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WASHINGTON, D.C.. 20402 



Viet-Nam Information Notes 

The first three pamphlets of a new series of background papers on various aspects of the 
Viet-Nam conflict have been published by the Department of State. Basic Data on South Viet- 
Nam (publication 8195) summarizes the history, geography, government, and economy of the 
country. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (publication 8196) reviews peace efforts by the 
United States and the United Nations and other diplomatic initiatives. Communist-Directed Forcet 
in South Viet-Nam (publication 8197) reviews the growth of Viet Minh and Viet Cong forces 
Communist objectives, strengths, and weaknesses. 



To: Supt. of Doeumenta 
Govt. Printing Office 
Wasliington, 0.0. 20402 

PUBLICATIONS 8195, 8196, 8197 5 CENTS EACH 

Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send copies of 

Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Basic Data on South Viet-Nam 

(8195) ; The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Com- 

munist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam (8197). 




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City, State, and ZIP code_ 







Vol. LVI, No. 1U9 

April 3, 1967 

Address by President Johnson 53 U 

hy Assistant Secretary Solomon 555 

President Johnson's Message to Congress 5A0 

For index see inside back cover 

The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia 

Address by President Johnson i 

It is always a very special privilege and 
pleasure for me to visit Tennessee. 

For a Texan it is like homecoming, be- 
cause much of the courage and hard work 
that went into the building of the South- 
west came from the hills and the fields of 
Tennessee. It strengthened the sinews of 
thousands of men- — at the Alamo, at San 
Jacinto, and at the homes of our pioneer 

This morning I visited the Hermitage, 
the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two 
centuries have passed since that most 
American of all Americans was born. The 
world has changed a great deal since his 
day. But the qualities which sustain men 
and nations in positions of leadership have 
not changed. 

In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, free- 
dom has its price. 

In our time, as in his, history conspires 
to test the American will. 

In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage 
and vision, and the willingness to sacrifice, 
will sustain the cause of freedom. 

This generation of Americans is making 
its imprint on history. It is making it in the 
fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of 
Viet-Nam. I think most of our citizens — 
after a very penetrating debate which is 
our democratic heritage — have reached a 
common understanding on the meaning and 
on the objectives of that struggle. 

' Made before a joint session of the Tennessee 
State Legislature at Nashville, Tenn., on Mar. 15 
(White House press release). 

Before I discuss the specific questions 
that remain at issue, I should like to review 
the points of widespread agreement. 

It was 2 years ago that we were forced to 
choose, forced to make a decision between 
major commitments in defense of South 
Viet-Nam or retreat — the evacuation of 
more than 25,000 of our troops, the col- 
lapse of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the 
face of subversion and external assault. 

Andrew Jackson would never have been 
surprised at the choice we made. 

We chose a course in keeping with Ameri- 
can tradition, in keeping with the foreign 
policy of at least three administrations, 
with the expressed will of the Congress of 
the United States, with our solemn obliga- 
tions under the Southeast Asian treaty, and 
with the interest of 16 million South Viet- 
namese who had no wish to live under Com- 
munist domination. 

As our commitment in Viet-Nam re- 
quired more men and more equipment, some 
voices were raised in opposition. The ad- 
ministration was urged to disengage, to 
find an excuse to abandon the effort. 

These cries came despite growing evi- 
dence that the defense of Viet-Nam held 
the key to the political and economic future 
of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle 
grew correspondingly. 

It became clear that if we were pre- 
pared to stay the course in Viet-Nam, we 
could help to lay the cornerstone for a di- 
verse and independent Asia, full of promise 
and resolute in the cause of peaceful eco- 



nomic development for her long-suffering 

But if we faltered, the forces of chaos 
would scent victoiy and decades of strife 
and aggression would stretch endlessly be- 
fore us. 

The choice was clear. We would stay the 
course. We shall stay the course. 

I think most Americans support this fun- 
damental decision. Most of us remember 
the fearful cost of ignoring aggression. 
Most of us have cast aside the illusion that 
we can live in an affluent fortress while 
the world slides into chaos. 

Basic Objectives in Viet-Nam 

I think we have all reached broad agree- 
ment on our basic objectives in Viet-Nam. 

First, an honorable peace that will leave 
the people of South Viet-Nam free to fashion 
their own political and economic institu- 
tions without fear of terror or intimidation 
from the North. 

Second, a Southeast Asia in which all 
countries — including a peaceful North Viet- 
Nam — apply their scarce resources to the 
real problems of their people: combating 
hunger, ignorance, and diseases. 

I have said many, many times that noth- 
ing would give us greater pleasure than to 
invest our own resources in the construc- 
tive works of peace rather than in the fu- 
tile destruction of war. 

Third, a concrete demonstration that ag- 
gression across international frontiers or 
demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable 
means of political change. 

There is, I think, a general agreement 
among Americans on the things that we do 
not want in Viet-Nam. 

We do not want permanent bases. We will 
begin with the withdrawal of our troops 
on a reasonable schedule whenever recipro- 
cal concessions' are forthcoming from our 

We do not seek to impose our political 
beliefs upon South Viet-Nam. Our Republic 
rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We 
will be happy to see free competition in the 

intellectual marketplace whenever North 
Viet-Nam is willing to shift the conflict 
from the battlefield to the ballot box. 

So, these are the broad principles on 
which most Americans agree. 

On a less general level, however, the 
events and frustrations of these past few 
difficult weeks have inspired a number of 
questions about our Viet-Nam policy in the 
minds and hearts of a good many of our 
citizens. Today, here in this historic cham- 
ber, I want to deal with some of those 
questions that figure most prominently in 
the press and in some of the letters which 
reach a President's desk. 

Many Americans are confused by the bar- 
rage of information about military engage- 
ments. They long for the capsule summary 
which has kept tabs on our previous wars, 
a line on the map that divides friend from 

Tlie IMiiitary Situation 

Precisely what, they ask, is our military 
situation, and what are the prospects of 
victory ? 

The first answer is that Viet-Nam is ag- 
gression in a new guise, as far removed 
from trench warfare as the rifle from the 
longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of 
subversion, of ambush.. Pitched battles are 
very rare, and even more rarely are they 

Today, more than 1 million men from the 
Republic of Viet-Nam and its six allies are 
engaged in the order of battle. 

Despite continuing increases in North 
Viet-Nam infiltration, this strengthening of 
Allied forces in 1966, under the brilliant 
leadership of General [William C] West- 
moreland, was instrumental in reversing 
the whole course of this war. 

—We estimate that 55,000 North Viet- 
namese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966, 
compared with 35,000 the previous year. 
More were wounded, and more than 20,000 

— By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese, 

APRIL 3, 1967 


more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from 
other Allied forces were killed in action. 

— The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966 
average of two weapons captured from the 
Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic 
turnaround from the previous 2 years. 

— Allied forces have made several suc- 
cessful sweeps through territories that 
were formerly considered Viet Cong sanc- 
tuaries only a short time ago. These opera- 
tions not only cost the enemy large num- 
bers of men and weapons but are very 
damaging to his morale. 

What does all of this mean? Will the 
North Vietnamese change their tactics? 
Will there be less infiltration of main units? 
Will there be more of guerrilla warfare? 

The actual truth is we just don't know. 

What we do know is that General West- 
moreland's strategy is producing results, 
that our military situation has substan- 
tially improved, that our military success has 
permitted the groundwork to be laid for a 
pacification program which is the longrun 
key to an independent South Viet-Nam. 

Bombing of Military Targets in the North 

Since February 1965 our military opera- 
tions have included selective bombing of 
military targets in North Viet-Nam. Our 
purposes are three. 

— To back our fighting men by denying 
the enemy a sanctuary; 

— To exact a penalty against North 
Viet-Nam for her flagrant violations of the 
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962; 

— To limit the flow, or to substantially 
increase the cost, of infiltration of men and 
materiel from North Viet-Nam. 

All of our intelligence confirms that we 
have been successful. 

Yet, some of our people object strongly 
to this aspect of our policy. Must we 
bomb? many people ask. Does it do any 
military good? Is it consistent with Ameri- 
ca's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman 
act that is aimed at civilians ? 

On the question of military utility, I can 


only report the firm belief of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff", the 
Central Intelligence Agency, General West- 
moreland and our commanders in the field, j. 
and all the sources of information and ad- I 
vice available to the Commander in Chief: j* 
and that is that the bombing is causing 
serious disruption and is bringing about 
added burdens to the North Vietnamese 
infiltration effort. 

We know, for example, that half a mil- . 
lion people are kept busy just repairing 
damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and 
other strategic facilities, and in air and 
coastal defense and repair of powerplants. 

I also want to say categorically that it is 
not the position of the American Govern- 
ment that the bombing will be decisive in 
getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has, 
however, created very serious problems for 
them. The best indication of how substan- 
tial is the fact that they are working so 
hard every day with all their friends 
throughout the world to try to get us to 

The bombing is entirely consistent with 
America's limited objectives in South Viet- 
Nam. The strength of Communist main- 
force units in the South is clearly based on 
their infiltration from the North. I think it 
is simply unfair to our American soldiers, 
sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese 
allies to ask them to face increased enemy 
personnel and firepower without making an 
effort to try to reduce that infiltration. 

Now, as to bombing civilians, I would 
simply say that we are making an effort 
that is unprecedented in the history of war- 
fare to be sure that we do not. It is our 
policy to bomb military targets only. 

We have never deliberately bombed cities 
nor attacked any target with the purpose 
of inflicting civilian casualties. 

We hasten to add, however, that we rec- 
ognize, and we regret, that some people, 
even after warning, are living and working 
in the vicinity of military targets and they 
have suff"ered. 

We are also, too, aware that men and 


machines are not infallible and that some 
mistakes do occur. 

But our record on this account is, in my 
opinion, highly defensible. 

Look for a moment at the record of the 
other side. 

Any civilian casualties that result from 
our operations are inadvertent, in stark con- 
trast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of 
systematic terror. 

Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese 
civilians have been killed, tortured, and kid- 
naped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt 
about the deliberate nature of the Viet 
Cong program. One need only note the fre- 
quency with which Viet Cong victims are 
village leaders, teachers, health workers, 
and others who are trying to carry out con- 
structive programs for their people. 

Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely 
unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral 
double bookkeeping which makes us get 
sometimes very weary of our critics. 

But there is another question that we 
should answer: Why don't we stop bomb- 
ing to make it easier to begin negotiations? 

The answer is a simple one: 

— We stopped for 5 days and 20 hours in 
May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply 
returned our message in a plain envelope. 

— We stopped bombing for 36 days and 
15 hours in December 1965 and January 
1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settle- 
ment of the Viet-Nam problem can be en- 
visaged only when the United States Gov- 
ernment has accepted the four-point stand 
of the Government of the Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam, has proved this by ac- 
tual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and 
for good its air raids and all other acts of 
war against the Democratic Republic of 

— Only last month we stopped bombing 
for 5 days and 18 hours, after many prior 
weeks in which we had communicated to 
them several possible routes to peace, any 
one of which America was prepared to take. 
Their response, as you know, delivered to 
His Holiness the Pope, was this: The 

United States "must put an end to their 
aggression in Viet-Nam, end unconditionally 
and definitively the bombing and all other 
acts of war against the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet- 
Nam all American and satellite troops, rec- 
ognize the South Vietnamese National Front 
for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese peo- 
ple settle themselves their own affairs." 

That is where we stand today. 

They have three times rejected a bomb- 
ing pause as a means to open the way to 
ending the war and go together to the nego- 
tiating table. 

South VJet-Nam's Economic Progress 

The tragedy of South Viet-Nam is not 
limited to casualty lists. 

There is much tragedy in the story of a 
nation at war for nearly a generation. It 
is the story of economic stagnation. It is 
the story of a generation of young men, 
the flower of the labor force, pressed intq 
military service by one side or the other. 

No one denies that the survival of South 
Viet-Nam is heavily dependent upon early 
economic progress. 

My most recent and my most hopeful re- 
port of progress in this area came from an 
old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, who re- 
cently went as my representative to Viet- 
Nam to begin to work with the Vietnamese 
people on economic planning for that area.^ 

He reported — and with some surprise, I 
might add — that he discovered an extraor- 
dinary air of confidence among the farm- 
ers and the village leaders and the trade 
unionists and the industrialists. He con- 
cluded that their economic behavior sug- 
gests, and I quote him, "that they think 
they know how all of this is going to come 

Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South 
Vietnamese were among the hardest work- 

^ For remarks made by Mr. Lilienthal at a news 
conference at the White House on Feb. 27, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 467. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


ing people that he had seen in developing 
countries around the world, that "to have 
been through 20 years of war and still have 
this amount of 'zip' ahnost insures their 
long-term economic development." 

Mr. Lilienthal will be going with me to 
Guam Saturday night to talk with our new 
leaders about the plans he will try to in- 
stitute there. 

Our AID programs are supporting the 
drive toward this sound economy. 

But none of these economic accomplish- 
ments will be decisive by itself. And no 
economic achievement can substitute for a 
strong and free political structure. 

We cannot build such a structure — be- 
cause only the Vietnamese can do that. 

And I think they are building it. As I am 
talking to you here, a freely elected con- 
stituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling 
with the last details of a new constitution, 
one which will bring the Republic of Viet- 
Nam to full membership among the demo- 
cratic nations of the world. We expect that 
constitution to be completed this month. 

In the midst of war they have been build- 
ing for peace and justice. That is a re- 
markable accomplishment in the annals 
of mankind. 

Changes in U.S. Mission Staff 

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has 
served us with such great distinction, is 
coming to the end of his second dis- 
tinguished tour of duty in Saigon. 

To replace him, I am drafting as our Am- 
bassador to the Government of Viet-Nam Mr. 
Ellsworth Bunker — able and devoted, full 
of wisdom and experience acquired on five 
continents over many years. 

As his deputy, I am nominating and re- 
calling from Pakistan Mr. Eugene Locke, 
our young and very vigorous Ambassador 
to Pakistan. 

To drive forward with a sense of urgency 
the work in pacification in Viet-Nam, I am 
sending the President's Special Assistant, 
Mr. Robert Komer. 

To strengthen General Westmoreland in 
the intense operations that he will be con- 

ducting in the months ahead, I am assign- 
ing to him additional topflight military 
personnel, the best that this country has 
been able to produce. 

So you can be confident that in the 
months ahead we shall have at work in 
Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most te- 
nacious, and the most experienced team 
that the United States of America can 

In view of these decisions and in view of 
the meetings that will take place this week- 
end, I thought it wise to invite the leaders 
of South Viet-Nam to join us in Guam for a 
part of our discussions, if it were con- 
venient for them. I am gratified to be in- 
formed that they have accepted our invita- 

I should also like for you to know that 
the representatives of all the countries that 
are contributing troops in Viet-Nam will be 
coming to Washington for April 20 and 21 
meetings for a general appraisal of the sit- 
uation that exists, 

U.S. Position on Peace Negotiations 

This brings me to my final point: the 
peaceful and just world that we all seek. 

We have just lived through another flurry 
of rumors of "peace feelers." 

Our years of dealing with this problem 
have taught us that peace will not come 
easily. The problem is a very simple one: 
It takes two to negotiate at a peace table, 
and Hanoi has just simply refused to con- 
sider coming to a peace table. 

I don't believe that our own position on 
peace negotiations can be stated any more 
clearly than I have stated it many times in 
the past — or than the distinguished Secre- 
tary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador 
Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg], or 
any number of other oflScials have stated it 
in every forum that we could find. 

I do want to repeat to you this after- 
noon — and through you to the people 
of America — the essentials now, lest there 
be any doubts. 

— United States representatives are 



ready at any time for discussions of the 
Viet-Nam problem or any related matter 
with any government or governments, if 
there is any reason to believe that these dis- 
cussions will in any way seriously advance 
the cause of peace. 

— We are prepared to go more than half- 
way and to use any avenue possible to en- 
courage such discussions. And we have done 
that at every opportunity. 

We believe that the Geneva accords of 
1954 and 1962 could serve as the central 
elements of a peaceful settlement. These ac- 
cords provide, in essence, that both South 
and North Viet-Nam should be free from 
external interference, while at the same 
time they would be free independently to 
determine their positions on the question 
of reunification. 

We also stand ready to advance toward 
a reduction of hostilities, without prior 
agreement. The road to peace could go from 
deeds to discussions, or it could start with 
discussions and go to deeds. We are ready 
to take either route. We are ready to move 
on both of them. 

But reciprocity must be the fundamental 
principle of any reduction in hostilities. The 
United States cannot and will not reduce 
its activities unless and until there is some 
reduction on the other side. To follow any 
other rule would be to violate the trust that 
we undertake when we ask a man to risk 
his life for his country. 

We will negotiate a reduction of the 
bombing whenever the Government of 
North Viet-Nam is ready, and there are al- 
most innumerable avenues of communica- 
tion by which the Government of North 
Viet-Nam can make their readiness known. 

To this date and this hour, there has 
been no sign of that readiness. Yet, we 

must — and we will — keep on trying. 

As I speak to you today. Secretary Rusk 
and our representatives throughout the 
world are on a constant alert. Hundreds 
and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversa- 
tions, free from the glare of front-page 
headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held 
and they will be held on the possibilities 
of bringing peace to Viet-Nam. 

Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years 
of experience of troubleshooting on the 
most difficult international problems that 
America has ever had, is carrying out my 
instructions that every possible lead, how- 
ever slight it may first appear, from any 
source, public or private, shall be followed 

Let me conclude by saying this: I so much 
wish that it were within my power to assure 
that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple 
message: America is committed to the de- 
fense of South Viet-Nam until an honora- 
ble peace can be negotiated. 

If this one communication gets through 
and its rational implications are drawn, we 
should be at the table tomorrow. It would 
be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of 
thousands of Americans — as brave as any 
who ever took the field for their country — 
could come back home. 

And the man who could lead them back is 
the man that you trained and sent from 
here, our own beloved, brilliant General 
"Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes 
came back to their homes, millions of Viet- 
namese could begin to make a decent life for 
themselves and their families without fear 
of terrorism, without fear of war, or with- 
out fear of Communist enslavement. 

That is what we are working and fighting 
for. We must not — we shall not — and we 
will not — fail. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


The Latin American Summit IVIeeting 

Message From President Johnson to the Congress 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In less than a month, the leaders of the 
American states will meet in Punta del Este 
in Uruguay. 

It will be the first such meeting in a 
decade, and the second ever held, of the 
heads of the free nations of our hemi- 
spheric system. 

This meeting represents another link in 
the bond of partnership which joins us with 
more than 230 million neighbors to the 

The gathering is far more than a symbol 
of flourishing friendship. Its purpose is a 
review of the progress we have made to- 
gether in a great adventure which unites 
the destinies of all of us. Beyond that it 
will include a common commitment to the 
historic and humane next steps we plan to 
take together. 

I look to this meeting with enthusiasm. 
The peaceful and progressive revolution 
which is transforming Latin America is 
one of the great inspirational movements of 
our time. Our participation in that revolu- 
tion is a worthy enterprise blending our 
deepest national traditions with our most 
responsible concepts of hemispheric soli- 

The Measure of Progress 

The cooperative spirit between the rest 
of the Americas and the United States has 
been building for decades. 

The establishment of the Inter-American 
Development Bank in 1959, and the Act of 
Bogota in 1960, under the leadership of 

President Eisenhower, helped turn that 
spirit to substance. In those historic com- 
pacts the American governments pledged 
their joint efforts to the development of 
programs to improve the lives of all the 
people of Latin America. They provided the 
impetus for an action taken in 1961 on 
which the history of the hemisphere has 
since turned. That action — the Alliance for 
Progress, which moved dramatically for- 
ward under President Kennedy — fused old 
dreams and fired new hopes. With its com- 
mitment of mutual assistance and self-help 
programs, it attacked evils as old as the 
condition of man — hunger, ignorance, and 

That Alliance is now 6 years old. 

What can we say of it? 

We can say that there is a clear record of 
progress. Per capita growth rates for Latin 
America show that more countries have 
broken the economic stagnation of earlier 
years. Reform and modernization are ad- 
vancing as a new wave of managers and 
technicians apply their skills. There have 
been steady gains in private, national and 
foreign investments. Inflation is easing. 
The struggle for social justice is proceeding. 

These are all true. But the statements of 
progress are more meaningful, and they 
more realistically reflect the spirit of the 
Alliance, when they relate to the people for 
whose lives the Alliance itself was created. 
Since the Alliance began, and with the 
funds that we have contributed — 

■ H. Doc. 84, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (White House 
press release dated Mar. 13). 



Men, women, and children are alive today 
who would otherwise have died. 

— 100 million people are being protected 
from malaria. In 10 countries, deaths 
caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to 
2,280 in three years' time. Smallpox cases 
declined almost as sharply. 

— 1,200 health centers, including hos- 
pitals and mobile medical units, are in op- 
eration or soon will be. 

For te7}3 of thousands of families, the 
most ftindamental conditions of life are 

— 350,000 housing units have been, or are 
now being, built. 

— 2,000 I'ural wells and 1,170 portable 
water supply systems have been built to 
benefit some 20 million persons. 

Children are going to school now who 
would not have gone before. 

— Primary school enrollments have in- 
creased by 23 percent; secondary school en- 
rollments by 50 percent; university enroll- 
ments by 39 percent. 

— 28,000 classrooms have been built. 

— 160,000 teachers have been trained or 
given additional training. 

— More than 14 million textbooks have 
been distributed. 

— 13 million schoolchildren and 3 million 
preschoolers participate in school lunch 

Men ivhose fathers for generations have 
worked land owned by others now work it 
as their own. 

— 16 countries have legislation dealing 
directly with land reform. 

— With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres 
have been irrigated and 106,000 acres 

— More than 700,000 agricultural loans 
have benefited 3.5 million people. 

— 15,000 miles of road have been built or 
improved, many of them farm-to-market 
access roads. 

All of these are heartening facts. But 
they are only the beginning of the story, 

and only part of it. Statistics can only sug- 
gest the deep human meaning of hope alive 
now where once none lived. Statistics can- 
not report the wonder of a child bom into a 
world which will give him a chance to 
break through the tyranny of indifference 
which doomed generations before him to 
lives of bleakness and want and misery. 

Nor can they reveal the revolution which 
has come about in the minds of tens of mil- 
lions of people when they saw that their 
own efforts, combined with those of their 
governments and their friends abroad, could 
change their lives for the better. 

Perhaps most important of all, statistics 
cannot adequately reflect the emergence of 
a vigorous, competent and confident new 
generation of Latin American leaders. 
These men are determined to see realized in 
their own time a strong, modern Latin 
America, loyal to its own traditions and 
history. They are men who know that rhet- 
oric and resolutions are no substitute for 
sustained hard work. 

And statistics can never tell us what 
might have been. They cannot record the 
shots which might have rung out in the 
avenidas and plazas of a dozen Latin Ameri- 
can cities, but did not — or the howls of 
angry crowds which might have formed, 
but did not. The full success of the Alli- 
ance for Progress must be sought not 
only in what has been accomplished but in 
what has been avoided as well. 

Ferment gripped the hemisphere when 
the Alliance was born. In places through- 
out the world, terror with its bloodshed 
sought to redress ancient evils. And in some 
of these places — in Cuba and half a 
world away in Southeast Asia — even greater 
evil followed the thrust of violence. Through 
their own efforts under the Alliance for 
Progress, the Latin Americans have trans- 
formed the hemisphere into a region of de- 
termination and hope. 

The United States' participation in the 
Alliance was a bold affirmation of its belief 
that the true revolution which betters 
men's lives can be effected peacefully. The 
Alliance's 6-year record of accomplishments 

APRIL 3, 1967 


is history's clear testament to the validity 
of that belief. 

It is also a testament to the validity of 
the underlying principle of self-help. Our 
support has been vitally important to the 
successes so far achieved. But the commit- 
ments and dedication of the Latin Ameri- 
can nations themselves to these tasks has 
been the keystone of that success. 

The Task Before Us 

The record of progress only illuminates 
the work w^hich still must be done if life for 
the people of this hemisphere is truly to 
improve — not just for today, but for the 
changing years ahead. 

Last August, in a statement on the fifth 
anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, I 
described the challenge in these terms: ^ 

If present trends continue, the population of this 
hemisphere will be almost 1 billion by the year 2000. 
Two-thirds — some 625 million— will live in I,atin 
America. Whatever may be done through programs 
to reduce the rate of population growth, Latin Amer- 
ica faces a vast challenge. 

Farm production, for instance, should increase by 
6 percent every year, and that will be double the 
present rate. 

At least 140 million new jobs will need to be 

Over a million new homes should be built each 

More than 175,000 new doctors need to be trained 
to meet the very minimum requirements. 

Hundreds of thousands of new classrooms should 
be constructed. 

And annual per capita growrth rates should in- 
crease to the range of 4 to 6 percent. 

These requirements, added to the demands of the 
present, mean that new sights must be set, that new 
directions and renewed drive must be found if we 
are to meet the challenge, if we are to move forward. 

It is with these sober problems confront- 
ing us that the leaders of the American 
states will meet at Punta del Este. 

Pillars of Progress 

Our governments have been hard at work 
for months preparing for this meeting. 

Our concern has centered on the ques- 
tion of how we can speed the development 
process in Latin America. We know that 
growth and trade are interacting forces. 

We know that they depend on the free 
movement of products, people and capital. 
We know they depend on people who are 
healthy and educated. We know that these 
conditions contain the seeds of prosperity 
for all of us. 

Further, based on our joint experience so 
far under the Alliance, we know that the 
future progress of the hemisphere must 
rest on four strong pillars: 

1 . Elimination of Barriers to Trade 

Civilization in most of Latin America fol- 
lowed along the coastal I'im of the conti- 
nent. Today the centers of population are 
concentrated here. Vast inner frontiers lie 
remote and untouched, separated from each 
other by great rivers, mountains, forests 
and deserts. Simon Bolivar saw these nat- 
ural barriers as major obstacles to trade 
and communication and to his dream of a 
single great Latin American republic. 

Because of them, Latin American coun- 
tries for a century and a half tended to 
look outward for their markets to Europe 
and the United States. 

Now they are looking inward as well. They 
see the same barriers, but they see them as 
less formidable. They are confident that 
with modem technology they can be over- 
come. Now with projects set in motion by 
the Alliance for Progress, men are begin- 
ning to carve roads along the slopes of the 
Andes, push bridges across the rushing riv- 
ers, connect power grids, extend pipelines 
and link the overland national markets. 

The barriers of nature symbolize obstruc- 
tions every bit as restrictive as the arti- 
ficial trade barriers that men erect. The work 
to remove them both must proceed together. 

Latin American leaders have seen the very 
real threat of industrial stagnation in the 
high tariff barriers they have erected 
against their commerce with each other. 
They see economic integration as indispensa- 
ble to their future industrial growth. 

The Central American countries, stimu- 
lated by Alliance programs, have already 
achieved spectacular increases in trade and 

* For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330. 



investment. The larger grouping of South 
American states and Mexico, however, has 
approached economic unity at a slower pace. 
Now both groups together must system- 
atically move toward a Latin American 
Common Market. When this is carried into 
effect, it will bring the most profound 
change in hemispheric relations since inde- 
pendence. The countries of Latin America 
have given clear and sure indication that 
they intend to join together to advance 
toward this goal. 

2. Improvement of Education 

The burden of illiteracy, which the masses 
of people in Latin America have borne for 
centuries, is beginning to lift. In other 
times, the pace might have been satisfac- 
tory. It cannot be considered so today. 

The countries of Latin America hope and 
aim to be economically strong. Such nations 
will require trained people in an abundance 
far greater than their classrooms and lab- 
oratories provide. The scientists, the teach- 
ers, the skilled laborers, the administrators 
and the planners on whom tomorrow de- 
pends must be trained before tomorrow 
arrives. Children must go to school in ever- 
increasing numbers. Adults who have never 
written their names must be raised to the 
level of literacy. University facilities must 
be expanded and scientific, technical and 
vocational training must be provided of dif- 
ferent kinds and in different fields. 

All of this means more schools and an ex- 
pansion of educational opportunities to 
reach more and more people with every 
passing month. 

3. Agriculture 

Half the people of Latin America live in 
rural areas. 

Most of that rural life is still shackled 
by poverty and neglect. Agricultural pro- 
ductivity is still restricted by outdated 
methods and outmoded policies. Compre- 
hensive programs and reforms must be ac- 
celerated to bring modern fanning tech- 
niques to the campo. 

We and our neighbors to the south en- 

vision a dynamic Latin American agricul- 
ture which will help raise the standards of 
rural life. 

We envision a sufficient increase in the 
production of food to provide for their 
growing populations — and to help meet 
world needs as well. 

We envision a modernization of farming 
policies and techniques which will lead to a 
healthy competitive climate for food pro- 

Jf. Health 

Finally, we will strive harder than ever 
before to improve the health of all the 

The battle against diseases that kill and 
cripple will be intensified. 

Programs to make safe water supply and 
essential sanitation services available to all 
will be accelerated. 

Nutrition levels for poor children and 
their parents will be advanced. 

These are the problems we face together, 
and the promises we envision together, as 
we prepare for Punta del Este. 

The problems are real. But the promises 
are also real. They are not empty visions. 
They are all within our reach. They will not 
be accomplished quickly or easily. But they 
are objectives worthy of the support of all 
our people. 

Increased Assistance 

In keeping with the spirit of our commit- 
ment under the Alliance for Progress and 
after a careful review of the objectives 
which our Latin American neighbors have 
set for themselves, I believe that we should 
pledge increased financial assistance in the 
years ahead. 

The fundamental principle which has 
guided us in the past — demonstrated need 
and self-help — will continue to shape our 
actions in the future. 

/ recommend that Congress approve a 
commitment to increase our aid by up to 
$1.5 billion or about $300 million per year 
over the next 5 years. 

It must not be at the expense of our 

APRIL 3, 1967 


efforts in other parts of this troubled world. 

This amount will be in addition to the 
$1 billion we have been annually investing 
in the future of Latin American democracy, 
since the Alliance for Progress began 6 
years ago. The total value of our economic 
assistance, even after the proposed in- 
creases, will still be only a fraction of the 
resources the Latin American nations are 
themselves investing. 

The $1.5 billion increase I propose must 
be considered an approximate figure. Its 
precise determination will depend on steps 
which the Latin American nations them- 
selves must take. But even so, we can pro- 
ject in a general way what will be neces- 

1. Agriculture, Education, and Health 

Approximately $900 million of this in- 
crease should be used over the next 5 years 
to train teachers and build new laboratories 
and classrooms; to increase food produc- 
tion and combat the malnutrition which 
stunts the promise of young children; to 
fight disease and cure the ill. 

$100 million of this amount has been in- 
cluded in the fiscal 1968 budget totals. I will 
request that it be added to the new obliga- 
tional authority of $543 million already 
recommended for the Alliance for Progress. 

For the next four fiscal years, the addi- 
tional annual amount of some $200 million 
is vdthin the $750 million authorization for 
the Alliance for Progress approved by 
Congress last year. 

2. A Latin American Common Market 

Approximately one-quarter to one-half 
billion dollars over a 3 to 5 year period, be- 
ginning about 1970, may be required to as- 
sist Latin America to move toward a com- 
mon market. 

Progress in this direction will require a 
period of transition. To help with this ad- 
justment, assistance can be used to retrain 
workers, ease balance of payments prob- 
lems, and stimulate intra-Latin American 

The members of the Alliance for Prog- 

ress, including the United States, should be 
prepared to finance this assistance on an 
equitable matching basis. 

I will ask Congress to authorize these 
funds only when the first essential steps 
toward a common market are taken. 

3. Multi-National Projects — Communications, 
Roads, and River Systems 

Approximately $150 million over a 3- 
year period should provide additional funds 
to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Spe- 
cial Operations. These increased contribu- 
tions can help finance pre-investment 
studies and a portion of the cost of new 
multi-national projects: 

— Roads to link the nations and people 
of Latin America. 

— Modem communication networks to 
speed communications. 

— Bridges to carry the fruits of com- 
merce over river barriers; dams to stem the 
ravages of flood. 

— Hydroelectric plants to provide a plen- 
tiful source of power for growth and pros- 

We will request congressional authoriza- 
tion to provide this amount together with 
our regular $250 million annual contribu- 
tion for each of the next 3 years to the 
Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special 

We expect our partners in the Bank to in- 
crease their contributions on a proportional 


For the nations participating, Punta del 
Este will be a returning. It was there, 6 
years ago in that city by the sea, that the 
American nations framed the charter of 
the Alliance which unites the hopes of 
this hemisphere. 

We will be bringing with us the accumu- 
lated wisdom shaped by the experience 
gained in the years that have intervened. 

We have learned much. Our sister coun- 
tries know, and know well, that the burden 
of the task is theirs, the decisions are 



theirs, the initiative to build these new so- 
cieties must be theirs. They know that the 
only road to progress is the road of self- 

They know that our role can only be that 
of support, with our investment only a small 
portion of what they themselves contribute 
to their future. 

This knowledge strengthens their own 
resolve, and their own commitment. 

The people of the United States have 
learned, over the 6 years since that first 
conference at Punta del Este, that the in- 
vestment to which we pledged our support 
there is a good and honorable one. 

It is an investment made in the spirit of 
our world view, so well described by a great 
American jurist. Learned Hand: 

Right knows no boundaries, and justice no fron- 
tiers; the brotherhood of man is not a domestic 

That view of the world provides us with 
the knowledge that service is mutually re- 
warding. We have learned in the span of a 
generation that when we help others in a 
truly meaningful way, we serve our own 
vital interests as well. 

I could go to the summit meeting with 
the President's executive authority and 
reach understandings with our Latin Amer- 
ican neighbors on behalf of this country. 
I believe it is much more in our demo- 
cratic tradition if the Executive and the Con- 
gress work together as partners in this 

I am, therefore, going to you in the Con- 
gress not after a commitment has been 
made, but before making any commitment. 
I seek your guidance and your counsel. I 

have already met with some 40 of your 

I am asking the entire Congress and the 
American people to consider thoroughly my 
recommendations. I will look to their judg- 
ment and support as I prepare for our Na- 
tion's return to Punta del Este. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, March 13, 1967. 

President Hails Senate Action 
on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated March 16 

In giving its advice and consent to the rati- 
fication of the consular convention ^ today 
[March 16], the Senate acted in the best tra- 
dition of American government. The impres- 
sive vote for ratification was the product not 
only of strong bipartisan leadership but also 
of responsible action by the membership. 

The convention will provide important 
measures to protect Americans traveling in 
the Soviet Union. Last year more than 18,000 
of our citizens visited the U.S.S.R. These 
measures will become applicable as soon as 
the treaty enters into force. 

I hope the Soviet Government will now 
move promptly to ratify the convention and 
that arrangements will be made for its early 
entry into force. 

' S. Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess. ; for text, see 
Bulletin of June 22, 1964, p. 979. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


"March 12th is ... a proud anniversary. Years from notv 
men will still mark this date, and the man whose Doctrine 
gave it meaning." 

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine 

Following are texts of a letter from Presi- 
dent Johnson to former President Truman 
and his messages to King Constantine of 
Greece and President Cevdet Sunay of 
Turkey on the occasion of the 20th anni- 
versary of the Truman Doctrine. 


White House press release dated March H 

Dear Mr. President: On this day — as 
on so many others — those who love freedom 
will once again honor your name. 

Twenty years ago you went before the Con- 
gress and summoned the American people to 
a great endeavor: that of helping free peoples 
to "maintain their free institutions and their 
national integrity against aggressive move- 
ments that seek to impose upon them totali- 
tarian regimes." ^ 

With that message you served two great 
functions of the Presidency — those of the 
teacher and the leader. You related the strug- 
gle of the Greek people against armed ter- 
rorism to the national security of the United 
States. You recognized that totalitarian 
regimes, imposed upon free peoples by direct 
or indirect aggression, "undermine the foun- 
dations of international peace." And you 
called upon the Congress and the American 
people to help resist that aggression. 

Today America is again engaged in helping 
to turn back armed terrorism. As in your 
day, there are those who believe that effort 
is too costly. As on other occasions during the 

' For a message delivered by President Truman 
before a joint session of the Congress on Mar. 12, 
1947, see Bulletin Supplement of May 4, 1947, p. 

past twenty years, there are those who coun- 
sel us that the stakes are not high enough, 
nor the danger near enough, to warrant our 

But our people have learned that freedom 
is not divisible; that order in the world is 
vital to our national interest; and that the 
highest costs are paid not by those who meet 
their responsibilities, but by those who ignore 

You helped to teach those lessons, Mr. 
President. Just as importantly, you had the 
courage and the determination to put them 
into practice: in Greece and Turkey, in Ber- 
lin, in Korea, and in other parts of the world 
where today men are free and prospering be- 
cause of what you did. 

March 12th is thus a proud anniversary. 
Years from now men will still mark this date, 
and the man whose Doctrine gave it meaning. 

With best wishes for your health and hap- 


Lyndon B. Johnson 

The Honorable Harry S. Truman 
Independence, Missouri 


White House press release dated March 11 

Twenty years ago today. President Harry 
S. Truman asked the American people to help 
the Greek nation preserve its freedom. Before 
a joint session of the Congress, he declared: 

I believe it must be the policy of the United States 
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres- 



The message and the program he conveyed 
on that historic occasion became known as 
the Truman Doctrine. 

In commemoration of that decisive hour, in 
thanksgiving for his courage and vision, and 
in celebration of the friendship that endures 
between our peoples, I extend to you and the 
citizens of Greece my warm greetings and 
best wishes. In this I am joined by every 
American who rejoices that Greece is today 
free and prospering. 

President Truman recognized that the 
security of the United States was intimately 
related to that of Greece. He warned our 
people — who, like yours, had just emerged 
from a savage conflict with another terrorist 
aggressi on — that 

We shall not realize our objectives unless we are 
willing to help free peoples to maintain their free 
institutions and their national integrity against ag- 
gressive movements that seek to impose upon them 
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank 
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon 
free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, under- 
mine the foundations of international peace and 
hence the security of the United States. 

The American people responded to his call 
for assistance to a people struggling to be 
free — and their decision has affected, not 
only the security of your great nation, but 
the security of the world for two decades. 

I am aware of the sacrifices made by the 
Greek people in the past 20 years. I am proud 
of the fact that throughout that period, the 
United States and Greece have worked 
together in close partnership toward common 
goals. I revere the Greek spirit, that for 
thousands of years has inspired the world, 
and that has taught men to cherish freedom 
above all else in life. 

Today we mark a moment in man's long 
quest for freedom. I salute you and your 
people on this proud anniversary, and I look 
forward to a future of continued friendship 
and cooperation between our nations. 


White House press release dated March 11 

On the twentieth anniversary of the 
Truman Doctrine, I extend to you and to the 
Turkish people my good wishes. Then as now, 
the American people admire the vitality and 
the passion for freedom of the Turkish 
people. Then as now, the United States is 
proud of its association with the forward- 
looking Turkish nation. 

Turkey has been a sturdy ally in NATO 
and CENTO. Its men played an unforgettable 
part with the United Nations forces which 
assured that aggression would not succeed in 

With its security assured by its own 
courage and efforts, united with those of its 
allies, Turkey has moved forward remarkably 
in economic and social development. The 
vision of a modern Turkey, not only loyal to 
its own traditions and ambitions, but also a 
creative part of the world of contemporary 
science, technology, and industry, has been 
brought measurably closer to reality. 

The visit you will soon be making to the 
United States affords an opportunity to give 
added meaning to that association. It will 
also serve as a symbol of the importance of 
the partnership of our two great republics. 
Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to 
welcoming you and Mrs. Sunay. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship and Cooperation 

Prime Minister II Kwon Chung of Korea 
visited the United States March 12-17. He 
met with President Johnson and other U.S. 
officials at Washington March H.-15. Follow- 
ing are an exchange of greetings between 
President Johnson and Prime Minister 
Chung, their exchange of toasts at a White 
House luncheon, and a joint statement issued 
at the close of their talks on March H. 


Wlute House prees release dated March 14 

President Johnson 

It is now almost 17 years since that June 
day when the invader struck at South Korea. 
For a few, time has erased the meaning of 
that day and all that followed. But for most 
Americans, it remains as clear as it was to 
President Harry Truman when he said: 

In my generation, this was not the first occasion 
when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled 
some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Aus- 
tria. I remembered how each time that the democ- 
racies failed to act it had encouraged the aggres- 
sors to keep going ahead. ... I felt certain that 
... if the Communists were permitted to force 
their way into the Republic of Korea without opposi- 
tion from the free world, no small nation would have 
the courage to resist threats and aggression by 
stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed 
to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, 
just as similar incidents had brought on the second 
world war. It was also clear to me that the founda- 
tions and the principles of the United Nations were 
at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea 
could be stopped. 

Mr. Prime Minister, the attack v/as 
stopped — and we have had 15 years to see 
the results. 

The Korean people, whom you so proudly 
represent here today, have strengthened and 

developed the independence that was once 
so dearly bought. They have moved forward, 
slowly at first and with some uncertainty, 
to meet problems that seemed to defy all 

I remember how depressed and discour- 
aged all of us were at the future of Korea 
in the darkest days of the war, and I remem- 
ber the prognostications and the prophecies 
of the cynics of that hour. 

But would that we all look at South Korea 

There is freedom of speech and a free 
press. There are free elections — and I un- 
derstand you are about to have another soon. 

Economically, Korea has made amazing 

A leading Western financial publication 
recently picked Korea as the developing 
country with "the best all-around national 
performance in 1966 in the world of eco- 
nomics and finance." 

Your rate of economic growth is close to 
12 percent. 

You are approaching self-sufficiency in 

You set $250 million as your export goal 
last year — and you reached and surpassed 
that goal. 

The world knows what Koreans are doing 
with their freedom and their independence. 

I don't mean to imply that you have solved 
all your economic and social problems, be- 
cause we all know that you have not. Nor 
have we. No one really has. But the Korean 
economy has "taken off" — as one of my ad- 
visers is frequently fond of saying. 

Korea's freedom is a consequence, above 
all, of Korean fortitude and courage. But the 
Korean people recognize that it is the result, 
too, of the heroism and sacrifice of their 



friends. They know that freedom brings rc- 
siionsibilities as well as rights. 

So they have begun to turn their attention 
from purely national needs and goals to the 
broader problems of Asia and the world. 
Korean initiative in launching the Asian and 
Pacific Council has been recognized and ad- 
mired by all. 

And today Koreans are fighting in the de- 
fense of another brave people. Once again 
we work side by side together — we fight 
together — against aggression. Once again 
we shall prove that it can be turned back by 
the courageous deteiTnination of free men. 

In peace, as in war, we have joined our 
efFoi-ts — in the Asian Development Bank, in 
cooperative efforts to improve food produc- 
tion, in transportation, and in education and 
health measures throughout Asia. 

Mr. Prime Minister, our peoples are linked 
by the strongest bonds of friendship. They 
were forged in the savagery and sorrow of 
war. They have been tested now in the chal- 
lenges of peace. 

The value of this friendship is beyond 
words. It is one of those benefits that come 
to men and nations all too rarely. 

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very 
warmest welcome to you and to all the dis- 
tinguished members of your party. 

I eagerly look forward to our exchange 
of views today and tomorrow. 

I hope this visit to our country will be one 
of your most pleasant, one of your most 
interesting, and one of the most memorable 
journeys among us. We are delighted to have 
you. Thank you for having come. 

Prime Minister Chung 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is 
with great pleasure and a sense of privilege 
that I receive the warm welcome extended 
to me and my party today. 

First of all, I have the honor of conveying 
best regards from the President and Mrs. 
Park to you and Mrs. Johnson and to all the 
people of the United States of America. 

Also, I am most happy to visit once again 
this Capital City of the United States, for 
which I have a profound feeling of friendli- 

ness. I have no adequate words to express 
the pleasure I feel as I see you once again, 
having come by that firm bridge of good 
faith and friendship which was strengthened 
by the exchange of visits by our heads of 

Mr. President, under your great and in- 
spiring leadership, the freedom-loving spirit 
of the Founding Fathers of the United States 
and the glorious history of the American 
struggle for the preservation of freedom 
shine bright in all parts of the world. 

Today, a new chapter in the history of the 
United States is being written on the un- 
swerving effoi-ts of the American people, 
who are determined to crush, with faith and 
courage, violence and aggression and to es- 
tablish world peace in the true sense through 
perseverance and tolerance. 

I am most happy to say that the entire 
people of the Republic of Korea have a deep 
respect and are grateful for the great con- 
tributions being made by the American peo- 

Mr. President, the Republic of Korea and 
the United States of America are the allies 
bound together for the common cause. Our 
traditional ties of friendship have been 
strengthened further over the last few years. 

Today, the spirit of cooperation between 
our two countries is evident not only in the 
battlefield but in all our mutual endeavors, 
which are aimed at the establishment of a 
new world of prosperity in peace and free- 

I pledge here that as a trusted ally of the 
United States the Republic of Korea will 
share all the adversities we may encounter 
in our joint endeavor. 

Mr. President, as you have witnessed in 
person, my country is advancing under the 
leadership of President Park to a better, 
brighter tomorrow. The "Land of Morning 
Calm" is today full of vigor, vitality, and 
promise of a modern, self-sustaining future. 

The assistance and cooperation rendered 
by the people of the United States since the 
end of World War II have borne full fruit 
in a land that was once plagued with despair 
and devastation. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


It is with the utmost pleasure that I con- 
vey to the people of the United States the 
warmest gratitude of the people of the Re- 
public of Korea. 

We are today marching ahead with con- 
stancy and hope toward a bright future, 
ever thankful to the American people for 
helping them make this progress possible. 

Mr. President, I am looking forward with 
joy in my heart to meeting with you and 
other leaders of your Government during my 
visit. We will discuss in all sincerity and 
frankness those problems of mutual interest 
which confront us today, with a view to 
strengthening the existing ties of friendship 
between our two countries. 

Once again, I wish to express my gratitude 
to you, Mr. President, for this warm wel- 
come extended to me and my party. Thank 


White House press release dated March 14 

President Johnson 

This morning I had the privilege of wel- 
coming you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the 
United States of America. 

Now it is a very great pleasure to welcome 
you to my home. 

Around us here today you will see many 
people who know your country well. And 
each of them is a friend of Korea. 

Although I was in your country only a 
very short time, the visit last fall was one 
of the most memorable and the most heart- 
warming that I have ever known. 

Mrs. Johnson and I shall never forget — 
and everyone with us will remember — the 
warmth, the spontaneity, the hospitality of 
the Korean people. I can still hear the rus- 
tling of countless small flags — Korean and 
American — that welcomed us in Seoul. I can 
still see those schoolboy posters all along 
your streets and the open friendliness in the 
faces of those who held them. 

We knew, of course, that your country was 
called the Land of the Morning Calm. And 

we found it to be so — in the early morning 
when the mists are rising off' the rivers. 

But it is not long before the air is filled 
with the sounds of men building and plant- 
ing and producing, of little children reciting 
their lessons in the school, of the whole coun- 
tiyside coming awake and work being done. 

I was struck by the evidence of economic 
growth and vigor that I saw everywhere we 
looked. Koreans were working to make a bet- 
ter society — to insure that all of the people 
shared in the fruits of their economic 

So both of us would like to cultivate our 
gardens in peace. We would like to make 
them bloom as they have never bloomed be- 
fore — to create and to enjoy the blessings of 
prosperity, to enlarge the possibilities of a 
dignified and meaningful life. 

But in our world even the most remote 
nations are often barred from cultivating 
their gardens in peace. 

It is a world where peace and freedom and 
justice are constantly in jeopardy. 

It is a world where men, if they will not 
stand up, may be forced to kneel. 

Neither Koreans nor Americans kneel 
gracefully before conquerors or before ag- 

It is a world where responsibilities are 
heavy for those who are willing to shoulder 
the burden of responsibility. 

We carried that burden together in the 
defense of South Korea. We carry it to- 
gether as we meet here today, in the defense 
of South Viet-Nam. We shall continue to 
carry it until ambitious men recognize that 
aggression and terror are futile and out- 
dated weapons in relations between peoples 
and nations. 

We shall continue together because, as 
President Harry Truman said more than 15 
years ago: i 

AH free nations are exposed and all are in peril. 
Their only security lies in banding together. No one 

' For President Truman's state of the Union mes- 
sage on Jan. 8, 1951, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951, 
p. 123. 



nation can find protection in a selfish search for a 
safe haven from the storm. 

In going to the assistance of others — as 
our Korean friends know so well — America 
does not seek to dominate or control. We do 
not seek national grandeur or special privi- 

What we seek — in cooperation with like- 
minded nations like Korea — is the basis for 
a lasting peace, a peace with justice, not the 
peace of the grave but the peace of life, 
where men are free and able to shape their 
own future. 

Today, together, we fight. But even as we 
do, we work together in a multitude of ways 
to improve the quality of the life of our own 
people and of others in the world. 

And when real peace comes, as it will 
come, I know we shall continue to work — 
together and with others — to better the 
world we have inherited and helped to pre- 

Mr. Prime Minister, we are delighted that 
you are with us today. 

In the spirit of our deep friendship and 
admiration for a very brave people, I ask 
all of those who have come here today to 
join me in a toast: To His Excellency, 
the President of the Republic of Korea — and 
to the continued prosperity and freedom of 
the Korean people. 

Prime Minister Chung 

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies 
and gentlemen: I wish to extend my heart- 
felt gratitude to you for your warm address 
and for this wonderful luncheon for me and 
my party. 

After 4 years, I am indeed happy to visit 
this country once again. 

I was moved by the marvelous aerial view 
of this great city, which has become more 
beautiful and splendid than I remembered. 
Here again as I find myself in this amicable 
and congenial company of old friends, I am 
at a loss for adequate words to express my 
deep emotion. 

Mr. President, as I stand here, I have a 
vivid memory of the cheers of millions of 

people on the streets of Seoul who, with 
flags in their hands, welcomed you to Korea 
last autumn. 

I am sure that you personally felt then 
the admiration and appreciation of the Ko- 
rean people. As a great leader, you have the 
mission of protecting freedom. You are 
armed with unfailing courage and a strong 
belief in justice. These are qualities we Ko- 
reans know are needed at this critical time 
in history. 

Mr. President and distinguished guests, as 
President Park has stated before, we have 
been trying very hard to be a nation which 
stands by its friends and repays its obliga- 
tions. We know well that real gratitude is 
more properly expressed by deeds rather 
than by words. 

I am very proud to declare that the sacri- 
fices and efforts made by American people in 
Korea have not been wasted. 

Mr. President, you stated in Seoul 2 that 
self-esteem gives to a people confidence, a 
strong confidence, without which a people 
can accomplish little and with which they 
can surmount any obstacles. 

Today, we are full of this confidence; my 
people are overcoming all difficulties and 
marching toward a hopeful tomorrow. 

During the past several years, under the 
inspiring leadership of President Park, we 
Korean people have achieved political sta- 
bility and economic progress. 

According to 1966 statistics of our eco- 
nomic growth, the per capita income reached 
$123; the total amount of exports, $250 mil- 
lion; and the foreign reserves, close to $230 

I know well that these figures are not so 
big as to surprise any one of you. Neverthe- 
less, these figures are really encouraging to 
us, because comparing them with those of 5 
years ago, you will discover that some of 
them have almost doubled and still others 
have increased almost 10 times. 

Mr. President and distinguished guests, 
the Korean people, who in the past were 

2 For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner at 
Seoul on Oct. 31, 1966, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 771. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


negative and resistant, have now become one 
of the free nations in the world, pursuing a 
course of affirmation and positive contribu- 
tion. In other words, today we ask ourselves 
what we can do as an ally of the United 
States and what we can do as a free nation 
in Asia. At the same time we ask what we 
can contribute to the freedom and peace of 
all mankind. 

We are growing today. We sent our troops 
to the Republic of Viet-Nam, normalized our 
relations with Japan, and hosted the minis- 
terial meeting for Asian and Pacific coop- 

We participated in the Manila Summit 
Conference and took part in the establish- 
ment of the Asian Development Bank. These 
are some of the tangible results recently 
achieved through the strength and confi- 
dence of the people of Korea. 

Mr. President, today the Asian countries, 
including Korea, are facing, as President 
Franklin Roosevelt pointed out in his state- 
ment of four freedoms, the tasks of achiev- 
ing freedom from fear and freedom from 

We have learned that freedom in the 20th 
century can only be obtained through coop- 
eration among peoples. 

Your address delivered at Johns Hopkins 
University ^ is a most important and histori- 
cal declaration, clarifying the goals of the 
United States in Asia. 

Particularly, your grand designs for ever- 
lasting peace and promotion of the well- 
being of the suffering peoples in Asia and 
firm attitude against injustice and fear have 
brought to the Asian people new hope and 
new courage, inspiring them with a sense of 

Today, the Korean people admire you as a 
defender of freedom and peace and as an 
architect of the happiness of mankind. 

Also, on this occasion I wish to express 
my profound respect and appreciation to the 
American people. Their contributions since 
the Second World War helped bring freedom 
to Korea and other nations in Asia. 

' Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

Mr. President, we Korean people have de- .| 
veloped into a trusted nation of the free ■ i 
Asia. We share our joys and sorrows with I' 
the American people, who have always been I ' 
with us, not only in the darkness of despair 
but also in the bright morning of hope. 

Finally, I express once again my heartfelt 
gratitude to you and my sincere hope for 
your continued friendship and assistance. ' 

Distinguished gentlemen, may I ask you 
to join me in a toast to the magnificent con- ' 
tribution of President Johnson to mankind, 
to the health of President and Mrs. Johnson, 
and to the everlasting prosperity and happi- 
ness of the American people. 


White HouBe press release dated March 14 

Prime Minister II Kwon Chung of the Republic of 
Korea arrived in Washin^on on March 14 at the 
invitation of President Johnson. The President and 
the Prime Minister met on March 14 and exchanged 
views on matters of mutual concern to the two gov- 
ernments. Also present were Minister of National 
Defense Sung Eun Kim, Minister of Commerce and 
Industry Chung Hun Park, Secretary General to 
the President Hu Rak Lee, Ambassador Hyun Chul 
Kim, Under Secretary of State Nicholas DeB. Katz- 
enbach, Special Assistant to the President Walt W. 
Rostow, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Samuel D. Berger. 
The Prime Minister brought with him a personal 
message to President Johnson from President Park 
Chung Hee. 

President Johnson extended his cong^ratulations to 
President Park on the remarkable progress achieved 
by the Korean people in recent years and the en- 
couraging prospects for continued progress in vari- 
ous fields of national life in Korea. 

President Johnson expressed the continuing admi- 
ration of the American people for the courage and 
prowess of the Korean forces on the field of battle 
in Viet-Nam and for their effective endeavors to 
promote the welfare of the Vietnamese populace. 
President Johnson indicated the importance he at- 
taches to the combat capabilities of these forces and 
the steps being taken to strengthen these capa- 
bilities further with improved equipment. The 
Prime Minister stated his impressions of the cur- 
rent situation in Viet-Nam gained during his recent 
visit there. The President and the Prime Minister 
agreed that efforts to bring about a just and lasting 
peace must be constantly pursued but reaffirmed the 
determination of their two governments to continue 
vigorously the military struggle in Viet-Nam until 



the North Vietnamese are willing to enter into 
meaningful negotiations for peace. They affirmed 
that their two governments would continue to act in 
closest consultation on both these matters. Recalling 
that the United States Government has pledged to 
give special support to the Government of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam on peaceful development, in- 
cluding the latter government's revolutionary de- 
velopment programs, and that the Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Korean 
Government to render assistance for the same pro- 
grams. President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung 
agreed that their two governments will, in close 
consultation and coordination among themselves and 
with the Government of Viet-Nam, jointly render 
cooperation and assistance to the successful imple- 
mentation of the peaceful development activities in- 
cluding the Government of Viet-Nam's revolutionary 
development program. 

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed 
the recent series of incidents on land and sea in and 
near the Demilitarized Zone in Korea in which both 
ROK and U.S. units have suffered casualties from 
unprovoked attacks by North Korean forces. They 
agreed on the need for maintaining constant vigi- 
lance against the threat of renewed aggression 
against the Republic of Korea. They further agreed 
that in view of this continuing threat modernization 
of the Korean armed forces should be continued as 
rapidly as legislative and budgetary limitations will 
permit. President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness 
and determination of the United States to render 
prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed 
attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance 
with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. President 
Johnson assured Prime Minister Chung that the 
United States would continue to support the Korean 
armed forces at levels adequate to ensure Korea's 

Prime Minister Chung reviewed his government's 
economic objective, as set forth in its Second Five 
Year Economic Development Plan. President John- 
son expressed the admiration of the American people 
for the striking progress made by the Korean Gov- 
ernment and people during recent years in increas- 
ing gross national product, industrial output, agri- 
cultural production, exports, and domestic revenues. 
President Johnson reaffirmed to Prime Minister 
Chung his previous assurances that the United 
States would continue to support the economic 
growth of the Republic of Korea, and in particular, 
to assist in the achievement of the goals of the 
second Five Year Plan. Further development loans 
will constitute one form of such support. He noted 
also that a consultative group of friendly govern- 
ments, including the United States, and interna- 
tional lending institutions has been formed to coor- 
dinate the provisions of development funds to the 
Republic of Korea. 

Prime Minister Chung expressed gratification over 

the imminent visit of the private trade and invest- 
ment mission to Korea under the leadership of Mr. 
George W. Ball. He assured President Johnson that 
the trade mission would be warmly welcomed in 
Korea, in keeping with the desire of both govern- 
ments to expand trade between the two nations and 
to promote American private investment in Korea. 
President Johnson reaffirmed the United States 
Government interest in furthering the growth of 
trade between the Republic of Korea and the United 
States and stressed the importance of periodic meet- 
ings between appropriate United States officials and 
their Korean counterparts. It was agreed that the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Secre- 
tary of Commerce meet annually for this purpose. 
He also assured the Prime Minister that the United 
States would cooperate with the Republic of Korea 
to bring promptly to the attention of American pri- 
vate business interests the opportunities and possi- 
bilities for investment in Korea, both through com- 
mercial loans and joint business ventures. 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung re- 
affirmed the conviction of their two governments 
that existing regional organizations and institutions 
in the Pacific area should be strengthened and de- 
veloped, with the ultimate objective of creating a 
new Pacific Community, open to all nations pre- 
pared to live at peace and to cooperate and work 
for the welfare of the people of Asia and the Pacific, 
as agreed by Presidents Johnson and Park in their 
joint statement in Seoul in November, igoe.* Presi- 
dent Johnson and Prime Minister Chung recalled the 
goals of freedom as declared by the seven heads of 
state at Manila last October ' and Prime Minister 
Chung reaffirmed the determination of the govern- 
ment of the Republic of Korea to continue its efforts 
towards accelerating the growth of a Pacific Com- 
munity. President Johnson expressed appreciation 
for the initiative and important contributions made 
by the Republic of Korea in the evolution of the 
Pacific Community. He stressed the importance of 
solidarity and mutual support among the countries 
in the region and expressed the readiness of the 
United States Government to play its part in devel- 
oping the Pacific Community. 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung re- 
affirmed the strong ties of friendship and mutual 
interest between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States and pledged themselves anew to the 
maintenance and strengthening of those ties and 
to continued cooperation between their two govern- 
ments in the economic, political, and military fields. 

On behalf of the members of his party and the 
Korean people. Prime Minister Chung expressed his 
deepest appreciation to President Johnson for the 
warm reception and for the hospitality extended to 
him by President Johnson and the United States. 

* Ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777. 
= Ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


U.S. Investment and Trade 
Mission Visits Korea 

President Johnson announced on March 
10 (White House press release) that 27 U.S. 
business and financial leaders will visit 
Korea March 18-24 to stimulate American 
private investment and to promote increased 
U.S.-Korean trade. 

This mission is the result of an agree- 
ment between President Johnson and Presi- 
dent Chung Hee Park in Seoul last Novem- 
ber for an exchange between the two nations 
to discuss these aims.^ The two Presidents 
noted that the stability and progress of the 
Korean economy should make these objec- 
tives possible. 

At White House request, George W. Ball, 
former Under Secretary of State, organized 
and will lead this U.S. private investment 
and trade mission to Korea.^ Members will 
be traveling at their own expense. 

Before their departure the group will as- 
semble in Washington on March 16 for 
briefings by State Department Agency for 
International Development, Commerce De- 
partment, and Export-Import Bank officials. 

This mission leaves Washington on March 
17 and will spend 7 days in Korea as guests 
of the Korean Government.^ 

Foreign IVIinister of Guinea 
Visits the United States 

The Foreign Minister of Guinea, Louis- 
Lansana Beavogui, arrived at New York on 
March 6 for a visit to the United States of 
approximately 10 days. (For an announce- 
ment of the visit, see Department of State 
press release 45 dated March 6.) He was 

' For text of a joint statement dated Nov. 2, see 
Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777. 

* For a White House announcement, see ibid., 
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 69. 

^ For names of the members of the mission, see 
White House press release dated Mar. 10. 

accompanied by Mr. Mohammed Kassoury 
Bangoura, Director General of Technical 
Cooperation and Economic Matters, Ministry . 
of Foreign Afi"airs. | 

During the course of his visit, Foreign 
Minister Beavogui spent several days in 
Washington, where he conferred with the 
Secretary of State and other U.S. officials. 
He also visited Puerto Rico and the Virgin 

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls 
To Remain at Present Levels 

Department Announcement 

Press release 66 dated March 13 

The Department of State announced on 
March 13 agreement with Canada that there 
will be no increase in tolls on the St. 
Lawrence Seaway for at least four years. 

The United States Government considers 
that in view of the rapid growth of traffic on 
the Seaway a toll increase is not necessary. 
Traffic on the Seaway reached record levels 
in 1966 and tonnage carried on the waterway 
exceeded for the first time the tonnage fore- 

The Seaway toll structure may be re- 
viewed after four years at the request of 
either government. 

United States and Canadian representa- 
tives also have agreed on an adjustment in 
the division of toll revenues under which 
Canada's share will be increased from 71 to 
73 percent for the next four years. The 
United States-Canadian agreement of March 
9, 1959,1 on St. Lawrence Seaway tolls pro- 
vided for adjustment of shares for the two 
countries in accordance with their relative 
costs, and the present adjustment reflects 
costs incurred in recent years. 

' For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and 
text of a memorandum of agreement, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440. 



Cotton in the World Trade Arena 

by Anthony M. Solomon 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

I am honored to have this opportunity to 
participate in your 52d annual convention. 
As Assistant Secretary of State for Eco- 
nomic Affairs, I am delighted to pay testi- 
mony to the fact that your association has 
been closely and helpfully involved over the 
years in international commercial affairs. 
The cotton trade has a long and proud tra- 
dition in the trading history of our country. 
Your familiarity with both the problems and 
potentialities of international trade reflects 
this experience and heritage. And it is there- 
fore no accident that from your ranks have 
arisen men who have been leaders in this 

The Department of State's credentials also 
go back a long way. Our people have not 
plowed cottonfields in the ordinary course of 
their work, but they have met payrolls, so 
to speak, in other important ways. 

Our first Ministers to Europe after we 
won independence, John Adams in Great 
Britain and Thomas Jefferson in France, put 
more time and effort into expanding our 
trade than on any other single activity. They 
worked to get better markets for what were 
then examples of our technologically ad- 
vanced products — whale oil and whale-oil 
candles. More generally, they negotiated 
hard to remove discrimination against all 
our products in foreign markets and to re- 
duce trade barriers on a reciprocal basis. We 
were a have-not nation then, and we knew 

* Address made before the Southern Cotton Asso- 
ciation at Memphis, Tenn., on Mar. 10 (press release 
53 dated Mar. 9). 

that we had to export agricultural products 
to buy the machinery and equipment we 
needed from abroad. 

The men who followed Adams and Jeffer- 
son in representing our country abroad have 
continued to work in the same vineyard. 
They sought to improve opportunities to sell 
our products, ranging from cotton to com- 
puters, and to widen areas of reciprocal 
trade. At home our position has been much 
the same. It is a source of pride for me today 
to recall that one of my most distinguished 
predecessors and a leading architect of our 
present trade policy, Will Clayton, came to 
his public work from a background in cot- 

In the first days of our history this policy 
stemmed from the premise that we could 
most effectively realize our potentialities as 
a nation as part of the world economy rather 
than in economic isolation. This fundamental 
proposition is the more valid today when by 
our very size and power we have far-reach- 
ing and inescapable responsibilities for de- 
fending peace and strengthening freedom 
throughout the world. 

My purpose today is to talk about interna- 
tional trade problems and cotton policy. 
What are our international trade objectives, 
and are they, or should they be, different for 
cotton? I propose first to comment briefly 
on the status of our efforts in the trade field; 
second, to examine the cotton trade in the 
context of this trade policy; and third, to ex- 
plore with you the current status and future 
prospects of cotton as we see them now. 

We have done much in the two decades 

APRIL 3, 1967 


since World War II to dismantle the network 
of barriers that throttled trade in the suspi- 
cious world of the thirties. As a result, the 
volume of world trade has grown faster than 
at any time in this century. Trade has be- 
come a positive and dynamic factor in the 
rapid recovery and expansion of the free- 
world economy. 

We seek to continue this move toward a 
free and open world trading system based on 
the principle of nondiscrimination and a 
minimum of restrictions on the flow of 
goods, capital, and services across national 
boundaries. Such a system promotes the 
growth of all. It encourages specialization, 
the development and exchange of technology, 
and growing productivity. It provides the 
competitive environment essential for a new 
generation of ideas, technology, and trade 
patterns. These results serve the interests of 
all trading nations; they clearly are in the 
commercial, economic, and even strategic in- 
terest of the United States. 

One of the important lessons we learned 
from the disastrous experience of the inter- 
war period is that attempts by nations to 
solve their problems at the expense of others 
are self-defeating. In the end, everybody 
loses. Conversely, experience has also shown 
that the wider the area and the more nu- 
merous the commodities moving on a freely 
traded basis, the more all can benefit. 

These are the premises underlying our ac- 
tions in the trade field — and they are all 
familiar to you. To lose sight of them for 
short-term or narrow considerations would 
penalize the most efficient segments of U.S. 
agriculture and industry and, in the end, the 
overall national interest. Fortunately, the 
competitive character of the U.S. economic 
environment, and the receptiveness of our 
producers to change, support a generally out- 
ward-looking posture on international trade. 

In the day-to-day dealings with foreign 
countries on specific trade issues and in ne- 
gotiations in GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariff's and Trade], the U.N., or other inter- 
national organizations, many considerations 
must go into the determination of what con- 
stitutes the national interest. One factor 

weighing heavily in this determination is the 
welfare of domestic producers and traders — 
their production capabilities, costs, employ- 
ment, and income. It is for this reason that 
we have frequent and thorough discussions 
of specific trade issues with representatives 
of U.S. industry, labor, and trade. 

Budgetary and balance-of-payments con- 
siderations are also involved. The constraints 
of our balance-of-payments position in recent 
years have made it essential that we assess 
carefully the foreign exchange consequences 
of actions aff'ecting our exports. And the 
relation of budgetary considerations to the 
fight against inflation is self-evident. 

Foreign policy considerations are a third 
general factor. Expanding trade on multi- 
lateral principles requires that we adhere to 
the rules of the game. In addition, considera- 
tion must be given to the problems of devel- 
oping countries if they are to play their role 
in reciprocal trade and make satisfactory 
economic progress. For these reasons, work 
on specific trade issues requires consultations 
with representatives of the governments of 
foreign producers of our export commodi- 

Kennedy Round Negotiations 

In 1962 the Congress authorized us in the 
Trade Expansion Act to speed up the process 
of reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to 
trade. The Kennedy Round negotiations, 
which are the vehicle for this effort, will 
shortly reach a climax. The next few weeks 
will tell how well we will succeed. 

On industrial items, substantial and mu- 
tually beneficial offers have been put on the 
table by all participants. Difficult issues re- 
main in key sectors. Their resolution will 
require some give-and-take, but above all it 
will require that all participants recognize 
once again that their individual self-interest 
in fact lies in an environment that insures 
the continued and rapid expansion of world 

We recognized from the first that the 
Kennedy Round agricultural negotiations 
would be diflficult. Agricultural support sys- 
tems are complicated, varied — and every- 



where. Agricultural protective devices are 
also legion. Nevertheless, the entire Western 
trading world agreed in Geneva on the goal 
of liberalizing agricultural ti-ade. 

I am sure you appreciate the nature of 
the negotiating difficulties. Societies such as 
our own have deep roots in, and complex 
commitments to, their agricultural sectors. 
Over time these have resulted in government 
regulations and techniques of agricultural 
support going well beyond tariffs. The tech- 
niques are very difficult to change in a short 
time. They are closely related to arrange- 
ments which effectively control the price as 
well as the volume of imports. As we have 
learned in Geneva and in other agricultural 
discussions, understanding the nature and 
consequences of each of these systems is in 
itself a major enterprise. 

We understand the social and political 
pressures and needs which have brought 
these arrangements to their present state of 
development. We have accepted for many 
years the need of our own farmers for gov- 
ernmental assistance in production and mar- 
keting. We recognize that for some time to 
come governments will continue to give spe- 
cial assistance to agriculture. We seek, how- 
ever, in the Kennedy Round, to reach agree- 
ment on restricting the application of these 
systems so as to assure an expansion in 
world agricultural trade. To do this, govern- 
ments must be willing to subject policies that 
historically were considered to be of purely 
domestic concern to international discussion, 
coordination, and agreement. 

Problems of Cotton in World Trade 

Unlike the problems of many sectors of 
our agricultural economy, the problems of 
cotton in world trade do not arise from diffi- 
culties of access to markets, to which I have 
been alluding. They arise primarily from the 
capacity of world cotton producers to place 
on world markets ever-increasing quantities 
of cotton in the face of severe competition 
from manmade fibers and a relatively slow 
growth in the consumption of cotton prod- 
ucts. But governments have contributed to 
the difficulties and may do so again. 

U.S. cotton programs in the past have not 
been as effective as they should have been in 
dealing with a situation of chronic oversup- 
ply. Support policies have concentrated on 
prices and thus have tended to foster uneco- 
nomic production patterns, delay readjust- 
ments, and discourage consumption. In an 
effort to offset the effects of these policies on 
our exports we resorted to export subsidies. 
To offset the effect on consumption we made 
payments to pi'ocessors. 

More recently, of course, our pohcies took 
a more positive turn. We replaced the system 
of support prices by a more rational and ef- 
fective program which permits market 
prices to find their competitive levels. Our 
present farm supports, which take the form 
of direct payments to producers, are proving 
to be more eflfective in adjusting production 
to requirements. 

We have one problem other cotton pro- 
ducers do not share because we are willing, 
as a Government, to hold stocks of cotton. 
We do so as part of our policy to assist cot- 
ton fanners. As you know, many countries 
grow and export cotton. With the single ex- 
ception of the United States, these are devel- 
oping countries. Cotton is the number-one 
export of 9 of such countries and ranks 
among the three most important exports of 
17 countries. These countries in recent years 
have increased their share in world cotton 
production, consumption, and exports. They 
do not have the economic strength and re- 
sources, however, to hold cotton from one 
year to the next but market their annual pro- 
'duction each year. 

As a result of our price-support programs 
operating in concert with our willingness to 
take supplies off the market, we have be- 
come, to a certain degree, the residual sup- 
plier of the world commercial market. 

It is in this context that I propose to 
review the developments in the cotton situa- 
tion since our 1965 legislation went into 
effect and to hazard some speculations about 
the future. 

At the start of the current marketing year 
last summer, the situation was discouraging. 
Stocks in the United States were at a record 

APRIL 3, 1967 


high, stocks in foreign exporting countries 
were the highest in a decade, but stocks in 
importing countries were in the third year 
of decline. Foreign production had been 
growing steadily, creating a further imbal- 
ance in supply. Prices of upland cotton con- 
tinued to weaken, but world trade in cotton 
was stagnant. In contrast, manmade fiber 
production and sales set new records. 

Here in the United States production was 
stable at a level well above disappearance, 
despite the many years of acreage control. 
By the end of the last crop year, U.S. stocks 
were almost 17 million bales, equivalent to 
over a year's production; and 88 percent of 
the carryover was in CCC [Commodity 
Credit Corporation] inventory. Exports last 
year were sharply off from prior levels, less 
than 3 million bales. Anticipation of the new 
program aggravated the situation that de- 
veloped by July 31, 1966. Nevertheless, there 
is little doubt that the prior U.S. prograei 
had failed to solve some of the basic prob- 
lems of U.S. cotton marketing and had made 
others worse. 

Cotton Situation Improving 

The 1965 legislation ^ was designed to deal 
with this situation. Its aims were: to move 
cotton into trade for domestic consumption 
and export; reduce use of the CCC price- 
support loan program; reduce domestic pro- 
duction; gradually liquidate CCC stocks with 
minimum adverse effects for current produc- 
tion of our growers; reduce CCC's role in 
merchandising cotton; and make and keep 
U.S. cotton competitive with cotton from 
other exporting countries. 

The situation has improved greatly in less 
than a year. Some aspects are radically 
changed. Our own production declined 
sharply, partly as a consequence of bad 
weather but chiefly in response to the acre- 
age limitations and payments provided by 
the new law. Production was well below dis- 
appearance. Domestic consumption has risen, 

' P.L. 89-321. 

and exports have been encouraging. In the 
first 7 months of this marketing year, ex- 
ports surpassed those in the entire 1965-66 
marketing year. The carryover will show a 
shariJ decline. CCC is now practically out of 
the merchandising of the better qualities of 
cotton and prices for these types are being 
determined in the marketplace. Price differ- 
entials for less desirable qualities of cotton 
have widened, again in response to market 
demand. As a result of these developments, 
many of our cotton farmers have better in- 
comes, the CCC has lower costs, and the tax- 
payer benefits. 

The world cotton situation has also im- 
proved. Foreign production is down, foreign 
acreage declined last year by over 1 million 
acres, consumption is up, and trade is 
higher. The progress made this year suggests 
that a balance between cotton supply and 
demand is attainable. 

The increase in exports is gratifying. Fur- 
ther improvement in the level of U.S. exports 
is desirable and possible if we produce what 
the world needs. Secretary [of Agriculture 
Orville L.] Freeman expressed the hope a 
year ago that the U.S. would export at least 
17 million bales in the first 3 years of the 
program. Our record this year encourages 
hope that this expectation will materialize. 

But the progress made in this first year 
under the 1965 legislation and the improved 
world situation should not obscure the fact 
that U.S. cotton still faces some difficult prob- 
lems. Our experience this year indicates that 
there is room in the world market for addi- 
tional quantities of U.S. cotton. But our own 
production must be responsive to the market. 
There is doubt in the market that our sup- 
plies of better qualities will be sufficient to 
meet domestic and foreign demand. At the 
same time, the U.S. Government continues 
to purchase and store large amounts of 
poorer qualities, for which the demand is 

The shift in demand to longer staple 
lengths is a worldwide phenomenon. It is 
particularly challenging to U.S. producers at 



this time. The problem can be solved through 
intelligent cooperation of government, pro- 
ducers, and shippers and through further 
adjustments in our cotton program. Loan 
rate discounts and differentials that reflect 
the new market situation can be an impor- 
tant means of moving toward a better 
balance of qualities. Further adjustments 
will have to be made in our cotton support 
programs to give more elbowroom to those 
of our producers who can produce high- 
quality cotton at low cost. The increased de- 
mand for certain alternative crops, such as 
soybeans and feedgrains, should facilitate 
these adjustments. 

Need for Responsible Price Policy 

There are some who see price cutting as 
the panacea to our cotton problems. My own 
view is that attempts to dump our produc- 
tion and stocks on the world market would 
not solve our cotton problems and would be 
contrary to our overall trade objectives. 
They could only result in a serious disruption 
of world markets which would be disadvan- 
tageous to us all. I wish to make clear the 
facts and analysis that underlie this conclu- 

Cotton's prospects have been carefully ex- 
amined in a Department of Agriculture re- 
port entitled "Analysis of Factors Affecting 
U.S. Cotton Exports." The Department of 
Agriculture estimates that a 1-cent reduction 
in world cotton prices would increase free- 
world consumption of cotton by about 
135,000 bales above the trend and reduce the 
average annual growth in foreign free-world 
production by about 100,000 bales. This is a 
very rough estimate. It makes no allowance 
for future changes in the relative prices of 
the fibers that compete with cotton, nor can 
it tell us how cotton growers in less devel- 
oped countries vdll behave at different price 
levels than those that have recently been 
experienced. It points up, however, that price 
cuts cannot be expected to increase U.S. cot- 
ton exports by large amounts. Our present 
evidence suggests that even a cut in price of 

as much as 4 cents from present levels would 
not increase the volume of exports suffi- 
ciently to make up for the reduction in price. 
On the other hand, such a price reduction 
would increase the budgetary cost of our cot- 
ton program. 

A major reason for the small response to 
price cuts is the limited ability of cotton 
growers in developing countries to shift to 
other crops. Fanners in these countries do 
not have the skills, training, or capital to 
respond quickly to changes in the market; 
they cannot easily apply new techniques to 
their land and explore new market oppor- 
tunities. Such adjustments take far longer 
than they do in the United States and re- 
quire a combination of price incentives, tech- 
nical help, and capital assistance. For these 
reasons, cotton producers in foreign coun- 
tries would be forced to meet cuts in our 
prices. For the same reasons, their produc- 
tion may well continue to grow in the future, 
although at a lower rate. 

We must also consider the consequences 
for other countries of an unrestricted cotton 
price cutting policy in the United States. 
Such price cuts would seriously reduce the 
foreign exchange income of Latin American 
and other producing countries and require 
them to cut back their development effort 
under the Alliance for Progress and other 
programs which we strongly support. Fur- 
thermore, we would be charged with seeking 
to drive other producers from the market, 
not through the forces of competition but on 
the basis of government action. 

It is essential that cotton producing coun- 
tries that are presently unable to grow 
enough food to meet their own needs should 
examine whether they are making the best 
use of their agricultural resources. Those 
countries receiving food assistance from us 
have been asked to review governmental 
measures which provide undue incentives for 
the production of commercial crops in over- 
supply, such as cotton or coffee. We hope 
that uneconomic production of cotton will be 

APRIL 3, 1967 


reduced or eliminated as governments give 
higher priority to food production. 

Taking all these considerations into ac- 
count, our goal should be a price policy 
which takes account of the realities of the 
market. Cotton has become a cheaper prod- 
uct relative to the general price level. This 
price trend is a reflection of improved tech- 
nology in the production of cotton and the 
increasing competitiveness of manmade fi- 

No government should try to reverse these 
price trends. But it is not in our interest on 
the other hand that cotton — our cotton or 
that of other producing countries — be sold 
more cheaply than it need be to retain its 
markets. A price war would not be to our 
benefit or that of any other exporters. 

International Exchanges of Views 

A responsible price policy must be com- 
plemented by continuing efforts to improve 
the quality competitiveness of cotton. As I 
said earlier, much remains to be done to in- 
crease the production of high-quality cotton. 
More can be done to improve consumer ac- 
ceptance of cotton and its use. The United 
States is pleased to be one of eight major 
cotton exporting countries that have adhered 
to the International Institute for Cotton and 
its promotion program. 

Rational price policies, improvement of 
quality, promotion programs, are thus all 
necessary ingredients of a policy aiming at 
a more healthy balance of supply and de- 
mand. But all of these efforts could come to 
naught in the absence of responsible produc- 
tion policies. The United States has taken 
a major step forward under its new legisla- 
tion. But this is not a problem for the United 
States alone. Other major cotton producing 
countries must adjust their production to 
market prospects. If the world cotton econ- 
omy is to move steadily toward a healthy 
equilibrium, all major cotton producing 
countries should be prepared to submit their 
cotton policies to international scrutiny and 
to take any necessary corrective action. 

This is a good time to begin. We moved 
closer to a worldwide cotton equilibrium this 
year because production went down both in 
the United States and abroad. A continued 
increase of 1 million bales a year in world 
consumption should make it possible to 
achieve a further reduction in U.S. stocks 
and further progress toward balance be- 
tween world consumption and available sup- 
plies. But this balance can only be main- 
tained if all major producing countries 
pursue responsible production policies. 

The International Cotton Advisory Com- 
mittee has been a useful forum for the ex- 
amination of policies of member countries. 
This work should be intensified and extended 
to production plans. The Committee should 
consider more fully the consequences of 
measures its members expect to take and 
whether these actions are consistent with the 
market prospects. The Committee could also 
examine whether members who desire inter- 
national advice and assistance can be helped 
to shift resources to other types of agricul- 
tural production. 

This exchange of views could significantly 
contribute toward avoiding the excessive in- 
creases in world production that might cause 
a renewed buildup of surpluses and thereby 
confront all of us with more painful and 
costly alternatives. If, as a consequence, pro- 
duction and demand grow in rough parallel, 
we can avoid the instability of price and the 
frequent and unpredictable changes of policy 
which have imposed such severe burdens on 
cotton growers, traders, and governments of 
cotton growing countries. 

In sum, our objective in cotton, as in other 
commodities, is to promote increased con- 
sumption, trade, and income. We believe we 
can achieve this objective through increasing 
reliance on market forces. It is essential, 
however, that government actions — both in 
the United States and abroad — insure that 
the movement toward balance in the world 
cotton economy is not reversed. I am confi- 
dent that by moving in this direction we can 
meet our domestic needs in ways that are 
consistent with our responsibilities abroad. 



United States Joins Dedication 
of Jidda Desalting Plant Site 

by Stewart L. Udall 
Secretaiy of the Interior ^ 

Let me commence by again thanking the 
Minister of Agriculture [Hassan Mishari] 
for the honor extended to me and my Gov- 
ernment through his Government's invitation 
to visit Saudi Arabia and attend the dedix^a- 
tion of the Jidda desalination plant. I am 
most happy to be present at this event, which 
is of great importance both for Saudi Arabia 
and the United States. 

The decision to build this plant, which 2 
years from now will begin to supply 5 mil- 
lion gallons daily of sweet water to the city 
of Jidda, represents the culmination of a 
long series of efforts in both your country 
and mine. For centuries man has dreamed 
of converting the limitless supplies of sea 
water to meet the needs of a thirsty world, 
but until recent years the possibility of 
achieving this goal without exorbitant costs 
seemed beyond reach. Only in recent years 
has the development of new technology 
brought the goal within our grasp. 

In order to exploit new possibilities, the 
United States Congress in 1952 created the 
Office of Saline Water in the Department of 
Interior, which is under my supervision. Ex- 
perimental plants have since been con- 
structed both in the United States and 
abroad, each designed to lower the cost of 
providing sweet water through desalting. 

These developmental efforts, however, are 
not confined to the United States. Many coun- 
tries have been involved in the development 
of improved desalting technology. Our good 
friends in the United Kingdom have been 
leaders in the field. Every nation should 
place its talents in the drive to provide sweet 
water to the world's parched areas. 

In October 1965 the United States spon- 
sored the First International Symposium on 
Water Desalination, in which Saudi Arabia 
joined over 60 other nations.^ President 
Johnson announced the United States' inten- 
tion to join "a massive cooperative interna- 
tional effort to find solutions for man's water 
problems." ^ Conversations between Saudi 
Arabia and the United States at the time of 
the International Symposium led to an agree- 
ment through which the United States De- 
partment of Interior has since cooperated 
directly with the Saudi Arabian Government 
in planning the present plant now being de- 
signed and soon to be erected. 

Many persons deserve commendation for 
the efforts which have brought this project 
to the verge of realization. The Jidda de- 
salination plant is a reflection of the wise 
leadership of His Majesty King Faisal in 
his progressive program to bring peace and 
prosperity to the Saudi people. 

From personal participation in negotia- 
tions, I am familiar with the great impor- 
tance Minister Mishari has attached to this 
project and the unfailing attention which 
Prince Mohamed, as Director of the Saudi 
Saline Water Conversion Office, has given 
every step of the arrangements. Aside from 
the technical personnel of OSW, credit also 
goes to private consultants such as Jackson 
and Moreland and the engineers, Burns and 
Roe, now designing the project. The manu- 
facture of equipment and actual construc- 
tion of the plant is open to international 
bidding. This is truly a cooperative effort. 

In the long and glorious history of Saudi 
Arabia, the dedication of Jidda desalination 
plant project is sure to be remembered as a 
milestone of progress. Fresh water and elec- 
tric power to be produced here will satisfy 
the needs of Jidda's growing population for 
personal consumption and sanitation and 

' Remarks made at Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on Feb. 5 
on the occasion of the dedication of the site for the 
desalination plant for the city of Jidda. 

' For an address by Secretary Udall at the open- 
ing session of the symposium, see Bulletin of Nov. 
1, 1965, p. 716. 

' Ibid., p. 720. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


permit nourishing the area's gardens and 
livestock. The plant will also permit new- 
industries, contributing to the region's pros- 
perity. It is also important not only to this 
major city but as well to the nation of Saudi 
Arabia as a whole, for we trust the success- 
ful completion and operation of this plant 
will lead the way to similar and perhaps even 
larger plants elsewhere in this rapidly de- 
veloping country. 

This plant has another significance which 
cannot be overlooked. The people of all the 
world's arid countries are watching us to- 
day. If this project is successful, and I have 
no doubt that it will be, it will represent a 
major technical accomplishment to be stud- 
ied and adapted time and again until in the 
course of technological progress the day ar- 
rives when mankind need no longer worry 
about the terrible problems of thirst. 

For the present, however, the age-old 
problem of satisfying man's thirst and nour- 
ishing his flocks and fields remains with us. 
Concern is felt not only in desert countries. 
Even nations such as my own, once thought 
to have unlimited water resources, have come 
to realize that nature's abundance has limits. 
In the United States we find ourselves wag- 
ing constant war against the shortage of 
water in all parts of the country. The strug- 
gle is being pursued on many fronts. In 
addition to the millions of dollars which have 
been spent to develop economical means to 
purify sea water — research which has cul- 
minated in the design of this plant — other 
expenditures amounting to billions of dollars 
have been invested in dam building, irriga- 
tion, flood control, and water purification. 

Other nations increasingly are giving their 
attention to the proper management of their 
precious water resources. Your country 
wisely has concerned itself not only with the 
possibilities of desalination, as represented 
by the dedication of this site today, but also 
is engaged in dam building, irrigation and 
drainage projects, and exploration of under- 
ground water resources. 

My brief visit to Saudi Arabia will allow 
me to inspect the new water supply system 

of your capital, Riyadh, and development 
projects at al-Hasa and Qatif Oases. I regret 
time will not permit my visiting other inter- 
esting areas of your country which bear 
many significant resemblances to my own 
State of Arizona, located in the arid south- 
west of the United States where water has 
always been in short supply. 

Thus men of many nations have come to 
realize that meeting future needs requires 
the reexamination of every facet of water 
exploration and utilization, and in this effort 
the cooperation of all nations is required. 
The success of the International Symposium 
on Water Desalination which I referred to 
earlier has led President Johnson to call an 
International Conference on Water for Peace 
to be held in Washington in May 1967. This 
will permit the meeting of experts to ex- 
change information and views on the world's 
water problems and seek practical solutions 
to these problems and simultaneous consul- 
tations among government officials responsi- 
ble for conservation and development on 
means of implementing solutions. The con- 
ference will provide a forum for discussing 
water resources development, international 
cooperation to solve water problems, and 
possible establishment of a continuing world- 
wide Water for Peace program. 

I am particularly pleased that Saudi Ara- 
bia has already accepted our invitation to 
attend the conference and has promised to 
send a large delegation, headed by Minister 
Mishari and Prince Mohamad. We sincerely 
hope that through this conference Saudi 
Arabia will share with the world the knowl- 
edge it has gained through the many water 
conservation and development programs 
already initiated here and will simultane- 
ously learn through the experience of others. 

Before I left Washington to come to Jidda, 
President Johnson requested that I convey 
his warm regards and sincere congratula- 
tions to his friend King Faisal and all the 
people of Saudi Arabia. May I again add my 
own congratulations and sincere hopes for 
the success of this venture and those to fol- 
low and my compliments on the high degree 



of progress which the Saudi people have al- 
ready attained under the leadership of His 
Majesty. My Government looks forward to 
continued cooperation with the Saudi Ara- 
bian Government in achievement of peaceful 

Asian Development Bank 
Immunities Defined 


White House press release d&ted March 7 

The President on March 7 issued an Execu- 
tive order designating the Asian Development 
Bank as a public international organization 
entitled to the benefits of the International 
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945. 

Under that act, public international organi- 
zations in which the United States partici- 
pates and which have been designated by the 
President through appropriate Executive 
order are entitled to certain privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities, such as im- 
munity from suit and judicial process, im- 
munity from search and confiscation of prop- 
erty, and exemption from certain internal 
revenue, property, and other taxes. 

Notwithstanding this designation, the 
Asian Development Bank will be subject to 
legal action in cases authorized by the 
Agreement Establishing the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank. 

The order also (1) delegates to the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, acting in consultation 
with the National Advisory Council on Inter- 
national Monetary and Financial Policies, 
authority to instruct representatives of the 
United States to the Asian Development 
Bank, and (2) delegates to that Council 
authority otherwise to coordinate United 
States policies relating to the Bank. The 
responsibilities of the Secretary and the 
Council with respect to the Bank are the 
same as those previously assigned to them 
in regard to other international financial 

institutions. These assignments of author- 
ity do not derogate from the foreign policy 
responsibilities of the Secretary of State. 


Enjoyment of Certain Privileges, Exemptions, 
AND Immunities by the Asian Developement 
Bank and Coordination of United States 
Policies With Regard to the Bank 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Reor- 
ganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353), by 
section 4 of the Asian Development Bank Act, ap- 
proved March 16, 1966 (Public Law 89-369), and by 
section 1 of the International Organizations Im- 
munities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), and as 
President of the United States, it is ordered as fol- 

Section 1. (a) The Asian Development Bank, 
an organization in which the United States partici- 
pates under the authority of the Asian Development 
Bank Act, is hereby designated as a public interna- 
tional organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities conferred by the Inter- 
national Organizations Immunities Act. 

(b) The foregoing designation shall not be (1) 
deemed to abridge in any respect privileges, exemp- 
tions, and immunities which that organization may 
have acquired or may accpiire by treaty or congres- 
sional action, or (2) construed to affect in any way 
the applicability of the provisions of Article 50 of the 
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development 
Bank as adopted by the Congress in the Asian Devel- 
opment Bank Act. 

Sec. 2. Executive Order No. 11269 of February 
14, 1966, is amended as follows : 

(1) By adding at the end of section 2 the follow- 
ing new subsection : 

"(c) The Council shall perform with respect to the 
Asian Development Bank, the same functions as 
those delegated to it by subsections (a) and (b) 
of this section with respect to other international 
financial institutions." 

(2) By adding at the end of section 3 thereof the 
following new subsection : 

"(d) The Secretary of the Treasury shall perform, 
with respect to the Asian Development Bank, the 
same functions as those delegated to him by sub- 
sections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to 
other international financial institutions." 

The White House, March 7, 1967. 

' 32 Fed. Reg. 3933. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


Department Issues Public Notices 
on Travel to Restricted Areas 

On March H, the Department spokesman 
announced that notices concerning the cort/- 
tinuation of area travel restrictions for Cuba 
and the Communist-controlled areas of Viet- 
Nam, Korea, and China tvere being published 
in the Federal Register. In making the an- 
nouncement, he noted that: "There will 
no longer be restriction on travel to Albania." 

Folloiving are texts of an amendment to 
the Code of Federal Regulations on passports 
and four public notices which were published 
in the Federal Register on March 1 6. 

Amendment to Code of Federal Regulations ' 

Title 22 — Foreign Relations 

Chapter I — Department of State 

Part 51 — Passports 

Passports Invalid for Travel to Restricted Areas 

Part 51, Chapter I, Title 22, Code of Federal Regu- 
lations, section 51.72 (as corrected at 31 F.R. 13654, 
Oct. 22, 1966, and as amended at 31 F.R. 16143, Dec. 
16, 1966) is amended to read as follows : 

§ 51.72 Passports invalid for travel to restricted 

Upon determination by the Secretary that a coun- 
try or area is : 

(a) A country with which the United States is at 
war, or 

(b) A country or area where armed hostilities are 
in progress, or 

(c) A country or area to which travel must be re- 
stricted in the national interest because such travel 
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign 

U.S. passports shall cease to be valid for travel to, 
in or through such country or area unless specifically 
validated therefor. Any determination made under 
this section shall be published in the Federal Reg- 
ister along with a statement of the circumstances 
requiring the restriction. Unless limited to a shorter 
period, any such restriction shall expire at the end 
of 1 year from the date of publication of such notice 
in the Federal Register, unless extended or sooner 
revoked by the Secretary by public notice. 

Effective date. This amendment shall become effec- 
tive on March 16, 1967. 

The provisions of section 4 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238; 5 U.S.C. 1003) relative 
to notice of proposed rulemaking are inapplicable to 

this order because the regulation contained herein 
involves foreign affairs functions of the United 

(Sees. 1, 4, 44 Stat. 887, 63 Stat. Ill, as amended; 
22 U.S.C. 211a, 5 U.S.C. 161c) 
For the Secretary of State. 

Idar Rimestad, 

Deputy Under Secretary 

for Administration. 

March 14, 1967. 

Public Notice 256* 

U.S. Citizens 

Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through 

Mainland China 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), 
travel to, in, or through Mainland China is re- 
stricted as unrestricted travel to, in, or through 
Mainland China would seriously impair the conduct 
of U.S. foreign affiairs. In view of the present 
unsettled conditions within Mainland China and the 
risks and dangers which might ensue from the in- 
advertent involvement of American citizens in 
domestic disturbances, the currently applicable re- 
strictions on travel of American citizens to the 
Chinese mainland are therefore extended. 

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for 
travel to, in, or through Mainland China unless spe- 
cifically endorsed for such travel under the authority 
of the Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 
year from the date of publication in the Federal 
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by 
public notice. 

Dated: March 14, 1967. 
For the Secretary of State. 

Idar Rimestad, 
Deputy Under Secretary 
for Administration. 

Public Notice 257 

U.S. Citizens 
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through Cuba 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), 
travel to, in, or through Cuba is restricted. In view 
of the declared hostility of the Cuban government to 
the United States and other democratic governments 
of the Western Hemisphere and the avowed policy 
of that government to promote terrorism and subver- 
sion in Latin America, unrestricted travel to, in, or 
through Cuba would seriously impair the conduct 

' 32 Fed. Reg. 4122. 

' 32 Fed. Reg. 4140. 



of U.S. foreign affairs. It would be incompatible with 
the resolutions adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Con- 
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Or- 
ganization of American States, of which the United 
States is a member. At this meeting, held in Wash- 
ington from July 21-26, 1964, it was resolved that 
the governments of the American states not main- 
tain diplomatic, consular, trade, or shipping rela- 
tions with Cuba under its present government. 
Among other things, this policy of isolating Cuba 
was intended to minimize the capability of the Castro 
government to carry out its openly proclaimed pro- 
grams of subversive activities in the Hemisphere. 

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for 
travel to, in, or through Cuba unless specifically 
endorsed for such travel under the authority of 
the Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 
year from the date of publication in the Federal 
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by 
public notice. 

Public notice 179, 26 F.R. 492, promulgated Janu- 
ary 16, 19161, is hereby canceled. 

Dated: March 14, 1967. 
For the Secretary of State. 

Idar Rimestad, 

Deputy Under Secretary 

for Administration. 

Public Notice 258° 

U.S. Citizens 

Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through 

North Korea 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel 
to, in, or through North Korea is restricted as un- 
restricted travel to, in, or through North Korea 
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreigfn 
affairs. In view of the dangerous tensions in the Far 
East, the expressed and virulent hostility of the 
North Korean regime toward the United States, the 
continued recurrence of incidents along the military 
demarcation line, and the special position of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Korea which is recog- 
nized by resolution of the United Nations General 
Assembly as the only lawful government in Korea, 
the Department of State believes that wholly unre- 
stricted travel by American citizens to North Korea 
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign 

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for 
travel to, in, or through North Korea unless specifi- 
cally endorsed for such travel under the authority of 
the Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 
year from the date of publication in the Federal 

• 32 Fed. Reg. 4140. 

Register unless extended or sooner revoked by 
public notice. 

Dated: March 14, 1967. 
For the Secretary of State. 

Idar Rimestad, 

Deputy Under Secretary 

for Administration. 

Public Notice 259^ 

U.S. Citizens 

Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through 

North Viet-Nam 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(b), 
travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam is restricted 
as this is "a country or area where armed hostilities 
are in progress". 

Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for 
travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam unless spe- 
cifically endorsed for such travel under the authority 
of the Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire at the end of 1 
year from the date of publication in the Federal 
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by 
public notice. 

Dated: March 14, 1967. 
For the Secretary of State. 

Idar Rimestad, 

Deputy Under Secretary 

for Administration. 

Foreign Policy Conference 
Held at Philadelphia 

The Department of State announced on 
March 18 (press release 59 dated March 17) 
that Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to 
the Council of the Organization of American 
States, would be the principal speaker in a 
tri-State foreign policy conference at Phila- 
delphia, Pa., on March 30. The conference, 
jointly sponsored by the Department of State 
and the World Affairs Council of Philadel- 
phia, had the cooperation of more than 25 
other State and community organizations in 
the area. It was attended by several hundred 
civic and community leaders and news media 
representatives from Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Delaware, and the city of Baltimore. 

Other State Department officers scheduled 
to participate were: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 

APRIL 3, 1967 


Member, Policy Planning Council; David H. 
Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for In- 
ternational Organization Affairs; Philander 
P. Claxton, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of State for Population Matters; John Hol- 
dridge, Deputy Director, Office of Research 

and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific; 
and Frederick W. Flott, Foreign Service offi- 
cer (formerly Special Assistant to Ambassa- 
dor Lodge in Saigon). Mrs. Charlotte Moton 
Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs, was the conference moderator. 


U.S. Participation in the U.N. 
During 1965 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson transmitting to the Con- 
gress the 20th annual report on U.S. par- 
ticipation in the United Nations.^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am submitting herewith the twentieth 
annual report on United States participation 
in the United Nations, covering calendar 
year 1965. 

That year gave new evidence of our coun- 
try's vigorous commitment to the world or- 
ganization, and to the cause of peace which 
it serves. All of the American efforts re- 
corded here — whether political, economic, so- 
cial, legal or administrative — were designed 
solely to further that commitment. 

The whole world shared our grief when 
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson died in Lon- 
don on July 14, 1965. The respect and affec- 
tion in which he was held, and the world's 
gratitude for his contributions to the United 
Nations, found expression in messages from 
officials and leaders around the globe, and in 
the rare tribute of a memorial meeting in the 
General Assembly hall at the United Nations. 

One measure of a nation's regard for the 

' U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the 
President to the Congress for the Year 1965 (H. Doc. 
458, 89th Cong., 2d sess.) ; Department of State pub- 
lication 8137, for sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20402 ($2.00). 

United Nations is the quality of representa- 
tives it sends to the Organization. Accord- 
ingly, I asked Arthur J. Goldberg to leave 
the Supreme Court of the United States and 
to succeed Ambassador Stevenson as our 
Permanent Representative to the United Na- 

Ambassador Goldberg's first important 
task was to help end the paralysis suffered 
by the General Assembly in 1964 as a result 
of the U.N. constitutional crisis. It had be- 
come clear that the membership as a whole 
was not prepared to apply the penalty pro- 
vided by Article 19 of the Charter — loss of 
vote in the Assembly for those more than 
two years in arrears — to those members who 
had refused to contribute their assessed 
shares of certain peacekeeping operations. 
On August 16, Ambassador Goldberg an- 
nounced that the United States would not 
seek to frustrate the evident desire of many 
members that the General Assembly should 
proceed normally. At the same time, he made 
it clear that the United States reserved the 
same option to make exceptions to collective 
financing assessments in the future. 

The consensus reached by the General As- 
sembly included agreement that the Orga- 
nization's financial difficulties should be 
solved through voluntary contributions, par- 
ticularly from those delinquent in their pay- 
ments. A few nations contributed, but those 
furthest in arrears did not. The financial 
condition of the United Nations thus re- 
mained precarious. 

During 1965, the Security Council made 



a major contribution to international peace 
by lialting the hostilities between India and 
Pakistan arising from the Kashmir dispute. 
In thus arresting a full-scale war on the sub- 
continent, the Organization prevented untold 
tragedy in Asia — and proved anew its value 
as an instrument for peace. 

United Nations peace forces and truce su- 
pervisors continued to stand guard through- 
out 1965 in Cyprus, in Kashmir, in Korea, 
and along the troubled borders of Israel. The 
Security Council also dispatched United Na- 
tions representatives and observers to the 
Dominican Republic during the disorders 
there; but the primacy of the Organization 
of American States in dealing successfully 
with this regional problem, in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter, remained 

During the year, concrete steps toward 
disarmament were again strongly urged 
from all quarters, although progress proved 
disappointingly slow; the serious problems of 
race relations and colonialism in Southern 
Africa were also a cause of increasing de- 
bate and concern; and the United Nations 
and its members were repeatedly urged by 
the United States to join in the search for 
peace in Viet-Nam. 

In my speech in San Francisco on June 25, 
1965 2 — the Twentieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations — I called upon its members 
to use all their influence, individually and 
collectively, to bring to the negotiating table 
those who seemed determined to continue the 
conflict. Ambassador Goldberg addressed 
similar appeals to United Nations members. 
Indeed, in his first official communication as 
U.S. Representative, a letter to the Security 
Council President on July 30, 1965,^ Ambas- 
sador Goldberg recalled the legitimate inter- 
est of the Security Council in the peace of 
Southeast Asia and asserted that "The 
United States stands ready, as it has in the 
past, to collaborate unconditionally with 
members of the Security Council in the 
search for an acceptable formula to restore 

peace and security to that area of the world." 
Unfortunately, these initiatives produced 
no affirmative response from those support- 
ing the aggression against South Viet-Nam. 
Two suspensions of the bombing of North 
Viet-Nam during the year were no more suc- 
cessful in opening the path to honorable ne- 
gotiations. The tragic conflict continues un- 
abated in Viet-Nam. But we are continuing 
• our efforts untiringly to seek a peaceful set- 
tlement of this issue through the United Na- 
tions and all other channels. This was the 
key issue dealt with in Ambassador Gold- 
berg's statement to the twenty-first General 
Assembly in the general debate in September 

The year 1965 marked the mid-point of the 
United Nations Development Decade. It was 
a year of sober assessment. Despite substan- 
tial progress in some areas, it was clear that 
in most of the more than one hundred coun- 
tries with per capita incomes of less than 
$200, economic growth had been largely 
swallowed up by the mounting tide of popu- 
lation growth. Multilateral programs of aid, 
trade, and investment, although substantial 
in absolute terms, are not sufficient — even 
when combined with all the other large pro- 
grams, public and private — to narrow the 
"development gap." 

This discouraging assessment stimulated 
new efforts to cope wth development prob- 

— The newly created U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development began its search for 
new trade patterns and practices which 
would benefit the developing countries. 

— The establishment of a new U.N. Orga- 
nization for Industrial Development was ap- 
proved by the General Assembly. 

— The U.N. Development Program was 
established by merger of the U.N. Expanded 
Program of Technical Assistance and the 
Special Fund. The United States had worked 
long and hard for the integration of these 
two major U.N. operational programs in or- 
der to permit better planning and more ef- 
fective use of resources. 

' For text, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 98. 
» For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278. 

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


— Foundations were laid for the new 
Asian Development Bank with a capitaliza- 
tion of $1 billion, including a $200 million 
subscription by the United States. It prom- 
ises to be one of the most effective agencies 
for the financing of economic and social de- 
velopment in Asia. 

— A new African Development Bank, de- 
signed to play a similar role in Africa, 
opened for business. 

Through these and other instrumentali- 
ties, our delegations in U.N. agencies have 
given leadership and positive support to ma- 
jor goals in the struggle for a better life: 
more food production; assistance in volun- 
tary family planning; the training of skilled 
manpower; development of transport and 
communications; fuller utilization of natural 
resources; and increased application of sci- 
ence and technology. 

The year 1965 had been designated Inter- 
national Cooperation Year (ICY) by the 
U.N. General Assembly, and U.N. members 
were urged to commemorate it in appropri- 
ate ways. The culmination of the American 
celebration was a White House Conference 
attended by more than 5,000 distinguished 
Americans — leaders in their communities, in 
business and industry, in educational and la- 
bor organizations, in the arts and sciences, 
and in the professions.^ The Conference dis- 
cussed reports on international cooperation 
in agriculture, atomic energy, disarmament, 
health, the welfare of women and youth, and 
many other fields. Many of its recommenda- 
tions have already been put into effect. 
Others are being thoroughly evaluated by a 
special White House Committee which will 
shortly submit its report to me. 

Public support for the United Nations con- 
tinued at a high level as the Organization 
approached its twenty-first anniversary. 
Most thoughtful people know that the 

° Two special issues of the Bulletin were devoted 
exclusively to International Cooperation Year: for 
articles by chairmen of the ICY Cabinet committees, 
see ibid., Sept. 6, 1965 ; for articles by senior govern- 
ment consultants to the citizens' committees, see ibid., 
Nov. 22, 1965. 

United Nations is a far from perfect orga- 
nization, in a far from perfect world. Yet 
they also recognize that it and its specialized 
agencies are the best system yet devised for 
sovereign nations to work together with 
equality and self-respect. 

Our investment in the United Nations, and 
its various agencies and special programs, 
supplements other activities undertaken to 
preserve, protect, or promote a wide range 
of national interests. Above all, our commit- 
ment to the United Nations is an expression 
of faith which has illumined the entire his- 
tory of our country: a faith that the creative 
powers of democracy and human reason can 
overcome the evils of tyranny and violence. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, March 9, 1967. 

1966 International Negotiations 
for Arms Control and Disarmament 

Following is President Johnson's letter of 
February 17 transmitting to the Congress 
the United States Arms Control and Disar- 
mament Agency's sixth annual report, cover- 
ing the period January 1-December 31, 
1966, '^ together with the portion of the re- 
port entitled "International Negotiations." 


To the Congress of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith the Sixth An- 
nual Report of the Arms Control and Dis- 
armament Agency. I do so with considerable 
satisfaction, since this year has seen signifi- 
cant progress in this Nation's 20-year effort 
to bring under control the armaments which 
are the product of man's 20th-century in- 

In 1966 a significant link was added to the 
still slender chain of aiTns control agree- 

' H. Doc. 58, 90th Cong., 1st sess. Single copies of 
the report are available upon request from the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20451. 



ments — a treaty banning weapons of mass 
destruction in outer space and on celestial 
bodies.^ Its significance will grow as our 
mastery of space grows, and our children 
will remark the %visdom of this agreement 
to a greater degree than the present state of 
our own knowledge quite permits today. 

The past year has also brought us close to 
another agreement, one of even greater im- 
mediacy — a treaty to prevent the further 
spread of nuclear weapons here on earth. 
Our hopes are high that this long effort will 
soon be crowned with success. 

The United States has been trying to pre- 
vent the prohferation of nuclear weapons 
since 1946. At that time Bernard Baruch, 
speaking for the United States at the United 
Nations, said "If we fail we have damned 
every man to be the slave of fear." It is true 
that we failed then, but we did not become 
the "slaves of fear"; instead we persisted. 
' In the Arms Control and Disarmament Act 
I of 1961, Congress decreed that the search 
for ways to save succeeding generations 
I from the scourge of war should become a 
matter of first emphasis for the United 
States Government. The establishment of an 
independent Agency to work out ways to 
bring the arms race under control was the 
act of a rational people who refused to sub- 
mit to the fearful implications of the nuclear 

Several things are evident from a reading 
of this report. The first is that we are suc- 
ceeding, after a few short years, in develop- 
ing an integrated and highly expert attack 
on the problem of arms control and disarma- 
ment. Our security has two faces — strength 
and restraint; arms and arms control. We 
have come to the point where our thinking 
about weapons is paralleled by our thinking 
about how to control them. The Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament Agency plays a cen- 
tral role in this development. 

The second is that despite the magnitude 
and complexity of armament imposed on the 
world by the cold war, the problem can be 
made to yield to imagination and determina- 

• For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953. 

"tion, so that now we might legitimately be- 
gin to count up the score: we have cut down 
the danger of "accidental war" with the hot 
line, curtailed the injection of radioactive 
waste into the atmosphere with the limited 
test ban treaty, and joined in strengthening 
the system of safeguards designed by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to close 
one of the doors to nuclear weapons. 

The United States has anticipated the fu- 
ture by putting all of Antarctica, and more 
recently outer space, off limits to weapons of 
mass destruction. Nonarmament is easier 
than disarmament, and in these terms alone, 
the value of these latter treaties cannot be 
overestimated. In addition, however, we 
should not overlook the significance of this 
approach to the problems in arms control we 
face right now. A treaty to prevent the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons will have this 
same preventive element — without it we face 
the prospect of a world in which more than 
a dozen nations will possess nuclear weap- 
ons. If our hopes for success in a treaty are 
realized, the chances for still further agree- 
ments will be greatly enhanced. These next 
steps will also be more difficult, because they 
must involve the weapons we might other- 
wise add to our arsenals, or even those now 
on hand. 

This brings me to my last observation, 
which is that this report reveals the sobering 
reality of the immensity of the task we have 
undertaken. Read in the context of recent 
developments in the Soviet Union — the 
buildup of their strategic forces and the de- 
ployment of an anti-ballistic missile system 
around Moscow — we are reminded that our 
hard-won accomplishments can be swept 
away overnight by still another costly and 
futile escalation of the arms race. 

It is my belief that the United States and 
the Soviet Union have reached a watershed 
in the dispiriting history of our arms com- 
petition. Decisions may be made on both 
sides which will trigger another upward 
spiral. The paradox is that this should be 
happening at a time when there is abundant 
evidence that our mutual antagonism is be- 

APRIL 3, 1967 


ginning to ease. I am determined to use all 
the resources at my command to encourage 
the reduction in tension that is in our mutual 
interest, and to avoid a further, mutually- 
defeating buildup. The work of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency will con- 
tinue to be of invaluable assistance in this 
urgent task. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, February 17, 1967. 

excerpt from annual report 

International Negotiations 

We are in the midst of a ^eat transition, a 
transition from narrow nationalism to international 
partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war 
to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a 
troubled and threatened planet. . . . We are shap- 
ing a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear 
affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in 
trade negotiations, in political consultation and in 
working together with the governments and peoples 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.^ 

In 1966, the United States sent its emissaries to 
almost every capital of the world in an effort to 
find ways to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. 
In parallel to that effort, American disaiTnament 
negotiators intensified their activities — in Geneva, 
New York, Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris 
— at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee 
(ENDC) ," at the 21st session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, in consultation vvdth our allies 
and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union. 

The ENDC reconvened on January 27, 1966, and 

' For text of President Johnson's state of the 
Union message on Jan. 10, see ihid., Jan. 30, 1967, 
p. 158. 

■* The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disamnament 
will enter its sixth year on February 21, 1967. The 
Committee, which meets at the Palais des Nations 
in Geneva, was established under a joint U.S.- 
U.S.S.R. agreement and welcomed by the General 
Assembly. While it is not a United Nations body, 
it reports to the General Assembly and the Dis- 
armament Commission and is serviced by the U.N. 
Secretariat. Membership is made up of five NATO 
nations (United States, Canada, Italy, United King- 
dom, and France; the last has never taken her seat 
at the conference table), five from the Warsaw 
Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, 
and U.S.S.R.), and eight non-aligned nations (Bra- 
zil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Swe- 
den, and United Arab Republic). [Footnote in 

received a message from President Johnson," who 
pledged the United States to "continue to pursue 
every avenue for stable peace." That effort, he said, 
"has no more important set of goals than those of 
disarmament, which are the business of this con- 

As the year went on, hopes for success on two 
major arms control agreements brightened per- 
ceptibly. It was clear that at least one of them — 
a treaty governing activities in outer space and on 
celestial bodies — would be achieved. The other — a* 
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 
— was moving closer to accord. 


The negotiations at Geneva were dominated by 
the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weap- 
ons. As the conference convened, the U.S. draft 
treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to 
nations not now possessing them (presented in the 
previous ENDC session, on August 17, 1965) lay 
on the table.^ The Soviet Union had submitted its 
draft to the United Nations General Assembly on 
September 24, 1965. This document was subse- 
quently presented to the ENDC on January 27, 1966. 

The first principle of a non-proliferation treaty, 
enunciated in the U.N. resolution adopted over- 
whelmingly in November of 1965, is that it should 
contain no "loopholes which might permit nuclear 
or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or in- 
directly, nuclear weapons in any form." ' Early in 
the 1966 session of the ENDC, ACDA Director Wil- 
liam C. Foster restated the President's pledge: ' 

We are prepared to work with other countries 
to assure that no non-nuclear country acquires 
its own nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself 
to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in 
manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are 
prepared to agree that these things should not be 
done directly or indirectly, through third countries 
or groups of countries, or through units of the 
armed forces or military personnel under any mili- 
tary alliance. 

In an attempt to show a spirit of flexibility and 
to make its treaty language more precise, the United 
States, on March 22, 1966, tabled amendments to 
Articles I, II, and IV of the U.S. draft treaty.' 

* For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263. 

« For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474. 

' For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, 
see ihid., Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873. 

' For text of President Johnson's message to the 
1966 session of the ENDC, see ibid., Feb. 21, 1966, 
p. 263. 

° For texts of a U.S. statement and the amend- 
ments, see ihid., Apr. 25, 1966, p. 675. 



The amendments were intended to clarify and em- 
phasize the Western view that collective defense 
arrang'ements would not violate the principle of non- 
proliferation. The determined intention of the 
United States not to relinquish its veto over the 
use of U.S. weapons was stressed repeatedly in 
the conference debate. As Mr. Foster put it — 

... no one — I repeat, no one — will be able to fire 

United States weapons unless the United States 

decides that they are to be fired. This is the situ- 

i ation which now obtains, and we have no intention 

whatsoever of changing it. 

In March, the Soviet Union transferred its long- 
time chief delegate to the ENDC, Semyon K. 
Tsarapkin, to the post of Ambassador to Germany. 
I He was replaced by Alexei A. Roshchin, who in the 
following months mounted a concentrated, closely- 
reasoned attack on the U.S. draft treaty. The Soviet 
views were presented in a manner relatively free 
of polemic, except for the now familiar vituperation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their central 
target was those provisions of the treaty which 
they claimed would permit West German "access" 
to or control over nuclear weapons through partici- 
pation in NATO defense arrangements. They dis- 
missed as irrelevant U.S. insistence that Soviet fears 
about nuclear weapons in the Western alliance 
were groundless because of firm U.S. retention of its 
veto over the use of such weapons. The U.S. treaty, 
contended Ambassador Roshchin, would lead to pro- 
liferation so long as it allowed for access through 
co-ownership or co-possession of nuclear weapons by 
NATO countries through such schemes as the pro- 
posed multilateral force. The U.S. approach to the 
treaty, he argued, did not really bar dissemination; 
it only retained a veto on the use of nuclear weap- 
ons by non-nuclear-weapon states. The U.S. response 
was a vigorous defense of its treaty draft, and a 
serious attempt at persuasion; the debate provided, 
in consequence, an illuminating clarification and ex- 
position of the position of the two sides rarely 
matched in the conference's open debate. 

The debate made clear that resolution of U.S.- 
Soviet differences would involve a long and arduous 
negotiation. In the hope of some tangible, short- 
term progress, Western representatives urged the 
conference to begin work on the less difficult as- 
pects of the treaty drafts. The Italian delegation 
suggested the adoption of a partially agreed text, 
and the Canadians submitted a working paper set- 
ting forth the two drafts article by article in 
parallel columns. The Soviets, however, resisted this 
approach, and insisted on sticking to the central 
point at issue. The United States, during the re- 
mainder of the session, proceeded on its own to 
raise other substantive questions; one of them was 
the safeguards provision, another the necessity for 
making sure a non-proliferation treaty did not con- 
tain a loophole permitting nuclear explosions under 

the guise of peaceful experiments. 

The ENDC adjourned on August 25, without any 
agreement between the United States and the So- 
viet Union. Nonetheless, there was an atmosphere 
of hope and expectation among the delegates, en- 
gendered in part by the depth and seriousness with 
which the major elements in the draft treaties 
had been considered. President Johnson's announced 
intention to renew his search for an "acceptable 
compromise" in "language which we can both live 
with," " signalled a new phase in the negotiation. 
Privately, the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen were 
beginning intensive talks in Geneva. 

These talks were resumed during the period of 
the disarmament debate in the 21st United Nations 
General Assembly, which convened in New York 
on September 20. On September 23, Soviet Foreig^n 
Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko, in a speech before 
the General Assembly, proposed as an additional 
item for the U.N. agenda the "renunciation of ac- 
tions hampering a non-proliferation agreement." 
The Soviet Union, in commenting on the resolution, 
implied that plans for NATO nuclear defenses might 
"hinder" agreement on a treaty. The United States 
announced that while it could not support such an 
argument, it would support the resolution and, in 
fact, co-sponsored it. 

The resolution was subsequently adopted by the 
U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 110 to 1 (Al- 
bania) with Cuba abstaining." The affirmative vote 
included France, and marks the first time in recent 
years that France has voted as favoring efforts to 
halt the spread of nuclear weapons. 

Formal debate on non-proliferation was completed 
in the First Committee on November 10, with the 
adoption of a resolution, proposed by the eight non- 
aligned members of the ENDC, which remanded the 
question to the ENDC. The United States supported 
this resolution on the grounds that the Geneva con- 
ference was the proper forum for the negotiation. 

Informal discussions, however, continued through- 
out the remainder of the year. Following talks in 
New York and Washington between Secretary Rusk 
and Foreign Minister Gromyko in early October, Mr. 
Foster and Soviet Ambassador to the ENDC A. A. 
Roshchin continued bilateral talks in New York. The 
Soviets abandoned their earlier resistance to con- 
sidering other than the central point of disagree- 
ment, and in consequence considerable "underbrush" 
has been cleared away by the talks. At the year's 
end, there still remained important points to be 
resolved, but the outlook was more encouraging 
than at any time since the two draft treaties were 

"At a White House news conference on July 5, 

" For text of A/RES/2149 (XXI) adopted Nov. 
4, 1966, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966, p. 902. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


International Safeguards 

A key element in U.S. efforts to curb the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment 
of safeguards against the diversion of peaceful nu- 
clear resources to military purposes. Nuclear reac- 
tors which produce electrical power are now in 
operation or under construction in 51 countries. 
These reactors produce a complicating byproduct 
— Plutonium, a fissionable material which can be 
chemically separated and used in the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons. 

Although most countries have openly expressed a 
reluctance to undertake the economic, military, and 
political consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons, 
pressure to do so can arise from suspicions that 
neighbor or rival states might clandestinely produce 
them. If such suspicions can be dispelled, an impor- 
tant incentive for nuclear proliferation will be re- 
moved. A system of international safeguards, such 
as that developed by the International Atomic En- 
ergy Agency (IAEA), provides the most effective 
assurance that peaceful nuclear programs are truly 
peaceful. To underline its own conviction that this 
is so, the United States is transferring its bilateral 
agreements to the jurisdiction of the international 
agency. In addition, we have recommended that all 
non-nuclear-weapon states accept IAEA safeguards 
or an equivalent system on their nuclear activities, 
so as to assure their neighbors that they are not 
secretly developing nuclear weapons, and to receive 
like assurance in return. 

The United States — even though a nuclear power 
— has voluntarily placed several of its reactors un- 
der IAEA safeguards in order to show its strong 
support for the system and to prove that the inspec- 
tion procedures are not burdensome or intrusive. 
The United Kingdom has followed the U.S. example. 
In order to offset an apparent imbalance, which 
some of the non-nuclear-weapon states have felt to 
be unjust, the United States proposed (on July 28 
at the ENDC)" that all states undertake not to 
export any source or fissionable material or spe- 
cialized equipment to any other state for peaceful 
purposes except under IAEA or equivalent interna- 
tional safeguards. Thus, in the transfer of fission- 
able materials and equipment between states, the 
nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon 
states receive like treatment in the control of inter- 
national traffic in nuclear materials. 

The question of international safeguards was dis- 
cussed further at the United Nations 21st General 
Assembly. In a statement to the First Committee on 
November 9," Mr. Foster commended the several 
proposals, made during the annual General Confer- 
ence of the IAEA held in Vienna in October, to 
widen the coverage of IAEA safeguards, including 

" Ibid., Aug. 22, 1966, p. 281. 
■^ Ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 930. 

that made by Norway that a state not producing 
nuclear weapons invite the IAEA to safeguard its 
entire nuclear program. In welcoming this proposal, 
Mr. Foster pointed out that it would "go a long way 
toward reducing the grave threat of nuclear prolif- 
eration." He also called attention — as worthy of 
serious consideration — to the offer made by Poland 
and Czechoslovakia at the IAEA Conference to place 
their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards pro- 
vided the Federal Republic of Germany did the same. 
Czechoslovakia is completing its first power reactor; 
Poland, which operates three research reactors, does 
not plan to build a power reactor until sometime 
in the 1970's. Mr. Foster pointed out that while the 
Federal Republic of Germany (which has 28 re- 
search reactors and 12 power reactors in operation, 
under construction or planned) already has placed 
its activities under European Atomic Energy Com- 
munity (EURATOM) safeguards, the West Ger- 
mans were themselves "giving the proposal serious 
consideration, as evidenced by the statement issued 
on 26 October by the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany." 

On November 22, the Director-General of the 
IAEA, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, addressed the U.N. 
General Assembly. He traced the phenomenal 
growth of nuclear energy as a source of electrical 
power and forecast the remarkable ways in which 
developing countries can use nuclear science to help 
solve such serious problems as the growing gap be- 
tween the world's population and its food and water 
supplies. But he also warned that the growth and 
spread of nuclear power represented a potential 
threat if measures were not taken to insure that its 
use is limited to peaceful activities. He reported on 
the progress made since the IAEA safeguards sys- 
tem was first adopted in 1961 — progress in expanded 
application and in acceptance by additional coun- 
tries. He cited as particularly encouraging the pro- 
posal made by Poland and Czechoslovakia. 

Security Guarantees to Non- Nuclear- Weapon 

The question of assurance of another kind was 
also introduced in both the ENDC and U.N. discus- 
sions: that of some form of guarantee for the se- 
curity of non-nuclear-weapon states who commit 
themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. In his 
message to the opening of the Geneva conference on 
January 27 President Johnson reaffirmed his pledge 
that "nations that do not seek the nuclear path 
can be sure that they will have our strong support 
against threats of nuclear blackmail." This pledge 
has been reaffirmed on many occasions, most re- 
cently by President Johnson when the Chinese Com- 
munists exploded their fourth nuclear test during 
his 1966 Asian journey. Soviet Premier [Aleksei N.] 
Kosygin offered to include a clause in the U.S.S.R.'s 
original draft treaty "prohibiting the use of nuclear 



■weapons against non-nuclear Powers parties to the 
treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their ter- 
ritory." No amendment was offered by the Soviet 
(delegate, however, during the 1966 sessions of the 
■Geneva conference. Western delegations, particularly 
the Canadian, questioned how the concept of effec- 
tive nuclear guarantees could be incorporated in a 
non-proliferation treaty. The non-aligned members 
of the ENDC found both President Johnson's state- 
ment and the Kosygin proposal attractive and sug- 
gested that the question be explored further. 

The 21st U.N. General Assembly remanded the 
question of non-proliferation to the ENDC in a 
resolution drafted by the eight non-aligned members 
of the Committee." This resolution (adopted by a 
vote of 97 to 2, with 3 abstentions) contained an 
operative paragraph dealing with security guaran- 
tees for non-nuclear-weapon states which do not 
possess nuclear weapons (i.e., the Kosygin proposal) 
and any other proposals for solving this problem. 
Although voting for the resolution itself, the United 
States abstained from voting on this operative 
paragraph on the grounds that it cited a specific 
non-use formula for ENDC consideration while fail- 
ing to give similar treatment to other suggestions 
which had been made for dealing with the problem 
of assistance to a non-nuclear victim of nuclear 
threats or aggrression. 

Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes 

At Geneva, on August 9, ACDA Deputy Director 
Adrian S. Fisher raised a question about the draft 
treaties to which little attention had been previously 
directed.'^ He pointed out that a non-proliferation 
treaty would not be completely effective if it per- 
mitted the development of nuclear-explosive devices 
for any purpose, however innocently intended for 
peaceful use they might be. The "inescapable tech- 
nological fact," he pointed out, is that a nuclear- 
I explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can 
be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for 
military use; the technology of making nuclear- 
explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially 
the same as that for making nuclear weapons. 

As a means of resolving the dilemma posed by 
a prohibition on peaceful explosions by non-nuclear 
states, the United States suggested that "if and 
when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives 
that are permissible under test ban treaty limita- 
tions prove technically and economically feasible, 
nuclear-weapon states should make available to other 
states nuclear explosive services for peaceful appli- 
cations." A nuclear-weapon state would provide the 
desired nuclear detonation under appropriate inter- 
national observation, with the nuclear device re- 

' Ibid., p. 936. 

' Ibid., Sept. 5, 1966, p. 351. 

maining in the custody and under the control of the 
country performing the service. Such a service, Mr. 
Fisher suggested, could be provided at a cost to the 
recipient state far below that at which they could 
develop and produce such devices for themselves. 
Canada, rich in nuclear knowledge and natural 
resources requiring development, nevertheless 
promptly disclaimed "any intention to develop its 
own capacity to conduct peaceful nuclear explo- 

The Canadian delegate supported the U.S. pro- 
posal, saying: 

In our view, the development by a non-nuclear- 
weapon State of the capacity to conduct a nuclear 
explosion even though it is designed for peaceful 
purposes would, in effect, constitute proliferation, 
and proliferation is a development to which the 
Canadian Government has repeatedly declared its 

In addition to the proliferation aspect, he pointed 
out the tremendous cost in terms of resources and 
manpower which would be involved in developing 
a nuclear device to carry out an explosion for peace- 
ful purposes. 

Balanced Obligations 

Throughout the discussions in both the ENDC 
and the U.N. General Assembly, delegates repre- 
senting non-nuclear-weapon states expressed their 
conviction that "a non-proliferation treaty should be 
coupled with, or followed by, tangible steps to halt 
the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce, and 
eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the 
means of their delivery." This concept was formally 
presented by the non-aligned eight in a memoran- 
dum to the ENDC during the 1965 session and was 
reiterated in their memorandum of August 19, 1966. 

With respect to the treaty itself, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union take the position that 
it should be a simple undertaking on the part of 
nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear 
weapons to states not now possessing them, and a 
corresponding commitment on the part of non- 
nuclear-weapon states not to acquire them. The 
feeling on both sides appeared to be that the pros- 
pects for agreement should not be jeopardized by 
the complications of additional arms control meas- 

The United States has long recognized, however, 
that other measures must be diligently pursued to 
control and reduce the dangers of the nuclear arms 
race. It views a non-proliferation treaty as the 
logical next step. Once agreement is reached, the 
way will be paved for further agreements. The 
United States believes that in addition to calling on 
non-nuclear-weapon states to give up the option of 
acquiring nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states 
should take positive action to curb their own nu- 
clear arsenals. It has tabled a number of proposals 

APRIL 3, 1967 


to this end — the extension of the test ban treaty, a 
cutoff in fissionable materials production, a "freeze" 
on the numbers of offensive and defensive missiles. 

Extension of the Limited Test Ban 

The U.S. proposal to extend the limited test ban, 
(which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, 
under water, or in outer space) '^ to underground 
tests is important to the control of proliferation. 
The primary obstacle to reaching agreement has 
been the inability to agree with the Soviet Union 
about what constitutes adequate verification. 

In the arms control context, the term "verifica- 
tion" refers to the process by which a nation as- 
sures itself that its security is not being jeopardized 
as a result of another nation's violations of an 
agreement. Without adequate verification, mutual 
suspicions vsdll tend to grow to the point where 
failure of the agreement is likely. The Soviet Union 
remains adamant in its refusal to permit inspection 
on its territory. 

The science of seismology has advanced to the 
point where larger seismic events — those which reg- 
ister 4.75 or above on the Richter magnitude scale 
— can usually be identified by instruments outside 
the country as either earthquakes or man-made ex- 
plosions. Despite recent technological improvements, 
however, difficulty still arises with the smaller seis- 
mic events, most of which can be detected but not 
identified with a sufficiently high degree of confi- 

The idea of extending the limited test ban treaty 
to cover underground tests above a certain "thresh- 
old" was first advanced by the Brazilian delegate, 
in 1963, who suggested a seismic magnitude of 4.75, 
and has been favorably regarded by other ENDC 
members since. At the 1965 session of the ENDC, 
the United Arab Republic renewed its previous pro- 
posals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all 
other tests, and scientific and technical discussions 
on problems of detection and identification. The 
United States rejected this idea on the grounds 
that it would constitute, in effect, an uninspected 
test ban. Variations on the "threshold" concept were 
discussed by ENDC members during the 1966 ses- 

Two conferences held outside the ENDC provided 
topics for discussion of a test ban. At a conference 
of non-nuclear powers in Sweden it was agreed to 
set up a "nuclear detection club" for the exchange 
of seismic information. At a meeting in Scar- 
borough, Canada," a proposal was made for a sus- 
pension, for a trial period, of all nuclear tests. The 
suspension would be policed by a system of "verifi- 
cation by challenge." Under this procedure, a coun- 
try suspecting another country of conducting a test 
would ask the latter to supply information on the 
suspicious event. If the challenged country did not 


provide a satisfactory explanation, and did not per- 
mit inspection, the challenging country could with- 
draw from the undertaking not to test. 

The desire to find a way out of the verification 
impasse was felt very strongly by the non-aligned 
members of the ENDC, and this desire was shared 
wholeheartedly by the United States. The various 
ideas and suggestions put forth for a solution are 
appealing, and the United States has given the 
most careful consideration to them. U.S. negotiators 
have pointed out, however, that these various ap- 
proaches leave many problems unsolved. 

The United States has spent large sums in re- 
search in an effort to improve techniques for seis- 
mic detection and identification. Improvements in 
capabilities have been achieved, but there still re- 
mains a level at which the United States believes 
militarily significant nuclear tests can be carried 
out underground without being identified as such 
by national means alone; it has therefore continued 
to insist that some on-site inspection is necessary 
to police a comprehensive test ban. 

The technical facts as set forth by the United 
States have been generally accepted. But it has 
been argued that they lead directly to a political 
question; namely, how much risk can be tolerated 
in relying on instruments alone to determine if 
nuclear-weapons tests are taking place. It is the 
U.S. position that banning underground tests with- 
out adequate verification is not consistent with U.S. 
security interests; that in addition the occurrence 
of unresolved suspicious events wiU generate mis- 
trust and new tensions. The "challenge" idea, at- 
tractive in many ways, raises just such questions. 
In a statement to the E'NDC on April 4, Mr. Fisher 
predicted that frustrations would result from the 
refusal of a challenged country to furnish satisfac- 
tory information. In any case, the Soviet representa- 
tive flatly rejected this idea on the last day of the 
ENDC session. "The proposal to control the ban- 
ning of such tests on the basis of 'verification by 
challenge or invitation,' " he said, "is quite unac- 
ceptable to the Soviet Union. . . ." 

Cutoff of Fissionable IMaterials Production 

Another U.S. proposal directed towards curbing! 
the arms race calls for a verified cutoff of fission- 
able materials production for use in weapons, and 
a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable mate- 
rials to peaceful purposes. To make this measure 

'« For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234. 

" Sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs, The Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and 
the American Assembly of Columbia University — 
June 23-26, 1966. [Footnote in original.] 


even more attractive, the United States has also 
proposed that the materials for transfer be obtained 
by the verified destruction of several thousand nu- 
clear weapons. 

On August 11, Mr. Fisher presented to the ENDC 
a method for monitoring a shutdown reactor — an 
important feature of an agreement on a verified 
halt of the production of fissionable material for 
weapons use. 

The U.S. Government had sought to develop an 
effective inspection method which would be as unin- 
trusive as possible. It utilizes a "passive" device — 
one which has no moving parts or electronics which 
might be subject to malfunction, which makes no 
permanent attachments to impair the future use of 
the facility, and which can remain undisturbed in 
place on a shutdown plant until removed for an 
inspection. The neutrons generated in the core of 
an operating reactor can be detected and measured 
by means of a material which captures neutrons. 
The monitoring device consists of wires containing 
natural cobalt. The wires are placed in a tube, which 
is then rolled flat. They thus take on a unique con- 
figuration inside this "safing tape," and this "finger- 
print" is X-rayed before the tape goes into the 
reactor. The tape is then sealed by an ingeniously 
devised plastic cap into which pieces of metal shav- 
ings have been mixed at random. Photog:raphs are 
made of this second "fingerprint." The reactor can- 
not then be operated in violation of an agreement 
without activating the telltale cobalt inside; the 
outside seal cannot be disturbed without altering 
the fingerprint. Inspections need not occur with an- 
noying frequency, and can be scheduled in advance. 

On November 16, 1966, this method for policing 
the "cutoff" measure was demonstrated on a shut- 
down reactor at the Atomic Energy Commission's 
Hanford Plant, near Richland, Washington. U.N. 
General Assembly delegates and advisors from 51 
countries and several international organizations 
witnessed the demonstration as guests of the U.S. 

Freeze on Offensive and Defensive iVIissiles 

In his seven-point message to the ENDC on Janu- 
ary 27, President Johnson renewed his proposal for 
a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of of- 
fensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles (SNDVs). He stated that if progress were 
made on the freeze, the United States would then be 
prepared to explore the possibility of sig^nificant 
reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles. 
The "freeze" was first proposed in 1964. The U.S. 
Representative reminded the ENDC that had this 
proposal been accepted and implemented then, the 
subsequent substantial increases in SNDV inven- 
tories of the United States and the Soviet Union 
would not have taken place." 

In Geneva on August 16, U.S. Delegate Fisher 
outlined the U.S. rationale for inclusion of anti- 
ballistic missiles in a freeze proposal. 

He noted that the strategic stability which exists 
today depends on the knowledge that each side has 
the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and cas- 
ualties on the other in retaliation for an initial 
attack. If a freeze were put into effect on offensive 
forces alone, this strategic balance could be upset 
by the deployment of an improved defensive system 
by one of the adversaries. Such a shift in the mili- 
tary balance would force the other side to under- 
take counteractions, such as the parallel deployment 
of an anti-ballistic missile system, increased offen- 
sive deployment, or the introduction of new or im- 
proved weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing 
ballistic-missile defenses. The resulting arms race 
would be self-defeating. Higher and higher destruc- 
tive potentials would be reached, and, despite the 
presence of defensive systems costing billions of dol- 
lars or rubles, casualties would still reach fantas- 
tically high levels if nuclear war should occur. 
Secretary of State Rusk underlined the U.S. con- 
cern in his press conference December 21.'' "We 
would regret very much," he said, "the lifting of 
the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major 
expenditures . . . with perhaps no perceptible result 
in the total strategic situation." 

Nuclear-Free Zones 

The United States is strongly in favor of the 
establishment of nuclear-free zones where the initia- 
tive for such zones originates within the area con- 
cerned; where the zone includes all states in the 
area whose participation is deemed important; 
where the creation of a zone would not disturb 
necessary security arrangements; and where pro- 
visions are included for following up on alleged 
violations in order to give reasonable assurance of 
compliance with the zone. 

Under these criteria, the United States is pre- 
cluded from accepting the proposal to make Central 
Europe a nuclear-free zone, but for such areas as 
Africa and Latin America, the idea has met with 
the full support of the United States. The most 
notable example of a successful agreement to insure 
that a geographical area will be free of nuclear 
weapons (and other weapons as well) is the 1959 
Antarctica Treaty. 

An active attempt to make Latin America a 
nuclear-free zone has been going on since 1962, 
when Brazil first introduced the idea to the 17th 

■' For a U.S. statement of Aug. 2, 1966, see Bul- 
letin of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 317. 
" Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 43. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


U.N. General Assembly. The following year five 
Latin American Presidents joined in proposing a 
Latin American nuclear-free zone, and with the 
blessing of the 18th U.N. General Assembly, a Pre- 
paratory Commission for the Denuclearization of 
Latin America was established. The Commission, 
after a series of working meetings, has drawn up 
a draft treaty and is scheduled to meet again Janu- 
ary 31, 1967.^° Although differences remain in the 
positions of some of the members of the Commission 
with respect to the provisions of the treaty, a com- 
promise is thought to be possible. In any case, the 
United States regards the initiative of the Latin 
American countries as an outstanding example of 
regional activity to limit and control armaments, 
and has formally conveyed its full support to the 

Controlling Conventional Weapons 

Although the discussions at the ENDC and the 
U.N. General Assembly centered mainly on halting 
and turning back the nuclear arms race, attention 
was also given to the problem of controlling con- 
ventional armaments. The seventh point of the 
President's message of January 27 to the ENDC 
presented an approach for progrress in this area, 
in suggesting that countries, on a regional basis, 
explore ways to limit competition among themselves 
for costly weapons often sought for reasons of il- 
lusory prestige. He stated that if "arrangements 
can be worked out and assurance can be given that 
they will be observed, the United States stands 
ready to respect them." 

Elaborating on this matter in a statement to the 
ENDC on April 19, ACDA Director Foster sug- 
gested six principles as possible guidelines for the 
control of conventional arms: that the affected coun- 
tries not acquire military equipment which they 
agree to regulate; that the initiative come from 
within the region concerned; that any arrangement 
include all states in that region whose participation 
is deemed Important by the other participants; that 
potential suppliers respect the restrictions agreed 
to; that arrangements contribute to the security of 
the states concerned and to the maintenance of a 
stable military balance; and, lastly, that provision 
be made for satisfying all interested parties that 
the arrangement is being respected. 

There are many diflficulties involved, but the 
United States has offered full cooperation in imple- 
menting regional arms control arrangements. Re- 
gional agreements to control armaments will en- 
hance security by reducing tensions, permitting 
constructive utilization of economic resources, and 
contributing to the ultimate achievement of general 

ACDA has worked in close coordination with the 

«' For background, see ibid.. Max. 13, 1967, p. 436. 

Department of State in seeking ways to bring dip- 
lomatic influence to bear on the policies of foreign 
nations with respect to the acquisition of "prestige" 
armaments. Discussions are continuing among U.S. 
officials and Latin American members of the Orga- 
nization of American States. This question will 
probably be one of the major items to be included 
on the agenda of the summit meeting of Latin 
American Presidents which is scheduled to take 
place in the spring of 1967. It is hoped that the 
heads of the states represented at the conference 
will declare their intention not to acquire certain 
types of sophisticated military equipment. 

General and Complete Disarmament 

In 1962, at the opening of the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union tabled plans for general and 
complete disarmament. These plans have in common, 
as agreed in advance by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., 
a plan for a three-stage process of disarmament, to 
be carried out under effective controls. There the 
similarity begins to break down. The U.S. plan calls 
for balanced reductions, across the board by per- 
centages, for all armaments and forces; the Soviet 
plan advocates immediate elimination, in the first 
stage of the disarmament process, of all nuclear 
delivery vehicles, with the exception of a "nuclear 
umbrella," to be retained by the U.S. and the Soviet 
Union until the end of the third stage. 

The Soviet "nuclear umbrella," as first proposed 
by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1962, was 
vaguely described as a "strictly limited" quantity 
of intercontinental missiles, antiballistic missiles 
and antiaircraft missiles, to be kept until the end 
of the second stage on the territories of the two 
countries. In September 1963 this was amended to 
"the end of the third stage." The Soviet draft does 
not provide for adequate verification; it provides 
only for inspection of the missiles at announced 
launching pads. 

In the first year of the conference, an agenda was 
set up for discussion of stage I, and the Committee 
has worked on this ever since. The agenda includes 
discussion of nuclear delivery vehicles, conventional 
arms, nuclear disarmament, military bases, armed 
force levels, military expenditures, outer space 
measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to re- 
duce the risk of war, transition from first to second 
stages, and establishment of an International Dis- 
armament Organization. 

During the 1966 session, the United States sug- 
gested to the Committee that the principal reason 
for failure to make progress on the stage I agenda 
item covering nuclear delivery vehicles lay in the 
Soviet refusal to permit the establishment of a 
working group, or even to elaborate on their "nu- 
clear umbrella" proposal until ENDC accepted the 
concept "in principle." 



U.N. Resolution on Chemical 
and Biological Warfare 

On December 5, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly 
adopted, with the support of the United States, a 
resolution which calls on all nations to observe the 
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 
1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As- 
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The United 
States, although not a party to the Geneva Proto- 
col, has always observed the principles and objec- 
tives which the Protocol sought to achieve, and 
joined 90 other countries in voting for this resolu- 

U.S. policy with regard to the use of chemical 
and bacteriological weapons in the conduct of war- 
fare was clearly recorded before the vote. "We have 
repeatedly endeavoured to find adequate means to 
attain those objectives (of the Protocol)," said the 
U.S. Representative. "We have never used biological 
weapons of any kind, bacteriological or otherwise." 
He pointed out that the Protocol does not apply to 
all gases: "It would be unreasonable to contend 
that any rule of international law prohibits the use 
in combat against an enemy, for humanitarian pur- 
poses, of agents that Governments around the world 
commonly use to control riots by their own people. 
Similarly, the Protocol does not apply to herbicides, 
which involve the same chemicals and have the same 
effects as those used domestically in the United 
States, the Soviet Union and many other countries 
to control weeds and other unwanted vegetation." 

Treaty on Outer Space and Celestial Bodies 

On December 8, 1966, President Johnson con- 
firmed that agreement had been reached on the 
Outer Space Treaty, characterizing it as "the most 
important arms control development since the 
limited test ban treaty of 1963." " 

The treaty forbids the placing of weapons of mass 
destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies and 
places additional restrictions on military activities 
on the moon and other celestial bodies. In order to 
allow verification of these restrictions, open access 
to all areas on celestial bodies is guaranteed. The 
treaty also contains a number of general principles 
designed to establish a legal regime in outer space. 

The treaty had its genesis in the U.N. resolution 
banning bombs in orbit which was passed unani- 
mously in October 1963, the Declaration of Legal 
Principles for Outer Space Exploration passed in 
December 1963, and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 
which reserves the Antarctic for exclusively peaceful 

Negotiations on the treaty were conducted in the 
Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. These negotiations 
started in Geneva on July 12, 1966, and were com- 
pleted in New York at the United Nations. On De- 
cember 19 the U.N. General Assembly adopted by 
acclamation Resolution 2222, endorsing this historic 

The substance of the arms control provisions is 
in article IV. This article restricts military activi- 
ties in two ways: 

First, it contains an undertaking not to place in 
orbit around the earth, install on the moon or any 
other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer 
space nuclear or any other weapons of mass de- 

iSecond, it limits the use of the moon and other 
celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes, and 
expressly prohibits their use for establishing mili- 
tary bases, installations or fortification; testing 
weapons of any kind ; or conducting military maneu- 

Among the other more important principles estab- 
lished by the treaty are: 

There shall be freedom of exploration and use of 
outer space and celestial bodies for all States on a 
basis of equality. 

Claims of sovereignty and national appropriation 
are barred. 

There shall be unconditional obligation to help 
and to return astronauts promptly and safely if 
they land elsewhere than planned, and to exchange 
information relating to astronaut safety. 

The treaty will be signed for the United States 
at the White House on January 27, 1967, in the 
name of the President by the Secretary of State 
and the United States Ambassador to the United 

'^ For President Johnson's statement of Dec. 9, 
1966, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952. 

" For U.S. statements and text of the resolution, 
see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

APRIL 3, 1967 



Calendar of International Conferences* 

Scheduled April Through June 1967 

Inter- American Children's Institute: 47th Meeting of the Managua .... Apr. 3-6 

Directing Council. 
IMCO Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 5th London Apr. 3-7 

FAO Ad Hoc Conference on the Control of Olive Pests: 7th Turkey Apr. 3-7 

International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Rome Apr. 3-8 

Special Committee of Experts. 
U.N. Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression . . New York .... Apr. 3-10 
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the International Con- New York .... Apr. 3-10 

ference on Human Rights. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 23d Tokyo Apr. 3-17 

Plenary Session. 

World Meteorological Organization: 5th Congress .... Geneva Apr. 3-28 

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting San Jose Apr. 4-7 

UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to New York .... Apr. 4-19 

Trade: 2d Session. 

ICAO All- Weather Operations Panel: 3d Meeting .... Montreal Apr. 4-21 

OECD Working Party on Short-Term Forecasts Paris Apr. 5-6 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Apr. 5-6 

OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on UNCTAD Com- Paris Apr. 6-7 


U.N. Working Group of Committee on Tungsten New York .... Apr. 6-12 

NATO Industrial Planning Committee Paris Apr. 7 (1 day) 

Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 6th Annual Rio de Janeiro . . . Apr. 9-16 

Meeting of Board of Directors and 12th Meeting of Tech- 
nical Advisory Council. 
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Intergovem- San Jose Apr. 10-12 

mental Meeting. 
FAO/ECE Codex Alimentarius Group on Standardization of Geneva Apr. 10-14 

Fruit Juices. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Navigation: 2d Session London Apr. 10-14 

FAO Working Party on Fishery Statistics in North Atlantic Aberdeen .... Apr. 10-15 

Area: 5th Session. 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Offi ce of International Conferences on March 15, 1967, 
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the 
period April-June 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meet- 
ings. Persons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, com- 
piled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty; 
BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio 
Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; 
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, Inter- 
national Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; 
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; 
ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; 
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations 
Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postel Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World 
Meteorological Organization. 


U.N. Industrial Development Organization Board .... 
Economic Commission for Europe: 22d Plenary Session . . 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee 

Meeting of American Chiefs of State 

FAO/U.N. Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food 
Program: 11th Session. 

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Standing Com- 

ITU/CC'lR Study Group XIII 

ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group: 3d Meeting . 
International Coffee Organization: High-Level Working 


NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping 

9th International Hydrographic Conference 

OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel . . 

SEATO Council: 12th Session 

U.N. General Assembly: 5th Special Session 

ANZUS Council: 16th Session 

Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank : 

8th Meeting. 

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 2d Session 

ECAFE Expert Group for Technical Study of Draft Con- 
vention on Road Traffic and Road Signs and Signals. 

UNESCO Executive Board: 76th Session 

CENTO Council at Ministerial Level: 15th Ses.sion .... 

PAHO Executive Committee: 56th Meeting 

WHO Governing Council: 3d Session of International Agency 

for Research on Cancer. 

OECD Special Committee for Oil 

20th International Film Festival 

U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations 

ILO Technical Meeting of Experts on Organization and 

Planning of Vocational Training. 
11th Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs: 3d Session. 

FAO Study Group on Grains: 11th Session 

OECD Agriculture Committee 

NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group 

ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and 

Technology to Development: 7th Session. 
ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination .... 

WHO Executive Committee: 19th Session 

International Coffee Council 

Economic Commission for Latin America: 12th Session . . 
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Special Committee 

on Enforcement. 
ICEM Budget and Finance Committee: 15th Session .... 
FAO Near East Plant Protection Commission: 2d Session . 

ITU Administrative Council: 22d Session 

World Health Organization: 20th Assembly 

Economic and Social Council: 42d Session 

U.N. International Lav/ Commission: 19th Session .... 

ICEM Executive Committee: 29th Session 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 5th Annual Meeting 
UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st 

Session (resumed). 

International Rubber Study Group: 81st Meeting 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session .... 
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government 

NATO Food and Agricultural Planning Committee .... 
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 

Sea: 11th Session. 

ICEM Council: 27th Session 

UPU Executive Council 

12th Diplomatic Conference on International Maritime Law 
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems: 

6th Session. 

New York . 
Geneva . . 
Paris . . . 
Punta del Este 
Rome . . . 

Paris . . . 
New York . 

Geneva . . 
Paris . . . 
London . . 

London . . 
Monte Carlo 
Paris . . . 
New York . 

Rome . 

Paris . 
Lyons . 

Paris . 


Rome . . 
Paris . . 
Paris . . 
New York 

New York 
Paris . 





New York 



Paris . 

Paris . 


The Hague 
Paris . 

Paris . 

Bern . 

Apr. 10-28 
Apr. 11-29 
Apr. 12 (1 day) 
Apr. 12-14 
Apr. 12-21 

Apr. 13 (1 day) 
Apr. 13-14 

Apr. 17-28 
Apr. 17-29 
Apr. 17-29 

Apr. 18-20 
Apr. 18-May 3 
Apr. 19-21 
Apr. 19-21 
Apr. 21- 



Apr. 24-29 
Apr. 24r-May 3 

Apr. 24-May 12 
Apr. 25-26 
Apr. 26-May 5 
Apr. 27-28 

Apr. 27-28 
Apr. 27-May 12 


May 1-5 

May 1-5 
May 1-5 
May 1-12 
May 2-13 
May 5-6 



May 6-27 
May 8-27 
May 8-June 2 
May 8-July 14 
May 9-12 
May 9-12 
May 9-12 
May 9-12 

May 9-12 
May 9-26 
May 10-12 

May 11-12 
May 15-19 

May 15-19 
May 16-26 
May 16-27 
May 22-26 

APRIL 3, 1967 


Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1967 — Continued 

UNHCR Executive Committee: 17th Session 

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning .... 

OECD Fiscal Committee 

International Conference on Water for Peace 

NATO Civil Defense Committee 

ILO Governing Body: 169th Session 

WHO Executive Board: 40th Session 

IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures 

Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special 
Commission on Divorce. 

OECD Economic Policy Committee 

NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee .... 

U.N. Committee of 24 on Independence to Colonial Countries 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 34th Session 

ECAFE Asian Highway Coordinating Committee: 3d Session 

FAO/WHO Committee of Experts on the Code of Principles 
for Milk and Milk Products. 

UNESCO Coordinating Council for International Hydrolog- 
ical Decade: 3d Session. 

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 26th Plenary Meet- 

Inter-American Committee for Cultural Action 

OECD I*ulp and Paper Committee 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . 

International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 
17th Meeting. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 3d Session 

ECOSOC Committee for Progrram and Coordination . . . 

ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 7th Session 

European Civil Aviation Conference: 6th Meeting .... 

U.N. Development Program Governing Council: 4th Session 

International Labor Organization: 51st Conference .... 

NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee 

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on 
Food Hygiene. 

UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget: Program 
Committee and Executive Board. 

FAO Council: 48th Session 

FAO World Scientific Conference on Biology and Culture of 
Shrimps and Prawns. 

BIRPI Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Con- 
vention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property 
and the Berne Copyright Convention. 

IMCO Council: 18th Session 

ECE Conference of European Statisticians 

FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on 
Processed Fruits and Vegetables. 

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Trans- 

Berlin International Film Festival 

International Whaling Commission: 19th Meeting .... 

Inter- American Economic and Social Council: 5th Annual 
Meetings at the Ministerial and Expert Level. 

IAEA Board of Governors 

FAO Study Group on Rice: Steering Committee 

International Cotton Institute: 2d General Assembly . . . 

OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees . . . 

NATO Ministerial Council 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 9th Meeting of Ex- 
ecutive Committee. 

Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meet- 
ing of the Permanent Technical Advisory Committee on 
Labor Affairs. 

FAO Working Party on Pest Resistance to Pesticides . . . 

NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee: Plenary 

Geneva May 22-30 

Geneva May 23-26 

Paris May 23-26 

Washington . . . May 23-31 

Paris May 25-26 

Geneva May 26 and June 

Geneva May 29-30 

London May 29-June 2 

The Hague .... May 29-June 9 

Paris May 31-June 1 

Paris May 31-June 2 

New York .... May 

New York .... May 

Kabul May 

Rome May 

Paris May 

Netherlands . . . May 

Mexico May or June 

Paris June 1-2 

Paris June 2 (1 day) 

Boston June 5-10 

London June 5-12 

New York .... June 5-16 

New York .... June 5-23 

Strasbourg .... June 6-7 

Geneva June 6-23 

Geneva June 7-29 

Paris June 8-9 

Washington . . . June 12-16 

New York 

Rome . . . 
Mexico City 

Stockholm . 

June 12-22 

June 12-23 
June 12-24 

June 12-July 15 

London June 19-21 

Geneva June 19-23 

Washington .... June 19-23 

Paris June 20-22 

Berlin June 23-July 4 

London .... June 27-July 1 

Viiia del Mar . . . June 30-July 13 

Vienna June 

Rome June 

Antwerp June 

Paris June 

Luxembourg . . . June 

Rome June 

Viiia del Mar 


Rome June 

Paris June 




United States and Brazil Sign 
Income Tax Convention 


Press release 57 dated M&rch 14 

U.S. Ambassador John W. Tuthill, Bra- 
zilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juracy 
]\Iagalhaes, and Brazilian Minister of Finance 
Octavio Gouvea de Bulhoes signed an income 
tax convention between the two countries at 
Rio de Janeiro on March 13. The convention 
follows in broad outline the pattern of tax 
conventions already in effect between the 
United States and other foreign countries. 

The convention describes general rules of 
taxation and specifies the manner of relief 
from double taxation and the rules deter- 
mining the source of income. It also sets 
forth maximum withholding rates applicable 
with respect to certain types of income and 
special rules covering personal income of 
aliens. In addition, the convention contains 
an article providing that the United States 
shall allow a tax credit for investment in 
Brazil under certain circumstances. Further 
details on the convention are provided in a 
press release issued by the U.S. Treasury 

The convention, which will be transmitted 
to the Senate for advice and consent to rati- 
fication, will have effect for taxable years be- 
ginning on or after the first day of January 
of the year following the exchange of instru- 
ments of ratification. 


The Treasury Department announced on 
March 14 that the income tax convention be- 
tween the United States and Brazil includes 
the following provisions: 

Allowance of a 7 percent investment tax 
credit for investment in machinery and equip- 
ment in Brazil by U.S. firms. The credit is 
modeled after the investment tax credit 
applicable under the United States Internal 
Revenue Code. 

The investment tax credit would be allowed 
under the same conditions as those applicable 
to the domestic investment tax credit. Con- 
sequently, this aspect of the treaty would 
apply only when the domestic credit is opera- 
tive in the United States. 

The treaty limits Brazilian withholding tax 
to 20 percent on dividends flowing to the 
United States from direct investment in Bra- 

The Brazilian withholding tax on interest 
paid to financial institutions in the United 
States and on royalties paid to U.S. licensors 
is limited to 15 percent. 

Current Actions 



International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New York, September 28 through 
November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 
27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Accession deposited: Honduras, January 20, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter- 
national waterborne transportation, with annex. 
Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.' 
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967. 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967.^ 
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967. 

Organization of American States 

Charter of the Organization of American States. 
Signed at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into 
force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361. 
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, March 13, 1967. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea. Approved by the International Conference 

^ Not in force. 

^ Not in force for the United States. 

APRIL 3, 1967 


on Safety of Life at Sea, London May 17-June 
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 

Acceptance deposited: Australia, January 13, 


International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.' 
Accession deposited: Maldive Islands, February 
28, 1967. 



Agreement amending Annex B of the mutual de- 
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1960 
(TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Brussels February 2 and 22, 1967. Entered into 
force February 22, 1967. 


Agreement supplementing the agreement of Septem- 
ber 30, 1958 (TIAS 4121), relating to investment 
guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into force March 
3, 1967. 

Agrreement for sales of agricultural commodities 

* Not in force for the United States. 

under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- 
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
(68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. 
Signed at Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into 
force March 3, 1967. 


Agreement regarding the status of the Korean 
Service Corps, with agreed understandings. Signed 
at Seoul February 23, 1967. 
Entered into force: March 10, 1967. 


Agreement relating to investment g^uaranties. Signed 
at Maseru February 24, 1967. Enters into force 
on the date of notification from the Government 
of Lesotho that agreement has been approved 
in conformity with constitutional procedures. 


Additional agreement to the agreement of May 17, 
1949 (TIAS 1946), for financing certain educa- 
tional and cultural programs. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at The Hague June 22, 1966. 
Entry into force: February 28, 1967; effective 
January 1, 1965. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 10, 1966 
(TIAS 5806), for financing certain programs of 
educational and cultural exchange. Effected by 
exchange of notes at London February 16, 1967. 
Entered into force February 16, 1967. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Serrices, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16; 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 


INDEX April 3, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U9 

Albania. Department Issues Public Notices on 
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register 
entries) 564 

Asia. Asian Development Bank Immunities De- 
fined (Executive order) 563 

Brazil. United States and Brazil Sign Income 
Tax Convention 581 

Canada. St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain 
at Present Levels 554 


The Latin American Summit Meeting (Presi- 
dent's message to Congress) 540 

1966 International Negotiations for Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament (President's letter of 
transmittal and excerpt from ACDA's sixth 
annual report to Congress) ....... 568 

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet 
Consular Pact (Johnson) 545 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 
(Johnson) 566 

Cuba. Department Issues Public Notices on 
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register 
entries) 564 

Department and Foreign Service. The Defense 
of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free 
Asia (Johnson) 534 

Disarmament. 1966 International Negotiations 
for Arms Control and Disarmament (Presi- 
dent's letter of transmittal and excerpt from 
ACDA's sixth annual report to Congress) . 568 

Economic Affairs 

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined 
(Executive order) 563 

Cotton in the World Trade Arena (Solomon) 555 

The Defense of Viet^Nam: Key to the Future 
of Free Asia (Johnson) 534 

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at 
Present Levels 554 

United States and BrazU Sign Income Tax 
Convention 581 

U.S. Investment and Trade Mission Visits 
Korea 554 

United States Joins Dedication of Jidda De- 
salting Plant Site (Udall) 561 

Foreign Aid 

The Latin American Summit Meeting (Presi- 
dent's message to Congress) 540 

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine 
(Johnson) 546 

Greece. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doc- 
trine (Johnson) 646 

Guinea. Foreign Minister of Guinea Visits the 
United States 554 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined 
(Executive order) 563 

Calendar of International Conferences .... 578 


Department Issues Public Notices on Travel 
to Restricted Areas (Federal Register en- 
tries) 564 

U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship 
and Cooperation (Chung, Johnson) .... 548 

U.S. Investment and 'Trade Mission Visits 
Korea 554 

Latin America. The Latin American Summit 
Meeting (President's message to Congress) 540 

Military Affairs. The Defense of Viet-Nam: 
Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534 

Passports. Department Issues Public Notices on 
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register 
entries) 564 

Presidential Documents 

Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined 663 
The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future 

of Free Asia 634 

The Latin American Summit Meeting .... 640 
1966 International Negotiations for Arms Con- 
trol and Disarmament 668 

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet 

Consular Pact 645 

20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine . . 646 
U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship 

and Coopieration 648 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 . . 566 
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference Held 

at Philadelphia 665 

Saudi Arabia. United States Joins Dedication 

of Jidda Desalting Plant Site (Udall) ... 661 
Trade. Cotton in the World Trade Arena 

(Solomon) 555 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 681 

President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet 
Consular Pact (Johnson) 645 

St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Pres- 
ent Levels 654 

United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax 
Convention 58I 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 
(Johnson) 666 

Turkey. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doc- 
trine (Johnson) 645 

U.S.S.R. President Hails Senate Action on 

U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact (Johnson) . . . 645 
United Nations. U.S. Participation in the U.N. 

During 1965 (Johnson) 666 


The Defense of Viet Nam: Key to the Future 

of Free Asia (Johnson) 534 

Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to 

Restricted Areas (Federal Register entries) 564 

Name Index 

Chung, II Kwon 648 

Johnson, President 534, 540, 545, 546, 

548, 563, 566, 568 

Solomon, Anthony M 555 

Udall, Stewart L 661 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Oflice of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 13 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
45 of March 6 and 53 of March 9. 

No. Date Subject 

56 3/13 St. Lawrence Seaway tolls. 

57 3/14 Income taxconvention with Brazil 

(rewrite) . 
t58 3/16 Cotton textile agreement with 

59 3/17 Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Philadelphia, Pa. (re- 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



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Vol. LVI, No. U50 

April 10, 1967 




Statements Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 600 



Department Statement and Texts of Letters 595 

For index see inside hack cover 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam 


President Johnson left Washington on 
March 19 for Guam, where on March 20-21 
he conferred with top Vietnamese and U.S. 
officials on the situation in South Viet-Nam. 
Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the Na- 
tional Leadership Committee of the Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam, and South Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who at- 
tended the conference at the President's in- 
vitation, brought with them a copy of the 
new Vietnamese Constitution adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly. The leaders of the 
two Governments exchanged views on mili- 
tary, political, and economic developments in 
South Viet-Nam. A joint communique was 
issued at the close of the meeting on March 

Included in the U.S. delegation were Sec- 
retary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara; Director of 
the Agency for International Development 
William S. Gaud; Ambassador at Large W. 
Averell Harriman; Ambassador at Large 
Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador-designate to 
Viet-Nam; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler; Director of the 
Central Intelligence Agency Richard M. 
Helms; Ambassador to Viet-Nam Henry 
Cabot Lodge; Ambassador to Pakistan 
Eugene M. Locke, Deputy-Ambassador- 
designate to Viet-Nam; Special Assistant to 
the President Robert W. Komer; Special 
Assistant to the President W. W. Rostow; 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna- 
tional Security Affairs John T. McNaughton; 
Consultant to the President on Viet-Nam, 

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor; the U.S. com- 
mander in Viet-Najm, Gen. William C. West- 
moreland; the commander of U.S. forces in 
the Pacific, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp; Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Leonard C. Unger, Co- 
ordinator of the Interagency Viet-Nam Task 
Force; and David E. Lilienthal, president of 
the Development and Research Corp., New 
York, N.Y. 


Arrival of President Johnson 

White HouBe press release (Guam) dated March 20 

Mr. President, your staff members, dis- 
tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: For 
Guam today is a moment of history. This is 
an historic occasion, another milestone in 
the annals of the histoiy of Guam. 

Mr. President, we are very proud and 
deeply honored that you have selected the 
Territory of Guam as the site for this im- 
portant conference. 

Mr. President, we want you to know that 
the people of Guam are 100 percent behind 
your Viet-Nam policy. 

Mr. President, we want you to know that 
we are loyal and patriotic citizens. We 
cherish and endear your leadership. We want 
you to live long, for you have worked hard 
for peace. 

We welcome you to Guam, and we hope 
that during your sojourn your stay will be 
pleasant. Thank you. 




We have come to Guam to confer with 
our military commanders, our diplomatic 
representatives, and with those who are 
helping to wage the peaceful campaign 
against poverty and want in Viet-Nam. 

We have come to meet once again the 
leaders of South Viet-Nam, whose people 
continue to bear the great burdens of a war 
that they did not invite but which was thrust 
upon them by Communist terror. 

We will discuss the progress and the fu- 
ture course of our military effort. We will 
review our diplomatic initiatives. We will 
try to estimate the chances of bringing 
peace to Viet-Nam through an honorable set- 

Our new team of representatives in Saigon 
— ^Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke, 
Mr. Komer — will be here with us, as will the 
great patriot whom Mr. Bunker will succeed. 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. 

We chose Guam as the site of our meeting 
for its convenience to those who are con- 
ducting the military and peaceful develop- 
ment campaign in Viet-Nam. But beyond 
that consideration, there is a historical sig- 
nificance to this island that stirs the mem- 
ories of those who remember the dark hours 
of World War II and which strengthens our 
determination to persevere in Viet-Nam to- 

Guam knows a war in a way that no other 
part of America knows it. It was the only 
inhabited part of our nation to be occupied 
by hostile forces during the Second World 

That war, and all of its anguish, changed 
forever the world as we had known it. It 
taught us lessons that we shall never forget 
— most important, that the peace of all the 
world is threatened when aggressors are en- 
couraged to feed on any part of it. 

America, which lost Guam and then freed 
it again with blood that now stains this 
ground, has not forgotten that lesson. Amer- 
ican boys in Viet-Nam are once again carry- 
ing the American commitment to resist ag- 

gression and to make possible the sacred 
work of peace among men. 

We are grateful to you — all of you — for 
coming out here to welcome us. Pray that 
our work here will bear fruit, for we labor 
for you, for your fellow Americans, for the 
people of Viet-Nam, and for all of those who 
love peace and freedom throughout the 

I should like to address a very special 
word to my Guamanian friends. 

I am proud of the distinction which this 
trip gives me of being the first American 
President to come here while in office. I 
am very proud of Guam. All America is 
proud of the progress that it has made to- 
ward self-government in the short time since 
civil administration came to this island in 

We are proud of the strides that you have 
taken under a very fine public servant, Gov- 
ernor Guerrero. His first term of office is 
now ending. 

It gives me real pleasure to tell you 
that just before we landed I signed a 
nomination to go to the United States Senate 
giving my recommendation that the Honor- 
able Manuel Guerrero be appointed to a sec- 
ond term as the Governor of Guam. 

I hope that Governor Guerrero will be the 
last Governor to be appointed by a Presi- 
dent. If the Congress acts favorably on leg- 
islation that I have proposed, he will be. 
That legislation will give the American citi- 
zens of Guam, along with your fellow citi- 
zens in other parts of the United States, the 
right to elect your own Governor. 

Then all of you who are already contribut- 
ing so much to the efforts of your country 
and the effort that your country is making 
in Viet-Nam will at long last have one of 
the great rights of the American democracy. 
I look forward to the day when I may sign 
that bill that is now pending into the law of 
our lands. 

Thank you, my friends, for this warm wel- 
come. I know that I shall enjoy spending the 
next few days with you. 

APRIL 10, 1967 


Arrival of Vietnamese Leaders 

White House press release {Guam) dated March 20 

Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, most 
distinguished officials from the Republic of 
Viet-Nam and the United States of America, 
ladies and gentlemen: Once again I am very 
pleased to welcome two brave Vietnamese 
leaders to American soil. 

We met in Hawaii a little over a year 
ago.i Then, our talks were of plans and 
hopes. Today, we meet in a time of progress. 
It is our common task to extend that prog- 
ress in the days ahead. 

Ever since our conference last fall in 
Manila,^ your country has traveled far on 
the road to democracy. Your Assembly has 
hammered out a new Constitution. I am in- 
formed that I will see a copy of that Consti- 
tution during our meeting here. 

It is the foundation stone of a freely and 
popularly elected government. You are the 
leaders of 16 million courageous and dedi- 
cated people who are determined to forge 
a free nation from the fires of war. 

Your people look to a Viet-Nam that is 
unencumbered by a foreign presence on its 
soil, unhindered by acts of terror and ag- 
gression, free to determine its own destiny. 

I hope that this conference will be of value 
to both of us in charting the course for the 
future of the struggle for freedom in Viet- 

I am also delighted and particularly 
anxious for you to get to know Ambassador 
Bunker, who will shortly succeed Ambassa- 
dor Lodge in Saigon. I know that you will 
find him an able and understanding Am- 
bassador, as you will his associate, Mr. 
Locke. I know you will find him a worthy 
successor to a very brave and distinguished 

Last week I reassured my own people that 
America is committed to the defense of South 

Viet-Nam until an honorable peace can be ' : 

I renew that pledge to you today. 

Thank you very much. 


Mr. President, thank you very much for 
your kind words of welcome. I am happy to 
set foot again on American soil in the midst 
of the Pacific and have this opportunity to 
meet again with you, Mr. President, and 
the distinguished members of your Govern- 

As we pointed out last year following our 
meeting in Honolulu, we must maintain close 
contact. There is no adequate substitute for 
exchanging ideas than face to face across 
a table. | 

At that Manila Conference last October ' 
we had again agreed upon the principle of 
close consultation for review of what we 
have done and for candid and thorough dis- ii 
cussions of the various problems confronting f 
us in the defense of freedom in Viet-Nam. 

I am grateful that you have found it pos- 
sible to cross the major part of the Pacific 
Ocean for this meeting to be had, an im- 
portant juncture in our effort in Viet-Nam 
to stem ofi" the Communist aggression from 
the North and to give substance and solid 
foundations to democracy in the Republic of 

Thanks to your help, we are now throwing 
a line against Communist aggression in 
Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people will 
long remember that at this crucial moment 
of their history, their freedom is preserved, 
thanks to the solidarity of millions of people 
around this Pacific Ocean. 

Vietnamese soldiers are especially proud 
to fight side by side with valiant soldiers of 
the United States of America in this great 
struggle to defend freedom and to secure a 
long-lasting peace in this part of this world. 

The Republic of Viet-Nam will do her best 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, 
p. 302. 

* For background, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

' For President Johnson's address before the Ten- 
nessee State Legislature on Mar. 15, see ibid., Apr. 
3, 1967, p. 534. 



so that all the brave soldiers who have made 
the supreme sacrifices in tlie defense of free- 
dom will not have given their lives in vain. 

Viet-Nam is the crucial test case on which 
will hinge not only the fate of Southeast 
Asia but also of many other areas in the 
world, where newly independent nations are 
groping for a path toward the future. 

Together we will win this war, not only 
against the Communist aggression but also 
against the immemorial enemies of mankind 
— hunger, disease, and ignorance — to launch 
a society in which everyone will find a right- 
ful place in establishing a meaningful democ- 
racy under the sign of progress and social 

In the spirit of the Manila Conference, the 
Republic of Viet-Nam spares no effort to 
explore all possible avenues which may lead 
us to a just and honorable peace. 

When such a peace is restored, a general 
reconciliation among all Vietnamese will be 
possible, to put an end to the sufferings and 
ravages of the war and open a new era in 
which all Vietnamese of good will can par- 
ticipate in the building of a free and peace- 
ful nation. 

With these hopes, I look forward to fruit- 
ful discussions at this meeting. 

Thank you very much. 

Opening Statement at Conference, March 20 

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20 

I shall make my opening remarks very 
short. We are old friends and comrades in 
arms. We do not need to elaborate on pre- 
liminaries before getting down to work. 

Our two Governments have developed 
methods of regular consultation that have 
served us well in the critical days in which 
we've been associated. I am confident this 
will continue. 

Today I am introducing to you our new 
Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, and his 
deputy, Eugene Locke. He has served our 
country — and the cause of freedom — on three 

continents. It is tyi)ical of him that he is 
ready to serve in this struggle as well. His 
distinguished talents give us full confidence 
for the future. 

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has rep- 
resented the United States in Saigon with 
great dedication and ability. One measure of 
our appreciation for his splendid service is 
the caliber of the man we have chosen as 
his successor. 

We meet at an auspicious time. The task 
of drafting a Constitution for South Viet- 
Nam, I am informed, has been completed. 
The drafters were elected by people in every 
section of the country — except where they 
were prevented from voting by pressures of 
the Viet Cong. I know you regret, as I do, 
that the Viet Cong succeeded in preventing 
anyone from voting. We believe that a sys- 
tem which stands in the way of democratic 
process in this fashion cannot survive very 
long among the people- — even when it uses 
terror and assassination to achieve its ends. 

Now your great task is to conduct a na- 
tional election for a new government. The 
success of that election is as important as 
any of the military operations we shall con- 
duct in the months ahead. 

There are many signs that we are at a 
favorable turning point. Your fighting men, 
aided by your allies, now hold the initiative 
and are striking heavy blows against the 
strongholds and refuges of the Viet Cong 
and their North Vietnamese masters. And in 
the villages the medicine of the revolutionary 
development program is already beginning to 
take eflPect. The Viet Cong are turning 
sharply against that program's administra- 
tion. I think that is very solid tribute to its 

There are many other things I could cite 
that give us encouragement. But Viet-Nam 
is still a land of war and suffering, where 
the danger of inflation and epidemics and 
political conflict lie just beneath the surface. 
So let us turn today to see again what we 
can do to make our joint efforts even more 

APRIL 10, 1967 


statement on New Vietnamese Constitution, 
IMarch 20 ^ 

I am deeply pleased to hear from Prime 
Minister Ky that the Directorate has agreed 
to the new Constitution just adopted by the 
Constituent Assembly of the Republic of 

The Constitution marks the most impor- 
tant step in Viet-Nam's progress toward rep- 
resentative government. It is the fruit of 6 
months of labor by delegates whose very 
elections demonstrated the ability of the 
people of South Viet-Nam to move forward 
toward democracy in the midst of war and 
despite the savage opposition of the Viet 

Many of the provisions of the Constitu- 
tion were actively debated during 6 months 
of consideration by the Assembly. But when 
agreement was finally reached, the Consti- 
tution was approved by the unanimous vote 
of the Assembly. 

Like the U. S. Constitution, the Vietnam- 
ese Constitution has been written by the 
democratically chosen representatives of 
the people. And like the Constitutional Con- 
vention in Philadelphia two centuries ago, 
the Assembly in Saigon included many men 
in their late twenties or early thirties. 

The Constitution secures freedom of 
speech and freedom of religion. It guaran- 
tees civil rights and due process of law and 
provides for free political expression by the 
press, political parties, and trade unions, as 
well as by individuals. 

It establishes an executive branch and en- 
dows it with wide powers, but subjects it, 
at the same time, to strong measures of con- 
trol by the Legislature. The Legislature will 
enjoy wide authority, perhaps wider than 
that of the U. S. Congress. 

Three times in less than 2 years South 
Viet-Nam has moved closer toward establish- 
ing a government fully responsive to the 
people. The first of these steps was the pro- 
vincial elections held in May 1965; the sec- 

■* Read to news correspondents by Secretary Rusk 
at a news conference on Mar. 20 (White House 
press release (Guam)). 

ond step was the election, last September 11, 
of the members of the Constituent Assembly; 
now a democratic Constitution has been 

There will be other steps on the road to 
more representative government in Viet- 
Nam during the coming months. A new 
round of village and hamlet elections will 
begin in April, when over 900 village coun- 
cils will be elected. In May and June nearly 
5,000 hamlet chiefs will be chosen. Then, ^' 
the election of a President and the Senate, „ 
provided for in the new Constitution, is 
planned for late summer. Finally, the elec- 
tion of the House of Representatives will 
come within a month after the election of a 


President. i " 

All those who have thoughtfully studied f 
the modem history of Viet-Nam know that 
military power alone cannot secure the peace 
and insure the progress of that nation, nor 
of any other. Free political institutions are 
indispensable to the success of South Viet- i 
Nam's long struggle against terror, and f 
those who support her in that struggle re- 
joice in the success of this past week. 


President Johnson 

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20 

In 1873, when Viet-Nam was disputing the 
right of France to extend control over the 
whole country, a scholar named Bui Vien 
was sent by the Emperor to enlist the help 
of the United States. He was received by 
President Grant. 

On his way home he was informed of 
President Grant's decision that, because of 
unforeseen circumstances, the United States 
would be unable to assist Viet-Nam. 

He stopped in Japan to see an old friend, 
the American Consul in Yokohama. As peo- 
ple did in those days in Asia, the two men 
exchanged poems. Here is what Bui Vien 

' At a dinner for U.S. and Vietnamese officials. 



We pour out wine into glasses at Yokohama in 

the ninth month — in autumn. 
Turning my head towards the clouds of Vietnam, 

I am anxious about my country. 
Sea and land — memory and emotion — remind me 

of my former journey. 
Enjoying myself with you, I regret all the more 

that we must part. 
Spiritual companion, in what year will we be 

together in the same sampan? 

Today we know the answer. We are to- 
gether. And we know our destination. We 
established it years ago, and affirmed it at 
Honolulu and Manila. The brave sons of both 
our nations reaffirm it anew with every day 
that passes. 

The trip is not yet over. The waters ahead 
may be rough. But together, with courage 
and unflagging devotion to the duty we 
share, we will make it. 

Gentlemen, to the free peoples of Viet- 
Nam and the United States, who love their 
liberty and fight to preserve it. 

Chairman Thieu 

White House press release (Guam) dated March 20 

Mr. President, gentlemen: I would like 
to thank you most sincerely for making this 
gathering not only an opportunity for the 
leaders of both Governments to exchange 
views on common problems but also a 
family affair in which protocol yields to in- 
formality and cordiality. 

I am deeply touched by your evocation of 
the historical diplomatic mission. In the last 
century, Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Vien 
went on a good-will mission to the United 
States, a great country from across the 
Pacific Ocean, in what was for us, may I 
say, the Far East. 

What I would like to add in recalling the 
history of Vietnaanese-American friendship 
is that, almost a century and a half ago, an 
American Ambassador of good will, named 
John White, also came to Viet-Nam. He was 
a well-respected citizen of Boston, a busi- 
nessman and traveler. History did not record 
his poems, but he wrote memoirs about his 
influences in our exotic land. 

Today we have had the privilege and the 

great pleasure to have in Ambassador Lodge 
a much more illustrious Ambassador from 
Boston. We are sad to see him leaving, but 
the years he spent in Viet-Nam will long 
be remembered. 

We know that with Ambassador Bunker 
another page of cordial and constructive 
friendship will be opened. 

In this spirit may I ask you, Mr. President 
and gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the 
everlasting friendship and solidarity between 
our two nations, for freedom, peace, and 


White House press release (Guam) dated March 21 

The President of the United States and 
the Chief of State and the Prime Minister 
of Viet-Nam completed their discussions in 
Guam. These talks have demonstrated again 
their joint determination with their allies, 
to defend freedom in South Viet-Nam and at 
the same time to continue the earnest search 
for an honorable peace. 

President Johnson took this occasion to 
present to Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister 
Ky and their party the new leadership of 
the U.S. Mission in Saigon. Ambassador Ells- 
worth Bunker will take up from Ambassa- 
dor Lodge the maintenance and strengthen- 
ing of close relations with the Government 
of Viet-Nam. He will be working with that 
Government in its struggle to preserve the 
nation's freedom, in its steady progress 
toward economic and social development, and 
in the new political chapter now opening of 
constitutional and representative govern- 
ment under elected leaders. President John- 
son introduced Ambassador Eugene Locke, 
who will take Ambassador Porter's place as 
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission, and he 
also explained that his Special Assistant, 
Mr. Robert Komer, would be in Saigon giv- 
ing his attention to Pacification/RD matters. 

Meeting with their advisors, President 
Johnson and Chairman Thieu and Prime 
Minister Ky reviewed the encouraging prog- 
ress on the various programs of the Vietnam- 

APRIL 10, 1967 


ese Government which had been discussed 
at Honolulu early in 1966 and were outlined 
in the Communique of the Seven Allied Na- 
tions meeting in Manila last October. 

Discussion covered the military front, 
where the initiative lies increasingly with 
the allied forces and where the leaders of 
North Viet-Nam must recognize the futility 
of their effort to seize control of South Viet- 
Nam by force. 

The meeting also reviewed those programs 
of the Vietnamese Government to which the 
United States is providing assistance. They 
found that, a solid foundation having been 
laid, the pacification and revolutionary de- 
velopment program was now beginning to 
show encouraging results, despite Viet Cong 
efforts to disrupt it by terror and intimida- 
tion. They noted the successful maintenance 
of financial stability while recognizing the 
need for continued vigilance on this front. 
They heard from Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr. 
David Lilienthal of the long-range economic 
planning now getting underway. Plans for 
continued efforts in the fields of national rec- 
onciliation and reform of land policies and 
tenure provisions were described by the Viet- 
namese leaders. 

They also outlined the provisions of the 
Constitution drafted by the Constituent As- 
sembly elected last September 11 and agreed 
by the Assembly and approved by the Direc- 
torate in the last few days. This instrument 
provides for the principal organs of a rei> 
resentative government and assures to the 
people civil and economic rights and social 
justice. The Constitution offers full civil 
rights to those who respect its provisions 
and the world looks forward to the day 
when the Viet Cong will take advantage of 
this offer, abandon the course of terror and 
violence and join in making a free, modem 
society in South Viet-Nam. 

It was also announced that elections for 
a president will be held under the Constitu- 
tion within 4 to 5 months and the elections 
for a legislature shortly thereafter. Mean- 
while a major forward step will be made 
toward the restoration of democratic local 

government when village hamlet elections 
take place, starting in April. 

The numerous and varied efforts made in 
recent months to bring about a peaceful 
settlement were reviewed by the heads of 
both delegations. Thus far, they noted re- 
gretfully. North Viet-Nam has failed to 
respond to all such efforts. However, Chair- 
man Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and Presi- 
dent Johnson reaffirmed their undertakings 
at Manila and Honolulu and pledged them- 
selves anew to the diligent pursuit of peace. 
Continuing consultations about the search 
for peace will be maintained among the 
nations whose forces are now fighting 
against aggression in South Viet-Nam. 

The Vietnamese and American leaders 
also took note of the forthcoming meetings 
in Washington of SEATO on April 18-20 
and of the Foreign Ministers of nations 
having troops in Viet-Nam on April 20-21. 
The latter will bring together again the 
Governments which met at Manila last 
October and provide an opportunity for 
them to review progress and programs in 
Viet-Nam and consult on future courses of 

The Vietnamese leaders are leaving Guam 
for Saigon this morning and President 
Johnson is expected to depart at the end of 
the day. 


Statement by President Johnson, Andersen 
Air Force Base, Guam, IVIarch 21 

White House press release dated March 21 

Before I returned to Washington, I 
wanted to come here to see some of the men 
and their families who are carrying the 
burdens of this war, as I did last fall when 
I went to Cam Ranh Bay.^ 

In some respects our engagement in Viet- 
Nam is familiar to America. 

In World War II and in Korea, as in 
Viet-Nam, there was a conflict of ideology 

For background, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 735. 



between ourselves and our adversaries. But 
the struggle is not limited to one of ideology. 

Force had to be met with force. Amer- 
icans had to shoulder rifles, man tanks and 
warships, and take bombers into the air, all 
at great risk to their lives and at a great 
distance from their homelands. 

The ideological debates continued over the 
wisdom of involvement or noninvolvement: 

The "America Firsters" had their say, but 
the aggressor could not be stopped by argu- 

People who desired to live in freedom 
could not be protected by debating points. 

The defense of freedom required then, as 
it requires now, the willingness of brave 
men to face danger, to risk death, and to 
live with their fears for months and years 
on end. 

Today we are here to decorate 12 men, 
all of whom risked their lives many times 
in the air over Viet-Naxn. As their Com- 
mander in Chief and the representative of 
the people whom they have so gallantly 
served, I salute them with all my heart. 

There are some respects, as professional 
soldiers know, in which this war is different 
from the others that we have waged. There 
are no sharply defined battle lines. The 
random terror of the subversive, not the 
mythical power of a conventional army in 
the field, is the enemy's main weapon. 

Political and social forces are at work 
which complicate the struggle and which 
make it necessary to do far more than wage 
a traditional military campaign. 

We met these past 2 days here with 
leaders, Vietnamese and Americans, to dis- 
cuss some of the elements of this difi'erent 
kind of war in Viet-Nam. 

We have brought the new team of Ameri- 
can representatives to Viet-Nam: Ambas- 
sador Ellsworth Bunker, who has served 
his country with great distinction in the 
Dominican crisis, in India, in Italy, and 
many other posts of the highest responsi- 
bility; Ambassador Eugene Locke, who now 
represents us in Pakistan; and Robert 
Komer, who until now has been in the 

White House as my counselor on the civil 
side of the Vietnamese war. 

We wanted these distinguished Americans 
to meet the leaders of Viet-Nam with whom 
they will be working in the months ahead. 

We came here to discuss seven of our 
major concerns in Viet-Nam today: 

First, the military progress of the war, 
both in the South and in the North. 

Second, the political progress that is 
being made in South Viet-Nam. Prime 
Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new 
Constitution which the freely elected Con- 
stitutent Assembly had just adopted in 
in South Viet-Nam and which the Directory 
had just approved. This is the third and 
the most significant step that South Viet- 
Nam has taken toward granting its people 
the fundamental rights of democracy. 

Third, we discussed in some detail the 
morale, the health, the training, the food, 
the clothing, and the equipment of our superb 
young fighting men. I questioned General 
Westmoreland closely on all of these matters, 
and his response was deeply gratifying to 

Fourth, the national reconciliation pro- 
gram in Viet-Nam. 

Fifth, the land reform program, which 
is moving steadily forward. 

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties 
and what is being done to help those who 
are injured or who are wounded by the war. 

Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an 
end to this conflict at as early a date as 
possible by an honorable settlement. 

We did not adopt any spectacular, new 
programs at this meeting. We said in ad- 
vance that that was not our plan. The nature 
of this war is not amenable to spectacular 
programs or to easy solutions. It requires 
courage, perseverance, and dedication — ex- 
actly the qualities that men such as you 
are providing today. 

So to all of the men of this command, 
and their families who so loyally stand by 
them in this hour of trial, let me say as we 
leave Guam that all America honors you 
and is grateful to you. 

APRIL 10, 1967 


We feel refreshed by the conviction that 
on several fronts — military, political, and 
social — we and our allies are making sub- 
stantial progress. When the inevitability of 
that progress finally gets through and be- 
comes clear to Hanoi, we shall then arrive 
at what Churchill would have called "the 
beginning of the end." 

I leave you today with pride — great 
pride — in what you are doing and great 
confidence for the country that you serve. 

I do not want to let this occasion go by 
without presenting to you some of the great 
public servants who lead this nation in this 
critical period. 

I want to introduce your Secretary of 
State — Dean Rusk. 

Next I want to introduce your Secretary 
of Defense — Robert McNamara. 

Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador 

" The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Wheeler; Admiral Sharp; General 
Maxwell Taylor; General Westmoreland; and 
your distinguished Governor of Guam. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle- 

Statement by President Johnson, Andrews 
Air Force Base, Washington, March 21 

White Hoiue press release dated March 21 

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. 

As I said upon my departure from Guam, 
we discussed seven of our major concerns at 
at our meeting there. 

First, the military progress of the war, 
both in the South and in the North. 

Second, the political progress that is being 
made now in South Viet-Nam. Prime Minis- 
ter Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitu- 
tion which the freely elected Constituent 
Assembly has adopted and which the Direc- 

tory has just approved. This is the third and 
most significant step that South Viet-Nam 
has taken toward granting its people the 
fundamental rights of democracy. 

Third, we discussed the morale, the health, 
the training, the food, the clothing, and 
equipment of our superb young fighting men. 
I questioned General Westmoreland very 
closely on these matters. His response was 
extremely gratifying to me. 

Fourth, the national reconciliation pro- 
gram in Viet-Nam. 

Fifth, the land reform program, which is 
moving steadily forward. Premier Ky told 
me that he had distributed 27,000 titles just 

Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and 
what is being done to help those who are 
injured or who are wounded by the war. 

Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an 
end to this conflict by an honorable settle- 

We did not adopt any specific or spec- 
tacular new programs at this meeting. The 
nature of this war is not amenable to spec- 
tacular programs or easy solutions. It re- 
quires courage, perseverance, and dedication. 

During my flight home I learned that 
Hanoi had made public an exchange of let- 
ters between me and Ho Chi Minh.'' His reply 
to me of mid-February and his earlier public 
reply to His Holiness the Pope were regret- 
table rebuffs to a genuine effort to move to- 
ward peace. This has been the consistent atti- 
tude of Hanoi to many efforts by us, by other 
governments, by groups of governments, and 
by leading personalities throughout the 
world. Nevertheless, we shall persevere in 
our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until 
that is achieved, of course, we shall con- 
tinue to do our duty in Viet-Nam. 

' See p. 595. 



President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation 
on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi IVIinh 

On March 21 the Department of State 
made public the text of a letter from Presi- 
dent Johnson to Ho Chi Minh, President of 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, after 
the text of that letter and President Ho's 
reply had been broadcast in English by Radio 
Hanoi earlier that day. The letters were ex- 
changed in February through officials of the 
American and North Vietnamese Embassies 
in Moscow. President Johnson's letter was 
delivered there on February 8, and the reply 
on Febmary 15. 

Following is a Department statement of 
March 21, together with the texts of the two 


President Johnson did write to President 
Ho Chi Minh a letter delivered to the North 
Vietnamese in Moscow on February 8. 

This personal letter from President John- 
son reaffirmed earlier proposals made on four 
occasions by the United States Government 
to Hanoi through representatives in Moscow, 
commencing in early January. These pro- 
posals called attention to the upcoming Tet 
cease-fire and urged direct talks aimed at re- 
solving this Viet-Nam conflict. Other than a 
diatribe against the United States, delivered 
on January 27, no response at all was re- 
ceived to these proposals prior to that of Feb- 
ruary 15 by President Ho Chi Minh. 

' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 21 by the 
Department spokesman. 


President Johnson's Letter 

His Excellency 
Ho Chi Minh 


Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

Dear Mr, President : I am writing to you 
in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can 
be brought to an end. That conflict has 
already taken a heavy toll — in lives lost, in 
wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and 
in simple human misery. If we fail to find a 
just and peaceful solution, history will judge 
us harshly. 

Therefore, I believe that we both have a 
heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to 
peace. It is in response to that obligation that 
I am writing directly to you. 

We have tried over the past several years, 
in a variety of ways and through a number 
of channels, to convey to you and your col- 
leagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settle- 
ment. For whatever reasons, these efforts 
have not achieved any results. 

It may be that our thoughts and yours, our 
attitudes and yours, have been distorted or 
misinterpreted as they passed through these 
various channels. Certainly that is always a 
danger in indirect communication. 

There is one good way to overcome this 
problem and to move forward in the search 
for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to 
arrange for direct talks between trusted 
representatives in a secure setting and away 
from the glare of publicity. Such talks should 

APRIL 10, 1967 


not be used as a propaganda exercise but 
should be a serious effort to find a workable 
and mutually acceptable solution. 

In the past two weeks, I have noted public 
statements by representatives of your gov- 
ernment suggesting that you would be pre- 
pared to enter into direct bilateral talks with 
representatives of the U.S. Government, pro- 
vided that we ceased "unconditionally" and 
permanently our bombing operations against 
your country and all military actions against 
it. In the last day, serious and responsible 
parties have assured us indirectly that this 
is in fact your proposal. 

Let me frankly state that I see two great 
difficulties with this proposal. In view of 
your public position, such action on our part 
would inevitably produce worldwide specula- 
tion that discussions were under way and 
would impair the privacy and secrecy of 
those discussions. Secondly, there would 
inevitably be grave concern on our part 
whether your government would make use of 
such action by us to improve its military 

With these problems in mind, I am pre- 
pared to move even further towards an end- 
ing of hostilities than your Government has 
proposed in either public statements or 
through private diplomatic channels. I am 
prepared to order a cessation of bombing 
against your country and the stopping of 
further augmentation of U.S. forces in South 
Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infil- 
tration into South Viet-Nam by land and by 
sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on 
both sides would, I believe, make it possible 
for us to conduct serious and private discus- 
sions leading toward an early peace. 

I make this proposal to you now with a 
specific sense of urgency arising from the 
imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam. 
If you are able to accept this proposal I see 
no reason why it could not take effect at the 
end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The 
proposal I have made would be greatly 
strengthened if your military authorities and 
those of the Government of South Viet-Nam 
could promptly negotiate an extension of the 
Tet truce. 

As to the site of the bilateral discussions 

I propose, there are several possibilities. We ) 
could, for example, have our representatives t 
meet in Moscow where contacts have already ( 
occurred. They could meet in some other 
country such as Burma. You may have other 
arrangements or sites in mind, and I would 
try to meet your suggestions. 

The important thing is to end a conflict 
that has brought burdens to both our peoples, 
and above all to the people of South Viet- 
Nam. If you have any thoughts about the 
actions I propose, it would be most important 
that I receive them as soon as possible. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

President Ho Chi IMinli's Reply 


His Excellency 
Lyndon B. Johnson 
President of the United States 

Excellency, on February 10, 1967, I re- 
ceived your message. Here is my response. 

Viet-Nam is situated thousands of miles 
from the United States. The Vietnamese 
people have never done any harm to the 
United States. But, contrary to the commit- 
ments made by its representative at the 
Geneva Conference of 1954, the United 
States Government has constantly intervened 
in Viet-Nam, it has launched and intensified 
the war of aggression in South Viet-Nam for 
the purpose of prolonging the division of 
Viet-Nam and of transforming South Viet- 
Nam into an American neo-colony and an 
American military base. For more than two 
years now, the American Government, with 
its military aviation and its navy, has been 
waging war against the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam, an independent and sovereign 

The United States Government has com- 
mitted war crimes, crimes against peace and 
against humanity. In South Viet-Nam a half- 
million American soldiers and soldiers from 
the satellite countries have resorted to the 
most inhumane arms and the most barbarous 
methods of warfare, such as napalm, chemi- 
cals, and poison gases in order to massacre 
our fellow countrymen, destroy the crops. 



and wipe out the villag-es. In North Viet-Nam 
thousands of American planes have rained 
down hundreds of thousands of tons of 
bombs, destroying cities, villages, mills, 
roads, bridges, dikes, dams and even 
churches, pagodas, hospitals, and schools. In 
your message you appear to deplore the suf- 
fering and the destruction in Viet-Nam. 
Permit me to ask you: Who perpetrated 
these monstrous crimes? It was the Ameri- 
can soldiers and the soldiers of the satellite 
countries. The United States Government is 
entirely responsible for the extremely grave 
situation in Viet-Nam. 

The American war of aggression against 
the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge 
to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat 
to the peoples' independent movement, and a 
grave danger to peace in Asia and in the 

The Vietnamese people deeply love inde- 
pendence, liberty, and peace. But in the face 
of the American aggression they have risen 
up as one man, without fearing the sacrifices 
and the privations. They are determined to 
continue their resistance until they have won 
real independence and liberty and true peace. 
Our just cause enjoys the approval and the 
powerful support of peoples throughout the 
world and of large segments of the American 

The United States Government provoked 
the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. It must 
cease that aggression, it is the only road lead- 
ing to the re-establishment of peace. The 
United States Government must halt defini- 
tively and unconditionally the bombings and 
all other acts of war against the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South 
Viet-Nam all American troops and all troops 
from the satellite countries, recognize the 
National Front of the Liberation of South 
Viet-Nam, and let the Vietnamese people set- 
tle their problems themselves. Such is the 
basic content of the four-point position of the 
Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam, such is the statement of the essen- 
tial principles and essential arrangements of 
the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Viet-Nam. 
It is the basis for a correct political solution 
of the Vietnamese problem. In your message 

you suggested direct talks between the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United 
States. If the United States Government 
really wants talks, it must first halt uncon- 
ditionally the bombings and all other acts of 
war against the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam. It is only after the unconditional 
halting of the American bombings and of all 
other American acts of war against the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the 
United States could begin talks and discuss 
questions affecting the two parties. 

The Vietnamese people will never give way 
to force, it will never accept conversation 
under the clear threat of bombs. 

Our cause is absolutely just. It is desirable 
that the Government of the United States act 
in conformity to reason. 

Ho Chi Minh 

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission 
To Use U Tapao Airbase 

Statement by Secretary Rusk ^ 

I invite your attention to an announcement 
made in Bangkok this morning [March 22] 
regarding the Thai Government's agreement 
to permit the U.S. Air Force to use the Thai 
airbase at U Tapao. 

In this connection, the President has asked 
me to express his deep appreciation, and that 
of the American people, for the very great 
contribution which Thailand is making to the 
common cause in Southeast Asia. No country 
has been stronger in its support for the con- 
cept of collective security, and no country has 
been quicker to recognize that collective secu- 
rity carries obligations as well as benefits. 

Thailand was among the first to send 
troops to repel aggression in Korea. Thailand 
has provided air and naval units to assist in 
the defense of its neighbor, the Republic of 

' Read U> news correspondents by the Department 
spokesman on Mar. 22 (press release 73). 

APRIL 10, 1967 


Viet-Nam, and the Thai Government recently 
announced its decision to send, in addition, a 
ground combat unit to Viet-Nam. It is worth 
noting that when the Thai Government called 
for a thousand volunteers for this unit, more 
than 30,000 Thai young men responded. 

Another great contribution which Thailand 
has made to the Allied war effort in Viet- 
Nam is the use of Thai military installations 
and facilities by United States military 
forces. The military installations and facili- 
ties are made available by Thailand as a 
member of SEATO and are critically impor- 
tant to us as we carry out our part of the 
war effort. U.S. Air Force planes flying from 
Thai bases at Takhli, Udorn, Korat, Ubon, 
and Nakorn Phanom are of immeasurable 
importance in meeting the aggression against 
South Viet-Nam. The completion of the air 
base at U Tapao and the Thai Government's 
decision to permit its use by B-52's will 
greatly increase the effectiveness of our air 

When the President was in Bangkok last 
October he acknowledged that the Thai con- 
tribution to the common defense involved 
risks for Thailand. At that time the President 

Let me assure you in this regard that Thailand 
can count on the United States to meet its obliga- 
tions under the SEATO treaty. The commitment 
of the United States under the SEATO treaty is 
not of a particular political party or administra- 
tion in my country, but of America as a nation. 
And I repeat to you: America keeps its commit- 

Thailand has made other great contribu- 
tions to security and stability in the area. Its 
determination to defeat through its own 
efforts the attempts by Peking and Hanoi to 
create insurgency in Thailand is wholly ad- 
mirable. Despite this costly and difficult 
effort, the Thai have achieved remarkable 
internal economic growth and development. 
And they have been a leader in the movement 
to create institutions of regional cooperation 

' For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner 
at Bangkok on Oct. 28, 1966, see Bulletin of Nov. 
21, 1966, p. 767. 

which manifest the new spirit of hope that is 
growing in Asia today. 

Thailand, which is known the world over 
for its devotion to its national independence, 
can take special pride in its contribution to 
fostering this new spirit of hope. 

By its action today, Thailand has shown 
once again that it knows, as does the United 
States, that it is by standing together as 
allies that we preserve our own independence 
and freedom. 

Pacific Islands Trust Territory 

White House Announcements 


White House press release (Guam) dated March 21 

The President met on March 21 with High 
Commissioner William Norwood and other 
officials of the government of the Trust Ter- 
ritory of the Pacific Islands. Commissioner 
Norwood and his associates came to Guam 
at the President's invitation to brief him on 
conditions and prospects in the territory, 
which is administered by the United States 
under the supervision of the United Nations. 
The territory consists of more than 2,000 
islands in the Mariana, Caroline, and Mar- 
shall groupings. 

The discussion centered on economic and 
social progress. Commissioner Norwood gave 
the President a detailed account of recent ad- 
vances in such critical fields as health and 
education. He also discussed the important 
role in these efforts being played by the 
Peace Corps, which has nearly 500 volun- 
teers now at work in the territory. 

The President also congratulated Mr. Nor- 
wood and his colleagues on the quickening 
pace of political development reflected in the 
formation of the Congress of Micronesia and 
in the increasing numbers of Micronesians 
who are assuming responsible positions in 
the government. 



The President expressed the full support 
of the American people for these encourag- 
ing developments. He urged Commissioner 
Nonvood to press forward with the govern- 
ment's consideration of an economic develop- 
ment plan for the territory. He cited as 
evidence of U.S. support the recent Senate 
passage of the administration-proposed bill 
lifting the ceiling on financial support to the 
territoiy. He expressed confidence that the 
House would also act favorably. 

In thanking Commissioner Norwood for 
his presentation, the President said: 

"Although I very much regret that time 
won't permit a personal visit to the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands, I believe that 
Commissioner Norwood's impressive analysis 
has given me a vivid sense of the progressive 
spirit now at work in Micronesia. Under his 
inspired leadership, I am confident that the 
people of the trust territory can look forward 
to new victories in the never-ending battle 
against poverty, ignorance, and disease. 

"Mr. Norwood has the support of every 
American in this noble cause." 


White House prees release (Guam) dated March 21 

The President on March 21 declared a 
major disaster for the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands because of damages caused by 
Typhoon Sally. He made available Federal 
funds in the amount of $750,000 for disaster 
assistance in the affected areas. 

Koror and Babelthuap are two small 
islands in the Palau District of the trust ter- 
ritory, located approximately 250 miles 
southwest of Guam. These islands suffered 
severe damage when typhoon winds roared 
through the island on March 2. 

Emergency mass care services are being 
furnished by the trust territory government 
assisted by the military and the American 
National Red Cross. The Department of Ag- 
riculture has provided large quantities of 
surplus foods to feed disaster victims. 

The President's major disaster declaration 

and allocation of funds will permit Federal 
assistance for the recovery and rehabilitation 
of the devastated areas. These funds will be 
used for the repair or replacement of public 
facilities damaged or destroyed in the disas- 

This program of assistance authorized un- 
der the Federal Disaster Act (Public Law 
81-875) is administered by the Office of 
Emergency Planning. The OEP Region 7 
office in Santa Rosa, Calif., is coordinating 
Federal disaster relief activities in the trust 

U.S. Mission Ciiiefs in Europe 
iVIeet at Bonn 

The Department of State announced on 
March 24 (press release 65) that a 4-day 
conference of chiefs of American diplomatic 
missions in Europe would be held at Bonn, 
Germany, from March 28 to 31. The meeting 
brought together American ambassadors 
from 30 diplomatic posts in the European 

Vice President Humphrey attended a part 
of the conference sessions on March 29-30. 

Under Secretary Katzenbach left Washing- 
ton March 29 to chair the last day of the con- 
ference. The earlier sessions were chaired by 
John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs. 

The meeting is one of a series of regional 
meetings called periodically in different 
parts of the world by the Department of 
State to permit American ambassadors 
abroad to discuss questions of mutual interest 
and exchange views with senior Washington 
officials. The last such conference of all 
American ambassadors in Europe was held 
at Bonn in 1963. A meeting of U.S. ambas- 
sadors to NATO countries took place at The 
Hague in 1965. 

' For a list of the chiefs of American missions 
in Europe, see Department press release 65 dated 
Mar. 24. 

APRIL 10, 1967 



Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge 
Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty 

Following are statements made by Secre- 
tary Rusk and Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on March 7.^ 


Press release 46 dated March 7 

It gives me great pleasure to be here to- 
day to discuss with you the recently signed 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi- 
ties of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies.^ 

I am delighted to be associated today with 
my Cabinet colleague, our distinguished 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur 
Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg handled 
our side of the negotiation of this treaty 
with great skill and dedication and is em- 
inently qualified to go over its contents with 
you in detail. Since my remarks are in the 
nature of an introduction of Ambassador 
Goldberg, I shall make them brief. 

In my view, the interests and security of 
the United States would be advanced by its 
ratification. Perhaps of greatest significance 
is the fact that there is a treaty at all. 
Negotiations were proposed only last May, 
when President Johnson urged that steps be 
taken to negotiate a treaty on celestial 
bodies.^ On the proposal of the Soviet Union, 
negotiations were expanded to draw on 
previous United Nations resolutions and to 
include all of outer space as well as celestial 

bodies within the scope of the treaty. We 
welcomed that proposal as forthcoming and 
responsive to the problems that confront 

The negotiations proceeded in a business- 
like fashion, with a minimum of polemics, 
and were successfully concluded in a remark- 
ably short time, considering the treaty's 
comprehensive nature. The conclusion of this 
treaty, we feel, augurs well for the possibility 
of finding areas of common interest and 
agreement with the Soviet Union on other 
significant issues — especially in those fields 
in which there are genuine common interests 
affecting all mankind. 

The Antarctic Treaty * and the limited test 
ban treaty ^ are examples of a congruence of 
common interests among the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and many other countries. 
The Outer Space Treaty is the most recent 
example of a successful identification of com- 
mon interests and their expression in a 
mutually acceptable legal instrument. 

It is our earnest desire and our basic policy 
to continue to explore with the Soviet Union 
and others additional ways of reducing the 
danger of conflict and of promoting stability 
and security in the world. Progress in achiev- 
ing this aim may not be rapid, and it is not 

' The complete hearings will be published by the 

' S. Ex. D, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953. 

' For a statement by President Johnson on May 7, 
1966, see ibid., June 6, 1966, p. 900. 

* For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914. 

» For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239. 



inevitable. But it is possible, and it is more 
urgrent than many think. A task of prime im- 
portance at this time is the conclusion of a 
treaty to prevent the further spread of 
nuclear weapons. We are working hard on 
tliat treaty. Similarly, we should like to make 
progress on an agreement to limit the pro- 
spective race in offensive and defensive mis- 
siles and are pleased that the Soviet Union 
has indicated its willingness to participate in 
serious discussions. 

The Outer Space Treaty now before this 
committee emerged from the processes of the 
United Nations and its General Assembly. 
The treaty is a positive result of the political 
process which the General Assembly has de- 
veloped over the course of years. It indicates 
the manner in which standards of behavior 
and, indeed, rules of international law can 
result from the deliberations of the General 

The antecedents of the Outer Space Treaty 
are, I believe, generally familiar to you. They 
are the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the United 
Nations Declaration of Legal Principles Gov- 
erning the Activities of States in the Ex- 
ploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions in 1963; * and the resolution adopted 
by the General Assembly in 1963 that calls 
upon states not to station weapons of mass 
destruction in space — whether in orbit 
around the earth, on celestial bodies, or other- 

This treaty represents a synthesis of the 
experience of nations since the beginning of 
the space age. There has been, for almost 8 
years, an earnest effort to articulate and de- 
fine the general standards of behavior that 
should govern states in the use of outer 
space and celestial bodies. The standards de- 
veloped in the Outer Space Treaty represent 
a balance of rights and obligations between 
nations conducting space activities and those 
who do not. The treaty contains provisions 
of immediate applicability and others that 
will assume greater importance as the activ- 
ities of states develop in outer space. Finally, 

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012. 
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754. 

the treaty provides for arms control meas- 
ures that will promote our security today 
and will be of increasing importance in years 
to come. 

Establishing a balance between rights and 
obligations was of pai'ticular concern to the 
treaty negotiators. It was recognized that 
while only a limited number of states might 
enter outer space, such activities could affect 
the well-being of all on this planet and in 
the earth's environment. Further, it was rec- 
ognized that when man extends his activities 
beyond this earth, he ought to do so as 
more than just the representative of a sin- 
gle nation-state. Thus the treaty speaks of 
astronauts as "envoys of mankind" and con- 
siders the exploration and use of space and 
celestial bodies to be for the benefit of all 
mankind. Knowledge derived from space will 
be made available to scientists of all nations. 
The importance of avoiding harmful contami- 
nation of the earth as well as of celestial 
bodies is dealt with in the treaty. The pro- 
visions on liability, interference with other 
countries' space activities, and assistance to 
and return of astronauts are part of the bal- 
ance of rights and obligations which are char- 
acteristic of any successful negotiating 

The treaty is balanced, as well, between 
principles having immediate application and 
others whose usefulness will be in future 
years. Among the principles of immediate im- 
portance are the provisions on liability, the 
obligation unconditionally to assist and to re- 
turn astronauts, and the obligation to report 
any findings that bear on the safety of astro- 
nauts. These can be of direct importance in 
the carrying forward of our space program. 
Among the broad principles that will grow 
in significance are those applying interna- 
tional law and the United Nations Charter 
to the activities of states in outer space, in- 
suring freedom of exploration, and barring 
national appropriation of outer space and 
celestial bodies. 

Finally, the treaty's arms control provi- 
sions are of immediate and particular im- 
portance to our national security. Parties to 
the treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 

APRIL 10, 1967 


weapons or any other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction, install such weapons on 
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in 
outer space in any other manner. Parties 
to the treaty undertake as well to use the 
moon and other celestial bodies exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. They undertake not to 
establish military bases, installations, or for- 
tifications, and to abstain from testing any 
types of weapons or conducting military 
maneuvers on celestial bodies. There is, of 
course, no prohibition on the use of military 
personnel and equipment for peaceful pur- 

Concomitant with these arms control meas- 
ures, the treaty contains provisions which, 
together with our own developing national 
capabilities, will permit adequate verifica- 
tion that the treaty is being observed. Arti- 
cle I permits free access to all areas of celes- 
tial bodies. Article XII provides that all 
stations, installations, equipment, and space 
vehicles on the moon and other celestial 
bodies shall be open to representatives of 
other parties to the treaty. In addition, outer 
space and celestial bodies are declared free 
for exploration and use by all states, and 
the treaty provides that outer space is not 
subject to national appropriation. Under the 
treaty, space vehicles of the United States 
will be free to go anywhere in outer space, 
on the moon or other celestial bodies. The 
problems of military security related to this 
treaty have been examined with great care. 
The conclusion of the executive branch, in- 
cluding those with special responsibility for 
military and defense matters, is that the 
treaty will contribute to this country's se- 

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the attempt 
to develop law and a peaceful world order 
constitutes a necessary element in United 
States policy. These are essential goals of the 
United Nations as well. The Outer Space 
Treaty establishes the basis for a legal regime 
to govern the activities of states in outer 

The treaty is not complete in all possible 
details. It does not deal with all problems 
that may develop. But it is responsive to those 

problems that can be described and forecast 

This treaty demonstrates that man's skill 
at making law can keep pace with his tech- 
nological prowess. The treaty succeeds in sub- 
stantial measure in establishing the neces- 
sary standards for reducing the dangers of 
military conflict in outer space and for en- 
couraging its peaceful exploration. 

I venture to hope that this treaty may 
serve as an impressive model for cooperation 
among the nations — a cooperation that is 
essential if the world is going to escape de- 
struction by conflict and if it is going to make 
headway in conquering disease and poverty, 
in relating population rationally to means 
of decent livelihood, and in off"ering all men 
proper scope for their talents and energies. 


U.S./U.N. press release 23 dated March 7 

I welcome this opportunity to give testi- 
mony to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
on the Outer Space Treaty. In this statement 
I shall first briefly sum up the most important 
provisions of the treaty, then indicate what 
seem to me its main points of significance to 
our national interest and security, and 
finally, discuss in somewhat more detail the 
history of our negotiations. 

I. Major Provisions 

In sum, the treaty's most important provi- 
sions can be stated as follows: 

1. In the area of arms control, it forbids 
the orbiting or stationing in outer space or on 
celestial bodies of nuclear or other weapons 
of mass destruction. It specifies that the 
moon and other celestial bodies are to be used 
only for peaceful purposes and forbids cer- 
tain military activities on celestial bodies. 
Further, it guarantees access, without veto, 
by each party to the installations and ve- 
hicles of other parties on celestial bodies. It 
insures, as well, freedom of movement any- 
where in outer space and on celestial bodies. 

2. The treaty declares outer space to be the 
"province of all mankind" and forbids claims 
of sovereignty to outer space or the moon or 



any other celestial body. It explicitly extends 
the rule of international law, including the 
charter, into the newly entered realm of outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial 

3. The treaty furthers peaceful coopera- 
tion in a number of ways. It assures freedom 
of scientific investigation in outer space and 
commits the parties to promote international 
cooperation to this end. It guarantees free- 
dom of access to all parts of celestial bodies. 
It requires the fullest practicable reporting 
by all states on the nature, conduct, locations, 
and results of their space activities. It calls 
for avoidance of space activities that would 
contaminate celestial bodies or do harm to 
the earth's environment. It forbids harmful 
interference with another's space activities 
and calls for appropriate consultation. And 
it declares as a general principle that the 
exploration and use of outer space "shall be 
carried out for the benefit and in the interests 
of all countries." 

4. Finally, the treaty affords Important 
protections to astronauts. They are to be re- 
garded as envoys of all mankind. In outer 
space, astronauts of different nations are re- 
quired to assist one another. If an astronaut 
makes an emergency landing on foreign ter- 
ritory, he must be given all possible assist- 
ance and must be returned home safely and 
promptly. And any hazard to astronauts that 
is discovered in outer space must be made 
known immediately by the party making the 

That is not intended to be a complete list 
of the treaty's provisions, but I believe it 
covers those that are most significant. 

II. Advantages to the United States 

The Outer Space Treaty contributes sub- 
stantially not only to the fabric of common 
interests and peace in the community of na- 
tions but also, and particularly, to the na- 
tional interest and security of the United 
States. Many of its provisions, indeed, have 
been objectives of our diplomacy since the 
earliest years of the space age. Some are of 
immediate and concrete value; others are 
very broad principles whose ultimate value 

may not be fully realized for many years, 
until mankind has greatly multiplied its pres- 
ent activity in the new realm of outer space. 

The advantages to the United States are, as 
I see them, of four kinds: 

1. Arms control. President Johnson has 
called this treaty "the most important arms 
control development since the limited test 
ban treaty of 1963." ^ Unlike the nuclear tests 
which were outlawed by the 1963 treaty, the 
military measures in outer space which this 
treaty will outlaw are measures that have 
never been taken. But nobody can say with 
confidence that they might not be taken; and 
this treaty forbids such measures. Surely it 
is much better and infinitely easier to close 
the door to the arms race before it enters a 
new dimension than to attempt to root it out 
once it has become established. 

Moreover, beyond its intrinsic value as an 
arms control measure, this treaty raises 
hopes for further steps along this road. In 
writing the arms control provisions of the 
Outer Space Treaty we drew inspiration and 
guidance from the corresponding provisions 
of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, as well as 
from the limited test ban treaty. Thus this is, 
in a very real sense, the third in a historic 
succession of treaties limiting the arms race. 
It is our hope that this success will, in turn, 
help to smooth the way for the next major 
step which we now urgently seek to take in 
agreement with the Soviet Union and any 
other powers concerned; namely, the treaty 
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Each of these steps will give the United 
States — and the community of nations — ^more 
security at less cost. 

2. International order. The entire Outer 
Space Treaty vdll help to strengthen interna- 
tional order and promote habits of peaceful 
cooperation — not only in the new realm of 
outer space itself but in the many space- 
related activities here on earth. 

The treaty promotes these ends, first, by 
seeking to remove both the means and the 
causes of conflict in outer space. The arms 
control provisions operate in this sense. So 

' For a statement by President Johnson on Dec. 8, 
1966, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952. 

APRIL 10, 1967 


do those provisions which extend interna- 
tional law into the realm of outer space and 
forbid claims of sovereignty in that realm. 
By thus seeking to minimize the hazards of 
human conflict in outer space, we hope to 
free our astronauts to concentrate on the 
natural hazards and challenges of this new 
environment — and to work together in over- 
coming them. 

The treaty also contains provisions to pro- 
mote international cooperation in the con- 
quest of space for common benefit. Although 
we are still in an early stage of growth in 
space science and technology, we already 
know that in such major fields as communica- 
tions, weather forecasting, and navigation no 
nation can reap the full benefits of space 
technology except by joining in international 
cooperative ventures. In this sense the Outer 
Space Treaty is in the same line of historical 
development as the many treaties and agree- 
ments which govern the day-to-day essentials 
of modern life — which assure that interna- 
tional mail is delivered, that ships do not col- 
lide in the night, that epidemic diseases do 
not cross frontiers, and so on. All these 
instruments have a double value. Not only 
do they bring their various practical bene- 
fits; they also, when taken together, make up 
the very strong fabric of community life 
among the nations — binding nations together 
by their practical common interests and con- 
stituting a powerful, though little-noticed, 
discouragement to war and incentive to 

3. United States-Soviet relations. All these 
considerations have a special importance in 
their bearing on our evolving relations with 
the Soviet Union. It is significant that the 
country which has for many years been our 
major adversary and a major source of 
danger to our security has also emerged as 
the only other nation with a space program 
comparable in size and scope to our own. 
Moreover, this has happened at a time when 
some of the sharp edges of Soviet hostility 
against the non-Communist world have begun 
to wear down, enabling them perhaps to see 
their own true interests in a somewhat dif- 
ferent light and to discuss with non-Commu- 


nist nations, including ourselves, new areas 
of common interests. 

This treaty, following on the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959 and the limited test ban treaty 
of 1963, is one further step in translating 
some of these common interests into concrete 
and enduring agreements. We should not 
exaggerate the impact on history of any one 
of these treaties in isolation; but it would be 
hard indeed to overstate the general tendency 
to which they all contribute — that of a 
growth of peace and tolerance and openness 
among the Soviet Union, the other nations 
associated with it in Eastern Europe, and 
the non-Communist nations. I believe that 
this long-term trend will be advanced by this 

4. Interests of nonlaunching powers. 
Finally, I believe this treaty is helpful to the 
interests of the United States in that it also 
serves and protects the interests of the non- 
launching powers. While we have cooperative 
programs of space research with a large 
number of countries, many nations have little 
or no space program of their own; yet their 
cooperation in the conquest of space is im- 
portant in a number of ways, and it was 
essential to a meaningful treaty that it make 
equitable provision for the protection of their 
interests rather than concentrate too nar- 
rowly on the particular concerns of the major 
space powers. Moreover, all countries, 
whether space powers or not, have a great 
stake in peace and in measures of arms con- 
trol to enhance the security of all. 

In this connection we were fortunate in 
having as our negotiating framework the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space. This body was created 
by the General Assembly in 1961, at the joint 
initiative of the United States and the 
U.S.S.R., to deal with both the legal and the 
scientific and technical implications of this 
new activity. Understandably, the major 
negotiating issues, which I shall discuss in a 
moment, arose between the leading space 
powers. But the delegates of other powers 
also took an active part in the writing of the 

As a result, these other powers can have 


confidence that the obligations which they 
assume under the treaty, such as the return 
of astronauts or space vehicles landing on 
their soil, are fully balanced by provisions 
protecting their rights and providing them 
\vith concrete benefits. Among the most im- 
portant of these are the hope expressed that 
space will be explored and used "for the bene- 
fit and in the interests of all countries" and 
the explicit assurance of the right of all 
states, without discrimination and on a basis 
of equality, to explore freely and use outer 
space and celestial bodies. These areas thus 
cannot become the exclusive preserve of the 
big powers or the first arrivals. 

Numerous other provisions of the treaty, 
such as those on liability and contamination, 
protect the interests of the smaller powers. 
As a matter of principle as well as of prag- 
matism, I believe it is very much in the 
interest of the United States that the non- 
launching powers, whose cooperation and 
friendship are of great importance to us, 
should have such protections and assurances. 

III. Development of the Treaty 

Let me now give the committee some high- 
lights of the history of this treaty, both 
within the United States Government and in 
the negotiating phase. 

As far as the United States Government is 
concerned, this treaty is the result, over the 
years, of a broadly based consensus and of 
wide consultation and collaboration. This has 
been true as between political parties, as be- 
tween the Executive and the Congress, and 
as between the executive departments. 

The bipartisan origins of the treaty, as 
well as the early congressional interest in it, 
are attested to by the fact that the earliest 
initiatives toward international agreement in 
this area were taken by President Eisen- 
hower and by the then majority leader of the 
Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson — who was also at 
that time the chairman of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. 
Ever since that time the successive steps to- 
ward this treaty have been taken on a bi- 
partisan basis and in the closest consultation 
between the Executive and the concerned 

committees of Congress. This was true dur- 
ing the negotiation in Geneva last July and 
August, when two of our congressional ad- 
visers, Chairman George Miller of the Com- 
mittee on Science and Astronautics and Rep- 
resentative James Fulton, came to Geneva. 
The advice and counsel provided by Members 
of the Senate in Washington and New York 
at various stages of the negotiations were 
likewise deeply appreciated. 

As for the executive branch, the nature of 
the subject made necessary the close collabo- 
ration of a number of executive departments 
and agencies. This collaboration was evi- 
denced by the composition of my negotiating 
delegation which included representatives of 
the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
NASA, the AEC, ACDA, and the Depart- 
ment of State. From my standpoint as a 
negotiator this collaboration has been most 
successful, and I cannot speak too highly of 
the participation and advice we received 
from all parts of the Government during the 
negotiating phase. 

I am not going to go into the whole history 
of the work on this treaty within the Govern- 
ment, which started almost with the begin- 
ning of the space age. A recent stimulus for 
these preparations was the developing pace 
of United States and Soviet activities directed 
toward the landing of astronauts on the 
moon. In October of 1965 the State Depart- 
ment circulated the text of a proposed treaty 
to other executive agencies including the De- 
partment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and 
the National Aeronautics and Space Council. 
Subsequent interdepartmental consultations 
proceeded into the early months of 1966 and 
resulted in a number of changes in the pro- 
posed text. 

On May 7, 1966, President Johnson made 
an announcement drawing attention to the 
need for a treaty laying down rules and pro- 
cedures for the exploration of celestial bodies 
and calling for early international discussions 
to this end. He pointed out that the United 
States wanted to do what it could to see that 

APRIL 10, 1967 


serious political conflicts did not arise as a 
result of space activities and to insure that 
astronauts would be able freely to conduct 
scientific investigations of the moon. 

The President's announcement proposed 
six elements of such a treaty: (1) freedom 
of exploration, (2) prohibition of claims of 
sovereignty, (3) freedom of scientific investi- 
gation and international cooperation, (4) 
studies to avoid harmful contamination, (5) 
mutual assistance among astronauts in case 
of need, and (6) a ban on the stationing of 
weapons of mass destruction, weapons tests, 
and military maneuvers on celestial bodies. 

Mr. Chairman, each and every one of these 
six elements is included in the treaty now 
before the committee. 

On May 9 I informed the Chairman of the 
United Nations Outer Space Committee, Am- 
bassador Kurt Waldheim of Austria, of the 
President's statement and requested an early 
session of the 28-member Legal Subcommit- 
tee to prepare a treaty for submission to the 
General Assembly in the fall.' On May 11 I 
gave the permanent representative of the 
Soviet Union at the United Nations an out- 
line of our points for inclusion in the pro- 
posed treaty. We also consulted widely with 
other members of the Legal Subcommittee. 

The first response from the U.S.S.R. came 
on May 30 in the form of a letter from For- 
eign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko to Sec- 
retary-General U Thant. This letter asked 
that the matter of a celestial bodies treaty be 
taken up by the General Assembly in the 
fall. It was very encouraging to us; because 
not only did we and the Soviets apparently 
have in mind the same subject for a treaty — 
namely, activities on celestial bodies — but in 
addition the principles that they proposed for 
inclusion in the treaty were extremely close 
to ours. I therefore wrote to Ambassador 
Waldheim on June 16 ^'' proposing that the 
Outer Space Legal Subcommittee be convened 
on July 12 so as to begin work without de- 
lay. This proposal was quickly agreed to. 

• For text of Ambassador Goldberg's letter of May 
9, 1966, see ibid., June 6, 1966, p. 900. 
"/bid., July 11, 1966, p. 60. 

Meanwhile, on June 16, both we and the 
Soviet Union made public proposed treaty 
texts.ii With regard to the scope of the drafts, 
both texts dealt with activities on celestial 
bodies. The Soviet text also included provi- 
sions on the regulation of activities in outer 
space generally. These were drawn from two 
major resolutions of the General Assembly: 
the "no bombs in orbit" resolution ^^ and the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space. Both these resolu- 
tions had been unanimously adopted by the 
Assembly in 1963 as a result of United States 
initiatives. The principles they contained are 
among the most important in the treaty. 

It should be recalled, however, that the 
Outer Space Treaty embodies major provi- 
sions that were not in the 1963 resolutions. 
Of prime importance among these are the 
prohibition on use of celestial bodies for 
specified military activities, the guarantee of 
open and veto-free access by space powers to 
each other's installations on celestial bodies, 
and the provision for full reporting of space 

The treaty negotiations in the Legal Sub- 
committee opened at the European headquar- 
ters of the United Nations in Geneva on the 
agreed date, July 12. They ran until August 
4 and, after a brief adjournment, resumed in 
New York from September 12 through 
September 16. Great progress had been made, 
but the treaty was still some distance from 
completion. During September, October, and 
November, the U.S. delegation held detailed 
private consultations with many members of 
the Legal Subcommittee, including, of 
course, the Soviet Union. As a result of these 
consultations, agreement on the treaty text 
was finally reached in early December. 

In accordance with United Nations proce- 
dures, the completed space treaty then made 
its appearance in the Political Committee of 
the General Assembly in a resolution co- 
sponsored by 43 members of the United Na/- 
tions, among them many members of the 
Outer Space Committee, including the United 

" For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see ibid., p. 61. 
"Ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754. 



states, the United Kingdom, France, and the 
Soviet Union. The resolution commended the 
treaty, requested the depositaiy governments 
to open it for signature and ratification at the 
earliest possible date, and expressed the hope 
for the widest possible adherence. 

The General Assembly adopted this reso- 
lution by acclamation on December 19.1^ The 
treaty was then perfected in French, Spanish, 
and Chinese — with indispensable help from 
the United Nations Secretariat. On January 
27 it was opened for signature simultaneously 
in Washington, London, and Moscow. At the 
ceremony in Washington ^* 60 states signed 
the treaty, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The 
total number of signatories at present is 75. 

IV. Principal Issues in the Negotiations 

With the committee's permission, I shall 
now discuss certain issues that arose during 
the negotiations, in which the Soviet view dif- 
fered from our own and agreement was 
reached after experiencing some difficulty. 

My purpose is not to lay undue stress on 
the difficulties we encountered, because the 
fact is that the negotiations as a whole went 
very smoothly and rapidly and were marked 
by a spirit of accommodation and a willing- 
ness on all sides to compromise without sacri- 
ficing fundamental principles. Moreover, the 
importance of a given provision cannot 
always be measured by the difficulty in reach- 
ing agreement on it. A number of the major 
provisions which I mentioned at the outset of 
this statement, and which are important to 
our interests, were agreed on with little or 
no difficulty. 

However, I do believe that some account 
of the main issues on which there has been 
difficulty and of how they were resolved may 
be useful to the committee in forming its own 
judgment on the overall value of the treaty. 
These points related to (1) access to installa- 
tions on celestial bodies, (2) limitations on 
specified military activities on celestial 
bodies, (3) requests by launching powers for 

tracking facilities, (4) liability for damage 
resulting from space launchings, and (5) the 
unconditional obligation to return astronauts 
who land on foreign territory or on the high 

1. Access to installations on celestial 
bodies. The United States treaty draft of 
June 16 proposed that 

All areas of celestial bodies including all stations, 
installations, equipment, and space vehicles on celes- 
tial bodies, shall be open at all times to repre- 
sentatives of other States conducting activities on 
celestial bodies. 

We considered such a guarantee of openness 
to be fundamental to the treaty. Specifically, 
it was necessary in order to verify compliance 
with the prohibition against the placing of 
weapons of mass destruction on celestial 
bodies and the limitation on specified military 
activities there. 

The first Soviet treaty proposal did not 
contain any provision on open access. After 
considerable discussion in Geneva, the 
U.S.S.R. accepted in principle our proposal 
that there should be open access and agreed 
that such access should apply to all areas of 
celestial bodies and to all stations, installa- 
tions, equipment, and space vehicles placed 
on such bodies. 

However, the U.S.S.R. raised two difficul- 
ties concerning this article. First, they in- 
sisted that there should be access only "on a 
basis of reciprocity." This phrase, in its 
usual meaning, was acceptable to us. Indeed, 
it is implied in every international agree- 
ment. But we had to be sure that the record 
would leave no doubt as to its meaning. After 
thorough discussion we reached agreement 
with the Soviet and other delegations on this 
point. I then made a statement in the Legal 
Subcommittee in Geneva on August 3 as to 
the meaning of the phrase.^^ I reiterated this 
interpretation in my statement of December 
17 to the Political Committee of the General 
Assembly,!^ the text of which is attached to 
the President's message." This statement 

" For text, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 83. 

" For background, see ibid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 266. 

" Ibid., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321. 
" Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78. 

" For President Johnson's message to the Senate 
on Feb. 7, see ibid.. Mar. 6, 1967, p. 386. 

APRIL 10, 1967 


was an authoritative, on-the-record interpre- 
tation of the treaty. It was not challenged in 
the debate, and the resolution commending 
the treaty was thereupon adopted by accla- 

In these clarifying statements I pointed 
out that the words "on a basis of reciprocity" 
in article XII do not import a veto. That is, 
they do not mean that State A may visit 
State B's facilities or installations on a celes- 
tial body only if B asks to visit those of A. 
On the contrary, "on a basis of reciprocity" 
merely states what would be true in any event 
under international law. Any party to the 
treaty has the right to visit installations of 
another party on a celestial body — whether 
or not the other party chooses to exercise its 
reciprocal right. If, however, the prospective 
visitor has illegally, and in violation of the 
treaty, barred visits to its facilities by the 
state whose installations it wishes to inspect, 
the second state may deny a visit to the 
breaching party. This result is simply an ap- 
plication of the principle that when one 
party breaches a material obligation which 
is owed to another party, the latter is entitled 
to withhold performance of a commensurate 
obligation which it would otherwise have 
owed to the first party. 

I might point out, in addition, that if any 
party were to deny access to its facilities and 
thus breach this basic provision of the 
treaty, other parties whose rights had thus 
been interfered with would be entitled to take 
action consistent with international law. Thus 
in the event of a material breach, a party 
would have the option of treating the 
entirety of its treaty obligations toward the 
breaching party as having come to an end, 
to be revived only upon remedial action by 
the defaulter. 

The second difficulty raised by the 
U.S.S.R. in regard to the access provision 
was its proposal that celestial bodies installa- 
tions should be open "subject to agreement 
between the parties with regard to the time 
of visit to such objects." I considered this 
proposal to be totally unacceptable. Such a 
provision could have been read as giving a 
party the right to withhold a visit indefinitely 

and thus achieve a veto in fact. The Soviets 
insisted that this was not their intention; but 
since we were dealing with a key provision 
of the treaty, it was essential that we fore- 
close any doubt as to the right of visitation. 

At this stage the Japanese and Italian 
delegates made a valuable point. They sug- 
gested that what the treaty needed was some 
guarantee that a visit would not jeopardize 
the safety of astronauts or normal function- 
ing of the installations being visited. On re- 
flection it seemed clear that the inspection 
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, from 
which our access language was drawn, were 
not in all respects appropriate for the Outer 
Space Treaty. This was especially true in 
view of the far greater difficulties and 
hazards of lunar exploration in contrast to 
Antarctic exploration — the extreme impor- 
tance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need 
for careful conservation of life-supporting 
systems, and the difficulty of surface travel. 
We would not want to receive a visit from the 
Soviets or any other party if that visit would 
jeopardize the lives of our astronauts. We 
also bore in mind the practical fact that for 
the foreseeable future it would be immensely 
difficult to engage in forbidden activities on 
the moon without detection. 

Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty thus 
embodies the practical solution that "reason- 
able advance notice of a projected visit" shall 
be given "in order that appropriate consul- 
tations may be held and that maximum pre- 
cautions may be taken to assure safety and 
to avoid interference with normal operations 
in the facility to be visited." There is no veto. 
I made this clear in a statement on the rec- 
ord on August 3 in the Legal Subcommittee 
in Geneva and on December 17 in the Gen- 
eral Assembly's Political Committee in New 
York. Again, no country dissented. 

Before leaving this matter of verification, 
let me make clear that the access provisions I 
have been discussing apply only to celestial 
bodies and are a safeguard against treaty 
violations in that context. The prohibition 
against placing weapons of mass destruction 
in orbit has no related provision dealing 
specifically with verification. The treaty 



leaves it open to individual countries to 
employ their own national means of verifica- 
tion. I understand that in his testimony Gen- 
eral Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chair- 
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] will state why, 
from the viewpoint of our armed services, 
the prohibition on orbiting nuclear weapons 
is desirable. Accordingly, I do not propose to 
go into this matter. But speaking for the 
administration, after close consultation with 
the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and NASA, I want to stress that the 
executive branch is agreed that our national 
interest is served by this provision. 

To this I might add that if we had no 
treaty prohibition against orbiting nuclear 
weapons, the Soviet Union would have no 
legal inhibition in this area of any kind what- 
ever. Our situation could therefore only be 
worsened if the treaty failed to include this 
prohibition. It is our judgment that the 
existence of the prohibition will tend to limit 
the arms race, help make the problem of 
nuclear weapons more manageable, and 
thereby assist the growth of international 
security. It will help avoid a costly and 
dangerous new area of weapons deployment. 

2. Limitations on specified military activi- 
ties on celestial bodies. In developing our 
position as to permissible activities on celes- 
tial bodies, we drew heavily on the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959. The prohibitions on specified 
types of military activities in that treaty have 
stood the test of time. Interestingly enough, 
the first Soviet proposal also reflected shared 
Antarctic experience. 

The United States, following closely the 
Antarctic Treaty, proposed that the establish- 
ment of military fortifications, the carrying 
out of military maneuvers, and the testing of 
weapons on celestial bodies be prohibited and 
that the treaty should also state the matter 
affirmatively by calling for celestial bodies to 
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. 

Now, in offering these proposals we clearly 
and candidly recognized that military person- 
nel and military equipment, as such, should 
not and could not be prohibited from celestial 
bodies. Most of our astronauts are members 
of the armed services. Our rocketry has been 

developed in important measure with funds 
appropriated by the Congress as part of de- 
fense budgets. The United States treaty 
draft of June 16 therefore added a saving 
clause as follows: 

The use of military personnel, facilities or equip- 
ment for scientific research or for any other peaceful 
purpose shall not be prohibited. 

Here, too, we followed the pattern of the 
Antarctic Treaty. 

This matter, which is dealt with in article 
IV, paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty 
created two problems of considerable diffi- 
culty. Part of the problem appears to have 
been semantic. 

First, the U.S.S.R. asserted that our pro- 
posal to ban "military fortifications" was 
inadequate and that we should agree as well 
to forbid "military bases and installations." 
Now, we had no problem in accepting a ban 
on "military bases." The Antarctic Treaty 
contains a ban on military bases, and no one 
has ever charged that, for example, the Navy- 
supported facilities on McMurdo Sound 
were a military base in violation of the 
Antarctic Treaty. But we were doubtful 
about accepting a ban on "military installa- 
tions" because it seemed too sweeping. Any 
construction on the moon, if built or used by 
astronauts belonging to a military service, 
could conceivably be labeled a "military 
installation" even though its character and 
purpose were entirely peaceful. I pointed out 
to the Soviet delegation on a number of occa- 
sions that a lunar barracks built to house 
astronauts who might be drawn from the 
military services of their country might be 
said to be a "military installation" — or at 
least could be alleged to be such — regardless 
of the fact of its peaceful and research- 
supporting character. I made it clear that 
the United States could not accept a prohibi- 
tion whose apparent scope might be so broad 
as to defy meaningful definition. 

Our proposed saving clause raised much 
the same issue in a different form. At first the 
Soviets professed to see no need for such a 
clause. They took the position that the em- 
ployment by them of Soviet military person- 
nel for activities on celestial bodies would not 

APRIL 10, 1967 


violate the treaty. We pointed out that unless 
there were such a saving clause as to astro- 
nauts having military rank, a party might 
later charge that employment of such astro- 
nauts was prohibited. Eventually, without too 
much difficulty, the U.S.S.R. came around to 
accepting the saving clause which now 
appears as the penultimate sentence of 
article IV and states that "The use of mili- 
tary personnel for scientific research or for 
any other peaceful purposes shall not be pro- 

But it was only toward the very end of our 
negotiations that the Soviets agreed to a sav- 
ing clause regarding military equipment. We 
were able to agree on such a clause, contained 
in the last sentence of article IV, stating that 
"The use of any equipment or facility neces- 
sary for peaceful exploration of the moon and 
other celestial bodies shall also not be pro- 

Agreement on this saving clause, in turn, 
made it possible for us to accept the inclusion 
of "military installations" among the prohibi- 
tions applying to celestial bodies. To return 
to the example of the barracks, such a facility 
would be in conformity with the treaty be- 
cause it would be necessary for peaceful ex- 

3. Tracking facilities. A third diflSculty in 
the negotiations involved earth-based track- 
ing stations. This subject was raised by the 
U.S.S.R., but for some time it was not clear 
what they wanted. Their first treaty proposal, 
on June 16, read as follows: "The Parties to 
the Treaty undertake to accord equal condi- 
tions to States engaged in the exploration of 
outer space." When it became apparent that 
many members of the Legal Subcommittee 
did not understand what this language meant, 
the U.S.S.R. made a second proposal, on July 
20, that "States Parties to the Treaty will 
accord other States Parties to the Treaty 
conducting activities relating to the explora- 
tion and use of outer space equal conditions 
for observing the flight of space objects 
launched by these States." 

The Subcommittee took some time to con- 
sider this proposal. The Soviet delegate 
portrayed it as a limited obligation. He said 

that it merely required that State A, if it had 
granted a tracking facility to State B, must 
also grant tracking facilities on request to 
State C. This explanation seemed to suggest 
that the Soviets might be seeking a "free 
ride" by applying the most-favored-nation 
principle to the granting of tracking facili- 
ties. Under their proposal, the countries with 
whom the United States has carefully negoti- 
ated bilateral space agreements over a period 
of years would have been obliged to let the 
Soviets construct installations on their soil. 
As you know, the United States has agree- 
ments for tracking facilities with a large 
number of countries including Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Madagascar, 
Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 

The representatives of a number of these 
countries made clear that they could not 
agree to such an obligation. They pointed 
out, as we also did, that arrangement for the 
establishment of a space tracking facility is a 
bilateral matter. Not only is it related to the 
desire of nations to cooperate with one an- 
other in space research, but there are also 
practical considerations which might impel a 
country to grant a facility to one space power 
while finding it undesirable to make a like 
grant to another space power. The Soviet pro- 
posal to place an absolute obligation upon 
host countries was therefore unacceptable. 

Further discussions led to further revi- 
sions. Eventually, a solution to this problem 
was found in the provision which appears as 
article X of the treaty. This article provides 
that ". . . the States Parties to the Treaty 
shall consider on a basis of equality any 
requests by other States Parties to the Treaty 
to be afforded an opportunity to observe the 
flight of space objects launched by those 
States. The nature of such an opportunity for 
observation and the conditions under which 
it could be afforded shall be determined by 
agreement between the States concerned." 

We consulted closely with a number of the 
countries who have granted tracking facili- 
ties to us before agreeing to this proposal. 
We also considered our own obligations in 
view of the fact that, as you know, the United 
States has entered into an agreement with 



the European Space Research Organization 
authorizing it to construct a tracking facility 
at Fairbanks, Alaska." Our friends said that 
they could agree to the text of article X on 
the understanding that an authoritative 
statement would be made as to the scope and 
limitations of the obligations which that 
article imposes. 

Accordingly, after extensive consultations 
with a number of members, including the 
Soviet Union, I decided to place upon the 
record an authoritative interpretation of 
what this obligation entails. On December 17, 
speaking to the General Assembly's Political 
Committee, I said: 

It is quite clear from the text of the article, how- 
ever, that there must be agreement between the 
parties concerned for the establishment of a track- 
ing facility. The article as thus revised recognizes 
that the elements of mutual benefit and acceptability 
are natural and necessary parts of the decision 
whether to enter into an agreement concerning such 
a facility, and it appropriately incorporates the prin- 
ciple that each state which is asked to cooperate has 
the right to consider its legitimate interests in reach- 
ing its decision. 

No objection was recorded to this statement 
and this put the matter to rest. 

4. Liability. The 1963 Declaration of Legal 
Principles adopted by the General Assembly 
contains a provision on liability which is car- 
ried over into the space treaty without 
change. Article VII of the treaty codifies the 
international legal rule that a country which 
launches a space vehicle, or from whose terri- 
tory an object is launched into outer space, is 
"internationally liable for damage to another 
State Party ... or to its natural or juridical 
persons by such object or its component 
parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer 
space, including the moon and other celestial 

Article VII is indeed desirable. But a 
separate agreement on liability for damages 
caused by space vehicles is a necessity, and 
we hope to continue work in the Outer Space 
Legal Subcommittee toward that end. Such 
an agreement should lay down rules and pro- 
cedures governing liability and the presenta- 

" For text, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 979. 

tion of international claims. Work of this 
character has been undertaken in the Legal 
Subcommittee since 1962, but the issues are 
complex and redoubled efforts are required. 
A number of basic issues remain. These in- 
clude how costs should be shared when 
damages are caused by a space project in 
which more than one country participates; 
how to measure the damage applicable to loss 
of life, bodily injury, and destruction of prop- 
erty; and agreement on a tribunal to adjudi- 
cate disputed claims. 

The Legal Subcommittee has on its agenda 
a separate agreement on liability, and we will 
want to prepare our position for future de- 
liberations on this subject. What is most 
satisfactory is that the Outer Space Treaty 
contains an optimum fundamental rule on 
this subject. 

5. Return of astronauts. Finally, I would 
like to comment on the obligation, contained 
in article V of the space treaty, that when 
astronauts land on foreign territory or on the 
high seas "they shall be safely and promptly 
returned to the State of registry of their 
space vehicle." The 1963 Declaration of Legal 
Principles stated this rule in the same 

However, in the Outer Space Legal Sub- 
committee discussions of 1964 and 1965 con- 
cerning a detailed agreement on the return 
of astronauts and space vehicles, the 
U.S.S.R. had not proved as forthcoming. The 
Soviets had at various times appeared to 
insist on language that might be taken to 
limit the humanitarian obligation to return 
an astronaut. We thought it incompatible 
with the spirit of the treaty, which describes 
astronauts as "envoys of mankind," to sug- 
gest in any manner that detention could be 
envisaged or tolerated. We thus continued to 
insist that the duty to return must be abso- 
lute and unconditional. It is a particular 
source of satisfaction to us that agreement 
was reached on this basis. 

On a related matter, we were also able to 
reach agreement on the unconditional obliga- 
tion to report to other parties or the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations, "any 
phenomena they discover in outer space, in- 

APRIL 10, 1967 


eluding the moon and other celestial bodies, 
which could constitute a danger to the life or 
health of astronauts." 


Mr. Chairman, I commend to this commit- 
tee the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. I believe 
it meets the essential test of any international 
agreement which the President submits to the 
Senate. It will further the national interest 
and the security of the United States and will 
encourage the cause of peace in the world. 
I earnestly hope the Senate will advise and 
consent to its ratification. 


United States and Poland Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Preea release 58 dated March 16 

The Governments of the United States and 
Poland exchanged notes on March 15 effect- 
ing a comprehensive agreement covering 
U.S. imports of all categories of cotton tex- 
tiles from Poland.! The 3-year agreement 
was signed for the United States by Assist- 
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs Anthony 
M. Solomon and for Poland by Mr. Zdzislaw 
Szewczyk, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of 
the Polish People's Republic. 

The United States entered into the agree- 
ment in accordance with its obligations under 
the Long-Term Arrangement for interna- 
tional trade in cotton textiles. This arrange- 
ment was negotiated in 1962 by importing 
and exporting countries under the auspices 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Poland is not a participant in GATT 

' For text of the U.S. note, see Department press 
release 58 dated Mar. 16. 

or the Long-Term Arrangement, but has 
applied for admission to GATT. 

The agreement will supersede current limi- 
tations on seven individual categories of cot- 
ton textile imports from Poland which the 
United States put into effect in 1966. 

The effect of the agreement is to provide 
for orderly growth in Polish exports of cot- 
ton textiles to the United States while avoid- 
ing disruption in the U.S. domestic market. 

The agreement sets an aggregate limit of 
5 million square yards equivalent for the 
first agreement year, with a 5 percent in- 
crease permitted in the second and succeed- 
ing years of the agreement. The total is 
divided almost equally between apparel, 2.6 
million square yards equivalent, and other 
categories, 2.4 million square yards equiva- 
lent. There are also nine individual category 

The Polish Government agreed to use its 
best efforts to space exports from Poland to 
the United States within each category evenly 
throughout the agreement year, taking into 
consideration normal seasonal factors. 

The two Governments agreed to cooperate 
in providing statistical data to each other and 
to consult as necessary on problems that may 
arise in administration of the agreement. 

In 1966 the United States imported from 
Poland 3.1 million square yards equivalent of 
cotton textiles valued at $652,000. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi- 
lateral agreement between the United States and 
Brazil of July 8, 1965 (TIAS 6126), for coopera- 
tion concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna March 10, 1967. Enters into 
force on the date which the Agency shall have 
received from the two Governments written noti- 
fication that they have complied with all statu- 
tory and constitutional requirements for entry 
into force. 

Signatures: Brazil, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 



Consular Relations 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the acquisition of na- 
tionality. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17, 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17, 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. 
Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered 
into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Signature: Sudan, March 15, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London, April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967.' 
Acceptance deposited: United States, March 17, 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949. 
Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089. 
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries signed under date 
of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Wash- 
ington June 25, 1956. Entered into force January 
10, 1959. TIAS 4170. 
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Declaration of understanding regarding the interna- 
tional convention for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington 
April 24, 1961. Entered into force June 5, 1963. 
TIAS 5380. 
Acceptance received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat- 
ing to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington 
July 15, 1963. Entered into force April 29, 1966. 
TIAS 6011. 
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat- 
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington 
November 29, 1965.'' 
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat- 
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by 
the Commission. Done at Washington November 
29, 1965.' 
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with 
final protocol, general regulations with final pro- 
tocol, and convention with final protocol and reg- 
ulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 17, 
1966; Spain, Spanish territories in Africa, No- 
vember 9, 1966; Yugoslavia, November 15, 1966. 


International telecommunication convention with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.' 
Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 25, 
1967; Ceylon, January 13, 1967; Finland, Feb- 
ruary 3, 1967; Lebanon, January 10, 1967; 
Nigeria, January 21, 1967. 
Accession deposited: Guyana, March 8, 1967. 


Declaration on the provisional accession of Argen- 
tina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. En- 
tered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184. 
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967. 
Declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force 
April 19, 1964; for the United States November 
20, 1964. TIAS 5687. 
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967. 
Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the pro- 
visional accession of Iceland to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687). 
Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into 
force December 28, 1965; for the United States 
December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943. 
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967. 
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force Au- 
gust 1, 1966. TIAS 6065. 
Acceptance: Portugal, February 7, 1967. 
Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
the provisional accession of Argentina to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 
5184). Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. 
Acceptances: Argentina, January 9, 1967; Aus- 
tralia, January 11, 1967; Austria, December 30, 
1966;^ Belgium, January 27, 1967;' Canada, 
January 3, 1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966; 
Finland, December 30, 1966; Indonesia, Decem- 
ber 28, 1966; Israel, January 3, 1967; Japan, 
December 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22, 
1966;' Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway, 
January 16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967; 
Tunisia, February 15, 1967; Turkey, February 
1, 1967; United Kingdom, February 13, 1967; 
United States, December 13, 1966. 
Entered into force: January 9, 1967. 
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
the provisional accession of the United Arab Re- 
public to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November 
17, 1966. 

Acceptances: Australia, January 11, 1967; Bel- 
gium, January 27, 1967;' Canada, January 3, 
1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966; Finland, 
December 30, 1966; Greece, January 24, 1967; 
Indonesia, December 28, 1966; Japan, Decem- 
ber 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22, 1966; ' 
Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway, January 
16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967; Switzer- 
land, February 14, 1967; Turkey, February 1, 
1967; United Arab Republic, January 18, 1967; 
United Kingdom, February 13, 1967; United 
States, December 13, 1966. 
Entered into force: January 18, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

^ Not in force. 

' Subject to ratification. 

APRIL 10, 1967 




Convention for the avoidance of double taxation 
with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Rio 
de Janeiro March 13, 1967. Enters into force upon 
exchange of ratifications. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. 
Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967. 
Entered into force: March 7, 1967. 


Agreement amending annex B of the mutual de- 
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 
(TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Luxembourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into 
force March 14, 1967. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Consular Convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
16, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities 
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- 
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. 
Signed at Saigon March 13, 1967. Entered into 
force March 13, 1967. 


' Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

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Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
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cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are 
available at 5# each. 

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Mauritania. Pub. 8169. 8 pp. 

South West Africa. Pub. 8168. 8 pp. 

Swaziland. Pub. 8174. 8 pp. 

United Arab Republic Pub. 8152. 8 pp. 


VOL. LVI, NO. 1450 


APRIL 10, 1967 

The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issaed by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addressee made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

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INDEX April 10, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1A50 

Asia. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use 
U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597 

Congress. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador 
Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer 
Space Treaty 600 

Department and Foreigrn Service 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam 
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu- 
nique) 586 

U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet at Bonn . 599 

Ek:onoinic Affairs 

Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) . . 598 
United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile 

Agreement 612 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at 
Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint com- 
munique) 586 

Europe. U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet 
at Bonn 599 

Military Affairs 

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use 
U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam 
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu- 
nique) 586 

Von-Self-Goveming Territoriee. Pacific Islands 
Trust Territory (Johnson) 598 

Outer Space. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador 
Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer 
Space Treaty 600 

Poland. United States and Poland Sign Cotton 
Textile Agreement 612 

Presidential Documents 

Pacific Islands Trust Territory 598 

President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation 

on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh . . 595 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam . 586 

Publications. Recent Releases 614 

Science. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Gold- 
berg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space 
Treaty 600 

Thailand. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To 
Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 612 

Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge 

Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty . . 600 
United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile 

Agreement 612 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Gold- 
berg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space 
Treaty 600 

United Nations 

Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) . . 598 
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge 
Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty . . 600 


President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation 
on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh (De- 
partment statement and texts of letters) . 595 

Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U 
Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597 

U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam 
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu- 
nique) 586 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J 600 

Guerrero, Manuel F. L 586 

Ho Chi Minh 595 

Johnson, President 586, 595, 598 

Rusk, Secretary 597, 600 

Thieu, Nguyen Van 586 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 20—26 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 20 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
46 of March 7 and 58 of March 22. 

No. Date Subject 

160 3/20 U.S. inspection of Antarctic sta- 
tions (rewrite). 

t61 3/21 Convention on conduct of North 
Atlantic fisheries. 

•62 3/23 Harriman: Franklin D. Roose- 
velt birthday memorial dinner, 
New York. 

*63 3/24 Program for visit of Prime Min- 
ister of Afghanistan. 

t64 3/24 U.S. and Portugal sign cotton 
textile agreement. 
65 3/24 Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic mis- 
sions in Europe to meet at 
Bonn (rewrite). 

t66 3/25 Itinerary for Vice President 
Humphrey's trip to Europe 
March 26-April 9. 
73 3/22 Rusk: Thai airbases. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

« U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/40 







BOX 280 




Viet-Nam Information Notes 

The first three pamphlets of a new series of background papers on various aspects of 
Viet-Nam conflict have been published by the Department of State. Basic Data on South Vi 
Nam (publication 8195) summarizes the history, geography, government, and economy of 
country. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (publication 8196) reviews peace efforts by 
United States and the United Nations and other diplomatic initiatives. Communist-Directed Fo' 
in South Viet-Nam (publication 8197) reviews the growth of Viet Minh and Viet Cong for« 
Communist objectives, strengths, and weaknesses. 



To: Sopt. of DoeameDtai 
Govt. Printing Offle* 
Washinston, D.C. 20402 

PUBLICATIONS 8195, 8196, 8197 5 CENTS EACH 

Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send copies of 

Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Basic Data on South Viet-Nam 

(8195) ; The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Com- 
munist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam (8197). 


EneloMd . 

To be mallad 
iBter _ 

Bcfand . 
Coapon : 
Fostaca . 









Street address- 

City, State, and ZIP codcL. 







Vol. LVI, No. U51 

April 17, 1967 



Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 636 



Texts of Secretary-General's Aide Memoire and U.S. Replies 624. 

For index see inside back cover 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 

Press release 70 dated March 28 


Earlier today, the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, U Thant, made public 
some proposals which he had offered to a 
number of governments involved in the 
problem in Viet-Nam on March 14.i The fol- 
lowing day we gave the Secretary-General 
our interim reply, stating that we welcomed 
his initiative and, after consultation with 
the Government of Viet-Nam and other 
allies, we would give him a more considered 

On March 18 we delivered that reply to 
the Secretary-General, and you now have 
that in front of you. 

In essence, the Secretary-General pro- 
posed that there be a general standstill truce 
in Viet-Nam, that there then be preliminary 
talks leading to a reconvening of the Geneva 

In our reply we stated that we accepted 
the outline of his proposals, that we would 
be glad to negotiate the standstill truce and 
take part in preliminary discussions leading 
to a reconvening of that conference. 

We do not yet have in front of us the full 
text of whatever reply Hanoi may have de- 
livered to the Secretary-General. Whether 
Hanoi will make that public, I do not now 
know. We do have a public statement from 
Hanoi which seems to indicate their attitude. 
That public statement of yesterday said that: 

To call on both sides to cease fire and hold un- 
conditional negotiations, while the United States 
is committing aggression against Viet-Nam and tak- 
ing serious steps in its military escalation in both 
zones of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction be- 
tween the aggressor and the victim of aggression. 

to depart from reality, and to demand that the 
Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the 

And then it adds: 

And, by the way, it is necessary to underline once 
again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which 
has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no 
concern with the United Nations and the United 
Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any 
way in the Viet-Nam question. 

The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi 
has once again taken a negative view toward 
an initiative taken by someone else to move 
this matter toward peace. 

I might say that the recent publication of 
the exchange between President Johnson and 
Ho Chi Minh 2 and today's publication of the 
proposals of the Secretary-General, and the 
responses to it, illustrate the problem that 
we have had from the beginning in bringing 
the Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclu- 

Many governments, many groups of gov- 
ernments, many world personalities, have 
tried to take an initiative to move this con- 
flict toward a peaceful settlement. There has 
invariably been a positive and a constructive 
response from the United States, and there 
has invariably been a negative and hostile 
and, at times, vituperative response from the 
authorities in Hanoi. When one looks back 
over the long record of initiatives taken by 
many personalities and governments and 
groups of governments, one sees the record 
of Hanoi's intransigence, with such phrases 
as "swindle" and "farce" and words of that 

Now, we do not ourselves believe that 
peace is not the business of the United Na- 
tions. We believe that no nation can say that 

1 See p. 624. 

• Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1966, p. 595. 



a world organization representing 122 na- 
tions cannot properly take up the question of 
maintaining the peace. The charter provides 
for it, the obligations of the nations of the 
world are involved, and the issue of peace is 
at stake. 

Nevertheless, we have never insisted that 
tlie United Nations is the sole mechanism 
for dealing with this question. 

There is now pending before the Security- 
Council a resolution offered by the United 
States calling for a peaceful settlement of 
this problem.^ That has been resisted in the 
United Nations because of the attitude of 
Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement of 
the United Nations. When the Soviet Ambas- 
sador said at the Security Council that "This 
is not the business of the U. N., it is a matter 
for the Geneva machinery," Ambassador 
Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations Arthur J. Goldberg] said, "All 
right. If that is your view, we will agree 
with that; then let us use the Geneva ma- 

But the Geneva machinery has been para- 
lyzed by the attitude of Hanoi and Peking. 
For example, that machinery has not been 
available to respond favorably to Prince 
[Norodom] Sihanouk's request that the In- 
ternational Control Commission step up its 
activities to insure the neutrality and the 
territorial integrity of Cambodia. That 
machinery was not available to insure the 
demilitarization of the demilitarized zone be- 
tween North and South Viet-Nam. 

So we would say to the authorities in 
Hanoi that surely there must be some ma- 
chinery somewhere which can open the pos- 
sibilities of peace. If not the United Nations, 
then the Geneva machinery; if not the 
Geneva machinery, then the resources of 
quiet diplomacy. 

I can tell you, now that the exchange be- 
tween President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh 
has been made public, and U Thant's pro- 
posals and our reply have been made public, 
that there is nothing in the private record 

' For text of a U.S. draft resolution submitted to 
the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 31, 1966, see ibid., 
Feb. 14, 1966, p. 231. 

which throws any different light on this sit- 
uation than you now have in the public 
record. Despite all of the efforts made pri- 
vately by many people in many places, the 
private record and the public record are now 
in agreement. 

I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi 
would give serious thought to the present 
situation. If they have supposed that they 
would be able to obtain a military victory 
in the South, they must surely now put that 
hope aside. If they have had any hope that 
there would be a political collapse in South 
Viet-Nam, surely they must now know that 
all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who 
have some differences among themselves, are 
resolved to bring into being a constitutional 
government in which those various groups 
can work together on a basis of the free 
choice of the South Vietnamese people with 
respect to their future and that one point on 
which they are generally agreed in South 
Viet-Nam is that they do not wish the pro- 
gram of Hanoi or the Liberation Front. 

If Hanoi supposes that somehow interna- 
tional opinion will come to their rescue, 
surely they must know that when they rebuff 
the United Nations Organization, an organi- 
zation of 122 members, this will not bring 
them support in other parts of the world. 
And surely they must understand that all 
small nations who are within the reach of 
some greater power have a stake in the 
ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its 
own future for itself. And surely Hanoi must 
not be under continuing misapprehension 
that somehow some divisions within the 
United States might cause us to change our 
attitude toward our commitments to South 
Viet-Nam. Because although there may be 
some differences among us, those differences 
are trivial compared to the differences be- 
tween all of us, on the one side, and Hanoi 
on the other. 

So we would hope that in some fashion, in 
some way, at some time, the authorities in 
Hanoi will make use of some machinery in 
which to be responsive to the many efforts 
which we and others have been making to- 
ward peace over the last several years. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


It is no good to brush aside the 17 non- 
alined nations, and the British Common- 
wealth of Prime Ministers, and His Holiness 
the Pope, the Secretary-General, and the 
President of India, and all the others who 
have been trying to find some basis on which 
this matter could be moved toward a peace- 
ful conclusion, and suppose that somehow 
world opinion is supporting them in their 
efforts to seize South Viet-Nam by force. 

So we would advise them to believe that, 
as far as we are concerned, we are not call- 
ing the search for a peaceful settlement to 
an end because of Ho Chi Minh's reply to 
President Johnson or because of the attitude 
which they seem to be taking toward U 
Thant's most recent proposals. We shall con- 
tinue that effort by private and public 
means, and we would hope that we would get 
some response through some channel that 
would begin to bring this thing within the 
range of discussion and make it possible to 
move toward a peaceful settlement. 

Now, I am ready for your questions. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of 
the reasons why they surely must not believe 
these various elements. What is it then you 
think that makes them keep on fighting and 
refusing to negotiate in the face of what 
must be a loss of international support and 
these other adverse factors ? 

A. Well, it is very hard to say. I can't 
enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi 
on a matter of that sort. I would suppose, 
really, that they are under some misappre- 
hension. They are making some mis judg- 
ments and miscalculations on some point, 
either the state of international opinion or 
the state of opinion within the United States. 
It's possible even that they still have some 
slender hopes of some military success in 
the South. 

I just don't know what is in their minds. 
But what I am saying is that, so far as we 
understand their point of view, the principal 


pillars of their hopes are eroding from under 
them and they should become interested in 
peace and at an early date and not at some 
long delayed future date. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement today in 
reply to U Thnnt has said that there would 
be an apprapriate involvement for the Gov- 
ernment of South Viet-Nam throughout the I 
entire process of arranging a peace. Would 
you spell that out a little more, sir? Premier 
\Nguyen Cao'\ Ky has been indicating that j 
ive haven't called him in. 

A. Well, obviously, any discussion with , 
North Viet-Nam about peace in Viet-Nam 'I 
must directly involve the Government of 
South Viet-Nam. Indeed, as you know, the 
Government of South Viet-Nam has on more 
than one occasion suggested direct talks be- 
tween South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. 
They have proposed, for example, that the 
two governments there get together on the 
question of possibly extending the Tet stand- 
down, the Tet cease-fire. 

We would support that as a means for 
coming to grips with this problem. We would 
think that it would be a very good idea if 
Hanoi were to accept the proposals of South 
Viet-Nam for direct talks to move this to- 
ward a peaceful solution. 

There are many opportunities available, 
you see. 

There would be direct talks between Sai- 
gon and Hanoi. There would be talks between 
ourselves and Hanoi. There would be talks 
under the auspices of the two cochairmen of 
the Geneva conferences, or under the 
auspices of the three members of the Interna- 
tional Control Commission. Or there could be 
intermediaries, such as the Secretaiy-Gen- 
eral of the United Nations, or some other dis- 
tinguished governmental or nongovernmental 
leader. Any of these methods are appropriate 
and useful, as far as we are concerned. 

The problem is that no one has been able 
to find a procedure or a method which ap- 
parently is agreeable to Hanoi. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes. 


Q. If Hanoi persists for months and even 
years in its attitude, tvhat will our response 
then be? What will our course be? 

A. We shall meet our commitments in 
South Viet-Nam. We shall do our duty there. 

Q. Mr. Secretai-y, at the end of the Korean 
war, as I recall, we entered into talks ivith- 
out a truce and the fighting continued for 2 
years. Would you explain, tvould this for- 
mula to ivhich you have responded today, 
could it be a lead to that same sort of thing, 
peace talks without any change in the fight- 
ing ? 

A. Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch 
[Joseph C. Harsch, NBC News], of our most 
elementary position on this matter of talks. 
We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow 
morning without any conditions of any sort 
on either side. We are prepared to talk while 
the shooting is going on. If the other side 
wishes to raise major conditions, as they 
have with their demand that there be an 
unconditional permanent cessation of the 
bombing, we are prepared to talk about con- 
ditions. We will discuss the conditions which 
must precede the initiation of formal negoti- 

Or if they do not wish to start at that end 
— that is, What do you do about the shoot- 
ing? — we are prepared to start at the other 
end — What do you do about a final settle- 
ment of the problem? — and work back from 
that to the practical means by which you 
reach the final settlement. So we are pre- 
pared to talk without any conditions of any 
sort — or about conditions. 

Now, let me say that we don't ourselves 
fully understand why there cannot be dis- 
creet talks even though the shooting is going 
on. Now, we are aware of the element of so- 
called face, but "face" is not a substitute for 
very serious practical problems that we face 
on the military side. 

Now, I remind you that we 'discussed Ber- 
lin while the blockade was still in effect. We 
discussed Korea while the hostilities were 
still in effect. Indeed, we took more casual- 
ties in Korea after the negotiations started 

than had occurred before the negotiations 
started. We talked about the Cuban missiles 
while the Cuban missile sites were being built 
by the hour in Cuba. So we are prepared to 
talk without any change in the military situa- 
tion whatever. 

But we are also prepared to talk about 
changes in the military situation. What we 
cannot do is to commit ourselves to a per- 
manent and unconditional stoppage of the 
bombing without knowing what the practical 
results of that will be on the military side. 

No one has been able to tell us, for example 
— just as one example — that if we stop the 
bombing, those three divisions or more of 
North Vietnamese troops that are now in 
and on both sides of the demilitarized zone 
will not advance to attack our Marines, who 
are 6 miles away. 

Now, obviously, these are important prac- 
tical questions. So we will talk at this 
moment, or we will talk about any other cir- 
cumstances in which the other side might 
think that they might wish to talk. But what 
we cannot do is to stop half the war and let 
the other half of the war go on unimpeded. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when 
we referred in our reply to the Secretary- 
General to a general standstill truce, are ive 
talking at that point of a cessation of the 
bombing and cessation of infiltration from 
the North? 

A. I would suppose that a general stand- 
still truce would involve an elimination of all 
military action of all sorts on both sides. 
Now, one reason why there has to be some 
discussion of that is that it is necessary 
for both sides to understand what in fact 
will happen, particularly in a guerrilla situa- 
tion where the situation on the ground is 
somewhat complicated. And so there needs to 
be some discussion of that point if it is 
to be a protracted standstill. 

But if that can be achieved, then we can 
move into the preliminary political discus- 
sions which might open the way for a recon- 
vening of the Geneva conference or some 
other appropriate forum. But a military 

APRIL 17, 1967 


standstill would involve the concept of stop- 
ping the military action on both sides, and 
that certainly would include stopping the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just how does this for- 
mula today differ from Mr. Thant's previous 
formula ? 

A. Well, I think that he would perhaps be 
the better one to comment on that. If there 
is a major difference, I think that this does 
place emphasis upon a mutual stop of the 
military action on both sides as an important 
first step. 

As far as his earlier proposals were con- 
cerned, the three-point proposals, you recall 
that they envisage that we would stop the 
bombing as the first point; the second point, 
that there would be a mutual deescalation of 
the military action; and, third, there would 
be discussions among all those involved in 
the conflict. 

We said, "Your point one, stopping the 
bombing, gives us no particular problem, 
but what do you have from the other side 
about point two?" Well, what he had from 
the other side about point two was a com- 
plete rejection — that there will be no mutual 
deescalation of military action. 

And on point three, the question of discus- 
sions with all the parties involved in the 
fighting, the other side has consistently said 
in and out — from time to time, rather — that 
the Liberation Front must be accepted as the 
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese 

We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi 
to engage in discussions with the Govern- 
ment in Saigon. We think that would be an 
appropriate way to begin such discussions 
and the possibilities of peace might be 
opened up if that channel were to become 
active. But thus far Hanoi has refused to 
exercise it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how ivould you dis- 
tinguish between this proposal and the Presi- 
dent's proposal to Ho Chi Minh ? 

A. Well, I think that perhaps the Secre- 
tary-General's proposal is somewhat broader 
in that it would presumably apply to a cease- 

fire throughout all of Viet-Nam, South Viet- 
Nam as well as the disengagement militarily 
between North Viet-Nam and South Viet- 
Nam. So to that extent, it is somewhat 
broader. But, nevertheless, that is something 
which we are perfectly prepared to discuss 
with representatives from the other side or 
are perfectly prepared to have the Govern- 
ment of Saigon discuss with the representa- 
tives from Hanoi. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat is your answer to 
those critics who say that the President's let- 
ter in effect raised the American price? 

A. Well, I don't understand what they are 
talking about. 

Q. Well, they say that in this letter the 
United States is demanding proof in advance 
that infiltration ivould have stopped. 

A. We didn't talk about proof in advance. 
The words used were "assurances that in- 
filtration had stopped." 

Q. Well, it is your contention that the 
price ivas not raised, that you're on the status 
quo ante as far as that is concerned? 

A. The principal point here is that Hanoi 
has increasingly emphasized during this past 
year its inflexible demand that a stop in the 
bombing be permanent and unconditional and 
that, in exchange for that, there would be 
no indication from Hanoi as to what com- 
parable or corresponding military action 
they would take on their side. 

Now, just recall, for example, during the 
37-day pause at the beginning of last year, 
Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to the heads of 
Communist states, and in that letter he de- 
manded that the United States must end un- 
conditionally and for good all bombing raids 
and other acts, war acts, against the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam — only in this 
way can a political solution of the Viet-Nam 
problem be envisaged. 

Now, that insistence upon the stoppage of 
the bombing, which would be permanent and 
unconditional, has been a major increase in 
the public demands of Hanoi during this past 
year. And that makes it necessary for us to 
know what would happen if we committed 
ourselves to any such cessation. 



The North Vietnamese representative in 
Paris on February 22d said that we must 
state in advance at the time of any cessation 
of bombing: that it would be permanent and 
unconditional. Well, that means that we must 
know what the effects would be. Will the 
infiltration continue? Will those three divi- 
sions move against our Marines? Are they 
going to continue their half of the war? No 
one has been able to whisper to us that that 
would not be the result. No one — private 
citizens, governments, Hanoi's own repre- 
sentatives, governments friendly to Hanoi — 
no one has been able to whisper to us that 
there would be any change in the present 
military tactics and strategy of Hanoi with 
respect to seizing South Viet-Nam by force. 

If any of you gentlemen have any infor- 
mation to the contrary, I would be glad to 
hear it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you if the 
channels directly to Hanoi remain open after 
this exchange of letters, and, if so, are we 
putting these propositions that you have just 
stated directly to them ? 

A. As far as we are concerned, the chan- 
nels remain open. They have been open all 
along. I have referred to the fact that noth- 
ing we have had privately throws any 
different light on what you now know pub- 
licly about the attitude of the two sides. But 
I shouldn't exaggerate the point that chan- 
nels remain open. When you pick up the tele- 
phone and nobody answers on the other end, 
is that a channel or not? Or if you find your- 
self in a telephone conversation and the other 
end hangs up, I will leave it to you as to 
whether that is a channel. I can say at the 
moment that our channels are not very 
efficient, to say the least. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the amount of 
reciprocity that we would require for stop- 
ping the bombing a negotiable commodity, or 
is there a decisive — must there be a com- 
plete stoppage in infiltration, or is it 

A. I don't want to give a categorical re- 
sponse to that because President Johnson in 
a recent press conference said that we would 

be glad to hear of almost anything from the 
other side. But that doesn't mean that we can 
live on just nothing from the other side — just 

I point out to you that during the Tet 
pause, at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave 
his reply to the letter which President John- 
son had sent to him at the beginning of the 
Tet pause, he had some other alternatives 
open to him. If there was a problem of time, 
he could have said, "Mr. President, time is 
rather short here. We need a little more time 
on this." He didn't say that. Or he could have 
said, "I don't particularly like your proposal, 
but here are my counterproposals." He didn't 
say that. In effect, he called for the capitula- 
tion of South Viet-Nam and capitulation of 
the American forces in South Viet-Nam and 
a permanent and unconditional stoppage of 
the bombing. That we can't take. 

Yes, sir? 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the 
public and private record being the same, 
tvhat exactly do you mean? Do you mean 
there is nothing outstanding now privately 
in the way of negotiation ? 

A. No. What I'm saying is there is nothing 
in the private record that reflects any dif- 
ferent view on the part of the authorities in 
Hanoi than you now have on the public rec- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain why 
you haven't published the text of four other 
letters that you recently sent to Hanoi? 

A. Because we do not wish ourselves to 
establish the point that a private communi- 
cation with us is impossible. If Hanoi wishes 
to make public a communication from us, as 
they did in connection with the exchange 
between President Johnson and Ho Chi 
Minh, that is a choice which they can make. 
But I think it could be very important in the 
future that Hanoi at least know that it is 
possible for them to communicate privately 
with us without its becoming public — to the 
extent that you gentlemen would let us get 
away with that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, point (b) of the United 

APRIL 17, 1967 


states answer talks about preliminary talks. 
What's your understanding of who would 
take part in those talks — just Hanoi and 
Washington, or would it be Saigon or the 

A. Well, we haven't formulated that in 
great detail because we need to know what 
the attitude of Hanoi would be and what the 
general situation would be. In our reply we 
did say that of course the Government of 
South Viet-Nam will have to be appropri- 
ately involved throughout this entire process 
and that the interests and views of our allies 
would also have to be taken fully into ac- 
count. So we did not try to make that precise 
in detail because we would be interested in 
knowing what Hanoi's response to the 

Secretary-General's initiative would be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the fact 
that there ivas no contradiction between the 
public and private record as far as peace 
talks are concerned. I wonder if you would 
be prepared to comment now on reports con- 
cerning the possibility of negotiations in 
Warsaw ? 

A. If your question is Would I be willing 
to? the answer is "No." I think the attitude 
of Hanoi on these matters is fairly clear at 
the present time, but I do not want to point 
the finger to, or close the door on, any con- 
tacts that might occur anywhere in any capi- 
tal as far as the future is concerned. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you vein) much. 

United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-General's 
Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam Conflict 

At a news conference held at U.N. Head- 
quarters on March 28 Secretary-General U 
Thant made public the text of his aide mem- 
oir e dated March 14- add/ressed to the parties 
concerned in the conflict in Viet-Nam and 
indicated that it would also be appropriate 
for the parties to make their replies public. 

Following is the text of the Secretary- 
General's aide memoire, together with texts 
of a U.S. interim reply of March 15 and the 
definitive U.S. reply of March 1 8 released by 
the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and 
the Department of State on March 28. 


On many occasions in the past the Secre- 
taiy-General of the United Nations has 
expressed his very great concern about the 
conflict in Viet-Nam. That concern is inten- 
sified by the growing fury of the war result- 

ing in the increasing loss of lives, indescrib- 
able suffering and misery of the people, 
appalling devastation of the country, uproot- 
ing of society, astronomical sums spent on 
the war and last but not least, his deepening 
anxiety over the increasing threat to the 
peace of the world. For these reasons, in the 
past three years or so, he submitted ideas 
and proposals to the parties primarily in- 
volved in the war with a view to creating 
conditions congenial for negotiations which 
unhappily have not been accepted by the 
parties. The prospects for peace seem to be 
as distant today than ever before. 

Nevertheless, the Secretary-General reas- 
serts his conviction that a cessation of the 
bombing of North Viet-Nam continues to be 
a vital need, for moral and humanitarian 
reasons and also because it is the step which 
could lead the way to meaningful talks to 
end the war. 

The situation being as it is today, the Sec- 



retary-General has now in mind proposals 
envisaging tliree steps: 

(a) A general stand-still truce. 

(b) Preliminaiy talks. 

(c) Reconvening of the Geneva Confer- 

In the view of the Secretary-General, a 
halt to all military activities by all sides is 
a practical necessity if useful negotiations 
are to be undertaken. Since the Secretary- 
General's three-point plan has not been ac- 
cepted by the parties, he believes that a 
general stand-still truce by all parties to the 
conflict is now the only course which could 
lead to fruitful negotiations. It must be con- 
ceded that a truce without effective supei*vi- 
sion is apt to be breached from time to time 
by one side or another, but an effective 
supervision of truce, at least for the moment, 
seems difficult to envisage as a practical 
possibility. If the parties directly involved 
in the conflict are genuinely motivated by 
considerations of peace and justice, it is 
only to be expected that earnest effort will 
be exerted to enforce the truce to the best 
of their ability. Should a public appeal by 
the Secretary-General in his personal capac- 
ity facilitate the observance of such a truce, 
he would gladly be prepared to do so. Ap- 
peals to that effect by a group of countries 
would also be worthy of consideration. 

Once the appeal has been made and a 
general stand-still truce comes into effect, 
the parties directly involved in the conflict 
should take the next step of entering into 
preliminary talks. While these talks are in 
progress, it is clearly desirable that the 
general stand-still truce will continue to be 
observed. In the view of the Secretary- 
General, these talks can take any of the fol- 
lowing forms: 

(1) Direct talks between the United 
States of America and the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam. 

(2) Direct talks between the two Govern- 
ments mentioned in one above, with the 
participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the 
Geneva Conference of 1954. 

(3) Direct talks between the two Govern- 
ments mentioned in one with the participa- 

tion of the members of the International 
Control Commission. 

(4) Direct talks between the two Govern- 
ments mentioned in one with the participa- 
tion of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva 
Conference of 1954 and of the members of 
the International Control Commission. 

The Secretary-General believes that these 
preliminary talks should aim at reaching an 
agreement on the modalities for the recon- 
vening of the Geneva Conference, with the 
sole purpose of returning to the essentials of 
that Agreement as repeatedly expressed by 
all parties to the conflict. These preliminary 
talks should seek to reach an agreement on 
the timing, place, agenda and participants 
in the subsequent formal meeting — the re- 
convening of the Geneva Conference. The 
Secretary-General deems it necessary to 
stress that the question of participants in the 
formal negotiations should not obstruct the 
way to a settlement. It is a question which 
could be solved only by agreeing that no 
fruitful discussions on ending the war in 
Viet-Nam could take place without involving 
all those who are actually fighting. Since the 
Government in Saigon as well as the Na- 
tional Front of Liberation of South Viet- 
Nam are actually engaged in military opera- 
tions, it is the view of the Secretary-General 
that a future formal conference could not 
usefully discuss the effective termination of 
all military activities and the new political 
situation that would result in South Viet- 
Nam without the participation of represent- 
atives of the Government in Saigon and 
representatives of the National Front of 
Liberation of South Viet-Nam. 

In transmitting these proposals to the 
parties directly concerned, the Secretary- 
General believes that he is acting within the 
limits of his good offices purely in his pri- 
vate capacity. He hopes that the divergent 
positions held by the parties both on the na- 
ture of the conflict and the ultimate political 
objectives will not prevent them from giving 
their very serious attention to these propos- 
als. Indeed, he takes this opportunity to 
appeal to them to give their urgent consid- 
eration to his proposals. 

APRIL 17, 1967 




U.S. /U.N. press release 30 dated March 28 

March 15, 1967 
The United States welcomes the proposal 
of the Secretary-General which contains con- 
structive and positive elements toward 
bringing about a peaceful settlement of the 
Vietnam conflict. 

The United States is in the process of con- 
sulting the government of South Vietnam 
and its allies. We expect to provide the 
Secretary-General with a full and prompt 


U.S./U.N. press release 31 dated March 28 

March 18, 1967 
As the Secretary-General knows, the 
United States and other Governments have, 
over many months, approached Hanoi, both 
publicly and privately, with proposals to end 
the conflict in Vietnam. To date, all such 
efforts have been rebuffed. The Government 
of North Vietnam has refused to agree to 
discussions without preconditions or to take 
reciprocal actions leading toward a cessation 
of hostilities. 

For this reason, the Government of the 
United States would be most interested in 
learning whether Hanoi is willing to enter 
into such discussions or to take reciprocal 
actions leading to peace in Vietnam. The 
United States has been, and remains willing 
to enter into discussions without precondi- 
tions with Hanoi at any time. 

To this end, the United States accepts the 
three-step proposal in the Aide Memoire of 
the Secretary-General of 14 March 1967 

' The text also was read to news correspondents 
at Washington by the Department of State spokes- 
man on Mar. 28. 

^ The text also was released by the Department 
of State on Mar. 28 (press release 69). 

(a) A general stand-still truce; 

(b) Preliminary talks; 

(c) Reconvening of the Geneva Confer- 

The United States believes it would be 
desirable and contributory to serious nego- 
tiations if an effective cessation of hostili- 
ties, as the first element in the three-point 
proposal, could be promptly negotiated. 

It would, therefore, be essential that the 
details of such a general cessation of hostili- 
ties be discussed directly by both sides, or 
through the Secretary-General, the Geneva 
Conference Co-Chairmen or otherwise as 
may be agreed. The United States is pre- 
pared to enter into such discussions im- 
mediately and constructively. 

The United States is also prepared to take 
the next steps in any of the forms suggested 
by the Secretary-General to enter into pre- 
liminary talks leading to agreement as to the 
modalities for reconvening of the Geneva 

Of course, the Government of South Viet- 
nam will have to be appropriately involved 
throughout this entire process. The interests 
and views of our allies would also have to 
be taken fully into account. 

The United States again expresses its ap- 
preciation to the Secretary-General for his 
untiring efforts to help bring about a peace- 
ful settlement and an end to the conflict in 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Afghanistan, Abdullah Malikyar, presented 
his credentials to President Johnson on 
March 17. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
March 17. 



Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States 

Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Mai- 
wandwal of Afghanistan visited the United 
States March 25-April 9. In Washington, 
March 28-30, he met with President Johnson 
and other U.S. Government officials. Follow- 
ing are an exchange of greetings hetiveen 
President Johnson and Prime Minister Mai- 
wandwal at an arrival ceremony on the south 
laivn of the White House on March 28, their 
exchange of toasts at a White House lunch- 
eon that afternoon, and a joint statement 
released later that day at the conclusion of 
their meeting. 


White House press release dated March 28 

President Johnson 

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests, 
ladies and gentlemen: I am very happy, on 
behalf of all Americans, to welcome you 
back to our country, Mr. Prime Minister, 
and to this Capital City that you know so^ 

All of us will remember that you came 
here before as the Ambassador from your 
country. Today you return as Prime Minis- 
ter. We are very proud that a good friend 
who lived among us has found time to pay 
us a cordial visit in the position of great 
trust and distinction which you now hold. 

Mr. Prime Minister, Afghanistan is far 
from us in miles and hours as we meet this 
morning. But for us it is no longer a distant, 
far-off, remote place. Countless Americans 
have come to know your country and to 
know your people. 

President Eisenhower was your guest. 
Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen 

Homaira are warmly remembered by all of 
us for their visit here in 1963.' 

Ambassador [Abdul Rahman] Pazhwak 
is our good neighbor in New York, where he 
now serves as President of the United Na- 
tions General Assembly. 

So we meet today as friends. We live on 
opposite sides of the globe, yet we have 
much in common: 

— Your land, like ours, has a strong tradi- 
tion of freedom and independence. 

— Your people, like ours, cherish diversity 
while they seek unity in mutual respect and 

— You, like us, are experimenters in the 
art of government and social reform. 

— And we share a common dedication to 
peace and to the ideal of a world community 
based on freedom. 

Mr. Prime Minister, these are only a few 
of the ties which bind our nations and our 
peoples together. Historically, the relations 
between our countries have been close and 
cordial. Today they are warmer than ever 
before. It is a very great honor and privilege 
to have you with us to discuss aft even more 
productive future. 

We are so happy that you could come to 
our land. 

Prime Minister Maiwandwal 

Mr. President, I wish to thank Your Ex- 
cellency most sincerely for your warm words 
of welcome and kind expressions of friend- 
ship toward Afghanistan. 

' For text of a joint communique issued at Wash- 
ington on Sept. 7, 1963, see Bulletin of Oct. 7, 
1963, p. 535. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


First, I have the honor to convey the 
heartfelt greetings of my sovereign, King 
Mohammed Zahir, to you personally and, 
through you, to the Government and the 
people of the United States of America. 

His Majesty recalls with the greatest of 
pleasure and satisfaction the cordial hospi- 
tality accorded to him and Her Majesty 
Queen Homaira during their memorable 
state visit to the United States in September 

For my own part, I wish to thank you for 
inviting me to make this visit to the United 
States, which I remember so fondly from 
my two previous official assignments in this 

It will afford me a welcome opportunity 
to meet and talk with you, Mr. President, as 
well as other officials and citizens of the 
United States, including many old friends. 

Although a considerable geographic dis- 
tance separates our two countries, our com- 
mon belief and devotion to liberty and re- 
spect for the inherent dignity of man has 
bridged this distance. 

I am confident that my visit will serve to 
strengthen and promote the friendly and cul- 
tural relations which so happily have pre- 
vailed between Afghanistan and the United 
States since the establishment of formal ties 
in 1943. 

I find it an interesting and noteworthy 
coincidence that the day before yesterday, 
my first full day in the United States on this 
visit, marked the anniversary of the signing 
of the historic agreement in Paris 31 years 
ago establishing diplomatic and consular 
representation between our two countries 
for the first time. 

It was during these years that Afghan 
students began coming to the United States 
for higher studies, and the flow has in- 
creased steadily through the years since 

Also over the past 20 years many Ameri- 
cans have been coming to Afghanistan to 
assist our country in its economic develop- 
ment, along with specialists and technicians 
of other countries and the United Nations. 

Afghanistan is engaged in an all-out effort 
to develop its economy while at the same 
time modernizing its political and social in- 

Our people deeply appreciate the assist- 
ance which the friendly countries, including 
the United States, have contributed to these 

Afghanistan follows a policy of active 
nonalinement and is determined to exercise 
its free judgment in international affairs. It 
endeavors wherever possible to serve the 
cause of international peace and the rights 
of nations and peoples in the firm belief that 
only in peace can the progress of all nations, 
including Afghanistan, be assured and that 
international understanding is the best way 
of insuring human prosperity throughout 
the world. 

My Government is strongly dedicated to 
working for reform in the economic, politi- 
cal, social, and cultural affairs in the coun- 

I am looking forward, Mr. President, to 
friendly exchanges of views with you and 
other members of your Government in the 
hope that they may contribute to the achieve- 
ment of the peace and prosperity for which 
we and our peoples strive. 


White House press release dated March 28 

President Johnson 

Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, 
ladies and gentlemen: Among the last state 
visitors that our beloved President John 
Kennedy received in this White House were 
Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen Ho- 
maira of Afghanistan. They won our hearts 
during that visit. They reminded us that, al- 
though their country and ours are half a 
world apart, we are neighbors in thought 
and we are kindred in spirit. 

Today it is our good fortune to welcome 
the distinguished diplomat, the professor 
and the journalist, who heads the (Govern- 
ment of Afghanistan. 



You, sir, are no stranger here with us. 
You are, rather, an old and very honored 
friend of many in this room and of many 
more elsewhere in this city and in this na- 

There was a time, Mr. Prime Minister, 
when we knew little of your country, except 
that it was a land of adventure, a romantic 
land where cultures met, rich history was 
written, a place where spirited and sturdy 
men fought with pride to maintain and to 
keep their independence. 

We know this still, but now we know a 
great deal more about your land. 

We know today that you and your coun- 
trymen, under the leadership of His Majesty 
King Zahir, have set as your high goal Af- 
ghanistan's "experiment in democracy." 

We know today what you are doing to 
develop your country. We know what you 
are doing to enrich the lives of all of your 

Mr. Prime Minister, we here in America, 
all of us, are very proud to be associated 
with you in that effort. 

If it would be useful to you, Mr. Prime 
Minister, if you think it would be helpful, 
we are prepared to send to your country a 
team of this nation's best agricultural ex- 
perts, directed by Secretary [of Agriculture 
Orville L.] Freeman, who would be delighted 
to work with your specialists in the vital 
achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency 
that we both know is so very important to 
this and to future generations. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you have come to visit 
with us just after the festival of the New 
Year in your country. That season, like the 
coming of spring for us, is a time of reaffir- 
mation and rededication. It is a time when 
we can, together, rededicate ourselves to the 
great tasks that each of us, in our own way, 
in our own land, is trying so hard to do: 

— to build a better framework of social 
justice for all of our people; 

— to devote our energies and our resources 
to better lives for all of our people; 

— to strengthen the strong roots of free- 
dom and the spirit of independence that has 

motivated us both throughout our histories; 
— and, most important of all, to make a 
contribution, individually and collectively, to 
a lasting peace among men throughout the 

This morning as we were talking the Sec- 
retary-General of the United Nations made 
public the main lines of his new proposal 
for a general truce and cessation of hostili- 
ties in Viet-Nam. He presented that proposal 
to our honored and most distinguished Am- 
bassador, Arthur Goldberg — who is privi- 
leged to be with us here today — in New York 
first on March 14th.2 

On March 15th, under Secretary Rusk's 
and Ambassador Goldberg's direction, we 
promptly replied, welcoming the proposal 
and noting that it contains "constructive and 
positive elements toward bringing a peaceful 
settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict." 

We promptly told the Secretary-General 
that we would be consulting immediately 
with the Government of South Viet-Nam 
and with our other allies and that we would 
provide him with a full and very prompt 
reply. On March 15th we said that. 

On March 18th Ambassador Goldberg 
delivered that reply. It was positive. It was 
definitive. It was affirmative. 

The Government of Viet-Nam also re- 
sponded constructively. 

Yesterday we regretfully learned from Ra- 
dio Hanoi that they were informing the 
world that they alpparently were not pre- 
pared to accept the Secretary-General's pro- 
posal. As they stated through their radio, 
"The Viet-Nam problem has no concern with 
the United Nations, and the United Nations 
has absolutely no right to interfere in any 
way with the Viet-Nam question." 

We respectfully disagree. War and peace 
are concerns of the United Nations. They are 
concerns of all people. 

We welcome the efforts of not only the 
United Nations but any nation, large or 
small, if they have any suggestion or any 
contribution they are prepared to make. 

» See p. 624. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


I would hope that the Secretary-General 
was correct this morning when he said that 
none of the parties has categorically — cate- 
gorically — turned his plan down. 

We have seen over the past several years 
— and, yes, recently in the past several 
months — one effort after another to bring 
peace to Southeast Asia fail because Hanoi 
rejected it. 

But, Mr. Prime Minister and honored 
guests, I want everyone who can hear my 
voice or see my words to know that this na- 
tion will continue to persist. Deep in our 
history is the memory of what President 
Abraham Lincoln said to his countrymen in 
the dark days of 1861: 

Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; 
and when, after much loss on both sides, and no 
gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old 
questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon 

In Southeast Asia the terms for the rela- 
tions among states were set in 1954 and 1962 
by international accords. In the end they 
must be honored. In the end the people of 
South Viet-Nam must be given the chance 
to determine their destiny without external 

So all of our power, our intelligence, and 
our imagination will be devoted in the fu- 
ture, as in the past, to bringing that day 

As we meet here in this spring, in this 
period of dedication, this spring of 1967, let 
us together pledge anew our dedication to 
the achievement of the objectives of social 
justice, devoting our energy and resources to 
better lives, to strengthening the roots of 
freedom and independence, and to making a 
contribution, individually and collectively, to 
peace among men. 

Mr. Prime Minister, I have no doubt, after 
our extended visit today, that we are joined 
in these objectives and in this resolve. 

Now I should like to ask our friends who 
have come here from other parts of the na- 
tion out of friendship and respect for the 
distinguished Prime Minister to join me in 

a toast to His Majesty King Zahir and to the 
great nation of Afghanistan. • ' 

Pritkie Minister Maiwandwal 

President Johnson, Your Excellencies, la- 
dies and gentlemen: I wish to thank you 
again, Mr. President, as I had the occasion 
to do on my arrival earlier this morning, for 
your very kind words of welcome to me per- 
sonally and your expressions of friendship 
for my country and the people of Afghani- 

It is gratifying to know that the visit of 
Their Majesties the King and Queen of Af- 
ghanistan in 1963 is still so fondly remem- 
bered in this country. I can assure you that 
the friendly sentiments you have expressed 
are warmly reciprocated by them. 

I am pleased to be here and to visit the 
United States again. 

Mr. President, the experiment of Afghani- 
stan in democracy, I am proud to confirm, is 
a noble endeavor and is in full swing under 
the wise and benevolent leadership and guid- 
ance of His Majesty our King. 

When he visited the United States in au- 
tumn 1963, this experiment was merely a 
new seed planted in our ancient soil, but it 
has been carefully nurtured since then and 
now has grown into a sturdy young plant. 

Its blossoms include a liberal new constitu- 
tion which appeared in 1964, free nationwide 
parliamentary elections by universal suffrage 
and secret ballot in 1965, establishment of an 
independent parliament representative of 
their nation, and the adoption of a host of 
progressive new laws designed to reform 
and modernize our society and political in- 

Our experiment, in short, has had a 
healthy start and is beginning to bear fruit. 

But we have chosen to modernize not on 
merely one but on several fronts at once — 
economic as well as political and social — and 
in some of this we highly value the great as- 
sistance which friends like the United States 
of America have been giving us in develop- 
ing our economy. 



We appreciate your help in building our 
infrastructure, especially the construction of 
roads like the magnificent Kabul-Kandahar 
Highway, a gift of the American people dedi- 
cated only last August in a ceremony at- 
tended by Secretary Fi-eeman — and the high- 
way between Herat and the Iranian border, 
currently under construction. 

Similar cooperation between our two coun- 
tries is, to a considerable extent, helping to 
develop our educational systems, our agri- 
culture, our water resources, and our trans- 
portation system. 

All of this will pay repeated dividends for 
the future lives of our people. 

May I assure you, Mr. President, that our 
prime aim and driving ambition is to reach 
self-sustained economic growth in as short a 
time as possible so as to free ourselves from 
the need for foreign assistance. 

Still, we continue to need your help in many 
ways in order to accelerate our growth and 
reach our national goals in the shortest pos- 
sible time. 

Your kind offer of assistance by a special 
team of experts to advise us on ways and 
means of achieving agricultural self-suffi- 
ciency would indeed be useful, and we look 
forward to discussing this, as well as other 
aspects of cooperation, with the responsible 
officials of your Government. 

Mr. President, Afghanistan is a real ex- 
ample of a country in which the sincere ef- 
forts of the people and friendly assistance of 
foreign countries have combined to create an 
area of peace and stability in an all too often 
turbulent and insecure world. 

We firmly believe in the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations, including the 
necessity of solving international problems 
by peaceful means. 

In this spirit, we continue to pursue our 
efforts aimed at the peaceful settlement of 
the Pakhtunistan problem, which constitutes 
the major issue in our relationships with 

As a living example of international coop- 
eration in peace, our policy of active and 
positive nonalinement and of coexistence has 

worked for the advantage of our country, our 
region, and, we hope, the world. 

This is not a new policy for us, but rather 
one we have pursued throughout this century 
as a national struggle and a consequence of 
our geographic position and historical expe- 

You have aptly referred, Mr. President, to 
the present season of the Afghan New Year, 
which falls also in the beginning of spring, 
as a time of rededication. In our case it 
marks this year the beginning of our third 
5-year plan, through which we hope to make 
further substantial progress in improving 
the life of our people. 

The Government and the nation of Af- 
ghanistan are grateful for the friendship, 
understanding, and interest manifested by 
the Government and people of the United 
States in our struggle for economic and so- 
cial betterment. 

Ladies and gentlemen, friends, I invite you 
to join me in a toast to the health and pros- 
perity of the President of the United States 
and to the great American people. 


White House press release dated March 28 

At the invitation of President Johnson, 
Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Mai- 
wandwal of Afghanistan visited Washington 
from March 28-30, 1967. The President and 
Prime Minister met on March 28 and ex- 
changed views on matters of mutual interest. 

President Johnson took particular pleasure 
in welcoming the Prime Minister back to 
Washington, recalling his long and distin- 
guished role as Ambassador from Afghani- 
stan to the United States. The President also 
recalled the state visit to the United States 
in September 1963 of Their Majesties King 
Mohammed Zahir Shah and Queen Ho- 
maira, a visit which added substantially to 
the long record of close friendship between 
the United States and Afghanistan. He 
asked the Prime Minister to convey to His 
Majesty the King the warm affection and ad- 

APRIL 17, 1967 


miration of the American people for the Af- 
ghan people. 

Prime Minister Maiwandwal described for 
the President Afghanistan's continuing ef- 
forts, under the leadership of His Majesty 
the King, to build and strengthen democratic 
institutions and to press economic and social 
progress. He outlined his government's in- 
tention, under the Third Five Year Plan, to 
intensify economic development efforts. The 
President assured the Prime Minister of the 
continuing desire of the United States to do 
its part in assisting Afghanistan's efforts for 
implementing the Third Five Year Plan. The 
Prime Minister expressed to the President 
the deep appreciation of the Afghan people 
for United States economic assistance. 

In this connection the President noted 
with special satisfaction cooperative efforts 
of long duration by the United States and 
Afghanistan in many fields of education. 

The Prime Minister reviewed Afghani- 
stan's foreign policy of non-alignment and 
friendship and cooperation with all Nations. 
He described the problems existing among 
the countries of the region to which Afghani- 
stan belongs and reiterated Afghanistan's 
view that these problems can be solved 
through peaceful means and in an atmos- 
phere of understanding, confidence and real- 

The two leaders talked about current de- 
velopments elsewhere in Asia, particularly 
the urgent need for peace and stability in 
Southeast Asia. They outlined their respec- 
tive positions on the problem of Vietnam and 
agreed that a peaceful and just settlement is 
urgently needed. The President described for 
the Prime Minister the many and persisting 
efforts of the United States to achieve a ces- 
sation of hostilities in Vietnam consistent 
with the freedom and independence of the 
people of South Vietnam. The Prime Min- 
ister stated that implementation of the 1954 
Geneva accords is a sound basis for the set- 
tlement of the Vietnamese problem. 

The President was delighted to know of 
the intention of the University of California 
at Santa Barbara to bestow an honorary de- 
gree on the Prime Minister during his cur- 
rent visit. 

Pan American Day 

and Pan American Week, 1967 


There is special meaning this year in the 
hemispheric tradition of Pan American Day. 

On April twelfth, for the first time in a decade 
and the second time in history, the Presidents and 
Heads of Government of the American nations will 
meet to fortify the foundation of the house of the 

Seventy-seven years ago we first joined our hearts 
and hands as brothers in a hopeful hemisphere. We 
pledged a common pledge — we dreamed a common 
dream. We have since translated that pledge into 
progress. And we have founded the Organization of 
American States as a firm framework for the ful- 
fillment of that dream. 

We have recently strengthened that Organization 
by amending its Charter to meet the challenge that 
our changring times demand. 

We have extended our unique experiment in in- 
ternational living by welcoming into our member- 
ship the new nation of Trinidad and Tobago. 

We have enhanced the meaning of that experi- 
ment by forging within it an Alliance for Progress 
in which our goals for the good life are matched 
only by our desire to achieve them. And the im- 
pressive accomplishments of these last six years 
trace that desire's grrowing satisfaction. 

When the Alliance was formed in 1961, it was 
estimated that our Latin American neighbors could 
supply about 80% of the capital required. In fact, 
they have done better than this. By the end of this 
year, the gross investment in Latin America will 
have totaled over $100 billion — and 95% of it will 
have been from domestic sources. This ability of 
our neighbors to save and invest in their owfi future 
is a most striking indication that Latin America 
can, with relatively modest external help, mobilize 
the resources needed for its own development — and 
thus strengthen the foundations of the house we 
share in this hemisphere. 

The cooperative spirit of the Alliance is bringing 
new-found confidence and hope into this house. 

— Per capita growth rates show that more and 
more countries are breaking the economic stagna- 
tion of earlier years. 

— -Men, women and children are alive today who 
would otherwise have died. In ten countries, deaths 
caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to 2,280 in 
three years' time. Smallpox cases declined almost 
as sharply. And new health centers and hospitals 
are growing everywhere. 

— Men whose fathers for generations toiled on 
land owned by others are now working it as their 
own. With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres have 

' No. 3774; 32 Fed. Reg. 5539. 



been irrigated and 106,000 acres reclaimed. 15,000 
miles of road have been built or improved, many of 
them farm-to-market access roads. 

— For tens of thousands of families, the most 
fundamental conditions of life are improving. 350,- 
000 housing units have been, or are now being, con- 
structed. New and modernized water supply sys- 
tems have been built to benefit some 20 million 

So as we assemble under the banner of the Alli- 
ance for Progrress, we are cheered by success and 
encouraged in the task that lies ahead. 

With the confidence born of achievement, we 
know that we can prepare a better world for the 
new generation of Americans who will come after 

We look to the 60% of Latin America's 245 mil- 
lion people who are now under the age of 25, and 
we know that the task of meeting their aspirations 
is great. But we also know that we have forged the 
tools to do the task. And there is promise in what 
we see. 

The sustaining arm of education is reaching out 
to more and more of this strategic 60% of Latin 

— Since the Alliance was formed, school enroll- 
ments have increased at an average annual rate 
of over 6%. This rate represents more than twice 
the rate of increase in the total population. 

— For each 1,000 inhabitants, there were 124 stu- 
dents enrolled in schools in 1960, 170 in 1965, and 
174 in 1966. 

— 28,000 new classrooms have been built. 

— 160,000 teachers have been trained or given 
additional training. 

— More than 14 million textbooks have been dis- 

— 13 million school children and 3 million pre- 
schoolers participate in school lunch programs. 

And more than this, what statistics cannot ade- 
quately relay is the emergence of a generation of 
vigorous, confident and responsible leaders through- 
out Latin America — leaders who are ready to help 
their countries help themselves. These leaders are 
beginning to include more and more women doers 
in their ranks. And since women comprise over half 
the population of Latin America, there is new 
potential in this leadership. 

The successes scored by the Alliance have been 
aided by the United States — but they have been 
realized by the cooperative spirit that resides in the 
commitment and dedication of the Latin American 
nations themselves. Their unrelenting perseverance 
has been a keystone in the firm foundation of our 
house of hemispheric progress. 

So as together we seek to strengthen — we seek a 
realistic goal. 

As together we build to better — we build on solid 

Bound by geography, bom of a common revolu- 

tionary heritage, nurtured by common ideals, com- 
mitted to the dignity of man, and sustained by the 
youth and vigor that have been our common 
strength, we will project our traditions into a 
promising future — and we will prevail. 

dent of the United States of America, do hereby 
proclaim Friday, April 14, 1967, as Pan American 
Day, and the week beginning April 9 and ending 
April 15 as Pan American Week; and I call upon 
the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and 
the officials of all other areas under the flag of the 
United States to issue similar proclamations. 

Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate 
itself to the fundamental goal of the inter- American 
system, embodied in the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States and in the Charter of 
Punta del Este: social justice and economic progress 
within the framework of individual freedom and 
political liberty. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this thirty-first 

day of March in the year of our Lord nine- 

[seal] teen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the 

Independence of the United States of 

America the one hundred and ninety-first. 

By the President : 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

U.S. Observers Inspect 
Antarctic Stations 

The Department of State announced on 
March 20 (press release 60) that a five-man 
U.S. observer team had completed an inspec- 
tion of Antarctic stations operated by other 
parties to the Antarctic Treaty.* The U.S. 
observers reported that they were welcomed 
in a friendly and cooperative spirit at every 
facility visited, that access to all installations 
was made available freely, and that all activi- 
ties observed in the Antarctic were in con- 

' For a Department announcement regarding ap- 
pointment of U.S. observers, see Bulletin of Jan. 
9, 1967, p. 71; for text of the treaty, see ibid., 
Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


sonance with the spirit and specific provi- 
sions of the treaty. 

The essence of the Antarctic Treaty is the 
dedication of the area for peaceful purposes. 
The treaty expressly prohibits in Antarctica 
any military measures, such as the establish- 
ment of military bases and fortifications, the 
execution of military maneuvers, and the 
testing of any type of weapons. Freedom of 
scientific investigation, as well as interna- 
tional cooperation toward that end, is pre- 
served. To insure observance of the treaty 
provisions, signatories have the right of 
inspection and aerial observation in all areas 
of Antarctica. 

The following stations were inspected: 


Operated by 


Dumont d'Durville 


Feb. 1 



Feb. 8-9 



Feb. 14 



Feb. 17 



Feb. 19 


South Africa 

Feb. 25 


United Kingdom 

Mar. 2 



Mar. 2 

In addition, the Danish ship Thala Dan, 
under charter to the French and Australian 
expeditions, was inspected while unloading 
cargo at Wilkes station. 

The observers made the journey on board 
the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Eastwind, 
which departed Wellington, New Zealand, on 
January 25 and landed the observers at 
Punta Arenas, Chile, on March 6. 

The U.S. observers who made the trip 
were: Frank G. Siscoe, Department of State; 
Merton Davies, Rand Corporation scientist; 
Col. Ernest F. Dukes, USAF; Karl Kenyon, 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sei-vice; and Cyril 
Muromcew, Department of State. 

The Antarctic Treaty was signed on 
December 1, 1959, and entered into force 
June 23, 1961. The 12 original signatories of 
the treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Bel- 
gium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. In addition, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland, and Denmark have acceded to 
the treaty. 

U.S., Canada Request IJC Study 
of American Falls at Niagara 

Press release 80 dated March 31 

The Depa rtment of State on March 31 sent 
the following letter to the International Joint 
Commission, United States and Canada, re- 
questing the Commission to investigate and 
report upon measures necessary to preserve 
or enhance the beauty of the American Falls 
at Niagara. An identical letter was transmit- 
ted to the Commission by the Government of 

March 31, 1967 
The International Joint Commission 

United States and Canada 
Washington, B.C., U.S.A. 

and Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 

Sirs : The Governments of the U.S.A. and 
of Canada have agreed to request the Inter- 
national Joint Commission, pursuant to Arti- 
cle IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 
1909,1 to investigate and report upon meas- 
ures necessary to preserve or enhance the 
beauty of the American Falls at Niagara. 
The Commission is specifically requested to 
investigate and recommend: 

(1) what measures are feasible and desir- 
able (a) to effect the removal of the talus 
which has collected at the base of the Amer- 
ican Falls, and (b) to retard or prevent fu- 
ture erosion; 

(2) other measures which may be desir- 
able or necessary to preserve or enhance the 
beauty of the American Falls; 

(3) the allocation, as between the United 
States and Canada, of the work and costs of 

At the same time, the Commission is asked 
to bear in mind the obligations of Canada 
and the United States contained in the Ni- 
agara Treaty of 1950 ^ and the mutual in- 
terest of the two countries in refraining from 

> 36 Stat. 2448. 

" Treaties and Other International Acts Series 



measures which might preserve or enhance 
one of the Falls to the detriment of the other. 

For the purpose of assisting the Commis- 
sion in its investigation and otherwise in the 
performance of its duties under this refer- 
ence, the two governments will upon request 
make available to the Commission the serv- 
ices of engineers and other specially qualified 
personnel of their governmental agencies and 
such information and technical data as may 
have been acquired or as may be acquired by 
them during the course of the investigation. 

The Commission is requested to submit its 
report to the two governments as soon as 
may be practicable. 

For the Secretary of State: 

George S. Springsteen 

Acting Assistant Secretary 

for European Affairs 

Convention Adopted on Conduct 
of North Atlantic Fisheries 

Press release 61 dated March 21 

Representatives of 18 countries engaged in 
fishing operations in the North Atlantic, 
including the United States, Canada, and 16 
European nations, on March 17 adopted and 
referred to governments for approval the 
text of a Convention on the Conduct of Fish- 
ing Operations in the North Atlantic. The 
convention was incorporated in a final act 
which has been signed by representatives of 
all countries participating in a Fisheries 
Policing Conference, which met at London 
four times starting in 1965. 

The convention establishes an international 
code of conduct to be followed by fishing ves- 
sels and ancillary craft in the North Atlantic 
area. It is designed to increase safety at sea, 
particularly on the international fishing 
grounds, and to reduce the risk of damage to 
boats and fishing gear which can occur when 
vessels using different fishing methods 
operate close to one another. 

The convention contains provisions on 

marking of fishing vessels to insure their 
identification at sea and estabhshes uniform 
supplementary light signals for fishing ves- 
sels. It also establishes uniform methods of 
marking nets and other gear in the sea and 
a code of good conduct on the fishing grounds. 
The convention provides for a conciliation 
procedure to facilitate settlement of small 
claims arising out of gear damage involving 
fishermen of different nations and for an 
inspection system whereby authorized officers 
from any of the participating countries in 
certain circumstances will be able to board 
and inspect fishing vessels of other partici- 
pating countries to investigate possible viola- 
tions of the rules or cases of damage. While 
it will be possible for certain countries to opt 
out of the boarding provisions, other aspects 
of the inspection system, such as observation 
and reporting of violations to the authorities 
of the flag state of the fishing vessel, will 
apply uniformly to all fishing vessels. 

The convention itself will be open for sig- 
nature in London from June 1 to November 
30, 1967. After signature it will be subject to 
ratification by the United States upon advice 
and consent of the Senate. 

The countries represented at the Con- 
ference were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ice- 
land, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether- 
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and 
United States. 

The Conference stemmed from the Euro- 
pean Fisheries Conference of 1963-64, at 
which a resolution was passed that the 
United Kingdom should convene a technical 
conference of all countries participating in 
the Northeast Atlantic fisheries to prepare a 
draft convention embodying a modern code 
for the conduct of fishing operations and of 
related activities in the Northeast Atlantic. 
It was also resolved to invite representatives 
of the United States and Canada to attend, so 
that the extension of the provisions of any 
such convention to the Northwest Atlantic 
fisheries might be considered. The convention 
will cover the area off the coasts of Canada 

APRIL 17, 1967 


and the United States as far south as Cape 
Hatteras, where fishing grounds are often 
occupied by vessels of many nations. 

Representatives of the Departments of 
State and Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard 
met several times with representatives of 
fishermen along the Atlantic coast in prepa- 
ration for negotiating the convention. 

The U.S. delegation consisted of John T. 

Gharrett, Regional Director of the U.S. 
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in Glouces- 
ter, Mass., as chairman and Rajonund T. 
Yingling of the Department of State as vice 
chairman. William L. Sullivan, Jr., of the De- 
partment of State was also a member of the 
delegation. Lt. Comdr. C. J. Blondin, U.S. 
Coast Guard, and John B. Skerry, Bureau of 
Commercial Fisheries, served as advisers. 


U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles 
for U.N. Peacekeeping Functions 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

Mr. Chairman [Francisco Cuevas Cancino, 
representative of Mexico] : I appreciate your 
courtesy in giving me this opportunity to 
make a statement on behalf of my delegation 
about the vitally important task of this com- 
mittee. And again, since I am appearing at 
these resumed sessions for the first time, may 
I express my pleasure, Mr. Chairman, that 
you are again in the chair and supported by 
an able bureau and an efficient staff. 

My main purpose is not to discuss in detail 
the various proposals which have been made 
here, on which the United States view has 
been ably set forth by my colleague, Ambas- 
sador Finger [Seymour M. Finger, senior 
adviser to the U.S. representative]. Rather 
I wish to emphasize at this critical stage in 

' Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace- 
keeping Operations, Working Group A, on Mar. 22 
(U.S./U.N press release 28/Corr. 1). 

the committee's proceedings the deep and 
continuing concern which my country feels 
for the future functioning of the United 
Nations in the peacekeeping field. 

We of the United States desire to do our 
part in every possible way in the combined 
efforts and in the mutual accommodation 
which will be'required if that essential func- 
tion is to be maintained in its full vigor. The 
same concern, we know, is widely shared not 
only in this committee but among the entire 
membership of the United Nations. 

It is now over 18 months since we weath- 
ered a grave constitutional crisis in the life of 
the organization and the General Assembly 
was enabled to resume its normal work. As 
all members know, the United States, as our 
contribution to the resolution of that crisis, 
without yielding its basic principles, re- 
luctantly acquiesced in the unwillingness of 



the majority to apply article 19 of the 
charter in that situation.^ 

But we have not changed our view about 
the capacity and the duty of the United Na- 
tions, in the future as in the past, to serve 
effectively as a keeper of peace among na- 
tions. On that issue, in our conception, the 
deepest interests of all members are alike — 
and there are many signs that the great 
majority, large and small, know this full 

Regrettably, certain major practical issues 
important to peacekeeping — particularly the 
issue of financing, over which the crisis 
arose — were not resolved in 1965. They are 
still unresolved today. In particular, it there- 
fore remains uncertain to what extent the 
United Nations can be looked to in the future 
— ^as in the past — to send peacekeeping 
forces into the field in order to maintain 
international peace and security. The crea- 
tion and maintenance of such forces in time 
of need stand as one of the greatest achieve- 
ments of the U.N. in its 21-year life. The un- 
certainty as to its future capacity in this 
regard is understandably a cause of anxiety 
to all nations and citizens throughout the 
world who have at heart the cause of world 
peace and security. 

To keep this matter in perspective, it 
should be noted that, despite all these uncer- 
tainties, the activities of the U.N. organs 
which are responsible under the charter for 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security have continued without interruption. 
Vital peacekeeping operations continue in 
Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Middle East. This 
is a testimonial, despite the lack of resolution 
of the issue, to the pragmatic good sense of 
the members of the U.N. who have dealt with 
crises as they arose. It would be a sad day 
indeed for the U.N. and for world peace, and 
for all we would hope to work and seek for, 
if the recalcitrance of one member or a few 
members were to prevent the U.N. from con- 
tinuing to take action to keep the peace. We 

are encouraged that this has not happened, 
and we persist in the confidence that it will 
not happen. 

What concerns us here is how to assure 
the readiness of the U.N. to face future 
emergencies. Last December, in the General 
Assembly, it appeared that an important step 
was about to be taken in this direction by the 
adoption of the thoughtful Canadian resolu- 
tion which received such a strong majority 
vote in the committee.^ And referring to the 
Canadian resolution, I cannot forbear from 
also acknowledging the deservedly admired 
contribution which has been made to our con- 
sideration of this subject by that conscience 
of the United Nations in the area of peace- 
keeping, the distinguished Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland, 
Frank Aiken, who has with resolution and 
fortitude persisted in keeping it at the fore- 
front of the U.N. agenda. 

The Canadian measure contained im- 
portant principles on financing, on the re- 
sidual authority of the General Assembly to 
launch peacekeeping operations, and on ad- 
vance planning by member states to con- 
tribute men and facilities to future U.N. 
peacekeeping operations. But at the last 
moment, as we all know, a final vote on this 
key resolution was deferred until the special 
session in April. 

Mr. Chairman, time has passed since then. 
That session is now imminent. In this situa- 
tion it may be useful for me to recapitulate 
four basic principles which my Government 
believes are among the minimum essentials 
of a solution. These are: 

— First, the capacity of the United Nations 
to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly in an 
emergency must be preserved. 

— Second, viable and equitable financial 
arrangements must be agreed upon, and 
faithfully implemented, to support this 

— Third, the essential role of the Secretary- 
General as executive head of the organization 

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg in the 
U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 
on Aug. 16, 1965, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 

^ A/SPC/L. 130/Rev. 4, introduced by Canada and 
cosponsored by six other countries; for text, see 
U.N. doc. A/6603. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


in peacekeeping operations, as in all other 
operations, must be respected. 

— Fourth, no single country, however pow- 
erful, can or should be permitted to frustrate 
by the veto a peacekeeping operation of the 
United Nations properly initiated by an 
appropriate organ of the U.N. 

Now let me comment briefly on each of 

Preserving the U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity 

First, the United Nations peacekeeping 

As for the vital importance of the capacity 
of the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping 
forces, I need scarcely reemphasize what is 
so well known to all members. This capacity 
is essential to the organization's very first 
purpose, set forth in article 1 of the charter: 
"to maintain international peace and secu- 
rity." It is a factor in the security of every 
nation on the globe, including my own. When 
through neglect or obstruction we diminish 
that capacity, we diminish to that extent the 
security of every nation. 

The U.N., of course, is valuable in many 
ways: as a point of diplomatic contact; as a 
forum of international debate; as a center of 
international cooperation for the betterment 
of human life in all of its aspects, economic, 
social, and with respect to human rights. But 
none of its values can be ranked higher than 
its services as a truly international peace- 
keeping organization. The "blue helmets" of 
the United Nations — whatever the imperfec- 
tions of the operations — in the Middle East, 
the Congo, and in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and in 
other areas, have restored calm to these 
troubled areas, any one of which might 
otherwise have become a battleground, a con- 
frontation of the great powers, with conse- 
quences catastrophic for the entire world. 
That the organization should lose its capacity 
to respond in this way to the similar emer- 
gencies which are sure to recur in this turbu- 
lent era is, as our Secretary-General re- 
marked nearly a year ago, "inconceivable." 
And yet, as he went on to say with his 
characteristic directness, "that is the kind 
of risk which we are now running." 

Regarding the means necessary to assure 
that this United Nations capacity remains 
unimpaired and particularly that members 
are prepared in advance to respond to a 
United Nations call for peacekeeping forces, 
we shall have more to say in the working 
group which deals with that subject. 

Financial Arrangements 

My second point relates to the vital need 
for reliable financial support of peacekeep- 
ing operations. It is this issue that first 
threatened to undermine the peacekeeping 
activity of the U.N. — and that threat still 
hangs over us today. 

One sign of it is the fact that the most 
recently inaugurated peacekeeping operation, 
that on Cyprus, is being financed on a 
hand-to-mouth basis by some 20 countries 
responding to periodic appeals from the Sec- 
retary-General. That the world's ranking 
international official should be obliged to go 
begging every few months to carry out the 
will of the organization, expressed by re- 
peated and unanimous resolutions of the 
Security Council, is neither dignified nor 

On the other hand, the financing of the 
United Nations Emergency Force in the Mid- 
dle East has been provided for on a sounder 
and more equitable footing. It has been 
covered by apportionment among the mem- 
bers — although regrettably not all have yet 
paid. Perhaps the formula used for UNEF 
through some improved mechanism can be 
helpful in finding a model for the future. 

One aspect of the financial problem is the 
question of voluntary contributions. I should 
like to deal with this with great frankness 
and candor with respect to the position of my 

At the time when a way was being sought 
to end the deadlock over article 19, many 
delegations came to the United States dele- 
gation and assured us that if we would not 
press for application of the article 19 voting 
penalty then the members who had refused 
to contribute to certain peacekeeping opera- 
tions would make substantial voluntary con- 
tributions to reduce the deficit of the orga- 



nization. In spite of these assurances, I am 
obliged to note that more than a year has 
passed and no voluntary contribution has yet 
been made by any of those countries that re- 
fused to contribute, particularly the major 

Now, some have suggested that the United 
States also should make a voluntary contri- 
bution. I need scarcely reiterate to this com- 
mittee that my country took the initiative in 
breaking the deadlock over article 19. Now 
it is for others to take the initiative by 
doing their part in the interest of U.N. sol- 

I also need scarcely remind the committee 
that the United States, in addition to paying 
its assessed share in every case, had long 
since made large voluntary contributions 
both to the United Nations Emergency Force 
and to the Congo operation. 

But I again repeat the assurance that I 
have given before: that once the promised 
substantial voluntary contributions have 
been made by those who we have been as- 
sured would make such contributions, the 
United States will not be found wanting — as 
indeed we have never been found wanting in 
support of the U.N.'s needs and require- 

I next turn briefly to the more basic ques- 
tion of future financial arrangements. 

The United States has in no way abated 
its support for the principle of collective 
financing for peacekeeping. We believe it 
should be applied in light of the realities and 
practicalities of the situation to the extent 
feasible, as it now is for certain peacekeeping 
operations contained in the regular budget. 

This is one area in which this committee 
could take a constructive step by examining 
the various proposals for a model special 
scale for financing operations involving 
heavy expenditures. We are prepared to join 
in the search for a reliable and equitable 
formula and to consider various approaches 
that have been suggested. 

For example, we will be glad to examine 
the concrete suggestion made by India; 
namely, that in cases where the Security 
Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation 

involving heavy expenditures, the General 
Assembly may apportion the resulting ex- 
penses on a special scale, reducing the share 
of the low-income countries. We are fully 
prepared to discuss this proposal in a spirit 
of mutual accommodation — and with a view 
to making real progress toward meaningful 

We have listened today with close atten- 
tion to the cogent observations just made by 
our distinguished colleague, Ambassador 
[Akira] Matsui of Japan, on the Indian 
proposal. As is usual for him and his country, 
Ambassador Matsui has made a notable con- 
tribution to the discussion in the careful 
analysis which he has given us today. 

We are also prepared to consider other 
financing formulas, including the Jamaican 
proposal and the formula embodied in the 
seven-power resolution adopted by the Spe- 
cial Political Committee last fall. 

And we have listened today also with great 
interest to the suggestions of the dis- 
tinguished representative of Ethiopia, our 
colleague. Ambassador [Lij Endalkatchew] 
Makonnen, toward a coordinated and bal- 
anced method for the initiation and financing 
of peacekeeping operations to be implemented 
on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement. We 
shall, of course, want to study these with 
care but I can assure Ambassador Makonnen 
here and now that the United States is pre- 
pared to consider his proposals with the 
closest attention as well as other proposals 
aimed toward the same goal. 

Ambassador Makonnen stated his aim as, 
and I quote him, "making the Organization 
readily responsive to any contingency that 
might require United Nations actions with- 
out badly needed actions being slowed down 
or hindered altogether by the requirement of 
big-power unanimity." I am in complete 
agreement with his statement so cogently 

We have also had an interesting proposal 
from the distinguished Minister Zorrilla 
[Luis G. Zorrilla, alternate representative] 
of Mexico concerning the financial aspects of 
peacekeeping, which also require and will re- 
ceive our careful consideration and study. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


In the same spirit we would be glad to dis- 
cuss suggestions with regard to a finance 
committee to consider methods of financing 
peacekeeping, including the French proposal 
for a committee linked to the Security Coun- 
cil. We believe that any such committee 
ought to be created by the General Assembly, 
whose authority in this area is supported by 
the charter. Perhaps a compromise might be 
possible; namely, a committee composed of 
the members of the Security Council but re- 
porting to the General Assembly. I mention 
this as an example of the flexibility which 
we are willing to manifest and which we be- 
lieve can lead to progress. 

Secretary-General's Executive Authority 

My third point is that any United Nations 
peacekeeping operation, like any other com- 
plex operation, requires a single executive. 
That executive should be the Secretary- 
General — in the future as in the past. 

In the peacekeeping area as in every other 
vital work of the organization, the Secretary- 
General simply cannot function as a glorified 
clerk. He must have the latitude to make the 
necessary day-to-day decisions. He must not 
be tied down by demands that administrative 
details be referred back to the Security 
Council or the General Assembly as the case 
may be. If the Secretary-General has to clear 
with them the assignment of every observer 
and the allocation of every jeep, the peace- 
keeping function of the U.N. will simply 
undergo a new form of paralysis — admin- 
istrative rather than financial. 

Of course, as in the past, the Secretary- 
General should operate within the scope of 
his authority and his mandate, and his rights 
and responsibilities and limitations under the 
charter. He should be responsive to the 
authorizing body. He should consult with the 
members on his conduct of peacekeeping 
operations. But consultation must not be dis- 
torted into a new form of veto. 

I can only say, from my experience and 
that of my predecessors at the United Na- 
tions, the Secretary-General has discharged 

his duty of consultation with complete 
fidelity and objectivity and in the interest of 
all members of the organization. 

No Veto on Peacekeeping 

Finally, the United States firmly adheres 
to the view that no one nation may frustrate 
the United Nations in its peacekeeping 

Under the charter, the Security Council's 
responsibility is not described as "exclusive" 
but rather as "primary." The power of the 
General Assembly to make recommendations 
in this realm is made clear in the charter, 
notably in articles 10, 11, 12, and 14. 

Various members, including France, have 
in the past suggested that the General As- 
sembly retains a role in peacekeeping activi- 
ties as distinct from enforcement actions. 
And it may be useful to emphasize this dis- 
tinction, to which we fully subscribe. Only 
the Security Council has power under the 
charter to mount enforcement actions. Such 
actions involve coercion and in launching 
them the Security Council has the power to 
issue orders binding on member states. That 
power is properly subject to the veto. 

The General Assembly has no binding 
power with respect to enforcement actions. It 
can only recommend. But the importance of 
this recommendatory power — which is pos- 
sessed also by the Security Council — is 
attested to by the fact that virtually all the 
operations involving military forces in the 
history of the United Nations have been 
authorized by recommendation. One, the 
United Nations Emergency Force, was 
recommended by the General Assembly. All 
the others were recommended by the Security 
Council without invoking its enforcement 

Believing as we do in these principles 
which we conceive to be entirely sound and 
compatible with the charter, we were much 
gratified last December when the Canadian 
resolution, containing a clear reaffirmation 
of the Assembly's role in this area, received 
such a strong majority vote in the Special 



Political Committee of the General Assembly. 
And we earnesly hope this vote foreshadows 
further progress toward the general accept- 
ance and reaffirmation of the Assembly's 
vital peacekeeping function. 

I believe the issue of the General Assem- 
bly's authority in this area has never been 
more eloquently stated than in the statement 
which our late beloved colleague, Dr. Victor 
Andres Belaunde of Peru, made in the de- 
bate on peacekeeping last December 14, on 
the last day of his life. I am convinced he 
spoke for an overwhelming part of the mem- 
bership of the United Nations when he said: 

We cannot resign ourselves to that absurd con- 
cept which, while recognizing the necessity for peace, 
holds that when the organ specifically charged with 
responsibility for peace becomes paralyzed, the Gen- 
eral Assembly should also be paralyzed and immo- 
bilized, impotent in the face of war and catastrophe. 
We cannot accept this ; we will never accept it. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I repeat that 
the United States wishes a resolution of this 
problem. It wishes to respond flexibly to any 
initiative whose purpose is to assure the 
future of the United Nations as a keeper of 
the peace. Progress cannot be made by un- 
requited concessions from one side. But 
where a spirit of accommodation is apparent, 
my Government will respond. 

The interests at stake in this matter 
transcend the interests of any nation or 
group of nations. All nations, great and 
small alike, irrespective of their size or loca- 
tion or ideology, irrespective of particular 
grievances, have a vital stake in a peaceful 
world order. 

One who serves here, Mr. Chairman, I am 
sure you will agree with me, is tempted very 
often to wonder what future historians will 
write about the United Nations in its first 

Perhaps they will record that its greatest 
period was a decade or so in which it created 
something the world had never seen before — 
international peacekeeping forces acting 
under the flag of, and in the name of, a world 
organization — but that after this brief 
flowering its members commenced to quarrel 

and to reassert their ancient jealousies, their 
doubts, their fears, their timidities, and that 
these pioneering actions were abandoned. 

Or perhaps they will write that the first 
flowering led to something better; that after 
a difficult crisis, the members realized how 
deep their common interest was; that they 
went on to put the U.N., the servant of that 
common interest, on a more solid footing — 
thus opening a new era in the history of 
man's ancient quest for peace. 

But historians can only record history; it 
is we who have the responsibility and who 
must write it. In the name of our common 
humanity, let us write a new history which 
our posterity in every nation will not be 
ashamed to read. 


Current Actions 



The Antarctic Treaty. Sig^ned at Washington 
December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 
1961. TIAS 4780. 

Accession deposited: Netherlands, including King- 
dom in Europe, Surinam, and Netherlands 
Antilles, March 30, 1967. 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 

Signature and ratification: Yugoslavia, March 21, 


Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 
1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.' 
Accession deposited: Mongolia (with reservations 
and declaration), January 5, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter- 
national waterborne transportation, with annex. 
Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963." 

' Not in force for the United States. 
* Not in force. 

APRIL 17, 1967 


Ratification deposited: United States, March 20, 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat- 
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington 
November 29, 1965.^ 
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 30, 1967. 

Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat- 
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by 
the Commission. Done at Washington November 
29, 1965.^ 
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 29, 1967. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at 
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for the 
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. 
Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, March 17, 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 8, 1967. 

Amendments to chapter II of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 
5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London 
November 30, 1966." 
Senate advice aiid consent to ratification: March 

21, 1967. 
Ratified by the President: March 28, 1967. 


Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29, 
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part 
I and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part 
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, March 29, 1967. 


Congo (Kinshasa) 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities 
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- 

ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. Signed 
at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi March 15, 1967. 
Entered into force March 15, 1967. 


Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington January 27, 1967. Entered into force 
January 27, 1967. 


Agreement relating to exportation of cotton vel- 
veteen fabrics from Italy to the United States. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
October 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19, 


Agreement amending the agreement of September 
12 and 19, 1966 (TIAS 6170), relating to the 
establishment of a geodetic satellite observation 
station at Kanoya. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tokyo February 21 and March 14, 1967. En- 
tered into force March 14, 1967. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington March 
15, 1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities 
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- 
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annexes. 
Signed at Tunis March 17, 1967. Entered into 
force March 17, 1967. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1, 
Ratified by the President: March 31, 1967. 

United Arab Republic 

Agreement relating to an educational and cultural 
exchange program. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Cairo January 5 and February 21, 1967. En- 
tered into force February 21, 1967. 

' Not in force. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

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Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

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Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16; 
single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
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be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
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INDEX April 17, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. Ii51 


Letters of Credence (Malikyar) 626 

Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the 
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint 
statement) 627 

Antarctica. U.S. Observers Inspect Antarctic 
Stations 633 

Canada. U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of 
American Falls at Niagara 634 

Economic Affairs 

Convention Adopted on Conduct of North At- 
lantic Fisheries 635 

U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of American 
Falls at Niagara 634 

Foreign Aid 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 
1967 (proclamation) 632 

Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the 
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint 
statement) 627 

Latin America. Pan American Day and Pan 
American Week, 1967 (proclamation) . . . 632 

Presidential Documents 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 

1967 632 

Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the 

United States 627 

Treaty Information 

Convention Adopted on Conduct of North At- 
lantic Fisheries 635 

Current Actions 641 

United Nations 

Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the 
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint 
statement) 627 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618 

United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-Gen- 
eral's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam 
Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide 
memoire and U.S. replies) 624 

U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles for U.N. 
Peacekeeping Functions (Goldberg) .... 636 


Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the 
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint 

statement) 627 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618 
United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-Gen- 
eral's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam 

Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide 

memoire and U.S. replies) 624 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J 636 

Johnson, President 627, 632 

Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim 627 

Malikyar, Abdullah 626 

Rusk, Secretary 618 

U Thant 624 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 27-April 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 27 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
60 of March 20 and 61 of March 21. 

No. Date Sabject 

*67 3/27 Linowitz: Overseas Press Club, 
New York (excerpts) . 

*68 3/27 Amendments to itinerary for visit 
of Prime Minister of Afghani- 

*69 3/28 U.S. reply to U.N. Secretary-Gen- 
eral's aide memoire on Viet- 
Nam (U.S./U.N. press release 
printed here). 
70 3/28 Rusk: news conference of March 

*71 3/29 Rusk: salute to Roy Wilkins at 
Freedom House dinner. 

*72 3/29 Linowitz: Women's National Press 
Club, Washington, D.C. (ex- 

*74 3/30 Linowitz: Regional Foreign Pol- 
icy Conference, Philadelphia 
(excerpts) . 

t75 3/30 Panel of advisers for Bureau of 
African Affairs (rewrite). 

*76 3/30 Meeting of U.S.-Japan Committee 
on Trade and Economic Mat- 

*77 3/30 Program for visit of President 
Sunay of Turkey. 

*78 3/30 Rusk: interview on Northwestern 
University radio program. 

t79 3/31 Palmer: "Africa and America." 
80 3/31 Study requested of measures to 
preserve beauty of American 
Falls at Niagara. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/41 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 204o2 




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Street Address 

City, State, and ZIP code:. 







Vol. LVI, No. U52 

April 24, 1967 

by Assistant Secretai'y Palmer 646 


Statement by AID Administrator WiUiam S. Gaud 

and Text of Communique 668 



Exchanges of Remarks Between President Johnson 

and President Sunay and Text of Joint Communique 652 

For index see inside back cover 

Africa and America 

by Joseph Palmer 2d 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs > 

I am very pleased to talk to this Council 
which shares with us in government a deep 
interest in advancing relations between the 
United States and Africa. 

I need not remind this group, with its 
knowledge and experience in African af- 
fairs, of Africa's far-reaching transition in 
the past decade: the creation of over 30 na- 
tions, the new impetus to the development 
of its human and material resources, and, 
above all, the response of its peoples to the 
opportunities and responsibilities of freedom. 
You are also aware of the inevitable gap be- 
tween goals and achievements in a continent 
whose aspirations are high and whose over- 
all level of productivity is still very low. 
Finally, you know that there are no pat an- 
swers to Africa's problems and, while they 
cannot be postponed until a mythical tomor- 
row, they cannot be solved overnight. 

With these thoughts in mind, may I dis- 
cuss briefly three areas of problems and op- 
portunities in Africa today: the aspirations 
of individuals, the tasks of national govern- 
ments, and the opportunities for regional co- 

The President, in his speech last May 26 ^ 
to the African ambassadors from OAU [Or- 
ganization of African Unity] countries, ex- 

' Address made before the Council of the African- 
American Institute at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 
31 (press release 79). 

» Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914. 

plicitly emphasized the importance of the 
aspiration for human dignity, racial equal- 
ity, and political rights in the history and 
experience of both the United States and the 
peoples of Africa. At this time the question 
of individual rights is at the heart of the 
several issues which are found in the south- 
ern part of the continent. Without minimiz- 
ing the importance of other problems, I 
would like to say a few words about South- 
ern Rhodesia and South West Africa, since 
they are presently occupying a major por- 
tion of the attention of the United Nations. 

The illegal declaration of independence in 
Southern Rhodesia was an effort by a white 
minority of 220,000 to perpetuate its control 
over some 4 million Africans. By its action 
the Smith regime — not the British nor the 
Africans nor the U.N. — confronted the 
world with an issue of principle that the 
international community could not ignore. 

The options open to the government of 
Southern Rhodesia in November 1965 were 
clear. It could continue to govern legally 
under the 1961 constitution, it could achieve 
legal independence on the basis of the prin- 
ciples advanced by the U.K. to safeguard 
the political and human rights of the major- 
ity as Rhodesia moved toward majority rule, 
or it could declare its independence illegally 
and seek to perpetuate minority rule. It 
chose the last option, and the international 
community responded, as it inevitably had 
to do, with virtually universal opposition. 



The basic issue was, and still is, the ques- 
tion of unimpeded progress toward majority 
rule. What the British seek and what most 
of the world would find acceptable is a set- 
tlement that assures an orderly but reason- 
able transition to majority rule, with minor- 
ity rights fully protected. Neither the British 
Commonwealth, the U.N., nor the United 
States demands immediate majority rule. 
Nor does anyone advocate depriving the 
minority of its legitimate rights. We believe 
that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia 
can make a valuable contribution to the de- 
velopment of an independent Rhodesia and 
that its rights should be protected so that it 
can play its full part in this great task in 
security and prosperity. 

U.S. Actions on Southern Rhodesia 

All of the action taken by the United 
States Government, acting in its own inter- 
est as a responsible member of the interna- 
tional community in response to the Smith 
regime's challenge, has been based on our 
recognition of the importance of the princi- 
ple involved. Within the framework of 
President Johnson's statement that the 
United States "will not support policies 
abroad which are based on the rule of mi- 
norities or the discredited notion that men 
are unequal before the law," * we have re- 
peatedly affirmed our opposition to the uni- 
lateral declaration of independence (UDI) 
by (1) opposing the present illegal regime 
in Salisbury, (2) supporting the role of the 
United Kingdom as the constitutional sov- 
ereign authority in Southern Rhodesia, (3) 
voting for the selective mandatory sanctions 
approved by the U.N. Security Council last 
December 16,* (4) adopting the necessary 
measures to give effect to the mandatory 
sanctions program supported by the inter- 
national community, and (5) continuing in 
force other measures to implement the exist- 
ing voluntary sanctions program. 

We do not know precisely what effect the 
new mandatory sanctions program will have. 
We are sure the program will impress upon 
the white minority in Southern Rhodesia the 
seriousness of international opposition to 
UDI and will reinforce the previously imple- 
mented voluntary sanctions program. We 
hope that it will lead the Smith regime to 
reconsider its position and reach a reason- 
able settlement of the issues. 

I would like to make it clear that the 
United States Government is cooperating 
with the international community in a peace- 
ful and measured effort through economic 
sanctions to achieve an internationally ac- 
cepted objective in a particular place under 
particular circumstances; also, that we are 
not committed to going beyond the present 
program, nor do we see any present need to 
do so. We believe that what is required of 
the international community at this stage is 
to make the existing program as effective 
as possible. 

The Situation in South West Africa 

The rights and aspirations of the individ- 
ual are also central issues in current discus- 
sions at the United Nations over the future 
of the international Territory of South West 
Africa. The principle involved was funda- 
mental to the mandate agreement of 1920, 
in which South Africa agreed to "promote 
to the utmost the material and moral well- 
being and social progress of the inhabitants." 

The International Court of Justice was 
asked to decide if South Africa had violated 
this obligation. In July 1966 the ICJ de- 
clined to adjudicate the substance of the 
charges on the ground that the plaintiffs 
lacked the requisite legal interest.^ However, 
the Court in three previous advisory opin- 
ions had said that South Africa cannot alter 
the status of the territory without the con- 
sent of the U.N. and that South Africa con- 
tinues to be bound to accept U.N. supervi- 
sion and to promote the inhabitants' 


* For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, 
see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73. 

' For a Department statement of July 27, 1966, 
see ibid., Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231. 

APRIL 24, 1967 


well-being and progress. The advisory opin- 
ions remain the basic and authoritative 
statements of the International Court of Jus- 
tice on important questions, including the 
existence and scope of South Africa's obliga- 
tions and the rights of the inhabitants of 
South West Africa. 

After more than two decades of trying to 
get the South African Government to ac- 
cept the principle of accountability to the 
U.N., the General Assembly in October 1966 
decided that South Africa's mandate was 
terminated and that the territory should be- 
come "the direct responsibility" of the U.N.^ 
The Ad Hoc Committee on South West Af- 
rica, which is composed of representatives 
of 14 countries, including ourselves, is ex- 
ploring "practical means by which South 
West Africa should be administered, so as to 
enable the people of the Territory to exer- 
cise the right of self-determination and to 
achieve independence. . . ." 

Three proposals have been made in the 
Committee, and these will be forwarded to 
the General Assembly for further considera- 
tion. The United States has joined with 
Italy and Canada in sponsoring a resolution 
to enable the U.N. to explore how it can dis- 
charge its responsibilities with respect to 
South West Africa. The people of South 
West Africa must be enabled to exercise 
their rights of self-determination, freedom, 
and independence in accordance with the 
U.N. Charter. 

In order to accomplish this, we propose 
the establishment of a U.N. Council for 
South West Africa and the appointment of 
a special representative to help achieve this 
objective. The council and commissioner 
would ascertain what elements may be con- 
sidered as representative of various people 
of the territory, establish all contacts deemed 
necessary, consult with various representa- 
tive elements to establish with them as soon 
as possible a nucleus of self-government in 
South West Africa and determine the neces- 

° For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution, 
see ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870. 

sary conditions that will enable South West 
Africa to achieve self-determination and in- 

As a part of the above process, we believe 
that a serious effort should be made to ex- 
plore with South Africa possible means of 
cooperation with the U.N. to fulfill the as- 
pirations of the inhabitants of South West 
Africa. There are, of course, many differing 
views within the U.N. with respect to the 
merits of such a dialog, and the recent an- 
nouncement by South Africa of its intention 
to create a separate Ovamboland in the 
northern part of the territory further com- 
plicates the problem. 

At the same time we all are deeply aware 
of the value of dialog in keeping open doors 
to peaceful and mutually advantageous ac- 
commodation. Interesting developments have 
recently been taking place in South Africa's 
relationships with some independent African 
states. While it is perhaps too early to assess 
the full significance of these developments, 
they may nevertheless hold some hope for 
greater flexibility in general approaches to 
the problems of this area. In the midst of 
the divergent views which characterize ef- 
forts to solve the South West Africa prob- 
lem, it therefore remains our hope that doors 
to peaceful accommodation can be kept open 
through a dialog among the parties con- 
cerned. Our representative on the Ad Hoc 
Committee has kept this very much in mind, 
and his efforts and those of others on the 
Committee have been consonant with this 
point of view. 

Tasks of National Governments 

The task of building governments which 
truly reflect the aspirations of the peoples of 
Africa is a critical problem throughout most 
of the continent. The President recognized 
this last May when he spoke of the never- 
ending effort of nations, new or old, to com- 
bine freedom with responsibility, liberty 
with order. 

I don't think that any of us underestimate 
the difficulties this task entails. In Africa it 
is part of the change and experimentation 



going on in many of its nations. We are well 
aware of the dangers in the breakdown of 
law and order, the problems arising from ir- 
regular seizures of power, and the handicaps 
which political instability poses for sound 
economic development. In mentioning briefly 
only two examples of the search for effective 
national government, I must necessarily pass 
over a number of other situations which also 
merit our sympathetic understanding. 

The Congo has been involved in a painful 
search for a formula of government accepta- 
ble to all of the country's many elements. 
After almost 7 years, there is for the first 
time peace within its frontiers. Its leader- 
ship can now turn its full attention to realiz- 
ing the country's potential as an African 
nation. No one expects that this task will be 
accomplished overnight, but there are many 
indications, both domestic and foreign, that 
the process of building sound relationships 
is under way. Within the country steps are 
being taken to reorganize and improve the 
administration and to reduce the budgetary 
deficit. At the same time export earnings 
increased from $338 million in 1965 to $434 
million in 1966. Constructive developments 
at home have been accompanied by success 
on the part of President [Joseph] Mobutu 
in establishing close relations with fellow 
African leaders where their interests coin- 
cide, as witnessed by the recent meeting of 
heads of state in Kinshasa. 

The great state of Nigeria, as we all know, 
is experiencing its time of troubles. This 
most populous country of Africa, in its sec- 
ond year of political crisis, has been subject 
to centrifugal forces in which regional, trib- 
al, and personal pressures all have played 
their part. The period of instability is begin- 
ning to show a cumulative adverse effect on 
the economy of the country, with all regions 
of Nigeria being hurt both in their normal 
trade and in their development by the swirl 
of events and pressures. It would be a great 
tragedy to Africa and the world if this trend 
continued to the point where it threatened 
the great potential for national development 
which Nigeria possesses in such outstanding 

degree and which has so engaged the ener- 
gies of her statesmen. All of us remain hope- 
ful that the wisdom and foresight which has 
characterized the Nigerian nation will pre- 
clude this. 

Nigeria's development of its national co- 
hesion and the form of its political associa- 
tion is, of course, for the Nigerians them- 
selves to determine. In these critical times 
her many friends can offer moral support 
and sympathetic understanding from the 
knowledge gained through experience that 
the road to full national identity is a long 
and difficult one and that each country must 
travel it in its own manner. 

We well remember that our own synthesis 
was achieved with long travail over 90 years 
following our independence. We wish for 
Nigeria and other nations facing similar dif- 
ficulties a less arduous and more peaceful 
resolution of their problems in a form best 
suited to their circumstances and aspirations. 

Opportunities for Regional Cooperation 

In no sector of African life are the needs 
and opportunities more pressing than in the 
field of regional cooperation. We know the 
history of Africa's boundaries — a blend of 
diplomatic compromise and imperial con- 
quest, with the result that they rarely relate 
to economic viability. We know the history of 
Africa's communications — initially with a 
metropole and fundamentally with the out- 
side world and not with fellow African na- 
tions. We know that one of the effects of 
many small national markets — and 26 of 
Africa's nations have 5 million people or less 
— is to complicate growth because of limita- 
tions on the viability of investment projects. 

In such situations appropriate interna- 
tional cooperative action could become a vital 
element in enhancing the prospects for eco- 
nomic development. Not a single major river 
in Africa lies wholly within one country. Not 
a single important crop is the sole product 
of one African nation. In these and prac- 
tically every activity one can think of that 
seriously affects the economy of an African 

APRIL 24, 1967 


country, there is an increment of effective- 
ness to be added by regional cooperation. 

Africa, as the newest of the continents to 
achieve independence, has had little time to 
develop its own regional institutions. Never- 
theless, the Economic Commission for Africa 
has not only pointed out paths of sound eco- 
nomic development to its members but has 
helped launch specific programs and institu- 
tions furthering the growth of the continent. 
The Organization of African Unity is seek- 
ing international political cooperation among 
its members which is so important to eco- 
nomic development. The African Develop- 
ment Bank, which opened its doors less than 
a year ago, already has 29 members and over 
$40 million in paid-in capital. Negotiations 
are under way for additional members and 
for additional assistance, probably through 
a special fund to which non-African nations 
may contribute. Our own support for this 
new institution is reflected in the promise of 
President Johnson in his foreign aid mes- 
sage to "seek an appropriate means of re- 
sponding to the recent request of the African 
Development Bank for U.S. participation in 
a special fund " '' 

These three institutions are only part of 
the growing pattern of regional cooperative 
efforts in Africa. Under the U.N. Develop- 
ment Program, a number of river basin ar- 
rangements are being developed. The rinder- 
pest program under the aegis of the OAU 
Scientific Technical and Research Commis- 
sion ranges over a score of African coun- 
tries. The World Health Organization, in 
cooperation with African health organiza- 
tions, AID, and others, is campaigning 
against smallpox and measles in 19 West 
African nations. OCAM [Organisation Com- 
mune Africaine et Malagache], UDEAC 
[Union Douaniere et Economique de I'Af- 
rique Centrale] , and the Conseil de I'Entente 
have been formed by various French-speak- 
ing countries for their mutual benefit. 

In responding to the needs and opportuni- 
ties of regional cooperation, the U.S. Gov- 

' Ibid., Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378. 

ernment has followed two very broad courses 
of action. First, arising out of the review of 
our policies called for by the President in 
his speech to the OAU ambassadors last I 
year, we suggested that the World Bank as- 
sume a greater role and involvement in 
African economic development. We believed 
that, using its prestige and experience, the 
IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development] might explore with 
African regional organizations establishment 
of an international standing committee to 
assess the evolving needs of the continent, 
set priorities, and integrate projects into 
more precisely defined development pro- 

After preliminary soundings among mem- 
bers and other international and regional 
organizations, the Bank recently met with 
the ECA, the ADB, and the U.N. Develop- 
ment Program to begin to work out plans 
for cooperative African economic develop- 
ment. Concentrating initially in the fields of 
power, transport, and telecommunications, 
this effort, in our opinion, is an auspicious 

Our second principal effort involves our 
own assistance programs. In the past 9 
months we have reviewed our policies in the 
light of both the followup of the President's 
speech and the aid legislation last autumn. 
As a result, we are putting special emphasis 
upon such fields of development as transpor- 
tation, telecommunications, agriculture, edu- 
cation, and health, and we shall be devoting 
an increasing percentage of our available 
resources for Africa to assisting regional in- 
stitutions and groupings and in financing 
regional projects. 

No one expects that these two approaches 
will work miracles by themselves. The sheer 
size of Africa's problems of economic and 
social growth precludes easy answers. More- 
over, as African leaders have often stated — 
and as the President said in his foreign aid 
message to Congress — self-help is the essen- 
tial ingredient of economic and social 
growth. However, we do believe that coop- 
eration among regional and international 



organizations, donor nations, and the Afri- 
can countries themselves can give a new 
dimension to this effort. The task before all 
of us is to transform our convictions into 
effective practice. 

The Secretary of State and the Adminis- 
trator of AID will shortly begin the presen- 
tation of the aid program to Congress. In 
the course of these hearings and of subse- 
iiuent discussion the Congress and the Amer- 
ican public will have the opportunity to 
examine the whole gamut of American over- 
seas assistance. In this connection I hope 
very much that we can focus on the needs 
and opportunities for regional cooperation. 
For along with the achievement of individ- 
ual rights and the forging of national gov- 
ernments, the search for cooperation in eco- 
nomic development with and among African 
countries is worthy of the best efforts of the 
, peoples of both of our two continents. 

Advisory Panel Named 
for African Affairs Bureau 

The Department of State announced on 
March 30 (press release 75) the appoint- 
ment of a panel of 12 new advisers for the 
Bureau of African Affairs and their partici- 
pation in the Bureau's established Advisory 
Council on African Affairs. 

This is the latest panel of advisers to be 
announced by the Department in accordance 
with the general plan made public on Octo- 
ber 18, 1966.1 On that date the advisory panel 
for the Bureau of International Organization 

Affairs was announced, followed by others 
on subsequent dates. 

The Advisory Council on African Affairs 
was established in June 1962 and since then 
has met periodically with officials of the Bu- 
reau of African Affairs. Its present member- 
ship is drawn from the business, philan- 
thropic, religious, academic, and other 
communities.2 The newly appointed advisers 
and the present members of the council may, 
from time to time, be called upon individ- 
ually or as members of small working groups 
for advice on matters within their fields of 

The 12 newly appointed advisers are: 

William Attwood, Cowles Communications, Inc., 
New York, N.Y. 

Leland Barrows, University of Pittsburgh, Pitts- 
burgh, Pa. 

Philip Bell, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa. 

Mercer Cook, Howard University, Washington, D.C. 

Frederick H. Harbison, Princeton University, 
Princeton, N.J. 

Ulric St. C. Haynes, Management Resources Corp., 
New York, N.Y. 

Francis Keppel, General Learning Corp., New York, 

James Loeb, the Saranac News, Saranac Lake, N.Y. 

Wilfred Owen, the Brookings Institution, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 

Alan Pifer, Carnegie Corp., New York, N.Y. 

Joseph C. Satterthwaite, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, Washington, D.C. 

Carroll L. Wilson, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology, Cambridge, Mass. 

' For announcements of other advisory panels, 
see Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966, 
p. 868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16; and 
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 72. 

^ For a list of the members of the council, see De- 
partment press release 75 dated Mar. 30. 

APRIL 24, 1967 


Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds 
of Friendsiiip and Cooperation 

President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic of 
Turkey made a state visit to the United 
States April 2-13. He arrived in Washington, 
D.C., on April 3 for a 3-day visit during 
which he met with President Johnson and 
other U.S. Government officials. Following 
are texts of an exchange of greetings between 
President Johnson and President Sunay at an 
arrival ceremony on April 3, their exchange 
of toasts at a state dinner at the White House 
that evening, and a joint communique re- 
leased on April 4- at the conclusion of their 


White House press release dated April 3 

President Johnson 

Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished 
guests, ladies and gentlemen: Mrs. Johnson 
and I are especially happy to see you, Mr. 
President. Your presence in America will 
give us a chance to return some of the 
warmth and friendliness we received from 
the people of Turkey on our visit to your 
country almost 5 years ago. Your people won 
our hearts, as they had already earned the 
respect and the admiration of all the Ameri- 
can people. 

Our century has been greatly enriched by 
the goals and achievements of the Turkish 
nation. More than four decades ago the emer- 
gence of modem Turkey, under the guiding 
genius of Kemal Ataturk, was one of the 
great revolutions of our age. It remains an 
inspiration to all who have since won their 

independence or who still seek to unshackle 
the fetters of the past. 

You have proved, by your example, that 
free men can create strong and independent 
institutions. Inscribed as a reminder to all 
who enter the halls of your Parliament are 
the words: "Sovereignty belongs to the 

Your citizens have demonstrated repeat- 
edly their commitment to constitutional 
government. Your vigorous parliamentary 
democracy is a tribute to that dedication. You 
have jealously guarded your freedom of 
conscience and protected your independence. 

Free men are also natural allies. 

Turkey has been one of the most active 
members of the United Nations. It has served 
on the Security Council as well as on other 
United Nations bodies. A member of the 
Council of Europe and of the United Nations 
Palestine Conciliation Commission, Turkey 
was one of the first countries to answer the 
United Nations' call for troops for Korea. In 
1952 Turkey joined the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, officially committing its 
strength to the cause of preserving peace. 

Between Turkey and the United States 
there is a bond, a special sense of fellowship 
which can be known only to those who belong 
to the strong fraternity of free men. 

It is in this spirit that we meet here today, 
Mr. President. I am looking forward to ex- 
ploring with you the great issues of the day 
and the paths we might together follow to 
bring greater harmony among all of the na- 
tions of the world. I am looking forward to 
learning more about the impressive and ex- 



citing progress being made in Turkey 
toward a more abundant and creative life for 
your people. 

There is a vigor and momentum in Turkey 
today which your friends in America have 
long and enthusiastically applauded. 

We know that the future belongs not 
merely to the strong but to those who will 
labor hardest at the constructive works of 
peace. And, as so often in this century, Mr. 
President, we see Turkey leading the way. 

Mr. President, we are delighted to have 
you and your gracious lady with us. 

President Sunay 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and 
gentlemen: I am very grateful for this most 
cordial and warm welcome. 

As I come to Washington to pay a state 
visit to the United States upon your kind 
invitation, my memory goes back to 1962, 
when we had the pleasure and the privilege 
of greeting you and Mrs. Johnson in Turkey. 
We were all, at that time, very much im- 
pressed by your powerful personality, your 
statesmanship, your dedication to the cause 
of peace and human progress. 

As the President of the United States you 
have devoted all your boundless energy to the 
ideals which are dear to you. 

My visit coincides with a very happy anni- 
versary. That anniversary is the anniversary 
of the Truman Doctrine, under which the 
United States undertook for the first time a 
commitment toward the free world. The 
implementation of this doctrine opened the 
way for a lasting solidarity and partnership 
between Turkey and the United States. 

We have so much in common with you. We 
share the same love of freedom and the same 
dedication to democracy. We are equally 
attached to the objective of a just peace and 
to the building of a community of free and 
equal nations. Our nations have proved 
throughout history how much they are deter- 
mined to safeguard their liberties and how 
much they can meet with courage and deter- 
mination any challenge. 

The cooperation we inaugurated 20 years 
ago is as strong as ever. This association has 
been sealed and reinforced by our ties of 
alliance within NATO, which we both con- 
sider as an indispensable element of equi- 
librium, security, and peace. We value deeply 
this partnership, and we are equally con- 
vinced of the need to work relentlessly to 
strengthen peace and promote mutual under- 
standing and confidence among the nations 
of the world. 

Mr. President, I am looking forward to 
meeting and discussing with you the matters 
of mutual interest, and I also rejoice at the 
prospect of meeting other good friends of 
Turkey in the United States. 

It is my fervent hope and expectation that 
our personal contacts will serve to strengthen 
further the ties of friendship which bind our 
two countries and to promote a greater 
understanding between our peoples. Thank 


White House press release dated April 3 

President Johnson 

Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished 
guests: This house is honored tonight by a 
distinguished visitor from a very famous 
land. A bridge between two continents, 
Turkey had become a melting pot of races 
long before the first explorers ever reached 
our shores. Great empires, which have left 
their stamp on history, have risen and fallen 
in this land. Its people have contributed pro- 
foundly to the arts of civilization. 

But nothing in Turkey's ancient past sur- 
passes its modern achievements. 

When this century was still young, from 
the ashes of an empire a great new Turkish 
nation was formed. The remarkable energy, 
vision, and wisdom of a great leader, Kemal 
Ataturk, set his people on the path of 20th- 
century accomplishment. 

A great philosopher once said that the 
creator of a commonwealth must toil in one 

APRIL 24, 1967 


century for the benefits that his descendants 
will reap in the next. 

Turkey has proved that we need not 
always wait so long. The Turkish people 
today are already enjoying many of the 
fruits of their own efforts. 

They have joined the mainstream of eco- 
nomic progress. They are shaping events 
rather than being shaped by them. Their 
borders are secure, their democratic institu- 
tions are strong. 

But, Mr. President, as the American phi- 
losopher Ralph Waldo Emerson once said, 
"The true test of civilization is not the cen- 
sus, nor the size of the cities, nor the crops, 
but the kind of man that the country turns 

Mr. President, our countries are different 
in many ways. But I think we can both be 
proud that they turn out men that have much 
in common. 

Americans and Turks alike are devoted to 
social justice, to the preservation of freedom, 
to democracy. 

Our people alike seek personal participa- 
tion in the affairs of their government. 

Americans and Turks alike desire greater 
educational opportunities for their children, 
for we realize that the future belongs not to 
us but to them. 

Americans and Turks alike are seekers 
after a world that is free of war and strife 
and a world where each of us, to the limits of 
his capacity, can pursue excellence. 

Mr. President, your life has been spent in 
dedicated service to your countrymen, first 
as a soldier, now as President of the Repub- 
lic, always as a faithful servant of your 
people. There is no higher dedication. 

On this occasion tonight I cannot help but 

This is the anniversary of the Truman 
Doctrine. Twenty years ago, when President 
Truman called upon the American people to 
rally in defense of the freedom of Greece 
and Turkey, there was a great deal of criti- 
cism in this land about that decision. 

Mr. Truman was accused of arrogance, of 
wanting to play "world policeman." In the 

words of one commentator, who is still with 
us, the Truman Doctrine was a disastrous 
entanglement in an anti-Communist crusade 
which could only lead to a much wider war. 

Some of us refused to believe this. Indeed, 
one of the proud moments of my life was on 
May 7, 1947, when I rose in the House to sup- 
port President Truman and his supposedly 
"disastrous" policy of containment. 

In voting for aid to Greece and Turkey, I 
said on that day: 

I do so with the hope that Russia has peaceful 
intentions; that she desires to live at peace with 
other nations; that she will cooperate in the restora- 
tion of a war-torn world ; but, if it be otherwise, then 
I am certain as I stand here that the passage of 
this measure is the only course that this country can 
in decency take, and the only course which may 
avoid war. 

Tonight, as we meet here in the White 
House, Greece and Turkey — and Korea — are 
taken for granted as dynamic, freedom-loving 
nations. And I hazard the guess that in 20 
years the Republic of Viet-Nam will similarly 
be taken for granted. 

These things have been accomplished be- 
cause the United States of America and its 
allies throughout the world have stood firm 
before the tide of aggression — and the tide 
has receded. And among those who unflinch- 
ingly confronted the risks and obligations, 
there has been — and, I think, always will be, 
Mr. President — a very special bond of fellow- 

We have a unique tie. For two decades our 
peoples have shared a vigil beside the gates 
of freedom — not for ourselves but for the 
entire fellowship of free men, the weak as 
well as the strong, the timid and the meek as 
well as the brave. The graves of brave 
Americans and brave Turks in the hills of 
Korea tonight are an eternal testament to our 

We honor this great common tradition to- 
night as we honor you. May it grow and 
prosper in the years ahead, as new genera- 
tions, inspired by common ideals, make free- 
dom, justice, and progress their common 
cause as it has been ours. 



Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask 
you to join me in a toast to the people of the 
Republic of Turkey and to their President, 
Cevdet Sunay. 

President Sunay 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and 
gentlemen: I am deeply moved by your warm 
and cordial welcome. I would like to express 
to you on my behalf and on behalf of my wife 
our sincere thanks for your kind words about 
us and for the gracious hospitality we have 
received here in Washington. 

I have been to Washington several times 
before, but this time I have the great 
privilege, as President of the Republic of 
Turkey, of being here as your guest. 

I am particularly happy to be surrounded 
here tonight by so many distinguished Amer- 
icans, many of whom I had the pleasure of 
meeting earlier. 

I think, Mr. President, that my visit is 
timely, not that there are any unresolved 
problems between our countries but because 
for more than a decade a Turkish President 
has not visited the United States and because, 
this year, as you have mentioned, we are cele- 
brating the Truman Doctrine, which consti- 
tutes a landmark in the history of Turkish- 
American relations. 

It is proper that on this occasion I pay a 
warm tribute to President Truman for his 
farsightedness and wisdom in laying down 
the basis of a policy which culminated later 
on in the signing of the Atlantic alliance. 

President Eisenhower, whom we remember 
with respect and admiration as a great sol- 
dier and a great statesman and whom I had 
the honor of meeting personally, also visited 
us in Turkey in 1959. 

Mr. President, in 1962 we had the privilege 
of welcoming you and your charming wife. I 
have a very vivid recollection of this visit 
and of the spontaneous demonstration of 
friendship and esteem with which you were 
greeted wherever you went in Turkey. 

I am referring to these events to illustrate 
the closeness of our relations and the depth of 
our friendship. 

We have in Turkey a profound admiration 
for the great American democracy from 
which all struggles for freedom have drawn 
such inspiration. 

I know, Mr. President, that you know how 
much the Turkish nation is resolute in its 
unflinching adherence to the ideals of indi- 
vidual and political freedom. We are proud, 
in Turkey, of the strength and vitality of our 
democratic institutions. 

It is within the framework of liberty and 
democracy that the Turkish nation also 
undertook the difficult task of insuring rapid 
economic growth and social progress. In this 
field, also, we feel encouraged by our recent 

The rate of our economic growth is not far 
behind the target set for us by the 5-year 
development plan, and there is strong hope 
that this rate may be increased in future 

We are in need of foreign economic aid to 
attain our target at the present, but our in- 
tention is not to rely indefinitely on the 
inflow of such assistance. Our goal is, on the 
contrary, to use our internal and external re- 
sources as effectively as possible in order to 
reach the stage of self-sustaining growth dur- 
ing our third 5-year development plan. 

Mr. President, great changes have oc- 
curred in the international field over the last 
20 years. Europe, which was for the most 
part desolate in the aftermath of a tragic 
war, has now reached, behind the shield of 
NATO, a peace of stability, prosperity, and 
progress never attained before in all its 

Vast areas in Asia and Africa have en- 
tered the cause of freedom, independence, 
and technical progress. 

In recent times we have also observed and 
shared hopes for a detente in East-West rela- 
tions. The valuable objective of building and 
maintaining bridges of contact between the 
West and the East, which I know, Mr. Presi- 
dent, you attach special importance to, is a 
further indication that progress has been 
made in this direction. 

Any decrease in international tension and 

APBIL 24, 1967 


any progress toward a stable peace and 
greater international cooperation is, of 
course, of deep satisfaction to the people and 
Government of my country. 

Indeed, Turkey is not failing to bring fully 
its contribution to this end in its interna- 
tional relationships. But as long as peace does 
not rest on solid foundations, insuring effec- 
tively the security of each nation, we cannot 
afford to relinquish our individual and col- 
lective strength. 

NATO remains, therefore, in our view, an 
essential element of peace and security. 

NATO is even more than that. It is, we 
believe, the instrument of the close partner- 
ship in which we can cooperate to an ever- 
growing extent for reinforcing peace and 
enhancing international cooperation. 

Mr. President, we are grateful to the 
United States for the military and economic 
aid extended to Turkey since the inception of 
the Truman Doctrine. This aid has con- 
tributed greatly to the strengthening of our 
defensive capability and furthering our eco- 
nomic development. 

But I am convinced, Mr. President, that 
you would agree with me that this assistance 
is serving our common interests. 

To safeguard her own security and to con- 
tribute to the mutual defense effort of the 
free world, Turkey is indeed under a heavy 
defense burden. On the other hand, a strong, 
vigorous, and developing Turkey is certainly 
to the best interests of the free world. We 
value deeply in Turkey our partnership, our 
friendship, and our alliance with the United 

No relationship can flourish if it is not 
based on mutual respect, equality, and confi- 
dence. I am certain that our two Govern- 
ments will develop their close associations in 
that spirit. 

We can only regret that we continue to be 
involved in an unfortunate dispute in our 
area. You know how much effort we spent to 
solve this problem peacefully in a way to 
safeguard the legitimate interests of the 
parties concerned. We will continue on this 
path, but at the same time we are determined 

not to permit or tolerate any attempt to im- 
pose a unilateral solution or any pressure to 
that end. 

Mr. President, in closing my remarks I 
would like to say how happy we are in 
Turkey to have as your representative a dis- 
tinguished and most capable diplomat — Am- 
bassador Parker Hart. His contribution to 
Turkey- American understanding and coop- 
eration has been invaluable. 

I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join 
me in drinking a toast to the health of the 
President of the United States of America 
and the people of the United States of 


White House press release dated April 4 

At the invitation of President Johnson and Mrs. 
Johnson, President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic 
of Turkey and Mrs. Sunay are paying a state visit 
to the United States. 

The warm welcome and cordial hospitality ex- 
tended to President Sunay and his party reflect the 
deep and traditional friendship between the peoples 
of Turkey and the United States. President Sunay 
expressed his sincere thanks to the Government and 
the people of the United States for the warm and 
friendly reception accorded him. 

During the visit to Washington, April 3-5, the 
two Presidents, joined by Foreign Minister [Ihsan 
Sabri] Caglayangil and Secretary Rusk, engaged in 
wide-ranging talks during which they reviewed the 
relations between the two countries and the impor- 
tant international problems affecting world peace 
and security. 

The two Presidents recalled the history of Turk- 
ish-United States relations and recognized the sub- 
stantial contributions made by Turkey to the Free 
World. They also stressed the close association be- 
tween the two countries which began with imple- 
mentation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. 

Both Presidents found themselves in agreement 
that Turkey and the United States continue to 
share a community of interests in questions affect- 
ing the peace of the world, a devotion to democracy 
and freedom, a commitment to the principles of 
haiTnony and mutual respect among nations. It is 
on the basis of these common interests and princi- 
ples that they reaffirmed the determination of their 
countries further to develop their relations based 
upon mutual respect, understanding, and trust. 

One of the main subjects dealt with was the eco- 



nomic development of Turkey. President Sunay de- 
scribed the encouraging progress in this field and 
stressed the efforts of Turkey to achieve the objec- 
tives set forth in the five year development plan. 
The two Presidents agreed that the consortium for 
aid to Turkey has provided an eflScient multilateral 
mechanism for securing the foreign aid needed by 
Turkey, and that this cooperative endeavor should 
continue. President Johnson reaffirmed the United 
States determination to continue to support the 
development efforts of Turkey by maintaining at 
a significant level its economic assistance, the aim 
being to assist Turkey to reach its declared goal 
of vigorous, self-sustaining economic growth. 

Both Presidents recognized the need of promoting 
cooperation in areas of science and technology for 
peaceful purposes. The two Presidents discussed the 
problems concerning the Atlantic Alliance. They 
welcomed the lessening of tension in Europe. They 
agreed, however, that the Atlantic Alliance remains 
an indispensable safeguard to peace and security in 
Europe and in the world. They reiterated the need 
to maintain the integrated military structure of 
NATO as the basis of an adequate defense and 
deterrent, and to reinforce the solidarity of the 
Alliance in the spirit of partnership. They noted 
with satisfaction that the arrangements for nuclear 
planning constitute a development reflecting allied 
solidarity and cooperation. 

President Johnson, recognizing the vital role 
which Turkey plays within the NATO defense al- 
liance, pledged the continuing assistance of the 
United States for the strengthening of Turkey's 
defense capabilities. Reviewing the situation in Eu- 
rope, the two Presidents agreed that a stable peace 
requires the healing of the division of that conti- 
nent. In this regard they also discussed the efforts 
which their Governments have been making to ease 
East- West tensions. They stressed the importance of 
improving East-West relations and of developing an 
atmosphere of mutual trust. They agreed that this 
development would contribute to peace. 

The two Presidents reiterated the attachment of 
their countries to the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations and expressed the hope that the 
United Nations would become increasingly an effec- 
tive instrument for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 

President Sunay and President Johnson stressed 
the need to work unceasingly towards complete and 

general disarmament under effective international 
controls. They stressed their concern over the dan- 
gers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and 
e.xpressed the hope that a non-proliferation treaty 
would soon be completed in a way that would take 
fully into account the interests of all. 

During their talks the two Presidents reviewed 
recent developments in Southeast Asia. President 
Johnson described the situation in Vietnam and the 
efforts of the United States Government to bring 
about a peaceful settlement. President Sunay ex- 
pressed his appreciation for the reaffirmation by 
the United States Government of its desire for 
early negotiations. Both Presidents expressed regret 
that recent intensive efforts to find a way to a solu- 
tion had not so far yielded any positive results. 
They found themselves in agreement on the need to 
support the right of the Vietnamese, both in the 
South and in the North, to determine their own fu- 
ture in peace. 

President Johnson and President Sunay discussed 
also the problem of Cyprus in all its aspects. They 
reviewed the developments since the unhappy events 
of 1963, which caused so much distress and suffering 
on the island, especially to the Turkish community. 
They emphasized the need to refrain from any ac- 
tion likely to increase tension on the island and 
between interested parties. President Sunay in- 
vited the attention of President Johnson to the 
sufferings resulting from the present situation on 
the island. He reiterated Turkey's desire to arrive 
at a peaceful and agreed settlement. Referring to 
bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece, both 
Presidents expressed the hope that such talks would 
lead to an honorable solution reconciling the legiti- 
mate interests of all the parties concerned, includ- 
ing the communities living on the island. In their 
discussion, proceeding from the binding effects of 
existing treaties, both Presidents agreed that these 
remain an essential factor in seeking such a solu- 
tion. The two Presidents expressed their apprecia- 
tion of the task performed by the United Nations 
force in Cyprus and discussed ways in which the 
efforts of the United Nations to preserve peace 
and to secure a return to normal conditions can be 

The two Presidents expressed the conviction that 
their frank and cordial talks would further the 
bonds of friendship, alliance, and cooperation be- 
tween Turkey and the United States. 

APRIL 24, 1967 


President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Recommendations 

Following is a statement made by Presi- 
dent Johnson on April 3 upon receipt of the 
report of the White House committee which 
reviewed the recommendations made at the 
White House Conference on International 

White House press release dated April 3 

In late November of 1965, as part of this 
country's International Cooperation Year 
(ICY) program, I convened the White House 
Conference on International Cooperation.^ 
The conference brought together more than 
5,000 American leaders who exchanged views 
with people in the government and produced 
over 400 recommendations in 30 reports 
dealing with specific subject areas for inter- 
national cooperation. On August 1, 1966, I 
appointed a White House committee to over- 
see a review of the ICY recommendations. 
This committee, which has continually ad- 
vised me on actions taken on these recom- 
mendations, has now completed its work. 

It is with great pleasure that I can report 
that action has been taken or is now in prog- 
ress in fields covered by about three-fourths 
of the more than 400 recommendations. 
Others are being subjected to further study. 
Fewer than 10 percent are considered to be 
impractical at this time. 

This is a splendid example of cooperation 
between private citizens and their govern- 
ment. It confirms what I said when I called 
the conference: that "international coopera- 
tion is no longer an academic subject; it is a 
fact of life." « 

• For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965, 
p. 966. 

• Ibid., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 

The ICY recommendations in the time 
ahead will continue to guide us. A number 
of the issues they dealt with are high on our 
agenda of business at this moment: 

War on Hunger. The ICY reports brought 
out the critical interrelationship between the 
supply of food and the rapid increase of the 
world's population. 

In recognition of these problems, we made 
major adjustments last year in our Food for 
Peace Act and other laws. In my message to 
the Congress this year,^ I reaffirmed our in- 
tention to make the present food emergency 
in India the occasion for all nations to launch 
a new, continuing international campaign 
against hunger. The Congress approved the 
resolution to commit the United States to 
share fully in this effort to meet India's re- 
maining food grain deficit. 

World Weather Watch. The ICY reports 
recommend active U.S. participation in the 
development of a World Weather Watch — an 
international system to observe the world's 
atmosphere and to communicate and analyze 
worldwide weather data rapidly and effi- 

For centuries man's inability to predict 
weather far enough ahead has caused incal- 
culable human suffering and property dam- 
age from storms, floods, and other natural 
disasters. The Congress of the World Meteor- 
ological Organization is meeting this week to 
consider plans for the World Weather Watch. 
The proposed system will, through interna- 
tional cooperation, lead to improved weather 
forecasting and protection of life and prop- 

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con- 
gress of Feb. 2, see ihid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295. 



erty and deserves the wholehearted support 
of the American people. I am instructing our 
representatives to the meeting to pledge the 
full and continuing participation of the 
United States in this important endeavor. 

Outer Space Treaty. The ICY reports 
urged an international agreement to assure 
the exploration and use of outer space solely 
for peaceful purposes. 

On January 27 of this year the United 
States signed such a treaty with the Soviet 
Union and more than 60 other nations. Hear- 
ings are now under way in the Senate on the 
question of U.S. adherence. 

Moratorium on Antiballistic Missiles. The 
ICY reports recommended a U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
moratorium on new deployment of systems 
for ballistic-missile defense. 

We are taking no actions to deploy ABM's, 
pending the outcome of discussions with the 
Soviet Union. Responding to our initiative, 
Chairman [Aleksei N.] Kosygin has con- 
firmed the willingness of his government to 
discuss the question of both offensive and de- 
fensive systems. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention. The 
ICY reports called for ratification of this con- 
vention to provide greater legal protection to 
our citizens visiting the Soviet Union. 

In response to my request, the Senate has 
now given its advice and consent, and I have 
ratified and confirmed this treaty as a con- 
structive step in our policy of "bridgebuild- 
ing" with Eastern Europe. 

East-West Trade Relations. The ICY re- 
ports pointed to the necessity for new ground 
rules to liberalize U.S. trade with Eastern 
European countries. 

I have recommended to the Congress early 
passage of the East-West trade relations bill 
as an essential move in this direction. 

New Directions for Foreign Assistance. 
The ICY reports recommended continued 
commitment of substantial U.S. resources to 
foreign assistance, with emphasis on changed 
foreign assistance policies, strengthening of 
technical assistance, and greater utilization 
of private resources in assistance programs. 

In my message of February 9,* I asked the 
Congress to enact a new foreign assistance 

bill based on six guiding principles: (1) self- 
help; (2) sharing costs with other nations; 

(3) encouragement to regional development; 

(4) emphasis on agriculture, health, and edu- 
cation; (5) protecting our balance of pay- 
ments; and (6) improved administration. 
Early enactment of that bill is essential to an 
effective foreign assistance program. 

A Nonproliferation Treaty. The ICY re- 
ports called for the early conclusion of a 
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear 

We are continuing to press our negotia- 
tions with other nations for a nonprolifera- 
tion agreement, recognizing this problem as 
one of the most urgent of our times. 

These are only a few of the outstanding 
recommendations in the ICY reports on 
which the Government is seeking completed 

The White House committee which over the 
past 8 months has been evaluating these 
recommendations was chaired by Director of 
the Bureau of the Budget Charles L. 
Schultze. Other members were my Special 
Assistants Walt W. Rostow and Joseph A. 
Califano, Jr. The executive director of the 
White House conference and also chairman 
of the ICY Committee on Urban Develop- 
ment, Mr. Raymond D. Nasher of Dallas, 
Texas, also served as a member. 

In order to make sure that action does not 
end here, I am sending a memorandum to the 
heads of those departments and agencies that 
took part in the ICY program, directing 
them to take specific further actions as re- 
quired and to continue the dialog with inter- 
ested citizens. I have also asked Mr. 
Schultze to work with the agency heads in 
order to assure action on, and attention to, 
the recommendations. 

It has long been my conviction that those 
of us in Government can greatly profit by a 
continuing and frank exchange with people 
in business, education, other professions, and 
in civic life. For this reason, at my direction, 
there have been appointed in the State De- 
partment alone during the past year seven 

♦ For text, see ibid.. Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378, 

APRIL 24, 1967 


citizens' committees including over 125 indi- 
viduals to serve in an advisory capacity. The 
ICY program has convinced me there can be 
no substitute for this dialog in a vital 
democracy. The White House committee's re- 
view indicates that this sort of contact can 
be an extremely useful part of the regular 
business of Government. It is one of the best 

ways to keep the people and their Govern- 
ment close to each other. 

I again express my gratitude to all those 
who participated in the ICY program. The 
future of mankind demands ever-increasing 
international cooperation. It must become a 
way of living — a way that will lead to better 
living for all peoples. 

U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today 

by Eugene M. Braderman '■ 

I should like first to sketch briefly the 
background of change that has been a part 
of Philippine life, and of Philippine-Amer- 
ican relations, since 1946. Certainly, a seri- 
ous consideration of the future shape of 
Philippine-U.S. relations, our purpose in 
meeting here, is only possible after a look 
back at the road we have traveled and a look 
at where we stand now. 

The nature of Philippine nationalism will 
be a critical element in all aspects of our dis- 
cussions during the next 2 days. In a large 
sense it has been one of the dominant fac- 
tors in our bilateral relationship since 1946. 
We will want to look deeply into our mutual 
relationship and deal candidly with those 
Issues which seem to have set us at cross- 
purposes. Every area of misunderstanding 
that we can identify, every failure of cul- 
tural perception that we can bring to light, 
will ease — at least a little — our path in the 
future. We may well be able to identify some 
recurrent themes that are standard elsewhere 
for developing countries. 

' Address made before the Philadelphia Regional 
Assembly, the World Affairs Council, and the Amer- 
ican Assembly at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 9 (press 
release 48). Mr. Braderman is Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Commercial and Business Activities. 

I often think that when we talk about 
"international understanding" we ought 
really to be thinking first about cultural dif- 
ferences. We ought to consider carefully the 
different angles from which our varying 
histories make difi'erent countries see life. 
We should be taking into account our own 
unspoken assumptions and aspirations and 
those of other men. Once we have mastered 
that difficult exercise — and it is difficult — we 
will be ready to deal with lofty generali- 
ties like "international understanding." This 
sort of international empathy is not easy. It 
requires an unsentimental understanding of 
one's own country and an equally clear-eyed 
knowledge of the other. All of us, including 
Americans and Filipinos, have had less than 
20/20 vision in the past, but I think it is im- 
proving rapidly now. 

The past 20 years have seen an accelerat- 
ing growth of Filipino consciousness of the 
Philippines as a national state. It is fair to 
say that the Filipinos are groping for a 
finished view of themselves and are casting 
about for a new role in international life. 
This may take shape as a more consciously 
Asian participation in world aff"airs; it is 
highly likely that it will be increasingly con- 
sciously Filipino. 



Whatever the final shape of Filipino soci- 
ety, the road thei'e is apt to be a rocky one 
and the reserves of good will and patience 
of everyone will be frequently tested in the 
years ahead. 

But it is heartening that the Philippines, 
in developing its own national role in the 
world, and tending to its own enlightened 
interests, continues to grow in stature among 
the nations of Southeast Asia. Deeply con- 
scious of our own close relations with the 
Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, 
with Thailand and with Malaysia, we see 
Philippine friendship with these nations as 
a crucial link in a chain of mutual interde- 
pendence among the free peoples of the Far 
East to assure their continued freedom. The 
growth of Philippine relations with Japan, 
which we hope will expand still further, is 
another encouraging development in the in- 
terest of both nations and a further impetus 
to ever-growing mutual cooperation in this 
region of the world. 

Another basic ongoing development that 
will affect all sectors of Philippine life is the 
rapid rate of population growth. As you all 
know, modern public health measures re- 
sulting in the suppression of many killing 
diseases have contributed significantly to the 
population explosion that is now underway 
across the world. This tremendous popula- 
tion increase is of great concern. In the 
Philippines the population is estimated to be 
growing at a rate of between 3 and Si/o per- 
cent annually, probably closer to 3i/^ percent 
than to 3. The present estimated population 
of about 33 million, which has more than 
doubled since 1939, will have grown to about 
55 million by 1980. This rate of population 
growth tends to put a very heavy burden 
on the country's economic structure and on 
its political institutions. Real economic 
growth has to reach 31/2 percent annually 
just to avoid losing ground to population 

It will be difficult for the Government of 
the Philippines to raise the quality of life for 
the average man — as it ardently wants to 
do — for more and more resources will have 
to be poured into infrastructure to cope with 

the growing population, to the probable detri- 
ment of industrial investment. This is a 
major problem and will surely leave its mark 
on the Philippines in the years to come. 

The first step in meeting the problem — 
more food for more mouths — is already un- 
derway under the vigorous, able direction of 
President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos. The intro- 
duction of the new strain of rice, with its 
great possibilities for the Philippines and 
later for all of Asia, is an example of the 
kind of answers that will have to be found. 

A final bit of background concerns the de- 
velopment of the economy. There are three 
main lines that concern us here today — the 
overall growth, industrialization, and the role 
of the United States relative to Philippine 
economic development. 

In recent years we have seen the economy 
of the Philippines develop at an impressive 
rate; especially noteworthy has been the in- 
crease in industrialization. Fifteen years ago 
IIV2 percent of the national income of the 
Philippines came from manufacturing. Today 
about 20 percent does; and manufacturing 
will become increasingly important in the fu- 
ture economic life of the Philippines. 

There is a vigorous, eager, and growing 
private sector. It is reaching out for new 
ideas and new techniques and will be a grow- 
ing source of strength for the economy in 
years to come. 

Economic Growth Targets 

The Philippines is well justified in being 
proud of the great progress of the past two 
decades, since the time within easy memory 
when it lay prostrate and ravaged by war. 
By the beginning of the 1960's the Philip- 
pine economy had achieved all the essentials 
for self-sustained and vigorous growth. Still 
we must observe that the average rate of 
growth — 4.9 percent in the period 1957-64 
and less than 4.5 percent in 1965 — while 
ahead of many Latin American countries, of 
India, Pakistan, and Iran, ranked the Philip- 
pines behind Thailand with 7.4 percent over 
the same period, behind Taiwan with 7.1 per- 
cent, and behind Malaysia with 5.9 percent. 
In the more relevant terms of per capita 

APRIL 24, 1967 


gross national product over the same years, 
the Philippines averaged only a 1.7 percent 
rate of growth, well behind that of Thai- 
land, Taiwan, Iran, India, and Pakistan, and 
markedly behind the Philippines' own aver- 
age of 2.5 percent in the years from 1953 
to 1959. 

The problem that remains to be tackled if 
the Philippine economy is to achieve a satis- 
factory rate of growth in per capita income, 
assuming an annual population increase of 
well over 3 percent, is illustrated by calcu- 
lating gross investment requirements for the 
remaining years of this decade. With this 
rate of population increase, an annual growth 
rate of 6 percent in GNP is by no means an 
excessive target for the Philippine economy. 
Such a growth rate will only yield an an- 
nual increase in per capita income of about 
2.8 percent. Best estimates are that the 
Philippines will need a large inflow of for- 
eign capital — approaching $1 billion over the 
next 5 years — to achieve this rate of growth. 
I believe that an examination of the under- 
lying statistics and estimates on which this 
prediction is based will reveal it to be a pru- 
dent one, given the necessity for building up 
foreign exchange reserves, as well as debt 
repayment and servicing costs. 

In summary, we are here to consider our 
relationships with a vital, vigorous, growing 
country now moving rapidly into conscious- 
ness of full, independent maturity. 

Nonetheless, President Marcos' problems 
are almost overwhelming when we detail 
them one by one, as we will no doubt be do- 
ing in the course of this assembly. It will 
take every bit of even his enormous dyna- 
mism and executive skill to grapple with 
these successfully. An insufficient rate of eco- 
nomic growth, a still undefined sense of direc- 
tion in terms of future trade and investment 
policies, the deterioration of law and order, 
the tendency to laxness and overindulgence 
in both public and private sectors — all these 
compound President Marcos' problems. 

Perhaps most important is the need for 
Filipinos to agree on a consciously identified 
set of national goals. Without such a consen- 
sus it may be doubted whether in the long 
run Philippine politics can harmonize with 

the needs of the economy and whether devel- 
opment can proceed on a vigorous basis to 
reach determined targets. 

What now seems most important is to stim- 
ulate rising levels of income and purchas- 
ing power in the countryside. President Mar- 
cos has placed high priority on increased rice 
production and improved standards of living 
for the rural population. In addition to im- 
proving the quality of rural life, economic 
development in this sector will do much to 
create the markets which Philippine indus- 
try will need in order to develop and prosper. 

What is, I think, required most of all is a 
clear realization on both sides of the need 
for continued private as well as public re- 
sources to meet the development goals of the 

We note that long-range expansion in the 
level of trade stems not from preferential 
devices but from the natural circumstance 
that increasing prosperity in both our coun- 
tries is creating a higher level of demand. 
For the Philippines, as for all nations, this 
means that both its capacity to export and 
its ability to buy are inescapably dependent 
upon the success of its overall program for 
economic growth and development. 

I have mentioned earlier what we believe 
to be conservatively estimated needs for for- 
eign investment inflow if the Philippines 
wishes to grow at a reasonable and realistic 
target rate. The record shows that U.S. direct 
investment has contributed substantially over 
the years to the buildup of Philippine cap- 
ital; it has been instrumental in building 
Philippine economic prosperity and has con- 
tributed to raising the earning capacity of 
the nation and of many Filipinos individu- 

The Philippine experience in this respect is 
similar to our own. Foreign investment 
played a very significant role in U.S. eco- 
nomic growth. It continues to make a major 
contribution. We welcome it and our invest- 
ment climate is warm, because we want cap- 
ital to flow. The need for a stable, receptive 
investment climate in capital-importing coun- 
tries is especially important today. As more 
and more attractive opportunities for invest- 
ment open up all over the world, investment 



capital is in a position to pick and choose its 
opportunities. There is truly a sellers' market 
in the capital markets of the world; and this 
being the case, there can be no doubt of the 
need of the Philippines for the adoption of 
a clear investment policy providing stable 
conditions and reasonable incentives. Presi- 
dent Marcos clearly has this problem in mind. 

The Laurel-Langley Agreement 

As the Philippines has evolved politically 
and economically over the past 20 years, our 
relationship has changed with the times and 
the altering circumstances of histoiy. As the 
most enthusiastic backer of Philippine inde- 
pendence, we have acted over the years to 
support the aspirations of the Philippines. In 
a communique issued by Presidents Johnson 
and Marcos last September,^ President John- 
son pledged a wide range of cooperative 
measures with the Philippines in the scien- 
tific, educational, economic, and military 
spheres. The two Presidents agreed at that 
time that exploratory work would begin be- 
fore June 30 of this year looking toward a 
new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley 
agreement ^ on its expiration in 1974. 

Thus, the Laurel-Langley agreement is a 
timely subject for discussion. This agreement 
has special meaning for me because I partici- 
pated in its negotiation 13 years ago. As the 
principal framework for economic relations 
between the Philippines and the United 
States, it has been a subject of critical atten- 
tion for years. It has inevitably been drawn 
into the self-questioning and self-examination 
that are a part of developing political and 
economic nationalism and sometimes, I think, 
has loomed larger than life on that account. 

The Laurel-Langley agreement was signed 
in September of 1955 and replaced the trade 
agreement of 1946. The agreement is to ter- 
minate in 1974. Certain aspects of the treaty 
deserve special attention, for they raise broad 
policy issues for which solutions must be 

Articles I and II of the agreement provide 

= For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 

3348; for text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 463. 

for a declining scale of tariff preferences 
which will end in 1974 with the termination 
of the agreement. Currently Philippine 
goods entering the United States pay 40 per- 
cent of the U.S. tariff. This will increase to 
60 percent in January 1968, then to 80 per- 
cent in January 1971, and will reach 100 
percent in 1974. On the U.S. side, American 
goods entering the Philippines began pay- 
ing 90 percent of the Philippine tariff 2 years 
ago — in January 1965 — and will begin pay- 
ing 100 percent on January 1, 1974. 

The purpose of these articles was to pro- 
vide an adequate period during which Philip- 
pine producers and exporters could ration- 
alize their production costs and diversify 
their markets in the change from a free- 
trade to a normal commercial relationship 
with the United States. The move toward a 
normal relationship also reflects the legiti- 
mate desire of Filipinos for economic inde- 

Sugar, on which the Philippines receives 
currently an annual import quota of 1,050,- 
000 tons, is an entirely separate matter, not 
affected by the declining scale of tariff prefer- 
ences mentioned earlier. 

"National Treatment" of Investments 

Article VI of the agreement, which deals 
with parity rights, is of special concern. 
Presidents Johnson and Marcos have already 
agreed that no extension of these rights will 
be sought after 1974. What happens after 
the cessation of parity rights is a very com- 
plex and thorny question. Both Presidents 
recognized this in their September 15 com- 
munique by pointing out the necessity of pro- 
viding an adequate framework after 1974 for 
a fair and equitable treatment of new and 
existing investments. 

The existing uncertainty about what will 
happen after 1974 is an inhibiting factor to 
American investment in the parity areas, and 
this uncertainty may well extend the area of 
doubt about other American capital invest- 
ment in the Philippines. I hope that we will 
find the beginning of an answer during our 

Article VII of the agreement provides for 

APRIL 24, 1967 


the national treatment by either party of citi- 
zens or enterprises of the other engaged in 
business activities. That is to say, a Fili- 
pino business operating in Ohio would re- 
ceive exactly the same treatment as an Ohio 
corporation, and vice versa. National treat- 
ment of American firms in the Philippines 
has caused some Filipinos to raise the cry 
of economic invasion. Long-continued public 
debate on the matter seems to have caused 
a hardening of public attitudes on the ques- 
tion of foreign investment. 

We sympathize with the turmoil and ques- 
tioning of a country caught up in the growth 
of economic nationalism, for its dilemma is 
a hard one. It is an area of decision often 
faced these days as developing countries find 
their role in the world. A developing country 
frequently sees foreign investment as a form 
of invasion designed to tear away the natural 
resources that are an irreplaceable part of 
the national wealth. At least this is an argu- 
ment put forward, often whether natural re- 
sources are involved or not. But thoughtful, 
sophisticated men, after considering the 
alternatives, come up against the hard eco- 
nomic fact that economic development calls 
for investment capital and the only source 
for much of this is from abroad. But it re- 
quires a stable, attractive investment climate, 
as I mentioned earlier. 

Though it may be small consolation to the 
developing society to be reminded that it is 
in its turn going through the same economic 
and psychological process that the capital- 
exporting countries had to go through when 
they were struggling with the problem of 
economic development, it is nevertheless a 

Another area of doubt and concern relates 
to the Retail Trade Nationalization Act of 
1954 and the questions involved in its appli- 
cation. The operation of many and varied 
corporate enterprises has been made very 
uncertain. It would be inappropriate for me 
to more than touch on this question in 
passing, since aspects of the operation of the 
law are currently before the judiciary of the 

I would like to conclude these remarks this 

morning on a note that I feel accurately re- 
flects what is enduring in the relationship 
between our two countries and what we must 
do to gear our new ties to one another. It 
mirrors my own view of our relationship: 
We must not see it through rose-colored 
glasses, but neither must we allow ourselves 
to forget the real and enduring values it con- 
tains and will contain in the future. 

We must remember that we share a long 
stretch of history; this sharing in its way 
has shaped our national philosophies and our 
national aspirations. We came to this shared 
history from half a world away, from differ- 
ing economies, and from distinct historical 
backgrounds. But we meet in our mutual re- 
gard and respect for human dignity, for the 
individual's right to live as he chooses in a 
free society, for the conduct of international 
relations on the basis of equality and law 
rather than on coercion and conquest. 

As was said in the final report of the Amer- 
ican Assembly meeting in Davao: 

"Our problems are not automatically self- 
liquidating; their resolution requires constant 
effort, good will and a sense of responsibility 
on both sides — particularly as new genera- 
tions of Filipinos and Americans assume 

U.S. To Increase Civilian 
Hospital Capacity in Viet-Nam 

The Department of State announced on 
April 6 (press release 84) that the United 
States plans to increase civilian hospital 
capacity in Viet-Nam. Three U.S. military 
field tyi^e hospital units manned by U.S. mili- 
tary personnel will be established to provide 
interim relief pending enlargement of the 
Vietnamese hospital system. The three field 
units will be established as soon as possible 
in temporary construction at Da Nang, 
Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon. These hospitals 
will work in close coordination with the ex- 
isting civilian and military hospitals in Viet- 

This measure to close gaps in the civilian 



medical assistance program was discussed at 
the Guam conference in March.^ 

Despite enormous effort in the past to pro- 
vide needed capacity, some hospitals are over- 
crowded and inadequately staffed. Certain 
types of surgical treatment cannot be pro- 
vided in some of the hospitals. 

In undertaking this further expansion of 
medical assistance the U.S. Government 
hopes that the need for these civilian facili- 
ties will end soon. 

The Agency for International Development 
is now assisting the Vietnamese Govern- 
ment to expand several hospitals and con- 
struct seven additional hospitals of surgical 
units in other parts of the country. 

AID also is exploring with the Govern- 
ment of Viet-Nam and private U.S. groups 
alternative means of providing reconstruc- 
tive surgical treatment not presently avail- 
able in Viet-Nam. 

Unprecedented measures have been taken 
over the past year to assist the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Health to care for war refugees, 
civilian war casualties, and other elements 
of the population of South Viet-Nam who 
could not afford private medical care. The 
U.S. military medical services, civilian and 
medical personnel from 13 other free-world 
nations, and American volunteer doctors and 
agencies have joined with AID to provide 
emergency assistance. The AID medical 
assistance program alone has increased from 
$5 million in 1965 to nearly $50 million in 
1967. Forty-three surgical and medical teams, 
of which 25 are from the United States and 
18 from other countries, are working with 
the Vietnamese Health Ministry staffs in pro- 
vincial hospitals throughout South Viet-Nam. 
In addition, 32 volunteer physicians on 2- 
month rotational assignments under the 
auspices of the American Medical Association 
and AID supplement the regular Vietnamese 
and foreign staffs. Vietnamese and American 
military units also are providing outpatient 
treatment and diagnoses in villages through- 
out the country. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1967, 
p. 586. 

New Policy Outlined on Funds 
for U.S. Voluntary Organizations 

White House press release dated March 29 


I have received the report from the com- 
mittee which I appointed on February 15 to 
review relationships between the Central In- 
telligence Agency and private American vol- 
untary organizations. This committee con- 
sisted of Under Secretary of State Nicholas 
Katzenbach, as chairman. Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare John Gard- 
ner, and CIA Director Richard Helms. 

I accept this committee's proposed state- 
ment of policy and am directing all agencies 
of the government to implement it fully. 

We will also give serious consideration to 
the committee's recommendation "that the 
Government should promptly develop and 
establish a public-private mechanism to pro- 
vide public funds openly for overseas activi- 
ties of organizations which are adjudged 
deserving, in the national interest, of public 
support." To review concrete ways of accom- 
plishing this objective, I am requesting 
Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of a 
special committee which will include repre- 
sentatives from the Executive, the Congress, 
and the private community. 


Dear Mr. President: The committee which you 
appointed on February 15, 1967 has sought, pursuant 
to your request : 

— To review relationships between government 
agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and educational and private voluntary organizations 
which operate abroad ; and 

— ^To recommend means to help assure that such 
organizations can play their proper and vital role 

The committee has held a number of meetings, in- 
terviewed dozens of individuals in and out of gov- 
ernment, and reviewed thousands of pages of reports. 
We have surveyed the relevant activities of a number 
of federal agencies. And we have reviewed in partic- 
ular and specific detail the relationship between CIA 
and each relevant organization. 

APRIL 24, 1967 


Our report, supplemented with supporting classi- 
fied documents, follows. 

In summary, the committee offers two basic recom- 
mendations : 

1. It should be the policy of the United States 
Government that no federal agency shall provide any 
covert financial assistance or support, direct or indi- 
rect, to any of the nation's educational or private 
voluntary organizations. 

2. The Government should promptly develop and 
establish a public-private mechanism to provide pub- 
lic funds openly for overseas activities of organiza- 
tions which are adjudged deserving, in the national 
interest, of public support. 

1. A New Policy 

The years immediately after World War II saw a 
surge of communist activity in organizations 
throughout the world. Students, scientists, veterans, 
women and pi-ofessional groups were organized into 
international bodies which spoke in the cadences, ad- 
vocated the policies, and furthered the interests of 
the communist bloc. Much of this activity was 
organized, directed, and financed covertly by com- 
munist governments. 

American organizations reacted from the first. The 
young men and women who founded the United 
States National Student Association, for example, 
did so precisely to give American youth the capacity 
to hold their own in the international arena. But the 
importance of students as a force in international 
events had yet to become widely understood and NSA 
found it difficult to attract private support for its 
international activities. Accordingly, the United 
States Government, acting through the Central Intel- 
ligence Agency, provided support for this overseas 

We have taken NSA as an example. While no use- 
ful purpose would be served by detailing any other 
CIA programs of assistance to private American 
voluntary organizations, one fundamental point 
should be clearly stated: such assistance was given 
pursuant to National Security Council policies begin- 
ning in October, 1951 and with the subsequent con- 
currence of high-level senior interdepartmental re- 
view committees in the last four Administrations. In 
December, 1960, in a classified report submitted after 
a year of study, a public-private Presidential Com- 
mittee on Information Activities Abroad specifically 
endorsed both overt and covert programs, including 
those assisted by CIA. 

Our study, undertaken at a later time, discloses 
new developments which suggest that we should now 
re-examine these policies. The American public, for 
example, has become increasingly aware of the im- 
portance of the complex forms of international com- 
petition between free societies and communist states. 
As this awareness has grown, so have potential 

sources of support for the overseas work of private 

There is no precise index to these sources, but 
their increase is suggested by the growth in the num- 
ber of private foundations from 2,220 in 1955 to 
18,000 in 1967. Hence it is increasingly possible for 
organizations like NSA to seek support for overseas 
activities from open sources. 

Just as sources of support have increased, so has 
the number of American groups engaged in overseas 
work. According to the Agency for International De- 
velopment, there has been a nine-fold increase just 
among voluntary organizations which participate in 
technical assistance abroad, rising from 24 in 1951 
to 220 in 1965. The total of all private American 
voluntary groups now working overseas may well 
exceed a thousand. 

The number of such organizations which has been 
assisted covertly is a small fraction of the total. The 
vast preponderance have had no relationship with the 
government or have accepted only open government 
funds — which greatly exceed funds supplied covertly. 

The work of private American organizations, in 
a host of fields, has been of great benefit to scores of 
countries. That benefit must not be impaired by for- 
eign doubts about the independence of these organiza- 
tions. The committee believes it is essential for the 
United States to underscore that independence imme- 
diately and decisively. 

For these reasons, the committee recommends the 


No federal agency shall provide any covert finan- 
cial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to 
any of the nation's educational or private volun- 
tary organizations. This policy specifically ap- 
plies to all foreign activities of such organiza- 
tions and it reaffirms present policy with respect 
to their domestic activities. 

Where such support has been given, it will be 
teiTninated as quickly as possible without de- 
stroying valuable private organizations before 
they can seek new means of support.' 

We believe that, particularly in the light of re- 
cent publicity, establishment of a clear policy of this 
kind is the only way for the government to carry 
out two important responsibilities. One is to avoid 
any implication that governmental assistance, be- 
cause it is given covertly, is used to affect the pol- 
icies of private voluntary groups. The second respon- 

' On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect 
that the process of termination can be largely — per- 
haps entirely — completed by December 31, 1967. 
[Footnote in original.] 



sibility is to make it plain in all foreign countries 
that the activities of private American groups abroad 
are, in fact, private. 

The committee has sought carefully to assess the 
impact of this Statement of Policy on CIA. We have 
reviewed each relevant program of assistance carried 
out by the Agency in case-by-case detail. As a result 
of this scrutiny, the committee is satisfied that appli- 
cation of the Statement of Policy will not unduly 
handicap the Agency in the exercise of its national 
security responsibilities. Indeed, it should be noted 
that, starting well before the appearance of recent 
publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to 
disengage from certain of these activities. 

The committee also recommends that the imple- 
mentation of this policy be supervised by the senior 
interdepartmental review committee which already 
passes on proposed CIA activities and which would 
review and assist in the process of disengagement.' 

2. New Methods of Support 

While our first recommendation seeks to insure 
the independence of private voluntary organizations, 
it does not deal with an underlying problem — how to 
support the national need for, and the intrinsic worth 
of, their efforts abroad. 

Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with in- 
tellectual or youth groups abroad knows that free 
institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous 
attack, some of it carefully organized and well- 
financed, all of it potentially dangerous to this nation. 

It is of the greatest importance to our future and 
to the future of free institutions everywhere that 
other nations, especially their young people, know 
and understand American viewpoints. There is no 

' If the Statement of Policy is to be eflfective, it 
must be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this 
committee, no programs currently would justify any 
exception to this policy. At the same time, where the 
security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossi- 
ble for this committee to state categorically now 
that there will never be a contingency in which 
overriding national security interests may require 
an exception — nor would it be credible to enunciate 
a policy which purported to do so. 

We therefore recommend that, in the event of such 
unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review 
committee be permitted to make exceptions to the 
Statement of Policy, but only where overriding na- 
tional security interests so require; only on a case- 
by-case basis; only where open sources of support 
are shown to be unavailable; and only when such 
exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secre- 
taries of State and Defense. In no event should any 
future exception be approved which involves any 
educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization. 
[Footnote in original.] 

better way to meet this need than through the activ- 
ity of private American organizations. 

The time has surely come for the government to 
help, support such activity in a mature, open manner. 

Some progress toward that aim already has been 
made. In recent years, a number of federal agencies 
have developed contracts, grants, and other forms 
of open assistance to private organizations for over- 
seas activities. This assistance, however, does not 
deal with a major aspect of the problem. A number 
of organizations cannot, without hampering their 
effectiveness as independent bodies, accept funds di- 
rectly from government agencies. 

The committee therefore recommends that the Gov- 
ernment should promptly develop and establish a 
public-private mechanism to provide public funds 
openly for overseas activities of organizations which 
are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of 
public support. 

Such a mechanism could take various forms. One 
promising proposal, advanced by Mr. Eugene Black, 
calls for a publicly funded but privately admin- 
istered body patterned on the British Council. 

The British Council established in 1934, operates 
in 80 countries, administering approximately $30,- 
000,000 annually for reference libraries, exhibitions, 
scholarships, international conferences, and cultural 
exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn 
from private life, the Council has maintained a repu- 
tation for independence, even though 90 percent of 
its funds are governmental. 

According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural 
Relations Services, other nations have developed 
somewhat similar institutions. The Indian Council 
for Cultural Relations, for example, is entirely gov- 
ernment-financed but operates autonomously. The 
governing body of the Swedish Institute for Cultural 
Relations consists of both government and private 
members. This institute receives 75 percent of its 
funds from the government and the remainder from 
private contributions. 

The experience of these and other countries helps 
to demonstrate the desirability of a similar body in 
the United States, wholly or largely funded by the 
federal government. Another approach might be the 
establishment of a governmental foundation, perhaps 
with links to the existing Federal Inter-Agency 
Council on International Education and Cultural 

Such a public-private body would not be new to 
the United States. Congress established the Smith- 
sonian Institution, for example, more than a century 
ago as a private corporation, under the guardianship 
of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private 
Board of Regents. 

The committee began a preliminary study of what 
might be the best method of meeting the present 
need. It is evident, however, that, because of the 
great range both of existing government and private 

APRIL 24, 1967 


philanthropic programs, the refinement of alterna- 
tives and selection among them is a task of consid- 
erable complexity. Accordingly, we do not believe 
that this exclusively governmental committee is an 
appropriate forum for the task and we recommend, 
instead, the appointment of a larger group, including 
individuals in private life with extensive experience 
in this field. 

The basic principle, in any event, is clear. Such a 
new institution would involve government funds. It 
might well involve government officials. But a pre- 
mium must be placed on the involvement of private 
citizens and the exercise of private judgements, for 

to be effective, it would have to have — and be recog- 
nized to have — a high degree of independence. 

The prompt creation of such an institution, based 
on this principle, would fill an important — and never 
more apparent. — national need. 

John W. Gardner 

Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 

Richard Helms 

Director of Central Intelligence 

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 

Under Secretary of State, Chairman 


CENTO Economic Committee 
iVIeets at Washington 

The 15th meeting of the Economic Com- 
mittee of the Central Treaty Organization 
took place at Washington March li-16. Fol- 
lowing are texts of a statement made at the 
opening session on March 14- by William S. 
Gaud, Administrator of the Agency for In- 
ternational Development, a communique is- 
sued on March 16 at the close of the meeting, 
and a list of the members of the U.S. dele- 


It gives me great pleasure to have this op- 
portunity to welcome the CENTO Economic 
Committee to Washington. It's an oppor- 
tunity that doesn't arise very often — once 
every 5 years. We look forward to it. We are 
glad to have you here. And we look forward 
to the next meeting 5 years hence. 

We are particularly happy that the Secre- 
tary General [Abbas Ali KhalatbaryJ has 
been able to attend this meeting. He is now 
in his 6th year of service for CENTO. He 
has made many contributions to the organiza- 
tion and to its members. And we are de- 

lighted to have him here to give us some 

CENTO is now in its 13th year. If it were 
a human being, it would just be becoming a 
teenager — a rather dubious prospect. You 
can't be too sure what happens to teenagers. 
Normally they go through a fairly difficult 

But the comparison is not appropriate. 
CENTO is in no sense a teenager. It has been 
a responsible member of the world commu- 
nity for a good many years. It has served its 
members well — and those like the United 
States which are not members but vitally 
interested in its proceedings and its success. 
It has served us well in the past and seems 
destined to do so in the future. 

CENTO'S immediate purpose, of course, 
has been the defense of the CENTO region 
against Communist aggression. Its object 
has been to provide security, to form a shield, 
to erect a barrier of mutual defense. It has 
done this. 

But it would not have served its full pur- 
pose or its deeper purpose if that were all 
that it had done. Why did the regional mem- 
bers of CENTO want a shield? What was the 
purpose of this shield? Not to let them relax 
at ease and in comfort, not to preserve the 
status quo, not to keep the world as it was; 



not a bit of it. They wanted a shield behind 
which they could work, behind which the eco- 
nomic, social, and pohtical development of 
their countries and of the region could take 
place without outside interference. They be- 
lieved that by pooling their resources, by 
working together, by getting others to work 
with them, they would be able to devote more 
of their resources to development than would 
otherwise have been the case. 

Security, freedom from external aggres- 
sion, freedom from internal subversion — 
these are prerequisites to fruitful develop- 
ment anywhere. This is the constant tussle 
that those of us in the aid business see all 
around the world. 

How do you use the limited resources that 
are available to make as much progress as 
possible? If you had your way, if you had 
your choice, you would devote all of these re- 
sources to long-term development. 

The world isn't that easy. We are always 
being diverted from this long-term business 
of economic development by short-term prob- 
lems, by the necessity for security. The prob- 
lem is always the same: How do we keep this 
diversion of resources from the long-term job 
of development as small as possible; how do 
we keep it to a minimum so that we can spend 
as much as possible of the limited resources 
we all have on development? 

One answer clearly lies in regional orga- 
nizations such as CENTO. One of the most 
encouraging features of today's world, it 
seems to me, is the growth of these regional 

You started early. Yours was one of the 
first. You have had this security, and you 
have made good use of it. Iran, Pakistan, and 
Turkey have all made great strides in devel- 
opment in the last 12 years in the field of 
agricultural production, in the field of indus- 
trial production, in health, in education, in 
the growth of private enterprise, in the 
growth of those institutions which are strong 
enough to support the weight of a free society 
— and it takes a good deal more to support 
the weight of a free society than it does to 
support other types of societies. In all these 
ways, your countries have made great prog- 

ress: a better life for your people, a fuller life 
for your people, and as a result, greater in- 
ternal strength, greater intrinsic security. 

We in the United States are very proud to 
have had a hand in helping this development. 
We have contributed a good deal in the way 
of resources — food aid, economic aid, and 
military aid — to the countries in the CENTO 
region. Much of this has been direct assist- 
ance to regional projects: the telecommunica- 
tions system, the airway system, the highway, 
the railroad, many others. Some of them are 
less monumental than these but, in the long 
run, at least as important. 

But we all know that external aid can't do 
much by itself. It is the people of the de- 
veloping countries who have the main job. 
It's their resources which count primarily; 
and more than their resources, it's their 
spirit, it's their will. It's only the developing 
countries that can provide the sparks that 
will ignite the fire of development. These 
have to come from within, and they have 
come from within in your part of the world. 

I don't want to exaggerate. None of us can 
rest on our oars; the job is far from finished. 
There are many challenges ahead, and they 
are all pretty obvious. 

The first and the foremost challenge, it 
seems to me, is that of increasing the produc- 
tion of food worldwide. It's not only a mat- 
ter of producing more food, it's a matter of 
distribution and teaching people to eat bet- 
ter food. The world doesn't face immediate 
starvation today. It will — in 10 years, in 15 
years — unless we do better. But we do face 
today, and we have been facing for many 
years, the results of malnutrition, insufficient 
protein, not enough of the right kind of food. 
And we know that malnutrition stunts both 
bodies and minds. Our job in the food line, 
the job of all of us, is not only more food, 
but better food, better types of food — and to 
see that these better types of foods reach all 
of our people. 

Closely allied to this question of food is 
that of achieving a balance between foods 
and mouths. The world can grow the food 
necessary to feed our increasing populations 
for a time, but not forever. We all know this 

APRIL 24, 1967 


today. And we have got to get to work on the 
problem — one of the biggest challenges of our 

In the field of health there are cholera, 
measles, chickenpox, smallpox, typhoid fever, 
malaria^ — any number of diseases. They 
needn't take the toll that they do. But we 
haven't stopped them yet. We haven't really 
started to stop them. 

There is the need for education — training, 
enabling people to fit into the kind of a world 
that we want to live in in the future. All na- 
tions must learn how to make constructive 
use of the many advances in technology that 
the world sees today. They come so fast they 
make you dizzy. They come a lot faster than 
we are able to adapt them to their best use. 

There is a need for adaptive research, in 
all fields, to make what is useful in one part 
of the world useful in another part of the 

There are any number of areas in which 
there are still challenges. There are many 
frontiers to be explored, many worlds still to 
be conquered. 

I am sure that CENTO and its members 
will rise to these challenges. You will do so as 
individual nations, as members of CENTO, 
as members of the Regional Cooperation for 
Development Organization, and in other ways 
that will present themselves as time goes on. 

You have already proved your ability to do 
this. You already have a substantial momen- 
tum toward development. As I said earlier, 
you have the added strength of belonging to 
a regional organization; you are not working 
alone. Through this union, you have greater 
strength, greater knowledge, and greater 
capacity to meet these challenges. 

We in the United States are happy to assist 
you in your continuing efforts to promote 
the peace and the well-being of your people. 
We will certainly continue to help you with 
present cooperative programs. The initiatives 
for what needs to be done in the region are 
coming, increasingly, from you; and we will 
be glad to give such help as we can to new 
regional projects to which the member coun- 
tries of CENTO give high priority as a part 
of their own development plans. 

We look forward, with interest and antici- 
pation, to future meetings of this Committee 
at which we can all assess the further prog- 
ress that you will have made toward the 
peaceful development of the CENTO region. 

Delegates, again I greet you with enthusi- 
asm and with warmth, and I wish you well in 
your deliberations. 

Thank you very much. 


The role of the Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) in the economic development of Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey was the central theme of the 
deliberations of CENTO's Economic Committee in its 
annual meeting which concluded in Washing^ton on 
Thursday [March 16]. The Committee assessed the 
momentum already achieved in this direction and 
opened the way to initiatives in the field of indus- 
trial development in the CENTO region. 

Delegates of all five CENTO countries — Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States — participated in the three-day session, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, 
head of the United States delegation. The Secretary 
General of the Organization, Dr. A. A. Khalatbary, 
addressed the Committee at its opening meeting. 

In response to an initiative of the Turkish Dele- 
gation the Committee moved into a new field and 
agreed that an ad hoc Working Group be formed to 
identify those fields of industrial development which 
would be of substantial economic benefit to the Re- 
gional Countries and to make recommendations for 
the conduct of feasibility studies of specific projects 
and other activities under CENTO auspices in these 

Earlier, the Committee had noted with apprecia- 
tion the statement of Mr. William S. Gaud, Adminis- 
trator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, at the opening meeting. The Committee 
invited the attention of the Regional Member Gov- 
ernments particularly to Mr. Gaud's remarks con- 
cerning initiatives by the Regional Members and 
his assurance that the United States would be glad 
to give such help as it could to new regional projects 
to which Member Countries give high priority as a 
part of their own development plans. 

The Committee also welcomed the statement by 
the leader of the United Kingdom's Delegation that, 
despite economic difficulties, the amount of his Gov- 
ernment's annual contribution to the economic ac- 
tivities of CENTO would not be reduced. 

The Committee also noted that CENTO projects 
were making definite contributions in such fields as 
public health, agriculture, science and education. For 
example, an Emergency Working Party on Cholera 
was formed following an epidemic in the region and 



as a result of its recommendations stockpiles of anti- 
cholera supplies and equipment were being built up 
and a Regional Health Advisor provided. Pakistan 
and Iran offered vaccines as needed, and provided 
special training in anti-cholera techniques to doctors 
of the region. 

The Committee directed its Sub-Committee on 
Agriculture to continue to concern itself with the 
development of the Van-Rezaiyeh area in eastern 
Turkey and northwestern Iran, and to identify other 
areas where similar developmental projects could be 
sponsored by CENTO. The Sub-Committee was also 
instructed to pursue further initiatives in the mar- 
keting and processing of agricultural products, in- 
cluding livestock. 

Recognizing the vital importance of developing the 
water resources of the regional countries, the Com- 
mittee approved the establishment of a Working 
Group on Hydrology and Water Resource Develop- 
ment with terms of reference embracing water 
power, irrigation of agricultural lands and supplies 
for human consumption and industrial use. 

In the field of science and education, the Commit- 
tee welcomed the establishment of the new Multi- 
lateral Scientific Fund, which is to be administered 
by the CENTO Scientific Coordinating Board, with 
its headquarters in Tehran. 

The Committee also reviewed the work of 
cento's own technical assistance programme under 
the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund. This 
Fund is designed to make use of the rapidly growing 
resources of technical expertise to be found in Iran, 
Pakistan and Turkey. Currently, funds contributed 
annually by the five countries are used to off'er 
scholarships in the Region's own technical colleges 
and universities, to make the services of outstanding 
technical experts of one Regional Country available 
to the other two, and in other ways. In a move to 
enhance the effectiveness of this programme, the 
Committee approved a revision of the Fund's terms 
of reference designed to make it even more flexible 
and responsive to the needs of the three Regional 

The full report of the Economic Committee's de- 
liberations and recommendations will be submitted to 
the Organization's Council of Ministers which is due 
to meet in London April 25-26. 


Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
U.S. Representative 

Scott L. Behoteguy, U.S. Economic Coordinator for 
CENTO Affairs (Ankara), Alternate U.S. Repre- 

Albert R. Baron, Economic Adviser, Office of the 
U.S. Economic Coordinator for CENTO Affairs 

John H. Funari, Director, Office of Greece-Turkey- 
Iran-Cyprus-CENTO AflFairs, Agency for Interna- 
tional Development 

Victor Gauthier, Officer in Charge, CENTO Affairs, 
Agency for International Development 

William C. Nenno, Bureau of Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, Department of State 

Sidney Sober, Director, Office of Regional Affairs, 
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Department of State 

Robert A. Stein, Bureau of Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs, Department of State 


President Urges Accession to 1961 
Single Convention on Narcotics 

Follorving are texts of a letter of transmit- 
tal from, President Johnson to the Senate and 
a report to the President from Acting Secre- 
ta)-y of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach re- 
garding the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs, 1961. 


white House press release dated March 8 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to accession to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, 
open for signature at New York March 30, 
1961 to August 1, 1961, I transmit herewith 
a copy of the Convention along with the 
Final Act * of the United Nations Conference 
at which the Convention was adopted. 

For nearly sixty years the United States 
has taken a leading part in international 
cooperation for the control of narcotic drugs. 
We should continue this cooperation to the 
fullest possible extent in combating the 
scourge of drug abuse. 

After a survey by a special task force on 

" For texts, see S. Ex. G, 90th Cong., 1st sess. 

APRIL 24, 1967 


the contribution of the Convention to the con- 
trol of illegal international drug traffic, I 
have concluded that the national and interna- 
tional interest in drug control will be sig- 
nificantly advanced by United States acces- 

I recommend that the Senate give the Con- 
vention early and favorable consideration. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, March 8, 1967 


White House press release dated March 8 

February 15, 1967 

The President: I have the honor to sub- 
mit to you a copy of the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, with the recom- 
mendation that the Convention be transmit- 
ted to the Senate for its advice and consent 
to accession. 

The Convention was adopted at the United 
Nations Conference for the Adoption of a 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held 
in New York from January 24, 1961 through 
March 25, 1961. The Final Act of that Con- 
ference, which is bound along with the Con- 
vention, is transmitted for the information 
of the Senate. 

The Convention was designed to replace 
by a single instrument the existing multi- 
lateral treaties in the field of narcotic drugs, 
to reduce the number of treaty organs 
exclusively concerned with the control of nar- 
cotic drugs, and to make provision for the 
control of the production of raw materials of 
narcotic drugs. 

During the period March 30 to August 1, 
1961 when the Convention was open for sig- 
nature it was signed for sixty-four countries. 
Thirty-four of those countries have deposited 
ratifications of the Convention and twenty 
other countries have acceded to it. 

The Convention was not signed for the 
United States for several reasons. The prin- 
cipal reason was a concern that omission 
from the Convention of the "closed list" pro- 
vision embodied in the 1953 Protocol (14 

UST 10), under which only seven named 
countries could engage in the production of 
opium for export, would result in many addi- 
tional countries engaging in such production 
and a consequent spiralling of the amount 
of opium that would be diverted into illicit 

Another principal reason for not signing 
the Convention was a concern that the pro- 
visions permitting reservations would result 
in States making reservations that would 
cripple the international measures necessary 
for the control of narcotic drugs. 

Because of the concerns noted, it was con- 
sidered that if the 1953 Protocol for Limit- 
ing and Regulating the Cultivation of the 
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International 
and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium 
were brought into force, it would provide 
more effective international control of nar- 
cotic drugs than would be possible under the 
Single Convention. However, even though 
that Protocol was brought into force on 
March 8, 1963, only five States have become 
party to it since that date. Three of those five 
States were newly independent States that 
gave notification that they continued to con- 
sider themselves bound by the Protocol by 
reason of its ratification on their behalf prior 
to independence. At present, fourteen years 
after the date it was signed, only fifty States 
are parties to the Protocol. 

Neither the omission of the "closed list" 
provision from the Single Convention nor the 
provisions permitting reservations appear to 
be affecting the application of the Single Con- 

Although under a provision of Article 24 
of the Convention any country can undertake 
the production of opium for export in 
amounts not exceeding five tons annually, 
there appears to be no record of any country 
having undertaken the production of opium 
for export under that provision since the 
Convention entered into force on December 
13, 1964. 

The reservations that have been made to 
the Convention have been modest and of little 
apparent effect when compared with the res- 
ervations that are permitted under its pro- 



visions. Experience under the Convention 
during the past two years has not shown 
that the reservations made have resulted in 
any apparent weakening of the international 
controls provided in the Convention. 

The above-mentioned "closed list" provi- 
sion of the 1953 Protocol as compared with 
the provisions of the 1961 Convention on the 
limitation on production of opium for inter- 
national trade, and the effect of the pro- 
visions of the 1961 Convention permitting 
reservations are discussed in detail in the 
enclosed "Report on the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and Comparative 
Analysis of the Single Convention, 1961 and 
the Protocol of 1953". That report and 
analysis also outline the background of the 
Convention, its principal merits, and discuss 
the international controls and prohibitions 
provided therein. The substance of the report 
and comparative analysis was transmitted 
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations with a letter dated October 
24, 1961 from the Department of State in 
response to a request from the Chairman. 

It appears from the relatively large num- 
ber of ratifications and accessions to the 
Single Convention that have taken place in 
the few years since it was signed that it will 
become the most widely accepted of the nar- 
cotics control treaties. Because of this, and 
because all international controls will soon 
be exercised through the organs specified in 
the Single Convention, accession to the Single 
Convention would be in keeping with the 
long-standing leadership exercised by the 
United States in the international control of 
narcotic drugs. All international narcotic 
controls will be exercised through the inter- 
national control organs specified in that Con- 
vention, namely, the existing Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social 
Council, and the new International Narcotics 
Control Board established by the Convention 
(Article 5). 

Under the Transitional Provisions of the 
Convention (Article 45) the functions of the 
Board are being provisionally carried out by 
the Permanent Central Narcotics Board 
(PCNB) constituted under Chapter VI of 

the International Opium Convention signed 
at Geneva February 19, 1925 and by the 
Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) constituted 
under Chapter II of the Geneva Convention 
of July 13, 1931. The Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations, pursuant to 
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 45 
of the 1961 Convention, has fixed March 2, 
1968, as the date upon which the new Board 
will enter upon its duties and replace the 
PCNB (on which the United States has long 
been represented) and the DSB. The Board 
will consist of eleven members to be elected 
by the Economic and Social Council (Article 
9). The United States, as a member of the 
World Health Organization, has a voice in 
the nomination of three of the members and 
also, as a Member of the United Nations, has 
a voice in the nomination of eight of the 
members. It is considered desirable that the 
United States be represented on the Board 
and it may be expected that a United States 
member would be elected by the Council. 
Effective participation by the United States 
member in the work of the Board would, 
however, be materially advanced by acces- 
sion to the Convention by the United States. 
The Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 
concur in my recommendation that the Con- 
vention be transmitted to the Senate for its 
advice and consent to accession. 
Respectfully submitted, 

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach 


Current Actions 


Automotive Traffic 

Customs convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 

APRIL 24, 1967 


Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967. 
Convention concerning' customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into 
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 
24, 1964.' 
Accession deposited: Mongolia, January 5, 1967.' 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967.' 
Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, February 16, 



Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4192, 5608, 5117, 5551), 
governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway and 
a lockage fee on the Welland Canal. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31, 1967. 
Entered into force March 31, 1967. 


Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 23, 
1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967. 


' Not in force for the United States. 
' With a reservation and a declaration. 


The Senate on April 5 confirmed the following 

Lucius D. Battle to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated January 26.) 

Ellsworth Bunker to be Ambassador to the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see 
Department of State press release 85 dated April 

William W. Heath to be Ambassador to Sweden. 
(For biographic details, see White House press re- 
lease dated March 22.) 

Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador at Large. 

Douglas MacArthur to be Ambassador to Austria, 

John M. McSweeney to be Ambassador to Bul- 
garia. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated March 22.) 

Richard H. Nolte to be Ambassador to the United 
Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated February 21.) 

Karl F. Rolvaag to be Ambassador to Iceland. 
(For biographic details, see White House press re- 
lease dated March 22.) 


The Department of State Bulletin, 


weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreig:n rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
ind international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of eeneral International inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 

APRIL 24, 1967 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreim $16; 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX April 2U, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U52 


Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs 

Bureau 651 

Africa and America (Palmer) 646 

lAsia. Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary 
I for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 674 
Austria. MacArthur confirmed as Ambassador 674 
Bulgaria. McSweeney confirmed as Ambassador 674 
Congo (Kinshasa). Africa and America 

(Palmer) 646 


Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge, 
MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) . 674 

President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con- 
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671 

Department and Foreign Service 

Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs 
Bureau 651 

Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge, 
MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) . 674 

Developing Countries. CENTO Economic Com- 
mittee Meets at Washington (Gaud, commu- 
nique) 668 

Economic Afifairs 

Africa and America (Palmer) 646 

CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Wash- 
ington (Gaud, communique) 668 

Q.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand 
Today (Braderman) 660 

Foreign Aid 

Africa and America (Palmer) 646 

Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds 
of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, 
Sunay, joint communique) 652 

U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity 
in Viet-Nam 664 

Iceland. Rolvaag confirmed as Ambassador . . 674 

International Cooperation. President Reviews 
Action Taken on ICY Recommendations 
(Johnson) 658 

International Organizations. CENTO Economic 
Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud, 
communique) 668 

Middle East 

Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary for 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs . . 674 
ENTO Economic Committee Meets at Wash- 
ington (Gaud, communique) 668 

Nigeria. Africa and America (Palmer) . . 646 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Turkey 
and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of 
Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Sunay, 
joint communique) 652 

Philippines. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where 
We Stand Today (Braderman) 660 

Presidential Documents 

New Policy Outlined on Funds for U.S. Volun- 
tary Organizations (Johnson, text of Presi- 
dential committee report) 665 

President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Rec- 
ommendations 658 

President Urges Accession to 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotics 671 

Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds 
of Friendship and Cooperation 652 

South West Africa. Africa and America 
(Palmer) 646 

Southern Rhodesia. Africa and America 

(Palmer) 646 

Sweden. Heath confirmed as Ambassador . . 674 

Trade. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We 

Stand Today (Braderman) 660 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 673 

President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con- 
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671 

Turkey. Turkey and the United States Reaffirm 
Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (John- 
son, Sunay, joint communique) 652 

United Arab Republic. Nolte confirmed as 

Ambassador 674 

United Nations 

Africa and America (Palmer) 646 

President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con- 
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671 

Bunker confirmed as Ambassador 674 

U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity 

in Viet-Nam 664 

Name Index 

Battle, Lucius D 674 

Braderman. Eugene M 660 

Bunker, Ellsworth 674 

Gardner, John W 665 

Gaud, William S 668 

Heath, William W 674 

Helms, Richard 665 

Johnson, President .... 652, 658, 665, 671 

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 665, 671 

Lodge, Henry Cabot 674 

MacArthur, Douglas 674 

McSweeney, John M 674 

Nolte, Richard H 674 

Palmer, Joseph, 2d 646 

Rolvaag, Karl F 674 

Sunay, Cevdet 652 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 3-9 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 3 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 48 
of March 9, 75 of March 30, and 79 of March 




*81 4/3 Department publishes "The Coun- 
try Team." 

t82 4/5 Indefinite validity of multiple- 
entry visitors visas (rewrite). 

t83 4/5 U.S. delegation to 3d spssion of 
11th Meeting of Consultation of 
American Ministers of Foreign 
84 4/6 U.S. to increase civilian hospital 
capacity in Viet-Nam (rewrite). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/42 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c.. 20402 



Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam 

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (publication 8213), the most recent pamphlet 
the series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, describes tl 
military, economic, and social assistance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam by natioi 
other than the United States. 

The three other background papers on various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict publish* 
earlier were: Basic Data on South Viet-Nam, The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam, and Communis 
Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam. 



To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printins Offie* 
Wuhinston, D.C. 20402 

Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send copies of 

Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Free World Assistance for South 

Viet-Nam (8213) ; Basic Data on South Viet-Nam (8195) ; The 

Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Communist-Directed Forces in South 

Viet-Nam (8197). 




To be BuUsd 


Coupon nfond . 








Street address- 

City, State, and ZIP code. 







Vol. LVI, No. U53 

May 1,1967 

Remarks by President Johnson and Vice President Hunvphrey 
at Washington; Addresses by the Vice President in Europe 678 

by David H. Popper 689 


Statement by President Johnson and Text 
of Congressional Resolution 700 

For index see inside back cover 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe 

Following are remarks made by President 
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey at a 
ceremony on the South Lawn of the White 
House on April 10 upon the Vice President's 
retur^i from a 2-iveek working visit to seveyi 
European countries. Also included are three 
addresses made by Vice President Humphrey 
during his European trip.^ 


White House press release dated April 10 

Remarks by President Johnson 

Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, dis- 
tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen : Mr. 
Vice President, you will see here this morn- 
ing, assembled to greet you, a large part of 
the Government of the United States, as 
well as many of our most distinguished 
private citizens. 

We have with you here the Cabinet, the 
Under Secretaries, the heads of many of the 
most important agencies. We have the 
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and other 
members of the leadership in Congress, as 
well as many of the leading members. 

Their presence here this morning speaks, 
more eloquently than any words of mine, 
of the importance your country attaches to 
the mission that you and your charming wife 
have just completed. 

For more than 2 weeks now you have been 
the authentic voice of America in the coun- 
cil halls of our European allies. 

You have told both the leaders and the 

' For details of the Vice President's itinerary, 
see Department of State press release 66 dated 
Mar. 25. 

peoples of seven friendly nations that Amer- 
ica is still the daughter of Europe and that 
we intend to continue doing our share as we 
pursue our common destinies. 

You have also carried to them, with great 
eloquence and ability, our conviction that 
peace, like freedom, is indivisible. Neither 
the New World of the Americas nor the Old 
World of Europe can ever hope to fulfill 
either its dreams or its ambitions until the 
Ancient World of Asia has become a full 
and equal partner in the forward movement 
of men. 

No one knows better than you, Mr. Vice 
President, that this conviction lies at the 
very roots of American policy in Viet-Nam 
and throughout Asia. I believe that that con- 
viction and that policy are much clearer 
today in the minds of our friends in Europe, 
because you and Mrs. Humphrey were there 
to personally express it to them. 

During these past 2 weeks you have been 
more than America's spokesman: You have 
also been America's eyes and ears. You left 
here bearing an American message to the 
people of Europe; this morning you return 
with Europe's message to the people of 

Within a few hours, I expect to depart on 
a similar mission to our friends in Latin 

Between us, we will then have shared 
within a few weeks a degree of consultation 
and discussion with other nations that is 
unequaled, so far as I can recall, in American 

There is good reason for these consulta- 
tions. I think it was very well expressed dur- 
ing your visit to Europe. 

"The essence of statesmanship," you said, 
"is not a rigid adherence to the past but a 



present and probing concern for the 
future." 2 

We have that concern. 

We hope that others share it. 

We seek their advice and recommenda- 
tions as earnestly as we ask them to con- 
sider ours. 

In all of this, Mr. Vice President and Mrs. 
Humphrey, you have played a profoundly 
important part. You have served as a bridge 
for better understanding — and better under- 
standing among nations, in this nuclear era, 
is really the best hope of mankind. 

Mr. Vice President and Muriel, we wel- 
come you home. We were very proud of you. 
We followed you every step of the way. We 
are so glad to have you back. 

Now you can pick up for the next week 
some of the problems here that I will leave 
with you. 

Remarks by Vice President Humphrey 

Mr. President, Your Excellencies, mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, Mr. Speaker, leaders of 
the Congress, and my fellow Americans: Mr. 
President, I am sure you know, first of all, 
that my heart is filled with appreciation and 
gratitude for the opportunity that you have 
afforded me, because it has been indeed a 
high honor to represent you and our beloved 
country these past 2 weeks in several of the 
nations of Europe. 

But, as you have indicated, it is so good 
to be home once again and to be with fellow 
Americans to continue our efforts in the 
cause of peace and freedom. 

The purpose of my mission was to listen, 
to look, and to learn — and, if called upon, to 
explain. In so doing I was given the oppor- 
tunity to see Europe as it is more than two 
decades after the end of World War II, 20 
years after the inception of the Marshall 
Plan, and 10 years after the signing of the 
Rome treaties. 

I saw a new Western Europe that has 
achieved an unprecedented degree of well- 
being, prosperity, and security and an in- 

' At a luncheon address before the U.S. Chiefs 
of Missions in Europe at Bonn on Mar. 30. 

creased sense of identity and pride. That 
Europe, Mr. President, is testimony to the 
soundness of our policies, past and present, 
and to the genius and industry of the people 
and of the nations of that continent. 

My discussions with European leaders 
covered the Kennedy Round trade negotia- 
tion, which is now entering its final stage, 
discussions toward a nuclear nonprolifera- 
tion treaty, relations between East and West, 
the building of a larger European unity, the 
revitalization of the NATO alliance, the re- 
sponsibility of the rich nations to the poor, 
the need for modernizing our international 
monetary system, and, above all, the 
strengthening of international institutions 
for peace. 

I found the leaders of Western Europe 
ready and eager to join with us in meeting 
these challenges — but as our equal partners. 
I gave them our assurance that a full and 
equal Atlantic partnership, a partnership 
based on true equality, was and continues to 
be the objective of American policy. I as- 
sured them that we welcomed a growing 
sense of "Europeanism" and independence. 
I expressed our confidence that this new as- 
surance and vitality would be directed to- 
ward cooperation internationally as well as 
within Europe's own borders. 

Mr. President, as you have stated on 
several occasions in these past months, we 
are entering a new era in our relations with 
the peoples of Europe. 

We are, in a sense, at the end of the post- 
war period. Now, in this last third of the 
20th century, we are moving forward in a 
period of productive partnership in the West 
and of peaceful engagement with the East. 

There are concerns, yes, and there are 
questions. There is the need for an even 
closer relationship between ourselves and our 
European partners. But there is even more 
a common basis of understanding, an agree- 
ment on fundamental principles, and a will- 
ingness to work together which I believe 
can open the road ahead. 

Twenty years ago the most that any of 
us dared hope for was the revival and re- 
newal of a war-torn continent. 

MAY 1, 1967 


Today, our expectations have been ful- 
filled — and far beyond. I believe that if we 
and our partners can maintain our unity, 
our cohesion, and our common will, the next 
20 years can bring to full realization the 
final healing of Europe's old wounds and 
divisions, the replacement of the Iron Cur- 
tain with an open door, and a chance to meet 
the new priorities of nation-building and 
peaceful development all around the world. 

Mr. President, I shall give you a full re- 
port on my mission. In the meantime, I bring 
back to you and to the American people my 
firm belief that our friends in Europe re- 
main our good friends and that we do have 
reason for optimism. 

While I have this moment, Mr. President, 
may I wish you a very successful and, 
indeed, a most productive voyage to Latin 
America, where the mission that you under- 
take is of the greatest significance. 

It is a high honor and a rare privilege to 
be your partner in these endeavors. 


Berlin House of Representatives, April 6 

Governing Mayor [Heinrich] Albertz, 
distinguished Senators, and Members of the 
House of Representatives, ladies and gentle- 
men: I am honored to speak to you on the 
occasion of this special session of the Berlin 
House of Representatives. I am honored, too, 
to bring to the Members of this House this 
personal message from the President of the 
United States: 

It is a special pleasure to send you, through 
Vice President Humphrey, my owti good wishes and 
those of the American people as you assume your 
new responsibilities. 

More than 5 years ago I had the privilege of 
being with the people of Berlin during a time of 
crisis. Their courage, which won the admiration and 
support of free men everywhere, met the challenge 
of those dark days. Their strength and fortitude 
since then have kept Berlin a free and thriving 
city. All Americans look forward to the time when 
the tragic division of Berlin is ended and Germany 
is once again a united country. 

My countrymen join me in the hope and expecta- 
tion that the future will bring you peace and 

My remarks will be brief. I mean them to 
be direct ?nd to the point. You will remem- 
ber when President Johnson spoke to this 
House. It was a time, for Berlin, of deep 

President Johnson spoke then of the need 
for confidence, for poise, and for faith. And 
he pledged our commitment to the people of 
Berlin. You have shown confidence, poise, 
and faith. And I renew now his pledge. 

Berliners, more than anyone else, know 
the value of commitments that are kept. 

Just as Berliners — with the help of allies 
— have maintained the integrity of their 
city, so are the people of South Viet-Nam — 
with the help of allies — struggling today to 
maintain the integrity of their country. 

And I know that the people of Berlin 
know, as all free peoples know, that our com- 
mitment to freedom in one place is no less 
than our commitment to freedom in another. 

Today Berlin stands stronger than ever 
before. Berlin is strong because her citizens 
have an indestructible spirit. 

Berlin is strong because her men and 
women stand not only together but in 
solidarity with free men and women all over 
the world. 

Berlin is strong because her people look 
not to the past but always to the future. 

This city owes much to one of your mem- 
bers, the former Governing Mayor of this 
city, and my friend, Willy Brandt. Today he 
has joined hands with Chancellor [Kurt] 
Kiesinger to help the new Government of 
the Federal Republic meet new opportuni- 
ties. We in America are impressed by the 
great strides which this German Govern- 
ment has made toward reconciliation with 
the countries of Eastern Europe. And we 
welcome the initiatives now being taken by 
your country so that yesterday's Iron Cur- 
tain may become tomorrow's open door. 

We welcome the movement of people, of 
goods, and of ideas which is today permeat- 
ing societies formerly closed to the outside 



Berlin has the chance to play a large role 
in making: the open door a reality. And I 
know, in a spirit of confidence and hope, 
that you will. For, as your Chancellor said 
only last night, Berlin can be a bridge — an 
open bridge on the path to peace. 

In the center of free Berlin there stands 
today a stark ruin — the skeleton of a church, 
preserved to symbolize eternally the de- 
pravity of war. 

It is our hope that the Iron Curtain may 
one day, too, lie in ruins, its remnants a 
symbol of a time that mercifully ended. 

A great act in the human drama lies at 
hand: Through peaceful engagement in 
Europe we have the chance to shape a com- 
monwealth of progress dedicated not to war 
but to peace, not to doctrinal conflict but to 
constructive reconciliation. 

We have the chance, as President Johnson 
has expressed it,^ to help the people of 
Europe to achieve together: 

— a continent in which the peoples of Eastern 
and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder for 
the common good ; 

— a continent in which alliances do not confront 
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide 
a framework in which West and East can act 
together in order to assure the security of all. 

Berlin is a city that is alive. Berlin is a 
city moving forward. Berlin will always be 
a great city. And, if we stand together, one 
day Berlin will once more be the capital of 
a reunited Germany in a safe and peaceful 

North Atlantic Council, Paris, April 7 

Mr. Chairman and members of the North 
Atlantic Council: This organization — this 
NATO — has been so close to the heart of my 
country's foreign policy for so long that it is 
a part of our everyday vocabulary, one of 
our assumptions about national commitment 
that almost everyone takes for granted. 

We look upon NATO's success as an estab- 
lished fact of contemporary life. Its strength 

^ For an advance text of President Johnson's 
address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

is a matter of high priority in our nation's 

It has survived both external and internal 
crises and we have come to assume that this 
is a hardened habit. 

Even when we indulge in the periodic 
luxury of disagreement among ourselves, 
our disagreements do not run to the merits 
of NATO but rather to the best or more 
effective or most economical way to keep it 
in business for the long term. 

Even when we are committed in other 
parts of the world, it simply does not occur 
to us that the way to pursue our purposes in 
other areas is to abandon our purposes in 
the Atlantic and European area. 

But to accept NATO as a constant in our 
foreign policy is not to assume that its tasks, 
its opportunities, and its form of organiza- 
tion must remain fixed from decade to 

This organization came into being after 
the historic decision of Stalin to go it alone 
in the postwar world and to use the threat of 
Soviet armed force and to expand westward. 

NATO first blunted, then contained, that 
outward thrust into Europe. The threat from 
the East is not gone, but it has moderated. 
It has moderated to a large degree because 
we have held together. And the passage of 
time, the increasing material well-being of 
Soviet society, the growing flexibility of the 
Soviet economy, the moderating experience 
of dealing with other nations, are leading 
to modifications within the once-monolithic 
Soviet bloc. 

Just as Western Europe has changed, so 
have the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
New conditions require a new response. 

We will need to find our way to a resolu- 
tion of those fundamental European issues 
which, so long as they remain unresolved, 
will prevent true security and the reconcilia- 
tion of East and West which we all seek. 

When the Marshall Plan followed the pro- 
gram of defense aid to Greece and Turkey, 
President Truman described it as the "other 
half of the walnut." 

My point here is that our goal in the years 

MAY 1, 1967 


ahead is to add the other half of the walnut 
to the half we already have — by matching 
deterrence with peaceful engagement. 

If we are to be successful, we must stand 
together in this new period just as firmly as 
we did at the height of the cold war. 

We have not surmounted three crises over 
Berlin in an atmosphere of protracted ten- 
sion to lose now, in a moment of relaxation, 
what we then dared to stand for and sus- 
tain. And despite the limitations of what we 
can do to encourage the tides of change in 
relations between East and West, much re- 
mains that we can do. 

We are all aware of the quickening tempo 
of East^West contacts. Your own compila- 
tions here show more than half a hundred 
significant political contacts between East- 
ern and Western governments last year; 
many of them involved ministers and chiefs 
of government. 

For my part, I found this two-way traffic 
significant enough to refer to the prospect 
for an open door between East and West 
when I spoke last month at Fulton, Missouri, 
on the 21st anniversary of Winston Church- 
ill's Iron Curtain speech.^ 

The increasing exchange of people, official 
and unofficial, is matched by an increasing 
exchange of goods and services as each of 
our countries has tried to expand its volume 
of trade and tourism with the East. This, 
too, is hopeful. Indeed, we expect to engage 
more vigorously in this trade ourselves in 
the months and years ahead. 

You are aware of the various steps — a 
commercial air agreement, a consular treaty, 
export credit guarantees to some of the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe, a proposed East- 
West trade bill, and other proposals — which 
my Government has made or hopes to make 
to help thaw the ice in the East. 

And, of course, we are all expectantly 
aware that in recent times the Soviet leaders 
have been gradually more open to the idea 

■* For Vice President Humphrey's address on Mar. 
5, see ibid., Mar. 27, 1967, p. 486. 

of entering into negotiations — more inter- 
ested in talking seriously about possible 
agreements, less unreasonable in formulat- 
ing their positions, and less dogmatic in put- 
ting them forth. 

This beginning of thaw is reflected in the 
foreign policy and, I suppose, the domestic 
policies of every nation represented at this 

We have a way of safeguarding and har- 
monizing our interests as the traffic quickens 
through the open door. 

It is by consultation through this Council. 

Our task around this table will be to de- 
sign the other half of the walnut — by stimu- 
lating, guiding, and monitoring the process 
of movement together. 

In the words of President Johnson last 
October 7: "The alliance must become a 
forum for increasingly close consultations. 
These should cover the full range of joint 
concerns — from East^West relations to 
crisis management." 

He meant just what he said, and our rep- 
resentatives in NATO are instructed to live 
by this policy. 

In sum then, my Government believes that 
we have to maintain a credible NATO de- 

If we do, there will be more and more op- 
portunities to work constructively on East- 
West relations, because NATO will continue 
to prove the futility of aggressive behavior 
in Europe. 

But as we have managed together the busi- 
ness of deterrence, we must manage together 
the even more complex business of making a 
durable peace in Europe. Our presence in the 
midst of the alliance bears witness to our 
firm commitment to act as faithful partners 
of our allies. 

And if we follow the Golden Rule — that 
each of us consult as soon, as often, and as 
frankly as he would wish the other to con- 
sult — the alliance will prove to be the mid- 
wife of more helpful times. 

Mr. Chairman, my countrymen can never 
lose interest in the peace and security and 



well-being of Europe for historical reasons 
that are too obvious to need recalling here. 

We have felt since the end of the last 
war that the security of Berlin, the 
security of Germany, the security of Eu- 
rope, the security of the North Atlantic 
and Canada, and of the United States itself, 
are all one and the same thing — a common 
concern, the common expression of which is 
NATO. And we still think so. 

In these years we have together prevented 
war and given protection against aggres- 

Now, on the threshold of a new period, we 
must move together beyond defense to the 
business of peace and peaceful progress. 

We face, perhaps, the opportunity of our 
century. And if we stand together now as 
in the past, we shall have success. 

OECD Council, Paris, April 7 

This year we mark the anniversary of two 
decades of cooperation between America and 
Europe in the cause of reconstruction and 
economic progress. 

These have been years of accomplishments 
unprecedented in character and scope. 

The member countries of the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] have had the longest period 
of uninterrupted economic growth in the 
modern era. That growth has been far be- 
yond our expectations, and its benefits have 
been widely distributed among our peoples. 
International trade has flourished. Goods and 
capital have moved across the borders at 
high and rising levels. 

This exchange has taken place within a 
system of monetary arrangements which, 
whatever its shortcomings and strains, has 
worked. We have had no competitive devalu- 
ations, no major dislocations, no depressions. 
We have, in short, been phenomenally suc- 
cessful in dealing with our common economic 

Perhaps even more noteworthy, when seen 
in the perspective of history, we have to- 
gether embarked on a deliberate and sus- 

tained effort, involving the transfer of re- 
sources and skills on a substantial scale, to 
improve the lot of those hundreds of millions 
of human beings in other parts of the world 
less fortunate than our own. 

It is not possible now to allocate credit 
for these achievements very exactly among 
the several international organizations that 
have contributed to them. When a balance is 
finally struck, however, the work of this 
organization and its predecessor, the OEEC 
[Organization for European Economic Coop- 
eration] , will have to be given great weight. 

And without waiting for the historian's 
verdict, Mr. Secretary General, I believe that 
in this 20th anniversary year of Secretary 
Marshall's Harvard speech, we are justified 
in looking with great pride at what the orga- 
nization has accomplished. 

But it is a part of the human condition 
that we are never lacking for unsolved prob- 
lems and for new tasks. 

The OECD has been at the center of the 
process of economic change and development 
ever since its founding. Its influence and the 
actions of its member nations must be di- 
rected to a host of problems still with us. 

First, because the deadline is directly upon 
us, is the Kennedy Round. 

Trade has been the great growth industry 
of the postwar years. 

Trade of the OECD countries with the 
world has tripled since 1948, while produc- 
tion was doubling. 

A great design for further reducing bar- 
riers to trade is now being painfully worked 
out at Geneva. It must succeed for both the 
industrial and agricultural sectors if this 
remarkable growth is to continue. 

The Kennedy Round will be decided in a 
matter of weeks. The period in which we 
need to come to basic agreement on reform 
and improvement of the international mone- 
tary system can be measured in months. 

This is an area where agreement is neces- 
sary, not to enable the United States to solve 
its balance-of-payments problems but rather 
to assure that the international economy has 

MAY 1, 1967 


the monetary underpinning for the expan- 
sion of output and trade and, in the end, wel- 
fare that our peoples properly expect. 

Another great and unfinished task con- 
fronting us is the bridging of the division 
between Eastern and Western Europe. This 
is a major objective of my own Government. 

We are encouraged at seeing that the proc- 
ess, however slow, is underway. 

I know that you, Mr. Secretary General, 
have been charged with considering, along 
with the permanent representatives here, 
ways and means through which the OECD 
can widen the range of East-West economic 
relations. The United States does not expect 
miracles out of this process. But we wish you 
and the OECD every success in finding the 
means to fruitful contact with the East. 

In recent months, a new coinage has en- 
tered the intellectual currency of this orga- 
nization. The phrase "technological gap" has 
come to stand for a whole complex of ideas, 
apprehensions, and even some misconcep- 

The underlying idea is that there is an im- 
portant disparity in the level of technology 
achieved by the United States in comparison 
with other members of the OECD. 

The apprehension is that by virtue of our 
size and wealth and the emphasis we place 
on research and development, this disparity 
will increase. That there may be some ele- 
ments of misconception here is suggested by 
the fact that over the past 15 years, the eco- 
nomic growth of Western Europe and Japan 
has outpaced that of the United States. 

In point of fact, there are no technological 
monopolies in the world today. Technology 
flows readily and freely through the normal 
channels of trade and investment. 

If technological advance occurs more 
rapidly in the United States than elsewhere, 
the explanation must be sought in educa- 
tional, organizational, and economic factors. 

And if there is a relative lack of techno- 
logical innovation in other countries of this 
organization, I believe that it is these factors 

that must be considered and dealt with. 

President Johnson, some months ago, es- 
tablished a high-level committee, chaired by 
his Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, to 
examine the technological gap and to make 
appropriate recommendations for dealing 
with it. We are taking a full part, of course, 
in the study that is underway in the OECD. 
We expect that the OECD investigation will 
not only help to determine the dimensions of 
the problem but will also provide guideposts 
to the cooperative actions which may con- 
tribute to its solution. 

And we stand ready to be forthcoming in 
helping our partners in their technological 

As we learn more of the technological 
revolution, we must use its potential jointly 
for the common good. 

As I have said elsewhere, we need to find 
ways to insure a continuous exchange of 
technological and organizational experience 
among the members of this organization and 
perhaps to expand it some day to include 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

The most threatening and intractable 
problem confronting members of this orga- 
nization, Mr. Secretary General, is repre- 
sented by the chasm separating the affluent 
society of a few hundred million peoples 
represented at this table from that other 
society which includes the largest part of the 
human race. 

That other society is populated by people 
living on the ragged edge of poverty, never 
free of want, who now — in many areas — 
face the threat of famine on a catastrophic 

It is to the lasting credit of the OECD 
that from its inception it has recognized this 
problem and tried to do something about it. 

There is a growing recognition that the 
gap between the affluent and the poor na- 
tions is the primordial problem of our times. 

It is at once massive, stubborn, and urgent. 

It is understandable in simple terms of 
human morality. 



But it can be solved only by the most 
imaginative and far-reaching measures, in- 
volving all of our countries in a cooperative 
effort that must be sustained for years. 

A few days ago, Pope Paul VI treated this 
subject in an encyclical that will surely take 
its place among the great documents of our 

He set forth the problem in terms which 
speak both to the mind and to the heart. 

He described entire continents where 
countless men and women suffer hunger 
and where, because of malnutrition, children 
never attain their proper physical and men- 
tal development. 

He pointed out the pressing duty of the 
developed countries to help and urged that 
they should consider such aid as a normal 
and proper charge on their resources. 

He prescribed the measures needed in 
terms so appropriate to the OECD that I can 
do no better than to repeat them. 

If these efforts are to attain their full effective- 
ness, they cannot remain scattered and isolated; 
less still can they compete for reasons of prestige 
or power; the situation demands planned and 
coordinated programs. A program is in fact more 
than, and better than, single acts of assistance 
dependent on individual expressions of good will. 
It involves . . . thorough studies, a fixing of objec- 
tives, a determination of means, and a consolida- 
tion of efforts, to respond to present needs and 
predictable requirements. 

The OECD has made a beginning on this 
path. And it is even now grappling with the 
most urgent and the most harrowing aspect 
of the development problem: how to feed 
the world's teeming millions. 

I had the privilege of addressing the mem- 
bers of the Development Assistance Com- 
mittee of the organization when they met in 
Washington last summer.^ I said then that 
we in the DAC would have to answer two 
key questions: How much help is needed? 
How can our countries best work together in 
providing that help ? 

I said our study should look not just to pil- 

• Ibid., Aug. 8, 1967, p. 202. 

ing up data but should look to action — action 
directed toward a clear and feasible goal: 
the eradication of large-scale famine and 

Within the past few weeks the DAC has 
published documents which seem likely to 
contribute significantly to answering the 
two questions I posed. Next week, I am told, 
competent officials from the member coun- 
tries of the Committee will meet here to con- 
sider these documents. 

It is both the hope and the expectation of 
my Government that from these delibera- 
tions will emerge the outlines of actions to 
cope decisively with the threatening catas- 
trophe that we simply cannot accept: the 
tragedy of starvation in a world of grow- 
ing affluence. Hunger is the immediate prob- 

But, as we all know, our plans must ex- 
tend much farther. 

Together with the developing nations we 
must concert measures that will increase per 
capita growth at a rate which will reduce the 
enormous disparity between their world and 

A few months ago, Mr. George Woods, the 
president of the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development, gave a very 
thoughtful speech to the Economic and 
Social Council. In his remarks he called for 
review at high political levels of the state of 
development aid in relation to the needs. He 
suggested that careful staff preparation 
would be a necessary preliminary to any 
such review. 

It seems to me that the OECD has an im- 
portant contribution to make to this kind of 
preparation. Its work ought to be even more 
specifically addressed to obstacles to eco- 
nomic growth in the developing countries 
and to the specific measures that the rich 
countries can make toward accelerating that 

For, as Pope Paul said, if development is 
the new name of peace, who would not wish 
to work at this task with all his strength? 

MAY 1, 1967 


NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
Holds First Ministers Meeting 

The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear 
Planning Group at the ministerial level was 
held April 6-7 at Washington. Following is 
a statement concerning the meeting made 
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa- 
mara at his news conference on April 3, 
together with the text of a communique re- 
leased by the NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group at the close of the meeting on April 7. 


On Thursday and Friday of this week 
[April 6-7] I shall be meeting in Washing- 
ton with the defense ministers of Canada, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom; and the Secretary 
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- 
nization. These ministers comprise the new 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group which, 
together with the Nuclear Defense Affairs 
Committee, was established as a permanent 
body by the North Atlantic Council last De- 
cember to advise it on matters of nuclear 

I am especially pleased to be the host for 
this meeting. It represents, I believe, a sig- 
nificant new approach and achievement after 
more than a decade of persistent endeavor 
by many individuals and by many nations to 
bring all members of the alliance into fuller 
partnership in the planning of nuclear 
strategy. It is a milestone in the history of 

The personal participation of the seven 
defense ministers in the Nuclear Planning 
Group reflects the new intimate involvement 
of nationally responsible government lead- 
ers in NATO planning activities. Such active 
participation by top defense authorities is 
essential to assure realism in our work and 
the vigorous support of the member govern- 

' For text of a final communique released at the 
close of the North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting on Dec. 16, 1966, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 
1967, p. 49. 

ments in carrying out NATO plans. It is, I 
believe, largely responsible for the great 
progress we have made in nuclear planning 
in the past 2 years. 

The foundation of the security of the alli- 
ance is nuclear power. Thus, it is only 
natural that the nonnuclear members of the 
alliance have always felt a need to be in- 
formed about nuclear matters and to par- 
ticipate in nuclear planning. They have been 
uncertain of their role. They believed, and 
rightly so, that they should have a greater 
voice in assessing the nuclear threat to the 
alliance, in determining the nuclear forces 
required to meet that threat, and in working 
out how and under what conditions these 
nuclear forces would be employed. 

For more than 10 years the NATO nations 
have struggled with the problem of how to 
better integrate the nuclear and nonnuclear 
powers on nuclear matters and have consid- 
ered many recommendations and proposals. 

These efforts include: 

1. A proposal in 1960 that the United 
States sell or assist in the European produc- 
tion of Polaris missiles to be deployed under 
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe] . 

2. Another suggestion in 1960 to create a 
multilateral atomic authority which would 
have made NATO "a fourth atomic power." 

3. An additional proposal in 1960 for a 
NATO medium range ballistic missile 
(MRBM) force involving Polaris submarines 
and missile-carrying surface ships, with 
multilateral ownership, financing, and con- 
trol and "mixed manning to the extent opera- 
tionally feasible." 

4. A proposal in 1961 for a NATO sea- 
borne force. 

5. A suggestion in 1963 for an inter- 
Allied nuclear force to include U.K. V- 
bombers, Polaris submarines, and other 
nuclear elements. 

6. A proposal in 1963 for a multilateral 
nuclear force comprising Polaris submarines 
provided by the United Kingdom, United 
States forces, and possibly mixed-manned 

7. A proposal in 1964 for an Atlantic 



nuclear force of British V-bombers, British 
Polaris sii,bmarines, U.S. Polaris boats, and 
other elements. 

8. Suggestions in the early 1960's that 
mobile medium range ballistic missiles 
(MMRBM) might be deployed in Euroi^e on 
railroad cars or truck-drawn trailers. 

It has only been in the last year and a half 
that substantial progress in expanding the 
role of the nonnuclear powers in nuclear 
affairs has been accomplished. 

The meeting this week stems from a pro- 
posal by the United States to the NATO de- 
fense ministers in June 1965 for consultation 
by a small group of the ministers about the 
problems of nuclear planning. As a result, 
a Special Committee of Defense Ministers 
met in Paris in November 1965. It set up the 
Nuclear Planning Working Group composed 
of five NATO defense ministers. This ad hoc 
group met four times in 1966: in Washing- 
ton, London, Paris, and Rome. It reviewed 
and discussed the strategic and tactical 
nuclear resources of the alliance, the poten- 
tial circumstances and consequences of their 
use, and the way in which the alliance should 
organize to carry on future discussion of 
these subjects. 

These were by far the most substantive 
and effective discussions on nuclear matters 
ever attempted between NATO's nuclear and 
nonnuclear powers. For example, one of my 
colleagues stated in February that there had 
been more progress on NATO nuclear prob- 
lems during the past 12 months than in the 
preceding 17 years. 

The Working Group recommended that a 
permanent organization be created to carry 
on this work, and the Nuclear Defense 
Affairs Committee, open to all NATO coun- 
tries, and the Nuclear Planning Group were 
established by the foreign and defense min- 
isters during the meeting of the North Atlan- 
tic Council last December. 

At this week's meeting, the Nuclear Plan- 
ning Group will continue to examine NATO 
nuclear strength in all of its aspects, includ- 
ing plans for the development, production, 
and use of strategic and tactical weapons sys- 
tems. In addition, we shall discuss the recent 

steps taken by the Soviet Union to deploy an 
anti-ballistic-missile system, as well as the 
status of the U.S. ABM program. We shall 
also discuss the effort being made by this 
country to persuade the Soviet Union to join 
with us in holding down the spiraling of a 
fruitless arms race. 

Again, I want to emphasize the signifi- 
cance of this meeting. It is without question 
one of the most important and far-reaching 
steps of the last decade in the evolution of 


The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, composed 
of Ministers of Defense of seven NATO countries, 
adjourned today after a two-day conference in 
Washington. Attending the first meeting of the 
Nuclear Planning Group were Paul Hellyer, Can- 
ada; Gerhard Schroeder, Germany; Roberto Tremel- 
loni, Italy; Willem den Toom, Netherlands; Ahmet 
Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom; 
and Robert S. McNamara, United States. NATO 
Secretary-General Manlio Brosio was chairman. 

The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. 
Robert S. McNamara, led a discussion of the stra- 
tegic nuclear forces of the Alliance and anti-bal- 
listic missile defense. The Ministers reviewed the 
changes which have occurred in the strategic 
nuclear threat facing the Alliance since the meet- 
ing of the Nuclear Planning Working Group in 
February 1966, and the means and plans available 
to counter that threat. They concluded that the 
size of existing strategic nuclear forces and the 
plans for employing them are adequate to the need. 
They discussed the technical, strategic and finan- 
cial aspects of ballistic missile defense including 
both the Soviet deployments and the U.S. R&D 
program, and agreed to keep this subject under 
review. The Ministers also received a report from 
Secretary McNamara on the current status of dis- 
cussions initiated by the U.S. with the Soviet Gov- 
ernment to explore ways of preventing a further 
spiraling of the arms race. The Ministers noted 
that the U.S. Government intends to keep its allies 
fully advised as these discussions progress. 

The United Kingdom Secretary of State for De- 
fense, Mr. Denis Healey, led a discussion of tactical 
nuclear forces. The Ministers agreed that the num- 
ber of tactical nuclear weapons available to the 
Allied Commanders in Europe and the Atlantic are 
adequate but that the appropriate distribution of 
types of weapons should be kept under continuous 
review. They also agreed to initiate a number of 
specific studies to help in clarifying important ques- 
tions related to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. 

MAY 1, 1967 


Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu, the Minister of Defense 
of Turkey, led a discussion of atomic demolition 
munitions and considerations related to the possible 
use of these weapons in the defense of the treaty 
area. The Ministers agreed to conduct further 
studies on this subject. 

Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, led a discussion 
on the role of host countries in Allied arrangements 
for the planning and use of nuclear weapons. 

The Ministers noted that the Nuclear Planning 
Group itself as well as the Military Committee of 
the Alliance offer the opportunity for national 
governments to exert a direct influence on nu- 
clear planning in the Alliance through their senior 
political and military authorities. They will conduct 
further detailed studies on specific aspects of this 
question and will continue their discussion at the 
next Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning 

The Ministers set a work program for the fu- 
ture and agreed to meet again in Ankara in Sep- 
tember 1967. 

The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the 
permanent structure established by the North At- 
lantic Council at its Ministerial Meeting in Paris 
in December 1966. At that time, the Council estab- 
lished the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open 
to all NATO countries, to advise the Council on 
nuclear policy. At the same time the seven-nation 
Nuclear Planning Group was created to handle the 
detailed work of the Nuclear Defense Affairs 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Singapore, Wong Lin Ken, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Johnson 
on April 7. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated April 7. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Bwenzani 
Banda, presented his credentials to President 
Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Am- 

bassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated April 7. 

U.S. Decides Not To Resume 
Arms Aid to India and Pakistan 

Department Statement * 

The Department of State announced on 
April 12 that the Government has concluded 
an extensive review of policy with regard to 
the provision of military equipment to India 
and Pakistan and has decided that the 
United States will not resume grant military 
assistance, which has been suspended since 
September 1965. 

The United States is, therefore, closing 
the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group 
in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply 
Mission in India. This process is expected to 
be completed by July 1, 1967, in both cases. 

The U.S. Government has also decided to 
remove its present restrictions on the kinds 
of spare parts which may be sold to India 
and Pakistan for previously supplied equip- 
ment. Henceforth, the Government will be 
prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis 
all requests for export permits covering the 
cash purchase of spare parts. 

The United States will continue to keep its 
military sales policy under careful review to 
insure that it is not contributing to an arms 
race between India and Pakistan. The 
United States strongly hopes that both coun- 
tries will make progress in resolving the 
problems and differences that divide them 
and that they will accord an increasing pri- 
ority in the allocations of their resources to 
agricultural and industrial development. 

' Read to news correspondents by the Department 
spokesman on Apr. 12. 



China, the United Nations, and the United States 

by David H. Popper 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ' 

We must, I think, approax;h the problem of 
United States policy regarding the repre- 
sentation of China in the United Nations in 
the perspective of history. In this perspective 
it quickly becomes clear that it is an over- 
simplification to regard Chinese-American 
relations as habitually or necessarily antago- 
nistic. Indeed, looking backward one is 
struck by the long-continued interest of the 
United States in the development of China 
and in the close ties which have typically 
existed between the Chinese and the Amer- 
ican peoples. 

For almost 150 years there have been 
Americans who were passionately interested 
in China. The earliest basis of interest was 
economic: Students of American history 
know how important the China trade was to 
the seafarers of New England and the mid- 
Atlantic. In visiting collections of early 19th- 
century Americana — for example, at the 
Winterthur Museum near Wilmington, Dela- 
ware — one is struck by the amount of mag- 
nificent Chinese furniture, tableware, and 
fabrics then to be found in the finer Ameri- 
can homes. 

At a later stage, when European coun- 
tries were engaged in carving out conces- 
sions in a China which seemed to be falling 
apart, the United States played an active 
role in seeking equality of commercial op- 
portunity for all in China. Americans bene- 
fited as a result from concessions exacted 

' Address made before the public affairs fellows 
of the Brookings Institution at Washington, D.C., 
on Mar. 28. 

by others, but the fact is that Americans 
were not in the forefront in inflicting the 
colonial indignities to which China was sub- 
jected as the 19th century drew to its close. 

Our national interest in the period of the 
20th-century World Wars tended on the 
whole to bolster Chinese independence. We 
reacted strongly, though as it turned out not 
strongly enough, to the Japanese invasion 
of Manchuria in 1931, which perhaps began 
the melancholy train of events leading to 
Pearl Harbor. And we collaborated very 
actively indeed with the Chinese Nationalist 
Government in fighting the Japanese during 
World War II. 

Through all this period, in increasing 
measure, American educators, missionaries, 
and traders were at work in China. There 
was, I think, a rather unique bond between 
the two countries. "Old China hands" 
formed a very special group of commitment 
and expertise, and they had a strong influ- 
ence on American policy. 

It was not surprising, therefore, that in 
drafting the United Nations Charter the 
United States insisted that China should be 
one of the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council. We should 
not overlook the fact that this decision repre- 
sented something of an innovation. A non- 
European state was included in the inner 
circle of nations possessing major respon- 
sibiUty in the U.N. for maintaining interna- 
tional peace and security. Japan had attained 
permanent membership in the League of 
Nations Council, but this was a far less 

MAY 1, 1967 


significant body than the U.N. Security 

Unhappily, China was not able to turn to 
the task of peaceful development at the end 
of the Second World War. Years of strife — 
invasion by foreign foes and civil conflict at 
home — had drained China of its wealth, rid- 
dled its human resources, and destroyed its 
internal stability. The Chinese Communists 
were able to exploit this situation to seize 
power in large areas of the country. Strenu- 
ous efi'orts were made by the United States 
to help the Chinese to form an overall coali- 
tion government which would restore peace. 
These efforts unfortunately failed, and in 
1949 victorious Communist armies forced 
the legitimate government of China and a 
million of its supporters to take refuge on 
the island of Taiwan, where the Government 
of the Republic of China is located today. 

The establishment of the Chinese Commu- 
nist regime throughout mainland China 
while the legitimate government of China 
continued in existence on Taiwan presented 
the U.N. with a serious political and legal 
problem. The government — indeed the very 
personalities — associated with the original 
Chinese assumption of membership in the 
United Nations still exercised the functions 
of government in an area they controlled. 
The de facto control of the Chinese Com- 
munists on the mainland could not be denied; 
but in 1949-50 it could hardly be said that 
enough time had elapsed to draw any con- 
clusions as to how much support that regime 
had in mainland China or how firmly it 
would become established. 

Aggression Against the U.N. in Korea 

Then, as the statesmen and lawyers 
wrestled with this problem. North Korean 
forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded 
the free territory of the Republic of Korea 
in June 1950. In the events which followed. 
Communist Chinese forces became massively 
involved in the aggression. It was not only an 
active aggression against the Republic of 
Korea; it was an aggression against the 


United Nations itself. And the United Na- 
tions, in a historic resolution of the General 
Assembly, directly condemned the Chinese 
Communists for participating in the aggres- 
sion against the U.N. The actual language 
of one paragraph of that resolution, adopted 
on February 1, 1951, reads as follows: 

The General Assembly ... ji 

Finch that the Central People's Government of ' 
the People's Republic of China, by giving direct 
aid and assistance to those who were already 
committing aggression in Korea and by engaging 
in hostilities against United Nations forces there, 
has itself engaged in aggression in Korea. 

This put the problem of Chinese represen- 
tation in a new and difi'erent perspective. It 
was now complicated by the fact that from 
the United Nations standpoint the Chinese 
Communists had, as it were, the status of an 
outlaw. To most U.N. members, including the 
United States, it seemed at the time quite 
inappropriate to regard the Chinese Com- 
munist regime as qualified in political terms 
to be represented in the halls of the United 
Nations, which it directly defied by armed 

Legally speaking, we were not talking at 
this stage about the admission of a new 
member to the organization but about the 
narrower question of who should sit in the 
seats reserved for China in the U.N. Yet by 
analogy, the question of qualifications for 
U.N. membership necessarily came to the 
forefront. The U.N. Charter provides that 
U.N. membership is open to "peace- 
loving states" which accept the obligations 
contained in the U.N. Charter and which, in 
the judgment of the organization, are able 
and willing to carry out these obligations. 
As long as Communist China defied the pro- 
visions of the U.N. Charter having to do 
with the maintaining of international peace 
and security, as long as it persisted in de- 
fending and justifying its acts of aggression 
in Korea, as long as it would not undertake 
to measure up to the standards to which all 
United Nations members subscribe, it did 
not seem to most U.N. members that Com- 


munist China could properly be seated in 
the U.N. 

The Korea episode has not been liquidated 
to this day, though relatively stable condi- 
tions exist along the 38th parallel. Yet, on 
top of the Korean experience, the U.N. has 
observed one manifestation after another of 
resort to aggressive force by the Chinese 
Communist regime. The Chinese Communists 
used force to subdue Tibet. In two military 
episodes the Chinese Communists overran 
the frontiers of India. They endeavored to 
force their way into control of the offshore 
islands which remained under the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of China. 

Reaction to Communist Chinese Extremism 

Nor were Chinese Communist efforts lim- 
ited to the immediate borders under their 
control. Representing the most extreme wing 
of Communist doctrine, the Chinese Commu- 
nists embarked on subversive activities in 
widely scattered areas, both in Asia and on 
other continents. Communists plotted to seize 
control in Malaya and later Indonesia. Chi- 
nese Communist support for subversion 
turned up in Africa. And Chinese Commu- 
nist logistic and ideological support is a very 
appreciable factor in sustaining North Viet- 
Nam's aggression against South Viet-Nam. 

In the end, Communist Chinese extremism 
has succeeded in alarming or offending al- 
most everyone. You cannot, after all, preach 
a doctrine of permanent revolution without 
antagonizing governments and people who 
feel that they have already passed through 
their national revolutions. Even the Com- 
munist associates of Peking have found it 
impossible — save only Albania, Peking's 
ever-faithful spokesman — to maintain close 
and friendly relations with the Chinese 
Communists. And now, in recent months, we 
have observed astounding political convul- 
sions within China itself. 

This, then, is the background against 
which the problem of Chinese representation 
in the United Nations has been considered 
from year to year. It helps to explain why 

the Chinese Communists have never attained 
representation in the United Nations despite 
the admitted fact that they hold under their 
control so large a population and so great an 
area of the earth's surface. 

Let me say a few words now regarding 
efforts to obtain Chinese Communist partici- 
pation in the U.N. 

Originally these efforts were spearheaded 
by the then great and good friend of the 
Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union. In- 
deed, at the beginning of 1950 the Soviet 
Union sought unsuccessfully to challenge the 
credentials of the Republic of China in the 
U.N. Security Council. The Soviets actually 
walked out of the Council temporarily when 
they were defeated on this issue — ironically, 
thereby enabling the Security Council to act 
with great dispatch when the Republic of 
Korea was invaded in June of that year. 

Since the Council is a continuing body, 
credentials are not periodically resubmitted 
as they are at the annual sessions of the U.N. 
General Assembly, and thus the issue has not 
recently arisen in the Security Council. It 
is worth remembering, however, that what 
would be at stake if it were would be more 
than a simple question of whether the Chi- 
nese representatives' credentials were in 
good form. A political issue of first-rank im- 
portance would be involved, and only the 
Security Council could make the determina- 

In the U.N. General Assembly, the Chinese 
representation question has been taken up 
from year to year, always with the same re- 
sult. For many years the Assembly adopted 
a so-called "moratorium" resolution in which 
the Assembly simply decided to take no ac- 
tion on proposals to change the representa- 
tion of China. More recently, the direct issue 
of choice has been debated at length and put 
to the vote. As a matter of procedure, the 
Assembly has decided that any change in 
Chinese representation is an important po- 
litical matter which, pursuant to the charter, 
requires a two-thirds majority in the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

MAY 1, 1967 


Actually, proposals for a change have 
never attained even a simple majority. There 
was a hair-trig-ger tie vote in 1965 ^ (a two- 
thirds majority being required for action), 
but the balance in 1966 swung against the 
Chinese Communists by 11 votes. And the 
decisions taken at the General Assembly 
have been applied throughout the U.N. sys- 
tem of specialized agencies in the economic 
and social field. 

Chinese Communist Attitude Toward U.N. 

What are the reasons for this rare uni- 
formity of action ? Why is it that, in literally 
hundreds of decisions taken in the most 
diverse U.N. bodies over a period of 17 years 
during which the number of U.N. members 
has doubled, the results have always — with 
only one minor and temporary exception — 
been the same ? 

The answer cannot, I suggest, be reduced 
to the oversimplification that United States 
pressure has dragooned U.N. majorities into 
voting against their own convictions year 
after year. Certainly we have made our 
views known. Those holding different views 
have done the same. But we have made our 
views known on many other questions as 
well, with a less successful batting average 
than this. And be it noted, the cleavage on 
this subject splits the NATO allies, splits 
Asia, and splits Africa. 

It seems more reasonable to believe that 
the facts bearing on the problem are the de- 
cisive element in the situation. This must be 
so, by the very nature of the case. For the 
entire thrust of the philosophy of the U.N. 
tends toward universality of participation; 
other things being equal, universality should 
enable the organization to function with 
maximum effectiveness. 

But this does not mean that the members 
of the United Nations are willing to pay any 
price whatever to attain that goal. There are 
limits which they have not hitherto been will- 
ing to disregard. 

The fact is that the Communist Chinese 

2 For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 13, 1965, 
p. 940. 

leaders have not been willing, to date, to take 
any step which would indicate that they 
value participation in the United Nations 
system or that they particularly desire to 

First, they have never renounced the doc- 
trine of the unfettered use of force in inter- 
national affairs which they have advocated 
and pursued since they gained power. All 
around them, their nearby neighbors fear 
that they may be attacked. 

Second, they persist in supporting sub- 
versive activities in other countries, boasting 
of their intention to foment "peoples wars" 
or "wars of liberation" in a kind of perma- 
nent wave of revolution. The effects are far 
reaching, as our involvement in Viet-Nam 
amply demonstrates. And the Maoist doc- 
trine and mystique are unmatched in the 
advocacy of violence. 

It will be argued that some states which 
are at present members of the U.N. are also 
less than completely committed to U.N. 
Charter objectives. We may admit that this 
is true and that unfortunately not every U.N. 
member observes standards of conduct which 
in our eyes would represent full compliance 
with the charter. But none has a record 
which stands comparison with that of the 
Chinese Communists. I am reminded of the 
recent report of the President's Commis- 
sion on Law Enforcement, which cites a sur- 
vey indicating that 91 percent of those ques- 
tioned admitted that they had at some time 
committed some act punishable by law. We 
do not on that account treat criminal ele- 
ments as if they were ordinary men. 

A third point impeding the Chinese Com- 
munist cause in the United Nations is the 
constant shrill, incredible campaign of 
abuse and vilification of the organization and 
its Secretary-General which spews forth 
from Chinese Communist sources. 

A fourth point is the array of conditions 
put forward by the Chinese Communists for 
their entry. Seeking to stand history on its 
head, the Communists in 1965 demanded 
that the United Nations rescind its resolu- 
tion condemning them for aggression in 
Korea, brand the United States as the ag- 



gressor in that case, reorganize the United 
Nations in a fashion more to their liking, 
and expel states they regard as imperialist 
puppets while admitting others they consider 
qualified. How serious these demands are one 
cannot know, but they certainly give sub- 
stance to the view that the Chinese Commu- 
nists are intent on isolating themselves. 

Fifth, and in the long run perhaps 
most important, the Chinese Communists in- 
sist as a condition of participation that the 
United Nations expel the Government of the 
Republic of China and leave Peking a free 
hand to take over the people and territory 
of Taiwan. This is a condition that the 
United States could not accept. The Rei)ublic 
of China on Taiwan with its population of 
131/2 million is larger than more than 80 
other U.N. members. Its record in sustain- 
ing the principles and the work of the orga- 
nization bears comparison with that of any 
member. We are not prepared to repudiate 
our commitments to the Republic of China 
— nor will other U.N. members do so. 

This, then, is the record of the Chinese 
Communist problem in the United Nations in 
the past. Must we assume that the position 
will persist unchanged in the future? 

No one can answer that question today — if 
only because no one can predict the outcome 
of the extraordinary political drama now 
gripping mainland China. 

Yet, very few elements in international 
affairs are immutable. Changes are bound to 
occur in China, in other states, and in the 
United Nations. What bearing they will have 
on the problem as we see it today is obscure. 

The "Study Committee" Proposal 

One new and interesting element ap- 
peared in the consideration of the Chinese 
representation problem at the 21st General 
Assembly session last fall. 

A number of Western governments — Bel- 
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Trini- 
dad and Tobago — introduced a resolution * 
proposing the establishment of a committee 
to explore and study the Chinese repre- 

sentation situation in all its aspects in order 
to make recommendations to the 1967 session 
for an equitable and practical solution to the 
question of the representation of China in 
the United Nations in keeping with United 
Nations Charter principles. 

The resolution was rejected by a vote of 
34 for and 62 against, with 25 abstentions. 
We voted for it as a means of determining, 
through the proposed committee, answers 
to questions which, as Ambassador Gold- 
berg informed the General Assembly,'' can 
only be answered by Peking. He put the 
questions this way: 

Will they refrain from putting forward clearly 
unacceptable demands, and specifically the unac- 
ceptable demand that the Republic of China be 
expelled from this organization? 

And will they assume the obligations of the U.N. 
Charter, in particular the basic obligation to re- 
frain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any 

In supporting the "study committee" pro- 
posal, we made it clear that we did not con- 
sider that it prejudiced in any way our own 
commitment to the Republic of China. 

Why did the proposal fail? In large part, 
I believe, because it was so strongly opposed 
by both the Republic of China and the spon- 
sors of the Chinese Communists. Both of 
them resented any hint that it might be pos- 
sible to settle the Chinese representation 
problem on any basis other than by a clear 
choice between one and the other. 

It is not for us as Americans to question 
the reality of this sentiment on both sides. 
We are compelled to recognize that as mat- 
ters stand today it tends to undercut pro- 
posals made by American citizens and others 
for what is known as a "two China" solu- 
tion. Whatever plausibility such suggestions 
may have, the hard fact is that no one has as 
yet been able to convince either of the parties 
immediately concerned that they form an ac- 
ceptable basis for dealing with this peren- 
nial problem. 

This, then, will be the situation as we pre- 
pare for the United Nations General As- 

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 929. 

^ Ibid., p. 926. 

MAY 1, 1967 


sembly session of September 1967. As we did 
last year, we shall thoroughly review our 
tactics. I would not want to speculate now 
on the procedures which, 6 months from 
now, will seem most appropriate. But I can 
say that our actions regarding the problem 
will be determined within this very clear 

Chinese Communists' Isolation Self-Decreed 

We do not have a frozen attitude on ques- 
tions relating to China. The Korean conflict 
is slipping back into history. The fusillades 
of the cold war, as applied to other Commu- 
nist countries, are now more muted; and we 
are exploring ways in which we can coop- 
erate with these countries in limited areas to 
mutual advantage. The questions raised by 
Ambassador Goldberg are therefore very 
much in point: They do not demand from 
Communist China anything we would not ex- 
pect from any other regime. 

It should be clear that the United States 
is not engaged in a policy with regard to 
Communist China which is vindictive for its 
own sake. We are not conducting or plan- 
ning a holy war in Asia. Nor do we have 
any designs or pretensions on the territory 
of Communist China or any other political 

Our concern is with practices of aggres- 
sion and subversion. We oppose these because 
unless they are curbed our objective of a 
world governed by law and able to unleash 
its latent energies for peaceful progress can- 
not be attained. 

Not only have we no desire to attack Com- 
munist China; we do not wish to isolate it. 
The recent record on this subject is quite 
clear. American and Communist Chinese 
negotiators have held 132 meetings since 
1956 in Geneva and Warsaw. It may be that 
the United States has had more continued 
contact on matters of high policy with the 
Chinese Communists than any other Western 

It is unfortunately true that these meet- 

ings of ambassadors have produced little of 
substantive significance. That is because, to 
the Chinese Communists, a precondition for 
all progress is a requirement that the United 
States abandon the Republic of China — 
something which we are unwilling to do. But 
the essential fact is that both parties have a 
desire to maintain in being this unusual 
channel through which cases can be argued 
and points of view advanced. Given a more 
reasonable attitude on the part of the 
Chinese Communists, there is no reason why 
some day this channel cannot become more 

Furthermore, we have felt that Commu- 
nist China's isolation is not a matter of 
United States or United Nations action, but 
something the Chinese Communists have de- 
creed for themselves. It is not the United 
States or other Western countries which 
have maintained a modern Chinese Wall of 
rigid controls around Communist China. On 
the contrary, for many years the United 
States has vainly tried to persuade the Chi- 
nese Communists to agree to an exchange of 
journalists as one of the first steps to an in- 
crease in understanding between our people. 
More recently, we have taken steps to permit 
American scholars, experts in medicine and 
public health, and other specialists to travel 
to Communist China. But almost invariably 
all of our initiatives have been rejected by 
the Chinese Communists. 

In a speech on the essentials for peace in 
Asia, President Johnson last July reviewed 
our policy toward Communist China.^ One 
of those essentials, he said, was "reconcilia- 
tion between nations that now call them- 
selves enemies." 

The President developed this theme in his 
state of the Union message on January 10: * 

We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation 
between the people of mainland China and the 
world community — including working together in 

* Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158. 
« /6Jd., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158. 



all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress 
on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their 
fellow men elsewhere, depends. 

We would be the first to welcome a China which 
decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We 
would be the first to applaud her were she to apply 
her great energies and intelligence to improving the 
welfare of her people. And we have no intention 
of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security 
and friendly relations with her neighboring 

Our hope that all of this will some day happen 
rests on the conviction that we, the American 
people and our allies, will and are going to see 
Viet-Nam through to an honorable peace. 

Thus, the door to cooperation between our- 
selves and the people of mainland China 
could be opened — but the keys are in their 
hands. The basic requirement is a desire on 
the part of Peking to cooperate peacefully 
with others. This could be demonstrated if 
Peking were to cease its support for the ag- 
gression against South Viet-Nam or if it 
would throw its influence on the side of un- 
conditional negotiations for a peaceful settle- 
ment of the Viet-Nam conflict. 

And there are many other areas in which, 
with absolutely no impairment of dignity or 
rights, the signal could be given that fair 
and free negotiation on problems of general 
concern could be undertaken. The world cries 
out for effective arms control measures, for a 
halt to the spread of nuclear weapons, for 
the freer flow of ideas and people and goods, 
for peaceful economic development, for con- 
ditions of security for all. 

As of today there is no sign whatever of 
any response from Communist China to 
these imperatives of a better world order. 

We await developments, in the spirit of 
President Johnson's address last July: 

We persist because we know that hunger and 
disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no bound- 
aries of either creed or class or country. 

We persist because we believe that even the most 
rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich 
possibilities of a diverse world. 

And we continue because we believe that coop- 
eration, not hostility, is really the way of the future 
in the 20th century. 

That day is not yet here. It may be long in com- 
ing, but I tell you it is clearly on its way, because 
come it must. 

These are our guidelines for the period 

U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas 
With Indefinite Validity 

The Department of State announced on 
April 5 (press release 82) that beginning 
April 15 it would authorize the issuance of 
visitors visas valid for multiple entries to 
the United States over an indefinite period 
of time instead of the present maximum 
duration of 4 years. 

U.S. consular officers will issue the new 
visas on a selective basis to nationals of 
countries which do not require visas of 
American tourists and business travelers. 
The new visas permit temporary visits to the 
United States for business or pleasure any 
number of times. As heretofore, the Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Service will set 
the maximum period of time that a visitor 
may remain in the United States on the oc- 
casion of each visit. 

The new visa procedure was instituted in 
recognition of this year's designation as 
International Tourist Year by the United 
Nations. It was developed jointly by the 
State Department and the United States 
Travel Service as members of the Presi- 
dential Cabinet Task Force on Travel chaired 
by Vice President Humphrey. 

An amendment to the visa regulations of 
the Department of State was published in 
the Federal Register on April 6 ^ with an 
effective date of April 15 authorizing issu- 
ance of indefinite validity visas under section 
101(a) (15) (B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. 

' 32 Fed. Reg. 5620. 

MAY 1, 1967 


President Hails U.S. CounciPs 
Support of East-West Trade 

Folloiving is an exchange of letters be- 
tiveen President Johnson and Christopher H. 
Phillips, president of the United States Coun- 
cil of the International Chamber of Com- 
merce, together with a statement by the 

text of president johnson's letter 

The White House, 
Washington, March 25, 1967. 

Dear Mr. Phillips : I very much appreci- 
ated your letter transmitting the Council's 
policy statement on East- West trade. I know 
that the conclusions and recommendations 
are the products of profound study. All 
Americans can take pride in the creative 
spirit in which you, Mr. [Arthur K.] Wat- 
son, Mr. [Hoyt P.] Steele, and your other 
associates have approached this important 

In my judgment, the statement is an elo- 
quent expression of the case for giving the 
President the tools necessary to work for the 
improvement in East-West relations which 
is the best hope for a lasting peace. As you 
point out, increased peaceful trade with East- 
ern Europe and the Soviet Union will serve 
our broad political objectives as well as our 
economic interests. Peaceful economic com- 
petition builds a common stake in stability. 
The day that it replaces the arms race as the 
primary form of East-West rivalry will be 
a landmark in the history of man. 

Of course, we shall have to feel our way 
carefully. The East-West trade legislation I 
have proposed ^ was recommended by a dis- 
tinguished group of businessmen, economists, 
and labor leaders; it is carefully designed to 
be used only when it is clear that our 
interests are served. It provides for trade, 
not aid. It does not affect the system of con- 
trols on the export of strategic goods. It does 

' For text of the proposed legislation, see BULLETIN 
of May 30, 1966, p. 843. 

not lower our guard; it simply permits us to 
grant the same tariff treatment to the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe which we grant 
all other nations if, and to the degree that, it 
will further our interests. 

The issue reduces to a simple question: 
should we be prepared to do our part to 
bridge the chasm between East and West 
which has so long threatened the peace of 
the world? Trade alone will not be sufficient 
to this task. But it will certainly be neces- 
sary. I believe, as you do, that we must be 
ready to respond as opportunities arise. The 
East- West Trade Act which I have proposed 
to the Congress would equip us to do so. 

The policy statement of the United States 
Council of the International Chamber of 
Commerce is further powerful testimony to 
the wisdom of this course. Your countrymen 
are deeply in your debt. 

My best personal regards to you and your 
fellow Council members. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 
Mr. Christopher H. Phillips 
United States Council of the International 

Chamber of Commerce, Inc. 
New York, New York 

text of mr. phillips' letter 

March 3, 1967 
The President 
The White House 
Washi7igton, D.C. 

Dear Mr. President: The United States 
Council has devoted considerable attention 
in recent months to the possibility of changes 
in U.S. policies towards East-West trade. In 
view of the more hopeful and constructive 
relations which now appear to exist between 
the United States and the countries of East- 
ern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Council 
has concluded that the United States should 
work for an increased flow of mutually bene- 
ficial trade and production with the countries 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

I enclose a statement which details the 



Council's recommendations, prepared by our 
Committee on Commercial Policy under the 
Chairmanship of Mr. Hoyt P. Steele, Vice 
President of the General Electric Company, 
and approved by our Executive Committee, 
whose Chairman is Mr. Arthur K. Watson, 
Vice Chairman of International Business 
Machines Corporation. 

As you. probably know, the U.S. Council 
represents some 300 major U.S. corporations 
and banks engaged in international trade 
and production. It is the American section of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, an 
organization of world business leaders from 
some 75 countries. The recommendations con- 
tained in the U.S. Council's statement are 
those of our members only, but they are 
shared by the business communities of the 
other nations represented in the ICC. 

It is our hope that legislation to permit an 
expansion of trade between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern 
European nations will shortly be enacted by 
Congress and that hearings will be scheduled 
in the near future looking toward this end. 

Christopher H. Phillips 


The U.S. Council believes, for the reasons set 
forth in the next six paragraphs, that the United 
States should pursue a more flexible policy than in 
the past towards trade with Eastern Europe. To this 
end, the U.S. Council supports enactment of the pro- 
posed East-West Trade Relations Act and offers a 
further series of recommendations in the balance of 
this statement for measures it would urge the U.S. 
Government to take over a period of time should the 
climate for a regularization of trade between East 
and West continue to improve. 

The recent NATO meetings decisively reflected the 
changes in East-West relations which have taken 
place in the last twenty years. After a generation of 
concentration on the defense of the West against the 
East, including commercial and economic policies ori- 
ented to that objective, the emphasis at this session 
and in the summary communique ' issued at its con- 
clusion was almost exclusively on commercial pol- 
icies in keeping with the developing detente between 
East and West. The noticeable improvement in rela- 

» Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49. 

tions among Western nations and those of Eastern 
Europe certainly has at least some of its origins in 
the growing coincidence of the long-run interests of 
the United States and Russia in peaceful conditions 
in the world at large. To the extent that this coinci- 
dence is recognized by both parties, there is reason to 
hope that recent guarded progress toward normaliza- 
tion of commercial contacts will prove durable. 

The gradual relaxation of cold-war tensions has 
already brought about a substantial increase in trade 
flows between Eastern European countries and those 
of the rest of the world. Both industrialized and de- 
veloping countries have participated in this growth. 
However, in comparison with other industrialized 
nations, U.S. trade with the Eastern European na- 
tions has remained very small. During 1965, for 
example. Western Europe and Japan exported $3.8 
billion in goods to the Eastern European countries, 
excluding Yugoslavia, and imported almost $4.5 bil- 
lion from them. U.S. figures for this same period 
were only $139 million in exports and $138 million 
in imports. 

As The Economist put it: "The communist coun- 
tries remain the one market where America virtually 
leaves the field clear to Western Europe and Japan." 
The same article points out that Comecon (a limited 
Eastern European effort to mirror Common Market 
economic collaboration) includes within its perimeter 
over 330 million people- — almost 60 million more than 
the countries of the EEC [European Economic Com- 
munity] and the EFTA [European Free Trade Asso- 
ciation] combined. 

The U.S. Council does not believe that controls 
over strategic materials can at present be relaxed, 
but it does believe that the argument against trad- 
ing with the USSR and other Eastern European 
countries on the grounds that such trade might con- 
tribute to their economic power is of limited validity. 
Trade by definition does not take place unless bene- 
fits accrue to both parties. If one nation refuses to 
participate, insofar as the second party can find an- 
other trading partner, the loss is entirely sustained 
by the country refusing to do business. This is the 
situation into which the United States has drifted. 
While other countries of the world are increasingly 
enjoying the benefits of expanded two-way trade 
with the Eastern European countries, our policies 
to a great extent deny these markets to our ex- 
porters and deny to our consumers those products 
in which the Eastern European countries are becom- 
ing competitive. 

As other industrialized countries expand their 
markets within the Eastern countries, there is a 
natural tendency for the exporter's technology and 
standards to be accepted and adhered to in the im- 
porting nation. The longer that U.S. exporters re- 
frain from participating in the markets of Eastern 
Europe the more firmly established in those mar- 
kets will be the standards and technology of our com- 
petitors in other Western industrialized countries — 

MAY 1, 1967 


and the more difficult will it be for American com- 
panies to enter these markets in the future. 

From the U.S. view, the most fundamental gain 
of all may well be the imprint inevitably made by 
successful and growing daily commercial operations, 
carrying as they do a continuous effective argument 
for the freer contractual trading policies which they 

Accordingly, the U.S. Council believes that the 
time has come for the United States to do what it 
can to make possible a regularization of trade and 
payments with the Eastern European countries. New 
opportunities are, in fact, arising for the U.S. to 
negotiate with the countries of Eastern Europe for 
modification on their part of policies which have 
rigidly reinforced the differences between our eco- 
nomic systems. We should be ready to take advantage 
of these opportunities. 

Specifically, as noted above, the U.S. Council sup- 
ports enactment of the East-West Trade Relations 
Act of 1966. Eastern European nations have more 
and more been pursuing individual national policies 
over recent years. They no longer constitute a mono- 
lithic bloc. The United States should be in a position 
to forge new relationships with these countries indi- 
vidually. New economic policies are being adopted by 
Russia and the other Eastern European countries 
designed to make their production more responsive to 
market considerations and their prices more reflec- 
tive of costs. These policies, if successfully imple- 
mented, should gradually result in the production of 
more goods marketable in the United States and 
Western markets generally. The President should be 
empowered to grant most-favored-nation status to 
Eastern nations, enabling their goods to be imported 
into the U.S. at the same tariff rates as those of 
other countries of the world. Since tariffs at present 
have little meaning in the controlled economies of 
Eastern Europe, other concessions should be sought 
in exchange, such as market access for U.S. prod- 
ucts, the protection of industrial property rights, the 
right to more direct contact between U.S. business- 
men and the ultimate consumer/supplier, and satis- 
factory arbitral arrangements for the settlement of 
commercial disputes. 

The extension of most-favored-nation treatment to 
Ea.stem European countries should enable the U.S. 
consumer to benefit from competitive imports from 
the Eastern European countries, and, at the same 
time, enable those countries to earn the foreign ex- 
change with which to purchase U.S. goods. United 
States suppliers should be able to participate to the 
fullest extent consistent with our national security 
in the markets of Eastern Europe. To permit this 
participation there should be further removals of 
non-strategic items from the Export Control List, as 

in the case of 400 items recently removed. Items 
which are freely available elsewhere in the world 
should not require individual export licenses in the 
United States. 

The U.S. Council would not like to see a so-called 
credit race develop among Western suppliers to East- 
ern Europe. It recognizes, however, that recently 
credits of longer than five years duration have been 
granted in other industrialized countries. It does not 
believe that U.S. industry should be precluded from 
bidding on an equal basis with its competitors in 
other nations. It is recognized that a shortage of 
hard currencies in many ways places the countries 
of Eastern Europe in a position similar to that of 
many less developed countries, and that if sales of 
heavy equipment are to take place longer-term 
credits, more realistically representative of periods 
of amortization, may be essential. Bearing in mind 
that such exports are beneficial to the United States, 
the U.S. Council accordingly urges that U.S. sup- 
pliers be enabled to match the tenns offered by their 
competitors. To this end, the credit guarantee pol- 
icies of the Export-Import Bank should be similarly 
noiTnalized to permit credits to be extended to buy- 
ers in Eastern European countries which are com- 
petitive with those of other Western suppliei-s, and 
the full use of these facilities should be encouraged. 
In principle, we believe that Eastern European gov- 
ernments should equally extend adequate credit to 
Western buyers, and would recommend that the 
Administration attempt to include provisions for 
reciprocal credit in trade agreements negotiated 
with individual countries. 

The recent trend toward internationalization of 
production has not left Eastern Europe untouched. 
In the past few years a number of agreements have 
been concluded under which individual Western firms 
have undertaken to participate in the actual produc- 
tion of the USSR and other countries of Eastern 
Europe. American firms, which are prime initiators 
and leaders in the field of overseas production, should 
be able to participate in the opportunities which the 
large and growing markets of Eastern Europe pre- 
sent. U.S. government policy should support private 
efforts to respond to these markets. Where the un- 
derlying transaction warrants, credit terms should 
be as favorable as for other areas; similarly, the 
program of government guarantees against political 
risks ought in principle to include these markets. 
More systematic payment arrangements than now 
exist would be desirable, if not essential, to the 
growth of producing arrangements. To assist in the 
determination of credit-worthiness, and thus to ex- 
pand the use of credits in business transactions, 
countries of Eastern Europe should be encouraged 
to publish financial data similar to that published 



by Western countries — and by Yugoslavia — covering 
gold and foreign exchange reser\'es, total foreign in- 
debtedness, and repayment schedules. 

Many, if not most, of the problems encountered in 
attempting to increase peaceful commerce between 
East and West stem from the lack of participation 
of the Eastern countries in Western institutions. The 
present move toward association on the part of 
Poland with the General .Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade should be encouraged. It is to be hoped that 
other Eastern European countries will follow suit. 
Compliance on their part with the general rules of 
GATT in their external trade would do much to 
regularize the conditions for their Western trading 

Most important, however, to a return to normal 
commercial relations, as it was for the industrialized 
countries of the West after World War II, is even- 
tual currency convertibility. Every opportunity 
should be pressed to broaden convertibility with the 
rest of the world. Increased transferability among 
Eastern European currencies should, where possible, 
be encouraged as an interim step. The recent addi- 
tion of $33 million of gold and convertible currencies 
to the fixed capital of the Comecon's bank, the Intei'- 
national Bank for Economic Cooperation, should be 
welcomed. While there is little that can be done on 
our part to hasten this process, the U.S. Council 
recommends that the U.S. Government attempt to 
emphasize in its negotiations with Eastern European 
governments the benefits accruing from early con- 
vertibility. The question of Eastern countries' mem- 
bership in the I.M.F. [International Monetary Fund] 
and the I.B.R.D. [International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development] could usefully be re- 
studied by member countries and by Eastern coun- 
tries. It is in the interest of the United States to 
see these countries assume the responsibilities that 
are inherent in membership in these organizations. 

U.S. and Portugal Sign New 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
]VIarch 24 (press release 64) that the Govern- 
ments of the United States and Portugal had 
concluded a new comprehensive bilateral 
agreement concerning cotton textile exports 
from Portugal to the United States. The 
agreement was effected at Lisbon on March 
23 in an exchange of notes between U.S. Am- 

bassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Portu- 
guese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco No- 

The new agreement runs for 4 years, be- 
ginning January 1, 1967. It replaces the 
bilateral agreement of March 12, 1964, which 
was to expire on Decembei- 31, 1966, but was 
extended for 3 months to March 31, 1967, 
in an exchange of notes signed at Lisbon on 
December 19, 1966.2 

Like its predecessors, the new agreement 
is designed to promote the orderly develop- 
ment of trade in cotton textiles between Por- 
tugal and the United States pursuant to the 
objectives of the Long-Term Arrangement 
for international trade in cotton textiles in 
which both countries participate. 

The new agreement sets an aggregate 
limit for calendar 1967 of 102,300,000 square 
yards equivalent and covers all 64 categories 
of cotton textile trade. It provides for three 
group ceilings covering yarn (66,100,000 
square yards equivalent), fabric (27,000,000 
square yards equivalent), and apparel 
(9,200,000 square yards equivalent). Nine- 
teen specific ceilings are also provided for. 
They include: each of the four yarn cate- 
gories; those fabric categories covering ging- 
hams, carded-yarn sheeting, carded-yarn 
twill and sateen, carded and combed yarn- 
dyed fabrics, as well as carded-yarn fabrics 
not elsewhere specified; and apparel cate- 
gories covering T-shirts, knitshirts, sport- 
shirts and slacks, blouses, dresses, ladies' 
suits, dressing gowns and nightwear. 

Other provisions on flexibility, undue con- 
centration, spacing, exchange of statistics, 
categories and conversion factors, consulta- 
tion, administrative arrangements, equity, 
termination, and relationship of the agree- 
ment to the Geneva Long-Temi Arrangement 
are also included. 

' For text of the U.S. note, see Department press 
release 64 dated Mar. 24. 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
5741 and 6186. 

MAY 1, 1967 



President Signs Joint Resolution 
on Food Assistance to India 

Following is a statement by President 
Johnson made on April 1 upon signing H.J. 
Res. 267, to support emergency food assist- 
ance to India, together with the text of the 
joint resolution.'^ 


White House press release dated April 1 

The war on hunger is the work of the en- 
tire world. H.J. Res. 267 — supporting emer- 
gency food assistance to India — is a new 
expression of America's commitment to that 
humane task. 

In passing the resolution by an overwhelm- 
ing vote, the Congress has once again re- 
sponded compassionately to India's critical 
food needs. We will provide her people with 
up to 3 million additional tons of food grain. 
An additional $25 million worth of food is 
authorized for distribution by CARE and 
other voluntary agencies to families in 
drought-stricken areas. 

The joint resolution demonstrates our 
faith in India's own drive to achieve self- 
sufficiency in food grains. We believe that her 
ambitious program of agricultural develop- 
ment will be rewarded with steadily increas- 
ing food grain production. What we and the 
other more fortunate nations do to help India 
through a crisis will enable her to push for- 
ward with an economic development plan 
which will, we hope, bring sufficient food 
within the reach of her 500 million people. 

The resolution also underlines the fact that 
success depends on other nations' help. The 
United States is not able to supply all the 

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con- 
gress on food for India dated Feb. 2, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 20, 1967. 

assistance that India needs. This offer en- 
dorsed by the Congress of up to 3 million tons 
of food grain in this resolution is contingent 
on appropriate matching from other coun- 
tries. Other nations have responded in the 
past. We hope and trust they can and will 
meet these new and compelling needs. 

The World Bank is already playing an im- 
portant role in mobilizing the worldwide 
effort to assist India. It has called a meeting 
of the nations belonging to the India Con- 
sortium in early April to discuss this and 
other economic problems which India faces. 
We will carefully follow these deliberations 
and decisions. 

I urge the nations attending that meeting 
to continue and to expand their food aid and 
general economic aid. I hope that nations 
which have not been associated with this 
effort in the past will join with us now, either 
formally or informally. 

Hunger transcends national borders and 
ideologies. It is a condition that all under- 
stand and none can countenance. This resolu- 
tion reaffirms America's intention to do its 
part to help India meet the threat of hunger 
that confronts her today. 



To support emergency food assistance to India. 

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the 
policy of the United States to combat hunger and 
malnutrition and to encourage economic develop- 
ment in the developing countries ; and 

Whereas two years of drought have caused a grave 
food shortage in India which threatens the lives 
and health of millions of people; and 

Whereas the urgency of the need of the Indian 
people and the time needed for congressional de- 
liberation have required the United States already 
to commit three million six hundred thousand 
tons of grain valued at $275,000,000 as a part of 
the eight to ten million tons of grain estimated to 
be required during the calendar year 1967 from 
outside India to prevent irreparable hardship to 
the people of India; and 

' Public Law 90-7, 90th Cong.; H.J. Res. 267, Mar. 
20, 1967. 



Whereas the programs of economic and agricultural 
development which have been launched by the 
Government of India would be seriously impaired 
if the international community failed to act 
promptly and on an adequate scale to meet the 
urgent needs of the people of India: Therefore 

Resolved by the Senate and Hotise of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States of America in Con- 
gress assembled, That the Congress approves the 
participation of the United States in cooperation 
with other countries and with multilateral organi- 
zations, including the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization, and others, in urgent 
international efforts designed to — 

(a) develop a comprehensive self-help approach 
to the war on hunger based on a fair sharing of the 
burden among the nations of the world ; 

(b) encourage and assist the Government of India 
in achieving food self-sufficiency; and 

(c) help meet India's critical food and nutritional 
needs by making available agricultural commodities 
or other resources needed for food procurement or 

Because uncertainty in connection with Public 
Law 480 transactions tends to depress market prices, 
it is the sense of Congress that, in carrying out this 
Aid to India program, the Administration should, 
subject to the requirement of section 401 of Public 
Law 480 with respect to the availability of the com- 
modity at the time of exportation, make announce- 
ments of intention, purchases and shipments of 
commodities on schedules and under circumstances 
which will protect and strengthen farm market 
prices to the maximum extent possible. 

The Congress endorses the President's policy of 
equal participation on the part of the United States 
with all other nations, under terms and conditions 
set forth in Public Law 480, as amended, in assist- 
ing the Government of India to meet these needs. 

Further, the Congress recommends, on the basis 
of estimates now available, that the United States 
provide an additional amount of food grain not to 
exceed three million tons at an estimated cost of 
$190,000,000 as the United States share toward meet- 
ing the India food deficit, provided it is appropriately 
matched, and specifically extends its support to the 
allocation of approximately $190,000,000 of funds 
available to the Commodity Credit Corporation in 
calendar year 1967 which will be required to ac- 
complish this purpose. 

The Congress further recommends that the Presi- 
dent provide an additional $25,000,000 of emergency 
food relief for distribution by CARE and other 
American voluntary agencies. 


Current Actions 



Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 

Adherences deposited: Barbados, March 21, 1967; 
Uganda, April 10, 1967. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Ratification deposited: Argentina, March 7, 1967. 


Articles of agreement of the International Mone- 
tary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington 
December 27, 1945. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 

Readmitted to membership: Indonesia, February 
21, 1967. 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for 
signature at Washington December 27, 1945. En- 
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Readmitted to membership : Indonesia, April 13, 


Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as 
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva 
May 20, 1965." 
Acceptance deposited: Morocco, March 2, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with 
final protocol, general regulations with final pro- 
tocol, and convention with final protocol and 
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 

Adherences deposited: Guyana, Mauritania, Zam- 
bia, March 22, 1967. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly December 21, 

Signatures: Burundi, February 1, 1967; Colombia, 
March 23, 1967; Dahomey, February 2, 1967; 
Federal Republic of Germany, February 10, 
1967; India, March 2, 1967; Iran, March 8, 
1967; Somalia, January 26, 1967; Uruguay, 
February 21, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
" Not in force. 

MAY 1, 1967 


Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, January 16, 
1967; Iceland, March 13, 1967; Tunisia, Janu- 
ary 13, 1967. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to chapter II of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 
5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London 
November 30, 1966.^ 
Acceptance received: United States, April 7, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, 
and Moscow January 27, 1967.* 
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, April 11, 1967. 



Agreement relating to radio communications be- 
tween amateur stations on behalf of third par- 
ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos 
Aires March 31, 1967. Entered into force April 
30, 1967. 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of 
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio 
operators of either country to operate their sta- 
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Buenos Aires March 31, 1967. En- 
tered into force April 30, 1967. 


Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1956, as 
amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation con- 
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at 
Washington April 11, 1967. Enters into force on 
the date on which each Government shall have 
received from the other written notification that 
it has complied with all statutory and constitu- 
tional requirements for entry into force. 

■ Not in force. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of March 3, 1967. Ef- 
fected by an exchange of notes at Accra April 
6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967. 


Agreement extending the agreement of April 15, 
1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559, 5664, 
6151, 6190), relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi 
March 30, 1967. Entered into force March 30, 


Agreement amending the agreement of June 18 and 
22, 1962 (TIAS 5097), for financing certain edu- 
cational exchange programs. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21 
and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities 
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop- 
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), 
with annex. Signed at Seoul March 25, 1967. 
Entered into force March 25, 1967. 


Understanding relating to the delivery of two C-47 
aircraft and related articles and services. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Bamako January 5, 1967. 
Entered into force January 5, 1967. 

Somali Republic 

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4, 
1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mogadiscio February 27 and March 1, 1967. En- 
tered into force March 1, 1967. 

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4, 
1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738, 
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mogadiscio March 30 and 31, 1967. Entered into 
force April 1, 1967. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested agencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the worlc of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is Included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for lale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.O., 20402. 
Price: 62 Issues, domestic (10, foreign $16 ; 
single copy SO cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX May 1,1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1453 

China. China, the United Nations, and the 
United States (Popper) 689 

Communism. China, the United Nations, and 
the United States (Popper) 689 

Congress. President Signs Joint Resolution on 
Food Assistance to India (Johnson, text of 
joint resolution) 700 

Economic Affairs 

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of 
East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) ... 696 

U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile 
Agreement 699 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip 
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) .... 678 


President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East- 
West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) 696 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip 
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) .... 678 

Foreign Aid 

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food 
Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint 
resolution) 700 

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to 
India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688 

Germany. Vice President Humphrey Returns 
From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678 


President Signs Joint Resolution on Food 
Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint 
resolution) 700 

U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to 
India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip 

to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678 

Military Affairs. NATO Nuclear Planning 
Group Holds First Ministers Meeting (Mc- 
Namara, communique) 686 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First 
Ministers Meeting (McNamara, commu- 
nique) 686 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip 
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678 

Pakistan. U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms 
Aid to India and Pakistan (Department 
statement) 688 

Passports. U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas With In- 
definite Validity 695 

Portugal. U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton 

Textile Agreement 699 

Presidential Documents 

President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East- 
West Trade 696 

President Signs Joint Resolution on Food 

Assistance to India 700 

Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip 

to Europe 678 

Singapore. Letters of Credence (Wong) . . . 688 
Trade. President Hails U.S. Council's Support 

of East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) . . 696 
Treaty Information 

Current Actions 701 

U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile 

Agreement 699 

United Nations. China, the United Nations, and 

the United States (Popper) 689 

Zambia. Letters of Credence (Banda) . . . 688 
Name Index 

Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani 688 

Humphrey, Vice President 678 

Johnson, President 678, 696, 700 

McNamara, Robert S 686 

Phillips, Christopher H 696 

Popper, David H 689 

Wong Lin Ken 688 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 10-16 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 10 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are 
Nos. 64 of March 24 and 82 of April 5. 

No. Date 


*85 4/12 Bunker sworn in as Ambassador 
to Viet-Nam (biographic de- 
tails) . 

*86 4/13 Battle sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs (biographic 
details) . 

*87 4/14 Nolte sworn in as Ambassador to 
the United Arab Republic (bio- 
graphic details). 

Not printed. 

■d U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967 — 251-933/43 

Superintendent of DocuMEr 





BOX 286 

BOSTON MASS 02 11 7 



American Foreign Policy 
Current Documents, 1963 

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papers which indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United 

The 1963 volume includes documentation on the U.N. financial crisis; the attempt to estab- 
lish a multilateral nuclear force within NATO ; the situations in the Congo, Laos, and Viet-Nam; 
the development of the Sino-Soviet split; the negotiation of the partial nuclear test ban treaty; 
efforts to guarantee the use of outer space for peaceful purposes; and the debate over foreign aid, 

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Name . 

Street Address 

City, State, and ZIP code_ 







Vol. LVI, No. 145A 

May 8, 1967 


Statements by President Johnson at Punta del Este 
and Text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America 706 

Excerpts From an Address by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz 
Before the National Press Club 729 

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 722 

For index see inside back cover 

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta dei Este 

The Chiefs of State of 20 member nations 
of the Organization of American States met 
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, to 
renew their commitment to the cause of 
Latin American economic and social develop- 

President Johnson arrived at Punta del 
Este on April 11 after a brief stop at Monte- 
video, where he was greeted by President 
Gestido of Uniguay. At Punta del Este, 
President Johnson attended the sessions of 
the 3-day Summit Conference, speaking at 
an informal session on April 12 and at a 
public session on April 13. During his 4-day 
visit to Punta del Este, President Johnson 
also held bilateral talks with the Latin 
American Presidents. 

Folloiving are President Johnson's re- 
marks and statements at Montevideo and 
Punta del Este and the text of the Declara- 
tion of the Presidents of America, which 
was signed by 17 Chiefs of State, the Prime 
Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and the 
representative of the President of Haiti at 
the closing session of the conference on 
April 14.^ 

Arrival, Carrasco Airport, Montevideo, April 11 

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated 
April 11 

President Gestido, Your Excellencies, 
ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I ap- 
preciate deeply your warm and generous 

This is the first time that I step on South 
American soil. It is my very great privilege 
that it should be the land of Artigas. 

More than 150 years ago, Artigas said: 

"The cause of the people does not admit of 
the slightest delay." 

The same cause brings us here to Punta 
del Este. 

Six years ago a great charter was written 
in Punta del Este. Under its banner we have 
moved forward and made progress. We are 
demonstrating that free men working 
through institutions of representative de- 
mocracy can best satisfy man's ambitions. 

But we also know that our task is only in 
its beginning. The experience of the first 6 
years of the Alliance tells where we must 
quicken the pace. 

Diligent work has gone on during the past 
year in preparing the program which the 
Presidents will consider at this conference. 
This program is not a reaction to crisis, but 
it is a response of farsighted Latin Amer- 
ican leadership to the needs of present and 
future generations. 

The progress of our Alliance shows that 
the initiative is increasingly with Latin 
America. We in the United States welcome 
this — as we believe you do. I would repeat 
what I said to my fellow Presidents last 
August: 2 "Move boldly along this path and 
the United States will be by your side." 

Mr. President, I look forward to this con- 
ference and to the opportunity it will afford 
me to exchange views with my fellow Presi- 
dents. I believe that personal contact is es- 
sential to understanding, and I know that 
understanding is the foundation of our com- 
mon effort. 

' President Otto Arosemena Gomez of Ecuador 
declined to sign the declaration; Bolivia did not 
attend the conference, and Cuba is not presently 
participating- in the inter-American system. 

' Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330. 



The hemisphere is grateful to your Gov- 
ernment and your people for opening its 
doors to all of us. I should like to join my 
colleagues in sajring muchas gracias. 

Informal Session of Chiefs of State 
Conference, Punta del Este, April 12 

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated 
April 12 

Mr. Chaii-man, fellow Chiefs of State: I 
shall be presenting some thoughts in the 
agenda of our conference tomorrow; but as 
we enter into our private discussion of the 
declaration before us which our foreign 
ministers have prepared, I wish to make a 
few specific observations. 

Fii-st, I want to restate my support of the 
program which you have set for yourselves. 

In my message to the Congress on March 
13,^ I recommended increased financial as- 
; sistance to your countries in the areas 
: covered by the declaration before me: eco- 
nomic integration, multinational projects, 
agriculture, education, and health. This rep- 
[ resents my convictions and my policy today. 

The decisions which you take here — and 
the followup action which you take in the 
months ahead — will enable me to pursue 
that policy. 

Second, I wish to state my country's posi- 
tion on how we might assist in expanding 
Latin American trade. 

Much of our thought and work in the 
1 hemisphere has centered in recent years on 
ways to expand the volume and the value of 
Latin American exports. 

We all know that basically the answer lies 
in the diversification of agriculture and in 
making overly protected Latin American in- 
dustry competitive and efficient. This is one 
of the reasons that we all support Latin 
American economic integration. 

But we wish to be as helpful as we can in 
this transitional period in Latin American 

We are now devoting a major effort to try 
to make the Kennedy Round negotiations a 
success. If they succeed, they will help us 

' For text, see ibid., Apr. 3, 1967, p. 540. 

all — including Latin America. But the proc- 
ess of freeing trade from unnecessary re- 
strictions will not come to an end when the 
current important Kennedy Round negotia- 
tions are completed. 

We have been examining the kind of trade 
initiatives that the United States should pro- 
pose in the years ahead. We are convinced 
that our future trade policy must pay special 
attention to the needs of the developing 
countries in Latin America and elsewhere in 
the world. 

We have been exploring with other major 
industrialized countries what practical steps 
can be taken to increase the export earnings 
of all developing counties. We recognize that 
comparable tariff" treatment may not always 
permit developing countries to advance as 
rapidly as desired. Temporary tariff advan- 
tages for all developing countries by all in- 
dustrialized countries would be one way to 
deal with this. 

We think this idea is worth pursuing. We 
will be discussing it further with members 
of our Congress, with business and labor 
leaders, and we will seek the cooperation of 
other governments in the world trading com- 
munity to see whether a broad consensus can 
be reached along these lines. 

We also recognize the very special impor- 
tance for certain Latin American countries 
of earnings from coffee exports. In our pro- 
grams for assistance for agricultural de- 
velopment we are already helping to carry 
forward the process of diversification — 
which alone can prevent chronic surpluses. 
As a further step in this direction, we are 
prepared to lend $15 million to the proposed 
international coflfee diversification and 
development fund, with the understanding 
that the coffee-producing countries agree to 
contribute $30-$50 million per year over the 
next 5 years, and to lend up to $15 million 
more to match contributions by other coffee- 
consuming members of the International 
Coffee Agreement. 

I have been informed of the great impor- 
tance which you attach to the use of Alliance 
for Progress funds to finance procurement 
in other Alliance for Progress countries as 

MAY 8, 1967 


well as in the United States. I know that 
you are all aware of the United States bal- 
ance-of-payments problems, and we deeply 
appreciate your cooperation in helping us 
meet them. 

The cooperative nature of our Alliance is 
very important to me. I want you to know 
that we shall undertake consultations on this 
matter. We shall try to establish whether we 
can agree that aid funds for capital projects 
and related technical assistance can be used 
in Alliance for Progress countries in ways 
which will protect the U.S. balance of pay- 

The final point I would make has to do 
with the declaration which is before us. As 
the political leaders of our countries, we 
have the responsibility to translate complex 
issues into understandable language for our 
peoples. The decisions reached at this meet- 
ing are complicated decisions. Though es- 
sential to the progress and prosperity of our 
people, they may seem removed from press- 
ing everyday needs unless we extract them 
from the language of the economists and 
diplomats — on whom we so greatly rely. 

I know that when I return home I shall 
try to make clear to our people these basic 
decisions we have made together. And I am 
sure you will all wish to do the same. 

Public Session of Chiefs of State 
Conference, Punta del Este, April 13 

White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated 
April 13 

Mr. Chairman, fellow Chiefs of State, 
ladies and gentlemen: First, President 
Gestido, may I express, on behalf of my en- 
tire delegation, gratitude to you for the 
courtesy and generosity that Uruguay has 
offered her sister nations at this conference. 

We have come to Punta del Este as the 
leaders of 20 governments — and as the 
trustees for more than 400 million human 

We meet in a city where, 5^2 years ago, 
an alliance was fonned, a pledge was made, 
and a dream begun. 

Now we must measure the progress we 
have made. We must name the barriers that 

still stand between us and the fulfillment of 
our dream. Then we must put in motion 
plans that will set us firmly on the way to- 
ward the proud destiny that is our peoples' 

We meet as friends, as neighbors, and as 
allies. Hundreds of years ago we were the 
New World. Now each of us faces the prob- 
lems of growing maturity — of industrializa- 
tion, of rapid urban growth, of sharing the 
opportunities of life among our people. 

We no longer inhabit a new world. We 
cannot escape from our problems, as the first 
Americans could, in the vastness of an un- 
charted hemisphere. If we are to grow and 
prosper, we must face the problems of our 
maturity. And we must do it both boldly and 
wisely — and we must face them now. 

If we do, we can create a new America — 
where the best in man may flourish in free- 
dom and dignity. If we neglect the planning, 
if we ignore the commitments that it re- 
quires, if our rhetoric is not followed by 
action, we shall fail not only the Americans 
of this generation but hundreds of millions 
to come. 

In unity, and only in unity, is our 
strength. The barriers that deny the dream 
of a new America are stronger than the 
strongest among us acting alone. But they 
cannot stand against our combined will and 
our common eif ort. 

So I speak to you as a ready partner in 
that eff'ort. I represent a nation committed 
by history, by national interest, and by sim- 
ple friendship to the cause of progress in 
Latin America. But the assistance of my na- 
tion will be useful only as it reinforces your 
own determination and builds on your own 
achievements — and only as it is bound to the 
growing unity of our own hemisphere. 

As I have listened to the able and eloquent 
addresses of my fellow Presidents and 
Prime Ministers who have gathered here, 
and as I have surveyed the constructive sug- 
gestions that have been made, here are the 
tasks before us as I see it: 

First, you will be forging a great new com- 
mon market — expanding your industrial 



base, increasing your participation in world 
trade, and broadening economic opportuni- 
ties for your people. I have already made my 
liosition clear to my Congress and my people: 
If Latin America decides to create a common 
market, I shall recommend a substantial 
contribution to a fund that will help ease the 
transition into an integrated regional econ- 

Second, you will design, and join together 
to build, great multinational projects that 
will open up the inner frontiers of Latin 
America. These will provide — at last — the 
physical basis of Simon Bolivar's vision of 
continental unity. I shall ask my people to 
provide over a 3-year period substantial ad- 
ditional funds for the Inter-American Bank's 
Fund for Special Operations as our part of 
this special effort. I have also asked the 
Export-Import Bank to give urgent and sym- 
pathetic attention, wherever it is economi- 
cally feasible, to loans for earth stations that 
will bring satellite communications to Latin 
America so that this great hemisphere can 
have the communications it so sorely needs. 

Third, I know how hard you are striving 
to expand the volume and value of Latin 
American exports. Bilateral and multilateral 
efforts to achieve this are already under way. 
But, as I made very clear yesterday after- 
noon in our private session, we are prepared 
to consider a further step in international 
trade policy. We are ready to explore with 
other industrialized countries — and with our 
own people — the possibility of temporary 
preferential tariff advantages for all develop- 
ing countries in the markets of all the indus- 
trialized countries. We are also prepared to 
make our contribution to additional shared 
efforts in connection with the International 
Coffee Agreement. 

Fourth, all of us know that modernizing 
agriculture and increasing its productivity is 
an urgent task for Latin America, as it is 
for the whole world. Modernizing education 
is equally important. I have already urged 
our Government to expand our bilateral 
assistance in the field of agriculture and in 
the field of education. 

Fifth, you are engaged in bringing to 

Latin American life all that can be used from 
the common fund of modern science and 
technology. In addition to the additional re- 
sources we shall seek in the field of education, 
we are now prepared to join with Latin 
American nations in: 

— creating an inter-American training 
center for educational broadcasting and sup- 
porting a pilot educational television demon- 
stration project in a Central American 
country that will teach the children by day 
and entertain and inform their families at 

— establishing a new inter-American foun- 
dation for science and technology; 

— developing a regional program of marine 
science and technology; and 

— exploring a Latin American regional 
program for the peaceful uses of atomic 

Sixth, the health of the people of Latin 
America ultimately depends on everything 
we do to modernize the life of the region. But 
we must never forget that when children are 
not provided with adequate and balanced 
diets they are permanently affected as human 
beings and as citizens. Therefore, we in our 
country propose to increase our food pro- 
gram for preschool children in Latin America 
by tripling it and substantially improve our 
school lunch program by doubling it in the 
year ahead. We are also prepared to set up 
in Latin America a demonstration center in 
the field of fish protein concentrates. We be- 
lieve that this essential ingredient of a bal- 
anced diet can be provided at a much lower 
cost than has ever been known in our history. 

Finally, I shall urge funds be provided to 
help establish Alliance for Progress centers 
at colleges and universities in the United 
States. Our partnership must be based on 
respect for our various cultures and civiliza- 
tions. And respect is built upon knowledge. 
This new education program will offer new 
opportunities for students and educators of 
your countries and of my country to under- 
stand each other and to work closer to- 

Our discussions here are couched in the 

MAY 8, 1967 


technical terms of trade and development 
policies. But beyond these impersonal terms 
stands the reality of individual men, women, 
and children. It is for them — not for the 
statisticians and economists — that we have 
come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It 
is for them — and especially for the young 
among them — that the hope and the chal- 
lenge of this Alliance exists. 

For them, we must move forward from 
this hour. Each of us present should engage 
in some introspection and ask ourselves: 

What are we ourselves doing to build more 
schools, more hospitals, and more roads? 

What are we doing to produce more food 
and to take the steps necessary on our own 
initiative to see that this job is done? 

What are we ourselves doing to develop 
more trade; to take on the hard problems in 
our own countries of tax reform and land 
reform, of creating new jobs and new eco- 
nomic opportunities for our own people 
whom we presume to lead, of cleaning out 
the red tape and acting with the sense of 
urgency that our times require; and, above 
all, providing action to carry out the record 
and following through on the plans we have 

I pledge to you today that I will do all I 
can, in my time of leadership, to help you 
meet these challenges. 

One of the first groups that I met with the 
first week I was in the White House, when I 
became President, was the Ambassadors to 
Washington from Latin America. I called 
them to the East Room to talk to them about 
this program and their plans.* 

From that hour until this I have acceler- 
ated America's contribution to the hemi- 
sphere by increasing substantially the flow of 
my country's funds — substantially increas- 
ing them by 35 percent the last 3 years over 
the preceding 3 years — to this hemisphere. 

I know what is at stake for you, and I 
know what is at stake for me and my coun- 
try. More than that, I know what is at stake 
for Latin America. 

We raised the total flow of funds. For the 

' Ibid., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912. 

3 years 1961 to 1964, it ran $3,700 million. 
From 1964, 1965 and 1966, that $3,700 mil- 
lion was raised to about $5 billion. 

I know that the demands are increasing 
and the clock is ticking. I know that the 
dream of the new America will not wait. I 
know that most of you sense the same 
urgency, the same need for speedy decision 
and effective action in your own country, as 
well as in mine. 

My fellow Presidents, I should like to con- 
clude by speaking not only to you but speak- 
ing to the young people of your countries who 
will follow you, the youth of our nations — 
to the students in the schools and universi- 
ties, to the young people on the farms and 
in the new factories, to the labor unions, to 
the civil service of our governments — to all 
of those who are moving into their time of 

This is the way I would like to speak to 
them this afternoon; this is the message that 
I would like to bring to them: 

All that has been dreamed of in the years 
since the Alliance started can only come to 
pass if your hearts and your minds are dedi- 
cated and committed to it. 

It is our duty — we who hold public office 
and bear great private responsibilities — to 
create an environment in which you can 
build your part of the new America. 

It is your duty to prepare yourselves now 
— to use the tools of learning and the ideal- 
ism that is your natural heritage for the 
humane purposes that lie deep in our com- 
mon civilization. 

You cry out for change, for what President 
Franklin Roosevelt called a New Deal. And 
you do not want it imposed from above. You 
want a chance to help shape the conditions 
of your own lives. 

You — the youth of the Americas — should 
know that revolutions of fire have brought 
men in this hemisphere, and in jungles half 
the world away, still greater tyrannies than 
those they fought to cast off. 

Here in the countries of the Alliance, a 
peaceful revolution has affirmed man's 
ability to change the conditions of his life 
through the institutions of democracy. In 



your hands is the task of carrying it forward. 

The pace of change is not fast enough. It 
will i-emain too slow unless you join your 
energies, your skills and commitments, in a 
mighty effort that extends into the farthest 
reaches of this hemisphere. 

The time is now. The responsibility is ours. 

Let us declare the next 10 years the decade 
of urgency. Let us match our resolve and our 
resources to the common tasks until the 
dream of a new America is accomplished and 
is a reality in the lives of all of our people. 

Thank you. 

Statement After Conclusion 
of the Summit Conference ° 

The leaders of the Americas met in Bogota 
and Punta del Este 6 years ago to inaugurate 
one of the most audacious programs in the 
annals of mankind. 

The goal was to demonstrate that freedom 
and economic development are not enemies, 
that massive social and political transforma- 
tions can be accomplished vdthout the lash 
of dictatorship or the spur of terror. 

That was a time to state the challenge. The 
years that have passed prove beyond any 
doubt that the nations and peoples of the 
Americas responded creatively to this chal- 

We returned to Punta del Este for an 
assessment of our achievements and our 
future obligations. We met in a spirit of 
candor, with a full realization of the scope 
of the problems that confront us. 

We have looked at the past and the future 
with cold realism, knowing that our cause 
will not be served by either naive optimism 
or cynical pessimism. 

We have learned much, and much that we 
have learned confirms the judgment of 
Ecclesiastes that "he who increaseth wisdom, 
increaseth sorrow." We have long since 
abandoned the view that rhetoric could alter 
a social system or that a blueprint could 
guarantee economic growth. Economic and 
social development is a task not for sprinters 
but for long-distance runners. 

' Released to news correspondents by the White 
House at Punta del Este on Apr. 14. 

We know now that transforming the lives 
of over 250 million people requires a com- 
mitment to specifics. It requires a fierce, a 
stubborn, dedication to those undramatic 
day-to-day attainments that are the sinews of 
economic and social progress. This is espe- 
cially true of the United States and Latin 

We are greatly impressed by the steps that 
have been taken — the progress made by 
Latin America in recent years. We are also 
impressed by the high level of cooperation 
that has developed among the proudly inde- 
pendent nations of the Americas. 

In my judgment this has been an extremely 
valuable conference. We have set our pri- 
orities for the next stage. 

First, we have made some vital structural 
commitments. The fulfillment of these objec- 
tives will not only be a major accomplish- 
ment in its own right, but it will make pos- 
sible wide-ranging improvements presently 
beyond our reach. 

The Latin American Common Market, 
once achieved, will alter the whole economy 
of the hemisphere and vdll have consequences 
in every sector of social and political organi- 

Multinational projects, opening the way 
for the movement of people, goods, elec- 
tricity, will have a similar impact. 

Second, we have moved to deal with a num- 
ber of immediate problems: 

— to expand Latin American trade; 

— to modernize Latin American agricul- 
ture and increase food production to meet 
the needs of an expanding population; 

— to combat illiteracy and improve educa- 
tional systems; 

— to provide access to the latest scientific 
and technological developments and so to help 
bridge the "technological gap"; 

— to expand health measures so that the 
latest fruits of medical science will be at the 
disposal of all our people; 

— to eliminate unnecessary military spend- 

The first phase of the Alliance has been a 
success by any realistic standard. 

MAY 8, 1967 


The second phase is now under way. It will 
cut to the heart of the problem — the mod- 
ernization of overprotected Latin American 
industry, underfinanced Latin American 
agriculture and education. It will be difficult 
and demanding. It will require sustained 

The American people have responded 
generously to the needs of their fellow Amer- 
icans; and I am sure that our friends in Latin 
America realize that we can be depended 
upon in the long struggle that will follow, as 
we could in the beginning of the Alliance. 

I return to my country in good heart for 
this reason. I have met all of the Presidents 
of the Latin American Republics and the 
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. I 
am convinced that the leaders of Latin Amer- 
ica are serious and determined to develop 
their nations. And I believe the people of the 
United States will continue to respond to 
their efforts. 


The Presidents of the American States and the 
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Meet- 

Resolved to give more dynamic and concrete ex- 
pression to the ideals of Latin American unity and 
of solidarity among the peoples of America, which 
inspired the founders of their countries ; 

DeterminbH) to make this goal a reality within 
their own generation, in keeping with the economic, 
social and cultural aspirations of their peoples; 

Inspired by the principles underlying the inter- 
American system, especially those contained in the 
Charter of Punta del Este,' the Economic and Social 
Act of Rio de Janeiro,' and the Protocol of Buenos 
Aires amending the Charter of the Organization of 
American States; 

Conscious that the attainment of national and 
regional development objectives in Latin America 
is based essentially on self-help ; 

Convinced, however, that the achievement of 
those objectives requires determined collaboration 
by all their countries, complementary support 
through mutual aid, and expansion of external co- 
operation ; 

• For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462. 
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998. 

Pledged to give vigorous impetus to the Alliance 
for Progress and to emphasize its multilateral char- 
acter, with a view to encouraging balanced develop- 
ment of the region at a pace substantially faster 
than attained thus far; 

United in the intent to strengthen democratic 
institutions, to raise the living standards of their 
peoples and to assure their increased participation 
in the development process, creating for these pur- 
poses suitable conditions in the political, economic 
and social as well as labor fields ; 

Resolved to maintain a harmony of fraternal re- 
lations in the Americas, in which racial equality 
must be effective ; 


The solidarity of the countries they represent and 
their decision to achieve to the fullest measure the 
free, just, and democratic social order demanded by 
the peoples of the Hemisphere. 

Latin America will create a common market. 

The Presidents of the Latin American Repub- 
lics resolve to create progressively, beginning in 
1970, the Latin American Common Market, which 
shall be substantially in operation in a period of 
no more thr.n fifteen years. The Latin American 
Common Market will be based on the complete de- 
velopment and progressive convergence of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association and of the Cen- 
tral American Common Market, taking into account 
the interests of the Latin American countries not 
yet affiliated with these systems. This grreat task 
will reinforce historic bonds, will promote industrial 
development and the strengthening of Latin Amer- 
ican industrial enterprises, as well as more efficient 
production and new opportunities for employment, 
and will permit the region to play its deservedly 
significant role in world affairs. The ties of friend- 
ship among the peoples of the Continent will thus 
be strengthened. 

The President of the United States of Amer- 
ica, for his part, declares his firm support for this 
promising Latin American initiative. 

The Undersigned Presidents Affirm That: 

We will lay the physical foundations for Latin 
American economic integration through multina- 
tional projects. 

Economic integration demands a major sustained 
effort to build a land transportation network and 
to improve transportation systems of all kinds so 
as to open the way for the movement of both people 
and goods throughout the Continent; to establish an 
adequate and efficient telecommunications system; to 
install interconnected power systems; and to de- 
velop jointly international river basins, frontier re- 



gions, and economic areas which include the terri- 
tory of two or more countries. 

We will join in efforts to increase substantially 
Latin American foreign-trade earnings. 
To increase substantially Latin American foreign- 
trade earnings, individual and joint efforts shall be 
directed toward facilitating nondiscriminatory ac- 
cess of Latin American products in world markets, 
toward increasing Latin American earnings from 
traditional exports, toward avoiding frequent fluc- 
tuations in income from such commodities, and, 
finally, toward adopting measures that will stim- 
ulate exports of Latin American manufactured 

We will modernize the living conditions of our 
rural populations, raise agricultural productiv- 
ity in general, and increase food production for 
the benefit of both Latin America and the rest 
of the world. 

The living conditions of the rural workers and 
farmers of Latin America will be transformed, to 
guarantee their full participation in economic and 
social progress. For that purpose, integrated pro- 
grams of modernization, land settlement, and agrar- 
ian reform will be carried out as the countries so 
require. Similarly, productivity wall be improved and 
agricultural production diversified. Furthermore, 
recognizing that the Continent's capacity for food 
production entails a dual responsibility, a special 
effort will be made to produce sufficient food for the 
growing needs of their own peoples and to contribute 
toward feeding the peoples of other regions. 

We will vigorously promote education for de- 

To give a decisive impetus to education for de- 
velopment, literacy campaigns will be intensified, 
education at all levels will be greatly expanded, and 
its quality improved so that the rich human poten- 
tial of their peoples may make their maximum con- 
tribution to the economic, social, and cultural de- 
velopment of Latin America. Educational systems 
will be modernized taking full advantage of educa- 
tional innovations, and exchanges of teachers and 
students will be increased. 

We will harness science and technology for the 

service of our peoples. 

Latin America will share in the benefits of cur- 
rent scientific and technological progress so as to 
reduce the widening gap between it and the highly 
industrialized nations in the areas of production 
techniques and of living conditions. National scien- 
tific and technological programs will be developed 
and strengthened and a regional program will be 
started; multinational institutes for advanced train- 
ing and research will be established; existing insti- 
tutes of this kind in Latin America will at the same 

time be strengthened and contributions will be made 
to the exchange and advancement of technological 

We will expand programs for improving the 

health of the American peoples. 

The fundamental role of health in the economic 
and social development of Latin America demands 
that the prevention and control of communicable 
diseases be intensified and that measures be taken 
to eradicate those which can be completely elimi- 
nated by existing techniques. Also programs to sup- 
ply drinking water and other services essential to 
urban and rural environmental sanitation will be 
speeded up. 

Latin America will eliminate unnecessary mili- 
tary expenditures. 

The Presidents of the Latin American Re- 
publics, conscious of the importance of armed 
forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at 
the same time that the demands of economic de- 
velopment and social progress make it necessary to 
devote to those purposes the maximum resources 
available in Latin America. 

Therefore, they express their intention to limit 
military expenditures in proportion to the actual 
demands of national security in accordance with 
each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding 
those expenditures that are not indispensable for 
the performance of the specific duties of the armed 
forces and, where pertinent, of international com- 
mitments that obligate their respective governments. 
With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of 
Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the 
hope that it may enter into force as soon as possi- 
ble, once the requirements established by the Treaty 
are fulfilled. 

In Facing the Problems Considered in This 
Meeting, which constitute a challenge to the will of 
the American governments ' and peoples, the Presi- 
dents proclaim their faith in the basic purpose of 
the inter- American system: to promote in the Amer- 
icas free and democratic societies, existing under 
the rule of law, whose dynamic economies, reinforced 
by growing technological capabilities, will allow them 
to serve with ever-increasing effectiveness the 
peoples of the Continent, to whom they announce 
the following program. 

' When the term "Latin America" is used in this 
text, it is to be understood that it includes all the 
member states of the Organization of American 
States, except the United States of America. The 
term "Presidents" includes the Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The term "Continent" com- 
prises both the continental and insular areas. [Foot- 
note in original.] 

MAY 8, 1967 




Chapter I 

Latin American Economic Integration 

AND Industrial Development 

1. Principles, objectives, and goals 

Economic integration is a collective instrument 
for accelerating Latin American development and 
should constitute one of the policy goals of each of 
the countries of the region. The greatest possible 
efforts should be made to bring it about, as a neces- 
sary complement to national development plans. 

At the same time, the different levels of develop- 
ment and economic and market conditions of the 
various Latin American countries must be borne in 
mind, in order that the integration process may 
promote their harmonious and balanced growth. 
In this respect, the countries of relatively less eco- 
nomic development, and, to the extent required, those 
of insufficient market, will have preferential treat- 
ment in matters of trade and of technical and finan- 
cial cooperation. 

Integration must be fully at the service of Latin 
America. This requires the strengthening of Latin 
American enterprise through vigorous financial and 
technical support that will permit it to develop and 
supply the regional market efficiently. Foreign pri- 
vate enterprise will be able to fill an important func- 
tion in assuring achievement of the objectives of 
integration within the pertinent policies of each of 
the countries of Latin America. 

Adequate financing is required to facilitate the 
economic restructuring and adjustments called for 
by the urgent need to accelerate integration. 

It is necessary to adopt all measures that will 
lead to the completion of Latin American integra- 
tion, above all those that will bring about, in the 
shortest time possible, monetary stability and the 
elimination of all restrictions, including administra- 
tive, financial, and exchange restrictions, that ob- 
struct the trade of the products of the area. 

To these ends, the Latin American Presidents 
agree to take action on the following points: 

a. Beginning in 1970, to establish progressively 
the Latin American Common Market, which should 
be substantially in operation within a period of no 
more than fifteen years. 

b. The Latin American Common Market will be 
based on the improvement of the two existing in- 
tegration systems: the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA) and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM). The two systems will 
initiate simultaneously a process of convergence by 
stages of cooperation, closer ties, and integration, 
taking into account the interest of the Latin Amer- 
ican countries not yet associated with these sys- 
tems, in order to provide their access to one of them. 

c. To encourage the incorporation of other coun- 
tries of the Latin American region into the existing 
integration systems. 

2. Measures with regard to the Latin American 

Free Trade Association {LAFTA) 

The Presidents of the member states of LAFTA 
instruct their respective Ministers of Foreign Af- 
fairs, who wrill participate in the next meeting of 
the Council of Ministers of LAFTA, to be held in 
1967, to adopt the measures necessary to implement 
the following decisions : 

a. To accelerate the process of converting LAFTA 
into a common market. To this end, starting in 1970, 
and to be completed in a period of not more than 
fifteen years, LAFTA will put into effect a system 
of programmed elimination of duties and all other 
nontariff restrictions, and also a system of tariff 
harmonization, in order to establish progressively a 
common external tariff at levels that will promote 
efficiency and productivity, as well as the expansion 
of trade. 

b. To coordinate progressively economic policies 
and instruments and to harmonize national laws to 
the extent required for integration. These measures 
will be adopted simultaneously with the improve- 
ment of the integration process. 

c. To promote the conclusion of sectoral agree- 
ments for industrial complementation, endeavoring 
to obtain the participation of the countries of rela- 
tively less economic development. 

d. To promote the conclusion of temporary sub- 
regional agreements, with provision for reducing 
tariffs within the subregions and harmonizing treat- 
ments toward third nations more rapidly than in the 
general agreements, in keeping with the objectives 
of regional integration. Subregional tariff reduc- 
tions will not be extended to countries that are not 
parties to the subregional agreement, nor will they 
create special obligations for them. 

Participation of the countries of relatively less 
economic development in all stages of the integra- 
tion process and in the formation of the Latin Amer- 
ican Common Market will be based on the provisions 
of the Treaty of Montevideo and its complementary 
resolutions, and these countries will be given the 
greatest possible advantages, so that balanced de- 
velopment of the region may be achieved. 

To this same end, they have decided to promote 
immediate action to facilitate free access of prod- 
ucts of the LAFTA member countries of relatively 
less economic development to the market of the other 
LAFTA countries, and to promote the installation 
and financing in the former countries of industries 
intended for the enlarged market. 

The countries of relatively less economic develop- 
ment will have the right to participate and to obtain 
preferential conditions in the subregional agree- 
ments in which they have an interest. 



The situation of countries characterized as being 
of insufficient market shall be taken into account in 
temporary preferential treatments established, to the 
extent necessary to achieve a harmonious develop- 
ment in the integration process. 

It is understood that all the provisions set forth 
in this section fall within or are based upon the 
Treaty of Montevideo. 

3. Measures with regard to the Central American 

economic integration program 

The Presidents of the member states of the Cen- 
tral American Common Market commit themselves: 

a. To carry out an action program that vrill in- 
clude the following measures, among others: 

(1) Improvement of the customs union and estab- 
lishment of a Central American monetary union; 

(2) Completion of the regional network of infra- 
structure ; 

(3) Promotion of a common foreign-trade policy; 

(4) Improvement of the common market in agri- 
cultural products and implementation of a joint, co- 
ordinated industrial policy; 

(5) Acceleration of the process of free movement 
of manpower and capital within the area; 

(6) Harmonization of the basic legislation re- 
quired for economic integration. 

b. To apply, in the implementation of the forego- 
ing measures, and when pertinent, the temporary 
preferential treatment already established or that 
may be established, in accordance with the principle 
of balanced development among countries. 

c. To foster closer ties between Panama and the 
Central American Common Market, as well as rapid 
expansion of trade and investment relations with 
neighboring countries of the Central American and 
Caribbean region, taking advantage, to this end, of 
their geographic proximity and of the possibilities 
for economic complementation ; also, to seek conclu- 
sion of subregional agreements and agreements of 
industrial complementation between Central Amer- 
ica and other Latin American countries. 

4. Measures common to Latin American countries 

The Latin American Presidents commit them- 
selves : 

a. Not to establish new restrictions on trade among 
Latin American countries, except in special cases, 
such as those arising from equalization of tariffs 
and other instruments of trade policy, as well as 
from the need to assure the initiation or expansion 
of certain productive activities in countries of rela- 
tively less economic development. 

b. To establish, by a tariff cut or other equivalent 
measures, a margin of preference within the region 
for all products originating in Latin American coun- 
tries, taking into account the different degrees of 
development of the countries. 

c. To have the measures in the two preceding 

paragraphs applied immediately among the member 
countries of LAFTA, in harmony with the other 
measures referring to this organization contained 
in the present chapter and, insofar as possible, to 
extend them to nonmember countries in a manner 
compatible with existing international commitments, 
inviting the latter countries to extend similar pref- 
erence to the members of LAFTA, with the same 

d. To ensure that application of the foregoing 
measures shall not hinder internal readjustments de- 
signed to rationalize the instruments of trade policy 
made necessary in order to carry out national devel- 
opment plans and to achieve the goals of integration. 

e. To promote acceleration of the studies already 
initiated regarding preferences that LAFTA coun- 
tries might grant to imports from the Latin Ameri- 
can countries that are not members of the Associa- 

f. To have studies made of the possibility of con- 
cluding agreements of industrial complementation in 
which all Latin American countries may participate, 
as well as temporary subregional economic integra- 
tion agreements between the CACM and member 
countries of LAFTA. 

g. To have a committee established composed of 
the executive organs of LAFTA and the CACM to 
coordinate implementation of the foregoing points. 
To this end, the committee will encourage meetings 
at the ministerial level, in order to ensure that Latin 
American integration will proceed as rapidly as pos- 
sible, and, in due course, initiate negotiation of a 
general treaty or the protocols required to create 
the Latin American Common Market. Latin Ameri- 
can countries that are not members shall be invited 
to send representatives to these meetings and to 
those of the committee of the executive organs of 
LAFTA and the CACM. 

h. To give special attention to industrial develop- 
ment within integration, and particularly to the 
strengthening of Latin American industrial firms. In 
this regard, we reiterate that development must be 
balanced between investments for economic ends and 
investments for social ends. 

5. Measures common to member countries of the Or- 
ganization of American States (OAS) 
The Presidents of the member states of the OAS 

a. To mobilize financial and technical resources 
within and without the hemisphere to contribute to 
the solution of problems in connection with the bal- 
ance of payments, industrial readjustments, and re- 
training of the labor force that may arise from a 
rapid reduction of trade barriers during the period 
of transition toward the common market, as well as 
to increase the sums available for export credits in 
intra-Latin American trade. The Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank and the organs of both existing inte- 

MAY 8, 1967 


gration systems should participate in the mobiliza- 
tion of such resources. 

b. To mobilize public and private resources within 
and without the hemisphere to encourage industrial 
development as part of the integration process and 
of national development plans. 

c. To mobilize financial and technical resources to 
undertake specific feasibility studies on multinational 
projects for Latin American industrial firms, as well 
as to aid in carrying out these projects. 

d. To accelerate the studies being conducted by 
various inter-American agencies to promote strength- 
ening of capital markets and the possible establish- 
ment of a Latin American stock market. 

e. To make available to Central America, within 
the Alliance for Progress, adequate technical and 
financial resources, including those required for 
strengthening and expanding the existing Central 
American Economic Integration Fund, for the pur- 
pose of accelerating the Central American economic 
integration program. 

f. To make available, within the Alliance for Prog- 
ress and pursuant to the provisions of the Charter 
of Punta del Este, the technical and financial re- 
sources needed to accelerate the preparatory studies 
and work involved in converting LAFTA into a 
common market. 

Chapter II 

Multinational Action for Infrastructure 

The economic integration of ' Latin America de- 
mands a vigorous and sustained effort to complete 
and modernize the physical infrasti'ucture of the 
region. It is necessary to build a land transport 
network and improve all types of transport systems 
to facilitate the movement of persons and goods 
throughout the hemisphere; to establish an adequate 
and efficient telecommunications system and inter- 
connected power systems; and jointly to develop 
international watersheds, frontier regions and eco- 
nomic areas that include the territory of two or 
more countries. In Latin America there are in 
existence projects in all these fields, at different 
stages of preparation or implementation, but in 
many cases the completion of prior studies, finan- 
cial resources, or merely the coordination of efforts 
and the decision to bring them to fruition are lack- 

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS 
agree to engage in determined action to undertake 
or accelerate the construction of the infrastructure 
required for the development and integration of 
Latin America and to make better use thereof. In 
so doing, it is essential that the groups of inter- 
ested countries or multinational institutions deter- 
mine criteria for assigning priorities, in view of the 

amount of human and material resources needed for 
the task. 

As one basis for the criteria, which will be de- 
termined with precision upon consideration of the 
specific cases submitted for study, they stress the 
fundamental need to give preferential attention to 
those projects that benefit the countries of the re- 
gion that are at a relatively lower level of economic 

Priority should also be given to the mobilization 
of financial and technical resources for the prepara- 
tion and implementation of infrastructure projects 
that will facilitate the participation of landlocked 
countries in regional and international trade. 

In consequence, they adopt the following decisions 
for immediate implementation : 

1. To complete the studies and conclude the agree- 
ments necessary to accelerate the construction of 
an inter-American telecommunications network. 

2. To expedite the agreements necessary to com- 
plete the Pan American Highway, to accelerate the 
construction of the Bolivarian Highway (Carretera 
Marginal de la Selva) and its junction with the 
Trans-Chaco Highway and to support the studies 
and agreements designed to bring into being the 
new highway systems that will join groups of coun- 
tries of continental and insular Latin America, as 
well as the basic works required to develop water 
and airborne transport of a multinational nature 
and the corresponding systems of operation. As a 
complement to these agreements, negotiations should 
be undertaken for the purpose of eliminating or 
reducing to a minimum the restrictions on interna- 
tional traffic and of promoting technical and admin- 
istrative cooperation among land, water, and air 
transport enterprises and the establishment of mul- 
tinational transport services. 

3. To sponsor studies for preparing joint projects 
in connection with watersheds, such as the studies 
commenced on the development of the River Plate 
basin and that relating to the Gulf of Fonseca. 

4. To allocate sufficient resources to the Preinvest- 
ment Fund for Latin American Integration of 
the IDB for conducting studies that will make it 
possible to identify and prepare multinational proj- 
ects in all fields that may be of importance in 
promoting regional integration. In order that the 
aforesaid Fund may carry out an effective promo- 
tion effort, it is necessary that an adequate part of 
the resources allocated may be used without reim- 
bursement, or with reimbursement conditioned on 
the execution of the corresponding projects. 

5. To mobilize, within and outside the hemisphere, 
resources in addition to those that will continue to 
be placed at the disposal of the countries to sup- 
port national economic development programs, such 
resources to be devoted especially to the implemen- 
tation of multinational infrastructure projects that 



can represent important advances in the Latin 
American economic integration process. In this re- 
gard, the IDB should have additional resources in 
order to participate actively in the attainment of 
this objective. 

Chapter III 

Measures To Improve International Trade 
Conditions in Latin America 

The economic development of Latin America is 
seriously affected by the adverse conditions in 
which its international trade is carried out. Market 
structures, financial conditions, and actions that 
prejudice e.xports and other income from outside 
Latin America are impeding its growth and retard- 
ing the integration process. All this causes particu- 
lar concern in view of the serious and growing 
imbalance between the standard of living in Latin 
American countries and that of the industrialized 
nations and, at the same time, calls for definite 
decisions and adequate instruments to implement 
the decisions. 

Individual and joint efforts of the member states 
of the OAS are essential to increase the incomes 
of Latin American countries derived from, and 
to avoid frequent fluctuations in, traditional ex- 
ports, as well as to promote new exports. Such 
efforts are also essential to reduce any adverse 
effects on the external earnings of Latin American 
countries that may be caused by measures which 
may be taken by industrialized countries for bal- 
ance of payments reasons. 

The Charter of Punta del Este, the Economic 
and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro and the new 
provisions of the Charter of the OAS reflect a 
hemispheric agreement with regard to these prob- 
lems, which needs to be effectively implemented; 
therefore, the Presidents of the member states of 
the OAS agree: 

1. To act in coordination in multilateral negotia- 
tions to achieve, without the more highly developed 
countries' expecting reciprocity, the g:reatest possible 
reduction or the elimination of tariffs and other 
restrictions that impede the access of Latin Ameri- 
can products to world markets. The Government of 
the United States intends to make efforts for the 
purpose of liberalizing the conditions affecting ex- 
ports of basic products of special interest to Latin 
American countries, in accordance with the provi- 
sions of Article 37(a) of the Protocol of Buenos 

2. To consider together possible systems of gen- 
eral nonreciprocal preferential treatment for ex- 
ports of manufactures and semimanufactures of the 
developing countries, with a view to improving the 
condition of the Latin American export trade. 

3. To undertake a joint effort in all international 

institutions and organizations to eliminate discrimi- 
natory preferences against Latin American exports. 

4. To strengthen the system of intergovernmental 
consultations and carry them out sufficiently in 
advance, so as to render them effective and ensure 
that programs for placing and selling surpluses and 
reserves that affect the exports of the developing 
countries take into account the interests of the 
Latin American countries. 

5. To ensure compliance with international com- 
mitments to refrain from introducing or increasing 
tariff and nontariff barriers that affect exports of 
the developing countries, taking into account the 
interests of Latin America. 

6. To combine efforts to strengthen and perfect 
existing international agreements, particularly the 
International Coffee Agreement, to obtain favorable 
conditions for trade in basic products of interest to 
Latin America and to explore all possibilities for the 
development of new agreements. 

7. To support the financing and prompt initiation 
of the activities of the Coffee Diversification Fund, 
and consider in due course the creation of other 
funds to make it possible to control the production 
of basic products of interest to Latin America in 
which there is a chronic imbalance between supply 
and demand. 

8. To adopt measures to make Latin American ex- 
port products more competitive in world markets. 

9. To put in operation as soon as possible an inter- 
American agency for export promotion that vdll 
help to identify and develop new export lines and 
to strengthen the placing of Latin American prod- 
ucts in international markets, and to improve na- 
tional and regional agencies designed for the same 

10. To initiate such individual or joint action on 
the part of the member states of the OAS as may 
be required to ensure effective and timely execution 
of the foregoing agrreements, as well as those that 
may be required to continue the execution of the 
agreements contained in the Charter of Punta del 
Este, in particular those relating to foreign trade. 

With regard to joint action, the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and 
other agencies in the region shall submit to the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council (lA- 
ECOSOC), for consideration at its next meeting, the 
means, instruments, and action program for initiat- 
ing execution thereof. 

At its annual meetings, lA-ECOSOC shall exam- 
ine the progress of the programs under way with 
the object of considering such action as may ensure 
compliance with the agreements concluded, inasmuch 
as a substantial improvement in the international 
conditions in which Latin American foreign trade 
is carried on is a basic prerequisite to the accelera- 
tion of economic development. 

MAY 8, 1967 


Chapter IV 

Modernization of Rural Life and Increase of 

Agricultural Productivity, Principally 

of Food 

In order to promote a rise in the standard of liv- 
ing of farmers and an improvement in the condition 
of the Latin American rural people and their full 
participation in economic and social life, it is neces- 
sary to give greater dynamism to agriculture in 
Latin America, through comprehensive programs 
of modernization, land settlement, and agrarian re- 
form when required by the countries. 

To achieve these objectives and to carry out these 
programs, contained in the Charter of Punta del 
Este, it is necessary to intensify internal efforts and 
to provide additional external resources. 

Such progn*ams vdll be oriented toward increas- 
ing food production in the Latin American coun- 
tries in sufficient volume and quality to provide ade- 
quately for their population and to meet world needs 
for food to an ever-increasing extent, as well as 
toward improving agricultural productivity and 
toward a diversification of crops, which will assure 
the best possible competitive conditions for such pro- 

All these development efforts in agriculture must 
be related to the overall development of the national 
economies in order to harmonize the supply of agri- 
cultural products and the labor that could be freed 
as a result of the increase in farm productivity 
with the increase in demand for such products and 
with the need for labor in the economy as a whole. 

This modernization of agricultural activities will 
furthermore create conditions for a development 
more in balance with the effort toward industrializa- 

To achieve these goals, the Latin American Presi- 
dents undertake : 

1. To improve the formulation and execution of 
agricultural policies and to ensure the carrying out 
of plans, programs, and projects for preinvestment, 
agricultural development, agrarian reform, and land 
settlement, adequately coordinated with national 
economic development plans, in order to intensify 
internal efforts and to facilitate obtaining and utiliz- 
ing external financing. 

2. To improve credit systems, including those ear- 
marked for the resettlement of rural workers who 
are beneficiaries of agrarian reform, and for in- 
creased productivity, and to create facilities for the 
production, marketing, storage, transportation, and 
distribution of agricultural products. 

3. To provide adequate incentives, including price 
incentives, to promote agricultural production under 
economic conditions. 

4. To foster and to finance the acquisition and in- 
tensive use of those agricultural inputs which con- 
tribute to the improvement of productivity, as well 

as the establishment and expansion of Latin Amer- 
ican industries producing agricultural inputs, par- 
ticularly fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural 

5. To ensure the adequacy of tax systems that 
affect the agricultural sector, so that they may con- 
tribute to the increase of productivity, more pro- 
duction, and better land distribution. 

6. To expand substantially programs of special- 
ized education and research and of agricultural ex- 
tension, in order to improve the training of the rural 
worker and the education of technical and profes- 
sional personnel, and, also, to intensify animal and 
plant sanitation campaigrns. 

7. To provide incentives and to make available 
financial resources for the industrialization of agri- 
cultural production, especially through the develop- 
ment of small and medium industry and the promo- 
tion of exports of processed agricultural products. 

8. To facilitate the establishment of multinational 
or international programs that will make it possible 
for Latin America to supply a larger proportion of 
world food needs. 

9. To foster national programs of community de- 
velopment and of self-help for small-scale farmers, 
and to promote the creation and strengthening of 
agricultural cooperatives. 

By recognizing the importance of the stated ob- 
jectives, goals and means, the Presidents of the 
member states of the OAS undertake, vdthin the 
spirit of the Alliance for Progress, to combine in- 
tensified internal efforts with additional external 
support especially earmarked for such measures. 

They call upon CIAP, when analyzing the agri- 
cultural sector as included in national development 
plans, to bear in mind the objectives and measures 
indicated herein, g^iving due attention to agrarian 
reform programs in those countries that consider 
these programs an important basis for their agri- 
cultural progress and economic and social develop- 

Chapter V 

Educational, Technological, and Scientific 

Development and Intensification of 

Health Programs 

A. Education and Culture 

Education is a sector of high priority in the over- 
all development policy of Latin American nations. 

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS 
recognize that, during the past decade, there has 
been development of educational services in Latin 
America unparalleled in any other period of the his- 
tory of their countries. 

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that: 

a. It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of 
national efforts in the field of education ; 



b. Educational systems should be more adequately 
adjusted to the demands of economic, social, and cul- 
tural development; 

c. International cooperation in educational mat- 
ters should be considerably intensified, in accord- 
ance with the new standards of the Charter of the 

To these ends, they agree to improve educational 
administrative and planning systems; to raise the 
quality of education so as to stimulate the creativ- 
ity of each pupil; to accelerate expansion of educa- 
tional systems at all levels; and to assign priority to 
the following activities related to economic, social, 
and cultural development: 

1. Orientation and, when necessary, reorganiza- 
tion of educational systems, in accordance with the 
needs and possibilities of each country, in order to 
achieve : 

a. The expansion and progressive improvement 
of preschool education and extension of the period 
of general education ; 

b. An increase in the capacity of secondary schools 
and the improvement of their curricula ; 

c. An increase in opportunities following general 
education, including opportunities for learning a 
trade or a specialty or for continuing general educa- 

d. The gradual elimination of barriers between 
vocational and general education; 

e. The expansion and diversification of univer- 
sity courses, so that they vnW include the new pro- 
fessions essential to economic and social develop- 

f. The establishment or expansion of graduate 
courses through professional schools ; 

g. The establishment of refresher courses in all 
branches and types of education, so that graduates 
may keep their knowledge up to date in this era of 
rapid scientific and technological prog^ress; 

h. The strengthening and expansion of adult edu- 
cation programs ; 

1. The promotion of special education for excep- 
tional students. 

2. Promotion of basic and advanced training for 
teachers and administrative personnel; development 
of educational research and experimentation, and 
adequate expansion of school building programs. 

3. Broadening of the use of educational television 
and other modern teaching techniques. 

4. Improvement of rural elementary schools to 
achieve a level of quality equal to that of urban 
elementary schools, with a view to assuring equal 
educational opportunities to the rural population. 

5. Reorganization of vocational education, when 
necessary, taking into account the structure of the 
labor force and the foreseeable manpower needs of 
each country's development plan. 

6. An increase in private financing of education. 

7. Encouragement of local and regional communi- 
ties to take an effective part in the construction of 
school buildings and in civic support to educational 

8. A substantial increase in national scholarship 
and student loan and aid programs. 

9. Establishment or expansion of extension serv- 
ices and services for preserving the cultural heritage 
and encouraging intellectual and artistic activity. 

10. Strengthening of education for international 
understanding and Latin American integration. 

Multinational efforts 

1. Increasing international resources for the pur- 
poses set forth in this chapter. 

2. Instructing the appropriate agencies of the 
OAS to: 

a. Provide technical assistance to the countries 
that so request: 

i) In educational research, experimentation, and 
innovation ; 

ii) For training of specialized personnel; 

iii) In educational television. It is recommended 
that study be made of the advisability of es- 
tablishing a multinational training center in 
this field; 

b. Organize meetings of experts to recommend 
measures to bring national curricula into harmony 
with Latin American integration goals; 

c. Organize regional volunteer teacher programs; 

d. Extend inter-American cooperation to the pres- 
ervation and use of archeological, historic, and ar- 
tistic monuments. 

3. Expansion of OAS programs for fellowships, 
student loans, and teacher exchange. 

National educational and cultural development ef- 
forts will be evaluated in coordination by CIAP and 
the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, 
and Culture (now the Inter- American Cultural Coun- 

B. Science and technology 

Advances in scientific and technological knowledge 
are changing the economic and social structure of 
many nations. Science and technology offer infinite 
possibilities for providing the people with the well- 
being that they seek. But in Latin American coun- 
tries the potentialities that this wealth of the modern 
world offers have by no means been realized to the 
degree and extent necessary. 

Science and technology offer genuine instruments 
for Latin American progress and must be given an 
unprecedented impetus at this time. This effort calls 
for inter- American cooperation, in view of the mag- 
nitude of the investments required and the level at- 
tained in such knowledge. In the same way, their 
organization and implementation in each country 
cannot be effected without a properly planned scien- 
tific and technological policy within the general 
framework of development. 

MAY 8, 1967 


For the above reasons the Presidents of the mem- 
ber states of the OAS agree upon the following 
measures : 

Internal efforts 

Establishment, in accordance with the needs and 
possibilities of each country, of national policies in 
the field of science and technology, with the neces- 
sary machinery and funds, the main elements of 
which shall be: 

1. Promotion of professional training for scien- 
tists and technicians and an increase in their num- 

2. Establishment of conditions favoring full uti- 
lization of the scientific and technological potential 
for solving the economic and social problems of Latin 
America, and to prevent the exodus of persons quali- 
fied in these fields. 

3. Encouragement of increased private financial 
contributions for scientific and technological research 
and teaching. 

Multinational efforts 

1. Establishment of a Regional Scientific and 
Technological Development Program designed to ad- 
vance science and technology to a degree that they 
will contribute substantially to accelerating the eco- 
nomic development and well-being of their peoples 
and make it feasible to engage in pure and applied 
scientific research of the highest possible quality. 
This Program shall complement Latin American 
national programs in the area of science and tech- 
nology and shall take special account of the char- 
acteristics of each of the countries. 

2. The Progrram shall be oriented toward the 
adoption of measures to promote scientific and tech- 
nological research, teaching, and information ; basic 
and advanced training of scientific personnel ; and 
exchange of information. If shall promote inten- 
sively the transfer to, and adaptation by, the Latin 
American countries of knowledge and technologies 
originating in other regions. 

3. The Program shall be conducted through na- 
tional agencies responsible for scientific and techno- 
logical policy, through institutions — national or in- 
ternational, public or private — either now existing 
or to be established in the future. 

4. As part of the Program, they propose that 
multinational technological and scientific training 
and research institutions at the post-graduate level 
be established, and that institutions of this nature 
already existing in Latin America be strengthened. 
A group, composed of high-ranking, qualified per- 
sons, experienced in science, technology, and uni- 
versity education, shall be established to make rec- 
ommendations to the Inter-American Council for 
Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter- 
American Cultural Council) on the nature of such 
multinational institutions, including such matters as 
their organization, the characteristics of their multi- 
national administration, financing, location, coordi- 

nation of their activities among themselves and 
with those of pertinent national institutions, and on 
the other aspects of their operation. The aforemen- 
tioned group, selected and convoked by the Inter- 
American Council for Education, Science, and Cul- 
ture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council) or, 
failing this, by CIAP, shall meet within 120 days 
after the close of this meeting. 

5. In order to encourage the training of scientific 
and technological personnel at the higher academic 
levels, they resolve that an Inter-American Fund 
for Scientific and Technological Training shall be 
established as part of the Program, so that scientists 
and research workers from Latin American coun- 
tries may pursue advanced scientific and technolog- 
ical studies, with the obligation to engage in a period 
of scientific work in Latin America. 

6. The Program shall be promoted by the Inter- 
American Council for Education, Science, and Cul- 
ture (now the Inter- American Cultural Council) , in 
cooperation with CIAP. They shall coordinate their 
activities with similar activities of the United Na- 
tions and other interested organizations. 

7. The program may be financed by contributions 
of the member states of the inter-American system, 
inter-American or international institutions, techno- 
logically advanced countries, universities, founda- 
tions, and private individuals. 

C. Health 

Improvement of health conditions is fundamental 
to the economic and social development of Latin 

Available scientific knowledge makes it possible 
to obtain specific results, which, in accordance with 
the needs of each country and the provisions of the 
Charter of Punta del Este, should be utilized to 
attain the following objectives: 

a. Control of communicable diseases and eradica- 
tion of those for which methods for total elimina- 
tion exist. Pertinent programs shall receive inter- 
national coordination when necessary. 

b. Acceleration of programs for providing drink- 
ing-water supplies, sewerage, and other services 
essential to environmental sanitation in rural and 
urban areas, giving preference to lower-income 
groups. On the basis of studies carried out and with 
the cooperation of international financing agencies, 
national revolving fund systems shall be used to 
assure the continuity of such programs. 

c. Greater and more rapid progress in improv- 
ing nutrition of the neediest groups of the popula- 
tion, taking advantage of all possibilities offered 
by national effort and international cooperation. 

d. Promotion of intensive mother and child wel- 
fare programs and of educational programs on over- 
all family guidance methods. 

e. Priority for basic and advanced training of 
professional, technical, administrative, and auxiliary 
personnel, and support of operational and adminis- 



trative research in the field of health. 

f. Incorporation, as early as the preinvestment 
phase, of national and regional health programs into 
general development plans. 

The Presidents of the member states of the OAS, 
therefore, decide: 

1. To expand, within the framework of general 
planning, the preparation and implementation of 
national plans that will strengthen infrastructure 
in the field of health. 

2. To mobilize internal and external resources to 
meet the needs for financing these plans. In this 
connection, to call upon CIAP, when analyzing the 
health sector in national development programs, to 
take into account the objectives and needs indicated. 

3. To call upon the Pan American Health Orga- 
nization to cooperate with the governments in the 
preparation of specific programs relating to these 

Chapter VI 

Elimination of Unnecessary Military 

The Latin American Presidents, conscious of the 
importance of the armed forces in maintaining 
security, at the same time recog^iize that the de- 
mands of economic development and social progress 
make it necessary to apply the maximum resources 
available in Latin America to these ends. 

Consequently, they express their intention to 
limit military expenditures in proportion to the ac- 
tual demands of national security, in accordance 
with each country's constitutional provisions, avoid- 
ing those expenditures that are not indispensable 
for the performance of the specific duties of the 
armed forces and, where pertinent, of international 
commitments that obligate their respective govern- 

With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of 
Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the 
hope that it may enter into force as soon as possi- 
ble, once the requirements established by the Treaty 
are fulfilled. 

Done at Punta del Este, Urug^uay, in the English, 
French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages, this 
Pan American Day, the fourteenth of April of the 
year one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven, the 
seventy-seventh anniversary of the founding of the 
inter-American system. 

List of Signatories to the 

Declaration of the Presidents of America 

(In the order of signing) 

Juan Carlos Ongania 

Presidente de la Republica Argentina 

Arthur da Costa e Silva 

Presidente de Republica do Brasil 

Carlos Lleras Restrepo 
Presidente de la Republica de Colombia 

Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez 

Presidente de la Republica de Costa Rica 

Eduardo Frei Montalva 

Presidente de la Republica de Chile 

Fidel Sanchez Hernandez 

Presidente Electo de la Republica de El Salvador 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

President of the United States of America 

Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro 

Presidente de la Republica de Guatemala 

Arthur Bonhomme 

Representant du President de la Republique d' Haiti 

OswALDO Lopez Arellano 

Presidente de la Republica de Honduras 

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 

Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 

Lorenzo Guerrero 

Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua 

Marco A. Robles 

Presidente de la Republica de Panamd 

Alfredo Stroessner 

Presidente de la Republica del Paraguay 

Fernando Belaunde Terry 

Presidente de la Republica del Peru 

Joaquin Balaguer 

Presidente de la Republica Dominicana 

Eric Williams 
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago 

Raul Leoni 

Presidente de la Republica de Venezuela 

Oscar Diego Gestido 

Presidente de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay 


President Johnson 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State 
Henry A. Hoyt, Ambassador to Uruguay 
William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for Inter- 
national Development 
Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative on the Council 

of the Organization of American States 
Leonard H. Marks, Director, United States Infor- 
mation Agency 
Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President 
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 
George E. Christian, I*ress Secretary to the President 
Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State 

for Economic Affairs 
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Inter- American Affairs 
W. True Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the 

David Bronheim, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the 
Alliance for Progress 

MAY 8, 1967 


Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference 
and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press" 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rusk on April 16 on the Na- 
tional Broadcasting Company's television 
and radio program "Meet the Press." Inter- 
viewing the Secretary were John Hightoiver 
of the Associated Press, Philip Potter of the 
Baltimore Sun, Ray Scherer of NBC News, 
and Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent mem- 
ber of the "Meet the Press" panel. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the history of 
Latin America is full of pacts and promises 
to bring social and economic reform or 
change. Why do you think this latest agree- 
ment at Punta del Este will succeed where 
the others have fallen so far short in the 

Secretary Rusk: I think, in the first place, 
at Punta the Presidents of Latin America 
committed themselves to move toward a com- 
mon market for Latin America. This is a 
major decision, perhaps the most important 
decision they will have made since they be- 
came independent states, and I was im- 
pressed with the seriousness of their deter- 
mination on this point. 

Further, I think there are solid accom- 
plishments already in the Alliance for 
Progress, but everyone, I think, recognizes 
that time is running short, that this total ef- 
fort must be stepped up; and I think our 
Latin American friends understood that on 
their side as well as on our side. The notion 
that this next 10 years must be a decade of 
urgency is one that was generally accepted 
and came out in the speeches of the Latin 
American Presidents. 

I was impressed with the fact that there 
was so little empty rhetoric. There was some 

very serious discussion of some very im- 
portant practical problems. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, what relevance 
does a common market that isn't started 
until 1970 and isn't going to be in real opera- 
tion until 1985 have to the very serious and 
immediate problems of Latin America: 
poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, lack of 
liberties ? 

Secretary Rusk: There are two different 
parts of it. One has to do with the develop- 
ment that goes on in each country. I have 
no doubt that this great development effort 
will be stepped up, but as far as the common 
market is concerned, there are certain things 
they will begin doing immediately. 

For example, they have agreed that they 
will not interpose any additional restrictions 
on trade among themselves. Now, that is a 
negative decision but it is an important one. 

Secondly, between now and 1970 they will 
begin to create some margins of preference 
within the inter-American countries in their 
own tariff structure. But I would like to 
emphasize that this is an extremely complex 
problem in putting together the economies of 
some 19 or 20 countries. 

Mr. Spivak: What do you consider are 
some of the major problems they face in 
bringing the common market into execution? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, one of the problems 
is that there are countries in the common 
market at different stages of development. 
Even within South America alone there are 
three that are relatively underdeveloped — 
Paraguay, for example, Ecuador. There are 
others who are called countries of limited 
markets, countries like Colombia, Venezuela, 



Uruguay, Chile; and there are the three ad- 
vanced countries of Brazil, Argentina, and 

Now, it isn't easy to mesh countries to- 
gether into a single economy that are in dif- 
ferent stages of development, and so they 
will be taking some time between now and 
1970 to put together the machinery of the 
common market. My guess is that if they 
will work very hard they can just about make 
it, but it is not the kind of decision that 
can be made overnight. 

Opportunities of Economic Coalition 

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, so many 
of the Latin American countries have been 
unable to solve their individual problems. Is 
there any reason to think they can solve 
their joint problems by going into a conti- 
nentwide market? Are you merging strength, 
or are you merging weakness? 

Secretary Rusk: I think the key point to 
bear in mind is that economic integration in 
Latin America will surely contribute to a 
rapid industrial development, based upon the 
prospect of a market that now would contain 
some 250 million people and by another 30 
years might be a market of 500 million peo- 
ple. That makes it possible for industries to 
establish themselves with quite different 
opportunities than they now face with more 
limited national markets if they are con- 
templating investment in Latin America. 
This would apply also to the mobilization of 
their local resources. 

I think also the Latin American countries 
are getting into a position to help each other 
more. Mexico, for example, is contributing 
very strongly in the economic — in the tech- 
nical and scientific field to other countries in 
'Xiatin America; Chile is training economists; 
Brazil is training doctors; Mexico and Colom- 
bia are providing improved seed. And I 
think as they move toward economic coalition 
there will be many more opportunities open- 
ing up for them and for outsiders than would 
be true if they remained, say, 20 national 

Mr. Hightoiver: The next question relates 
to how the United States may be able to assist 

in this process. Does the President intend to 
go through with his plan of asking Congress 
for additional funds for assistance to Latin 
America, and if so, how much? 

Secretary Rusk: We have indicated we 
would hope this year to replenish the Fund 
for Special Operations of the Inter-American 
Bank at a somewhat higher level, the range 
of $300 million instead of $250 million, in 
order that that additional money can be used 
in these multinational projects, such as con- 
necting highways and telecommunications 
systems and projects of that sort, to provide 
some of the physical basis for economic inte- 

Then we will be asking for an increased 
appropriation this year to the Alliance for 

The third principal source of possible aid 
would come in 1969 to 1970 in connection 
with the possibility of some fund in support 
of the common market itself, but that is a 
long time off yet. 

Mr. Hightower: Our present aid is running 
at the rate of about $1 billion a year to Latin 

Secretary Rusk: Just over a billion dollars 
from all sources. 

Mr. Hightower: Is the idea that in the next 
year or so this might go up to $1.3 billion or 
a billion and a half? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the President has 
indicated to the Congress that this year we 
will expect to increase our appropriation to 
the Alliance for Progress by $100 million 
and next year by $200 million. 

Mr. Potter: Before going to that Summit 
Conference you tried to get a resolution 
through Congress of support for our position 
there and it was amended to the point where 
administration spokesmen said it was worse 
than useless. How, in view of that, do you 
anticipate getting more money out of Con- 
gress for increased spending that the Presi- 
dent has promised — 

Secretary Rusk: I think in the first place 
this question of a resolution in the Congress 
got caught up in a procedural debate as to 
how the President and the Congress should 
consult each other and whether the Congress 

MAY 8, 1967 


itself ought to come up with a resolution in 
advance of a commitment of this sort. 

Now, as you may recall, when President 
Johnson was Majority Leader he helped 
President Eisenhower get an almost immedi- 
ate resolution in the Congress in support of 
a $500 million additional Latin American 
effort that was agreed to at Bogota in 1960. 
And the President felt that it would be im- 
portant for him to know what the Congress 
had to say on this matter before he went to 
the conference. Now, the House of Repre- 
sentatives expressed itself. The resolution in 
the Senate more or less left the situation as 
it would have been had the President simply 
gone on his own without consulting the Con- 

But in that discussion a number of the Sen- 
ators who had apparently some doubts about 
the procedure expressed their support for an 
increased effort in Latin America and more 
or less encouraged us to go ahead in the con- 
fidence that the Congress would probably 
back us up after we hear from the Latin 
Americans as to what they wanted to do. 

• • • • • 

Mr. Potter: Why didn't the population ex- 
plosion, which is the world's worst, figure in 
the context of the conference there ? 

Secretary Rusk: Quite frankly, Mr. Potter, 
I think that these countries could do more 
about it if we talked as little about it as pos- 
sible. Some of them are taking steps in that 
direction, but they prefer to take them 
quietly rather than create a great national 
debate — as we would have had in our own 
country, say, 25 or 30 years ago. 

Recognition of Importance of Seif-Help 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, again on the 
question of the resolution, some observers 
have made the point that perhaps it was an 
unintended blessing that the Senate did not 
give the President that resolution, that it 
tended to put the emphasis at the conference 
on self-help. Could you go along with that 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't want to go 
through a postmortem now on the resolution, 
because we know where we are now and we 
go on from here and get our job done; but I 
think the notion that development turns 
critically upon self-help has been getting 
around the hemisphere in a very realistic 
fashion for a period of some months. The 
Latin American press has reflected that in 
relation to this particular meeting, and this 
is understandable. External assistance to 
Latin America will be in the order of perhaps 
up to 2 percent of their gross national prod- 
uct. What they do with the 98 percent of 
their gross national product will determine 
their success or failure in development, and 
this is beginning to get across in Latin Amer- 
ica. And so I was very pleased there was such 
strong insistence by the Latin Americans 
themselves on self-help and a recognition that 
that is a necessary preliminary to anything 
that external aid could do. 

Mr. Scherer: President [Oscar D.] Gestido 
of Uruguay said that the conference turned 
out better than he expected. What do you sup- 
pose he meant by that? 

Major Decisions Reached 

Secreta)"ij Rusk: I have participated in the 
preliminary meetings of the Foreign Min- 
isters on at least two occasions, and we did 
not know to what extent the different coun- 
tries would be willing to put aside their bi- 
lateral problems or the smaller technical 
problems in order to come together on the 
great strategic issues of the hemisphere in 
the economic and social field. Well, I was 
pleased that at the meeting of the Presidents, 
the Presidents gave their attention to those 
things which were genuinely of Presidential 
importance, and they did not pursue some of 
the technical details which have been raised 
in the Foreign Ministers meeting; and I think 
if you looked at the connection between the 
advance preparations on the one side and the 
results of the meeting on the other you would 
see what President Gestido had in mind. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, everybody is 



calling: this conference a success. How many 
years will it be before we know it really was 
the success it seemed to be; when will iirog- 
ress toward a common market be measur- 

Secretary/ Rusk: I think we can see some 
beginning of that now, but I think we would 
not know until about 1969 or 1970 whether 
they will be able to agree on the machinery 
and the basic principles of the common mar- 
ket that would be necessary for it to get 
started. This involves marrying the LAFTA 
[Latin American Free Trade Association] 
common market in South America with the 
Central American Common Market without 
having one get in the way of the other. As I 
say, this is a very complicated matter and it 
will take a lot of work, but it will be about 
1969 or '70 before we can see the major de- 
cisions reached which will put the common 
market into business. 

Effect of Antiwar Demonstrations 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to take 
you to Viet-Nam for a question or two. We 
had huge demonstrations again yesterday. 
Do you think these demonstrations are hav- 
ing an effect in North Viet-Nam? Do you 
think that they are prolonging the war in 

Secretary Rusk: Well, these have been 
called "huge." I suppose they are large, but 
I'emember, we have a population of almost 
200 million people and those who speak for 
the 200 million Americans are the President 
and the Congress on such issues. We have in 
our constitutional system an opportunity for 
lawful and peaceful expression. I am con- 
cerned, Mr. Spivak, that the authorities in 
Hanoi may misunderstand this sort of thing 
and that the net effect of these demonstra- 
tions will be to prolong the war and not to 
shorten it. You see, if we heard that 100,000 
people were marching in Hanoi for peace, we 
would draw very important conclusions from 
it. Now, we don't know whether Hanoi is suf- 
ficiently sophisticated to understand that this 
is not the way the American people come to 

their decisions and that these demonstrations 
will not affect the conduct of the war. 

Mi: Spivak: Mr. Secretary, we have had 
these divisions of opinion before, and we 
have had wars before; but I think you must 
agree that these are demonstrations and the 
opposition is much greater than it has been 
in the past. What is your explanation for 
these demonstrations in this country and in 
other areas of the world? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am not sure that, 
in terms of numbers, these expressions of 
dissent are larger than we have had in other 
wars. That is a matter that the historians 
can check up on some day. But I would think 
that part of it is that half the American 
people can now no longer remember World 
War II or the events that led up to it, and the 
great central question of our day. How do 
you organize a durable peace? is slipping into 
the background. And if we get our eyes off 
of that question, I don't know where the 
human race comes out. Because it is im- 
portant to us in organizing a durable peace 
in the Pacific that the commitments of the 
United States be respected by us and by 
others. And if we once start down the trail 
that we started down in the thirties, if you 
try to get a little peace by giving away one 
little country at a time and giving the ag- 
gressors the idea that they can get away 
with aggression with impunity, then there 
is going to be no peace. 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I think the his- 
torians were right that we had nothing like 
this either in the First World War or in the 
Second World War. Do you think that these, 
as some people think, that these are Com- 
munist-inspired, that these demonstrations — 

Secretary Rusk: I have no doubt at all that 
the Communist apparatus is very busy indeed 
in these operations all over the world and in 
our own country, but I do not mean to say 
by that that all those who have objections to 
the war in Viet-Nam are Communists. But 
the worldwide Communist movement is work- 
ing very hard on this. 

Mr. Spivak: Do we have evidence of that? 

MAY 8, 1967 


Secretary Rusk: I am giving you my re- 
sponsible personal view that the Communist 
apparatus is working very hard on it. 

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, the United 
States now for a year and a half has brought 
enormous military power to bear against 
Communist forces in South Viet-Nam. Are 
these forces now getting weaker or stronger 
or holding their own ? 

Military Situation in Viet-Nam 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have a good deal 
of evidence, from prisoners and from docu- 
ments and from what we know of their de- 
plojonents, that the other side is having con- 
siderable difficulty in maintaining their 
forces, in giving them supply, keeping up 
their morale. They have encountered real 
problems in dealing with such things as the 
mobility of our own forces through heli- 
copters and the massive firepower which we 
can bring to bear if necessary. 

That does not mean, however, in a guer- 
rilla situation that the matter can be wound 
up quickly, overnight, just through military 
means. It does indicate, however, that the 
kind of war that involves large units in fixed 
battle clearly is not on as far as the other side 
is concerned. 

No, I think we have seen some very favor- 
able signs that we are making headway on 
the military side, but that does not mean that 
the war is just about over. 

Mr. Hightower: Can you say more specifi- 
cally what you mean, sir, when you say this 
kind of large-unit war is not on? Is it not 
possible, for example, to have a major en- 
gagement of large units somewhere south of 
the demilitarized zone? 

Secretary Rusk: It is possible. This is par- 
ticularly true in the far north where some 
three or four divisions of North Vietnamese 
forces are in the vicinity of the demilitarized 
zone. But the massed firepower that can be 
brought to bear by the Allied forces would 
make this, I think, a very unremunerative 
undertaking for the other side, and there is 
some reason to think from the captured 

documents that we have seen that they also 
agree that this is not their best way of 

Mr. Hightower: If you treat the conflict as 
having a conventional warfare element and a 
guerrilla warfare element and keep these two 
very distinct, are you suggesting it would be 
possible, as I think Ambassador [Henry 
Cabot] Lodge has suggested, to win and con- 
clude the conventional warfare aspect of this 
conflict this year? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am reluctant to 
put dates on, but I would think we made very, 
very substantial headway during 1966 on the 
conventional type of warfare. Now, the paci- 
fication effort against the guerrillas is almost 
by nature a slower task, because it means 
winkling out these people in the countryside 
and in the mountains under conditions where 
it is very hard to find them, quite apart from 
dealing with them. But that is beginning to 
move now, and I think that behind the cover 
of the military success against the large 
units can come an increased pace against the 
guerrillas. I must say I have been impressed 
by the doubling of the rate of defectors from 
the other side. Thus far in 1967 that is double 
1966, which in turn had doubled over 1965, 
and I think that is a very important indi- 
cator of what is happening on the other side. 

Mr. Potter: Mr. Rusk, the Reverend Martin 
Luther King said yesterday at this antiwar 
rally in New York City that the Viet-Nam 
conflict is bringing us into increasing scorn 
around the globe. Is that your reading? Is 
there validity to that statement? 

Secretary Rusk: No, that is not my under- 
standing, and I doubt that other people 
around the globe have elected anyone here as 
their particular spokesman on that. 

We have no doubt about the attitude of the 
free nations of Asia on this point, for exam- 
ple. We know that there are demonstrations 
in Europe; but I think our friends in Europe 
know that, from their own point of view, the 
integrity of the United States in a security 
treaty is very important for Europe. The 
governments there understand that, and they 



also understand that the United States 
inescapably must be deeply concerned about 
the orofanization of peace in the Pacific. We 
are not a one-ocean country. We look upon 
our commitments in the North Atlantic as 
very fundamental, but we also are concerned 
with our allies in the Pacific, and I think 
there is broad understanding for this point 
of view. I would hope that people here would 
let these other nations and other people speak 
for themselves and not come to too rapid a 
conclusion about what they might think about 
this situation. 

Mr. Potter: Do you think that a trip by the 
President to Europe might be advisable to 
kill this idea that we are not acceptable over 

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to go into 
that. The Vice President has had a very suc- 
cessful visit there recently, and I wouldn't 
want to pick up the question as to whether 
there should be an immediate sequel. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, how disturbed 
is this Government over the mounting indi- 
cations that Peking and Moscow have put 
aside their differences to assure a flow of 
arms to Hanoi ? 

Secretary Riisk: The political differences 
between Moscow and Peking continue to be 
very deep and very serious. We do not yet 
know to what extent there is any practical 
effect from the rumored adiustments of ar- 
rangements about transporting arms through 
China to Hanoi that has been going on all 
along, with occasional interruptions for one 
reason or another, but I wouldn't think this 
itself changes the basic situation very much. 

Mr. Scherer: Your view is that this is just 
a rumor? 

Secretary Rusk: No, I am just saying that 
we have not confirmed just what it means 
and therefore I am referring to it as a report. 

Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, up until the 
end of the year casualties were running 
about a hundred a week. Now, rather sud- 
denly, they have almost doubled that. What 
is the meaning of this? Isn't Hanoi harden- 
ing its attitude ? 

Secretary Rusk: I don't think that is re- 
flected — that the casualties have to do with 
Hanoi's attitude so much as with the fact 
that the pace of the fighting is increased; and 
the casualties on the other side have gone 
up much faster than our own casualties. 

Negotiations Without Conditions 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, Secretary- 
General U Thant said again recently that he 
was convinced that if bombing of North Viet- 
Nam ceased there would be talks within a few 
weeks. Now, if he gave us his assurance of 
that, would we stop the bombing on his as- 
surance, or Ho Chi Minh's assurance, that 
there would be talks ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think we need to 
know, for example, what those three divi- 
sions that are poised in the demilitarized 
zone are going to do if we stop the bombing. 
Are they going to attack our Marines that 
are 6 miles away? No one has been able to 
give us the slightest whisper that if we 
stopped the bombing those divisions would 
not move against our Marines. 

Mr. Spivak: Are you saying then that we 
will not stop the bombing even for an as- 
surance of talks by anybody, that it isn't 
talks we are seeking — 

Secretary Rusk: We have asked for some 
reciprocal action on the other side of a mili- 
tary character. Let me take just a moment 
here on this point. If we were to propose to- 
day that we would negotiate only if they 
stopped all the violence in South Viet-Nam 
while we continued bombing the North, 
everybody would say we are crazy. Now, why 
is it — if it is crazy for us, why is it reason- 
able for Hanoi to put forward exactly the 
same proposition and have it embraced by a 
good many people in different parts of the 
world? We are prepared to talk today with- 
out conditions; we are prepared to talk about 
conditions if they want to talk about arrange- 
ments that might lead to talks — 

Mr. Spivak: Isn't that a condition, though ? 
Aren't you making a condition ? 

MAY 8, 1967 


Secretai'y Rusk: No, this is a condition 
which Hanoi has raised, that there can be no 
talks unless we stop the bombing. All right, 
we will talk with them about conditions — 
what should they do in relation to our stop- 
ping the bombing — or we will talk with them 
today without conditions of any sort. 

Mr. Spivak: If they now say they will talk 
if you stop the bombing? 

Secretary Rusk: That is a major condition 
they raised. We need something from them 
by way of reciprocity. 

Mr. Higktower: On another aspect of this 
issue, Mr. Secretary, do you feel that Com- 
munist forces are now being hurt badly 
enough, or may in the near future be hurt 
badly enough, so that they would have to re- 
sort to negotiation on some acceptable terms 
in order to open another front in this con- 
flict, to offset the military force? 

Secretary Rusk: I don't know, Mr. High- 
tower, quite frankly, whether they would at 
some point bring this matter to a conclusion 
through negotiations or whether they would 
simply let the matter dribble away, wither 
away, and disappear. 

There are some very difficult problems for 
them in negotiations. In the first place, they 
would have to recognize in negotiations that 
they have been doing what they have been 
doing, which they have not publicly done be- 
fore. So I can't really tell yet just how this 
is going to wind up. 

Southern Hemisphere Telescope 
To Be Built in Chilean Andes 

White House press release (Punta del Este. Uruguay) dated 
April 13 

President Johnson and President Frei [of 
Chile] announced on April 13 that a 150-inch 
reflecting telescope, the largest in the South- 
ern Hemisphere, will be built in the Chilean 
Andes. This will make available for the first 
time one of the world's largest telescopes for 
exploration of the half of the sky which has 
been relatively neglected. 

The center of our own galaxy, as well as 
our nearest neighbor galaxy, the Magellanic 
Clouds, can be seen only from the Southern 
Hemisphere. The combination of the size of 
the telescope and the extreme clarity of the 
atmosphere at this site will give qualified 
astronomers from all of Latin America and 
the United States a scientific instrument of 
unprecedented power. 

Design and construction of the new tele- 
scope will be a joint effort of the University 
of Chile, the U.S. National Science Founda- 
tion, and the Ford Foundation. The total cost 
of the telescope is $10 million and will be 
financed jointly by the United States insti- 

The new telescope will be located at the 
Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in 
the Chilean Andes. It will be used in con- 
junction with 36- and 60-inch instruments 
that are already under construction. 



Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State 

by Sol M. Linowitz 

U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States ^ 

What were the expectations with refer- 
ence to the Summit Conference at Punta del 
Este and how well were they realized? 

In launching and moving forward the con- 
ference the Latin American Presidents 
anticipated that the Presidents of this hemi- 
sphere might come together, recognizing 
their common problems, and talk together 
frankly, freely, and with mutual respect 
about how to reach answers on the funda- 
mental issues. The hope was that they might 
then undertake important commitments af- 
fecting the future of the hemisphere. The 
conference would be a Latin American con- 
ference, organized and led by the Latin 
American leaders; and President John- 
son would be present as a cooperating part- 
ner assuring the Latin Americans of our sup- 
port and understanding and following their 
lead in hemispheric progress and unity. 

What happened at Punta del Este was pre- 
cisely that: 18 Presidents, one Presidential 
representative, and the Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago met, spoke frankly, 
and, with one exception, reached agreement 
on issues of profound significance to the 
future of Latin America. 

The conference was a Latin American con- 
ference, led by the Latin American Presi- 
dents and involving fundamental commit- 
ments on their part more far-reaching than 
any since these countries achieved their inde- 
pendence. President Johnson was there as a 
helpful junior partner in the effort, making 

' Excerpts from an address made before the Na- 
tional Press Club at Washin^n, D.C., on Apr. 21 
(press release 96). 

clear our own involvement and support and 
our willingness to walk at their side as they 
proceed along the bold path before them. 

The relationships established, the under- 
standings reached among the Presidents, and 
the spirit in which discussions were con- 
ducted, all give promise of a new era in inter- 
American relationships. 

It may be that the greatest contribution 
of this Summit Conference will have been 
not the decisions to move forward boldly 
along specific lines — fundamental as these 
decisions are — but rather its impact on the 
minds of men. The millions of the hemi- 
sphere were watching as their top political 
leaders looked at their common problems, 
discussed their differences, and chose the 
difficult way of peaceful revolution and de- 
velopment. This was a dramatic demonstra- 
tion of a dominant fact of Latin America 
today: that the Alliance for Progress repre- 
sents the mainstream of political, social, and 
economic thought and action. 

Is a Latin American Common Market 
really a feasible objective? Taking into ac- 
count the disparity of development among 
the countries of Latin America, is it reason- 
able to expect that there can indeed be 
fashioned a common market for the con- 
tinent overriding political, economic, and 
social barriers ? 

I believe that it is. And my belief is 
grounded in the knowledge that many of the 
leaders of Latin America today are men of 
vision, men who know how to dream and 
how to achieve; men who know that what is 
needed most for that breakthrough is a uni- 
fied assault by their nations against their 

MAY 8, 1967 


common problems, an assault that will launch 
both new life into the Alliance for Progress 
and a new era of common understanding in 
the Americas. 

They also understand that nowhere is that 
unified assault more important than in this 
complex problem of Latin American eco- 
nomic integration. For success here truly 
could result in an upheaval of a continent 
that would cast out the ills now paralyzing 
so much of its potential. 

And there is evidence that, vast though 
the undertaking may be and potentially dif- 
ficult though it admittedly is, it can be done. 
The first steps have already been taken 
through the organization of the Central 
American Common Market and the Latin 
American Free Trade Association. The coun- 
tries of Central America, for example, have 
expanded intrazonal exports from $33 mil- 
lion in 1960 to $155 million in 1966. Upward 
of 90 percent of all trade among the five 
countries of Central America is now restric- 
tion-free and the proportion of their intra- 
regional trade has more than doubled. 

It is true that in the larger Latin Ameri- 
can Free Trade Association — which includes 
Mexico and all of South America — progress 
has been slower. But even there, intrazonal 
trade jumped from $775 million in 1962 to 
an estimated $1.5 billion in 1966. In addition, 
some 9,000 tariff concessions have been 
negotiated since LAFTA was organized. 

Will the development of a Latin American 
Common Market provide increased competi- 
tion for some of our own export markets? 
Probably. The same was also true of the 
European Common Market. Yet the growth 
of the European market has not affected our 
industrial growth adversely; quite the con- 
trary. For whether it be Europe or Latin 
America — or any region, for that matter — 
our prosperity is bound up with the world's. 

We will have to make some adjustments 
and there may be some short-term losses, but 
these cannot be compared to our — and their 
— long-term gains as we engage in a mutu- 
ally profitable trade. And the story does not 
end with economics. There is a political moral 
too: An economically viable Latin America 
will have an even greater stake than it does 

today in a free, stable, and secure world. 

In conjunction with steps toward economic 
integration the Presidents agreed that there 
will have to be action to overcome physical 
obstacles to the regional flow of goods and 
services; this will mean continental road 
projects, interconnection of electric power 
systems and telecommunications, and joint 
investment in air transport, railroads, and 
steamship lines, as well as in such basic 
industries as fertilizers, pulp and paper, iron 
and steel, and petrochemicals. These and 
more are now grist for the Alliance mill as 
approved by the Presidents, and each project 
offers vast possibilities for transforming the 
map of Latin America. 

I believe that much of this imagination 
and vision can be provided by private enter- 
prise. Certainly it has both the technical 
know-how and the capital which are sorely 

Considerable misunderstanding still exists 
about the purposes and value of U.S. private 
investment in Latin American countries. 
Some of the blame for this may fall squarely 
on business, but less than popular concep- 
tion has it. 

Today many of the Latin American coun- 
tries are indeed making efforts to create a 
better environment for private investment; 
and United States businesses already supply 
one-tenth of the continent's production, pay 
one-fifth of all taxes, account for a third of 
all export earnings, and provide jobs for an 
estimated 1,500,000 Latin Americans. I hope 
it will continue to participate to an even 
greater degree, recognizing always the great 
role it can and must play in meeting the 
needs of the people of the continent. 

In concluding his address at the Latin 
American Summit Conference in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay, earlier this month, President 
Johnson spoke directly to the youth of the 
Americas.2 To them he said: 

All that has been dreamed of in the years since 
the Alliance started can only come to pass if your 
hearts and your minds are dedicated and committed 
to it. . . . Here in the countries of the Alliance, a 
peaceful revolution has affirmed man's ability to 
change the conditions of his life through the insti- 

■ See p. 708. 



tutions of democracy. In your hands is the task of 
carrying it forward. 

Behind these words was the recognition 
that the people of Latin America today are 
basically a young people, younger than we. 
Three-fifths of the Latin American popula- 
tion are under 24 years of age, compared 
with two-fifths for the United States and 
Canada. These young people now constitute 
the bulk of the electorate in Latin America — 
the people the governments must answer to 
and heed, the people who in a few years' 
time will be the leaders of the continent. 

It is the young people who must be con- 
vinced that the Alliance for Progress holds 
out a true promise for their future. It is 
they who must understand that while the 
Alliance for Progress can be their revolution, 
all of us in both North and South America 
share its ideals and its aspirations for some- 
thing better; for hope, for dignity, for demo- 
cratic institutions under law to carry on the 
fight in the only way it must be carried on — 
constructively, compassionately, and con- 
cerned with the right of the individual. 

In my visits to Latin America I've talked 
to university students about the Alliance and 
the relations between the United States and 
Latin America. I've been disappointed in 
their lack of awareness of how much the 
Alliance has been and is doing and their lack 
of excitement about its potential. Yet unless 
we can arouse that sense of excitement, that 
feeling of enthusiasm and loyalty among the 
masses of people of Latin America, neither 
the Presidents' program nor the Alliance can 

There are, of course, some who are afraid 
of change, who fear that rocking the boat 
can only lead to communism in a region so 
scarred with misery, poverty, and special 
interests. I think that the reverse is true — 
that the sure way to communism or to any 
other extreme, right or left — is not to change, 
not to understand the needs of the people, not 
to give them the opportunity to attain the 
economic mastery of their lives and, perhaps 
even more important, social justice. The 
United States must, of course, deeply con- 
cern itself with methods of opposing any 
overt or covert Communist attempts to in- 

filtrate this hemisphere. But in doing so we 
must also remember that anticommunism as 
such will not automatically command the 
attention of the average Latin American, who 
is steeped in his own personal struggle to 
keep his head above water. We must show 
that we stand for something better. 

City slum dwellers denied hope and 
illiterate rural Indians denied even a glimpse 
of the 20th century cannot offer a founda- 
tion to sustain or nurture democracy. A 
demagog who elbows his way upward 
through the masses and who offers them pro- 
tection and food will have their sullen sup- 
port or mute acquiescence. For these are the 
staple commodities they desperately want 
and need. No promise or vision can vie with 

And that is the meaning of the program 
undertaken at Punta del Este which must be- 
come known to the people in human terms. 
They must recognize that the Alliance for 
Progress is their charter, that the commit- 
ments at Punta del Este are their promise, 
and that even though "social justice" was not 
listed on the formal Summit agenda, it was 
never absent from the Presidents' con- 
ference table. As President Johnson said in 
his address: 

Our discussions here are couched in the technical 
terms of trade and development policies. But be- 
yond these impersonal terms stands the reality of 
individual men, women, and children. It is for them 
— not for the statisticians and economists— that we 
have come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It 
is for them — and especially for the young- among 
them — that the hope and the challenge of this 
Alliance exists. 

The promise of Latin America will be a 
difficult one to fulfill. We will incur many 
disappointments and encounter many frus- 
trations. We shall probably become dis- 
couraged from time to time, and then there 
will be voices raised urging us either to 
withdraw or to turn our backs on Latin 
America. Yet this is a risk which we do not 
dare take. If we lose heart in Latin America 
now, there may never be another place nor 
another day anywhere or any time. For the 
stakes there are high — just about the highest 
for which we have ever played — and we can- 
not afford to lose. 

MAY 8, 1967 


U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special 
U.N. General Assembly Confirmed 

The Senate on April 19 confirmed the fol- 
lowing to be representatives and alternate 
representatives of the United States to the 
fifth special session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations: 

Arthur J. Goldberg 
William B. Buffum 
Richard F. Pedersen 
Mrs. Eugenie Anderson 
Samuel C. Adams, Jr. 

Alternate Representatives 
Garland R. Farmer, Jr. 
Michael lovenko 

1966 Report on Automotive Trade 
With Canada Sent to Congress 

Letter of Transmittal 

White House press release dated March 22 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress 
the First Annual Report on the operation of 
the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.^ 
By this Act Congress authorized implementa- 
tion of the United States-Canada Automotive 
Products Agreement. 

This historic Agreement is a joint under- 
taking by the United States and Canada to 
create a broader market for automotive prod- 
ucts, to liberalize automotive trade between 
the two countries, and to establish conditions 
conducive to the most efficient patterns of in- 
vestment, production and trade in this critical 
industry. It is symbolic of the spirit of coop- 

' The 85-page report Canadian Automobile Agree- 
ment; First Annual Report of the President to the 
Congress on the Implementation of the Automotive 
Products Trade Act of 1965 (printed for the use of 
the Senate Committee on Finance) is for sale by the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (25 cents). 

eration between these two friendly neighbors. 
The first year of operations under the Act 
provides solid proof of its importance. The 
value of total trade in automotive products 
between the United States and Canada dur- 
ing 1966 exceeded $2 billion — compared with 
approximately $1.1 billion in 1965. The bene- 
fits to the people of both countries are im- 
pressive and fully detailed in the Report. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
March 22, 1967. 


Current Actions 


Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 
24, 1964.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967. 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on 
diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory 
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 
1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and 

extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial 

matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.* 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 

14, 1967. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966.' 

Accession deposited: Somali Republic, March 30, 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967. 
Acceptances deposited: Finland, March 20, 1967; 
Trinidad and Tobago, March 16, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 




Protocol relating to military obligations in certain 
cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague 
April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937. 
50 Stat. 1317. 
Accession deposited: Nigeria, March 17, 1967. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution of the sea by oil, 1954, with annexes. Done 
at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for 
the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954 
(TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962. 
Enters into force May 18, 1967, and, for amend- 
ment to Article XIV, June 28, 1967. TIAS 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, March 28, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with 
final protocol, general regulations with final pro- 
tocol, and convention with final protocol and 
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 
Ratifications deposited: Pakistan, December 19, 

1966; Sweden, December 13, 1966; Syrian Arab 

Republic, November 18, 1966. 


Convention for the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Sep- 
tember 12, 1964.=^ 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 13, 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and 
Moscow January 27, 1967.'' 
Signature : San Marino, April 21, 1967. 


International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 
18, 1967. 


Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and 
XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.* 
Acceptance : Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
December 3, 1955.^ 
Acceptance : Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 
11, 1957." 
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications 
to the texts of the schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva No- 
vember 30, 1957.* 
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establish- 
ment of new schedule III — Brazil — to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
December 31, 1958.* 
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications 
to the texts of the schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Feb- 
i-uary 18, 1959.* 
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to 
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Au- 
gust 17, 1959.* 
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967. 

Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force Au- 
gust 1, 1966. TIAS 6065. 
Acceptance: New Zealand, March 31, 1967. 

Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force Au- 
gust 25, 1966. TIAS 6185. 
Acceptance : France, February 24, 1967. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, February 28, 

Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
the provisional accession of Argentina to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done 
at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force 
January 9, 1967. TIAS 6224. 

Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;' 
India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967; 
South Africa, March 22, 1967; Yugoslavia, 
March 15, 1967.' 

Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
the provisional accession of the United Arab Re- 
public to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. En- 
tered into force January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225. 
Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;' 
India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967; 
Yugoslavia, March 15, 1967.' 

Trade, Transit 

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. 
Done at New York July 8, 1965.* 
Accession deposited: Chad, March 2, 1967. 


Congo (Kinshasa) 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of March 15, 1967. Ef- 
fected by an exchange of notes at Kinshasa April 
6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967. 


Agreement regarding the operation, maintenance 
and security of the Donges-Metz pipeline system, 
with protocol and exchange of letters. Signed at 
Paris March 24, 1967. Entered into force April 1, 

' Not in force for the United States. 

* Not in force. 

' Subject to ratification. 

MAY 8, 1967 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents. A 25 percent discount is made on 
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica- 
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay- 
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must 
accompany orders. 

Dear Student Leaders: An Exchange of Correspond- 
ence on Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk, in a point-by- 
point reply, answers a letter from a representative 
of 100 student leaders around the country. He out- 
lines the basic philosophy of the United States 
position on Viet-Nam and gi\es his thoughts on 
"how to organize a durable peace." Pub. 8190. 
East Asia and Pacific Series 154. 17 pp. 15^. 

Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States 
Armed Forces in Korea. Agreement with Korea — 
Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966. Entered into force 
February 9, 1967. With agreed minutes, agreed un- 
derstandings, and exchange of letters. TIAS 6127. 
155 pp. 45<f. 

Defense — Establishment of Petroleum Products 
Pipeline. Agreement with France — Signed at Paris 
June 30, 1953. Entered into force June 30, 1953. 
TIAS 6133. 8 pp. 10^. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Colombia — Signed at Bogota March 
10, 1966. Entered into force March 10, 1966. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 6138. 12 pp. 10^. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol 
amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and devel- 
opment. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965 — Signed 
on behalf of the United States February 8, 1965. 
Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139. 46 
pp. 20!<. 

Education — Joint Commission for Review of Opera- 
tion of Certain Scholarship Funds. Agreement with 
Mexico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico Sep- 
tember 30 and October 25, 1966. Entered into force 
October 25, 1966. TIAS 6140. 3 pp. 5<t. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco, 
amending the agreement of April 23, 1965, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rabat Oc- 
tober 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966. 
TIAS 6141. 3 pp. 5(f. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Rabat August 12, 1966. Entered into force 
August 12, 1966. With related notes. And amending 
agreement. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rabat 
October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 
1966. TIAS 6142. 17 pp. 10(i(. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Mauritania. Exchange 
of notes— Signed at Nouakchott September 19 and 
October 17, 1966. Entered into force October 17, 
1966. TIAS 6143. 4 pp. 5«f. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Paraguay. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Asuncion November 4, 1966. 
Entered into force November 4, 1966. TIAS 6144. 
5 pp. 5«!. 


VOL. LVI, NO. 1454 


MAY 8, 1967 

The Department ot State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication ifisued by the Office of 
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested as:encies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for Bale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15; 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX May 8, 1967 Vol.LVI,No. H5U 

Canada. 1966 Report on Automotive Trade 
With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) . 732 

Chile. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be 
Built in Chilean Andes 728 


1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can- 
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732 

U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly Confirmed 732 

Economic Affairs 

American CSiiefs of State Meet at Punta del 
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America) 706 

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can- 
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732 

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference 
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729 

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este 
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the 
Press" .722 

Foreign Aid 

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del 
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents 
of America) 706 

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference 
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729 

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este 
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the 
Press" 722 

International Organizations and Conferences 

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del 
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America) 706 

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference 
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729 

Latin America 

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del 
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America) 706 

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference 
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729 

Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este 
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the 
Press" 722 

Presidential Documents 

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del 
Este 706 

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can- 
ada Sent to Congress 732 

Publications. Recent Releases 734 

Science. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be 

Built in Chilean Andes 728 


American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del 

Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America) 706 

1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can- 
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732 

Reflections on the Inter-American Conference 

of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 732 

United Nations. U.S. Delegation to Fifth Spe- 
cial U.N. General Assembly Confirmed . . 732 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta 
del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet 

the Press" 722 

Name Index 

Adams, Samuel C, Jr 732 

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 732 

Buffum, William B 732 

Farmer, Garland R., Jr 732 

Goldberg, Arthur J 732 

lovenko, Michael 732 

Johnson, President 706, 732 

Linowitz, Sol M 729 

Pedersen, Richard F 732 

Rusk, Secretary 722 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
OiRce of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*88 4/17 Inauguration of Viet-Nam Train- 
ing Center at Foreign Service 

*89 4/17 MacArthur sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Austria (biographic de- 
tails) . 

t90 4/18 Rusk: SEATO Council of Min- 

*91 4/19 Rolvaag sworn in as Ambassador 
to Iceland (biographic details). 

t92 4/19 Rusk: message to German For- 
eign Minister on the occasion of 
the death of former Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer. 

*93 4/19 Regional foreign policy conference 
to be held at Chicago May 12. 

*94 4/19 Personnel changes in the Bureau 
of Security and Consular Af- 

t95 4/21 Katzenbach: Foreign Policy As- 
sociation, New York, N.Y. 
96 4/21 Linowitz: National Press Club, 
Washington (excerpts). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

if U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-936/44 






Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam 

Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (publication 8213), the most recent pamphlet il 
the series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, describes th( 
military, economic, and social assistance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam by nation 
other than the United States. 

The three other background papers on various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict publisher 
earlier were: Basic Data on South Viet-Nam, The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam, and Communist 
Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam. 



To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printlns OSes 
Waahinston, D.C. 20402 



To b« mslM 



Coupon refund . 

Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send copies of 

Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Free World Assistance for South 

Viet-Nam (8213) ; Basic Data on South Viet-Nam (8195) ; The 

Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Communist-Directed Forces in South 

Viet-Nam (8197). 









Street address. 

City, State, and ZIP code- 








May 15,1967 

by Under Secretary Katzenbach 753 

Statement by Secretary Rtisk and Text of Communique 7U2 

Memorandum of Transmittal and Excerpt From Report 758 


For index see inside back cover 

A Report to the Congress by the Commander 
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam 

by General William C. Westmoreland ^ 

I am deeply honored to address the Con- 
gress of the United States. I stand in the 
shadow of military men who have been here 
before me, but none of them could have had 
more pride than is mine in representing the 
gallant American fighting men in Viet-Nam 
today. These service men and women are sen- 
sitive to their mission, and, as the record 
shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out 
that mission. 

As their commander in the field I have 
seen many of you in Viet-Nam during the 
last 3 years. Without exception you gentle- 
men have shown interest, responsibility, and 
concern for the commitment which we have 
undertaken and for the welfare of our troops. 

The Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting to 
build a strong nation while aggression — 
organized, directed, and supported from 
without — attempts to engulf it. This is an 
unprecedented challenge for a small nation. 
But it is a challenge which will confront any 
nation that is marked as a target for the 
Communist stratagem called "war of na- 
tional liberation." I can assure you here and 
now that militarily this stratagem will not 
succeed in Viet-Nam. 

In 3 years of close study and daily obser- 
vation, I have seen no evidence that this is 
an internal insurrection. I have seen much 

' Address made before a joint session of Congress 
on Apr. 28. General Westmoreland is Commander 
of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet- 

evidence to the contrary — documented by 
the enemy himself — that it is aggression 
from the North. 

Since 1954, when the Geneva accords were 
signed, the North Vietnamese have been 
sending leaders, political organizers, tech- 
nicians, and experts on terrorism and sabo- 
tage into the South. Clandestinely directed 
from the North, they and their Hanoi-trained 
southern counterparts have controlled the 
entire course of the attack against the Re- 
public of South Viet-Nam. 

More than 2 years ago. North Vietnamese 
divisions began to arrive, and the control 
was no longer clandestine. Since then, the 
buildup of enemy forces has been formidable. 
During the last 22 months, the number of 
enemy combat battalions in the South has 
increased significantly, and nearly half of 
them are North Vietnamese. In the same 
period overall enemy strength has nearly 
doubled in spite of large combat losses. 

Enemy commanders are skilled profes- 
sionals. In general, their troops are indoc- 
trinated, well trained, aggressive, and under 
tight control. 

The enemy's logistic system is primitive 
in many ways. Forced to transport most of 
his supplies down through southeastern Laos, 
he uses a combination of trucks, bicycles, 
men, and animals. But he does this with sur- 
prising effectiveness. In South Viet-Nam the 
system is also well organized. Many of the 
caches we have found and destroyed have 



been stocked with enough supplies and equip- 
ment to support months of future operations. 

The enemy emphasizes what he calls stra- 
tegic mobility, although his tactics are based 
on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower, 
and often primitive means of communica- 
tions. However, his operational planning is 
meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes 
careful plans, assigns specific tasks in de- 
tail, and then rehearses the plan of attack 
until he believes it cannot fail. Local peasants 
are forced to provide food, shelter, and 
porters to carry supplies and equipment for 
combat units and to evacuate the dead and 
wounded from the battlefield. 

When all is ready he moves his large mili- 
tary formations covertly from concealed 
bases into the operational area. His intent 
I is to launch a surprise attack designed to 
achieve quick victory by shock action. This 
tactic has failed because of our courageous 
men, our firepower, and our spoiling at- 

Viet Cong Terrorism and Brutality 

For months now we have been successful 
in destroying a number of main-force units. 
We will continue to seek out the enemy, 
catch him off guard, and punish him at every 

But success against his main forces alone 
is not enough to insure a swift and decisive 
end to the conflict. 

This enemy also uses terror — murder, 
mutilation, abduction, and the deliberate 
shelling of innocent men, women, and chil- 
dren- — to exercise control through fear. Ter- 
ror, which he employs daily, is much harder 
to counter than his best conventional moves. 

A typical day in Viet-Nam was last Sun- 
day. Terrorists near Saigon assassinated a 
39-year-old village chief. The same day in 
the delta, they kidnaped 26 civilians assist- 
ing in arranging for local elections. The next 
day the Viet Cong attacked a group of 
Revolutionary Development workers, killing 
1 and wounding 12 with grenades and 
machinegun fire in one area, and in another 

they opened fire on a small civilian bus and 
killed 3 and wounded 4 of its passengers. 
These are cases of calculated enemy attack 
on civilians to extend by fear that which they 
cannot gain by persuasion. 

One hears little of this brutality here at 
home. What we do hear about is our own 
aerial bombings against North Viet-Nam, 
and I would like to address this for a mo- 

Enemy Waging Total War All Day— Every Day 

For years the enemy has been blowing 
bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads, 
sabotaging power stations, blocking canals, 
and attacking airfields in the South, and he 
continues to do so. This is a daily occurrence. 
Bombing in the North has been centered on 
precisely these same kinds of targets and for 
the same military purposes — to reduce the 
supply, interdict the movement and impair 
the effectiveness of enemy military forces. 

Within his capabilities, the enemy in Viet- 
Nam is waging total war all day, every day, 
everywhere. He believes in force, and his 
intensification of violence is limited only by 
his resources and not by any moral inhibi- 

To us a cease-fire means "cease fire." Our 
observance of past truces has been open and 
subject to public scrutiny. The enemy per- 
mits no such observation in the North or the 
South. He traditionally has exploited cease- 
fire periods when the bombing has been sus- 
pended to increase his resupply and infiltra- 
tion activity. 

This is the enemy; this has been the chal- 
lenge. The only strategy which can defeat 
such an organization is one of unrelenting 
but discriminating military, political, and 
psychological pressure on his whole structure 
at all levels. 

From his capabilities and his recent activi- 
ties, I believe the enemy's probable course 
in the months ahead can be forecast. 

In order to carry out his battlefield doc- 
trine I foresee that he will continue his build- 
up across the demilitarized zone and through 

MAY 15, 1967 


Laos, and he will attack us when he believes 
he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will 
not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare, 
although he certainly will continue to in- 
tensify his guerrilla activities. 

I expect the enemy to continue to increase 
his mortar, artillery, rocket, and recoilless 
rifle attacks on our installations. At the same 
time, he will step up his attacks on villages 
and district towns to intimidate the people 
and to thwart the democratic processes now 
under way in South Viet-Nam. 

Free-World Forces 

Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to 
me that the strategy we are following at this 
time is the proper one and that it is produc- 
ing results. While he obviously is far from 
quitting, there are signs that his morale and 
his military structure are beginning to de- 
teriorate. Their rate of decline will be in pro- 
portion to the pressure directed against him. 

Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to 
note that our forces and those of the other 
free-world allies have grown in strength and 
profited from experience. In this connection 
it is well to remember that Korea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines 
all have military forces fighting and work- 
ing with the Vietnamese and Americans in 
Viet-Nam. It also is worthy of note that 30 
other nations are providing noncombat sup- 
port. All of these free-world forces are doing 
well, whether in combat or in support of na- 
tion-building. Their exploits deserve recog- 
nition, not only for their direct contributions 
to the overall effort but for their symbolic 
reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes 
Communist expansion. 

As the focal point of this struggle in Asia, 
the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces 
merit special mention. 

In 1954 South Viet-Nam had literally no 
armed forces in being. There was no tradi- 
tion of military leadership. The requirement 
to build an army, navy, and air force in the 
face of enemy attack and political subversion 

seems, in retrospect, almost an impossible 
task. Yet, in their determination to resist the 
Communists, the Vietnamese have built an 
effective military force. 

South Viet-Nam's Effective Military Force 

What I see now in Viet-Nam is a military 
force that performs with growing profes- 
sional skill. During the last 6 months, Viet- 
namese troops have scored repeated suc- 
cesses against some of the best Viet Cong 
and North Vietnamese army units. 

Perhaps more important in this total 
effort is the support given by the Vietnamese 
military to the Government's nation-building, 
or Revolutionary Development, program. 
Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is 
engaged in or training for this vital program 
which will improve the lot of the people. This 
is a difl[icult role for a military force. Viet- 
namese soldiers are not only defending vil- 
lages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy 
they have turned to the task of nation- 
building as well. 

In 1952 there were some who doubted that 
the Republic of Korea would ever have a 
first-rate fighting force. I wish those doubters 
could see the Korean units in Viet-Nam to- 
day. They rank with the best fighters and 
the most effective civic action workers in 
Viet-Nam. When I hear criticism of the 
Vietnamese Armed Forces, I am reminded of 
that example. 

As you know, we are fighting a war with 
no front lines, since the enemy hides among 
the people, in the jungles and mountains, and 
uses covertly border areas of neutral coun- 
tries. Therefore, one cannot measure the 
progress of battle by lines on a map. We 
therefore have to use other means to chart 
progress. Several indices clearly point to 
steady and encouraging success: 

As an example, 2 years ago the Republic 
of Viet-Nam had fewer than 30 combat- 
ready battalions. Today it has 154. 

Then there were three jet-capable runways 
in South Viet-Nam. Today there are 14. 



In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that 
could take C-130 transport aircraft. We now 
have 89. 

Then there was one deepwater port for 
seagoing ships. Now there are seven. 

In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload. 
Now we turn them around in as little as 1 

A year ago thei'e was no long-haul high- 
way transport. Last month alone, 161,000 
tons of supplies were moved over the high- 
ways. During the last year the mileage of 
essential highways open for our use has 
risen from about 52 percent to 80 percent. 

During 1965 the Republic of Viet-Nam 
Armed Forces and its allies killed 36,000 of 
the enemy and lost approximately 12,000 
friendly killed, and 90 percent of these were 

During recent months this 3 to 1 ratio in 
favor of the Allies has risen significantly and 
in some weeks has been as high as 10 or 20 

In 1965, 11,000 Viet Cong rallied to the 
side of the Government. In 1966 there were 
20,000. In the first 3 months of 1967 there 
have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that 
equals all of 1965 and more than half of all 
of 1966. 

In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio 
of weapons captured was 2 to 1 in favor of 
the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first 
3 months of this year is 2i/^ to 1 in favor of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam and its allies. 

Our President and the representatives of 
the people of the United States, the Congress, 
have seen to it that our troops in the field 
have been well supplied and equipped. When 

a field commander does not have to look over 
his shoulder to see whether he is being sup- 
ported, he can concentrate on the battlefield 
with much greater assurance of success. I 
speak for my troops when I say: We are 
thankful for this unprecedented material 

As I have said before, in evaluating the 
enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he 
believes our Achilles' heel is our resolve. 
Your continued strong support is vital to the 
success of our mission. 

Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and 
coastguardsmen in Viet-Nam are the finest 
ever fielded by our nation. And in this 
assessment I include Americans of all races, 
creeds, and colors. Your servicemen in Viet- 
Nam are intelligent, skilled, dedicated, and 
courageous. In these qualities no unit, no 
service, no ethnic group, and no national 
origin can claim priority. 

These men understand the conflict and 
their complex roles as fighters and builders. 
They believe in what they are doing. They 
are determined to provide the shield of secu- 
rity behind which the Republic of Viet-Nam 
can develop and prosper for its own sake and 
for the future and freedom of all Southeast 

Backed at home by resolve, confidence, 
patience, determination, and continued sup- 
port, we will prevail in Viet-Nam over Com- 
munist aggression. 

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of 
Congress, I am sure you are as proud to 
represent our men serving their country and 
the free world in Viet-Nam as I am to com- 
mand them. 

MAY 15, 1967 


SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression 

The Council of Ministers of the Southeast 
Asia Treaty Organization met at Washing- 
ton April 18-20. Folloiving is a statement 
made by Secretary Rusk at the opening ses- 
sion on April 18, together tvith the text of 
the final communique issued at the close of 
the meeting on April 20. 


This alliance was formed some 12 years 
ago to defend peace and security in a very 
important part of the world. It so happened 
that the first international conference which 
I attended as Secretary of State was the 
meeting of the SEATO Ministerial Council 
in Bangkok in 1961. All of us were then 
deeply concerned with the threats to both 
Laos and to South Viet-Nam. With your per- 
mission, I shall recall certain remarks which 
I made at the opening of that meeting, not 
merely to indulge in self-quotation but as a 
reminder that the great issues with which we 
are confronted today have been of concern 
for a long time and that the present crisis did 
not start yesterday or last week or last 

I said then that: ^ 

The hard fact is that this particular meeting 
finds the treaty area in a situation full of danger 
for the future of its nations and peoples — a possi- 
bility clearly envisaged at the time of the founding 
of the treaty. . . . 

The people of this treaty area, no less than 
elsewhere, have an inherent right to create peace- 
ful, independent states and to live out their lives 
in ways of their own choosing. . . . 

' As-delivered text; an advance text was issued 
as Department of State press release 90 dated Apr. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547. 

We cannot hope for peace for ourselves if in- 
satiable appetite is unrestrained elsewhere. . . . 
If we are determined, as we are, to support our 
commitments under SEATO, it is because peace 
is possible only through restraining those who 
break it in contempt of law. . . . 

We believe, and we feel confident that our views 
are shared by the other members of this Organi- 
zation, that it is our obligation to assist the peoples 
of Southeast Asia in their fight for their freedom, 
both because of our responsibilities in connection 
with the formation of these states and because of 
the duties undertaken in the formation of the 
SEATO organization. 

Speaking for my country (I then said), I wish 
to assure the members of this Organization and 
the people of Southeast Asia that the United 
States will live up to these responsibilities. . . . 

And then in its 1961 communique ^ the 
SEATO Council endorsed the efforts, then 
just begun, for a cease-fire and peaceful set- 
tlement in Laos but said also that: 

If those efforts fail, however, and there continues 
to be an active military attempt to obtain control 
of Laos, members of SEATO are prepared, within 
the terms of the treaty, to take whatever action 
may be appropriate in the circumstances. 

And with regard to Viet-Nam, that same 
1961 communique said that: 

The Council noted with concern the efforts of 
an armed minority, again supported from outside 
in violation of the Geneva accords, to destroy the 
Government of South Viet-Nam, and declared its 
firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such takeover 
of that country. 

Agreements on the independence and neu- 
trality of Laos under a Government of Na- 
tional Union were achieved, at least on paper. 
But as we all know, the Communist North 
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao never did what 
they promised to do. In violation of the 
Geneva agreement of 1962, North Viet-Nam 

' Ibid., p. 549. 



ever withdrew all its troops from Laos and 
as continued to use Laotian territory to in- 
filtrate arms and men into South Viet-Nam. 
Then the International Control Commission 
has been denied facilities for investigating 
i^iolations of the Geneva agreement in Com- 
munist-held territory. And the coalition Gov- 
ernment of Laos itself has not been able to 
exercise its authority in those same areas. 
The Council expressed its increasing concern 
with these violations in its communiques in 
1964 and 1965 and 1966." 

The members of this alliance represented 
here understood from the beginning that the 
conflict in South Viet-Nam was not just a 
'civil war." I have already quoted the Coun- 
cil's 1961 communique on the element of out- 
side support. 

In 1964 the Council described the assault 
on the Republic of Viet-Nam as a "Commu- 
nist aggression" and as an "organized cam- 
paign . . . directed, supplied and supported 
by the Communist regime in North Viet- 
Nam. . . ." 

In 1965 and 1966 the Council called atten- 
tion to the enlarging scale of the aggression 
from the North — the increasing infiltrations 
of armed and combat personnel, including 
"members" and, later, "many units" of the 
regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam. 

There are still people in the world who pre- 
fer to shut their eyes and ears to these reali- 
ties. The governments represented here 
know, as they said in 1966, that North Viet- 
Nam is engaged in a "continuing armed at- 
tack" against the Republic of Viet-Nam "in 
contravention of the basic obligations of 
international law and in flagrant violation of 
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962." 

And we as a Council have recorded some 
fundamental convictions about security and 
peace; for example: "that the elimination of 
aggression is essential to the establishment 
and maintenance of a reliable peace" and 
that "efforts to meet the Communist chal- 
lenge" in the treaty area "must not fail." 

And we as a Council have expressed con- 

Tor texts, see ibid., May 4, 1964, p. 692; June 
7, 1965, p. 923; and Aug. 1, 1966, p. 172. 

cern with the continuing "serious threat" of 
subversion to the Asian member countries — 
to Thailand in particular. The members of 
the Council have reiterated "their determina- 
tion to do whatever is necessary to assist 
their ally to eliminate this threat." 

And while the Council has made clear the 
determination of its members to meet their 
commitments to repel aggression, either 
overt or indirect, it has made equally clear 
that the goal of this alliance is peace. 

Last year, after taking cognizance of the 
efforts of many governments and individu- 
als to initiate negotiations looking toward 
peace in Viet-Nam, it expressed the "common 
resolve" of its members "to do everything in 
their power to promote the peaceful settle- 
ment of the conflict." 

Since then there have been many further 
efforts to get peace talks started, and some 
of them most important, by our distin- 
guished cochairman [of the Geneva con- 
ferences, the United Kingdom] and member 
of this organization, and the sometimes con- 
temptuous refusal by Hanoi. My Govern- 
ment has made clear that we are willing to 
try any promising path to peace. We are pre- 
pared to talk about a final settlement — and 
then work out the steps by which it might be 
reached. We are prepared to take steps to 
deescalate the conflict whenever we are as- 
sured that the North will take appropriate 
corresponding steps. 

But every effort we and others have thus 
far made to talk peace has met a curt refusal 
by Hanoi. 

I should like to repeat here still once again 
what President Johnson and I have said 
many times: that we are ready for negotia- 
tions without conditions of any sort. If the 
authorities in Hanoi put forward conditions, 
we are ready to talk about conditions pre- 
liminary to more formal negotiations, or 
we're prepared to discuss the shape of a final 
settlement and try to work back from there. 

We're prepared for public or private talks, 
talks direct or indirect, with small numbers 
or in a general conference. 

And so, once again, we urge Hanoi to make 
use of some machinery — and there are many 

MAY 15, 1967 


options — or to make use of some diplomatic 
process — and there are many options — to en- 
gage seriously in a discussion which could 
lead toward peace. 

But there is some evidence that Hanoi is 
sustained by the hope that dissenting 
opinion, here or abroad, will cause the United 
States to abandon or weaken its support of 
South Viet-Nam. Any such supposition is a 
basic miscalculation which can only prolong 
the war, thus adding to the casualties. 

I believe that President Johnson expressed 
the resolve of a large majority of the Ameri- 
can people when he said, very simply: ^ 

We will not be defeated. 
We will not grow tired. 

We will not withdraw, either openly or under 
the cloak of a meaningless agreement. 

And that, I believe, is the resolve of all 
who are helping South Viet-Nam to repel 
this aggression. And at the same time, we 
shall continue unceasingly the search for a 
peaceful settlement. Eventually Hanoi must 
come to realize that it will not be permitted 
to conquer South Viet-Nam by force. 

Let me say just a word about the wider 
significance of SEATO. We all recognize that 
security is only the foundation on which na- 
tions seek to build better lives for their citi- 
zens. The Council has repeatedly expressed 
the dedication of this alliance to economic de- 
velopment and to social progress. It has ap- 
plauded the commitment of the Government 
of South Viet-Nam "to the work of social 
revolution and to the goal of free self-gov- 
ernment." It has also "welcomed steps to- 
wards increased regional cooperation in 
political, economic and cultural matters." 
And I am sure that all of us will continue to 
act in every possible constructive way to- 
ward the great objectives of political stabil- 
ity and economic and social progress in 
conditions of peace. 

And I believe that we see, all of us, solid 

'^ For President Johnson's address at Johns 
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7, 
1965, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

grounds for confidence in the future of 
Southeast Asia — indeed, of the free nations 
of East Asia and the Western Pacific gen- 
erally. Many individual nations have made 
dramatic economic progress. New regional 
organizations have come into being that 
carry with them tremendous promise. 

Moreover, last August agreements were 
reached to bring to an end the sterile con- 
frontation between Indonesia and its neigh- 
bors in Malaysia and Singapore. The present 
government in Indonesia is dedicated to pro- 
moting the welfare of its citizens and to liv- 
ing at peace with its own neighbors. 

All of these developments are essentially 
due to the good sense and creative spirit of 
the peoples and governments of East and 
Southeast Asia. Yet I think it is fair to re- 
late them in some degree to a growing 
climate of security and confidence in the area, 
and to relate that climate in turn to South 
Viet-Nam's heroic efforts to defend itself, to 
the efforts of other nations to assist South 
Viet-Nam, and to the broad contribution that 
SEATO as a whole has made over a long 
period of years. 

And so, even as we continue with the dif- 
ficult and complex tasks in South Viet-Nam, 
and with our other efforts to insure security 
among the members of SEATO, let us look 
outward to what is happening in all of Asia. 

As President Johnson said on returning to 
the United States from his Pacific tour last 
fall: « 

"We found people who are determined to 
be free. We found people who are determined 
to have a better life for their children and 
for their families. We found people who are 
dedicated and determined to stand on their 
own feet. 

"The United States of America has taken 
its stand in Asia and the Pacific. We are 
fighting ... in Viet-Nam to make that stand 
come true. And we are going to be success- 

Thank you very much. 

' Ibid., Nov. 28, 1966, p. 806. 




The Twelfth Meeting of the Council of the South- 
East Asia Treaty Organization was held in Wash- 
ington from April 18 to 20, 1967, under the Chair- 
manship of the Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary 
of State of the United States. 

All SEATO members, except France, participated. 
The Republic of Vietnam, a Protocol State, was 
represented by an observer Delegation headed by 
His E.xcellency Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. 

In viewing the Treaty Area as a whole, the 
Council was encouraged by the progress achieved 
in many directions since it met in Canberra in 
June 1966. Economic conditions have continued to 
improve. Transportation and communications have 
expanded. Ever greater attention is being given 
to the housing, health, education and general wel- 
fare of the people. The easing of political tensions 
among certain States of the area has been sustained, 
and has led to greater possibilities for regional 

The spirit of co-operation within the Asian and 
Pacific region under Asian initiative has continued 
to show vigorous growth in many directions. The 
Asian Development Bank is now a reality; the 
Asian and Pacific Council has been established and 
is soon to hold its Second Ministerial Meeting in 
Bangkok; the Association of South-East Asian 
States has taken on renewed life; the South-East 
Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat is pursu- 
ing an active program ; and there have been several 
regional or sub-regional conferences devoted to 
economic development and other matters of mutual 
concern. The Council observed with gratification 
these developments, in which SEATO members are 
working towards common ends with other countries. 

The Council reaffirmed its conclusion in 1965 and 
again in 1966 that "history shows that the toler- 
ance of aggression increases the danger to free 
societies everywhere". It reaffirmed its belief "that 
the rule of law should prevail and that international 
agreements should be honoured and steps taken 
to make them operative". It again declared its 
"conviction that the elimination of aggression is 
essential to the establishment and maintenance of 
a reliable peace". 

Communist aggression, both overt and by sub- 
version, infiltration and terrorism, accompanied by 
vicious propaganda, remains a major threat to the 
peace and security of the Area. The Council ex- 
pressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty 
Area cannot be considered in isolation from global 
problems of peace and security. The outcome of 
the struggle now going on against aggression, 
both overt and by subversion, would, the Council 
believed, have profound effects, not only in Asia, 

but throughout the world. It was therefore of the 
utmost importance that these aggressions should 
not succeed. 

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that SEATO 
continues to have a prime role in deterring or re- 
pelling aggression in all its forms while at the 
same time helping to improve economic and social 
conditions in the Area. 

Dedication to Peace and Progress 

The Members of the Council reaffirmed "their 
faith in the purposes and principles set forth in 
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire 
to live in peace with all peoples and all Govern- 
ments", as stated in the preamble to the Treaty. 
They look forward to the day when there will be 
peace and reconciliation throughout the Area and 
when the resources and talents of all countries, 
irrespective of ideology, can be devoted towards 
constructive efforts to achieve a better life for man- 

The Council welcomed the persistent efforts of 
the Republic of Vietnam, the United States Gov- 
ernment, the United Kingdom as Co-Chairman of 
the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, and 
other members of the Alliance, as well as of many 
interested third parties to bring about a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in South-East Asia. It 
recorded its disappointment that Hanoi had re- 
jected all the opportunities open to it for negotia- 
tions on a reasonable basis. It agreed that reci- 
procity is an essential element of any acceptable 
proposal for reduction in the fighting. Members of 
the Council reiterated their common resolve to 
persist tirelessly in the search for a just and last- 
ing peace in Vietnam. 


The Council noted with grave concern that North 
Vietnam continues its aggression by means of 
armed attack against the Republic of Vietnam, in 
patent violation of the principles of international 
law and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 
1962. It noted that during the past year North 
Vietnam has continued to infiltrate arms and com- 
bat personnel into South Vietnam, including large 
units of the regular army of North Vietnam. It 
noted also that Communist military operations in 
South Vietnam have long been directed and con- 
trolled by North Vietnam, and that recently there 
has been made public evidence further confirming 
the long standing presence in the South of Gen- 
erals of the regular Army of the North. 

The Council heard with deep interest a state- 
ment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Vietnam. It reaffirmed its admiration 

MAY 15, 1967 


for the courage and determination with which the 
Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam 
are defending their freedom and its concern and 
sympathy for the suffering so long endured by the 
Vietnamese people. Council Members welcomed the 
progress which is being made by the Republic of 
Vietnam in the political, economic and social fields, 
in particular the promulgation of a new Constitu- 
tion, the holding of local elections and preparations 
for national elections in September. They also 
welcomed the program for national reconciliation 
announced by the Republic of Vietnam and ex- 
pressed their hope that those South Vietnamese 
who have been misled or coerced by the Communists 
would make use of the opportunity now open to 
them to contribute to the political progress and 
prosperity of the Republic of Vietnam. 

The Council noted that the aggression against 
the Republic of Vietnam is supported by a world- 
wide Communist propaganda campaign which has 
systematically distorted essential facts about the 
origin and the nature of the conflict and the present 
situation in Vietnam. The Council expressed regret 
that this campaign has misled many people of good 

The Council again recalled that various Com- 
munist leaders have declared their belief that the 
assault on the Republic of Vietnam is a critical 
test of the concept of what they call a "war of 
national liberation" but which is in reality a tech- 
nique of aggression to impose Communist domina- 
tion. It reaffirmed its conclusion at Manila in 1964, 
at London in 1965 and at Canberra in 1966, that 
the defeat of this aggression is essential to the 
security of South-East Asia and would provide con- 
vincing proof that Communist expansion by such 
tactics will not be permitted. 

The Council noted with appreciation the increases 
in military, economic and humanitarian assistance 
by Member Governments to the Republic of Vietnam 
during the past year, in fulfillment of or consistent 
with their obligations under the South-East Asia 
Collective Defence Treaty. The Council also noted 
with appreciation the increase in such assistance 
to the Republic of Vietnam from non-SEATO 
members, notably the substantial increase in the 
Armed Forces provided by the Republic of Korea. 
Member Governments reaffirmed their determination 
to maintain, and where possible to increase, their 
efforts in support of Vietnam in accordance with 
their respective constitutional processes. 


The Council expressed its serious concern over 
the continuing violation by North Vietnam of the 
1962 Geneva Agreements through such acts as the 
maintenance of North Vietnamese military forces 
in Laos, the use of these forces against the Royal 

Government of Laos, and the use of the territory 
of Laos to reinforce and supply the Communist 
forces in South Vietnam, and to support insur- 
gency in Thailand. The Council again called for 
the implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements 
and expressed support for the efforts of Prime 
Minister Souvanna Phouma's Government of Na- 
tional Union to obtain peace by securing the 
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of an 
independent and neutral Laos. 


The Council expressed deep concern over the 
resurgence of Communist activity in Central Luzon 
in the Philippines and agreed that this local Com- 
munist movement continued to pose a threat to the 
peace and security essential to the development 
and progress of that SEATO member. 


The Council, conscious of the long-standing Com- 
munist efforts to foment insurgency in Thailand, 
noted the increase of such efforts in the past year 
and the conclusive evidence of support and direc- 
tion by Peking and Hanoi. The Council was en- 
couraged by Thailand's determination to defeat this 
Communist threat. It noted the Royal Thai Gov- 
ernment's effective moves against the existing guer- 
rilla forces and the impressive rural programs 
designed primarily to enhance the well-being of 
the people and to strengthen further their capacity 
to resist Communist blandishments and alien dom- 
ination. The Council reiterated the determination 
expressed in earlier communiques to do whatever 
is necessary to assist that country to eliminate the 

The Council noted that Thailand, despite the 
problems of Communist subversion at home, is 
contributing actively to the defence of the Republic 
of Vietnam. It also noted that, in addition to send- 
ing contingents from all three of its armed services 
to serve in Vietnam, Thailand is allowing other 
SEATO members to use Thailand's military instal- 
lations and facilities for purposes of common de- 
fence, both with a view to shortening the war in 
Vietnam and to contributing to the effort to make 
"another Vietnam" impossible. 


The Council reaffirmed its support for SEATO's 
role in assisting national efforts in countering sub- 
version. It expressed its satisfaction with the 
steadily increasing capability shown by SEATO, 
under the energetic direction of the Secretary- 
General, to find appropriate means of complement- 
ing the already vigorous efforts of member countries 
to combat this Communist tactic. 



Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation 

The Council reaffirmed its continued support for 
the economic, medical and cultural activities of 
SEATO and expressed satisfaction with the Or- 
ganization's efforts to ensure that these activities 
are being carefully directed to complement and 
augment national and regional programs. The 
Council took particular note of the progress during 
the year in many projects, including the Thai- 
SEATO Regional Community Development Tech- 
nical Assistance Centre, the SEATO Vehicle Re- 
build Workshop, the Skilled Labour Projects and the 
SEATO Regional Agricultural Research Project in 
the economic field; the SEATO Medical Research 
Laboratory, the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research 
Laboratory and the SEATO Clinical Research 
Centre in the medical field; and the Tribal Re- 
search Centre; also the Research Fellowships, Post- 
Graduate and Undergraduate scholarships, Pro- 
fessorships and the recent Seminar on problems of 
youth under the cultural program. 

The Council reviewed the progress in the transi- 
tion of the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering 
to the independent and greatly expanded Asian 
Institute of Technology. It noted that the transi- 
tion will be completed during the coming year. 

The Council noted that the Philippines and Thai- 
land have submitted various economic project pro- 
posals under the economic program of the Organiza- 
tion mainly designed to help strengthen their 
national economies and thereby to increase their 
capacity to resist Communist subversion. Pakistan 
also has submitted an extensive project for economic 
assistance. The Council agreed to give sympathetic 
and urgent attention to those proposals. 

Co-operation in the Military Field 

The Council approved the Report of the Military 
Advisers and paid tribute to the work of the Mili- 
tary Planning Office during the past year. The 
Council reiterated its conviction that the continuous 
planning and periodic military exercises carried out 
under the aegis of SEATO have helped to under- 
line the determination of SEATO members to 
guarantee South-East Asia's freedom from Com- 
munist domination, thereby helping to deter aggres- 
sion within the Treaty Area. 


The Pakistan Delegate wished it to be recorded 
that he did not participate in the drafting of the 
Communique and that the views expressed in it 
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Gov- 
ernment of Pakistan. 

Next Meeting 

The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation 

of the Government of New Zealand to hold its 
next Meeting in Wellington. 

Expression of Gratitude 

The Council expressed its gratitude to the Gov- 
ernment and people of the United States for their 
hospitality and for the excellent arrangements made 
for the Meeting. The Council voted warm thanks 
to the Chairman, the Honourable Dean Rusk. 

Leaders of National Delegations 

The leaders of the National Delegations to the 
Twelfth Council Meeting were : 

Australia The Rt. Hon. Paul Hasluck, 

M.P., Minister for Ex- 
ternal Affairs 

New Zealand The Rt. Hon. Keith Hol- 

yoake, C.H., M.P., Prime 
Minister and Minister of 
External Affairs 

Pakistan H. E. Mr. A. Hilaly, S.Pk., 

Ambassador to the United 

Philippines H. E. Mr. Narciso Ramos, 

Secretary of Foreign Af- 

Thailand H. E. Mr. Thanat Khoman, 

Minister of Foreign Af- 

United Kingdom The Rt. Hon. George Brown, 

M.P., Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs 

United States The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secre- 

tary of State 

Republic of Vietnam H. E. Dr. Tran Van Do, 
(Observer) Minister of Foreign Af- 


Seven Asian and Pacific Nations 
Consult on Efforts in Viet-Nam 

Folloiving is the text of a communique 
issued at the close of the seven-nation meet- 
ing on Viet-Nam held at Washington April 

The Minister for External Affairs of 
Australia, Mr. Paul Hasluck; the Vice Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Korea, Mr. Young Choo Kim; the Prime 
Minister and Minister of External Affairs 
of New Zealand, Mr. Keith Holyoake; the 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philip- 

MAY 16, 1967 


pines, Mr. Narciso Ramos; the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat 
Khoman; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do; 
and the Secretary of State of the United 
States of America, Mr. Dean Rusk, met in 
Washington, D.C., on April 20-21, 1967. The 
meeting was held at the invitation of the 
United States Government pursuant to the 
agreement reached by the seven nations of 
the Asian and Pacific region at the Manila 
Summit Conference last October ^ that there 
should be continuing consultations among 
them including meetings of their Foreign 
Ministers as required. Their purpose was to 
carry forward and strengthen programs in 
which they are jointly engaged to assist the 
people of the Republic of Viet-Nam to de- 
fend their country and preserve their free- 

The participants renewed their commit- 
ment to the Goals of Freedom promulgated 
at Manila: 

1. To be free from aggression. 

2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and dis- 

3. To build a region of security, order, and 

4. To seek reconciliation and peace 
throughout Asia and the Pacific. 

The opening statement by the Secretary of 
State of the United States included a review 
of the recent conference at Guam between 
American and Vietnamese leaders ^ and of 
pertinent aspects of the recently concluded 
Twelfth SEATO Council Meeting. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do, 
then discussed in detail the developments in 
several programs in his country which have 
taken place since the Manila Summit Con- 
ference last October. He highlighted the 
steps toward constitutional, representative 
government taken since the Manila Summit 
Conference, as well as the accelerating prog- 

' For the Manila Summit Conference documents, 
see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730. 

' For background, see ibid., Apr. 10, 1967, p. 587. 

ress of the Revolutionary Development Pro- 

The representatives of the seven nations 
noted that heartening progress had been re- 
corded in virtually every field of effort in 
South Viet-Nam. They applauded the fact 
that the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam had promulgated a new Constitu- 
tion on April 1, that elections under the Con- 
stitution are scheduled for September and 
October, and that village and hamlet elections 
are now well under way. They welcomed and 
offered encouragement to the continued de- 
velopment of the foundations of representa- 
tive government in the Republic of Viet- 
Nam. They were also pleased to note that the 
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had 
launched its program of national reconcilia- 
tion, which seeks to encourage those Viet- 
namese who have been misled or coerced by 
the Communists to return and participate 
freely in the political and economic life of 
the nation. 

The meeting also noted with satisfaction 
that since the Manila Summit Conference 
there had been increases in allied force con- 
tributions to South Viet-Nam. 

The representatives of the seven nations 
reaffirmed their resolve to continue their mili- 
tary and all other efforts, as firmly and as 
long as may be necessary, in close consulta- 
tion among themselves until the aggression is 
ended. They agreed that actions in pursuance 
of these policies should be in accordance with 
their respective Constitutional processes. 

At the same time, they reaffirmed that their 
united purpose was peace, and that they were 
prepared to pursue any avenue which could 
lead to a secure and just peace. In this con- 
nection they reviewed prospects for a peace- 
ful settlement and held an intensive discus- 
sion of the various peace proposals and ave- 
nues to such a settlement. They noted with 
regret the continuing refusal on Hanoi's part 
to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and 
the continuing campaign of distortion and 
calumny against those striving for peace. 
They agreed that continuing efforts should be 
made in search of peace in Viet-Nam and that 
such a peace must guarantee, among other 



things, the cessation of acts of aggression by 
the Communists, and uphold and respect the 
independence of the RepubUc of Viet-Nam 
and the right of the Vietnamese people to 
choose their own way of life. 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam described his Govern- 
ment's position with regard to the essential 
elements of peace in Viet-Nam and the other 
participants responded by reaffirming their 
own undertakings, as stated in the Com- 
munique of the Manila Summit Conference. 
It was agreed that a settlement in Viet-Nam, 
to be enduring, must respect the wishes and 
aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that 
the Republic of Viet-Nam should be a full 
participant in any negotiations designed to 
bring about a settlement of the conflict; and 
that the allied nations which have helped to 
defend the Republic of Viet-Nam should par- 
ticipate in any settlement of the conflict. 

The participants expressed their serious 
concern that North Viet-Nam continued to 
ignore its obligation to accord prisoners of 
war the rights to which they are entitled 
under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The 
participants noted particularly that North 
Viet-Nam has refused to permit the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross to visit the 
prisoners and assure their welfare and proper 
treatment. They reiterated their determina- 
tion to continue to comply fully with the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, called on North 
Viet-Nam once again to honor its commit- 
ments under those Conventions, and reaf- 
firmed their willingness to discuss prisoner 
exchanges in any appropriate forum. 

Finally, the Representatives agreed to 
strengthen the consultation and cooperation 
of the seven nations through their Ambas- 
sadors in Saigon and through other channels. 
In this connection, they agreed to examine 
the establishment of appropriate groups com- 
prising representatives of the seven nations 
to help present the objectives of the allies in 
regard to their efforts in Viet-Nam, which 
aim at halting aggression and securing an 
honourable and durable peace in that war- 
torn country as well as in the Southeast 
Asian region. 

ANZUS Council Discusses Political 
and Security Problems 

Folloiving is the text of a communique 
issued at the close of the 16th ANZUS 
(Australia, Neiv Zealand, and United States 
Security Treaty) Council meeting, which ivas 
held at Washington April 21-22. 

The 16th meeting of the ANZUS Council 
was held in Washington on April 21 and 22. 
The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, 
Prime Minister and Minister for External 
Affairs, represented New Zealand. The Right 
Honorable Paul Hasluck, Minister for Exter- 
nal Affairs, represented Australia, and the 
Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, 
represented the United States. 

This year, as in the past, the Ministers 
conducted a wide-ranging discussion of inter- 
national political and security matters, with 
particular emphasis on the South East Asian 
region. They agreed that the 12th SEATO 
Council meeting had concluded with good 
results, and they agreed that the Seven Na- 
tion Meeting on Viet-Nam had been a valu- 
able continuation of the consultation among 
allies begun at the Manila Summit Confer- 
ence last October. The Ministers agreed that: 

The most dangerous threat to the secu- 
rity of the world continues to come from 
Peking's brand of militant communism and 
communist armed aggression and subversion 
in Southeast Asia. 

The focal point of this threat is the ag- 
gression by North Viet-Nam against the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. 

The past year had seen the concerted free 
world effort in South Viet-Nam make con- 
siderable progress in strengthening South 
Viet-Nam and stopping aggression. 

The Ministers reaffirmed their hope that 
North Viet-Nam, realizing the determination 
of the people of South Viet-Nam and their 
allies, would reverse its intransigent stand 
and manifest a willingness to bring the con- 
flict to an end on fair and reasonable terms. 

The Ministers expressed their continued 
willingness to explore any serious initiative 
for peace, despite past disappointments. 

MAY 15, 1967 


The Ministers discussed and took note of 
the earnest efforts of Indonesia to reconstruct 
its economy. They endorsed the work of those 
nations involved in plans and action to as- 
sist Indonesia in its economic program. 

Noting that Communist China and France 
had conducted atmospheric testing during the 
past year, the Council reaffirmed its opposi- 
tion to all atmospheric testing of nuclear 
weapons in disregard of world opinion as ex- 
pressed in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

The Ministers expressed their desire to 
continue the frank exchanges that have 
marked the annual ANZUS Council Meeting 
and to continue to place great importance on 
the ANZUS alliance which binds together 
three nations dedicated to a common ideal of 
peace and prosperity for their own nations 
and for all people of the Pacific area. 

U.S. Proposes lO-Mile Buffer Area 
North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ 

Department Statement i 

The United States Government has care- 
fully studied Mr. Paul Martin's four-point 
proposal.^ We believe that it offers consid- 
erable promise for deescalating the conflict 
in Viet-Nam and for moving toward an over- 
all settlement. The United States Govern- 
ment also supports the statement of the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam made 
on April 18 with respect to the Canadian pro- 

We believe an important step toward re- 
solving the conflict could be taken if military 
forces were withdrawn from a significant 
area on both sides of the 17th parallel. The 
United States Government and the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be 
prepared to withdraw their forces to a line 10 
miles south of the demilitarized zone if the 

' Read to news correspondents by the Department 
spokesman on Apr. 19. 

^ Made in a statement before the House of Com- 
mons Standing Committee on External Affairs at 
Ottawa on Apr. 11. Mr. Martin is Canadian 
Minister for External Affairs. 

DRV (North Viet-Nam) were willing to with- 
draw its forces simultaneously to a line 10 
miles north of the DMZ. 

If the DRV agreed to such a mutual with- 
drawal, all military actions in and over the 
demilitarized zone and the areas extending 10 
miles north and south of the zone could stop. 

Both the Governments of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam and the United States would be 
ready to cooperate fully with the Interna- 
tional Control Commission and to grant it 
complete access to monitor and to supervise 
the withdrawal and the continued inspection 
of the southern part of the DMZ and the ad- 
ditional demilitarized area, provided the DRV 
would grant the ICC equivalent cooperation 
and access in its territory. 

The ICC would be asked to certify that 
North Vietnamese troops had, in fact, been 
withdrawn to a line 10 miles north of the 
DMZ and the DRV was not using the zone 
to support military activities. 

Upon the separation of forces, the United 
States Government and the Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam would be ready to 
undertake talks leading to further deescala- 
tion and to an overall settlement. Such talks 
could be public or private and take place at 
any appropriate level and site that the Gov- 
ernment of the DRV might suggest. 

U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece 
Following Military Takeover 

Statement by Secretary Rusk ' 

We have followed closely the situation in 
Greece since the military takeover there last 
Friday [April 21]. 

I am encouraged to see that King Con- 
stantine [on April 26] in his first public 
statement since last Friday has called for an 
early return to parliamentary government. 
We are now awaiting concrete evidence that 
the new Greek government will make every 
effort to reestablish democratic institutions 

' Released to news correspondents on Apr. 28. 



which have been an integrral part of Greek 
political life. I am gratified that Greece will 
continue its strong support of NATO. 

I also note that Minister [George] 
Papadopoulos at a press conference yester- 
day [April 27] is quoted as saying that the 
detained persons connected with the political 
leadership of Greece will be set free in a few 
days. I trust that this step will indeed be 

Ambassador [Phillips] Talbot has made 
unmistakably clear to the new government 
our concern for the safety of all political 
prisoners. He has received repeated assur- 
ances that they are well. 

President Johnson Attends 
Funeral of Konrad Adenauer 

President Johnson attended funeral serv- 
ices for Konrad Adenauer, former Chancel- 
lor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
which ivere held at Bonn and at Cologne on 
April 25. 

The President arrived at Bonn April 23 
and remained there until April 26. During 
his stay, the President called upon President 
Heinrich Luebke and Chancellor Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger of the Federal Republic. 

Following is an exchange of remarks be- 
tween Chancellor Kiesinger and President 
Johnson at the conclusion of their meeting at 
the German Chancellory on April 26, to- 
gether ivith a statement by President John- 
son on April 19 on the death of Dr. Adenauer 
and a message sent by Secretary Rusk to 
Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy 


White House press release (Bonn, Germany) dated April 26 

Chancellor Kiesinger 

The President and I had a long, open, and 
frank discussion on the problems which con- 
cern our two countries. 

I would like to say, first of all, what a 
great honor and token of friendship it was 
for President Johnson and such a great num- 
ber of most distinguished American citizens 
to come to us to participate in Konrad 
Adenauer's funeral. 

I would like to assure you, Mr. President, 
that these people will not forget what you 
have done. 

So far as our conversations are concerned, 
I think that we have, in a very good atmos- 
phere of mutual trust and confidence, dis- 
cussed all the matters that concern our two 

The President himself will, I am sure, 
agree with me that we have come to the view 
that we will continue to have frank and con- 
fident cooperation which, of course, takes 
into consideration the matters of our two na- 
tions and that any problems that might crop 
up will be discussed frankly without any at- 
tempt to bring about results which a partner 
would ignore. 

I can only say, in conclusion, that I am 
very happy and satisfied with this meeting: 
first of all, the very fact that I had the privi- 
lege of getting to know President Johnson, 
and secondly, of the results of our conversa- 
tions altogether. 

President Johnson 

It was more than two decades ago that I 
first came to Europe. It is astonishing to ob- 
serve the great progress that has been made 
since I first came here. 

That progress is a great tribute to the lead- 
ership of the great man that we laid to rest 
yesterday and whose passing we all mourn. 

He would want us to do what we have done 
today, and that is to reaffirm the friendship 
that exists between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and its peoples and the peoples of 
the United States of America. 

We have not made any hard and fast de- 
cisions today, although we have explored 
many of the interests of our respective 
people. We talked about, first, that the people 
in America hoped that it- may be possible for 
the Chancellor and his lady to visit our coun- 
try at an early date. We will both be in touch 

MAY 15, 19S7 


with each other about that date, and a new 
announcement will be forthcoming. 

At that time, we will review in depth and 
perhaps have more announcements for you 
concerning- the various subjects that are in 
the public mind and of great interest to the 
two nations: the nonproliferation treaty, the 
trade and monetary matters, the troop de- 
ployments, the security of the two nations, 
and the prosperity of our people. 

The Chancellor reviewed the viewpoint of 
his people in connection with all of those 
subjects. I attempted to tell him how we felt 
about them. 

It is clear from our discussions that the 
friendship that has existed and the close re- 
lationship that has existed between our two 
countries for more than the past two decades 
will be continued, that there will be constant, 
complete, and full consultation between us 
before decisions by either of us. 

Both of us believe that those consultations 
will not only be friendly but will be under- 
standing, and will result in the agreement 
and the approval of the peoples of both na- 

True, there will be differences of opinion, 
there will be decisions to be made and ad- 
justments to be entered into; but we both 
know that in unity there is strength, and we 
both expect strength for our respective 

We want, more than anything else, peace 
in the world and prosperity for all of its peo- 
ples. By working together, we believe we can 
best make our contributions to that end. 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated April 19 

Americans mourn the passing of Chancel- 
lor Konrad Adenauer. To us, to Europe, and 
to the world, he will always be a symbol of 
the vitality and courage of the German 
people. We will never forget his lifelong 
opposition to tyranny in any form. Nor will 
we forget how, with single-minded deter- 
mination, he led his nation from the ruins of 
war to a prosperous and respected position 
in the family of free nations. 

Konrad Adenauer will be missed every- 
where, but his dauntless spirit will live on in 
the Atlantic partnership he did so much to 
create. The contribution he made is one from 
which all free men will profit. There can be 
no greater monument to the memory of a 
great and beloved man. 

Message From Secretary Rusk 

Press release 92 dated April 19 

Dear Mr. Vice Chancellor: May I ex- 
press to you, Mr. Vice Chancellor, my deep 
personal sorrow at the passing of Dr. Kon- 
rad Adenauer who led your country so ably 
and so long. My fellow countrymen join the 
German people in this period of mourning. 
Konrad Adenauer's long and creative life 
will stand out in history as an inspiring ex- 
ample of courage and dedication. For myself 
it was a privilege and honor to have known 
him; all of us will continue to benefit from 
his great achievements. 



"We do not expect Soviet ideology suddenly to dissolve in 
a flood of American intentions. To the extent that coopera- 
tion proceeds, it will have to reflect the solid interests of 
both sides and it will have to be measured by the recipro- 
cal actions of both sides." 

United States Relations With the Soviet Union 

by Under Secretary Katzenbach 

How should we now deal with the Soviet 
Union? I have been struck by the paradoxi- 
cal answers offered, here and abroad, to that 

There are those who say, on occasions like 
the recent Consular Convention debate, that 
we cannot deal at all with the same Russians 
who are supporting North Viet-Nam. 

There are others who, on the same occa- 
sions, insist that the Soviet Union has 
changed so much in recent years that we now 
have at hand that placid condition which has 
come stylishly to be called detente. 

I believe neither argument to be persua- 
sive. It is no feat of statesmanship to assert 
that it would be wrong for us to insist on 
full, bellicose confrontation with the Soviet 
Union nor, on the other hand, to say we 
should guard against excessive optimism 
about our relations with the Soviet Union. 

What we should do, it seems to me, is to 
acknowledge coldly the inherent present 
limits to detente but also to analyze, en- 
courage, and take those progressive steps 
beneficial to the interests of the United 
States and the West. 

It is such an analysis about which I would 
like to speak today, touching first on the pres- 
ent obstacles to any large-scale detente, sec- 
ond on why some steps are in our interests, 
and third on the longer range relevance of 
such steps. 

' Address made before the Foreign Policy As- 
sociation at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 21 (press 
release 95, revised). 

It is perhaps a law of nature, or at least 
of politics, that when an abstract word is 
much used, it is also ill-used. Detente is such 
a word. Is there a detente with the Soviet 

If by that one means simply some degree 
of easing of tension, then certainly it is true 
that tensions do not run as high today as 
they did in the dark days of Stalin. But if by 
detente one means that the basic issues which 
gave rise to the cold war between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. are over and done 
with, I would have to demur. 

It is not yet possible — nor will it be pos- 
sible even at the point that aggression is 
turned back in Viet-Nam — to talk of an end 
to confrontation. To do so is to talk of 
harbingers and of hopes, not yet of facts. 

While Viet-Nam, for example, has not 
been the complete obstacle to cooperative 
steps that might have been feared, Moscow 
continues to provide Hanoi with economic 
and military assistance, augmenting North 
Viet-Nam's ability to persist in its aggres- 
sion against South Viet-Nam. Confrontation 
between East and West is hardly over. 

An equal obstacle is the division of 
Europe and Germany. The course of world 
events is toward diversity and away from 
the bipolar world of the 1950's. Yet in 
Europe the East^West deadlock remains ap- 
parent; Germany remains divided. Our secu- 
rity is inseparable from that of our Atlantic 
allies, and detente can have no real meaning 
without a stable and secure Europe. 

MAY 15, 1967 


Another obstacle lies in the character of 
the Soviet Union. Were it simply another 
great power pursuing its national interests, 
we would still live in a dangerous age. But 
the Soviet Union is not just a great power 
with nuclear might and with national in- 
terests of its own. It is also the center of 
supremely ambitious ideology. To be sure, 
Soviet leaders have recently shown increas- 
ing restraint and caution. Yet the ultimate 
supremacy of communism remains central 
to the Soviet world view. 

The grounds of basic confrontation re- 

Because it is not yet possible to end this 
confrontation, it does not follow that we must 
accept a policy of unrelieved hostility. In his 
handbook on English usage. Fowler divides 
the English-speaking world into five parts: 
those who neither know nor care what a split 
infinitive is; those who do not know, but still 
care very much; those who know and con- 
demn; those who know and approve; and 
those who know and distinguish. 

What he finds true of syntax, I believe we 
should find true of our dealings with the 
Soviets. Surely we are able now to know and 
to distinguish. 

The cold war no longer means monolithic 
belligerence. It may, indeed, be more ac- 
curate to talk of many small cold battles than 
of a single war, of many truces than of a 
single armistice. And all involve shifting 
interests and mobile fronts. 

— In the Antarctic, for example, Soviet 
and American scientists work in harmony. 
In the Arctic both nations maintain vigil 
against possible attack. 

— We exchange weather data from space 
satellites at the same time we compete in the 
race to the moon. 

— The Soviets responded to President 
Johnson's October 7 speech ^ by saying we 
were strangely deluded if we thought any 
improvement in relations was possible while 
the Viet-Nam war continued. A few days 
later, they accepted our proposal to conclude 

' For President Johnson's address at New York, 
N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, 
p. 622. 

an air agreement for direct air traffic be- 
tween New York and Moscow. 

The lesson, I would suggest, is that for our 
part we ought not simply, on the basis of old 
cold-war rigidities, to reject cooperative steps 
— in the way many opposed a Consular Con- 
vention. There may have been a time when 
such inflexible, ideological, hostile responses 
were appropriate. But we ought now to act 
on self-interest, not self-righteousness. 

I suggest that there are three categories 
of constructive steps which have already 
been taken or which it is possible to take. 

One category involves common interests 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The second category encompasses 
complementary interests. The third category 
involves compatible interests. 

Common interests. By far the most im- 
portant consideration for both nations is that 
their great power places them in unique re- 
lationship. For the first time in history, two 
nations live each with its hands on the jugu- 
lar of the other — and of every other nation. 

One small manifestation of our common 
interest in this most central of all subjects is 
the hot line between Moscow and Washing- 
ton, intended to provide both with the addi- 
tional margin of insurance which instant 
communication can afford against miscalcu- 

A second common interest is that we each 
have unfinished tasks at home which must be 
dealt with at the expense of rivalry. We 
each in our own contexts have internal fron- 
tiers to push back — frontiers of poverty, in- 
efficiency, discrimination, and frustration. 

This is a consideration in which the Soviet 
Union may well have an even greater stake 
than we do. The gross national product of 
the U.S.S.R. is about half of ours. The 
Soviets have only begun to make the basic in- 
vestments in consumer industry necessary to 
approach the American standard of living. 
The Soviets themselves have admitted seri- 
ous shortages of housing, automobiles, appli- 
ances, and at times even food. They face a 
tremendous task in satisfying the rising as- 
pirations of their people. 



Let me now turn to the second category: 
Complementai'y interests. 

Such an interest, in stability on the Asian 
subcontinent, led the United States and the 
Soviet Union to take independent but par- 
allel action to allay the Kashmir dispute and 
to offset Chinese mischief. 

Another, quite different, example is that of 
the Consular Convention. For the Soviets to 
have the prospect of additional consulates in 
the United States is no necessary loss to us. 
For us to gain reciprocal rights, and for 
American citizens to secure elemental pro- 
tection when they visit the Soviet Union, are 
hardly disadvantages to the Soviets. 

Finally, there is the category of: Compat- 
ible interests. 

In a number of instances each country 
calculates its gains and losses differently; 
both may find the same step acceptable be- 
cause of different assessments of relative 

Easl^West trade is one example. The 
Soviets hope to buy capital equipment from 
the West. We would like to see more con- 
sumer goods provided to the Soviet people. 
There may be the basis for trade arrange- 
ments here which each side finds advan- 

Another manifestation comes in scientific 
and cultural exchanges. The Soviets value 
the opportunities for collecting technical in- 
formation from scientific exchanges and the 
propaganda impact of such cultural attrac- 
tions as the Bolshoi Ballet. For our part, we 
believe we gain more on our side by expos- 
ing millions of Soviet citizens to the fruits of 
our open society through exhibits and 
monthly distribution of the magazine Amer- 

Such environmental contacts mean famili- 
arity and, the old axiom to the contrary, 
familiarity should not mean contempt but 

What does this analysis mean in terms of 
American foreign policy ? 

So far, we have pursued, and often taken 
the lead in, peaceful engagement: the Consu- 
lar Convention, the Civil Air Agreement, the 
Outer Space Treaty. We are seeking East- 

West trade legislation in the Congress. We 
have proposed talks on limiting defensive and 
offensive missile deplojTnent. 

In every case American and Soviet in- 
terests are, or would be, served. In every case 
progress is dependent on the willingness of 
the Soviet Union to advance with us step by 

The Soviet Union shares with us the spe- 
cial responsibility to build a more secure 
world. Simultaneously, in my view, its own 
self-interest demands such a policy. Soviet 
leaders may find it awkward publicly to 
agree with that assessment. But in any event, 
detente obviously must work both ways. 

The outline of the forward movement 
sought by President Johnson and this admin- 
istration is plain. As the President said last 
August: 2 

. . . what is the practical step forward in this 
direction? I think it is to reco^ize that while 
difTering principles and differing values may 
always divide us, they should not, and they must 
not, deter us from rational acts of common endeavor. 
The dogmas and the vocabularies of the cold war 
were enough for one generation. The world must 
not now flounder in the backwaters of the old and 
stagnant passions. 

In concert with other interested countries: 

— We seek to abate the strategic arms race. 
We hope that continued discussion will lead 
both sides to conclude that it is in neither's 
interest to expand defensive and offensive 

— We seek a worldwide nonproliferation 
agreement which will in fact inhibit the 
spread of national nuclear weapons and will 
be a step toward general disarmament. 

— We would like to see the Soviet Union 
join others in promoting more open East- 
West relations in Europe. Attempts by the 
Federal German Republic to develop more in- 
timate ties with the Eastern European na- 
tions should be encouraged, not hindered. 

— And finally, we seek mutual restraint 
and mutual influence for peace in troubled 
areas, whether in the Middle East or Laos 
or elsewhere. The greatest contribution 

^ For President Johnson's address at Arco, Idaho, 
on Aug. 26, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410. 

MAY 15, 1967 


would be to help bring an end to the fighting 
in Viet-Nam. 

In the meantime, in its relations with the 
Soviet Union the United States will continue 
to seek out the kinds of cooperation that are 
now feasible. We do not expect Soviet 
ideology suddenly to dissolve in a flood of 
American intentions. To the extent that co- 
operation proceeds, it will have to reflect the 
solid interests of both sides and it will have 
to be measured by the reciprocal actions of 
both sides. 

All this will not soon transfonn the world. 
The process of change in the Communist 
world and in East-West relations will be 
slow at best. But it holds promise for us, for 
our friends in Europe and the developing 
countries — and for the U.S.S.R. It is for the 
leaders of that great country to decide 
whether this promise will, at the end of the 
day, be fulfilled. 

Under Secretary Katzenbach 
Visits 11 African Countries 

The Department of State announced on 
April 26 (press release 97) that Under Sec- 
retary Katzenbach would visit 11 African 
countries May 10-27. He will be accompanied 
by Mrs. Katzenbach, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Aff'airs Wayne Fred- 
ericks, and several officials of the Department 
of State. 

Mr. Katzenbach will make his first stop 
in Senegal and will proceed to Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Ghana, Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and 

The trip, which was originally planned for 
February-March, will be the first extensive 
tour of Africa to be taken by an Under Sec- 
retary of State. Mr. Katzenbach's trip will 
allow him to see a significant cross section 
of African countries and to meet many Afri- 
can officials and other personalities. It re- 
flects his longstanding desire to visit Africa 
and to see at firsthand some of the interest- 
ing developments and trends in that conti- 

World Trade Week, 1967 


World trade joins the United States with other 
nations in a creative partnership that supports the 
growth of our free enterprise economy and advances 
the well-being of all our citizens. 

Last year, total trade among the non-communist 
countries amounted to about $180 billion. Since 1960, 
this trade has grown by more than $67 billion, or 
an annual rate of more than 8 percent. Trade among 
the nations of the free world should reach the as- 
tounding annual rate of $200 billion in the year 

The exchange of goods and services builds a foun- 
dation for mutual trust among nations. It sustains 
our hopes for the attainment of a better world, in 
which all peoples may live in peace. 

Expanding trade with nations around the world 
accelerates the pace of economic progress at home 
and abroad. 

— It enlarges the opportunities for United States 
businessmen to sell more products and services in 
world markets. Since 1960, U.S. exports of merchan- 
dise have risen by 50 percent. In 1966, they exceeded 
$29 billion, close to $3 billion more than the year 

— It provides employment for more American 
workers. About three and a half million Americans 
are engaged, directly or indirectly, in the produc- 
tion, transport and marketing of our exports. The 
growth of this trade will create jobs for many more 
workers in both rural and urban areas throughout 
the United States. 

— It widens the range of materials and consumer 
goods available at competitive prices in the domestic 

— It helps the developing countries make fuller use 
of their energies and resources. 

— It encourages the international exchange of 
ideas, knowledge, and experience. 

Vigorous expansion of our export volume is essen- 
tial. We have succeeded in reducing the deficit in our 
balance of payments, but we must make still further 

The United States will continue to support the re- 
ciprocal reduction of trade barriers to stimulate the 
flow of international commerce. To this purpose, an 
early and successful completion of the Kennedy 
Round of trade negotiations is especially important. 
There are only a few weeks remaining; by April 30, 
major issues must be settled and a balance of con- 
cessions achieved. The final agreement must be signed 
by June 30. An historic opportunity to broaden vastly 
the world's trade horizons is within reach. This 
opportunity must not be lost. 

' No. 3771; 32 Fed. Reg. B241. 



We are negotiating with other nations on the im- 
provement of the international monetary system. In- 
ternational agreement that will assure an adequate 
growth of world reserves is a key to the future ex- 
pansion of world trade. 

We believe that trade also offers a means of 
achieving fruitful, cooperation with the Soviet Union 
and other Eastern European nations. In 1966, U.S. 
exports to Eastern Europe totalled only $200 million 
while other non-communist countries sold Eastern 
Europe goods worth over $6 billion. U.S. ratification 
of a consular agreement with the U.S.S.R., our vari- 
ous trade missions to Eastern Europe, and our par- 
ticipation in the 1967 food processing fair in Moscow 
illustrate our effort to build bridges through trade. 
We must continue to pursue lasting peace by seek- 
ing out every possible course to healthy economic and 
cultural relations with these countries. 

The principal objective of our foreign trade policy 
is to promote the increase of peaceful, profitable com- 
merce among our Nation and others. 

World Trade Week reaffirms and supports this 

dent of the United States of America, do hereby 
proclaim the week beginning May 21, 1967, as 
World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate 
Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the 
observance of that week. 

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educa- 
tional, professional, and civic groups, as well as the 
people of the United States generally, to observe 
World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, ex- 
hibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities 
designed to promote continuing awareness of the 
importance of world trade to our economy and our 
relations with other nations. 

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this twenty- 
fourth day of March, in the year of our 
[seal] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and 
of the Independence of the United States 
of America the one hundred and ninety-first. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 2d Session 

A Study of the Communist Party and Coalition Gov- 
ernments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
European Countries. Prepared for the Subcom- 
mittee To Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security 
Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 
April 4, 1966. 33 pp. [Committee print.] 

Contmgency Planning for U.S. International Mone- 
tary Policy. Statements by private economists 
submitted to the Subcommittee on International 
Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic 
Committee. December 30, 1966. 160 pp. [Joint 
Committee print.] 

90th Congress, 1st Session 

Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Com- 
mission. Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 
11. 47 pp. 

Annual Report of the Maritime Administration. 
Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 21. 
116 pp. 

Fiftieth Annual Report of the United States Tariff 
Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1966. 
H. Doc. 26. 26 pp. 

Fourth Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Com- 
mission on International Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs. H. Doc. 32. January 10, 1967. 14 pp. 

Consular Convention With the Soviet Union. Hear- 
ings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. January 23-February 17, 1967. 374 pp. 

The Communist World in 1967. Hearing before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with for- 
mer Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugo- 
slavia George F. Kennan. January 30, 1967. 68 pp. 

Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. Hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
with former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. 
Reischauer. January 31, 1967. 76 pp. 

Harrison E. Salisbury's Trip to North Vietnam. 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. February 2, 1967. 151 pp. 

Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign 
Policy. Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations with Henry Steele Commager, 
Professor, Amherst College. February 20, 1967. 
59 pp. 

Conflicts Between United States Capabilities and 
ForeigTi Commitments. Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Realtions with Lt. Gen. 
James M. Gavin (U.S. Army, retired). February 
21, 1967. 44 pp. 

Our Changing Partnership With Europe. Report of 
Special Study Mission to Europe, 1966, of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November 
25-December 16, 1966. H. Rept. 26. February 22, 
1967. 53 pp. 

MAY 15, 1967 


Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace 
Surveys World Water Problems 

The Department of the Interior on April 
10 released the text of a report prepared by 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Water 
for Peace ^ and transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Interior and the Secretary of State by 
the chairman of the Committee, Assistant 
Secretary of the hiterior Kenneth Holum. 
Following are the chairman's memorandum 
of transmittal, an excerpt from the report 
comprising the Committee's recommenda- 
tions, and a list of the members of the Com- 


President Johnson launched the Water for 
Peace Program in his address of October 7, 
1965,2 in which he pledged United States 
participation in a "massive cooperative in- 
ternational effort to find solutions for man's 
water problems." Steps already have been 
taken to increase U.S. support for water 
projects within the foreign assistance pro- 
gram. The enclosed report prepared by an 
Interdepartmental Committee on Water for 
Peace representing interested agencies of 
the Federal Government briefly surveys the 
world's water problems and considers fur- 
ther actions which can be taken to advance 
this international cooperative effort. 

Water is vital to human life and to man's 
pursuit of happiness. It is essential to man's 
health, yet almost a billion people in the 
world lack even the simplest dependable sup- 

' Single copies of the 79-page report, Water for 
Peace; A Report of Background Considerations and 
Recommendations on the Water for Peace Program, 
(March 1967), are available upon request from the 
Water for Peace office, Department of the Interior, 
Washington, D.C., 20240. 

' Bulletin of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720. 

plies of potable water for personal and do- 
mestic use. Most of them suffer or have re- 
cently suffered from debilitating diseases 
that are water borne or that are attributable 
to a lack of water for personal hygiene; each 
year an estimated 500 million people are 
afflicted by such illnesses, and ten million 
people — about half of them infants — die. 
Millions suffer undernourishment and star- 
vation because water supplies are not prop- 
erly used or developed for food production. 
Water contributes in important ways to com- 
merce and industrial development. Water 
also is an integral part of the human en- 

All nations have water problems, but they 
differ in kind and character depending upon 
the nature and extent of their water re- 
sources, the state of technological and indus- 
trial development, population density, his- 
torical experience, and cultural values. In the 
industrialized countries these problems re- 
volve around water management, water pol- 
lution, and water reuse to serve highly intri- 
cate and intensive demands. In the less 
developed countries the lack of information, 
skilled manpower, cultural, legal and govern- 
ment institutions, and adequate planning 
represent the areas of most immediate need. 
International river systems in all regions of 
the world present significant opportunities 
to the riparian countries for mutual advan- 
tage and peaceful cooperation through co- 
ordinated development programs. 

For these reasons, an international coop- 
erative effort to advance water development 
throughout the world is aptly named the Wa- 
ter for Peace Program because the water 
cycle pays no attention to the boundaries 
men draw on maps; because hunger, disease 
and misery are everywhere the enemies of 
mankind; because no one nation has a mo- 



nopoly of knowledge and talent; and because 
by working together toward the solution of 
their common problems, men advance a little 
down the road to universal peace. 

Chapter II of the enclosed report sum- 
marizes the ways in which water can fulfill 
human needs and promote a better life. 
Chapter III reviews the programs required 
to develop water resources to serve these 
purposes, particularly from the point of view 
of national and local entities responsible for 
water development programs. Chapter IV 
describes the opportunities available to de- 
velop international river systems. Chapter V 
briefly reviews the many interrelated bi- 
lateral and multilateral programs and orga- 
nizations operating to improve water de- 
velopment. Chapter VI discusses several sug- 
gested organizational arrangements that 
should be undertaken to improve mutual 
cooperation in water development within the 
United Nations family, at the regional and 
subregional level, and within the United 
States to support the worldwide effort. 

Chapter VII sets forth a number of spe- 
cific recommendations which the Interdepart- 
mental Committee on Water for Peace 
believes are worthy of consideration to 
stimulate the rate of progress in water de- 
velopment throughout the world and to pro- 
mote a more systematic framework in which 
the efforts of individual countries and inter- 
national organizations can be coordinated to 
fulfill this end. 

This preliminary review of the world's 
water problems has led the Committee to 
four basic conclusions: First, that notwith- 
standing the many significant current inter- 
national water programs, the worldwide 
effort is not keeping pace with the worldwide 
needs. Second, water problems are so varied 
and the opportunities for development so 
complex, that water resources development 
in each country should be fully coordinated 
with the development of other economic and 
human resources. Third, that the most 
urgent need throughout the developing world 
is for an increased understanding of and 
capacity to deal with the problems involved 
in water resources development and manage- 

ment. Fourth, that existing and anticipated 
technological advances make possible the 
solutions of problems which earlier were 
considered insurmountable. 

Within the framework of these conclusions 
the recommendations include a number of 
specific proposals to provide more data and 
ijiformation about water problems, re- 
sources, and opportunities for development; 
more trained manpower to put knowledge 
and technology to work; improved planning 
and organization of water programs at local, 
national and regional levels; and enhanced 
utilization of science and technology for 
water development. The recommendations 
also implement the Committee's belief that 
many of the cooperative efforts of the world 
community to assist in these programs can 
best be coordinated by, and channeled 
through, strengthened or newly established 
multilateral institutions and programs at the 
regional and subregional levels. 

No specific recommendations are included 
with respect to international financing of 
construction projects other than that this 
subject be further studied and kept under 
constant surveillance. One reason for this is 
that the immediate need is not for new capi- 
tal financing but for more well-planned proj- 
ects which can meet the lending require- 
ments of the many existing sources of 
financial assistance. Second, internal sources 
of financing must be more thoroughly sur- 
veyed since these sources must provide the 
greatest percentage of capital requirements. 
A third consideration is that many of the 
countries in greatest need of new water 
facilities lack the technical and institutional 
capacity to operate and maintain them after 

Inasmuch as this report has been pre- 
pared by a group within the United States 
Government, these recommendations are 
focussed on what the United States might do 
both through its own programs and through 
its representation and voice in international 
councils in urging other nations to make 
parallel and cooperative contributions. This 
should not obscure recognition of the basic 
premise that nations and regions of the 

MAY 15, 1967 


world which have water problems and desire 
to respond to them by promoting water de- 
velopment, must undertake this responsi- 
bility themselves. Through the Water for 
Peace Program the world community can 
exchange knowledge and experience, offer 
encouragement, supply technology, and pro- 
vide technical and financial assistance, but 
one nation or region cannot do the job for 
any other. This principle of self-help is fun- 
damental to the program. 

In addition it is hoped that this report, 
which was produced primarily for the pur- 
pose of orienting the thinking in U.S. gov- 
ernment agencies toward making a more ef- 
fective contribution to solving the world's 
water problems, will be useful to participants 
at the International Conference on Water for 
Peace. It seems probable that it contains 
material which should be helpful in discus- 
sions, and should stimulate action along con- 
structive lines. 



The following recommendations are advanced by 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for 
Peace in the belief that they are worthy of consid- 
eration to stimulate the rate of progress in water 
development throughout the world and to promote 
a more systematic framework in which the efforts 
of individual countries and international organiza- 
tions can be coordinated to fulfill this end. 

The recommendations take into account the pro- 
grams the President has launched to combat hunger, 
ignorance and disease and the corresponding 
planned increases in U.S. aid to international 
agricultural, educational, and health programs. Al- 
though addressed to the subject of what the United 
States additionally might do, both through its own 
programs and through its representation and voice 
in international councils in urging other nations 
to make parallel and cooperative contributions, the 
recommendations are founded on the basic premise 
that nations and regions of the world which have 
water problems and desire to respond to them by 
promoting water development, must undertake this 
responsibility themselves. Through the international 
Water for Peace Program the world community 
can exchange knowledge and experience, offer 
encouragement, supply technology, and provide 
technical and financial assistance, but one nation or 

region cannot do the job for any other. This princi- 
ple of self-help is fundamental to the program. 

The recommendations are for both short- and 
long-term actions. Although they focus on water 
problems and ways to solve them, all such efforts 
should be planned within the broader framework 
of the overall economic and social development 
requirements of the respective country or region. 
The goal of giving the less developed countries in- 
creased ability to solve their own problems requires 
stress on more . extensive planning; education and 
training at the subprofessional and professional 
levels; institution building; discovery of new ways 
to utilize local labor, local materials and equipment, 
and local sources of finance; and enhanced applica- 
tion of science and technology. A regional or 
subregional approach to many of these problems can 
be especially useful. 

In the long run, progress in solving water prob- 
lems will be measured through new capital con- 
struction, ranging in size from the installation of 
simple sanitation facilities to the construction of 
large-scale river basin projects. Most of the financ- 
ing inevitably must come from local and national 
sources. Supplementary capital assistance must also 
be provided from international and bilateral sources, 
at expanded levels; requirements for this financing 
will need to be under constant review and should 
be related to the ability of countries to use the as- 
sistance effectively. 

The recommendations that follow are not mutu- 
ally exclusive. Some overlap ; all are complementary. 
For example, the program under the International 
Hydrological Decade supplements activities covered 
in four preceding sections on regional centers, edu- 
cation and training, research and information and 
data. This does not result in a duplication of 
activity, rather, the objectives of one recommenda- 
tion will be advanced by the successful carrying 
out of other related recommendations. 

1. Water for Living 

a. Goals. — We recommend that the United States 
encourage countries and regions having water sup- 
ply problems to establish realistic goals for their 
national efforts, as Latin America has done in the 
Charter of Punta del Este.' For example, consid- 
eration might be given to establishing the goal that 
by 1980 the percentage of urban and rural popula- 
tions in the developing countries served by piped 
drinking water will be increased at least by 50 

b. U.S. Bilateral Community Water Supply De- 
velopment Program. — (1) We recommend an in- 
crease in U.S. financial assistance to community 
water supply and sewerage projects in areas of 
critical need. This assistance should include pro- 

' For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see 
ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 



vision for necessary institutional support to estab- 
lish and operate water supply installations, includ- 
ing training programs and the enactment of 
national water legislation if necessary. 

(2) We recommend that the United States sponsor 
and cooperate in studies into ways and means to 
sharply accelerate improvement in urban and rural 
water supplies throughout the developing world con- 
sistent with the establishment of an institutional 
base that will in the future provide adequate water 
supplies financed largely through local revenues. 

c. International Water Supply Effort. — We recom- 
mend that the community water supply programs of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) be 
strengthened and that all governments and other in- 
ternational organizations increase technical assist- 
ance and capital support for community water 
supply programs. 

d. Desalination. — (1) We recommend that the 
United States offer to assist in the construction of — 

(a) Small- and medium-scale desalination plants, 
including solar stills, in those areas where the need 
for additional drinking water is critical, where 
humanitarian purposes would be fulfilled, and where 
there is no obviously cheaper source; 

(6) Desalination plants in areas where acute 
water shortages exist or occur unexpectedly or 
where economic development is retarded to the point 
of stagnation ; 

(c) Large-scale desalting plants, particularly 
when joined with the production of electrical en- 
ergy, which can make a dramatic impact in the 
solution of specific water problems. Decisions to 
assist in capital arrangements for such large-scale 
plants will, of course, have to be preceded by care- 
ful assessment of individual projects as presented. 

(2) We recommend that the United States con- 
tinue to offer to provide all appropriate technical 
assistance to countries interested in developing 
desalting projects. 

e. Pollution Control. — (1) We recommend that the 
Water for Peace Program be used as a foundation 
for a world effort at providing clean, health-preserv- 
ing water. The U.S. contribution to this, which will 
depend heavily on the expanded Community Water 
Supply Development Program of AID, should be 
coordinated with those health activities which are 
to be carried out under the proposed International 
Health Act of 1966," and also with the health activi- 
ties of other governments, the specialized agencies 
of the U.N., and other organizations as appropriate. 

(2) We recommend that pollution problems both 
in developed and developing countries be discussed 
at the International Conference on Water for Peace. 

•* For text of President Johnson's message to 
Congress on international education and health, see 
ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328. 

2. Water for Food 

a. Goals. — We recommend that the United States 
encourage countries needing more water and water 
management for increased food production to estab- 
lish specific goals, at least over the next 10 years 
to support their plans for food production to feed 
their expected population. Goals should be set for 
the development of water resources through im- 
proved water uses, supplemental water supply, 
elimination of flood damage, improved water man- 
agement, installation of needed drainage facilities, 
addition of new irrigation acreage, and fish produc- 
tion and processing. 

b. Expansion of AID Programs. — It is recom- 
mended that AID'S expanded activities in support 
of the President's Food for Freedom Program in- 
clude assistance for the solution of agricultural 
water problems, including planning, training, de- 
velopment of irrigation and reclamation facilities, 
flood control and drainage improvements, which, 
together with that furnished by all other sources, 
will support the attainment of the planned levels 
of food production. 

c. Support to the Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion. — We recommend that the United States urge 
the strengthening of the FAO, especially with re- 
spect to increased development and improved use of 
surface and ground water resources, and irrigation, 
drainage and flood control, for agriculture; improve- 
ment and management of upland watersheds; and 
greater production of fish for food, particularly 
fish farming in conjunction with agricultural land 
use, notably in rice-producing areas, and for con- 
ducting studies, inventories and the establishment 
of demonstration projects for promoting fishery 
production in coastal estuaries. 

d. Opportunities for Fish Production and Process- 
ing. — Water development programs, where appropri- 
ate, should provide for protection of fishery re- 
sources and their development, including methods 
for harvesting, processing, distribution, and market- 
ing in an efficient and economic manner. Emphasis 
should be placed on management for sustainable 
yield of fisheries resources and on development of 
fish protein concentrate from freshwater species. 

e. U.S.-Owned Local Currencies for Water Devel- 
opment. — (1) We recommend that, within the con- 
text of country program priorities, a portion of 
U.S.-owned excess local currencies be offered for 
the creation of agricultural development banks (or 
be added to the resources of existing banks) for 
irrigation and other water conservation and develop- 
ment activities and for making loans to farmers 
for these purposes. 

(2) We recommend that foreign currencies to be 
obtained under the Food for Freedom Program be 
used more extensively for the development of water 

(3) We recommend that a larger share of excess 

MAY 15, 1967 


foreign currency funds available to the U.S. Gov- 
ernment be used for research on water-related 
problems. Where congressional authorization is re- 
quired, it should be sought. Any other limitations 
which might prevent the use of such funds for 
research on local water problems within developing 
countries should be removed. 

f. Special Demonstration Projects. — We recom- 
mend that AID give special attention to large- 
scale projects for demonstration and training of 
nationals, consisting of coordinated development of 
water and land resources to be established in trib- 
utary watershed areas in selected countries or 
regions suffering a critical food shortage. In most 
instances these projects could be integ^rated with 
or become a part of river basin development 

3. Water for International Cooperation — Interna- 
tional Rivers 

We recommend that nations sharing international 
river basins as well as appropriate U.N. agencies be 
encouraged to give special attention to the coopera- 
tive development of international river systems, 
not only to realize the full economic values of their 
development but also because such effort is in itself 
a valuable encouragement to general international 

In support of this policy, we recommend: 

(1) That the United States encourage the Sec- 
retary-General of the United Nations to pursue his 
suggestion of early 1966 to conduct a survey of 
the potential for development in international 
rivers, but along regional or subregional lines and 
on a selective basis with respect to specific river 
basin projects. Although financing of regional sur- 
veys would presumably be through the UNDP 
[United Nations Development Program], the United 
States should be ready to make contributions to 
arrangements for such surveys. 

(2) That the United States encourage with other 
interested nations and U.N. agencies to give priority 
to the development of at least one additional inter- 
national river basin in each continent. 

(3) That the United States encourage countries 
bordering on international rivers to join in creating 
appropriate international bodies to promote the 
cooperative development of the river systems. 

(4) That the United States in calling the Water 
for Peace Conference invite the participants to 
report on studies of the development potentials of 
international river systems of particular interest 
to them. 

4. Regional Centers for Water Resources Develop- 

(1) We recommend that the United States offer 
to assist in the creation or strengthening of a num- 
ber of regional or subregional centers for water 

resources development, where appropriate, under 
the leadership of regional and subregional interna- 
tional entities, particularly the United Nations 
regional economic commissions and the Organization 
of American States. The sponsoring organization 
and the participating countries of the region should 
in each case work out the location and functions of 
the center and its relations with other institutions. 

(2) The sponsoring organization and the partici- 
pating countries of the region should clearly estab- 
lish their determination to provide long-term sup- 
port for each center. 

(3) The United States should be prepared, at 
least by the time of the international conference, 
to offer to contribute a substantial percentage of 
the annual cost for the first 5 years of nine new 
centers. The goal might be to establish or expand 
two centers in 1968, three in 1969, and four in 1970. 

5. Education and Training 

a. Regional Institutions for Professional Train- 
ing. — We recommend the creation or enlargement 
of a number of regional or subregional institutions 
and programs for professional training sponsored 
by appropriate multinational groups or by national 
groups with appropriate multinational involvement. 
A major input also could come from participation 
by industrial and other private groups. The func- 
tions of these institutions, we suggest, would be 
to provide undergraduate and graduate education 
in water-related disciplines, either as separate in- 
stitutions or as adjuncts to existing universities. 
The Water for Peace Program should be prepared 
to contribute to the support of these institutions, 
including arranging for the exchange of professors 
and scientists, as discussed below. These centers 
would complement, or, in appropriate cases, be 
combined with the Regional Centers for Water Re- 
sources Development proposed in recommendation 4 

b. Regional Technical and Vocational Training. — 
(1) We recommend that the United States, in co- 
operation with U.N. agencies and other countries, 
establish regional programs to train teams of in- 
structors who can conduct vocational training in 
connection with water resources projects. 

(2) We recommend that where special skills are 
required, special courses or training centers should 
be organized on a regional basis. 

(3) We recommend an expansion of the U.S. 
program of sponsoring regional short-term insti- 
tutes on a continuing basis outside of the United 
States for training technicians in water specialties. 

(4) We recommend that private industry and 
other private groups be considered as a source of 
instruction, personnel, materials, equipment and 
financing in these programs. 

c. Education and Training Programs in the 
United States. — We recommend that the U.S. Gov- 



ernnient assist universities, foundations, schools and 
Government agencies to improve their programs 
for the training of both foreign and U.S. nationals 
in curricula and practical field techniques essential 
to international water resources development. It 
would be desirable to have arrangements facilitat- 
ing the return of advanced students in the United 
States to their own countries later to do thesis 

d. Exchange and Fellowships Programs. — We 
recommend an expansion of exchange programs for 
professors, government officials, water specialists, 
and other experienced persons active in water 
matters. We also recommend an expansion of ex- 
change fellowship programs for graduate students 
in all fields related to water resources development. 

e. Education Study. — We recommend that the 
United States urge and support the initiation by an 
appropriate U.N. organization of a survey of availa- 
ble data concerning the facilities available and 
explicit needs for expanded education and training 
in water resources subjects. 

f. Peace Corps. — We recommend that the Peace 
Corps give greater emphasis to training and direct 
assistance on water resources development activities. 

g. Coordination With International Education 
Programs. — In his message on international educa- 
tion and health, the President made a number of 
proposals to strengthen U.S. position in interna- 
tional education programs. We recommend that as 
appropriate these programs include attention to 
education, training and study in the fields related 
to water resources development. 

6. Research and Surveys 

a. Existing Research Programs. — We recommend 
that on-going domestic research programs in the 
water field be encouraged and expanded, and that 
results and findings that could be of value in solv- 
ing the world's water problems be made available 
to the world community on a regular basis. 

b. Research and Development on Specific Prob- 
lems. — We recommend that the Water for Peace 
Program give active support to research, including 
testing, directed to the solution of specific problems 
in water resources development that are particularly 
characteristic of the less developed countries. Fund- 
ing could come in part from U.S.-owned local cur- 
rency funds. 

c. Regional Centers for Tropical Research. — We 
recommend that the United States contribute finan- 
cial and other support to the establishment and 
operation of several regional or subregional research 
centers, where appropriate, to study water-related 
problems peculiar to tropical areas. This research 
function might be added to those already assigned 
to the proposed Regional Water Resources Develop- 
ment Centers. Participation by universities located 
in the regions should be enlisted by the centers. 

d. Cooperative Research and Studies. — We recom- 
mend that broadly representative teams of U.S. 
experts be formed to engage in research and studies 
in cooperation with other countries on international 
and regional problems of water conservation and 
management of mutual interest. 

e. Resource Reconnaissance Surveys. — We recom- 
mend that the developing countries participating in 
the international conference mutually establish a 
common goal of completing by 1975 compatible re- 
connaissance surveys of their water and related land 
resources. If possible, this would be desirable against 
a background of overall resource inventories; and 
demographic and economic surveys could also be 
useful. To this end, the United States should offer 
technical assistance, as requested, and employ all 
available and newly developed techniques of radar, 
modern photography, and remote-sensing equipment 
as appropriate. 

f. Use of Satellites. — We recommend that the co- 
operation of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) be enlisted in the Water 
for Peace Program to study the feasibility of mak- 
ing surveys of water and related resources on a 
world basis, using instrumented earth orbiting 

g. Basic Data Networks. — We recommend that 
the United States offer to assist with the planning, 
design, and establishment of new or enlarged basic- 
data networks and compilation systems, particularly 
in the developing countries. 

h. Resource Studies and Project Evaluation. — We 
recommend that the United States provide increased 
support for planning studies of integrated resources 
development and in the application of project evalu- 
ation methods, and that the U.S. and international 
banking institutions be encouraged to expand their 
activities along these lines. 

7. Information, Data and Publications 

a. hiformation and Data Retrieval. — We endorse 
and support current U.S. efforts to establish facili- 
ties and advisory councils for coordinated water 
resources information retrieval and data storage 
and retrieval, and we recommend that the systems 
include categories relating to international water 
activities as well as domestic. 

b. Assistayice to Regional Centers. — We recom- 
mend that the United States provide assistance to 
the Regional Centers for Water Resources Develop- 
ment and to other regional groups in regard to the 
establishment of libraries, publications exchange, 
water information retrieval, and the development of 
interest profiles to take advantage of U.S. and other 
retrieval facilities. 

c. Publications Exchange. — We recommend that 
studies of existing facilities and programs for inter- 
national exchange of publications relating to water 
resources be made with a view to improving these 

MAY 15, 1967 


programs and filling in the gaps; that limited funds 
be made available to finance publications exchanges; 
and that the subject of international publication 
exchanges be discussed at the international confer- 

d. Translations. — We recommend that arrange- 
ments be made for the translations of pertinent tech- 
nical reports, manuals, and textbooks into other lan- 
guages where such materials are needed. 

8. International H ydrological Decade 

We recommend that the United States participate 
fully in the International Hydrological Decade, and 
we support the proposals of the U.S. National Com- 
mittee [for the International Hydrological Decade] 
for inclusion under the Water for Peace Program. 

9. United Nations Programs 

a. Strengthened Water Program. — We recommend 
that the United States reinforce and support the 
United Nations, the specialized agencies and the in- 
ternational development banks in accelerated and 
expanded programs for water resources develop- 
ment. We also recommend that the United States 
support increased allocation of funds for technical 
assistance and preinvestment surveys in the U.N. 
Development Program. The United States is 
planning to increase its pledge to the UNDP for 
1967 by $5 million; and expects to continue increas- 
ing its contributions in future years, with the 
result that additional financing should be available 
for water development projects as well as other 

b. Intergovernmental Committee on Water Ques- 
tions. — It is recommended that the U.S. Govern- 
ment, in addition to its support of the U.N. Ad- 
ministrative Committee on Coordination, support the 
establishment of an intergovernmental committee on 
water questions under the Economic and Social 
Council in order to help fill the need for a higher 
level coordinating mechanism among the many 
elements of the United Nations that are concerned 
with water questions. 

c. Ground Water Surveys. — We recommend that 
the United States encourage the U.N. to undertake 
a 5-year program of assembling, compiling and 
making available in published or other suitable 
form, information and data relating to the ground 
water resources in developing countries. 

10. Foreign Bilateral Programs 

We recommend that the United States representa- 
tive inform the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) in Paris of the proposed Water for Peace 
Program, including the international conference, 
and urge increased support for water resources 
projects in the bilateral programs of the member 

11. Water Law and Legal Institutions 

a. Legal Aspects of International Rivers. — The 
U.S. Government should encourage governmental 
and private organizations in the United States and 
abroad and international agencies to continue to 
study and make available the legal aspects of the 
use and development of water resources of inter- 
national rivers and river basins. The United States 
should also encourage specific bilateral and regional 
arrangements, in each case of international river 
basin development, to establish agreed legal prin- 
ciples, including provisions for the settlement of 
disputes through permanent institutions selected for 
the particular development. 

b. Water Legislation. — We recommend that assist- 
ance be provided by the United States, by regional 
centers and by other countries to each developing 
nation asking aid in establishing the codes and legal 
institutions necessary for the rapid and orderly 
development of its water resources. We also recom- 
mend that legal studies be included in the programs 
of U.S. international centers. 

c. U.N. Legal Experts. — The United States should 
urge that U.N. development programs relating to 
water resources should provide legal experts to the 
countries being assisted. These experts should give 
advice and assistance on international and domestic 
water law problems and on the organization and 
functioning of international and domestic institu- 
tions needed for water resource development. 

iZ. Strengthening U.S. Capabilities to Support Over- 
seas Water Development 

a. Careers in International Water Service. — We 
recommend that appropriate steps be taken to en- 
courage U.S. experts in all water-related disciplines 
from both inside and outside of Government to con- 
centrate on, or to augment their professional careers 
by, studies and work in overseas water problems. 

b. Expert Teams. — We recommend an expansion in 
the capacity of the United States to send abroad 
qualified teams of water resources experts to pro- 
vide various technical services to countries and re- 
gional entities requesting such help, particularly 
with regard to planning, administering, and financ- 
ing water resource programs. 

c. Water for Peace Organization. — We recommend 
the establishment within the U.S. Government of a 
Water for Peace Office, under interdepartmental 
guidance, to coordinate U.S. participation in over- 
seas water resource efforts, to serve as a central 
point to stimulate interest in international water 
programs, and to ensure the effective discharge of 
U.S. commitments under the Water for Peace Pro- 

d. Mobilizing Private Participation. — The Water 
for Peace Program should promote the interest and 
cooperation in international water activities of indi- 



viduals and of universities, private organizations, 
industry, and State governments, through such 
mechanisms as conferences and seminars, advisory 
committees, information exchanges, and group co- 

13. r/ie International Conference on Water for Peace 

The United States will sponsor an International 
Conference on Water for Peace in Washington, D.C., 
on May 23-31, 1967. This Conference should serve 
to identify problems, exchange knowledge, discuss 
goals, and consider cooperative action programs in 
furtherance of the worldwide objectives of the Water 
for Peace Program. 


Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department 

of the Interior, chairman 
John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary, Department of 

Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Department of the 

Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary, Department of 

Health, Education, and Welfare 
Albert H. Moseman, Assistant Administrator, 

Agency for International Development 
Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International 

Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department 

of State 
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy 

Robert White, Administrator, Environmental Sci- 
ence Services Administration, Department of 




The Senate on April 17 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to Haiti. 
(For biographic details, see White House press 
release dated March 22.) 


Miss Barbara M. Watson as Acting Administra- 
tor of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, 
effective April 17. (For biographic details, see De- 
partment of State press release 94 dated April 19.) 


Nathan Lewin as Deputy Administrator of the 
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective 
April 17. (For biographic details, see Department 
of State press release 94 dated April 19.) 


Current Actions 



Protocol to amend the convention for the unifica- 
tion of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague 
September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 
1, 1963.' 

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, March 16, 

Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.* 
Signature: Saudi Arabia, April 6, 1967. 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into 
force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Ratification deposited: Senegal, April 21, 1967. 


Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, 
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop- 
erty. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered 
into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notification of accession: Morocco, April 15, 1967. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptance deposited: Somali Republic, March 30, 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and 
Moscow January 27, 1967.* 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: April 
25, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 

MAY 15, 1967 



International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967.' 
Ratifications deposited: Iceland, March 8, 1967; 

Jordan, Peru, March 1, 1967. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959 
(TIAS 4893, 5603), to put into effect a revised 
frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical 
mobile (R) service and related information, with 
annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.^ 
Notifications of approval: Austria, March 2, 1967; 

Canada, February 23, 1967; Denmark, February 

28, 1967. 


Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva 
March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967. 
Acceptances: Korea, March 15, 1967; Austria, 

March 15, 1967;' Turkey, March 20, 1967; 

Netherlands, March 30, 1967;" United States, 

April 21, 1967. 



Agreement relating to the furnishing of military 
equipment, materials, and services for a program 
of civic action. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Djakarta April 14, 1967. Entered into force 
April 14, 1967. 


Understanding regarding certain errors in the 
translation of the Hebrew text of the extradition 
convention of December 10, 1962 (TIAS 5476). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Jerusalem and 

Tel Aviv April 4 and 11, 1967. Entered into force 
April 11, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the use of zlotys accrued 
under the agricultural commodities agreement of 
February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), for international 
travel. Effected by an exchange of letters at 
Warsaw April 10, 1967. Entered into force April 

10, 1967. 

Agreement on understandings relating to the level 
of Polish purchases in the United States in 1967 
and 1968 under the agricultural commodities 
agreement of February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517). 
Effected by an exchange of letters at Warsaw 
April 10, 1967. Entered into force April 10, 1967. 

Agreement supplementary to the agreement of 
February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), relating to the 
use of zlotys for English language teaching and 
to finance programs under the Mutual Educational 
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (75 Stat. 
527). Effected by an exchange of notes at Warsaw 
April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force April 

11, 1967. 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreements of June 7, 1957, as amended (TIAS 
3839, 3878, 3973, 4243, 4532) ; February 15, 1958, 
as amended (TIAS .3991, 4046, 4243, 4532) ; June 
10, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4245, 4288, 4415, 
4532); July 21, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4535); 
December 15, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4907, 
4998) ; and February 3, 1964, as amended (TIAS 
5517). Effected by an exchange of notes at War- 
saw April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force 
April 11, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

' Not in force. 

' Subject to ratification. 

" Ad referendum. 


VOL. LVI, NO. 1455 


MAY IS, 1967 

The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office of 
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs, 
provides the public and interested aerencies 
of the Government with information on 
developments in the field of foreign rela- 
tions and on the work of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service. The 
Bulletin includes selected press releases on 
foreign policy, issued by the White House 
and the Department, and statements and 
addresses made by the President and by 
the Secretary of State and other officers of 

the Department, as well as special articles 
on various phases of international affairs 
and the functions of the Department. In- 
formation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international inter- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative material 
in the field of international relations are 
listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 

intendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ; 
single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this publi- 
cation approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



INDEX May 15, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U55 

Africa. Under Secretary Katzenbach Visits 11 
African Countries 756 

Asia. SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To 
Hepel Aggression (Kusk, communique) . . . 742 

Australia. ANZUS Council Discusses Political 
and Security Problems (text of communique) 749 

Canada. U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area 
North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ ... 750 


Confirmations (Ross) 765 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 757 

A Report to the Congress by the Commander 
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West- 
moreland) 738 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (Lewin) 765 

Confirmations (Ross) 765 

Designations (Watson) 765 

Economic Affairs 

Interdepartmental Committee on Water for 
Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chair- 
man's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758 

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel 
Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742 

Foreign Aid. Interdepartmental Committee on 
Water for Peace Surveys World Water Prob- 
lems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt 
from report) 758 

Germany. President Johnson Attends Funeral 
of Konrad Adenauer (Johnson, Kiesinger, 
Rusk) 751 

Greece. U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece Fol- 
lowing Military Takeover (Rusk) .... 750 

Haiti. Ross confirmed as Ambassador .... 765 

Health. Interdepartmental Committee on Water 
for Peace Surveys World Water Problems 
(chairman's memorandum and excerpt from 
report) 758 

International Organizations and Conferences 

ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Secu- 
rity Problems (text of communique) . . . 749 

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel 
Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on 
Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747 

Military Affairs 

A Report to the Congrress by the Commander 

of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West- 
moreland) 738 

U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and 
South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750 

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Discusses Politi- 
cal and Security Problems (text of com- 
munique) 749 

Presidential Documents 

President Johnson Attends Funeral of Konrad 

Adenauer 751 

World Trade Week, 1967 756 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO 
Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggres- 
sion (Rusk, communique) 742 

Trade. World Trade Week, 1967 (proclama- 
tion) 756 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 765 

U.S.S.R. United States Relations With the 
Soviet Union (Katzenbach) 753 

United Nations. Interdepartmental Committee 
on Water for Peace Surveys World Water 
Problems (chairman's memorandum and ex- 
cerpt from report) 758 


ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Secu- 
rity Problems (text of communique) . . . 749 

A Report tn the Coneress by t^^e Commander 
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West- 
mmelund) . . 738 

SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel 
Aggression (Kusk, communique) 742 

Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on 
Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747 

U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and 
South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750 

Water for Peace. Interdepartmental Committee 
on Water for Peace Surveys World Water 
Problems (chairman's memorandum and ex- 
cerpt from report) 758 

Name Index 

Johnson, President 751, 756 

Katzenbach. Nicholas deB 753 

Kiesinger, Kurt (Seorg "751 

Lewin, Matnan 765 

Ross, Claude G 765 

Rusk, Secretary 742, 750, 751 

Watson, Miss Barbara M 765 

Westmoreland, Gen. William C 738 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 24 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
92 of April 19 and 95 of April 21. 




97 4/26 Itinerary for visit of Under Sec- 
retary Katzenbach to Africa, 
May 10-27. 

*98 4/28 Heath sworn in as Ambassador 
to Sweden (biographic details). 

*99 4/29 Katzenbach: acceptance of 1967 
Bellarmine Medal, Bellarmine 
College, Louisville, Ky. 

flOO 4/29 Harriman: "The United States 
and Eastern Europe in Per- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

ii U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-937/45 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



Political Development in South Viet-Nam 

Political Development in South Viet-Nam (publication 8231), the most recent pamphlet in tht 
series of Viet-Nam Information Notes published by the Department of State, discusses South Viet 
Nam's steady progress toward an elected government and representative institutions at all leveli 
of government. 

The four other background papers on Viet-Nam published earlier are: Basic Data on Souti 
Viet-Nam, The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam, Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam, an< 
Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam. , 



To: Sapt. of Document* 
Govt. Printlns Offlea 

WashinKton, D.C. 20402 

Enclosed fine $ (cash, check, or money order). Please send copies of 

Viet-Nam Information Notes as indicated: Political Development in South 

Viet-Nam (8231) ; Basic Data on South Viet-Nam (8195) ; The 

Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (8196) ; Communist-Directed Forces in South 

Viet-Nam (8197); Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam (8213). 



, Enclofled 

To be mailed 


Coupon refund 






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Street Address 

City, State, and ZIP code- 







Vol. LVI, No. U56 

May 22, 1967 

Address by Secretai-y Rusk 770 

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 790 



Transcript of Intei'vieio 

on National Educational Television Network 77 U 

For index see inside back cover 

The Role of the United States in World Affairs 

Address by Secretary Rusk '■ 

I am deeply complimented by your invi- 
tation and this chance to express my 
respect and appreciation to the United States 
Chamber of Commerce. I have 20 minutes 
in which to talk to you about our relations 
with the rest of the world. I shall use short- 
hand, therefore, and not pursue each para- 
graph to its obvious conclusion. Perhaps I 
might offer some thoughts which will be of 
some use to you in your discussions of the 
next 3 days. 

Let us begin by noting the enormous 
capacity of the United States. We need not 
dwell on our military power. It is so vast 
that the effects of its use are beyond the 
comprehension of the mind of man. It is 
so vast that we dare not allow ourselves 
to become infuriated. 

Our economic strength is only slightly 
less formidable. The gross national product 
of the United States equals that of all of 
the rest of NATO and Japan combined. It 
is twice that of the Soviet Union, and the 
gap is widening. It is 10 times that of main- 
land China, out of which they must try to 
take care of the needs of more than 700 
million people. It is 10 times that of all 
of Latin America combined. 

What the United States does, therefore, 
is of vital importance to the rest of the 
world. It is necessary for us to be reasonably 
predictable — both by our friends and by 

' Made before the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States at Washington, D.C., on May 1 (press 
release 101). 

those who might be our adversaries. Were 
we not to remain steady on course, the 
world situation could disintegrate into the 
law of the jungle and utter chaos. 

General Omar Bradley, a very wise man, 
once said that the time has come for us to 
chart our course by the distant stars and 
not by the lights of each passing ship. To- 
day I wish to identify some of those distant 

Our foreign policy derives from the kind 
of people we are and from the international 
environment in which we live. It is rela- 
tively simple, relatively long term, and 
nonpartisan. I have now had the privilege of 
being present for hundreds of meetings of 
committees and subcommittees of the Con- 
gress in executive session. On no single 
occasion have differences of view turned on 
party lines. There are, of course, differences 
of view — as there would be in this audience 
and as there are within the executive branch. 
Most of our problems are complex, and 
many of them turn upon razoredge differ- 
ences in judgment. But it is no accident 
that the main lines of our policy under 
Democratic and Republican administrations 
have been national in character. 

Our supreme aspiration is "to secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our 
Posterity." This means that the beginning 
of our foreign policy is the kind of society 
we build here at home. Our example casts 
its shadow around the globe. Our words 
about freedom and justice would ring 
hollow if we were not making it apparent 



that we were trying to make our own 
society a gleaming example of what free 
men can accomplish under the processes of 
consent. The performance of our economic 
system under the conditions of liberty is 
itself one of the most powerful supports of 
the simple notions of liberty to which we 
as a nation are dedicated. 

Our policy reflects the inescapable reality 
that we can no longer find national security 
in a world which is torn with violence and 
aggression and the awful reality that a 
great war fought with modern weapons 
would destroy most of our civilization. 

Maintenance of Peace 

A central problem of our nation, therefore, 
must be to pursue an organized peace — a 
lasting peace, a world in which disputes are 
settled by peaceful means, a world free of 
the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe, in 
which each nation lives under institutions 
of its own choice but in which all nations 
and peoples cooperate to promote their 
mutual welfare. 

This does not mean that we are the 
world's policeman. It does not mean we 
aspire to a Pax Americana. We do not par- 
ticipate in most of the crises which arise 
in different parts of the world. We use our 
diplomatic resources and our membership 
in such bodies as the United Nations to try 
to lay the hand of restraint upon high 
tempers and excessive violence and to help 
find ways and means to bring about a peace- 
ful settlement of the many disputes that 
appear upon the world's agenda. 

But we do have our own more direct 
share in maintaining the peace. We have 
more than 40 allies with whom we are 
mutually pledged to resist aggression. These 
alliances were formed through the most 
solemn process of our Constitution — the 
treaty process. Their purpose was to let 
others know in advance that aggression 
against those to whom we are committed 
will not be accepted. I hope that you will 
not consider it presumption for me to say 

that the integrity of these alliances is at 
the heart of the maintenance of peace, and 
if it should be discovered that the pledge 
of the United States is meaningless, the 
structure of peace would crumble and we 
would be well on our way to a terrible 

Arms Reduction 

We must try with all of our intelligence 
and skill to turn downward the arms race. 
It is not easy when there are those who will 
not accept simple requirements of inspection 
to give assurance that agreements will be 
carried out. It will not be easy so long as 
there are major unresolved questions such 
as the division of Germany. It will not be 
easy when there are powerful countries who 
are committed to what they consider a 
world revolution — fundamentally in opposi- 
tion to the kind of world envisaged in the 
United Nations Charter. But we must con- 
tinue to try. 

I take no comfort from the fact that the 
defense budget of the United States this 
year equals the total gross national product 
of all of Latin America. I take no pleasure 
from the fact that, since 1947, the NATO 
nations have been required to invest more 
than a trillion dollars in defense budgets. 

Even though progress may be slow, we 
must continue to wrestle with the problems 
of reducing the levels of arms in order that 
these vast resources can be put to the serv- 
ice of the humane purposes of ordinary men 
and women throughout the world. 

Even before vast resources might be 
freed through disarmament, we must take 
a responsible share in the process of eco- 
nomic and social development among those 
nations who are just beginning to enter the 
age of science and technology. We cannot 
sustain our own prosperity in a poverty- 
stricken world. Nor can we allow ourselves 
to be indifferent to misery and disease 
which burden so vast a proportion of the 
world's population. In this great task you 
in private enterprise are playing a major 

MAY 22, 1967 


and crucial role. The contributions which 
you will make in capital, managerial skills, 
and technical assistance are larger in total 
effect than those being made by governments. 

In the Western Hemisphere we have a 
role as a major partner both in the defense 
of the American system and in the great 
cooperative social and economic enterprise, 
the Alliance for Progress. 

In all the tasks of building peace and a 
better world, we encourage regional coopera- 
tive undertakings: Atlantic partnership, the 
prospective Latin American common market, 
the beginnings of regional cooperation in 
Africa, and new regional and subregional 
organizations in East Asia and the Western 

Where problems extend beyond the limits 
of effective national or regional action, we 
encourage broader approaches, through the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund, GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and 

Nor do we forget that the United States 
is a trading nation. The promotion of trade 
is a major object of our diplomacy — and 
has been since the time of Benjamin 
Franklin. We have an important role in 
creating a vigorous system of international 
trade and monetary arrangements which 
are adequate to the needs of an expanding 
world economy. 

Working Toward Reduction of Tensions 

In our relations with present or potential 
adversaries we must be resolute when firm- 
ness is required. On the other hand, we 
should make it clear that we are prepared 
to meet everyone else more than halfway 
in building a durable peace. Despite the 
presence of tension and violence, we should 
try to resolve every outstanding question 
and extend the hand of cooperation where 
there is any response from the other side. 

We need not be under illusions about the 
word detente, but we must work toward a 
genuine reduction of tensions. This is why 

we have concluded the test ban treaty, the 
civil air and consular agreements with the 
Soviet Union, and the space treaty. This 
is why we are working hard on such matters 
as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons 
and the attempt to impose some ceiling upon 
the further developments of defensive and 
offensive nuclear missiles. This is among 
the reasons why we have proposed to the 
Congress that we be given authority to 
negotiate trade agreements with the coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe — the other big 
reason being that we are Yankee traders 
and would like to benefit from that trade. 

You should also know that we attach the 
greatest importance to the official structure 
of diplomacy and to what are called the 
rights of legation. We have been concerned 
that the structure of diplomacy, built with 
great care and effort over a period of cen- 
turies, is not accorded the protection and 
the dignity which are essential if even mini- 
mum relations among states are to be pre- 
served. Among the purposes of diplomatic 
relations is to have the means for discuss- 
ing differences between states. We shall do 
everything that we can to support the rights 
of legation by our own conduct, and we shall 
insist upon full compliance with those same 
rights by all with whom we have relations. 

Although we do not expect other nations 
to copy our political or economic institutions, 
we have convictions about these matters, 
based on ideals and experience, and there- 
fore will continue to do what we can to 
encourage trends toward self-determination, 
government with the consent of the gov- 
erned, open societies, and individual human 

Peace Proposals Rejected by Hanoi 

It is not our purpose today to discuss 
Viet-Nam in any detail, but you would 
consider it strange if I should ignore it. You 
should know that your President spends 
just as much time on the search for peace 
as he does on the military struggle itself. 
You should know that we keep in touch 



with all the nations of the world, including 
some with whom we do not have formal 
relations. You should recall that half the 
governments of the world have tried, singly 
or in groups, to move the violence in South- 
east Asia toward a peaceful solution. 

Let me remind you of the many proposals 
which have been made by ourselves or by 
others as a part of this effort to take a 
step toward peace: 

— A reconvening of the Geneva conference 
of 1954 and a return to the agreements of 

— A reconvening of the Geneva conference 
of 1962 on Laos and a return to the agree- 
ments of 1962; 

— A conference on Cambodia; 

— An all- Asian peace conference; 

— A special effort by the two cochairmen; 

— A special effort by the ICC [Interna- 
tional Control Commission]; 

— A role for the United Nations Security 
Council, or the General Assembly, or the 
Secretary-General ; 

— Talks through intermediaries, single or 

— Direct talks — with the United States or 
with South Viet-Nam; 

— Exchange of prisoners of war; 

— Supervision of treatment of prisoners 
by International Red Cross; 

— Demilitarize the DMZ [demilitarized 
zone] ; 

— Widen and demilitarize the DMZ; 

— Interposition of international forces be- 
tween combatants; 

— Mutual withdrawal of foreign forces, 
including NVN forces; 

— Assistance to Cambodia to assure its 
neutrality and territory; 

— Cessation of bombing and reciprocal de- 

— Cessation of bombing, infiltration, and 
augmentation of United States forces; 

— Three suspensions of bombings to per- 
mit serious talks; 

— Discussion of Hanoi's 4 points along 
with points of others, such as Saigon's 4 
points and our 14 points; 

— Discussion of an agreed 4 points as basis 
for negotiation; 

— Willingness to find means to have the 
views of the Liberation Front heard in peace 

— Negotiations without conditions, negoti- 
ations about conditions, or discussion of a 
final settlement; 

— Peace and the inclusion of North Viet- 
Nam in large development program for 
Southeast Asia; 

— Government of South Viet-Nam to be 
determined by free elections; 

— Question of reunification to be deter- 
mined by free elections; 

— Reconciliation with Viet Cong and read- 
mission to the body politic of South Viet- 

— South Viet-Nam can be neutral if it so 

I have recalled these particular items with- 
out a complete search of the record; there 
may be more. But what is important for you 
to know is we have said yes to these some 28 
proposals and Hanoi has said no. Surely all 
those yeses and all those noes throw a light 
upon motivation — upon the question of who 
is interested in peace and who is trying to 
absorb a neighbor by force. Surely some light 
is thrown upon the character of American 
policy and the attitudes of the American peo- 
ple. Surely these yeses and noes are relevant 
to the moral judgments which one might 
wish to make about the situation in South- 
east Asia. 

MAY 22, 1967 


A Conversation With Dean Rusk 

Following is the transcript of an hour-long 
interview with Secretary Rusk by Paul 
Niven, Washington correspondent of the Na- 
tional Educational Television Network, which 
was televised from the Department of State 
to 75 affiliated stations of NET on May 5. 

Mr. Niven: Whether deliberately or not, 
the last few weeks have brought an escala- 
tion of the war in Viet-Nam. Whether it was 
deliberate or not remains a matter of seman- 
tic argument between the administration and 
its critics. There is no doubt, however, that 
criticism of and dissent from the war has 
escalated both in depth and in breadth. 

Viet-Nam is not the only issue of the hour, 
even if it is the towering one. Indeed, one of 
the themes of the critics is that the war is 
deflecting high officials here in Washington 
from other and larger issues. Despite Viet- 
Nam there has been a considerable relaxation 
of tension between East and West, as sym- 
bolized by the consular and space treaties 
and our continuing talks on antimissile de- 
fense and the spread of nuclear weapons. 

The spirit of detente was symbolized also 
by the arrival in this country of the daugh- 
ter of Joseph Stalin with no outburst of 
chauvinistic exultation on our part, no public 
anguish on the part of the Kremlin, and a 
civilized demeanor on the part of the lady 

Even as the United States and the Soviet 
Union pull closer together, China pulls 
farther and farther apart from both. In 
Western Europe new issues and old issues 
are at hand and recently took Vice President 
Humphrey on an important and not unevent- 
ful tour of the capitals of some of our NATO 

Substantive questions give rise anew on 
Capitol Hill and elsewhere to larger ques- 

tions concerning the overall American com- 
mitment all over the world, about its moral 
validity, and about its practicability in terms 
of our power in the world. 

It seems a very appropriate time, all in all, 
to talk with a man who for 6 years and 3 
months now has been the principal foreign 
policy adviser to Presidents Kennedy and 
Johnson. Here we are then in the State De- 
partment to talk to Secretary Dean Rusk. 

Mr. Secretary, I don't think we've had 
polls in the last 3 or 4 weeks to see whether 
opposition to the war in Viet-Nam is actu- 
ally increasing among the country as a whole. 
But certainly there has been an increase in 
the intensity and depth of public manifesta- 
tions of opposition. How do you and other 
officials of the administration who have spent 
so many hours trying to put your case and 
explain it to so many people account for this 
increase in public opposition? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have seen some 
highly organized demonstrations of minori- 
ties here and there in the country. But the 
people of the United States elect a President 
and a Congress to make these great decisions 
of national policy. 

And it is my impression that the ordinary 
men and women around the country under- 
stand what is involved in Viet-Nam. Now, we 
understand that many of them are impatient 
and want to see the steps taken to finish this 
war. Because after all that has happened 
since 1945, it is tragic that once again we 
should have to use force to resist an aggres- 
sion because we have learned a lot of lessons 
of what happens when aggression occurs. 

Mr. Niven: When you say that these are 
highly organized demonstrations, obviously 
the Communists are not uninterested in 
doing this in this country and elsewhere — but 
do you suggest that even among the orga- 



nizers of this opposition the Communists are 
anything like the majority? 

Secretary Riisk: Oh, I am not trying to 
establish any sense of numbers in this mat- 
ter. I think there are different groups. The 
Communist apparatus is busy all over the 
world, and it is busy in this country. Others 
who are genuine pacifists, conscientious 
objectors, people with strong religious con- 
victions on this point — for them I have the 
greatest respect. There are others who, for 
one reason or another, doubt that Viet-Nam 
is our problem. There is a variety of reasons 
why people object. But particular demonstra- 
tions are pretty highly organized. 

The Dilemma of Dissent 

Mr. Niven: Well, you and General [Wil- 
liam C] Westmoreland and others have 
pointed out that such demonstrations are 
bound to raise questions on the other side 
about our will to continue. On the other hand, 
isn't there a great danger that in trying to 
stifle dissent we create new problems ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Niven, there 
has never been any effort to stifle dissent. 
We have a dilemma in this respect, because 
two things are true. 

The one is that in our kind of free society 
there must be complete freedom of expres- 
sion, the opportunity for dissent, the right 
lawfully and peacefully to register one's dif- 
ference of view. Now, that is fundamental 
to our system, and there has never been any 
effort to stifle that. 

The other tiling that is equally as true is 
that Hanoi undoubtedly is watching this de- 
bate and is drawing some conclusions from 
it. Now, if we were to see 100,000 people 
marching in Hanoi calling for peace we 
would think the war was over. Now, it 
requires a good deal of sophistication on the 
part of Hanoi to understand that this is not 
the way we make decisions in this country — 
that there are a President and a Congress 
who are elected by the people and that the 
President and the Congress are supported 
by the great majority of the American people 
in these great decisions. 

Mr. Niven: Senator [Thruston B.] Morton 
suggested the other day that — quoting Gen- 
eral Westmoreland — when someone speaks of 
irresponsible acts at home without distin- 
guishing between the genuinely irresponsible 
burners of draft cards and people who lay 
down in front of trains and so forth and the 
really idealistic citizens who have strong 
reservations about the war, he only encour- 
ages the irresponsible elements among the 
dissenters. Don't you think there is some- 
thing to that? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't know how 
to judge something of that sort. I think all 
of us, whether we are official or private citi- 
zens, have a responsibility for all of the con- 
sequences of our acts and what we say. And 
when people elect to go into these matters 
and make their opinions known they should 
take into account what the total effect will be. 

But, again, in our society there must be 
full opportunity for free expression and 
there must be a debate in this country. And 
when differences exist we couldn't have our 
kind of free society without it. 

Mr. Niven: It would be perhaps too much 
to expect for the North Vietnamese to under- 
stand that these demonstrations are a minor- 
ity. But surely their Soviet allies are sophisti- 
cated enough at this stage of the game to 
understand this and to tell them that what 
is more important is the polls showing 70 
percent of the people — 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think there are those 
in the Communist world who understand this 
better than Hanoi might. I think the Soviet 
Union undoubtedly has more experience 
with us and they have a closer familiarity 
with our institutions and the way we op- 
erate. I think there is more understanding in 
Moscow on this point than there is in Hanoi. 

Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, the war itself — 
are we now in such a position that any sub- 
stantial deescalation unilaterally would be 
almost as disastrous as pulling out? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, let me point out that 
partial deescalation on our side seems to be 
uninteresting to Hanoi. For example, they 
object to the idea of a pause in the bombing, 

MAY 22, 1967 


the suspension of bombing. We have tried 
that seriously three times, and then there 
were two holiday truces in addition, a total 
of five times when there was no bombing. 
And before that we went through 5 years of 
increasing North Vietnamese attacks upon 
South Viet-Nam without any bombing in 
North Viet-Nam on our part. 

They are saying now that we must stop 
the bombing permanently and uncondition- 
ally and at the same time are refusing to 
undertake the slightest military step which 
they would take on their side to draw back 
on their part of the war. 

Now, let me illustrate what this means. If 
we were to say that we would negotiate only 
if they stopped all of their violence in South 
Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb North 
Viet-Nam, most people would say we were 
crazy. Now, why is what is crazy for us 
reasonable to some people when exactly the 
same proposition is put by the other side? 
What we need to have is some tangible step 
toward peace. And they have had many, 
many opportunities to register a willingness 
to engage in serious talks, to take some de 
facto practical steps to move this matter 
toward a peaceful solution. 

Mr. Niven: Well, you have got just one 
interpretation of their attitude. Max Frankel 
of the Sunday Times magazine did the same 
thing. But he also said that the President's 
letter to Ho Chi Minh i said in effect "We will 
stop the bombing if you will leave your quar- 
ter of a million Communist forces in South 
Viet-Nam unreplenished and unsupplied 
against a million troops on our side." Now, 
is that not a fair representation? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we said that we will 
stop the bombing if you will stop the infiltra- 
tion and if you stop the infiltration we will 
stop the further augmentation of our forces. 

Mr. Niven: Would they not hold that our 
forces at this point are so augmented and so 
well supplied that they could not leave their 
forces ? 

Secretary Rusk: They may, but their forces 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595. 

are where they have no right to be. They 
have no business being there. They have no 
right to try to seize South Viet-Nam by force. 
We are entitled under the SEATO treaty, as 
well as under the individual and collective 
security-self-defense arrangements of the 
U.N. Charter, to come to the assistance of 
South Viet-Nam upon their request when 
they are subjected to this kind of aggression. 
Now, we are not referring to something 
as though there is no difference between the 
two sides here. North Viet-Nam is trying to 
seize South Viet-Nam by force. If tomorrow 
morning they were to say that "This is not 
our purpose," we could have peace by tomor- 
row night. Now, it is just as simple as that, 
Mr. Niven. They are trying to impose a 
political solution upon South Viet-Nam by 
force from the North. Now, it can be peace if 
they hold their hands. And I don't see how 
there can be peace as long as they continue 
in that effort. 

Hanoi's Demand for Cessation of Bombing 

Mr. Niven: Is the principal objection to a 
cessation of bombing for the fourth time 
that we would incur more and more odium in 
the world were it renewed if they didn't 
come to the conference table, or is it purely 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the principal prob- 
lem is that, as I indicated, a suspension in 
the bombing would be rejected by Hanoi as 
an ultimatum. They say that we must guar- 
antee that this suspension would be perma- 
nent and unconditional. Now, that means 
stopping half the war without knowing what 
will happen with the other half of the war. 
And the President has said that we will be 
glad to hear from them on almost anything 
they would do on the military side in order 
to take a step toward peace in the situation. 

At the moment there are three or four 
divisions up in the so-called demilitarized 
zone, in that general area. North Vietnamese 
troops. No one is able to whisper to us behind 
his hand that if we stop the bombing those 
divisions will not attack our Marines who are 
3 or 4 miles away. Now, we can't be children 



about this. We can't be foolish. We need to 
know what the military effect would be if we 
stopped the bombing in North Viet-Nam on a 
permanent and unconditional basis. And no 
one is able or willing to give us the slightest 
information as to what the result would be. 

Mr. Niven: It seems to me that the great 
weakness in the case of your critics, including 
the highly placed ones in this country, is that 
they are forever looking for evidence of un- 
willingness to negotiate on the part of the 
administration without examining the ques- 
tion, "Is there any willingness to negotiate 
on the other side?" But isn't it fair to say, 
Mr. Secretary, that over the years the will- 
ingness of either side to negotiate and con- 
sequently the terms on which it was willing 
to negotiate has varied according to its ap- 
praisal of the military and political situation, 
where the advantage lay at the moment ? 

Secretary Rusk: Not really. It depends 
upon what result would be brought into 

Now, for example, in 1962, on the basis of 
an agreement between Chairman Khrushchev 
and President Kennedy in Vienna in June 
1961, we went to Geneva. We made substan- 
tial concessions in order to get an agreement 
on Laos. That was signed in July 1962. 
Among the concessions we made, for exam- 
ple, was to accept the nominee of the Soviet 
Union to be Prime Minister of Laos, Prince 
Souvanna Phouma. 

Now, we did not get performance by Hanoi 
on any one of the four principal elements in 
that agreement. They did not withdraw their 
North Vietnamese forces from Laos. They 
did not stop using Laos as an infiltration 
route into South Viet-Nam. They did not 
permit the coalition government to function 
in the Communist-held areas of Laos. And 
they did not permit the International Control 
Commission to function in the Communist- 
held areas of Laos. 

That agreement was based upon a major 
effort on our part to take a giant step toward 
peace in Southeast Asia. It didn't derive from 
any close-in, narrow view of what the mili- 
tary situation would be. Now, from that time 

forward we have been probing in every way 
that we could think of to try to find a peace- 
ful basis to bring this war to a conclusion in 
South Viet-Nam. 

Now, we can't bring it to a conclusion by 
giving them South Viet-Nam. We have major 
commitments there. 

U.S. Will Talk Without, or About, Conditions 

Mr. Niven: Weren't our conditions for 
talking a year ago, during the bombing pause 
in January '66, a little more unconditional 
than they are this time? Did we then not 
make it clear that we were willing to sit 
down and negotiate and continue the bomb- 
ing pause? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, there was a tempo- 
rary suspension of the bombing, and we had 
been told before that pause started that a 
somewhat longer pause than the 5-day pause 
which we had had earlier might make it pos- 
sible for something constructive to open up. 
We had been told that by some of the Com- 
munist countries. As a matter of fact they 
said, some of them, that if you stop 15 or 20 
days that might open up some possibilities. 
Well, we stopped for twice as long as they 
suggested. But on the 34th day of that pause 
Hanoi came back and said that you must stop 
your bombing permanently and uncondition- 
ally and only then can there be any talks. And 
at that time they said you must take the four 
points of Hanoi and you must accept the 
Liberation Front as the sole spokesman for 
South Viet-Nam. In other words, they were 
demanding that, in effect, we surrender 
South Viet-Nam to the North. 

Mr. Niven: We have, however, as a result 
of that experience perhaps, upped the ante, 
have we not, this time, where we have said 
that we demand the cessation of infiltration 
of men — 

Secretary Rusk: We will talk to these 
people without conditions of any sort. Now, 
they have raised a major condition, the stop- 
page of the bombing on a permanent basis. 
So we have said all right, we will talk to you 
about conditions, we will talk to you about 
that condition, we will talk about other 

MAY 22, 1967 


things — what you should do on your side, as 
a preliminary to negotiation, if you wish, you 

So we will talk to them either way, with- 
out conditions or about conditions. Now, it 
shouldn't be all that difficult for contacts to 
explore the possibilities of peace even while 
the fighting is going on. We negotiated on the 
Berlin blockade while Berlin was under 
blockade. We talked about Korea while the 
shooting was going on. 

Mr. Niven: You can talk while the bomb- 
ing and infiltration continues. 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. Indeed, in Korea we 
took more casualties after the talks started 
than we did before the talks started. And in 
the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we nego- 
tiated that question with the Soviet Union 
while they were building their missile sites 
just as fast as they could, you see. So there 
is nothing in our statements that means that 
if there is any real interest in peace that con- 
tacts and explorations cannot occur, either 
about the settlement or about the first steps 
toward peace and deescalating the violence, 
either one of them. 

Mr. Niven: Their position for 2 years now, 
of course, has been the bombing must stop. 
But if they were to abandon that and Ho Chi 
Minh cabled the President and said, "I will 
meet you in New Delhi 2 weeks from now 
without conditions, let the war go on," the 
President would go? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we will be in touch 
with them at the first opportunity that there 
will be a representative of Hanoi somewhere 
to talk about peace. We will be there. 

Mr. Niven: Publicly or privately? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is very 
likely that the most profitable contacts 
initially would be private. But we have asked 
for a conference of — of the Geneva con- 
ference of '54 or the Geneva conference of 
'62 or an all-Asian peace conference or a 
meeting between North Viet-Nam and South 
Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone; or we 
have suggested the two cochairmen [of the 
Geneva conferences] might be in touch with 
the two parties to do something about it, that 
is, Britain and the Soviet Union; or we would 

be glad to see the three members of the 
International Control Commission — India, 
Canada, and Poland — undertake this role. 
Public or private, direct or indirect — it 
makes no difference to us. 

Mr. Niven: Through your own knowledge, 
would you expect to end the war with negoti- 
ations or with a fizzling out, notably of the 
cessation of infiltration? 

Secretary Rusk: It is very hard to say. The 
Greek guerrilla operations fizzled out. There 
were systematic discussions preceding that. 
I think we ought to keep both doors open. 
And we have said to the other side on more 
than one occasion that if you don't want to 
come into a conference, if that is compli- 
cated, if you don't want to get into formal 
negotiations, then let's start doing some 
things on the ground of which each one of us 
can take note and to which we can respond, 
let's begin some de facto deescalation of this 
situation. And that hasn't produced any re- 
sults either. 

Geneva Accords a Basis for Serious Tallcs 

Mr. Niven: Apart from the question of how 
to get into negotiations, what really is there 
to negotiate about, Mr. Secretary? As long 
as Hanoi is not willing to represent — to ac- 
cept the South Vietnamese government or 
the emerging South Vietnamese government 
as the principal political structure of South 
Viet-Nam, as long as we are unwilling to 
accept the National Liberation Front as the 
principal political structure there, what really 
is there for the United States and North 
Viet-Nam to talk about ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that they 
and the Soviet Union continue to talk in 
terms of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 
1962. The Warsaw Pact countries in their 
meeting in Bucharest last year put out a 
statement in which they called upon us to 
comply completely with those accords. We 
said fine, let's get going. When we took this 
matter to the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the Soviet representatives said, 
"No, the United Nations is not the proper 
forum, the Geneva machinery is the proper 
forum." So Ambassador Goldberg said, "All 



right, if that is your view, then let's get 
going with the Geneva machinery." 

I think if there is to be serious talk it is 
likely to be on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 
agreements which were signed by the other 
side. We signed the 1962 agreements, al- 
though we did not sign the 1954 agreements. 
But we accepted both of these agreements 
as an adequate basis for peace in Southeast 

Mr. Niven: The President has said he 
would be happy to accept the outcome of free 
elections throughout Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Rusk: That is correct. 

Mr. Niven: Mr. [Henry Cabot] Lodge last 
week said it was unthinkable that we let the 
Viet Cong into the democratic structure of 
South Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Rusk: I think what he perhaps 
meant was that we don't see any indication 
that the South Vietnamese under genuinely 
free elections would elect the Liberation 
Front or the Viet Cong. Now, you have many 
groups in South Viet-Nam, the Buddhists 
and the Catholics, the Montagnards, the mil- 
lion ethnic Cambodians who have been living 
there for a long time, the million refugees 
who came down from Hanoi in 1955, that 
period. They disagree among themselves on 
a number of points. But the point that they 
seem to have in common is that they do not 
want the Liberation Front. So we would not 
expect that the South Vietnamese would 
elect the Viet Cong if there were free elec- 

Program of Reconciliation 

Mr. Niven: But what kind of a settlement 
would filter down to the village and end the 
situation in which the Viet Cong and the 
present agents of South Viet-Nam are 
struggling for control of that village? What 
would end the guerrilla war? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think in the first 
place a decision by Hanoi to abandon the 
effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force. This 
is by all means by all odds the most impor- 
tant single decision that could affect that 
result. I think that the rapid increase in the 

rate of defections from the Viet Cong, the 
growing disillusionment in the countryside, 
as one can sense it, with the Viet Cong and 
their very severe impositions upon the vil- 
lagers, are having an effect without that de- 
cision by Hanoi. But this is a simple problem 
of an attempt by Hanoi to do something in 
the South. If they would abandon that, I am 
quite sure the South Vietnamese, including 
the Viet Cong, would come to terms among 

Very recently the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment announced a program of reconcilia- 
tion in which they said that they would ac- 
cept back into the body politic those genuine 
southerners who had gone over to the Viet 
Cong and would like to return. There would 
be amnesty. They would not be mistreated. 
They could resume their place in society. And 
indeed some of the defectors from the Viet 
Cong, the so-called returnees, have been can- 
didates in village elections in the last three 
Sundays. And some of them have been 

So I have no real doubt that the south- 
erners, if left alone, would resolve these prob- 
lems among themselves. They can't do it so 
long as the North is insisting upon keeping 
this pressure going against the South by 
military means. 

Mr. Niven: With the continuing pressure 
are you confident that the emerging demo- 
cratic apparatus is going to survive and that 
the generals won't say "No" at the last 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the military 
leadership is very strongly committed to the 
constitutional process, because in January of 
last year they themselves took the initiative 
to start this process going. Now, when it 
came to the meeting at Honolulu,^ they re- 
peated that and we indicated that we were in 
favor of it, and this process has been going 
on ever since. But I think the military leader- 
ship is strongly committed to this constitu- 
tional process which they initiated and which 
has been picked up by the people in electing 
a constituent assembly, which has promul- 

For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302. 

MAY 22, 1967 


gated a constitution, and with elections that 
are anticipated this September. 

Mr. Niven: To return for just a moment to 
the question of bombing, Mr. Secretary, there 
is a projected lull of a day or two on the 
Buddhist birthday later this month. Is there 
any possibility that that will be attended by 
a flurry of diplomatic activity and be ex- 

Secretary Rusk: The Government of South 
Viet-Nam has again said that they would be 
glad to meet with the Government of North 
Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone to talk 
about an extension of that truce. Now, the 
short period of cessation of the bombing is 
not the kind of cessation that North Viet- 
Nam has described as a prerequisite for 
serious negotiations. Now, if between now 
and then there was some indication that they 
were prepared to talk without that condition 
or about that condition, then of course that 
would be of some interest. But we have no 
indication that that is coming. 

Mr. Niven: Wouldn't this perhaps be a 
face-saving means of getting something 
going on both sides ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, if they wish to raise 
the question further to extend that pause 
they can do so with Saigon, or they can com- 
municate in other respects if they would be 
interested in some such arrangement. The 
problem has been that they don't seem to 
think very much of any temporary arrange- 

Hanoi Takes Advantage of Truce Periods 

Mr. Niven: Well, suppose they proposed 
to suggest it be extended a week or so. Would 
that inevitably bring the reply from us 
"What will you do by way of reciprocation 
to reduce — " 

Secretary Rusk: Well, these are matters 
that need to be discussed. That is why Sai- 
gon has offered to meet them in the demili- 
tarized zone to talk about it — because an ex- 
tended pause without something serious 
going on simply means that they have an 
opportunity to resupply and move their peo- 
ple about and to load all the sampans in 
North Viet-Nam with supplies for the guer- 

rilla troops and get everything all set for 
a fresh lunge, you see, when it is over. 

During the Tet pause, when the hour ar- 
rived for the Tet truce to begin, hundreds 
of ships, boats, barges, trucks, suddenly 
raced for the South. They were there at the 
starter's gate like horses on a racetrack, and 
they just rushed pellmell to the South with 
thousands of tons of supplies to reequip 
their forces and resupply them. But the im- 
portant thing is that, although they knew 
that suspension was coming and they knew 
that we were interested in talking seriously 
during that suspension, they didn't have a 
diplomat at the starting gate. They were not 
willing to talk seriously about a settlement 
of the problem or about prolonging the ar- 
rangements or have some mutual deescala- 
tion of the violence during that Tet truce. 

Mr. Niven: It has been argued that the 
military advantage to us, in terms of infil- 
tration, of continuing the bombing may be 
outweighed by the unifying effect of the 
population of North Viet-Nam, may^ actually 
increase their will to continue the war. What 
is your appraisal of that? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, no one likes bomb- 
ing. People get mad under bombing. But 
there are some very important operational 
questions there. I mentioned those three divi- 
sions in the demilitarized zone. These North 
Vietnamese forces are just a few miles away 
from our Marines. Are we going to say to 
our Marines, "You must wait until those 
fellows get 2 miles away before you shoot at 
them, but don't shoot at them when they are 
9 miles away because that would be too rude 
— that is over on the other side of the bor- 
der"? If we see a truck column of 40 trucks 
coming down just north of the demilitarized 
zone, are we going to leave them alone and 
then have them use that ammunition against 
our men the next day? You can't do that. 
Let's have some peace. 

We can have peace literally within 24 
hours if Hanoi is willing to take seriously 
the 1954 and 1962 agreements, abandon its 
effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and 
join in mutual steps to turn down this vio- 
lence and get to the conference table. 



Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, will you turn to 
East^West relations as a whole? Up to a 
year or so ago it seemed to be the position 
of the Soviet Union until Viet-Nam was 
settled nothing could be settled. Now, we 
never agreed to that. The proliferation of 
talks and treaties since then suggests that 
the Russians have now turned away and are 
quite anxious to continue, and expand if pos- 
sible, the detente in spite of Viet-Nam. Is 
that a fair appraisal ? 

Effect of Viet-Nam on East-West Relations 

Secretary Rusk: Well, undoubtedly the 
Viet-Nam question injects a serious problem 
of tension, and on both sides. For example, 
there are many people in this country who 
have serious questions about whether we 
should ourselves open the door to expanding 
trade with Eastern Europe while the Viet- 
Nam situation is still going on. And I have 
no doubt they have some problems on their 
side in the same direction. However, we 
were glad to see that despite Viet-Nam it 
was possible to proceed with the space 
treaty, and we have been working hard on 
the nonproliferation treaty despite Viet- 
Nam. So as far as we are concerned, we are 
prepared to continue to work at these indi- 
vidual questions, small or large, if the other 
side is willing to do so. But there are ten- 
sions there that complicate the question on 
both sides, and I wouldn't want to deny that. 

Mr. Niven: You brought up a political 
question I would like to ask you — would like 
to pursue with you. Some of the people on 
the Hill opposed to the administration's 
policy in Viet-Nam have said when you send 
people around the country, military officers 
or others, as they put it, talking the lan- 
guage of the cold war and whipping up pas- 
sions about the war in Viet-Nam, you create 
a body of public opinion in this country 
which makes it difficult to get the consular 
treaty, to get through an increased East- 
West trade, and so forth. Is this true? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot generalize 
about that. Our general view is that we have 
to do what is necessary in Viet-Nam because 
of our commitments and because of its rela- 

tion with the general problem of organizing 
a durable peace in the world. But on the 
other hand we ought to be ready to try to 
resolve other questions, large or small, if 
we can. 

Now, that's difficult. Anxi it is not easy for 
all of our people to understand why it's im- 
portant. But I think the central question in 
front of us all is the question of organizing 
a peace. And every policy needs to be 
weighed in terms of whether it will con- 
tribute toward that objective or not. 

Now, we send out a thousand cables a day 
out of this Department. My guess is that 
most of the people would approve of most of 
those cables and that those who object to one 
particular part of the policy would support 
much of the rest. But the object of the en- 
tire effort is to organize a global peace, be- 
cause we are in a situation — and have been 
for over a decade — where the organization 
of a peace is necessary to the survival of the 
human race, in very simple terms. 

iVIoscow-Peking Problems 

Mr. Niven: In the -process of getting closer 
to the Russians, are they ever at all frank 
about their problems with their Chinese 

Secretary Rusk: No, they have not talked 
about China with us very much. We would 
not expect them to. This is a problem within 
the Communist world. 

Mr. Niven: Do they ever say, "Don't push 
us too far at this point, because you know 
what problems we are up against with the 

Secretary Rusk: No, no, they don't go into 
questions of that sort. We know that they are 
concerned about China, as we are — perhaps 
not for the same reason. We know that there 
has been a major difference between Moscow 
and Peking on the tactics to be pursued in 
advancing the world revolution. That has 
reached its high point in the period since 
1961. But China does not discuss the Soviet 
Union with us in our bilateral talks in War- 
saw. The Soviet Union does not discuss 
China with us on these important questions. 

Mr. Niven: The Soviet Union never tries 

MAY 22, 1967 


to lead us along toward something they want 
by the stated or implicit threat of their — 

Secretary Rusk: No, there has been a mini- 
mum of exchange as far as China is con- 
cerned with the Soviet Union. Now, China 
is accusing Moscow of being in some sort of 
a conspiracy with us, and sometimes you 
hear charges out of Moscow that Peking is 
assisting us by standing in the way of Com- 
munist unity. They throw these charges back 
and forth at each other. But as far as we 
are concerned, we are not ourselves brought 
directly into the middle of that particular 

Mr. Niven: Sir, many people were struck 
by the singularly calm atmosphere in which 
Mrs. [Svetlana] Alliluyeva arrived in this 
country. Was this accidental, or was it a 
result of considerable effort by the higher 
echelons of the administration and of the 
Soviet Union, perhaps? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot speak for 
the Soviet Union. As far as we are con- 
cerned, nothing special was done on our side. 
I have the impression that she is a rather 
calm person — that this was not one of those 
great cold-war episodes that one might have 
expected 10 years ago or 15 years ago. She 
has made her own statement about her own 
views, and they are rather simple and civi- 
lized views. My guess is that she would like 
a little peace and quiet. She will publish her 
memoirs or her autobiography while she is 
here and make her own decision about where 
she wants to live in the future. But this has 
not been a major political problem between 
ourselves and the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Niven: But did you and the President 
not delay — seek to delay her arrival, dis- 
courage her coming here for a few weeks 
in order to avoid its becoming a problem be- 
tween us and the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, she had the choice 
of going to several places when she left 
India, and she considered going to several 
places. She went to Switzerland temporarily. 
There was some problem about her coming 
here under those — under the circumstances 
of the emotion of the first moment. I mean 
all you gentlemen in the news media, for ex- 

ample, would not give her any privacy. 

Mr. Niven: I fully realize that. 

Secretary Rusk: And she was looking for 
a little peace and quiet and wanted appar- 
ently to catch her breath and decide what 
she wanted to do. 

Mr. Niven: Wasn't the delay desirable 
from the administration's point of view, and 
therefore suggested by the administration? 

Secretary Rusk: We did not impose a de- 
lay on her as far as we were concerned. 
We did not have in front of us the specific 
question of whether we should grant her 
political asylum in a political sense. She had 
a visa to come to this country. But I think 
she handled herself very well, and I think 
the whole situation has been handled rather 
well up to this point. 

Mr. Niven: Are you surprised that the 
Russians have said nothing, made no com- 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have not come 
to the end of the chapter yet. We are not sure 
whether they will or not. They have not 
raised any questions with us about it. 

Rotation of U.S. Forces From Europe 

Mr. Niven: Sir, the Vice President has re- 
cently been on a long trip, a tour of Euro- 
pean capitals, and we now have the news to- 
day that we are reducing our troops in 
Europe. Can you give us anything on the 
background of this decision? We have had 
groups of Senators wanting to cut forces; 
we have had others wanting us not to cut 
forces. We have had the reactions of the 
Europeans themselves to consider. Can you 
illuminate today's announcement? ^ 

Secretary Rusk: Well, back in 1951 we had 
in mind that we would have in Europe about 
5% divisions. In fact, we have about six di- 
visions there now. We added certain 
strength to it for our own reasons. 

Now, we are rotating two-thirds of a divi- 
sion, which means that we would expect to 
have present in Europe at all times the 5^ 
divisions rather than the 5% divisions. In 
addition, those brigades that are in this coun- 

' See p. 788. 



try will be in full readiness and will be able 
to return promptly if needed in Europe. 
They will replace each other in a regular 
rotation in Europe, and once a year the en- 
tire division will be together in Europe. 

This will give us a good test of mobility, 
of the idea of rotation. It also permits us to 
bring home a considerable number of de- 
pendents, which is of some importance to us 
from an expense and from an exchange point 
of view. 

And I think it does not in any significant 
way affect the military capabilities of NATO. 

Now, we will have to see whether there is 
any response from the other side in this gen- 
eral direction of any sort. But these are mat- 
ters that are being discussed in NATO as a 
part of the general NATO structure, and we 
think that what has been discussed thus far 
is reasonable under the circumstances. 

Mr. Niven: When you talk of looking for 
a response from the other side, do you mean 
that you are looking for a similar reduction 
of forces among the Warsaw Pact countries ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, it would be inter- 
esting if such reduction would occur. We are 
not expecting it. We have not been told that 
one would happen. And in London Mr. 
Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of 
the Soviet Council of Ministers] related the 
reduction of Warsaw Pact forces to a con- 
firmation of the status quo in Germany, in 
Central Europe. And that is not a very en- 
couraging prospect. 

But I am sure the NATO countries will 
keep their eyes on what the Warsaw Pact 
forces are doing in this situation as they 
from year to year make their own judgment 
about what NATO should do. 

Mr. Niven: Do you think there is any sub- 
stantial likelihood of a substantial deescala- 

Secretary Rusk: I would not be able to 
project, because I don't have any informa- 
tion from Eastern Europe on that. 

Mr. Niven: In the meantime, our motive 
is primarily balance of payments rather than 
increasing the availability of troops for Viet- 

Secretary Rusk: Well, these troops are not 

intended to be used in Viet-Nam. They re- 
main in a condition of readiness so they can 
not only rotate to Europe but go back quickly 
if needed in an emergency, and would remain 
a part of the same organized division and 
committed to NATO, assigned to NATO. 

Mr. Niven: But they will in fact, however, 
be 3,000 miles closer to Viet-Nam in case of 

Secretary Rusk: Well, they will be 3,000 
miles closer to a lot of other places. But the 
point is that they remain assigned to NATO, 
they will be available for immediate return 
to NATO, and every 6 months there will be 
a change in the brigade that is actually sta- 
tioned in NATO. So I just would prefer not 
to get into the question of tying this to 
other situations, because it is not a part of 
the plan. 

Britain and the Common IVIarket 

Mr. Niven: Sir, the British have again an- 
nounced their intention to apply for mem- 
bership in the Common Market. The French 
have indicated they are not going to veto 
them this time but they will take a long, hard 
look at it. Does this mean anything new in 
terms of our position? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have stayed out 
of the public discussion of this matter. This 
is basically a European question for the Six 
and for Britain. 

Everyone knows that we ourselves would 
be very glad to see this occur. But the issues 
there are so fundamental to our friends on 
the other side of the Atlantic that we have 
felt it is not for us to take an active part. 

My guess is that there will be some serious 
discussion and some rather complex negotia- 
tion before this can come about. But we just 
have no way of predicting the end of the 

Mr. Niven: If Britain is admitted to mem- 
bership, will it mean the end or the substan- 
tial diminution of what we have talked about 
over the years as the special relationship be- 
tween the U.S. and the U.K.? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the special relation- 
ship has been both real and unreal, depend- 
ing upon how one views it. Obviously this 

MAY 22, 1967 


country has had a long and traditional tie 
with Britain because of our historic past and 
because we have been so closely associated in 
so many common struggles and common 

I would suppose that if Britain enters 
Europe we would be working very closely 
with that new Europe, just as closely as we 
would have with Britain separately or with 
any of our European partners. So I don't 
think the problem of the special relationship 
is one that would bother us. It may bother 
somebody on the other side of the Atlantic. 

Mr. Niven: Well, now, even in the troubled 
1950's and '60's there have been a few 
shrinking areas of the world where when 
there was a crisis you or whatever Secretary 
of State or President of the United States 
could say, "Well, that area is primarily a 
British responsibility." If Britain turns her 
face now toward Europe, aren't those areas 
going to shrink even more and aren't we 
going to be playing the policeman in more 
places ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not ourselves 
looking for more business in this regard, and 
we are quite clear that we are not the police- 
man of the world. We have some very spe- 
cific commitments under existing treaties. 
But if you went back over the last 60 or 70 
crises of one sort or another that have oc- 
curred in the world, we have taken part in 
about 6 or 7 of them. We have been involved 
as a member of the United Nations and the 
Security Council, or diplomatically, in try- 
ing to reduce tensions and trying to help 
find a peaceful settlement of some of these 

But rather than think of a reduction of 
European influence with, say, the admission 
of Britain into Europe, I would hope that 
Europe as a whole, enlarged as it would be 
by the admission of Britain, would play its 
full role in world affairs that is there for it 
and that it is fully capable of playing. So 
that I don't look upon the development as 
one in which various people pull away and 
then we go rushing in filling in vacuums in 
different parts of the world. We have our 
basket pretty full. 

Mr. Niven: That brings up the overall 
question of our commitment in the world. 
And of course you get it from both sides. 
Whenever anything goes wrong in the world 
that we do not interfere in we are accused 
of sitting by and letting it happen; at the 
same time people say we are overextended 
and we are in too many places. How do you 
judge when we should be there and when we 
should not, what we should do? Perhaps in 
terms of Greece and Yemen in the last few 
weeks: Is each case one to be judged in terms 
of our central purpose? How do you make 
the determination in each case? 

The U.S. Commitment in the World 

Secretary Rusk: Well, it depends upon a 
number of things. In the first place, where 
we have a specific treaty commitment and a 
threat occurs against that treaty commit- 
ment, then we have a very specific obligation 
to do what we can as a signatory of that 

We have responsibilities as a permanent 
member of the Security Council of the 
United Nations to take an active and respon- 
sible part in helping the Security Council 
resolve those questions that are brought to 
the Security Council. 

We encourage other groups — such as the 
Organization of African Unity to try to pick 
up some of the disputes that exist on the 
continent of Africa and find local African 
solutions to those disputes on that continent. 

I would not want to speculate about indi- 
vidual hypothetical cases, but these are very 
complex questions. 

Our primary responsibilities have to do 
with our treaty commitments. 

But I think the United Nations effort is a 
very important part of our total effort in 
resolving disputes that have occurred in dif- 
ferent parts of the world. 

Mr. Niven: Do you ever have the feeling 
when you learn from cables of a new crisis 
that we are overextending, perhaps we 
shouldn't be in some of the countries that we 
are in, even on an aid basis? I don't expect 
you to name names of countries. But do you 



ever feel that we could concentrate our effort 
more if we were — 

Secretary Rusk: Well, that is somewhat of 
a nostalgic view in one sense. We have car- 
ried heavy burdens in this postwar period. 
But so have some other countries. 

We cannot really be completely indifferent 
to the developments in other continents. That 
doesn't mean that we should go rushing in 
unilaterally wherever there is a problem, try- 
ing to solve it unilaterally. 

For example, in the fighting between India 
and Pakistan, the Security Council of the 
United Nations acted very effectively there 
with the permanent members — and that in- 
cludes the Soviet Union and the United 
States — acting in a parallel fashion there to 
assist the Security Council in bringing that 
matter to a conclusion. 

But I think also we are encouraged by the 
fact that other countries have been taking a 
considerable share of the aid program bur- 
den. For example, a country like France 
spends more of its gross national product 
on foreign aid than we do. And Canada and 
Japan have been making their contribution 
in relation to their total gross national prod- 
uct. Japan put in as much capital in the 
Asian Development Bank as the United 
States. They matched ours, $200 million. 

So the total effort is steadily growing. But 
nevertheless we have to be interested in one 
way or another in difficult and dangerous 
problems that arise anywhere in the world. 
That doesn't mean we go and police them. 

International Communist iVIovement 

Mr. Niven: The charge has been made that 
this worldwide complicated multifaceted ef- 
fort is perpetuated in the name of resistance 
to a monolithic international Communist con- 
spiracy which no longer exists. The critics 
say that the international Communist move- 
ment is no longer an extension of the Soviet 
Union, it is fragmented, and therefore why 
shouldn't we relax? And if a particular area 
of the world goes Communist, can't we relax 
on the ground that it will eventually — na- 
tionalism will prevail over communism, as 

to some extent it seems to be doing in East- 
ern Europe? 

Secretary R^isk: Well, that depends upon 
what happens. 

In Southeast Asia we have treaty commit- 
ments that obligate us to take action to meet 
the common danger if there is an aggression 
by means of armed attack. That aggression 
is under way. 

If these questions can be decided by people 
in free elections, perhaps we could all relax. 
I don't know anyone who through free elec- 
tions, any great nation — we have a particu- 
lar State in India — that brought Communists 
to power with free elections. They are not 
monolithic — they are not monolithic. 

But all branches of the Communist Party 
that I know of are committed to what they 
call the world revolution. And their picture 
of that world revolution is quite contrary to 
the kind of world organization sketched out 
in the Charter of the United Nations. 

Now, they have important differences 
among themselves about how you best get 
on with that world revolution. And there is 
a contest within the Communist world be- 
tween those who think that peaceful coex- 
istence and peaceful competition is the better 
way to do it and the militants, primarily in 
Peking, who believe that you back this world 
revolution by force. 

But I think the Communist commitment 
to world revolution is pretty general through- 
out the Communist movement. 

Now, if they want to compete peacefully, 
all right, let's do that. But when they start 
moving by force to impose this upon other 
people by force, then you have a very serious 
question about where it leads and how you 
organize a world peace on that basis. 

Mr. Niven: A decade or a decade and a 
half ago the threat was that of one Commu- 
nist superpower supported by Communist 
movements all over the world. Isn't the chal- 
lenge reduced every time the Communist 
world becomes depolarized, every time at 
least a European government or even the 
Communist Party in Western Europe shows 
new signs of independence? 

MAY 22, 1967 


Secretary Rusk: Well, it may be reduced, 
but that does not mean it has disappeared. 

Mr. Niven: You don't feel — 

Secretary Rusk: I mean the fact that Mos- 
cow and Peking have not been very close 
friends has not reduced the danger created 
by the attack of Hanoi against South Viet- 
Nam. It is there — in a very accentuated 

Mr. Niven: For a time they quarreled over 
supplies. That has been resolved, apparently. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not sure that 
that so-called quarrel had a great deal of 
effect upon the actual delivery of supplies. 
We are not very sure of that. At least I per- 
sonally am not. I don't have detailed infor- 

Efforts Toward Easing Tensions 

Mr. Niven: You don't feel, then, that our 
posture in the world can be relaxed because 
of the increasing variety in the Communist 
world — that we still have a worldwide chal- 
lenge — 

Secretary Rusk: It depends upon what you 
mean by being relaxed, Mr. Niven. 

We are only 4 or 5 years away from two 
very grave crises with the Communist coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe, particularly with 
the Soviet Union, the Berlin crisis of 1961-62 
and the Cuban missile crisis. 

So we cannot suppose that these problems 
have disappeared forever. And the Warsaw 
Pact forces are in Central Europe in great 
strength right now. And the German prob- 
lem is unresolved. 

But on the other hand we would hope very 
much that we are entering a period of pru- 
dence and mutual respect on the possibility 
of settling outstanding problems. 

I remind you that President Kennedy and 
President Johnson and their Secretary of 
State have not gone down to the Senate with 
new alliances. President Kennedy took down 
the nuclear test ban treaty. President John- 
son concluded the civil air agreement and the 
consular agreement, the space treaty. We are 
working on the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons treaty. We would like to see some 
ceiling put on this race involving ABM's 

[antiballistic missiles] and additional of- 
fensive nuclear missiles. 

We would like to take up seriously the 
quiestion of increasing trade between our- 
selves and Eastern Europe. 

So we are prepared to do our part in con- 
tributing toward that easing of tension and 
settlement of outstanding questions. But that 
doesn't mean that the dangers have com- 
pletely disappeared and that we can just let 
down our guard and think that everything is 
all over. It just isn't. There is a lot to happen 
before we get to that point. 

Mr. Niven: Well, President Kennedy said 
in effect once that we can't settle anything 
with the Communists until we settle every- 
thing. Do you feel that some people now 
expect that just because we can settle some 
things that everything else is automatically 
solved, too? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to 
speak for the others. My own feeling about 
this is that we must continue to gnaw at 
these questions and wrestle with them and 
try to get on with them. 

Now, one could be discouraged, if one let 
oneself be, with the slow pace of disarma- 
ment. Yet we cannot afford to abandon the 
effort to get on with that job. Since 1947 the 
NATO countries alone have spent well over 
a trillion dollars on defense budgets. And the 
Soviet Union and its allies have spent com- 
parable amounts in relation to their own eco- 
nomic base. Now, think of the enormous un- 
finished business that their people and our 
people have to which we could commit those 
vast resources. We can't afford to abandon 
the disarmament effort, even though it seems 
to move slow. 

So let's keep worldng at these questions. 
Maybe today we can find some small question 
to settle. Maybe tomorrow it will be a some- 
what larger question. And maybe if we can 
get the nonproliferation treaty, that would 
be a rather important breakthrough on a 
particular front. But, of course, in the back- 
ground is the overriding need to bring this 
Viet-Nam question to a peaceful settlement, 
just as soon as we can and the other side can, 
just as soon as the other side will let us. 



Mr. Niven: I was going to ask: Do you 
ever feel that the Viet-Nam war, however 
justified — merely in terms of the time, atten- 
tion, and energy which you and the rest of 
this Capital have to devote to it — is deflect- 
ing all of you from other things? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, not at all. I think that 
the serious business of the Government goes 
on, and the President's time and my time are 
committed to European questions, disarma- 
ment questions, trade questions, Latin Amer- 
ican questions, the Alliance for Progress. 
No, life goes on. It is not true that Viet-Nam 
is diverting our attention from other parts 
of the world. 

Mr. Niven: But some of our former diplo- 
mats and some of the critics are forever 
contending that the Viet-Nam war places 
strings upon our alliances, it complicates and 
exacerbates other problems. 

Secretary Rusk: I think that is nonsense — 
because if you want to put some strain on 
our other alliances, just let it become appar- 
ent that our commitment under an alliance 
is not worth very much. Then you will see 
some strain on our alliances. 

Mr. Niven: You are suggesting if we don't 
uphold this commitment other people will 
lose faith in our commitments all over the