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Viet-Nam Information Notes
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Communist objectives, strengths, and weaknesses.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. 1U9
April 3, 1967
THE DEFENSE OF VIET-NAM: KEY TO THE FUTURE OF FREE ASIA
Address by President Johnson 53 U
COTTON IN THE WORLD TRADE ARENA
hy Assistant Secretary Solomon 555
THE LATIN AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING
President Johnson's Message to Congress 5A0
For index see inside back cover
The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free Asia
Address by President Johnson i
It is always a very special privilege and
pleasure for me to visit Tennessee.
For a Texan it is like homecoming, be-
cause much of the courage and hard work
that went into the building of the South-
west came from the hills and the fields of
Tennessee. It strengthened the sinews of
thousands of men- — at the Alamo, at San
Jacinto, and at the homes of our pioneer
people.
This morning I visited the Hermitage,
the historic home of Andrew Jackson. Two
centuries have passed since that most
American of all Americans was born. The
world has changed a great deal since his
day. But the qualities which sustain men
and nations in positions of leadership have
not changed.
In our time, as in Andrew Jackson's, free-
dom has its price.
In our time, as in his, history conspires
to test the American will.
In our time, as in Jackson's time, courage
and vision, and the willingness to sacrifice,
will sustain the cause of freedom.
This generation of Americans is making
its imprint on history. It is making it in the
fierce hills and the sweltering jungles of
Viet-Nam. I think most of our citizens —
after a very penetrating debate which is
our democratic heritage — have reached a
common understanding on the meaning and
on the objectives of that struggle.
' Made before a joint session of the Tennessee
State Legislature at Nashville, Tenn., on Mar. 15
(White House press release).
Before I discuss the specific questions
that remain at issue, I should like to review
the points of widespread agreement.
It was 2 years ago that we were forced to
choose, forced to make a decision between
major commitments in defense of South
Viet-Nam or retreat — the evacuation of
more than 25,000 of our troops, the col-
lapse of the Republic of Viet-Nam in the
face of subversion and external assault.
Andrew Jackson would never have been
surprised at the choice we made.
We chose a course in keeping with Ameri-
can tradition, in keeping with the foreign
policy of at least three administrations,
with the expressed will of the Congress of
the United States, with our solemn obliga-
tions under the Southeast Asian treaty, and
with the interest of 16 million South Viet-
namese who had no wish to live under Com-
munist domination.
As our commitment in Viet-Nam re-
quired more men and more equipment, some
voices were raised in opposition. The ad-
ministration was urged to disengage, to
find an excuse to abandon the effort.
These cries came despite growing evi-
dence that the defense of Viet-Nam held
the key to the political and economic future
of free Asia. The stakes of the struggle
grew correspondingly.
It became clear that if we were pre-
pared to stay the course in Viet-Nam, we
could help to lay the cornerstone for a di-
verse and independent Asia, full of promise
and resolute in the cause of peaceful eco-
534
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nomic development for her long-suffering
peoples.
But if we faltered, the forces of chaos
would scent victoiy and decades of strife
and aggression would stretch endlessly be-
fore us.
The choice was clear. We would stay the
course. We shall stay the course.
I think most Americans support this fun-
damental decision. Most of us remember
the fearful cost of ignoring aggression.
Most of us have cast aside the illusion that
we can live in an affluent fortress while
the world slides into chaos.
Basic Objectives in Viet-Nam
I think we have all reached broad agree-
ment on our basic objectives in Viet-Nam.
First, an honorable peace that will leave
the people of South Viet-Nam free to fashion
their own political and economic institu-
tions without fear of terror or intimidation
from the North.
Second, a Southeast Asia in which all
countries — including a peaceful North Viet-
Nam — apply their scarce resources to the
real problems of their people: combating
hunger, ignorance, and diseases.
I have said many, many times that noth-
ing would give us greater pleasure than to
invest our own resources in the construc-
tive works of peace rather than in the fu-
tile destruction of war.
Third, a concrete demonstration that ag-
gression across international frontiers or
demarcation lines is no longer an acceptable
means of political change.
There is, I think, a general agreement
among Americans on the things that we do
not want in Viet-Nam.
We do not want permanent bases. We will
begin with the withdrawal of our troops
on a reasonable schedule whenever recipro-
cal concessions' are forthcoming from our
adversary.
We do not seek to impose our political
beliefs upon South Viet-Nam. Our Republic
rests upon a brisk commerce in ideas. We
will be happy to see free competition in the
intellectual marketplace whenever North
Viet-Nam is willing to shift the conflict
from the battlefield to the ballot box.
So, these are the broad principles on
which most Americans agree.
On a less general level, however, the
events and frustrations of these past few
difficult weeks have inspired a number of
questions about our Viet-Nam policy in the
minds and hearts of a good many of our
citizens. Today, here in this historic cham-
ber, I want to deal with some of those
questions that figure most prominently in
the press and in some of the letters which
reach a President's desk.
Many Americans are confused by the bar-
rage of information about military engage-
ments. They long for the capsule summary
which has kept tabs on our previous wars,
a line on the map that divides friend from
foe.
Tlie IMiiitary Situation
Precisely what, they ask, is our military
situation, and what are the prospects of
victory ?
The first answer is that Viet-Nam is ag-
gression in a new guise, as far removed
from trench warfare as the rifle from the
longbow. This is a war of infiltration, of
subversion, of ambush.. Pitched battles are
very rare, and even more rarely are they
decisive.
Today, more than 1 million men from the
Republic of Viet-Nam and its six allies are
engaged in the order of battle.
Despite continuing increases in North
Viet-Nam infiltration, this strengthening of
Allied forces in 1966, under the brilliant
leadership of General [William C] West-
moreland, was instrumental in reversing
the whole course of this war.
—We estimate that 55,000 North Viet-
namese and Viet Cong were killed in 1966,
compared with 35,000 the previous year.
More were wounded, and more than 20,000
defected.
— By contrast, 9,500 South Vietnamese,
APRIL 3, 1967
535
more than 5,000 Americans, and 600 from
other Allied forces were killed in action.
— The Vietnamese Army achieved a 1966
average of two weapons captured from the
Viet Cong to every one lost, a dramatic
turnaround from the previous 2 years.
— Allied forces have made several suc-
cessful sweeps through territories that
were formerly considered Viet Cong sanc-
tuaries only a short time ago. These opera-
tions not only cost the enemy large num-
bers of men and weapons but are very
damaging to his morale.
What does all of this mean? Will the
North Vietnamese change their tactics?
Will there be less infiltration of main units?
Will there be more of guerrilla warfare?
The actual truth is we just don't know.
What we do know is that General West-
moreland's strategy is producing results,
that our military situation has substan-
tially improved, that our military success has
permitted the groundwork to be laid for a
pacification program which is the longrun
key to an independent South Viet-Nam.
Bombing of Military Targets in the North
Since February 1965 our military opera-
tions have included selective bombing of
military targets in North Viet-Nam. Our
purposes are three.
— To back our fighting men by denying
the enemy a sanctuary;
— To exact a penalty against North
Viet-Nam for her flagrant violations of the
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962;
— To limit the flow, or to substantially
increase the cost, of infiltration of men and
materiel from North Viet-Nam.
All of our intelligence confirms that we
have been successful.
Yet, some of our people object strongly
to this aspect of our policy. Must we
bomb? many people ask. Does it do any
military good? Is it consistent with Ameri-
ca's limited objectives? Is it an inhuman
act that is aimed at civilians ?
On the question of military utility, I can
536
only report the firm belief of the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff", the
Central Intelligence Agency, General West-
moreland and our commanders in the field, j.
and all the sources of information and ad- I
vice available to the Commander in Chief: j*
and that is that the bombing is causing
serious disruption and is bringing about
added burdens to the North Vietnamese
infiltration effort.
We know, for example, that half a mil- .
lion people are kept busy just repairing
damage to bridges, roads, railroads, and
other strategic facilities, and in air and
coastal defense and repair of powerplants.
I also want to say categorically that it is
not the position of the American Govern-
ment that the bombing will be decisive in
getting Hanoi to abandon aggression. It has,
however, created very serious problems for
them. The best indication of how substan-
tial is the fact that they are working so
hard every day with all their friends
throughout the world to try to get us to
stop.
The bombing is entirely consistent with
America's limited objectives in South Viet-
Nam. The strength of Communist main-
force units in the South is clearly based on
their infiltration from the North. I think it
is simply unfair to our American soldiers,
sailors, and marines and our Vietnamese
allies to ask them to face increased enemy
personnel and firepower without making an
effort to try to reduce that infiltration.
Now, as to bombing civilians, I would
simply say that we are making an effort
that is unprecedented in the history of war-
fare to be sure that we do not. It is our
policy to bomb military targets only.
We have never deliberately bombed cities
nor attacked any target with the purpose
of inflicting civilian casualties.
We hasten to add, however, that we rec-
ognize, and we regret, that some people,
even after warning, are living and working
in the vicinity of military targets and they
have suff"ered.
We are also, too, aware that men and
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
machines are not infallible and that some
mistakes do occur.
But our record on this account is, in my
opinion, highly defensible.
Look for a moment at the record of the
other side.
Any civilian casualties that result from
our operations are inadvertent, in stark con-
trast to the calculated Viet Cong policy of
systematic terror.
Tens of thousands of innocent Vietnamese
civilians have been killed, tortured, and kid-
naped by the Viet Cong. There is no doubt
about the deliberate nature of the Viet
Cong program. One need only note the fre-
quency with which Viet Cong victims are
village leaders, teachers, health workers,
and others who are trying to carry out con-
structive programs for their people.
Yet, the deeds of the Viet Cong go largely
unnoted in the public debate. It is this moral
double bookkeeping which makes us get
sometimes very weary of our critics.
But there is another question that we
should answer: Why don't we stop bomb-
ing to make it easier to begin negotiations?
The answer is a simple one:
— We stopped for 5 days and 20 hours in
May 1965. Representatives of Hanoi simply
returned our message in a plain envelope.
— We stopped bombing for 36 days and
15 hours in December 1965 and January
1966. Hanoi only replied: "A political settle-
ment of the Viet-Nam problem can be en-
visaged only when the United States Gov-
ernment has accepted the four-point stand
of the Government of the Democratic Re-
public of Viet-Nam, has proved this by ac-
tual deeds, has stopped unconditionally and
for good its air raids and all other acts of
war against the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam."
— Only last month we stopped bombing
for 5 days and 18 hours, after many prior
weeks in which we had communicated to
them several possible routes to peace, any
one of which America was prepared to take.
Their response, as you know, delivered to
His Holiness the Pope, was this: The
United States "must put an end to their
aggression in Viet-Nam, end unconditionally
and definitively the bombing and all other
acts of war against the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South Viet-
Nam all American and satellite troops, rec-
ognize the South Vietnamese National Front
for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese peo-
ple settle themselves their own affairs."
That is where we stand today.
They have three times rejected a bomb-
ing pause as a means to open the way to
ending the war and go together to the nego-
tiating table.
South VJet-Nam's Economic Progress
The tragedy of South Viet-Nam is not
limited to casualty lists.
There is much tragedy in the story of a
nation at war for nearly a generation. It
is the story of economic stagnation. It is
the story of a generation of young men,
the flower of the labor force, pressed intq
military service by one side or the other.
No one denies that the survival of South
Viet-Nam is heavily dependent upon early
economic progress.
My most recent and my most hopeful re-
port of progress in this area came from an
old friend of Tennessee, of the Tennessee
Valley Authority, David Lilienthal, who re-
cently went as my representative to Viet-
Nam to begin to work with the Vietnamese
people on economic planning for that area.^
He reported — and with some surprise, I
might add — that he discovered an extraor-
dinary air of confidence among the farm-
ers and the village leaders and the trade
unionists and the industrialists. He con-
cluded that their economic behavior sug-
gests, and I quote him, "that they think
they know how all of this is going to come
out."
Mr. Lilienthal also said that the South
Vietnamese were among the hardest work-
^ For remarks made by Mr. Lilienthal at a news
conference at the White House on Feb. 27, see
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 467.
APRIL 3, 1967
537
ing people that he had seen in developing
countries around the world, that "to have
been through 20 years of war and still have
this amount of 'zip' ahnost insures their
long-term economic development."
Mr. Lilienthal will be going with me to
Guam Saturday night to talk with our new
leaders about the plans he will try to in-
stitute there.
Our AID programs are supporting the
drive toward this sound economy.
But none of these economic accomplish-
ments will be decisive by itself. And no
economic achievement can substitute for a
strong and free political structure.
We cannot build such a structure — be-
cause only the Vietnamese can do that.
And I think they are building it. As I am
talking to you here, a freely elected con-
stituent assembly in Saigon is now wrestling
with the last details of a new constitution,
one which will bring the Republic of Viet-
Nam to full membership among the demo-
cratic nations of the world. We expect that
constitution to be completed this month.
In the midst of war they have been build-
ing for peace and justice. That is a re-
markable accomplishment in the annals
of mankind.
Changes in U.S. Mission Staff
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has
served us with such great distinction, is
coming to the end of his second dis-
tinguished tour of duty in Saigon.
To replace him, I am drafting as our Am-
bassador to the Government of Viet-Nam Mr.
Ellsworth Bunker — able and devoted, full
of wisdom and experience acquired on five
continents over many years.
As his deputy, I am nominating and re-
calling from Pakistan Mr. Eugene Locke,
our young and very vigorous Ambassador
to Pakistan.
To drive forward with a sense of urgency
the work in pacification in Viet-Nam, I am
sending the President's Special Assistant,
Mr. Robert Komer.
To strengthen General Westmoreland in
the intense operations that he will be con-
ducting in the months ahead, I am assign-
ing to him additional topflight military
personnel, the best that this country has
been able to produce.
So you can be confident that in the
months ahead we shall have at work in
Saigon the ablest, the wisest, the most te-
nacious, and the most experienced team
that the United States of America can
mount.
In view of these decisions and in view of
the meetings that will take place this week-
end, I thought it wise to invite the leaders
of South Viet-Nam to join us in Guam for a
part of our discussions, if it were con-
venient for them. I am gratified to be in-
formed that they have accepted our invita-
tion.
I should also like for you to know that
the representatives of all the countries that
are contributing troops in Viet-Nam will be
coming to Washington for April 20 and 21
meetings for a general appraisal of the sit-
uation that exists,
U.S. Position on Peace Negotiations
This brings me to my final point: the
peaceful and just world that we all seek.
We have just lived through another flurry
of rumors of "peace feelers."
Our years of dealing with this problem
have taught us that peace will not come
easily. The problem is a very simple one:
It takes two to negotiate at a peace table,
and Hanoi has just simply refused to con-
sider coming to a peace table.
I don't believe that our own position on
peace negotiations can be stated any more
clearly than I have stated it many times in
the past — or than the distinguished Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Rusk, or Ambassador
Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the
United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg], or
any number of other oflScials have stated it
in every forum that we could find.
I do want to repeat to you this after-
noon— and through you to the people
of America — the essentials now, lest there
be any doubts.
— United States representatives are
538
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ready at any time for discussions of the
Viet-Nam problem or any related matter
with any government or governments, if
there is any reason to believe that these dis-
cussions will in any way seriously advance
the cause of peace.
— We are prepared to go more than half-
way and to use any avenue possible to en-
courage such discussions. And we have done
that at every opportunity.
We believe that the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962 could serve as the central
elements of a peaceful settlement. These ac-
cords provide, in essence, that both South
and North Viet-Nam should be free from
external interference, while at the same
time they would be free independently to
determine their positions on the question
of reunification.
We also stand ready to advance toward
a reduction of hostilities, without prior
agreement. The road to peace could go from
deeds to discussions, or it could start with
discussions and go to deeds. We are ready
to take either route. We are ready to move
on both of them.
But reciprocity must be the fundamental
principle of any reduction in hostilities. The
United States cannot and will not reduce
its activities unless and until there is some
reduction on the other side. To follow any
other rule would be to violate the trust that
we undertake when we ask a man to risk
his life for his country.
We will negotiate a reduction of the
bombing whenever the Government of
North Viet-Nam is ready, and there are al-
most innumerable avenues of communica-
tion by which the Government of North
Viet-Nam can make their readiness known.
To this date and this hour, there has
been no sign of that readiness. Yet, we
must — and we will — keep on trying.
As I speak to you today. Secretary Rusk
and our representatives throughout the
world are on a constant alert. Hundreds
and hundreds of quiet diplomatic conversa-
tions, free from the glare of front-page
headlines, or of klieg lights, are being held
and they will be held on the possibilities
of bringing peace to Viet-Nam.
Governor Averell Harriman, with 25 years
of experience of troubleshooting on the
most difficult international problems that
America has ever had, is carrying out my
instructions that every possible lead, how-
ever slight it may first appear, from any
source, public or private, shall be followed
up.
Let me conclude by saying this: I so much
wish that it were within my power to assure
that all those in Hanoi could hear one simple
message: America is committed to the de-
fense of South Viet-Nam until an honora-
ble peace can be negotiated.
If this one communication gets through
and its rational implications are drawn, we
should be at the table tomorrow. It would
be none too soon for us. Then hundreds of
thousands of Americans — as brave as any
who ever took the field for their country —
could come back home.
And the man who could lead them back is
the man that you trained and sent from
here, our own beloved, brilliant General
"Westy" Westmoreland. As these heroes
came back to their homes, millions of Viet-
namese could begin to make a decent life for
themselves and their families without fear
of terrorism, without fear of war, or with-
out fear of Communist enslavement.
That is what we are working and fighting
for. We must not — we shall not — and we
will not — fail.
APRIL 3, 1967
539
The Latin American Summit IVIeeting
Message From President Johnson to the Congress
To the Congress of the United States:
In less than a month, the leaders of the
American states will meet in Punta del Este
in Uruguay.
It will be the first such meeting in a
decade, and the second ever held, of the
heads of the free nations of our hemi-
spheric system.
This meeting represents another link in
the bond of partnership which joins us with
more than 230 million neighbors to the
south.
The gathering is far more than a symbol
of flourishing friendship. Its purpose is a
review of the progress we have made to-
gether in a great adventure which unites
the destinies of all of us. Beyond that it
will include a common commitment to the
historic and humane next steps we plan to
take together.
I look to this meeting with enthusiasm.
The peaceful and progressive revolution
which is transforming Latin America is
one of the great inspirational movements of
our time. Our participation in that revolu-
tion is a worthy enterprise blending our
deepest national traditions with our most
responsible concepts of hemispheric soli-
darity.
The Measure of Progress
The cooperative spirit between the rest
of the Americas and the United States has
been building for decades.
The establishment of the Inter-American
Development Bank in 1959, and the Act of
Bogota in 1960, under the leadership of
President Eisenhower, helped turn that
spirit to substance. In those historic com-
pacts the American governments pledged
their joint efforts to the development of
programs to improve the lives of all the
people of Latin America. They provided the
impetus for an action taken in 1961 on
which the history of the hemisphere has
since turned. That action — the Alliance for
Progress, which moved dramatically for-
ward under President Kennedy — fused old
dreams and fired new hopes. With its com-
mitment of mutual assistance and self-help
programs, it attacked evils as old as the
condition of man — hunger, ignorance, and
disease.
That Alliance is now 6 years old.
What can we say of it?
We can say that there is a clear record of
progress. Per capita growth rates for Latin
America show that more countries have
broken the economic stagnation of earlier
years. Reform and modernization are ad-
vancing as a new wave of managers and
technicians apply their skills. There have
been steady gains in private, national and
foreign investments. Inflation is easing.
The struggle for social justice is proceeding.
These are all true. But the statements of
progress are more meaningful, and they
more realistically reflect the spirit of the
Alliance, when they relate to the people for
whose lives the Alliance itself was created.
Since the Alliance began, and with the
funds that we have contributed —
■ H. Doc. 84, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (White House
press release dated Mar. 13).
540
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Men, women, and children are alive today
who would otherwise have died.
— 100 million people are being protected
from malaria. In 10 countries, deaths
caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to
2,280 in three years' time. Smallpox cases
declined almost as sharply.
— 1,200 health centers, including hos-
pitals and mobile medical units, are in op-
eration or soon will be.
For te7}3 of thousands of families, the
most ftindamental conditions of life are
improving.
— 350,000 housing units have been, or are
now being, built.
— 2,000 I'ural wells and 1,170 portable
water supply systems have been built to
benefit some 20 million persons.
Children are going to school now who
would not have gone before.
— Primary school enrollments have in-
creased by 23 percent; secondary school en-
rollments by 50 percent; university enroll-
ments by 39 percent.
— 28,000 classrooms have been built.
— 160,000 teachers have been trained or
given additional training.
— More than 14 million textbooks have
been distributed.
— 13 million schoolchildren and 3 million
preschoolers participate in school lunch
programs.
Men ivhose fathers for generations have
worked land owned by others now work it
as their own.
— 16 countries have legislation dealing
directly with land reform.
— With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres
have been irrigated and 106,000 acres
reclaimed.
— More than 700,000 agricultural loans
have benefited 3.5 million people.
— 15,000 miles of road have been built or
improved, many of them farm-to-market
access roads.
All of these are heartening facts. But
they are only the beginning of the story,
and only part of it. Statistics can only sug-
gest the deep human meaning of hope alive
now where once none lived. Statistics can-
not report the wonder of a child bom into a
world which will give him a chance to
break through the tyranny of indifference
which doomed generations before him to
lives of bleakness and want and misery.
Nor can they reveal the revolution which
has come about in the minds of tens of mil-
lions of people when they saw that their
own efforts, combined with those of their
governments and their friends abroad, could
change their lives for the better.
Perhaps most important of all, statistics
cannot adequately reflect the emergence of
a vigorous, competent and confident new
generation of Latin American leaders.
These men are determined to see realized in
their own time a strong, modern Latin
America, loyal to its own traditions and
history. They are men who know that rhet-
oric and resolutions are no substitute for
sustained hard work.
And statistics can never tell us what
might have been. They cannot record the
shots which might have rung out in the
avenidas and plazas of a dozen Latin Ameri-
can cities, but did not — or the howls of
angry crowds which might have formed,
but did not. The full success of the Alli-
ance for Progress must be sought not
only in what has been accomplished but in
what has been avoided as well.
Ferment gripped the hemisphere when
the Alliance was born. In places through-
out the world, terror with its bloodshed
sought to redress ancient evils. And in some
of these places — in Cuba and half a
world away in Southeast Asia — even greater
evil followed the thrust of violence. Through
their own efforts under the Alliance for
Progress, the Latin Americans have trans-
formed the hemisphere into a region of de-
termination and hope.
The United States' participation in the
Alliance was a bold affirmation of its belief
that the true revolution which betters
men's lives can be effected peacefully. The
Alliance's 6-year record of accomplishments
APRIL 3, 1967
541
is history's clear testament to the validity
of that belief.
It is also a testament to the validity of
the underlying principle of self-help. Our
support has been vitally important to the
successes so far achieved. But the commit-
ments and dedication of the Latin Ameri-
can nations themselves to these tasks has
been the keystone of that success.
The Task Before Us
The record of progress only illuminates
the work w^hich still must be done if life for
the people of this hemisphere is truly to
improve — not just for today, but for the
changing years ahead.
Last August, in a statement on the fifth
anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, I
described the challenge in these terms: ^
If present trends continue, the population of this
hemisphere will be almost 1 billion by the year 2000.
Two-thirds — some 625 million— will live in I,atin
America. Whatever may be done through programs
to reduce the rate of population growth, Latin Amer-
ica faces a vast challenge.
Farm production, for instance, should increase by
6 percent every year, and that will be double the
present rate.
At least 140 million new jobs will need to be
created.
Over a million new homes should be built each
year.
More than 175,000 new doctors need to be trained
to meet the very minimum requirements.
Hundreds of thousands of new classrooms should
be constructed.
And annual per capita growrth rates should in-
crease to the range of 4 to 6 percent.
These requirements, added to the demands of the
present, mean that new sights must be set, that new
directions and renewed drive must be found if we
are to meet the challenge, if we are to move forward.
It is with these sober problems confront-
ing us that the leaders of the American
states will meet at Punta del Este.
Pillars of Progress
Our governments have been hard at work
for months preparing for this meeting.
Our concern has centered on the ques-
tion of how we can speed the development
process in Latin America. We know that
growth and trade are interacting forces.
We know that they depend on the free
movement of products, people and capital.
We know they depend on people who are
healthy and educated. We know that these
conditions contain the seeds of prosperity
for all of us.
Further, based on our joint experience so
far under the Alliance, we know that the
future progress of the hemisphere must
rest on four strong pillars:
1 . Elimination of Barriers to Trade
Civilization in most of Latin America fol-
lowed along the coastal I'im of the conti-
nent. Today the centers of population are
concentrated here. Vast inner frontiers lie
remote and untouched, separated from each
other by great rivers, mountains, forests
and deserts. Simon Bolivar saw these nat-
ural barriers as major obstacles to trade
and communication and to his dream of a
single great Latin American republic.
Because of them, Latin American coun-
tries for a century and a half tended to
look outward for their markets to Europe
and the United States.
Now they are looking inward as well. They
see the same barriers, but they see them as
less formidable. They are confident that
with modem technology they can be over-
come. Now with projects set in motion by
the Alliance for Progress, men are begin-
ning to carve roads along the slopes of the
Andes, push bridges across the rushing riv-
ers, connect power grids, extend pipelines
and link the overland national markets.
The barriers of nature symbolize obstruc-
tions every bit as restrictive as the arti-
ficial trade barriers that men erect. The work
to remove them both must proceed together.
Latin American leaders have seen the very
real threat of industrial stagnation in the
high tariff barriers they have erected
against their commerce with each other.
They see economic integration as indispensa-
ble to their future industrial growth.
The Central American countries, stimu-
lated by Alliance programs, have already
achieved spectacular increases in trade and
* For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.
542
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
investment. The larger grouping of South
American states and Mexico, however, has
approached economic unity at a slower pace.
Now both groups together must system-
atically move toward a Latin American
Common Market. When this is carried into
effect, it will bring the most profound
change in hemispheric relations since inde-
pendence. The countries of Latin America
have given clear and sure indication that
they intend to join together to advance
toward this goal.
2. Improvement of Education
The burden of illiteracy, which the masses
of people in Latin America have borne for
centuries, is beginning to lift. In other
times, the pace might have been satisfac-
tory. It cannot be considered so today.
The countries of Latin America hope and
aim to be economically strong. Such nations
will require trained people in an abundance
far greater than their classrooms and lab-
oratories provide. The scientists, the teach-
ers, the skilled laborers, the administrators
and the planners on whom tomorrow de-
pends must be trained before tomorrow
arrives. Children must go to school in ever-
increasing numbers. Adults who have never
written their names must be raised to the
level of literacy. University facilities must
be expanded and scientific, technical and
vocational training must be provided of dif-
ferent kinds and in different fields.
All of this means more schools and an ex-
pansion of educational opportunities to
reach more and more people with every
passing month.
3. Agriculture
Half the people of Latin America live in
rural areas.
Most of that rural life is still shackled
by poverty and neglect. Agricultural pro-
ductivity is still restricted by outdated
methods and outmoded policies. Compre-
hensive programs and reforms must be ac-
celerated to bring modern fanning tech-
niques to the campo.
We and our neighbors to the south en-
vision a dynamic Latin American agricul-
ture which will help raise the standards of
rural life.
We envision a sufficient increase in the
production of food to provide for their
growing populations — and to help meet
world needs as well.
We envision a modernization of farming
policies and techniques which will lead to a
healthy competitive climate for food pro-
duction.
Jf. Health
Finally, we will strive harder than ever
before to improve the health of all the
people.
The battle against diseases that kill and
cripple will be intensified.
Programs to make safe water supply and
essential sanitation services available to all
will be accelerated.
Nutrition levels for poor children and
their parents will be advanced.
These are the problems we face together,
and the promises we envision together, as
we prepare for Punta del Este.
The problems are real. But the promises
are also real. They are not empty visions.
They are all within our reach. They will not
be accomplished quickly or easily. But they
are objectives worthy of the support of all
our people.
Increased Assistance
In keeping with the spirit of our commit-
ment under the Alliance for Progress and
after a careful review of the objectives
which our Latin American neighbors have
set for themselves, I believe that we should
pledge increased financial assistance in the
years ahead.
The fundamental principle which has
guided us in the past — demonstrated need
and self-help — will continue to shape our
actions in the future.
/ recommend that Congress approve a
commitment to increase our aid by up to
$1.5 billion or about $300 million per year
over the next 5 years.
It must not be at the expense of our
APRIL 3, 1967
543
efforts in other parts of this troubled world.
This amount will be in addition to the
$1 billion we have been annually investing
in the future of Latin American democracy,
since the Alliance for Progress began 6
years ago. The total value of our economic
assistance, even after the proposed in-
creases, will still be only a fraction of the
resources the Latin American nations are
themselves investing.
The $1.5 billion increase I propose must
be considered an approximate figure. Its
precise determination will depend on steps
which the Latin American nations them-
selves must take. But even so, we can pro-
ject in a general way what will be neces-
sary:
1. Agriculture, Education, and Health
Approximately $900 million of this in-
crease should be used over the next 5 years
to train teachers and build new laboratories
and classrooms; to increase food produc-
tion and combat the malnutrition which
stunts the promise of young children; to
fight disease and cure the ill.
$100 million of this amount has been in-
cluded in the fiscal 1968 budget totals. I will
request that it be added to the new obliga-
tional authority of $543 million already
recommended for the Alliance for Progress.
For the next four fiscal years, the addi-
tional annual amount of some $200 million
is vdthin the $750 million authorization for
the Alliance for Progress approved by
Congress last year.
2. A Latin American Common Market
Approximately one-quarter to one-half
billion dollars over a 3 to 5 year period, be-
ginning about 1970, may be required to as-
sist Latin America to move toward a com-
mon market.
Progress in this direction will require a
period of transition. To help with this ad-
justment, assistance can be used to retrain
workers, ease balance of payments prob-
lems, and stimulate intra-Latin American
trade.
The members of the Alliance for Prog-
ress, including the United States, should be
prepared to finance this assistance on an
equitable matching basis.
I will ask Congress to authorize these
funds only when the first essential steps
toward a common market are taken.
3. Multi-National Projects — Communications,
Roads, and River Systems
Approximately $150 million over a 3-
year period should provide additional funds
to the Inter-American Bank's Fund for Spe-
cial Operations. These increased contribu-
tions can help finance pre-investment
studies and a portion of the cost of new
multi-national projects:
— Roads to link the nations and people
of Latin America.
— Modem communication networks to
speed communications.
— Bridges to carry the fruits of com-
merce over river barriers; dams to stem the
ravages of flood.
— Hydroelectric plants to provide a plen-
tiful source of power for growth and pros-
perity.
We will request congressional authoriza-
tion to provide this amount together with
our regular $250 million annual contribu-
tion for each of the next 3 years to the
Inter-American Bank's Fund for Special
Operations.
We expect our partners in the Bank to in-
crease their contributions on a proportional
basis.
Conclusion
For the nations participating, Punta del
Este will be a returning. It was there, 6
years ago in that city by the sea, that the
American nations framed the charter of
the Alliance which unites the hopes of
this hemisphere.
We will be bringing with us the accumu-
lated wisdom shaped by the experience
gained in the years that have intervened.
We have learned much. Our sister coun-
tries know, and know well, that the burden
of the task is theirs, the decisions are
544
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
theirs, the initiative to build these new so-
cieties must be theirs. They know that the
only road to progress is the road of self-
help.
They know that our role can only be that
of support, with our investment only a small
portion of what they themselves contribute
to their future.
This knowledge strengthens their own
resolve, and their own commitment.
The people of the United States have
learned, over the 6 years since that first
conference at Punta del Este, that the in-
vestment to which we pledged our support
there is a good and honorable one.
It is an investment made in the spirit of
our world view, so well described by a great
American jurist. Learned Hand:
Right knows no boundaries, and justice no fron-
tiers; the brotherhood of man is not a domestic
institution.
That view of the world provides us with
the knowledge that service is mutually re-
warding. We have learned in the span of a
generation that when we help others in a
truly meaningful way, we serve our own
vital interests as well.
I could go to the summit meeting with
the President's executive authority and
reach understandings with our Latin Amer-
ican neighbors on behalf of this country.
I believe it is much more in our demo-
cratic tradition if the Executive and the Con-
gress work together as partners in this
matter.
I am, therefore, going to you in the Con-
gress not after a commitment has been
made, but before making any commitment.
I seek your guidance and your counsel. I
have already met with some 40 of your
leaders.
I am asking the entire Congress and the
American people to consider thoroughly my
recommendations. I will look to their judg-
ment and support as I prepare for our Na-
tion's return to Punta del Este.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, March 13, 1967.
President Hails Senate Action
on U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release dated March 16
In giving its advice and consent to the rati-
fication of the consular convention ^ today
[March 16], the Senate acted in the best tra-
dition of American government. The impres-
sive vote for ratification was the product not
only of strong bipartisan leadership but also
of responsible action by the membership.
The convention will provide important
measures to protect Americans traveling in
the Soviet Union. Last year more than 18,000
of our citizens visited the U.S.S.R. These
measures will become applicable as soon as
the treaty enters into force.
I hope the Soviet Government will now
move promptly to ratify the convention and
that arrangements will be made for its early
entry into force.
' S. Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess. ; for text, see
Bulletin of June 22, 1964, p. 979.
APRIL 3, 1967
545
"March 12th is ... a proud anniversary. Years from notv
men will still mark this date, and the man whose Doctrine
gave it meaning."
20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine
Following are texts of a letter from Presi-
dent Johnson to former President Truman
and his messages to King Constantine of
Greece and President Cevdet Sunay of
Turkey on the occasion of the 20th anni-
versary of the Truman Doctrine.
LETTER TO FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMAN
White House press release dated March H
Dear Mr. President: On this day — as
on so many others — those who love freedom
will once again honor your name.
Twenty years ago you went before the Con-
gress and summoned the American people to
a great endeavor: that of helping free peoples
to "maintain their free institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive move-
ments that seek to impose upon them totali-
tarian regimes." ^
With that message you served two great
functions of the Presidency — those of the
teacher and the leader. You related the strug-
gle of the Greek people against armed ter-
rorism to the national security of the United
States. You recognized that totalitarian
regimes, imposed upon free peoples by direct
or indirect aggression, "undermine the foun-
dations of international peace." And you
called upon the Congress and the American
people to help resist that aggression.
Today America is again engaged in helping
to turn back armed terrorism. As in your
day, there are those who believe that effort
is too costly. As on other occasions during the
' For a message delivered by President Truman
before a joint session of the Congress on Mar. 12,
1947, see Bulletin Supplement of May 4, 1947, p.
829.
past twenty years, there are those who coun-
sel us that the stakes are not high enough,
nor the danger near enough, to warrant our
involvement.
But our people have learned that freedom
is not divisible; that order in the world is
vital to our national interest; and that the
highest costs are paid not by those who meet
their responsibilities, but by those who ignore
them.
You helped to teach those lessons, Mr.
President. Just as importantly, you had the
courage and the determination to put them
into practice: in Greece and Turkey, in Ber-
lin, in Korea, and in other parts of the world
where today men are free and prospering be-
cause of what you did.
March 12th is thus a proud anniversary.
Years from now men will still mark this date,
and the man whose Doctrine gave it meaning.
With best wishes for your health and hap-
piness.
Devotedly,
Lyndon B. Johnson
The Honorable Harry S. Truman
Independence, Missouri
MESSAGE TO KING CONSTANTINE
White House press release dated March 11
Twenty years ago today. President Harry
S. Truman asked the American people to help
the Greek nation preserve its freedom. Before
a joint session of the Congress, he declared:
I believe it must be the policy of the United States
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres-
sures.
546
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The message and the program he conveyed
on that historic occasion became known as
the Truman Doctrine.
In commemoration of that decisive hour, in
thanksgiving for his courage and vision, and
in celebration of the friendship that endures
between our peoples, I extend to you and the
citizens of Greece my warm greetings and
best wishes. In this I am joined by every
American who rejoices that Greece is today
free and prospering.
President Truman recognized that the
security of the United States was intimately
related to that of Greece. He warned our
people — who, like yours, had just emerged
from a savage conflict with another terrorist
aggressi on — that
We shall not realize our objectives unless we are
willing to help free peoples to maintain their free
institutions and their national integrity against ag-
gressive movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon
free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, under-
mine the foundations of international peace and
hence the security of the United States.
The American people responded to his call
for assistance to a people struggling to be
free — and their decision has affected, not
only the security of your great nation, but
the security of the world for two decades.
I am aware of the sacrifices made by the
Greek people in the past 20 years. I am proud
of the fact that throughout that period, the
United States and Greece have worked
together in close partnership toward common
goals. I revere the Greek spirit, that for
thousands of years has inspired the world,
and that has taught men to cherish freedom
above all else in life.
Today we mark a moment in man's long
quest for freedom. I salute you and your
people on this proud anniversary, and I look
forward to a future of continued friendship
and cooperation between our nations.
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SUNAY
White House press release dated March 11
On the twentieth anniversary of the
Truman Doctrine, I extend to you and to the
Turkish people my good wishes. Then as now,
the American people admire the vitality and
the passion for freedom of the Turkish
people. Then as now, the United States is
proud of its association with the forward-
looking Turkish nation.
Turkey has been a sturdy ally in NATO
and CENTO. Its men played an unforgettable
part with the United Nations forces which
assured that aggression would not succeed in
Korea.
With its security assured by its own
courage and efforts, united with those of its
allies, Turkey has moved forward remarkably
in economic and social development. The
vision of a modern Turkey, not only loyal to
its own traditions and ambitions, but also a
creative part of the world of contemporary
science, technology, and industry, has been
brought measurably closer to reality.
The visit you will soon be making to the
United States affords an opportunity to give
added meaning to that association. It will
also serve as a symbol of the importance of
the partnership of our two great republics.
Mrs. Johnson and I are looking forward to
welcoming you and Mrs. Sunay.
APRIL 3, 1967
547
U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship and Cooperation
Prime Minister II Kwon Chung of Korea
visited the United States March 12-17. He
met with President Johnson and other U.S.
officials at Washington March H.-15. Follow-
ing are an exchange of greetings between
President Johnson and Prime Minister
Chung, their exchange of toasts at a White
House luncheon, and a joint statement issued
at the close of their talks on March H.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
Wlute House prees release dated March 14
President Johnson
It is now almost 17 years since that June
day when the invader struck at South Korea.
For a few, time has erased the meaning of
that day and all that followed. But for most
Americans, it remains as clear as it was to
President Harry Truman when he said:
In my generation, this was not the first occasion
when the strong had attacked the weak. I recalled
some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Aus-
tria. I remembered how each time that the democ-
racies failed to act it had encouraged the aggres-
sors to keep going ahead. ... I felt certain that
... if the Communists were permitted to force
their way into the Republic of Korea without opposi-
tion from the free world, no small nation would have
the courage to resist threats and aggression by
stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed
to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war,
just as similar incidents had brought on the second
world war. It was also clear to me that the founda-
tions and the principles of the United Nations were
at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea
could be stopped.
Mr. Prime Minister, the attack v/as
stopped — and we have had 15 years to see
the results.
The Korean people, whom you so proudly
represent here today, have strengthened and
developed the independence that was once
so dearly bought. They have moved forward,
slowly at first and with some uncertainty,
to meet problems that seemed to defy all
solution.
I remember how depressed and discour-
aged all of us were at the future of Korea
in the darkest days of the war, and I remem-
ber the prognostications and the prophecies
of the cynics of that hour.
But would that we all look at South Korea
today.
There is freedom of speech and a free
press. There are free elections — and I un-
derstand you are about to have another soon.
Economically, Korea has made amazing
progress.
A leading Western financial publication
recently picked Korea as the developing
country with "the best all-around national
performance in 1966 in the world of eco-
nomics and finance."
Your rate of economic growth is close to
12 percent.
You are approaching self-sufficiency in
food.
You set $250 million as your export goal
last year — and you reached and surpassed
that goal.
The world knows what Koreans are doing
with their freedom and their independence.
I don't mean to imply that you have solved
all your economic and social problems, be-
cause we all know that you have not. Nor
have we. No one really has. But the Korean
economy has "taken off" — as one of my ad-
visers is frequently fond of saying.
Korea's freedom is a consequence, above
all, of Korean fortitude and courage. But the
Korean people recognize that it is the result,
too, of the heroism and sacrifice of their
548
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
friends. They know that freedom brings rc-
siionsibilities as well as rights.
So they have begun to turn their attention
from purely national needs and goals to the
broader problems of Asia and the world.
Korean initiative in launching the Asian and
Pacific Council has been recognized and ad-
mired by all.
And today Koreans are fighting in the de-
fense of another brave people. Once again
we work side by side together — we fight
together — against aggression. Once again
we shall prove that it can be turned back by
the courageous deteiTnination of free men.
In peace, as in war, we have joined our
efFoi-ts — in the Asian Development Bank, in
cooperative efforts to improve food produc-
tion, in transportation, and in education and
health measures throughout Asia.
Mr. Prime Minister, our peoples are linked
by the strongest bonds of friendship. They
were forged in the savagery and sorrow of
war. They have been tested now in the chal-
lenges of peace.
The value of this friendship is beyond
words. It is one of those benefits that come
to men and nations all too rarely.
Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very
warmest welcome to you and to all the dis-
tinguished members of your party.
I eagerly look forward to our exchange
of views today and tomorrow.
I hope this visit to our country will be one
of your most pleasant, one of your most
interesting, and one of the most memorable
journeys among us. We are delighted to have
you. Thank you for having come.
Prime Minister Chung
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: It is
with great pleasure and a sense of privilege
that I receive the warm welcome extended
to me and my party today.
First of all, I have the honor of conveying
best regards from the President and Mrs.
Park to you and Mrs. Johnson and to all the
people of the United States of America.
Also, I am most happy to visit once again
this Capital City of the United States, for
which I have a profound feeling of friendli-
ness. I have no adequate words to express
the pleasure I feel as I see you once again,
having come by that firm bridge of good
faith and friendship which was strengthened
by the exchange of visits by our heads of
state.
Mr. President, under your great and in-
spiring leadership, the freedom-loving spirit
of the Founding Fathers of the United States
and the glorious history of the American
struggle for the preservation of freedom
shine bright in all parts of the world.
Today, a new chapter in the history of the
United States is being written on the un-
swerving effoi-ts of the American people,
who are determined to crush, with faith and
courage, violence and aggression and to es-
tablish world peace in the true sense through
perseverance and tolerance.
I am most happy to say that the entire
people of the Republic of Korea have a deep
respect and are grateful for the great con-
tributions being made by the American peo-
ple.
Mr. President, the Republic of Korea and
the United States of America are the allies
bound together for the common cause. Our
traditional ties of friendship have been
strengthened further over the last few years.
Today, the spirit of cooperation between
our two countries is evident not only in the
battlefield but in all our mutual endeavors,
which are aimed at the establishment of a
new world of prosperity in peace and free-
dom.
I pledge here that as a trusted ally of the
United States the Republic of Korea will
share all the adversities we may encounter
in our joint endeavor.
Mr. President, as you have witnessed in
person, my country is advancing under the
leadership of President Park to a better,
brighter tomorrow. The "Land of Morning
Calm" is today full of vigor, vitality, and
promise of a modern, self-sustaining future.
The assistance and cooperation rendered
by the people of the United States since the
end of World War II have borne full fruit
in a land that was once plagued with despair
and devastation.
APRIL 3, 1967
549
It is with the utmost pleasure that I con-
vey to the people of the United States the
warmest gratitude of the people of the Re-
public of Korea.
We are today marching ahead with con-
stancy and hope toward a bright future,
ever thankful to the American people for
helping them make this progress possible.
Mr. President, I am looking forward with
joy in my heart to meeting with you and
other leaders of your Government during my
visit. We will discuss in all sincerity and
frankness those problems of mutual interest
which confront us today, with a view to
strengthening the existing ties of friendship
between our two countries.
Once again, I wish to express my gratitude
to you, Mr. President, for this warm wel-
come extended to me and my party. Thank
you.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated March 14
President Johnson
This morning I had the privilege of wel-
coming you, Mr. Prime Minister, to the
United States of America.
Now it is a very great pleasure to welcome
you to my home.
Around us here today you will see many
people who know your country well. And
each of them is a friend of Korea.
Although I was in your country only a
very short time, the visit last fall was one
of the most memorable and the most heart-
warming that I have ever known.
Mrs. Johnson and I shall never forget —
and everyone with us will remember — the
warmth, the spontaneity, the hospitality of
the Korean people. I can still hear the rus-
tling of countless small flags — Korean and
American — that welcomed us in Seoul. I can
still see those schoolboy posters all along
your streets and the open friendliness in the
faces of those who held them.
We knew, of course, that your country was
called the Land of the Morning Calm. And
we found it to be so — in the early morning
when the mists are rising off' the rivers.
But it is not long before the air is filled
with the sounds of men building and plant-
ing and producing, of little children reciting
their lessons in the school, of the whole coun-
tiyside coming awake and work being done.
I was struck by the evidence of economic
growth and vigor that I saw everywhere we
looked. Koreans were working to make a bet-
ter society — to insure that all of the people
shared in the fruits of their economic
growth.
So both of us would like to cultivate our
gardens in peace. We would like to make
them bloom as they have never bloomed be-
fore— to create and to enjoy the blessings of
prosperity, to enlarge the possibilities of a
dignified and meaningful life.
But in our world even the most remote
nations are often barred from cultivating
their gardens in peace.
It is a world where peace and freedom and
justice are constantly in jeopardy.
It is a world where men, if they will not
stand up, may be forced to kneel.
Neither Koreans nor Americans kneel
gracefully before conquerors or before ag-
gressors.
It is a world where responsibilities are
heavy for those who are willing to shoulder
the burden of responsibility.
We carried that burden together in the
defense of South Korea. We carry it to-
gether as we meet here today, in the defense
of South Viet-Nam. We shall continue to
carry it until ambitious men recognize that
aggression and terror are futile and out-
dated weapons in relations between peoples
and nations.
We shall continue together because, as
President Harry Truman said more than 15
years ago: i
AH free nations are exposed and all are in peril.
Their only security lies in banding together. No one
' For President Truman's state of the Union mes-
sage on Jan. 8, 1951, see BULLETIN of Jan. 22, 1951,
p. 123.
550
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nation can find protection in a selfish search for a
safe haven from the storm.
In going to the assistance of others — as
our Korean friends know so well — America
does not seek to dominate or control. We do
not seek national grandeur or special privi-
lege.
What we seek — in cooperation with like-
minded nations like Korea — is the basis for
a lasting peace, a peace with justice, not the
peace of the grave but the peace of life,
where men are free and able to shape their
own future.
Today, together, we fight. But even as we
do, we work together in a multitude of ways
to improve the quality of the life of our own
people and of others in the world.
And when real peace comes, as it will
come, I know we shall continue to work —
together and with others — to better the
world we have inherited and helped to pre-
serve.
Mr. Prime Minister, we are delighted that
you are with us today.
In the spirit of our deep friendship and
admiration for a very brave people, I ask
all of those who have come here today to
join me in a toast: To His Excellency,
the President of the Republic of Korea — and
to the continued prosperity and freedom of
the Korean people.
Prime Minister Chung
Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies
and gentlemen: I wish to extend my heart-
felt gratitude to you for your warm address
and for this wonderful luncheon for me and
my party.
After 4 years, I am indeed happy to visit
this country once again.
I was moved by the marvelous aerial view
of this great city, which has become more
beautiful and splendid than I remembered.
Here again as I find myself in this amicable
and congenial company of old friends, I am
at a loss for adequate words to express my
deep emotion.
Mr. President, as I stand here, I have a
vivid memory of the cheers of millions of
people on the streets of Seoul who, with
flags in their hands, welcomed you to Korea
last autumn.
I am sure that you personally felt then
the admiration and appreciation of the Ko-
rean people. As a great leader, you have the
mission of protecting freedom. You are
armed with unfailing courage and a strong
belief in justice. These are qualities we Ko-
reans know are needed at this critical time
in history.
Mr. President and distinguished guests, as
President Park has stated before, we have
been trying very hard to be a nation which
stands by its friends and repays its obliga-
tions. We know well that real gratitude is
more properly expressed by deeds rather
than by words.
I am very proud to declare that the sacri-
fices and efforts made by American people in
Korea have not been wasted.
Mr. President, you stated in Seoul 2 that
self-esteem gives to a people confidence, a
strong confidence, without which a people
can accomplish little and with which they
can surmount any obstacles.
Today, we are full of this confidence; my
people are overcoming all difficulties and
marching toward a hopeful tomorrow.
During the past several years, under the
inspiring leadership of President Park, we
Korean people have achieved political sta-
bility and economic progress.
According to 1966 statistics of our eco-
nomic growth, the per capita income reached
$123; the total amount of exports, $250 mil-
lion; and the foreign reserves, close to $230
million.
I know well that these figures are not so
big as to surprise any one of you. Neverthe-
less, these figures are really encouraging to
us, because comparing them with those of 5
years ago, you will discover that some of
them have almost doubled and still others
have increased almost 10 times.
Mr. President and distinguished guests,
the Korean people, who in the past were
2 For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner at
Seoul on Oct. 31, 1966, see ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 771.
APRIL 3, 1967
551
negative and resistant, have now become one
of the free nations in the world, pursuing a
course of affirmation and positive contribu-
tion. In other words, today we ask ourselves
what we can do as an ally of the United
States and what we can do as a free nation
in Asia. At the same time we ask what we
can contribute to the freedom and peace of
all mankind.
We are growing today. We sent our troops
to the Republic of Viet-Nam, normalized our
relations with Japan, and hosted the minis-
terial meeting for Asian and Pacific coop-
eration.
We participated in the Manila Summit
Conference and took part in the establish-
ment of the Asian Development Bank. These
are some of the tangible results recently
achieved through the strength and confi-
dence of the people of Korea.
Mr. President, today the Asian countries,
including Korea, are facing, as President
Franklin Roosevelt pointed out in his state-
ment of four freedoms, the tasks of achiev-
ing freedom from fear and freedom from
want.
We have learned that freedom in the 20th
century can only be obtained through coop-
eration among peoples.
Your address delivered at Johns Hopkins
University ^ is a most important and histori-
cal declaration, clarifying the goals of the
United States in Asia.
Particularly, your grand designs for ever-
lasting peace and promotion of the well-
being of the suffering peoples in Asia and
firm attitude against injustice and fear have
brought to the Asian people new hope and
new courage, inspiring them with a sense of
purpose.
Today, the Korean people admire you as a
defender of freedom and peace and as an
architect of the happiness of mankind.
Also, on this occasion I wish to express
my profound respect and appreciation to the
American people. Their contributions since
the Second World War helped bring freedom
to Korea and other nations in Asia.
' Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
Mr. President, we Korean people have de- .|
veloped into a trusted nation of the free ■ i
Asia. We share our joys and sorrows with I'
the American people, who have always been I '
with us, not only in the darkness of despair
but also in the bright morning of hope.
Finally, I express once again my heartfelt
gratitude to you and my sincere hope for
your continued friendship and assistance. '
Distinguished gentlemen, may I ask you
to join me in a toast to the magnificent con- '
tribution of President Johnson to mankind,
to the health of President and Mrs. Johnson,
and to the everlasting prosperity and happi-
ness of the American people.
JOINT STATEMENT
White HouBe press release dated March 14
Prime Minister II Kwon Chung of the Republic of
Korea arrived in Washin^on on March 14 at the
invitation of President Johnson. The President and
the Prime Minister met on March 14 and exchanged
views on matters of mutual concern to the two gov-
ernments. Also present were Minister of National
Defense Sung Eun Kim, Minister of Commerce and
Industry Chung Hun Park, Secretary General to
the President Hu Rak Lee, Ambassador Hyun Chul
Kim, Under Secretary of State Nicholas DeB. Katz-
enbach, Special Assistant to the President Walt W.
Rostow, and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs Samuel D. Berger.
The Prime Minister brought with him a personal
message to President Johnson from President Park
Chung Hee.
President Johnson extended his cong^ratulations to
President Park on the remarkable progress achieved
by the Korean people in recent years and the en-
couraging prospects for continued progress in vari-
ous fields of national life in Korea.
President Johnson expressed the continuing admi-
ration of the American people for the courage and
prowess of the Korean forces on the field of battle
in Viet-Nam and for their effective endeavors to
promote the welfare of the Vietnamese populace.
President Johnson indicated the importance he at-
taches to the combat capabilities of these forces and
the steps being taken to strengthen these capa-
bilities further with improved equipment. The
Prime Minister stated his impressions of the cur-
rent situation in Viet-Nam gained during his recent
visit there. The President and the Prime Minister
agreed that efforts to bring about a just and lasting
peace must be constantly pursued but reaffirmed the
determination of their two governments to continue
vigorously the military struggle in Viet-Nam until
552
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the North Vietnamese are willing to enter into
meaningful negotiations for peace. They affirmed
that their two governments would continue to act in
closest consultation on both these matters. Recalling
that the United States Government has pledged to
give special support to the Government of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam on peaceful development, in-
cluding the latter government's revolutionary de-
velopment programs, and that the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam has requested the Korean
Government to render assistance for the same pro-
grams. President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung
agreed that their two governments will, in close
consultation and coordination among themselves and
with the Government of Viet-Nam, jointly render
cooperation and assistance to the successful imple-
mentation of the peaceful development activities in-
cluding the Government of Viet-Nam's revolutionary
development program.
The President and the Prime Minister reviewed
the recent series of incidents on land and sea in and
near the Demilitarized Zone in Korea in which both
ROK and U.S. units have suffered casualties from
unprovoked attacks by North Korean forces. They
agreed on the need for maintaining constant vigi-
lance against the threat of renewed aggression
against the Republic of Korea. They further agreed
that in view of this continuing threat modernization
of the Korean armed forces should be continued as
rapidly as legislative and budgetary limitations will
permit. President Johnson reaffirmed the readiness
and determination of the United States to render
prompt and effective assistance to defeat an armed
attack against the Republic of Korea, in accordance
with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. President
Johnson assured Prime Minister Chung that the
United States would continue to support the Korean
armed forces at levels adequate to ensure Korea's
security.
Prime Minister Chung reviewed his government's
economic objective, as set forth in its Second Five
Year Economic Development Plan. President John-
son expressed the admiration of the American people
for the striking progress made by the Korean Gov-
ernment and people during recent years in increas-
ing gross national product, industrial output, agri-
cultural production, exports, and domestic revenues.
President Johnson reaffirmed to Prime Minister
Chung his previous assurances that the United
States would continue to support the economic
growth of the Republic of Korea, and in particular,
to assist in the achievement of the goals of the
second Five Year Plan. Further development loans
will constitute one form of such support. He noted
also that a consultative group of friendly govern-
ments, including the United States, and interna-
tional lending institutions has been formed to coor-
dinate the provisions of development funds to the
Republic of Korea.
Prime Minister Chung expressed gratification over
the imminent visit of the private trade and invest-
ment mission to Korea under the leadership of Mr.
George W. Ball. He assured President Johnson that
the trade mission would be warmly welcomed in
Korea, in keeping with the desire of both govern-
ments to expand trade between the two nations and
to promote American private investment in Korea.
President Johnson reaffirmed the United States
Government interest in furthering the growth of
trade between the Republic of Korea and the United
States and stressed the importance of periodic meet-
ings between appropriate United States officials and
their Korean counterparts. It was agreed that the
Minister of Commerce and Industry and the Secre-
tary of Commerce meet annually for this purpose.
He also assured the Prime Minister that the United
States would cooperate with the Republic of Korea
to bring promptly to the attention of American pri-
vate business interests the opportunities and possi-
bilities for investment in Korea, both through com-
mercial loans and joint business ventures.
President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung re-
affirmed the conviction of their two governments
that existing regional organizations and institutions
in the Pacific area should be strengthened and de-
veloped, with the ultimate objective of creating a
new Pacific Community, open to all nations pre-
pared to live at peace and to cooperate and work
for the welfare of the people of Asia and the Pacific,
as agreed by Presidents Johnson and Park in their
joint statement in Seoul in November, igoe.* Presi-
dent Johnson and Prime Minister Chung recalled the
goals of freedom as declared by the seven heads of
state at Manila last October ' and Prime Minister
Chung reaffirmed the determination of the govern-
ment of the Republic of Korea to continue its efforts
towards accelerating the growth of a Pacific Com-
munity. President Johnson expressed appreciation
for the initiative and important contributions made
by the Republic of Korea in the evolution of the
Pacific Community. He stressed the importance of
solidarity and mutual support among the countries
in the region and expressed the readiness of the
United States Government to play its part in devel-
oping the Pacific Community.
President Johnson and Prime Minister Chung re-
affirmed the strong ties of friendship and mutual
interest between the Republic of Korea and the
United States and pledged themselves anew to the
maintenance and strengthening of those ties and
to continued cooperation between their two govern-
ments in the economic, political, and military fields.
On behalf of the members of his party and the
Korean people. Prime Minister Chung expressed his
deepest appreciation to President Johnson for the
warm reception and for the hospitality extended to
him by President Johnson and the United States.
* Ibid., Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777.
= Ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
APRIL 3, 1967
553
U.S. Investment and Trade
Mission Visits Korea
President Johnson announced on March
10 (White House press release) that 27 U.S.
business and financial leaders will visit
Korea March 18-24 to stimulate American
private investment and to promote increased
U.S.-Korean trade.
This mission is the result of an agree-
ment between President Johnson and Presi-
dent Chung Hee Park in Seoul last Novem-
ber for an exchange between the two nations
to discuss these aims.^ The two Presidents
noted that the stability and progress of the
Korean economy should make these objec-
tives possible.
At White House request, George W. Ball,
former Under Secretary of State, organized
and will lead this U.S. private investment
and trade mission to Korea.^ Members will
be traveling at their own expense.
Before their departure the group will as-
semble in Washington on March 16 for
briefings by State Department Agency for
International Development, Commerce De-
partment, and Export-Import Bank officials.
This mission leaves Washington on March
17 and will spend 7 days in Korea as guests
of the Korean Government.^
Foreign IVIinister of Guinea
Visits the United States
The Foreign Minister of Guinea, Louis-
Lansana Beavogui, arrived at New York on
March 6 for a visit to the United States of
approximately 10 days. (For an announce-
ment of the visit, see Department of State
press release 45 dated March 6.) He was
' For text of a joint statement dated Nov. 2, see
Bulletin of Nov. 21, 1966, p. 777.
* For a White House announcement, see ibid.,
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 69.
^ For names of the members of the mission, see
White House press release dated Mar. 10.
accompanied by Mr. Mohammed Kassoury
Bangoura, Director General of Technical
Cooperation and Economic Matters, Ministry .
of Foreign Afi"airs. |
During the course of his visit, Foreign
Minister Beavogui spent several days in
Washington, where he conferred with the
Secretary of State and other U.S. officials.
He also visited Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands.
St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls
To Remain at Present Levels
Department Announcement
Press release 66 dated March 13
The Department of State announced on
March 13 agreement with Canada that there
will be no increase in tolls on the St.
Lawrence Seaway for at least four years.
The United States Government considers
that in view of the rapid growth of traffic on
the Seaway a toll increase is not necessary.
Traffic on the Seaway reached record levels
in 1966 and tonnage carried on the waterway
exceeded for the first time the tonnage fore-
cast.
The Seaway toll structure may be re-
viewed after four years at the request of
either government.
United States and Canadian representa-
tives also have agreed on an adjustment in
the division of toll revenues under which
Canada's share will be increased from 71 to
73 percent for the next four years. The
United States-Canadian agreement of March
9, 1959,1 on St. Lawrence Seaway tolls pro-
vided for adjustment of shares for the two
countries in accordance with their relative
costs, and the present adjustment reflects
costs incurred in recent years.
' For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and
text of a memorandum of agreement, see Bulletin
of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.
554
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cotton in the World Trade Arena
by Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^
I am honored to have this opportunity to
participate in your 52d annual convention.
As Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs, I am delighted to pay testi-
mony to the fact that your association has
been closely and helpfully involved over the
years in international commercial affairs.
The cotton trade has a long and proud tra-
dition in the trading history of our country.
Your familiarity with both the problems and
potentialities of international trade reflects
this experience and heritage. And it is there-
fore no accident that from your ranks have
arisen men who have been leaders in this
field.
The Department of State's credentials also
go back a long way. Our people have not
plowed cottonfields in the ordinary course of
their work, but they have met payrolls, so
to speak, in other important ways.
Our first Ministers to Europe after we
won independence, John Adams in Great
Britain and Thomas Jefferson in France, put
more time and effort into expanding our
trade than on any other single activity. They
worked to get better markets for what were
then examples of our technologically ad-
vanced products — whale oil and whale-oil
candles. More generally, they negotiated
hard to remove discrimination against all
our products in foreign markets and to re-
duce trade barriers on a reciprocal basis. We
were a have-not nation then, and we knew
* Address made before the Southern Cotton Asso-
ciation at Memphis, Tenn., on Mar. 10 (press release
53 dated Mar. 9).
that we had to export agricultural products
to buy the machinery and equipment we
needed from abroad.
The men who followed Adams and Jeffer-
son in representing our country abroad have
continued to work in the same vineyard.
They sought to improve opportunities to sell
our products, ranging from cotton to com-
puters, and to widen areas of reciprocal
trade. At home our position has been much
the same. It is a source of pride for me today
to recall that one of my most distinguished
predecessors and a leading architect of our
present trade policy, Will Clayton, came to
his public work from a background in cot-
ton.
In the first days of our history this policy
stemmed from the premise that we could
most effectively realize our potentialities as
a nation as part of the world economy rather
than in economic isolation. This fundamental
proposition is the more valid today when by
our very size and power we have far-reach-
ing and inescapable responsibilities for de-
fending peace and strengthening freedom
throughout the world.
My purpose today is to talk about interna-
tional trade problems and cotton policy.
What are our international trade objectives,
and are they, or should they be, different for
cotton? I propose first to comment briefly
on the status of our efforts in the trade field;
second, to examine the cotton trade in the
context of this trade policy; and third, to ex-
plore with you the current status and future
prospects of cotton as we see them now.
We have done much in the two decades
APRIL 3, 1967
555
since World War II to dismantle the network
of barriers that throttled trade in the suspi-
cious world of the thirties. As a result, the
volume of world trade has grown faster than
at any time in this century. Trade has be-
come a positive and dynamic factor in the
rapid recovery and expansion of the free-
world economy.
We seek to continue this move toward a
free and open world trading system based on
the principle of nondiscrimination and a
minimum of restrictions on the flow of
goods, capital, and services across national
boundaries. Such a system promotes the
growth of all. It encourages specialization,
the development and exchange of technology,
and growing productivity. It provides the
competitive environment essential for a new
generation of ideas, technology, and trade
patterns. These results serve the interests of
all trading nations; they clearly are in the
commercial, economic, and even strategic in-
terest of the United States.
One of the important lessons we learned
from the disastrous experience of the inter-
war period is that attempts by nations to
solve their problems at the expense of others
are self-defeating. In the end, everybody
loses. Conversely, experience has also shown
that the wider the area and the more nu-
merous the commodities moving on a freely
traded basis, the more all can benefit.
These are the premises underlying our ac-
tions in the trade field — and they are all
familiar to you. To lose sight of them for
short-term or narrow considerations would
penalize the most efficient segments of U.S.
agriculture and industry and, in the end, the
overall national interest. Fortunately, the
competitive character of the U.S. economic
environment, and the receptiveness of our
producers to change, support a generally out-
ward-looking posture on international trade.
In the day-to-day dealings with foreign
countries on specific trade issues and in ne-
gotiations in GATT [General Agreement on
Tariff's and Trade], the U.N., or other inter-
national organizations, many considerations
must go into the determination of what con-
stitutes the national interest. One factor
weighing heavily in this determination is the
welfare of domestic producers and traders —
their production capabilities, costs, employ-
ment, and income. It is for this reason that
we have frequent and thorough discussions
of specific trade issues with representatives
of U.S. industry, labor, and trade.
Budgetary and balance-of-payments con-
siderations are also involved. The constraints
of our balance-of-payments position in recent
years have made it essential that we assess
carefully the foreign exchange consequences
of actions aff'ecting our exports. And the
relation of budgetary considerations to the
fight against inflation is self-evident.
Foreign policy considerations are a third
general factor. Expanding trade on multi-
lateral principles requires that we adhere to
the rules of the game. In addition, considera-
tion must be given to the problems of devel-
oping countries if they are to play their role
in reciprocal trade and make satisfactory
economic progress. For these reasons, work
on specific trade issues requires consultations
with representatives of the governments of
foreign producers of our export commodi-
ties.
Kennedy Round Negotiations
In 1962 the Congress authorized us in the
Trade Expansion Act to speed up the process
of reducing tariff and nontariff barriers to
trade. The Kennedy Round negotiations,
which are the vehicle for this effort, will
shortly reach a climax. The next few weeks
will tell how well we will succeed.
On industrial items, substantial and mu-
tually beneficial offers have been put on the
table by all participants. Difficult issues re-
main in key sectors. Their resolution will
require some give-and-take, but above all it
will require that all participants recognize
once again that their individual self-interest
in fact lies in an environment that insures
the continued and rapid expansion of world
trade.
We recognized from the first that the
Kennedy Round agricultural negotiations
would be diflficult. Agricultural support sys-
tems are complicated, varied — and every-
556
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
where. Agricultural protective devices are
also legion. Nevertheless, the entire Western
trading world agreed in Geneva on the goal
of liberalizing agricultural ti-ade.
I am sure you appreciate the nature of
the negotiating difficulties. Societies such as
our own have deep roots in, and complex
commitments to, their agricultural sectors.
Over time these have resulted in government
regulations and techniques of agricultural
support going well beyond tariffs. The tech-
niques are very difficult to change in a short
time. They are closely related to arrange-
ments which effectively control the price as
well as the volume of imports. As we have
learned in Geneva and in other agricultural
discussions, understanding the nature and
consequences of each of these systems is in
itself a major enterprise.
We understand the social and political
pressures and needs which have brought
these arrangements to their present state of
development. We have accepted for many
years the need of our own farmers for gov-
ernmental assistance in production and mar-
keting. We recognize that for some time to
come governments will continue to give spe-
cial assistance to agriculture. We seek, how-
ever, in the Kennedy Round, to reach agree-
ment on restricting the application of these
systems so as to assure an expansion in
world agricultural trade. To do this, govern-
ments must be willing to subject policies that
historically were considered to be of purely
domestic concern to international discussion,
coordination, and agreement.
Problems of Cotton in World Trade
Unlike the problems of many sectors of
our agricultural economy, the problems of
cotton in world trade do not arise from diffi-
culties of access to markets, to which I have
been alluding. They arise primarily from the
capacity of world cotton producers to place
on world markets ever-increasing quantities
of cotton in the face of severe competition
from manmade fibers and a relatively slow
growth in the consumption of cotton prod-
ucts. But governments have contributed to
the difficulties and may do so again.
U.S. cotton programs in the past have not
been as effective as they should have been in
dealing with a situation of chronic oversup-
ply. Support policies have concentrated on
prices and thus have tended to foster uneco-
nomic production patterns, delay readjust-
ments, and discourage consumption. In an
effort to offset the effects of these policies on
our exports we resorted to export subsidies.
To offset the effect on consumption we made
payments to pi'ocessors.
More recently, of course, our pohcies took
a more positive turn. We replaced the system
of support prices by a more rational and ef-
fective program which permits market
prices to find their competitive levels. Our
present farm supports, which take the form
of direct payments to producers, are proving
to be more eflfective in adjusting production
to requirements.
We have one problem other cotton pro-
ducers do not share because we are willing,
as a Government, to hold stocks of cotton.
We do so as part of our policy to assist cot-
ton fanners. As you know, many countries
grow and export cotton. With the single ex-
ception of the United States, these are devel-
oping countries. Cotton is the number-one
export of 9 of such countries and ranks
among the three most important exports of
17 countries. These countries in recent years
have increased their share in world cotton
production, consumption, and exports. They
do not have the economic strength and re-
sources, however, to hold cotton from one
year to the next but market their annual pro-
'duction each year.
As a result of our price-support programs
operating in concert with our willingness to
take supplies off the market, we have be-
come, to a certain degree, the residual sup-
plier of the world commercial market.
It is in this context that I propose to
review the developments in the cotton situa-
tion since our 1965 legislation went into
effect and to hazard some speculations about
the future.
At the start of the current marketing year
last summer, the situation was discouraging.
Stocks in the United States were at a record
APRIL 3, 1967
557
high, stocks in foreign exporting countries
were the highest in a decade, but stocks in
importing countries were in the third year
of decline. Foreign production had been
growing steadily, creating a further imbal-
ance in supply. Prices of upland cotton con-
tinued to weaken, but world trade in cotton
was stagnant. In contrast, manmade fiber
production and sales set new records.
Here in the United States production was
stable at a level well above disappearance,
despite the many years of acreage control.
By the end of the last crop year, U.S. stocks
were almost 17 million bales, equivalent to
over a year's production; and 88 percent of
the carryover was in CCC [Commodity
Credit Corporation] inventory. Exports last
year were sharply off from prior levels, less
than 3 million bales. Anticipation of the new
program aggravated the situation that de-
veloped by July 31, 1966. Nevertheless, there
is little doubt that the prior U.S. prograei
had failed to solve some of the basic prob-
lems of U.S. cotton marketing and had made
others worse.
Cotton Situation Improving
The 1965 legislation ^ was designed to deal
with this situation. Its aims were: to move
cotton into trade for domestic consumption
and export; reduce use of the CCC price-
support loan program; reduce domestic pro-
duction; gradually liquidate CCC stocks with
minimum adverse effects for current produc-
tion of our growers; reduce CCC's role in
merchandising cotton; and make and keep
U.S. cotton competitive with cotton from
other exporting countries.
The situation has improved greatly in less
than a year. Some aspects are radically
changed. Our own production declined
sharply, partly as a consequence of bad
weather but chiefly in response to the acre-
age limitations and payments provided by
the new law. Production was well below dis-
appearance. Domestic consumption has risen,
' P.L. 89-321.
and exports have been encouraging. In the
first 7 months of this marketing year, ex-
ports surpassed those in the entire 1965-66
marketing year. The carryover will show a
shariJ decline. CCC is now practically out of
the merchandising of the better qualities of
cotton and prices for these types are being
determined in the marketplace. Price differ-
entials for less desirable qualities of cotton
have widened, again in response to market
demand. As a result of these developments,
many of our cotton farmers have better in-
comes, the CCC has lower costs, and the tax-
payer benefits.
The world cotton situation has also im-
proved. Foreign production is down, foreign
acreage declined last year by over 1 million
acres, consumption is up, and trade is
higher. The progress made this year suggests
that a balance between cotton supply and
demand is attainable.
The increase in exports is gratifying. Fur-
ther improvement in the level of U.S. exports
is desirable and possible if we produce what
the world needs. Secretary [of Agriculture
Orville L.] Freeman expressed the hope a
year ago that the U.S. would export at least
17 million bales in the first 3 years of the
program. Our record this year encourages
hope that this expectation will materialize.
But the progress made in this first year
under the 1965 legislation and the improved
world situation should not obscure the fact
that U.S. cotton still faces some difficult prob-
lems. Our experience this year indicates that
there is room in the world market for addi-
tional quantities of U.S. cotton. But our own
production must be responsive to the market.
There is doubt in the market that our sup-
plies of better qualities will be sufficient to
meet domestic and foreign demand. At the
same time, the U.S. Government continues
to purchase and store large amounts of
poorer qualities, for which the demand is
limited.
The shift in demand to longer staple
lengths is a worldwide phenomenon. It is
particularly challenging to U.S. producers at
558
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
this time. The problem can be solved through
intelligent cooperation of government, pro-
ducers, and shippers and through further
adjustments in our cotton program. Loan
rate discounts and differentials that reflect
the new market situation can be an impor-
tant means of moving toward a better
balance of qualities. Further adjustments
will have to be made in our cotton support
programs to give more elbowroom to those
of our producers who can produce high-
quality cotton at low cost. The increased de-
mand for certain alternative crops, such as
soybeans and feedgrains, should facilitate
these adjustments.
Need for Responsible Price Policy
There are some who see price cutting as
the panacea to our cotton problems. My own
view is that attempts to dump our produc-
tion and stocks on the world market would
not solve our cotton problems and would be
contrary to our overall trade objectives.
They could only result in a serious disruption
of world markets which would be disadvan-
tageous to us all. I wish to make clear the
facts and analysis that underlie this conclu-
sion.
Cotton's prospects have been carefully ex-
amined in a Department of Agriculture re-
port entitled "Analysis of Factors Affecting
U.S. Cotton Exports." The Department of
Agriculture estimates that a 1-cent reduction
in world cotton prices would increase free-
world consumption of cotton by about
135,000 bales above the trend and reduce the
average annual growth in foreign free-world
production by about 100,000 bales. This is a
very rough estimate. It makes no allowance
for future changes in the relative prices of
the fibers that compete with cotton, nor can
it tell us how cotton growers in less devel-
oped countries vdll behave at different price
levels than those that have recently been
experienced. It points up, however, that price
cuts cannot be expected to increase U.S. cot-
ton exports by large amounts. Our present
evidence suggests that even a cut in price of
as much as 4 cents from present levels would
not increase the volume of exports suffi-
ciently to make up for the reduction in price.
On the other hand, such a price reduction
would increase the budgetary cost of our cot-
ton program.
A major reason for the small response to
price cuts is the limited ability of cotton
growers in developing countries to shift to
other crops. Fanners in these countries do
not have the skills, training, or capital to
respond quickly to changes in the market;
they cannot easily apply new techniques to
their land and explore new market oppor-
tunities. Such adjustments take far longer
than they do in the United States and re-
quire a combination of price incentives, tech-
nical help, and capital assistance. For these
reasons, cotton producers in foreign coun-
tries would be forced to meet cuts in our
prices. For the same reasons, their produc-
tion may well continue to grow in the future,
although at a lower rate.
We must also consider the consequences
for other countries of an unrestricted cotton
price cutting policy in the United States.
Such price cuts would seriously reduce the
foreign exchange income of Latin American
and other producing countries and require
them to cut back their development effort
under the Alliance for Progress and other
programs which we strongly support. Fur-
thermore, we would be charged with seeking
to drive other producers from the market,
not through the forces of competition but on
the basis of government action.
It is essential that cotton producing coun-
tries that are presently unable to grow
enough food to meet their own needs should
examine whether they are making the best
use of their agricultural resources. Those
countries receiving food assistance from us
have been asked to review governmental
measures which provide undue incentives for
the production of commercial crops in over-
supply, such as cotton or coffee. We hope
that uneconomic production of cotton will be
APRIL 3, 1967
559
reduced or eliminated as governments give
higher priority to food production.
Taking all these considerations into ac-
count, our goal should be a price policy
which takes account of the realities of the
market. Cotton has become a cheaper prod-
uct relative to the general price level. This
price trend is a reflection of improved tech-
nology in the production of cotton and the
increasing competitiveness of manmade fi-
bers.
No government should try to reverse these
price trends. But it is not in our interest on
the other hand that cotton — our cotton or
that of other producing countries — be sold
more cheaply than it need be to retain its
markets. A price war would not be to our
benefit or that of any other exporters.
International Exchanges of Views
A responsible price policy must be com-
plemented by continuing efforts to improve
the quality competitiveness of cotton. As I
said earlier, much remains to be done to in-
crease the production of high-quality cotton.
More can be done to improve consumer ac-
ceptance of cotton and its use. The United
States is pleased to be one of eight major
cotton exporting countries that have adhered
to the International Institute for Cotton and
its promotion program.
Rational price policies, improvement of
quality, promotion programs, are thus all
necessary ingredients of a policy aiming at
a more healthy balance of supply and de-
mand. But all of these efforts could come to
naught in the absence of responsible produc-
tion policies. The United States has taken
a major step forward under its new legisla-
tion. But this is not a problem for the United
States alone. Other major cotton producing
countries must adjust their production to
market prospects. If the world cotton econ-
omy is to move steadily toward a healthy
equilibrium, all major cotton producing
countries should be prepared to submit their
cotton policies to international scrutiny and
to take any necessary corrective action.
This is a good time to begin. We moved
closer to a worldwide cotton equilibrium this
year because production went down both in
the United States and abroad. A continued
increase of 1 million bales a year in world
consumption should make it possible to
achieve a further reduction in U.S. stocks
and further progress toward balance be-
tween world consumption and available sup-
plies. But this balance can only be main-
tained if all major producing countries
pursue responsible production policies.
The International Cotton Advisory Com-
mittee has been a useful forum for the ex-
amination of policies of member countries.
This work should be intensified and extended
to production plans. The Committee should
consider more fully the consequences of
measures its members expect to take and
whether these actions are consistent with the
market prospects. The Committee could also
examine whether members who desire inter-
national advice and assistance can be helped
to shift resources to other types of agricul-
tural production.
This exchange of views could significantly
contribute toward avoiding the excessive in-
creases in world production that might cause
a renewed buildup of surpluses and thereby
confront all of us with more painful and
costly alternatives. If, as a consequence, pro-
duction and demand grow in rough parallel,
we can avoid the instability of price and the
frequent and unpredictable changes of policy
which have imposed such severe burdens on
cotton growers, traders, and governments of
cotton growing countries.
In sum, our objective in cotton, as in other
commodities, is to promote increased con-
sumption, trade, and income. We believe we
can achieve this objective through increasing
reliance on market forces. It is essential,
however, that government actions — both in
the United States and abroad — insure that
the movement toward balance in the world
cotton economy is not reversed. I am confi-
dent that by moving in this direction we can
meet our domestic needs in ways that are
consistent with our responsibilities abroad.
560
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States Joins Dedication
of Jidda Desalting Plant Site
by Stewart L. Udall
Secretaiy of the Interior ^
Let me commence by again thanking the
Minister of Agriculture [Hassan Mishari]
for the honor extended to me and my Gov-
ernment through his Government's invitation
to visit Saudi Arabia and attend the dedix^a-
tion of the Jidda desalination plant. I am
most happy to be present at this event, which
is of great importance both for Saudi Arabia
and the United States.
The decision to build this plant, which 2
years from now will begin to supply 5 mil-
lion gallons daily of sweet water to the city
of Jidda, represents the culmination of a
long series of efforts in both your country
and mine. For centuries man has dreamed
of converting the limitless supplies of sea
water to meet the needs of a thirsty world,
but until recent years the possibility of
achieving this goal without exorbitant costs
seemed beyond reach. Only in recent years
has the development of new technology
brought the goal within our grasp.
In order to exploit new possibilities, the
United States Congress in 1952 created the
Office of Saline Water in the Department of
Interior, which is under my supervision. Ex-
perimental plants have since been con-
structed both in the United States and
abroad, each designed to lower the cost of
providing sweet water through desalting.
These developmental efforts, however, are
not confined to the United States. Many coun-
tries have been involved in the development
of improved desalting technology. Our good
friends in the United Kingdom have been
leaders in the field. Every nation should
place its talents in the drive to provide sweet
water to the world's parched areas.
In October 1965 the United States spon-
sored the First International Symposium on
Water Desalination, in which Saudi Arabia
joined over 60 other nations.^ President
Johnson announced the United States' inten-
tion to join "a massive cooperative interna-
tional effort to find solutions for man's water
problems." ^ Conversations between Saudi
Arabia and the United States at the time of
the International Symposium led to an agree-
ment through which the United States De-
partment of Interior has since cooperated
directly with the Saudi Arabian Government
in planning the present plant now being de-
signed and soon to be erected.
Many persons deserve commendation for
the efforts which have brought this project
to the verge of realization. The Jidda de-
salination plant is a reflection of the wise
leadership of His Majesty King Faisal in
his progressive program to bring peace and
prosperity to the Saudi people.
From personal participation in negotia-
tions, I am familiar with the great impor-
tance Minister Mishari has attached to this
project and the unfailing attention which
Prince Mohamed, as Director of the Saudi
Saline Water Conversion Office, has given
every step of the arrangements. Aside from
the technical personnel of OSW, credit also
goes to private consultants such as Jackson
and Moreland and the engineers, Burns and
Roe, now designing the project. The manu-
facture of equipment and actual construc-
tion of the plant is open to international
bidding. This is truly a cooperative effort.
In the long and glorious history of Saudi
Arabia, the dedication of Jidda desalination
plant project is sure to be remembered as a
milestone of progress. Fresh water and elec-
tric power to be produced here will satisfy
the needs of Jidda's growing population for
personal consumption and sanitation and
' Remarks made at Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on Feb. 5
on the occasion of the dedication of the site for the
desalination plant for the city of Jidda.
' For an address by Secretary Udall at the open-
ing session of the symposium, see Bulletin of Nov.
1, 1965, p. 716.
' Ibid., p. 720.
APRIL 3, 1967
561
permit nourishing the area's gardens and
livestock. The plant will also permit new-
industries, contributing to the region's pros-
perity. It is also important not only to this
major city but as well to the nation of Saudi
Arabia as a whole, for we trust the success-
ful completion and operation of this plant
will lead the way to similar and perhaps even
larger plants elsewhere in this rapidly de-
veloping country.
This plant has another significance which
cannot be overlooked. The people of all the
world's arid countries are watching us to-
day. If this project is successful, and I have
no doubt that it will be, it will represent a
major technical accomplishment to be stud-
ied and adapted time and again until in the
course of technological progress the day ar-
rives when mankind need no longer worry
about the terrible problems of thirst.
For the present, however, the age-old
problem of satisfying man's thirst and nour-
ishing his flocks and fields remains with us.
Concern is felt not only in desert countries.
Even nations such as my own, once thought
to have unlimited water resources, have come
to realize that nature's abundance has limits.
In the United States we find ourselves wag-
ing constant war against the shortage of
water in all parts of the country. The strug-
gle is being pursued on many fronts. In
addition to the millions of dollars which have
been spent to develop economical means to
purify sea water — research which has cul-
minated in the design of this plant — other
expenditures amounting to billions of dollars
have been invested in dam building, irriga-
tion, flood control, and water purification.
Other nations increasingly are giving their
attention to the proper management of their
precious water resources. Your country
wisely has concerned itself not only with the
possibilities of desalination, as represented
by the dedication of this site today, but also
is engaged in dam building, irrigation and
drainage projects, and exploration of under-
ground water resources.
My brief visit to Saudi Arabia will allow
me to inspect the new water supply system
of your capital, Riyadh, and development
projects at al-Hasa and Qatif Oases. I regret
time will not permit my visiting other inter-
esting areas of your country which bear
many significant resemblances to my own
State of Arizona, located in the arid south-
west of the United States where water has
always been in short supply.
Thus men of many nations have come to
realize that meeting future needs requires
the reexamination of every facet of water
exploration and utilization, and in this effort
the cooperation of all nations is required.
The success of the International Symposium
on Water Desalination which I referred to
earlier has led President Johnson to call an
International Conference on Water for Peace
to be held in Washington in May 1967. This
will permit the meeting of experts to ex-
change information and views on the world's
water problems and seek practical solutions
to these problems and simultaneous consul-
tations among government officials responsi-
ble for conservation and development on
means of implementing solutions. The con-
ference will provide a forum for discussing
water resources development, international
cooperation to solve water problems, and
possible establishment of a continuing world-
wide Water for Peace program.
I am particularly pleased that Saudi Ara-
bia has already accepted our invitation to
attend the conference and has promised to
send a large delegation, headed by Minister
Mishari and Prince Mohamad. We sincerely
hope that through this conference Saudi
Arabia will share with the world the knowl-
edge it has gained through the many water
conservation and development programs
already initiated here and will simultane-
ously learn through the experience of others.
Before I left Washington to come to Jidda,
President Johnson requested that I convey
his warm regards and sincere congratula-
tions to his friend King Faisal and all the
people of Saudi Arabia. May I again add my
own congratulations and sincere hopes for
the success of this venture and those to fol-
low and my compliments on the high degree
562
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of progress which the Saudi people have al-
ready attained under the leadership of His
Majesty. My Government looks forward to
continued cooperation with the Saudi Ara-
bian Government in achievement of peaceful
progress.
Asian Development Bank
Immunities Defined
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release d&ted March 7
The President on March 7 issued an Execu-
tive order designating the Asian Development
Bank as a public international organization
entitled to the benefits of the International
Organizations Immunities Act of 1945.
Under that act, public international organi-
zations in which the United States partici-
pates and which have been designated by the
President through appropriate Executive
order are entitled to certain privileges,
exemptions, and immunities, such as im-
munity from suit and judicial process, im-
munity from search and confiscation of prop-
erty, and exemption from certain internal
revenue, property, and other taxes.
Notwithstanding this designation, the
Asian Development Bank will be subject to
legal action in cases authorized by the
Agreement Establishing the Asian Develop-
ment Bank.
The order also (1) delegates to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, acting in consultation
with the National Advisory Council on Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Policies,
authority to instruct representatives of the
United States to the Asian Development
Bank, and (2) delegates to that Council
authority otherwise to coordinate United
States policies relating to the Bank. The
responsibilities of the Secretary and the
Council with respect to the Bank are the
same as those previously assigned to them
in regard to other international financial
institutions. These assignments of author-
ity do not derogate from the foreign policy
responsibilities of the Secretary of State.
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11334^
Enjoyment of Certain Privileges, Exemptions,
AND Immunities by the Asian Developement
Bank and Coordination of United States
Policies With Regard to the Bank
By virtue of the authority vested in me by Reor-
ganization Plan No. 4 of 1965 (30 F.R. 9353), by
section 4 of the Asian Development Bank Act, ap-
proved March 16, 1966 (Public Law 89-369), and by
section 1 of the International Organizations Im-
munities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), and as
President of the United States, it is ordered as fol-
lows:
Section 1. (a) The Asian Development Bank,
an organization in which the United States partici-
pates under the authority of the Asian Development
Bank Act, is hereby designated as a public interna-
tional organization entitled to enjoy the privileges,
exemptions, and immunities conferred by the Inter-
national Organizations Immunities Act.
(b) The foregoing designation shall not be (1)
deemed to abridge in any respect privileges, exemp-
tions, and immunities which that organization may
have acquired or may accpiire by treaty or congres-
sional action, or (2) construed to affect in any way
the applicability of the provisions of Article 50 of the
Agreement Establishing the Asian Development
Bank as adopted by the Congress in the Asian Devel-
opment Bank Act.
Sec. 2. Executive Order No. 11269 of February
14, 1966, is amended as follows :
(1) By adding at the end of section 2 the follow-
ing new subsection :
"(c) The Council shall perform with respect to the
Asian Development Bank, the same functions as
those delegated to it by subsections (a) and (b)
of this section with respect to other international
financial institutions."
(2) By adding at the end of section 3 thereof the
following new subsection :
"(d) The Secretary of the Treasury shall perform,
with respect to the Asian Development Bank, the
same functions as those delegated to him by sub-
sections (a) and (b) of this section with respect to
other international financial institutions."
The White House, March 7, 1967.
' 32 Fed. Reg. 3933.
APRIL 3, 1967
563
Department Issues Public Notices
on Travel to Restricted Areas
On March H, the Department spokesman
announced that notices concerning the cort/-
tinuation of area travel restrictions for Cuba
and the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-
Nam, Korea, and China tvere being published
in the Federal Register. In making the an-
nouncement, he noted that: "There will
no longer be restriction on travel to Albania."
Folloiving are texts of an amendment to
the Code of Federal Regulations on passports
and four public notices which were published
in the Federal Register on March 1 6.
Amendment to Code of Federal Regulations '
Title 22 — Foreign Relations
Chapter I — Department of State
Part 51 — Passports
Passports Invalid for Travel to Restricted Areas
Part 51, Chapter I, Title 22, Code of Federal Regu-
lations, section 51.72 (as corrected at 31 F.R. 13654,
Oct. 22, 1966, and as amended at 31 F.R. 16143, Dec.
16, 1966) is amended to read as follows :
§ 51.72 Passports invalid for travel to restricted
areas.
Upon determination by the Secretary that a coun-
try or area is :
(a) A country with which the United States is at
war, or
(b) A country or area where armed hostilities are
in progress, or
(c) A country or area to which travel must be re-
stricted in the national interest because such travel
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign
affairs.
U.S. passports shall cease to be valid for travel to,
in or through such country or area unless specifically
validated therefor. Any determination made under
this section shall be published in the Federal Reg-
ister along with a statement of the circumstances
requiring the restriction. Unless limited to a shorter
period, any such restriction shall expire at the end
of 1 year from the date of publication of such notice
in the Federal Register, unless extended or sooner
revoked by the Secretary by public notice.
Effective date. This amendment shall become effec-
tive on March 16, 1967.
The provisions of section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238; 5 U.S.C. 1003) relative
to notice of proposed rulemaking are inapplicable to
this order because the regulation contained herein
involves foreign affairs functions of the United
States.
(Sees. 1, 4, 44 Stat. 887, 63 Stat. Ill, as amended;
22 U.S.C. 211a, 5 U.S.C. 161c)
For the Secretary of State.
Idar Rimestad,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.
March 14, 1967.
Public Notice 256*
U.S. Citizens
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
Mainland China
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c),
travel to, in, or through Mainland China is re-
stricted as unrestricted travel to, in, or through
Mainland China would seriously impair the conduct
of U.S. foreign affiairs. In view of the present
unsettled conditions within Mainland China and the
risks and dangers which might ensue from the in-
advertent involvement of American citizens in
domestic disturbances, the currently applicable re-
strictions on travel of American citizens to the
Chinese mainland are therefore extended.
Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for
travel to, in, or through Mainland China unless spe-
cifically endorsed for such travel under the authority
of the Secretary of State.
This public notice shall expire at the end of 1
year from the date of publication in the Federal
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by
public notice.
Dated: March 14, 1967.
For the Secretary of State.
Idar Rimestad,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.
Public Notice 257
U.S. Citizens
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through Cuba
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c),
travel to, in, or through Cuba is restricted. In view
of the declared hostility of the Cuban government to
the United States and other democratic governments
of the Western Hemisphere and the avowed policy
of that government to promote terrorism and subver-
sion in Latin America, unrestricted travel to, in, or
through Cuba would seriously impair the conduct
' 32 Fed. Reg. 4122.
' 32 Fed. Reg. 4140.
564
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of U.S. foreign affairs. It would be incompatible with
the resolutions adopted at the Ninth Meeting of Con-
sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Or-
ganization of American States, of which the United
States is a member. At this meeting, held in Wash-
ington from July 21-26, 1964, it was resolved that
the governments of the American states not main-
tain diplomatic, consular, trade, or shipping rela-
tions with Cuba under its present government.
Among other things, this policy of isolating Cuba
was intended to minimize the capability of the Castro
government to carry out its openly proclaimed pro-
grams of subversive activities in the Hemisphere.
Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for
travel to, in, or through Cuba unless specifically
endorsed for such travel under the authority of
the Secretary of State.
This public notice shall expire at the end of 1
year from the date of publication in the Federal
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by
public notice.
Public notice 179, 26 F.R. 492, promulgated Janu-
ary 16, 19161, is hereby canceled.
Dated: March 14, 1967.
For the Secretary of State.
Idar Rimestad,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.
Public Notice 258°
U.S. Citizens
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
North Korea
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), travel
to, in, or through North Korea is restricted as un-
restricted travel to, in, or through North Korea
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreigfn
affairs. In view of the dangerous tensions in the Far
East, the expressed and virulent hostility of the
North Korean regime toward the United States, the
continued recurrence of incidents along the military
demarcation line, and the special position of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Korea which is recog-
nized by resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly as the only lawful government in Korea,
the Department of State believes that wholly unre-
stricted travel by American citizens to North Korea
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign
affairs.
Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for
travel to, in, or through North Korea unless specifi-
cally endorsed for such travel under the authority of
the Secretary of State.
This public notice shall expire at the end of 1
year from the date of publication in the Federal
• 32 Fed. Reg. 4140.
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by
public notice.
Dated: March 14, 1967.
For the Secretary of State.
Idar Rimestad,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.
Public Notice 259^
U.S. Citizens
Restriction on Travel to, in, or Through
North Viet-Nam
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(b),
travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam is restricted
as this is "a country or area where armed hostilities
are in progress".
Hereafter U.S. passports shall not be valid for
travel to, in, or through North Viet-Nam unless spe-
cifically endorsed for such travel under the authority
of the Secretary of State.
This public notice shall expire at the end of 1
year from the date of publication in the Federal
Register unless extended or sooner revoked by
public notice.
Dated: March 14, 1967.
For the Secretary of State.
Idar Rimestad,
Deputy Under Secretary
for Administration.
Foreign Policy Conference
Held at Philadelphia
The Department of State announced on
March 18 (press release 59 dated March 17)
that Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to
the Council of the Organization of American
States, would be the principal speaker in a
tri-State foreign policy conference at Phila-
delphia, Pa., on March 30. The conference,
jointly sponsored by the Department of State
and the World Affairs Council of Philadel-
phia, had the cooperation of more than 25
other State and community organizations in
the area. It was attended by several hundred
civic and community leaders and news media
representatives from Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, Delaware, and the city of Baltimore.
Other State Department officers scheduled
to participate were: Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
APRIL 3, 1967
565
Member, Policy Planning Council; David H.
Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for In-
ternational Organization Affairs; Philander
P. Claxton, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State for Population Matters; John Hol-
dridge, Deputy Director, Office of Research
and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific;
and Frederick W. Flott, Foreign Service offi-
cer (formerly Special Assistant to Ambassa-
dor Lodge in Saigon). Mrs. Charlotte Moton
Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, was the conference moderator.
THE CONGRESS
U.S. Participation in the U.N.
During 1965
Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson transmitting to the Con-
gress the 20th annual report on U.S. par-
ticipation in the United Nations.^
To the Congress of the United States:
I am submitting herewith the twentieth
annual report on United States participation
in the United Nations, covering calendar
year 1965.
That year gave new evidence of our coun-
try's vigorous commitment to the world or-
ganization, and to the cause of peace which
it serves. All of the American efforts re-
corded here — whether political, economic, so-
cial, legal or administrative — were designed
solely to further that commitment.
The whole world shared our grief when
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson died in Lon-
don on July 14, 1965. The respect and affec-
tion in which he was held, and the world's
gratitude for his contributions to the United
Nations, found expression in messages from
officials and leaders around the globe, and in
the rare tribute of a memorial meeting in the
General Assembly hall at the United Nations.
One measure of a nation's regard for the
' U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the
President to the Congress for the Year 1965 (H. Doc.
458, 89th Cong., 2d sess.) ; Department of State pub-
lication 8137, for sale by the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20402 ($2.00).
United Nations is the quality of representa-
tives it sends to the Organization. Accord-
ingly, I asked Arthur J. Goldberg to leave
the Supreme Court of the United States and
to succeed Ambassador Stevenson as our
Permanent Representative to the United Na-
tions.
Ambassador Goldberg's first important
task was to help end the paralysis suffered
by the General Assembly in 1964 as a result
of the U.N. constitutional crisis. It had be-
come clear that the membership as a whole
was not prepared to apply the penalty pro-
vided by Article 19 of the Charter — loss of
vote in the Assembly for those more than
two years in arrears — to those members who
had refused to contribute their assessed
shares of certain peacekeeping operations.
On August 16, Ambassador Goldberg an-
nounced that the United States would not
seek to frustrate the evident desire of many
members that the General Assembly should
proceed normally. At the same time, he made
it clear that the United States reserved the
same option to make exceptions to collective
financing assessments in the future.
The consensus reached by the General As-
sembly included agreement that the Orga-
nization's financial difficulties should be
solved through voluntary contributions, par-
ticularly from those delinquent in their pay-
ments. A few nations contributed, but those
furthest in arrears did not. The financial
condition of the United Nations thus re-
mained precarious.
During 1965, the Security Council made
566
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
a major contribution to international peace
by lialting the hostilities between India and
Pakistan arising from the Kashmir dispute.
In thus arresting a full-scale war on the sub-
continent, the Organization prevented untold
tragedy in Asia — and proved anew its value
as an instrument for peace.
United Nations peace forces and truce su-
pervisors continued to stand guard through-
out 1965 in Cyprus, in Kashmir, in Korea,
and along the troubled borders of Israel. The
Security Council also dispatched United Na-
tions representatives and observers to the
Dominican Republic during the disorders
there; but the primacy of the Organization
of American States in dealing successfully
with this regional problem, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter, remained
unimpaired.
During the year, concrete steps toward
disarmament were again strongly urged
from all quarters, although progress proved
disappointingly slow; the serious problems of
race relations and colonialism in Southern
Africa were also a cause of increasing de-
bate and concern; and the United Nations
and its members were repeatedly urged by
the United States to join in the search for
peace in Viet-Nam.
In my speech in San Francisco on June 25,
1965 2 — the Twentieth Anniversary of the
United Nations — I called upon its members
to use all their influence, individually and
collectively, to bring to the negotiating table
those who seemed determined to continue the
conflict. Ambassador Goldberg addressed
similar appeals to United Nations members.
Indeed, in his first official communication as
U.S. Representative, a letter to the Security
Council President on July 30, 1965,^ Ambas-
sador Goldberg recalled the legitimate inter-
est of the Security Council in the peace of
Southeast Asia and asserted that "The
United States stands ready, as it has in the
past, to collaborate unconditionally with
members of the Security Council in the
search for an acceptable formula to restore
peace and security to that area of the world."
Unfortunately, these initiatives produced
no affirmative response from those support-
ing the aggression against South Viet-Nam.
Two suspensions of the bombing of North
Viet-Nam during the year were no more suc-
cessful in opening the path to honorable ne-
gotiations. The tragic conflict continues un-
abated in Viet-Nam. But we are continuing
• our efforts untiringly to seek a peaceful set-
tlement of this issue through the United Na-
tions and all other channels. This was the
key issue dealt with in Ambassador Gold-
berg's statement to the twenty-first General
Assembly in the general debate in September
1966.*
The year 1965 marked the mid-point of the
United Nations Development Decade. It was
a year of sober assessment. Despite substan-
tial progress in some areas, it was clear that
in most of the more than one hundred coun-
tries with per capita incomes of less than
$200, economic growth had been largely
swallowed up by the mounting tide of popu-
lation growth. Multilateral programs of aid,
trade, and investment, although substantial
in absolute terms, are not sufficient — even
when combined with all the other large pro-
grams, public and private — to narrow the
"development gap."
This discouraging assessment stimulated
new efforts to cope wth development prob-
lems:
— The newly created U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development began its search for
new trade patterns and practices which
would benefit the developing countries.
— The establishment of a new U.N. Orga-
nization for Industrial Development was ap-
proved by the General Assembly.
— The U.N. Development Program was
established by merger of the U.N. Expanded
Program of Technical Assistance and the
Special Fund. The United States had worked
long and hard for the integration of these
two major U.N. operational programs in or-
der to permit better planning and more ef-
fective use of resources.
' For text, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 98.
» For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278.
' For text, see ibid., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
APRIL 3, 1967
567
— Foundations were laid for the new
Asian Development Bank with a capitaliza-
tion of $1 billion, including a $200 million
subscription by the United States. It prom-
ises to be one of the most effective agencies
for the financing of economic and social de-
velopment in Asia.
— A new African Development Bank, de-
signed to play a similar role in Africa,
opened for business.
Through these and other instrumentali-
ties, our delegations in U.N. agencies have
given leadership and positive support to ma-
jor goals in the struggle for a better life:
more food production; assistance in volun-
tary family planning; the training of skilled
manpower; development of transport and
communications; fuller utilization of natural
resources; and increased application of sci-
ence and technology.
The year 1965 had been designated Inter-
national Cooperation Year (ICY) by the
U.N. General Assembly, and U.N. members
were urged to commemorate it in appropri-
ate ways. The culmination of the American
celebration was a White House Conference
attended by more than 5,000 distinguished
Americans — leaders in their communities, in
business and industry, in educational and la-
bor organizations, in the arts and sciences,
and in the professions.^ The Conference dis-
cussed reports on international cooperation
in agriculture, atomic energy, disarmament,
health, the welfare of women and youth, and
many other fields. Many of its recommenda-
tions have already been put into effect.
Others are being thoroughly evaluated by a
special White House Committee which will
shortly submit its report to me.
Public support for the United Nations con-
tinued at a high level as the Organization
approached its twenty-first anniversary.
Most thoughtful people know that the
° Two special issues of the Bulletin were devoted
exclusively to International Cooperation Year: for
articles by chairmen of the ICY Cabinet committees,
see ibid., Sept. 6, 1965 ; for articles by senior govern-
ment consultants to the citizens' committees, see ibid.,
Nov. 22, 1965.
United Nations is a far from perfect orga-
nization, in a far from perfect world. Yet
they also recognize that it and its specialized
agencies are the best system yet devised for
sovereign nations to work together with
equality and self-respect.
Our investment in the United Nations, and
its various agencies and special programs,
supplements other activities undertaken to
preserve, protect, or promote a wide range
of national interests. Above all, our commit-
ment to the United Nations is an expression
of faith which has illumined the entire his-
tory of our country: a faith that the creative
powers of democracy and human reason can
overcome the evils of tyranny and violence.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, March 9, 1967.
1966 International Negotiations
for Arms Control and Disarmament
Following is President Johnson's letter of
February 17 transmitting to the Congress
the United States Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency's sixth annual report, cover-
ing the period January 1-December 31,
1966, '^ together with the portion of the re-
port entitled "International Negotiations."
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
To the Congress of the United States:
I am transmitting herewith the Sixth An-
nual Report of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency. I do so with considerable
satisfaction, since this year has seen signifi-
cant progress in this Nation's 20-year effort
to bring under control the armaments which
are the product of man's 20th-century in-
genuity.
In 1966 a significant link was added to the
still slender chain of aiTns control agree-
' H. Doc. 58, 90th Cong., 1st sess. Single copies of
the report are available upon request from the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20451.
568
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ments — a treaty banning weapons of mass
destruction in outer space and on celestial
bodies.^ Its significance will grow as our
mastery of space grows, and our children
will remark the %visdom of this agreement
to a greater degree than the present state of
our own knowledge quite permits today.
The past year has also brought us close to
another agreement, one of even greater im-
mediacy— a treaty to prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons here on earth.
Our hopes are high that this long effort will
soon be crowned with success.
The United States has been trying to pre-
vent the prohferation of nuclear weapons
since 1946. At that time Bernard Baruch,
speaking for the United States at the United
Nations, said "If we fail we have damned
every man to be the slave of fear." It is true
that we failed then, but we did not become
the "slaves of fear"; instead we persisted.
' In the Arms Control and Disarmament Act
I of 1961, Congress decreed that the search
for ways to save succeeding generations
I from the scourge of war should become a
matter of first emphasis for the United
States Government. The establishment of an
independent Agency to work out ways to
bring the arms race under control was the
act of a rational people who refused to sub-
mit to the fearful implications of the nuclear
age.
Several things are evident from a reading
of this report. The first is that we are suc-
ceeding, after a few short years, in develop-
ing an integrated and highly expert attack
on the problem of arms control and disarma-
ment. Our security has two faces — strength
and restraint; arms and arms control. We
have come to the point where our thinking
about weapons is paralleled by our thinking
about how to control them. The Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency plays a cen-
tral role in this development.
The second is that despite the magnitude
and complexity of armament imposed on the
world by the cold war, the problem can be
made to yield to imagination and determina-
• For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.
"tion, so that now we might legitimately be-
gin to count up the score: we have cut down
the danger of "accidental war" with the hot
line, curtailed the injection of radioactive
waste into the atmosphere with the limited
test ban treaty, and joined in strengthening
the system of safeguards designed by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to close
one of the doors to nuclear weapons.
The United States has anticipated the fu-
ture by putting all of Antarctica, and more
recently outer space, off limits to weapons of
mass destruction. Nonarmament is easier
than disarmament, and in these terms alone,
the value of these latter treaties cannot be
overestimated. In addition, however, we
should not overlook the significance of this
approach to the problems in arms control we
face right now. A treaty to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons will have this
same preventive element — without it we face
the prospect of a world in which more than
a dozen nations will possess nuclear weap-
ons. If our hopes for success in a treaty are
realized, the chances for still further agree-
ments will be greatly enhanced. These next
steps will also be more difficult, because they
must involve the weapons we might other-
wise add to our arsenals, or even those now
on hand.
This brings me to my last observation,
which is that this report reveals the sobering
reality of the immensity of the task we have
undertaken. Read in the context of recent
developments in the Soviet Union — the
buildup of their strategic forces and the de-
ployment of an anti-ballistic missile system
around Moscow — we are reminded that our
hard-won accomplishments can be swept
away overnight by still another costly and
futile escalation of the arms race.
It is my belief that the United States and
the Soviet Union have reached a watershed
in the dispiriting history of our arms com-
petition. Decisions may be made on both
sides which will trigger another upward
spiral. The paradox is that this should be
happening at a time when there is abundant
evidence that our mutual antagonism is be-
APRIL 3, 1967
569
ginning to ease. I am determined to use all
the resources at my command to encourage
the reduction in tension that is in our mutual
interest, and to avoid a further, mutually-
defeating buildup. The work of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency will con-
tinue to be of invaluable assistance in this
urgent task.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, February 17, 1967.
excerpt from annual report
International Negotiations
We are in the midst of a ^eat transition, a
transition from narrow nationalism to international
partnership; from the harsh spirit of the cold war
to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a
troubled and threatened planet. . . . We are shap-
ing a new future of enlarged partnership in nuclear
affairs, in economic and technical cooperation, in
trade negotiations, in political consultation and in
working together with the governments and peoples
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.^
In 1966, the United States sent its emissaries to
almost every capital of the world in an effort to
find ways to bring an end to the war in Vietnam.
In parallel to that effort, American disaiTnament
negotiators intensified their activities — in Geneva,
New York, Washington, Moscow, London, and Paris
— at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee
(ENDC) ," at the 21st session of the United Nations
General Assembly, in consultation vvdth our allies
and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.
The ENDC reconvened on January 27, 1966, and
' For text of President Johnson's state of the
Union message on Jan. 10, see ihid., Jan. 30, 1967,
p. 158.
■* The Eighteen Nation Committee on Disamnament
will enter its sixth year on February 21, 1967. The
Committee, which meets at the Palais des Nations
in Geneva, was established under a joint U.S.-
U.S.S.R. agreement and welcomed by the General
Assembly. While it is not a United Nations body,
it reports to the General Assembly and the Dis-
armament Commission and is serviced by the U.N.
Secretariat. Membership is made up of five NATO
nations (United States, Canada, Italy, United King-
dom, and France; the last has never taken her seat
at the conference table), five from the Warsaw
Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania,
and U.S.S.R.), and eight non-aligned nations (Bra-
zil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Swe-
den, and United Arab Republic). [Footnote in
original.]
received a message from President Johnson," who
pledged the United States to "continue to pursue
every avenue for stable peace." That effort, he said,
"has no more important set of goals than those of
disarmament, which are the business of this con-
ference."
As the year went on, hopes for success on two
major arms control agreements brightened per-
ceptibly. It was clear that at least one of them —
a treaty governing activities in outer space and on
celestial bodies — would be achieved. The other — a*
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
— was moving closer to accord.
Non-Proliferation
The negotiations at Geneva were dominated by
the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. As the conference convened, the U.S. draft
treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to
nations not now possessing them (presented in the
previous ENDC session, on August 17, 1965) lay
on the table.^ The Soviet Union had submitted its
draft to the United Nations General Assembly on
September 24, 1965. This document was subse-
quently presented to the ENDC on January 27, 1966.
The first principle of a non-proliferation treaty,
enunciated in the U.N. resolution adopted over-
whelmingly in November of 1965, is that it should
contain no "loopholes which might permit nuclear
or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or in-
directly, nuclear weapons in any form." ' Early in
the 1966 session of the ENDC, ACDA Director Wil-
liam C. Foster restated the President's pledge: '
We are prepared to work with other countries
to assure that no non-nuclear country acquires
its own nuclear weapons, achieves the power itself
to fire nuclear weapons, or receives assistance in
manufacturing or testing nuclear weapons. We are
prepared to agree that these things should not be
done directly or indirectly, through third countries
or groups of countries, or through units of the
armed forces or military personnel under any mili-
tary alliance.
In an attempt to show a spirit of flexibility and
to make its treaty language more precise, the United
States, on March 22, 1966, tabled amendments to
Articles I, II, and IV of the U.S. draft treaty.'
* For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 21, 1966, p. 263.
« For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.
' For U.S. statements and text of the resolution,
see ihid., Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.
' For text of President Johnson's message to the
1966 session of the ENDC, see ibid., Feb. 21, 1966,
p. 263.
° For texts of a U.S. statement and the amend-
ments, see ihid., Apr. 25, 1966, p. 675.
570
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The amendments were intended to clarify and em-
phasize the Western view that collective defense
arrang'ements would not violate the principle of non-
proliferation. The determined intention of the
United States not to relinquish its veto over the
use of U.S. weapons was stressed repeatedly in
the conference debate. As Mr. Foster put it —
... no one — I repeat, no one — will be able to fire
United States weapons unless the United States
decides that they are to be fired. This is the situ-
i ation which now obtains, and we have no intention
whatsoever of changing it.
In March, the Soviet Union transferred its long-
time chief delegate to the ENDC, Semyon K.
Tsarapkin, to the post of Ambassador to Germany.
I He was replaced by Alexei A. Roshchin, who in the
following months mounted a concentrated, closely-
reasoned attack on the U.S. draft treaty. The Soviet
views were presented in a manner relatively free
of polemic, except for the now familiar vituperation
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Their central
target was those provisions of the treaty which
they claimed would permit West German "access"
to or control over nuclear weapons through partici-
pation in NATO defense arrangements. They dis-
missed as irrelevant U.S. insistence that Soviet fears
about nuclear weapons in the Western alliance
were groundless because of firm U.S. retention of its
veto over the use of such weapons. The U.S. treaty,
contended Ambassador Roshchin, would lead to pro-
liferation so long as it allowed for access through
co-ownership or co-possession of nuclear weapons by
NATO countries through such schemes as the pro-
posed multilateral force. The U.S. approach to the
treaty, he argued, did not really bar dissemination;
it only retained a veto on the use of nuclear weap-
ons by non-nuclear-weapon states. The U.S. response
was a vigorous defense of its treaty draft, and a
serious attempt at persuasion; the debate provided,
in consequence, an illuminating clarification and ex-
position of the position of the two sides rarely
matched in the conference's open debate.
The debate made clear that resolution of U.S.-
Soviet differences would involve a long and arduous
negotiation. In the hope of some tangible, short-
term progress, Western representatives urged the
conference to begin work on the less difficult as-
pects of the treaty drafts. The Italian delegation
suggested the adoption of a partially agreed text,
and the Canadians submitted a working paper set-
ting forth the two drafts article by article in
parallel columns. The Soviets, however, resisted this
approach, and insisted on sticking to the central
point at issue. The United States, during the re-
mainder of the session, proceeded on its own to
raise other substantive questions; one of them was
the safeguards provision, another the necessity for
making sure a non-proliferation treaty did not con-
tain a loophole permitting nuclear explosions under
the guise of peaceful experiments.
The ENDC adjourned on August 25, without any
agreement between the United States and the So-
viet Union. Nonetheless, there was an atmosphere
of hope and expectation among the delegates, en-
gendered in part by the depth and seriousness with
which the major elements in the draft treaties
had been considered. President Johnson's announced
intention to renew his search for an "acceptable
compromise" in "language which we can both live
with," " signalled a new phase in the negotiation.
Privately, the U.S. and Soviet Co-Chairmen were
beginning intensive talks in Geneva.
These talks were resumed during the period of
the disarmament debate in the 21st United Nations
General Assembly, which convened in New York
on September 20. On September 23, Soviet Foreig^n
Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko, in a speech before
the General Assembly, proposed as an additional
item for the U.N. agenda the "renunciation of ac-
tions hampering a non-proliferation agreement."
The Soviet Union, in commenting on the resolution,
implied that plans for NATO nuclear defenses might
"hinder" agreement on a treaty. The United States
announced that while it could not support such an
argument, it would support the resolution and, in
fact, co-sponsored it.
The resolution was subsequently adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly by a vote of 110 to 1 (Al-
bania) with Cuba abstaining." The affirmative vote
included France, and marks the first time in recent
years that France has voted as favoring efforts to
halt the spread of nuclear weapons.
Formal debate on non-proliferation was completed
in the First Committee on November 10, with the
adoption of a resolution, proposed by the eight non-
aligned members of the ENDC, which remanded the
question to the ENDC. The United States supported
this resolution on the grounds that the Geneva con-
ference was the proper forum for the negotiation.
Informal discussions, however, continued through-
out the remainder of the year. Following talks in
New York and Washington between Secretary Rusk
and Foreign Minister Gromyko in early October, Mr.
Foster and Soviet Ambassador to the ENDC A. A.
Roshchin continued bilateral talks in New York. The
Soviets abandoned their earlier resistance to con-
sidering other than the central point of disagree-
ment, and in consequence considerable "underbrush"
has been cleared away by the talks. At the year's
end, there still remained important points to be
resolved, but the outlook was more encouraging
than at any time since the two draft treaties were
presented.
"At a White House news conference on July 5,
1966.
" For text of A/RES/2149 (XXI) adopted Nov.
4, 1966, see Bulletin of Dec. 12, 1966, p. 902.
APRIL 3, 1967
571
International Safeguards
A key element in U.S. efforts to curb the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons is the establishment
of safeguards against the diversion of peaceful nu-
clear resources to military purposes. Nuclear reac-
tors which produce electrical power are now in
operation or under construction in 51 countries.
These reactors produce a complicating byproduct
— Plutonium, a fissionable material which can be
chemically separated and used in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons.
Although most countries have openly expressed a
reluctance to undertake the economic, military, and
political consequences of acquiring nuclear weapons,
pressure to do so can arise from suspicions that
neighbor or rival states might clandestinely produce
them. If such suspicions can be dispelled, an impor-
tant incentive for nuclear proliferation will be re-
moved. A system of international safeguards, such
as that developed by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), provides the most effective
assurance that peaceful nuclear programs are truly
peaceful. To underline its own conviction that this
is so, the United States is transferring its bilateral
agreements to the jurisdiction of the international
agency. In addition, we have recommended that all
non-nuclear-weapon states accept IAEA safeguards
or an equivalent system on their nuclear activities,
so as to assure their neighbors that they are not
secretly developing nuclear weapons, and to receive
like assurance in return.
The United States — even though a nuclear power
— has voluntarily placed several of its reactors un-
der IAEA safeguards in order to show its strong
support for the system and to prove that the inspec-
tion procedures are not burdensome or intrusive.
The United Kingdom has followed the U.S. example.
In order to offset an apparent imbalance, which
some of the non-nuclear-weapon states have felt to
be unjust, the United States proposed (on July 28
at the ENDC)" that all states undertake not to
export any source or fissionable material or spe-
cialized equipment to any other state for peaceful
purposes except under IAEA or equivalent interna-
tional safeguards. Thus, in the transfer of fission-
able materials and equipment between states, the
nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon
states receive like treatment in the control of inter-
national traffic in nuclear materials.
The question of international safeguards was dis-
cussed further at the United Nations 21st General
Assembly. In a statement to the First Committee on
November 9," Mr. Foster commended the several
proposals, made during the annual General Confer-
ence of the IAEA held in Vienna in October, to
widen the coverage of IAEA safeguards, including
" Ibid., Aug. 22, 1966, p. 281.
■^ Ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 930.
that made by Norway that a state not producing
nuclear weapons invite the IAEA to safeguard its
entire nuclear program. In welcoming this proposal,
Mr. Foster pointed out that it would "go a long way
toward reducing the grave threat of nuclear prolif-
eration." He also called attention — as worthy of
serious consideration — to the offer made by Poland
and Czechoslovakia at the IAEA Conference to place
their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards pro-
vided the Federal Republic of Germany did the same.
Czechoslovakia is completing its first power reactor;
Poland, which operates three research reactors, does
not plan to build a power reactor until sometime
in the 1970's. Mr. Foster pointed out that while the
Federal Republic of Germany (which has 28 re-
search reactors and 12 power reactors in operation,
under construction or planned) already has placed
its activities under European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOM) safeguards, the West Ger-
mans were themselves "giving the proposal serious
consideration, as evidenced by the statement issued
on 26 October by the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany."
On November 22, the Director-General of the
IAEA, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, addressed the U.N.
General Assembly. He traced the phenomenal
growth of nuclear energy as a source of electrical
power and forecast the remarkable ways in which
developing countries can use nuclear science to help
solve such serious problems as the growing gap be-
tween the world's population and its food and water
supplies. But he also warned that the growth and
spread of nuclear power represented a potential
threat if measures were not taken to insure that its
use is limited to peaceful activities. He reported on
the progress made since the IAEA safeguards sys-
tem was first adopted in 1961 — progress in expanded
application and in acceptance by additional coun-
tries. He cited as particularly encouraging the pro-
posal made by Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Security Guarantees to Non- Nuclear- Weapon
States
The question of assurance of another kind was
also introduced in both the ENDC and U.N. discus-
sions: that of some form of guarantee for the se-
curity of non-nuclear-weapon states who commit
themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons. In his
message to the opening of the Geneva conference on
January 27 President Johnson reaffirmed his pledge
that "nations that do not seek the nuclear path
can be sure that they will have our strong support
against threats of nuclear blackmail." This pledge
has been reaffirmed on many occasions, most re-
cently by President Johnson when the Chinese Com-
munists exploded their fourth nuclear test during
his 1966 Asian journey. Soviet Premier [Aleksei N.]
Kosygin offered to include a clause in the U.S.S.R.'s
original draft treaty "prohibiting the use of nuclear
572
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
■weapons against non-nuclear Powers parties to the
treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their ter-
ritory." No amendment was offered by the Soviet
(delegate, however, during the 1966 sessions of the
■Geneva conference. Western delegations, particularly
the Canadian, questioned how the concept of effec-
tive nuclear guarantees could be incorporated in a
non-proliferation treaty. The non-aligned members
of the ENDC found both President Johnson's state-
ment and the Kosygin proposal attractive and sug-
gested that the question be explored further.
The 21st U.N. General Assembly remanded the
question of non-proliferation to the ENDC in a
resolution drafted by the eight non-aligned members
of the Committee." This resolution (adopted by a
vote of 97 to 2, with 3 abstentions) contained an
operative paragraph dealing with security guaran-
tees for non-nuclear-weapon states which do not
possess nuclear weapons (i.e., the Kosygin proposal)
and any other proposals for solving this problem.
Although voting for the resolution itself, the United
States abstained from voting on this operative
paragraph on the grounds that it cited a specific
non-use formula for ENDC consideration while fail-
ing to give similar treatment to other suggestions
which had been made for dealing with the problem
of assistance to a non-nuclear victim of nuclear
threats or aggrression.
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes
At Geneva, on August 9, ACDA Deputy Director
Adrian S. Fisher raised a question about the draft
treaties to which little attention had been previously
directed.'^ He pointed out that a non-proliferation
treaty would not be completely effective if it per-
mitted the development of nuclear-explosive devices
for any purpose, however innocently intended for
peaceful use they might be. The "inescapable tech-
nological fact," he pointed out, is that a nuclear-
I explosive device intended for peaceful purposes can
be used as a weapon or can be easily adapted for
military use; the technology of making nuclear-
explosive devices for peaceful purposes is essentially
the same as that for making nuclear weapons.
As a means of resolving the dilemma posed by
a prohibition on peaceful explosions by non-nuclear
states, the United States suggested that "if and
when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives
that are permissible under test ban treaty limita-
tions prove technically and economically feasible,
nuclear-weapon states should make available to other
states nuclear explosive services for peaceful appli-
cations." A nuclear-weapon state would provide the
desired nuclear detonation under appropriate inter-
national observation, with the nuclear device re-
' Ibid., p. 936.
' Ibid., Sept. 5, 1966, p. 351.
maining in the custody and under the control of the
country performing the service. Such a service, Mr.
Fisher suggested, could be provided at a cost to the
recipient state far below that at which they could
develop and produce such devices for themselves.
Canada, rich in nuclear knowledge and natural
resources requiring development, nevertheless
promptly disclaimed "any intention to develop its
own capacity to conduct peaceful nuclear explo-
sions."
The Canadian delegate supported the U.S. pro-
posal, saying:
In our view, the development by a non-nuclear-
weapon State of the capacity to conduct a nuclear
explosion even though it is designed for peaceful
purposes would, in effect, constitute proliferation,
and proliferation is a development to which the
Canadian Government has repeatedly declared its
opposition.
In addition to the proliferation aspect, he pointed
out the tremendous cost in terms of resources and
manpower which would be involved in developing
a nuclear device to carry out an explosion for peace-
ful purposes.
Balanced Obligations
Throughout the discussions in both the ENDC
and the U.N. General Assembly, delegates repre-
senting non-nuclear-weapon states expressed their
conviction that "a non-proliferation treaty should be
coupled with, or followed by, tangible steps to halt
the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce, and
eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the
means of their delivery." This concept was formally
presented by the non-aligned eight in a memoran-
dum to the ENDC during the 1965 session and was
reiterated in their memorandum of August 19, 1966.
With respect to the treaty itself, both the United
States and the Soviet Union take the position that
it should be a simple undertaking on the part of
nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear
weapons to states not now possessing them, and a
corresponding commitment on the part of non-
nuclear-weapon states not to acquire them. The
feeling on both sides appeared to be that the pros-
pects for agreement should not be jeopardized by
the complications of additional arms control meas-
ures.
The United States has long recognized, however,
that other measures must be diligently pursued to
control and reduce the dangers of the nuclear arms
race. It views a non-proliferation treaty as the
logical next step. Once agreement is reached, the
way will be paved for further agreements. The
United States believes that in addition to calling on
non-nuclear-weapon states to give up the option of
acquiring nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon states
should take positive action to curb their own nu-
clear arsenals. It has tabled a number of proposals
APRIL 3, 1967
573
to this end — the extension of the test ban treaty, a
cutoff in fissionable materials production, a "freeze"
on the numbers of offensive and defensive missiles.
Extension of the Limited Test Ban
The U.S. proposal to extend the limited test ban,
(which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere,
under water, or in outer space) '^ to underground
tests is important to the control of proliferation.
The primary obstacle to reaching agreement has
been the inability to agree with the Soviet Union
about what constitutes adequate verification.
In the arms control context, the term "verifica-
tion" refers to the process by which a nation as-
sures itself that its security is not being jeopardized
as a result of another nation's violations of an
agreement. Without adequate verification, mutual
suspicions vsdll tend to grow to the point where
failure of the agreement is likely. The Soviet Union
remains adamant in its refusal to permit inspection
on its territory.
The science of seismology has advanced to the
point where larger seismic events — those which reg-
ister 4.75 or above on the Richter magnitude scale
— can usually be identified by instruments outside
the country as either earthquakes or man-made ex-
plosions. Despite recent technological improvements,
however, difficulty still arises with the smaller seis-
mic events, most of which can be detected but not
identified with a sufficiently high degree of confi-
dence.
The idea of extending the limited test ban treaty
to cover underground tests above a certain "thresh-
old" was first advanced by the Brazilian delegate,
in 1963, who suggested a seismic magnitude of 4.75,
and has been favorably regarded by other ENDC
members since. At the 1965 session of the ENDC,
the United Arab Republic renewed its previous pro-
posals for a 4.75 threshold, a moratorium on all
other tests, and scientific and technical discussions
on problems of detection and identification. The
United States rejected this idea on the grounds
that it would constitute, in effect, an uninspected
test ban. Variations on the "threshold" concept were
discussed by ENDC members during the 1966 ses-
sion.
Two conferences held outside the ENDC provided
topics for discussion of a test ban. At a conference
of non-nuclear powers in Sweden it was agreed to
set up a "nuclear detection club" for the exchange
of seismic information. At a meeting in Scar-
borough, Canada," a proposal was made for a sus-
pension, for a trial period, of all nuclear tests. The
suspension would be policed by a system of "verifi-
cation by challenge." Under this procedure, a coun-
try suspecting another country of conducting a test
would ask the latter to supply information on the
suspicious event. If the challenged country did not
574
provide a satisfactory explanation, and did not per-
mit inspection, the challenging country could with-
draw from the undertaking not to test.
The desire to find a way out of the verification
impasse was felt very strongly by the non-aligned
members of the ENDC, and this desire was shared
wholeheartedly by the United States. The various
ideas and suggestions put forth for a solution are
appealing, and the United States has given the
most careful consideration to them. U.S. negotiators
have pointed out, however, that these various ap-
proaches leave many problems unsolved.
The United States has spent large sums in re-
search in an effort to improve techniques for seis-
mic detection and identification. Improvements in
capabilities have been achieved, but there still re-
mains a level at which the United States believes
militarily significant nuclear tests can be carried
out underground without being identified as such
by national means alone; it has therefore continued
to insist that some on-site inspection is necessary
to police a comprehensive test ban.
The technical facts as set forth by the United
States have been generally accepted. But it has
been argued that they lead directly to a political
question; namely, how much risk can be tolerated
in relying on instruments alone to determine if
nuclear-weapons tests are taking place. It is the
U.S. position that banning underground tests with-
out adequate verification is not consistent with U.S.
security interests; that in addition the occurrence
of unresolved suspicious events wiU generate mis-
trust and new tensions. The "challenge" idea, at-
tractive in many ways, raises just such questions.
In a statement to the E'NDC on April 4, Mr. Fisher
predicted that frustrations would result from the
refusal of a challenged country to furnish satisfac-
tory information. In any case, the Soviet representa-
tive flatly rejected this idea on the last day of the
ENDC session. "The proposal to control the ban-
ning of such tests on the basis of 'verification by
challenge or invitation,' " he said, "is quite unac-
ceptable to the Soviet Union. . . ."
Cutoff of Fissionable IMaterials Production
Another U.S. proposal directed towards curbing!
the arms race calls for a verified cutoff of fission-
able materials production for use in weapons, and
a transfer of agreed quantities of fissionable mate-
rials to peaceful purposes. To make this measure
'« For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.
" Sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, The Institute for Strategic Studies,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and
the American Assembly of Columbia University —
June 23-26, 1966. [Footnote in original.]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
even more attractive, the United States has also
proposed that the materials for transfer be obtained
by the verified destruction of several thousand nu-
clear weapons.
On August 11, Mr. Fisher presented to the ENDC
a method for monitoring a shutdown reactor — an
important feature of an agreement on a verified
halt of the production of fissionable material for
weapons use.
The U.S. Government had sought to develop an
effective inspection method which would be as unin-
trusive as possible. It utilizes a "passive" device —
one which has no moving parts or electronics which
might be subject to malfunction, which makes no
permanent attachments to impair the future use of
the facility, and which can remain undisturbed in
place on a shutdown plant until removed for an
inspection. The neutrons generated in the core of
an operating reactor can be detected and measured
by means of a material which captures neutrons.
The monitoring device consists of wires containing
natural cobalt. The wires are placed in a tube, which
is then rolled flat. They thus take on a unique con-
figuration inside this "safing tape," and this "finger-
print" is X-rayed before the tape goes into the
reactor. The tape is then sealed by an ingeniously
devised plastic cap into which pieces of metal shav-
ings have been mixed at random. Photog:raphs are
made of this second "fingerprint." The reactor can-
not then be operated in violation of an agreement
without activating the telltale cobalt inside; the
outside seal cannot be disturbed without altering
the fingerprint. Inspections need not occur with an-
noying frequency, and can be scheduled in advance.
On November 16, 1966, this method for policing
the "cutoff" measure was demonstrated on a shut-
down reactor at the Atomic Energy Commission's
Hanford Plant, near Richland, Washington. U.N.
General Assembly delegates and advisors from 51
countries and several international organizations
witnessed the demonstration as guests of the U.S.
Government.
Freeze on Offensive and Defensive iVIissiles
In his seven-point message to the ENDC on Janu-
ary 27, President Johnson renewed his proposal for
a freeze on the numbers and characteristics of of-
fensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles (SNDVs). He stated that if progress were
made on the freeze, the United States would then be
prepared to explore the possibility of sig^nificant
reductions in the number of these delivery vehicles.
The "freeze" was first proposed in 1964. The U.S.
Representative reminded the ENDC that had this
proposal been accepted and implemented then, the
subsequent substantial increases in SNDV inven-
tories of the United States and the Soviet Union
would not have taken place."
In Geneva on August 16, U.S. Delegate Fisher
outlined the U.S. rationale for inclusion of anti-
ballistic missiles in a freeze proposal.
He noted that the strategic stability which exists
today depends on the knowledge that each side has
the ability to inflict unacceptable damage and cas-
ualties on the other in retaliation for an initial
attack. If a freeze were put into effect on offensive
forces alone, this strategic balance could be upset
by the deployment of an improved defensive system
by one of the adversaries. Such a shift in the mili-
tary balance would force the other side to under-
take counteractions, such as the parallel deployment
of an anti-ballistic missile system, increased offen-
sive deployment, or the introduction of new or im-
proved weapons capable of penetrating or bypassing
ballistic-missile defenses. The resulting arms race
would be self-defeating. Higher and higher destruc-
tive potentials would be reached, and, despite the
presence of defensive systems costing billions of dol-
lars or rubles, casualties would still reach fantas-
tically high levels if nuclear war should occur.
Secretary of State Rusk underlined the U.S. con-
cern in his press conference December 21.'' "We
would regret very much," he said, "the lifting of
the arms race to an entirely new plateau of major
expenditures . . . with perhaps no perceptible result
in the total strategic situation."
Nuclear-Free Zones
The United States is strongly in favor of the
establishment of nuclear-free zones where the initia-
tive for such zones originates within the area con-
cerned; where the zone includes all states in the
area whose participation is deemed important;
where the creation of a zone would not disturb
necessary security arrangements; and where pro-
visions are included for following up on alleged
violations in order to give reasonable assurance of
compliance with the zone.
Under these criteria, the United States is pre-
cluded from accepting the proposal to make Central
Europe a nuclear-free zone, but for such areas as
Africa and Latin America, the idea has met with
the full support of the United States. The most
notable example of a successful agreement to insure
that a geographical area will be free of nuclear
weapons (and other weapons as well) is the 1959
Antarctica Treaty.
An active attempt to make Latin America a
nuclear-free zone has been going on since 1962,
when Brazil first introduced the idea to the 17th
■' For a U.S. statement of Aug. 2, 1966, see Bul-
letin of Aug. 29, 1966, p. 317.
" Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 43.
APRIL 3, 1967
575
U.N. General Assembly. The following year five
Latin American Presidents joined in proposing a
Latin American nuclear-free zone, and with the
blessing of the 18th U.N. General Assembly, a Pre-
paratory Commission for the Denuclearization of
Latin America was established. The Commission,
after a series of working meetings, has drawn up
a draft treaty and is scheduled to meet again Janu-
ary 31, 1967.^° Although differences remain in the
positions of some of the members of the Commission
with respect to the provisions of the treaty, a com-
promise is thought to be possible. In any case, the
United States regards the initiative of the Latin
American countries as an outstanding example of
regional activity to limit and control armaments,
and has formally conveyed its full support to the
Commission.
Controlling Conventional Weapons
Although the discussions at the ENDC and the
U.N. General Assembly centered mainly on halting
and turning back the nuclear arms race, attention
was also given to the problem of controlling con-
ventional armaments. The seventh point of the
President's message of January 27 to the ENDC
presented an approach for progrress in this area,
in suggesting that countries, on a regional basis,
explore ways to limit competition among themselves
for costly weapons often sought for reasons of il-
lusory prestige. He stated that if "arrangements
can be worked out and assurance can be given that
they will be observed, the United States stands
ready to respect them."
Elaborating on this matter in a statement to the
ENDC on April 19, ACDA Director Foster sug-
gested six principles as possible guidelines for the
control of conventional arms: that the affected coun-
tries not acquire military equipment which they
agree to regulate; that the initiative come from
within the region concerned; that any arrangement
include all states in that region whose participation
is deemed Important by the other participants; that
potential suppliers respect the restrictions agreed
to; that arrangements contribute to the security of
the states concerned and to the maintenance of a
stable military balance; and, lastly, that provision
be made for satisfying all interested parties that
the arrangement is being respected.
There are many diflficulties involved, but the
United States has offered full cooperation in imple-
menting regional arms control arrangements. Re-
gional agreements to control armaments will en-
hance security by reducing tensions, permitting
constructive utilization of economic resources, and
contributing to the ultimate achievement of general
disarmament.
ACDA has worked in close coordination with the
«' For background, see ibid.. Max. 13, 1967, p. 436.
Department of State in seeking ways to bring dip-
lomatic influence to bear on the policies of foreign
nations with respect to the acquisition of "prestige"
armaments. Discussions are continuing among U.S.
officials and Latin American members of the Orga-
nization of American States. This question will
probably be one of the major items to be included
on the agenda of the summit meeting of Latin
American Presidents which is scheduled to take
place in the spring of 1967. It is hoped that the
heads of the states represented at the conference
will declare their intention not to acquire certain
types of sophisticated military equipment.
General and Complete Disarmament
In 1962, at the opening of the Eighteen Nation
Disarmament Committee, both the United States
and the Soviet Union tabled plans for general and
complete disarmament. These plans have in common,
as agreed in advance by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
a plan for a three-stage process of disarmament, to
be carried out under effective controls. There the
similarity begins to break down. The U.S. plan calls
for balanced reductions, across the board by per-
centages, for all armaments and forces; the Soviet
plan advocates immediate elimination, in the first
stage of the disarmament process, of all nuclear
delivery vehicles, with the exception of a "nuclear
umbrella," to be retained by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union until the end of the third stage.
The Soviet "nuclear umbrella," as first proposed
by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1962, was
vaguely described as a "strictly limited" quantity
of intercontinental missiles, antiballistic missiles
and antiaircraft missiles, to be kept until the end
of the second stage on the territories of the two
countries. In September 1963 this was amended to
"the end of the third stage." The Soviet draft does
not provide for adequate verification; it provides
only for inspection of the missiles at announced
launching pads.
In the first year of the conference, an agenda was
set up for discussion of stage I, and the Committee
has worked on this ever since. The agenda includes
discussion of nuclear delivery vehicles, conventional
arms, nuclear disarmament, military bases, armed
force levels, military expenditures, outer space
measures, peacekeeping machinery, measures to re-
duce the risk of war, transition from first to second
stages, and establishment of an International Dis-
armament Organization.
During the 1966 session, the United States sug-
gested to the Committee that the principal reason
for failure to make progress on the stage I agenda
item covering nuclear delivery vehicles lay in the
Soviet refusal to permit the establishment of a
working group, or even to elaborate on their "nu-
clear umbrella" proposal until ENDC accepted the
concept "in principle."
576
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.N. Resolution on Chemical
and Biological Warfare
On December 5, 1966, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted, with the support of the United States, a
resolution which calls on all nations to observe the
principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of
1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of As-
phyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The United
States, although not a party to the Geneva Proto-
col, has always observed the principles and objec-
tives which the Protocol sought to achieve, and
joined 90 other countries in voting for this resolu-
tion.
U.S. policy with regard to the use of chemical
and bacteriological weapons in the conduct of war-
fare was clearly recorded before the vote. "We have
repeatedly endeavoured to find adequate means to
attain those objectives (of the Protocol)," said the
U.S. Representative. "We have never used biological
weapons of any kind, bacteriological or otherwise."
He pointed out that the Protocol does not apply to
all gases: "It would be unreasonable to contend
that any rule of international law prohibits the use
in combat against an enemy, for humanitarian pur-
poses, of agents that Governments around the world
commonly use to control riots by their own people.
Similarly, the Protocol does not apply to herbicides,
which involve the same chemicals and have the same
effects as those used domestically in the United
States, the Soviet Union and many other countries
to control weeds and other unwanted vegetation."
Treaty on Outer Space and Celestial Bodies
On December 8, 1966, President Johnson con-
firmed that agreement had been reached on the
Outer Space Treaty, characterizing it as "the most
important arms control development since the
limited test ban treaty of 1963." "
The treaty forbids the placing of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space or on celestial bodies and
places additional restrictions on military activities
on the moon and other celestial bodies. In order to
allow verification of these restrictions, open access
to all areas on celestial bodies is guaranteed. The
treaty also contains a number of general principles
designed to establish a legal regime in outer space.
The treaty had its genesis in the U.N. resolution
banning bombs in orbit which was passed unani-
mously in October 1963, the Declaration of Legal
Principles for Outer Space Exploration passed in
December 1963, and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,
which reserves the Antarctic for exclusively peaceful
activity.
Negotiations on the treaty were conducted in the
Legal Subcommittee of the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. These negotiations
started in Geneva on July 12, 1966, and were com-
pleted in New York at the United Nations. On De-
cember 19 the U.N. General Assembly adopted by
acclamation Resolution 2222, endorsing this historic
agreement.^
The substance of the arms control provisions is
in article IV. This article restricts military activi-
ties in two ways:
First, it contains an undertaking not to place in
orbit around the earth, install on the moon or any
other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer
space nuclear or any other weapons of mass de-
struction.
iSecond, it limits the use of the moon and other
celestial bodies exclusively to peaceful purposes, and
expressly prohibits their use for establishing mili-
tary bases, installations or fortification; testing
weapons of any kind ; or conducting military maneu-
vers.
Among the other more important principles estab-
lished by the treaty are:
There shall be freedom of exploration and use of
outer space and celestial bodies for all States on a
basis of equality.
Claims of sovereignty and national appropriation
are barred.
There shall be unconditional obligation to help
and to return astronauts promptly and safely if
they land elsewhere than planned, and to exchange
information relating to astronaut safety.
The treaty will be signed for the United States
at the White House on January 27, 1967, in the
name of the President by the Secretary of State
and the United States Ambassador to the United
Nations.
'^ For President Johnson's statement of Dec. 9,
1966, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.
" For U.S. statements and text of the resolution,
see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
APRIL 3, 1967
577
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences*
Scheduled April Through June 1967
Inter- American Children's Institute: 47th Meeting of the Managua .... Apr. 3-6
Directing Council.
IMCO Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 5th London Apr. 3-7
Session.
FAO Ad Hoc Conference on the Control of Olive Pests: 7th Turkey Apr. 3-7
Session.
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law: Rome Apr. 3-8
Special Committee of Experts.
U.N. Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression . . New York .... Apr. 3-10
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee for the International Con- New York .... Apr. 3-10
ference on Human Rights.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 23d Tokyo Apr. 3-17
Plenary Session.
World Meteorological Organization: 5th Congress .... Geneva Apr. 3-28
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Annual Meeting San Jose Apr. 4-7
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to New York .... Apr. 4-19
Trade: 2d Session.
ICAO All- Weather Operations Panel: 3d Meeting .... Montreal Apr. 4-21
OECD Working Party on Short-Term Forecasts Paris Apr. 5-6
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris Apr. 5-6
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on UNCTAD Com- Paris Apr. 6-7
modities.
U.N. Working Group of Committee on Tungsten New York .... Apr. 6-12
NATO Industrial Planning Committee Paris Apr. 7 (1 day)
Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 6th Annual Rio de Janeiro . . . Apr. 9-16
Meeting of Board of Directors and 12th Meeting of Tech-
nical Advisory Council.
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Intergovem- San Jose Apr. 10-12
mental Meeting.
FAO/ECE Codex Alimentarius Group on Standardization of Geneva Apr. 10-14
Fruit Juices.
IMCO Subcommittee on Navigation: 2d Session London Apr. 10-14
FAO Working Party on Fishery Statistics in North Atlantic Aberdeen .... Apr. 10-15
Area: 5th Session.
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Offi ce of International Conferences on March 15, 1967,
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the
period April-June 1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meet-
ings. Persons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, com-
piled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Treaty;
BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio
Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council;
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration;
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization;
ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization;
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations
Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postel Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World
Meteorological Organization.
578 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.N. Industrial Development Organization Board ....
Economic Commission for Europe: 22d Plenary Session . .
OECD Maritime Transport Committee
Meeting of American Chiefs of State
FAO/U.N. Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food
Program: 11th Session.
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Standing Com-
ITU/CC'lR Study Group XIII
ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group: 3d Meeting .
International Coffee Organization: High-Level Working
Group.
NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping
9th International Hydrographic Conference
OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel . .
SEATO Council: 12th Session
U.N. General Assembly: 5th Special Session
ANZUS Council: 16th Session
Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank :
8th Meeting.
FAO Committee on Fisheries: 2d Session
ECAFE Expert Group for Technical Study of Draft Con-
vention on Road Traffic and Road Signs and Signals.
UNESCO Executive Board: 76th Session
CENTO Council at Ministerial Level: 15th Ses.sion ....
PAHO Executive Committee: 56th Meeting
WHO Governing Council: 3d Session of International Agency
for Research on Cancer.
OECD Special Committee for Oil
20th International Film Festival
U.N. Committee on Friendly Relations
ILO Technical Meeting of Experts on Organization and
Planning of Vocational Training.
11th Meeting of Consultation of American Ministers of
Foreign Affairs: 3d Session.
FAO Study Group on Grains: 11th Session
OECD Agriculture Committee
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and
Technology to Development: 7th Session.
ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination ....
WHO Executive Committee: 19th Session
International Coffee Council
Economic Commission for Latin America: 12th Session . .
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: Special Committee
on Enforcement.
ICEM Budget and Finance Committee: 15th Session ....
FAO Near East Plant Protection Commission: 2d Session .
ITU Administrative Council: 22d Session
World Health Organization: 20th Assembly
Economic and Social Council: 42d Session
U.N. International Lav/ Commission: 19th Session ....
ICEM Executive Committee: 29th Session
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee
Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 5th Annual Meeting
UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st
Session (resumed).
International Rubber Study Group: 81st Meeting
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 2d Session ....
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party on Government
Procurement.
NATO Food and Agricultural Planning Committee ....
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by
Sea: 11th Session.
ICEM Council: 27th Session
UPU Executive Council
12th Diplomatic Conference on International Maritime Law
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems:
6th Session.
New York .
Geneva . .
Paris . . .
Punta del Este
Rome . . .
Paris . . .
New York .
Geneva . .
Paris . . .
London . .
London . .
Monte Carlo
Paris . . .
Washington
New York .
Washington
Washington
Rome .
Bangkok
Paris .
London
Washingto:
Lyons .
Paris .
Cannes
Geneva
Geneva
Montevideo
Rome . .
Paris . .
Paris . .
New York
New York
Geneva
London
Caracas
Paris .
Geneva
Tripoli
Geneva
Geneva
New York
Geneva
Geneva
Paris .
Paris .
Geneva
The Hague
Geneva
Paris .
Paris .
London
Geneva
Bern .
Brussels
London
Apr. 10-28
Apr. 11-29
Apr. 12 (1 day)
Apr. 12-14
Apr. 12-21
Apr. 13 (1 day)
Apr. 13-14
Apr. 17-28
Apr. 17-29
Apr. 17-29
Apr. 18-20
Apr. 18-May 3
Apr. 19-21
Apr. 19-21
Apr. 21-
Apr.
Apr.
21-22
24-28
Apr. 24-29
Apr. 24r-May 3
Apr. 24-May 12
Apr. 25-26
Apr. 26-May 5
Apr. 27-28
Apr. 27-28
Apr. 27-May 12
April
April
April
April
April
April
May 1-5
May 1-5
May 1-5
May 1-12
May 2-13
May 5-6
May
May
6-8
6-13
May 6-27
May 8-27
May 8-June 2
May 8-July 14
May 9-12
May 9-12
May 9-12
May 9-12
May 9-12
May 9-26
May 10-12
May 11-12
May 15-19
May 15-19
May 16-26
May 16-27
May 22-26
APRIL 3, 1967
579
Calendar of International Conferences — Continued
Scheduled April Through June 1967 — Continued
UNHCR Executive Committee: 17th Session
ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning ....
OECD Fiscal Committee
International Conference on Water for Peace
NATO Civil Defense Committee
ILO Governing Body: 169th Session
WHO Executive Board: 40th Session
IMCO Working Group on Fire Test Procedures
Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special
Commission on Divorce.
OECD Economic Policy Committee
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee ....
U.N. Committee of 24 on Independence to Colonial Countries
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 34th Session
ECAFE Asian Highway Coordinating Committee: 3d Session
FAO/WHO Committee of Experts on the Code of Principles
for Milk and Milk Products.
UNESCO Coordinating Council for International Hydrolog-
ical Decade: 3d Session.
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 26th Plenary Meet-
ing.
Inter-American Committee for Cultural Action
OECD I*ulp and Paper Committee
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . .
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:
17th Meeting.
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 3d Session
ECOSOC Committee for Progrram and Coordination . . .
ECOSOC Committee for Industrial Development: 7th Session
European Civil Aviation Conference: 6th Meeting ....
U.N. Development Program Governing Council: 4th Session
International Labor Organization: 51st Conference ....
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on
Food Hygiene.
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget: Program
Committee and Executive Board.
FAO Council: 48th Session
FAO World Scientific Conference on Biology and Culture of
Shrimps and Prawns.
BIRPI Diplomatic Conference for the Revision of the Con-
vention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property
and the Berne Copyright Convention.
IMCO Council: 18th Session
ECE Conference of European Statisticians
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on
Processed Fruits and Vegetables.
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Trans-
port.
Berlin International Film Festival
International Whaling Commission: 19th Meeting ....
Inter- American Economic and Social Council: 5th Annual
Meetings at the Ministerial and Expert Level.
IAEA Board of Governors
FAO Study Group on Rice: Steering Committee
International Cotton Institute: 2d General Assembly . . .
OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees . . .
NATO Ministerial Council
FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 9th Meeting of Ex-
ecutive Committee.
Inter- American Conference of Ministers of Labor: 2d Meet-
ing of the Permanent Technical Advisory Committee on
Labor Affairs.
FAO Working Party on Pest Resistance to Pesticides . . .
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee: Plenary
Session.
Geneva May 22-30
Geneva May 23-26
Paris May 23-26
Washington . . . May 23-31
Paris May 25-26
Geneva May 26 and June
Geneva May 29-30
London May 29-June 2
The Hague .... May 29-June 9
Paris May 31-June 1
Paris May 31-June 2
New York .... May
New York .... May
Kabul May
Rome May
Paris May
Netherlands . . . May
Mexico May or June
Paris June 1-2
Paris June 2 (1 day)
Boston June 5-10
London June 5-12
New York .... June 5-16
New York .... June 5-23
Strasbourg .... June 6-7
Geneva June 6-23
Geneva June 7-29
Paris June 8-9
Washington . . . June 12-16
New York
Rome . . .
Mexico City
Stockholm .
June 12-22
June 12-23
June 12-24
June 12-July 15
London June 19-21
Geneva June 19-23
Washington .... June 19-23
Paris June 20-22
Berlin June 23-July 4
London .... June 27-July 1
Viiia del Mar . . . June 30-July 13
Vienna June
Rome June
Antwerp June
Paris June
Luxembourg . . . June
Rome June
Viiia del Mar
June
Rome June
Paris June
580
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Brazil Sign
Income Tax Convention
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Press release 57 dated M&rch 14
U.S. Ambassador John W. Tuthill, Bra-
zilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Juracy
]\Iagalhaes, and Brazilian Minister of Finance
Octavio Gouvea de Bulhoes signed an income
tax convention between the two countries at
Rio de Janeiro on March 13. The convention
follows in broad outline the pattern of tax
conventions already in effect between the
United States and other foreign countries.
The convention describes general rules of
taxation and specifies the manner of relief
from double taxation and the rules deter-
mining the source of income. It also sets
forth maximum withholding rates applicable
with respect to certain types of income and
special rules covering personal income of
aliens. In addition, the convention contains
an article providing that the United States
shall allow a tax credit for investment in
Brazil under certain circumstances. Further
details on the convention are provided in a
press release issued by the U.S. Treasury
Department.
The convention, which will be transmitted
to the Senate for advice and consent to rati-
fication, will have effect for taxable years be-
ginning on or after the first day of January
of the year following the exchange of instru-
ments of ratification.
TREASURY ANNOUNCEMENT
The Treasury Department announced on
March 14 that the income tax convention be-
tween the United States and Brazil includes
the following provisions:
Allowance of a 7 percent investment tax
credit for investment in machinery and equip-
ment in Brazil by U.S. firms. The credit is
modeled after the investment tax credit
applicable under the United States Internal
Revenue Code.
The investment tax credit would be allowed
under the same conditions as those applicable
to the domestic investment tax credit. Con-
sequently, this aspect of the treaty would
apply only when the domestic credit is opera-
tive in the United States.
The treaty limits Brazilian withholding tax
to 20 percent on dividends flowing to the
United States from direct investment in Bra-
zil.
The Brazilian withholding tax on interest
paid to financial institutions in the United
States and on royalties paid to U.S. licensors
is limited to 15 percent.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, September 28 through
November 30, 1962. Entered into force December
27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Honduras, January 20, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter-
national waterborne transportation, with annex.
Signed at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963.'
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.^
Ratified by the President: March 9, 1967.
Organization of American States
Charter of the Organization of American States.
Signed at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into
force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, March 13, 1967.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions
at sea. Approved by the International Conference
^ Not in force.
^ Not in force for the United States.
APRIL 3, 1967
581
on Safety of Life at Sea, London May 17-June
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Australia, January 13,
1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.'
Accession deposited: Maldive Islands, February
28, 1967.
BILATERAL
Beigium
Agreement amending Annex B of the mutual de-
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1960
(TIAS 2010). Effected by exchange of notes at
Brussels February 2 and 22, 1967. Entered into
force February 22, 1967.
Gliana
Agreement supplementing the agreement of Septem-
ber 30, 1958 (TIAS 4121), relating to investment
guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at
Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into force March
3, 1967.
Agrreement for sales of agricultural commodities
* Not in force for the United States.
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex.
Signed at Accra March 3, 1967. Entered into
force March 3, 1967.
Korea
Agreement regarding the status of the Korean
Service Corps, with agreed understandings. Signed
at Seoul February 23, 1967.
Entered into force: March 10, 1967.
Lcsotiio
Agreement relating to investment g^uaranties. Signed
at Maseru February 24, 1967. Enters into force
on the date of notification from the Government
of Lesotho that agreement has been approved
in conformity with constitutional procedures.
Netlieriands
Additional agreement to the agreement of May 17,
1949 (TIAS 1946), for financing certain educa-
tional and cultural programs. Effected by ex-
change of notes at The Hague June 22, 1966.
Entry into force: February 28, 1967; effective
January 1, 1965.
United Kingdom
Agreement amending the agreement of May 10, 1966
(TIAS 5806), for financing certain programs of
educational and cultural exchange. Effected by
exchange of notes at London February 16, 1967.
Entered into force February 16, 1967.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1449 PUBLICATION 8222 APRIL 3, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Serrices, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
582
INDEX April 3, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1U9
Albania. Department Issues Public Notices on
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register
entries) 564
Asia. Asian Development Bank Immunities De-
fined (Executive order) 563
Brazil. United States and Brazil Sign Income
Tax Convention 581
Canada. St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain
at Present Levels 554
Congress
The Latin American Summit Meeting (Presi-
dent's message to Congress) 540
1966 International Negotiations for Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament (President's letter of
transmittal and excerpt from ACDA's sixth
annual report to Congress) ....... 568
President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet
Consular Pact (Johnson) 545
U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965
(Johnson) 566
Cuba. Department Issues Public Notices on
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register
entries) 564
Department and Foreign Service. The Defense
of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future of Free
Asia (Johnson) 534
Disarmament. 1966 International Negotiations
for Arms Control and Disarmament (Presi-
dent's letter of transmittal and excerpt from
ACDA's sixth annual report to Congress) . 568
Economic Affairs
Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined
(Executive order) 563
Cotton in the World Trade Arena (Solomon) 555
The Defense of Viet^Nam: Key to the Future
of Free Asia (Johnson) 534
St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at
Present Levels 554
United States and BrazU Sign Income Tax
Convention 581
U.S. Investment and Trade Mission Visits
Korea 554
United States Joins Dedication of Jidda De-
salting Plant Site (Udall) 561
Foreign Aid
The Latin American Summit Meeting (Presi-
dent's message to Congress) 540
20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine
(Johnson) 546
Greece. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doc-
trine (Johnson) 646
Guinea. Foreign Minister of Guinea Visits the
United States 554
International Organizations and Conferences
Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined
(Executive order) 563
Calendar of International Conferences .... 578
Korea
Department Issues Public Notices on Travel
to Restricted Areas (Federal Register en-
tries) 564
U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship
and Cooperation (Chung, Johnson) .... 548
U.S. Investment and 'Trade Mission Visits
Korea 554
Latin America. The Latin American Summit
Meeting (President's message to Congress) 540
Military Affairs. The Defense of Viet-Nam:
Key to the Future of Free Asia (Johnson) 534
Passports. Department Issues Public Notices on
Travel to Restricted Areas (Federal Register
entries) 564
Presidential Documents
Asian Development Bank Immunities Defined 663
The Defense of Viet-Nam: Key to the Future
of Free Asia 634
The Latin American Summit Meeting .... 640
1966 International Negotiations for Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament 668
President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet
Consular Pact 645
20th Anniversary of the Truman Doctrine . . 646
U.S. and Korea Pledge Continued Friendship
and Coopieration 648
U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965 . . 566
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference Held
at Philadelphia 665
Saudi Arabia. United States Joins Dedication
of Jidda Desalting Plant Site (Udall) ... 661
Trade. Cotton in the World Trade Arena
(Solomon) 555
Treaty Information
Current Actions 681
President Hails Senate Action on U.S.-Soviet
Consular Pact (Johnson) 645
St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls To Remain at Pres-
ent Levels 654
United States and Brazil Sign Income Tax
Convention 58I
U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1965
(Johnson) 666
Turkey. 20th Anniversary of the Truman Doc-
trine (Johnson) 645
U.S.S.R. President Hails Senate Action on
U.S.-Soviet Consular Pact (Johnson) . . . 645
United Nations. U.S. Participation in the U.N.
During 1965 (Johnson) 666
Viet-Nam
The Defense of Viet Nam: Key to the Future
of Free Asia (Johnson) 534
Department Issues Public Notices on Travel to
Restricted Areas (Federal Register entries) 564
Name Index
Chung, II Kwon 648
Johnson, President 534, 540, 545, 546,
548, 563, 566, 568
Solomon, Anthony M 555
Udall, Stewart L 661
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 13-19
Press releases may be obtained from the
Oflice of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to March 13 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
45 of March 6 and 53 of March 9.
No. Date Subject
56 3/13 St. Lawrence Seaway tolls.
57 3/14 Income taxconvention with Brazil
(rewrite) .
t58 3/16 Cotton textile agreement with
Poland.
59 3/17 Regional foreign policy confer-
ence, Philadelphia, Pa. (re-
write).
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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u.s. government printing office
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U50
April 10, 1967
U.S. AND VIETNAMESE LEADERS CONFER AT GUAM 586
SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG URGE SENATE
APPROVAL OF OUTER SPACE TREATY
Statements Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 600
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATION
ON VIET-NAM REJECTED BY HO CHI MINH
Department Statement and Texts of Letters 595
For index see inside hack cover
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam
BACKGROUND
President Johnson left Washington on
March 19 for Guam, where on March 20-21
he conferred with top Vietnamese and U.S.
officials on the situation in South Viet-Nam.
Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the Na-
tional Leadership Committee of the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam, and South Vietnamese
Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, who at-
tended the conference at the President's in-
vitation, brought with them a copy of the
new Vietnamese Constitution adopted by the
Constituent Assembly. The leaders of the
two Governments exchanged views on mili-
tary, political, and economic developments in
South Viet-Nam. A joint communique was
issued at the close of the meeting on March
21.
Included in the U.S. delegation were Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara; Director of
the Agency for International Development
William S. Gaud; Ambassador at Large W.
Averell Harriman; Ambassador at Large
Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador-designate to
Viet-Nam; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler; Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency Richard M.
Helms; Ambassador to Viet-Nam Henry
Cabot Lodge; Ambassador to Pakistan
Eugene M. Locke, Deputy-Ambassador-
designate to Viet-Nam; Special Assistant to
the President Robert W. Komer; Special
Assistant to the President W. W. Rostow;
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna-
tional Security Affairs John T. McNaughton;
Consultant to the President on Viet-Nam,
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor; the U.S. com-
mander in Viet-Najm, Gen. William C. West-
moreland; the commander of U.S. forces in
the Pacific, Adm. U. S. Grant Sharp; Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Leonard C. Unger, Co-
ordinator of the Interagency Viet-Nam Task
Force; and David E. Lilienthal, president of
the Development and Research Corp., New
York, N.Y.
ARRIVAL CEREMONIES, GUAM INTER-
NATIONAL AIRPORT, MARCH 20
Arrival of President Johnson
White HouBe press release (Guam) dated March 20
REMARKS BY GOV. MANUEL F. L. GUERRERO
Mr. President, your staff members, dis-
tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: For
Guam today is a moment of history. This is
an historic occasion, another milestone in
the annals of the histoiy of Guam.
Mr. President, we are very proud and
deeply honored that you have selected the
Territory of Guam as the site for this im-
portant conference.
Mr. President, we want you to know that
the people of Guam are 100 percent behind
your Viet-Nam policy.
Mr. President, we want you to know that
we are loyal and patriotic citizens. We
cherish and endear your leadership. We want
you to live long, for you have worked hard
for peace.
We welcome you to Guam, and we hope
that during your sojourn your stay will be
pleasant. Thank you.
586
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
RESPONSE BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
We have come to Guam to confer with
our military commanders, our diplomatic
representatives, and with those who are
helping to wage the peaceful campaign
against poverty and want in Viet-Nam.
We have come to meet once again the
leaders of South Viet-Nam, whose people
continue to bear the great burdens of a war
that they did not invite but which was thrust
upon them by Communist terror.
We will discuss the progress and the fu-
ture course of our military effort. We will
review our diplomatic initiatives. We will
try to estimate the chances of bringing
peace to Viet-Nam through an honorable set-
tlement.
Our new team of representatives in Saigon
— ^Ambassador Bunker, Ambassador Locke,
Mr. Komer — will be here with us, as will the
great patriot whom Mr. Bunker will succeed.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.
We chose Guam as the site of our meeting
for its convenience to those who are con-
ducting the military and peaceful develop-
ment campaign in Viet-Nam. But beyond
that consideration, there is a historical sig-
nificance to this island that stirs the mem-
ories of those who remember the dark hours
of World War II and which strengthens our
determination to persevere in Viet-Nam to-
day.
Guam knows a war in a way that no other
part of America knows it. It was the only
inhabited part of our nation to be occupied
by hostile forces during the Second World
War.
That war, and all of its anguish, changed
forever the world as we had known it. It
taught us lessons that we shall never forget
— most important, that the peace of all the
world is threatened when aggressors are en-
couraged to feed on any part of it.
America, which lost Guam and then freed
it again with blood that now stains this
ground, has not forgotten that lesson. Amer-
ican boys in Viet-Nam are once again carry-
ing the American commitment to resist ag-
gression and to make possible the sacred
work of peace among men.
We are grateful to you — all of you — for
coming out here to welcome us. Pray that
our work here will bear fruit, for we labor
for you, for your fellow Americans, for the
people of Viet-Nam, and for all of those who
love peace and freedom throughout the
world.
I should like to address a very special
word to my Guamanian friends.
I am proud of the distinction which this
trip gives me of being the first American
President to come here while in office. I
am very proud of Guam. All America is
proud of the progress that it has made to-
ward self-government in the short time since
civil administration came to this island in
1950.
We are proud of the strides that you have
taken under a very fine public servant, Gov-
ernor Guerrero. His first term of office is
now ending.
It gives me real pleasure to tell you
that just before we landed I signed a
nomination to go to the United States Senate
giving my recommendation that the Honor-
able Manuel Guerrero be appointed to a sec-
ond term as the Governor of Guam.
I hope that Governor Guerrero will be the
last Governor to be appointed by a Presi-
dent. If the Congress acts favorably on leg-
islation that I have proposed, he will be.
That legislation will give the American citi-
zens of Guam, along with your fellow citi-
zens in other parts of the United States, the
right to elect your own Governor.
Then all of you who are already contribut-
ing so much to the efforts of your country
and the effort that your country is making
in Viet-Nam will at long last have one of
the great rights of the American democracy.
I look forward to the day when I may sign
that bill that is now pending into the law of
our lands.
Thank you, my friends, for this warm wel-
come. I know that I shall enjoy spending the
next few days with you.
APRIL 10, 1967
587
Arrival of Vietnamese Leaders
White House press release {Guam) dated March 20
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister Ky, most
distinguished officials from the Republic of
Viet-Nam and the United States of America,
ladies and gentlemen: Once again I am very
pleased to welcome two brave Vietnamese
leaders to American soil.
We met in Hawaii a little over a year
ago.i Then, our talks were of plans and
hopes. Today, we meet in a time of progress.
It is our common task to extend that prog-
ress in the days ahead.
Ever since our conference last fall in
Manila,^ your country has traveled far on
the road to democracy. Your Assembly has
hammered out a new Constitution. I am in-
formed that I will see a copy of that Consti-
tution during our meeting here.
It is the foundation stone of a freely and
popularly elected government. You are the
leaders of 16 million courageous and dedi-
cated people who are determined to forge
a free nation from the fires of war.
Your people look to a Viet-Nam that is
unencumbered by a foreign presence on its
soil, unhindered by acts of terror and ag-
gression, free to determine its own destiny.
I hope that this conference will be of value
to both of us in charting the course for the
future of the struggle for freedom in Viet-
Nam.
I am also delighted and particularly
anxious for you to get to know Ambassador
Bunker, who will shortly succeed Ambassa-
dor Lodge in Saigon. I know that you will
find him an able and understanding Am-
bassador, as you will his associate, Mr.
Locke. I know you will find him a worthy
successor to a very brave and distinguished
patriot.
Last week I reassured my own people that
America is committed to the defense of South
Viet-Nam until an honorable peace can be ' :
negotiated.^
I renew that pledge to you today.
Thank you very much.
RESPONSE BY CHAIRMAN THIEU
Mr. President, thank you very much for
your kind words of welcome. I am happy to
set foot again on American soil in the midst
of the Pacific and have this opportunity to
meet again with you, Mr. President, and
the distinguished members of your Govern-
ment.
As we pointed out last year following our
meeting in Honolulu, we must maintain close
contact. There is no adequate substitute for
exchanging ideas than face to face across
a table. |
At that Manila Conference last October '
we had again agreed upon the principle of
close consultation for review of what we
have done and for candid and thorough dis- ii
cussions of the various problems confronting f
us in the defense of freedom in Viet-Nam.
I am grateful that you have found it pos-
sible to cross the major part of the Pacific
Ocean for this meeting to be had, an im-
portant juncture in our effort in Viet-Nam
to stem ofi" the Communist aggression from
the North and to give substance and solid
foundations to democracy in the Republic of
Viet-Nam.
Thanks to your help, we are now throwing
a line against Communist aggression in
Southeast Asia. The Vietnamese people will
long remember that at this crucial moment
of their history, their freedom is preserved,
thanks to the solidarity of millions of people
around this Pacific Ocean.
Vietnamese soldiers are especially proud
to fight side by side with valiant soldiers of
the United States of America in this great
struggle to defend freedom and to secure a
long-lasting peace in this part of this world.
The Republic of Viet-Nam will do her best
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966,
p. 302.
* For background, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
' For President Johnson's address before the Ten-
nessee State Legislature on Mar. 15, see ibid., Apr.
3, 1967, p. 534.
588
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
so that all the brave soldiers who have made
the supreme sacrifices in tlie defense of free-
dom will not have given their lives in vain.
Viet-Nam is the crucial test case on which
will hinge not only the fate of Southeast
Asia but also of many other areas in the
world, where newly independent nations are
groping for a path toward the future.
Together we will win this war, not only
against the Communist aggression but also
against the immemorial enemies of mankind
— hunger, disease, and ignorance — to launch
a society in which everyone will find a right-
ful place in establishing a meaningful democ-
racy under the sign of progress and social
justice.
In the spirit of the Manila Conference, the
Republic of Viet-Nam spares no effort to
explore all possible avenues which may lead
us to a just and honorable peace.
When such a peace is restored, a general
reconciliation among all Vietnamese will be
possible, to put an end to the sufferings and
ravages of the war and open a new era in
which all Vietnamese of good will can par-
ticipate in the building of a free and peace-
ful nation.
With these hopes, I look forward to fruit-
ful discussions at this meeting.
Thank you very much.
STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Opening Statement at Conference, March 20
White House press release (Guam) dated March 20
I shall make my opening remarks very
short. We are old friends and comrades in
arms. We do not need to elaborate on pre-
liminaries before getting down to work.
Our two Governments have developed
methods of regular consultation that have
served us well in the critical days in which
we've been associated. I am confident this
will continue.
Today I am introducing to you our new
Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, and his
deputy, Eugene Locke. He has served our
country — and the cause of freedom — on three
continents. It is tyi)ical of him that he is
ready to serve in this struggle as well. His
distinguished talents give us full confidence
for the future.
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has rep-
resented the United States in Saigon with
great dedication and ability. One measure of
our appreciation for his splendid service is
the caliber of the man we have chosen as
his successor.
We meet at an auspicious time. The task
of drafting a Constitution for South Viet-
Nam, I am informed, has been completed.
The drafters were elected by people in every
section of the country — except where they
were prevented from voting by pressures of
the Viet Cong. I know you regret, as I do,
that the Viet Cong succeeded in preventing
anyone from voting. We believe that a sys-
tem which stands in the way of democratic
process in this fashion cannot survive very
long among the people- — even when it uses
terror and assassination to achieve its ends.
Now your great task is to conduct a na-
tional election for a new government. The
success of that election is as important as
any of the military operations we shall con-
duct in the months ahead.
There are many signs that we are at a
favorable turning point. Your fighting men,
aided by your allies, now hold the initiative
and are striking heavy blows against the
strongholds and refuges of the Viet Cong
and their North Vietnamese masters. And in
the villages the medicine of the revolutionary
development program is already beginning to
take eflPect. The Viet Cong are turning
sharply against that program's administra-
tion. I think that is very solid tribute to its
effectiveness.
There are many other things I could cite
that give us encouragement. But Viet-Nam
is still a land of war and suffering, where
the danger of inflation and epidemics and
political conflict lie just beneath the surface.
So let us turn today to see again what we
can do to make our joint efforts even more
eflfective.
APRIL 10, 1967
589
statement on New Vietnamese Constitution,
IMarch 20 ^
I am deeply pleased to hear from Prime
Minister Ky that the Directorate has agreed
to the new Constitution just adopted by the
Constituent Assembly of the Republic of
Viet-Nam.
The Constitution marks the most impor-
tant step in Viet-Nam's progress toward rep-
resentative government. It is the fruit of 6
months of labor by delegates whose very
elections demonstrated the ability of the
people of South Viet-Nam to move forward
toward democracy in the midst of war and
despite the savage opposition of the Viet
Cong.
Many of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion were actively debated during 6 months
of consideration by the Assembly. But when
agreement was finally reached, the Consti-
tution was approved by the unanimous vote
of the Assembly.
Like the U. S. Constitution, the Vietnam-
ese Constitution has been written by the
democratically chosen representatives of
the people. And like the Constitutional Con-
vention in Philadelphia two centuries ago,
the Assembly in Saigon included many men
in their late twenties or early thirties.
The Constitution secures freedom of
speech and freedom of religion. It guaran-
tees civil rights and due process of law and
provides for free political expression by the
press, political parties, and trade unions, as
well as by individuals.
It establishes an executive branch and en-
dows it with wide powers, but subjects it,
at the same time, to strong measures of con-
trol by the Legislature. The Legislature will
enjoy wide authority, perhaps wider than
that of the U. S. Congress.
Three times in less than 2 years South
Viet-Nam has moved closer toward establish-
ing a government fully responsive to the
people. The first of these steps was the pro-
vincial elections held in May 1965; the sec-
■* Read to news correspondents by Secretary Rusk
at a news conference on Mar. 20 (White House
press release (Guam)).
ond step was the election, last September 11,
of the members of the Constituent Assembly;
now a democratic Constitution has been
adopted.
There will be other steps on the road to
more representative government in Viet-
Nam during the coming months. A new
round of village and hamlet elections will
begin in April, when over 900 village coun-
cils will be elected. In May and June nearly
5,000 hamlet chiefs will be chosen. Then, ^'
the election of a President and the Senate, „
provided for in the new Constitution, is
planned for late summer. Finally, the elec-
tion of the House of Representatives will
come within a month after the election of a
Tl
President. i "
All those who have thoughtfully studied f
the modem history of Viet-Nam know that
military power alone cannot secure the peace
and insure the progress of that nation, nor
of any other. Free political institutions are
indispensable to the success of South Viet- i
Nam's long struggle against terror, and f
those who support her in that struggle re-
joice in the success of this past week.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, MARCH 20^
President Johnson
White House press release (Guam) dated March 20
In 1873, when Viet-Nam was disputing the
right of France to extend control over the
whole country, a scholar named Bui Vien
was sent by the Emperor to enlist the help
of the United States. He was received by
President Grant.
On his way home he was informed of
President Grant's decision that, because of
unforeseen circumstances, the United States
would be unable to assist Viet-Nam.
He stopped in Japan to see an old friend,
the American Consul in Yokohama. As peo-
ple did in those days in Asia, the two men
exchanged poems. Here is what Bui Vien
wrote:
' At a dinner for U.S. and Vietnamese officials.
590
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We pour out wine into glasses at Yokohama in
the ninth month — in autumn.
Turning my head towards the clouds of Vietnam,
I am anxious about my country.
Sea and land — memory and emotion — remind me
of my former journey.
Enjoying myself with you, I regret all the more
that we must part.
Spiritual companion, in what year will we be
together in the same sampan?
Today we know the answer. We are to-
gether. And we know our destination. We
established it years ago, and affirmed it at
Honolulu and Manila. The brave sons of both
our nations reaffirm it anew with every day
that passes.
The trip is not yet over. The waters ahead
may be rough. But together, with courage
and unflagging devotion to the duty we
share, we will make it.
Gentlemen, to the free peoples of Viet-
Nam and the United States, who love their
liberty and fight to preserve it.
Chairman Thieu
White House press release (Guam) dated March 20
Mr. President, gentlemen: I would like
to thank you most sincerely for making this
gathering not only an opportunity for the
leaders of both Governments to exchange
views on common problems but also a
family affair in which protocol yields to in-
formality and cordiality.
I am deeply touched by your evocation of
the historical diplomatic mission. In the last
century, Vietnamese Ambassador Bui Vien
went on a good-will mission to the United
States, a great country from across the
Pacific Ocean, in what was for us, may I
say, the Far East.
What I would like to add in recalling the
history of Vietnaanese-American friendship
is that, almost a century and a half ago, an
American Ambassador of good will, named
John White, also came to Viet-Nam. He was
a well-respected citizen of Boston, a busi-
nessman and traveler. History did not record
his poems, but he wrote memoirs about his
influences in our exotic land.
Today we have had the privilege and the
great pleasure to have in Ambassador Lodge
a much more illustrious Ambassador from
Boston. We are sad to see him leaving, but
the years he spent in Viet-Nam will long
be remembered.
We know that with Ambassador Bunker
another page of cordial and constructive
friendship will be opened.
In this spirit may I ask you, Mr. President
and gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the
everlasting friendship and solidarity between
our two nations, for freedom, peace, and
progress.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE, MARCH 21
White House press release (Guam) dated March 21
The President of the United States and
the Chief of State and the Prime Minister
of Viet-Nam completed their discussions in
Guam. These talks have demonstrated again
their joint determination with their allies,
to defend freedom in South Viet-Nam and at
the same time to continue the earnest search
for an honorable peace.
President Johnson took this occasion to
present to Chairman Thieu, Prime Minister
Ky and their party the new leadership of
the U.S. Mission in Saigon. Ambassador Ells-
worth Bunker will take up from Ambassa-
dor Lodge the maintenance and strengthen-
ing of close relations with the Government
of Viet-Nam. He will be working with that
Government in its struggle to preserve the
nation's freedom, in its steady progress
toward economic and social development, and
in the new political chapter now opening of
constitutional and representative govern-
ment under elected leaders. President John-
son introduced Ambassador Eugene Locke,
who will take Ambassador Porter's place as
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission, and he
also explained that his Special Assistant,
Mr. Robert Komer, would be in Saigon giv-
ing his attention to Pacification/RD matters.
Meeting with their advisors, President
Johnson and Chairman Thieu and Prime
Minister Ky reviewed the encouraging prog-
ress on the various programs of the Vietnam-
APRIL 10, 1967
591
ese Government which had been discussed
at Honolulu early in 1966 and were outlined
in the Communique of the Seven Allied Na-
tions meeting in Manila last October.
Discussion covered the military front,
where the initiative lies increasingly with
the allied forces and where the leaders of
North Viet-Nam must recognize the futility
of their effort to seize control of South Viet-
Nam by force.
The meeting also reviewed those programs
of the Vietnamese Government to which the
United States is providing assistance. They
found that, a solid foundation having been
laid, the pacification and revolutionary de-
velopment program was now beginning to
show encouraging results, despite Viet Cong
efforts to disrupt it by terror and intimida-
tion. They noted the successful maintenance
of financial stability while recognizing the
need for continued vigilance on this front.
They heard from Dr. Vu Quoc Thuc and Mr.
David Lilienthal of the long-range economic
planning now getting underway. Plans for
continued efforts in the fields of national rec-
onciliation and reform of land policies and
tenure provisions were described by the Viet-
namese leaders.
They also outlined the provisions of the
Constitution drafted by the Constituent As-
sembly elected last September 11 and agreed
by the Assembly and approved by the Direc-
torate in the last few days. This instrument
provides for the principal organs of a rei>
resentative government and assures to the
people civil and economic rights and social
justice. The Constitution offers full civil
rights to those who respect its provisions
and the world looks forward to the day
when the Viet Cong will take advantage of
this offer, abandon the course of terror and
violence and join in making a free, modem
society in South Viet-Nam.
It was also announced that elections for
a president will be held under the Constitu-
tion within 4 to 5 months and the elections
for a legislature shortly thereafter. Mean-
while a major forward step will be made
toward the restoration of democratic local
government when village hamlet elections
take place, starting in April.
The numerous and varied efforts made in
recent months to bring about a peaceful
settlement were reviewed by the heads of
both delegations. Thus far, they noted re-
gretfully. North Viet-Nam has failed to
respond to all such efforts. However, Chair-
man Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and Presi-
dent Johnson reaffirmed their undertakings
at Manila and Honolulu and pledged them-
selves anew to the diligent pursuit of peace.
Continuing consultations about the search
for peace will be maintained among the
nations whose forces are now fighting
against aggression in South Viet-Nam.
The Vietnamese and American leaders
also took note of the forthcoming meetings
in Washington of SEATO on April 18-20
and of the Foreign Ministers of nations
having troops in Viet-Nam on April 20-21.
The latter will bring together again the
Governments which met at Manila last
October and provide an opportunity for
them to review progress and programs in
Viet-Nam and consult on future courses of
action.
The Vietnamese leaders are leaving Guam
for Saigon this morning and President
Johnson is expected to depart at the end of
the day.
RETURN TO WASHINGTON
Statement by President Johnson, Andersen
Air Force Base, Guam, IVIarch 21
White House press release dated March 21
Before I returned to Washington, I
wanted to come here to see some of the men
and their families who are carrying the
burdens of this war, as I did last fall when
I went to Cam Ranh Bay.^
In some respects our engagement in Viet-
Nam is familiar to America.
In World War II and in Korea, as in
Viet-Nam, there was a conflict of ideology
For background, see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 735.
592
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
between ourselves and our adversaries. But
the struggle is not limited to one of ideology.
Force had to be met with force. Amer-
icans had to shoulder rifles, man tanks and
warships, and take bombers into the air, all
at great risk to their lives and at a great
distance from their homelands.
The ideological debates continued over the
wisdom of involvement or noninvolvement:
The "America Firsters" had their say, but
the aggressor could not be stopped by argu-
ment.
People who desired to live in freedom
could not be protected by debating points.
The defense of freedom required then, as
it requires now, the willingness of brave
men to face danger, to risk death, and to
live with their fears for months and years
on end.
Today we are here to decorate 12 men,
all of whom risked their lives many times
in the air over Viet-Naxn. As their Com-
mander in Chief and the representative of
the people whom they have so gallantly
served, I salute them with all my heart.
There are some respects, as professional
soldiers know, in which this war is different
from the others that we have waged. There
are no sharply defined battle lines. The
random terror of the subversive, not the
mythical power of a conventional army in
the field, is the enemy's main weapon.
Political and social forces are at work
which complicate the struggle and which
make it necessary to do far more than wage
a traditional military campaign.
We met these past 2 days here with
leaders, Vietnamese and Americans, to dis-
cuss some of the elements of this difi'erent
kind of war in Viet-Nam.
We have brought the new team of Ameri-
can representatives to Viet-Nam: Ambas-
sador Ellsworth Bunker, who has served
his country with great distinction in the
Dominican crisis, in India, in Italy, and
many other posts of the highest responsi-
bility; Ambassador Eugene Locke, who now
represents us in Pakistan; and Robert
Komer, who until now has been in the
White House as my counselor on the civil
side of the Vietnamese war.
We wanted these distinguished Americans
to meet the leaders of Viet-Nam with whom
they will be working in the months ahead.
We came here to discuss seven of our
major concerns in Viet-Nam today:
First, the military progress of the war,
both in the South and in the North.
Second, the political progress that is
being made in South Viet-Nam. Prime
Minister Ky gave me a copy of the new
Constitution which the freely elected Con-
stitutent Assembly had just adopted in
in South Viet-Nam and which the Directory
had just approved. This is the third and
the most significant step that South Viet-
Nam has taken toward granting its people
the fundamental rights of democracy.
Third, we discussed in some detail the
morale, the health, the training, the food,
the clothing, and the equipment of our superb
young fighting men. I questioned General
Westmoreland closely on all of these matters,
and his response was deeply gratifying to
me.
Fourth, the national reconciliation pro-
gram in Viet-Nam.
Fifth, the land reform program, which
is moving steadily forward.
Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties
and what is being done to help those who
are injured or who are wounded by the war.
Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an
end to this conflict at as early a date as
possible by an honorable settlement.
We did not adopt any spectacular, new
programs at this meeting. We said in ad-
vance that that was not our plan. The nature
of this war is not amenable to spectacular
programs or to easy solutions. It requires
courage, perseverance, and dedication — ex-
actly the qualities that men such as you
are providing today.
So to all of the men of this command,
and their families who so loyally stand by
them in this hour of trial, let me say as we
leave Guam that all America honors you
and is grateful to you.
APRIL 10, 1967
593
We feel refreshed by the conviction that
on several fronts — military, political, and
social — we and our allies are making sub-
stantial progress. When the inevitability of
that progress finally gets through and be-
comes clear to Hanoi, we shall then arrive
at what Churchill would have called "the
beginning of the end."
I leave you today with pride — great
pride — in what you are doing and great
confidence for the country that you serve.
I do not want to let this occasion go by
without presenting to you some of the great
public servants who lead this nation in this
critical period.
I want to introduce your Secretary of
State — Dean Rusk.
Next I want to introduce your Secretary
of Defense — Robert McNamara.
Ambassador Bunker and Ambassador
Lodge.
" The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Wheeler; Admiral Sharp; General
Maxwell Taylor; General Westmoreland; and
your distinguished Governor of Guam.
Thank you very much, ladies and gentle-
men.
Statement by President Johnson, Andrews
Air Force Base, Washington, March 21
White Hoiue press release dated March 21
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
As I said upon my departure from Guam,
we discussed seven of our major concerns at
at our meeting there.
First, the military progress of the war,
both in the South and in the North.
Second, the political progress that is being
made now in South Viet-Nam. Prime Minis-
ter Ky gave me a copy of the new Constitu-
tion which the freely elected Constituent
Assembly has adopted and which the Direc-
tory has just approved. This is the third and
most significant step that South Viet-Nam
has taken toward granting its people the
fundamental rights of democracy.
Third, we discussed the morale, the health,
the training, the food, the clothing, and
equipment of our superb young fighting men.
I questioned General Westmoreland very
closely on these matters. His response was
extremely gratifying to me.
Fourth, the national reconciliation pro-
gram in Viet-Nam.
Fifth, the land reform program, which is
moving steadily forward. Premier Ky told
me that he had distributed 27,000 titles just
recently.
Sixth, the extent of civilian casualties and
what is being done to help those who are
injured or who are wounded by the war.
Seventh, the possibilities of bringing an
end to this conflict by an honorable settle-
ment.
We did not adopt any specific or spec-
tacular new programs at this meeting. The
nature of this war is not amenable to spec-
tacular programs or easy solutions. It re-
quires courage, perseverance, and dedication.
During my flight home I learned that
Hanoi had made public an exchange of let-
ters between me and Ho Chi Minh.'' His reply
to me of mid-February and his earlier public
reply to His Holiness the Pope were regret-
table rebuffs to a genuine effort to move to-
ward peace. This has been the consistent atti-
tude of Hanoi to many efforts by us, by other
governments, by groups of governments, and
by leading personalities throughout the
world. Nevertheless, we shall persevere in
our efforts to find an honorable peace. Until
that is achieved, of course, we shall con-
tinue to do our duty in Viet-Nam.
' See p. 595.
594
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation
on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi IVIinh
On March 21 the Department of State
made public the text of a letter from Presi-
dent Johnson to Ho Chi Minh, President of
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, after
the text of that letter and President Ho's
reply had been broadcast in English by Radio
Hanoi earlier that day. The letters were ex-
changed in February through officials of the
American and North Vietnamese Embassies
in Moscow. President Johnson's letter was
delivered there on February 8, and the reply
on Febmary 15.
Following is a Department statement of
March 21, together with the texts of the two
letters.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ^
President Johnson did write to President
Ho Chi Minh a letter delivered to the North
Vietnamese in Moscow on February 8.
This personal letter from President John-
son reaffirmed earlier proposals made on four
occasions by the United States Government
to Hanoi through representatives in Moscow,
commencing in early January. These pro-
posals called attention to the upcoming Tet
cease-fire and urged direct talks aimed at re-
solving this Viet-Nam conflict. Other than a
diatribe against the United States, delivered
on January 27, no response at all was re-
ceived to these proposals prior to that of Feb-
ruary 15 by President Ho Chi Minh.
' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 21 by the
Department spokesman.
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS
President Johnson's Letter
His Excellency
Ho Chi Minh
President
Democratic Republic of Vietnam
Dear Mr, President : I am writing to you
in the hope that the conflict in Vietnam can
be brought to an end. That conflict has
already taken a heavy toll — in lives lost, in
wounds inflicted, in property destroyed, and
in simple human misery. If we fail to find a
just and peaceful solution, history will judge
us harshly.
Therefore, I believe that we both have a
heavy obligation to seek earnestly the path to
peace. It is in response to that obligation that
I am writing directly to you.
We have tried over the past several years,
in a variety of ways and through a number
of channels, to convey to you and your col-
leagues our desire to achieve a peaceful settle-
ment. For whatever reasons, these efforts
have not achieved any results.
It may be that our thoughts and yours, our
attitudes and yours, have been distorted or
misinterpreted as they passed through these
various channels. Certainly that is always a
danger in indirect communication.
There is one good way to overcome this
problem and to move forward in the search
for a peaceful settlement. That is for us to
arrange for direct talks between trusted
representatives in a secure setting and away
from the glare of publicity. Such talks should
APRIL 10, 1967
595
not be used as a propaganda exercise but
should be a serious effort to find a workable
and mutually acceptable solution.
In the past two weeks, I have noted public
statements by representatives of your gov-
ernment suggesting that you would be pre-
pared to enter into direct bilateral talks with
representatives of the U.S. Government, pro-
vided that we ceased "unconditionally" and
permanently our bombing operations against
your country and all military actions against
it. In the last day, serious and responsible
parties have assured us indirectly that this
is in fact your proposal.
Let me frankly state that I see two great
difficulties with this proposal. In view of
your public position, such action on our part
would inevitably produce worldwide specula-
tion that discussions were under way and
would impair the privacy and secrecy of
those discussions. Secondly, there would
inevitably be grave concern on our part
whether your government would make use of
such action by us to improve its military
position.
With these problems in mind, I am pre-
pared to move even further towards an end-
ing of hostilities than your Government has
proposed in either public statements or
through private diplomatic channels. I am
prepared to order a cessation of bombing
against your country and the stopping of
further augmentation of U.S. forces in South
Viet-Nam as soon as I am assured that infil-
tration into South Viet-Nam by land and by
sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on
both sides would, I believe, make it possible
for us to conduct serious and private discus-
sions leading toward an early peace.
I make this proposal to you now with a
specific sense of urgency arising from the
imminent New Year holidays in Viet-Nam.
If you are able to accept this proposal I see
no reason why it could not take effect at the
end of the New Year, or Tet, holidays. The
proposal I have made would be greatly
strengthened if your military authorities and
those of the Government of South Viet-Nam
could promptly negotiate an extension of the
Tet truce.
As to the site of the bilateral discussions
I propose, there are several possibilities. We )
could, for example, have our representatives t
meet in Moscow where contacts have already (
occurred. They could meet in some other
country such as Burma. You may have other
arrangements or sites in mind, and I would
try to meet your suggestions.
The important thing is to end a conflict
that has brought burdens to both our peoples,
and above all to the people of South Viet-
Nam. If you have any thoughts about the
actions I propose, it would be most important
that I receive them as soon as possible.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
President Ho Chi IMinli's Reply
Translation
His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
Excellency, on February 10, 1967, I re-
ceived your message. Here is my response.
Viet-Nam is situated thousands of miles
from the United States. The Vietnamese
people have never done any harm to the
United States. But, contrary to the commit-
ments made by its representative at the
Geneva Conference of 1954, the United
States Government has constantly intervened
in Viet-Nam, it has launched and intensified
the war of aggression in South Viet-Nam for
the purpose of prolonging the division of
Viet-Nam and of transforming South Viet-
Nam into an American neo-colony and an
American military base. For more than two
years now, the American Government, with
its military aviation and its navy, has been
waging war against the Democratic Republic
of Viet-Nam, an independent and sovereign
country.
The United States Government has com-
mitted war crimes, crimes against peace and
against humanity. In South Viet-Nam a half-
million American soldiers and soldiers from
the satellite countries have resorted to the
most inhumane arms and the most barbarous
methods of warfare, such as napalm, chemi-
cals, and poison gases in order to massacre
our fellow countrymen, destroy the crops.
596
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and wipe out the villag-es. In North Viet-Nam
thousands of American planes have rained
down hundreds of thousands of tons of
bombs, destroying cities, villages, mills,
roads, bridges, dikes, dams and even
churches, pagodas, hospitals, and schools. In
your message you appear to deplore the suf-
fering and the destruction in Viet-Nam.
Permit me to ask you: Who perpetrated
these monstrous crimes? It was the Ameri-
can soldiers and the soldiers of the satellite
countries. The United States Government is
entirely responsible for the extremely grave
situation in Viet-Nam.
The American war of aggression against
the Vietnamese people constitutes a challenge
to the countries of the socialist camp, a threat
to the peoples' independent movement, and a
grave danger to peace in Asia and in the
world.
The Vietnamese people deeply love inde-
pendence, liberty, and peace. But in the face
of the American aggression they have risen
up as one man, without fearing the sacrifices
and the privations. They are determined to
continue their resistance until they have won
real independence and liberty and true peace.
Our just cause enjoys the approval and the
powerful support of peoples throughout the
world and of large segments of the American
people.
The United States Government provoked
the war of aggression in Viet-Nam. It must
cease that aggression, it is the only road lead-
ing to the re-establishment of peace. The
United States Government must halt defini-
tively and unconditionally the bombings and
all other acts of war against the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, withdraw from South
Viet-Nam all American troops and all troops
from the satellite countries, recognize the
National Front of the Liberation of South
Viet-Nam, and let the Vietnamese people set-
tle their problems themselves. Such is the
basic content of the four-point position of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam, such is the statement of the essen-
tial principles and essential arrangements of
the Geneva agreements of 1954 on Viet-Nam.
It is the basis for a correct political solution
of the Vietnamese problem. In your message
you suggested direct talks between the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the United
States. If the United States Government
really wants talks, it must first halt uncon-
ditionally the bombings and all other acts of
war against the Democratic Republic of
Viet-Nam. It is only after the unconditional
halting of the American bombings and of all
other American acts of war against the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam that the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the
United States could begin talks and discuss
questions affecting the two parties.
The Vietnamese people will never give way
to force, it will never accept conversation
under the clear threat of bombs.
Our cause is absolutely just. It is desirable
that the Government of the United States act
in conformity to reason.
Sincerely,
Ho Chi Minh
Thailand Grants U.S. Permission
To Use U Tapao Airbase
Statement by Secretary Rusk ^
I invite your attention to an announcement
made in Bangkok this morning [March 22]
regarding the Thai Government's agreement
to permit the U.S. Air Force to use the Thai
airbase at U Tapao.
In this connection, the President has asked
me to express his deep appreciation, and that
of the American people, for the very great
contribution which Thailand is making to the
common cause in Southeast Asia. No country
has been stronger in its support for the con-
cept of collective security, and no country has
been quicker to recognize that collective secu-
rity carries obligations as well as benefits.
Thailand was among the first to send
troops to repel aggression in Korea. Thailand
has provided air and naval units to assist in
the defense of its neighbor, the Republic of
' Read U> news correspondents by the Department
spokesman on Mar. 22 (press release 73).
APRIL 10, 1967
597
Viet-Nam, and the Thai Government recently
announced its decision to send, in addition, a
ground combat unit to Viet-Nam. It is worth
noting that when the Thai Government called
for a thousand volunteers for this unit, more
than 30,000 Thai young men responded.
Another great contribution which Thailand
has made to the Allied war effort in Viet-
Nam is the use of Thai military installations
and facilities by United States military
forces. The military installations and facili-
ties are made available by Thailand as a
member of SEATO and are critically impor-
tant to us as we carry out our part of the
war effort. U.S. Air Force planes flying from
Thai bases at Takhli, Udorn, Korat, Ubon,
and Nakorn Phanom are of immeasurable
importance in meeting the aggression against
South Viet-Nam. The completion of the air
base at U Tapao and the Thai Government's
decision to permit its use by B-52's will
greatly increase the effectiveness of our air
operations.
When the President was in Bangkok last
October he acknowledged that the Thai con-
tribution to the common defense involved
risks for Thailand. At that time the President
said,^
Let me assure you in this regard that Thailand
can count on the United States to meet its obliga-
tions under the SEATO treaty. The commitment
of the United States under the SEATO treaty is
not of a particular political party or administra-
tion in my country, but of America as a nation.
And I repeat to you: America keeps its commit-
ments.
Thailand has made other great contribu-
tions to security and stability in the area. Its
determination to defeat through its own
efforts the attempts by Peking and Hanoi to
create insurgency in Thailand is wholly ad-
mirable. Despite this costly and difficult
effort, the Thai have achieved remarkable
internal economic growth and development.
And they have been a leader in the movement
to create institutions of regional cooperation
' For President Johnson's toast at a state dinner
at Bangkok on Oct. 28, 1966, see Bulletin of Nov.
21, 1966, p. 767.
which manifest the new spirit of hope that is
growing in Asia today.
Thailand, which is known the world over
for its devotion to its national independence,
can take special pride in its contribution to
fostering this new spirit of hope.
By its action today, Thailand has shown
once again that it knows, as does the United
States, that it is by standing together as
allies that we preserve our own independence
and freedom.
Pacific Islands Trust Territory
White House Announcements
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MEETING
WITH COMMISSIONER NORWOOD
White House press release (Guam) dated March 21
The President met on March 21 with High
Commissioner William Norwood and other
officials of the government of the Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands. Commissioner
Norwood and his associates came to Guam
at the President's invitation to brief him on
conditions and prospects in the territory,
which is administered by the United States
under the supervision of the United Nations.
The territory consists of more than 2,000
islands in the Mariana, Caroline, and Mar-
shall groupings.
The discussion centered on economic and
social progress. Commissioner Norwood gave
the President a detailed account of recent ad-
vances in such critical fields as health and
education. He also discussed the important
role in these efforts being played by the
Peace Corps, which has nearly 500 volun-
teers now at work in the territory.
The President also congratulated Mr. Nor-
wood and his colleagues on the quickening
pace of political development reflected in the
formation of the Congress of Micronesia and
in the increasing numbers of Micronesians
who are assuming responsible positions in
the government.
598
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The President expressed the full support
of the American people for these encourag-
ing developments. He urged Commissioner
Nonvood to press forward with the govern-
ment's consideration of an economic develop-
ment plan for the territory. He cited as
evidence of U.S. support the recent Senate
passage of the administration-proposed bill
lifting the ceiling on financial support to the
territoiy. He expressed confidence that the
House would also act favorably.
In thanking Commissioner Norwood for
his presentation, the President said:
"Although I very much regret that time
won't permit a personal visit to the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, I believe that
Commissioner Norwood's impressive analysis
has given me a vivid sense of the progressive
spirit now at work in Micronesia. Under his
inspired leadership, I am confident that the
people of the trust territory can look forward
to new victories in the never-ending battle
against poverty, ignorance, and disease.
"Mr. Norwood has the support of every
American in this noble cause."
ALLOCATION OF DISASTER FUNDS
White House prees release (Guam) dated March 21
The President on March 21 declared a
major disaster for the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands because of damages caused by
Typhoon Sally. He made available Federal
funds in the amount of $750,000 for disaster
assistance in the affected areas.
Koror and Babelthuap are two small
islands in the Palau District of the trust ter-
ritory, located approximately 250 miles
southwest of Guam. These islands suffered
severe damage when typhoon winds roared
through the island on March 2.
Emergency mass care services are being
furnished by the trust territory government
assisted by the military and the American
National Red Cross. The Department of Ag-
riculture has provided large quantities of
surplus foods to feed disaster victims.
The President's major disaster declaration
and allocation of funds will permit Federal
assistance for the recovery and rehabilitation
of the devastated areas. These funds will be
used for the repair or replacement of public
facilities damaged or destroyed in the disas-
ter.
This program of assistance authorized un-
der the Federal Disaster Act (Public Law
81-875) is administered by the Office of
Emergency Planning. The OEP Region 7
office in Santa Rosa, Calif., is coordinating
Federal disaster relief activities in the trust
territory.
U.S. Mission Ciiiefs in Europe
iVIeet at Bonn
The Department of State announced on
March 24 (press release 65) that a 4-day
conference of chiefs of American diplomatic
missions in Europe would be held at Bonn,
Germany, from March 28 to 31. The meeting
brought together American ambassadors
from 30 diplomatic posts in the European
area.^
Vice President Humphrey attended a part
of the conference sessions on March 29-30.
Under Secretary Katzenbach left Washing-
ton March 29 to chair the last day of the con-
ference. The earlier sessions were chaired by
John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs.
The meeting is one of a series of regional
meetings called periodically in different
parts of the world by the Department of
State to permit American ambassadors
abroad to discuss questions of mutual interest
and exchange views with senior Washington
officials. The last such conference of all
American ambassadors in Europe was held
at Bonn in 1963. A meeting of U.S. ambas-
sadors to NATO countries took place at The
Hague in 1965.
' For a list of the chiefs of American missions
in Europe, see Department press release 65 dated
Mar. 24.
APRIL 10, 1967
599
THE CONGRESS
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge
Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty
Following are statements made by Secre-
tary Rusk and Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on March 7.^
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 46 dated March 7
It gives me great pleasure to be here to-
day to discuss with you the recently signed
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies.^
I am delighted to be associated today with
my Cabinet colleague, our distinguished
Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur
Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg handled
our side of the negotiation of this treaty
with great skill and dedication and is em-
inently qualified to go over its contents with
you in detail. Since my remarks are in the
nature of an introduction of Ambassador
Goldberg, I shall make them brief.
In my view, the interests and security of
the United States would be advanced by its
ratification. Perhaps of greatest significance
is the fact that there is a treaty at all.
Negotiations were proposed only last May,
when President Johnson urged that steps be
taken to negotiate a treaty on celestial
bodies.^ On the proposal of the Soviet Union,
negotiations were expanded to draw on
previous United Nations resolutions and to
include all of outer space as well as celestial
bodies within the scope of the treaty. We
welcomed that proposal as forthcoming and
responsive to the problems that confront
mankind.
The negotiations proceeded in a business-
like fashion, with a minimum of polemics,
and were successfully concluded in a remark-
ably short time, considering the treaty's
comprehensive nature. The conclusion of this
treaty, we feel, augurs well for the possibility
of finding areas of common interest and
agreement with the Soviet Union on other
significant issues — especially in those fields
in which there are genuine common interests
affecting all mankind.
The Antarctic Treaty * and the limited test
ban treaty ^ are examples of a congruence of
common interests among the United States,
the Soviet Union, and many other countries.
The Outer Space Treaty is the most recent
example of a successful identification of com-
mon interests and their expression in a
mutually acceptable legal instrument.
It is our earnest desire and our basic policy
to continue to explore with the Soviet Union
and others additional ways of reducing the
danger of conflict and of promoting stability
and security in the world. Progress in achiev-
ing this aim may not be rapid, and it is not
' The complete hearings will be published by the
committee.
' S. Ex. D, 90th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see
Bulletin of Dec. 26, 1966, p. 953.
' For a statement by President Johnson on May 7,
1966, see ibid., June 6, 1966, p. 900.
* For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.
» For text, see ibid., Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.
600
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
inevitable. But it is possible, and it is more
urgrent than many think. A task of prime im-
portance at this time is the conclusion of a
treaty to prevent the further spread of
nuclear weapons. We are working hard on
tliat treaty. Similarly, we should like to make
progress on an agreement to limit the pro-
spective race in offensive and defensive mis-
siles and are pleased that the Soviet Union
has indicated its willingness to participate in
serious discussions.
The Outer Space Treaty now before this
committee emerged from the processes of the
United Nations and its General Assembly.
The treaty is a positive result of the political
process which the General Assembly has de-
veloped over the course of years. It indicates
the manner in which standards of behavior
and, indeed, rules of international law can
result from the deliberations of the General
Assembly.
The antecedents of the Outer Space Treaty
are, I believe, generally familiar to you. They
are the Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the United
Nations Declaration of Legal Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions in 1963; * and the resolution adopted
by the General Assembly in 1963 that calls
upon states not to station weapons of mass
destruction in space — whether in orbit
around the earth, on celestial bodies, or other-
wise.'
This treaty represents a synthesis of the
experience of nations since the beginning of
the space age. There has been, for almost 8
years, an earnest effort to articulate and de-
fine the general standards of behavior that
should govern states in the use of outer
space and celestial bodies. The standards de-
veloped in the Outer Space Treaty represent
a balance of rights and obligations between
nations conducting space activities and those
who do not. The treaty contains provisions
of immediate applicability and others that
will assume greater importance as the activ-
ities of states develop in outer space. Finally,
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.
the treaty provides for arms control meas-
ures that will promote our security today
and will be of increasing importance in years
to come.
Establishing a balance between rights and
obligations was of pai'ticular concern to the
treaty negotiators. It was recognized that
while only a limited number of states might
enter outer space, such activities could affect
the well-being of all on this planet and in
the earth's environment. Further, it was rec-
ognized that when man extends his activities
beyond this earth, he ought to do so as
more than just the representative of a sin-
gle nation-state. Thus the treaty speaks of
astronauts as "envoys of mankind" and con-
siders the exploration and use of space and
celestial bodies to be for the benefit of all
mankind. Knowledge derived from space will
be made available to scientists of all nations.
The importance of avoiding harmful contami-
nation of the earth as well as of celestial
bodies is dealt with in the treaty. The pro-
visions on liability, interference with other
countries' space activities, and assistance to
and return of astronauts are part of the bal-
ance of rights and obligations which are char-
acteristic of any successful negotiating
effort.
The treaty is balanced, as well, between
principles having immediate application and
others whose usefulness will be in future
years. Among the principles of immediate im-
portance are the provisions on liability, the
obligation unconditionally to assist and to re-
turn astronauts, and the obligation to report
any findings that bear on the safety of astro-
nauts. These can be of direct importance in
the carrying forward of our space program.
Among the broad principles that will grow
in significance are those applying interna-
tional law and the United Nations Charter
to the activities of states in outer space, in-
suring freedom of exploration, and barring
national appropriation of outer space and
celestial bodies.
Finally, the treaty's arms control provi-
sions are of immediate and particular im-
portance to our national security. Parties to
the treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear
APRIL 10, 1967
601
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner. Parties
to the treaty undertake as well to use the
moon and other celestial bodies exclusively
for peaceful purposes. They undertake not to
establish military bases, installations, or for-
tifications, and to abstain from testing any
types of weapons or conducting military
maneuvers on celestial bodies. There is, of
course, no prohibition on the use of military
personnel and equipment for peaceful pur-
poses.
Concomitant with these arms control meas-
ures, the treaty contains provisions which,
together with our own developing national
capabilities, will permit adequate verifica-
tion that the treaty is being observed. Arti-
cle I permits free access to all areas of celes-
tial bodies. Article XII provides that all
stations, installations, equipment, and space
vehicles on the moon and other celestial
bodies shall be open to representatives of
other parties to the treaty. In addition, outer
space and celestial bodies are declared free
for exploration and use by all states, and
the treaty provides that outer space is not
subject to national appropriation. Under the
treaty, space vehicles of the United States
will be free to go anywhere in outer space,
on the moon or other celestial bodies. The
problems of military security related to this
treaty have been examined with great care.
The conclusion of the executive branch, in-
cluding those with special responsibility for
military and defense matters, is that the
treaty will contribute to this country's se-
curity.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, the attempt
to develop law and a peaceful world order
constitutes a necessary element in United
States policy. These are essential goals of the
United Nations as well. The Outer Space
Treaty establishes the basis for a legal regime
to govern the activities of states in outer
space.
The treaty is not complete in all possible
details. It does not deal with all problems
that may develop. But it is responsive to those
problems that can be described and forecast
today.
This treaty demonstrates that man's skill
at making law can keep pace with his tech-
nological prowess. The treaty succeeds in sub-
stantial measure in establishing the neces-
sary standards for reducing the dangers of
military conflict in outer space and for en-
couraging its peaceful exploration.
I venture to hope that this treaty may
serve as an impressive model for cooperation
among the nations — a cooperation that is
essential if the world is going to escape de-
struction by conflict and if it is going to make
headway in conquering disease and poverty,
in relating population rationally to means
of decent livelihood, and in off"ering all men
proper scope for their talents and energies.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S./U.N. press release 23 dated March 7
I welcome this opportunity to give testi-
mony to the Committee on Foreign Relations
on the Outer Space Treaty. In this statement
I shall first briefly sum up the most important
provisions of the treaty, then indicate what
seem to me its main points of significance to
our national interest and security, and
finally, discuss in somewhat more detail the
history of our negotiations.
I. Major Provisions
In sum, the treaty's most important provi-
sions can be stated as follows:
1. In the area of arms control, it forbids
the orbiting or stationing in outer space or on
celestial bodies of nuclear or other weapons
of mass destruction. It specifies that the
moon and other celestial bodies are to be used
only for peaceful purposes and forbids cer-
tain military activities on celestial bodies.
Further, it guarantees access, without veto,
by each party to the installations and ve-
hicles of other parties on celestial bodies. It
insures, as well, freedom of movement any-
where in outer space and on celestial bodies.
2. The treaty declares outer space to be the
"province of all mankind" and forbids claims
of sovereignty to outer space or the moon or
602
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
any other celestial body. It explicitly extends
the rule of international law, including the
charter, into the newly entered realm of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies.
3. The treaty furthers peaceful coopera-
tion in a number of ways. It assures freedom
of scientific investigation in outer space and
commits the parties to promote international
cooperation to this end. It guarantees free-
dom of access to all parts of celestial bodies.
It requires the fullest practicable reporting
by all states on the nature, conduct, locations,
and results of their space activities. It calls
for avoidance of space activities that would
contaminate celestial bodies or do harm to
the earth's environment. It forbids harmful
interference with another's space activities
and calls for appropriate consultation. And
it declares as a general principle that the
exploration and use of outer space "shall be
carried out for the benefit and in the interests
of all countries."
4. Finally, the treaty affords Important
protections to astronauts. They are to be re-
garded as envoys of all mankind. In outer
space, astronauts of different nations are re-
quired to assist one another. If an astronaut
makes an emergency landing on foreign ter-
ritory, he must be given all possible assist-
ance and must be returned home safely and
promptly. And any hazard to astronauts that
is discovered in outer space must be made
known immediately by the party making the
discovery.
That is not intended to be a complete list
of the treaty's provisions, but I believe it
covers those that are most significant.
II. Advantages to the United States
The Outer Space Treaty contributes sub-
stantially not only to the fabric of common
interests and peace in the community of na-
tions but also, and particularly, to the na-
tional interest and security of the United
States. Many of its provisions, indeed, have
been objectives of our diplomacy since the
earliest years of the space age. Some are of
immediate and concrete value; others are
very broad principles whose ultimate value
may not be fully realized for many years,
until mankind has greatly multiplied its pres-
ent activity in the new realm of outer space.
The advantages to the United States are, as
I see them, of four kinds:
1. Arms control. President Johnson has
called this treaty "the most important arms
control development since the limited test
ban treaty of 1963." ^ Unlike the nuclear tests
which were outlawed by the 1963 treaty, the
military measures in outer space which this
treaty will outlaw are measures that have
never been taken. But nobody can say with
confidence that they might not be taken; and
this treaty forbids such measures. Surely it
is much better and infinitely easier to close
the door to the arms race before it enters a
new dimension than to attempt to root it out
once it has become established.
Moreover, beyond its intrinsic value as an
arms control measure, this treaty raises
hopes for further steps along this road. In
writing the arms control provisions of the
Outer Space Treaty we drew inspiration and
guidance from the corresponding provisions
of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, as well as
from the limited test ban treaty. Thus this is,
in a very real sense, the third in a historic
succession of treaties limiting the arms race.
It is our hope that this success will, in turn,
help to smooth the way for the next major
step which we now urgently seek to take in
agreement with the Soviet Union and any
other powers concerned; namely, the treaty
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Each of these steps will give the United
States — and the community of nations — ^more
security at less cost.
2. International order. The entire Outer
Space Treaty vdll help to strengthen interna-
tional order and promote habits of peaceful
cooperation — not only in the new realm of
outer space itself but in the many space-
related activities here on earth.
The treaty promotes these ends, first, by
seeking to remove both the means and the
causes of conflict in outer space. The arms
control provisions operate in this sense. So
' For a statement by President Johnson on Dec. 8,
1966, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 952.
APRIL 10, 1967
603
do those provisions which extend interna-
tional law into the realm of outer space and
forbid claims of sovereignty in that realm.
By thus seeking to minimize the hazards of
human conflict in outer space, we hope to
free our astronauts to concentrate on the
natural hazards and challenges of this new
environment — and to work together in over-
coming them.
The treaty also contains provisions to pro-
mote international cooperation in the con-
quest of space for common benefit. Although
we are still in an early stage of growth in
space science and technology, we already
know that in such major fields as communica-
tions, weather forecasting, and navigation no
nation can reap the full benefits of space
technology except by joining in international
cooperative ventures. In this sense the Outer
Space Treaty is in the same line of historical
development as the many treaties and agree-
ments which govern the day-to-day essentials
of modern life — which assure that interna-
tional mail is delivered, that ships do not col-
lide in the night, that epidemic diseases do
not cross frontiers, and so on. All these
instruments have a double value. Not only
do they bring their various practical bene-
fits; they also, when taken together, make up
the very strong fabric of community life
among the nations — binding nations together
by their practical common interests and con-
stituting a powerful, though little-noticed,
discouragement to war and incentive to
peace.
3. United States-Soviet relations. All these
considerations have a special importance in
their bearing on our evolving relations with
the Soviet Union. It is significant that the
country which has for many years been our
major adversary and a major source of
danger to our security has also emerged as
the only other nation with a space program
comparable in size and scope to our own.
Moreover, this has happened at a time when
some of the sharp edges of Soviet hostility
against the non-Communist world have begun
to wear down, enabling them perhaps to see
their own true interests in a somewhat dif-
ferent light and to discuss with non-Commu-
604
nist nations, including ourselves, new areas
of common interests.
This treaty, following on the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959 and the limited test ban treaty
of 1963, is one further step in translating
some of these common interests into concrete
and enduring agreements. We should not
exaggerate the impact on history of any one
of these treaties in isolation; but it would be
hard indeed to overstate the general tendency
to which they all contribute — that of a
growth of peace and tolerance and openness
among the Soviet Union, the other nations
associated with it in Eastern Europe, and
the non-Communist nations. I believe that
this long-term trend will be advanced by this
treaty.
4. Interests of nonlaunching powers.
Finally, I believe this treaty is helpful to the
interests of the United States in that it also
serves and protects the interests of the non-
launching powers. While we have cooperative
programs of space research with a large
number of countries, many nations have little
or no space program of their own; yet their
cooperation in the conquest of space is im-
portant in a number of ways, and it was
essential to a meaningful treaty that it make
equitable provision for the protection of their
interests rather than concentrate too nar-
rowly on the particular concerns of the major
space powers. Moreover, all countries,
whether space powers or not, have a great
stake in peace and in measures of arms con-
trol to enhance the security of all.
In this connection we were fortunate in
having as our negotiating framework the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space. This body was created
by the General Assembly in 1961, at the joint
initiative of the United States and the
U.S.S.R., to deal with both the legal and the
scientific and technical implications of this
new activity. Understandably, the major
negotiating issues, which I shall discuss in a
moment, arose between the leading space
powers. But the delegates of other powers
also took an active part in the writing of the
treaty.
As a result, these other powers can have
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
confidence that the obligations which they
assume under the treaty, such as the return
of astronauts or space vehicles landing on
their soil, are fully balanced by provisions
protecting their rights and providing them
\vith concrete benefits. Among the most im-
portant of these are the hope expressed that
space will be explored and used "for the bene-
fit and in the interests of all countries" and
the explicit assurance of the right of all
states, without discrimination and on a basis
of equality, to explore freely and use outer
space and celestial bodies. These areas thus
cannot become the exclusive preserve of the
big powers or the first arrivals.
Numerous other provisions of the treaty,
such as those on liability and contamination,
protect the interests of the smaller powers.
As a matter of principle as well as of prag-
matism, I believe it is very much in the
interest of the United States that the non-
launching powers, whose cooperation and
friendship are of great importance to us,
should have such protections and assurances.
III. Development of the Treaty
Let me now give the committee some high-
lights of the history of this treaty, both
within the United States Government and in
the negotiating phase.
As far as the United States Government is
concerned, this treaty is the result, over the
years, of a broadly based consensus and of
wide consultation and collaboration. This has
been true as between political parties, as be-
tween the Executive and the Congress, and
as between the executive departments.
The bipartisan origins of the treaty, as
well as the early congressional interest in it,
are attested to by the fact that the earliest
initiatives toward international agreement in
this area were taken by President Eisen-
hower and by the then majority leader of the
Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson — who was also at
that time the chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences.
Ever since that time the successive steps to-
ward this treaty have been taken on a bi-
partisan basis and in the closest consultation
between the Executive and the concerned
committees of Congress. This was true dur-
ing the negotiation in Geneva last July and
August, when two of our congressional ad-
visers, Chairman George Miller of the Com-
mittee on Science and Astronautics and Rep-
resentative James Fulton, came to Geneva.
The advice and counsel provided by Members
of the Senate in Washington and New York
at various stages of the negotiations were
likewise deeply appreciated.
As for the executive branch, the nature of
the subject made necessary the close collabo-
ration of a number of executive departments
and agencies. This collaboration was evi-
denced by the composition of my negotiating
delegation which included representatives of
the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
NASA, the AEC, ACDA, and the Depart-
ment of State. From my standpoint as a
negotiator this collaboration has been most
successful, and I cannot speak too highly of
the participation and advice we received
from all parts of the Government during the
negotiating phase.
I am not going to go into the whole history
of the work on this treaty within the Govern-
ment, which started almost with the begin-
ning of the space age. A recent stimulus for
these preparations was the developing pace
of United States and Soviet activities directed
toward the landing of astronauts on the
moon. In October of 1965 the State Depart-
ment circulated the text of a proposed treaty
to other executive agencies including the De-
partment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and
the National Aeronautics and Space Council.
Subsequent interdepartmental consultations
proceeded into the early months of 1966 and
resulted in a number of changes in the pro-
posed text.
On May 7, 1966, President Johnson made
an announcement drawing attention to the
need for a treaty laying down rules and pro-
cedures for the exploration of celestial bodies
and calling for early international discussions
to this end. He pointed out that the United
States wanted to do what it could to see that
APRIL 10, 1967
605
serious political conflicts did not arise as a
result of space activities and to insure that
astronauts would be able freely to conduct
scientific investigations of the moon.
The President's announcement proposed
six elements of such a treaty: (1) freedom
of exploration, (2) prohibition of claims of
sovereignty, (3) freedom of scientific investi-
gation and international cooperation, (4)
studies to avoid harmful contamination, (5)
mutual assistance among astronauts in case
of need, and (6) a ban on the stationing of
weapons of mass destruction, weapons tests,
and military maneuvers on celestial bodies.
Mr. Chairman, each and every one of these
six elements is included in the treaty now
before the committee.
On May 9 I informed the Chairman of the
United Nations Outer Space Committee, Am-
bassador Kurt Waldheim of Austria, of the
President's statement and requested an early
session of the 28-member Legal Subcommit-
tee to prepare a treaty for submission to the
General Assembly in the fall.' On May 11 I
gave the permanent representative of the
Soviet Union at the United Nations an out-
line of our points for inclusion in the pro-
posed treaty. We also consulted widely with
other members of the Legal Subcommittee.
The first response from the U.S.S.R. came
on May 30 in the form of a letter from For-
eign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko to Sec-
retary-General U Thant. This letter asked
that the matter of a celestial bodies treaty be
taken up by the General Assembly in the
fall. It was very encouraging to us; because
not only did we and the Soviets apparently
have in mind the same subject for a treaty —
namely, activities on celestial bodies — but in
addition the principles that they proposed for
inclusion in the treaty were extremely close
to ours. I therefore wrote to Ambassador
Waldheim on June 16 ^'' proposing that the
Outer Space Legal Subcommittee be convened
on July 12 so as to begin work without de-
lay. This proposal was quickly agreed to.
• For text of Ambassador Goldberg's letter of May
9, 1966, see ibid., June 6, 1966, p. 900.
"/bid., July 11, 1966, p. 60.
Meanwhile, on June 16, both we and the
Soviet Union made public proposed treaty
texts.ii With regard to the scope of the drafts,
both texts dealt with activities on celestial
bodies. The Soviet text also included provi-
sions on the regulation of activities in outer
space generally. These were drawn from two
major resolutions of the General Assembly:
the "no bombs in orbit" resolution ^^ and the
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space. Both these resolu-
tions had been unanimously adopted by the
Assembly in 1963 as a result of United States
initiatives. The principles they contained are
among the most important in the treaty.
It should be recalled, however, that the
Outer Space Treaty embodies major provi-
sions that were not in the 1963 resolutions.
Of prime importance among these are the
prohibition on use of celestial bodies for
specified military activities, the guarantee of
open and veto-free access by space powers to
each other's installations on celestial bodies,
and the provision for full reporting of space
activities.
The treaty negotiations in the Legal Sub-
committee opened at the European headquar-
ters of the United Nations in Geneva on the
agreed date, July 12. They ran until August
4 and, after a brief adjournment, resumed in
New York from September 12 through
September 16. Great progress had been made,
but the treaty was still some distance from
completion. During September, October, and
November, the U.S. delegation held detailed
private consultations with many members of
the Legal Subcommittee, including, of
course, the Soviet Union. As a result of these
consultations, agreement on the treaty text
was finally reached in early December.
In accordance with United Nations proce-
dures, the completed space treaty then made
its appearance in the Political Committee of
the General Assembly in a resolution co-
sponsored by 43 members of the United Na/-
tions, among them many members of the
Outer Space Committee, including the United
" For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see ibid., p. 61.
"Ibid., Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.
606
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
states, the United Kingdom, France, and the
Soviet Union. The resolution commended the
treaty, requested the depositaiy governments
to open it for signature and ratification at the
earliest possible date, and expressed the hope
for the widest possible adherence.
The General Assembly adopted this reso-
lution by acclamation on December 19.1^ The
treaty was then perfected in French, Spanish,
and Chinese — with indispensable help from
the United Nations Secretariat. On January
27 it was opened for signature simultaneously
in Washington, London, and Moscow. At the
ceremony in Washington ^* 60 states signed
the treaty, including the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. The
total number of signatories at present is 75.
IV. Principal Issues in the Negotiations
With the committee's permission, I shall
now discuss certain issues that arose during
the negotiations, in which the Soviet view dif-
fered from our own and agreement was
reached after experiencing some difficulty.
My purpose is not to lay undue stress on
the difficulties we encountered, because the
fact is that the negotiations as a whole went
very smoothly and rapidly and were marked
by a spirit of accommodation and a willing-
ness on all sides to compromise without sacri-
ficing fundamental principles. Moreover, the
importance of a given provision cannot
always be measured by the difficulty in reach-
ing agreement on it. A number of the major
provisions which I mentioned at the outset of
this statement, and which are important to
our interests, were agreed on with little or
no difficulty.
However, I do believe that some account
of the main issues on which there has been
difficulty and of how they were resolved may
be useful to the committee in forming its own
judgment on the overall value of the treaty.
These points related to (1) access to installa-
tions on celestial bodies, (2) limitations on
specified military activities on celestial
bodies, (3) requests by launching powers for
tracking facilities, (4) liability for damage
resulting from space launchings, and (5) the
unconditional obligation to return astronauts
who land on foreign territory or on the high
seas.
1. Access to installations on celestial
bodies. The United States treaty draft of
June 16 proposed that
All areas of celestial bodies including all stations,
installations, equipment, and space vehicles on celes-
tial bodies, shall be open at all times to repre-
sentatives of other States conducting activities on
celestial bodies.
We considered such a guarantee of openness
to be fundamental to the treaty. Specifically,
it was necessary in order to verify compliance
with the prohibition against the placing of
weapons of mass destruction on celestial
bodies and the limitation on specified military
activities there.
The first Soviet treaty proposal did not
contain any provision on open access. After
considerable discussion in Geneva, the
U.S.S.R. accepted in principle our proposal
that there should be open access and agreed
that such access should apply to all areas of
celestial bodies and to all stations, installa-
tions, equipment, and space vehicles placed
on such bodies.
However, the U.S.S.R. raised two difficul-
ties concerning this article. First, they in-
sisted that there should be access only "on a
basis of reciprocity." This phrase, in its
usual meaning, was acceptable to us. Indeed,
it is implied in every international agree-
ment. But we had to be sure that the record
would leave no doubt as to its meaning. After
thorough discussion we reached agreement
with the Soviet and other delegations on this
point. I then made a statement in the Legal
Subcommittee in Geneva on August 3 as to
the meaning of the phrase.^^ I reiterated this
interpretation in my statement of December
17 to the Political Committee of the General
Assembly,!^ the text of which is attached to
the President's message." This statement
" For text, see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 83.
" For background, see ibid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 266.
" Ibid., Aug. 29, 1966, p. 321.
" Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 78.
" For President Johnson's message to the Senate
on Feb. 7, see ibid.. Mar. 6, 1967, p. 386.
APRIL 10, 1967
607
was an authoritative, on-the-record interpre-
tation of the treaty. It was not challenged in
the debate, and the resolution commending
the treaty was thereupon adopted by accla-
mation.
In these clarifying statements I pointed
out that the words "on a basis of reciprocity"
in article XII do not import a veto. That is,
they do not mean that State A may visit
State B's facilities or installations on a celes-
tial body only if B asks to visit those of A.
On the contrary, "on a basis of reciprocity"
merely states what would be true in any event
under international law. Any party to the
treaty has the right to visit installations of
another party on a celestial body — whether
or not the other party chooses to exercise its
reciprocal right. If, however, the prospective
visitor has illegally, and in violation of the
treaty, barred visits to its facilities by the
state whose installations it wishes to inspect,
the second state may deny a visit to the
breaching party. This result is simply an ap-
plication of the principle that when one
party breaches a material obligation which
is owed to another party, the latter is entitled
to withhold performance of a commensurate
obligation which it would otherwise have
owed to the first party.
I might point out, in addition, that if any
party were to deny access to its facilities and
thus breach this basic provision of the
treaty, other parties whose rights had thus
been interfered with would be entitled to take
action consistent with international law. Thus
in the event of a material breach, a party
would have the option of treating the
entirety of its treaty obligations toward the
breaching party as having come to an end,
to be revived only upon remedial action by
the defaulter.
The second difficulty raised by the
U.S.S.R. in regard to the access provision
was its proposal that celestial bodies installa-
tions should be open "subject to agreement
between the parties with regard to the time
of visit to such objects." I considered this
proposal to be totally unacceptable. Such a
provision could have been read as giving a
party the right to withhold a visit indefinitely
and thus achieve a veto in fact. The Soviets
insisted that this was not their intention; but
since we were dealing with a key provision
of the treaty, it was essential that we fore-
close any doubt as to the right of visitation.
At this stage the Japanese and Italian
delegates made a valuable point. They sug-
gested that what the treaty needed was some
guarantee that a visit would not jeopardize
the safety of astronauts or normal function-
ing of the installations being visited. On re-
flection it seemed clear that the inspection
provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, from
which our access language was drawn, were
not in all respects appropriate for the Outer
Space Treaty. This was especially true in
view of the far greater difficulties and
hazards of lunar exploration in contrast to
Antarctic exploration — the extreme impor-
tance of unimpaired oxygen supply, the need
for careful conservation of life-supporting
systems, and the difficulty of surface travel.
We would not want to receive a visit from the
Soviets or any other party if that visit would
jeopardize the lives of our astronauts. We
also bore in mind the practical fact that for
the foreseeable future it would be immensely
difficult to engage in forbidden activities on
the moon without detection.
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty thus
embodies the practical solution that "reason-
able advance notice of a projected visit" shall
be given "in order that appropriate consul-
tations may be held and that maximum pre-
cautions may be taken to assure safety and
to avoid interference with normal operations
in the facility to be visited." There is no veto.
I made this clear in a statement on the rec-
ord on August 3 in the Legal Subcommittee
in Geneva and on December 17 in the Gen-
eral Assembly's Political Committee in New
York. Again, no country dissented.
Before leaving this matter of verification,
let me make clear that the access provisions I
have been discussing apply only to celestial
bodies and are a safeguard against treaty
violations in that context. The prohibition
against placing weapons of mass destruction
in orbit has no related provision dealing
specifically with verification. The treaty
608
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
leaves it open to individual countries to
employ their own national means of verifica-
tion. I understand that in his testimony Gen-
eral Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] will state why,
from the viewpoint of our armed services,
the prohibition on orbiting nuclear weapons
is desirable. Accordingly, I do not propose to
go into this matter. But speaking for the
administration, after close consultation with
the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and NASA, I want to stress that the
executive branch is agreed that our national
interest is served by this provision.
To this I might add that if we had no
treaty prohibition against orbiting nuclear
weapons, the Soviet Union would have no
legal inhibition in this area of any kind what-
ever. Our situation could therefore only be
worsened if the treaty failed to include this
prohibition. It is our judgment that the
existence of the prohibition will tend to limit
the arms race, help make the problem of
nuclear weapons more manageable, and
thereby assist the growth of international
security. It will help avoid a costly and
dangerous new area of weapons deployment.
2. Limitations on specified military activi-
ties on celestial bodies. In developing our
position as to permissible activities on celes-
tial bodies, we drew heavily on the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959. The prohibitions on specified
types of military activities in that treaty have
stood the test of time. Interestingly enough,
the first Soviet proposal also reflected shared
Antarctic experience.
The United States, following closely the
Antarctic Treaty, proposed that the establish-
ment of military fortifications, the carrying
out of military maneuvers, and the testing of
weapons on celestial bodies be prohibited and
that the treaty should also state the matter
affirmatively by calling for celestial bodies to
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Now, in offering these proposals we clearly
and candidly recognized that military person-
nel and military equipment, as such, should
not and could not be prohibited from celestial
bodies. Most of our astronauts are members
of the armed services. Our rocketry has been
developed in important measure with funds
appropriated by the Congress as part of de-
fense budgets. The United States treaty
draft of June 16 therefore added a saving
clause as follows:
The use of military personnel, facilities or equip-
ment for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purpose shall not be prohibited.
Here, too, we followed the pattern of the
Antarctic Treaty.
This matter, which is dealt with in article
IV, paragraph 2, of the Outer Space Treaty
created two problems of considerable diffi-
culty. Part of the problem appears to have
been semantic.
First, the U.S.S.R. asserted that our pro-
posal to ban "military fortifications" was
inadequate and that we should agree as well
to forbid "military bases and installations."
Now, we had no problem in accepting a ban
on "military bases." The Antarctic Treaty
contains a ban on military bases, and no one
has ever charged that, for example, the Navy-
supported facilities on McMurdo Sound
were a military base in violation of the
Antarctic Treaty. But we were doubtful
about accepting a ban on "military installa-
tions" because it seemed too sweeping. Any
construction on the moon, if built or used by
astronauts belonging to a military service,
could conceivably be labeled a "military
installation" even though its character and
purpose were entirely peaceful. I pointed out
to the Soviet delegation on a number of occa-
sions that a lunar barracks built to house
astronauts who might be drawn from the
military services of their country might be
said to be a "military installation" — or at
least could be alleged to be such — regardless
of the fact of its peaceful and research-
supporting character. I made it clear that
the United States could not accept a prohibi-
tion whose apparent scope might be so broad
as to defy meaningful definition.
Our proposed saving clause raised much
the same issue in a different form. At first the
Soviets professed to see no need for such a
clause. They took the position that the em-
ployment by them of Soviet military person-
nel for activities on celestial bodies would not
APRIL 10, 1967
609
violate the treaty. We pointed out that unless
there were such a saving clause as to astro-
nauts having military rank, a party might
later charge that employment of such astro-
nauts was prohibited. Eventually, without too
much difficulty, the U.S.S.R. came around to
accepting the saving clause which now
appears as the penultimate sentence of
article IV and states that "The use of mili-
tary personnel for scientific research or for
any other peaceful purposes shall not be pro-
hibited."
But it was only toward the very end of our
negotiations that the Soviets agreed to a sav-
ing clause regarding military equipment. We
were able to agree on such a clause, contained
in the last sentence of article IV, stating that
"The use of any equipment or facility neces-
sary for peaceful exploration of the moon and
other celestial bodies shall also not be pro-
hibited."
Agreement on this saving clause, in turn,
made it possible for us to accept the inclusion
of "military installations" among the prohibi-
tions applying to celestial bodies. To return
to the example of the barracks, such a facility
would be in conformity with the treaty be-
cause it would be necessary for peaceful ex-
ploration.
3. Tracking facilities. A third diflSculty in
the negotiations involved earth-based track-
ing stations. This subject was raised by the
U.S.S.R., but for some time it was not clear
what they wanted. Their first treaty proposal,
on June 16, read as follows: "The Parties to
the Treaty undertake to accord equal condi-
tions to States engaged in the exploration of
outer space." When it became apparent that
many members of the Legal Subcommittee
did not understand what this language meant,
the U.S.S.R. made a second proposal, on July
20, that "States Parties to the Treaty will
accord other States Parties to the Treaty
conducting activities relating to the explora-
tion and use of outer space equal conditions
for observing the flight of space objects
launched by these States."
The Subcommittee took some time to con-
sider this proposal. The Soviet delegate
portrayed it as a limited obligation. He said
that it merely required that State A, if it had
granted a tracking facility to State B, must
also grant tracking facilities on request to
State C. This explanation seemed to suggest
that the Soviets might be seeking a "free
ride" by applying the most-favored-nation
principle to the granting of tracking facili-
ties. Under their proposal, the countries with
whom the United States has carefully negoti-
ated bilateral space agreements over a period
of years would have been obliged to let the
Soviets construct installations on their soil.
As you know, the United States has agree-
ments for tracking facilities with a large
number of countries including Argentina,
Australia, Chile, Ecuador, Madagascar,
Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
The representatives of a number of these
countries made clear that they could not
agree to such an obligation. They pointed
out, as we also did, that arrangement for the
establishment of a space tracking facility is a
bilateral matter. Not only is it related to the
desire of nations to cooperate with one an-
other in space research, but there are also
practical considerations which might impel a
country to grant a facility to one space power
while finding it undesirable to make a like
grant to another space power. The Soviet pro-
posal to place an absolute obligation upon
host countries was therefore unacceptable.
Further discussions led to further revi-
sions. Eventually, a solution to this problem
was found in the provision which appears as
article X of the treaty. This article provides
that ". . . the States Parties to the Treaty
shall consider on a basis of equality any
requests by other States Parties to the Treaty
to be afforded an opportunity to observe the
flight of space objects launched by those
States. The nature of such an opportunity for
observation and the conditions under which
it could be afforded shall be determined by
agreement between the States concerned."
We consulted closely with a number of the
countries who have granted tracking facili-
ties to us before agreeing to this proposal.
We also considered our own obligations in
view of the fact that, as you know, the United
States has entered into an agreement with
610
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the European Space Research Organization
authorizing it to construct a tracking facility
at Fairbanks, Alaska." Our friends said that
they could agree to the text of article X on
the understanding that an authoritative
statement would be made as to the scope and
limitations of the obligations which that
article imposes.
Accordingly, after extensive consultations
with a number of members, including the
Soviet Union, I decided to place upon the
record an authoritative interpretation of
what this obligation entails. On December 17,
speaking to the General Assembly's Political
Committee, I said:
It is quite clear from the text of the article, how-
ever, that there must be agreement between the
parties concerned for the establishment of a track-
ing facility. The article as thus revised recognizes
that the elements of mutual benefit and acceptability
are natural and necessary parts of the decision
whether to enter into an agreement concerning such
a facility, and it appropriately incorporates the prin-
ciple that each state which is asked to cooperate has
the right to consider its legitimate interests in reach-
ing its decision.
No objection was recorded to this statement
and this put the matter to rest.
4. Liability. The 1963 Declaration of Legal
Principles adopted by the General Assembly
contains a provision on liability which is car-
ried over into the space treaty without
change. Article VII of the treaty codifies the
international legal rule that a country which
launches a space vehicle, or from whose terri-
tory an object is launched into outer space, is
"internationally liable for damage to another
State Party ... or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component
parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies."
Article VII is indeed desirable. But a
separate agreement on liability for damages
caused by space vehicles is a necessity, and
we hope to continue work in the Outer Space
Legal Subcommittee toward that end. Such
an agreement should lay down rules and pro-
cedures governing liability and the presenta-
" For text, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 979.
tion of international claims. Work of this
character has been undertaken in the Legal
Subcommittee since 1962, but the issues are
complex and redoubled efforts are required.
A number of basic issues remain. These in-
clude how costs should be shared when
damages are caused by a space project in
which more than one country participates;
how to measure the damage applicable to loss
of life, bodily injury, and destruction of prop-
erty; and agreement on a tribunal to adjudi-
cate disputed claims.
The Legal Subcommittee has on its agenda
a separate agreement on liability, and we will
want to prepare our position for future de-
liberations on this subject. What is most
satisfactory is that the Outer Space Treaty
contains an optimum fundamental rule on
this subject.
5. Return of astronauts. Finally, I would
like to comment on the obligation, contained
in article V of the space treaty, that when
astronauts land on foreign territory or on the
high seas "they shall be safely and promptly
returned to the State of registry of their
space vehicle." The 1963 Declaration of Legal
Principles stated this rule in the same
manner.
However, in the Outer Space Legal Sub-
committee discussions of 1964 and 1965 con-
cerning a detailed agreement on the return
of astronauts and space vehicles, the
U.S.S.R. had not proved as forthcoming. The
Soviets had at various times appeared to
insist on language that might be taken to
limit the humanitarian obligation to return
an astronaut. We thought it incompatible
with the spirit of the treaty, which describes
astronauts as "envoys of mankind," to sug-
gest in any manner that detention could be
envisaged or tolerated. We thus continued to
insist that the duty to return must be abso-
lute and unconditional. It is a particular
source of satisfaction to us that agreement
was reached on this basis.
On a related matter, we were also able to
reach agreement on the unconditional obliga-
tion to report to other parties or the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations, "any
phenomena they discover in outer space, in-
APRIL 10, 1967
611
eluding the moon and other celestial bodies,
which could constitute a danger to the life or
health of astronauts."
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, I commend to this commit-
tee the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. I believe
it meets the essential test of any international
agreement which the President submits to the
Senate. It will further the national interest
and the security of the United States and will
encourage the cause of peace in the world.
I earnestly hope the Senate will advise and
consent to its ratification.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Poland Sign
Cotton Textile Agreement
Preea release 58 dated March 16
The Governments of the United States and
Poland exchanged notes on March 15 effect-
ing a comprehensive agreement covering
U.S. imports of all categories of cotton tex-
tiles from Poland.! The 3-year agreement
was signed for the United States by Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs Anthony
M. Solomon and for Poland by Mr. Zdzislaw
Szewczyk, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of
the Polish People's Republic.
The United States entered into the agree-
ment in accordance with its obligations under
the Long-Term Arrangement for interna-
tional trade in cotton textiles. This arrange-
ment was negotiated in 1962 by importing
and exporting countries under the auspices
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Poland is not a participant in GATT
' For text of the U.S. note, see Department press
release 58 dated Mar. 16.
or the Long-Term Arrangement, but has
applied for admission to GATT.
The agreement will supersede current limi-
tations on seven individual categories of cot-
ton textile imports from Poland which the
United States put into effect in 1966.
The effect of the agreement is to provide
for orderly growth in Polish exports of cot-
ton textiles to the United States while avoid-
ing disruption in the U.S. domestic market.
The agreement sets an aggregate limit of
5 million square yards equivalent for the
first agreement year, with a 5 percent in-
crease permitted in the second and succeed-
ing years of the agreement. The total is
divided almost equally between apparel, 2.6
million square yards equivalent, and other
categories, 2.4 million square yards equiva-
lent. There are also nine individual category
ceilings.
The Polish Government agreed to use its
best efforts to space exports from Poland to
the United States within each category evenly
throughout the agreement year, taking into
consideration normal seasonal factors.
The two Governments agreed to cooperate
in providing statistical data to each other and
to consult as necessary on problems that may
arise in administration of the agreement.
In 1966 the United States imported from
Poland 3.1 million square yards equivalent of
cotton textiles valued at $652,000.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi-
lateral agreement between the United States and
Brazil of July 8, 1965 (TIAS 6126), for coopera-
tion concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Vienna March 10, 1967. Enters into
force on the date which the Agency shall have
received from the two Governments written noti-
fication that they have complied with all statu-
tory and constitutional requirements for entry
into force.
Signatures: Brazil, International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States.
612
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Consular Relations
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the acquisition of na-
tionality. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17,
1967.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: Madagascar, February 17,
1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states.
Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered
into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature: Sudan, March 15, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London, April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.'
Acceptance deposited: United States, March 17,
1967.
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
International convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries. Done at Washington February 8, 1949.
Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries signed under date
of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089). Done at Wash-
ington June 25, 1956. Entered into force January
10, 1959. TIAS 4170.
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Declaration of understanding regarding the interna-
tional convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (TIAS 2089). Done at Washington
April 24, 1961. Entered into force June 5, 1963.
TIAS 5380.
Acceptance received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington
July 15, 1963. Entered into force April 29, 1966.
TIAS 6011.
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington
November 29, 1965.''
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by
the Commission. Done at Washington November
29, 1965.'
Adherence received: Romania, March 21, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final pro-
tocol, and convention with final protocol and reg-
ulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Ratifications deposited: Ghana, November 17,
1966; Spain, Spanish territories in Africa, No-
vember 9, 1966; Yugoslavia, November 15, 1966.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.'
Ratifications deposited: Australia, January 25,
1967; Ceylon, January 13, 1967; Finland, Feb-
ruary 3, 1967; Lebanon, January 10, 1967;
Nigeria, January 21, 1967.
Accession deposited: Guyana, March 8, 1967.
Trade
Declaration on the provisional accession of Argen-
tina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960. En-
tered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.
Declaration on the provisional accession of Iceland
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force
April 19, 1964; for the United States November
20, 1964. TIAS 5687.
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.
Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the pro-
visional accession of Iceland to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687).
Done at Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into
force December 28, 1965; for the United States
December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.
Acceptance: Tunisia, February 15, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force Au-
gust 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Acceptance: Portugal, February 7, 1967.
Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on
the provisional accession of Argentina to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS
5184). Done at Geneva November 17, 1966.
Acceptances: Argentina, January 9, 1967; Aus-
tralia, January 11, 1967; Austria, December 30,
1966;^ Belgium, January 27, 1967;' Canada,
January 3, 1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966;
Finland, December 30, 1966; Indonesia, Decem-
ber 28, 1966; Israel, January 3, 1967; Japan,
December 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22,
1966;' Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway,
January 16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967;
Tunisia, February 15, 1967; Turkey, February
1, 1967; United Kingdom, February 13, 1967;
United States, December 13, 1966.
Entered into force: January 9, 1967.
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on
the provisional accession of the United Arab Re-
public to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November
17, 1966.
Acceptances: Australia, January 11, 1967; Bel-
gium, January 27, 1967;' Canada, January 3,
1967; Denmark, December 22, 1966; Finland,
December 30, 1966; Greece, January 24, 1967;
Indonesia, December 28, 1966; Japan, Decem-
ber 28, 1966; Netherlands, December 22, 1966; '
Nigeria, December 15, 1966; Norway, January
16, 1967; Sweden, January 27, 1967; Switzer-
land, February 14, 1967; Turkey, February 1,
1967; United Arab Republic, January 18, 1967;
United Kingdom, February 13, 1967; United
States, December 13, 1966.
Entered into force: January 18, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
^ Not in force.
' Subject to ratification.
APRIL 10, 1967
613
BILATERAL
Brazil
Convention for the avoidance of double taxation
with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Rio
de Janeiro March 13, 1967. Enters into force upon
exchange of ratifications.
Lesotho
Agreement relating to investment guaranties.
Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967.
Entered into force: March 7, 1967.
Luxembours
Agreement amending annex B of the mutual de-
fense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950
(TIAS 2014). Effected by exchange of notes at
Luxembourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into
force March 14, 1967.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Consular Convention. Signed at Moscow June 1,
1964."
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
16, 1967.
Viet-Nam
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex.
Signed at Saigon March 13, 1967. Entered into
force March 13, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
' Not in force.
Recent Releases
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Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20i02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25 percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5# each.
Botswana. Pub. 8046. 4 pp.
Ethiopia. Pub. 7785. 8 pp.
The Gambia. Pub. 8014. 4 pp.
Honduras. Pub. 8184. 4 pp.
Indonesia. Pub. 7786. 8 pp.
Lesotho. Pub. 8091. 4 pp.
Mauritania. Pub. 8169. 8 pp.
South West Africa. Pub. 8168. 8 pp.
Swaziland. Pub. 8174. 8 pp.
United Arab Republic Pub. 8152. 8 pp.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1450
PUBLICATION 8224
APRIL 10, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issaed by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addressee made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative materia]
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin ia for sale by the Sup«^
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
614
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX April 10, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1A50
Asia. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use
U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597
Congress. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador
Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer
Space Treaty 600
Department and Foreigrn Service
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu-
nique) 586
U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet at Bonn . 599
Ek:onoinic Affairs
Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) . . 598
United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile
Agreement 612
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at
Guam (Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint com-
munique) 586
Europe. U.S. Mission Chiefs in Europe Meet
at Bonn 599
Military Affairs
Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use
U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu-
nique) 586
Von-Self-Goveming Territoriee. Pacific Islands
Trust Territory (Johnson) 598
Outer Space. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador
Goldberg Urge Senate Approval of Outer
Space Treaty 600
Poland. United States and Poland Sign Cotton
Textile Agreement 612
Presidential Documents
Pacific Islands Trust Territory 598
President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation
on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh . . 595
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam . 586
Publications. Recent Releases 614
Science. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Gold-
berg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space
Treaty 600
Thailand. Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To
Use U Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597
Treaty Information
Current Actions 612
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge
Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty . . 600
United States and Poland Sign Cotton Textile
Agreement 612
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Gold-
berg Urge Senate Approval of Outer Space
Treaty 600
United Nations
Pacific Islands Trust Territory (Johnson) . . 598
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg Urge
Senate Approval of Outer Space Treaty . . 600
Viet-Nam
President Johnson's Proposal for Negotiation
on Viet-Nam Rejected by Ho Chi Minh (De-
partment statement and texts of letters) . 595
Thailand Grants U.S. Permission To Use U
Tapao Airbase (Rusk) 597
U.S. and Vietnamese Leaders Confer at Guam
(Guerrero, Johnson, Thieu, joint commu-
nique) 586
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 600
Guerrero, Manuel F. L 586
Ho Chi Minh 595
Johnson, President 586, 595, 598
Rusk, Secretary 597, 600
Thieu, Nguyen Van 586
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 20—26
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to March 20 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
46 of March 7 and 58 of March 22.
No. Date Subject
160 3/20 U.S. inspection of Antarctic sta-
tions (rewrite).
t61 3/21 Convention on conduct of North
Atlantic fisheries.
•62 3/23 Harriman: Franklin D. Roose-
velt birthday memorial dinner,
New York.
*63 3/24 Program for visit of Prime Min-
ister of Afghanistan.
t64 3/24 U.S. and Portugal sign cotton
textile agreement.
65 3/24 Chiefs of U.S. diplomatic mis-
sions in Europe to meet at
Bonn (rewrite).
t66 3/25 Itinerary for Vice President
Humphrey's trip to Europe
March 26-April 9.
73 3/22 Rusk: Thai airbases.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
« U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/40
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Nam (publication 8195) summarizes the history, geography, government, and economy of
country. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (publication 8196) reviews peace efforts by
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U51
April 17, 1967
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 28 618
U.S. RECAPITULATES BASIC PRINCIPLES
FOR U.N. PEACEKEEPING FUNCTIONS
Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 636
UNITED STATES ACCEPTS U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PROPOSAL
FOR ENDING THE VIET-NAM CONFLICT
Texts of Secretary-General's Aide Memoire and U.S. Replies 624.
For index see inside back cover
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28
Press release 70 dated March 28
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
Earlier today, the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, U Thant, made public
some proposals which he had offered to a
number of governments involved in the
problem in Viet-Nam on March 14.i The fol-
lowing day we gave the Secretary-General
our interim reply, stating that we welcomed
his initiative and, after consultation with
the Government of Viet-Nam and other
allies, we would give him a more considered
reply.
On March 18 we delivered that reply to
the Secretary-General, and you now have
that in front of you.
In essence, the Secretary-General pro-
posed that there be a general standstill truce
in Viet-Nam, that there then be preliminary
talks leading to a reconvening of the Geneva
conference.
In our reply we stated that we accepted
the outline of his proposals, that we would
be glad to negotiate the standstill truce and
take part in preliminary discussions leading
to a reconvening of that conference.
We do not yet have in front of us the full
text of whatever reply Hanoi may have de-
livered to the Secretary-General. Whether
Hanoi will make that public, I do not now
know. We do have a public statement from
Hanoi which seems to indicate their attitude.
That public statement of yesterday said that:
To call on both sides to cease fire and hold un-
conditional negotiations, while the United States
is committing aggression against Viet-Nam and tak-
ing serious steps in its military escalation in both
zones of Viet-Nam, is to make no distinction be-
tween the aggressor and the victim of aggression.
to depart from reality, and to demand that the
Vietnamese people accept the conditions of the
aggressors.
And then it adds:
And, by the way, it is necessary to underline once
again the views of the Government of Hanoi, which
has pointed out that the Viet-Nam problem has no
concern with the United Nations and the United
Nations has absolutely no right to interfere in any
way in the Viet-Nam question.
The indications are, therefore, that Hanoi
has once again taken a negative view toward
an initiative taken by someone else to move
this matter toward peace.
I might say that the recent publication of
the exchange between President Johnson and
Ho Chi Minh 2 and today's publication of the
proposals of the Secretary-General, and the
responses to it, illustrate the problem that
we have had from the beginning in bringing
the Viet-Nam problem to a peaceful conclu-
sion.
Many governments, many groups of gov-
ernments, many world personalities, have
tried to take an initiative to move this con-
flict toward a peaceful settlement. There has
invariably been a positive and a constructive
response from the United States, and there
has invariably been a negative and hostile
and, at times, vituperative response from the
authorities in Hanoi. When one looks back
over the long record of initiatives taken by
many personalities and governments and
groups of governments, one sees the record
of Hanoi's intransigence, with such phrases
as "swindle" and "farce" and words of that
sort.
Now, we do not ourselves believe that
peace is not the business of the United Na-
tions. We believe that no nation can say that
1 See p. 624.
• Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1966, p. 595.
618
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
a world organization representing 122 na-
tions cannot properly take up the question of
maintaining the peace. The charter provides
for it, the obligations of the nations of the
world are involved, and the issue of peace is
at stake.
Nevertheless, we have never insisted that
tlie United Nations is the sole mechanism
for dealing with this question.
There is now pending before the Security-
Council a resolution offered by the United
States calling for a peaceful settlement of
this problem.^ That has been resisted in the
United Nations because of the attitude of
Hanoi and Peking toward the involvement of
the United Nations. When the Soviet Ambas-
sador said at the Security Council that "This
is not the business of the U. N., it is a matter
for the Geneva machinery," Ambassador
Goldberg [U.S. Representative to the United
Nations Arthur J. Goldberg] said, "All
right. If that is your view, we will agree
with that; then let us use the Geneva ma-
chinery."
But the Geneva machinery has been para-
lyzed by the attitude of Hanoi and Peking.
For example, that machinery has not been
available to respond favorably to Prince
[Norodom] Sihanouk's request that the In-
ternational Control Commission step up its
activities to insure the neutrality and the
territorial integrity of Cambodia. That
machinery was not available to insure the
demilitarization of the demilitarized zone be-
tween North and South Viet-Nam.
So we would say to the authorities in
Hanoi that surely there must be some ma-
chinery somewhere which can open the pos-
sibilities of peace. If not the United Nations,
then the Geneva machinery; if not the
Geneva machinery, then the resources of
quiet diplomacy.
I can tell you, now that the exchange be-
tween President Johnson and Ho Chi Minh
has been made public, and U Thant's pro-
posals and our reply have been made public,
that there is nothing in the private record
' For text of a U.S. draft resolution submitted to
the U.N. Security Council on Jan. 31, 1966, see ibid.,
Feb. 14, 1966, p. 231.
which throws any different light on this sit-
uation than you now have in the public
record. Despite all of the efforts made pri-
vately by many people in many places, the
private record and the public record are now
in agreement.
I do hope that the authorities in Hanoi
would give serious thought to the present
situation. If they have supposed that they
would be able to obtain a military victory
in the South, they must surely now put that
hope aside. If they have had any hope that
there would be a political collapse in South
Viet-Nam, surely they must now know that
all of the groups in South Viet-Nam, who
have some differences among themselves, are
resolved to bring into being a constitutional
government in which those various groups
can work together on a basis of the free
choice of the South Vietnamese people with
respect to their future and that one point on
which they are generally agreed in South
Viet-Nam is that they do not wish the pro-
gram of Hanoi or the Liberation Front.
If Hanoi supposes that somehow interna-
tional opinion will come to their rescue,
surely they must know that when they rebuff
the United Nations Organization, an organi-
zation of 122 members, this will not bring
them support in other parts of the world.
And surely they must understand that all
small nations who are within the reach of
some greater power have a stake in the
ability of South Viet-Nam to determine its
own future for itself. And surely Hanoi must
not be under continuing misapprehension
that somehow some divisions within the
United States might cause us to change our
attitude toward our commitments to South
Viet-Nam. Because although there may be
some differences among us, those differences
are trivial compared to the differences be-
tween all of us, on the one side, and Hanoi
on the other.
So we would hope that in some fashion, in
some way, at some time, the authorities in
Hanoi will make use of some machinery in
which to be responsive to the many efforts
which we and others have been making to-
ward peace over the last several years.
APRIL 17, 1967
619
It is no good to brush aside the 17 non-
alined nations, and the British Common-
wealth of Prime Ministers, and His Holiness
the Pope, the Secretary-General, and the
President of India, and all the others who
have been trying to find some basis on which
this matter could be moved toward a peace-
ful conclusion, and suppose that somehow
world opinion is supporting them in their
efforts to seize South Viet-Nam by force.
So we would advise them to believe that,
as far as we are concerned, we are not call-
ing the search for a peaceful settlement to
an end because of Ho Chi Minh's reply to
President Johnson or because of the attitude
which they seem to be taking toward U
Thant's most recent proposals. We shall con-
tinue that effort by private and public
means, and we would hope that we would get
some response through some channel that
would begin to bring this thing within the
range of discussion and make it possible to
move toward a peaceful settlement.
Now, I am ready for your questions.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Q. Mr. Secretary, you have outlined all of
the reasons why they surely must not believe
these various elements. What is it then you
think that makes them keep on fighting and
refusing to negotiate in the face of what
must be a loss of international support and
these other adverse factors ?
A. Well, it is very hard to say. I can't
enter into the minds of the leaders in Hanoi
on a matter of that sort. I would suppose,
really, that they are under some misappre-
hension. They are making some mis judg-
ments and miscalculations on some point,
either the state of international opinion or
the state of opinion within the United States.
It's possible even that they still have some
slender hopes of some military success in
the South.
I just don't know what is in their minds.
But what I am saying is that, so far as we
understand their point of view, the principal
620
pillars of their hopes are eroding from under
them and they should become interested in
peace and at an early date and not at some
long delayed future date.
Q. Mr. Secretary, your statement today in
reply to U Thnnt has said that there would
be an apprapriate involvement for the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam throughout the I
entire process of arranging a peace. Would
you spell that out a little more, sir? Premier
\Nguyen Cao'\ Ky has been indicating that j
ive haven't called him in.
A. Well, obviously, any discussion with ,
North Viet-Nam about peace in Viet-Nam 'I
must directly involve the Government of
South Viet-Nam. Indeed, as you know, the
Government of South Viet-Nam has on more
than one occasion suggested direct talks be-
tween South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam.
They have proposed, for example, that the
two governments there get together on the
question of possibly extending the Tet stand-
down, the Tet cease-fire.
We would support that as a means for
coming to grips with this problem. We would
think that it would be a very good idea if
Hanoi were to accept the proposals of South
Viet-Nam for direct talks to move this to-
ward a peaceful solution.
There are many opportunities available,
you see.
There would be direct talks between Sai-
gon and Hanoi. There would be talks between
ourselves and Hanoi. There would be talks
under the auspices of the two cochairmen of
the Geneva conferences, or under the
auspices of the three members of the Interna-
tional Control Commission. Or there could be
intermediaries, such as the Secretaiy-Gen-
eral of the United Nations, or some other dis-
tinguished governmental or nongovernmental
leader. Any of these methods are appropriate
and useful, as far as we are concerned.
The problem is that no one has been able
to find a procedure or a method which ap-
parently is agreeable to Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary?
A. Yes.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Q. If Hanoi persists for months and even
years in its attitude, tvhat will our response
then be? What will our course be?
A. We shall meet our commitments in
South Viet-Nam. We shall do our duty there.
Q. Mr. Secretai-y, at the end of the Korean
war, as I recall, we entered into talks ivith-
out a truce and the fighting continued for 2
years. Would you explain, tvould this for-
mula to ivhich you have responded today,
could it be a lead to that same sort of thing,
peace talks without any change in the fight-
ing ?
A. Well, let me remind you, Mr. Harsch
[Joseph C. Harsch, NBC News], of our most
elementary position on this matter of talks.
We will talk this afternoon or tomorrow
morning without any conditions of any sort
on either side. We are prepared to talk while
the shooting is going on. If the other side
wishes to raise major conditions, as they
have with their demand that there be an
unconditional permanent cessation of the
bombing, we are prepared to talk about con-
ditions. We will discuss the conditions which
must precede the initiation of formal negoti-
ations.
Or if they do not wish to start at that end
— that is, What do you do about the shoot-
ing?— we are prepared to start at the other
end — What do you do about a final settle-
ment of the problem? — and work back from
that to the practical means by which you
reach the final settlement. So we are pre-
pared to talk without any conditions of any
sort — or about conditions.
Now, let me say that we don't ourselves
fully understand why there cannot be dis-
creet talks even though the shooting is going
on. Now, we are aware of the element of so-
called face, but "face" is not a substitute for
very serious practical problems that we face
on the military side.
Now, I remind you that we 'discussed Ber-
lin while the blockade was still in effect. We
discussed Korea while the hostilities were
still in effect. Indeed, we took more casual-
ties in Korea after the negotiations started
than had occurred before the negotiations
started. We talked about the Cuban missiles
while the Cuban missile sites were being built
by the hour in Cuba. So we are prepared to
talk without any change in the military situa-
tion whatever.
But we are also prepared to talk about
changes in the military situation. What we
cannot do is to commit ourselves to a per-
manent and unconditional stoppage of the
bombing without knowing what the practical
results of that will be on the military side.
No one has been able to tell us, for example
— just as one example — that if we stop the
bombing, those three divisions or more of
North Vietnamese troops that are now in
and on both sides of the demilitarized zone
will not advance to attack our Marines, who
are 6 miles away.
Now, obviously, these are important prac-
tical questions. So we will talk at this
moment, or we will talk about any other cir-
cumstances in which the other side might
think that they might wish to talk. But what
we cannot do is to stop half the war and let
the other half of the war go on unimpeded.
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you refer, when
we referred in our reply to the Secretary-
General to a general standstill truce, are ive
talking at that point of a cessation of the
bombing and cessation of infiltration from
the North?
A. I would suppose that a general stand-
still truce would involve an elimination of all
military action of all sorts on both sides.
Now, one reason why there has to be some
discussion of that is that it is necessary
for both sides to understand what in fact
will happen, particularly in a guerrilla situa-
tion where the situation on the ground is
somewhat complicated. And so there needs to
be some discussion of that point if it is
to be a protracted standstill.
But if that can be achieved, then we can
move into the preliminary political discus-
sions which might open the way for a recon-
vening of the Geneva conference or some
other appropriate forum. But a military
APRIL 17, 1967
621
standstill would involve the concept of stop-
ping the military action on both sides, and
that certainly would include stopping the
bombing.
Q. Mr. Secretary, just how does this for-
mula today differ from Mr. Thant's previous
formula ?
A. Well, I think that he would perhaps be
the better one to comment on that. If there
is a major difference, I think that this does
place emphasis upon a mutual stop of the
military action on both sides as an important
first step.
As far as his earlier proposals were con-
cerned, the three-point proposals, you recall
that they envisage that we would stop the
bombing as the first point; the second point,
that there would be a mutual deescalation of
the military action; and, third, there would
be discussions among all those involved in
the conflict.
We said, "Your point one, stopping the
bombing, gives us no particular problem,
but what do you have from the other side
about point two?" Well, what he had from
the other side about point two was a com-
plete rejection — that there will be no mutual
deescalation of military action.
And on point three, the question of discus-
sions with all the parties involved in the
fighting, the other side has consistently said
in and out — from time to time, rather — that
the Liberation Front must be accepted as the
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese
people.
We find disturbing the refusal of Hanoi
to engage in discussions with the Govern-
ment in Saigon. We think that would be an
appropriate way to begin such discussions
and the possibilities of peace might be
opened up if that channel were to become
active. But thus far Hanoi has refused to
exercise it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how ivould you dis-
tinguish between this proposal and the Presi-
dent's proposal to Ho Chi Minh ?
A. Well, I think that perhaps the Secre-
tary-General's proposal is somewhat broader
in that it would presumably apply to a cease-
fire throughout all of Viet-Nam, South Viet-
Nam as well as the disengagement militarily
between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-
Nam. So to that extent, it is somewhat
broader. But, nevertheless, that is something
which we are perfectly prepared to discuss
with representatives from the other side or
are perfectly prepared to have the Govern-
ment of Saigon discuss with the representa-
tives from Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat is your answer to
those critics who say that the President's let-
ter in effect raised the American price?
A. Well, I don't understand what they are
talking about.
Q. Well, they say that in this letter the
United States is demanding proof in advance
that infiltration ivould have stopped.
A. We didn't talk about proof in advance.
The words used were "assurances that in-
filtration had stopped."
Q. Well, it is your contention that the
price ivas not raised, that you're on the status
quo ante as far as that is concerned?
A. The principal point here is that Hanoi
has increasingly emphasized during this past
year its inflexible demand that a stop in the
bombing be permanent and unconditional and
that, in exchange for that, there would be
no indication from Hanoi as to what com-
parable or corresponding military action
they would take on their side.
Now, just recall, for example, during the
37-day pause at the beginning of last year,
Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to the heads of
Communist states, and in that letter he de-
manded that the United States must end un-
conditionally and for good all bombing raids
and other acts, war acts, against the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam — only in this
way can a political solution of the Viet-Nam
problem be envisaged.
Now, that insistence upon the stoppage of
the bombing, which would be permanent and
unconditional, has been a major increase in
the public demands of Hanoi during this past
year. And that makes it necessary for us to
know what would happen if we committed
ourselves to any such cessation.
622
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The North Vietnamese representative in
Paris on February 22d said that we must
state in advance at the time of any cessation
of bombing: that it would be permanent and
unconditional. Well, that means that we must
know what the effects would be. Will the
infiltration continue? Will those three divi-
sions move against our Marines? Are they
going to continue their half of the war? No
one has been able to whisper to us that that
would not be the result. No one — private
citizens, governments, Hanoi's own repre-
sentatives, governments friendly to Hanoi —
no one has been able to whisper to us that
there would be any change in the present
military tactics and strategy of Hanoi with
respect to seizing South Viet-Nam by force.
If any of you gentlemen have any infor-
mation to the contrary, I would be glad to
hear it.
Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you if the
channels directly to Hanoi remain open after
this exchange of letters, and, if so, are we
putting these propositions that you have just
stated directly to them ?
A. As far as we are concerned, the chan-
nels remain open. They have been open all
along. I have referred to the fact that noth-
ing we have had privately throws any
different light on what you now know pub-
licly about the attitude of the two sides. But
I shouldn't exaggerate the point that chan-
nels remain open. When you pick up the tele-
phone and nobody answers on the other end,
is that a channel or not? Or if you find your-
self in a telephone conversation and the other
end hangs up, I will leave it to you as to
whether that is a channel. I can say at the
moment that our channels are not very
efficient, to say the least.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the amount of
reciprocity that we would require for stop-
ping the bombing a negotiable commodity, or
is there a decisive — must there be a com-
plete stoppage in infiltration, or is it
negotiable?
A. I don't want to give a categorical re-
sponse to that because President Johnson in
a recent press conference said that we would
be glad to hear of almost anything from the
other side. But that doesn't mean that we can
live on just nothing from the other side — just
nothing.
I point out to you that during the Tet
pause, at the end of which Ho Chi Minh gave
his reply to the letter which President John-
son had sent to him at the beginning of the
Tet pause, he had some other alternatives
open to him. If there was a problem of time,
he could have said, "Mr. President, time is
rather short here. We need a little more time
on this." He didn't say that. Or he could have
said, "I don't particularly like your proposal,
but here are my counterproposals." He didn't
say that. In effect, he called for the capitula-
tion of South Viet-Nam and capitulation of
the American forces in South Viet-Nam and
a permanent and unconditional stoppage of
the bombing. That we can't take.
Yes, sir?
Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about the
public and private record being the same,
tvhat exactly do you mean? Do you mean
there is nothing outstanding now privately
in the way of negotiation ?
A. No. What I'm saying is there is nothing
in the private record that reflects any dif-
ferent view on the part of the authorities in
Hanoi than you now have on the public rec-
ord.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you explain why
you haven't published the text of four other
letters that you recently sent to Hanoi?
A. Because we do not wish ourselves to
establish the point that a private communi-
cation with us is impossible. If Hanoi wishes
to make public a communication from us, as
they did in connection with the exchange
between President Johnson and Ho Chi
Minh, that is a choice which they can make.
But I think it could be very important in the
future that Hanoi at least know that it is
possible for them to communicate privately
with us without its becoming public — to the
extent that you gentlemen would let us get
away with that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, point (b) of the United
APRIL 17, 1967
623
states answer talks about preliminary talks.
What's your understanding of who would
take part in those talks — just Hanoi and
Washington, or would it be Saigon or the
NLF?
A. Well, we haven't formulated that in
great detail because we need to know what
the attitude of Hanoi would be and what the
general situation would be. In our reply we
did say that of course the Government of
South Viet-Nam will have to be appropri-
ately involved throughout this entire process
and that the interests and views of our allies
would also have to be taken fully into ac-
count. So we did not try to make that precise
in detail because we would be interested in
knowing what Hanoi's response to the
Secretary-General's initiative would be.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the fact
that there ivas no contradiction between the
public and private record as far as peace
talks are concerned. I wonder if you would
be prepared to comment now on reports con-
cerning the possibility of negotiations in
Warsaw ?
A. If your question is Would I be willing
to? the answer is "No." I think the attitude
of Hanoi on these matters is fairly clear at
the present time, but I do not want to point
the finger to, or close the door on, any con-
tacts that might occur anywhere in any capi-
tal as far as the future is concerned.
Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you vein) much.
United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-General's
Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam Conflict
At a news conference held at U.N. Head-
quarters on March 28 Secretary-General U
Thant made public the text of his aide mem-
oir e dated March 14- add/ressed to the parties
concerned in the conflict in Viet-Nam and
indicated that it would also be appropriate
for the parties to make their replies public.
Following is the text of the Secretary-
General's aide memoire, together with texts
of a U.S. interim reply of March 15 and the
definitive U.S. reply of March 1 8 released by
the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and
the Department of State on March 28.
SECRETARY-GENERAL'S AIDE MEMOIRE
OF MARCH 14
On many occasions in the past the Secre-
taiy-General of the United Nations has
expressed his very great concern about the
conflict in Viet-Nam. That concern is inten-
sified by the growing fury of the war result-
ing in the increasing loss of lives, indescrib-
able suffering and misery of the people,
appalling devastation of the country, uproot-
ing of society, astronomical sums spent on
the war and last but not least, his deepening
anxiety over the increasing threat to the
peace of the world. For these reasons, in the
past three years or so, he submitted ideas
and proposals to the parties primarily in-
volved in the war with a view to creating
conditions congenial for negotiations which
unhappily have not been accepted by the
parties. The prospects for peace seem to be
as distant today than ever before.
Nevertheless, the Secretary-General reas-
serts his conviction that a cessation of the
bombing of North Viet-Nam continues to be
a vital need, for moral and humanitarian
reasons and also because it is the step which
could lead the way to meaningful talks to
end the war.
The situation being as it is today, the Sec-
624
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
retary-General has now in mind proposals
envisaging tliree steps:
(a) A general stand-still truce.
(b) Preliminaiy talks.
(c) Reconvening of the Geneva Confer-
ence.
In the view of the Secretary-General, a
halt to all military activities by all sides is
a practical necessity if useful negotiations
are to be undertaken. Since the Secretary-
General's three-point plan has not been ac-
cepted by the parties, he believes that a
general stand-still truce by all parties to the
conflict is now the only course which could
lead to fruitful negotiations. It must be con-
ceded that a truce without effective supei*vi-
sion is apt to be breached from time to time
by one side or another, but an effective
supervision of truce, at least for the moment,
seems difficult to envisage as a practical
possibility. If the parties directly involved
in the conflict are genuinely motivated by
considerations of peace and justice, it is
only to be expected that earnest effort will
be exerted to enforce the truce to the best
of their ability. Should a public appeal by
the Secretary-General in his personal capac-
ity facilitate the observance of such a truce,
he would gladly be prepared to do so. Ap-
peals to that effect by a group of countries
would also be worthy of consideration.
Once the appeal has been made and a
general stand-still truce comes into effect,
the parties directly involved in the conflict
should take the next step of entering into
preliminary talks. While these talks are in
progress, it is clearly desirable that the
general stand-still truce will continue to be
observed. In the view of the Secretary-
General, these talks can take any of the fol-
lowing forms:
(1) Direct talks between the United
States of America and the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam.
(2) Direct talks between the two Govern-
ments mentioned in one above, with the
participation of the two Co-Chairmen of the
Geneva Conference of 1954.
(3) Direct talks between the two Govern-
ments mentioned in one with the participa-
tion of the members of the International
Control Commission.
(4) Direct talks between the two Govern-
ments mentioned in one with the participa-
tion of the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva
Conference of 1954 and of the members of
the International Control Commission.
The Secretary-General believes that these
preliminary talks should aim at reaching an
agreement on the modalities for the recon-
vening of the Geneva Conference, with the
sole purpose of returning to the essentials of
that Agreement as repeatedly expressed by
all parties to the conflict. These preliminary
talks should seek to reach an agreement on
the timing, place, agenda and participants
in the subsequent formal meeting — the re-
convening of the Geneva Conference. The
Secretary-General deems it necessary to
stress that the question of participants in the
formal negotiations should not obstruct the
way to a settlement. It is a question which
could be solved only by agreeing that no
fruitful discussions on ending the war in
Viet-Nam could take place without involving
all those who are actually fighting. Since the
Government in Saigon as well as the Na-
tional Front of Liberation of South Viet-
Nam are actually engaged in military opera-
tions, it is the view of the Secretary-General
that a future formal conference could not
usefully discuss the effective termination of
all military activities and the new political
situation that would result in South Viet-
Nam without the participation of represent-
atives of the Government in Saigon and
representatives of the National Front of
Liberation of South Viet-Nam.
In transmitting these proposals to the
parties directly concerned, the Secretary-
General believes that he is acting within the
limits of his good offices purely in his pri-
vate capacity. He hopes that the divergent
positions held by the parties both on the na-
ture of the conflict and the ultimate political
objectives will not prevent them from giving
their very serious attention to these propos-
als. Indeed, he takes this opportunity to
appeal to them to give their urgent consid-
eration to his proposals.
APRIL 17, 1967
625
U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 15
1
U.S. /U.N. press release 30 dated March 28
March 15, 1967
The United States welcomes the proposal
of the Secretary-General which contains con-
structive and positive elements toward
bringing about a peaceful settlement of the
Vietnam conflict.
The United States is in the process of con-
sulting the government of South Vietnam
and its allies. We expect to provide the
Secretary-General with a full and prompt
reply.
U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 18 ^
U.S./U.N. press release 31 dated March 28
March 18, 1967
As the Secretary-General knows, the
United States and other Governments have,
over many months, approached Hanoi, both
publicly and privately, with proposals to end
the conflict in Vietnam. To date, all such
efforts have been rebuffed. The Government
of North Vietnam has refused to agree to
discussions without preconditions or to take
reciprocal actions leading toward a cessation
of hostilities.
For this reason, the Government of the
United States would be most interested in
learning whether Hanoi is willing to enter
into such discussions or to take reciprocal
actions leading to peace in Vietnam. The
United States has been, and remains willing
to enter into discussions without precondi-
tions with Hanoi at any time.
To this end, the United States accepts the
three-step proposal in the Aide Memoire of
the Secretary-General of 14 March 1967
envisaging:
' The text also was read to news correspondents
at Washington by the Department of State spokes-
man on Mar. 28.
^ The text also was released by the Department
of State on Mar. 28 (press release 69).
(a) A general stand-still truce;
(b) Preliminary talks;
(c) Reconvening of the Geneva Confer-
ence.
The United States believes it would be
desirable and contributory to serious nego-
tiations if an effective cessation of hostili-
ties, as the first element in the three-point
proposal, could be promptly negotiated.
It would, therefore, be essential that the
details of such a general cessation of hostili-
ties be discussed directly by both sides, or
through the Secretary-General, the Geneva
Conference Co-Chairmen or otherwise as
may be agreed. The United States is pre-
pared to enter into such discussions im-
mediately and constructively.
The United States is also prepared to take
the next steps in any of the forms suggested
by the Secretary-General to enter into pre-
liminary talks leading to agreement as to the
modalities for reconvening of the Geneva
Conference.
Of course, the Government of South Viet-
nam will have to be appropriately involved
throughout this entire process. The interests
and views of our allies would also have to
be taken fully into account.
The United States again expresses its ap-
preciation to the Secretary-General for his
untiring efforts to help bring about a peace-
ful settlement and an end to the conflict in
Vietnam.
Letters of Credence
Afghanistan
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Afghanistan, Abdullah Malikyar, presented
his credentials to President Johnson on
March 17. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
March 17.
626
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the United States
Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Mai-
wandwal of Afghanistan visited the United
States March 25-April 9. In Washington,
March 28-30, he met with President Johnson
and other U.S. Government officials. Follow-
ing are an exchange of greetings hetiveen
President Johnson and Prime Minister Mai-
wandwal at an arrival ceremony on the south
laivn of the White House on March 28, their
exchange of toasts at a White House lunch-
eon that afternoon, and a joint statement
released later that day at the conclusion of
their meeting.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated March 28
President Johnson
Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests,
ladies and gentlemen: I am very happy, on
behalf of all Americans, to welcome you
back to our country, Mr. Prime Minister,
and to this Capital City that you know so^
well.
All of us will remember that you came
here before as the Ambassador from your
country. Today you return as Prime Minis-
ter. We are very proud that a good friend
who lived among us has found time to pay
us a cordial visit in the position of great
trust and distinction which you now hold.
Mr. Prime Minister, Afghanistan is far
from us in miles and hours as we meet this
morning. But for us it is no longer a distant,
far-off, remote place. Countless Americans
have come to know your country and to
know your people.
President Eisenhower was your guest.
Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen
Homaira are warmly remembered by all of
us for their visit here in 1963.'
Ambassador [Abdul Rahman] Pazhwak
is our good neighbor in New York, where he
now serves as President of the United Na-
tions General Assembly.
So we meet today as friends. We live on
opposite sides of the globe, yet we have
much in common:
— Your land, like ours, has a strong tradi-
tion of freedom and independence.
— Your people, like ours, cherish diversity
while they seek unity in mutual respect and
justice.
— You, like us, are experimenters in the
art of government and social reform.
— And we share a common dedication to
peace and to the ideal of a world community
based on freedom.
Mr. Prime Minister, these are only a few
of the ties which bind our nations and our
peoples together. Historically, the relations
between our countries have been close and
cordial. Today they are warmer than ever
before. It is a very great honor and privilege
to have you with us to discuss aft even more
productive future.
We are so happy that you could come to
our land.
Prime Minister Maiwandwal
Mr. President, I wish to thank Your Ex-
cellency most sincerely for your warm words
of welcome and kind expressions of friend-
ship toward Afghanistan.
' For text of a joint communique issued at Wash-
ington on Sept. 7, 1963, see Bulletin of Oct. 7,
1963, p. 535.
APRIL 17, 1967
627
First, I have the honor to convey the
heartfelt greetings of my sovereign, King
Mohammed Zahir, to you personally and,
through you, to the Government and the
people of the United States of America.
His Majesty recalls with the greatest of
pleasure and satisfaction the cordial hospi-
tality accorded to him and Her Majesty
Queen Homaira during their memorable
state visit to the United States in September
1963.
For my own part, I wish to thank you for
inviting me to make this visit to the United
States, which I remember so fondly from
my two previous official assignments in this
country.
It will afford me a welcome opportunity
to meet and talk with you, Mr. President, as
well as other officials and citizens of the
United States, including many old friends.
Although a considerable geographic dis-
tance separates our two countries, our com-
mon belief and devotion to liberty and re-
spect for the inherent dignity of man has
bridged this distance.
I am confident that my visit will serve to
strengthen and promote the friendly and cul-
tural relations which so happily have pre-
vailed between Afghanistan and the United
States since the establishment of formal ties
in 1943.
I find it an interesting and noteworthy
coincidence that the day before yesterday,
my first full day in the United States on this
visit, marked the anniversary of the signing
of the historic agreement in Paris 31 years
ago establishing diplomatic and consular
representation between our two countries
for the first time.
It was during these years that Afghan
students began coming to the United States
for higher studies, and the flow has in-
creased steadily through the years since
then.
Also over the past 20 years many Ameri-
cans have been coming to Afghanistan to
assist our country in its economic develop-
ment, along with specialists and technicians
of other countries and the United Nations.
Afghanistan is engaged in an all-out effort
to develop its economy while at the same
time modernizing its political and social in-
stitutions.
Our people deeply appreciate the assist-
ance which the friendly countries, including
the United States, have contributed to these
goals.
Afghanistan follows a policy of active
nonalinement and is determined to exercise
its free judgment in international affairs. It
endeavors wherever possible to serve the
cause of international peace and the rights
of nations and peoples in the firm belief that
only in peace can the progress of all nations,
including Afghanistan, be assured and that
international understanding is the best way
of insuring human prosperity throughout
the world.
My Government is strongly dedicated to
working for reform in the economic, politi-
cal, social, and cultural affairs in the coun-
try.
I am looking forward, Mr. President, to
friendly exchanges of views with you and
other members of your Government in the
hope that they may contribute to the achieve-
ment of the peace and prosperity for which
we and our peoples strive.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated March 28
President Johnson
Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies,
ladies and gentlemen: Among the last state
visitors that our beloved President John
Kennedy received in this White House were
Their Majesties King Zahir and Queen Ho-
maira of Afghanistan. They won our hearts
during that visit. They reminded us that, al-
though their country and ours are half a
world apart, we are neighbors in thought
and we are kindred in spirit.
Today it is our good fortune to welcome
the distinguished diplomat, the professor
and the journalist, who heads the (Govern-
ment of Afghanistan.
628
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
You, sir, are no stranger here with us.
You are, rather, an old and very honored
friend of many in this room and of many
more elsewhere in this city and in this na-
tion.
There was a time, Mr. Prime Minister,
when we knew little of your country, except
that it was a land of adventure, a romantic
land where cultures met, rich history was
written, a place where spirited and sturdy
men fought with pride to maintain and to
keep their independence.
We know this still, but now we know a
great deal more about your land.
We know today that you and your coun-
trymen, under the leadership of His Majesty
King Zahir, have set as your high goal Af-
ghanistan's "experiment in democracy."
We know today what you are doing to
develop your country. We know what you
are doing to enrich the lives of all of your
people.
Mr. Prime Minister, we here in America,
all of us, are very proud to be associated
with you in that effort.
If it would be useful to you, Mr. Prime
Minister, if you think it would be helpful,
we are prepared to send to your country a
team of this nation's best agricultural ex-
perts, directed by Secretary [of Agriculture
Orville L.] Freeman, who would be delighted
to work with your specialists in the vital
achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency
that we both know is so very important to
this and to future generations.
Mr. Prime Minister, you have come to visit
with us just after the festival of the New
Year in your country. That season, like the
coming of spring for us, is a time of reaffir-
mation and rededication. It is a time when
we can, together, rededicate ourselves to the
great tasks that each of us, in our own way,
in our own land, is trying so hard to do:
— to build a better framework of social
justice for all of our people;
— to devote our energies and our resources
to better lives for all of our people;
— to strengthen the strong roots of free-
dom and the spirit of independence that has
motivated us both throughout our histories;
— and, most important of all, to make a
contribution, individually and collectively, to
a lasting peace among men throughout the
world.
This morning as we were talking the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations made
public the main lines of his new proposal
for a general truce and cessation of hostili-
ties in Viet-Nam. He presented that proposal
to our honored and most distinguished Am-
bassador, Arthur Goldberg — who is privi-
leged to be with us here today — in New York
first on March 14th.2
On March 15th, under Secretary Rusk's
and Ambassador Goldberg's direction, we
promptly replied, welcoming the proposal
and noting that it contains "constructive and
positive elements toward bringing a peaceful
settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict."
We promptly told the Secretary-General
that we would be consulting immediately
with the Government of South Viet-Nam
and with our other allies and that we would
provide him with a full and very prompt
reply. On March 15th we said that.
On March 18th Ambassador Goldberg
delivered that reply. It was positive. It was
definitive. It was affirmative.
The Government of Viet-Nam also re-
sponded constructively.
Yesterday we regretfully learned from Ra-
dio Hanoi that they were informing the
world that they alpparently were not pre-
pared to accept the Secretary-General's pro-
posal. As they stated through their radio,
"The Viet-Nam problem has no concern with
the United Nations, and the United Nations
has absolutely no right to interfere in any
way with the Viet-Nam question."
We respectfully disagree. War and peace
are concerns of the United Nations. They are
concerns of all people.
We welcome the efforts of not only the
United Nations but any nation, large or
small, if they have any suggestion or any
contribution they are prepared to make.
» See p. 624.
APRIL 17, 1967
629
I would hope that the Secretary-General
was correct this morning when he said that
none of the parties has categorically — cate-
gorically— turned his plan down.
We have seen over the past several years
— and, yes, recently in the past several
months — one effort after another to bring
peace to Southeast Asia fail because Hanoi
rejected it.
But, Mr. Prime Minister and honored
guests, I want everyone who can hear my
voice or see my words to know that this na-
tion will continue to persist. Deep in our
history is the memory of what President
Abraham Lincoln said to his countrymen in
the dark days of 1861:
Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always;
and when, after much loss on both sides, and no
gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old
questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon
you.
In Southeast Asia the terms for the rela-
tions among states were set in 1954 and 1962
by international accords. In the end they
must be honored. In the end the people of
South Viet-Nam must be given the chance
to determine their destiny without external
interference.
So all of our power, our intelligence, and
our imagination will be devoted in the fu-
ture, as in the past, to bringing that day
nearer.
As we meet here in this spring, in this
period of dedication, this spring of 1967, let
us together pledge anew our dedication to
the achievement of the objectives of social
justice, devoting our energy and resources to
better lives, to strengthening the roots of
freedom and independence, and to making a
contribution, individually and collectively, to
peace among men.
Mr. Prime Minister, I have no doubt, after
our extended visit today, that we are joined
in these objectives and in this resolve.
Now I should like to ask our friends who
have come here from other parts of the na-
tion out of friendship and respect for the
distinguished Prime Minister to join me in
a toast to His Majesty King Zahir and to the
great nation of Afghanistan. • '
Pritkie Minister Maiwandwal
President Johnson, Your Excellencies, la-
dies and gentlemen: I wish to thank you
again, Mr. President, as I had the occasion
to do on my arrival earlier this morning, for
your very kind words of welcome to me per-
sonally and your expressions of friendship
for my country and the people of Afghani-
stan.
It is gratifying to know that the visit of
Their Majesties the King and Queen of Af-
ghanistan in 1963 is still so fondly remem-
bered in this country. I can assure you that
the friendly sentiments you have expressed
are warmly reciprocated by them.
I am pleased to be here and to visit the
United States again.
Mr. President, the experiment of Afghani-
stan in democracy, I am proud to confirm, is
a noble endeavor and is in full swing under
the wise and benevolent leadership and guid-
ance of His Majesty our King.
When he visited the United States in au-
tumn 1963, this experiment was merely a
new seed planted in our ancient soil, but it
has been carefully nurtured since then and
now has grown into a sturdy young plant.
Its blossoms include a liberal new constitu-
tion which appeared in 1964, free nationwide
parliamentary elections by universal suffrage
and secret ballot in 1965, establishment of an
independent parliament representative of
their nation, and the adoption of a host of
progressive new laws designed to reform
and modernize our society and political in-
stitutions.
Our experiment, in short, has had a
healthy start and is beginning to bear fruit.
But we have chosen to modernize not on
merely one but on several fronts at once —
economic as well as political and social — and
in some of this we highly value the great as-
sistance which friends like the United States
of America have been giving us in develop-
ing our economy.
630
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We appreciate your help in building our
infrastructure, especially the construction of
roads like the magnificent Kabul-Kandahar
Highway, a gift of the American people dedi-
cated only last August in a ceremony at-
tended by Secretary Fi-eeman — and the high-
way between Herat and the Iranian border,
currently under construction.
Similar cooperation between our two coun-
tries is, to a considerable extent, helping to
develop our educational systems, our agri-
culture, our water resources, and our trans-
portation system.
All of this will pay repeated dividends for
the future lives of our people.
May I assure you, Mr. President, that our
prime aim and driving ambition is to reach
self-sustained economic growth in as short a
time as possible so as to free ourselves from
the need for foreign assistance.
Still, we continue to need your help in many
ways in order to accelerate our growth and
reach our national goals in the shortest pos-
sible time.
Your kind offer of assistance by a special
team of experts to advise us on ways and
means of achieving agricultural self-suffi-
ciency would indeed be useful, and we look
forward to discussing this, as well as other
aspects of cooperation, with the responsible
officials of your Government.
Mr. President, Afghanistan is a real ex-
ample of a country in which the sincere ef-
forts of the people and friendly assistance of
foreign countries have combined to create an
area of peace and stability in an all too often
turbulent and insecure world.
We firmly believe in the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, including the
necessity of solving international problems
by peaceful means.
In this spirit, we continue to pursue our
efforts aimed at the peaceful settlement of
the Pakhtunistan problem, which constitutes
the major issue in our relationships with
Pakistan.
As a living example of international coop-
eration in peace, our policy of active and
positive nonalinement and of coexistence has
worked for the advantage of our country, our
region, and, we hope, the world.
This is not a new policy for us, but rather
one we have pursued throughout this century
as a national struggle and a consequence of
our geographic position and historical expe-
rience.
You have aptly referred, Mr. President, to
the present season of the Afghan New Year,
which falls also in the beginning of spring,
as a time of rededication. In our case it
marks this year the beginning of our third
5-year plan, through which we hope to make
further substantial progress in improving
the life of our people.
The Government and the nation of Af-
ghanistan are grateful for the friendship,
understanding, and interest manifested by
the Government and people of the United
States in our struggle for economic and so-
cial betterment.
Ladies and gentlemen, friends, I invite you
to join me in a toast to the health and pros-
perity of the President of the United States
and to the great American people.
JOINT STATEMENT
White House press release dated March 28
At the invitation of President Johnson,
Prime Minister Mohammed Hashim Mai-
wandwal of Afghanistan visited Washington
from March 28-30, 1967. The President and
Prime Minister met on March 28 and ex-
changed views on matters of mutual interest.
President Johnson took particular pleasure
in welcoming the Prime Minister back to
Washington, recalling his long and distin-
guished role as Ambassador from Afghani-
stan to the United States. The President also
recalled the state visit to the United States
in September 1963 of Their Majesties King
Mohammed Zahir Shah and Queen Ho-
maira, a visit which added substantially to
the long record of close friendship between
the United States and Afghanistan. He
asked the Prime Minister to convey to His
Majesty the King the warm affection and ad-
APRIL 17, 1967
631
miration of the American people for the Af-
ghan people.
Prime Minister Maiwandwal described for
the President Afghanistan's continuing ef-
forts, under the leadership of His Majesty
the King, to build and strengthen democratic
institutions and to press economic and social
progress. He outlined his government's in-
tention, under the Third Five Year Plan, to
intensify economic development efforts. The
President assured the Prime Minister of the
continuing desire of the United States to do
its part in assisting Afghanistan's efforts for
implementing the Third Five Year Plan. The
Prime Minister expressed to the President
the deep appreciation of the Afghan people
for United States economic assistance.
In this connection the President noted
with special satisfaction cooperative efforts
of long duration by the United States and
Afghanistan in many fields of education.
The Prime Minister reviewed Afghani-
stan's foreign policy of non-alignment and
friendship and cooperation with all Nations.
He described the problems existing among
the countries of the region to which Afghani-
stan belongs and reiterated Afghanistan's
view that these problems can be solved
through peaceful means and in an atmos-
phere of understanding, confidence and real-
ism.
The two leaders talked about current de-
velopments elsewhere in Asia, particularly
the urgent need for peace and stability in
Southeast Asia. They outlined their respec-
tive positions on the problem of Vietnam and
agreed that a peaceful and just settlement is
urgently needed. The President described for
the Prime Minister the many and persisting
efforts of the United States to achieve a ces-
sation of hostilities in Vietnam consistent
with the freedom and independence of the
people of South Vietnam. The Prime Min-
ister stated that implementation of the 1954
Geneva accords is a sound basis for the set-
tlement of the Vietnamese problem.
The President was delighted to know of
the intention of the University of California
at Santa Barbara to bestow an honorary de-
gree on the Prime Minister during his cur-
rent visit.
Pan American Day
and Pan American Week, 1967
A PROCLAMATION!
There is special meaning this year in the
hemispheric tradition of Pan American Day.
On April twelfth, for the first time in a decade
and the second time in history, the Presidents and
Heads of Government of the American nations will
meet to fortify the foundation of the house of the
Americas.
Seventy-seven years ago we first joined our hearts
and hands as brothers in a hopeful hemisphere. We
pledged a common pledge — we dreamed a common
dream. We have since translated that pledge into
progress. And we have founded the Organization of
American States as a firm framework for the ful-
fillment of that dream.
We have recently strengthened that Organization
by amending its Charter to meet the challenge that
our changring times demand.
We have extended our unique experiment in in-
ternational living by welcoming into our member-
ship the new nation of Trinidad and Tobago.
We have enhanced the meaning of that experi-
ment by forging within it an Alliance for Progress
in which our goals for the good life are matched
only by our desire to achieve them. And the im-
pressive accomplishments of these last six years
trace that desire's grrowing satisfaction.
When the Alliance was formed in 1961, it was
estimated that our Latin American neighbors could
supply about 80% of the capital required. In fact,
they have done better than this. By the end of this
year, the gross investment in Latin America will
have totaled over $100 billion — and 95% of it will
have been from domestic sources. This ability of
our neighbors to save and invest in their owfi future
is a most striking indication that Latin America
can, with relatively modest external help, mobilize
the resources needed for its own development — and
thus strengthen the foundations of the house we
share in this hemisphere.
The cooperative spirit of the Alliance is bringing
new-found confidence and hope into this house.
— Per capita growth rates show that more and
more countries are breaking the economic stagna-
tion of earlier years.
— -Men, women and children are alive today who
would otherwise have died. In ten countries, deaths
caused by malaria dropped from 10,810 to 2,280 in
three years' time. Smallpox cases declined almost
as sharply. And new health centers and hospitals
are growing everywhere.
— Men whose fathers for generations toiled on
land owned by others are now working it as their
own. With U.S. assistance, 1.1 million acres have
' No. 3774; 32 Fed. Reg. 5539.
632
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
been irrigated and 106,000 acres reclaimed. 15,000
miles of road have been built or improved, many of
them farm-to-market access roads.
— For tens of thousands of families, the most
fundamental conditions of life are improving. 350,-
000 housing units have been, or are now being, con-
structed. New and modernized water supply sys-
tems have been built to benefit some 20 million
people.
So as we assemble under the banner of the Alli-
ance for Progrress, we are cheered by success and
encouraged in the task that lies ahead.
With the confidence born of achievement, we
know that we can prepare a better world for the
new generation of Americans who will come after
us.
We look to the 60% of Latin America's 245 mil-
lion people who are now under the age of 25, and
we know that the task of meeting their aspirations
is great. But we also know that we have forged the
tools to do the task. And there is promise in what
we see.
The sustaining arm of education is reaching out
to more and more of this strategic 60% of Latin
Americans.
— Since the Alliance was formed, school enroll-
ments have increased at an average annual rate
of over 6%. This rate represents more than twice
the rate of increase in the total population.
— For each 1,000 inhabitants, there were 124 stu-
dents enrolled in schools in 1960, 170 in 1965, and
174 in 1966.
— 28,000 new classrooms have been built.
— 160,000 teachers have been trained or given
additional training.
— More than 14 million textbooks have been dis-
tributed.
— 13 million school children and 3 million pre-
schoolers participate in school lunch programs.
And more than this, what statistics cannot ade-
quately relay is the emergence of a generation of
vigorous, confident and responsible leaders through-
out Latin America — leaders who are ready to help
their countries help themselves. These leaders are
beginning to include more and more women doers
in their ranks. And since women comprise over half
the population of Latin America, there is new
potential in this leadership.
The successes scored by the Alliance have been
aided by the United States — but they have been
realized by the cooperative spirit that resides in the
commitment and dedication of the Latin American
nations themselves. Their unrelenting perseverance
has been a keystone in the firm foundation of our
house of hemispheric progress.
So as together we seek to strengthen — we seek a
realistic goal.
As together we build to better — we build on solid
g^round.
Bound by geography, bom of a common revolu-
tionary heritage, nurtured by common ideals, com-
mitted to the dignity of man, and sustained by the
youth and vigor that have been our common
strength, we will project our traditions into a
promising future — and we will prevail.
Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JoHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
proclaim Friday, April 14, 1967, as Pan American
Day, and the week beginning April 9 and ending
April 15 as Pan American Week; and I call upon
the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
the officials of all other areas under the flag of the
United States to issue similar proclamations.
Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate
itself to the fundamental goal of the inter- American
system, embodied in the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States and in the Charter of
Punta del Este: social justice and economic progress
within the framework of individual freedom and
political liberty.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this thirty-first
day of March in the year of our Lord nine-
[seal] teen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the
Independence of the United States of
America the one hundred and ninety-first.
By the President :
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
U.S. Observers Inspect
Antarctic Stations
The Department of State announced on
March 20 (press release 60) that a five-man
U.S. observer team had completed an inspec-
tion of Antarctic stations operated by other
parties to the Antarctic Treaty.* The U.S.
observers reported that they were welcomed
in a friendly and cooperative spirit at every
facility visited, that access to all installations
was made available freely, and that all activi-
ties observed in the Antarctic were in con-
' For a Department announcement regarding ap-
pointment of U.S. observers, see Bulletin of Jan.
9, 1967, p. 71; for text of the treaty, see ibid.,
Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.
APRIL 17, 1967
633
sonance with the spirit and specific provi-
sions of the treaty.
The essence of the Antarctic Treaty is the
dedication of the area for peaceful purposes.
The treaty expressly prohibits in Antarctica
any military measures, such as the establish-
ment of military bases and fortifications, the
execution of military maneuvers, and the
testing of any type of weapons. Freedom of
scientific investigation, as well as interna-
tional cooperation toward that end, is pre-
served. To insure observance of the treaty
provisions, signatories have the right of
inspection and aerial observation in all areas
of Antarctica.
The following stations were inspected:
Station
Operated by
Date
Dumont d'Durville
France
Feb. 1
Wilkes
Australia
Feb. 8-9
Mawson
Australia
Feb. 14
Molodezhnaya
U.S.S.R.
Feb. 17
Showa
Japan
Feb. 19
SANAE
South Africa
Feb. 25
Signy
United Kingdom
Mar. 2
Orcadas
Argentina
Mar. 2
In addition, the Danish ship Thala Dan,
under charter to the French and Australian
expeditions, was inspected while unloading
cargo at Wilkes station.
The observers made the journey on board
the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Eastwind,
which departed Wellington, New Zealand, on
January 25 and landed the observers at
Punta Arenas, Chile, on March 6.
The U.S. observers who made the trip
were: Frank G. Siscoe, Department of State;
Merton Davies, Rand Corporation scientist;
Col. Ernest F. Dukes, USAF; Karl Kenyon,
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Sei-vice; and Cyril
Muromcew, Department of State.
The Antarctic Treaty was signed on
December 1, 1959, and entered into force
June 23, 1961. The 12 original signatories of
the treaty are: Argentina, Australia, Bel-
gium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, South Africa, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. In addition, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and Denmark have acceded to
the treaty.
U.S., Canada Request IJC Study
of American Falls at Niagara
Press release 80 dated March 31
The Depa rtment of State on March 31 sent
the following letter to the International Joint
Commission, United States and Canada, re-
questing the Commission to investigate and
report upon measures necessary to preserve
or enhance the beauty of the American Falls
at Niagara. An identical letter was transmit-
ted to the Commission by the Government of
Canada.
March 31, 1967
The International Joint Commission
United States and Canada
Washington, B.C., U.S.A.
and Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Sirs : The Governments of the U.S.A. and
of Canada have agreed to request the Inter-
national Joint Commission, pursuant to Arti-
cle IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909,1 to investigate and report upon meas-
ures necessary to preserve or enhance the
beauty of the American Falls at Niagara.
The Commission is specifically requested to
investigate and recommend:
(1) what measures are feasible and desir-
able (a) to effect the removal of the talus
which has collected at the base of the Amer-
ican Falls, and (b) to retard or prevent fu-
ture erosion;
(2) other measures which may be desir-
able or necessary to preserve or enhance the
beauty of the American Falls;
(3) the allocation, as between the United
States and Canada, of the work and costs of
construction.
At the same time, the Commission is asked
to bear in mind the obligations of Canada
and the United States contained in the Ni-
agara Treaty of 1950 ^ and the mutual in-
terest of the two countries in refraining from
> 36 Stat. 2448.
" Treaties and Other International Acts Series
2130.
634
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
measures which might preserve or enhance
one of the Falls to the detriment of the other.
For the purpose of assisting the Commis-
sion in its investigation and otherwise in the
performance of its duties under this refer-
ence, the two governments will upon request
make available to the Commission the serv-
ices of engineers and other specially qualified
personnel of their governmental agencies and
such information and technical data as may
have been acquired or as may be acquired by
them during the course of the investigation.
The Commission is requested to submit its
report to the two governments as soon as
may be practicable.
Sincerely,
For the Secretary of State:
George S. Springsteen
Acting Assistant Secretary
for European Affairs
Convention Adopted on Conduct
of North Atlantic Fisheries
Press release 61 dated March 21
Representatives of 18 countries engaged in
fishing operations in the North Atlantic,
including the United States, Canada, and 16
European nations, on March 17 adopted and
referred to governments for approval the
text of a Convention on the Conduct of Fish-
ing Operations in the North Atlantic. The
convention was incorporated in a final act
which has been signed by representatives of
all countries participating in a Fisheries
Policing Conference, which met at London
four times starting in 1965.
The convention establishes an international
code of conduct to be followed by fishing ves-
sels and ancillary craft in the North Atlantic
area. It is designed to increase safety at sea,
particularly on the international fishing
grounds, and to reduce the risk of damage to
boats and fishing gear which can occur when
vessels using different fishing methods
operate close to one another.
The convention contains provisions on
marking of fishing vessels to insure their
identification at sea and estabhshes uniform
supplementary light signals for fishing ves-
sels. It also establishes uniform methods of
marking nets and other gear in the sea and
a code of good conduct on the fishing grounds.
The convention provides for a conciliation
procedure to facilitate settlement of small
claims arising out of gear damage involving
fishermen of different nations and for an
inspection system whereby authorized officers
from any of the participating countries in
certain circumstances will be able to board
and inspect fishing vessels of other partici-
pating countries to investigate possible viola-
tions of the rules or cases of damage. While
it will be possible for certain countries to opt
out of the boarding provisions, other aspects
of the inspection system, such as observation
and reporting of violations to the authorities
of the flag state of the fishing vessel, will
apply uniformly to all fishing vessels.
The convention itself will be open for sig-
nature in London from June 1 to November
30, 1967. After signature it will be subject to
ratification by the United States upon advice
and consent of the Senate.
The countries represented at the Con-
ference were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and
United States.
The Conference stemmed from the Euro-
pean Fisheries Conference of 1963-64, at
which a resolution was passed that the
United Kingdom should convene a technical
conference of all countries participating in
the Northeast Atlantic fisheries to prepare a
draft convention embodying a modern code
for the conduct of fishing operations and of
related activities in the Northeast Atlantic.
It was also resolved to invite representatives
of the United States and Canada to attend, so
that the extension of the provisions of any
such convention to the Northwest Atlantic
fisheries might be considered. The convention
will cover the area off the coasts of Canada
APRIL 17, 1967
635
and the United States as far south as Cape
Hatteras, where fishing grounds are often
occupied by vessels of many nations.
Representatives of the Departments of
State and Interior and the U.S. Coast Guard
met several times with representatives of
fishermen along the Atlantic coast in prepa-
ration for negotiating the convention.
The U.S. delegation consisted of John T.
Gharrett, Regional Director of the U.S.
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in Glouces-
ter, Mass., as chairman and Rajonund T.
Yingling of the Department of State as vice
chairman. William L. Sullivan, Jr., of the De-
partment of State was also a member of the
delegation. Lt. Comdr. C. J. Blondin, U.S.
Coast Guard, and John B. Skerry, Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries, served as advisers.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles
for U.N. Peacekeeping Functions
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
Mr. Chairman [Francisco Cuevas Cancino,
representative of Mexico] : I appreciate your
courtesy in giving me this opportunity to
make a statement on behalf of my delegation
about the vitally important task of this com-
mittee. And again, since I am appearing at
these resumed sessions for the first time, may
I express my pleasure, Mr. Chairman, that
you are again in the chair and supported by
an able bureau and an efficient staff.
My main purpose is not to discuss in detail
the various proposals which have been made
here, on which the United States view has
been ably set forth by my colleague, Ambas-
sador Finger [Seymour M. Finger, senior
adviser to the U.S. representative]. Rather
I wish to emphasize at this critical stage in
' Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations, Working Group A, on Mar. 22
(U.S./U.N press release 28/Corr. 1).
the committee's proceedings the deep and
continuing concern which my country feels
for the future functioning of the United
Nations in the peacekeeping field.
We of the United States desire to do our
part in every possible way in the combined
efforts and in the mutual accommodation
which will be'required if that essential func-
tion is to be maintained in its full vigor. The
same concern, we know, is widely shared not
only in this committee but among the entire
membership of the United Nations.
It is now over 18 months since we weath-
ered a grave constitutional crisis in the life of
the organization and the General Assembly
was enabled to resume its normal work. As
all members know, the United States, as our
contribution to the resolution of that crisis,
without yielding its basic principles, re-
luctantly acquiesced in the unwillingness of
686
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
the majority to apply article 19 of the
charter in that situation.^
But we have not changed our view about
the capacity and the duty of the United Na-
tions, in the future as in the past, to serve
effectively as a keeper of peace among na-
tions. On that issue, in our conception, the
deepest interests of all members are alike —
and there are many signs that the great
majority, large and small, know this full
well.
Regrettably, certain major practical issues
important to peacekeeping — particularly the
issue of financing, over which the crisis
arose — were not resolved in 1965. They are
still unresolved today. In particular, it there-
fore remains uncertain to what extent the
United Nations can be looked to in the future
— ^as in the past — to send peacekeeping
forces into the field in order to maintain
international peace and security. The crea-
tion and maintenance of such forces in time
of need stand as one of the greatest achieve-
ments of the U.N. in its 21-year life. The un-
certainty as to its future capacity in this
regard is understandably a cause of anxiety
to all nations and citizens throughout the
world who have at heart the cause of world
peace and security.
To keep this matter in perspective, it
should be noted that, despite all these uncer-
tainties, the activities of the U.N. organs
which are responsible under the charter for
the maintenance of international peace and
security have continued without interruption.
Vital peacekeeping operations continue in
Cyprus, Kashmir, and the Middle East. This
is a testimonial, despite the lack of resolution
of the issue, to the pragmatic good sense of
the members of the U.N. who have dealt with
crises as they arose. It would be a sad day
indeed for the U.N. and for world peace, and
for all we would hope to work and seek for,
if the recalcitrance of one member or a few
members were to prevent the U.N. from con-
tinuing to take action to keep the peace. We
are encouraged that this has not happened,
and we persist in the confidence that it will
not happen.
What concerns us here is how to assure
the readiness of the U.N. to face future
emergencies. Last December, in the General
Assembly, it appeared that an important step
was about to be taken in this direction by the
adoption of the thoughtful Canadian resolu-
tion which received such a strong majority
vote in the committee.^ And referring to the
Canadian resolution, I cannot forbear from
also acknowledging the deservedly admired
contribution which has been made to our con-
sideration of this subject by that conscience
of the United Nations in the area of peace-
keeping, the distinguished Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister of Ireland,
Frank Aiken, who has with resolution and
fortitude persisted in keeping it at the fore-
front of the U.N. agenda.
The Canadian measure contained im-
portant principles on financing, on the re-
sidual authority of the General Assembly to
launch peacekeeping operations, and on ad-
vance planning by member states to con-
tribute men and facilities to future U.N.
peacekeeping operations. But at the last
moment, as we all know, a final vote on this
key resolution was deferred until the special
session in April.
Mr. Chairman, time has passed since then.
That session is now imminent. In this situa-
tion it may be useful for me to recapitulate
four basic principles which my Government
believes are among the minimum essentials
of a solution. These are:
— First, the capacity of the United Nations
to deploy peacekeeping forces promptly in an
emergency must be preserved.
— Second, viable and equitable financial
arrangements must be agreed upon, and
faithfully implemented, to support this
capacity.
— Third, the essential role of the Secretary-
General as executive head of the organization
' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg in the
U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
on Aug. 16, 1965, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p.
454.
^ A/SPC/L. 130/Rev. 4, introduced by Canada and
cosponsored by six other countries; for text, see
U.N. doc. A/6603.
APRIL 17, 1967
637
in peacekeeping operations, as in all other
operations, must be respected.
— Fourth, no single country, however pow-
erful, can or should be permitted to frustrate
by the veto a peacekeeping operation of the
United Nations properly initiated by an
appropriate organ of the U.N.
Now let me comment briefly on each of
these.
Preserving the U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity
First, the United Nations peacekeeping
capacity:
As for the vital importance of the capacity
of the United Nations to deploy peacekeeping
forces, I need scarcely reemphasize what is
so well known to all members. This capacity
is essential to the organization's very first
purpose, set forth in article 1 of the charter:
"to maintain international peace and secu-
rity." It is a factor in the security of every
nation on the globe, including my own. When
through neglect or obstruction we diminish
that capacity, we diminish to that extent the
security of every nation.
The U.N., of course, is valuable in many
ways: as a point of diplomatic contact; as a
forum of international debate; as a center of
international cooperation for the betterment
of human life in all of its aspects, economic,
social, and with respect to human rights. But
none of its values can be ranked higher than
its services as a truly international peace-
keeping organization. The "blue helmets" of
the United Nations — whatever the imperfec-
tions of the operations — in the Middle East,
the Congo, and in Cyprus, in Kashmir, and in
other areas, have restored calm to these
troubled areas, any one of which might
otherwise have become a battleground, a con-
frontation of the great powers, with conse-
quences catastrophic for the entire world.
That the organization should lose its capacity
to respond in this way to the similar emer-
gencies which are sure to recur in this turbu-
lent era is, as our Secretary-General re-
marked nearly a year ago, "inconceivable."
And yet, as he went on to say with his
characteristic directness, "that is the kind
of risk which we are now running."
Regarding the means necessary to assure
that this United Nations capacity remains
unimpaired and particularly that members
are prepared in advance to respond to a
United Nations call for peacekeeping forces,
we shall have more to say in the working
group which deals with that subject.
Financial Arrangements
My second point relates to the vital need
for reliable financial support of peacekeep-
ing operations. It is this issue that first
threatened to undermine the peacekeeping
activity of the U.N. — and that threat still
hangs over us today.
One sign of it is the fact that the most
recently inaugurated peacekeeping operation,
that on Cyprus, is being financed on a
hand-to-mouth basis by some 20 countries
responding to periodic appeals from the Sec-
retary-General. That the world's ranking
international official should be obliged to go
begging every few months to carry out the
will of the organization, expressed by re-
peated and unanimous resolutions of the
Security Council, is neither dignified nor
acceptable.
On the other hand, the financing of the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Mid-
dle East has been provided for on a sounder
and more equitable footing. It has been
covered by apportionment among the mem-
bers— although regrettably not all have yet
paid. Perhaps the formula used for UNEF
through some improved mechanism can be
helpful in finding a model for the future.
One aspect of the financial problem is the
question of voluntary contributions. I should
like to deal with this with great frankness
and candor with respect to the position of my
Government.
At the time when a way was being sought
to end the deadlock over article 19, many
delegations came to the United States dele-
gation and assured us that if we would not
press for application of the article 19 voting
penalty then the members who had refused
to contribute to certain peacekeeping opera-
tions would make substantial voluntary con-
tributions to reduce the deficit of the orga-
638
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nization. In spite of these assurances, I am
obliged to note that more than a year has
passed and no voluntary contribution has yet
been made by any of those countries that re-
fused to contribute, particularly the major
ones.
Now, some have suggested that the United
States also should make a voluntary contri-
bution. I need scarcely reiterate to this com-
mittee that my country took the initiative in
breaking the deadlock over article 19. Now
it is for others to take the initiative by
doing their part in the interest of U.N. sol-
vency.
I also need scarcely remind the committee
that the United States, in addition to paying
its assessed share in every case, had long
since made large voluntary contributions
both to the United Nations Emergency Force
and to the Congo operation.
But I again repeat the assurance that I
have given before: that once the promised
substantial voluntary contributions have
been made by those who we have been as-
sured would make such contributions, the
United States will not be found wanting — as
indeed we have never been found wanting in
support of the U.N.'s needs and require-
ments.
I next turn briefly to the more basic ques-
tion of future financial arrangements.
The United States has in no way abated
its support for the principle of collective
financing for peacekeeping. We believe it
should be applied in light of the realities and
practicalities of the situation to the extent
feasible, as it now is for certain peacekeeping
operations contained in the regular budget.
This is one area in which this committee
could take a constructive step by examining
the various proposals for a model special
scale for financing operations involving
heavy expenditures. We are prepared to join
in the search for a reliable and equitable
formula and to consider various approaches
that have been suggested.
For example, we will be glad to examine
the concrete suggestion made by India;
namely, that in cases where the Security
Council authorizes a peacekeeping operation
involving heavy expenditures, the General
Assembly may apportion the resulting ex-
penses on a special scale, reducing the share
of the low-income countries. We are fully
prepared to discuss this proposal in a spirit
of mutual accommodation — and with a view
to making real progress toward meaningful
agreement.
We have listened today with close atten-
tion to the cogent observations just made by
our distinguished colleague, Ambassador
[Akira] Matsui of Japan, on the Indian
proposal. As is usual for him and his country,
Ambassador Matsui has made a notable con-
tribution to the discussion in the careful
analysis which he has given us today.
We are also prepared to consider other
financing formulas, including the Jamaican
proposal and the formula embodied in the
seven-power resolution adopted by the Spe-
cial Political Committee last fall.
And we have listened today also with great
interest to the suggestions of the dis-
tinguished representative of Ethiopia, our
colleague. Ambassador [Lij Endalkatchew]
Makonnen, toward a coordinated and bal-
anced method for the initiation and financing
of peacekeeping operations to be implemented
on the basis of a gentlemen's agreement. We
shall, of course, want to study these with
care but I can assure Ambassador Makonnen
here and now that the United States is pre-
pared to consider his proposals with the
closest attention as well as other proposals
aimed toward the same goal.
Ambassador Makonnen stated his aim as,
and I quote him, "making the Organization
readily responsive to any contingency that
might require United Nations actions with-
out badly needed actions being slowed down
or hindered altogether by the requirement of
big-power unanimity." I am in complete
agreement with his statement so cogently
expressed.
We have also had an interesting proposal
from the distinguished Minister Zorrilla
[Luis G. Zorrilla, alternate representative]
of Mexico concerning the financial aspects of
peacekeeping, which also require and will re-
ceive our careful consideration and study.
APRIL 17, 1967
689
In the same spirit we would be glad to dis-
cuss suggestions with regard to a finance
committee to consider methods of financing
peacekeeping, including the French proposal
for a committee linked to the Security Coun-
cil. We believe that any such committee
ought to be created by the General Assembly,
whose authority in this area is supported by
the charter. Perhaps a compromise might be
possible; namely, a committee composed of
the members of the Security Council but re-
porting to the General Assembly. I mention
this as an example of the flexibility which
we are willing to manifest and which we be-
lieve can lead to progress.
Secretary-General's Executive Authority
My third point is that any United Nations
peacekeeping operation, like any other com-
plex operation, requires a single executive.
That executive should be the Secretary-
General — in the future as in the past.
In the peacekeeping area as in every other
vital work of the organization, the Secretary-
General simply cannot function as a glorified
clerk. He must have the latitude to make the
necessary day-to-day decisions. He must not
be tied down by demands that administrative
details be referred back to the Security
Council or the General Assembly as the case
may be. If the Secretary-General has to clear
with them the assignment of every observer
and the allocation of every jeep, the peace-
keeping function of the U.N. will simply
undergo a new form of paralysis — admin-
istrative rather than financial.
Of course, as in the past, the Secretary-
General should operate within the scope of
his authority and his mandate, and his rights
and responsibilities and limitations under the
charter. He should be responsive to the
authorizing body. He should consult with the
members on his conduct of peacekeeping
operations. But consultation must not be dis-
torted into a new form of veto.
I can only say, from my experience and
that of my predecessors at the United Na-
tions, the Secretary-General has discharged
his duty of consultation with complete
fidelity and objectivity and in the interest of
all members of the organization.
No Veto on Peacekeeping
Finally, the United States firmly adheres
to the view that no one nation may frustrate
the United Nations in its peacekeeping
work.
Under the charter, the Security Council's
responsibility is not described as "exclusive"
but rather as "primary." The power of the
General Assembly to make recommendations
in this realm is made clear in the charter,
notably in articles 10, 11, 12, and 14.
Various members, including France, have
in the past suggested that the General As-
sembly retains a role in peacekeeping activi-
ties as distinct from enforcement actions.
And it may be useful to emphasize this dis-
tinction, to which we fully subscribe. Only
the Security Council has power under the
charter to mount enforcement actions. Such
actions involve coercion and in launching
them the Security Council has the power to
issue orders binding on member states. That
power is properly subject to the veto.
The General Assembly has no binding
power with respect to enforcement actions. It
can only recommend. But the importance of
this recommendatory power — which is pos-
sessed also by the Security Council — is
attested to by the fact that virtually all the
operations involving military forces in the
history of the United Nations have been
authorized by recommendation. One, the
United Nations Emergency Force, was
recommended by the General Assembly. All
the others were recommended by the Security
Council without invoking its enforcement
power.
Believing as we do in these principles
which we conceive to be entirely sound and
compatible with the charter, we were much
gratified last December when the Canadian
resolution, containing a clear reaffirmation
of the Assembly's role in this area, received
such a strong majority vote in the Special
640
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Political Committee of the General Assembly.
And we earnesly hope this vote foreshadows
further progress toward the general accept-
ance and reaffirmation of the Assembly's
vital peacekeeping function.
I believe the issue of the General Assem-
bly's authority in this area has never been
more eloquently stated than in the statement
which our late beloved colleague, Dr. Victor
Andres Belaunde of Peru, made in the de-
bate on peacekeeping last December 14, on
the last day of his life. I am convinced he
spoke for an overwhelming part of the mem-
bership of the United Nations when he said:
We cannot resign ourselves to that absurd con-
cept which, while recognizing the necessity for peace,
holds that when the organ specifically charged with
responsibility for peace becomes paralyzed, the Gen-
eral Assembly should also be paralyzed and immo-
bilized, impotent in the face of war and catastrophe.
We cannot accept this ; we will never accept it.
Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I repeat that
the United States wishes a resolution of this
problem. It wishes to respond flexibly to any
initiative whose purpose is to assure the
future of the United Nations as a keeper of
the peace. Progress cannot be made by un-
requited concessions from one side. But
where a spirit of accommodation is apparent,
my Government will respond.
The interests at stake in this matter
transcend the interests of any nation or
group of nations. All nations, great and
small alike, irrespective of their size or loca-
tion or ideology, irrespective of particular
grievances, have a vital stake in a peaceful
world order.
One who serves here, Mr. Chairman, I am
sure you will agree with me, is tempted very
often to wonder what future historians will
write about the United Nations in its first
quarter-century.
Perhaps they will record that its greatest
period was a decade or so in which it created
something the world had never seen before —
international peacekeeping forces acting
under the flag of, and in the name of, a world
organization — but that after this brief
flowering its members commenced to quarrel
and to reassert their ancient jealousies, their
doubts, their fears, their timidities, and that
these pioneering actions were abandoned.
Or perhaps they will write that the first
flowering led to something better; that after
a difficult crisis, the members realized how
deep their common interest was; that they
went on to put the U.N., the servant of that
common interest, on a more solid footing —
thus opening a new era in the history of
man's ancient quest for peace.
But historians can only record history; it
is we who have the responsibility and who
must write it. In the name of our common
humanity, let us write a new history which
our posterity in every nation will not be
ashamed to read.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Antarctica
The Antarctic Treaty. Sig^ned at Washington
December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23,
1961. TIAS 4780.
Accession deposited: Netherlands, including King-
dom in Europe, Surinam, and Netherlands
Antilles, March 30, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature and ratification: Yugoslavia, March 21,
1967.
Genocide
Convention on the prevention and punishment of the
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9,
1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.'
Accession deposited: Mongolia (with reservations
and declaration), January 5, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Inter-American convention on facilitation of inter-
national waterborne transportation, with annex.
Done at Mar del Plata June 7, 1963."
' Not in force for the United States.
* Not in force.
APRIL 17, 1967
641
Ratification deposited: United States, March 20,
1967.
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to measures of control. Done at Washington
November 29, 1965.^
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 30, 1967.
Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089) relat-
ing to entry into force of proposals adopted by
the Commission. Done at Washington November
29, 1965.^
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 29, 1967.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pol-
lution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for the
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, March 17,
1967.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 8, 1967.
Amendments to chapter II of the international con-
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS
5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London
November 30, 1966."
Senate advice aiid consent to ratification: March
21, 1967.
Ratified by the President: March 28, 1967.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966. Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part
I and parts III to VII; August 1, 1966, for part
IL
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, March 29, 1967.
BILATERAL
Congo (Kinshasa)
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annex. Signed
at Kinshasa and Lubumbashi March 15, 1967.
Entered into force March 15, 1967.
Israel
Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington January 27, 1967. Entered into force
January 27, 1967.
Italy
Agreement relating to exportation of cotton vel-
veteen fabrics from Italy to the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
October 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19,
1966.
Japan
Agreement amending the agreement of September
12 and 19, 1966 (TIAS 6170), relating to the
establishment of a geodetic satellite observation
station at Kanoya. Effected by exchange of notes
at Tokyo February 21 and March 14, 1967. En-
tered into force March 14, 1967.
Poland
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington March
15, 1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967.
Tunisia
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68
Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with annexes.
Signed at Tunis March 17, 1967. Entered into
force March 17, 1967.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Consular convention. Signed at Moscow June 1,
1964.''
Ratified by the President: March 31, 1967.
United Arab Republic
Agreement relating to an educational and cultural
exchange program. Effected by exchange of notes
at Cairo January 5 and February 21, 1967. En-
tered into force February 21, 1967.
' Not in force.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1451 PUBLICATION 8225 APRIL 17, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16;
single copy 80 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
642
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX April 17, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. Ii51
Afghanistan
Letters of Credence (Malikyar) 626
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint
statement) 627
Antarctica. U.S. Observers Inspect Antarctic
Stations 633
Canada. U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of
American Falls at Niagara 634
Economic Affairs
Convention Adopted on Conduct of North At-
lantic Fisheries 635
U.S., Canada Request IJC Study of American
Falls at Niagara 634
Foreign Aid
Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1967 (proclamation) 632
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint
statement) 627
Latin America. Pan American Day and Pan
American Week, 1967 (proclamation) . . . 632
Presidential Documents
Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1967 632
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the
United States 627
Treaty Information
Convention Adopted on Conduct of North At-
lantic Fisheries 635
Current Actions 641
United Nations
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint
statement) 627
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618
United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam
Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide
memoire and U.S. replies) 624
U.S. Recapitulates Basic Principles for U.N.
Peacekeeping Functions (Goldberg) .... 636
Viet-Nam
Prime Minister of Afghanistan Visits the
United States (Johnson, Maiwandwal, joint
statement) 627
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 28 618
United States Accepts U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral's Proposal for Ending the Viet-Nam
Conflict (texts of Secretary-General's aide
memoire and U.S. replies) 624
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 636
Johnson, President 627, 632
Maiwandwal, Mohammed Hashim 627
Malikyar, Abdullah 626
Rusk, Secretary 618
U Thant 624
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 27-April 2
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to March 27 which
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos.
60 of March 20 and 61 of March 21.
No. Date Sabject
*67 3/27 Linowitz: Overseas Press Club,
New York (excerpts) .
*68 3/27 Amendments to itinerary for visit
of Prime Minister of Afghani-
stan.
*69 3/28 U.S. reply to U.N. Secretary-Gen-
eral's aide memoire on Viet-
Nam (U.S./U.N. press release
printed here).
70 3/28 Rusk: news conference of March
28.
*71 3/29 Rusk: salute to Roy Wilkins at
Freedom House dinner.
*72 3/29 Linowitz: Women's National Press
Club, Washington, D.C. (ex-
cerpts).
*74 3/30 Linowitz: Regional Foreign Pol-
icy Conference, Philadelphia
(excerpts) .
t75 3/30 Panel of advisers for Bureau of
African Affairs (rewrite).
*76 3/30 Meeting of U.S.-Japan Committee
on Trade and Economic Mat-
ters.
*77 3/30 Program for visit of President
Sunay of Turkey.
*78 3/30 Rusk: interview on Northwestern
University radio program.
t79 3/31 Palmer: "Africa and America."
80 3/31 Study requested of measures to
preserve beauty of American
Falls at Niagara.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/41
Superintendent of Documents
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U52
April 24, 1967
AFRICA AND AMERICA
by Assistant Secretai'y Palmer 646
CENTO ECONOMIC COMMITTEE MEETS AT WASHINGTON
Statement by AID Administrator WiUiam S. Gaud
and Text of Communique 668
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES REAFFIRM BONDS
OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
Exchanges of Remarks Between President Johnson
and President Sunay and Text of Joint Communique 652
For index see inside back cover
Africa and America
by Joseph Palmer 2d
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs >
I am very pleased to talk to this Council
which shares with us in government a deep
interest in advancing relations between the
United States and Africa.
I need not remind this group, with its
knowledge and experience in African af-
fairs, of Africa's far-reaching transition in
the past decade: the creation of over 30 na-
tions, the new impetus to the development
of its human and material resources, and,
above all, the response of its peoples to the
opportunities and responsibilities of freedom.
You are also aware of the inevitable gap be-
tween goals and achievements in a continent
whose aspirations are high and whose over-
all level of productivity is still very low.
Finally, you know that there are no pat an-
swers to Africa's problems and, while they
cannot be postponed until a mythical tomor-
row, they cannot be solved overnight.
With these thoughts in mind, may I dis-
cuss briefly three areas of problems and op-
portunities in Africa today: the aspirations
of individuals, the tasks of national govern-
ments, and the opportunities for regional co-
operation.
The President, in his speech last May 26 ^
to the African ambassadors from OAU [Or-
ganization of African Unity] countries, ex-
' Address made before the Council of the African-
American Institute at New York, N.Y., on Mar.
31 (press release 79).
» Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
plicitly emphasized the importance of the
aspiration for human dignity, racial equal-
ity, and political rights in the history and
experience of both the United States and the
peoples of Africa. At this time the question
of individual rights is at the heart of the
several issues which are found in the south-
ern part of the continent. Without minimiz-
ing the importance of other problems, I
would like to say a few words about South-
ern Rhodesia and South West Africa, since
they are presently occupying a major por-
tion of the attention of the United Nations.
The illegal declaration of independence in
Southern Rhodesia was an effort by a white
minority of 220,000 to perpetuate its control
over some 4 million Africans. By its action
the Smith regime — not the British nor the
Africans nor the U.N. — confronted the
world with an issue of principle that the
international community could not ignore.
The options open to the government of
Southern Rhodesia in November 1965 were
clear. It could continue to govern legally
under the 1961 constitution, it could achieve
legal independence on the basis of the prin-
ciples advanced by the U.K. to safeguard
the political and human rights of the major-
ity as Rhodesia moved toward majority rule,
or it could declare its independence illegally
and seek to perpetuate minority rule. It
chose the last option, and the international
community responded, as it inevitably had
to do, with virtually universal opposition.
646
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The basic issue was, and still is, the ques-
tion of unimpeded progress toward majority
rule. What the British seek and what most
of the world would find acceptable is a set-
tlement that assures an orderly but reason-
able transition to majority rule, with minor-
ity rights fully protected. Neither the British
Commonwealth, the U.N., nor the United
States demands immediate majority rule.
Nor does anyone advocate depriving the
minority of its legitimate rights. We believe
that the white minority in Southern Rhodesia
can make a valuable contribution to the de-
velopment of an independent Rhodesia and
that its rights should be protected so that it
can play its full part in this great task in
security and prosperity.
U.S. Actions on Southern Rhodesia
All of the action taken by the United
States Government, acting in its own inter-
est as a responsible member of the interna-
tional community in response to the Smith
regime's challenge, has been based on our
recognition of the importance of the princi-
ple involved. Within the framework of
President Johnson's statement that the
United States "will not support policies
abroad which are based on the rule of mi-
norities or the discredited notion that men
are unequal before the law," * we have re-
peatedly affirmed our opposition to the uni-
lateral declaration of independence (UDI)
by (1) opposing the present illegal regime
in Salisbury, (2) supporting the role of the
United Kingdom as the constitutional sov-
ereign authority in Southern Rhodesia, (3)
voting for the selective mandatory sanctions
approved by the U.N. Security Council last
December 16,* (4) adopting the necessary
measures to give effect to the mandatory
sanctions program supported by the inter-
national community, and (5) continuing in
force other measures to implement the exist-
ing voluntary sanctions program.
We do not know precisely what effect the
new mandatory sanctions program will have.
We are sure the program will impress upon
the white minority in Southern Rhodesia the
seriousness of international opposition to
UDI and will reinforce the previously imple-
mented voluntary sanctions program. We
hope that it will lead the Smith regime to
reconsider its position and reach a reason-
able settlement of the issues.
I would like to make it clear that the
United States Government is cooperating
with the international community in a peace-
ful and measured effort through economic
sanctions to achieve an internationally ac-
cepted objective in a particular place under
particular circumstances; also, that we are
not committed to going beyond the present
program, nor do we see any present need to
do so. We believe that what is required of
the international community at this stage is
to make the existing program as effective
as possible.
The Situation in South West Africa
The rights and aspirations of the individ-
ual are also central issues in current discus-
sions at the United Nations over the future
of the international Territory of South West
Africa. The principle involved was funda-
mental to the mandate agreement of 1920,
in which South Africa agreed to "promote
to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants."
The International Court of Justice was
asked to decide if South Africa had violated
this obligation. In July 1966 the ICJ de-
clined to adjudicate the substance of the
charges on the ground that the plaintiffs
lacked the requisite legal interest.^ However,
the Court in three previous advisory opin-
ions had said that South Africa cannot alter
the status of the territory without the con-
sent of the U.N. and that South Africa con-
tinues to be bound to accept U.N. supervi-
sion and to promote the inhabitants'
'Ibid.
* For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 73.
' For a Department statement of July 27, 1966,
see ibid., Aug. 15, 1966, p. 231.
APRIL 24, 1967
647
well-being and progress. The advisory opin-
ions remain the basic and authoritative
statements of the International Court of Jus-
tice on important questions, including the
existence and scope of South Africa's obliga-
tions and the rights of the inhabitants of
South West Africa.
After more than two decades of trying to
get the South African Government to ac-
cept the principle of accountability to the
U.N., the General Assembly in October 1966
decided that South Africa's mandate was
terminated and that the territory should be-
come "the direct responsibility" of the U.N.^
The Ad Hoc Committee on South West Af-
rica, which is composed of representatives
of 14 countries, including ourselves, is ex-
ploring "practical means by which South
West Africa should be administered, so as to
enable the people of the Territory to exer-
cise the right of self-determination and to
achieve independence. . . ."
Three proposals have been made in the
Committee, and these will be forwarded to
the General Assembly for further considera-
tion. The United States has joined with
Italy and Canada in sponsoring a resolution
to enable the U.N. to explore how it can dis-
charge its responsibilities with respect to
South West Africa. The people of South
West Africa must be enabled to exercise
their rights of self-determination, freedom,
and independence in accordance with the
U.N. Charter.
In order to accomplish this, we propose
the establishment of a U.N. Council for
South West Africa and the appointment of
a special representative to help achieve this
objective. The council and commissioner
would ascertain what elements may be con-
sidered as representative of various people
of the territory, establish all contacts deemed
necessary, consult with various representa-
tive elements to establish with them as soon
as possible a nucleus of self-government in
South West Africa and determine the neces-
° For a U.S. statement and text of the resolution,
see ibid., Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.
sary conditions that will enable South West
Africa to achieve self-determination and in-
dependence.
As a part of the above process, we believe
that a serious effort should be made to ex-
plore with South Africa possible means of
cooperation with the U.N. to fulfill the as-
pirations of the inhabitants of South West
Africa. There are, of course, many differing
views within the U.N. with respect to the
merits of such a dialog, and the recent an-
nouncement by South Africa of its intention
to create a separate Ovamboland in the
northern part of the territory further com-
plicates the problem.
At the same time we all are deeply aware
of the value of dialog in keeping open doors
to peaceful and mutually advantageous ac-
commodation. Interesting developments have
recently been taking place in South Africa's
relationships with some independent African
states. While it is perhaps too early to assess
the full significance of these developments,
they may nevertheless hold some hope for
greater flexibility in general approaches to
the problems of this area. In the midst of
the divergent views which characterize ef-
forts to solve the South West Africa prob-
lem, it therefore remains our hope that doors
to peaceful accommodation can be kept open
through a dialog among the parties con-
cerned. Our representative on the Ad Hoc
Committee has kept this very much in mind,
and his efforts and those of others on the
Committee have been consonant with this
point of view.
Tasks of National Governments
The task of building governments which
truly reflect the aspirations of the peoples of
Africa is a critical problem throughout most
of the continent. The President recognized
this last May when he spoke of the never-
ending effort of nations, new or old, to com-
bine freedom with responsibility, liberty
with order.
I don't think that any of us underestimate
the difficulties this task entails. In Africa it
is part of the change and experimentation
648
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
going on in many of its nations. We are well
aware of the dangers in the breakdown of
law and order, the problems arising from ir-
regular seizures of power, and the handicaps
which political instability poses for sound
economic development. In mentioning briefly
only two examples of the search for effective
national government, I must necessarily pass
over a number of other situations which also
merit our sympathetic understanding.
The Congo has been involved in a painful
search for a formula of government accepta-
ble to all of the country's many elements.
After almost 7 years, there is for the first
time peace within its frontiers. Its leader-
ship can now turn its full attention to realiz-
ing the country's potential as an African
nation. No one expects that this task will be
accomplished overnight, but there are many
indications, both domestic and foreign, that
the process of building sound relationships
is under way. Within the country steps are
being taken to reorganize and improve the
administration and to reduce the budgetary
deficit. At the same time export earnings
increased from $338 million in 1965 to $434
million in 1966. Constructive developments
at home have been accompanied by success
on the part of President [Joseph] Mobutu
in establishing close relations with fellow
African leaders where their interests coin-
cide, as witnessed by the recent meeting of
heads of state in Kinshasa.
The great state of Nigeria, as we all know,
is experiencing its time of troubles. This
most populous country of Africa, in its sec-
ond year of political crisis, has been subject
to centrifugal forces in which regional, trib-
al, and personal pressures all have played
their part. The period of instability is begin-
ning to show a cumulative adverse effect on
the economy of the country, with all regions
of Nigeria being hurt both in their normal
trade and in their development by the swirl
of events and pressures. It would be a great
tragedy to Africa and the world if this trend
continued to the point where it threatened
the great potential for national development
which Nigeria possesses in such outstanding
degree and which has so engaged the ener-
gies of her statesmen. All of us remain hope-
ful that the wisdom and foresight which has
characterized the Nigerian nation will pre-
clude this.
Nigeria's development of its national co-
hesion and the form of its political associa-
tion is, of course, for the Nigerians them-
selves to determine. In these critical times
her many friends can offer moral support
and sympathetic understanding from the
knowledge gained through experience that
the road to full national identity is a long
and difficult one and that each country must
travel it in its own manner.
We well remember that our own synthesis
was achieved with long travail over 90 years
following our independence. We wish for
Nigeria and other nations facing similar dif-
ficulties a less arduous and more peaceful
resolution of their problems in a form best
suited to their circumstances and aspirations.
Opportunities for Regional Cooperation
In no sector of African life are the needs
and opportunities more pressing than in the
field of regional cooperation. We know the
history of Africa's boundaries — a blend of
diplomatic compromise and imperial con-
quest, with the result that they rarely relate
to economic viability. We know the history of
Africa's communications — initially with a
metropole and fundamentally with the out-
side world and not with fellow African na-
tions. We know that one of the effects of
many small national markets — and 26 of
Africa's nations have 5 million people or less
— is to complicate growth because of limita-
tions on the viability of investment projects.
In such situations appropriate interna-
tional cooperative action could become a vital
element in enhancing the prospects for eco-
nomic development. Not a single major river
in Africa lies wholly within one country. Not
a single important crop is the sole product
of one African nation. In these and prac-
tically every activity one can think of that
seriously affects the economy of an African
APRIL 24, 1967
649
country, there is an increment of effective-
ness to be added by regional cooperation.
Africa, as the newest of the continents to
achieve independence, has had little time to
develop its own regional institutions. Never-
theless, the Economic Commission for Africa
has not only pointed out paths of sound eco-
nomic development to its members but has
helped launch specific programs and institu-
tions furthering the growth of the continent.
The Organization of African Unity is seek-
ing international political cooperation among
its members which is so important to eco-
nomic development. The African Develop-
ment Bank, which opened its doors less than
a year ago, already has 29 members and over
$40 million in paid-in capital. Negotiations
are under way for additional members and
for additional assistance, probably through
a special fund to which non-African nations
may contribute. Our own support for this
new institution is reflected in the promise of
President Johnson in his foreign aid mes-
sage to "seek an appropriate means of re-
sponding to the recent request of the African
Development Bank for U.S. participation in
a special fund " ''
These three institutions are only part of
the growing pattern of regional cooperative
efforts in Africa. Under the U.N. Develop-
ment Program, a number of river basin ar-
rangements are being developed. The rinder-
pest program under the aegis of the OAU
Scientific Technical and Research Commis-
sion ranges over a score of African coun-
tries. The World Health Organization, in
cooperation with African health organiza-
tions, AID, and others, is campaigning
against smallpox and measles in 19 West
African nations. OCAM [Organisation Com-
mune Africaine et Malagache], UDEAC
[Union Douaniere et Economique de I'Af-
rique Centrale] , and the Conseil de I'Entente
have been formed by various French-speak-
ing countries for their mutual benefit.
In responding to the needs and opportuni-
ties of regional cooperation, the U.S. Gov-
' Ibid., Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378.
ernment has followed two very broad courses
of action. First, arising out of the review of
our policies called for by the President in
his speech to the OAU ambassadors last I
year, we suggested that the World Bank as-
sume a greater role and involvement in
African economic development. We believed
that, using its prestige and experience, the
IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development] might explore with
African regional organizations establishment
of an international standing committee to
assess the evolving needs of the continent,
set priorities, and integrate projects into
more precisely defined development pro-
grams.
After preliminary soundings among mem-
bers and other international and regional
organizations, the Bank recently met with
the ECA, the ADB, and the U.N. Develop-
ment Program to begin to work out plans
for cooperative African economic develop-
ment. Concentrating initially in the fields of
power, transport, and telecommunications,
this effort, in our opinion, is an auspicious
beginning.
Our second principal effort involves our
own assistance programs. In the past 9
months we have reviewed our policies in the
light of both the followup of the President's
speech and the aid legislation last autumn.
As a result, we are putting special emphasis
upon such fields of development as transpor-
tation, telecommunications, agriculture, edu-
cation, and health, and we shall be devoting
an increasing percentage of our available
resources for Africa to assisting regional in-
stitutions and groupings and in financing
regional projects.
No one expects that these two approaches
will work miracles by themselves. The sheer
size of Africa's problems of economic and
social growth precludes easy answers. More-
over, as African leaders have often stated —
and as the President said in his foreign aid
message to Congress — self-help is the essen-
tial ingredient of economic and social
growth. However, we do believe that coop-
eration among regional and international
650
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
organizations, donor nations, and the Afri-
can countries themselves can give a new
dimension to this effort. The task before all
of us is to transform our convictions into
effective practice.
The Secretary of State and the Adminis-
trator of AID will shortly begin the presen-
tation of the aid program to Congress. In
the course of these hearings and of subse-
iiuent discussion the Congress and the Amer-
ican public will have the opportunity to
examine the whole gamut of American over-
seas assistance. In this connection I hope
very much that we can focus on the needs
and opportunities for regional cooperation.
For along with the achievement of individ-
ual rights and the forging of national gov-
ernments, the search for cooperation in eco-
nomic development with and among African
countries is worthy of the best efforts of the
, peoples of both of our two continents.
Advisory Panel Named
for African Affairs Bureau
The Department of State announced on
March 30 (press release 75) the appoint-
ment of a panel of 12 new advisers for the
Bureau of African Affairs and their partici-
pation in the Bureau's established Advisory
Council on African Affairs.
This is the latest panel of advisers to be
announced by the Department in accordance
with the general plan made public on Octo-
ber 18, 1966.1 On that date the advisory panel
for the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs was announced, followed by others
on subsequent dates.
The Advisory Council on African Affairs
was established in June 1962 and since then
has met periodically with officials of the Bu-
reau of African Affairs. Its present member-
ship is drawn from the business, philan-
thropic, religious, academic, and other
communities.2 The newly appointed advisers
and the present members of the council may,
from time to time, be called upon individ-
ually or as members of small working groups
for advice on matters within their fields of
specialization.
The 12 newly appointed advisers are:
William Attwood, Cowles Communications, Inc.,
New York, N.Y.
Leland Barrows, University of Pittsburgh, Pitts-
burgh, Pa.
Philip Bell, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.
Mercer Cook, Howard University, Washington, D.C.
Frederick H. Harbison, Princeton University,
Princeton, N.J.
Ulric St. C. Haynes, Management Resources Corp.,
New York, N.Y.
Francis Keppel, General Learning Corp., New York,
N.Y.
James Loeb, the Saranac News, Saranac Lake, N.Y.
Wilfred Owen, the Brookings Institution, Washing-
ton, D.C.
Alan Pifer, Carnegie Corp., New York, N.Y.
Joseph C. Satterthwaite, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Washington, D.C.
Carroll L. Wilson, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Cambridge, Mass.
' For announcements of other advisory panels,
see Bulletin of Nov. 7, 1966, p. 721; Dec. 5, 1966,
p. 868; Dec. 26, 1966, p. 966; Jan. 2, 1967, p. 16; and
Jan. 9, 1967, p. 72.
^ For a list of the members of the council, see De-
partment press release 75 dated Mar. 30.
APRIL 24, 1967
651
Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds
of Friendsiiip and Cooperation
President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic of
Turkey made a state visit to the United
States April 2-13. He arrived in Washington,
D.C., on April 3 for a 3-day visit during
which he met with President Johnson and
other U.S. Government officials. Following
are texts of an exchange of greetings between
President Johnson and President Sunay at an
arrival ceremony on April 3, their exchange
of toasts at a state dinner at the White House
that evening, and a joint communique re-
leased on April 4- at the conclusion of their
meetings.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated April 3
President Johnson
Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished
guests, ladies and gentlemen: Mrs. Johnson
and I are especially happy to see you, Mr.
President. Your presence in America will
give us a chance to return some of the
warmth and friendliness we received from
the people of Turkey on our visit to your
country almost 5 years ago. Your people won
our hearts, as they had already earned the
respect and the admiration of all the Ameri-
can people.
Our century has been greatly enriched by
the goals and achievements of the Turkish
nation. More than four decades ago the emer-
gence of modem Turkey, under the guiding
genius of Kemal Ataturk, was one of the
great revolutions of our age. It remains an
inspiration to all who have since won their
independence or who still seek to unshackle
the fetters of the past.
You have proved, by your example, that
free men can create strong and independent
institutions. Inscribed as a reminder to all
who enter the halls of your Parliament are
the words: "Sovereignty belongs to the
people."
Your citizens have demonstrated repeat-
edly their commitment to constitutional
government. Your vigorous parliamentary
democracy is a tribute to that dedication. You
have jealously guarded your freedom of
conscience and protected your independence.
Free men are also natural allies.
Turkey has been one of the most active
members of the United Nations. It has served
on the Security Council as well as on other
United Nations bodies. A member of the
Council of Europe and of the United Nations
Palestine Conciliation Commission, Turkey
was one of the first countries to answer the
United Nations' call for troops for Korea. In
1952 Turkey joined the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, officially committing its
strength to the cause of preserving peace.
Between Turkey and the United States
there is a bond, a special sense of fellowship
which can be known only to those who belong
to the strong fraternity of free men.
It is in this spirit that we meet here today,
Mr. President. I am looking forward to ex-
ploring with you the great issues of the day
and the paths we might together follow to
bring greater harmony among all of the na-
tions of the world. I am looking forward to
learning more about the impressive and ex-
652
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
citing progress being made in Turkey
toward a more abundant and creative life for
your people.
There is a vigor and momentum in Turkey
today which your friends in America have
long and enthusiastically applauded.
We know that the future belongs not
merely to the strong but to those who will
labor hardest at the constructive works of
peace. And, as so often in this century, Mr.
President, we see Turkey leading the way.
Mr. President, we are delighted to have
you and your gracious lady with us.
President Sunay
Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and
gentlemen: I am very grateful for this most
cordial and warm welcome.
As I come to Washington to pay a state
visit to the United States upon your kind
invitation, my memory goes back to 1962,
when we had the pleasure and the privilege
of greeting you and Mrs. Johnson in Turkey.
We were all, at that time, very much im-
pressed by your powerful personality, your
statesmanship, your dedication to the cause
of peace and human progress.
As the President of the United States you
have devoted all your boundless energy to the
ideals which are dear to you.
My visit coincides with a very happy anni-
versary. That anniversary is the anniversary
of the Truman Doctrine, under which the
United States undertook for the first time a
commitment toward the free world. The
implementation of this doctrine opened the
way for a lasting solidarity and partnership
between Turkey and the United States.
We have so much in common with you. We
share the same love of freedom and the same
dedication to democracy. We are equally
attached to the objective of a just peace and
to the building of a community of free and
equal nations. Our nations have proved
throughout history how much they are deter-
mined to safeguard their liberties and how
much they can meet with courage and deter-
mination any challenge.
The cooperation we inaugurated 20 years
ago is as strong as ever. This association has
been sealed and reinforced by our ties of
alliance within NATO, which we both con-
sider as an indispensable element of equi-
librium, security, and peace. We value deeply
this partnership, and we are equally con-
vinced of the need to work relentlessly to
strengthen peace and promote mutual under-
standing and confidence among the nations
of the world.
Mr. President, I am looking forward to
meeting and discussing with you the matters
of mutual interest, and I also rejoice at the
prospect of meeting other good friends of
Turkey in the United States.
It is my fervent hope and expectation that
our personal contacts will serve to strengthen
further the ties of friendship which bind our
two countries and to promote a greater
understanding between our peoples. Thank
you.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated April 3
President Johnson
Mr. President, Mrs. Sunay, distinguished
guests: This house is honored tonight by a
distinguished visitor from a very famous
land. A bridge between two continents,
Turkey had become a melting pot of races
long before the first explorers ever reached
our shores. Great empires, which have left
their stamp on history, have risen and fallen
in this land. Its people have contributed pro-
foundly to the arts of civilization.
But nothing in Turkey's ancient past sur-
passes its modern achievements.
When this century was still young, from
the ashes of an empire a great new Turkish
nation was formed. The remarkable energy,
vision, and wisdom of a great leader, Kemal
Ataturk, set his people on the path of 20th-
century accomplishment.
A great philosopher once said that the
creator of a commonwealth must toil in one
APRIL 24, 1967
653
century for the benefits that his descendants
will reap in the next.
Turkey has proved that we need not
always wait so long. The Turkish people
today are already enjoying many of the
fruits of their own efforts.
They have joined the mainstream of eco-
nomic progress. They are shaping events
rather than being shaped by them. Their
borders are secure, their democratic institu-
tions are strong.
But, Mr. President, as the American phi-
losopher Ralph Waldo Emerson once said,
"The true test of civilization is not the cen-
sus, nor the size of the cities, nor the crops,
but the kind of man that the country turns
out."
Mr. President, our countries are different
in many ways. But I think we can both be
proud that they turn out men that have much
in common.
Americans and Turks alike are devoted to
social justice, to the preservation of freedom,
to democracy.
Our people alike seek personal participa-
tion in the affairs of their government.
Americans and Turks alike desire greater
educational opportunities for their children,
for we realize that the future belongs not to
us but to them.
Americans and Turks alike are seekers
after a world that is free of war and strife
and a world where each of us, to the limits of
his capacity, can pursue excellence.
Mr. President, your life has been spent in
dedicated service to your countrymen, first
as a soldier, now as President of the Repub-
lic, always as a faithful servant of your
people. There is no higher dedication.
On this occasion tonight I cannot help but
reminisce.
This is the anniversary of the Truman
Doctrine. Twenty years ago, when President
Truman called upon the American people to
rally in defense of the freedom of Greece
and Turkey, there was a great deal of criti-
cism in this land about that decision.
Mr. Truman was accused of arrogance, of
wanting to play "world policeman." In the
words of one commentator, who is still with
us, the Truman Doctrine was a disastrous
entanglement in an anti-Communist crusade
which could only lead to a much wider war.
Some of us refused to believe this. Indeed,
one of the proud moments of my life was on
May 7, 1947, when I rose in the House to sup-
port President Truman and his supposedly
"disastrous" policy of containment.
In voting for aid to Greece and Turkey, I
said on that day:
I do so with the hope that Russia has peaceful
intentions; that she desires to live at peace with
other nations; that she will cooperate in the restora-
tion of a war-torn world ; but, if it be otherwise, then
I am certain as I stand here that the passage of
this measure is the only course that this country can
in decency take, and the only course which may
avoid war.
Tonight, as we meet here in the White
House, Greece and Turkey — and Korea — are
taken for granted as dynamic, freedom-loving
nations. And I hazard the guess that in 20
years the Republic of Viet-Nam will similarly
be taken for granted.
These things have been accomplished be-
cause the United States of America and its
allies throughout the world have stood firm
before the tide of aggression — and the tide
has receded. And among those who unflinch-
ingly confronted the risks and obligations,
there has been — and, I think, always will be,
Mr. President — a very special bond of fellow-
ship.
We have a unique tie. For two decades our
peoples have shared a vigil beside the gates
of freedom — not for ourselves but for the
entire fellowship of free men, the weak as
well as the strong, the timid and the meek as
well as the brave. The graves of brave
Americans and brave Turks in the hills of
Korea tonight are an eternal testament to our
comradeship.
We honor this great common tradition to-
night as we honor you. May it grow and
prosper in the years ahead, as new genera-
tions, inspired by common ideals, make free-
dom, justice, and progress their common
cause as it has been ours.
654
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask
you to join me in a toast to the people of the
Republic of Turkey and to their President,
Cevdet Sunay.
President Sunay
Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, ladies and
gentlemen: I am deeply moved by your warm
and cordial welcome. I would like to express
to you on my behalf and on behalf of my wife
our sincere thanks for your kind words about
us and for the gracious hospitality we have
received here in Washington.
I have been to Washington several times
before, but this time I have the great
privilege, as President of the Republic of
Turkey, of being here as your guest.
I am particularly happy to be surrounded
here tonight by so many distinguished Amer-
icans, many of whom I had the pleasure of
meeting earlier.
I think, Mr. President, that my visit is
timely, not that there are any unresolved
problems between our countries but because
for more than a decade a Turkish President
has not visited the United States and because,
this year, as you have mentioned, we are cele-
brating the Truman Doctrine, which consti-
tutes a landmark in the history of Turkish-
American relations.
It is proper that on this occasion I pay a
warm tribute to President Truman for his
farsightedness and wisdom in laying down
the basis of a policy which culminated later
on in the signing of the Atlantic alliance.
President Eisenhower, whom we remember
with respect and admiration as a great sol-
dier and a great statesman and whom I had
the honor of meeting personally, also visited
us in Turkey in 1959.
Mr. President, in 1962 we had the privilege
of welcoming you and your charming wife. I
have a very vivid recollection of this visit
and of the spontaneous demonstration of
friendship and esteem with which you were
greeted wherever you went in Turkey.
I am referring to these events to illustrate
the closeness of our relations and the depth of
our friendship.
We have in Turkey a profound admiration
for the great American democracy from
which all struggles for freedom have drawn
such inspiration.
I know, Mr. President, that you know how
much the Turkish nation is resolute in its
unflinching adherence to the ideals of indi-
vidual and political freedom. We are proud,
in Turkey, of the strength and vitality of our
democratic institutions.
It is within the framework of liberty and
democracy that the Turkish nation also
undertook the difficult task of insuring rapid
economic growth and social progress. In this
field, also, we feel encouraged by our recent
progress.
The rate of our economic growth is not far
behind the target set for us by the 5-year
development plan, and there is strong hope
that this rate may be increased in future
years.
We are in need of foreign economic aid to
attain our target at the present, but our in-
tention is not to rely indefinitely on the
inflow of such assistance. Our goal is, on the
contrary, to use our internal and external re-
sources as effectively as possible in order to
reach the stage of self-sustaining growth dur-
ing our third 5-year development plan.
Mr. President, great changes have oc-
curred in the international field over the last
20 years. Europe, which was for the most
part desolate in the aftermath of a tragic
war, has now reached, behind the shield of
NATO, a peace of stability, prosperity, and
progress never attained before in all its
history.
Vast areas in Asia and Africa have en-
tered the cause of freedom, independence,
and technical progress.
In recent times we have also observed and
shared hopes for a detente in East-West rela-
tions. The valuable objective of building and
maintaining bridges of contact between the
West and the East, which I know, Mr. Presi-
dent, you attach special importance to, is a
further indication that progress has been
made in this direction.
Any decrease in international tension and
APBIL 24, 1967
655
any progress toward a stable peace and
greater international cooperation is, of
course, of deep satisfaction to the people and
Government of my country.
Indeed, Turkey is not failing to bring fully
its contribution to this end in its interna-
tional relationships. But as long as peace does
not rest on solid foundations, insuring effec-
tively the security of each nation, we cannot
afford to relinquish our individual and col-
lective strength.
NATO remains, therefore, in our view, an
essential element of peace and security.
NATO is even more than that. It is, we
believe, the instrument of the close partner-
ship in which we can cooperate to an ever-
growing extent for reinforcing peace and
enhancing international cooperation.
Mr. President, we are grateful to the
United States for the military and economic
aid extended to Turkey since the inception of
the Truman Doctrine. This aid has con-
tributed greatly to the strengthening of our
defensive capability and furthering our eco-
nomic development.
But I am convinced, Mr. President, that
you would agree with me that this assistance
is serving our common interests.
To safeguard her own security and to con-
tribute to the mutual defense effort of the
free world, Turkey is indeed under a heavy
defense burden. On the other hand, a strong,
vigorous, and developing Turkey is certainly
to the best interests of the free world. We
value deeply in Turkey our partnership, our
friendship, and our alliance with the United
States.
No relationship can flourish if it is not
based on mutual respect, equality, and confi-
dence. I am certain that our two Govern-
ments will develop their close associations in
that spirit.
We can only regret that we continue to be
involved in an unfortunate dispute in our
area. You know how much effort we spent to
solve this problem peacefully in a way to
safeguard the legitimate interests of the
parties concerned. We will continue on this
path, but at the same time we are determined
not to permit or tolerate any attempt to im-
pose a unilateral solution or any pressure to
that end.
Mr. President, in closing my remarks I
would like to say how happy we are in
Turkey to have as your representative a dis-
tinguished and most capable diplomat — Am-
bassador Parker Hart. His contribution to
Turkey- American understanding and coop-
eration has been invaluable.
I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join
me in drinking a toast to the health of the
President of the United States of America
and the people of the United States of
America.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
White House press release dated April 4
At the invitation of President Johnson and Mrs.
Johnson, President Cevdet Sunay of the Republic
of Turkey and Mrs. Sunay are paying a state visit
to the United States.
The warm welcome and cordial hospitality ex-
tended to President Sunay and his party reflect the
deep and traditional friendship between the peoples
of Turkey and the United States. President Sunay
expressed his sincere thanks to the Government and
the people of the United States for the warm and
friendly reception accorded him.
During the visit to Washington, April 3-5, the
two Presidents, joined by Foreign Minister [Ihsan
Sabri] Caglayangil and Secretary Rusk, engaged in
wide-ranging talks during which they reviewed the
relations between the two countries and the impor-
tant international problems affecting world peace
and security.
The two Presidents recalled the history of Turk-
ish-United States relations and recognized the sub-
stantial contributions made by Turkey to the Free
World. They also stressed the close association be-
tween the two countries which began with imple-
mentation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947.
Both Presidents found themselves in agreement
that Turkey and the United States continue to
share a community of interests in questions affect-
ing the peace of the world, a devotion to democracy
and freedom, a commitment to the principles of
haiTnony and mutual respect among nations. It is
on the basis of these common interests and princi-
ples that they reaffirmed the determination of their
countries further to develop their relations based
upon mutual respect, understanding, and trust.
One of the main subjects dealt with was the eco-
656
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nomic development of Turkey. President Sunay de-
scribed the encouraging progress in this field and
stressed the efforts of Turkey to achieve the objec-
tives set forth in the five year development plan.
The two Presidents agreed that the consortium for
aid to Turkey has provided an eflScient multilateral
mechanism for securing the foreign aid needed by
Turkey, and that this cooperative endeavor should
continue. President Johnson reaffirmed the United
States determination to continue to support the
development efforts of Turkey by maintaining at
a significant level its economic assistance, the aim
being to assist Turkey to reach its declared goal
of vigorous, self-sustaining economic growth.
Both Presidents recognized the need of promoting
cooperation in areas of science and technology for
peaceful purposes. The two Presidents discussed the
problems concerning the Atlantic Alliance. They
welcomed the lessening of tension in Europe. They
agreed, however, that the Atlantic Alliance remains
an indispensable safeguard to peace and security in
Europe and in the world. They reiterated the need
to maintain the integrated military structure of
NATO as the basis of an adequate defense and
deterrent, and to reinforce the solidarity of the
Alliance in the spirit of partnership. They noted
with satisfaction that the arrangements for nuclear
planning constitute a development reflecting allied
solidarity and cooperation.
President Johnson, recognizing the vital role
which Turkey plays within the NATO defense al-
liance, pledged the continuing assistance of the
United States for the strengthening of Turkey's
defense capabilities. Reviewing the situation in Eu-
rope, the two Presidents agreed that a stable peace
requires the healing of the division of that conti-
nent. In this regard they also discussed the efforts
which their Governments have been making to ease
East- West tensions. They stressed the importance of
improving East-West relations and of developing an
atmosphere of mutual trust. They agreed that this
development would contribute to peace.
The two Presidents reiterated the attachment of
their countries to the principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and expressed the hope that the
United Nations would become increasingly an effec-
tive instrument for the maintenance of international
peace and security.
President Sunay and President Johnson stressed
the need to work unceasingly towards complete and
general disarmament under effective international
controls. They stressed their concern over the dan-
gers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons and
e.xpressed the hope that a non-proliferation treaty
would soon be completed in a way that would take
fully into account the interests of all.
During their talks the two Presidents reviewed
recent developments in Southeast Asia. President
Johnson described the situation in Vietnam and the
efforts of the United States Government to bring
about a peaceful settlement. President Sunay ex-
pressed his appreciation for the reaffirmation by
the United States Government of its desire for
early negotiations. Both Presidents expressed regret
that recent intensive efforts to find a way to a solu-
tion had not so far yielded any positive results.
They found themselves in agreement on the need to
support the right of the Vietnamese, both in the
South and in the North, to determine their own fu-
ture in peace.
President Johnson and President Sunay discussed
also the problem of Cyprus in all its aspects. They
reviewed the developments since the unhappy events
of 1963, which caused so much distress and suffering
on the island, especially to the Turkish community.
They emphasized the need to refrain from any ac-
tion likely to increase tension on the island and
between interested parties. President Sunay in-
vited the attention of President Johnson to the
sufferings resulting from the present situation on
the island. He reiterated Turkey's desire to arrive
at a peaceful and agreed settlement. Referring to
bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece, both
Presidents expressed the hope that such talks would
lead to an honorable solution reconciling the legiti-
mate interests of all the parties concerned, includ-
ing the communities living on the island. In their
discussion, proceeding from the binding effects of
existing treaties, both Presidents agreed that these
remain an essential factor in seeking such a solu-
tion. The two Presidents expressed their apprecia-
tion of the task performed by the United Nations
force in Cyprus and discussed ways in which the
efforts of the United Nations to preserve peace
and to secure a return to normal conditions can be
strengthened.
The two Presidents expressed the conviction that
their frank and cordial talks would further the
bonds of friendship, alliance, and cooperation be-
tween Turkey and the United States.
APRIL 24, 1967
657
President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Recommendations
Following is a statement made by Presi-
dent Johnson on April 3 upon receipt of the
report of the White House committee which
reviewed the recommendations made at the
White House Conference on International
Cooperation.
White House press release dated April 3
In late November of 1965, as part of this
country's International Cooperation Year
(ICY) program, I convened the White House
Conference on International Cooperation.^
The conference brought together more than
5,000 American leaders who exchanged views
with people in the government and produced
over 400 recommendations in 30 reports
dealing with specific subject areas for inter-
national cooperation. On August 1, 1966, I
appointed a White House committee to over-
see a review of the ICY recommendations.
This committee, which has continually ad-
vised me on actions taken on these recom-
mendations, has now completed its work.
It is with great pleasure that I can report
that action has been taken or is now in prog-
ress in fields covered by about three-fourths
of the more than 400 recommendations.
Others are being subjected to further study.
Fewer than 10 percent are considered to be
impractical at this time.
This is a splendid example of cooperation
between private citizens and their govern-
ment. It confirms what I said when I called
the conference: that "international coopera-
tion is no longer an academic subject; it is a
fact of life." «
• For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965,
p. 966.
• Ibid., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.
The ICY recommendations in the time
ahead will continue to guide us. A number
of the issues they dealt with are high on our
agenda of business at this moment:
War on Hunger. The ICY reports brought
out the critical interrelationship between the
supply of food and the rapid increase of the
world's population.
In recognition of these problems, we made
major adjustments last year in our Food for
Peace Act and other laws. In my message to
the Congress this year,^ I reaffirmed our in-
tention to make the present food emergency
in India the occasion for all nations to launch
a new, continuing international campaign
against hunger. The Congress approved the
resolution to commit the United States to
share fully in this effort to meet India's re-
maining food grain deficit.
World Weather Watch. The ICY reports
recommend active U.S. participation in the
development of a World Weather Watch — an
international system to observe the world's
atmosphere and to communicate and analyze
worldwide weather data rapidly and effi-
ciently.
For centuries man's inability to predict
weather far enough ahead has caused incal-
culable human suffering and property dam-
age from storms, floods, and other natural
disasters. The Congress of the World Meteor-
ological Organization is meeting this week to
consider plans for the World Weather Watch.
The proposed system will, through interna-
tional cooperation, lead to improved weather
forecasting and protection of life and prop-
' For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress of Feb. 2, see ihid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295.
658
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
erty and deserves the wholehearted support
of the American people. I am instructing our
representatives to the meeting to pledge the
full and continuing participation of the
United States in this important endeavor.
Outer Space Treaty. The ICY reports
urged an international agreement to assure
the exploration and use of outer space solely
for peaceful purposes.
On January 27 of this year the United
States signed such a treaty with the Soviet
Union and more than 60 other nations. Hear-
ings are now under way in the Senate on the
question of U.S. adherence.
Moratorium on Antiballistic Missiles. The
ICY reports recommended a U.S.-U.S.S.R.
moratorium on new deployment of systems
for ballistic-missile defense.
We are taking no actions to deploy ABM's,
pending the outcome of discussions with the
Soviet Union. Responding to our initiative,
Chairman [Aleksei N.] Kosygin has con-
firmed the willingness of his government to
discuss the question of both offensive and de-
fensive systems.
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention. The
ICY reports called for ratification of this con-
vention to provide greater legal protection to
our citizens visiting the Soviet Union.
In response to my request, the Senate has
now given its advice and consent, and I have
ratified and confirmed this treaty as a con-
structive step in our policy of "bridgebuild-
ing" with Eastern Europe.
East-West Trade Relations. The ICY re-
ports pointed to the necessity for new ground
rules to liberalize U.S. trade with Eastern
European countries.
I have recommended to the Congress early
passage of the East-West trade relations bill
as an essential move in this direction.
New Directions for Foreign Assistance.
The ICY reports recommended continued
commitment of substantial U.S. resources to
foreign assistance, with emphasis on changed
foreign assistance policies, strengthening of
technical assistance, and greater utilization
of private resources in assistance programs.
In my message of February 9,* I asked the
Congress to enact a new foreign assistance
bill based on six guiding principles: (1) self-
help; (2) sharing costs with other nations;
(3) encouragement to regional development;
(4) emphasis on agriculture, health, and edu-
cation; (5) protecting our balance of pay-
ments; and (6) improved administration.
Early enactment of that bill is essential to an
effective foreign assistance program.
A Nonproliferation Treaty. The ICY re-
ports called for the early conclusion of a
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons.
We are continuing to press our negotia-
tions with other nations for a nonprolifera-
tion agreement, recognizing this problem as
one of the most urgent of our times.
These are only a few of the outstanding
recommendations in the ICY reports on
which the Government is seeking completed
action.
The White House committee which over the
past 8 months has been evaluating these
recommendations was chaired by Director of
the Bureau of the Budget Charles L.
Schultze. Other members were my Special
Assistants Walt W. Rostow and Joseph A.
Califano, Jr. The executive director of the
White House conference and also chairman
of the ICY Committee on Urban Develop-
ment, Mr. Raymond D. Nasher of Dallas,
Texas, also served as a member.
In order to make sure that action does not
end here, I am sending a memorandum to the
heads of those departments and agencies that
took part in the ICY program, directing
them to take specific further actions as re-
quired and to continue the dialog with inter-
ested citizens. I have also asked Mr.
Schultze to work with the agency heads in
order to assure action on, and attention to,
the recommendations.
It has long been my conviction that those
of us in Government can greatly profit by a
continuing and frank exchange with people
in business, education, other professions, and
in civic life. For this reason, at my direction,
there have been appointed in the State De-
partment alone during the past year seven
♦ For text, see ibid.. Mar. 6, 1967, p. 378,
APRIL 24, 1967
659
citizens' committees including over 125 indi-
viduals to serve in an advisory capacity. The
ICY program has convinced me there can be
no substitute for this dialog in a vital
democracy. The White House committee's re-
view indicates that this sort of contact can
be an extremely useful part of the regular
business of Government. It is one of the best
ways to keep the people and their Govern-
ment close to each other.
I again express my gratitude to all those
who participated in the ICY program. The
future of mankind demands ever-increasing
international cooperation. It must become a
way of living — a way that will lead to better
living for all peoples.
U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand Today
by Eugene M. Braderman '■
I should like first to sketch briefly the
background of change that has been a part
of Philippine life, and of Philippine-Amer-
ican relations, since 1946. Certainly, a seri-
ous consideration of the future shape of
Philippine-U.S. relations, our purpose in
meeting here, is only possible after a look
back at the road we have traveled and a look
at where we stand now.
The nature of Philippine nationalism will
be a critical element in all aspects of our dis-
cussions during the next 2 days. In a large
sense it has been one of the dominant fac-
tors in our bilateral relationship since 1946.
We will want to look deeply into our mutual
relationship and deal candidly with those
Issues which seem to have set us at cross-
purposes. Every area of misunderstanding
that we can identify, every failure of cul-
tural perception that we can bring to light,
will ease — at least a little — our path in the
future. We may well be able to identify some
recurrent themes that are standard elsewhere
for developing countries.
' Address made before the Philadelphia Regional
Assembly, the World Affairs Council, and the Amer-
ican Assembly at Philadelphia, Pa., on Mar. 9 (press
release 48). Mr. Braderman is Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Commercial and Business Activities.
I often think that when we talk about
"international understanding" we ought
really to be thinking first about cultural dif-
ferences. We ought to consider carefully the
different angles from which our varying
histories make difi'erent countries see life.
We should be taking into account our own
unspoken assumptions and aspirations and
those of other men. Once we have mastered
that difficult exercise — and it is difficult — we
will be ready to deal with lofty generali-
ties like "international understanding." This
sort of international empathy is not easy. It
requires an unsentimental understanding of
one's own country and an equally clear-eyed
knowledge of the other. All of us, including
Americans and Filipinos, have had less than
20/20 vision in the past, but I think it is im-
proving rapidly now.
The past 20 years have seen an accelerat-
ing growth of Filipino consciousness of the
Philippines as a national state. It is fair to
say that the Filipinos are groping for a
finished view of themselves and are casting
about for a new role in international life.
This may take shape as a more consciously
Asian participation in world aff"airs; it is
highly likely that it will be increasingly con-
sciously Filipino.
660
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Whatever the final shape of Filipino soci-
ety, the road thei'e is apt to be a rocky one
and the reserves of good will and patience
of everyone will be frequently tested in the
years ahead.
But it is heartening that the Philippines,
in developing its own national role in the
world, and tending to its own enlightened
interests, continues to grow in stature among
the nations of Southeast Asia. Deeply con-
scious of our own close relations with the
Republic of Korea, the Republic of China,
with Thailand and with Malaysia, we see
Philippine friendship with these nations as
a crucial link in a chain of mutual interde-
pendence among the free peoples of the Far
East to assure their continued freedom. The
growth of Philippine relations with Japan,
which we hope will expand still further, is
another encouraging development in the in-
terest of both nations and a further impetus
to ever-growing mutual cooperation in this
region of the world.
Another basic ongoing development that
will affect all sectors of Philippine life is the
rapid rate of population growth. As you all
know, modern public health measures re-
sulting in the suppression of many killing
diseases have contributed significantly to the
population explosion that is now underway
across the world. This tremendous popula-
tion increase is of great concern. In the
Philippines the population is estimated to be
growing at a rate of between 3 and Si/o per-
cent annually, probably closer to 3i/^ percent
than to 3. The present estimated population
of about 33 million, which has more than
doubled since 1939, will have grown to about
55 million by 1980. This rate of population
growth tends to put a very heavy burden
on the country's economic structure and on
its political institutions. Real economic
growth has to reach 31/2 percent annually
just to avoid losing ground to population
growth.
It will be difficult for the Government of
the Philippines to raise the quality of life for
the average man — as it ardently wants to
do — for more and more resources will have
to be poured into infrastructure to cope with
the growing population, to the probable detri-
ment of industrial investment. This is a
major problem and will surely leave its mark
on the Philippines in the years to come.
The first step in meeting the problem —
more food for more mouths — is already un-
derway under the vigorous, able direction of
President [Ferdinand E.] Marcos. The intro-
duction of the new strain of rice, with its
great possibilities for the Philippines and
later for all of Asia, is an example of the
kind of answers that will have to be found.
A final bit of background concerns the de-
velopment of the economy. There are three
main lines that concern us here today — the
overall growth, industrialization, and the role
of the United States relative to Philippine
economic development.
In recent years we have seen the economy
of the Philippines develop at an impressive
rate; especially noteworthy has been the in-
crease in industrialization. Fifteen years ago
IIV2 percent of the national income of the
Philippines came from manufacturing. Today
about 20 percent does; and manufacturing
will become increasingly important in the fu-
ture economic life of the Philippines.
There is a vigorous, eager, and growing
private sector. It is reaching out for new
ideas and new techniques and will be a grow-
ing source of strength for the economy in
years to come.
Economic Growth Targets
The Philippines is well justified in being
proud of the great progress of the past two
decades, since the time within easy memory
when it lay prostrate and ravaged by war.
By the beginning of the 1960's the Philip-
pine economy had achieved all the essentials
for self-sustained and vigorous growth. Still
we must observe that the average rate of
growth — 4.9 percent in the period 1957-64
and less than 4.5 percent in 1965 — while
ahead of many Latin American countries, of
India, Pakistan, and Iran, ranked the Philip-
pines behind Thailand with 7.4 percent over
the same period, behind Taiwan with 7.1 per-
cent, and behind Malaysia with 5.9 percent.
In the more relevant terms of per capita
APRIL 24, 1967
661
gross national product over the same years,
the Philippines averaged only a 1.7 percent
rate of growth, well behind that of Thai-
land, Taiwan, Iran, India, and Pakistan, and
markedly behind the Philippines' own aver-
age of 2.5 percent in the years from 1953
to 1959.
The problem that remains to be tackled if
the Philippine economy is to achieve a satis-
factory rate of growth in per capita income,
assuming an annual population increase of
well over 3 percent, is illustrated by calcu-
lating gross investment requirements for the
remaining years of this decade. With this
rate of population increase, an annual growth
rate of 6 percent in GNP is by no means an
excessive target for the Philippine economy.
Such a growth rate will only yield an an-
nual increase in per capita income of about
2.8 percent. Best estimates are that the
Philippines will need a large inflow of for-
eign capital — approaching $1 billion over the
next 5 years — to achieve this rate of growth.
I believe that an examination of the under-
lying statistics and estimates on which this
prediction is based will reveal it to be a pru-
dent one, given the necessity for building up
foreign exchange reserves, as well as debt
repayment and servicing costs.
In summary, we are here to consider our
relationships with a vital, vigorous, growing
country now moving rapidly into conscious-
ness of full, independent maturity.
Nonetheless, President Marcos' problems
are almost overwhelming when we detail
them one by one, as we will no doubt be do-
ing in the course of this assembly. It will
take every bit of even his enormous dyna-
mism and executive skill to grapple with
these successfully. An insufficient rate of eco-
nomic growth, a still undefined sense of direc-
tion in terms of future trade and investment
policies, the deterioration of law and order,
the tendency to laxness and overindulgence
in both public and private sectors — all these
compound President Marcos' problems.
Perhaps most important is the need for
Filipinos to agree on a consciously identified
set of national goals. Without such a consen-
sus it may be doubted whether in the long
run Philippine politics can harmonize with
the needs of the economy and whether devel-
opment can proceed on a vigorous basis to
reach determined targets.
What now seems most important is to stim-
ulate rising levels of income and purchas-
ing power in the countryside. President Mar-
cos has placed high priority on increased rice
production and improved standards of living
for the rural population. In addition to im-
proving the quality of rural life, economic
development in this sector will do much to
create the markets which Philippine indus-
try will need in order to develop and prosper.
What is, I think, required most of all is a
clear realization on both sides of the need
for continued private as well as public re-
sources to meet the development goals of the
Philippines.
We note that long-range expansion in the
level of trade stems not from preferential
devices but from the natural circumstance
that increasing prosperity in both our coun-
tries is creating a higher level of demand.
For the Philippines, as for all nations, this
means that both its capacity to export and
its ability to buy are inescapably dependent
upon the success of its overall program for
economic growth and development.
I have mentioned earlier what we believe
to be conservatively estimated needs for for-
eign investment inflow if the Philippines
wishes to grow at a reasonable and realistic
target rate. The record shows that U.S. direct
investment has contributed substantially over
the years to the buildup of Philippine cap-
ital; it has been instrumental in building
Philippine economic prosperity and has con-
tributed to raising the earning capacity of
the nation and of many Filipinos individu-
ally.
The Philippine experience in this respect is
similar to our own. Foreign investment
played a very significant role in U.S. eco-
nomic growth. It continues to make a major
contribution. We welcome it and our invest-
ment climate is warm, because we want cap-
ital to flow. The need for a stable, receptive
investment climate in capital-importing coun-
tries is especially important today. As more
and more attractive opportunities for invest-
ment open up all over the world, investment
662
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
capital is in a position to pick and choose its
opportunities. There is truly a sellers' market
in the capital markets of the world; and this
being the case, there can be no doubt of the
need of the Philippines for the adoption of
a clear investment policy providing stable
conditions and reasonable incentives. Presi-
dent Marcos clearly has this problem in mind.
The Laurel-Langley Agreement
As the Philippines has evolved politically
and economically over the past 20 years, our
relationship has changed with the times and
the altering circumstances of histoiy. As the
most enthusiastic backer of Philippine inde-
pendence, we have acted over the years to
support the aspirations of the Philippines. In
a communique issued by Presidents Johnson
and Marcos last September,^ President John-
son pledged a wide range of cooperative
measures with the Philippines in the scien-
tific, educational, economic, and military
spheres. The two Presidents agreed at that
time that exploratory work would begin be-
fore June 30 of this year looking toward a
new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley
agreement ^ on its expiration in 1974.
Thus, the Laurel-Langley agreement is a
timely subject for discussion. This agreement
has special meaning for me because I partici-
pated in its negotiation 13 years ago. As the
principal framework for economic relations
between the Philippines and the United
States, it has been a subject of critical atten-
tion for years. It has inevitably been drawn
into the self-questioning and self-examination
that are a part of developing political and
economic nationalism and sometimes, I think,
has loomed larger than life on that account.
The Laurel-Langley agreement was signed
in September of 1955 and replaced the trade
agreement of 1946. The agreement is to ter-
minate in 1974. Certain aspects of the treaty
deserve special attention, for they raise broad
policy issues for which solutions must be
found.
Articles I and II of the agreement provide
= For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
3348; for text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 463.
for a declining scale of tariff preferences
which will end in 1974 with the termination
of the agreement. Currently Philippine
goods entering the United States pay 40 per-
cent of the U.S. tariff. This will increase to
60 percent in January 1968, then to 80 per-
cent in January 1971, and will reach 100
percent in 1974. On the U.S. side, American
goods entering the Philippines began pay-
ing 90 percent of the Philippine tariff 2 years
ago — in January 1965 — and will begin pay-
ing 100 percent on January 1, 1974.
The purpose of these articles was to pro-
vide an adequate period during which Philip-
pine producers and exporters could ration-
alize their production costs and diversify
their markets in the change from a free-
trade to a normal commercial relationship
with the United States. The move toward a
normal relationship also reflects the legiti-
mate desire of Filipinos for economic inde-
pendence.
Sugar, on which the Philippines receives
currently an annual import quota of 1,050,-
000 tons, is an entirely separate matter, not
affected by the declining scale of tariff prefer-
ences mentioned earlier.
"National Treatment" of Investments
Article VI of the agreement, which deals
with parity rights, is of special concern.
Presidents Johnson and Marcos have already
agreed that no extension of these rights will
be sought after 1974. What happens after
the cessation of parity rights is a very com-
plex and thorny question. Both Presidents
recognized this in their September 15 com-
munique by pointing out the necessity of pro-
viding an adequate framework after 1974 for
a fair and equitable treatment of new and
existing investments.
The existing uncertainty about what will
happen after 1974 is an inhibiting factor to
American investment in the parity areas, and
this uncertainty may well extend the area of
doubt about other American capital invest-
ment in the Philippines. I hope that we will
find the beginning of an answer during our
deliberations.
Article VII of the agreement provides for
APRIL 24, 1967
663
the national treatment by either party of citi-
zens or enterprises of the other engaged in
business activities. That is to say, a Fili-
pino business operating in Ohio would re-
ceive exactly the same treatment as an Ohio
corporation, and vice versa. National treat-
ment of American firms in the Philippines
has caused some Filipinos to raise the cry
of economic invasion. Long-continued public
debate on the matter seems to have caused
a hardening of public attitudes on the ques-
tion of foreign investment.
We sympathize with the turmoil and ques-
tioning of a country caught up in the growth
of economic nationalism, for its dilemma is
a hard one. It is an area of decision often
faced these days as developing countries find
their role in the world. A developing country
frequently sees foreign investment as a form
of invasion designed to tear away the natural
resources that are an irreplaceable part of
the national wealth. At least this is an argu-
ment put forward, often whether natural re-
sources are involved or not. But thoughtful,
sophisticated men, after considering the
alternatives, come up against the hard eco-
nomic fact that economic development calls
for investment capital and the only source
for much of this is from abroad. But it re-
quires a stable, attractive investment climate,
as I mentioned earlier.
Though it may be small consolation to the
developing society to be reminded that it is
in its turn going through the same economic
and psychological process that the capital-
exporting countries had to go through when
they were struggling with the problem of
economic development, it is nevertheless a
fact.
Another area of doubt and concern relates
to the Retail Trade Nationalization Act of
1954 and the questions involved in its appli-
cation. The operation of many and varied
corporate enterprises has been made very
uncertain. It would be inappropriate for me
to more than touch on this question in
passing, since aspects of the operation of the
law are currently before the judiciary of the
Philippines.
I would like to conclude these remarks this
morning on a note that I feel accurately re-
flects what is enduring in the relationship
between our two countries and what we must
do to gear our new ties to one another. It
mirrors my own view of our relationship:
We must not see it through rose-colored
glasses, but neither must we allow ourselves
to forget the real and enduring values it con-
tains and will contain in the future.
We must remember that we share a long
stretch of history; this sharing in its way
has shaped our national philosophies and our
national aspirations. We came to this shared
history from half a world away, from differ-
ing economies, and from distinct historical
backgrounds. But we meet in our mutual re-
gard and respect for human dignity, for the
individual's right to live as he chooses in a
free society, for the conduct of international
relations on the basis of equality and law
rather than on coercion and conquest.
As was said in the final report of the Amer-
ican Assembly meeting in Davao:
"Our problems are not automatically self-
liquidating; their resolution requires constant
effort, good will and a sense of responsibility
on both sides — particularly as new genera-
tions of Filipinos and Americans assume
leadership."
U.S. To Increase Civilian
Hospital Capacity in Viet-Nam
The Department of State announced on
April 6 (press release 84) that the United
States plans to increase civilian hospital
capacity in Viet-Nam. Three U.S. military
field tyi^e hospital units manned by U.S. mili-
tary personnel will be established to provide
interim relief pending enlargement of the
Vietnamese hospital system. The three field
units will be established as soon as possible
in temporary construction at Da Nang,
Quang Ngai, and Qui Nhon. These hospitals
will work in close coordination with the ex-
isting civilian and military hospitals in Viet-
Nam.
This measure to close gaps in the civilian
664
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
medical assistance program was discussed at
the Guam conference in March.^
Despite enormous effort in the past to pro-
vide needed capacity, some hospitals are over-
crowded and inadequately staffed. Certain
types of surgical treatment cannot be pro-
vided in some of the hospitals.
In undertaking this further expansion of
medical assistance the U.S. Government
hopes that the need for these civilian facili-
ties will end soon.
The Agency for International Development
is now assisting the Vietnamese Govern-
ment to expand several hospitals and con-
struct seven additional hospitals of surgical
units in other parts of the country.
AID also is exploring with the Govern-
ment of Viet-Nam and private U.S. groups
alternative means of providing reconstruc-
tive surgical treatment not presently avail-
able in Viet-Nam.
Unprecedented measures have been taken
over the past year to assist the Vietnamese
Ministry of Health to care for war refugees,
civilian war casualties, and other elements
of the population of South Viet-Nam who
could not afford private medical care. The
U.S. military medical services, civilian and
medical personnel from 13 other free-world
nations, and American volunteer doctors and
agencies have joined with AID to provide
emergency assistance. The AID medical
assistance program alone has increased from
$5 million in 1965 to nearly $50 million in
1967. Forty-three surgical and medical teams,
of which 25 are from the United States and
18 from other countries, are working with
the Vietnamese Health Ministry staffs in pro-
vincial hospitals throughout South Viet-Nam.
In addition, 32 volunteer physicians on 2-
month rotational assignments under the
auspices of the American Medical Association
and AID supplement the regular Vietnamese
and foreign staffs. Vietnamese and American
military units also are providing outpatient
treatment and diagnoses in villages through-
out the country.
' For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1967,
p. 586.
New Policy Outlined on Funds
for U.S. Voluntary Organizations
White House press release dated March 29
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
I have received the report from the com-
mittee which I appointed on February 15 to
review relationships between the Central In-
telligence Agency and private American vol-
untary organizations. This committee con-
sisted of Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach, as chairman. Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare John Gard-
ner, and CIA Director Richard Helms.
I accept this committee's proposed state-
ment of policy and am directing all agencies
of the government to implement it fully.
We will also give serious consideration to
the committee's recommendation "that the
Government should promptly develop and
establish a public-private mechanism to pro-
vide public funds openly for overseas activi-
ties of organizations which are adjudged
deserving, in the national interest, of public
support." To review concrete ways of accom-
plishing this objective, I am requesting
Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of a
special committee which will include repre-
sentatives from the Executive, the Congress,
and the private community.
TEXT OF REPORT
Dear Mr. President: The committee which you
appointed on February 15, 1967 has sought, pursuant
to your request :
— To review relationships between government
agencies, notably the Central Intelligence Agency,
and educational and private voluntary organizations
which operate abroad ; and
— ^To recommend means to help assure that such
organizations can play their proper and vital role
abroad.
The committee has held a number of meetings, in-
terviewed dozens of individuals in and out of gov-
ernment, and reviewed thousands of pages of reports.
We have surveyed the relevant activities of a number
of federal agencies. And we have reviewed in partic-
ular and specific detail the relationship between CIA
and each relevant organization.
APRIL 24, 1967
665
Our report, supplemented with supporting classi-
fied documents, follows.
In summary, the committee offers two basic recom-
mendations :
1. It should be the policy of the United States
Government that no federal agency shall provide any
covert financial assistance or support, direct or indi-
rect, to any of the nation's educational or private
voluntary organizations.
2. The Government should promptly develop and
establish a public-private mechanism to provide pub-
lic funds openly for overseas activities of organiza-
tions which are adjudged deserving, in the national
interest, of public support.
1. A New Policy
The years immediately after World War II saw a
surge of communist activity in organizations
throughout the world. Students, scientists, veterans,
women and pi-ofessional groups were organized into
international bodies which spoke in the cadences, ad-
vocated the policies, and furthered the interests of
the communist bloc. Much of this activity was
organized, directed, and financed covertly by com-
munist governments.
American organizations reacted from the first. The
young men and women who founded the United
States National Student Association, for example,
did so precisely to give American youth the capacity
to hold their own in the international arena. But the
importance of students as a force in international
events had yet to become widely understood and NSA
found it difficult to attract private support for its
international activities. Accordingly, the United
States Government, acting through the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, provided support for this overseas
work.
We have taken NSA as an example. While no use-
ful purpose would be served by detailing any other
CIA programs of assistance to private American
voluntary organizations, one fundamental point
should be clearly stated: such assistance was given
pursuant to National Security Council policies begin-
ning in October, 1951 and with the subsequent con-
currence of high-level senior interdepartmental re-
view committees in the last four Administrations. In
December, 1960, in a classified report submitted after
a year of study, a public-private Presidential Com-
mittee on Information Activities Abroad specifically
endorsed both overt and covert programs, including
those assisted by CIA.
Our study, undertaken at a later time, discloses
new developments which suggest that we should now
re-examine these policies. The American public, for
example, has become increasingly aware of the im-
portance of the complex forms of international com-
petition between free societies and communist states.
As this awareness has grown, so have potential
sources of support for the overseas work of private
organizations.
There is no precise index to these sources, but
their increase is suggested by the growth in the num-
ber of private foundations from 2,220 in 1955 to
18,000 in 1967. Hence it is increasingly possible for
organizations like NSA to seek support for overseas
activities from open sources.
Just as sources of support have increased, so has
the number of American groups engaged in overseas
work. According to the Agency for International De-
velopment, there has been a nine-fold increase just
among voluntary organizations which participate in
technical assistance abroad, rising from 24 in 1951
to 220 in 1965. The total of all private American
voluntary groups now working overseas may well
exceed a thousand.
The number of such organizations which has been
assisted covertly is a small fraction of the total. The
vast preponderance have had no relationship with the
government or have accepted only open government
funds — which greatly exceed funds supplied covertly.
The work of private American organizations, in
a host of fields, has been of great benefit to scores of
countries. That benefit must not be impaired by for-
eign doubts about the independence of these organiza-
tions. The committee believes it is essential for the
United States to underscore that independence imme-
diately and decisively.
For these reasons, the committee recommends the
following:
STATEMENT OF POLICY
No federal agency shall provide any covert finan-
cial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to
any of the nation's educational or private volun-
tary organizations. This policy specifically ap-
plies to all foreign activities of such organiza-
tions and it reaffirms present policy with respect
to their domestic activities.
Where such support has been given, it will be
teiTninated as quickly as possible without de-
stroying valuable private organizations before
they can seek new means of support.'
We believe that, particularly in the light of re-
cent publicity, establishment of a clear policy of this
kind is the only way for the government to carry
out two important responsibilities. One is to avoid
any implication that governmental assistance, be-
cause it is given covertly, is used to affect the pol-
icies of private voluntary groups. The second respon-
' On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect
that the process of termination can be largely — per-
haps entirely — completed by December 31, 1967.
[Footnote in original.]
666
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
sibility is to make it plain in all foreign countries
that the activities of private American groups abroad
are, in fact, private.
The committee has sought carefully to assess the
impact of this Statement of Policy on CIA. We have
reviewed each relevant program of assistance carried
out by the Agency in case-by-case detail. As a result
of this scrutiny, the committee is satisfied that appli-
cation of the Statement of Policy will not unduly
handicap the Agency in the exercise of its national
security responsibilities. Indeed, it should be noted
that, starting well before the appearance of recent
publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued efforts to
disengage from certain of these activities.
The committee also recommends that the imple-
mentation of this policy be supervised by the senior
interdepartmental review committee which already
passes on proposed CIA activities and which would
review and assist in the process of disengagement.'
2. New Methods of Support
While our first recommendation seeks to insure
the independence of private voluntary organizations,
it does not deal with an underlying problem — how to
support the national need for, and the intrinsic worth
of, their efforts abroad.
Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with in-
tellectual or youth groups abroad knows that free
institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous
attack, some of it carefully organized and well-
financed, all of it potentially dangerous to this nation.
It is of the greatest importance to our future and
to the future of free institutions everywhere that
other nations, especially their young people, know
and understand American viewpoints. There is no
' If the Statement of Policy is to be eflfective, it
must be rigorously enforced. In the judgment of this
committee, no programs currently would justify any
exception to this policy. At the same time, where the
security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossi-
ble for this committee to state categorically now
that there will never be a contingency in which
overriding national security interests may require
an exception — nor would it be credible to enunciate
a policy which purported to do so.
We therefore recommend that, in the event of such
unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review
committee be permitted to make exceptions to the
Statement of Policy, but only where overriding na-
tional security interests so require; only on a case-
by-case basis; only where open sources of support
are shown to be unavailable; and only when such
exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secre-
taries of State and Defense. In no event should any
future exception be approved which involves any
educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.
[Footnote in original.]
better way to meet this need than through the activ-
ity of private American organizations.
The time has surely come for the government to
help, support such activity in a mature, open manner.
Some progress toward that aim already has been
made. In recent years, a number of federal agencies
have developed contracts, grants, and other forms
of open assistance to private organizations for over-
seas activities. This assistance, however, does not
deal with a major aspect of the problem. A number
of organizations cannot, without hampering their
effectiveness as independent bodies, accept funds di-
rectly from government agencies.
The committee therefore recommends that the Gov-
ernment should promptly develop and establish a
public-private mechanism to provide public funds
openly for overseas activities of organizations which
are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of
public support.
Such a mechanism could take various forms. One
promising proposal, advanced by Mr. Eugene Black,
calls for a publicly funded but privately admin-
istered body patterned on the British Council.
The British Council established in 1934, operates
in 80 countries, administering approximately $30,-
000,000 annually for reference libraries, exhibitions,
scholarships, international conferences, and cultural
exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn
from private life, the Council has maintained a repu-
tation for independence, even though 90 percent of
its funds are governmental.
According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural
Relations Services, other nations have developed
somewhat similar institutions. The Indian Council
for Cultural Relations, for example, is entirely gov-
ernment-financed but operates autonomously. The
governing body of the Swedish Institute for Cultural
Relations consists of both government and private
members. This institute receives 75 percent of its
funds from the government and the remainder from
private contributions.
The experience of these and other countries helps
to demonstrate the desirability of a similar body in
the United States, wholly or largely funded by the
federal government. Another approach might be the
establishment of a governmental foundation, perhaps
with links to the existing Federal Inter-Agency
Council on International Education and Cultural
Affairs.
Such a public-private body would not be new to
the United States. Congress established the Smith-
sonian Institution, for example, more than a century
ago as a private corporation, under the guardianship
of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private
Board of Regents.
The committee began a preliminary study of what
might be the best method of meeting the present
need. It is evident, however, that, because of the
great range both of existing government and private
APRIL 24, 1967
667
philanthropic programs, the refinement of alterna-
tives and selection among them is a task of consid-
erable complexity. Accordingly, we do not believe
that this exclusively governmental committee is an
appropriate forum for the task and we recommend,
instead, the appointment of a larger group, including
individuals in private life with extensive experience
in this field.
The basic principle, in any event, is clear. Such a
new institution would involve government funds. It
might well involve government officials. But a pre-
mium must be placed on the involvement of private
citizens and the exercise of private judgements, for
to be effective, it would have to have — and be recog-
nized to have — a high degree of independence.
The prompt creation of such an institution, based
on this principle, would fill an important — and never
more apparent. — national need.
Respectfully,
John W. Gardner
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
Richard Helms
Director of Central Intelligence
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State, Chairman
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
CENTO Economic Committee
iVIeets at Washington
The 15th meeting of the Economic Com-
mittee of the Central Treaty Organization
took place at Washington March li-16. Fol-
lowing are texts of a statement made at the
opening session on March 14- by William S.
Gaud, Administrator of the Agency for In-
ternational Development, a communique is-
sued on March 16 at the close of the meeting,
and a list of the members of the U.S. dele-
gation.
STATEMENT BY MR. GAUD
It gives me great pleasure to have this op-
portunity to welcome the CENTO Economic
Committee to Washington. It's an oppor-
tunity that doesn't arise very often — once
every 5 years. We look forward to it. We are
glad to have you here. And we look forward
to the next meeting 5 years hence.
We are particularly happy that the Secre-
tary General [Abbas Ali KhalatbaryJ has
been able to attend this meeting. He is now
in his 6th year of service for CENTO. He
has made many contributions to the organiza-
tion and to its members. And we are de-
lighted to have him here to give us some
guidance.
CENTO is now in its 13th year. If it were
a human being, it would just be becoming a
teenager — a rather dubious prospect. You
can't be too sure what happens to teenagers.
Normally they go through a fairly difficult
time.
But the comparison is not appropriate.
CENTO is in no sense a teenager. It has been
a responsible member of the world commu-
nity for a good many years. It has served its
members well — and those like the United
States which are not members but vitally
interested in its proceedings and its success.
It has served us well in the past and seems
destined to do so in the future.
CENTO'S immediate purpose, of course,
has been the defense of the CENTO region
against Communist aggression. Its object
has been to provide security, to form a shield,
to erect a barrier of mutual defense. It has
done this.
But it would not have served its full pur-
pose or its deeper purpose if that were all
that it had done. Why did the regional mem-
bers of CENTO want a shield? What was the
purpose of this shield? Not to let them relax
at ease and in comfort, not to preserve the
status quo, not to keep the world as it was;
668
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
not a bit of it. They wanted a shield behind
which they could work, behind which the eco-
nomic, social, and pohtical development of
their countries and of the region could take
place without outside interference. They be-
lieved that by pooling their resources, by
working together, by getting others to work
with them, they would be able to devote more
of their resources to development than would
otherwise have been the case.
Security, freedom from external aggres-
sion, freedom from internal subversion —
these are prerequisites to fruitful develop-
ment anywhere. This is the constant tussle
that those of us in the aid business see all
around the world.
How do you use the limited resources that
are available to make as much progress as
possible? If you had your way, if you had
your choice, you would devote all of these re-
sources to long-term development.
The world isn't that easy. We are always
being diverted from this long-term business
of economic development by short-term prob-
lems, by the necessity for security. The prob-
lem is always the same: How do we keep this
diversion of resources from the long-term job
of development as small as possible; how do
we keep it to a minimum so that we can spend
as much as possible of the limited resources
we all have on development?
One answer clearly lies in regional orga-
nizations such as CENTO. One of the most
encouraging features of today's world, it
seems to me, is the growth of these regional
organizations.
You started early. Yours was one of the
first. You have had this security, and you
have made good use of it. Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey have all made great strides in devel-
opment in the last 12 years in the field of
agricultural production, in the field of indus-
trial production, in health, in education, in
the growth of private enterprise, in the
growth of those institutions which are strong
enough to support the weight of a free society
— and it takes a good deal more to support
the weight of a free society than it does to
support other types of societies. In all these
ways, your countries have made great prog-
ress: a better life for your people, a fuller life
for your people, and as a result, greater in-
ternal strength, greater intrinsic security.
We in the United States are very proud to
have had a hand in helping this development.
We have contributed a good deal in the way
of resources — food aid, economic aid, and
military aid — to the countries in the CENTO
region. Much of this has been direct assist-
ance to regional projects: the telecommunica-
tions system, the airway system, the highway,
the railroad, many others. Some of them are
less monumental than these but, in the long
run, at least as important.
But we all know that external aid can't do
much by itself. It is the people of the de-
veloping countries who have the main job.
It's their resources which count primarily;
and more than their resources, it's their
spirit, it's their will. It's only the developing
countries that can provide the sparks that
will ignite the fire of development. These
have to come from within, and they have
come from within in your part of the world.
I don't want to exaggerate. None of us can
rest on our oars; the job is far from finished.
There are many challenges ahead, and they
are all pretty obvious.
The first and the foremost challenge, it
seems to me, is that of increasing the produc-
tion of food worldwide. It's not only a mat-
ter of producing more food, it's a matter of
distribution and teaching people to eat bet-
ter food. The world doesn't face immediate
starvation today. It will — in 10 years, in 15
years — unless we do better. But we do face
today, and we have been facing for many
years, the results of malnutrition, insufficient
protein, not enough of the right kind of food.
And we know that malnutrition stunts both
bodies and minds. Our job in the food line,
the job of all of us, is not only more food,
but better food, better types of food — and to
see that these better types of foods reach all
of our people.
Closely allied to this question of food is
that of achieving a balance between foods
and mouths. The world can grow the food
necessary to feed our increasing populations
for a time, but not forever. We all know this
APRIL 24, 1967
669
today. And we have got to get to work on the
problem — one of the biggest challenges of our
times.
In the field of health there are cholera,
measles, chickenpox, smallpox, typhoid fever,
malaria^ — any number of diseases. They
needn't take the toll that they do. But we
haven't stopped them yet. We haven't really
started to stop them.
There is the need for education — training,
enabling people to fit into the kind of a world
that we want to live in in the future. All na-
tions must learn how to make constructive
use of the many advances in technology that
the world sees today. They come so fast they
make you dizzy. They come a lot faster than
we are able to adapt them to their best use.
There is a need for adaptive research, in
all fields, to make what is useful in one part
of the world useful in another part of the
world.
There are any number of areas in which
there are still challenges. There are many
frontiers to be explored, many worlds still to
be conquered.
I am sure that CENTO and its members
will rise to these challenges. You will do so as
individual nations, as members of CENTO,
as members of the Regional Cooperation for
Development Organization, and in other ways
that will present themselves as time goes on.
You have already proved your ability to do
this. You already have a substantial momen-
tum toward development. As I said earlier,
you have the added strength of belonging to
a regional organization; you are not working
alone. Through this union, you have greater
strength, greater knowledge, and greater
capacity to meet these challenges.
We in the United States are happy to assist
you in your continuing efforts to promote
the peace and the well-being of your people.
We will certainly continue to help you with
present cooperative programs. The initiatives
for what needs to be done in the region are
coming, increasingly, from you; and we will
be glad to give such help as we can to new
regional projects to which the member coun-
tries of CENTO give high priority as a part
of their own development plans.
We look forward, with interest and antici-
pation, to future meetings of this Committee
at which we can all assess the further prog-
ress that you will have made toward the
peaceful development of the CENTO region.
Delegates, again I greet you with enthusi-
asm and with warmth, and I wish you well in
your deliberations.
Thank you very much.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
The role of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) in the economic development of Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey was the central theme of the
deliberations of CENTO's Economic Committee in its
annual meeting which concluded in Washing^ton on
Thursday [March 16]. The Committee assessed the
momentum already achieved in this direction and
opened the way to initiatives in the field of indus-
trial development in the CENTO region.
Delegates of all five CENTO countries — Iran,
Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States — participated in the three-day session,
under the chairmanship of Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell,
head of the United States delegation. The Secretary
General of the Organization, Dr. A. A. Khalatbary,
addressed the Committee at its opening meeting.
In response to an initiative of the Turkish Dele-
gation the Committee moved into a new field and
agreed that an ad hoc Working Group be formed to
identify those fields of industrial development which
would be of substantial economic benefit to the Re-
gional Countries and to make recommendations for
the conduct of feasibility studies of specific projects
and other activities under CENTO auspices in these
fields.
Earlier, the Committee had noted with apprecia-
tion the statement of Mr. William S. Gaud, Adminis-
trator of the United States Agency for International
Development, at the opening meeting. The Committee
invited the attention of the Regional Member Gov-
ernments particularly to Mr. Gaud's remarks con-
cerning initiatives by the Regional Members and
his assurance that the United States would be glad
to give such help as it could to new regional projects
to which Member Countries give high priority as a
part of their own development plans.
The Committee also welcomed the statement by
the leader of the United Kingdom's Delegation that,
despite economic difficulties, the amount of his Gov-
ernment's annual contribution to the economic ac-
tivities of CENTO would not be reduced.
The Committee also noted that CENTO projects
were making definite contributions in such fields as
public health, agriculture, science and education. For
example, an Emergency Working Party on Cholera
was formed following an epidemic in the region and
670
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
as a result of its recommendations stockpiles of anti-
cholera supplies and equipment were being built up
and a Regional Health Advisor provided. Pakistan
and Iran offered vaccines as needed, and provided
special training in anti-cholera techniques to doctors
of the region.
The Committee directed its Sub-Committee on
Agriculture to continue to concern itself with the
development of the Van-Rezaiyeh area in eastern
Turkey and northwestern Iran, and to identify other
areas where similar developmental projects could be
sponsored by CENTO. The Sub-Committee was also
instructed to pursue further initiatives in the mar-
keting and processing of agricultural products, in-
cluding livestock.
Recognizing the vital importance of developing the
water resources of the regional countries, the Com-
mittee approved the establishment of a Working
Group on Hydrology and Water Resource Develop-
ment with terms of reference embracing water
power, irrigation of agricultural lands and supplies
for human consumption and industrial use.
In the field of science and education, the Commit-
tee welcomed the establishment of the new Multi-
lateral Scientific Fund, which is to be administered
by the CENTO Scientific Coordinating Board, with
its headquarters in Tehran.
The Committee also reviewed the work of
cento's own technical assistance programme under
the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Fund. This
Fund is designed to make use of the rapidly growing
resources of technical expertise to be found in Iran,
Pakistan and Turkey. Currently, funds contributed
annually by the five countries are used to off'er
scholarships in the Region's own technical colleges
and universities, to make the services of outstanding
technical experts of one Regional Country available
to the other two, and in other ways. In a move to
enhance the effectiveness of this programme, the
Committee approved a revision of the Fund's terms
of reference designed to make it even more flexible
and responsive to the needs of the three Regional
Countries.
The full report of the Economic Committee's de-
liberations and recommendations will be submitted to
the Organization's Council of Ministers which is due
to meet in London April 25-26.
U.S. DELEGATION
Stuart W. Rockwell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
U.S. Representative
Scott L. Behoteguy, U.S. Economic Coordinator for
CENTO Affairs (Ankara), Alternate U.S. Repre-
sentative
Albert R. Baron, Economic Adviser, Office of the
U.S. Economic Coordinator for CENTO Affairs
(Ankara)
John H. Funari, Director, Office of Greece-Turkey-
Iran-Cyprus-CENTO AflFairs, Agency for Interna-
tional Development
Victor Gauthier, Officer in Charge, CENTO Affairs,
Agency for International Development
William C. Nenno, Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Sidney Sober, Director, Office of Regional Affairs,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State
Robert A. Stein, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs, Department of State
THE CONGRESS
President Urges Accession to 1961
Single Convention on Narcotics
Follorving are texts of a letter of transmit-
tal from, President Johnson to the Senate and
a report to the President from Acting Secre-
ta)-y of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach re-
garding the Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, 1961.
PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
white House press release dated March 8
To the Senate of the United States:
With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to accession to the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961,
open for signature at New York March 30,
1961 to August 1, 1961, I transmit herewith
a copy of the Convention along with the
Final Act * of the United Nations Conference
at which the Convention was adopted.
For nearly sixty years the United States
has taken a leading part in international
cooperation for the control of narcotic drugs.
We should continue this cooperation to the
fullest possible extent in combating the
scourge of drug abuse.
After a survey by a special task force on
" For texts, see S. Ex. G, 90th Cong., 1st sess.
APRIL 24, 1967
671
the contribution of the Convention to the con-
trol of illegal international drug traffic, I
have concluded that the national and interna-
tional interest in drug control will be sig-
nificantly advanced by United States acces-
sion.
I recommend that the Senate give the Con-
vention early and favorable consideration.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, March 8, 1967
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
White House press release dated March 8
February 15, 1967
The President: I have the honor to sub-
mit to you a copy of the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, with the recom-
mendation that the Convention be transmit-
ted to the Senate for its advice and consent
to accession.
The Convention was adopted at the United
Nations Conference for the Adoption of a
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, held
in New York from January 24, 1961 through
March 25, 1961. The Final Act of that Con-
ference, which is bound along with the Con-
vention, is transmitted for the information
of the Senate.
The Convention was designed to replace
by a single instrument the existing multi-
lateral treaties in the field of narcotic drugs,
to reduce the number of treaty organs
exclusively concerned with the control of nar-
cotic drugs, and to make provision for the
control of the production of raw materials of
narcotic drugs.
During the period March 30 to August 1,
1961 when the Convention was open for sig-
nature it was signed for sixty-four countries.
Thirty-four of those countries have deposited
ratifications of the Convention and twenty
other countries have acceded to it.
The Convention was not signed for the
United States for several reasons. The prin-
cipal reason was a concern that omission
from the Convention of the "closed list" pro-
vision embodied in the 1953 Protocol (14
UST 10), under which only seven named
countries could engage in the production of
opium for export, would result in many addi-
tional countries engaging in such production
and a consequent spiralling of the amount
of opium that would be diverted into illicit
traffic.
Another principal reason for not signing
the Convention was a concern that the pro-
visions permitting reservations would result
in States making reservations that would
cripple the international measures necessary
for the control of narcotic drugs.
Because of the concerns noted, it was con-
sidered that if the 1953 Protocol for Limit-
ing and Regulating the Cultivation of the
Poppy Plant, the Production of, International
and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium
were brought into force, it would provide
more effective international control of nar-
cotic drugs than would be possible under the
Single Convention. However, even though
that Protocol was brought into force on
March 8, 1963, only five States have become
party to it since that date. Three of those five
States were newly independent States that
gave notification that they continued to con-
sider themselves bound by the Protocol by
reason of its ratification on their behalf prior
to independence. At present, fourteen years
after the date it was signed, only fifty States
are parties to the Protocol.
Neither the omission of the "closed list"
provision from the Single Convention nor the
provisions permitting reservations appear to
be affecting the application of the Single Con-
vention.
Although under a provision of Article 24
of the Convention any country can undertake
the production of opium for export in
amounts not exceeding five tons annually,
there appears to be no record of any country
having undertaken the production of opium
for export under that provision since the
Convention entered into force on December
13, 1964.
The reservations that have been made to
the Convention have been modest and of little
apparent effect when compared with the res-
ervations that are permitted under its pro-
672
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
visions. Experience under the Convention
during the past two years has not shown
that the reservations made have resulted in
any apparent weakening of the international
controls provided in the Convention.
The above-mentioned "closed list" provi-
sion of the 1953 Protocol as compared with
the provisions of the 1961 Convention on the
limitation on production of opium for inter-
national trade, and the effect of the pro-
visions of the 1961 Convention permitting
reservations are discussed in detail in the
enclosed "Report on the Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and Comparative
Analysis of the Single Convention, 1961 and
the Protocol of 1953". That report and
analysis also outline the background of the
Convention, its principal merits, and discuss
the international controls and prohibitions
provided therein. The substance of the report
and comparative analysis was transmitted
to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations with a letter dated October
24, 1961 from the Department of State in
response to a request from the Chairman.
It appears from the relatively large num-
ber of ratifications and accessions to the
Single Convention that have taken place in
the few years since it was signed that it will
become the most widely accepted of the nar-
cotics control treaties. Because of this, and
because all international controls will soon
be exercised through the organs specified in
the Single Convention, accession to the Single
Convention would be in keeping with the
long-standing leadership exercised by the
United States in the international control of
narcotic drugs. All international narcotic
controls will be exercised through the inter-
national control organs specified in that Con-
vention, namely, the existing Commission on
Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social
Council, and the new International Narcotics
Control Board established by the Convention
(Article 5).
Under the Transitional Provisions of the
Convention (Article 45) the functions of the
Board are being provisionally carried out by
the Permanent Central Narcotics Board
(PCNB) constituted under Chapter VI of
the International Opium Convention signed
at Geneva February 19, 1925 and by the
Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) constituted
under Chapter II of the Geneva Convention
of July 13, 1931. The Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations, pursuant to
the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 45
of the 1961 Convention, has fixed March 2,
1968, as the date upon which the new Board
will enter upon its duties and replace the
PCNB (on which the United States has long
been represented) and the DSB. The Board
will consist of eleven members to be elected
by the Economic and Social Council (Article
9). The United States, as a member of the
World Health Organization, has a voice in
the nomination of three of the members and
also, as a Member of the United Nations, has
a voice in the nomination of eight of the
members. It is considered desirable that the
United States be represented on the Board
and it may be expected that a United States
member would be elected by the Council.
Effective participation by the United States
member in the work of the Board would,
however, be materially advanced by acces-
sion to the Convention by the United States.
The Secretary of the Treasury and the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
concur in my recommendation that the Con-
vention be transmitted to the Senate for its
advice and consent to accession.
Respectfully submitted,
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Customs convention on the temporary importation of
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4,
1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS
3943.
APRIL 24, 1967
673
Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967.
Convention concerning' customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Australia, January 6, 1967.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.'
Accession deposited: Mongolia, January 5, 1967.'
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.'
Acceptance deposited: Ivory Coast, February 16,
1967.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement amending the agreement of March 9,
1959, as amended (TIAS 4192, 5608, 5117, 5551),
governing tolls on the St. Lawrence Seaway and
a lockage fee on the Welland Canal. Effected by
exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31, 1967.
Entered into force March 31, 1967.
Portugal
Arrangement concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 23,
1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' Not in force for the United States.
' With a reservation and a declaration.
Confirmations
The Senate on April 5 confirmed the following
nominations:
Lucius D. Battle to be an Assistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated January 26.)
Ellsworth Bunker to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 85 dated April
12.)
William W. Heath to be Ambassador to Sweden.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated March 22.)
Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador at Large.
Douglas MacArthur to be Ambassador to Austria,
John M. McSweeney to be Ambassador to Bul-
garia. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated March 22.)
Richard H. Nolte to be Ambassador to the United
Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated February 21.)
Karl F. Rolvaag to be Ambassador to Iceland.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated March 22.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Department of State Bulletin,
VOL. LVI, NO. 1452 PUBLICATION 8230
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreig:n rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
ind international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of eeneral International inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
APRIL 24, 1967
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreim $16;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
674
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX April 2U, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U52
Africa
Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs
Bureau 651
Africa and America (Palmer) 646
lAsia. Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary
I for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 674
Austria. MacArthur confirmed as Ambassador 674
Bulgaria. McSweeney confirmed as Ambassador 674
Congo (Kinshasa). Africa and America
(Palmer) 646
Congress
Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge,
MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) . 674
President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Department and Foreign Service
Advisory Panel Named for African Affairs
Bureau 651
Confirmations (Battle, Bunker, Heath, Lodge,
MacArthur, McSweeney, Nolte, Rolvaag) . 674
Developing Countries. CENTO Economic Com-
mittee Meets at Washington (Gaud, commu-
nique) 668
Economic Afifairs
Africa and America (Palmer) 646
CENTO Economic Committee Meets at Wash-
ington (Gaud, communique) 668
Q.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We Stand
Today (Braderman) 660
Foreign Aid
Africa and America (Palmer) 646
Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds
of Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson,
Sunay, joint communique) 652
U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity
in Viet-Nam 664
Iceland. Rolvaag confirmed as Ambassador . . 674
International Cooperation. President Reviews
Action Taken on ICY Recommendations
(Johnson) 658
International Organizations. CENTO Economic
Committee Meets at Washington (Gaud,
communique) 668
Middle East
Battle confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs . . 674
ENTO Economic Committee Meets at Wash-
ington (Gaud, communique) 668
Nigeria. Africa and America (Palmer) . . 646
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Turkey
and the United States Reaffirm Bonds of
Friendship and Cooperation (Johnson, Sunay,
joint communique) 652
Philippines. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where
We Stand Today (Braderman) 660
Presidential Documents
New Policy Outlined on Funds for U.S. Volun-
tary Organizations (Johnson, text of Presi-
dential committee report) 665
President Reviews Action Taken on ICY Rec-
ommendations 658
President Urges Accession to 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotics 671
Turkey and the United States Reaffirm Bonds
of Friendship and Cooperation 652
South West Africa. Africa and America
(Palmer) 646
Southern Rhodesia. Africa and America
(Palmer) 646
Sweden. Heath confirmed as Ambassador . . 674
Trade. U.S.-Philippine Relations: Where We
Stand Today (Braderman) 660
Treaty Information
Current Actions 673
President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Turkey. Turkey and the United States Reaffirm
Bonds of Friendship and Cooperation (John-
son, Sunay, joint communique) 652
United Arab Republic. Nolte confirmed as
Ambassador 674
United Nations
Africa and America (Palmer) 646
President Urges Accession to 1961 Single Con-
vention on Narcotics (Johnson, Katzenbach) 671
Viet-Nam
Bunker confirmed as Ambassador 674
U.S. To Increase Civilian Hospital Capacity
in Viet-Nam 664
Name Index
Battle, Lucius D 674
Braderman. Eugene M 660
Bunker, Ellsworth 674
Gardner, John W 665
Gaud, William S 668
Heath, William W 674
Helms, Richard 665
Johnson, President .... 652, 658, 665, 671
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 665, 671
Lodge, Henry Cabot 674
MacArthur, Douglas 674
McSweeney, John M 674
Nolte, Richard H 674
Palmer, Joseph, 2d 646
Rolvaag, Karl F 674
Sunay, Cevdet 652
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 3-9
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to April 3 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 48
of March 9, 75 of March 30, and 79 of March
31.
No.
Date
Subject
*81 4/3 Department publishes "The Coun-
try Team."
t82 4/5 Indefinite validity of multiple-
entry visitors visas (rewrite).
t83 4/5 U.S. delegation to 3d spssion of
11th Meeting of Consultation of
American Ministers of Foreign
Affairs.
84 4/6 U.S. to increase civilian hospital
capacity in Viet-Nam (rewrite).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
it U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-933/42
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U53
May 1,1967
VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY RETURNS FROM TRIP TO EUROPE
Remarks by President Johnson and Vice President Hunvphrey
at Washington; Addresses by the Vice President in Europe 678
CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE UNITED STATES
by David H. Popper 689
PRESIDENT SIGNS JOINT RESOLUTION ON FOOD ASSISTANCE TO INDIA
Statement by President Johnson and Text
of Congressional Resolution 700
For index see inside back cover
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip to Europe
Following are remarks made by President
Johnson and Vice President Humphrey at a
ceremony on the South Lawn of the White
House on April 10 upon the Vice President's
retur^i from a 2-iveek working visit to seveyi
European countries. Also included are three
addresses made by Vice President Humphrey
during his European trip.^
WELCOMING CEREMONY, WASHINGTON,
APRIL 10
White House press release dated April 10
Remarks by President Johnson
Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Humphrey, dis-
tinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen : Mr.
Vice President, you will see here this morn-
ing, assembled to greet you, a large part of
the Government of the United States, as
well as many of our most distinguished
private citizens.
We have with you here the Cabinet, the
Under Secretaries, the heads of many of the
most important agencies. We have the
Speaker, the Majority Leader, and other
members of the leadership in Congress, as
well as many of the leading members.
Their presence here this morning speaks,
more eloquently than any words of mine,
of the importance your country attaches to
the mission that you and your charming wife
have just completed.
For more than 2 weeks now you have been
the authentic voice of America in the coun-
cil halls of our European allies.
You have told both the leaders and the
' For details of the Vice President's itinerary,
see Department of State press release 66 dated
Mar. 25.
peoples of seven friendly nations that Amer-
ica is still the daughter of Europe and that
we intend to continue doing our share as we
pursue our common destinies.
You have also carried to them, with great
eloquence and ability, our conviction that
peace, like freedom, is indivisible. Neither
the New World of the Americas nor the Old
World of Europe can ever hope to fulfill
either its dreams or its ambitions until the
Ancient World of Asia has become a full
and equal partner in the forward movement
of men.
No one knows better than you, Mr. Vice
President, that this conviction lies at the
very roots of American policy in Viet-Nam
and throughout Asia. I believe that that con-
viction and that policy are much clearer
today in the minds of our friends in Europe,
because you and Mrs. Humphrey were there
to personally express it to them.
During these past 2 weeks you have been
more than America's spokesman: You have
also been America's eyes and ears. You left
here bearing an American message to the
people of Europe; this morning you return
with Europe's message to the people of
America.
Within a few hours, I expect to depart on
a similar mission to our friends in Latin
America.
Between us, we will then have shared
within a few weeks a degree of consultation
and discussion with other nations that is
unequaled, so far as I can recall, in American
history.
There is good reason for these consulta-
tions. I think it was very well expressed dur-
ing your visit to Europe.
"The essence of statesmanship," you said,
"is not a rigid adherence to the past but a
678
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
present and probing concern for the
future." 2
We have that concern.
We hope that others share it.
We seek their advice and recommenda-
tions as earnestly as we ask them to con-
sider ours.
In all of this, Mr. Vice President and Mrs.
Humphrey, you have played a profoundly
important part. You have served as a bridge
for better understanding — and better under-
standing among nations, in this nuclear era,
is really the best hope of mankind.
Mr. Vice President and Muriel, we wel-
come you home. We were very proud of you.
We followed you every step of the way. We
are so glad to have you back.
Now you can pick up for the next week
some of the problems here that I will leave
with you.
Remarks by Vice President Humphrey
Mr. President, Your Excellencies, mem-
bers of the Cabinet, Mr. Speaker, leaders of
the Congress, and my fellow Americans: Mr.
President, I am sure you know, first of all,
that my heart is filled with appreciation and
gratitude for the opportunity that you have
afforded me, because it has been indeed a
high honor to represent you and our beloved
country these past 2 weeks in several of the
nations of Europe.
But, as you have indicated, it is so good
to be home once again and to be with fellow
Americans to continue our efforts in the
cause of peace and freedom.
The purpose of my mission was to listen,
to look, and to learn — and, if called upon, to
explain. In so doing I was given the oppor-
tunity to see Europe as it is more than two
decades after the end of World War II, 20
years after the inception of the Marshall
Plan, and 10 years after the signing of the
Rome treaties.
I saw a new Western Europe that has
achieved an unprecedented degree of well-
being, prosperity, and security and an in-
' At a luncheon address before the U.S. Chiefs
of Missions in Europe at Bonn on Mar. 30.
creased sense of identity and pride. That
Europe, Mr. President, is testimony to the
soundness of our policies, past and present,
and to the genius and industry of the people
and of the nations of that continent.
My discussions with European leaders
covered the Kennedy Round trade negotia-
tion, which is now entering its final stage,
discussions toward a nuclear nonprolifera-
tion treaty, relations between East and West,
the building of a larger European unity, the
revitalization of the NATO alliance, the re-
sponsibility of the rich nations to the poor,
the need for modernizing our international
monetary system, and, above all, the
strengthening of international institutions
for peace.
I found the leaders of Western Europe
ready and eager to join with us in meeting
these challenges — but as our equal partners.
I gave them our assurance that a full and
equal Atlantic partnership, a partnership
based on true equality, was and continues to
be the objective of American policy. I as-
sured them that we welcomed a growing
sense of "Europeanism" and independence.
I expressed our confidence that this new as-
surance and vitality would be directed to-
ward cooperation internationally as well as
within Europe's own borders.
Mr. President, as you have stated on
several occasions in these past months, we
are entering a new era in our relations with
the peoples of Europe.
We are, in a sense, at the end of the post-
war period. Now, in this last third of the
20th century, we are moving forward in a
period of productive partnership in the West
and of peaceful engagement with the East.
There are concerns, yes, and there are
questions. There is the need for an even
closer relationship between ourselves and our
European partners. But there is even more
a common basis of understanding, an agree-
ment on fundamental principles, and a will-
ingness to work together which I believe
can open the road ahead.
Twenty years ago the most that any of
us dared hope for was the revival and re-
newal of a war-torn continent.
MAY 1, 1967
679
Today, our expectations have been ful-
filled— and far beyond. I believe that if we
and our partners can maintain our unity,
our cohesion, and our common will, the next
20 years can bring to full realization the
final healing of Europe's old wounds and
divisions, the replacement of the Iron Cur-
tain with an open door, and a chance to meet
the new priorities of nation-building and
peaceful development all around the world.
Mr. President, I shall give you a full re-
port on my mission. In the meantime, I bring
back to you and to the American people my
firm belief that our friends in Europe re-
main our good friends and that we do have
reason for optimism.
While I have this moment, Mr. President,
may I wish you a very successful and,
indeed, a most productive voyage to Latin
America, where the mission that you under-
take is of the greatest significance.
It is a high honor and a rare privilege to
be your partner in these endeavors.
ADDRESSES MADE IN EUROPE
BY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY
Berlin House of Representatives, April 6
Governing Mayor [Heinrich] Albertz,
distinguished Senators, and Members of the
House of Representatives, ladies and gentle-
men: I am honored to speak to you on the
occasion of this special session of the Berlin
House of Representatives. I am honored, too,
to bring to the Members of this House this
personal message from the President of the
United States:
It is a special pleasure to send you, through
Vice President Humphrey, my owti good wishes and
those of the American people as you assume your
new responsibilities.
More than 5 years ago I had the privilege of
being with the people of Berlin during a time of
crisis. Their courage, which won the admiration and
support of free men everywhere, met the challenge
of those dark days. Their strength and fortitude
since then have kept Berlin a free and thriving
city. All Americans look forward to the time when
the tragic division of Berlin is ended and Germany
is once again a united country.
My countrymen join me in the hope and expecta-
tion that the future will bring you peace and
prosperity.
My remarks will be brief. I mean them to
be direct ?nd to the point. You will remem-
ber when President Johnson spoke to this
House. It was a time, for Berlin, of deep
crisis.
President Johnson spoke then of the need
for confidence, for poise, and for faith. And
he pledged our commitment to the people of
Berlin. You have shown confidence, poise,
and faith. And I renew now his pledge.
Berliners, more than anyone else, know
the value of commitments that are kept.
Just as Berliners — with the help of allies
— have maintained the integrity of their
city, so are the people of South Viet-Nam —
with the help of allies — struggling today to
maintain the integrity of their country.
And I know that the people of Berlin
know, as all free peoples know, that our com-
mitment to freedom in one place is no less
than our commitment to freedom in another.
Today Berlin stands stronger than ever
before. Berlin is strong because her citizens
have an indestructible spirit.
Berlin is strong because her men and
women stand not only together but in
solidarity with free men and women all over
the world.
Berlin is strong because her people look
not to the past but always to the future.
This city owes much to one of your mem-
bers, the former Governing Mayor of this
city, and my friend, Willy Brandt. Today he
has joined hands with Chancellor [Kurt]
Kiesinger to help the new Government of
the Federal Republic meet new opportuni-
ties. We in America are impressed by the
great strides which this German Govern-
ment has made toward reconciliation with
the countries of Eastern Europe. And we
welcome the initiatives now being taken by
your country so that yesterday's Iron Cur-
tain may become tomorrow's open door.
We welcome the movement of people, of
goods, and of ideas which is today permeat-
ing societies formerly closed to the outside
world.
680
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Berlin has the chance to play a large role
in making: the open door a reality. And I
know, in a spirit of confidence and hope,
that you will. For, as your Chancellor said
only last night, Berlin can be a bridge — an
open bridge on the path to peace.
In the center of free Berlin there stands
today a stark ruin — the skeleton of a church,
preserved to symbolize eternally the de-
pravity of war.
It is our hope that the Iron Curtain may
one day, too, lie in ruins, its remnants a
symbol of a time that mercifully ended.
A great act in the human drama lies at
hand: Through peaceful engagement in
Europe we have the chance to shape a com-
monwealth of progress dedicated not to war
but to peace, not to doctrinal conflict but to
constructive reconciliation.
We have the chance, as President Johnson
has expressed it,^ to help the people of
Europe to achieve together:
— a continent in which the peoples of Eastern
and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder for
the common good ;
— a continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide
a framework in which West and East can act
together in order to assure the security of all.
Berlin is a city that is alive. Berlin is a
city moving forward. Berlin will always be
a great city. And, if we stand together, one
day Berlin will once more be the capital of
a reunited Germany in a safe and peaceful
world.
North Atlantic Council, Paris, April 7
Mr. Chairman and members of the North
Atlantic Council: This organization — this
NATO — has been so close to the heart of my
country's foreign policy for so long that it is
a part of our everyday vocabulary, one of
our assumptions about national commitment
that almost everyone takes for granted.
We look upon NATO's success as an estab-
lished fact of contemporary life. Its strength
^ For an advance text of President Johnson's
address at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
is a matter of high priority in our nation's
policy.
It has survived both external and internal
crises and we have come to assume that this
is a hardened habit.
Even when we indulge in the periodic
luxury of disagreement among ourselves,
our disagreements do not run to the merits
of NATO but rather to the best or more
effective or most economical way to keep it
in business for the long term.
Even when we are committed in other
parts of the world, it simply does not occur
to us that the way to pursue our purposes in
other areas is to abandon our purposes in
the Atlantic and European area.
But to accept NATO as a constant in our
foreign policy is not to assume that its tasks,
its opportunities, and its form of organiza-
tion must remain fixed from decade to
decade.
This organization came into being after
the historic decision of Stalin to go it alone
in the postwar world and to use the threat of
Soviet armed force and to expand westward.
NATO first blunted, then contained, that
outward thrust into Europe. The threat from
the East is not gone, but it has moderated.
It has moderated to a large degree because
we have held together. And the passage of
time, the increasing material well-being of
Soviet society, the growing flexibility of the
Soviet economy, the moderating experience
of dealing with other nations, are leading
to modifications within the once-monolithic
Soviet bloc.
Just as Western Europe has changed, so
have the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
New conditions require a new response.
We will need to find our way to a resolu-
tion of those fundamental European issues
which, so long as they remain unresolved,
will prevent true security and the reconcilia-
tion of East and West which we all seek.
When the Marshall Plan followed the pro-
gram of defense aid to Greece and Turkey,
President Truman described it as the "other
half of the walnut."
My point here is that our goal in the years
MAY 1, 1967
681
ahead is to add the other half of the walnut
to the half we already have — by matching
deterrence with peaceful engagement.
If we are to be successful, we must stand
together in this new period just as firmly as
we did at the height of the cold war.
We have not surmounted three crises over
Berlin in an atmosphere of protracted ten-
sion to lose now, in a moment of relaxation,
what we then dared to stand for and sus-
tain. And despite the limitations of what we
can do to encourage the tides of change in
relations between East and West, much re-
mains that we can do.
We are all aware of the quickening tempo
of East^West contacts. Your own compila-
tions here show more than half a hundred
significant political contacts between East-
ern and Western governments last year;
many of them involved ministers and chiefs
of government.
For my part, I found this two-way traffic
significant enough to refer to the prospect
for an open door between East and West
when I spoke last month at Fulton, Missouri,
on the 21st anniversary of Winston Church-
ill's Iron Curtain speech.^
The increasing exchange of people, official
and unofficial, is matched by an increasing
exchange of goods and services as each of
our countries has tried to expand its volume
of trade and tourism with the East. This,
too, is hopeful. Indeed, we expect to engage
more vigorously in this trade ourselves in
the months and years ahead.
You are aware of the various steps — a
commercial air agreement, a consular treaty,
export credit guarantees to some of the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, a proposed East-
West trade bill, and other proposals — which
my Government has made or hopes to make
to help thaw the ice in the East.
And, of course, we are all expectantly
aware that in recent times the Soviet leaders
have been gradually more open to the idea
■* For Vice President Humphrey's address on Mar.
5, see ibid., Mar. 27, 1967, p. 486.
of entering into negotiations — more inter-
ested in talking seriously about possible
agreements, less unreasonable in formulat-
ing their positions, and less dogmatic in put-
ting them forth.
This beginning of thaw is reflected in the
foreign policy and, I suppose, the domestic
policies of every nation represented at this
table.
We have a way of safeguarding and har-
monizing our interests as the traffic quickens
through the open door.
It is by consultation through this Council.
Our task around this table will be to de-
sign the other half of the walnut — by stimu-
lating, guiding, and monitoring the process
of movement together.
In the words of President Johnson last
October 7: "The alliance must become a
forum for increasingly close consultations.
These should cover the full range of joint
concerns — from East^West relations to
crisis management."
He meant just what he said, and our rep-
resentatives in NATO are instructed to live
by this policy.
In sum then, my Government believes that
we have to maintain a credible NATO de-
terrent.
If we do, there will be more and more op-
portunities to work constructively on East-
West relations, because NATO will continue
to prove the futility of aggressive behavior
in Europe.
But as we have managed together the busi-
ness of deterrence, we must manage together
the even more complex business of making a
durable peace in Europe. Our presence in the
midst of the alliance bears witness to our
firm commitment to act as faithful partners
of our allies.
And if we follow the Golden Rule — that
each of us consult as soon, as often, and as
frankly as he would wish the other to con-
sult— the alliance will prove to be the mid-
wife of more helpful times.
Mr. Chairman, my countrymen can never
lose interest in the peace and security and
682
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
well-being of Europe for historical reasons
that are too obvious to need recalling here.
We have felt since the end of the last
war that the security of Berlin, the
security of Germany, the security of Eu-
rope, the security of the North Atlantic
and Canada, and of the United States itself,
are all one and the same thing — a common
concern, the common expression of which is
NATO. And we still think so.
In these years we have together prevented
war and given protection against aggres-
sion.
Now, on the threshold of a new period, we
must move together beyond defense to the
business of peace and peaceful progress.
We face, perhaps, the opportunity of our
century. And if we stand together now as
in the past, we shall have success.
OECD Council, Paris, April 7
This year we mark the anniversary of two
decades of cooperation between America and
Europe in the cause of reconstruction and
economic progress.
These have been years of accomplishments
unprecedented in character and scope.
The member countries of the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] have had the longest period
of uninterrupted economic growth in the
modern era. That growth has been far be-
yond our expectations, and its benefits have
been widely distributed among our peoples.
International trade has flourished. Goods and
capital have moved across the borders at
high and rising levels.
This exchange has taken place within a
system of monetary arrangements which,
whatever its shortcomings and strains, has
worked. We have had no competitive devalu-
ations, no major dislocations, no depressions.
We have, in short, been phenomenally suc-
cessful in dealing with our common economic
problems.
Perhaps even more noteworthy, when seen
in the perspective of history, we have to-
gether embarked on a deliberate and sus-
tained effort, involving the transfer of re-
sources and skills on a substantial scale, to
improve the lot of those hundreds of millions
of human beings in other parts of the world
less fortunate than our own.
It is not possible now to allocate credit
for these achievements very exactly among
the several international organizations that
have contributed to them. When a balance is
finally struck, however, the work of this
organization and its predecessor, the OEEC
[Organization for European Economic Coop-
eration] , will have to be given great weight.
And without waiting for the historian's
verdict, Mr. Secretary General, I believe that
in this 20th anniversary year of Secretary
Marshall's Harvard speech, we are justified
in looking with great pride at what the orga-
nization has accomplished.
But it is a part of the human condition
that we are never lacking for unsolved prob-
lems and for new tasks.
The OECD has been at the center of the
process of economic change and development
ever since its founding. Its influence and the
actions of its member nations must be di-
rected to a host of problems still with us.
First, because the deadline is directly upon
us, is the Kennedy Round.
Trade has been the great growth industry
of the postwar years.
Trade of the OECD countries with the
world has tripled since 1948, while produc-
tion was doubling.
A great design for further reducing bar-
riers to trade is now being painfully worked
out at Geneva. It must succeed for both the
industrial and agricultural sectors if this
remarkable growth is to continue.
The Kennedy Round will be decided in a
matter of weeks. The period in which we
need to come to basic agreement on reform
and improvement of the international mone-
tary system can be measured in months.
This is an area where agreement is neces-
sary, not to enable the United States to solve
its balance-of-payments problems but rather
to assure that the international economy has
MAY 1, 1967
683
the monetary underpinning for the expan-
sion of output and trade and, in the end, wel-
fare that our peoples properly expect.
Another great and unfinished task con-
fronting us is the bridging of the division
between Eastern and Western Europe. This
is a major objective of my own Government.
We are encouraged at seeing that the proc-
ess, however slow, is underway.
I know that you, Mr. Secretary General,
have been charged with considering, along
with the permanent representatives here,
ways and means through which the OECD
can widen the range of East-West economic
relations. The United States does not expect
miracles out of this process. But we wish you
and the OECD every success in finding the
means to fruitful contact with the East.
In recent months, a new coinage has en-
tered the intellectual currency of this orga-
nization. The phrase "technological gap" has
come to stand for a whole complex of ideas,
apprehensions, and even some misconcep-
tions.
The underlying idea is that there is an im-
portant disparity in the level of technology
achieved by the United States in comparison
with other members of the OECD.
The apprehension is that by virtue of our
size and wealth and the emphasis we place
on research and development, this disparity
will increase. That there may be some ele-
ments of misconception here is suggested by
the fact that over the past 15 years, the eco-
nomic growth of Western Europe and Japan
has outpaced that of the United States.
In point of fact, there are no technological
monopolies in the world today. Technology
flows readily and freely through the normal
channels of trade and investment.
If technological advance occurs more
rapidly in the United States than elsewhere,
the explanation must be sought in educa-
tional, organizational, and economic factors.
And if there is a relative lack of techno-
logical innovation in other countries of this
organization, I believe that it is these factors
that must be considered and dealt with.
President Johnson, some months ago, es-
tablished a high-level committee, chaired by
his Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, to
examine the technological gap and to make
appropriate recommendations for dealing
with it. We are taking a full part, of course,
in the study that is underway in the OECD.
We expect that the OECD investigation will
not only help to determine the dimensions of
the problem but will also provide guideposts
to the cooperative actions which may con-
tribute to its solution.
And we stand ready to be forthcoming in
helping our partners in their technological
development.
As we learn more of the technological
revolution, we must use its potential jointly
for the common good.
As I have said elsewhere, we need to find
ways to insure a continuous exchange of
technological and organizational experience
among the members of this organization and
perhaps to expand it some day to include
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
The most threatening and intractable
problem confronting members of this orga-
nization, Mr. Secretary General, is repre-
sented by the chasm separating the affluent
society of a few hundred million peoples
represented at this table from that other
society which includes the largest part of the
human race.
That other society is populated by people
living on the ragged edge of poverty, never
free of want, who now — in many areas —
face the threat of famine on a catastrophic
scale.
It is to the lasting credit of the OECD
that from its inception it has recognized this
problem and tried to do something about it.
There is a growing recognition that the
gap between the affluent and the poor na-
tions is the primordial problem of our times.
It is at once massive, stubborn, and urgent.
It is understandable in simple terms of
human morality.
684
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
But it can be solved only by the most
imaginative and far-reaching measures, in-
volving all of our countries in a cooperative
effort that must be sustained for years.
A few days ago, Pope Paul VI treated this
subject in an encyclical that will surely take
its place among the great documents of our
times.
He set forth the problem in terms which
speak both to the mind and to the heart.
He described entire continents where
countless men and women suffer hunger
and where, because of malnutrition, children
never attain their proper physical and men-
tal development.
He pointed out the pressing duty of the
developed countries to help and urged that
they should consider such aid as a normal
and proper charge on their resources.
He prescribed the measures needed in
terms so appropriate to the OECD that I can
do no better than to repeat them.
If these efforts are to attain their full effective-
ness, they cannot remain scattered and isolated;
less still can they compete for reasons of prestige
or power; the situation demands planned and
coordinated programs. A program is in fact more
than, and better than, single acts of assistance
dependent on individual expressions of good will.
It involves . . . thorough studies, a fixing of objec-
tives, a determination of means, and a consolida-
tion of efforts, to respond to present needs and
predictable requirements.
The OECD has made a beginning on this
path. And it is even now grappling with the
most urgent and the most harrowing aspect
of the development problem: how to feed
the world's teeming millions.
I had the privilege of addressing the mem-
bers of the Development Assistance Com-
mittee of the organization when they met in
Washington last summer.^ I said then that
we in the DAC would have to answer two
key questions: How much help is needed?
How can our countries best work together in
providing that help ?
I said our study should look not just to pil-
• Ibid., Aug. 8, 1967, p. 202.
ing up data but should look to action — action
directed toward a clear and feasible goal:
the eradication of large-scale famine and
hunger.
Within the past few weeks the DAC has
published documents which seem likely to
contribute significantly to answering the
two questions I posed. Next week, I am told,
competent officials from the member coun-
tries of the Committee will meet here to con-
sider these documents.
It is both the hope and the expectation of
my Government that from these delibera-
tions will emerge the outlines of actions to
cope decisively with the threatening catas-
trophe that we simply cannot accept: the
tragedy of starvation in a world of grow-
ing affluence. Hunger is the immediate prob-
lem.
But, as we all know, our plans must ex-
tend much farther.
Together with the developing nations we
must concert measures that will increase per
capita growth at a rate which will reduce the
enormous disparity between their world and
ours.
A few months ago, Mr. George Woods, the
president of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, gave a very
thoughtful speech to the Economic and
Social Council. In his remarks he called for
review at high political levels of the state of
development aid in relation to the needs. He
suggested that careful staff preparation
would be a necessary preliminary to any
such review.
It seems to me that the OECD has an im-
portant contribution to make to this kind of
preparation. Its work ought to be even more
specifically addressed to obstacles to eco-
nomic growth in the developing countries
and to the specific measures that the rich
countries can make toward accelerating that
growth.
For, as Pope Paul said, if development is
the new name of peace, who would not wish
to work at this task with all his strength?
MAY 1, 1967
685
NATO Nuclear Planning Group
Holds First Ministers Meeting
The first meeting of the NATO Nuclear
Planning Group at the ministerial level was
held April 6-7 at Washington. Following is
a statement concerning the meeting made
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa-
mara at his news conference on April 3,
together with the text of a communique re-
leased by the NATO Nuclear Planning
Group at the close of the meeting on April 7.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY McNAMARA
On Thursday and Friday of this week
[April 6-7] I shall be meeting in Washing-
ton with the defense ministers of Canada,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey,
and the United Kingdom; and the Secretary
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nization. These ministers comprise the new
NATO Nuclear Planning Group which,
together with the Nuclear Defense Affairs
Committee, was established as a permanent
body by the North Atlantic Council last De-
cember to advise it on matters of nuclear
policy.*
I am especially pleased to be the host for
this meeting. It represents, I believe, a sig-
nificant new approach and achievement after
more than a decade of persistent endeavor
by many individuals and by many nations to
bring all members of the alliance into fuller
partnership in the planning of nuclear
strategy. It is a milestone in the history of
NATO.
The personal participation of the seven
defense ministers in the Nuclear Planning
Group reflects the new intimate involvement
of nationally responsible government lead-
ers in NATO planning activities. Such active
participation by top defense authorities is
essential to assure realism in our work and
the vigorous support of the member govern-
' For text of a final communique released at the
close of the North Atlantic Council ministerial
meeting on Dec. 16, 1966, see Bulletin of Jan. 9,
1967, p. 49.
ments in carrying out NATO plans. It is, I
believe, largely responsible for the great
progress we have made in nuclear planning
in the past 2 years.
The foundation of the security of the alli-
ance is nuclear power. Thus, it is only
natural that the nonnuclear members of the
alliance have always felt a need to be in-
formed about nuclear matters and to par-
ticipate in nuclear planning. They have been
uncertain of their role. They believed, and
rightly so, that they should have a greater
voice in assessing the nuclear threat to the
alliance, in determining the nuclear forces
required to meet that threat, and in working
out how and under what conditions these
nuclear forces would be employed.
For more than 10 years the NATO nations
have struggled with the problem of how to
better integrate the nuclear and nonnuclear
powers on nuclear matters and have consid-
ered many recommendations and proposals.
These efforts include:
1. A proposal in 1960 that the United
States sell or assist in the European produc-
tion of Polaris missiles to be deployed under
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander
Europe] .
2. Another suggestion in 1960 to create a
multilateral atomic authority which would
have made NATO "a fourth atomic power."
3. An additional proposal in 1960 for a
NATO medium range ballistic missile
(MRBM) force involving Polaris submarines
and missile-carrying surface ships, with
multilateral ownership, financing, and con-
trol and "mixed manning to the extent opera-
tionally feasible."
4. A proposal in 1961 for a NATO sea-
borne force.
5. A suggestion in 1963 for an inter-
Allied nuclear force to include U.K. V-
bombers, Polaris submarines, and other
nuclear elements.
6. A proposal in 1963 for a multilateral
nuclear force comprising Polaris submarines
provided by the United Kingdom, United
States forces, and possibly mixed-manned
ships.
7. A proposal in 1964 for an Atlantic
686
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nuclear force of British V-bombers, British
Polaris sii,bmarines, U.S. Polaris boats, and
other elements.
8. Suggestions in the early 1960's that
mobile medium range ballistic missiles
(MMRBM) might be deployed in Euroi^e on
railroad cars or truck-drawn trailers.
It has only been in the last year and a half
that substantial progress in expanding the
role of the nonnuclear powers in nuclear
affairs has been accomplished.
The meeting this week stems from a pro-
posal by the United States to the NATO de-
fense ministers in June 1965 for consultation
by a small group of the ministers about the
problems of nuclear planning. As a result,
a Special Committee of Defense Ministers
met in Paris in November 1965. It set up the
Nuclear Planning Working Group composed
of five NATO defense ministers. This ad hoc
group met four times in 1966: in Washing-
ton, London, Paris, and Rome. It reviewed
and discussed the strategic and tactical
nuclear resources of the alliance, the poten-
tial circumstances and consequences of their
use, and the way in which the alliance should
organize to carry on future discussion of
these subjects.
These were by far the most substantive
and effective discussions on nuclear matters
ever attempted between NATO's nuclear and
nonnuclear powers. For example, one of my
colleagues stated in February that there had
been more progress on NATO nuclear prob-
lems during the past 12 months than in the
preceding 17 years.
The Working Group recommended that a
permanent organization be created to carry
on this work, and the Nuclear Defense
Affairs Committee, open to all NATO coun-
tries, and the Nuclear Planning Group were
established by the foreign and defense min-
isters during the meeting of the North Atlan-
tic Council last December.
At this week's meeting, the Nuclear Plan-
ning Group will continue to examine NATO
nuclear strength in all of its aspects, includ-
ing plans for the development, production,
and use of strategic and tactical weapons sys-
tems. In addition, we shall discuss the recent
steps taken by the Soviet Union to deploy an
anti-ballistic-missile system, as well as the
status of the U.S. ABM program. We shall
also discuss the effort being made by this
country to persuade the Soviet Union to join
with us in holding down the spiraling of a
fruitless arms race.
Again, I want to emphasize the signifi-
cance of this meeting. It is without question
one of the most important and far-reaching
steps of the last decade in the evolution of
NATO.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 7
The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, composed
of Ministers of Defense of seven NATO countries,
adjourned today after a two-day conference in
Washington. Attending the first meeting of the
Nuclear Planning Group were Paul Hellyer, Can-
ada; Gerhard Schroeder, Germany; Roberto Tremel-
loni, Italy; Willem den Toom, Netherlands; Ahmet
Topaloglu, Turkey; Denis Healey, United Kingdom;
and Robert S. McNamara, United States. NATO
Secretary-General Manlio Brosio was chairman.
The United States Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Robert S. McNamara, led a discussion of the stra-
tegic nuclear forces of the Alliance and anti-bal-
listic missile defense. The Ministers reviewed the
changes which have occurred in the strategic
nuclear threat facing the Alliance since the meet-
ing of the Nuclear Planning Working Group in
February 1966, and the means and plans available
to counter that threat. They concluded that the
size of existing strategic nuclear forces and the
plans for employing them are adequate to the need.
They discussed the technical, strategic and finan-
cial aspects of ballistic missile defense including
both the Soviet deployments and the U.S. R&D
program, and agreed to keep this subject under
review. The Ministers also received a report from
Secretary McNamara on the current status of dis-
cussions initiated by the U.S. with the Soviet Gov-
ernment to explore ways of preventing a further
spiraling of the arms race. The Ministers noted
that the U.S. Government intends to keep its allies
fully advised as these discussions progress.
The United Kingdom Secretary of State for De-
fense, Mr. Denis Healey, led a discussion of tactical
nuclear forces. The Ministers agreed that the num-
ber of tactical nuclear weapons available to the
Allied Commanders in Europe and the Atlantic are
adequate but that the appropriate distribution of
types of weapons should be kept under continuous
review. They also agreed to initiate a number of
specific studies to help in clarifying important ques-
tions related to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
MAY 1, 1967
687
Mr. Ahmet Topaloglu, the Minister of Defense
of Turkey, led a discussion of atomic demolition
munitions and considerations related to the possible
use of these weapons in the defense of the treaty
area. The Ministers agreed to conduct further
studies on this subject.
Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Defense of
the Federal Republic of Germany, led a discussion
on the role of host countries in Allied arrangements
for the planning and use of nuclear weapons.
The Ministers noted that the Nuclear Planning
Group itself as well as the Military Committee of
the Alliance offer the opportunity for national
governments to exert a direct influence on nu-
clear planning in the Alliance through their senior
political and military authorities. They will conduct
further detailed studies on specific aspects of this
question and will continue their discussion at the
next Ministerial meeting of the Nuclear Planning
Group.
The Ministers set a work program for the fu-
ture and agreed to meet again in Ankara in Sep-
tember 1967.
The Nuclear Planning Group is part of the
permanent structure established by the North At-
lantic Council at its Ministerial Meeting in Paris
in December 1966. At that time, the Council estab-
lished the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, open
to all NATO countries, to advise the Council on
nuclear policy. At the same time the seven-nation
Nuclear Planning Group was created to handle the
detailed work of the Nuclear Defense Affairs
Committee.
Letters of Credence
Singapore
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Singapore, Wong Lin Ken, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on April 7. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated April 7.
Zambia
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Zambia, Rupiah Bwenzani
Banda, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on April 7. For texts of the Am-
bassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated April 7.
U.S. Decides Not To Resume
Arms Aid to India and Pakistan
Department Statement *
The Department of State announced on
April 12 that the Government has concluded
an extensive review of policy with regard to
the provision of military equipment to India
and Pakistan and has decided that the
United States will not resume grant military
assistance, which has been suspended since
September 1965.
The United States is, therefore, closing
the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply
Mission in India. This process is expected to
be completed by July 1, 1967, in both cases.
The U.S. Government has also decided to
remove its present restrictions on the kinds
of spare parts which may be sold to India
and Pakistan for previously supplied equip-
ment. Henceforth, the Government will be
prepared to consider on a case-by-case basis
all requests for export permits covering the
cash purchase of spare parts.
The United States will continue to keep its
military sales policy under careful review to
insure that it is not contributing to an arms
race between India and Pakistan. The
United States strongly hopes that both coun-
tries will make progress in resolving the
problems and differences that divide them
and that they will accord an increasing pri-
ority in the allocations of their resources to
agricultural and industrial development.
' Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman on Apr. 12.
688
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
China, the United Nations, and the United States
by David H. Popper
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs '
We must, I think, approax;h the problem of
United States policy regarding the repre-
sentation of China in the United Nations in
the perspective of history. In this perspective
it quickly becomes clear that it is an over-
simplification to regard Chinese-American
relations as habitually or necessarily antago-
nistic. Indeed, looking backward one is
struck by the long-continued interest of the
United States in the development of China
and in the close ties which have typically
existed between the Chinese and the Amer-
ican peoples.
For almost 150 years there have been
Americans who were passionately interested
in China. The earliest basis of interest was
economic: Students of American history
know how important the China trade was to
the seafarers of New England and the mid-
Atlantic. In visiting collections of early 19th-
century Americana — for example, at the
Winterthur Museum near Wilmington, Dela-
ware— one is struck by the amount of mag-
nificent Chinese furniture, tableware, and
fabrics then to be found in the finer Ameri-
can homes.
At a later stage, when European coun-
tries were engaged in carving out conces-
sions in a China which seemed to be falling
apart, the United States played an active
role in seeking equality of commercial op-
portunity for all in China. Americans bene-
fited as a result from concessions exacted
' Address made before the public affairs fellows
of the Brookings Institution at Washington, D.C.,
on Mar. 28.
by others, but the fact is that Americans
were not in the forefront in inflicting the
colonial indignities to which China was sub-
jected as the 19th century drew to its close.
Our national interest in the period of the
20th-century World Wars tended on the
whole to bolster Chinese independence. We
reacted strongly, though as it turned out not
strongly enough, to the Japanese invasion
of Manchuria in 1931, which perhaps began
the melancholy train of events leading to
Pearl Harbor. And we collaborated very
actively indeed with the Chinese Nationalist
Government in fighting the Japanese during
World War II.
Through all this period, in increasing
measure, American educators, missionaries,
and traders were at work in China. There
was, I think, a rather unique bond between
the two countries. "Old China hands"
formed a very special group of commitment
and expertise, and they had a strong influ-
ence on American policy.
It was not surprising, therefore, that in
drafting the United Nations Charter the
United States insisted that China should be
one of the five permanent members of the
United Nations Security Council. We should
not overlook the fact that this decision repre-
sented something of an innovation. A non-
European state was included in the inner
circle of nations possessing major respon-
sibiUty in the U.N. for maintaining interna-
tional peace and security. Japan had attained
permanent membership in the League of
Nations Council, but this was a far less
MAY 1, 1967
689
significant body than the U.N. Security
Council.
Unhappily, China was not able to turn to
the task of peaceful development at the end
of the Second World War. Years of strife —
invasion by foreign foes and civil conflict at
home — had drained China of its wealth, rid-
dled its human resources, and destroyed its
internal stability. The Chinese Communists
were able to exploit this situation to seize
power in large areas of the country. Strenu-
ous efi'orts were made by the United States
to help the Chinese to form an overall coali-
tion government which would restore peace.
These efforts unfortunately failed, and in
1949 victorious Communist armies forced
the legitimate government of China and a
million of its supporters to take refuge on
the island of Taiwan, where the Government
of the Republic of China is located today.
The establishment of the Chinese Commu-
nist regime throughout mainland China
while the legitimate government of China
continued in existence on Taiwan presented
the U.N. with a serious political and legal
problem. The government — indeed the very
personalities — associated with the original
Chinese assumption of membership in the
United Nations still exercised the functions
of government in an area they controlled.
The de facto control of the Chinese Com-
munists on the mainland could not be denied;
but in 1949-50 it could hardly be said that
enough time had elapsed to draw any con-
clusions as to how much support that regime
had in mainland China or how firmly it
would become established.
Aggression Against the U.N. in Korea
Then, as the statesmen and lawyers
wrestled with this problem. North Korean
forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded
the free territory of the Republic of Korea
in June 1950. In the events which followed.
Communist Chinese forces became massively
involved in the aggression. It was not only an
active aggression against the Republic of
Korea; it was an aggression against the
690
United Nations itself. And the United Na-
tions, in a historic resolution of the General
Assembly, directly condemned the Chinese
Communists for participating in the aggres-
sion against the U.N. The actual language
of one paragraph of that resolution, adopted
on February 1, 1951, reads as follows:
The General Assembly ... ji
Finch that the Central People's Government of '
the People's Republic of China, by giving direct
aid and assistance to those who were already
committing aggression in Korea and by engaging
in hostilities against United Nations forces there,
has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.
This put the problem of Chinese represen-
tation in a new and difi'erent perspective. It
was now complicated by the fact that from
the United Nations standpoint the Chinese
Communists had, as it were, the status of an
outlaw. To most U.N. members, including the
United States, it seemed at the time quite
inappropriate to regard the Chinese Com-
munist regime as qualified in political terms
to be represented in the halls of the United
Nations, which it directly defied by armed
force.
Legally speaking, we were not talking at
this stage about the admission of a new
member to the organization but about the
narrower question of who should sit in the
seats reserved for China in the U.N. Yet by
analogy, the question of qualifications for
U.N. membership necessarily came to the
forefront. The U.N. Charter provides that
U.N. membership is open to "peace-
loving states" which accept the obligations
contained in the U.N. Charter and which, in
the judgment of the organization, are able
and willing to carry out these obligations.
As long as Communist China defied the pro-
visions of the U.N. Charter having to do
with the maintaining of international peace
and security, as long as it persisted in de-
fending and justifying its acts of aggression
in Korea, as long as it would not undertake
to measure up to the standards to which all
United Nations members subscribe, it did
not seem to most U.N. members that Com-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
munist China could properly be seated in
the U.N.
The Korea episode has not been liquidated
to this day, though relatively stable condi-
tions exist along the 38th parallel. Yet, on
top of the Korean experience, the U.N. has
observed one manifestation after another of
resort to aggressive force by the Chinese
Communist regime. The Chinese Communists
used force to subdue Tibet. In two military
episodes the Chinese Communists overran
the frontiers of India. They endeavored to
force their way into control of the offshore
islands which remained under the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China.
Reaction to Communist Chinese Extremism
Nor were Chinese Communist efforts lim-
ited to the immediate borders under their
control. Representing the most extreme wing
of Communist doctrine, the Chinese Commu-
nists embarked on subversive activities in
widely scattered areas, both in Asia and on
other continents. Communists plotted to seize
control in Malaya and later Indonesia. Chi-
nese Communist support for subversion
turned up in Africa. And Chinese Commu-
nist logistic and ideological support is a very
appreciable factor in sustaining North Viet-
Nam's aggression against South Viet-Nam.
In the end, Communist Chinese extremism
has succeeded in alarming or offending al-
most everyone. You cannot, after all, preach
a doctrine of permanent revolution without
antagonizing governments and people who
feel that they have already passed through
their national revolutions. Even the Com-
munist associates of Peking have found it
impossible — save only Albania, Peking's
ever-faithful spokesman — to maintain close
and friendly relations with the Chinese
Communists. And now, in recent months, we
have observed astounding political convul-
sions within China itself.
This, then, is the background against
which the problem of Chinese representation
in the United Nations has been considered
from year to year. It helps to explain why
the Chinese Communists have never attained
representation in the United Nations despite
the admitted fact that they hold under their
control so large a population and so great an
area of the earth's surface.
Let me say a few words now regarding
efforts to obtain Chinese Communist partici-
pation in the U.N.
Originally these efforts were spearheaded
by the then great and good friend of the
Chinese Communists, the Soviet Union. In-
deed, at the beginning of 1950 the Soviet
Union sought unsuccessfully to challenge the
credentials of the Republic of China in the
U.N. Security Council. The Soviets actually
walked out of the Council temporarily when
they were defeated on this issue — ironically,
thereby enabling the Security Council to act
with great dispatch when the Republic of
Korea was invaded in June of that year.
Since the Council is a continuing body,
credentials are not periodically resubmitted
as they are at the annual sessions of the U.N.
General Assembly, and thus the issue has not
recently arisen in the Security Council. It
is worth remembering, however, that what
would be at stake if it were would be more
than a simple question of whether the Chi-
nese representatives' credentials were in
good form. A political issue of first-rank im-
portance would be involved, and only the
Security Council could make the determina-
tion.
In the U.N. General Assembly, the Chinese
representation question has been taken up
from year to year, always with the same re-
sult. For many years the Assembly adopted
a so-called "moratorium" resolution in which
the Assembly simply decided to take no ac-
tion on proposals to change the representa-
tion of China. More recently, the direct issue
of choice has been debated at length and put
to the vote. As a matter of procedure, the
Assembly has decided that any change in
Chinese representation is an important po-
litical matter which, pursuant to the charter,
requires a two-thirds majority in the Gen-
eral Assembly.
MAY 1, 1967
691
Actually, proposals for a change have
never attained even a simple majority. There
was a hair-trig-ger tie vote in 1965 ^ (a two-
thirds majority being required for action),
but the balance in 1966 swung against the
Chinese Communists by 11 votes. And the
decisions taken at the General Assembly
have been applied throughout the U.N. sys-
tem of specialized agencies in the economic
and social field.
Chinese Communist Attitude Toward U.N.
What are the reasons for this rare uni-
formity of action ? Why is it that, in literally
hundreds of decisions taken in the most
diverse U.N. bodies over a period of 17 years
during which the number of U.N. members
has doubled, the results have always — with
only one minor and temporary exception —
been the same ?
The answer cannot, I suggest, be reduced
to the oversimplification that United States
pressure has dragooned U.N. majorities into
voting against their own convictions year
after year. Certainly we have made our
views known. Those holding different views
have done the same. But we have made our
views known on many other questions as
well, with a less successful batting average
than this. And be it noted, the cleavage on
this subject splits the NATO allies, splits
Asia, and splits Africa.
It seems more reasonable to believe that
the facts bearing on the problem are the de-
cisive element in the situation. This must be
so, by the very nature of the case. For the
entire thrust of the philosophy of the U.N.
tends toward universality of participation;
other things being equal, universality should
enable the organization to function with
maximum effectiveness.
But this does not mean that the members
of the United Nations are willing to pay any
price whatever to attain that goal. There are
limits which they have not hitherto been will-
ing to disregard.
The fact is that the Communist Chinese
2 For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 13, 1965,
p. 940.
leaders have not been willing, to date, to take
any step which would indicate that they
value participation in the United Nations
system or that they particularly desire to
participate.
First, they have never renounced the doc-
trine of the unfettered use of force in inter-
national affairs which they have advocated
and pursued since they gained power. All
around them, their nearby neighbors fear
that they may be attacked.
Second, they persist in supporting sub-
versive activities in other countries, boasting
of their intention to foment "peoples wars"
or "wars of liberation" in a kind of perma-
nent wave of revolution. The effects are far
reaching, as our involvement in Viet-Nam
amply demonstrates. And the Maoist doc-
trine and mystique are unmatched in the
advocacy of violence.
It will be argued that some states which
are at present members of the U.N. are also
less than completely committed to U.N.
Charter objectives. We may admit that this
is true and that unfortunately not every U.N.
member observes standards of conduct which
in our eyes would represent full compliance
with the charter. But none has a record
which stands comparison with that of the
Chinese Communists. I am reminded of the
recent report of the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement, which cites a sur-
vey indicating that 91 percent of those ques-
tioned admitted that they had at some time
committed some act punishable by law. We
do not on that account treat criminal ele-
ments as if they were ordinary men.
A third point impeding the Chinese Com-
munist cause in the United Nations is the
constant shrill, incredible campaign of
abuse and vilification of the organization and
its Secretary-General which spews forth
from Chinese Communist sources.
A fourth point is the array of conditions
put forward by the Chinese Communists for
their entry. Seeking to stand history on its
head, the Communists in 1965 demanded
that the United Nations rescind its resolu-
tion condemning them for aggression in
Korea, brand the United States as the ag-
692
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gressor in that case, reorganize the United
Nations in a fashion more to their liking,
and expel states they regard as imperialist
puppets while admitting others they consider
qualified. How serious these demands are one
cannot know, but they certainly give sub-
stance to the view that the Chinese Commu-
nists are intent on isolating themselves.
Fifth, and in the long run perhaps
most important, the Chinese Communists in-
sist as a condition of participation that the
United Nations expel the Government of the
Republic of China and leave Peking a free
hand to take over the people and territory
of Taiwan. This is a condition that the
United States could not accept. The Rei)ublic
of China on Taiwan with its population of
131/2 million is larger than more than 80
other U.N. members. Its record in sustain-
ing the principles and the work of the orga-
nization bears comparison with that of any
member. We are not prepared to repudiate
our commitments to the Republic of China
— nor will other U.N. members do so.
This, then, is the record of the Chinese
Communist problem in the United Nations in
the past. Must we assume that the position
will persist unchanged in the future?
No one can answer that question today — if
only because no one can predict the outcome
of the extraordinary political drama now
gripping mainland China.
Yet, very few elements in international
affairs are immutable. Changes are bound to
occur in China, in other states, and in the
United Nations. What bearing they will have
on the problem as we see it today is obscure.
The "Study Committee" Proposal
One new and interesting element ap-
peared in the consideration of the Chinese
representation problem at the 21st General
Assembly session last fall.
A number of Western governments — Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy, and Trini-
dad and Tobago — introduced a resolution *
proposing the establishment of a committee
to explore and study the Chinese repre-
sentation situation in all its aspects in order
to make recommendations to the 1967 session
for an equitable and practical solution to the
question of the representation of China in
the United Nations in keeping with United
Nations Charter principles.
The resolution was rejected by a vote of
34 for and 62 against, with 25 abstentions.
We voted for it as a means of determining,
through the proposed committee, answers
to questions which, as Ambassador Gold-
berg informed the General Assembly,'' can
only be answered by Peking. He put the
questions this way:
Will they refrain from putting forward clearly
unacceptable demands, and specifically the unac-
ceptable demand that the Republic of China be
expelled from this organization?
And will they assume the obligations of the U.N.
Charter, in particular the basic obligation to re-
frain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
state?
In supporting the "study committee" pro-
posal, we made it clear that we did not con-
sider that it prejudiced in any way our own
commitment to the Republic of China.
Why did the proposal fail? In large part,
I believe, because it was so strongly opposed
by both the Republic of China and the spon-
sors of the Chinese Communists. Both of
them resented any hint that it might be pos-
sible to settle the Chinese representation
problem on any basis other than by a clear
choice between one and the other.
It is not for us as Americans to question
the reality of this sentiment on both sides.
We are compelled to recognize that as mat-
ters stand today it tends to undercut pro-
posals made by American citizens and others
for what is known as a "two China" solu-
tion. Whatever plausibility such suggestions
may have, the hard fact is that no one has as
yet been able to convince either of the parties
immediately concerned that they form an ac-
ceptable basis for dealing with this peren-
nial problem.
This, then, will be the situation as we pre-
pare for the United Nations General As-
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 19, 1966, p. 929.
^ Ibid., p. 926.
MAY 1, 1967
693
sembly session of September 1967. As we did
last year, we shall thoroughly review our
tactics. I would not want to speculate now
on the procedures which, 6 months from
now, will seem most appropriate. But I can
say that our actions regarding the problem
will be determined within this very clear
framework.
Chinese Communists' Isolation Self-Decreed
We do not have a frozen attitude on ques-
tions relating to China. The Korean conflict
is slipping back into history. The fusillades
of the cold war, as applied to other Commu-
nist countries, are now more muted; and we
are exploring ways in which we can coop-
erate with these countries in limited areas to
mutual advantage. The questions raised by
Ambassador Goldberg are therefore very
much in point: They do not demand from
Communist China anything we would not ex-
pect from any other regime.
It should be clear that the United States
is not engaged in a policy with regard to
Communist China which is vindictive for its
own sake. We are not conducting or plan-
ning a holy war in Asia. Nor do we have
any designs or pretensions on the territory
of Communist China or any other political
entity.
Our concern is with practices of aggres-
sion and subversion. We oppose these because
unless they are curbed our objective of a
world governed by law and able to unleash
its latent energies for peaceful progress can-
not be attained.
Not only have we no desire to attack Com-
munist China; we do not wish to isolate it.
The recent record on this subject is quite
clear. American and Communist Chinese
negotiators have held 132 meetings since
1956 in Geneva and Warsaw. It may be that
the United States has had more continued
contact on matters of high policy with the
Chinese Communists than any other Western
country.
It is unfortunately true that these meet-
ings of ambassadors have produced little of
substantive significance. That is because, to
the Chinese Communists, a precondition for
all progress is a requirement that the United
States abandon the Republic of China —
something which we are unwilling to do. But
the essential fact is that both parties have a
desire to maintain in being this unusual
channel through which cases can be argued
and points of view advanced. Given a more
reasonable attitude on the part of the
Chinese Communists, there is no reason why
some day this channel cannot become more
useful.
Furthermore, we have felt that Commu-
nist China's isolation is not a matter of
United States or United Nations action, but
something the Chinese Communists have de-
creed for themselves. It is not the United
States or other Western countries which
have maintained a modern Chinese Wall of
rigid controls around Communist China. On
the contrary, for many years the United
States has vainly tried to persuade the Chi-
nese Communists to agree to an exchange of
journalists as one of the first steps to an in-
crease in understanding between our people.
More recently, we have taken steps to permit
American scholars, experts in medicine and
public health, and other specialists to travel
to Communist China. But almost invariably
all of our initiatives have been rejected by
the Chinese Communists.
In a speech on the essentials for peace in
Asia, President Johnson last July reviewed
our policy toward Communist China.^ One
of those essentials, he said, was "reconcilia-
tion between nations that now call them-
selves enemies."
The President developed this theme in his
state of the Union message on January 10: *
We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation
between the people of mainland China and the
world community — including working together in
* Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1966, p. 158.
« /6Jd., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
694
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress
on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their
fellow men elsewhere, depends.
We would be the first to welcome a China which
decided to respect her neighbors' rights. We
would be the first to applaud her were she to apply
her great energies and intelligence to improving the
welfare of her people. And we have no intention
of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security
and friendly relations with her neighboring
countries.
Our hope that all of this will some day happen
rests on the conviction that we, the American
people and our allies, will and are going to see
Viet-Nam through to an honorable peace.
Thus, the door to cooperation between our-
selves and the people of mainland China
could be opened — but the keys are in their
hands. The basic requirement is a desire on
the part of Peking to cooperate peacefully
with others. This could be demonstrated if
Peking were to cease its support for the ag-
gression against South Viet-Nam or if it
would throw its influence on the side of un-
conditional negotiations for a peaceful settle-
ment of the Viet-Nam conflict.
And there are many other areas in which,
with absolutely no impairment of dignity or
rights, the signal could be given that fair
and free negotiation on problems of general
concern could be undertaken. The world cries
out for effective arms control measures, for a
halt to the spread of nuclear weapons, for
the freer flow of ideas and people and goods,
for peaceful economic development, for con-
ditions of security for all.
As of today there is no sign whatever of
any response from Communist China to
these imperatives of a better world order.
We await developments, in the spirit of
President Johnson's address last July:
We persist because we know that hunger and
disease, ignorance and poverty, recognize no bound-
aries of either creed or class or country.
We persist because we believe that even the most
rigid societies will one day awaken to the rich
possibilities of a diverse world.
And we continue because we believe that coop-
eration, not hostility, is really the way of the future
in the 20th century.
That day is not yet here. It may be long in com-
ing, but I tell you it is clearly on its way, because
come it must.
These are our guidelines for the period
ahead.
U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas
With Indefinite Validity
The Department of State announced on
April 5 (press release 82) that beginning
April 15 it would authorize the issuance of
visitors visas valid for multiple entries to
the United States over an indefinite period
of time instead of the present maximum
duration of 4 years.
U.S. consular officers will issue the new
visas on a selective basis to nationals of
countries which do not require visas of
American tourists and business travelers.
The new visas permit temporary visits to the
United States for business or pleasure any
number of times. As heretofore, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service will set
the maximum period of time that a visitor
may remain in the United States on the oc-
casion of each visit.
The new visa procedure was instituted in
recognition of this year's designation as
International Tourist Year by the United
Nations. It was developed jointly by the
State Department and the United States
Travel Service as members of the Presi-
dential Cabinet Task Force on Travel chaired
by Vice President Humphrey.
An amendment to the visa regulations of
the Department of State was published in
the Federal Register on April 6 ^ with an
effective date of April 15 authorizing issu-
ance of indefinite validity visas under section
101(a) (15) (B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
' 32 Fed. Reg. 5620.
MAY 1, 1967
695
President Hails U.S. CounciPs
Support of East-West Trade
Folloiving is an exchange of letters be-
tiveen President Johnson and Christopher H.
Phillips, president of the United States Coun-
cil of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, together with a statement by the
council.
text of president johnson's letter
The White House,
Washington, March 25, 1967.
Dear Mr. Phillips : I very much appreci-
ated your letter transmitting the Council's
policy statement on East- West trade. I know
that the conclusions and recommendations
are the products of profound study. All
Americans can take pride in the creative
spirit in which you, Mr. [Arthur K.] Wat-
son, Mr. [Hoyt P.] Steele, and your other
associates have approached this important
question.
In my judgment, the statement is an elo-
quent expression of the case for giving the
President the tools necessary to work for the
improvement in East-West relations which
is the best hope for a lasting peace. As you
point out, increased peaceful trade with East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union will serve
our broad political objectives as well as our
economic interests. Peaceful economic com-
petition builds a common stake in stability.
The day that it replaces the arms race as the
primary form of East-West rivalry will be
a landmark in the history of man.
Of course, we shall have to feel our way
carefully. The East-West trade legislation I
have proposed ^ was recommended by a dis-
tinguished group of businessmen, economists,
and labor leaders; it is carefully designed to
be used only when it is clear that our
interests are served. It provides for trade,
not aid. It does not affect the system of con-
trols on the export of strategic goods. It does
' For text of the proposed legislation, see BULLETIN
of May 30, 1966, p. 843.
not lower our guard; it simply permits us to
grant the same tariff treatment to the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe which we grant
all other nations if, and to the degree that, it
will further our interests.
The issue reduces to a simple question:
should we be prepared to do our part to
bridge the chasm between East and West
which has so long threatened the peace of
the world? Trade alone will not be sufficient
to this task. But it will certainly be neces-
sary. I believe, as you do, that we must be
ready to respond as opportunities arise. The
East- West Trade Act which I have proposed
to the Congress would equip us to do so.
The policy statement of the United States
Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce is further powerful testimony to
the wisdom of this course. Your countrymen
are deeply in your debt.
My best personal regards to you and your
fellow Council members.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Mr. Christopher H. Phillips
President
United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.
New York, New York
text of mr. phillips' letter
March 3, 1967
The President
The White House
Washi7igton, D.C.
Dear Mr. President: The United States
Council has devoted considerable attention
in recent months to the possibility of changes
in U.S. policies towards East-West trade. In
view of the more hopeful and constructive
relations which now appear to exist between
the United States and the countries of East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Council
has concluded that the United States should
work for an increased flow of mutually bene-
ficial trade and production with the countries
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
I enclose a statement which details the
696
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Council's recommendations, prepared by our
Committee on Commercial Policy under the
Chairmanship of Mr. Hoyt P. Steele, Vice
President of the General Electric Company,
and approved by our Executive Committee,
whose Chairman is Mr. Arthur K. Watson,
Vice Chairman of International Business
Machines Corporation.
As you. probably know, the U.S. Council
represents some 300 major U.S. corporations
and banks engaged in international trade
and production. It is the American section of
the International Chamber of Commerce, an
organization of world business leaders from
some 75 countries. The recommendations con-
tained in the U.S. Council's statement are
those of our members only, but they are
shared by the business communities of the
other nations represented in the ICC.
It is our hope that legislation to permit an
expansion of trade between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern
European nations will shortly be enacted by
Congress and that hearings will be scheduled
in the near future looking toward this end.
Respectfully,
Christopher H. Phillips
TEXT OF U.S. COUNCIL STATEMENT
The U.S. Council believes, for the reasons set
forth in the next six paragraphs, that the United
States should pursue a more flexible policy than in
the past towards trade with Eastern Europe. To this
end, the U.S. Council supports enactment of the pro-
posed East-West Trade Relations Act and offers a
further series of recommendations in the balance of
this statement for measures it would urge the U.S.
Government to take over a period of time should the
climate for a regularization of trade between East
and West continue to improve.
The recent NATO meetings decisively reflected the
changes in East-West relations which have taken
place in the last twenty years. After a generation of
concentration on the defense of the West against the
East, including commercial and economic policies ori-
ented to that objective, the emphasis at this session
and in the summary communique ' issued at its con-
clusion was almost exclusively on commercial pol-
icies in keeping with the developing detente between
East and West. The noticeable improvement in rela-
» Ibid., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 49.
tions among Western nations and those of Eastern
Europe certainly has at least some of its origins in
the growing coincidence of the long-run interests of
the United States and Russia in peaceful conditions
in the world at large. To the extent that this coinci-
dence is recognized by both parties, there is reason to
hope that recent guarded progress toward normaliza-
tion of commercial contacts will prove durable.
The gradual relaxation of cold-war tensions has
already brought about a substantial increase in trade
flows between Eastern European countries and those
of the rest of the world. Both industrialized and de-
veloping countries have participated in this growth.
However, in comparison with other industrialized
nations, U.S. trade with the Eastern European na-
tions has remained very small. During 1965, for
example. Western Europe and Japan exported $3.8
billion in goods to the Eastern European countries,
excluding Yugoslavia, and imported almost $4.5 bil-
lion from them. U.S. figures for this same period
were only $139 million in exports and $138 million
in imports.
As The Economist put it: "The communist coun-
tries remain the one market where America virtually
leaves the field clear to Western Europe and Japan."
The same article points out that Comecon (a limited
Eastern European effort to mirror Common Market
economic collaboration) includes within its perimeter
over 330 million people- — almost 60 million more than
the countries of the EEC [European Economic Com-
munity] and the EFTA [European Free Trade Asso-
ciation] combined.
The U.S. Council does not believe that controls
over strategic materials can at present be relaxed,
but it does believe that the argument against trad-
ing with the USSR and other Eastern European
countries on the grounds that such trade might con-
tribute to their economic power is of limited validity.
Trade by definition does not take place unless bene-
fits accrue to both parties. If one nation refuses to
participate, insofar as the second party can find an-
other trading partner, the loss is entirely sustained
by the country refusing to do business. This is the
situation into which the United States has drifted.
While other countries of the world are increasingly
enjoying the benefits of expanded two-way trade
with the Eastern European countries, our policies
to a great extent deny these markets to our ex-
porters and deny to our consumers those products
in which the Eastern European countries are becom-
ing competitive.
As other industrialized countries expand their
markets within the Eastern countries, there is a
natural tendency for the exporter's technology and
standards to be accepted and adhered to in the im-
porting nation. The longer that U.S. exporters re-
frain from participating in the markets of Eastern
Europe the more firmly established in those mar-
kets will be the standards and technology of our com-
petitors in other Western industrialized countries —
MAY 1, 1967
697
and the more difficult will it be for American com-
panies to enter these markets in the future.
From the U.S. view, the most fundamental gain
of all may well be the imprint inevitably made by
successful and growing daily commercial operations,
carrying as they do a continuous effective argument
for the freer contractual trading policies which they
inculcate.
Accordingly, the U.S. Council believes that the
time has come for the United States to do what it
can to make possible a regularization of trade and
payments with the Eastern European countries. New
opportunities are, in fact, arising for the U.S. to
negotiate with the countries of Eastern Europe for
modification on their part of policies which have
rigidly reinforced the differences between our eco-
nomic systems. We should be ready to take advantage
of these opportunities.
Specifically, as noted above, the U.S. Council sup-
ports enactment of the East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1966. Eastern European nations have more
and more been pursuing individual national policies
over recent years. They no longer constitute a mono-
lithic bloc. The United States should be in a position
to forge new relationships with these countries indi-
vidually. New economic policies are being adopted by
Russia and the other Eastern European countries
designed to make their production more responsive to
market considerations and their prices more reflec-
tive of costs. These policies, if successfully imple-
mented, should gradually result in the production of
more goods marketable in the United States and
Western markets generally. The President should be
empowered to grant most-favored-nation status to
Eastern nations, enabling their goods to be imported
into the U.S. at the same tariff rates as those of
other countries of the world. Since tariffs at present
have little meaning in the controlled economies of
Eastern Europe, other concessions should be sought
in exchange, such as market access for U.S. prod-
ucts, the protection of industrial property rights, the
right to more direct contact between U.S. business-
men and the ultimate consumer/supplier, and satis-
factory arbitral arrangements for the settlement of
commercial disputes.
The extension of most-favored-nation treatment to
Ea.stem European countries should enable the U.S.
consumer to benefit from competitive imports from
the Eastern European countries, and, at the same
time, enable those countries to earn the foreign ex-
change with which to purchase U.S. goods. United
States suppliers should be able to participate to the
fullest extent consistent with our national security
in the markets of Eastern Europe. To permit this
participation there should be further removals of
non-strategic items from the Export Control List, as
in the case of 400 items recently removed. Items
which are freely available elsewhere in the world
should not require individual export licenses in the
United States.
The U.S. Council would not like to see a so-called
credit race develop among Western suppliers to East-
ern Europe. It recognizes, however, that recently
credits of longer than five years duration have been
granted in other industrialized countries. It does not
believe that U.S. industry should be precluded from
bidding on an equal basis with its competitors in
other nations. It is recognized that a shortage of
hard currencies in many ways places the countries
of Eastern Europe in a position similar to that of
many less developed countries, and that if sales of
heavy equipment are to take place longer-term
credits, more realistically representative of periods
of amortization, may be essential. Bearing in mind
that such exports are beneficial to the United States,
the U.S. Council accordingly urges that U.S. sup-
pliers be enabled to match the tenns offered by their
competitors. To this end, the credit guarantee pol-
icies of the Export-Import Bank should be similarly
noiTnalized to permit credits to be extended to buy-
ers in Eastern European countries which are com-
petitive with those of other Western suppliei-s, and
the full use of these facilities should be encouraged.
In principle, we believe that Eastern European gov-
ernments should equally extend adequate credit to
Western buyers, and would recommend that the
Administration attempt to include provisions for
reciprocal credit in trade agreements negotiated
with individual countries.
The recent trend toward internationalization of
production has not left Eastern Europe untouched.
In the past few years a number of agreements have
been concluded under which individual Western firms
have undertaken to participate in the actual produc-
tion of the USSR and other countries of Eastern
Europe. American firms, which are prime initiators
and leaders in the field of overseas production, should
be able to participate in the opportunities which the
large and growing markets of Eastern Europe pre-
sent. U.S. government policy should support private
efforts to respond to these markets. Where the un-
derlying transaction warrants, credit terms should
be as favorable as for other areas; similarly, the
program of government guarantees against political
risks ought in principle to include these markets.
More systematic payment arrangements than now
exist would be desirable, if not essential, to the
growth of producing arrangements. To assist in the
determination of credit-worthiness, and thus to ex-
pand the use of credits in business transactions,
countries of Eastern Europe should be encouraged
to publish financial data similar to that published
698
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
by Western countries — and by Yugoslavia — covering
gold and foreign exchange reser\'es, total foreign in-
debtedness, and repayment schedules.
Many, if not most, of the problems encountered in
attempting to increase peaceful commerce between
East and West stem from the lack of participation
of the Eastern countries in Western institutions. The
present move toward association on the part of
Poland with the General .Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade should be encouraged. It is to be hoped that
other Eastern European countries will follow suit.
Compliance on their part with the general rules of
GATT in their external trade would do much to
regularize the conditions for their Western trading
partners.
Most important, however, to a return to normal
commercial relations, as it was for the industrialized
countries of the West after World War II, is even-
tual currency convertibility. Every opportunity
should be pressed to broaden convertibility with the
rest of the world. Increased transferability among
Eastern European currencies should, where possible,
be encouraged as an interim step. The recent addi-
tion of $33 million of gold and convertible currencies
to the fixed capital of the Comecon's bank, the Intei'-
national Bank for Economic Cooperation, should be
welcomed. While there is little that can be done on
our part to hasten this process, the U.S. Council
recommends that the U.S. Government attempt to
emphasize in its negotiations with Eastern European
governments the benefits accruing from early con-
vertibility. The question of Eastern countries' mem-
bership in the I.M.F. [International Monetary Fund]
and the I.B.R.D. [International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development] could usefully be re-
studied by member countries and by Eastern coun-
tries. It is in the interest of the United States to
see these countries assume the responsibilities that
are inherent in membership in these organizations.
U.S. and Portugal Sign New
Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
]VIarch 24 (press release 64) that the Govern-
ments of the United States and Portugal had
concluded a new comprehensive bilateral
agreement concerning cotton textile exports
from Portugal to the United States. The
agreement was effected at Lisbon on March
23 in an exchange of notes between U.S. Am-
bassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Portu-
guese Foreign Minister Alberto Franco No-
gueira.'
The new agreement runs for 4 years, be-
ginning January 1, 1967. It replaces the
bilateral agreement of March 12, 1964, which
was to expire on Decembei- 31, 1966, but was
extended for 3 months to March 31, 1967,
in an exchange of notes signed at Lisbon on
December 19, 1966.2
Like its predecessors, the new agreement
is designed to promote the orderly develop-
ment of trade in cotton textiles between Por-
tugal and the United States pursuant to the
objectives of the Long-Term Arrangement
for international trade in cotton textiles in
which both countries participate.
The new agreement sets an aggregate
limit for calendar 1967 of 102,300,000 square
yards equivalent and covers all 64 categories
of cotton textile trade. It provides for three
group ceilings covering yarn (66,100,000
square yards equivalent), fabric (27,000,000
square yards equivalent), and apparel
(9,200,000 square yards equivalent). Nine-
teen specific ceilings are also provided for.
They include: each of the four yarn cate-
gories; those fabric categories covering ging-
hams, carded-yarn sheeting, carded-yarn
twill and sateen, carded and combed yarn-
dyed fabrics, as well as carded-yarn fabrics
not elsewhere specified; and apparel cate-
gories covering T-shirts, knitshirts, sport-
shirts and slacks, blouses, dresses, ladies'
suits, dressing gowns and nightwear.
Other provisions on flexibility, undue con-
centration, spacing, exchange of statistics,
categories and conversion factors, consulta-
tion, administrative arrangements, equity,
termination, and relationship of the agree-
ment to the Geneva Long-Temi Arrangement
are also included.
' For text of the U.S. note, see Department press
release 64 dated Mar. 24.
^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5741 and 6186.
MAY 1, 1967
699
THE CONGRESS
President Signs Joint Resolution
on Food Assistance to India
Following is a statement by President
Johnson made on April 1 upon signing H.J.
Res. 267, to support emergency food assist-
ance to India, together with the text of the
joint resolution.'^
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated April 1
The war on hunger is the work of the en-
tire world. H.J. Res. 267 — supporting emer-
gency food assistance to India — is a new
expression of America's commitment to that
humane task.
In passing the resolution by an overwhelm-
ing vote, the Congress has once again re-
sponded compassionately to India's critical
food needs. We will provide her people with
up to 3 million additional tons of food grain.
An additional $25 million worth of food is
authorized for distribution by CARE and
other voluntary agencies to families in
drought-stricken areas.
The joint resolution demonstrates our
faith in India's own drive to achieve self-
sufficiency in food grains. We believe that her
ambitious program of agricultural develop-
ment will be rewarded with steadily increas-
ing food grain production. What we and the
other more fortunate nations do to help India
through a crisis will enable her to push for-
ward with an economic development plan
which will, we hope, bring sufficient food
within the reach of her 500 million people.
The resolution also underlines the fact that
success depends on other nations' help. The
United States is not able to supply all the
' For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on food for India dated Feb. 2, see Bulletin
of Feb. 20, 1967.
assistance that India needs. This offer en-
dorsed by the Congress of up to 3 million tons
of food grain in this resolution is contingent
on appropriate matching from other coun-
tries. Other nations have responded in the
past. We hope and trust they can and will
meet these new and compelling needs.
The World Bank is already playing an im-
portant role in mobilizing the worldwide
effort to assist India. It has called a meeting
of the nations belonging to the India Con-
sortium in early April to discuss this and
other economic problems which India faces.
We will carefully follow these deliberations
and decisions.
I urge the nations attending that meeting
to continue and to expand their food aid and
general economic aid. I hope that nations
which have not been associated with this
effort in the past will join with us now, either
formally or informally.
Hunger transcends national borders and
ideologies. It is a condition that all under-
stand and none can countenance. This resolu-
tion reaffirms America's intention to do its
part to help India meet the threat of hunger
that confronts her today.
TEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
JOINT RESOLUTION'
To support emergency food assistance to India.
Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the
policy of the United States to combat hunger and
malnutrition and to encourage economic develop-
ment in the developing countries ; and
Whereas two years of drought have caused a grave
food shortage in India which threatens the lives
and health of millions of people; and
Whereas the urgency of the need of the Indian
people and the time needed for congressional de-
liberation have required the United States already
to commit three million six hundred thousand
tons of grain valued at $275,000,000 as a part of
the eight to ten million tons of grain estimated to
be required during the calendar year 1967 from
outside India to prevent irreparable hardship to
the people of India; and
' Public Law 90-7, 90th Cong.; H.J. Res. 267, Mar.
20, 1967.
700
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Whereas the programs of economic and agricultural
development which have been launched by the
Government of India would be seriously impaired
if the international community failed to act
promptly and on an adequate scale to meet the
urgent needs of the people of India: Therefore
belt
Resolved by the Senate and Hotise of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled, That the Congress approves the
participation of the United States in cooperation
with other countries and with multilateral organi-
zations, including the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Food
and Agriculture Organization, and others, in urgent
international efforts designed to —
(a) develop a comprehensive self-help approach
to the war on hunger based on a fair sharing of the
burden among the nations of the world ;
(b) encourage and assist the Government of India
in achieving food self-sufficiency; and
(c) help meet India's critical food and nutritional
needs by making available agricultural commodities
or other resources needed for food procurement or
production.
Because uncertainty in connection with Public
Law 480 transactions tends to depress market prices,
it is the sense of Congress that, in carrying out this
Aid to India program, the Administration should,
subject to the requirement of section 401 of Public
Law 480 with respect to the availability of the com-
modity at the time of exportation, make announce-
ments of intention, purchases and shipments of
commodities on schedules and under circumstances
which will protect and strengthen farm market
prices to the maximum extent possible.
The Congress endorses the President's policy of
equal participation on the part of the United States
with all other nations, under terms and conditions
set forth in Public Law 480, as amended, in assist-
ing the Government of India to meet these needs.
Further, the Congress recommends, on the basis
of estimates now available, that the United States
provide an additional amount of food grain not to
exceed three million tons at an estimated cost of
$190,000,000 as the United States share toward meet-
ing the India food deficit, provided it is appropriately
matched, and specifically extends its support to the
allocation of approximately $190,000,000 of funds
available to the Commodity Credit Corporation in
calendar year 1967 which will be required to ac-
complish this purpose.
The Congress further recommends that the Presi-
dent provide an additional $25,000,000 of emergency
food relief for distribution by CARE and other
American voluntary agencies.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherences deposited: Barbados, March 21, 1967;
Uganda, April 10, 1967.
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: Argentina, March 7, 1967.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington
December 27, 1945. Entered into force Decem-
ber 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Readmitted to membership: Indonesia, February
21, 1967.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for
signature at Washington December 27, 1945. En-
tered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Readmitted to membership : Indonesia, April 13,
1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva
May 20, 1965."
Acceptance deposited: Morocco, March 2, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final pro-
tocol, and convention with final protocol and
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Adherences deposited: Guyana, Mauritania, Zam-
bia, March 22, 1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965."
Signatures: Burundi, February 1, 1967; Colombia,
March 23, 1967; Dahomey, February 2, 1967;
Federal Republic of Germany, February 10,
1967; India, March 2, 1967; Iran, March 8,
1967; Somalia, January 26, 1967; Uruguay,
February 21, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
" Not in force.
MAY 1, 1967
701
Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, January 16,
1967; Iceland, March 13, 1967; Tunisia, Janu-
ary 13, 1967.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to chapter II of the international con-
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS
5780). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London
November 30, 1966.^
Acceptance received: United States, April 7, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London,
and Moscow January 27, 1967.*
Ratification deposited: Bulgaria, April 11, 1967.
BILATERAL
Argentina
Agreement relating to radio communications be-
tween amateur stations on behalf of third par-
ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos
Aires March 31, 1967. Entered into force April
30, 1967.
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Buenos Aires March 31, 1967. En-
tered into force April 30, 1967.
Australia
Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation con-
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at
Washington April 11, 1967. Enters into force on
the date on which each Government shall have
received from the other written notification that
it has complied with all statutory and constitu-
tional requirements for entry into force.
■ Not in force.
Ghana
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 3, 1967. Ef-
fected by an exchange of notes at Accra April
6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967.
India
Agreement extending the agreement of April 15,
1964, as amended and extended (TIAS 5559, 5664,
6151, 6190), relating to trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi
March 30, 1967. Entered into force March 30,
1967.
Israel
Agreement amending the agreement of June 18 and
22, 1962 (TIAS 5097), for financing certain edu-
cational exchange programs. Effected by exchange
of notes at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21
and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967.
Korea
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D),
with annex. Signed at Seoul March 25, 1967.
Entered into force March 25, 1967.
Mali
Understanding relating to the delivery of two C-47
aircraft and related articles and services. Effected
by exchange of notes at Bamako January 5, 1967.
Entered into force January 5, 1967.
Somali Republic
Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4,
1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738,
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mogadiscio February 27 and March 1, 1967. En-
tered into force March 1, 1967.
Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4,
1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508, 5738,
5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mogadiscio March 30 and 31, 1967. Entered into
force April 1, 1967.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1453 PUBLICATION 8232 MAY 1, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the worlc of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is Included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin Is for lale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.O., 20402.
Price: 62 Issues, domestic (10, foreign $16 ;
single copy SO cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
702
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX May 1,1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1453
China. China, the United Nations, and the
United States (Popper) 689
Communism. China, the United Nations, and
the United States (Popper) 689
Congress. President Signs Joint Resolution on
Food Assistance to India (Johnson, text of
joint resolution) 700
Economic Affairs
President Hails U.S. Council's Support of
East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) ... 696
U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile
Agreement 699
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) .... 678
Europe
President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-
West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) 696
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) .... 678
Foreign Aid
President Signs Joint Resolution on Food
Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint
resolution) 700
U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to
India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688
Germany. Vice President Humphrey Returns
From Trip to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678
India
President Signs Joint Resolution on Food
Assistance to India (Johnson, text of joint
resolution) 700
U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms Aid to
India and Pakistan (Department statement) 688
International Organizations and Conferences.
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678
Military Affairs. NATO Nuclear Planning
Group Holds First Ministers Meeting (Mc-
Namara, communique) 686
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO Nuclear Planning Group Holds First
Ministers Meeting (McNamara, commu-
nique) 686
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip
to Europe (Johnson, Humphrey) 678
Pakistan. U.S. Decides Not To Resume Arms
Aid to India and Pakistan (Department
statement) 688
Passports. U.S. Issuing Visitors Visas With In-
definite Validity 695
Portugal. U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton
Textile Agreement 699
Presidential Documents
President Hails U.S. Council's Support of East-
West Trade 696
President Signs Joint Resolution on Food
Assistance to India 700
Vice President Humphrey Returns From Trip
to Europe 678
Singapore. Letters of Credence (Wong) . . . 688
Trade. President Hails U.S. Council's Support
of East-West Trade (Johnson, Phillips) . . 696
Treaty Information
Current Actions 701
U.S. and Portugal Sign New Cotton Textile
Agreement 699
United Nations. China, the United Nations, and
the United States (Popper) 689
Zambia. Letters of Credence (Banda) . . . 688
Name Index
Banda, Rupiah Bwenzani 688
Humphrey, Vice President 678
Johnson, President 678, 696, 700
McNamara, Robert S 686
Phillips, Christopher H 696
Popper, David H 689
Wong Lin Ken 688
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 10-16
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to April 10 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are
Nos. 64 of March 24 and 82 of April 5.
No. Date
Subject
*85 4/12 Bunker sworn in as Ambassador
to Viet-Nam (biographic de-
tails) .
*86 4/13 Battle sworn in as Assistant Sec-
retary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs (biographic
details) .
*87 4/14 Nolte sworn in as Ambassador to
the United Arab Republic (bio-
graphic details).
Not printed.
■d U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967 — 251-933/43
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. 145A
May 8, 1967
PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN CHIEFS OF STATE
Statements by President Johnson at Punta del Este
and Text of the Declaration of the Presidents of America 706
Excerpts From an Address by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz
Before the National Press Club 729
Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 722
For index see inside back cover
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta dei Este
The Chiefs of State of 20 member nations
of the Organization of American States met
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, to
renew their commitment to the cause of
Latin American economic and social develop-
ment.
President Johnson arrived at Punta del
Este on April 11 after a brief stop at Monte-
video, where he was greeted by President
Gestido of Uniguay. At Punta del Este,
President Johnson attended the sessions of
the 3-day Summit Conference, speaking at
an informal session on April 12 and at a
public session on April 13. During his 4-day
visit to Punta del Este, President Johnson
also held bilateral talks with the Latin
American Presidents.
Folloiving are President Johnson's re-
marks and statements at Montevideo and
Punta del Este and the text of the Declara-
tion of the Presidents of America, which
was signed by 17 Chiefs of State, the Prime
Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, and the
representative of the President of Haiti at
the closing session of the conference on
April 14.^
STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Arrival, Carrasco Airport, Montevideo, April 11
White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated
April 11
President Gestido, Your Excellencies,
ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I ap-
preciate deeply your warm and generous
welcome.
This is the first time that I step on South
American soil. It is my very great privilege
that it should be the land of Artigas.
More than 150 years ago, Artigas said:
"The cause of the people does not admit of
the slightest delay."
The same cause brings us here to Punta
del Este.
Six years ago a great charter was written
in Punta del Este. Under its banner we have
moved forward and made progress. We are
demonstrating that free men working
through institutions of representative de-
mocracy can best satisfy man's ambitions.
But we also know that our task is only in
its beginning. The experience of the first 6
years of the Alliance tells where we must
quicken the pace.
Diligent work has gone on during the past
year in preparing the program which the
Presidents will consider at this conference.
This program is not a reaction to crisis, but
it is a response of farsighted Latin Amer-
ican leadership to the needs of present and
future generations.
The progress of our Alliance shows that
the initiative is increasingly with Latin
America. We in the United States welcome
this — as we believe you do. I would repeat
what I said to my fellow Presidents last
August: 2 "Move boldly along this path and
the United States will be by your side."
Mr. President, I look forward to this con-
ference and to the opportunity it will afford
me to exchange views with my fellow Presi-
dents. I believe that personal contact is es-
sential to understanding, and I know that
understanding is the foundation of our com-
mon effort.
' President Otto Arosemena Gomez of Ecuador
declined to sign the declaration; Bolivia did not
attend the conference, and Cuba is not presently
participating- in the inter-American system.
' Bulletin of Sept. 5, 1966, p. 330.
706
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The hemisphere is grateful to your Gov-
ernment and your people for opening its
doors to all of us. I should like to join my
colleagues in sajring muchas gracias.
Informal Session of Chiefs of State
Conference, Punta del Este, April 12
White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated
April 12
Mr. Chaii-man, fellow Chiefs of State: I
shall be presenting some thoughts in the
agenda of our conference tomorrow; but as
we enter into our private discussion of the
declaration before us which our foreign
ministers have prepared, I wish to make a
few specific observations.
Fii-st, I want to restate my support of the
program which you have set for yourselves.
In my message to the Congress on March
13,^ I recommended increased financial as-
; sistance to your countries in the areas
: covered by the declaration before me: eco-
nomic integration, multinational projects,
agriculture, education, and health. This rep-
[ resents my convictions and my policy today.
The decisions which you take here — and
the followup action which you take in the
months ahead — will enable me to pursue
that policy.
Second, I wish to state my country's posi-
tion on how we might assist in expanding
Latin American trade.
Much of our thought and work in the
1 hemisphere has centered in recent years on
ways to expand the volume and the value of
Latin American exports.
We all know that basically the answer lies
in the diversification of agriculture and in
making overly protected Latin American in-
dustry competitive and efficient. This is one
of the reasons that we all support Latin
American economic integration.
But we wish to be as helpful as we can in
this transitional period in Latin American
history.
We are now devoting a major effort to try
to make the Kennedy Round negotiations a
success. If they succeed, they will help us
' For text, see ibid., Apr. 3, 1967, p. 540.
all — including Latin America. But the proc-
ess of freeing trade from unnecessary re-
strictions will not come to an end when the
current important Kennedy Round negotia-
tions are completed.
We have been examining the kind of trade
initiatives that the United States should pro-
pose in the years ahead. We are convinced
that our future trade policy must pay special
attention to the needs of the developing
countries in Latin America and elsewhere in
the world.
We have been exploring with other major
industrialized countries what practical steps
can be taken to increase the export earnings
of all developing counties. We recognize that
comparable tariff" treatment may not always
permit developing countries to advance as
rapidly as desired. Temporary tariff advan-
tages for all developing countries by all in-
dustrialized countries would be one way to
deal with this.
We think this idea is worth pursuing. We
will be discussing it further with members
of our Congress, with business and labor
leaders, and we will seek the cooperation of
other governments in the world trading com-
munity to see whether a broad consensus can
be reached along these lines.
We also recognize the very special impor-
tance for certain Latin American countries
of earnings from coffee exports. In our pro-
grams for assistance for agricultural de-
velopment we are already helping to carry
forward the process of diversification —
which alone can prevent chronic surpluses.
As a further step in this direction, we are
prepared to lend $15 million to the proposed
international coflfee diversification and
development fund, with the understanding
that the coffee-producing countries agree to
contribute $30-$50 million per year over the
next 5 years, and to lend up to $15 million
more to match contributions by other coffee-
consuming members of the International
Coffee Agreement.
I have been informed of the great impor-
tance which you attach to the use of Alliance
for Progress funds to finance procurement
in other Alliance for Progress countries as
MAY 8, 1967
707
well as in the United States. I know that
you are all aware of the United States bal-
ance-of-payments problems, and we deeply
appreciate your cooperation in helping us
meet them.
The cooperative nature of our Alliance is
very important to me. I want you to know
that we shall undertake consultations on this
matter. We shall try to establish whether we
can agree that aid funds for capital projects
and related technical assistance can be used
in Alliance for Progress countries in ways
which will protect the U.S. balance of pay-
ments.
The final point I would make has to do
with the declaration which is before us. As
the political leaders of our countries, we
have the responsibility to translate complex
issues into understandable language for our
peoples. The decisions reached at this meet-
ing are complicated decisions. Though es-
sential to the progress and prosperity of our
people, they may seem removed from press-
ing everyday needs unless we extract them
from the language of the economists and
diplomats — on whom we so greatly rely.
I know that when I return home I shall
try to make clear to our people these basic
decisions we have made together. And I am
sure you will all wish to do the same.
Public Session of Chiefs of State
Conference, Punta del Este, April 13
White House press release (Punta del Este, Uruguay) dated
April 13
Mr. Chairman, fellow Chiefs of State,
ladies and gentlemen: First, President
Gestido, may I express, on behalf of my en-
tire delegation, gratitude to you for the
courtesy and generosity that Uruguay has
offered her sister nations at this conference.
We have come to Punta del Este as the
leaders of 20 governments — and as the
trustees for more than 400 million human
beings.
We meet in a city where, 5^2 years ago,
an alliance was fonned, a pledge was made,
and a dream begun.
Now we must measure the progress we
have made. We must name the barriers that
still stand between us and the fulfillment of
our dream. Then we must put in motion
plans that will set us firmly on the way to-
ward the proud destiny that is our peoples'
right.
We meet as friends, as neighbors, and as
allies. Hundreds of years ago we were the
New World. Now each of us faces the prob-
lems of growing maturity — of industrializa-
tion, of rapid urban growth, of sharing the
opportunities of life among our people.
We no longer inhabit a new world. We
cannot escape from our problems, as the first
Americans could, in the vastness of an un-
charted hemisphere. If we are to grow and
prosper, we must face the problems of our
maturity. And we must do it both boldly and
wisely — and we must face them now.
If we do, we can create a new America —
where the best in man may flourish in free-
dom and dignity. If we neglect the planning,
if we ignore the commitments that it re-
quires, if our rhetoric is not followed by
action, we shall fail not only the Americans
of this generation but hundreds of millions
to come.
In unity, and only in unity, is our
strength. The barriers that deny the dream
of a new America are stronger than the
strongest among us acting alone. But they
cannot stand against our combined will and
our common eif ort.
So I speak to you as a ready partner in
that eff'ort. I represent a nation committed
by history, by national interest, and by sim-
ple friendship to the cause of progress in
Latin America. But the assistance of my na-
tion will be useful only as it reinforces your
own determination and builds on your own
achievements — and only as it is bound to the
growing unity of our own hemisphere.
As I have listened to the able and eloquent
addresses of my fellow Presidents and
Prime Ministers who have gathered here,
and as I have surveyed the constructive sug-
gestions that have been made, here are the
tasks before us as I see it:
First, you will be forging a great new com-
mon market — expanding your industrial
708
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
base, increasing your participation in world
trade, and broadening economic opportuni-
ties for your people. I have already made my
liosition clear to my Congress and my people:
If Latin America decides to create a common
market, I shall recommend a substantial
contribution to a fund that will help ease the
transition into an integrated regional econ-
omy.
Second, you will design, and join together
to build, great multinational projects that
will open up the inner frontiers of Latin
America. These will provide — at last — the
physical basis of Simon Bolivar's vision of
continental unity. I shall ask my people to
provide over a 3-year period substantial ad-
ditional funds for the Inter-American Bank's
Fund for Special Operations as our part of
this special effort. I have also asked the
Export-Import Bank to give urgent and sym-
pathetic attention, wherever it is economi-
cally feasible, to loans for earth stations that
will bring satellite communications to Latin
America so that this great hemisphere can
have the communications it so sorely needs.
Third, I know how hard you are striving
to expand the volume and value of Latin
American exports. Bilateral and multilateral
efforts to achieve this are already under way.
But, as I made very clear yesterday after-
noon in our private session, we are prepared
to consider a further step in international
trade policy. We are ready to explore with
other industrialized countries — and with our
own people — the possibility of temporary
preferential tariff advantages for all develop-
ing countries in the markets of all the indus-
trialized countries. We are also prepared to
make our contribution to additional shared
efforts in connection with the International
Coffee Agreement.
Fourth, all of us know that modernizing
agriculture and increasing its productivity is
an urgent task for Latin America, as it is
for the whole world. Modernizing education
is equally important. I have already urged
our Government to expand our bilateral
assistance in the field of agriculture and in
the field of education.
Fifth, you are engaged in bringing to
Latin American life all that can be used from
the common fund of modern science and
technology. In addition to the additional re-
sources we shall seek in the field of education,
we are now prepared to join with Latin
American nations in:
— creating an inter-American training
center for educational broadcasting and sup-
porting a pilot educational television demon-
stration project in a Central American
country that will teach the children by day
and entertain and inform their families at
night;
— establishing a new inter-American foun-
dation for science and technology;
— developing a regional program of marine
science and technology; and
— exploring a Latin American regional
program for the peaceful uses of atomic
energy.
Sixth, the health of the people of Latin
America ultimately depends on everything
we do to modernize the life of the region. But
we must never forget that when children are
not provided with adequate and balanced
diets they are permanently affected as human
beings and as citizens. Therefore, we in our
country propose to increase our food pro-
gram for preschool children in Latin America
by tripling it and substantially improve our
school lunch program by doubling it in the
year ahead. We are also prepared to set up
in Latin America a demonstration center in
the field of fish protein concentrates. We be-
lieve that this essential ingredient of a bal-
anced diet can be provided at a much lower
cost than has ever been known in our history.
Finally, I shall urge funds be provided to
help establish Alliance for Progress centers
at colleges and universities in the United
States. Our partnership must be based on
respect for our various cultures and civiliza-
tions. And respect is built upon knowledge.
This new education program will offer new
opportunities for students and educators of
your countries and of my country to under-
stand each other and to work closer to-
gether.
Our discussions here are couched in the
MAY 8, 1967
709
technical terms of trade and development
policies. But beyond these impersonal terms
stands the reality of individual men, women,
and children. It is for them — not for the
statisticians and economists — that we have
come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It
is for them — and especially for the young
among them — that the hope and the chal-
lenge of this Alliance exists.
For them, we must move forward from
this hour. Each of us present should engage
in some introspection and ask ourselves:
What are we ourselves doing to build more
schools, more hospitals, and more roads?
What are we doing to produce more food
and to take the steps necessary on our own
initiative to see that this job is done?
What are we ourselves doing to develop
more trade; to take on the hard problems in
our own countries of tax reform and land
reform, of creating new jobs and new eco-
nomic opportunities for our own people
whom we presume to lead, of cleaning out
the red tape and acting with the sense of
urgency that our times require; and, above
all, providing action to carry out the record
and following through on the plans we have
made?
I pledge to you today that I will do all I
can, in my time of leadership, to help you
meet these challenges.
One of the first groups that I met with the
first week I was in the White House, when I
became President, was the Ambassadors to
Washington from Latin America. I called
them to the East Room to talk to them about
this program and their plans.*
From that hour until this I have acceler-
ated America's contribution to the hemi-
sphere by increasing substantially the flow of
my country's funds — substantially increas-
ing them by 35 percent the last 3 years over
the preceding 3 years — to this hemisphere.
I know what is at stake for you, and I
know what is at stake for me and my coun-
try. More than that, I know what is at stake
for Latin America.
We raised the total flow of funds. For the
' Ibid., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.
3 years 1961 to 1964, it ran $3,700 million.
From 1964, 1965 and 1966, that $3,700 mil-
lion was raised to about $5 billion.
I know that the demands are increasing
and the clock is ticking. I know that the
dream of the new America will not wait. I
know that most of you sense the same
urgency, the same need for speedy decision
and effective action in your own country, as
well as in mine.
My fellow Presidents, I should like to con-
clude by speaking not only to you but speak-
ing to the young people of your countries who
will follow you, the youth of our nations —
to the students in the schools and universi-
ties, to the young people on the farms and
in the new factories, to the labor unions, to
the civil service of our governments — to all
of those who are moving into their time of
responsibility.
This is the way I would like to speak to
them this afternoon; this is the message that
I would like to bring to them:
All that has been dreamed of in the years
since the Alliance started can only come to
pass if your hearts and your minds are dedi-
cated and committed to it.
It is our duty — we who hold public office
and bear great private responsibilities — to
create an environment in which you can
build your part of the new America.
It is your duty to prepare yourselves now
— to use the tools of learning and the ideal-
ism that is your natural heritage for the
humane purposes that lie deep in our com-
mon civilization.
You cry out for change, for what President
Franklin Roosevelt called a New Deal. And
you do not want it imposed from above. You
want a chance to help shape the conditions
of your own lives.
You — the youth of the Americas — should
know that revolutions of fire have brought
men in this hemisphere, and in jungles half
the world away, still greater tyrannies than
those they fought to cast off.
Here in the countries of the Alliance, a
peaceful revolution has affirmed man's
ability to change the conditions of his life
through the institutions of democracy. In
710
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
your hands is the task of carrying it forward.
The pace of change is not fast enough. It
will i-emain too slow unless you join your
energies, your skills and commitments, in a
mighty effort that extends into the farthest
reaches of this hemisphere.
The time is now. The responsibility is ours.
Let us declare the next 10 years the decade
of urgency. Let us match our resolve and our
resources to the common tasks until the
dream of a new America is accomplished and
is a reality in the lives of all of our people.
Thank you.
Statement After Conclusion
of the Summit Conference °
The leaders of the Americas met in Bogota
and Punta del Este 6 years ago to inaugurate
one of the most audacious programs in the
annals of mankind.
The goal was to demonstrate that freedom
and economic development are not enemies,
that massive social and political transforma-
tions can be accomplished vdthout the lash
of dictatorship or the spur of terror.
That was a time to state the challenge. The
years that have passed prove beyond any
doubt that the nations and peoples of the
Americas responded creatively to this chal-
lenge.
We returned to Punta del Este for an
assessment of our achievements and our
future obligations. We met in a spirit of
candor, with a full realization of the scope
of the problems that confront us.
We have looked at the past and the future
with cold realism, knowing that our cause
will not be served by either naive optimism
or cynical pessimism.
We have learned much, and much that we
have learned confirms the judgment of
Ecclesiastes that "he who increaseth wisdom,
increaseth sorrow." We have long since
abandoned the view that rhetoric could alter
a social system or that a blueprint could
guarantee economic growth. Economic and
social development is a task not for sprinters
but for long-distance runners.
' Released to news correspondents by the White
House at Punta del Este on Apr. 14.
We know now that transforming the lives
of over 250 million people requires a com-
mitment to specifics. It requires a fierce, a
stubborn, dedication to those undramatic
day-to-day attainments that are the sinews of
economic and social progress. This is espe-
cially true of the United States and Latin
America.
We are greatly impressed by the steps that
have been taken — the progress made by
Latin America in recent years. We are also
impressed by the high level of cooperation
that has developed among the proudly inde-
pendent nations of the Americas.
In my judgment this has been an extremely
valuable conference. We have set our pri-
orities for the next stage.
First, we have made some vital structural
commitments. The fulfillment of these objec-
tives will not only be a major accomplish-
ment in its own right, but it will make pos-
sible wide-ranging improvements presently
beyond our reach.
The Latin American Common Market,
once achieved, will alter the whole economy
of the hemisphere and vdll have consequences
in every sector of social and political organi-
zation.
Multinational projects, opening the way
for the movement of people, goods, elec-
tricity, will have a similar impact.
Second, we have moved to deal with a num-
ber of immediate problems:
— to expand Latin American trade;
— to modernize Latin American agricul-
ture and increase food production to meet
the needs of an expanding population;
— to combat illiteracy and improve educa-
tional systems;
— to provide access to the latest scientific
and technological developments and so to help
bridge the "technological gap";
— to expand health measures so that the
latest fruits of medical science will be at the
disposal of all our people;
— to eliminate unnecessary military spend-
ing.
The first phase of the Alliance has been a
success by any realistic standard.
MAY 8, 1967
711
The second phase is now under way. It will
cut to the heart of the problem — the mod-
ernization of overprotected Latin American
industry, underfinanced Latin American
agriculture and education. It will be difficult
and demanding. It will require sustained
effort.
The American people have responded
generously to the needs of their fellow Amer-
icans; and I am sure that our friends in Latin
America realize that we can be depended
upon in the long struggle that will follow, as
we could in the beginning of the Alliance.
I return to my country in good heart for
this reason. I have met all of the Presidents
of the Latin American Republics and the
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. I
am convinced that the leaders of Latin Amer-
ica are serious and determined to develop
their nations. And I believe the people of the
United States will continue to respond to
their efforts.
DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF AMERICA
The Presidents of the American States and the
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Meet-
ing IN PUNTA DEL ESTE, URUGUAY,
Resolved to give more dynamic and concrete ex-
pression to the ideals of Latin American unity and
of solidarity among the peoples of America, which
inspired the founders of their countries ;
DeterminbH) to make this goal a reality within
their own generation, in keeping with the economic,
social and cultural aspirations of their peoples;
Inspired by the principles underlying the inter-
American system, especially those contained in the
Charter of Punta del Este,' the Economic and Social
Act of Rio de Janeiro,' and the Protocol of Buenos
Aires amending the Charter of the Organization of
American States;
Conscious that the attainment of national and
regional development objectives in Latin America
is based essentially on self-help ;
Convinced, however, that the achievement of
those objectives requires determined collaboration
by all their countries, complementary support
through mutual aid, and expansion of external co-
operation ;
• For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 462.
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.
Pledged to give vigorous impetus to the Alliance
for Progress and to emphasize its multilateral char-
acter, with a view to encouraging balanced develop-
ment of the region at a pace substantially faster
than attained thus far;
United in the intent to strengthen democratic
institutions, to raise the living standards of their
peoples and to assure their increased participation
in the development process, creating for these pur-
poses suitable conditions in the political, economic
and social as well as labor fields ;
Resolved to maintain a harmony of fraternal re-
lations in the Americas, in which racial equality
must be effective ;
Proclaim
The solidarity of the countries they represent and
their decision to achieve to the fullest measure the
free, just, and democratic social order demanded by
the peoples of the Hemisphere.
Latin America will create a common market.
The Presidents of the Latin American Repub-
lics resolve to create progressively, beginning in
1970, the Latin American Common Market, which
shall be substantially in operation in a period of
no more thr.n fifteen years. The Latin American
Common Market will be based on the complete de-
velopment and progressive convergence of the Latin
American Free Trade Association and of the Cen-
tral American Common Market, taking into account
the interests of the Latin American countries not
yet affiliated with these systems. This grreat task
will reinforce historic bonds, will promote industrial
development and the strengthening of Latin Amer-
ican industrial enterprises, as well as more efficient
production and new opportunities for employment,
and will permit the region to play its deservedly
significant role in world affairs. The ties of friend-
ship among the peoples of the Continent will thus
be strengthened.
The President of the United States of Amer-
ica, for his part, declares his firm support for this
promising Latin American initiative.
The Undersigned Presidents Affirm That:
We will lay the physical foundations for Latin
American economic integration through multina-
tional projects.
Economic integration demands a major sustained
effort to build a land transportation network and
to improve transportation systems of all kinds so
as to open the way for the movement of both people
and goods throughout the Continent; to establish an
adequate and efficient telecommunications system; to
install interconnected power systems; and to de-
velop jointly international river basins, frontier re-
712
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gions, and economic areas which include the terri-
tory of two or more countries.
We will join in efforts to increase substantially
Latin American foreign-trade earnings.
To increase substantially Latin American foreign-
trade earnings, individual and joint efforts shall be
directed toward facilitating nondiscriminatory ac-
cess of Latin American products in world markets,
toward increasing Latin American earnings from
traditional exports, toward avoiding frequent fluc-
tuations in income from such commodities, and,
finally, toward adopting measures that will stim-
ulate exports of Latin American manufactured
products.
We will modernize the living conditions of our
rural populations, raise agricultural productiv-
ity in general, and increase food production for
the benefit of both Latin America and the rest
of the world.
The living conditions of the rural workers and
farmers of Latin America will be transformed, to
guarantee their full participation in economic and
social progress. For that purpose, integrated pro-
grams of modernization, land settlement, and agrar-
ian reform will be carried out as the countries so
require. Similarly, productivity wall be improved and
agricultural production diversified. Furthermore,
recognizing that the Continent's capacity for food
production entails a dual responsibility, a special
effort will be made to produce sufficient food for the
growing needs of their own peoples and to contribute
toward feeding the peoples of other regions.
We will vigorously promote education for de-
velopment.
To give a decisive impetus to education for de-
velopment, literacy campaigns will be intensified,
education at all levels will be greatly expanded, and
its quality improved so that the rich human poten-
tial of their peoples may make their maximum con-
tribution to the economic, social, and cultural de-
velopment of Latin America. Educational systems
will be modernized taking full advantage of educa-
tional innovations, and exchanges of teachers and
students will be increased.
We will harness science and technology for the
service of our peoples.
Latin America will share in the benefits of cur-
rent scientific and technological progress so as to
reduce the widening gap between it and the highly
industrialized nations in the areas of production
techniques and of living conditions. National scien-
tific and technological programs will be developed
and strengthened and a regional program will be
started; multinational institutes for advanced train-
ing and research will be established; existing insti-
tutes of this kind in Latin America will at the same
time be strengthened and contributions will be made
to the exchange and advancement of technological
knowledge.
We will expand programs for improving the
health of the American peoples.
The fundamental role of health in the economic
and social development of Latin America demands
that the prevention and control of communicable
diseases be intensified and that measures be taken
to eradicate those which can be completely elimi-
nated by existing techniques. Also programs to sup-
ply drinking water and other services essential to
urban and rural environmental sanitation will be
speeded up.
Latin America will eliminate unnecessary mili-
tary expenditures.
The Presidents of the Latin American Re-
publics, conscious of the importance of armed
forces to the maintenance of security, recognize at
the same time that the demands of economic de-
velopment and social progress make it necessary to
devote to those purposes the maximum resources
available in Latin America.
Therefore, they express their intention to limit
military expenditures in proportion to the actual
demands of national security in accordance with
each country's constitutional provisions, avoiding
those expenditures that are not indispensable for
the performance of the specific duties of the armed
forces and, where pertinent, of international com-
mitments that obligate their respective governments.
With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of
Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the
hope that it may enter into force as soon as possi-
ble, once the requirements established by the Treaty
are fulfilled.
In Facing the Problems Considered in This
Meeting, which constitute a challenge to the will of
the American governments ' and peoples, the Presi-
dents proclaim their faith in the basic purpose of
the inter- American system: to promote in the Amer-
icas free and democratic societies, existing under
the rule of law, whose dynamic economies, reinforced
by growing technological capabilities, will allow them
to serve with ever-increasing effectiveness the
peoples of the Continent, to whom they announce
the following program.
' When the term "Latin America" is used in this
text, it is to be understood that it includes all the
member states of the Organization of American
States, except the United States of America. The
term "Presidents" includes the Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago. The term "Continent" com-
prises both the continental and insular areas. [Foot-
note in original.]
MAY 8, 1967
713
II
ACTION PROGRAM
Chapter I
Latin American Economic Integration
AND Industrial Development
1. Principles, objectives, and goals
Economic integration is a collective instrument
for accelerating Latin American development and
should constitute one of the policy goals of each of
the countries of the region. The greatest possible
efforts should be made to bring it about, as a neces-
sary complement to national development plans.
At the same time, the different levels of develop-
ment and economic and market conditions of the
various Latin American countries must be borne in
mind, in order that the integration process may
promote their harmonious and balanced growth.
In this respect, the countries of relatively less eco-
nomic development, and, to the extent required, those
of insufficient market, will have preferential treat-
ment in matters of trade and of technical and finan-
cial cooperation.
Integration must be fully at the service of Latin
America. This requires the strengthening of Latin
American enterprise through vigorous financial and
technical support that will permit it to develop and
supply the regional market efficiently. Foreign pri-
vate enterprise will be able to fill an important func-
tion in assuring achievement of the objectives of
integration within the pertinent policies of each of
the countries of Latin America.
Adequate financing is required to facilitate the
economic restructuring and adjustments called for
by the urgent need to accelerate integration.
It is necessary to adopt all measures that will
lead to the completion of Latin American integra-
tion, above all those that will bring about, in the
shortest time possible, monetary stability and the
elimination of all restrictions, including administra-
tive, financial, and exchange restrictions, that ob-
struct the trade of the products of the area.
To these ends, the Latin American Presidents
agree to take action on the following points:
a. Beginning in 1970, to establish progressively
the Latin American Common Market, which should
be substantially in operation within a period of no
more than fifteen years.
b. The Latin American Common Market will be
based on the improvement of the two existing in-
tegration systems: the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) and the Central American
Common Market (CACM). The two systems will
initiate simultaneously a process of convergence by
stages of cooperation, closer ties, and integration,
taking into account the interest of the Latin Amer-
ican countries not yet associated with these sys-
tems, in order to provide their access to one of them.
c. To encourage the incorporation of other coun-
tries of the Latin American region into the existing
integration systems.
2. Measures with regard to the Latin American
Free Trade Association {LAFTA)
The Presidents of the member states of LAFTA
instruct their respective Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs, who wrill participate in the next meeting of
the Council of Ministers of LAFTA, to be held in
1967, to adopt the measures necessary to implement
the following decisions :
a. To accelerate the process of converting LAFTA
into a common market. To this end, starting in 1970,
and to be completed in a period of not more than
fifteen years, LAFTA will put into effect a system
of programmed elimination of duties and all other
nontariff restrictions, and also a system of tariff
harmonization, in order to establish progressively a
common external tariff at levels that will promote
efficiency and productivity, as well as the expansion
of trade.
b. To coordinate progressively economic policies
and instruments and to harmonize national laws to
the extent required for integration. These measures
will be adopted simultaneously with the improve-
ment of the integration process.
c. To promote the conclusion of sectoral agree-
ments for industrial complementation, endeavoring
to obtain the participation of the countries of rela-
tively less economic development.
d. To promote the conclusion of temporary sub-
regional agreements, with provision for reducing
tariffs within the subregions and harmonizing treat-
ments toward third nations more rapidly than in the
general agreements, in keeping with the objectives
of regional integration. Subregional tariff reduc-
tions will not be extended to countries that are not
parties to the subregional agreement, nor will they
create special obligations for them.
Participation of the countries of relatively less
economic development in all stages of the integra-
tion process and in the formation of the Latin Amer-
ican Common Market will be based on the provisions
of the Treaty of Montevideo and its complementary
resolutions, and these countries will be given the
greatest possible advantages, so that balanced de-
velopment of the region may be achieved.
To this same end, they have decided to promote
immediate action to facilitate free access of prod-
ucts of the LAFTA member countries of relatively
less economic development to the market of the other
LAFTA countries, and to promote the installation
and financing in the former countries of industries
intended for the enlarged market.
The countries of relatively less economic develop-
ment will have the right to participate and to obtain
preferential conditions in the subregional agree-
ments in which they have an interest.
714
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The situation of countries characterized as being
of insufficient market shall be taken into account in
temporary preferential treatments established, to the
extent necessary to achieve a harmonious develop-
ment in the integration process.
It is understood that all the provisions set forth
in this section fall within or are based upon the
Treaty of Montevideo.
3. Measures with regard to the Central American
economic integration program
The Presidents of the member states of the Cen-
tral American Common Market commit themselves:
a. To carry out an action program that vrill in-
clude the following measures, among others:
(1) Improvement of the customs union and estab-
lishment of a Central American monetary union;
(2) Completion of the regional network of infra-
structure ;
(3) Promotion of a common foreign-trade policy;
(4) Improvement of the common market in agri-
cultural products and implementation of a joint, co-
ordinated industrial policy;
(5) Acceleration of the process of free movement
of manpower and capital within the area;
(6) Harmonization of the basic legislation re-
quired for economic integration.
b. To apply, in the implementation of the forego-
ing measures, and when pertinent, the temporary
preferential treatment already established or that
may be established, in accordance with the principle
of balanced development among countries.
c. To foster closer ties between Panama and the
Central American Common Market, as well as rapid
expansion of trade and investment relations with
neighboring countries of the Central American and
Caribbean region, taking advantage, to this end, of
their geographic proximity and of the possibilities
for economic complementation ; also, to seek conclu-
sion of subregional agreements and agreements of
industrial complementation between Central Amer-
ica and other Latin American countries.
4. Measures common to Latin American countries
The Latin American Presidents commit them-
selves :
a. Not to establish new restrictions on trade among
Latin American countries, except in special cases,
such as those arising from equalization of tariffs
and other instruments of trade policy, as well as
from the need to assure the initiation or expansion
of certain productive activities in countries of rela-
tively less economic development.
b. To establish, by a tariff cut or other equivalent
measures, a margin of preference within the region
for all products originating in Latin American coun-
tries, taking into account the different degrees of
development of the countries.
c. To have the measures in the two preceding
paragraphs applied immediately among the member
countries of LAFTA, in harmony with the other
measures referring to this organization contained
in the present chapter and, insofar as possible, to
extend them to nonmember countries in a manner
compatible with existing international commitments,
inviting the latter countries to extend similar pref-
erence to the members of LAFTA, with the same
qualification.
d. To ensure that application of the foregoing
measures shall not hinder internal readjustments de-
signed to rationalize the instruments of trade policy
made necessary in order to carry out national devel-
opment plans and to achieve the goals of integration.
e. To promote acceleration of the studies already
initiated regarding preferences that LAFTA coun-
tries might grant to imports from the Latin Ameri-
can countries that are not members of the Associa-
tion.
f. To have studies made of the possibility of con-
cluding agreements of industrial complementation in
which all Latin American countries may participate,
as well as temporary subregional economic integra-
tion agreements between the CACM and member
countries of LAFTA.
g. To have a committee established composed of
the executive organs of LAFTA and the CACM to
coordinate implementation of the foregoing points.
To this end, the committee will encourage meetings
at the ministerial level, in order to ensure that Latin
American integration will proceed as rapidly as pos-
sible, and, in due course, initiate negotiation of a
general treaty or the protocols required to create
the Latin American Common Market. Latin Ameri-
can countries that are not members shall be invited
to send representatives to these meetings and to
those of the committee of the executive organs of
LAFTA and the CACM.
h. To give special attention to industrial develop-
ment within integration, and particularly to the
strengthening of Latin American industrial firms. In
this regard, we reiterate that development must be
balanced between investments for economic ends and
investments for social ends.
5. Measures common to member countries of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS)
The Presidents of the member states of the OAS
agree:
a. To mobilize financial and technical resources
within and without the hemisphere to contribute to
the solution of problems in connection with the bal-
ance of payments, industrial readjustments, and re-
training of the labor force that may arise from a
rapid reduction of trade barriers during the period
of transition toward the common market, as well as
to increase the sums available for export credits in
intra-Latin American trade. The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank and the organs of both existing inte-
MAY 8, 1967
715
gration systems should participate in the mobiliza-
tion of such resources.
b. To mobilize public and private resources within
and without the hemisphere to encourage industrial
development as part of the integration process and
of national development plans.
c. To mobilize financial and technical resources to
undertake specific feasibility studies on multinational
projects for Latin American industrial firms, as well
as to aid in carrying out these projects.
d. To accelerate the studies being conducted by
various inter-American agencies to promote strength-
ening of capital markets and the possible establish-
ment of a Latin American stock market.
e. To make available to Central America, within
the Alliance for Progress, adequate technical and
financial resources, including those required for
strengthening and expanding the existing Central
American Economic Integration Fund, for the pur-
pose of accelerating the Central American economic
integration program.
f. To make available, within the Alliance for Prog-
ress and pursuant to the provisions of the Charter
of Punta del Este, the technical and financial re-
sources needed to accelerate the preparatory studies
and work involved in converting LAFTA into a
common market.
Chapter II
Multinational Action for Infrastructure
Projects
The economic integration of ' Latin America de-
mands a vigorous and sustained effort to complete
and modernize the physical infrasti'ucture of the
region. It is necessary to build a land transport
network and improve all types of transport systems
to facilitate the movement of persons and goods
throughout the hemisphere; to establish an adequate
and efficient telecommunications system and inter-
connected power systems; and jointly to develop
international watersheds, frontier regions and eco-
nomic areas that include the territory of two or
more countries. In Latin America there are in
existence projects in all these fields, at different
stages of preparation or implementation, but in
many cases the completion of prior studies, finan-
cial resources, or merely the coordination of efforts
and the decision to bring them to fruition are lack-
ing.
The Presidents of the member states of the OAS
agree to engage in determined action to undertake
or accelerate the construction of the infrastructure
required for the development and integration of
Latin America and to make better use thereof. In
so doing, it is essential that the groups of inter-
ested countries or multinational institutions deter-
mine criteria for assigning priorities, in view of the
amount of human and material resources needed for
the task.
As one basis for the criteria, which will be de-
termined with precision upon consideration of the
specific cases submitted for study, they stress the
fundamental need to give preferential attention to
those projects that benefit the countries of the re-
gion that are at a relatively lower level of economic
development.
Priority should also be given to the mobilization
of financial and technical resources for the prepara-
tion and implementation of infrastructure projects
that will facilitate the participation of landlocked
countries in regional and international trade.
In consequence, they adopt the following decisions
for immediate implementation :
1. To complete the studies and conclude the agree-
ments necessary to accelerate the construction of
an inter-American telecommunications network.
2. To expedite the agreements necessary to com-
plete the Pan American Highway, to accelerate the
construction of the Bolivarian Highway (Carretera
Marginal de la Selva) and its junction with the
Trans-Chaco Highway and to support the studies
and agreements designed to bring into being the
new highway systems that will join groups of coun-
tries of continental and insular Latin America, as
well as the basic works required to develop water
and airborne transport of a multinational nature
and the corresponding systems of operation. As a
complement to these agreements, negotiations should
be undertaken for the purpose of eliminating or
reducing to a minimum the restrictions on interna-
tional traffic and of promoting technical and admin-
istrative cooperation among land, water, and air
transport enterprises and the establishment of mul-
tinational transport services.
3. To sponsor studies for preparing joint projects
in connection with watersheds, such as the studies
commenced on the development of the River Plate
basin and that relating to the Gulf of Fonseca.
4. To allocate sufficient resources to the Preinvest-
ment Fund for Latin American Integration of
the IDB for conducting studies that will make it
possible to identify and prepare multinational proj-
ects in all fields that may be of importance in
promoting regional integration. In order that the
aforesaid Fund may carry out an effective promo-
tion effort, it is necessary that an adequate part of
the resources allocated may be used without reim-
bursement, or with reimbursement conditioned on
the execution of the corresponding projects.
5. To mobilize, within and outside the hemisphere,
resources in addition to those that will continue to
be placed at the disposal of the countries to sup-
port national economic development programs, such
resources to be devoted especially to the implemen-
tation of multinational infrastructure projects that
716
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
can represent important advances in the Latin
American economic integration process. In this re-
gard, the IDB should have additional resources in
order to participate actively in the attainment of
this objective.
Chapter III
Measures To Improve International Trade
Conditions in Latin America
The economic development of Latin America is
seriously affected by the adverse conditions in
which its international trade is carried out. Market
structures, financial conditions, and actions that
prejudice e.xports and other income from outside
Latin America are impeding its growth and retard-
ing the integration process. All this causes particu-
lar concern in view of the serious and growing
imbalance between the standard of living in Latin
American countries and that of the industrialized
nations and, at the same time, calls for definite
decisions and adequate instruments to implement
the decisions.
Individual and joint efforts of the member states
of the OAS are essential to increase the incomes
of Latin American countries derived from, and
to avoid frequent fluctuations in, traditional ex-
ports, as well as to promote new exports. Such
efforts are also essential to reduce any adverse
effects on the external earnings of Latin American
countries that may be caused by measures which
may be taken by industrialized countries for bal-
ance of payments reasons.
The Charter of Punta del Este, the Economic
and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro and the new
provisions of the Charter of the OAS reflect a
hemispheric agreement with regard to these prob-
lems, which needs to be effectively implemented;
therefore, the Presidents of the member states of
the OAS agree:
1. To act in coordination in multilateral negotia-
tions to achieve, without the more highly developed
countries' expecting reciprocity, the g:reatest possible
reduction or the elimination of tariffs and other
restrictions that impede the access of Latin Ameri-
can products to world markets. The Government of
the United States intends to make efforts for the
purpose of liberalizing the conditions affecting ex-
ports of basic products of special interest to Latin
American countries, in accordance with the provi-
sions of Article 37(a) of the Protocol of Buenos
Aires.
2. To consider together possible systems of gen-
eral nonreciprocal preferential treatment for ex-
ports of manufactures and semimanufactures of the
developing countries, with a view to improving the
condition of the Latin American export trade.
3. To undertake a joint effort in all international
institutions and organizations to eliminate discrimi-
natory preferences against Latin American exports.
4. To strengthen the system of intergovernmental
consultations and carry them out sufficiently in
advance, so as to render them effective and ensure
that programs for placing and selling surpluses and
reserves that affect the exports of the developing
countries take into account the interests of the
Latin American countries.
5. To ensure compliance with international com-
mitments to refrain from introducing or increasing
tariff and nontariff barriers that affect exports of
the developing countries, taking into account the
interests of Latin America.
6. To combine efforts to strengthen and perfect
existing international agreements, particularly the
International Coffee Agreement, to obtain favorable
conditions for trade in basic products of interest to
Latin America and to explore all possibilities for the
development of new agreements.
7. To support the financing and prompt initiation
of the activities of the Coffee Diversification Fund,
and consider in due course the creation of other
funds to make it possible to control the production
of basic products of interest to Latin America in
which there is a chronic imbalance between supply
and demand.
8. To adopt measures to make Latin American ex-
port products more competitive in world markets.
9. To put in operation as soon as possible an inter-
American agency for export promotion that vdll
help to identify and develop new export lines and
to strengthen the placing of Latin American prod-
ucts in international markets, and to improve na-
tional and regional agencies designed for the same
purpose.
10. To initiate such individual or joint action on
the part of the member states of the OAS as may
be required to ensure effective and timely execution
of the foregoing agrreements, as well as those that
may be required to continue the execution of the
agreements contained in the Charter of Punta del
Este, in particular those relating to foreign trade.
With regard to joint action, the Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and
other agencies in the region shall submit to the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council (lA-
ECOSOC), for consideration at its next meeting, the
means, instruments, and action program for initiat-
ing execution thereof.
At its annual meetings, lA-ECOSOC shall exam-
ine the progress of the programs under way with
the object of considering such action as may ensure
compliance with the agreements concluded, inasmuch
as a substantial improvement in the international
conditions in which Latin American foreign trade
is carried on is a basic prerequisite to the accelera-
tion of economic development.
MAY 8, 1967
717
Chapter IV
Modernization of Rural Life and Increase of
Agricultural Productivity, Principally
of Food
In order to promote a rise in the standard of liv-
ing of farmers and an improvement in the condition
of the Latin American rural people and their full
participation in economic and social life, it is neces-
sary to give greater dynamism to agriculture in
Latin America, through comprehensive programs
of modernization, land settlement, and agrarian re-
form when required by the countries.
To achieve these objectives and to carry out these
programs, contained in the Charter of Punta del
Este, it is necessary to intensify internal efforts and
to provide additional external resources.
Such progn*ams vdll be oriented toward increas-
ing food production in the Latin American coun-
tries in sufficient volume and quality to provide ade-
quately for their population and to meet world needs
for food to an ever-increasing extent, as well as
toward improving agricultural productivity and
toward a diversification of crops, which will assure
the best possible competitive conditions for such pro-
duction.
All these development efforts in agriculture must
be related to the overall development of the national
economies in order to harmonize the supply of agri-
cultural products and the labor that could be freed
as a result of the increase in farm productivity
with the increase in demand for such products and
with the need for labor in the economy as a whole.
This modernization of agricultural activities will
furthermore create conditions for a development
more in balance with the effort toward industrializa-
tion.
To achieve these goals, the Latin American Presi-
dents undertake :
1. To improve the formulation and execution of
agricultural policies and to ensure the carrying out
of plans, programs, and projects for preinvestment,
agricultural development, agrarian reform, and land
settlement, adequately coordinated with national
economic development plans, in order to intensify
internal efforts and to facilitate obtaining and utiliz-
ing external financing.
2. To improve credit systems, including those ear-
marked for the resettlement of rural workers who
are beneficiaries of agrarian reform, and for in-
creased productivity, and to create facilities for the
production, marketing, storage, transportation, and
distribution of agricultural products.
3. To provide adequate incentives, including price
incentives, to promote agricultural production under
economic conditions.
4. To foster and to finance the acquisition and in-
tensive use of those agricultural inputs which con-
tribute to the improvement of productivity, as well
as the establishment and expansion of Latin Amer-
ican industries producing agricultural inputs, par-
ticularly fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural
machinery.
5. To ensure the adequacy of tax systems that
affect the agricultural sector, so that they may con-
tribute to the increase of productivity, more pro-
duction, and better land distribution.
6. To expand substantially programs of special-
ized education and research and of agricultural ex-
tension, in order to improve the training of the rural
worker and the education of technical and profes-
sional personnel, and, also, to intensify animal and
plant sanitation campaigrns.
7. To provide incentives and to make available
financial resources for the industrialization of agri-
cultural production, especially through the develop-
ment of small and medium industry and the promo-
tion of exports of processed agricultural products.
8. To facilitate the establishment of multinational
or international programs that will make it possible
for Latin America to supply a larger proportion of
world food needs.
9. To foster national programs of community de-
velopment and of self-help for small-scale farmers,
and to promote the creation and strengthening of
agricultural cooperatives.
By recognizing the importance of the stated ob-
jectives, goals and means, the Presidents of the
member states of the OAS undertake, vdthin the
spirit of the Alliance for Progress, to combine in-
tensified internal efforts with additional external
support especially earmarked for such measures.
They call upon CIAP, when analyzing the agri-
cultural sector as included in national development
plans, to bear in mind the objectives and measures
indicated herein, g^iving due attention to agrarian
reform programs in those countries that consider
these programs an important basis for their agri-
cultural progress and economic and social develop-
ment.
Chapter V
Educational, Technological, and Scientific
Development and Intensification of
Health Programs
A. Education and Culture
Education is a sector of high priority in the over-
all development policy of Latin American nations.
The Presidents of the member states of the OAS
recognize that, during the past decade, there has
been development of educational services in Latin
America unparalleled in any other period of the his-
tory of their countries.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that:
a. It is necessary to increase the effectiveness of
national efforts in the field of education ;
718
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
b. Educational systems should be more adequately
adjusted to the demands of economic, social, and cul-
tural development;
c. International cooperation in educational mat-
ters should be considerably intensified, in accord-
ance with the new standards of the Charter of the
OAS.
To these ends, they agree to improve educational
administrative and planning systems; to raise the
quality of education so as to stimulate the creativ-
ity of each pupil; to accelerate expansion of educa-
tional systems at all levels; and to assign priority to
the following activities related to economic, social,
and cultural development:
1. Orientation and, when necessary, reorganiza-
tion of educational systems, in accordance with the
needs and possibilities of each country, in order to
achieve :
a. The expansion and progressive improvement
of preschool education and extension of the period
of general education ;
b. An increase in the capacity of secondary schools
and the improvement of their curricula ;
c. An increase in opportunities following general
education, including opportunities for learning a
trade or a specialty or for continuing general educa-
tion;
d. The gradual elimination of barriers between
vocational and general education;
e. The expansion and diversification of univer-
sity courses, so that they vnW include the new pro-
fessions essential to economic and social develop-
ment;
f. The establishment or expansion of graduate
courses through professional schools ;
g. The establishment of refresher courses in all
branches and types of education, so that graduates
may keep their knowledge up to date in this era of
rapid scientific and technological prog^ress;
h. The strengthening and expansion of adult edu-
cation programs ;
1. The promotion of special education for excep-
tional students.
2. Promotion of basic and advanced training for
teachers and administrative personnel; development
of educational research and experimentation, and
adequate expansion of school building programs.
3. Broadening of the use of educational television
and other modern teaching techniques.
4. Improvement of rural elementary schools to
achieve a level of quality equal to that of urban
elementary schools, with a view to assuring equal
educational opportunities to the rural population.
5. Reorganization of vocational education, when
necessary, taking into account the structure of the
labor force and the foreseeable manpower needs of
each country's development plan.
6. An increase in private financing of education.
7. Encouragement of local and regional communi-
ties to take an effective part in the construction of
school buildings and in civic support to educational
development.
8. A substantial increase in national scholarship
and student loan and aid programs.
9. Establishment or expansion of extension serv-
ices and services for preserving the cultural heritage
and encouraging intellectual and artistic activity.
10. Strengthening of education for international
understanding and Latin American integration.
Multinational efforts
1. Increasing international resources for the pur-
poses set forth in this chapter.
2. Instructing the appropriate agencies of the
OAS to:
a. Provide technical assistance to the countries
that so request:
i) In educational research, experimentation, and
innovation ;
ii) For training of specialized personnel;
iii) In educational television. It is recommended
that study be made of the advisability of es-
tablishing a multinational training center in
this field;
b. Organize meetings of experts to recommend
measures to bring national curricula into harmony
with Latin American integration goals;
c. Organize regional volunteer teacher programs;
d. Extend inter-American cooperation to the pres-
ervation and use of archeological, historic, and ar-
tistic monuments.
3. Expansion of OAS programs for fellowships,
student loans, and teacher exchange.
National educational and cultural development ef-
forts will be evaluated in coordination by CIAP and
the Inter-American Council for Education, Science,
and Culture (now the Inter- American Cultural Coun-
cil).
B. Science and technology
Advances in scientific and technological knowledge
are changing the economic and social structure of
many nations. Science and technology offer infinite
possibilities for providing the people with the well-
being that they seek. But in Latin American coun-
tries the potentialities that this wealth of the modern
world offers have by no means been realized to the
degree and extent necessary.
Science and technology offer genuine instruments
for Latin American progress and must be given an
unprecedented impetus at this time. This effort calls
for inter- American cooperation, in view of the mag-
nitude of the investments required and the level at-
tained in such knowledge. In the same way, their
organization and implementation in each country
cannot be effected without a properly planned scien-
tific and technological policy within the general
framework of development.
MAY 8, 1967
719
For the above reasons the Presidents of the mem-
ber states of the OAS agree upon the following
measures :
Internal efforts
Establishment, in accordance with the needs and
possibilities of each country, of national policies in
the field of science and technology, with the neces-
sary machinery and funds, the main elements of
which shall be:
1. Promotion of professional training for scien-
tists and technicians and an increase in their num-
bers.
2. Establishment of conditions favoring full uti-
lization of the scientific and technological potential
for solving the economic and social problems of Latin
America, and to prevent the exodus of persons quali-
fied in these fields.
3. Encouragement of increased private financial
contributions for scientific and technological research
and teaching.
Multinational efforts
1. Establishment of a Regional Scientific and
Technological Development Program designed to ad-
vance science and technology to a degree that they
will contribute substantially to accelerating the eco-
nomic development and well-being of their peoples
and make it feasible to engage in pure and applied
scientific research of the highest possible quality.
This Program shall complement Latin American
national programs in the area of science and tech-
nology and shall take special account of the char-
acteristics of each of the countries.
2. The Progrram shall be oriented toward the
adoption of measures to promote scientific and tech-
nological research, teaching, and information ; basic
and advanced training of scientific personnel ; and
exchange of information. If shall promote inten-
sively the transfer to, and adaptation by, the Latin
American countries of knowledge and technologies
originating in other regions.
3. The Program shall be conducted through na-
tional agencies responsible for scientific and techno-
logical policy, through institutions — national or in-
ternational, public or private — either now existing
or to be established in the future.
4. As part of the Program, they propose that
multinational technological and scientific training
and research institutions at the post-graduate level
be established, and that institutions of this nature
already existing in Latin America be strengthened.
A group, composed of high-ranking, qualified per-
sons, experienced in science, technology, and uni-
versity education, shall be established to make rec-
ommendations to the Inter-American Council for
Education, Science, and Culture (now the Inter-
American Cultural Council) on the nature of such
multinational institutions, including such matters as
their organization, the characteristics of their multi-
national administration, financing, location, coordi-
nation of their activities among themselves and
with those of pertinent national institutions, and on
the other aspects of their operation. The aforemen-
tioned group, selected and convoked by the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science, and Cul-
ture (now the Inter-American Cultural Council) or,
failing this, by CIAP, shall meet within 120 days
after the close of this meeting.
5. In order to encourage the training of scientific
and technological personnel at the higher academic
levels, they resolve that an Inter-American Fund
for Scientific and Technological Training shall be
established as part of the Program, so that scientists
and research workers from Latin American coun-
tries may pursue advanced scientific and technolog-
ical studies, with the obligation to engage in a period
of scientific work in Latin America.
6. The Program shall be promoted by the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science, and Cul-
ture (now the Inter- American Cultural Council) , in
cooperation with CIAP. They shall coordinate their
activities with similar activities of the United Na-
tions and other interested organizations.
7. The program may be financed by contributions
of the member states of the inter-American system,
inter-American or international institutions, techno-
logically advanced countries, universities, founda-
tions, and private individuals.
C. Health
Improvement of health conditions is fundamental
to the economic and social development of Latin
America.
Available scientific knowledge makes it possible
to obtain specific results, which, in accordance with
the needs of each country and the provisions of the
Charter of Punta del Este, should be utilized to
attain the following objectives:
a. Control of communicable diseases and eradica-
tion of those for which methods for total elimina-
tion exist. Pertinent programs shall receive inter-
national coordination when necessary.
b. Acceleration of programs for providing drink-
ing-water supplies, sewerage, and other services
essential to environmental sanitation in rural and
urban areas, giving preference to lower-income
groups. On the basis of studies carried out and with
the cooperation of international financing agencies,
national revolving fund systems shall be used to
assure the continuity of such programs.
c. Greater and more rapid progress in improv-
ing nutrition of the neediest groups of the popula-
tion, taking advantage of all possibilities offered
by national effort and international cooperation.
d. Promotion of intensive mother and child wel-
fare programs and of educational programs on over-
all family guidance methods.
e. Priority for basic and advanced training of
professional, technical, administrative, and auxiliary
personnel, and support of operational and adminis-
720
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
trative research in the field of health.
f. Incorporation, as early as the preinvestment
phase, of national and regional health programs into
general development plans.
The Presidents of the member states of the OAS,
therefore, decide:
1. To expand, within the framework of general
planning, the preparation and implementation of
national plans that will strengthen infrastructure
in the field of health.
2. To mobilize internal and external resources to
meet the needs for financing these plans. In this
connection, to call upon CIAP, when analyzing the
health sector in national development programs, to
take into account the objectives and needs indicated.
3. To call upon the Pan American Health Orga-
nization to cooperate with the governments in the
preparation of specific programs relating to these
objectives.
Chapter VI
Elimination of Unnecessary Military
Expenditures
The Latin American Presidents, conscious of the
importance of the armed forces in maintaining
security, at the same time recog^iize that the de-
mands of economic development and social progress
make it necessary to apply the maximum resources
available in Latin America to these ends.
Consequently, they express their intention to
limit military expenditures in proportion to the ac-
tual demands of national security, in accordance
with each country's constitutional provisions, avoid-
ing those expenditures that are not indispensable
for the performance of the specific duties of the
armed forces and, where pertinent, of international
commitments that obligate their respective govern-
ments.
With regard to the Treaty on the Banning of
Nuclear Arms in Latin America, they express the
hope that it may enter into force as soon as possi-
ble, once the requirements established by the Treaty
are fulfilled.
Done at Punta del Este, Urug^uay, in the English,
French, Portuguese, and Spanish languages, this
Pan American Day, the fourteenth of April of the
year one thousand nine hundred sixty-seven, the
seventy-seventh anniversary of the founding of the
inter-American system.
List of Signatories to the
Declaration of the Presidents of America
(In the order of signing)
Juan Carlos Ongania
Presidente de la Republica Argentina
Arthur da Costa e Silva
Presidente de Republica do Brasil
Carlos Lleras Restrepo
Presidente de la Republica de Colombia
Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
Presidente de la Republica de Costa Rica
Eduardo Frei Montalva
Presidente de la Republica de Chile
Fidel Sanchez Hernandez
Presidente Electo de la Republica de El Salvador
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
Presidente de la Republica de Guatemala
Arthur Bonhomme
Representant du President de la Republique d' Haiti
OswALDO Lopez Arellano
Presidente de la Republica de Honduras
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Lorenzo Guerrero
Presidente de la Republica de Nicaragua
Marco A. Robles
Presidente de la Republica de Panamd
Alfredo Stroessner
Presidente de la Republica del Paraguay
Fernando Belaunde Terry
Presidente de la Republica del Peru
Joaquin Balaguer
Presidente de la Republica Dominicana
Eric Williams
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago
Raul Leoni
Presidente de la Republica de Venezuela
Oscar Diego Gestido
Presidente de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay
MEMBERS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION
President Johnson
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Henry A. Hoyt, Ambassador to Uruguay
William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for Inter-
national Development
Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative on the Council
of the Organization of American States
Leonard H. Marks, Director, United States Infor-
mation Agency
Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President
Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President
George E. Christian, I*ress Secretary to the President
Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic Affairs
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter- American Affairs
W. True Davis, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury
David Bronheim, Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the
Alliance for Progress
MAY 8, 1967
721
Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este Conference
and Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press"
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk on April 16 on the Na-
tional Broadcasting Company's television
and radio program "Meet the Press." Inter-
viewing the Secretary were John Hightoiver
of the Associated Press, Philip Potter of the
Baltimore Sun, Ray Scherer of NBC News,
and Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent mem-
ber of the "Meet the Press" panel.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the history of
Latin America is full of pacts and promises
to bring social and economic reform or
change. Why do you think this latest agree-
ment at Punta del Este will succeed where
the others have fallen so far short in the
past?
Secretary Rusk: I think, in the first place,
at Punta the Presidents of Latin America
committed themselves to move toward a com-
mon market for Latin America. This is a
major decision, perhaps the most important
decision they will have made since they be-
came independent states, and I was im-
pressed with the seriousness of their deter-
mination on this point.
Further, I think there are solid accom-
plishments already in the Alliance for
Progress, but everyone, I think, recognizes
that time is running short, that this total ef-
fort must be stepped up; and I think our
Latin American friends understood that on
their side as well as on our side. The notion
that this next 10 years must be a decade of
urgency is one that was generally accepted
and came out in the speeches of the Latin
American Presidents.
I was impressed with the fact that there
was so little empty rhetoric. There was some
very serious discussion of some very im-
portant practical problems.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, what relevance
does a common market that isn't started
until 1970 and isn't going to be in real opera-
tion until 1985 have to the very serious and
immediate problems of Latin America:
poverty, illiteracy, overpopulation, lack of
liberties ?
Secretary Rusk: There are two different
parts of it. One has to do with the develop-
ment that goes on in each country. I have
no doubt that this great development effort
will be stepped up, but as far as the common
market is concerned, there are certain things
they will begin doing immediately.
For example, they have agreed that they
will not interpose any additional restrictions
on trade among themselves. Now, that is a
negative decision but it is an important one.
Secondly, between now and 1970 they will
begin to create some margins of preference
within the inter-American countries in their
own tariff structure. But I would like to
emphasize that this is an extremely complex
problem in putting together the economies of
some 19 or 20 countries.
Mr. Spivak: What do you consider are
some of the major problems they face in
bringing the common market into execution?
Secretary Rusk: Well, one of the problems
is that there are countries in the common
market at different stages of development.
Even within South America alone there are
three that are relatively underdeveloped —
Paraguay, for example, Ecuador. There are
others who are called countries of limited
markets, countries like Colombia, Venezuela,
722
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Uruguay, Chile; and there are the three ad-
vanced countries of Brazil, Argentina, and
Mexico.
Now, it isn't easy to mesh countries to-
gether into a single economy that are in dif-
ferent stages of development, and so they
will be taking some time between now and
1970 to put together the machinery of the
common market. My guess is that if they
will work very hard they can just about make
it, but it is not the kind of decision that
can be made overnight.
Opportunities of Economic Coalition
Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, so many
of the Latin American countries have been
unable to solve their individual problems. Is
there any reason to think they can solve
their joint problems by going into a conti-
nentwide market? Are you merging strength,
or are you merging weakness?
Secretary Rusk: I think the key point to
bear in mind is that economic integration in
Latin America will surely contribute to a
rapid industrial development, based upon the
prospect of a market that now would contain
some 250 million people and by another 30
years might be a market of 500 million peo-
ple. That makes it possible for industries to
establish themselves with quite different
opportunities than they now face with more
limited national markets if they are con-
templating investment in Latin America.
This would apply also to the mobilization of
their local resources.
I think also the Latin American countries
are getting into a position to help each other
more. Mexico, for example, is contributing
very strongly in the economic — in the tech-
nical and scientific field to other countries in
'Xiatin America; Chile is training economists;
Brazil is training doctors; Mexico and Colom-
bia are providing improved seed. And I
think as they move toward economic coalition
there will be many more opportunities open-
ing up for them and for outsiders than would
be true if they remained, say, 20 national
markets.
Mr. Hightoiver: The next question relates
to how the United States may be able to assist
in this process. Does the President intend to
go through with his plan of asking Congress
for additional funds for assistance to Latin
America, and if so, how much?
Secretary Rusk: We have indicated we
would hope this year to replenish the Fund
for Special Operations of the Inter-American
Bank at a somewhat higher level, the range
of $300 million instead of $250 million, in
order that that additional money can be used
in these multinational projects, such as con-
necting highways and telecommunications
systems and projects of that sort, to provide
some of the physical basis for economic inte-
gration.
Then we will be asking for an increased
appropriation this year to the Alliance for
Progress.
The third principal source of possible aid
would come in 1969 to 1970 in connection
with the possibility of some fund in support
of the common market itself, but that is a
long time off yet.
Mr. Hightower: Our present aid is running
at the rate of about $1 billion a year to Latin
America.
Secretary Rusk: Just over a billion dollars
from all sources.
Mr. Hightower: Is the idea that in the next
year or so this might go up to $1.3 billion or
a billion and a half?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the President has
indicated to the Congress that this year we
will expect to increase our appropriation to
the Alliance for Progress by $100 million
and next year by $200 million.
Mr. Potter: Before going to that Summit
Conference you tried to get a resolution
through Congress of support for our position
there and it was amended to the point where
administration spokesmen said it was worse
than useless. How, in view of that, do you
anticipate getting more money out of Con-
gress for increased spending that the Presi-
dent has promised —
Secretary Rusk: I think in the first place
this question of a resolution in the Congress
got caught up in a procedural debate as to
how the President and the Congress should
consult each other and whether the Congress
MAY 8, 1967
723
itself ought to come up with a resolution in
advance of a commitment of this sort.
Now, as you may recall, when President
Johnson was Majority Leader he helped
President Eisenhower get an almost immedi-
ate resolution in the Congress in support of
a $500 million additional Latin American
effort that was agreed to at Bogota in 1960.
And the President felt that it would be im-
portant for him to know what the Congress
had to say on this matter before he went to
the conference. Now, the House of Repre-
sentatives expressed itself. The resolution in
the Senate more or less left the situation as
it would have been had the President simply
gone on his own without consulting the Con-
gress.
But in that discussion a number of the Sen-
ators who had apparently some doubts about
the procedure expressed their support for an
increased effort in Latin America and more
or less encouraged us to go ahead in the con-
fidence that the Congress would probably
back us up after we hear from the Latin
Americans as to what they wanted to do.
• • • • •
Mr. Potter: Why didn't the population ex-
plosion, which is the world's worst, figure in
the context of the conference there ?
Secretary Rusk: Quite frankly, Mr. Potter,
I think that these countries could do more
about it if we talked as little about it as pos-
sible. Some of them are taking steps in that
direction, but they prefer to take them
quietly rather than create a great national
debate — as we would have had in our own
country, say, 25 or 30 years ago.
Recognition of Importance of Seif-Help
Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, again on the
question of the resolution, some observers
have made the point that perhaps it was an
unintended blessing that the Senate did not
give the President that resolution, that it
tended to put the emphasis at the conference
on self-help. Could you go along with that
view?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't want to go
through a postmortem now on the resolution,
because we know where we are now and we
go on from here and get our job done; but I
think the notion that development turns
critically upon self-help has been getting
around the hemisphere in a very realistic
fashion for a period of some months. The
Latin American press has reflected that in
relation to this particular meeting, and this
is understandable. External assistance to
Latin America will be in the order of perhaps
up to 2 percent of their gross national prod-
uct. What they do with the 98 percent of
their gross national product will determine
their success or failure in development, and
this is beginning to get across in Latin Amer-
ica. And so I was very pleased there was such
strong insistence by the Latin Americans
themselves on self-help and a recognition that
that is a necessary preliminary to anything
that external aid could do.
Mr. Scherer: President [Oscar D.] Gestido
of Uruguay said that the conference turned
out better than he expected. What do you sup-
pose he meant by that?
Major Decisions Reached
Secreta)"ij Rusk: I have participated in the
preliminary meetings of the Foreign Min-
isters on at least two occasions, and we did
not know to what extent the different coun-
tries would be willing to put aside their bi-
lateral problems or the smaller technical
problems in order to come together on the
great strategic issues of the hemisphere in
the economic and social field. Well, I was
pleased that at the meeting of the Presidents,
the Presidents gave their attention to those
things which were genuinely of Presidential
importance, and they did not pursue some of
the technical details which have been raised
in the Foreign Ministers meeting; and I think
if you looked at the connection between the
advance preparations on the one side and the
results of the meeting on the other you would
see what President Gestido had in mind.
Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, everybody is
724
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
calling: this conference a success. How many
years will it be before we know it really was
the success it seemed to be; when will iirog-
ress toward a common market be measur-
able?
Secretary/ Rusk: I think we can see some
beginning of that now, but I think we would
not know until about 1969 or 1970 whether
they will be able to agree on the machinery
and the basic principles of the common mar-
ket that would be necessary for it to get
started. This involves marrying the LAFTA
[Latin American Free Trade Association]
common market in South America with the
Central American Common Market without
having one get in the way of the other. As I
say, this is a very complicated matter and it
will take a lot of work, but it will be about
1969 or '70 before we can see the major de-
cisions reached which will put the common
market into business.
Effect of Antiwar Demonstrations
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to take
you to Viet-Nam for a question or two. We
had huge demonstrations again yesterday.
Do you think these demonstrations are hav-
ing an effect in North Viet-Nam? Do you
think that they are prolonging the war in
anyway?
Secretary Rusk: Well, these have been
called "huge." I suppose they are large, but
I'emember, we have a population of almost
200 million people and those who speak for
the 200 million Americans are the President
and the Congress on such issues. We have in
our constitutional system an opportunity for
lawful and peaceful expression. I am con-
cerned, Mr. Spivak, that the authorities in
Hanoi may misunderstand this sort of thing
and that the net effect of these demonstra-
tions will be to prolong the war and not to
shorten it. You see, if we heard that 100,000
people were marching in Hanoi for peace, we
would draw very important conclusions from
it. Now, we don't know whether Hanoi is suf-
ficiently sophisticated to understand that this
is not the way the American people come to
their decisions and that these demonstrations
will not affect the conduct of the war.
Mi: Spivak: Mr. Secretary, we have had
these divisions of opinion before, and we
have had wars before; but I think you must
agree that these are demonstrations and the
opposition is much greater than it has been
in the past. What is your explanation for
these demonstrations in this country and in
other areas of the world?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I am not sure that,
in terms of numbers, these expressions of
dissent are larger than we have had in other
wars. That is a matter that the historians
can check up on some day. But I would think
that part of it is that half the American
people can now no longer remember World
War II or the events that led up to it, and the
great central question of our day. How do
you organize a durable peace? is slipping into
the background. And if we get our eyes off
of that question, I don't know where the
human race comes out. Because it is im-
portant to us in organizing a durable peace
in the Pacific that the commitments of the
United States be respected by us and by
others. And if we once start down the trail
that we started down in the thirties, if you
try to get a little peace by giving away one
little country at a time and giving the ag-
gressors the idea that they can get away
with aggression with impunity, then there
is going to be no peace.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, I think the his-
torians were right that we had nothing like
this either in the First World War or in the
Second World War. Do you think that these,
as some people think, that these are Com-
munist-inspired, that these demonstrations —
Secretary Rusk: I have no doubt at all that
the Communist apparatus is very busy indeed
in these operations all over the world and in
our own country, but I do not mean to say
by that that all those who have objections to
the war in Viet-Nam are Communists. But
the worldwide Communist movement is work-
ing very hard on this.
Mr. Spivak: Do we have evidence of that?
MAY 8, 1967
725
Secretary Rusk: I am giving you my re-
sponsible personal view that the Communist
apparatus is working very hard on it.
Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, the United
States now for a year and a half has brought
enormous military power to bear against
Communist forces in South Viet-Nam. Are
these forces now getting weaker or stronger
or holding their own ?
Military Situation in Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have a good deal
of evidence, from prisoners and from docu-
ments and from what we know of their de-
plojonents, that the other side is having con-
siderable difficulty in maintaining their
forces, in giving them supply, keeping up
their morale. They have encountered real
problems in dealing with such things as the
mobility of our own forces through heli-
copters and the massive firepower which we
can bring to bear if necessary.
That does not mean, however, in a guer-
rilla situation that the matter can be wound
up quickly, overnight, just through military
means. It does indicate, however, that the
kind of war that involves large units in fixed
battle clearly is not on as far as the other side
is concerned.
No, I think we have seen some very favor-
able signs that we are making headway on
the military side, but that does not mean that
the war is just about over.
Mr. Hightower: Can you say more specifi-
cally what you mean, sir, when you say this
kind of large-unit war is not on? Is it not
possible, for example, to have a major en-
gagement of large units somewhere south of
the demilitarized zone?
Secretary Rusk: It is possible. This is par-
ticularly true in the far north where some
three or four divisions of North Vietnamese
forces are in the vicinity of the demilitarized
zone. But the massed firepower that can be
brought to bear by the Allied forces would
make this, I think, a very unremunerative
undertaking for the other side, and there is
some reason to think from the captured
documents that we have seen that they also
agree that this is not their best way of
fighting.
Mr. Hightower: If you treat the conflict as
having a conventional warfare element and a
guerrilla warfare element and keep these two
very distinct, are you suggesting it would be
possible, as I think Ambassador [Henry
Cabot] Lodge has suggested, to win and con-
clude the conventional warfare aspect of this
conflict this year?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I am reluctant to
put dates on, but I would think we made very,
very substantial headway during 1966 on the
conventional type of warfare. Now, the paci-
fication effort against the guerrillas is almost
by nature a slower task, because it means
winkling out these people in the countryside
and in the mountains under conditions where
it is very hard to find them, quite apart from
dealing with them. But that is beginning to
move now, and I think that behind the cover
of the military success against the large
units can come an increased pace against the
guerrillas. I must say I have been impressed
by the doubling of the rate of defectors from
the other side. Thus far in 1967 that is double
1966, which in turn had doubled over 1965,
and I think that is a very important indi-
cator of what is happening on the other side.
Mr. Potter: Mr. Rusk, the Reverend Martin
Luther King said yesterday at this antiwar
rally in New York City that the Viet-Nam
conflict is bringing us into increasing scorn
around the globe. Is that your reading? Is
there validity to that statement?
Secretary Rusk: No, that is not my under-
standing, and I doubt that other people
around the globe have elected anyone here as
their particular spokesman on that.
We have no doubt about the attitude of the
free nations of Asia on this point, for exam-
ple. We know that there are demonstrations
in Europe; but I think our friends in Europe
know that, from their own point of view, the
integrity of the United States in a security
treaty is very important for Europe. The
governments there understand that, and they
726
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
also understand that the United States
inescapably must be deeply concerned about
the orofanization of peace in the Pacific. We
are not a one-ocean country. We look upon
our commitments in the North Atlantic as
very fundamental, but we also are concerned
with our allies in the Pacific, and I think
there is broad understanding for this point
of view. I would hope that people here would
let these other nations and other people speak
for themselves and not come to too rapid a
conclusion about what they might think about
this situation.
Mr. Potter: Do you think that a trip by the
President to Europe might be advisable to
kill this idea that we are not acceptable over
there?
Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to go into
that. The Vice President has had a very suc-
cessful visit there recently, and I wouldn't
want to pick up the question as to whether
there should be an immediate sequel.
Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, how disturbed
is this Government over the mounting indi-
cations that Peking and Moscow have put
aside their differences to assure a flow of
arms to Hanoi ?
Secretary Riisk: The political differences
between Moscow and Peking continue to be
very deep and very serious. We do not yet
know to what extent there is any practical
effect from the rumored adiustments of ar-
rangements about transporting arms through
China to Hanoi that has been going on all
along, with occasional interruptions for one
reason or another, but I wouldn't think this
itself changes the basic situation very much.
Mr. Scherer: Your view is that this is just
a rumor?
Secretary Rusk: No, I am just saying that
we have not confirmed just what it means
and therefore I am referring to it as a report.
Mr. Scherer: Mr. Secretary, up until the
end of the year casualties were running
about a hundred a week. Now, rather sud-
denly, they have almost doubled that. What
is the meaning of this? Isn't Hanoi harden-
ing its attitude ?
Secretary Rusk: I don't think that is re-
flected— that the casualties have to do with
Hanoi's attitude so much as with the fact
that the pace of the fighting is increased; and
the casualties on the other side have gone
up much faster than our own casualties.
Negotiations Without Conditions
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, Secretary-
General U Thant said again recently that he
was convinced that if bombing of North Viet-
Nam ceased there would be talks within a few
weeks. Now, if he gave us his assurance of
that, would we stop the bombing on his as-
surance, or Ho Chi Minh's assurance, that
there would be talks ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think we need to
know, for example, what those three divi-
sions that are poised in the demilitarized
zone are going to do if we stop the bombing.
Are they going to attack our Marines that
are 6 miles away? No one has been able to
give us the slightest whisper that if we
stopped the bombing those divisions would
not move against our Marines.
Mr. Spivak: Are you saying then that we
will not stop the bombing even for an as-
surance of talks by anybody, that it isn't
talks we are seeking —
Secretary Rusk: We have asked for some
reciprocal action on the other side of a mili-
tary character. Let me take just a moment
here on this point. If we were to propose to-
day that we would negotiate only if they
stopped all the violence in South Viet-Nam
while we continued bombing the North,
everybody would say we are crazy. Now, why
is it — if it is crazy for us, why is it reason-
able for Hanoi to put forward exactly the
same proposition and have it embraced by a
good many people in different parts of the
world? We are prepared to talk today with-
out conditions; we are prepared to talk about
conditions if they want to talk about arrange-
ments that might lead to talks —
Mr. Spivak: Isn't that a condition, though ?
Aren't you making a condition ?
MAY 8, 1967
727
Secretai'y Rusk: No, this is a condition
which Hanoi has raised, that there can be no
talks unless we stop the bombing. All right,
we will talk with them about conditions —
what should they do in relation to our stop-
ping the bombing — or we will talk with them
today without conditions of any sort.
Mr. Spivak: If they now say they will talk
if you stop the bombing?
Secretary Rusk: That is a major condition
they raised. We need something from them
by way of reciprocity.
Mr. Higktower: On another aspect of this
issue, Mr. Secretary, do you feel that Com-
munist forces are now being hurt badly
enough, or may in the near future be hurt
badly enough, so that they would have to re-
sort to negotiation on some acceptable terms
in order to open another front in this con-
flict, to offset the military force?
Secretary Rusk: I don't know, Mr. High-
tower, quite frankly, whether they would at
some point bring this matter to a conclusion
through negotiations or whether they would
simply let the matter dribble away, wither
away, and disappear.
There are some very difficult problems for
them in negotiations. In the first place, they
would have to recognize in negotiations that
they have been doing what they have been
doing, which they have not publicly done be-
fore. So I can't really tell yet just how this
is going to wind up.
Southern Hemisphere Telescope
To Be Built in Chilean Andes
White House press release (Punta del Este. Uruguay) dated
April 13
President Johnson and President Frei [of
Chile] announced on April 13 that a 150-inch
reflecting telescope, the largest in the South-
ern Hemisphere, will be built in the Chilean
Andes. This will make available for the first
time one of the world's largest telescopes for
exploration of the half of the sky which has
been relatively neglected.
The center of our own galaxy, as well as
our nearest neighbor galaxy, the Magellanic
Clouds, can be seen only from the Southern
Hemisphere. The combination of the size of
the telescope and the extreme clarity of the
atmosphere at this site will give qualified
astronomers from all of Latin America and
the United States a scientific instrument of
unprecedented power.
Design and construction of the new tele-
scope will be a joint effort of the University
of Chile, the U.S. National Science Founda-
tion, and the Ford Foundation. The total cost
of the telescope is $10 million and will be
financed jointly by the United States insti-
tutions.
The new telescope will be located at the
Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in
the Chilean Andes. It will be used in con-
junction with 36- and 60-inch instruments
that are already under construction.
728
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference of Chiefs of State
by Sol M. Linowitz
U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States ^
What were the expectations with refer-
ence to the Summit Conference at Punta del
Este and how well were they realized?
In launching and moving forward the con-
ference the Latin American Presidents
anticipated that the Presidents of this hemi-
sphere might come together, recognizing
their common problems, and talk together
frankly, freely, and with mutual respect
about how to reach answers on the funda-
mental issues. The hope was that they might
then undertake important commitments af-
fecting the future of the hemisphere. The
conference would be a Latin American con-
ference, organized and led by the Latin
American leaders; and President John-
son would be present as a cooperating part-
ner assuring the Latin Americans of our sup-
port and understanding and following their
lead in hemispheric progress and unity.
What happened at Punta del Este was pre-
cisely that: 18 Presidents, one Presidential
representative, and the Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago met, spoke frankly,
and, with one exception, reached agreement
on issues of profound significance to the
future of Latin America.
The conference was a Latin American con-
ference, led by the Latin American Presi-
dents and involving fundamental commit-
ments on their part more far-reaching than
any since these countries achieved their inde-
pendence. President Johnson was there as a
helpful junior partner in the effort, making
' Excerpts from an address made before the Na-
tional Press Club at Washin^n, D.C., on Apr. 21
(press release 96).
clear our own involvement and support and
our willingness to walk at their side as they
proceed along the bold path before them.
The relationships established, the under-
standings reached among the Presidents, and
the spirit in which discussions were con-
ducted, all give promise of a new era in inter-
American relationships.
It may be that the greatest contribution
of this Summit Conference will have been
not the decisions to move forward boldly
along specific lines — fundamental as these
decisions are — but rather its impact on the
minds of men. The millions of the hemi-
sphere were watching as their top political
leaders looked at their common problems,
discussed their differences, and chose the
difficult way of peaceful revolution and de-
velopment. This was a dramatic demonstra-
tion of a dominant fact of Latin America
today: that the Alliance for Progress repre-
sents the mainstream of political, social, and
economic thought and action.
Is a Latin American Common Market
really a feasible objective? Taking into ac-
count the disparity of development among
the countries of Latin America, is it reason-
able to expect that there can indeed be
fashioned a common market for the con-
tinent overriding political, economic, and
social barriers ?
I believe that it is. And my belief is
grounded in the knowledge that many of the
leaders of Latin America today are men of
vision, men who know how to dream and
how to achieve; men who know that what is
needed most for that breakthrough is a uni-
fied assault by their nations against their
MAY 8, 1967
729
common problems, an assault that will launch
both new life into the Alliance for Progress
and a new era of common understanding in
the Americas.
They also understand that nowhere is that
unified assault more important than in this
complex problem of Latin American eco-
nomic integration. For success here truly
could result in an upheaval of a continent
that would cast out the ills now paralyzing
so much of its potential.
And there is evidence that, vast though
the undertaking may be and potentially dif-
ficult though it admittedly is, it can be done.
The first steps have already been taken
through the organization of the Central
American Common Market and the Latin
American Free Trade Association. The coun-
tries of Central America, for example, have
expanded intrazonal exports from $33 mil-
lion in 1960 to $155 million in 1966. Upward
of 90 percent of all trade among the five
countries of Central America is now restric-
tion-free and the proportion of their intra-
regional trade has more than doubled.
It is true that in the larger Latin Ameri-
can Free Trade Association — which includes
Mexico and all of South America — progress
has been slower. But even there, intrazonal
trade jumped from $775 million in 1962 to
an estimated $1.5 billion in 1966. In addition,
some 9,000 tariff concessions have been
negotiated since LAFTA was organized.
Will the development of a Latin American
Common Market provide increased competi-
tion for some of our own export markets?
Probably. The same was also true of the
European Common Market. Yet the growth
of the European market has not affected our
industrial growth adversely; quite the con-
trary. For whether it be Europe or Latin
America — or any region, for that matter —
our prosperity is bound up with the world's.
We will have to make some adjustments
and there may be some short-term losses, but
these cannot be compared to our — and their
— long-term gains as we engage in a mutu-
ally profitable trade. And the story does not
end with economics. There is a political moral
too: An economically viable Latin America
will have an even greater stake than it does
today in a free, stable, and secure world.
In conjunction with steps toward economic
integration the Presidents agreed that there
will have to be action to overcome physical
obstacles to the regional flow of goods and
services; this will mean continental road
projects, interconnection of electric power
systems and telecommunications, and joint
investment in air transport, railroads, and
steamship lines, as well as in such basic
industries as fertilizers, pulp and paper, iron
and steel, and petrochemicals. These and
more are now grist for the Alliance mill as
approved by the Presidents, and each project
offers vast possibilities for transforming the
map of Latin America.
I believe that much of this imagination
and vision can be provided by private enter-
prise. Certainly it has both the technical
know-how and the capital which are sorely
needed.
Considerable misunderstanding still exists
about the purposes and value of U.S. private
investment in Latin American countries.
Some of the blame for this may fall squarely
on business, but less than popular concep-
tion has it.
Today many of the Latin American coun-
tries are indeed making efforts to create a
better environment for private investment;
and United States businesses already supply
one-tenth of the continent's production, pay
one-fifth of all taxes, account for a third of
all export earnings, and provide jobs for an
estimated 1,500,000 Latin Americans. I hope
it will continue to participate to an even
greater degree, recognizing always the great
role it can and must play in meeting the
needs of the people of the continent.
In concluding his address at the Latin
American Summit Conference in Punta del
Este, Uruguay, earlier this month, President
Johnson spoke directly to the youth of the
Americas.2 To them he said:
All that has been dreamed of in the years since
the Alliance started can only come to pass if your
hearts and your minds are dedicated and committed
to it. . . . Here in the countries of the Alliance, a
peaceful revolution has affirmed man's ability to
change the conditions of his life through the insti-
■ See p. 708.
780
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tutions of democracy. In your hands is the task of
carrying it forward.
Behind these words was the recognition
that the people of Latin America today are
basically a young people, younger than we.
Three-fifths of the Latin American popula-
tion are under 24 years of age, compared
with two-fifths for the United States and
Canada. These young people now constitute
the bulk of the electorate in Latin America —
the people the governments must answer to
and heed, the people who in a few years'
time will be the leaders of the continent.
It is the young people who must be con-
vinced that the Alliance for Progress holds
out a true promise for their future. It is
they who must understand that while the
Alliance for Progress can be their revolution,
all of us in both North and South America
share its ideals and its aspirations for some-
thing better; for hope, for dignity, for demo-
cratic institutions under law to carry on the
fight in the only way it must be carried on —
constructively, compassionately, and con-
cerned with the right of the individual.
In my visits to Latin America I've talked
to university students about the Alliance and
the relations between the United States and
Latin America. I've been disappointed in
their lack of awareness of how much the
Alliance has been and is doing and their lack
of excitement about its potential. Yet unless
we can arouse that sense of excitement, that
feeling of enthusiasm and loyalty among the
masses of people of Latin America, neither
the Presidents' program nor the Alliance can
succeed.
There are, of course, some who are afraid
of change, who fear that rocking the boat
can only lead to communism in a region so
scarred with misery, poverty, and special
interests. I think that the reverse is true —
that the sure way to communism or to any
other extreme, right or left — is not to change,
not to understand the needs of the people, not
to give them the opportunity to attain the
economic mastery of their lives and, perhaps
even more important, social justice. The
United States must, of course, deeply con-
cern itself with methods of opposing any
overt or covert Communist attempts to in-
filtrate this hemisphere. But in doing so we
must also remember that anticommunism as
such will not automatically command the
attention of the average Latin American, who
is steeped in his own personal struggle to
keep his head above water. We must show
that we stand for something better.
City slum dwellers denied hope and
illiterate rural Indians denied even a glimpse
of the 20th century cannot offer a founda-
tion to sustain or nurture democracy. A
demagog who elbows his way upward
through the masses and who offers them pro-
tection and food will have their sullen sup-
port or mute acquiescence. For these are the
staple commodities they desperately want
and need. No promise or vision can vie with
that.
And that is the meaning of the program
undertaken at Punta del Este which must be-
come known to the people in human terms.
They must recognize that the Alliance for
Progress is their charter, that the commit-
ments at Punta del Este are their promise,
and that even though "social justice" was not
listed on the formal Summit agenda, it was
never absent from the Presidents' con-
ference table. As President Johnson said in
his address:
Our discussions here are couched in the technical
terms of trade and development policies. But be-
yond these impersonal terms stands the reality of
individual men, women, and children. It is for them
— not for the statisticians and economists— that we
have come here to plan, to dream, and to work. It
is for them — and especially for the young- among
them — that the hope and the challenge of this
Alliance exists.
The promise of Latin America will be a
difficult one to fulfill. We will incur many
disappointments and encounter many frus-
trations. We shall probably become dis-
couraged from time to time, and then there
will be voices raised urging us either to
withdraw or to turn our backs on Latin
America. Yet this is a risk which we do not
dare take. If we lose heart in Latin America
now, there may never be another place nor
another day anywhere or any time. For the
stakes there are high — just about the highest
for which we have ever played — and we can-
not afford to lose.
MAY 8, 1967
731
U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special
U.N. General Assembly Confirmed
The Senate on April 19 confirmed the fol-
lowing to be representatives and alternate
representatives of the United States to the
fifth special session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations:
Representatives
Arthur J. Goldberg
William B. Buffum
Richard F. Pedersen
Mrs. Eugenie Anderson
Samuel C. Adams, Jr.
Alternate Representatives
Garland R. Farmer, Jr.
Michael lovenko
1966 Report on Automotive Trade
With Canada Sent to Congress
Letter of Transmittal
White House press release dated March 22
To the Congress of the United States:
I am pleased to transmit to the Congress
the First Annual Report on the operation of
the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.^
By this Act Congress authorized implementa-
tion of the United States-Canada Automotive
Products Agreement.
This historic Agreement is a joint under-
taking by the United States and Canada to
create a broader market for automotive prod-
ucts, to liberalize automotive trade between
the two countries, and to establish conditions
conducive to the most efficient patterns of in-
vestment, production and trade in this critical
industry. It is symbolic of the spirit of coop-
' The 85-page report Canadian Automobile Agree-
ment; First Annual Report of the President to the
Congress on the Implementation of the Automotive
Products Trade Act of 1965 (printed for the use of
the Senate Committee on Finance) is for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (25 cents).
eration between these two friendly neighbors.
The first year of operations under the Act
provides solid proof of its importance. The
value of total trade in automotive products
between the United States and Canada dur-
ing 1966 exceeded $2 billion — compared with
approximately $1.1 billion in 1965. The bene-
fits to the people of both countries are im-
pressive and fully detailed in the Report.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House,
March 22, 1967.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on
diplomatic relations concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18,
1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.'
Ratification deposited: Sweden, March 21, 1967.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.*
Senate advice and consent to ratification: April
14, 1967.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at
London April 5, 1966.'
Accession deposited: Somali Republic, March 30,
1967.
Maritime Matters
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967.
Acceptances deposited: Finland, March 20, 1967;
Trinidad and Tobago, March 16, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
732
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Nationality
Protocol relating to military obligations in certain
cases of double nationality. Done at The Hague
April 12, 1930. Entered into force May 25, 1937.
50 Stat. 1317.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, March 17, 1967.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pol-
lution of the sea by oil, 1954, with annexes. Done
at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force for
the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.
Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954
(TIAS 4900). Done at London April 11, 1962.
Enters into force May 18, 1967, and, for amend-
ment to Article XIV, June 28, 1967. TIAS 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, March 28, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with
final protocol, general regulations with final pro-
tocol, and convention with final protocol and
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Ratifications deposited: Pakistan, December 19,
1966; Sweden, December 13, 1966; Syrian Arab
Republic, November 18, 1966.
Sea
Convention for the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Sep-
tember 12, 1964.=^
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 13,
1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.''
Signature : San Marino, April 21, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: April
18, 1967.
Trade
Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and
XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.*
Acceptance : Korea, March 15, 1967.
Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
December 3, 1955.^
Acceptance : Korea, March 15, 1967.
Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April
11, 1957."
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.
Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications
to the texts of the schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva No-
vember 30, 1957.*
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.
Protocol relating to negotiations for the establish-
ment of new schedule III — Brazil — to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
December 31, 1958.*
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.
Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications
to the texts of the schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Feb-
i-uary 18, 1959.*
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.
Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to
the texts of the schedules to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Au-
gust 17, 1959.*
Acceptance: Korea, March 15, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force Au-
gust 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Acceptance: New Zealand, March 31, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force Au-
gust 25, 1966. TIAS 6185.
Acceptance : France, February 24, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Austria, February 28,
1967.
Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on
the provisional accession of Argentina to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force
January 9, 1967. TIAS 6224.
Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;'
India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967;
South Africa, March 22, 1967; Yugoslavia,
March 15, 1967.'
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on
the provisional accession of the United Arab Re-
public to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. En-
tered into force January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225.
Acceptances: France, February 24, 1967; Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, March 8, 1967;'
India, March 23, 1967; Kenya, March 21, 1967;
Yugoslavia, March 15, 1967.'
Trade, Transit
Convention on transit trade of land-locked states.
Done at New York July 8, 1965.*
Accession deposited: Chad, March 2, 1967.
BILATERAL
Congo (Kinshasa)
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 15, 1967. Ef-
fected by an exchange of notes at Kinshasa April
6, 1967. Entered into force April 6, 1967.
France
Agreement regarding the operation, maintenance
and security of the Donges-Metz pipeline system,
with protocol and exchange of letters. Signed at
Paris March 24, 1967. Entered into force April 1,
1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
* Not in force.
' Subject to ratification.
MAY 8, 1967
733
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25 percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Dear Student Leaders: An Exchange of Correspond-
ence on Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk, in a point-by-
point reply, answers a letter from a representative
of 100 student leaders around the country. He out-
lines the basic philosophy of the United States
position on Viet-Nam and gi\es his thoughts on
"how to organize a durable peace." Pub. 8190.
East Asia and Pacific Series 154. 17 pp. 15^.
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States
Armed Forces in Korea. Agreement with Korea —
Signed at Seoul July 9, 1966. Entered into force
February 9, 1967. With agreed minutes, agreed un-
derstandings, and exchange of letters. TIAS 6127.
155 pp. 45<f.
Defense — Establishment of Petroleum Products
Pipeline. Agreement with France — Signed at Paris
June 30, 1953. Entered into force June 30, 1953.
TIAS 6133. 8 pp. 10^.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Colombia — Signed at Bogota March
10, 1966. Entered into force March 10, 1966. With
exchange of notes. TIAS 6138. 12 pp. 10^.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Protocol
amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and devel-
opment. Done at Geneva February 8, 1965 — Signed
on behalf of the United States February 8, 1965.
Entered into force June 27, 1966. TIAS 6139. 46
pp. 20!<.
Education — Joint Commission for Review of Opera-
tion of Certain Scholarship Funds. Agreement with
Mexico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico Sep-
tember 30 and October 25, 1966. Entered into force
October 25, 1966. TIAS 6140. 3 pp. 5<t.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco,
amending the agreement of April 23, 1965, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rabat Oc-
tober 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25, 1966.
TIAS 6141. 3 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Morocco. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Rabat August 12, 1966. Entered into force
August 12, 1966. With related notes. And amending
agreement. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rabat
October 25, 1966. Entered into force October 25,
1966. TIAS 6142. 17 pp. 10(i(.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Mauritania. Exchange
of notes— Signed at Nouakchott September 19 and
October 17, 1966. Entered into force October 17,
1966. TIAS 6143. 4 pp. 5«f.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Paraguay. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Asuncion November 4, 1966.
Entered into force November 4, 1966. TIAS 6144.
5 pp. 5«!.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1454
PUBLICATION 8234
MAY 8, 1967
The Department ot State Bulletin, a
weekly publication ifisued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested as:encies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for Bale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
734
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX May 8, 1967 Vol.LVI,No. H5U
Canada. 1966 Report on Automotive Trade
With Canada Sent to Congress (Johnson) . 732
Chile. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be
Built in Chilean Andes 728
Congress
1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can-
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732
U.S. Delegation to Fifth Special U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Confirmed 732
Economic Affairs
American CSiiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America) 706
1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can-
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729
Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the
Press" .722
Foreign Aid
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presidents
of America) 706
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729
Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the
Press" 722
International Organizations and Conferences
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America) 706
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729
Latin America
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America) 706
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729
Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta del Este
Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet the
Press" 722
Presidential Documents
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este 706
1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can-
ada Sent to Congress 732
Publications. Recent Releases 734
Science. Southern Hemisphere Telescope To Be
Built in Chilean Andes 728
Trade
American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del
Este (Johnson, Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America) 706
1966 Report on Automotive Trade With Can-
ada Sent to Congress (Johnson) .... 732
Reflections on the Inter-American Conference
of Chiefs of State (Linowitz) 729
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 732
United Nations. U.S. Delegation to Fifth Spe-
cial U.N. General Assembly Confirmed . . 732
Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Discusses the Punta
del Este Conference and Viet-Nam on "Meet
the Press" 722
Name Index
Adams, Samuel C, Jr 732
Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 732
Buffum, William B 732
Farmer, Garland R., Jr 732
Goldberg, Arthur J 732
lovenko, Michael 732
Johnson, President 706, 732
Linowitz, Sol M 729
Pedersen, Richard F 732
Rusk, Secretary 722
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 17-23
Press releases may be obtained from the
OiRce of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
*88 4/17 Inauguration of Viet-Nam Train-
ing Center at Foreign Service
Institute.
*89 4/17 MacArthur sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Austria (biographic de-
tails) .
t90 4/18 Rusk: SEATO Council of Min-
isters.
*91 4/19 Rolvaag sworn in as Ambassador
to Iceland (biographic details).
t92 4/19 Rusk: message to German For-
eign Minister on the occasion of
the death of former Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer.
*93 4/19 Regional foreign policy conference
to be held at Chicago May 12.
*94 4/19 Personnel changes in the Bureau
of Security and Consular Af-
fairs.
t95 4/21 Katzenbach: Foreign Policy As-
sociation, New York, N.Y.
96 4/21 Linowitz: National Press Club,
Washington (excerpts).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
if U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-936/44
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DEPARTMENT
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STATE
BULLETIN
VolLVI,No.U55
May 15,1967
UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
by Under Secretary Katzenbach 753
SEATO COUNCIL REAFFIRMS RESOLVE TO REPEL AGGRESSION
Statement by Secretary Rtisk and Text of Communique 7U2
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON WATER FOR PEACE
SURVEYS WORLD WATER PROBLEMS
Memorandum of Transmittal and Excerpt From Report 758
A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND,
COMMANDER OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN VIET-NAM 738
For index see inside back cover
A Report to the Congress by the Commander
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam
by General William C. Westmoreland ^
I am deeply honored to address the Con-
gress of the United States. I stand in the
shadow of military men who have been here
before me, but none of them could have had
more pride than is mine in representing the
gallant American fighting men in Viet-Nam
today. These service men and women are sen-
sitive to their mission, and, as the record
shows, they are unbeatable in carrying out
that mission.
As their commander in the field I have
seen many of you in Viet-Nam during the
last 3 years. Without exception you gentle-
men have shown interest, responsibility, and
concern for the commitment which we have
undertaken and for the welfare of our troops.
The Republic of Viet-Nam is fighting to
build a strong nation while aggression —
organized, directed, and supported from
without — attempts to engulf it. This is an
unprecedented challenge for a small nation.
But it is a challenge which will confront any
nation that is marked as a target for the
Communist stratagem called "war of na-
tional liberation." I can assure you here and
now that militarily this stratagem will not
succeed in Viet-Nam.
In 3 years of close study and daily obser-
vation, I have seen no evidence that this is
an internal insurrection. I have seen much
' Address made before a joint session of Congress
on Apr. 28. General Westmoreland is Commander
of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-
Nam.
evidence to the contrary — documented by
the enemy himself — that it is aggression
from the North.
Since 1954, when the Geneva accords were
signed, the North Vietnamese have been
sending leaders, political organizers, tech-
nicians, and experts on terrorism and sabo-
tage into the South. Clandestinely directed
from the North, they and their Hanoi-trained
southern counterparts have controlled the
entire course of the attack against the Re-
public of South Viet-Nam.
More than 2 years ago. North Vietnamese
divisions began to arrive, and the control
was no longer clandestine. Since then, the
buildup of enemy forces has been formidable.
During the last 22 months, the number of
enemy combat battalions in the South has
increased significantly, and nearly half of
them are North Vietnamese. In the same
period overall enemy strength has nearly
doubled in spite of large combat losses.
Enemy commanders are skilled profes-
sionals. In general, their troops are indoc-
trinated, well trained, aggressive, and under
tight control.
The enemy's logistic system is primitive
in many ways. Forced to transport most of
his supplies down through southeastern Laos,
he uses a combination of trucks, bicycles,
men, and animals. But he does this with sur-
prising effectiveness. In South Viet-Nam the
system is also well organized. Many of the
caches we have found and destroyed have
738
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
been stocked with enough supplies and equip-
ment to support months of future operations.
The enemy emphasizes what he calls stra-
tegic mobility, although his tactics are based
on foot mobility, relatively modest firepower,
and often primitive means of communica-
tions. However, his operational planning is
meticulous. He gathers intelligence, makes
careful plans, assigns specific tasks in de-
tail, and then rehearses the plan of attack
until he believes it cannot fail. Local peasants
are forced to provide food, shelter, and
porters to carry supplies and equipment for
combat units and to evacuate the dead and
wounded from the battlefield.
When all is ready he moves his large mili-
tary formations covertly from concealed
bases into the operational area. His intent
I is to launch a surprise attack designed to
achieve quick victory by shock action. This
tactic has failed because of our courageous
men, our firepower, and our spoiling at-
tacks.
Viet Cong Terrorism and Brutality
For months now we have been successful
in destroying a number of main-force units.
We will continue to seek out the enemy,
catch him off guard, and punish him at every
opportunity.
But success against his main forces alone
is not enough to insure a swift and decisive
end to the conflict.
This enemy also uses terror — murder,
mutilation, abduction, and the deliberate
shelling of innocent men, women, and chil-
dren-— to exercise control through fear. Ter-
ror, which he employs daily, is much harder
to counter than his best conventional moves.
A typical day in Viet-Nam was last Sun-
day. Terrorists near Saigon assassinated a
39-year-old village chief. The same day in
the delta, they kidnaped 26 civilians assist-
ing in arranging for local elections. The next
day the Viet Cong attacked a group of
Revolutionary Development workers, killing
1 and wounding 12 with grenades and
machinegun fire in one area, and in another
they opened fire on a small civilian bus and
killed 3 and wounded 4 of its passengers.
These are cases of calculated enemy attack
on civilians to extend by fear that which they
cannot gain by persuasion.
One hears little of this brutality here at
home. What we do hear about is our own
aerial bombings against North Viet-Nam,
and I would like to address this for a mo-
ment.
Enemy Waging Total War All Day— Every Day
For years the enemy has been blowing
bridges, interrupting traffic, cutting roads,
sabotaging power stations, blocking canals,
and attacking airfields in the South, and he
continues to do so. This is a daily occurrence.
Bombing in the North has been centered on
precisely these same kinds of targets and for
the same military purposes — to reduce the
supply, interdict the movement and impair
the effectiveness of enemy military forces.
Within his capabilities, the enemy in Viet-
Nam is waging total war all day, every day,
everywhere. He believes in force, and his
intensification of violence is limited only by
his resources and not by any moral inhibi-
tions.
To us a cease-fire means "cease fire." Our
observance of past truces has been open and
subject to public scrutiny. The enemy per-
mits no such observation in the North or the
South. He traditionally has exploited cease-
fire periods when the bombing has been sus-
pended to increase his resupply and infiltra-
tion activity.
This is the enemy; this has been the chal-
lenge. The only strategy which can defeat
such an organization is one of unrelenting
but discriminating military, political, and
psychological pressure on his whole structure
at all levels.
From his capabilities and his recent activi-
ties, I believe the enemy's probable course
in the months ahead can be forecast.
In order to carry out his battlefield doc-
trine I foresee that he will continue his build-
up across the demilitarized zone and through
MAY 15, 1967
739
Laos, and he will attack us when he believes
he has a chance for a dramatic blow. He will
not return exclusively to guerrilla warfare,
although he certainly will continue to in-
tensify his guerrilla activities.
I expect the enemy to continue to increase
his mortar, artillery, rocket, and recoilless
rifle attacks on our installations. At the same
time, he will step up his attacks on villages
and district towns to intimidate the people
and to thwart the democratic processes now
under way in South Viet-Nam.
Free-World Forces
Given the nature of the enemy, it seems to
me that the strategy we are following at this
time is the proper one and that it is produc-
ing results. While he obviously is far from
quitting, there are signs that his morale and
his military structure are beginning to de-
teriorate. Their rate of decline will be in pro-
portion to the pressure directed against him.
Faced with this prospect, it is gratifying to
note that our forces and those of the other
free-world allies have grown in strength and
profited from experience. In this connection
it is well to remember that Korea, Australia,
New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines
all have military forces fighting and work-
ing with the Vietnamese and Americans in
Viet-Nam. It also is worthy of note that 30
other nations are providing noncombat sup-
port. All of these free-world forces are doing
well, whether in combat or in support of na-
tion-building. Their exploits deserve recog-
nition, not only for their direct contributions
to the overall effort but for their symbolic
reminder that the whole of free Asia opposes
Communist expansion.
As the focal point of this struggle in Asia,
the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces
merit special mention.
In 1954 South Viet-Nam had literally no
armed forces in being. There was no tradi-
tion of military leadership. The requirement
to build an army, navy, and air force in the
face of enemy attack and political subversion
seems, in retrospect, almost an impossible
task. Yet, in their determination to resist the
Communists, the Vietnamese have built an
effective military force.
South Viet-Nam's Effective Military Force
What I see now in Viet-Nam is a military
force that performs with growing profes-
sional skill. During the last 6 months, Viet-
namese troops have scored repeated suc-
cesses against some of the best Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese army units.
Perhaps more important in this total
effort is the support given by the Vietnamese
military to the Government's nation-building,
or Revolutionary Development, program.
Nearly half of the Vietnamese Army now is
engaged in or training for this vital program
which will improve the lot of the people. This
is a difl[icult role for a military force. Viet-
namese soldiers are not only defending vil-
lages and hamlets, but with spirit and energy
they have turned to the task of nation-
building as well.
In 1952 there were some who doubted that
the Republic of Korea would ever have a
first-rate fighting force. I wish those doubters
could see the Korean units in Viet-Nam to-
day. They rank with the best fighters and
the most effective civic action workers in
Viet-Nam. When I hear criticism of the
Vietnamese Armed Forces, I am reminded of
that example.
As you know, we are fighting a war with
no front lines, since the enemy hides among
the people, in the jungles and mountains, and
uses covertly border areas of neutral coun-
tries. Therefore, one cannot measure the
progress of battle by lines on a map. We
therefore have to use other means to chart
progress. Several indices clearly point to
steady and encouraging success:
As an example, 2 years ago the Republic
of Viet-Nam had fewer than 30 combat-
ready battalions. Today it has 154.
Then there were three jet-capable runways
in South Viet-Nam. Today there are 14.
740
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In April 1965 there were 15 airfields that
could take C-130 transport aircraft. We now
have 89.
Then there was one deepwater port for
seagoing ships. Now there are seven.
In 1965 ships had to wait weeks to unload.
Now we turn them around in as little as 1
week.
A year ago thei'e was no long-haul high-
way transport. Last month alone, 161,000
tons of supplies were moved over the high-
ways. During the last year the mileage of
essential highways open for our use has
risen from about 52 percent to 80 percent.
During 1965 the Republic of Viet-Nam
Armed Forces and its allies killed 36,000 of
the enemy and lost approximately 12,000
friendly killed, and 90 percent of these were
Vietnamese.
During recent months this 3 to 1 ratio in
favor of the Allies has risen significantly and
in some weeks has been as high as 10 or 20
tol.
In 1965, 11,000 Viet Cong rallied to the
side of the Government. In 1966 there were
20,000. In the first 3 months of 1967 there
have been nearly 11,000 ralliers, a figure that
equals all of 1965 and more than half of all
of 1966.
In 1964 and the first part of 1965 the ratio
of weapons captured was 2 to 1 in favor of
the enemy. The ratio for 1966 and the first
3 months of this year is 2i/^ to 1 in favor of
the Republic of Viet-Nam and its allies.
Our President and the representatives of
the people of the United States, the Congress,
have seen to it that our troops in the field
have been well supplied and equipped. When
a field commander does not have to look over
his shoulder to see whether he is being sup-
ported, he can concentrate on the battlefield
with much greater assurance of success. I
speak for my troops when I say: We are
thankful for this unprecedented material
support.
As I have said before, in evaluating the
enemy strategy, it is evident to me that he
believes our Achilles' heel is our resolve.
Your continued strong support is vital to the
success of our mission.
Our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and
coastguardsmen in Viet-Nam are the finest
ever fielded by our nation. And in this
assessment I include Americans of all races,
creeds, and colors. Your servicemen in Viet-
Nam are intelligent, skilled, dedicated, and
courageous. In these qualities no unit, no
service, no ethnic group, and no national
origin can claim priority.
These men understand the conflict and
their complex roles as fighters and builders.
They believe in what they are doing. They
are determined to provide the shield of secu-
rity behind which the Republic of Viet-Nam
can develop and prosper for its own sake and
for the future and freedom of all Southeast
Asia.
Backed at home by resolve, confidence,
patience, determination, and continued sup-
port, we will prevail in Viet-Nam over Com-
munist aggression.
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of
Congress, I am sure you are as proud to
represent our men serving their country and
the free world in Viet-Nam as I am to com-
mand them.
MAY 15, 1967
741
SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggression
The Council of Ministers of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization met at Washing-
ton April 18-20. Folloiving is a statement
made by Secretary Rusk at the opening ses-
sion on April 18, together tvith the text of
the final communique issued at the close of
the meeting on April 20.
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK
This alliance was formed some 12 years
ago to defend peace and security in a very
important part of the world. It so happened
that the first international conference which
I attended as Secretary of State was the
meeting of the SEATO Ministerial Council
in Bangkok in 1961. All of us were then
deeply concerned with the threats to both
Laos and to South Viet-Nam. With your per-
mission, I shall recall certain remarks which
I made at the opening of that meeting, not
merely to indulge in self-quotation but as a
reminder that the great issues with which we
are confronted today have been of concern
for a long time and that the present crisis did
not start yesterday or last week or last
month.
I said then that: ^
The hard fact is that this particular meeting
finds the treaty area in a situation full of danger
for the future of its nations and peoples — a possi-
bility clearly envisaged at the time of the founding
of the treaty. . . .
The people of this treaty area, no less than
elsewhere, have an inherent right to create peace-
ful, independent states and to live out their lives
in ways of their own choosing. . . .
' As-delivered text; an advance text was issued
as Department of State press release 90 dated Apr.
18.
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.
We cannot hope for peace for ourselves if in-
satiable appetite is unrestrained elsewhere. . . .
If we are determined, as we are, to support our
commitments under SEATO, it is because peace
is possible only through restraining those who
break it in contempt of law. . . .
We believe, and we feel confident that our views
are shared by the other members of this Organi-
zation, that it is our obligation to assist the peoples
of Southeast Asia in their fight for their freedom,
both because of our responsibilities in connection
with the formation of these states and because of
the duties undertaken in the formation of the
SEATO organization.
Speaking for my country (I then said), I wish
to assure the members of this Organization and
the people of Southeast Asia that the United
States will live up to these responsibilities. . . .
And then in its 1961 communique ^ the
SEATO Council endorsed the efforts, then
just begun, for a cease-fire and peaceful set-
tlement in Laos but said also that:
If those efforts fail, however, and there continues
to be an active military attempt to obtain control
of Laos, members of SEATO are prepared, within
the terms of the treaty, to take whatever action
may be appropriate in the circumstances.
And with regard to Viet-Nam, that same
1961 communique said that:
The Council noted with concern the efforts of
an armed minority, again supported from outside
in violation of the Geneva accords, to destroy the
Government of South Viet-Nam, and declared its
firm resolve not to acquiesce in any such takeover
of that country.
Agreements on the independence and neu-
trality of Laos under a Government of Na-
tional Union were achieved, at least on paper.
But as we all know, the Communist North
Vietnamese and Pathet Lao never did what
they promised to do. In violation of the
Geneva agreement of 1962, North Viet-Nam
' Ibid., p. 549.
742
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ever withdrew all its troops from Laos and
as continued to use Laotian territory to in-
filtrate arms and men into South Viet-Nam.
Then the International Control Commission
has been denied facilities for investigating
i^iolations of the Geneva agreement in Com-
munist-held territory. And the coalition Gov-
ernment of Laos itself has not been able to
exercise its authority in those same areas.
The Council expressed its increasing concern
with these violations in its communiques in
1964 and 1965 and 1966."
The members of this alliance represented
here understood from the beginning that the
conflict in South Viet-Nam was not just a
'civil war." I have already quoted the Coun-
cil's 1961 communique on the element of out-
side support.
In 1964 the Council described the assault
on the Republic of Viet-Nam as a "Commu-
nist aggression" and as an "organized cam-
paign . . . directed, supplied and supported
by the Communist regime in North Viet-
Nam. . . ."
In 1965 and 1966 the Council called atten-
tion to the enlarging scale of the aggression
from the North — the increasing infiltrations
of armed and combat personnel, including
"members" and, later, "many units" of the
regular armed forces of North Viet-Nam.
There are still people in the world who pre-
fer to shut their eyes and ears to these reali-
ties. The governments represented here
know, as they said in 1966, that North Viet-
Nam is engaged in a "continuing armed at-
tack" against the Republic of Viet-Nam "in
contravention of the basic obligations of
international law and in flagrant violation of
the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962."
And we as a Council have recorded some
fundamental convictions about security and
peace; for example: "that the elimination of
aggression is essential to the establishment
and maintenance of a reliable peace" and
that "efforts to meet the Communist chal-
lenge" in the treaty area "must not fail."
And we as a Council have expressed con-
Tor texts, see ibid., May 4, 1964, p. 692; June
7, 1965, p. 923; and Aug. 1, 1966, p. 172.
cern with the continuing "serious threat" of
subversion to the Asian member countries —
to Thailand in particular. The members of
the Council have reiterated "their determina-
tion to do whatever is necessary to assist
their ally to eliminate this threat."
And while the Council has made clear the
determination of its members to meet their
commitments to repel aggression, either
overt or indirect, it has made equally clear
that the goal of this alliance is peace.
Last year, after taking cognizance of the
efforts of many governments and individu-
als to initiate negotiations looking toward
peace in Viet-Nam, it expressed the "common
resolve" of its members "to do everything in
their power to promote the peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict."
Since then there have been many further
efforts to get peace talks started, and some
of them most important, by our distin-
guished cochairman [of the Geneva con-
ferences, the United Kingdom] and member
of this organization, and the sometimes con-
temptuous refusal by Hanoi. My Govern-
ment has made clear that we are willing to
try any promising path to peace. We are pre-
pared to talk about a final settlement — and
then work out the steps by which it might be
reached. We are prepared to take steps to
deescalate the conflict whenever we are as-
sured that the North will take appropriate
corresponding steps.
But every effort we and others have thus
far made to talk peace has met a curt refusal
by Hanoi.
I should like to repeat here still once again
what President Johnson and I have said
many times: that we are ready for negotia-
tions without conditions of any sort. If the
authorities in Hanoi put forward conditions,
we are ready to talk about conditions pre-
liminary to more formal negotiations, or
we're prepared to discuss the shape of a final
settlement and try to work back from there.
We're prepared for public or private talks,
talks direct or indirect, with small numbers
or in a general conference.
And so, once again, we urge Hanoi to make
use of some machinery — and there are many
MAY 15, 1967
743
options — or to make use of some diplomatic
process — and there are many options — to en-
gage seriously in a discussion which could
lead toward peace.
But there is some evidence that Hanoi is
sustained by the hope that dissenting
opinion, here or abroad, will cause the United
States to abandon or weaken its support of
South Viet-Nam. Any such supposition is a
basic miscalculation which can only prolong
the war, thus adding to the casualties.
I believe that President Johnson expressed
the resolve of a large majority of the Ameri-
can people when he said, very simply: ^
We will not be defeated.
We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw, either openly or under
the cloak of a meaningless agreement.
And that, I believe, is the resolve of all
who are helping South Viet-Nam to repel
this aggression. And at the same time, we
shall continue unceasingly the search for a
peaceful settlement. Eventually Hanoi must
come to realize that it will not be permitted
to conquer South Viet-Nam by force.
Let me say just a word about the wider
significance of SEATO. We all recognize that
security is only the foundation on which na-
tions seek to build better lives for their citi-
zens. The Council has repeatedly expressed
the dedication of this alliance to economic de-
velopment and to social progress. It has ap-
plauded the commitment of the Government
of South Viet-Nam "to the work of social
revolution and to the goal of free self-gov-
ernment." It has also "welcomed steps to-
wards increased regional cooperation in
political, economic and cultural matters."
And I am sure that all of us will continue to
act in every possible constructive way to-
ward the great objectives of political stabil-
ity and economic and social progress in
conditions of peace.
And I believe that we see, all of us, solid
'^ For President Johnson's address at Johns
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., on Apr. 7,
1965, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
grounds for confidence in the future of
Southeast Asia — indeed, of the free nations
of East Asia and the Western Pacific gen-
erally. Many individual nations have made
dramatic economic progress. New regional
organizations have come into being that
carry with them tremendous promise.
Moreover, last August agreements were
reached to bring to an end the sterile con-
frontation between Indonesia and its neigh-
bors in Malaysia and Singapore. The present
government in Indonesia is dedicated to pro-
moting the welfare of its citizens and to liv-
ing at peace with its own neighbors.
All of these developments are essentially
due to the good sense and creative spirit of
the peoples and governments of East and
Southeast Asia. Yet I think it is fair to re-
late them in some degree to a growing
climate of security and confidence in the area,
and to relate that climate in turn to South
Viet-Nam's heroic efforts to defend itself, to
the efforts of other nations to assist South
Viet-Nam, and to the broad contribution that
SEATO as a whole has made over a long
period of years.
And so, even as we continue with the dif-
ficult and complex tasks in South Viet-Nam,
and with our other efforts to insure security
among the members of SEATO, let us look
outward to what is happening in all of Asia.
As President Johnson said on returning to
the United States from his Pacific tour last
fall: «
"We found people who are determined to
be free. We found people who are determined
to have a better life for their children and
for their families. We found people who are
dedicated and determined to stand on their
own feet.
"The United States of America has taken
its stand in Asia and the Pacific. We are
fighting ... in Viet-Nam to make that stand
come true. And we are going to be success-
ful."
Thank you very much.
' Ibid., Nov. 28, 1966, p. 806.
744
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 20
The Twelfth Meeting of the Council of the South-
East Asia Treaty Organization was held in Wash-
ington from April 18 to 20, 1967, under the Chair-
manship of the Honourable Dean Rusk, Secretary
of State of the United States.
All SEATO members, except France, participated.
The Republic of Vietnam, a Protocol State, was
represented by an observer Delegation headed by
His E.xcellency Dr. Tran Van Do, Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
In viewing the Treaty Area as a whole, the
Council was encouraged by the progress achieved
in many directions since it met in Canberra in
June 1966. Economic conditions have continued to
improve. Transportation and communications have
expanded. Ever greater attention is being given
to the housing, health, education and general wel-
fare of the people. The easing of political tensions
among certain States of the area has been sustained,
and has led to greater possibilities for regional
co-operation.
The spirit of co-operation within the Asian and
Pacific region under Asian initiative has continued
to show vigorous growth in many directions. The
Asian Development Bank is now a reality; the
Asian and Pacific Council has been established and
is soon to hold its Second Ministerial Meeting in
Bangkok; the Association of South-East Asian
States has taken on renewed life; the South-East
Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat is pursu-
ing an active program ; and there have been several
regional or sub-regional conferences devoted to
economic development and other matters of mutual
concern. The Council observed with gratification
these developments, in which SEATO members are
working towards common ends with other countries.
The Council reaffirmed its conclusion in 1965 and
again in 1966 that "history shows that the toler-
ance of aggression increases the danger to free
societies everywhere". It reaffirmed its belief "that
the rule of law should prevail and that international
agreements should be honoured and steps taken
to make them operative". It again declared its
"conviction that the elimination of aggression is
essential to the establishment and maintenance of
a reliable peace".
Communist aggression, both overt and by sub-
version, infiltration and terrorism, accompanied by
vicious propaganda, remains a major threat to the
peace and security of the Area. The Council ex-
pressed its conviction that the threat in the Treaty
Area cannot be considered in isolation from global
problems of peace and security. The outcome of
the struggle now going on against aggression,
both overt and by subversion, would, the Council
believed, have profound effects, not only in Asia,
but throughout the world. It was therefore of the
utmost importance that these aggressions should
not succeed.
The Council reaffirmed its conviction that SEATO
continues to have a prime role in deterring or re-
pelling aggression in all its forms while at the
same time helping to improve economic and social
conditions in the Area.
Dedication to Peace and Progress
The Members of the Council reaffirmed "their
faith in the purposes and principles set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire
to live in peace with all peoples and all Govern-
ments", as stated in the preamble to the Treaty.
They look forward to the day when there will be
peace and reconciliation throughout the Area and
when the resources and talents of all countries,
irrespective of ideology, can be devoted towards
constructive efforts to achieve a better life for man-
kind.
The Council welcomed the persistent efforts of
the Republic of Vietnam, the United States Gov-
ernment, the United Kingdom as Co-Chairman of
the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1962, and
other members of the Alliance, as well as of many
interested third parties to bring about a peaceful
resolution of the conflict in South-East Asia. It
recorded its disappointment that Hanoi had re-
jected all the opportunities open to it for negotia-
tions on a reasonable basis. It agreed that reci-
procity is an essential element of any acceptable
proposal for reduction in the fighting. Members of
the Council reiterated their common resolve to
persist tirelessly in the search for a just and last-
ing peace in Vietnam.
Vietnam
The Council noted with grave concern that North
Vietnam continues its aggression by means of
armed attack against the Republic of Vietnam, in
patent violation of the principles of international
law and of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and
1962. It noted that during the past year North
Vietnam has continued to infiltrate arms and com-
bat personnel into South Vietnam, including large
units of the regular army of North Vietnam. It
noted also that Communist military operations in
South Vietnam have long been directed and con-
trolled by North Vietnam, and that recently there
has been made public evidence further confirming
the long standing presence in the South of Gen-
erals of the regular Army of the North.
The Council heard with deep interest a state-
ment by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Vietnam. It reaffirmed its admiration
MAY 15, 1967
745
for the courage and determination with which the
Government and people of the Republic of Vietnam
are defending their freedom and its concern and
sympathy for the suffering so long endured by the
Vietnamese people. Council Members welcomed the
progress which is being made by the Republic of
Vietnam in the political, economic and social fields,
in particular the promulgation of a new Constitu-
tion, the holding of local elections and preparations
for national elections in September. They also
welcomed the program for national reconciliation
announced by the Republic of Vietnam and ex-
pressed their hope that those South Vietnamese
who have been misled or coerced by the Communists
would make use of the opportunity now open to
them to contribute to the political progress and
prosperity of the Republic of Vietnam.
The Council noted that the aggression against
the Republic of Vietnam is supported by a world-
wide Communist propaganda campaign which has
systematically distorted essential facts about the
origin and the nature of the conflict and the present
situation in Vietnam. The Council expressed regret
that this campaign has misled many people of good
intent.
The Council again recalled that various Com-
munist leaders have declared their belief that the
assault on the Republic of Vietnam is a critical
test of the concept of what they call a "war of
national liberation" but which is in reality a tech-
nique of aggression to impose Communist domina-
tion. It reaffirmed its conclusion at Manila in 1964,
at London in 1965 and at Canberra in 1966, that
the defeat of this aggression is essential to the
security of South-East Asia and would provide con-
vincing proof that Communist expansion by such
tactics will not be permitted.
The Council noted with appreciation the increases
in military, economic and humanitarian assistance
by Member Governments to the Republic of Vietnam
during the past year, in fulfillment of or consistent
with their obligations under the South-East Asia
Collective Defence Treaty. The Council also noted
with appreciation the increase in such assistance
to the Republic of Vietnam from non-SEATO
members, notably the substantial increase in the
Armed Forces provided by the Republic of Korea.
Member Governments reaffirmed their determination
to maintain, and where possible to increase, their
efforts in support of Vietnam in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
Laos
The Council expressed its serious concern over
the continuing violation by North Vietnam of the
1962 Geneva Agreements through such acts as the
maintenance of North Vietnamese military forces
in Laos, the use of these forces against the Royal
Government of Laos, and the use of the territory
of Laos to reinforce and supply the Communist
forces in South Vietnam, and to support insur-
gency in Thailand. The Council again called for
the implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements
and expressed support for the efforts of Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma's Government of Na-
tional Union to obtain peace by securing the
sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of an
independent and neutral Laos.
Philippines
The Council expressed deep concern over the
resurgence of Communist activity in Central Luzon
in the Philippines and agreed that this local Com-
munist movement continued to pose a threat to the
peace and security essential to the development
and progress of that SEATO member.
Thailand
The Council, conscious of the long-standing Com-
munist efforts to foment insurgency in Thailand,
noted the increase of such efforts in the past year
and the conclusive evidence of support and direc-
tion by Peking and Hanoi. The Council was en-
couraged by Thailand's determination to defeat this
Communist threat. It noted the Royal Thai Gov-
ernment's effective moves against the existing guer-
rilla forces and the impressive rural programs
designed primarily to enhance the well-being of
the people and to strengthen further their capacity
to resist Communist blandishments and alien dom-
ination. The Council reiterated the determination
expressed in earlier communiques to do whatever
is necessary to assist that country to eliminate the
threat.
The Council noted that Thailand, despite the
problems of Communist subversion at home, is
contributing actively to the defence of the Republic
of Vietnam. It also noted that, in addition to send-
ing contingents from all three of its armed services
to serve in Vietnam, Thailand is allowing other
SEATO members to use Thailand's military instal-
lations and facilities for purposes of common de-
fence, both with a view to shortening the war in
Vietnam and to contributing to the effort to make
"another Vietnam" impossible.
Counter-Subversion
The Council reaffirmed its support for SEATO's
role in assisting national efforts in countering sub-
version. It expressed its satisfaction with the
steadily increasing capability shown by SEATO,
under the energetic direction of the Secretary-
General, to find appropriate means of complement-
ing the already vigorous efforts of member countries
to combat this Communist tactic.
746
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic, Medical and Cultural Co-operation
The Council reaffirmed its continued support for
the economic, medical and cultural activities of
SEATO and expressed satisfaction with the Or-
ganization's efforts to ensure that these activities
are being carefully directed to complement and
augment national and regional programs. The
Council took particular note of the progress during
the year in many projects, including the Thai-
SEATO Regional Community Development Tech-
nical Assistance Centre, the SEATO Vehicle Re-
build Workshop, the Skilled Labour Projects and the
SEATO Regional Agricultural Research Project in
the economic field; the SEATO Medical Research
Laboratory, the Pakistan-SEATO Cholera Research
Laboratory and the SEATO Clinical Research
Centre in the medical field; and the Tribal Re-
search Centre; also the Research Fellowships, Post-
Graduate and Undergraduate scholarships, Pro-
fessorships and the recent Seminar on problems of
youth under the cultural program.
The Council reviewed the progress in the transi-
tion of the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering
to the independent and greatly expanded Asian
Institute of Technology. It noted that the transi-
tion will be completed during the coming year.
The Council noted that the Philippines and Thai-
land have submitted various economic project pro-
posals under the economic program of the Organiza-
tion mainly designed to help strengthen their
national economies and thereby to increase their
capacity to resist Communist subversion. Pakistan
also has submitted an extensive project for economic
assistance. The Council agreed to give sympathetic
and urgent attention to those proposals.
Co-operation in the Military Field
The Council approved the Report of the Military
Advisers and paid tribute to the work of the Mili-
tary Planning Office during the past year. The
Council reiterated its conviction that the continuous
planning and periodic military exercises carried out
under the aegis of SEATO have helped to under-
line the determination of SEATO members to
guarantee South-East Asia's freedom from Com-
munist domination, thereby helping to deter aggres-
sion within the Treaty Area.
Pakistan
The Pakistan Delegate wished it to be recorded
that he did not participate in the drafting of the
Communique and that the views expressed in it
do not necessarily reflect the position of the Gov-
ernment of Pakistan.
Next Meeting
The Council accepted with pleasure the invitation
of the Government of New Zealand to hold its
next Meeting in Wellington.
Expression of Gratitude
The Council expressed its gratitude to the Gov-
ernment and people of the United States for their
hospitality and for the excellent arrangements made
for the Meeting. The Council voted warm thanks
to the Chairman, the Honourable Dean Rusk.
Leaders of National Delegations
The leaders of the National Delegations to the
Twelfth Council Meeting were :
Australia The Rt. Hon. Paul Hasluck,
M.P., Minister for Ex-
ternal Affairs
New Zealand The Rt. Hon. Keith Hol-
yoake, C.H., M.P., Prime
Minister and Minister of
External Affairs
Pakistan H. E. Mr. A. Hilaly, S.Pk.,
Ambassador to the United
States
Philippines H. E. Mr. Narciso Ramos,
Secretary of Foreign Af-
fairs
Thailand H. E. Mr. Thanat Khoman,
Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs
United Kingdom The Rt. Hon. George Brown,
M.P., Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
United States The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secre-
tary of State
Republic of Vietnam H. E. Dr. Tran Van Do,
(Observer) Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs
Seven Asian and Pacific Nations
Consult on Efforts in Viet-Nam
Folloiving is the text of a communique
issued at the close of the seven-nation meet-
ing on Viet-Nam held at Washington April
20-21.
The Minister for External Affairs of
Australia, Mr. Paul Hasluck; the Vice Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Korea, Mr. Young Choo Kim; the Prime
Minister and Minister of External Affairs
of New Zealand, Mr. Keith Holyoake; the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philip-
MAY 16, 1967
747
pines, Mr. Narciso Ramos; the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Mr. Thanat
Khoman; the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do;
and the Secretary of State of the United
States of America, Mr. Dean Rusk, met in
Washington, D.C., on April 20-21, 1967. The
meeting was held at the invitation of the
United States Government pursuant to the
agreement reached by the seven nations of
the Asian and Pacific region at the Manila
Summit Conference last October ^ that there
should be continuing consultations among
them including meetings of their Foreign
Ministers as required. Their purpose was to
carry forward and strengthen programs in
which they are jointly engaged to assist the
people of the Republic of Viet-Nam to de-
fend their country and preserve their free-
dom.
The participants renewed their commit-
ment to the Goals of Freedom promulgated
at Manila:
1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and dis-
ease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and
progress.
4. To seek reconciliation and peace
throughout Asia and the Pacific.
The opening statement by the Secretary of
State of the United States included a review
of the recent conference at Guam between
American and Vietnamese leaders ^ and of
pertinent aspects of the recently concluded
Twelfth SEATO Council Meeting.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, Dr. Tran Van Do,
then discussed in detail the developments in
several programs in his country which have
taken place since the Manila Summit Con-
ference last October. He highlighted the
steps toward constitutional, representative
government taken since the Manila Summit
Conference, as well as the accelerating prog-
' For the Manila Summit Conference documents,
see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
' For background, see ibid., Apr. 10, 1967, p. 587.
ress of the Revolutionary Development Pro-
gram.
The representatives of the seven nations
noted that heartening progress had been re-
corded in virtually every field of effort in
South Viet-Nam. They applauded the fact
that the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam had promulgated a new Constitu-
tion on April 1, that elections under the Con-
stitution are scheduled for September and
October, and that village and hamlet elections
are now well under way. They welcomed and
offered encouragement to the continued de-
velopment of the foundations of representa-
tive government in the Republic of Viet-
Nam. They were also pleased to note that the
Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam had
launched its program of national reconcilia-
tion, which seeks to encourage those Viet-
namese who have been misled or coerced by
the Communists to return and participate
freely in the political and economic life of
the nation.
The meeting also noted with satisfaction
that since the Manila Summit Conference
there had been increases in allied force con-
tributions to South Viet-Nam.
The representatives of the seven nations
reaffirmed their resolve to continue their mili-
tary and all other efforts, as firmly and as
long as may be necessary, in close consulta-
tion among themselves until the aggression is
ended. They agreed that actions in pursuance
of these policies should be in accordance with
their respective Constitutional processes.
At the same time, they reaffirmed that their
united purpose was peace, and that they were
prepared to pursue any avenue which could
lead to a secure and just peace. In this con-
nection they reviewed prospects for a peace-
ful settlement and held an intensive discus-
sion of the various peace proposals and ave-
nues to such a settlement. They noted with
regret the continuing refusal on Hanoi's part
to resolve the conflict by peaceful means and
the continuing campaign of distortion and
calumny against those striving for peace.
They agreed that continuing efforts should be
made in search of peace in Viet-Nam and that
such a peace must guarantee, among other
748
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
things, the cessation of acts of aggression by
the Communists, and uphold and respect the
independence of the RepubUc of Viet-Nam
and the right of the Vietnamese people to
choose their own way of life.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam described his Govern-
ment's position with regard to the essential
elements of peace in Viet-Nam and the other
participants responded by reaffirming their
own undertakings, as stated in the Com-
munique of the Manila Summit Conference.
It was agreed that a settlement in Viet-Nam,
to be enduring, must respect the wishes and
aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that
the Republic of Viet-Nam should be a full
participant in any negotiations designed to
bring about a settlement of the conflict; and
that the allied nations which have helped to
defend the Republic of Viet-Nam should par-
ticipate in any settlement of the conflict.
The participants expressed their serious
concern that North Viet-Nam continued to
ignore its obligation to accord prisoners of
war the rights to which they are entitled
under the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The
participants noted particularly that North
Viet-Nam has refused to permit the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross to visit the
prisoners and assure their welfare and proper
treatment. They reiterated their determina-
tion to continue to comply fully with the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, called on North
Viet-Nam once again to honor its commit-
ments under those Conventions, and reaf-
firmed their willingness to discuss prisoner
exchanges in any appropriate forum.
Finally, the Representatives agreed to
strengthen the consultation and cooperation
of the seven nations through their Ambas-
sadors in Saigon and through other channels.
In this connection, they agreed to examine
the establishment of appropriate groups com-
prising representatives of the seven nations
to help present the objectives of the allies in
regard to their efforts in Viet-Nam, which
aim at halting aggression and securing an
honourable and durable peace in that war-
torn country as well as in the Southeast
Asian region.
ANZUS Council Discusses Political
and Security Problems
Folloiving is the text of a communique
issued at the close of the 16th ANZUS
(Australia, Neiv Zealand, and United States
Security Treaty) Council meeting, which ivas
held at Washington April 21-22.
The 16th meeting of the ANZUS Council
was held in Washington on April 21 and 22.
The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake,
Prime Minister and Minister for External
Affairs, represented New Zealand. The Right
Honorable Paul Hasluck, Minister for Exter-
nal Affairs, represented Australia, and the
Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State,
represented the United States.
This year, as in the past, the Ministers
conducted a wide-ranging discussion of inter-
national political and security matters, with
particular emphasis on the South East Asian
region. They agreed that the 12th SEATO
Council meeting had concluded with good
results, and they agreed that the Seven Na-
tion Meeting on Viet-Nam had been a valu-
able continuation of the consultation among
allies begun at the Manila Summit Confer-
ence last October. The Ministers agreed that:
The most dangerous threat to the secu-
rity of the world continues to come from
Peking's brand of militant communism and
communist armed aggression and subversion
in Southeast Asia.
The focal point of this threat is the ag-
gression by North Viet-Nam against the Re-
public of Viet-Nam.
The past year had seen the concerted free
world effort in South Viet-Nam make con-
siderable progress in strengthening South
Viet-Nam and stopping aggression.
The Ministers reaffirmed their hope that
North Viet-Nam, realizing the determination
of the people of South Viet-Nam and their
allies, would reverse its intransigent stand
and manifest a willingness to bring the con-
flict to an end on fair and reasonable terms.
The Ministers expressed their continued
willingness to explore any serious initiative
for peace, despite past disappointments.
MAY 15, 1967
749
The Ministers discussed and took note of
the earnest efforts of Indonesia to reconstruct
its economy. They endorsed the work of those
nations involved in plans and action to as-
sist Indonesia in its economic program.
Noting that Communist China and France
had conducted atmospheric testing during the
past year, the Council reaffirmed its opposi-
tion to all atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons in disregard of world opinion as ex-
pressed in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The Ministers expressed their desire to
continue the frank exchanges that have
marked the annual ANZUS Council Meeting
and to continue to place great importance on
the ANZUS alliance which binds together
three nations dedicated to a common ideal of
peace and prosperity for their own nations
and for all people of the Pacific area.
U.S. Proposes lO-Mile Buffer Area
North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ
Department Statement i
The United States Government has care-
fully studied Mr. Paul Martin's four-point
proposal.^ We believe that it offers consid-
erable promise for deescalating the conflict
in Viet-Nam and for moving toward an over-
all settlement. The United States Govern-
ment also supports the statement of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Viet-Nam made
on April 18 with respect to the Canadian pro-
posal.
We believe an important step toward re-
solving the conflict could be taken if military
forces were withdrawn from a significant
area on both sides of the 17th parallel. The
United States Government and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be
prepared to withdraw their forces to a line 10
miles south of the demilitarized zone if the
' Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman on Apr. 19.
^ Made in a statement before the House of Com-
mons Standing Committee on External Affairs at
Ottawa on Apr. 11. Mr. Martin is Canadian
Minister for External Affairs.
DRV (North Viet-Nam) were willing to with-
draw its forces simultaneously to a line 10
miles north of the DMZ.
If the DRV agreed to such a mutual with-
drawal, all military actions in and over the
demilitarized zone and the areas extending 10
miles north and south of the zone could stop.
Both the Governments of the Republic of
Viet-Nam and the United States would be
ready to cooperate fully with the Interna-
tional Control Commission and to grant it
complete access to monitor and to supervise
the withdrawal and the continued inspection
of the southern part of the DMZ and the ad-
ditional demilitarized area, provided the DRV
would grant the ICC equivalent cooperation
and access in its territory.
The ICC would be asked to certify that
North Vietnamese troops had, in fact, been
withdrawn to a line 10 miles north of the
DMZ and the DRV was not using the zone
to support military activities.
Upon the separation of forces, the United
States Government and the Government of
the Republic of Viet-Nam would be ready to
undertake talks leading to further deescala-
tion and to an overall settlement. Such talks
could be public or private and take place at
any appropriate level and site that the Gov-
ernment of the DRV might suggest.
U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece
Following Military Takeover
Statement by Secretary Rusk '
We have followed closely the situation in
Greece since the military takeover there last
Friday [April 21].
I am encouraged to see that King Con-
stantine [on April 26] in his first public
statement since last Friday has called for an
early return to parliamentary government.
We are now awaiting concrete evidence that
the new Greek government will make every
effort to reestablish democratic institutions
' Released to news correspondents on Apr. 28.
750
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which have been an integrral part of Greek
political life. I am gratified that Greece will
continue its strong support of NATO.
I also note that Minister [George]
Papadopoulos at a press conference yester-
day [April 27] is quoted as saying that the
detained persons connected with the political
leadership of Greece will be set free in a few
days. I trust that this step will indeed be
taken.
Ambassador [Phillips] Talbot has made
unmistakably clear to the new government
our concern for the safety of all political
prisoners. He has received repeated assur-
ances that they are well.
President Johnson Attends
Funeral of Konrad Adenauer
President Johnson attended funeral serv-
ices for Konrad Adenauer, former Chancel-
lor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
which ivere held at Bonn and at Cologne on
April 25.
The President arrived at Bonn April 23
and remained there until April 26. During
his stay, the President called upon President
Heinrich Luebke and Chancellor Kurt Georg
Kiesinger of the Federal Republic.
Following is an exchange of remarks be-
tween Chancellor Kiesinger and President
Johnson at the conclusion of their meeting at
the German Chancellory on April 26, to-
gether ivith a statement by President John-
son on April 19 on the death of Dr. Adenauer
and a message sent by Secretary Rusk to
Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy
Brandt.
MEETING WITH GERMAN CHANCELLOR,
BONN, APRIL 26
White House press release (Bonn, Germany) dated April 26
Chancellor Kiesinger
The President and I had a long, open, and
frank discussion on the problems which con-
cern our two countries.
I would like to say, first of all, what a
great honor and token of friendship it was
for President Johnson and such a great num-
ber of most distinguished American citizens
to come to us to participate in Konrad
Adenauer's funeral.
I would like to assure you, Mr. President,
that these people will not forget what you
have done.
So far as our conversations are concerned,
I think that we have, in a very good atmos-
phere of mutual trust and confidence, dis-
cussed all the matters that concern our two
countries.
The President himself will, I am sure,
agree with me that we have come to the view
that we will continue to have frank and con-
fident cooperation which, of course, takes
into consideration the matters of our two na-
tions and that any problems that might crop
up will be discussed frankly without any at-
tempt to bring about results which a partner
would ignore.
I can only say, in conclusion, that I am
very happy and satisfied with this meeting:
first of all, the very fact that I had the privi-
lege of getting to know President Johnson,
and secondly, of the results of our conversa-
tions altogether.
President Johnson
It was more than two decades ago that I
first came to Europe. It is astonishing to ob-
serve the great progress that has been made
since I first came here.
That progress is a great tribute to the lead-
ership of the great man that we laid to rest
yesterday and whose passing we all mourn.
He would want us to do what we have done
today, and that is to reaffirm the friendship
that exists between the Federal Republic of
Germany and its peoples and the peoples of
the United States of America.
We have not made any hard and fast de-
cisions today, although we have explored
many of the interests of our respective
people. We talked about, first, that the people
in America hoped that it- may be possible for
the Chancellor and his lady to visit our coun-
try at an early date. We will both be in touch
MAY 15, 19S7
751
with each other about that date, and a new
announcement will be forthcoming.
At that time, we will review in depth and
perhaps have more announcements for you
concerning- the various subjects that are in
the public mind and of great interest to the
two nations: the nonproliferation treaty, the
trade and monetary matters, the troop de-
ployments, the security of the two nations,
and the prosperity of our people.
The Chancellor reviewed the viewpoint of
his people in connection with all of those
subjects. I attempted to tell him how we felt
about them.
It is clear from our discussions that the
friendship that has existed and the close re-
lationship that has existed between our two
countries for more than the past two decades
will be continued, that there will be constant,
complete, and full consultation between us
before decisions by either of us.
Both of us believe that those consultations
will not only be friendly but will be under-
standing, and will result in the agreement
and the approval of the peoples of both na-
tions.
True, there will be differences of opinion,
there will be decisions to be made and ad-
justments to be entered into; but we both
know that in unity there is strength, and we
both expect strength for our respective
peoples.
We want, more than anything else, peace
in the world and prosperity for all of its peo-
ples. By working together, we believe we can
best make our contributions to that end.
DEATH OF CHANCELLOR ADENAUER
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release dated April 19
Americans mourn the passing of Chancel-
lor Konrad Adenauer. To us, to Europe, and
to the world, he will always be a symbol of
the vitality and courage of the German
people. We will never forget his lifelong
opposition to tyranny in any form. Nor will
we forget how, with single-minded deter-
mination, he led his nation from the ruins of
war to a prosperous and respected position
in the family of free nations.
Konrad Adenauer will be missed every-
where, but his dauntless spirit will live on in
the Atlantic partnership he did so much to
create. The contribution he made is one from
which all free men will profit. There can be
no greater monument to the memory of a
great and beloved man.
Message From Secretary Rusk
Press release 92 dated April 19
Dear Mr. Vice Chancellor: May I ex-
press to you, Mr. Vice Chancellor, my deep
personal sorrow at the passing of Dr. Kon-
rad Adenauer who led your country so ably
and so long. My fellow countrymen join the
German people in this period of mourning.
Konrad Adenauer's long and creative life
will stand out in history as an inspiring ex-
ample of courage and dedication. For myself
it was a privilege and honor to have known
him; all of us will continue to benefit from
his great achievements.
752
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
"We do not expect Soviet ideology suddenly to dissolve in
a flood of American intentions. To the extent that coopera-
tion proceeds, it will have to reflect the solid interests of
both sides and it will have to be measured by the recipro-
cal actions of both sides."
United States Relations With the Soviet Union
by Under Secretary Katzenbach
How should we now deal with the Soviet
Union? I have been struck by the paradoxi-
cal answers offered, here and abroad, to that
question.
There are those who say, on occasions like
the recent Consular Convention debate, that
we cannot deal at all with the same Russians
who are supporting North Viet-Nam.
There are others who, on the same occa-
sions, insist that the Soviet Union has
changed so much in recent years that we now
have at hand that placid condition which has
come stylishly to be called detente.
I believe neither argument to be persua-
sive. It is no feat of statesmanship to assert
that it would be wrong for us to insist on
full, bellicose confrontation with the Soviet
Union nor, on the other hand, to say we
should guard against excessive optimism
about our relations with the Soviet Union.
What we should do, it seems to me, is to
acknowledge coldly the inherent present
limits to detente but also to analyze, en-
courage, and take those progressive steps
beneficial to the interests of the United
States and the West.
It is such an analysis about which I would
like to speak today, touching first on the pres-
ent obstacles to any large-scale detente, sec-
ond on why some steps are in our interests,
and third on the longer range relevance of
such steps.
' Address made before the Foreign Policy As-
sociation at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 21 (press
release 95, revised).
It is perhaps a law of nature, or at least
of politics, that when an abstract word is
much used, it is also ill-used. Detente is such
a word. Is there a detente with the Soviet
Union?
If by that one means simply some degree
of easing of tension, then certainly it is true
that tensions do not run as high today as
they did in the dark days of Stalin. But if by
detente one means that the basic issues which
gave rise to the cold war between the United
States and the U.S.S.R. are over and done
with, I would have to demur.
It is not yet possible — nor will it be pos-
sible even at the point that aggression is
turned back in Viet-Nam — to talk of an end
to confrontation. To do so is to talk of
harbingers and of hopes, not yet of facts.
While Viet-Nam, for example, has not
been the complete obstacle to cooperative
steps that might have been feared, Moscow
continues to provide Hanoi with economic
and military assistance, augmenting North
Viet-Nam's ability to persist in its aggres-
sion against South Viet-Nam. Confrontation
between East and West is hardly over.
An equal obstacle is the division of
Europe and Germany. The course of world
events is toward diversity and away from
the bipolar world of the 1950's. Yet in
Europe the East^West deadlock remains ap-
parent; Germany remains divided. Our secu-
rity is inseparable from that of our Atlantic
allies, and detente can have no real meaning
without a stable and secure Europe.
MAY 15, 1967
753
Another obstacle lies in the character of
the Soviet Union. Were it simply another
great power pursuing its national interests,
we would still live in a dangerous age. But
the Soviet Union is not just a great power
with nuclear might and with national in-
terests of its own. It is also the center of
supremely ambitious ideology. To be sure,
Soviet leaders have recently shown increas-
ing restraint and caution. Yet the ultimate
supremacy of communism remains central
to the Soviet world view.
The grounds of basic confrontation re-
main.
Because it is not yet possible to end this
confrontation, it does not follow that we must
accept a policy of unrelieved hostility. In his
handbook on English usage. Fowler divides
the English-speaking world into five parts:
those who neither know nor care what a split
infinitive is; those who do not know, but still
care very much; those who know and con-
demn; those who know and approve; and
those who know and distinguish.
What he finds true of syntax, I believe we
should find true of our dealings with the
Soviets. Surely we are able now to know and
to distinguish.
The cold war no longer means monolithic
belligerence. It may, indeed, be more ac-
curate to talk of many small cold battles than
of a single war, of many truces than of a
single armistice. And all involve shifting
interests and mobile fronts.
— In the Antarctic, for example, Soviet
and American scientists work in harmony.
In the Arctic both nations maintain vigil
against possible attack.
— We exchange weather data from space
satellites at the same time we compete in the
race to the moon.
— The Soviets responded to President
Johnson's October 7 speech ^ by saying we
were strangely deluded if we thought any
improvement in relations was possible while
the Viet-Nam war continued. A few days
later, they accepted our proposal to conclude
' For President Johnson's address at New York,
N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966,
p. 622.
an air agreement for direct air traffic be-
tween New York and Moscow.
The lesson, I would suggest, is that for our
part we ought not simply, on the basis of old
cold-war rigidities, to reject cooperative steps
— in the way many opposed a Consular Con-
vention. There may have been a time when
such inflexible, ideological, hostile responses
were appropriate. But we ought now to act
on self-interest, not self-righteousness.
I suggest that there are three categories
of constructive steps which have already
been taken or which it is possible to take.
One category involves common interests
between the United States and the Soviet
Union. The second category encompasses
complementary interests. The third category
involves compatible interests.
Common interests. By far the most im-
portant consideration for both nations is that
their great power places them in unique re-
lationship. For the first time in history, two
nations live each with its hands on the jugu-
lar of the other — and of every other nation.
One small manifestation of our common
interest in this most central of all subjects is
the hot line between Moscow and Washing-
ton, intended to provide both with the addi-
tional margin of insurance which instant
communication can afford against miscalcu-
lation.
A second common interest is that we each
have unfinished tasks at home which must be
dealt with at the expense of rivalry. We
each in our own contexts have internal fron-
tiers to push back — frontiers of poverty, in-
efficiency, discrimination, and frustration.
This is a consideration in which the Soviet
Union may well have an even greater stake
than we do. The gross national product of
the U.S.S.R. is about half of ours. The
Soviets have only begun to make the basic in-
vestments in consumer industry necessary to
approach the American standard of living.
The Soviets themselves have admitted seri-
ous shortages of housing, automobiles, appli-
ances, and at times even food. They face a
tremendous task in satisfying the rising as-
pirations of their people.
754
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Let me now turn to the second category:
Complementai'y interests.
Such an interest, in stability on the Asian
subcontinent, led the United States and the
Soviet Union to take independent but par-
allel action to allay the Kashmir dispute and
to offset Chinese mischief.
Another, quite different, example is that of
the Consular Convention. For the Soviets to
have the prospect of additional consulates in
the United States is no necessary loss to us.
For us to gain reciprocal rights, and for
American citizens to secure elemental pro-
tection when they visit the Soviet Union, are
hardly disadvantages to the Soviets.
Finally, there is the category of: Compat-
ible interests.
In a number of instances each country
calculates its gains and losses differently;
both may find the same step acceptable be-
cause of different assessments of relative
advantage.
Easl^West trade is one example. The
Soviets hope to buy capital equipment from
the West. We would like to see more con-
sumer goods provided to the Soviet people.
There may be the basis for trade arrange-
ments here which each side finds advan-
tageous.
Another manifestation comes in scientific
and cultural exchanges. The Soviets value
the opportunities for collecting technical in-
formation from scientific exchanges and the
propaganda impact of such cultural attrac-
tions as the Bolshoi Ballet. For our part, we
believe we gain more on our side by expos-
ing millions of Soviet citizens to the fruits of
our open society through exhibits and
monthly distribution of the magazine Amer-
ika.
Such environmental contacts mean famili-
arity and, the old axiom to the contrary,
familiarity should not mean contempt but
understanding.
What does this analysis mean in terms of
American foreign policy ?
So far, we have pursued, and often taken
the lead in, peaceful engagement: the Consu-
lar Convention, the Civil Air Agreement, the
Outer Space Treaty. We are seeking East-
West trade legislation in the Congress. We
have proposed talks on limiting defensive and
offensive missile deplojTnent.
In every case American and Soviet in-
terests are, or would be, served. In every case
progress is dependent on the willingness of
the Soviet Union to advance with us step by
step.
The Soviet Union shares with us the spe-
cial responsibility to build a more secure
world. Simultaneously, in my view, its own
self-interest demands such a policy. Soviet
leaders may find it awkward publicly to
agree with that assessment. But in any event,
detente obviously must work both ways.
The outline of the forward movement
sought by President Johnson and this admin-
istration is plain. As the President said last
August: 2
. . . what is the practical step forward in this
direction? I think it is to reco^ize that while
difTering principles and differing values may
always divide us, they should not, and they must
not, deter us from rational acts of common endeavor.
The dogmas and the vocabularies of the cold war
were enough for one generation. The world must
not now flounder in the backwaters of the old and
stagnant passions.
In concert with other interested countries:
— We seek to abate the strategic arms race.
We hope that continued discussion will lead
both sides to conclude that it is in neither's
interest to expand defensive and offensive
deployments.
— We seek a worldwide nonproliferation
agreement which will in fact inhibit the
spread of national nuclear weapons and will
be a step toward general disarmament.
— We would like to see the Soviet Union
join others in promoting more open East-
West relations in Europe. Attempts by the
Federal German Republic to develop more in-
timate ties with the Eastern European na-
tions should be encouraged, not hindered.
— And finally, we seek mutual restraint
and mutual influence for peace in troubled
areas, whether in the Middle East or Laos
or elsewhere. The greatest contribution
^ For President Johnson's address at Arco, Idaho,
on Aug. 26, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 19, 1966, p. 410.
MAY 15, 1967
755
would be to help bring an end to the fighting
in Viet-Nam.
In the meantime, in its relations with the
Soviet Union the United States will continue
to seek out the kinds of cooperation that are
now feasible. We do not expect Soviet
ideology suddenly to dissolve in a flood of
American intentions. To the extent that co-
operation proceeds, it will have to reflect the
solid interests of both sides and it will have
to be measured by the reciprocal actions of
both sides.
All this will not soon transfonn the world.
The process of change in the Communist
world and in East-West relations will be
slow at best. But it holds promise for us, for
our friends in Europe and the developing
countries — and for the U.S.S.R. It is for the
leaders of that great country to decide
whether this promise will, at the end of the
day, be fulfilled.
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Visits 11 African Countries
The Department of State announced on
April 26 (press release 97) that Under Sec-
retary Katzenbach would visit 11 African
countries May 10-27. He will be accompanied
by Mrs. Katzenbach, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for African Aff'airs Wayne Fred-
ericks, and several officials of the Department
of State.
Mr. Katzenbach will make his first stop
in Senegal and will proceed to Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Ghana, Congo (Kinshasa), Zambia,
Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Ethiopia.
The trip, which was originally planned for
February-March, will be the first extensive
tour of Africa to be taken by an Under Sec-
retary of State. Mr. Katzenbach's trip will
allow him to see a significant cross section
of African countries and to meet many Afri-
can officials and other personalities. It re-
flects his longstanding desire to visit Africa
and to see at firsthand some of the interest-
ing developments and trends in that conti-
nent.
World Trade Week, 1967
A PROCLAMATION'
World trade joins the United States with other
nations in a creative partnership that supports the
growth of our free enterprise economy and advances
the well-being of all our citizens.
Last year, total trade among the non-communist
countries amounted to about $180 billion. Since 1960,
this trade has grown by more than $67 billion, or
an annual rate of more than 8 percent. Trade among
the nations of the free world should reach the as-
tounding annual rate of $200 billion in the year
ahead.
The exchange of goods and services builds a foun-
dation for mutual trust among nations. It sustains
our hopes for the attainment of a better world, in
which all peoples may live in peace.
Expanding trade with nations around the world
accelerates the pace of economic progress at home
and abroad.
— It enlarges the opportunities for United States
businessmen to sell more products and services in
world markets. Since 1960, U.S. exports of merchan-
dise have risen by 50 percent. In 1966, they exceeded
$29 billion, close to $3 billion more than the year
before.
— It provides employment for more American
workers. About three and a half million Americans
are engaged, directly or indirectly, in the produc-
tion, transport and marketing of our exports. The
growth of this trade will create jobs for many more
workers in both rural and urban areas throughout
the United States.
— It widens the range of materials and consumer
goods available at competitive prices in the domestic
marketplace.
— It helps the developing countries make fuller use
of their energies and resources.
— It encourages the international exchange of
ideas, knowledge, and experience.
Vigorous expansion of our export volume is essen-
tial. We have succeeded in reducing the deficit in our
balance of payments, but we must make still further
improvement.
The United States will continue to support the re-
ciprocal reduction of trade barriers to stimulate the
flow of international commerce. To this purpose, an
early and successful completion of the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations is especially important.
There are only a few weeks remaining; by April 30,
major issues must be settled and a balance of con-
cessions achieved. The final agreement must be signed
by June 30. An historic opportunity to broaden vastly
the world's trade horizons is within reach. This
opportunity must not be lost.
' No. 3771; 32 Fed. Reg. B241.
756
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We are negotiating with other nations on the im-
provement of the international monetary system. In-
ternational agreement that will assure an adequate
growth of world reserves is a key to the future ex-
pansion of world trade.
We believe that trade also offers a means of
achieving fruitful, cooperation with the Soviet Union
and other Eastern European nations. In 1966, U.S.
exports to Eastern Europe totalled only $200 million
while other non-communist countries sold Eastern
Europe goods worth over $6 billion. U.S. ratification
of a consular agreement with the U.S.S.R., our vari-
ous trade missions to Eastern Europe, and our par-
ticipation in the 1967 food processing fair in Moscow
illustrate our effort to build bridges through trade.
We must continue to pursue lasting peace by seek-
ing out every possible course to healthy economic and
cultural relations with these countries.
The principal objective of our foreign trade policy
is to promote the increase of peaceful, profitable com-
merce among our Nation and others.
World Trade Week reaffirms and supports this
objective.
Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
proclaim the week beginning May 21, 1967, as
World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate
Federal, State, and local officials to cooperate in the
observance of that week.
I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educa-
tional, professional, and civic groups, as well as the
people of the United States generally, to observe
World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, ex-
hibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities
designed to promote continuing awareness of the
importance of world trade to our economy and our
relations with other nations.
In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-
fourth day of March, in the year of our
[seal] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and
of the Independence of the United States
of America the one hundred and ninety-first.
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
A Study of the Communist Party and Coalition Gov-
ernments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern
European Countries. Prepared for the Subcom-
mittee To Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security
Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
April 4, 1966. 33 pp. [Committee print.]
Contmgency Planning for U.S. International Mone-
tary Policy. Statements by private economists
submitted to the Subcommittee on International
Exchange and Payments of the Joint Economic
Committee. December 30, 1966. 160 pp. [Joint
Committee print.]
90th Congress, 1st Session
Fifth Annual Report of the Federal Maritime Com-
mission. Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc.
11. 47 pp.
Annual Report of the Maritime Administration.
Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 21.
116 pp.
Fiftieth Annual Report of the United States Tariff
Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30, 1966.
H. Doc. 26. 26 pp.
Fourth Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on International Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs. H. Doc. 32. January 10, 1967. 14 pp.
Consular Convention With the Soviet Union. Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. January 23-February 17, 1967. 374 pp.
The Communist World in 1967. Hearing before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with for-
mer Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugo-
slavia George F. Kennan. January 30, 1967. 68 pp.
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. Hearing
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
with former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O.
Reischauer. January 31, 1967. 76 pp.
Harrison E. Salisbury's Trip to North Vietnam.
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. February 2, 1967. 151 pp.
Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign
Policy. Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations with Henry Steele Commager,
Professor, Amherst College. February 20, 1967.
59 pp.
Conflicts Between United States Capabilities and
ForeigTi Commitments. Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Realtions with Lt. Gen.
James M. Gavin (U.S. Army, retired). February
21, 1967. 44 pp.
Our Changing Partnership With Europe. Report of
Special Study Mission to Europe, 1966, of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, November
25-December 16, 1966. H. Rept. 26. February 22,
1967. 53 pp.
MAY 15, 1967
757
Interdepartmental Committee on Water for Peace
Surveys World Water Problems
The Department of the Interior on April
10 released the text of a report prepared by
the Interdepartmental Committee on Water
for Peace ^ and transmitted to the Secretary
of the Interior and the Secretary of State by
the chairman of the Committee, Assistant
Secretary of the hiterior Kenneth Holum.
Following are the chairman's memorandum
of transmittal, an excerpt from the report
comprising the Committee's recommenda-
tions, and a list of the members of the Com-
mittee.
TEXT OF MEMORANDUM
President Johnson launched the Water for
Peace Program in his address of October 7,
1965,2 in which he pledged United States
participation in a "massive cooperative in-
ternational effort to find solutions for man's
water problems." Steps already have been
taken to increase U.S. support for water
projects within the foreign assistance pro-
gram. The enclosed report prepared by an
Interdepartmental Committee on Water for
Peace representing interested agencies of
the Federal Government briefly surveys the
world's water problems and considers fur-
ther actions which can be taken to advance
this international cooperative effort.
Water is vital to human life and to man's
pursuit of happiness. It is essential to man's
health, yet almost a billion people in the
world lack even the simplest dependable sup-
' Single copies of the 79-page report, Water for
Peace; A Report of Background Considerations and
Recommendations on the Water for Peace Program,
(March 1967), are available upon request from the
Water for Peace office, Department of the Interior,
Washington, D.C., 20240.
' Bulletin of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720.
plies of potable water for personal and do-
mestic use. Most of them suffer or have re-
cently suffered from debilitating diseases
that are water borne or that are attributable
to a lack of water for personal hygiene; each
year an estimated 500 million people are
afflicted by such illnesses, and ten million
people — about half of them infants — die.
Millions suffer undernourishment and star-
vation because water supplies are not prop-
erly used or developed for food production.
Water contributes in important ways to com-
merce and industrial development. Water
also is an integral part of the human en-
vironment.
All nations have water problems, but they
differ in kind and character depending upon
the nature and extent of their water re-
sources, the state of technological and indus-
trial development, population density, his-
torical experience, and cultural values. In the
industrialized countries these problems re-
volve around water management, water pol-
lution, and water reuse to serve highly intri-
cate and intensive demands. In the less
developed countries the lack of information,
skilled manpower, cultural, legal and govern-
ment institutions, and adequate planning
represent the areas of most immediate need.
International river systems in all regions of
the world present significant opportunities
to the riparian countries for mutual advan-
tage and peaceful cooperation through co-
ordinated development programs.
For these reasons, an international coop-
erative effort to advance water development
throughout the world is aptly named the Wa-
ter for Peace Program because the water
cycle pays no attention to the boundaries
men draw on maps; because hunger, disease
and misery are everywhere the enemies of
mankind; because no one nation has a mo-
758
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nopoly of knowledge and talent; and because
by working together toward the solution of
their common problems, men advance a little
down the road to universal peace.
Chapter II of the enclosed report sum-
marizes the ways in which water can fulfill
human needs and promote a better life.
Chapter III reviews the programs required
to develop water resources to serve these
purposes, particularly from the point of view
of national and local entities responsible for
water development programs. Chapter IV
describes the opportunities available to de-
velop international river systems. Chapter V
briefly reviews the many interrelated bi-
lateral and multilateral programs and orga-
nizations operating to improve water de-
velopment. Chapter VI discusses several sug-
gested organizational arrangements that
should be undertaken to improve mutual
cooperation in water development within the
United Nations family, at the regional and
subregional level, and within the United
States to support the worldwide effort.
Chapter VII sets forth a number of spe-
cific recommendations which the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Water for Peace
believes are worthy of consideration to
stimulate the rate of progress in water de-
velopment throughout the world and to pro-
mote a more systematic framework in which
the efforts of individual countries and inter-
national organizations can be coordinated to
fulfill this end.
This preliminary review of the world's
water problems has led the Committee to
four basic conclusions: First, that notwith-
standing the many significant current inter-
national water programs, the worldwide
effort is not keeping pace with the worldwide
needs. Second, water problems are so varied
and the opportunities for development so
complex, that water resources development
in each country should be fully coordinated
with the development of other economic and
human resources. Third, that the most
urgent need throughout the developing world
is for an increased understanding of and
capacity to deal with the problems involved
in water resources development and manage-
ment. Fourth, that existing and anticipated
technological advances make possible the
solutions of problems which earlier were
considered insurmountable.
Within the framework of these conclusions
the recommendations include a number of
specific proposals to provide more data and
ijiformation about water problems, re-
sources, and opportunities for development;
more trained manpower to put knowledge
and technology to work; improved planning
and organization of water programs at local,
national and regional levels; and enhanced
utilization of science and technology for
water development. The recommendations
also implement the Committee's belief that
many of the cooperative efforts of the world
community to assist in these programs can
best be coordinated by, and channeled
through, strengthened or newly established
multilateral institutions and programs at the
regional and subregional levels.
No specific recommendations are included
with respect to international financing of
construction projects other than that this
subject be further studied and kept under
constant surveillance. One reason for this is
that the immediate need is not for new capi-
tal financing but for more well-planned proj-
ects which can meet the lending require-
ments of the many existing sources of
financial assistance. Second, internal sources
of financing must be more thoroughly sur-
veyed since these sources must provide the
greatest percentage of capital requirements.
A third consideration is that many of the
countries in greatest need of new water
facilities lack the technical and institutional
capacity to operate and maintain them after
construction.
Inasmuch as this report has been pre-
pared by a group within the United States
Government, these recommendations are
focussed on what the United States might do
both through its own programs and through
its representation and voice in international
councils in urging other nations to make
parallel and cooperative contributions. This
should not obscure recognition of the basic
premise that nations and regions of the
MAY 15, 1967
759
world which have water problems and desire
to respond to them by promoting water de-
velopment, must undertake this responsi-
bility themselves. Through the Water for
Peace Program the world community can
exchange knowledge and experience, offer
encouragement, supply technology, and pro-
vide technical and financial assistance, but
one nation or region cannot do the job for
any other. This principle of self-help is fun-
damental to the program.
In addition it is hoped that this report,
which was produced primarily for the pur-
pose of orienting the thinking in U.S. gov-
ernment agencies toward making a more ef-
fective contribution to solving the world's
water problems, will be useful to participants
at the International Conference on Water for
Peace. It seems probable that it contains
material which should be helpful in discus-
sions, and should stimulate action along con-
structive lines.
EXCERPT FROM REPORT— CHAPTER VII:
RECOMMENDATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The following recommendations are advanced by
the Interdepartmental Committee on Water for
Peace in the belief that they are worthy of consid-
eration to stimulate the rate of progress in water
development throughout the world and to promote
a more systematic framework in which the efforts
of individual countries and international organiza-
tions can be coordinated to fulfill this end.
The recommendations take into account the pro-
grams the President has launched to combat hunger,
ignorance and disease and the corresponding
planned increases in U.S. aid to international
agricultural, educational, and health programs. Al-
though addressed to the subject of what the United
States additionally might do, both through its own
programs and through its representation and voice
in international councils in urging other nations
to make parallel and cooperative contributions, the
recommendations are founded on the basic premise
that nations and regions of the world which have
water problems and desire to respond to them by
promoting water development, must undertake this
responsibility themselves. Through the international
Water for Peace Program the world community
can exchange knowledge and experience, offer
encouragement, supply technology, and provide
technical and financial assistance, but one nation or
region cannot do the job for any other. This princi-
ple of self-help is fundamental to the program.
The recommendations are for both short- and
long-term actions. Although they focus on water
problems and ways to solve them, all such efforts
should be planned within the broader framework
of the overall economic and social development
requirements of the respective country or region.
The goal of giving the less developed countries in-
creased ability to solve their own problems requires
stress on more . extensive planning; education and
training at the subprofessional and professional
levels; institution building; discovery of new ways
to utilize local labor, local materials and equipment,
and local sources of finance; and enhanced applica-
tion of science and technology. A regional or
subregional approach to many of these problems can
be especially useful.
In the long run, progress in solving water prob-
lems will be measured through new capital con-
struction, ranging in size from the installation of
simple sanitation facilities to the construction of
large-scale river basin projects. Most of the financ-
ing inevitably must come from local and national
sources. Supplementary capital assistance must also
be provided from international and bilateral sources,
at expanded levels; requirements for this financing
will need to be under constant review and should
be related to the ability of countries to use the as-
sistance effectively.
The recommendations that follow are not mutu-
ally exclusive. Some overlap ; all are complementary.
For example, the program under the International
Hydrological Decade supplements activities covered
in four preceding sections on regional centers, edu-
cation and training, research and information and
data. This does not result in a duplication of
activity, rather, the objectives of one recommenda-
tion will be advanced by the successful carrying
out of other related recommendations.
1. Water for Living
a. Goals. — We recommend that the United States
encourage countries and regions having water sup-
ply problems to establish realistic goals for their
national efforts, as Latin America has done in the
Charter of Punta del Este.' For example, consid-
eration might be given to establishing the goal that
by 1980 the percentage of urban and rural popula-
tions in the developing countries served by piped
drinking water will be increased at least by 50
percent.
b. U.S. Bilateral Community Water Supply De-
velopment Program. — (1) We recommend an in-
crease in U.S. financial assistance to community
water supply and sewerage projects in areas of
critical need. This assistance should include pro-
' For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see
ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
760
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
vision for necessary institutional support to estab-
lish and operate water supply installations, includ-
ing training programs and the enactment of
national water legislation if necessary.
(2) We recommend that the United States sponsor
and cooperate in studies into ways and means to
sharply accelerate improvement in urban and rural
water supplies throughout the developing world con-
sistent with the establishment of an institutional
base that will in the future provide adequate water
supplies financed largely through local revenues.
c. International Water Supply Effort. — We recom-
mend that the community water supply programs of
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) be
strengthened and that all governments and other in-
ternational organizations increase technical assist-
ance and capital support for community water
supply programs.
d. Desalination. — (1) We recommend that the
United States offer to assist in the construction of —
(a) Small- and medium-scale desalination plants,
including solar stills, in those areas where the need
for additional drinking water is critical, where
humanitarian purposes would be fulfilled, and where
there is no obviously cheaper source;
(6) Desalination plants in areas where acute
water shortages exist or occur unexpectedly or
where economic development is retarded to the point
of stagnation ;
(c) Large-scale desalting plants, particularly
when joined with the production of electrical en-
ergy, which can make a dramatic impact in the
solution of specific water problems. Decisions to
assist in capital arrangements for such large-scale
plants will, of course, have to be preceded by care-
ful assessment of individual projects as presented.
(2) We recommend that the United States con-
tinue to offer to provide all appropriate technical
assistance to countries interested in developing
desalting projects.
e. Pollution Control. — (1) We recommend that the
Water for Peace Program be used as a foundation
for a world effort at providing clean, health-preserv-
ing water. The U.S. contribution to this, which will
depend heavily on the expanded Community Water
Supply Development Program of AID, should be
coordinated with those health activities which are
to be carried out under the proposed International
Health Act of 1966," and also with the health activi-
ties of other governments, the specialized agencies
of the U.N., and other organizations as appropriate.
(2) We recommend that pollution problems both
in developed and developing countries be discussed
at the International Conference on Water for Peace.
•* For text of President Johnson's message to
Congress on international education and health, see
ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.
2. Water for Food
a. Goals. — We recommend that the United States
encourage countries needing more water and water
management for increased food production to estab-
lish specific goals, at least over the next 10 years
to support their plans for food production to feed
their expected population. Goals should be set for
the development of water resources through im-
proved water uses, supplemental water supply,
elimination of flood damage, improved water man-
agement, installation of needed drainage facilities,
addition of new irrigation acreage, and fish produc-
tion and processing.
b. Expansion of AID Programs. — It is recom-
mended that AID'S expanded activities in support
of the President's Food for Freedom Program in-
clude assistance for the solution of agricultural
water problems, including planning, training, de-
velopment of irrigation and reclamation facilities,
flood control and drainage improvements, which,
together with that furnished by all other sources,
will support the attainment of the planned levels
of food production.
c. Support to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion.— We recommend that the United States urge
the strengthening of the FAO, especially with re-
spect to increased development and improved use of
surface and ground water resources, and irrigation,
drainage and flood control, for agriculture; improve-
ment and management of upland watersheds; and
greater production of fish for food, particularly
fish farming in conjunction with agricultural land
use, notably in rice-producing areas, and for con-
ducting studies, inventories and the establishment
of demonstration projects for promoting fishery
production in coastal estuaries.
d. Opportunities for Fish Production and Process-
ing.— Water development programs, where appropri-
ate, should provide for protection of fishery re-
sources and their development, including methods
for harvesting, processing, distribution, and market-
ing in an efficient and economic manner. Emphasis
should be placed on management for sustainable
yield of fisheries resources and on development of
fish protein concentrate from freshwater species.
e. U.S.-Owned Local Currencies for Water Devel-
opment.— (1) We recommend that, within the con-
text of country program priorities, a portion of
U.S.-owned excess local currencies be offered for
the creation of agricultural development banks (or
be added to the resources of existing banks) for
irrigation and other water conservation and develop-
ment activities and for making loans to farmers
for these purposes.
(2) We recommend that foreign currencies to be
obtained under the Food for Freedom Program be
used more extensively for the development of water
projects.
(3) We recommend that a larger share of excess
MAY 15, 1967
761
foreign currency funds available to the U.S. Gov-
ernment be used for research on water-related
problems. Where congressional authorization is re-
quired, it should be sought. Any other limitations
which might prevent the use of such funds for
research on local water problems within developing
countries should be removed.
f. Special Demonstration Projects. — We recom-
mend that AID give special attention to large-
scale projects for demonstration and training of
nationals, consisting of coordinated development of
water and land resources to be established in trib-
utary watershed areas in selected countries or
regions suffering a critical food shortage. In most
instances these projects could be integ^rated with
or become a part of river basin development
projects.
3. Water for International Cooperation — Interna-
tional Rivers
We recommend that nations sharing international
river basins as well as appropriate U.N. agencies be
encouraged to give special attention to the coopera-
tive development of international river systems,
not only to realize the full economic values of their
development but also because such effort is in itself
a valuable encouragement to general international
cooperation.
In support of this policy, we recommend:
(1) That the United States encourage the Sec-
retary-General of the United Nations to pursue his
suggestion of early 1966 to conduct a survey of
the potential for development in international
rivers, but along regional or subregional lines and
on a selective basis with respect to specific river
basin projects. Although financing of regional sur-
veys would presumably be through the UNDP
[United Nations Development Program], the United
States should be ready to make contributions to
arrangements for such surveys.
(2) That the United States encourage with other
interested nations and U.N. agencies to give priority
to the development of at least one additional inter-
national river basin in each continent.
(3) That the United States encourage countries
bordering on international rivers to join in creating
appropriate international bodies to promote the
cooperative development of the river systems.
(4) That the United States in calling the Water
for Peace Conference invite the participants to
report on studies of the development potentials of
international river systems of particular interest
to them.
4. Regional Centers for Water Resources Develop-
ment
(1) We recommend that the United States offer
to assist in the creation or strengthening of a num-
ber of regional or subregional centers for water
resources development, where appropriate, under
the leadership of regional and subregional interna-
tional entities, particularly the United Nations
regional economic commissions and the Organization
of American States. The sponsoring organization
and the participating countries of the region should
in each case work out the location and functions of
the center and its relations with other institutions.
(2) The sponsoring organization and the partici-
pating countries of the region should clearly estab-
lish their determination to provide long-term sup-
port for each center.
(3) The United States should be prepared, at
least by the time of the international conference,
to offer to contribute a substantial percentage of
the annual cost for the first 5 years of nine new
centers. The goal might be to establish or expand
two centers in 1968, three in 1969, and four in 1970.
5. Education and Training
a. Regional Institutions for Professional Train-
ing.— We recommend the creation or enlargement
of a number of regional or subregional institutions
and programs for professional training sponsored
by appropriate multinational groups or by national
groups with appropriate multinational involvement.
A major input also could come from participation
by industrial and other private groups. The func-
tions of these institutions, we suggest, would be
to provide undergraduate and graduate education
in water-related disciplines, either as separate in-
stitutions or as adjuncts to existing universities.
The Water for Peace Program should be prepared
to contribute to the support of these institutions,
including arranging for the exchange of professors
and scientists, as discussed below. These centers
would complement, or, in appropriate cases, be
combined with the Regional Centers for Water Re-
sources Development proposed in recommendation 4
above.
b. Regional Technical and Vocational Training. —
(1) We recommend that the United States, in co-
operation with U.N. agencies and other countries,
establish regional programs to train teams of in-
structors who can conduct vocational training in
connection with water resources projects.
(2) We recommend that where special skills are
required, special courses or training centers should
be organized on a regional basis.
(3) We recommend an expansion of the U.S.
program of sponsoring regional short-term insti-
tutes on a continuing basis outside of the United
States for training technicians in water specialties.
(4) We recommend that private industry and
other private groups be considered as a source of
instruction, personnel, materials, equipment and
financing in these programs.
c. Education and Training Programs in the
United States. — We recommend that the U.S. Gov-
762
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ernnient assist universities, foundations, schools and
Government agencies to improve their programs
for the training of both foreign and U.S. nationals
in curricula and practical field techniques essential
to international water resources development. It
would be desirable to have arrangements facilitat-
ing the return of advanced students in the United
States to their own countries later to do thesis
work.
d. Exchange and Fellowships Programs. — We
recommend an expansion of exchange programs for
professors, government officials, water specialists,
and other experienced persons active in water
matters. We also recommend an expansion of ex-
change fellowship programs for graduate students
in all fields related to water resources development.
e. Education Study. — We recommend that the
United States urge and support the initiation by an
appropriate U.N. organization of a survey of availa-
ble data concerning the facilities available and
explicit needs for expanded education and training
in water resources subjects.
f. Peace Corps. — We recommend that the Peace
Corps give greater emphasis to training and direct
assistance on water resources development activities.
g. Coordination With International Education
Programs. — In his message on international educa-
tion and health, the President made a number of
proposals to strengthen U.S. position in interna-
tional education programs. We recommend that as
appropriate these programs include attention to
education, training and study in the fields related
to water resources development.
6. Research and Surveys
a. Existing Research Programs. — We recommend
that on-going domestic research programs in the
water field be encouraged and expanded, and that
results and findings that could be of value in solv-
ing the world's water problems be made available
to the world community on a regular basis.
b. Research and Development on Specific Prob-
lems.— We recommend that the Water for Peace
Program give active support to research, including
testing, directed to the solution of specific problems
in water resources development that are particularly
characteristic of the less developed countries. Fund-
ing could come in part from U.S.-owned local cur-
rency funds.
c. Regional Centers for Tropical Research. — We
recommend that the United States contribute finan-
cial and other support to the establishment and
operation of several regional or subregional research
centers, where appropriate, to study water-related
problems peculiar to tropical areas. This research
function might be added to those already assigned
to the proposed Regional Water Resources Develop-
ment Centers. Participation by universities located
in the regions should be enlisted by the centers.
d. Cooperative Research and Studies. — We recom-
mend that broadly representative teams of U.S.
experts be formed to engage in research and studies
in cooperation with other countries on international
and regional problems of water conservation and
management of mutual interest.
e. Resource Reconnaissance Surveys. — We recom-
mend that the developing countries participating in
the international conference mutually establish a
common goal of completing by 1975 compatible re-
connaissance surveys of their water and related land
resources. If possible, this would be desirable against
a background of overall resource inventories; and
demographic and economic surveys could also be
useful. To this end, the United States should offer
technical assistance, as requested, and employ all
available and newly developed techniques of radar,
modern photography, and remote-sensing equipment
as appropriate.
f. Use of Satellites. — We recommend that the co-
operation of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) be enlisted in the Water
for Peace Program to study the feasibility of mak-
ing surveys of water and related resources on a
world basis, using instrumented earth orbiting
vehicles.
g. Basic Data Networks. — We recommend that
the United States offer to assist with the planning,
design, and establishment of new or enlarged basic-
data networks and compilation systems, particularly
in the developing countries.
h. Resource Studies and Project Evaluation. — We
recommend that the United States provide increased
support for planning studies of integrated resources
development and in the application of project evalu-
ation methods, and that the U.S. and international
banking institutions be encouraged to expand their
activities along these lines.
7. Information, Data and Publications
a. hiformation and Data Retrieval. — We endorse
and support current U.S. efforts to establish facili-
ties and advisory councils for coordinated water
resources information retrieval and data storage
and retrieval, and we recommend that the systems
include categories relating to international water
activities as well as domestic.
b. Assistayice to Regional Centers. — We recom-
mend that the United States provide assistance to
the Regional Centers for Water Resources Develop-
ment and to other regional groups in regard to the
establishment of libraries, publications exchange,
water information retrieval, and the development of
interest profiles to take advantage of U.S. and other
retrieval facilities.
c. Publications Exchange. — We recommend that
studies of existing facilities and programs for inter-
national exchange of publications relating to water
resources be made with a view to improving these
MAY 15, 1967
763
programs and filling in the gaps; that limited funds
be made available to finance publications exchanges;
and that the subject of international publication
exchanges be discussed at the international confer-
ence.
d. Translations. — We recommend that arrange-
ments be made for the translations of pertinent tech-
nical reports, manuals, and textbooks into other lan-
guages where such materials are needed.
8. International H ydrological Decade
We recommend that the United States participate
fully in the International Hydrological Decade, and
we support the proposals of the U.S. National Com-
mittee [for the International Hydrological Decade]
for inclusion under the Water for Peace Program.
9. United Nations Programs
a. Strengthened Water Program. — We recommend
that the United States reinforce and support the
United Nations, the specialized agencies and the in-
ternational development banks in accelerated and
expanded programs for water resources develop-
ment. We also recommend that the United States
support increased allocation of funds for technical
assistance and preinvestment surveys in the U.N.
Development Program. The United States is
planning to increase its pledge to the UNDP for
1967 by $5 million; and expects to continue increas-
ing its contributions in future years, with the
result that additional financing should be available
for water development projects as well as other
purposes.
b. Intergovernmental Committee on Water Ques-
tions.— It is recommended that the U.S. Govern-
ment, in addition to its support of the U.N. Ad-
ministrative Committee on Coordination, support the
establishment of an intergovernmental committee on
water questions under the Economic and Social
Council in order to help fill the need for a higher
level coordinating mechanism among the many
elements of the United Nations that are concerned
with water questions.
c. Ground Water Surveys. — We recommend that
the United States encourage the U.N. to undertake
a 5-year program of assembling, compiling and
making available in published or other suitable
form, information and data relating to the ground
water resources in developing countries.
10. Foreign Bilateral Programs
We recommend that the United States representa-
tive inform the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) in Paris of the proposed Water for Peace
Program, including the international conference,
and urge increased support for water resources
projects in the bilateral programs of the member
nations.
11. Water Law and Legal Institutions
a. Legal Aspects of International Rivers. — The
U.S. Government should encourage governmental
and private organizations in the United States and
abroad and international agencies to continue to
study and make available the legal aspects of the
use and development of water resources of inter-
national rivers and river basins. The United States
should also encourage specific bilateral and regional
arrangements, in each case of international river
basin development, to establish agreed legal prin-
ciples, including provisions for the settlement of
disputes through permanent institutions selected for
the particular development.
b. Water Legislation. — We recommend that assist-
ance be provided by the United States, by regional
centers and by other countries to each developing
nation asking aid in establishing the codes and legal
institutions necessary for the rapid and orderly
development of its water resources. We also recom-
mend that legal studies be included in the programs
of U.S. international centers.
c. U.N. Legal Experts. — The United States should
urge that U.N. development programs relating to
water resources should provide legal experts to the
countries being assisted. These experts should give
advice and assistance on international and domestic
water law problems and on the organization and
functioning of international and domestic institu-
tions needed for water resource development.
iZ. Strengthening U.S. Capabilities to Support Over-
seas Water Development
a. Careers in International Water Service. — We
recommend that appropriate steps be taken to en-
courage U.S. experts in all water-related disciplines
from both inside and outside of Government to con-
centrate on, or to augment their professional careers
by, studies and work in overseas water problems.
b. Expert Teams. — We recommend an expansion in
the capacity of the United States to send abroad
qualified teams of water resources experts to pro-
vide various technical services to countries and re-
gional entities requesting such help, particularly
with regard to planning, administering, and financ-
ing water resource programs.
c. Water for Peace Organization. — We recommend
the establishment within the U.S. Government of a
Water for Peace Office, under interdepartmental
guidance, to coordinate U.S. participation in over-
seas water resource efforts, to serve as a central
point to stimulate interest in international water
programs, and to ensure the effective discharge of
U.S. commitments under the Water for Peace Pro-
gram.
d. Mobilizing Private Participation. — The Water
for Peace Program should promote the interest and
cooperation in international water activities of indi-
764
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
viduals and of universities, private organizations,
industry, and State governments, through such
mechanisms as conferences and seminars, advisory
committees, information exchanges, and group co-
operation.
13. r/ie International Conference on Water for Peace
The United States will sponsor an International
Conference on Water for Peace in Washington, D.C.,
on May 23-31, 1967. This Conference should serve
to identify problems, exchange knowledge, discuss
goals, and consider cooperative action programs in
furtherance of the worldwide objectives of the Water
for Peace Program.
MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department
of the Interior, chairman
John A. Baker, Assistant Secretary, Department of
Agriculture
Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Department of the
Army
Philip Lee, Assistant Secretary, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
Albert H. Moseman, Assistant Administrator,
Agency for International Development
Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department
of State
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy
Commission
Robert White, Administrator, Environmental Sci-
ence Services Administration, Department of
Commerce
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on April 17 confirmed the nomina-
tion of Claude G. Ross to be Ambassador to Haiti.
(For biographic details, see White House press
release dated March 22.)
Designations
Miss Barbara M. Watson as Acting Administra-
tor of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs,
effective April 17. (For biographic details, see De-
partment of State press release 94 dated April 19.)
Appointments
Nathan Lewin as Deputy Administrator of the
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective
April 17. (For biographic details, see Department
of State press release 94 dated April 19.)
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Protocol to amend the convention for the unifica-
tion of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague
September 28, 1955. Entered into force August
1, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, March 16,
1967.
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem-
ber 14, 1963.*
Signature: Saudi Arabia, April 6, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into
force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Senegal, April 21, 1967.
Properly
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered
into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Morocco, April 15, 1967.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Somali Republic, March 30,
1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.*
Senate advice and consent to ratification: April
25, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
MAY 15, 1967
765
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.'
Ratifications deposited: Iceland, March 8, 1967;
Jordan, Peru, March 1, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959
(TIAS 4893, 5603), to put into effect a revised
frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical
mobile (R) service and related information, with
annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.^
Notifications of approval: Austria, March 2, 1967;
Canada, February 23, 1967; Denmark, February
28, 1967.
Trade
Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967.
Acceptances: Korea, March 15, 1967; Austria,
March 15, 1967;' Turkey, March 20, 1967;
Netherlands, March 30, 1967;" United States,
April 21, 1967.
BILATERAL
Indonesia
Agreement relating to the furnishing of military
equipment, materials, and services for a program
of civic action. Effected by exchange of notes
at Djakarta April 14, 1967. Entered into force
April 14, 1967.
Israel
Understanding regarding certain errors in the
translation of the Hebrew text of the extradition
convention of December 10, 1962 (TIAS 5476).
Effected by exchange of notes at Jerusalem and
Tel Aviv April 4 and 11, 1967. Entered into force
April 11, 1967.
Poland
Agreement relating to the use of zlotys accrued
under the agricultural commodities agreement of
February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), for international
travel. Effected by an exchange of letters at
Warsaw April 10, 1967. Entered into force April
10, 1967.
Agreement on understandings relating to the level
of Polish purchases in the United States in 1967
and 1968 under the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517).
Effected by an exchange of letters at Warsaw
April 10, 1967. Entered into force April 10, 1967.
Agreement supplementary to the agreement of
February 3, 1964 (TIAS 5517), relating to the
use of zlotys for English language teaching and
to finance programs under the Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (75 Stat.
527). Effected by an exchange of notes at Warsaw
April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force April
11, 1967.
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreements of June 7, 1957, as amended (TIAS
3839, 3878, 3973, 4243, 4532) ; February 15, 1958,
as amended (TIAS .3991, 4046, 4243, 4532) ; June
10, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4245, 4288, 4415,
4532); July 21, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4535);
December 15, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4907,
4998) ; and February 3, 1964, as amended (TIAS
5517). Effected by an exchange of notes at War-
saw April 10 and 11, 1967. Entered into force
April 11, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
' Subject to ratification.
" Ad referendum.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1455
PUBLICATION 8235
MAY IS, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services. Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested aerencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
766
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX May 15, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U55
Africa. Under Secretary Katzenbach Visits 11
African Countries 756
Asia. SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To
Hepel Aggression (Kusk, communique) . . . 742
Australia. ANZUS Council Discusses Political
and Security Problems (text of communique) 749
Canada. U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area
North and South of Viet-Nam DMZ ... 750
Congress
Confirmations (Ross) 765
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 757
A Report to the Congress by the Commander
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West-
moreland) 738
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Lewin) 765
Confirmations (Ross) 765
Designations (Watson) 765
Economic Affairs
Interdepartmental Committee on Water for
Peace Surveys World Water Problems (chair-
man's memorandum and excerpt from report) 758
SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel
Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742
Foreign Aid. Interdepartmental Committee on
Water for Peace Surveys World Water Prob-
lems (chairman's memorandum and excerpt
from report) 758
Germany. President Johnson Attends Funeral
of Konrad Adenauer (Johnson, Kiesinger,
Rusk) 751
Greece. U.S. Reviews Situation in Greece Fol-
lowing Military Takeover (Rusk) .... 750
Haiti. Ross confirmed as Ambassador .... 765
Health. Interdepartmental Committee on Water
for Peace Surveys World Water Problems
(chairman's memorandum and excerpt from
report) 758
International Organizations and Conferences
ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Secu-
rity Problems (text of communique) . . . 749
SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel
Aggression (Rusk, communique) 742
Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on
Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747
Military Affairs
A Report to the Congrress by the Commander
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West-
moreland) 738
U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and
South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750
New Zealand. ANZUS Council Discusses Politi-
cal and Security Problems (text of com-
munique) 749
Presidential Documents
President Johnson Attends Funeral of Konrad
Adenauer 751
World Trade Week, 1967 756
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. SEATO
Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel Aggres-
sion (Rusk, communique) 742
Trade. World Trade Week, 1967 (proclama-
tion) 756
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 765
U.S.S.R. United States Relations With the
Soviet Union (Katzenbach) 753
United Nations. Interdepartmental Committee
on Water for Peace Surveys World Water
Problems (chairman's memorandum and ex-
cerpt from report) 758
Viet-Nam
ANZUS Council Discusses Political and Secu-
rity Problems (text of communique) . . . 749
A Report tn the Coneress by t^^e Commander
of U.S. Military Forces in Viet-Nam (West-
mmelund) . . 738
SEATO Council Reaffirms Resolve To Repel
Aggression (Kusk, communique) 742
Seven Asian and Pacific Nations Consult on
Efforts in Viet-Nam (text of communique) 747
U.S. Proposes 10-Mile Buffer Area North and
South of Viet-Nam DMZ 750
Water for Peace. Interdepartmental Committee
on Water for Peace Surveys World Water
Problems (chairman's memorandum and ex-
cerpt from report) 758
Name Index
Johnson, President 751, 756
Katzenbach. Nicholas deB 753
Kiesinger, Kurt (Seorg "751
Lewin, Matnan 765
Ross, Claude G 765
Rusk, Secretary 742, 750, 751
Watson, Miss Barbara M 765
Westmoreland, Gen. William C 738
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 24-30
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to April 24 which ap-
pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos.
92 of April 19 and 95 of April 21.
No.
Date
Subject
97 4/26 Itinerary for visit of Under Sec-
retary Katzenbach to Africa,
May 10-27.
*98 4/28 Heath sworn in as Ambassador
to Sweden (biographic details).
*99 4/29 Katzenbach: acceptance of 1967
Bellarmine Medal, Bellarmine
College, Louisville, Ky.
flOO 4/29 Harriman: "The United States
and Eastern Europe in Per-
spective."
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
ii U.S. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-937/45
Superintendent of Documents
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U56
May 22, 1967
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Address by Secretai-y Rusk 770
SEVENTEEN YEARS IN EAST ASIA
by Assistant Secretary Bundy 790
AMBASSADOR LODGE DISCUSSES VIET-NAM
IN NEW YORK TIMES INTERVIEW 795
A CONVERSATION WITH DEAN RUSK
Transcript of Intei'vieio
on National Educational Television Network 77 U
For index see inside back cover
The Role of the United States in World Affairs
Address by Secretary Rusk '■
I am deeply complimented by your invi-
tation and this chance to express my
respect and appreciation to the United States
Chamber of Commerce. I have 20 minutes
in which to talk to you about our relations
with the rest of the world. I shall use short-
hand, therefore, and not pursue each para-
graph to its obvious conclusion. Perhaps I
might offer some thoughts which will be of
some use to you in your discussions of the
next 3 days.
Let us begin by noting the enormous
capacity of the United States. We need not
dwell on our military power. It is so vast
that the effects of its use are beyond the
comprehension of the mind of man. It is
so vast that we dare not allow ourselves
to become infuriated.
Our economic strength is only slightly
less formidable. The gross national product
of the United States equals that of all of
the rest of NATO and Japan combined. It
is twice that of the Soviet Union, and the
gap is widening. It is 10 times that of main-
land China, out of which they must try to
take care of the needs of more than 700
million people. It is 10 times that of all
of Latin America combined.
What the United States does, therefore,
is of vital importance to the rest of the
world. It is necessary for us to be reasonably
predictable — both by our friends and by
' Made before the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States at Washington, D.C., on May 1 (press
release 101).
those who might be our adversaries. Were
we not to remain steady on course, the
world situation could disintegrate into the
law of the jungle and utter chaos.
General Omar Bradley, a very wise man,
once said that the time has come for us to
chart our course by the distant stars and
not by the lights of each passing ship. To-
day I wish to identify some of those distant
stars.
Our foreign policy derives from the kind
of people we are and from the international
environment in which we live. It is rela-
tively simple, relatively long term, and
nonpartisan. I have now had the privilege of
being present for hundreds of meetings of
committees and subcommittees of the Con-
gress in executive session. On no single
occasion have differences of view turned on
party lines. There are, of course, differences
of view — as there would be in this audience
and as there are within the executive branch.
Most of our problems are complex, and
many of them turn upon razoredge differ-
ences in judgment. But it is no accident
that the main lines of our policy under
Democratic and Republican administrations
have been national in character.
Our supreme aspiration is "to secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity." This means that the beginning
of our foreign policy is the kind of society
we build here at home. Our example casts
its shadow around the globe. Our words
about freedom and justice would ring
hollow if we were not making it apparent
770
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
that we were trying to make our own
society a gleaming example of what free
men can accomplish under the processes of
consent. The performance of our economic
system under the conditions of liberty is
itself one of the most powerful supports of
the simple notions of liberty to which we
as a nation are dedicated.
Our policy reflects the inescapable reality
that we can no longer find national security
in a world which is torn with violence and
aggression and the awful reality that a
great war fought with modern weapons
would destroy most of our civilization.
Maintenance of Peace
A central problem of our nation, therefore,
must be to pursue an organized peace — a
lasting peace, a world in which disputes are
settled by peaceful means, a world free of
the threat of thermonuclear catastrophe, in
which each nation lives under institutions
of its own choice but in which all nations
and peoples cooperate to promote their
mutual welfare.
This does not mean that we are the
world's policeman. It does not mean we
aspire to a Pax Americana. We do not par-
ticipate in most of the crises which arise
in different parts of the world. We use our
diplomatic resources and our membership
in such bodies as the United Nations to try
to lay the hand of restraint upon high
tempers and excessive violence and to help
find ways and means to bring about a peace-
ful settlement of the many disputes that
appear upon the world's agenda.
But we do have our own more direct
share in maintaining the peace. We have
more than 40 allies with whom we are
mutually pledged to resist aggression. These
alliances were formed through the most
solemn process of our Constitution — the
treaty process. Their purpose was to let
others know in advance that aggression
against those to whom we are committed
will not be accepted. I hope that you will
not consider it presumption for me to say
that the integrity of these alliances is at
the heart of the maintenance of peace, and
if it should be discovered that the pledge
of the United States is meaningless, the
structure of peace would crumble and we
would be well on our way to a terrible
catastrophe.
Arms Reduction
We must try with all of our intelligence
and skill to turn downward the arms race.
It is not easy when there are those who will
not accept simple requirements of inspection
to give assurance that agreements will be
carried out. It will not be easy so long as
there are major unresolved questions such
as the division of Germany. It will not be
easy when there are powerful countries who
are committed to what they consider a
world revolution — fundamentally in opposi-
tion to the kind of world envisaged in the
United Nations Charter. But we must con-
tinue to try.
I take no comfort from the fact that the
defense budget of the United States this
year equals the total gross national product
of all of Latin America. I take no pleasure
from the fact that, since 1947, the NATO
nations have been required to invest more
than a trillion dollars in defense budgets.
Even though progress may be slow, we
must continue to wrestle with the problems
of reducing the levels of arms in order that
these vast resources can be put to the serv-
ice of the humane purposes of ordinary men
and women throughout the world.
Even before vast resources might be
freed through disarmament, we must take
a responsible share in the process of eco-
nomic and social development among those
nations who are just beginning to enter the
age of science and technology. We cannot
sustain our own prosperity in a poverty-
stricken world. Nor can we allow ourselves
to be indifferent to misery and disease
which burden so vast a proportion of the
world's population. In this great task you
in private enterprise are playing a major
MAY 22, 1967
771
and crucial role. The contributions which
you will make in capital, managerial skills,
and technical assistance are larger in total
effect than those being made by governments.
In the Western Hemisphere we have a
role as a major partner both in the defense
of the American system and in the great
cooperative social and economic enterprise,
the Alliance for Progress.
In all the tasks of building peace and a
better world, we encourage regional coopera-
tive undertakings: Atlantic partnership, the
prospective Latin American common market,
the beginnings of regional cooperation in
Africa, and new regional and subregional
organizations in East Asia and the Western
Pacific.
Where problems extend beyond the limits
of effective national or regional action, we
encourage broader approaches, through the
United Nations, the World Bank, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, GATT [General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and
others.
Nor do we forget that the United States
is a trading nation. The promotion of trade
is a major object of our diplomacy — and
has been since the time of Benjamin
Franklin. We have an important role in
creating a vigorous system of international
trade and monetary arrangements which
are adequate to the needs of an expanding
world economy.
Working Toward Reduction of Tensions
In our relations with present or potential
adversaries we must be resolute when firm-
ness is required. On the other hand, we
should make it clear that we are prepared
to meet everyone else more than halfway
in building a durable peace. Despite the
presence of tension and violence, we should
try to resolve every outstanding question
and extend the hand of cooperation where
there is any response from the other side.
We need not be under illusions about the
word detente, but we must work toward a
genuine reduction of tensions. This is why
we have concluded the test ban treaty, the
civil air and consular agreements with the
Soviet Union, and the space treaty. This
is why we are working hard on such matters
as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
and the attempt to impose some ceiling upon
the further developments of defensive and
offensive nuclear missiles. This is among
the reasons why we have proposed to the
Congress that we be given authority to
negotiate trade agreements with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe — the other big
reason being that we are Yankee traders
and would like to benefit from that trade.
You should also know that we attach the
greatest importance to the official structure
of diplomacy and to what are called the
rights of legation. We have been concerned
that the structure of diplomacy, built with
great care and effort over a period of cen-
turies, is not accorded the protection and
the dignity which are essential if even mini-
mum relations among states are to be pre-
served. Among the purposes of diplomatic
relations is to have the means for discuss-
ing differences between states. We shall do
everything that we can to support the rights
of legation by our own conduct, and we shall
insist upon full compliance with those same
rights by all with whom we have relations.
Although we do not expect other nations
to copy our political or economic institutions,
we have convictions about these matters,
based on ideals and experience, and there-
fore will continue to do what we can to
encourage trends toward self-determination,
government with the consent of the gov-
erned, open societies, and individual human
rights.
Peace Proposals Rejected by Hanoi
It is not our purpose today to discuss
Viet-Nam in any detail, but you would
consider it strange if I should ignore it. You
should know that your President spends
just as much time on the search for peace
as he does on the military struggle itself.
You should know that we keep in touch
772
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
with all the nations of the world, including
some with whom we do not have formal
relations. You should recall that half the
governments of the world have tried, singly
or in groups, to move the violence in South-
east Asia toward a peaceful solution.
Let me remind you of the many proposals
which have been made by ourselves or by
others as a part of this effort to take a
step toward peace:
— A reconvening of the Geneva conference
of 1954 and a return to the agreements of
1954;
— A reconvening of the Geneva conference
of 1962 on Laos and a return to the agree-
ments of 1962;
— A conference on Cambodia;
— An all- Asian peace conference;
— A special effort by the two cochairmen;
— A special effort by the ICC [Interna-
tional Control Commission];
— A role for the United Nations Security
Council, or the General Assembly, or the
Secretary-General ;
— Talks through intermediaries, single or
group;
— Direct talks — with the United States or
with South Viet-Nam;
— Exchange of prisoners of war;
— Supervision of treatment of prisoners
by International Red Cross;
— Demilitarize the DMZ [demilitarized
zone] ;
— Widen and demilitarize the DMZ;
— Interposition of international forces be-
tween combatants;
— Mutual withdrawal of foreign forces,
including NVN forces;
— Assistance to Cambodia to assure its
neutrality and territory;
— Cessation of bombing and reciprocal de-
escalation;
— Cessation of bombing, infiltration, and
augmentation of United States forces;
— Three suspensions of bombings to per-
mit serious talks;
— Discussion of Hanoi's 4 points along
with points of others, such as Saigon's 4
points and our 14 points;
— Discussion of an agreed 4 points as basis
for negotiation;
— Willingness to find means to have the
views of the Liberation Front heard in peace
discussions;
— Negotiations without conditions, negoti-
ations about conditions, or discussion of a
final settlement;
— Peace and the inclusion of North Viet-
Nam in large development program for
Southeast Asia;
— Government of South Viet-Nam to be
determined by free elections;
— Question of reunification to be deter-
mined by free elections;
— Reconciliation with Viet Cong and read-
mission to the body politic of South Viet-
Nam;
— South Viet-Nam can be neutral if it so
chooses.
I have recalled these particular items with-
out a complete search of the record; there
may be more. But what is important for you
to know is we have said yes to these some 28
proposals and Hanoi has said no. Surely all
those yeses and all those noes throw a light
upon motivation — upon the question of who
is interested in peace and who is trying to
absorb a neighbor by force. Surely some light
is thrown upon the character of American
policy and the attitudes of the American peo-
ple. Surely these yeses and noes are relevant
to the moral judgments which one might
wish to make about the situation in South-
east Asia.
MAY 22, 1967
773
A Conversation With Dean Rusk
Following is the transcript of an hour-long
interview with Secretary Rusk by Paul
Niven, Washington correspondent of the Na-
tional Educational Television Network, which
was televised from the Department of State
to 75 affiliated stations of NET on May 5.
Mr. Niven: Whether deliberately or not,
the last few weeks have brought an escala-
tion of the war in Viet-Nam. Whether it was
deliberate or not remains a matter of seman-
tic argument between the administration and
its critics. There is no doubt, however, that
criticism of and dissent from the war has
escalated both in depth and in breadth.
Viet-Nam is not the only issue of the hour,
even if it is the towering one. Indeed, one of
the themes of the critics is that the war is
deflecting high officials here in Washington
from other and larger issues. Despite Viet-
Nam there has been a considerable relaxation
of tension between East and West, as sym-
bolized by the consular and space treaties
and our continuing talks on antimissile de-
fense and the spread of nuclear weapons.
The spirit of detente was symbolized also
by the arrival in this country of the daugh-
ter of Joseph Stalin with no outburst of
chauvinistic exultation on our part, no public
anguish on the part of the Kremlin, and a
civilized demeanor on the part of the lady
involved.
Even as the United States and the Soviet
Union pull closer together, China pulls
farther and farther apart from both. In
Western Europe new issues and old issues
are at hand and recently took Vice President
Humphrey on an important and not unevent-
ful tour of the capitals of some of our NATO
allies.
Substantive questions give rise anew on
Capitol Hill and elsewhere to larger ques-
tions concerning the overall American com-
mitment all over the world, about its moral
validity, and about its practicability in terms
of our power in the world.
It seems a very appropriate time, all in all,
to talk with a man who for 6 years and 3
months now has been the principal foreign
policy adviser to Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson. Here we are then in the State De-
partment to talk to Secretary Dean Rusk.
Mr. Secretary, I don't think we've had
polls in the last 3 or 4 weeks to see whether
opposition to the war in Viet-Nam is actu-
ally increasing among the country as a whole.
But certainly there has been an increase in
the intensity and depth of public manifesta-
tions of opposition. How do you and other
officials of the administration who have spent
so many hours trying to put your case and
explain it to so many people account for this
increase in public opposition?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have seen some
highly organized demonstrations of minori-
ties here and there in the country. But the
people of the United States elect a President
and a Congress to make these great decisions
of national policy.
And it is my impression that the ordinary
men and women around the country under-
stand what is involved in Viet-Nam. Now, we
understand that many of them are impatient
and want to see the steps taken to finish this
war. Because after all that has happened
since 1945, it is tragic that once again we
should have to use force to resist an aggres-
sion because we have learned a lot of lessons
of what happens when aggression occurs.
Mr. Niven: When you say that these are
highly organized demonstrations, obviously
the Communists are not uninterested in
doing this in this country and elsewhere — but
do you suggest that even among the orga-
774
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nizers of this opposition the Communists are
anything like the majority?
Secretary Riisk: Oh, I am not trying to
establish any sense of numbers in this mat-
ter. I think there are different groups. The
Communist apparatus is busy all over the
world, and it is busy in this country. Others
who are genuine pacifists, conscientious
objectors, people with strong religious con-
victions on this point — for them I have the
greatest respect. There are others who, for
one reason or another, doubt that Viet-Nam
is our problem. There is a variety of reasons
why people object. But particular demonstra-
tions are pretty highly organized.
The Dilemma of Dissent
Mr. Niven: Well, you and General [Wil-
liam C] Westmoreland and others have
pointed out that such demonstrations are
bound to raise questions on the other side
about our will to continue. On the other hand,
isn't there a great danger that in trying to
stifle dissent we create new problems ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Niven, there
has never been any effort to stifle dissent.
We have a dilemma in this respect, because
two things are true.
The one is that in our kind of free society
there must be complete freedom of expres-
sion, the opportunity for dissent, the right
lawfully and peacefully to register one's dif-
ference of view. Now, that is fundamental
to our system, and there has never been any
effort to stifle that.
The other tiling that is equally as true is
that Hanoi undoubtedly is watching this de-
bate and is drawing some conclusions from
it. Now, if we were to see 100,000 people
marching in Hanoi calling for peace we
would think the war was over. Now, it
requires a good deal of sophistication on the
part of Hanoi to understand that this is not
the way we make decisions in this country —
that there are a President and a Congress
who are elected by the people and that the
President and the Congress are supported
by the great majority of the American people
in these great decisions.
Mr. Niven: Senator [Thruston B.] Morton
suggested the other day that — quoting Gen-
eral Westmoreland — when someone speaks of
irresponsible acts at home without distin-
guishing between the genuinely irresponsible
burners of draft cards and people who lay
down in front of trains and so forth and the
really idealistic citizens who have strong
reservations about the war, he only encour-
ages the irresponsible elements among the
dissenters. Don't you think there is some-
thing to that?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't know how
to judge something of that sort. I think all
of us, whether we are official or private citi-
zens, have a responsibility for all of the con-
sequences of our acts and what we say. And
when people elect to go into these matters
and make their opinions known they should
take into account what the total effect will be.
But, again, in our society there must be
full opportunity for free expression and
there must be a debate in this country. And
when differences exist we couldn't have our
kind of free society without it.
Mr. Niven: It would be perhaps too much
to expect for the North Vietnamese to under-
stand that these demonstrations are a minor-
ity. But surely their Soviet allies are sophisti-
cated enough at this stage of the game to
understand this and to tell them that what
is more important is the polls showing 70
percent of the people —
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think there are those
in the Communist world who understand this
better than Hanoi might. I think the Soviet
Union undoubtedly has more experience
with us and they have a closer familiarity
with our institutions and the way we op-
erate. I think there is more understanding in
Moscow on this point than there is in Hanoi.
Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, the war itself —
are we now in such a position that any sub-
stantial deescalation unilaterally would be
almost as disastrous as pulling out?
Secretary Rusk: Well, let me point out that
partial deescalation on our side seems to be
uninteresting to Hanoi. For example, they
object to the idea of a pause in the bombing,
MAY 22, 1967
775
the suspension of bombing. We have tried
that seriously three times, and then there
were two holiday truces in addition, a total
of five times when there was no bombing.
And before that we went through 5 years of
increasing North Vietnamese attacks upon
South Viet-Nam without any bombing in
North Viet-Nam on our part.
They are saying now that we must stop
the bombing permanently and uncondition-
ally and at the same time are refusing to
undertake the slightest military step which
they would take on their side to draw back
on their part of the war.
Now, let me illustrate what this means. If
we were to say that we would negotiate only
if they stopped all of their violence in South
Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb North
Viet-Nam, most people would say we were
crazy. Now, why is what is crazy for us
reasonable to some people when exactly the
same proposition is put by the other side?
What we need to have is some tangible step
toward peace. And they have had many,
many opportunities to register a willingness
to engage in serious talks, to take some de
facto practical steps to move this matter
toward a peaceful solution.
Mr. Niven: Well, you have got just one
interpretation of their attitude. Max Frankel
of the Sunday Times magazine did the same
thing. But he also said that the President's
letter to Ho Chi Minh i said in effect "We will
stop the bombing if you will leave your quar-
ter of a million Communist forces in South
Viet-Nam unreplenished and unsupplied
against a million troops on our side." Now,
is that not a fair representation?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we said that we will
stop the bombing if you will stop the infiltra-
tion and if you stop the infiltration we will
stop the further augmentation of our forces.
Mr. Niven: Would they not hold that our
forces at this point are so augmented and so
well supplied that they could not leave their
forces ?
Secretary Rusk: They may, but their forces
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595.
are where they have no right to be. They
have no business being there. They have no
right to try to seize South Viet-Nam by force.
We are entitled under the SEATO treaty, as
well as under the individual and collective
security-self-defense arrangements of the
U.N. Charter, to come to the assistance of
South Viet-Nam upon their request when
they are subjected to this kind of aggression.
Now, we are not referring to something
as though there is no difference between the
two sides here. North Viet-Nam is trying to
seize South Viet-Nam by force. If tomorrow
morning they were to say that "This is not
our purpose," we could have peace by tomor-
row night. Now, it is just as simple as that,
Mr. Niven. They are trying to impose a
political solution upon South Viet-Nam by
force from the North. Now, it can be peace if
they hold their hands. And I don't see how
there can be peace as long as they continue
in that effort.
Hanoi's Demand for Cessation of Bombing
Mr. Niven: Is the principal objection to a
cessation of bombing for the fourth time
that we would incur more and more odium in
the world were it renewed if they didn't
come to the conference table, or is it purely
military?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the principal prob-
lem is that, as I indicated, a suspension in
the bombing would be rejected by Hanoi as
an ultimatum. They say that we must guar-
antee that this suspension would be perma-
nent and unconditional. Now, that means
stopping half the war without knowing what
will happen with the other half of the war.
And the President has said that we will be
glad to hear from them on almost anything
they would do on the military side in order
to take a step toward peace in the situation.
At the moment there are three or four
divisions up in the so-called demilitarized
zone, in that general area. North Vietnamese
troops. No one is able to whisper to us behind
his hand that if we stop the bombing those
divisions will not attack our Marines who are
3 or 4 miles away. Now, we can't be children
776
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
about this. We can't be foolish. We need to
know what the military effect would be if we
stopped the bombing in North Viet-Nam on a
permanent and unconditional basis. And no
one is able or willing to give us the slightest
information as to what the result would be.
Mr. Niven: It seems to me that the great
weakness in the case of your critics, including
the highly placed ones in this country, is that
they are forever looking for evidence of un-
willingness to negotiate on the part of the
administration without examining the ques-
tion, "Is there any willingness to negotiate
on the other side?" But isn't it fair to say,
Mr. Secretary, that over the years the will-
ingness of either side to negotiate and con-
sequently the terms on which it was willing
to negotiate has varied according to its ap-
praisal of the military and political situation,
where the advantage lay at the moment ?
Secretary Rusk: Not really. It depends
upon what result would be brought into
being.
Now, for example, in 1962, on the basis of
an agreement between Chairman Khrushchev
and President Kennedy in Vienna in June
1961, we went to Geneva. We made substan-
tial concessions in order to get an agreement
on Laos. That was signed in July 1962.
Among the concessions we made, for exam-
ple, was to accept the nominee of the Soviet
Union to be Prime Minister of Laos, Prince
Souvanna Phouma.
Now, we did not get performance by Hanoi
on any one of the four principal elements in
that agreement. They did not withdraw their
North Vietnamese forces from Laos. They
did not stop using Laos as an infiltration
route into South Viet-Nam. They did not
permit the coalition government to function
in the Communist-held areas of Laos. And
they did not permit the International Control
Commission to function in the Communist-
held areas of Laos.
That agreement was based upon a major
effort on our part to take a giant step toward
peace in Southeast Asia. It didn't derive from
any close-in, narrow view of what the mili-
tary situation would be. Now, from that time
forward we have been probing in every way
that we could think of to try to find a peace-
ful basis to bring this war to a conclusion in
South Viet-Nam.
Now, we can't bring it to a conclusion by
giving them South Viet-Nam. We have major
commitments there.
U.S. Will Talk Without, or About, Conditions
Mr. Niven: Weren't our conditions for
talking a year ago, during the bombing pause
in January '66, a little more unconditional
than they are this time? Did we then not
make it clear that we were willing to sit
down and negotiate and continue the bomb-
ing pause?
Secretary Rusk: Well, there was a tempo-
rary suspension of the bombing, and we had
been told before that pause started that a
somewhat longer pause than the 5-day pause
which we had had earlier might make it pos-
sible for something constructive to open up.
We had been told that by some of the Com-
munist countries. As a matter of fact they
said, some of them, that if you stop 15 or 20
days that might open up some possibilities.
Well, we stopped for twice as long as they
suggested. But on the 34th day of that pause
Hanoi came back and said that you must stop
your bombing permanently and uncondition-
ally and only then can there be any talks. And
at that time they said you must take the four
points of Hanoi and you must accept the
Liberation Front as the sole spokesman for
South Viet-Nam. In other words, they were
demanding that, in effect, we surrender
South Viet-Nam to the North.
Mr. Niven: We have, however, as a result
of that experience perhaps, upped the ante,
have we not, this time, where we have said
that we demand the cessation of infiltration
of men —
Secretary Rusk: We will talk to these
people without conditions of any sort. Now,
they have raised a major condition, the stop-
page of the bombing on a permanent basis.
So we have said all right, we will talk to you
about conditions, we will talk to you about
that condition, we will talk about other
MAY 22, 1967
777
things — what you should do on your side, as
a preliminary to negotiation, if you wish, you
see.
So we will talk to them either way, with-
out conditions or about conditions. Now, it
shouldn't be all that difficult for contacts to
explore the possibilities of peace even while
the fighting is going on. We negotiated on the
Berlin blockade while Berlin was under
blockade. We talked about Korea while the
shooting was going on.
Mr. Niven: You can talk while the bomb-
ing and infiltration continues.
Secretary Rusk: Yes. Indeed, in Korea we
took more casualties after the talks started
than we did before the talks started. And in
the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we nego-
tiated that question with the Soviet Union
while they were building their missile sites
just as fast as they could, you see. So there
is nothing in our statements that means that
if there is any real interest in peace that con-
tacts and explorations cannot occur, either
about the settlement or about the first steps
toward peace and deescalating the violence,
either one of them.
Mr. Niven: Their position for 2 years now,
of course, has been the bombing must stop.
But if they were to abandon that and Ho Chi
Minh cabled the President and said, "I will
meet you in New Delhi 2 weeks from now
without conditions, let the war go on," the
President would go?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we will be in touch
with them at the first opportunity that there
will be a representative of Hanoi somewhere
to talk about peace. We will be there.
Mr. Niven: Publicly or privately?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is very
likely that the most profitable contacts
initially would be private. But we have asked
for a conference of — of the Geneva con-
ference of '54 or the Geneva conference of
'62 or an all-Asian peace conference or a
meeting between North Viet-Nam and South
Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone; or we
have suggested the two cochairmen [of the
Geneva conferences] might be in touch with
the two parties to do something about it, that
is, Britain and the Soviet Union; or we would
be glad to see the three members of the
International Control Commission — India,
Canada, and Poland — undertake this role.
Public or private, direct or indirect — it
makes no difference to us.
Mr. Niven: Through your own knowledge,
would you expect to end the war with negoti-
ations or with a fizzling out, notably of the
cessation of infiltration?
Secretary Rusk: It is very hard to say. The
Greek guerrilla operations fizzled out. There
were systematic discussions preceding that.
I think we ought to keep both doors open.
And we have said to the other side on more
than one occasion that if you don't want to
come into a conference, if that is compli-
cated, if you don't want to get into formal
negotiations, then let's start doing some
things on the ground of which each one of us
can take note and to which we can respond,
let's begin some de facto deescalation of this
situation. And that hasn't produced any re-
sults either.
Geneva Accords a Basis for Serious Tallcs
Mr. Niven: Apart from the question of how
to get into negotiations, what really is there
to negotiate about, Mr. Secretary? As long
as Hanoi is not willing to represent — to ac-
cept the South Vietnamese government or
the emerging South Vietnamese government
as the principal political structure of South
Viet-Nam, as long as we are unwilling to
accept the National Liberation Front as the
principal political structure there, what really
is there for the United States and North
Viet-Nam to talk about ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that they
and the Soviet Union continue to talk in
terms of the Geneva accords of 1954 and
1962. The Warsaw Pact countries in their
meeting in Bucharest last year put out a
statement in which they called upon us to
comply completely with those accords. We
said fine, let's get going. When we took this
matter to the Security Council of the United
Nations, the Soviet representatives said,
"No, the United Nations is not the proper
forum, the Geneva machinery is the proper
forum." So Ambassador Goldberg said, "All
778
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
right, if that is your view, then let's get
going with the Geneva machinery."
I think if there is to be serious talk it is
likely to be on the basis of the 1954 and 1962
agreements which were signed by the other
side. We signed the 1962 agreements, al-
though we did not sign the 1954 agreements.
But we accepted both of these agreements
as an adequate basis for peace in Southeast
Asia.
Mr. Niven: The President has said he
would be happy to accept the outcome of free
elections throughout Viet-Nam.
Secretary Rusk: That is correct.
Mr. Niven: Mr. [Henry Cabot] Lodge last
week said it was unthinkable that we let the
Viet Cong into the democratic structure of
South Viet-Nam.
Secretary Rusk: I think what he perhaps
meant was that we don't see any indication
that the South Vietnamese under genuinely
free elections would elect the Liberation
Front or the Viet Cong. Now, you have many
groups in South Viet-Nam, the Buddhists
and the Catholics, the Montagnards, the mil-
lion ethnic Cambodians who have been living
there for a long time, the million refugees
who came down from Hanoi in 1955, that
period. They disagree among themselves on
a number of points. But the point that they
seem to have in common is that they do not
want the Liberation Front. So we would not
expect that the South Vietnamese would
elect the Viet Cong if there were free elec-
tions.
Program of Reconciliation
Mr. Niven: But what kind of a settlement
would filter down to the village and end the
situation in which the Viet Cong and the
present agents of South Viet-Nam are
struggling for control of that village? What
would end the guerrilla war?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think in the first
place a decision by Hanoi to abandon the
effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force. This
is by all means by all odds the most impor-
tant single decision that could affect that
result. I think that the rapid increase in the
rate of defections from the Viet Cong, the
growing disillusionment in the countryside,
as one can sense it, with the Viet Cong and
their very severe impositions upon the vil-
lagers, are having an effect without that de-
cision by Hanoi. But this is a simple problem
of an attempt by Hanoi to do something in
the South. If they would abandon that, I am
quite sure the South Vietnamese, including
the Viet Cong, would come to terms among
themselves.
Very recently the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment announced a program of reconcilia-
tion in which they said that they would ac-
cept back into the body politic those genuine
southerners who had gone over to the Viet
Cong and would like to return. There would
be amnesty. They would not be mistreated.
They could resume their place in society. And
indeed some of the defectors from the Viet
Cong, the so-called returnees, have been can-
didates in village elections in the last three
Sundays. And some of them have been
elected.
So I have no real doubt that the south-
erners, if left alone, would resolve these prob-
lems among themselves. They can't do it so
long as the North is insisting upon keeping
this pressure going against the South by
military means.
Mr. Niven: With the continuing pressure
are you confident that the emerging demo-
cratic apparatus is going to survive and that
the generals won't say "No" at the last
minute?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the military
leadership is very strongly committed to the
constitutional process, because in January of
last year they themselves took the initiative
to start this process going. Now, when it
came to the meeting at Honolulu,^ they re-
peated that and we indicated that we were in
favor of it, and this process has been going
on ever since. But I think the military leader-
ship is strongly committed to this constitu-
tional process which they initiated and which
has been picked up by the people in electing
a constituent assembly, which has promul-
For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.
MAY 22, 1967
779
gated a constitution, and with elections that
are anticipated this September.
Mr. Niven: To return for just a moment to
the question of bombing, Mr. Secretary, there
is a projected lull of a day or two on the
Buddhist birthday later this month. Is there
any possibility that that will be attended by
a flurry of diplomatic activity and be ex-
tended?
Secretary Rusk: The Government of South
Viet-Nam has again said that they would be
glad to meet with the Government of North
Viet-Nam in the demilitarized zone to talk
about an extension of that truce. Now, the
short period of cessation of the bombing is
not the kind of cessation that North Viet-
Nam has described as a prerequisite for
serious negotiations. Now, if between now
and then there was some indication that they
were prepared to talk without that condition
or about that condition, then of course that
would be of some interest. But we have no
indication that that is coming.
Mr. Niven: Wouldn't this perhaps be a
face-saving means of getting something
going on both sides ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, if they wish to raise
the question further to extend that pause
they can do so with Saigon, or they can com-
municate in other respects if they would be
interested in some such arrangement. The
problem has been that they don't seem to
think very much of any temporary arrange-
ment.
Hanoi Takes Advantage of Truce Periods
Mr. Niven: Well, suppose they proposed
to suggest it be extended a week or so. Would
that inevitably bring the reply from us
"What will you do by way of reciprocation
to reduce — "
Secretary Rusk: Well, these are matters
that need to be discussed. That is why Sai-
gon has offered to meet them in the demili-
tarized zone to talk about it — because an ex-
tended pause without something serious
going on simply means that they have an
opportunity to resupply and move their peo-
ple about and to load all the sampans in
North Viet-Nam with supplies for the guer-
rilla troops and get everything all set for
a fresh lunge, you see, when it is over.
During the Tet pause, when the hour ar-
rived for the Tet truce to begin, hundreds
of ships, boats, barges, trucks, suddenly
raced for the South. They were there at the
starter's gate like horses on a racetrack, and
they just rushed pellmell to the South with
thousands of tons of supplies to reequip
their forces and resupply them. But the im-
portant thing is that, although they knew
that suspension was coming and they knew
that we were interested in talking seriously
during that suspension, they didn't have a
diplomat at the starting gate. They were not
willing to talk seriously about a settlement
of the problem or about prolonging the ar-
rangements or have some mutual deescala-
tion of the violence during that Tet truce.
Mr. Niven: It has been argued that the
military advantage to us, in terms of infil-
tration, of continuing the bombing may be
outweighed by the unifying effect of the
population of North Viet-Nam, may^ actually
increase their will to continue the war. What
is your appraisal of that?
Secretary Rusk: Well, no one likes bomb-
ing. People get mad under bombing. But
there are some very important operational
questions there. I mentioned those three divi-
sions in the demilitarized zone. These North
Vietnamese forces are just a few miles away
from our Marines. Are we going to say to
our Marines, "You must wait until those
fellows get 2 miles away before you shoot at
them, but don't shoot at them when they are
9 miles away because that would be too rude
— that is over on the other side of the bor-
der"? If we see a truck column of 40 trucks
coming down just north of the demilitarized
zone, are we going to leave them alone and
then have them use that ammunition against
our men the next day? You can't do that.
Let's have some peace.
We can have peace literally within 24
hours if Hanoi is willing to take seriously
the 1954 and 1962 agreements, abandon its
effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, and
join in mutual steps to turn down this vio-
lence and get to the conference table.
780
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, will you turn to
East^West relations as a whole? Up to a
year or so ago it seemed to be the position
of the Soviet Union until Viet-Nam was
settled nothing could be settled. Now, we
never agreed to that. The proliferation of
talks and treaties since then suggests that
the Russians have now turned away and are
quite anxious to continue, and expand if pos-
sible, the detente in spite of Viet-Nam. Is
that a fair appraisal ?
Effect of Viet-Nam on East-West Relations
Secretary Rusk: Well, undoubtedly the
Viet-Nam question injects a serious problem
of tension, and on both sides. For example,
there are many people in this country who
have serious questions about whether we
should ourselves open the door to expanding
trade with Eastern Europe while the Viet-
Nam situation is still going on. And I have
no doubt they have some problems on their
side in the same direction. However, we
were glad to see that despite Viet-Nam it
was possible to proceed with the space
treaty, and we have been working hard on
the nonproliferation treaty despite Viet-
Nam. So as far as we are concerned, we are
prepared to continue to work at these indi-
vidual questions, small or large, if the other
side is willing to do so. But there are ten-
sions there that complicate the question on
both sides, and I wouldn't want to deny that.
Mr. Niven: You brought up a political
question I would like to ask you — would like
to pursue with you. Some of the people on
the Hill opposed to the administration's
policy in Viet-Nam have said when you send
people around the country, military officers
or others, as they put it, talking the lan-
guage of the cold war and whipping up pas-
sions about the war in Viet-Nam, you create
a body of public opinion in this country
which makes it difficult to get the consular
treaty, to get through an increased East-
West trade, and so forth. Is this true?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot generalize
about that. Our general view is that we have
to do what is necessary in Viet-Nam because
of our commitments and because of its rela-
tion with the general problem of organizing
a durable peace in the world. But on the
other hand we ought to be ready to try to
resolve other questions, large or small, if
we can.
Now, that's difficult. Anxi it is not easy for
all of our people to understand why it's im-
portant. But I think the central question in
front of us all is the question of organizing
a peace. And every policy needs to be
weighed in terms of whether it will con-
tribute toward that objective or not.
Now, we send out a thousand cables a day
out of this Department. My guess is that
most of the people would approve of most of
those cables and that those who object to one
particular part of the policy would support
much of the rest. But the object of the en-
tire effort is to organize a global peace, be-
cause we are in a situation — and have been
for over a decade — where the organization
of a peace is necessary to the survival of the
human race, in very simple terms.
iVIoscow-Peking Problems
Mr. Niven: In the -process of getting closer
to the Russians, are they ever at all frank
about their problems with their Chinese
aUies?
Secretary Rusk: No, they have not talked
about China with us very much. We would
not expect them to. This is a problem within
the Communist world.
Mr. Niven: Do they ever say, "Don't push
us too far at this point, because you know
what problems we are up against with the
Chinese"?
Secretary Rusk: No, no, they don't go into
questions of that sort. We know that they are
concerned about China, as we are — perhaps
not for the same reason. We know that there
has been a major difference between Moscow
and Peking on the tactics to be pursued in
advancing the world revolution. That has
reached its high point in the period since
1961. But China does not discuss the Soviet
Union with us in our bilateral talks in War-
saw. The Soviet Union does not discuss
China with us on these important questions.
Mr. Niven: The Soviet Union never tries
MAY 22, 1967
781
to lead us along toward something they want
by the stated or implicit threat of their —
Secretary Rusk: No, there has been a mini-
mum of exchange as far as China is con-
cerned with the Soviet Union. Now, China
is accusing Moscow of being in some sort of
a conspiracy with us, and sometimes you
hear charges out of Moscow that Peking is
assisting us by standing in the way of Com-
munist unity. They throw these charges back
and forth at each other. But as far as we
are concerned, we are not ourselves brought
directly into the middle of that particular
situation.
Mr. Niven: Sir, many people were struck
by the singularly calm atmosphere in which
Mrs. [Svetlana] Alliluyeva arrived in this
country. Was this accidental, or was it a
result of considerable effort by the higher
echelons of the administration and of the
Soviet Union, perhaps?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I cannot speak for
the Soviet Union. As far as we are con-
cerned, nothing special was done on our side.
I have the impression that she is a rather
calm person — that this was not one of those
great cold-war episodes that one might have
expected 10 years ago or 15 years ago. She
has made her own statement about her own
views, and they are rather simple and civi-
lized views. My guess is that she would like
a little peace and quiet. She will publish her
memoirs or her autobiography while she is
here and make her own decision about where
she wants to live in the future. But this has
not been a major political problem between
ourselves and the Soviet Union.
Mr. Niven: But did you and the President
not delay — seek to delay her arrival, dis-
courage her coming here for a few weeks
in order to avoid its becoming a problem be-
tween us and the Soviet Union?
Secretary Rusk: Well, she had the choice
of going to several places when she left
India, and she considered going to several
places. She went to Switzerland temporarily.
There was some problem about her coming
here under those — under the circumstances
of the emotion of the first moment. I mean
all you gentlemen in the news media, for ex-
ample, would not give her any privacy.
Mr. Niven: I fully realize that.
Secretary Rusk: And she was looking for
a little peace and quiet and wanted appar-
ently to catch her breath and decide what
she wanted to do.
Mr. Niven: Wasn't the delay desirable
from the administration's point of view, and
therefore suggested by the administration?
Secretary Rusk: We did not impose a de-
lay on her as far as we were concerned.
We did not have in front of us the specific
question of whether we should grant her
political asylum in a political sense. She had
a visa to come to this country. But I think
she handled herself very well, and I think
the whole situation has been handled rather
well up to this point.
Mr. Niven: Are you surprised that the
Russians have said nothing, made no com-
plaint?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have not come
to the end of the chapter yet. We are not sure
whether they will or not. They have not
raised any questions with us about it.
Rotation of U.S. Forces From Europe
Mr. Niven: Sir, the Vice President has re-
cently been on a long trip, a tour of Euro-
pean capitals, and we now have the news to-
day that we are reducing our troops in
Europe. Can you give us anything on the
background of this decision? We have had
groups of Senators wanting to cut forces;
we have had others wanting us not to cut
forces. We have had the reactions of the
Europeans themselves to consider. Can you
illuminate today's announcement? ^
Secretary Rusk: Well, back in 1951 we had
in mind that we would have in Europe about
5% divisions. In fact, we have about six di-
visions there now. We added certain
strength to it for our own reasons.
Now, we are rotating two-thirds of a divi-
sion, which means that we would expect to
have present in Europe at all times the 5^
divisions rather than the 5% divisions. In
addition, those brigades that are in this coun-
' See p. 788.
782
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
try will be in full readiness and will be able
to return promptly if needed in Europe.
They will replace each other in a regular
rotation in Europe, and once a year the en-
tire division will be together in Europe.
This will give us a good test of mobility,
of the idea of rotation. It also permits us to
bring home a considerable number of de-
pendents, which is of some importance to us
from an expense and from an exchange point
of view.
And I think it does not in any significant
way affect the military capabilities of NATO.
Now, we will have to see whether there is
any response from the other side in this gen-
eral direction of any sort. But these are mat-
ters that are being discussed in NATO as a
part of the general NATO structure, and we
think that what has been discussed thus far
is reasonable under the circumstances.
Mr. Niven: When you talk of looking for
a response from the other side, do you mean
that you are looking for a similar reduction
of forces among the Warsaw Pact countries ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, it would be inter-
esting if such reduction would occur. We are
not expecting it. We have not been told that
one would happen. And in London Mr.
Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of
the Soviet Council of Ministers] related the
reduction of Warsaw Pact forces to a con-
firmation of the status quo in Germany, in
Central Europe. And that is not a very en-
couraging prospect.
But I am sure the NATO countries will
keep their eyes on what the Warsaw Pact
forces are doing in this situation as they
from year to year make their own judgment
about what NATO should do.
Mr. Niven: Do you think there is any sub-
stantial likelihood of a substantial deescala-
tion?
Secretary Rusk: I would not be able to
project, because I don't have any informa-
tion from Eastern Europe on that.
Mr. Niven: In the meantime, our motive
is primarily balance of payments rather than
increasing the availability of troops for Viet-
Nam.
Secretary Rusk: Well, these troops are not
intended to be used in Viet-Nam. They re-
main in a condition of readiness so they can
not only rotate to Europe but go back quickly
if needed in an emergency, and would remain
a part of the same organized division and
committed to NATO, assigned to NATO.
Mr. Niven: But they will in fact, however,
be 3,000 miles closer to Viet-Nam in case of
need.
Secretary Rusk: Well, they will be 3,000
miles closer to a lot of other places. But the
point is that they remain assigned to NATO,
they will be available for immediate return
to NATO, and every 6 months there will be
a change in the brigade that is actually sta-
tioned in NATO. So I just would prefer not
to get into the question of tying this to
other situations, because it is not a part of
the plan.
Britain and the Common IVIarket
Mr. Niven: Sir, the British have again an-
nounced their intention to apply for mem-
bership in the Common Market. The French
have indicated they are not going to veto
them this time but they will take a long, hard
look at it. Does this mean anything new in
terms of our position?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have stayed out
of the public discussion of this matter. This
is basically a European question for the Six
and for Britain.
Everyone knows that we ourselves would
be very glad to see this occur. But the issues
there are so fundamental to our friends on
the other side of the Atlantic that we have
felt it is not for us to take an active part.
My guess is that there will be some serious
discussion and some rather complex negotia-
tion before this can come about. But we just
have no way of predicting the end of the
road.
Mr. Niven: If Britain is admitted to mem-
bership, will it mean the end or the substan-
tial diminution of what we have talked about
over the years as the special relationship be-
tween the U.S. and the U.K.?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the special relation-
ship has been both real and unreal, depend-
ing upon how one views it. Obviously this
MAY 22, 1967
783
country has had a long and traditional tie
with Britain because of our historic past and
because we have been so closely associated in
so many common struggles and common
efforts.
I would suppose that if Britain enters
Europe we would be working very closely
with that new Europe, just as closely as we
would have with Britain separately or with
any of our European partners. So I don't
think the problem of the special relationship
is one that would bother us. It may bother
somebody on the other side of the Atlantic.
Mr. Niven: Well, now, even in the troubled
1950's and '60's there have been a few
shrinking areas of the world where when
there was a crisis you or whatever Secretary
of State or President of the United States
could say, "Well, that area is primarily a
British responsibility." If Britain turns her
face now toward Europe, aren't those areas
going to shrink even more and aren't we
going to be playing the policeman in more
places ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not ourselves
looking for more business in this regard, and
we are quite clear that we are not the police-
man of the world. We have some very spe-
cific commitments under existing treaties.
But if you went back over the last 60 or 70
crises of one sort or another that have oc-
curred in the world, we have taken part in
about 6 or 7 of them. We have been involved
as a member of the United Nations and the
Security Council, or diplomatically, in try-
ing to reduce tensions and trying to help
find a peaceful settlement of some of these
disputes.
But rather than think of a reduction of
European influence with, say, the admission
of Britain into Europe, I would hope that
Europe as a whole, enlarged as it would be
by the admission of Britain, would play its
full role in world affairs that is there for it
and that it is fully capable of playing. So
that I don't look upon the development as
one in which various people pull away and
then we go rushing in filling in vacuums in
different parts of the world. We have our
basket pretty full.
Mr. Niven: That brings up the overall
question of our commitment in the world.
And of course you get it from both sides.
Whenever anything goes wrong in the world
that we do not interfere in we are accused
of sitting by and letting it happen; at the
same time people say we are overextended
and we are in too many places. How do you
judge when we should be there and when we
should not, what we should do? Perhaps in
terms of Greece and Yemen in the last few
weeks: Is each case one to be judged in terms
of our central purpose? How do you make
the determination in each case?
The U.S. Commitment in the World
Secretary Rusk: Well, it depends upon a
number of things. In the first place, where
we have a specific treaty commitment and a
threat occurs against that treaty commit-
ment, then we have a very specific obligation
to do what we can as a signatory of that
treaty.
We have responsibilities as a permanent
member of the Security Council of the
United Nations to take an active and respon-
sible part in helping the Security Council
resolve those questions that are brought to
the Security Council.
We encourage other groups — such as the
Organization of African Unity to try to pick
up some of the disputes that exist on the
continent of Africa and find local African
solutions to those disputes on that continent.
I would not want to speculate about indi-
vidual hypothetical cases, but these are very
complex questions.
Our primary responsibilities have to do
with our treaty commitments.
But I think the United Nations effort is a
very important part of our total effort in
resolving disputes that have occurred in dif-
ferent parts of the world.
Mr. Niven: Do you ever have the feeling
when you learn from cables of a new crisis
that we are overextending, perhaps we
shouldn't be in some of the countries that we
are in, even on an aid basis? I don't expect
you to name names of countries. But do you
784
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ever feel that we could concentrate our effort
more if we were —
Secretary Rusk: Well, that is somewhat of
a nostalgic view in one sense. We have car-
ried heavy burdens in this postwar period.
But so have some other countries.
We cannot really be completely indifferent
to the developments in other continents. That
doesn't mean that we should go rushing in
unilaterally wherever there is a problem, try-
ing to solve it unilaterally.
For example, in the fighting between India
and Pakistan, the Security Council of the
United Nations acted very effectively there
with the permanent members — and that in-
cludes the Soviet Union and the United
States — acting in a parallel fashion there to
assist the Security Council in bringing that
matter to a conclusion.
But I think also we are encouraged by the
fact that other countries have been taking a
considerable share of the aid program bur-
den. For example, a country like France
spends more of its gross national product
on foreign aid than we do. And Canada and
Japan have been making their contribution
in relation to their total gross national prod-
uct. Japan put in as much capital in the
Asian Development Bank as the United
States. They matched ours, $200 million.
So the total effort is steadily growing. But
nevertheless we have to be interested in one
way or another in difficult and dangerous
problems that arise anywhere in the world.
That doesn't mean we go and police them.
International Communist iVIovement
Mr. Niven: The charge has been made that
this worldwide complicated multifaceted ef-
fort is perpetuated in the name of resistance
to a monolithic international Communist con-
spiracy which no longer exists. The critics
say that the international Communist move-
ment is no longer an extension of the Soviet
Union, it is fragmented, and therefore why
shouldn't we relax? And if a particular area
of the world goes Communist, can't we relax
on the ground that it will eventually — na-
tionalism will prevail over communism, as
to some extent it seems to be doing in East-
ern Europe?
Secretary R^isk: Well, that depends upon
what happens.
In Southeast Asia we have treaty commit-
ments that obligate us to take action to meet
the common danger if there is an aggression
by means of armed attack. That aggression
is under way.
If these questions can be decided by people
in free elections, perhaps we could all relax.
I don't know anyone who through free elec-
tions, any great nation — we have a particu-
lar State in India — that brought Communists
to power with free elections. They are not
monolithic — they are not monolithic.
But all branches of the Communist Party
that I know of are committed to what they
call the world revolution. And their picture
of that world revolution is quite contrary to
the kind of world organization sketched out
in the Charter of the United Nations.
Now, they have important differences
among themselves about how you best get
on with that world revolution. And there is
a contest within the Communist world be-
tween those who think that peaceful coex-
istence and peaceful competition is the better
way to do it and the militants, primarily in
Peking, who believe that you back this world
revolution by force.
But I think the Communist commitment
to world revolution is pretty general through-
out the Communist movement.
Now, if they want to compete peacefully,
all right, let's do that. But when they start
moving by force to impose this upon other
people by force, then you have a very serious
question about where it leads and how you
organize a world peace on that basis.
Mr. Niven: A decade or a decade and a
half ago the threat was that of one Commu-
nist superpower supported by Communist
movements all over the world. Isn't the chal-
lenge reduced every time the Communist
world becomes depolarized, every time at
least a European government or even the
Communist Party in Western Europe shows
new signs of independence?
MAY 22, 1967
785
Secretary Rusk: Well, it may be reduced,
but that does not mean it has disappeared.
Mr. Niven: You don't feel —
Secretary Rusk: I mean the fact that Mos-
cow and Peking have not been very close
friends has not reduced the danger created
by the attack of Hanoi against South Viet-
Nam. It is there — in a very accentuated
form.
Mr. Niven: For a time they quarreled over
supplies. That has been resolved, apparently.
Secretary Rusk: Well, we are not sure that
that so-called quarrel had a great deal of
effect upon the actual delivery of supplies.
We are not very sure of that. At least I per-
sonally am not. I don't have detailed infor-
mation.
Efforts Toward Easing Tensions
Mr. Niven: You don't feel, then, that our
posture in the world can be relaxed because
of the increasing variety in the Communist
world — that we still have a worldwide chal-
lenge—
Secretary Rusk: It depends upon what you
mean by being relaxed, Mr. Niven.
We are only 4 or 5 years away from two
very grave crises with the Communist coun-
tries of Eastern Europe, particularly with
the Soviet Union, the Berlin crisis of 1961-62
and the Cuban missile crisis.
So we cannot suppose that these problems
have disappeared forever. And the Warsaw
Pact forces are in Central Europe in great
strength right now. And the German prob-
lem is unresolved.
But on the other hand we would hope very
much that we are entering a period of pru-
dence and mutual respect on the possibility
of settling outstanding problems.
I remind you that President Kennedy and
President Johnson and their Secretary of
State have not gone down to the Senate with
new alliances. President Kennedy took down
the nuclear test ban treaty. President John-
son concluded the civil air agreement and the
consular agreement, the space treaty. We are
working on the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons treaty. We would like to see some
ceiling put on this race involving ABM's
[antiballistic missiles] and additional of-
fensive nuclear missiles.
We would like to take up seriously the
quiestion of increasing trade between our-
selves and Eastern Europe.
So we are prepared to do our part in con-
tributing toward that easing of tension and
settlement of outstanding questions. But that
doesn't mean that the dangers have com-
pletely disappeared and that we can just let
down our guard and think that everything is
all over. It just isn't. There is a lot to happen
before we get to that point.
Mr. Niven: Well, President Kennedy said
in effect once that we can't settle anything
with the Communists until we settle every-
thing. Do you feel that some people now
expect that just because we can settle some
things that everything else is automatically
solved, too?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to
speak for the others. My own feeling about
this is that we must continue to gnaw at
these questions and wrestle with them and
try to get on with them.
Now, one could be discouraged, if one let
oneself be, with the slow pace of disarma-
ment. Yet we cannot afford to abandon the
effort to get on with that job. Since 1947 the
NATO countries alone have spent well over
a trillion dollars on defense budgets. And the
Soviet Union and its allies have spent com-
parable amounts in relation to their own eco-
nomic base. Now, think of the enormous un-
finished business that their people and our
people have to which we could commit those
vast resources. We can't afford to abandon
the disarmament effort, even though it seems
to move slow.
So let's keep worldng at these questions.
Maybe today we can find some small question
to settle. Maybe tomorrow it will be a some-
what larger question. And maybe if we can
get the nonproliferation treaty, that would
be a rather important breakthrough on a
particular front. But, of course, in the back-
ground is the overriding need to bring this
Viet-Nam question to a peaceful settlement,
just as soon as we can and the other side can,
just as soon as the other side will let us.
786
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Niven: I was going to ask: Do you
ever feel that the Viet-Nam war, however
justified — merely in terms of the time, atten-
tion, and energy which you and the rest of
this Capital have to devote to it — is deflect-
ing all of you from other things?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, not at all. I think that
the serious business of the Government goes
on, and the President's time and my time are
committed to European questions, disarma-
ment questions, trade questions, Latin Amer-
ican questions, the Alliance for Progress.
No, life goes on. It is not true that Viet-Nam
is diverting our attention from other parts
of the world.
Mr. Niven: But some of our former diplo-
mats and some of the critics are forever
contending that the Viet-Nam war places
strings upon our alliances, it complicates and
exacerbates other problems.
Secretary Rusk: I think that is nonsense —
because if you want to put some strain on
our other alliances, just let it become appar-
ent that our commitment under an alliance
is not worth very much. Then you will see
some strain on our alliances.
Mr. Niven: You are suggesting if we don't
uphold this commitment other people will
lose faith in our commitments all over the
world.
Secretary Rusk: And more importantly,
our adversaries or prospective adversaries
may make some gross miscalculations about
what we would do with respect to those com-
mitments.
Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, if you had your
way and this thing could be ended, what
problems would be solved with it and what
new problems, if any, would come along in
its wake? Do you see the war, the end of
the Viet-Nam war, ending the chapter in
history and suddenly opening up all sorts of
new possibilities, or do you see it ushering
in new problems ?
Secretary Rusk: I would think that peace
in Viet-Nam would open up some real oppor-
tunities for the nations of Asia to get on
with their new momentum in the field of eco-
nomic and social development and in terms
of regional cooperation.
As you know. President Johnson has in-
vited North Viet-Nam to take part in that
total effort in Southeast Asia and the Presi-
dent has said that we would make a very
large contribution to that total effort if there
were conditions of peace.
So I think there are very stimulating new
opportunities that will open up.
Now, I am not going to suggest that the
end of the Viet-Nam situation will settle
every other problem. I am the 54th Secretary
of State, and I think I can guarantee that the
55th Secretary of State is going to have
plenty of problems. But because change is
built into our present world, rapid change
is going to be with us for as long as one can
see into the future.
But I think that the end of the aggression
in Viet-Nam would put us a very long step
forward toward this organization of a dura-
ble peace. I think there is a general recog-
nition in the world that a nuclear exchange
does not make sense, that sending massed
divisions across national frontiers is pretty
reckless today. If we get this problem of
these "wars of national liberation" under
reasonable control, then maybe we can look
forward to a period of relative peace, al-
though there will continue to be quarrels and
neighborhood disputes and plenty of business
for the Security Council of the United Na-
tions.
Mr. Niven: Without nuclear confrontation
or anything like that, do you see more brush-
fire wars, more "wars of national libera-
tion"? Is peaceful coexistence always going
to lapse into a war here and there, a limited
war?
Secretary Rusk: I just cannot be a prophet
on that. It would seem to me that the general
trend has been toward the use of less violence
in settling political disputes and toward com-
petition by peaceful means. I think there is
some evidence pointing in that direction. I
hope that's true. And we must work toward
insuring that it is true. But we will have to
take these things one step at a time and work
on them as best we can.
Mr. Niven: The question arises, of course:
Even if the Soviet Union is from here on
MAY 22, 1967
787
going to be a pacific influence within the
Communist world, what is the influence of
China going to be?
Secretary Rusk: We don't know very much
about what the second generation in Peking
will look like. Indeed, part of that commotion
that is going on there now may have to do
with some shift in influence between the first
generation and the second generation of lead-
ership. Most of the members of the present
government in Peking are veterans of the
Long March. They are the first generation —
with the rather dogmatic and rather harsh
views of the primitive Marxist, if you like.
Now, what does the second generation look
like? Will they be managers, bureaucrats,
technicians, scientists, people of that sort,
or will they be dynamic ideologists still pur-
suing this rather militant brand of commu-
nism? We don't really know yet — although
we have a very great stake in the answer.
So we can hope that in time some of the
elan of that original violence will spend it-
self, and that we look forward to a little
more pragmatism, a little more prudence in
their relations with the rest of the world.
Mr. Niven: Mr. Secretary, our time is up.
Thank you very much.
U.S., U.K., and Germany
Conclude Trilateral Talks
The final sessions of the series of trilateral
discussions by representatives of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Federal
Reipublic of Germany were held at London
April 27-28.^ Following is the text of a U.S.
Government statement on the conclusion of
the talks, which was released at Washington
on May 2.
Press release 104 dated May 2
Since last October the Governments of the
United States, United Kingdom and Federal
Republic of Germany have been engaged in a
series of discussions of the problems posed
for the defense of NATO and the balance of
payments position of the respective parties
by the forces stationed in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. The three Governments
have now completed these talks. The discus-
sion of questions regarding forces of the
United States and United Kingdom are con-
tinuing in NATO.
The United States believes that construc-
tive proposals have been made toward
answering the questions faced. In particular
the financial arrangements that have been
concluded between the British and German
Governments, between the American and
British Governments, and between the
United States and the German Government
and the German Bundesbank, will help deal
with foreign exchange costs of American and
British forces in Germany. The German Gov-
ernment intends to continue procurement of
military goods and services in the United
States on a scale significant in relation to the
German defense effort. The Federal Republic
decides what levels of procurement it wishes
to undertake. The total of the prospective
German military purchases does not match
the United States foreign exchange expendi-
tures in Germany for military purposes. The
arrangements also include the willingness of
the Bundesbank to invest during the period
July 1967-June 1968 $500 million in special
medium-term United States Government se-
curities, which will mean a capital import for
the United States. In addition, the Bundes-
bank, in agreement with the German Govern-
ment, has made known its intention to
continue its practice of not converting dollars
into gold as part of a policy of international
monetary cooperation. Between the United
Kingdom and the Federal Republic, there are
arrangements for German offsetting pur-
chases in the defense and civil sectors, which
are expected to amount in all to nearly $150
million. To assist the British to meet their
foreign exchange costs in Germany the
United States Government has undertaken
to make on a basis of open and competitive
bidding, an additional $19.6 million of mili-
tary purchases in Britain between April 1,
1967 and March 31, 1968. The basis for these
• For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 31, 1966,
p. 670, and Dec. 5, 1966, p. 867.
788
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
financial decisions is the recognition that the
balance of payments consequences, arising
from the stationing of forces abroad for the
common defense continue to pose a problem
for joint attention.
With regard to alliance strategy and forces
and how available resources can be used most
effectively for the common defense, the Rep-
resentatives recognized that the NATO De-
fense Planning Committee offers the best
forum for continuing discussions of these
matters. Discussions in that committee,
which have just begun, will enable the Gov-
ernments to confer fully with their Allies be-
fore taking decisions concerning adjustments
in the structure or deployment of the armed
forces now committed to NATO.
With a view to initiating such discussions
in the Defense Planning Committee, the Rep-
resentatives concluded with respect to United
Kingdom forces, that some force redeploy-
ments may be appropriate.
These forces would remain in the United
Kingdom and committed to NATO. With
respect to United States forces, the Repre-
sentatives concluded that the flexibility pro-
vided by developments in strategic mobility
should permit some changes in the deploy-
ment of cei-tain ground and air force units
which could be made without affecting their
availability for combat in Europe within the
time required.
The United States has proposed to NATO
that it redeploy from the FRG to the United
States up to 35,000 military personnel. The
ground and air units affected, whether at
their United States or FRG bases, will re-
main fully committed to NATO.
The proposal for the Army is as follows:
The United States Army division involved
will be the 24th Infantry Division. At least
one brigade of that division will be in Ger-
many at all times. The other two brigades
and an appropriate share of divisional and
non-divisional support units — totaling ap-
proximately two-thirds of a United States
division force — will be redeployed from Ger-
many to the United States. Once a year, all
three brigades will be in Germany for ex-
ercises involving the entire division. The ro-
tation plan provides that the three brigades
would succeed each other on temporary duty
in the FRG. Forces redeployed to the United
States will be maintained in a high degree
of readiness, and equipment will be main-
tained in the FRG in sufficient quantity and
readiness to ensure that the forces can be
promptly redeployed to Germany.
The proposal for the Air Force is as fol-
lows: The three tactical fighter wings, now
based in Germany, are involved in the plan.
Five squadrons will be in Germany at all
times. Four squadrons of the aircraft will
be redeployed to the United States.
All of the aircraft will be together in Ger-
many once a year for exercises. The aircraft
in the United States will be at a high degree
of readiness to assure their rapid return to
Europe.
First movements under both plans will not
take place before January 1, 1968 and the
plans may be in operation as soon as June
30, 1968, but in no event before the United
States is ready to operate the system effec-
tively.
MAY 22, 1967
789
Seventeen Years in East Asia
by William P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^
I stand before you today at a time when
American military forces, with those of other
nations, are engaged in assisting a small
nation of Asia — South Viet-Nam — to pre-
serve its own independence. This is the situa-
tion that is in the forefront of our thinking.
But as I do so, my mind goes back to June
1950, nearly 17 years ago. Then President
Truman took the decision to send American
forces to assist another small Asian nation
that was the victim of aggression. Although
that decision shortly became part of an ac-
tion by the United Nations — an action made
possible by the Soviet Union's fortuitous boy-
cott of the Security Council — it stands as a
landmark in our own postwar policy in East
Asia. And it is perhaps particularly fitting to
use it as a reference point before a gathering
of this organization, many of whose members
joined the Legion as a result of their service
in the Korean conflict.
This group hardly needs to be told why we
are acting as we are in South Viet-Nam. We
are acting to preserve South Viet-Nam's
right to work out its own future without ex-
ternal interference, including its right to
make a free choice on unification with the
North. We are acting to fulfill a commitment
that evolved through the actions of Presi-
dents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and
that was originally stated in the SEATO
treaty, overwhelmingly ratified by the Senate
in 1954. And we are acting to demonstrate to
the world that the Communist technique of
"people's wars" or "wars of national libera-
tion"— in essence, imported subversion,
armed terror, guerrilla action, and ultimately
conventional military action — can be de-
feated even in a situation where the Commu-
nist side had the greatest possible advantages
through an unfortunate colonial heritage,
political diflficulty, and the inherent weak-
nesses to which so many of the new nations
of the world are subject.
All of these are valid reasons for what we
are doing in Viet-Nam. As the plain and
straightforward speech of General West-
moreland last week ^ once again made clear,
we are acting to meet an attempt by one na-
tion to take over another nation by force, by
externally supported, directed, and now
manned military force. Whatever the inter-
nal discontents at any time within the South,
this is the root of the matter and of our in-
volvement.
I could talk to you today solely about Viet-
Nam, where we stand and where we are
headed. But with General Westmoreland's
full appraisal of the situation still fresh in
your minds, I thought it would be more use-
ful to put the conflict into the perspective of
which it is also a vital part — that of the
policies we have followed in East Asia con-
sistently, at least since our historic 1950 de-
cision to assist South Korea, and in some
areas for still longer.
In essence, for the past 17 years under
both parties and four Presidents, we have
pursued a policy of seeking to assist the non-
Communist nations of East Asia and the
Pacific to work out their own future in their
' Address made before the National Executive
Committee of the American Legion at Indianapolis,
Ind., on May 3 (press release 107).
' For text, see Bulletin of May 15, 1967, p. 738.
790
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
own way and in accordance with their own
traditions. We have made a bet with history
that the peoples and nations of this area are
capable of surviving as free and independent
states and that progress can best be achieved
if they are protected against external force
and are assisted in their economic and social
development by the nations in a position to
do so.
Our policies have been guided essentially
by two propositions rooted deeply in our own
national interest:
First, that the extension of hostile control
over other nations or wide areas of Asia,
specifically by Communist China, North Ko-
rea, and North Viet-Nam, would in a very
short time create a situation that would
menace all the countries of the area and
present a direct and major threat to the most
concrete national interests of this country.
Second, and directly related to the first
proposition, is the belief that an East Asian
and Pacific region comprised of free and in-
dependent states working effectively for the
welfare of their people is in the long run
essential to preventing the extension of hos-
tile power and also essential to the regional
and world peace in which the United States
as we know it can survive and prosper.
The First 15 Years
So in the years from 1950 to 1965 the
United States acted in two different spheres.
To meet the security threat to the area and
to individual nations, we stood firm in Korea
and entered into a progressive series of
treaty commitments: to Japan, to Korea, to
the Republic of China, and to the Philippines
on a bilateral basis; to Australia and New
Zealand under the ANZUS treaty; and to
member nations and the protocol state of
South Viet-Nam under the SEATO treaty.
In support of these commitments we de-
ployed major forces to the area and we as-
sisted the nations of the area to develop, to
the best of their ability, military forces ap-
propriate to the threat that each faced.
But our actions were never confined to
security alone, for we knew that security was
a necessary but not a sufficient condition to
lasting stability and progress in the area.
Thus, beginning with the reconstruction of
Japan in the early postwar years, we devel-
oped a wide pattern of programs to provide
economic assistance to those nations that
wished it and were prepared to use it effec-
tively.
Let us then draw back and see what hap-
pened by 1965 as a result of the inherent
great capacity of the nations of Asia and of
our own assistance efforts.
In Japan, American forces were with-
drawn and, with substantial United States
economic help until the midfifties, spectacu-
lar economic advances took place. Major land
reform programs were concluded and democ-
racy flourished.
South Korea, devastated by the conflict to
a degree far beyond anything that has hap-
pened in Viet-Nam, had great difficulty for
many years but beginning in the early 1960's
took hold of its affairs, carried through a
genuine democratic election, and began to
make real economic progress.
The Republic of China on Taiwan beat
back a Communist threat to the offshore is-
lands in 1958 and on the economic side car-
ried out sound and effective policies, includ-
ing land reform, which made possible the
reduction and in 1965 the elimination of U.S.
assistance programs. By 1961 the Republic
of China began a small but still very signifi-
cant program of technical assistance, mainly
in agriculture, throughout Africa, Asia, and
Latin America.
The Philippines beat back a Communist
Huk rebellion and consolidated a working
democracy.
Thailand, which had the great advantage
of never having been subject to colonial con-
trol, made steady progress.
There were similar success stories in other
parts of the area where we were not directly
involved, notably in Malaysia and Singapore,
where the British carried through wise and
realistic programs to make these nations in-
dependent and self-governing.
In other nations developments were more
uneven. Indonesia, in particular, fell under
MAY 22, 1967
791
the spell of Sukarno's extreme nationalism.
By 1965 she was hostile to us, engaged in a
sterile but dangerous military confrontation
with Malaysia and Singapore, and headed
very shortly for Communist control and an
effective alliance with Communist China.
So, in early 1965, the overall picture in
East Asia was one where a number of the
key nations had shown what could be done,
but there remained serious dark spots. Yet
East Asia as a whole had resisted any exten-
sion of Communist control and had demon-
strated a capacity for social development and
economic growth — on an extraordinary scale
in Japan and markedly in other key nations.
That economic performance contrasted
sharply, as the Asians were aware, with the
deteriorating economic situation in Conrniu-
nist China, whose gross national product did
not increase and may even have declined
from 1958 to 1965 and whose per capita in-
come dropped steadily. Realistic Asians must
already have concluded that the economic
methods of communism were vastly inferior
to the variety of methods used by the free
nations of the area.
The Last 2 Years
But, of course, the situation in Viet-Nam
in 1965 stood, alongside the trend in Indo-
nesia, as the major dark spot in the area.
And in early 1965 it became clear that unless
the United States and other nations intro-
duced major combat forces and took military
action against the North, South Viet-Nam
would be taken over by Communist force. If
that had happened, there can be no doubt
whatever that, by the sheer dynamics of
aggression. Communist Chinese and North
Vietnamese subversive efforts against the
rest of Southeast Asia would have been in-
creased and encouraged, and the will and
capacity of the remaining nations of South-
east Asia to resist these pressures would have
been drastically and probably fatally reduced.
So our actions in Viet-Nam were not only
important in themselves or in fulfillment of
our commitment but were vital in the wider
context of the fate of the free nations of
Asia. The leaders of free Asia are fully
aware of the relationship between our stand
in Viet-Nam and the continued independence
of their nations. The Prime Minister of Ma-
laysia has emphasized that if South Viet-
Nam were to fall before the Communists, his
nation could not survive. The Prime Minister
of Singapore has stated that our presence in
Viet-Nam has bought time for the rest of
the area. The Japanese Government has
made known its conviction that we are con-
tributing to the security of the area.
Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Aus-
tralia, and Thailand have shown their con-
victions by sending military units to assist
the South Vietnamese. Their efforts, joined
with ours and with the South Vietnamese,
have ended the threat of a Communist mili-
tary takeover.
The other great dark spot of 1965 — the
probability of a Communist takeover in In-
donesia— has also disappeared. A premature
and abortive attempt at a coup was defeated
in a struggle that extended eventually over
many tricky months, and there emerged a
strongly nationalist non-Communist govern-
ment.
This has been a tremendously important
change in Southeast Asia as a whole. A hos-
tile and eventually Communist Indonesia
could over time have undermined all that we
were doing to defend Viet-Nam and to pre-
serve the security of the rest of Southeast
Asia. The present Indonesia — nationalist,
prepared to live at peace with its neighbors,
and directing its attention to its long-
neglected internal problems — not only is a
highly significant development in terms of
Indonesia's own history, aspirations, and the
welfare of its people; it also opens the way
to a Southeast Asian community of nations
living at peace, adopting the international
posture each may choose, and making human
betterment their central objective.
As the major dark spots have changed for
the better, the light spots have become
brighter. Korea is advancing the progress of
792
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
its people at rates close to those of Japan a
decade ago. Japan is well on its way to be-
coming the third nation of the world in terms
of gross national product and has pledged 1
percent of its income for aid to lesser devel-
oped countries, principally in East Asia.
Thailand continues to surge ahead at a rate
that has averaged 7 percent in economic
grovdJi over the last decade and which should
be sustained. The election of Ferdinand Mar-
cos as President of the Philippines in late
1965 brought to power the most skilled, vig-
orous, and attractive leader the Philippines
has produced for some time.
Another extremely encouraging sign is the
groAvth of regional spirit and the emergence
of new regional institutions, notably the
Asian Development Bank, the Asian and Pa-
cifi? Council of 10 nations, the ASA [Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asia] grouping of
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines in
Southeast Asia, and the host of constructive
international cooperative efforts centered on
education, transportation, development of
the Mekong Valley, and other projects of a
regional nature.
Also heartening is the enlarged role of
multilateral aid — economic assistance by the
European nations, by Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, and by international institutions
such as the World Bank. Multilateral aid not
only involves the sharing of economic re-
sources but also lessens political sensitivity
to any one donor nation in the recipient
country. Furthermore, in the most concrete
way, it represents a vote of confidence by the
aid-granting nations in the future of free
Asia.
I could discuss other success stories at
length. Malaysia and Singapore held off In-
donesia's confrontation during Sukarno's
time with the vital help of Britain, which
continues to play a major stabilizing role in
the area. Australia and New Zealand helped
in that effort, and their owti steady progress
and growing assumption of responsibility in
Asia speak for themselves.
The point is clear. With security help from
the United States and, in Malaysia and
Singapore, from the Commonwealth, and
with economic aid from ourselves and in-
creasingly from international institutions
and other nations, very real progress can be
and has been made.
The Role of Viet-Nam
In the broad picture what is the role of
Viet-Nam? Behind the great and emerging
changes I have sketched lies an atmosphere
of growing confidence, a sensing by the peo-
ples of free Asia that progress is possible and
that security can be maintained. Our action
in Viet-Nam has been vital in helping to
bring about that confidence. For, as virtually
all non-Communist governments in the area
realize, their security requires a continuing
United States ability to act, not necessarily
an American presence, although that, too,
may be required in individual cases, but an
ability to act for a long time. And that we
must — and, I think, shall — provide.
That increasing confidence also depends
deeply on the belief that essential economic
assistance will continue to be provided. With-
out what we have done in Viet-Nam and the
assistance we have provided throughout the
region, I doubt very much if a considerable
number of the favorable developments I have
spoken of would have occurred, and certainly
they would not have come so rapidly. I think
that responsible people in East Asia would
agree strongly with this judgment.
I cannot too strongly stress this "confi-
dence factor." It is an intangible, the signi-
ficance of which is difficult to perceive unless
one has visited the countries of Asia recently
or, better still, periodically over an interval.
Today, the increase in confidence among
the non-Communist nations of Asia is palpa-
ble. Communist Chinese past failures and
present difficulties play a part, but our own
role in Viet-Nam is a major element even as
the war goes on.
The New York Times is not wholly in ac-
cord with our Viet-Nam policy, to put it
mildly, though one sometimes has difficulty
MAY 22, 1967
793
in finding what ultimate settlement they do
propose. But I do find myself in accord with
a senior correspondent of the Times who re-
ported last Sunday, after a tour in Southeast
Asia, under the headline "Non-Red Nations
in Asia Take Hope," that:
Non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia
appear to be more confident about the future as
a result of the United States' stand in Viet-Nam
and the political convulsions in Peking. . . .
The officials [in these countries] believe that in
the pause occasioned by allied resistance in Viet-
Nam and Communist China's turmoil, this area
can be strengthened to the point of successful
resistance to political subversion and economic
pressures.
I submit that this is a central and impor-
tant change in the whole Southeast Asian
position and one to which we have not given
adequate weight.
Moreover, this growing confidence, as well
as the end of such extremist regimes as that
of Sukarno, has led to one other major
change. This is the increased willingness of
the peoples and nations of Southeast Asia,
and of Asia generally, to pass beyond the
psychological scars of the colonial period and
to accept a partnership role by ourselves and
the other developed nations. Even as the
white man's domination in Asia is a thing
of the past — and rightly so — ^the sincere co-
operation of white nations is today accepted
virtually throughout the area.
So, last October, President Johnson joined
with the heads of six other East Asian and
Pacific nations in declaring "our unity, our
resolve, and our purpose in seeking together"
four goals of freedom.^ These are:
1. To be free from aggression.
2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and dis-
ease.
3. To build a region of security, order, and
progress.
4. To seek reconciliation and peace
throughout Asia and the Pacific.
The Manila Conference was the occasion
for affirming these goals, which we deeply
believe to be shared not only by the six
nations that joined in that declaration but by
all the free nations of the area.
At the same time, the fact that these goals
could be declared at Manila, and considered
realistic as never before, reflected the tre-
mendous constructive changes now taking
place in East Asia and the Pacific. It is not
too much to say that we may well stand at a
turning point in the evolution of Asia toward
the kind of free and independent states that
the nations of Asia seek, each in its own way,
and that we, in our national interests, wish
to support.
The Future
We must and shall persevere in Viet-Nam,
for, without a just and honorable solution
there, the very "confidence factor" now
abroad in Asia would surely dissipate.
But we must look wider than Viet-Nam
and in a sense beyond Viet-Nam. Asia may
indeed have turned the comer, but on any
realistic forecast there remain great difficul-
ties and the possibility of serious setbacks in
individual nations. The spirit of regional co-
operation is only beginning to take effect and
needs the kind of support envisaged in Pres-
ident Johnson's historic Baltimore speech 2
years ago.^
So I hope that such responsible groups as
yours — and indeed our people as a whole —
will never lose sight of the continuing need
throughout the rest of the area for economic
and military assistance. Such assistance rep-
resents a very small fraction of the financial
burden, not to mention the lives, that our
effort in Viet-Nam is costing us. It could
play a vital part in preventing future Viet-
Nams. And it can further the presently con-
structive trends throughout Asia.
In essence. East Asia is on the move as
never before in its history. Our role is that
of a partner in the great changes that are
under way. In that role, we are already
joined by nations of the region itself —
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand — and
there have come into being multilateral
' For texts of the Manila Conference documents,
see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
* For text, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
794
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
frameworks for assistance to Thailand,
Malaysia, and, in the past year, for the
critical situation in Indonesia.
Our role differs greatly from one country
to another. We cannot and should not act
where we are not wanted or where there are
not adequate local government programs to
support. More and more, we shall act in
concert with others, and the burden of as-
sistance will thus be more widely and fairly
shared.
But act we must. The bet with history that
we made 17 years ago looks better than it
ever has. The nations of Asia have shown the
capacity and the talent that any study of his-
tory would have always told us that they had.
But their job is a long one, and we must look
at our own efforts from the longrun stand-
point too.
For what is at stake is nothing less than
a historic transformation of Asia. We have a
part to play in that transformation. This is
in our national interest. But it is also because
we ourselves, with the other nations of the
West, are in large part the source of the ideas
of nationalism, participation of the people in
their own government, and the possibility
and techniques of economic progress — and
these are the true revolutions in this period
of history in Asia.
Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam
in New Yoric Times Interview
Following is the transcript of an inter-
view with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
at Saigon on April 18 by four New York
Times correspondents, tvhich was published
on April 26 after Ambassador Lodge had left
for the United States and his new assignment
as Ambassador at Large.
Q. You have said on a number of occasions
during the last 6 months that the war was
going much better than when you arrived
but that much still remained to be done.
Could you talk for a moment about the tasks
that remain unfinished?
A. I think the biggest thing within Viet-
Nam still ahead of us is to get pacification
really rolling. When I say pacification, I
mean the effort to overcome clandestine ag-
gression. We've got two kinds of aggression
here — overt aggression, that is, conventional
war, and clandestine aggression or terrorism.
And I think the effort to overcome clandes-
tine aggression — which, behind a military
shield, requires a braiding together of super-
police techniques with political, economic,
and social programs — is still the thing ahead
of us in South Viet-Nam.
I'm inclined to agree with the remark
attributed to Ho Chi Minh (and which I
think he probably made) that when Ameri-
cans and South Vietnamese learn how to
overcome the guerrilla infrastructure that
will be decisive. That's still ahead of us. We
have made more progress on that than ever
before, and we've had some very successful
episodes.
But to have some successful episodes which
have been conducted by some unusually bril-
liant people isn't the same thing as having
it rolling. When a program is really rolling,
it means that average people can take it and
make it work. So that, I think, is the big
thing within South Viet-Nam.
I think the big thing outside South Viet-
Nam would be if in the United States we
were to give the appearance of unity and if
it were no longer possible for Hanoi to toss
in some kind of bone and we all start snarl-
ing at each other over it. They have been
very good at that, I think.
Think, for example, of a proposal such as
the bombing pause, in which they ask us to
give up our tnrnip card against their aggres-
sion and they would do nothing in exchange.
MAY 22, 1967
795
Yet that proposal was taken with a great
deal of respect in America and had a very
divisive effect on public opinion. If these
propaganda ploys of theirs were to stop
working, I think that might bring the war
to a close very quickly. The appearance of
unity could be very important.
The Pacification Program
Q. On the question of pacification, do yon
believe the present plan is sound? If so,
what's going to be needed to achieve the
rolling momentum you are speaking of?
A. Well, pacification begins with the fol-
lowing Vietnamese military forces: ARVN
[Army of the Republic of Vietnam] , the Re-
gional Forces, and the Popular Forces, whose
job it is to create enough security with the
help of the provincial reconnaissance units,
provincial night fighters, so that the police
can function.
At that point you can bring in revolution-
ary development teams who are trained in
political community organization and then
the economic and social programs — schools,
clinics, et cetera — can begin.
That's roughly the order in which things
should happen. As you know, the AKVN is
being retrained and revamped and reoriented
so as to concentrate on this phase rather
than on conventional war, and the quicker
that goes, the quicker the whole thing will go.
Q. Do you think the American advisory
effort has been a success?
A. We have military advisers at all differ-
ent echelons. The decision was taken about
a year ago by the Vietnamese to concentrate
ARVN on pacification work, which I call a
sort of superconstabulary work. Now the
difference between constabulary and military
work — the difference between a man under
arms who is a policeman and a man under
arms who is a soldier — is that the policeman
fights where he lives, and his home and his
wife and his children, his father and mother,
are right near by.
In pacification work he has the advantage
over the man who comes from a distance in
that the local man knows the trails, he knows
the caves, he knows who the hard-core ter-
rorist leaders are. Or, if he doesn't know, he
can find out much more easily. He knows
where they are, and the crux of this matter
is eliminating three or four thousand hard-
core leaders because they are the people the
enemy cannot replace easily and quickly. If
they started to disappear, it would have a
very sobering effect on Hanoi.
This is different from straight military
fighting, and ARVN has to be refocused and
reoriented to do this, and I think some prog-
ress has been made. I wouldn't say the job
was completely done.
Appeal of Viet Cong Lower Than Ever
Q. It u^ed to be felt that the guerrillas
were more dedicated and better motivated
than the Government forces opposing them.
Has that changed at all, or do you disagree
ivith the thesis in the first place?
A. I don't disagree with the thesis that if
you go far enough back — that in '46 and in
'53, '54, and '55 there was great ideological
motivation, to use a rather big mouthful of
words, on the side of the Viet Minh, as it
then was. I think there has been a big
change.
I think that today if you would eliminate
terrorism, the whole Viet Cong thing would
fall apart. Terror is the glue that holds it
together now. It's the egg in the cake. I
think, in a funny kind of way, that the
Vietnamese people — whenever they get a
chance to express themselves — express them-
selves against the Viet Cong.
Now that doesn't mean a vote of confidence
in any individual government of Viet-Nam
or any person, because that kind of public
character does not exist here yet. But when,
for example, they want to get out of where
they are so as to be safe, they very seldom
go over to the Viet Cong side; they go to
the Government side.
I have, over a 4-year period, noticed some
very profound psychological changes in Viet-
Nam. There is a feeling of self-confidence,
there is a spirit of compromise which is in
796
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
marked contrast to the coup-plotting and
violence of which there has been so much,
and there has been a tendency to take re-
sponsibility for one's actions.
The new Constitution and the new Na-
tional Solidarity Proclamation — and the
process of vision, hard work, and compro-
mise by which they were achieved — are
heartening evidence of this new spirit. I
think the unifying tendencies are much
stronger in this country than they were in
1954. And I would say the ideological appeal
of the Viet Cong was very much less.
It's been very hard for us here in Viet-
Nam to see the Viet Cong and the NLF
[National Liberation Front] as a political
thing. I know in the United States people
talk about it as though it were a socially
conscious group of liberals. I can't see that
here at all. To us they look wildly unpopular
and feared. To me it's a very formidable
force based on terrorism with very, very
professional terrorist leaders and organizers,
and I think the ideological appeal of it is
lower than it's ever been — it's almost nil.
And to invite such a politically trained sub-
versive group into the Government here, as
some people at home suggest, would be un-
thinkable to someone who has lived through
this period in Viet-Nam, or for that matter
through 1948 in Czechoslovakia. It would
mean total defeat.
Progress Toward Social Consciousness
Q. In your opinion, after years here, do
you think you can have lasting progress un-
til something is done about the inequities and
shortcomings in Vietnamese society? Are we
really going to get anywhere until the society
is fundamentally revolutionized?
A. You are absolutely right: This must
happen and people must see it happening.
I don't think there is a country in the world
where it is a greater waste of time to make
a political speech. Americans, with all their
experience in democracy, take politicians'
speeches more seriously than Vietnamese do.
They have got a skepticism that is very
marked, and they must believe that a real
revolution is under way by what they ac-
tually see happening.
Most of those in authority whom I know,
and most of the ones who want to get into
authority, all agree that this must happen.
Now, it's one thing to say, "I'm a revolution-
ary and in favor of a revolution." It's an-
other thing to bring it about. Bringing it
about requires a tremendous lot of trained
people, requires organizing ability, money,
all kinds of things they lack. But I think
there is a realization that a medieval social
system won't do.
My memory goes back 4 years, and I think
there has been progress in 4 years. I think
there can be more. It's not a thing you are
going to do all at once. But there is a trend
in that direction.
Q. Is it an expedient or is it something
that ivill last?
A. That's one of the big questions here.
Can a society emerge from medievalism,
can it emerge from a state of mind of "Every
man for himself and devil take the hind-
most" and "dog eat dog" and all that? Can
all that happen in East Asia without an iron
Communist dictatorship? The iron Commu-
nist dictatorship has eliminated that kind of
thing but has had to enslave people to do it.
One of the things our presence is doing
here is encouraging the Vietnamese to move
into a socially conscious state of mind with-
out having people subjected to ironclad
dictatorship. But this is still one of the big
questions.
Q. The assertion is som,etimes made that
the Vietnamese don't want us here, that they
want to he left alone. What do you think?
A. When you have over 400,000 Americans
coming into a small country like this, you
are bound to have some friction and some
anti- Americanism — particularly at the begin-
ning when there was only one real port, the
port of Saigon, and 95 percent of everything
came in through Saigon.
We therefore had to come in through
Saigon, too, and jostle everybody and push
MAY 22, 1967
797
everyone around and say in effect, "Make
room for me." We put up the price of cig-
arettes and the price of beer and rents, all
that. There was some rowdyism, some
drunks, and so on.
Gradually we are getting things organized
so most Americans are not in the cities. This
is better for Americans and better for Viet-
namese. In Saigon the American military
population started with 18,000 at the begin-
ning of the year. It is about 12,000 now and
will be down to 6,000 by the end of 1967.
Q. In the presidential elections this fall,
if we had civilian and military candidates
of roughly equal competence, which would
he more desirable?
A. I am not going to answer that question
quite the way you put it, but I will say that
the military in the United States has a mili-
tary job to do, and that's all. The military
in Viet-Nam, as in many tropical, under-
developed countries, has a military job to
do as well as a very big sociological job.
A country like Viet-Nam, which has ex-
isted ethnically and linguistically and artis-
tically for a long time and has a strong sense
of peoplehood, is just beginning to get the
kind of sense of nationhood we know in the
West and which it must create if it is to
survive with such predatory neighbors.
Certainly the biggest nation-building entity
is the military. Also, it has the reservoir of
administrative talent. It's the most likely
place where they can go to find people to do
certain administrative jobs. I grant you,
ideally speaking it is better for the military
not to get into those things, and it's better
for the community not to have the military
do them. But in a country at this stage of
development, they must do it.
Therefore, one of the essentials to stability
in South Viet-Nam is for the military not to
fight within itself, and one of the things
accomplished in the last few years was to
keep the military together.
Any administration here which excluded
the military completely from the Government
would be doing something dangerous, be-
cause you can't take the strongest element
in a society and deprive it of responsibility
and exclude it.
What you want to do with the strongest
element is to impose duties on them and
watch them and not keep them outside where
the inherent power they have is bound to
make itself felt — maybe in a disorderly way.
So, I believe the military must be a par-
ticipant in the Government here in the fu-
ture. This doesn't mean that you have to have
a military man as President — I don't mean
that, although it may happen. But it does
mean they must be involved and have respon-
sibilities imposed upon them which every-
body understands, and the press must watch
them and report on them and not have them
out in the bushes. That would be a very
serious error.
Effect of a Cease-Fire
Q. People seem to talk a lot about a cease-
fire. If there were a cease-fire, would that
cripple the pacification effort ? Would it make
it impossible to take what you regard as
the most important single step: bringing the
Government back into the hamlets?
A. You asked me two questions. I'd like
to answer the first by calling attention to a
statement recently made in the Christian
Science Monitor by Professor John Fairbank,
the East Asia expert at Harvard, who said
that Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are
committed to permanent revolutionary strug-
gle rather than to an interlude of war which
is terminated by formal peace.
In other words, where we want peace they
want conquest. We and they, therefore, are
not having a misunderstanding which can be
dispelled and elucidated by the good offices
of third parties. There have been situations
like that many times in history, but this is
not one of them.
There is no misunderstanding, and the war
will not be ended by pretending that there is.
I am not sure that that truth is sufficiently
understood.
Now, on the question of cease-fire, one kind
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of cease-fire would be a situation in which
they would stop infiltrating and stop killing
village officials and we would stop bombing.
That's an illustration of one kind of cease-
fire which has some merit to it.
There's another kind of cease-fire whereby
the military forces in South Viet-Nam would
have to stop operations but the terrorists
could go on terrorizing.
Incidentally, many of the terrorists don't
use firearms. The cease-fire would not apply
to these people who torture and kidnap and
do this kind of thing. Such a cease-fire would
be profoundly unacceptable.
Any kind of arrangement which can't be
inspected, or which we respect and they
don't, simply gives them an engraved invi-
tation to take over the country. That's why
I believe that the first thing to be done is
to agree upon an enforceable inspection sys-
tem. If a cease-fire can't be inspected, I
wouldn't bother to talk about it.
Q. Some 'persons argue that we would have
been better off if Diem [President Ngo Dinh
Diem} had not been overthroivn by his own
army in 1963, that the war would have gone
better. What do you think ?
A. When President Kennedy nominated
me to come out here, I had a long talk in
Washington with a distinguished Vietnamese
who said that unless they left the country
no power on earth could prevent the assas-
sination of Mr. Diem, his brother Mr. Nhu,
and Mr. Nhu's wife — that the situation here
had developed to a point where their deaths
were inevitable. I got out here and had not
been here one week before I was absolutely
convinced that this person was right, that the
Diem government was in its terminal phase.
Maybe, I said, it could last for 3 weeks or
6 weeks, but its days were numbered. And
so to talk of how nice it would have been
had they gone on is quite beside the point.
There was an abuse of the police power
that aroused deep, deep resentment. The
Vietnamese people, let it be said to their
credit, deeply resent abuse of the police
power. There was never any question that
the regime could not have lasted.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, why do you suppose
it is that in the United States so many dis-
tinguished, so many thoughtful people, are,
in Mr. [Richard M.] Nixon's words, so "mis-
taken and misguided" about the war and the
justice of it?
A. I think most of the, "misguidedness" is
a result of the strangeness. Some Americans
compare this war with World War II. Why
wouldn't they compare it with World War II,
since it's the war all of us know ?
In World War II you beat the German
army and the war was over. Here you beat
the North Vietnamese army and it simply
gives you a hunting license to go after the
terrorists.
Those are discouraging, depressing
thoughts. And none of us were taught about
this area in college — at least I never heard
anything about Southeast Asia. Therefore
you must come out here to learn, and for
most people to come out here is a big under-
taking.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, tvhen you leave, a
great number of people will be leaving at
rotighly the same time — the three American
corps commanders, your political officer, the
Deputy Ambassador, the economic counsel-
or, and so on. Is it dangerous to change so
many people at once? Wouldn't it be better
to stagger them and provide better continuity
in the handling of our policy here?
A. I think in these senior jobs a year is
too short, but I think when you get around
3 years it gets to be too long for most peo-
ple. Of course, there are exceptions to these
rules. It is a pity that some of the terms
happen to come to an end at the same time.
That's just coincidence.
I do think the new people are very, very
good. Ideally speaking, I think if we could
have staggered it a little more it might have
been better, but that was more or less chance.
Q. People talk in terms of a war that may
continue 2 years, 5 years, or 10 years, we
MAY 22, 1967
799
don't know. Given the duration and the in-
tensity of the quarrel so far, this might turn
out to be a conflict that was almost passed
down from father to son. Would you care
to comment on this at all?
A. Well, we have had our troops in Ger-
many ever since 1945. That's father to son.
We have had troops in Korea since 1950.
The world is dangerous, the world is disor-
derly, the world is very, very complicated,
and there's no use pretending it isn't. There
isn't a nice, straight, smooth, cellophane-
wrapped, sanitized path to peace which our
Government is deliberately ignoring.
You have a choice between dangers and,
realistically, our young men ought to expect
to render some military service during the
course of their lives. After all, what's going
to happen to the United States if, when it's
in trouble, the young men don't rally around
and help?
Q. But it's not the United States that's in
trouble. Ifs South Viet-Nam.
A. I don't agree with that. I think this is
a vital concern of ours.
Q. Are there places that are not of vital
concern ?
A. Yes, a lot of them. The well-advertised
domino theory applies here and applies in
Berlin. I don't think it applies in the middle
of the Sahara Desert.
Q. What do you say to the argument that
in this case the United States has undertaken
a commitment that may surpass our capa-
bilities to deal with it?
A. I don't think so. I think if we are stead-
fast and give the appearance of unity, this
is going to be a success. I think success here
is going to start off an upward spiral in the
world that will be very far reaching. I think
it will be the beginning of a much better era
for humanity generally. I think we are going
to be successful here if we have the patience
and persistence, and that it will be richly
worth while.
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days
A PROCLAMATION*
The Rush-Bagot Agreement, signed on April 28-
29, 1817, provided for naval disarmament between
Canada and the United States along the Great
Lakes and Lake Champlain.
It is the oldest arms limitation treaty existing
in the world today. For that reason alone it
deserves wide recognition.
The Rush-Bagot Agreement — expressed in an
exchange of notes between Richard Rush, Acting
Secretary of State, and Sir Charles Bagot, British
Minister to the United States — was one of the most
significant steps in the development of peaceful
relations between the United States and Canada.
The unfortified boundary between our two countries
is a symbol to the rest of the world of the harmony
and understanding which can be aclueved by two
sovereign governments.
The celebration of this event in the United States
and Canada coincides with the opening of the 1967
Universal and International Exhibition — known as
EXPO 67— in Montreal. The theme of the Exhibi-
tion, "Man and His World," has a close relation-
ship to the spirit of peace and good will embodied
in the Rush-Bagot Agreement.
In recognition of the significance of this agree-
ment signed 150 years ago, the Congress by a joint
resolution approved April 27, 1967, has requested
the President to issue a proclamation designating
April 28-29, 1967, as Rush-Bagot Agreement Days.
Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
designate April 28-29, 1967, as Rush-Bagot Agree-
ment Days; and I invite the Governors of the
several States, the chief officials of local govern-
ments, and the people of the United States to
observe these days with appropriate ceremonies and
activities.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-
seventh day of April in the year of our
[seax,] Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-seven, and
of the Independence of the United States
of America the one hundred and ninety-first.
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
» No. 3781 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 6757.
800
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
An Economic Profile of Mainland China. Studies
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. Vol.
1 : General Economic Setting, The Economic Sec-
tors, 339 pp.; Vol. 2: Population and Manpower
Resources, External Economic Relations, Appen-
dix, 345 pp. February 1967. [Joint Committee
prints.]
Food for Progress in Latin America. A report on
agricultural development in Latin America by
Henry S. Reuss, chairman. Subcommittee on
International Finance, House Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, together with supplemental
views of the Honorable Paul A. Fino. February 8,
1966. 255 pp. [Subcommittee print.]
Sixth Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. H. Doc. 58. February 20,
1967. 41 pp.
Study Mission to East Berlin, Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Report by Senator
Claiborne Pell to the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations. February 23, 1967. 6 pp. [Com-
mittee print.]
Trade Involving Southern Rhodesia. A communica-
tion from the President. H. Doc. 63. February 28,
1967. 5 pp.
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
Analysis and backg^round data. Staff report pre-
pared for the use of the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. March 1967. 84
pp. [Committee print.]
The Atlantic Alliance: Unfinished Business. A study
submitted by the Subcommittee on National Se-
curity and International Operations to the Senate
Committee on Government Operations. March 1,
1967. 15 pp. [Committee print.]
The Fiat-Soviet Auto Plant and Communist Eco-
nomic Reforms. A report by four members of the
Subcommittee on International Trade, House
Committee on Banking and Currency. March 1,
1967. 99 pp. [Subcommittee print.]
Twenty-second Report of the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on Information. H. Doc. 74. March 6,
1967. 31 pp.
Emergency Food Assistance to India. Reports to ac-
company H.J. Res. 267. H. Rept. 67, March 6,
1967, 18 pp.; S. Rept. 70, March 15, 1967, 11 pp.
Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967.
Report to accompany H.R. 6098. H. Rept. 68.
March 6, 1967. 51 pp.
Extension of Time for Filing Certain Requests
Under Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments
Act. Report to accompany H.R. 4880. H. Rept.
100. March 8, 1967. 2 pp.
Duty-Free Treatment of Dicyandiamide. Reports to
accompany H.R. 286. H, Rept. 110, March 9, 1967,
2 pp.; S. Rept. 78, March 22, 1967, 2 pp.
Duty on Certain Nonmalleable Iron Castings. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 653. H. Rept. 111. March
9, 1967. 4 pp.
Duty-Free Treatment of Limestone for Cement. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 1141. H. Rept. 112. March
9, 1967. 2 pp.
TariflF Classification of Chinese Gooseberries. Report
to accompany H.R. 2155. H. Rept. 114. March 9,
1967. 2 pp.
Amending the Act of June 30, 1954, as Amended,
Providing for the Continuance of Civil Govern-
ment for the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 5277. H. Rept.
117. March 10, 1967. 31 pp.
Latin American Summit Conference. Message from
the President. H. Doc. 84. March 13, 1967. 7 pp.
Support for a New Phase of the Alliance for
Progress at Forthcoming Meeting of the American
Chiefs of State. Report to accompany H.J. Res.
428. H. Rept. 145. March 20, 1967. 9 pp.
The International Bridge Act of 1967. Report to
accompany S. 623. S. Rept. 80. March 23, 1967.
4 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap.
Report to accompany H.R. 5615. H. Rept. 164.
March 23, 1967. 4 pp.
Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Nickel.
Report to accompany H.R. 3349. H. Rept. 165.
March 23, 1967. 3 pp.
Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to
accompany H.R. 3652. H. Rept. 166, March 23,
1967. 3 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final
protocol, and convention with final protocol and
regulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.
Ratifications deposited: Dahomey, January 13,
1967; Gabon, January 27, 1967; Nigeria,
January 10, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Ratification deposited: Niger, May 3, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.*
Ratified by the President: April 25, 1967.
' Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.
MAY 22, 1967
801
BILATERAL
Norway
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 4,
1967. Enters into force on the date on which each
Government shall have received from the other
written notification that it has complied vnth all
statutory and constitutional requirements for
entry into force.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the loan of an additional
vessel to the Philippines pursuant to the agree-
ments of September 8 and October 4, 1961, as
amended (TIAS 4865, 6137), and June 23, 1953
(TIAS 2834). Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila March 21 and 28, 1967. Entered into force
March 28, 1967.
Agreement on the use of the Veterans Memorial
Hospital and the provision of inpatient and out-
patient medical care and treatment of veterans by
the Philippines and the furnishing of grants-in-
aid by the United States. Signed at Manila April
25, 1967. Entered into force April 25, 1967.
Agreement on the use of the Veterans Memorial
Hospital and the provision of medical care
and treatment of veterans by the Philippines
and the furnishing of grants-in-aid by the United
States. Signed at Manila June 30, 1958, as
amended. Entered into force July 1, 1958. TIAS
4067, 5378.
Terminated : April 25, 1967.
Somali Republic
Agreement extending the technical cooperation
program agreement of January 28 and February
4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 5508,
5738, 5814, 6148). Effected by exchange of notes
at Mogadiscio April 25 and 26, 1967. Entered
into force April 26, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
201f02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Agricultural Commodities. Agrreement with Viet-
Nam, amending the agreement of March 21, 1966,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon
November 3, 1966. Entered into force November 3,
1966. TIAS 6145. 2 pp. h<(.
Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road.
Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ottawa October 31 and November 17, 1966. En-
tered into force November 17, 1966. TIAS 6147.
3 pp. 5^.
Technical Cooperation. Agreements with the Somali
Republic, extending the agreement of January 28
and February 4, 1961, as extended. TIAS 6148.
15 pp. 10(».
Cultural Relations — Exchanges in the Scientific,
Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields
in 1966-1967. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics — Signed at Washington March
19, 1966. Entered into force March 19, 1966, with
effect from January 1, 1966. With annexes. TIAS
6149. 66 pp. 25^.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1456
PUBLICATION 8238
MAY 22, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly pablication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the ForeiKn Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, aa well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation ia included concerning treaties
ind international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
802
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
^DEX May 22, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U56
)
i^tierican Principles. The Role of the United
States in World Affairs (Rusk) 770
lia. Seventeen Years in Elast Asia (Bundy) 790
nada. Rush-Bagot Agreement Days (procla-
mation) 800
Gngress. Congressional Documents Relating
to Foreign Policy 801
Iplomacy. The Role of the United States in
iVorld Affairs (Rusk) 770
fonomic Affairs
^ Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript
)f NET interview) 774
irenteen Years in East Asia (Bundy) . . . 790
Brope. A Conversation With Dean Rusk
[transcript of NET interview) 774
Grmany. U.S., U.K., and Germany Conclude
rrilateral Talks (U.S. statement) .... 788
>rth Atlantic Treaty Organization
A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript
f NET interview) 774
^., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral
:'alks (U.S. statement) 788
P'sidential Documents. Rush-Bagot Agree-
iient Days 800
plications. Recent Releases 802
■aty Information
•rent Actions 801
sh-Bagot Agreement Days (proclamation) . 800
S.S.R. A Conversation With Dean Rusk
transcript of NET interview) 774
ited Kingdom
Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript
f NET interview) 774
., U.K., and Germany Conclude Trilateral
'alks (U.S. statement) 788
t-Nam
bassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam in
Tew York Times Interview 795
A Conversation With Dean Rusk (transcript
of NET interview) 774
The Role of the United States in World Af-
fairs (Rusk) 770
Seventeen Years in East Asia (Bundy) . . . 790
Name Index
Bundy, William P 790
Johnson, President 800
Lodge, Henry Cabot 795
Niven, Paul 774
Rusk, Secretary 770, 774
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 1-7
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
101 5/1 Rusk: "The Role of the United
States in World Affairs."
*102 5/1 National foreign policy confer-
ence for editors and broad-
casters, Washington, D.C., May
22—23.
tl03 5/1 Linowitz: "The Road From Punta
del Este."
104 5/2 U.S. statement on conclusion of
tripartite talks.
*105 5/2 Visit of Yen Chia-kan, Vice
President and Prime Minister
of the Republic of China.
tl06 5/2 U.S. delegation to ECLA meeting,
Caracas, May 2-13.
107 5/3 Bundy: "Seventeen Years in East
Asia:"
tl08 5/3 Martin: Overseas Press Club,
New York, N.Y.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
•CtU.S. Government Printing Office 1967—251-937/46
superintenc
u.s. governm
washing:
SOCIA!. SCIENCE DEPARTMENT
PUBLIC LIBRARY
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
THE OTHER AFRICA: THE MAGHREB
by Assistant Secretary Palmer 806
THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE IN PERSPECTIVE
by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman 815
THE ROAD FROM PUNTA DEL ESTE
by Ambassador Sol M. Linou-itz 822
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR 1968
Statement by Secretary Rtisk
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 826
For index see inside back cover
The Other Africa: The Maghreb
by Joseph Palmer 2d
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
The Texan commander of a division en
route for the North African landings in
World War II is said to have told his troops
that he wanted them to avoid trouble with
the local population whatever the provoca-
tion. "They may even try to tell you that
Africa is bigger than Texas," he said. "Well,
you just agree with them."
This vast continent is, of course, three
times the size of the United States. And like
North America, it is characterized by great
diversity. To many, it brings to mind Black
Africa, the sub-Saharan heartland of the
continent. To others, it evokes the problems
of its troubled southern extremity.
Tonight I want to talk about another part
of Africa, that portion which lies between
the Sahara and the Mediterranean. In our
terminology we call it North Africa. To the
Arabs it is known as the Maghreb, or Arab
"West." Sometimes, with the poetic imagery
which characterizes the Arabs, they call it
the "Island of the West" — an island, that
is, surrounded by the oceans and the desert.
In a more precise geographical sense,
North Africa falls in the northwest quadrant
of Africa, a rectangle of Atlantic and Medi-
terranean coastline and Saharan hinterland
stretching to the borders of Egypt and the
Sudan. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya
are the four countries of the Arab Maghi'eb,
' Address made in the Walsh lecture series at
the Georgetown University School of Foreign
Service, Washington, D.C., on May 9 (press release
109).
but the influence of their Berber-Arab-
Islamic-Moorish culture has spread to the
outer rim of the Sahara.
The Maghreb itself is no insignificant por-
tion of the earth's surface. Morocco, Algeria,
Tunisia, and Libya comprise an area half the
size of the United States. Algeria, the second
largest country of Africa after the Sudan, is
one-third the size of the United States. Libya
is 21/2 times as large as Texas. After one has
traveled 1,200 miles from Algiers to Taman-
rasset, there are still 300 miles to go before
reaching the borders of Niger and Mali. The
North African coastline from Morocco to the
eastern limits of Libya matches the coastline
of southern Europe from Portugal to Tur-
key.
The population of the Maghreb is ap-
IH-oaching 35 million and at the present rate
of growth — one of the fastest in the world —
will double in our lifetime.
Geography helps explain the unique role
which this area has filled throughout history.
North Africa overlaps several intersecting
worlds. It stands at one of the great cross-
roads of civilization.
For nearly 3,000 years North Africa's
indigenous Berber stock has survived inva-
sion after invasion from one direction or
another around the Mediterranean basin.
Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Van-
dal, Arab, Spaniard, Turk, Frenchman, and
Italian have had their day. To a greater or
lesser extent, the North African has vari-
ously absorbed the invader's blood, assimi-
806
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lated his culture, and been subjected, for a
while at least, to his government. But
throughout, the North African has stead-
fastly remained his own separate, stoic,
resilient, independent-minded self. Far from
losing his distinctive character, he has been
broadened in his outlook, enriched in his
culture, fortified in his knowledge of himself.
Now, with his newly won independence,
the North African moves forward on the
world stage as a proud and distinct figure,
qualified by his history to serve as an inter-
preter among men of different origins and
background. No doubt this is why North
Africans attach such importance to playing
a full and active role in the United Nations,
in the Organization of African Unity, and in
other international bodies.
Geographic and Cultural Affinities
North Africa has affinities in all directions
of the compass. It has always been a part of
that Mediterranean world from which so
much of our own civilization has derived. It
has received from the Mediterranean world
and given to the Mediterranean world. The
great Arabo-Islamic civilization of the Moors
that arose in Spain and North Africa from
the 9th to the 15th centuries was the main
custodian and conduit of the learning of the
times and in turn inspired the rich outpour-
ing of Moorish literature, music, art, and
architecture that have characterized the
Maghreb's cultural life down to our day.
From the Near East came the external
factors which have so strongly influenced the
Maghrebian character: the religion, lan-
guage, and culture of the Arabs. The inva-
sions in the early centuries of the Arab
conquest probably brought no more than a
few hundred thousand Arabs into North
Africa, but the bonds of language and cul-
ture are so strong that North Africans take
their membership in the Arab family for
granted. So do the other Arabs. The attach-
ment to Islam is even more pervasive and
deep rooted. To the North African, his re-
ligion is a dominating factor in his daily life.
But do not ask a North African whether
he thinks of himself as an Arab or an Afri-
can, for he sees no contradiction and no
need to make a choice. He is both — by birth-
right and by birthplace.
The more we have learned about Africa's
great desert, the Sahara, and the historic
commercial routes which have linked its
northern and southern shores, the more we
have come to realize that the caravan trails
across this sea of sand have been as impor-
tant in their way as the shipping lanes of the
Mediterranean. Yesterday, the camel; today,
the oil company trucks and the airplanes
bridge the physical gap. Tomorrow, one of
the several ambitious schemes to carry mod-
ern roads across the desert will undoubtedly
materialize. The desert itself, as an increas-
ing fount of wealth, will be a resource
shared by the surrounding nations.
North Africa is part of modern Africa
politically and emotionally as well as geo-
graphically. The decolonization process,
which provides the principal unifying theme
for Africans today, had its beginnings in
North Africa. Libya led the way in 1951, the
first African country to achieve its inde-
pendence in the modern era. The struggles
which ensued in Morocco and Tunisia, and
above all, the long, bitter, and bloody war for
national independence in Algeria, helped to
encourage conditions in which other African
countries would gain their independence
under more peaceful and "auspicious circum-
stances. Today the North African states
share with the other new African nations the
problems of consolidating and realizing the
full potential of their sovereign freedom.
A few statistics underline the importance
of North Africa's ties with Europe. Within
the past century — during the period of
colonial rule — the North African has been
extensively exposed to the economic and
social consequences of Western European
industrialization. A newcomer to Morocco,
Algeria, or Tunisia is struck by the well-
developed infrastructure of roads, railroads,
communications, utilities, buildings, light
industry, and modern farms created by the
French. Trade is overwhelmingly with
MAY 29, 1967
807
Western Europe. Two examples: More than
80 percent of Algeria's exports still go to
France; about a third of West Germany's
crude oil supplies come from Libya. The
West is the main source of investment
capital and technical assistance. The school
systems of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia
employ thousands of French teachers. More
likely than not, an educated Moroccan,
Algerian, or Tunisian has been exposed to
much the same learning process as a French-
man. He is almost as familiar with Paris
as with Casablanca, Algiers, or Tunis. The
interrelationship of the two areas is well
illustrated by the fact that three quarters
of a million North Africans today find em-
liloyment in the labor-short economies of
Western Europe.
North Africa's interrelationship with
Europe is buttressed by its strategic impor-
tance to that continent and to the Mediter-
ranean area generally. The region commands
the Pillars of Hercules and looks out upon
the Atlantic. Casablanca is over a thousand
miles closer to New York than is Rio de
Janeiro. The genuine independence and
stability of this area is therefore of great
importance to the free world.
U.S.-North African Community of Interests
American ties with this area go back
to our earliest history as a nation. To en-
courage and protect a thriving trade into
the Mediterranean in the late 18th and early
19th centuries, the establishment of satis-
factory diplomatic relations with the Bar-
bary States was one of the first tasks of our
new Republic. The first American consulate
was established in Algiers in 1792. A treaty
of peace and friendship concluded with
Morocco in 1787 has been maintained in its
essential provisions to this day for what is
said to be the longest unbroken treaty rela-
tionship in United States history.
The modern period of our relations with
North Africa began in World War H when
thousands of Americans came to know
North Africa and North Africans came to
know the United States through the friendly
and personable GI. Two historic moments
in the war and postwar period greatly rein-
forced the good name which the American
soldier, with his innate democratic behavior,
had created for this country: President
Roosevelt's meeting with the Sultan of
Morocco at Casablanca in 1943 and John F.
Kennedy's historic Senate speech in 1957
on the Algerian problem. Both had a reso-
nance which is still alive in North Africa
today. Not only was the United States seen
as a great and powerful nation, but one
understanding and sympathetic toward
North Africa's own desire for freedom and
self-expression.
The United States, as a world power, and
the emerging nations of North Africa are
today developing a growing community of
interests which is finding expression in the
major programs of economic development
aid we have undei'taken in Morocco and
Tunisia; the substantial amounts of Amer-
ican agricultural supplies going to Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia to help meet their food
deficits; the major role of American enter-
prise in Libya's booming oil development,
and to a lesser but growing extent, the part
played by American capital in the other
countries of the Maghreb.
American capital and skills are sought,
along with those of Western Europe and
other sources, to help North Africa realize
its economic promise. North Africa's oil and
gas resources represent one of the world's
great energy potentials. The needs of North
Africa and the world market enhance the
prospects that this potential will increasingly
be realized. Much the same can be said of
North Africa's vast possibilities for produc-
ing phosphate and nitrogenous fertilizers. A
world facing hunger will require also that
these resources be developed. The question is
mainly when and by whom.
This rapid survey of external influences
active in the area must take into account the
increasing interest of the Soviet Union and of
several other Eastern European states in the
area. The principal manifestations are the
steadily mounting Soviet naval and merchant
shipping in the Mediterranean, the growing
trade with North Africa, and the large Soviet
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
programs of economic and military aid to Al-
geria. Soviet financial and technical commit-
ments to Algerian industrialization are sec-
ond only to those of France, while the Soviet
Union is the primary source of military
weapons and training for an Algerian army
that has become the third most powerful on
the African Continent. On a smaller scale,
Soviet economic and technical assistance is
also furnished to Morocco and Tunisia, while
several of the Eastern European countries
are actively pursuing the attractive com-
mercial opportunities in Libya.
Finally, North Africa is a focal point of
interest for the entire third world. Here, in a
sense, intersect the East-West competition
between the Communist states and those of
the free world, and the North-South disparity
between the richer and the poorer nations.
North Africa is thus exposed to all the great
political currents and controversies of the
day and has become one of the principal
laboratories of African independence. If the
new nations of North Africa, with their eco-
nomic and political promise and their rela-
tively advanced stage of technical and educa-
tional development, cannot develop resilient,
durable, progressive societies in this complex
age, the outlook for the rest of the underde-
veloped world is bleak. Happily, there are a
number of reasons to be optimistic about
North Africa's future.
Strong Spirit of Independence
Despite the inner stresses and problems
which seem at times to threaten its tran-
quillity, independent North Africa has built
up a rather remarkable record of stability.
There has been only one significant change of
government, the overthrow of Ben Bella, but
even this change was accomplished with-
out bloodshed. The border clash between
Morocco and Algeria in 1963 over disputed
territory was quickly brought to an end by
the good sense of the two parties and the
good offices of the Organization of African
Unity. By and large, North African govern-
ments have devoted themselves diligently to
the challenge of nation-building. Economic
improvement is the major interest and the
major objective of all the Maghreb countries.
The people of this area are proudly inde-
pendent in fact as well as name. They have
a strong historical tradition of their own and
an innate sense of dignity and self-respect.
They have struggled resolutely for their inde-
pendence and can be expected to remain
fiercely resistant to any attempt from any
quarter to dominate their lives. More than
this, the North African states are deeply
committed to the cause of freedom through-
out Africa.
The North African states seek friendly re-
lations with all nations that reciprocate their
friendship and respect their sovereignty. But
they are determined to chart their own
course.
Algeria is a case in point. At the govern-
mental level it has close relations with the
Soviet Union. The U.A.R. apart, it is the
principal beneficiary of Soviet aid in Africa.
Yet Algeria is motivated by an intense view
of its national self-interest, has dealt severely
with its domestic Communists, recognizes
that its most fruitful economic relationships
are those with its former adversary, France,
and has repeatedly expressed to our own Gov-
ernment the desire for closer relations.
I should add that we fully reciprocate this
expressed desire for friendship. There is no
denying that certain well-known problems —
the sharp difference of view over Viet-Nam,
the concerns arising in the area from the in-
flow of Soviet arms, issues relating to invest-
ment climate and property rights — do not
make the task any easier. But the dialog is
both frank and useful, as our officials in Al-
giers and my colleagues and I in Washington
know from personal experience. We consider
it to be clearly in the interests of both coun-
tries, and equally important to stability and
progress in the area as a whole, to try to find
a way around the obstacles and to enlarge the
bases of cooperation. The key lies in patience,
perseverance, mutual respect, and underlying
good will.
It is well to remember that the hardheaded
nationalism and strong spirit of independence
characteristic of all of the North African na-
tions in fact provide the surest safeguard
MAY 29, 1967
809
that they will not yield to alien doctrines or
dictation. We have good reason to welcome
this outlook, for with us it is axiomatic that
United States interests in the world are best
served by free relations among free men.
Prospects for Development and Stability
The economic takeoff prospects in North
Africa are among the most hopeful anywhere
in the developing world. Algeria alone ac-
counts for a substantial portion of the world's
reserves of natural gas. Libya is already one
of the world's leading oil producers, with out-
put nearing 2 million barrels a day and
annual income from oil revenues of over $600
million, almost $400 for each of Libya's 1.6
million inhabitants. Morocco, Tunisia, and
Spanish Sahara are rich in phosphates, and
throughout North Africa iron and other
minerals are found in significant quantities.
We do not yet know what other wealth still
undiscovered may lie beneath the Sahara or
in the waters off the North African coast.
In a sober appreciation of development
prospects throughout the underdeveloped
world, the President of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
Mr. George Woods, has placed the countries
around the Mediterranean, including those
of North Africa, in a special category:
Given at least moderate political stability, these
countries can be expected to make steady progress.
Apart from their own talents and resources, they
have the advantage of proximity to the industrial
heartland of Europe, which makes possible sub-
stantial earnings from trade. A number have oil
and gas deposits and other mineral resources which
can serve as the basis for material development.
All of them will surely profit from tourism — the
apparently limitless urge of the Europeans and
Americans to visit old places which are new to
them and to seek the sun.
In assessing the prospects for future de-
velopment and stability, one cannot fail to be
impressed by the unifying forces within the
region. While it is true that the inevitable
customs and police formalities serve to dif-
ferentiate national frontiers, the forces for
cooperation run wide and deep. The people
speak a common language, a dialectical form
of Arabic. The overwhelming majority are
Moslems. Customs, cuisines, dress, and tra-
ditions are much alike. All have emerged
from a common colonial past, three of the
four under the same foreign power. To the
North African, his neighbors are "brothers,"
whatever the differences among governments
may be. This unity is worth building on.
The North African countries even share
their most pressing problems in common.
Each has a swelling population. Fifty percent
of the people in the area are under 21. There
is a clear danger that this new generation,
coming of age in new countries with institu-
tions which have not yet met the test of time
and with economies that are still weak, will
demand more of their governments than they
can possibly provide. None of the govern-
ments of the area has been in power very
long; Libya has just celebrated its 15th birth-
day, and Algeria is not quite .5. With the
rapid growth of population, none of the coun-
tries is presently able to feed itself, even
though agriculture remains the base of each
economy. The magnitude of these problems
suggests that a common approach would be
useful, and I will have more to say about this
aspect a little later on.
Causes of Tension
But despite these cohesive factors and
common problems, the North African nations
are to a regrettable degree diverted from
their real interests at the present time by a
climate of mutual suspicion and distrust.
Cooperation is to some extent inhibited by
the differing nature of the regimes: Morocco
a hereditary monarchy seeking progress
along an evolutionary path; Algeria a revolu-
tionary republic of the left imposing a rather
rigid form of state socialism; Tunisia a mod-
erate republic pragmatic in its policies and
favorable to Western liberal principles; Libya
a constitutional monarchy with a free enter-
prise economic system.
A much more important cause of tension,
however, arises from the legacy of disputed
territorial borders which the North African
countries, like other parts of the continent,
have inherited from the colonial past. For
the most part the border differences are
810
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
minor, but in the western Maghreb a serious
problem arises from Morocco's contention
that it has been deprived of an historic right
to large parts of southwestern Algeria, as
well as Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. This
assertion is flatly rejected by Morocco's
neighbors.
The territorial problem has in turn been
an important contributing factor in the
buildup of arms in the North African coun-
tries, which has now become the most seri-
ous obstacle to close, confident relations in
the Maghreb. The causes are complex, but
the consequences can be all too clear and
dangerous.
In 1963 an obscure incident in the re-
moter reaches of the Sahara sparked a
short, intensive amied conflict between
Morocco and Algeria. Since that time Al-
geria has concentrated on creating a strong
modern army. Supplied by the Soviet Union
with nearly $200 million worth of jet planes,
tanks, and other sophisticated armament,
Algeria has now acquired a significant lead
in weapons over its neighbors. Algeria re-
peatedly stresses that its intentions are solely
defensive, points to the remote and lengthy
borders which it must protect, and empha-
sizes that it has no territorial ambitions of
its own. Unfortunately, however, through
the mere acquisition of such a formidable
arsenal Algeria has aroused the fear and
suspicion of its neighbors. They in turn have
requested additional military assistance from
the United States and others.
While we see no present evidence that any
country in North Africa has any intention
of attacking its neighbor, we have not felt
that we could fail to take into account the
concerns which have been evoked by the ob-
vious arms imbalance in the area. We have
therefore responded with minimal programs
for Morocco and Tunisia designed purely for
defensive purposes and calculated to give
these countries a basic sense of security
within which to continue their internal de-
velopment efforts. Within the framework of
such legitimate needs, we are determined to
do everything within our power to avoid
contributing to a Maghreb arms race.
Arms expenditures are a tragic waste of
money. With the millions of dollars now al-
located to North African defense budgets,
how many factories might have been built,
how many shantytowns replaced by decent
modern housing, how many sick healed, how
many more children educated.
Then, too, the existence of armaments it-
self breeds suspicion and inhibits the sort of
confident cooperation required to launch re-
gional projects. Opportunities to engage in
fruitful collaboration are lost because each
side is watching another aspect of his neigh-
bor's behavior.
Finally, arms procurement tends to be-
come a vicious, destructive spiral whose con-
tinuing escalation increasingly dilutes con-
structive efforts by governments to improve
the economic levels of their people.
The United States would earnestly hope to
see these arms increases halted. Great pow-
ers and small have a responsibility to work
toward this end. The basic question for the
political leadership in the Maghreb states is
whether, in this day and age, expenditure
for armaments brings more security or less.
But this is a question which cannot be an-
swered by any one of the states alone. It is
a matter for the collective wisdom and col-
lective conscience of all the nations of the
region.
Regional Cooperation for Development
While the arms problem is serious, it is in
curious contrast with the hopeful — if still
only preliminary — steps toward area coop-
eration that are taking place. Throughout
the Maghreb there is a heartening under-
standing of the need to pool resources and
work out problems in common.
Institutions have been developing for some
years to coordinate policies. There are an-
nual meetings of the Maghreb economic min-
isters, as well as a Permanent Consultative
Committee in Tunis with a staff of about 50.
Seven permanent commissions meet regu-
larly to consider specific products and prob-
lems in the fields of air transport, highways,
railways, maritime transport, tourism, tele-
communications, and commercial relations.
MAY 29, 1967
811
There is in being a regulatory body which
oversees and coordinates the production of
esparto grass for all four countries and
which markets the product. A similar body
handles all national problems of control of
locusts, long a fearsome plague in the south-
ern Maghreb.
Plans for additional steps in a regional
direction are well under way. There has been
considerable consultation on the creation of
a regional airline, replacing the four small
national carriers. The Tourism Commission
has inaugurated a hotel training program,
with United Nations assistance, in Algiers.
There is a Center for Industrial Studies at
Tripoli which serves as a central clearing-
house for information on industrialization.
Studies are under way on lowering of cus-
toms barriers and quotas among the four
countries.
Potential of Water and Natural Resources
Regional planning in North Africa could
look to still broader horizons. In parts of the
Maghreb there is enough rainfall for only
one crop every 3 years. Last year's drought
in the noiTnally productive areas of Mo-
rocco and Algeria was so severe and crops
so sparse that these two countries alone had
to import 2 million tons of the world's in-
creasingly scarce supplies of wheat. The out-
look for the harvest this year is somewhat
better but still uncertain. Even in the best
of present conditions the countries of North
Africa are not able to feed themselves.
Yet in Roman times, and even much more
recently, the Maghreb was a grain exporting
area. We know that there are substantial
untapped water resources. Studies over the
past few years have indicated the existence
of an enormous underground fresh water
lake beneath the Sahara several hundreds of
miles in radius. Deep wells have been drilled
in all four countries, but the most ambitious
effort has been undertaken in Tunisia under
the AID "50-well project."
We know from our experience in this
country that some desert soils, given ade-
quate water, can be unusually productive.
It has been estimated that in the region
around Colomb-Bechar in Algeria there is
sufficient underground water to irrigate
nearly 500,000 acres and that the soil and
climate are virtually identical to those of the
Imperial Valley in California.
Current studies are under way to test the
prospects for utilization of these vast soil
and water resources, some with the assist-
ance of the United Nations Special Fund.
What is needed, however, is a comprehensive
plan for utilization of water on the scale of
the Maghreb itself, because there can obvi-
ously be inequitable withdrawals from com-
mon resources threatening the balance of the
entire region. To these new sources might be
added the benefits of desalinization and
"rainmaking" techniques through cloud seed-
ing as these processes become commercially
feasible.
A regional approach to industrialization
based on the largely unutilized natural re-
sources of each country would speed up the
development process immeasurably. North
Africa's oil and gas open up a whole range
of possibilities in the field of petrochemical
manufactures. North Africa can also draw
on its own reserves of iron ore in building a
steel industry. While the area also has some
coal, it may be that the new gas reduction
process for making steel will prove more
economic for North Africa in view of its
huge deposits of natural gas.
Meanwhile, in Europe there is a nearby
market for the petroleum output not pres-
ently needed by North Africa's nascent in-
dustry. The most direct routes for Algerian
natural gas pipelines to Spain and Italy and
on to Central Europe run through Morocco
and Tunisia.
Morocco, with vast phosphate reserves, is
already beginning to specialize in fertilizer
production; Algeria and Libya have a com-
parable advantage in nitrogenous fertilizers
based on natural gas. Full utilization of both
types will not only stimulate industrial pro-
duction but will also have an immediate im-
pact on agricultural yields.
There are many other examples of re-
gional projects worth study and eventual
implementation. The traveler who visits
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Tunisia's rapidly developing tourist centers
would doubtless like to continue on to Mo-
rocco via Algeria, but the lack of facilities
en route inhibit this development despite the
beauty and historic attraction of the area.
Telecommunications inside the area and to
the outside world need expansion. Opportu-
nities in many fields are almost unlimited,
and given bold initiatives, the pace and ex-
tent of development throughout the region
could be given substantial new dimensions
through collective efforts.
North Africans will have to rely primarily
on their own efforts to realize these goals,
but there are numerous outside sources of
help, public and private, that can be drawn
on to assist. In the realm of planning, pro-
motion, and coordination, the services of
such international agencies as the World
Bank and the United Nations Development
Program deserve particular attention. The
IBRD has made comprehensive studies of all
four North African economies and probably
has a greater amount of current information
essential to regional planning than any other
institution. In the development of North
Africa's petroleum and other mineral re-
sources, the need for outside private invest-
ment would seem to be immense.
As President Johnson told the African
Ambassadors in his address to them last
May 26: 2
The world has now reached a stage where some
of the most effective means of economic growth
can best be achieved in large units commanding
large resources and large markets. . . .
This does not mean the loss of hard-earned
national independence. But it does mean that the
accidents of national boundaries do not have to lead
to hostility and conflict or serve as impossible
obstacles to progres.s.
Why is North Africa important to the
United States and to the rest of the free
world ? I have already suggested some of the
reasons.
It is a new area in the sense that it has
just emerged in freedom and independence.
It is seeking to express itself in its own way
and to build a better life for its peoples. It
For text, see Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
has its divisive tendencies, but neither the
border dispute nor the arms race has yet
reached the point of no return where the
prestige of governments is committed to
reckless courses of action.
North Africa is an area whose capacity to
develop is highly promising provided the
four governments — and their friends — pur-
sue wise policies. It is favored in combining
the potential factors required for takeoff,
with one of its countries, Libya, already hav-
ing passed from international debtor to
creditor. Tunisia has maintained a remark-
able rate of growth — an average of about 6
percent per annum — for several years, uti-
lizing her human resources in tandem with
extensive United States and other foreign
assistance. Algeria, more generously en-
dowed with material resources than her im-
mediate neighbors, has spent several millions
of dollars to make sure that it has the best
available technical advice, much of it from
private American consultants, in planning
the development of these resources. Morocco,
recognizing that the future prosperity of
much of its growing population is linked to
agriculture, is making strong efforts to im-
prove productivity through the introduction
of modern agricultural practices.
North Africa is a key area from several
points of view: in human terms, because of
its long experience as a crossroads and be-
cause of the major role it assumes in the
vanguard of the newly liberated nations of
the African Continent.
In terms of geography, it is as important
to the stability of the key Mediterranean
region as its neighbors to the north.
North Africa is important as a testing
ground. In an area with exceptional human
and physical homogeneity one finds widely
different forms of government and social
systems at work. The success or failure of
each of these systems will have lessons to
teach us as well as the developing world.
North Africa is also important as a com-
mercial partner. Total American investment
in the area is over a billion dollars, and this
figure will continue to rise. Because of co-
lonial patterns of trade, the area is less im-
MAY 29, 1967
813
portant as a trading partner than it will
become in time. American technology is
greatly appreciated throughout the Maghreb,
and its role can be expected to become more
important.
North Africa is one of those regions of
the world where the problem of feeding a
growing population has become critical but
where the possibilities of overcoming the
food-population gap are reassuring if tem-
porary foreign support is combined with in-
tensive self-help. I am gratified to say that
in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the three
North African countries where we have had
substantial P.L. 480 programs, there seems
to be an increased determination to push
ahead with needed self-help measures.
I have throughout dealt with the Maghreb
as a whole. This is not an accident. Our basic
policy interest is in the stability and prog-
ress of the area as a whole.
As in other parts of the developing world,
we support the national integrity and inde-
pendence of all the countries of the region,
attempt to help them promote social and eco-
nomic development, and seek to encourage
their efforts to move toward regional cohe-
sion. We earnestly desire to have friendly
relations with all four countries of the
Maghreb.
For us to adopt any other policy would be
to run grave risks of political polarization.
Such a development would not be in the in-
terests of any of the countries of the region
— nor any of those outside it.
It is basic American policy to stimulate
and assist regional economic cooperation.
We believe that sheer economic necessity
makes such a policy desirable in the Magh-
reb. We welcome the steps already taken in
this direction. Although small, they compare
favorably with effoi'ts of regional groupings
at similar stages of development. We will be
looking carefully for opportunities to assist,
with the limited resources we have available,
in this evolutionary process.
Our policy on the underlying causes for
tension in the Maghreb is also clear. U.S.
spokesmen have said repeatedly that we en-
dorse the principles on frontiers in Africa
enunciated by the Organization of African
Unity. We have been and remain opposed to
any attempt to modify them by force. Our
military assistance programs in the area are
modest, are specifically for defensive pur-
poses, and are tailored carefully to the policy
I have already outlined. We would much
prefer to put our resources into other types
of aid.
I have met all of the present leadership of
the states of the Maghreb, and I remain
optimistic that they will choose the paths of
cooperation and development rather than
narrow nationalist advantage. They know
that their people have at last achieved the
most precious right to determine their own
destinies. We have every reason to believe
they will not give up that right again.
As for us, we are heartened by the reser-
voir of good will toward the United States
and Americans that exists so widely among
the people of the Maghreb. We want to pre-
serve this good will. We believe that to as-
sist countries like the new nations of North
Africa is a challenging task. In standing
ready to help them achieve constructive ends,
we seek no special position, no special ad-
vantage.
The United States has only one funda-
mental objective in North Africa: its peace-
ful and orderly development in conformity
with its own aspirations and in ways that
will best serve the common good. Along with
other nations dedicated to constructive de-
velopment in the area, we stand ready to
play our proper part in this endeavor. What
President Johnson said in addressing the
African Ambassadors applies in full force
to the part of the continent we have been
di.scussing tonight:
. . . none of us can be content when we measure
what is being done against what could be done.
We are anxious to work with you to fulfill your
ambitions. Working with others, we are prepared
to help build with you a modem Africa,
North Africa's true vocation is to be a
zone of prosperity through cooperation. The
realization of this area's unusual promise
for economic self -fulfillment is today the goal
toward which all efforts — national, regional,
and international— should converge.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United States and Eastern Europe in Perspective
by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman '
United States relations today with Eastern
Europe are still being shaped by past events,
attitudes, and policies. The states of central
Eastern Europe came into being as a result
of the Versailles conference. They were es-
tablished in deference to a political principle,
national self-determination, with little con-
sideration of economic realities. As a result,
these nations suffered serious economic diffi-
culties. The greatest tragedy was Vienna — a
head left without a body — with unmanage-
able unemployment. The leaders of the new
countries made gallant efforts, with some suc-
cess particularly in Czechoslovakia and Po-
land, to overcome the dislocations and con-
struct viable economies. Another significant
development of the early twenties was the
network of treaties encouraged by France
known as the cordon sanitaire, intended to
create a buffer against the inroads of Bolshe-
vism.
An abrupt change in attitude occurred on
the day the Nazis invaded Russia in June
1941 when Churchill accepted the Soviet
Union as an ally. The early discussions be-
tween the Soviet Union and the British and
ourselves related largely to immediate con-
siderations of the war — military strategy
and supply matters to help the Soviet Union
withstand the Nazi onslaught.
From October 1943, the time of the Mos-
cow conference of foreign ministers, the
political problems of the postwar Europe
were increasingly discussed, with particular
concentration on the future of Eastern
' Address made before the 31st American Assem-
bly at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on Apr. 29
(press release 100).
Europe. By that time it was already ap-
parent that the Red army would occupy these
countries as it forced the invading Nazi
ai-mies back to Germany. In this conference,
however, Mr. Hull was primarily interested
in reaching agreement with the Soviets on
the overall declaration of principles ex-
pressed in the Moscow declaration. This he
felt would fonn a basis for detailed decisions
at a later time. Mr. Eden's approach was the
more direct one of attempting to reach
understandings on specific issues. At that
meeting, he proposed a confederation of
Eastern European states, a plan that had
been tentatively approved by Sikorski and
Benes. He hoped this federation would create
political as well as economic strength in Cen-
tral Europe and could overcome the weak-
ness which the dismemberment of the Habs-
burg empire had created.
But Molotov would have none of it. He
piously cloaked his rejection with what he
called the need to await the "result of a free,
peaceful and well-considered expression of
the will of the people." The Soviets made it
plain that they would not permit the recon-
struction of any new cordon sanitaire, and
they showed little respect for what they
called "the emigre governments" in London.
We got the impression that the Soviets
wanted a fragmented postwar Europe con-
sisting of small, weak states throughout —
easily dominated by the Soviet Union.
A month later at Tehran, Churchill sought
Stalin's agreement specifically regarding an
independent Poland. Stalin responded by
demanding a revision of the Riga treaty
boundary, which the Soviets had always con-
sidered unjust. He referred to the prior
MAY 29, 1967
815
British proposal of the Curzon line as being
a more correct ethnic division. He offered
compensation to Poland at the expense of
Germany.
U.S. Interest in Poland's Future
From then on, Poland became the primary
political topic of discussion between the
British and ourselves and the Russians.
Hitler's invasion of Poland had brought
Britain into the war, and Poland was a coun-
try with which many Americans were espe-
cially concerned. Under instructions from
President Roosevelt, I talked about Poland
with Stalin more frequently than any other
subject.
I recall, one time in the late winter of
1944, opening a discussion with Stalin by
saying that President Roosevelt had asked
me to talk to him about the future of Poland.
Stalin replied, "The Poles, the Poles — can't
you think of anything else to talk about but
the Poles?" He asserted that Poland had
always created difficulties for Russia and
that it was the invasion corridor through
which Western European armies had at-
tacked Russia. Since Poland was so impor-
tant to Russia's security, he could not see
why we did not leave the future of Poland to
the Soviet Union. Stalin insisted that they
must have a "friendly neighbor."
I explained to Stalin that American public
opinion would not support a U.S. adminis-
tration that failed to protect the right of
these peoples to determine their own future.
Stalin's reply amazed me. He said that he
had his own public opinion to think about —
that the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians
wanted to be reunited with their brothers in
the areas that had been unfairly taken from
them. As Stalin was blunt, I could be also.
I suggested that Stalin was in a position to
take care of public opinion in the Soviet
Union. His reply was revealing. He main-
tained that he had to pay constant attention
to public opinion since, he explained, "We
have had three revolutions in a generation."
In other words, Stalin regarded suppression
of counterrevolution as his primary concern
in dealing with Russian public opinion.
The talks continued. In October 1944
Churchill brought the London Polish leaders
with him to Moscow, hoping thereby to reach
an understanding. Finally, at Yalta in Febru-
ary 1945, an agreement was reached not only
for Poland but for all of the states of Eastern
Europe. Through the Declaration for Liber-
ated Europe, as well as the Agreement on
Poland, the Soviet Union undertook to work
with the British and American Governments
to assure the holding of free and unfettered
elections with all democratic, non-Fascist
parties having a full right to participate. The
unhappy fact is that Stalin failed to keep his
Yalta agreements.
It is hard to understand why Stalin should
have made agreements at Yalta and then
broken them so soon thereafter. One explana-
tion, which I am inclined to believe, is that
he had expected that the Red army would
be welcomed as the liberator from the Nazi
tyranny and that in the first blush of this
enthusiasm a Communist-dominated govern-
ment could be elected. Perhaps this explains
why at Yalta he had proposed elections
within 1 month of liberation.
Bierut, the leader of the Lublin Poles, was
in Moscow when Stalin returned from that
conference, and he must have learned from
him that in Poland a free election could not
be trusted, that the Red army was being
regarded as a new invading force. The
historic fear and distrust of Russia was still
paramount in people's minds. This proved
true in other countries as well. Later, in the
summer of 1945, for some reason free elec-
tions were permitted in Hungary, which ex-
posed the fact that the Communist Party
there had little ])opular support. It could only
command 17 percent of the vote.
The fate of Eastern Europe in the imme-
diate postwar period was sealed by the pres-
ence of the Red army. The effort of Church-
ill and Roosevelt at Yalta to come to an
agreement with Stalin failed, but that effort
in itself had the value of exposing Stalin's
perfidy and aggressive intentions to the
world.
It is important to recall that the United
States did not accept for several years the
816
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
inevitability of conflict with the Soviet
Union. It is well to keep in mind that even
as late as June 1947 General Marshall in
his famous Harvard speech offered assistance
to all of Europe, including- the Soviet Union.
However, Molotov walked out of the con-
ference convened in Paris to consider the
offer, and the Soviets compelled Poland and
Czechoslovakia to reverse their preliminary
decision to participate. The Iron Curtain
which Churchill had described came down to
divide Europe — with a bang that all could
hear — and the cold war was intensified.
American opinion had been slow to accept
the split. It was hard for Americans to un-
derstand that the Soviet leaders, after all
the tragic losses of the war, would not want
to cooperate in rebuilding a peaceful world.
It is significant to recall that after Church-
ill's Fulton speech, his hotel in New York
was picketed and he was met with student
demonstrations at Columbia, where he was
given an honorary degree. Many of these
people were not extremists. They hated war.
A Foreign Service officer with whom I have
worked closely in recent years confessed to
me that he had taken part as a student in
the demonstration at Columbia in the belief
that Churchill was fanning war emotions.
In the intervening 20 years, certain events
have tended to exacerbate our conflict with
the Soviet bloc: the Berlin blockade, the
North Korean attack, the Cuban missile
crisis, and the Soviet's continuing support
for so-called "national liberation move-
ments" in South America and elsewhere.
Trends in Eastern Europe
But other events have tended to ameliorate
the tensions. Stalin's hopes for a monolithic
structure of international communism have
been shattered. The accord between Moscow
and Peking, though never complete, has been
ruptured, seemingly beyond repair. Tito's
break with Stalin has encouraged the other
Eastern European countries to force a
loosening of Moscow's domination. It is well
for us to remember that although we had
nothing to do with Tito's break with Stalin,
there is no doubt that our military and eco-
nomic help made it possible for him to main-
tain his independence. Another favorable
trend has been the changes within the Com-
munist countries themselves which have
somewhat eased the most rigid controls, mak-
ing easier contacts with the West.
When in 1955 Khrushchev welcomed Tito
back into the fold, Tito insisted on retaining
complete independence — political, military,
economic, and ideological. Tito has continued
the development of his relations with the
West to the point where 65 percent of his
foreign trade is with the free world and only
35 percent is with the Soviets and the East-
ern European bloc.
Trade between Western and Eastern
Europe has steadily increased in nonstrategic
items. Throughout the period we and our
allies have maintained what is known as a
COCOM list, controlling shipments of prod-
ucts that are considered of strategic value.
In addition, cultural exchanges and mutual
tourism have substantially increased. The
larger numbers, of course, go from the West
to the East. Not only Yugoslavia's Dalmatian
coast but Bulgarian and Romanian Black Sea
beaches are attracting large numbers of
Western European vacationists. However,
Hungary, for example, permitted 244,000 of
its citizens to visit non-Communist countries
in 1965.
Each of the Eastern European countries
has in its own way undertaken to reduce the
rigidities of Communist economic control.
The economic difficulties faced by Communist
countries have compelled them to experiment
with ways to decentralize management and
increase incentives.
Controls were never as complete in the
Eastern European countries as in the Soviet
Union. The most striking example is agri-
culture. In Poland, for instance, 87 percent
of the land remains in the hands of the
peasants.
In the new experiments, Yugoslavia has
shown the way in breaking down central di-
rection of the economy. Step by step indi-
vidual enterprises, controlled in theory at
least by the workers, have been forced to
compete with one another. Bank credits have
MAY 29, 1967
817
replaced Government-provided funds. Each
enterprise must earn its right to exist by pro-
ducing a profit. Also, the need to expand ex-
ports has compelled these enterprises to meet
foreign competition as well. This has led
Yugoslavia to join GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade] in August 1966
and to welcome private foreign investment in
its industry. It is still too early to judge how
this will work.
Although the Communist Party in Yugo-
slavia still controls the ideology and policy of
the Government, it is planning to give up its
detailed direction of Government operations.
Politically, the Assemblies of the local Re-
publics as well as the Federal Assembly in
Belgrade are assuming greater responsibility.
In Slovenia last December a cabinet sub-
mitted its resignation when it lost an Assem-
bly vote on a health insurance bill. But the
Communist Party still dominates political
expression, as is evidenced by Mihajlov's re-
cent conviction.
The other countries of Eastern Europe are
undoubtedly watching with fascination events
in Yugoslavia. There can be no doubt that
Yugoslavia's example will be followed if it is
successful, even though at a more cautious
pace. Unfortunately, our ability to help Yugo-
slavia at this critical period has been checked
by the adoption by Congress of the ill-
considered Findley and Belcher amendments.
The greater success Yugoslavia has with its
experiments in the freeing of its economy,
the greater influence its example will have on
the other countries of Eastern Europe.
The increasing complexities of the Soviet
economy are also compelling Moscow to ex-
periment with new methods of decentraliza-
tion and incentives. Their economists are
studying the methods of the United States
and Western Europe, in an attempt to under-
stand the reason for the extraordinary post-
war Western economic success which has
belied so dramatically the predictions of
Stalin's economists of the early economic col-
lapse of the West. In Moscow one no longer
hears such predictions.
In fact, I was interested in the attitude of
one of the senior Soviet economists in a con-
versation I had with him the last time I was
in Moscow. He complained that too many of
the Americans he met were specialists on the
Soviet economy. He wanted to talk instead to
"the specialists on the American economy."
In no sense am I suggesting that the Com-
munist one-party system is breaking down.
Irreversible changes, however, are taking
place; and this includes, to a small degree at
least, freedom of expression. Control of indi-
vidual thought and expression seems to be
the last stronghold to which the Communists
are clinging, even though the demand for
more freedom is growing in strength. Some
criticism is permitted and the strict insist-
ence on "Socialist realism" in art has been
relaxed. However, those who have the cour-
age to overstep the bounds of "propriety" in
their attack on the current regimes or Com-
munist doctrine are severely punished.
U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe
The American attitude, particularly in
Congress, toward Eastern Europe has ad-
justed itself haltingly to the changes that
have taken place. President Johnson has
appealed to the country to undertake building
bridges to the East, and in his October 7
speech to the National Conference of Edi-
torial Writers he brought into focus the inter-
relationship of our European policies.^
In referring to the unnatural partition of
Europe he warned that Europe must be made
whole again if peace is to be secure. He
stated:
Our purpose is not to overturn other govern-
ments, but to help the people of Europe to achieve:
— a continent in which the peoples of Eastern
and Western Europe vi^ork shoulder to shoulder
together for the common good ;
— a continent in which alliances do not confront
each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide
a framework in which West and East can act
together in order to assure the security of all.
In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be
reunited.
The distance the United States has lagged
' For the advance text of President Johnson's ad-
dress at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see
Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
818
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
behind Western Europe in bridgebuilding to
the East is clearly shown by the trade figiires.
Whereas the trade between Western and
Eastern Europe exclusive of the Soviet Union
was over $5 billion in 1965, the U.S. trade
was less than $200 million.
Under these circumstances, it doesn't make
any sense for us to continue to restrict trade
in nonstrategic goods as we have been doing.
This self-denial is achieving no useful pur-
pose. We are simply losing business to West-
era European competitors and creating a lot
of unnecessary ill will.
Over the years. Congress has placed re-
striction on restriction. Crippling amend-
ments have been added to essential legislation
which Presidents could not afford to veto.
Even today, there is danger that ultracon-
servative Congressmen may attempt to
further damage our national interests by
offering amendments to such legislation as
the Export-Import Bank Charter renewal,
handicapping its usefulness in expanding
trade. The effect of legislation has been com-
pounded by rigid bureaucratic interpreta-
tions. President Johnson has reversed some
of these bureaucratic interpretations. He has
reduced export controls with respect to hun-
dreds of nonstrategic items, and he has au-
thorized the Export-Import Bank to guaran-
tee commercial credits to selected countries.
Incidentally, the President has most wisely
authorized the Export-Import Bank to help
finance the purchase by Fiat of $50 million
of machinery for incorporation into their
project in the Soviet Union. This project will
undoubtedly increase the pressures by the
people on the Government for more automo-
biles, with all the diversion of resources that
that will entail. Every family I have met
throughout the Soviet Union longs for an
automobile and the release that that will give
them.
The President has also taken other steps
within his authority, but legislation is essen-
tial before we can begin to encourage a rea-
sonable flow of trade.
The proposed East-West trade relations
bill,^ if approved by Congress, would author-
ize the President to extend most-favored-
nation tariff treatment to individual Com-
munist countries when he determines this to
be in the national interest. This authority
would be exercised through a commercial
agreement with a particular country for a
period of not more than 3 years. Aside from
the export of strategic items, which would of
course remain prohibited, the trade itself
would depend on the decisions of individual
private firms. The President would have the
power to suspend or terminate such commer-
cial agreements if he determined that the
other party was not living up to its obliga-
tions or if he determined that suspension or
termination were in the national interest.
Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-
Nam, Cuba, and the Soviet Zone of Germany
are specifically excluded by the provisions of
this bill.
The people of Eastern Europe want to ex-
pand contacts with the West. In fact, they
feel that they have more in common with the
West than with Russia. They particularly
long for better relations with us. The individ-
ual family ties with the United States are
still close. But more than that, to Eastern
Europeans the United States exemplifies a
better life. They seek not only technical
knowledge and products but also personal
contacts and the opportunity to visit the
United States.
Enlarging NATO's Role
Hopes of improved relations with the
United States have been encouraged by the
decreasing threat of hostilities in Europe.
This has, of course, also influenced the people
of Western Europe and has led to a demand
for the rethinking of NATO's role.
The receding fear of war has given impetus
to the desire of Western Europe for less de-
pendence on the United States and a sense of
greater independence. I do not see why we
should be overly concerned by this natural
development, but we must take into account
this change in psychology and appreciate its
sensitivities.
^ For text, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 843.
MAY 29, 1967
819
There are certain principles, however, that
we must clearly continue to support in West-
ern Europe. Since the Marshall Plan, encour-
agement of the integration of Western
Europe has been one of our foremost policies.
Our concern for the reunification of Germany
must remain our firm ix)licy as an essential
means to achieve eventual European stability.
The basic security interests of the North At-
lantic community must be safeguarded, but
detailed arrangements must be modernized
to meet changing conditions.
Except for France, the other 14 members
of NATO have agreed to maintain integrated
forces, but we are also exploring together
ways in which NATO can enlarge its activi-
ties, including the field of East-West rela-
tions. The President has given encouragement
to the development of common policies in this
area.
Obviously, trade agreements and other de-
tailed matters will be dealt with through bi-
lateral understandings. However, all except
France agree that the NATO nations must
stand together to prevent the Soviet Union
from succeeding in fragmenting Western
Europe again and to concert policies in East-
West relations.
Although nationalism among the nations
of Eastern Europe has led to their demand
for greater independence from Moscow, there
is reason for our recognizing that cooperation
among the countries of Eastern Europe can
contribute to the health of the entire conti-
nent. The President clearly recognized this
when he pointed out that the alliances pro-
vide a framework in which West and East
can act together in order to advance common
interests and assure the security of all.
The hope that the peoples of Western and
Eastern Europe can work together for the
common good can only be realized if both
accept the existence of each other's political
systems and avoid interference in each
other's internal affairs. Yet progress depends
in no small degree on the development of
more open societies in the East. These
changes can only come from within, but they
can be encouraged by our readiness to
cooperate.
Increased Eastern European participation
in various international economic organiza-
tions should be encouraged. Yugoslavia al-
ready is a member of the World Bank, the
IMF [International Monetary Fund], the
International Development Association, and
GATT. The U.N. Economic Commission for
Europe can be made more eff'ective in
furthering East-West relations. We should
attempt to get Eastern Europe as well as the
Soviet Union to cooperate in the immense
and pressing task of assisting the developing
nations, perhaps through association with the
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] and its subcommittee,
the DAC [Development Assistance Commit-
tee].
Differences in Ideology
At best, progress can be made only on a
step-by-step basis.
We must realize that the outward thrust
of international communism is not dead.
With all of the Soviets' protestations of
peaceful coexistence, the Soviets still support
"national liberation movements" and claim
that so-called "wars of national liberation"
are just. They call upon Eastern European
Communist parties to do the same.
I have had an opportunity to discuss this
question bluntly with Soviet leaders, and al-
though they are pragmatic in considering
methods of achieving production, they still
hold rigidly to the concept that communism
will eventually sweep the world.
Although I doubt that they are prepared
to take the risks their predecessors did, and
they certainly do not wish to face nuclear
war, they will take advantage of any open-
ing in any part of the world to expand the
influence of communism.
There is no secret about this activity. The
Communist press reports the actions taken at
the international conferences held in Havana
that blatantly call for "intensification of all
forms of the struggle, including the armed
struggle of the peoples of the three continents
(of Asia, Africa, and Latin America)." Eight
Latin American countries, including such
820
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
democratic countries as Venezuela and Peru,
have been specifically named as targets for
"organized revolution and violence." They
even call for "resolute aid . . . for the
struggle for the independence of Puerto
Rico"! A Pravda editorial has supported
these actions, stating: "The Soviet people
. . . regard it as their sacred duty to give
support to the peoples fighting for their inde-
pendence" and referred to the terrorists as
"the Latin American patriots."
It is hard for a Westerner to understand
how the Communists can maintain that we
are the imperialist aggressor when, for ex-
ample, we help the freely elected Government
of Venezuela in its efforts to stamp out the
terrorist movement that is responsible for
acts of sabotage and murder. They consider
that we are attempting to block the inevi-
table trend of history. They contend that the
small group of terrorists is, in fact, speaking
for the people. One must understand that
they still think in terms of the handful of
Bolsheviks who arrived in Petrograd in
April 1917 and within 6 months took over
control of the country and have been "speak-
ing for the people" of Russia ever since.
Nothing we say or do today will change
that conviction. Developments within the
Soviet Union and, particularly, Eastern
Europe have tempered the ardor of the inter-
national revolutionary spirit and have made
the Soviets more conservative in undertaking
risky actions. This trend will probably con-
tinue, and I feel they will be less and less
ready to invest in foreign adventures as time
goes on.
Improved relations between East and West
can speed that day. This is the answer to
those who ask why we should improve rela-
tions with the Communist countries while
they are giving assistance to North Viet-Nam
in its aggression against the South. Whether
we like it or not, the governments of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe consider
North Viet-Nam as an allied Communist
country and believe it is their duty to support
it when it is engaged in a conflict.
Certainly, the Vietnamese war is making
it more difficult to come to agreements with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. But
such agreements as we have been able to
reach tend to relieve tensions and to encour-
age the Soviet Union and others to use their
influence to end the conflict. I am satisfied the
Soviet and the Eastern European govern-
ments would like to see the Viet-Nam war
ended. They believe it contributes primarily
to Peking's interests, and they do not want a
confrontation with us. They want stability in
Europe. The Soviets want to make progress
in the control of nuclear weapons and want
to be able to reduce military expenditures.
Their resources are already strained, and
they would like to devote more of their re-
sources to improving the living conditions
which their people are demanding.
But we must expect them to continue to
give assistance to a sister Communist coun-
try. North Viet-Nam, which they consider an
overriding obligation.
With our diff'erences in ideology, we must
expect continuing frictions in one place or
another. We cannot today expect an ultimate
settlement. But we can expect the gradual
breaking down of barriers, improvement of
relations, more areas of common agreement.
If we are wise enough to pursue the oppor-
tunities as they unfold, we will certainly
hasten the day when we can hope for a viable
settlement in Europe — "a continent," as the
President has suggested, "in which the
peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work
shoulder to shoulder together for the common
good."
MAY 29, 1967
821
"With an investment of $10 billion in Latin America, Amer-
ican business has a vital stake in the Alliance for Progress.
. . . Our business firms, therefore, have an immense respon-
sibility and opportunity. They can do much to assist the
nations of Latin America attain the exciting goals they set
for themselves at Punta del Este."
The Road From Punta del Este
by Sol M. Linowitz
U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States ^
The most important achievement of the
Presidents' conference at Punta del Este ^
was the determination to launch a new con-
certed effort in the war against want, the
war that must be the prime concern of all
who search for peace. In that context the
agreement to press forward with the eco-
nomic integration of the continent was his-
toric in every sense of the word, and I believe
it will be remembered as one of the truly
important international developments in the
decade of the sixties.
But the meetings also pointed up the
urgency of a greatly intensified effort in vir-
tually every area if the Alliance is to fulfill
its vision of a hemisphere of nations — north
and south — free and independent, economi-
cally viable, socially just, and politically
secure.
And they emphasized anew what we have
believed all along: that in a day of intense
danger and infinite promise, the hope and
idealism that inspired the Alliance in its
beginnings are nothing less than a practical
approach to some of the world's most per-
plexing problems, a roadmap to the future
' Address made before the annual cong-ressional
dinner of the New York State Chambers of Com-
merce at Washington, D.C., on May 1 (press release
103).
* For background, see Bulletin of May 8, 1967,
p. 706.
of the hemisphere. To find our way, however,
will require some basic changes in attitude
and concepts both in the United States and
in Latin America — changes that began at
the meetings and now, hopefully, will con-
tinue.
For to face up to the job ahead requires
reality, not rhetoric. It requires a primary
understanding of the brute fact that two-
thirds of the continent of Latin America is
ill-fed, ill-clad, sick, and illiterate. It requires
an even deeper understanding of how vital
is the peaceful revolution that is now at-
tempting what is unquestionably the greatest
economic and social change in the history of
the world. It is the success — or failure — of
this revolution that is at stake.
Thus far, as so many of the Latin Ameri-
can Presidents themselves made clear at
Punta del Este, the nations of this continent
have not suflSciently unified their assault on
their mutual problems. It is true they share
a common geographic locale and two Iberian
languages for the most part, but in great
measure that is about as far as their unity
has gone in the past.
It is now the resolve of virtually all of
them — and certainly the hope of the United
States — that the future which began at
Punta del Este will see a different story un-
fold, a story in which the unity of economic
integration will give ultimate victory to the
822
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Republics of America in their common fight
against their common enemies of poverty,
hunger, and underdevelopment. And the only
victory that will be meaningful will be an
economic awakening that will eventually cast
out the ills that now paralyze so much of the
region's rich and limitless potential.
The leaders who came to Punta del Este
were mostly men of vision, men who know
how to dream and to reach for grand accom-
plishments. They do not need us to tell them
of the advantages that will accrue to their
nations individually and their region collec-
tively when all of them begin to pull together
instead of separately.
They realize, even as we, that the job be-
gun by the Alliance nearly 6 years ago is
already taking longer, much longer, than had
been planned. But they also realize, again
even as we, that only catastrophe can result
if we or they quit now. The job must be
finished, and all of us must have the patience
and the continuing will to see it through.
And lest anyone misunderstand the facts, let
me emphasize that the success of the effort is
essential to North America and South Amer-
ica alike. For when all is said and done, we
need Latin America as much as Latin Amer-
ica needs us.
But the will to grow, to succeed, cannot
come from any plan; it must grow into an
avalanche, one that will sweep away the
massive wall of poverty and social inequality
still grounded all too deep on single-com-
modity exports, government monopolies, lack
of any mass market or widespread industry,
and. unspeakable slums.
None of us dares forget then that to suc-
ceed the Alliance must hold true to the
original philosophy that gave it life: to sat-
isfy the basic needs of the Latin American
people for homes, work and land, health, and
schools — techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y
escuela. If it is to do this in fact, it must
stimulate the profound social changes that
are the prerequisites of a life of dignity.
Only thus will the gap between the rich and
the poor be narrowed in any meaningful
way. Only thus will the dams, the highways,
the housing projects, the new schools, the
integrated continentwide economy, and all
the other goals of the Alliance that were re-
afiirmed at Punta del Este have any lasting
value or true meaning.
For the most efficient factory cannot jus-
tify a city's slums, and economic growth is
to no avail if it serves only a fraction of the
people. It must serve them all. And that, in
sum, is the ultimate goal of the Alliance in
the years ahead — the goal to which the Presi-
dents of the American Republics have
pledged themselves.
And the goals of the Alliance, let me make
clear, are no idle pie-in-the-sky yearnings
put there because they sound good or just
serve some propaganda value. The goals of
the Alliance are real, as real as the atom and,
indeed, as powerful as the atom. They reflect
what can be accomplished by the force of
international cooperation, the most powerful
constructive force our society knows.
Indeed, when the 20th century is out, no
small part of the judgment we will have
earned will be determined by how well or
poorly international cooperation will have
been used in Latin America.
It would be a mistake to assume, however,
that this cooperation in the economic sphere
and its coordinated assault on the assorted
ills of the region must await the definitive
establishment of the common market, which
the Presidents hoped would be in operation
by 1985. Certainly it cannot — and the
Presidents were quite emphatic about this,
and rightfully so. A common market would
require the servicing of smaller regional
markets, of a transport system, a communi-
cations system, and a variety of other sys-
tems and services, some large, some small,
but all indispensable for economic integra-
tion.
Today, in some cases — just to cite one ex-
ample— it would be impossible to arrange the
surface transportation of goods to various
parts of the continent. So here is a good be-
ginning: the development of a continental
road system, part of which could well mark
the historic completion of the Pan American
Highway.
And what about a linking together of vari-
MAY 29, 1967
823
ous national electric grid works and power
systems, as well as a continentwide telecom-
munications system ?
Then there are all sorts of existing possi-
bilities for hydroelectric projects harnessing
the largely untapped power of the continent's
rivers. Many of them, such as the Amazon,
could also be used for convenient and eco-
nomical transportation if navigable channels
would only be developed and new ports built.
And would not the continent's airlines, its
railroads, its steamship lines, offer other ex-
cellent and readymade areas for joint enter-
prise? Add to these such basic industries —
some now hard pressed — as fertilizers, pulp
and paper, iron and steel, and petrochemi-
cals, and already there is the where\\ithal for
an economic boom the likes of which the
continent has never known.
I have mentioned possible projects at ran-
dom. But they are part of a long list that
raises exciting prospects of victories that can
be won. More important, they are all essen-
tial to an integrated Latin American market
and prove the feasibility of the entire under-
taking.
I believe that much of the imagination and
vision to realize these opportunities without
undue delay can be provided by private en-
terprise. And here I wish to sound a word of
caution.
American business is our country's most
conspicuous and most important presence in
Latin America today. It employs li/o million
Latin Americans; its investments account for
one- tenth of the total output of goods; it pays
one-fifth of all Latin American taxes; it is
responsible for one-third of all Latin Ameri-
can exports. With an investment of $10 bil-
lion in Latin America, American business
has a vital stake in the Alliance for Prog-
ress. Whether American investments there
will grow- — and in some cases whether they
will be allowed to remain — may well depend
on the success or failure of the Alliance. Our
business firms, therefore, have an immense
responsibility and opportunity. They can do
much to assist the nations of Latin America
attain the exciting goals they set for them-
selves at Punta del Este.
I know that American business has already
done much in fields ranging from heavy in-
vestments to training for community develop-
ment. But I hope it will undertake to do even
more. It can do this in part by utilizing local
people not merely for unskilled or assembly-
line work but by training them to become
supervisors and part of management. It can
do this by giving special consideration to be-
coming active in less developed parts of the
continent where efforts are under way to
bring the 20th century to areas which have
for years remained in darkness.
I hope that our American business firms
will always recognize that the needs of the
people of Latin America must come first and
that their investments can be made most
secure by building on solid foundations for
the future — taking into account the needs of
the community.
In short, I hope that American business
will, in the truest and deepest sense, always
be a good neighbor to the people of Latin
America.
Doing so will involve a great deal more
than economics. For if we know all there is
to know about all the rich natural resources
of Latin America without knowing or under-
standing the continent's most important re-
source of all— its people — we fail in our
undertaking. To know the statistics of Latin
America's gross national product without
knowing, too, its history and its culture is,
in fact, to be ill prepared for the challenges
ahead, challenges that can only be met on a
people-to-people basis.
It is here, I believe, we must raise our
sights. Our traditional concepts of time and
distance have already been radically altered
by the conquests of science and technology.
One of the benefits of the common market
will be a closer relationship among all the
nations of the Americas, and we should be
thinking even now of ways to make that rela-
tionship one of mutual trust and regard.
There is much that can and should be done
here, within and without the Alliance. There
is room here for government, for business,
and for the institutions of learning in Latin
America and in the United States. They must
824
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
participate even more than they are now,
from meeting the very elementiiry needs to
the highest and most complex of challenges.
That is why it is obviously insufficient to
think of economic development as sjTiony-
mous with progress, that the job will be
done merely by concentrating on industry
and agriculture. If we do, the victory
achieved may be Pyrrhic indeed. What is
needed is the support and enthusiasm of the
Latin American people for the Alliance and
its broad social objectives.
For in the long run, as I have said, it will
not be the politician or government repre-
sentative from North America or South
America who will make or break the Alli-
ance in the future. It will be the little man,
particularly the young man and the young
woman, the restless youth of Latin America
who are searching to express themselves in
a revolution for social justice. The Alliance
must become their personal revolution. Only
when it does, if it does, can we say there will
be a true chance of success.
Where do we go from here? That is the
big question of the moment. The obvious
answer, of course, is that we must now move
to implement all that was said and all that
was agreed upon at Punta del Este.
Latin America is strewn with false starts
and disappointed hopes. That cannot be the
destiny of the Alliance. Its future must be
written in terms of partnership, of shared
hopes and hemispheric unity — the "brave
new world" we have sought to build since the
days of Simon Bolivar. And we will do it if
we continue the momentum of Punta del Este
and work together to improve and enrich and
ennoble the common life of the people of the
Americas. We shall not do this between today
and tomorrow, and we shall not do it if our
forward movement is tied to paper solutions
rather than to the determination to succeed
no matter how painful.
With time we will do it. The ancient lesson
that the journey of a thousand leagues begins
with a single step is indeed a lesson for today
and for all the American Republics, our own
included. And each forward step we take in
helping Latin America to build a continent
of hope and accomplishment is a step not
confined only to this hemisphere but one
that advances outward to all the world and
moves us closer to our universal goal of
peace and justice for all men.
U.S. Protests Hanoi's Violation
of Geneva Convention on POW's
Department Statement ^
The United States Government is con-
cerned at reports that United States pris-
oners of war in North Viet-Nam were
paraded through the streets of Hanoi on
May 6 and put on display at a press con-
ference. These actions by the North Vietnam-
ese authorities are a flagrant violation of
the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war,
especially article 13, which states: ". . . pris-
oners of war must at all times be protected,
particularly against acts of violence or in-
timidation and against insults and public
curiosity."
This action by North Vietnamese authori-
ties is especially disturbing in light of indi-
cations that one or more of the prisoners
were wounded and unwell. The United States
Government has repeatedly called on North
Vietnamese authorities to live up to and
honor their responsibilities under the Geneva
Convention, to which they adhered in 1957.
The United States Government is sending
a protest on this matter to North Viet-Nam
through the International Committee of the
Red Cross.
' Read to news correspondents by the Depart-
ment spokesman on May 8.
MAY 29, 1967
825
THE CONGRESS
The Foreign Assistance Program for 1968
Statement by Secretary Rusk '■
Thank you very much for the opportunity
of appearing before you in support of the
President's economic and military assistance
programs.^
Twenty years ago President Truman trans-
mitted to the Congress a recommendation for
funds to help reconstruct war-torn Europe.^
The Marshall Plan was launched. President
Truman called it "an investment toward the
peace and security of the world and toward
the realization of hope and confidence in a
better way of life for the future. . . ."
This creative act of statesmanship accom-
plished everything that President Truman
had hoped. Within a comparatively few years
free Europe became economically strong and
politically stable.
The focus of our foreign assistance pro-
grams has long since shifted from Europe to
the less developed countries, but our purposes
are basically the same. Our programs today,
as they were 20 years ago, are "an invest-
ment toward the peace and security of the
world. . . ."
The job that we are trying to do today is
much more complex than it was during the
Marshall Plan. The task today is the building
of viable societies in the less developed coun-
' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on May 4.
^ For text of President Johnson's message to
Congress on foreign aid, see Bulletin of Mar. 6,
1967, p. 378.
" For text of President Truman's message of
Dec. 19, 1947, see ibid., Dec. 28, 1947, p. 1233.
tries, not merely the rebuilding of tempo-
rarily shattered economies, as in Europe.
The dominant facts of life in the develop-
ing countries are impatience, unrest, and,
above all, rapid change. Men see widening
alternatives and expansive futures. Disillu-
sionment must not follow. Frustrated so-
cieties lack stabihty; they are prey to sub-
version and aggression; they themselves are
sometimes hostile and aggressive. We must
help to encourage the dynamic elements of
the new societies to address themselves to
constructive tasks of economic, social, and
political progress.
In most developing countries the obstacles
to steady progress are formidable. In varying
degrees these countries lack the technology
and managerial experience which are the
basic tools of the economically advanced na-
tions. They lack the foreign exchange needed
to invest in their futures. And often they lack
the sound policies, institutions, and laws
needed to modernize rapidly.
It is important that we and the other eco-
nomically advanced countries share with the
less developed countries our technological
knowledge and our experience in organizing
complex economic and social enterprises. It
is important that we and others provide some
financial assistance.
The United States has a strong commit-
ment to foreign aid and the job that we,
other developed nations, and the less de-
veloped nations have to do together. Last
year the Congress expressed this commitment
826
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
by authorizing- development loans and the
Alliance for Progress through fiscal year
1969. This year the President has requested
similar authorizations for all other Foreign
Assistance Act programs. I urge this com-
mittee and the Congress to authorize all eco-
nomic and military assistance programs
through fiscal year 1969.
Military Assistance
Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNa-
mara has appeared before the committee to
discuss with you the proposed military
assistance program; and other witnesses, in-
cluding the Assistant Secretaries of State re-
sponsible for the geographic regions con-
cerned, have discussed with you how these
programs support the foreign policy and the
defense interests of the United States.
I should like at this time to state my con-
viction that this program — for which the
President is requesting $596 million in new
appropriations for fiscal year 1968 — is the
minimum necessary to support the foreign
policy of our country.
It will be used primarily for these pur-
poses:
— To strengthen the ability of friendly na-
tions adjacent to the Soviet Union or Commu-
nist China to meet external military threats;
— To help developing nations protect them-
selves against internal violence and thereby
provide the stability that is essential to de-
velopment; and
— To provide essential military help to four
or five countries so that their development
programs will not be paralyzed by military
requirements.
The military assistance program is a neces-
sary complement to the economic assistance
program; and it is a small insurance policy
against the growth of situations around the
world which might require far greater com-
mitments of our resources, perhaps even in-
cluding our military manpower.
I fully support the proposed transfer of
military assistance programs for Laos, Thai-
land, NATO infrastructure and international
military headquarters from the military
assistance accounts to the regular Defense
Department budget. By mutual agreement
with Secretary McNamara, the Department
of State will continue, as in the past, to coor-
dinate these programs with our overall
political and economic interests in each area.
I strongly urge approval of the military
assistance program for fiscal year 1968.
Economic Assistance
Over the past years both the Congress and
the Executive have learned a good deal about
the development process and the role the
United States can and should play in it. The
legislation and program before this commit-
tee reflect that experience.
The less developed countries hold in their
own hands the keys to their own future. It is
their efforts — not ours or those of other donor
countries — that will open the doors to better
lives for their peoples. That is why we insist
on self-help. This is not just because it is im-
portant that the taxpayer's dollar yield a dol-
lar's worth of return but for the deep human-
itarian reason that without self-help the job
cannot be done. As Mr. Gaud [William S.
Gaud, Administrator, Agency for Interna-
tional Development] mentioned when he ap-
peared before this committee on April 5, the
legislation before you emphasizes the im-
portance of self-help in a number of ways,
including authorization for a National Ad-
visory Committee on Self -Help.
There have been remarkable adjustments
in the AID program to reflect our balance-of-
payments problems. In fiscal year 1959 only
40 percent of AID funds were spent for U.S.
goods and services. In fiscal year 1968 it is
estimated that 87 percent of AID expendi-
tures will be for American goods and serv-
ices and that the net adverse impact of the
program on the U.S. balance of payments
will be about $107 million. The United States
must continue to watch carefully its balance
of payments. That is why the AID program
today transfers U.S. skills and commodities
MAY 29, 1967
827
— not U.S. dollars — to the less developed
countries.
Governmental actions are important, but,
without private sector support, the job cannot
be done. That is why the AID program works
both with and through American private
enterprise and other private organizations in
helping to build strong private sectors in the
developing countries.
We cannot do everything everywhere. The
job is too big. That is why we concentrate
our programs in a few key countries and on a
few key problems — agriculture, education,
and health.
The United States is not the only advanced
country which recognizes its stake in develop-
ment. Other developed nations now have
strong aid programs. It is to our advantage
to coordinate our program with theirs and to
encourage them to enlarge their programs.
That is why we prefer to provide most of our
development loans in a multilateral frame-
work.
Cooperation among the less developed coun-
tries themselves can lead to faster progress.
Many of them face the same challenges; and
by pooling resources and energies they will
be better able to meet these challenges. That
is why the United States actively encourages
and supports regional efforts. The movement
toward regionalism reflects the growing
recognition among both advanced and de-
veloping countries of the necessity for eco-
nomic and political interdependence. We are
hopeful that the momentum of regional coop-
eration will be quickened in the next few
years.
These are the main principles of the pro-
posed AID program and legislation. Mr. Gaud
and others have discussed them in detail with
you.
The President originally requested a total
of $2.53 billion in new appropriations to
carry out the proposed AID program for fis-
cal year 1968. In addition, he plans to request
an additional $100 million for the Alliance
for Progress in connection with the recent
Summit Conference. This would bring the
total request for fiscal year 1968 to $2.63 bil-
lion. The $100 million, however, is included
in the President's budget, and therefore the
size of the Federal budget would not be in-
creased by this request.
This is a prudent request and takes into
account the burdens resulting from the strug-
gle in Viet-Nam. A strict and simple standard
was applied to the AID budget: What is the
minimum amount needed to serve our short-
term security interests and to maintain the
forward momentum in less developed coun-
tries that is essential to our long-range secu-
rity? The AID budget request reflects this
approach. And it is worth noting that the
fiscal year 1968 Foreign Assistance Act re-
quest, along with other foreign assistance
requests such as Peace Corps, Public Law
480, and contributions to the International
Development Association, total less than 7
percent of our GNP. By contrast, in 1949,
economic assistance funds totaled nearly 3
percent of our gross national product.
We know that time is short, and we must
use it to our best advantage. If we have in-
adequate aid programs, if progress in most
developing countries is not visible and con-
tinuous, we shall be living in a less stable and
more threatening world. But time can be our
ally, if we use our opportunities wisely to
help build economic and social strength and
political stability in the developing areas of
the world. While setbacks in the developing
countries have occurred and will occur, there
is ground for encouragement.
Latin America
In Latin America the Alliance for Progress,
now 6 years old, is in some ways a touch-
stone of our eff"oi-ts in the less developed
areas of the world.
We know the perils to our own security of
economic or pohtical instability and social in-
justice in Latin America. While the Castro
regime in Cuba has made a mockery of the
aspirations of the Cuban people, it continues
to be a reminder of the urgency of our com-
mon tasks in Latin America. Castro-sup-
ported subversion and insurgency have been
quashed in a number of countries. But recent
outbreaks in Venezuela and Bolivia indicate
a continuing potential for disorder and vio-
828
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
lence, which warns against apathy. In the
Dominican Republic we are working now to
help repair a legacy of injustice and inaction.
There is increasing evidence that the Alli-
ance is taking hold and that most Latin
American nations are making healthy strides
toward stability and future self-sufficiency. In
all but a few, governments are now working
to meet the needs of all the people. Much has
been done to improve tax structures and tax
administration, to light inflation, and to
strengthen institutions required for more
productive private enterprise. A start has
been made to expand educational and health
facilities and a number of countries have in-
stituted far-ranging agricultural and land
reforms. Of coui'se, much remains to be done.
The recent meeting of Presidents in
Uruguay ^ expressed an understanding of
the tasks ahead. The Summit Conference not
only reaffirmed the basic tenets of the Alli-
ance for Progress but placed new emphasis
on accelerated progress in the vital areas of
agriculture, health, education, and science. It
also made an historic decision to undertake
the economic integration of the countries of
Latin America.
Long before the Summit, President John-
son said,^
We are ready ... to work in close cooperation
toward an integrated Latin America. ... To my
fellow Presidents, I pledge: Move boldly along this
path and the United States will be by your side.
At long last, a concrete commitment to a
continental common market has been set in
motion. A timetable and technical procedures
for moving ahead have been agreed upon, and
this is a very important milestone.
I am confident that discussions at the Sum-
mit will lead to a greatly increased number
of regional development projects in Latin
America. With the cooperation of the Inter-
American Development Bank, we will sup-
port promising initiatives. The future of
Latin America depends to a considerable de-
gree on the growth of effective multinational
^ For background, see ibid., May 8, 1967, p. 706.
' For an address by President Johnson at Wash-
ington, D.C., on Aug. 17, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 5,
1966, p. 330.
projects — transportation and communica-
tions links, educational and training centers,
joint industrial ventures, and frontier and
river basin development projects.
I am glad to take the opportunity of thank-
ing this committee and the House of Repre-
sentatives for the nonpartisan support of the
President through the resolution adopted by
the House prior to the Summit Conference. I
assure you that it was much appreciated and
was helpful in our deliberations at Punta
del Este.
Because of the interest of this committee
and the enactment last year of title IX of the
Foreign Assistance Act, our attention is more
clearly focused on the creation and growth of
local institutions, both private and public, to
promote democratic participation in eco-
nomic, social, and political development.
There already have been some notable
achievements. In the last 2 years, for exam-
ple, in Central America alone, more than 479
credit unions were organized, with 76,000
members. The recent local municipal elections
in Peru were the first held in the last 40
years. As the committee knows, people with a
personal stake in a nation's progress will
work toward responsible and effective gov-
ernment. Those nations will move quickest
who rely on expanding sources of local
initiative.
A number of Latin American countries are
particularly well placed to influence favor-
ably the future course of the Alliance. Brazil,
for example, is so large that its performance
strongly influences events in the rest of the
hemisphere. Some countries, such as Mexico
and Venezuela, are now in a position to lend
a hand to their neighbors in speeding their
development. The Central American coun-
tries are setting the pace in economic integra-
tion.
Our largest program in Latin America is
for Brazil. Its landmass is larger than the
continental United States, and its people com-
prise one-half of all South Americans. A
healthy Brazil is essential to a prospering
Alliance. In the last 3 years, the drive to
stabilize Brazil's economy and curb the infla-
tion which had distorted national life for
MAY 29, 1967
829
many years has achieved a measure of suc-
cess. The annual rate of inflation has dropped
from a peak of 140 percent in early 1964 to
the current level of about 25-30 percent. Our
large fiscal year 1968 aid program will help
a new government to sustain improvements
in agriculture, housing, and health, while
stemming continuous inflationary pressures.
Near East and South Asia
The countries of the Near East and South
Asia are more distant but hardly less im-
portant than those in Latin America to the
establishment of a reliable and durable peace.
For this reason, I regard economic assistance
to these countries as a vital necessity.
We are pleased that the three major aid
recipients there — India, Pakistan, and
Turkey — have increasingly turned their
great talents to the domestic challenges of
modernization. These three countries will
get about 90 percent of fiscal year 1968 de-
velopment assistance planned for this region.
Excepting only Viet-Nam, the India pro-
gram is our largest economic aid program,
although we provide less than half of India's
external aid. Members of the Consortium for
India have pledged over $6 billion for the
third 5-year plan and the first year of the
fourth plan — our share has been 42 percent.
The efforts of the India Consortium reflect
not only India's great needs but the supreme
importance which all free nations attach to
Indian strength and independence.
Indian development efforts are sharply
focused on the food and population problem.
Over 40 percent of the proposed AID funds
will be used to help India improve food out-
put. The Indian Government plans to double
its outlays for agriculture over the next 5
years and to quadruple spending for family
planning programs. Fertilizer purchases in-
creased 85 percent over the last year. Crash
programs in farmland development have
been initiated, and the supply of improved
seeds and pesticides has been increased. I
think it is imperative that we continue to give
India the backing it requires in its days of
difficulty.
We hope that India and Pakistan can find
a way to achieve genuine cooperation in the
subcontinent. Such cooperation would consti-
tute a formidable bulwark of free-world
strength. Pakistan is on its way to realizing
its potentials. Its economic performance has
been very good. Our planned program for
Pakistan is also one of our largest, although
again our assistance is more than matched
by others.
The strategic importance of Turkey has
been obvious for generations, poised as it is
on the flanks of East Europe, Russia, and the
Near East. Our large but declining level of
economic assistance there is designed to
facilitate the Turkish Government's goal of
self-sustaining growth by 1973. Turkey's
performance has been impressive. For exam-
ple, in 1966 its GNP increased by over 8 per-
cent; agricultural production went up 11 per-
cent; and its foreign exchange earnings
increased by over 15 percent.
Africa
Our sympathies run deep for African
aspirations for more decent and plentiful
lives. We fully realize the importance of
Africa in our contemporary world. Its land-
mass is more than three times our own, and
it holds 300 million people. It is rich in
natural resources important to the interna-
tional community. Its geographical location
is pivotal.
There continues to be political instability in
Africa. Some 35 countries are experiencing
the growing pains of new independence. In
these formative years our help can be im-
portant in determining the type of societies
that will develop in Africa and the role they
will play in world affairs.
While we regard African developments
with close attention, other advanced nations,
mainly Great Britain and France, with long
historical relations with Africa, have pro-
vided the most assistance, along with interna-
tional institutions. AID's African program
averages less than $200 million a year. Other
U.S. programs, such as Food for Freedom
and Peace Corps, bring our total share to
about 25 percent of annual free-world assist-
ance to Africa.
830
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We have sought to make ouv aid in Africa
more effet-tive and efficient. In the last year,
we have reexamined our approach to helping
African nations and have recast our AID
policies and programs in Africa along lines
which will emphasize regional projects and
multilateral participation and will reduce the
number of African countries with bilateral
AID programs. I understand that State De-
partment and AID witnesses have appeared
before you and testified extensively on the de-
tails of this approach. In brief, AID has regu-
lar bilateral development assistance pro-
grams in 34 countries in Africa in the current
fiscal year. Under the new policy, AID will
continue bilateral programs — coordinated in
most cases with other donors — in 10 African
countries: Nigeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan,
Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the three coun-
tries of East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, and
Uganda). In other African countries, as
existing activities are completed over the next
few years, AID expects to shift most assist-
ance to regional and multilateral projects and
reduce the number of bilateral programs sub-
stantially. An indispensable part of this
policy will be our continued use of a modest
self-help fund in each country for short-term,
high-impact projects.
The reduction of programs must be gradual
to avoid the waste involved in stopping tech-
nical assistance projects that are only par-
tially completed or in not going ahead with
development loans that have reached an ad-
vanced stage of joint planning. We need flexi-
bility to carry out this policy and achieve our
foreign policy objectives. For these and other
important reasons, I do not think it is wise
to impose arbitrary ceilings on the number
of countries eligible for aid.
This new aid policy should prove effective
in serving both our interests and the develop-
ment needs of the Africans. If adjustments
in the policy prove necessary, we will make
them. The Africans themselves recognize the
need for multinational efforts to overcome the
limitations of natural resources and bound-
aries. Nowhere is the idea of regional coop-
eration more relevant for achieving the com-
monly shared goal of a better future. We are
encouraged by the progress initiated by the
Africans in instituting the African Develop-
ment Bank, which was conceived and orga-
nized and is capitalized entirely by Africans.
We and other donors plan to provide help to
a new special fund of the Bank. Regional de-
velopment schemes should receive in fiscal
year 1968 twice the funds that they received
in fiscal year 1966. These include pi'ojects for
agricultural production, disease control, re-
gional training, and education.
East Asia
In East Asia, Viet-Nam and her Southeast
Asian neighbors are a most crucial battle-
ground in the struggle for a durable world
order. In Viet-Nam, it is necessary for us to
meet our commitments because our commit-
ments are the principal support for the struc-
ture of peace. We have sought repeatedly to
bring the other side to the conference table,
thus far without success. We must persist in
all our efforts. As I have said before, our eco-
nomic assistance programs, while smaller in
scale, are as important as our military efforts
in the achievement of our objectives. For fis-
cal year 1968 we plan to use $550 million.
These funds will serve four vital purposes.
— First, in a most literal sense, they will
support the drive to build a viable nation,
piece by piece, area by area, in which all the
South Vietnamese may identify themselves
with national purposes and national pro-
grams to achieve security and order. Our aid
helps with the task of reconstruction and de-
velopment for the future and helps to sustain
the morale of the South Vietnamese today.
— Second, another sizable portion of our
funds will help maintain economic stability in
the midst of the war. The commodity import
program which we finance has dampened
dangerous inflationary pressures.
— Third, we conduct programs to relieve
wartime suffering and dislocation. AID per-
sonnel and our military forces work in close
partnership to cope directly with the human
and material destruction of war.
— Fourth, we are building for the future,
with a growing program of long-term de-
MAY 29, 1967
831
velopment in electrical power, transportation,
agriculture, medicine, and other fields.
Like the war itself, the conditions under
which we conduct our economic assistance
are most difficult. In 1965, rapidly increasing
militaiy expenditures threatened the South
Vietnamese economy with crippling inflation
which might well have undercut the whole
military effort. Rather than risk this threat,
we decided to expand quickly and sizably the
AID commodity import program. We made
this necessary decision knowing full well that
for a while there would be some theft and
diversion and we would suffer enormous
problems stemming from logistics limitations.
AID simply did not have a large enough staff
at the time; there were not enough end-use in-
spectors or auditors, and it would take time
to get them out to Viet-Nam; port facilities,
storage and transportation facilities, and so
on, were at that time inadequate to the expan-
sion of the import program. We knew all that
at the time and went ahead anyway, because,
as I said, the only alternative was to risk the
real threat of ruinous inflation. Thefts and
diversions of goods, corruption, and other
serious dislocations are inevitable in some
measure under wartime conditions. But we
have made important progress over the last
year and particularly the last 6 months in
overcoming these difficulties. We have placed
some U.S. military in operational control of
handling commodities in transit between port
and warehouse; the AID Mission has doubled
its audit staff; it has instituted an automated
accounting system, sent a U.S. Bureau of
Customs team to assist the Viet-Nam Cus-
toms Office, and much more. We are keeping
a close watch on all aspects of the aid pro-
gram, and we are encouraged by the rapidly
growing effectiveness of the necessary con-
trols.
I believe that we are already witnessing
the dividends of our stand in Viet-Nam. A
few years ago, it was assumed by many in
Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific that
mainland China was the wave of the future.
Now throughout all the free nations of East
Asia we sense a new vitality and confidence.
Most of them are making impressive eco-
nomic progress. They are also working to-
gether more and more effectively.
Nowhere is the momentum of regional
cooperation more evident than in East Asia
and the Western Pacific. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank is now established and in business.
Development of the Mekong Valley is pro-
ceeding despite the war. Throughout East
Asia a variety of regional associations are
taking root, all founded on a common interest
to foster development in a climate of peace.
Cooperative arrangements in education, agri-
culture, transportation, and communications
are coming into existence rapidly.
In Thailand and Laos, it is necessary to
conduct substantial economic aid programs to
thwart increased Communist subversion and
insurgency. Other nations are helping. We
expect that requirements for more conven-
tional types of development assistance to
Thailand over the next several years will be
met by a combination of governments and
international institutions.
Korea is now growing at an annual rate
of 8 percent and will likely repeat the gratify-
ing economic and social successes already
achieved in Taiwan. Both nations show what
can be accomplished in a relatively few years.
Dean Jacoby in his newly published study
on Taiwan development^ has concluded that,
while vigorous self-help efforts were the key
to success, it would nonetheless have taken
Taiwan as much as 40 years to achieve self-
supporting growth, not 15, without substan-
tial American assistance.
Indonesia is now at the start of this jour-
ney, and the new government is committed
to addressing the energies of the Indonesian
people to the problems of internal construc-
tion. We are prepared to support sound
stabilization and development programs
along with other governments and interna-
tional agencies.
Mr. Chairman, this is my seventh formal
° U.S. Aid to Taiwan; a Study of Foreign Aid,
Self-Help, and Development by Neil H. Jacoby (F. A.
Praeger, New York, 1967).
832
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
appearance before your committee to seek
your autliorization for foreign aid.
There is involved here a fundamental issue
in our relations with the rest of the world,
particularly with the struggling underde-
veloped world. The economic growth and
power of the United States are almost beyond
comprehension. Our gross national product
equals that of all of NATO and Japan com-
bined; it is twice that of the Soviet Union,
with the gap continuing to widen; it is 10
times that of mainland China with its 700
million people; it is 10 times that of all of
Latin America. This year's defense budget of
the United States equals the total gross na-
tional product of Latin America. If we are to
be negligent about the needs of the rest of the
world, we shall soon be in a position of a
voracious nation calling upon the rest of the
world to feed our own economy in order to
widen the gap between us and all the rest.
We cannot accept so stark a contrast between
the future we would ask for ourselves and
the future to which others can aspire. If we
are not to become isolated by the choice of
others, we must make it clear that we are
prepared to engage in their problems, help to
share their burdens, and be ourselves a good-
citizen nation in the community of nations.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Copyright
Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September
16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, March 22,
1967.
Protocol 1 annexed to the Universal Copyright
Convention concerning the application of that
convention to the works of stateless persons and
refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.
Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS
3324.
Accession deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967.
Protocol 2 annexed to the Universal Copyright
Convention concerning the application of that
convention to the works of certain international
organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952.
Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS
3324.
Accession deposited: Netherlands, March 22, 1967.
Protocol 3 annexed to the Universal Copyright
Convention concerning the effective date of in-
struments of ratification or acceptance of or
accession to that convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19,
1954. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, March 22,
1967.
Customs
Customs convention regarding ECS carnets for com-
mercial samples. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956.
Entered into force October 3, 1957.'
Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.
Customs convention on the international transport
of goods under cover of TIR carnets with modi-
fications of annexes. Done at Geneva January
15, 1959. Entered into force January 7, I960.'
Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.
Customs convention on containers. Done at (Jeneva
May 18, 1956. Entered into force August 4, 1959.'
Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.
Customs convention on the temporary importation
of professional equipment. Done at Brussels June
8, 1961. Entered into force July 1, 1962.'
Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.
Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the
temporary admission of goods. Done at Brussels
December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30,
1963.'
Ratified by the President: May 3, 1967.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done
at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force
April 24, 1964.'
Accession deposited: Dahomey, March 27, 1967.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta,
March 7, 1967."
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on dip-
lomatic relations concerning the compulsory
settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18,
1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.'
Notification that it considers itself bound: Malta,
March 7, 1967.
Fisheries
International convention for the conservation of
Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14,
1966.=
Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization.
Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended.
Entered into force April 7, 1948; as to the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, April 25, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
- With a declaration.
= Not in force.
MAY 29, 1967
833
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964.'
Seriate advice and consent to ratification: May 8,
1967.
Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 18, 1967.
Publications
Convention concerning the international exchange
of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3,
1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.*
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8,
1967. .
Convention concerning the exchange of official pub-
lications and government documents between
states. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.
Entered into force May 30, 1961.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8,
1967.
Sea
Convention for the International Council for the Ex-
ploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Sep-
tember 12, 1964.=
Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the
United Nations. Adopted by the General Assem-
bly at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
December 20, 1965.=
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May 8,
1967.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, April 12, 1967;
Mexico, April 18, 1967.
Women — Political Rights
Convention on the political rights of women. Done
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force
July 7, 1954.'
Signature : Gabon, April 19, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Gabon, April 19, 1967.
Accession deposited: United Kingdom, vnth res-
ervations, February 24, 1967.*
BILATERAL
Afghanistan
Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended
and extended (TIAS 2856, 4670, 4979, 5243, 5477,
5714, 5807, 5901, 5993, 6123). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Kabul December 26, 1966, and
April 16 and 29, 1967. Entered into force April
29, 1967.
Australia
Amendment to the agreement of June 22, 1956, as
amended (TIAS 3830, 4687), for cooperation
concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed
at Washington April 11, 1967.
Entered into force: May 5, 1967.
Canada
Canadian note of April 5, 1966, and pi-oposed
United States reply concerning amendment of the
Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries (TIAS
3326).=
Ratified by the President: April 24, 1967.
Kenya
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended
(TIAS 5725, 5769, 5870, 5919, 5963). Effected by
an exchange of notes at Nairobi March 14 and
April 25, 1967. Entered into force April 25, 1967.
Morocco
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D),
with annexes. Signed at Rabat April 20, 1967.
Entered into force April 20, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
= Not in force.
■* Including the territories under the territorial
sovereignty of the United Kingdom; and Brunei,
Tonga, British Solomon Protectorate, and Swaziland.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LVI, NO. 1457 PUBLICATION 8241
MAY 29, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the Held of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington. D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
834
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
IDEX May 29, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. H57
frica
le Foreigrn Assistance Program for 1968
(Rusk) 826
le Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) . . 806
geria. The Other Africa; The Maghreb
(Pahner) 806
^ia. The Foreign Assistance Program for
i;)68 (Rusk) 826
mgress. The Foreign Assistance Program for
1968 (Rusk) 826
•onomic Affairs
le Other Africa: The Maghreb (Palmer) . . 806
le Road From Punta del Este (Linowitz) . . 822
irope. The United States and Eastern Europe
in Perspective (Harriman) 815
>reign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program
for 1968 (Rusk) 826
itin America
le Foreign Assistance Program for 1968
(Rusk) 826
le Road From Punta del Este (Linowitz) . . 822
bya. The Other Africa: The Maghreb
(Palmer) 806
liddle East. The Foreign Assistance Program
for 1968 (Rusk) 826
lorocco. The Other Africa: The Maghreb
(Palmer) 806
l>land. The United States and Eastern Europe
in Perspective (Harriman) 815
'-ade. The United States and Eastern Europe
in Perspective (Harriman) 815
-eaty Information. Current Actions .... 833
Tunisia. The Other Africa: The Maghreb
(Palmer) 806
U.S.S.R. The United States and Eastern Europe
in Perspective (Harriman) 815
Viet-Nam
The United States and Eastern Europe in
Perspective (Harriman) 815
U.S. Protests Hanoi's Violation of Geneva
Convention on POW's 825
Yugoslavia. The United States and Eastern
Europe in Perspective (Harriman) .... 815
Name Index
Harriman, W. Averell 815
Linowitz, Sol M 822
Palmer, Joseph, 2d 806
Rusk, Secretary 826
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 8-14
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to May 8 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
100 of April 29 and 103 of May 1.
No. Date Sabject
109 5/9 Palmer: "The Other Africa:
The Maghreb."
tll2 5/10 Rostow: "The Importance of
Agricultural Development in
Our Strategy for Peace."
fHeld for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
*U.S. Government Printing Office 1967—251-937/47
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. dc. zoaoz
official business
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Nam's steady progress toward an elected government and representative institutions at all lei
of government.
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Viet-Nam, The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam, Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-Nam,
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. H58
June 5, 1967
PERSEVERING FOR PEACE
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
838
THE UNITED STATES AND THAILAND
by Ambassador Graham Martin 851
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
IN OUR STRATEGY FOR PEACE
by Under Secretary Rostotv 856
For index see inside back cover
Persevering for Peace
by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
It is a real pleasure to join in this regional
foreign policy conference in my native city
of Chicago. If there is anybody who still
thinks of the Midwest as the bastion of
American isolationism, he ought to be here
today. He would find proof in this meeting
that the modern Midwest agrees with what
one of the great statesmen of this region,
Arthur Vandenberg, said near the end of
World War II: "I do not believe that any
nation hereafter can immunize itself by its
own exclusive action."
The basic fact of our world position in this
generation is not isolation but — to use a
favorite word of President Kennedy — "inter-
dependence." So you as leaders in your own
communities are right to concern yourselves,
as you have been doing today, with the
problems which the United States faces in
the larger community of nations.
Since I represent our country at the
United Nations, perhaps you are now won-
dering what the United Nations can do to
solve these problems. I would not be candid
if I did not report that progress at the
United Nations on many international
questions is painfully slow and uncertain.
Many of the issues we deal with are more
frustrating than anything I ever encountered
during my years in the field of labor-man-
agement negotiations.
There are international disputes that have
been with the United Nations almost since
' Address made before a regional foreign policy
conference at Chicago, 111., on May 12 (U.S./U.N.
press release 54).
its founding. Sometimes we manage to move
foi-ward — one difficult step at a time. At
other times, like Alice in Wonderland, we
have to run as fast as we can just to stay in
the same place.
And sometimes, indeed, the situation gets
worse — as when large-scale fighting broke
out in Kashmir in 1965, shortly after I ar-
rived at the United Nations. When that hap-
pened, the Security Council took swift action
to restore the cease-fire and bring about the
withdrawal of armed forces by India and
Pakistan. This step, even without any resolu-
tion of the basic issue, was regarded as a
major achievement of the United Nations;
and indeed it was.
Similarly, the U.N.'s peacekeeping opera-
tions— in the Middle East, in the Congo, in
Cyprus — have eff"ectively prevented the fires
of war from spreading, from perhaps even
involving the great powers. From the stand-
point of the United States interest in a more
stable and secure world, the United Nations
by what it has done in these situations, as
well as in Korea, has paid for itself many
times over.
It is important that the United Nations
should always have this capacity to inter-
vene for peace and to deploy impartial inter-
national peace forces where the need arises.
We are working on this very problem right
now in the General Assembly. For the first
duty of the U.N., as Churchill said long ago,
is "not to get us to heaven but to keep us
from going to the other place."
In addition, the U.N. is pledged to pro-
838
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mote positive cooperation among' nations.
And in fact it does so. It is the main center
for a tremendous range of international co-
operative activities ranging from weather
observation to education, health, population
control, food, the welfare of children, and the
delivery of mail. It operates the very effec-
tive United Nations Development Program.
And it is deeply involved in the continuing
effort for a reliable system of disarmament
and arms control.
Only last year the United Nations played
a key part in our successful negotiation of
the Outer Space Treaty. This treaty, which
has now been approved by a unanimous vote
of the United States Senate, is the basic
charter for international action in the newly
entered realm of outer space. It contains
major arms control provisions. It provides
for cooperation in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space and for the safety of
astronauts. Like the Antarctic Treaty and
the partial test ban treaty, it is an important
step toward a more constructive and less
dangerous relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This treaty, too,
is a major United Nations achievement — the
most significant, I think, in the nearly 2
years since I came to my United Nations
post.
Viet-Nam Peace Efforts at the U.N.
Despite these achievements, I do not at all
consider that the United Nations record is
one with which we can be satisfied. But we
would do well to remember that, as Adlai
Stevenson pointed out, when the nations
criticize the U.N. they are criticizing them-
selves. We, the sovereign member nations,
are the United Nations. It has no special
magic apart from what its members bring
to it; and if that magic is less than it should
be, truly "the fault lies not in our stars but
in ourselves" — not just in the United States
but in all the members.
This truth applies with particular empha-
sis to the subject on which I want to concen-
trate today: the infinitely difficult and
frustrating search for peace in Viet-Nam.
By rights Viet-Nam, as the main focus of
war in the world today, ought also to be the
main focus of peace efforts at the United
Nations. Indeed, I have sought to make it so
from the outset of my service at the United
Nations nearly 2 years ago. I doubt if a sin-
gle day has gone by during that period when
we have not had some conversation or some
diplomatic probing with the Secretary-
General or with other members concerning
Viet-Nam. U Thant has sought repeatedly,
but unavailingly, to move toward a solution.
Although we have not agreed with every-
thing he has said on the subject, we have
encouraged him — and we still encourage him
— to pursue his efforts. And we responded
affirmatively to his proposal of March 14.^
Also, at our initiative the Security Council
put the matter on its agenda more than a
year ago — but has taken no action on it. The
inability of the Security Council to act must
be ascribed not to the organization itself
but primarily to certain powerful members
which possess the veto power and which have
been unwilling to see it act. Just 3 weeks ago
in the General Assembly I had occasion to
reply to a Soviet speech against our involve-
ment in Viet-Nam.3 In my reply I reminded
the Assembly that the matter is already on
the Security Council's agenda and that the
Council could proceed immediately to con-
sider Viet-Nam if the Soviet Union would
withdraw its objections and its implied
threat of a veto. To this we received no reply.
We do not cease to hope that the Soviet
Union will see its own interest in working
for a peaceful solution in Viet-Nam, whether
through the United Nations or through the
Geneva conference, of which the Soviet
Union is cochairman, or through any other
channel. If their attitude, and that of Hanoi
and Peking, should change, the United Na-
tions might indeed play a major role — both
in achieving a just peace in Viet-Nam and in
' For texts of the Secretary-General's aide me-
moire of Mar. 14 and U.S. replies, see Bulletin
of Apr. 17, 1967, p. 624.
' For Ambassador Goldberg's statement of Apr. 25,
see U.S./U.N. press release 48.
JUNE 5, 1967
839
helping to maintain and implement the peace
once it is achieved. Thus, the fact that Viet-
Nam remains on the Security Council's
agenda provides, as I have often said before,
a reference point which could be highly use-
ful in the future.
In the meantime, the United States and
other members continue at the United
Nations and in many capitals of the world to
pursue unrelentingly the search for a just
peace. The admirable courage and persever-
ance of our men on the battlefield must be
fully matched by our perseverance in seeking
through diplomacy to find the common
ground on which a fair and honorable politi-
cal settlement can be built.
U.S. Debate on Viet-Nam
Probably it is inevitable that, as our
citizens view this complex dual process in
which so much is at stake, some should be
confused and distressed by it and should
vigorously dissent. A great deal of the dis-
sent arises from a desire to simplify tlie situ-
ation— to pursue either peaceful or warlike
methods, not both at the same time. Some of
the dissenters would have us stop the peace
effort and seek to end the war exclusively by
military means. Others, on the contrary,
would unilaterally reduce or even end the
war effort and step up the peace effort.
Whatever misunderstanding and occa-
sional excesses this national debate may in-
volve, I see no reason to deplore dissent it-
self— and certainly not to try to curb it. At a
time when we have even heard it suggested
that we lay aside the first amendment, per-
haps we would do well to remind ourselves
of the wise counsel of Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes that in "the constitutional
rights of free speech, free press and free
assembly . . . lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional govern-
ment."
Certainly no one, including especially our
adversaries in Viet-Nam, should draw the
wrong conclusions from the fact that some
Americans openly disagree with each other
in a time of war. As the Supreme Court said
long ago, our Constitution "is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its pro-
tection all classes -of men, at all times, and
under all circumstances." The fact that such
a national debate can be held is far from
being a sign of weakness or irresolution; on
the contrary, it is a sign of strength. Our
nation can emerge from this debate stronger
than ever — provided we remain always on
guard against the danger of equating dissent
with disloyalty.
But there may also be another danger.
Even now, as successive peace efforts have
been frustrated and the military conflict has
sharpened, some observers have begun to
assert that the United States has changed
its basic policy and is no longer seeking to
negotiate a peaceful and honorable political
solution of the Vietnamese conflict. Instead,
it is asserted, we are now trying to impose a
military solution — to crush our adversary by
main force, to break his will, and to impose
on him an unconditional surrender.
U.S. Policy Remains Constant
Speaking for this administration, let me
say categorically that such speculations are
unfounded. The United States continues
without letup to seek a just political solution
of the conflict. We have not sought, and we
do not now seek, to impose a military solu-
tion or an unconditional surrender in Viet-
Nam. By the same token, we reject the
notion that North Viet-Nam has the right to
impose a military solution on the South. Our
policy is the same that President Johnson
announced in his address at Baltimore 2
years ago: ■• that "the only path for reason-
able men is the path of peaceful settlement";
and that "we will never be second in the
search for such a peaceful settlement in Viet-
Nam." This policy of ours is constant; it has
not changed; it remains the dominant im-
pulse of the United States concerning Viet-
Nam.
But if this is true, some critics say, why
does the United States not stop the bombing
of North Viet-Nam and thus improve the
* Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
840
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
prospects for peace? I would like to comment
briefly on this question.
It is sometimes forgotten that we have
expressed repeatedly our readiness to con-
sider moves to deescalate the war and to take
the first step. I reaffirmed yesterday ^ the
offer we made in my speech of September
22 ^ in the General Assembly. At that time,
we offered to take the first step and "order a
cessation of all bombing of North Viet-Nam
the moment we are assured, privately or
otherwise, that this step will be answered
promptly by a corresponding and appro-
priate deescalation on the other side."
The authorities in Hanoi have made a
number of statements implying, without
quite saying so, that if the bombing were
stopped permanently and unconditionally
Hanoi would be willing to talk. But surely it
would not be unreasonable for us, before
proceeding along these lines, to ask that cer-
tain clarifying questions be answered, such
as:
1. What would we talk about, and how
soon?
2. Would the talks embrace our proposals
as well as those of Hanoi ?
3. Would the purpose of the talks be an
honorable negotiated settlement and not a
mere surrender of one side?
4. How would Hanoi reciprocate militarily
to our action in ceasing the bombing ?
5. What assurances would there be that
neither side would derive any military ad-
vantage from the other's deescalation?
If Hanoi's answers to such questions as
these were such as to provide assurances
rather than vague promises, the prospects
for peace would be brighter.
Then there are those who argue that seri-
ous peace talks are unlikely to begin until
both sides can envisage in advance the com-
mon ground on which the final settlement
can be built. Some light must be visible at
the end of the tunnel — so the argument goes
— before the parties can be expected even to
sit down together.
° For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on
May 11, see U.S./U.N. press release 53.
' Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, p. 518.
This argument, too, deserves to be ex-
plored; and I do not hesitate to do so, be-
cause I do see light at the end of the tunnel.
It is much too soon to see the actual terms
of settlement in detail. But the outlines can
be discerned if we study the facts of the
situation and the attitudes of the two sides.
At this point I am not talking about
the procedural problems — the "who, when,
where, and how" of a political negotiating
forum. These problems are, of course, highly
important, and we have made known our
ideas concerning them. But it may well be
that both sides would find it easier to agree
on "who, when, where, and how" if there
were some beginning of mutual hope that
agreement could ultimately be reached on
"what" — ^in other words, on the kind of po-
litical future to be envisaged for Viet-Nam.
So let me address myself to that central
question.
Limited U.S. Aims in Viet-Nam
As far as the United States is concerned,
our aims in respect to Viet-Nam are strictly
limited. They have not been widened or in-
flated or changed in any way since the
President stated them 2 years ago at Balti-
more. Indeed, I restated them last September
in my address to the General Assembly.
There are, to begin with, certain aims
which we do not pursue and which we have
explicitly disavowed. We are not embarked
on a "holy war" against communism. We
do not seek to do any injury to mainland
China nor to threaten any of its legitimate
interests. We seek no American sphere of
influence in Asia nor any permanent Ameri-
can military presence in Viet-Nam. As re-
gards North Viet-Nam, we do not seek to
overthrow its government, nor do we ask for
the surrender of anything that belongs to it.
As regards South Viet-Nam also, we have
made further important disclaimers. We do
not seek a military alliance with South Viet-
Nam nor a policy of political alinement. Nor
do we seek to exclude any segment of the
South Vietnamese people from peaceful par-
ticipation in their country's future. Indeed,
we heartily welcome the policy of national
JUNE 5, 1967
841
reconciliation on which the South Vietnamese
Government has recently embarked. In ac-
cordance with this policy, Chief of State
Thieu recently pledged that those who return
from the Viet Cong will be treated as first-
class citizens and will enjoy full rights. As
a further earnest of our good faith, we have
stated our willingness to agree to a time
schedule for the supervised phased with-
drawal from South Viet-Nam of all external
forces — those of North Viet-Nam as well as
those from the United States and other coun-
tries aiding South Viet-Nam. We agreed at
Manila ' that all Allied forces in South Viet-
Nam should be withdrawn not later than 6
months after the other side withdraws its
forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and
the level of violence thus subsides.
All these assurances stand, and I reaffirm
them today.
Stated affirmatively, our strictly limited
aims in Viet-Nam can be summed up very
briefly. They are as follows:
1. We seek to assure for the people of
South Viet-Nam the same right of self-
determination — to decide their own political
destiny, free of force or external inter-
ference— that the United Nations Charter
affirms for all.
2. We believe that reunification of Viet-
Nam should be decided upon through a free
choice by the peoples of both the North and
the South without outside interference, the
results of which choice we are fully prepared
to support.
These two points, we believe, are faithful
to the Geneva accords; and as we have often
stated, we believe the essence of the Geneva
accords provides the basis for a settlement.
Now, if we compare this position of ours
with that of North Viet-Nam, we find that
in many respects they are parallel. But there
is one difference which is fundamental and
cannot be ignored. This is found in the third
of Hanoi's "four points," which calls for the
settlement of South Viet-Nam's internal
' For text of the joint communique issued at the
close of the Manila Conference on Oct. 25, 1966,
see ibid., Nov. 14, 1966, p. 730.
842
affairs "in accordance with the program of
the National Liberation Front for South
Viet-Nam." Ho Chi Minh has raised the
same problem in a different way in his de- j
mand that we recognize the National Lib-
eration Front as the "sole genuine repre-
sentative" of the people of South Viet-Nam.
It is strange that Hanoi should propose
such conditions and at the same time agree
with us that the Geneva accords offer a
proper basis for peace. Actually, the National
Liberation Front was not even in existence
in 1954 when the Geneva accords were writ-
ten; whereas a South Vietnamese Govern-
ment was in existence in 1954 and was a
participant at the Geneva conference. To de-
mand that it be ignored in the peace settle-
ment would be tantamount to a demand for
unconditional surrender by the South Viet-
namese Government and could not lead to
peace.
But it is important to recall that not all
of Hanoi's statements on the National Lib-
eration Front have been as categorical as
this, and indeed some of them have been
open to more than one interpretation. We
therefore owe it to the cause of peace to
continue to probe in order to determine
whether they have more to say on the sub-
ject.
Political Evolution in South Viet-Nam
Meanwhile, we trust that the leaders in
Hanoi, as well as those of the National Lib-
eration Front, have observed closely not only
the course of the fighting but also the recent
political events below the 17th parallel.
If they have, they will have seen the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam, despite the dis-
tractions of war and terrorism, carrying out
a series of difficult steps on the road to full
and legitimate constitutional government. A
constituent assembly was popularly elected.
It produced a constitution providing for a
representative government. This constitution
has already been promulgated and, pursuant
to it, the dates have been set for the election
this year, by popular vote, of a president
and a national parliament.
Meanwhile, elections are being held this
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
spring in the South for village and hamlet
officials. These elections have been bringing
nearly 80 percent of the registered voters to
the polls, despite the efforts of the Viet Cong
to prevent them by terrorism.
It should also be recalled that all the elec-
tions thus far have been held under the
scrutiny of the world press, whose verdict is
that they have been conducted freely and
honestly. Moreover, the South Vietnamese
Government has expressed its willingness to
have United Nations observers, as well as the
diplomatic corps, present at its elections.
Certainly anybody interested in having the
popular will expressed, and in the growth of
representative government in South Viet-
Nam, will welcome these developments.
And a further fact which ought surely to
be of interest to North Viet-Nam, as well as
to the Viet Cong and the National Liberation
Front, is the commitment by the South Viet-
namese Government to the policy of national
reconciliation. In this policy they might well
see at least the beginning of an assurance
that those who now follow the Viet Cong
■ and the National Liberation Front, whether
their rank be high or low, will suffer no
political reprisals and will have a chance in
a future peaceful South Viet-Nam to pursue
their legitimate aims by peaceful and demo-
cratic means.
Surely it is altogether wise and proper
that there should be such assurances. If there
is to be peace in Viet-Nam, those who have
taken arms against the Government should
be confident that when the fighting is ended
they will be free to go to North Viet-Nam
if that is their decision; that if they choose
to remain, they will suffer no reprisals for
I having fought in the war; and that in a
future South Viet-Nam they will have an
equal chance, as first-class citizens with full
rights, to pursue a peaceful life so long as
they do not seek, contrary to the constitu-
tion under which they live, to overthrow the
government by force and violence. This, as I
understand it, is precisely what is implied in
the program of national reconciliation.
No doubt, this political evolution in South
Viet-Nam falls short of the maximum aims
JUNE 5, 1967
of the government of Hanoi. But it should
by now be clear to them that their maximum
aims cannot be realized — as indeed, in all
justice, they should not be. This being so,
would not this political evolution — which has
already begun — when implemented in good
faith, with all that may develop from it,
form a basis for a negotiated settlement of
this particular issue underlying the conflict?
And would this not be all the more true if
mutual distrust regarding implementation of
the withdrawal provisions of the Geneva ac-
cords and the Manila communique could be
dissipated by appropriate international guar-
antees and supervision ? These, too, I submit,
are questions worth exploring for the sake
of a just peace.
Such are some elements of the picture of
a peaceful settlement which can be envisaged
in broad outline even now. It is a picture in
which no party to the conflict can claim a
triumph — but in which none will taste
humiliation or defeat. It is a picture entirely
consistent with the Geneva accords. The
leadership in North Viet-Nam, and in the
National Liberation Front, would perhaps
do well to consider this picture and to pon-
der whether the bitter sacrifices of this war,
however long continued, could possibly bring
about a result any nearer to their heart's
desire.
It has occasionally happened in past ages
that wars have taken on a terrible momen-
tum of their own in which the original
causes were virtually forgotten and the pro-
longed suffering led only to deeper hatred
and more ambitious war aims on both sides.
This must not be allowed to happen in Viet-
Nam. The ferocity of combat must be for us
not an incitement to hatred or a temptation
to revenge but rather a stem discipline re-
quiring us to define responsibly the minimum
interests for which our soldiers fight and
which a peace settlement must protect. In
this way the maximum hope is preserved
for the discovery of common ground on
which such a settlement can be based.
I do not want to arouse any false expecta-
tions by anything that I have said. I cannot
report that the outlook for an early settle-
843
ment is promising. But it is precisely at the
time when the outlook is dark that we must
refuse to lose hope and continue to approach
the problems of peace, formidable though
they are, with energy and resourcefulness.
The history of other conflicts amply dem-
onstrates that the search for peace is seldom
easy. It is full of stops and starts and of
hopes deferred. We Americans have a repu-
tation for being impatient, and this can be
a good quality — provided that when difficul-
ties arise which impatience cannot cure we
show that we can also be resolute and perse-
vering.
In the most tragic struggle of our Ameri-
can history. President Lincoln summed up
the spirit of his policy in those famous
words of his second inaugural: "With malice
toward none, with charity for all, with firm-
ness in the right as God gives us to see the
right, let us strive on to finish the work we
are in."
Those words expressed then, and they still
express today, more than a laudable moral
sentiment: They express the best strategy
and the best policy. We may well take them
as our guide as we strive to bring to Viet-
Nam the peace which the people of that coun-
try and of the United States, and the vast
majority throughout the world, fervently
desire.
U.S. Support of Pacification
Effort in Viet-Nam Reorganized
Following is a statement by Ellsworth
Bunker, American Ambassador to the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam, m,ade at the opening of his
news conference at Saigon on May 11.
My colleagues and I have been busy over
the past 2 weeks discussing how we could
best organize the U.S. Mission and maintain
a seasoned top-level U.S. team. Having
served as Ambassador in three major posts
before this one, I am a firm believer in team
operation and in fullest continuity.
Though it will not be a normal practice, I
called a special press conference today so that
I could share my decisions with you.
First, Ambassador Eugene Locke, of
course, is my alter ego. As such, he will in-
sure coordination of all Mission activities.
Second, I am delighted that Barry Zor-
thian, Minister-Counselor for Information
and Director of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs
Office, has agreed to stay on indefinitely to
handle this vital function.
Third, I am equally delighted that Major
General Edward Lansdale has also agreed to
stay on indefinitely as Mission liaison officer
for the revolutionary development program
and indispensable source of advice. That Mr.
Zorthian and General Lansdale will stay on
gives an important element of continuity to
our top team.
Fourth, Dr. Charles Cooper, who served
for the last year as economic deputy to Mr.
Komer in the White House and who was pre-
viously special assistant to Walter Heller,
Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers, will come out in June to replace Leroy
Wehrle as Counselor for Economic Affairs.
As most of you know, Mr. Wehrle's work has
been invaluable here. Mr. Cooper is the best
successor he could have.
Fifth, since being appointed U.S. Ambassa-
dor to Viet-Nam, I have given a great deal
of thought to how to organize most effectively
the U.S. advisory role in support of the Viet-
namese Government's revolutionary develop-
ment effort. Like my predecessor, I regard
revolutionary development — often termed
pacification — as close to the heart of the mat-
ter in Viet-Nam.
Support of revolutionary development has
seemed to me and my senior colleagues to be
neither exclusively a civilian nor exclusively
a military function but to be essentially civil/
military in character. It involves both the
provision of continuous local security in the
countryside — necessarily a primarily mili-
tary task — and the constructive programs
conducted by the Ministry of Revolutionary
Development, largely through its 59-member
revolutionary development teams. The Gov-
ernment of Viet-Nam has recognized the
dual civil/military nature of the revolu-
844
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ti(inary development process by assigning re-
sponsibility for its execution to the corps/
region commanders and by deciding to assign
the bulk of the regular army of the Republic
of Viet-Nam, as well as the regional and
popular forces, to provide the indispensable
security so that revolutionary development
can proceed in the countryside.
As senior American official in Viet-Nam, I
have concluded that the U.S. advisory and
supporting role in revolutionary development
can be made more effective by unifying its
civil and military aspects under a single man-
agement concept. Unified management, a
single chain of command, and a more closely
dovetailed advisory effort will, in my opinion,
greatly improve U.S. support of the vital
revolutionary development program.
Therefore, I am giving General [William
C] Westmoreland the responsibility for the
performance of our U.S. Mission field pro-
grams in support of revolutionary develop-
ment. To assist him in performing this func-
tion, I am assigning Mr. Robert Komer to
his headquarters to be designated as Deputy
for Revolutionary Development to COMUS-
MACV, with personal rank of Ambassador.
I have two basic reasons for giving this
responsibility to General Westmoreland. In
the first place, the indispensable first state of
pacification is providing continuous local
security, a function primarily of the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces, in which the
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-
Nam, performs a supporting advisory role.
In the second place, the greater part of the
U.S. advisory and logistic assets involved in
support of revolutionary development belong
to MACV. If unified management of U.S.
Mission assets in support of the Vietnamese
program is desirable, COMUSMACV is the
logical choice.
I have directed that a single chain of re-
sponsibility for advice and support of the
Vietnamese revolutionary development pro-
gram be instituted from Saigon down to dis-
trict level. Just as Mr. Komer will supervise
the U.S. advisory role at the Saigon level as
Deputy to General Westmoreland, so will the
present OCO regional directors serve as depu-
ties to the U.S. senior advisers to the Viet-
namese corps/region commander.
At the province level, a senior adviser will
be designated, either civilian or military, fol-
lowing analysis of the local situation.
While management will thus be unified,
the integrity of the Office of Civil Operations
will be preserved. It will continue to perform
the same functions as before and will con-
tinue to have direct communication on tech-
nical matters with its field echelons. The
present Revolutionary Development Support
Division of MACV will be integrated into
OCO, and its chief will serve as deputy to
the Director of OCO.
As senior U.S. official in Viet-Nam, I in-
tend to keep a close eye on all U.S. activities,
including our support of revolutionary devel-
opment. I am simply having this advisory
effort report to me through COMUSMACV
rather than through two channels as in the
past. I intend to keep fully informed per-
sonally about all developments in this field
and to hold frequent meetings with General
Westmoreland and Ambassador Komer for
the purpose of formulating policy.
Such a unified civil/military U.S. advisory
effort in the vital field of revolutionary devel-
opment is unprecedented. But so, too, is the
situation which we confront. Revolutionary
development is in my view neither civil nor
military but a unique wartime need. Thus my
solution is to have U.S. civilian and military
officials work together as one team in order
to more effectively support our Vietnamese
allies. Many further details will have to be
worked out, and various difficulties will
doubtless be encountered; but I am confident
that this realinement of responsibilities is a
sound management step and I count on all
U.S. officers and officials concerned to make
it work effectively in practice.
JUNE 5, 1967
845
Vice President of the Republic of China
Visits the United States
The Vice President and Prime Minister of
the Republic of China, Yen Chia-kan, visited
the United States May 7-25. In Washington,
May 9 and 10, he met ivith President John-
son and other U.S. Government officials. Fol-
lowing are an exchange of greetings between
President Johnson and Vice President Yen
at an arrival ceremony at the White House
on May 9, their exchange of toasts at a
White House luncheon that afternoon, and a
joint statement released on May 10 at the
conclusion of their meetings.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
white House press release dated May 9
President Johnson
Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Yen, honored
members of the Chinese Government, dis-
tinguished guests: We welcome you today,
Mr. Vice President, as a leader of a very
gallant and resourceful nation.
We always value our exchanges with your
Government. We welcome this new oppor-
tunity to benefit from your views on world
affairs, especially on the developments in
East Asia.
The example of the Republic of China en-
courages and inspires us all.
We all know how you have stanchly main-
tained your independence far out on the
frontier of aggression. Less well known is
how constantly and vigorously your people
have worked to achieve that economic level
which alone can make longrun freedom a
reality.
Once the economic outlook for free China
was very dim. But your people were deter-
mined to apply their wisdom and skill, and
the United States was prepared to offer
assistance.
Today an admiring world witnesses these
results:
— Since 1952, your per capita gross na-
tional product has doubled.
— Since 1960, your exports have tripled.
— Today, you have one of the highest
standards of living in Asia.
History will surely note, Mr. Vice Presi-
dent, your impressive personal role in these
achievements and your nation's role in help-
ing the family of nations upward to new
dignity and to new hope.
You have given vital substance to one of
your oldest and wisest proverbs: "Give a
man a fish, and he will eat a meal. But teach
him how to fish, and he will eat forever."
That philosophy, that wisdom, and that
compassion have made the Republic of China
a model for many lands. Your people have
taught men of different cultures many valu-
able lessons— particularly in those regions
where there is yet no winner in the grim
race between population groAvth and food
supply.
They can look to free China for evidence
that this race can be won for humanity. In
the past 10 years your population growth
rate has dropped from 3.5 percent to 2.7
percent, while your food production has in-
creased by almost 6 percent.
Mr. Vice President, your successes have
been many and great, and it has been our
privilege to share some of them. But our
sense of common achievement was greatest
when, in 1965, 1 was able to tell the Congress
that free China no longer needed American
economic assistance.
The Republic of China, strong itself, is
now able to contribute to the development
of other countries. Through your Project
Vanguard, some 500 agricultural technicians
846
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
are assisting 23 nations in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. Another 100 technicians are
helping South Viet-Nam with its agricul-
tural, electrical power, and medical prob-
lems. You are also doing your part in the
Asian Development Bank, which promises
so much for all the people of Asia.
Mrs. Johnson and I shall never forget the
delightful visit we had to your country 6
years ago. We are delighted that you could
come here and be with us today.
Your great philosopher said what is in
our hearts when he asked, "Is it not delight-
ful to have a friend come from a far place ?"
Mr. Vice President and Mrs. Yen, we
take great pride and pleasure in welcoming
you to our land. We hope that your visit
here will be one that you will enjoy and
remember.
Vice President Yen
Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson: First of all,
allow me to express my appreciation for
the honor that you, Mr. President, have
done me, in inviting me to visit your great
country. I again thank you for all the com-
plimentary remarks you have made on me
and also on my country, the Republic of
China.
My wife and I are deeply grateful to you,
Mr. President, and to Mrs. Johnson, and to
all those who are here today.
I have brought with me the very warm
greetings of President and Madame Chiang
Kai-shek and of the people of the Republic
of China to you, Mr. President, to Mrs.
Johnson, and to all the people of the United
States of America.
The people of my country still cherish
with very endearing remembrances the visit
which you, Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson,
made to my country in 1961.
It was during the course of your visit
that your country and my country reaffirmed
their common determination to fight for and
to extend the frontiers of freedom and de-
mocracy in Asia.
Ever since that time, while the dark
forces of communism have been stemmed
in some parts of Asia, it was this great
country of the United States of America
which has chosen to honor its commitments
by responding very resolutely and very
heroically against aggression and for the
preservation of peace and freedom in my
part of the world.
As an ally and a free nation, the Repub-
lic of China is proud to pledge its support
to the noble cause which the United States
is upholding.
The traditional ties of friendship between
your country and mine have had a very long
standing and have withheld many trying
times and many trying events.
The present visit of mine to your country,
I hope, will afford me the opportunity of
learning from the wisdom of your thinking,
Mr. President, and also of discussing with
you many problems of common interest, with
particular reference to those problems which
are now existing in Asia.
I also am looking forward to the oppor-
tunity of meeting with many leaders in your
administration, with members of your Con-
gress, and with citizens of your country in
many walks of life.
I am sure this visit of mine will further
cement the very strong ties which have
already existed between our two countries,
and will also serve to enhance our mutual
understanding and strengthen our friend-
ship.
Again, Mr. President, I take this oppor-
tunity to thank you for your kindness and
for the honor that you have bestowed upon
me. Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you
very much.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
white House press release dated May 9
President Jolinson
Your Excellency the Vice President of the
Republic of China and Mrs. Yen, members of
the Cabinet, distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen: There is an old American proverb
that says, "An hour's intelligent conversation
is worth a thousand memos."
This morning I have had the privilege of
such a conversation with a wise and devoted
JUNE 5, 1967
847
friend of the United States, Vice President
C. K. Yen of the Republic of China.
Mr. Vice President, we are delighted that
you and Mrs. Yen could be with us, both for
personal reasons and because your presence
is symbolic of a long and cherished bond be-
tween our two peoples.
When China sought a leader for its first
diplomatic mission to the West a hundred
years ago, it chose Anson Burlingame, the
first American Minister to reside in China's
Capital, as its trustee. Our relationship has
grown more intimate, more meaningful, over
the intervening century.
Our countries are joined by a treaty of
mutual defense. But our alliance goes far
deeper. It is an alliance that has been tested
in times of war. It has been tempered by our
struggle against forces that would have de-
stroyed both of us.
We were loyal to that alliance then. We are
loyal to it today.
We are firmly committed to the defense of
Taiwan, and to upholding your rights as a
member of the United Nations.
Mr. Vice President, we in America admire
what you have done to bring economic pros-
perity to Taiwan. We are proud to have
worked with you.
— Taiwan's land reform program is out-
standing in Asia — a model for countries
around the world.
- — In the past 15 years you have doubled
your per capita gross national product so that
your people now enjoy one of the highest
standards of living in all Asia.
But the Republic of China has gone far
beyond any selfish concern with its own for-
tunes— you have helped other countries to
help themselves.
As valiant soldiers in the war against
hunger and want — the war on which the
future of civilization depends — farmers and
technicians from Taiwan have traveled to
other countries, other continents, to offer
help, knowledge, and technical ability to less
fortunate peoples.
Mr. Vice President, I have witnessed some
of these miracles with my own eyes. I hope
848
that your visit here will further encourage
your people and will give us the opportunity
to, in part, try to repay the warm hospitality
which Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed in our
visit to your country 6 years ago.
Ladies and gentlemen, I should like to ask
you to please join me in a toast to the Presi-
dent of the Republic of China and to lasting
friendship between the Chinese and the
American peoples.
Vice President Yen
Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, Your Ex-
cellencies, ladies and gentlemen: My wife and
I feel overwhelmed by the kind comments
that have been made by President Johnson.
I think it is an honor which has been done not
only to my wife and myself but also to my
country as a whole.
The traditional friendly relations between
the United States of America and my coun-
try have been long lasting and, as the Presi-
dent has already indicated, such friendship
will go on and on forever and forever in the
common cause of peace and of righteousness
in this world.
When Mr. Burlingame came to my coun-
try about 100 years ago, both the United
States and my country were already partners
in the international scene. It might be inter-
esting that at one time or another Americans
have been representing my country on many
occasions.
Subsequently many events happened in the
world and those events have testified to the
unfailing friendship and strong ties between
the two countries.
I think those ties have already undergone
such trying events and such trying times
that we are sure in the future these ties will
be even stronger.
But we have to be conscious of the chang-
ing world as it is and as it will be. We know
that probably in the future more challenges
will be posed against the freedom-loving
countries, especially the United States of
America and the Republic of China.
We know that only international coopera-
tion can withstand all these challenges, but I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
believe the wisdom of the American people
and the wisdom of President Johnson, to-
gether with all the conscientious efforts made
on the part of my country, will combine to
turn the tide of world events so that eventu-
ally righteousness, peace, freedom, democ-
racy, and human dignity will win.
I have just been talking to Mrs. Johnson
about the great antipoverty program that the
President is now sponsoring. I consider this
not only a program of the United States; I
consider that as a program for the whole
world in which the United States will play a
leading role and, in that role, my country will
very fervently join.
Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you to
join with me in a toast to the continued
health of our host and hostess, the President
of the United States and Mrs. Johnson.
JOINT STATEMENT
White House press release dated May 10
His Excellency Yen Chia-kan, Vice President and
Prime Minister of the Republic of China, has con-
cluded a two-day visit to Washington at the invita-
tion of President Johnson. Vice President Yen met
with President Johnson to discuss matters of com-
mon concern on May 9. Also present were Ambas-
sador Chow Shu-kai, Minister of Economic Affairs
Li Kwoh-ting, Ambassador to the United Nations
Liu Chieh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Samson
C. Shen, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador
to China Walter P. McConaughy, and Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs William P. Bundy. Director of the Informa-
tion Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lai
Chia-chiu was present as recorder for the Chinese
side.
The President welcomed the opportunity to re-
affirm to the Vice President the solemn commitment
of the United States as provided for in the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954. Vice President Yen noted
that the Chinese Communists pose a continuing
threat, and the President reassured the Vice Presi-
dent that the United States intends to continue to
furnish military aid to the Republic of China in
accordance with the provisions of the Military
Assistance Agreement of 1951.
The President and Vice President reviewed the
international situation, with particular reference to
the current situation in East Asia. They exchanged
information and views on conditions on the Chinese
mainland resulting from the Cultural Revolution.
They agreed that the struggle for power is far from
over and that developments on the Chinese main-
land are closely related to the peace and security of
Asia. They further agreed to consult on future
developments on the Chinese mainland.
The President and the Vice President reviewed
the Free World effort to halt Communist aggression
against the Republic of Vietnam. President Johnson
and Vice President Yen agreed that unless the
aggression is stopped, peace and security cannot
prevail in Asia and the Pacific region. The President
expressed his gratification with the Republic of
China's contributions to the development of Viet-
nam's economy, noting especially the work of Chi-
nese technicians in assisting the Republic of Viet-
nam to increase her food production. The Vice
President expressed the strong support of the Re-
public of China for the United States policy in
Vietnam and the hope that the Republic of China
would find it possible further to strengthen her
economic and technical cooperation with the Repub-
lic of Vietnam.
It was agreed that periodic consultations between
the United States and the Republic of China on
problems of common concern in East Asia had been
fruitful and should be continued.
The President and the Vice President discussed
the question of Chinese representation in the United
Nations. They noted the favorable outcome of the
21st General Assembly when efforts to expel the
Republic of China from the United Nations and
seat the Chinese Communists were decisively de-
feated. The President reaffirmed that the United
States firmly supports the Republic of China's seat
in the United Nations. The President and the Vice
President agreed that their Governments would
continue to consult closely on the best means for
achieving their common objectives in the United
Nations.
The President expressed admiration for the con-
tinuing progress made by the Republic of China in
developing Taiwan's economy since the conclusion
of the U. S. economic aid program in 1965. He also
noted the sharp contrast between economic condi-
tions in Taiwan and on the Chinese mainland.
The President congratulated Vice President Yen
on the remarkable success of the Republic of China's
technical cooperation programs in friendly coun-
tries, particularly in the field of agriculture, and
noted that the Republic of China is making a most
significant contribution to the collective War on
Hunger.
In the course of their conversation President
Johnson and Vice President Yen also reviewed pro-
grams intended to develop cooperation among Asian
nations. The President and Vice President noted the
potentialities of the Asian and Pacific Council and
the Asian Development Bank to promote peace and
prosperity in Asia and the Pacific region.
Vice President Yen spoke of the need to
strengthen science and technology in the Republic
of China as a vital force in national and regional
JUNE 5, 1967
849
development. He welcomed the President's offer to
have his Science Adviser, Dr. [Donald F.] Hornig,
lead a team of experts to Taiwan to survey scientific
and technological assets and needs in the Republic
of China. Dr. Hornig will also advise on ways by
which more career opportunities might be provided
in Taiwan for Chinese scientists now teaching and
working outside China.
President Johnson and Vice President Yen re-
affirmed the strong ties between the United States
and the Republic of China founded on the historic
friendship between the Chinese and American
peoples.
Committee's school construction program,
will include 5,000 units of the three-room
"Marcos" type and 1,545 units of the two-
room prefabricated "Army" type. The school
buildings will be erected throughout the Re-
public of the Philippines to help meet a seri-
ous shortage of classroom space.
The agreement, which was signed at
Manila on May 18, provides that the first
disbursement from the Special Fund for this
project will be made within 2 weeks of the
signing of the agreement.
U.S. and Philippines Agree
on School Building Project
The Department of State announced on
May 18 (press release 114) that the Govern-
ments of the United States and of the Philip-
pines had approved a project calling for an
expenditure of $13,077,000 from the Special
Fund for Education, which was created by
the U.S. Congress in an amendment to the
Philippine war damage legislation of 1962.
The funds will be utilized to construct 6,545
school buildings in the Philippines.
The agreement on the project, the first
negotiated by the American and Philippine
panels, follows the guidelines set forth in the
communique of Presidents Johnson and
Marcos of September 16, 1966.^ In paragraph
22 of that communique the two Presidents
agreed "to put to effective and creative use
the Special Fund for Education" and directed
the joint panels to accelerate their discus-
sions and to implement rapidly projects as
they are mutually agreed.
The school buildings, a portion of the
Philippines' Presidential School Building
' For text of the communique, see Bulletin of
Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.
Letters of Credence
Burundi
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Burundi, Terence Nsanze, pre-
sented his credentials to President Johnson
on May 10. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
May 10.
Dahomey
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Dahomey, Maxime-Leopold Zoll-
ner, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on May 10. For texts of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
May 10.
Morocco
The newly appointed Ambassador of Mo-
rocco, Ahmed Osman, presented his creden-
tials to President Johnson on May 10. For
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State
press release dated May 10.
850
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United States and Thailand
by Graham Martin
Ambassador to Thailand '
I see that your club bulletin forecast a
candid appraisal of American relations with
the Kingdom of Thailand. I shall try to
justify that expectation. I hope you will also
permit me to go a bit beyond Thai-American
relationships and add a few comments on
the Thai role in Asia. I would like to sketch
in brief outline the extraordinary initiatives
that have originated in Bangkok in the past
few years, initiatives which have caught the
imagination and elicited the cooperation of
almost all other nations in Asia.
It would be, I think, almost impossible to
exaggerate the enormous importance of these
developments to our country. It seems to me
that they provide a striking validation of the
correctness of our decision to meet fully the
commitments this country has undertaken in
Southeast Asia.
I think the steady, progressive evolution of
these new institutions of Asian cooperation
provides one of the more dramatic stories of
this decade. We have been perhaps unduly
preoccupied with military minutiae in the
past. I was therefore happy to see that one
of the lead articles in last Sunday's New
York Times by one of your distinguished and
perceptive members, Mr. Drew Middleton,
after extensive talks with senior officials in
most of the countries of the area, did record
his impression that "The officials believe that
in the pause occasioned by allied resistance
in Viet-Nam and Communist China's turmoil,
• Address made before the Overseas Press Club
at New York, N.Y., on May 3 (press release 108).
this area can be strengthened to the point of
successful resistance to political subversion
and economic pressures." I am convinced this
is indeed the case, and I hope many more
of you will investigate thoroughly the signifi-
cance of these developments and report your
conclusions to the American people.
Finally, I would like to expose my concern
over the difficulties, as I see them from half-
way round the world, that the virtual revo-
lution in communications has posed for you
in meeting the responsibilities we both have,
responsibilities I believe you have always
accepted as an automatic corollary of the
constitutional protection afforded you to keep
the American people completely informed.
In speaking of Thai-American relations, I
can start with no better authority than the
distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand,
His Excellency Thanat Khoman. It was only
a little less than a year ago that I had to
cut short a visit to the United States in order
to be back in Bangkok on May 29 to sign on
behalf of the United States an important
treaty with Thailand — a new Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations. The date of
May 29 was chosen by the Thai Foreign
Minister because it was the anniversary of
a similar treaty that had been signed 110
years before, on May 29, 1856.
In our remarks we both recorded the often
overlooked fact that Thailand was the first
Asian nation with which the young United
States of America had a treaty relationship
—in 1833. The Foreign Minister, in recalling
the mutually beneficial relationship that had
JUNE 5, 1967
851
characterized the intervening period, went on
to observe that
. . . our relationship stands out as a remarkable
example where a small nation can work with a great
power without being dominated or indeed losing its
identity. In this area and at this time when expan-
sionist and domineering tendencies are dangerously
lurking, Thai-American cooperation is a worthy
encouragement to our own constant endeavors to
preserve our freedom and independence as well as
to those who are striving to achieve the same
objective. Relationship between a great and a
small nation can be mutually fruitful and beneficial
provided both sides acknowledge and respect the
rights to equal opportunity and to enjoy equal bene-
fits, over and above the inequalities of life and
practical realities. If that principle is observed, as
it has been in the present case, there can be a
partnership which will not smother or jeopardize
the free existence of the smaller party but rather
enhance the latter's growth and development. On
our part, we intend to secure the observance of such
a principle and I am confident that this also corre-
sponds to the desire of the United States Govern-
ment. We, therefore, look forward not only to the
continuing close association between our two nations,
but particularly that it will serve as a model to an
orderly and peaceful development of the relationship
between the nations, large and small, in this part
of the world, relationship which will not entail
subservience to one of the other but rather mutually
trustworthy and fruitful partnership and cooper-
ation.
This comment from an Asian statesman
vi^hose quaHties of fierce independence, cour-
age, and high diplomatic skill are in the
true tradition of his nation — which was the
only bit of geography along the littoral of
Asia which managed to maintain its freedom
and independence during successive waves of
European colonization — does not, I suggest,
support the current stereotypes we hear all
too often about the quality of American rela-
tionships with other nations and peoples. It
does attest, on the contrary, to our continu-
ing ability to conduct our relations with due
regard for the sensibilities and the tradi-
tional values of others. Our relationship with
Thailand has been and continues to be a
partnership of equals.
Nor can there be any doubt, among those
who have taken the trouble to become in-
formed, that Thailand brings to this partner-
ship as much as she receives. The one mani-
festation of this cooperation best known at
the present moment is the military coopera-
tion being afforded by Thailand.
As you know, Thailand and the United
States both undertook commitments to the
security of Southeast Asia when both nations
ratified their accession to the SEATO treaty
in 1954. In recognition of that commitment,
the Government of Thailand has permitted
the United States, as a SEATO ally, to use
certain Thai bases to facilitate military op-
erations in the defense of South Viet-Nam
from externally organized and directed ag-
gression. In so doing, Thailand expressed by
its action a complete faith in the validity of
American statements that we intended fully
to carry out our commitments in Southeast
Asia.
As we all know, other countries in the area
have chosen not to risk their national exist-
ence in so direct and immediate a re-
sponse to the aggressors. But the Thai, who
have always been free, fully intend to remain
a free nation. Indeed, the very word "Thai"
means free; and as a free nation it felt that
it had no recourse except to honor its obliga-
tions to the best of its ability, as we were
also doing. During the past 3 years there
have been literally hundreds of times when
I have, at the request of our Government,
presented requests to the Thai for additional
assistance. I would like to openly record the
fact that never once in this period has there
ever been an association between their affirm-
ative response and our action — or too often
lack of action — on a request which they rnlay
have made te us for assistance. I suggest
that many of you will find the same difficul-
ties that I have experienced in finding a
parallel in the history of American alliances
with other countries.
These bases, which have been fully de-
scribed to the American people, have made
a major contribution to the AUied war effort.
It is impossible to estimate how many thou-
sands of Allied lives have been saved in
Viet-Nam as a direct result of Thailand's
cooperation. However, a partial sampling of
the stream of propaganda protests beamed
852
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
at Thailand by Peking and Hanoi gives
ample evidence that our concerted actions
have hurt them painfully.
Long-range Communist plans for Thai-
land's subversion, openly announced by
Peking some years ago, have been acceler-
ated. Thai-U.S. cooperation has taken these
new tactics into account. In addition to our
long-range program vs^hich has assisted in
training and modernizing Thailand's armed
forces, we have added other training assist-
ance, including an American Special Forces
unit which is assisting in the training of
additional Thai military units in counter-
insurgency operations. The Thai desired to
move with extreme rapidity to meet this new
threat. Pending completion of training of
Thai pilots, we provided last year at Thai
request a company of unarmed American
helicopters to provide the all-important ele-
ment of mobility and logistical flexibility for
Thai security units.
I might add for the record that neither the
Special Forces nor other American training
personnel nor these temporarily provided
helicopters participated in any way in actual
counterinsurgency combat operations. The
Thai have insisted that this is their own
responsibility which they will meet within
their own country with their own forces.
Consequently, on the completion of the train-
ing of the Thai helicopter pilots, the unit
which we had provided was withdrawn to
Viet-Nam on schedule on the first of Febru-
aiy this year.
You are all aware that the Royal Thai
Government has recently decided to add
to the Royal Thai Navy and Royal Thai
Air Force units already operating in South
Viet-Nam an additional fighting force from
the Royal Thai Army. They will be warmly
welcomed in resisting aggression by their
other SEATO allies who became familiar
with their courage and valor when they
fought as allies in the United Nations Com-
mand in Korea.
In recent days you have heard from one
of America's distinguished soldiers of the
military successes of the free-world Allied
forces in Viet-Nam. We should also note
that Asians have not waited for these mili-
tary successes to begin the creation of a
new Asia. They began this process some time
ago when it became certain we fully intended
to honor our commitments.
Initiatives in Asian Regional Cooperation
A few moments ago I alluded to the ex-
traordinary initiatives which have been bub-
bling up out of Bangkok, initiatives which
before our eyes are rapidly filling in the out-
lines of firm patterns of regional cooperation
in Asia.
Among these, I would like particularly to
call attention to the patient, determined, and
persistent diplomacy of U Nyun of Burma,
the Executive Secretary of ECAFE [Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far
East] , which led to the creation of the Asian
Development Bank.
It is in Bangkok that the activities of the
four riparian states of the Mekong Basin
have joined together in the Mekong Com-
mission, successfully subordinating their po-
litical differences to a concerted effort for the
development of the incredible potential in-
herent in this great river system, a potential
judged by many experts to be as vast as that
of our own TVA.
In a few weeks we shall see in Bangkok
the second meeting of the Asian and Pacific
Council, formed a year ago in Seoul. That
meeting was preceded by a year and a half
of patient work in Bangkok by the ambas-
sadors of the nations concerned under the
chairmanship of the Thai Foreign Minister.
This resulted in a degree of cooperation evi-
denced in Seoul which proved so startling
to Western observers last year. I think we
may confidently anticipate in the forthcoming
meeting in Bangkok revelations of additional
progress which has been made in the inter-
vening year.
The reactivation of the Association of
Southeast Asia has already proved an enor-
mously attractive magnet for other nations
in the area, and I believe we can confidently
JUNE 5, 1967
853
expect a broadening of this subregional
framework in the near future.
The progress of the Southeast Asian Min-
isters of Education is proceeding in the per-
fecting of the details of the new Asian In-
stitute of Technology and the cooperative
broadening of existing institutions in the
fields of agriculture and tropical medicine
which will provide additional momentum to
the development of these badly needed addi-
tional human resources.
We have just seen concluded in Manila
the second meeting of the Conference on
/ Asian Economic Development which was first
convened in Tokyo last year at Japanese
initiative.
Dramatic and Constructive Change
These are illustrations of the startling
momentum already achieved on the basis of
Asian acceptance of the validity of America's
commitment. We are seeing here the explora-
tory stirrings of the rising Asian urge to get
on with the business of orderly regional
growth through the collective engagement of
Asian resources. As I have said before, the
breadth of these activities is as impressive
as it is little known. These new cooperative
efforts extend not only into such fields as
irrigation, hydroelectric power, transporta-
tion, communication, natural resources ex-
ploration, scientific and technical research,
experimental agriculture, and quality manu-
facturing controls but also into the fields of
coordinated economic planning and coopera-
tive fiscal policies.
Last October here in New York, Foreign
Minister Thanat Khoman, in commenting on
these developments, observed:
The smaller nations in Southeast Asia have felt
the need of getting closer with one another. If
division has been the characteristic of the past
and had brought about grievous losses of freedom
and independence and had allowed interference and
pressure by outside powers, the future aims should
be for closer and more fruitful cooperation and
Integration. While such cooperation should be
basically regional, it is not in our interest to make it
exclusive. Outside elements may have a role to play
but not a domineering or dominating role. If any-
thing, it will be a cooperation on the basis of
equality and partnership.
I would like to reiterate that Asian efforts
to unify and fortify the region have begun
to move so fast that a real danger now exists
that American and Western adjustments to
such dramatic and constructive change will
fall behind. The fact that the President has
engaged the vision, the statesmanship, and
the extraordinary competence of Eugene
Black to coordinate our activities in these
fields gives me confidence that we will sur-
mount the bureaucratic resistance to the
necessity for new techniques and accelerated
action to match these Asian initiatives.
Free Asia has reached the point where it is
prepared to associate itself with new Western
initiatives which complement its own. It
would be a pessimist indeed who could not
see the newly compelling opportunities for
fruitful cooperation which Asians are pro-
viding in the course of regional reformation
and development. The question now is
whether America and others have mastered
the technique of full and equal partnership
in Asia. I am increasingly confident that the
answer will be affirmative.
Perspective in the News
I said in the beginning that I wished to
share with you my concern over the difficul-
ties we both face in our responsibilities to
keep the American people as completely in-
formed as we possibly can. I mention these
problems with some diffidence because I have
no solutions to offer. However, I could not
think of a better place to come for advice
and counsel, since your membership, I am
certain, representing as it does such a broad
spectrum of influence on all media, is actively
engaged with the same concerns.
Having been rather fully occupied half
the world away for these last 31/2 years, I
am perhaps only dimly aware of the effects
of the massive revolution in the field of com-
munications. For example, I have had time
to delve only briefly into the observations of
Mr. Marshall McLuhan. Perhaps if I had
more time I would not have found myself
more puzzled than before. I did find appeal-
ing the recent comment of Mr. Richard Coe.
Recognizing that we are living in a period of
854
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
change, he observed that change is never
orderly but chaotic, that not one thing but
an awesome range of things happen at the
same time, that the greatest danger was in
missing the perspectives, and that the ironic
cause for the lack of perspective perhaps is
that instant communications stresses the
chaos and not the order of civilization.
In reporting a war, I suppose it is unfor-
tunately true that the most dramatic inci-
dents are those involving violence and
destruction. Instant communication also faces
the editor, whether TV or newspaper, with
the problem of instant choice. If I had the
responsibility for making the choice, I would
probably also choose the dramatic. But the
problem is how do we get at least a bit of
perspective.
We have been told of the military com-
petence of our sons, and for this we may be
justly proud. But how do we tell the Ameri-
can people that their sons are also engaged
in constructive tasks as well, that our soldiers
in Southeast Asia have eagerly welcomed the
opportunity to assist whenever they could in
the tasks of nation-building, that in so doing
they have earned the affection and regard of
the Southeast Asian peoples as well as their
respect for their fighting prowess?
How do we tell the American people of the
stanchness and steadfastness of an ally like
Thailand?
And how do we tell the American people
of the initiatives and ingenuity with which
the Asians are creating the institutions of
regional cooperation which hold every pros-
pect of bringing an increasing stability and
strength to the area ?
How do we explain, in reference to
SEATO, the difference between the ma-
chinery of an alliance and the alliance itself;
that this alliance has demonstrated a truly
remarkable flexibility, under the Rusk-
Thanat clarification ^ of the "jointly and
separately" language of article II; that this
flexibility and resilience has permitted all
five of the Pacific members of the SEATO
alliance to engage troops in combat in Viet-
Nam, while maintaining the full participa-
tion of the non-Pacific members in the
economic and social tasks which are also
contributing to the stability and progress of
the area ?
How do you tell the Asians that the ex-
tended coverage we have given the use of
the right of dissent, which we cherish in a
free society, does not represent the great
preponderance of American public opinion,
which does understand what we are about
and which has and which will continue to
overwhelmingly support our doing what has
to be done ?
How do you look and see and arrange to
tell the American people that as a result of
that steadfastness and support all objective
evidence now establishes that we have in the
making in Asia and the Pacific a success of
American policy fully as great as our success
in Europe in the fifties ?
For this is indeed the fact.
As I said in the beginning, I have no
answers to these questions, but I do believe it
important that answers be found.
May I close by reverting again to the oc-
casion of the signing of the treaty on May
29 last year. In my reply to the Foreign
Minister's comments I read the entry my
predecessor had made in his personal journal
describing those events at the signing of the
treaty 110 years before. As I review the
totality of our efforts in Southeast Asia, I
have concluded that his closing sentence is as
appropriate now as it was then.
He said 111 years ago: "I have great confi-
dence for the future."
And so do I.
^ For text of a joint statement of Mar. 6, 1962, see
Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.
JUNE 5, 1967
855
The Importance of Agricultural Development
in Our Strategy for Peace
by Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
This first International Agribusiness Con-
ference in itself marks an important stage in
our thought about the specter of hunger
which haunts the world. All of us know —
at least we know intellectually — that the race
between population and food supply is still
in doubt and that the gloomy prophecies of
Malthus are now a matter of urgent concern.
We know that there is no rational reason
for mankind to drown in a sea of hunger,
that foresight and policy can and should as-
sure all men the opportunities of affluence.
But we know, too, that there is a gap be-
tween intellectual awareness of a problem
and the emotional sense of urgency which
drives men to act. Your presence here shows
how many of us, in Government, in private
life, and in the important enterprises you so
responsibly represent, have crossed that
boundary line.
I was asked to talk today about agricul-
tural development as part of the war on
hunger and more particularly about the role
of private business in the process of agri-
cultural development abroad. I should like
to ask you to consider these questions in the
context of our foreign policy as a whole.
Defining the goal of our foreign policy is
simplicity itself: to make American democ-
racy safe. But there is nothing simple about
achieving that goal in a turbulent world.
Processes of disintegration have been rein-
forced by two World Wars, and they have
' Address made before the International Agri-
business Conference of the Chicago Board of Trade
at Chicago, 111., on May 10 (press release 112).
not yet been brought under control by our
instinct for order. We have lost the privilege
of delegating to others the protection of our
national interest in world political stability.
Britain and France are no longer able to
conduct a "concert of the powers," as they
did for a century before 1914, to maintain
an equilibrium in world politics.
By necessity, we have inherited leadership
in that quest for equilibrium. Two wars and
more than 20 years of postwar crisis have
convinced us that "The buck stops here," as
President Truman once said. We cannot re-
treat from our obligations, for they are obli-
gations we owe to ourselves — obligations of
our own national security in a small, disor-
derly, and interconnected world. A serious
tremor in Asia is felt today in Europe and
the United States. The existence of nuclear
weapons gives every controversy which may
involve either the Soviet Union or the United
States a special dimension. We are too rich,
too powerful, and too important in the life
of the world to be able to stand safely aside.
Any disturbance in the general balance of
power necessarily involves us. We must
therefore continue to play an active, forward
role with other friendly nations in seeking
order, the indispensable predicate of prog-
ress. The order we seek is not ideological in
character, nor is it the enemy of progress. To
the contrary, our goal is the flexible, hos-
pitable order described in the United Nations
Charter — a world of independent nations,
each free to pursue its own institutions, but
cooperating with each other to prevent ag-
gression, maintain peace, and further mutual
856
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
interests, a peaceful, progressive world
order of diverse but cooperative national
societies.
Our relations to the developing countries
should be viewed in this perspective and in
terms of these goals. It is a relationship of
many threads, and it is rapidly becoming one
of the major problems in our foreign policy
and that of the other developed countries.
In this realm, it is fair to say that while
there can be no progress without order, there
can be no order without progress, either.
18 Years of Experience and Experiment
A generation ago, development assistance
was not part of the job of our State Depart-
ment or of other Foreign Offices — it was the
responsibility of the imperial powers. But
World War II brought an end to the old
order of empire as the main organizing prin-
ciple of the Southern Hemisphere. New gov-
ernments began to struggle with the respon-
sibilities of nationhood. Many floundered
and regressed. Most of them lacked enough
trained people to organize and direct a mod-
ern society. Often they lacked coherent
social and political systems beyond those of
the tribal order or of primitive agricultural
villages. They needed time and resources
with which to build. Meanwhile, their weak-
nesses tempted aggression — both external
and from within. From the point of view of
world security, they constitute a gigantic
Balkan problem on a totally new scale, as
the recent history of Asia and Africa attest.
The conflicts threatening the general peace
have arisen recently not in Europe but in
Korea, the Congo, Cuba, and the whole
sweep of Southeast Asia.
The new nations that emerged from the
old colonial empires expected our protection
against the tide of encroachment. And they
asked for our help in the tasks of develop-
ment. Our answer was President Truman's
Point 4 — his call for international programs
of economic and technical assistance, de-
signed to help the new nations achieve eco-
nomic independence.
We have come a long way since that day
18 years ago when President Truman asked
Americans to help build a better way of life
for the millions overseas who lived in pov-
erty, ignorance, sickness, and despair. Few
then realized the complexity of the task. In-
deed, in most of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America the job is still not done — far from
it.
But thi-ough 18 years of experience and
experiment, of success and of failure, the
world has learned many lessons about the
process of development. And those lessons
are indispensable to success in the years
ahead.
First, we have learned just how hard the
challenge is. It is one thing to be faced, as
we were under the Marshall Plan, with a
problem of recovery involving 16 nations and
260 million people; and quite another to con-
front the task of helping over 70 countries
and 11/4 bilhon people.
It was one task to encourage the revival
and reconstruction of developed countries
which had a solid human and technical foun-
dation for advanced industrial life; quite
another to initiate the first basic steps to-
ward development in countries without a
middle class or an educated working class,
without entrepreneurs, and without the ex-
perience of modern economic life, with an
illiteracy rate of 70 percent or more and
a per capita income of $100 or less.
Second, we have learned that — despite the
difficulty of the task — our purposes today
must remain what they were in 1949 when
President Truman proposed Point 4.
On humanitarian grounds, as President
Kennedy put it 6 years ago,^ we must pledge
"to those people in the huts and villages
of half the globe struggling to break the
bonds of mass misery . . . our best efforts to
help them help themselves, for whatever
period is required — not because the Commu-
nists may be doing it, not because we seek
their votes, but because it is right."
On grounds of self-interest, we should
seek to end the polarization of the world into
rich and poor nations, because poverty and
' For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see
Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
JUNE 5, 1967
857
deprivation and hunger destroy dignity,
block progress, and open tiie way to political
disorders which could rip the fabric of peace
upon which our own security depends.
Third, we have learned that for all our
zeal and energy, our role in the process of
development is a secondary one. The chief
responsibility for development rests on the
developing nations themselves. Unless they
adopt realistic policies and programs capable
of encouraging growth, no amount of outside
assistance can impose modernity upon them.
Only their will, and their acceptance of re-
ality, can transform their static, rural so-
cieties into modem ones. We know that that
task requires hard choices on their part and
often the abandonment of treasured myths.
But difficult decisions of this kind are being
made in many of the new countries of the
world and in some of the older Socialist coun-
tries as well. They are discovering that the
market is an efficient way to organize many
aspects of economic life and that private
enterprise is a powerful force even in state-
directed economies.
Fourth, we have learned that the essence
of the development process is as much
sociological as it is economic and techno-
logical: that it calls for transformations of
attitudes as well as habits of work. All over
the world, men are realizing that develop-
ment is a task beyond the reach of govern-
ments alone, however devoted. Moderniza-
tion requires the energies of the private
sector — the decisions of farmers and busi-
nessmen— as well as the plans of govern-
ment agencies, and the discipline of those
twin apostles of international rectitude, the
IMF [International Monetary Fund] and
the IBRD [International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development] .
Fifth, we have learned that though the
task is difficult it is far from hopeless. Com-
mendable records of growth have been at-
tained in certain less developed countries,
including Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan,
and Venezuela. Others, such as Pakistan,
South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey, are ap-
proaching that objective.
Finally, we have learned that sufficiency
in food must be accorded a first priority in
development plans and that agricultural de-
velopment is crucial to overall economic de-
velopment. After all, agriculture has proved
to be the most progressive of all Western
industries in terms of output per manhour.
This is a fact which is only beginning to be
realized in many of the new countries. There,
in a mercantilist perspective, agriculture has
been regarded as a badge of colonial de-
pendence and industrialization as a symbol
of independence. Thus, for many years agri-
culture was relatively neglected in the de-
velopment plans of new countries which
were fully capable of growing all or a large
part of the food they needed. Often, such
decisions reflected the erroneous judgment
that it was more profitable in the long run
to bypass agriculture on the road to develop-
ment, while food needs were met by imports,
sometimes, indeed, by imports of surplus
foods on concessional terms.
The advanced countries contributed to this
misplaced emphasis — often, I suppose, out of
impatience to see rapid and visible results
from their assistance, but more seriously, by
their failure to insist on agricultural self-
help in food-deficient developing countries
which have the capacity to grow food eco-
nomically.
Let me be very clear on this point. We do
not want to repeat or to compound the eco-
nomic mistakes of agricultural protectionism
in earlier centuries — or indeed those of our
own time. We are not advocating agricultural
self-sufficiency for its own sake. There are
many countries where it makes sense to pro-
duce machinery or oil and to import food.
But there are many food-importing countries
where it would make good economic sense to
grow food. That is the problem I am talking
about.
As a principle of development policy, how-
ever, both the United States and the coun-
tries we help now place a much higher em-
phasis on agricultural development and on
investment in agricultural and agriculture-
related industries.
858
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
This basic chang:e — the new stress on agri-
cultural development in formulating policy —
has come about in response to a growing
awareness of the "mathematics of hunger."
Let me review that somber litany.
Despite the fact that they have 50-80 per-
cent of their working force in agriculture,
the developing countries face a growing food
problem. Until World War II these nations
were exporters of grain. This year they will
import over 30 million tons of grain from
the industrialized world. For the past 6
years, indeed, the world has consumed more
grain than it produced, filling the gap largely
with stored surpluses from North America.
Now these surpluses are gone, and the
United States has taken the unprecedented
step of putting half our unused acreage back
into production to help meet world food
needs, which are increasing at the rate of
4 percent a year. But our unused capacity is
limited, and so is that of the other grain-pro-
ducing countries. There are no longer inex-
haustible reservoirs of food grains for the
hungry of the world.
On the demand side, population growth in
the developing countries, as a result of
sharply reduced death rates and increased
births, has been nothing short of spectacular,
frequently exceeding 3 percent a year, or
treble that of the industrialized countries. At
this rate, by 1980 there will be more than an-
other billion people in the world to feed,
most of them in the food-short countries of
the world. India's population alone will in-
crease by a figure equal to the present popu-
lation of the United States. By the year 2000,
Latin America's population could triple,
reaching 600 million. Will those 600 million
people have to compete for food resources
presently inadequate to feed 200 million?
The FAO [Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion] estimates that cereals deficits in all de-
veloping countries would total around 42
million tons by 1975, a deficit greater than
the wheat crop expected in the United States
this year. By 1985, the deficit could exceed 80
million tons — an amount greater than the
total wheat capacity we can presently foresee
for the United States even if all reserve
acreage were brought back into production
and technological improvement continued at
its present rate.
The growing demand for food is not a func-
tion of population growth alone. As income
rises, food demand increases sharply and of
course shifts from grains to meat and other
proteins. The effect of rising income on food
demand can certainly be expected to continue
through the decade of the seventies, thereby
compounding the food problems we face in
the years ahead.
The conclusion is obvious. The developing
world must acquire a far greater capacity to
produce its own food.
Our objective, therefore, must be dra-
matically to transform the low yields per acre
of the traditional agriculture practices in
most developing countries into the high
yields of modern scientific agriculture. The
problem is also one of time. Development
which took decades to achieve in Europe, the
United States, and Japan must occur in these
countries in a matter of years. At the same
time, we and the other developed countries
must promote and support similarly am-
bitious programs to check the rate of popula-
tion growth.
Highest Priority to the War on Hunger
United States development assistance
policy has been restructured in the light of
the lessons we have learned.
I am not suggesting that because we have
refined our development policies we can in-
dulge in self-congratulation. For all the aid
efforts of the United States, Western Europe
and Japan over the last 20 years, the pros-
perous few are still islands of affluence in a
sea of appalling poverty. Eighty percent of
the world's people live in rural areas eking
out a bare subsistence with methods un-
changed since Biblical times. The disparity
between the rich and the poor continues to
grow wider. Our growth in GNP in one year
is greater than the whole GNP with which
India must support a population of nearly
500 million people.
But we have made progress. The Presi-
JUNE 5, 1967
859
dent's recent messages on the subject ^
squarely face the basic problems which have
emerged in the course of these years of trial
and error. They stress the primacy of the
problem of hunger and agricultural develop-
ment and the international character of the
task of development. They state over and over
again that these problems transcend ideology:
They concern — and starkly concern — the
human family as a whole.
Development, the President has said, is too
large a problem for governments alone. Suc-
cess requires a mobilization of all available
energies, those of business, of education, of
foundations, of cooperatives, of voluntary
agencies, and other private groups.
Above all, he has urged, development re-
quires a concentration of limited resources on
the tasks which are fundamental — food, edu-
cation, and health.
On the domestic front, we have drastically
revised our Food for Peace program. Under
the new legislation. Public Law 480 is no
longer a surplus disposal program. Indeed,
there is no longer a surplus. The United
States is growing more food to help feed de-
veloping countries. By conditioning our food
aid on a showing that the receiving countries
are engaged in meaningful programs of agri-
cultural "self-help," we are promoting an
agricultural revolution abroad which is es-
sential to meeting both food and development
requirements.
Our economic assistance programs for the
coming year will give highest priority to the
war on hunger. Almost $700 million, a 35 per-
cent increase over this year's allocation, will
be spent on AID programs to support de-
veloping-country efforts to increase their
food production.
The President has created in AID a cen-
tral staff office devoted to the war on hunger
as a central point within the Government for
leadership and coordination of these war on
hunger programs. The War on Hunger Office,
headed by Herbert Waters, who is with us
today, will coordinate the physical and tech-
'Ibid., Feb. 20, 1967, p. 295, and Mar. 6, 1967,
p. 378.
nical side of these activities, including rural
and agricultural development research. Food
for Freedom, food from the sea, population
and family planning, and nutrition and child
feeding. And the new Office of Private Re-
sources, headed by Herbert Salzman, who is
also with us today, will supply skills and re-
sources through loans and investment guar-
anties, research financing, and other incen-
tives to enlist private resources in the process
of development.
These programs should enable us to help
the developing countries to establish coherent
strategies for economic and agricultural de-
velopment. We stress that agriculture is more
than just the application of inputs — that the
farmer must be educated in new techniques
and given adequate economic incentives if
he is to accept new practices. We direct
attention to government pricing policy and
producer incentives, and we insist that agri-
culture be given a high priority in govern-
ment planning and investment. One of the
most striking lessons of recent experience in
the developing countries is the effectiveness
of economic incentives in changing agricul-
tural practices and output. The ratio between
grain and fertilizer prices, the opening of
roads and markets, the availability of fore-
casts— all these familiar tools of farm eco-
nomics seem to have the same impact on a
farmer's decisions in Thailand as they do in
Iowa.
We also stress the importance of research
on the development of better seed strains, on
the more intensive use of fertilizers and
pesticides, on water use, farmer credit and
marketing problems, and improved transpor-
tation, storage, and processing facilities.
Shared Power and Mutual Responsibility
The President has also worked unceasingly
to mobilize the truly international effort re-
quired to achieve a world agricultural revo-
lution. On every possible occasion and in
every appropriate international forum the
United States has sought to draw interna-
tional attention to the world's food problems.
— In the context of the Kennedy Round of
860
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
trade negotiations, the United States has
taken the lead in working toward a multi-
lateral food aid program as a part of an inter-
national grains agreement, a program in
which all major wheat exporting and import-
ing countries would participate.
— In the OECD [Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development], to
facilitate the flow of fertilizer and other in-
puts so essential to increasing agricultural
production we have proposed that a fund be
established to guarantee agricultural re-
sources investment in developing countries by
OECD private investors.
— In the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the U.N. we have encouraged other
nations to contribute to the World Food Pro-
gram by pledging our contributions in food
commodities and cash on a matching basis.
— Most recently. President Johnson, in sup-
port of India's efforts to feed its population
in the face of severe drought, proposed and
obtained international agreement on a new
initiative making food aid to India an inter-
national responsibility coordinated through
the World Bank India Aid Consortium.
We seek in these efforts to systematize and
coordinate international efforts and to en-
large them. Why? Because we recognize that,
powerful as the United States is, the job is
far greater than the resources we can offer.
Therefore, we must work to increase the size
and effectiveness of our collective contribu-
tions. Moreover, and perhaps more funda-
mentally, we believe that it is healthy for the
international community as a whole to as-
sume responsibility for great problems which
affect the general interest. We are convinced
that joint action is the most effective action
in today's world. All the advanced countries
have a responsibility to unite in the basic
common enterprises upon which the possi-
bility of future peace and progress depend.
We must develop habits of collective action
through great peaceful coalitions for specific
tasks. Such coalitions among governments in
the areas of peacekeeping, development aid,
arms control, and trade will, I believe and
hope, be the dominant characteristic of the
coming decade.
These necessities define our strategy: a
search for authentic partnership of shared
power and mutual responsibility.
Opening the Door for Private Resources
Up to now, I have been speaking of the
role that governments must play in stimulat-
ing development. But the task of development
is not a task for governments alone; the need
for capital in the developing world is very
large — a multiple of existing or prospective
aid programs if progress is to be generated
and accelerated. The knowledge, initiative,
managerial experience, and capital re-
quired for development can come only
from the business and professional commu-
nities of the advanced countries. The com-
panies, large and small, which do business in
the countries of the developing world can be
among the most important agents of eco-
nomic progress. They carry with them the
absorptive capacity required to make effective
use of the resources they transfer to develop-
ing countries. They and they alone can help
to build a strong and vigorous private sector
in the countries in which they operate. In
agriculture, for example, private business
operations have important byproducts: Sales-
men teach farmers the lessons of scientific
agriculture; policy planners seek to coordi-
nate and balance the operations of their firms
with other operations critical to agricultural
development viewed as a system or matrix of
relations; and technical personnel strive to
adapt agricultural techniques and procedures
to particular country environments in ways
unique to the creative force of free enterprise.
Success in development will thus depend
in substantial measure upon our ability to
open the door for these private resources and
talents. This is a lesson we have learned from
the history of our own development, which
was largely financed throughout the 19th
century by continuing flows of capital from
Europe. It is also the experience of the de-
veloping world. Those developing countries
which have enjoyed the most rapid growth
and the most broadly based progress have
been countries where the creative force of
national and international private enterprise
JUNE 5, 1967
861
has been welcomed and encouraged by public
policy. Israel, Taiwan, Greece, and now
Korea, Pakistan, and Peru, have all experi-
enced the regenerative effect of an upsurge
in productive private activity.
The institutional capacity of private enter-
prise to transfer capital and technology is
vast, yet as of now far too little United
States private investment is taking plac* in
developing countries. Excluding the Western
Hemisphere, direct investment in all of the
rest of the developing world comes to only
$800 million. A sample study of broad indus-
try categories in 20 major developing coun-
tries reveals that only 70 United States firms
account for nearly half of United States in-
vestment of such categories in these countries
and that less than 500 firms are involved in
all. In 1965 the net capital outflow from the
United States for direct investment, other
than oil and mining, in all developing coun-
tries in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East
came to only $66 million, about the cost of one
large shopping center in a United States city.
How can this be explained ? The simple fact
is that until now the profit prospects from
investing in developing countries, taking into
account the risks and difficulties involved,
have not been as attractive as comparable in-
vestment opportunities in the United States,
Canada, or Europe.
One of the great tests for the politics of
progress for the coming years will be the
ability of governments and business firms,
both within and without the developing
world, to find policies to bridge this gap be-
tween risk and reward in private business
investment in developing countries — new ap-
proaches to improve profit prospects, reduce
risks, and ease investment difficulties.
When one considers the magnitudes in-
volved, the eflFort is certainly worth making.
Total United States domestic investment is
nearly $120 billion. With investment decisions
being made each year which total $120 billion,
it is obvious that even a small impact on these
investment decisions in favor of venturing
into developing countries could dramatically
increase the flow of United States capital
abroad. Governments must find new ways to
catalyze private enterprise and must search
for new institutions and new instruments
which make risk taking more attractive.
We need a break from past traditions, a
quantum leap forward in our approach to
encouraging private enterprise to participate
in the process of development.
Responsible and enlightened leaders of our
business community have called for such poli-
cies. Academic studies have documented the
case for them. Your Government believes that
a truly international response is required. We
are seeking in the OECD and in other
forums a broadly based international agree-
ment which would establish internationally
recognized rules respecting both the rights
and responsibilities of overseas investors.
Such an agreement should include appro-
priate safeguards for the interests of all the
countries concerned. If such an agreement
can be reached, it could multiply the availa-
bility of enterprise, capital, and management
in the developing countries.
From Traditional to Scientific Agriculture
Nowhere is this need more urgent than in
the field of agriculture.
In the coming years, the indispensable
transformation from traditional to scientific
agriculture in the developing world will re-
quire the intensive application of billions of
dollars of additional manufactured requisites,
such as fertilizers, pesticides, improved seed
strains, irrigation pumps, and farm equip-
ment. Such transformations cannot occur
without a corresponding development in the
agricultural infrastructure.
Projected fertilizer costs alone stagger the
imagination; estimates of foreign exchange
requirements for fertilizer investment run
beyond $1 billion a year for the 1970's.
The same urgent need and potential de-
mand exists for the skills and know-how of
Western agricultural technicians, research
scientists, and extension workers.
The challenge of development is how to
transfer these desperately needed resources —
capital and managerial, technological and dis-
tributive— from the great agribusiness com-
plexes of North America, Western Europe,
862
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and Japan to those areas of great food needs
so as ultimately to create a worldwide food
production and marketing system of high
productivity.
The Western World must find ways to ex-
port the industrial capitalist revolution
which has made its own agriculture the
greatest in the world. In the United States
and Canada in the last 25 years, yield per
acre has gone up over 100 percent, many
times that in the developing world. An Amer-
ican rice farmer grows four times more food
per acre than the Indian. The American
farmer now feeds himself and 32 others. In
Japan, wheat yield per acre is three times
greater than the yields in India; in the
Netherlands, five times greater. We now have
sufficient technical answers, the capital, and
njanagerial know-how necessary to produce
enough food to give all people of the world
a decent diet. The question is how to adapt
these tools to the situation in the less de-
veloped world.
I take it the search for answers to this
question is why we have all assembled for
this conference.
This is not to say that we are starting
from scratch. Far from it.
Indeed, it might be helpful to our delibera-
tions to describe briefly some of the programs
already in train and some of the new pro-
gram ideas being considered right now.
U.S. agribusiness firms — many of those
represented here today — are currently mak-
ing good use of AID'S investment incentive
and risk reduction programs. For example:
— Since last June AID has agreed to reim-
burse half the cost of 23 preinvestment
feasibility studies of agribusiness projects.
These 23 agreements represent potential in-
vestments of about $150 million.
— In the past 2 years AID has insured .$130
million of U.S. investment in 113 agribusiness
projects against inconvertibility, expropria-
tion, and war damage. We now have $3.6 bil-
lion in total coverage of all types of private
investment outstanding.
—Six of AID'S 12 extended "all risk" guar-
anties outstanding are for food and agricul-
ture projects: major fertilizer complexes in
Korea, India, and Brazil, fish processing in
Somalia, grain marketing in Thailand, and
a feed and poultry operation in Korea.
Through the use of these "all risk" guaranties
we are making it possible for major U.S.
institutional lenders — insurance companies,
pension funds, and trusts — to provide for the
first time long-term capital for important
private projects in less-developed countries.
AID also has under way new programs to
promote large-scale, vertically integrated
agricultural projects in Africa and to carry
out high protein food studies in Latin Amer-
ica and elsewhere.
Just as the Office of the War on Hunger
has been established as the central focus for
Government programs on food, nutrition,
population, and agricultural development, so
the Office of Private Resources, headed by
Herbert Salzman, has been established as a
central point for contact with American busi-
ness firms and other private groups, such as
voluntary agencies, foundations, and coopera-
tives. To cut down red tape and speed up de-
cisions affecting the businessman, a private
investment center will be set up within the
Office of Private Resources to administer
aid's investment incentive programs.
We in the Government have taken seri-
ously the suggestion made by the agribusi-
ness community that the problem of agricul-
ture must be approached as a "systems"
problem. With that in mind, a pilot program
has been launched to test the applicability
of the "systems" approach to agricultural
development.
In addition, our planners and technical ex-
perts, working in close cooperation with the
business community, have been trying to find
an institutional framework for an across-the-
board approach to agricultural development
through consortia arrangements in which a
number of related production facilities would
associate together and operate under one
single general management.
So as you can see, the United States Gov-
ernment is trying to involve U.S. private
enterprise more deeply, more actively, and on
a broader front in the war on hunger.
But we really have just begun to inventory
JUNE 5, 1967
863
the resources, both pubhc and private, which
could be mobilized for the purpose.
The climate for cooperation between Gov-
ernment and business has never been better.
It is up to all of us to translate that climate
into meaningful action.
We don't expect businessmen to invest in
the absence of a reasonable likelihood that
fair profits can be earned. But we can ask
that you consider overseas prospects very
carefully and act on the basis of your long-
term self-interest. We can ask that you ex-
plore with us the innovations we are consid-
ering and that you offer us the full benefit of
your advice and experience. We must know
more precisely what is needed to increase the
flow of private resources.
I can promise that your suggestions will be
carefully considered and that we are willing
to propose new solutions, radical solutions,
which have a chance to speed up the achieve-
ment of the goal. We know that we don't have
all the answers in this new and challenging
field and that without your help we cannot
know what the world of planning is actually
like in the markets and marketplaces of dis-
tant countries.
But we need more from you, as well. The
people assembled here tonight represent a
powerful constituency, an important voice in
the country, influential in molding public
opinion. You in the agribusiness community
have indicated your appreciation of the grave
crisis in agricultural development and food
supply facing the world. Yet public support
for development assistance has not been suf-
ficient to make possible the increase in public
assistance levels which must be forthcoming
to avert disaster.
In the last 20 years we have learned
enough about development to know what is
needed. The battlelines are drawn, but the
outcome is still in doubt. In large measure,
success will depend on you in your roles as
citizens and businessmen. We ask you to help
us carry the message — to serve as a develop-
ment constituency in maintaining public sup-
port for this critical element in our strategy
for peace.
For the Government's part, we remain a
ready and willing partner — constantly seek-
ing to improve our services to you and to pro-
vide an increasing variety of investment
incentives and information programs to make
investment more attractive.
In particular, I hope we can work together
more closely on the difficult task of improving
the investment climate in the developing
countries. We recognize that where the
climate is hostile or otherwise inhospitable to
private enterprise, private enterprise is un-
likely to invest regardless of the Government
programs and incentives that we make avail-
able. But in many countries investment
climate can be improved, through favorable
experience with a pilot project, through bet-
ter communications, and through effective
negotiations. For this to happen, however, we
must know a great deal more about the indi-
vidual country's obstacles which deter you
as businessmen from investment there.
It may well be that we should establish
a framework for a continuing dialog between
business and Government on problems like
that of investment climate — an ongoing
mechanism for Government-business coopera-
tion in the agribusiness field involving people
at the highest level and meeting on a regular
basis. Certainly the desirability of such a
mechanism should be discussed at this con-
ference.
I should also hope that the conferees will
discuss the role that business might play in
education abroad, either through the direct
efforts of our advanced education-technology
firms developing educational material for
farmers, and our agribusiness firms working
directly with the farmer, or through the
usual channels of educational exchange such
as foundations, universities, or governmental
organizations.
The simple goal of our foreign policy is a
new period in human affairs — not an Ameri-
can Century or a Rich Country Century, but
an era of international partnership in which
we can all work together on the basis of
mutual respect and full responsibility in the
interest of our common humanity. Here at
864
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
liome that task requires us to test the ability
of Government and business firms to work
together in new and imaginative ways toward
consistent objectives. We wish to explore new
frontiers in Government-business relations
because we cannot afford not to. As Pope Paul
has said in his last encyclical, "the new name
for peace is development."
And in this all of us have a stake.
Pacific Islands Trust Territory
To Receive Additional Funds
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release dated May 10
I have today [May 10] signed S. 303,
amending the law authorizing funds for the
government of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands.'
Present law authorizes the appropriation
of $17.5 million annually. S. 303 increases
that authorization, for fiscal 1967, to $25
million. For fiscal 1968 and 1969, it raises
the figure to $35 million — double today's
amount.
The United States has an obligation, under
the terms of our trusteeship agreement with
the United Nations, to promote the educa-
tional, social, political, and economic develop-
ment of the Trust Territory — where 90,000
people inhabit 2,000 islands scattered over
more than 3 million square miles of the
Western Pacific.
We have made an appreciable start toward
meeting that obligation — though a great deal
remains to be done to raise living standards
in the islands.
From my visit to American Samoa in Oc-
tober of last year, and from conversations
with leaders of the Trust Territory in Guam
last March,2 I know of the urgency that at-
tends this responsibility. I am happy to sign
into law a measure that recognizes that ur-
gency and allows us to respond to it mean-
ingfully.
I have already asked that the Congress
appropriate additional funds, both this year
and next, so that among other projects we
can build schools, hospitals, roads, airfields,
and communication facilities, hire teachers
and doctors and nurses, and provide for the
economic development of the area. We are
working to help the people of the islands
become self-reliant, and ultimately joined in
a full relationship with other nations border-
ing the Pacific.
Another beneficial feature of the bill I am
signing today is the recognition it gives to
the presence of our Peace Corps volunteers
in this area. They are serving at the request
of the people of the Trust Territory in edu-
cation, health, public works, and community
development work. They represent a vital
expression of America's interest in the is-
lands.
TREATY INFORMATION
'As enacted, S. 303 is Public Law 90-16.
^ For back^ound, see Bulletin of Apr. 10, 1967,
p. 598.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Labor
Instrument for the amendment of the constitution
of the International Labor Organization. Dated at
Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April
20, 1948. TIAS 1868.
Admission to membership: Barbados, May 8, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Amendment to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.'
Proclaimed by the President: May 10, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United
States May 16, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: May 10, 1967.
Publications
Agreement relating to the repression of the circula-
' Not in force.
JUNE 5, 1967
865
tion of obscene publications, signed at Paris May
4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed at
Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force Sep-
tember 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 1511;
TIAS 2164.
Notification that it considers itself hound: Malta,
March 24, 1967.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Approved by the International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17,
1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS
5813.
Acceptance deposited: Brazil, March 8, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Signature : Sierra Leone, May 16, 1967.
White Slave Traffic
Agreement for the repression of the trade in white
women, as amended by the protocol of May 4,
1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904.
Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.
Notification that it considers itself hound: Malta,
March 24, 1967.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement governing the coordination of pilotage
services on the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence
Seaway, with memorandum of arrangements. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington April
13, 1967. Entered into force April 13, 1967.
' Not in force.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
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Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20A02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publico^
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able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea.
Agreement with Other Governments. Done at Lon-
don February 20, 1962— Signed on behalf of the
United States of America, subject to acceptance,
March 2, 1962. Entered into force October 28, 1966.
TIAS 6150. 17 pp. lOif.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India,
extending the agreement of April 15, 1964, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi
October 21, 1966. Entered into force October 21,
1966. Effective October 1, 1966. TIAS 6151. 3 pp.
5^.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the
Republic of Korea, amending the agreement cvf
January 26, 1965. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Washington November 22, 1966. Entered into force
November 22, 1966. Effective January 1, 1966. With
related letters. TIAS 6152. 6 pp. 5(f.
Claims — Indemnification for Losses Arising from
Ammunition Shipments. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Exchange of notes — Signed at London October 27,
1966. Entered into force October 27, 1966. TIAS
6154. 5 pp. 5(f.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1458
PUBLICATION 8244
JUNE 5, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bareaa of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the Add of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Supers
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Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
866
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX June 5, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. 1^58
Asia. The United States and Thailand
(Martin) 851
Burundi. Letters of Credence (Nsanze) . . . 850
China. Vice President of the Republic of China
Visits the United States (Johnson, Yen) . . 846
Dahomey. Letters of Credence (Zollner) . . . 850
Department and Foreign Service. U.S. Support
of Pacification Effort in Viet-Nam Reorga-
nized (Bunker) 844
Economic Affairs
The Importance of Agricultural Development
in Our Strategy for Peace (Rostow) . . . 856
The United States and Thailand (Martin) . . 851
Foreign Aid. The Importance of Agricultural
Development in Our Strategy for Peace
(Rostow) 856
Morocco. Letters of Credence (Osman) . . . 850
Non-Self-Goveming Territories. Pacific Islands
Trust Territory To Receive Additional Funds
(Johnson) 865
Philippines. U.S. and Philippines Agree on
School Building Project 850
Presidential Documents
Pacific Islands Trust Territory To Receive
Additional Funds 865
Vice President of the Republic of China Visits
the United States 846
Publications. Recent Releases 866
Thailand. The United States and Thailand
(Martin) 851
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 865
United Nations. Persevering for Peace (Gold-
berg) 838
Viet-Nam
Persevering for Peace (Goldberg) 838
The United States and Thailand (Martin) . . 851
U.S. Support of Pacification Effort in Viet-
Nam Reorganized (Bunker) 844
Name Index
Bunker, Ellsworth 844
Goldberg, Arthur J 838
Johnson, President 846, 865
Martin, Graham 851
Nsanze, Terence 850
Osman, Ahmed 850
Rostow, Eugene V 856
Yen, Chia-kan 846
Zollner, Maxime-Leopold 850
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 15-21
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to May 15 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
108 of May 3 and 112 of May 10.
No. Date
tllO 5/16
till 5/15
Subject
Brown to maintain liaison on for-
eign policy with U.S. Gov-
ernors.
Valenti to head U.S. delegation
to International Film Festival,
Moscow, July 5-20 (rewrite).
U.S.-Mexico fishery talks.
Agreement to construct school
buildings in the Philippines
(rewrite).
t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
tll3
114
5/17
5/18
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
OUR FOREIGN POLICY COMMITMENTS TO ASSURE A PEACEFUL FUTURE
Address by Secretary Riisk 874^
EAST-WEST TRADE: AN AVENUE TOWARD WORLD PEACE
by Acting Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Troiobridge 881
UNITED STATES URGES DIALOG REGARDING SOUTH WEST AFRICA
Statements by Ambassador Goldberg in the Fifth Special Session
of the U.N. General Assembly and Text of Resolution 888
THE UNITED STATES CALLS FOR RESTRAINT IN THE NEAR EAST
Statements by President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg 870
For index see inside back cover
The United States Calls for Restraint In the Near East
Following is a statement made by Presi-
dent Johnson on May 28, together with a
statement made in the U.N. Security Council
by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg
on May 24 during consideration by the Coun-
cil of the crisis in the Near East.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated May 23
In recent days tension has again risen
along the armistice lines between Israel and
the Arab states. The situation there is a mat-
ter of very grave concern to the whole inter-
national community. We earnestly support
all efforts, in and outside the United Nations
and through its appropriate organs, includ-
ing the Secretary-General, to reduce ten-
sions and to restore stability. The Secretary-
General has gone to the Near East on his
mission of peace with the hopes and prayers
of men of good will everywhere.
The Near East links three continents. The
birthplace of civilization and of three of the
world's great religions, it is the home of
some 60 million people and the crossroads
between East and West.
The world community has a vital interest
in peace and stability in the Near East, one
that has been expressed primarily through
continuing United Nations action and assist-
ance over the past 20 years.
The United States, as a member of the
United Nations, and as a nation dedicated
to a world order based on law and mutual
respect, has actively supported efforts to
maintain peace in the Near East.
The danger, and it is a very grave danger,
lies in some miscalculation arising from a
misunderstanding of the intentions and
actions of others.
The Government of the United States is
deeply concerned, in particular, with three
potentially explosive aspects of the present
confrontation.
First, we regret that the General Armi-
stice Agreements have failed to prevent
warlike acts from the territory of one
against another government or against
civilians or territory under control of an-
other government.
Second, we are dismayed at the hurried
withdrawal of the United Nations Emer-
gency Force from Gaza and Sinai after more
than 10 years of steadfast and effective serv-
ice in keeping the peace, without action by
either the General Assembly or the Security
Council of the United Nations. We continue
to regard the presence of the United Nations
in the area as a matter of fundamental im-
portance. We intend to support its continu-
ance with all possible vigor.
Third, we deplore the recent buildup of
military forces and believe it a matter of
urgent importance to reduce troop concen-
trations. The status of sensitive areas, as the
Secretary-General emphasized in his report
to the Security Council,^ such as the Gaza
Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particu-
larly important aspect of the situation.
In this connection I want to add that the
purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to
Israeli shipping has brought a new and very
grave dimension to the crisis. The United
States considers the gulf to be an interna-
tional waterway and feels that a blockade of
Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially
» U.N. doc. S/7896.
870
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
disastrous to the cause of peace. The right
of free, innocent passage of the international
waterway is a vital interest of the entire
international community.
The Government of the United States is
seeking clarification on this point. We have
already urged Secretary-General Thant to
recognize the sensitivity of the Aqaba ques-
tion, and we have asked him to give it the
highest priority in his discussions in Cairo.
To the leaders of all the nations of the
Near East, I wish to say what three Ameri-
can Presidents have said before me — that
the United States is firmly committed to the
support of the political independence and
territorial integrity of all the nations of that
area. The United States strongly opposes
aggression by anyone in the area, in any
form, overt or clandestine. This has been
the policy of the United States led by four
Presidents — President Truman, President
Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and
myself — as well as the policy of both of our
political parties. The record of the actions of
the United States over the past 20 years,
within and outside the United Nations, is
abundantly clear on this point.
The United States has consistently sought
to have good relations with all the states of
the Near East. Regrettably, this has not
always been possible, but we are convinced
that our differences with individual states
of the area and their differences with each
other must be worked out peacefully and in
accordance with accepted international prac-
tice.
We have always opposed — and we oppose
in other parts of the world at this very
moment — the efforts of other nations to re-
solve their problems with their neighbors by
the aggression route. We shall continue to
do so. And tonight we appeal to all other
peace-loving nations to do likewise.
I call upon all concerned to observe in a
spirit of restraint their solemn responsibili-
ties under the Charter of the United Nations
and the General Armistice Agreements.
These provide an honorable means of pre-
venting hostilities until, through the efforts
of the international community, a peace with
justice and honor can be achieved.
I have been in close and very frequent
contact — and will be in the hours and days
ahead — with our able Ambassador, Mr.
Goldberg, at the United Nations, where we
are now pursuing the matter with great
vigor, and we hope that the Security Coun-
cil can and wnll act effectively.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
U.S./U.N. press release 70 dated May 24
The United States strongly supported the
request by Canada and Denmark last eve-
ning for an immediate meeting of the
Security Council.^ We did so out of our grave
concern over the sharp increase of tension
between Israel and her Arab neighbors since
the Secretary-General's departure and out of
our belief that the Secretary-General should
be accorded all possible support in the diffi-
cult peace mission on which he is now
embarked.
When the Secretary-General announced
his intention to undertake this critically
important journey, my Government immedi-
ately gave him our full backing. We agreed
with his assessment of the gravity of the
situation when he said on May 19, in his re-
port to the CouncU (S/7896), that "the cur-
rent situation in the Near East is more
disturbing, indeed, I may say more menac-
ing, than at any time since the fall of 1956."
We, like others in the Council, would nor-
mally have awaited a further report from the
Secretary-General before convening a meet-
ing of the Council. However, since the Secre-
tary-General made his report — indeed, in the
2 days since he departed for Cairo — condi-
tions in the area have taken a still more
menacing turn because of a threat to cus-
tomary international rights which have been
exercised for many years in the Gulf of
Aqaba. This had led us to the belief that the
Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities,
» U.N. doc. S/7902.
JUNE 12, 1967
871
should meet without delay and take steps to
relieve tension in the area.
In his report to the Council, the Secretary-
General correctly singled out two areas as
"particularly sensitive." One was the Gaza
Strip. The other was Sharm el-Sheikh, which
stands at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.
The position of the United States on these
matters was publicly stated yesterday by
President Johnson, and I shall not take the
time of the Council to reiterate what he
explicitly said.
We are well aware, of course, of the long-
standing grievances, some of them of many
years' standing, in all sides of this complex
dispute. Whoever is familiar with the area
knows that, regrettably, these underlying
problems are not going to be resolved to-
morrow.
The cause of peace which we here are
pledged to serve will not be advanced by
raking over the past or attempting over-
ambitiously to settle the future. Our objec-
tive today should be much more limited — but
nonetheless of crucial importance under pres-
ent circumstances. It should be to express
full support for the efforts of the Secretary-
General to work out a peaceful accommoda-
tion of the situation. Accordingly, we should
call upon all states to avoid any action which
might exacerbate the already tense situation
which prevailed when the Secretary-General
departed on his mission.
Judging from what we heard in this morn-
ing's meeting, there should be no difficulty
in obtaining the agreement of all members
for this course of action by the Council. And
surely it is the plain obligation of the parties,
as members of the United Nations commit-
ted to the cause of peace, to assure that
there is no interference with existing inter-
national rights which have long been enjoyed
and exercised in the area by many nations.
Such interference would menace the mission
of the Secretary-General and could abort his
efforts to work out a peaceful accommoda-
tion.
We are fully aware, as are all the members
of the Council, of the longstanding under-
lying problems in the area. But no problem
of this character can be settled by warlike
acts. The United States opposition to the use
of aggression and violence of any kind, on
any side of this situation, over the years, is
a matter of record. As our actions over many
years have demonstrated, and as President
Johnson reaffirmed in his statement yester-
day,
. . . the United States is firmly committed to the
support of the political independence and territorial
integrity of all the nations of that area. The United
States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the
area, in any form, overt or clandestine.
My country's devotion to this principle
has been demonstrated concretely — not only
in the Suez crisis, where we stood against
old allies, but consistently through the years.
In fact, in the most recent debate in this
Council involving this area,^ we made very
clear the United States commitment to the
solution of all problems of the area by ex-
clusively peaceful means and by recourse to
the armistice machinery.
Mr. President, only 2 days ago many of
us here had occasion, during the debate on
the peacekeeping question in the General
Assembly, to speak of the vital interest
which all powers, great and small alike,
share in maintaining an impartial interna-
tional instrument of stability — an instru-
ment which, when danger and discord arise,
can transcend narrow self-interest and put
power at the service of peace. That instru-
ment is the United Nations; and above all,
it is this Security Council with its primary
charter responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
The view is sometimes stated that the
smaller powers, because they are most vul-
nerable, are the real beneficiaries of United
Nations efforts to maintain the peace,
whereas the great powers "can take care of
themselves." My country does not accept this
view. Nobody questions the vital interest of
the smaller powers in this activity; indeed,
they have manifested that interest time and
time again by their votes and their contri-
butions. But neither should anybody suppose
' For background, see Buli^tin of Dec. 26, 1966,
p. 974.
872
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
that the exercise by the United Nations of its
responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security does not serve
the basic interests of the great powers also.
Great powers have both interests and re-
sponsibilities in this matter — and the greater
the power, the greater the responsibility.
In this spirit, Mr. President, I am author-
ized to announce that the United States,
both within and outside the United Nations,
is prepared to join with other great powers
— the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and France — in a common effort to restore
and maintain peace in the Near East.
Mr. President, all must join in the search
for peace: the Secretary-General, the Secu-
rity Council, and the great powers. Both
separately and together let us work in this
common cause which so vitally affects our
own interests and those of all the world.
Prayer for Peace,
Memorial Day, 1967
A PROCLAMATION'
In reverent tribute on this Memorial Day 1967 we
salute the gallant men of our country who have
served us and still serve us so nobly and selflessly
in defense of freedom.
We can never repay their sacrifices. Our honored
dead sleep in hallowed ground on five continents. The
debt we owe them, and that our children will owe for
generations to come, is beyond measure.
Today, our young men are fighting and dying in
Vietnam so that other young men may stand as
they have stood — proudly independent, free to deter-
mine their own destiny. Before their common sacrifice
and dedication the barriers of race, color, or creed
crumble. The heroism of a just cause makes all men
brothers against tyranny.
Every President in time of armed conflict must
act in the deep conviction that the cause for which
our young men suffer and die transcends their sac-
rifices.
A century ago President Lincoln expressed his
grief over the terrible losses of the war between the
States. He pointed out that all deprecated war, all
sought to avoid it, but as there were those who would
make war, so there must be those who could accept
war.
' No. 3785; 32 Fed. Reg. 7621.
We have had to accept the war in Vietnam to re-
deem our pledge to those who have accepted in good
faith our commitment to protect their right of free
choice. Only in this way can we preserve our own
right to act in freedom.
So we shall continue to resist the aggressor in
Vietnam, as we must.
But we continue to hold open the door to an hon-
orable peace, as we must.
On this hallowed day, on behalf of the American
people — indeed, on behalf of all of the people in the
world — I repeat to the leaders of those whom we
fight: Let us end this tragic waste; let us sit down
together to chart the simple course to peace; let us
together lead our peoples out of this bloody impasse.
And I ask you, my fellow Americans, to join me
in prayer that the voice of reason and humanity
will be heeded, that this tragic struggle can soon be
brought to an end.
The Congress in a joint resolution approved May
11, 1950 (64 Stat. 158), has requested the President
to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of
the United States to observe each Memorial Day as
a day of prayer for permanent peace and designat-
ing a period during such day when the people of the
United States might unite in such supplication:
Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JoHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
designate Memorial Day, Tuesday, May 30, 1967, as
a day of prayer for permanent peace and I desig-
nate the hour beginning in each locality at eleven
o'clock in the morning of that day as a time to unite
in such prayer.
I urge the press, radio, television, and all other
information media to cooperate in this observance.
I also urge all of the people of this Nation to join
me in prayer to the Almighty for the safety of our
Nation's sons and daughters around the world, for
His blessing on those who have sacrificed their lives
for this Nation in this and all other struggles, and
for His aid in building a world where freedom and
justice prevail, and where all men live in friendship,
understanding, and peace.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this twenty-second
day of May in the year of our Lord nine-
[seal] teen hundred and sixty-seven, and of the
Independence of the United States of Amer-
ica the one hundred and ninety-first.
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
JUNE 12, 1967
873
Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure a Peaceful Future
Address by Secretary Rusk ■
I am not going to take your time to talk
about things that you know more about than
I do, but I would just say this: I hope that
none of you will ever underestimate what
you're doing in relation to the future pros-
pects for peace in the world.
I would guess that in the next two or three
decades we will have two overriding prob-
lems. The one is to keep the beast of nuclear
power in its cage, and the other is to keep the
beast of hunger away from the doors of our
families throughout the world.
And these are not unrelated. We may be in
a very special period of history, limited in
time, which gives us a chance to do some-
thing that we had better do if we do not
move into another period of history. Because
at the present time there is no government.
Communist or otherwise, reaching out to ab-
sorb other nations on the theory that they
must do so in order to feed their own people.
There is in the world at the present time a
rather general hope and expectation that
somehow science and technology and im-
proved productivity will be able to meet the
increasing demands of rising populations.
Orville Freeman and many of you here in
the audience can predict for us about how
long we have to test whether that is so, be-
cause if that effort fails, then I think we will
find that food itself will become a major ele-
ment in hostility among nations.
So the more that you and your colleagues
can become missionaries of the agricultural
revolution and can help carry the best that
the mind of man can devise to the needs of
' Made before the national conference of the U.S.
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service
at Washington, D.C., on May 18.
production in every corner of the world, the
more you are genuinely building a peaceful
world.
I would like to make some comments today
about peace and the organization of a dura-
ble peace, because that is not only what our
business in the State Department is all about
but what the life of our nation in the long
run depends upon.
I will preface my remarks by a reminder
that half the people can no longer remember
World War II and less than half can remem-
ber the events which led up to World War II.
That means that the great central overriding
question which was in front of us in 1945 is
being forgotten. And that question is, How
do you organize a durable peace? Although
there may be differences of view about this
or that or the other policy, I would hope that
all of us could at least agree that that is the
overriding question and not let ourselves be-
come indifferent or careless or forgetful
about its importance.
Looking backward, let us recall that when
many of you and I were students, the govern-
ments of the world of that day were unable
or unwilling to take the steps necessary to
organize a durable peace. We went into the
conflagration of World War II for the most
part without the arms and without the train-
ing and without the acts of prevention which
might have saved that generation from that
great catastrophe where tens of millions of
lives were lost all over the world by the
countries engaged in it.
Nevertheless, we did have a chance to sit
down and write article 1 of the United Na-
tions Charter, which represents the lessons
learned from World War II. That article
874
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
talks about the need to suppress aggression
and breaches of the peace, to settle disputes
by peaceful means, to extend the right of
self-idetermination to all peoples, and to co-
operate freely across national frontiers to get
on with the great humanitarian tasks of
mankind, including those tasks in which you
are engaged. Now, we ought to be respect-
ful of what is written in article 1 of the
United Nations Charter, if for no other rea-
son than that we paid such a terrible price
for the chance to write it.
But there is an even more pressing reason
why we must read it often and thoughtfully
and prayerfully, and it is that we shall not
have a chance to draw the lessons from world
war III. There will not be enough left. And
so if there are some of us who speak with
passion about the necessity for organizing a
durable peace, I hope that we can understand
something about the tremendous power of
destruction in the hands of frail human be-
ings all over the world. At long last men
must learn how to live together on the same
planet under institutions of law, settling dis-
putes by peaceful means and not permitting
violence and aggression, appetite and ambi-
tion, to run unrestrained throughout the
earth.
Although we have many unresolved prob-
lems with Eastern Europe, this is why we
have been trying to probe for the possibilities
of resolving some of those questions.
We are under no illusion about the major
objectives of the Communist world. They
have not given up their aim of a world revo-
lution. But we ought to be interested in try-
ing to work, even with them — or perhaps
even especially with them — to move toward
something that they and we can call in due
time peaceful coexistence.
This is why President Kennedy and Presi-
dent Johnson and their Secretary of State
have not taken dovni to the Senate additional
alliances in these past 6 years. President
Kennedy, on the heels of the Cuban missile
crisis, was able to present the nuclear test
ban treaty. President Johnson, despite seri-
ous differences with the Soviet Union and
countries of Eastern Europe, has concluded
the Civil Air Agreement, the Consular
Treaty, the Space Treaty in the United Na-
tions. This is why we are working hard on
a treaty to prevent the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons. This is why we should
like to have serious discussions about limit-
ing new levels in the arms race which might
be precipitated by building antiballistic mis-
siles and then multiplying the offensive mis-
siles on top of those at costs of additional
tens of billions to our respective defense
budgets on both sides. And this is why the
President has suggested to the Congress
that it might be well for us to have legislative
authority with which we could negotiate
bilateral trade agreements with particular
countries in Eastern Europe.
So we are in a position to make our con-
tribution toward a solution of some of the
problems, whether large or small, which
stand in the way of organizing a durable
peace.
Now, it is of course no secret that one of
the greatest obstacles in this process is the
situation in the Pacific. We do not believe
that we can be loyal to our alliances in the
Atlantic and disloyal to our alliances in the
Pacific. We do not believe that this earth can
be safe for the human race if there is a cer-
tain repose and calm in half of it across the
Atlantic and violence and destruction and
terror in the other half of it across the Pa-
cific.
Myths About Viet-Nam
So I should like to comment to you today
on a few points involving the discussion of
Viet-Nam and in the direction of trying to
brush away some of the underbrush in our
discussion, perhaps some of the myths, some
of those elements which come into the dis-
cussions which contribute as much to mis-
understanding as understanding.
First, I have heard it said that Viet-Nam
is such a preoccupation that it causes us to
neglect things that are going on in other
parts of the world. We send out about a thou-
sand cables a day from the State Department
on every working day. I think most of you
JUNE 12, 1967
875
would agree with most of those cables, al-
though I suspect no one of you would agree
with all one thousand of them on any particu-
lar day. But the work of the world goes on.
And I have not been able to have people tell
me of subjects that are important, requiring
our interest and participation, in which we
are not fully taking part — whether it is the
Kennedy Round or NATO or monetary re-
form, or the economic integration of this
hemisphere or Latin America or a new life
for the Alliance for Progress, or economic
and social development in Africa, or the or-
ganization of the Asian Development Bank,
or whatever it might be.
The work of the world goes on, and your
President spends his time and attention com-
prehensively on these large tasks before all
of us. And so it just isn't so that this is caus-
ing us to neglect what is going on. That
doesn't mean that ^ome difficult problems
don't arise in some ouier parts of the world
and that full attention to solutions sometimes
may not be difficult.
"Civil War" Concept Not Applicable
Secondly, I hear it said that Viet-Nam is
just a civil war, therefore we should forget
about it, that it is only a family affair among
Vietnamese. Well, it's quite true that among
the Viet Cong and the National Liberation
Front there is a large component of authentic
Southerners who are in rebellion against the
several authorities who have been organized
in Saigon.
But those are not the people who explain
the presence of American combat forces in
South Viet-Nam. Because beginning in 1960
the authorities in the North activated the
Communist cadres which had been left be-
hind at the time of the division of the coun-
try. Then from 1960 onward they sent in
substantial numbers of Southerners who had
gone North, were trained in the North, and
were sent back as cadres and armed elements
to join in seizing the country. And by 1964
they had run out of authentic Southerners
and were sending Northerners in increasing
numbers, and late that year they began to
send regular units of the North Vietnam-
ese Regular Army. Today there are more
than 20 regiments of the North Vietnamese
Regular Forces in South Viet-Nam and sub-
stantial forces in and just north of the de-
militarized zone in direct contact with our
Marines.
It was what the North is doing to the
South that caused us to send combat forces
there, because we felt we had an obligation
to do so under the SEATO treaty, a treaty
which calls upon us to take steps to meet the
common danger. And if the North would de-
cide to hold its hand and not persist in its
effort to seize South Viet-Nam by force, this
situation could be resolved peacefully, liter-
ally in a matter of hours.
And I can assure you that in these divided
countries this concept of civil war is not
really applicable. If the Federal Republic of
Germany sent 20 regiments of its forces into
East Germany, I can be very sure that the
countries of Eastern Europe would not look
upon that as a family affair among Germans.
Or if North Korea sent 20 regiments into
South Korea, or the other way around, that
that would not be looked upon by either side
as a civil war.
So let us note that there is a Southern ele-
ment in the Viet Cong, but note also that it
is the aggression from the North which
raises the problem of international security
and it is that aggression which must be ended
if peace is to come. And peace would come
very quickly just as soon as that effort is
stopped.
Then I have heard a good deal about this
word "escalation." Now, I would just call to
your attention in passing that that seems to
be a word reserved only for the United States
and Allied forces. Very seldom do you see
any reference to escalation by the other side.
Before we put any ground combat units into
South Viet-Nam and before we started the
bombing of North Viet-Nam, major elements
of the 325th North Vietnamese Regular
Army were sent into South Viet-Nam. That
wasn't escalation. That was infiltration, gen-
erally, in the way in which people talked
about it.
876
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Let me give you a good example of what
I mean by this word. The North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong, for several months now,
have been mining Saigon harbor. Not too
long ago they sank a British-flag ship in the
Saigon River. I daresay you don't recall hav-
ing read about that mining as an escalatory
step on the part of the other side. But I'm
sure you would agree with me that if we
were to pick up their mines out of the Saigon
River and simply take them home where they
came from, to Haiphong, everybody would
cry "Escalation ! Escalation !"
Have you seen the use of Cambodia by Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces referred
to as an escalation of the war by the other
side? We haven't bombed the headquarters
in Hanoi of General [Vo Nguyen] Giap. But
the other side set up some mortars in the
center of Saigon and tried to shell General
[William C] Westmoreland's headquarters
not long ago.
So at least this is a word that ought to be
used on both sides, if necessary, along with
the firm realization that we are prepared
this afternoon to start the process of deesca-
lation just as soon as the other side is willing
to join in.
No "Unconditional Surrender" Demand
There have been many, many dozens of
proposals made by ourselves, by other gov-
ernments, or by groups of governments,
pointing toward deescalation on both sides
as a means for reducing the violence and
bringing this matter to the conference table.
Just recently, we have suggested that both
sides pull 10 miles away from each side of
the demilitarized zone.^ But all of these meas-
ures have been turned down by Hanoi.
I have heard it said that we are asking the
other side for unconditional surrender. Well,
let's look at that just for a moment.
We are not asking North Viet- Nam to sur-
render an acre of ground nor a man. We are
not asking them to change their regime. We
' For a Department announcement of May 8, see
Bulletin of May 29, 1967, p. 825.
are not asking them to pay any reparations.
Indeed, we have invited them to take part in
the Southeast Asian development program,
to which we would contribute a billion dol-
lars. The only thing we are asking them to do
is to stop their effort to seize Laos and South
Viet-Nam by force. To call that "uncondi-
tional surrender" is, it seems to me, an abuse
of the English language.
Time and time again, we've put proposals
to them trying to probe for peace. But we
have not asked to occupy their country or to
impose upon them the kind of unconditional
surrender that anyone associates with that
term in World War II in conneation with
Germany or Japan.
We have had a good many people in this
country who are inclined to speak for the
Asians without letting the Asians speak for
themselves. The free nations of Asia are
deeply concerned that there be peace in
Southeast Asia and that this small country —
South Viet-Nam — have a chance to make its
own choice about its future. And I am sure
that there would be general panic throughout
free Asia if the United States were to fail to
meet its obligations in that situation.
Then, there are those who say, from time
to time, that "Well, Viet-Nam is too bad,
because it gets in the way of a detente with
the Soviet Union." Well, it is true that Viet-
Nam is a subject of tension between our-
selves and the Soviet Union. So was Azerbai-
jan, the northern province of Iran, in 1946,
when the Soviets tried to retain their troops
there after the war. So were the Eastern
provinces of Turkey in about the same year,
when the Soviets demanded special conces-
sions in those parts of Turkey. And Greece
was a source of tension when the guerrillas
were storming in from Yugoslavia and Bul-
garia, with Soviet support, to try to seize
Greece. And Berlin was a source of tension
when it was put under blockade by the Soviet
Union in '47 and '48. And, of course, Korea
was a source of tension. And the Cuban mis-
siles were a source of tension.
We do not move to peace and the relaxa-
tion of tension by giving away one small
JUNE 12, 1967
877
country after another — increasing the appe-
tites of those on the other side and leaving
them with the hope and expectation that by
additional pressures they might get more and
more.
The Soviet Union is a cochairman of the
Geneva conferences on Southeast Asia. We
should be very glad indeed to sit down with
them in a conference, or in any other fashion,
to talk about the full application of the agree-
ments of 1954 and 1962. It need not be a
source of tension between us.
We would like to see it settled. But we
cannot contribute somebody else's country on
the thesis that the other side would be happy
about it were we to do so — if that is what is
meant by detente, which it does not mean
tome.
Reciprocity Required for Peaceful Solution
I have seen doubts cast upon the extent
of our desire for a peaceful settlement in
Southeast Asia. On occasion, I have seen
signs, such as "Peace in Viet-Nam," when I
go out to speak. I have wanted to go up to
some of these people and ask them to let me
help them carry the sign, because at Presi-
dent Johnson's request, I have carried that
sign into every capital of the world over and
over again. There are literally hundreds of
conversations, dozens of offers, continuing
contacts, probing for the possibility of a
peaceful settlement.
But today the situation is, unhappily, rela-
tively simple. North Viet-Nam is saying that
we must make an unconditional and perma-
nent commitment to stop the bombing at a
time when they will make no military move
on their own side in the direction of deescala-
tion. And, in that circumstance, they might
talk after a period of — well, we don't know;
we have heard 3 weeks; we don't know what
the exact time period would be.
Now, let me call your attention to what
that really means. If we were to say that we
would negotiate only if the other side stops
all of its violence in South Viet-Nam while
we continue to bomb North Viet-Nam, every-
one would say we're crazy. But when Hanoi j
makes the same proposition, the other way
around, there are many people who would
say, "Well, that's a reasonable proposition.
Why don't you take it? Why don't you take
it?"
We would like for someone to be able to
tell us, either publicly or by a whisper behind
the hand, that if we stop our part of the war
somebody will stop the other part of the war;
that if we stop the bombing those three or
four divisions of North Vietnamese forces in
the demilitarized zone will not attack those
Marines who are 3 or 4 miles away. There
has to be some elementary notion of reciproc-
ity in this thing if the two sides are going
to bring this matter to a peaceful solution.
Now, these are some of the points that I
think have confused the situation. There are
others. A pause in the bombing, for example,
is not good enough for the other side. They
call that an "ultimatum." So if some of you
write me a letter urging us to pause in the
bombing, I hope that you will understand you
are not arguing with us, you are arguing
with Hanoi. Because Hanoi says it must be
permanent and unconditional and without
reciprocal action on their side in the military
arena to reduce or turn back their part of
the war.
Well, now, this deals with matters far
more important than South Viet-Nam, al-
though that's important. It is more important
than Southeast Asia, though that is of great
importance. How we deal with a situation of
this sort is central to the question of orga-
nizing a durable peace. Imagine, in mind's
eye, a map of the world redrawn — with Iran
and Turkey and Greece and Berlin and Korea
and the Congo and the Philippines and Ma-
laya and Southeast Asia all having been ab-
sorbed by the other side. Do you think that
there could be any peace in the world under
those circumstances? Of course, we would
long since have been in a general conflagra-
tion.
The commitment of the United States to its
40 or more allies is a very important element
878
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in the building of a durable peace. And if
those who would be our adversaries should
ever suppose that our commitments are not
worth anything, then we shall see dangers
we have not yet dreamed of.
My concluding remark is this: Don't sell
your country short with respect to its moti-
vations and its purposes and its hopes for
the future of the world.
Lord Acton once said that "Power tends to
corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely."
The American people came out of World
War II with incredible power, and that has
been multiplied many, many times. The ef-
fects of the use of the power at our disposal
are almost literally beyond the comprehen-
sion of the mind of man. But that kind of
power has not corrupted the American peo-
ple.
The purposes of this nation are deter-
mined by those people, and those purposes
are what you know them to be in your own
homes, in your own communities, and on your
farms and in your co-ops, and in your local
institutions. They are: A little peace in the
world. To live and let live. A chance for fami-
lies to grow up in decency. None of that
knock on the door of terror at midnight. A
little organization of law. A chance to let the
blessings of science and technology come to
bear on the daily needs of ordinary men and
women. These are the simple purposes of the
American people, and they are shared by
ordinary men and women throughout the
world.
Now, that's what it's all about — to give
those purposes of ordinary men and women
a chance to operate in a world in which gov-
ernments give them expression. Now, there
will be some burdens, and it is tragic that
they are the kinds of burdens present today
in Southeast Asia, after all that has
happened since 1945. There will be some
burdens. But those who believe in freedom
have had to bear burdens before. And when
the United States puts its hands to some of
these great tasks, then something happens.
So keep up your spirit.
Kennedy Round Holds Promise
of Free-World Economic Growth
The Sixth Round of Tariff Negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Kennedy Round) was concluded at
Geneva on May 16. Following is a statement
made by President Johnson at Washington
that day, together with a statement made by
William M. Roth, the President's Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, at a
news conference at Washington on May 23.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated Ma.y 16
General agreement has been reached on all
the major issues in the trade negotiations.
The way is now clear for the conclusion of
a final agreement covering billions of dollars'
worth of trade among more than 50 coun-
tries.
Much hard work remains for the weeks
ahead. The general understandings reached
must be put into concrete form. Thousands
of tariffs are involved. The final details must
await the completion of this work — and final
approval given by governments.
I hope that the final action will meet the
standards underlying the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, namely:
— ^to stimulate economic growth at home;
— to strengthen economic relations with
the free world; and
— ^to reinforce our strength and vitality in
the cause of freedom.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ROTH
There are limitations on the extent to
which I can discuss the results we have
achieved in Geneva. Although almost all ma-
jor substantive issues in the Kennedy Round
have been resolved, numerous details are yet
to be worked out and the final documentation
prepared. The formal multilateral agreement
concluding the Sixth Round of Tariff Nego-
JUNE 12, 1967
879
tiations will be sigTied June 30, 1967. Until
that time, we cannot disclose specifics of con-
cessions made or received by the United
States.
Throughout these negotiations, public atti-
tudes— like my own — have been conditioned
by the tedium and frustrations of these ex-
tended negotiations and by the crisis atmos-
phere that has prevailed through the last
several weeks of final bargaining. Because
failure seemed at times imminent and a mini-
mum result often seemed the most likely
alternative, it has been difficult for all of us
to recognize how very well we have come out.
In scope and magnitude the concessions to
which all major trading nations are com-
mitted are far greater than ever previously
negotiated. Balance among the participants
has been achieved without serious unraveling
of initial offers, although a major scaling
down was made in such sectors as aluminum,
steel, and textiles. For the first time in inter-
national commercial negotiations, valuable
concessions have been exchanged on a wide
variety of farm products. Important progress
on reducing nontariff barriers has been made.
A summation of the most important Ken-
nedy Round results would include the follow-
ing:
— Tariff cuts of 50 percent on a very broad
range of industrial goods and cuts in the 30
to 50 percent range on many more.
— An agreement on the treatment of chem-
ical products that deals with the American
Selling Price (ASP) issue in a manner that
provides major chemical traders with mu-
tually advantageous concessions in the main
Kennedy Round agreement and a separate
and balanced package that makes additional
concessions available to the United States if
it abandons the American Selling Price sys-
tem.
— Nontariff barrier (NTB) liberalization
including a very significant accord on anti-
dumping procedures as well as European
NTB modifications in the ASP package.
— Useful, if limited, progress on the com-
plex and sensitive problems in the steel, alu-
minum, pulp and paper, and textile sectors,
including a 3-year extension of the Long-
Term Cotton Textile Arrangement.
— Agricultural concessions to which the
United States attaches great value because
they create new trading opportunities for our
farmers and because they support our con-
tention that international negotiation on
trade in farm products can accomplish some-
thing.
— A world grains arrangement guarantee-
ing higher minimum trading prices and es-
tablishing a program under which other
nations will share with us in the vital but
burdensome task of supplying food aid to the
undernourished people in the less developed
countries.
— Significant assistance to the less devel-
oped countries through permitting their par-
ticipation in the negotiations without requir-
ing reciprocal contributions from them,
through special concessions on products of
particular interest to them, and through the
food aid provisions of the grains arrange-
ment.
These are the elements that added together
make the Kennedy Round a success.
It is difficult to predict the trade impact of
this agreement. It should certainly stimulate
trade expansion. However, the tariff cuts be-
come effective in five annual reductions and
many other economic factors affect levels of
world trade; so quantitative projections are
impossible.
Finally, this agreement contains the prom-
ise of significantly improved international
economic relations, particularly by strength-
ening ties between the United States and
the European Economic Community, and the
United States and Canada, and by reducing
the wall between the Community and the
EFTA [European Free Trade Association]
countries. The Kennedy Round agreement
holds the promise of economic growth and
increasing prosperity for all free-world na-
tions. It has been a very gratifying and re-
warding effort.
880
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
East-West Trade: An Avenue Toward World Peace
by Alexander B. Trowbridge
Acting Secretary of Commerce'^
Two years ago, soon after becoming a
Government official, I made a short visit to
Budapest to open the U.S. exhibition at the
Budapest International Trade Fair.
While there, I had an opportunity to talk
with some Hungarians. They lost no time
in illustrating their type of self-directed
humor which has gained some fame as one
method of commentary on their form of
government. Their jokes take the form of
question and answer. "Why," they ask,
hasn't Switzerland become a Socialist
country?" They answer, "Because it is too
small — it couldn't afford it!"
We here in the United States are not small.
As we exert every effort to build a perma-
nent peace, we are indeed too big to be able
to afford automatic rejection of any potential
avenue of peaceful engagement.
"Trade," Emerson wrote, "is a plant
which grows wherever there is peace, as
soon as there is peace, and as long as there
is peace."
United States policy is to cultivate this
plant of progress and mutual benefit in the
soil of peaceful engagement between the
East and the West.
The administration, as President Johnson
has stated clearly and often, favors the
equitable liberalization of two-way trade in
peaceful goods with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. We have taken a number
of steps in this direction. We have sought
congressional action to further open the way.
And we have encouraged the commercial
• Address made before the East- West Trade Con-
ference at Bowling Green State University, Bowling
Green, Ohio, on May 4.
activists of the private sector to move ahead
in this area, as indeed they are now doing.
This broad approach is a central element
in President Johnson's policy of building
new bridges of "ideas, education, culture,
trade, technical cooperation, and mutual
understanding for world peace and pros-
perity." 2 Peaceful trade can form one of the
strongest and most durable of these bridges
between East and West.
And, particularly with the passage of
time, this expanding trade can yield tangible,
meaningful material benefits on both the
Eastern and Western ends of the bridge of
commerce.
In this context, distinguished gatherings
such as this one can play a major part in
catalyzing progress. I am therefore very glad
to be with you today, not only in personal
terms but within this far more important
international framework.
The very fact that this meeting is being
held emphasizes a most important mutual
realization both in the East and the West:
Evolving conditions and evolving relation-
ships in our complex, changing world de-
mand that we be more flexible and forward
looking — both in the East and in the West —
in order to serve the peaceful and progres-
sive future of all of our peoples. We know
that to be hidebound and hypnotized by the
divisions and antagonisms of former years
is to serve only the past.
Even as we meet here today, the first
industry-organized. Government-approved
United States trade mission is visiting
' BuLumN of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.
JUNE 12, 1967
881
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We
hope that during its stay in Moscow — as well
as in Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade — the
Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce mission
firmly plants its steps on the road to com-
mercial growth.
And in addition, a second agricultural
and business trade mission from California
is now preparing to leave for Moscow next
week on a trip that will also take them to the
cities of Kiev, Kishinev, Krasnodar, and
Kharkov. Their Moscow visit will coincide,
as well, with the opening of the 21-nation
international exhibition there — INPROD-
MASH-67 — at which some 18 United States
companies will be displaying their food proc-
essing, packaging, and distribution equip-
ment.
Add to this the series of industry-spon-
sored or Government-organized U.S. trade
groups that have operated in Poland,
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in the
past few years — plus participation in numer-
ous trade fairs and exhibits in this period
— plus the initial U.S. trade mission to
Czechoslovakia scheduled for later in 1967 —
and I believe you see examples of what I
generally call a "steady movement from the
permissive to the promotional" approach by
our country as we consider East- West trade.
Growth of U.S. Trade With Eastern Europe
There are, of course, numerous other
dimensions as well.
One was the significant growth of United
States trade last year with the Soviet Union
and the nations of Eastern Europe to the
highest level in the past two decades, with
the single exception of 1964 when an un-
usually large volume of wheat shipments
inflated the total by $180 million.
The two-way trade total in 1966 came to
something over $375 million, compared to
$277 million in 1965 — an increase on the
order of 35 percent overall, with a slightly
larger increase in U.S. exports to the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe than in U.S.
imports from these nations. From 1965 to
1966, the U.S. export total rose from $140
million to $198 million, while the imports
went from $138 million to $178 million.
Alongside aggregate U.S. two-way trade
in 1966 of about $55 billion, this is not a very
large total. Nor does it come to more than a
small percentage of the volume of commerce
that flows between the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe and other major trading
nations.
For example, according to the preliminary
figures that I have seen, trade between the
Federal Republic of Germany and these
nations last year exceeded $2 billion, con-
trasted to the U.S. $375 million. The figure
for the United Kingdom was about $1 billion;
and Japan, France, and Italy all fell in the
range between $600 million and $1 billion.
The United States total does take on added
perspective, however, with consideration of
two additional factors.
First, United States trade figures do not
include exports by the overseas subsidiaries
or licensees of U.S. firms. Rather, these are
reflected in the trade statistics of host
nations. Although solid figures are not
available, such trade between European-
based U.S. subsidiaries and licensees and the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe appears to be
growing rapidly.
Second, trade statistics are limited to com-
modities. Not included is the sales price or
other monetary value of technical data or
services. Yet such trade constitutes an in-
creasingly important share of exports east-
ward by U.S. industrial and engineering
firms. An increasing number of such trans-
actions have been licensed under the Export
Control Act.
There have been cases where the likely
return to the U.S. firm from the export of
technical data to Eastern Europe was several
million dollars, and others often are known
to total in the hundreds of thousands.
Cumulatively, this element of East-West
trade could represent a sizable addition to
the value of exports reported for only the
shipment of goods.
Although it is a generalization, we can say
that United States participation in East-West
882
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
trade is somewhat larger than suggested by
the bare statistics, with a growth rate that is
significant, and has a potential for future ex-
pansion across a diverse range of peaceful
products.
Such expansion will not come automati-
cally, however. Considerable effort to build
and broaden and strengthen the bridges of
peaceful trade are necessary at both ends of
the span. And considerable effort will be
necessary to increase and enhance the flow of
commerce across the bridges.
Let us not underestimate the difficulties of
expanding trade at the same time as we are
strongly committed to resist Communist
aggression in Viet-Nam. We have adopted
what I describe as a "dual track" policy.
With one hand we confront such aggression
where it must be resisted, and our resolve
is firm. But in a time where pressures in-
crease on one front, we need pressure relief
valves on other fronts. Hence the desire to
keep open channels of conmiunication — in
education, travel, culture — as well as trade.
Trade Liberalization Measures
President Johnson, carrying forward the
efforts of the past three administrations in
today's evolving world environment, has
acted in a number of ways to liberalize, to
stimulate, and to support East-West trade as
a part of our overall, long-term policy toward
Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia.
— Export conti-ols have been liberalized.
More than 400 nonstrategic items were re-
moved from the Commerce Department's
Commodity Control List late last year. These
products, which now can be shipped without
a specific license, cover a broad range in-
cluding consumer products, textiles, certain
metal manufactures and machinery, various
chemical materials and products, and a con-
siderable number of manufactured articles.
In addition, the process of sifting, refining,
and updating this list is an ongoing one. We
want to make sure that our control list is
realistic and unburdened with excessive or
ineffective coverage.
— Commercial credit facilities have been
extended. In his October 7th speech,^ Presi-
dent Johnson authorized the Export-Import
Bank to provide normal commercial credit
guarantees on industrial export transactions
with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungaiy, and
Bulgaria — as provided in July 1964 for ex-
ports to Romania. Commercial credit facil-
ities are an important concomitant to trade
that must and does receive our continuing
attention.
— At the same time, the President an-
nounced that he had authorized the Export-
Import Bank to extend a loan of some $50
million to the Istituto Mobiliare Itali^ano to
finance U.S.-origin machine tools and other
equipment for the automobile plant to be
cohstructed by the Italian firm Fiat in the
Soviet Union. Eximbank participation en-
courages U.S. businessmen to compete for
these sales, assists Fiat in obtaining the fin-
est equipment available, and tangibly ex-
presses our support for projects designed to
serve the consumer goods requirements of
the people of the Soviet Union or Eastern
Europe. While any equipment sold for this
plant will be carefully examined to ascertain
that it has basically peaceful applications, we
operate from the general approach that we
would rather see traffic jams of automobiles
than of tanks.
— The East- West Trade Relations Act pro-
posed by President Johnson * can provide the
conditions under which steady expansion can
come about by authorizing the President to
use nondiscriminatory tariff treatment as a
bargaining element in negotiating commer-
cial agreements with these nations. The basis
for this proposal was developed by a group
of distinguished American business leaders
led by Mr. Irwin Miller of the Cummins En-
gine Company.^
Realistic judgment does not suggest that
such legislative authority in itself would set
in motion an immediate flood of two-way
= For text, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
•> For text, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 843.
^ For text of the report of the Special Committee
on U.S. Trade With East European Countries and
the Soviet Union, see ibid., p. 845.
JUNE 12, 1967
883
trade. But the power to extend such tariff
treatment, which currently applies only to
Poland of the nations concerned, could cer-
tainly help to increase the flow of East- West
commerce.
I think it is true that the implementation of
nondiscriminatory tariff treatment has psy-
chological and political overtones as well as
commercial importance. But if we are seri-
ous about desiring to increase the levels of
peaceful trade — which we are — then we
should frankly face the impediments that
exist and reduce them where possible. The
Soviet Union and tha nations of Eastern
Europe will have to export to earn exchange
to buy our products. We should recognize
their need to operate under competitive con-
ditions equal to other countries selling in our
market.
Of course, agreements reached under this
act would have to be based on mutual benefits.
In return for the benefits of most-favored-
nation treatment, the United States may seek
settlement of commercial disputes, arrange-
ments for protection of industrial property,
provisions for promotion of U.S. products,
entry and travel of commercial representa-
tives, arrangements for market access and
fair treatment for our goods, and settlement
of claims.
Taken as a whole, as I say, these adminis-
tration measures represent a broad and ener-
getic administration approach. They are de-
signed to reduce conspicuous obstacles to
United States two-way trade with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe.
Increasingly, we hope, the name of the
game will become competition in each other's
markets consistent with normal commercial
relationships that extend across other inter-
national borders around the globe, and despite
the differences in economic organization that
exist between our countries.
The challenges, then, will be clear at both
ends of the bridge. We will have to become
increasingly aware of each other's market
requirements, of competitive practices and
conditions, of consumer likes and dislikes. We
will have to develop advertising, promotional,
and distribution techniques suited to the
varying markets. We will have to be patient
and flexible. Long and time-consuming ex-
changes are probably necessary in order to
build the kind of mutual confidence we hope
for as part of "peaceful engagement."
This problem is neither simple nor insolu-
ble. To a considerable extent, the answer is
likely to be fully realized only through experi-
ence. Such experience as has been gained by
Western businessmen negotiating in the
Soviet Union indicates the need for patient
and skilled bargaining techniques. Experi-
ence of Soviet and Eastern European state
trading agencies has probably shown them
the need to adapt to the competitive demands
of our free economies.
A number of approaches present them-
selves for the acquisition and broadening of
such experience. Perhaps, to speed the orien-
tation process, trade officials of the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe will want to
broaden commercial relationships with busi-
nessmen in this country, and particularly im-
porters. Perhaps it will be desirable in some
cases to contract certain business services in
the United States, at least during this orien-
tation process.
Or again, possibly businessmen and trade
officials on both sides might think in terms
of general approaches to broadening commu-
nications. Trade missions or factfinding
tours, such as the Time Inc. and Business
International group visits, are undoubtedly
useful. The use of business publications
stimulates exchange of business or market-
ing information. Obviously, there are a good
many alternate routes that could be followed.
As well as increased sales in each other's
markets, this process could also lead to fur-
ther expansion in the future through explora-
tion of new trading techniques or the reex-
amination of existing trade tools for applica-
tion to trade between the United States and
these nations. To cite one example, it may
be that the technique of switch trading —
which is proving useful elsewhere — could
have an application. As I have suggested,
however, time, effort, and experience must
interact before such specifics emerge.
The essential aim in this current period is
884
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to get the ball moving — to allow the dynamics
of peaceful international commerce to come
fully into play here as in other areas of world
trade that have seen such surging expansion.
Primary Role of American Business
Past this point, I cannot stress strongly
enough the primary role of American busi-
ness in this whole process of gro^vth. While
the government-to-government aspects of
world trade can be decisive, the fact remains
that in our system there is no business with-
out business.
From a great many indications, there is
indeed at the present time impressive and
growing interest in the American business
community in the potentials of East-West
trade, just as an increasingly favorable com-
mercial cUmate appears to be emerging in
the nations of this region.
International cooperative efforts under
way today also hold promise of important
progress in the vital field of industrial prop-
erty, particularly in connection with patents.
This is a complex and difficult area where
material accomplishment comes slowly, but
the pluses to date are encouraging. They
include:
— Soviet accession to the International
Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, or Paris Convention, the leading
international treaty in the patent and trade-
mark field.
— Subsequent U.S.S.R. and Eastern Euro-
pean support for the U.S. proposal, in the
Executive Committee of the Paris Conven-
tion, that set in motion current detailed con-
sideration of an international patent coopera-
tion treaty.
— Formation of a state trading agency
known as Licensintorg in the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Trade to handle foreign licensing
matters including promotion of export-
import arrangements in this field.
— And issuance of basic Soviet publications
in this field in English translation.
These are positive steps in an area that
bears particularly on trade in the new prod-
ucts and processes that are staples in U.S.
business overseas. In particular, they stimu-
late the confidence that is fundamental to
increased commerce.
So, in summary, what we see today
throughout this broad field of U.S. trade with
the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are new
activity, new interest, new developments.
The picture is one of movement, and the di-
rection is toward expansion and liberaliza-
tion. We are increasingly talking of contracts
rather than contrasts.
One very significant part of the picture is
the notably increased national interest and
national debate on this vital subject across
the United States — by business groups, in
the newspapers, at meetings such as this
one, and among the general public. I applaud
this, both because healthy, vigorous national
dialog — pro or con — is at the very heart of
our democratic process and because the views
expressed by the business community and
others provide important contributions to
the President and the Congress in their con-
siderations and decisions affecting East-West
trade. I hope that this discussion can sepa-
rate the myths and the realities of the situa-
tion and that our policy directions are based
on realistic appraisals rather than emotional
reactions.
All that we have said notwithstanding, I
believe it is abundantly clear that the
numerous diverse influences on the future of
East- West trade that we have been discussing
remain subordinate in impact to one single
central determinant. I am referring, of
course, to the general climate of relations be-
tween the United States and these nations.
In this regard. President Johnson has ex-
pressed United States hopes and intentions
in a brief, historically eloquent declaration:
"Our objective," he has said, "is not to con-
tinue the cold war but to end it." *
In the years to come, mounting traffic
across the bridge of commerce between our
nations could be one very effective element
in achieving this objective for our own peo-
ple and all of the peoples of the world.
° For President Johnson's state of the Union mes-
sage of Jan. 10, see ibid., Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
JUNE 12, 1967
885
President Johnson Sets Goal
of Substantial Export Increase
Remarks by President Johnson ^
Acting Secretary [of Commerce Alexan-
der B.] Trowbridge, distinguished Members
of Congress, welcome guests, ladies and gen-
tlemen: It has been said that the road to
trust between nations passes through the
marketplace.
Today we gather in the Rose Garden at
the White House to honor 10 American com-
panies whose worldwide efforts are helping
us to prove that observation.
By developing new markets for American
products, these companies have served their
country and they have served it well. You
gentlemen have advanced your own profits
— but you have also furthered the cause of
international cooperation. That, I think, is
"enlightened self-interest" at its best.
This ceremony takes place during World
Trade Week, when we affirm some basic
principles of economic and foreign policy.
We believe that it is very much in our
interest and is necessary to expand world
trade.
We know it speeds the pace of economic
progress.
We know it promises a better life for all
men.
We know that it sustains our greatest
hope: the hope of all people that there can
be peace in the world.
Last year, two-way trade between the
United States and our free Asian partners
amounted to $12 billion. Certainly that is
good business — and good international policy.
Today, we are doing our best to bury our
ancient differences — to achieve better rela-
tions among all nations. Part of that search
is our effort to build new bridges between
the East and West.
The flow of peaceful commerce across
' Made upon presentation of Presidential "E"
Awards for export excellence to 10 manufacturers
and business organizations on May 23 (White House
press release) .
those bridges could bring lasting benefits to
both sides.
The barriers which fell at Geneva last
week clear the way for great advances in
mutual trade. The Kennedy Round will open
a new era of world commerce.
We are entering that new era with an ex-
cellent record in export expansion. Last year
our United States merchandise exports
soared to more than $29 billion. That is a
50 percent increase since 1960.
Unfortunately, we have not achieved the
balance-of-payments gains we hoped this
expansion would bring, because imports
have grown much more rapidly than exports.
That is a problem that we just must over-
come. The way to solve it is not to limit im-
ports but rather to dedicate ourselves to
doing our best to increase the things that we
produce and to increase those exports.
To accomplish that end, I have consulted
with the new — I trust soon to be — Senator
[Warren G.] Magnuson and the rest of you
Senators willing — Secretary of Commerce.
Mr. Trowbridge and the Cabinet Committee
on the Balance of Payments are going to
undertake a far-ranging export study.
Specifically, I have asked him to give me
his recommendations and his advice on these
questions. I think the answer to most of the
questions, like the answer to most questions,
is "Yes"; but I want him to study it and re-
port as quickly as possible. The first ques-
tion is:
— Should we increase the U.S. trade and
industrial exhibitions overseas?
— If we should, to what extent; and what
do they think should flow from this effort?
— Should we open new trade centers
abroad? Should we undertake more trade
missions ? Should we have more mobile trade
fairs ?
— ^Should we modify our export-financing
system? How can we improve the financing
to help sell the products that our industry
and our labor make?
— How can we make the U.S. industry —
and the people who make up and contribute
to it — more export minded ?
886
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I would like, this morning, to thank Mr.
John R. Kimberly and Mr. Thomas Miner
for the reports from the National Export
Expansion Council. They will be used by us.
We anticipate that they will be very helpful
and of great value.
This is somewhat of a meeting to thank
all of you and to say to you that your coun-
try is grateful. You deserve the recognition
you are receiving. I am glad to welcome you
here and to present the flags that we will
give you that will be symbols of your
achievement.
One of the most ambitious goals we have
for the months ahead is under the direction
of this youngest Cabinet member — to try to
fire up the producers of this Nation to at-
tempt to make a substantial increase in our
exports and to find new ways and means of
bringing about that result.
We welcome the advice and suggestions of
Members of Congress, and of industry and
labor generally.
Thank you very much for coming here
and being a part of this ceremony.
President Requests $400 Million
for Latin American Loans
White House Announcement
White House press release dated Hay IT
President Johnson on May 17 submitted
to Congress a 1968 budget amendment for
$400 million, most of it for self-help loans to
Latin America to implement the Declaration
of American Presidents at the Punta del
Este conference last month.^
Of the proposed $400 million, $300 million
would be for the U.S. contribution to the
Inter-American Development Bank's Fund
' For text of the Declaration signed at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, on Apr. 14, see Bulletin of May 8,
1967, p. 712.
for Special Operations and $100 million for
additional Alliance for Progress loans and
grants.
The proposed $300 million for the Inter-
American Development Bank is for the first
installment of the U.S. share of a $1.2 bil-
lion increase in the resources of the Fund for
Special Operations recommended by the
Bank's Board of Governors last month. The
Fund provides long-term, low-interest loans
for economic and social development projects
in support of the objectives of the Alliance
for Progress. The increase voted by the
Board of Governors will permit the Bank to
continue the operations of the Fund through
1971.
To further the objectives agreed to at
Punta del Este, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank will use the expanded resources
of the Fund to finance more agricultural and
educational projects in Latin America, as
well as to expand its financing of multina-
tional projects, such as road and telecommu-
nications networks.
The $100 million request for the Alliance
for Progress brings the total proposed for
the Alliance in fiscal year 1968 to $643
million.
Ninety million dollars of the new funds
would be in the form of loans to finance pri-
ority projects in education and agriculture,
the remaining $10 million for grants to help
support multinational projects in science and
technology.
Loans in support of agricultural develop-
ment will assist the Alliance countries to
diversify crop production, reducing their de-
pendence on surplus commodities such as cof-
fee and sugar; also to help finance agricul-
tural credit, irrigation projects, and farm-to-
market roads.
Loans in the educational sector will supple-
ment the self-help efforts of the Alliance
countries to step up vocational and technical
training and boost the production of text-
books and other educational materials.
JUNE 12, 1967
887
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
United States Urges Dialog Regarding South West Africa
Following are statements made in the fifth
special session of the U.N. General Assembly
by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg
on April 26 and May 19, together with the
text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly
on May 19.
STATEMENT OF APRIL 26
U.S. delegation press release 49
The General Assembly is now convened in
special session to give further consideration
to the question of South West Africa. We
meet in accordance with the terms of Reso-
lution 2145, adopted with virtual unanimity
last October 27.^ It is my delegation's hope
that, despite the difficulty of this matter and
the known differences of view concerning it,
we can again display the same unity of de-
cision that we achieved last October; for it
is from such a united stand, as well as from
the intrinsic soundness of our decisions, that
our Assembly resolutions derive their true
force.
Since Resolution 2145 contains the basic
agreed position of the United Nations on this
question, it may be well to recall the essen-
tial steps we took in adopting that resolu-
tion:
— We decided that, since South Africa had
failed to fulfill its obligations in respect of
the mandated Territory of South West
Africa and had in fact disavowed the
mandate, the mandate was terminated, that
apart from the mandate South Africa has no
other right to administer the territory, and
that South West Africa now comes under the
• For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 5, 1966, p. 870.
direct responsibility of the United Nations.
— We reaffirmed the right of the people
of South West Africa to self-determination,
freedom, and independence in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations.
— We reaffirmed that South West Africa,
until it attains independence, has an inter-
national status and called upon the South
African Government to refrain and desist
from any action which would tend to alter
that status. In this regard, as the United
States has already said, implementation of
the recent statement by the South African
Government concerning Ovamboland would
fall into this category.
— We created the Ad Hoc Committee on
South West Africa to recommend practical
means by which the responsibility of the
United Nations in this matter is to be dis-
charged.
— And we agreed to meet in special ses-
sion no later than April to receive the Com-
mittee's report.
The United States today categorically re-
affirms its support of this resolution and all
that we have said in this Assembly in sup-
port of it.
The Ad Hoc Committee, among its 14
members, contained a fair and representative
cross section of the entire membership of the
United Nations. The United States served as
a member. I should like to express our ap-
preciation to those who participated in its
work, particularly to Ambassador [Max]
Jakobson of Finland, its wise and impartial
Chairman; its Vice Chairman, Ambassador
[Jose] Pinera of Chile; its rapporteur, Mr.
[Kifle] Wodajo of Ethiopia; and indeed to
all the members who, by their serious
888
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
approach and by their willin^ess to con-
sider all suggestions, helped the Committee
in its difficult assignment. I also wish to
acknowledge the indispensable support of
the Secretariat, which performed with its
customary efficiency.
The Committee's report is now before us.^
There have been expressions of regret that
the Committee was not able to unite on a
single recommendation concerning the "prac-
tical means" to be adopted. Such unanimity
would have been most desirable. Neverthe-
less, the Committee has perfonned a most
useful and necessary function in presenting
to the General Assembly the various alterna-
tive proposals which its report contains.
I agree entirely with our Chairman, Am-
bassador Jakobson, that it would serve no
good purpose to gloss over the differences
among these proposals. It will be a test of
our statesmanship in this Assembly to find
ways to maintain the vital unity of action
that we achieved in our original resolution.
The United States, which joined in one of
these three proposals in the Committee,
fully understands and respects the motives
of the sponsors of the other proposals. But
I wish to state the reasons which impelled
my country to join Italy and Canada in the
proposal which we submitted together.^
It is important that all of us, whatever
our differences as revealed in these various
proposals, should remember what it is that
unites us. We are united in our common pur-
pose to bring self-determination, freedom,
and independence to the people of South West
Africa in accordance with the charter and in
our common dedication to the terms of the
Resolution 2145. That resolution is our
anchor.
The greatest disservice to that resolution,
and to its effective implementation, would be
tion, "practical means by which South West
Africa and in the world that the U.N. is
fundamentaUy divided on how these prin-
ciples are to be achieved. The issue is not
among ourselves but between us and South
Africa. Our objective is not to score debating
points against each other; it is to work to-
gether in the spirit of Resolution 2145 in
order to find, in the words of that resolu-
tion, "practical means by which South
West Africa should be administered, so as to
enable the people of the Territory to exer-
cise the right of self-determination and to
achieve independence."
Now, some may question whether it is
possible for the Assembly to unite on an
effective course of action. I see no reason to
doubt that we can do so. Indeed, we must do
so, for unless we are substantially united
our action cannot be effective. In our debate
last October I said — and this can be said
with equal relevance now — that to be effective
on this issue we need more than world
opinion voiced by words in a resolution; we
need the cooperation of all manifested in
concrete action.*
Last October we achieved such concrete
action. Let no one underestimate the historic
consequence of what we decided. After 20
years of wrestling with this problem of
South West Africa — after many years of
proceedings before the International Court
of Justice — the United Nations, through
Resolution 2145, took the decisive action of
declaring South Africa's mandate terminated
by its own default. We further decided that
South West Africa now comes under the
direct responsibility of the United Nations.
These actions were unprecedented in the
history of this organization — just as the
problem Which gave rise to them was un-
precedented.
When the General Assembly took that
action, the United States strongly supported
it; and we still do. We do not in any way
retreat from that support. On the contrary,
we are prepared to move forward in keep-
ing with the commitment which I made in
my statement of last October 12, proposing
"steps which can be immediately and prac-
tically implemented, and which lie within the
capacity of this organization ... to provide
the community of nations promptly with a
considered blueprint for united and peace-
" U.N. doc. A/6640.
' U.N. doc. A/AC.129/L.6.
* For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on Oct.
12, 1966, see BULLETIN of Oct. 31, 1966, p. 690.
JUNE 12, 1967
889
ful action for the benefit of the people of
South West Africa."
Indeed, Mr. President, it is precisely such
steps that the United States has sought to
develop by joining with Canada and Italy in
the three-power proposal.
Let me briefly sum up the terms of this
proposal:
1. It reaffirms the decisions of Resolution
2145.
2. It recommends that the General As-
sembly in this special session appoint a spe-
cial representative for South West Africa, on
the nomination of the Secretary-General.
3. It recommends that the special session
also appoint a United Nations Council for
South West Africa made up of three or more
members to be designated by yourself, Mr.
President, with which the Special Repre-
sentative will cooperate and to which he will
report.
4. It sets forth a concrete mandate for
the Special Representative. He is to survey
the situation, to establish all necessary con-
tacts, and to consult with all representative
elements in the territory, looking toward the
establishment as soon as possible of a nucleus
of self-government in South West Africa. He
is also to recommend the nature and amount
of external assistance for the administration
of the territory and to determine the neces-
sary conditions that will enable the people of
that territory to achieve self-determination
and independence.
5. Finally, it calls for a report by the Spe-
cial Representative to the 22d regular ses-
sion of the General Assembly in September
on tJie progress made and on his recom-
mendations for the further implementation
of the Assembly's decisions.
Mr. President, these steps which we pro-
pose are practical and concrete. In offering
them we propose not to delay nor to recon-
sider our commitment but to carry it for-
ward. We propose not to step backward from
Resolution 2145 but to find ways within the
capacity of the United Nations to put it into
practical effect. Indeed, certain provisions of
these joint proposals of Italy, Canada, and
the United States parallel to a major degree
provisions of the other two proposals tabled
in the Committee.
It is, of course, also a fact that the other
two proposals contemplate additional steps
not embraced in ours. It is these additional
steps that involve a real difference of view
which must be candidly faced. Its essence, in
our view, is simply this: We are convinced
that the United Nations should, in present
circumstances, continue to seek peaceful
means to resolve this important problem
which has been a source of international
tension for decades; the other proposals,
however, explicitly or implicitly look toward
an immediate or early confrontation with
South Africa.
Let me restate briefly why we believe our
approach is to be preferred.
First, as I have already suggested, in all
realism it would be too much to hope that
this problem, which has been developing for
nearly half a century and with which the
United Nations itself has wrestled for 20
years, could be resolved in the few months
since the General Assembly first took deci-
sive action with respect to it.
Second, although the General Assembly
has adopted a far-reaching policy, we have
not yet — either individually or collectively —
entered into any dialog with South Africa
in an effort to implement that policy.
Although we have declared South Africa's
rights under the mandate in the territory
to be terminated, it is still a fact — of which
our Chairman, Ambassador Jakobson, cor-
rectly reminded us in his statement — that
South Africa "has possession of the terri-
tory."
In these circumstances, the members of
the United Nations would clearly be remiss
if we did not seek through diplomatic dia-
log a peaceful solution. I shall frankly add
that I do not know — nobody can know —
whether such a dialog would be fruitful. But
I do know that public opinion in my country,
and indeed in many parts of the world,
would not understand a policy which seems
890
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ready to resort to immediate coercion
rather than explore the possibilities of
peaceful progress.
Third, the world is already suffering from
too many confrontations. It would be a
strange irony if the United Nations — whose
highest aim is to resolve disputes and achieve
justice by peaceful means and to harmonize
the actions of nations — should itself fail to
pursue such means and instead add still an-
other confrontation to a list already too long.
What is needed now is not confrontation but
consultation. We have no cause to imitate
the conqueror Alexander, who when chal-
lenged to solve the puzzle of the Gordian
knot took a sword and cut it through. In this
day and age the U.N. should not be in a hurry
to use the sword; rather we must apply our-
selves to the task of untying the knot.
There is no reason whatever to think that
the proposed dialog or consultation would go
against the U.N.'s purpose. On the contrary,
the aim of any such dialog would be to
achieve genuine self-determination, freedom,
and independence for the people of South
West Africa in accordance with the charter
— and their rapid advancement.
To consult for this purpose is not to
capitulate; it is to explore the ground over
which we must move. In this, as in every
situation of conflict, the famous admonition
of President Kennedy remains true: "Let us
never negotiate out of fear. But let us never
fear to negotiate." ^
Fourth, when we urge that progress be
made with all reasonable speed, we do not
thereby suggest or in any way condone indefi-
nite delay. What we do suggest is that the
next step we must take is one which employs
the arts of diplomacy — the "peaceful means"
enjoined upon us by the charter. One of our
reservations about the other proposals is that
they appear either to shun a dialog or to sug-
gest in advance that any dialog would end
in failure. Our proposal does not assume
either success or failure; we do maintain,
however, that no one can know until it has
been tried. We have a responsibility to his-
toi-y to try this next step, and to try it with
all reasonable means at our disposal.
Fifth, we do not agree with the view ex-
pressed in this debate which would simply
have the United Nations arbitrarily declare
the Territory of South West Africa to be
independent here and now, with no regard
for the means by which that pretended inde-
pendence is to be achieved or for the welfare
of the people involved. Such a course would
be an irresponsible step backward from our
commitment under Resolution 2145. We have
declared South West Africa to be a respon-
sibility of the United Nations, and that re-
sponsibility should not be disowned. To re-
treat from that commitment would be a
betrayal of the interests of South West
Africa and would bring the United Nations
into disrepute before the world.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, the
United States believes that the proposal
which we have joined in supporting is a
sound approach. We do not suggest that in
putting forward this proposal we and our
Italian and Canadian colleagues have spoken
the last word on the subject — nor that the
General Assembly, if it adopts this proposal,
will have spoken the last word.
But now is not a time for the last word to
be spoken. Let the United Nations speak the
next word — and let it speak with a united
voice. It is of the utmost importance that we
continue to manifest our common determina-
tion to proceed with all the unanimity and
effectiveness we can muster to achieve the
objectives of Resolution 2145.
In this effort the United States will not
for a moment forget the basic human issue
involved. We will continue to be guided by
the view expressed by President Johnson
last May: «
. . . that domination of one race by another leads
to waste and injustice. ... A nation in the 20th
century cannot expect to achieve order and sustain
growth unless it moves — not just steadily but rap-
idly— in the direction of full political rights for all
its peoples.
' For President Kennedy's inaugural address, see
ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
' Ibid., June 13, 1966, p. 914.
JUNE 12, 1967
891
If this human principle is to be realized
against the obstacles that confront us, we
cannot always hope for immediate success.
We must know how to persist and to tackle
resolutely the problems that face us, every
step of the way.
A celebrated philosopher, Salvador de
Madariaga, once uttered a wise saying about
the most effective form of human action, and
I shall conclude with his words:
Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic.
We must walk in the right direction but we must
walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is
desirable ; to define what is possible at any time with-
in the scope of what is desirable; and to carry out
what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable.
Let the U.N. proceed to discharge its duty
to South West Africa in that spirit —
expeditiously, faithfully, peacefully, in the
greatest unanimity, and step by step — until
our goal is attained.
STATEMENT OF MAY 19
U.S. delesration prees release 63
We of the United States were heartened
last October when the Assembly achieved, in
the adoption of Resolution 2145 by the
overwhelming vote of 114 to 2, an auspicious
unity of action on this most difficult issue.
In spite of wide differences of approach, we
managed to unite in a historic decision that
South Africa had forfeited its right to ad-
minister South West Africa; that South
Africa's mandate over the territory was at
an end; that the territory was now under the
direct responsibility of the United Nations;
and that an Ad Hoc Committee should
recommend practical means by which the
Territory should be administered so as to
enable its people to exercise their right to
self-determination and to achieve inde-
pendence.
My country served on that Ad Hoc Com-
mittee. Throughout its meetings, and again
in this special session of the Assembly, we
labored long and hard with all schools of
thought in search of a common approach.
Our hope was to achieve agreement on a
resolution which would carry Resolution
2145 a further step forward — perhaps not
as big a step as we might wish, but at all
events a step which would be taken with the
unanimity necessary to make it solid and
effective.
Now, for the time being, we must candidly
accept the fact that our efforts have not suc-
ceeded. The draft resolution A/L.516 just
voted, for reasons which we made clear to
the sponsors from the outset, could not be
supported by my Government.
I have no desire whatever to engage in
long explanations, and certainly not in re-
criminations. I entirely respect the motives
of those who have put forward the draft
resolution. And I wish to express apprecia-
tion for the attentive consideration which
was given to the views of my delegation dur-
ing our common attempts to reconcile our
different approaches.
Lest there be any misunderstanding — and
because the issue is still a long way from
being resolved — I wish to restate at this time
as succinctly as possible my country's posi-
tion concerning South West Africa.
1. We continue our full support of Resolu-
tion 2145. This historic resolution stands as
the virtually unanimous decision of the
United Nations on this issue.
2. We shall continue to support the
United Nations in its search for practical
means by which its responsibility with re-
spect to South West Africa, pursuant to
Resolution 2145, can be discharged.
3. We believe further progress in this
matter will inevitably require a good-faith
effort to advance the purposes of Resolution
2145 through a dialog with the Government
of South Africa, which still remains in
physical control of the territory.
Fellow delegates, despite our differences,
let us not forget how wide our agreement
has been, and still remains, on this important
issue. We are agreed in our abhorrence of
apartheid and racism. We are agreed in our
892
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
determination to see the people of South
West Africa enjoy their full rights under the
charter. And we are agreed in our affirma-
tion of the responsibilities of the United
Nations in this regard.
In Resolution 2145, not quite 7 months
ago, we closed the door on a chapter of his-
tory nearly 50 years in duration — the
chapter of South Africa's rights in South
West Africa under the mandate. The next
chapter is still being written. Although we
were unable to support today's resolution,
we nevertheless pledge that the United
States, faithful to its vote in support of
Resolution 2145, will do whatever it can, by
all appropriate and peaceful means, to imple-
ment the terms and purposes of that reso-
lution.
My country's tradition concerning uni-
versal freedom is such that wherever any
people come forward to claim it as their
equal birthright, the United States must and
will support them. We shall therefore faith-
fully support the people of South West
Africa in their just aspirations by every
effective peaceful means until those aspira-
tions have been attained.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^
The General- Assembly,
Having considered the report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee for South West Africa,
Reaffirming its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14
December 1960 containing the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples,
Reaffirming its resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27
October 1966, by which it terminated the Mandate
conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exer-
cised on his behalf by the Government of the Union
of South Africa and decided that South Africa had
no other right to administer the Territory of South
West Africa,
Having assumed direct responsibility for the
Territory of South West Africa in accordance with
resolution 2145 (XXI),
Recognizing that it has thereupon become in-
cumbent upon the United Nations to give effect to
its obligations by taking practical steps to transfer
power to the people of South West Africa,
I
Reaffirms the territorial integrity of South West
Africa and the inalienable right of its people to
freedom and independence, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, General Assembly
resolution 1514 (XV) and all other resolutions con-
cerning South West Africa;
II
1. Decides to establish a United Nations Council
for South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as
the Council) comprising eleven Member States to
be elected during the present session and to entrust
to it the following powers and functions, to be
discharged in the Territory :
(a) To administer South West Africa until inde-
pendence, with the maximum possible participation
of the people of the Territory ;
(6) To promulgate such laws, decrees and admin-
istrative regulations as are necessary for the ad-
ministration of the Territory until a legislative
assembly is established following elections conducted
on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
(c) To take as an immediate task all the neces-
sary measures, in consultation with the people of
the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent
assembly to draw up a constitution on the basis of
which elections will be held for the establishment of
a legislative assembly and a responsible government;
(d) To take all the necessary measures for the
maintenance of law and order in the Territory;
(e) To transfer all powers to the people of the
Territory upon the declaration of independence;
2. Decides that in the exercise of its powers and
in the discharge of its functions the Council shall
be responsible to the General Assembly;
3. Decides that the Council shall entrust such
executive and administrative tasks as it deems
necessary to a United Nations Commissioner for
South West Africa (hereinafter referred to as the
Commissioner), who shall be appointed during the
present session by the General Assembly on the
nomination of the Secretary- General ;
4. Decides that in the performance of his tasks
the Commissioner shall be responsible to the Council;
III
1. Decides that:
'U.N. doc. A/RES/2248 (S-V) (A/L.516/Rev. 1) ;
adopted by the Assembly on May 19 by a vote of
85 to 2, with 30 abstentions (U.S.).
(a) The administration of South West Africa
under the United Nations shall be financed from
the revenues collected in the Territory ;
(6) Expenses directly related to the operation of
the Council and the Office of the Commissioner —
the travel and subsistence expenses of members of
JUNE 12, 1967
89S
the Council, the remuneration of the Commissioiner
and his staff and the cost of ancillary facilities —
shall be met from the regular budget of the United
Nations;
2. Requests the specialized agencies and the ap-
propriate organs of the United Nations to render
to South West Africa technical and financial assist-
ance through a co-ordinated emergency programme
to meet the exigencies of the situation ;
IV
1. Decides that the Council shall be based in South
West Africa ;
2. Requests the Council to enter immediately into
contact with the authorities of South Africa in
order to lay down procedures, in accordance with
General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and the
present resolution, for the transfer of the adminis-
tration of the Territory with the least possible up-
heaval ;
3. Further requests the Council to proceed to
South West Africa with a view to:
(a) Taking over the administration of the Ter-
ritory;
(6) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African
police and military forces;
(c) Ensuring the withdrawal of South African
personnel and their replacement by personnel oper-
ating under the authority of the Council;
(d) Ensuring that in the utilization and recruit-
ment of personnel preference be given to the in-
digenous people;
4. Calls upon the Government of South Africa
to comply vdthout delay with the terms of resolu-
tion 2145 (XXI) and the present resolution and to
facilitate the transfer of the administration of the
Territory of South West Africa to the Council;
5. Requests the Security Council to take all ap-
propriate measures to enable the United Nations
Council for South West Africa to discharge the
functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by
the General Assembly;
6. Requests all States to extend their whole-
hearted co-operation and to render assistance to
the Council in the implementation of its task;
V
Requests the Council to report to the General
Assembly at intervals not exceeding three months
on its administration of the Territory, and to submit
a special report to the Assembly at its twenty-second
session concerning the implementation of the present
resolution ;
VI
Decides that South West Africa shall become in-
dependent on a date to be fixed in accordance with
the wishes of the people and that the Council shall
do all in its power to enable independence to be
attained by June 1968.
United States Urges Agreement
on Peacekeeping Question
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly'^
The problem of United Nations peacekeep-
ing operations has coine before the General
Assembly at the very moment when interna-
tional developments have brought this sub-
ject to the forefront of world attention and
concern. We would have to have our heads
buried in the sand not to be aware of the
connection between the question which we
are debating here and the concrete and im-
mediate realities in the Middle East.
The United States does not wish to say
anything here today which would interfere
with the Secretary-General's efforts to
pacify the situation in the Middle East. The
most that any of us can constructively do at
this moment is to wish him Godspeed and
every success in the critical mission on which
he is about to embark.
In this situation, and in light of the fact
that we are dealing with a procedural reso-
lution, I do not believe it would contribute
to progress for me to make an extensive
statement on the substance of this question.
The Special Committee of 33 on Peacekeep-
ing Operations has proposed a resolution
under which the General Assembly would
ask the Special Committee to continue its
work and report to the 22d General Assem-
bly in the fall.^ Although we would have pre-
ferred substantive action on this question at
the 21st session, or indeed at this special
session, we nevertheless stated in the Com-
mittee of 33 that we would acquiesce in this
resolution. I pledge the best efforts of my
Government in the C!onmiittee's efforts to
reach agreement.
Mr. President, peacekeeping lies at the
' Made in the fifth special session of the U.N.
General Assembly on May 22 (U.S. delegation press
release 65) .
' A/RES/2249 (S-V) ; adopted by the Assembly on
May 23 by a vote of 90 (U.S.) to 1, with 11 absten-
tions.
894
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
very heart of the responsibilities of the
United Nations under the charter. Whatever
the import of the events of recent days, it is
necessary to remember that we are dealing
here with a problem which is not transitory.
It will be with us for many years and per-
haps generations to come. We heartily agree
with the Secretary-General, in the concluding
passage of his report to this Assembly last
Thursday,' when he appealed to the members
to "intensify their efforts both for the main-
tenance of peace in this particular situation
and for the improvement of the capacity of
the organization to maintain peace." It is in
the spirit of that appeal that I make this
statement.
At the very outset I should like to take this
occasion to pay tribute to Ambassador
[Francisco] Cuevas Cancino of Mexico and
Ambassador [Max] Jakobson of Finland for
their commendable performance as chairmen
of the two committees whose reports are be-
fore us.* This appreciation extends also to
the able bureaus and secretariats serving
these committees.
The position of the United States on the
principles involved in U.N. peacekeeping
was set forth by me only 2 months ago in
the Committee of 33.^
Broadly speaking, they are as follows:
— The capacity of the U.N. to deploy
peacekeeping forces promptly in an emer-
gency must be preserved.
— To support this capacity, viable and
equitable financing arrangements must be
agreed upon and faithfully implemented.
— Any U.N. peacekeeping operation, like
any other complex operation, requires a
single executive. That executive should be
the Secretary-General. He should, of course,
operate within the scope of his authority, re-
maining fully responsible to the authorizing
body and consulting with members on his
conduct of peacekeeping operations.
' U.N. doc. A/6669.
* U.N. doc. A/6637, Report of the Special Political
Committee; U.N. doc. A/6654, Report of the Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.
° For Ambassador Gk>ldberg's statement of Mar. 22,
see Bulletin of Apr. 17, 1967, p. 636.
— No single country, however powerful,
can or should be permitted to frustrate by
the veto a peacekeeping operation of the
United Nations properly initiated by an ap-
propriate organ of the U.N.
Mr. President, my Government has not
changed its belief that these principles are
sound and that they express the true mean-
ing of the charter. Indeed, the history of this
question shows that this belief is shared by
the vast majority of members. We are aware,
of course, that some other members differ
with us in varying degrees. But it is cer-
tainly not my intention today to prolong the
constitutional debate. For we have never re-
garded this question in any of its aspects —
legal, financial, or otherwise — as an issue in
the so-called cold war. We have never looked
upon it as a confrontation between the ma-
jor powers. On the contrary, we believe the
major powers, regardless of ideology, share
a basic interest in the promotion of peace
and security among all nations, large and
small. And we believe the United Nations
peaceikeeping activities are vitally important
to that end.
I do not hesitate to emphasize the interest
of the great powers in this matter. The view
is sometimes stated that the smaller powers,
because they are more vulnerable, are the
real beneficiaries of United Nations peace-
keeping, whereas the great powers "can take
care of themselves." My country does not
accept this view. Nobody questions the vital
interest of the smaller powers in this ac-
tivity; indeed, they have manifested that
interest time and time again by their votes
and their contributions. But neither should
anybody suppose that the United Nations
peacekeeping operations do not serve the
basic interests of the great powers also.
We live in a fast-changing and fast-
shrinking world in which obsolete habits of
thought can be suicidal. Great powers should
not alone be responsible for policing trouble
spots, settling quarrels, and protecting
weaker nations. But if the United Nations
cannot perform this task, what is the alter-
native? For all members, great and small
alike, have obligations to uphold the law of
JUNE 12, 1967
895
the charter and to help each other to main-
tain their integrity and independence. It is
far better for nations to discharge these ob-
ligations collectively rather than individu-
ally. That is the root of the whole matter of
peacekeeping.
Surely the era is long past when the world
community could afford to ignore, or be in-
different to, wars between small powers; for
bitter experience has taught us how infec-
tious they can be. All such conflicts carry
within them the danger of confrontations
into which the great powers themselves could
be drawn and whose destruction would rain
impartially on great and small alike.
My country and the other major powers
therefore share with all countries a vital
interest in maintaining and fostering an im-
partial international instrument of stability
— an instrument which, when danger and
discord arise as they inevitably must, can
intervene not for power but for peace. This
interest has nothing to do with ideology. It
has everything to do with human survival.
The impartial international instrument we
need already exists. It is the United Na-
tions. Its capacity to serve effectively has
been demonstrated in some of the most
dangerous situations of our time. In those
instances where it has succeeded, it has re-
paid its cost a thousandfold. In those in-
stances in which it fails, our response should
not be despair or repudiation but a resolve
to strengthen its effectiveness and to make
it succeed. As Adlai Stevenson warned, "Let
none of us mock its weakness, for when we
do we are mocking ourselves."
In this connection much has been said in
favor of fidelity to the limitations laid down
in the charter. My country yields to none in
this regard — although there are differences
as to what the limitations are. But the
charter does not consist exclusively of limi-
tations. It also confers positive responsibili-
ties to act for peace. These responsibilities
rest on the organs of the United Nations;
they also rest on us, the member states. Each
member, in a manner commensurate with its
power, must bear those responsibilities.
In this spirit, Mr. President, we of the
United States pledge anew our desire to see
the peacekeeping question resolved and our
readiness to work with all others to this end.
We wish to respond flexibly to any initiative
whose purpose is to assure the future of the
United Nations as a keeper of the peace — to
assure that every part of its peacemaking
and peacekeeping machinery is kept in
working order and improved. Progress to
this end, as we have pointed out before, can-
not be made by unrequited concessions from
one side. But where a spirit of accommoda-
tion is apparent, my Government will re-
spond.
And we shall display the same responsive
and responsible attitude also on the collateral
question of the United Nations financial
deficit. As all members know, the United
States over the years has been very forth-
coming on this question. Through the years
we have made large voluntary contributions
to U.N. peacekeeping, over and above our
assessed share. We also took a major initia-
tive 2 years ago, which was reflected in the
consensus of the General Assembly on Sep-
tember 1, 1965, in order to break the dead-
lock over article 19.
I am content to rest on the record of our
performance and leave it to the judgment of
the members whether others have fulfilled
their obligations under the consensus.
Mr. President, we look forward to the day,
which we trust is not far distant, when all
members will see their interests in the same
light and will support a vigorous United
Nations peacekeeping role as readily as
fellow townsmen, whatever their differences,
support an efficient police force. That day, re-
grettably, is not yet. But we must not cease
to work for its arrival.
Some will argue that it is unrealistic, in
view of disappointments, to continue to be-
lieve in a world of law and order in which
the responsibility for keeping the peace is
shared collectively. I do not suggest that the
road toward such an international order is
easy or assured of success. But I do suggest
that we are even less assured of success if
we continued to rely on the so-called Real-
politik which has been the tradition of re-
896
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cent centuries. There is nothing less realis-
tic than Realpolitik. It has brought tragic
wars, the loss of many millions of lives, and
no real security for either the strong or the
weak.
Surely in this gi-eat world organization,
where the tremors of international upheaval
from eveiy quarter of the globe are recorded
every day, it is not too soon for all mem-
bers, great and small, to measure their re-
sponse to the dangers that surround us. This
is no time to make ingenious calculations of
the least that we can be required to do by
the letter of the charter. It is rather a time
for us to see how much we can do, under the
charter, to advance the purposes of peace.
Such is our common unfinished task, for the
completion of which the United States
pledges its unceasing cooperation.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Ambassador Brown To Maintain
Liaison With U.S. Governors
President Johnson on Man/ 15 announced
that Winthrop G. Brown, who has been
Ambassador to Korea since July 1964, ivould
become Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, with responsibility for liaison with the
Governors of the various States. Following is
a Department announcement concerning the
assignment.
Press release 110 dated May 16
The purpose of Ambassador Brown's as-
signment is to achieve closer and more effec-
tive relationships with the Governors, re-
sponsive to their needs and interests in the
realm of foreign affairs, through the liaison
office recently established in Washington by
the National Governors' Conference and
through direct contacts in State capitals.
Ambassador Brown will return to Washing-
ton in mid-June.
This new undertaking is in step with the
Department's efforts, especially in recent
years, to contribute toward a greater com-
munity of understanding between the people
of the United States and the officials who
represent them in the conduct of our foreign
relations. In large measure, this has also
been the main focus of a number of ongoing
programs arranged by the Department.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Protocol relating to certain amendments to the con-
vention on international civil aviation (TIAS
1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered
into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.
Ratification deposited : Singapore, January 4, 1967.
Protocol relating to amendment of article 50 (a) of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 21, 1961.
Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
Ratification deposited: Singapore, January 4, 1967.
Cultural Relations
Constitution of the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded
at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force
November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Signature and acceptance: Guyana, March 21,
1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into
force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Morocco, May 11, 1967.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964.'
Accessions deposited: Turkey, May 23, 1967;
United States, May 25, 1967.
Ratified by the President: May 15, 1967.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered
into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Ireland, May 9, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
JUNE 12, 1967
897
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967."
Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, May 22,
1967.
Signature: Burma, May 22, 1967.
Tetecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.'
Ratifications deposited: Korea, March 14, 1967;
Tunisia, Uganda, April 1, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.
Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notification of approval: Malaysia, March 15,
1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4893, 5603) to put into effect a
revised frequency allotment plan for the aero-
nautical mobile (R) service and related informa-
tion, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29,
1966.'
Notifications of approval: Argentina, April 4,
1967; Luxembourg, March 14, 1967; Mada-
gascar, March 8, 1967; Malaysia, March 11,
1967.
United Nations
Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the
United Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly
at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
December 20, 1965."
Ratified by the President: May 15, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement amending the agreement of Aug^ust 28,
1964 (TIAS 5643), for the financing of certain
educational and cultural exchange programs.
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra May
12, 1967. Entered into force May 12, 1967.
Canada
Agreement relating t» Canada Pension Plan. Signed
at Ottawa May 5, 1967. Entered into force May
5, 1967.
Japan
Agreements concerning certain fisheries off the coast
of the United States with agreed minutes. Ef-
fected by exchanges of notes at Tokyo May 9,
1967. Entered into force May 9, 1967.
New Zealand
Agreement extending the agreement of June 8, 1962
(TIAS 5075), relating to the loan of a vessel to
New Zealand. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington December 15, 1966, and May 5, 1967.
Entered into force May 5, 1967.
Pakistan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities
under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Develop-
ment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D),
with annex. Signed at Islamabad May 11, 1967.
Entered into force May 11, 1967.
Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement relating to the reciprocal grranting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Port of Spain January 14 and March
16, 1967. Entered into force March 16, 1967.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL LVI, NO. 1459
PUBLICATION 8248
JUNE 12, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
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in the field of international relations are
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Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15;
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Note: Contents of this publication are
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898
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX June 12, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. U59
Department and Foreign Service. Ambassador
Brown To Maintain Liaison With U.S. Gov-
ernors 897
Economic Affairs
East- West Trade: An Avenue Toward World
Peace (Trowbridge) 881
Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World
Economic Growth (Johnson, Roth) .... 879
Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure
a Peaceful Future (Rusk) 874
President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial
Export Increase (Johnson) 886
Europe. East- West Trade: An Avenue Toward
World Peace (Trowbridge) 881
Foreign Aid. President Requests $400 Million
for Latin American Loans 887
Latin America. President Requests $400 Mil-
lion for Latin American Loans 887
Near East The United States Calls for Re-
straint in the Near East (Johnson, Goldberg) 870
Presidential Documents
Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World
Economic Growth 879
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 . . . 873
President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial
Export Increase 886
The United States Calls for Restraint in the
Near East 870
South Africa. United States Urges Dialog Re-
garding South West Africa (Goldberg, text
of resolution) 888
South West Africa. United States Urges Dia-
log Regarding South West Africa (Goldberg,
text of resolution) 888
Trade
East- West Trade: An Avenue Toward World
Peace (Trowbridge) 881
Kennedy Round Holds Promise of Free-World
Economic Growth (Johnson, Roth) .... 879
President Johnson Sets Goal of Substantial
Export Increase (Johnson) 886
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 897
United Nations
The United States Calls for Restraint in the
Near East (Johnson, Goldberg) 870
United States Urges Agreement on Peacekeep-
ing Question (Goldberg) 894
United States Urges Dialog Regarding South
West Africa (Goldberg, text of resolution) 888
Viet-Nam
Our Foreign Policy Commitments To Assure
a Peaceful Future (Rusk) 874
Prayer for Peace, Memorial Day, 1967 (procla-
mation) 873
Name Index
Brown, Winthrop G 897
Goldberg, Arthur J 870, 888, 894
Johnson, President 870, 873, 879, 886
Roth, William M 879
Rusk, Secretary 874
Trowbridge, Alexander B 881
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 22-28
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Release issued prior to May 22 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 110
of May 16.
No.
Date
Subject
tll5 5/22 U.S. delegation to International
Conference on Water for
Peace, May 23-31 (rewrite).
*116 5/25 Water for Peace Office estab-
lished in Department.
tll7 5/25 U.S.-Mexican fishery talks con-
cluded.
*118 5/26 Ross sworn in as Ambassador to
Haiti (biographic details).
tll9 5/26 U.S. contribution to UNDP/FAO
fishery project in Viet-Nam
(rewrite) .
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
HUMANITY'S GREATEST NEED
Addresses by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk
at the International Conference on Water for Peace 902
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES CONSIDERATION
OF THE CRISIS IN THE NEAR EAST
Statements by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 920
SCIENCE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT
by Herman Pollack 910
For index see inside back cover
Humanity's Greatest Need
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WATER FOR PEACE,
WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY 23-31
OPENING ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
MAY 23
White House press release dated May 23
This Conference has a vital mandate. The
questions that you will consider deal directly
with the future of life on this earth.
No President has ever welcomed a gather-
ing with greater expectations. I come from
land where water is treasure. For a good
many years, I have done my share of agitat-
ing to increase the water resources of my
native State. I have known the frustrations
of this task. A member of the Texas Legis-
lature once recited some lines on this sub-
ject:
Oh the glamor and the clamor
That attend affairs of state
Seem to fascinate the people
And impress some folks as great.
But the truth about the matter,
In the scale of loss and gain :
Not one inauguration's worth
A good, slow, two-inch rain !
As man faces the next century, one ques-
tion stands above all others: How well — and
how long — can the earth sustain its ever-
growing population?
As much as anything, water holds the key
to that simple question: water to drink,
water to grow the food we must eat, water
to sustain industrial growth.
Today, man is losing his race with the
growing need that he has for water.
We face, on a global scale, the plight of
the Ancient Mariner:
Water, water, everywhere.
Nor any drop to drink.
For a planet two-thirds covered with wa-
ter, this seems to be a very strange shortage.
There is so much plenty all around us.
Yet 97 percent of our waters are in the
ocean, thus far — but I hope not for very
long — of little use to us for either drinking
or irrigation.
Another 2 percent lies frozen in glaciers
and icecaps.
The 1 percent remaining could meet most
of man's needs — if only it were distributed
when and where we need it most.
But today, while millions suffer the rav-
ages of storms — and simultaneously suffer
the ravages of floods — other millions are
thirsty. While men barely tap the abundance
of lakes and rivers and streams, others
watch their crops shrivel with drought.
More and more, people dwell in cities,
where clean water means the difference be-
tween sickness and health. Yet today 40 per-
cent of the world's city dwellers — four out
of 10 — have no water service.
If this is the problem now, think for just
a moment what the future will bring you.
By the year 2000, the world's population
will have doubled to 6 billion — now it is a
little over 3 billion. Our need for water will
have more than doubled.
I ask this Conference to take as its point
of perspective the year 2000. That is not very
far away.
Imagine as you meet here that you are fac-
ing the needs of your children and your chil-
dren's children. Imagine what we must do
to move the world from now until then.
Ask yourselves the big questions:
902
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
How can we engineer our continents and
how can we direct our great river systems to
make use of the water resources that all of
us are wasting today?
How can we tap the vast underground
waters now undeveloped?
How can we modify the weather and bet-
ter distribute the lifegiving rain?
How can we desalt the waters of the ocean,
and how can we freshen our brackish wa-
ters?
How can we use our water supplies again
and again before we finally yield them into
the sea?
How can we curb the filth that pollutes
our streams ?
During the 3 years or more that I have
been President, I have recommended and the
Congress has approved programs in each
and all of these areas — water management,
river valley development, desalting, pollution
control, and research on weather modifica-
tion. But I realize — as you must have — that
we have only begun.
You must consider, finally, the most im-
portant question of all: How can we, as re-
sponsible leaders and spokesmen, awaken
the world's people and the world's leaders to
the urgent problem that confronts the
world?
Even at the risk of being called dreamers,
you must ask these questions and seek the
answers. Unless you do, you will not measure
the true dimension of humanity's greatest
need. You must chart the specific steps to-
ward a more abundant future.
One step must be this: to quicken the pace
of science and technology.
Last week, in the East Room of the White
House, I signed an act of Congress to make
possible a new plant which will more than
double the world's present capacity for de-
salting water. A decade ago, the best plant
design could produce only 50,000 gallons per
day at a cost of $5 per thousand gallons. This
new plant, powered by nuclear energy, will
eventually produce 150 million gallons of
fresh water per day at a cost approaching 20
cents per thousand gallons. That is 3,000
times as much as could be produced 10 years
ago, at one-twenty-fifth the cost.
But the world needs fresh water, and it
needs it at much lower costs.
This is my country's pledge: to continue
work in every area which holds promise for
the world's water needs. And my country
pledges to share the fruits of this technology
with all of those who wish to share it
with us.
American scientists will begin discussions
next month with India on experimental rain-
making projects which may hold promise for
drought-ridden countries all over the world.
A second need we must face up to is to
train more manpower.
We must attract the best technicians and
the best planners to this lifegiving science.
And we must devise programs to educate all
our people in the wiser use of water.
Third, we need to build better institutions
for managing water resources.
This point cannot be overstressed. We
need improved management as much as we
need new technology.
We must support the United Nations and
the international agencies which are trying
to provide world leadership in this field. We
must develop more effective forms of local,
national, and regional cooperation.
For this truth is self-evident: Neither wa-
ter nor weather is a respecter of boundary
lines.
Finally, we need to support new programs
in water resource development.
Projects of international cooperation must
be multiplied many times over what we have
ever done before — projects like those now
under way in the Mekong and the Indus
River Basins.
Frankly, I am not — and I know you are
not — satisfied with the progress that we
are making in these fields now. We are not
using all the imagination and all the enter-
prise that our problem requires. We need
agents who will push, prod, shove, and move
ahead with these international efforts. We
need planners to help develop concrete proj-
ects. We need financial experts who know
JUNE 19, 1967
903
how to interest the world's lending institu-
tions, and educators that can recruit and
train additional skilled manpower for us.
To set top priority for these endeavors in
our own Government, I have already di-
rected the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, to
establish immediately a Water for Peace
Office. Its major role will be to lead and to
coordinate this country's efforts in the
world's water programs.
But we also need to create strong re-
gional offices throughout this world to pro-
vide us with the leadership and to stimulate
cooperation among all nations. The United
States is prepared to join you and all others
in establishing a network of regional water
resource centers. We will provide our fair
share of the expert assistance, the supplies
and the equipment, and the financing that is
needed.
We are confident that the United Nations
and other international organizations repre-
sented here today can and will play a key
role in this enterprise. We should seek to put
the first two centers in operation within the
next 24 months to serve as the spur and
the goad in promoting Water for Peace— and
freedom.
We have called this conference here in
order to learn — and in order to share.
No group could have a more exciting or
more worthwhile mission.
You study the life cycle of our planet. You
deal with nature's elements as men have al-
ways known them: the river, the sea, the
sun, and the sky.
Man once looked to these elements and
found his poetry. Now he must look to them
and find his preservation.
You will grapple with the political as well
as the physical problems of mankind.
For ages past, men have fought wars over
water without adding one single drop to the
world's supply. Now we face and share the
challenge to use water — more abundant wa-
ter— as the enduring servant of peace, free-
dom, and liberty. Let this be your vision dur-
ing the next week, and let this be your
achievement in the years to come.
We are glad that you could come here and
meet with us. We look forward to the pro-
ductive and constructive results that will
flow from your thinking.
We want you to know that we welcome
you. We want to work with you. We truly
believe that there are few problems that
could engage men that offer such limitless
opportunities.
We hope you enjoy your visit. We look
forward to working with you in the years
ahead.
ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSK, MAY 31
Press release 121 dated May 31
Just over a week ago. President Johnson
greeted you here. He stressed the magnitude
of the problems confronting us. He empha-
sized the significance of your deliberations.
And he expressed high hopes for the benefits
to mankind that may be expected to flow
from them. Judging by what I have seen and
heard, he will not be disappointed.
In fact, as this Conference draws to a
close, I think we may all feel solid satisfac-
tion. You, because of what your deliberations
and discussions here have accomplished:
There can be no doubt that they have set the
stage for sharply accelerated progress in the
field of water management. The unselfish de-
votion of time and energy which made such
accomplishment possible is indeed admirable.
For our part, we who have acted as hosts to
this gathering can feel sincerely that our
efforts have been more than justified by your
serious, indeed enthusiastic, response.
Beyond this gratification at a job well
done, there is another dimension to the re-
sults achieved. The value of endeavor is al-
ways proportional to the importance of the
goal as well as to the quality of the endeavor.
We all know that one of the most important
tasks on earth is providing mankind with
adequate sources of pure water. No one is
immune from dependence on water. Man's
need for it is as elemental as it is wide-
spread. The presence of water means life
904
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and health; its absence, disease and death.
As populations mount with startling rapid-
ity, the task becomes daily more vital.
The area of your interest, proper manage-
ment of water resources, is broad as well as
important. And it involves some extremely
complicated and highly technical considera-
tions:
— Desalination, poJlution control, drainage
and irrigation projects, hydroelectric instal-
lations;
— The establishment and direction of ap-
propriate institutions;
— Cultivating the human resources with-
out which no progress is possible.
All these require application of the most
sophisticated techniques of scientist, engi-
neer, administrator, and educator. The ex-
change of information, the cross-fertilization
of ideas, among specialists has naturally
been a most concrete and visible aspect of
this Conference.
But there is another side to the picture.
Though perhaps less immediate, it is equally
real and in the long run may be no less con-
structive. I refer to the impact this gather-
ing, and its repercussions, should have on
the relations between states and peoples, to
its influence in foreign affairs — to its polit-
ical implications, if you will. This is a side
which I am rather better equipped to discuss
than the strictly technical. So I intend to
concentrate on it during my few remarks
this morning.
As President Johnson said so recently
here, the field of water resource management
is made for cooperation.
Neither its evaporation from the oceans
nor its fall from the skies shows the least
interest in boundaries. Many of its surface
carriers, the great rivers, traverse two or
several nations. Lakes and streams and wells
may be the property of political entities, but
their ultimate sources know no sovereignty.
Equally international is the demand. Pos-
sessing a certain citizenship bears no direct
relations to a man's need for water. Such
secondaiy factors as stage of economic de-
velopment do produce patterns of greater or
less per capita consumption, it is true. But
this is a matter of historic accident.
So water is vital, and both demand and
supply are global. Water tends basically to
unify and not to divide.
Secondly, the supply of pure water to com-
munities of human beings is more productive
of amity than enmity. There have been many
cases when antagonisms were sharpened
through disputes over water, to be sure. But
the cause of friction was lack of water or
improper distribution, not improved supplies
or allocations. To the extent the water needs
of a given community are better satisfied,
both itself and its neighbors benefit. The
former gains directly; the latter, through
reduction in those tensions which always rise
in a people deprived of an essential. So there
is clearly a net gain to all when one is
helped.
Further, water normally facilitates the
arts of peace. It causes agriculture to flour-
ish and turns the wheels of industry and
commerce. The availability of plentiful sup-
plies of water is not likely to direct a na-
tion's thoughts to aggression — rather the
reverse.
Beyond these broad tendencies, we see the
same unifying principle operating upon
practical measures. Though each land has
its own specific problems, there are many
common features. Slaking the thirst of arid
regions by converting brine to fresh water
involves the same industrial processes
whether that region is in the Near East or
the American Southwest. Efl"ective ap-
proaches to pollution control will be much
the same in Western Europe as on America's
east coast. Erecting dams, controlling floods,
sinking wells, collecting hydrological data
— all these activities are carried out in much
the same way regardless of location. The
techniques of water resource management
are to a considerable degree applicable every-
where, therefore are transferable.
When we turn to less comprehensive
JUNE 19, 1967
905
areas, the same principle holds with even
greater force. There are regions containing
a number of countries which share an al-
most identical hydrological environment. The
problems of each country in such regions
will be very similar to those of its neighbors.
By the same token, so will the solutions. In
consequence, by far the most efficient ap-
proach to solutions will be through joint ac-
tion. We believe much is to be gained by
encouraging the development of regional
centers where talent may be pooled to
achieve common goals.
We thus see how the laws of logic point
toward cooperation in this field of water
management: cooperation between nations
to avoid global catastrophe; between neigh-
bors to enrich the lot of each; between in-
stitutions whose work is complementary;
between individuals whose community of
interest acts as a bond.
In turn, such cooperation can bring in-
creasing understanding, mutual respect, and
confidence. And this is simply another way
of saying that it will work in the direction
of better international relations, of an im-
proved international political climate. It will
be a force making for peace between nations.
It is this contribution, which we anticipate
from your efforts, that has given rise to a
phrase you have heard frequently — you have
been attending a Conference on "Water for
Peace."
Following this Conference, close study
must be given to the ideas exchanged and
the proposals suggested here. From this
should come clearer and more specific guide-
lines for the work to be done. To assist in
our share of this task and to coordinate the
international activities of the United States
Government agencies in the water field, the
Department which I represent has been
charged with establishing a special Water
for Peace Office.' It will be an integral part
' For an announcement of the establishment of the
Water for Peace Office, see Department of State
press release 116 dated May 25.
of the Department of State but will draw
heavily on the expertise of operating agen-
cies, and especially on that of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, which under the leader-
ship of Secretary Udall has been making
major contributions in this field.
Our objective is not an exclusive American
activity. Our hope, rather, is for a massive
multilateral effort in which all developed and
developing countries will join. It will be nec-
essary to work closely with and through
existing international organizations, as well
as to cooperate in expanded sharing of sci-
entific and technical knowledge among na-
tions on both a multilateral and a bilateral
basis.
Much excellent work is now being done in
the water field by international organiza-
tions. But the magnitude of the problem is
so large that there is no lack of room for
useful activity by all of us. As President
Johnson indicated, progress in this field has
not kept pace with the dimensions of the
problem. So we must move from the general
to the more specific. Some of you have sug-
gested, as a followup to this global Confer-
ence, a series of meetings to develop action
programs on particular aspects of water re-
source management. I agree. These meetings
might be devoted to the needs of particular
regions, including the establishment of re-
gional water resource centers or pollution
control or community water supply or irri-
gation— there is no lack of topics. All who
can contribute should participate. They
might be sponsored by an international or-
ganization such as the United Nations or
one of its related agencies, or the lead could
be taken by some country or countries with
special interests in a particular area or
problem.
We have no wish to dictate either the form
or the content of such meetings. But I as-
sure you my Government will be ready to
lend its cooperation in any way suitable. The
staff of our newly formed Office of Water for
Peace will be prepared for consultation. Be-
906
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tween us we can do much to translate the
plans you have been developing into fruitful
actualities.
In closing, let me thank you for your pres-
ence here.
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State announced on
May 22 (press release 115) that the Inter-
national Conference on Water for Peace
would convene on May 23 at Washington.
The Conference had its origin in the Presi-
dent's statement on October 7, 1965,^ when
he announced the beginning of a Water for
Peace program under which the United
States would join in a massive cooperative
international effort to find a solution for
man's water problems. At that time he also
announced that the United States would con-
vene a conference to deal with all the world's
water problems.
The primary purpose of the Conference
was to provide a forum for the exchange of
experiences, ideas, and technology. It is
hoped that it will provide the basis for the
subsequent development of specific courses
of action or programs for the development
of water resources. Ninety-six countries and
25 intergovernmental organizations were to
participate in the Conference. Nineteen
countries were to be represented at the min-
isterial level.
The U.S. representatives were Stewart L.
Udall, Secretary of the Interior, chairman;
Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agricul-
ture; Donald F. Hornig, Director, Office of
Science and Technology, Executive Office of
the President; David E. Lilienthal, chairman,
Development and Resources Corporation,
New York, N.Y.; and Joseph C. Swidler,
cochairman, citizens advisory committee. In-
ternational Conference on Water for Peace,
Washington, D.C
• For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 1, 1965, p. 720.
' For names of the alternate U.S. representatives,
see press release 115 dated May 22.
President Johnson Visits
EXPO 67 at IVIontreal
Following are remarks m,ade by President
Johnson on May 25 during his visit to the
Canadian World Exhibition {EXPO 67) at
Montreal on the occasion of United States
National Day at the exhibition.
REMARKS AT ARRIVAL CEREMONY,
PLACE DES NATIONS
White House press release dated May 26
It is always a great pleasure for me to
visit Canada. Your magnificent EXPO 67 —
knowledge that this is your centennial anni-
versary— serves to heighten my interest.
My first trip outside of the United States
after I became President was to visit Can-
ada. That was to Vancouver, where we met
with Prime Minister Pearson to proclaim
the Columbia River Treaty.
We came to conserve the water resources
of our great continent — and so naturally
that day it was pouring down rain. It rained
so hard, in fact, that I never delivered the
speech that I had prepared for that occa-
sion. But don't worry. While the temptation
is hard to resist, I'm not going to deliver
that speech here today.
I well recall some words your Prime
Minister spoke to me on that rainy day in
Vancouver more than 2 years ago. He told
me then:'
... I assure you, Mr. President, that had you
landed at our most eastern airport in Newfoundland,
5,000 or more miles away, or at any place between,
our welcome to you would have been equally warm
both for yourself and as President of the United
States. . . .
You have focused the eyes of the world on
the theme of your exhibition: "Man and His
World." We hope that among other lessons
to be learned here will be this: that proud
and independent peoples can live peacefully
' Bulletin of Oct. 12, 1964, p. 505.
JUNE 19, 1967
907
side by side, can live in peace and partner-
ship as g-ood neighbors; that they need not
waste their substance and destroy their
dreams with useless quarrels and senseless,
unconstructive conflict.
We of the United States of America con-
sider ourselves blessed. We have much to
give thanks for. But the gift of providence
that we really cherish is that we were given
as our neighbors on this great, wonderful
continent the people and the nation of Can-
ada.
So we are very delighted to be here. We
are so g"lad that you invited us. We thank
you very much for your courtesy.
REMARKS AT U.S. PAVILION
white House press release dated May 25
It is a very great pleasure to come here
today to present this "Great Ring of Can-
ada" to the people of Canada. It was made
in the United States of America, but it is
all Canadian.
The 12 crystal plaques commemorate your
10 Provinces and your two Territories. It
displays their coats of arms and their official
flowers.
There is also the motto of Canada. That
motto is in Latin, which I will not attempt
to recite. But I recognize the source, because
it is from the Book of Psalms. And in the
version I read as a little boy, it promised
that the righteous "shall have dominion also
from sea to sea."
The Psalm from which Canada takes her
motto — and which is so often repeated in
this "Great Ring" — contains some other
thoughts which I think would be appro-
priate to recall today.
It describes the just ruler, and it says:
He shall judge thy people with righteousness, and
thy poor with judgment. . . .
He shall judge the poor of the people, he shall
save the children of the needy, and he shall break in
pieces, the oppressor. . . .
In his days shall the righteous flourish; and
abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth.
He shall have dominion also from sea to sea, and
from the river unto the ends of the earth.
And so, Mr. Commissioner General
[Pierre Dupuy], if the President of the
United States may be permitted to comment
on the internal afl'airs of a sister nation,
Canada's motto was well chosen.
We share the goals and the ideals that are
expressed in that motto. It is my profound
hope that this eloquent expression of it will
be viewed by generations yet unborn as an
historic symbol. I hope they will have reason
to remember it as tangible evidence that two
great nations were united in their efforts to
create the kind of world for which men have
always longed but really have never
achieved.
If that comes to pass, then Canadians and
Americans alike may well say for all time:
Our ancestors pointed the way.
This is not a crystal ball. We cannot see
all that just by looking into it. But I believe
it is there. It is there in the history of Can-
ada. It is there in the history of the United
States. And I strongly suspect that what is
sometimes cloudy and obscure to us will be
as crystal clear to our grandchildren as this
great work of art that we have come here
to unveil today to our friends.
President Johnson Confers
With Canadian Prime IVIinister
071 May 25, after his visit to EXPO 67 at
Montreal, President Johnson conferred ivith
Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson
at Harrington Lake, Ontario. Following are
their remarks at a joint press briefing held
at Uplands RCAF Base, Ottawa, on May 25
upon President Johmson's departure for
Washington.
White House press release dated May 25
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
I want to tell you about our visit here
today and to thank the people of Canada,
the distinguished Prime Minister, and the
other officials of the Canadian Government
for their hospitality.
908
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We had a delightful visit at EXPO. We
were thrilled to see what you people had
done there in the way of permitting other
nations to come here and demonstrate their
friendship for your great country and to
exchange exhibits and ideas with our neigh-
bors.
I imposed on the Prime Minister by going
with him to lunch and counseling with him
on the problems that confront the peoples
of the world today. We, of course, discussed
the situation that exists in the Middle East,
the discussions that took place yesterday in
the Security Council of the United Nations,'
and the likely discussions that will take
place in the days ahead.
As you know, we in the United States have
a very high regard for Prime Minister Pear-
son. He has worked with our people over a
long period. He has served in our Capital.
He has distinguished himself as a citizen of
the world. He is one of the great living
experts on the particular area of the world
which greatly concerns us now.
The Prime Minister and I exchanged
ideas. Our visit was a very agreeable one.
We not only talked about the Middle East,
but we talked about our respective countries,
our problems with each other, the problems
that good neighbors do have.
We also talked about the situation in Viet-
Nam, as we have on other occasions. I
brought him up to date on the reports that
we have from there — our viewpoint. I am
returning to Washington very shortly where
I will meet Lord Casey, who is due there at
5:30.
I would summarize our visit by saying my
talk with the Prime Minister and others was
quite constructive and very agreeable. I hope
that in the days ahead I might have the
' See p. 920.
opportunity to come here for a somewhat
more extended stay than the situation today
would permit.
I have been President a little over 3 years;
I have had a chance to visit Canada three
times. I would like to have some other visits
in the future.
PRIME MINISTER PEARSON
The President is due in Washington at
5:30 to meet with the Governor General of
Australia, so I hope he won't be detained.
I think the President, who I was so happy
to have as my guest at Harrington Lake, has
said all that can be said about our talks.
We covered a lot of ground. From my
point of view, they were very helpful indeed,
and I am very grateful indeed to the Presi-
dent for getting his viewpoint on some of
the very dangerous and difficult interna-
tional situations that face us today.
I just want to express my gratitude for
the President taking time to come here, and
as he has indicated, he hopes to get baak in
our centennial year to Canada for a little
longer visit.
So I think if you will excuse us, I will go
to the plane with the President and wave
him goodby to Washington.
Letters of Credence
Iran
The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran,
Hushang Ansary, presented his credentials
to President Johnson on May 26. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated May 26.
JUNE 19, 1967
909
"The overlap between the fields of economics and politics
and the fields of science and technology already dictates that
these areas he handled as unities." In this address at the
University of Illinois Centennial Colloquium on Science and
Human Affairs on May 17, Herman Pollack^ Acting Direc-
tor, International Scientific and Technological Affairs,
describes the Department's response to "the challenge of
science in foreign affairs."
Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department
by Herman Pollack
Science in the State Department is a sub-
ject about which precious Httle is generally
known. I feel it is of great importance that
it be more widely understood — and espe-
cially in the academic community. My re-
marks today will deal with the subject
broadly. I shall discuss, at least briefly, three
principal themes: the present and future im-
portance of the interaction between science
and foreign affairs, the attitude of the De-
partment of State on the subject, and the
administrative response we have made to the
challenge of science in foreign affairs.
This may be as good a point as any to note
that I speak of science and technology as
though they were one — which they are not —
and when I use the term "science" I encom-
pass both basic and applied — ^and I shall
assume you fully understand the distinction.
Dr. Walsh McDermott is credited with the
following distinction, which may not prove
too helpful to you. "The work you or your im-
mediate colleagues are doing," McDermott
said, "is clearly basic; all other research is
applied."
Let me begin with a remark now so com-
monplace as to be almost platitudinous, yet
nevertheless fundamental and very real; that
is, we are in the midst of a technological
revolution without precedent in its combina-
tion of scale, pace, and impact on the affairs
of men.
The crucial element in that combination
is pace, for the rate of development from
the first demonstration of a new technological
concept to its widespread commercial and
social use tends to be incredibly brief.
Let me illustrate by taking you back 10
years — one brief decade — to 1957, in many
ways a landmark year. That was the year of
Sputnik and the year of the first full-scale
nuclear power reactor, the prototype plant in
Shippingport, Pennsylvania. Sputnik, let us
recall, was deaf and blind and, save for a
radio beep, dumb. Yet, in less than 10 years
satellites have made possible revolutionary
contributions to world communications,
meteorology, and astronomy. Direct-broad-
cast TV, natural-resource sensing, and other
far-reaching applications are offstage. Ten
years after the Shippingport power reactor
went on the line, nuclear power is no longer
a thing of the future. It has arrived, and over
50 percent of the new powerplants now being
contracted for in the United States are
nuclear. I shall refer later to the interna-
tional implications of this development.
In 1957 desalination was still largely a
shipboard enterprise and water costs were in
excess of $5 per 1,000 gallons. Today, plants
producing in excess of 1 million gallons a day
are becoming general — in Kuwait, in
Curacao, and in Florida, among others — and
it has been agreed to build a combination
910
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
power and water plant for the Metropolitan
Water District in Los Angeles which is
planned ultimately to produce 150 million
gallons of water at an estimated cost of 22
cents per 1,000 gallons. That plant is to the
state of the art in large-scale desalting tech-
nology as was the Shippingport plant to the
state of the art in nuclear power production.
In 1957 rain augmentation was still
largely restricted to experiments carried on
in a refrigerator. Today, rain augmentation
experiments are being conducted on an in-
creasingly large scale, and experience to date
is sufficiently promising for our Department
of the Interior to begin planning production
activities.
Ten years ago the future of computer tech-
nology was but dimly seen, and very few
really cared about the oceans.
Incidentally, 1957 was a landmark year
in other ways, and it may help us to place
these technical events in a larger context.
That year witnessed the signing of the Euro-
pean Common Market treaty and the first
racial controversy in Little Rock; the last
battleship was being readied for mothballs;
the first ballistic-missile nuclear submarine
was about to be launched; and the U-2's were
flying.
So in the brief decade since 1957, we have
progressed from youth to adolescence, accom-
panied by the usual growing pains. The mem-
bers of a Presidential panel who recently
prepared a report on "Computers in Higher
Education" would take exception to that
statement. They allege in their opening sen-
tence that "After growing wildly for years,
the field of computing now appears to be
approaching its infancy."
Whether infant, youth, or adolescent, the
key point is that though there is ample to
contend with today, there is much yet to
come. A Torrey Canyon capable of polluting
international waters with 120,000 tons of
crude oil has sister ships now on the high
seas at 205,000 tons, and vessels of 500,000
tons and more are not far off. The tankers
used in World War II were generally less
than 20,000 tons. Not only has the pace of
discovery increased; the rate of application
has also increased. Furthermore, the impact
of each innovation — like a pebble thrown into
a pond — sends its eddies in ever-widening
circles.
The leisurely tempo of our early history
has vanished to the accompaniment of some
shattering explosions, explosions of tech-
nology, of population, of information, and of
rising expectations. We have the tools, we
have the knowledge, and we have the oppor-
tunity to direct our destiny if we also exer-
cise some common sense and political astute-
ness.
Significance for Diplomacy
Now, what does all this mean to the prac-
titioner of diplomacy, to those who labor in
the vineyard of the Department of State?
Some of its significance is obvious. Take plu-
tonium, for instance. Every nuclear power
station in the world automatically produces
Plutonium, and plutonium is the material
with which you make atomic bombs. The cur-
rent international debate on the safeguards
article of the nonproliferation treaty con-
cerns ultimately this plutonium which is
unavoidably produced by nuclear power reac-
tors all over the world. Such reactors will
increasingly dominate the electrical generat-
ing market in the years ahead, simply because
the economics of producing large quantities
of power to meet the needs of an energy-
hungry world increasingly favor nuclear fuel
over fossil fuels.
Now that nuclear energy as a power source
is no longer a vision but a reality, we can
anticipate dramatic and far-reaching changes
in heretofore energy-poor countries, for
nuclear energy is remarkably independent of
the source of uranium ore.
The advent of large quantities of desali-
nated water may provide a basis for easing
traditional differences among nations on the
allocation and control of scarce water re-
sources.
Space developments, by their very environ-
ment, must be essentially international in
character. This is also true of weather modi-
fication and the exploitation of the mineral
and living resources of the oceans.
JUNE 19, 1967
911
The realization that the vigor of a na-
tion's economy is now largely dependent upon
the quality of and the use to which it puts
its science and technology has given rise to
international comparisons of technological
proficiency and in turn to the problem of the
"technological gap." This today is as mean-
ingful to a diplomat as were comparisons of
the size of standing armies several genera-
tions ago. The brain drain is no longer
merely an interesting phenomenon. It has
acquired the status of a political issue and
a fairly hot one, at that.
Distance is no longer of much comfort in
terms of providing security from one's ene-
mies. The oceans no longer protect. Now-
adays they are more noteworthy as the
environment of the nuclear-powered missile-
equipped submarine.
These quick illustrations are sufficient, I
think, to indicate that the present-day inter-
action of science and foreign affairs is ex-
tensive. And these, of course, are the subjects
on which we work daily. Not only do scien-
tific and technological developments affect the
basic geopolitical-economic considerations
which underlie foreign policy decisions, but
they become increasingly the very subject of
international negotiations. They are provid-
ing a host of new problems, with awesome
potential for the disadvantage of the amity
of nations. On the other hand, their bene-
ficial potential, imaginatively and effectively
employed, could have immense favorable
impact on the climate of international rela-
tions over the next century or more.
International Cooperation in Science
That a significant portion of the fabric of
international affairs today is composed of
relationships on scientific and technical sub-
jects is attested to by reference to the host
of international agencies concerned with such
matters. Among the more noteworthy are the
International Atomic Energy Agency, the
World Health Organization, the Food and
Agriculture Organization, the Intergovern-
mental Oceanographic Commission, and the
scientific components of the various regional
security and economic organizations. We
might also recall that the "S" in UNESCO
stands for "Scientific" and there is a stand-
ing U.N. Committee on the Application of
Science and Technology to Development.
Increasing in importance are bilateral pro-
grams such as the separate U.S.-Japan
Scientific, Natural Resources, and Medical
Cooperation programs; the U.S.-German
Natural Resources Cooperative Program; and
the well-publicized French-Soviet cooperative
undertakings in science and technology. In
the nongovernmental sector there are the
large-scale activities of the great interna-
tional scientific unions.
The United States well recognizes the im-
portance and value of maintaining scientific
contacts even when political differences may
otherwise strain relations among nations. The
Department of State accordingly puts in
much effort in facilitating the movement of
scientists. I am glad to report that consider-
able progress has been made in removing
some of the red tape that has in times past
been troublesome.
The United States is a strong supporter
of international cooperation in scientific and
technical programs and activities because we
find such cooperation to be in the national
interests.
We recognize that the sum of the
world's scientific knowledge is a result of con-
tributions from many lands and many peo-
ples, and we exchange scientists and techni-
cal information partly to acquire the results
of foreign research for our own programs.
The scientific community has a very real
interest in this aspect and seeks these inter-
national contacts for professional stimulation
and recognition, as well.
The nations of the world are all interested
in education and material progress. We work
through the common denominators of science
and technology as one means of enlarging
the world sense of community. Broad national
interest requires that we exert affirmative
leadership in all areas to build a world
environment which is congenial to the con-
tinued existence of free societies. It is, for
912
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
example, in that national interest to seek
better ways to advance the material well-
being of the have-nots and to work with
other nations in developing effective arms
control mechanisms.
We believe that effective international
institutions are an essential part of that
world environment we are seeking to build,
and our actions reflect that belief. We also
support and cooperate with regional scien-
tific efforts, because we believe that strong
regional organizations offer a superior future
to that permitted by the parochial and limited
national practices of the last century.
We are developing joint cooperative re-
search programs with nations such as Japan,
West Germany, and others. These nations can
make contributions to research of mutual
interest in equivalent measure with the
United States, and these programs serve to
strengthen American science.
There are substantial concerns about man's
future which require worldwide integrated
action. Such immediate problems as popula-
tion pressures, protection of basic food crops
and the development of new sources of food,
and water management require a joint ap-
proach now. For the future, international
action will be needed in disease control, re-
source exploitation and conservation, weather
modification and control, and in the search
for new energy sources. For the far future,
mastery of and competence in the ocean
depths and outer space will require a massive,
sustained, and cooperative effort.
These things are together a practical rea-
son for the Government's interest in provid-
ing strong continuing leadership to inter-
national cooperation in world scientific and
technological affairs.
We cannot ignore one further and very
real reason: that of native American idealism.
We believe in a human response to human
needs, we believe in the upgrading of human
existence, and we have strong historical ties
to many nations, particularly in Europe and
in Latin America. We value the faith placed
in the American people; it is our nature to
respond to that faith affirmatively.
Department of State Science Office
It is quite clear that the Department of
State must be equipped both with structure
and with manpower capable of treating ade-
quately these newly important facets of inter-
national affairs. The adequacy with which
this is being done in the Department of State
is from time to time subjected to public
scrutiny and comment, as those of you who
follow Science magazine are aware. One of
your previous speakers. Professor Eugene B.
Skolnikoff, has just published a book "Sci-
ence, Technology, and American Foreign
Policy," which discusses this subject very
knowledgeably and with considerable insight.
This scrutiny into our performance is both
appropriate and timely, for within the De-
partment we are still in our swaddling clothes
in our ability to handle some of these sub-
jects. And as I said at the outset, the subject
is sufficiently important to warrant more
attention than it has yet received.
Indeed, I am dismayed at how frequently
worldly scientists and engineers and pro-
fessors of international relations, men who
should know better, express surprise at the
existence of a science office in the Depart-
ment. It is known as International Scientific
and Technological Affairs or, more familiarly
in our intramural alphabet soup, as SCI. Re-
porting directly to the Secretary, ranking
with the other major components of the De-
partment, it advises the Secretary on foreign
policy and international relations to assure
consideration of scientific and technological
factors, and it develops policies and proposals
for international science and technology pro-
grams and activities. It is a small organiza-
tion, numbering approximately 20 officers,
half of whom are scientists or engineers. The
remaining are foreign affairs specialists.
Our organization includes an Office of
Atomic Energy Affairs, an Office of Outer
Space Affairs, and an Office of General Scien-
tific Affairs. Although the principal focus for
efforts in these areas in the Department, by
no means does SCI have an exclusive juris-
diction, nor do we seek one. Practically every
JUNE 19, 1967
913
bureau in the Department has a major in-
volvement in some technological program.
The European Bureau and EURATOM
[European Atomic Energy Community] ; the
Near Eastern and South Asian Bureau and
the U.S.-Israeli Joint Desalting Program;
and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
and the pioneering science and technology
section of the Punta del Este communique of
last month ^ are illustrative.
Just as wars can no longer be left entirely
to the soldiers and science is too much a part
of our lives to be left entirely to the scien-
tists, so, too, foreign affairs is too compre-
hensive a field and involves too many aspects
of American life to be left to the foreign
affairs specialist alone. The overlap between
the fields of economics and politics and the
fields of science and technology already dic-
tates that these areas be handled as unities.
The increasingly elaborate relationships and
interrelationships, both here and abroad,
which are now developing require a new
symbiosis in all aspects of human affairs.
It is for this reason, among others, that the
Department of State has established an ex-
tensive pattern of relationships with the ma-
jor scientific and technical agencies of the
Government. There is a very tangible inter-
play between science operations and foreign
operations and between science policy and
foreign policy. Most of these relationships are
informal, although a reasonable amount of
activity is covered by interagency committees,
many of which SCI chairs, including policy
committees on space, marine sciences, and
desalting. We also represent the Department
of State on interagency technical committees
too numerous to mention.
Abroad the principal structural response
by the Department of State has been the
establishment at some 18 major embassies
of the position of scientific attache, and at
over 90 other posts of the position of science
liaison officer. The latter is a Foreign Serv-
ice officer who as a part-time responsibility
' For text of the Declaration of the Presidents
of America signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay, on
Apr. 14, see Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 712.
follows science and technology matters for his
embassy. The problem of manpower, that is,
staffing the attache positions as well as sci-
ence liaison officer positions and the Foreign
Service generally, is one that concerns me
greatly. Let me explain why.
I participate regularly in the training pro-
grams provided by the Department to our
fledgling Foreign Service officers. These are
the young men and women (average age
about 27) who by 1980 will be on the brink
of holding positions of great responsibility
and authority in the upper echelons of the
Department of State and who by 1990, less
than 25 years hence, will in all likelihood be
holding positions of Assistant and Under
Secretary of State and will be heading the
United States missions to the principal inter-
national organizations and to the key coun-
tries of the world.
These, then, are the people who will be
responsible for providing advice and exper-
tise on the problems posed in 1980, when the
peaceful nuclear power reactors located
throughout the world will be daily producing
Plutonium sufficient for dozens of nuclear
weapons. Undoubtedly this will be the gen-
eration dealing with the critical phases of the
international tensions posed by an explosively
expanding world population that will con-
tinue well into the eighties. They will prob-
ably have to chart international law for the
ocean bottoms. By 1980 the continuing prob-
lem of the definition and control of the Con-
tinental Shelf may well take on critical form.
As these young men and women reach
their professional maturity, one might even
speculate that instantaneous global commu-
nication by satellite, married to supersonic
transport and a computer technology by
several orders of magnitude more capable
than that now existing, together with other
scientific and technological developments,
will have an increasingly upsetting impact
upon the theories of the modern state upon
which our present model of international re-
lations is constructed.
Although technological forecasting is be-
coming fashionable, it remains a very uncer-
tain occupation, and scientific forecasting is
914
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
literally not possible. Nevertheless, it is not
unreasonable to assume that practitioners of
diplomacy in 1980 will not be comfortable
or qualified in their assignments unless they
have a much deeper and more comprehensive
knowledge of science and technology than do
their present-day colleagues. Such knowledge
will not be acquired by osmosis nor, I sug-
gest, by self-study. It will have to be pro-
gramed and structured — both by the Depart-
ment of State for its professional staff and
by the academic institutions as part of their
preparation of our future recruits.
The young men and women most recently
recruited are not much better off, in terms of
their academic preparations for a world in
which science and technology loom so large,
than the present crop of senior officers who
completed their formal education when the
table of elements had stabilized at 92 and
space was a term in the lexicon of the real
estate agent.
Training "Men of Science"
Let us look a bit more deeply into this
question of manpower for science in the
State Department. I have already mentioned
the position of scientific attache now estab-
lished at 18 posts abroad. We view the scien-
tific attache as a policy officer with a scien-
tific or technical background. It is his
full-time job to focus on the political, eco-
nomic, military, and public relations impact
of science and technology on U.S. foreign
policy objectives. Our first scientific attache
was such a man. Ben Franklin's scientific in-
volvement, first in London and then in Paris,
could well serve as a continuing model for our
present-day scientific attache program. We
have such men serving in our embassies today
and wrestling with problems which would
leave Ben gasping — probably with delight.
We need more such men capable of marrying
science and foreign affairs, but I have found
that the supply is inadequate to the demand.
We have found that scientists, like many
others, frequently lack an awareness of the
realities of world politics and, correspond-
ingly, foreign affairs specialists are fre-
quently resistant to the acquisition of
knowledge about scientific and technical de-
velopments applicable to foreign affairs. I
don't mean to be disparaging toward either
group — after all, some of my best friends are
scientists, and I must live with the diplomats.
The challenge is, in part, to our educational
systems. I would like to quote two eminent
men on this subject. Secretary Rusk told a
congressional panel on science policy last
January that: ^
For any American involved in public affairs today,
scientific literacy is a must; and that is particularly
so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced that
the Foreign Service oflScer should be familiar with
the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science.
He should understand the sources of our technologi-
cal civilization. He should be able to grasp the social
and economic implications of current scientific dis-
coveries and engineering accomplishments. I think
it is feasible for nonscientists to be, in the phrase
of H. G. Wells, "men of science" with real awareness
of this aspect of man's advance.
This is one view from the ridge. Across the
valley, on his own ridge, Glenn Seaborg,
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, said this last week:
Students should not specialize in science to the
extent that the humanities are neglected. The sig-
nificance of science and technology and their role in
society cannot be understood apart from the human
values and social institutions that are affected —
often drastically — by the dynamic forces of scientific
discovery and technological change. In our rapidly
changing world the scientist has a special responsi-
bility to think about the impact of science on people
and to communicate to the public about science.
Scientists must be concerned about the world in
which science is used, and they must understand
the values, the sensitivities, the wants, and the needs
of people. Only the humanities and the social sciences
can provide this essential, broad framework of
understanding.
This recognition at the highest levels of
Government of the need for fusing the fields
of foreign affairs and science in using the
new technology in the service of man has its
corollary in activities such as this one at the
University of Illinois. A number of American
universities have started programs to blend
^ For an address by Secretary Rusk before the
eighth annual Panel on Science and Technologry of
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics,
on Jan. 24, see ibid., Feb. 13, 1967, p. 238.
JUNE 19, 1967
915
science and public policy, including foreign
affairs, to this purpose. Some few have estab-
lished institutes within the universities. These
programs are of course independent of the
Government, but we follow their development
with great interest. These new initiatives
in the universities may build the necessary
bridge and may provide us with those "men
of science" skilled in foreign affairs.
The scientific attaches, as good as they
are, cannot operate in a vacuum, nor can
they alone fill the vacuum. We must begin
now to insure that the next generation of
Foreign Service officers adds scientific liter-
acy to the wide range of skills and knowledge
already required in their profession.
For the benefit of junior officers as well as
their older colleagues, we conduct a continu-
ing indoctrination within the Department at
many levels, ranging from the Secretary's
science luncheons and briefings for principal
officers of the Department to special courses
at the State Department's Foreign Service
Institute, general Departmental briefings,
press releases, film presentations, and science
articles in State Department journals. We
have joined with the science agencies in an
exchange program, involving annually 10
junior officers, in order to expose the mem-
bers of the Foreign Service to substantive
science programs and to give young officers
of the science agencies an insight into the use
of science in foreign policy. This program is
about to celebrate its first anniversary.
These efforts are not enough, but at least
they are a beginning. We would welcome the
opportunity to cooperate with the universities
in extending this training program through-
out the country.
In conclusion, I would like to restate my
principal points. Science and foreign affairs
are inextricably linked today, and the bond
will grow. We have barely scratched the sur-
face, and one of our major problems is that
of quality of manpower — not only for spe-
cialized jobs but for the Foreign Service as
a whole. I don't know what the ultimate mix
of training should be; I have urged the Na-
tional Science Foundation to consider
whether it could not stimulate the universi-
ties to help meet the State Department's re-
quirements for diplomat-scientists, or scien-
tist-diplomats, depending upon your own
orientation; and I would urge those of you
here to think about the opportunities pre-
sented by this new field of foreign affairs.
We must begin equipping ourselves now with
the men and women who are going to be
making the foreign policy recommendations
and decisions in the career generation to
come. The Secretary of State put the prob-
lem this way: *
As the scientists put their minds to the problems
of the future, it is just as important that the social
sciences and the humanities do the same. The old
notion that somehow the future is not the business
of the humanities and the social sciences is rapidly
disappearing, because the other half of our great
universities is hurling us into the future at a breath-
taking pace. Unless those who think about the prob-
lems of man similarly address themselves to the
future, and not merely to some remote past nor to
the views spoken somewhere else at an earlier stage,
then we will have vast problems confronting us in
the future. This joint action among all groups . . .
is indispensable if we are to move ahead as rational
human beings into this uncharted future.
We are all aware of the tremendous popu-
lation explosion facing the world over the
next quarter century; and the world's de-
mands for new sources of power are increas-
ing at three times that rate. The promise of
the sea as a source of natural resources and
food, the challenges of outer space, the infor-
mation explosion and computer technology,
advances in understanding the life processes,
control of the physical environment, the con-
tainment of nuclear energy, and the search
for controlled fusion are among the giant
challenges of the new civilization. Three hun-
dred and fifty years ago, in his "New Atlan-
tis," Francis Bacon told of a civilization
based upon science and technology used for
the benefit of all. That potential exists today.
But science policy is about where economic
policy was before Adam Smith. Understand-
ing of the interaction of science and society,
and intelligent forecasting and planning, are
prerequisites to a realization of that poten-
tial.
'Ibid.
916
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The burst of energies at loose in all realms
of life is cumulative. An adaptability and
resourcefulness of unimagined dimension will
be required of future generations, and for the
remainder of the century we will live in the
midst of rapid change. It is our job to insure
the survival and health of the United States
as a political entity— and in today's world
that means the continued and careful exercise
of leadership in all areas of interaction be-
tween nations.
Sacrifices in Viet-Nam IVIarked
in Memorial Day IVIessages
Following is an exchange of messages on
Memorial Day between President Johnson
and Nguyen Van Thieu, Chairman of the
National Leadership Committee of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam.
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated May 30
The President's Message
Dear General Thieu: Your thoughtful
Memorial Day message will be deeply ap-
preciated by the American people. It will have
particular meaning in those homes and fami-
lies where a life has been given in the defense
of our common freedom.
In remembering our own honored dead,
our thoughts turn inevitably to the valiant
allies with whom we have shared the burden
of resisting aggression. Thus we are mindful
today of the great sacrifices of the Viei>
namese people and we look forward to a
brighter day of peace and progress in Viet-
nam, in Asia, and throughout the world.
General Thieu's Message
Dear Mr. President: On the occasion of
Memorial Day, I wish to express to you, in
the name of the Vietnamese people and in
my own name, our most sincere gratitude for
the valiant officers and men of the United
States who have made the supreme sacrifice
of their lives to defend freedom and to ensure
a just and durable peace in this part of the
world.
Americans and Vietnamese have toiled and
struggled together on this soil for a noble
cause. The sacrifices that our own peoples
have made together in this common cause
strengthen every day the bonds of friendship
between our two nations. They constitute the
bulwark against tyranny, for the preserva-
tion of an international society in which East
and West can cooperate in harmony, in
mutual appreciation and mutual respect.
We are confident of the successful outcome
of this struggle, and shall do our best so that
the sacrifices of these brave heroes will not
be made in vain.
President Joiinson Greets
Japanese Governors
Following are remarks made by President
Johnson on May 2h to nine Japanese Gov-
ernors visiting the United States.
White House press release dated May 24
I aim happy to extend to each one of you,
on behalf of all the American people, our
welcome to the United States and a warm
welcome to the White House.
The mutual visits which the Governors of
Japan and the Governors of the United
States have been making for the past 3 years
are, I think, a great benefit to our countries.
Much has been made of the great differ-
ences between our countries— differences of
culture, religion, and geography. But I am
struck by our similarities.
Our two countries are among the world's
most active and vital and prosperous. And we
are among the most deeply involved in world
affairs.
Both of us face the problems of success:
challenges of growth, of rising affluence, of
social and political change.
In a turbulent world, the answers which
our countries find to those problems will have
influence far beyond our borders.
That is why I am grateful for the mutual
understanding and the common progress
which result from your contacts with our
Governors — ^and theirs with you.
JUNE 19, 1967
917
You are advancing the noblest cause of all:
the cause of peace.
In meeting the problem of urban growth,
for instance, I am struck by how our ap-
proaches coincide. Both Japan and America
have experienced explosive urban growth.
Two-thirds of our people now live in cities.
Coping with this explosion tests not only our
technology but the very power of democracy
to govern creatively and effectively. Our re-
sponses are remarkably similar. Both of us
cherish the principle of local initiative, local
action.
And we have a great deal to learn from
each other. We are already learning from
Japan about the development of high-speed
railways. When we see the Tokyo-Osaka ex-
press train streaking along at 125 miles an
hour, we dream of the day when trains on
our eastern seaboard will move as fast. And,
at a time when mass urban transit is a major
national issue in the United States, we are
studying your suburban rail systems.
In this and other fields the exchange of
ideas can be a way to better understanding
between our people. We believe it leads to
eventual peace and progress all over the
world.
I hope that there are developments in our
country which will be useful to you in Japan.
Our country is facing great new problems
— and establishing great new programs. As
a result, our Federal system is being chal-
lenged.
We believe that we will meet that chal-
lenge. Right now, we are establishing better
conmiunication, better cooperation, better
understanding between our States and the
Federal Government.
On your visit, you can see that happening. I
hope it gives you some ideas to take home.
I am glad to observe that you are having
lunch today with our friends in the Congress.
Gentlemen, you do us honor by your visit.
I salute you — and I salute the National Gov-
ernors' Conference for its part in this ven-
ture of understanding.
U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing
Drug Reaction Reporting System
The White House announced on May 9
that President Johnson had that day author-
ized an agreement with the World Health
Organization to establish, on a pilot basis,
an international system to monitor and re-
port adverse drug reactions.
Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare John W. Gardner was delegated author-
ity to implement the project under the
provisions of the International Health Re-
search Act of 1960 [Public Law 86-610] .i
"A worldwide early warning system for
drugs will be a vital health protection meas-
ure for people everywhere," the President
said. "Increasingly powerful and sophisti-
cated drugs emerge from laboratories as
boons to the struggle against man's bodily
afflictions. In actual use, however, some
drugs have had unexpected and tragic con-
sequences before medical communities could
become aware of unpredictable side effects.
This worldwide early warning system is a
big step forward in protecting all people
from these unforeseen hazards. We are glad
to make this grant to assist in its establish-
ment."
The worldwide monitoring center for ad-
verse drug reactions will parallel the pro-
gram established by the Food and Drug
Administration to provide such a warning
system in the United States. A significant
venture in international cooperation, the
center will be similar in kind to other WHO-
designated centers for the international co-
ordination of efforts to control such diseases
as shigella, rickettsia, and influenza.
Computer facilities of the FDA would be
utilized in the international system. Data
from national drug reaction reporting cen-
ters would feed into the central computer
facility. Hazardous drug reactions detected
' For text of a letter from President Johnson
to Secretary Gardner, see White House press
release dated May 9.
918
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
in any reporting nation could then be dis-
seminated throughout the world.
The President authorized Secretary Gard-
ner to grant to the World Health Organiza-
tion the funds necessary to launch the pilot
project. The estimated cost for the first year
of operation is $180,000. In addition, the
FDA will provide computer services and of-
fice facilities in Washington, D. C.
Worldwide interest in the development of
an international drug reaction reporting
system was stimulated by the thalidomide
tragedy in Europe, where thousands of de-
formed babies were born before the cause
was attributed to the use of the sedative
drug by women during pregnancy.
U.S.-Mexican Fishery Talks
Held at Washington
Joint Statement
Press release 117 dated May 25
Informal and exploratory conversations
between representatives of Mexico and the
United States on fishery questions of mutual
interest, which began in the Department of
State, Washington, D.C., on May 15, were
concluded today [May 25]. The motive of
the conversations was the recent changes
which both countries have made in their
laws relating to jurisdiction over marine
fisheries within the contiguous zone off their
territorial seas, and their purpose was to
exchange views regarding the conditions
under which United States fishermen may
be permitted to continue their traditional
fisheries in that zone. The Mexican law
establishing an exclusive fisheries zone be-
tween 9 and 12 miles off the Mexican coasts
provides that under certain conditions for-
eign fishermen may continue their traditional
fishing activities within that zone during the
five years commencing with 1968.
The Mexican delegation was headed by
Mexico's Ambassador to the United States,
Dr. Hugo B. Margain, and included Ambas-
sador Dr. Oscar Rabasa, Legal Adviser to
the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, Capt.
C. G. Gilberto Lopez Lira, Secretariat of the
Navy, and Dr. Jorge Echaniz R., Director
General of Fisheries, Secretariat of Industry
and Commerce.
The United States delegation was headed
by Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Spe-
cial Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to
the Secretary of State, and included Harold
E. Crowther, Director, Bureau of Com-
mercial Fisheries, Department of the In-
terior, Raymund T. Yingling, Legal Adviser
for Special Functional Problems, Depart-
ment of State, and William M. Terry, As-
sistant Director for International Affairs,
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, Depart-
ment of the Interior. Both delegations were
assisted by advisers representing their
Pacific and Gulf coast industries.
In the course of their conversations, the
representatives of both Governments pre-
sented fully their points of view on all
aspects of questions related to the continua-
tion of traditional United States fisheries in
Mexico's exclusive fishery zone beyond its
territorial sea. Considerable areas of coin-
cidence of the views of the two delegations
were found. These areas where the views of
the two delegations were found to be in
agreement, as well as the reservations and
suggestions of both delegations in other
areas, are incorporated into a joint report to
the Governments. The report contains points
which could serve as a basis on which tradi-
tional fishing by nationals of each country
may continue within the exclusive fishery
zone of the other country during a limited
period of time. It is expected that this report
will serve as the basis for further considera-
tion towards reaching an agreement between
the Governments.
The talks developed in a spirit of friend-
ship and mutual respect which permitted
them to reach a successful conclusion.
JUNE 19, 1967
919
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Security Council Continues Consideration
of the Crisis in the Near East
Statements by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative in the Security Council
FIRST STATEMENT OF MAY 29
U.S. /U.N. press release 73
We are here today to consider what means
the United Nations — and specifically the
Security Council — should adopt to deal with
the present crisis in the Near East. The Sec-
retary-General has correctly assessed this
crisis. He has described it as more serious,
indeed, more menacing, than at any time
since 1956.
In dealing with this problem we should
avoid wasteful recriminations over the re-
sponse of the United Nations to recent events.
The organization has played a crucial role
for many years in maintaining peace, how-
ever fragile, in the Near East. The General
Armistice Agreements, the Truce Supervision
Organization, the admirable 10-year service
of the UNEF [United Nations Emergency
Force], the many important actions of the
Security Council and the General Assembly
and the successive Secretaries-General and
other United Nations officials — these are a
great and memorable chapter in United
Nations history. In the Near East more than
in any other region, the world has looked
to the United Nations to keep the door
closed on the specter of war.
Now the door has come unhinged. This
fact is not a reason to question the motives
of the United Nations handling of the matter.
Nor is it a reason for despair or handwring-
ing. Our duty is rather to find new ways by
which the United Nations can reassert itself
for peace, to the end that war may be averted
and that the area may achieve the "reason-
able, peaceful and just solutions" of which
the Secretary-General has spoken in the
concluding passage of the report which was
circulated last Saturday [May 27] .^
We have seen one chapter of the U.N.'s
role in the Near East come to an end. It is
now our task to open a new chapter in this
long search for peace.
In addressing this task we notably have
before us the report of the Secretary-General.
I wish to read to the Council a section of
the report to which the Secretary-General
clearly attaches particular importance:
The decision of the Government of the United
Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of
Tiran, of which I learned while en route to Cairo,
has created a new situation. Free passage through
the Strait is one of the questions which the Govern-
ment of Israel considers most vital to her interests.
The position of the Government of the United Arab
Republic is that the Strait is territorial waters in
which it has a right to control shipping. The Gov-
ernment of Israel contests this position and asserts
the right of innocent passage through the Strait.
The Government of Israel has further declared that
Israel will regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran
to Israel flagships and any restriction on cargoes of
ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a casus
belli. While in Cairo, I called to the attention of the
Government of the United Arab Republic the dan-
gerous consequences which could ensue from re-
U.N. doc. S/7906.
920
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
stricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of
Tiran. I expressed my deep concern in this regard
and my hope that no precipitate action would be
taken.
The Secretary-General further pointed out:
The freedom of navigation through the Strait of
Tiran is not, however, the only immediate issue
which is endangering peace in the Near East. Other
problems, such as sabotage and terrorist activities
and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the
Demilitarized Zone between Israel and Syria, will,
unless controlled, almost surely lead to further
serious fighting.
And it is, of course, quite clear from other
references in this and in his previous re-
port ^ that the tensions which arise from
substantial military confrontation in the
Gaza Strip following the withdrawal of
UNEF from the area are also sensitive and
serious.
Soberly appraising the situation and tak-
ing into account his conversations in Cairo
with U.A.R. leaders, the Secretary-General in
paragraph 14, a key paragraph of his report,
said:
In my view, a peaceful outcome to the present
crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will
allow tension to subside from its present explosive
level. I therefore urge all the parties concerned to
exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence and
to avoid all other actions which could increase ten-
sion, to allow the Council to deal with the under-
lying causes of the present crisis and to seek solu-
tions.
I cannot conceive that any member of the
Security Council will not support this ap-
peal.
This grave appeal from the Secretary-
General has lost none of its relevance since
his report was issued. A blockade of the
Gulf of Aqaba has been announced. Armies
stand within sight of each other on the armi-
stice lines between Israel, Syria, and Egypt,
including the Gaza Strip. Incidents have oc-
curred resulting in casualties, some of which
have been reported today. Thus the dangers
in these three areas, which the Secretary-
General has rightly identified as the most
sensitive of all, remain at their height. Pas-
sions are still high and the need for utmost
restraint on both sides has in no way abated.
But we can take note today not only of the
continuing dangers to which I have referred
but also, I am glad to say, of a favorable
development. Yesterday the Prime Minister
of Israel [Levi Eshkol] stated that his Gov-
ernment has decided to rely on "the continua-
tion of political action in the world arena" to
stimulate "international factors to take effec-
tive measures to insure free international
passage" in the Strait of Tiran.
This statement is very much to be wel-
comed. It is clearly in the spirit of the Sec-
retary-General's appeal for a "breathing
spell" and his urgent request that, to this end,
the parties "exercise special restraint" and
"forego belligerence." It has followed also
upon strenuous diplomatic efforts by the
governments of member states, including my
own, in support of the Secretary-General's
appeal. Last week, indeed, while he was in
Cairo, I made on behalf of my Government a
parallel appeal "to avoid any action which
might exacerbate the already tense situation
which prevailed when the Secretary-General
.departed on his mission." ^
Prime Minister Eshkol's statement will be
all the more effective if it is now matched in
the same spirit by other parties and by all
the governments principally concerned. We
note in this connection the Secretary-Gen-
eral's account in his report of his conversa-
tions in Cairo, during which, he tells us,
"President Nasser and Foreign Minister
Riad assured me that the United Arab Re-
public would not initiate offensive action
against Israel." But, regrettably, since then
President Nasser has reiterated that the re-
strictions on shipping through the Strait
which he imposed while the Secretary-Gen-
eral was en route to Cairo remain in effect.
Therefore, it would be a mistake to suppose
that the crisis has now substantially eased.
Diplomacy is still operating within very nar-
row limits and on a short time schedule. We
in the Security Council, therefore, must
intensify our efforts, both collectively and in
U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.
' For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
on May 24, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 871.
JUNE 19, 1967
921
our separate capacities, to promote a modus
Vivendi, particularly at the points of greatest
danger. Surely all will agree that means must
be found to liquidate this conflict as a mili-
tary one, and in particular to de-fuse the
most sensitive area, the Gulf of Aqaba.
It is necessary for me under the circum-
stances to make explicit the basic attitude of
the United States as we approach this task.
Our attitude is rooted in the charter, in op-
position to aggression from any side, and in
full support of international law and the
role of the United Nations. Ours is not an
attitude of partisanship. The foundation of
our policy remains as President Johnson
stated last week: *
To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East,
I wish to say what three American Presidents have
said before me — that the United States is firmly
committed to the support of the political independ-
ence and territorial integrity of all the nations of
that area. The United States strongly opposes
aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt
or clandestine. This has been the policy, of the
United States led by four Presidents — President
Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F.
Kennedy, and myself — as well as the policy of both
of our political parties. The record of the actions
of the United States over the past 20 years, within
and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear
on this point.
The United States has consistently sought to have
good relations with all the states of the Near East.
Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but
we are convinced that our differences with individual
states of the area and their differences with each
other must be worked out peacefully and in accord-
ance with accepted international practice.
These general observations have direct ap-
plication to the concrete case before us. In
the view of my Government the first step
which the Council must take is to put its
great authority behind the appeal of the
Secretary-General. This first step is urgently
required; for, however welcome yesterday's
statements of restraint may be, tension re-
mains great and the timespan in which to
avert a clash is short. We need a breathing
spell for diplomatic activity and for this
* For a statement made by President Johnson on
May 23, see ibid., p. 870.
Council's more deliberate disposition of the
underlying issues. Therefore, the United
States believes that the Council, as an interim
measure and without extended debate, should
endorse the Secretary-General's appeal and
call upon all parties concerned "to exercise
special restraint, to forego belligerence and
to avoid all other actions which could increase
tension, to allow the Council to deal with the
underlying causes of the present crisis and
to seek solutions." The full authority of the
Council would thus be placed behind his
appeal.
We believe from the context of the situa-
tion that, with respect to the particularly
sensitive area of Aqaba, "foregoing bellig-
erence" must mean foregoing any blockade
of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing
spell requested by the Secretary-General and
permitting free and innocent passage of all
nations and all flags through the Strait of
Tiran to continue as it has during the last 10
years. This would enable the Council to deal
with the situation deliberately and free of the
threat of "dangerous consequences" which,
as the Secretary-General says in his report,
"could ensue from restricting innocent pas-
sage of ships in the Strait of Tiran."
But such an expression of support for the
Secretary-General's appeal would only be
the beginning of our task. If the momentum
for peace thus generated is to endure, the
Council must address itself in longer range
terms to all three of the points of tension
which the Secretary-General has identified
in his report: the Gulf of Aqaba situation,
the confrontation in the Gaza area and on the
Syrian-Israeli frontier, and the problem of
terrorism. Let me comment on each of these
three matters in turn.
Concerning the Gulf of Aqaba, the basic
view of the United States was stated on May
23 by President Johnson as follows:
The United States considers the Gulf to be an
international waterway and feels that a blockade of
Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous
to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent
passage of the international waterway is a vital
interest of the entire international community.
922
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
With respect to innocent passage through
the Strait of Tiran, it must be said with all
gravity that the issue over international
rights in the Gulf and in the Strait cannot
be solved by unilateral steps to change the
status qtio which has existed for more than
10 years and has made peace possible in the
area throughout that period and which is in
accordance with international law. Not only
are the rights of immediate parties at stake
but also the rights of all trading nations
under international law.
Such law, indeed, has been expressed in
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,^ to
which many nations are parties. Article 16,
paragraph 4, of that convention states that:
There shall be no suspension of the innocent pas-
sage of foreigTi ships through straits which are used
for international navigation between one part of the
high seas and another part of the high seas or the
territorial sea of a foreign State.
I should like to observe, Mr. President,
that both the United States and the Soviet
Union among others are parties to this con-
vention and joined in the declaration of
article 16.
We are all aware, of course, that the U.A.R.
is a coastal state and possesses territorial sea
along the shores of the Strait of Tiran and
the Gulf of Aqaba. However, it is only one of
four such coastal states possessing territorial
seas bordering on these waters.
We are aware of the claim of the U.A.R.
to control shipping through its territorial sea
in the Strait. But surely it is not in keeping
with the spirit and obligations of the U.N.
Charter for such a coastal state to embark
unilaterally on measures of force to press its
claim. For over 10 years the settlement made
by the U.N. in 1957 has been the basis of a
peaceful regime for the Strait and Gulf. If
any state wishes to alter the status quo, it
has a clear obligation under the charter to
proceed by peaceful means. Article 33 is
unmistakable in the obligation that it lays
upon all members:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security, shall, first of all,
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peace-
ful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dis-
pute by such means.
It is particularly important that the long-
established practice in the Gulf of Aqaba
and the Strait of Tiran not be disturbed
during the period in which efforts are made
under article 33 to deal with claims that have
been raised. This, I repeat, is our specific
understanding of the meaning, in the con-
text of the Aqaba problem, of the Secretary-
General's appeal to the parties "to exercise
special restraint" and "to forego bellig-
erence." Surely the stopping, searching, and
preventing the passage of ships through the
Strait would clearly fall in the category of
acts against which this appeal is directed.
I turn now to the second highly sensitive
problem mentioned by the Secretary-Gen-
eral— the military confrontation in the Gaza
Strip and on the Syrian-Israeli frontier. This
confrontation is obviously highly dangerous,
particularly in the heavily populated area of
the Gaza Strip. The next step for the Secu-
rity Council in both areas should be to find
practical means, through whatever United
Nations machinery is readily available, to
minimize the danger of a military clash along
this line and to help the opposing forces to
disengage. We have only to read the news
bulletins which are even now coming in, with
their reports of firing going on in Gaza, to
realize how urgent action is on this problem.
Third, it is necessary to face other prob-
lems, such as, in the Secretary-General's
words, "sabotage and terrorist activities
and rights of cultivation in disputed areas
in the Demilitarized Zone between Israel and
Syria." The Security Council has many times
called upon the parties to observe scrupu-
lously the General Armistice Agreements
with their strict prohibition of all hostile
acts from the territory of any of the parties
= For text, see ibid., June 30, 1958, p. 1111.
JUNE 19, 1967
923
and to return to the normal operations of the
armistice machinery.
Fourth, there is a final step we must take
if we are to achieve a more lasting reduction
of tension in the Near East. Effective steps
must be taken to reaffirm the General Armi-
stice Agreements and revitalize the armistice
machinery.
Mr. President, this critical hour is no time
for selling the United Nations short. Its
resources are far greater than some suppose.
The diplomatic arsenal is not confined to
debate or the adoption of resolutions. It en-
compasses quiet diplomacy by the Secretary-
General and the members, the good offices
of member states, the use of intermediaries,
and all the devices comprehended in article
33 of the charter.
Therefore, the United States looks beyond
today's debate toward further effective steps
by all concerned, in the highest tradition of
this organization and the spirit of the
charter, to save the peace in the Near East.
What we do here today, Mr. President,
and in the days to come, will affect not only
the peace of the Near East but the good
name and standing of this great organization.
The eyes of the world are, quite literally,
upon us in this debate. Now, more than ever,
world opinion expects the United Nations to
live up to its promise of peace.
But the United Nations cannot be an
abstract entity in the clouds. Its life and its
vigor depend totally on certain very concrete
entities here on earth — namely, the govern-
ments of member states. The issue of war or
peace lies not in our stars, but in ourselves.
It lies in whether or not we, the members,
are sufficiently alive to our common humanity
and our manifold common interests, includ-
ing the vital interest each one of us has in
the maintenance of peace in accordance with
the charter.
If we are alive to these interests, then
surely we shall find ways to transcend today's
conflicts and to "harmonize the actions of
nations" as the charter bids us do — and thus
to win together the only victories truly
worth having, which are victories for peace.
SECOND STATEMENT OF MAY 29
U.S. /U.N. press release 74
Mr. President, I make a few remarks in
the exercise of my right of reply to the com-
ments by the distinguished representative of
the Soviet Union, Ambassador [Nikolai T.]
Fedorenko.
I am quite content to allow the members
of the Council to judge whose statements in
tone and content on the agenda item dis-
played the most impartiality — my statement
or Ambassador Fedorenko's. Indeed, the rec-
ord will show that I stated in the same terms
our commitment to respect the political in-
dependence and territorial integrity of all
the nations in the area, Arabic and Israeli
alike, and our desire — fervent desire — to
have good relations with all states of the
Near East. I fail to notice any such even-
handed reference in his remarks.
Also, it is rather interesting, in trying to
talk about the agenda item, I referred only
once to the Soviet Union and then only in
the context of a factual statement that the
Soviet Union had adhered to an international
convention on freedom of the seas. On the
contrary. Ambassador Fedorenko's statement
was studded with pejorative statements
about my country, statements which I reject
as being totally without foundation.
This type of statement of our colleague,
the distinguished Soviet Ambassador, con-
tributes nothing to the just resolution of the
grave problem before us. Conspicuous in
that was virtually the total absence of ref-
erence to the Secretary-General's report,
which virtually every other member of the
Council pointed to as the best guideline we
could have in determining where we are to
go from here. The distinguished Ambassa-
dor's statement heats up the situation rather
than cools it off. Such statements divert our
attention from the problem at hand. They
do not — and I say this most regretfully —
advance our search for a reasonable, peace-
ful, and honorable settlement.
It is also a strange phenomenon that the
Soviet representative always, in a speech of
924
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
this character, injects a totally irrelevant
subject. In the introduction to his speech,
lie sought to bring into this Council for dis-
cussion Viet-Nam. And it is also a strange
phenomenon that, although this is not the
agenda item, it is an agenda item before the
Council at the request of the United States,
but the Soviet Union objects. If the Soviet
representative were really agreeable not
only to talk but to vote on the Viet-Nam
problem inthis Council and would withdraw
his objection to the Council's consideration
of the subject, I shaill be very glad to accom-
modate him at any time.
[In a further right of reply to the Soviet repre-
sentative, Ambassador Goldberg said.]
My colleague and friend, Ambassador
Fedorenko, says that the meaning of our
discussion is not clear. I should like to clar-
ify it for him.
The United States is opposed to belligerent
acts and violence by anyone in the Middle
East, no matter what their political ideology
or alinement may be. We respect their right
to their own political systems and to make
their own alinements.
We stand ready to endorse the Secretary-
General's appeal to all the parties concerned
"to exercise special restraint, to forego bel-
ligerence and to avoid all other actions
which could increase tension, to allow the
Council to deal with the underlying causes
of the present crisis and to seek solutions."
Can the Soviet Union say the same?
STATEMENT OF MAY 30
U.S. /U.N. press release 7B
I speak very briefly in the exercise of my
right to reply. And I shall do so in terms of
what I conceive the main function of this
Council is at the present time, and that is
not to say anything that might exacerbate a
situation which is by common recognition
very tense, very grave, very serious, and men-
acing to the cause of world peace and se-
curity.
Our distinguished colleague. Ambassador
Tomeh [George J. Tomeh, of Syria], made
reference to the position of the United States
in relation, as he put it, throughout the past
to the question of the regrettably longstand-
ing differences between Israel and the Arab
states. The import of his remarks was that
the United States in this matter has taken
a one-sided position, has not been impartial,
and has lined itself up invariably on the side
of Israel, regardless of the merits of the
particular dispute.
I should say to my distinguished friend
that the record does not bear out that asser-
tion. Indeed, without referring to the very
ancient past, all we have to do is refer to the
very recent past, the recollection of which is
fresh in the minds of all of us. The very last
action taken by this Security Council in ref-
erence to the problems in the Near East was
taken on the complaint of Jordan against
Israel, and the expressions of the United
States and the vote of the United States on
that occasion was cast against Israel in that
particular matter.^
If I were to go to the very long distant
past, I should recall to the members of this
Council what I scarcely need recall: that on
October 29, 1956, an historic day in the
history of the United Nations, it was the
United States standing against old friends
and allies that brought the matter of the
Suez crisis to the United Nations. And I
shall leave to the judgment of the United
Nations what the position of the United
States was in that area.
I am not going to burden the record of
this Council with the long history of the
positions of the United States in this matter.
I have it before me, and should the occasion
arise, I would have no hesitancy in doing it.
I have the record of every resolution that
has been discussed and voted upon in this
Council in relation to this troublesome area.
And the record of those resolutions amply
demonstrates the consistent attitude of the
United States to let the chips fall where they
may and to take the position which I as-
serted yesterday in defense of the political
For background, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 974.
JUNE 19, 1967
925
and territorial integrity of every country in
the Middle East.
It would be very illuminating to look at
the record of the past and see where our
country has stood in relation to the many,
many problems which have arisen in this
area. It is a record of evenhanded conduct
between the parties. It is a one-sided record
in the cause of peace in the area and in
defense of the charter. That type of parti-
sanship, I readily concede, we have. We are
partisan in the interests of peace. We are
partisan in the interests of pacifying the situ-
ation in the area. We are partisan in the
interests of protecting the territorial integ-
rity and the political independence of all
member nations of the United Nations which
have been received in this body and which
are entitled to equal respect on the part of
all of us.
And I do not apologize for the statements
of Vice President Humphrey or any other
American official who professes friendship
for any member of the United Nations, be-
cause our country professes friendship for
all countries of the United Nations.
I shall not, Mr. President, because the
right of reply should be exercised, encumber
the record with this longstanding position
of the United States, which is sustained in
the records both of the Security Council and
the General Assembly in the interests of
impartial consideration of this particular
problem.
Now, I should like to say a word about
what my friend, the distinguished and able
representative of the United Arab Republic
[Mohamed Awad El Kony], said in his re-
marks. I did not enter into a long legal dis-
cussion yesterday about the problem of the
free and innocent passage in the Strait of
Tiran, specifically because I made the point
that I thought we had a short-range problem
and a long-range problem. The short-range
problem, I said, was restoration of the status
quo ante which existed on the Strait, and
which has existed for 11 years, so that the
Council, enjoying the breathing spell, the
cooling-oflf period, that the Secretary-General
has suggested, could consider the underlying
problems so we could arrive at a fair, just,
and honorable solution of these problems.
Therefore, I said, if the members of the
Council will recall, that the long-range prob-
lem of the Gulf of Aqaba and free and
innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran was
a long-range problem and that it deserved
and required the attention of the Council.
And in my view of what we ought to do —
and I still have that view — we ought to sup-
port the Secretary-General's appeal unani-
mously for a cooling-off period. And I again
remind the members of the Council that the
Secretary-General included in that appeal
the avoidance of acts of belligerence.
And I said that I thought we ought to
honor the request of the Secretary-General,
just coming back from the area, as to what
course of action was indicated at this time
so that we could more deliberately proceed
to deal with the long-range problem.
But my professional pride is somewhat
touched by the reference of my distinguished
friend. Ambassador El Kony, concerning the
legal question involved. I am not going to
take the time of the Council to discuss it.
But I am going to say something very simple
about it. And that is not what my views are
but what the views of the Security Council
have been on this subject of the assertion
which the Ambassador has made on behalf
of his country of belligerent rights with re-
spect to the free and innocent passage in the
Strait and in the Gulf.
As long ago as 1951, the Council expressed
itself on the subject of whether belligerent
rights could be asserted in light of the Armi-
stice Agreement which this Council has al-
ways endorsed between the parties to the
dispute, Israel and the Arabic states. And
that resolution'' contained the following pas-
sage:
Considering that since the Armistice regime,
which has been in existence for nearly two and a
half years, is of a permanent character, neither
party can reasonably assert that it is actively a
belligerent. . . .
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 17, 1951, p. 479.
926
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Now, this is a fundamental principle
which, when we address ourselves to the
substance, I think we will have to talk about,
because I also notice in the Secretary-Gen-
eral's report — a report wliich I noted from
Cairo — about a desire on the part of the
U.A.R. to reaffii-m the validity of the General
Armistice Agreement.
And here, too, it must be remembered we
are equalhanded, because I should like in
fairness to also recall that at various times
the State of Israel has not always recognized
the complete validity of the Armistice Agree-
ment, saying on its part that the other side
does not recognize the validity of the Armi-
stice Agreement as a whole.
That is something I think we ought to
discuss. I can state the position of my own
Government. The position of my Government
has always been consistently — and remains
today — that since there is an Armistice
Agreement which this organization has en-
dorsed and which this organization was the
principal architect of, neither side therefore
has the right to exercise belligerent rights.
That is the legal position which I assert.
Again, I apologize to this Council. As I
said, my professional pride was slightly
touched. I did not intend to enter upon a
substantive argument at this point. I think
we will have to consider that when we em-
bark upon the necessary tasks of rebuilding
the framework of the General Armistice
Agreements. And obviously, when we do, we
have to come to grips with the fundamental
question, and that fundamental question
which may be basic to the whole question in
the area is: How does anybody assert rights
of conducting war against anybody else if
there is an armistice? How does anybody as-
sert belligerent rights if there is an armi-
stice ?
That is the question that we will have a
chance to talk about. I am sure Ambassador
El Kony will want to say something more
on that subject. It is a complicated legal sub-
ject. It does not permit adequate exploration
in even the brief statement that I have made.
And I did not want to make a legal argu-
ment yesterday. Yesterday I was trying sim-
ply to say: Let us do first things first. Let us
have a cooling-oflf period. Let us restore the
status quo ante. Let us then proceed upon
the solemn task of rebuilding and revitaliz-
ing and reaffirming the Armistice Agree-
ments.
STATEMENT OF MAY 31
U.S. /U.N. press release 76
I have asked to speak briefly in order to
table a resolution^ for the consideration of
the Council. This resolution is simple and
reads as follows:
The Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-
General in Document S/7906,
Having heard the statements of the parties.
Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the
Middle East,
Noting that the Secretary-General has in his re-
port expressed the view that "a peaceful outcome
to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing
spell which will allow tension to subside from its
present explosive level", and that he therefore urged
"all the parties concerned to exercise special re-
straint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other
actions which could increase tension, to allow the
Council to deal with the underlying causes of the
present crisis and to seek solutions",
1. Calls on all the parties concerned as a first
step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,
2. Encourages the immediate pursuit of interna-
tional diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the
situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just
solutions,
3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and
continuous review so that the Council may determine
what further steps it might take in the exercise
of its responsibilities for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
It is obvious that this is an interim resolu-
tion. It simply endorses the Secretary-Gen-
eral's appeal for a breathing spell in order,
in his words, to "allow tension to subside
from its present explosive level" and to gain
time in which "to seek, and eventually to
find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions."
To this end the resolution urges all par-
ties to exercise the restraint necessary so as
« U.N. doc. S/7916.
JUNE 19, 1967
927
to allow both this Council and international
diplomacy to pursue the further steps re-
quired to de-fuse the situation and move
toward peace.
Mr. President, in offering this resolution
at this time, my delegation is conscious of
the fact that it is now 1 week since the Coun-
cil first met in the present crisis. Our meet-
ing today is the fourth in this series of
meetings, during which all of us — the mem-
bers of the Council and the parties to the
dispute — have had the opportunity to state
our respective positions. Five days ago the
Secretary-General returned from his arduous
mission to Cairo. Four days ago his report
was circulated to the Council, in which he
said that his major concern at this critical
juncture was "to gain time in order to lay
the basis for a detente."
The events since then have certainly un-
derscored the urgency which the Secretary-
General expressed to us last Friday in his
report. To be sure, in my statement to the
Council on Monday I was able to refer to a
brief and welcome respite which had been
obtained by diplomatic efforts in which my
country actively participated. Nevertheless,
I was obliged to emphasize that the crisis
had not substantially eased, tension remained
great, and the timespan in which to avert a
clash was short. These remarks regrettably
still hold true today.
The Security Council in a world body of
122 members is a relatively small and com-
pact body, designedly so under the charter.
It is charged in article 24 of the charter
with "primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security."
Let us not forget the reason, which is made
expressly clear in the same article. It is, to
quote the charter: "In order to ensure
prompt and effective action by the United
Nations. . . ."
To that end the United States believes the
Council ought, step by step, to take the
necessary decisions in this extremely grave
and important matter. The resolution which
we now submit reflects the first step which,
in our view, the Council should take. The
measures which we propose in this interim
resolution are designed, in the spirit of the
Secretary-General's report, to insure a cool-
ing-off period in the Near East without
prejudice to the ultimate rights or claims of
any party. This will afford the necessary
time for more deliberate disposition of the
underlying issues.
It is not our intention, in offering this
interim resolution, to attempt in any way to
evade or delay the exercise by the Council
of its responsibility to seek solutions to the
underlying causes of the present crisis. On
the contrary, our aim is to gain time and to
create a climate in which such solutions can
be sought under more favorable conditions.
Indeed, our resolution takes into account
the fact that the Council has two types of
responsibilities. In addition to its responsi-
bility to avert an imminent clash, it has also
the responsibility conferred by chapter VI of
the charter, and described in the Secretary-
General's words, "to seek, and eventually to
find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions."
And corresponding responsibilities lie also,
under the charter, on every member state in
the international community — to support our
common effort in the United Nations to
achieve peace and security in the Near East.
Mr. President, there is one great issue in
the balance here today: the issue of keeping
the peace in the Near East, with all that that
implies for world security. But we in this
Council must also recognize that we face
another issue as well: the issue of the po-
tency and efficacy of the United Nations.
The 21-year record of the Security Coun-
cil contains numerous instances of historic
decisions: decisions by which we, the mem-
bers, were able to "harmonize our actions,"
as the charter says, sufficiently to save the
world from the scourge of war. We have
proved that we have the capacity to serve
the purpose assigned to us by the charter.
The issue now is whether we have the cour-
age, the resolution, and the vision to exercise
that capacity.
Mr. President, it must be candidly ac-
knowledged that we have many conflicting
interests represented at this table. But we
have one overriding common interest, which.
928
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
is peace. I suspect that a detached observer,
following these proceedings, will be watch-
ing, above all, to see whether partisan con-
cerns and narrow interests can be subordi-
nated to our overriding common interest in
peace.
Mr. President, I earnestly commend this
draft resolution to the attention of the
Council.
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Hong Kong Amend
Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
May 31 (press release 122) that the United
States-Hong Kong bilateral cotton textile
agreement, signed in Hong Kong on August
26, 1966,1 was amended on May 31 at Hong
Kong by an exchange of diplomatic notes.^
The amendment resulted from the recent
decision of the GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] Cotton Textile Committee
to extend the Long-Term Arrangement on
international trade in cotton textiles (the
LTA) for an additional 3 years, a decision
which both Governments supported. It also
concludes discussion between the U.S. and
Hong Kong regarding the coverage of cer-
tain products under the bilateral agreement.
Hong Kong will extend its system of export
control so that all items which are by major
weight or by chief value cotton textiles will
be subject to the limitations of the agreement.
Other major features of the amendment
are as follows:
1. The aggregate limit in the 1966 agree-
ment is increased. For the second agreement
year (October 1, 1966-September 30, 1967)
the increase is 5 million square yards, making
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 26, 1966, p. 468.
* For text of the U.S. note, see Department of
State press release 122 dated May 31..
the total 343,625,000 square yards equivalent.
For the third agreement year (October 1,
1967-September 30, 1968) the increase is 15
million square yards so that the aggregate
limit, including growth, will be 371,306,250
square yards equivalent.
2. Group and certain specific limits are also
increased.
3. Hong Kong is permitted to carry over
shortfalls from year to year of up to 5 per-
cent of the aggregate and applicable group
and specific limits.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquar-
ters, New York, September 28 through November
30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963.
TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited : Jamaica, May 3, 1967.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.'
Ratification deposited: Ireland, May 10, 1967.
Fisheries
International convention for the conservation of At-
lantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14,
1966."
Ratification deposited: United States, May 18,
1967.
Maritime Matters
Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964."
Acceptances received: Brazil, November 17, 1966;
Finland, January 17, 1967; Indonesia, October
11, 1966; Israel, February 6, 1967; Lebanon,
February 15, 1967; Mauritania, November 1,
1966; Philippines, October 31, 1966; Switzer-
land, January 9, 1967; Trinidad and Tobago,
November 24, 1966.
Publications
Convention concerning the international exchange
of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3,
1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961.'
Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.
Convention concerning the exchange of official pub-
lications and government documents between
states, and proces-verbal relating thereto. Adopted
at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force
November 23, 1961.'
Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.
• Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
JUNE 19, 1967
929
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signature : Venezuela, April 21, 1967.
Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, April 21, 1967;
Hungary (with reservation and statement).
May 4, 1967; Niger, April 27, 1967; United
Arab Republic (with reservation). May 1, 1967.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.'
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, May 1, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London, and
Moscow January 27, 1967.'
Ratified by the President: May 24, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the
United Nations of June 26, 1945, as amended (59
Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857). Adopted at New York
December 20, 1965.'
Ratification deposited: Hungary, May 4, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).
Open for signature at Washington May 15 through
June 1, 1967, inclusive.'
Signatures: Argentina, May 29, 1967; Australia,
May 25, 1967; Belgium and Luxembourg, May
29, 1967; ' Brazil, May 25, 1967; Canada, Costa
Rica, June 1, 1967; Cuba, May 31, 1967; El
Salvador, June 1, 1967; Finland, May 29, 1967;
France, May 26, 1967; Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, May 31,
1967; India, June 1, 1967; Ireland, May 25,
1967; Israel, May 31, 1967; Korea, Lebanon,
June 1, 1967; Mexico, May 26, 1967; Nether-
lands, Norway, June 1, 1967; Peru, May 17,
1967; Portugal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
June 1, 1967; Southern Rhodesia, May 26, 1967;
Sweden, May 31, 1967; Switzerland, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, June 1, 1967; ■*
United Arab Republic, May 15, 1967; United
Kingdom, May 26, 1967; United States, May
31, 1967; Vatican City, May 29, 1967; Vene-
zuela, June 1, 1967; Western Samoa, May 31,
1967.
BILATERAL
Honduras
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Tegucigalpa December 29, 1966,
January 24 and April 17, 1967. Entered into force
April 17, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
' Signed in name of Belgian-Luxembourg Economic
Union.
■* With a statement.
Correction
The Editor of the Bulletin wishes to call
attention to a printer's error in the issue of
May 29, 1967, p. 828. In Secretary Rusk's
statement on the Foreign Assistance Program
for 1968, the fourth sentence in the first full
paragraph in the second column, p. 828,
should read:
"And it is worth noting that the fiscal year
1968 Foreigfn Assistance Act request, along
with other foreign assistance requests such
as Peace Corps, Public Law 480, and contri-
butions to the International Development
Association, total less than .7 percent of our
GNP."
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1460
PUBLICATION 8249
JUNE 19, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affaire,
provides the public and interested aerencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreiem Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, aa well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Pbice: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $16 ;
single copy 80 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1960).
notb: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
930
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX June 19, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. H60
Canada
President Johnson Confers With Canadian
Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) . . . 908
President Johnson Visits EXPO 67 at Montreal
(Johnson) 907
Department and Foreign Service
Humanity's Greatest Need — International Con-
ference on Water for Peace, Washington,
D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) .... 902
Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Depart-
ment (Pollack) 910
Ekronomic Affairs
U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile
Agreement 929
U.S.-Mexican Fishery Talks Held at Wash-
ington (joint statement) 919
Health. U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug
Reaction Reporting System 918
Hong Kong. U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cot-
ton Textile Agreement 929
International Organizations and Conferences
Humanity's Greatest Need — International Con-
ference on Water for Peace, Washington,
D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) .... 902
U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reac-
tion Reporting System 918
Iran. Letters of Credence (Ansary) .... 909
Japan. President Johnson Greets Japanese Gov-
ernors (Johnson) 917
Mexico. U.S.-Mexican Fishery Talks Held at
Washington (joint statement) 919
Near East
President Johnson Confers With Canadian
Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) .... 908
U.N. Security Council Continues Consideration
of the Crisis in the Near East (Goldberg) 920
Presidential Documents
Humanity's Greatest Need — International Con-
ference on Water for Peace, Washington,
D.C., May 23-31 902
President Johnson Confers With Canadian
Prime Minister 908
President Johnson Greets Japanese Governors 917
President Johnson Visits EXPO 67 at Montreal 907
Sacrifices in Viet-Nam Marked in Memorial
Day Messages 917
U.S. To Aid WHO in Developing Drug Reac-
tion Reporting System 918
Science
Humanity's Greatest Need — International Con-
ference on Water for Peace, Washington,
D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson, Rusk) .... 902
Science, Foreig^i Affairs, and the St^te Depart-
ment (Pollack) 910
Treaty Information
Current Actions 929
U.S. and Hong Kong Amend Cotton Textile
Agreement 929
United Nations. U.N. Security Council Con-
tinues Consideration of the Crisis in the
Near East (Goldberg) 920
Viet-Nam
President Johnson Confers With Canadian
Prime Minister (Johnson, Pearson) . . . 908
Sacrifices in Viet-Nam Marked in Memorial
Day Messages (Johnson, Thieu) 917
Water for Peace. Humanity's Greatest Need —
International Conference on Water for Peace,
Washington, D.C., May 23-31 (Johnson,
Rusk) 902
Name Index
Ansary, Hushang 909
Goldberg, Arthur J 920
Johnson, President . . 902, 907, 908, 917, 918
Pearson, Lester B 908
Pollack, Herman 910
Rusk, Secretary 902
Thieu, Nguyen Van 917
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 29-June 4
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to May 29 which ap-
pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos.
115 of May 22 and 117 of May 25.
Subject
Katzenbach: "America and Af-
rica: The New World and the
Newer World" (revised).
Rusk: Water for Peace Confer-
ence.
U.S.-Hong Kong bilateral cotton
textile agreement amended (re-
write) .
Program for visit of Prime
Minister of Australia.
Program for visit of Prime
Minister of the United King-
dom.
Linowitz: commencement address,
Wellesley College, Wellesley,
Mass., June 3 (excerpts).
U.S.-Mexico cotton textile agree-
ment (rewrite).
Program for visit of King
Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thai-
land.
Program for visit of President
of Malawi.
Katzenbach : commencement ad-
dress. Smith College, North-
ampton, Mass., June 4.
U.S. reply to Soviet note concern-
ing incident at Cam Pha.
No.
Date
tl20
5/29
121
5/31
122
5/31
*123
5/31
*124
6/2
*125 6/2
tl26
6/2
*127
6/2
*128
6/2
*129
6/3
tl30 6/3
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
•t^.%. Government Printing Office: 1967—251-938/51
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVI, No. U61
June 26, 1967
THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST
White House Statement on the Outbreak of Hostilities 9i9
Statements by Secretary Rusk at White House News Briefings 9^9
Statements by Ambassador Goldberg in the U.N. Security Council
and Texts of Cease-Fire Resolutions 93Jf
Statement by President Johnson on the Establishment
of a Special Committee of the National Security Council 951
Exchange of Letters Between President Johnson and Senator Mansfield
951
AMERICA AND AFRICA: THE NEW WORLD AND THE NEWER WORLD
Address at Addis Ababa by Under Secretary Katzenbach 95A
For index see inside back cover
U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire
in tlie Near East
Follotving are the major statements made
in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Repre-
sentative Arthur J. Goldberg during the
Council's consideration of the crisis in the
Near East June 6-9, together ivith texts of
the three resolutions adopted by the Council
during that period and two U.S. draft reso-
lutions submitted on May 31 and June 8.
FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 6
U.S./U.N. press release 80
In the resolution ^ just adopted the Secu-
rity Council, acting in the exercise of its re-
sponsibilities under the charter, has issued
a clear call for an end to the hostilities in
the Near East. This resolution is a first step
on the road back toward peace. It carries the
full authority of the United Nations. It is
now the duty of all the parties concerned to
comply fully and promptly with the terms of
this resolution. It is equally the duty of every
member of the United Nations to support the
implementation of the resolution by the full
weight of its influence.
The resolution itself, as all members of the
Council know, is the result of intensive
political efforts here at the United Nations
during the past 36 hours, under the lead-
ership of our President and by various
governments and their distinguished repre-
sentatives here. It reflects a successful har-
monizing of our respective points of view
toward a single goal: to quench the flames of
war in the Near East and to begin to move
toward peace in the area.
This resolution, with its appeal for a cease-
fire, calls for precisely the action which my
' U.N. doc. S/233 (1967).
delegation has been urging since we met to
consider the outbreak of hostilities yesterday
morning. Indeed, Mr. President, it is con-
sistent with the spirit in which we have ap-
proached every stage of this crisis. We have
throughout supported every effort by our dis-
tinguished Secretary-General to maintain the
peace in the area and sought to the best of
our ability to exercise a restraining influence
on the parties concerned. We have expressed
willingness to join in the search for peace
here in the United Nations and by our own
diplomatic efforts as well.
Regrettably, our efforts and those of many
others, including the Secretary-General, to
prevent a war ended in failure. When that
was apparent, my Government considered
that the first and foremost urgent step was
to put an end to the tragic bloodshed by
bringing an immediate halt to the hostilities.
For this reason, the United States and other
members for the past 36 hours vigorously
urged as a first step the adoption of a reso-
lution calling for an immediate cease-fire by
all the governments concerned.
We deeply regret that so much time has
been lost in the process. However, it is grati-
fying that other members of the Council have
now reached the same conclusion and that we
can now issue a unanimous appeal to the
parties to lay down their arms. It is our fer-
vent hope that the Council's appeal will be
immediately and fully complied with.
We believe that a cease-fire represents the
urgent first step in restoring peace to the
Near East. Once this is accomplished, Mr.
President, my delegation believes that the
Council should then turn its immediate
attention to the other steps that will be re-
quired to achieve a more lasting peace.
934
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Mr. President, in that approach my coun-
try's policy remains as President Johnson
stated it on May 23d in these words: ^
To the leaders of all the nations of the Near
East, I wish to say what three American Presidents
have said before me — that the United States is
firmly committed to the support of the political
independence and territorial integrity of all the
nations of that area. . . .
The United States has consistently sought to have
good relations with all the states of the Near East.
Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but
we are convinced that our differences with indi-
vidual states of the area and their differences with
each other must be worked out peacefully and in
accordance with accepted international practice.
It was our concern about this, Mr. Presi-
dent, that brought us to this Council very
early and prompted us in a series of efforts
here to avert what has occurred. In imple-
mentation of this policy directed to all coun-
tries in the Near East, when the fires have
been dampened and tension reduced, we
stand ready to join in efforts to bring a last-
ing peace to the area, in which cooperative
programs for the economic and social devel-
opment of all countries of the region would
be an integral part.
Before concluding, Mr. President, it is my
duty to speak of a specific matter related to
the position I have just reiterated. During
the past 24 hours, fantastic allegations have
been made about United States aircraft being
involved in the hostilities in the Near East.
These allegations are totally without founda-
tion in fact. They are made up out of whole
cloth.
I take this opportunity in the Security
Council, on the complete authority of the
United States Government, to deny them
categorically without any ifs, ands, or buts.^
Indeed, yesterday morning, June 5, within
hours after first hearing such charges, my
Government denied them in a formal state-
ment issued by the Department of Defense
which I now quote:
There have been reports that United States air-
craft from aircraft carriers assigned to the 6th
Fleet have flown to Israeli airfields. Other reports
U.S. Welcomes the "First Step"
Toward Peace in the Near East
statement by President Johnson
white House press release dated June 6
The cease-fire vote of the Security Council
opens a very hopeful path away from danger
in the Middle East. It reflects responsible con-
cern for peace on the part of all who voted
for it. The United States has warmly sup-
ported this resolution. We hope the parties
directly concerned will promptly act upon it.
We believe that a cease-fire is the necessary
"first step," in the words of the resolution it-
self, a first step toward what we all must
hope will be a new time of settled peace and
progress for all the peoples of the Middle
East.
It is toward this end that we shall now
strive.
' For text, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 870.
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk, see p. 950.
have stated that 6th Fleet aircraft have partici-
pated in air activity elsewhere in the area of con-
flict. All such reports are erroneous. All 6th Fleet
aircraft are and have been several hundred miles
from the area of conflict.
Mr. President, charges of this sort at a
time like this cannot be treated lightly. They
are in the category of a cry of "Fire!" in a
crowded theater. They have been used in the
overt incitement of mob violence against
American diplomatic and other installations
in several Arab states. These false reports —
on the motives for which I do not wish to
speculate — have been propagated in a highly
inflammable situation.
In these circumstances, my Government
considers it necessary to take prompt steps to
prevent the further spread of these dan-
gerous falsehoods. With this in mind, I am
authorized to announce in this Council and
propose two concrete measures:
f(i' The United States is prepared, first, to
cooperate in an immediate impartial investi-
gation of these charges by the United Nations
and to offer all facilities to the United Na-
tions in this investigation.
And, second, as a part of or in addition
to such an investigation, the United States is
prepared to invite United Nations personnel
JUNE 26, 1967
935
aboard our aircraft carriers in the Mediter-
ranean today, tomorrow, or at the conven-
ience of the United Nations to serve as im-
partial observers of the activities of our
planes in the area and to verify the past
activities of our planes from our official rec-
ords and from the log that each ship carries.
These observers, in addition, will be free to
interview air crews on these carriers without
inhibition so as to determine their activities
during the days in question. Their presence
as observers on these carriers will be wel-
comed throughout the period of this crisis
and so long as these ships are in the eastern
waters of the Mediterranean.
In the meantime, I ask any government
interested in peace to see to it that these false
and inflammatory charges are given no
further credence by any source within its
control.
Mr. President, in conclusion let me com-
mend to every state the Council's resolution
just adopted: Our duty now, as member
states bound by the charter, is to place all
the influence at the command of our respec-
tive governments behind the fulfillment of
the decision unanimously arrived at by the
Council. Properly carried out, this resolu-
tion will be a major step toward peace and
security in the Near East and will provide
a point of reference from which to resolve
underlying problems in a spirit of justice
and equity.
SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 6
U.S./U.N. press release 81
Mr. President, I am impelled to exercise
this right of reply to the statement just made
by the distinguished Foreign Minister of
Iraq [Adnan Pachachi], who is a man well
known to all of us and who deservedly enjoys
a very great and eminent reputation here at
the United Nations. Nevertheless, I must re-
ject as completely unfounded what he has
just said. And I should like to do that by
reference to the record, which is well known
to every member of this Council.
The United States took the lead of all coun-
tries on this Council to attempt several weeks
ago to bring this matter before the Council
so that this Council in the exercise of its re-
sponsibilities could take the action necessary
to prevent any — and I emphasize "any" —
warlike action in the Middle East. Our record
in this respect is a clear and plain record of
what we did.
I should like to recall to the members of
this Council that when we joined in this
effort, there were members of this Council
who took the position that we were attempt-
ing to dramatize the situation, that every-
thing was all right, that it was not necessary
for the Council to take any action, that things
were tranquil, that all we had to do was sit
by and let events happen.
We had a great Governor of this very
State, Governor Al Smith, and his very
favorite expression was: "Let us look at the
record." And now I shall recall the record,
since our attitude is brought into question.
Incidents broke out in the Near East on
May 5 and May 8. These incidents were re-
ported by Security Council documents by our
distinguished Secretary-General in the most
objective terms, which is characteristic of
him, on May 11 and May 13. What was the
response of my Government? I should like to
read what was issued on May 15th:
The United States strongly supports the efforts
of the Secretary-General on behalf of the United
Nations to maintain peace in the Middle East. We
share his concern about the situation, as expressed
in his recent statements of May 11th and May 13th,
and are distressed over reports of increased tension
and military preparations.
Diplomatic efforts on the part of my Government
in support of the Secretary-General's appeals are
now undei-way, and we hope the response to his
efforts will be positive.
May I interject at this point that in our
diplomatic efforts we went to all important
capitals, including all of the countries con-
cerned, with a fervent plea for restraint in
the situation, a plea to avoid all threats and
acts of force.
On May 18 — and we were fairly lonely at
this time, except for a few others — I made a
936
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
statement on behalf of my Government at
that time, after visiting the Secretary-Gen-
eral and hearing at firsthand a report from
him on his concerns, which he elaborated in
his i-eports of May 11th and May 13th.
I should like to read you what I said pub-
licly on that occasion: *
The Secretary-General and I reviewed the present
situation in the Middle East. I expressed the deep
concern of the United States over reports of in-
creased tension and military movements in the area.
On the same day, I met with the press here
at the U.N. Building, after meeting with the
Secretary-General, and this is what I said: ■*
We are concerned, as I have said, over reports
of increased tension and military movements in the
area, and we would hope very much that the situa-
tion would stabilize. ... I know of no other sub-
ject at the moment that is of g-i'eater concern. . . .
On May 19 I again made a statement of a
public character, and I repeat that statement:
The United States fully shares the serious mis-
grivings expressed by the Secretary-General in his
letter of May 18 about the effect of the with-
drawal of the United Nations Emergency Force in
the present tense situation in the Middle East and
his expression of belief that UNEF has been an
impoi-tant factor in maintaining relative quiet in
the area. We deeply regret the developments that
are taking place. . . .
In the light of today's developments we ai'e giving
I urgent consideration, in consultation with others,
to the further steps that might be required in
support of peace and the role of the United Nations
in preserving it in the Middle East.
On May 20, when the Secretary-General
announced his decision — a welcome decision
— to proceed on an arduous mission to Cairo
in the interest of peace in the area, I issued
a formal statement on behalf of my Govern-
ment as follows: ^
In light of the extreme gravity of the current
situation in the Middle East and the state of tension
prevailing there, the United States greatly welcomes
the decision of the Secretary-General to travel to
that area in an effort to assure peace. . . .
We note with great concern the Secretary-Gen-
eral's report today to the Security Council warn-
ing that the situation is more menacing than at any
time since the fall of 1956. We share this con-
cern. . . .
On May 23 I made this statement here in
New York: *
We have been consulting intensively with other
members over the last several days, since the crisis
first arose, to determine in what way the Security
Council could best contribute to the cause of peace
in the area. We entirely agree that the time has
now come, in the light of the gravity of the cir-
cumstances, for the Security Council to discharge its
primary responsibility under the charter for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Then we had a meeting of the Security
Council [May 24]. Some members here re-
sisted a meeting because they said the
Secretary-General was on his mission. We
had said we did not want to do anything in
any way to prejudice the result of the
Secretary-General's mission, but neverthe-
less, in light of the increased tension in the
area, we supported the effort made by
Canada and Denmark to call a meeting to
support the efforts of the Secretary-General.
At that meeting I said this on behalf of my
Government: "^
It has been said, for example, that one of the
possibly adverse effects of a discussion at this time
would be to dramatize a situation better left quiet.
Mr. Pi'esident, this Council would have to be bury-
ing its head in the sand if it refused to recognize
the threat to peace implicit in the developments
which have occurred since our distinguished Secre-
tary-General left New York 2 days ago. It is
precisely because of these developments, not known
to him nor to any member of the Council, that we
have been called here today urgently to consider
what the Council ought to do in discharge of its
responsibility to further his efforts and not to im-
pede them.
Mr. President, this Council meeting cannot dram-
atize a situation which at this moment is at the
central stage of world concern. It can, however,
play a role, hopefully, in drawing a curtain on a
tragedy which potentially threatens the peace and
well-being of all people in the area and, indeed,
of all mankind. . . .
* For transcript of Ambassador Goldberg's news
conference of May 18, see U.S./U.N. press release
61.
^ For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 64 dated
May 20.
* For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 68 dated
May 23.
' For text, see U.S./U.N. press release 69 dated
May 24.
JUNE 26, 1967
937
On May 24, in the Security Council, I
said: *
The United States strongly supported the request
by Canada and Denmark last evening for an im-
mediate meeting of the Security Council. We did so
out of our grave concern over the sharp increase
of tension between Israel and her Arab neighbors
since the Secretary-General's departure and out
of our belief that the Secretary-General should be
accorded all possible support in the difficult peace
mission on which he is now embarked.
And then I added:
. . . since the Secretary-General made his report
— indeed, in the 2 days since he departed for
Cairo — conditions in the area have taken a still
more menacing turn. . . . This had led us to the
belief that the Council, in the exercise of its re-
sponsibilities, should meet without delay and take
steps to relieve tension in the area. . . .
Great powers have both interests and responsi-
bilities in this matter — and the greater the power,
the greater the responsibility.
On May 29 I said in this Council, after the
return of our distinguished Secretary-
General: *
This grave appeal from the Secretary-General
has lost none of its relevance since his report was
issued. A blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba has been
announced. Armies stand within sight of each other
on the armistice lines between Israel, Syria, and
Egypt, including the Gaza Strip. Incidents have
occurred resulting in casualties, some of which have
been reported today. Thus the dangers in these three
areas, which the Secretary-General has rightly iden-
tified as the most sensitive of all, remain at their
height. Passions are still high and the need for
utmost restraint on both sides has in no way
abated.
On May 30, in this Council, I said this:
(The) situation ... is by common recognition
very tense, very g^rave, very serious, and menacing
to the cause of world peace and security.
On May 31 — and I am referring to events
all of which transpired before the outbreak
of hostilities — I said this:
The events since then have certainly underscored
the urgency which the Secretary-General expressed
to us last Friday in his report.
' For text, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 871.
' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg
on May 29, 30, and 31, see ibid., June 19, 1967,
p. 920.
Then on June 3 I said this: ^"
The Secretary-General in his appeal, in this grave
situation, has made an appeal to all concerned for
restraint. The United States is supporting this
appeal.
Mr. President, I am sorry to burden you
with this recital of the position of my Gov-
ernment, but one thing I want to make crys-
tal clear: It is not compatible with the state-
ment that has been made that the United
States in any way contributed to the cause
of tension in the area. Quite the contrary, the
United States, conscious of what the Secre-
tary-General had called to our attention, has
devoted every means at the disposal of our
Government, public and private, in the
interests of restraint in the area. We have
gone diplomatically to Israel and the Arab
states and have urged since May 15 — when
we had the Secretary-General's report before
us — restraint and pacific settlement.
We, along with others, made every effort
to get this Security Council to exercise its
own responsibilities in the area. We are one
of the members of the Security Council — only
one; we cannot order its deliberations. The
picture of a country egging someone on is
scarcely compatible with our record of
urging this Council to take action which we
at all times supported — and have supported
today — to urge all parties — I emphasize "all
parties" — to refrain from force and to fol-
low the charter prescription to settle disputes
by peaceful means.
More than that, any allegation that the
United States has given in this circumstance
"massive assistance to Israel" — and I quote
the distinguished Foreign Minister — is com-
pletely and entirely without foundation. What
we have done is to urge restraint. Every
communication, public and private, has been
directed to this end.
I regret very much, Mr. President, that
this Council did not heed our advice. Under
the charter, we did not have to wait, as we
pointed out in our presentation to the Coun-
" For text, see U.S. /U.N. press release 78 dated
June 3.
938
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cil, until a breach of peace occurred. The
charter talks about "threats to the peace,"
and it was our considered judgment, based
on events which were reported by the Sec-
retary-General, that the Council should exer-
cise its collective judgment, collective respon-
sibility, collective power, in the interests of
restraining all of the parties and bringing
about a peaceful composition and averting
the tragedy of war.
This is the record of the attitude of my
country in this matter. It is a record not of
partisanship; it is a record of sober respon-
sibility; it is a record of attempting to work
thi'ough the United Nations, the organ that
we created for this purpose. It is a record
also of exerting all diplomatic means at the
disposal of my country to avoid what has
occurred in the last few days.
So I cannot accept the concept that the
United States, which took the lead even to
the extent of offering a resolution before this
Council for a breathing spell, ^^ is in any way
to be charged with having fomented and en-
couraged anything that occurred. It is just
inconsistent with the facts — which are a mat-
ter of public record, as well as a matter of
private record — known to all the Arab states
involved in this conflict, as well as to Israel.
Those communications were widespread so
as to exercise by diplomatic means everything
we could do to restrain what the Secretary-
General pointed out was the most grave and
menacing situation in the Middle East that
we have faced since the Suez crisis.
Therefore, Mr. President, I only regret —
and I say this without recrimination — that
our appeals, diplomatically and to this Coun-
cil, were not heeded. I only regret that there
were members of this Council that took the
position that we were artificially dramatizing
a situation which already at that time was
the most dramatic on the world scene and
which today has resulted in the catastrophe
of which we spoke.
" U.N. doc. S/7916; for a statement by Ambassa-
dor Goldberg on May 31, see Bulletin of June 19,
1967, p. 927.
I say this — and I say it in all friendship
for all who have spoken: It is not good, it is
not good, to take a position which lays to
our country a position which our country
does not hold and which the facts belie and
which cannot be supported.
But something more is involved. It has
been a basic conception of the United States,
as a principal supporter of the United Na-
tions, and as one of its founders, that this
organization had a responsibility to avert the
catastrophe. And it was our effort to get this
Council to discharge that responsibility which
brought us here. In the negotiations which
have taken place we made every attempt to
do everything we could to urge restraint, and
we shall continue to do so in light of the
Council's resolution which has been passed
today.
Mr. President, I would not like by any
thought of omission to indicate that we do
not, with the greatest regret, the greatest
sorrow, share the views of my other col-
leagues about the deaths of members of the
UNEF contingents of India and Brazil. We
believe in peacekeeping. We think those
brave soldiers paid a supreme sacrifice for
their dedication to the United Nations. We
express this regret now, and my Government
at the highest levels is expressing its regrets
to the heads of state. We think that this is a
regrettable and sorrowful chapter in the his-
tory of the United Nations. And we have no
hesitancy in condemning those responsible.
We think that the lives of those soldiers are
the first priority for all men who believe in
the great peacekeeping effort of the United
Nations.
Mr. President, I would say this: My coun-
try desires, as I have said, good relations
with all. We try to have good relations with
all. Good relations are not going to be the
products of statements which are not
founded upon fact. Indeed, I, in this Council,
conscious of some documents that have been
circulated, categorically stated on the highest
authority of my Government that if there
was any doubt about the position of the
JUNE 26, 1967
939
United States with respect to any regime,
whatever its ideology, in the Middle East, I
wanted to lay that doubt to rest.
The passage which I read today — and have
read three times — stands: We respect the ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence
of every state in the Middle East. It has
been our consistent policy. We believe in it.
We believe in the spirit of friendship for all
of the countries concerned. That is our posi-
tion. That remains our position. It is not
changed by anything that has been said, be-
cause it represents the fundamental policy
of our country.
Finally, Mr. President, when the historical
record of this period is written, the United
States will yield to no one in what it did
through private channels to urge everybody
to exercise restraint in this situation. We
have worked day and night in this Council
and outside this Council. We have accepted
every suggestion that has been made by
members of this Council to try to compose
this situation. And I repeat the offer I made
earlier — I know of no similar offer that has
been made in the history of the United
Nations — to admit on naval vessels of the
United States, in terms of intimacy and con-
fidence, the representatives of the United
Nations, with complete access to verify the
peaceful activities of the United States in
this situation.
[In a further intervention Ambassador Goldberg
said:]
I cannot allow to stand unchallenged a few
of the statements by the distinguished Am-
bassador of Syria, Ambassador [George J.]
Tomeh, to this group.
First of all, he purports to give me legal
advice about my competency to sit on this
Council. In this he joins the company of
others who have been attempting to give me
legal advice during the course of these de-
bates. Well, I have heard the legal advice,
and it sounds as if it comes from someone
not admitted to the practice of law.
I have before me the agenda which has
been adopted unanimously. I do not find on
the agenda any complaint against the United
States. Syria is always welcome to lodge an
agenda item, which can be discussed at the
proper time.
Now, I can only conclude that Mr. Tomeh's
speech was written before I made my cate-
gorical denial of American participation —
military or otherwise — in this regrettable
conflict which is going on now. And I shall
say again for his information, for the infor-
mation of this Council, and for the informa-
tion of his countrymen that there are no
United States carrier planes, no military air-
craft, no military forces, carrying volunteers
or anything else, involved in this conflict.
Now, we have an old American slang say-
ing— I don't apply it to him, Mr. President —
that when you are involved in a situation
where your veracity is challenged you "Put
up or shut up." Now, we have put up before
this Council the very simple method to test
the accuracy of statements which are taken
out of whole cloth; and that is through the
instrumentality of this organization. We have
issued an invitation to this organization to
provide observers in order to verify the ac-
curacy of these unfounded statements. They
will receive the greatest welcome from our
country. I think that is the best proof that
I could possibly offer concerning this ex-
tremely inflammatory and totally unfounded
statement concerning the United States.
There is a statement which I must reject
with great emphasis, because it relates to the
essential fabric of our society; and that is a
statement charging that any citizen of the
United States has double loyalty to his coun-
try because he has attachments to his
ancestral home. That is the implication, I
take it, of the Ambassador's remark.
Our country is a pluralistic society. We
draw our citizenry from virtually every coun-
try on the face of the globe. This is the
source of our strength as a nation from
which we derive the virility of American life
in our culture, in our institutions, in our tra-
ditions, in all that we do. We do not accept
the concept that because our citizens, what-
ever their faith or religion or ancestral
origin may be, have an interest in their
940
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ancestral homes, this is a sign of double
loyalty or lack of attacliment to our Ameri-
can institutions.
I served in President Kennedy's adminis-
tration. One of the finest features of that
administration in terms of world interest
was the visit he made to his ancestral home.
That was applauded by all Americans, re-
gardless of their faith or of their religion
or their traditions or their background.
I regret that Ambassador Tomeh does not
understand our country, although he has
lived here a long time. Our citizens are loyal
to our country, and his references to the atti-
tudes of our citizens, as I said the other day,
are completely out of order. I would have
challenged that statement and asked for a
ruling that it is out of order, but I thought
we ought to hear him out, because I believe
profoundly in free speech for any member of
the United Nations. But I do wish to state
that it is untenable for members of the
United Nations to intervene in our domestic
affairs. That we reject as completely unten-
able. We would not presume to do that with
respect to any country in the world. We
would not presume to do it with respect to
his country, which has several elements of
religion and tradition. We simply cannot
accept it as the appropriate thing to say
about our country, and we do not accept it.
As I said the other day, our policies can
be approved or disapproved, praised or criti-
cized, in this Council. This is a world body,
and we are not immune to that. But what is
immune from consideration by this Council
is the attitude of our own citizens in the
exercise of their constitutional rights or the
points of view, any points of view, that they
may have in terms of their exercise of their
democratic rights as citizens.
Finally, I would like to say this, and per-
haps we can go back to the origins of this
difficulty: The canard — and it was a canard
— was circulated that the United States had
something to do with alleged plots against
Syria. I appeared before this Council and I
told this Council on the highest authority
that there was nothing to that allegation,
nothing to it. Now, repeating allegations
without evidence and just making accusa-
tions is not proof. It does not sustain the
charge; it just spreads defamation. I must
reject completely a statement like this as
defamatory and completely unfounded.
FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 8
U.S./U.N. press release 86
Mr. President, in its two resolutions call-
ing for and then demanding a cease-fire, the
Security Council in the past 3 days has taken
the first essential step on the road back to
peace in the Middle East. But we have not
achieved our objective, as is evident from
the letter read to us by the Secretary-General
and by the oral report which he has just
given to the members of the. Council.
The increasing gravity of the situation
makes it perfectly clear that we must take
further steps in order to maximize the
chances of building a peace in that tormented
region, a peace which will be stable and just
to all concerned. The cessation of hostilities
and the building of such a peace, it is obvi-
ous, cannot be done quickly. But the steps
toward it must be taken without delay. It is
for this reason that my delegation has asked
for this urgent meeting of the Council today
and has submitted the draft resolution which
has been distributed to the members of the
Council. This resolution ^ reads as follows:
The Security Council,
Recalling its Resolutions 233 and 234,
Recalling that in the latter resolution the Coun-
cil demanded that the governments concerned should
as a first step cease fire and discontinue military
operations at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967,
Noting that Israel and Jordan have indicated
their mutual acceptance of the Council's demands
for a cease-fire, and that Israel has e.xpressed with
respect to all parties its acceptance of the cease-
fire provided the other parties accept.
Noting further with deep concern that other par-
ties to the conflict have not yet agreed to a cease-fire,
1. Calls for scrupulous compliance by Israel and
Jordan with the agreement they have reached on
a cease-fire.
" U.N. doc. S/7952.
JUNE 26, 1967
941
2. Insists that all the other parties concerned
immediately comply with the Council's repeated
demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all mili-
tary activity as a first urgent step toward the
establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East,
3. Calls for discussions promptly thereafter
among the parties concerned, using such third party
or United Nations assistance as they may wish,
looking toward the establishment of viable arrange-
ments encompassing the withdrawal and disengage-
ment of armed personnel, the renunciation of force
regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital
international rights, and the establishment of a
stable and durable peace in the Middle East,
4. Requests the President of the Security Coun-
cil and the Secretary-General to take immediate
steps to assure compliance with the cease-fire and
to report to the Council thereon within twenty-four
hours,
5. Also requests the Secretary-General to pro-
vide such assistance as may be required in facilitat-
ing the discussions called for in paragraph 3.
It is obvious from the text of this resolu-
tion that the provisions in the resolution fall
into two distinct parts.
First, paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 are designed
to complete the essential — and I emphasize
"essential" — first step of the cease-fire.
Fighting must stop. It must stop now. It
should have stopped before, but it certainly
must stop now. We welcome the fact that a
mutual cease-fire has already been accepted
by Israel and Jordan. We also welcome the
fact that the Government of Israel an-
nounced officially in a letter today to the Se-
curity Council President, document S/7945,
that it accepts the Security Council call for an
immediate cease-fire if the other parties ac-
cept. It is necessary that all the other parties
now agree to put into effect a cease-fire im-
mediately, and this resolution so provides. It
further provides in paragraph 4 for the as-
sistance both of yourself, Mr. President, and
the Secretary-General to assure prompt com-
pliance with the Council's call for a cease-
fire. In this respect this provision draws on
the useful idea put forward yesterday in the
draft resolution submitted by the distin-
guished representative of Canada.'^
Second, the resolution calls in paragraph
3 for prompt discussions after a cease-fire
" U.N. doc. S/7941.
has been achieved, looking toward the estab-
lishment of viable arrangements encompass-
ing the withdrawal and disengagement of
armed personnel, the renunciation of force
regardless of its nature, the maintenance of
vital international rights, and what I am
sure every member of this Council hopes for:
the establishment of a stable and durable
peace in the Near East. And paragraph 5
asks our distinguished Secretary-General to
assist in whatever way may be necessary to
facilitate such discussions.
Mr. President, my Government believes
that this dual approach, in which the comple-
tion of the cease-fire is combined with a call
for longer range discussions, is the approach
most likely to bring progress toward real
peace in the Near East. In simple realism, in
light of all that has occurred, we must all
recognize that immediately beyond the first
essential step of cease-fire there still lie the
basic political issues which have fed the fires
of conflict in this region for two decades.
Indeed, the entire debate in this Security
Council over the last several days has em-
phasized this essential fact. It would not do
justice to the problem to confine our concerns
exclusively to the cessation of hostilities
without also thereafter promptly addressing
ourselves to the causes of hostilities.
In order to initiate such a prompt ap-
proach to the causes of the hostilities, we
have included in our draft resolution para-
graph 3. Our purpose is to provide for move-
ment toward the final settlement of all out-
standing questions between the parties,
which the U.N. envisaged nearly 20 years
ago. And I should like to emphasize, when
we say all questions, all outstanding ques-
tions, we mean all. No outstanding question
should be excluded. The objective must be a
decision by the warring powers to live in
peace and to establish normal relations, as
contemplated and pledged by the U.N. Char-
ter.
Mr. President, clearly such major contro-
versies as that which have plagued the Near
East for these many years cannot be solved
without difficulty, and anyone conversant
with the situation would be lacking in candor
942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
if he did not acknowledge this. To minimize
the obstacles to a prompt beginning of such
a discussion, we have included in paragraph
3 the suggestion that the parties make use of
such United Nations or third-party assist-
ance as they may wish; and in paragraph 5
we have included a particular request to the
Secretary-General, in his unique position as
an impartial international servant, to pro-
vide such assistance in this connection as
may be required.
Speaking for the United States, let me add
that our view on all these many problems
has been stated many times and has not
changed. I wish to reaffirm in all sincerity
that my country's wish for all the nations
and peoples of the Middle East is a true peace
of justice, mutual tolerance, and creative
growth. We want to see that region get away
from the dreadful cycle of arms races and
war. We are ready to do anything necessary
in order to achieve that' eventual result. We
want to see the gifted peopvle of all nations
in the area devote their talents and energies
to the works of peace and construction, the
eradication of disease and ignorance and
prejudice and poverty, and the building of a
better life for all the people, since we are
convinced that this is what the people of the
area truly want and seek. And to this end, I
renew the pledge of the United States to join
in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the Mid-
dle East and to lend all our energies to this
end.
A wise philosopher once observed that
there is no conflict which cannot be resolved
if it is dealt with at a higher level than that
on which it occurred. Let us now call on the
parties to this conflict to rise to such a higher
level, one which takes fully into account both
all the hard realities of this complex situa-
tion and also its creative possibilities.
Now, in this moment of sad conflict and
danger, is the time for the United Nations,
through this authoritative organ, the Secu-
rity Council, to point the way. And now also
is the time for all loyal members of the
United Nations, in and out of this Council, to
put their influence at the service of peace. It
is in this belief that my delegation has of-
fered the present draft resolution, for which
I ask the Council's prompt and constructive
consideration.
Mr. President, when war breaks out it
touches all of us; no one is immune. In the
last few days we have had sad reports about
death of U.N. personnel — Indian personnel,
Brazilian personnel, Irish personnel. And to-
day it is with sadness that I report that this
morning we received information that an
unarmed United States ship in the Mediter-
ranean had been attacked and hit by a tor-
pedo, with resultant loss of life, American
life. The Government of Israel has admitted
responsibility for the incident and has ex-
pressed apologies. I wish to express dismay
at this incident and to call for vigorous steps
to assure that it is not repeated and to in-
form the Council that the United States Gov-
ernment has already protested the attack
directly to the Government of Israel.
Mr. President, this Council has a great
responsibility, and that responsibility is to
see to it that all fighting stops in the area.
This is the purport of our resolution, which
I commend to the members of this Council.
SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 8
U.S. /U.N. press release 86
We have taken due note of the letter from
the distinguished Permanent Representative
of the United Arab Republic, Ambassador
[Mohamed Awad] El Kony, read to us by
our Secretary-General, indicating that his
Government is prepared to accept the cease-
fire called for by this Council on the condi-
tion that the other party ceases the fire. This
acceptance of the Council's resolutions call-
ing for a cease-fire parallels the acceptance
made by the Government of Israel with
respect to a cease-fire.
My Government was very glad that this
declaration has been made and conveyed to
the Security Council. We hope it will lead
to similar declarations by other countries
concerned which have not yet responded af-
firmatively, that it will lead to the end of
the military conflict, and that it will be the
JUNE 26, 1967
943
beginning of the establishment of a stable
and durable peace in the Near East.
Accordingly, in light of the information
received since the circulation of our draft
resolution, we have made the following revi-
sions in our draft resolution and have asked
the Secretariat to distribute our revisions. i*
But I shall, with your permission, read the
revisions, since apparently they are not yet
ready for distribution.
In preambular paragraph 3, "Noting that
Israel and Jordan," we revised that to read,
"Noting that Israel, Jordan, and the United
Arab Republic" and then go on as in the
draft resolution.
And in operative paragraph 1, after the
words "Calls for scrupulous compliance by
Israel and Jordan," eliminate the word "and"
and add the words after "Jordan": "and the
United Arab Republic with their agree-
ments," so that the paragraph will read,
"Calls for scrupulous compliance by Israel,
Jordan and the United Arab Republic with
their agreements to a cease-fire."
The Secretariat will distribute these revi-
sions, but I should like now to call them to
the attention of the Council.
FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 9
U.S./U.N. press release 88
Mr. President, the United States voted for
the draft resolution ^^ presented by you be-
cause of the extreme urgency of the situation
and because ever since this grave conflict
broke out we have consistently favored an
immediate end to all fighting, and, indeed,
before the conflict broke out we sought by
every possible means to avert it. We were
prepared to vote for such a cease-fire when
we walked into the Council before 10:00 a.m.
this morning. We only regret that over 2
hours were lost before the Council was able
to come to this decision.
This delay, Mr. President, was due to no
" U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 1. For text of a further
revision (S/7952/Rev. 2), see p. 948.
'*U.N. doc. S/7960 (S/RES/235(1967)).
fault of yours. Throughout your handling of
this grave aff'air, you have acted with ex-
treme expedition and have made every effort
to have the Council act urgently and ener-
getically in the interests of stopping the
fighting and bringing about more stable con-
ditions in the area. And I would be less than
candid if I did not also say that the delay
was not due to the parties involved. Both
parties involved were ready for us to proceed
at 10:00 a.m.
Now, what is the delay due to ? It is, in my
opinion, more than time to call a spade a
spade. The delay is due to the fact that other
members of the Council insist upon attempt-
ing to inject into our discussions matters
which should be handled next. It is because
some members of the Council do not ade-
quately, in my view, understand the extreme
urgency of bringing the fighting to an end
and because they bring into our discussion
important matters which should require and
will need the Council's consideration after
we bring the fighting to an end.
It is only fair to recall that the same sort
of unfortunate delay took place on Monday
and Tuesday. If all of the members of the
Council had been prepared, as we were, to
demand a cease-fire the moment the fighting
broke out, perhaps a great deal of bloodshed
and many complications could have been
avoided. Indeed, Mr. President, if all mem-
bers of the Council had been prepared on the
24th of May to support the resolution that
you offered on behalf of your country [Den-
mark], and the distinguished representative
of Canada joined in doing, perhaps no con-
flict would have taken place.
Now we have had a grave conflict and now
we must do everything within our power to
bring the fighting to an end, to bring an end
to the bloodshed and the hardship and the
loss of lives that have occurred in the area.
We have joined other members of the Coun-
cil now for the third time in saying that there
must be a cease-fire and there must be a
cease-fire in practice on the part of all, not
only in words. The cease-fire must promptly
be made fully effective and durable in all
sectors. That is our most urgent task.
944
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Every minute that fighting continues in
the present tense situation poses further
dangers to peace. Further delay in full im-
plementation of the cease-fire resolutions of
this Council is not acceptable — not accept-
able— I think to all members of the Council.
All hostilities must stop promptly, and the
cease-fire must be observed scrupulously and
continuously by all parties. It must also be
accepted by the other combatant states who
have not yet done so.
To bring about this result and to insure
that the cease-fire once achieved is strictly
adhered to, my delegation is pleased that the
Council has also acted to request the Secre-
tary-General to take energetic efforts to im-
plement its decision. Part of our problem
here also has been the fact that some mem-
bers of this Council have not been willing to
authorize the appropriate officials of the U.N.
to take action in implementation of the Coun-
cil's resolution.
Mr. President, it is not a high mark in the
history of this organization that a simple
resolution offered a few days ago by the dis-
tinguished delegate of Canada was not
promptly acted upon but was thought to be
something that required study and consid-
eration. What kind of study? What kind of
consideration, when what was called for was
the entire energy and resources of this orga-
nization in the interests of bringing the
fighting to an end so that the Council could
then proceed to deal with the underlying
causes of the conflict and to pacify the situ-
ation and to help bring about a durable
peace ?
Now we are using the Secretary-General.
We should have done so before. We should
have followed the suggestion made by the
distinguished delegate of Canada and uti-
lized the resources of this organization for
the purpose of bringing about peace in the
area. We are not doing credit to the U.N. by
the manner in which we are proceeding. I
say this with the greatest regret, because I
have great faith in this organization. But
this organization is not stronger than the
will of its members, and this organization
has no magic wand unless its members are
prepared to give it the magic wand that will
enable this organization to perform its du-
ties.
If we go back, Mr. President — as we will
have to go back at an appropriate time — and
consider what happened in this situation, we
will see that what has happened has been a
lack of ability to concei-t our action here so
that conflict can be avoided and also a lack
of ability to concert our action here once
conflict takes place to stop fighting so that
there can then be a sorting out of the prob-
lems which develop when fighting takes
place. This has been our consistent problem,
and this morning we had another witness to
the difficulties of doing the minimum that is
required in order to contain a very danger-
ous situation.
Because of our delay, people have lost
their lives, and that is something that we
have to assume responsibility for before the
conscience of the world. I believe that this
type of maneuvering ought to stop in this
Council, and I say this very plainly and very
categorically. My Government is willing to
concert its actions with every member of this
Council so that we can stop fighting, so that
we can take up all that we need to consider,
so that we can make a major contribution
toward the restoration of peace in the area.
We are ready at any time to do that. We are
ready under any circumstances.
We feel very strongly that when we delay
and when we engage in elaborate and un-
necessary negotiations, quibbling about
words, quibbling about ideas which are not
relevant to the particular problem that we
have at hand, which is to stop the fighting,
we do not do a service to the cause of peace.
We have acted now. By now we could
have had the report of the Secretary-General
which would have enabled us all to see what
had happened and, hopefully, his intervention
would have brought about full implementa-
tion of the cease-fire resolution.
I hope and trust, Mr. President, that as
we proceed in the handling of this grave
affair, we will all be conscious of our re-
sponsibilities— conscious of our responsibili-
ties to humanity — and that we will proceed
JUNE 26, 1967
945
in such fashion that this Council can act
with expedition and with the full force and
spirit of the charter to bring about an end
to the fighting. Having done so, I pledge on
behalf of my Government that we will do
everything within our power to act together
with members of the Council to deal with all
the other problems which will remain before
us. It was in that spirit that we offered our
draft resolution yesterday. But we must take
care of first things first; and the very first
thing, as is apparent from the conflicting
reports we received this morning, is that the
fighting should stop and stop now.
SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 9
U.S./U.N. press release 92
I should like to make this statement on the
full authority of my Government. The Se-
curity Council with the full support of the
United States has adopted three resolutions
calling for and demanding an unconditional
cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states.
The United States deems it of the gravest
import that the Security Council's resolu-
tions shall be complied with in letter and in
spirit by Israel and the Arabic countries in-
volved. There has been too much bloodshed
and loss of life, and it is imperative that
this war come to an end and that all gov-
ernments involved in this conflict should
return to the urgent task of restoring peace
to the Middle East.
Mr. President, the policy of my Govern-
ment with respect to this situation was
prophetically stated by the President of the
United States on May 23. It still remains the
policy of our Government, as I indicated
when I offered the resolution for the consid-
eration of this Council yesterday, when I
said: "Speaking for the United States, let me
add that our view on all these many prob-
lems has been stated many times and has not
changed." It is perhaps necessary to recall
what the President of the United States
stated on May 23. He stated that:
The Government of the United States is deeply
concerned, in particular, with three potentially ex-
plosive aspects of the present confrontation.
First, we regret that the General Armistice Agree-
ments have failed to prevent warlike acts from the
territory of one against another government or
against civilians or territory under control of an-
other government.
Second, we are dismayed at the hurried with-
drawal of the United Nations Emergency Force
from Gaza and Sinai after more than 10 years of
steadfast and effective service in keeping the
peace, vdthout action by either the General Assem-
bly or the Security Council of the United Nations.
We continue to regard the presence of the United
Nations in the area as a matter of fundamental
importance. We intend to support its continuance
with all possible vigor.
Third, we deplore the recent buildup of military
forces and believe it a matter of urgent importance
to reduce troop concentrations. The status of sensi-
tive areas, as the Secretary-General emphasized
in his report to the Security Council," such as the
Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba, is a particularly
important aspect of the situation.
Mr. President, nothing could have been
more specific than the statement of the Pres-
ident of the United States dealing with this
particular situation. And then the President
of the United States stated the policy of our
Government, which has been a constant
policy for 20 years. He stated it in explicit
terms, and his statement was not matched
by other governments, which might have
assured an avoidance of this conflict.
To the leaders of all the nations of the Near
East, I wish to say what three American Presi-
dents have said before me — that the United States
is firmly committed to the support of the political
independence and territorial integrity of all the
nations of that area. The United States strongly
opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any
form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy
of the United States led by four Presidents —
President Truman, President Eisenhower, President
John F. Kennedy, and myself — as well as the policy
of both of our political parties. The record of the
actions of the United States over the past 20 years,
within and outside the United Nations, is abun-
dantly clear on this point.
The United States has consistently sought to have
good relations with all states of the Near East.
Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but
we are convinced that our differences with indi-
vidual states of the area and their differences with
each other must be worked out peacefully and in
accordance with accepted international practice.
Now, Mr. President, those words were not
" U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.
946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
heeded at the time, and our efforts to obtain
general recognition of their import were not
heeded in this Council. They were frustrated
by certain members of this Council.
But in presenting a draft resolution to this
Security Council just yesterday, I pointed out
that it was essential to our search for peace
in the area that our objective must be a deci-
sion by the warring powers to live in peace
and to establish normal relations, as contem-
plated and pledged by the United Nations
Charter. And I said our purpose is to provide
for movement toward the final settlement of
outstanding questions between the parties,
which the United Nations envisaged nearly
20 years ago.
Mr. President, we have had a long debate,
and there have been charges and counter-
charges in statements by the parties. And
what is the situation in which the Security
Council finds itself? Due to the fact that
there is no effective United Nations ma-
chinery in the area, due to the fact that its
effectiveness has been impaired by what we
all know has occurred, no one in this Coun-
cil, exercising the quasi-judicial character of
the Council, can at this point resolve the con-
flicting statements which have been made.
What is imperatively required here are
two things, which every fair-minded person
must recognize. And the first is this, if it
can be done in this Council and if obstruc-
tionism will cease: an impartial investigation
by the Secretary-General of the allegations
which have been made concerning the viola-
tion of the cease-fire orders, which all parties
that have expressed themselves have now
said — Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jor-
dan, and Syria — an impartial investigation
by the Secretary-General, with adequate ma-
chinery to make the investigation of the state
of compliance in the area. Obviously, any
group called upon to decide the conflicting
charges and the conflicting statements which
have been made would need this in order to
make a decision in the matter.
And the second thing which we impera-
tively need is adequate machinery on the part
of the Secretary-General to implement these
cease-fire resolutions which have been or-
dered by this Council.
Today both of these are lacking. Today
both of these are imperatively required if
we are to do the job that this Council has to
do and if we are to do it not on the basis of
accepting one party's version as against the
version of another but to do it on the basis
of impartial, objective facts established by
the most impartial agency we have — the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
My country would support those two pro-
posals. My country has been willing to sup-
port it throughout this debate so that all that
we do can be done in the interests of main-
taining peace in the area. Therefore, Mr.
President, I make these proposals to this
Council so that this Council can act; not act
on the basis of one-sided adherence to a point
of view alleged but act on the basis of estab-
lished facts that satisfy fairminded men and
also act on the basis of what must really be
done in a situation as complicated as this.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations
is lacking the tools to do the job of imple-
menting a cease-fire resolution. Therefore,
we will have what we have had in some other
situations, and that is charges and counter-
charges, allegations of violation of a cease-
fire, which we, sitting in New York thou-
sands of miles from the scene, are unable to
resolve.
Finally, Mr. President, I say this: Debate
here, accusations here, will not solve the
problem. What will solve the problem is,
first, ascertainment of the facts; second, ac-
tion on the ground by United Nations ma-
chinery to make sure that the cease-fire is
properly implemented. Those are the two
ways which are necessary for us to proceed.
This is the view of my Government, and I
convey it to the members of this Council.
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Resolution of June 6
The Security Council,
Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General
in this situation.
" S/RES/233 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on
June 6.
JUNE 26, 1967
947
Having heard the statements made in the Council,
Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with
the menacing situation in the Near East,
1. Calls upon the Governments concerned as a
first step to take forthwith all measures for an im-
mediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all mili-
tary activities in the area;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the
Council promptly and currently informed on the
situation.
Resolution of June 7 '^
The Security Council,
Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Gov-
ernments concerned to take forthwith as a first
step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and
for a cessation of all military activities in the
Near East (resolution 233 (1967)), military activ-
ities in the area are continuing,
Concerned that the continuation of military ac-
tivities may create an even more menacing situation
in the arpa,
1. Demands that the Gbvernments concerned
should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all
military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June
1967;
2. Requests the Secretary-CJeneral to keep the
Council promptly and currently informed on the
situation.
U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
Draft Resolution of May 31 '°
Tlie Security Council,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-
General in document S/7906,
Having heard the statements of the parties.
Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the
Middle East,
Noting that the Secretary-General has in his
report expressed the view that "a peaceful outcome
to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing
spell which will allow tension to subside from its
present explosive level", and that he therefore urged
"all the parties concerned to exercise special re-
straint, to forego belligerence and to avoid all other
actions which could increase tension, to allow the
Council to deal with the underlying causes of the
present crisis and to seek solutions",
1. Calls on all the parties concerned as a first
step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,
2. Encourages the inmiediate pursuit of interna-
tional diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the
situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just
solutions,
3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and
continuous review so that the Council may deter-
mine what further steps it might take in the exer-
cise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
Resolution of June 9
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234
(1967),
Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria
have announced their mutual acceptance of the
Council's demand for a cease-fire.
Noting the statements made by the representa-
tives of Syria and Israel,
1. Confirms its previous resolutions about imme-
diate cease-fire and cessation of military action;
2. Demands that hostilities should cease forth-
with;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to make imme-
diate contacts with the Governments of Israel and
Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the
above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the
Security Council not later than two hours from now.
"S/RES/234 (1967); adopted unanimously on
June 7.
"S/RES/235 (1967); adopted unanimously on
June 9.
"U.N. doc. S/7916/Rev. 1; for background, see
Bulletin of June 19, 1967, p. 927.
«» S/7952/Rev. 2.
Revised Draft Resolution of June 8
The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 233 and 234,
Recalling that in the latter resolution the Coun-
cil demanded that the Governments concerned should
as a first step cease fire and discontinue military
operations at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967,
Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United
Arab Republic have indicated their acceptance of
the Council's demand for a cease-fire.
Noting further with deep concern reports of con-
tinued fighting between Israel and Syria,
1. Insists on an immediate scnapulous implementa-
tion by all the parties concerned of the Council's
repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation
of all military activity as a first urgent step to-
ward the establishment of a stable peace in the
Middle East;
2. Calls for discussions promptly thereafter among
the parties concerned, using such third party or
United Nations assistance as they may wish, look-
ing toward the establishment of viable arrangements
encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement
of armed personnel, the renunciation of force re-
gardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital
international rights and the establishment of a
stable and durable peace in the Middle East;
948
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
3. Reqiiests the President of the Security Council
and the Secretary-General to take immediate steps
to seek to assure compliance with the cease-fire and
to report to the Council thereon within twenty-four
i hours ;
4. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide
such assistance as may be required in facilitating
the discussions called for in paragraph 2.
The Situation in the Near East
Following, in chronological order, are re-
leases relating to the crisis in the Near East
tvhich were issued by the White House June
5-8.
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 5 '
We are deeply distressed to learn that
large-scale fighting has broken out in the
Middle East, an eventuahty we had sought
to prevent.
Each side has accused the other of launch-
ing aggression. At this time the facts are
not clear. But we do know that tragic con-
sequences will flow from this needless and
desti-uctive struggle if the fighting does not
cease irmnediately.
The United Nations Security Council has
been called into urgent session.
In accordance with his policy instituted
earlier to keep the Congress advised of devel-
opments in the Middle East crisis, the Presi-
dent has asked Secretaiy Rusk and Secretary
McNamara to brief the Senate and House
leaders at 9:30 a.m. today. At 8:30 this morn-
ing the President will meet with Secretaries
Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, and
George Christian.
The United States will devote all its
energies to bring about an end to the fight-
ing and a new beginning of programs to as-
sure the peace and development of the entire
' Read to news correspondents by George Chris-
tian, Press Secretai-y to the President (White House
press release dated June 5).
area. We call upon all parties to support the
Security Council in bringing about an im-
mediate cease-fire.
STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK
News Briefing at the White House, June S
White House press release dated June 5
Secretary Rusk: I understand there has
been some discussion in the course of the
day about the attitude of the United States
in this situation in the Near East.
I would refer you to the very fundamental
statement made by President Johnson on
May 23d ^ and to his reafl!irmation of the
policies enunciated by four Presidents: that
the United States is committed to the sup-
port of the independence and territorial in-
tegrity of all the nations of the area of the
Near East.
We are in a situation where several gov-
ernments have declared war. We are not a
belligerent. We do not have forces involved
in this violence. Our citizens in the area are
entitled to the treatment that is due to citi-
zens of countries who are not belligerents.
They are not enemy aliens, wherever they
might be out there.
But this traditional word of international
law, "neutrality," does not involve indiffer-
ence. The President has been deeply con-
cerned about this situation since it flared up
about 21/^ or 3 weeks ago and has worked
incessantly to try to stabilize the peace out
there.
We have an obligation under the United
Nations Charter, and very especially as a
permanent member of the Security Council,
to carry our full share of the primary re-
sponsibihty of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and
security.
At the present time we are making a max-
imum eff"ort in the Security Council to bring
about a cease-fire. In the course of the day.
' For text, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 870.
JUNE 26, 1967
949
that has been caught up in some of the
political discussions which have to do with
the longer range issues.
We have felt that it is important to work
with the Security Council to stop the fighting
in order that peaceful processes can have a
chance to operate on those other questions.
So there is the position at law that we are
not a belligerent. There is the position of
deep concern, which we have as a nation
and as a member of the United Nations, in
peace in that area.
I would hope that this would clarify some
of the discussion that I have heard in the
course of the day. I can take just a question
or two. I have to go to a meeting in a
moment.
Q. Then, Mr. Secretary, what we are try-
ing to get straightened out was Mr.
McCloskey's [Robert J. McCloskey, the
Department spokesman'] statement that we
were "neutral in thought, word, and deed"
The tradition of neutrality, legally, in inter-
national law — would that foreclose any
options that we would have in the future?
Secretary Rusk: I don't want to speculate
about the future. What I am saying is that
the President has stated in the most funda-
mental way our attitude on this in his state-
ment of May 23d. You had his statement, of
course, this morning, about our attitude
toward this outbreak of violence.
I want to emphasize that any use of this
word "neutral," which is a great concept of
international law, is not an expression of
indifference, and, indeed, indifference is not
permitted to us because we have a very
heavy obligation under the United Nations
Charter, and especially as one of the per-
manent members of the Security Council, to
do everything we can to maintain inter-
national peace and security.
Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government
made any determination on the basis of the
information it has as to who initiated the
violence in this (present outbreak?
Secretary Rusk: No. The President com-
mented on that this morning in his state-
ment. The facts are still very obscure. It may
be some time before the facts can be clari-
fied. It may take quite a long time. We have
not tried to make a judgment on that, and
we have no reason to think that the Security
Council is trying to make a judgment on
that at the moment. The key problem is to
get the shooting stopped.
Q. Have we had any indication whether
Russia will go along tvith the effort to get a
cease-fire resolution through the Security
Council?
Secretary Rusk: We hope that they will.
There have been discussions with them in
the course of the day at the Security Council.
They, of course, as a permanent member,
have the same obligations that we have to
play their role in maintaining international
peace and security. But when I last heard
from the situation up there, those talks had
not come to a final conclusion in the Security
Council.
Q. Mr. Rusk, under our concept of neutral-
ity, ivould it be a violation for one of the
countries involved to raise funds by financ-
ing or floating bonds in this country, in your
judgment ?
Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to get
into that. We are not in a situation that calls
for judgment or decision on that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are we neutral in
thought, ivord, and deed ?
Secretary Rusk: I have in a good many
words told you what our attitude is. I don't,
I think, need to get into particular phraseol-
ogy that goes beyond what the President
has said and what I have said. Thank you.
News Briefing at the White House, June 6
White House press release dated June 6
Secretary Rusk: Early this morning I
heard a charge made by Cairo that U.S.
carrier-based planes had taken part in at-
tacks on Egypt.
These charges are utterly and wholly false.
The truth of the matter could have been
ascertained very quickly if the authorities in
950
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cairo had picked up a telephone and asked
our Ambassador about it, or if their Ambas-
sador in Washington had asked the Depart-
ment of State or the Department of Defense
about it.
We know that they and some of their
friends know where our carriers are. We can
only conclude that this was a malicious
charge, known to be false, and, therefore,
obviously was invented for some purpose not
fully disclosed.
I said yesterday that the United States
is not a belligerent in this situation. Our
forces are not participating in it. There is
just no word of truth in the charge that U.S.
aircraft have taken part in any of these pres-
ent operations in the Near East.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any idea why
they might have made this charge?
Secretary Rusk: I think they are trying to
create difficulties for Americans in the Near
East. I suppose they are trying to make this
a part of a propaganda campaign. But we
don't like this kind of charge, and we would
hope that they would make the minimum
effort to deal with such matters in a truthful
fashion.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 7
White House press release dated June 7
The United Nations Security Council has
called for a cease-fire in the Middle East.^
This first clear step toward lasting peace
has the strongest support of our Govern-
ment. We have worked as hard as we could
to avoid hostilities and to end them. But the
fighting came, and the road forward to real
peace and progress will not be easy. Still,
there is now a real chance for all to turn
from the frustrations of the past to the hopes
of a peaceful future. While the first responsi-
bility falls to the peoples and governments in
the area, we must do our best to that end,
both inside and outside the United Nations.
' See p, 934.
The continuing crisis and the effort to help
build a new peace will require the most care-
ful coordination of the work of our Govern-
ment. To insure this coordination, I am today
estabUshing a Special Committee of the
National Security Council. The Secretary of
State will preside over this committee, and
its members will be the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and
Mr. Walt Rostow. I shall meet with the com-
mittee from time to time as necessary and
so will the Vice President and the Ambas-
sador to the United Nations.
I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve
as a Special Consultant to the President and
to be Executive Secretary of the committee.
Mr. Bundy has worked with us before, and
he has been in informal consultation in the
last year on a number of subjects. Mr. Bundy
has now asked his board of trustees at the
Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of
absence, and he is already at work. I am ask-
ing all agencies of the Government to assist
him with such staff support as he may re-
quest for the Special Committee. The com-
mittee will meet regularly at the White
House.
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS, THE PRESIDENT
AND SENATOR MANSFIELD, JUNE 8
White House press release dated June 8
Senator Mansfield to the President
Deak Mr. President: As I said this
morning, it would be a great help to me, and
I think to the Senate as a whole if we could
have your own current views on the situa-
tion in the Middle East. That situation has
developed so rapidly in recent days, and the
issues before us there are of such great im-
portance, that the Senate would be grateful,
I am sure, to have your own present assess-
ment.
Sincerely,
Mike Mansfield
JUNE 26, 1967
951
The President to Senator Mansfield
Dear Mike: I am delighted to respond to
your note with a brief statement on the cur-
rent situation as we see it. I entirely share
your view that it is good for the President
and the Senate to be in close touch on this
matter.
Our most urgent present concern is to
find a way to bring the fighting in the Mid-
dle East to an end. We are deeply con-
cerned that there has not yet been an
effective response to the two unanimous
votes by which the U.N. Security Council
has called for a cease-fire. While the repre-
sentative of Israel agreed to comply if other
parties also agreed only Jordan, among the
Arab States, has agreed to the cease-fire.
Ambassador Goldberg, on my instructions,
has requested the immediate convening of
another Security Council session, to deal
with the current situation, and we have
presented a Resolution whose text I attach.*
The fighting has already brought the suf-
fering and pain that comes with all such
conflict. These losses have included the
lives of Americans engaged in the work of
peaceful communication on the high seas.
On this matter we have found it necessary
to make a prompt and firm protest to the
Israel Government which, to its credit, had
already acknowledged its responsibility and
had apologized. This tragic episode will
underline for all Americans the correctness
of our own urgent concern that the fighting
should stop at once.
So we continue to believe that a cease-fire
is the urgent first step required to bring
about peace in that troubled part of the
world. At the same time we know, of course,
that a cease-fire will be only a beginning and
that many more fundamental questions must
be tackled promptly if the area is to enjoy
genuine stability. Our new Resolution begins
to deal with some of these questions.
Let me emphasize that the U.S. continues
to be guided by the same basic policies
which have been followed by this Adminis-
tration and three previous Administrations.
These policies have always included a con-
sistent effort on our part to maintain good
relations with all the peoples of the area in
spite of the difficulties caused by some of
their leaders. This remains our policy despite
the unhappy rupture of relations which has
been declared by several Arab states.^
We hope that the individual states in the
Middle East will now find new ways to
work out their differences with each other
by the means of peace, and in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations. We
look beyond the current conflict to a new
era of greater stability which will permit all
the peoples of the area to enjoy the fruits
of lasting peace. Our full efforts will be
directed to this end.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
P.S. While this letter was in the type-
writer I learned of the announcement, by
the President of the Security Council, that
the United Arab Republic accepts the cease-
fire resolutions subject only to acceptance
by Israel. Thus we seem at the edge of
progress in the directions this letter indi-
cates. You can be sure that the Government
will continue its work for peace, especially
in the Security Council where Ambassador
Goldberg has done such brilliant and pro-
ductive work in the last days.
Notice to U.S. Travelers
to the Middle East
The Department of State announced on
June 5 (press release 131) that in view of
the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle
East, U.S. citizens desiring to go to the fol-
lowing countries must until further notice
obtain passports specifically endorsed by the
* Not issued as part of the release; see p. 941.
^ As of June 7, the following nations had severed
relations with the United States: Algeria, Iraq,
Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Republic,
and Yemen. Lebanon has recalled its Ambassador
and has requested the United States to recall the
American Ambassador, but has not severed rela-
tions.
952
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Department of State for such travel: Algeria,
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Repub-
lic, and Yemen.^
All outstanding passports, except those of
U.S. citizens remaining in those countries,
are being declared invalid for travel there
unless specifically endorsed for such travel.
The Department contemplates that excep-
tions to these regulations will be granted to
persons whose travel may be regarded as be-
ing in the best interests of the United States,
such as newsmen or businessmen with pre-
viously established business interests.
Permanent resident aliens cannot travel
to those countries unless special permission
is obtained for this purpose through the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges
of Attacks on Ship at Cam Pha
Following is the text of a U.S. note which
was delivered to the Soviet Charge d' Affaires
at Washington on June 3.
Press release 130 dated June 3
June 3, 1967.
The Government of the United States of
America refers to the note of the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics dated June 2, 1967.2
The United States Government has inves-
tigated the circumstances surrounding the
incident described in the Ministry's note,
which alleges that on June 2 at 1140 Mos-
cow time American aircraft bombed the
Soviet motor vessel "Turkestan" in the road-
stead of the port of Cam Pha damaging the
ship and seriously wounding two crewmen.
As a result of this investigation, it has
been established that two flights of American
aircraft were engaged in military operations
on June 2 in the vicinity of Cam Pha. At-
' For text of Public Notice 266, see 32 Fed. Reg.
8250.
' Not printed here.
tacks by these aircraft, however, were di-
rected only against legitimate military
targets and every possible care was taken
to avoid damage to any merchant shipping
in or near Cam Pha. The American pilots
engaged in the strikes report that all
ordnance was on target, but that intense
anti-aircraft fire was present in the area.
It appears, therefore, that any damage and
injuries sustained by the Soviet ship and
its personnel were in all probability the re-
sult of the anti-aircraft fire directed at
American aircraft during the period in
question. Accordingly, on the basis of facts
available to us which we believe to be com-
plete, the United States Government cannot
accept the version of the incident contained
in the Soviet note of June 2.
United States military pilots are under
strict instructions to avoid engagement with
any vessels which are not identified as hos-
tile, and all possible efforts are taken to
prevent damage to international shipping in
Vietnamese waters. Nevertheless, accidental
damage remains an unfortunate possibility
wherever hostilities are being conducted, and
the Soviet Government knows that shipping
operations in these waters under present
circumstances entail risks of such accidents.
It is unfortunate that the "Turkestan"
was damaged and particularly that members
of its crew suffered injuries. It is, indeed,
regrettable that, according to subsequent re-
ports, one member of the crew died as a
result of injuries sustained. It is also re-
grettable that hundreds of Vietnamese,
Americans, and citizens of allied nations are
dying each week as a consequence of the
aggression of North Vietnam against the
Republic of Vietnam.
The Soviet Government may be assured
that United States authorities will continue
to make all possible efforts to restrict air
activities to legitimate military targets. At
the same time, the United States Govern-
ment believes it would be helpful if the
Soviet Government would make renewed
eflforts, as Co-chairman of the Geneva Con-
ference, toward bringing about a peaceful
settlement of the conflict in Vietnam.
JUNE 26, 1967
953
America and Africa: The New World and the Newer World
by Under Secretary Katzenbach '■
In the Congo there is a wise proverb: "Let
him speak who has seen with his eyes."
It is so with this great continent. In the
United States one can imagine Africa from
the stereotypes generated by films and zoos
and masks in museums. One can hear about
Africa from a growing number of Americans
with ties here. One can read about Africa
from a swelling number of books. But none
of this data can produce more than a
Mercator projection. None of it can convey
the vitality of Africa, the equal vitality of
old villages and new cities. None of it can
convey the diversity and spirit of your
people. I can say this because, heeding the
proverb, I have come to see with my own
eyes.
I cannot now pretend to speak with great
insight. A tour of 12 countries in 17 days
can provide no more than a taste, a sugges-
tion. But I do wish to share with you a few
observations as this full and moving experi-
ence draws to a close.
It is fitting that I do so at this time, in
this city, and in this place. It is a fitting
time, for yesterday was the fourth anni-
versary of the creation of the Organization
of African Unity — a date whose importance
is already plain and which will, I believe,
become even clearer in coming years. And
today is the first anniversary of President
Johnson's memorable address on Africa,^ an
' Address made at Haile Selassie I University at
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 26 (press release
120, revised, dated May 29).
" Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
expression of congratulation and confidence
which he has asked me to renew to the offi-
cers and member nations of the OAU.
Equally, this is a fitting place. As one who
was closely involved for 5 years in America's
great effort to make law the instrument of
full equality, I can have only the warmest
feelings for your law school and for its
seminal effect on legal education throughout
Africa.
I expressed the hope that it would be pos-
sible to come here to offer some reflections
on Africa, because to talk of Africa is to talk
of change and to talk of youth. My words
may have some interest in the United States.
They may have some significance to political
leaders in Africa. But it is the young people
of Africa — you and the generation immedi-
ately to follow — who will determine the out-
come. It is you who are the most important
audience of all.
It has been observed that travelers are
justified in describing what they have seen
and need not rise to generalization. I might
be greatly tempted to take that observation
to heart, for we have seen magnificent things.
Yet it is impossible to settle for mere descrip-
tion. The contrasts are still more startling
than the sights.
In West Africa we saw the sun set on an
uninhabited rain forest beach just as it might
have 10 centuries ago. But only a few miles
away, in Dakar, we saw a spectacular urban
renewal project housing 60,000.
In Zambia we saw men pulling wooden
carts to market. But only a few miles away
we saw giant cargo planes unloading barrels
954
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of oil and taking on tons of coppei' ingots, all
within 12 minutes.
In Ghana we saw a village woman in a red
loincloth cooking over an open fire. But only
a few yards away we saw energy pouring out
of the giant orange penstocks of the Volta
River Dam.
We have seen, in short, the old Africa and
the new.
Power of Revolutionary Change
If the changes that are taking place are
far reaching, they are not unique to this
continent. The whole world feels the power of
revolutionary change. One level is external:
the change in international relations impelled
by the headlong technological advances of the
past few decades. A second level is internal:
the attempts by new nations to find appropri-
ate institutions and responses to meet the
needs of their peoples.
Change is all about us, and yet we are only
dimly aware of the forces that it unleashes.
The giant Volta River Dam at Akosombo
means power, industry, and economic
strength. But consider the problems that
have come with it:
— The vast reservoir behind the dam has
displaced thousands of families.
■ — After generations of fishing in a swift
river, those who remain must now learn to
catch lake fish.
— Medical specialists brood about which
new diseases will be bred in the now still
water.
On a larger scale, we send men into space.
We communicate instantaneously with the
most distant nations by satellites. His Im-
perial Majesty this year has twice flown to
North America more easily than he traveled
to the provinces not many years ago. Yet we
are still trying to find a way to bring some-
thing so fundamental as human dignity and
self-determination to the Africans in the
southern part of this continent.
This is a cause in which we stand with you,
conscience to conscience. Not for economic
gain, not for political advantage, not for cos-
metic appearance, but because we share the
certainty once expressed by President [of
Zambia Kenneth] Kaunda: "We shall win
because we are right."
Parallels in Development
As striking as these contrasts in change
may be, I find myself impressed by some
striking parallels between the new world of
America and the newer world of Africa.
I do not mean America of the moment, for
that is a deceptive model. First, America may
be wealthy, America may be advanced,
America may be a world power, but America
also is troubled by internal problems. Like
Africa, like other parts of the world, my
country encompasses a great underdeveloped
country, an underdeveloped America of citi-
zens who are poor, who often are ignorant,
and who for too long have been ignored.
President Johnson and his administration
have made the uplifting of these people a
prime domestic goal, but that goal cannot
soon be achieved.
Second, America of today is a deceptive
model precisely because it is the developed
America of today. Our concern, our devoted
concern here, is the Africa of tomorrow.
What do I mean, then, by striking parallels
between America and Africa? I mean paral-
lels in development — the factors in the
growth of my country which have relevance
to the grovHh of the new nations of your
continent.
Let me focus on three of these factors.
Education
The first is education, and I would like to
begin by reading you a passage I find unusu-
ally descriptive:
. . . what sphere of patriotic exertion is left open
for the lover of his country, but the sphere of im-
proving the rising generation through the instrumen-
tality of a more perfect and efficient system for their
education?
We call our fathers patriots, because they loved
their country and made sacrifices for its welfare.
But what was their country? A vast tract of wilder-
ness territory did not constitute it. It was not
unconscious, insentient plains, or rivers, or moun-
JUNE 26, 1967
955
tains, however beautifully and majestically they
might spread, or flow, or shine, beneath the canopy
of heaven. Their country was chiefly their descend-
ants, the human beings who were to throng these
vast domains, the sentient, conscious natures which
were to live here, and living, to enjoy or suffer.
These words were written in 1842 by
Horace Mann, an American and a leading
exponent of public education. They have
relevance to Africa now. Efforts like his
were successful. The United States initiated
widespread free public education. Was it
merely coincidence that my country's
mushrooming rush to industrial power began
approximately 15 years later?
The importance Africa places on education
is evident from statistics. Of 53 African uni-
versities, 30 have been created since 1952 and
11 since 1961. The number of all students on
this continent has nearly tripled in 15 years,
from 9 milHon in 1950 to 27 million today.
The number of university students has gone
from 70,000 in 1950 to more than 250,000.
Yet it is impossible to take too much cheer
from such statistics, for there are other
figures which suggest the enormity of the
job ahead. University enrollment may be
180,000 greater than it was 15 years ago.
Yet at the same time, the number of uni-
versity-aged Africans has increased by 3
million in just the past 5 years.
Transportation
A second parallel between developing
Africa and America when it was developing
is transportation.
America began as a nation of 4 million,
largely settled, like many of your countries,
on the coastal fringe of a vast land con-
taining vast mineral and agricultural
treasure.
Unlocking that wilderness was an immedi-
ate goal. Even before the steam engine had
been invented, we had completed what was
then a national road. When the railroad did
come, it became an object of high priority.
In 1830 America had 23 miles of railroads.
Twenty-five years later there were 18,000
miles of railroads. Five years after that, in
1860, there were 30,000 miles.
I believe it is fair to say that from 1840
until the turn of the century transportation
— the railroad — was the key to American
success.
In 1869 came an historic date that sym-
bolizes much of our past and your future —
the completion of a transcontinental railroad
line — a line that tied a vast nation together;
a line that allowed ore, wheat, and timber to
be taken out; a line that allowed men to
come in.
"The railroad," an American historian has
written, "tied the North and West into one
massive free economy. It did much more. It
tied business to politics and both to the life
of the individual in a way unknown in Amer-
ica before."
What these words say about America seem
to me to have great force on this continent.
The parallel with present-day Africa is
indeed striking. The new nations of this con-
tinent require circulatory lifeblood, allowing
the transport of your natural wealth and the
ready infusion of human resources to help
develop it.
In the Africa of the late 20th century,
transportation might well center on high-
ways, or even air routes, rather than rail-
roads. But the principle — and the potential —
are the same.
Agriculture and Natural Resources
Finally, let me turn to agriculture and
natural resources. When America was settled,
there were vast expanses of fertile but inac-
cessible land. There were hidden treasures
in minerals. It was the railroad that opened
up those riches to development. As transpor-
tation improved, young America could go
beyond farming for subsistence and become
a source of food for others; our Midwest was
built on a foundation of wheat for the world.
The fertility provided by nature and the
accessibility provided by technology were
supported by another factor: extensive Gov-
ernment-private cooperation to improve both
the production and the lives of our farm
population.
One great advance was an act of Congress
of 1862 providing for colleges to promote
knowledge of "agriculture and mechanic
956
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
arts." In short order, such institutions were
established in almost every eligible State.
These did more than train young men and
women in needed skills. Through extension
centers, they went out to the people. Ulti-
mately, through resident agents in each
county, they reached out to virtually every
part of our agricultural areas. These county
agents brought practical advice as well as
technical and scientific information — not only
to farmers but also to their wives and
families.
The parallels of mineral and agricultural
potential in this continent are plain. There
is great need for information, tutelage, and
advice at the village level. There is a need at
least as great for instruction and assistance
in marketing and distribution. Here in
Ethiopia, the Agricultural High School at
Jimma and the College of Agriculture at
Alemaya are pioneering efforts on a fruitful
frontier. For Africa could become an agri-
cultural heartland for the world, given your
unlimited potential for production. That is
a potential for more than one-crop econo-
mies, for a wide diversity of crops, some
with industrial applicability. And it is a
potential for more than agricultural produc-
tion, for it could readily lead to the develop-
ment of the food-processing industry.
However appropriate these parallels may
be, there is a basic defect in each of them:
America was able to devise these answers to
development alone and at its own pace for
two reasons — reasons which make it possible
for Americans to be thankful that our Thir-
teen Colonies won their independence in a
simpler day.
One of these reasons is that we came to
independence at a time when it was possible
for us to be truly independent — to hold our-
selves aloof from the rest of the world.
Though we were impoverished, we were
left alone to build a nation and find our
destiny. For decades, we found a watchword
in Washington's farewell address: "It is our
true policy to steer clear of permanent alli-
ances with any portion of the foreign world."
For us, nonalinement was an easy task.
The second reason is that, unlike some 30
new African nations, we became independent
in a time when technological change was
slow and slight.
Our arms were rudimentary, but they fired
as well — sometimes better — than the naval
cannon and muskets of imperial Britain.
Our economy was simple, but then so was
that of every country, in a time when con-
cepts like gross national product were a cen-
tury away from definition.
And our industry was primitive, for there
was no other sort of industry. It was con-
ducted on spinning wheels and blacksmiths'
anvils. The world had not yet even dreamed
of megatons or megawatts, aluminum
smelters, or titanium airplanes.
In short, newly independent America had
time — time to explore itself, time to educate
itself, time to learn new vocabularies and
new technologies as they were devised.
By contrast, the new nations of Africa
have been called to the main stage immedi-
ately— to go from the spear to the slide rule,
from disunited tribes to the United Nations
virtually in months.
Need for Skilled and Educated Africans
Can this transition be made with the speed
which the influential young men and women
of Africa believe necessary?
That is not a question for an outsider to
answer. It is a centi'al question in virtually
every new African nation. Their answers
undoubtedly will vary. I would suggest, how-
ever, that there are two irreducible factors
to which we must reconcile ourselves, fac-
tors which must limit the telescoping of time
on this continent.
The first of these factors is human capa-
bilities. The education of intelligent men and
women in complex skills can be improved in
quality. It can be enlarged in quantity. But
no amount of good motives, nor wealth, nor
wisdom can, without the passage of time,
produce the pool of skilled and educated
African men and women who are required to
manage the affairs and fuel the spirit of a
modern nation.
You here in this eminent institution will be
JUNE 26, 1967
957
frontiersmen in that effort. But not until your
numbers swell — as surely they will — can this
country and your sister countries on this con-
tinent find the manpower with which to gen-
erate widespread growth.
Emphasis on Cooperative Development
The second factor to which I believe we
must reconcile ourselves follows the first. It
is suggested occasionally that the develop-
ment time gap could be overcome if only de-
veloped nations like the United States would
more fully meet responsibilities of assistance
to the underdeveloped world.
As a son of a free country and as a friend
of Africa, I am unable to accept this case. It
is theoretically possible for major industrial
powers to send huge sums and corps of tech-
nicians to build and operate factories or
transportation systems or railroads. And by
doing so they would help build nations in
Africa. But they would not be African na-
tions in Africa. As we oppose neocolonialism,
so should we oppose such a false solution.
President Johnson has observed accurately
that development cannot be exported. And
President [of Tanzania Juhus K.] Nyerere
has said of his people, they "recognize that
the task of economic development is a long
and heavy one . . . our people do not believe
that it is better to be a wealthy slave than a
poor free man."
By no means do I wish to suggest that
African nations can avoid losing their inde-
pendence only by refusing outside assistance.
Nor do I wish to suggest that already de-
veloped nations should not assist those parts
of humanity who are coming late to political
manhood. What I do believe is that, in the
interests both of developed and developing
nations, developmental assistance must be
carefully offered — and it must be carefully
received.
In his speech on Africa a year ago, Presi-
dent Johnson outlined a policy for such
assistance, noting that:
The world has now reached a stage where some
of the most effective means of economic growth can
best be achieved in large units commanding large
resources and large markets. Most nation-states are
too small, when acting alone, to assure the welfare
of all of their people.
This is the principle which underlies our
present policy of aid for Africa^ — coopera-
tion among donors and cooperation among
recipients.
This is not a new philosophy for us. Nearly
a third of the aid we have provided in the
past has been for projects benefiting not
merely one country but several.
We are assisting river development in the
Senegal River, Niger River, and Lake Chad
basins. We are working with an organization
of 14 Central African nations to combat
measles, smallpox, rinderpest, and bovine
pneumonia. In this decade Ethiopia and four
other African countries have combined, with
American and British support, to form the
Desert Locust Control Authority, whose
efforts have been completely successful. We
have helped to establish advanced education
institutions, like the regional heavy equip-
ment training center in Togo.
Neither is such a cooperative policy new
in the relations of other countries. The na-
tions of Western Europe have made striking
progress in the past decade toward a common
market. The leaders of Latin America have
just pledged themselves to work toward a
similar goal.
The aim of our cooperative policy is
simple: maximum benefit for all the new
nations of Africa. We do not seek to dictate
development priorities to recipient countries.
The fact is that virtually every nation has
the same developmental priorities to begin
with — the same sort of priorities which I de-
scribed as paralleling the experience of my
country- — education, transportation, and agri-
cultural and natural-resource development.
Nor is it our aim to require rigid coopera-
tive groupings. The new nations of Africa
have varying links to each other. River de-
velopment may run north and south; a rail-
road may benefit two nations; a public health
program may involve 14.
We shall look with particular interest for
programs organized by existing multilateral
organizations: the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, ECA [Economic Com-
958
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mission for Africa], and the OAU. At the
same time, we will welcome project proposals
devised directly by the participating coun-
tries. Indeed, the competition among them
may well serve as a spur and thus itself help
bring the economies of scale to African de-
velopment.
Impulse Toward African Unity
Even beyond flexibility, beyond economies
of scale, beyond the more beneficial use of
developmental assistance, our new emphasis
on cooperation among donors and cooperation
among recipients can have another result,
a result which may, in the end, be the most
important of all. It can serve as an additional
impulse toward African unity.
In my various conversations across this
continent I have found unity a goal that is
widely shared and a goal that is particularly
prized by young people. They see their young
countries struggling against the arbitrary
divisions inflicted by the colonial period —
divisions created by inherited boundaries,
divisions created by the imposition of dif-
ferent Western languages, divisions created
by different levels of colonial development.
It is this aspect of cooperative development
that is to me the most hopeful and the most
exciting. For if it is conducted among group-
ings established by the recipient countries
themselves, it seems to me that it can be an
important force toward the eventual conquest
of those arbitrary divisions.
We believe, in short, that this policy of
coordination among donors and cooperation
among recipients is sound. We hope it will
be successful. But even if it succeeds beyond
our wildest expectations, it can only hasten —
and not bring about — the emergence of
Africa as a community of strong and confi-
dent nations, able and willing to make their
contribution to the welfare of their people
and of the world.
And that work, that very difficult and
patient and inspired and patriotic work,
must be yours. The present leaders of Africa
have begun that work with wisdom and
courage. It will be in your lifetimes — and
indeed because of your lifetimes — that this
work will come to fruition, that the land, and
the people who animate the land, and the
spirit that animates your people, will make
their mighty contribution to the world.
I think of the words of President [of
Senegal Leopold S.] Senghor, describing the
spirit Africa can give to the world:
For who would teach rhythm to a dead world of
machines and guns?
Who would give the cry of joy to wake the dead
and the bereaved at the dawn?
Say, who would give back the memory of life to
the man whose hopes are smashed?
I see, much more clearly now, what he
means. Africa will not be easily mastered.
One has only to see the struggle of wresting
crops from difficult soil and hostile climate
to know that it has taken people of character
to make something of the land. It has taken
courage, tenacity, humor, creativity — in
short, spirit.
What has impressed me, then, about Africa
is not so much its vastness, nor its resource
potential, nor its beauty, but its people.
The foundation of Africa is the spirit of
its people.
Africa is on the move. I knew that before
I came. Now I believe it.
U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy"
Following are remarks made by President
Johnson at Neivport News, Va., on May 27
on the occasion of the christening of the air-
craft carrier John F. Kennedy.
White House press release dated May 27
In March 1943, almost a quarter of a cen-
tury ago, a young naval lieutenant assumed
his first command — a tiny PT boat — and
sailed intrepidly into the savage battle for
the Solomons.
Next year 5,000 Americans will put to sea
in this giant ship named John F. Kennedy —
for whom the voyage of destiny began in the
Solomons and ended tragically at the pin-
nacle of national affection and respect, the
Presidency of the United States.
This is the third carrier since the end of
JUNE 26, 1967
959
the Second World War to bear the name of
a man. Carriers are noi-mally named for
famous battles or great ships of the past.
Its only companions are named for Franklin
Delano Roosevelt and James V. Forrestal.
This is highly appropriate because these
three singular men had a great deal in com-
mon:
— Each of them died in the service of his
country.
— Each of them understood that, whatever
the risk, men must defend freedom, the
leaven in the bread of life that alone makes
true peace possible.
— ^Each of them believed, in John Ken-
nedy's moving words: ^
... it is the fate of this generation ... to live
with a strug-gle we did not start, in a world we
did not make. But the pressures of life are not
always distributed by choice. And while no nation
has ever been faced by such a challenge, no nation
has ever been so ready to seize the burden and the
glory of freedom.
To face that challenge, John Kennedy
knew, took strength as well as idealism: He
knew it as a student who saw the failure of
appeasement in the 1930's; he knew it as a
naval officer in the South Pacific; he knew it
as President of the United States.
Because John Kennedy understood that
strength is essential to sustain freedom, be-
cause he recognized that we cannot afford to
mark time or stand in place, he requested
funds for this carrier from the Congress in
1963.
In the year 2000 — and beyond — this ma-
jestic ship we christen today may still be
sailing the oceans of the world. We pray that
her years will be years of peace. But if she
must fight, both the flag she flies and the
name she bears will carry a profound mes-
sage to friend and foe alike.
For the 5,000 Americans who will man
this great ship — and for all their country-
men, whose hopes ride with them — this is a
moment of reflection.
Today, as throughout our history, we bear
fateful responsibilities in the world. From
the moment of our national creation, Ameri-
' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159.
can ideals have served as a beacon to the
oppressed and the enslaved.
In times past it has often been our
strength and our resolve which have tipped
the scales of conflict against aggressors or
would-be aggressors. That role has never
been an easy one. It has always required not
only strength but patience — the incredible
courage to wait where waiting is appropri-
ate, to avoid disastrous results to shortcut
history — and sacrifice, the tragic price we
pay for our commitment to our ideals.
No President understood his nation's his-
toric role and purpose better than John F.
Kennedy. No man knew more deeply the bur-
dens of that role. And no man ever gave
more. Let this ship we christen in his name
be a testament that his countrymen have not
forgotten.
President Johnson Holds Talks
With Australian Prime IVIinister
Prime Minister Harold E. Holt of Austra~
lia visited Washington June 1-2 to confer
with President Johnson and other high Gov-
ernment officials. Follotving are texts of re-
marks by President Johnson and the Prime
Minister at an arrival ceremony on the South
Laivn of the White House on June 1.
white House press release dated June 1
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Johnson and I
are very happy that you and Mrs. Holt could
join us here today for the beginning of what
I know will be a most pleasant and enjoyable
visit.
At the Manila Conference last fall, we and
the leaders of five other nations of Asia and
the Pacific proclaimed some goals that we
felt all of our peoples could aspire to: to be
free from aggression; to conquer hunger,
illiteracy, and disease; to build a region of
security, order, and progress; and to seek
reconciliation and peace throughout this
great region.
960
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We are ready, Australia and the United
States — and all of the nations of the Asian
and Pacific region — to vigorously pursue
those goals with all the strength and deter-
mination that we can muster. We are ready
to reshape the future of the peaceful and
secure Asia that is to be.
But today we fight shoulder to shoulder
with our Vietnamese, Korean, Thai, Filipino,
and New Zealand allies. We fight not because
we like to but only to insure the right of a
small nation to make its own future and to
have its own people determine what that
future will be.
Tomorrow we shall work to build and to
repair what has been broken, to make the
harvest larger, and to make the future of
all men brighter.
We shall do it with the power of electricity
and not the power of bombs. We shall do it
with tools instead of tanks. We shall do it
with teachers, doctors, and technicians.
We know — you and I — that this is going to
be done, for we know that it has already
been done in both of our countries.
Your country, the great land of Australia,
has only just begun. Ahead of it lies the
promise of rapid growth, of ever-increasing
prosperity. Each day, almost, I seem to see
where you are discovering new sources of
wealth, new buildings are rising up in your
growing cities, new factories are open to
make needed goods and to provide jobs.
Australia, I know, stands ready, as does
the United States, to try to help others move
down the path that we have trod from very
simple and very hard beginnings to strength,
independence, and wealth.
But these things will not come and they
cannot come, unless there is a security, a dig-
nity, and an opportunity. And security will
never come to Asia unless there are men of
courage and men who are prepared to stand
up and resist when the aggressor moves in to
steal, kill, and conquer.
This is what a man whom we both admire
so much once said — Winston Churchill. This
is what he meant when he declared:
"Courage is the first of human qualities, be-
cause it is the one quality that guarantees
all others."
The brave men who fight today wearing
our uniforms — your men and ours and our
other allies— struggle there to make all else
possible. And we know that they will suc-
ceed.
Mr. Prime Minister, we take a great deal
of pleasure in again welcoming you to this
Capital City and to this country of ours.
I welcome you as a brave leader, as a long-
time and a very loyal friend, and as a wise
statesman.
I repeat again, for Mrs. Johnson and my
family, we are so glad that you and Mrs.
Holt are here.
REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER HOLT
Thank you, Mr. President, for the friend-
liness and the warmth of your welcome, a
warmth and friendliness of welcome to
Australia, to my Government, to Mrs. Holt
and myself, and to those members of the
official party who are with me.
We are looking forward to another valu-
able talk in that series of talks that you and
I have had together, which at all times have
proved informative and helpful to us.
We have many important issues to discuss.
There is, of course, our mutual concern with
the events in Viet-Nam, the peaceful prog-
ress of which you have spoken in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific, to which you have given
so much constructive thought; the implica-
tions for our two countries of the United
Kingdom's application to join the European
Economic Community; the military disposi-
tions of the United Kingdom east of Suez,
which concern us both.
There will always be between two coun-
tries who are so prominent, despite our dif-
ference in size and stature, in affairs of
world trade, economic and trade problems
which we can usefully and fruitfully discuss
together.
It is, perhaps, a mark of our mutual in-
terest, of our friendship, our close relations,
and the many matters that concern us to-
gether that this should be the fifth in a series
of talks you and I have enjoyed together in
the past 12 months.
JUNE 26, 1967
961
I question whether any other head of gov-
ernment has had the same good fortune to
see you so often and speak to you closely on
so many different occasions: My two visits to
Washington last year; your own spectacular
and historic first visit of a United States
President to Australia; the Manila Confer-
ence, which you have just referred to, with
its reminder of those high goals we set at
that very fruitful conference there; and now
this series of talks together here in Wash-
ington.
As to Viet-Nam: On my journey here, I
had the opportunity of a very valuable brief-
ing from Admiral [U. S. G.] Sharp, your
Commander in Chief of the Pacific Com-
mand. He was able to give me, in factual
terms, evidence of the progress being made
in all aspects of the military campaign.
Yesterday in Los Angeles, speaking to the
World Affairs Council, I was able to canvass
some of the aspects of our joint interest in
this conflict. If the reaction I received there
is typical of the feeling of the people of the
United States, I would believe that there has
been a growth in understanding and support
for the place that the United States is play-
ing in that significant conflict.
The last time I visited you, Mr. President,
I was able to tell you something of the prog-
ress which, thanks to the shield of American
protection, the free countries of Southeast
Asia and the Pacific were able to make.
It seemed to me this had not been widely
reported here. As one of those countries
which had been able to take advantage of
the security and the protection, the resist-
ance to Communist aggression which had
been made possible by the massive interven-
tion of the United States of America, I was
able to speaJi of the progress which we and
other countries were making.
Now, nearly 12 months later, with many
major developments, most of them favorable
from our viewpoint, including the end of con-
frontation in Malaysia; the steady economic
progress in countries running around the arc
of Asia and Southeast Asia, from Korea,
Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand; the emergence
in Indonesia of a strong anti-Communist gov-
ernment anxious to cooperate in tasks of
rehabilitation and the reconstruction of the
economy there — these things have been sub-
stantial gains for us.
In my own most recent visit, which in-
cluded, as you know, visits to Cambodia,
Laos, to neutral countries, and to Taiwan
and Korea, I found every evidence of friend-
ship for my own country.
I found in those countries, which have
alined themselves with us, not only appreci-
ation of all that your great country is doing
but a deteiTnination to press on with the
economic progress which has been so spec-
tacularly a feature of their recent experience.
So I think we meet together with hope in
our hearts. Perhaps the struggle may still
be long; perhaps it may be shorter than the
superficial evidence would indicate.
I know from my own quite intimate con-
tacts with you that there is no national
leader in the world more anxious to secure
a peace, more anxious to secure a just and
enduring settlement in Viet-Nam, than
yourself.
In all the endeavors that you make in
order to bring about a peaceful conclusion
to this struggle — which means so much to
the free peoples of Asia and the Pacific and,
indeed, to the free world as a whole — you
have at all times been able to count, as you
shall be able in the future, upon the friendly
and loyal support of your ally, Australia.
We have countries with great needs of eco-
nomic development. Even with the strength
and power of the United States, I know that
there are many tasks to which you would
be willing and anxious to turn your hand if
so much of your resources were not being
deployed for the purposes of resistance to
aggression and the need to insure the peace.
In my own country it is a deep depriva-
tion for us to have to divert manpower and
resources from the task of developing a con-
tinent of virtually the size of the United
States.
So, apart from our own natural humani-
tarian instincts, we have a vested interest
in the material welfare of our countries in
the securing of a peace.
962
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I reject the criticisms of those who ques-
tion in some fashion our good faith in this
particular matter.
You, sir, are the third in line of United
States Presidents who have seen clearly the
need to meet the aggression as it has come
in Viet-Nam.
If peace is to be secured, it will not be by
some wobbling in our actions, in our pur-
poses. It will be by the demonstration of our
unwavering resolution to press on, be it long
or short, with the struggle until a settlement,
a just and enduring settlement, can be
secured. It will be in that spirit, I know, that
you and I will embark on our fruitful talks
together.
Thank you again, all of you, for the
warmth of your welcome to the head of an
Australian Government.
President Johnson Confers
With British Prime IVIinister
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson
conferred with President Johnson and other
high Government officials at Washington
June 2-3. Following are texts of remarks
exchanged by the President and the Prime
Minister at an arrival ceremony on the South
Lawn of the White House on June 2.
the Congress of the United States only 19
days after Pearl Harbor.
I have never forgotten those words. Nor
have I forgotten others spoken just 4 years
earlier by a great American, who said:
... if we are to have a world in which we can
breathe freely and live in amity without fear — the
peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort
to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace
can rest secure. . . .
Those who cherish their freedom and recognize
and respect the equal right of their neighbors to
be free and live in peace, must work together for
the triumph of law and moral principles in order
that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in
the world.
That was Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
He and Winston Churchill struck a com-
mon theme of peace and justice. They
pledged our countries to a common commit-
ment which we have honored ever since.
We come here today in another time of
trouble, when peace and justice are again in
the balance. It is on occasions like this that
the counsel of old and trusted friends is most
welcome.
Mr. Prime Minister, we are so happy to
have you and Mrs. Wilson and your party
with us. We look forward with anticipation
to a constructive meeting, a pleasant ex-
change of views on the future of our coun-
tries and the future of the world.
We know that your coming here is pleas-
ing to the people of our country. We hope
your stay will be a pleasant one.
White House press release dated June 2
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Mr. Prime Minister, your visit here this
morning maintains a tradition that was
begun by two great statesmen representing
our countries.
One was a great Englishman. More than a
quarter of a century ago, he said:
It is not given to us to peer into the mysteries
of the future; still I avow my hope and faith, sure
and inviolate, that in the days to come the British
and American peoples will for their own safety
and for the good of all, walk together in majesty,
in justice, and in peace.
That was Winston Churchill. He spoke to
REMARKS BY PRIME MINISTER WILSON
May I first, Mr. President, thank you for
the very warm and colorful reception that
has been given to my wife and myself here
this morning and, Mr. President, for your
own kind words of greeting.
I do not think that any words of yours
or of mine are needed to underline what you
have said, the gravity of the situation the
world is facing at this time, nor the impor-
tance of the fact that our two countries at
this time are able to have discussions on the
way ahead. It is fully recognized in your
country and in ours.
JUNE 26, 1967
963
We have had a debate in Parliament this
week that these talks today — as part of the
wider talks and consultations going on
throughout the world — above all, the talks
in which your representatives, ours, and our
friends' are concerned in the Security Coun-
cil— are of vital importance in creating the
conditions for a lasting peace.
Mr. President, I know you will agree when
I say that however great the problem that
has arisen with such dramatic and startling
suddenness in these past 2 weeks, no consid-
eration of that problem should allow or will
allow us to be blinded to the continuing im-
portance of veiy many other great problems
that were in our minds and in our hearts be-
fore the recent crisis blew up.
This visit of ours was arranged some
weeks ago. Even then, we were conscious
that there were these great problems of
peace and war in Asia, problems of coopera-
tion, cooperation for peace, problems of coop-
eration for progress in economic affairs, that
will be taking our time today.
And urgent though the present situation
is in the Middle East — and we shall no doubt
give a proper priority to it in our talks — both
of us know that these other problems, these
lasting and abiding problems, require a set-
tlement and will be given the urgency which
you and I know that they deserve.
Mr. President, I was heartened by your
reminder of the close cooperation between
our two countries in war and in peace — and,
above all, in the struggle for peace.
That is what we are here to talk about
today, Mr. President, and with you I look
forward to getting down to work.
I thank you.
U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO
Fisheries Project in Viet-Nam
The Department of State announced on
May 26 (press release 119) that the United
States had on that day agreed to contribute
$2,012,000 to the Food and Agriculture
Organization under the freedom from
hunger campaign for assistance to a United
Nations Development Program fisheries
project in South Viet-Nam.
Under the agreement, the U.S. contribu-
tion will help expand the scope of the proj-
ect which FAO is carrying out for the UNDP
at the request of the Vietnamese Govern-
ment. Recent experience in the South China
Sea has indicated that a great increase in the
fish catch would be possible if traditional in-
shore operations of the Vietnamese fishing
industry could be modernized and expanded
to include deepwater operations. Since fish
provide a large portion of the protein in the
Vietnamese diet, this project could result in
a much-needed improvement in the food
supply of the average Vietnamese.
The original UNDP project, calling for $1
million from the Special Fund and $336,000
as the Government of Viet-Nam's counter-
part contribution, consisted of inshore sur-
veys and feasibility studies. The United
States contribution will enable the project
to be enlarged to include investigations and
feasibility studies for offshore operations. It
will enable FAO to pay for the charter of a
deepwater trawler and necessary equipment
and personnel, including a U.N. expert. The
Netherlands is also planning to contribute
to this enlarged project.
United States and IVIexico Sign
Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
June 2 (press release 126) that the United
States and Mexico signed on that day a 4-
year cotton textile bilateral agreement cover-
ing the exports of Mexico's cotton textiles to
the United States for the period May 1,
1967-April 30, 1971.i Ambassador Hugo B.
Margain signed on behalf of the Govern-
ment of Mexico; Anthony M. Solomon, As-
sistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, signed on behalf of the U.S. Govern-
ment. Main features of the new agreement
are:
' For text of the U.S. note, see press release 126
dated June 2.
964
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
1. The aggregate limit for the first year
of the agreement is 75 million square yards.
This limit, as well as the other limits in the
agreement, will be increased by 5 percent for
the second and subsequent years of the
agreement.
2. The group limit applicable for the first
agreement year for yarns (categories 1-4)
is 51.8 million square yards; for fabric (cate-
gories 5-27), 21 million square yards; and
for made-up goods, apparel, and miscellane-
ous (categories 28-64), 2.2 million square
yards.
3. Specific ceilings are provided for six
fabric and two apparel categories. There are
also subceilings for duck and zipper tape.
In the first year of the agreement only, three
category ceilings may be exceeded by speci-
fied quantities within the group ceiling for
fabric.
4. Other provisions are also included on
flexibility, undue concentration, spacing, ex-
change of statistics, categories and conver-
sion factors, consultation, administrative ar-
rangements, equity, carryover, controls,
termination, and relationship to the Geneva
Long-Term Arrangement on trade in cotton
textiles.
U.S. and Italy Terminate
Air Transport Agreement
Following is the text of a joint com-
munique issued on May 31 upon conclusion of
talks at Rome between representatives of the
U.S. and Italian Governments.
Representatives of the Italian Government
and of the Government of the United States
of America have been engaged in consulta-
tions to negotiate a new agreement govern-
ing scheduled commercial air services be-
tween the two countries. The new agreement
was intended to replace the present air
transport agreement,^ which expires on May
31, 1967, as a result of its denunciation by
Italy.
It has not been possible for a new agree-
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
1902, 2081, 4558.
ment to be reached prior to the expiration of
the present agreement, and the discussions
have been discontinued. The termination of
this agreement has removed the present legal
basis for air services between the two coun-
tries by their respective air carriers. Accord-
ingly, each government may, in light of its
applicable laws and civil aviation policies,
determine whether and under what condi-
tions the services should be permitted. In
the meantime, no immediate effects on sched-
uled flights of Italian and U.S. carriers are
foreseen at present.
Both delegations express the hope that it
will be possible, in the near future, to re-
sume conversations in order to arrive at an
agreement satisfactory to both countries.
United States and Panama Amend
Air Transport Agreement
Joint Statement
Press release 136 of June 7
The American Ambassador to Panama, the
Honorable Charles W. Adair, Jr., and the
Panamanian Vice Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions, His Excellency Arturo Morgan-
Morales, concluded an exchange of diplomatic
notes yesterday [June 6] in Panama City
amending the Air Transport Services Agree-
ment between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of
Panama. The original Agreement, which pro-
vides the basis for international air services
between the two countries by U.S. and Pana-
manian airlines, was signed in Panama City
on March 31, 1949 and amended in 1952.
The notes exchanged confirm agreements
reached in bilateral consultations which the
two Governments held in Washington, D.C.,
between March 13 and March 20, 1967. One
amendment gives Panamanian airlines the
right to establish services between Panama
and New York, direct or via Miami, in addi-
tion to the present Panamanian route to the
Miami terminal via intermediate points in
the Caribbean. In amending the Route Sched-
ule, the two Governments also inserted a
paragraph recognizing that neither party will
JUNE 26, 1967
965
impose unilateral restrictions on frequencies,
capacity or type of aircraft offered by air-
lines of the other party over the agreed
routes. A third amendment adds a new sec-
tion to the Annex, to establish principles and
procedures relating to airline tariffs over
agreed routes.
Both Governments consider that the latest
amendments to the Air Transport Agreement
will ensure the continued orderly develop-
ment of international air services between
the United States and Panama, to the bene-
fit of the travelling public, the airlines, and
the friendly relations which exist between
the two countries.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 2d Session
International Aspects of Antitrust. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 1,
April 20-August 30, 1966. 645 pp., tables.
90th Congress, 1st Session
Human Rights Conventions. Hearings before a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations on the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women (Ex. J, 88th Cong.,
1st sess.), the Convention Concerning the Aboli-
tion of Forced Labor (Ex. K, 88th Cong., 1st
sess.). Supplementary Slavery Convention (Ex.
L, 88th Cong., 1st sess.). February 23 and March
8, 1967. 227 pp.
Conununist Threat to the United States Through
the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee
to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part
16, March 7, 1967, 85 pp.; part 17, March 7
and 8, 1967, 59 pp.
Marine Science Affairs— A Year of Transition.
Message from the President transmitting the
first report of the National Council on Marine
Resources and Engineering Development. H. Doc.
79. March 9, 1967. 162 pp.
Support for a New Phase of the Alliance for
Progress. Hearings before the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 428. March 14
and 15, 1967. 93 pp.
Latin American Summit Conference. Report to
accompany S.J. Res. 60. S. Rept. 83. April 3,
1967. 4 pp.
Authorizing the Continued Loan of Certain Naval
Vessels and a New Loan. Extension of existing
loans of 10 naval vessels to friendly foreign
nations and authorizing a new loan to Korea. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 6167. H. Rept. 169. April
4, 1967. 13 pp.
Report of Audit of Export-Import Bank of Wash-
ington, Fiscal Year 1966. H. Doc. 96. April 5,
1967. 27 pp.
Report of Special Study Mission to the Near East,
comprising Representative Edward R. Roybal,
chairman, and Representatives E. Ross Adair,
J. Irving Whalley, and E. Y. Berry of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 172.
April 5, 1967. 70 pp.
Disposal of United States Military Installations
and Supplies in France. Report submitted by
Senator Ernest Gruening, chairman. Subcom-
mittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations. S. Doc. 16.
April 6, 1967. 47 pp.
National Science Foundation. Message from the
President transmitting the 16th annual report of
the National Science Foundation, for the fiscal
year ended June 30, 1966. H. Doc. 102. April 7,
1967. 175 pp.
Immigration and Naturalization. Report by the
Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S.
Rept. 168. April 12, 1967. 8 pp.
Rush-Bagot Agreement Days. Report to accompany
S.J. Res. 49. S. Rept. 185. April 13, 1967. 3 pp.
Authorizing the President to Designate October 31
of Each Year as National UNICEF Day. Report
to accompany S.J. Res. 56. S. Rept. 186. April 13,
1967. 3 pp.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part II.
April 17-21, 1967. 240 pp.
Report of the Special Study Mission to the Domini-
can Republic, Guyana, Brazil and Paraguay,
comprising Representative Armistead Selden,
chairman, and Representative William S. Mail-
liard of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
H. Rept. 219. May 1, 1967. 61 pp.
Peace Corps Act Amendment of 1967. Hearing be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
S. 1031. May 4, 1967. 41 pp.
Report of Special Subcommittee Following Visit to
Southeast Asia March 23 through April 4, 1967.
House Committee on Armed Services. May 6, 1967.
15 pp.
Government, the Universities, and International
Affairs: A Crisis in Identity. Letter from the
Chairman, the U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and Cultural Affairs
transmitting a special report by Professors
Walter Adams and Adrian Jaffe of Michigan
State University. H. Doc. 120. May 11, 1967. 18
pp.
Export-Import Bank Extension. Report, together
with supplemental and individual views, to ac-
company H.R. 6649. H. Rept. 256. May 11, 1967.
27 pp.
Inter-American Development Bank Act Amendments
of 1967. Report, together with minority and indi-
vidual views, to accompany H.R. 9547. H. Rept.
266. May 18, 1967. 32 pp.
Market Promotion Activity of Foreign Agricultural
Service (Third Review). First Report by the
House Committee on Government Operations. H.
Rept. 311. May 25, 1967. 33 pp.
Amendments to the Act Creating the Atlantic-
Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission. Re-
port to accompany S. 1566. S. Rept. 295. June 8,
1967. 11 pp.
966
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, as amended. Done at New York October
26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS
3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, June 4, 1967.
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traffic with annexes and pro-
tocol. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. En-
tered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Botswana, January 3, 1967.'
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.=
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, May 11, 1967; Ire-
land, May 10, 1967.
International Court of Justice
Statute of the International Court of Justice (59
Stat. 1055).
Declarations recognizing compulsory jurisdiction
deposited: Malta, December 6, 1966; Malawi,
December 12, 1966.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final
protocol, and convention with final protocol and
reg:ulations of execution. Done at Vienna July
10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966.
TIAS 5881.
Ratification deposited: Morocco, April 7, 1967.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement establishing interim arrangements for
a global communications satellite system. Done
at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into
force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Peru, June 9, 1967.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.
Signature: Junta Permanente Nacional de Tele-
comunicaciones of Peru, June 9, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967.=
Accession deposited: Lesotho, May 26, 1967.
■■ With a reservation.
" Not in force for the United States.
Trade
Protocol extending the arrangement regarding in-
ternational trade in cotton textiles of October 1,
1962 (TIAS 5240). Done at Geneva May 1, 1967.
Enters into force October 1, 1967.
Acceptance deposited: United States, May 25,
1967.
Declaration on the provisional accession of Argen-
tina to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 18, 1960.
Entered into force October 14, 1962. TIAS 5184.
Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.
Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade embodying results of the 1960-61 tariff
conference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. En-
tered into force August 15, 1962; for the United
States December 31, 1962. TIAS 5253.
Acceptance: Pakistan, April 27, 1967.
Declaration on provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13,
1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for
the United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.
Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.
Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into
force April 19, 1964; for the United States
November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.
Acceptance: Ivory Coast, April 17, 1967.
Proces-verbal extending the declaration on pro-
visional accession of Iceland to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687). Done at
Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force
December 28, 1965; for the United States
December 30, 1965. TIAS 5943.
Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967.
Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on
provisional accession of Tunisia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 4498),
as extended (TIAS 4958 and 5809). Done at
Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force
January 6, 1966. TIAS 6005.
Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24.
1967.
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva April 1, 1966. Entered into force
August 1, 1966. TIAS 6065.
Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967.
Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered into force
August 25, 1966; for the United States January
17, 1967. TIAS 6185.
Acceptance: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967.
Third proces-verbal extending the declaration on
provisional accession of Argentina to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
November 17, 1966. Entered into force January
9, 1967. TIAS 6224.
Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967; New Zealand, May 9, 1967; Pakistan,
April 19, 1967.
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on
provisional accession of the United Arab Re-
public to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva November
JUNE 26, 1967
967
17, 1966. Entered into force January 18, 1967.
TIAS 6225.
Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967; New Zealand, May 9, 1967; Pakistan,
April 19, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 2, 1967. Entered into force April 14, 1967;
for the United States April 21, 1967!
Ratification: Netherlands, May 1, 1967.
Acceptances: Central African Republic, April 24,
1967; European Economic Community, March
31, 1967; France, April 24, 1967; Federal Re-
public of Germany, May 9, 1967; Italy, May 8,
1967; Japan, April 18, 1967; United States,
April 21, 1967,
BILATERAL
Covey T. Oliver to be an Assistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated May 24.)
William J. Porter to be Ambassador to Korea.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated May 16.)
PUBLICATIONS
Italy
Agreement relating to air transport services, with
annex, schedule and protocol, as amended and
extende'd (TIAS 1902, 2081, 4558). Signed at
Rome February 6, 1948. Entered into force
September 2, 1948.
Terminated by Italy: May 31, 1967.
Switzerland
Agreement relating to the granting of authorizations
to permit licensed amateur radio operators of
either country to operate their stations in the
other country. Effected by exchange of notes at
Bern January 12 and May 16, 1967. Entered into
force May 16, 1967.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on May 10 confirmed the nomination
of Robert H. McBride to be Ambassador to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. (For bio-
graphic details, see Department of State press re-
lease 132 dated June 6.)
The Senate on May 24 confirmed the nomination
of Andrew V. Corry to be Ambassador to Ceylon,
and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the
Maldive Islands. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated May 4.)
The Senate on June 8 confirmed the following
nominations:
Benigno C. Hernandez to be Ambassador to
Paraguay. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated May 30.)
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5# each.
Austria. Pub. 7955. 8 pp.
Greece. Pub. 8198. 8 pp.
Korea. Pub. 7782. 8 pp.
Malaysia. Pub. 7753. 8 pp.
Spain. Pub. 7800. 4 pp.
Upper Volta. Pub. 8201. 4 pp.
Uruguay. Pub. 7857. 4 pp.
Viet-Nam Information Notes. The first five pam-
phlets of a new series of background papers on
various aspects of the Viet-Nam conflict:
No. 1. Basic Data on South Viet-Nam summarizes
the history, geography, government, and economy
of the country. Pub. 8195. East Asian and Pacific
Series 155. 4 pp. 5#.
No. 2. The Search for Peace in Viet-Nam re-
views peace efforts by the United States and the
United Nations, as well as other diplomatic initia-
tives. Pub. 8196. East Asian and Pacific Series
156. 8 pp. 5^
No. 3. Communist-Directed Forces in South Viet-
Nam reviews the growth of Viet Minh and Viet
Cong forces. Communist objectives, strengths, and
weaknesses. Pub. 8197. East Asian and Pacific
Series 157. 8 pp. 5<f.
No. 4. Free World Assistance for South Viet-Nam
describes the military, economic, and social assist-
ance being provided to the Republic of Viet-Nam
by nations other than the United States. Pub. 8213.
East Asian and Pacific Series 159. 8 pp. 5(f.
No. 5. Political Development in South Viet-Nam
discusses South Viet-Nam's steady progress toward
968
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
an elected government and representative institu-
tions at all levels of government. Pub. 8231. East
Asian and Pacific Series 160. 8 pp. 5^.
U.S. Participation in the U.N. Twentieth annual
report by the President to the Congress, for the
year 1965. Pub. 8137. International Organization
and Conference Series 73. xvi, 415 pp., charts. $2.
Fisheries — King Crab. Agreement with Japan
amending and extending the agreement of Novem-
ber 25, 1964. Exchange of notes — Signed at Wash-
ington November 29, 1966. Entered into force
November 29, 1966. TIAS 6155. 3 pp. 5(J.
Sea Level Canal Site — Joint Technical-Economio
Feasibility Investigations and Studies. Agreement
with Colombia. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bo-
gota October 25, 1966. Entered into force October
25, 1966. With memorandum of record. TIAS 6156.
11 pp. lOiJ.
Peace Corps. Agreement with the Central African
Republic. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bangui
September 9 and November 24, 1966. Entered into
force November 24, 1966. TIAS 6157. 6 pp. 5<t.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Paraguay,
amplifying the agreement of October 28, 1955 —
Signed at Asuncion August 11, 1966. Entered into
force November 16, 1966. TIAS 6158. 3 pp. 5(f.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Panama. Exchange of notes — Signed at Panama
November 16, 1966. Entered into force November
16, 1966. TIAS 6159. 4 pp. 5<t.
Satellit* Telemetry /Telecommand Station Near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Agreement with the European
Space Research Organization. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Paris November 28, 1966. Entered into
force November 28, 1966. TIAS 6160. 10 pp. 10^.
Joint Defense Space Research Facility. Agreement
with Australia — Signed at Canberra December 9,
1966. Entered into force December 9, 1966. TIAS
6162. 6 pp. 5<f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement
of August 17, 1965. Exchange of notes — Signed at
La Paz November 30, 1966. Entered into force
November 30, 1966. TIAS 6164. 3 pp. 5^
Weather Stations — Continuation of Cooperative
Meteorological Program. Agreement with the
Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes — Dated at
Santo Domingo June 17 and July 21, 1966. Entered
into force July 21, 1966. Effective June 30, 1965.
TIAS 6167. 6 pp. 5<f.
Transfer of Certain Paintings for the Weimar Mu-
seum. Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washing-
ton December 9 and 16, 1966. Entered into force
December 16, 1966. TIAS 6169. 2 pp. 54.
Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement
with Japan. Exchange of notes — Dated at Tokyo,
September 12 and 19, 1966. Entered into force Sep-
tember 19, 1966. TIAS 6170. 4 pp. 5(«.
Joint Commission To Study Economic and Social
Development of Border Area. Agreement with Mex-
ico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico and
Tlatelolco November 30 and December 3, 1966. En-
tered into force December 3, 1966. TIAS 6171. 3
pp. 5<J.
Weather Stations — Continuation of Cooperative
Meteorological Program in the Cayman Islands.
Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Washington November 23 and December
12, 1966. Entered into force December 12, 1966.
Effective July 1, 1962. TIAS 6175. 7 pp. 10(t.
Headquarters of the United Nations. Agreement
with the United Nations, amending the supplemen-
tal agreement of February 9, 1966. Exchange of
notes — Signed at New York December 8, 1966. En-
tered into force December 8, 1966. TIAS 6176. 2
pp. 5«J.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam — Signed at Saigon December 15, 1966. Entered
into force December 15, 1966. With exchange of
notes. TIAS 6177. 10 pp. 10(J.
Refunding of Indebtedness Due Under Certain
Agreements. Agreement with Greece — Signed at
Athens May 28, 1964. Entered into force November
5, 1966. TIAS 6178. 7 pp. 10<*.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Gambia. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Bathurst November 26 and De-
cember 5, 1966. Entered into force December 5,
1966. TIAS 6181. 5 pp. 5(<.
Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Spain Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Spain and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency signed at Vienna
December 9, 1966. Entered into force December 9,
1966. TIAS 6182. 21 pp. 15(«.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Iran — Signed at Tehran December
20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 1966.
With exchange of notes. TIAS 6183. 6 pp. 5«f.
International Institute for Cotton. Amendment to
the Articles of Agreement of the International
Cotton Institute. Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly of the International Cotton Institute, at
Washington, September 7, 1966. Entered into force
September 7, 1966. TIAS 6184. 2 pp. 5#.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement vrith Portugal,
extending the agreement of March 12, 1964, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lisbon
December 19, 1966. Entered into force December
19, 1966. TIAS 6186. 2 pp. 5<f.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
the Netherlands. Exchange of notes — Signed at
The Hague June 22, 1966. Entered into force
December 21, 1966. TIAS 6189. 4 pp. 5<f.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India,
extending the agreement of April 15, 1964, as
amended and extended. Exchange of notes— Signed
at New Delhi December 30, 1966. Entered into force
December 30, 1966. Effective October 1, 1966.
TIAS 6190. 3 pp. 5<J.
Treaties — Continued Application to Lesotho of Cer-
tain Treaties Concluded Between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Agreement with Lesotho.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Maseru October 4,
JUNE 26, 1967
969
1966. Entered into force October 4, 1966. TIAS
6192. 3 pp. 5(t.
Amity and Economic Relations. Treaty with To^o —
Signed at Lome February 8, 1966. Entered into
force February 5, 1967. TIAS 6193. 21 pp. 15(f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Paki-
stan, amending the agreement of May 26, 1966, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi
and Islamabad December 28, 1966. Entered into
force December 28, 1966. TIAS 6194. 3 pp. B(f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India,
amending the agreement of September 30, 1964,
as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New
Delhi December 23, 1966. Entered into force
December 23, 1966. TIAS 6198. 3 pp. 5<f.
Maritime Matters — Deployment of USS Cascade to
Malta. Agreement with Malta. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Valletta December 22 and 28, 1966.
Entered into force December 28, 1966. TIAS 6201.
5 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with the Philippines — Signed at Manila
December 22, 1966. Entered into force December
22, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 6202. 9 pp.
m.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea, amending the agreement of March
7, 1966. Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul
December 5, 1966. Entered into force December 5,
1966. TIAS 6203. 3 pp. 5(f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Malta —
Signed at Washington November 16, 1966. Entered
into force January 26, 1967. TIAS 6205. 3 pp. 5<f.
Tracking Station on Antigua. Agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
January 17 and 23, 1967. Entered into force January
23, 1967. TIAS 6207. 17 pp. 10^.
Tracking Stations. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Exchange of notes — Signed at London December 28,
1966, and January 1, 1967. Entered into force
January 1, 1967. TIAS 6208. 9 pp. lOff.
No.
Date
131
6/5
132
6/6
133
6/5
134
6/6
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 5-11
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 5 which ap-
pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos.
119 and 120 of May 26, 126 of June 2, and
130 of June 3.
Subject
Notice to travelers to the Middle
East (rewrite).
McBride sworn in as Ambassador
to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (biographic details).
Katzenbach: commencement ad-
dress at Georgetown Univer-
sity.
Intellectual Property Conference
of Stockholm at Stockholm,
June 12-July 14 (U.S. delega-
tion).
Harriman: "L'opinion en 2i
heures" luncheon in honor of
20th anniversary of the Mar-
shall Plan, Paris.
U.S. and Panama amend air
transport agreement.
Amendment to program for visit
of the King of Thailand.
Transfer of oceanographic re-
search vessel to Government of
India.
Harriman: "Continuity of Pur-
pose in a Generation of
Change," commencement ad-
dress at Brandeis University,
June 11.
North Atlantic Council ministe-
rial meeting, Luxembourg,
June 13-14 (U.S. delegation).
tl35 6/6
136
6/7
*137
6/8
tl38
6/8
*139 6/10
tl40 6/10
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
VOL. LVI, NO. 1461
PUBLICATION 8252
JUNE 26, 1967
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office of
Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs,
provides the public and interested agencies
of the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign rela-
tions and on the work of the Department
of State and the Foreign Service. The
Bulletin includes selected press releases on
foreign policy, issued by the White House
and the Department, and statements and
addresses made by the President and by
the Secretary of State and other officers of
the Department, as well as special articles
on various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department. In-
formation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
IJnited States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international inter-
est.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative material
in the field of international relations are
listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, foreign $15;
single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this publi-
cation approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be repnnted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
970
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX June 26, 1967 Vol. LVI, No. H61
Africa. America and Africa: The New World
and the Newer World (Katzenbach) .... 954
American Principles. U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy"
(Johnson) 959
Australia. President Johnson Holds Talks With
Australian Prime Minister (Holt, Johnson) . 960
Aviation
U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agree-
ment (joint communique) 965
United States and Panama Amend Air Trans-
port Agreement (joint statement) .... 965
Ceylon. Corry confirmed as Ambassador . . . 968
Congo (Kinshasa). McBride confirmed as Am-
bassador 968
Congress
Confirmations (Corry, Hernandez, McBride,
Oliver, Porter) 968
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 966
The Situation in the Near East (Johnson,
Mansfield, Rusk) 949
Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Corry, Hernandez, McBride, Oliver,
Porter) 968
Economic Affairs
America and Africa: The New World and the
Newer World (Katzenbach) 954
United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile
Agreement 964
U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries
Project in Viet-Nam 964
Foreign Aid. America and Africa: The New
World and the Newer World (Katzenbach) . 954
Italy. U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport
Agreement (joint communique) 965
Korea. Porter confirmed as Ambassador . . . 968
Latin America. Oliver confirmed as Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs . . . 968
Maldive Islands. Corry confirmed as Ambas-
sador 968
Mexico. United States and Mexico Sign Cotton
Textile Agreement 964
Military AfiFairs. U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy"
(Johnson) 959
Near East
Notice to U.S. Travelers to the Middle East . . 952
The Situation in the Near East (Johnson,
Mansfield, Rusk) 949
U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire in
the Near East (Goldberg, Security Council
resolutions, U.S. draft resolutions) .... 934
U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace
in the Near East (Johnson) 935
Panama. United States and Panama Amend
Air Transport Agreement (joint statement) . 965
Paraguay. Hernandez confirmed as Ambas-
sador 968
Passports. Notice to U.S. Travelers to the Mid-
dle East 952
Presidential Documents
President Johnson Confers With British Prime
Minister 963
President Johnson Holds Talks With Austra-
lian Prime Minister 960
The Situation in the Near East 949
U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace
in the Near East 935
U.S.S. "John F. Kennedy" 959
Publications. Recent Releases 968
Treaty Information
Current Actions 967
U.S. and Italy Terminate Air Transport Agree-
ment (joint communique) 965
United States and Mexico Sign Cotton Textile
Agreement 964
United States and Panama Amend Air Trans-
port Agreement (joint statement) , . . . 965
U.S.S.R. U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges of At-
tacks on Ship at Cam Pha (text of U.S.
note) 953
United Kingdom. President Johnson Confers
With British Prime Minister (Johnson,
Wilson) 963
United Nations
The Situation in the Near East (Johnson,
Mansfield, Rusk) 949
U.N. Security Council Demands a Cease-Fire
in the Near East (Goldberg, Security Council
resolutions, U.S. draft resolutions) .... 934
U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries
Project in Viet-Nam 964
U.S. Welcomes the "First Step" Toward Peace
in the Near East (Johnson) 935
Viet-Nam
President Johnson Holds Talks With Austra-
lian Prime Minister (Holt, Johnson) . . . 960
U.S. Rejects Soviet Charges of Attacks on
Ship at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 953
U.S. To Contribute to UNDP/FAO Fisheries
Project in Viet-Nam 964
Name Index
Corry, Andrew V 968
Goldberg, Arthur J 934
Hernandez, Benigno C 968
Holt, Harold E 96O
Johnson, President 935, 949, 959,
960, 963
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 954
Mansfield, Mike 949
McBride, Robert H 968
Oliver, Covey T 968
Porter, William J 968
Rusk, Secretary 949
Wilson, Harold 963
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