 673 
Professional equipment, temporary importation of, 

customs convention (1961) : U.S., 481 
Sheet glass, modification of escape-clause duty 

rates, 216 
Southern Rhodesia, U.N. sanctions against: 77, 
373 ; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146 
U.S., capital goods, 342 
Viet-Nam, AID commercial imports: 202; Gaud, 

Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi- 
nated, proclamation, 217 

271-701 — 67 3 


Income, conventions for the relief of double taxation. 

iSee Double taxation 

Agriculture, development and problems: Johnson, 
298, 334, 383, 700; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 
Communism, threat to (Sisco),462 
Council for Cultural Relations, 667 
Experimental rain-making projects (Johnson), 903 
Financing, problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 404 
Food crisis: 

Multilateral aid: Johnson, 295; Rusk, 46, 48 
U.S. proposals: 701; Johnson, 299, 658; E. V. 
Rostow, 403, 861 
U.S. aid: Johnson, 295, 298, 300, 383, 700; Rusk, 
46, 48 

Congressional resolution, text, 700 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 182, 224, 353, 481, 

530, 701, 702, 733, 930 
U.S. aid: 

AID programs: Johnson, 159; E. V. Rostow, 863; 

Rusk, 830 
Military aid terminated, 688 
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234, 300; Rusk, 830 
U.S. fact-finding committee, results of tour (John- 
son), 299 
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700; 
E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 ; Rusk, 
India-Pakistan border dispute, U.N. role: Goldberg, 
838 ; Johnson, 567 ; Rusk, 785 ; Sisco, 66 
Soviet position (Sisco), 462 
Indonesia : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172 
Communism, rejection of: Bundy, 325, 791, 792; 

Holt, 962; Martin, 196; W. W. Rostow, 493 
Economic progress: 750; Johnson, 384; Rusk, 832 
Malaysia, relations with: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 438, 481, 613, 

U.N. membership, participation renewed (Gold- 
berg) , 100 
Indus River basin (Johnson) , 903 
Industrial property, convention (1883, as revised) for 
the protection of : Argentina, 353 ; Dahomey, 85, 
154; Ireland, 897; Morocco, 765 
Soviet accession, importance (Trowbridge) , 885 
Information activities and programs : 

Adverse drug reaction reporting center, WHO, 918 

Amerika (Katzenbach),755 

Appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 232, 

CIA-assisted programs, 666 
Computer technology (Pollack) , 911 
Newsmen, exception from U.S. travel restrictions, 

Outer space treaty provisions for public reporting: 
Goldberg, 81, 606; Johnson, 388 

Infoi-mation activities and programs — Continued 
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed, 

480, 482 
Scientific information: 332; Humphrey, 166 
Trade and industrial exhibitions overseas : Johnson, 

886; Trowbridge, 884 
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519 
Water resources information, recommendations for 
coordination and expanded programs : 763, 907 ; 
Rusk, 905 
Institute of International Education (Humphrey), 

Inter-Agency Council on International Education and 

Cultural Affairs, 667 
Inter-American Development Bank: 715; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 496; Rusk, 829 
Fund for Special Operations, appropriations and 
authorization request, FY 1968: 887; Johnson, 
231,235, 544; Rusk, 723 
U.S. alternate governor (Gaud), confirmation, 482 
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 334, 382, 540, 709 
Interest Equalization Tax, 342 

Rate adjustment : 344 ; Johnson, 335 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation, 699 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment : Bundy, 325, 793 ; E. V. Rostow, 858 ; W. W. 
Rostow, 496 
African development, role: Katzenbach, 958; 

Palmer, 650, 813 
Articles of agreement, current actions: Indonesia, 

East European countries membership, question of: 

699; Harriman, 820 
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 296, 299, 383, 700; 

E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 
U.S. Alternate Governor (E. V. Rostow), con- 
firmation, 261 
U.S. support: Johnson, 383; E. V. Rostow, 403; 
Rusk, 772 
International Cereals Arrangement: Blumenthal, 

297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861; Roth, 880 
International Chamber of Commerce, 696 
International Conference on Water for Peace: 762, 

765; Solomon, 562 
International Control Commission: 750; Goldberg, 
507; Johnson, 515; Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127, 620, 
773,778; U Thant, 625 
Laos, inability to function in (Rusk) , 169, 281, 743, 
International cooperation : 
Antarctic Treaty, 71 

Desalination development (Solomon), 561 
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 885 
International Cooperation Year (Johnson), 568, 

Marine resources, U.N. resolution on study and 

development of (Goldberg), 101 
Mekong River development: Bundy, 326; John- 
son, 903 
Nuclear energy development (Seaborg), 97 



International cooperation — Continued 

Outer space treaty provisions, prospects and im- 
portance: Dean, 268; Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg, 
81, 83, 603; Johnson, 387; Rusk, 267; U Thant, 
Scientific information: Humphrey, 166; Pollack, 

Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes, 

U.N. Charter principles: Johnson, 330; Rusk, 875 
U.N. covenants, support, 109 
U.S. support: Johnson, 13, 231; Pollack, 912; E. V. 

Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 267 
Water for Peace: 758, 762, 907; Johnson, 902; 

Rusk, 905 
White House Conference on International Coopera- 
tion, recommendations, report of action taken 
(Johnson), 658 
World community of developed nations (Brzezin- 

World food supply, obligations to contribute to 
(Johnson), 296, 300 
International Cotton Advisory Committee (Solomon), 

International Court of Justice : 

South West Africa decision: Goldberg, 144; Pal- 
mer, 647 
Statute, current actions: Barbados, 36; Malta, 
Malawi, 967 
International Development Association: 338; Harri- 
man, 820; Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 27; W. W. 
Rostow, 496 
Authorization request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 231, 
International Education Act of 1966: Humphrey, 164; 

Johnson, 15 
International Hydrological Decade, 760, 764 
International Institute for Cotton (Solomon), 560 
International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, Niag- 
ara Falls study requested, 634 
International law : 

Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. 

(Goldberg), 102 
Common law of nations (Meeker), 59 
International agreements, relation to: Goldberg, 

141 ; Meeker, 58 
International due process (Rusk), 249 
Outer space law, development of: 577; Goldberg, 

79, 142, 602; Rusk, 601 
Outer space treaty, importance to: Dobrynin, 269; 

Goldberg, 79, 99, 141; U Thant, 268 
SOLAS 1960 Convention amendments, nature of 

(Miller), 176 
Treaties, law of, proposed international drafting 

conference, U.N. (Goldberg), 102 
U.N., advancement of: Goldberg, 140, 896; Rusk, 

U.N. covenants on human rights, international law 

aspects (Harris), 104 
U.N. resolutions, legal status (Nabrit), 31 

International law — Continued 

U.N. sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, legal 

status: 369, 374; Goldberg, 143 
Water resources, legal aspects, 764 
International monetary system: 

Balance of payments. See Balance of payments 
Reforms needed: 340, 348; Humphrey, 863; John- 
son, 335, 757 ; E. V. Rostow, 19, 23 ; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 497 
International organizations (see also name of orga- 
nization) : 
AID appropriations request FY 1967 (Johnson). 

Development and U.S. support: Humphrey, 489; 
Johnson, 906; Pollack, 913; W. W. Rostow, 491 
Universal copyright convention, protocol 2 re works 
of, current actions ; Netherlands, 833 
International rivers, development: (see also Mekong 
River basin) : 762; Johnson, 903; Katzenbach, 
International Telecommunications Union (Sisco) , 462 
International Tourist Year, 695 
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435 
International Year for Human Rights (Goldberg), 

Investment disputes, convention (1965) on the settle- 
ment of, between states and nationals of other 
states: Burundi, 481; Cameroon, Kenya, 182; 
Korea, 481; Morocco, 897; Senegal, 765; Sudan, 
613; Sweden, 154; Trinidad and Tobago, 182; 
U.K., 122; Yugoslavia, 641 
Investment Guaranty Program, agreements with: 
Cameroon, 530; Ghana, 582; Indonesia, 438; 
Lesotho, 582, 614; Malta, 393; Paraguay, 86 
Investment of foreign capital in U.S., 343 
Investment of private capital abroad: 337, 346; 
Braderman, 664 
Africa (Johnson), 383 

Agricultural industries, U.S. support for increased 
investment: Johnson, 295, 300; E. V. Rostow, 
404, 856 
AID Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381; 

E. V. Rostow, 860 
Balance of payments, effect on, 342, 444 
Brazil, investment tax credit, 581 
Europe, U.S. subsidiaries, survey (McGhee), 151 
Korea, 69, 553, 554 
Latin America ( Linowitz) , 730, 824 
Philippines (Braderman), 662 

Rights and responsibilities of overseas investors, 
proposed international agreement (E. V. 
Rostow), 862 
U.S. encouragement: Johnson, 231, 379; E. V. 
Rostow, 861 ; Rusk, 828 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 909 

Economic progress: 670; Gaud, 669; W. W. Rostow, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 438, 701 
U.S. military assistance (Johnson) , 384 




Treaties, a^eements, etc., 154, 481 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 481, 897, 

929, 967 
Israel : 

Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli conflict 
Cotton textile agreement concluded, announcement 

and text, 389 
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 

862 ; W. W. Rostow, 496 
Syrian border dispute, U.N. role and U.S. support: 

Goldberg, 100; Sisco, 66 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353, 613, 642, 702, 

766, 929, 930 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 

Air transport agreement terminated, 965 
Balance of payments position, 347 
Fiat automotive plant in Soviet Union : Harriman, 
819; Katzenbach, 4; Solomon, 522; Trow- 
bridge, 883 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 481, 646, 
Ivanov, Igor, 25 
Ivory Coast: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 642, 674, 967 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 

Jackson, Andrew (Johnson), 534 

Jackson, Henry M., 514 

Jacoby, Neil H. (Rusk) , 832 

Jakobson, Max (Goldberg), 888, 895 

Jamaica, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 929 

James, William, 63 (quoted) 


Asian affairs, role: Bundy, 326; Martin, 196 

Balance-of -payments position, 347 

Eastern Europe, relations and trade (Solomon), 

519, 521 
Economic progress: 336; Bundy, 324, 791, 793; 

McGhee, 150 
Foreign aid programs: Johnson, 334; Rusk, 785 
Governors, U.S. visit (Johnson) , 917 
Import quota controls reduced, 246 
Korea, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552 
Nuclear power plant production (Seaborg), 93 
Political progress (E. V. Rostow) , 399 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224, 260, 613, 642, 

898, 968 
U.S.-Japan fishery talks, 178, 424 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509 
Jefferson, Thomas: 451; quoted, 160 
Johnson, Lyndon B.: 

Addresses, remarks, and statements: 
Africa, U.S. aid, 159, 379, 383 
Aggression, U.S. record in meeting, 161, 830, 546, 

654, 871, 960 
Alliance for Progress, 12, 158, 231, 382, 540, 632 
Summit meeting, statements, 706, 707, 708, 711 

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 
Addresses, etc. — Continued 

American ideals, 163, 301, 385, 654, 960 

Amistad Dam, 12 

Antiballistic missiles, 160, 569, 659 

Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 870, 935, 952 

Asia, regional cooperation and U.S. support, 162, 

380, 382, 469, 549, 960 
Astronauts Grissom, Chaffee, and White, deaths 

of, 388 
Balance of payments, U.S., 233, 334, 381, 886 
CIA-private U.S. voluntary organizations, rela- 
tionships, report on policy review, 665 
Consular convention with Soviet Union, 287, 545, 

East- West relations, U.S. efforts to improve, 159, 

334, 659, 680, 696 
Europe, visit of Vice President Humphrey, 678 
EXPO 67, 907 

Food-population crisis, 160, 295, 902 
Foreign aid programs: 

1968 budget, 230, 378, 543 

Principles, 296, 334, 381, 659, 958 (quoted) 
Germany, Federal Republic of. Chancellor Ade- 
nauer, regrets at death, 751, 752 
Germany, reunification, 680 (quoted) 
Guam, 587 
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death 

of, 147 
India, food crisis, U.S. and multilateral aid, 295, 

383, 658, 700 
International Cooperation Year, report of action 

taken on recommendations of White House 

Conference, 658 
International monetary system, 335 
Japan, U.S. relations, 917 
Kennedy Round, 333, 756 

Negotiations concluded, 879 
Korea, U.S. relations, 548 
Lincoln's birthday, 452 (quoted) 
National Christmas Tree, lighting ceremony, 14 
NATO, 159 
Near and Middle East {see also Arab-Israeli 

conflict),159, 382, 384 
Nuclear "blackmail," 572 (quoted) 
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, need for and 

U.S. support, 447, 569, 659 
Outer space treaty, 386, 569, 659 

Signature ceremony, 266 
President Frei of Chile, U.S. visit, 71 
Rio Grande salinity agreement, 428 
Soviet Union, nuclear arms race, proposal talks, 

State of the Union (excerpts) , 158 
Trade, 333, 757, 886 

Trust Territory of the Pacific, 599 (quoted), 865 
Turkey, 383, 547, 652, 653 
United Kingdom, U.S. relations, 963 
United Nations, 330, 566, 629 

Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in 
office, 14 



Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 
Addresses, etc. — Continued 

U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony, 

Viet-Nam (for details, sec Viet-Nam) : 
Appropriations requests, 233, 236 
Economic and political progress, 537 
Guam conference, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594 
Peace negotiations, 537, 538 
Political and economic progress, 589, 590 
Tet cease-fire termination, 365 
U.S. commitments, 160, 534, 961 
U.S. military policy and objectives, 535, 593, 

Visits of Lilienthal and Komer, 467 

War on Hunger, 295, 379, 658 

Water for Peace, 902 

World peace, U.S. role, 550 

World Weather Watch, 658 

Educational TV task force, 15 

International Conference on Education, hosts, 15 
Asian tour, results (Martin) , 197 
Correspondence and messages : 

East-West trade recommendations of Interna- 
tional Chamber of Commerce, 696 

Education, International Conference on, 15 

Educational TV, appointment of task force, 15 

Memorial Day messages exchanged with General 
Thieu, 917 

Truman Doctrine, 20th anniversary, 546, 547 


Negotiation, proposed for, 595 
Tet cease-fire, proposed extension of, 319 
Guam Conference: 586; Johnson, 587, 588, 589, 590, 

592, 594 
Meetings with Heads of State and officials of, re- 
marks and joint communiques: Afghanistan, 
627; Australia, 960; Brazil, 242; Canada, 908; 
China, 846; Ethiopia, 425; Korea, 548; Mexico, 
12; Morocco, 328; Turkey, 652; U.K., 963 
Messages, letters, and reports to Congress: 

Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position, 952 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 6th an- 
nual report, transmittal, 568 

Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 1st an- 
nual report, transmittal, 732 

Budget, FY 1968, excerpts, 230 

Economic Report of the President (excerpts), 

Foreign aid, program, 1967, 878 

International Coffee Agi-eement, 2nd annual re- 
port, transmittal, 250 

Latin American meeting of Chiefs of State, 540 

Narcotic drugs, U.S. accession to single conven- 
tion, 1961, recommended, 671 
Outer space treaty ratification recommended, 

Peace Corps, 5th annual report, 529 
State of the Union (excerpts) , 158 

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 
Messages, etc. — Continued 
U.S. pai-ticipation in the U.N., 20th annual re- 
port, transmittal, 566 

Supplemental appropriations request, FY 

1967, 236 
U.S. position on bombing of North Viet-Nam, 
War on Hunger program, 295 
Outer space treaty, work on (Goldberg), 605 
Policies: Harriman, 819; Johnson, 903; Katzen- 

bach, 955; W. W. Rostow, 504 
Press briefing, transcript of, 467 
Responsibilities: Johnson, 160, 298; Rusk, 249, 270, 

Tribute to: Rusk, 131, 270; Silva e Costa, 243 
Visit to Canada: Johnson, 907, 908; Pearson, 909 
Visit to Europe, question of (Rusk), 727 
Visit to Korea, 1966; Chung, 551; Johnson, 550 
Visit to Latin America: 678, 721; Humphrey, 680; 

Johnson, 706 
Visit to North Viet-Nam, question of (Rusk), 283 
Johnson, Paul, 274 
Johnson, U. Alexis, 420 
Jordan : 

Israeli military action, U.N. peacekeeping role 

(Goldberg), 100 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 766 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Judicial or extrajudicial documents in civil or com- 
mercial matters, service abroad, convention 
(1965): France, 353; U.S., 732 

Kalb, Marvin, 127 

Kashmir. See India-Pakistan border dispute 

Katzenbach, Nicholas de B.: Johnson, 665; Rusk, 247 

Addresses and reports, 2, 671, 753, 954 

Meetings, 552, 599 

Visit to Africa: 756; Katzenbach, 954 
Kaunda, Kenneth (quoted), 955 

Kennedy. John F. (quoted), 281-282, 316, 838, 891 
U.S.S. John F. Kennedy, christening ceremony 
(Johnson), 959 
Kennedy, Robert F.: Goldberg, 508; Rusk, 322, 516 
Kenya : 

AID programs (Rusk), 831 

Political development (Palmer), 456 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 182, 733, 834 

Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
Kenyatta, Jomo, 456 
Kenyon, Karl W., 71, 632 
Keppel, Francis, 651 
Khalatbary, Abbas Ali, 668, 670 
Kiesinger, Kurt: 362, 751 ; Humphrey, 680 
Kim, Sung Eun, 552 
King, David S., 261 
King, Martin Luther, 726 
King Hassan II, 328, 330 
Kohler, Foy D., 6, 247, 406 



Komer, Robert W. : 469, 586, 591 ; Bunker, 845 ; John- 
son, 538, 587, 593 
Korea, unification and U.N. role (Goldberg), 101 
Korea, North, U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565 
Korea, Republic of: 

AID programs (E. V. Rostow) , 863 
Asia, role in: 553; Chung, 552; Johnson, 548 
Communist attacks, U.S. and ROK casualties, 553 
Economic progress: 69, 337, 552; Bundy, 324, 791, 
792; Chung, 551; Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 384, 
548, 550; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862; W. W. 
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832 
Japan, relations: Bundy, 326; Chung, 552 
Political development: Bundy, 325; Johnson, 548 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 438, 481, 582, 702, 

733, 766, 898, 930, 968 
U.N. recognition as sole lawful government of 

Korean people, 565 
U.S. Ambassador (Porter), confirmation, 968 
U.S. investment and trade mission: 69, 554; Chung, 

U.S. military assistance: 553; Johnson, 384 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Chung, 548 
Viet-Nam, military and other aid to: 552; Bundy, 
324, 792 ; Chung, 552 ; Johnson, 549, 961 ; W. W. 
Rostow, 503 ; Westmoreland, 740 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg) , 505, 509 
Visit of President Johnson (1966): Chung, 551; 
Johnson, 550 
Korean conflict: Johnson, 161, 547; U. A. Johnson, 
421 ; Kohler, 7, 409; Popper, 690; W. W. Rostow, 
492; Rusk, 621, 877; Sisco, 66; Truman, 548 
Korean Service Corps agreement, 582 
Kosygin, Aleksei N. : 444; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 466, 

Kristensen, Thorkil (E. V. Rostow) , 20 
Kuwait, U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Ky, Nguyen Cao; 586; Goldberg, 513 


Convention on the abolition of forced labor, 1957: 
Soviet position (Goldberg), 527 
U.S. ratification recommended (Goldberg), 524 
Europe, large-scale movement of labor, 337 
OECD manpower studies (Rostow), 21 
U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights, 
provisions, 108, 115 
Labor Organization, International (Goldberg), 527 
Constitution, 1946, instrument for the amendment 
of, Barbados, 865 
Lachs, Manfred (Goldberg), 78 
Land-locked states, convention (1965) on transit 

trade of: Chad, 733 
Lansdale, Edward, 844 

Communism, threat of (Rusk), 169, 832, 877 
Communist use in infiltration of Viet-Nam: 
Meeker, 59; Rusk, 281, 282, 743, 777; SEATO, 

Laos — Continued 

Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326 
Neutrality: 285; Rusk, 281, 282 
Outer space treaty, signature, 260 
U.S. aid program: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827 
Laos agreement, 1962 (see also Geneva accords), 
Communist violations: Johnson, 514, W. W. Ros- 
tow, 503; Rusk, 126, 128, 281, 282, 283, 742, 777; 
SEATO, 746 
Last Revolution (Economist), 495 
Latin America: 
AID high-protein food studies (E. V. Rostow), 


Rejection and countermeasures : 564; Johnson, 

541; Martin, 195 
Threat of: 103; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 828 
Economic integration: 712; Bunker, 472, Johnson, 
542, 708; Linowitz, 822; W. W. Rostow, 498; 
Rusk, 723, 829 
Alliance for Progress action program, text, 714 
Industrial development. See Alliance for Progress 
International Coffee Agreement, importance, 252 
Leadership (Johnson), 541, 633 
Nuclear arms, treaty on the banning of, 436, 576, 

Nuclear-free zone: 575; Rusk, 361 
Population control, prospects (Rusk), 724 
Self help and internal cooperation (Rusk), 723, 

States included in, 713n 

Ti-ade (see also Latin American Common Market) : 
713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 542, 707, 709; 
W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722 
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text, 
U.S. cotton policies, effects of (Solomon), 559 
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384 
U.S. preschool and school lunch programs (John- 
son), 709 
USIA activities increase (Johnson), 236 
Visit of President Johnson : Humphrey, 680 ; John- 
son, 678 
Latin American Common Market: 712, 714; John- 
son, 543, 544, 711; Linowitz, 729; Rusk, 722, 725 
Latin American Free Trade Association: 338, 712, 
714; Blumenthal, 434; Linowitz, 730; Rusk, 725 
Laurel-Langley agreement (Braderman), 663 
League to Enforce Peace (Rusk) , 270 
Lebanon : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 438, 613, 929, 930 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Leddy,JohnM., 17, 599 
Lee, Hu Rak, 552 
Lee Kuan Yew (Bundy), 324 
Lesotho : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 16 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 582, 614, 967 



Less developed countries (see also Newly independ- 
ent nations) : 
Agriculture. See Agriculture 

Council of Economic Advisers, Report of (ex- 
cerpts), 336, 337 
Debt problems: 338; E. V. Rostow, 26, 404 
Economic and social development: 

Communism, as a countermeasure to: Linovi^itz, 

731 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk, 826 
Industrialized countries, role of: 336; Harriman, 
820; Humphrey, 489, 685; Johnson, 160, 296, 
300, 334, 380, 709; NATO, 50; E. V. Rostow, 
400, 861; Rusk, 241,826 
OECD programs: Humphrey, 684; E. V. Ros- 
tow, 25 
Education. See Education 

Educational TV: Johnson, 15; E. V. Rostow, 405 
Food and population crisis. See Food and popula- 
tion crisis 
Foreign investment capital. See Investment of 

private capital abroad 
International covenants on human rights (U.N.), 

obligations under: 107; Harris, 105 
International law, importance to (Goldberg), 145 
Latin America (see also Alliance for Progress), 

Rusk, 722 
Nuclear power, peaceful uses, 572 
Soviet and East European aid, need for coopera- 
tion with West (Harriman) , 820 
State Department Policy Planning Council, ad- 
visory panel, 16 
Trade : 

Kennedy Round, importance to: 28, 70, 339; 
Blumenthal, 430; Johnson, 333, 707; E. V. 
Rostow, 27, 404 ; Roth, 478, 880 
Temporary preferential tariff advantages, pro- 
posed: 712; Johnson, 709 
U.N. membership, importance (Sisco), 459 
U.N. role (Johnson), 567 

U.S. aid, objectives and principles: 700; Johnson, 
230, 232, 235, 296, 334, 378, 381; E. V. Rostow, 
400,857; Rusk, 826 
Water projects, importance, 758 
Lewin, Nathan, 765 
Liberia, AID programs (Rusk) , 831 

Development, problems, and U.S. interests 

(Palmer), 806 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Lilienthal, David E.: 69, 467, 586, 592, 907; Johnson, 

467, 537 
Lincoln, Abraham: Goldberg, 510, 512, 528, 844; 

Johnson, 873 ; quoted, 630 
Linowitz, Sol M., 476, 565, 721, 729, 822 
Load line, convention, international (1966) : France, 
353; Malagasy Republic, 393; Peru, 353; Somali, 
732 ; South Africa, 353 
Locke, Eugene M.: 586; Bunker, 844; Johnson, 538, 

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 586, 795; Hightower, 726; John- 
son, 161, 538, 587, 588, 589, 594, 674; Rusk, 779; 
Taylor 286 ;Thieu, 591 

Loeb, James, 651 

Lopez Munguia, Agustin, 71 

Lord Acton (quoted), 879 

Luther, Martin (quoted) , 266 

Luxembourg, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 306, 614, 
898, 930 

MacArthur, Douglas, 674 
Macomber, William B., Jr., 482 
Maghreb (North Africa) , Palmer, 806 
Magnuson, Warren G. (Johnson) , 886 
Mailliard, William S., 476 
Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim, 627, 630 
Makonnen, Lij Endalkatchew, 638 
Malagasy Republic: 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 530, 613, 898 
U.S. Ambassador (King), confirmation, 261 
Malawi : 

Independence, 367 

International Court of Justice, Statute, 967 
Malaysia (see also Association of Southeast Asia) : 
Asian countries, relations (Martin), 196 
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy, 
325, 791; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W. 
Rostow, 496 
Indonesia, relations: Bundy, 326, 792; Rusk, 744 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 898 
Maldive Islands: 

International telecommunications convention 

(1965), viath annexes, 582 
U.S. Ambassador (Corry), confirmation, 968 
Mali, delivery of two C-47 aircraft and related 

articles and services, understanding re, 702 
Malikyar, Abdullah, 626 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 393, 833, 866, 967 
Manila Conference: 517, 748; Bundy, 326, 794; 
Chung, 552; Goldberg, 311; Holt, 962; Johnson, 
960; Thieu, 588 
Mann, Horace (quoted), 955 
Manpower Utilization and Techniques (Cortada, 

Hope), 219 
Mansfield, Mike, 951 
Marcos, Ferdinand E.: Braderman, 661; Bundy, 324, 

Margain, Hugo B., 919 
Marine resources. See Food resources 
Maritime Consultative Organization, Intergovern- 
mental : 
Convention (1964), amendments to: Argentina, 
85; Brazil, 929; Bulgaria, 85; Burma, 224; 
Czechoslovakia, 85; Finland, Indonesia, Israel, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Philippines, 929; Sene- 
gal, 85; Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, 
929; U.S., 865 
Entry into force, 305 



Maritime Consultative Organization — Continued 
Fire safety standards for passenger ships, improve- 
ment of international standards: 102; John- 
son, 429 ; Miller, 173 
Maritime matters {see also Ships and shipping), ex- 
ploration of the sea. Convention (1964) for the 
International Council of: Netherlands, 733; U.S., 
481, 834 
Maritime traffic. See Ships and shipping 
Marks, Leonard H., 16, 721 

Marriage and family (see also Women), U.N. Inter- 
national Covenants on Human Rights, provisions, 
108, 115 
Marshall, George C. (quoted), 271 
Martin, Edward, 476 
Martin, Graham, 193, 851 
Martin, Paul, 750 
Martin, William C. (quoted) , 273 
Martola, Ilmari (Goldberg), 179 
Matthews, Zachariah K., 16 

Mauritania, treaties, agreements, etc., 353, 701, 929 
McBride, Robert H., 968 
McCloskey, Robert J., 950 
McConaughy, Walter P., 849 
McDermott, Walsh (quoted) , 910 
McDougal, Myres: Goldberg, 140; quoted, 144 
McGee, GaleW. (Johnson), 299 
McGhee, George C, 148 
McGovern, George, 48 

McKernan, Donald L., 178, 216, 332, 424, 919 
McNamara, Robert S. : 586, 686 ; Rusk, 129 
Meetings, 53, 687 
National Security Council, Special Committee of, 

membership (Johnson), 951 
Press conference, transcript, 465, 686 
TV interview, transcript of, 442 
McNaughton, John T., 586 
McSweeney, John M., 674 
Meeker, Leonard C, 54 

Mekong River development: Bundy, 326, 793; John- 
son, .334, 903; Lilienthal, 469; Martin, 196, 853; 
W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 832 
Memorial Day, 1967: Johnson, 917; Thieu, 917 

Prayer for Peace, proclamation, 873 
Menzel, Rolf, 358 
Meteorological research : 

Rain augmentation experiments: Johnson, 903; 

Pollack, 911 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 
Cooperative meteorological program in the 

Cayman Islands, agreement with U.K., 86 
Cooperative program for meteorological observa- 
tions, agreement with Dominican Republic for 
continuation of, 86 
Water for Peace programs (Johnson), 903 
Mexico : 

Aid to other Latin American countries (Rusk), 723 
Cotton textile agreement, announcement, 964 
Economic progress: 337; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; 
Rusk, 723, 829 

Mexico — Continued 

Fishery talks held, joint statement and delegations, 

Joint Mexico-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual 

meeting, 70 
Radio broadcasting agi'eement talks resumed, 352 
Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson), 428 -^ 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 154, 182, 224, 260, 

261, 354, 481, 834, 930 
U.S. relations; 13; Johnson, 13 
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Micronesia, Congress of (Johnson), 598 
Middleton, Drew, 851 
Military assistance: 

Appropriations request, FY 1967 (Johnson), 384 
Appropriations request, FY 1968 (Rusk), 827 
Balance of payments, effect on. See Balance of pay- 
ments, U.S. 
Civic action program, Indonesia, agreement re 
furnishing military equipment, materials, and 
services, 766 
Equipment and material, agreement with Brazil re 

disposition of, 393 
India and Pakistan, U.S. military aid terminated, 

Soviet aid to Algeria (Palmer) , 809, 811 
Thailand, U.S. training missions (Martin) , 199, 853 
Military bases: 

Outer space treaty prohibition on: Goldberg, 80, 

609; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602 
Philippines, agreement re relinquishment by U.S. 
of right to use of certain land areas within 
Camp John Hay, 122 
Thailand bases, U.S. use under SEATO framework: 

Martin, 198; Rusk, 597 
Viet-Nam, permanent U.S. bases, U.S. position: 
284; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509; Johnson, 535; 
Rusk, 282, 317 
Miller, George (Goldberg), 605 
Miller, J. Irwin: Katzenbach, 3; Trowbridge, 882 
Miller, Jack (Johnson), 299 
Miller, William K., 173 
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce trade mission 

(Trowbridge), 882 
Mishari, Hassan (Udall), 561 
Missiles (see also Nuclear weapons) : 
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition: 575, 
687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445, 569, 
659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow, 501; 
Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875 
NATO: 687; McNamara, 686 
Poseidon and Polaris (Rusk) , 46 
Mobutu, Joseph (Palmer), 649 
Mohale, Albert S., 16 

Monetary Fund, International: 340; Brzezinski, 419; 
Harriman, 820; Johnson, 335; E. V. Rostow, 858; 
W. W. Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772 
Articles of agreements: Indonesia, 701 
East European countries' membership, question of, 



Monetary Fund, International — Continued 

U.S. Alternate Governor (Rostow), contirmation, 

U.S. holdings (Johnson), 235 
Blongolia, treaties, agreements, etc., 641, 674 
Moore, John Bassett, (Rusk) , 270 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 850 
Cultural agreement with U.S., text, 351 
Development, pi-oblems, and U.S. interests : Palmer, 

806; Rusk, 831 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 701, 765, 834, 

897, 967 
U.S. relations: Johnson, 330; King Hassan II, 329, 

U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
U.S. visit of King Hassan II, 328 
Morozov, Platon, 461 
Morse, Wayne, 507 
Morton, Thruston B., 775 
Moss, Frank E. (Johnston) , 299 
Mossman, James, 442 
Mott, Newcomb : Kohler, 412 ; Rusk, 248 
Mozambique : 

Halting of oil tankers to Southern Rhodesia, 371 
Self-determination, need for (Goldberg), 290 
Muromcew, Cyril, 71, 634 
Murphy, Charles P. (Miller), 174 
MUST (Manpower Utilization System and Tech- 
niques), Cortada, Hope, 219 
Mutual defense : 

Agreements with: Australia, reestablishment of 
joint defense space research facility, 86; Bel- 
gium, 582; Luxembourg, 614 
China : 849 ; Johnson, 848 
Korea, 553 

U.S. military assistance programs (Johnson), 

Nabrit, James M., Jr., 29, 30 

NAC. See North Atlantic Council 

Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 326 

Narcotic drugs. See Drugs 

NASA. See National Aeronautics and Space Admin- 

Nasher, Raymond D., 659 

National Advisory Committee on Self-Help (John- 
son), 379, 380 

National Advisory Council on International Monetary 
and Financial Policies, 563 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Mc- 

National Export Expansion Council, 887 

National Governors' Conference (Johnson), 918 

National Science Foundation: 728; Pollack, 916 

National Student Association, 666 

Nationalism : 

Eastern Europe: Brzezinski, 417; Harriman, 817; 
Humphrey, 486; Katzenbach, 2 ; Kohler, 8, 408; 
W. W. Rostow, 495; Solomon, 519 

Nationalism — Continued 
Indonesia (Bundy), 792 

Less developed countries (W. W. Rostow), 494 
North African states (Palmer), 809 
Philippines (Braderman), 660 
Western Europe, dangers of (Humphrey), 487 

Acquisition of, optional protocol to Vienna con- 
vention on consular relations (1963) : Mada- 
gascar, 613 
Double, military obligations in certain cases, pro- 
tocol (1930): Nigeria, 733 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Natural resources, sovereignty of state (Harris) , 105 
Near and Middle East (see also Arab-Israeli conflict 
and names of individual countries) : 
Economic and social development, U.S. support 

(Goldberg), 935 
U.N. peacekeeping role: Goldberg, 101, 638, 894; 

Sisco, 66 
U.S. military and economic aid, U.S. appropriations 

request (Johnson), 382, 384 
U.S. policy: Goldberg, 100; Johnson, 159, 870 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Nepal, treaties, agreements, etc., 306 
Netherlands, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 354, 

393, 582, 613, 641, 733, 766, 833, 930, 968 
Neuberger, Maurine B., 448 
Neutrality and nonalinement: 

Afghanistan: 632; Maiwandwal, 628, 631 
Cambodia: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619, 773 
Southeast Asia (Rusk), 281 
U.S. neutrality in Arab-Israeli conflict (Rusk) , 949, 

950, 951 
Viet-Nam, U.S. position: 285; Goldberg, 61 
(quoted) , 509, 841 ; Rusk, 281, 773 
New York Times: 466, 776, 851 ; Bundy, 793 
New Zealand: 

ANZUS council meeting: 517; communique, 749 

Asian development, role in (Bundy), 793 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 260, 353, 733, 

765, 898, 967, 968 
U.S. Ambassador (Henning), confirmation, 261 
Viet-Nam, military aid to: Bundy, 324, 792; John- 
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland, 
Newly independent nations (see also Less developed 
countries aiid najne of country) : 
Africa : Goldberg, 289, Katzenbach, 955 
Barbados (Goldberg), 28 
Communism, danger of: E. V. Rostow, 857; W. W. 

Rostow, 494 
North Africa (Palmer), 807 
U.N. membership, significance (Sisco) , 67 
Nicaragua, treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260 
Nicolson, Sir Harold (quoted) , 140 
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc., 306, 801, 930 
Nigeria : 

AID programs (Rusk), 831 
Political developments (Palmer), 649 



Nigeria — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 393, 481, 613, 733, 
Niven, Paul, 774 
Nkomo, Joshua, 371 
Nolte, Richard H., 674 
Nonnationals, U.N. international covenants on 

human rights: 114; Harris, 105 
North Atlantic Council (Humphrey) , 681 
Defense ministers meeting, Paris, 1966: 

Joint communique and annexes: 49; Rusk, 46 
U.S. delegation, 53 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: 
Armed forces: 

Financing of, effect on balance-of-payments posi- 
tions: 788; Rusk, 362, 783 
1967 commitments and prospects, 51 
Size and deployment: 789; Rusk, 362, 782 
Civil emergency planning, 50 

Deterrent role: 49, 51, 657; Brzezinski, 416; Harri- 
man, 820; Humphrey, 682; Rusk, 361; Sunay, 
East- West relations, role in: 49, 697; Harriman, 
819; Humphrey, 487, 681; Rusk, 47, 360; 
Sunay, 655 
France, position of: 51; Harriman, 820; Rusk, 46 
Headquarters, relocation, 51 

International developments, study of effects of 
changes in, on NATO policies; 50; resolution, 
Modernization of: Humphrey, 681; E. V. Rostow, 

Nuclear planning and consultation: 51, 687; Mc- 

Namara, 686 
Nuclear Planning Group, 1st ministerial meeting: 

687; McNamara, 686 
Nuclear weapons, Soviet objections to possible Ger- 
man use of, 571 
Turkey, support of: 627; Johnson, 547, 652; Sun- 
ay, 653 
U.S. support: Humphrey, 681; Johnson, 159; Rusk, 
358, 364, 827 

Import quota controls removed, 246 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 306, 481, 530, 613, 
802, 930 
Norwood, William (Johnson), 598 
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree- 
ments re U.S. liability: Greece, 225 
Nsanze, Terence, 850 
Nuclear-free zones : 

Central Europe, question of: 575; Rusk, 361 
Latin America: 436, 575, 713, 721; Rusk, 361 
Nuclear proliferation: 
Treaty, proposed: 

Chinese Communist participation, question of 

(Rusk), 132 
ENDC 1966 conference results, 570 

Nuclear proliferation — Continued 
Treaty, proposed — Continued 

Need for and U.S. support: 436, 657; Goldberg, 
79, 83, 99, 603; Humphrey, 488; Johnson, 447, 
569, 659; Katzenbach, 755; E. V. Rostow, 399; 
W. W. Rostow, 501, 504; Rusk, 48, 132, 169, 
601, 786, 875; U Thant, 268 
Nonnuclear states, effect on and rights under: "* 
572; Johnson, 447; McNamara, 446; E. V. 
Rostow, 400 
Peaceful uses, question of: Pollack, 911; Rusk, 

Safeguards, 571 

EUR ATOM safeguards, question on (Rusk), 
Soviet position, review, 571 
Nuclear test ban, comprehensive, verification meas- 
ures and Soviet rejection, 574 
Nuclear test ban treaty, 1963: 
Current actions : Nigeria, 481 
Importance : Goldberg, 603 ; Rusk, 267 
Nuclear tests: 

Antarctic Treaty, ban on, 71 
Communist China : 750; Rusk, 132 
France, 750 

Outer space treaty, prohibition of: Goldberg, 80, 

609; Rusk, 602 

Nuclear war (see also War) , dangers of: McNamara, 

443; W. W. Rostow, 500; Rusk, 272, 874; Sisco, 


Nuclear weapons (see also Armaments and Missiles) : 

Latin America, treaty on the banning of nuclear 

arms in, 436, 576, 713, 721 
Outer space treaty, prohibition on use of: 577; 
Goldberg, 80, 99, 141, 608, 839; Johnson, 266, 
387, 569; Rusk, 601 
Production of, U.S. proposals for freezes and lim- 
itations on: 574; Johnson, 659; Rusk, 43, 171, 
Nyasaland, Federation of Rhodesia and, 367 
Nyerere, Julius K. (quoted), 958 

OCAM (Organisation Commune Africaine et 
Malagache), 650 

Oceanographic Commission, Intergovernmental 
(Sisco), 462 

OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co- 
operation), 683 

Office of Civil Operations : Bunker, 845 ; Komer, 470 

Office of Private Resources: Johnson, 381; E. V. 
Rostow, 860, 8G3 

Office of Saline Water (Udall),561 

Office of the War on Hunger: Johnson, 381; E. V. 
Rostow, 860, 863 

Oil (see also Petroleum), pollution of sea by, inter- 
national convention (1954) for prevention of: 
Israel, 353; Ivory Coast, 642; U.S., 733 
Amendments: Greece, 733 

Oliver, Covey T., 968 



Organisation Commune Africaine et Malagache 

(Palmer), 650 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment : 
Accomplishments, role, and U.S. support: 336; 
Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 166, 683; E. V. 
Rostow, 19; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 359 
Agricultural Food Fund, U.S. proposal: Johnson, 

297 ; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861 
Balance-of-payments report, 345 
Development Assistance Committee: 764; Hum- 
phrey, 685; E. V. Rostow, 25 
Export earnings of less developed countries, special 

study (Blumenthal) , 435 
India, food aid, question of: 701 ; Rusk, 48 
International technological cooperation study 

(McGhee), 148 
Investment guarantee fund, proposed (Johnson), 

Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, statements 

(Rostow), and text of joint communique, 19 
Soviet and Eastern Europe, relations: Harriman, 

820; E. V. Rostow, 24 
Turkey, aid to : 28 ; Johnson, 383 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation 

(Humphrey), 683 
Organization of African Unity: Haile Selassie, 426; 
Johnson, 427; Katzenbach, 954, 959; Palmer, 650, 
807; W. W. Rostow, 499; Rusk, 784 
Organization of American States : 

Charter, current actions : Trinidad and Tobago, 581 

Cuba, policy on, 103, 565 

Declaration of the Presidents of America, text, 

Dominican Republic crisis (Johnson) , 567 
Membership, 713n 
Trinidad and Tobago, membership : 464n ; Rusk, 

U.S. support (Johnson) , 632 
Osman, Ahmed, 850 
Outer space: 

Exploration, world-wide benefits from (Rusk), 241 
Jupiter probe, NASA-ESRO, proposed (McGhee), 

Southern Hemisphere telescope in Chilean Andes, 

Space law, development: 577; Goldberg, 142, 602; 

Rusk, 601 
Treaties, agreements, etc: 

Exploration and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, treaty 
(1967) governing the activities of states: 
Current actions: Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Australia, 260; Austria, 438; Belgium, 
306; Bolivia, Botswana, 260; Brazil, 306; 
Burma, 898; Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, 
Central African Republic, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Cyprus, 260; 
Czechoslovakia, 260, 898; Denmark, Do- 
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 

Outer space — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued 

Exploration and use of outer space, etc. — Con. 
Current actions — Continued 

Ethiopia, Finland, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, 260; India, 481; Indo- 
nesia, 260; Iraq, 481; Israel, Italy, Japan, 
260; Jordan, 306; Korea, Laos, Lesotho, 
Luxembourg, 260; Mexico, 260; Nepal, 
306; Netherlands, 353; New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, 260; Niger, 306, 801; Norway, 
306; Panama, Philippines, Poland, Romania, 
Rwanda, 260; San Marino, 733; Sierra 
Leone, 866; South Africa, 481; Somali 
Republic, 306; Soviet Union, 260; Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Tur- 
key, U.A.R., U.K., 260; U.S., 260, 765, 930; 
Upper Volta, 481; Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Viet-Nam, Yugoslavia, 260 
Development and background (Goldberg), 605 
Installations, outer space treaty provisions for 
free access to all parties: 577; Goldberg, 80, 
141, 602, 606, 607; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 602 
Provisions, importance, and U.S. support: 
570, 577; Goldberg, 79, 83, 98, 141, 602, 839; 
Johnson, 569; NATO, 49; Rusk, 42 
Signature ceremony, statements: Dean, 286; 
Dobrynin, 269; Goldberg, 267; Johnson, 266; 
Rusk, 266; U Thant, 268 
U.N. resolution, 83 

U.S. ratification: 386; Goldberg, 602; John- 
son, 386, 659; Rusk, 600 
U.S. -Soviet cooperation: Goldberg, 142, 604, 
606; Rusk, 600; Sisco, 460 
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree- 
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354 
Joint defense space research facility, agreement 

with Australia re establishment of, 86 
Space vehicle tracking stations in U.K., agree- 
ment, 225 
Antigua, station on, 354 
Tracking and telemetry facility in Mahe, Sey- 
chelles, agreement with U.K., 225 
U.N. conference, proposed, U.N. resolution, 83n 
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149 
Ovamboland, status of: Goldberg, 888; Palmer, 648 
Owen, Wilfred, 651 

Pacific Community, 553 

Pacific Islands Trust Territory. See Trust Territory 

of the Pacific Islands 
PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) , 721, 761 
Pakistan (see also India-Pakistan border dispute) : 
Afghanistan, relations with (Maiwandwal), 631 
Aid Consortium: Johnson, 383; W. W. Rostow, 496 
Economic development: 337, 670; Gaud, 669; John- 
son, 383; E. V. Rostow, 401, 862; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 496; Rusk, 830 
SEATO communique, position on, 747 



Pakistan — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 182, 733, 898, 967, 968 
U.S. aid: 

Military aid terminated, 688 
1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830 
U.S. and multilateral aid: Gaud, 669; Johnson, 159; 
Rusk, 830 
Palmer, Joseph, II, 449, 646, 806 
Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967, 

proclamation, 632 
Pan American Health Organization, 721, 761 
Panama : 

Air transport agreement amended, 965 
Central American Common Market, relations, 715 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 353 
U.S. economic aid (Johnson), 382 
Panorama, TV interview of Secretary McNamara, 

Papadopoulos, George (Rusk), 751 

Economic level of development (Rusk), 722 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 224 
U.S. Ambassador (Hernandez), confirmation, 968 
Pardo, Arvid, 327 
Park, Chung Hee (Chung) , 549 
Park, Chung Hun, 552 

Patents (see also Industrial property), international 
patent cooperation treaty, proposed (Trow- 
bridge), 885 
Payton, Robert L., 261 
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman, 627 
Peace Corps programs: 

Accomplishments and role, 337 

Agreements establishing: Antigua, 182; Dominica, 
393; Gambia, 122; Saint Christopher Nevis 
and Anguilla, St. Vincent, 306 
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson), 

232, 235 
Expansion, proposed, 244 
5th annual report (Johnson), 529 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Johnson), 

598, 865 
Water resources development activities, recommen- 
dations for, 763 
Pearson, Lester B.: 908, 909; Johnson, 909 
Peccei, Aurelio (Humphrey), 166 
Pechel, Peter, 358 
Pedersen, Richard F., 261, 732 
Perkins, James : 15 ; Huinphrey, 164 

Communism, threat of (Harriman) , 821 
Economic progress: Johnson, 382; E. V. Rostow, 

Political progress (Rusk), 829 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 353, 481, 766, 
930, 967 

North Africa, resources of (Palmer), 810, 812 
Southern Rhodesia: 
U.N. economic sanctions and U.S. support, 370 


Petroleum — Continued 
North Africa — Continued 

U.N. mandatory sanctions against supply of: 77, 
374 ; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation. Executive order, 146 
Peyrefitte, Alain (McGhee), 152 

Philippines (see also Association of Southeast Asia) : >, 
Asian Mission Chiefs' meeting: communique, 517; 

Goldberg, 511 
Communism, threat of (SEATO), 746 
Economic and political development: Braderman, 

661; Bundy, 325, 791, 793 
Educational institutes (Martin), 196 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 224, 260, 261, 306, 

802, 929 
U.S. relations (Braderman), 660 
U.S. school building project, agreement, 850 
Viet-Nam, military aid to : Bundy, 324, 792 ; John- 
son, 961; W. W. Rostow, 503; Westmoreland, 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505, 
Phillips, Christopher H., 696 
Pifer, Alan, 651 
Piiiera, Jose (Goldberg), 888 
Poage, W. R. (Johnson), 299 
Poland : 

Cotton textile agreement, 612 

Economic and political evolution: Kohler, 9, 408, 

Solomon, 519 
Nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, recip- 
rocal offer, 572 
Post World War II (Harriman), 816 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 642, 766 
U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3 
Pollack, Herman, 910 

Air pollution (Rusk), 240 

Outer space treaty provisions for avoiding pollu- 
tion: Goldberg, 81; Johnson, 388; Rusk, 601 
Pollution of the sea by oil, international conven- 
tion (1954) for prevention of: Israel, 353; 
Ivory Coast, 642 ; U.S., 733 
Amendments: Greece, 733 
Water for Peace programs : 761 ; Johnson, 903 
Pope Paul VI, 685 (quoted) 

Viet-Nam peace efforts and U.S. support: Goldberg, 
63; Johnson, 319 
Popper, David H., 566, 689 
Population growth: 

Control needed: 337; Johnson, 295; E. V. Rostow, 

402; W. W. Rostow, 497; Rusk, 241 
Energy consumption forecasts (Seaborg), 90 
Family planning programs: Johnson, 160; E. V. 
Rostow, 402; Rusk, 830 
U.S. aid (Johnson), 381 
Food supply, relation to. See Food and population 

Latin America (Rusk), 724 
North Africa (Palmer), 810 


Population growth — Continued 
Philippines (Braderman), 661 
Policy Planning Council advisory panel, 16 
U.N. population control experts, training (Gold- 
berg) , 101 
Porter, William J.: 968; Goldberg, 513; Taylor, 286 
Portugal : 

African colonies, need for self-determination (Gold- 
berg) , 290 
Cotton textile agreement with U.S., announcement, 

Southern Rhodesia, use of Portuguese ports to 

evade oil embargo, 371, 374 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 224, 613, 674, 930 
Postal Union, Universal, constitution (1964), with 
final protocols: 
China, 85; Dahomey, Gabon, 801; Ghana, 613; 
Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauritania, 701; 
Morocco, 967; New Zealand (including Niue, 
the Cook Islands, and the Tokelau Islands), 
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (in- 
cluding Spanish territories in Africa), 613; 
Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia, 
85; Yugoslavia, 613; Zambia, 701 
Potter, Philip, 723 
Powell, Robert, 137 
Price, Robert I., 102 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk (Rusk), 128, 129, 281, 320, 

Prince Souvanna Phouma (Rusk), 281, 320 
Prisoners, political, military takeover in Greece 
(Rusk), 751 
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam 
Private Resources, Office of: Johnson, 381; E. V. 

Rostow, 860, 863 
Proclamations by the President: 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1967 

(3774), 632 
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 (3785), 873 
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (3781) , 800 
Sheet glass, escape-clause duties modified (3762), 

Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi- 
nated (3761), 217 
World Trade Week, 1967 (3771), 756 
Public Law 480 (see also Agricultural surpluses and 
Food for Peace) : Johnson, 235 ; E. V. Rostow, 860 
Programs in: India, 701; North Africa (Palmer), 
814; Viet-Nam (Komer),"470 

Agriculture Department, Analysis of Factors Af- 
fecting U.S. Cotton Exports (Solomon), 559 
Canadian Automobile Agreement; First Annual 
Report of the President to the Congress on the 
Implementation of the Automotive Products 
Trade Act of 1965, 732n 
Congress : 

Documents relating to foreign policy, lists, 18, 
223, 350, 757, 801, 966 

Publications — Continued 

Congress — Continued 

Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Eco- 
nomic Reforms, report (Solomon), 522 
Our Changing Partnership with Europe, 522n 

International exchange of, convention (1958): 
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929 

Obscene, agreement (1910) re repression of cir- 
culation of, as amended: Malta, 865 

Official publications, agreement with Jamaica for 
the exchange of, 154 

Official publications and government documents, 
exchange between states, convention (1958) : 
Indonesia, 481; U.S., 834, 929 

State Department: 
Recent releases, lists, 37, 225, 261, 306, 393, 614, 

734, 802, 866, 968 
Treaties in Force: A List of Agreements and 
Other International Agreements of the United 
States in Force on January 1, 1967, released, 

United Nations, lists of current documents, 36, 181, 
305, 437 

U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the 
President to the Congress for the Year 1965, 

Water for Peace: A Report of Background Con- 
siderations and Recommendations on the Water 
for Peace Program, released, 758 
Pulitzer, Joseph (quoted), 186 

Rabasa, Oscar, 919 

Racial discrimination (see also Human rights) : 
Africa, U.S. position (Johnson), 159 
Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455; 

Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68 
Convention (1965), international, for the elimi- 
nation of: Algeria, 353; Australia, 154; 
Burundi, 701 ; Cameroon, 353 ; Costa Rica, 702 ; 
Colombia, 701; Cyprus, 353, 930; Czechoslo- 
vakia, 154; Dahomey, 701; Finland, 154; Ger- 
many, 701; Hungary, 930; Iceland, 154, 702; 
India, Iran, 701; Mauritania, 353; Mexico, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 154; Niger, 930; 
Norway, 154; Panama, 353; Sierra Leone, 154; 
Somalia, 701; Tunisia, 702; U.A.R., 930; U.K., 
154; Uruguay, 701; Vatican, 154 
Southern Rhodesia: 367; Goldberg, 73, 144; 

Palmer, 450, 646; Sisco, 68 
Suppression of, U.N. role: Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66 
Radio : 

Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

Broadcasting in the standard broadcasting band 

(protocol) : Blexico, 182, 224, 261 
Consultations resumed, 352 

Cultural exchange arrangements with Romania, 
renewal, 480, 482 



Radio — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc. — Continued 
Licensed amateur radio operators, reciprocal 
granting of authorizations to operate in either 
country, agreements with: Argentina, 702; 
Netherlands, 154; Switzerland, 968; Trinidad 
and Tobago, 898 
Radio communications between Alaska and 
British Colombia, agreement with Canada, U.S. 
notice of termination, 482 
Radio communications between amateur stations 
on behalf of third parties, agreement with 
Argentina, 702 
Radio regulations (1959): 

Partial revision re frequency allotment plan 
for aeronautical mobile (R) service and re- 
lated information: Argentina, 898; Austria, 
Canada, Denmark, 766; Luxembourg, Mad- 
agascar, Malaysia, 898 
Entry into force, 481 
Partial revision with annexes and additional 
protocol: Malaysia, 898 
USIA programs, increase (Johnson), 236 
Voice of America (Kohler), 411 
Ramos, Narciso, 747, 748 
Rapacki Plan (Rusk), 361 
Red Sea lights, maintenance, international agreement 

(1962) , Soviet Union, 305 

Stateless persons and refugees, application (pro- 
tocol 1) of the universal copyright convention: 
Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833 
Viet-Nam: 209; Komer, 470 
Voluntary agencies, aid to (Sisco) , 64 
Regional cooperation and development: Brzezinski, 
415; Blumenthal, 434; W. W. Rostow, 497 
Africa. See Africa 
Arms control, 576 
CENTO: 671; Gaud, 668 
Defense. See Collective security 
Development banks: 338; E. V. Rostow, 403 
SEATO programs: 745, 747; Rusk, 744 
U.S. support: 338; Johnson, 231, 328, 334, 379, 
380, 904; Palmer, 814; Pollack, 913; W. W. 
Rostow, 500; Rusk, 772, 828, 906 
Water for Peace program : 759, 762 ; Johnson, 904 ; 
Rusk, 906 
Reifenberg, Jan, 358 
Research. See Science and technology 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of, 367 
Rimestad, Idar, 261 

Rio Grande salinity agreement (Johnson) , 428 
Road traffic: 

Convention (1949), with annexes and protocol, 

Botswana, 967 
Convention (1954) on customs facilities for tour- 
ing, Singapore, 122 
Customs convention (1954) on the temporary im- 
portation of private road vehicles, Australia, 

Rockwell, Stuart W., 670, 671 
Rogers, William P., 292, 302 
Rolvaag, Karl F., 674 

Cultural exchange arrangement renewed, 479, 482 
Increasing independence (Solomon), 519 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 260, 482, 613 
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Johnson, 960; quoted, 270, 

289, 963 
Roshchin, Alexei A., 571 
Ross, Claude G., 765 

Rostow, Eugene V., 19, 24, 25, 53, 261, 398, 856 
Rostow, W. W., 491, 552, 586, 659, 721; Johnson, 951 
Roth, William M., 476, 476n, 523, 879 
Ruge, Gerd, 358 

Rush-Bagot Agreement Days, proclamation, 800 
Rusk, Dean: 
Addresses, correspondence, remarks, and state- 
ments : 
Africa, U.S. aid, 830 
Aggression, prevention, and countermeasures, 

271, 278, 363, 771 
Alliance for Progress, 464, 723, 828 

Summit meeting, prospects from, 722, 829 
Antiballistic missiles, questions on, 43, 46, 47, 

321, 361, 875 
Arab-Israeli conflict, 949, 950 
Armaments, control and reduction, 46, 171, 601, 

Asia, U.S. aid, 830, 832 
Cambodia, nonalinement, 128, 129, 281, 320, 619, 


Propaganda, 725, 775 

Threat of and U.S. role against, 127, 134, 272, 
278, 785, 787, 827, 877 
Communist China: 

Asia, threat to, 169, 275 
Leadership struggle, 47, 170, 280, 788 
Nuclear potential, 132 
U.S. relations, 283, 322 
Consular convention with Soviet Union, need for 

ratification, 247 
East- West relations, 4 (quoted), 47, 169, 360, 
363, 463 (quoted), 523 (quoted), 772, 786 
Viet-Nam, effect of, 781, 875 
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966, 171, 772, 

Europe, U.S. relations and interests, 358, 364, 

726, 784 
Food and population crisis, 46, 169, 874 
Foreign Assistance Program for 1968, 826 
Foreign policy, 134, 270, 770, 784, 879 
Freedom of speech and expression, 130, 725, 775 
General Assembly, 21st session, evaluation, 42 
Germany, reunification, 360, 362, 771 
Germany, Federal Republic of: 

Chancellor Adenauer, regrets at death of, 752 
Political developments, 365 



Rusk, Dean — Continued 

Addresses, etc. — Continued 
Germany, Federal Republic of — Continued 

U.S. common interests, 359 

U.S. visit of Minister Brandt, 320 
Greece, political developments, 750 
Herter, Christian, expression of sorrow on death 

of, 147 
India, U.S. and multilateral food aid, 46, 48, 830 
Kennedy Round, 361 
Laos, 1962 agreements, 126, 128, 281, 282, 742, 

Latin American economic integration, 722, 723, 

725, 829 
Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, U.S. visit, 782 
NATO, 358, 360 

Ministerial Council meeting, Paris, 1966, 46 

U.S. forces, 362, 782 
1951-1966, important events of, 168 
1966 developments, and prospects from, 47, 128 
Nuclear-free zones, 361 
Nuclear proliferation: 

EURATOM safeguards, 360 

Treaty, need for, 48, 132, 321, 601, 786, 875 
Outer space treaty, 42, 266, 600 
Science and foreign affairs, 238 
SEATO council meeting, 742 
Secretary of State, work of, 365 
Sino-Soviet relations, 132, 168, 781, 785 

Viet-Nam, effect of, 44, 283, 727, 786 
Soviet Union, U.S. citizens, convictions, 44 
Thailand, U.S. air force use of Thai bases, 597 
U.K., European Common Market, membership, 

proposed, 783 
U.S. world commitments, 784, 875 
Viet-Nam (for details, see Viet-Nam) : 

Cease-fire, proposals and prospects from, 126, 
276, 317, 321, 359, 364, 464, 516, 622, 727, 

775, 780, 878 

Civilian casualties, 130, 135, 274, 276 
Communist China and Soviet military support, 

275, 727, 786 
National reconciliation (pacification) pro- 
gram, 129, 779 
Peace talks: 

Private channels, question of, 280, 321, 623, 

624, 778 
U Thant proposals, U.S. and Communist 

positions, 618 
U.S. willingness, 42, 43, 47, 126, 135, 172, 
281, 317, 464, 516, 618, 727, 743, 772, 777, 
Political progress, 131, 279, 779 
Situation reports, 44, 274, 726 
U.S. commitments, 128, 133, 272, 275, 725, 744, 

776, 875 

U.S. economic aid, 830 

U.S. 14 points, 281, 318 

U.S. military targets, 45, 130, 131, 135, 275 

Rusk, Dean — Continued 

Addresses, etc. — Continued 
Viet-Nam — Continued 

U.S. objectives, 45, 133, 278, 317 
U.S. public opinion, 130, 133, 619, 725, 774 
Water for Peace, 904 

World peace, importance, 136, 169, 269, 278, 358, 
363, 725, 771, 781, 874 
Alliance for Progress conferences, U.S. delegate, 

472n, 476 
CIA special policy committee, chairman (Johnson), 

Health, 131 
Meetings with: 

Alliance for Progress summit conference, 721 
ANZUS Council, 749 
China, Vice President Yen, 849 
Guam conference, 586, 594 
NATO ministerial council, 53 
SEATO Council of Ministers, 516, 747 
Turkey, President Sunay, 656 
Viet-Nam, 7-nation meeting, 748 
National Security Council, Special Committee of, 

chairmanship (Johnson), 951 
News conferences, transcripts of, 42, 317, 464, 466, 

TV and radio interviews, transcripts of, 126, 168, 

274, 358, 722, 774 
Work of, satisfactions and rewards, 365 
Rusk, Thomas Jefferson, 269 
Rwanda, outer space treaty, signature, 260 

Safety of life at sea : 

International convention, 1960 : 

Amendments to chapter II, U.S., 642, 702 
Current actions: Brazil, 642; Ireland, 481; 

Somalia, 765 
Passenger-ship safety amendments: 102; John- 
son, 429; Miller, 173; Romania, 224 
International regulations for preventing collisions, 
1960: Australia, 581-582; Brazil, 866; China, 
North Atlantic fisheries, convention on conduct of, 
provisions, 635 
Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, treaties, agree- 
ments, etc., 306 
St. Lawrence Seaway, tolls, 554, 674 
St. Vincent, treaties, agreements, etc., 306 
Salisbury, Harrison: 321; Powell, 137; Rusk, 131 
Salzman, Herbert (E. V. Rostow), 860, 863 
San Marino, outer space treaty (1967) , 733 
Satellites (see also Communications: Satellites, 
Meteorological research, and Outer space) : 
Communications stations proposed for Latin Amer- 
ica (Johnson), 709 
Development and importance (Pollack), 910 
Surveys of water and related resources, proposed 

use in, 763 
Tracking facilities, access, outer space treaty pro- 
visions for (Goldberg) , 82, 610 



Satellites — Continued 

Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

ESRO Alaska telemetry/telecommand station, 
agreement for establishment and operation of, 
Geodetic satellite observation stations, agree- 
ments with: Japan, 86, 642; Mexico, 354 
Satterthwaite, Joseph C, 651 
Saudi Arabia: 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft, signature, 765 
Jidda desalination plant dedication, U.S. participa- 
tion (Udall), 561 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Seaborg, Glenn T., 90, 915 (quoted) 
Scherer, Ray, 724 

Schlesinger, Arthur (Goldberg), 511 
Schroeder, Gerhard, 687, 688 
Schultze, Charles L.: 237; Johnson, 659 
SCI (International Scientific and Technological Af- 
fairs, office of) , Pollack, 913 
Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy, 

Science and technology: 

China, U.S. survey team, 849 

Europe (McGhee), 152 

International cooperation: 657; Brzezinski, 414; 

Humphrey, 488; Rusk, 239 
Latin America: 713, 719, 887; Johnson, 709 
NATO resolution, 50, 52 
OECD cooperation: Humphrey, 166, 684; E. V. 

Rostow, 22 
Science and foreign affairs: Pollack, 910; Rusk, 

238; Seaborg (quoted), 915 
Soviet-U.S. exchanges, value (Katzenbach), 755 
Technical data, exportation to Southern Rhodesia, 

prohibition of. Executive order, 146 
Technological forecasting: Pollack, 914; Rusk, 239 
Technological gaps: 713; Humphrey, 165, 684; Mc- 
Ghee, 148; Pollack, 912; Rusk, 238 
U.N. role: Pollack, 912; Sisco, 459, 462 
U.S. research and development (McGhee), 149 
Water resources research and development, rec- 
ommendations for: 763; Johnson, 903 
Security Council, U.N.: 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 

Meeting called (Goldberg), 871 
Role in and U.S. support: Goldberg, 100, 920, 
925, 927, 934, 941, 944, 946; Johnson, 935, 951, 
952; Rusk, 949 
UNEP withdrawn vnthout action by (Johnson), 
China, membership (Popper), 689 
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 437 
Israeli-Syrian border dispute (Goldberg), 100 
Peacekeeping operations : 

Discussion delays, problem of (Goldberg), 944, 

Primary responsibilities: 375; Goldberg, 143, 
640, 872, 928; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 949 

Security Council, U.N. — Continued 
Peacekeeping operations — Continued 
Soviet position (Sisco), 461 

Veto, exercise of: Goldberg, 144, 638, 640, 839, 
895 ; Sisco, 461 
Resolutions : 

Arab-Israeli conflict, cease-fire requests, 947, 948 \ 
Southern Rhodesia, mandatory sanctions against, 

U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus, 6-month ex- 
tension, 180n 
Southern Rhodesia: 

Mandatory sanctions against, and U.S. support: 
373; Goldberg, 73, 99, 142; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation, 145, 377 
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support: 369, 375; Pal- 
mer, 449, 457; Sisco, 68 
U.S. deputy representative (Pedersen), confirma- 
tion, 261 
U.S. responsibilities as a permanent member 

(Rusk), 784 
Viet-Nam, role in. See under Viet-Nam 
Seismographic research, 574 
Selden, Armistead I., Jr., 476 
Selective service (Powell), 137 
Self-defense. See Defense 
Self-determination : 
Aden (Goldberg), 100 
Africa, southern (Katzenbach), 955 
Angola and Mozambique, need for (Goldberg), 290 
Asia (see also Viet-Nam) : Bundy, 790; U. A. John- 
son, 422 
Importance and U.N. role (Sisco) , 67 
Independent statehood not necessarily required: 

Goldberg, 290 ; Nabrit, 32 
Nigeria (Palmer), 649 
South- West Africa: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888; Palmer, 

648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68 
Southern Rhodesia: 376; Goldberg, 99, 142; 

Palmer, 456 
U.N. Charter principles (Rusk) , 170, 875 
U.N. covenants, 107, 112 
U.N. resolution and U.S. support: Nabrit, 29, 30; 

text, 32 
U.S. support (Rusk) , 772 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam. 
Sender Freies Berlin, 358 
Senegal : 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 765 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
Senghor, Leopold S. (quoted), 959 
Sharp, U.S. Grant: 586, 594 ; Holt, 962 
Sheet glass, proclamation modifying escape-clause 

action, 216 
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime Consultative 
Organization, Intergovernmental) : 
International waterways, U.S. position: Goldberg, 
871, 921, 923, 926, 938; Johnson, 870, 922 
(quoted) ; U Thant, 920 (quoted) , 921 



Ships and shipping — Continued 
Passenger ships, IMCO fire safety standards rec- 
ommendations: 102; Johnson, 429; Miller, 173 
Southern Rhodesian exports, U.N. sanctions against 
shipments of: 77, 374; Palmer, 449 
U.S. implementation, Executive order, 146 
Soviet vessel Turkestan, allegations of U.S. air 

attacks and U.S. rejection, 953 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 

International waterborne transportation, inter- 
American convention (1963), on facilitation 
of: U.S., 481, 581,641 
Maritime traffic, international convention (1965), 
on facilitation of, with annexes: Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, 305; Finland, 732; Iceland, 
393; Ivory Coast, 694; Nigeria, 393; Soviet 
Union, 85; Trinidad and Tobago, 732; U.S., 
481, 581, 613, 865 
Entry into force, 305 
NS Savannah, private company operation, agree- 
ment re U.S. liability: Greece, 225 
Pilotage services on the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Seaway, agreement with Canada 
governing coordination of, 866 
USS Cascade (destroyer tender), deployment of, 

agreement with Malta, 225 
Vessels, loans of, agreements with : New Zealand, 
898; Philippines, 802 
U.S. military supplies to Viet-Nam (Wheeler), 188 
USS John F. Kennedij, christening ceremony 

(Johnson), 959 
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involvement in Mid- 
dle East, and U.S. reply (Goldberg), 935, 940 
U.S. vessel, Israeli attack on: Goldberg, 943; John- 
son, 952 
Sierra Leone: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 377 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 866, 930, 967 
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom (Rusk) , 128, 129, 281, 619 
Sindermann, Carl J., 71 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688 
Economic progress (Bundy), 325, 791 
Indonesia, relations with: Bundy, 792; Rusk, 744 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 122, 182, 897 
Sino-Soviet relations: Brzezinski, 419; Harriman, 
817; Katzenbach, 2; Kohler, 9, 407; W. W. 
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 132, 168, 781, 785; Solomon, 
Viet-Nam, effect of: Rusk, 727, 786; Sisco, 461 
Viet-Nam peace talks, effect on (Rusk), 44, 283 
Sisco, Joseph J., 64, 458 
Siscoe, Frank G., 71, 634 
Sithole, Ndabaningi, 371 
Skolnikoff, Eugene B., 913 
Slavery : 

Supplementary convention (1956) for the abolition 
of slavery, the slave trade, and practices simi- 
lar to : Afghanistan, 85 ; Luxembourg, 930 
U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524 

Slavery — Continued 

U.N. International Covenants on Human Rights, 

prohibition of, 113 
White women, agreement (1949) for the suppres- 
sion of trade in, as amended: Malta, 866 
Smathers, George A., 476 
Smith, Al (quoted), 936 
Smith, Willard J. (Miller), 175 
Smithsonian Institute, 667 
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea 
Solomon, Anthony M.: 518, 555, 721; Miller, 174 
Somali, Republic of: 

AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 225, 306, 438, 701, 702, 

732, 765, 802 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
South Africa, Republic of: 

Apartheid: Goldberg, 292, 891, 892; Palmer, 455; 

Rogers, 302 ; Sisco, 68 
South West Africa mandate, termination: 893; 

Goldberg, 888, 889; Palmer, 648; Sisco, 68 
Southern Rhodesia, support and aid in evading 

sanctions, 374 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 224, 353, 481, 733, 930 
South West Africa: 

ICJ decision: Goldberg, 144, 292; Palmer, 647; 

Rogers, 302 
Self-determination for, U.N. role in development 
of: Goldberg, 292, 888; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 
302; Sisco, 68 
U.N. administration of: Goldberg, 99, 292, 888, 
892; Palmer, 648; Rogers, 302; Sisco, 68 
U.N. resolution, text, 893 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization: 

Council of Ministers meeting, Washington: 516, 
592; Rusk, 742 
Text of communique, 745 
U.S. delegation, 516 
Military Advisers meeting, Washington, 516, 592 
Thai support: Martin, 198, 852; Rusk, 598 
Viet-Nam : 

Importance of U.S. commitments under: John- 
son, 515; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 776, 
Position and support: Martin, 855; Rusk, 281, 
Southeast Asian Ministers of Education (Martin), 

196, 854 
Southern Rhodesia: 

Background: 366; Palmer, 449 
Independence, U.K. conditions for: 368, 372, 377; 
Palmer, 457, 646 
U.S., contrasted with (Palmer), 451 
International Wheat Agreement, 1967 protocol, 

Land Apportionment Act (Palmer), 453 
Racial discrimination in. See Racial discrimination 
Rhodesian Front party (Palmer), 454 
Soviet Union, position of, 374 



Southern Rhodesia — Continued 

Responsibilities: 369, 375; Goldberg, 74, 143; 

Palmer, 455, 647 
Use of force against, questions of, 372, 374 
U.K.-Rhodesian talks: 368; Goldberg, 76; Sisco, 67 
U.N. resolutions and U.S. support, 369 
U.N. sanctions: 

Economic: 370; Goldberg, 142, 291; Palmer, 647 
Legal basis for: 369, 374; Goldberg, 75 
Mandatory: 373, 376; Goldberg, 73, 142; Palmer, 
449, 647; Sisco, 68 
Resolution, text, 77 

South Africa and Portugal, importance to en- 
forcement of, 371, 374 
Sovereignty, equality of states, essential elements of 

(Harris), 105 
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Communism, and 
Sino-Soviet relations) : 
Allegations of U.S. air attack on Soviet vessel 

rejected, 953 
Antiballistic missiles, U.S.-Soviet competition in: 
575, 687; Humphrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 445, 
569, 659; McNamara, 442, 687; W. W. Rostow, 
501 ; Rusk, 43, 47, 171, 321, 361, 601, 875 
Central Europe, nuclear weapons aimed at (Rusk), 

Consular convention with U.S.: 614, 642; Hum- 
phrey, 489; Johnson, 160, 287, 545, 659; 
Katzenbaeh, 755 ; Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247 
Economic problems: Harriman, 818; Katzenbaeh, 

754; Kohler, 407; Solomon, 519 
Food processing fair, Moscow, U.S. participation, 

Germany, Federal Republic of, relations (Rusk), 

ILO charges of forced labor practices (Goldberg), 

India, grain shipments to (Johnson), 299 
Industrial property, international participation 

(Trowbridge), 885 
INPRODMASH-67 (Trowbridge), 882 
Italian Fiat automobile plant: Harriman, 819; 
Katzenbaeh, 4 ; Solomon, 522 ; Trowbridge, 883 
Leadership (Brzezinski), 417 
North Africa, interests and influence (Palmer), 

808, 811 
Nuclear proliferation treaty, review of position on, 

Oceanographic survey, cooperation with U.S. 

(Sisco), 462 
Outer space treaty, position on: Goldberg, 142, 604, 

607; Rusk, 600; Sisco 460 
Southern Rhodesia, position on, 374 
Technological level (Humphrey) , 166 
Trade : 

Liberalization (Trowbridge), 885 
U.S. See East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 85, 224, 260, 305, 393, 
614, 642, 930 

Soviet Union — Continued 

Arena for peaceful East- West engagement: 

Humphrey, 489; Sisco, 458 
Peacekeeping operations, position on: Goldberg, 
101,895; Sisco, 461 
U.S. citizens, convention of (Rusk) , 44, 248 
U.S. relations: 

Efforts to improve: 697; Humphrey, 487, 488, 
681; Johnson, 159, 409 (quoted), 757; Katzen- 
baeh, 753; Kohler, 8, 406; Niven, 774; E. V. 
Rostow, 399, 403 ; W. W. Rostow, 495 ; Rusk, 
363, 772 
U.S. visit of Mrs. Svetlana Alliluyeva, effect 

(Rusk), 782 
Viet-Nam, effect on: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 171, 
278, 877 
U.S.-Soviet talks on limiting nuclear arms race, 

proposed: Johnson, 445; BIcNamara, 444 
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge) , 882 
Viet-Nam, arms supply to: Katzenbaeh, 753; 

Kohler, 413; Rusk, 275, 466 
World relations, development of: Harriman, 821; 
Humphrey, 486; Meeker, 62 
Space. See Outer space and Satellites 
Spain : 

Import quota controls removed, 246 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 354, 613, 642 
Spivak, Lawrence E., 722 

State Department (see also Foreign Service) : 
Advisory panels: Johnson, 660; appointments, 16, 

72, 651 
Ambassador at Large (Lodge), confirmation, 674 
Appointments and designations, 261, 765, 897 
Assistant Secretaries of State, confirmation: 

Battle, 674; Macomber, 482; Oliver, 968 
Bureau of European Affairs, advisory panel, ap- 
pointment, 17 
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 

Information and cultural programs, appropriations 

request, FY 1968 (Johnson), 232, 236 
Publications. See under Publications 
Science briefings: Pollack, 916; Rusk, 238 
Science office (Pollack), 913 
U.S. mission chiefs in Europe, meeting, 599 
Water for Peace Office, establishment: Johnson, 

904 ; Rusk, 906 
Work of (Rusk), 875 
State of the Union (Johnson) , 158 
Stateless persons and refugees, application (protocol 
1) of the universal copyright convention: Italy, 
481 ; Netherlands, 833 
Steele, Hoyt P., 696, 697 

Stevenson, Adlai : Johnson, 566 ; quoted, 293, 839, 896 
Stoltenberg, Gerhard (McGhee), 152 
Strategic trade controls. See Trade 
AID programs (Rusk), 831 



Sudan — Continued 

Convention (1965) on the settlement of investment 
disputes betvceen states and nationals of other 
states, 613 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Sugar, International Sugar Agreement, 1958, proto- 
col: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 224; Bolivia, 
481; Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, 224; Congo (Brazzaville), 481; Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Ghana, 
224; Guyana, 393; Guatemala, 224; Haiti, 224; 
Hungary, 224, 481; India, 224, 481; Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lebanon, Mada- 
gascar, 224 ; Mexico, 224, 481 ; Morocco, Nether- 
lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Para- 
guay, 224; Peru, 224, 481; Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of South Africa, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, U.K., U.S., 224 
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 216, 332 
Sullivan, William L., Jr., 636 
Sunay, Cevdet, 652, 653, 655 
Sunobe, Ryoso, 178, 424 
Suwito Kusumowidagdo, 172 
Sweden : 

Institute for Cultural Relations, 667 

Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 93 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 481, 613, 732, 

733, 930 
U.S. Ambassador (Heath), confirmation, 674 
Swidler, Joseph C, 907 
Switzerland, treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 393, 

613, 733, 929, 930, 967, 968 
Syrian Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli conflict) : 
Israeli border dispute, U.N. peacekeeping role 

(Goldberg), 100 
Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final 

protocols, 733 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 

Taft, William Howard (Rusk), 270 

Taiwan (see also China, Republic of; and Formosa) : 

Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy, 

791; Johnson, 848; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858, 862; 

W.W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 832 

U.S. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Self- 

Help, and Development, 832n 
U.S. military assistance (Johnson), 384 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505, 
509, 511 
Talbot, Phillips (Rusk), 751 
Tanzania : 

AID programs (Rusk), 831 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
Tariff Commission, budget appropriation request, 

FY 1968 (Johnson), 232 
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic policy and rela- 
tions; Tariffs and trade, general agreement on; 
and Trade) : 

Tariff policy, U.S. — Continued 

Most-favored-nation policy: 698; Blumenthal, 435 ; 

Katzenbach, 3 
National interests: Johnson, 696; Solomon, 556; 

Trowbridge, 883 
Philippines (Braderman), 663 
Presidential discretionary authority: 698; Harri- 

man, 819; Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 521, 523 
Sheet glass duties modified, proclamation: 216; 

Johnson, 333 
Watch movements escape-clause duty rates termi- 
nated, proclamation: 217; Johnson, 333 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on: 

Agreements, declarations, proces-verbal, and 
protocols : 
Accessions to, current actions on : 

Argentina, provisional: Ivory Coast, 967; 
Tunisia, 613 

Third proces-verbal: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, 613; Central 
African Republic, 967; Denmark, Finland, 
613; France, Germany, India, 733; Indo- 
nesia, Israel, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733; 
Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 967; 
Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 967; 
South Africa, 733; Sweden, Tunisia, Tur- 
key, U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733 
Iceland, provisional : Ivory Coast, 967 ; Tunisia, 

Proces-verbal extending: Central African 
Republic, 967; Tunisia, 613 
Korea, protocol: Austria, 766; Central African 
Republic, European Economic Community, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 968; Korea, 
Netherlands, Turkey, 766; U.S., 766, 968 
Switzerland, protocol: Central African Re- 
public, 967; Germany, 224; Netherlands, 
354; New Zealand, 733; Portugal, 613; 
Spain, 354 
Tunisia, provisional, third proces-verbal : Cen- 
tral African Republic, 967 
United Arab Republic, provisional: Ivory 
Coast, 967 

Second proces-verbal: Australia, Belgium, 

Canada, 613; Central African Republic, 

968; Denmark, Finland, 613; France, 

Germany, 733; Greece, 613; India, 733; 

Indonesia, Japan, 613; Kenya, 733; 

Netherlands, 613; New Zealand, 968; 

Nigeria, Norway, 613; Pakistan, 968; 

Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.A.R., 

U.K., U.S., 613; Yugoslavia, 733 

Yugoslavia, protocol: Austria, 733; Central 

African Republic, 967; Chad, 354; France, 

733; Netherlands, 354; U.S., 260 

International trade in cotton textiles, protocol 

extending the arrangement on: 929; U.S., 967 

1960-1961 Tariff Conference, protocol embodying 

results of: Germany, 224, 306; Pakistan, 967 



Tariffs and trade, general agreement on — Continued 
Agreements, declarations, etc. — Continued 
Part I and articles XXIX and XXX, protocol 

amending: Korea, 733 
Part IV, entrance into force, prospects from : 70 ; 

Blumenthal, 433 
Schedule III — Brazil-protocol re negotiations for 
the establishment of a new schedule: Korea, 
Schedules, rectifications and modifications to the 
texts of, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th protocols: 
Korea, 733 
Committee on Trade and Development: Blumenthal, 

430; U.S. delegate, 430n 
Contrasting party, admission as: Barbados, 482 
Eastern European membership, need for: 699; 

Brzezinski, 419; Humphrey, 488 
International Trade Center (Blumenthal), 435 
Kennedy Round: 

Importance and U.S. support: 28, 70, 245, 339; 
Blumenthal, 430; Humphrey, 488, 683; John- 
son, 297, 333, 707, 756, 886; NATO, 50; E. V. 
Rostow, 23, 27; Roth, 476, 880; Rusk, 359, 361; 
Solomon, 556 
Negotiations concluded: Johnson, 879; Roth, 879 
U.S. participation, problems and conditions: 
E. V. Rostow, 403, 860; Roth, 477; Rusk, 772 
Yugoslavian membership (Harriman), 818 
Double taxation, convention on avoidance of. See 

Double taxation 
Interest Equalization Tax, 342 

Adjustment of rates needed: 344; Johnson, 335 
Taylor, Maxwell D., 285, 514 (quoted), 586, 594 
Tear gas and military gas, use of, 577 
Technical assistance: 
CENTO programs, 671 

U.N. assistance to South West Africa requested, 
Technical cooperation programs : 

Agreements with: Afghanistan, 834; Somali Re- 
public, 225, 438, 702, 802 
Budget appropriations request FY 1968 (Johnson) , 

China, Republic of, 849 
Latin America, 719 
Water for Peace, 761 
Technology. See Science and technology 
Telecommunications (see also Radio) : 

Convention (1965), international, with annexes: 
Australia, Ceylon, 613; Congo (Brazzaville), 
393; Denmark, 122; Finland, Guyana, 613; 
Ireland, 766; Jordan, 766; Korea, 898; Leba- 
non, 613; Lesotho, 967; Maldive Islands, 582; 
Netherlands, 393; Nigeria, 613; Peru, 766; 
Switzerland, 393; Tunisia, Uganda, 898; U.K., 
393; U.S., 733, 801 
Educational TV: 719; Johnson, 15, 709; E. V. 

Rostow, 405 
Latin America, system proposed, 712 

Territorial sea and the contiguous zone, convention 

(1958), Goldberg, 923 
Terry, William M., 919 

Thailand (see also Association of Southeast Asia) : 
AID programs (E. V. Rostow), 863 
Asian Institute of Technology: 747; Martin, 196, 

854 ^ 

Asian role: Martin, 196, 851; Rusk, 597 
Communism, danger of: Bundy, 325; Martin, 853; 

Rusk, 169, 275, 743, 832; SEATO, 746 
Economic progress: 337; Braderman, 661; Bundy, 
325, 791, 793; E. V. Rostow, 401, 858; W. W. 
Rostow, 496; Rusk, 598 
Outer space treaty, signature, 260 
U.S. aid: Johnson, 384; Rusk, 827 
U.S. air force use of Thai bases : 746, : Martin, 852 ; 

Rusk, 597 
U.S. relations: Martin, 198, 851; Thanat Khoman, 

852 (quoted) 
Viet-Nam, military aid to: 746; Bundy, 324, 792; 
Johnson, 961; Martin, 198, 852, 853; W. W. 
Rostow, 503 ; Rusk, 597 ; Westmoreland, 740 
Thanat Khoman: 197, 747, 748 (quoted), 852, 854 
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 586, 588, 591 
Thuc, Nguyen Dang: 69 Lilienthal, 468 
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 592 
Tlateloleo, Treaty of, 436 
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago 

Regional heavy equipment training center (Katzen- 

bach), 958 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 182, 260 

Amity and economic relations, treaty of, 181 
Toon, Malcolm, 71 
Topaloglu, Ahmet, 687, 688 
Touring and tourism: 

Eastern Europe: Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 682; 

E. V. Rostow, 25 
International Tourist Year, 695 
North Africa: Palmer, 812; Woods (quoted), 810 
Road traffic, convention (1954) re customs facili- 
ties: Singapore, 122 
Romania, cultural exchange arrangement renewed, 

480, 482 
U.S.-Soviet tourists, numbers compared: Kohler, 

412; Rusk, 247 
U.S. visitors visas with indefinite validity, 695 
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses; Economic 
policy; Exports; Imports; and Tariff policy, 
U.S.) : 
Cotton. See Cotton 

Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, trade with 
West: 697; Harriman, 817; Humphrey, 488; 
Johnson, 696, 757; Katzenbach, 4, 755; Solo- 
mon, 519, 521; Trowbridge, 881 
Expansion, importance and U.S. support: 339; 
Johnson, 334; E. V. Rostow, 404; W. W. 
Rostow, 497 ; Rusk, 772 



Trade — Continued 

Latin America: 713; Blumenthal, 434; Johnson, 
542, 707, 709; W. W. Rostow, 498; Rusk, 722 
Declaration of the Presidents of America, text, 
Less developed countries, 245, 338 
North Africa (Palmer) , 807 
OECD countries (Humphrey), 683 
Soviet Union, Licensintorg (Trowbridge), 885 
Strategic trade controls: 697; Harriman, 817; 
Johnson, 696; Katzenbach, 4; Kohler, 10, 413; 
Solomon, 518 
Trade negotiations, U.S. special representative 

(Roth), confirmation, 476n 
Transit trade of land-locked states, convention 
(1965), Chad, 733 
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 
(Goldberg), 102 
U.S. trade: 

Balance on goods and surpluses, 341 
Canada, automotive products, 732 
Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, need to in- 
crease (see also East-West Trade Relations 
Act of 1966): Harriman, 818; Humphrey, 
682; Johnson, 334, 757, 886; Katzenbach, 2; 
Kohler, 10, 413 ; E. V. Rostow, 24 ; Rusk, 786 ; 
Solomon, 518 
U.S. trade missions (Trowbridge), 881 
Foreign policy considerations: Johnson, 886; 

Katzenbach, 3; Solomon, 555 
Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee, 2nd annual 

meeting, 70 
Korea, investment and trade study: 69, 554; 

Chung, 553 
Philippines (Braderman), 662 
Policy objectives: Johnson, 757, Trowbridge, 881 
Southern Rhodesia, prohibition of, Executive 
order, 146 
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation, 756 
Trade Expansion Act: Blumenthal, 433; Roth, 477; 

Rusk, 361 
Tran Van Do, 745, 747, 748 
Transportation : 

Africa (Katzenbach), 956 
Latin America (Linowitz), 823 
Mass urban transit (Johnson), 918 
Viet-Nam, importance of: Komer, 469; Westmore- 
land, 741 
Travel (see also Touring and tourism) : 

Foreign travel to U.S., encouragement: 344; John- 
son, 335 
Middle East, U.S. travel restricted, announcement, 

U.S. travel restrictions: 
Amendments, texts, 564 
Extended, 102 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 36, 85, 122, 154, 181, 224, 
260, 305, 353, 392, 438, 481, 530, 581, 612, 641, 673, 
701, 732, 765, 801, 833, 865, 897, 929, 967 
Treaty on treaties, U.N. international conference, 
proposed (Goldberg), 102 

Treaties in force: A List of Treaties and Other In- 
ternational Agreements of the United States in 
Force on January 1, 1967, released, 288 
Tremelloni, Roberto, 687 
Trinidad and Tobago: 

OAS membership: 464n; Johnson, 632; Rusk, 464 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 84, 122, 182, 224, 581, 
732, 898, 929 
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 881 
Truman, Harry S (quoted), 546, 547, 548, 550, 856 
Truman Doctrine: E. V. Rostow, 857; 20th anniver- 
sary, Johnson, 546, 547, 654; Sunay, 653, 655 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: 

Additional U.S. funds authorized (Johnson), 865 
Disaster relief (Johnson) , 599 

Economic and political progress (Johnson), 598 

Development, problems, and U.S. interests: Pal- 
mer, 806 ; Rusk, 831 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 85, 224, 260, 613, 642, 

702, 898, 967 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Turkel, Harry, 71 
Turkestan, Soviet motor vessel, 953 
Turkey : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 172 
Economic and political development: 337, 656, 670; 
Gaud, 669; Johnson, 383, 547, 652, 654; E. V. 
Rostow, 401, 858; W. W. Rostow, 496; Rusk, 
830; Sunay, 655 
Financing, problems of,' 338 
NATO position and aid: 50, 657; Johnson, 652; 

Sunay, 653, 655 
OECD aid: 28; Johnson, 383 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 613, 766, 897 
U.S. aid, 1968 estimate: Johnson, 234; Rusk, 830 
U.S. military and economic assistance: 657; Gaud, 

669; Johnson, 384; Sunay, 656 
U.S. visit of President Sunay: 652; Johnson, 547 

U Nyun (Martin), 196, 853 

U Thant (see also United Nations and Viet-Nam), 
Goldberg, 179 
Arab-Israeli conflict, peacekeeping efforts. See 

Arab-Israeli conflict 
Outer space treaty signature ceremony, message, 

U.N. Secretary-General, continuation in office as: 

Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42 
Viet-Nam : 

Peace proposals: Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622; 

U Thant, 138 ; text, 624 
Peace talks, role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 138, 839; 
Johnson, 629; Rusk, 43, 45, 47, 620; U Thant, 
Visit to Asia (Goldberg), 507, 513 
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic 
Udall, Stewart L.: 561, 907; Rusk, 906 
UDEAC (Union Douaniere et Economique de 
I'Afrique Centrale), 650 



Uganda : 

AID programs (Rusk), 831 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 701, 898 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
UNCTAD. See United Nations Conference on Trade 

and Development 
UNEF. See United Nations Emergency Force 
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific and Cultural 

Organization, U.N.), 897 
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force in Cyprus 
Unger, Leonard C, 586 
Union Douaniere et Economique de I'Afrique Cen- 

trale (Palmer), 650 
United Arab Republic (see also Arab-Israeli con- 
flict) : 
Straits of Tiran, restriction of shipping: Goldberg, 
871, 921, 923, 938; Johnson, 870; U Thant 
(quoted), 920, 921 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 393, 613, 642, 733, 

930, 967 
U.S. Ambassador (Nolte), confirmation, 674 
U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
United Kingdom (see also names of self-governing 
colonies) : 
Aden, future withdrawal from (Goldberg), 100 
Asia, role in (Bundy) , 791, 793 
Balance-of-payments position, 347 
BBC TV interview of Secretary McNamara, 442 
British independent TV interview of Secretary 

Rusk, 274 
CENTO economic aid, 670 
Economic problems (McGhee), 149 
European Common Market, proposed membership : 

Holt, 961 ; Rusk, 783 
Foreign aid programs (Rusk), 830 
Nuclear power plant programs (Seaborg), 92 
Rhodesia. Sec Southern Rhodesia 
Sir Montague Burton Lecture, University of Leeds 

(W. W. Rostow),491 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 37, 86, 122, 154, 224, 225, 

260, 354, 393, 582, 613, 834, 930 
U.S. NATO forces, deployment, 789 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Wilson, 963 
United Nations: 

Aden, possible U.N. participation in elections 

(Goldberg), 100 
Arab-Israeli conflict, role. See Arab-Israeli 

Capital development fund resolution (Goldberg), 

Charter. See United Nations Charter 
Documents, lists of, 36, 181, 305, 437 
East-West relations, role : Goldberg, 98 ; Harriman, 

820 ; E. V. Rostow, 25 ; Sisco, 458 
Headquarters of, amendment of supplemental 

agreement (1966), 86 
Human rights, role in: Goldberg, 524; Sisco, 67 
International Covenants on Human Rights, texts, 
107, 111 
Optional protocol, 120 

United Nations — Continued 

Korea, supervision of elections (Goldberg), 101 
Mekong River development, role: Bundy, 326; 

Johnson, 334 
Membership : 

Barbados: 29n; Goldberg, 28; Sisco, 67 
Communist China, question of: 849; Goldberg, 
100; U. A. Johnson, 423; Popper, 689 
Communist conditions for (Popper), 692 
Increases in (Goldberg), 100, 290 
Significance of: Goldberg, 872, 895; Sisco, 67 
Outer space treaty, role in development of: 84, 
577; Goldberg, 78, 98, 267, 602, 839; Rusk, 601; 
Sisco, 460 
Peacekeeping operations (see also Arab-Israeli 
conflict. General Assembly, and Security 
Council) : 
Financing, problems of and U.S. position: 
Goldberg, 101, 180, 636, 638, 895, 896; Johnson, 
Importance and principles : 657 ; Goldberg, 179, 
838, 862, 895, 928, 939; Harriman, 489; John- 
son, 567, 629; Rusk, 363, 785; Sisco, 65 
Need for improvement: Meeker, 63; W. W. Ros- 
tow 502; Sisco, 65 
Soviet and French refusal to pay assessments 

(Goldberg), 101 
Soviet-U.S. differences: Goldberg, 895; Sisco, 

U.S. support (Rusk) , 271, 950 
Racial discrimination, U.N. role in suppression of: 

Goldberg, 292; Sisco, 66 
Secretary-General : 

Role of (see also Arab-Israeli conflict and Viet- 

Nam) : Goldberg, 637, 640, 895; Sisco, 461 
Visit to Near East. See Arab-Israeli conflict 
Secretary-General U Thant, continuation in office: 

Goldberg, 15, 98; Johnson, 14; Rusk, 42 
Soviet Union, utilization of, for propaganda and 

other purposes: Goldberg, 924; Sisco, 458 
Special Committee on Friendly Relations (Nabrit), 

Specialized agencies: 894; Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 

297, 567; Pollack, 912; Sisco, 462 
Turkey, support of (Johnson), 652 
U.S. participation in the U.N., 20th annual report 

(Johnson), 566 
U.S. representatives, confirmation, 261 
U.S.-Soviet furtherance of particular aims: Hum- 
phrey, 489; Sisco, 458 
U.S. support: Goldberg, 289; Johnson, 568; Nabrit, 

31; Rusk, 772, 784 
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam 

Water development projects, U.S. recommenda- 
tions: 762, 764; Johnson, 903; Rusk, 906 
United Nations Charter: 

Article 109, amendment: Argentina, 834; Hungary, 
930; Mexico 834; U.S., 834, 898 



United Nations Charter — Continued 

Obligations and responsibilities of member states 

under: 107, 112, 375; Goldberg, 76, 100, 142, 

291, 839, 895, 923, 927, 945 ; Meeker, 61 ; Nabrit, 

31; Palmer, 449; Rusk, 950 

Principles: 111; Churchill (quoted), 490; Johnson, 

330; E. V. Rostow, 856; Rusk, 133, 170, 363, 


Communist ideology, contrasted with (Sisco) , 463 

Outer space treaty, application to: Goldberg 79; 

Johnson, 387 
Southern Rhodesia, application to: 176, 376; 
Goldberg, 75, 142; Palmer, 449 
SEATO support, 745 

Self-defense, inherent right to: Meeker, 60; Rusk, 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 110 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space: 84; Goldberg, 267, 604; Sisco, 461 
Resolution endorsing recommendations, 83n 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment (Johnson), 567 
United Nations Development Decade: 336; John- 
son, 567 
United Nations Development Program: 762; Gold- 
berg, 839 1 Johnson, 567 ; Palmer, 650, 813 
U.S. 1967 pledge, 764 

Viet-Nam, FAO fisheries project, U.S. financial 
support, 964 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 

(Harriman), 820 
United Nations Emergency Force: 

Casualties in Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. regrets 

(Goldberg), 939, 943 
Financing (Goldberg), 638 
Middle East: 

Extension of (December, 1966) : Goldberg, 101 
Withdrawal (May, 1967), U.S. position: Gold- 
berg, 947; Johnson, 870 
United Nations Force in Cyprus (NATO), 50 
Extension (December, 1966), Goldberg, 179 
U.S. pledge (Goldberg), 180 
United Nations Office of Public Information (Sisco), 

United Nations Organization for Industrial Develop- 
ment (Johnson), 567 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 

(Sisco), 66 
United States citizens and nationals: 

Boycotts of Communist goods (Katzenbach), 2 
Claims. See Claims 

Communist propaganda, effect on (Rusk), 725, 775 
Detention by Czechoslovakia (Kohler), 10 
Foreign affairs advisory panels: 16; Johnson, 660 
Middle East: 

Status as neutrals (Rusk), 949, 950, 951 
Travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Responsibilities of: Lodge, 800; Rusk, 131, 775 
Responsibility of press to keep well informed (Mar- 
tin), 851, 854 

United States citizens and nationals — Continued 
Rights abroad, consular convention with Soviet 
Union: Johnson, 287, 545; Katzenbach, 755; 
Kohler, 411 ; Rusk, 247 
Selective Service, position on (Powell), 137 
U.S. foreign policy based on (Rusk), 879 
United States Information Agency, educational TV, 

task force assignment (Johnson), 16 
United States Travel Service (Johnson), 335 
Universal copyright convention (1952), protocol 1 re 
application to works of stateless persons and 
refugees : Italy, 481 ; Netherlands, 833 
Universal Postal Union, constitution (1964), with 
final protocols : China, 85 ; Dahomey, Gabon, 801 ; 
Ghana, 613; Guyana, 701; India, 353; Mauri- 
tania, 701; Morocco, 967; New Zealand (includ- 
ing Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands) , 
353; Nigeria, 801; Pakistan, 733; Spain (includ- 
ing Spanish territories in Africa), 613; Sweden, 
Syrian Arab Republic, 733; Tunisia, 85; Yugo- 
slavia, 613; Zambia, 701 
Upper Volta, outer space treaty, signature, 481 
Urban development (Johnson), 918 

Economic level of development (Rusk), 723 
Kennedy Round, importance to ( Blumenthal ) , 432 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 701 

Vandenberg, Arthur, 838 

Vatican City State, treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 930 

Venezuela : 

Communism, threat of: Harriman, 821; Rusk, 828 
Economic level of development: 337; E. V. Rostow, 

401,858; Rusk, 722, 829 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 86, 260, 930 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 216 

Amnesty program: 209; Komer, 470; Rusk, 279; 

Wheeler, 191 
Asia, importance to. See under Asia 
Background (Meeker), 54 
Baguio Chiefs of Mission meeting, 517 
Cambodia, nonalinement: 285; Rusk, 128, 129, 281, 

320, 619, 773 
Communist infiltration increased during: John- 
son, 365, 596; Rusk, 127, 128, 317, 320, 321, 364, 
621, 776, 780; Westmoreland, 739 
Communist proposals: Goldberg, 313; Ho Chi 
Minh, 596; Johnson, 596; Lodge, 795; Rusk, 
126, 276, 277, 317, 321, 364, 464, 622, 623, 776, 
777, 878 
Extensions of, proposed, and prospects from: 
Goldberg, 63, 508, 840; Johnson, 537, 567; 
Lodge, 798; Powell, 137; Rusk, 44, 277, 317, 
320, 364, 516, 727, 776, 777, 780; U Thant, 139 
Senator Kennedy proposals: Goldberg, 508; 
Rusk, 516 



Viet-Nam — Continued 
Cease-fire — Continued 
Tet (Lunar New Year): 595; Goldberg, 310; 
Johnson, 319; Komer, 471 ; Rusk, 126, 320, 620, 
623, 780 

Hostilities resumed (Johnson), 365 
U Thant proposals: Goldberg, 138; Rusk, 126, 
618, 622 

U.S. acceptance: 626; U Thant, 139, 624 
U.S. willingness for reciprocal ceasefire: 284, 
626, 750; Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 63, 138, 313, 
508, 841 ; Johnson, 319, 539, 596 ; Rusk, 126, 317, 
319, 359, 464, 621, 622, 623, 727, 773, 776, 878 
Communism, rejection of: Lodge, 796; Rusk, 279, 

282, 619, 779 
Communist aggression and subversion : 

Casualties: 953; Johnson, 515, 536; Rusk, 45, 274, 
727; Westmoreland, 741; Wheeler, 189 
Civilian: 665; Johnson, 515, 536, 593, 594; 
Rusk, 130, 135, 275, 276 
Communist responsibilities: 953; Johnson, 
515, 537; Rusk, 136, 275; Westmoreland, 
Communist: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 466; 

Rusk, 278, 727 
Vietnamese: Johnson, 535-536; Rusk, 282; 
Westmoreland, 741 
Communism : 

Defectors from: Martin, 194; Rusk, 278, 279, 
726, 779; Westmoreland, 741 
Communist China, position and support: Gold- 
berg, 508; Kohler, 413; Popper, 691; W. W. 
Rostow, 493; Rusk, 42, 172, 275, 280, 619, 727, 
786; Wheeler, 191 
Communist position: Ho Chi Minh, 596; Johnson, 

629; Lodge, 798; Rusk, 127 
Communist reliance on : 

U.S. disagreements: Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 130, 

620, 725, 744, 775 
World opinion (Rusk) , 619, 620, 744 
Communist responsibility: 953; Bundy, 790; 
Johnson, 514; Nabrit, 30; W. W. Rostow, 503; 
Rusk, 45, 127, 135, 272, 274, 282, 743, 776, 780, 
876; SEATO, 745; Westmoreland, 738 
Compared with (Rusk), 877 

Korea: Meeker, 60; Rusk, 621, 778 
Malaya, U.K. operations (Rusk), 279, 283 
World War 11 (Lodge), 799 
Deescalation, mutual {see also Cease-fire) : 
Communist rejection (Rusk), 45, 622 
U Thant proposals: Rusk, 622; U Thant, 139 
U.S. position: 284, 750; Goldberg, 315, 506, 
841; Johnson, 539; Rusk, 126, 317, 322, 465, 
743, 775, 877 
Escalation to major land war, question of: 

Powell, 136; Rusk, 364; U Thant, 139 
Guerrilla warfare, problems of: Johnson, 535, 
593; Komer, 471; Lodge, 795, 799; Rusk, 278, 
283,729; Taylor (quoted), 514; Westmoreland, 

Viet-Nam — Continued 

Communist aggression and subversion — Continued 
Increases and U.S. responses: McNamara, 465, 
466; Rusk, 134, 282, 318, 464, 876; Westmore- 
land, 738 
International law aspects (Meeker) , 57 
Propaganda: 748; Lodge, 796; Martin, 194; 

SEATO, 746 
Soviet Union, position and support: Harriman, 
821; Goldberg, 508, 513, 839; Kohler, 413; 
Popper, 691; W. W. Rostow, 493; Rusk, 172, 
275, 280, 466, 619, 727, 778, 786; Wheeler, 191 
Test case for: Bundy, 790; Kohler, 8, 410; 
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 494; SEATO, 746; 
Thieu, 589; Westmoreland, 738 
Demarcation line between North and South, sig- 
nificance of (Meeker), 61 
Demilitarized zone: 

Geneva Accords provisions: Goldberg, 311; 

Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 281 
10-mile buffer area, U.S. proposal: 750; Rusk, 
Devastation of country, question of (Rusk), 135 
Diem government (Lodge), 799 
Economic and social development: Goldberg, 506; 
SEATO, 746 

Budget request FY 1967 (Johnson), 233, 383 
Commodity assistance programs, 1966 man- 
agement report: Gaud, 200; text of re- 
port, 201 
Expenditures, 210 
Medical assistance, increases, 664 
Supplies, distribution (Komer), 469 
Revolutionary development: 209, 592, 748; Gaud, 
201; Goldberg, 511; Taylor, 286; Westmore- 
land, 740 
Vietnamese army cadre training program: 
Komer, 470; Lodge, 796; Taylor, 287; 
Wheeler, 191 
U.S. goals and support: 285; Bundy, 325; Gold- 
berg, 513; Johnson, 231, 516, 537, 587, 961; 
Komer, 469; Lilienthal, 468; Rusk, 317, 831; 
Wheeler, 186 
U.S. programs, Communist participation: 285; 
Goldberg, 311; Johnson, 162, 516, 535; Rusk, 
U.S. study team, 69 

Viet-Nam position: Lilienthal, 467; Thieu, 589 
Education, 209 

Guam conference: 586; Guerrero, 586; Johnson, 
538, 587, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594; Thieu, 588, 
Results, 665 
Inflation control: 202; Gaud, 200; Goldberg, 514, 
592; Johnson, 233, 589; Komer, 470; Rusk, 
831; Taylor, 287 
International Control Commission: Johnson, 515; 
Meeker, 56; Rusk, 127 



Viet-Nam — Continued 

International Control Commission — Continued 

Role in and U.S. support: 750; Goldberg, 507; 
Rusk, 620, 773, 778; U Thant, 625 
Manila Conference, Viet-Nam aims and U.S. sup- 
port: 748; Bundy, 794; Goldberg, 311; Thieu, 
Memorial Day messages exchanged: Johnson, 

Thieu, 917 
Military and other aid from other countries: 552, 
748, 749; Bundy, 324, 792; Chung, 552; John- 
son, 549, 961 ; Martin, 198, 199, 852, 853 ; W. W. 
Rostow, 503; Rusk, 133, 597; SEATO, 746; 
Westmoreland, 740 

Baguio meeting of Chiefs of Mission, 517 

7-nation meeting of representatives, Washing- 
ton: 517, 592; communique, 747; Johnson, 538 
National Liberation Front (see also under Negotia- 
tions for peaceful settlement) : Goldberg, 312, 
842; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 172, 280, 779 
National reconciliation (pacification) program: 
592, 748; Goldberg, 506, 510, 841-842, 843; 
Johnson, 161, 536, 538, 593, 594; Komer, 470, 
471; Lodge, 795, 796; Rusk, 129, 726, 779; 
SEATO, 746; Taylor, 286; Wheeler, 191 

U.S. support reorganized ( Bunker) , 844 
Negotiations for peaceful settlement : 

ANZUS, 749 

Asian proposal (Martin), 196 

Communist 4-points: Goldberg, 311, 842; Ho Chi 
Minh, 597; Johnson, 537; Rusk, 172, 317, 773, 

Communist position: 626; Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 
126, 131, 277, 283, 322, 618, 622, 728 

Communist rejection: 592, 626, 748; Johnson, 
537, 538, 594, 630; Rusk, 129, 131, 618, 743, 773 

Conferences, Asian or Geneva: 284; Goldberg, 
315, 619 (quoted) ; Rusk, 281, 317, 618, 621, 773, 
778,878; U Thant, 625 

Johnson offer: 595; Johnson, 595; Rusk, 622, 776 
Communist rejection: 596; Johnson, 629; Rusk, 
618, 623 

National Liberation Front: 

As sole representative of Viet-Nam: Goldberg, 

312, 842 ; Rusk, 277, 322, 777 
Participation: Rusk, 622, 773; U Thant, 625 

Peace efforts of other countries (Rusk) , 317, 618, 
743, 773 

Private contacts: Goldberg, 315; Rusk, 280, 317, 
321, 623, 624, 778 

Private discussion: Goldberg, 507, 513; Johnson, 
539, 596; Rusk, 619 

SEATO position, 745 

Sino-Soviet problems, effect on (Rusk), 44, 132, 

U Thant: 

Proposals: 626; Goldberg, 839; Rusk, 618, 622; 

U Thant, 624 
Role in: Goldberg, 63, 98, 839; Rusk, 43, 45, 47, 
126, 620, 773 ;U Thant, 625 

Viet-Nam — Continued 

Negotiations for peaceful settlement — Continued 
U.S. 14-points : 284 ; Rusk, 281, 318 
U.S. willingness: 570, 592, 626, 632, 657, 750; 
Goldberg, 63, 98, 137, 310, 505, 507, 510, 840; 
Johnson, 162, 236, 365, 538, 567, 587, 593, 594, 
595, 629, 873; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 43, 47, 129, 
133, 135, 172, 272, 281, 283, 317, 359, 465, 516, 
618, 620, 743, 773, 778, 831, 877 
"Apparent contradictions": Goldberg, 316, 512, 
840; Powell, 137; Rusk, 135, 321, 619, 623, 
777, 878 
Without preconditions: 284, 626; Goldberg, 
138, 510, 512; Johnson, 162, 535; Rusk, 43, 
129, 317, 465, 621, 727, 743, 773, 777 
Viet-Cong representation: 285; Goldberg, 312; 

Rusk, 126, 135, 172, 280, 281; U Thant, 139 
Viet-Nam government participation: 626, 749; 
Goldberg, 842; Rusk, 620, 622, 624; U Thant, 
Neutrality and nonalinement, U.S. position on: 
285; Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 509, 841; Rusk, 
281, 773 
Pacification (seize-and-hold) efforts. See National 

reconciliation program 
Peace : 

Geneva accords as a basis for: 284, 632; Gold- 
berg, 63, 138, 311, 842; Johnson, 539, 630; 
Rusk, 136, 281, 283, 466, 619, 778; U Thant, 
Prospects for: Goldberg, 315, 508, 510, 513, 843; 
Lodge, 800; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 128, 726, 779, 
780, 876 
U.S. objectives: 592; Goldberg, 310, 506, 512, 
840; Holt, 962; Johnson, 230, 516, 535, 917; 
Katzenbach, 756; Rusk, 130, 272, 277; Thieu, 
Viet-Nam position, 749 
Political development and progress: 592, 748; 
Goldberg, 311, 513, 842; Johnson, 589, 590; 
Komer, 469; Lodge, 797; Rusk, 135, 279, 619, 
779; SEATO, 746; Wheeler, 191 
Communists, participation in, question of: 285, 
592; Goldberg, 311, 313, 841, 843; Rusk, 279, 
773, 779 
Constitution: 586, 592, 748; Goldberg, 505, 509, 
510, 842; Johnson, 538, 588, 589, 590, 593, 594; 
Lodge, 797; Rusk, 131, 780 
Elections: 285; Goldberg, 505, 512; Rusk, 317, 
773, 779 

Communist interference : Goldberg, 843 ; John- 
son, 589; Rusk, 128 
Leadership: Goldberg, 513; Lodge, 798 
NLF candidates, question of: Goldberg, 513; 
Lodge, 797 
Ports, improvements: 204, 210; Gaud, 200; Komer, 
470 ; Rusk, 832 ; Westmoreland, 741 ; Wheeler, 
Press coverage: Martin, 855; Rusk, 127, 131; 
Wheeler, 186 



Viet-Nam — Continued 
Prisoners : 

Exchange, U.S. willingness: 749; Rusk, 281, 320, 

465, 773 
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment of , Com- 
munist noncompliance, 749, 825 
Refugees from Communism: 209, 665; Komer, 470 
Reunification, U.S. position: 285; Bundy, 790; 
Goldberg, 62 (quoted), 311, 312, 842; John- 
son, 539; Meeker, 61; Nabrit, 30; Rusk, 274, 
279, 281, 317, 773 
Self-determination, 657, 749 

U.S. support: 285; Bundy, 323, 790; Goldberg, 62 
(quoted), 138, 311, 505, 510, 512, 842; John- 
son, 160, 516, 535, 588, 630, 961; Nabrit, 29; 
Rusk, 135, 272, 274, 281, 318 
Seven-nation meeting of ministers, Washington, 

communique, 748 
Soviet Union, responsibilities as cochairman of 

Geneva Conference: 953; Rusk, 466, 878 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154, 260, 614 
U.N. role: 

Communist position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 

629; Rusk, 42, 619, 778; U Thant, 138 
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 98, 839; John- 
son, 567; Meeker, 60 
U.S. position: Goldberg, 839; Johnson, 162, 567, 
629; Nabrit, 29; Rusk, 42, 618, 773; U Thant, 
UNDP/FAD fisheries project, U.S. support, 964 
U.S. air actions (see also U.S. military operations) : 
Ho Chi Minh, 596 
Bombing errors: Johnson, 537; Rusk, 135, 275 
Military targets only: 953; Johnson, 514, 536; 

Rusk,45, 130, 131,135,275 
Soviet allegations of U.S. attack on Soviet ves- 
sel and U.S. rejection, 953 
Thailand, use of bases in: 746; Martin, 852; 

Rusk, 597 
U.S. position and objectives: Johnson, 514, 536; 
McNamara, 465; Meeker, 61; Rusk, 127, 780; 
Westmoreland, 739; Wheeler, 190 
U.S. Ambassador (Bunker), confirmation: 674; 

Johnson, 538, 587, 588 
U.S. commitments: Bundy, 790; Goldberg, 505; 
Johnson, 158, 161, 516, 534, 539, 587, 588, 873; 
Martin, 194 ; W. W. Rostow, 493, 503 ; Rusk, 45, 
128, 621, 744, 777, 781, 785; Wheeler, 187, 192 
Importance of dependability: Bundy, 323, 792; 
Humphrey, 680; Lodge, 800; Martin, 195; 
Meeker, 62; W. W. Rostow, 503; Rusk, 272, 
274, 725, 726, 787, 831, 877, 878 
SEATO: Bundy, 790; Johnson, 160, 515; Martin, 
852; Meeker, 62; Rusk, 133, 272, 275, 744, 776, 
U.S. military forces: 

Manpower levels: Johnson, 535; McNamara, 465; 
Rusk, 129; Wheeler, 187 

Viet-Nam — Continued 

U.S. military forces — Continued 

Morale and successes: Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 
161, 236, 593, 594; Westmoreland, 738, 741; 
Wheeler, 186, 189 
Relations with Vietnamese: Lodge, 797; Martin, 

855; Rusk, 282 
Withdrawal, conditions necessary for: 284; 
Bundy, 323; Goldberg, 313, 842; Meeker, 62; 
Rusk, 282, 317 
U.S. military intelligence: Johnson, 536; Mc- 
Namara, 466; Rusk, 278, 280, 318; Taylor, 286; 
Wheeler, 190 
U.S. military operations : 

FY 1968 budget (Johnson) , 230, 233 

Increases: McNamara, 465; Rusk, 134, 464; 

Westmoreland, 740 
Logistics : Taylor, 286 ; Wheeler, 188 
Responsibility for: Johnson, 538, 873; Rusk, 774 
Results: 592; Johnson, 14, 515, 536, 594; Komer, 
471; Martin, 194; McNamara, 465; Rusk, 276, 
278, 726; Westmoreland, 740; Wheeler, 187, 
Supplemental obligational authority request FY 
1967: 236; Schultze, 237 
U.S. military policy: Johnson, 161, 236; Rusk, 726; 
Taylor, 287 ; Westmoreland, 739 
"Hawks V. Doves": Goldberg, 840; Rusk, 363 
U.S. national interests (Rusk), 133, 169, 272 
U.S. objectives (see also Peace): Bundy, 790; 
Goldberg, 61 (quoted), 505, 509; Johnson, 535, 
593, 594, 630, 678; Rusk, 45, 278, 281, 318, 877 
Congressional support (Johnson) , 160, 534 
Political rather than military solution: Goldberg, 
62 (quoted), 310, 507, 840; Nabrit, 30 
U.S. public opinion and morale: Goldberg, 509, 840; 
Guerrero, 596; Johnson, 534; Lodge, 795, 799; 
Martin, 193, 855; Powell, 136, 192 (correc- 
tion) ; Rusk, 130, 133, 619, 774 
Demonstrations (Rusk), 725, 774 

Communist influence (Rusk), 725, 775 
Senator Wayne Morse, question of views (Gold- 
berg) , 507 
Viet-Nam Army (see also Economic and social de- 
velopment: Revolutionary development): 
Johnson, 589; Rusk, 282; Westmoreland, 740 
Vietnamese, character and goals: Humphrey, 680; 
Johnson, 161, 537, 587; Lilienthal, 467; Lodge, 
796; Rusk, 135 
Visit of Ambassador Goldberg (Goldberg), 505, 509 
Visit of General Taylor (Taylor) , 285 
Visit of Komer and Lilienthal : Johnson, 467, 537 ; 

Lilienthal, 467 
World opinion: Johnson, 515; Martin, 195; Rusk, 
273, 276, 619, 726; U Thant, 139; Wheeler, 192 
Asia: Baguio meeting, 517; Goldberg, 505, 513; 

Holt, 962; Rusk, 726 
East European countries: Harriman, 821; 
Kohler, 413 ; Rusk, 283 



Viet-Nam, North: 

President Johnson, question of visit (Rusk) , 283 
U.S. journalists: 

Opinions of (Rusk), 131 
Visits to (Rusk), 127 
U.S. travel restrictions, 103, 565 
Visas : 

U.S. passports to Middle East invalidated, an- 
nouncement, 953 
U.S. visitors' visas, indefinite validity, 695 
Voice of America: Kohler, 411; Solomon, 519 
Voluntary organizations, private, CIA relationships: 

665; Johnson, 665 
Volunteers to America, 244 

Wadsworth, James J., 353 
Waldheim, Kurt (Nabrit), 32 
Walters, Barbara, 168 

Chemical and biological warfare, 577 
Dangers of and need for prevention: Brzezinski, 
415; Goldberg, 895; Rusk, 134, 170, 271, 363 
War on Hunger: Humphrey, 685; Johnson, 231, 235, 
295, 298, 329, 379, 381, 658, 700, 849; E. V. Ros- 
tow, 403, 856 ; Rusk, 874 
AID, office of, establishment (Johnson), 381 
War on Poverty (see also Great Society) : Katzen- 

bach, 955; Yen, 849 
Warsaw Pact countries (Rusk), 283 
Washington, George, 328 
Watanabe, Takeshi (Bundy), 326 
Watch movements, escape-clause duty rates termi- 
nated, proclamation, 217 
Water for Peace, international conference: 762, 765, 

907; Johnson, 902; Rusk, 904; Solomon, 562 
Water for Peace; A Report of Background Consider- 
ations and Recommendations on the Water for 
Peace Program: excerpts, 760; released, 758n 
Water resources (see also Conservation, Desalination, 
Flood control and Water for Peace), North 
Africa (Palmer), 812 
Waters, Herbert, 860 
Watson, Arthur K., 696, 697 
Watson, Barbara M., 765 
Wehner, Herbert, 360 
Wehrle, Leroy, 844 
Western hemisphere, convention on nature protection 

and wildlife preservation: Costa Rica, 353 
Western Samoa, International Wheat Agreement, 

1967 protocol, signature, 930 
Westmoreland, William C: 586, 738; Bunker, 845; 
Goldberg, 511; Johnson, 161, 467, 535, 538, 539, 
593, 594; Rusk, 877; Taylor, 286 

International grains agreement, U.S. interests: 
432; Johnson, 297; E. V. Rostow, 403, 861; 
Roth, 880 
U.S. shipments to India. See India 

Wheat — Continued 

Wheat Agreement (1962), International, protocol 
for further extension of: Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 930 ; Costa Rica, 642, 
930; Cuba, 930; Ecuador, 182; El Salvador, 
930; Finland, 86, 930; Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Greece, 930; Guatemala, 
122, 930; Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, 930; 
Japan, 224; Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
930; Mexico, 86, 930; Netherlands, Norway, 
930; Peru, 122, 930; Portugal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Soviet 
Union, Sweden, Switzerland, 930; U.A.R., 393, 
930; U.K., U.S., Vatican City, 930; Venezuela, 
86, 930; Western Samoa, 930 
Wheeler, Earle G., 53, 586, 594, 609; addresses, 186 
White, Edward: Goldberg, 80; Johnson, 388 
White, John (Thieu), 591 

White House Conference on International Coopera- 
tion (Johnson), 658 
WHO. See World Health Organization 
Wilson, Carroll L., 651 
Wilson, Harold: 963; Humphrey, 166; quoted, 368, 

373; Rusk, 466; Sisco, 67 
Wilson, Woodrow (Rusk), 270 
WHO. See World Meteorological Organization 
Wodajo, Kifle (Goldberg), 888 
Women : 

Equal rights, U.N. covenants provisions, 107 
Political rights of, convention (1953) : 

Current actions: Afghanistan, 86; Gabon, U.K., 

U.S. ratification urged (Goldberg) , 524 
Wong Lin Ken, 688 
Woods, George: Humphrey, 685; quoted, 810; Rusk, 

World Food Program, U.S. pledge: Johnson, 297; 

E. V. Rostow, 861 
World Health Organization: 761; Palmer, 650 
Constitution (1946), as amended: Barbados, 833 

Amendment to article 7 : Morocco, 701 
Drug reaction reporting system, announcement, 919 
World Meteorological Organization, U.N.: Johnson, 

658; Sisco, 462 
World order: 

Big-power responsibilities : Goldberg, 895 ; Johnson, 
546, 550, 917; Meeker, 58; E. V. Rostow, 856; 
Rusk, 770 
Institutions and practices contributing to: Kohler, 

8, 408 ; Sisco, 64 ; Yen, 849 
Interdependence of modern world: Goldberg, 838; 
Johnson, 301, 385; Pollack, 912; E. V. Rostow, 
399, 896; W. W. Rostow, 504; Rusk, 267, 270; 
Sisco, 459 
International law, importance: Goldberg, 140, 896; 

McDougal (quoted), 144 
Obligations of community of man : Brzezinski, 414 ; 
Goldberg, 896; Hand (quoted), 545; Johnson, 
296, 300, 381; E. V. Rostow, 861; W. W. 
Rostow, 491 



World peace : 

Communism, threat to: ANZUS, 749; Bundy, 791; 

Kohler, 7; E. V. Rostow, 399; Rusk, 169, 743, 

Durable peace, importance and U.S. goal: Brzezin- 

ski, 415; Chung, 549; Goldberg, 289, 895; 

Johnson, 231, 328, 329, 587, 678, 907; Katzen- 

bach, 755; Roosevelt (quoted), 963; W. W. 

Rostow, 500; Rusk, 136, 169, 267, 269, 278, 

358, 363, 725, 771, 781, 784, 874, 787; Sisco, 

Economic problems, relation to: Humphrey, 489; 

E. V. Rostow, 857-858; Rusk, 829 
Near East, importance to (Johnson), 870 
Nuclear proliferation. See Nuclear entries 
Outer space treaty, importance to (Goldberg), 78, 

83, 98, 603 
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967, proclama- 
tion, 873 
Southern Rhodesian situation as a threat to: 369, 

373, 375; Goldberg, 75, 143, 291; Palmer, 449 
U.S.-Soviet interests: 697; Katzenbach, 754 
Viet-Nam situation a throat to: ANZUS, 749; 

Goldberg, 137; Johnson, 160; Lodge, 800; 

Rusk, 42, 136, 359, 781, 787, 831 ; U Thant, 139 
World Trade Week, 1967, proclamation: 756, John- 
son, 886 
World Weather Watch : Johnson, 658 ; Sisco, 462 
Wortham, Buel (Rusk), 44, 248 
Wortzel, Arthur I., 71 

Yarmouth Castle disaster: Johnson, 429; Miller, 173 
Yemen Arab Republic: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 327 

U.S. travel restrictions, announcement, 952 
Yen Chia-kan, 847 
Yingling, Raymund T., 636, 919 

Young Choo Kim, 747 "< 

Yugoslavia : 

Economic and political development: Brzezinski, 
417; Harriman, 817, 820; Katzenbach, 5; 
Kohler, 8, 408, 411; Solomon, 519 

Import quota controls removed, 246 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 260, 354, 613, 641, 733, 

U.S. food aid, question of (Rusk) , 46 

U.S. trade policies (Katzenbach), 3 

Zambia : 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 688 

Political and economic development: Goldberg, 73; 
Katzenbach, 954 

Southern Rhodesian situation, effect on: 367, 372, 
374 ; Goldberg, 73, 75 

Universal Postal Union, constitution, with final 
protocols, 701 

Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach, 756 
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), 371 
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) , 371 
Zimbabwe African National Union, 371 
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, 371 
Zollner, Maxime-Leopold, 850 
Zorthian, Barry, 844 





~ OF 


Vol. LVI, No. U36 

January 2, 1967 

by Under Secretary Katzenbach 2 

by Deputy Under Secretary Kohler 6 


Statements by Under Secretary Rostow 

and Text of Communique 19 

For index see inside back cover 

The Issues of East-West Trade 

by Under Secretary Katzenbach '■ 

Today, I would like to spend a few minutes 
discussing with you the issues of East-West 
trade, and I would like to begin by recalling 
still another protest cause — ^that of the citi- 
zens who have ranged themselves into "Com- 
mittees to Warn of the Arrival of Communist 
Merchandise on the Local Scene." 

Some have gone into groceries to paste 
labels on Polish hams. A man in Shreveport, 
Louisiana, appeals for funds in the belief that 
if we continue to import Yugoslav tobacco for 
American cigarette blends, "all the Chris- 
tians will be persecuted and the women 
raped and the little children sent to slave 
camps." A lady in New Jersey is waging a 
campaign against the import of carrots from 
Canada on the ground that some of the car- 
rots are Communist carrots. 

Let me make it plain that I have no quar- 
rel with the right of such individuals to pro- 
test or demonstrate lawfully. Nor is it for 
me to object to their ardor on behalf of a 
cause. But I would suggest that their patriot- 
ism exceeds their understanding, for in such 
blanket protest against communism they are 
reacting to the facts of the last decade rather 
than this one. 

Communism surely remains a resolute op- 
ponent of free societies. And surely there is 
little need, at a time when we are fighting in 
Viet-Nam, to repeat our nation's determina- 
tion to resist Communist aggression. 

But how vastly different is the face of com- 
munism in the world today than it was a 
decade ago. How much meaning can even the 
phrase "world communism" have when Red 
Guards riot at the Soviet Embassy in Peking 
and the Chinese Conununists charge the 
Soviet Union with conspiring with the United 
States to betray North Viet-Nam ? 

Communism is no longer the monolith of 
Stalin's time. Increasingly, we see deep, even 
bitter, divisions between Communist nations. 
Increasingly, we see Eastern European coun- 
tries pursuing individual national interest 
and identity. Increasingly, these countries re- 
flect grave understanding of the impartial 
dangers of destruction. 

For both sides these changes create a 
channel for contact, for understanding, and 
for peace. And this is a channel we have al- 
ready begun to travel. Three years ago we 
were able to agree on a test ban treaty. Re- 
cently, we extended our cultural exchanges 
agreement with the Soviet Union,^ and we 
have signed an air travel agreement.^ Only 
yesterday came word of the agreement 
barring nuclear weapons in space. 

Two months ago. President Johnson told 
a New York audience ^ that: 

Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the 
East — a shift from the narrow concept of coexist- 
ence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement. 

Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward 

' Address made before the National Association of 
Manufacturers' 71st annual Congress of American 
Industry at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 9 (press re- 
lease 289). 

^ For text of a joint communique of Mar. 19, 1966, 
see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 543. 

= For text, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791. 

* For an advance text of President Johnson's 
address before the National Conference of Editorial 
Writers, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 


the Soviet Union has been the same. Where neces- 
sary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we 
shall work with the East to build a lasting peace. 

We do not intend to let our differences on Viet- 
Nam or elsewhere ever prevent us from exploring 
all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and 
the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and 
our allies shall go step by step with them just as 
far as they are willing to advance. 

In short, the winds of change in Eastern 
Europe are freeing the ice floes of the cold 
war. They can be warm winds. They can also 
be trade winds. 

Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 

Trade with Eastern Europe is a subject in 
which the NAM has exhibited sustained and 
responsible interest, as exemplified by the ex- 
tensive study by Dr. Mose Harvey which you 
commissioned. As I think Dr. Harvey would 
agree, this is a time when increasing trade 
with Eastern Europe, under careful and selec- 
tive direction, can be both good business and 
good policy. 

But the Government does not now have the 
authority to free that trade or to apply selec- 
tive direction. It is not now possible for the 
United States to take full advantage of the 
opportunities presented by trade. 

The core of the problem is that only Yugo- 
slavia and Poland now receive the same tariflf 
treatment we give to the other countries of 
the world. The President may not extend it 
to the other countries of Eastern Europe. 

This is the most-favored-nation treatment, 
which for 40 years has been central to our 
foreign commercial policy. (I might add, 
however, that I have never understood the 
reason for the phrase. All that "most fa- 
vored" means is "nondiscriminatory" treat- 

We gave most-favored-nation treatment to 
Eastern Europe for many years. In 1951, 
however, at the height of the cold war, we 
withdrew it, imposing on the products of 
these countries the very high rates of the old 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. 

This was a rational distinction to make in 
1951. But is it rational today? Should not the 
President have authority to negotiate with 
any of these countries for the advantages we 

can gain by offering them the same tariff 
rates we apply to the rest of the world ? 

The President's inability to negotiate in 
this manner now sharply limits our capacity 
to use our great economic power of trade as 
an instrument of foreign policy. And more 
obviously, it sharply limits trade. This is a 
self-imposed restriction, and we are the only 
major free-world nation to so tie our hands. 

The Miller Committee Recommendations 

Recognizing the potential of a freer hand, 
the President sought to explore both the 
policy and trade benefits. In early 1965 he 
appointed a study committee of distinguished 
business, labor, and academic leaders, includ- 
ing members of this association, and chaired 
by J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the Cummins 
Engine Company. 

The Miller committee conducted an ex- 
haustive study, which was based on full 
access to our defense and intelligence infor- 
mation. In its superb report it concluded 
that the United States, having built the most 
powerful defense system the world has ever 
seen, could and should seek practical means 
of reducing areas of conflict.^ 

Peaceful, nonstrategic trade, the commit- 
tee said, "can be an important instrument of 
national policy in our country's relations 
with individual Communist nations of 
Europe" and we should use trade negotia- 
tions with those countries more actively, ag- 
gressively, and confidently "in the pursuit of 
our national welfare and world peace." 

And the single most important- step, the 
committee concluded, is to give the President 
discretionary authority to grant — or with- 
draw — nondiscriminatory tariff treatment to 
individual countries of Eastern Europe. 

The proposed East-West Trade Relations 
Act,* based on the Miller committee recom- 
mendations, would do exactly that. Congress 
did not act on this measure last year, but as 
the President said in October, we intend to 
press for it in the coming Congress. 

= For text, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 845. 
' For background and text of the proposed legisla- 
tion, see ibid., p. 838. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 

T have so far only suggested the adminis- 
tration's reasoning in supporting this meas- 
ure. Let me now analyze it in somewhat 
greater detail on the framework of three 
basic questions. 

Three Basic Questions 

The first is: Why should we send goods to 
Communist countries — opponents of our sys- 
tem — and thus either directly or indirectly 
strengthen their military capacity? 

Unlike the blanket condemnation of pro- 
testers who paste labels on hams in markets, 
this is not only a sensible question but a basic 
question. There are three answers to it. 

1. At present, the export of strategic goods 
— goods closely or directly related to military 
use — is strictly controlled. In seeking this 
act we would not abandon such independent 

2. The Soviet Union's military capability 
is not based on imports. On the contrary, as 
the world knows, it has developed advanced 
weapons and space technology from its own 

3. It is not likely that trade with the 
United States would release Soviet resources 
for additional military spending. The Soviet 
Union already gives highest priority to mili- 
tary spending. Larger imports* from the 
United States would almost certainly expand 
the consumer sector of the Soviet economy, 
not the military. As the Miller committee 
noted, any change in Soviet resource availa- 
bility would "affect its civilian economy, not 
its military budget." 

The basic point, after all, is that we are 
talking about trade, not aid. The Soviet 
Union and the other East European coun- 
tries would have to pay for increased imports 
either with gold or by increased exports — 
and those would require diversion of re- 
sources to produce. 

The effect of all three of these points 
was summarized by the Miller committee: 
". . . total Western nonstrategic trade, let 
alone U.S. trade, could not be expected to 
alter the fundamental relationship between 
East- West militaiy capabilities." 

Accepting that conclusion, it is still fair 

to ask the second question: Would expanded 
East-West trade really amount to very much 
economically; is it really good busijiess? 

The total amount of trade potential in the 
East European countries should not be exag- 
gerated. They are not among the great trad- 
ing nations, nor are they soon likely to 
become so. 

Nevertheless, their trade could be mean- 
ingful. The rocketing success of the free 
economies in the West is exerting a major 
influence on the economic planners of the 

In the past 15 years East European trade 
has increased fivefold. Last year the free 
world sold more than $6 billion in goods to 
Eastern Europe and bought almost the same 

The United States has not shared in this 
growth. West Germany, for example, exports 
more than half a billion dollars' worth of 
goods each year, five times our present total. 
Earlier this year, the Fiat company of Italy 
entered into an agreement to build an $800 
million compact car plant in the Soviet 

In other words, East European trade with 
the West is going to expand, with us or with- 
out us. If we do not participate, however, we 
will lose more than business opportunities. 
We will have forfeited a major opportunity 
to achieve policy gains, and this raises the 
third question: Would expanded East-West 
trade really amount to very much diplo- 
matically; is it really good policy? 

This, in the administration's view, is by far 
the most important aspect of East-West 
trade. Where reasons of economic gain might 
justify it, reasons of policy require it. 

As Secretary Rusk observed last week: '' 

It is too late in history to maintain intractable 
hostility across the entire range of relationships. 
. . . even at a time when there are difficult and 
painful and even dangerous issues between us, it 
is necessary in the interest of Homo sapiens for the 
leaders on both sides to explore the possibilities of 
pointr, of agreement. . . . 

Enlarged trade can be a significant frame- 

' In an address before the Executives Club of 
Chicago on Nov. 30, 1966. 


work for such exploration — if the countries 
of Eastern Europe want trade, as surely they 
do. Life magazine this week describes a trade 
fair in Plovdiv, Bulgaria. The American 
pavilion was small compared with the Soviet 
and German displays, but it was stocked with 
such items as a cropdusting plane, data proc- 
essing machines, a tire-recapping machine, 
and an electronic "car doctor." 

The magazine quotes one American official 
as saying, "They try to do everything here 
with one pair of pliers. When we showed 
them 20 different kinds of pliers, not to men- 
tion all those screwdrivers — well, my God." 

In less than 2 weeks the pavilion had 
attracted 650,000 people, three times the 
population of the city. 

At the most specific level, the enlarged 
trade would give us the influence to secure 
satisfactoiy economic concessions, such as 
patent protections or trade and tourist pro- 
motion offices or assurances concerning arbi- 
tration of commercial disputes. 

Reassertjon of National Identities 

A larger benefit relates to the continuing 
movement of these countries away from the 
rigidities of the past. Politically, they are 
reasserting their national identities. Eco- 
nomically, they are turning increasingly 
away from centralized direction and increas- 
ingly toward greater use of the profit incen- 

Yugoslavia is the model example. After 
breaking away from the Cominform in 1948, 
Yugoslavia began economic decentralization, 
giving considerable autonomy to individual 
enterprises. This has continued to the point 
that Yugoslavia is now a member of the great 
international economic institutions like the 
World Bank, GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade], and the International 
Monetary Fund. 

This change is not isolated. Almost all the 
countries of Eastern Europe are working to 
overcome the clumsiness and inefficiencies of 
overcentralized economic direction. 

Next January 1 Czechoslovakia embarks on 
a major economic reform program placing 
new responsibilities on the plant managers 
and placing new stress on the market and the 
price system in determining the success or 
failure of individual enterprises. 

A year later Hungary is scheduled to put 
even more radical changes into effect. New 
experiments are underway in Bulgaria and 
Poland. And you are familiar with the experi- 
ments in using the profit motive underway in 
the Soviet Union. 

In most of these countries efficiency is re- 
placing ideology as the guide in economic 
matters, and the demands of the ordinary 
consumer for more goods and a better stand- 
ard of living are being listened to with new 

What is most striking in this process of 
change is that in no two Eastern European 
countries are the changes identical. Each is 
going its own way, reflecting growing feel- 
ings of national identity and independence 
which are coming to the surface throughout 
the area. 

But by acting on these changes, we can 
advance our own interests and advance the 
prospects of peace. Through trade we can 
encourage them to rebuild their historical 
friendly ties to the West. Through trade we 
can increase their contacts with American 
businessmen — and tourists. Through trade 
we can encourage their participation in inter- 
national institutions— and international re- 
sponsibilities. Through trade we can increase 
their stake in peaceful relations with the 

And, finally, basic to all of these benefits 
is our demonstration of faith in the strength 
of the free society. We do not fear the tests 
to which the future will put such a society. 
We have not sought to seal it behind an Iron 
Curtain or a Berlin wall — nor should we seal 
it behind a rigid tariff blockade. 

That blockade should be removed. On 
behalf of good business, good policy, and good 
sense I invite and welcome your support. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 

East-West Relations: Shaping a Stable World 

by Foy D. Kohler 

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs i 

I am glad to be with you today. It seems 
very appropriate to me that my first appear- 
ance outside of Washington since my return 
from the Soviet Union should be in Florida, 
for it is the State my wife and I are in the 
process of adopting, having originated, re- 
spectively, in North Carolina and Ohio. This 
background, I take it, will make us feel very 
much at home among our fellow Floridians. 

Just a few weeks ago, we returned from 
Moscow after living there for nearly 41/2 
years. Maybe as a result of that experience 
and of previous assignments in Eastern Eu- 
rope, I can cast some light for you on the 
problems of East-West relations, a subject 
which is vital — I was about to say a matter 
of life and death — to all of us. 

A century ago a voyage to Russia con- 
sumed months. When we came back by com- 
bination of plane and ship it took us 7 days. 
When direct air communications are estab- 
lished next year, a flight from Moscow to 
New York will take about 8 hours. But even 
today a missile can make it in 30 minutes. 

For a good many years American Presi- 
dents have been concerned that the traffic 
between these two particular points on the 
globe should go by sea and land and in the 
atmosphere, rather than on a ballistic trajec- 
tory through space. I have had the privilege 
of working with several administrations — 
with President Eisenhower, with President 
Kennedy, with President Johnson — on this 

' Made before the Florida Department of the 
American Legion at Orlando, Fla., on Dec. 11 (press 
release 290 dated Dec. 10). 

question. I found that each of these Presi- 
dents, looking at the problem from the point 
of view of the national interest, of the well- 
being and security of all Americans, came to 
hold essentially the same views and reached 
essentially the same conclusions. The policies 
which have issued from their profound con- 
sideration of how to insure a peaceful world 
have been set forth by all of them, most 
recently, of course, by President Johnson. 

Speaking last August at the National Re- 
actor Testing Center for the Atomic Energy 
Commission at Idaho Falls, the President, 
after hailing the peaceful potential of atomic 
power, said: ^ 

But there is another — and a darker — side of the 
nuclear age that we should never forget. That is 
the danger of destruction by nuclear weapons. 

. . . uneasy is the peace that wears a nuclear 
crown. And we cannot be satisfied with a situation 
in which the world is capable of extinction in a 
moment of error, or madness, or anger. . . . 

Since 1945, we have opposed Communist efforts 
to bring about a Communist-dominated world. We 
did so because our conviction and our interests de- 
manded it; and we shall continue to do so. 

But we have never sought war or the destruction 
of the Soviet Union; indeed, we have sought in- 
stead to increase our knowledge and our under- 
standing of the Russian people with whom we share 
a common feeling for life, a love of song and story, 
and a sense of the land's vast promises. 

After talking of our differences with the 
Soviet Union, the President posed the ques- 
tion as to what practical step could be taken 
forward toward peace. He answered himself: 

» For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410. 


I think it is to recognize that while differing 
principles and differing values may always divide us, 
they should not, and they must not, deter us from 
rational acts of common endeavor. . . . 

This does not mean that we have to become bed- 
fellows. It does not mean that we have to cease 
competition. But it does mean that we must both 
want — and work for and long for — that day when 
"nation shall not lift up sword against nation, 
neither shall they learn. war any more." 

In October, just before he left for his trip 
to the Far East, President Johnson spelled 
all this out a bit further in a speech in New 
York reviewing U.S. policy toward Europe 
as a whole.^ 

The Atlantic allies (he said) have always tried 
to maintain (a healthy balance) between strength 
and conciliation, between firmness and flexibility, 
between resolution and hope. . . . 

A just peace remains our goal. . . . the world is 
changing. Our policy must reflect the reality of 
today — not yesterday. . . . 

Our purpose is not to overturn other governments 
but to help the people of Europe to achieve: 

A continent in which the peoples of Eastern and 
Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together 
for the common good. 

A continent in which alliances do not confront 
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a 
framework in which West and East can act together 
in order to assure the security of all. 

The President then listed some new meas- 
ures he intends to take to strengthen the 
prospects for improved relations with the 
Soviet Union and countries of Eastern Eu- 
rope in trade and other fields, and he wel- 
comed comparable measures on the part of 
our Atlantic allies. 

Why have a succession of Presidents of 
different political persuasion reached essen- 
tially the same conclusions? Why did Presi- 
dent Johnson state our policy in the terms I 
have quoted? These are questions I should 
like to explore with you this morning. 

I think we can start by agreeing that the 
free world continues to be challenged by a 
hostile political system whose leaders claim 
that only that system, materialistic in con- 
cept, authoritarian in character, is capable 
of solving the problems besetting mankind. 
They proclaim as a matter of historical in- 

For advance text, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

evitability that their system is destined to 
rule the world. It is a fact that Communist 
regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe pursue an ideology fundamentally 
opposed to our own. 

Since 1945 the conflict between the two 
systems has sometimes taken the form of 
trials of strength and periods of military 
conflict; more often, it has been conducted 
by less violent methods. That confrontation, 
in broader terms, has its "defensive" and 
"oflfensive" aspects, if I may use these mili- 
tary terms. I propose to speak to you today 
about both aspects. 

Meeting Force With Force 

In the course of the last 20 years the 
United States has had to confront Commu- 
nist violence in many parts of the world. 
This we have done, and this we will do, if 
necessary, again. We firmly believe that in 
the nuclear age no power has the right to 
impose its ideas or its system on others 
through the use of arms. This is a funda- 
mental lesson which all nations must learn 
and abide by. We have striven to drive that 
lesson home. 

Accordingly, when Greece was threatened 
by Communist subversion in the immediate 
postwar years, the United States did not 
hesitate to come to the aid of Greece. At that 
time, there were many who argued that we 
should not. They said that Greece was under 
a conservative, indeed even a reactionary, 
system not worthy of our assistance. Today, 
20 years later, Greece is a thriving democ- 
racy, and even the severest critics of Presi- 
dent Truman's policy now agree that our 
eflforts in Greece contributed to peace and 
stability in the Balkans. 

I need not speak to you at length about the 
Korean war. Many of you assembled here to- 
day took part in that conflict, and you know 
well what was at stake. The United States 
did not hesitate to send its young men and to 
commit its resources in order to insure that 
peace and stability would prevail in the 
Northern Pacific. Because we did not hesi- 
tate. Communist China as well as Stalin's 
Russia learned, painfully and at some cost to 

JANUARY 2, 1967 

them, that the United States is unflinching 
when faced with the threat of force. 

In Europe we have made it clear to our 
friends and foes that we stand by our com- 
mitments. They have been tested twice in 
BerUn. The United States is still in West 
Berlin, and no citizen of West Berlin need 
fear about his future. 

There was a time during the postwar con- 
frontation when the Soviet leadership, be- 
cause of misguided assumptions, concluded 
that the balance of power could be turned in 
its favor and that the United States could be 
stared down in a nuclear confrontation. So- 
viet missiles were implanted not far from 
here— in Cuba. But precisely because we 
stood firm and fast, wisdom prevailed and 
the Soviet missiles are there no longer. 

Thus, painfully and gradually, a measure 
of restraint has come into American-Soviet 
relations. This has come about because the 
Soviets have no illusions about our determi- 
nation to meet force with force. 

We are in the process of establishing the 
same principle in Viet-Nam. The issue there 
is not a local one. It pertains to the peace of 
Asia and, more fundamentally, to the kind 
of strategy international communism will 
follow in this decade. Having learned that 
overt force does not pay, some Communists 
concluded that covert force may open the 
gates. We are keeping them shut. It is no 
secret that we believe that in keeping them 
shut we are aiding not only the cause of 
peace but also the arguments of those Com- 
munists who have already learned that vio- 
lence is not the way to global supremacy. 

Had we been weak in Viet-Nam, we would 
have helped the arguments of the more radi- 
cal Communists who contend that covert vio- 
lence is something to which the United States 
cannot effectively respond. If we had not re- 
sponded, we would have proven the radical 
Communists right. 

These periods of violence have thus dem- 
onstrated — and are demonstrating in Viet- 
Nam — that Communist attempts to expand 
their systems by force can and will be con- 
tained by the determination of the free 
world. But, as I have suggested, these re- 

sponses have been essentially "defensive." 
And these contests have also demonstrated 
that force is not a solution to the basic con- 
flict between political systems. 

Evolutionary Developments 

In many respects the more important and 
long-lasting aspect of the struggle is the one 
I would describe as "offensive," despite its 
less spectacular nature. I have in mind active 
promotion of a process of gradual change 
designed to shape the kind of world we 
would all like to live in: a world of coopera- 
tive communities in which ideological divi- 
sions no longer create fundamental gulfs be- • 
tween men and societies; a world in which | 
violence gives way to the rule of law; a world 
in which poverty and suffering are overcome 
by worldwide efforts to improve the well- 
being of man. | 

Indeed, this quieter and more subtle proc- 
ess has already brought about some funda- 
mental evolutionary developments in the 
Communist world. And the action of such 
natural forces as nationalism has been en- 
couraged by positive programs of developing 
constructive relationships with the countries 
of Eastern Europe carried on by the United 
States and other Western countries for the 
past decade. 

The Communist world is no longer mono- 
lithic. We can no longer talk of a Sino-Soviet 
bloc. The first crack appeared in 1948, with 
the Soviet-Yugoslav split. One- of the great 
decisions in American foreign policy was 
President Truman's prompt and immediate 
support of the Yugoslav declaration of na- 
tional independence by the provision of 
large-scale military and economic aid to sup- 
port this Yugoslav position. 

Since then Yugoslavia has gone its own 
independent way and is experimenting \vith 
changes in its economic and political system 
that are of importance for the Communist 
world as a whole. As you probably know, 
Yugoslavia has gone a long way toward a 
market economy, and today the Yugoslav 
leaders are debating what role the Commu- 
nist party should be playing in this society, 
how much dissent ought to be permitted, 


what forms of human liberty should be in- 
troduced into a system that once was a totali- 
tarian one. Just 4 days ago, for the first time 
in Communist history the g-overnment of one 
of the Yugoslav provinces, Slovenia, was 
forced to resign in the face of opposition in 
its own parliament. 

Ten years ago, both Poland and Hungary 
challenged Soviet supremacy. Although the 
Hungarian revolution was brutally crushed, 
Poland did gain a measure of autonomy. Its 
government has not broken with the Soviet 
Union, and we should have no illusions about 
that. Nonetheless, significant aspects of Pol- 
ish life are free of Communist control. More 
than 80 percent of Polish farmland is pri- 
vately owned and cultivated. Collectivization 
has been abandoned altogether. A measure 
of freedom of expression is tolerated. Exten- 
sive contacts with the West have been devel- 
oped. Hundreds of young Poles are studying 
in Western institutions, many of them in the 
United States. 

More generally, the process of fragmenta- 
tion in the Communist world has been ac- 
centuated by the Si no-Soviet dispute. That 
dispute has dissipated the illusion of unity 
which has been one of the sources of strength 
of Communist ideology. It has proven not 
only to the world at large but to the Com- 
munists themselves that their ideology does 
not insure global unity; it has proven that 
national aspirations and feelings are more 
powerful than doctrinal formulas. 

Today the Soviet people can take little 
comfort in having a Communist neighbor to 
the East of them. That Communist neighbor, 
with nearly four times the population of the 
Soviet Union, makes no secret of its hostility 
ind contempt for the Soviet Union. I often 
.vonder how we would feel if one of our 
leighbors had close to 700 million people, 
vas developing nuclear weapons and rockets, 
vas condemning our social system and laying 
'laims to major portions of our territory. I 
leed not recall how concerned we were about 
he Soviet missiles on the small island of 
]uba. Magnify that threat many times and 
'ou may get a sense of how an average Rus- 
ian feels. 

The Sino-Soviet dispute has served to in- 
crease the margin of autonomy for the East 
Europeans. While generally siding with the 
Soviet Union, with the notable exception of 
Albania, the East Europeans have also taken 
advantage of the dispute to assert greater 
autonomy for themselves. This is a normal 
and understandable eft^ect, typical of the in- 
ternational game: Whenever a major partner 
is preoccupied elsev/here, the minor partners 
become more eflPective in asserting their in- 
terests. In that respect the East Europeans 
are no different from anyone else. 

Desire for Closer Relations With the West 

If I may generalize broadly, today the 
East Europeans are increasingly desirous of 
developing relations with the West. They 
realize that the crisis they face in their econ- 
omies, the need they have for more advanced 
forms of science and technology, their quest 
for cultural self-expression can only be satis- 
fied through closer relations with the West. 

This, to a large extent, is also true of the 
Soviet Union. I have in mind here the Soviet 
people rather than the Soviet leadership. The 
leadership itself is still governed by ideologi- 
cal considerations which color its approach to 
the West. It is still more interested in pur- 
suing the goal of fragmenting Western unity 
than in seeking a general accommodation 
with the West. But we should keep in mind 
that Communist rule in these countries, by 
their own definition, represents a monopoly 
of political power in the hands of a single 
party which includes only a small minority 
of the population. And Russian society at 
large, as I can testify through countless con- 
tacts, desires to participate in the Western 
civilization; it wishes to develop closer con- 
tacts with the United States; it does not de- 
sire to be cut off from the world by an ideo- 
logical curtain. 

I would be misleading you if I created the 
impression that everything is rosy in the 
Communist world — and I do not mean to 
make a bad pun by that remark. There are 
many things taking place there which we can 
justly classify as retrogressive. We are un- 
happy over the fact that, in the context of our 

ANUARY 2, 1967 

efforts to improve relations with the East, the 
Czechoslovak Government has seen fit to kid- 
nap a U.S. citizen who was not even in 
Czechoslovakia voluntarily but was brought 
in by a Soviet aircraft not scheduled to stop 

We are also dismayed, as are all free men, 
by the sight of distinguished Soviet writers 
being tried and sent to prison because they 
dared to publish in the West the products of 
their creative talent. We are indignant when 
American tourists in the Soviet Union are 
subjected to harsh and arbitrary procedures 
for trivial offenses. We are concerned by the 
conflict with the Catholic Church and by 
other forms of intellectual intolerance re- 
cently manifested in Poland. 

All of these manifestations, however, have 
to be seen in their broad perspective. And the 
trend, to me, seems clear : It involves a decline 
in the ideological passions which have 
dominated mankind in the last 100 years. 

Without going into tedious historical 
analysis, I think it is fair to say that the age 
of ideologies has been a peculiar phenomenon 
in history. It was the product of a very spe- 
cial phase of European development. Many 
nations, going through similar social and in- 
dustrial revolutionary changes, became in- 
fected by ideological attitudes. 

Those of you who travel to Europe must be 
struck how much less ideological the Euro- 
peans have become. The same is true, I can 
tell you on the basis of my personal experi- 
ence, of the East Europeans and the Rus- 
sians. Indeed, precisely because they were 
exposed to a pernicious and dogmatic 
ideology, in some respects they are even less 
ideological than their West European 
brothers. I remember talking not long ago to 
an East European Communist professor, 
whom I asked, "Why did your ideology die 
so quickly?" To which he responded — and, I 
repeat, he is a Communist — "Die so quickly? 
I think it took too long to die." His attitude 
is symptomatic of many others who, disil- 
lusioned by Stalinism, embittered by per- 
sistent economic and social failures of the 
system, are turning to more pragmatic solu- 


I think it is our role in the world today to 
take advantage of the trends of thought and 
of the developments which I have discussed 
to shape a larger and more stable relation- 
ship with some of the Communist states and "< 
to encourage constructive change within. We 
should not lower our guard, but we should 
take advantage of every opportunity to de- 
velop closer contacts and wider relations with 
them in order to shape a stable world. 

Our efforts to that end have not been with- 
out their rewards. We helped save Yugoslav 
independence during its hour of danger, and 
anyone familiar with East Europe knows 
that in the years that followed Yugoslavia 
has had a major liberalizing impact on the 
rest of the Soviet world. Under President 
Eisenhower we extended economic assistance 
to the Poles, and we made it easier for them 
to preserve their free-enteii^rise agricultural 

Trade a Two-Way Street 

Taking advantage of the opportunities 
which are now opening, we wish to expand 
our relations with the Communist states. 
Some of the restrictions on East- West trade 
adopted during the earlier, more intense 
phase of the cold war have now outlived their 
usefulness. In proposing to Congress the 
East-West Trade Relations Act,^ the Presi- 
dent has taken an action designed to give 
greater flexibility to the United States in 
dealing with the Communist countries. The 
export of military or militarily useful items 
to Communist countries is effectively pro- 
hibited by Allied agreement. Further restric- 
tions on our trade with these states do not in 
the long run deny the Communists anything; 
they can obtain most of the goods concerned 
in West Europe or elsewhere. Added restric- 
tions do make it more difficult for us to de- 
velop relations designed to shape patterns of 
development that we consider favorable in 
the Eastern states. At the same time they 
punish our own farmers and manufacturers 

■* For text of the proposed legislation, see ibid., 
May 30, 1966, p. 843. 


I do not think I need to tell you that our 
purpose is not a series of giveaways; rather, 
our intent is to create such commercial rela- 
tions that the Communist states develop 
closer ties with the West, such relations that 
they will increasingly be encouraged to evolve 
domestically along the lines we desire. I can 
assure you that the people in these countries 
know how we and the Western Europeans 
live. They know it is much better than the 
way they live. They want to live as we do, to 
have cars, adequate housing, and better 

It is clear to me that it is in our interest 
to take actions which help bring about a 
diversion of their resources from military 
and space programs to consumer goods. 
Trade is not just commercial, but also po- 
litical. It is a two-way street and one of the 
channels of communications with these coun- 
tries. Let me put it to you this way. Who 
here would not sooner have people in Yugo- 
slavia growing tobacco rather than produc- 
ing munitions? Who among us would not 
rather have Soviet workers making passen- 
ger cars instead of missiles? Isn't it better 
for us all for Poland to devote increased re- 
sources to production of high-quality pork 
and ham? Who does not think it useful that 
Romanian resources be devoted to an auto- 
mobile-tii'e industry rather than to produc- 
tion of jet fuel? 

In sum, we must be able to use our vast 
power and our resources to shape the kind 
of world we would want to see our children 
live in. In his recent major speech on East- 
West relations, the President called for a 
"broader vision of peaceful engagement." 
This was not a call for an immediate accom- 
modation with the Soviet Union, nor was it 
an effort to attain a settlement in Europe on 
the basis of the status quo. It is rather a 
commitment on the part of the United States 
to continue seeking a new Europe in which 
a more durable settlement can eventually be 

As the President said, the present division 
of Europe and of Germany will be ended 
through a long process of change, which re- 
quires the emergence of new conditions and 
attitudes both in the East and in the West. 
There are no rapid breakthroughs waiting 
in the wings. 

As we look to the future, we believe that 
progress toward European unity and Atlan- 
tic cooperation provides a foundation stone 
for a stable East-West reconciliation. We'll 
continue to build such a Europe, and we'll 
continue to seek such a reconciliation. 

Eventually, we hope to see emerge an East- 
ern Europe of more independent states, with 
governments more responsive to domestic 
needs and pressures, participating more fully 
in a larger structure of bilateral and multi- 
lateral East-West cooperation in Europe — a 
cooperation that includes also the United 
States and the Soviet Union. In seeking such 
East-West reconciliation, in the words of 
Secretary of State Rusk,^ 

Ours is not an effort to subvert the Eastern 
European governments nor to make those states 
hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No 
one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is 
again balkanized. 

We approach this task in a spirit of self- 
reliance and optimism. We know that we 
have the means to repel aggression wher- 
ever it occurs. We know that we have the 
will to do so. Of this, let no one have any 
doubt. But it is not enough simply to react 
to Conununist challenges. If we are to win 
this contest, we must remain on the "offen- 
sive"; we must take positive and constructive 
initiatives. We know that our citizens, intel- 
ligently perceiving the realities of this age, 
will support an East-West policy that uses to 
the fullest the wealth and diversity of this 
nation to shape an enduring peace. 

' For text of Secretary Rusk's address at New 
York, N.Y., on Aug. 22, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 12, 
1966, p. 362. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect Amistad Dam 

President Johnson and President Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz of Mexico on December 3 made 
a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam con- 
struction site near Del Rio, Tex., and Ciudad 
Acuna, Mexico. Follmving are texts of Presi- 
dent Johnson's statement of November 29, 
his remarks at Ciudad Acuna on December 3, 
and a joint statement issued by the two 
Presidents at the close of the visit. 

Statement of November 29 

Whit« House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 29 

President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico has asked 
me to join him on Saturday [December 3] 
for a joint inspection of the Amistad Dam 
construction site on the Rio Grande. 

I will be accompanied by Mrs. Johnson, 
Secretary [of the Interior] Stewart Udall, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- Ameri- 
can Affairs Lincoln Gordon, and Ambassador 
Fulton Freeman. 

Some of you may know that Amistad Dam 
is the second major international storage 
dam to be built by our two Governments on 
the Rio Grande pursuant to the 1944 water 

The dam will prevent floods originating in 
rivers on both sides of the boundary from 
causing loss of life and great property dam- 
age such as occurred in the floods of 1954 
and 1958. It will also assist in water conser- 
vation and offer potential power generation. 
It will enable the two Governments for the 
first time to control the waters of the Rio 
Grande throughout its international section. 

Remarks at the Civic Plaza, Ciudad Acuna, 
IVIexico, December 3 

Whit^ House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated December 3 

Last April we met in your beautiful capital 
city to pay homage to a hero of the past.^ 

Today we meet here on the frontier to in- 
spect a monument to the future. 

The work that we see going on around us 
tells us the dramatic story of what two 
peoples working together can accomplish: 

— Here we see the decisions of President 
Eisenhower and President [Adolfo] Lopez 
Mateos to embark on this joint enterprise.^ 

— Here we will see the action of two Con- 
gresses in voting the funds to build the dam. 

^Here we see the Mexican and the United 
States technicians and laborers working side 
by side throwing up the earth embankments 
and erecting the concrete structures. 

— And looking into the future, Mr. Presi- 
dent, we will see millions of farmers and 
towTispeople on both sides of this great river 
enjoying the protection which this great dam 
will afford and the resources and recreation 
which this great lake will provide. 

What we are accomplishing along this 
river, Mr. President, sets a pattern which I 
hope will be increasingly repeated by neigh- 
boring countries throughout this hemisphere. 

The future of Latin America's progress de- 
pends in considerable measure on the develop- 
ment of multinational projects such as we 
have here at the Amistad Dam: 

' For background, see Bulletin of May 9, 1966, 
p. 726. 

' For backgiound, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1960, p. 742, 
and Dec. 5, 1960, p. 851. 



— There are river basins like the River 
Plate system to be harnessed. 

— There are roads like the Eastern Andean 
Highway to be built. 

— There are petroleum and gas pipelines 
to be laid. 

— There are satellite telecommunications 
systems to be designed. 

— There are electric power grids, as in 
Central America, yet to be connected. 

— There are basic industries like fertilizer, 
paper, and petrochemicals that are to be de- 

— And there are still inner frontiers in 
both Central and South America yet to be ex- 

We have other frontiers to cross together: 
There are children to be educated, minds to 
be developed, bodies to be healed, health to be 
preserved. These, too, are worthy goals for 
good neighbors who share a common dedica- 
tion to human progress and to social justice. 

At the forthcoming meeting of Presidents 
of the American Republics there will be op- 
portunity for all of us to give the multina- 
tional project movement added impetus. 

For only by working across frontiers and 
pooling human and material resources, as we 
have done here, can a strong and an inte- 
grated Latin America be achieved. 

Our common frontier, Mr. President, 
stretches for almost 2,000 miles from the 
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. 

Amistad Dam is another link in the bridge 
of mutual trust, friendship, and progress 
which unite our two peoples. 

Everyone here today in his own way has 
contributed to the building of Amistad Dam. 
You can be very proud of your contribution. 

I am very happy and very grateful to my 
good friend President Diaz Ordaz for the op- 
portunity to share with him — and with you — 
the pleasure of this moment of fellowship 
and the excitement of the construction of a 
great project like Amistad Dam. 

Long live the friendship between the peo- 
ple of the United States and the people of 


White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 3 

The Presidents of the United States of 
America and the United Mexican States have 
come together here, because of the common 
interest of their governments in the progress 
of construction of the Amistad (Friendship) 
Dam which is being constructed jointly by 
the two governments on the Rio Grande near 
Del Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila, 
under the Treaty of 1944. 

The Presidents have expressed their pleas- 
ure at the satisfactory progress of the con- 
struction which will assure completion of the 
Dam by the Spring of 1969, on schedule. 

The International Dam is a multi-purpose 
project: It will control the River's floods and 
thereby prevent the loss of life and devastat- 
ing property damage as have occurred in the 
past on both sides of the River from Del Rio 
and Ciudad Acuiia to Brownsville, Texas, and 
Matamoros, Tamaulipas. 

With Falcon Dam, it will conserve the 
greatest quantity of annual flow of the river 
in a way to insure the continuance of exist- 
ing uses and development of the optimum 
feasible future uses within the water allot- 
ments to each countiy. It will enable develop- 
ments of hydroelectric energy which will be 
divided equally between the two countries. It 
will enable development of a great inland 
water recreational facility for the benefiit of 
this region in the two countries. 

The Presidents recognize that the construc- 
tion of the Amistad Dam stems from the good 
understanding and frank and cordial spirit of 
international cooperation which happily exist 
between the United States and Mexico, and 
that it constitutes an outstanding example of 
how two neighbor countries can resolve their 
common boundary problems with benefit to 

The Presidents expressed pleasure that this 
joint visit to the site of the Dam has afforded 
them opportunity to strengthen even more 
their personal friendship which will undoubt- 
edly be reflected in greater understanding 
between the two nations. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


President Johnson Lights 
the Nation's Christmas Tree 

Remarks by President Johnson i 

Tonight, with prayerful hope for the 
future, we have come here to light the Na- 
tion's Christmas tree. 

Exactly 175 years ago today America sent 
another light out into the world. That light — 
and that promise — was America's Bill of 
Rights. Few documents in all the history of 
freedom have ever so illuminated the paths 
of men. Today, the light of that great charter 
guides us yet. 

I know, as you know, that we face an un- 
certain future. Grave problems threaten us 
all. As your President, I struggle with these 
problems every waking moment of every day. 

Here at home, in our own land, more than 
20 million Negroes still yearn for the rights 
and the dignity that the rest of us take for 

Abroad, half of the world's people struggle 
daily against hunger, disease, and poverty. 

And tonight, even as we speak, American 
men are fighting in a strange land, a half a 
world away. 

And yet, at this time of Christmas, there 
are signs of hope. 

In the United States, we have made more 
progress in human rights in the past 6 years 
than we have made in all of the previous 100 
years. And, if the goal of true equality is still 
far down the road, the barriers before that 
goal are falling every day. 

Throughout the world old quarrels are be- 
ing forgotten, and nation is joining nation in 
a common effort to try to improve the lot of 

And finally, in Viet-Nam, the tide of battle 
has turned. No one can say just how long 
that war will last. But we can say that ag- 
gression has been blunted and that peace, 
with honor, will surely follow. 

The months ahead will not be easy ones. 
They will require great sacrifice, patience, 
understanding, and tolerance from each of 

' Made at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 15 (White 
House press release) . 

us. But let us here tonight dedicate this 
Christmas tree with hope and great confi- 
dence. And let us rededicate ourselves to the 
principles of our Bill of Rights "to give light 
to them that sit in darkness and in the 
shadow of death, to guide our feet into the 
way of peace." 

U.S. Pleased at Reappointment 
of U.N. Secretary-General 

On December 2 the U.N. General Assenv- 
bly unanimously approved the reappoint- 
ment of U Thant to another term of office 
as Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
Follo^ving is the text of a letter from Presi^ 
dent Johnson to Secretary-General U Thant, 
together ivith a statement by Arthur J. 
Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United 


U.S./U.N. press release 6001 dated December 4 

December 3, 1966 

My dear Mr. Secretary General: The 
American people join me in warmest con- 
gratulations on your reappointment for an 
additional five-year term. Your selfless deci- 
sion to continue to serve the organization 
will, I am sure, inspire the membership to 
strengthen the United Nations in discharging 
the great purposes of the Charter. 

In these troubled times, the devotion of the 
best talents, energies and efforts of men of 
good will to the cause of world peace is more 
indispensable than ever before. We are 
therefore especially pleased that you have re- 
dedicated yourself to this great task. 

You may depend on my continuing closest 
personal attention to the problems confront- 
ing the organization in its search for peace. 

In the years ahead, it is my greatest hope 
that your rededicated faith and skills will 
charge the United Nations with new 
strength, and the human family vdth new 
hope, and so give new substance to the 



promise of the Charter. As you enter on your 
new teiTn of office, you carry with you my 
best personal wishes. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 
statement by ambassador goldberg 

U.S./ U.N. press release 5000 dated December 2 

The United States is immensely gratified 
at the decision of the Secretary-General to 
accept another full term in this most im- 
portant oflSce. 

His high sense of duty led him to accede 
to the unanimous wishes of the Security 
Council, in spite of his personal desire to re- 
turn to private life. The United Nations 
sorely needs his experience, integrity, and 
the trust he commands from the entire mem- 
bership of the organization. By accepting 
another term he brings new strength, pur- 
pose, and confidence to the United Nations 
and to the high office of the Secretary-Gen- 
eral itself. 

My Government pledges him its full sup- 
port in this role which is so vital to the cause 
of world peace and security. 

International Conference 
on Education 

Folloiving is the text of a letter from. 
President Johnson to Dr. James Perkins, 
"president of Cornell University, regarding 
preparations for the International Confer- 
ence on Education to be held in 1967. 

White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated November 24 

November 24, 1966 
Dear Dr. Perkins : As you know, we are 
deeply concerned about the role of education 
in fostering social and economic development 
throughout the world. That concern underlies 
the new International Education Act of 
1966. It is the reason for the Center for 
Educational Cooperation which we are plan- 
ning to establish in the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare. 

I believe it is highly important to stimu- 
late deeper mutual understanding among na- 
tions of the major education problems facing 
the world. For this reason, I have asked you 
and Secretary Gardner to serve as hosts to an 
International Conference on Education to be 
held in 1967. It should provide a forum for 
lively discussion of future goals of educa- 
tional policy in the participating countries. 

Prior to this conference, I hope you will 
bring together the most knowledgeable edu- 
cators and administrators from the United 
States and from other nations to develop a 
meaningful agenda. 

I am grateful to you for undertaking this 
important project. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Group To Study Educational TV 
for Use in Aid Program 

Following is the text of a memorandum 
from President Johnson to the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Health, Education, 
and Welfare, the Director of the United 
States Information Agency, the Director of 
the Agency for International Development, 
and the Director of the Peace Corps. 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated November 26 

November 26, 1966 
During my recent trip to the Far East, 
I visited the educational television station in 
Pago Pago, American Samoa, and saw how 
television is being used to improve the level 
of learning in elementary and secondary 

I believe that educational television can 
play a vital role in assisting less-developed 
countries in their educational effort. These 
stations can be used for adult education and 
information programs during evening hours. 
Community leaders can use these channels 
for discussion of important public issues. 

For these reasons, I am appointing a task 
force with the following assignment: 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


1. Assess the value of educational televi- 
sion broadcasting for primary and secondary 
schools in less-developed countries. 

2. Report on plans being made for educa- 
tional television outside the United States 
and how the United States may participate 
most effectively in this effort. 

3. Advise whether AID education pro- 
grams and other foreign assistance can be 
better concentrated on this effort within their 
present limits. 

Representatives of the Agency for Inter- 
national Development, the Department of 
State, U. S. Information Agency, Depart- 
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, and 
the Peace Corps are designated as members 
of the task force. Leonard H. Marks, Direc- 
tor of the U. S. Information Agency, is to 
act as Chairman of the task force and Doug- 
lass Cater of my staff as liaison with the 
various departments or governmental agen- 
cies involved. 

This task force should commence its work 
immediately and submit a preliminary report 
within 90 days and a final report on or be- 
fore July 1, 1967. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Letters of Credence 


The first Ambassador of the Republic of 
Botswana, Zachariah K. Matthews, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Johnson 
on December 14. For text of the Ambassa- 
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated De- 
cember 14. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Luben Nikolov 
Guerassimov, presented his credentials to 
President Johnson on December 14. For text 
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated December 14. 

Ivory Coast 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Ivory Coast, Timonthee N'Guetta 
Ahoua, presented his credentials to President 
Johnson on December 14. For text of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated December 14. 


The first Ambassador of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho, Albert S. Mohale, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Johnson on December 
14. For text of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated December 14. 

Policy Planning Council, European 
Affairs Bureau Advisers Named 


The Department of State announced on 
December 9 (press release 288) the forma- 
tion of two panels of advisers for the Policy 
Planning Council. The establishment of these 
panels is part of a general effort, made public 
on October 18, ^ to seek the advice of private 
American citizens interested in foreign rela- 

One panel will advise the Council on long- 
term problems of growth in less developed 
areas, with particular emphasis on the prob- 
lem of food resources in relation to popula- 
tion growth. 

The other will advise on long-term prob- 
lems relating to the developed nations, with 
particular attention to (a) relations among 
the developed non-Communist nations; (b) 
East-West relations, involving both Com- 
munist and non-Communist nations; (c) 
North-South relations, between developed 
and developing countries. 

Of the 22 members of the panels, 15 are 
currently associated with universities and 7 

Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721. 



are affiliated with research, public service, 
and business organizations. 

The panels will meet several times a year, 
and the Department may be in touch with 
individual members at other times on specific 

The members of the two advisory panels 
to the Policy Planning Council are: 

Panel A — Economic Development, Food, 
and Population Problems 

Thomas K. Burch, director, demographic division. 
Center for Population Research, Georgetown 
University, Washington, D.C. 

Paul G. Clark, chairman. Center for Development 
Economics, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. 

Jonathan Garst, agricultural consultant and author, 
Berkeley, Calif. 

Everett E. Hagen, professor of economics, Mas- 
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 

Earl O. Heady, professor of agricultural economics, 
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 

D. Gayle Johnson, profes.sor of economics, Univer- 
sity of Chicago, Chicago, 111. 

Bruce F. Johnston, professor. Food Research Insti- 
tute, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 

Carl Kaysen, president. Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton, N.J. 

Dudley Kirk, president, Population Council, New 
York, N.Y. 

Gustav F. Papanek, Center for International Af- 
fairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Hugh T. Patrick, acting associate director, Economic 
Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven, 

Panel B — Developed Countries 

Abram Bergson, director, Russian Research Center, 

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Harold Van Buren Cleveland, vice president. First 

National City Bank, New York, N.Y. 
William E. Griffith, professor of political science, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 

Stanley H. Hoffmann, professor of political science. 

Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
Charles P. Kindelberger, professor of economics, 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 

Paul F. Langer, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 

Leon Lindberg, professor of political science, Uni- 
versity of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 
John Newhouse, associate, Twentieth Century Fund, 

New York, N.Y. 
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., assistant professor of 

political science, University of Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia, Pa. 

Richard E. Pipes, professor of history. Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Henry S. Rowen, president-designate, Rand Corpo- 
ration, Santa Monica, Calif. 


The Department of State announced on 
December 15 (press release 293) the forma- 
tion of a panel of advisers for the Bureau of 
European AflFairs. 

This is the sixth panel of advisers an- 
nounced by the Department in accordance 
with the general plan made public on October 
18 for the creation of several panels of civil- 
ian specialists from outside government to 
serve as advisers to the Department on a 
broad range of foreign policy matters. Ad- 
visory panels for the Bureaus of Interna- 
tional Organization Affairs ^ and East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs,^ including a separate 
panel on China,^ and two advisory panels for 
the Policy Planning Council were announced 

The 22 members of the European panel 
have been drawn chiefly from the academic 
community, private foundations, and re- 
search institutions. Other advisers may be 
added as required. 

Panel members will meet with the Assist- 
ant Secretary for European Affairs, John 
Leddy, individually or in small groups to dis- 
cuss specific aspects of policy. Mr. Leddy has 
told the panel members that he will look for- 
ward to receiving their thoughts at any time 
regarding existing policies and possibilities 
for new initiatives. This procedure began ear- 
lier this month when Mr. Leddy met with a 
small group from the panel. 

The members of the advisory panel to the 
Bureau of European Affairs are: 

Frank Altschul, vice president. Council on Foreig^n 

Relations, New York, N. Y. 
John A. Armstrong, professor of political science, 

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 

« Ibid., p. 722. 

' Ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 868. 

* Ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


Cyril E. Black, professor of history, Princeton Uni- 
versity, Princeton, N. J. 

John C. Campbell, senior research fellow. Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y. 

Mrs. Miriam Camps, Council on Foreign Relations, 
New York, N. Y. 

Melvin Conant, Government Relations Department, 
Standard Oil Company, New York, N. Y. 

Harold C. Deutsch, professor of history. University 
of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 

William Diebold, Jr., senior research fellow, Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York, N. Y. 

Merle Fainsod, professor of history and political sci- 
ence. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Werner B. Feld, chairman, Department of Govern- 
ment, Louisiana State University, New Orleans, 

William E. Griffith, professor of political science. 
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 

Ernest B. Haas, professor of international law and 
organization. University of California, Berkeley, 

Henry A. Kissinger, associate professor of govern- 
ment, Center for International Affairs, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Philip E. Mosely, director, European Institute, Co- 
lumbia University, New York, N. Y. 

Robert Osgood, director, Washington Center of For- 
eign Policy Research, Washington, D. C. 

Thomas C. Schelling, professor of economics, Center 
for International Affairs, Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Mass. 

Warner R. Schilling, acting director. Institute of 
War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, 
New York, N. Y. 

Paul Seabury, provost. College IV, University of 
California, Santa Cruz, Calif. 

Marshall D. Shulman, professor of international 
politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 
Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 

Eric Stein, professor of law, University of Michigan 
Law School, Ann Arbor, Mich. 

Shepard Stone, director, International Affairs Pro- 
gram, The Ford Foundation, New York, N. Y. 

Raymond Vernon, director. Center for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 2d Session 

News Policies in Vietnam. Hearings before the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 17- 
31, 1966. 161 pp. [Committee print.] 

Communist Threat to the United States Through 
the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal 
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Septem- 
ber 13-15, 1966. 42 pp. [Committee print] 

Florence Agreement Implementation Legislation. 
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance 
on H.R. 8664. September 30, 1966. 87 pp. [Com- 
mittee print.] 

An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military 
Assistance Programs in Vietnam. Forty-second 
report by the Committee on Government Opera- 
tions. H. Rept. 2257. October 12, 1966. 133 pp. 

International Education Act of 1966. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 14643. S. Rept. 1715. October 12, 
1966. 21 pp. 

Fur Seal Act of 1966. Conference report to accom- 
pany S.2102. H. Rept. 2274. October 13, 1966. 
4 pp. 

Tariff Classification of Chinese Gooseberries. Report 
to accompany H.R. 16160. H. Rept. 2282. October 
14, 1966. 2 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Television 
and Radio Receiving Tubes. Report to accompany 
H.R. 16092. October 14, 1966. 3 pp. 

Safety of Life at Sea. Conference report to accom- 
pany H.R. 10327. H. Rept. 2285. October 14, 1966. 
8 pp. 

Report of the Ninth Meeting of the Canada-United 
States Interparliamentary Group, May 18-22, 1966, 
Washington, D.C., by Representative Cornelius E. 
Gallagher, chairman of the House of Representa- 
tives delegation. H. Rept. 2291. October 17, 1966. 
16 pp. 

Duty Treatment of Limestone for Cement. Report 
to accompany H.R. 5950. H. Rept. 2293. October 

17, 1966. 2 pp. 

Duty Treatment of Dicyandiamide. Report to accom- 
pany H.R. 16077. H. Rept. 2294. October 17, 1966. 
2 pp. 

Tariff Treatment of Certain Articles. Conference re- 
port to accompany H.R. 11216. H. Rept. 2297. 
October 17, 1966. 4 pp. 

Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings. Report 
to accompany H.R. 13116. H. Rept. 2303. October 

18, 1966. 4 pp. 
Footl for Peace. Conference report to accompany 

H.R. 14929. H. Rept. 2304. October 18, 1966. 22 pp. 




OECD Ministerial Council IVIeets at Paris 

The Ministerial Council of the Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment met at Paris November 2i-25. Follow- 
ing are three statements made by Eugene V. 
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Af- 
fairs, who 7vas head of the U.S. delegation, 
and the text of a commiinique issued at the 
close of the meeting on November 25. 


I am pleased both personally and profes- 
sionally that my first appearance at an inter- 
national organization in my new post is at 
this meeting of the OECD. We are happy as 
a government to pay tribute to the OECD 
on its fifth anniversary, which marks almost 
20 years of constructive and sagacious work 
by this agency and its predecessor. 

I should like, if I may, to add a personal 
tribute to what I have said oflicially. Every 
student of economics and of international 
affairs is in your debt for a solid and quiet 
achievement, imaginative in its perspectives 
and original in its intellectual strength. Your 
studies and reports have been indispensable 
tools of study and of action, both for gov- 
ernments and international organizations 
and for scholars in many fields all over the 

Those of you who have read President 
Johnson's speech of October 7 ^ will appre- 

'For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

ciate the importance our Government at- 
taches to the future of the Atlantic relation- 
ship. That speech announces a policy of 
vigorous initiative in the many cooperative 
programs which have done so much to vital- 
ize the free world and knit it together. 

If we look back to the bleak days of the 
late forties, when this organization had its 
beginnings, we can realize what stupendous 
deeds have been accomplished. The economies 
and societies of the free world have been 
restored — indeed, more than restored, they 
have been transformed. The nations repre- 
sented here have never in their histories 
known so long a period of sustained growth 
nor a period so rich in progress toward social 
justice. Their achievement is truly the great 
social revolution of the 20th century, a revo- 
lution accomplished peacefully and without 
destructive conflict and one which dramati- 
cally improved the welfare of all our peoples. 

In this process the OECD has played a 
significant part from the days when its pred- 
ecessor helped to organize the eff"ort of the 
Marshall Plan in ways which contributed to 
the reconstruction both of national economies 
and of the international economy which is 
the decisive matrix of our respective national 

If we look forward in the perspective of 
this achievement, we can, I think, define one 
of the vital functions which the OECD can 
and should perform in guiding the relation- 
ships between our national economies and the 
international economy, from which they 

[JANUARY 2, 1967 


draw so much of their capacity for develop- 

The decisive fact about our economic ex- 
perience since 1945 is that each of us, in our 
own ways, has created and mastered methods 
for effectively managing our national eco- 
nomic lives. We now take it for granted that 
the great trade cycles of the past, the great 
swings of unemployment and inflation, are 
matters of economic history. It has been one 
of the basic purposes of this organization to 
help coordinate the policies of governments 
and international agencies in this regard, 
through the powerful influence of regular 
consultations based on serious studies. We 
take it for granted also that governments and 
public agencies can and should anticipate the 
future and help to direct flows of capital and 
the development of crucial techniques. We 
take it for granted that we should have poli- 
cies directed at targets for growth, an inno- 
vation in policy which this body has helped 
to establish. 

Some of the control measures developed in 
this period have worked better than others. 
Some are restrictive rather than expansive in 
their effects. Many are incomplete or in need 
of reform. For present purposes, the impor- 
tant fact is that we have reason to be confi- 
dent that our economic systems can be effec- 
tively directed as systems and that we c?n 
act effectively to improve and reform the 
devices of guidance and control which we use 
to manage different sectors of our economies, 
and those economies viewed in their totality. 
One of the shortcomings of the interna- 
tional economy of the free world, as com- 
pared with our several national economies, is 
that we have not yet developed procedures of 
international economic oversight as compre- 
hensive and as effective as those used in na- 
tional economic management. The OECD has 
made an important and most useful begin- 
ning in this regard. As we are all aware, one 
of its great tasks for the future is to develop 
this organization as an international coun- 
cil of economic advice which could help na- 
tional governments and other international 
agencies of action to establish the policies 

and programs we all need in order to main- 
tain an international economy of wide hori- 
zons through which mankind can be helped 
to realize the potentials of modern technique 
and to overcome the curse of poverty. 

One of the major tools of economic man- 
agement in all countries is that of the eco- 
nomic review — ^the attempt to examine the 
performance of the economy as a whole, and 
the performance of its several parts and 
sectors, in the light of our anticipations of 
the future. With that thought in mind, I turn 
now to the Secretary General's [Thorkil 
Kristensen] excellent and candid annual re- 
port to this Council, upon which he has just 

U.S. Economic Policy 

I shall note first the several references in 
his report to the economic performance of the 
United States. 

As the Secretary General remarked, our 
recent budgetary actions and programs of 
monetaiy restraint have slowed down what 
might have become an untenably rapid rise 
in economic activity. We agree with his con- 
clusion that both the level of internal demand 
and the pressures of militaiy spending in the 
United States raise the possibility that fur- 
ther restrictive measures might become de- 
sirable, depending upon the response of the 
economy to the programs of limitation which 
have already been applied and the new budg- 
et. As he says, a flexible fiscal policy may be 
called for in the months ahead. I can assure 
you that the issue is on our agenda. 

We will not have a recession in 1967. Nor 
shall we have anything that could properly 
be described as an inflation. All recent indi- 
cations are that we are making the transition 
to a sustainable full employment growth pat- 
tern, despite the burden of our military re- 
sponsibilities and all that they have involved 
in recent years. 

If we have not made further progress in 
our balance-of-payments position this year, 
the chief reasons are the increase in our im- 
ports, due to the high rate of economic activ- 
ity at home, and the continuing direct foreign 



exchange costs of our inteniational commit- 
ments — two factors which are interrelated. 
These trends have been offset to a certain ex- 
tent by capital movements influenced by the 
level of interest rates in the United States. 

The United States has, at present, a net 
international payments deficit on military ac- 
count of $2.6 billion. This is not the budget- 
ary cost, but the foreign exchange drain. We 
have a net deficit on foreign aid account — 
after tying — of about three-quarters of a bil- 
lion dollars. The total of these twa items 
taken together is about 2i/o times our liquid- 
ity deficit. 

It is our policy to make further progress 
toward equilibrium in our balance of pay- 
ments, through the modification and continu- 
ance of our present actions. The limiting 
factor in that process, of course, is the need 
to maintain military forces both in Europe 
and in the Far East, where their presence is 
required by overriding considerations of col- 
lective security. 

And there should be no doubt, finally, that 
the United States is prepared to adjust its 
fiscal, monetary, and other policies as neces- 
sary to assure a growing, balanced economy. 

Need for Productivity Gains 

r Turning now to other aspects of economic 
policy, I join in the general commendation of 
Working Party II for its excellent review of 
progress toward the economic growth target. 
The policy lessons of the growth report are 

We can agree with the Secretary General 
that economic growth and price stability are 
not always easy partners in a free society. If 
we are to achieve both goals, we need to blend 
fiscal, monetary, and income policies for flexi- 
ble demand management and appropriate re- 
straint on costs. 

But new, bold policies will be needed to 
supplement those which have already become 
familiar. During the first 5 years of this 
decade, labor markets in most of our coun- 
tries were relieved of excessive pressures by 
the availability of new workers. They came 
into the labor market by immigration. 

through a reduction of unemployment, or 
through movements from farm to industry. 
For the next 5 years, and for the longer run, 
many of these sources may diminish in im- 
portance. Meanwhile, the trend will continue 
toward shorter hours, longer vacations, ear- 
lier retirement, later school-leaving ages. If 
present manpower policies continue, we shall 
be lucky in many countries if the effective 
labor force can be held stable — which would 
mean that the entire burden of economic 
growth wall depend on increases in produc- 

This prospect should tell us how necessary 
will be policy measures aimed at steady and 
substantial productivity gains. Many of the 
issues that arise are being considered in the 
bodies of this organization. We need to pur- 
sue these lines of work with all possible ex- 
pedition and vigor. 

Higher productivity requires some reallo- 
cation of resources and increased attention to 
investment, as was so well pointed out in the 
growth report. 

For this reason, as well as for reasons of 
simple social justice, we attach great impor- 
tance to the manpower studies of OECD. We 
have much to learn from each other's experi- 
ence in this vital field. New and imaginative 
methods have been adopted in recent years 
in education, in retraining, and in encourag- 
ing labor mobility. More is to be done, both 
directly and through appropriate tax meas- 
ures, to encourage the employment of older 
people who prefer work to retirement and to 
facilitate the training of migrants from so- 
cieties which have not been part of the world 
of modern technology. We are far from hav- 
ing exhausted the range of wise and humane 
actions that governments can take to raise 
the income-producing capacities of their 

The United States has taken many of its 
ideas in this general area from European ex- 
perience, but we are still comparatively back- 
ward in this significant area. We think that 
continuing systematic exchanges on man- 
power policy in the OECD can be of real 
value to all of us in the pursuit of more 

IJANUARY 2, 1967 


mobile and more equitable societies. 

Another key to higher productivity is ad- 
vancing technology — the fruits of research 
and development and investment in new 
plant and equipment. 

The Pace of Technological Change 

I know that there is concern in Europe — 
and understandable concern — that the pace 
of technological change is lagging here in 
comparison with the United States. In some 
areas these disparities of technique produce 
anxiety about a possible loss of economic 
control, or a sense of coercive pressure. 

I suggest that if these problems are ex- 
amined in wider perspective, anxieties should 
be allayed. If we look at the entire range of 
our industries and not only at the few in- 
dustries which have been propelled forward 
by new techniques generated in or near 
the defense sector, we see at once that there 
are many technological gaps and not simply 
one. The principle of comparative advantage 
has not vanished as a force in economic life. 
No one can ride on an American railroad 
coach and conclude that all technical dispari- 
ties are in one direction. 

The problem of using science in technology 
is a universal one and an old one. All coun- 
tries have much to contribute if advance is to 
be maintained. And advance requires many 
modes of cooperative effort, from which we 
have as much to learn as to contribute. 

We are therefore ready, as President 
Johnson said recently,^ to join with you in 
a systematic examination of these problems 
and in cooperative programs to further the 
advance of science and technology. I have no 
doubt that the work just begun by the 
Science Policy Committee will illuminate this 
whole complex area and will point to ways 
in which we can cooperate to foster an opti- 
mum rate of technological development 
throughout the OECD community. 

If we are to realize our full potential in 
technological advancement, we shall need 
more investment and the reallocation of re- 


sources that I referred to earlier. We are 
persuaded that much can be done in all our 
economies, and in the international economy, 
to improve our machinery for mobilizing 
savings and making them available for the ^ 
basic work of cost reduction through invest- 
ment. This, I believe, is where the role of 
our capital markets is fundamental to the 
growth process. 

As you know, the United States attaches 
great importance to the capital-markets 
study now before us and to the recommenda- 
tions we expect to see emerge from further 
work. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that later 
today you call upon Mr. Silberstein [Murray 
Silberstein, of Oppenheimer and Co., New 
York] of the American delegation for some 
further observations about this important 

Restrictive Business Practices 

Similarly, I trust that you are in agree- 
ment that the organization should actively 
pursue its work on restrictive business prac- 
tices. Private arrangements to share mar- 
kets, to fix prices, and otherwise to evade 
the discomforts of competition are destined 
by their nature to inhibit the growth of pro- 
ductivity. When extended beyond one coun- 
try they tend to frustrate and offset the 
economic benefits of lower trade barriers. 

Our Committee of Experts is considering 
a recommendation to member governments 
on international cooperation in the field of 
restrictive business practices. We support 
the recommendation and hope that it will 
lead to further cooperative steps in this im- 
portant field. The whole area is one of fun- 
damental importance to the development of a 
truly effective international economy. There 
have been changes in law and practice in 
this field in many countries in recent years 
and in the European Economic Community. 
Whether an international agreement is 
needed to supplement national law in pro- 
tecting the international economy as a whole 
is a question which in our view merits seri- 
ous consideration. 



Continuing work on investment in educa- 
tion, on curriculm building, and on teach- 
ing teachers also deserves our support. 
Nothing is more important for the future 
of the OECD community than an expanding 
flow of teachers and students in both direc- 
tions across the Atlantic and Pacific. 

Let me close this intervention with some 
brief remarks on the bearing of certain other 
international economic policies on economic 

One is trade policy. We are not here to 
debate the issues of the Kennedy Round. 
But as we move into an economic situation 
in which manpower and other resources be- 
come progressively tighter, we are going to 
need to improve the efficiency with which 
we use these factors of production. Trade 
policy offers the most immediate and prac- 
tical way we have to expose our economies 
to the fresh air of competition. 

The forces of protection and restriction 
are always with us, always seeking to es- 
tablish comfortable enclaves of monopoly. 
If we hope to hold a line against that pres- 
sure and to find out where we can produce 
most profitably, we shall need pressures 
from outside as well as from inside our 
countries. Our basic interests should lead us 
not only to take advantage of the Kennedy 
Round to achieve the greatest reduction of 
tariff and other trade barriers in the post- 
war period but also to take a long look ahead 
at the needs of the OECD community for the 
trade policy that will promote economic 

International Monetary Policy 

Finally, I turn to international monetary 

Beyond the immediate problems of deficits 
and surpluses is the question of the interna- 
tional monetary system itself. 

The system under which we have lived 
since the end of the war has gone hand in 
hand with the longest period of steady eco- 
nomic growth and the greatest expansion of 
trade in the history of our countries. It has 

been developed and maintained by a series 
of ingenious and imaginative devices of co- 
operation, which have supplemented and fur- 
thered the invaluable influence of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund. No tribute can be 
excessive to the devoted work of the various 
groups of experts in this field who have 
solved successive threats to the monetary 
system in a spirit of admirable solidarity. 
Our Economic Policy Committee and its 
Working Party III have also been notable 
participants in this endeavor. Without these 
international efforts the progress of the 
world economy in investment, trade, and 
growth would have been impossible. 

The assurance of relative stability and 
openness in our monetary arrangements has 
been a major factor in the structure of the 
economy, a factor favoring and facilitating 
growth on a world scale. 

Nonetheless, the monetary system is not 
yet perfectly adapted to the economic needs 
of the next generation. If by common con- 
sent we now wish to modify it, we should 
do so in the spirit of building on what has 
been accomplished for positive and carefully 
defined goals. 

Essentially, we should seek to improve the 
system in many ways that will continue to 
provide the monetary basis for high and sus- 
tained rates of growth of production and 
trade. We wish, of course, to maintain the 
discipline of external reality in our internal 
programs of costs, prices, and investment. 
But we do not want the monetary system 
to work in such fashion that ijiembers of the 
system encountering temporary balance-of- 
payments deficits are driven to unduly dis- 
ruptive internal and external policies. 

Recent trends in the accumulation and dis- 
position of reserve assets make it clear that 
we need a new and assured source of 
liquidity which can be employed responsibly 
and under proper safeguards when needed. 
This is, I believe, the objective of the Group 
of Ten.3 And we need to adopt and adapt on 

^ The 10 countries which participate in the Gen- 
eral Arrangements To Borrow, designed to provide 
the IMF with additional currencies. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


a practical basis the sensible suggestions of 
Working Party III in its report on the ad- 
justment process. Other improvements in the 
monetary system may well be considered. 
As the fruitful and promising proposals of 
recent years approach the point of decision 
through the tested machinery of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, these possibilities 
should also be examined. 

The debate over monetary policy, like 
many other aspects of economics, sometimes 
takes on a moral cast.. We have gotten over 
the puritanical conviction that periods of 
depression and unemployment were good for 
our characters. But we still sometimes talk 
as if the balance of payments were a totem 
to be worshipped, not an economic reality 
like others to be controlled in the interest 
of the general welfare. Not all balance-of- 
payments deficits or surpluses are sinful or 
harmful to the legitimate economic interests 
of other countries. I hope and believe we are 
learning to confront this fact as a fact with- 
out raising the temperature of international 


Press release 280 dated November 25 

I should like to say a few words now 
about East-West relations or more specifi- 
cally about the part the OECD might play 
in the task of closing the breach that has ex- 
isted between Western and Eastern Europe 
for nearly 20 years. 

President Johnson on October 7 in a basic 
statement of policy on American relations 
with Europe said: "Our task is to achieve a 
reconciliation with the East — a shift from 
the narrow concept of coexistence to the 
broader vision of peaceful engagement." He 
observed in the course of his remarks that 
"The OECD can . . . play an important part 
in trade and contact with the East." 

There is nothing new in this announce- 
ment. What is new in the President's speech 
is the feeling that for many reasons the time 
may have come for the Eastern countries to 

accept our overtures. We can hope so and 
try, separately and together. 

Two facts about the situation in Europe 
are plain, as the President made clear: There 
can be no detente in Europe without German ' 
reunification, but no peaceful reunification of 
Germany can be imagined without detente, 
without the consent of the Soviet Union and 
the East European countries. 

You will all recall that Secretary Marshall 
in 1947 called for a European-wide coopera- 
tive effort to restore the whole continent to 
economic health.* It was the choice of the 
Soviet Union and not of the United States 
that made the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation a purely Western en- 
terprise. It would be entirely fitting, as we 
approach the 20th anniversary of the Mar- 
shall Plan, for the OECD to have a part in 
the unfinished task of fostering the recon- 
ciliation of the two Europes. I 

What might the OECD do to foster this 
process? In the first instance, it seems to us 
the OECD offers a place where we could 
have a fruitful systematic exchange of 
views about our peaceful economic relations 
with Eastern Europe. If we begin with the 
proposition that our interest is in expanding 
and strengthening those relationships, then 
we could use the several bodies of the OECD 
for an examination of ways and means to 
prosecute that interest. For example, we 
should be interested in your experience with, 
and appraisal of, the possibilities for invest- 
ment in Eastern Europe, including joint ven- 

We are not suggesting, I emphasize, that 
we should promote a common position with 
which to confront the countries of Eastern 
Europe. Rather we should work for a shared 
view about practical steps which might be 
taken separately and together to extend and 
advance the area of peaceful economic en- 

Trade is a case in point. The United States 
has not traditionally had a large trade with 

■* For an address by Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, 
see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159. 



the Soviet Union and the countries of East- 
ern Europe. In both the prewar and postwar 
periods other OECD countries have had 
much more ex])erience in this field. In this 
respect, we are simply following the lead of 
all the countries of Western Europe. Trad- 
ing with centrally planned and state-trading 
countries calls for diflferent methods than 
those which apply in trade with Western 
countries, at least at this stage in the evolu- 
tion of the economies of the Eastern Euro- 
pean countries. We believe there is much to 
be learned from your experience and feel 
that it could be extremely useful for the 
Trade Committee to undertake an exchange 
of views about the modalities of trade with 
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe. 

In the second instance, it seems to us 
that there are certain activities within the 
OECD that might be made more productive 
for us all if we were eventually to associate 
some or all of the Eastern European coun- 
tries with them. One thinks, for example, of 
tourism, which has become the single largest 
European industry. Our citizens are breach- 
ing frontiers everywhere, in the peaceful 
pursuit of sunshine, scenery, and culture, to 
say nothing of souvenirs. Now that the tour- 
ist has found Eastern Europe, it might be 
appropriate for OECD's Tourism Committee 
to consider how its activities might be 
broadened to cover additional countries; sim- 
ilarly, we might consider inviting Eastern 
European representatives to such activities 
as the OECD-sponsored Conference on Road 

These are suggestive, not exhaustive, of 
possibilities that might be explored. 

It would be prudent, of course, to move 
ahead carefully. We recognize the need to 
take fully into account the activities and po- 
tential of the Economic Commission for Eu- 
rope and of other organizations in the U.N. 
family. For many purposes they will be pref- 
erable institutions to the OECD as forums 
for promoting improved East- West relations. 
Following the sage advice this morning of 
the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, we 
should not waste our budget in duplicative 
projects. Taking this aspect of the problem 

fully into account, I urge that this ministerial 
meeting endorse the proposal that the Sec- 
retary General in consultation with heads of 
delegations be asked to explore within the 
organization the possibilities for a construc- 
tive OECD role in the reconciliation of East 
and West. 

I further urge that a statement to this 
effect be included in the communique. 


The evolution of our agenda reflects the 
changing pattern of world politics and of 
world economics. For a few years — a very 
few years only — Europe was our preoccupa- 
tion. But the task of order and progress in 
the world at large quickly forced itself upon 
us. Our membership and our agenda were 

Today we turn to one of the key issues, 
on which, it is not too much to say, the 
future of peace and progress depend. 

Article I of our convention assigns a high 
priority to development assistance policies. 
We have just heard the somber and powerful 
exposition of Secretary General Kristensen. 
My Government agrees with his analysis. We 
believe that in the years ahead of us we 
shall have to take a great leap forward in 
this field if we hope to avert social catas- 
trophe on an unimaginable scale. 

Our view of the nature of the development 
process in nonindustrialized countries recalls 
prevailing opinion about the problem of re- 
construction in Europe at the end of the war. 
At first we thought a few small reconstruc- 
tion loans would do the job. We gradually 
began to realize that the task was of a com- 
pletely different order of magnitude, that it 
required national and international efforts 
on a very much larger scale: the Marshall 
Plan and OEEC and EPU [European Pay- 
ments Union] , productivity missions and re- 
training programs — a long list of efforts 
which were in fact sociological as well as 
economic in their effect. 

Development assistance is quite possibly 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


the most complex undertaking that our 
countries have ever embarked upon. We are 
only beginning to achieve a comprehensive 
notion of how our resources can best be used 
to further the cause of development. We shall 
continue for a long time to need an active 
and creative Development Assistance Com- 
mittee to consider our respective experiences 
and for the planning of new programs and 

So far as the United States is concerned, 
we see several areas for urgent DAC atten- 
tion. They are: 

First, the world food problem; 

Second, self-help performance standards; 

Third, the growing burden of indebtedness 
on developing countries. 

The Secretary General has referred to the 
gravity of the world food problem, and Sec- 
retary Schnittker [John A. Schnittker, Un- 
der Secretary of Agriculture] will wish to 
comment on this crucial issue. 

My own view is that we face here a situa- 
tion of potential disaster. We cannot afford 
to pass over any opportunity to do something 
about it now, while we still have a margin of 

Secretary Rusk last July at the DAC high- 
level meeting asked for "openminded exami- 
nation" by OECD members of a number of 
proposals and questions for dealing with the 
problem,^ all of which we hope the OECD 
will consider. In the meantime our thinking 
has progressed further. 

In our judgment, one way we might col- 
lectively mark the 20th anniversary of the 
Marshall Plan would be for OECD members 
more tangibly to demonstrate their willing- 
ness to help the developing countries. 

Agricultural Development Fund 

We believe that OECD members should 
carefully consider establishment of a fund 
to stimulate agricultural development. Such 
a fund could encourage investors in OECD 
countries to invest in agriculture and in ag- 
riculturally related industry in developing 

■ Ibid., Aug. 8, 1966, p. 199. 

countries. Perhaps it could guarantee invest- 
ment in facilities located in developing coun- 
tries producing fertilizer and other agricul- 
tural inputs and it could provide an interest 
rate subsidy on approved private loans for 
agricultural development in developing coun- 

We hope that you will wish to give the 
most serious consideration to such possibili- 
ties. Indeed, we should particularly welcome 
proposals from you for an even more far- 
reaching demonstration of the organization's 
willingness to help meet the capital needs of 
the developing countries. However, since we 
all have budgetary problems, it is the under- 
lying thought of the American suggestion 
that we should try to use limited public re- 
sources in such a way as to promote the 
maximum flow of private capital to develop- 
ing countries and particularly into the agri- 
cultural sector. 

A year or two ago the DAC devoted a 
good bit of attention to the question of self- 
help performance and recommended in July 
1965 that member countries take account of 
the self-help efforts of developing countries 
in determining the level and composition of 
their assistance. We believe that it is now 
time for the DAC to return to the question 
of development performance: How can we 
employ our aid to elicit and support the best 
efforts of the developing countries? This will 
call for a closer look at what is going on 
within the developing countries than we have 
hitherto taken. And this need raises ques- 
tions of procedures and organizational rela- 
tionships which Secretary Schnittker will dis- 
cuss in a moment. 

Debt Problem of the Developing Countries 

A thii'd subject for the DAC is the increas- 
ingly sizable debt problem of the developing 

A recent study by a DAC working party 
gave some indication of its dimensions: Eight 
countries with a total indebtedness of about 
$7 billion are in near critical situations; an- 
other 15 countries with a proportionately 
large debt burden can be classified as serious 
cases likely calling for urgent action by their 




creditors in the near future. We believe fur- 
ther study looking to ways of forestalling 
impending debt crises is urgently needed. But 
debt is the result of the volume and terms of 
past lending. To increase the net transfer of 
resources to developing countries, we must 
increase the volume of aid and greatly im- 
prove the terms of lending. 

We hope the DAC will continue its efforts 
in this field in close relationship with the 
IMF and the IBRD [International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development]. 

Let me mention briefly the financial re- 
quirements of the International Development 
Association. Last July the President of the 
Bank outlined his proposals for the replenish- 
ment of IDA at a significantly higher amount 
in order to provide resources needed to carry 
on IDA'S critical role in providing develop- 
ment capital. My own Government has stated 
its willingness to increase its contribution to 
IDA under suitable arrangements dealing 
with the transfer problem,* and I hope that 
other OECD member countries also will 
promptly support IDA replenishment. 

Finally, I believe that any OECD discus- 
sion of trade policy in November 1966 must 
give priority attention to the GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariff's and Trade] negotia- 
tions now entering their decisive stage at 
Geneva. Full success of the Kennedy Round 
can make a major contribution to improving 
the export prospects of the developing coun- 
tries. This will require, however, greater 
efforts than heretofore to put together a 
special package of particular interest to the 
developing countries. We intend to do our 
I part. 

Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Special 
Group, my delegation is pleased to support 
the recommendation of the Trade Committee 
and the Secretary General that the group 
continue its work. 

The Special Group has done a useful job 
in beginning an exploration of various al- 
ternative policies to provide improved op- 
portunities for the developing countries to 
expand their export earnings. This is an im- 

portant, complex, and difficult subject, and 
the full implications of any possible new ap- 
proaches have to be carefully studied and 
weighed. In particular, our effort to achieve 
harmonized and constructive trade policies to 
aid the developing countries should take full 
account, in my view, of the importance of 
continuing the process of reducing tariffs on 
a global basis. 


1. The Council of the OECD met at Ministerial 
level in Paris on 24th and 25th November 1966, 
under the Chairmanship of the Honourable Gun- 
nar Lange, Minister of Commerce and Industry of 
Sweden, and reviewed the economic situation of its 
Member countries, their economic relations with the 
rest of the world, and the work of the Organisation 

2. Five years ago Ministers set the collective tar- 
get to be achieved between 1960 and 1970 of a 50 
per cent growth in real gross national product for 
Member countries as a whole.' Ministers welcomed 
the Report on Economic Growth in the decade 1960- 
70 which shows that progress so far has been satis- 
factory and has even exceeded the rate needed to 
meet this target. The growth prospects for the re- 
mainder of the decade continue to be good, but the 
problem of containing inflationary tendencies while 
maintaining full employment is still in the fore- 
ground. Member countries will have to pursue their 
efforts to ensure the effective control of demand, the 
increase of productive resources and the optimum 
use of available manpower. Ministers therefore in- 
structed the Organisation to continue its work on 
these problems. 

3. Concerning international payments Ministers 
noted that, because of the strong measures taken in 
the United Kingdom, a substantial improvement can 
now be expected in the balance of payments of this 
country. France, Italy and Japan, which recently 
had large surpluses, are now also moving slowly 
towards a more equilibrated position but a new 
surplus appears to be arising in Germany. In the 
United States' payments situation, encouraging prog- 
ress has been made, although the deficit in the 
global balance has not yet disappeared. Increasing 
defence expenditure has contributed to a reduction of 
the current surplus but the net capital outflow has 
been reduced considerably because of higher interest 
rates in the country and governmental measures. In 
general the differences in interest rates between 
Member countries are smaller than last year. 

'For background, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 633. 

' Ibid., Dec. 18, 1961, p. 1014. 

FAlSrUARY 2, 1967 


Ministers instructed the Organisation to continue 
to keep under surveillance the payments relations of 
its Member countries taking into account the recom- 
mendations contained in its Report on the Adjust- 
ment Process. 

4. Ministers agreed that the Organisation should 
continue its work directed to improving the opera- 
tion of capital markets; this work has given valu- 
able indications about the mechanisms for mobilising 
savings to finance investment. The Organisation will 
also pursue actively the work already begun on the 
nature and the economic consequences of differences 
in scientific and technical levels between countries. 

5. The developing Member countries have dur- 
ing the period 1960/65 on the whole had a faster 
economic growth than other Members but being 
societies in transformation they have special prob- 
lems that are being dealt with in the Organisation 
and will call for continued attention. 

Concerning the Consortia for Greece and Turkey, 
it was stressed that appropriate aid in forms cor- 
responding to the needs of the two countries con- 
tinued to be necessary. 

6. Despite some increase in 1965 the total flow 
of aid from Member countries to developing coun- 
tries in general is still unsatisfactory and the pay- 
ments difficulties of a number of developing coun- 
tries are increasing. Ministers stressed that the 
volume of aid should be increased in the years to 
come and its terms and conditions improved. 

The Ministers took note of various suggestions 
for improving the development assistance efforts of 
OECD countries. 

Agricultural production in a number of develop- 
ing countries is growing slowly, while demand is 
rising fast, partly because of the rapid population 
grrowth. Greater emphasis should therefore be given 
to agricultural development in the aid programmes 
of Member countries and possible ways should be 
studied of stimulating private investment in agri- 
culture and agriculture-related industries in the de- 
veloping countries. 

The various aspects of the food problems are now- 
taken up by the Organisation in co-operation with 
other international organisations. 

7. Ministers stressed the importance of a success- 
ful conclusion of the current multilateral tariff nego- 
tiations (Kennedy Round). 

8. The Special Group set up to examine trade re- 
lations with developing countries pursuant to a de- 
cision by the Council meeting at Ministerial level in 
November 1965 was asked by Ministers to continue 
its work. 

9. Finally, Ministers expressed interest in widen- 
ing the area of east-west economic relations. They 
agreed that the Secretary-General, in consultation 
with Permanent Representatives, should consider 
within the Organisation possibilities of action. 


Barbados Admitted 
to United Nations 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg \ 

U. S. Representative in the Security Council ' -^. 

As the representative of my country I join 
my colleagi'es who have spoken in expressing 
great pleasure in the opportunity to vote to 
recommend the admission of the newly inde- 
pendent state of Barbados to membership in 
the United Nations. 

Barbados last month became the 26th in- 
dependent nation in this hemisphere. We 
congratulate both Barbados and the United 
Kingdom for the peaceful and friendly 
manner in which the transition to independ- 
ence was accomplished. And this congratula- 
tion I am very glad to extend in person to 
the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Great 
Britain, my old friend George Brown, who 
graces us with his presence here today. 

At the ceremonies in Bridgetown on No- 
vember 30, Barbados became the 28th British 
dependent territory to be granted independ- 
ence after World War II. Quite a record ! 

Our Chief Justice and a delegation of 
prominent Americans were privileged to par- 
ticipate in the impressive independence-day 
ceremonies in Barbados, to which Chief 
Adebo [S. 0. Adebo, representative of 
Nigeria] just made reference. They enjoyed 
the hospitality and the balmy climate of this 
island, just as many Americans have enjoyed 
it with the great cordiality they have always 
received from the citizens of Barbados. And 
I wish to take this occasion to assure the citi- 
zens of Barbados that as fellow ex-colonists 
we shall receive them with similar cordiality 
if they visit the friendly shores of Massa- 

We believe that Barbados enters the family 
of nations with a proud heritage which will 
serve it well as it faces the challenges of in- 
dependence. Lord Caradon [representative of 
the United Kingdom] has made reference to 

' Made in the Security Council on Dec. 7 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 5005). 


their great democratic tradition. Indeed, it is 
well to remind ourselves that the Barbados 
House of Assembly, established in 1639, is 
the third oldest parliament in the Common- 
wealth of Nations and also the third oldest in 
the Western Hemisphere. The Barbados Dec- 
laration of Rights of 1651 was well known 
to the framers of our Declaration of Inde- 
pendence and to the framers of our Consti- 
tution. Indeed, many of the rights which 
were proclaimed in the Barbados Declaration 
of Rights were later echoed in these great 
American documents of independence and 

The people of Barbados have enjoyed full 
internal self-government since 1961, and 
their government was chosen in free demo- 
cratic elections under universal suffrage. So 
this country is well prepared to take its place 
in the family of nations as a sovereign state. 

Reference has already been made, and I 

shall not repeat what has been said, about the 
commendable advances that the people of 
Barbados have made in the economic and 
social spheres. 

In conclusion, I wish to convey on behalf 
of the United States our sincere congratula- 
tions to the distinguished Prime Minister of 
Barbados, Mr. Errol Walton Barrow, and 
His Excellency the Governor General of 
Barbados, Sir John Stow, who played such an 
important part in this peaceful transition to 

Mr. President, the United States welcomes 
the application of Barbados and looks for- 
ward to close association with its representa- 
tives here, and we gladly support the resolu- 
tion submitted here today by its sponsors.^ 

* The Council on Dec. 7 unanimously recommended 
that Barbados be admitted to membership in the 
United Nations. On Dec. 9 the General Assembly 
admitted Barbados by acclamation. 

U.N. Urges No Interference With Right 
of Peoples to Self-Determination 

Following are statements made by U.S. 
Representative James M. Nabrit, Jr., in the 
U.N. General Assembly during debate on the 
agenda item entitled "Strict observance of 
the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
in international relations, and of the right of 
peoples to self-determination," together with 
the text of a tivo-part resolution adopted on 
November 30. 


U.S. delesration press release 4970 

I had not intended to participate in the 
discussion this morning but some of the un- 
founded and sweeping statements made have 
led me to intervene. 

I do not intend to speak at length. I can- 
not refrain from noting, however, that the 

willingness of certain delegates to use this 
and every other U.N. forum to talk about 
Viet-Nam, combined with their unwilling- 
ness to let any U.N. organ try to do any- 
thing about Viet-Nam, shows a cynical dis- 
respect for the role and responsibility of the 
United Nations and its members which my 
delegation cannot share. 

Viet-Nam is, of course, vitally related to 
one of the rights touched upon in the speech 
by the Czechoslovakian delegate this morn- 
ing, the right of self-determination. Indeed, 
this is the very core of the Vietnamese con- 
flict. For what we seek in Viet-Nam, and 
what the people of South Viet-Nam are fight- 
ing for, is what any people anywhere have 
the right to: the right to determine their own 
political destiny free from interference. 

No amount of polemics or invective or dis- 

JANUARY 2, 1967 


tortion of the record can alter the fact that 
North Viet-Nam is so far unwilling to per- 
mit the people of South Viet-Nam to exercise 
that right. Surely, the representative of 
Czechoslovakia — from the past bitter experi- 
ence of his own people in both the postwar 
and the prewar period — must have a deep 
appreciation of the strong yearning of peo- 
ples to choose their own political, economic, 
and social system, free of external force and 

The essential facts of the Viet-Nam con- 
flict can be stated briefly: 

Viet-Nam today remains divided along the 
demarcation line agreed upon in Geneva in 
1954. To the north and south of that line are 
North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. Pro- 
visional though they may be, pending a deci- 
sion on the peaceful reunification of Viet- 
Nam by the process of self-determination, 
they are nonetheless political realities in the 
international community. 

The Geneva accord which established the 
demarcation line is so thorough in its prohi- 
bition of the use of force that it forbids mili- 
tary interference of any sort by one side in 
the aff"airs of the other. It even forbids ci- 
vilians to cross the demilitarized zone. In 
1962, at the Geneva conference held that 
year, military infiltration through Laos was 
?.lso forbidden. 

Yet, despite those provisions South Viet- 
Nam is under an attack, already several 
years old, by forces directed and supplied 
from the North and reinforced by regular 
units — currently some 17 identified regi- 
ments — of the North Vietnamese Army. The 
manifest purpose of this attack is to force 
upon the people of South Viet-Nam a system 
which they have not chosen by any peaceful 

The prohibition of the use of force in the 
charter itself must apply with full vigor to 
international demarcation lines that have 
been established by solemn international 
agreements. This is true not only in Viet- 
Nam but also in all divided states, where the 
recourse to force between the divided parts 
can have far-reaching consequences. Further- 
more, solemn international agreements, spe- 

cifically the Geneva accord, explicitly pro- 
hibit recourse to force as a means of reuni- 
fying Viet-Nam. 

It is because of the attempt to upset by 
violence the situation in Viet-Nam, and its 
far-reaching implications elsewhere, that the 
United States and other countries have re- 
sponded to appeals from South Viet-Nam 
for military assistance. 

We want a political solution, not a military 
solution, to this conflict. By the same token, 
we reject the idea that North Viet-Nam has 
the right to impose a military solution. 

We seek to assure for the people of South 
Viet-Nam the same right of self-determina- 
tion — to decide its own political destiny free 
of force — that the United Nations Charter 
aflfirms for all. 

As Ambassador Goldberg stated to the As- 
sembly on September 23: ^ When it comes to 
Viet-Nam, "what counts ... is not prowess in 
the art of invective but prowess in the art 
of peacemaking." 


U.S. delegation press release 4992 

The United States, as a cosponsor of draft 
resolution A/L.495, has participated vigor- 
ously in the long and complex negotiations 
from which the new draft, in document A/L. 
501 just introduced by Ambassador [Kurt] 
Waldheim of Austria, has emerged. 

It is hardly necessary to recall the impor- 
tant role which the United States has played 
throughout its history in the evolution of 
self-determination and freedom. One need 
only refer to the Fourteen Points of Presi- 
dent Wilson in this connection. 

In this century my country has devoted 
much of its human and material resources to 
the protection of many nations and peoples 
throughout the world from the ravages of 
the threat and use of force. We hope that all 
nations and authorities will heed the call of 
this text to refrain from the unjustified use 
of armed force and put aside attacks on 

For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966, p. 609. 



peoples who wish to be free and live in peace. 

The United States warmly supports the 
emphasis of the new text on freedom. For 
our part, we consider that the right of every 
people to freedom deserves special attention 
and is something more than, and different 
from, the principle of self-determination or 
the combined "principle" of self-determina- 
tion and independence. We are glad that this 
compromise text recognizes the right of peo- 
ples "to self-determination and freedom and 

The draft resolution thus clearly applies 
to the unhappy instances of those who have 
been deprived of their freedom or autonomy 
since the Second World War. The resolution 
thus usefully reminds us that the depriva- 
tion of the freedom of a people is as much a 
violation of the principle of self-determina- 
tion as the failure to permit a dependent 
people to achieve self-government or inde- 
pendence, as may be appropriate. 

Second, this resolution is, of course, not a 
statement of international law. While it 
speaks in terms of rights and duties, it rep- 
resents essentially a political statement by 
the General Assembly of the importance of 
freedom and self-determination and reminds 
states of the critical importance that all 
should comply with the requirement of arti- 
cle 2, paragraph 4, of the charter, which 
prohibits "the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independ- 
ence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations." Certainly the compromise text 
does not — and could not — affect obligations 
of member states under the charter. 

From the beginning of the debate on 
agenda item 92, the Assembly has considered 
only the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force insofar as it relates to self-determina- 
tion. Obviously, therefore, even if this text 
were a statement of the law — which it is not 
— it could not be an exhaustive one. 

To give but two examples, in formulating 
legal texts stating the principles concerning 
the threat or use of force, the Special Com- 
mittee on Friendly Relations will have to 

JANUARY 2, 1967 

articulate the fact that under article 2, para- 
graph 4, of the charter indirect aggression — 
subversion, infiltration, and terrorism — is as 
equally prohibited as conventional forms of 
armed attack. It will also have to elaborate 
on the right of self-defense, which article 51 
of the charter preserves, and its application 
to all uses of armed force, direct and indirect 

The compromise text does touch upon as- 
pects of indirect aggression insofar as they 
relate to self-determination. In adopting this 
resolution, the General Assembly will once 
again draw to the attention of the world the 
gravity of indirect aggression. The resolu- 
tion refers expressly to General Assembly 
Resolution 2131 (XX), which this body 
adopted on December 21, 1965.^ That decla- 
ration specifically calls upon states not to 
"organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or 
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activi- 
ties directed towards the violent overthrow 
of the regime of another State, or interfere 
in civil strife in another State." 

The compromise text now before us builds 
upon this condemnation of subversion in all 
its forms. Operative paragraph l(n) points 
out that "the use of force in any other form 
contrary to the Charter" is impermissible. 
This political pronouncement by the General 
Assembly is especially appropriate at a time 
when unremitting efforts at illegal subver- 
sion, infiltration, terrorism, sabotage, and 
the clandestine supply of arms are endan- 
gering the peace in many parts of the world. 

I wish to make it clear that the United 
States has participated fully in the negotia- 
tions which have led to this compromise text. 

We have also participated fully in the 
work of the Special Committee on Friendly 
Relations and will continue to do so. It is that 
committee to which the General Assembly 
has entrusted the task of the progressive de- 
velopment of international law and its codi- 
fication with regard to the principles of 
friendly relations and cooperation among 
states in accordance with the charter. That 

' For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, 
see Bulletin of Jan. 24, 1966, p. 124. 


work is juridical work and requires partici- 
pation by skilled jurists. 

The legal character of the work of the 
Special Committee on Friendly Relations and 
the Sixth Committee has been expressly rec- 
ognized by all three groups of cosponsors 
who have authorized Ambassador Waldheim 
to say, as he has, that ". . . these committees 
are the bodies which deal with the foiTnula- 
tion of legal principles" and that "It is for 
use in that task that these materials are 
referred." Indeed, the compromise text does 
not purport to impose its statement of politi- 
cal principle and exhortation as "the law" 
on the principles of threat or use of force 
and self-detei-mination. 

Third, in the negotiations on the compro- 
mise text particular attention was concen- 
trated on preambular paragraph 4 which 
reads: "Recognizing that peoples subjected to 
colonial oppression are entitled to seek and 
receive all support in their struggle which is 
in accordance with the purposes and princi- 
ples of the Charter." 

This formulation is a vast improvement 
over the proposal originally put forward in 
A/L.493 which would have purported to rec- 
ognize a "right" to seek and receive support 
and assistance — without any qualifications 
whatsoever. Obviously, such a right is sub- 
ject to the provisions of the charter, particu- 
larly the prohibition on the threat or use of 
force in article 2, paragraph 4. The text of 
the compromise properly reflects relevant 
charter limitations on furnishing material 
and other support. 

Fourth, Mr. President, the United States 
delegation notes that the reference to "inde- 
pendence" in operative paragraph 1(b) of 
the compromise text does not require inde- 
pendence in the sense of independent state- 
hood. As my Government has consistently 
maintained, and as the General Assembly 
has recognized in Resolution 1541 (XV), the 
charter-based principles of self-determina- 
tion can be fulfilled when a people freely 
chooses independent statehood, free associa- 
tion with another state, or integration with 
another state. 

In view of what I have said, the cosponsors 
of draft resolution A/L.495 will not press it 
to a vote and, instead, will vote for the com- 
promise text in document A/L.501. We un- 
derstand that Czechoslovakia and the other 
cosponsors of A/L.493 support the compro- 
mise and are not pressing their original pro- 
posal to a vote and that Italy and the other 
cosponsors of A/L.498 are doing likewise. 

As I have said, this compromise text is the 
result of a series of meetings between the 
three groups of cosponsors of draft resolu- 
tions on this item. These meetings, often pro- 
tracted and difficult, have resulted in a 
compromise text largely because of the 
efforts of Ambassador Waldheim, who pre- 
sided over them. In concluding, we want to 
pay tribute to his untiring efforts to reach 
a resolution acceptable to the three groups of 


Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the 
Threat or Use of Force in International Re- 
lations, AND of the Right of Peoples to Self- 

The General Assembly, 

Drawing the attention of States to the funda- 
mental obligations incumbent upon them in accord- 
ance with the Charter of the United Nations to 
refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integ- 
rity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations and to develop friendly re- 
lations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of 

Deeply concerned at the existence of dangerous 
situations in the world constituting a direct threat 
to universal peace and security, due to the arbitrary 
use of force in international relations. 

Reaffirming the right of peoples under colonial 
rule to exercise their right to self-determination and 
independence and the right of every nation, large 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/2160 (XXI) (A/L.501 and 
A/L.501/Corr.l) ; adopted by the General Assembly 
on Nov. 30, 1966, by a vote of 98 (U.S.) to 2, with 
8 abstentions. 



or small, to choose freely and without any external 
interference its political, social and economic system. 

Recognizing that peoples subjected to colonial 
oppression are entitled to seek and receive all sup- 
port in their struggle which is in accordance with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter, 

Firmly convinced that it is within the power and 
in the vital interest of the nations of the world to 
establish genuinely sound relations between States, 
based on justice, equality, mutual understanding and 

Recalling the declarations contained in its resolu- 
tions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 2131 
(XX) of 21 December 1965, 

1. Reaffirms that: 

(a) States shall strictly observe, in their inter- 
national relations, the prohibition of the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations. Accordingly, armed attack by one State 
against another or the use of force in any other 
form contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
constitutes a violation of international law giving 
rise to international responsibility; 

(6) Any forcible action, direct or indirect, which 
deprives peoples under foreign domination of their 
right to self-determination and freedom and inde- 
pendence and of their right to determine freely their 
political status and pursue their economic, social 
and cultural development constitutes a violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly, the 
use of force to deprive peoples of their national 
identity, as prohibited by the Declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their In- 
dependence and Sovereignty contained in General 
Assembly resolution 2131 (XX), constitutes a vio- 
lation of their inalienable rights and of the principle 
of non-intervention ; 

2. Urgently appeals to States: 
(a) To renounce and to refrain from any action 

contrary to the above-stated fundamental principles 
and to assure that their activities in international 
relations are in full harmony with the interests of 
international peace and security; 

(6) To make every effort and to undertake all 
necessary measures with a view to facilitating the 
exercise of the right of self-determination of peoples 
under colonial rule, lessening international tension, 
strengthening peace and promoting friendly rela- 
tions and co-operation among States; 

3. Reminds all Member States of their duty to 
give their fullest support to the endeavours of the 
United Nations to ensure respect for and the ob- 
servance of the principles enshrined in the Charter 
and to assist the Organization in discharging its 
responsibilities as assigned to it by the Charter 
for the maintenance of international peace and 
security ; 


Considering that the above principles, together 
with the other five principles concerning friendly 
relations and co-operation among States, have been 
the object of a study with a view to their progres- 
sive development and codification,'' on the basis of 
General Assembly resolutions 1815 (XVII) of 18 
December 1962, 1966 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963 
and 2103 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 

Requests the Secretary-General to include the 
present resolution and the records of the debate on 
the item entitled "Strict observance of the prohibi- 
tion of the threat or use of force in international 
relations, and of the right of peoples to self-deter- 
mination" in the documentation to be considered in 
the further study of the principles of international 
law concerning friendly relations and co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations, with a view to the early adop- 
tion of a declaration containing an enunciation of 
these principles. 

U.N. doc. A/6320. 

IJANUARY 2, 1967 


Calendar of International Conferences' 

In Recess as of January 1, 1967 

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- Geneva Mar. 14, 1962 

cessed Aug. 25, 1966; to be resumed Feb. 21, 1967). 

Scheduled January Through March 1967 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution Geneva Jan. 4-6 

NATO Allied Radio Frequency Agency London Jan. 4-6 

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Problems of Nationality and Dakar Jan. 4-17 

Registration of Aircraft. 

ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and New York .... Jan. 4-23 

Protection of Minorities. 

ECE Electric Power Committee Geneva Jan. 9-12 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Jan. 10 (1 day) 

UNDP Governing Council: 3d Session New York .... Jan. 10-27 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 10-27 

OECD Trade Committee Paris Jan. 12-13 

FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Food Production Paris Jan. 12-13 

FAO International Conference on Weed Control Washington .... Jan. 15-Feb. 13 

FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Review .... Rome Jan. 16 (1 or 2 days) 

ECE Expert Group on Market Trends and Prospects for Geneva Jan. 16-18 

Chemical Products. 

ECE Inland Transport Committee Geneva Jan. 16-19 

IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution: 2d Session London Jan. 16-20 

ECA Conference of Industrialists and Financiers Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 16-21 

GATT Trade and Development Committee Punta del Este . . Jan. 16-20 

WHO Executive Board: 39th Session Geneva Jan. 17-Feb. 7 

ICAO Special Panel of Experts on Limits of Liability Under Montreal Jan. 19-30 

the Warsaw Convention as Amended by The Hague Protocol. 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . Paris Jan. 23 (1 day) 

FAO Working Party on the Rational Utilization of the Fishery Rome Jan. 23-25 

Resources of the Indian Ocean: 1st Session. 

ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Jan. 23-27 

ECAFE Working Party of Telecommunications Experts . . New Delhi .... Jan. 23-31 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, 1966, 
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period 
January-March 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Per- 
sons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the 
Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT, 
International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; 
ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, 
Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture 
Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy 
Agency; lA-ECOSOC, Inter- American Economic and Social Council; lANEC, Inter- American Nuclear 
Energy Commission; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Orga- 
nization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organi- 
zation; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; 
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, 
United Nations Development Program; WHO, World Health Organization. , 


ITU/CCITT Plan Committee for Africa Addis Ababa . . . Jan. 23-Feb. 8 

CENTO Economic Experts Ankara Jan. 24-26 

8th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East Khartoum .... Jan. 24-Feb 2 

ECOSOC Working Group To Study the Proposal To Create New York .... Jan. 24-Feb. 3 

the Institution of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human 


OECD Special Committee for Oil: General Working Group . Paris Jan. 25 (1 day) 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: Working Group . London Jan. 25-26 

FAO Subcommittee on the Development of Cooperation Rome Jan. 25-28 

With Other International Organizations Concerned With 


ECAFE Mekong Committee Vientiane .... Jan. 25-30 

OECD Energy Committee Paris Jan. 26-27 

ECE Gas Committee Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 3 

UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 10 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session .... Geneva Jan. 31-Feb. 15 

OECD Turkish Consortium: Pledging Session Paris January 

OECD Tourism Committee Paris January 

ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Typhoons Manila January-February 

OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Feb. 1-3 

NATO Science Committee Paris Feb. 2-3 

ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Coordination Committee New Delhi .... Feb. 2-9 

on Railway Research. 

ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human New York .... Feb. 6-8 


IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures: 3d Session . London Feb. 6-10 

International Coffee Organization : High-Level Working Group London Feb. 6-10 

on Basic Quotas. 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission : 10th Annual Meeting . Washington .... Feb. 6-17 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee Paris Feb. 7-9 

PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety: 3d Montevideo .... Feb. 10-12 


Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Meeting .... Montevideo .... Feb. 13-22 

Economic Commission for Africa: 8th Plenary Session . . . Lagos Feb. 13-25 

ILO Governing Body: 168th Session Geneva Feb. 13-Mar. 3 

ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women New York .... Feb. 13-Mar. 6 

ECAFE Committee on Trade: 10th Session Bangkok Feb. 15-24 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee London Feb. 20-Mar. 3 

ECOSOC Human Rights Commission: 23d Session .... Geneva Feb. 20-Mar. 23 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 2d Session Geneva Feb. 21-Mar. 8 

ECOSOC Ad Hoc Committee on Periodic Reports on Human Geneva Feb. 27-Mar. 3 


ITU/CCIR Study Group The Hague .... Feb. 27-Mar. 3 

ECAFE Intraregional Talks on Trade Promotion Bangkok February 

lANEC Special Legal Committee Mexico City .... February 

IBE Executive Committee: 44th Meeting Geneva February 

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna February 

ECOSOC Commission for Social Development New York .... Mar. 6-22 

ECAFE Committee on Industry and Natural Resources: 19th Bangkok Mar. 7-14 


OECD Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel . . Paris Mar. 8-10 

5th ECAFE Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and Canberra .... Mar. 8-22 

the Far East. 

ILO Committee of Experts on Application of Convention and Geneva Mar. 9-22 

Recommendations: 37th Session. 

OECD Committee for Science Policy Paris Mar. 13-14 

IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement: 7th Session . London Mar. 13-17 

ECE Coal Committee: Group of Rapporteurs on Fly Ash . . Pittsburgh .... Mar. 13 and 17 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Mar. 14-15 

CENTO Economic Committee Washington .... Mar. 14-16 

OECD Committee for Research Cooperation Paris Mar. 15-17 

ICAO Conference on Charges for Airports and Air Naviga- Montreal Mar. 29-Apr. 18 

tion Facilities. 

U.N. Committee on Question of Defining Aggression .... New York .... March 

CENTO Liaison Committee London March 

5th lA-ECOSOC Meeting at the Ministerial and Expert Viiia del Mar . . . March 


Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meet- Vina del Mar . . . March 

ing of the Permanent Technical Committee on Labor Affairs. 

JANUARY 2, 1967 85 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica- 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Report by the Secretary-General on the Present Sta- 
tus of the Demilitarized Zone Set Up by the Gen- 
eral Armistice Agreement Between Israel and 
Syria (Part A). S/7573. November 2, 1966. 5 pp. 

Letter dated November 15 from the representatives 
of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai- 
land, and the United States of America and from 
the permanent observers of the Republic of Korea 
and the Republic of Viet- Nam transmitting the 
texts of the three statements issued at the Manila 
Summit Conference on October 25. S/7591. No- 
vember 16, 1966. 12 pp. 

Note verbale dated November 25 from the perma- 
nent mission of the U.S.S.R. in reply to the note 
dated November 7 addressed to the Secretary- 
General by the permanent missions of France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States regarding 
the "German Democratic Republic." S/7599. No- 
vember 28, 1966. 2 pp. 

Note by the Secretary-General concerning means of 
strengthening the effectiveness of the United Na- 
tions Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine. 
S/7603. November 29, 1966. 3 pp. 

Letter dated November 30 from the Prime Minister 
of Barbados making application for membership 
of the United Nations. S/7607. December 2, 1966. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na- 
tions Operation in Cyprus for the period June 11- 
December 5, 1966. S/7611. December 8, 1966. 61 pp. 

Letter dated December 7 from the Deputy Secre- 
tary-General of the Organization of African 
Unity transmitting the text of a resolution on 
Southern Rhodesia which was adopted by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU held at Addis Ababa November 5-9. 
S/7614. December 7, 1966. 3 pp. 

General Assembly 

Population Grovjrth and Economic Development. Re- 
port of the Secretary-General. A/6466. October 14, 
1966. 11 pp. 

United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment. Report of the Trade and Development Board 
(31 October 1965-24 September 1966). A/6315. 
October 17, 1966. 205 pp. 

Letter dated October 20 from the representative of 
South Africa transmitting a memorandum in am- 
plification of his statement on October 7 in the 
General Assembly in right of reply during the 
debate on South West Africa. A/6480. October 20, 
1966. 33 pp. 

Personnel Questions. Composition of the Secretariat. 
Report of the Secretary-General. A/6487. October 
26, 1966. 41 pp. 

Technical Assistance to Promote the Teaching, 
Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation of 

International Law. Report of the Secretary- 
General. A/6492. November 1, 1966. 42 pp. 

Report of the Executive Director of the United Na- 
tions Institute for Training and Research. A/6500. 
November 8, 1966. 51 pp. 

Activities in the Field of Industrial Development: 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the United^ 
Nations Organization for Industrial Development. 
Report of the Second Committee. A/6508. Novem- 
ber 11, 1966. 26 pp. 

Reports of the International Law Commission on 
the second part of its seventeenth session and on 
its eighteenth session. Report of the sixth com- 
mittee. A/6516. November 21, 1966. 63 pp. 

United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa. Re- 
port by the Secretary-General. A/6494. December 
1, 1966. 11 pp. 

The Korean Question. Letter dated December 2 from 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Korea transmitting a memorandum of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea dated November 
30. A/C.1/936. December 2, 1966. 12 pp. 


Current Actions 


United Nations 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Sig^ned at San 
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 

Admission to membership : Barbados, December 9, 



Agreement relating to treaty obligations assumed 
by Botswana upon its independence. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Gaberones September 30, 
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966. 

European Space Research Organization 

Agreement relating to the establishment and opera- 
tion of a satellite telemetry/telecommand station 
near Fairbanks, Alaska. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Paris November 28, 1966. Entered into 
force November 28, 1966. 


Agreement extending the cotton textiles agreement 
of April 15, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5559, 5664). 
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi Octo- 
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force October 21, 1966. 



Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending- the agreement of November 
18, 1964 (TIAS 5697), on cooperation in the field 
of desalination, including the use of atomic 
energ>'. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow 
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into 
force December 3, 1966. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement providing for the use by civil aircraft of 
the airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base on 
Grand Turk Island. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington December 2 and 8, 1966. Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed upon. 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
201)02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents, except in the case of free publications, 
which may be obtained from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some 
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are 
available at 5^ each. 

Ceylon. Pub. 7757. 8 pp. 
Chad. Pub. 7669. 8 pp. 
Hong Kong. Pub. 8126. 4 pp. 
South Africa. Pub. 8021. 8 pp. 
Tunisia. Pub. 8142. 4 pp. 

How Foreign Policy Is Made (Revised). Illustrated 
pamphlet reviews, in the context of today's prob- 
lems, the roles that the President, the Secretary of 
State and other Presidential advisers, the Congress, 
and the American people play in the vital policy- 
making process. Includes a basic statement of the 
five fundamental goals of U.S. foreign policy. Pub. 
7707. General Foreign Policy Series 195. 24 pp. 30<f. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with British 
Guiana — Signed at Georgetown May 29, 1965. En- 
tered into force August 18, 1965. TIAS 5942. 3 
pp. 5<f. 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with 
Belgium, modifying and supplementing the conven- 
;ion of October 28, 1948, as amended by the supple- 
mentary conventions of September 9, 1952, and 
August 22, 1957— Signed at Brussels May 21, 1965. 
Entered into force August 29, 1966. With exchange 
)f notes — Dated at Brussels September 27 and No- 
vember 19, 1965. TIAS 6073. 25 pp. 15<S. 

Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Sweden— Signed at Washington July 28, 
1966. Entered into force September 15, 1966. TIAS 

6076. 12 pp. 10«f. 

Tracking Stations. Agreement with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
extending the agreement of January 20, 1961, as 
extended. Exchange of notes — Signed at London 
July 19, 1966. Entered into force July 19, 1966. TIAS 

6077. 2 pp. 5«'. 

Sampling of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by 
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, ex- 
tending the agreement of May 9, 1961, as extended. 
Exchange of notes — Dated at Canberra August 9, 
1966. Entered into force August 9, 1966. TIAS 6078 
2 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ceylon, 
amending the agreement of March 12, 1966. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Colombo August 25, 
1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 
6079. 2 pp. 5(f. 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Peru, 
amending the agreement of December 27, 1946, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington 
March 2, 1966. Entered into force March 2, 1966. 
TIAS 6080. 6 pp. 5<f. 

Protocol to the Social Progress Trust Fund Agree- 
ment. Agreement with the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank — Signed at Washington September 7, 
1966. Entered into force September 7, 1966. TIAS 
6081. 2 pp. 5«(. 

Boundary Waters — Loan of Waters of the Colorado 
River. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Mexico August 24, 1966. Entered into 
force August 24, 1966. TIAS 6082. 4 pp. 5<f. 

Defense — Establishment of Petroleum Products Pipe- 
line. Agreement with the Philippines. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Manila August 26, 1966. Entered 
into force August 26, 1966. TIAS 6083. 5 pp. 5^. 

Military Bases in the Philippines. Agreement with 
the Philippines, amending the agreement of March 
14, 1947, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Washington September 16, 1966. Entered into force 
September 16, 1966. TIAS 6084. 3 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Jordan — Signed at Amman August 
25, 1966. Entered into force August 25, 1966. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 6085. 8 pp. 100. 

Trade. Agreement with Argentina, relating to the 
status of the agreements of October 14, 1941, and 
July 24, 1963. Exchange of notes — Signed at Buenos 
Aires August 3 and 8, 1966. Entered into force Au- 
gust 8, 1966. TIAS 6086. 5 pp. 50. 

Visas — Waiver of Nonimmigrant Visa Fees. Agree- 
ment with Japan. Exchange of notes — Dated at 
Tokyo August 9 and 23, 1966. Entered into force 
September 22, 1966. TIAS 6087. 14 pp. 100. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong 
Kong. Exchange of notes. — Signed at Hong Kong 
August 26, 1966. Entered into force August 26, 1966. 
Effective October 1, 1965. With related notes. TIAS 
6088. 12 pp. 100. 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Supplementary 
protocol with the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

TANUARY 2, 1967 


and Northern Ireland, amending the convention of 
April 16, 1945, as modified by the supplementary 
protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, and Aug:ust 
19, 1957— SigTied at London March 17, 1966. Entered 
into force September 9, 1966. TIAS 6089. 16 pp. 10«». 

Settlement of Investment Disputes. Convention with 
Other Governments approved March 18, 1965, by the 
Executive Directors of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), at Wash- 
ington, for submission to member governments. 
Open for signature at IBRD, and signed in behalf 
of the United States of America August 27, 1965. 
Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 95 
pp. SOff. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Israel, amending the agreement of July 
12, 1955, as amended — Signed at Washington Au- 
gust 23, 1966. Entered into force September 22, 1966. 
TIAS 6091. 3 pp. 5<t. 

Study of Radioactivity of Upper Atmosphere by 
Means of Balloons. Agreement with Australia, sup- 
plementing and modifying the agreement of May 9, 
1961, as extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at 
Canberra September 1, 1966. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 1, 1966. TIAS 6092. 4 pp. 50. 

Defense: Transfer of Aircraft and Equipment. 

Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes — 

Signed at Jidda May 16 and November 11, 1965. 
Entered into force November 11, 1965. TIAS 6095. 
3 pp. 50. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Nor- 
way, amending annex C to the agreement of Jan- 
uary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Dated at Oslo 
August 29 and September 6, 1966. Entered into force 
September 6, 1966. TIAS 6096. 3 pp. 50. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul September 14, 
1966. Entered into force September 14, 1966. With 
agreed understanding. TIAS 6097. 5 pp. 50. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia, 
amending the agreement of July 30, 1966. Exchange 
of notes— Signed at Tunis September 19, 1966. En- 
tered into force September 19, 1966. TIAS 6098. 3 
pp. 50. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Republic of China, amending the 
agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended — Signed at 
Washington August 25, 1966. TIAS 6099. 5 pp. 50. 

Continental Radar Defense System — Phaseout of 
Certain Stations. Agreement with Canada. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Washing^ton September 30, 1966. 
Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6102. 
2 pp. 50. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developmenta in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, bb well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin la for sale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Oflfice, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreian 116: 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX January 2, 1967 Vol LVI, No. U36 

Agriculture. OECD Ministerial Council Meets 
at Paris (Rostow, communique) 22 

Barbados. Barbados Admitted to United Na- 
tions (Goldberg) 28 

Botswana. Letters of Credence (Matthews) . .16 

Bulgaria. Letters of Credence (Guerassimov) . 16 

Communism. East-West Relations: Shaping a 
Stable Worid (Kohler) 6 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreigrn Policy 18 

Department and Foreign Service. Policy Plan- 
ning Council, European Affairs Bureau Ad- 
visers Named 16 

Developing Countries. OECD Ministerial Coun- 
cil Meets at Paris (Rostow, communique) . . 22 

Economic Affairs 

The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2 

OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros- 
tow, communique) 22 

Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu- 
reau Advisers Named 16 

President Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect 
Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) . . 12 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Group To Study Educational TV for Use in 
Aid Program (Johnson) 15 

International Conference on Education (John- 
son) 15 


East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World 
(Kohler) 6 

The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2 

OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros- 
tow, communique) 22 

Policy Planning Council, European Affairs Bu- 
reau Advisers Named 16 

Foreign Aid. Group To Study Educational TV 
for Use in Aid Program (Johnson) .... 15 

Human Rights. President Johnson Lights the 
Nation's Christmas Tree 14 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences .... 34 
3ECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros- 
tow, communique) 22 

[very Coast. Letters of Credence (Ahoua) . . 16 

^atin America. President Johnson Visits Mex- 
ico To Inspect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint 
statement) 12 

^esotho. Letters of Credence (Mohale) . . . . 16 

riexico. President Johnson Visits Mexico To In- 
spect Amistad Dam (Johnson, joint statement) 12 

'fon-Self-Governing Territories. U.N. Urges No 
Interference With Right of Peoples to Self- 
Determination (Nabrit, text of resolution) . . 29 

'residential Documents 

Iroup To Study Educational TV for Use in Aid 
Program 15 

ntemational Conference on Education ... 15 

'resident Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ- 
mas Tree 14 

resident Johnson Visits Mexico To Inspect 
Amistad Dam 12 

U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre- 
tary-General 14 

Publications. Recent Releases 37 


East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World 

(Kohler) 6 

The Issues of East- West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2 
OECD Ministerial Council Meets at Paris (Ros- 
tow, communique) 22 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 36 

East- West Relations: Shaping a Stable World 

(Kohler) 6 

The Issues of East-West Trade (Katzenbach) . 2 

United Nations 

Barbados Admitted to United Nations (Gold- 
berg) 28 

Current U.N. Documents 36 

U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo- 
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of 
resolution) 29 

U.S. Pleased at Reappointment of U.N. Secre- 
tary-General (Goldberg, Johnson) 14 


President Johnson Lights the Nation's Christ- 
mas Tree 14 

U.N. Urges No Interference With Right of Peo- 
ples to Self-Determination (Nabrit, text of 
resolution) 29 

Name Index 

Ahoua, Timonthee N'Guetta 16 

Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 12 

Goldberg, Arthur J 14, 28 

Guerassimov, Luben Nikolov 16 

Johnson, President 12, 14, 15 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 2 

Kohler, Foy D 6 

Matthews, Zachariah K 16 

Mohale, Albert S 16 

Nabrit, James M., Jr 29 

Rostow, Eugene V 19 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 12 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
280 of November 24, 288 and 289 of December 
9, and 290 of December 10. 

No. Date Subject 

t291 12/12 U.S. delegation to NATO minis- 
terial meeting. 

t292 12/13 Meeker: "Viet-Nam and the In- 
ternational Law of Self- 
293 12/15 Advisory panel for Bureau of 
European Affairs. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

i^U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/26 






Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Tasic 

The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fir 
to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integrati' 
of the Western European community; and, third, to quicken progress in East-West relation! 

President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers 
New York, N.Y., on October 7, 1966, discussed the new steps being taken, and those under cc 
sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address. 



To: Supt. of Doeumentt 
GoTt. Printins Offle* 
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(cash, check, or money order). Please send 

copies of Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task. 



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Street address . 

City, State, and ZIP code 







Vol. LVI, No. US7 

January 9, 1967 


by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser 5A 


Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 73 

Statements by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 78 

For index see inside back cover 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 21 

Press release 297 dated December 21 

My season's compliments to the dis- 
tinguished and talented members of the press 
corps that covers and sometimes discovers 
the Department of State. And I hope you 
have a very prosperous and successful new 

Yesterday afternoon the 21st General As- 
sembly concluded. As you by now are well 
aware, a General Assembly constitutes a ma- 
jor review of most of the international 
issues of the day. You might be interested 
that, with 98 items on the agenda and 121 
members through most of the Assembly — 
one country was added at the end — that 
meant that there were almost 12,000 primary 
votes cast in the General Assembly this year. 

We are very grateful to Ambassador 
[Arthur J.] Goldberg for his distinguished 
leadership. He was ably assisted by Senator 
[Frank] Church of Idaho and Senator 
[Clifford P.] Case of New Jersey and a very 
competent delegation up there. 

Ambassador Goldberg just shortly — just 
a few minutes ago made an extended com- 
ment on the work of this General Assembly. 
And you will be interested in reviewing that. 
We will try to have copies of his statement 
for you in the course of the afternoon here. 

I must say that I was very much encour- 
aged that the General Assembly was able to 
bring the space treaty to a conclusion as far 
as international discussions are concerned.* 
We believe that this was a very positive step 
forward, as a result of President Johnson's 
initiative earlier in the year. 

Outer space may seem a long way away, 
but its activities very much involve us here 
on this earth; and the application of the gen- 

eral principles of the Antarctic Treaty to 
outer space, I think, is a substantial step for- 
ward and may help us in the never-ending 
task of trying to put some ceiling on the arms 

We are very pleased that the Secretary- 
General consented to accept an additional 
term and carries with him into his new term 
the solidarity of the support of the member- 
ship of the U.N. And we wish him the very 
best of success in his new term of office. 

Viet-Nam was discussed in many ways at 
the General Assembly — although it was not 
formally on the agenda. It was discusj:ed at 
the table and in the corridors. And it obvi- 
ously is the major and most dangerous issue 
in building a durable peace. 

We have regretted that the United Nations 
has not been permitted to take hold of that 
question and try to find a solution to it. That 
results primarily from the attitude of Hanoi 
and Peking, who have repeatedly insisted 
that this question is not an appropriate mat- 
ter for the United Nations to deal with. That 
attitude on their part has led many delega- 
tions to believe that formal action by the 
United Nations might get in the way of a 
settlement of the matter by other means, for 
example, the use of the Geneva machinery 
or through other types of discussion or 

We, as you know, have suggested to the 
Secretary-General that he use his utmost 
effort to bring this matter into a forum of 
discussion,^ and we hope very much that 
some progress can be made in that direction. 

By and large, it was a constructive meet- 
ing of the General Assembly, and we were 
pleased and encouraged by the general re- 

* See p. 78. 

' See p. 63. 



suits — although obviously there is still some 
unfinished business, both in the housekeep- 
ing of the U.N. itself, the unfinished business 
of making proper arrangements for peace- 

But, nevertheless, we were pleased by the 
course of the Assembly as a whole. 

Now I am ready for your questions. 

Antiballistic Missiles and the Arms Race 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since Secretary [of De- 
fense Robert S.] McNamara last month dis- 
closed that the Russians are deploying some 
antiballistic missiles, there has been consid- 
erable speculation that this 7vas likely to 
touch off another spiral in the arms race, and 
there has been spectilation as to what the 
United States can do about this in its discus- 
sions with Russia. Would you care to address 
yourself to that subject for a moment? 

A. Well, there is not very much that I can 
say on that today. You have seen what Secre- 
tary McNamara has said. 

We would regret very much the lifting of 
the arms race to an entirely new plateau of 
major expenditures. 

As you know, we made earlier to the 
Geneva conference proposals for freezes and 
limitations on the further production of 
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons. 

We would like to see some means developed 
by which both sides would not have to go into 
wholly new and unprecedented levels of mili- 
tary expenditure, with perhaps no percep- 
tible result in the total strategic situation. 

This is a matter that is before the Geneva 
conference. We and the Soviet Union are co- 

I presume that there will be further con- 
tacts on this matter. But I cannot go into that 
in more detail at this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, is one pos- 
sible means to deal with this problem to 
ipproach the Soviet Union on a moratorium 
jn deployment of ballistic missile defense 
systems ? 

A. Well, implicit in the idea of a freeze is 
:hat there will be an agreement that certain 
imitations will be accepted, that those limi- 

tations could be relied upon with assurance 
by all sides, and that in that way both sides 
could be relieved from the burdens of moving 
to wholly new and major levels of expendi- 

But this has been before the Geneva con- 
ference. There has been no progress on it 
thus far in that conference. The two cochair- 
men^ we and the Soviet Union, have reviewed 
the agenda from time to time to see where 
we might make progress. That conference 
will be meeting again in February. I just 
cannot anticipate at this point just what 
might be the result of the contacts that are 
implicit in a matter of that sort, in a con- 
ference of that sort. 

VIet-Nam Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to what Am- 
bassador Goldberg said in his letter to the 
Secretary-General, he made — he used some 
rather siveeping language in saying that he 
requests "that you will take whatever steps 
you consider necessary to bring about the 
necessary discussions." Does this represent 
any policy change as far as the United States 
is concerned in that one might read it as wide 
enough to allow for some negotiations with 
the National Liberation Front ? 

A. I would not read detail into it. When 17 
nonalined nations last year indicated that 
they thought there should be negotiations 
without preconditions, we said, yes, we 
thought that was a good idea. The other side 
turned it down. 

We are prepared to talk about the problem 
without preconditions of any sort from either 
side. We are prepared to have preliminary 
discussions with the other side about precon- 
ditions, if they want to talk about those. We 
are prepared to come to a conference. We are 
prepared to have bilateral discussions. We 
are prepared to use intermediaries. We are 
prepared to have discreet and private con- 

But it is very hard to find someone on the 
other side who is prepared to talk seriously 
about bringing this matter to a peaceful con- 

The Secretary-General has a new term of 

FANUARY 9, 1967 


office with the overwhelming unanimous sup- 
port of the United Nations. As you know, he 
is very much concerned in this major prob- 
lem affecting the peace of the world. And so 
we would be glad to see the Secretary- 
General use the widest powers available to 
him to probe the possibilities of a serious dis- 
cussion about a peaceful conclusion of this 

Q. Do you use the term "other side" ex- 
clusively to mean Hanoi, or does it include 
the National Liberation Front? 

A. Well, we have not talked about pre- 
conditions of any sort with the Secretary- 
General, and so I don't suppose I need talk 
about them here. 

President Johnson has made some com- 
ments — in July of last year — about the 
Liberation Front.* 

But let's see what the Secretary-General 
might be able to accomplish in his contacts 
with those who are directly involved in this 
and might bring it to a conclusion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are some keen 
observers of this situation that think that so 
long as Russia and Communist China are on 
opposite sides, with their split, it ivould be 
very difficult for Hanoi to sit down at the 
conference table, tvith this conflicting advice 
on either side of them. Do you think this is a 
factor in holding up peace talks ? 

A. I would prefer not to comment pre- 
cisely on your exact question. 

I think that undoubtedly the various capi- 
tals in the Communist world tend to look over 
their shoulders at each other in a matter of 
this sort, and this somewhat complicates the 
problem of responsible contacts and respon- 
sible discussions with a view to winding this 
matter up. 

In that sense, there is no single place, there 
is no single point of view with whom one can 
enter into talks in order to bring it to a con- 

So I think the complexity on the other side 
does complicate the technical procedures, the 

' At a news conference on July 28, 1965. 

diplomatic procedures, by which one can 
establish contact and move this thing for- 

Q. Do you see any interest, Mr. Secretary, 
on the part of Hanoi or the National Libera-^ 
tion Front in arriving at a longer Christmas 
truce or talking about conditions for an 
extended truce running into the new year? 

A. No, I have not. From the statements 
they made, it would point rather in the other 

Americans Convicted in Soviet Union 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that 
the United States Government can do to try 
to effect the release of Mr. [BueV] Wortham, 
who was convicted to 3 years of labor today 
by a Leningrad court ? 

A. Well, we will continue to pursue this 
matter. We did feel that, although these two 
young men acknowledged the offenses for 
which — with which they were charged, the 
punishment was more harsh than the viola- 
tions themselves would seem to warrant. 

There are procedures of appeal and 
clemency that are available, and we expect 
that those will be utilized. 

I do not myself wish to condone these par- 
ticular actions, but I think, as the Soviet 
Union moves into a period in which they are 
trying to encourage tourism and have maxi- 
mum contacts with other countries, that they 
might recognize that on occasion minor inci- 
dents of this sort may occur and that it will 
be in their interest to resolve them in 
accordance with the general practice of most 
governments when temporary foreign guests 
pull pranks of this sort — or whatever you 
want to call it — that would be a violation of 
local law. 

I would hope that the Soviet authorities 
would take cognizance of this sort of thing 
and take action to mitigate the punishment 
that has been meted out to these two men. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, Buel 
Wortham's mother has expressed the hope 
that he might be exchanged for the man 



; named Igor Ivanov, who is being held in this 

j coiintry under a 20-year sentence. Has any- 

"> thing been done to negotiate such an ex- 

] change? 

. A. No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, going back for a moment 
to your comment about the Secretary- 
General, where you say that he has a neiv 
mandate and that you ivould be very glad to 
see him, use the widest powers available to 
probe the prospects of peaceful negotiations, 
does that mean that if he should succeed in 
doing what he did once before, in arranging 
for the other side to send representatives to 
Rangoon or someplace else, that we would 
this time accept the offer and also go our- 
selves ? 

A. Well, I don't want to go into the ques- 
tion of whether or not there was a previous 
incident of the sort that you talked about in 
exactly those terms. 

Q. He has said so. 

A. Well, I think that when the full record 
is out some day that will take on a somewhat 
different context, and I think it is not good 
for the future for me to intrude into the past 
on that particular point. 

But he has a maximum latitude here, as 
far as we are concerned in the situation, to 
see what can be worked out on the other side 
in terms of responsible discussions. 

No Indication of Deescalation From Hanoi 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some 
misunderstanding of our motives in seeking 
a truce or an extended armistice, while, at the 
same time, ive seem to tighten the noose and 
hit harder ivith bombs in North Viet-Nam. 
Cozild you put this in perspective for us? 

A. Well, we have a military interest in hit- 
ting military targets in North Viet-Nam to 
try to impede, slow down, or interfere with 
the steady movement of men and supplies 
into the South. We have had nothing in the 
way of reciprocity from the North in terms 
of pulling back on their violence in South 

We have tried over many, many months 
now, since the pause of January, to try to 
get some indication from the other side as to 
whether they would be willing to talk about 
deescalation or enter into deescalation, in 
fact, without any formal agreements, on 
some basis of reciprocity. We have not been 
able to do that. 

These particular incidents, I think, have 
to be looked at against the background of 
what is responsible for the fighting and who 
would be glad to see it wound up. As far as 
we are concerned, we regret every person 
that has been lost in South Viet-Nam, and in 
North Viet-Nam. And there should not have 
been any of these casualties if these people 
in North Viet-Nam had undertaken to live 
at peace with their southern neighbors and 
not launched their Liberation Front, for 
which they are now celebrating the sixth 
birthday, and not sent their cadres and their 
men and their arms and their regiments into 
South Viet-Nam to seize that country by 

Now, all of this is unnecessary from our 
point of view. And it could be brought to con- 
clusion very quickly if that central ambition 
on the part of Hanoi were abandoned. Now, 
that's what is lacking here in this situation. 

Now, in a struggle of this sort there are 
going to be those who are injured by acci- 
dent, or otherwise, or going to be those who 
suffer from the struggle. But I should think 
we ought to concentrate on why it started 
and how it could be brought to a conclusion. 
And, on that, I think the responsibility rests 
very heavily with Hanoi. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event no negotia- 
tions for peace are upcoming, are we pre- 
pared for a military victory in both North 
and South? 

A. Well, our objectives there have been 
very clearly defined. We are trying to pro- 
tect South Viet-Nam, under treaty commit- 
ments, from this aggression by means of 
armed attack from the North, from the in- 
filtration of these men and arms into the 
South. We have no desire to destroy North 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


Viet-Nam, or insist upon changing their 
regime, or any of those things. We are trying 
to meet our commitments to South Viet-Nam. 
And, on that basis, this matter could be 
wound up very quickly. 

The NATO Council Meeting 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you assess for us, 
please, the last week's NATO conference? 
The reports from Paris were rather favor- 
able. The French appear to be cooperative. 
Brandt's [Willy Brandt, German Foreign 
Minister'] debut got favorable reviews. I won- 
der horv you feel about it ? 

A. This was my 12th NATO meeting of 
ministers, and I must say I thought it was 
one of the most businesslike and most pro- 
ductive of those that I have attended for 
some time. I think there has been a rather 
broad understanding between the Fourteen 
on the one side and France on the other as 
to the boundaries that now arise between 
the Fourteen and France as to who would 
take care of what kind of business. 

The Fourteen met as the Defense Commit- 
tee and transacted a good deal of business 
affecting the military arrangements in the 
alliance, including the nuclear committee 
that was established. Those were referred to, 
I think, in paragraphs 15 to 21 of the com- 
munique.'' In the communique France pointed 
out that they had not participated in those 
discussions and did not associate themselves 
with it. But as far as the other discussions 
were concerned, France was present and we 
had a good exchange among all 15 on such 
questions as the East-West relations. 

I must say that there was a general feeling 
that two of our eminent new members among 
the ministers, Mr. George Brown of Britain 
and Mr. Willy Brandt of Germany, both 
made very strong impressions on the Council. 
So I think on the whole it was a very, very 
encouraging and a very good meeting. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to the qiies- 
tion of a missile freeze, Secretary McNamara 
has also told us that the administration plans 
to ask Congress for appropriations for the 

* For text, see p. 49. 

Poseidon missile and improvement on the 
Polaris missile. Would the administration be 
willing to put off deployment of this missile if 
there could be some agreement ? 

A. No, I wouldn't want to get into that 
kind of question. That is a problem for the 
Secretary of Defense, and these are matters 
that the administration is considering in 
connection with his presentation to the Con- 
gress. It's a matter on which there will be 
full discussion with the appropriate congres- 
sional committees. I wouldn't want to point 
to the future in that way today. 

International Effort on Food Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on tivo food decisions 
facing the administration, will the shipments 
to Yugoslavia that Congressman [Paul] 
Findley has objected to be released, and will 
grain be released for India in the near 
future ? 

A. As far as India is concerned, very sub- 
stantial quantities of grain will be arriving 
in India during January. As you know, we 
have been concerned that this food problem 
be taken up as a general international prob- 
lem in which all countries who are in a posi- 
tion to contribute will do so. It is not true 
that we have been putting pressure on par- 
ticular countries, as I have seen reported in 
the last day or so. But, nevertheless, we are 
glad that some other countries are taking up 
this matter seriously and are making some 
significant contributions. 

The prospect is that over the next decade 
there is going to be a major crisis in the food 
situation and all countries, including those 
who are going to need the food and those who 
are in a position to contribute in whatever 
way, must make a concerted and sustained 
effort to deal with it. Otherwise, there is 
going to be considerable hunger in the world. 

You saw Secretary [of Agriculture Orville 
L.] Freeman's remarks yesterday on that 
subject, and I would expect and hope that 
appropriate international action will be 
taken to assist the Indians in their critical 

At the present time I am not actually sure 
just what the situation is with Yugoslavia, 



and I wouldn't want to comment on that 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the 
•^ current upheaval in China in terms of the 
\ possibility of change in our relationship with 
j Peiping? 

I A. Well, we have not tried to analyze the 
significance of what is going on in China. We 
have the feeling that it is important, these 
events there. But I think we would be fool- 
ing you if we said that we fully understood 
exactly what is happening. My guess is that 
some of the leaders in China don't know 
exactly what is happening. So our present 
ignorance doesn't embarrass us too much. 

But we have seen no indications thus far 
that what is happening there has any signifi- 
cant bearing on their relations with us or 
their attitudes toward us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your appraisal that 
the Soviet Union has made a com,mitment to 
an all-out deployment of the antiballistic mis- 
^ sile system ? 

I A. No. I have no information on that one 
way or the other. We just don't know that. 

Developments of 1966 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that it's getting 

^ toward the close of the year, I wonder if you 

. could summarize what you think have been 

, the main gains and setbacks during the year 

and what do you see in the year ahead? 

A. Well, I would almost need some notice 
on that question because that is a rather com- 
: prehensive question. 

I think that during this past year we have 
„ seen continuing increase of contacts between 
'J the East and West as far as Eastern Europe 
i! is concerned. We had in front of us at NATO 
t a little summation of the East- West contacts 
I in the last few months among the NATO 
countries, and I think there were about 185 
items on that list, which is available to you. 
There seems to be an interest in trying to 
keep these East- West divisions under control 
' and to try to find points of agreement if pos- 
sible, whether in the arms field or in the 
trade field, or cultural exchanges, or what- 

ever. I would hope that that represents a 
trend which will continue and that we can 
begin to see some reduction of tension on a 
more permanent basis between these two 
great systems of states. 

I think out in Asia we know now that 
South Viet-Nam is not going to be overrun 
by force by North Viet-Nam. And we see a 
recovery of confidence and hope among the 
free nations of Asia. 

I think this past year has seen a very ex- 
citing demonstration of the intention of the 
free nations of Asia to get on with their jobs, 
not only nationally but in groups, in coopera- 
tion with each other. We have had such dra- 
matic developments as the founding of the 
Asian Development Bank and the formation 
of the ASPAC [Asian and Pacific Council] 
group that recently met in Seoul, Korea. We 
have a feeling that free Asia is on the move. 
They are demonstrating a capacity to move 
ahead economically and socially and with 
more competence in the political field. Those 
are all very much to the good. 

We have been encouraged by the per- 
formance of the Alliance for Progress and 
the discussions which have been anticipating 
the meeting of the foreign ministers in 
February and a meeting of the heads of gov- 
ernment in April here in this hemisphere. I 
think in the broadest terms the general 
trends have been in a constructive and 
promising direction. 

The most significant failure in 1966 has 
been the failure to find a means to bring this 
Vietnamese problem to the conference table 
or to a peaceful solution. And I would hope 
very much that the year 1967 would be a 
time when that will become possible. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection ivith that 
and in connection ivith the recent statement 
to Secretary-General U Thant, are we saying 
that ive will accept a cease-fire, a simple 
cease-fire, which is lengthy or semipermor 
nent ? 

A. Well, we are saying that we believe 
that the Secretary-General should exercise 
his office to the fullest to explore all possibili- 
ties of a responsible discussion with the other 
side to bring this matter to a peaceful con- 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


elusion. I wouldn't want to elaborate that 
matter in detail any more than is contained 
in Ambassador Goldberg's letter, because 
the Secretary-General himself ought to have 
a maximum freedom of maneuver at this 

Food Assistance to India 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to this 
India food problem which has got to the 
point, as I understand it, ivhere the United 
States can't carry the bicrden alone — in 
handling their financial and development 
problems, why, recourse nms had to a con- 
sortium, with the machinery to bring this 
cooperation on the problem. I think it's Sena- 
tor IGeorgel McGovern that is advocating 
the possibility of some sort of thing like that 
to work on food. What do you think of this? 

A. Well, we have raised this food problem 
in such organizations as the OECD [Orga- 
nization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment]- — we did that here in Washing- 
ton; ^ and in the FAO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Na- 
tions. The Indian Government itself is in 
touch with a considerable number of govern- 
ments to find out what assistance might be 
forthcoming, not only from the food pro- 
ducers but from those who might contribute 
fertilizer or funds or other types of 

I do think that a group of nations will 
have to do what is necessary in a situation 
of this sort. Whether it would be a formal 
consortium or simply an informal arrange- 
ment by governments dealing directly with 
the Indian Government, I wouldn't want to 
say at this point, but the OECD organiza- 
tion and the FAO and other bodies will have 
to give systematic and serious attention to 
the food problem if, in fact, the problem is 
going to be met here over the next few years, 
and we strongly urge that they do so. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any 
progress on the nonproliferation treaty in 
the last couple of months ? 

' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 8, 1966, 
p. 199. 

A. I think what we last said on that re- 
mains the situation, that certain underbrush 
has been perhaps cleared away, but there still 
are important problems to be resolved. This 
is a matter in which allies on both sides pre- 
sumably are in touch with each other. I' 
would hope that this next year — that we are 
not too long delayed in the next year, that 
we might find some way to resolve this mat- 
ter. It would be a major step forward if it 
could be brought to a conclusion, but I can- 
not today report that we have reached that 
point. It is a matter of discussion among 
many governments at the present time, and 
we would hope some progress could be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the India 
food problem for a moment, there is still 
pending on the President's desk the request 
of India for 2 million additioyial tons of food 
grains beyond the very large quantities that 
we have committed ourselves to send, and 1 
believe they wanted this to arrive in Febi~u- 
ary to tide them over until the March harvest 
has come in. I think in the past you have said 
that this request nms under urgent considera- 
tion by our Government. Does what you have 
just said now indicate that tve would hope 
that other countries would share this btirden 
with us so that we would not have to supply 
all the 2 million tons by ourselves? 

A. I believe some announcements have al- 
ready been made from some other govern- 
ments, and Secretary Freeman indicated that 
there would be a million tons of wheat arriv- 
ing in India in January. 

Q. In January? But what about February? 

A. Well, that would be for distribution in 
the month, presumably during the month of 
February, and arrangements are being dis- 
cussed about what might be done beyond that. 
But there is no specific word today about 
action taken beyond those already an- 
nounced, and when the action — when any de- 
cisions are made on this, they will be 

The press: Mr. Secretary, we wish you a 
Merry Christmas, and we hope you will be 
able to take the whole day off. Thank you 
very much. 



North Atlantic Council IVIeets at Paris 

The North Atlantic Council held its regular 
ministerial meeting at Paris December 15-16. 
Following are texts of the final communique 
and three annexes which were released by the 
Council at the close of the meeting on Decem- 
ber 16, together ivith a list of the members of 
the U.S. delegation. 


1. Ministers of member governments of the 
Atlantic Alliance have met in Paris. 

2. The North Atlantic Council, meeting on 
15th and 16th December, reaffirmed the pur- 
poses and principles of the Alliance, and their 
resolve to ensure stability and well-being in 
the North Atlantic area, and to unite their 
efforts for the preservation of peace and se- 
curity for their peoples. 

3. The Alliance has demonstrated its value 
by successfully averting threats to peace and 
safeguarding the security of the Atlantic 
area. By its defensive strength including its 
effective means of deterrence, as well as by 
maintaining its solidarity, the Alliance has 
produced the basis for the present marked 
reduction of tension in Europe. This basis 
remains essential for the security of the Alli- 
ance and for progress towards a peaceful 
solution of outstanding problems, including 
the problem of Germany. 

4. The Council associated itself with the 
views expressed in the Declaration by the 
Governments of France, the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
United States which appears as an Annex to 
this Communique. With regard to Berlin, the 
Council stands by its declaration of 16th De- 
cember, 1958.* 

5. Ministers agreed on the need for con- 
tinued efforts to achieve a peaceful solution 
of the German problem to meet the German 
people's fundamental right to reunification. 
So long as Germany continues to be divided 
there cannot be a genuine and stable settle- 
ment in Europe. The peaceful progress of 
Europe must proceed from reciprocal confi- 
dence and trust, which will take time to grow 
from sustained policies of co-operative effort 
and better understanding on both sides. It 
means especially removing barriers to freer 
and more friendly reciprocal exchanges be- 
tween countries of different social and eco- 
nomic systems. 

6. For their part, the members of the At- 
lantic Alliance have confirmed their intention 
to continue their efforts to secure better rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union and the states of 
Eastern Europe in the political, economic, 
social, scientific and cultural fields. Ministers 
examined the report on East/West relations 
prepared in accordance with the instructions 
given at the last Ministerial meeting in June 
1966.2 They welcomed the wide range of sug- 
gestions in the report and emphasised their 
willingness to explore ways of developing co- 
operation with the Soviet Union and the 
states of Eastern Europe in tasks of interest 
and benefit to all concerned. They, moreover, 
noted that contacts, conversations and agree- 
ments have recently increased. In the field of 
East/West relations there are clearly differ- 
ent approaches which can be adopted, 
whether between individual countries or in a 
wider international framework. 

7. Ministers welcomed the approval by the 
United Nations Outer Space Committee of a 
draft treaty on the peaceful use of outer 

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4. 

' For text of a communique issued on June 8, 1966, 
see ibid., June 27, 1966, p. 1001. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


space.' Encourag-ed by this, they affirmed 
their determination to continue to consult ac- 
tively on problems of disarmament, to keep 
under review the progress of international 
discussions on measures to prevent the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons, and to seek 
agreement on satisfactory arms control meas- 
ures which might contribute to the improve- 
ment of European security and the relaxation 
of tension. In so doing, they hoped to bring 
about conditions which could permit a grad- 
ual and balanced revision in force levels on 
both sides. At the same time, they reaffirmed 
their conviction that no acceptable permanent 
solution to the question of European security 
is possible without agreement on the most 
critical political problems. 

8. Turning to economic questions. Minis- 
ters noted that the gap between the most ad- 
vanced and the less-developed countries had 
widened further. They reaffirmed that all ad- 
vanced countries, whatever their economic 
systems, had a responsibility to offer assist- 
ance to developing countries. 

9. Ministers expressed the hope that the 
present multilateral tariff negotiations (Ken- 
nedy Round) would be carried to a successful 
conclusion and would promote the expansion 
of trade to the greater benefit of all. They 
also attached great importance to the initia- 
tives designed to overcome the existence of 
two trading areas in Western Europe and to 
facilitate technical co-operation between the 
European countries concerned. 

10. On the initiative of the Italian Govern- 
ment there was an exchange of views on ques- 
tions arising out of the uneven technological 
development of different countries. Ministers, 
after stressing the importance and complex- 
ity of this problem, invited the Permanent 
Representatives to study the procedure which 
might be followed for further examination 
and implementation of the Italian proposals, 
and to report their findings to the Spring 
Ministerial meeting. A Resolution on this 
subject was adopted and is attached. 

• See p. 78. 

11. The Council reaffirmed the importance 
of continuing to assist Greece and Turkey 
within the framework of the Alliance in or- 
der to maintain the effectiveness of their con- 
tribution to the common defense. Recom- 
mending wide participation in the aid 
programme, the Council agreed that this pro- 
gramme should be extended to cover the pe- 
riod 1966-1970. 

12. Ministers took note of the Secretary 
General's report on his "Watching Brief" 
concerning Greek-Turkish relations and re- 
affirmed their support for the continuation 
of his activities in this respect. They ex- 
pressed their firm hope that the continuing 
exchanges of views between Turkey and 
Greece on the Cyprus question and on Greek- 
Turkish relations would contribute to bring- 
ing about positive results. They reiterated 
their appreciation of the presence of the 
United Nations Force in Cyprus and the hope 
that an improvement in the situation in the 
island would be achieved. They stressed that 
no action should be taken which could worsen 
the situation in the island and increase the 

13. On the proposal of the Belgian Govern- 
ment and recalling the initiative taken by 
Canada in December 1964, the Council re- 
solved to undertake a broad analysis of in- 
ternational developments since the signing of 
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. Its pur- 
pose would be to determine the influence of 
such developments on the Alliance and to 
identify the tasks which lie before it, in or- 
der to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for 
a durable peace. A Resolution on this subject 
was adopted and is attached. 

14. Ministers approved a report on Civil 
Emergency Planning. They noted that a re- 
appraisal of these activities within NATO 
had been completed and they reaffirmed the 
importance of such planning for the protec- 
tion of civil populations and in the support 
of overall defence. 

15. Ministers met as the Defence Planning 
Committee on 14th December, 1966. As a fur- 
ther step in the process initiated at Athens 



in 1962, they approved recommendations re- 
garding nuclear planning and consultation, 
submitted by the Special Committee of De- 
fence Ministers. They agreed to establish in 
NATO two permanent bodies for nuclear 
planning — a policy body called the Nuclear 
Defence Affairs Committee, open to all 
NATO countries, and, subordinate to it, a 
Nuclear Planning Group of seven members 
which will handle the detailed work. 

16. To improve the ability of NATO to 
engage in timely consultation in the event of 
crisis, Ministers approved the development 
of new arrangements for the rapid exchange 
and the more effective use of relevant infor- 
mation and data. To facilitate such exchange 
of data, Ministers approved in principle the 
establishment of a new NATO-wide commu- 
nications scheme along the lines recom- 
mended by the Special Committee. They also 
examined a report from the Special Commit- 
tee on possible improved procedures for con- 
sultation. They agreed that further studies 
and planning in this important area should 
be undertaken, and requested the Secretary 
General and Permanent Representatives to 
consider how this work could most usefully 
be carried forward. The Special Committee, 
set up in June 1965, has now completed its 

17. Ministers reviewed reports on the pres- 
ent status of NATO's military effort and 
noted the force commitments undertaken by 
governments for 1967 under the NATO Force 
Plan adopted by Defence Ministers in July 

18. After a comprehensive review of ques- 
tions of strategy, force requirements, and 
resources, in the course of which they dis- 
cussed the military capabilities and intentions 
of the Soviet Union, Ministers considered the 
political, strategic and economic guidance 
to be given to the NATO Militaiy Authorities 
for their appreciation of the military situa- 
tion as it will affect NATO up to and includ- 
ing 1975. They gave instructions for further 
studies in these fields in the light of this dis- 

19. On the basis of the results of numer- 
ous studies conducted since July 1966, Min- 
isters gave instructions for further work to 
be carried out within the framework of the 
new defence planning review procedures due 
to be initiated in January 1967 for the regu- 
lar projection of NATO force planning five 
years ahead. This work will be directed, pri- 
marily, towards securing the best balance of 
forces and the most effective use of the re- 
sources made available by NATO govern- 
ments for defence. 

20. Ministers underlined the importance of 
the defence of the flank regions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty area and issued further guid- 
ance regarding the provision of external rein- 
forcements in defence emergencies. They also 
gave instructions concerning the improve- 
ment of the local forces in the South-Eastern 
Region. Substantial progress was made to- 
wards agreement upon the common funding 
of the exercises of the Allied Command Eu- 
rope Mobile Force. 

21. Ministers agreed to study whether a 
NATO satellite communication programme 
should be established which would provide 
for a co-operative effort by member nations 
in the new and developing field of space tech- 
nology and its application to NATO's vital 
communications needs. Meanwhile, an experi- 
mental project was agreed which will provide 
a link between SHAPE [Supreme Headquar- 
ters Allied Powers Europe] at its new head- 
quarters and AFSOUTH [Allied Forces 
Southern Europe] at Naples. 

22. France did not take part in the discus- 
sions referred to in paragraphs 15-20 and 
did not associate herself with the correspond- 
ing decisions. 

23. The Council decided that a new perma- 
nent headquarters should be constructed at 
the Heysel in Brussels, and a new temporary 
headquarters at Evere, also in Brussels. The 
Council expressed its gratitude to the Belgian 
Government for having made available these 
two sites. 

24. The regular Spring Ministerial Meet- 
ing will be held in Luxembourg in 1967. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


Annex A 

Declaration on Germany 

The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger- 
many, the United Kingdom and the United 
States met on 14th December, 1966, on the 
eve of the Ministerial Meetings of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, in Paris in order to discuss 
the situation in Germany. The meeting took 
place exactly eight years after the four For- 
eign Ministers had met in Paris on 14th De- 
cember, 1958, when Foreign Minister [Willy] 
Brandt, then Governing Mayor of Berlin, re- 
ported on the situation of Berlin. The Foreign 
Ministers confirmed that their governments 
would continue to be responsible for the se- 
curity and viability of a free Berlin. 

The Foreign Ministers of France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States took 
note of the intention of the Federal Republic 
of Germany to develop human, economic and 
cultural contacts between the two parts of 
Germany. These contacts aim in particular at 
alleviating the human misery which is a 
result of the partition of the German people. 
The three Ministers share the views of the 
Federal Government and will support these 
efforts within the framework of the responsi- 
bilities incumbent on their governments. 

The Ministers re-emphasised that the solu- 
tion of the German question is one of the es- 
sential problems in the relations between East 
and West. This solution can only be achieved 
by peaceful methods, on the basis of the right 
of self-determination, and through the crea- 
tion of an atmosphere of detente on the con- 
tinent, under conditions guaranteeing the 
security of all countries. 

Annex B 

Resolution on International 

Technological Co-operation 

(Adopted by the Council on 16th December, 


The North Atlantic Council : 

Recognising the need for continued pro- 
motion of economic co-operation within the 

spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic 

Having noted proposals submitted by the 
Italian Government on 5th October and 7th 
December, 1966, the additional comments 
provided to the Council by the Italian Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, and the statements of 
other Ministers in the course of the debate; 

Convinced that it is important that con- 
sideration be given to the Italian proposals 
so that measures can be applied as soon as 
possible to give renewed impetus to interna- 
tional co-operation in the technological field; 
and to such other measures as will serve to 
raise the general level of scientific and tech- 
nological achievement; 

Recommends that the Council in Perma- 
nent Session study the procedure which 
might be followed for further examination 
and implementation of the Italian proposals, 
and report its findings to the Spring Minis- 
terial Meeting; 

Instructs the Secretary General to submit 
shortly to the Council in Permanent Session, 
a report on the scientific and technological 
programmes already underway in NATO in 
view of the contributions these activities can 
make toward a reduction of technological dis- 

Annex C 

Resolution of the North Atlantic 

The Council, desirous of achieving the 
fundamental purposes of the North Atlantic 
Treaty in the spirit of cohesion and solidarity 
between the signatories of the Treaty: 

Considers it essential to analyse the politi- 
cal events which have occurred since the 
Treaty was signed, with a view to ascertain- 
ing their influence on international relations 
and on the Alliance itself; 

Accordingly, the Council Undertakes to 
study the future tasks which face the Alli- 
ance, and its procedures for fulfilling them, 
in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor 
for a durable peace. It will examine ways of 
improving consultation within the Alliance, 
including the European member countries. 



In carrying out this study at a hig-h politi- 
cal level, the Council will Utilise the most 
appropriate possible procedures for fulfilling 
its mandate. 

A preliminary report will be examined at 
the Spring 1967 Ministerial Meeting and the 
Ministerial Council at its meeting in Decem- 
ber 1967 will draw the appropriate conclu- 
sions that emerge from the enquiry. 


Press release 291 dated December 12 


Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, chairman 
Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury 
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense 

U.S. Representative on the 
North Atlantic Council 
Harlan Cleveland 

Members of the Delegation 

Department of State 

Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to France 

Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State 

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secre- 
tary of State 

Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and 
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs 

Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic 
Political-Military Affairs 

Samuel T. Parelman, secretary of delegation. Deputy 
Director, Office of International Conferences 

Richard I. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs 

Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs 

George S. Springsteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for European Affairs 

Andrew L. Steigman, Staff Assistant to the Secre- 
tary of State 

George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of NATO 
and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs 

Department of the Treasury 

Douglass Hunt, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

the Treasury 
James F. King, Assistant to the Secretary of the 

Charles A. Sullivan, Assistant to the Secretary of 

the Treasury 

Department of Defense 

Maj. Gen. Russell Dougherty, USAF, Director, Euro- 
pean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs 

John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of De- 
fense for International Security Affairs 

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Public Affairs 

Adm. A. G. Ward, U.S. Representative to the Mili- 
tary Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 

Gen. Earle Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff 

Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs 

U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation and European Regional Organizations 
Dwight Dickinson, Director, Office of Political Affairs 
Philip J. Farley, Deputy U.S. Representative on the 

North Atlantic Council 
John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Rep- 
Timothy W. Stanley, Director, United States NATO 
Force Planning Group 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self-defense 

by Leonard C. Meeker 
Legal Adviser ^ 

Throughout this land, the war in Viet- 
Nam weighs heavy on the minds of Ameri- 
cans. It is again and again the subject of our 
talk, under the pressing flow of news dis- 
patches and under the thousand impacts this 
war has on our lives. It is never far from our 

Fighting a war is never cheap, never easy. 
The Viet-Nam war is a particularly difficult 
one. As President Johnson has said, this is a 
new kind of war. It is not a war of major 
battles to be won or lost. It calls for courage 
and fortitude to stick it out, over a long 
period of time if need be. 

There are few who would not be rid of the 
war. It impinges directly on the lives of 
American young men by the tens and hun- 
dreds of thousands. Most Americans are 
anxious to turn our full resources to another 
great war — a war on poverty and hunger at 
home and throughout the world. Some believe 
the Viet-Nam war divides the world at a 
time when we are most impelled to seek world 

One cannot but be concerned about these 
problems. No one can say that debate is 
unnecessary — quite the contrary. We are 
dealing with great issues. There are risks to 
be weighed and roads that must be chosen. 

It is my purpose, in the hour we have to- 
gether this evening, to locate the Viet-Nam 
war in the great river of time: first, to indi- 

' 1966 Louis Caplan Lecture in Law at the Uni- 
versity of Pittsburgh Law School, Pittsburgh, Pa., 
on Dec. 13 (press release 292). 

cate something of how it arose; then, to relate 
it to the existing framework of international 
law; finally, to consider the place of this con- 
flict in the building of a more stable and just 
world order as nations move along the high- 
road of history. 

Origins of the Viet-Nam Conflict 

Viet-Nam has a very short political his- 
tory under that name — one that does not go 
back even 20 years. Viet-Nam is made up 
of three areas that were included in what 
France called, for purposes of colonial admin- 
istration, Indochina. Those areas were: 
Tonkin in the Red River Delta of the north, 
Annam along the central coast, and Cochin 
China in the south around Saigon. In the 
19th century France ruled these areas as pro- 
tectorates and colonies, along with Laos and 
Cambodia; all together, they made up Indo- 

The colonial picture was a typical one: ad- 
ministrators from France to govern; French 
armed forces to keep order; colonists to direct 
agriculture and trade; native gentry and 
leaders who were clients of the French and 
profited from the relationship; finally, the 
Indochinese majority, who performed the 
labor of the country and received relatively 
little return for their toil. 

Japan's military leaders, as part of their 
program of expansion and conquest, occupied 
Indochina in 1940. The colonial administra- 
tion and the European residents of Indochina 
by and large collaborated with the Japanese. 



They hoiked thereby to keep the political, eco- 
nomic, and social situation under control. 

It was in World War II that the recent his- 
tory of Viet-Nam began. Dissidents who 
opposed the French and the Japanese carried 
on a resistance movement. Ho Chi Minh was 
the acknowledged leader of this movement 
from the beginning. By 1945 the drive for 
independence had become a significant politi- 
cal force. The sense of nationalism and the 
ideas of self-detennination were at work in 
Indochina, as they were elsewhere in Asia 
and soon came to be in Africa. 

But France in the postwar period did not 
follow the course of independence soon taken 
by Britain for India, Bumia, and other 
Commonwealth territories. France sought 
instead to restore and reinforce its colonial 
administration in Indochina. What had been 
wartime resistance by the Viet Minh orga- 
nization continued and grew as a struggle to 
rid the country of colonial rule. In 1949 
France sought to stem the tide by setting up 
indigenous governments of limited authority 
in Cambodia, in Laos, and in a new State of 
Viet-Nam. France kept control of foreign 
affairs, defense, and financial matters. 

The guerrilla campaign of the Viet Minh 
grew into a major war with the French 
colonial forces. At the end of 5 years the bat- 
tle of Dien Bien Phu had been lost by the 
French, and Paris had decided to seek a po- 
litical settlement. This was the origin of the 
Geneva conference of 1954, in which the five 
great world powers took part, along with 
Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Viet- 
Nam — each of which by then had its own 
regime. The Government in the South had 
been created by and was alined with France. 
Hanoi was the seat of the rebel Viet Minh 
regime which had been fighting the French. 
Its concentration of militaiy and political 
power was in the North, but it had guerrilla 
units operating throughout the countiy. The 
participants in the Geneva conference did not 
have to produce any agreement at all. They 
were free to continue all the existing dis- 
agreements. The French and Viet Minh mili- 
tary forces could have gone on with the 
fighting, to whatever conclusion it would 

yield. Since, however, they did reach a series 
of international agreements, we are entitled 
to look at them as binding legal instruments. 
We will want first to see what contracts 
were made. We will want to see what provi- 
sion was made for insuring compliance. We 
will want to look at what happened in fact. 
We will want to examine the legal rights of 
the- parties in the circumstances of 1956 to 

The Geneva Accords 

The 1954 Geneva conference produced 
agreements on Cambodia and Laos as well as 
on Viet-Nam, but for present purijoses we 
shall consider only the instruments relating 
to Viet-Nam.2 The chief of these was the 
Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in 
Viet-Nam. It was signed on behalf of the 
commander in chief of the French Union 
forces in Indochina and on behalf of the com- 
mander in chief of the People's Army of 

The very first article of the Viet-Nam 
cease-fire agreement fixed a demarcation line, 
near the 17th parallel in central Viet-Nam, 
"on either side of which the forces of the 
two parties shall be regrouped after their 
withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army 
of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the 
forces of the French Union to the south." 
Under article 19 of the same agreement, the 
two parties were bound to insure that the 
zones assigned to them "are not used for the 
resumption of hostilities or to further an ag- 
gressive policy." And under article 24 each 
party was obligated to "commit no act and 
undertake no operation against the other 
party." Articles 16 and 17 of the agreement 
prohibited the introduction into Viet-Nam of 
additional armed forces or weapons, but per- 
mitted the rotation of troops and the replace- 
ment of wornout or used-up materiel. Article 
18 prohibited the establishment of new mili- 
tary bases throughout Viet-Nam territory. 

In a separate document, known as the 

^ For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950- 
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State 
publication 6446, p. 750. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference,^ 
the conference powers agreed that the settle- 
ment of political problems in Viet-Nam 
should "permit the Viet-Namese people to 
enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed 
by democratic institutions established as a 
result of free general elections by secret bal- 
lot." There were to be general elections in 
July 1956 under the supervision of the Inter- 
national Control Commission. Consultations 
on this subject were to be held between repre- 
sentatives of the two zones beginning in July 

Here, then, were the basic undertakings of 
the Geneva accords. If observed, they should 
have kept the peace in Viet-Nam. What was 
to insure that the parties would live up to 
these undertakings ? The agreement sought to 
provide some machinery for international 

There was to be an International Control 
Commission, made up of representatives of 
India, Canada, and Poland. The Commission 
was to oversee fulfillment of all the obliga- 
tions of the agreement. It was to have inspec- 
tion teams at its disposal and access to any 
and all places in both zones of Viet-Nam. 
Some of the Commission's decisions could be 
made by majority vote; others, including 
those dealing with violations or threats of 
violations which might lead to a resumption 
of hostilities, would require a unanimous vote 
of all members. 

In this respect, the arrangement was 
flawed from the beginning. Any member of 
the Commission could veto a decision on a 
question of compliance with the agreement. 
On other matters, even a majority might be 
unobtainable because the representative of 
India, in carrying out his Government's 
policy of nonalinement, could remain aloof 
and equivocal on important matters. Vetoes 
were in fact cast, and the Indian chairman 
of the Commission often pursued his national 
policy of neutralism and nonalinement. The 
Commission had other difficulties, too. The 
zonal authorities, and particularly those in 
North Viet-Nam, denied access to the inspec- 
tion teams of the Commission. 

' Ibid., p. 785. 

As a result of this state of aflFairs, the 
world has not had an eff"ective, authoritative, 
and impartial reporting mechanism on the 
facts in Viet-Nam. There could and did arise 
disputes about the facts in Viet-Nam. For 
example, who lived up to the cease-fire 
agreement, and who broke it? Was the sub- 
sequent conflict indigenous and essentially a 
civil war, or was there the intervention of 
substantial and perhaps crucial external 
force ? 

Events in Viet-Nam Since 1954 

Issues like these have a bearing on the 
international legal rights of the parties. Be- 
cause they are an essential part of the legal 
analysis, we must try to deal with them. 
Since, for the most part, we do not have avail- 
able authoritative findings by an impartial 
international body, it is necessaiy to work 
with the best evidence that can be gathered. 

I should like to set out what the United 
States Government believes happened after 
July 1954 and to set these events beside the 
provisions of the Geneva accords. I shall, of 
course, discuss what the Government of 
South Viet-Nam and the Government of the 
United States did after July 1954. But be- 
cause their actions were in the nature of a 
response to events directed from Hanoi, it 
seems most logical to examine first what the 
other side was doing. 

Despite the obligation of regroupment in 
the cease-fire agreement, some effective Com- 
munist guerrilla units continued to operate in 
areas of South Viet-Nam where they had 
been during the hostilities with France. 
Large numbers of the southern Viet Minh 
troops who were withdrawn north of the 
demarcation line were retained by Hanoi in 
military or security units; others received 
further training in guerrilla warfare. 

The North Vietnamese regime began to 
infiltrate these ethnic Southerners into South 
Viet-Nam as early as 1957. Up to the conclud- 
ing months of 1964, approximately 40,000 
infiltrators moved south, to join the guerrillas 
already there who had been supported with 
arms and supplies by Hanoi since 1956. Once 
in South Viet-Nam. the infiltrators were as- 



signed to existing combat units or used to 
form new units, frequently in their original 
home provinces. All of this activity — the 
training, the equipping, the transporting, the 
assigning — was directed from Hanoi. It did 
not just happen within South Viet-Nam. 

As the infiltration from the North con- 
tinued, Hanoi began to exhaust its supply of 
ethnic Southerners who could be sent into the 
South for guerrilla warfare. Beginning in 
late 1964, the infiltrating units consisted es- 
sentially of North Vietnamese soldiers or- 
ganized in regular army units. Upward of 
80,000 of these troops have infiltrated from 
the North during the last 2 years. The 
Northerners have frequently entered in large 
units, rather than in small groups, and have 
retained their military organization. After 
allowing for casualties from all causes, it is 
estimated that there are today about 45,000 
North Vietnamese army regulars in South 
Viet-Nam. This represents nearly half of the 
main force of Communist combat troops in 
the South — a force currently estimated at 
100,000. Of the remaining 55,000, many are 
irregulars who earlier infiltrated from the 
North; almost all the rest have been re- 
cruited from Communist-held areas in the 
South — there has been no rallying to the 
Communist cause from Government-held 

Let us now look at what the Communists 
have been doing with their forces in South 
Viet-Nam during the last 10 years. They 
began their operations with terrorism and 
assassination aimed at local government 
officials. From 1957 to 1959 more than 1,000 
civilians were assassinated or kidnaped by 
Communist guerrillas in the South. In the 
ensuing 2 years their attacks were intensi- 
fied and began to be conducted by battalion- 
size units against the military and security 
forces of the Government in the South. The 
level of military activity increased progres- 

With the arrival of regular North Viet- 
namese army units, beginning in the conclud- 
ing months of 1964, sizable military engage- 
ments have taken place almost continuously 
in many different parts of South Viet-Nam. 

Unlike Korea, where the Communists 
launched openly an invasion in broad day- 
light across an international demarcation 
line, the Communists in Viet-Nam have re- 
sorted to covert and clandestine tactics. This 
is the strategy of what Communist ideology 
and propaganda call the "war of national 

On the basis of the evidence which has 
been accumulated over a period of time, it 
seems beyond dispute that from the begin- 
ning the conflict in South Viet-Nam has not 
been simply an indigenous rebellion. Much of 
the military manpower came from the North. 
So also with weapons and supplies. And, per- 
haps most important of all, the planning, the 
direction, the orders, have come from Hanoi. 

International Law in Relation 
to the Viet-Nam Conflict 

How does one apply international law to 
this kind of problem? 

It is necessary to begin by finding out what 
international law is. We have a fairly clear 
idea of what it is not. It is not a framework 
of government such as our own and other 
democratic countries have at home. There is 
no international legislature to make the rules 
of the game for all to accept and follow. 
There is no system of courts. There is no 
police force. 

What is a government to do in the face of 
so imperfect a world, in the face of so chaotic 
a scene, such as that created by large-scale 
violence and hostilities in Southeast Asia? 
Some have suggested that it is best to 
acknowledge there is no real law to deal with 
such a situation of conflict and that the 
proper course is to proceed with whatever 
practical actions will most advance the mili- 
tary power, the security position, and the 
general interests of the United States. I won- 
der if such a view does not beg an important 
question. Will this country's security be en- 
hanced, will its interests be served, without 
our making an honest and determined at- 
tempt to develop international law and live 
by it? 

We may feel the absence today of a law- 
giver outside national governments, who 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


could, to our comfort and security, give and 
enforce law among the nations. That absence 
does not relieve us of moral and political 
obligations. It means instead that govern- 
ments will have to go on working very hard 
if there are to be functioning and effective 
processes and institutions of world law in the 

Let us remember, too, that the shape of 
things to come is in no small way determined 
by the actions of great powers. This is an 
aspect of the responsibility that the United 
States, along with other countries, bears in 
the modem world. I have no doubt myself 
that the road of pragmatism and the road of 
idealism run together as we consider the 
needs and the possibilities for developing 
effective world law. 

International Agreements 

1. There are many ways of making law. 
One powerful means of lawmaking available 
to governments is to join in making interna- 
tional agreements and then to act in con- 
formity with them. 

In the case of Viet-Nam we have the 
Geneva accords as a starting point and legal 
framework for dealing with the situation. 
Although the United States did not sign the 
accords, from the beginning it undertook to 
respect them, and President Eisenhower said 
that "any renewal of Communist aggression 
would be viewed by us as a matter of grave 
concern." * 

The United States began as early as 1954 
to arrange for aid to South Viet-Nam to pro- 
mote its viability and development. For 
nearly 7 years United States forces and mate- 
rial in the South stayed within the limits set 
by the Geneva accords for external military 
assistance, despite the fact that North Viet- 
Nam had been violating these accords from 
the start and despite the gradual escalation of 
these violations. Not until late 1961 did the 
number of United States military personnel 
in the South rise above 900. When the United 

■" For a statement made by President Eisenhower 
on July 21, 1954, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, 
p. 163. 

States made the decision to exceed the limits 
laid down by the Geneva accords, it was on 
the basis of a principle of international law 
similar to the doctrine of fundamental breach 
in the domestic law of contracts. North Viet- 
Nam had violated seriously the obligation to 
prevent the northern zone from being "used 
for the resumption of hostilities or to further 
an aggressive policy." In these circum- 
stances. South Viet-Nam was relieved from 
the obligation to comply with the cease-fire 
agreement's limitations on military man- 
power and materiel when the South needed 
additional strength for its own defense 
against aggression from the North. 

Here it is noteworthy that in June 1962 the 
Indian and Canadian members of the Inter- 
national Control Commission found it pos- 
sible to agree as follows in a report: 

. . . there is evidence to show that armed and 
unarmed personnel, arms, munitions and other sup- 
plies have been sent from the Zone in the North 
to the Zone in the South with the object of support- 
ing, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, 
including armed attacks, directed against the Armed 
Forces and Administration of the Zone in the 
South. . . . 

. . . there is evidence to show that the PAVN 
[People's Army of Viet-Nam] has allowed the 
Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encourag- 
ing and supporting hostile activities in the Zone 
in the South, aimed at the overthrow of the Ad- 
ministration in the South. 

The Commission also cited the Republic of 
Viet-Nam for its activities in importing mili- 
tary equipment and personnel above the 
limits imposed by the 1954 Geneva accords. 
However, these actions were taken by South 
Viet-Nam as part of its effort to defend itself 
against aggression and subversion from the 
North. And at no time did South Viet-Nam 
undertake to overrun the North by force. 

I have mentioned this report of the Inter- 
national Control Commission because it 
shows that the international machinery set 
up by the Geneva accords agreed with the 
legal analysis of the situation made by the 
United States, when that machinery was able 
to function. But for most of the last dozen 
years, it has been unable to function as in- 



Government Actions and Precedents 
They Create 

2. Another way in which international law 
is made is through the actions of govern- 
ments and the precedents they create. If a 
government acts consistently with a series of 
coherent principles, it may make a contribu- 
tion to the common law of nations. The 
United States Government has tried to do 
this in the case of Viet-Nam, both with re- 
spect to situations not envisioned by the 
Geneva accords and in giving practical in- 
terpretations and applications to the general 
rules laid down by the Charter of the United 

Some commentators, in talking about Viet- 
Nam, have set up three categories of situa- 
tions for their legal analysis of the problem: 
The first is the category of wholly indigenous 
rebellion. The second category is one in which 
there is large-scale intervention from outside 
short of armed attack. The third is the cate- 
gory of armed attack, in which one country 
employs its regular miUtary forces to gain 
control of another country. 

The evidence does not allow for the con- 
clusion that the war in Viet-Nam was ever 
a simple category-one situation. It was prob- 
ably, fpv quite some period of time, a cate- 
gory-two situation. By the end of 1964, 
however, it had become very clearly a cate- 
gory-three situation. 

Critics of United States Gk)vernment policy 
have argued that, if there was North Viet- 
namese intervention in the South, any United 
States assistance to South Viet-Nam that 
might be justified would have to be confined 
geographically to South Viet-Nam. Even if 
one were to concede that such a rule applies 
in the case of a category-two situation, it cer- 
tainly does not apply to a case of armed 
attack. Legitimate defense includes military 
action against the aggressor wherever such 
action is needed to halt the attack. 

During the decade after Geneva, the 
United States did confine its assistance to 
South Viet-Nam to military personnel, sup- 
plies, and activities in the South. The United 
States took no action against the source of 

aggression in the North. Then, in late 1964, 
as I have already indicated. North Viet-Nam 
moved into a new phase of its aggression and 
began dispatching southward whole units of 
its regular armed forces. The tempo of the 
war had increased by early 1965, and addi- 
tional measures of defense were required. 

Infiltration — Current Mode 
of "Armed Attack" 

3. I have heard and read arguments by 
some that Viet-Nam does not present a situa- 
tion of "armed attack" because invading 
armies were not massed at a border and did 
not march across it in broad daylight. To be 
sure, that is the way armed attacks occurred 
in 1914, at the beginning of World War II, 
and even in Korea. But strategies and tactics 
have changed. The current mode of armed 
aggression in Viet-Nam is by the infiltration 
of military units and the weapons of war 
under cover of darkness, through jungle 
areas, and across the territory of a neighbor- 
ing state — Laos. 

The law, if it is to be a living and working 
force, must concern itself with the substance 
and the reality of what is going on. The 
answer to a question of law cannot properly 
turn on the mere form or appearance that a 
protagonist may give to its action. The judg- 
ment whether North Viet-Nam has engaged 
in "armed attack" against the South cannot 
depend on the form or appearance of its con- 
duct. The crucial consideration is that North 
Viet-Nam has marshaled the resources of the 
state and has sent instrumentalities of the 
state, including units of its regular armed 
forces, into South Viet-Nam to achieve state 
objectives by force — in this case to subject 
the South to its rule. 

Measures of Collective Defense 

4. United States and South Vietnamese 
airstrikes and other military actions against 
North Viet-Nam have been based on the legal 
proposition that they are measures of collec- 
tive defense against armed attack from the 
North. I would like to take up some of the 
arguments that have been made against this 
proposition. First, it has been argued that, 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


while the United States says South Viet-Nam 
is under armed attack, no international body, 
such as the United Nations, has made such a 
finding-. The United States Government re- 
grets that neither the Security Council nor 
the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has been able or seen fit to express itself on 
Viet^Nam. But ought we to adopt the view 
that if the United Nations makes no finding, 
there is therefore no armed attack and the 
aggressor must accordingly be permitted to 
pursue his ambitions without being subjected 
to effective countermeasures? 

Certainly the United Nations Charter does 
not say this. Article 51 of the charter, dealing 
with armed attack, says that "the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense" 
may be exercised "until the Security Council 
has taken the measures necessary to main- 
tain international peace and security." Thus 
it is for a defender to claim and assert that 
armed attack has taken place, justifying 
measures of defense. The defender does not 
have to await action by the Security Council. 
His duty, as is made clear by the remainder 
of article 51, is to report to the Council. Then 
the Council will, in the end, decide what has 
happened, who is right, and what measures 
must be taken. 

The United States has several times re- 
ported to the Council in the last 2 years on 
military actions in Viet-Nam. The Council 
has taken no action. In January and Febru- 
ary 1966 the Council elected not to debate the 
situation in Viet-Nam, although the United 
States had once again raised the whole ques- 
tion. In September of this year Ambassador 
[Arthur J.] Goldberg made a full presenta- 
tion to the General Assembly on Viet-Nam.^ 
The subject was a central topic in the month- 
long general debate that was held in New 
York during October. Again, no United Na- 
tions action was taken. 

International Lines of Demarcation 

5. Another argument made against the 
United States legal position on collective self- 

' Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518. 

defense is that Viet-Nam is a single country 
and that the regime in the North is not 
legally precluded from taking steps, includ- 
ing the use of force, to unify North and 
South Viet-Nam under a single Communist 
regime. Any such argument ignores the plain 
provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954. It 
also suggests a view of international law that 
would operate to undermine peace and se- 
curity in many parts of the world. 

The Geneva accords are very clear in draw- 
ing a demarcation line between North and 
South Viet-Nam. This line was to be re- 
spected by the opposing armed forces, includ- 
ing all elements — regular or irregular — under 
their control. It divided Viet-Nam into two 
zones which would be administered by dif- 
ferent authorities. The line was set by an 
international agreement negotiated at a con- 
ference in Geneva of the principal powers 

The fact that the demarcation line was not 
intended as a permanent boundary surely did 
not give either side license to disregard it. 
The very purpose of the line was to end hos- 
tilities and separate the fighting forces. Mov- 
ing troops from one zone to the other to 
engage them in hostilities was clearly in 
breach of the international agreement 
reached at Geneva in 1954. 

It was also true in the Korea of 1950 that 
the 38th parallel was not a permanent bound- 
ary but instead an international demarca- 
tion line established at the end of World War 
II. Like the line in Viet-Nam, the line in 
Korea was not intended to last; it was hoped 
that the country could be unified. But all of 
this made the North Korean invasion of that 
year no less an armed attack under interna- 
tional law. 

The importance of respecting interna- 
tional lines of demarcation is evident in 
Europe also. The lines of demarcation be- 
tween East and West Germany and around 
West Berlin have never been intended as 
permanent boundaries. However, they are 
lines of great importance, and any moves to 
disregard them would have the gravest con- 



Question of "Free Elections" 

6. Still another argnment has been ad- 
vanced by some to justify the actions of 
Hanoi. It runs as follows: The Geneva ac- 
cords looked forward to a political settlement 
as the result of which Viet-Nam would be 
unified; elections were to be held in the sum- 
mer of 1956, and during the preceding year 
consultations were to be held between the 
authorities of North and South concerning 
the elections; South Viet-Nam declined to 
take part in consultations, and there have 
been no elections; hence, North Viet-Nam had 
freedom to proceed in its own way with re- 
unification of the country. 

This argument has no merit. The elections 
referred to in the Geneva accords were to be 
"free general elections by secret ballot." Even 
the North Vietnamese Defense Minister in 
effect admitted long ago that such elections 
would have been impossible in North Viet- 
Nam. Speaking at the 10th Congress of the 
North Vietnamese Communist Party Central 
Committee in October 1956 General [Vo 
Nguyen] Giap said: 

We have made too many deviations and executed 
too many honest people. We attacked on too large 
a front and seeing enemies everywhere, resorted 
to terror, which became far too widespread. 

Thus it cannot properly be said that there 
was any breach of agreement by South Viet- 
Nam when it declined to proceed toward elec- 
tions that could not possibly have been mean- 

Defense Measures Proportional to Attack 

7. Before concluding this review of the 
United States legal position, I would like to 
refer to the principle that measures of de- 
fense must be proportional to the attack. The 
United States program of airstrikes against 
North Viet-Nam has been designed for the 
purpose of interfering with transport to the 
South; destroying supplies intended for ship- 
ment to the South; in short, to halt the con- 
tinuing aggression by North Viet-Nam. As 
Ambassador Goldberg said 2 months ago: 

It is because of the attempt to upset by violence 

JANUARY 9, 1967 

the situation in Viet-Nam, and its far-reaching 
implications elsewhere, that the United States and 
other countries have responded to appeals from 
South Viet-Nam for military assistance. 

Our aims in giving this assistance are strictly 

We are not engaged in a "holy war" against com- 

We do not seek to establish an American empire or 
a sphere of influence in Asia. 

We seek no permanent military bases, no per- 
manent establishment of troops, no permanent al- 
liances, no permanent American presence of any 
kind in South Viet-Nam. 

We do not seek to impose a policy of alinement 
on South Viet-Nam. 

We do not seek to overthrow the Government of 
North Viet-Nam. 

We do not seek to do any injury to mainland 
China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests. 

We do not ask of North Viet-Nam an uncondi- 
tional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything 
that belongs to it. 

Efforts To Find a Peaceful Settlement 

I have been setting forth reasons in sup- 
port of United States military actions against 
North Viet-Nam. Justification for these ac- 
tions in no way displaces a continuing obliga- 
tion we have under the United Nations 
Charter to seek a peaceful settlement. It has 
long been said that nations must try to settle 
their disputes by peaceful means before any 
resort to force. But it is no less true that the 
participants in armed conflict are bound to go 
on seeking a settlement by peaceful means 
even while hostilities are in progress. 

Particularly in the last 2 years, the United 
States has made major efforts to negotiate an 
end to the war in Viet-Nam. In April 1965 
President Johnson, in response to the appeal 
of 17 nonalined countries, offered to com- 
mence negotiations without precondition.* 
This was not acceptable to Hanoi. A year ago 
the United States conducted a concentrated 
peace offensive for over 5 weeks. Again there 
was no affirmative answer from the other 

At the General Assembly this fall, Ambas- 

' For text of President Johnson's address at Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., see ibid., Apr. 
26, 1965, p. 606. 


sador Goldberg summed up our aims in the 
following way: 

We want a political solution, not a military solu- 
tion, to this conflict. By the same token, we reject 
the idea that North Viet-Nam has the right to im- 
pose a military solution. 

We seek to assure for the people of South Viet- 
Nam the same right of self-determination — to decide 
its own political destiny, free of force — that the 
United Nations Charter affirms for all. 

And we believe that reunification of Viet-Nam 
should be decided upon through a free choice by the 
peoples of both the North and the South without 
outside interference, the results of which choice we 
are fully prepared to support. 

. . . We are prepared to order a cessation of all 
bombing of North Viet-Nam the moment we are 
assured, privately or otherwise, that this step will be 
answered promptly by a corresponding and appro- 
priate deescalation on the other side. 

Prospects Into the Future 

It is not given to us to foresee in what way 
the Viet-Nam war will end. It is possible that 
the protagonists will meet at the conference 
table and settle the conflict by negotiation. 
The United States will continue to press its 
efforts toward peaceful settlement. 

It is also possible that, over time, North 
Viet-Nam will gradually reduce and ulti- 
mately cease its intervention in the South, 
having found that force does not pay and that 
the relationships between North and South 
must be worked out on the levels of economic 
intercourse and political accommodation. 

Other possibilities have been urged by 
some: for example, outright withdrawal of 
United States forces from Viet-Nam or with- 
drawal of those forces to a few coastal bases. 
I cannot see that any such ending to the war 
in Viet-Nam would be acceptable from the 
point of view of the world community interest 
in peace and justice among nations. Such an 
ending would gravely impair the effectiveness 
of the international law that we have today. 

For one thing, withdrawal and abandon- 
ment of South Viet-Nam would be to sacrifice 
the Geneva accords and advertise for all to 
see that an international agreement can with 
impunity be treated by an aggressor as a 
mere scrap of paper. Moreover, withdrawal 

and abandonment of South Viet-Nam would 
undermine the faith of other countries in 
United States defense treaty commitments 
and would encourage would-be aggressors to 
suppose they could successfully and even 
freely impose on their weaker neighbors by 

In less than 2 months after the 1954 
Geneva conference on Indochina, the United 
States and other Pacific countries signed the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. By 
a unanimously agreed protocol, that treaty 
covers South Viet-Nam. The parties to the 
treaty have engaged jointly and severally to 
"act to meet the common danger" if there is 
"aggression by means of armed attack" 
against any of the parties or any protocol 
state. To disengage from this commitment 
could have no other effect than to undermine 
the assurance of all concerned that the United 
States will live up to its commitments. Politi- 
cal and military stability will not be achieved 
but could instead be destroyed by a policy of 
making agreements and then not carrying 
them out. 

We have seen in Europe, during the two 
decades since World War II, the success of a 
policy of insisting that the integrity of inter- 
national settlements not be upset by force. 
The strengthening of Western Europe 
through the Marshall Plan and the North At- 
lantic Treaty put an effective curb on Soviet 
expansionism. We have seen a favorable de- 
velopment in the increased maturity of Soviet 
conduct toward the rest of the world. With a 
growing stake in preserving and developing 
what has already been achieved at home, the 
Soviet Government plainly pursues a very 
different course from that of the younger and 
still more violent revolution in China. 

It is an important part of the task of build- 
ing a more secure and just world to weight 
the balances of other governments' processes 
of calculation, so far as we are able, in the 
direction of discussion and reason and away 
from violence and force. This is part of the 
meaning of the Viet-Nam war today. The use 
of external force to gain political ends must 
not turn out to be profitable. 



The course of history shows that the 
temptation to prey upon weaker nations has 
often been too strong. In 1910 William James 
foresaw: "The war against war is going to 
be no holiday excursion or camping party." 
He emphasized the vast difficulty involved in 
abolishing war. "Extravagant ambitions," he 
wrote, "will have to be replaced by reasonable 
claims, and nations must make common cause 
against them." 

This process of making common cause goes 
on even in the troubled world of 1966. For 
all the disappointments, shortcomings, and 
sometimes retrograde motion, the institution 
of the United Nations has recorded progress 
in the long world campaign for peace with 
justice. The processes and machinery of 
world organization will have to be strength- 
ened and developed. Governments will have 
to learn and act upon the conviction that 
change is necessary to justice but that it must 
be ordered and peaceful change, without vio- 

James' essay from which I quoted was di- 
rected to finding a "moral equivalent of war" 
— a constructive activity that could take over 
war's historic function of offering challenge 
to man's ambitions and binding peoples to- 
gether against a common foe. If it is chal- 
lenge we need, the world scene is abundant. 
There are no apparent limits to the resources 
and energies that nations could put into the 
exploration of space or into the improvement 
of man's condition on earth. The pressure of 
exploding population on food resources in the 
world is as threatening as any invasion from 
outer space could be. 

The world still has time in which to adjust 
and redirect man's activities toward survival 
and growth. Will we not have the wit and the 
will to make this effort? It seems a necessity 
in this time when, as President Kennedy said: 
"man holds in his mortal hands the power to 
abolish all forms of human poverty and all 
forms of human life." '' 

U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General 
for Help in Seeking Peace 

Following is the text of a letter delivered 
to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant by 
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations, on December 19. 

U.S. /U.N. press release B03B 

December 19, 1966 
My dear Mr. Secretary General: Two 
world leaders who command the respect of 
the entire international community have re- 
cently voiced the desire for a cease-fire in 
Vietnam. On December 8, Pope Paul VI 
noted the temporary Christmas truce ar- 
ranged in Vietnam and beseeched all con- 
cerned to transform this temporary truce 
into a cessation of hostilities which would 
become the occasion for sincere negotiations. 
And you, Mr. Secretary General, expressed 
the sincere hope on the same day that the 
parties directly concerned would heed the 
Pope's appeal. 

In the fourteen points my Government has 
put forward as elements of a peaceful set- 
tlement in Vietnam, you will recall, the 
United States has explicitly stated: ^ A cessa- 
tion of hostilities could be the first order of 
business at a conference or could be the sub- 
ject of preliminary discussions. I herewith 
reaffirm our commitment to that proposal — 
a proix)sal which is in keeping with the ap- 
peal of the Pope as endorsed by you. Our 
objective remains the end of all fighting, of 
all hostilities and of all violence in Vietnam 
— and an honorable and lasting settlement 
there, for which, as we have repeatedly said, 
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 
would be a satisfactory basis. 

President Johnson has time and again 
stressed his desire for a peaceful settlement 
of the Vietnam conflict. Other United States 
leaders have spoken in a similar vein. In 
speaking before the General Assembly on be- 
half of my Government on September 22,^ 

' For text of President Kennedy's inaugural ad- 
dress, see ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 

• For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225. 
*Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


I noted there are differences between our 
aims as to the basis for such a settlement 
and the stated position of North Vietnam. 
I went on to say that: ". . . no differences 
can be resolved without contact, discussion 
or negotiations." This holds equally true with 
regard to arrangements for a mutual cessa- 
tion of hostilities. 

We turn to you, therefore, with the hope 
and the request that you will take whatever 
steps you consider necessary to bring about 

the necessary discussions which could lead 
to such a cease-fire. I can assure you that the 
Government of the United States will co- 
operate fully with you in getting such dis- 
cussions started promptly and in bringing 
them to a successful completion. 

I request that this letter be circulated as 
an official document of the Security Ck)uncil. 
Sincerely yours, 

Arthur J. Goldberg 

Institutions for Order 

by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

I am happy to be with you tonight because 
of my admiration for the Joint Distribution 
Committee. For over 50 years your organiza- 
tion has been dedicated to the advancement 
of human welfare. You have practiced the 
highest kind of humanitarianism in a coldly 
practical and realistic world. 

You have brought hope and assistance and 
security to millions of persecuted and under- 
privileged members of the Jewish faith 
wherever you could reach them. When neces- 
sary, you have moved them to safe havens 
where they could once again take up a nor- 
mal existence as parts of larger communities. 
You have done this through a nongovern- 
mental effort which has won the applause of 
men of good will everywhere and which has 
served as an example for the welfare work 
of many other groups and denominations. 

I would like to suggest that this type of 
practical idealism is needed not only in the 

' Address made before the American Jewish Joint 
Distribution Committee at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 
7 (TJ.S./U.N. press release 5006). 

field of human welfare, narrowly defined, but 
throughout the entire range of international 
relations. As man gains greater power not 
only to alter his environment but to destroy 
his fellow man, it becomes plainer than ever 
that the world needs at least minimum 
ground rules of good conduct. In the past, 
when the destructive capabilities of men and 
nations were smaller, our level of tolerance 
for antisocial behavior in international af- 
fairs was a good deal greater than it is today. 
We could afford a certain measure of irre- 
sponsibility. But the inexorable advances of 
science and technology, with their enormous 
destructive potential, have changed all that 
for good. 

Nor is the power of the atom the only 
dangerous new force confronting our genera- 
tion. All governments today, whatever their 
ideology, are affected not only by the nuclear 
threat but by the development of the race be- 
tween population growth and the food sup- 
ply and by explosive political, racial, eco- 
nomic, and social problems. The solutions to 
these problems are on the agenda of man- 



kind not for just a year or two but for a 
generation to come. 

But I believe our greatest problem is none 
of these. There may be keys that will unlock 
all these doors, but what we need still more 
is a master key which can open them all. I 
submit that this key is a set of institutions, 
of procedures, of habits of cooperation 
among nations, strong enough to contain any 
technical or political or economic or popula- 
tion problem and move us toward a solution. 
The building of such institutions and habits 
of cooperation among nations is, I truly be- 
lieve, the assignment of the century. 

The nation-state has afforded us protection 
in the past and has enabled us to make im- 
mense material progress, but it is increas- 
ingly clear that it alone cannot do so in the 
future. No matter how strong, how vast, how 
wealthy, how populous, a country may be, it 
no longer lays claim to any absolute security. 
It must look to alliances and regional associ- 
ations; and, beyond even these, it must look 
to some overarching entity embracing every 
peace-loving state. 

The United Nations is that entity. Fragile 
as it is, the U.N. is the principal guardian of 
the general interest of man that we have. It 
was created to bring that interest to bear on 
the great problems of our time. As guardian 
of the general interest, the United Nations 
functions as the keeper of the world's 

The U.N. "Peace Machine" 

On what principles can this machinery be 
constructed ? One answer is to be found in the 
preamble and the statement of purposes and 
principles contained in articles 1 and 2 of the 
United Nations Charter. These famous words 
call on the nations to maintain international 
peace and security by preventing aggression 
and other breaches of the peace; to 
strengthen the rule of law in the world; to 
promote the self-determination of peoples, 
the realization of human rights, and economic 
and social progress for people everywhere. 
They state the determination of the peoples 
of the world "to practice tolerance" — and 

what a tremendous idea is expressed in that 
one word "tolerance" — and to "live together 
in peace with one another as good neigh- 

If all the world were to live by these rules 
our troubles would be largely over. But the 
framers of the charter had much too good a 
grip on reality to expect that. They knew that 
international conflicts would still occur. They 
knew, too, that these conflicts do not always 
arise out of a simple confrontation between 
the angels who are right and the devils who 
are wrong. Much more often, the problem is 
less one of right against wrong than of "my 
right" against "your right." The problem 
then is to find some reasonable settlement 
which will give at least minimal satisfaction 
to the equitable claims of each party. And a 
great deal of the work of the U.N. involves 
exactly that kind of search for mutually ac- 
ceptable arrangements — not satisfactory to 
any party but bearable by all. 

I will tell you frankly that the U.N.'s 
efforts to fulfill even this more realistic aim 
have been only moderately successful. There 
have been successes and failures, and there 
will be in the future. 

This is because the U.N. is after all no 
more than the totality of its member states 
acting individually. Each of these members 
is likely to be an interested party in many 
of the problems at issue. 

But however imperfect the record may be, 
the fact is that the machinery itself, the 
United Nations as an institution, is still run- 
ning. It is in use for the purpose for which 
it was created: as the charter itself puts it, 
"to be a center for harmonizing the actions 
of nations" in pursuit of their common aims 
of peace and progress. When we consider the 
depth of international discord in the world, 
it is little wonder that the machine shows 
signs of strain and wear and tear ! 

But don't be fooled. History is not made in 
neat and tidy places but in the heat and dust 
of conflict. This worn and battered "peace 
machine" on the East River is, I submit, the 
most original creation of man in our century. 
It must be made to work effectively, because 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


with modern arms we will not have the 
chance ag'ain to learn the lessons of World 
War II. 

Fundamental Settlements Take Time 

And to balance its failures, the U.N. has 
compiled a record of successes which provide 
proof that it is an effective institution: again 
and again it has damped down brush-fire 
disputes that could have led to a world con- 
flagration. The case of Korea was the U.N.'s 
greatest confrontation with aggressors, but it 
is only one item on the list. In a broad arc 
extending from New Guinea to the Congo, 
U.N. missions have helped to prevent fighting 
or to bring it to an end where it has started. 
In Kashmir, the U.N. stabilized a danger- 
ously fragile demarcation line for 17 years 
and restabilized it after the new outbreak of 
1965. In the Congo, the U.N. prevented total 
anarchy in a new nation and creation of a 
chaotic vacuum which could have brought 
great-power rivalry into the heart of Africa. 
In the Middle East and in Cyprus, U.N. blue 
helmets stand guard to this day over political 
quarrels which remain dangerously explosive. 

Unfortunately, this kind of peacekeeping 
after the fact has been more effective than 
the U.N.'s attempts to settle disputes before 
they reach the stage of violence. 

This is a pity, but it is a fact, a fact which 
is easily explained. People are not too well 
endowed with foresight. They will do a lot 
of drastic things in the heat of crisis. They 
will act heroically when the building catches 
on fire, but you can't get them to clean out all 
those oily rags in the basement. The problems 
of peacemaking are very much the same. 

It is far harder to persuade the parties to 
negotiate out differences through mutual ad- 
justment of passionately maintained claims 
and views, and equally hard to induce antago- 
nists to accept impartial outside judgment. 
Even where U.N. peace forces patrol today — 
in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and along the borders 
of Israel — the embers of war are still alive; 
and the U.N. is still unable to extinguish the 
embers by producing fundamental solutions. 

We have little basis for believing that this 
situation will soon be changed in any very 

substantial way. The opportunities for peace- 
ful settlement will remain open; the varied 
machinery the U.N. has at its disposal to set- 
tle disputes will continue to be available; 
but breakthroughs to fundamental settle- 
ments will be rare and hard to come by. 
Many governments — not only the United 
States — work hard, but this will take time. 

Meanwhile, we can perhaps do something 
to improve the peacekeeping process itself. 
On the "hottest" U.N.-guarded frontier, for 
example, the frontier around Israel, there is 
an urgent need for better security conditions. 
The violence of recent days is deplorable; 
violence tends to breed more violence. 

The states concerned can themselves 
satisfy some of the need for greater security 
through better border controls and through 
the internal control of raiding parties. These 
states can also, and indeed should, recognize 
that in their own interest they should aid and 
not hamper the work of U.N. observers; they 
should permit the access and provide the fa- 
cilities which observers may reasonably re- 
quest. Only in this way can the most accurate 
summary of events be reported to the U.N., 
and only thus can the responsibility for what 
has happened be most clearly fixed. For this 
reason the United States welcomes and sup- 
ports the Secretary-General's recent recom- 
mendation to strengthen the U.N. Truce 
Supervision Organization. 

standards To Protect Individual Rights 

While the organization continues to be 
deeply concerned with maintaining the peace, 
its members have increasingly come to re- 
gard certain other aspects of the U.N.'s work 
as of equal importance. 

The "new look" at the United Nations 
gives ever greater prominence to those mat- 
ters which weigh most heavily on the minds 
of the great nonwhite majority of nations 
and populations now represented in the orga- 
nization. Problems of human rights are very 
much in the forefront, particularly those that 
involve race discrimination. The manifold 
problems of self-determination and economic 
and social development are also high on the 



Let me say a word about human rights. To 
a degree never before achieved, the idea that 
a state can do as it pleases with its own na- 
tionals or with other individuals within its 
territory is steadily losing ground. In con- 
trast with the pre-World War II period, more 
and more countries are recognizing that the 
international community of the United Na- 
tions has an interest in establishing and 
maintaining standards to protect individual 
rights^ — that this, too, is one of the ingredi- 
ents of peace. 

Beginning with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948, we have seen a 
steady flow of declarations and conventions 
designed to induce states — which alone can 
take such action — to protect the rights of in- 
dividuals. Piece by piece, the U.N. is con- 
structing a code of desirable international 
conduct in the human rights area. The range 

*" it covers is extremely wide, as it must be if 
it is to bridge the gap that separates ad- 
vanced from primitive societies and free from 
controlled social systems. U.N. standards 
cover: the prevention of slavery and forced 
labor; the political rights of women; general 
civil and political and economic, social, and 
cultural rights; discrimination in education; 
and discrimination on grounds of race and 
religion. These standards are accepted by 
many governments, but there is still a long, 
long way to go. 

For various reasons, not all states will 

i ratify those U.N. human rights documents 

, which take treaty form. In our own case, for 
example, where the observance of individual 
rights is deeply rooted in our tradition, some 
of the U.N. standards are less advanced than 
our own, and we would be loath to risk com- 
promising the latter. We must, and do, never- 

^: theless, encourage others to improve their 
standards and practices; and if treaties 
worked out within the U.N. are a useful way 
for doing so, the United States will continue 
to cooperate. 

If the U.N. is to fulfill its basic purposes, 
our attention to individual rights must be 
matched by progress toward equality and 
self-determination for whole nations and 
We know from our own anticolonial tradi- 

tion how important these principles are for 
peoples who have only recently gained their 
independence or who are still seeking it. For 
such peoples, the United Nations is a source 
of aid and protection. U.N. membership is a 
badge of equal status in a world of sovereign 

Thanks in large part to the U.N., over 50 
new states have been created out of old 
colonial territories since 1945, with a sur- 
prising lack of violent opposition. The process 
proves the adage that nothing is more power- 
ful than an idea whose time has come. 

This process still continues. The Security 
Council this afternoon recommended the ad- 
mission of Barbados to U.N. membership, 
and the General Assembly is expected to vote 
Barbados into the organization as its 122d 
member by the end of the week.^ 

The few remaining pockets of resistance 
stand out as glaring exceptions to the gen- 
eral trend. Where colonial domination is 
linked with race discrimination, the incon- 
sistency is even more evident and the pres- 
sure from those who have already gained 
their freedom is the most impassioned. 

If nothing is done in the areas where race 
repression is sanctioned, race tensions could 
erupt into violence both inside and outside 
today's problem areas. It might then prove 
impossible to forestall a downward drift into 
anarchy and totalitarian dictatorship. 

This is a problem no single nation can 
handle alone. We are already confronted 
with the question how far the U.N. should 
go, and how far we as its strongest member 
should go, to bring about the fulfillment of 
U.N. objectives. 

stubborn Problems of Southern Africa 

At the moment this question is centered 
on Rhodesia. This week Prime Minister 
[Harold] Wilson made a dramatic and su- 
preme effort to reach agreement with the 
illegal regime of Ian Smith which would re- 
store constitutional government and guaran- 
tee the rights of the African majority. That 
effort, as you know, collapsed when the 

' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 2, 1967, 
p. 28. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


Rhodesian leadership refused to agree. To- 
morrow the United Kingdom will be asking 
the Security Council to consider the imposi- 
tion of selective mandatory sanctions against 
the Rhodesian regime.' 

The United Kingdom is now being pressed 
to crush the rebellion by force in order to 
end white domination. The African states 
want independence for Rhodesia, and they 
want the British to grant it only when the 
4 million black men in Rhodesia are guaran- 
teed the enjoyment of their rights. They 
oppose independence on any other terms. 

It would not be proper for me to antici- 
pate what the U.N. Security Council may de- 
cide to do in this situation. But it is note- 
worthy that the Council a year ago with our 
full support called for voluntary sanctions 
against Rhodesia, and even went so far as to 
authorize a British blockade of oil shipments 
by sea through Portuguese Mozambique.^ 
President Johnson has long since pledged 
United States support for the freedom of all 
the people of Rhodesia, "not just 6 percent 
of them." 5 

South West Africa also presents an urgent 
self-determination question. Last October the 
U.N. General Assembly decided that South 
Africa had in effect forfeited its old League 
of Nations mandate to administer that terri- 
tory, largely because South Africa main- 
tained its apartheid policy there.^ The Assem- 
bly is now seeking, through a special 
committee created by an overwhelming vote, 
to induce the Government of South Africa to 
permit the establishment of an international 
administration designed to lead South West 
Africa toward self-determination. 

This approach to a solution was accepted 
in the Assembly by the United States and 113 
other countries — virtually the entire interna- 
tional community. Thus we know what we 
want the U.N. to do, though we are not yet 
clear on how it can be done. 

' See p. 7.3. 

■* For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, 
p. 908, and May 2, 1966, p. 713. 

"■Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914. 

' For a U.S. statement and text of a resolution, 
see ihid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870. 

The Assembly's approach is wisely prag- 
matic in this new and difficult situation. Its 
committee has broad latitude to recommend 
practical means by which South West Africa 
should be administered for the desired ends. 
When that committee reports next spring, 
the time will have come for the U.N. to con- 
sider what more can be done to move this 
matter toward a just and satisfactory out- 

These problems of southern Africa are 
tough and stubborn. It will be exceedingly 
difficult to induce those who hold power in 
that area to comply with U.N. resolutions 
designed to bring about political change. 
Some of the U.N.'s weapons, such as moral 
suasion and the power of world opinion, 
have already been employed to no avail. The 
alternatives are not without risks. Voices 
will be heard calling for broad mandatory 
economic sanctions, for the necessary steps 
to make those sanctions effective, and for the 
use of force. What the U.N. must determine 
is the degree of sacrifice its members are 
willing to contemplate, individually and col- 
lectively, in order to achieve reasonable solu- 
tions. Discussions of the use of economic and 
military pressure by the U.N. lead us into 
new and largely uncharted waters. The ques- 
tions which are raised are vital for the future 
of Africa, for the future of the U.N., and per- 
haps ultimately for the future of every na- 
tion which may someday stake its existence 
on the rule of law in the world. 

In this talk I have tried to give you a 
glimpse of a few of the tough problems with 
which we deal in the United Nations. The 
U.N. didn't create these problems, any more 
than a hospital creates the diseases and in- 
juries with which it deals. Quite the reverse 
is true: The U.N. was created to cope with 
just such difficulties as these. 

Some jieople used to suppose that the U.N. 
was intended by its founders to do away with 
all these problems overnight. Any such ex- 
pectation was certain to end in disillusion- 
ment. Whoever truly believes in human 
progress must expect to pay the price in slow 
and frustrating human effort. 

The troubles of our age are many and pro- 



found. We shall conquer some of them, step 
by step, in our time; others, in all likelihood, 
will still be around for our children and 
grandchildren to wrestle with. 

But if these jiroblems are not to overwhelm 
us, the nations which make up the human 
family must have the means to cope with 
them together, as members of one human 

The means exist today in the institutions 
of international order, however primitive 
they may be. The capstone of these institu- 
tions is the United Nations. Let us use it for 
all it is worth, because our willingness to do 
so may well spell the difference between 
catastrophe and a world in which human 
freedom is possible. 

Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team 
Studying Vietnamese Development 

The White House announced on December 
16 that, in response to a request from Prime 
Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky, the United 
States Government will join with the Gov- 
ernment of Viet-Nam in sponsoring a joint 
planning effort on the long-run development 
of the Vietnamese economy. 

In the opinion of the two Governments it 
is time now to prepare for the problems and 
jpportunities of peace. 

With the concurrence of the Vietnamese 
overnment, the United States Government 
las asked Mr. David E. Lilienthal to lead a 
longoveiTimental U.S. study and planning 
;eam which will report to the two Govern- 
nents. Mr. Lilienthal has agreed to put to- 
gether a team drawn from his Development 
md Resources Corporation and other U.S. 
ources with broad experience in develop- 
nental planning. It will operate under con- 
;ract to the Agency for International De- 
velopment. Mr. Lilienthal's experience and 
ligh qualifications are widely known, and the 
i'resident is grateful that he has agreed to 
mdertake this task. 

The United States team will work closely 
vith a counterpart Vietnamese development 
)lanning team led by Professor Nguyen 

ANUARY 9, 1967 

Dang Thuc of the University of Saigon. 

The Government of Viet-Nam stressed at 
the Manila Conference i its plans for the 
building of an expanded postwar economy, 
including plans for the conversion of mili- 
tary installations when appropriate. 

Eugene Black, after his recent tour of 
Southeast Asia, has reported to the Presi- 
dent that, even in the midst of war, the 
foundations of future economic progress are 
being laid in Viet-Nam. The outlook for the 
Vietnamese economy once peace returns is 
highly favorable, Mr. Black told the Presi- 

U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea 
for Investment, Trade Studies 

The White House announced on December 
15 that George W. Ball, former Under Sec- 
retary of State, mil head a privately orga- 
nized delegation of U.S. businessmen to 
Korea during the week of March 20 to stimu- 
late American private investment and to pro- 
mote increased U.S.-Korean trade. 

The mission was originally proposed dur- 
ing discussions between President Johnson 
and Korean President Chung Hee Park in 
Seoul early in November. The Presidents 
agreed then that the Korean economy's cur- 
rent progress should make possible a sub- 
stantial expansion of U.S. investment in 
Korea and in trade between the two nations.^ 

The Korean economy has grown at a rate 
of 8 percent per year in the last 3 years. 
During the same period, exports have tripled 
and are expected to reach the equivalent of 
$250 million in 1966. 

Delegation members will be selected dur- 
ing the next month. Each will be a leader 
in his industry or in the financial community. 
It is planned to include representatives of 

' For texts of the documents issued at the close of 
the Manila Conference, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 
1966, p. 730. 

' For text of a joint statement issued at Seoul, 
Korea, on Nov. 2 at the conclusion of President 
Johnson's state visit, see Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1966, 
p. 777. 


large and small industry, banking, and trade 
from major business centers of the United 
States who will be interested in specific areas 
of industry or trade in Korea. 

Mr. Ball, presently associated with the in- 
vestment banking firm of Lehman Brothers, 
is chairman of Lehman International, Ltd., 
and counsel to the law firm of Cleary, Gott- 
lieb, Steen and Hamilton. 

Tristan E. Beplat, senior vice president of 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust and president 
of the Korean-American Commercial and In- 
dustrial Association in New York, has agreed 
to assist Mr. Ball. 

Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee 
Holds Second Meeting 

Joint Communique 

Press release 296 dated December 21 

The Joint Mexican-United States Trade 
Committee ^ held its second annual meeting 
from December 15 to 17, 1966, in Mexico 
City to discuss matters concerning United 
States-Mexican trade. The Delegation of 
Mexico was headed by Mr. Placido Garcia 
Reynoso, Subsecretary of Industry and Com- 
merce, and the United States Delegation by 
Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Trade 

This joint committee is a continuing forum 
created by the two governments for the 
regular exchange of views on issues involved 
in trade between the two countries and to 
consider recommendations for possible ac- 
tions to facilitate trade to the advantage of 
both nations. The meetings of the committee 
have been characterized by frankness and 

The committee considered general trade 
trends and specific commercial problems re- 
garding Mexican-U.S. trade. The U.S. Dele- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 

gation welcomed steps that had been taken 
by the Government of Mexico in the interval 
between the first and second meetings to 
liberalize and improve the administration of 
Mexican import controls. 

The Delegation of Mexico noted with 
great interest steps that had been taken by 
the U.S. Government since the initial meeting 
of the Committee to liberalize access to the 
U.S. market for certain exports from 
Mexico. These steps included elimination by 
the United States of some import restrictions 
in addition to certain tariff and customs 
measures of benefit to Mexican trade. 

The hope was expressed that further steps 
might be taken by the governments of both 
countries to facilitate the mutual trade, 
taking into consideration the difference in the 
levels of development between them and the 
necessity for Mexico to take internal 
measures to stimulate the development of its 

The two delegations took note of recent 
developments in the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade], especially the 
formal entry into force of the new part IV 
on trade and development, in which, among 
other things, the developed countries agreed 
not to require full reciprocity from less 
developed countries in trade negotiations. 

The two delegations also noted the 
progress of the Kennedy Round of tariff 
negotiations. The U.S. Delegation pointed 
out that even countries not members of 
GATT stand to receive benefits from these 
negotiations through the application of the 
most-favored-nation rule. 

There was an exchange of views regarding 
the Mexican Government program of indus- 
trialization and related measures concerning 
the domestic ownership of enterprises in 
certain economic areas. 

In considering concrete cases, the Mexican 
delegation pointed out certain problems 
which arise from U.S. customs duties and 
which hinder the sale of Mexican products 
in the U.S. market. The Mexican delegation 
suggested the elimination or reduction of 
such duties. 



The U.S. Delegation mentioned concrete 
cases in which the reduction of duties and 
import restrictions would permit greater 
access for U.S. products to the Mexican 
market and explained how increased imports 
of these products might benefit the Mexican 
economy as well as that of the United 

A special aspect of the meeting was a 
presentation of progress achieved by Ambas- 
sador Harry Turkel and Mr. Agustin Lopez 
Munguia, who were appointed by the Govern- 
ments of the United States and Mexico 
respectively to study problems and make 
recommendations regarding facilitating trade 
in the U.S.-Mexico border areas. 

The committee also discussed a U.S. pro- 
posal for a bilateral agreement to facilitate 
the transit of the U.S.-Mexican border by 
truck carriers as a means of improving trade 
between the two countries. 

President Frei of Chile 
To Visit the United States 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 20 

I have invited President Eduardo Frei of 
Chile to make an official visit to Washington 
on February 1 and 2. He has accepted, and 
arrangements are being worked out. 

I look forward to this visit with special 
interest. During the past 2 years President 
Frei and I have communicated by letter on 
I several occasions. The visit will give us the 
■ opportunity to talk further about issues af- 
fecting our respective countries, the hemi- 
sphere, and the world. I am particularly in- 
terested in learning more from President 
Frei about the achievements of his great ex- 
periment of revolution in freedom. Natu- 
rally, we will also review the future course 
of the Alliance for Progress in relation to 
preparation for the meeting of Presidents 
of the American Republics. 

U.S. Appoints Observers 
for Antarctic Inspections 

The Department of State announced on 
December 23 (press release 299) the appoint- 
ment of nine Antarctic observers, replacing 
those who were appointed in 1963, to carry 
out any inspections which the United States, 
as a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty, may 
decide to undertake in accord with provisions 
of that treaty. 

The names of persons appointed as ob- 
servers are: Merton E. Davies, Ernest F. 
Dukes, Richard P. Gingland, Karl W. 
Kenyon, Cyril Muromcew, Carl J. Sinder- 
mann, Frank G. Siscoe, Malcolm Toon, and 
Arthur I. Wortzel.i 

The Antarctic Treaty 2 provides that in 
the Antarctic area there shall be freedom of 
scientific investigation and continued inter- 
national cooperation and that the area shall 
be used for peaceful purposes only. It bans 
nuclear explosions and the disposal of atomic 
waste in Antarctica pending general inter- 
national agreement on the subject (but does 
not prohibit the use of nuclear reactors). 
While implying neither renunciation nor 
recognition of rights or asserted claims, it 
prohibits for the duration of the treaty the 
making of new claims, the enlarging of exist- 
ing claims, and the use of activities in 
Antarctica as a basis for asserting, support- 
ing, or denying territorial claims. It grants 
to the signatories of the treaty the right of 
inspection and aerial observation in all areas 
of Antarctica and obligates them to exert 
approjjriate eflforts, consistent with the Char- 
ter of the United Nations, to the end that no 
one should engage in any activity in 
Antarctica contrary to the principles or 
purposes of the treaty. 

The 12 signatory powers of the Antarctic 
Treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 

' For biographic details, see press release 299 
dated Dec. 23. 

^For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 

Inspections have taken place in Antarctica 
every year since 1963. In that year New 
Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom 
inspected United States stations. In 1964 the 
United States inspected stations of Argen- 
tina, Chile, France, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. In 1965 
and 1966 Argentina inspected the United 
States Palmer station. 

Advisers Named for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Bureau 

Press release 295 dated December 20 

The Department of State announced on 
December 20 the formation of a panel of 
advisers for the Bureau of Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs. ^ The advisers will make 
available to the Department on a continuing 
basis a variety of talent and experience. 
Many of the advisers have longstanding con- 
nections or interests in the Near East and 
South Asia. The panel includes distinguished 
leaders from the fields of education, science, 
business, and labor, and from nonprofit 
institutions concerned with foreign affairs. 
Among its members are several former 
ambassadors and others with eminent records 
of past service with the U.S. Government. 

Individual members of the panel will con- 
sider issues of key concern to the Bureau of 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. It 
is expected that the advisers not only will 
apply their special insight to problems and 
proposals placed before them by the Bureau 

' For announcements of other advisory panels, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966, p. 
868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; and Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16. 

but also will initiate new policy ideas. Con- 
sultation on any given issue will be with one 
or several members of the panel, depending 
on the subject in question and the particular 
background of the advisers. Additional ad- 
visers may be added to the panel from time 
to time. 

The members of the panel are: 

John S. Badeau, director, Middle East Institute, 
Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 

John C. Campbell, Council on Foreign Relations, 
New York, N.Y. 

John H. Davis, New York, N.Y.; former vice chair- 
man, board of trustees of American University of 

John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics, 
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 

Robert F. Goheen, president, Princeton University, 
Princeton, N.J. 

Raymond A. Hare, president. Middle East Institute, 
Washingrton, D.C. 

Joseph E. Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, New York, N.Y. 

Joseph D. Keenan, international secretary, Interna- 
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; vice 
president, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C. 

David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the board. Develop- 
ment and Resources Corp., New York, N.Y. 

D. W. Lockard, associate director, Center for Middle 
Eastern Studies, Harvard University. 

Edward S. Mason, Lamont University Professor, 
Harvard University. 

Grinnell Morris, president. Empire Trust Co., New 
York, N.Y. ; chairman, board of trustees, Robert 
College, Istanbul, Turkey. 

Richard E. Neustadt, professor of government and 
director of the Institute of Politics, Harvard Uni- 

Richard L. Park, professor of political science. Uni- 
versity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich. 

Frederick Seitz, president. National Academy of Sci- 
ences, Washington, D.C. 

Francis O. Wilcox, dean. School of Advanced Inter- 
national Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 
Washington, D.C. 

Wayne Wilcox, associate professor of government, 
Columbia University. 

Charles W. Yost, Council on Foreign Relations, New 
York, N.Y. 




Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions 
Against Southern Rhodesia 

Following is a statement made by U.S. 
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the 
U.N. Security Council on December 12, to- 
gether with the text of a resolution adopted 
by the Council on December 16. 


U.S./U.N. press release B021 

The Council has met to consider further 
the question of Southern Rhodesia, a question 
which once again has been brought before us 
by the country that bears the heaviest and 
most direct responsibility in this matter, the 
United Kingdom. 

This problem, as was made clear at the 
irecent Commonwealth Conference and before 
then at Lagos, is not only of concern to the 
United Kingdom but "of wider concern to 
Africa, the Commonwealth and the world." 

Now, why has this problem of Southern 
Rhodesia become a matter of such worldwide 
concern ? 

A clue to the answer, I think, can be found 
in the fact that the regime in Salisbury, 
headed by Mr. [Ian] Smith, which declared 
itself independent and sovereign over a year 
ago, has yet to be recognized as such by a 
single government. 

There is a solid reason why this unilateral 
action of the Smith regime has been rejected 
while the independence of a score of other 
states has been acclaimed and recognized by 
the world community. In all cases in which 
solonial peoples, during the life of the United 
N^ations, have acceded to independence, this 
accession has never been tainted with the 

application of principles of racial superiority. 
Just the opposite is the case in the regime 
of Mr. Smith. Whatever that regime may as- 
sert in its propaganda, its legislative enact- 
ments and its whole course of conduct have 
clearly been designed to thwart majority rule 
and perpetuate racial superiority. 

Indeed, the claim of independence by the 
Smith regime is a false and spurious claim, 
made by and on behalf of a small white mi- 
nority for the purposes of assuming control 
in a country 94 percent of whose people are 
nonwhite. It is contrary to the spirit of the 
United Nations Charter and to principles en- 
shrined therein, including "universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedom for all without distinc- 
tion as to race, sex, language, or religion." 

On behalf of my Government, I reiterate 
that we shall not recognize this regime. The 
objective which the United States supports 
is that stated last May by President John- 
son: 1 "To open the full power and responsi- 
bility of nationhood to all the people of Rho- 
desia — not just 6 percent of them." 

We well understand the apprehensions of 
the other nations of Africa, particularly 
Southern Rhodesia's neighbor Zambia, con- 
cerning the Southern Rhodesian crisis. Zam- 
bia is seeking to make its way in the world 
on the only basis which can possibly promise 
peace, freedom, and progress; namely, a mul- 
tiracial society in which the majority rules 
and the rights of minorities are protected. 
We understand and share the concern of the 

' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


leaders of Zambia at the prospect of a neigh- 
boring regime which in its 1 year of so-called 
independence has already intensified its dis- 
crimination against the African majority 
and introduced new decrees under the ex- 
tended Emergency Powers Act which are 
anathema to all who care about civil liber- 
ties — laws conferring the broadest powers of 
arrest, censorship, and other curtailments of 
fundamental rights. 

U.S. Support of U.K. Proposal 

The refusal of the United Kingdom — the 
constitutional authority — to recognize the il- 
legal act of the Smith regime in attempting 
to throw off British authority is no denial of 
freedom for the people of Southern Rho- 
desia. Rather, it is a decision not to permit 
a small element in that country to deny free- 
dom to the great majority. 

This decision is not that of a power which 
obstinately stands in the way of granting 
genuine independence to colonial territories. 
Since the founding of the United Nations, it 
is pertinent to recall, Great Britain has ac- 
corded independence to 28 nations — nearly a 
quarter of the membership of this organiza- 

This is a record of substantial achievement 
in peaceful decolonization and one which does 
credit both to the United Kingdom and to 
the people who were formerly under its au- 
thority but who are now independent. It 
helps to explain why the Council has recog- 
nized that the main responsibility for action 
is in the hands of the United Kingdom which 
has, in the words of the Commonwealth com- 
munique, "constitutional authority and re- 
sponsibility for guiding Rhodesia to inde- 

The United States believes that the exer- 
cise of this responsibility remains a wise 
policy. I do not say that if we had been the 
constituted authority we would have done 
everything exactly as it has been done, every 
step of the way, by the British Government. 
No nation could say that. But we do respect 
the fact that it is the United Kingdom that 
has borne and still bears this responsibility 

and that this has been affirmed by the Com- 
monwealth and recognized by the Council. 

We, as members of the Council, have our 
own responsibilities in this matter. But in 
all fairness we must recognize the difficulties- 
confronting the United Kingdom and respect 
the strenuous efforts it has made to find an 
agreed solution compatible with the principle 
of majority rule and acceptability of the de- 
cision to the Rhodesian people as a whole. 
Certainly a negotiated settlement conform- 
ing to these criteria would have been the best 

Now, unhappily, the effort to achieve that 
settlement has not been successful. As a re- 
sult, the United Kingdom has again come 
here to obtain the backing of the Council, 
and thereby the cooperation of all members 
of the United Nations, for the next step. It 
is right and wise that this should be done. 
For if the problem is to be resolved in peace 
— and surely we all share a common obliga- 
tion to see that it is resolved in peace — the 
cooperation of all other nations will be re- 
quired. Under the charter this Council is the 
body through which that cooperation can 
best be assured. 

It is no light action which the Foreign 
Secretary of the United Kingdom has asked 
the Council to endorse through the draft 
resolution now before us.^ We are asked to 
impose under chapter VII mandatory eco- 
nomic sanctions of a substantial nature 
against the Smith regime. If this resolution 
is adopted, as we believe it should be, it will 
be the first time in the 21 years of the United 
Nations that the Council has taken this type 
of far-reaching action. 

The United States considers these sanc- 
tions have one purpose and one purpose only: 
to bring about a peaceful settlement of the 
Rhodesian problem. We do not look upon 
them as punitive or vengeful. We support 
them in the honest conviction that they are 
now necessary in order to drive home to the 
illegal regime that the international commu- 
nity will not tolerate the existence of a dis- 
criminatory system based on minority rule 

' U.N. doc. S/7621. 



in defiance of the United Nations and its 

In considering this serious step, my Gov- 
ernment has taken into account the problems 
that it will have to face because of the loss 
of a source for certain materials critical to 
our industrial economy. In the discharge of 
our charter responsibilities we are prepared 
to assume this cost. We are well aware, more- 
over, that the impact of the requested sanc- 
tion will fall heavily on Zambia — whose 
economy my country has taken substantial 
steps to support — on other nearby countries 
of Africa, and, to a very substantial degree, 
on the United Kingdom itself. 

Legal Basis for Proposed Action 

We know also that, aside from economic 
problems, questions are raised as to the legal 
basis for this proposed action. In particular, 
it is asserted that the question of Southern 
Rhodesia is an internal matter of sole con- 
cern to the administering authority. But 
while we recognize that responsibility for 
action lies on the United Kingdom, the rec- 
ord shows that the United Nations, over the 
years, has also recognized Southern Rhodesia 
as falling within the provisions of chapter 
XI of the charter. Under this chapter, and 
specifically under article 73(b), the adminis- 
tering authority accepts the responsibility 
"to develop self-government, to take due ac- 
count of the political aspirations of the peo- 
ples, and to assist them in the progressive 
development of their free political institu- 
tions. . . ." 

Therefore, so far as the United Nations is 
concerned, the administering authority has 
always had an international responsibility to 
the United Nations in regard to Southern 
Rhodesia. And it is precisely the exercise of 
this responsibility that the Smith regime 
seeks to frustrate and obstruct. 

But the question may also be raised 
whether the situation constitutes a threat to 
the peace, which is the condition under which 
sanctions can be imposed under chapter VII 
of the charter. 

We in the United States learned over 100 

years ago that any attempt to institutionalize 
and legitimize a political principle of racial 
superiority in a new state was unacceptable. 
The effort to do so created an inflammatory 
situation, and our nation had to rid itself 
of this false and hateful doctrine at great 
cost. It should not be necessary for me to 
emphasize that what could not be accepted by 
the United States in the mid-19th century 
can surely not be accepted by the interna- 
tional community in the late 20th century. 

Any person familiar with recent history 
would have to be blind and deaf not to per- 
ceive the danger in the course of action of 
the Smith regime. Some will nevertheless ask 
why is it proper, for example, to impose 
mandatory sanctions in this case and not in 

The answer to this, in our judgment, lies 
in the fact that there are a number of unique 
elements in the Southern Rhodesian situa- 
tion. Here we have witnessed an illegal sei- 
zure of power by a minority bent on perpet- 
uating the political subjugation of the vast 
majority. That act itself is bound to create a 
dangerous and inflammatory situation. More- 
over, Southern Rhodesia, as I have said, is a 
territory whose population is subject to pro- 
tection under chapter XI of the charter, 
which, among other things, calls for the de- 
velopment of self-government to take account 
of the political aspiration of the peoples. 
What we have seen in Rhodesia under the 
Smith regime has been precisely the con- 

All of this has happened, I would empha- 
size, against the express will of the sovereign 
authority for that territory, the United King- 
dom. Regrettably, the efl!"ort of the United 
Kingdom to negotiate a settlement on the 
basis of the charter in recent days has failed. 
Now the United Kingdom comes to this 
Council asking for a Council decision under 
article 41 to apply mandatory sanctions in 
order to cope with the situation which has 

None of us should be surprised by this 
request. The Security Council has already 
found in previous sessions, particularly on 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


November 20, 1965, that the continuance in 
time of such a situation was likely to lead to 
a threat to peace.' This situation has not only 
continued; since negotiations have failed, it 
has obviously grown more acute, especially 
since the rejection by the Smith regime of 
the recent direct effoi-t of the British Prime 
Minister to find an honorable solution. 

Situation Not Static But Deteriorating 

We thus have a situation in a colony where 
a small minority seeks to subjugate the ma- 
jority — we have an effort by a small minor- 
ity to suppress the political rights of a ma- 
jority, to extend into a non-self-governing 
territory practices of racial discrimination 
which have been found abhorrent by the 
United Nations — and where the sovereign 
authority for the territory voluntarily comes 
to the United Nations and asks it to take 
measures which will permit the restoration 
of the full rights of the people of Southern 
Rhodesia under the United Nations Charter. 

What we have here, in short, is not a static 
but a deteriorating situation in which the 
danger to peace is obviously growing and to 
which the Council must address itself. 

Resolute and prompt action by the Secu- 
rity Council to deal with this problem in a 
peaceful but effective way will lessen the 
danger of more drastic developments, from 
whatever quarter they may threaten to come. 

I am well aware that, whereas some criti- 
cize the proposed action as too strong, others 
complain that it is too mild to achieve its 
purpose. These latter critics point out that 
the measures which the Security Council has 
recommended in the past have not proved 
sufficient to rectify the situation. 

Whatever views there may be about the 
efficacy of these economic measures already 
taken, there is a key difference between them 
and what is now proposed. 

' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg on 
Nov. 12 and Nov. 20, 1965, and Apr. 9, 1966, and 
texts of resolutions adopted on those dates, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 912, and May 2, 1966, 
p. 713. 

Unlike the voluntary sanctions which the 
Council approved a year ago, those now re- 
quested are mandatory. Under article 25 of 
the charter all members are obliged to carry 
them out — and indeed all nonmembers are 
also called upon to do so in the resolution, a& 
the organization is authorized to insure by 
virtue of article 2, paragraph 6, of the char- 
ter. If any member or nonmember should 
substantially fail to carry out the Council's 
decision, this failure would be a violation of 
charter provisions and obligations. 

It has been asserted also that the League 
of Nations failed in its attempt to impose 
effective economic sanctions. But surely this 
fact should not discourage us. The United 
Nations is different from the League of Na- 
tions not only in the breadth of its member- 
ship but in the fact that it has already done 
successfully many things which the League 
found impossible to do. While it is apparent 
that success in the present enterprise cannot 
be guaranteed in advance, the probabilities 
of success will be greatest if all of us in good 
faith bend our efforts to assure its success — 
as indeed we are obligated to do. 

For my own country, I wish to say cate- 
gorically that if the Council decides to take 
the action pursuant to article 41, which we 
anticipate, the United States will apply the 
full force of our law to implementing this 
decision in accordance with the authority es- 
tablished under the United Nations Partici- 
pation Act of 1945. 

Mr. President, the Rhodesian situation 
presents a grave practical problem with 
great moral implications. It is sometimes 
said that moral considerations are irrelevant 
in the practical affairs of nations. But my 
Government takes the contrary view, and so 
does the United Nations Charter. The law of 
the charter is based on many moral consider- 
ations. The day that law is held to be irrele- 
vant, or to be available to some members and 
not available to others, will be a tragic day 
for world peace. 

If, however, we are to act effectively for 
the charter's principles, we must practice the 



art of the possible. We must decide upon 
those measures which we can implement — 
and to implement thoroughly those measures 
on which we have decided. The greater the 
unanimity of the Council in making its deci- 
sion, the greater will be our assurance of 
worldwide support for it. 

It is an unhappy fact that some situations 
exist in the world in which the Council is 
unable to act effectively. Here is a situation 
in which we can act. If every state does its 
duty in the work that now lies before us, our 
action will not only exert a profound effect in 
Salisbury; it will do much to build respect 
for the United Nations as a force for peace 
and justice in Africa and throughout the 

It is for all these reasons that the United 
States supports the course of action proposed 
by the United Kingdom. 


The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 No- 
vember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 
221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its 
appeal to all States to do their utmost in order to 
break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, 

Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far 
and the measures taken by the administering Power 
have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rho- 
desia to an end. 

Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in 
this resolution, the measures provided for in reso- 
lution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, as well as 
those initiated by Member States in implementation 
of that resolution, shall continue in effect. 

Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of 
the United Nations Charter, 

1. Determines that the present situation in South- 
ern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security; 

2. Decides that all States Members of the United 
Nations shall prevent: 

(a) the import into their territories of asbestos, 
iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper. 

*U.N. doc. S/RES/232 and Corr. 1 (1966) (S/ 
7621/Rev. 1, as amended) ; adopted by the Council on 
Dec. 16, 1966, by a vote of 11 (U.S.) to 0, with 4 ab- 
stentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, and U.S.S.R.). 

JANUARY 9, 1967 

meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather 
originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported 
therefrom after the date of this resolution; 

(6) any activities by their nationals or in their 
territories which promote or are calculated to pro- 
mote the export of these commodities from Southern 
Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in 
their territories in any of these commodities origi- 
nating in Southern Rhodesia and exported there- 
from after the date of this resolution, including in 
particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rho- 
desia for the purposes of such activities or dealings; 

(c) shipment in vessels or aircraft of their regis- 
tration of any of these commodities originating in 
Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the 
date of this resolution ; 

(d) any activities by their nationals or in their 
territories which promote or are calculated to pro- 
mote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of 
arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, 
military vehicles, and equipment and materials for 
the manufacture and maintenance of arms and am- 
munition in Southern Rhodesia; 

(e) any activities by their nationals or in their 
territories which promote or are calculated to pro- 
mote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other 
aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and 
materials for the manufacture, assembly or main- 
tenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern 
Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of 
their registration of any such goods destined for 
Southern Rhodesia: and any activities by their na- 
tionals or in their territories which promote or are 
calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly 
of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; 

(/) participation in their territories or territories 
under their administration or in land or air trans- 
port facilities or by their nationals or vessels of 
their registration in the supply of oil or oil products 
to Southern Rhodesia; 

notwithstanding any contracts entered into or 
licenses granted before the date of this resolution; 

3. Reminds Member States that the failure or re- 
fusal by any of them to implement the present reso- 
lution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of 
the Charter; 

4. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people 
of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence 
in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) ; and recognizes the legitimacy of their strug- 
gle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set 
forth in the Charter of the United Nations; 

5. Calls upon all States not to render financial or 
other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in 
Southern Rhodesia; 

6. Calls upon all States Members of the United 


Nations to carry out this decision of the Security 
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United 
Nations Charter; 

7. Urges, having regard to the principles stated 
in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States 
not Members of the United Nations to act in accord- 
ance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the pres- 
ent resolution; 

8. Calls upon States Members of the United Na- 
tions or of the specialized agencies to report to the 

Secretary-General the measures each has taken in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the 
present resolution ; 

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Council on the progress of the implementation of 
the present resolution, the first report to be submit- 
ted not later than 1 March 1967; 

10. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for 
further action as appropriate in the light of develop- 

U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space Treaty 

Following are statements made in Commit- 
tee I (Political and Security) and in plenary 
session by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the General Assembly, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Assembly on December 19. 


U.S. delegation press release 5034 

The treaty on outer space which now lies 
before this committee is an achievement in 
which all of us here, I am sure, find cause for 
great satisfaction and great hope.' We are 
happy to be a cosponsor of the resolution 
commending this treaty. We hope and trust 
that it will command the virtually unanimous 
support of the committee and the General 
Assembly. We share the wish that the treaty 
will be opened for signature very soon and 
will gain the widest possible adherence. 

I should like to take this occasion to pay 
tribute to our distinguished colleague who 
opened this debate. Judge Manfred Lachs 
of Poland. He has shown admirable skill and 

' For a statement made by President Johnson on 
Dec. 8 and text of the Treaty on Principles Gov- 
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 
1966, p. 952. 


impartiality in his role as chairman of the 
Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, within whose 
framework this treaty was negotiated in 
Geneva last July and more recently here in 
New York. Much of the credit for the success 
of our negotiations is due to him. We are 
also greatly indebted to Ambassador Kurt 
Waldheim of Austria, the chairman of the 
parent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, who played an outstanding role 
in bringing this project to fruition. There is 
no need for me to repeat what Professor 
Lachs has just now so ably explained about 
the history and procedural status of this 
treaty. But, speaking for the United States, 
which takes a very great interest in the ex- 
ploration of outer space, and in recognition 
of all that this implies for the peace of the 
world, I do wish to make some general obser- 

We of the United States regard this treaty 
as an important step toward peace. We do 
not wish to exaggerate its significance, but 
neither do we underrate it. It will greatly re- 
duce the danger of international conflict and 
promote the prospects of international coop- 
eration for the common interest in the newest 
and most unfamiliar of all realms of human 
activity, a realm in which the actions of na- 
tions are sure to be fateful for good or ill. 

The greatest danger facing us in outer 


space comes not from the physical environ- 
ment, however cold and hostile it may be, but 
from our own human nature and from the 
discords that trouble our relationship here 
on earth. Therefore, as we stand on the 
threshold of the space age, our first respon- 
sibility as governments is clear: We must 
make sure that man's earthly conflicts will 
not be carried into outer space. 

We know that not all these conflicts are 
easily or quickly ended. But it has for years 
been the deep desire and hope of many coun- 
tries, my own included, that the danger which 
they pose might be reduced; that the exten- 
sion of them into new realms might be pre- 
vented; and that this might be achieved in 
ways which would advance the interests of 
all nations. 

This treaty responds to that desire and 
hope. It thus takes its place in a historic 
progression: First was the Antarctic Treaty 
of 1959, reserving that large area of the 
world for exclusively peaceful activity; sec- 
ond was the limited test ban treaty of 1963; 
and third is the treaty which now lies before 
this committee. 

We hope and believe this series of peace- 
building agreements will continue to grow. 
Nothing would make us happier than if the 
treaty against the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons should soon be added as the fourth 
item on this historic list. 

Thus step by step, we may manage to re- 
lieve our fellow man of the increasingly 
heavy burden of conflict and armaments and 
danger he has borne for so long. And, step 
by step, we may also advance the rule of law 
into further areas of the relations between 

Record of the Negotiations 

In this great endeavor we can take much 
encouragement from the record of the nego- 
tiations on this treaty, which took place in 
the Legal Subcommittee, beginning last July 
12 in Geneva, and were completed here in 
New York. These negotiations were remark- 
able for their speed and for the businesslike 
and reasonable attitude of all concerned. 

In such a successful negotiation no party 

gains all that it wanted, but no party's major 
interests are injured, and every party gains 
something as the areas of common interest 
are discovered and defined. It was in this 
spirit of reasonable compromise that the 
negotiators reached agreement on a number 
of points of difference, not only between the 
two principal space powers but also between 
them and the other powers. The result is a 
treaty which reflects a very fair balance of 
interests and obligations from the standpoint 
of all concerned, including the countries 
which as yet have little or no space program 
of their own. 

The aim of the negotiators of this treaty 
was riot to provide in detail for every con- 
tingency that might arise in the exploration 
and use of outer space, many of which are 
unforeseeable, but rather to establish a set 
of basic principles. The treaty's provisions 
are purposely broad. But they are provisions 
which should be welcomed by the United Na- 
tions and particularly by the General As- 
sembly, for a great many of them derive 
from the recommendations which the Assem- 
bly made in two of its important resolutions 
of 1963: the Declaration of Legal Principles 
Governing Activities in Outer Space,^ and 
the "no bombs in orbit" resolution.^ More- 
over, the treaty responds to some of the most 
important concerns assigned to the General 
Assembly by the charter: disarmament and 
the regulation of armaments; international 
cooperation in the political and other fields; 
and, by no means least in importance, the 
progressive development of international law. 
Indeed, one of the most important prin- 
ciples in the treaty is that contained in article 
III, which binds all parties to carry on their 
activities in outer space "in accordance with 
international law, including the Charter of 
the United Nations." As man steps into the 
void of outer space, he will depend for his 
survival not only on his amazing technology 
but also on this other gift which is no less 
precious: the rule of law among nations. 
I shall not detain the committee with a full 

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012. 
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 7.54. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


discussion of the treaty's provisions. But I do 
wish to comment both on its arms control 
provisions and on those relating to peaceful 

Arms Control Provisions 

The United States view of the significance 
of the treaty's provisions on arms control 
was summed up by President Johnson in his 
statement a week ago, when he welcomed 
this treaty as "the most important arms con- 
trol development since the limited test ban 
treaty of 1963." The substance of the arms 
control provisions is in article IV. This arti- 
cle restricts military activities in two ways: 

First, it contains an undertaking not to 
place in orbit around the earth, install on the 
moon or any other celestial body, or other- 
wise station in outer space, nuclear or any 
other weapons of mass destruction. 

Second, it limits the use of the moon and 
other celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful 
purposes and expressly prohibits their use 
for establishing military bases, installations 
or fortifications, testing weapons of any kind, 
or conducting military maneuvers. 

Quite as important as these arms control 
provisions are the means available for assur- 
ing each party that the others are living up 
to them. I wish to call attention particularly 
to articles I, II, and XII. The principle used 
is similar to that embodied in the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959; namely, free access by all 
parties to one another's installations. 

This principle finds expression first in arti- 
cle I, which provides that "there shall be free 
access to all areas of celestial bodies." It is 
reinforced by the prohibition in article II 
against national appropriation of outer 
space or of celestial bodies. And it is further 
reinforced as regards celes.tial bodies by arti- 
cle XII, under which "All stations, installa- 
tions, equipment and space vehicles on the 
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open 
to representatives of other States Parties to 
the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity." 

The words "on a basis of reciprocity" in 
article XII do not confer, or imply the ex- 
istence of, any right or power to veto pro- 

posed visits to other countries' facilities on a 
celestial body. As I said on this point in the 
Legal Subcommittee in Geneva last August 

A veto is not compatible with the idea of reci- 
procity and reciprocal rights. If there is a veto, 
there are no meaningrful rights; without the exist- 
ence of rights there can be no reciprocity. 

The meaning of the words "on the basis of 
reciprocity" in article XII is in fact the mean- 
ing which common sense would dictate — and 
which was fully accepted by all the members 
of the Legal Subcommittee in Geneva; 
namely, that representatives of a state party 
to the treaty conducting activities on celestial 
bodies will have a right of access to the sta- 
tions, installations, equipment, and space 
vehicles of another state party on a celestial 
body, regardless of whether the second state 
has ever claimed, or has ever exercised, a 
right of access itself. The fact that the second 
state may not have asserted such a right, or 
may not have exercised it, in no way impairs 
the first state's right to access. However, if 
the first state has denied access to repre- 
sentatives of the second state, then the latter 
is not required, on the principle of reciproci- 
ty, to grant access to representatives of the 
first state. Indeed, the same logical result 
would follow whether or not this treaty pro- 
vision contained any express mention of reci- 

Moreover, any denial of access to facilities 
contemplated in this article would entitle the 
other party to exercise such other remedies 
as it would have under international law. 

In my statement of August 3 to the sub- 
committee, I made clear that the United 
States delegation was prepared to agree to 
inclusion of the words "on a basis of 
reciprocity" if the understanding I have just 
outlined, and have just repeated here, Mr. 
Chairman, was generally shared — and, in 
particular, was shared by the Soviet Union — 
and if the remaining provisions in the article 
were consistent with the idea of reciprocity 
and meaningful treaty rights. I stated ex- 
plicitly that the veto clause was not con- 
sistent and not acceptable. Nor does the re- 

* Ibid., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321. 



quirement of advance notice of a projected 
visit suggest any veto right or power. The 
United States accepted the advance notice 
provision on the suggestion of our friends 
from Japan, who pointed out at an early date 
that concern for the safety of our astronauts 
and the integrity of our facilities on celestial 
bodies requires that a visitor be asked to give 
reasonable advance notice of his intended 
visit. The restricted purpose of this notice 
requirement is expressly stated in article XII 
to be "in order that appropriate consultations 
may be held and that maximum precautions 
may be taken to assure safety and to avoid 
interference with normal operations in the 
facility to be visited." There is no veto. 

Peaceful Cooperation Provisions 

Now I turn to the more affirmative pro- 
visions of the treaty — those which lay down 
some basic ground rules for peaceful coopera- 
tion among nations in the exploration and use 
of outer space. 

The keynote is struck in the very first 
operative words of the treaty, in article I: 

The exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun- 
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development, and shall be the province of 
all mankind. 

The same article goes on to make clear that 
the exploration and use of outer space shall 
be the right of all states without any dis- 
crimination and on a basis of equality. This 
and other provisions, particularly that which 
prohibits claims of territorial sovereignty, 
make clear the intent of the treaty that 
outer space and celestial bodies are open not 
just to the big powers or the first arrivals but 
shall be available to all, both now and in the 
future. This principle is a strong safeguard 
for the interests of those states which have, 
at the present time, little or no active space 
program of their own. Their interests are 
also protected by other provisions, for ex- 

Article VII, which fixes on the launching 
state the responsibility for any damage 

caused by objects launched by or for them or 
from their territory; 

Article IX, which requires states to con- 
duct their space activities "with due regard 
to the corresponding interests of all other 
States Parties to the Treaty." This includes 
a specific obligation to avoid harmful con- 
tamination of outer space or of celestial 
bodies and also to avoid adverse changes in 
the terrestrial environment; 

And Article XI, which requires the fullest 
practicable public reporting, by parties con- 
ducting space activities, of "the nature, con- 
duct, locations and results of such activities" 
— a practice which my own country has vol- 
untarily followed since the space age began. 
This provision seeks to assure that the full 
scientific harvest from space research will be 
available to all the world, not just to the par- 
ties that do most of the exploring. 

It is wise and proper that the treaty should 
secure these rights and benefits to all parties, 
including the nonlaunching nations. For their 
cooperation also is necessary in many re- 
spects, some of which the treaty also provides 
for, such as assistance to and return of any 
astronauts who may make emergency land- 
ings on their territory and return to the 
owner of objects launched into outer space 
which fall on their territory. In addition, 
maximum benefits from the exploration of 
outer space depend on the cooperation of the 
international scientific and technical com- 
munity in all nations, large and small alike. 

We are all in this venture together, and we 
need one another's cooperation. 

The same spirit of cooperation, let me say 
emphatically, should prevail also among the 
major space countries, specifically my own 
country and the Soviet Union — and any 
others that may later develop comparable 
programs of space launchings and manned 
flight. Two provisions of the treaty con- 
cretely illustrate this desirable relationship. 
Article IX calls for international cooperation 
and mutual assistance and includes a provi- 
sion for consultation in the case of potentially 
harmful experiments. Article V requires that 
the same universal respect for life and limb 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


which has been traditional among mariners 
at sea for many centuries shall also govern 
among astronauts in outer space. In all space 
activities, under this article, "the astronauts 
of one State Party shall render all possible 
assistance to the astronauts of other States 
Parties." And any party which discovers con- 
ditions in outer space that could endanger 
the life or health of astronauts is obliged to 
report this to the other parties or to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

As the space age proceeds, and particularly 
as manned space flights develop, many forms 
of cooperation beween astronauts of major 
space powers are sure to develop which today 
cannot be foreseen. The framers of this 
treaty did not try to peer into the unfore- 
seeable; but rather we tried to insure, by lay- 
ing down broad principles, that all concerned 
will enter this unknown realm as friends and 
partners in peace. 

Tracking Facilities, Accession 

Before concluding, I wish to make brief 
additional comments on two of the articles of 
the treaty. 

The first of these is article X, dealing with 
the granting of tracking facilities. In this I 
speak on behalf of a large number of states, 
some of which have granted tracking facili- 
ties and some of which have not. 

We welcome the revised form in which this 
article appears in the final text of the treaty. 
The article requires that if a party has 
granted tracking facilities to another party, 
it is obliged, on an equal basis, to consider 
a request for tracking facilities by a third 
party. It is quite clear from the text of the 
article, however, that there must be agree- 
ment between the parties concerned for the 
establishment of a tracking facility. The 
article as thus revised recognizes that the 
elements of mutual benefit and acceptability 
are natural and necessary parts of the deci- 
sion whether to enter into an agreement con- 
cerning such a facility, and it properly 
incorporates the principle that each state 
which is asked to cooperate has the right to 
consider its legitimate interests in reaching 
its decision. 

Finally, I wish to comment briefly on the 
accession clause in article XIV of the treaty. 
The adoption of the accession clause now 
included in the Treaty on Principles Govern- 
ing the Activities of States in the Explora- 
tion and Use of Outer Space — urged because 
of exceptional circumstances favoring a very 
broad geographical coverage for the space 
treaty — does not, of course, bring about the 
recognition or otherwise alter the status of 
an unrecognized regime or entity which may 
seek to file an instrument of accession to the 
space treaty. Under international law and 
practice, recognition of a government or 
acknowledgement of the existence of a state 
is brought about as the result of a deliberate 
decision and course of conduct on the part 
of a government intending to accord recogni- 
tion. Recognition of a regime or acknowl- 
edgement of an entity cannot be inferred 
from signature, ratification, or accession to a 
multilateral agreement. The United States 
believes that this viewpoint is generally 
accepted and shared, and it is on this basis 
that we join in supporting the present final 
clauses of the space treaty. 

"Envoys of Manlcind" 

Mr. Chairman, perhaps I can best express 
my country's feelings about this treaty by 
recalling an encounter which several of us, 
including the Secretary-General, shared here 
at the United Nations last year with an 
American astronaut. He is Colonel Edward 
White, and he had then only recently 
returned from a 4-day Gemini mission in 
which he had carried out the first American 
"walk in space." 

Colonel White had carried with him on this 
flight a memento which he was eager to 
present to the United Nations — a United 
Nations flag, probably the first ever to fly in 
space. The Secretary-General very graciously 
agreed to accept this flag for the United 

We had a little ceremony in which the 
colonel made a short speech, and in that 
speech he said something I shall never forget. 
He said that, as he looked down from space 
at the earth passing below and recognized 



the familiar shapes of the oceans and 
continents moving past, one thing that struck 
him very forcefully was something he did 
not see. He saw no national boundaries. 

Most of us who sit in this room as envoys 
of our respective governments will probably 
never see that sight, which history has 
reserved for a younger generation than ours. 
But perhaps it is not too much to hope that 
we will see it in our mind's eye and that in 
the work we have to do we, too, will be able 
to serve also, in some small measure, as 
"envoys of mankind." 

On behalf of the United States I have the 
privilege of commending this treaty to the 
First Committee of the General Assembly 
and urge that the resolution which will speed 
it forward be promptly unanimously ap- 


U.S. delegation press release 6037 

It is indeed fitting that the treaty on outer 
space should come before the General 
Assembly as the 21st session draws to a close, 
for that extraordinary document provides at 
the same time a momentous finale to the 
work pf this session and a note of progress 
and cooperation and hope from which future 
sessions may derive inspiration and light. 

On this historic occasion the United States 
would like to join the other nations that have 
acknowledged a special debt to the Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, to the 
space and nonspace powers alike, without 
whose contributions this treaty would never 
have been possible. And, of course, I should 
like to acknowledge our thanks and apprecia- 
tion to Ambassador Waldheim and Professor 
Lachs for their leadership in this great 

This, in every sense of the word, is a 
United Nations treaty in which all member 
nations can justly take great pride. It has 
been negotiated under the auspices of the 
organization and is the instrument of its 
labor. The treaty furthers the aims of the 
charter by greatly reducing the danger of 
international conflict and by promoting the 

JANUARY 9, 1967 

prospects of international cooperation for 
the common interests in the newest realm of 
human activity. 

This treaty is an important step toward 
peace. It takes its place in a historic progres- 
sion: the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the 
limited test ban treaty of 1963, and now this 
treaty. We hope and trust this series of 
peacebuilding agreements will continue to 
grow. Nothing would make the United States 
happier than if a treaty against the prolifer- 
ation of nuclear weapons should soon be 
added as the fourth compact on this historic 
list. Thus, step by step, we shall advance the 
rule of law into further areas of the relations 
between states. 

Mr. President, it is with great satisfaction 
that the United States will vote for Draft 
Resolution II, which commends the treaty on 
outer space and expresses the hope for the 
widest possible adherence to this treaty, a 
hope we share in full measure and full con- 


Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies 

The General Assembly, 

Having considered the report of the Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ' covering its work 
during 1966, and in particular the work accom- 
plished by the Legal Sub-Committee during its fifth 
session, held at Geneva from 12 July through 4 
Aug^ust and at New York from 12 September 
through 16 September, 

Noting further the progress achieved through sub- 
sequent consultations among States Members of the 
United Nations, 

'U.N. doc. A/RES/2222 (XXI); adopted unani- 
mously by the Assembly on December 19. Two other 
resolutions on the subject of outer space were 
adopted on the same day and also were supported 
by the United States; A/RES/2221 (XXI) calling 
for a United Nations conference on the exploration 
and peaceful uses of outer space to be held at Vienna 
in September 1967; and A/RES/2223 (XXI) endors- 
ing a number of other recommendations in the report 
of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 

« U.N. doc. A/6431. 


Reaffirming the importance of international co- 
operation in the field of activities in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, and the importance 
of developing the rule of law in this new area of 
human endeavour, 

1. Commends the Treaty on Principles Govern- 
ing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, the text of which is annexed to this 
resolution ; 

2. Requests the depositary Governments to open 
the Treaty for signature and ratification at the 
earliest possible date ; 

3. Expresses its hope for the widest possible ad- 
herence to this Treaty; 

4. Requests the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space : 

(a) To continue its work on the elaboration of an 
agreement on liability for damages caused by the 
launching of objects into outer space and an agree- 
ment on assistance to and return of astronauts and 
space vehicles, which are on the agenda of the Com- 
mittee ; 

(b) To begin at the same time the study of ques- 
tions relative to the definition of outer space and the 
utilization of outer space and celestial bodies, includ- 
ing the various implications of space communica- 
tions ; 

(c) To report to the twenty-second session of the 
General Assembly on the progress of its work. ' 


Income Tax Convention Signed 
With Trinidad and Tobago 

Department Statement 

Press release 302 dated December 23 

On December 22, 1966, the American Am- 
bassador at Port of Spain and the Minister 
of Finance of Trinidad and Tobago signed 
a convention between the United States and 
Trinidad and Tobago for the avoidance of 
double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 

evasion with respect to taxes on income and 
the encouragement of international trade 
and investment. 

The income tax convention of April 16, 
1945, between the United States and the 
United Kingdom, a^ modified by supplemen- 
tary protocols of June 6, 1946, May 25, 1954, 
and August 19, 1957,^ was extended in its 
application to Trinidad and Tobago as of 
January 1, 1959, pursuant to the procedure 
prescribed in article XXII of that conven- 
tion. Trinidad and Tobago became an inde- 
pendent nation on August 31, 1962. In 1965, 
in accordance with provisions in the 1945 
convention for that purpose, the Govern- 
ment of Trinidad and Tobago gave notice 
to the United States Government of an in- 
tention to terminate the application of the 
convention as between it and the United 

The new convention is limited in scope; 
and it is anticipated that it will be replaced 
by a more comprehensive income tax con- 
vention between the two countries, negotia- 
tions for which will be commenced during 

The new convention is designed primarily 
as an interim measure to permit corpora- 
tions of one of the countries to receive divi- 
dends from their subsidiary corporations op- 
erating in the other country (a subsidiary 
for this purpose being a corporation at least 
10 percent of the outstanding shares of vot- 
ing stock of which is owned by the recipient 
corporation) at a reduced rate of withhold- 
ing tax. Under existing internal law of each 
country, dividends paid by a corporation of 
one country to a resident of the other coun- 
try are subject to a 30 percent withholding 
tax. Subject to prescribed conditions, the 
convention will have the effect of reducing 
this withholding rate to 5 percent with re- 
spect to such dividends. 

In addition to its corporation tax, which 
is imposed at a rate of 44 percent, Trinidad 
and Tobago imposes, under its Finance Act 
of 1966, a tax of 30 percent on profits (after 

' The text of the treaty was printed as an annex 
to this resolution. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
1546, 3165, 4124. 



payment of the corporation tax) derived in 
Trinidad and Tobago by a permanent estab- 
lishment of a United States corporation un- 
less such profits are invested within Trinidad 
and Tobago. Subject to prescribed conditions, 
the convention will have the effect of reduc- 
ing the rate of this "branch profits" tax to 
5 percent. 

In general, therefore, the convention pre- 
scribes a 5 percent rate limitation on the tax 
that can be imposed by the source country 
on dividends derived from sources within 
that country to certain corporations of the 
other country. It prescribes a 25 percent rate 
limitation on the tax that can be imposed by 
the source country on dividends derived from 
sources within that country to other corpo- 
rations and individual residents of the other 

The convention also contains articles des- 
ignating the taxes that are the subject of the 
convention, defining various terms found in 
the convention, and prescribing the foreign 
tax credit. 

The convention will enter into force upon 
the exchange of instruments of ratification, 
but it is agreed that all necessary steps will 
be taken to make the provisions effective as 
of January 1, 1966. The convention shall 
terminate on December 31, 1967, but may 
be continued in effect from year to year by 
an exchange of notes for that purpose on or 
before December 31 of any taxable year. 

The convention will be transmitted to the 
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilat- 
eral agreement between the United States and 
Spain of August 16, 1957, as amended (TIAS 
3988, 5990), for cooperation concerning civil uses 
of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna December 9, 
1966. Entered into force December 9, 1966. 


Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 

mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.' 
Signature : Denmark, November 21, 1966. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquar- 
ters, New York, September 28 through November 
30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. 
TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Kenya, December 15, 1966. 


Convention concerning the International Union for 
the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brus- 
sels July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1891. 
26 Stat. 1518. 
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966. 

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels 
July 5, 1890, relating to the creation of an Inter- 
national Union for the Publication of Customs 
Tariffs (26 Stat. 1518). Done at Brussels Decem- 
ber 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950; for 
the United States September 15, 1957. TIAS 3922. 
Adherence deposited: Algeria, September 29, 1966. 

IMaritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.' 
Acceptances received: Argentina, September 30, 
1966; Bulgaria, September 29, 1966; Czechoslo- 
vakia, October 3, 1966; Senegal, September 28, 
Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Open for signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.' 
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (vdth a statement), October 25, 1966. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with 
final protocol, general regulations with final proto- 
col, and convention with final protocol and regula- 
tions of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. 
Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratifications deposited: China, September 6, 1966; 
Tunisia, September 13, 1966. 


Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as 
revised, for the protection of industrial property. 
Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into 
force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notification of accession: Dahomey, December 10, 


Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav- 
ery, the slave trade and institutions and practices 
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 

Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16, 


Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966 for part I 

' Not in force. 

• Not in force for the United States. 

JANUARY 9, 1967 


and parts III to VII; Augiist 1, 1966 for part II. 
Acceptances deposited: Finland, December 14, 

1966; Mexico, December 22, 1966; Venezuela, 

December 19, 1966. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954." 

Accession deposited: Afghanistan, November 16, 



Agreement relating to the establishment of a joint 
defense space research facility. Signed at Can- 
berra December 9, 1966. Entered into force De- 
cember 9, 1966. 

Dominican Republic 

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative pro- 
grram for meteorological observations. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Santo Domingo June 17 and 
July 21, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1966; 
effective June 30, 1965. 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agreement relating to the transfer of three paint- 
ings to the Federal Republic of Germany for the 
Weimar Museum. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington December 9 and 16, 1966. Entered 
into force December 16, 1966. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a geo- 
detic satellite observation station at Kanoya. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September 
12 and 19, 1966. Entered into force September 19, 


Agrreement relating to creation of a joint commis- 
sion to study economic and social development of 
the border area. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico and Tlatelolco November 30 and Decem- 
ber 3, 1966. Entered into force December 3, 1966. 


Agreement amending the agreement of October 28, 
1955 (TIAS 3558), relating to investment guaran- 
ties. Signed at Asuncion August 11, 1966. 
Entered into force : November 16, 1966. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to a cooperative meteorological 
program in the Cayman Islands. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington November 23 and 
December 12, 1966. Entered into force December 
12, 1966; effective July 1, 1962. 

United Nations 

Agreement amending the supplemental agreement 
of February 9, 1966, regarding the headquarters 
of the United Nations (TIAS 5961). Effected by 
exchange of notes at New York December 8, 1966. 
Entered into force December 8, 1966. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, aa well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the Held of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10. foreign $16; 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX January 9, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 14S7 



Africa. Institutions for Order (Sisco) .... 64 

Antarctica. U.S. Appoints Observers for Ant- 
arctic Inspections 71 

Asia. Advisers Named for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Bureau 72 

Chile. President Frei of Chile To Visit the United 
States (Johnson) 71 

Department and Foreign Service. Advisers 
Named for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Bureau 72 

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of December 21 42 

Economic Affairs. 

Income Tax Convention Sigrned With Trinidad 

and Tobago 84 

Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying 

Vietnamese Development 69 

Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds Second 

Meeting 70 

U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for Investment, 

Trade Studies 69 

Europe. North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris 
(communique) 49 

Foreign Aid. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of December 21 42 

Human Rights. Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64 

India. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of De- 
cember 21 42 

International Law. Viet-Nam and the Interna- 
tional Law of Self-Defense (Meeker) ... 54 

Korea. U.S. Businessmen To Visit Korea for In- 
vestment, Trade Studies 69 

Mexico. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds 
Second Meeting 70 

Military Affairs. North Atlantic Council Meets 
at Paris (communique) 49 

Near East 

Advisers Named for Near Eastern and South 

Asian Bureau 72 

Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

North Atlantic Council Meets at Paris (com- 
munique) 49 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 21 42 

Presidential Documents. President Frei of Chile 
To Visit the United States 71 

Science. U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer 
Space Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) . 78 

South West Africa. Institutions for Order 
(Sisco) 64 

Southern Rhodesia 

Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64 

Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions 
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text 
of resolution) 73 

Trade. Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee Holds 
Second Meeting 70 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 85 

Income Tax Convention Signed With Trinidad 

and Tobago 84 

U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space 

Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78 

Trinidad and Tobago. Income Tax Convention 
Signed With Trinidad and Tobago . ... 84 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
December 21 42 

United Kingdom. Security Council Votes Man- 
datory Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 73 

United Nations 

Institutions for Order (Sisco) 64 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 21 42 

Security Council Votes Mandatory Sanctions 
Against Southern Rhodesia (Goldberg, text 
of resolution) 73 

U.N. General Assembly Endorses Outer Space 
Treaty (Goldberg, text of resolution) ... 78 

U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help in 
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63 


Mr. Lilienthal To Head U.S. Team Studying 
Vietnamese Development 69 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Decem- 
ber 21 42 

U.S. Asks U.N. Secretary-General for Help iii 
Seeking Peace (Goldberg) 63 

Viet-Nam and the International Law of Self- 
Defense (Meeker) 54 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 69 

Goldberg, Arthur J 63,73,78 

Johnson, President "71 

Lilienthal, David E 69 

Meeker, Leonard C 54 

Rusk, Secretary 42 

Sisco, Joseph J 64 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: December 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 18 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
291 of December 12 and 292 of December 13. 





295 12/20 


NATO communique (original 
NATO document printed here- 

Advisory panel for Bureau of 
Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs. 

Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Com- 
mittee meeting. 

Rusk: news conference of De- 
cember 21. 

Termination of income tax con- 
vention with Honduras. 

U.S. observers under Antarctic 
Treaty (rewrite). 

IMCO Subcommittee recommends 
new passenger-ship standards. 

Travel restrictions. 

Income tax convention with 
Trmidad and Tobago. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Buixetin. 













it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/27 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c., 20402 



The Promise of the New Asia 

U.S. Policy in the Far East as Stated by President Johnson on His Pacific Journey 

This 72-page illustrated pamphlet contains the major statements and addresses made by Presi 
dent Johnson during his 17-day journey, October 17-November 2, to seven Asian and Pacific na 
tions. The pamphlet also includes a statement by General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S. com 
mander in Viet-Nam, made before the chiefs of state and heads of government of the seven alli« 
nations at the Manila Summit Conference, as well as the texts of the three historic document 
issued at the close of the Manila Conference: the Goals of Freedom, the Joint Communique, am 
the Declaration of Peace and Progress in Asia and the Pacific. 

PUBLICATION 8166 $1.0" 


To: Supt. of Documsots 
Govt. Printinc OfBes 
Washiostoa, D.C. 2M02 

PUBLICATION 8166 ?1.00 

Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order). Please send 

. copies of The Promise of the New Asia. 



Tto bs maUsd 


CoupoB nCoDd , 










Street sddressL. 

Citjr. Stete, and ZIP codei. 







Vol. LVI, No. U38 

January 16, 1967 

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 98 

Statement by Ambassador Patricia R. Harris and Texts of Covenants lOi 


Article by Glenn T. Seaborg 
Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioii 90 

For index see inside back cover 

By 1980, Dr. Seuborg predicts, fissionable material will be 
produced over the face of the globe "siifficient for the poten- 
tial production of a substantial amount of the world's 
electrical power — or, alternatively, sxifficient for tens of 
nuclear weapons a day." This article, in which Dr. Seaborg 
discusses the importance of miclear power to a rapidly 
expanding population, is based on a lecture he delivered in 
London on October 2 A, 1966, before the British Nuclear 
Energy Society. 

Worldwide Nuclear Power— Progress and Problems 

by Glenn T. Seaborg 

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

Before one can discuss the future of power 
with any realism, one must first tal]< about 
people — people in terms of population and 
the ever-growing pressure of population. This 
is a subject of overwhelming importance 
today, and I am sure that many are familiar 
with the infonnation in figure 1 showing the 
exponential growth of the world's population 
projected to the year 2000. The cui-ve on this 
graph bears a simple but most relevant mes- 
sage: Between the year 1960 and the year 
2000, the world's population will about 
double. It will rise from 3 billion to 6 billion 
people. Now, if all the other aspects of civili- 
zation as we know it were to remain the 
same and proportionally each individual 
consumed the same amount of energy tomor- 
row as today, the energy demand should also 

But we know that this will not be the case, 
and figure 2 shows the actual situation. This 
graph of past and projected annual world- 
wide energy consumption covers the same 
period as the previous population curve. The 
previous curve, noi-malized to the worldwide 
energy consumption curve at the year 1950, 
has also been included for comparison's sake. 
Tliis makes obvious the fact that the con- 

sumption of energy by individuals does not 
have a constant value. In highly technological 
societies, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, there has been and will be 
a significant increase in energy consumption 
per capita. In the emerging nations, however, 
there probably will be a startling increase. 
The consumption of energy in these countries 
today is almost nil compared to what it might 
be tomorrow. 

It is difficult to comprehend fully the 
energy demands of a world of double today's 
population with all its people enjoying living 
standards approaching those of the people of 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Think of the magnitude of energy that may 
be required some day if we were to air- 
condition much of Africa and the subcon- 
tinent of Asia and heat population centers 
that will be growing up in subarctic regions. 
What would it mean to provide the power 
required to transport people and materials 
to the remote ijarts of the globe to satisfy 
the needs of an ever-expanding population 
and provide sufficient power and fresh water 
for home, industry, and agriculture? Imagine 
the future energy needs involved in growing, 
processing, and distributing food, from land 



and sea, for a world i^opulation double that 
of today — and demanding an adequate diet 
for all. These are only a few of the energy 
challenges we face. 

Recognizing the great importance of 
energy for future global social and economic 
well-being — perhaps for our veiy survival — 
consider one important form of energy — 
electricity. The past and projected worldwide 
annual electricity production is represented 
in figure 3. Again, the worldwide annual 
energy consumption as sho^vn in the previous 
figure has been normalized to the worldwide 
electricity production cui've at the year 1950 
and projected to the year 2000. I believe it is 
particularly evident that electricity will pro- 
vide an even greater fraction of the energy 
consumed by man in the ensuing decades than 
it does today. This should not be a surprising 
fact when one realizes that many parts of the 
world are just being ushered into the electric 
age. Further, electricity is a particularly 
easily managed forni of energy. It can be 
simply transported by wire, conveniently and 
economically generated in large blocks, and 
it is capable of being produced from a number 
of independent energy sources, that is, hydro, 
fossil fuels, or the heat generated from 
nuclear fission. It is electricity produced by 
this last means that I would like to turn to 
next and examine in some detail. 

Advantages of Nuclear Power 

In general, the future of nuclear electric 
power looks bright indeed, but we who are 
in this field know that we have many 
obstacles to overcome and that much hard 
work remains ahead of us to make the most 
of the atom's great potential power. 

When we look at the nuclear electrical pro- 
duction throughout the world from the year 
1950 to the turn of the centuiy, as seen in 
figure 4, again we have a familiar pattern 
of rapid exponential gi'o^vth. In this case, 
because of the newness of this energy 
source — nuclear generating capacity was 
clearly zero in 1960 — the annual world\vide 
electricity production cui've has been nor- 
malized to the worldwide nuclear production 
curve at the year 1970. It is genei'ally agreed 















_^ — ^^"^ 




— 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 — 1 1 1 

that nuclear energy will take an ever-increas- 
ing share of the electrical generating capacity 
until the turn of the century. By that time, 
it is predicted that essentially all new elec- 
trical powerplants to be built will be nuclear 

This then brings us to the importance of 
nuclear power. As I indicated before, a 
rapidly expanding global population, its 
increasing appetite for energy, and the satis- 
faction of an increasingly larger share of this 
energy appetite by electricity make nuclear 
electric power a key element in the future 
well-being and progress of man. 

Assuming continued improvements in 
nuclear power technology, the building of 
veiy large size plants, and the absence of cer- 
tain financial restraints, nuclear power has 
the potential for a significant reduction in 
the cost of electricity. A reduction large 
enough to cause rather dramatic changes in 
energy utilization is foreseen by some. There 
is no doubt that large-scale, low-cost sources 
of energy will determine more than any other 
single resource the availability and cost of 
other basic resources such as food, water, 
and industrial materials. With very low cost 
power, desalted water would be a reality. 
Our nitrogenous fertilizers and many of our 
basic chemicals would be produced by new 
routes and from raw materials such as water, 
air, and coal. Electricity would widely be 
used to reduce most ores to metals. The 
world of tomorrow will certainly be far dif- 
ferent from that of today if these promises 
of very low cost nuclear power do come true. 

There are, I might add, other obvious ad- 

JANUARY 16, 1967 




IV«0 2000 

vantages to nuclear power today. It is a clean 
source of power and does not add to the 
burden of pollution in the air. It is relatively 
independent of geography because of the 
extreme compactness and long life of nuclear 
fuels, and therefore nuclear powerplants can 
be constructed far from their sources of raw 
material — uranium and thorium ores — with- 
out a significant economic penalty. And, 
finally, it lends itself well toward generation 
in large blocks of ix)wer so that enonnous, 
very economical, central power stations can 
be built. 

Economic Requirements 

But if nuclear energy is actually to be used 
in this important role, it must be capable of 
meeting at least two criteria. First, it must 
be economic wherever it is used. Otherwise 
nuclear power stations will not be built in any 
significant numbers. Second, sufficient re- 
serves of nuclear fuel must be available to 
provide the enormous amounts of energy 
which will be required, not only through the 
year 2000 but also beyond, as our energy 
consumption ever increases. 

Recent Trends 

Turning now to the present status of nu- 
clear power in the world, let me point out 
that the tyijes of reactors being constructed 
today are being built for current and near- 
term economic use, and their design does not 
in general take into consideration the long- 

term future resources of nuclear fuel. At 
present this long-term concern is really not 
a necessary condition of reactor construction 
because nuclear energy represents but a 
minor fraction of the annual global energy 
consumption and uranium resources are 
ample to meet near-term requirements. 

As is generally known, the current reactor 
types have achieved economical competitive- 
ness — remarkably so in countries such as the 
United States. In fact, in my tenure as 
Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Com- 
mission I have witnessed a remarkable evolu- 
tion of nuclear power. When I first took office 
the entire program was questioned on the 
ground that the expenditures of vast sums 
of public funds seemed to be for naught, that 
nuclear power would not be economic for 
several decades to come. Today I find some 
people at the other extreme beginning to 
question whether any additional government 
funding of advanced nuclear power programs 
is necessaiy, since so many nuclear power- 
plants are being sold by the nuclear industiy 
that the industry has reached the point of 
being self-supporting. In the United States 
alone, firm commitments for the construction 
of nuclear powerplants went from 2 million 
kilowatts in 1963-64 to 5 million kilowatts 
in 1965 to 15 million kilowatts for the first 
9 months of 1966. A similar increase in reac- 
tor construction is expected to occur in other 

In the United Kingdom, for example, the 






second nuclear power program, adopted in 
1965, planned a program of 5 million kilo- 
watts of nuclear generating capacity during 
the period 1970-75. This program was in- 
creased to 8 million kilowatts by the end of 

The French civil program, as another ex- 
ample, is the largest in continental Europe. 
According to the French Government's "fifth 
plan," the French foresee 2.5 million to 4 
million kilowatts installed from 1966 to 1970 
utilizing gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, and 
natural-uranium-fueled plants of 500,000 
kilowatts or more. At the present time, about 
1 percent of France's electrical energy is of 
nuclear origin; by 1970 it is expected to reach 
5 percent and by 1975, 12 percent. 

The installation of nuclear power in Japan 
is expected to total from 4.3 million to 5.3 
million kilowatts by 1975 and approximately 
10 million kilowatts by 1980. Seven central 
stations are in various stages of planning in 
Japan, with two plants now operating. 
Sweden also plans a long-range construction 
program of six nuclear i)lants totaling 2.5 
million kilowatts of power by 1978. In the 
Federal Republic of Germany two plants are 
now producing electricity, two are being 
built, and plans are going forward on several 
others. It is apparent that nuclear power will 
have a rapid growth in Germany during the 
next decade. Canada, India, Italy, Switzer- 
land, and Spain also have substantial 
nuclear power plans. 

One of the reasons given for this abrupt 
change in events has been the ability of the 
electric producers to begin utilizing very 
large blocks of electrical generation. As a re- 
sult, it has become possible to take advantage 
of the savings incurred through scaling 
nuclear powerplants to very large sizes. 

Uranium Prices 

A fixed price of uranium equal to $8 per 
pound of UsOg has been a general level which 
has been attained through extensive national 
and international procurement of uranium 
ores over the past decade. Recently, prices a 






H70 1980 


few dollars below the $8 level have been 
negotiated due to the temporary surplus of 
uranium ore supphes. However, if one views 
this question of uranium ore resources from 
a long-term viewpoint, the price will probably 
slowly escalate as the higher grade ores are 
consumed and as the general cost of labor 
and materials increases. For the present 
moment the figure of about $8 a pound of 
UaOs is a fair and perhaps a somewhat con- 
servative one not likely to change drastically 
for the next decade. 

What degree of urgency must be given to 
increasing uranium prices ? This should have 
a direct eff"ect on the future planning and pro- 
grams leading to the development of ad- 
vanced and improved reactors. As an 
extreme, if the world could be assured that 
from here to the turn of the century the 
price for UaOs would remain at today's level, 
there might be considerably less pressure 
and urgency for the development through 
government sponsorship of newer and more 
efficient reactors. Nonetheless, there would 
remain some important incentives for the 
continued development of newer reactor 
types which might promise to be more eco- 
nomical than the current round of reactors. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 










CtPtCIIT (Mat) 










0-IS 0-30 0-50 0-100 


In the United Kingdom this has been exempli- 
fied in the progress from the magnox reac- 
tors to the advanced gas-cooled reactors. 

Uranium Reserves 

To offer some appreciation of the time 
scale which should lie factored into these 
programmatic decisions, figure 5 shows the 
known and estimated uranium resources. 
These uranium resources are shown as mil- 
lions of tons of UsOs as well as the I'elated 
megawatts of nuclear generating caimbility. 
The figures are based on the assumption of 
sufficient fuel for a 30-year lifetime for 
nuclear powerplants of the current light 
water and advanced gas-cooled reactor types. 
Combining the infoiTnation presented on this 
chart with that on the earlier one (figure 4) 
showing a very rapid exponential growth of 
nuclear power generating capability, one can 
predict that the known or estimated world- 
wide ore resources costing $10 per pound or 
less are sufficient to supply about 300,000 
megawatts of nuclear generating capability, 
which will be contracted for, with the conse- 
quent commitment of the indicated amount 
of uranium, by 1980. If one considers 
uranium ore resources of $15 per pound or 
less, the reserves, both known and estimated, 
are sufficient to support power stations 
generating about 550,000 megawatts of 
nuclear power, a capacity which will be 
reached by about the year 1985. Using 
uranium ore resources of $30 per pound or 

less, the reserves are sufficient for about 1 
million megawatts of nuclear power, which 
will be reached by about the year 1990. A 
very important fact sho\\Ti by this chart 
(figure 5) is that there are enormous re- 
sources of uranium available if one is not 
limited by cost of the ore. 

I might also add a word of warning about 
these figures. They do not reflect the in- 
creased activity during the past months 
toward new uranium exploration in the 
United States, Canada, and elsewhere. They 
represent the facts as we know them today. 
I am certain, however, that additional ore 
supplies will be found, in similar fashion to 
the new fossil fuel resources found yearly, 
and that this figure represents a conservative 
view of things. 

In addition to these resources of uranium 
ere, vast quantities of thorium ore will be 
found, quantities similar in magnitude to 
that of the uranium ores. Thorium can also 
be considered a nuclear energy resource al- 
though it itself is not fissionable. Thorium- 
232, the isotope of thorium found in these 
ores, like the nonfissionable isotope uranium- 
238 which is the very abundant isotope of 
uranium found in nature, can be converted 
to useful fissionable form by nuclear trans- 
mutation. As you know, in the case of 
uranium-238 the small fraction of the natu- 
rally fissionable isotope uranium-235 pro- 
vides the fission reaction neutrons which, 
when captured by uranium-238, cause it to 
undergo a transmutation eventually leading 
to plutonium-239, an isotope which is fission- 
able. Similarly, thorium-232 upon capturing 
a neutron can be transmuted to uranium-233, 
another fissionable isotope. Thus, plutonium- 
239 and uranium-233 are the keys to unlock- 
ing the vast energies stored in uranium-238 
and thorium-232. Unfortunately, the current 
reactor types do not take full advantage of 
this situation. 

We presently know that it is quite feasible 
to increase the efficiency of utilization of our 
uranium ore resources. The heavy water 
moderated and cooled reactor and certain ad- 
vanced reactors indicate one direction in 



which to proceed. Increasing the thermal 
efficiency of nuclear powerplants is another 

Breeder Reactors 

In general temis it appears readily possible 
to more than double the energy which can be 
extracted from a pound of uranium by going 
to reactors with higher conversion ratios than 
the currently available light water and ad- 
vanced gas-cooled reactors. I refer to the near 
breeders. The effect of this increased effi- 
ciency is reflected in the fact that with the 
installation of these near breeder reactors in 
place of the current reactors the period of use 
of the known uranium ore resources can be 
extended for about a decade. 

The actual effect of near breeder reactors 
is even more dramatic since some of these 
would utilize the thorium-uranium-233 fuel 
cycle to supplement and replace the uranium- 
plutomum-239 fuel cycle. But whatever fuel 
cycle is in fact used, near breeder reactors 
must provide improved nuclear efficiencies in 
order to make a significant contribution. 

There is an obvious incentive for getting 
near or into a breeding regime. By breeding 
I mean — as many of you know — a reactor 
where more fissionable fuel is produced from 
the fertile uranium-238 or thorium-232 than 
is consumed in the fission chain reaction. If 
one gets to a conversion or breeding ratio of 
1.1 or greater, tremendous gains can be ob- 
tained. Rather than utilizing only a few per- 
cent of the energy present in the nuclear fuel, 
more than 50 percent can be usefully har- 
nessed. This fact also means that even 
though the current reactors inefficiently uti- 
lize the uranium and thorium fuels, these 
fuels are not wasted. The large fraction of 
uranium-238 and thorium-232 not consumed 
in these reactors can serve eventually as fuel 
for future breeder reactors. 

This has an immediate compound effect. 
Assuming one is able to build economic 
breeder reactors, the nuclear generating 
capacity capable of being ultimately fueled 
with today's low-cost ore resources is greatly 
increased. Second, the high efficiency of these 
reactors means that they should be less sensi- 

tive to increases in the future costs of nuclear 

Unfortunately, as we all know, govern- 
ment life and service are not so simple as to 
permit one to say "Let there be a breeder re- 
actor," and, lo, there is a breeder reactor. 
There are many real scientific and techno- 
logical hurdles which must be crossed. In 
addition there are other tyi3es of advanced 
reactors — near breeders — which for the near- 
term have considerable economic promise. If 
one looks about the world today, one can see 
several types of advanced reactors, including 
breeder reactors, under intensive develop- 

The breeder reactors, representing a some- 
what more difficult technology than the near 
breeder tyiies, will be more expensive to con- 
struct. The near breeder reactor types, after 
all, are built on technology closer at hand. 
The operating costs of the low-gain breeder 
and the near breeder reactors based on jires- 
ent uranium fuel prices are not too different. 

These near breeder and breeder reactors, 
from a simple economic viewpoint, all 
promise to have remarkably low operating 
costs reflecting efficient fuel cycles. This also 
indicates that there is some incentive for de- 
veloping these advanced reactors regardless 
of whether the price of uranium should in- 
crease — for they may be more economical 
than current types. 

Of importance from a national and world- 
wide viewpoint is the built-in insurance 
policy which one can purchase with these 
near breeder reactors and breeder reactors. 
This insurance policy is reflected in the insen- 
sitivity of the total generating cost to the 
price of natural uranium. Doubling the price 
of natural uranium increases the generating 
costs of the near breeder reactors about two- 
tenths of a mill per kilowatt hour or less, and 
of the fast breeders perhaps one-tenth of a 
mill or even less. The fast breeder reactor, in 
fact, may prove so efficient that ore costing 
$100 or more per pound of UaOs, available in 
virtually unlimited quantities, could still be 
used without a sizable economic penalty. 

One other important consideration that 
must be borne in mind in analyzing the 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


future trend of reactor development and its 
impact on nuclear fuel resources and the 
economy of electric power generation is the 
specific power of these future reactors. The 
specific power, that is, the power generated 
per kilogram of fuel placed in the reactor, 
can perhaps be viewed more simply in terms 
of the inventory of fuel required by a given 
size reactor. The higher the specific power, 
the lower the inventoiy. A low inventoiy has 
the effect of lowering the generating costs 
because the fuel carrying charges are less; 
that is, less capital funds are tied up in fuel 
inventory. Further, considering a breeder re- 
actor economy, a smaller reactor inventory 
affects the doubling time, that is, the time re- 
quired before a breeder reactor could refuel 
a carbon copy of itself. Also a smaller reactor 
inventory in any type of nuclear plant means 
that the resource requirements are less. 
Therefore, there is considerable incentive to 
develop near breeders and breeder reactors 
with high specific power and therefore low 
fuel inventoi-y requii'ements. 

Any future reactor economy will probably 
be a mixed reactor economy. We will prob- 
ably always have several types of reactors, 
with new reactor construction determined, 
among other factors, by the projected rate of 
growth of electric power demands, the price 
of natural uranium, and the price of bred 
fissionable material at the time the decision 
to go ahead with a reactor unit is made. 

Large-Scale Plutonium Production 

In conclusion, let me focus on an important 
point: the plethora of fissionable material. 
Whether or not near breeder reactors and 
breeder reactors are, in fact, developed, built, 
and operated, significant amounts of fission- 
able materials, especially plutonium, will be 
bred throughout the world. And, as you know, 
plutonium can be used as the explosive in- 
gredient of nuclear weapons. Figure 6 sum- 
marizes the cumulative quantities of plu- 
tonium that would be produced by the years 
1980 and 2000 — astonishing amounts indeed. 
This plutonium will be produced throughout 








the world by 1980, if our projections are cor- 
rect, at the rate of more than 100 kilograms 
a day! In other words, material will be pro- 
duced over the face of the globe sufficient for 
the potential production of a substantial 
amount of the world's electrical power — or, 
alternatively, sufficient for tens of nuclear 
weapons a day. 

The cumulative figures are striking: We 
calculate that the worldwide stock of plu- 
tonium by 1970 will be 10,000 kilograms. By 
1980 this will have increased almost twenty- 
fold— to 180,000 kilograms. Just 20 years 
later this figure will have mounted to the 
almost unbelievable total of 4 million kilo- 
grams ! 

In the light of this, there are some who 
would say that the only rational course is to 
bring an abrui^t and complete halt to the de- 
velopment of nuclear power here and now, 
that the price we pay for a little additional 
energy is much too high for the risk of nu- 
clear annihilation, and that no adequate 
means of control can be developed to insure, 
in fact, that these nuclear fuels will not be 

But most of us know that such thinking is 
not fully realistic. Even in the early days of 
nuclear development, while there were some i 
who felt we could hold back all our infonna- 
tion and discoveries on this new form of 
energy, thus keeping others from obtaining 
nuclear weapons, most of us knew that it was 
only a matter of time before other countries 



could achieve a nuclear capability independ- 
ently of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 
the United King-dom. The major seci'et of the 
atomic bomb was, of course, that it worked — 
and this had been revealed to the world. 
Many countries of the world had their own 
supplies of natural uranium and, ])erhaps 
more important, their own scientists. We 
also considered that if we failed to cooperate 
in sharing: our peaceful nuclear technology 
and nuclear materials, there would be other 
countries which might be willing to provide 
nuclear materials and technology without a 
firm assurance as to their eventual peaceful 
end use. 

Choosing, therefore, a more positive and 
constructive approach, the task has thus be- 
come not a matter of forbidding the further 
spread of nuclear science but rather one of 
helping one another to develop the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy under conditions 
which assure the peaceful use of the nuclear 
equipment and materials which are supplied. 

An org'anization already playing a very 
significant role in guaranteeing that the 
peaceful atom will remain peaceful through- 
out the world is an agency whose existence is 
hardly known to the general public. This 
organization is the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), with its headquar- 
ters in Vienna and its current membership 
of 96 nations, with 3 additional member na- 
tions about to be admitted. We have in the 
work of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency perhaps the forerunner of a fully in- 
ternational safeguards and control system. 
The essence of this system lies in the right to 
inspect facilities and materials supplied 
through international agreement. Such in- 
spections are carried out by IAEA interna- 
tional inspection teams at facilities in 
countries which have agreed to accept inter- 
national safeguards. 

In addition to its present activities relat- 
ing to the inspection of reactors, the IAEA 
has recently considered and developed appro- 
priate safeguards and controls for chemical 
reprocessing plants to assure that none of the 
materials separated and purified in these 
plants are diverted to nonpeaceful uses. 

I am hopeful that the future will show a 
continued increase in the application of these 
IAEA safeguards and controls and that 
eventually we may have a worldwide system 
of safeguards and controls under which all 
nations will be able to develop and share the 
peaceful atom free from the fear of a poten- 
tial nuclear threat. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


The Work of the 21st Session of the U.N. General Assembly 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ' 

At the conclusion of the 21st General 
Assembly of the United Nations it is fitting 
that its actions should be evaluated in the 
light of the only meaningful standard: the 
purposes of the charter and, above all, the 
cause of peace. 

Judged by this standard, the record of the 
session — and of the Security Council during 
the same period — shows many constructive 
achievements and some regrettable short- 

In addition to the specific actions discussed 
below, the session was also significant for its 
atmosphere. Issues raised for propaganda 
purposes did not make much headway. A 
searching for bridges between East and West 
was more evident this year than a year ago 
or in some previous sessions. The strength of 
this apparent desire for greater cooperation 
and accommodation must of course be tested 
by concrete action. Some evidences of posi- 
tive action were present in this session, and 
we hoije to see more in times to come. 

1. The Secretary-General 

A highly important achievement was the 
unanimous reappointment of U Thant as 
Secretary-General for a second 5-year term. 
His willingness to serve again in response 
to the unanimous wish of the membership 
demonstrated anew his devotion to the ideals 
of the organization. It is greatly to be hoped 
that the resounding new vote of confidence 

> Released at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 21 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 5044). 


in him will enable him to apply those ideals 
with renewed effectiveness even to the most 
difl^cult problems confronting the interna- 
tional community. 

2. Viet-Nam 

The continued inability of the United Na- 
tions to work eff"ective]y in the conflict in 
Viet-Nam has been a failure not of the orga- 
nization but of key members and govern- 
ments which have been unwilling to consent 
to such action. We were encouraged by the 
fact that a majority of speakers who referred 
to Viet-Nam in the Assembly's general debate 
took note of our significant proposals of 
September 22 ^ and supported, as does the 
United States, discussions looking toward a 
peaceful settlement. We continue to hope the 
United Nations may play a more positive 
role. We especially hope that the Secretary- 
General will find it possible, in response to 
our appeal to him on Monday,' to help bring 
about discussions which could lead to a mu- 
tual cessation of hostilities and an honorable 

3. Outer Space 

A most significant Assembly action was 
the unanimous vote commending the outer 
space treaty and urging the widest possible 
adherence to it.^ The treaty was negotiated in 

^ Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518. 
' Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63. 
* For background, see ibid., p. 78 ; for text of the 
treaty, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952. 



the United Nations Outer Space Committee 
in Geneva and this autumn at the United Na- 
tions in New York. It is a pioneerinof exten- 
sion of international law into the newly 
entered realm of outer space. It embodies the 
most important aiTns control measure since 
the imrtial test ban treaty of 1963, as well as 
principles for peaceful cooperation in the ex- 
ploration and use of outer space, including- 
the moon and other celestial bodies. The con- 
clusion of this treaty at the present time is 
a major step tow^ard peace and an encourag- 
ing sign that the actions of nations, in the 
charter's words, can be harmonized in 
significant fields even while major discords 
in other fields remain unresolved. 

4. Nonproliferation 

It is greatly to be hojjed that the outer 
space treaty will quickly be followed by the 
conclusion of the long-sought nonprolifera- 
tion treaty, banning the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. The seriousness of the de- 
bate in the First Committee on this subject, 
and the resolution urging an early agree- 
ment,^ are hopeful auguries for this vitally 
important arms control measure, which we 
hope may pave the way for still further dis- 
armament agreements. 

5. Human Rights Covenants 

In a field equally important to peace — that 
of human rights — the General Assembly took 
another jiioneering step when it ovenvhelm- 
ingly approved two instruments long in the 
making: the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.'' The United States 
voted for these documents. Whatever their 
imperfections, they will be remembered in 
histoiy as the first major attempt by the 
community of nations to extend to the entire 
range of human rights the protection of bind- 
ing international agreements. The day is sure 
to come when no government can any longer 
ignore its obligation, implicit in the United 

Nations Charter, to respect at least the mini- 
mum standards of human rights which these 
covenants seek to define. 

6. South West Africa 

Of the numerous difiicult colonial issues 
that faced this Assembly session, the one on 
which the most important action was taken 
was the dispute over the territory of South 
West Africa. The Assembly created an Ad 
Hoc Committee for South West Africa to 
recommend practical means by which the ter- 
ritory can be administered so as to enable the 
people to exercise their right of self-deter- 

This resolution, adopted by a nearly unani- 
mous vote, was strongly supported by the 
United States as a realistic, practical, and 
important foi-ward step. We will serve on the 
new committee, which is to report by next 
April to a special session of the Assembly. 
The teiTus of the resolution, and the nearly 
unanimous support which it received, give 
grounds for hope that it may lead toward a 
solution of this thorny problem which will be 
both just and peaceful and will lie within the 
capacity of the United Nations. 

7. Southern Rhodesia 

The General Assembly considered the prob- 
lem of Southern Rhodesia, but it was the 
Security Council's unprecedented action in 
imposing mandatory sanctions on key expoi-ts 
and on oil imports into the territory that was 
the most significant.^ While no one can guar- 
antee the success of this undertaking in 
advance, the probabilities will be greatest if 
all of us undertake good-faith eflForts to make 
it succeed. I repeat that the United States will 
apply this decision with the full force of law. 
We hope it will contribute to a peaceful solu- 
tion and to the essential goal of assuring that 
all the people of Southern Rhodesia, not just 
the 6 percent of European ancestry, achieve 
the right to control their own destiny. 

^ For text of Resolution 2153, see ibid., Dec. 19, 
1966, p. 936. 
•^ See p. 107. 

' For text of Resolution 2145, see Bulletin of Dec. 
5, 1966, p. 871. 

* For background and text of a resolution, see ibid., 
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


8. Middle East 

Border disturbances in the Middle East 
also came before the Security Council twice 
during the session. Against a background of 
incursions into Israel stemming from Syrian 
territory, 10 members of the Council, includ- 
ing the United States, voted for a resolution 
asking Syria to strengthen its measures to 
prevent incidents in violation of the Anni- 
stice Agreement.9 Subsequently, again with 
our support, the Council firmly denounced 
the Israeli military action in November on 
Jordanian territory.^o On both occasions the 
United States expressed its opposition to all 
use of violence across existing Middle East- 
ern frontiers, regardless of the direction in 
which it occurs. 

We believe that the discussions demon- 
strated the Council's desire that all such vio- 
lence cease, and we regret that one of these 
resolutions met a Soviet veto, which con- 
tributed to instability in the area. Our own 
basic policy of respecting the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of all countries in 
the Middle East is unchanged and was reaf- 
firmed during these debates. 

9. Aden 

In the difficult case of Aden, the Assembly 
took another important step to assist in a 
peaceful settlement. The imminent with- 
drawal of Britain from Aden leaves the politi- 
cal future of the area uncertain. The Assem- 
bly, with full support from the United 
Kingdom, asked the Secretary-General to 
send a special mission to Aden to recommend 
practical steps for self-determination by the 
people, including possible United Nations 
participation in elections there. This step 
should help to stabilize an area which could 
easily become one of the world's danger 

10. other Issues in Africa 

Several other resolutions, while reflecting 
the Assembly's deep concern over colonialism 

« For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, 
see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969. 

'» For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, 
see ibid., p. 974. 

and denial of human rights in southern 
Africa — a concern which we share — were, we 
felt, unrealistic in method, and the United 
States was unable to give them full support. 
Sweeping resolutions which do not reflect a 
broad intention of practical support can only 
in the long nm diminish the influence of the 

11. Membership 

With the end of colonial rule in still fur- 
ther territories of Africa and the Caribbean, 
the General Assembly increased its member- 
ship to 122 with the admission of four new 
members: Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, and 
Barbados. The return of Indonesia to active 
participation in the United Nations was also 
widely welcomed. 

12. Chinese Representation 

This year, as previously, the Assembly 
gave thoughtful consideration to the issue of 
the representation of China in the United Na- 
tions. The proposal of Albania to expel the 
Republic of China in order to seat repre- 
sentatives of Communist China was rejected 
by a solid majority of 57 to 46. Once again, 
too, the Assembly affirmed, also by an in- 
creased majority, that any proposal to change 
the representation of China is an important 
question and thus, under the charter, requires 
a two-thirds vote for decision." 

Although the Italian study-committee pro- 
posal was not adoiJted, the United States sup- 
ported it, noting that its mandate did not 
prejudge the results of the proposed study. 

As I indicated in my statement to the As- 
sembly, the United States does not seek to 
isolate mainland China. We were prepared 
for the United Nations to ask Peking its atti- 
tude on key questions involved: whether it 
would drop its unacceptable demands, espe- 
cially for the expulsion of the Republic of 
China, and whether it would assume the 
obligations of the charter— including the 
obligation to refrain from the use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political 

" For a U.S. statement and texts of resolutions, 
see ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 926. 



independence of any state. Only Peking can 
answer these questions. 

13. Korea 

On another longstanding Asian issue, the 
Assembly clearly reaffirmed United Nations 
support for the peaceful unification of Korea 
through free U.N.-supervised elections and 
rebuffed a major Soviet effort to end the 
United Nations role in Korea. 

This double failure to act on the related 
issues of peacekeeping and financing must be 
set down among the chief shortcomings of 
this session. Great powers can take care of 
their own interests, but the ability of the 
United Nations to function as a keeper of the 
peace is vital to the interests of the great ma- 
jority of members, particularly the smaller 
ones, and, indeed, to the eflFectiveness of the 
organization under the charter. 

14. Peacekeeping 

Although a constructive Canadian resolu- 
tion on the highly important issue of peace- 
keeping was approved by a large majority 
in committee, the Assembly, to our regret, 
put off final action on this measure until its 
resumed session in April. The Canadian reso- 
lution's most important provisions are those 
reaffirming the role of the General Assembly 
in peacekeeping in circumstances where the 
Security Council is unable to act and sug- 
gesting a model scale for the broad and 
equitable sharing of the costs of expensive 
peacekeeping forces. 

We continue to believe that it is highly im- 
portant for the Assembly to take prompt and 
positive action on this question and not to 
allow the recalcitrance of a few members to 
impair the capacity of the United Nations to 
fulfill its peacekeeping role. 

A favorable development in peacekeeping 
was the much improved vote by which the As- 
sembly extended for another year the United 
Nations Emergency Force in the Middle 
East. This resolution provides for sharing 
the cost of UNEF along the lines of the model 
scale of assessments embodied in the 
Canadian resolution. 

15. Financing 

As of the date of this report, it is also to be 
regretted that the Soviet Union and France, 
both of whom have refused to pay assess- 
ments on past peacekeeping operations, have 
still not made the substantial voluntary con- 
tributions which were contemplated in the 
consensus arrived at last year and which are 
necessary to restore the United Nations to 
financial health. 

16. Population Growth 

For the first time, the General Assembly 
specifically recognized and took concrete ac- 
tion on the urgent and important problem of 
rapidly expanding pvopulations and their 
pressure both on limited food supplies and on 
other requirements of economic and social 
progress. At the request of member states. 
United Nations agencies are now authorized 
to train population control experts. The 
United States, which has a deep interest in 
world food supplies and in the development 
of nations, strongly supported this resolution. 
We hope its adoption will encourage nations 
in which this problem exists to move more 
energetically to solve it. 

17. iVIarine Resources 

On the initiative of the United States, the 
Assembly adopted without a dissenting vote 
a resolution to promote international coopera- 
tion in the study and development of marine 
resources, including very great untapped pro- 
tein resources of the oceans, which are likely 
to play an increasing part in the world's food 

18. Capital Development Resolution 

Over the dissenting votes of the United 
States and the other major capital-exporting 
countries, the Assembly adopted a resolution 
to establish a United Nations capital develop- 
ment fund which is supix)sed to begin func- 
tioning in 1968. Such a fund would duplicate 
longstanding and more soundly designed 
machinery for international capital assist- 
ance. It is most unlikely that enough funds 
will be forthcoming to put this fund into 
operation. This resolution demonstrates anew 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


that economic decisions taken even by larg-e 
majorities are sterile unless they include the 
concurrence of those who must furnish the 

19. International Law 

The Assembly acted to strengthen interna- 
tional law in two significant areas. It estab- 
lished a Commission on International Trade 
Law to unify and hannonize divergent na- 
tional laws in this important field. And it 
decided to convene a major international 
conference in 1968 and 1969 to draft a 
"treaty on treaties," a set of rules governing 
the law of treaties, their validity, interpre- 
tation, and effect. Both these steps are of 
great potential significance for the develop- 
ment of the rule of law among nations. 

IMCO Subcommittee Recommends 
New Passenger-Ship Standards 

Press release 300 dated December 23 

A further significant step has been taken 
in the improvement of international stand- 
ards for the safety of passeng-er ships: The 
Subcommittee on Fire Protection of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization (IMCO) has successfully com- 
pleted its assignment to recommend new fire 
safety standards for future ships before the 
end of 1966. This work supplements activi- 
ties which culminated in November on meas- 
ures to improve fire safety in existing ships 
following recent disastrous casualties caused 
by fire at sea.^ 

In its third and final session, held in 
London, the committee considered many 
specific problems in fire protection, including 
crew training and equipment for firefighting. 
ships cariying motor vehicles with fuel in 
their tanks, fire insulation of bulkheads and 
decks, and the precautions to be taken in the 
design of machinery spaces. 

Eighteen countries took part in the dis- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, 
p. 965. 

cussions. The chief product of the com- 
mittee's work is a body of proposed regula- 
tions on a new unified method of fire 
protection, detection, and extinction in 
passenger ships to be built in future. 

The proposed new method permits two 
vai'iants for fire protection, detection, and 
extinction in the accommodation and service 
spaces of future passenger ships. These 
variants may be described broadly as follows: 

(a) Within the main zone fire-resist- 
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided 
by incombustible fire-retarding divisions, and 
an automatic fire detection and fire alarm 
system will be provided. 

(b) Within the main zone fire-resist- 
ing divisions, such spaces will be subdivided 
by incombustible divisions which may have 
a lesser degree of fire integrity than is 
required for variant (a) above, and an auto- 
matic sprinkler and fire detection and fire 
alarm system will be provided. 

The committee agreed that each of these 
variants would provide an equal standard of 
fire safety in passenger ships of the future. 

The next stage will be consideration of 
these proposals by IMCO's Maritime Safety 
Committee in February 1967. Amendments 
adopted by the Committee would receive final 
consideration by the IMCO Assembly in 
October 1967. 

The United States delegation was headed 
by Comdr. Robert I. Price, U.S. Coast 

Present Travel Restrictions 
Extended Tlirough IVIarch 15 

Press release 301 dated December 23 

The State Department published in the 
Federal Register dated December 16 an 
amendment to the passport regulations ex- 
tending all present area restrictions until 
March 15, 1967, unless modified sooner. 

The United States maintains passport 
restrictions on travel by American citizens 
to five areas: Albania, Cuba, and the 



Communist-controlled areas of Korea, China, 
and Viet-Nam. 

American passports are not valid for 
travel to or through these areas. However, 
they may be specially validated by the De- 
pai'tment of State if the pros])ective traveler 
shows that the purpose of his trip justifies 
exception to tlie travel ban. The conditions 
for such approval are set forth in the new 
passport regulations published on October 
20, 1966.' 

The State Department can apply a travel 
ban to a given country in only three situa- 
tions: when that country is at war with the 
United States, when amied hostilities are in 
progress there, or when travel must be re- 
stricted in the national interest because it 
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. 
foreign affairs. 

In years past the State Department 
gi-anted only a few excei^tions to its travel 
restrictions. Such exceptions as were made 
generally were available only to applicants 
in a limited number of occupations and pro- 
fessions or for travel required for compelling 
humanitarian reasons. 

Gradually the policies have been revised 
and the eligible categories broadened. 

Now persons in certain professional and 
occupational categories are entitled to special 
validation of their passports when the pur- 
pose of their travel is directly related to their 
professional responsibilities. Included here 
are newsmen, doctors and scientists in public 
health, scholars with postgraduate degrees, 
and American Red Cross representatives. 

A second broad "discretionary" category 
exists. At his discretion, and judging each 
case individually on its merits, the Secretary 
of State may make exceptions to the travel 
restrictions for persons in cultural, athletic, 
commercial, educational, professional, or 
other fields or in public affairs, as well as 
for persons who will be writing or reporting 
for ])ublic media about their travels although 
they are not professional reporters. 

In these discretionary categories the State 

Department will take several factors into 
consideration in making its decision. One is 
the potential benefit to the United States of 
the pi-oposed visit, another the applicant's 
need to make the visit, and a third the cur- 
rent situation with regard to the area to be 

Similar categories and considerations are 
applied to resident aliens applying for per- 
mission to travel to a restricted area under 
22 CFR 46.5(e). 

Violation of the travel restrictions — that 
is, traveling- to one of the restricted areas 
without proper validation or without pass- 
port — is grounds for the State Department 
to revoke or cancel the violator's passport. 
Such infraction may also be punishable un- 
der Federal law (8 U.S.C. 1185 and/or 18 
U.S.C. 1544). 

No further passport will be issued to the 
violator until the Secretary of State receives 
formal assurance and is satisfied that the 
person will not again violate travel restric- 

The Department's ix)wer to regulate the 
passport field goes back to early days of our 
nation and has been i-eflected in congres- 
sional legislation for more than a century. 

The restrictions help to assure that ordi- 
nary American citizens will not become in- 
nocent victims of the hostile policies of for- 
eign powers in areas where our Government 
can offer little protection. 

These measures may also have important 
effects in promoting the U.S. national in- 
terest and achieving our foreign policy goals. 
For example, in accordance with the resolu- 
tions of the Organization of American 
States and the judgment of that body that 
the Communist regime in Cuba is openly 
committed to subversion in the hemisphere, 
U.S. policy toward Cuba has been one of 
political, economic, and social isolation. Our 
travel restrictions to this area have been 
an important element in this policy. 

Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 723. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 



U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Human Rights 

On December 16 the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly unanimously adopted the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the Interyiational 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with 
an optional protocol. Following is a state- 
ment made in Committee III (Social, 
Humanitarian and Cultural) by U.S. Alter- 
nate Representative Patricia R. Harris on 
December 12, together with the texts of the 
hrcman rights covenants. 


U.S. delegation press release 6008 

The United States delegation has voted in 
favor of the international covenants on 
human rights because we beheve that after 
20 years of consideration, the United Nations 
must, in 1966, move forward in promulgating 
a broadly acceptable codification of human 

The covenants represent the culmination of 
almost 20 years of work on what was de- 
signed to be an international bill of rights. 
The historical importance of the first step in 
that process — the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights ' — is well known. Concluding 
steps have been taken by our committee 

It is appropriate that preparation of the 
covenants has been concluded at the time 
when we are about to mark the 18th anni- 
versary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 

However, while the Universal Declaration 

is an authoritative statement of principle, it 
is not a binding legal agreement. The inter- 
national covenants on himian rights testify to 
our efforts to translate the principles set 
forth in the Universal Declaration into rights 
recognized in law. The importance of such 
efforts cannot be overemphasized if we are to 
fulfill the hope voiced by Eleanor Roosevelt 
when she said that the Universal Declaration 
might well become the "international Magna 
Carta of all mankind." ^ 

Nonetheless, the United States delegation 
has, from the beginning of our deliberations 
on these covenants, voiced doubts about the 
formulation of certain ideas, which in their 
final form continue to cause us grave con- 
cern. I would like to explain our votes and set 
forth our understanding of various provisions 
in the covenants. 

Throughout, the Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights speaks of "rights" 
that in fact are objectives which no govern- 
ment, no matter what its human and financial 
resources, could implement immediately upon 
assuming the obligation to insure them. This 
is recognized in ai-ticle 2, paragraph 1, which 
contains qualifying language to the effect 
that each state party "undertakes to take 
steps . . . with a view to achieving progres- 
sively the full realization of the rights recog- 
nized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means. . . ." 

Article 2, paragraph 1, also speaks of an 
undertaking by states parties "to take steps, 
individually and through international assist- 
ance and co-operation especially economic 

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1948, p. 752. 

■ Ibid., p. 751. 



and technical, to the maximum of its avail- 
able resources. . . ." My Government is 
liledged to international economic and social 
cooperation under the Charter of the United 
Nations, and it vigorously suppoi-ts efforts to 
cooperate with other nations, particularly 
with the developing nations. Its record in ex- 
tending assistance through international co- 
operation speaks for itself. Article 2, para- 
graph 1, however, might be construed by 
some to impose a foiTnal legal obligation upon 
the states jiarties to give economic, technical, 
or other assistance. We must reject such an 
interpretation. In our view, it is not appro- 
])riate to specify in a covenant on human 
rights and in such detail the forms which 
international cooperation might take. 

"Double Standard" Unacceptable 

The most discriminatory provision in the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights is article 2, paragraph 3, which was 
adopted by this committee by a vote of 41 in 
favor, 38 against, and 21 abstentions. Para- 
graph 3 provides that developing countries 
may determine the extent to which they 
would guarantee the economic rights recog- 
nized in the covenant to nonnationals. 

The covenant should not contain a pro- 
vision such as this, which authorizes in vir- 
tually unqualified terms discriminatory 
treatment of nonnationals by a certain group 
of states parties. Paragraph 3 creates a 
vague double standard between developing 
and developed countries and is difficult to 
reconcile with the spirit of universality of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The 
paragraph is also inconsistent with accepted 
principles of international law. It runs coun- 
ter to the undertaking of states parties in 
paragraph 2 of the same article "to guarantee 
that the rights enunciated in the present 
Covenant will be exercised without dis- 
crimination of any kind. . . ." 

Furthermore, paragraph 3 seems to imply 
that developed countries may not distinguish 
between their own nationals and aliens, 
whereas there is a generally accepted inter- 
national practice to make certain distinctions 

between nationals and aliens, with due i-e- 
gard to international law. 

If such a provision was to be included in 
the covenant, it should have recognized that 
all states have the right to make the deter- 
mination, not merely "developing countries" 
— a term, incidentally, not yet defined in the 
covenant — and should have reflected the re- 
quirement that states parties, in making such 
a determination, have due regard to inter- 
national law. 

Madam Chairman, I have already men- 
tioned the narrow vote by which paragraph 
3 of article 2 was adopted. My delegation 
voted against the paragraph in this commit- 
tee, and we still find it unacceptable. 

My delegation wishes also to point out that 
we have a continuing concern about article 
25 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which is repeated as article 
47 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. My Government fully supports the 
principle expressed therein, namely, that 
peiTnanent sovereignty over natural wealth 
and resources is an inherent right of all 
peoples and an essential element of the 
sovereign equality of states. However, article 
1, paragraph 2, of the covenant provides the 
effective substantive formulation on this 
question, and it cannot be impaired by article 
25, as many other delegations have said, in- 
cluding some of the sponsors of article 25. 
In addition, this repetition of the principle 
of article 1, paragraph 2, has no valid place 
among the implementation clauses. 

Madam Chairman, we joined other dele- 
gations in voting in favor of the civil and 
political covenant and the optional protocol 
annexed thereto. This vital document defines 
civil and political rights and obligations 
which states undertake to respect and insure 
upon becoming parties to the covenant. Its 
implementation machinery provides for in- 
suring respect for the covenant in three ways: 
states parties are to submit reports for con- 
sideration by the Human Rights Committee 
established under the covenant; a conciliation 
mechanism is available to assist in settling 
differences among states parties regarding 
respect for the covenant, provided that the 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


states parties concerned have made a declara- 
tion accepting the procedure; and the optional 
protocol enables a state paity to agree that 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction may 
submit communications to the Human Rights 
Committee established by the covenant re- 
garding alleged violations by that state of the 
rights set forth in the covenant. 

My delegation voted for the optional proto- 
col because we think that those states parties 
to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which are prepared to do so should have the 
opportunity to accept the right of individual 
petition beyond their national frontiers. 

Freedom of Speech in U.S. 

We applaud many of the provisions of the 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, par- 
ticularly the confii-mation of the right to lib- 
erty and security of person, the right to a free 
and fair trial, and freedom of association. 

On the other hand, article 20 of that 
covenant provides for the prohibition by law 
of "any propaganda for war" and "any advo- 
cacy of national, racial, or religious hatred 
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence." 

One of the principles embodied in the Uni- 
versal Declaration of Human Rights and in 
the covenant is freedom of speech. It is the 
view of the United States that article 20 of 
the covenant does not obligate a state to take 
any action that would i)rohibit its citizens 
from freely and fully expressing their views 
on any subject, no matter how obnoxious they 
may be or whether they are in accord with 
government policy or not. The United States 
Supreme Court has emphasized the distinc- 
tion between "advocacy of abstract doctrine 
and advocacy directed at promoting unlawi'ul 
action." In our view, therefore, a state should 
not act under article 20 unless the dissemina- 
tion of the obnoxious ideas mentioned therein 
is accompanied by, or threatens imminently 
to promote, illegal acts. Under our law, there 
must be an imminent danger of illegal action 
before speech becomes unlaud'ul. We have 
similar problems with articles 19 and 21, 
which fall below the standards established by 

our Constitution and the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights. 

Article 5, common to both covenants, ex- 
pressly provides that there shall be no re- 
striction upon or derogation from any of the 
fundamental human rights recognized or 
existing in any state on the pretext that the 
covenant does not recognize such rights or 
that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. My 
Government is particularly pleased with the 
inclusion of these provisions, since the consti- 
tutional protection of human rights in the 
United States is truly extensive and compre- 
hensive, in large measure l>ecause of the con- 
stant vigilance of our citizens. In respect of 
many rights guaranteed in the covenant, the 
standard established by law in the United 
States is higher than that in the covenant, 
and no action under this covenant could re- 
strict the enjoyment of any right enjoyed in 
the United States. 

The United States understands that none 
of the three instruments which the committee 
has adopted would impose an obligation on 
any state party to take measures not fully 
consistent with its own constitutional guaran- 
tees or with established constitutional 
framework of federal-state relationships. 

To summarize the position of my delega- 
tion, I would say simply that, in each instance 
where we question these instruments, our 
concern is that they do not go far enough in 
protecting the rights of all individuals. Our 
fear is that some may see opportunities for 
and support of discriminatory action detri- 
mental to the achievement of the very rights 
guaranteed in the covenants. 

Madam Chairman, there can be no doubt, 
whatever may be the concern which any of 
us may express about particular portions of 
these instruments, that we are participating 
in an historic moment. The adoption of these 
covenants and the protocol by this committee 
will stand as a watershed of human rights 

My delegation is convinced that we face a 
new day in which no government and no 
people can be free of a sense of obligation to 
meet the demands of the standards of human 
freedom enumerated in these covenants. The 



United States has from its inception imposed 
upon itself the highest standards, and we 
welcome the opportunity both to test and to 
enhance that standard in the context of the 
promulgation of the human rights covenants. 
Although none of our votes, including that 
of my delegation, carries any implication 
with regard to signature or ratification of the 
covenants, it can safely be said that the com- 
pletion of these covenants and, hopefully, 
their early entry into force will add a new 
dimension to the protection of the rights of 


International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 


The States Parties to the present Covenant, 

Considering that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world. 

Recognizing that these rights derive from the in- 
herent dignity of the human person. 

Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free 
human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want 
can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and 
cultural rights, as well as his civil and political 

Considering the obligation of States under the 
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and 

Realizing that the individual, having duties to 
other individuals and to the community to which he 
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, 

Agree upon the following articles: 

Part I 
Article 1 
1. ^11 peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of the right they freely determine their 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (Annex) ; adopted 
by the General Assembly on Dec. 16. 

political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. 

2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dis- 
pose of their natural wealth and resources without 
prejudice to any obligations arising out of interna- 
tional economic co-operation, based upon the princi- 
ple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of 

3. The States Parties to the pre.sent Covenant, in- 
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis- 
tration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, 
shall promote the realization of the right of self- 
determination, and shall respect that right, in con- 
formity with the provisions of the United Nations 

Part II 
Article 2 

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un- 
dertakes to take steps, individually and through in- 
ternational assistance and co-operation especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its avail- 
able resources, with a view to achieving progres- 
sively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative 

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated 
in the present Covenant will be exercised without 
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, na- 
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta- 

3. Developing countries, with due regard to human 
rights and their national economy, may determine 
to what extent they would guarantee the economic 
rights recognized in the present Covenant to non- 

Article 3 
The States Parties to the present Covenant under- 
take to ensure the equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural 
rights set forth in this Covenant. 

Article U 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog- 
nize that in the enjoyment of those rights provided 
by the State in conformity with the present Cove- 
nant, the State may subject such rights only to such 
limitations as are determined by law only in so far 
as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the 
general welfare in a democratic society. 

Article 5 
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter- 
preted as implying for any State, group or person, 
any right to engage in any activity or to perform 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
or freedoms recognized herein, or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres- 
ent Covenant. 

2. No restriction upon or derogation from any of 
the fundamental human rights recognized or existing 
in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regula- 
tions or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that 
the present Covenant does not recognize such rights 
or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 

Part III 

Article G 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right to work, which includes the right 
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by 
work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will 
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 

2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the 
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of 
this right shall include technical and vocational guid- 
ance and training programmes, policies and tech- 
niques to achieve steady economic, social and cul- 
tural development and full and productive employ- 
ment under conditions safeguarding fundamental 
political and economic freedoms to the individual. 

Article 7 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog- 
nize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just 
and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in 

(a) Remuneration which provides all workers as 
a minimum vdth: 

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work 
of equal value without distinction of any kind, in 
particular women being guaranteed conditions of 
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with 
equal pay for equal work ; and 

(ii) A decent living for themselves and their 
families in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Covenant; 

(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 

(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be pro- 
moted in his employment to an appropriate higher 
level, subject to no considerations other than those 
of seniority and competence; 

(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of 
working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as 
well as remuneration for public holidays. 

Article 8 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to ensure : 

(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions 
and join the trade union of his choice subject only 
to the rules of the organization concerned, for the 
promotion and protection of his economic and social 

interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exer- 
cise of this right other than those prescribed by law 
and which are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security or public order or 
for the protection of the rights and freedom of 

(b) The right of trade unions to establish na- 
tional federations or confederations and the right 
of the latter to form or join international trade- 
union organizations; 

(c) The right of trade unions to function freely 
subject to no limitations other than those pre- 
scribed by law and which are necessary in a demo- 
cratic society in the interests of national security or 
public order or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others; 

(d) The right to strike, provided that it is exer- 
cised in conformity with the laws of the particular 

2. This article shall not prevent the imposition of 
lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, or of the police, or of 
the administration of the State. 

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States 
Parties to the International Labour Convention of 
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Rights to Organize to take legislative measures 
which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a 
manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided 
for in that Convention. 

Article 9 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog- 
nize the right of everyone to social security includ- 
ing social insurance. 

Article 10 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recog- 
nize that: 

1. The widest possible protection and assistance 
should be accorded to the family, which is the nat- 
ural and fundamental group unit of society, particu- 
larly for its establishment and while it is responsible 
for the care and education of dependent children. 
Marriage must be entered into with the free consent 
of the intending spouses; 

2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers 
during a reasonable period before and after child- 
birth. During such period working mothers should 
be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social 
security benefits; 

3. Special measures of protection and assistance 
should be taken on behalf of all children and young 
persons without any discrimination for reasons of 
parentage or other conditions. Children and young 
persons should be protected from economic and social 
exploitation. Their employment in work harmful to 
their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely 
to hamper their normal development should be pun- 



ishable by law. States should also set age limits 
below which the paid employment of child labour 
should be prohibited and punishable by law. 

Article 11 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, includ- 
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, .and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions. The 
States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure 
the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-opera- 
tion based on free consent. 

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be 
free from hunger, shall take, individually and 
through international co-operation, the measures, in- 
cluding specific programmes, which are needed: 

(a) To improve methods of production, consei-va- 
tion and distribution of food by making full use of 
technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating 
knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by de- 
veloping or refoiTning agrarian systems in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and 
utilization of natural resources ; and 

(b) Take into account the problems of both food- 
importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure 
an equitable distribution of world food supplies in 
relation to need. 

Article 12 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health. 

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to 
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization 
of this right shall include those necessary for: 

(a) The provision for the reduction of the still- 
birth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child ; 

(b) The improvement of all aspects of environ- 
mental and industrial hygiene ; 

(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epi- 
demic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 

(d) The creation of conditions which would assure 
to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness. 

Article 13 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to education. They 
agree that education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense 
of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They fur- 
ther agree that education shall enable all persons to 
participate efltectively in a free society, promote un- 
derstanding, tolerance and friendship among all 

nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, 
and further the activities of the United Nations for 
the maintenance of peace. 

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize that, with a view to achieving the full 
realization of this right : 

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and 
available free to all ; 

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, 
including technical and vocational secondary educa- 
tion, shall be made generally available and accessible 
to all by every appropriate means, and in particular 
by the progressive introduction of free education; 

(c) Higher education shall be made equally ac- 
cessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every 
appropriate means, and in particular by the pro- 
gressive introduction of free education; 

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged 
or intensified as far as possible for those persons 

"who have not received or completed the whole period 
of their primary education ; 

(e) The development of a system of schools at all 
levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellow- 
ship system shall be established, and the material 
conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously im- 

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents 
and, when applicable, legal guardians, to choose for 
their children schools other than those established 
by the public authorities which conform to such 
minimum educational standards as may be laid down 
or approved by the State and to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity 
with their own convictions. 

4. No part of this article shall be construed so as 
to interfere with the liberty of individuals and 
bodies to establish and direct educational institu- 
tions, subject always to the observance of the prin- 
ciples set forth in paragraph 1 and to the require- 
ment that the education given in such institutions 
shall conform to such minimum standards as may 
be laid down by the State. 

Article H 

Each State Party to the present Covenant which, 
at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able 
to secure in its metropolitan territory or other ter- 
ritories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary 
education, free of charge, undertakes, within two 
years, to work out and adopt a detailed plan of 
action for the progressive implementation, within 
a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the 
plan, of the principle of compulsory education free 
of charge for all. 

Article 15 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone : 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


(a) To take part in cultural life; 

(b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications; 

(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he is the 

2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to 
the present Covenant to achieve the full realization 
of this right shall include those necessary for the 
conservation, the development and the diffusion of 
science and culture. 

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research and creative activity. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the benefits to be derived from the encour- 
agement and development of international contacts 
and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields. 

Part IV 

Article 16 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit in confoiTnity with this part of 
the Covenant reports on the measures which they 
have adopted and the progress made in achieving 
the observance of the rights recognized herein. 

2. (a) All reports shall be submitted to the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations who shall trans- 
mit copies to the Economic and Social Council for 
consideration in accordance with the provisions of 
the present Covenant. 

(b) The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall also transmit to the specialized agencies copies 
of the reports, or any relevant parts therefrom, 
from States Parties to the present Covenant which 
are also members of these specialized agencies in so 
far as these reports, or parts therefrom, relate to 
any matters which fall within the responsibilities of 
the said agencies in accordance with their constitu- 
tional instniments. 

Article 17 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
shall furnish their reports in stages, in accordance 
with a programme to be established by the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council within one year of the 
entry into force of the present Covenant after con- 
sultation with the States Parties and the specialized 
agencies concerned. 

2. Reports may indicate factors and difiicultios 
affecting the degree of fulfilment of obligations 
under the present Covenant. 

3. Where relevant information has previously been 
furnished to the United Nations or to any special- 
ized ageticy by any State Party to the i)resent Co\- 
enant it will not be necessary to reproduce that 
infoi-mation but a precise reference to the informa- 
tion so furnished will .suffice. 

Article 18 
Pur.suant to its re.sponsibilities under the Charter 
in the field of human rights and fundamental free- 
doms, the Economic and Social Council may make 
arrangements with the specialized agencies in re- 
spect of their reporting to it on the progress made 
in achieving the observance of the provisions of the 
present Covenant falling within the scope of their 
activities. These reports may include particulars of 
decisions and recommendations on such implementa- 
tion adopted by their competent organs. 

Article 19 
The Economic and Social Council may transmit to 
the Commission on Human Rights for study and 
general recommendation or as appropriate for infor- 
mation the reports concerning human rights sub- 
mitted by States in accordance with articles 16 and 
17, and those concerning human rights submitted by 
the specialized agencies in accordance with arti- 
cle 18. 

Article 20 
The States Parties to the present Covenant and 
the specialized agencies concerned may submit com- 
ments to the Economic and Social Council on any 
general recommendation under article 19 or ref- 
erence to such general recommendation in any report 
of the Commission or any documentation referred to 

Article 21 
The Economic and Social Council may submit 
from time to time to the General Assembly reports 
with recommendations of a general nature and a 
summary of the information received from the 
States Parties to the present Covenant and the spe- 
cialized agencies on the measures taken and the 
progress made in achieving general observance of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 

Article 22 
The Economic and Social Council may bring to 
the attention of other organs of the United Nations, 
their subsidiary organs and specialized agencies con- 
cerned with furnishing technical assistance, any 
matters arising out of the reports referred to in 
this part of the present Covenant which may assist 
such bodies in deciding each within its field of com- 
petence, on the advisability of international meas- 
ures likely to contribute to the effective progressive 
implementation of the present Covenant. 

Article 23 
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree 
that international action for the achievement of the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant includes 
such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the 
adoption of i-ecommendalions, the furnishing of tech- 
nical assistance and the holding of regional meetings 
and technical meetings for the purpose of consulta- 



tion and study organized in conjunction with the 
Governments concerned. 

Article 3i 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter- 
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of 
the specialized agencies which define the respective 
responsibilities of the various organs of the United 
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard to 
the matters dealt with in the present Covenant. 

Article 25 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter- 
preted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples 
to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural 
wealth and resources. 

Part V 

Article 26 

1. The present Covenant is open for signature by 
any State Member of the United Nations or member 
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State 
Party to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, and by any other State which has been 
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions to become a party to the present Covenant. 

2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. 
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

3. The present Covenant shall be open to accession 
by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this 

4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall infoi-m all States which have signed the pres- 
ent Covenant or acceded to it of the deposit of each 
instrument of ratification or accession. 

Article 27 

1. The present Covenant shall enter into force 
three months after the date of the deposit with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or instrument 
of accession. 

2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant 
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty-fifth 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession, 
the present Covenant shall enter into force three 
months after the date of the deposit of its own in- 
strument of ratification or instrument of accession. 

Article 28 
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex- 
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi- 
tations or exceptions. 

Article 29 
1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may 

propose an amendment and file it with the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. The Secretary-Gen- 
eral of the United Nations shall thereupon commu- 
nicate any proposed amendments to the States 
Parties to the present Covenant with a request that 
they notify him whether they favour a conference of 
States Parties for the purpose of considering and 
voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least 
one third of the States Parties favours such a con- 
ference the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene the conference under the auspices of 
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a 
majority of the States Parties present and voting 
at the conference shall be submitted to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations for approval. 

2. Amendments shall come into force when they 
have been approved by the General Assembly and 
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. 

3. When amendments come into force they shall 
be binding on those States Parties which have ac- 
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound 
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any 
earlier amendment which they have accepted. 

Article 30 
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti- 
cle 26, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall infoiTn all States referred to 
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following 
particulars : 

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under 
article 26; 

(b) The date of the entry into force of the present 
Covenant under article 27 and the date of the entry 
into force of any amendments under article 29. 

Article 31 

1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the United Nations. 

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove- 
nant to all States referred to in article 26. 

International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 

The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles 
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, 
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world, 

Recognizing that these rights derive from the 
inherent dignity of the human person, 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


Recognizing that, in accordance with the Univer- 
sal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free 
human beings enjoying civil and political freedom 
and freedom from fear and want can only be 
achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone 
may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as 
his economic, social and cultural rights. 

Considering the obligation of States under the 
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and 

Realizing that the individual, having duties to 
other individuals and to the community to which he 
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the 
promotion and observance of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, 

Agree upon the following articles : 

Part I 
Article 1 

1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. 
By virtue of the right they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. 

2. All peoples may, for their ovm ends, freely 
dispose of their natural wealth and resources with- 
out prejudice to any obligations arising out of inter- 
national economic co-operation, based upon the prin- 
ciple of mutual benefit, and international law. In no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of 

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, in- 
cluding those having responsibility for the adminis- 
tration of Non-Self-Goveraing and Trust Territories, 
shall promote the realization of the right of self- 
determination, and shall respect that right, in con- 
formity with the provisions of the United Nations 

Part II 

Article 2 

1. Each State Party to the present Covenant un- 
dertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, with- 
out distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, na- 
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta- 

2. Where not already provided for by existing 
legislative or other measures, each State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes to take the neces- 
sary steps, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and with the provisions of the present 
Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other meas- 
ures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant. 

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant un- 

(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity ; 

(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a 
remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative au- 
thorities, or by any other competent authority pro- 
vided for by the legal system of the State, and to 
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 

(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted. 

Article 3 
The States Parties to the present Covenant under- 
take to ensure the equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set 
forth in the present Covenant. 

Article i 

1. In time of public emergency which threatens 
the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the pres- 
ent Covenant may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the present Covenant to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situ- 
ation, provided that such measures are not incon- 
sistent with their other obligations under interna- 
tional law and do not involve discrimination solely 
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion 
or social origin. 

2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 
1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this 

3. Any State Party to the present Covenant avail- 
ing itself of the right of derogation shall inform 
immediately the other States Parties to the present 
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations of the provisions 
from which it has derogated and of the reasons by 
which it was actuated. A further communication 
shall be made, through the same intermediary, on 
the date on which it terminates such derogation. 

Article 5 

1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be inter- 
preted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the pres- 
ent Covenant. 

2. There shall be no restriction upon or deroga- 
tion from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any State Party to the 
present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, regu- 
lations or custom on the pretext that the present 
Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it 
recognizes them to a lesser extent. 



Part III 
Article 6 

1. Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 

2. In countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for 
the most serious crimes in accordance with law in 
force at the time of the commission of the crime and 
not contrary to the provisions of the present Cove- 
nant and to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty 
can only be carried out pursuant to a final judge- 
ment rendered by a competent court. 

3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime 
of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this 
article shall authorize any State Party to the pres- 
ent Covenant to derogate in any way from any obli- 
gation assumed under the provisions of the Conven- 
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide. 

4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right 
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. 
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence 
of death may be granted in all cases. 

5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below eighteen years 
of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant 

6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay 
or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by 
any State Party to the present Covenant. 

Article 7 

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 

particular, no one shall be subjected without his 

free consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 

Article 8 

1. No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and 
the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohibited. 

2. No one shall be held in servitude. 

3. (a) No one shall be required to perform forced 
or compulsory labour ; 

(b) The preceding sub-paragraph shall not be 
held to preclude in countries where imprisonment 
with hard labour may be imposed as a punishment 
for a crime, the performance of hard labour in pur- 
suance of a sentence to such punishment by a com- 
petent court; 

(c) For the purpose of this paragraph the term 
"forced or compulsory labour" shall not include: 

(i) Any work or service, not referred to in sub- 
paragraph (b), normally required of a person who 
is under detention in consequence of a lawful order 
of a court, or of a person during conditional release 
from such detention ; 

(ii) Any service of a military character and, in 
countries where conscientious objection is recognized, 
any national service required by law of conscientious 

(iii) Any service exacted in cases of emergency or 
calamity threatening the life or well-being of the 
community ; 

(iv) Any work or service which forms part of 
normal civil obligations. 

Article 9 

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security 
of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance 
with such procedures as are established by law. 

2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at 
the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and 
shall be promptly informed of any charges against 

3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or 
other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial 
power and shall be entitled to trial within a reason- 
able time or to release. It shall not be the general 
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in 
custody, but release may be subject to guarantees 
to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial 
proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution 
of the judgement. 

4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest 
or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings 
before a court, in order that such court may decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful. 

5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful 
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right 
to compensation. 

Article 10 

1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. 

2. (a) Accused persons shall, save in exceptional 
circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons, 
and shall be subject to separate treatment appropri- 
ate to their status as unconvicted persons; 

(b) Accused juvenile persons shall be separated 
from adults and brought as speedily as possible for 

3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treat- 
ment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall 
be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Ju- 
venile offenders shall be segregated from adults and 
be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and 
legal status. 

Article 11 
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground 
of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


Article 12 

1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a 
State shall, within that territory, have the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his resi- 

2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, 
including his own. 

3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject 
to any restrictions except those which are provided 
by law, are necessary to protect national security, 
public order ("ordre public"), public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and 
are consistent with the other rights recognized in 
the present Covenant. 

4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the 
right to enter his own country. 

Article 13 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State 
Party to the present Covenant may be expelled 
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached 
in accordance with law and shall, except where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise 
require, be allowed to submit the reasons against 
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and 
be represented for the purpose before, the compe- 
tent authority or a person or persons especially 
designated by the competent authority. 

Article H 

1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations 
in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. The Press and 
the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial 
for reasons of morals, public order ("ordre public") 
or national security in a democratic society, or when 
the interest of the private lives of the parties so re- 
quires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; 
but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or 
in a .suit at law shall be made public except where 
the interest of juveniles otherwise requires or the 
proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the 
guardianship of children. 

2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall 
have the right to be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 

3. In the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone shall be entitled to the follow- 
ing minimum guarantees, in full equality: 

(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a 
language which he understands of the nature and 
cause of the charge against him ; 

(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the 
preparation of his defence and to communicate with 

counsel of his own choosing; 

(c) To be tried without undue delay; 

(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend 
himself in person or through legal assistance of his 
own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have 
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal 
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the 
interests of justice so require, and without payment 
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient 
means to pay for it; 

(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses 
against him and to obtain the attendance and ex- 
amination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 

(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter 
if he cannot understand or speak the language used 
in court; 

(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself, 
or to confess guilt. 

4. In the case of juveniles, the procedure shall be 
such as will take account of their age and the de- 
sirability of promoting their rehabilitation. 

5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the 
right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed 
by a higher tribunal according to law. 

6. When a person has by a final decision been 
convicted of a criminal offence and when subse- 
quently his conviction has been reversed or he has 
been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly 
discovered fact shows conclusively that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has 
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction 
shall be compensated according to law, unless it is 
proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact 
in time is wholly or partly attributable to him. 

7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
again for an offence for which he has already been 
finally convicted or acquitted in accordance vnth the 
law and penal procedure of each country. 

Article 15 

1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal 
offence on account of any act or omission which did 
not constitute a criminal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was commit- 
ted. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the 
one that was applicable at the time when the crimi- 
nal offence was committed. If, subsequently to the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law 
for the imposition of a lighter penalty, the offender 
shall benefit thereby. 

2. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial 
and punishment of any person for any act or omis- 
sion which, at the time when it was committed, was 
criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations. 

Article 16 
Evei-yone shall have the right to recognition every- 
where as a person before the law. 



Article 17 

1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or un- 
lawful interference with his privacy, family, home 
or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
law against such interference or attacks. 

Article 18 

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom either individually 
or in community with others and in public or pri- 
vate, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would 
impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice. 

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs 
may be subject only to such limitations as are pre- 
scribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others. 

4. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to have respect for the liberty of par- 
ents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to ensure 
the religious and moral education of their children 
in confoiinity with their own convictions. 

Article 19 

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions 
without interference. 

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writ- 
ing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice. 

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in the 
foregoing paragraph carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall be such only as 
are provided by law and are necessary, (1) for re- 
spect of the rights or reputations of others, (2) for 
the protection of national security or of public order 
("ordre public"), or of public health or morals. 

Article 20 

1. Any pi'opaganda for war shall be prohibited by 

2. Any advocacy of national, racial, or religious 
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law. 

Article 21 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recog- 
nized. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise 
of this right other than those imposed in conformity 
with the law and which are necessary in a demo- 
cratic society in the interests of national security or 

public safety, public order ("ordre public"), the pro- 
tection of public health or morals or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. 

Article 22 

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to foiTn 
and join trade unions for the protection of his 

2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise 
of this right other than those prescribed by law and 
which are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security or public safety, public 
order ("ordre public"), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent 
the imposition of lawful re.strictions on members of 
the anned forces and of the police in their exercise 
of this right. 

3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States 
Parties to the International Labour Convention of 
1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise to take legislative measures 
which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such 
a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided 
for in the Convention. 

Article 23 

1. The family is the natural and fundamental 
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State. 

2. The right of men and women of marriageable 
age to marry and to found a family shall be recog- 

3. No marriage shall be entered into without the 
free and full consent of the intending spouses. 

4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall 
take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights 
and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, dur- 
ing marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of 
dissolution, provision shall be made for the neces- 
sary protection of any children. 

Article 2J^ 

1. Every child shall have, wthout any discrimina- 
tion as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, na- 
tional or social origin, property or birth, the right 
to such measures of protection as required by his 
status as a minor, on the part of his family, the 
society and the State. 

2. Every child shall be registered immediately 
after birth and shall have a name. 

3. Evei-y child has the right to acquire a na- 

Article 25 
Every citizen shall have the right and the oppor- 
tunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


directly or through freely chosen representatives; 

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suf- 
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guarantee- 
ing the free expression of the will of the electors; 

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, 
to public service in his country. 

Article S6 
All persons are equal before the law and are en- 
titled without any discrimination to equal protection 
of the law. In this respect the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons 
equal and effective protection against discrimination 
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status. 

Article 27 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or lin- 
guistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in com- 
munity with the other members of their group, to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, or to use their own language. 

Part IV 

Article 28 

1. There shall be established a Human Rights 
Committee (hereafter referred to in the present 
Covenant as "the Committee"). It shall consist of 
eighteen members and shall carry out the functions 
hereinafter provided. 

2. The Committee shall be composed of nationals 
of the States Parties to the present Covenant who 
shall be persons of high moral character and recog- 
nized competence in the field of human rights, con- 
sideration being given to the usefulness of the par- 
ticipation of some persons having legal experience. 

3. The members of the Committee shall be elected 
and shall serve in their personal capacity. 

Article 29 

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected 
by secret ballot from a list of persons possessing the 
qualifications prescribed in article 28 and nominated 
for the purpose by the States Parties to the present 

2. Each State Party to the present Covenant may 
nominate not more than two persons. These persons 
shall be nationals of the nominating State. 

3. A person shall be eligible for renomination. 

Article SO 

1. The initial election shall be held no later than 
six months after the date of the entry into force of 
the present Covenant. 

2. At least four months before the date of each 
election of the Committee, other than an election to 
fill a vacancy declared in accordance with article 34, 

the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
address a written invitation to the States Parties to 
the present Covenant to submit their nominations 
for membership of the Committee within three 

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all the 
persons thus nominated, with an indication of the 
States Parties which have nominated them, and 
shall submit it to the States Parties to the present 
Covenant no later than one month before the date 
of each election. 

4. Elections of the members of the Committee 
shall be held at a meeting of the States Parties to 
the present Covenant convened by the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations at the Headquarters 
of the United Nations. At that meeting, for which 
two thirds of the States Parties to the present Cove- 
nant shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected 
to the Committee shall be those nominees who obtain 
the largest number of votes and an absolute major- 
ity of the votes of the representatives of States 
Parties present and voting. 

Article 31 

1. The Committee may not include more than one 
national of the same State. 

2. In the election of the Committee consideration 
shall be given to equitable geographical distribution 
of membership and to the representation of the dif- 
ferent forms of civilization as well as of the princi- 
pal legal systems. 

Article 32 

1. The members of the Committee shall be elected 
for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for 
re-election if renominated. However, the terms of 
nine of the members elected at the first election 
shall expire at the end of two years; immediately 
after the first election the names of these nine mem- 
bers shall be chosen by lot by the Chairman of the 
meeting referred to in paragraph 4 of article 30. 

2. Elections at the expiry of oflice shall be held 
in accordance with the preceding articles of this 
part of the present Covenant. 

Article 33 

1. If, in the unanimous opinion of the other mem- 
bers, a member of the Committee has ceased to 
carry out his functions for any cause other than 
absence of a temporary character, the ChaiiTnan of 
the Committee shall notify the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations who shall then declare the seat 
of that member to be vacant. 

2. In the event of the death or the resignation of 
a member of the Committee, the Chairman shall im- 
mediately notify the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations who shall declare the seat vacant from the 
date of death or the date on which the resignation 
takes effect. 



Article Si 

1. When a vacancy is declared in accordance with 
article 33 and if the temi of office of the member to 
be replaced does not expire within six months of the 
declaration of the vacancy, the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations shall notify each of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant which may within 
two months submit nominations in accordance with 
article 29 for the purpose of filling the vacancy. 

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the per- 
sons thus nominated and shall submit it to the 
States Parties to the present Covenant. The election 
to fill the vacancy shall then take place in accord- 
ance with the relevant provisions of this part of the 
present Covenant. 

3. A member of the Committee elected to fill a 
vacancy declared in accordance with article 33 shall 
hold ofl^ce for the remainder of the term of the 
member who vacated the seat on the Committee 
under the provisions of that article. 

Article 35 

The members of the Committee shall, with the 
approval of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, receive emoluments from United Nations 
resources on such terms and conditions as the Gen- 
eral Assembly may decide having regard to the 
importance of the Committee's responsibilities. 

Article 36 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
provide the necessary staff and facilities for the 
eflFective perfonnance of the functions of the Com- 
mittee under this Covenant. 

Article 37 

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee at 
the Headquarters of the United Nations. 

2. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall 
meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules 
of procedure. 

3. The Committee shall normally meet at the 
Headquarters of the United Nations or at the United 
Nations Office at Geneva. 

Article 38 
Every member of the Committee shall, before tak- 
ing up his duties, make a solemn declaration in open 
committee that he will perform his functions im- 
partially and conscientiously. 

Article 39 

1. The Committee shall elect its officers for a term 
of two years. They may be re-elected. 

2. The Committee shall establish its own rules of 
procedure, but these rules shall provide, inter alia, 

(a) Twelve members shall constitute a quorum; 

(b) Decisions of the Committee shall be made by 
a majoi-ity vote of the members present. 

Article UO 

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant 
undertake to submit reports on the measures they 
have adopted which give effect to the rights recog- 
nized herein and on the progress made in the enjoy- 
ment of those rights; (a) within one year of the 
entry into force of the present Covenant for the 
States Parties concerned and (b) thereafter when- 
ever the Committee so requests. 

2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations who shall transmit 
them to the Committee for consideration. Reports 
shall indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, 
affecting the implementation of the present Cove- 

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
may after consultation with the Committee transmit 
to the specialized agencies concerned copies of such 
parts of the reports as may fall within their field of 

4. The Committee shall study the reports submit- 
ted by the States Parties to the present Covenant. 
It shall transmit its reports and such general com- 
ments as it may consider appropriate to the States 
Parties. The Committee may also transmit to the 
Economic and Social Council these comments along 
with the copies of the reports it has received from 
States Parties to the present Covenant. 

5. The States Parties to the pi-esent Covenant may 
submit to the Committee observations on any com- 
nients that may be made in accordance with para- 
graph 4 of this article. 

Article Ul 
1. A State Party to the present Covenant may at 
any time declare under this article that it recognizes 
the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State 
Party claims that another State Party is not ful- 
filling its obligations under the present Covenant. 
Communications under this article may be received 
and considered only if submitted by a State Party 
which has made a declaration recognizing in regard 
to itself the competence of the Committee. No com- 
munication shall be received by the Committee if it 
concerns a State Party which has not made such a 
declaration. Communications received under this ar- 
ticle shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
following procedure: 

(a) If a State Party to the present Covenant con- 
siders that another State Party is not giving effect 
to the provisions of the present Covenant, it may, 
by written communication, bring the matter to the 
attention of that State Party. Within three months 
after the receipt of the communication, the receiving 
State shall afford the State which sent the commu- 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


nication an explanation or any other statement in 
writing clarifying the matter, which should include, 
to the extent possible and pertinent, reference to 
domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, 
or available in the matter. 

(b) If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfac- 
tion of both States Parties concerned within six 
months after the receipt by the receiving State of 
the initial communication, either State shall have 
the right to refer the matter to the Committee, by 
notice given to the Committee and to the other 

(c) The Committee shall deal with a matter re- 
ferred to it only after it has ascertained that all 
available domestic remedies have been invoked and 
exhausted in the matter, in conformity with the 
generally recognized principles of international law. 
This shall not be the rule where the application of 
the remedies is unreasonably prolonged. 

(d) The Committee shall hold closed meetings 
when examining communications under this article. 

(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph 
(c), the Committee shall make available its good 
offices to the States Parties concerned with a view 
to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis 
of respect for human rights and fundamental free- 
doms as recognized in this Covenant. 

(f) In any matter referred to it, the Committee 
may call upon the States Parties concerned, referred 
to in sub-paragraph (b), to supply any relevant 

(g) The States Parties concerned, referred to in 
sub-paragraph (b), shall have the right to be repre- 
sented when the matter is being considered in the 
Committee and to make submissions orally and/or 
in writing. 

(h) The Committee shall, within twelve months 
after the date of receipt of notice under sub-para- 
graph (b), submit a report: 

(i) If a solution within the terms of sub-para- 
graph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine 
its report to a brief statement of the facts and of 
the solution reached ; 

(ii) If a solution is not reached, within the tei-ms 
of sub-paragraph (e), the Committee shall confine 
its report to a brief statement of the facts; the 
written submissions and record of the oral submis- 
sions made by the States Parties concerned shall be 
attached to the report. 

In every matter the report shall be communicated 
to the States Parties concerned. 

2. The provisions of this article shall come into 
force when ten States Parties to the present Cove- 
nant have made declarations under paragraph 1 of 
this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by 
the States Parties with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations who shall transmit copies thereof 
to the other States Parties. A declaration may be 

withdravim at any time by notification to the Secre- 
tary-Greneral. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice 
the considei'ation of any matter which is the subject 
of a communication already transmitted under this 
article; no further communication by any State 
Party shall be received after the notification of 
vidthdrawal of the declaration has been received by 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations unless 
the State Party concerned had made a new declara- 

Article 42 

1. (a) If a matter referred to the Committee in 
accordance with article 41 is not resolved to the 
satisfaction of the States Parties concerned, the 
Committee may, with the prior consent of the States 
Parties concerned, appoint an ad hoc Conciliation 
Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Com- 
mission"). The good offices of the Commission shall 
be made available to the States Parties concerned 
with a view to an amicable solution of the matter 
on the basis of respect for the present Covenant; 

(b) The Commission shall consist of five persons 
acceptable to the States Parties concerned. If the 
States Parties concerned fail to reach agreement 
within three months on all or part of the composi- 
tion of the Commission the members of the Commis- 
sion concerning whom no agreement was reached 
shall be elected by secret ballot by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the Committee from among its 

2. The members of the Commission shall serve in 
their personal capacity. They shall not be nationals 
of the States Parties concerned, or of a State not 
party to the present Covenant, or of a State Party 
which has not made a declaration under article 41. 

3. The Commission shall elect its ovm Chairman 
and adopt its own rules of procedure. 

4. The meetings of the Commission shall normally 
be held at the Headquarters of the United Nations 
or at the United Nations Office at Geneva. However, 
they may be held at such other convenient places as 
the Commission may determine in consultation with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the 
States Parties concerned. 

5. The secretariat provided in accordance with 
article 36 shall also service the Commissions ap- 
pointed under this article. 

6. The information received and collated by the 
Committee shall be made available to the Commis- 
sion and the Commission may call upon the States 
Parties concerned to supply any other relevant in- 

7. When the Commission has fully considered the 
matter, but in any event not later than twelve 
months after having been seized of the matter, it 
shall submit to the Chairman of the Committee a 
report for communication to the States Parties con- 



(a) If the Commission is unable to complete its 
consideration of the matter within twelve months, it 
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the 
status of its consideration of the matter. 

(b) If an amicable solution to the matter on the 
basis of respect for human rights as recognized in 
the present Covenant is reached, the Commission 
shall confine its report to a brief statement of the 
facts and of the solution reached. 

(c) If a solution within the terms of sub-para- 
graph (b) is not reached, the Commission's report 
shall embody its findings on all questions of fact 
relevant to the issues between the States Parties 
concerned, as well as its views on the possibilities of 
amicable solution of the matter. This report shall 
also contain the written submissions and a record 
of the oral submissions made by the States Parties 

(d) If the Commission's report is submitted under 
sub-paragraph (c), the States Parties concerned 
shall, within three months of the receipt of the 
report, infonn the Chairman of the Committee 
whether or not they accept the contents of the report 
of the Commission. 

8. The provisions of this article are without prej- 
udice to the responsibilities of the Committee under 
article 41. 

9. The States Parties concerned shall share 
equally all the expenses of the members of the Com- 
mission in accordance with estimates to be provided 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

10. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall be empowered to pay the expenses of the mem- 
bers of the Commission, if necessary, before reim- 
bursement by the States Parties concerned in ac- 
cordance with paragraph 9 of this article. 

Article 1,3 
The members of the Committee and of the ad hoc 
conciliation commissions which may be appointed 
under article 41, shall be entitled to the facilities, 
privileges and immunities of experts on mission for 
the United Nations as laid down in the relevant sec- 
tions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu- 
nities of the United Nations. 

Article 4-4 
The provisions for the implementation of the pres- 
ent Covenant shall apply without prejudice to the 
procedures prescribed in the field of human rights 
by or under the constituent instruments and the con- 
ventions of the United Nations and of the special- 
ized agencies and shall not prevent the States Par- 
ties to the present Covenant from having recourse 
to other procedures for settling a dispute in accord- 
ance with general or special international agree- 
ments in force between them. 

Article Ji.5 
The Committee shall submit to the General As- 

sembly, through the Economic and Social Council, 
an annual report on its activities. 

Part V 

Article U6 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be inter- 
preted as impairing the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations and of the constitutions of the 
specialized agencies which define the respective re- 
sponsibilities of the various organs of the United 
Nations and of the specialized agencies in regard 
to the matters dealt with in the present Covenant. 

Article 1,7 
Nothing in the Covenant shall be interpreted as 
impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy 
and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and 

Part VI 

Article 18 

1. The present Covenant is open for signature by 
any State Member of the United Nations or member 
of any of its specialized agencies, by any State 
Party to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, and by any other State which has been 
invited by the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions to become a party to the present Covenant. 

2. The present Covenant is subject to ratification. 
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

3. The present Covenant shall be open to acces- 
sion by any State referred to in paragraph 1 of this 

4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall inform all States which have signed this Cove- 
nant or acceded to it of the deposit of each instru- 
ment of ratification or accession. 

Article i9 

1. The present Covenant shall enter into force 
three months after the date of the deposit with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the 
thirty-fifth instiniment of ratification or instrument 
of accession. 

2. For each State ratifying the present Covenant 
or acceding to it after the deposit of the thirty- 
fifth instniment of ratification or instrument of ac- 
cession, the present Covenant shall enter into force 
three months after the date of the deposit of its own 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. 

Article 50 
The provisions of the present Covenant shall ex- 
tend to all parts of federal States without any limi- 
tations or exceptions. 

JANUARY 16, 1967 


Article 51 

1. Any State Party to the present Covenant may 
propose an amendment and file it with the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall thereupon 
communicate any proposed amendments to the 
States Parties to the present Covenant with a re- 
quest that they notify him whether they favour a 
conference of States Parties for the purpose of con- 
sidering' and voting upon the proposal. In the event 
that at least one third of the States Parties favours 
such a conference the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall convene the conference under 
the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment 
adopted by a majority of the States Parties pi-esent 
and voting at the conference shall be submitted to 
the General Assembly of the United Nations for 

2. Amendments shall come into force when they 
have been approved by the General Assembly and 
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Covenant in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. 

3. When amendments come into force they shall 
be binding on those States Parties which have ac- 
cepted them, other States Parties being still bound 
by the provisions of the present Covenant and any 
earlier amendment which they have accepted. 

Article 52 
Irrespective of the notifications made under arti- 
cle 48, paragraph 5, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall inform all States referred to 
in paragraph 1 of the same article of the following 
particulars : 

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under 
article 48 ; 

(b) The date of the entry into force of the pres- 
ent Covenant under article 49 and the date of the 
entry into force of any amendments under arti- 
cle 51. 

Article 53 

1. The present Covenant, of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the United Nations. 

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall transmit certified copies of the present Cove- 
nant to all States referred to in article 48. 

Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

The States Parties to the present Protocol, 

Considering that in order further to achieve the 

purposes of the Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (hereinafter referred to as "the Covenant") 

and the implementation of its provisions it would 

be appropriate to enable the Human Rights Com- 
mittee set up in part IV of the Covenant (herein- 
after referred to as "the Committee") to receive and 
consider, as provided in the present Protocol, com- 
munications from individuals claiming to be victims 
of violations of any of the rights set forth in the^ 
Have agreed as follows: 

Article 1 
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a 
party to the present Protocol recognizes the compe- 
tence of the Committee to receive and consider com- 
munications from individuals, subject to its 
jurisdiction, claiming to be victims of a violation by 
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in 
the Covenant. No communication shall be received 
by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the 
Covenant which is not a Party to the present Pro- 

Article 2 
Subject to the provision of article 1, individuals 
claiming that any of their rights enumerated in the 
Covenant have been violated and who have exhausted 
all available domestic remedies may submit a written 
communication to the Committee for consideration. 

Article 3 
The Committee shall consider inadmissible any 
communication under this Protocol which is anony- 
mous, or which it considers to be an abuse of the 
right of submission of such communications or to be 
incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant. 

Article i 

1. Subject to the provisions of article 3, the Com- 
mittee shall bring any communications submitted to 
it under the present Protocol to the attention of the 
State Party to the present Protocol alleged to be vio- 
lating any provision of the Covenant. 

2. Within six months, the receiving State shall 
submit to the Committee written explanations or 
statements clarifying the matter and the remedy, if 
any, that may have been taken by that State. 

Article 5 

1. The Committee shall consider communications 
received under the present Protocol in the light of 
all written information made available to it by the 
individual and by the State Party concerned. 

2. The Committee shall not consider any communi- 
cation from an individual unless it has ascertained 

(a) the same matter is not being examined under 
another procedure of international investigation or 
settlement ; 

(b) the individual has exhausted all available 
domestic i-emedies. This shall not be the rule where 
the application of the remedies is unreasonably pro- 



3. The Committee shall hold closed meetings when 
examining communications under the present Pro- 

4. The Committee shall forward its views to the 
State Party concerned and to the individual. 

Article 6 
The Committee shall include in its annual report 
under article 45 of the Covenant a summary of its 
activities under the present Protocol. 

Article 7 
Pending the achievement of the objectives of Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 
1960 concerning the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
provisions of the present Protocol shall in no way 
limit the right of petition granted to these peoples 
by the Charter of the United Nations and other 
international conventions and instruments under the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies. 

Article 8 

1. The present Protocol is open for signature by 
any State which has signed the Covenant. 

2. The present Protocol is subject to ratification 
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the 
Covenant. Instruments of ratification shall be de- 
posited vidth the Secretary-General of the United 

3. The present Protocol shall be open to accession 
by any State which has ratified or acceded to the 

4. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an 
instrument of accession with the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. 

5. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall inform all States which have signed the present 
Protocol or acceded to it of the deposit of each in- 
strument of ratification or accession. 

Article 9 

1. Subject to the entry into force of the Covenant, 
the present Protocol shall enter into force three 
months after the date of the deposit with the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations of the tenth 
instrument of ratification or instrument of accession. 

2. For each State ratifying the present Protocol 
or acceding to it after the deposit of the tenth instru- 
ment of ratification or instrument of accession, the 
present Protocol shall enter into force three months 

• after the date of the deposit of its own instrument 
I of ratification or instrument of accession. 

I Article 10 

The provision of the present Protocol shall extend 
to all parts of federal States without any limitations 
or exceptions. 

Article 11 
1. Any State Party to the present Protocol may 

propose an amendment and file it viath the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations. The Secretary- 
General of the United Nations shall thereupon com- 
municate any proposed amendments to the States 
Parties to the present Protocol with a request that 
they notify him whether they favour a conference of 
States Parties for the purpose of considering and 
voting upon the proposal. In the event that at least 
one third of the States Parties favours such a con- 
ference the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene the conference under the auspices of 
the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a 
majority of the States Parties present and voting at 
the conference shall be submitted to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations for approval. 

2. Amendments shall come into force when they 
have been approved by the General Assembly and 
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties to the present Protocol in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. 

3. When amendments come into force they shall 
be binding on those States Parties which have 
accepted them, other States Parties being still bound 
by the provisions of the present Protocol and any 
earlier amendment which they have accepted. 

Article 12 

1. Any State Party may denounce the present 
Protocol at any time by written notification ad- 
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. Denunciation shall take effect three months 
after the date of receipt of the notification by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

2. Denunciation shall be without prejudice to the 
continued application of the provisions of the present 
Protocol to any communication submitted under 
article 2 before the eff'ective date of denunciation. 

Article 13 
Irrespective of the notifications made under article 
8, paragraph 5, of the present Protocol, the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations shall inform all 
States referred to in article 48, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant of the following particulars: 

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions under 
article 8 ; 

(b) The date of the entry into force of the pres- 
ent Protocol under article 9 and the date of the 
entry into force of any amendments under article 11; 

(c) Denunciations under article 12. 

Article H 

1. The present Protocol, of which the Chinese, 
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives 
of the United Nations. 

2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall transmit certified copies of the present Protocol 
to all States referred to in article 48 of the 

JANUARY 16, 1967 



Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into 
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Singa- 
pore, December 14, 1966. 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, December 
19, 1966.' 


International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.^ 
Ratification deposited : Denmark, November 9, 1966. 


Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I 
and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II. 
Acceptance deposited: Peru, December 21, 1966. 
Approval deposited: Guatemala, December 28, 1966. 

' Excluding Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Southern 
Rhodesia, Brunei, Aden, Protectorate of South Ara- 
bia, Kamaran, Kuria Muria Islands, and Perim. 

" Not in force. 



Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C."^ 
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Kabul December 22, 1966. Entered into force 
December 22, 1966. 


Agreement for the establishment of a Peace Corps 
program in The Gambia. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Bathurst November 26 and December 5, 
1966. Entered into force December 5, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 
1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at 
Tehran December 20, 1966. Entered into force 
December 20, 1966. 


Agrreement amending the agreement of December 18, 
1948, as amended (TIAS 1864, 3148, 3278, 4254), 
for financing certain educational exchange pro- 
grams. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome 
October 5, 1966. Entered into force October 5, 


Agreement relating to the relinquishment to the 
Philippines by the United States of its right to 
the use of certain land areas within Camp John 
Hay. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila 
December 13, 1966. Entered into force December 
13, 1966. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and the encouragement of inter- 
national trade and investment. Signed at Port of 
Spain December 22, 1966. Enters into force upon 
the exchange of ratifications. 


the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concemingr treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publi'ration issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addressee made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 

JANUARY 16, 1967 

intendent of Documents. U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 : 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX January 16, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U38 

Atomic Energy 

Worldwide Nuclear Power — Progress and Prob- 
lems (Seaborg) 90 

Economic Affairs 

IMCO Subcommittee Recommends New Passen- 
ger-Ship Standards 102 

Human Rights 

U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Human 

Rights (Harris, texts of covenants) .... 104 
International Organizations and Conferences 
IMCO Subcommittee Recommends New Pas- 
senger-Ship Standards 102 


Present Travel Restrictions Extended Through 

March 15 102 


Worldwide Nuclear Power — Progress and Prob- 
lems (Seaborg) 90 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 122 

United Nations 

U.N. Adopts International Covenants on Hu- 
man Rights (Harris, texts of covenants) . . 104 
The Work of the 21st Session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly (Goldberg) 98 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J gg 

Harris, Patricia R * jo4 

Seaborg, Glenn T \ qq 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Dec. 26-Jan. 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to December 26 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos 
300 and 301 of December 23. 





t304 12/29 




Thompson sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to the USSR (bio- 
graphic details). 

Goldberg: "International Law in 
the United Nations." 

U.S.-Japan fishery discussions. 

Rusk: death of former Secre- 
tary Christian A. Herter. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

■ji-U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/28 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Foreign Relations of the United States 
1944, Volume I, General 

The Department of State recently released another volume in the Foreign Relations series cov- 
ei'ing documentation of American policy and diplomacy for the year 1944. 

Volume I is concerned with the multilateral diplomacy of the United States. Of particulal 
interest in this volume is the extensive documentation on the Dumbarton Oaks conversations anc 
on other preliminaries to the establishment of the United Nations, specifically preparations foi 
the San Francisco Conference of 1945. There is also full coverage of U.S. participation in th< 
work of the European Advisory Commission, which drew up the Allied plans for the occupatior 
and control of Germany and the surrender terms for the Axis satellites. Other documents dea 
with such questions as war crimes, censorship, repatriation of American citizens, and protection o: 

Three other volumes for 1944 have already been published, and three others are in preparation 


To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Frintinc Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send me 

copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, as indicated below. 

n ISii, Voluvie I, General, publication 8138, $5.75. 

1944, Volume III, The British Commonwealth and Europe, publication 7889, 

19U, Volume IV, Europe, publication 8067, $4.75. 

1944, Volume V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, The Far East, .publi- 
cation 7859, $4.25. 





„ Enclosed — . 

To be mailed 



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City, State, and ZIP Code 







Vol. LVI, No. USB 

January 23, 1967 


Transcript of Interview 126 

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg HO 

by Ambassador George C. McGhee H8 


For index see inside hack cover 

Secretary Rusk Discusses Prospects for 1967 
on "Face the Nation'' 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rusk on the Columbia Broad- 
casting System's television and radio pro- 
gram "Face the Nation" on January 1. 
Interviewing the Secretary were Martin 
Agronsky and Marvin Kalb of CBS News 
and Jesse L. Cook of Time magazine. 

Mr. Agronsky: First, Mr. Secretary, may 
I wish you a happy new year. 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much. 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, the Commu- 
nist Viet Cong today proposed a week-long- 
truce from February 8 to 15 in Viet-Nam. 
Will we accept it? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that will be a mat- 
ter of consultation among all of the govern- 
ments that have troops in South Viet-Nam, 
particularly with the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment, but with the others. It would not be 
for me to say at this particular moment what 
their attitude will be, because that requires 

As you know, they took the initiative in 
suggesting a 4-day truce at Tet. 


Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, in a letter to 
our U.N. Ambassador, Mr. Goldberg, the 
U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant, yesterday 
again called on the United States to make an 
unconditional hold of bombing in Viet-Nam 
as a first step toward a lasting peace.' 

Now, Mr. Goldberg immediately answered 
that he could not make — we could not accept 
a unilateral cessation of bombing unless there 
was some sign from Hanoi that they were 
prepared to meet with us for truce negotia- 

Is that now the American position? Could 

' See p. 137. 

we not under any circumstances end the* 
bombing unilaterally, and will we not? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the Secretary- 
General's first point was that we ourselves 
stop the bombing. He has in his briefcase, 
publicly as well as privately, a commitment 
by us that we are prepared to stop the bomb- 
ing as a step toward peace. 

His second point was a mutual deescala- 
tion of the violence by both sides. So far as 
we know, he has nothing in his briefcase or 
that subject from the other side. 

Now, the present position is that on his 
three points, Hanoi has rejected points 2 anc 
3. On the matter of negotiations with al 
those taking part in the fighting, Hanoi ha.' 
said that the Viet Cong must be accepted a; 
the sole representative of the South Vietnam 
ese people. 

Now, we hope the Secretary-General, witl 
very wide authority as far as we are con 
cerned, will be able to probe the other sid 
to find out what the effect would be if w 
stopped the bombing. 

You see, Mr. Agronsky, we went througl 
5 years without any bombing of North Viet 
Nam, during which we went to the Laotiai 
conference and signed an agreement whicl 
was not performed in any respect by th 
other side — 5 years during which we hai 
hundreds of contacts with other government 
trying to bring the entire Southeast Asia) 
problem to a peaceful settlement. 

Then we had a brief 5-day pause, and oi 
the third day we had the message from al 
interested Communist governments that the; 
had no interest in this. 

Then over the turn of the year we had '< 
37-day pause, much longer than had beei 
suggested by some of those on the other sid 




as a pause to explore the possibilities of 
peaceful settlement. 

Now, we are prepared, as President John- 
son has made it clear over and over again, 
i:o take the first steps and to go more than 
halfway to bring this matter to a peaceful 
conclusion. But what we feel that we are 
entitled to know is what would happen if we 
iid; and no one, literally no one, has been 
ible to give us the slightest suggestion as to 
ivhat would happen if we stopped the bomb- 
ng, other than that men and arms would 
30ur in from the North against the South. 

Now, if anyone can tell us that that would 
lot be the case, we would be very glad to 
lear about it. 

tombing of North Viet-Nam 

Mr. Cook: There are important psycho- 
ogical costs, though, that the bombing is 
ausing us, Mr. Secretary. Does the air war 
ave a logic of its own ? Do we not stop now 
ecause it would lead the other side simply 
) think that we are too weak to continue? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Cook, let us take 

look at what would happen if we stopped 
le bombing and then nothing else whatever 
ould happen. 

North Viet-Nam would be safe and secure 
nd comfortable, and meanwhile they would 
e sending their regiments and their divi- 
ons into South Viet-Nam to try to take over 
outh Viet-Nam by force. 

Now, the bombing of North Viet-Nam is 
rectly related to what they are doing in the 
3uth. The key point in this is that this could 
op literally this afternoon at sundown if 
le other side would let us know that they 
•e holding their hand from the effort to seize 
)uth Viet-Nam by force. 

Now, we have had a long and tortuous road 
nee 1945 in trying to build some peace in 

e world. And we have not come to where 

,'ie are by giving away Iran to Mr. Stalin's 

. :j'rces, or the eastern provinces of Turkey, 

'jI- welcoming the guerrillas into Greece, or 

ving away Berlin, or giving away South 

orea. This has been a tough struggle, to 

•ganize a peace in the world. And that is 

1 we are interested in. 

Now, the problem there is: Can the stop- 
ping of the bombing lead toward peace? 

If someone — you or the Secretary-General 
or anyone from the other side — can give us 
any suggestions, any indication, any infor- 
mation, we will look at it very quickly. The 
President has emphasized over and over 
again that we will go more than halfway. 
But you cannot stop this war just by stop- 
ping a half of it, if the other side is going 
to pursue it. 

Need for Serious Response From Hanoi 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in this very spirit, 
sir, within the last couple of weeks the North 
Vietnamese have allowed and have indicated 
that they will allow a handful of American 
journalists into Hanoi to cover the war. 
There are about four American women there 
now who are interested in trying to get 
peace. The VC radio announces today that 
they will go Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] 
Ky 3 days more on a Tet period — he asked 
for 4, and they are ready to go 7. 

Is it possible that all of this together might 
be regarded as the indication that we are all 
seeking ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the indication that 
is important is the indication that can be 
specific and can be private and can be serious. 

I must say — and I regret this — that we do 
not yet see an indication from the other side, 
by the channels that are readily available, 
that they are prepared to move this matter 
toward peace. 

Now, we have ourselves approved pass- 
ports for a considerable number of gentlemen 
in your profession, and only a very few of 
them have been able to get into Hanoi. We 
would be glad to have others go and to ask 
some of the searching questions about the 
question of peace. 

That is: What about their more than 20 
regiments in South Viet-Nam? What about 
their refusal to come to a Geneva conference 
on Viet-Nam or on Laos or Cambodia ? What 
about their refusal to demilitarize the demili- 
tarized zone along the 17th parallel? What 
about their opposition to efforts by the ICC 
[International Control Commission] to as- 

IIlNUARY 23, 1967 


sure Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia that his 
country can remain neutral and uninvolved 
in this situation, or the steady refusals of 
negotiations proposed by 17 nonalined na- 
tions, by President Johnson, by His Holiness 
the Pope, by the Secretary-General, by all 
sorts of — by the Prime Ministers of the 
Commonwealth ? 

These are the questions that ought to be 
asked. And thus far we have had answers^ — 
we know what they are. But they ought to 
be probed further. 

Mr. Kalb: If I understand you, then, sir, 
what you are saying is that it is a specific 
and, as you put it, serious kind of indication 
that you want from the other side, rather 
than any kind of cosmetics — 

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a serious mat- 
ter, this is a serious matter. 

Mr. Kalb: We are trying to get at a defi- 
nition — 

Secretary Rusk: We are entitled to be seri- 
ous about it. After all, we know that during 
these two truces we just had — the Christmas 
and New Year's truce — that the other side 
is undertaking — has undertaken — substantial 
resupply operations. We know that in certain 
instances they have maneuvered their forces 
like Olympic dash men at the starting gate to 
take off just as soon as the truce is over. 

These are serious matters. And we cannot 
approach them in terms of vagueness or sen- 
timentality or just hopes. 

There are plenty of ways open in which 
we can be — we are in touch with the other 
side seriously and serious responses can be 

Prospects for Peace in Viet-Nam 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, pessimism 
permeates everything you have said about 
the prospects for peace in Viet-Nam in 1967. 
You don't think, then, do you, that there is a 
possibility of ending the war under the pres- 
ent circumstances ? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I think there is a pos- 
sibility. The task of diplomacy is to proceed 
on the basis of optimism. And I never close 
the door to the possibility that this situation 
will change. 


I do believe that one basis for optimism is i 
that the other side must surely now under- 
stand that they are not going to succeed in 
seizing South Viet-Nam by force. Now, 
maybe that will bring about a significant 
change in their political approach to this 

But if I am pessimistic, it is simply because 
we have not yet seen any indication from the 
other side that they are prepared to give up i 
their idea of seizing South Viet-Nam by I 

You see, they opposed the free elections in i 
South Viet-Nam for a constituent assembly; ; 
they won't let the question of reunification 
be decided by the free choice of the peoples 
concerned. They refuse conferences and ne- 
gotiations and all those devices by which 
crises of this sort have been solved in years j 

We haven't had one iota of response or 
compliance by them with the Laotian agree- 
ment of 1962, for example, which they signed, j,,. 
along with the rest of us. ■pi 

So there does need to be a change of pur- 
pose and a change of ambition in Hanoi, be- 
cause otherwise at the end of the day, Mr. 
Agronsky, someone has to make a very 
simple decision: Here come two more regi- 
ments of North Vietnamese down the road 
across the 17th parallel; now, do you oppose 
them or do you get out of their way? Now, 
so long as that occurs, somebody has to make 
that decision. And our decision is that undei 
our treaty commitments we must meet them, 
along with our allies, and not get out of their 

Mr. Agronsky: Our commander in Viet- 
Nam, General [William C] Westmoreland 
has indicated that it may be a matter of years, 
as he puts it, rather than months — this wai 
will go on for a matter of years rather than 
months, and everything you say seems tc 
reflect the same estimate. Is that correct? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we oughl 
to be prepared, here at home and over there 
to do what is required to be done for what 
ever time it is required. That does not mean 
however, that there may not be some possi- 
bility that this crisis, along with other crises 


may be resolved before anyone really expects 
it. In other words, we are trying to resolve 
this problem literally tomorrow. 

This is why we said to Foreign Secretary 
'Brown — George Brown, of Britain: If you 
can get the others to come to a meeting of 
North and South Viet-Nam and the United 
States, we will be there, we will be there. 
That is why we have given the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations carte blanche 
to see what he can work out in his contacts 
with the other side to bring this matter to a 
peaceful settlement. That is why we have 
said "negotiations without preconditions" to 
;he 17 neutral countries, or why President 
Johnson talked about unconditional discus- 

We will take a look at all of it with 
;he other side — or even a part of it. 

There is no reason on earth, for example, 
vhy the nations involved here on both sides 
!Ould not agree with Prince Sihanouk's re- 
luest for assistance in maintaining the neu- 
rality and the territorial integrity of 
Cambodia. And if there is seriousness on the 
ther side, there is no reason why we cannot 
tisure the demilitarization of the demili- 
arized zone between North and South Viet- 
nam. If we cannot solve the whole problem, 
^e are prepared to try to solve a part of it. 
But you gentlemen know that there has 
een no response from the other side. 
Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, what about 
ttempts in 1967 to resolve — to push the 
latter a little farther by heavier military 
ction of our own? As you know, you are 
acing a more hawkish Congress than you 
id in the last session. There have been sug- 
estions that the administration will use the 
ist year before the next presidential election 
ear to try and achieve some kind of settle- 
lent. And if diplomatic channels are as 
ogged as you suggest, perhaps a more pow- 
rful military action is the only course. 
Secretary Rusk: Well, first let me say that 
16 diplomatic channels are not clogged. The 
oint is that, with diplomatic channels, we 
not find a basis for peace here. 
But in any event, on the matter of military 
irces, Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] 


NUARY 23, 1967 

McNamara has pointed out that there will be 
additional forces in South Viet-Nam during 
1967, although the rate of increase will not 
be as high as it was during 1966 unless there 
is some unforeseen circumstance that we are 
not now at the moment taking into account. 
I myself believe that there must come a 
time when the authorities in Hanoi will 
recognize that what they are trying to do is 
not on, and therefore either de facto, by 
action on the ground, or in some sort of nego- 
tiation or conference, their effort must be 
brought to a halt. And we are prepared to 
take that up in either way, either by recipro- 
cal action taken on the ground or by some 
sort of discussion or negotiation. 

The Pacification Effort 

Mr. Cook: On that score, Mr. Secretary, it 
has been suggested in Washington that they 
won't reach that decision until progress is 
made on the pacification task, until the infra- 
structure of the Viet Cong is destroyed or 
seriously damaged. And yet only a few weeks 
ago Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge was 
here in Washington and conceded, despite all 
the efforts of the year — the Honolulu Con- 
ference, the Manila Conference — as he put it, 
that isn't rolling as yet. Are there any pros- 
pects for improvement in the next year? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is recog- 
nized this is a very important point in terms 
of not only what happens in South Viet- 
Nam but in the attitude of the other side. 

When it becomes clear that that infrastruc- 
ture of subversion and the guerrilla structure 
in the countryside is not able to maintain 
itself, I think this will be the signal to the 
other side that what they are trying to do 
is not on. 

As you know, the South Vietnamese forces 
are now being turned more and more to this 
pacification effort, which is basically a seize- 
and-hold protection for the villagers so that 
they can get on with their work without 
harassment by the Viet Cong. It has taken 
some time to move into that stage, because 
there were other very urgent issues, such as 
the operations of the main force regiments 
and battalions of the Viet Cong. But that is 


moving, and we hope to make some signifi- 
cant headway on that during 1967. 

Organizing a Durable Peace 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, a couple of days 
ago you spent about an hour and 45 minutes 
talking with religious leaders. There have 
been letters sent to the President almost 
warning that young people may not choose 
to serve, even if they have to go to jail to 
stay with that conviction. And there is at 
least the appearance of a ground swell of 
public opinion riding against the administra- 
tion's policy in Viet-Nam. 

Two questions on this, sir: One, do you 
regard this as a serious diplomatic problem 
in terms of how Hanoi sees this all? And, 
secondly, do you regard it as a ground swell, 
and if so, how do you ride against it? I am 
trying to gage your own estimate of this. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the 
first place there is a diplomatic problem for 
which we cannot offer much of a remedy, 
because it is quite clear that Hanoi would like 
to lean on evidences of disagreement here at 
home to encourage their own hopes. But 
nevertheless, we are a free society and we 
must have a vigorous public discussion 
of these issues here at home. 

The other question: We are at the present 
time in a situation where about half the 
American people can no longer remember 
World War H and the events that led up to 
it. And the overriding issue for us and the 
new generation is: How do you organize a 
durable peace in the world? 

Now, when I was a student they said: 
Don't worry about this place out here; it is 
too far away; or, this is not our business; or, 
give them another bite and perhaps the ag- 
gressor will be satisfied. And that led an 
entire generation into World War H, with 
frightful catastrophe for the entire world. 

We came out of that, and we tried to set 
down what was necessary to organize a peace 
— and we should all read article 1 of the 
United Nations Charter on that, because 
those are the lessons of World War H. And 
let me say in parentheses that we better hold 
on to those lessons, because we are not going 


to have any chance to draw the lessons from 
world war HI. 

So the overriding issue is how to organize 
a durable peace. And at the heart of that is 
the right of all nations, large and small, to 
live at peace without being molested by their 
neighbors. It is just as simple as that, al- || 
though some people are inclined to call that 
kind of language trite. The notion that we 
leave the aggressor free to follow his appetite 
is a notion that leads us straight into war. 
This is where the warmongering is these days 
— those who refuse to face the necessity of 
organizing a durable peace. That is our cen- 
tral question. 

Mr. Cook: Those who accept this strategy 
of the administration still have some ques- 
tions about tactics. Do you think in retrospect 
it was wise to bomb so close to Hanoi during 
the Christmas season, with all its overtones, 
or to continue to land troops — 

Secretary Rusk: President Johnson spoke 
yesterday at his press conference about our 
bombing policy. We are bombing military 
targets. Our Armed Forces are under almost 
unprecedented instructions with respect tc 
avoiding civilian casualties. And we know 
that they go to great lengths to carry oul 
those instructions in the spirit in which th« 
instructions were given. 

Quite frankly, Mr. Cook, what I could d( 
with is more compassion and more sympathj 
with those tens of thousands of civilians ii 
South Viet-Nam who have been killed an( 
kidnaped by the Viet Cong and North Viet 
namese forces as a matter of deliberate policj 
and the far larger tens of thousands of Soutl 
Vietnamese military who have been kille( 
and wounded simply because North Viet-Nan 
is trying to seize South Viet-Nam by force 

Now, the President has indicated what oui 
policy is on this, and we will continue to pur i 
sue that policy. 

But one of the things that is missing hen 
in some discussion is any notion of reci 
procity. | 

You mentioned one of the groups that cami 
to see me. I try to see different groups fron 
time to time who want to express differen 
views. But I say to them privately ver; 



often: What do you want Hanoi to do as a 
contribution toward peace in this situation? 
And they say: Well, we want them to take 
their troops home; or, we want them to stop 
their infiltration. And I say: But why don't 
you say that? Why don't you say that when 
you write me an open letter? Because if that 
is your position, you ought to make your posi- 
tion known. 

The problem is that some groups, I think, 
would feel embarrassed because they know 
that Hanoi would tell them — would reject 
what they have to suggest. 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, would you 
regard the dispatches of Harrison Salisbury 
from Hanoi to the New York Times as dis- 
torting the perspective in which we should 
be seeing the war, as being unfair to our 
position and to our policies? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I don't want to get 
into the particular personal argument with 
a particular reporter. He presumably will be 
3ut of North Viet-Nam one of these days, 
md you gentlemen can put to him all the 
questions you want to — and that is your job; 
t is not mine. I do observe that from his dis- 
patches you can draw the conclusion that we 
ire not going after the civilian population 
>f North Viet-Nam. Hanoi is there. Hanoi is 
here. And you have to look pretty hard to 
ind some damage inside Hanoi — and a good 
leal of speculation about whether it was 
aused by SAM's or by antiaircraft or what 
night have actually caused it. But you will 
lave your chance presumably to go over 
hese matters with him when he comes out 
f North Viet-Nam. 

.ey to Negotiations Lies in Hanoi 

Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, do you see any 
opes for peace or at least negotiations in the 
cheduled emergence late this year of a 
ivilian government in Viet-Nam ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the constituent as- 
embly has been making very good progress 
1 drafting its constitution. We would hope 
erhaps by March or April that that con- 
titution would be proclaimed, following 
'hich there would be national elections for 
civilian government. 

I think the question of negotiations — again, 
some people may think I am being much too 
simple about this — turns on what the attitude 
of the North is toward its attempt to take 
over South Viet-Nam by force. There is no 
problem of negotiations if they are willing to 
negotiate. Now, this would be the problem 
faced by a civilian government or by us or 
by anybody else. So the key to this lies in 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, you used the ex- 
pression that some people may feel that you 
are "putting it in somewhat simple form." 
You said before that some people say this is 
a "trite expression," when you talked about 
the neighbor idea. 

There has been over the past years some 
criticism leveled quite directly at you, sir, and 
very recently a respected columnist from the 
New York Times said that you were "a tired 
man." I am wondering,, sir, how all of this 
criticism strikes you and how you yourself 
respond to it. 

Secretary Rusk: It doesn't bother me very 
much. I would regret it if everybody older 
than I am should leave what they are doing 
now. This would include a good many col- 
umnists and other distinguished figures. No, 
there are times when it is noon halfway 
around the world and midnight here in 
Washington, and sometimes there are long 
days. But I feel fine. And I am greatly stimu- 
lated and inspired by President Johnson's 
own example and by the privilege I have in 
trying to help him build a peace in the world. 
This is the important thing. And if I can 
contribute anything to it, I am at his disposal. 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, could we 
anticipate, then, that you would be in a posi- 
tion to accept an invitation on January 1, 
1968, to "face the nation" ? 

Secretary Rtisk: Well, if you invite me, I 
will take it under consideration if I am in a 
position to receive that invitation at that 
time. As you know, the Secretary of State 
serves at the pleasure of the President, and 
this is a matter for him. But I think every 
American ought to be at his disposal if he 
wants them to serve. 

Mr. Cook: Mr. Secretary, the Chinese have 

A.NUARY 23, 1967 


been suggesting of late that we and the 
Soviets are on a "collusion course." Is there 
enough collusion here to expect any prolifera- 
tion treaty within the next — 

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a very inter- 
esting ideological factor that comes into it. 
You see, for many, many years both the 
Soviet Union and Communist China have sort 
of branded us as Enemy Number One. Now 
they are in a considerable to-do with each 
other. And so it is rather natural for Peking 
to charge that somehow Moscow and Wash- 
ington are in a conspiracy and for Moscow 
to be suspicious about whether we and 
Peking are not in some sort of conspiracy, 
because Moscow says that Peking is stand- 
ing in the way of the unity of the Communist 
world in dealing with the imperialists. I 
think this is an internal ideological point. As 
a matter of fact, we are not in a conspiracy 
either with Moscow or with Peking, and both 
capitals can relax on that point as far as I 
am concerned. 

Hope for Nortproliferation Treaty 

Mr. Cook: On the antiproliferation treaty, 
sir, the President said yesterday, I believe, 
that in recent weeks there have been some 
signs of progress. What is that progress ? Do 
you expect an early draft of the treaty? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope very 
much in 1967 — among the great hopes would 
be that we get peace in Viet-Nam, that we 
get a nonproliferation treaty, and that the 
nations of the world can take some strong 
steps toward meeting the emerging food 
crisis which is going to be with us for the 
next decade. 

On the nonproliferation treaty, there have 
been discussions. These matters are being 
discussed among our allies, as well as with the 
members of the Geneva conference. Some of 
the underbrush has been cleared away. But 
we still do not have an agreement yet, as the 
President indicated. We hope very much we 
could come to an agreement during 1967. 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, how realis- 
tic could any such antiproliferation treaty be 
that did not include Communist China? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the question would 
be who proliferates and to whom? Now, in 
a purely technical sense, even though Peking 
may not be a party to such an agreement, if 
everybody else is, there is no one with whom 
to proliferate. 

I personally believe that existing nuclear 
powers have a strong interest in a nonpro- 
liferation treaty because it is almost in the 
nature of this weapon that they do not look 
with favor on its further spread throughout 
the world. 

But in any event, we are working at it. We 
would hope very much that Peking would 
take part in it, although on past performance 
we have no reason to think that they will. But 
it is a matter that the rest of the world has 
to grapple with. 

You know our basic attitude has been that 
one nuclear power is too many. One of the 
great tragedies is that the Baruch proposals 
of 1946 were not accepted. And if one is too 
many, then five are too many. But certainly 
10, 15, would be too many. 

We can take some comfort from the fact 
that we have had 21 years now in which a 
nuclear weapon has not been fired in anger 
But we had better be very careful about try- 
ing to limit that possibility for the future. 

Mr. Cook: Well, the Chinese just firec 
another test this week, Mr. Secretary. Hav< 
you revised your estimate of their timetable 
when they will have an ICBM that coulc 
threaten us ? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I have not. Mr. McNa- 
mara has dealt with that. It will take somt 
time yet. But there is no question this is an 
ominous development in the world situation 

Mr. Agronsky: Thank you very much, Mrr 
Secretary — I wish we had time to go on — fow| 
being here to "face the nation." 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you. 





Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Policy 
on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders 

Following are texts of a letter from Sec- 
retary Rusk to 100 student leaders and the 
students' letter of December 29 addressed to 
President Johnson. Secretary Rusk's letter 
was forwarded to Robert Powell, president 
of the student body, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 



Press release 2 dated January 6 

January 4, 1967 

Dear Stxjdent Leaders: I have received 
,nd read carefully your thoughtful letter to 

e President about our policy in Viet-Nam. 

Your interest and your concern are shared 
•y most thinking Americans. No one desires 

ore strongly to bring an early and honor- 
able conclusion to the conflict in Viet-Nam 
than those who are working day and night, 
both here and in Viet-Nam, to achieve that 

The questions you have raised are among 
those that have been asked and discussed re- 
peatedly in the councils of your Government. 
If some of these matters continue, as you 
say, to agitate the academic community, it 
is certainly not because answers have not 
been provided. It is more, I think, because 
the answers to great and complex questions 
can never fully satisfy all the people in a 
free and questioning society. 

Nevertheless, I am glad to have the chance 
to address myself to the four specific ques- 
tions about which you stated you and others 
.felt doubt or concern. 

(First, you asked if America's vital in- 
srests are sufficiently threatened in Viet- 

JANUARY 23, 1967 

Nam to necessitate the growing commitment 

There is no shadow of doubt in my mind 
that our vital interests are deeply involved in 
Viet-N^jn and in Southeast Asia. 

We are involved because the nation's word 
has been given that we would be involved. 
On February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1 
the United States Senate passed the South- 
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That 
Treaty stated that aggression by means of 
armed attack in the treaty area would en- 
danger our own peace and safety and, in that 
event, "we would act to meet the common 
danger." There is no question that an ex- 
panding armed attack by North Viet-Nam on 
South Viet-Nam has been under way in re- 
cent years; and six nations, with vital inter- 
ests in the peace and security of the region, 
have joined South Viet-Nam in defense 
against that armed attack. 

Behind the words and the commitment of 
the Treaty lies the lesson learned in the 
tragic half century since the First World 
War. After that war our country withdrew 
from eff'ective world responsibility. When ag- 
gressors challenged the peace in Manchuria, 
Ethiopia, and then Central Europe during 
the 1930's, the world community did not act 
to prevent their success. The result was a 
Second World War — which could have been 

That is why the Charter of the United 
Nations begins with these words: "We the 
peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge 
of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind. . . ." And 
the Charter goes on to state these objectives: 


"to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained . . . and to unite our 
strength to maintain international peace and 
security. . . ." 

This was also the experience President 
Truman had in mind when — at a period 
when the United Nations was incapable of 
protecting Greece and Turkey from aggres- 
sion — he said:' "We shall not realize our ob- 
jectives unless we are willing to help free 
peoples to maintain their free institutions 
and their national integrity against aggres- 
sive movements that seek to impose upon 
them totalitarian regimes." 

These are the memories which have in- 
spired the four postwar American Presidents 
as they dealt with aggressive pressures and 
thrusts from Berlin to Korea, from the Car- 
ibbean to Viet-Nam. 

In short, we are involved in Viet-Nam be- 
cause we know from painful experience that 
the minimum condition for order on our 
planet is that aggression must not be per- 
mitted to succeed. For when it does succeed, 
the consequence is not peace, it is the further 
expansion of aggression. 

And those who have borne responsibility 
in our country since 1945 have not for one 
moment forgotten that a third world war 
would be a nuclear war. 

The result of this conviction and this 
policy has been a generation's effort which 
has not been easy for the United States. We 
have borne heavy burdens. We have had to 
face some conflict and a series of dangerous 

But the hard and important fact is that 
in the postwar world external aggression has 
not been permitted to develop its momentum 
into general war. 

Look back and imagine the kind of world 
we now would have if we had adopted a dif- 
ferent course. What kind of Europe would 
now exist if there had been no commitment 
to Greece and Turkey? No Marshall Plan? 
No NATO? No defense of BerUn? Would 
Europe and the world be better off or worse? 

• Bulletin Supplement, May 4, 1947, p. 829. 

Would the possibilities of detente be on the 
present horizon? 

Then turn the globe and look at Asia. If 
we had made no commitments and offered no 
assistance, what kind of Asia would there^ 
now be? Would there be a confident and vital 
South Korea? A prosperous and peaceful 
Japan? Would there be the new spirit of 
regional cooperation and forward movement 
now developing throughout Asia? 

If you were to talk to the leaders of Asia 
as I have, you would know what Asians 
really think of our commitment in Viet- 
Nam. You would know that the new vigor 
in Asia, the new hope and determination, are 
based in part on the conviction that the 
United States will continue to support the 
South Vietnamese in their struggle to build 
a life of their own within the framework of 
the Geneva Accords in 1954 and 1962 — that 
we shall see it through to an honorable peace. 

Second, you wonder whether our vital in- 
terests are best protected by our growing 

We must always weigh what we are doing 
against the requirements of the situation and 
what the other side is doing. You are aware, 
I am sure, that the flow of men and material 
from North Viet-Nam into the South rad- 
ically increased towards the end of 1964 and 
continued at a high level in the next two 
years. It was to meet that escalation, de- 
signed to achieve military victory by the 
North against the South, that we sent our 
men in large numbers and began an air cam- 
paign against military targets in North Viet- 

At the other end of the scale, one must 
contrast what we are doing with what we 
could be doing. You know the power that is 
available to us — in men, resources and 

We have done both more than some people 
would wish, and less than others advocate. 
We have been guided both by the demands 
imposed upon us by increased aggression and 
by the need for restraint in the application 
of force. We have been doing what the Presi- 
dent judges to be necessary to protect the 
nation's vital interests, after hearing the 
views of the government's military and civil- 



ian experts. We shall continue to do what is 
necessary to meet the threat the Vietnamese 
and their allies face. 

Third, you raise the question whether a 
war that may devastate much of the country- 
side can lead to the stable and prosperous 
Viet-Nam we hope for. 

First, it is an error to suggest that the 
fighting in Viet-Nam has devastated "much 
of the countryside." There has been too much 
destruction and disruption — as there is in 
any war. And we deeply regret the loss of 
life that is involved — in the South and in the 
North, among both soldiers and civilians. 

But devastation has been far less than on 
the conventional battlefields of World War 
II and Korea. If peace could come to South 
Viet-Nam today, I think most people would 
be amazed at its rapid recovery. For the 
Vietnamese are intelligent, energetic and am- 
bitious people. And they are determined to 
see their country prosper. I am confident that 
they can achieve that end — if they but have 
the chance to do so, in peace and in their 
own way. 

That day cannot come too soon. 

You also suggest that there are "apparent 
jontradictions" in the American position on 
efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. 

We have said that there will be no diffi- 
culty in having the views of the Viet Cong 
presented at any serious negotiation. The de- 
:ails of how this might be done can be dis- 
cussed with the other side; there is little 
joint in negotiating such details with those 
A^ho cannot stop the fighting. 

We have made it clear that .we cannot ac- 
;ept the Liberation Front as the "sole" or 
'only legitimate voice" of the Vietnamese 
people. Yet that is what the Front has said 
t is. The Buddhists, Catholics, Cao Dai, Hoa 
ilao, ethnic Cambodians, the almost a mil- 
ion refugees who fled from North Viet-Nam 
;o the South in 1954-55, and the Monta- 
?nards are not prepared to have the Libera- 
ion Front as their spokesman. The capacity 
)f the Government and people of South Viet- 
"^am to conduct the election of the Constitu- 
ional Assembly in September 1966, despite 
he opposition of the Viet Cong, made it clear 

that the VC are a small minority in the coun- 
try, detei-mined to convert their ability to 
organize for terror into domination over the 
majority. Those now enrolled with the Viet 
Cong should be turning their minds in a 
diflferent direction. They should be asking: 
"How can we end this war and join as free 
citizens in the making of a modern nation in 
South Viet-Nam?" 

We know that the effort at armed conquest 
which we oppose in Viet-Nam is organized, 
led, and supplied by the leaders in Hanoi. We 
know that the struggle will not end until 
those leaders decide that they want it to end. 

So we stand ready — now and at any time 
in the future — to sit down with representa- 
tives of Hanoi, either in public or in secret, 
to work out arrangements for a just solu- 

You state correctly that we have a com- 
mitment to the right of self-determination 
of the people of South Viet-Nam. There is 
no ambiguity whatsoever. We shall abide by 
the decision of the Vietnamese people as they 
make their wishes known in free and demo- 
cratic elections. Hanoi and the Liberation 
Front do not agree. 

You also suggest that there is disparity 
between our statements and our actions in 
Viet-Nam, and you refer to recent reports 
of the results of our bombing in North Viet- 

It is our policy to strike targets of a mili- 
tary nature, especially those closely related 
to North Viet-Nam's efforts to conquer the 
South. We have never deliberately attacked 
any target that could legitimately be called 
civilian. We have not bombed cities or di- 
rected our efforts against the population of 
North Viet-Nam. 

We recognize that there has been loss of 
life. We recognize that people living or work- 
ing in close proximity to military targets may 
have suffered. We recognize, too, that men 
and machines are not infallible and that some 
mistakes have occurred. 

But there is a vast difference between such 
unintentional events and a deliberate policy 
of attacking civilian centers. I would remind 
you that tens of thousands of civilians have 

ANUARY 23, 1967 


been killed, wounded, or kidnapped in South 
Viet-Nam, not by accident but as the result 
of a deliberate policy of terrorism and intim- 
idation conducted by the Viet Cong. 

We regret all the loss of life and property 
that this conflict entails. We regret that a 
single person, North or South, civilian or 
soldier, American or Vietnamese, must die. 

And the sooner this conflict can be settled, 
the happier we and the Vietnamese people 
will be. 

Meantime, we shall continue to do what 
is necessary — to protect the vital interests 
of the United States, to stand by our allies 
in Asia, and to work with all our energy 
for a peaceful, secure and prosperous South- 
east Asia. Only by meeting these commit- 
ments can we keep on this small and vulner- 
able planet the minimum conditions for peace 
and order. 

Only history will be able to judge the 
wisdom and the full meaning of our present 
course — in all its dimensions. 

But I would close by sharing with you a 
hope and a belief. I believe that we are com- 
ing towards the end of an era when men can 
believe it is profitable and, even, possible to 
change the status quo by applying external 
force. I believe those in Hanoi who persist 
in their aggressive adventure — and those who 
support them — represent ideas and methods 
from the past, not the future. Elsewhere in 
the world those committed to such concepts 
have faded or are fading from the scene. 

I believe, therefore, that if we and our 
allies have the courage, will, and durability 
to see this struggle through to an honorable 
peace, based on the reinstallation of the 
Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, we have 
a fair chance of entering quieter times in 
which all of us will be able to turn more of 
our energies to the great unfinished tasks 
of human welfare and to developing the arts 
of conciliation and peaceful change. 

The overriding question for all of mankind 
in this last third of the Twentieth Century is 
how to organize a durable peace. Much of the 
experience which has gone into answers to 
that question has been largely forgotten — 
perhaps some of it should be. But the ques- 

tion remains — and remains to be answered. 
I should much enjoy discussing this with you 
if we can find a way to do so. 

I would value a chance to discuss the is- 
sues posed in your letter with a representa- 
tive group of signatories or with as many 
as could conveniently join me in Washing- 
ton at a mutually agreeable time. 

With best wishes and thanks for your seri- 
ous concern. 

Sincerely yours, 

Dean Rusk 


December 29, 1966 

Dear Mr. President: In your talk to the student 
interns last summer,' as on other occasions, you 
have recognized and discussed problems that have 
been troubling members of our generation. We have 
been grateful for your concern and encouraged by 
your invitation to express some of our thoughts. 

Since many of these thoughts center increasingly 
on the situation in Vietnam, the New Year's re- 
newal of the truce seems a suitable occasion to report 
to you that significant and growing numbers of our 
contemporaries are deeply troubled about the pos- 
ture of their Government in Vietnam. We believe 
the state of mind of these people, though largely 
unreported, is of great importance, because there 
are many who are deeply troubled for every one who 
has been outspoken in dissent. 

A great many of those faced with the prospect 
of military duty find it hard to square performance 
of that duty with concepts of personal integrity and 
conscience. Even more are torn by reluctance to 
participate in a war whose toll in property and life 
keeps escalating, but about whose purpose and value 
to the United States they remain unclear. 

The truces have highlighted a growing conviction 
on American campuses that if our objective in the 
fighting in Vietnam is a negotiated settlement 
rather than a military "victory," continued escala- 
tion cannot be justified by the failure of the other 
side to negotiate. If, on the other hand, our objective 
is no longer a negotiated settlement, the nature and 
attainability of our objectives in Vietnam raise seri- 
ous new doubts. There is thus increasing confusion 
about both our basic purpose and our tactics, and 
there is increasing fear that the course now being 
pursued may lead us irrevocably into a major land 
war in Asia — a war which many feel could not be 
won without recourse to nuclear weapons, if then. 

* Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
Aug. 22, 1966, p. 1083. 



In this context there is widespread support for the 
suggestion of the Pope and others that the resumed 
truce be extended de facto by restraint on both sides, 
even if no formal agreement is achieved. And there 
is hope that if fighting must be resumed in 1967 it 
will be resumed on a reduced scale. 

In short, Mr. President, a great many of our con- 
temporaries, raised in the democratic tradition of 
thinking for themselves, are finding a growing con- 
flict between their own observations on the one hand, 
and statements by Administration leaders about the 
war on the other. These are people as devoted to the 
Constitution, to the democratic process, and to law 
and order as were their fathers and brothers who 
served willingly in two World Wars and in Korea. 

Unless this conflict can be eased, the United States 
will continue to find some of her most loyal and cou- 
rageous young people choosing to go to jail rather 
than to bear their country's arms, while countless 
others condone or even utilize techniques for evading 
their legal obligations. Contributing to this situation 
is the almost universal conviction that the present 
Selective Service Law operates unfairly. 

We write in the hope that this letter will encour- 
age a frank discussion of these problems. If such a 
discussion clarified American objectives in Vietnam, 
it might help reverse the drift, which is now from 
confusion toward disaffection. To this end, we submit 
for your consideration some of the questions now 
agitating the academic community: 

— There is doubt that such vital interests as may 
be threatened are best protected by this growing 

— There is doubt that such vital interests as may 
oe threatened are best protected by this growing 

— There is doubt that a war which may devastate 
nuch of the countryside can lead to the stable and 
prosperous Vietnam we once hoped our presence 
ivould help create. 

— There is considerable concern about apparent 
contradictions in the American position on certain 
joints basic to any efforts to negotiate a settlement. 
High Government officials reiterate our eagerness to 
legotiate "unconditionally," but we remain unclear 
ibout our willingness to accept full participation by 
he Viet Cong as an independent party to negotia- 
ions. Similarly, Administration spokesmen reiterate 
lur commitment to self-determination for South 
/ietnam, but we remain unclear about our willing- 
less to accept a coalition (or pro-communist) govem- 
nent should the people of Vietnam eventually choose 
uch a government under adequate international 

Finally, Mr. President, we must report a growing 
«nse — reinforced by Mr. Harrison Salisbury's re- 
cent reports from Hanoi — that too often there is a 
vide disparity between American statements about 
Vietnam and American actions there. 

We hope you will find it possible to share your 

thoughts with us about these matters. The rising 
confusion about national purposes can undermine 
mutual trust and respect among our people. This 
seems to us as urgent a problem as any that con- 
fronts the Nation today. 

We are grateful for your interest and send our 
best wishes for the New Year. 

Robert Powell 

Student Body President 

University of North Carolina 

Chapel Hill, N.C. 

on behalf of himself and [99] other elected 
heads of student government organizations 
and editors of college newspapers, all sign- 
ing in their own individual capacities 

U.S. Reaffirms Desire 
for Peace in Viet-Nam 

Following is an exchange of letters be- 
tween Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representa- 
tive to the United Nations, and U.N. 
Secretary-General U Thant. 


U.S. /U.N. press release B04B 

December 31, 1966 
My Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I ap- 
preciate your thoughtful reply to my letter of 
December 19 1 concerning Vietnam. The 
subject at issue — peace in Vietnam — is of 
such vital importance to my Government and 
to world peace that we have given your reply 
immediate attention and are sending you 
herewith our reply. 

We share your deep concern about the de- 
velopment and effects of the conflict in Viet- 
nam: the risk it poses to international 
peace, the ill effects upon relations between 
states, and — more than anything else — the 
tragic toll in death and destruction. 

I can assure you without reservation that 
the preeminent desire of the United States 
Government is to bring all hostilities in Viet- 
nam to a prompt and honorable end con- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 63. 

ANUARY 23, 1967 


sistent with the United Nations Charter, 
which affirms for all peoples the right of self- 
determination, the right to decide their own 
destiny free of force. 

We have carefully reflected on your ideas, 
expressed in your December 30 letter and on 
previous occasions, about the cessation of 
bombing of North Vietnam. As you rightly 
point out, Mr. Secretary-General, our size and 
power impose special responsibilities upon us. 
And it is with these responsibilities in mind 
that I wish to assure you categorically that 
my Government is prepared to take the first 
step toward peace: specifically, we are ready 
to order a prior end to all bombing of North 
Vietnam the moment there is an assurance, 
private or otherwise, that there would be a 
reciprocal response toward peace from North 

I am, thus, reaffirming herewith an offer 
made before the General Assembly — on 
September 22 ^ and again on October 18.^ We 
hope and trust that you will use every means 
at your disposal to determine what tangible 
response there would be from North Viet- 
nam in the wake of such a prior step toward 
peace on our part. 

While reaffirming our offer, I would also 
express our conviction that the goal which, 
I am sure, we both share — an end to all 
fighting, to all hostilities, to all organized 
terror and violence — cannot be attained by 
either appeals for or the exercise of restraint 
by only one side in the Vietnam conflict. 
We therefore welcome the idea in your letter 
that there be an extended cease-fire, which 
would obviously include a cessation of the 
bombing of North Vietnam as well as an 
end to all hostilities and organized violence 
in the south. We believe the temporary 
truces already arranged in Vietnam offer 
opportunities for initiatives in that direction 
— though we cannot but regret that the other 
parties concerned have shown no interest so 
far in such a cease-fire. 

We continue to believe that peace can come 
to Vietnam in one of two ways: through 
deeds, such as a mutual cessation or reduction 

» Ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518. 
'Ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 757. 

of hostilities, or through discussions. We 
agree with you fully that the ultimate basis 
for a peaceful settlement could be the Geneva 
Accords. We are, however, entirely flexible 
in our approach to the discussions we have 
sought to promote, whether they be format" 
negotiations or informal contacts. In this con- 
nection we would be prepared, as President ! 
Johnson publicly stated this morning,* to 
meet promptly with the Governments of 
North and South Vietnam as proposed by . 
the United Kingdom on December 30. As my 
Government has stated before on many occa- 
sions, we are prepared to discuss all proposals 
and points which any interested party may 
wish to put forward. I am sure that your de- 
sire for a first step to bring about peace is 
accompanied by a strong interest on your part 
in what the subsequent step would be. 

I would conclude, Mr. Secretary-General, 
by expressing our certainty that you — as all 
men of good will — agree it is the war in all its 
facets which must be brought to an end. We 
are thus heartened — and believe all who de- 1 
sire peace in Vietnam will share the feeling 
— by your assurance that you will continue 
to exert your efforts and explore every avenue I 
toward a peaceful solution of the Vietnam 

Sincerely yours, 

Arthur J. Goldberg 


U.N. doc. S/7668 

30 December 1966 
My dear Ambassador, I have very carefully 
studied your letter to me dated 19 December 1966 
on the subject of Viet-Nam. May I say how apprecia- 
tive I am of your Government's request that I might 
take whatever steps I "consider necessary to bring 
about the necessary discussions which could lead to 
such a cease-fire", and especially of the assurance 
that "the Government of the United States will co- 
operate fully ... in getting such discussions started 
promptly and in bringing them to a successful com- 

You are, of course, aware of my preoccupation 
with the question of Viet-Nam during the last three 
years. This preoccupation stems not merely from 

' In reply to a question at a nevirs conference. 



ny recognition of the serious risk that the continua- 
;ion of this war poses to international peace and 
security. To a very large extent it is influenced even 
nore by my deep sympathy, and indeed anguish, over 
;he untold suffering of the people of Viet-Nam who 
Tiave known no peace for a generation, the tragic 
oss of lives on all sides, the increasing number of 
:ivilian casualties, the appalling destruction of prop- 
erty and the vast and mounting sums being spent 
)n the prosecution of the war. 

In this context may I also stress my strong feei- 
ng, publicly expressed more than once, that what is 
•eally at stake in Viet-Nam, unless an early end to 
he hostilities is brought about, is the independence, 
he identity and the survival of the country itself. 

I have already referred to the serious risk to in- 
ernational peace and security that the continuance 
f the war in Viet-Nam poses. There is an ever pres- 
nt danger that the war in Viet-Nam may spread, 
nd even spill over its frontiers. Already the war 
as poisoned relations amongst States and has, as I 
aid earlier, brought to a halt the great enterprise 
f co-operation and understanding between nations 
?hich had barely made a modest start in recent 

This is how I see the over-all situation. It is a 
ituation in which a powerful nation like the United 
tates should take the initiative in the quest for 
eace and show an enlightened and humanitarian 
pirit. I believe that in the circumstances only action 
eliberately undertaken in such spirit which, because 
f its power and position, the United States can 
fford to undertake, can halt the escalation and 
ilargement of this war, and thus bring about a 
irning of the tide towards peace. 

Let me take this opportunity of reiterating my 
iree-point programme, to which I still firmly ad- 

1. The cessation of the bombing of North Viet- 

2. The scaling down of all military activities by 
II sides in South Viet-Nam; 

3. The willingness to enter into discussions with 
lose who are actually fighting. 

I strongly believe that this three-point programme, 
' which the cessation of the bombing of North 
iet-Nam is the first and essential part, is necessary 
I create the possibility of fruitful discussions lead- 
ig to a just and honourable settlement of the prob- 
m of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agree- 
lents of 1954. 

I also wish to recall that in the course of the 

twenty-first session, in the debate of the General 
Assembly, the majority of the delegations have en- 
dorsed the three-point programme. Many more heads 
of delegations also specifically pleaded for the cessa- 
tion of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. It seems 
to me that this is a very clear indication of the 
public opinion of the world at large on this issue. 

Leaders of religious faiths all over the world have 
also expressed their anxiety about the continuance 
and escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. Only a few 
days ago the General Secretary of the World Coun- 
cil of Churches expressed a similar concern. 

When His Holiness the Pope made his plea for 
an extended cease-fire, I endorsed it and I urged all 
parties to heed his appeal. In my statement of 2 
December I said: "Is it too much to hope that what 
is made possible for just a couple of days by the 
occurrence of common holidays may soon prove 
feasible for a longer period by the new commitments 
that peace requires, so that an atmosphere may be 
created which is necessary for meaningful talks to 
be held in the quest for a peaceful solution?" 

This is what I have in mind when I refer to the 
need for a humanitarian approach. If action in such 
a spirit could be undertaken, even without condi- 
tions, by the United States to stop the bombing 
of North Viet-Nam, and if the New Year cease-fire 
could be extended by all the parties, I feel hopeful 
that thereafter some favourable developments may 
follow. I am reminded in this context that in 1954 
negotiations for a peaceful settlement were con- 
ducted even without a formal cease-fire and while 
fighting was going on. Even though there may be 
sporadic breaches of the cease-fire on account of 
lack of control and communication, I believe that 
this would provide a welcome respite for private 
contacts and diplomatic explorations so that, in time, 
formal discussions can take place on the basis of 
the Geneva Agreements of 1954. 

I am writing this letter to you after long delibera- 
tion. I would like to close by assuring you and your 
Government that, in my personal and private ca- 
pacity, I shall continue to exert my utmost efforts 
and to explore every avenue which may lead to a 
just, honourable and peaceful solution of the prob- 
lem of Viet-Nam. 

As your letter under reply was issued as a Se- 
curity Council document [S/7641], I am arranging 
for this reply also to be issued as a document of the 
Security Council. 

Yours sincerely, 

U Thant 

INUARY 23, 1967 


International Law in the United Nations 

by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

All of us recognize that the practice and 
teaching of law have undergone a profound 
revolution in the last generation. No aspect of 
this revolution has been more striking than 
the growing involvement of American 
lawyers and law schools with international 
legal problems. 

A generation ago international law was 
considered a specialty so divorced from the 
normal run of practice that Frederic R. 
Coudert, a leading member of the New York 
Bar, could complain, upon being elevated to 
the presidency of the American Society of 
International Law: "Those colleagues who 
describe me as an international lawyer are 
just trying to take away my best domestic 
clients !" 

Today the effective representation of cli- 
ents in our major urban centers requires the 
ability to deal with the legal aspects of inter- 
national transactions. And, of course, there 
is hardly a Federal agency in which the 
lawyer does not find himself concerned with 
international legal problems. 

The curricula of our major law schools re- 
flect this development. I understand that two- 
thirds of the students at some of our major 
law schools now take at least one course in 
the field of international law. 

This is as it should be. Indeed, I wonder 
whether the trend in our law schools has gone 
far enough. In the light of the revolutionary 
developments which are increasing the inter- 

' Address made before the Association of American 
Law Schools at Washington, D.C., on Dec. 29 (press 
release 304). 


national influences on our national life — de- 
velopments in science and technology, politics 
and economics, in mass communications — one 
may well ask whether today's law student 
should not be expected to take at least one 
course in international law, just as he takes 
one course in torts, contracts, or property. If 
this seems like an extreme suggestion, let us 
remember that today's law student will be 
reaching the peak of his professional career 
in the year 2000. 

When we speak of the international role 
of our law schools, of course, we think of 
research as well as teaching. Two centuries 
ago the High Court of the Admiralty could 
dismiss the work of scholars in international 
law by saying: "A pedantic man in his closet 
dictates the laws of nations; everybody 
quotes, and nobody minds him." Today oui 
scholars in international law are not onlj 
quoted but minded. And I can think of no bet- 
ter example than Professor McDougai 
[Myres McDougai, president, Association ol 
American Law Schools] himself and his 
monumental works on the law of outer space, 
the oceans, and the use of force — not to men- 
tion many other scholars who are in this 
room today. 

But what of law in relation to diplomacy^ 
What is its relevance in dealing with the 
problems of mankind as we face them in the 
United Nations? 

Sir Harold Nicolson once wrote that "the 
worst kind of diplomats are missionaries, 
fanatics and lawyers." Needless to say, we dc 
not believe that at the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations. Sir Harold might be shocked 


;o learn that the large majority of our dele- 
gates and senior advisers at this last General 
Assembly session were lawyers. In fact, we 
lad the full-time services of one law school 
lean and one law school professor, both of 
hem on leave, and the part-time services of 
I professor of international law. One of the 
'ew nonlawyers on the delegation was the 
"oreign Service officer whose title is Coun- 

There are many Americans, I know, who 
luestion the relevance of law in diplomacy 
.nd in a political institution like the United 
Nations. This skepticism results, I believe, 
rom a number of misconceptions. Some peo- 
ile think that law is only concerned with the 
lechanical application of principles found in 
ases and textbooks. Some see law and poli- 
ics as antithetical concepts that operate in 
'atertight compartments. And some believe 
lat the differences between East and West 
nd North and South have destroyed the basis 
)r international law. 

I regard these views as profoundly mis- 
iken. After 18 months and two General As- 
?mblies, I am impressed by the significance 
f law and legal skills in diplomacy and in the 

ork of the United Nations. 

Perhaps a good way to illustrate this is to 
ok at two subjects with which the United 

ations has recently been involved: outer 
)ace and Rhodesia. 

le Development of Space Law 

As you all know, one of the principal mat- 
ers which engaged our attention during re- 
;nt months was the negotiation of a treaty 
werning the exploration and use of outer 
)ace, including the moon and other celestial 
3dies.2 The negotiations were successfully 
mcluded in early December, and the General 
ssembly has recommended that all states 
gn and ratify the treaty. 

This treaty is an important step in the 
rogressive development of international law. 

reduces the danger of conflict and promotes 
le prospects of cooperation in the newest 
id most unfamiliar of all realms of human 

' For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1966, 
952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

activity. Among other things, the treaty pro- 
vides that: 

— Outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, shall be free for ex- 
ploration and use by all states on a basis of 
equality and in accordance with international 

— Outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, is not subject to na- 
tional appropriation by claim of sovereignty, 
by means of use or occupation, or by any 
other means. 

— Nuclear weapons and other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction shall not be sta- 
tioned in space or on celestial bodies. 

The treaty also provides for international 
liability for space vehicle accidents, for the 
rescue and return of astronauts and equip- 
ment, for the avoidance of harmful contami- 
nation of celestial bodies from earth and vice 
versa, for the exchange of information on 
space activities through the United Nations 
and other bodies, and for access to stations 
on the moon and other celestial bodies upon 
reasonable advance notice. 

This treaty did not spring full blown from 
the minds of a few U.N. delegates. It repre- 
sented the culmination not only of negotia- 
tions which began in Geneva last summer but 
of years of consideration in the U.N. and 
elsewhere. This record reveals, I think, a 
number of significant things about the role 
of international law in diplomacy and in the 
United Nations. 

First, the record shows that the develop- 
ment of international law is possible even in 
the midst of deep divergencies of ideology 
and national interest. Even between ad- 
versary powers there can be agreements con- 
taining mutual restraints and reciprocal con- 
cessions which serve the interests of both 
sides. The incentive for the negotiation of 
such agreements and for compliance with 
them is the hope of reciprocity; the sanction 
is the fear of reprisal. For example, it would 
have been difficult for either the Soviet 
Union or the United States to commit itself 
unilaterally not to station nuclear weapons 
in space, but such commitments could be ex- 
changed to the net advantage of both. 

^NUARY 23, 1967 


Second, the record shows the evolutionary 
character of international law in gradually 
codifying ground rules which are perceived 
by states to be in their common interests. In 
space as on earth, the life of the law has not 
been logic but experience. Consider the fol- 
lowing chronology: 

— In 1959, year two of the space age, a 
committee appointed by the U.N. could refer 
to a developing practice that space could be 
used for orbiting satellites without objection 
from subjacent states. 

— In 1961, year four of the space age, this 
principle could be recommended to states in 
a General Assembly resolution, together with 
the related principle, on which there had 
been no practice, that there could be no sov- 
ereign claims on celestial bodies. 

— In 1963, year six of the space age, both 
these principles could be included in a 
Declaration of Legal Principles by the Gen- 
eral Assembly asserted to have the force of 

— And in 1966, year nine of the space age. 
these principles could be included in a for- 
mal treaty instrument. 

This history provides the most recent illus- 
tration of how international law is developed 
in the world today: how states gradually per- 
ceive common interests on the basis of experi- 
ence and how these common interests are 
gradually crystallized into binding rules of 

In the course of the recent negotiations I 
was struck by the fact that the Soviet Union 
and ourselves both followed the same prag- 
matic approach to the development of space 
law. Both countries were prepared to reach 
agreement on those matters where experience 
had demonstrated a sufficient measure of 
common interest, and both countries resisted 
the injection of questions which, though im- 
portant and logically related to the agreed 
principles, were not ripe for international 
negotiation — such as the delimitation of outer 
space and the exploitation of resources on 
celestial bodies. 

Third, the record demonstrates the effec- 
tiveness of the United Nations as a vehicle 
for the development of international law. The 

process of discussion and negotiation of legal 
principles governing outer space naturally 
focused on the two great space powers. But 
the fact that these negotiations were carried 
on in the multilateral framework of the U.Nr^ 
undoubtedly encouraged the space powers to 
be more forthcoming than they otherwise 
might have been — and obliged them to take 
account of the legitimate interests of other 
countries, which also took part in the negotia- 
tions all along the way. Moreover, in the light 
of the Viet-Nam war and the Sino-Soviet 
split, the fact that the space negotiations took 
place in the United Nations made it less dif- 
ficult for the Soviet Union to make the agree- 

Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia 

Even as we were completing our work on 
the space treaty, we were involved in the Se- 
curity Council with another important sub- 
ject which can also tell us something about 
the relevance of law in the United Nations. I 
refer, of course, to Rhodesia. 

Earlier this month, the Security Council 
took an unprecedented step with respect to 
Rhodesia.^ It imposed mandatory sanctions 
on key exports from Rhodesia and on oil ex- 
ports to that territory. 

This was the first time in the history of the 
United Nations that such sanctions had been 
imposed. All members of the United Nations 
are legally obligated to apply these sanctions 
in accordance with article 25 of the charter. 
For the first time in history, our Government 
will be prohibiting activities in international 
trade by American individuals and corpora- 
tions pursuant to a U.N. order under the au- 
thority of our United Nations Participation 

A number of individuals in our country 
have attacked, on both legal and policy 
grounds, this action of the Security Council 
and the support which the United States has 
given it. 

First, it is said that the United Nations 
action represents a denial of the principle of 

' For background, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73. 
' See p. 145. 



The simple answer to this argument is that 

the Smith regime is not asserting the right 

of self-determination for all the Rhodesian 

people but merely the right of 6 percent of 

Y the Rhodesian people who are white to rule 

j lover 94 percent who are black. The refusal of 

j Ithe United Kingdom to recognize the illegal 

1 sseizure of power by the Smith regime, far 

jfrom being a denial of self-determination, is 

, |an attempt to implement that objective for 

jthe Rhodesian people as a whole. 

Second, it is argued that the action of the 
Security Council involves a violation of article 
12, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter. This 
iprovision reads: 

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall au- 
thorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state or shall require the Members to submit 
such matters to settlement under the present Char- 
ter; but this principle shall not prejudice the appli- 
cation of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 

The fallacy of this argument can be seen 
when the facts in the case are tested against 
the provisions I have just quoted: 

— Rhodesia is not a "state" and has not 
been recognized as such by a single govern- 
ment or international organization. 

— The situation in Rhodesia is not "domes- 
tic," since it involves the international re- 
sponsibilities of the United Kingdom under 
chapter XI of the charter relating to non-self- 
governing territories. 

— The action of the Security Council does 
not constitute "intervention," since the Coun- 
cil has acted at the request and with the con- 
currence of the legitimate sovereign, the 
United Kingdom. 

— Article 2, paragraph 7, by its own terms, 
does not apply to the application of enforce- 
ment measures such as the mandatory eco- 
nomic sanctions imposed by the Council in 
this case. 

Third, it is argued that there is here no 
threat to international peace justifying resort 
to mandatory sanctions. 

Under article 39 of the charter, it is the 
responsibility of the Security Council to "de- 
termine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres- 

sion" and to "make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in ac- 
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to main- 
tain or restore international peace and 

This determination by the Council in the 
exercise of its charter powers is conclusive 
and may not be contested by any member. 
The Council has made a judgment as to what 
is likely to happen in the future if the seizure 
of power by the white minority is not brought 
to an end. The judgment can hardly be 
termed unreasonable. The attempt of 220,000 
whites to rule 4 million nonwhites in a con- 
tinent of nonwhite governments which have 
recently achieved independence involves great 
risks of violence. 

Fourth, it is argued that sanctions cannot 
logically be applied against Rhodesia since 
the "threat to the peace" originates else- 
where. This legal conclusion, it is added, is 
not affected by the morality or lack of 
morality of the actions taken by the Smith 

This argument involves still more funda- 
mental misconceptions. Under chapter VII of 
the charter, the Security Council is author- 
ized to order sanctions without the necessity 
of determining which party to a dispute is 
the source of a threat to international peace. 
This should not be surprising. A similar prac- 
tice is followed in our country in major labor- 
management disputes affecting the national 
health and safety, where Federal powers can 
be employed to preserve the economy without 
judgment on the merits of controversy. 

But the principal fallacy in this argument 
is the failure to recognize that the threat to 
the peace inherent in the Rhodesian situation 
is the seizure of power by the Smith regime 
rather than the potential response to it. 

It is in this sense that the actions of the 
Smith regime raise legal as well as moral 
issues. Some say that moral considerations 
are irrelevant in the practical affairs of na- 
tions. But the United Nations Charter, like 
the United States Constitution, embodies 
moral principles. One of the principal pur- 
poses of the United Nations is to promote 
"respect for human rights and for funda- 

JANUARY 23, 1967 


mental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion." The 
attempt of the Smith regime to alter the 
status quo in Rhodesia and create a new state 
committed to the violation of these world 
community standards is the real source of 
the threat to the peace. 

Finally, it is argued that the application of 
mandatory sanctions to Rhodesia constitutes 
a dangerous precedent for similar U.N. action 
wherever any violations of human rights may 
be involved. 

This argument overlooks a number of 
unique elements in the Rhodesian situation. 
Here we have witnessed an illegal seizure of 
power by a small minority bent on perpetuat- 
ing the subjugation of the vast majority. 
Moreover, in this situation the sovereign au- 
thority with international responsibility for 
the territory has asked the United Nations 
to take measures which will permit the 
restoration of the full rights of the people 
of this territory under the charter. 

We in the United States learned over 100 
years ago that any attempt to institutionalize 
and legitimize a political principle of racial 
superiority in a new state was unacceptable. 
The effort to do so created an inflammatory 
situation, and our nation had to rid itself of 
this false and hateful doctrine at great cost. 
What could not be accepted by the United 
States in the mid-19th century cannot be ac- 
cepted by the international community in the 
late 20th century. 

Law in the United Nations, as in our own 
society, is often developed on a case-by-case 
basis. We should analyze each action of U.N. 
political organs with due regard for the facts 
of each case and be careful of hasty generali- 

Because the Security Council considers the 
situation in Rhodesia, with its unique legal 
and factual elements, as constituting a threat 
to the peace requiring thp application of 
mandatory sanctions, does not absolve it from 
an independent exercise of judgment in dif- 
ferent situations. Moreover, each of the 
permanent members of the Security Council 
has the power to prevent the use of enforce- 
ment measures in other situations where it 
may deem them to be inappropriate. 






In the short time available to me I hav If'P"" 
given but two examples of the relevance o; iis''''^ 
law and legal skills to problems before th( iJis"'' 
United Nations. Even from my brief tenun iilSi *' 
at the U.N., I could have cited many others 

— the status of South West Africa follow 
ing the regrettable decision of the Interna '°° 
tional Court of Justice; 

— the constitutional questions surrounding 
the authorizing, managing, and financing of 
peacekeeping operations; 

— the consideration of improved procel 
dures for factfinding, mediation, and concilia- *'^'' 

— the strengthening of U.N. machinery in 
trade and aid to less developed countries; ani 

— the examination of procedures to imple-|Wif 
ment human rights standards through th( 
human right covenants ^ and the proposed 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

Creative Values in International Law 

The building of these institutions for th( 
promotion of peaceful change, justice, eco- 
nomic development, and human rights is as 
much the work of the lawyer as the elabora 
tion of legal norms for the prevention of viO' 

As Professor McDougal said yesterday Im 
his presidential address: 

In our contemporary community . . . people have 
largely ceased to think of law as serving only the 
rather primitive function of maintaining minimum 
order, in preserving the peace and minimizing un- 
authorized coercion, and have come generally to think 
of it as a positive instrument for promoting optimum 
order, in security and the greater production and 
wider distribution of all community values. 

I have no doubt from my work at the U.N. 
that this is true of international as well a.'; 
domestic law. The aspect that says "Thou 
shalt not" — essential though it is — is only 
half the story. Law is more than prohibitions 
on the use of force. It is also, and equally 
essentially, an affirmative concept: a force 
for justice and equal opportunity and for the 
redress of legitimate grievances. Law must 
operate to eliminate discrimination, to assure 
human rights, to feed the hungry, to educate 

'' For texts, see ibid., Jan. 16, 1966, p. 107. 
















:he ignorant, to raise up the oppressed. It 

^. must foster in the international realm the 

'^'"'s tij same creative and positive values which na- 

ions, at their best, have fulfilled in their 

)wn domestic life. 

This creative approach to the role of inter- 
laational law reflects not merely idealism but 
realism as well. Today more than ever, it 
ijl«rould be unrealistic to talk about peace with- 
out addressing ourselves to these positive 

For one of the dominant facts of the 
emerging world community is that the ma- 
jority of its members are still extremely poor 
and still have vivid recollections of what it is 
like to live under colonial rule. They are pre- 
occupied with economic and social develop- 
ment and with human rights. Their commit- 
ment to the law of nations, and to the peace 
which it seeks to build, will deepen only as 
the law helps them to realize these legitimate 

If American law schools can provide our 
■future leadership with an understanding of 
this larger role of international law — and if 
"they can provide the intellectual tools to act 
upon it effectively — they will have performed 
an historic service not just for the United 
States but for the world. 







IIU.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions 
iAgainst Southern Rhodesia 


White House press release dated January 5 

The President on January 5 signed Execu- 
tive Order No. 11322 implementing the 
United Nations Security Council's Resolution 
No. 232 of December 16, 1966,i which im- 
posed selective mandatory economic sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia. 

The President acted under the United Na- 
tions Participation Act of 1945, as amended. 
Section 5 of the act empowers the President 
to implement Security Council decisions 
adopted pursuant to article 41 of the United 
Nations Charter. In its Resolution No. 232, 

JANUARY 23, 1967 

the Council decided that all member states 
shall prohibit imports of Rhodesian asbestos, 
iron ore, chrome, pig iron, sugar, tobacco, 
copper, meat and meat products, and hides, 
skins, and leather, as well as dealing by their 
nationals or in their territories in such prod- 
ucts originating in Southern Rhodesia. The 
resolution also obligates members to embargo 
shipments of arms, aircraft, motor vehicles, 
and petroleum and petroleum products to 
Southern Rhodesia. 

This Executive order prohibits the activi- 
ties proscribed by the resolution, including 
transactions involving commodities exported 
from Southern Rhodesia after December 16, 
the date of the resolution, and delegates to 
the Secretaries of State, Commerce, and the 
Treasury the authority to promulgate regula- 
tions necessary to carry out the order. These 
regulations will be issued by the Departments 
shortly and will be effective as of January 5. 

A violation of the Executive order is a 
criminal offense. Provision will be made in 
the regulations to deal with cases of undue 
hardship arising from transactions com- 
menced before the date of the order. 

The selective mandatory sanctions imposed 
by the Security Council's resolution of 
December 16 supplement earlier voluntary 
measures taken by a large majority of U.N. 
members in response to the Council's appeal, 
contained in its resolution of November 20, 
1965,2 that they break off economic relations 
with Southern Rhodesia. This resolution was 
adopted a few days after the Smith regime 
in Southern Rhodesia had unilaterally de- 
clared its independence on November 11, 
1965. The United States joined with other 
states in implementing the voluntary meas- 
ures called for by the Security Council by 
embargoing the shipment to Southern Rho- 
desia of all arms, military equipment, and 
related items and by suspending the 1965 and 
1966 U.S. import quotas for Rhodesian sugar. 
Since early 1966,. the United States has called 
upon U.S. firms to cooperate with the volun- 
tary Security Council sanctions and has 

• For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Jan. 
9, 1967, p. 73. 

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916. 


recommended that U.S. firms comply with 
British Orders-in-Council by avoiding trade 
in commodities of significant importance to 
the Southern Rhodesian economy, including 
petroleum, as well as Rhodesian exports of 
chrome, asbestos, and tobacco. 


Relating to Trade and Other Transactions 
Involving Southern Rhodesia 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, includ- 
ing section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act 
of 1945 (59 Stat. 620), as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c), 
and section 301 of Title 3 of the United States 
Code, and as President of the United States, and 
considering the measures which the Security Coun- 
cil of the United Nations, by Security Council 
Resolution No. 232 adopted December 16, 1966, has 
decided upon pursuant to article 41 of the Charter 
of the United Nations, and which it has called upon 
all members of the United Nations, including the 
United States, to apply, it is hereby ordered: 

Section 1. The following are prohibited effective 
immediately, notwithstanding any contracts entered 
into or licenses granted before the date of this 

(a) The importation into the United States of 
asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, 
copper, meat and meat products, and hides, skins and 
leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and ex- 
ported therefrom after December 16, 1966, or prod- 
ucts made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or else- 

(b) Any activities by any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote or 
are calculated to promote the export from Southern 
Rhodesia after December 16, 1966, of any of the 
commodities specified in subsection (a) of this section 
originating in Southern Rhodesia, and any dealings 
by any such person in any such commodities or in 
products made therefrom in Southern Rhodesia or 
elsewhere, including in particular any transfer of 
funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such 
activities or dealings: Provided, however, that the 
prohibition against the dealing in commodities ex- 
ported from Southern Rhodesia or products made 
therefrom shall not apply to any such commodities 
or products which, prior to the date of this Order, 
had been imported into the United States. 

(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of United 
States registration of any of the commodities speci- 
fied in subsection (a) of this section originating 

'32 Fed. Reg. 119. 




in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom afte 
December 16, 1966, or products made therefrom i 
Southern Rhodesia or elsewhere. 

(d) Any activities by any person subject to th 
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o 
are calculated to promote the sale or shipment -t 
Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types 
military aircraft, military vehicles and equipmen 
and materials for the manufacture and maintenanc 
of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia. 

(e) Any activities by any person subject to th 
jurisdiction of the United States, which promote o 
are calculated to promote the supply to Southeri 
Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles 
and of equipment and materials for the manufac 
ture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft or moto 
vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in ves 
sels or aircraft of United States registration of an; 
such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and an; 
activities by any person subject to the jurisdictio] 
of the United States, which promote or are calcu 
lated to promote the manufacture or assembly o 
aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia. 

(f) Any participation in the supply of oil or oil 
products to Southern Rhodesia (i) by any persoi 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
or (ii) by vessels or aircraft of United States reg 
istration, or (iii) by the use of any land or ai 
transport facility located in the United States. 

Sec. 2. The functions and responsibilities for thi 
enforcement of the foregoing prohibitions are dele 
gated as follows: 

(a) To the Secretary of State, the function am 
responsibility of enforcement relating to the im 
portation into, or exportation from the United State: 
of articles, including technical data, the control o: 
the importation or exportation of which is providec 
for in section 414 of the Mutual Security Act o: 
1954 (68 Stat. 848), as amended (22 U.S.C. 1934) 
and has been delegated to the Secretary of State by 
section 101 of Executive Order No. 10973 of No- 
vember 3, 1961.* 

(b) To the Secretary of Commerce, the functior 
and responsibility of enforcement relating to — 

(i) the exportation from the United States oi 
articles other than the articles, including technical 
data, referred to in subsection (a) of this section; 

(ii) the transportation in vessels or aircraft of 
United States registration of any commodities the 
transportation of which is prohibited by section 1 
of this Order. 

(c) To the Secretary of the Treasury, the func- 
tion and responsibility of enforcement to the extent 
not delegated under subsections (a) or (b) of this 




* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 27, 1961, p. 900. 


^ Sec. 3. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
' he Treasury, and the Secretary of Commerce shall 
^ xercise any authority which such officer may have 
J part from the United Nations Participation Act 
jf 1945 or this Order so as to give full effect to this 
(rder and Security Council Resolution No. 232. 

Sec. 4. (a) In carrying out their respective func- 
ions and responsibilities under this Order, the Sec- 
" etary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Com- 
lerce shall consult with the Secretary of State. 
ach such Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, 
ath other government agencies and private persons, 
(b) Each such Secretary shall issue such regu- 
itions, licenses, or other authorizations as he con- 
iders necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
irder and Security Council Resolution No. 232. 
Sec. 5. (a) The term "United States", as used in 
lis Order in a geographical sense, means all terri- 
)ry subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 
(b) The term "person" means an individual, part- 
ership, association, or other unincorporated body 
f individuals, or corporation. 


HE White House, 
anuary 5, 1967. 

< ''resident Johnson, Secretary Rusk 
Ijllourn Death of Christian Herter 


"hite House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated December 31 

It is with great personal sorrow that I 
!arned that Christian Herter, a great Ameri- 
an, died last night. 

His life and career spanned a period which 
aw this nation emerge from a century of iso- 
ition to take a place of leadership on the 
'^orld scene. From the day in 1916 when he 
x)k up a post as attache in the American 
Imbassy in Berlin to the leadership of the 
Kennedy Round negotiations to expand and 
beralize world trade — which he was exercis- 
(ig to the day of his death — he participated 
!i the events of our time and shaped them. 

He was with President Wilson at the 

ANUARY 23, 1967 

Versailles Peace Conference in 1918-19. 

He was at the side of Herbert Hoover in 
his work in European relief in 1920-21. 

He then turned to journalism and teaching 
and to public service in Massachusetts. He 
lectured on international relations at Har- 
vard. He rose to be speaker in the Massa- 
chusetts Legislature; and then for 10 years 
was a Member of Congress. 

As a Member of Congress, he led the fa- 
mous Herter committee, whose report helped 
bring to life the Marshall Plan. For 4 years, 
he was Governor of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, and then Under Secretary of 
State and Secretary of State. 

Throughout his life he stood for an Amer- 
ica that would assume its full responsibilities 
on the world scene in conformity with the 
highest values of our national tradition. 

Christian Herter was a wise, gentle, and 
wholly dedicated patriot. He will be missed 
greatly by all of us, but his life and work 
will always be remembered as an important 
part of the half century which has trans- 
formed this nation's place in the world com- 


Press release 306 dated December 31 

The death of Governor Christian Herter is 
a source of deep grief to me and to his many 
friends and colleagues in the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service. 

During a lifetime of selfless and brilliant 
service as legislator, diplomat. Governor, 
Under Secretary and then Secretary of State, 
Governor Herter was one of America's great- 
est public servants. 

During his most recent activity as the 
President's Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, he performed a most difficult 
and intricate duty with great skill and devo- 

Those of us who knew him have suffered a 
great personal loss. Our country will sorely 
miss his talent and dedication. 


Europe and America— Partners in Technology 

by George C. McGhee 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 


In Germany and other European countries 
concern has been expressed in recent months 
about diiTerences in the level and rates of 
technological development between Europe 
and the United States. There has been dis- 
cussion of what has come to be called the 
"technology gap." A belief appears to exist 
that critical sectors of the European economy 
are not participating sufficiently in the re- 
search that leads to advanced technological 

This is fed by statements implying that 
America's greater size, its greater capital re- 
sources, and particularly its large-scale 
official support of industrial research and de- 
velopment, will result in technological superi- 
ority that no European competitor can 
match. It is said that American-owned firms 
operating in Europe do not engage in an ap- 
propriate amount of basic research, but im- 
port their research "full blown" from the 
United States for use by their European 
manufacturing subsidiaries. 

This subject is of great political and eco- 
nomic interest to both of our countries. To- 
night I want to consider some of the facts, 
try to place them in perspective, and make 
clear the intention of the United States to 
work with Europe in alleviating the causes 
of its concern. 

A symposium on international technologi- 
cal cooperation examined this subject in de- 
tail during the Hannover Fair. The Science 


• Address made at the Wirtschafthochschule at 
Mannheim, Germany, on Nov. 10. 

Policy Committee of the OECD [Organiza 
tion of Economic Cooperation and Develop 
ment] has begun a study of this developmeni 
including its causes and its significance ii 
relation to other aspects of economic growth 
More has to be done; many more discussion 
must be held. We can, however, attempt ai 
analysis. Let us begin with a general obser 

One important aim of both research an« 
technological development is economic prog 
ress. The conclusion is inescapable thai 
Western Europe, in terms of gross national 
product, productivity, and industrial produc 
tion, has more than kept pace with the eco> 
nomic growth of the United States over th- 
past 15 years. Even in production for export 
where Europe is often said to be at an in 
creasing disadvantage, the record shows tha 
Europe has done substantially better than wt 

Between 1953 and 1964 the Federal Repub 
lie's gross national product grew at an an 
nual average rate in real terms of 6.3 per- 
cent; the figure for the United States was 3.11 
percent. During the same period the Euro- 
pean Common Market area grew 5.5 percent 
a year. 

EEC [European Economic Community]! 
and German exports also developed more 
rapidly than those of the United States. Be- 
tween 1957 and 1964 U.S. exports expanded 
25 percent; during the same period German 
exports increased 88 percent and the EEC as 
a group, 90 percent. 

It would be a different story if European 



irms were unable to compete with Ameri- 
;ans; however, the United States and Ger- 
nany at present have approximately equiva- 
ent growth rates of about 4 percent in real 
;erms. And, although progress in Western 
Europe has not been even, the only signifi- 
cant exception to the generally favorable 
;rend has been Great Britain. It is interest- 
ing that — of five countries surveyed in a re- 
cent OECD study — Great Britain made the 
greatest research and development effort on 
all four counts of measurement: amount of 
funds invested, percentage of gross national 
product, per capita expenditure, and per- 
zi centage of manpower employed. Yet it 
loI^showed the poorest record in the past 15 
ent years in gross national product growth, in- 
: dustry growth, and increase in productivity 
!l; and exports. 

Trends in the Technological "Spin Off" 

There is a belief in Europe that the strong 
technological and commercial position of 
American industry has resulted largely from 
research contracts provided by the United 
States Government. It is true that in recent 
years our Government expenditures for re- 
search and development have increased 
markedly. At present they total $15 billion 
a year; in addition, American industry 
spends $7 billion of its own. The total re- 
search and development outlay in the United 
States equals about 3.1 percent of the gross 
national product. This compares with about 
1.8 percent in Germany. 

Although about 60 percent of United 
States Federal funds for research and devel- 
opment have gone to American industry, it 
is important to understand that they were 
not provided as subsidies for mass-produc- 
tion industries in competition with foreign 
producers. They went to develop products 
which the U.S. Government has bought. The 
United States Government has, moreover, 
been a specialized type of customer, setting 
standards and placing orders in such a way 
as to meet politically determined U.S. na- 
tional objectives. 

The largest area of research and develop- 
ment support has been in defense — and quite 

logically so, since the basis of all advanced 
weapons systems is a sophisticated technol- 
ogy. In second place is space research. These 
two fields alone presently consume some $12 
billion yearly of Federal funds out of $15 
billion allotted to research and development. 
It is not easy to identify the extent of the 
"spin off" process; that is, the benefits that 
civilian technology derives from military or 
space programs. More studies are necessary. 
Several trends, however, seem clear. 

When the products of the military and 
space programs coincide with the demands of 
the civilian economy, the technological trans- 
fer is demonstrated in its most dramatic 
form. Take, as an example, jet aircraft and 
computers. A requirement for a military jet 
tanker led to the development of the Boeing 
707. Because the Defense Department and 
the space agencies needed computers, their 
advance was accelerated. Civil and military 
aircraft development have traditionally gone 
hand in hand. 

But in other fields the transfer has been 
slower in coming. The limitation for civilian 
market production is cost; the defense or 
government market frequently sets perform- 
ance limits. Different approaches and differ- 
ent production philosophies are required to 
meet the needs of the two different markets. 
Civilian production requires a large adver- 
tising, distribution, sales promotion, and 
market development organization. But Gov- 
ernment requires none of this. 

One additional point must be made. The 
space program, costing the American tax- 
payer about $5 billion a year, results in much 
technical knowledge which, it is believed, 
should be widely applicable in American in- 
dustry. In the past the civilian economy has, 
however, been slow to absorb this technology. 
The National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration has created a special division 
of technology utilization, which collects and 
disseminates new technical information to 
private firms. This has been enthusiastically 
welcomed by American industry; it will be 
interesting to see how successful it is in gain- 
ing wider application of new technical knowl- 
edge. In this connection I might say that 

JANUARY 23, 1967 


NASA, in certain cases, now issues royalty- 
producing licenses to foreign firms interested 
in NASA-sponsored developments. 

I wish to be fully understood. Certainly 
the general economy benefits from these Gov- 
ernment-supported research activities, but 
their nature is, I think, often misunderstood. 
If we overemphasize their benefits, the result 
may be to obscure the real causes of the so- 
called "technology gap" which we are con- 

There have been several important results 
of the U.S. Government commitment to re- 
search and development. One has been to 
dramatize the role of science and technology 
in national development. Space has fired the 
imagination of many young people. Federal 
support has provided training for young sci- 
entists in many areas of basic research, and 
these people have later found their way into 
industry. In a more direct sense the defense 
and particularly the space programs in the 
United States have resulted in new concepts 
of project direction and control. 

A "Management Gap" 

The concept of "systems management" — a 
kind of mathematical formalization of good 
"horse sense" as applied to complicated tech- 
nical systems — has made it possible to con- 
trol large projects involving hundreds of 
companies and thousands of people to ex- 
tremely high tolerances of reliability, within 
rigid time limits and with maximum effi- 
ciency. Successful application of these meth- 
ods permits the most economical use of raw 
materials and of expensive personnel. It 
means more and better products at lower 
prices — which is the secret of meeting busi- 
ness competition. 

But new methods are available to all who 
will accept them. Their adoption, however, 
depends on management initiative. I have 
heard it said that the European problem is 
not so much a "technology gap" as it is a 
"management gap." 

It is generally assumed that research and 
development means innovation — and that in- 





novation means economic growth. This is 
oversimplification. A new invention can I 
applied only with enterprise supported I 
sufficient investment capital where there e: 
ists a broad market. We need to know moi 
about the relation between research and di 
velopment as it relates to economic growtl: 
however, it is clear that they do not neces 
sarily follow one another automatically 

Dr. Donald Hornig, President Johnson' 
Science Adviser, at an OECD science minij 
ters meeting, pointed out that an essentia 
ingredient is the proper environment for er 
couragement of innovative application. Gov 
ernments may help to create this enviror 
ment through their policies in the fields o 
patents, taxation, capital development, an' 
wages and prices. These are often more im 
portant than the policy toward science o 
research. The laboratory is only one aspec1>- 
and not necessarily the most important — ii 
the complex structure of an expanding indus 
trial society. 

Japan is an example. With research ant 
development roughly equal to Germany's 
Japan's growth rates in recent years hav( 
been twice the German and three times th( 
French rate. Japan leads the world in ship 
building. She is second only to the Unite<i 
States in plastics production, although sh« 
originated but few of the new plastics mate* 
rials herself. 

Look for a minute at Sony, the outstanding 
Japanese electronics firm. I have been tolc 
that $100 invested in Sony in 1946 woulc 
now yield $7 million. Sony's development ol 
miniaturized radios, tape recorders, and tele 
vision sets for the civilian market is based oni 
the application of a patented American in 
vention, the transistor, which was largely 
neglected in the United States until Japanese 
enterprise showed the way. Even more sig- 
nificant is the fact that Sony's largest market 
is the United States. 

Japan has been particularly successful in 
exploiting the results of foreign research and 
development through two kinds of arrange- 
ments; namely, purchase of technical know- 
how and production by jointly owned foreign 



Jubsidiaries. Japan has used its limited re- 
lources very skillfully indeed. 
It is often said that the growth of Ameri- 
an subsidiaries endangers the European 
iconomy. When I spoke before the Rhein- 
luhr Club in Duesseldorf in June, I at- 
empted to make one point clear: that Ameri- 
an business firms operating in Germany are 
Jerman firms or joint U.S.-German under- 
lakings in every sense of the word. The point 
8 important. It has also been said that 
i^merican firms here are only producers, that 
Ihey do no research of their own in Europe 
md hence are making Europe increasingly 
lependent on American technology. This can 
ilso be viewed in another light. 

Survey of U.S. Subsidiaries in Germany 

A marked characteristic of German science 
and technology is a shortage of qualified per- 
sonnel. If U.S. firms opened large research 
'acilities here, they would compete for an 
already scarce commodity; namely, the re- 
,earch scientist. But, assuming that U.S. de- 
velopment of research facilities here is de- 
drable, let us look at the facts. The Embassy 
'ecently surveyed U.S. subsidiaries operating 
n the Federal Republic to learn the extent 
and magnitude of their research operations. 

In reply, some pointed out the nature of 
;heir operations called for no research. This 
s also true of many German firms. Some 
American firms were only recently estab- 
ished. But, out of the 74 firms which have 
replied so far, 32 reported that they were 
carrying on research and development in this 
country — with expenditures averaging be- 
tween 2 and 6 percent of total turnover. Six 
others stated that most of their research was 
being done in laboratories established by par- 
ent organizations in other Common Market 
countries. Two other respondents said that 
they planned to begin research work in Ger- 
many in 1968. In sum, the replies showed 
American subsidiaries devoting steadily 
greater expenditures to research and develop- 
ment in Germany. 

American subsidiaries carrying out re- 
search in Germany include IBM Deutschland, 

Deutsche ITT Industries, and Kaiser Alumin- 
ium-Werke, to mention only a few. IBM is 
operating six development and research lab- 
oratories in Europe alone. The laboratories 
in Germany employ 700 scientists and tech- 
nicians. During the period 1964-1965, IBM 
donated $15 million to German universities 
for the promotion of science and research. 
Fifty of its employees lecture regularly at 
German universities and technical institutes. 

Kaiser Aluminium is spending approxi- 
mately 3 percent of its turnover for research 
and development in Germany, developing 
new and improved alloys for cryogenic and 
ballistic applications, as well as for architec- 
tural use. Deutsche ITT Industries has a re- 
search program amounting to 7 percent of its 
sales turnover; the program is directed to- 
ward development of semiconductor compo- 

Opel also conducts an independent research 
and development program in this country. In- 
deed, the Opel Kadett was completely de- 
signed and developed in Germany. The 
millionth car in this series rolled oflf the as- 
sembly line last month. On an average, Opel's 
research expenditures come to about 2 per- 
cent of its annual sales turnover; this would 
be about 72 million deutsche marks for 1965. 

Besides the research these organizations 
are doing here, we should also keep in mind 
the knowledge German scientists, employed 
by these firms, bring back from their fre- 
quent assignments and trips to the United 
States. To this should be added the access 
these firms obtain to research results and 
information developed in the United States — 
or in laboratories elsewhere. In research and 
development the payoff is in the application, 
not in the research itself. And in this respect 
Europe is profiting directly from investments 
made elsewhere. This is a net gain. 

Let us extend this reasoning. Even if a 
firm begins abroad as a producer, it must 
eventually become an innovator too — and a 
developer as well — if it is to compete in an 
active consumer market. This means re- 
search and product development, and it 
means research done not only in America but 

JANUARY 23, 1967 


directly in the marketing area. This means 
research designed to meet the competition on 
its own ground, carried out by people who 
know and can evaluate local conditions. 

Europe as a Research Entity 

In developing their European facilities 
many American firms are looking at Europe 
not as a group of independent countries but 
as a unit. A regional laboratory in one coun- 
try often performs research for subsidiaries 
throughout Europe. Gulf Oil, for instance, 
has just established a new research center in 
Rotterdam; Esso, in addition to its long- 
standing facility in Hamburg, will centralize 
its petrochemical research for Europe at a 
new center in Brussels next year. 

Several U.S. chemical companies have 
maintained research operations in Europe 
for some time: Union Carbide in Brussels 
and Monsanto Chemical and American Cy- 
anamid in Switzerland. Eastman Kodak 
does research in Paris. IBM has a basic re- 
search operation in Zurich. In short, U.S. 
firms are beginning to look upon Europe as a 
research entity. They realize that a localized 
or fractionalized approach is uneconomical, 
just as they have realized that research done 
only in the United States cannot meet the 
needs of the European market. 

Some observers have questioned the quality 
of European research and development. 
There is no foundation for this. European 
research is of the highest quality. It is so 
good, in fact, that the United States Govern- 
ment agencies are still obtaining basic re- 
search through grants and contracts to 
European laboratories. Despite concern over 
the balance-of-payments deficit, U.S. outlays 
for research in Europe approach $10 million 
a year — more than $700,000 of which is 
spent in Germany. 

European governments could do more to 
support research and development. I am con- 
vinced, as I look at the efforts of Science 
Minister [Gerhard] Stoltenberg or at the 
work of Minister [Alain] Peyrefitte in Paris, 
that research budgets in these two countries 
will continue to increase. It must be recog- 


nized, however, that a greater problem tha; 
money is scientific manpower. To prepare fo 
researchers of the future, European school 
must stimulate the imagination of their stu 
dents. In 1962 there were 6.2 researel 
workers per 1,000 population in the Unite 
States, compared with 2.9 in Western Eu 
rope. Europe's educational programs must b 
oriented to narrow this gap. 

Considerable concern has been voiced ii 
Europe about the so-called "brain drain": tb 
loss of trained scientists through emigratioi 
to the United States. It is difficult to obtaii 
accurate data, and the situation differs fron 
country to country. The French do not seen 
to enjoy working in America; if they go a 
all, they rarely stay. A decade ago Germai 
scientists were leaving for the United States 
at the rate of several hundred a year. Al 
though American institutions — universitie; 
and colleges as well as industries — will al 
ways welcome well-trained professionals 
from Europe, I can assure you that it is noi 
our desire to rob Europe of her research 
scientists and engineers. 

To assure that she keeps her scientists Ea 
rope herself must create the proper working 
environment, be it through investment ir 
new projects and programs, or through in 
creased opportunities for individual develop- 
ment and advancement in the universities. A 
large, mobile pool of technical manpower 
exists in the United States. Competition 
among Government, private firms, and uni- 
versities for outstanding people has raised 
the scientist's status as well as his salary 
and career opportunities. In sum, personnel 
policy is an important aspect of national sci- 
ence policy. Recognizing this, the Federal 
Republic's "Science Cabinet" only the other 
day announced salary increases for scientists 
working in federally supported research in- 

It has been suggested that America initiate 
a "technological Marshall Plan" for Europe. 
But technical capability is not to be had for 
the asking — or the giving. Europe must co- 
ordinate her own research and development 
priorities, define her technological goals, and 



rovide the funds needed to assure their 

Much of America's technological knowl- 
dge is in the hands of private industry, 
imerican organizations are eager to partici- 
late in joint projects or in exchanges of 
inow-how with European counterparts. Of- 
en the cheapest way to acquire technical 
inow-how is through purchase of a license, 
lany United States firms have acquired Ger- 
lan licenses. This is often cheaper than per- 
orming the research. But Europeans will 
nd American firms much more interested in 
rading one idea for another — in a swap 
ather than a sale. The good contract negoti- 
tor seeks to acquire useful new knowledge, 
,ot merely to sell a license. One of the 
trongest arguments for an independent com- 
any research program is the bargaining 
ower thus acquired. 

ireas for Government-Sponsored Research 

While I have emphasized that the solution 
3 the so-called "technology gap" cannot be 
ought exclusively in government-sponsored 
esearch, there are, nevertheless, areas in the 
o-called big sciences where costs exceed the 
apacities of individual firms — even large 
nes. In such areas as atomic energy, space 
■esearch, oceanography, high energy physics, 
,ir and water pollution research, and de- 
alination of sea water, government initiative 
an be important in stimulating technological 

Some of these costs may exceed even na- 
ional capabilities. But since we pursue the 
ame goals, why should we not collaborate 
hrough a combination of government and 
)rivate initiative to achieve them? During 
Ilhancellor [Ludwig] Erhard's recent visit 
,0 the United States, he and President John- 
son discussed technological advance. The 
President expressed American willingness to 
;onsider European ideas.^ The Italian Gov- 
irnment has already made a proposal which 
s currently under study in Western capitals. 
N'ASA has been discussing a coordinated 

* For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 17, 1966, 
p. 578. 

U.S.-European program with ESRO, the 
European Space Research Organization. A 
specific proposal for a highly sophisticated 
probe to the planet Jupiter is on the table. 
We hope the Europeans will be able to par- 
ticipate. Besides producing valuable data on 
the solar system, the project promises major 
technological benefits for European industry. 

I would, before closing, like to point to 
the achievement of the Federal Republic's 
nuclear program, particularly for the benefit 
of those who argue that there is no hope of 
Europe's forging ahead in the technological 
race. In 1955 the Federal Republic made its 
bow in the realm of atomic energy. Thanks 
to a policy of Government assistance for pri- 
vate initiative, with a core of distinguished 
physicists, with the expenditure of $825 mil- 
lion, and in cooperation with EURATOM as 
well as the United States and Great Britain, 
German nuclear science has advanced to 
world levels. In the present program of co- 
operation with Europe and the United States 
for faster breeder reactor development, Ger- 
many is playing with distinction the role of 
an original contributor as well as a benefici- 

Thus, a national initiative, plus the setting 
of a national priority and coupled with inter- 
national cooperation, has paid great divi- 
dends. There is no reason why this cannot be 
repeated in other areas as well. 

But these are decisions for Europe to 
make. It is not, I believe, appropriate for us 
to prescribe solutions. I wish only to reiterate 
my Government's willingness to consider Eu- 
ropean suggestions for a cooperative resolu- 
tion of our technological and industrial dif- 
ferences. The historical, economic, and 
cultural fates of Western Europe and the 
United States are inextricably entwined. We 
must collaborate to strengthen this fabric. 

There will be problems and differing view- 
points, but the dialog between us must con- 
tinue. As a contribution to that dialog, I am 
grateful to have had the opportunity to come 
here this evening to set forth American views 
on a subject of economic and political con- 
cern to all of us. 

JANUARY 23, 1967 



Current Actions 



Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, December 29, 1966. 


Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, 
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop- 
erty. Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. En- 
tered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States 
March 6, 1931. TS 834. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Da- 
homey, September 22, 1966. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly December 21, 

Signatures: Australia, October 13, 1966; Czecho- 
slovakia (with a reservation and declaration), 
October 7, 1966; Finland, October 6, 1966; Holy 
See, November 21, 1966; Iceland, November 14, 
1966; Mexico, November 1, 1966; Netherlands, 
October 24, 1966; New Zealand, October 25, 
1966; Norway, November 21, 1966; Sierra Le- 
one, November 17, 1966; United Kingdom (with 
a reservation and interpreting statements), 
October 11, 1966. 



Agricultural commodities agreement under title ' 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and J- 
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S„ 
1731-36), with exchange of notes. Signed t 
Baghdad December 19, 1966. Entered into fois 
December 19, 1966. 


Agreement for the exchange of official publicatioi. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston Dece ■ 
ber 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 19t. 


Agreement relating to the granting of authorizatio; 
to permit licensed amateur radio operators ' 
either country to operate their stations in t 
other country. Effected by exchange of notes , 
The Hague June 22, 1966. 
Entered into force: December 21, 1966. 


Agreement extending the arrangement concerni ■ 
trade in cotton textiles of March 12, 1964 (TL'' 
5741). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisb. 
December 19, 1966. Entered into force Decemb 
19, 1966. 


Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sig:ned 
Lome February 8, 1966. 
Ratifications exchanged: January 5, 1967. 
Enters into force : February 5, 1967. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and A 
sistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.' 
1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed i 
Saigon December 15, 1966. Entered into fori 
December 15, 1966. 

Not in force. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of- foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

VOL. LVI, NO. 1439 

the Department, afl -^/ell as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 


intendent of Documents, U.S. Govemmer 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20401 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi 
cation approved by the Director of th 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966) 

NOTE : Contents of this publication ar 
not copyrighted and items contained hereii 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart 
ment of State Bulletin as the source wll 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed ii 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature 



INDEX January 23, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1439 

Department and Foreign Service. President 
Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mouni Death of 
Christian Herter 147 

lEconomic AfiFairs 

[Europe and America — Partners in Technology 
(McGhee) 148 

U.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against 

Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145 
Europe. Europe and America — Partners in 

Technology (McGhee) 148 

Germany. Europe and America — Partners in 

Technology (McGhee) 148 

Presidential Documents 

President Johnson, Secretary Rusk Mourn 

Death of Christian Herter 147 

US. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against 

Southern Rhodesia 145 

[Europe and America — Partners in Technology 

(McGhee) 148 

International Law in the United Nations 

(Goldberg) 140 

southern Rhodesia 

International Law in the United Nations 

(Goldberg) 140 

J/S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against 

Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145 
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 154 
Jnited Nations 
international Law in the United Nations 

(Goldberg) 140 

J.S. Implements U.N. Sanctions Against 

Southern Rhodesia (Executive order) . . . 145 
J.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam 

(Goldberg, U Thant) 137 


Secretary Rusk Discusses Prospects for 1967 
on "Face the Nation" 126 

Secretary Rusk Redefines United States Pol- 
icy on Viet-Nam for Student Leaders (Pow- 
ell, Rusk) 133 

U.S. Reaffirms Desire for Peace in Viet-Nam 
(Goldberg, U Thant) 137 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J 137, 140 

Johnson, President 145, 147 

McGhee, George C 148 

Powell, Robert 133 

Rusk, Secretary 126, 133, 147 

U Thant 137 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 2 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
304 of December 29 and 306 of January 9. 

No. Date Subject 

fl 1/5 U.S. and Togo exchange instru- 
ments of ratification on com- 
mercial treaty. 
2 1/6 Rusk: letter to student leaders. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

■ti U.S. Government Printing Office: 1966—251-932/29 






Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task 

The United States must move ahead on three fronts in regard to its European policy: fii 
to modernize NATO and strengthen other Atlantic alliances; second, to further the integi'ati 
of the Western European community; and, third, to quicken progress in East-West relation 

President Johnson, in an address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers 
New York, N.Y., on October 7, 1966, discussed the new steps being taken, and those under c( 
sideration, to achieve these ends. This pamphlet contains the text of that address. 



To: Sapt. of DoconeBts 
Gon. Prlatius Offlea 
Wsshinston, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ 

(cash, check, or money order). Please send 

copies of Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task. 




To be mslM 



Coupon nfund . 









Street address.. 

City, State, and ZIP codeL. 







Vol. LVI, No. lUO 

January SO, 1967 

Address of President Johnson to the Congress (Excerpts) 158 

Address by Vice President Humphrey ISA 


Transcript of Interview 168 

Article by William K. Miller 173 

For index see inside back cover 

The State of the Union 


Mr. Speaker, Mr. Vice President, distin- 
guished Members of the Congress: 

I have come here tonight to report to you 
that this is a time of testing for our Nation. 

At home, the question is whether we will 
continue working for better opportunities 
for all Americans, when most Americans are 
already living better than any people m his- 

Abroad, the question is whether we have 
the staying power to fight a very costly M^ar, 
when the objective is limited and the danger 
to us is seemingly remote. 

So our test is not whether we shrink from 
our country's cause when the dangers to us 
are obvious and close at hand but, rather, 
whether we carry on when they seem ob- 
scure and distant — and some think that it 
is safe to lay down our burdens. 

I have come tonight to ask this Congress 
and this Nation to resolve that issue: to 
meet our commitments at home and abroad 
— to continue to build a better America — and 
to reaffirm this Nation's allegiance to free- 

As President Abraham Lincoln said, "We 
must ask where we are, and whither we are 

' Delivered on Jan. 10 (Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Jan. 16, 1967); also 
available as H. Doc. 1, 90th Cong., 1st sess. 

Abroad, as at home, there is also risk in 
change. But abroad, as at home, there is a 
greater risk in standing still. No part of our 
foreign policy is so sacred that it ever re- 
mains beyond review. We shall be flexible 
where conditions in the world change — and 
where man's efforts can change them for the 

Transition to International Partnership 

We are in the midst of a great transition 
— a transition from narrow nationalism to 
international partnership; from the harsh 
spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of 
common humanity on a troubled and a 
threatened planet. 

In Latin America the American chiefs of 
state will be meeting very shortly to give our 
hemispheric policies new direction. 

We have come a long way in this hemi- 
sphere since the inter- American effort in eco- 
nomic and social development was launched 
by the conference at Bogota in 1960 under 
the leadership of President Eisenhower. The 
Alliance for Progress moved dramatically 
forward under President Kennedy. There is 
new confidence that the voice of the people 
is being heard, that the dignity of the indi- 
vidual is stronger than ever in this hemi- 
sphere, and we are facing up to and meeting 
many of the hemispheric problems together. 
In this hemisphere that reform under de- 
mocracy can be made to happen — because it 
has happened. So together, I think, we must 



now move to strike down the barriers to full 
cooperation among the American nations 
and to free the energ:ies and the resources of 
two great continents on behalf of all of our 

Africa stands at an earlier stage of de- 
velopment than Latin America. It has yet to 
develop the transportation, communications, 
agriculture, and, above all, the trained men 
and women without which growth is impos- 
sible. There, too, the job will best be done if 
the nations and peoples of Africa cooperate 
on a regional basis. More and more our pro- 
grams for Africa are going to be directed 
toward self-help. 

The future of Africa is shadowed by un- 
solved racial conflicts. Our policy will con- 
tinue to reflect our basic commitments as a 
people to support those who are prepared to 
work toward cooperation and harmony be- 
tween races and to help those who demand 
change but reject the fool's gold of violence. 

In the Middle East the spirit of good will 
toward all unfortunately has not yet taken 
hold. An already tortured peace seems to be 
constantly threatened. We shall try to use 
our influence to increase the possibilities of 
improved relations among the nations of that 
region. We are working hard at that task. 

In the great subcontinent of South Asia 
live more than a sixth of the earth's popula- 
tion. Over the years we — and others — have 
invested very heavily in capital and food for 
the economic development of India and 

We are not prepared to see our assistance 
wasted, however, in conflict. It must 
strengthen their capacity to help themselves. 
It must help these two nations— both our 
friends — to overcome poverty, to emerge as 
self-reliant leaders, and find terms for 
reconciliation and cooperation. 

In Western Europe we shall maintain in 
NATO an integrated common defense. But 
we also look forward to the time when 
greater security can be achieved through 
measures of arms control and disarmament 
and through other forms of practical agree- 

Relations With Eastern Europe 

We are shaping a new future of enlarged 
partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic 
and technical cooperation, in trade negotia- 
tions, in political consultation, and in work- 
ing together with the governments and 
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet 

The emerging spirit of confidence is pre- 
cisely what we hoped to achieve when we 
went to work a generation ago to put our 
shoulder to the wheel and try to help rebuild 
Europe. We faced new challenges and oppor- 
tunities then and there — and we faced also 
some dangers. But I believe that the peoples 
on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as both 
sides of this Chamber, wanted to face them 

Our relations with the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe are also in transition. We 
have avoided both the acts and the rhetoric 
of the cold war. When we have differed with 
the Soviet Union, or other nations for that 
matter, I have tried to differ quietly and with 
courtesy and without venom. 

Our objective is not to continue the cold 
war but to end it. 

We have reached an agreement at the 
United Nations on the peaceful uses of outer 
space: ^ 

We have agreed to open direct air flights 
with the Soviet Union.' 

We have removed more than 400 nonstra- 
tegic items from export control. 

We are determined that the Export- 
Import Bank can allow commercial credits to 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslo- 
vakia, as well as to Romania and Yugoslavia. 

We have entered into a cultural agreement 
with the Soviet Union for another 2 years.* 

We have agreed with Bulgaria and 
Hungary to upgrade our legations to embas- 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, 
p. 952, and Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

' For text of an agreement signed on Nov. 4, see 
ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 791. 

■* For text of a joint communique, see ibid., Apr. 4, 
1966, p. 543. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


We have started discussions with interna- 
tional agencies on ways of increasing con- 
tacts with Eastern European countries. 

This administration has taken these steps 
even as duty compelled us to fulfill and exe- 
cute alliances and treaty obligations through- 
out the world that were entered into before 
I became President. 

So, tonight I now ask and urge this Con- 
gress to help our foreign and our commercial 
trade policies by passing an East- West trade 
bill and by approving our consular conven- 
tion with the Soviet Union. 

The Soviet Union has in the past year in- 
creased its long-range missile capabilities. 
It has begun to place near Moscow a limited 
antimissile defense. My first responsibility to 
our people is to assure that no nation can 
ever find it rational to launch a nuclear at- 
tack or to use its nuclear power as a credible 
threat against us or against our allies. 

I would emphasize that that is why an im- 
portant link between Russia and the United 
States is in our common interest, in arms 
control and in disarmament. We have the 
solemn duty to slow down the arms race be- 
tween us, if that is at all possible, in both 
conventional and nuclear weapons and de- 
fenses. I thought we were making some 
progress in that direction the first few 
months I was in office. I realize that any ad- 
ditional race would impose on our peoples, 
and on all mankind for that matter, an addi- 
tional waste of resources with no gain in 
security to either side. 

I expect in the days ahead to closely con- 
sult and seek the advice of the Congress 
about the possibilities of international 
agreements bearing directly upon this prob- 

The Food-Population Problem 

Next to the pursuit of peace, the really 
greatest challenge to the human family is the 
race between food supply and population in- 
crease. That race tonight is being lost. 

The time for rhetoric has clearly passed. 
The time for concerted action is here and 
we must get on with the job. 

We believe that three principles must pre- 
vail if our policy is to succeed: 

First, the developing nations must give 
highest priority to food production, including 
the use of technology and the capital of- 
private enterprise. 

Second, nations with food deficits must put 
more of their resources into voluntary family 
planning programs. 

And third, the developed nations must all 
assist other nations to avoid starvation in the 
short run and to move rapidly toward the 
ability to feed themselves. 

Every member of the world community 
now bears a direct responsibility to help 
bring our most basic human account into 

Why We Are in Viet-Nam 

I come now finally to Southeast Asia — and 
to Viet-Nam in particular. Soon I will sub- 
mit to the Congress a detailed report on that 
situation. Tonight I want to just review the 
essential points as briefly as I can. 

We are in Viet-Nam because the United 
States of America and our allies are com- 
mitted by the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet 
the common danger" of aggression in South- 
east Asia. 

We are in Viet-Nam because an interna- 
tional agreement signed by the United 
States, North Viet-Nam, and others in 1962 
is being systematically violated by the Com- 
munists. That violation threatens the inde- 
pendence of all the small nations in Southeast 
Asia and threatens the peace of the entire 
region and perhaps the world. 

We are there because the people of South 
Viet-Nam have as much right to remain non- 
Communist — if that is what they choose — 
as North Viet-Nam has to remain Commu- 

We are there because the Congress has 
pledged by solemn vote to take all necessary 
measures to prevent further aggression. 

No better words could describe our pres- 
ent course than those once spoken by the 
great Thomas Jefferson: "It is the melan- 
choly law of human societies to be compelled 



sometimes to choose a great evil in order to 
ward off a greater." 

We have chosen to fight a Hmited war in 
Viet-Nam in an attempt to prevent a larger 
war — a war almost certain to follow, I be- 
lieve, if the Commimists succeed in overrun- 
ning and taking over South Viet-Nam by 
aggression and by force. I believe, and I am 
supported by some authority, that if they are 
not checked now the world can expect to pay 
a greater price to check them later. 

That is what our statesmen said when they 
debated this treaty, and that is why it was 
ratified 82 to 1 by the Senate many years 

You will remember that we stood in West- 
ern Europe 20 years ago. Is there anyone in 
this Chamber tonight who doubts that the 
course of freedom was not changed for the 
better because of the courage of that stand? 

Sixteen years ago we and others stopped 
another kind of aggression — ^this time it was 
in Korea. Imagine how different Asia might 
be today if we had failed to act when the 
Communist army of North Korea marched 
south. The Asia of tomorrow will be far dif- 
ferent because we have said in Viet-Nam, as 
we said 16 years ago in Korea: "This far and 
no further." 

I think I reveal no secret when I tell you 
that we are dealing with a stubborn adver- 
sary who is committed to the use of force 
and terror to settle political questions. 

I wish I could report to you that the con- 
flict is almost over. This I cannot do. We face 
more cost, more loss, and more agony. For 
the end is not yet. I cannot promise you that 
it will come this year — or come next year. 
Our adversary still believes, I think, tonight, 
that he can go on fighting longer than we 
can and longer than we and our allies will 
be prepared to stand up and resist. 

Our men in that area — there are nearly 
500,000 now — have borne well "the burden 
and the heat of the day." Their efforts have 
deprived the Communist enemy of the vic- 
tory that he sought and that he expected a 
year ago. We have steadily frustrated his 
main forces. General [William C] West- 

moreland reports that the enemy can no 
longer succeed on the battlefield. 

So I must say to you that our pressure 
must be sustained — and will be sustained — 
until he realizes that the war he started is 
costing him more than he can ever gain. 

I know of no strategy more likely to at- 
tain that end than the strategy of "accumu- 
lating slowly, but inexorably, every kind of 
material resource" — of "laboriously teaching 
troops the very elements of their trade." 
That, and patience — and I mean a great deal 
of patience. 

Our South Vietnamese allies are also being 
tested tonight. Because they must provide 
real security to the people living in the coun- 
tryside. And this means reducing the ter- 
rorism and the armed attacks, which kid- 
naped and killed 26,900 civilians in the last 
32 months, to levels where they can be suc- 
cessfully controlled by the regular South 
Vietnamese security forces. It means bring- 
ing to the villagers an effective civilian gov- 
ernment that they can respect, and that they 
can rely upon, and that they can participate 
in, and that they can have a personal stake 
in. We hope that government is now begin- 
ning to emerge. 

While I cannot report the desired progress 
in the pacification effort, the very distin- 
guished and able Ambassador, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, reports that South Viet-Nam is turn- 
ing to this task with a new sense of urgency. 
We can help, but only they can win this part 
of the war. Their task is to build and protect 
a new life in each rural province. 

Spirit of Hope Rising in Asia 

One result of our stand in Viet-Nam is 
already clear. 

It is this: The peoples of Asia now know 
that the door to independence is not going to 
be slammed shut. They know that it is pos- 
sible for them to choose their own national 
destinies — without coercion. 

The performance of our men in Viet-Nam 
— backed by the American people — has 
created a feeling of confidence and unity 
among the independent nations of Asia and 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


the Pacific. I saw it in their faces in the 19 
days that I spent in their homes and in their 
countries. Fear of external Communist con- 
quest in many Asian nations is already sub- 
siding — and with this, the spirit of hope is 
rising. For the first time in history, a com- 
mon outlook and common institutions are 
already emerging. 

This forward movement is rooted in the 
ambitions and the interests of Asian nations 
themselves. It was precisely this movement 
that we hoped to accelerate when I spoke at 
Johns Hopkins in Baltimore in April 1965,^ 
and I pledged "a much more massive effort 
to improve the life of man" in that part of 
the world, in the hope that we could take 
some of the funds that we were spending on 
bullets and bombs and spend it on schools and 

Twenty months later our efforts have pro- 
duced a new reality: The doors of the billion- 
dollar Asian Development Bank that I 
recommended to the Congress, and you en- 
dorsed almost unanimously, I am proud to 
tell you, are already open. Asians are en- 
gaged tonight in regional efl^orts in a dozen 
new directions. Their hopes are high. Their 
faith is strong. Their confidence is deep. 

And even as the war continues, we shall 
play our part in carrying forward this con- 
structive historic development. As recom- 
mended by the Eugene Black mission, and 
if other nations will join us, I will seek a spe- 
cial authorization from the Congress of $200 
million for East Asian regional programs. 

Because we are eager to turn our re- 
sources to peace. Our eflForts in behalf of 
humanity I think need not be restricted by 
any parallel or by any boundary line. The 
moment that peace comes, as I pledged in 
Baltimore, I will ask the Congress for funds 
to join in an international program of recon- 
struction and development for all the people 
of Viet-Nam — and their deserving neighbors 
who wish our help. 

' rbid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

We shall continue to hope for a reconcilia- 
tion between the people of mainland China 
and the world community — including work- 
ing together in all the tasks of arms control, 
security, and progress on which the fate of- 
the Chinese people, like their fellow men 
elsewhere, depends. 

We would be the first to welcome a China 
which decided to respect her neighbors' 
rights. We would be the first to applaud her 
were she to apply her great energies and in- 
telligence to improving the welfare of her 
people. And we have no intention of trying 
to deny her legitimate needs for security and 
friendly relations with her neighboring coun- 

Our hope that all of this will some day hap- 
pen rests on the conviction that we, the 
American people and our allies, vdll and are 
going to see Viet-Nam through to an honor- 
able peace. 

We will support all appropriate initiatives 
by the United Nations, and others, which can 
bring the several parties together for uncon- 
ditional discussions of peace — anywhere, any 
time. And we will continue to take every pos- 
sible initiative ourselves to constantly probe 
for peace. 

The Course of Wisdom for This Country 

Until such efforts succeed, or until the 
infiltration ceases, or until the conflict sub- 
sides, I think the course of wisdom for this 
country is that we just must firmly pursue 
our present course. We will stand firm in 

I think you know that our fighting men 
there tonight bear the heaviest burden of 
all. With their lives they serve their Nation. 
We must give them nothing less than our 
full support — and we have given them that — 
nothing less than the determination that 
Americans have always given their fighting 
men. Whatever our sacrifice here, even if it 
is more than $5 a month, it is small compared 
to their own. 



How long it will take I cannot prophesy. I 
only know that the will of the American 
people, I think, is tonight being tested. 

Whether we can fight a war of limited ob- 
jectives over a period of time, and keep alive 
the hope of independence and stability for 
people other than ourselves; whether we can 
continue to act with restraint when the 
temptation to "get it over with" is inviting 
but dangerous; whether we can accept the 
necessity of choosing "a great evil in order 
to ward off a greater"; whether we can do 
these without arousing the hatreds and the 
passions that are ordinarily loosed in time of 
war — on all these questions so much turns. 

The answers will determine not only where 
we are, but "whither we are tending." 

A time of testing — yes. And a time of 
transition. The transition is sometimes slow; 
sometimes unpopular; almost always very 
painful; and often quite dangerous. 

But we have lived with danger for a long 
time before, and we shall live with it for a 
long time yet to come. We know that "man is 

born unto trouble." We also know that this 
Nation was not forged and did not survive 
and grow and prosper without a great deal of 
sacrifice from a great many men. 

For all the disorders that we must deal 
with and all the frustrations that concern us 
and all the anxieties that we are called upon 
to resolve, for all the issues that we must 
face with the agony that attends them, let 
us remember that "those who expect to reap 
the blessings of freedom must, like men, 
undergo the fatigues of supporting it." 

But let us also count not only our burdens 
but our blessings — for they are many. 

And let us give thanks to the One who 
governs us all. 

Let us draw encouragement from the signs 
of hope — for they, too, are many. 

Let us remember that we have been tested 
before and America has never been found 

So with your understanding, I would hope 
your confidence, and your support, we are 
going to persist — and we are going to suc- 

JANUARY 30, 196? 


The Technological Revolution and the World of the 1970's 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 

The Institute of International Education 
is a place where intellect and power have 
been brought together— and long before 
Franklin Roosevelt's "brain trust" or the era 
of the Washington in-and-outer. 

The Institute of International Education 
has been in existence now almost half a cen- 
tury. Its initiatives preceded the Fulbright 
Act, the Smith-Mundt Act, the Mutual Edu- 
cational and Cultural Exchange Act, the 
International Education Act, and the range 
of highly important programs which form 
the base of our efforts in international 
education today. And these programs came 
none too soon. But without the work of the 
Institute of International Education they 
might not have come at all. 

In the past two decades we have seen sci- 
ence and technology shrink our neighborhood 
so that today the moral unity and interde- 
pendence of man (which for centuries has 
been the basis of Western civilization) has 
now become a physical fact of our lives. Iso- 
lationism has been replaced by a global 

Yet we are today only at the primitive 
stages of the scientific and technological de- 
velopment which will shrink our human 
neighborhood still further. 

The prospect of a supersonic transport 
plane — a few years ago a matter of "if" — is 
today only a matter of "who first?" I doubt 
that we have full grasp of what the SST 

' Made before the Institute of International Edu- 
cation at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6. 

will mean in terms of increased exchange of 
people and goods. 

And the communications satellites — Buck 
Rogers items through most of our lifetimes — 
will soon be bringing mass communication, 
in the real sense, to our planet. They bear 
with them, too, the implications cf the crea- 
tion of a one-world classroom. 

Tlie sky is no longer the limit! 

strengthening International Education 

In such an age, our position of world lead- 
ership demands that we go far beyond our 
present efforts in international education. 

The International Education Act will make 
a i-eal difference in helping improve the 
faculties, facilities, and libraries of our col- 
leges and universities. Its impact will be felt 
at both the undergraduate and graduate 

The new Center for Educational Coopera- 
tion, among its other functions, will serve as 
a Government manpower resources head- 
quarters in the entire field. 

These things give us a framework upon 
which we can build. 

Next year the President will convene an 
international conference on education. Its 
purpose will be to look beyond the programs 
presently underway or even contemplated — 
in fact, to take international education into 
century 21. Planning meetings for the con- 
ference will begin in the next few weeks, 
under the chairmanship of Secretary [of 
Health, Education, and Welfare John W.] 
Gardner and Dr. James Perkins of Cornell. 



But we all should remember that the de- 
termination of the Government to do its part 
to strengthen international education in no 
way diminishes the need for continued lead- 
ership in this field by private institutions of 
all kinds, foundations, universities, colleges, 
churches, and others. 

The role of the Government in this field 
must always be to supplement, never to sup- 
plant, the efforts of private groups and indi- 
viduals. The bold experiments, the expanded 
programs that should come from private in- 
stitutions — like the Institute of International 
Education — can be carried out only with the 
continued support of American private bene- 
factors. So take the initiative — do your job — 

Indeed, one of the urgent tasks of our 
American democracy is to find new ways and 
means to mobilize and allocate both public 
and private resources to the priorities of our 
time without either destroying private initia- 
tive or unduly enhancing public power. 

The Second Industrial Revolution 

Tonight I would like to address myself to 
the next decade, to the world of the 1970's. 
I would like to take advantage of the pres- 
ence of so many illustrious figures from the 
world of education and finance, foundations 
and business, the communications media and 
the arts, to raise certain questions which you 
and your children must answer. And it is 
appropriate that these questions be put to 

Governments — and government officials — 
must deal with immediate problems. This 
often clouds their perception of the future. 
But you are less inhibited by these restraints 
and better situated to anticipate what is com- 
ing as well as to respond to what is here. 

In speculating on the world of the 1970's 
(and what I suggest here tonight can only 
be considered as speculation by an amateur) 
I would like to raise several questions about 
the consequences of what has been called 
the second industrial revolution. 

The first industrial revolution was charac- 
terized by the invention of powerful 

machines which multiply man's capacity for 
physical work. The second industrial revolu- 
tion, which is coming upon us long before the 
problems of the first have been solved, is 
characterized by the invention of new elec- 
tronic machines which are destined to mul- 
tiply the capacity of the human mind. 

Differences Between Developed Areas 

One important consequence of the second 
industrial revolution involves the techno- 
logical gap which today separates the world's 
most developed country, the United States, 
from the other developed areas of the world 
— yes, even Europe. 

This unique gap exists in large part be- 
cause the second industrial revolution has 
developed in the United States far more than 
in any other area. It results, in part, from 
the difl'ering levels of technological progress 
and organizational efficiency, which are also 
affected by the factor of optimum size. 

These can lead to the creation of dif- 
ferences between two developed areas — "de- 
veloped" in the sense of the first industrial 
revolution — just as there are differences 
which now exist between the so-called de- 
veloped areas of the Northern Hemisphere 
and the developing or underdeveloped na- 
tions of the South. 

Scientific and technical progress is con- 
tinuing at an accelerated rate with no pros- 
pect of reaching a saturation point. Dis- 
coveries are based on previous knowledge and 
in turn generate progress in other fields. 
Progress becomes self-propelling. 

Only four areas of the world — the United 
States, Western Europe, Japan, and the 
Soviet Union — have the educational and re- 
search resources and other elements of a 
technological base to deal with the current 
pace of scientific discoveries. But none of the 
four has the resources today to deal effec- 
tively with the entire spectrum of these dis- 
coveries, although the United States comes 
closest to it. 

Scientific and technological progress de- 
pends greatly on the rate of investment in 
research and development. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


Recent Common Market estimates show 
the total of scientists and research workers 
in the United States to be 4 times greater 
than in all the countries of the EEC [Euro- 
pean Economic Community] and 3I/2 times 
greater than in the Soviet Union. 

According to the same estimates, research 
expenditures in the United States are 7 times 
greater than in the Common Market and 3V^ 
times those of the Soviet Union. 

And U.S. per capita investment is six 
times as much as in the Common Market and 
four times that of the Soviet Union. 

Organizational Structure and Capacity 

Beyond the statistics, however, we are told 
by European entrepreneurs that this dis- 
parity in scientific research capacity is 
widened by the difference in organizational 
capacity between the United States and 

Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti, for one, believes 
that only the United States possesses the 
highly developed modern organization re- 
quired to profit appreciably from the techno- 
logical discoveries of today. 

This is especially important in the new and 
complex field of electronic data processing, 
where organization is the decisive factor in 
exploiting the potential capacity of highly 
refined machines. 

To translate the amazing potential of com- 
puters into concrete benefits for society re- 
quires an accumulation of skills which few 
nations have. It requires, as Mr. Peccei 
points out, "evolved user techniques, knowl- 
edge of machine languages, advanced meth- 
odology, rich program libraries, access to the 
cross-fertilizing experiences of a vast net- 
work of users, plus a competent array of 
mathematicians, analysts and programmers." 

What is relevant here is that the material 
advantages which exist in an advanced 
society such as the United States or Western 
Europe are multiplied by the organizational 
structure and capacity of the country or 

Western European countries today have j 
neither the size required for such efficient 
organization nor adequate basic infrastruc- 
ture, such as fully sufficient communication 
linkage essential to transmission of elec- - 
tronic data. The end of the present fragmen- 
tation of Europe is considered a necessity. 

Technology and Unity 

But, fortunately, on both sides of the 
Atlantic we are beginning to face up to this 

We have already taken steps to remove 
barriers to the flow of scientific and techni- 
cal information and instruments to and from 
our country.'' 

As a United States Senator I proposed that 
NATO, in meeting the new challenges facing 
the alliance, should take concrete steps to- 
ward narrowing the technological gap. 

Proposals for such cooperative actions are 
now formally before the NATO ministers.' 
The OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] ministers 
have recently authorized an analytical study 
of the gap.'' 

One promising proposal has been Prime 
Minister Wilson's [British Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson] for a European Technologi- 
cal Community. If Europe — which has 
already seen the benefits of a Euroi)ean Eco- 
nomic Community, a Coal and Steel Com- 
munity, and an Atomic Energy Community 
— were to pool her technology in a similar 
way, I have no doubt that the gap would in 
the next decade begin to close. 

The fundamental question which I would 
like to leave with you is: What are the impli- 
cations of this second industrial revolution 
for the international relations of the 1970's, 
especially the late 1970's? 

' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966, 
p. 894. 

' For text of a resolution adopted by the NATO 
Council of Ministers on Dec. 16, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 
9, 1967, p. 52. 

* For U.S. statements and text of a communique 
dated Nov. 25, 1966, see ibid., Jan. 2, 1967, p. 19. 



I do not know the answer. But already 
serious men are concerned that it could re- 
sult not in greater unity, not in the cement- 
ing of a long-cherished Atlantic partnership, 
but in estrangement between Europe and the 
United States. 

Yes, it could release forces which would 
widen the gap between the United States and 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at a 
time when the ideological and military com- 
petition between them might be diminishing. 

If these are legitimate concerns, should 
not men of vision and foresight seek to plan 
for these eventualities and by decisive action 
influence their development? 

We must guide the technological revolu- 
tion so that it can enhance our unity rather 
than cause alienation and division. 

This means that some way must be found 
to insure a continuous exchange of techno- 
logical and organizational experience be- 
tween Europe and the United States which 
will achieve an equilibrium that can be main- 
tained and possibly someday expanded to in- 
clude Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

If this seems fanciful, I would repeat that 
I am discussing the next decade — which ends 
in 1980 — not the present. 

New Realities of a New Era 

Reflecting on the problems which this sec- 
ond industrial revolution will bring to our 
own country in the next decade, a young 
American pioneer in the second industrial 
revolution, Mr. John Diebold, has proposed 
the creation of "an institute for the con- 
tinued assessment of the human consequences 
of technological change." 

Perhaps what is needed in the interna- 
tional field is some equivalent forum which 
would bring together under nongovernmental 
auspices men of wisdom and experience from 
the universities and foundations, science and 
industry, politics and the professions, who 
could systematically assess the implications 
of this second industrial revolution for the 
world of the 1970's. Their recommendations 

would invariably become an important guide 
to governmental decisionmaking. 

Yes, we must have a global policy which 
fits the new realities of a new era. 

With such a policy, we shall be better pre- 
pared not only to deal with the relations be- 
tween the technologically advanced areas of 
the world and the problems of survival and 
peace which affect all countries, but also with 
those areas where the first industrial revolu- 
tion is still taking hold. 

I refer to the problems of hunger and over- 
population, education and social justice, and 
distribution of wealth. 

We shall be better prepared to strengthen 
and enlarge the area of prosperity in the 

Building a Truly Human World 

In the next decade, even more than the 
present, the relationship between foreign 
affairs and education will be important. 

The scholar and the businessman, the 
foundation and the university, will play a 
significant role in accelerating the techno- 
logical revolution and assisting mankind to 
deal with its consequences. 

But the closeness of their relationship, in 
this decade or the next, in no way implies 
that the university and the scholars and the 
scientists should cease to independently pur- 
sue their own ends. Chief among these is the 
pursuit and dissemination of truth. Govern- 
ment — at home or abroad — should not deflect 
them from pursuing this end. 

But in the next decade, as in this one, 
scientific and technological education will not 
be enough to sustain the spirit of civilization 
or the functioning of a democratic society. 

The vision of the poet and the philosopher, 
the humanist and the historian, is needed to 
stimulate what Shakespeare called the "bet- 
ter angels of our nature." 

Without these to guide us, the technologi- 
cal revolution in the next decade can bring 
the faceless men of an Orwellian world, men 
whose sole distinction lies in their similarity 
to one another. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


The vision we need as we face the 1970's is 
that of a great man who died in this city a 
decade ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 

For him the marvels of modem science 
and technology provided man with a new op- 
portunity to build a truly human world. 

Through his vision we can come to under- 
stand that the growing interdependence of 
mankind caused by the technological revolu- 
tion can lead to a world civilization in which 

both persons and nations find their individu- 
ality enhanced, find their mutual dependence 
and mutual fate a condition to be welcomed 
rather than a threat to be feared. 

If the men of talent and vision seize the 
opportunity to plan now for the world of the 
1970's, your children and mine at the turn 
of the next decade can look forward with 
hope and confidence to 1984. 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today'' Program 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rusk on the National Broad- 
casting System's television program "Today" 
on Jantmry 12. Interviewing the Secretary 
were Hugh Downs from New York and 
Joseph C. Harsch in Washington. 

Mr. Downs: You know, so much of the Na- 
tion and, indeed, the world is concerned 
these days over our current foreign policy. 
So it seems most appropriate to invite Sec- 
retary of State Dean Rusk into our Washing- 
ton studios this morning 

Mr. Secretary, before we start on some of 
the more immediate problems, and since this 
is, as you may know, "Today" — the "Today" 
program's 15th anniversary week, I wonder 
if you'd tell us what you consider to be some 
of the most important events that have oc- 
curred over the past 15 years? 

Secretary Rusk: Good morning, Hugh. I 
think I would like to start by congratulating 
you, and Barbara [Walters], and Frank 
[Blair] on the "Today" program. It's a great 
show, and I see it almost every day. 

Mr. Doivns: Thank you. 

Secretary Rusk: These 15 years have been 
filled with important events. They began with 
the winding up of the Korean war on the 
basis of a rejection of North Korea's at- 
tempts to seize South Korea by force. 

This period has seen the multiplication 
of nuclear weapons and the development of 
competitive nuclear weapon systems, raising 
for the first time in man's history the opera- 
tional issue of the survival of the human race 
— although, I think we can take more confi- 
dence from — than we think from the fact 
that it's been 21 years now since a nuclear 
weapon has been fired in anger. That's a far 
more important fact than most people 

It does point to the tragedy that the 
Baruch proposals were not accepted back in 
1946, under which there would have been no 
nuclear power. 

I think the historians will say that one of 
the most dramatic aspects of this 15 years 
has been the doubling of the membership of 
the United Nations, the emergence of 60 or 
more new nations into the world community 
by — largely by peaceful means. 

We have seen the second generation come 
to power in the Soviet Union. 

We've seen major division within the 
Communist world because the authorities in 
Peking have isolated themselves, even in the 
Communist world, by their doctrines of mili- 
tancy and aggressiveness. 

We've had the experience of the Cuban 
missile crisis in which men had to look down 
the long cannon's mouth of great catastrophe. 



And I think everybody came away from 
that more prudent, a little more cautious 
about how they conduct themselves in world 

We wind up this 15 years with some big 
problems on our hands, the central one being 
how we organize a durable peace. 

I think in the next decade we're going to 
face a critical food situation throughout the 
world to which all nations must address 

But I think also that we can see that com- 
mon sense is making some headway. 

President Kennedy took to the Senate the 
nuclear test ban treaty. 

President Johnson has moved on the civil 
air agreement with the Soviet Union, the 
consular agreement, his East- West trade pro- 
posals, the space treaty. We hope that we'll 
be able to find some answer to the non- 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

So there's a full agenda ahead. But when 
we look back on these 15 years, I think we 
can see some steady progress toward peace 
and reason in the world. 

Mr. Downs: Thank you. And on that note, 
I'll turn the questioning now over to NBC 
diplomatic correspondent Joseph C. Harsch, 
who I see is sitting in the studio alongside 

Aggression in Southeast Asia 

Mr. Harsch: Thank you, Hugh. I'm glad 
I am here. 

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to start it out by 
going back to the news conference that Sec- 
retary-General U Thant of the United Na- 
tions did 2 days ago. In that there appeared 
to be considerable differences with American 
policy. For example, he said, "I do not sub- 
scribe to the generally held view that if South 
Viet-Nam falls, then country X, then coun- 
try Y, then country Z will follow. I do not 
agree with this so-called domino theory." Is 
this a matter of difference with our policy? 

Secretary Rxisk: Well, I myself have never 
subscribed to something called the domino 
theory, because that suggests that we're 
merely playing games with little wooden 

blocks with dots on them. Actually, the prob- 
lem is the old problem of the phenomenon of 

Country X, if you like, is South Viet-Nam. 
North Viet-Nam is trying to seize South 
Viet-Nam by force. 

Country Y is, perhaps, Laos. We had an 
agreement on Laos in 1962 under which there 
would be no North Vietnamese forces in 
Laos. And Laos would not be used as a route 
of infiltration into South Viet-Nam. That 
has not been performed. And the govern- 
ment that we agreed on in Geneva in 1962 
has not been permitted to exercise authority 
throughout Laos. And the International Con- 
trol Commission has not been permitted to 
exercise its functions in the Communist-held 
areas of Laos. So, undoubtedly, there are 
appetites with respect to Laos. 

Country Z is, perhaps, already Thailand. 
The other side has announced that they are 
going after Thailand. There are subversive 
guerrilla elements in northeast Thailand 
trained outside. There's a Thai training camp 
now in North Viet-Nam preparing additional 
guerrillas to go into Thailand. 

So, there's no need for something called 
the domino theory. 

The theory is that proclaimed in Peking 
repeatedly, that the world revolution of com- 
munism must be advanced by militant means. 
Now, if they can be brought toward an atti- 
tude of peaceful coexistence, if the second 
generation in China can show some of the 
prudence that the second generation in the 
Soviet Union has shown, then, maybe, we can 
begin to build a durable peace there. 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, the Secretary- 
General of the U.N. also in that same news 
conference said, "I do not subscribe to the 
view that South Viet-Nam is strategically 
vital to Western interests and Western se- 
curity." What are our vital strategic interests 
in the area? Do you regard Viet-Nam as 

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are important 
geographical features, natural resources, 
large numbers of people in Southeast Asia. 

I think the heart of the matter is, again, 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


the phenomenon of aggression. And if the 
momentum of aggression should begin to roll 
in that part of the world, stimulated or sup- 
ported or engaged in by those who are com- 
mitted to the spread of the world revolution 
by violence, then that seems to put us back 
on the trail that led us into World War II. 

What is important is that all nations, large 
and small, have a chance to live unmolested 
by their neighbors, as provided in the United 
Nations Charter. 

Article 1 of the charter deals with acts of 
aggression, breaches of the peace, the neces- 
sity for peaceful settlement of disputes. 
Article 2 of the charter is about the self- 
determination of people. These are very im- 
portant lessons derived from the events 
which led us into World War II. We feel that 
we've got to hang on to those lessons, be- 
cause if they lead us into world war III, 
there won't be much left from which we can 
draw lessons and start over again. 

Threat to Durable Peace 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, is it not the 
question so much of our vital interests, as of 
the threat to our vital interests? 

Now, you said yesterday i that four Presi- 
dents have identified this area as being stra- 
tegically important to us. At the time that 
process started — we're talking about Presi- 
dent Truman now and then President 
Eisenhower's time — there certainly did seem 
to be a major threat to our interests in that 

What has happened to the nature of that 
threat? During the last year I had in mind 
the breach between Moscow and Peking. Is 
there not a diminution in the threat to our 
interests in that area because Moscow and 
Peking are no longer close together? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Peking has the capa- 
bility of maintaining a major threat there, 
de])ending upon both its policy and its action. 

You see, we have a very strong interest 
in the organization of peace in the Pacific, 
just as we have in the Atlantic. We have 

' In an informal press interview. 

alliances with Korea and Japan and the Re- 
public of China and the Philippines, Thai- 
land, Australia, New Zealand. So, we are 
very much interested in the stability of the 
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and in East 

Now, if these aggressive pressures from 
Hanoi, with the support of Peking, should 
move into Southeast Asia, not only are hun- 
dreds of millions of people involved and vital 
resources involved, but the prospects for a 
durable peace dissolve. 

And so we have a tremendous interest in 
establishing in that area of the world, as we 
have done in the NATO area, the notion that 
the nations must be left alone and be allowed 
to live in peace, as the Charter of the United 
Nations provides. 

Leadership Struggle in Mainland China 

Mr. Harsch: But the danger 2 years ago 
was much greater than it is now, surely. 

Secretary Rtisk: Well, I'm not sure what is 
going to be the reaction of the authorities in 
Peking when they get all of these present 
troubles sorted out. What are they going to 
do about their doctrine of militant support 
of the world revolution ? 

They've had a series of setbacks in the last 
2 years, a major setback in Indonesia, 
catastrophe in the Afro-Asian conference. 
They put in an ultimatum to India during the 
India-Pakistan fighting and had to back 
away from it. They've been almost expelled 
from the world Communist movement. 
They've been expelled from four or five coun- 
tries in Africa. 

Now, these have undoubtedly put great 
pressures on the leadership there. And my 
guess is that one of the reasons why there 
is considerable turmoil at the top in main- 
land China today is that there must have 
been some important policy discussions there 
about whether or not they're on the right 
track and that this has led to differences 
among the leadership which are being re- 
flected in some of the events that we hear 
about from day to day now. 

Mr. Harsch: What is your reading, as of 



this — right now, on what's going on in 
Peking ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that it is fair 
to suspend judgment on that. 

If I say that I don't really know, it doesn't 
embarrass me very much, because I suspect 
that Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Ch'en I, and 
these other people out there don't really know 
exactly what is happening there. But there 
seems to be an authentic struggle of leader- 
ship among the top 12 or 15 people in that 
system. There seems to be a considerable de- 
bate on policy going on beneath the surface. 
Some of that debate might well have 
precipitated this present struggle. But I 
think it might be well to discount, in part, 
some of the day-to-day news there. We 
are watching it very closely. But I think we 
ought not to jump to premature conclusions 
about how it's going to come out. Frankly, 
we just don't know. 

Mr. Harsch: And you only go so far as to 
recognize it as being an internal struggle for 

Secretary Rusk: I think that's at the heart 
of it, yes. 

Mr. Harsch: Might it affect the whole posi- 
tion of China? Could it lead to a civil war in- 
side China, do you think ? 

Secretary Riisk: It's possible, although I 
think that we ought to be very cautious about 
saying that it's headed that way at the pres- 
ent time. 

This is basically, I think, a struggle among 
the leadership elite. They may be able to find 
ways to work this out among themselves 
through compromise, or one group may find 
itself in full control at the expense of another 
group. We just don't know, quite frankly, 
what that means. 

Need for Ceilings on Arms Race 

Mr. Harsch: I want to change to another 
subject now. In the President's state of the 
Union last night,^ he said that the Soviet 
Union has begun to place near Moscow a 
limited antimissile defense. And he deplored 
this and expressed the hope that something 
might be done about it. Is this a subject 

which can best be handled in a sort of general 
group in Geneva, or is this something that is 
best handled directly between ourselves and 
the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Rusk: I think the two are not 
necessarily contradictory, because we and the 
Soviet Union are the cochairmen of the 
group in Geneva. Therefore, we're in fre- 
quent touch with each other about the agenda 
of that conference. 

Quite some time ago we put proposals be- 
fore the Geneva conference for a freeze on 
the further development of both offensive 
and defensive nuclear weapons. We hope very 
much that that can be taken up and some 
conclusions reached, because we could move 
simply to new plateaus of enormous expendi- 
ture on both sides without basically changing 
the overriding strategic situation but thereby 
diverting very large resources away from the 
unfinished business which both of us face 
for our own people. 

So that we're very serious about finding 
some way to put some ceilings on the arms 
race and try to turn it down. And this is one 
of the important elements in that. 

Mr. Harsch: Are you hopeful ? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think diplomacy 
must always proceed on the basis of hope 
and optimism, because that's our business. 
And we hope very much that there can be 
some progress made on this matter. 

Mr. Harsch: The President says that he 
urges Congress to help our foreign commer- 
cial trade policies by passing an East-West 
trade bill. That is going to be a difficult prob- 
lem with the new Congress, is it not? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the atmos- 
phere associated with the struggle in Viet- 
Nam will make it difficult. But we do believe 
that, despite Viet-Nam, we should continue 
to gnaw away at any points where we can 
improve our relations between East and 
West, and try to build a little peace in the 

Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, I know that 
Hugh Downs back in New York has another 
question he wants to put to you. What little 

' See p. 158. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


time we have I reluctantly yield back to you, 

Basis for Peace in Viet-Nam 

Mr. Downs: On either or both sides of the 
Viet-Nam war forces is there the desire not 
toend that war? 

Secretary Rtisk: I think that both sides 
would like to end it but they differ in views 
about the basis on which it can be ended. 

The authorities in Hanoi continue to insist 
upon their four points as a basis for the set- 
tlement, and the third of those points is that 
South Viet-Nam be organized on the program 
of the National Liberation Front without re- 
gard to the views of the overwhelming ma- 
jority of the South Vietnamese. 

I believe that we must keep in contact both 
privately and publicly in order to explore 
every possibility of a move toward peace, 
whether at a conference table or, in fact, 
whether with a general settlement or even a 
partial settlement, because the situation is 
too dangerous to permit it to go on indefi- 
nitely in its present condition. 

Mr. Downs: I wasn't speaking of official 
policy, sir, on the — I know there forces 
that do desire to end the war on both sides. 
I wondered if you thought there were signifi- 
cant forces that desired not to end it on 
either side. 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think so, unless — 
unless they can achieve particular — particu- 
lar goals. 

I think there are those in North Viet-Nam 
who don't want to end it without having 
achieved their purposes in South Viet-Nam. 
And it may be that the authorities in Peking, 
for example, would like to see this go on 
indefinitely as a part of their general mili- 
tant approach to international affairs. 

But I don't believe that that, at the end of 
the day, will prove to be the decisive problem 
as far as peace is concerned. The problem is: 
On what basis can peace be achieved? And 

we're constantly probing that in every pos- 
sible way. 

Mr. Dotvns: Very good. And our thanks to 
you for being with us this morning. Thanks 
to Joseph C. Harsch, NBC diplomatic corre- 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Colombia, Hernan Echavarria Olozaga, 
presented his credentials to President John- 
son on January 13. For text of the Ambas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
January 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Haiti, Arthur Bonhomme, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on January 
13. For text of the Ambassador's remarks 
and the President's reply, see Department 
of State press release dated January 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Indonesia, Suwito Kusumowidagdo, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Johnson 
on January 13. For text of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
January 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Turkey, Melih Esenbel, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Johnson on January 13. 
For text of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated January 13. 



In this article written especially for the Bulletin, WiUiam 
K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, dis- 
cusses the actions taken in the past year to update interruv- 
tional safety standards for passenger ships. Mr. Miller was 
chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Extraordinary As- 
sembly of IMCO, which approved the new standards in 
November 1966. 

New International Rules for Passenger-Ship Safety 

by William K. Miller 

Early morning radio listeners on Novem- 
ber 13, 1965, were shocked to hear the news 
that the cruise ship Yarmouth Castle, with 
376 passengers aboard, was ablaze at sea 
between Miami and Nassau. Later reports 
brought the tragic news that 88 of the 
ship's passengers, most of them American 
citizens, and 2 of the crew — 90 persons in 
all — had lost their lives. 

The Yarmouth Castle was a ship of 5,000 
tons operating under Panamanian registry. 
On the cruise on which she burned, as on the 
other cruises, her passengers were nearly 
all American citizens, and so, consequently, 
were most of the casualties. The tragedy 
occurred less than 2 years after the Lakonia, 
also a passenger vessel, had burned at sea 
with the loss of 125 lives. 

In the United States there was, very 
naturally, an immediate and intense public 
demand for Government action to improve 
the safety standards of passenger ships 
which sail from U.S. ports, particularly of 
old ships like the Yarmouth Castle. 

It was clear that the international rules 
governing safety of life at sea had to be 
upgraded. To do this the United States 
turned to the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO), the 64- 
member specialized agency of the United 
Nations which deals particularly with tech- 

nical matters affecting shipping and has 
special responsibility for safety of life at 
sea. IMCO has had a notably successful 
record of cooperative efforts by its members 
in agreeing on and improving international 
standards in its area of competence. 

IMCO responded to the United States' call 
for a cooperative effort, and on November 
30, 1966, the Third Extraordinary IMCO 
Assembly approved a series of amendments 
to the Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) that will improve the fire-safety 
standards for passenger vessels, particularly 
for the older ships that constitute the great- 
est risks. 

Approval of these amendments just a year 
after the Yarmouth Castle disaster repre- 
sents unusually rapid handling of a matter 
involving so many countries. The action 
culminated a year of intensive effort by U.S. 
Government agencies, assisted by maritime 
safety experts of major maritime nations 
and by the machinery of IMCO. 

Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 

The international requirements for fire 
safety have been established in a series of 
conventions for safety of life at sea, the 
first of which was signed in 1929, with 
subsequent conventions signed in 1948 and 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


Each convention represented a substantial 
improvement over the predecessor conven- 
tion, and each did much to improve safety- 
standards around the world; but even the 
newer conventions, those of 1948 and 1960, 
had major weaknesses. These were escape 
clauses or "grandfather" clauses, which pro- 
vided that ships existing when the 1948 
convention came into force need not comply 
with the new requirements beyond the extent 
that each government considered "reason- 
able and practicable." Hence the two 
conventions meant major safety improve- 
ments for new ships — the 1948 convention 
notably for fire safety and the 1960 con- 
vention notably for subdivision and stabil- 
ity — but they did not do much about many 
of the oldest ships and worst risk cases. 

Currently 57 governments are parties to 
the 1960 SOLAS Convention, which became 
effective May 26, 1965, including the govern- 
ments of all of the principal maritime 
nations of the world. A satisfactory amend- 
ment of the convention, therefore, means 
adequate safety rules in most of the world's 
maritime traffic. 

The convention provides for its own 
amendment through the machinery of IMCO. 
Under the most practical amendment proce- 
dure, there are at least three major steps: 
First, recommendations must be adopted by 
the Maritime Safety Committee, IMCO's 
principal technical body, by a two-thirds 
majority; second, the recommended amend- 
ments must be adopted by the IMCO As- 
sembly, again by a two-thirds majority; 
and third, the amendments must be accepted 
by two-thirds of the contracting govern- 
ments to the SOLAS Convention. 

Amendments so approved may be deter- 
mined to be of such an important nature 
that any contracting government that 
declares it does not accept them must cease 
to be a party to the convention. This pro- 
vision does not mean that a government 
which does not act on the amendments 
automatically ceases to be a party; a specific 
negative action is needed. A determination 

of an "important nature" in this sense also 
requires approval by a two-thirds majority 
in the IMCO Assembly and two-thirds of the 
contracting governments to the SOLAS Con- 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee Action 

Immediately after the Yarmouth Castle 
fire, the State Department, in the closest 
cooperation with other Government agencies, 
called for the earliest possible meeting of 
the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee to 
consider proposals for new fire-safety stand- 
ards. At its regular January meeting the 
Committee scheduled a special meeting solely 
for this purpose at London May 3-10, 1966. 
This allowed time for preparation of tech- 
nical proposals, among which was a paper 
drawn up by the U.S. Coast Guard and cir- 
culated in March to other governments for 
consideration before the meeting. 

In preparation for the meeting Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Anthony M. Solomon, accompanied by Rear 
Adm. Charles P. Murphy, USCG, traveled 
to a number of European capitals to explain 
the importance the United States attached to 
these proposals and to ask support for them. 

When the Maritime Safety Committee met 
in May, Ambassador at Large W. Averell 
Harriman made a key opening statement ^ 
on behalf of the U.S. proposals. 

The Committee adopted a series of amend- 
ments to the SOLAS Convention, incorpo- 
rating most of the substance of the U.S. 
proposals as they related to existing passen- 
ger ships. There were some improvements 
resulting from the interchange of expert 
views, and there were some compromises; 
but the overall result was satisfactory. 

The Committee also recommended a few 
changes in the regulations applying to new 
ships to be constructed in the future, but 
left this job, for the most part, to a second 
stage and assigned its Fire Safety Subcom- 

' For text, see Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 952. 



mittee the task of developing comprehensive 

Following the Maritime Safety Com- 
mittee's action, the IMCO Council arranged 
for a special session of the IMCO Assembly, 
the organization's plenary body, to be con- 
vened November 28, 1966, nearly a year 
before the next regular Assembly, scheduled 
for October 1967. An earlier date could not 
be set since the SOLAS Convention provides 
that prospective amendments must be com- 
municated to the Contracting Governments 
at least 6 months before Assembly consider- 

United States Legislation 

Before IMCO's action was completed, the 
U.S. Congress passed legislation comple- 
menting the proposed SOLAS amendments. 

The Yarmouth Castle disaster was fol- 
lowed in 1966 by two more ship fires, the 
Viking Princess on a cruise from Florida 
and the Hanseatic at her pier in New York. 
Fortunately, there was no loss of life directly 
due to the fires in these incidents, but they 
did further emphasize the need to make 
ships safer. 

The administration, early in 1966, pro- 
posed legislation including provisions for 
disclosure and notice to the public of safety 
standards of U.S. and foreign passenger 
ships leaving U.S. ports, financial responsi- 
bility of operators against death and per- 
sonal injury and against nonperformance of 
the voyage, removal of the present low ship- 
owner liability limits, ajid higher minimum 
safety standards for U.S. passenger ships 
on inland waters. (All U.S. oceangoing 
passenger ships already meet very high 
safety standards.) Senate and House com- 
mittees held hearings on these proposals in 
April, June, and October and ultimately 
approved most of the measures proposed by 
the administration. 

Basically, with the exception of the pro- 
posal to remove the liability limits, all of the 
specific recommendations of the executive 

agencies were incorporated in the new law, 
P.L. 89-777, enacted November 6, 1966. 

One new provision was added. This re- 
quires that passenger ships which do not 
comply with the safety standards of SOLAS 
1960, as modified by the amendments pro- 
posed in May, shall not depart U.S. ports 
with passengers who are U.S. nationals and 
who embarked at those ports. This provision 
is to be effective when the amendments 
proposed by the IMCO Maritime Safety 
Committee last May come into force, but in 
any case not later than November 2, 1968. 

The new law will require all passenger- 
ship operators to give notice of a ship's 
safety standards to prospective passengers, 
both in promotional literature and in adver- 
tising, under regulations which the Coast 
Guard is now preparing. It was made clear 
both in the Senate Commerce Committee's 
report and in the testimony of Adm. Willard 
J. Smith, the Commandant of the Coast 
Guard, before the House Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries Committee, that the safety 
standards here in question are international 
standards. The Senate committee report 
specifically contemplated the use of SOLAS 
1960 standards, as modified by the IMCO 
Maritime Safety Committee's proposals, as 
guides in establishing disclosure regulations. 
These are the same standards to which the 
direct safety provisions of the legislation 
are related. 

Hence it is clear that the Congress ac- 
cepted the concept of international standards 
with resi>ect to disclosure of safety stand- 
ards as well as with respect to the actual 
ship safety rules that will apply. 

Regulations implementing the financial 
responsibility provisions of the new law are 
to be issued by the Federal Maritime Com- 
mission, the U.S. Government's regulatory 
agency for ocean shipping. This legislation 
is intended to insure that funds will be avail- 
able to meet claims of persons injured or 
the estates of those killed in passenger-ship 
accidents and for refunds when a sailing is 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


The Federal Maritime Commission, like 
the Coast Guard, has already held meetings 
with interested parties, domestic and for- 
eign, to hear and consider their ideas on 
implementing regulations in order to insure 
that specific requirements as ultimately 
determined will not only be meaningful but 
will be reasonable and not unduly burden- 

As noted above, the new law makes no 
change in legal provisions on shipowners' 
liability. Stated simply, this liability now 
may be limited under U.S. law to the value 
of the vessel after the accident or $60 per 
ton of the vessel's tonnage if the vessel's 
value is not enough to meet claims. There 
is widespread agreement that the present 
limits are too low, if there should be limits 
at all, and the President has stated that 
the administration will make another effort 
this year to repeal the present outmoded 

IMCO Assembly Action 

The Third Extraordinary Assembly of the 
Intergovenmiental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, which was held at London 
November 28-30, 1966, approved without 
significant change the recommendations of 
the Maritime Safety Committee to amend 
SOLAS 1960 and upgrade the international 
fire-safety standards for passenger ships. 

There were several minor changes, mostly 
for clarification, but the U.S. delegation was 
satisfied that none of them significantly 
depart from the Committee's recommenda- 
tions or reduce the level of safety standards. 
Similarly, the delegation was satisfied that 
there is no conflict or inconsistency in sub- 
stance between the new regulations ap- 
proved by the IMCO Assembly and the 
safety standards established by U.S. law. 

The substantive content of the new regu- 
lations was approved by overwhelming 
majorities. The closest vote on a directly 
substantive issue was 35 to 2, clearly 
reflecting the strong consensus for the 
recommended improvements. 

The most controversial question at the 
Assembly was whether the proposed amend- 
ments are, in the terms of article IX (e) of 
the SOLAS 1960 Convention, of such an 
important nature that any contracting 
government which declares it does not accept 
them shall cease to be a party to the con- 
vention 12 months after they come into 

The United States and nearly all the 
Western maritime countries supported such 
a finding. Opposition came from a few coun- 
tries which apparently were concerned with 
the prospective effects on their older ships. 

Several delegations stated that they con- 
sidered the amendments important but were 
opposed to a finding in the sense of article 
IX (e) because it might force some countries 
out of the convention. Some of these dele- 
gations argued that the exercise of the 
"important nature" clause was contrary to 
generally accepted concepts of international 
law and prejudicial to sovereign rights. The 
U.S. delegation, in response to these argu- 
ments, pointed out that the Assembly was 
following a procedure cleai'ly defined in the 
convention and that the contracting govern- 
ments accepted this procedure in accepting 
the convention. 

One representative urged the impor- 
tance of crew training as opposed to struc- 
tural requirements. The U.S. representative 
agreed that crew training is important and 
should be stressed, but expressed the belief 
that it cannot be controlled through inter- 
national rules as readily as structure can. 
He noted that passenger ships operate on 
cruises from U.S. ports, carrying nearly all 
American passengers, in some cases never 
returning to the country of registry. If 
this type of trafl^c is to continue, it is not 
acceptable to the United States to rely on 
crew-training requirements of other coun- 
tries without adequate fire-safety structural 

The Assembly decided that the amend- 
ments are of an "important nature" in the 
sense of the convention by a vote of 26 to 



8, with 5 abstentions. The vote on the final 
resolution of the Assembly, which was 29 
to 2, with 12 abstentions, reflected the objec- 
tions of several countries to the "important 
nature" finding. 

A second issue which required serious 
attention was the question of the legality of 
the amendments. One delegation stated 
doubts whether the Assembly was competent 
to apply amendments relating to the struc- 
ture of existing ships in view of the pro- 
vision of article IX (f) of the SOLAS 1948 
and 1960 Conventions, which state that 
amendments relating to the structure of 
ships shall apply only to ships the keels of 
which are laid after the date on which the 
amendment comes into force. It was argued 
that if the Assembly wished to enforce such 
amendments with respect to existing ships, 
it would first have to amend article IX (f) 
and that such amendments to the regulations 
could only be approved by a subsequent 
Assembly after the amendment to article 
IX (f) came into force. 

The U.S. delegation and several other 
delegations disagreed with this conclusion 
and took the position that amendments to 
structural provisions could be applied to 
existing ships with or without amendment 
of article IX (f), provided that the necessary 
two-thirds of the Assembly approved and 
the amendments were accepted by two-thirds 
of the contracting governments. 

It was pointed out that the question had 
been discussed by the Maritime Safety Com- 
mittee and that no delegation had expressed 
any doubt as to the legality of applying 
structural amendments to existing ships, 
article IX (f) notwithstanding. A passage 
from the record of the SOLAS 1948 confer- 
ence was cited, supporting the view that the 
authors of that convention intended that 
article IX (f) could be overridden by amend- 
ments to the regulations. Ultimately it be- 
came apparent that almost all delegations 
considered it clear that structural amend- 
ments can legally be applied to existing ships 
without amendment of article IX (f). 

Mr. Miller's article is one of a series being 
written especially for the Bulletin by oflBcers 
of the Department and the Foreign Service. 
Officers who may be interested in submitting 
original bylined articles are invited to call 
Jewell Wilson in the Bulletin office, extension 

The purpose of the amendments adopted 
by the Assembly was to bring all passenger 
ships up to an acceptable modern standard 
of fire safety by eliminating the effects of 
the grandfather clauses of the SOLAS 1948 
and 1960 Conventions. 

Effect of Amendments 

Specifically, the proposals adopted by the 
Assembly will eliminate vessels with wooden 
hulls, decks, and deckhouses. All basic 
structure will be of steel. Ships will be 
divided by steel fire barriers not more than 
131 feet apart to isolate any fire that may 
start. In a like manner, the accommodation 
spaces will be separated by steel bulkheads 
and decks from such hazardous areas as 
galleys, cargo space, and machinery space. 

Within the accommodation spaces, the 
various rooms, if not constructed of incom- 
bustible materials, will be protected by an 
automatic sprinkler system or other protec- 
tive measures will be taken. In any event, 
stairways and passageways will be specially 
constructed to off"er a safe avenue of escape 
in the event of a fire. 

Vessels built before SOLAS 1948 came 
into force in 1952 will have to meet the 
1948 requirements for fire-extinguishing 
systems. Fire pumps will have to be so 
located and arranged that the whole system 
will not be put out of action by a fire in 
any one space. In some cases more fire 
pumps will be required. 

Many other details adopted by the As- 
sembly will improve the fire safety of exist- 
ing passenger vessels. 

The effects of the amendments will vary 
widely. Owners of the most modern and 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


safest ships will not have to do anything 
very difficult or very expensive to conform 
to the new rules. Owners of most older 
ships will have to go to greater expense, 
and in many cases major rebuilding will be 
involved. A number of old ships doubtless 
will have to be scrapped. 

The job is not yet finished, even in a pro- 
cedural sense. The amendments must now be 
accepted by two-thirds of the contracting 
governments to the SOLAS Convention and 
will not come into force legally until 12 
months later. 

Recognizing the need for rapid action, the 
IMCO Assembly approved, without dissent, 
the Maritime Safety Committee's recom- 
mendation that the amendments are so vital 
to safety of life at sea that contracting gov- 
ernments should not await formal entry 
into force but should act immediately to put 
the recommended measures into effect to the 
maximum extent and as soon as possible. 

For the United States, acceptance of the 
amendments requires the advice and consent 
of the Senate. There is reason to hope that 
the Senate will act promptly, particularly 
in the light of the great concern shown by 
the Congress and the conformity of the pro- 
posed standards to those incorporated in the 
new U.S. law. 

The Congress has shown serious concern 
with the whole problem, not only in legisla- 
tive action but also in close attention to the 
action of the executive branch in the inter- 
national forum. Members of the House Com- 
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
attended the sessions of the Maritime Safety 
Committee in January and May and were 
present at every session of the special 
Assembly in November. 

IMCO's work on improvements in stand- 
ards for new ships also requires further 
action. After several meetings, the IMCO 
Subcommittee on Fire Protection agreed in 
December on a series of recommendations 

which are to be considered by the Maritime 
Safety Committee in February. If all goes 
well, these amendments to the convention 
will be approved by the Assembly at its 
regular session next October, and we can- 
expect further improvements in the level 
of fire safety in passenger ships newly built 
around the world. 

U.S., Japan Discuss Operations 
in New U.S. Fisheries Zone 

Press release 305 dated December 29 

U.S. and Japanese fishery delegations be- 
gan preliminary discussions in Washington 
December 28 on the question of the continu- 
ation of Japanese fishing operations in the 
new U.S. fisheries zone established by the 
enactment of Public Law 89-658 last October. 

The new law extends United States juris- 
diction over fisheries to 9 miles from the 3- 
mile territorial sea, or a total of 12 miles 
from the shoreline. It provides for continua- 
tion of traditional foreign fishing in the new 
zone as may be recognized by the United 

The United States has notified govern- 
ments likely to be concerned, including Japan, 
of its willingness to consider such views as 
those governments desire to advance regard- 
ing the law and continuation of their fisheries 
in the new zone. The current talks are ex- 
ploratory in nature and are expected to be 
followed by a second round of talks early in 
the new year.i 

The U.S. delegation is led by Donald L. 
McKeman, Special Assistant for Fisheries 
and Wildlife to the Secretary of State; the 
Japanese delegation is led by Ryozo Sunobe, 
Minister, Embassy of Japan. 

' The exploratory talks concluded Jan. 3. Discus- 
sions are expected to be resumed Feb. 6. 




United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended Through June 1967 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^ 

Mr. President, I should first like to express 
my appreciation to our distingoiished Secre- 
tary-General for his lucid and thorough 
report on the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus,^ on the basis of which report we have 
again extended UNFICYP for a further 
period of 6 months. 

In thanking the Secretary-General and his 
staff, I think it appropriate at this time to 
recall that the Secretary-General has labored 
long and hard in carrying out his far- 
reaching responsibilities in this situation. His 
report of December 8. together with its 
addendum, continues to illustrate the close 
and faithful execution of the Council's 
mandate by the Secretary-General and the 
Secretary-General's distinguished representa- 
tive, our distinguished former colleague, 
Ambassador Carlos Bemardes, and by the 
men of the United Nations Force, commanded 
by the very able General Ilmari Martola. 

In pursuit of its efforts to restore normal 
conditions, we note with satisfaction that 
during the past 6 months UNFICYP has con- 
cluded an arrangement with the Government 
of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot leader- 
ship which has restored postal services in the 
Turkish sector of Nicosia and Lefka. And we 
express appreciation to the Goveitmient of 

• Made in the Security Council on Dec. 15 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 5030). 

=> U.N. doc. S/7611 and Corr. 1. 

Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots for this 
cooperation. UNFICYP's efforts have also 
led to an agreement covering the method for 
processing and registering land transactions. 
This is all good. 

With regard to the efforts of the United 
Nations Force to contribute to the mainte- 
nance of law and order, we are, however, 
disturbed at the increase in the number of 
incidents, including what the Secretary- 
General calls — and I quote him — "frequent 
breaches of the cease-fire," many of which 
are deliberate bomb explosions and other 
terrorist actions, and the establishment of 
new fortified positions, as described by the 
Secretary-General's report, in a manner con- 
trary to the accepted understanding that the 
extension of existing positions is detrimental 
to the interests of peace on the island. My 
delegation believes that those responsible for 
the conditions described in the Secretary- 
General's report, which have caused deep con- 
cern to the Force commander, should take all 
necessary measures to assure that the situa- 
tion rapidly changes for the better. 

We are also concerned by the Secretary- 
General's supplementary report which was 
issued December 13.* The United Nations 
Force, manned by excellent contingents from 
Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, 

' U.N. doc. S/7611/Add. 1. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


Denmark, United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
and Australia, has done a remarkably fine 
job of maintaining peace on the island in the 
best tradition of the United Nations. We be- 
lieve peace and order can only be achieved by 
an even greater degree of cooperation with 
UNFICYP. The importation of additional 
arms in violation of the spirit and intent of 
the Council's March 4, 1964, resolution ■* will 
not achieve greater peace and security. On 
the contrary, their very presence cannot be 
other than a source of insecurity and strife. 

We welcome the agreement of the Govern- 
ment of Cyprus to allow UNFICYP to in- 
spect those arms. But we would hope further 
that these arms can be neutralized, and this 
could occur if the Cypriot Government 
agreed to place the arms which have already 
arrived under the continuing custody of the 
United Nations Force. 

Mr. President, this Council has today met 
for the third time this year on the question 
of Cyprus.^ As others have noted, it has for 
the 10th time since March 1964 extended the 
mandate of UNFICYP. Given the conditions 
on the island, my Government believes that 
these actions have been necessary and that 
the stated objectives of the Council's resolu- 
tion merit our moral and material support. 

But we must remind ourselves again of 
what the Secretary-General has pointed out 
to us, and what has been adverted to by 
others, that the financial base for UNFICYP 
is a narrow and uncertain one. His remarks 
highlight the fact that this organization 
cannot expect a peacekeeping operation such 
as UNFICYP to succeed, however dedicated 
and energetic its personnel, unless we col- 
lectively provide the required support. This 
is our obligation, not the Secretary-General's. 

This Council owes its appreciation to those 
countries, unfortunately too limited in num- 
ber, which have continued to support 
UNFICYP financially since its creation 
nearly 3 years ago. These countries have 

showm a high degree of responsibility for 
carrying out this vital U.N. peacekeeping 
function. My Government hopes that they 
will find it possible to continue their volun- 
tary contributions to sustain UNFICYP, de- 
spite the long and at times discouraging 
deadlock over the Cyprus issue. And we also 
hope that members who have not yet con- 
tributed will be able to do so on this 

My Government, having voted for the reso- 
lution, feels that it must match its vote by a 
concrete demonstration of its support for 
the resolution, and therefore I wrish to an- 
nounce that the United States pledges $4 
million toward the $9,675,000 cash budget for 
UNFICYP for the 10th period, December 
27, 1966, to June 26, 1967. And our ultimate 
contribution against this pledge will, as in 
the past, depend upon contributions of 
other governments and continuation of 
UNFICYP's cost estimates. 

Our willingness to continue supporting 
UNFICYP is based on the necessity for the 
parties concerned to explore every conceiv- 
able avenue which may lead toward accom- 
modation. And we have heard with interest 
wlvat our colleague. Ambassador [Alexis S.] 
Liatis of Greece, has said, and we express 
appreciation, too, for what we have heard of 
the Turkish Government in this connection. 
And likewise we invite and welcome the good 
spirit of the Cypriot Government to the same 
end. The responsibility to show progress to- 
ward an agreed solution increases with the 
passage of time. For this reason I believe, as 
others have pointed out, that the final opera- 
tive paragraph of the resolution is most 
apposite to the situation and accurately ex- 
presses our expectation as to the future 
course of events.® 

* For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1964, 
p. 465. 

° For U.S. statements, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 
718, and July 11, 1966, p. 63. 

•In a resolution (S/RES/231 (1966)) adopted 
unanimously on Dec. 15, the Security Council ex- 
tended "the stationing in Cyprus of the United Na- 
tions Peace-keeping Force . . . for a further period 
of six months ending 26 June 1967, in the expectation 
that sufficient progress toward a solution by then 
will make possible a withdrawal or substantial re- 
duction of the Force." 



I have adverted to the talks between the 
Governments of Turkey and Greece, and the 
Secretary-General has noted them. We share 
his hope that these talks will be one of the 
means by which a peaceful solution can be 
found. The fact that these talks have con- 
tinued in secrecy for 6 months shows how 
seriously the two Governments take their re- 
sponsibilities in attempting to settle this most 
difficult problem. This problem has seriously 
affected their relations for more than a 
decade. Its settlement, we know, is not easy. 
We know the settlement needs time and it 
above all needs peace on the island. This can 
best be achieved if UNFICYP receives, as I 
have said earlier, the fullest cooperation of 
all parties concerned, and in particular the 
Government of Cyprus, which has such a 
vital stake in this area. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letters dated December 14 from the Deputy Secre- 
tary General of the Organization of African Unity 
transmitting text of resolutions adopted by the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the OAU held at Addis Ababa November 
5-9: resolution respecting the policies of apartheid 
and racial discrimination of the Republic of South 
Africa, S/7637, December 15, 1966, 3 pp.; resolu- 
tion respecting the territories under Portuguese 
administration, S/7638, December 15, 1966, 2 pp.; 
resolution respecting South West Africa, S/7639, 
December 15, 1966, 2 pp. 

General Assembly 

The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the 

Republic of South Africa. Report of the Special 

Political Committee. A/6579. December 13, 1966. 

10 pp. 
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees. Report of the Third Committee. 

A/6586. December 13, 1966. 9 pp. 
World Campaign for Universal Literacy. Report of 

the Second Committee. A/6592. December 14, 1966. 

5 pp. 
Progressive Development of the Law of International 

Trade. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/6594. 

December 15, 1966. 23 pp. 


Ratifications Exchanged With 
Togo on Commercial Treaty 

Press release 1 dated January 5 

Instruments of ratification of the treaty of 
amity and economic relations between the 
United States and Togo, signed at Lome on 
February 8, 1966, were exchanged on Jan- 
uary 5 in Washington. The exchange was 
made by Secretary Rusk and the Togolese 
Ambassador, Robert Ajavon, in a brief for- 
mal ceremony at the Department of State. 
This action completes the procedures re- 
quired for bringing the treaty into force. By 
its terms, the treaty will enter into force on 
February 5, 1967, 1 month after the exchange 
of ratifications. 

The treaty contains provisions covering 
such subjects as entry and sojourn, personal 
freedoms, access to courts, just compensation 
in the event of expropriation, rights with re- 
spect to carrying on business activities, prop- 
erty rights, taxation, exchange controls, 
treatment of imports and exports, treatment 
of shipping, and other matters affecting the 
status and activities of citizens of one coun- 
try within the territories of the other. 

U.S.-Honduras income Tax 
Convention Terminated 

Department Statement 

Press release 298 dated December 22 

The convention of June 25, 1956, between 
the United States and Honduras for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the pre- 
vention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income will cease to be in force with 
respect to taxable years beginning on or 
after January 1, 1967. 

JANUARY 30, 1967 


In accordance with the terms of the con- 
vention, the Government of Honduras has 
given notice of intention to terminate the 
convention at the end of 1966. 

Discussions from time to time between 
United States and Honduran officials with a 
view to effecting amendments in the con- 
vention have not resulted in agreement on 
such amendments. It is expected that there 
will be further discussions with a view to 
the conclusion, as soon as practicable, of a 
new income tax convention. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energ^y 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, January 5, 1967. 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 

Ratifications deposited: Cameroon, Kenya, and 
Trinidad and Tobago, January 3, 1967. 


Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I 

and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part II. 
Approval deposited: Ecuador, January 4, 1967. 



Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Antigua. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Bridgetown and Antigua December 
19 and 28, 1966. Entered into force December 28, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended 
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913, 
5965, 6032, 6113, 6146). Effected by an exchange 
of notes at New Delhi December 23, 1966. En- 
tered into force December 23, 1966. 

Agreement extending the agreement of April 15, 
1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559, 
5664, 6151), concerning trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi De- 
cember 30, 1966. Entered into force December 30, 
.1966; effective October 1, 1966. 


Protocol amending the agreement of January 29, 
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcasting 
in the standard broadcast band. Signed at Mexico 
April 13, 1966. 

Ratifications exchanged : January 12, 1967. 
Entered into force: January 12, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS 
6052, 6074). Effected by an exchange of notes at 
Rawalpindi and Islamabad December 28, 1966. 
Entered into force December 28, 1966. 


Treaty of amity and economic relations. Sigfned at 
Lome February 8, 1966. Enters into force Febru- 
ary 5, 1967. 
Proclaimed by the President: January 11, 1967. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price; 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15: 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the sotlrce will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX January 30, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. lUO 

Africa. The State of the Union (excerpts from 
President Johnson's address) 158 


Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro- 
grram 168 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Johnson's address) 158 


Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro- 
gram 168 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Johnson's address) 158 

Colombia. Letters of Credence (Echavarria) . . 172 

Congress. New International Rules for Passen- 
ger-Ship Safety (Miller) 173 

Cyprus. United Nations Force in Cyprus Ex- 
tended Through June 1967 (Goldberg) ... 179 

Developing Countries. The Technological Revo- 
lution and the World of the 1970's (Hum- 
phrey) 164 

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk Interviewed on 
"Today" Program 168 

Economic Affairs 

New International Rules for Passenger-Ship 
Safety (Miller) 173 

Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com- 
mercial Treaty 181 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Johnson's address) 158 

U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi- 
nated 181 

U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New U.S. 
Fisheries Zone 178 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Techno- 
logical Revolution and the World of the 
1970's (Humphrey) 164 


The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Johnson's address) 158 

The Technological Revolution and the World 
of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164 

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Bonhomme) . . . 172 

Honduras. U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Conven- 
tion Terminated 181 

Indonesia. Letters of Credence (Suwito) . . . 172 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

New International Rules for Passenger-Ship 
Safety (Miller) 173 

Japan. U.S., Japan Discuss Operations in New 
U.S. Fisheries Zone 178 

Latin America. The State of the Union (ex- 
cerpts from President Johnson's address) . . 158 

Middle East. The State of the Union (excerpts 
from President Johnson's address) .... 158 

Presidential Documents. The State of the Union 158 

Science. The Technological Revolution and the 
World of the 1970's (Humphrey) 164 

Toga Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on 
Commercial Treaty 181 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 182 

Ratifications Exchanged With Togo on Com- 
mercial Treaty 181 

U.S.-Honduras Income Tax Convention Termi- 
nated 181 

Turkey. Letters of Credence (Esenbel) ... 172 

U.S.S.R. The State of the Union (excerpts from 
President Johnson's address) 158 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 181 

United Nations Force in Cyprus Extended 
Through June 1967 (Goldberg) 179 


Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Today" Pro- 
gram 168 

The State of the Union (excerpts from Presi- 
dent Johnson's address) 158 

Name Index 

Bonhomme, Arthur 172 

Echavarria Olozaga, Heman 172 

Esenbel, Rxelih 172 

Goldberg, Arthur J 179 

Humphrey, Vice President 164 

Johnson, President 158 

Miller, William K 173 

Rusk, Secretary 168 

Suwito Kusumowidagdo 172 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: January 9-15 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to January 9 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
298 of December 22, 305 of December 29, and 
1 of January 5. 

No. Date fetbjett 

t3 1/12 Exchange of ratifications of proto- 
col to U.S.-Mexican standard- 
band broadcasting agreement. 

*4 1/12 Program for visit of President 
Frei of Chile. 

t5 1/12 National policy statement on in- 
ternational book and library ac- 
tivities (rewrite). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

■CrU.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-932/30 

Superintendent of documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Viet-Nam in Brief 

What peace initiatives have the United States and other governments taken to bring the 
:onflict in Viet-Nam to an early and honorable end? What is being achieved in the "other war" 
in Viet-Nam? Who fights in Viet-Nam? Why is the United States there? These and other pertinent 
juestions affecting every American's stake in a secure future are answered in this 21-page 



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Govt. Prlntins 0£Be« 

Washinitton, D.C, 20402 

Enclosed find $_ 


(cash, check, or money order). Please send 

copies of Viet-Nam in Brief. 



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Street Address 

City, State, and ZIP Code 







Vol. LVI, No. lUl 

February 6, 1967 

by General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 186 

by Ambassador Graham Martin 193 



Text of Report 200 



Special Article by James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope 218 

For index see inside back cover 

The U.S. Achievements in Viet-Nam 

by General Earle G. Wheeler 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ' 

Five days ago, I returned from Viet-Nam. 
There, for the eighth time in the past 4 years, 
I visited those men and women of our Armed 
Forces who are most dangerously involved 
with the protection of freedom and the se- 
curity interests of the United States. As al- 
ways, I returned with deep respect for them 
and renewed conviction that they fight in a 
high cause. And more than ever before, I 
came home with profound pride in what 
these brave men and women have achieved. 
I might add that I was also impressed with 
the energy and courage of the newsmen in 
Viet-Nam. Some 500 of them are making this 
the best covered war in history. With these 
impressions fresh in mind, I propose to talk 
tonight about Viet-Nam. 

It is clear to me why we are in Viet-Nam 
and why we should be there. Therefore, 
rather than entering the lists of policy de- 
bate, I propose to report on an aspect of 
Viet-Nam which is less well known and ap- 
preciated — what we have achieved there. 

In speaking of achievements I do so as a 
military man, reporting mainly on military 
matters. Nevertheless, I am fully aware of 
the importance and difficulty of the political, 
economic, and social problems which must 
be mastered if we are to achieve success in 
Viet-Nam. I have no illusions that I can fol- 
low the injunction of Tennyson to "Charm 
us, orator, till the lion look no larger than 
the cat." I would not wish to. Rather, I hope 

' Address made before the Washington Profes- 
sional Chapter of Sigma Delta Chi at Washington, 
D.C., on Jan. 17. 

to take the advice of Joseph Pulitzer when 
he said: "Put it before them briefly so they 
will read it, clearly so they will appreciate 
it, picturesquely so they will remember it, 
and, above all, accurately so they will be 
guided by its light." 

In discussing our military accomplish- 
ments, both accuracy and comprehension de- 
pend upon proper context. With this in mind, 
I should like to emphasize these facts: Less 
than 2 years have passed since our first, 
retaliatory airstrike in North Viet-Nam; only 
IV2 years have gone by since, we began to 
deploy major combat forces in South Viet- 
Nam; and little more than a year has tran- 
spired since our first major ground battle in 
the la Drang Valley. As wars go, these are 
short periods of time. It is within this con- 
text of time that we Americans should judge 
what we have achieved. 

As a backdrop, it is also instructive to 
remember what the critics of our policy had 
to say, just yesterday, about military opera- 
tions in Asia. Do you recall these Cassandra- 
like pronouncements ? 

— The American soldier can't stand the 
rigors of jungle combat. 

— American units are too large, cumber- 
some, and roadbound to do battle in under- 
developed areas. 

— U.S. materiel — the B-52, jet fighters, 
artillery, ships, and electronic equipment — 
is too sophisticated to be useful. 

— Supply lines to Asia are too long, and 
we lack the logistic bases from which to 



— Guerrilla warfare is alien to American 
Armed Forces. We can't understand the peo- 
ple, speak their language, or gain their con- 
fidence; we aren't trained in counterguerrilla 
tactics; we lack the patience; and we can't 
find the enemy or come to grips with him. 

— It is suicidal optimism to think that we 
can fight on the mainland of Asia. 

— And massive Chinese Communist inter- 
vention is certain. 

A Hard Task Well Done 

These prophets, some still active and pro- 
pounding new theses of doom, sold short the 
courage, decency, ingenuity, energy, knowl- 
edge, and judgment of their fellow Ameri- 
cans. They were wrong on every count, and 
the record bears this out. Let me oite you 
examples, not to say that the lion looks "no 
larger than the cat," not to glory in the 
statistics of combat, not to forget the sorrow 
and hell which is war, but simply to tell you 
of a hard but necessary task well done. 

You will recall where we stood 2 years ago. 
Our mission in Viet-Nam was the same as 
now, but we were trying to accomplish it 
through aid, advice, and logistic help alone. 
In February of 1965, in retaliation for Com- 
munist attacks against U.S. forces, we 
launched our first, limited airstrikes against 
North Viet-Nam. By the late spring of that 
year, due to a combination of causes, the 
Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army was 
threatening to overwhelm the armed foi'ces 
of South Viet-Nam. That summer, at the 
request of the South Vietnamese, the United 
States made the decision to commit major 
forces to halt aggression. I doubt that any 
decision by any President has been more 
difficult or more honorable. 

What was needed, without delay, was a 
transfusion of spirit and power and mate- 
riel which would give heart to our Vietnam- 
ese allies and put up the first, clear stoplight 
to aggression. Almost incredibly, the United 
States moved nearly 200,000 men and almost 
21/2 million tons of supplies over thousands 
of miles to Southeast Asia between July and 
October 1965. This alone, in my judgment, 
was a magnificent feat of arms. No other 

nation could have achieved it. And I doubt 
that any other nation would have committed 
itself so strongly to a principle. 

But this massive infusion would not suf- 
fice. We were at grips with a stubborn and 
bitter enemy. We had to sustain the morale 
of the South Vietnamese, hunt down the en- 
emy's regular forces, guard against his guer- 
rillas, strike at the military sources of his 
aggression, and, all the while, help with the 
political and economic development of South 

In the face of such problems, what have 
we accomplished since that short time ago? 
In brief, much. Let me cite a part of the 

Record of U.S. Accomplishments 

On the 1st of July 1965, only some 60,000 
men of all services were deployed ashore 
in Viet-Nam. Relatively few of these were 
in combat units. By the first week of Janu- 
ary 1967, 395,000 were ashore, with a very 
great increase in fighting power and combat 
support. For example: Army and Marine 
Corps strengths alone had increased by some 
266,000 men; combat maneuver elements had 
gone up more than 400 percent; helicopter 
maneuver capability had increased at least 
fourfold; ground fire support was up by 600 
percent; airstriking power had doubled; and 
military engineer support had quadrupled. 

The total numerical increase is impres- 
sive in itself — nearly 330,000 — but much 
more so when you recall that these are highly 
trained men, fully prepared for their hard 
and unique tasks. Many of them were civil- 
ians a year and a half ago. Beyond this, 
many of their units, including major ones, 
did not exist in 1965 but are now fighting 
in South Viet-Nam. 

To give an idea of what is involved in put- 
ting such numbers of skilled and dedicated 
men into Viet-Nam, consider the following: 
The total Armed Forces have increased in 
strength by more than 650,000 men in the 
past 18 months to support Viet-Nam and 
our other commitments as well; the training 
base in the United States — and this includes 
major facilities and the men to operate them 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


— has been greatly expanded; in addition to 
giving all men basic and specialist training, 
creating some units, and bringing all units 
to a high state of readiness, nearly 1 million 
U.S. military personnel have received in- 
struction in counterinsurgency and thou- 
sands study the Vietnamese language each 
year. Remember, too, that when our men 
arrive in Viet-Nam, they are not only trained 
and physically hardened, but they are also 
specially supplied and equipped to cope with 
the enemy they will face and the environ- 
ment in which they will work or fight. 

Difficult as it was to raise, train, equip, 
and organize these forces, perhaps even 
harder tasks were involved in moving them 
and in preparing logistically for their em- 
ployment. It was as if one were to move a 
major American city some 10,000 miles, 
place it in a radically new environment, and 
expect that every aspect of its existence — 
public and private — would be provided for 
without delay or confusion and in the face 
of dangers and difficulties such as its citizens 
had never confronted before. 

In the time frame I have cited, to move 
more than 300,000 people over such a dis- 
tance, somewhat more than half by sea and 
the rest by air, involved major feats of plan- 
ning, organization, and operation. We have 
quite literally operated continual air and sea 
trains from the United States for this pur- 
pose and for resupply. Requirements have 
been large. For example, passenger sealift 
in support of Viet-Nam has increased fifteen- 
fold, and commercial airlift to augment our 
military means has expanded fourfold over 
the same brief period. 

In terms of military cargo, the effort is 
equally impressive. Extrapolating from the 
records we now have for the first 10 months 
of 1966, in that year alone we airlifted some 
200,000 short tons of supplies into Viet-Nam 
and transported well over 8 million measure- 
ment tons by sea. The sealift, from January 
to October 1966 alone, amounted to over 
1,000 shiploads, exceeding the cargo shipped 
to Korea in 1951 during the height of that 

Meeting the Logistic Challenges 

Despite these major successes, however, 
perhaps the greatest logistic challenges of 
all lay within Viet-Nam. From ports to air- 
fields, from depots to maintenance facilities, 
and from headquarters to troop cantonment 
areas, virtually all of the modern structures 
needed to support an operation of this mag- 
nitude had to be constructed from near 
scratch. The achievements in this field will be 
the subject of future books. Let me sketch 
just some of the outlines. 

In the beginning there was essentially but 
one port, Saigon. This, as you know, posed 
serious problems for us. As someone said, in 
the early days we proved conclusively that 10 
ports in the United States can load ships 
faster than 1 port can unload them in Viet- 
Nam. By now, however, we have 10 ports of 
various sizes, in various stages of develop- 
ment, from Hue in the north to Can Tho 
in the south. Saigon now handles only 31 
percent of our cargo, while Da Nang and 
Cam Ranh Bay, for example, handle 22 per- 
cent and 19 percent, respectively. 

Along with ports, a great need existed for 
tactical and logistic airbases. At this time, 
important airbases are being constructed or 
improved at 24 locations, and the work on 
air facilities to handle anything from heli- 
copters up to jet transports has been prodi- 
gious over the past year and a half. 

The project at Cam Ranh Bay, with which 
I am sure you are familiar, is representative 
of the magnitude of effort. From a tiny 
coastal port for primitive craft has now 
evolved the largest logistic complex in Viet- 
Nam, already including a major deep-water 
port, large supply and maintenance facilities, 
troop cantonments, and an airfield with a 
10,000-foot permanent runway. Additionally, 
three other associated tactical airbases, jet 
capable, have been put in operation, and 
much other construction goes forward. 

As one other particularly graphic case in 
point, a rice paddy 2 miles north of Saigon 
was selected as a prospective deep-draft port. 
Operational use began last October; this 
month the first of the deep-draft berths 



should be operational, and by August of this 
year the last of the four berths should be 

Across the land, a vast variety of other 
critical facilities have been completed or are 
well advanced. Primary logistic depots are 
underway at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam 
Ranh, and Saigon. Brigade or equivalent 
cantonments are being provided at 40 dif- 
ferent locations. These works, all together, 
now make it possible for us to support our 
troops on a scope, and with an efficiency and 
dispatch, hardly conceivable for one who saw 
Viet-Nam in early days. 

This logistic support can be measured in 
many ways: 

— There is the equipment which our men 
use, largely new, unexcelled, in ample supply 
with rare and temporary exception, and fit- 
ted to the task at hand. (This is, I might 
observe, the first war in my ken in which the 
fruits of modern research and development 
have appeared on the battlefield of the cur- 
rent, rather than a future, conflict.) 

— There is the modern-day Red Ball Ex- 
press, a special Air Force lift of priority 
items to Southeast Asia, which flew some 
9,400 critically needed tons in its first year 
of operation. 

— There is the lifesaving air evacuation of 
medical patients from South Viet-Nam — 
over 25,000 in 1966. 

— There are the millions of tons which 
processed through the ports I have men- 
tioned, 97 percent of all the supplies and 
equipment sent to Viet-Nam. 

— But perhaps most graphically of all, 
there is the weight of firepower which we 
have been able to employ to save American 
and Allied lives. For example. General 
[Moshe] Dayan, former Israeli Army Chief 
of Staff, observed one small and brief battle 
in which a Viet Cong regiment attacked a 
South Korean company of 130 men. To pro- 
tect that unit until help could arrive, Ameri- 
can fire-support units laid down 21,000 shells 
along a 200-yard-wide strip between jungle 
and wire. That was, as General Dayan 
pointed out, "more than the total volume of 

artillery fire expended by the Israeli Army 
during the Sinai campaign and the War of 
Independence together." 

Combat Operations 

I have talked at length of logistic achieve- 
ments because it is these which seem to be 
least well known. But mention of fire sup- 
port brings up the subject of combat opera- 
tions. Young Americans, the much-maligned 
products of our affluent society, have proved 
their dedication, toughness, remarkable 
valor, great good humor, and deep compas- 
sion under the harshest, most complex cir- 
cumstances. And the American Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps — and let's not 
forget the Coast Guard — have demonstrated 
a collective professional skill which is per- 
haps without parallel in the history of war- 

These operations have exacted a toll: Over 
6,700 Americans have died in battle in Viet- 
Nam, and more than 38,000 have been 
wounded in action. By the standards of other 
wars, these are not heavy casualties. But in 
terms of individual sacrifice, and by any 
gage of human compassion, these are figures 
of sorrow, heavily underlining the debt 
which many men, in many lands, owe to the 
young and the few of America. 

At the same time, I would remind you that 
people in other free nations — the Republic 
of Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and 
New Zealand, for example — also have cause 
for personal grief. And above all, there are 
the sacrifices made by the South Vietnamese 
in the defense of their homeland. Since Jan- 
uary 1961, their military alone have lost 
more men in action, in equivalent population 
terms, than the total of American battle 
deaths from the Revolutionary War to the 
present day. 

Like their allies, our men have fought with 
great bravery. From July 1962 until mid- 
December 1966, some 29,000 of them had re- 
ceived awards for valor in Viet-Nam, and 
more than 40,000 had received the Purple 
Heart. Included among the highest decora- 
tions were 11 Medals of Honor and 201 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


awards of the Distinguished Service Cross, 
Navy Cross, and Air Force Cross. 

While these men fought, many more were 
engaged in the onerous, unsung jobs of sup- 
port — supply, transportation, maintenance, 
construction, communication, and so on. 
Others engaged officially, or on their own 
time, in the manifold tasks of advising the 
Vietnamese and helping them with military 
and civilian problems alike. As Chet Huntley 
noted in a recent broadcast: "The American 
soldier in Viet-Nam spends only a small por- 
tion of his time in combat; many are never 
in combat; but the major portion of his time 
is spent in rescuing people, patching up peo- 
ple, picking up kids, building irrigation sys- 
tems, schools, dispensaries, roads, houses, 
and whole villages. The American soldier in 
Viet-Nam is a builder." 

U.S. Gains Reflected in Many Ways 

What has all this effort, sacrifice, bravery, 
and dedication achieved? Not a final victory, 
even on the battlefield, but a turnaround of 
pessimism, an end to unimpeded invasion, 
and a long forward step. These gains are re- 
flected in many ways. 

One of our primary needs was to improve 
our intelligence, our knowledge of who and 
where the enemy was. Sun Tze observed long 
ago, "Know your enemy . . . and you can 
fight a hundred battles without disaster." 
Since 1965, there has been a dramatic im- 
provement in the quality and quantity of our 
intelligence. Actions extending from long- 
range infantry patrols, to vastly expanded 
aerial surveillance, to the use of new scien- 
tific devices, and on to the institution of a 
centralized automatic data processing sys- 
tem have enabled us to find the enemy, an- 
ticipate his actions, and make full use of our 
mobility and firepower. 

Our forces, increasingly strong, mobile, 
well supplied, and armed with better intelli- 
gence, have hunted down the enemy's main 
units and fought "a hundred battles without 
disaster." I have mentioned the early battle 
in the la Drang Valley in which the newly 
arrived 1st Cavalry Division fought the first 

major North Vietnamese units to enter com- 
bat. Those young, untested troopers inflicted 
more than 1,500 fatalities on the enemy and 
drove him out of Viet-Nam for the time. 

Since then, all of our ground units have 
pursued the aggressors, giving them no ha- 
ven, no rest, and no chance to mount a single 
major attack. As an example of many ac- 
tions, the Marines last year, in Operations 
Hastings and Prairie alone, inflicted over 
2,000 confirmed fatalities on the North Viet- 
namese Army. And last fall, in the former 
sanctuary of Tay Ninh Province, the largest 
ground operation of the war — Attleboro — 
took place. The 1st Infantry Division, ele- 
ments of the 25th Division, and the 196th 
Brigade badly defeated three regiments of 
tough Viet Cong. Over 1,100 enemy were 
killed or captured, and vast quantities of en- 
emy foodstuffs and war materiel were de- 

In the air in South Viet-Nam, Air Force, 
Marine, and Navy pilots gave the ground 
soldier the greatest, most responsive, and 
most effective air support in history. Every- 
thing from the B-52 bomber to the single- 
engine 0-1 observation plane has literally 
been integrated with the actions of platoons, 
companies, and battalions on the ground. 

In the air over North Viet-Nam, gallant 
airmen, attacking with great restraint and 
precision in the face of intense antiaircraft 
fire, have struck at the military facilities 
supporting aggression. 

And on the rivers and seas, naval ships 
and craft have contributed their airpower 
and gunpower and greatly reduced the 
enemy's ability to move, reinforce, or resup- 


How do we assess what these and many 
other operations have achieved? Here are 
some of the ways: 

— Since the fall of 1965, enemy attacks 
have fallen off in size, frequency, and dura- 
tion. Where regimental attacks were once 
common, and division attacks clearly pended, 
we now find ourselves fighting mostly com- 
panies and battalions. We estimate that their 
battalions are now averaging only 1 day's 



fighting per month. And where once the 
enemy could sustain combat for a month at 
a time, as in the la Drang, he now hits and 
runs to avoid disaster. 

— In the past year, in hundreds of engage- 
ments, the enemy won no single major battle. 

— Enemy captured on the battlefield rose 
from 6,000 in 1965 to more than 9,000 in 

— Enemy killed in action — confirmed fa- 
talities — increased a minimum of 35 percent 
in 1966. 

— Enemy defectors under the Chieu Hoi 
amnesty program increased in 1966 by 82 
percent over the preceding year. 

— Weapons captured on the battlefield in- 
creased some 35 percent in 1966. 

— Enemy supplies were captured or de- 
stroyed in large quantities — for example, in 
1966, enough rice to support nearly 80,000 
men for a year. 

— For the first time, farmers in the I and 
II Corps areas were able to harvest and keep 
most of their crops. 

— Thousands of enemy trucks, railroad 
cars, and vessels have been destroyed from 
the air and sea. Much of his POL has gone 
up in flames. Approximately 20 percent of 
his total military forces are engaged in de- 
fensive programs. Some 300,000 of his men 
are engaged in repair, reconstruction, and 
relocation. The effectiveness of our air cam- 
paign is made increasingly clear by enemy 
propaganda complaints. And now, to escape 
it and to seek more propaganda fuel, he is 
apparently turning his own population into 
hostages by placing military materiel and 
installations in the midst of heavily peopled 
towns and areas. 

— Even "revolutionary development," paci- 
fication, that program whose success is cru- 
cial to enduring security and progress for the 
Vietnamese, has taken forward steps. First 
of all, there is the relatively recent military 
protection which we have been able to give 
to this effort. Secondly, a major Vietnamese 
cadre training program is in full swing, and 
457 cadre teams of 59 men each are already 
at work. Thirdly, elements of the Vietnamese 

Army are being trained to complement the 
cadre teams and provide a shield behind 
which they can function. And finally, the 
enemy tide is beginning to recede. 

In this latter regard, recall the situation 
in 1965, when major U.S. units were first in- 
troduced. In the I Corps area, the Viet Cong 
had moved into the coastal lowlands and 
were beginning to isolate Da Nang and Hue. 
In the II Corps region, the Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese units moved with total 
freedom and were on the verge of overrun- 
ning several provincial capitals. In III and 
IV Corps, the Viet Cong were moving unim- 
peded between war zones C and D, then 
sanctuaries, and the critical delta areas. In 
each of these areas now the tide is running 
out on the enemy and the people are begin- 
ning, tentatively, to sense and respond to 
some degree of security. 

Much remains to be done in revolutionary 
development — a great part of the job, in fact 
— but when a million South Vietnamese refu- 
gees elect to leave Viet Cong areas and seek 
safe haven with the Government of Viet- 
Nam, as they have since our troops arrived 
in 1965, the signs of the future look promis- 

This has been a long recitation of success. 
For each unit or effort I have mentioned, I 
could have cited others equally important 
and praiseworthy. On the other hand, I could 
have detailed the problems unsolved, some 
discouragements, and some failures. But 
there has been more than enough of pessi- 
mism, and I wanted to balance the ledger. 

Making It Possible for Freedom To Triumph 

What does it all mean, in sum ? 

First of all, it does not mean that we have 
won in Viet-Nam, or even that victory is 
close at hand. The enemy is bitterly deter- 
mined and supported by major outside 
powers. And military success is only one in- 
gredient of ultimate victory. 

In other, nonmilitary, spheres there have 
been achievements, too. The Government it- 
self has shown energy and relative stability 
after surviving the stress of political turmoil 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


in the spring of 1966. The free election and 
the subsequent deliberations of the constitu- 
ent assembly are hopeful omens. The Manila 
Conference brought a new measure of unity, 
resolve, and purpose to free Asia. But major 
barriers, internal and external, still stand in 
the way of prosperous peace for the Viet- 

To me, our military achievements mean 
these things: 

— The enemy's chance for military victory 
is gone. 

— The enemy's freedom to steal, bully, and 
terrorize has been reduced. 

— The North Vietnamese have now learned 
that there is an increasing toll to pay for 

— The South Vietnamese now know that 
security is more than a dream, and tangible 
opportunities for a promising future have 
come into view. 

— Americans have committed themselves 
to a principle in Viet-Nam. They have 
worked with success and fought with honor 
to sustain it. In a brief span of time, they 
have achieved much militarily — the first task 
— and the door is now open to success in 
other fields. In an editorial last fall. The 
Economist discussed the influence which 
America was successfully exerting against 
the Communists in Asia, particularly in 
Viet-Nam. That distinguished British 
journal observed: "Five years ago a stable 
south-east Asia looked like a pipe dream. 

Now there may be a chance of bringing peace 
to that shattered region." The Economist 
added that ". . . the greatest contribution 
has been made by the American deployment 
in Vietnam." I think there is this chance for 
stability and peace, and I agree that this is 
largely the achievement of our men in Viet- 

The need, now and in the future, is for 
persistence and determination. There is a bit 
of old Arabic philosophy which is pertinent: 

Nothing in the world can take the place of per- 
sistence. Talent will not; nothing is more common 
than unsuccessful men with talent. Genius will not; 
unrewarded genius is almost a proverb. Education 
will not; the world is full of educated derelicts. 
Persistence and determination are omnipotent. 

What we have done in Viet-Nam, espe- 
cially in the past year and a half, is to make 
it possible for freedom to triumph. If we de- 
termine to persist, the recent past can be 
prolog to victory. 


The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call 
attention to the following printer's error in 
the issue of January 23, 1967. 

The fifth paragraph in the first column on 
page 137 should read: 

" — There is doubt that America's vital inter- 
ests are sufficiently threatened in Vietnam to 
necessitate the growing commitment there." 



Thailand and Southeast Asia 

by Graham Martin 
Ambassador to Thailand ^ 

It is very pleasant to be invited to talk 
with you again at the beginning of the New- 
Year. It is also appropriate to respond to the 
request of this peculiarly representative in- 
stitution, the American Chamber of Com-; 
merce, to again review with you the year 
that has closed. Also, at the request of some 
of you, I will again venture a tentative ap- 
praisal of what is ahead of us in the year 
now beginning. 

I am quite conscious of the necessity — as 
the senior American in Thailand, carrying 
the responsibility, as the President's repre- 
sentative, for all that the United States does 
here in its civilian and military programs — 
to give as complete a report and as honest an 
appraisal as I possibly can. 

It is a very dii!icult thing, and it is often 
an occupationally dangerous thing, to at- 
tempt too much precision in one's estimates 
of future events. For example, the phrase of 
Winston Churchill, "a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma," is certainly ap- 
plicable to the convulsions we are witnessing 
today in mainland China. One can only hope 
that out of this agony of a people, with whom 
our own nation has historic bonds of friend- 
ship and mutual respect, may soon come a 
regime which will permit the pragmatic and 
creative genius of the Chinese people and 
the vast richness of the Chinese cultural her- 
itage to again become engaged in the cooper- 
ative progress of the rest of mankind. It is 

' Address made before the American Chamber of 
Commerce at Bangkok, Thailand, on Jan. 18 (press 
release 11 dated Jan. 23). 

certain that this will happen eventually. It 
may happen sooner than we now dare to an- 

One can speak with much more certainty 
about the underlying deep convictions of 
one's own country and the courses of action 
which will certainly flow from those convic- 
tions. And this is possible despite the 
stridency of the debate within our open 
society which may momentarily obscure the 
inevitability of our actions. Last year I said 
we could accept certain basic realities as 
constant. And as we look back, we find this 
to have been true. 

As you may recall, the stridency of a 
highly vocal minority within our own coun- 
try then had, in the minds of some of you, 
brought into question the validity of the 
American commitment in Southeast Asia. 
I said last January that the American com- 
mitment to assist the peoples of Southeast 
Asia was a determined commitment, a solidly 
dependable commitment, a commitment sup- 
ported by the great majority of our people, 
a commitment supported now even by those 
who may have doubted, a decade ago, the 
wisdom of our making it. For deeply in- 
grained in our American heritage, as a part 
of the fiber of our very being, is the memory 
of that small and gallant band who, in 
declaring their independence from an op- 
pressive colonial rule, pledged not only their 
lives and their fortunes but threw into the 
scales another perhaps even more precious 
possession, their "sacred Honor." 

It is no more conceivable today than it 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


was in 1776 that our country would dishonor 
such a commitment. We will grumble about 
it. We will complain that we would much 
rather be doing more constructive things, 
but, as we have always done, in the end we 
will do what is necessary to be done. We will 
keep our word. We will honor the commit- 

I also said last year aggression would not 
be tolerated or accommodated in the inter- 
ests of convenience and expediency. We have 
made no such accommodation. I also said 
that Mao's theory of "the people's war," or 
as formulated elsewhere, "wars of just liber- 
ation," could not prevail against our country 
and its allies. It has not, and it will not. And 
I ventured to forecast that as these realities 
of the constancy of the American commit- 
ment and of the American performance be- 
came evident, we could anticipate that the 
engagement of Asian energies in increasingly 
effective patterns of regional cooperation 
would startle all of us by their rapidly ac- 
celerating momentum. And this we have cer- 
tainly seen in full measure. 

Failure of Hanoi's Propaganda Campaign 

In the course of the past year we have 
seen in Viet-Nam a maximum effort by the 
North Vietnamese to inflict a Dien Bien Phu 
type of victory on the forces of the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam and its allies. The 
forces of Hanoi and the Viet Cong had de- 
luded themselves into thinking that the time 
had come to move to the classic third phase. 
Having attempted to destroy the very fabric 
of government and of society itself by an 
incredibly callous and brutal campaign of 
assassination and terror, one could move to 
defeat the main forces of one's enemy. But 
it just didn't work out that way. 

Instead, South Vietnamese and American 
forces crushed the North Vietnamese regular 
forces and the Viet Cong wherever they 
would stand and do battle. More than that, 
the so-called redoubt areas, which had here- 
tofore been their safe havens and their 
storehouses of vast quantities of muni- 
tions and rice, were progressively denied to 
them. Their rice ration grows smaller and 

their munitions more scarce. Instead of be- 
ing welcomed, they are vigorously resisted 
by the South Vietnamese. The result is an 
increasing number of defectors each telling 
his tale of the malnutrition, the hardships, 
and the disillusionment that is setting in. 

Whether under such circumstances it is 
possible to gear back down to a lower phase 
of insurgency is doubtful indeed. It is in- 
creasingly evident that more and more of 
the North Vietnamese soldiers in the South 
are realizing the impossibility of attaining 
the goal of their doctrinaire masters in 

When their masters in Hanoi will reach 
the same conclusion is not yet clear. It seems 
they are still counting on the efficacy of 
their primary weapon: a propaganda cam- 
paign so cleverly orchestrated on a world- 
wide basis that some sincere and well- 
meaning people have unwittingly become 
involved in spreading an absurd collection 
of distortions. Here again one can venture 
a conclusion with confidence. It is that this 
campaign cannot succeed. Our people have 
an instinctive ability to cut through such 
technique and to reject the phony. It takes 
a little time, but in the end the reaction is 
to cut through to the truth. 

I do not, therefore, see in the propaganda 
campaign a serious danger to the validity 
of our commitment to Southeast Asia. I do, 
however, see in it a source of encouragement 
to Hanoi to hang on to what is clearly a 
losing cause in the hope that propaganda will 
persuade us to grasp defeat out of the mouth 
of victory. 

Validity of U.S. Goals in Asia 

I have often thought that a curious side 
effect of these distortions is that they some- 
times obscure the validity of much simpler 
goals of American policy than those of utter 
perfection that are sometimes set for us by 
commentators who do not have the responsi- 
bility for achieving them. 

This is best illustrated by a long conver- 
sation I had recently with an eminent Euro- 
pean journalist I had come to know well in 
my 10 years in Europe. He had just returned 



from a journey through Asia, including a 
stay in Saigon. He said he never ceased to 
be fascinated with the peculiar masochistic 
attitude Americans adopted about their en- 
gagement abroad. I started to bristle. He 
said, "Don't argue yet — just listen." He went 
on to say that listening from Europe to the 
public dialog in the United States, one could 
only conclude that Americans were on the 
verge of disaster in South Viet^Nam, that 
Americans were vastly unpopular in Asia, 
that there was no clear aim to American 
policy, that we were determined on an esca- 
lation that would be uncontrollable. He said 
that he could go on with such a list, but I 
probably knew more items to include than 
did he. I said I had heard a few more items. 

He said most of the rest of the world 
looked at it quite differently. He said the rest 
of the world assumed our primary objective 
to be the denial of Southeast Asia to Com- 
munist Chinese hegemony. He said it was 
quite clear to everyone except ourselves, and 
possibly Hanoi and Peking, that we had 
already achieved this objective. He said he 
thought historians would quite likely regard 
what we had done in Viet-Nam as the crucial 
turning point in the life of the developing 
two-thirds of the world. He said that if Com- 
munist China had succeeded in this attempt, 
it would have led to such a complete valida- 
tion of "the thought of Mao Tse^tung" that 
a nuclear confrontation might have become 
inevitable. He said that our firm stand in 
South Viet-Nam has led directly to the al- 
most complete elimination of Communist 
Chinese influence from Africa and Latin 
America. He said that Mao believed that the 
techniques of the "war of just liberation" 
could not be contained by the most powerful 
nation the world had ever known. Had Mao 
been proved correct, then Africa and Latin 
America as well as Asia would have certainly 
been engulfed by this technique. 

Anyway, he said, whether Americans real- 
ize they have already achieved this goal or 
not, it is quite evident that all Asia realizes 
it and is already acting on this conviction in 
the creation of a new Asia — a free Asia with 

increasingly effective patterns of cooperation 
in economic and social fields. These would, he 
thought, lead inevitably to a closer political 
cohesion which in turn would provide the 
patterns for an Asian security arrangement 
that would allow them to handle their own 

He went on to say that American policy in 
Asia and the Pacific was on the verge of a 
success as great as in Europe in the fifties. 
He reminded me that the same sort of at- 
tacks were made by Americans on American 
policy then as are being made now. He said 
he still found it fascinating that while Amer- 
icans were sometimes irritating in their in- 
sistence on their superiority in so many 
ways, they consistently underrated their ac- 
complishments abroad. As a matter of fact, 
he said, America has handled its unequaled 
power with great imagination, its vast mili- 
tary strength with ingenuity and with enor- 
mous restraints. Its leaders have somehow 
begun to master the most difficult lesson of 
those who are chosen to govern — the ability 
to tightly control a vast mechanism which, 
historically, has often developed a momentum 
and direction of its own. 

The most important thing of all, he said, 
is that in validating your commitment in full 
as you are doing, you are insuring the credi- 
bility of your commitments elsewhere. And 
in so doing it is obvious that your people 
have acquired the patience to see the job 
through. He concluded his monolog by saying 
that destiny has apparently chosen your 
country to lead, for a while at least. And it 
begins to look as if you might be worthy 
of the choice. 

• • • • • 

I agree with him that the last year has 
brought a great change to the situation in 
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. The Commu- 
nist aggressor once struggled for a victory 
which he could not obtain. He is now strug- 
gling to avert a defeat he cannot avoid. 

While there is much grim work still to be 
done in South Viet-Nam, the issue is now 
certain. And those of us who live in Bangkok 
have had the good fortune to watch the birth 
of the new Asia of which my friend spoke. 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


Asian Cooperative Efforts 

I believe history will record more fully 
than do our media the important contribu- 
tion made by our friend and colleague here 
in Bangkok, His Excellency U Nyun, Ex- 
ecutive Secretary of ECAFE. Among his 
many accomplishments for the welfare of 
the peoples of Asia will be recorded his pa- 
tient, determined, and persistent diplomacy 
which was primarily responsible for bringing 
into being the new Asian Development Bank 
and which is now pushing the Mekong de- 
velopment scheme into an accelerating mo- 

Within the year, we saw here in Bangkok 
the months of patient work by the Commit- 
tee of Ambassadors under the leadership of 
the Thai Foreign Minister which led to the 
meeting in Seoul where nine Asian nations 
formed the Asian and Pacific Council. We 
shall see this new organization hold its 
second meeting here in Bangkok this year. 

It was here in Bangkok that we saw the re- 
activation of the Association of Southeast 
Asia, founded in 1961 but interrupted by the 
difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia. 

That meeting could not have taken place 
without the prior settlement of these difficul- 
ties which had also led to strained relations 
between Malaysia and the Philippines. The 
reconciliation of Indonesia and Malaysia, pro- 
moted by the patient, infinitely skillful and 
selfless diplomacy of Thailand, climaxed In- 
donesia's rejection of communism and the 
return of reason to that nation's internal 
and foreign affairs. 

It was here in Bangkok this year that the 
Foreign Minister of Thailand, joined by his 
colleagues from the Philippines and Malay- 
sia, launched the first wholly Asian move to 
settle the Vietnamese war. It was in this con- 
text that there was the first Asian call for 
Japan to begin to assume a political role in 
Asian regional affairs commensurate with its 
abilities and economic strength. 

In April the Conference on Asian Develop- 
ment was convened in Tokyo at Japanese 
initiative. It, like the Asian and Pacific 
Council, will continue to meet regularly in 

other Asian capitals. It is characteristic of 
virtually all these newly organized regional 
projects to broaden participation by sharing 
responsibility for the planning and hosting 
of conferences. 

It was in Bangkok, for example, that the 
first group of Southeast Asian Ministers of 
Education met during November of 1965 to 
explore the possibilities of regional coordi- 
nation of educational programs and the shar- 
ing of facilities. They met again last month 
in Manila, where they approved formation of 
a permanent secretariat. The dozen cooper- 
ative educational projects which they voted 
to support include the creation of an Asian 
Institute of Technology, to be located in 
Thailand; an Agricultural Institute, to be 
located in the Philippines; and an Institute 
of Tropical Medicine. 

These are but a few of the many coopera- 
tive projects which have been instituted or 
given new momentum under Asian leadership 
during the past year. Some, like the gigantic 
Mekong River development project, are well 
established. Others are but exploratory stir- 
rings of the rising Asian urge to get on with 
the business of orderly regional growth 
through the collective engagement of Asian 
resources. The breadth of these activities is 
as impressive as it is little known. These new 
cooperative efforts extend not only into such 
fields as irrigation, hydroelectric power, 
transportation, communication, natural re- 
sources exploration, scientific and technical 
research, experimental agriculture, and qual- 
ity manufacturing controls but also into the 
fields of coordinated economic planning and 
cooperative fiscal policies. 

I know of no more succinct assessment of 
the meaning of these developments than that 
voiced last July by the President of the 
United States. In a speech reviewing Asia's 
remarkable rate of recent progress, Presi- 
dent Johnson said: ^ 

. . . this is the new Asia, and this is the new 
spirit we see taking shape behind our defense of 
South Viet-Nam. Because we have been firm, be- 
cause we have committed ourselves to the defense 

' For text, see BtiLLETiN of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158. 



of one small country, others have taken new heart. 
... we never intend to let [them] down. America's 
word will always be good. 

The trend has been revealed with great 
clarity also by His Excellency Thanat Kho- 
man, the Foreign Minister of Thailand, who 
last October, in New York City, said: 

The smaller nations in Southeast Asia have felt 
the need of getting closer with one another. If 
division has been the characteristic of the past and 
had brought about g^rievous losses of freedom and 
independence and had allowed interference and 
pressure by outside powers, the future aims should 
be for closer and more fruitful cooperation and 
integration. While such cooperation should be basi- 
cally regional, it is not in our interest to make it 
exclusive. Outside elements may have a role to play 
but not a domineering or dominating role. If any- 
thing, it will be a cooperation on the basis of equal- 
ity and partnership. 

If this then is the prevailing mood and 
outlook of the new Asia, let us give credit 
where credit is most assuredly due: 

First, to the people and the leaders of 
Asia, because they have upheld both their 
values and their resolve through long years 
of uncertainty and disorder. 

Second, to those American leaders who 
have perceived that Asians want nothing 
more from us than the opportunity to deliver 
themselves not only from the age-old, im- 
mobilizing fear of Chinese exploitation but 
from poverty, illiteracy, sickness, and shriv- 
eled opportunities. 

There is no mistaking what accounts for 
the upsurge in feelings of good will and con- 
fidence toward the United States throughout 
the Asian region. It has been America's ex- 
tension of more imaginative, more meaning- 
ful assistance and support for Asia's own 
initiatives, Asia's own solutions, Asia's own 
priorities, and Asia's own defenses. 

Nothing illustrates better the effect of this 
approach than the responsiveness evoked in 
the course of President Johnson's recent 
Asian tour. For it brought forth from mil- 
lions in this region great waves of spon- 
taneous affection toward the man whose 
words and actions have come to be associated 
with their own advances toward a better life. 

The President's visit gave the people of 
Asia an opportunity to confirm the essential 
rightness of American policy in Asia. They 
seized that opportunity by rendering him a 
unique welcome. I do not hesitate to predict 
that historians will record it as an illumi- 
nating, catalytic event which raised the cur- 
tain on an era of unprecedented, mutually 
advantageous cooperation between Asia and 
the West. For what was demonstrated by the 
warmth and public enthusiasm of the Presi- 
dent's reception everywhere, and what was 
underscored repeatedly for all the world to 
see, is that the forces of neutralism, anti- 
colonialism, and regional dissension are no 
longer significant factors in Asian affairs. 
The argument, by Americans oddly enough, 
that U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese war 
would make it hated throughout Asia was 
shown to be wholly false. 

The reality of the situation, as we have 
seen, is quite the contrary. The trend is 
toward greater willingness to move in con- 
cert with others to devise a lasting, essen- 
tially Asian counterweight to Chinese power 
in the area. The motivating force for this is 
not Asian self-aggrandizement. It is simply 
the impatience of Asians for a peace in which 
to build their nations, provide for their fam- 
ilies, plot more satisfying lives, and lift the 
horizons of future generations. 

Asian efforts to unify and fortify the re- 
gion have begun to move so fast, in fact, that 
the danger now exists that American and 
Western adjustments to such dramatic and 
constructive change will fall behind. Free 
Asia has reached the point where it is pre- 
pared to associate itself with new Western 
initiatives which complement its own. But 
how many nations are prepared to propose 
and follow through on the wholly equitable 
terms a self-reliant and united Asia right- 
fully will demand ? Westerners cannot expect 
to operate in Asia in the future on terms 
that existed in the past. But it would be a 
pessimist indeed who could not see the newly 
compelling opportunities for fruitful coopera- 
tion which Asians are providing in the course 
of coordinated regional reformation and de- 
velopment. The question now is whether 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


America and others have mastered the tech- 
nique of full and equal partnership in Asia. 

Pattern of Thai-American Relations 

As America and others in the West look 
for answers to that question, I would hold 
that the pattern of Thai-American relations 
offers a sound basis on which effective for- 
mulas can be devised. It has been the tradi- 
tion of Thai-American relations, for over a 
century and a half, to set exemplary stand- 
ards in terms of the mutual understanding 
and respect which are essential in contacts 
between nations, particularly between those 
whose disparities in their size and power 
are significant. 

As the Foreign Minister of Thailand ob- 
served last May, "Our relationship stands 
out as a remarkable example of how a small 
nation can work with a great power without 
being dominated or indeed losing its iden- 

It was his hope, he emphasized, that Thai- 
American collaboration would become what 
the Foreign Minister termed "a model to an 
orderly and peaceful development of the rela- 
tionship between nations, large and small, in 
this part of the world — relationships which 
will not entail subservience of one to the 
other, but rather mutually trustworthy and 
fruitful partnership and cooperation." 

I share completely the opinions of my Thai 
colleague on the techniques of enlightened 
diplomacy and international cooperation. 
Nothing is more important in the modern 
world than the psychological relations be- 
tween nations, particularly the patterns of 
style, attitude, and behavior which become es- 
tablished in the solution of common problems 
through intimate, complex, and sensitive as- 
sociations. The basis on which Thailand and 
the United States conduct their relations 
takes those considerations into full account. 
We practice earnest solicitation and consider- 
ation of each other's opinions on all matters 
of common concern. We acknowledge mutual 
responsibility for the outcome of joint efforts. 
And, most importantly, we cultivate an at- 
mosphere of full trust within a genuinely 
equitable partnership. 

Now, there are no doubts among you here 
in Bangkok as to whether Thailand brings as 
much to that partnership as she receives. 
There are a great many voluntary and recip- 
rocal actions which could . be cited. To ex- 
amine only one of them, we might choose 
Thailand's contribution to the military effec- 
tiveness of her American and South Viet- 
namese allies, which is a part of her ongoing 
heavy support of SEATO objectives. 

As you know, the Royal Thai Government 
has permitted the use of its bases by ele- 
ments of the United States Armed Forces en- 
gaged in carrying out defensive measures 
under the obligations both Governments had 
assumed under the SEATO treaty. These 
bases at Korat, Ubon, Nakom Phanon, 
Udorn, Takhli, and U-Tapao have been a 
major contribution to the Allied war effort. 

It is impossible to estimate how many thou- 
sand Allied lives have been saved in South 
Viet-Nam as a direct result of Thailand's co- 
operation. But one needs only to sample the 
enraged stream of propaganda protests 
beamed at Thailand by Peking and Hanoi to 
conclude that our concerted actions hurt them 

The Thai facilities which have played such 
a critical role in the defense of South Viet- 
Nam did not appear miraculously or mysteri- 
ously, simply because of the free world's ur- 
gent need for them. Those installations were 
put in place by Thailand much earlier, in 
the course of long-term military prepared- 
ness efforts undertaken in its own defense 
and in response to its obligations as a highly 
conscientious member of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization. 

The complex of modern military logistical 
facilities now available in Thailand is the 
result of a combined effort that has been 
made within the SEATO framework to pro- 
vide for the defense of the treaty area. The 
United States continues to play its role with- 
in SEATO by taking an active part in the 
maintenance and improvement of those facil- 
ities. Thus, among the 35,283 members of the 
American Armed Forces in Thailand, as of 
January 5 there were some 8,000 engaged in 



the construction and maintenance of strategic 
roadways, communications networks, port 
facilities, military supply depots, and other 
installations which have been judged by 
SEATO members to be essential for the 
security of this area. 

At the same time, the U.S. continues its 
16-year-old program to assist in the training 
and equipment of Thailand's armed forces. 
As long-range Communist plans for Thai- 
land's subversion, announced by Peking some 
time ago, are accelerated, Thai-U.S. coopera- 
tion under the military assistance program 
has taken these new tactics into account. An 
American Special Forces unit has been de- 
ployed here on a training mission which will 
give Thailand additional military units 
skilled in counterinsurgency operations. At 
Thai request, a company of unarmed Ameri- 
can helicopters has been temporarily operat- 
ing in the northeast to provide the all- 
important elements of mobility and logistical 
flexibility for Thai security units. The 
American unit's mission is best described as 
a "taxi service," which has been available to 
Thai civilian and military authorities en- 
gaged in the numerous economic, social, and 
security development programs Thailand 
has organized to protect and benefit its 
people in the remote areas. In the next 2 
weeks these airlift missions will be taken 
over by the Thai Government, using its own 
new aircraft, flown and serviced by newly 
graduated helicopter pilots and ground 
maintenance crews. 

I might add for the record that neither 
the Special Forces and other American train- 
ing personnel nor these temporarily provided 
helicopters have participated in actual coun- 
terinsurgency combat operations. The Thai 
have insisted that this is their responsibility 
which they will meet with their own armed 
forces. The helicopters are therefore being 
assigned to other duties by the Secretary of 
Defense at the end of this month in accord- 
ance with arrangements made on their ar- 
rival last August. 

It is in these and other unsensational ways 
that the United States has moved to help 
strengthen this country militarily and to as- 

sist a government deeply conscious of its 
responsibilities for protecting its own and 
neighboring people. 

As you know, the Royal Thai Government 
has decided to add to the Royal Thai Air 
Force and Royal Thai Navy units, now en- 
gaged with their other free- wo rid allies in 
resisting aggression in South Viet-Nam, an 
additional fighting force from the Royal Thai 
Army. They will be warmly welcomed by 
their other SEATO allies, who learned of 
their courage and valor when they fought 
as allies in the United Nations command in 

In summary, our mission here is not to 
oversee or involve ourselves in the internal 
military and civilian aff'airs which are the 
exclusive business of the Thai themselves. 
Our mission is to perform as trusted friend, 
discreet confidant, and dependable ally and 
where we can to make available from our 
experience and resources those things which 
Thailand judges to be applicable and bene- 
ficial to its own development and security. 

And it is a similar approach, I submit, 
that will enable America to associate itself 
most fully with the new order that has begun 
to emerge so rapidly within free Asia. The 
old order is passing. Its death rattle can be 
heard in the jungles of Viet-Nam, just as the 
new era can be glimpsed in Asia's busy con- 
ference halls. 

The United States has traveled a long, 
challenging, and burdensome way to reach 
this point. The final miles may prove to be 
a bit rough because they feature a bitter, 
complicated struggle against fanatical ex- 
tremists. But we now know what our role 
entails. We know that it need not overtax 
our resources. We do know that the Amer- 
ican people have the patience and the deter- 
mination we will need to carry out our com- 
mitments. If there is any important element 
still missing from the American commitment 
to keep Southeast Asia secure, I would sug- 
gest that it is confidence in ourselves, con- 
fidence in the future of Asia, and pride that 
we have made that future possible by meet- 
ing our commitments, not only to Asia but 
to our ancient obligation to freedom. 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


AID Report on Viet-Nam Commodity Programs 
Submitted to President Johnson 

Folloiving is a letter of transmittal to 
President Johnson from William S. Gaud, 
Administrator of the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development, together with the text 
of a report on the management of AID com- 
modity programs in Viet-Nam in 1966. 

letter of transmittal 

9 January 1967 

Dear Mr. President: I submit here- 
with a year-end report on the management 
of AID commodity assistance programs in 
Vietnam and what we are doing to improve 
their effectiveness and prevent their misuse. 

Such a special report seemed desirable to 
me because of the magnitude of our Vietnam 
aid program and the difficult wartime cir- 
cumstances under which it must be admin- 
istered, unique in AID's experience. Effective 
management of such large and complex pro- 
grams would be a demanding task in any 
developing country. It has been especially 
demanding in a country whose economy, 
social structure, communications and trans- 
portation have been dislocated by a long war. 
Rapid expansion of these programs to meet 
urgent requirements in 1966 compounded 
the management task. 

The U.S. has provided about $455 million 
in food, equipment and other civil aid sup- 
plies during 1966 to support "revolutionary 
development" activities in the rural areas, 
fight inflation throughout the country, estab- 
lish the foundation for long-term develop- 
ment, and provide medical and relief supplies 
to the victims of communist terror and ag- 

To administer this expanding program, the 

AID Mission staff had to be doubled during 
the year. New systems, procedures and con- 
trols were adopted to strengthen safeguards 
against abuses and facilitate handling of sup- 
plies. These include exchange devaluation 
and reforms in import procedures made by 
the Government of Vietnam, major changes 
in AID'S Commercial Import Program opera- 
tions, expansion and improvement of phys- 
ical facilities and management of the Viet- 
namese ports, a large increase in U.S. ad- 
visory services and auditing staffs, and 
improvements in documentation and infor- 
mation systems. 

Among the most important specific actions 
taken were: 

— assignment of the U.S. Army's 1st 
Logistic Command to supervise the handling 
of almost all AID project commodities from 
ship discharge to Government warehouses; 

— assignment of the 125th Terminal Com- 
mand as an advisory unit to the Vietnamese 
director of the Port of Saigon; 

— doubling the AID Mission's auditing 
staff and the assignment of controllers and 
traveling auditors to all regions; 

— assignment of a U.S. Bureau of Customs 
team to assist the Vietnamese Customs Office 
in improving its procedures and spot-check- 
ing AID-financed commercial imports; 

— a decision to station American logistics 
advisors in provincial and regional ware- 
houses; and 

— development of an automated arrival ac- 
counting system for AID's commercial im- 

Nonetheless, as generally happens in war- 
time, there has been some illegal diversion 
or other loss of aid supplies to Vietnam. 



Any such loss is deplorable, even in wartime, 
and I know that you have been concerned, as 
have I and my staff, with the necessity of 
assuring that large amounts of AID-financed 
commodities are not stolen or otherwise di- 
verted. This report summarizes our work 
on that problem. It reviews the AID Mis- 
sion's estimates of the recent and current 
rates of loss in the major program categories 
and measures to reduce these losses. 

These estimates, which are the most com- 
prehensive and carefully reviewed findings 
available, indicate that in recent months no 
more than 5-6% of all U.S. economic assist- 
ance commodities delivered to Vietnam were 
stolen or otherwise diverted. 

Though these rates of loss are comparable 
to or lower than losses in other war zones 
under less difficult conditions, they are by no 
means acceptable and we are doing our best 
to reduce them further. Management im- 
provements now in force or being initiated 
are expected to reduce losses substantially 
over the coming year. I am confident that my 
next report to you will reflect further im- 
provement in the management and effective- 
ness of the AID commodity programs. 
Sincerely yours, 

William S. Gaud 


I. Introduction 

AID has undertaken in Vietnam a war- 
time economic assistance program unprece- 
dented in its magnitude and intensity. 

In late 1965, it became necessary to in- 
crease vastly the AID and Food for Peace 
commodity programs in order to bolster the 
Vietnamese economy against inflationary 
pressures resulting from the U.S. and Viet- 
namese military buildup, to provide greater 
support to the "revolutionary development" 
program in the rural areas, and to furnish 
relief and medical supplies to refugees and 
other victims of the "shooting war." 

To be effective, our response to these ur- 
gent requirements had to be full and fast. 
Obligation of funds and the initiation of or- 

ders for the programs had to be started at 
once, even before all the personnel needed to 
manage them were on the job in Vietnam. 
The AID American staff of "direct-hire" per- 
sonnel stationed in Vietnam or in training 
on January 1, 1966, numbered about 700; by 
December 31, 1966, it had nearly doubled. At 
the same time, AID and the Government of 
Vietnam undertook a variety of economic 
measures, reforms and procedures to man- 
age more effectively this massive and com- 
plex flow of commodities. 

During calendar year 1966, the period cov- 
ered in this report, actual disbursements for 
AID and Food for Peace program goods 
shipped to Vietnam totaled $455 million, 
compared with $266 million in 1965. Opera- 
tion and control of a program of this size 
in a less developed country would be diffi- 
cult in time of peace under relatively stable 
social and economic conditions. South Viet- 
nam in 1966 presented far greater problems. 
It was in every sense disjointed by war, its 
modest transportation capacity disrupted 
and insecure, its public and private manage- 
ment ranks thinned, its system of deterring 
corruption inadequate. 

To meet the requirements of the Viet- 
namese economy and civil counterinsurgency 
effort, well over 150,000 different commod- 
ities had to be procured, shipped and dis- 
tributed — items as large as huge gas tur- 
bine generators and manufacturing plant 
machinery and as small as sewing needles, 
as complex as specially designed industrial 
engines and as "simple" as shiploads of rice. 
Nearly 3 million tons of economic assistance 
goods were shipped to Vietnam during 1966 
— the equivalent of 900 shiploads. 

This report summarizes the nature and 
purposes of the AID commodity programs, 
describes the economic, managerial and logis- 
tical problems that have had to be overcome, 
and enumerates the economic measures, 
physical facilities and operational systems 
which have been or are being created to cope 
with these problems. The report deals sepa- 
rately with commodities which are intended 
for sale in Vietnam's commercial markets 
(part II) and those which are intended for 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


use in projects or relief programs (part III). 
In both sections, the flow of goods is ex- 
amined from arrival in Vietnam to the pro- 
gram destinations. 

Special attention is directed throughout 
to the problems of loss, theft or other diver- 
sion of AID-funded commodities and correc- 
tive measures. Losses of economic assistance 
goods in Vietnam are estimated by our 
Mission at no more than .5 to 6 percent over- 
all in recent months. This aggregate is de- 
rived from estimates, using several separate 
methods, of between 2 and 5 percent of com- 
mercial imports (which accounted in 1966 
for 85 percent of the total commodity flow), 
and estimates of between 10 and 15 percent 
of the far smaller amount of project and 
relief commodities which must be distributed 
to every province, often through insecure 
territory. These rates of loss are believed to 
be no more, and perhaps less, than that suf- 
fered in other wartime conditions. However, 
such losses are unacceptable to AID. They 
are being reduced now by new measures in 
the Saigon port and will be reduced through- 
out the internal logistic system by other 
measures recently adopted. The physical con- 
trol and management systems already in- 
stalled or decided upon are outlined below. 

A separate section addresses economic war- 
fare, the effort to frustrate the Viet Cong ex- 
ploitation of local supply sources including 
U.S. economic and military aid supplies. 

II. strengthening the Vietnamese Economy: 
The Commercial Import and Food for 
Peace Programs 

A. Combating Inflation 

About 85 percent of the economic aid 
goods sent to Vietnam in 1966 were com- 
mitted to the fight against destructive infla- 
tion. To the extent that imports could 
moderate domestic shortages, this AID com- 
mei-cial import program and Food for Peace 
program succeeded. 

With over two-thirds of its able-bodied 
men in the 20-30 year age group absorbed 
by the war eff'ort, cities swollen by refugees, 
internal transportation disrupted and much 
of the agricultural area a battleground. 

South Vietnam's capacity to provide goods 
and services for its own population has been 
drastically reduced. The shortage of domestic 
goods and services was compounded by an 
increase of over 130 percent during 1965- 
1966 in the amount of piasters in circulation, 
funds spent primarily in support of the war 
eff'ort for salaries and expenditures of Viet- 
namese soldiers, policemen, civil servants 
and construction workers, and of U.S. troops 
and military contractors. If this increase in 
purchasing power were not offset by an in- 
crease in the inflow of goods, prices of scarce 
commodities would be bid up rapidly and a 
runaway inflation would undermine morale 
and cause extreme social inequity, jeopard- 
izing the whole defense effort. 

U.S. provision of commodities through the 
commercial import and Food for Peace pro- 
grams gives the disrupted South Vietnamese 
economy additional dollar resources to fi- 
nance more imports, supplementing the 
foreign currency resources it earns through 
normal financial transactions. These pro- 
grams provide food, fertilizer, construction 
materials, machinery — thousands of items 
needed to keep the economy operating and 
expanding. The sale of these imported goods 
and domestic and customs revenue collections 
absorb piasters and reestablish the balance 
between money and goods in the marketplace. 

In late 1965 the existing AID commercial 
import program (CIP) and Title I sales of 
the Food for Peace program were rapidly 
expanded to meet this critical need. 

B. Hoiv the CIP and Title I Programs Func- 

The Government of Vietnam (GVN) con- 
trols imports of commodities for commercial 
sale in the country through a licensing sys- 
tem. After a license has been issued by the 
GVN and before AID approves U.S. funding 
of the import under the CIP, an AID com- 
modity analyst reviews the order with special 
attention to four factors: 

— Is the applicant an authorized importer 
not under suspension? 

— Is the commodity a nonluxury item ? 
— Could the enemy adapt such commodity 



to use as an item of critical importance? 

— Is the size of the order reasonable in 
terms of the current Vietnamese market de- 

If the order is approved, the AID analyst 
assists the importer in preparing an invita- 
tion for proposals. The importer then entei's 
into an agreement with the most qualified 
responsive bidder, who ships the goods to the 
importer. The supplier is paid by AID in 
dollars. The importer deposits the piaster 
equivalent of the cost of the goods in a 
"counterpart fund," which is jointly admin- 
istered by the U.S. and Vietnamese Govern- 
ments to support sections of the GVN mili- 
tary and civil budgets. 

The goods themselves are received by the 
importer through customs, almost always at 
the Port of Saigon, and disseminated 
throughout the Vietnamese economy. The 
presence of AID's "clasped hands" symbol 
on these commodities sold in shops through- 
out Vietnam has frequently been misin- 
terpreted as an indication of the diversion 
of AID material meant for free distribution 
or use in projects. It is, on the contrary, 
tangible evidence that the CIP effort is 

Most Food for Peace commodities brought 
to Vietnam for sale under Title I of that 
program are handled in precisely the same 
manner as other CIP goods. Title I rice, 
however, is treated differently. Approxi- 
mately 59 percent of the rice is off-loaded at 
the Port of Saigon by the U.S. Army's 4th 
Terminal Command and placed in a GVN 
rice warehouse, while the remaining 41 per- 
cent is landed at the ports of Da Nang, Qui 
Nhon and Nha Trang. The Vietnamese 
Government then distributes the rice as 

— Most is sold to merchants for local cur- 
rency. They, in turn, distribute it in the rice 
deficit areas in normal commercial channels. 

— About 10 percent is turned over to the 
Vietnamese armed forces to supplement 
their diets. 

— A small amount is sold directly by the 
GVN to the public. 

During calendar 1966, 422,000 metric tons 
of rice, valued at approximately $58 million, 
were exported to Vietnam under the Title I 

C. Reforms of the System 

Vietnamese importers active in the CIP 
and Food for Peace program, like business- 
men elsewhere, strive to make the largest 
sustainable profit. 

Before 1965 it was not especially easy for 
importers to manipulate the market because 
the foreign exchange rate was fairly realistic 
and smaller incomes and limited purchasing 
power kept the demand for imports stable. 
Following the rapid buildup of 1965, how- 
ever, a combination of increased purchasing 
power, saturated logistic facilities, increased 
VC interdiction of internal distribution, an 
exchange rate which had become unrealistic 
and war-thinned civil government adminis- 
tration created a situation in which importers 
could collude with one another and with un- 
scrupulous suppliers to generate windfall or 
monopoly profits. Administrative price con- 
trols proved ineffective or positively harmful. 
In effect, the institutions of the import sec- 
tor, operating under a body of regulations 
adopted several years ago during a period of 
relative stability, were shown in some in- 
stances to be inadequate or counterproduc- 

In the spring and summer of 1966 the 
Governments of Vietnam and the United 
States agreed on import reforms. Coupled 
with the economic stabilization measures rec- 
ommended by the International Monetary 
Fund, these reforms, each discussed below, 
reduced opportunities for profiteering and 
corrected other abuses that had taken place 
under the CIP. 

1. Devaluation. On June 18 the Vietnam- 
ese Government announced a new system of 
exchange rates which raised the effective 
cost of foreign exchange for imports from 
60 to 118 piasters per dollar, plus duties. 
While the primary purpose of devaluation 
was to absorb excess liquidity and keep in- 
flation within tolerable limits, additional 
benefits were derived from the effect the new 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


exchange rate had on CIP transactions. 
Doubling the piaster cost of foreign exchange 
made illegal reexportation of CIP commodi- 
ties unattractive and reduced the profit pos- 
sibilities in such practices as overinvoicing. 

2. Expavded Competition in the Commer- 
cial Import Sector. Open general licensing 
was adopted for the licensing of most im- 
ports financed under the CIP, and with 
Vietnamese-owned foreign exchange, and the 
former system of administrative allocation of 
foreign exchange on the basis of importer 
quotas was abolished. New importers were 
permitted to enter the previously closed im- 
port community if they could demonstrate 
that they were responsible firms, 70 percent 
Vietnamese owned, and had at least 15 mil- 
lion piasters of paid-in capital. They had to 
prove that they had warehouse facilities 
available, and they were required to deposit 
1 million piasters with the Ministry of Na- 
tional Economy as a surety bond against 
illegal activities. To date the applications of 
more than 170 new importers have been au- 
thorized or are in process. This increase in 
competition has been a healthy stimulus to 
the economy. 

3. Consolidated Procurement. As a de- 
terrent to possible collusion between sup- 
pliers and importers, to achieve economies in 
procurement and to improve logistic manage- 
ment, both Governments agreed to consoli- 
dated procurement procedures for several 
bulk commodities, including galvanized iron 
sheet, white cement, newsprint, tinplate, 
fertilizer and jute bags. These commodities, 
and others which may be added in the future, 
are now purchased by the U.S. General Serv- 
ices Administration (GSA) acting as agent. 
GSA procures under standard U.S. Govern- 
ment procedures and arranges ocean trans- 
portation — usually on vessels provided by 
the U.S. Military Sea Transportation Serv- 

Since GSA buys in large quantities, econ- 
omies can be achieved in both procurement 
and transportation. Consolidated shipments 
help to relieve port congestion and expedite 
customs clearance. 

4. Broader Advertising of Procurement. 
Under CIP regulations any transaction of 
more than $10,000 must be advertised in a 
circular published by the AID Office of Small 
Business. This permits American suppliers 
to learn of requirements and off'er bids. To 
reduce the possibility of importers who want 
to import more than $10,000 worth of goods 
evading this requirement by applying for 
separate import licenses of less than $10,000, 
each general importer is now allowed only 
three licenses under $10,000 in any 3-month 

The resulting increase in small business 
advertising should bring about lower prices 
due to increased competition. By reducing the 
volume of import transactions this innova- 
tion should also reduce the time required to 
process import licenses and consolidate the 
movement of commercial shipments through 
the Port of Saigon. 

5. Elimination of Agents' Commissions. In 
the past, local agents' commissions have been 
eligible for dollar financing under the CIP. 
In order to reduce possible U.S. balance of 
payments drain and the opportunity for 
abuses such as illegal capital flight, AID has 
made arrangements to cease financing of 
commissions for any agents except those who 
are U.S. citizens maintaining residence in 
the United States. 

D. Physical Control of Commercial Imports 
in Saigon Port Area. 

Nowhere has the military and civilian im- 
port buildup which began in the summer of 

1965 caused greater strains than at the Port 
of Saigon. The port's physical equipment, 
security facilities and documentation sys- 
tems, though adequate to handle the flow 
of cargo prior to 1965, were not designed 
to cope with the extraordinary demands of 
1966. Designed to handle 1.5 million tons of 
cargo a year, the port was operating at an 
annual rate of 3.5 million tons by Januaiy 

1966 and had reached an annual level of al- 
most 5 million tons by November 1966. 

The decision to strain port facilities be- 
cause of the urgency of the military and eco- 
nomic efforts was made with knowledge that 



confusion and congestion would result until 
new facilities and systems could be estab- 

By niid-1966 the specific measures, dis- 
cussed in detail later in this section, had 
begun discernibly to relieve port congestion, 
and present conditions, while not yet satis- 
factory, reflect very substantial improve- 

Control of the CIP and Title I programs is 
largely a problem limited to the Saigon area 
and, more often than not, to the port itself. 
Once these goods have cleared customs and 
have been delivered to the importer, AID's 
commodity import mission has essentially 
been accomplished. Thereafter they flow, 
through commercial channels within the local 
economy to meet the needs of the people and 
hold down inflation. 

Nevertheless, the U.S. AID Mission to 
Vietnam, together with other U.S. agencies 
and the Government of Vietnam, maintains 
a continuing interest in these and all other 
commodities available in the marketplace in 
an eff'ort to limit the ability of Viet Cong 
military units to obtain critical supplies. This 
eff'ort is described in detail in chapter IV. 

Since most CIP commodities are not 
shipped to Vietnam separately from other 
commercial cargoes, the efforts to improve 
their handling must in most cases be directed 
at the operation of the entire port. The steps 
which have been and are being taken toward 
this end fall into five categories: (1) expan- 
sion of physical facilities, (2) improved port 
management, (3) increasing U.S. advisory 
activities, (4) improvement of documenta- 
tion procedures, and (5) tightening of port 

1. Expansion of Physical Facilities. Sai- 
gon Port's handling of commercial cargo has 
been increased from 295,000 metric tons a 
month in January 1966 to 415,000 metric 
tons in November 1966 principally because 
of the following measures: 

— 14 additional deep draft buoy sites have 
been prepared and a floating dock for roU- 
on, roll-off unloading has been put into op- 

— Roads and open storage areas have been 
repaired or constructed. More efficient traffic 
patterns have been laid out. 

— More barge discharge and transit fa- 
cilities have been opened. Sheet steel piling 
has been provided for constructing LST and 
barge landing sites in Saigon. 

— Obstructions to navigation in the Saigon 
River have been removed. 

— Five heavy-duty hydraulic dredges for 
use in port construction have been sent to 

— AID has procured or contracted for 552 
trucks, 156 barges, 13 tugs and 213 pieces 
of handling equipment (e.g., cranes and fork 
lifts) to facilitate port operations, and more 
equipment is being procured — all additional 
to port equipment used by the U.S. military. 

— Steel plate for constructing 47 new 
barges in Vietnam and rehabilitating 40 ex- 
isting barges has recently arrived (these are 
included in the 156 barges referred to 

— 10 coastal vessels and a 3,000-ton-per- 
month junk fleet have been chartered to help 
move cargo from Saigon to other ports. 

— The major New Port project, which is 
creating an entire new section of the Saigon 
port, is partially constructed and in use by 
the U.S. military. It is scheduled for com- 
pletion in the spring of 1967. 

— A new fish market pier, south of the 
main port area, is now in operation. 

— A fresh water facility for ships in port 
has been finished. 

— 676,000 square feet of new civil ware- 
house space at Thu Due, close to Saigon, is 
being built. It is partially in use now and is 
expected to be fully operational by April 
1967. This facility possesses double the ca- 
pacity of existing port transit warehouses 
for civil cargo. 

— Other Saigon area warehouse facilities 
have been expanded to expedite port clear- 

— The load on the Port of Saigon has been 
reduced by the expansion of facilities at a 
number of other Vietnamese ports including 
Quang Ngai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Da Nang 
and Cam Ranh Bay. The capacity of these 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


ports has been increased more than threefold, 
from 125,000 metric tons per month in Au- 
gust 1965 to more than 400,000 metric tons 
at present. 

2. Improved Port Management 

— The Vietnamese Army has been given re- 
sponsibiHty for management of the port. The 
Port Director, General Lan, is responsible 
directly to the Prime Minister. 

— To reduce congestion, the GVN has de- 
creed that all cargo must be removed from 
port warehouses within 30 days or be con- 
fiscated and auctioned by the government. 
(This decree was not being enforced satis- 
factorily at the close of the year, but con- 
gestion in port warehouses had been re- 

3. Increasing U.S. Advisory Activities 

— Since March 1966 a U.S. Customs Bu- 
reau advisory team detailed to AID has been 
increased from 1 to 10 and will be expanded 
to 20 by February 1967. This team is work- 
ing closely with the Vietnamese Customs 
Bureau in improving its procedures and sys- 

— A four-man U.S. Census Bureau team, 
serving with AID since August 1966, is as- 
sisting the Vietnamese Customs Bureau and 
the Ministry of Finance in developing auto- 
mated data processing systems to provide 
rapid and accurate financial and logistical 

— U.S. civilian and military port advisers 
are assisting the port authorities of Vietnam 
in improving reporting and inventory control 
systems. A group of port management ex- 
perts is advising on port operations. 

— An eight-member team from the Inter- 
national Longshoremen's Union worked with 
the Saigon stevedoring companies during 
most of 1966 to advise on techniques for in- 
creasing cargo handling capability. 

—In September 1966, the U.S. Army's 
125th Terminal Command arrived in Viet- 
nam to supplement the services of the AID 
technical advisers to the Director of the Port 
of Saigon and his staff. All of its 187 officers 
and enlisted men are assigned to the com- 

mercial area and working in scheduling of 
ships, unloading and warehousing proce- 
dures, imix)rter notification, etc. The unit 
has set up its own documentation system, dis- 
cussed in the next section, to provide checks 
on the existing system. 

4. Improvement of Documentation Proce- 
dures. When tramp ships carrying bulk com- 
mercial cargo are ready to unload, the con- 
signee selects a stevedoring company to 
assume responsibility for discharging his 
cargo. Liners are called to berth and dis- 
charged by stevedores hired by the steamship 
companies. Ships carrying cargo of high 
value are normally discharged directly into 
customs controlled transit sheds in the port 
area. Ships containing bulk cargoes are gen- 
erally moored at buoys mid-stream in the 
Saigon River and discharged into barges. In 
many cases, customs officials are able to clear 
such cargo as it is off-loaded, in which case 
the barge can take its cargo directly to the 
importer's warehouse. In other instances the 
barge becomes, in effect, a floating bonded 
warehouse waiting its turn to discharge the 
cargo into a customs transit shed for clear- 
ance. Disorderly use of barges for tempo- 
rary storage is one of the major current 
causes of congestion in the port. 

The 125th Terminal Command has set up 
a documentation system for commercial 
cargo parallel to the combined coverage of 
the four separate and distinct Vietnamese 
systems maintained by the Saigon Port Di- 
rector, the ship's agent, the stevedore and 
the Customs Bureau. 

When the 125th's system becomes fully op- 
erational, a copy of each arriving ship's man- 
ifest will be forwarded to the unit's docu- 
mentation section which will prepare a 
separate set of control documents for each 
consignment on board. These documents will 
then follow the goods from off-loading, 
through intermediate stages — e.g., a barge 
or a transit warehouse — ^to delivery to the 
importer. The control documents will then be 
returned to the documentation section. At 
each step checkers will have compared the 
quantity and condition of the goods with the 



notations on the document, so that a com- 
plete record of each consignment will be 

The AID Mission's automated arrival ac- 
counting system for commercial imports, be- 
gun in July 1966, will produce reports early 
this year on goods cleared through customs 
related to records of U.S. Government pay- 
ments to American suppliers for the period 
July through December 1966. Later in the 
spring, the system will be modified to assimi- 
late input from the 125th Terminal Command 
documentation section, and will then auto- 
matically follow CIP imports from the orig- 
inal license request through all intermediate 
steps to customs clearance. 

To assist AID/Washington in advance re- 
views of import transactions, a system for 
sorting all CIP letters of credit opened in 
favor of suppliers in the U.S. or abroad, re- 
gardless of amount, is being established; the 
electronic sorting program is expected to be 
ready very soon. Thereafter, AID/Washing- 
ton commodity analysts, logisticians, con- 
trollers, and economic warfare experts will 
have a weekly statement available (better 
than data now used) which shows all letters 
of credit issued, arranged by importer, sup- 
plier, and commodity involved. The review 
of this information in Washington prior to 
shipment will permit corrective action on 
major problems much earlier than is possible 
under AID's normal port audit procedures. 

5. Tightening of Port Security. As the 
efficiency of Saigon port operations declined 
in late 1965 and early 1966 under the great 
surge of military and civilian commodities, 
the need for more elaborate security pre- 
cautions to protect incoming cargoes in- 
creased. Both the U.S. and Vietnamese Gov- 
ernments have taken a number of significant 
steps to this end. 

Direct U.S. actions in the security field — 
principally the U.S. Customs team's inspec- 
tion of 10 to 20 percent of the CIP consign- 
ments, the presence of several hundred U.S. 
military police in the port area, and the 1st 
Logistical Command's increased responsi- 
bility in the commercial sector of the port — 
have played an important role in recent 

months in reducing loss in the port area. In 
the months ahead their efforts will have an 
increasingly significant impact. 

Four Vietnamese organizations are in- 
volved in some phase of port security — the 
Navy, the military police, the Customs 
Bureau and the harbor police. 

The military police are responsible for con- 
trolling Vietnamese military personnel in 
the port area and the Vietnamese Navy main- 
tains security in the shipping channel be- 
tween the port of Saigon and Vung Tau at the 
mouth of the Saigon River. 

The Customs Bureau has 1,700 employees, 
1,300 of whom work in the Saigon port. 
Their enforcement operations include the 
use of several large launches and 12 smaller 
assault boats provided by AID in September 

The harbor police, a branch of the national 
police, has responsibility for physical secu- 
rity in the port area. The force now stands 
at 600 men, an increase of over 100 since 
January 1966. It will grow by another 100 
men in the next few months. The harbor 
police has established checkpoints at a num- 
ber of strategic port locations (see chart 2 
in the appendix) i and mounts regular water 
patrols covering 96 kilometers of waterways 
containing up to 1,400 barges, junks, lighters, 
and other miscellaneous small boats, many of 
which double as homes for one or more 
families. Movement of craft in the port area 
is strictly controlled. Officers of the harbor 
police, in patrols and at checkpoints, inspect 
personal identity cards and movement per- 
mits, check barge cargo manifests against 
cargo on board, and detain the suspects when- 
ever these inspections reveal apparent irreg- 

Harbor police water-borne operations are 
conducted in 4 patrol boats and 18 smaller 
assault boats provided by AID, an increase 
of 16 in the past year. The group's new main- 
tenance staff, advised and augmented by 
three expert Filipino mechanics, has tripled 
the effective usage of harbor police craft in 
less than a year. The boats are linked by an 

' Not printed here. 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


efficient radio communications network. The 
harbor police forces are advised by a reg- 
ularly assigned AID public safety adviser. 

The harbor police director also controls 
the activities of a 167-man police field force 
unit recently assigned to the An Khanh area 
directly across the Saigon River from the 
main piers. 

Until recently, the Vietnamese Navy, the 
military police, the Customs officials and the 
harbor police operated independently. A 
major step was taken in September 1966 to- 
ward integrating the efforts of all of these 
groups and the U.S. Military Police with the 
establishment of joint marine and land pa- 
trols. The members of these patrols, acting 
together, now possess the aggregate of each 
of their members' limited jurisdictions. 

Heightened security efforts are reflected in 
the fact that port area arrests for improper 
documentation, trespassing, theft and other 
offenses rose from a rate of 150 per month 
in early 1966 to 500 a month by end of 1966, 
while reports of major crimes dropped 

E. Theft of Commercial Imports 

Theft in port areas is a problem in the 
less congested ports of many countries at 
peace. High value, low bulk goods of a sort 
not financed by AID are the thieves' prin- 
cipal targets. 

The AID Mission's best current estimate, 
based on resurveys and spot checks over the 
last few months and the judgment of the 
U.S. technical experts working with the com- 
mercial program, is that the recent rate of 
theft of CIP and Title I commodities from 
off-loading through port clearance in Saigon 
is between 2 and 5 percent of the total of 
all such commercial imports. The loss rate 
is now believed to be near the lower end of 
that range. This estimate is based on the 
following sources: 

— The U.S. Customs Bureau advisory 
team, whose primary assignment is advising 
the Vietnamese Customs Bureau, also spot 
checks between 10 and 20 percent of all CIP 
cargoes. These professional inspectors esti- 

mate losses of CIP imports as no more than 
2 to 5 percent and believe that the more ac- 
curate current figure is closer to 2 percent. 

— -The Vietnamese Insurance Agent's As- 
sociation, comprising all insurance companies - 
operating in Vietnam, reports that all-risk 
coverage of CIP and other commercial goods 
is available to Vietnamese importers for 
losses prior to off-loading. Premiums run be- 
tween 0.4 and 10 percent of the cargo's 
value, with the average, however, close to 2 
percent. Most of the companies also offer 
their regular customers limited coverage for 
a period of 30 days after off-loading (which 
includes a restriction of coverage to 15 days 
while the commodities are in barges) for an 
additional premium of up to 0.3 percent. The 
insurer may also agree to grant up to two 
further 2-week periods of coverage at double 
the additional premium. 

Insurance coverage is fairly wide, though 
selective. The local banks, which finance most 
of the importers, insist on maximum insur- 
ance coverage and the association itself esti- 
mates that 90 to 95 percent of all CIP 
cargoes are insured at some or all stages of 
their voyage. The association reports that 
claims paid out by all of its members for 
losses during 1966 will aggregate about 1 
percent of the value of goods insured. As 
noted, however, this figure is subject to qual- 
ification since coverage of high risks is lim- 
ited and matters of proof often impede col- 
lection of claims. 

— Societe de Surveillance (Geneve) S.A., a 
private Swiss international shipping inspec- 
tion company, experienced in Vietnam, is un- 
der contract to the AID Mission to review 
deliveries of several types of CIP and Title 
I commodities, as well as to check rice ship- 
ments arriving in the ports of Qui Nhon and 
Nha Trang. The goods spot checked by the 
company are representative of 60 percent of 
the dollar value of AID-financed commercial 
imports. The company's first report, cover- 
ing the period from March 1966 to October 
1966, shows total shortages of "less than one 
percent." Technically, this is a measure of 



loss from time of shipment to the time the 
vessel arrives at the port of Saigon. How- 
ever, while food supplies are nonnally 
checked in the hold of the ship, pharma- 
ceuticals and general CIP cargo are moni- 
tored in the transit warehouse and machin- 
ery is inspected at its end-use location. 
Therefore, while not a comprehensive deter- 
mination of total loss, this report has con- 
siderable bearing on the matter. 

— Officials of the Food for Peace program, 
the 4th Terminal Command, and others 
working closely with the program state that 
there is little theft of Title I rice. 

— Despite the fact that AID-financed com- 
mercial imports achieve their purposes when 
they have passed through customs to the 
market, frequent audits are conducted by 
the AID Mission's Financial Management 
Staff to determine the ultimate use made of 
selected commercial imports. These audits 
are primarily to determine whether goods 
are reaching the enemy, to -determine the 
effectiveness of importing these commodities 
and the reliability of importers. Audits are 
currently in progress on the end use of over 
$100 million worth of commercial imports, 
or about 25 percent of total shipments. This 
increased auditing program has been made 
possible by expansion of the AID Mission 
audit staff from 17 to 34 since May 1966. A 
survey of audits recently completed, includ- 
ing one on $4 million worth of textiles, indi- 
cates that over 95 percent of the examined 
AID-financed commercial imports shipped 
to Vietnam are properly used in the economy. 
The losses noted in these audits — less than 
5 percent of the total shipped — include diver- 
sion and theft in the port as well as loss, 
breakage, theft and improper use after the 
commodities are delivered to the importer 
and thence to the Vietnamese economy. 

The measures recently initiated should be- 
come fully effective early in 1967 and further 
reduce theft of commercial cargo in the 
poits. Our new data systems will provide 
more accurate measures of these losses 

III. strengthening the Vietnamese Society: 
AID Project Assistance 

A. Growth of the Program 

The AID project program is a complex of 
many technical assistance, social develop- 
ment, refugee assistance, institutional devel- 
opment and relief activities. The great ma- 
jority of these projects are planned and 
executed in the rural areas in direct support 
of the Government of Vietnam's revolution- 
ary development program. Revolutionary 
development is an integrated military and 
civil effort to liberate the people of Vietnam 
from Viet Cong control, provide security, 
initiate political, economic and social devel- 
opment, and win the support of the people 
for their government. AID's role, on the 
civil side, is vital to success in this "other 
war" — the indispensable partner of the mili- 
tary effort to defeat communist aggression 
and insurgency. 

AID's support takes the form of technical 
advisers for the planning and execution of 
projects, the training of Vietnamese, and the 
provision of construction materials, many 
types of equipment, seeds, fertilizer and med- 
ical and relief supplies. These goods and 
services are provided under projects jointly 
planned and executed by both governments. 
They include over 30 different agricultural 
activities, irrigation and water management, 
fishery activities and forestry projects; about 
50 education activities — construction of 
hamlet schools, provision of textbooks and 
other educational materials, teacher training, 
support of vocational and agricultural 
schools in the rural areas and adult training 
programs; a massive public health program, 
including the construction, equipping and 
staffing of provincial hospitals, a large-scale 
immunization program, nursing education 
and training and a variety of sanitation and 
public health programs; refugee programs to 
construct and equip camps, carry out educa- 
tional and self-help activities within the 
camps, and relocate refugees or return them 
to their villages; the Chieu Hoi or "open 
arms" program, designed to attract defectors 

FEBRUARY 6, 1967 


from the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese 
forces, screen, assist and reorient them, and 
reintegrate them as far as possible into the 
Vietnamese mihtary forces or into the civil 
society; roadbuilding, electrification, water 
supply and other-public works projects; pro- 
grams in public administration; in labor and 
trade union development; and relief pro- 
grams using U.S. agriculture products under 
Titles II and III of P.L. 480. 

To carry out these activities, project com- 
modities must be transported from the ports 
through the logistic systems of the appropri- 
ate Vietnamese ministries to regional and 
provincial warehouses and then to project 
sites in thousands of villages and hamlets 
rarely reached in the past, where transporta- 
tion and security are poor and the Viet Cong 
are near or present. 

It is important for the political and social 
objectives of the program that the Viet- 
namese Government at all levels be directly 
involved in conducting these projects, in- 
cluding the distribution of supplies. It is for 
this reason that AID's commodity manage- 
ment programs are directed toward improve- 
ment of Vietnamese systems. 

In fiscal year 1965 the U.S. Government 
obligated over $63 million for project com- 
modities including P.L. 480 Title II and III 
supplies. Because of the necessity to expand 
the agriculture and education efforts in the 
provinces, to meet the needs of a greatly in- 
creased flow of refugees, and to extend direct 
medical services to all provinces the project 
program had to be greatly expanded. Obliga- 
tions for the project program and relief com- 
modities in fiscal year 1966 more than 
doubled to $135 million. Actual expenditures 
against shipments in calendar year 1966 
were $68 million. 

Along with the project program's growth, 
AID has sought to increase the efficiency of 
distribution of project commodities and to 
reduce loss and wastage under wartime con- 
ditions. Since many of these pi'ograms are 
designed to support the revolutionary devel- 
opment efforts in the countryside, where in- 
security and lack of government control is 

greatest, the loss rates in these programs 
have necessarily been greater than those ex- 
perienced in the commercial import program. 

B. Project Commodity Procedures and Con- 

1. Improved Port Handling. Until July 
1966 project commodities and CIP cargoes 
were handled in the same way in the Port 
of Saigon. The only distinction between the 
two lay in that project goods were consigned 
to a Vietnamese Government agency rather 
than to a private importer. Importation of 
project commodities was therefore likewise 
impeded by port congestion. While steps 
taken to improve port facilities, handling 
and security mentioned in the previous 
chapter benefited the project program as 
well, further action was necessary and feasi- 
ble with respect to project goods. 

In July 1966 the U.S. Army's 1st Logis- 
tical Command was given operational re- 
sponsibility for discharging all project com- 
modities landed in the Saigon area (90 
percent of the total) and moving them to 
ministry warehouses. The 1st Logistical 
Command assigned operational responsibility 
to the Army's 4th Terminal Command, a 
unit of 809 officers and men highly skilled in 
port operations, which also handles military 
cargo in the Port of Saigon. 

The 4th Terminal Command has set up a 
system of tight physical and documentary 
controls over project cargo which have re- 
duced losses between the port and the min- 
istry warehouses to a documented six-tenths 
of 1 percent during the month of November. 
The 4th Terminal Command estimates that 
figures for December will be just as good or 
lower than for November. Similar procedures 
are now being installed at the ports of Da 
Nang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, which to- 
gether handle all of the project commodities 
not passing through Saigon. 

2. Movement from the Ports to the Prov- 
inces. The 4th Terminal Command has estab- 
lished an extremely effective system for get- 
ting the goods to Vietnamese Government 
warehouses, but their movement forward 



from the warehouses in Saigon is handled 
separately by the several ministries, most of 
which have their own logistics systems, and 
directly by the AID Mission. Each of these 
systems is described in the sections that fol- 
low. The current estimated percentage of loss 
is noted for each. As graphically illustrated 
in chart 1 ^ in the appendix to this report, 
all project commodities account for only 15 
percent of the total expenditures on commod- 
ities, and each of these individual systems 
represents only a portion of the total project 
commodity program. Therefore, while the 
loss rate in some areas is relatively high, it 
is applied to only a small portion of the total 

(a) Public Safety. The national police 
logistics system is well conceived and run. It 
is monitored closely at all levels by 10 AID 
public safety logistics advisers, an increase 
of 2 since May 1966. These logistics advisers 
have their office with their Vietnamese coun- 
terparts in the national police logistics sys- 
tem headquarters, where they are able to 
monitor all supply movements. AID public 
safety field advisers working with the na- 
tional police in their assigned areas actually 
check on the location of weapons by serial 
number. Movement between Saigon and the 
field is normally handled by air using the 
facilities of Air America, an airline under 
contract to AID. 

These controls restrict loss or illegal diver- 
sion to an amount now estimated at less than 
1 percent by AID advisers. 

(b) Public Health. The public health logis- 
tics system was established under American 
military procedures and is closely supervised 
by 14 AID logistical advisers to the Ministry 
of Health, an increase of 8 since May 1966. 
These advisers maintain control over the 
records system of the Health Ministry's cen- 
tral warehouse at Phu Tho near Saigon and 
supervise the inspection of project medical 
supplies from the time of their delivery by 
the 4th Terminal Command until they are 
shipped to the provincial hospitals. Com- 
modities are normally transported to prov- 

' Not printed here. 

ince hospitals and health services by Air 
America or by a military airlift. Controls 
are good in most hospitals, but petty theft 

Some project medical supplies are sent to 
district and local health clinics which are 
under the direction of the Vietnamese prov- 
ince chief of medicine. Members of U.S. and 
free-world medical teams as well as AID 
public health logistical advisers stationed in 
the area are able to perform only occasional 
spot checks on such supplies. 

AID advisers estimate that about 10-15 
percent of public health project commodities 
are lost. By far the greater part of this loss 
occurs among the medical supplies which are 
distributed from the provincial level to dis- 
trict and local health clinics. Further im- 
provements in supply handling are expected 
to result from a program of regional ware- 
houses scheduled for construction in 1967. 

(c) Public Works. The Ministry of Public 
Works logistics system is reasonably efficient. 
Moreover, 90 percent of the dollar value of 
AID public works project assistance comes 
in the form of bulky heavy equipment and 
vehicles which AID logisticians are able to 
monitor by serial number. Very little theft of 
this equipment is reported. Losses of goods 
such as construction materials and spare 
parts, which comprise the remaining 10 per- 
cent of dollar value, are relatively high be- 
cause they are transported in small con- 
tainers to the provinces by truck, coastal 
vessel or other relatively insecure means and 
pass through many hands. 

The AID Mission is adding two public 
works warehouse advisers to its staff and is 
working with the Ministry of Public Works 
to improve and modernize its procedures. 

The Mission estimates that well under 5 
percent of all public works project commod- 
ities are lost. 

(d) The Central Purchasing Agency. The 
Vietnamese Government's Central Purchas- 
ing Agency (CPA) logistics system services 
the programs of the Commissariat fo