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Volume LVII, Nos. 1462-U87 

July S-December 25, 1967 




Date of Issue 




' of Issue 



July 3, 1967 

1- 28 



2, 1967 



July 10, 1967 

29- 56 



9, 1967 



July 17,1967 

57- 84 



16, 1967 



July 24, 1967 




23, 1967 



July 31, 1967 




30, 1967 



Aug. 7, 1967 




6, 1967 



Aug. 14, 1967 




13, 1967 



Aug. 21, 1967 




20, 1967 



Aug. 28, 1967 




27, 1967 



Sept. 4, 1967 




4, 1967 



Sept. 11, 1967 







Sept. 18, 1967 




18, 1967 



Sept. 25, 1967 




25. 1967 



Publication 8360 
Released April 1968 

For sale by the Siiperintendenl of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 
Price 30 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $10 per year; $5 additional for foreign mailing. 


Volume LVII, Numbers 1462-1487, July 3-December 25, 1967 



Abel, I. W., 489 
Ackley, Gardner, 46, 392n, 455 
Adams, Henry (quoted), 303 
Adams, John Quincy (quoted), 605 
Advisory Committee on Science and 

Technology (Goldschmidt), 305 
Afghanistan : 
Agricultural commodities, agree- 
ment with U.S. for sales of, 270 
Technical cooperation program agree- 
ment, with U.S., 270 
Africa (see also individual countries): 
Chinese technical assistance programs 

(Bundy), 199 
Contributions to U.S.: Johnson, 571 ; 

Palmer, 656 
Economic cooperation and develop- 
ment and U.S. support for re- 
gional efforts: Johnson, 32, 330, 
632; W. W. Rostow, 67 
Organization for African Unity: 

W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88 
Peace Corps activities (Palmer), 658 
Preferential trade arrangements (Sol- 
omon), 185 
Southern, racial discrimination in 

(Goldberg), 488 
U.S. aid policy (Rusk), 212, 803 
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach 
(Johnson), 32 
African Development Bank: W. W. 

Rostow, 68; Rusk, 210, 212 
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Sol- 
idarity Organization: 495, 496; 
Rusk, 491 
Agency for International Development 
(see also Foreign aid policy, U.S.): 
Africa, policies for aid to (Rusk), 212, 

Appropriations request fiscal year 

1968 (Rusk), 208 
Iran economic aid, termination: 

Johnson, 827; Rusk, 825 
Latin American programs. See Alli- 
ance for Progress 
Objectives and budget (Katzenbach), 

Philippines (Blair), 204 
Agency for the Safety of Air Naviga- 
tion in Africa and Madagascar, 81 
Aggression (see also China, Communist; 
Communism; and Soviet Union): 
OAS, final act and resolutions, 496 
Prevention and suppression: Johnson, 
779, 851; Katzenbach, 604, 818; 
E. V. Rostow, 425; Rofere and 
Schlesinger (quoted), 603; Rusk, 
88,252, 348, 564, 821, 857 

Aggression — Continued 
U.N. Charter principles for suppres- 
sion of (Lodge), 469 
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam 
Agricultural surpluses, U.S. use in over- 
seas programs, agreements with 
Afghanistan, 270; Brazil, 625, 698 
Congo (Kinshasa), 190; Ghana 
729; Iceland, 26; India, 117, 514 
Indonesia, 590, 846; Israel, 309 
Liberia, 698; Mexico, 770; Pakistan 
154, 309; Sudan, 26; Tunisia, 770 
Viet-Nam, 310, 590, 729 
U.S. policy: Katzenbach, 531; Solo- 
mon, 183 
A.griculture (j« aha Agricultural sur- 
pluses, Food and Agriculture Orga- 
nization, and Food for Freedom): 
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo 

1968 (Freeman), 136 
.\sia (Gaud), 582 
Asian Development Bank Fund for 

Agriculture (Gaud), 580 
Europe: Schaetzel, 713; Trowbridge, 

Farm-income problem: Freeman, 132; 

Solomon, 183 
India: Gaud, 583; Rusk, 211, 802 
Iran: Johnson, 360; Rusk, 826 
Ivory Coast (Johnson), 330 
Kennedy Round concessions : 95,100; 
Freeman, 132; Johnson, 884; 
Roth, 124, 577 
Micronesia, land management (Salii), 

Modernization, importance of (see 
also Food and population crisis): 
Fowler, 528; Gaud, 582; Gold- 
schmidt, 305; Johnson, 762; 
Rusk, 254; Sen (quoted), 766 
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756 
World Food Panel report, 76 
Nepal, 709 

Screwworm fly, elimination of, U.S.- 
Mexico, 682 
Trade problems: Freeman, 642 ; Nor- 
wood, 369; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 
181, 183 
Viet-Nam (LUienthal), 865, 866 
Water. See Water resources 
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 654 
AID. See Agency for International De- 
Communist China representation in 
U.N., draft resolution: Fountain, 
829, 830; text, 833 
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow), 


Intergovernmental Maritime Consult- 
ative Organization, convention 
(1965), amendment to article 28, 
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229 
Alianza paral el Progreso. See Alliance for 

Alliance for Progress (see also Inter- 
American Development Bank): 
Accomplishments, goals, and U.S. 
support: 717; Diaz Ordaz, 678; 
Johnson, 31, 499, 717 (quoted); 
Linowitz, 617; Oliver, 105, 754, 
868; Rusk, 90, 210, 254, 490 
Eliinination of U.S. import quotas on 
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of 
(E. y. Rostow), 238 
Multinational infrastructure projects: 
Oliver, 104, 755, 757, 873; Rusk, 
211; Solomon, 536 
Sixth anniversary: Johnson, 287; Lin- 
owitz, 321 
Summit meeting, results and pros- 
pects: 681; Johnson, 31, 498, 
499; Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 103, 
470, 755, 869; E. V. Rostow, 238; 
W. W. Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211, 
492, 493, 805; Solomon, 534 
U.S. Ambassador Coerr, request by 

Ecuador for recall of, 621 
U.S. financial support: Oliver, 869; 
Rusk, 208 
Cutback in aid, probable adverse 
eff'ects: Oliver, 471; Rusk, 805 
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu- 
ments, 1964, released, 550 
American ideals: Blair, 207; Johnson, 
303,631,653; E. V. Rostow, 609; 
Rusk, 251, 255, 348, 741 
Amistad Dam, 681 
Amity and economic relations, treaty 

of: Thailand, 438, 477, 662 
Andean Common Market (Solomon), 

Anderson, Eugenie, 365 
Anderson, Robert B. (Oliver), 474 
Angola, Congo mercenaries, use as 

base for (Buffum), 807 
Ankrah, Joseph A., 572 
Antiballistic missiles. See under Missiles 
Anton Bruun, RV, U.S. research vessel, 23 
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.) 

treaty, map, 460 
Apartheid (Goldberg), 488 
Apple, R. W., Jr., 416 



Arab-Israeli conflict: Johnson, 325; 

NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 425; 

Rusk, 559 

Cease-fire, importance of: 11, 12; 

Goldberg, 3, 6, 9, 10, 50, 263, 

690, 691; Johnson, 35, 37 
Khartoum conference, prospects from 

(Rusk), 388 
NATO interests (Cleveland), 145 
U.N. resolution, text, 112 
U.S. aid: 400; Goldberg, 65 

Johnson, 64, 65 
U.S. position: U, 52; Goldberg, 8; 

49, 108, 110, 111, 148, 218, 486 

834, 839; Johnson, 33; E. V 

Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 210, 388 

Soviet draft resolutions: 12n, 112n 

Goldberg, 5, 6, 51, 217, 842, 843 

te-xt, 10, 12 
Soviet position: Goldberg, 47, 109 

110, 263, 834, 836; Johnson, 38 

Rusk, 159 
U.N. resolutions, U.S. position: Gold 

berg, 108, 148, 691; Rusk, 149 
U.N. role and U.S. support: 361 

709; Goldberg, 3, 6, 10, 13, 47 

49, 52, 110, 148, 216, 487, 690 

691, 834, 840; Johnson, 33; Rusk 
165, 387, 559, 561 

U.N. special representative, need for 

835«; Goldberg, 835, 840, 842 
U.S. draft resolutions: 12«, 112n, 691. 
Goldberg, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 51, 834, 
836, 838; texts, 4, 7, 12, 51 
Soviet position on (Goldberg), 9, 10 
U.S. involvement, allegations of, and 
U.S. replies: 112n; Goldberg, 3, 
5, 9, 11, 48, 50, 150, 217, 262; 
E. V. Rostow, 237 
U.S. position: Goldberg, 3, 5, 9, 10, 
47, 48, 108, 148, 216, 486, 690, 
691, 834, 836, 841; Johnson, 33, 
37, 39, 40; E. V. Rostow, 237, 
425; Rusk, 88, 160, 210, 387, 561 
U.S. press and public opinion (Gold- 
berg), 8, 691 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41, 
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Near and Middle East, and indi- 
vidual countries 
Joint U.S.-Argentine Trade and Eco- 
nomic Committee, 2nd meeting, 
joint communique, 146 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 245, 

378, 405, 728, 845, 846 
U.S. consulate at Cordoba, closure, 
Armaments {see also Military assistance. 
Missiles, ani/ Nuclear weapons): 
Arms race: 

International arms traffic, problem 
of: Katzenbach, 532, 795; Rusk, 
Latin America, question of: Katzen- 
bach, 797; Linowitz, 619, Oliver, 
473, 757, 871 
Middle East: 52; Goldberg, 7, 49, 
110, 148, 486, 834, 837, 843; 
Johnson, 33; Katzenbach, 532, 
796; McCloskey, 652; E. V. 
Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 160, 210, 
215, 387, 561 

Armaments — Continued 
Arms race — Continued 
U.S. -Soviet nuclear arms race: 
Fisher, 543; McNamara, 445 
Control {see also Disarmament): 
Communist China, position on 

(Fountain), 832 
Deep ocean floor, need for arms 
control measures (Goldberg),724 
Cyprus, importation of (Pedersen), 53 
East Europe and Soviet weapons, 
threat to Western Europe: 14; 
E. V. Rostow, 607; Rusk, 600 
Middle East, U.S. arms shipments 
policy : McCloskey, 652 ; Rusk, 387 
Nigeria, Soviet supply to, U.S. posi- 
tion, 320 
Nuclear. See Nuclear headings 
Outer space treaty, provisions: John- 
son, 567; Rusk, 566 
Soviet arms budget (Rusk), 558 
Viet-Nam {see also Viet-Nam), Soviet 
and Communist China supply of 
arms (Rusk), 598 
Armed forces: 
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position. 

See Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Congo (Kinshasa), foreign mercenar- 
ies, U.N. resolution and U.S. sup- 
port (Buflum), 151, 152, 807 
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat- 
ment of in time of war: 
Congo (Brazzaville), 81; Kenya, 
698; Kuwait, 514; Zambia, 698 
Philippines, settlement of claims for 
pay and allowances of recognised 
Philippine guerrillas, not previ- 
ously paid in full, and for errone- 
ous deductions of advanced salary 
from the backpay of eligible Phil- 
ippine veterans, agreement re, 
U.K., proposed reduction of Asian 

forces: Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259 
U.S., tribute to (Johnson), 747 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Arnold, Thurman W., 475 
ASA (Association of Southeast Asia): 

Bundy, 198; Kaplan, 233 
ASE.\N (Association of Southeast Asian 

Nations): Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822 
ASECNA (Agency for the Safety of Au- 
Navigation in Africa and Madagas- 
car), 81 
Asgeirsson, Asgeir, 201 
Ashmore, Harry, 462 
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia 
{see also Asian entries. Association of 
Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization, and individual 
Communism, danger of: 64; Bundy, 
278, 286; Johnson, 325; Katzen- 
bach, 604; Marcos (quoted), 520; 
Rusk, 253, 555, 560, 563, 597, 857 
Economic and social development {see 
also names oj countries and Regional 
cooperation, infra): Gaud, 581; 
Johnson, 32 61; Kaplan, 231; 
Rusk, 822 
Thailand, role of, 64 
U.S. role: Bundy, 196; Rusk, 802 
Food and population crisis. See Food 
and popvuation crisis 

Asia — Continued 

Japan, role of: 452, 454, 745; Gaud, 

581; Johnson, 32, 510, 742; 

Kaplan, 233 ; Rusk, 452 ; Sato, 744 

Philippines, interests and role (Blair), 

Regional cooperation and develop- 
ment: 452, 578, 615, 792; Bundy, 
198, 285; Gaud, 579; Johnson, 
453, 508, 612, 632, 743, 852; 
Kaplan, 233; W. W. Rostow, 68; 
Rusk, 214, 347, 563, 736, 804, 822 
SEATO, importance to. See SEATO 
U.S. commitments: Blair, 203; Bundy, 
276; Johnson, 453, 852; Rusk 
160, 458, 555, 563, 596, 599, 703, 
821, 823, 857 
Viet-Nam, importance to security 
of: Blair, 206; Bundy, 195, 278, 
285; Bunker, 781; Clifi"ord, 257, 
258; Johnson, 520, 614, 777, 779, 
851; Kaplan, 231, 234; Lee, 613; 
E. V. Rostow, 426, 608; W. W. 
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 90, 252, 344, 
347, 740, 857 ; Souvanna Phouma, 
654; Taylor, 259 
U.S. relations and role: Bundy, 195; 
Gaud, 580; Johnson, 614, 615; 
Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach, 819 
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 

and Taylor, 256 
World peace, importance to (Gaud), 

"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604; 
Rusk, 596 
Asian, Southeast, Ministerial Confer- 
ence for Economic Development: 
454; Rusk, 452 
Asian, Southeast, Ministers of Educa- 
tion Secretariat: Bundy, 198; Gaud, 
580; Johnson, 509 
Asian and Pacific Council: Bundy, 198; 
Gaud, 597; Johnson, 509; Kaplan, 
233; Rusk, 822 
Asian Development Bank: Bundy, 198; 
Kaplan, 233; Katzenbach, 335; 
Rusk, 214, 559, 822 
Japan, support of: 454; Johnson, 510, 
742 ; W. W. Rostow, 68 ; Rusk, 452 
Special funds for, U.S. support: 454, 
578; Gaud, 580, 581; Johnson, 
508; Rusk, 210, 456, 458 
Asian Labor Ministe.s, Conference of: 

Bundy, 198; Gaud, 579 
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council 
Association of Southeast Asia: Bimdy, 

198; Kaplan, 233 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 

Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822 
Astronauts, envoys of mankind (Dean), 

Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization 
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal 
Study Commission, 3rd annual re- 
port: 302; Johnson, 302 
Atlantic partnership: Harriman, 18; 

Leddy, 762 
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of: 
Agreements re application of safe- 
guards. See under Atomic Energy 
Agency, International 
Civil uses, bilateral agreements with: 
Norway, 26; South Africa, 222, 



Atomic energy — Continued 
Middle East programs, U.S. support 

(Goldberg), 218 
Nonproliferation treaty, draft, pro- 
visions for peaceful nuclear ex- 
plosions: 319; Foster, 316 
PLOWSHARE nuclear craterin^ ex- 
periments re interoceanic sea-level 
canal feasibility study (Johnson) 
Safeguards. See Atomic Energy 

Agency, International 
U.S. -Japan cooperation, 747 
Atomic Energy Agency, International: 
lltli general conference, U.S. delega- 
tion, 476 
-Agreement with U.S. and Indonesia 

for application of, 81 
Agreements re application of safe- 
guards to existing bilateral agree- 
ments: Japan, 809; South Africa, 
U.S. nuclear activities, proposal for 
application of: 319; Johnson, 863 
Statute (1956) as amended: Honduras, 
153; Uganda, 378 
Attlee, Lord, death of (Johnson), 568 
Australia (ice also Southeast Asia Treaty 
Asian students in (Bundy), 199 
Observers for Viet-Nam election 

(Lodge), 350 
Trade preference arrangements with 
less developed counti-ies (Solo- 
mon), 186 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 589, 

625, 728 
LT.S. exports, probable effect of U.S. 
preferential trade legislation : 
Fowler, 651; Rusk, 635 
U.S. military alliance (Rusk), 563 
Viet-Nam, military and other aid: 
Holt (quoted), 520; McNamara, 
169; Rusk, 91, 92, 391, 599 
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 
and Taylor, 256 
Kennedy Round tariff reductions, 

97, 100 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 625, 
Automotive products, U.S. -Canada 
Automotive Agreement, 1965: 45; 
Reynolds, 140 
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic 
Air services technical talks vdth Soviet 

Union completed, 820 
Air transport, Micronesia, needs 

(Norwood), 370 
G-130 transport aircraft, U.S. aid 
to Congo (Kinshasa) : Buffum, 1 52 
U.S. accidental overflights of Com- 
munist China: Bundy, 355; 
Bunker, 421 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 
Air navigation equipment, agree- 
ment with Germany re lease of, 8 1 
Air navigation services, joint fi- 
nancing services in: 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 

current actions: India, 769 
Iceland, current actions: India, 

Aviation — Continued 
Treaties — Continued 

Air transport agreements with: 
Bolivia, 54; Mexico, 589, 625; 
Panama, 54 

Aircraft, international recognition 
of rights in, convention (1948); 
Thailand, 697 

Aircraft, offenses and certain other 
acts committed on board, con- 
vention (1963): Netherlands, 117 

Aircraft operated on or on behalf of 
the U.S., agreement with ASE- 
CNA re services and facilities for, 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 


Babbidge, Homer Daniels, Jr., 332 
Baggs, William, 462 
Bahamas, industrial property conven- 
tion (1883, as revised), application 
to, 662 
Bahamas Proving Ground, agreement 
with U.K., re withdrawal of the 
senior member of the British Armed 
Forces posted there, 309 
Balagucr, Joaquin, 620 
Balance of payments: 
Japan, 452, 746 

Latin America (Solomon), 537, 533 
U.K. pound devaluation, cooperative 
adjustments to offset effect of: 
Fowler, 793; OECD communique, 
882; E. V. Rostow, 879 
U.S.: 452, 746; Freeman, 132; John- 
son, 266, 852; Reynolds, 137 
Foreign aid programs, effect on: 
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V. 
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209 
Foreign travel, effect on: 828; E. V. 

Rostow, 879 
U.S. exports, effect on: Fowler, 650; 
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 688; 
Udall, 638 
Viet-Nam, effect of: 45; E. V. 
Rostow, 879 
World monetary system, adjustments 
(Fowler), 524, 526 
Ball, George, 462, 661, 759 (quoted) 
Banda, H. Kamuzu, 43 
GAS membership (Oliver), 871 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 190, 

270, 309, 404, 438, 550, 590, 846. 
U.S. Ambassador (Mann), confirma- 
tion, 478 
Harnett, Peter, 596 
Harnett, Robert W., 586 
Bator, Francis: 392n; Fowler, 393 
Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc- 
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge, 
Observers for Viet-Nam elections 

(Lodge), 350 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 378, 
478, 625, 769, 770 
Benjamin, Robert S., 489 
Bennett, Ivan L., Jr., 76, 874 
Berlin (see also Germany): Hrzezinski, 
21; Cleveland, 142; Katzenbach, 
335; NAG, 14; Rusk, 600 

Bernardes, Carlos A. (Goldberg), 52 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, 62, 63 
Big-power responsibility: Brzezinski, 22; 
Bundy, 285; Bunker, 781; Johnson, 
35, 38, 59, 325, 853; Kaplan, 234; 
Katzenbach, 334, 534, 604, 818; 
Kiesinger, 329; Lee, 613; Oliver, 
474; E. V. Rostow, 423, 428, 606, 
609; Rusk, 251, 348, 564, 735, 807; 
Sato, 744 
BIRPI (International Bureaus for the 
Protection of Industrial and Intel- 
lectual Property), Trowbridge, 505 
Bismarck, Kail Otto (quoted), 328 
Black, Eugene (Johnson), 508 
Blair, William McCormick, Jr., 203 
Bogdan, Corneliu, 202 
Boggs, Neil, 352, 464 
Bolivar, Sim6n (quoted), 618 
Communism, danger of: Johnson, 
683; Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach, 
533; Rusk, 210, 490, 493 
OAS final act and resolutions, texts, 
Guevara, Ernesto "Che", report of 

death (Rusk), 561 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 697 
Bolton, Frances (Palmer), 658 
Bonin Islands, question of return to 

Japan: 745; Rusk, 457, 459 
Botswana : 
World Bank and International Mone- 
tary Fund membership (Fowler), 
World Meteorological Organization 
convention, 1947, accession, 624 
Bowers, Raymond, 585 
Bowie, Robert R., 16 
Bowles, Chester (quoted), 583 
Boyd, Alan S., 455 
Braderman, Eugene M., 78 
Brandeis, Louis D. (quoted), 107 
Former President Castello Branco, 

death of (Rusk), 159 
International coffee agreement exten- 
sion, U.S. -Brazil discussions: 799; 
Oliver, 756 
Nonproliferation treaty, reservations 

to (Rusk), 388 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 625, 698 
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 211 
Brezhnev, Leonid I. (Cleveland), 143 
Brodie, Henry, 725 
Broomfield, Wilham S., 489, 844 
Brosio, Manlio, 859, 860 
Brown, Harold (McNamara), 448 
Brown, L. Dean, 625 
Hrown, Winthrop G. (quoted), 232 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 19 
Buffum, William B., 46, 151, 152, 489. 

Safety of life at sea, international 
convention (1960), acceptance, 
U.N. role in Viet-Nam negotiations, 
position on (Goldberg), 670 
Bull, Odd: 12n; Goldberg, 4 
Bundy, William P., 195, 260, 275, 352, 

Bunker, Ellsworth: 416, 584, 748, 781; 
Johnson, 707; Rusk, 557 




Communism, danger of: Johnson, 
520; Rusk, 164, 560, 563, 597, 822 
U.N. Charter amendments to article 
109, ratification, 81 
Bushy, Horace, 476 
Butler, Samuel, 794 
Butterworth, W. Walton, 46 

Callahan, James, 396, 793 
Communist use as base for Viet-Nam 

infiltration (Rusk), 89, 412 
Neutrality: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89, 
412, 558, 597 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 514 
U.S. visit of President Ahidjo: 654; 
Palmer, 657 
Asian Development Bank, support for: 

Gaud, 580; Johnson, 510 
Champlain waterway, IJC feasibility 

study, report, 107 
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com- 
mittee on Trade and Economic 
Aflairs, 11th meeting, communi- 
que, 44 
Kennedy Round: 
Antidumping legislation: 97, 99; 

Roth, 126; Trowbridge, 131 
Tariff reductions: 98, 99, 100; 
Johnson, 884; Katzenbach, 688; 
Roth, 178; Trowbridge, 128 
U.S. replacement of interim staging 
arrangements by Kennedy Round 
staging, proclamation, 800 
Oil exports to U.S. (Udall), 641 
Pembina river bjisin, IJC report, 874 
Trade restrictions on U.S. exports 

reduction, 860, 861 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153, 
190, 337, 378, 549, 589, 625, 698, 
728, 770, 885 
Canadian Bank Act, 45 
Cantinflas (Johnson), 674 
Carrillo Flores, Antonio, 684 
Castello Branco, President, death of 

(Rusk), 159 
Castroism {see also Cuba) : Johnson, 498; 
Linowitz, 322, 616; Oliver, 473, 757; 
Rusk, 210, 490, 805 
Center for the Study of Democratic 

Institutions, 462 
Central African Republic, U.S. Ambas- 
sador (Lewis), confirmation, 478 
Central American Common Market: 
Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 1 05, 47 1 , 870; 
Rusk, 211; Solomon, 534 
Central American States, Organization 

of, 697 
Ceylon, treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 

404, 661 
Chad, U.S. Ambassador (Vance), con- 
firmation, 310 
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text), 
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684 
Chancellor, John, 390 
Chandrasekhar, S. (Gaud), 583 
Inflation control (Solomon), 539 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 846 
U.S. aid (Katzenbach), 531 

Chile — Continued 

U.S. Ambassador (Korry), confirma- 
tion, 337 
China, Communist {see also Aggression 
and Communism) : 
Asia, throat to: 744; Fountain, 831; 
Katzenbach, 604, 796; Marcos, 
520 (quoted); Rusk, 164, 347, 563, 
564, 596, 821 
Containment of: Katzenbach, 819; 

Rusk, 598, 704 
Leadership and policy, problems: 
Bundy, 356; Bunker, 421; Kaplan, 
230; Rusk, 347, 389, 415, 563 
Military bases, use by North Viet- 
Nam planes, question of (Rusk), 
389, 416 
Nuclear potential and U.S. strategy: 
Fisher, 543; Katzenbach, 819; 
McNamara, 449; E. V. Rostow, 
610; Rusk, 164, 563 
U.N. membership: 

Communist conditions for (Foun- 
tain), 831 
U.N. resolutions, texts, 833 
U.S. position: Fountain, 829; Rusk, 
389, 390 
U.S. accidental overflights: Bundy, 

355; Bunker, 421 
U.S. involvement as a result of Viet- 
Nam, questions of: Bundy, 283, 
357; Bunker, 420; Kaplan, 234; 
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 564 
U.S. relations: Johnson, 32; Kaplan, 
234; Katzenbach, 820; E. V. 
Rostow, 430; Rusk, 390, 415, 739 
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow), 

Viet-Nam : 
Military aid: Bundy, 3.56; Gold- 
berg, 672; Lodge, 467; E. V. 
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 598, 600 
Position on: Fountain, 832; Rusk, 
164, 558 
"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604; 
Rusk, 596 
China, Republic of: 
Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud, 

Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581, 
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach, 
531; Rusk, 214, 822 
Population control (Gaud), 583 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309, 

U.N. membership, question of ex- 
pulsion from (Fountain), 829, 830 
Draft resolution, text, 833 
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an- 
nouncement and text, 694 
U.S. mutual defense treaty, map: 

460; Rusk, 563 
U.S. scientific team, report of: 585; 
Johnson (quoted), 585 
Christian, George, 349, 864 
Churchill, Sir Winston (quoted), 251, 

263, 530, 791 
Civil emergency planning, agreement 
with Canada re cooperation on, 378 
Civil rights {see also Human rights and 
Racial discrimination) : 
U.S.: Goldberg, 488; Linowitz, 322, 
618; E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk, 
491, 856; Waters, 765 
Women. See Women 

Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva 
convention (1949) re: Congo 
(Brazzaville), 81; Kenya, 698; Ku- 
wait, 514; Zambia, 698 
Lake Ontario international arbitral 
tribunal, immunities as inter- 
national organization, Executive 
order, 507 
Micronesia, post World War II 
damage claims: Anderson, 365; 
Norwood, 373 
Philippine veterans and recognized 

guerrillas, agreement re, 117 
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico), 
settlement, 261 
Clark, Robert E., 411 
Cleveland, Harlan, 16, 141 
aifford, Qark M., 256 
Cocoa, international agreement, im- 
portance: Oliver, 756; Solomon, 182 
Coerr, Wymberley DeR., 621 
Diversification fund, U.S. support 

(Solomon), 182 
International coffee agreement 
(1962), with annexes: 
Current actions: Barbados, 117; 

Bolivia, 697; Israel, 661 
Extension, need for: Brazil-U.S. dis- 
cussions, 799; Mexico-U.S. sup- 
port, 682; Oliver, 756 
Collective security {see also Mutual 
defense) : 

Asia-U.S.: Bundy, 278; Johnson, 852; 

Rusk, 415, 458, 555, 563, 596, 

598, 703, 823, 857; Souvanna 

Phouma, 654 

NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, U.S. 

bases, 745 
U.N. principles and U.S. support 

(Rusk), 87, 252 
U.S. collective defense arrangements 

(map), 460 
U.S. commitments, importance: 
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 16, 779, 
853; Katzenbach, 336; E. V. 
Rostow, 608; Rusk, 91, 252, 704, 
U.S. national interests: Katzenbach, 
334; E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 597 
U.S. nuclear strategic policy: Gold- 
berg, 488; McNamara, 443 
Collisions at sea, international regula- 
tions (1960) for prevention of: 
Czechoslovakia, 270 
Communism, threat of (Katzenbach) 

Cotton textiles, arrangement re inter- 
national trade, protocol, accept- 
ance, 625 
Inflation control (Solomon), 539 
Interoceanic canal study commission, 
3rd annual report: 302; Johnson, 
Colombo Plan (Bundy), 199 
Colonialism {see also Self-determina- 
tion), Viet-Nam, French colonial 
period, review (Bundy), 275 
Commerce, Department of, 70n 
Commodity trade problems: Norwood, 
369; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 181 



Common markets. See name of market 
Communications, {see also Radio and 
Asia, role of Asian Development Bank 

in development (Gaud), 581 
Domestic svstems, importance (John- 
son), 299 
Global commercial communications 
satellite system: 
Interim arrangements: Kenya, 
589; Panama, 624; Tanzania, 26 
Special arrangements: East Airi- 
can External Telecommunica- 
tions Co., Ltd., 26, 589; Panama, 
Importance of and U.S. policy 

(Johnson), 296 
Italv: Johnson, 500; Saragat, 501 
N.VrO: Cleveland, 145; E. V. 

Rostow, 428 
U.S. policy task force, appointment: 
301n; Johnson, 301 
Communications Satellite Corporation 

(Johnson), 297 
Communism (see also Aggression ; China, 
Communist; and Soviet Union): 
Asia. See under Asia 
Coexistence: Goldberg, 483, 791; 

Rusk, 563, 564 
Cold v/ar (see also East-West relations) : 

Katzenbach, 817 
Domino theory : Bundy, 281 ; Johnson, 

851; Rusk, 347, 560 
Economic and social conditions, effect 
on: 496; Johnson, 851 ; Linowitz, 
322; Katzenbach, 530 
Increasing fragmentation of militant 
ideological movements : Brzezinski, 
19;Leddy, 761 
Rejection and countermeasures; 
Humphrey, 789; Linowitz, 617; 
Ohver, 473; Rusk, 214, 490, 493, 
O.AS final act and resolutions, 
texts, 493 
U.S. foreign policy: Brzezinski, 22; 
Katzenbach, 817; E. V. Rostow, 
U.S. role: Blair, 207; Johnson, 519, 
522; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 
530; Rusk, 344, 563, 704, 741, 806, 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Wars of national liberation: Bundy, 
283; E. V. Rostow, 426, 608; 
Rusk, 92, 252, 601, 703 
World goals: Kaplan, 230; Katzen- 
bach, 819; Rusk, 491, 600 
Corapton, Arthur (quoted), 862 
COMSAT. See Global communications 
satellite system under Commuica- 
tions: Satellites 
Conferences, international (^see also 

subject), calendar, 24, 435 
Confucius (quoted), 614 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 
(Kinshasa) : 
Agricultural commodities sales agree- 
ment with U.S., 190 
Intervention in, U.N., resolutions and 
U.S. support (Buffum, 151, 152, 

Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), Ge- 
neva convention (1949) re pro- 
tection of civilian persons in time 
of war, current actions, 81 
Congress, U.S.: 
Africa, interest in (Palmer), 658 
Documents relating to foreign policy, 
lists, 79, 107, 147, 215, 239, 364, 
511, 718, 807, 885 
Foreign policy responsibilities (Kat- 
zenbach), 333 
Joint resolutions, Trust Territory of 
the Pacific Islands, status of, text, 
Alliance for Progress, U.S. financial 
support: Linowitz, 619; Olivei', 
755; Rusk, 805 
Foreign aid, 1967, cutback in: 
Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver, 471, 
758; Rusk, 208 
Inter-American Development Bank, 
U.S. financial support (Johnson), 
Micronesia, budget (Norwood), 366 
Military aid poHcies (Oliver), 757 
Poland, tariff legislation (Gro- 
nouski), 434 
Legislation, proposed: 
American Selling Price system of 
customs evaluation: Johnson, 885; 
Roth, 173, 575; Trowbridge, 131 
Asian Development Bank, Special 
Fund: 454, 578; Gaud, 531; 
Johnson, 503; Rusk, 210, 458 
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal 
Study Commission, additional 
funds and time extension re- 
quests: 302; Johnson, 302 
Import quotas on extra long staple 
cotton, elimination of (E. V. 
Rostow), 236 
Kennedy Round implementation : 
Johnson, 885; Katzenbach, 688; 
Roth, 575 
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504 
Tax increase (Johnson), 266 
Trade Expansion Act negotiating 
authority, restoration of: Kat- 
zenbach, 689; Roth, 576, 649; 
Rusk, 636 
Trade protectionist bills, adverse 
effect on Kennedy Round re- 
sults and U.S. trade: Diaz Ordaz, 
677, 681; Freeman, 642; Fowler, 
650; Johnson (quoted), 877; 
Katzenbach, 686; E. V. Rostow, 
877; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634; 
Trowbridge, 645 ; Udall, 638 
Legislative schedule, determination of 

(Rusk), 458 
Presidential messages, letters, and re- 
ports. See under Johnson, Lyndon 
Public hearings, problems of (Rusk), 

Senate advice and consent: 
International grains arrangement 

(Johnson), 716, 885 
OAS Charter amendments (John- 
son), 78 
Senate concurrent resolution, U.N. 
role in Viet-Nam solution (Gold- 
berg), 667 
Senate confirmations, 46, 246, 310, 
337, 478, 489, 625, 729 

Congress, U.S. — Continued 
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 780; 
Katzenbach, 603; Rusk, 560, 563 
Conservation and development of nat- 
ural resources, U.S. -Japan coop- 
eration: 454; Rusk, 452 
Consular relations: 
Argentina, U.S. Cordoba consulate 

closed, 246 
France, U..S. consular convention rati- 
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885 
Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened, 

U.K., Edinburgh and Liverpool ele- 
vated to consulates general, 310 
U.S. Embassy at Saigon, dedication 

(Bunker), 584 
Vienna convention (1963): Cam- 
eroon, 26; Panama (and optional 
protocol), 477 
Entry into force, 81 
Cooper, John Sherman, 562 
Copyright convention, international 
(1952), extension to St. Vincent, 661 
Corner, Frank H., 13 
Corona, Achille (Rusk), 855 
Corwin, Edward S. (quoted), 333 
Costa Mendez, Nicanor, 146 
Costa Rica: 
Sea-level canal study commission, 3rd 
annua] report: 302 ; Johnson, 302 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 153, 
405, 697 
Costello, William A., 478 
Cotton, extra long staple cotton exports 
to U.S., proposed closure of (E. V. 
Rostow), 236 
Cotton textiles: 
Argentine imports to U.S., 146 
Bilateral agreements with: China, 
625, 694; Hong Kong, 54; India, 
378, 398; Israel, 154, 243 
Jamaica, 590, 622; Malta, 23, 81 
Mexico, 26; Pakistan, 114, 154 
PhUippines, 511, 550; Portugal 
548, 625; Spain, 625, 726 
Turkey, 116, 117; U.A.R., 625 
Yugoslavia, 506, 625 
International trade arrangements 
(1962), Poland, 770 
E.xtension of: 95, 98; Johnson, 884; 
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 127; 
Solomon, 181; Trowbridge, 130, 
Protocol, current actions: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, 
Colombia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, India, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Norway, 624; Paki- 
stan, 222; Poland, 770; Portugal, 
624, 729; Spain, Sweden, 624; 
Turkey, 222; U.A.R., U.K. (in- 
cluding Hong Kong), 624 
Less developed countries, trade con- 
siderations (Solomon), 187 
Council of Europe (Rusk), 856 
Counterfeiting, international convention 
(1929) and protocol for the suppres- 
sion of counterfeiting currency, 
Ceylon, 54 
Couve de Murville, Maurice (W. W. 
Rostow), 65 



Crnobrnja, Bogdan, 362 
Crockett, Kennedy M., 246 
Cruz, J. V. (quoted), 832 
CSDI (Center for the Study of Demo- 
cratic Institutions), 462 
Alliance for Progress, U.S. position on 

participation (Linowitz), 617 
Free-world and Communist trade: 

OAS, 496; Rusk, 491, 493 
GATT provisional accession agree- 
ments, current actions, 405 
International Sugar Agreement, lack 

of support for (Solomon), 182 
Subversion and insurgency: Johnson, 
683; Katzcnbach, 532, 797; Lino- 
witz, 322, 617; Oliver, 473; Rusk, 
210, 252, 383, 490,493 
OAS final act and resolutions, texts, 
U.S. trade embargo: E. V. Rostow, 
236; Rusk, 492 
Cuban missile crisis: Brzezinski, 21; 

Katzenbach, 818 
Cultural relations and programs {set also 
Educational exchange programs and 
Foreign students in the U.S.): 
African contributions to U.S.: John- 
son, 571; Palmer, 659 
Educational, scientific, and cultural 
Importation of, UNESCO agree- 
ment (1950), and protocol, Kenya, 
International circulation of visual 
and auditory materials, agreement 
(1949) for facilitating, Malawi, 
International Education and Cultural 
Exchange Program, annual report 
(Johnson), 303 
International fairs program. Execu- 
tive order, 827 
Mexico-U.S., 682 

Philippines, cultural development 

tiust fund, agreement re use of 

Special Fund for Education for 

establishment of, 337 

Romania, 1968 exchanges program, 

agreement, 875 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter- 
national Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, members confirmed, 332 
Garnets, TIR, customs convention on 
the international transport of 
goods under, Ireland, 270 
Road vehicles, private, convention 
(1954) on the temporary importa- 
tion of, Ireland, 438 
Touring, customs facilities, convention 
(1954) on: Ireland, 438; Uruguay, 
U.S. -Canada duty-free allowances, 
proposals, 45 
Cyprus (NAG), 15 
Threat of war lifted, U.S. and U.N. 
roles: Johnson, 859; Vance, 860 
UNFIG\T, 6-month extension, 53n 
U.S. pledge (Pedersen), 52 
Czechoslovakia, treaties, agreements, 
etc., 270, 309, 405 


Daane, J. Dewey: 392n; Fowler, 393 

Dagens Nyheler, transcript of Secretary 

Rusk interview, 91 
Dahomey, Peace Corps program, agree- 
ment re establishment of, 154 
Davis, Spencer, 385 
De Oliveira, J. G., 881 
De Tocqueville (quoted), 328 
Dean, Sir Patrick, 565 
Debrah, Ebenezer Moses, 578 
Defense (see also Collective security and 
Mutual defense): 
National security, oil import control 

program (Udall), 639 
Nuclear strategy (McNamara), 443 
Defense, Department of: 
Defense expenditures review (John- 
son), 267 
Military assistance appropriations, 
proposed transfer to budget of 
(Rusk), 208 
Deming, Frederick L.: 392n; Fowler, 

Democracy and democratic processes 
Humphrey, 791 ; Johnson, 522, 572 
Linowitz, 618, 620; Norwood, 374 
E. V. Rostow, 606 
Nepal (King Mahendra), 708 
Farm-income support practice (Free- 
man), 134 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221, 
589, 625, 809, 845, 845 
Desalination (Rusk), 738 
Iran: 361; Johnson, 360; Shah 

Pahlavi, 360 
Middle East: Goldberg, 487; John- 
son, 34 
U.S. -Mexico cooperative projects, 682 
d'Estaing, Giscard (quoted), 710 
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo: 674, 675, 677; 

Johnson, 683 
Diori Hamani, 541, 542 
Diplomatic relations and recognition: 
Ecuador, recall of U.S. Ambassador 

requested, 621 
Retaliatory trade legislation, proposed 

(E. V. Rostow), 236 
Southern Yemen, 861 
Vienna convention (1961): Nigeria, 
221 ; Norway, 769 
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See 

Foreign Service 
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S., 
presentation of credentials: Ecua- 
dor, 431 ; Ghana, 578; Greece, 507; 
Italy, 13; Jamaica, 431; Japan, 69; 
Jordan, 362; Malawi, 507; New 
Zealand, 1 3 ; Poland, 43 1 ; Romania, 
202; Togo, 202; Yugoslavia, 362 
Dirksen, Everett M. (Johnson), 40 
DiSaUe, Michael, 476 
Disarmament {see also Armaments and 
Nuclear weapons), U.S. position; 
319, 744; Foster, 317; Goldberg, 
488; Johnson, 295; Leddy, 761; 
NAC, 14; Rusk, 90, 738 
Disaster relief, Rio Grande floods: 680; 

Diaz Ordaz, 674; Johnson, 673 
Disputes, compulsory settlement of, 
optional protocol on Vienna con- 
vention, Norway, 769 
Disputes, pacific settlement of {see also 
Investment disputes, convention): 
171; Dean, 566; Rusk, 87 
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 565 

Dominican Republic: 
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto 
Rican Economic Commission, an- 
nouncement, 620 
Political stability (Oliver), 871 
U.S. role (Rusk), 211 
Double taxation, income, agreements 
and conventions for the avoidance 
of: Canada, 698, 770; France, 268, 
270; Malawi, 337; Trinidad and 
Tobago, 698, 729 
Drugs, narcotic: 
Single convention (1961), on: Malay- 
sia, 270; Philippines, 661; U.S., 
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in control of, 
Drury, Charles M., 46 
Duncan Reservoir, agreement with 
Canada re special operating pro- 
gram, 54 
Dzu, Truong Dinh, 416 


East-West Center for Technical Inter- 
change, Hawaii (Norwood), 372 
East-West relations: Brzezinski, 23; 
Goldberg, 483; Katzenbach, 817; 
NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 610; 
Schaetzel, 711; Waters, 767 
Detente: 14; Cleveland, 142; Kie- 
singer, 326, 327; Leddy, 760; 
Rusk, 90, 600 
NATO role: E. V. Rostow, 427; 

Rusk, 600 
U.S. efforts to improve: 454; Gro- 
nouski, 434; Harriman, 18; John- 
son, 16, 32; Rusk, 600, 856 
Viet-Nam, effect of (Kaplan), 234 
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966 

(Rusk), 600 
Eastwind, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, 

EGA (Economic Commission for Africa) : 
Goldschmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow, 
ECAFE (Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East): Gaud, 579; 
Goldschmidt, 304 
EGLA (Economic Commission for 
Latin America): Goldschmidt, 304 
Economic and Social Council, U.N.: 
Documents, lists of, 308, 404, 438, 694 
Educational, scientific, and cultural 
materials, importation of, agree- 
ment ( 1 950), and protocol, Kenya, 
Food aid for developing countries, 
U.S. support for resolution on 
(Goldschmidt), 304 
Economic and social development {set 
also Economic and technical aid. 
Foreign aid programs. Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment, and name of cvuntry): 
Jolinson, 32, 330; W. W. Rostow, 67 
Asia. See Asia 
Bonin Islands, 459 

Communism, as a countermeasure to: 
496; Johnson, 851; Katzenbach, 
530; Linowitz, 322, 618 
Education, importance to (Bundy), 

Europe: Brzezinski, 22; Schaetzel, 710; 
Trowbridge, 72 



Economic and social development — 
Hunger, disease, ignorance, key fac- 
tors: Hiimpiirev, 792; Johnson, 
59, 325, 570, 632, 655, 707, 753, 
851 ; Linowitz, 617; E. V. Rostow, 
424, 610; Rusk, 209, 255 
Industrialized countries, role of: 329, 
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32, 
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876; 
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon. 
183, 185; Waters, 767 
Internal stability, relation to, U.S. 
military assistance role: Katzen- 
bach, 533, 795; Oliver, 758, 871; 
Rusk, 215, 806; Waters, 764 
Latin America. See Alliance for Prog- 
Less developed countries. See Less 

developed countries 
Micronesia: Anderson, 365; Johnson, 

363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376 
Middle East, U.S. position and sup- 
port: Goldberg, 9, 108, 148, 218; 
Rusk, 210 
Multilateral coordination, need for: 
Johnson, 331, 763; Katzenbach, 
Nepal: 709; Johnson, 706, 707 
PhUippines (Blair), 205 
Political stability, importance: John- 
son, 632, 778, 851; Katzenbach, 
334; Rusk, 210, 214, 806; Waters, 
Principles for: Johnson, 42; Oliver 

472,872; Rusk, 208 
Private enterprise, role of: Gaud, 581 ; 
Linowitz, 324; Oliver, 104; Rusk, 
Self-help: 745; Fowler, 527; Gaud, 
582 ; Johnson, 499 ; Linowitz, 618 ; 
Oliver, 470 
Singapore (Johnson), 612, 614 
U.S.: Brzezinski, 21; Johnson, 267; 

E. V. Rostow, 878; Rusk, 255 
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; Johnson, 
16, 632; Katzenbach, 335, 530; 
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 801 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Economic and technical aid (see also 
Agency for International Develop- 
ment, Agricultural surpluses. Alli- 
ance for Progress, Economic and 
social development. Foreign aid pro- 
grams, Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, International Bank, and 
Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development) : 
Organization of Central American 
States, agreement with U.S. for, 
current actions: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, 697 
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair), 
Economic Commission for Africa: Gold- 

schmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow, 68 
Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East: Gaud, 579; Goldschmidt, 
Economic Commission for Europe (E. 

V. Rostow), 428 
Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica (Goldschmidt), 304 

Economic policy and relations, U.S.: 
Domestic policy: 
Farm programs geared to pressing 

foreign needs (Johnson), 763 
Farmers, benefits to, of Kennedy 
Round concessions (Freeman), 
133, 642 
Great Society program, need for 

(E. V. Rostow), 61 1 
Income taxes, proposed 10-percent 
surcharge: Johnson, 266; E. V. 
Rostow, 878; Trowbridge, 504 
State of the budget and the economy 
(Johnson), 266 
Foreign policy: 
Agricultural trade policy objectives: 
Freeman, 135, 642; Roth, 179; 
Solomon, 183 
Kennedy Round [see under Tai-iffs 
and trade, general agreement on) 
U.S. business, effect on: Reynolds, 
137; Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 127 
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social 

Council, U.N. 
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 337 
U.S. Ambassador, recall requested, 
Eden, Anthony, 276 
Edisto, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, 362 
Education, 303 

Education {see also Cultural relations 
and programs; Educational ex- 
change programs, international; 
Foreign students in the U.S.): 
AID technical training programs 

(Katzenbach), 532 
Asia: Bundy, 197; Gaud, 579, 580 
Benito Juarez-Abraham Lincoln schol- 
arships, 681 
"Brain drain": 585; Bundy, 197; 
Oliver, 1 06 ; Schaetzel, 712; Trow- 
bridge, 71, 74 
Communications satellites, importance 

to (Johnson), 296 
Importance (Johnson), 303, 569 
Iran (Johnson), 358 
Labor adjustment assistance program, 
training opportunities (Reynolds), 
Latin America (Oliver), 105, 472, 757 
Micronesia: Norwood, 371, 373; 

Salii, 377 
Nepal (Johnson), 707 
OECD study (Trowbridge), 72 
Philippines, Special Fund for Educa- 
tion, agreements re uses of, 26, 
117. 337 
Science cooperation agreement with 

Italy, 80 
Southeast Asian Ministers of Educa- 
tion Secretariat (Bundy), 198 
Thailand, 64 

TV and other new media: Johnson, 
570, 614; Linowitz, 619; Norwood 
370; Oliver, 757 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter- 
national Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, members confirmed, 
U.S. intellectuals, foreign policy role 
(Gronouski), 432 

Education — Continued 
Women, U.N. Commission on the 
status of, report of 20th session 
(Tillett), 219 
Educational, scientific, and cultural 
Agreement (1949) for facilitating in- 
ternational circulation of visual and 
auditory materials: Malawi, 245 
Importation of, UNESCO agreement 
(1950), and protocol: Kenya, 697 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization, U.N. : 
Long-term program for advancement 

of women, report (Tillett), 219 
Oceanographv development (Gold- 
berg), 723 
Educational exchange programs, inter- 
national (Rusk), 91 
Agreements with: Italy, 80; Romania, 

875; Turkey, 270 
International Educational and Cul- 
tural Exchange Program, annual 
report (Johnson), 303 
International fairs program. Executive 

order, 827 
Volunteers to America, 235 
EEC (Economic Commission for Eu- 
rope), E. V. Rostow, 428 
Egypt. See United Arab Republic 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com- 
mittee, draft treaty on nuclear 
nonproliferation {see also Nuclear 
proliferation): Foster, 291, 315; 
Johnson, 315; text, 319 
Einstein, Alfred (Rusk), 559 
EI Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc., 

54, 697 
Embassies, U.S.-Soviet proposed ex- 
change of chancery sites, 540 
Emerson, Ralph W. (quoted), 303, 327, 

ENDC. See Eighteen-Nation Disarma- 
ment Committee 
Energy resources, U.S.-Canada trade 

in, 45 
ESRO (European Space Research 

Organization), Frutkin, 401 
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 270, 478 
U.S. Ambassador (Hall), confirma- 
tion, 478 
EURATOM, (European Atomic En- 
ergy Community), Rusk, 856 
Europe {see also Atlantic and European 
headings, East-West relations. North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 
individual countries): 
Eastern : 
Increasing independence: Leddy, 

761; Rusk, 252 
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for East- 
ern Europe participation in 
(Johnson), 300 
U.S. economic relations. See East- 
West relations 
Unification: NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 
428; Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 711, 
U.N. European Office, U.S. repre- 
sentative (Tubby), 625 
Western : 
Germany, policy of (Kiesinger), 326 
Marshall Plan: Harriman, 17; 
Johnson, 16 



E urope — Continued 
Western — Continued 
Middle East war (E. V. Rostow), 

Nonagricultural imports from U.S., 

restrictions reduced, 860 

Technological gap with U.S.: 

Brzczinski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V. 

Rostow, 880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 

712; Trowbridge, 70 

Unification: 329; Cleveleuid, 144; 

Harriman, 17; E. V. Rostow, 

429; W. VV. Rostow, 66; Rusk, 857 

U.S. commitments [see also NATO") : 

Qeveland, 146; Leddy, 761 
U.S. import quotas, probable ef- 
fect: Fowler, 651; Rusk, 637 
U.S. relations and interests: 503; 
Brzezinski, 21; Harriman, 17; 
Johnson, 16, 328; Leddy, 762; 
E. V. Rostow, 422, 879; W. W. 
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 855; Schaet- 
zel, 710 
U.S. role in Viet-Nam, position on: 
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 857 
European Atomic Energy Community 

(Rusk), 856 
European Coal and Steel Community: 
Harriman, 18; Rusk, 856; Solomon, 
Tariff reductions, 96 
European Common Market. See Euro- 
pean Economic Community 
European Economic Community: 
Johnson, 632; E. V. Rostow, 429; 
Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 710; Solomon, 
Africa, preferential trade arrange- 
ments (Solomon), 185 
Farm-income support practices (Free- 
man), 134 
Kennedy Round negotiations: 96, 
97, 98, 100; Johnson, 884; Kat- 
zenbach, 688; Reynolds, 137; 
Roth, 124, 125, 178; Trowbridge, 
128, 130 
Membership increases, questions of: 
Harriman, 18; Katzenbach, 687; 
Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 715; Solo- 
mon, 187 
Surpluses, export program for (Free- 
man), 643 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 809, 

U.S. balance of payments imbalance, 
problem of: OECD, 832; E. V. 
Rostow, 879 
U.S. protectionist tariflFs, probable 
effects on (Katzenbach), 687 
European Free Trade Association 
(Rusk), 856 
Kennedy Round tariff reductions: 
97, '99; Katzenbach, 688; Reyn- 
olds, 137; Roth, 576; Trow- 
bridge, 128 
U.K. relations (Solomon), 538 
European Payments Union (Harriman), 

European Space Research Organiza- 
tion (Frutkin), 401 
Evans, Rowland, 353 
Executive orders: 
Interest equalization tax rates modi- 
fied (11368), 396 
International fairs program {11380), 

Executive orders — Continued 

International Secretariat for Volun- 
teer Service, designation as a 
public international organization 
(11363), 207 
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, im- 
munities as international organi- 
zation (11372), 507 
Expo 70, 454 

Export-Import Bank (Katzenbach), 531 

Exports (see also Export-Import Bank; 

Imports; Tariffs and trade, general 

agreement on; and Trade): 

Asian countries, increases in (Gaud), 

Less developed countries: 
Importance to: OECD, 882; Oliver, 
756; Solomon, 181; Woods 
(quoted), 678 
Promotion services and technical 
assistance, GATT-UNGTAD pro- 
posed merger, 725 
U.S.: Katzenbach, 687; Roth, 179 
Agricultural: Freeman, 132, 642; 

Rusk, 636 
,\rgentine-U.S., 146 
Automobiles, Kennedy Round elim- 
ination of certain road-use taxes 
(Roth), 127 
Chemicals (Roth), 176 
Nontariff trade restrictions, reduc- 
tions in, 860 
Technological progress, relation to 

(Trowbridge) , 506 
Trade restrictions of other countries 
in retaliation for proposed LT.S. 
import quotas, discussions of: 
Diaz Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler, 
650; Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 
686; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 635; 
Trowbridge, 645; Udall, 638 
Extradition, Malawi, agreement re 
continuance of force of existing 
U.S.-U.K. agreement, 337 

Family planning. See Population growth 
Famine 1975 (Gaud), 582 
FAO. S'e Food and Agriculture Organi- 
Far East. See Asia and names of individual 

Faulkner, William (quoted), 631 
Federal Communications Commission 

(Johnson), 297 
Federalist, The, 333 

Fedorenko, Nikolai T., (quoted), 670 
Feldman, George J., 625 
Fermi, Enrico (Johnson), 502, 862 
Finland, treaties, agreements, etc., 

153, 221, 625, 845, 846 
Fish and fisheries: 
Fish protein concentiate: Gold- 

schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, 
U.S. commissioner (Pautzke), ap- 
pointment, 172 
International Whaling Commission, 
U.S. commissioner (McHugh), 
announcement, 586 
Mexico-U.S. discussions on 12-mile 

zone, 475 
Micronesia (Norwood), 370 
Soviet-U.S. fisheries agreements, re- 
view, 873 

Fish and fisheries — Continued 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 

Atlantic tunas, conservation of, 
international convention (1966): 
Gabon, 885; Japan, 514; South 
Africa, 885 
Great Lakes fisheries convention 
(1954) with Canada, amendment, 
proclamation, U.S., 190 
High seas in the western areas of 
the middle Atlantic Ocean, agree- 
ment with Soviet L'nion on certain 
fishery problems, 846 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Commission, convention, 1949: 
Canada, 549; Ecuador, 337 
North Adantic, conduct of fishing 
operations in, convention (1967) 
with annexes: U.S., 885 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, con- 
vention (1965), international, pro- 
tocols on measures of control and 
entry into force: Soviet Union, 661 
Traditional fisliing in the exclusive 
fishery zones contiguous to the 
territorial seas, agreement with 
Mexico, 662,681, 685 
Viet-Nam off-shore fishery develop- 
ment project, agreement with 
FAO re fund-in-trust grant, 222 
Fisher, Adrian S., 489, 543 
Fisk, James B., 585 
Flood control: 
Rio Grande floods: 680; Diaz Ordaz, 

674; Johnson, 673 
U.S. -Mexico agreement concluded 
(Johnson), 147 
Food aid convention (1967): 716; 
Johnson, 716 
Ciu'rent actions: Argentina, 846; 
Australia, 728; Belgium, 770; 
Canada, 728; Denmark, 810, 846; 
EEC, Finland, France, 846; Ger- 
many, 770; Italy (as EEC member 
State), 810; Japan, 728; Luxem- 
bourg, Netherlands, 770; Norway, 
846; Sweden, 810; Switzerland, 
U.K., 846; U.S., 728 
Food and Agriculture, The State of, 1967, 

(cited), 766 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
(Goldschmidt), 305 
Fishery conservation studies (Gold- 
berg), 723 
Offshore fishery development project 
for Viet-Nam, agreement re fund- 
in-trust grant, 222 
Food and population crisis: Fowler, 528; 
Johnson, 762; OECD, 882; Rusk, 
90, 254, 737; Sen (quoted), 766; 
Waters, 764 
Asia (Gaud), 582 
Famine 7975, William and Paul 

Paddock (Gaud), 582 
India: Gaud, 583; Johnson, 763; 

Kaplan, 235; Rusk, 211, 802 
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756 
Marine resources, food potentijJ 

(Humphrey), 228 
U.N. agencies, role in (Goldschmidt), 

304, 307 
World Food Panel, report: 76; 

Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533 
World Food Problem, The, vol. Ill, 
announcement and summary, 874 



Food for Freedom: Katzenbach, 531; 

Rusk, 212; Waters, 767 
Food resources {see also Agriculture): 
Edible protein, U.S. support for in- 
creased development, production, 
and use (Goldschmidt), 307 
Food synthesis, prospects, 77 
Force, use of. See Aggression 
Foreign Ajfairs, 285 

Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also 
Agency for International Develop- 
ment, Alliance for Progress, Eco- 
nomic and technical aid, Food for 
Freedom, and Peace Corps): 
Houphouet-Boigny, 331 
Balance of payments considerations: 
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V. 
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209 
Cutbacks, impact of: Johnson, 753, 
777; Oliver, 758; Rusk, 389, 801 
Education, U.S. aid for (Jolmson), 

Food aid programs, 1966, report 

(Johnson), 762 

Foreign Advisory Programs, General 

Advisory Committee, appointment 

of new members, 294 

Foreign policy aspects of: Johnson, 

753, 778; Katzenbach, 530, 795; 

Rusk, 253, 735, 801; Waters, 767 

GATT multilateral food aid program: 

101 ; Freeman, 133 
GNP, percentage of: Katzenbach, 

531; Oliver, 870 
Matching-funds principle (Johnson), 

Multilateral aid, coordination with: 
Johnson, 508, 763; Rusk, 209, 
212, 803; Waters, 767 
Principles: 77; Blair, 204; Johnson, 
78, 763, 767; Katzenbach, 531; 
Rusk, 90, 389, 821 
Regional efforts, support for (Rusk), 

209, 212, 803 

Self-help principle: Harriman, 17; 

Johnson, 510, 763; Oliver, 499; 

Rusk, 209, 212, 254, 803; Waters, 


Foreign aid programs of other countries: 

Asian development, need for increased 

multilateral aid (Kaplan), 233 

European (U.K. and France) aid to 

Africa (Rusk), 212, 803 
Germany (Kiesinger), 327 
Japan: 745; Gaud, 581 
Thailand (Gaud), 583 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, cut- 
backsin: Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver, 
471, 758; Rusk, 389, 801 
Foreign Assistance Programs, General 
Advisory Committee, new members, 
Foreign policy, U.S. {see also Com- 
munism, Viet-Nam, and World 
Alliance for Progress as an instrument 

of (Linowitz), 617 
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu- 
ments, 1964, released, 550 
Briefing conferences, regional: Boston 
586; Kansas, 397; Reading, 586i 
St. Louis, 476 
Congressional documents relating to 
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147, 
215, 239, 364, 511, 718, 807, 885 

Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued 

Consultations on, as opposed to public 

hearings (Rusk), 560 
Evolution of (Brzczinski), 19 
Foreign aid as an instrument of: 
Johnson, 753, 778; Katzenbach, 
530, 795; Rusk, 253, 735, 801; 
Waters, 767 
1967 constructive developments: 
Johnson, 32, 776, 852; Rusk, 558, 
736, 856 
Principles, objectives, and problems: 
Brzezinski, 22; Johnson, 303, 852; 
Katzenbach, 794; E. V. Rostow, 
606; Rusk, 348, 736 
President, primary role: Johnson, 
780; Katzenbach, 333, 336; E. V. 
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 348, 741 
President and Congress compared: 
Johnson (quoted), 336; Katzen- 
bach, 333 
Security of U.S., central purpose: 
Johnson, 851; Katzenbach, 334; 
E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 251 
Tariff policies, U.S. national interest 
considerations: Rusk, 634; Udall, 
U.N. Charter, based on: Humphrey, 

790; Rusk, 87 
U.S. citizens, role in: Gronouski, 432; 
Rusk, 824 
Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I, 
General: The United Nations, released, 
Foreign Service {see also State Depart- 
ment): Johnson, 780; Ambassadors, 
confirmation, 246, 310, 337, 478, 
625, 729 
Foreign students in the U.S. {see also 
Cultural relations, Education, and 
Educational exchemge programs, 
Africa (Palmer), 657 
Asian (Bundy), 197 
Fosdick, Raymond (quoted), 740 
Foster, John S. (McNamara), 448 
Foster, William C, 291, 315 
Fountain, L. H., 489, 829 
Fowler, Henry H., 46, 132 (quoted), 

455, 523, 650, 793 
Consular convention with U.S., rati- 
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885 
Germany, relations (Kiesinger), 326 
Income tax convention, signature, 268 
Kennedy Round road-use tax re- 
ductions: 98; Roth, 127; Trow- 
bridge, 131 
NATO withdrawal, adjustments to: 

Leddy, 760; Rusk, 856 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 222, 
270, 378, 478, 514, 625, 729, 
845, 846, 885 
Viet-Nam colonial era, review 
(Bundy), 275 
Frederick, Pauline, 466 
Freedom: Blair, 207 ; Johnson, 777 

Four freedoms (Rusk), 855 
Freedom of speech and press, U.S.: 
Goldberg, 264, 691; Johnson, 59, 
778; Rusk, 855 
Arab-Israeli conflict (Goldberg), 8, 

Freeman, Fulton, 475 

Freeman, Orville L., 46, 132, 455, 642 

Fried, Edward R., 146 

Frutkin, Arnold W., 401 

Fulbright, J. William: 559; Linowitz, 

Fulbright-Hays Act, 235 

Conservation of Atlantic tunas, inter- 
national convention (1966), 885 
President Mba, death of, U.S. con- 
dolences (Johnson), 867 
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 280 
Treaties, agreements, etc, 477, 624, 

U.S. Ambassador (Brown), confirma- 
tion, 625 
World Bank and International Mon- 
etary Fund membership (Fowler), 
Garcia, Hector P., 489 
Gaston, Valente, Enrique, 146 
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general 

agreement on 
Gaud, William S., 455, 579 
General Advisory Committee on Foreign 
Assistance Programs, appointment 
of new members, 294 
General and the President, The, cited, 603 
General Assembly, U.N.: 
Documents, lists of, 113, 242, 404, 

438, 694, 726 
Emergency special session : 
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 46 
U.S. position (Goldberg), 12, 47, 
Marine resources committee, pro- 
posed (Goldberg), 723 
Middle East crisis, resolutions on and 
U.S. position {see also Emergency 
special session, supra; and Arab- 
Israeli conflict): Goldberg, 49, 
51, 108, 112, 148, 216, 486; Rusk 
387, 559 
Aid to refugees, 1 12 
Jerusalem, status of, 113, 151 
Korean unification, 845 
Communist China, Albanian draft 

resolution, 833 
Important-question, 833 
Middle East situation, 218 
22nd session: 
Agenda, 239, 545 
President Manescu, 483n 
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 489 
Geneva conference, Laos. See Laos 

Geneva conference, Viet-Nam. See 

under Viet-Nam. 
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment 
of prisoners of war, wounded and 
sick, armed forces, and civilians 
in time of war: 
Arab-Israeli conflict, application to: 

11, 112; Goldberg, 8 
Current actions : Congo (Brazzaville), 
81; Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514; 
Zambia, 698 



Genocide, convention (1951) on the 
prevention and punishment of: 

Uruguay, 309 
Geodetic survey, agreement with Upper 

Volta, 478 ■ 
Germany reunification: Cleveland, 144; 
Kiesinger, 326, 328; Leddy, 760; 
Rusk, 600; Schaetzel, 711 
Importance to peace of Europe: 
329; Johnson, 325; NAG, 14; 
E. V. Rostow, 428 
Germany, Federal Republic of: 
East Germany, relations: 14; Cleve- 
land, 144; Rusk, 600 
NATO forces, proposed reductions: 

Johnson, 327; Rusk, 166 
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, prob- 
lem of (Foster), 292, 294 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 153, 

337, 625, 769, 770, 810 
U.S. copyright time limit on filings, 
extended for German citizens, 
U.S. pork exports restrictions reduced, 

U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, 325 
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 578 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 810 
U.S. visit of General Ankrah, 571 
Glassboro meeting of President Johnson 
and Soviet Chairman Kosygin; 35, 
36, 37, 38; Rusk, 159 
Goethe, Johann (quoted), 328 
Gold standard, U.S.: Fowler, 523; 
Johnson, 793; E. V. Rostow, 877 
Goldberg, Arthur J.: 
Addresses, correspondence, and state- 
ABM limited deployment, 487 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 
Jerusalem, status of, 149, 486 
U.N. role and U.S. support, 3, 5, 
10, 47, 49, 110, 216, 263, 690, 
691, 834, 836, 841, 842 
U.S. position, 9, 49, 108, 112, 148, 

216, 486, 690, 691, 834 
U.S. reply to allegations of U.S. 
involvement, 11, 48, 150, 217 
East-West relations, 483 
Geneva agreements, 485 
Korean DMZ violations, 692 
Nuclear weapons draft treaty, im- 
portance, 487 
Ocean floor, cooperative explora- 
tion and use, 723 
Racial discrimination, 488 
Self-determination, 488 
Surveyor V lunar landing, trans- 
mittal of report, 769 
U.N. debate, value of, 262 
U.N. General Assembly, convening 
of emergency special session, U.S. 
position, 12, 216 
UNRVVA, U.S. pledge, 65 
Bombing pauses, 484, 669 
Peaceful settlement, U.S. position 
and U.N. role, 48, 483, 667, 671 
World peace, 216, 264, 483 
International Platform Association 

awEu'd, 262 
Outer space treaty, role in negotia- 
tions (Johnson), 567 

Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued 
U.N. General Assembly, U.S. repre- 
sentative, confirmation: 
Special emergency session, 46 
22nd session, 489 
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 304 
Goralski, Robert, 354 
Grains. See International Grains Ar- 
rangement, Rice, and Wheat 
Grant, U.S. (quoted), 42 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway, 
coordination of pilotage services, 
agreement with Canada, 625 
Great Lakes fisheries agreement (1954), 

amendment: U.S., 190 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, U.S. 
Commissioner (Pautzke), appoint- 
ment, 172 
Great Society: Johnson, 268; E. V. 

Rostow, 61 1 
Greece {see also Cyprus): 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 507 
Estate-tax protocol, supplementary, 

entry into force, 809 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 698, 

810, 845 
Turkey, relations (NAC), 14 
Greene, J. J., 46 
Gronouski, John \., 432 
Group of Ten: 454; Fowler, 526; Rusk, 
456 _ 
Ministerial meeting, Washington; 
392; text of communique, 396 
U.S. delegation, 392, 392n 
Communism, threat to (Katzenbach), 

Political stability (Oliver), 871 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 550, 
Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (Rusk), 561 
Guinea, agricultural sales agreement 

with U.S., 729 
Gulf of Aqaba (Goldberg), 5, 6, 7, 49 
Gullion, Edmund, 276 
Gut Dam, Lake Ontario claims tribunal, 

Guy, William, 349 

Guyana, Peace Corps program, agree- 
ment re establishment, 54 


Haines Road winter maintenance agree- 
ment with Canada, 46 
Haiti, International Wheat Agreement 
(1962), 1967 protocol for further 
extension of, 270 
Hall, William O., 478 
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 146, 265 
Harmel, Pierre, 422 
Harriman, W. Averell, 16, 17 
Harris. Patricia Roberts, 16, 489 
Harsch, Joseph C, 411 
Hawk missiles, 729 
Health and medical research: 

Communications satellites, impor- 
tance to (Johnson), 296 
Edible protein, production and use 
of, importance (Goldschmidt), 
Micronesia: Norwood, 372; Salii, 377 
Romania, 1968 exchange program, 

agreement, 875 
U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical 
Science Committee, 3rd meeting, 

Health and medical research — Con. 
World Health Organization constitu- 
tion (1946), as amended: Lesotho, 
Amendment to article 7: Barbados, 
270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica, 
117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 27 
Herter, Christian A.: Johnson, 885; 

Roth, 124 
Hesburgh, Theodore M., 294 
He.'5s, Frederic O., 504 
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 349 
Hightower, John, 458 
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 478 
Hilsman, Roger, 279, 559 
Hilton, James (quoted), 817 
Historical summaries: 
U.S. foreign policy (Katzenbach), 815 
Viet-Nam, U.S. policy development 
(Bundy), 275 
Hollybush [see also Glassboro meeting), 

35, 38 
Holmes, Justice (quoted), 200 
Holt, Harold (quoted), 520 
Honduras, treaties, agreements, etc., 

153, 697 
Hong Kong: 
Communist China, threat of (Rusk), 

Family planning programs (Gaud), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221, 625 
Hornig, Donald F.: 585; McNamara, 

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 331 
Houssay, Bernardo, 717 
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 586 
Hughes, Richard: 349; Johnson, 36 
Hull, Cordell (Rusk), 634 
Human rights {see also Civil rights and 
Great Society): 
Human Rights Week and Human 
Rights Year, proclamation, 660 
OAS resolution, 496 
Status of Women, U.N. Commission 
on, report of 20th session (Tillett), 
U.N. principles and U.S. support: 
112; Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252 
Human Rights International Confer- 
ence (Tillett), 221 
Humphrey, Hubert H.: 
Addresses and remarks: 
Oceanographic research and devel- 
opment, international cooperation 
for, 227 
World order, 790 
Visit to Europe, results (Cleveland), 

Visit to Southeast Asia, 789 
Humphrey, Ralph, 343n 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 81 
U.S. Ambassador (Hillenbrand), con- 
firmation, 478 
Hussey, William B., 698 
Hydrographic Organization, Interna- 
tional, Convention (1967) with 
annexes: U.S., 477 

IAEA. Set Atomic Energy Agency, 

IBRD. See International Bank for 

Reconstruction and Development 



ICC. See International Control Com- 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117, 

222, 405, 846 
U.S. visit of President Asgeirsson, 201 
IDA. See International Development 

ILO (International Labor Organiza- 
tion), 220 
IMCO. See Maritime Consultative 

Organization, International 
IMF. See Monetary Fund, International 
Imports {see also Customs; Exports; Tar- 
iffs and trade, general agreement 
on; and Trade): 
Educational, scientific, and cul- 
tural materials, importation of, 
UNESCO agreement (1950), and 
protocol: Kenya, 697 
Road vehicles, private, convention 
(1954) on the temporary impor- 
tation of: Ireland, 438 
Argentine exports, U.S. restrictions, 

Cotton, foreign policy aspects of pro- 
posed elimination of import quotas 
(E. V. Rostow), 236 
Dairy and meat imports, problem 
of, and U.S. controls (Freeman), 
135, 643 
Escape clause tariffs on typewriter 
ribbon cloth and stainless steel 
flatware, termination (Johnson), 
Import quota legislation, proposed, 
probable adverse effects of: Diaz 
Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler, 650; 
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 686; 
E. V. Rostow, 877; Roth, 574, 
648; Rusk, 635; Trowbridge, 645; 
Udall, 638 
Oil imports (Udall), 641 
Textile and apparel industries, Tar- 
iff Commission study requested: 
Johnson, 529; Trowbridge, 647 
Conventions for relief of double taxa- 
tion. See Double taxation 
Income and property tax convention 

with France, 268, 270 
Income tax administration, agreement 
with Viet-Nam, 54 
Agricultural modernization: Gaud, 

583; Rusk, 211,802 
Communist China, question of guar- 
antees against: Foster, 293; Rusk, 
Cotton textile agreement with U.S. 

announcement and text, 398 
Food and population problems: Gaud, 
583; Johnson, 763; Kaplan, 235; 
Rusk, 211,802 
Sikkim border (Rusk), 563, 597 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 378, 

514, 625, 662, 769, 770, 845 
U.S. additional wheat shipments 

authorized (Johnson), 430 
U.S. aid: Johnson, 763; Katzenbach, 

531; Rusk, 211, 802 
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz- 
enbach), 795 
U.S. oceanographic research vessel, 
announcement of transfer to, 23 

India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 431; 

Rusk, 211, 802 
India-Pakistan relations: Goldberg, 264; 
Kaplan, 235; Katzenbach, 796; 
Rusk, 212 
Communism, rejection of: Bundy, 
287; Johnson, 520; E. V. Rostow, 
608; Rusk, 560, 597, 822 
Economic and political progress: 
Gaud, 582; Humplu-ey, 791; 
Johnson, 32; W. \V. Rostow, 68; 
Rusk, 214,804 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 405, 

590, 846 
Visit of Vice President Humphrey, 
789, 790 

Joint communique, 792 
World Bank role in economic stabiliza- 
tion (Fowler), 523 
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 75, 
Convention (1883, as revised) for the 
protection of, 1958: Bahamas, 
662; Malta, 662; Togo, 337 
U.S. copyright filings, time limit ex- 
tended for German citizens, 171 
Inflation: Katzenbach, 688; OECD, 
882; E. V. Rostow, 879; Solomon, 
Information activities and programs: 
International fairs program. Executive 

order, 827 
U.N. specialized agencies, communi- 
cation with developing countries 
re aid in food and population 
problems (Goldschmidt), 304 
Institute for Technical Interchange at 
East-West Center, Hawaii (Nor- 
wood), 372 
INTELSAT (International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Consortium): 
402; Johnson, 297 
Inter-American Development Bank: 
Linowitz, 321; Oliver, 105, 471; 
Rusk, 211 
Agreement (1959) establishing, with 
annexes, acceptance: Trinidad 
and Tobago, 190 
U.S. support: Johnson, 499; Oliver, 
755; Rusk, 210, 805 
Interest equalization tax rates modified. 

Executive order, 396 
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development: 476; Harriman, 
18; Johnson, 509; Katzenbach, 
335; Oliver, 105; Solomon, 184 
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 624 
Indonesia, role in : Fowler, 523 ; Gaud, 
International Boundary and Water 
Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 681, 684, 
International Control Commission: E. 
V. Rostow, 608; Rusk, 93, 386, 412, 
558, 597 
International cooperation: Ahidjo, 655; 
Linowitz, 616; Rusk, 87, 90, 738 
East Asian-U.S. (Bundy), 197 
Japan-U.S., 746 
Law of treaties, importance to 

(Kearney), 721 
Nuclear energy development for 
peaceful purposes: 319; Foster, 

International cooperation — Continued 
Oceanographic and marine resource 
development: Goldberg, 723; 
Humphrey, 227 
Outer space treaty provisions: John- 
son, 567; Rusk, 566 
Patent systems (Trowbridge), 506 
Satellite and space research programs: 

Frutkin, 401 ; Johnson, 297 
Technological development, NAC res- 
olution, text, 15 
Water for Peace, 245 
International Development Association, 
increase in and U.S. support: 45; 
Fowler, 527, 528; Katzenbach, 335, 
531 ; Rusk, 210; Solomon, 536 
International Education Act of 1966 

(Johnson), 303 
International Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, U.S. Advisory Commission, 
members confirmed, 332 
International Finance Corporation 

(Fowler), 527 

International grains arrangement 

(1967): 146, 716; John.son, 716, 884 

Current actions: Argentina, 845, 846; 

Australia, 728; Belgium, 769, 770; 

Canada, 728; Denmark, 809, 810, 

846; EEC, Finland, France, 845, 

846; Germany, 769, 770; Greece, 

India, Ireland, Israel, 845; Italy 

(as EEC member), 809, 810; 

Japan, 728; Korea, Lebanon, 845; 

Luxembourg, 770; Mexico, 845; 

Netherlands, 770; Norway, 845, 

846; Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi 

Arabia, South Africa, Spain, 845; 

Sweden, 810; Switzerland, 845, 

846 ; Tunisia, 728 ; U.K., 845, 846 ; 

U.S., 728 

International Indian Ocean Expedition, 

International Joint Commission, U.S.- 
Canada, 107 
Pembina river basin report, 874 
International law: 
Ocean floor, development (Goldberg), 

Rule of law: Bundy, 200; Dean, 565; 
Goldberg, 2G4; Johnson, 295; 
Rusk, 252, 735 
Treaties, ILC draft convention, U.S. 

position (Kearney), 719 
U.S. advisory panel members, an- 
nouncement, 661 
World Law Day, 1967, proclamation, 
International monetary system, 45 
Convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold 

(Fowler), 523 
Special drawing rights facility: 
Fowler, 393, 523; Johnson, 392; 
Rusk, 456 
U.K. devaluation of pound sterling, 
effect: Fowler, 793; Johnson, 793; 
OECD communique, 882; E. V. 
Rostow, 877 
International organizations (see also 
name of organization ) : 
Calendar of international conferences, 

24, 435 
International Secretariat for Volun- 
teer Service, designation as, 207 
Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal, desig- 
nation as, 507 



International organizations — Con. 
U.S. support: Katzenbach, 335; Rusk, 
90, 209, 805 
International Red Cross, 170 
International Rice Institute: Gaud, 582; 

Lilienthal, 866 
International Secretariat for Volunteer 

Service, Executive order, 207 
International Telecommunications Sat- 
ellite Consortium: 402; Johnson, 
International waterways, free mari- 
time passage, U.S. position: 51, 
362; Goldberg, 5, 6, 7, 49, 108, 110, 
148, 486, 834, 839; Johnson, 33; 
E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk, 83, 164, 
International Year on Human Rights 

(TiUctt), 221 
Investment disputes, international cen- 
ter for the settlement of (Fowler), 
U.S. panel members named, 475 
Investment disputes between states and 
nationals of other states, conven- 
tion (1963) on: Ceylon, 404, 661; 
Finland, 221; France, Japan, Nor- 
way, Togo, 378; Switzerland, 549 
Investment guaranties, agreements re: 
Gambia, 810; Indonesia, 405; Mal- 
awi, 309; Rwanda, 54; Swaziland, 
Investment of private capital abroad 
(Roth), 179 
Asia (Gaud), 581 
Europe: E. V. Rostow, 880; Schaetzel, 

Indonesia (Gaud), 582 
Iran (Rusk), 826 
Japan, 453 

Korea (Brown), 232 (quoted) 
Latin America: Oliver, 470; Solomon, 

Less developed countries, importance 
to: Fowler, 525; Johnson, 763; 
OECD, 882 
Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677 
Micronesia: Norwood, 369; Salii, 376 
Trinidad and Tobago, agreement with 

U.S., 698, 729 
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865 
Desalination, U.S. study team: 361; 
Johnson, 360; Shah Pahlavi, 360 
Economic development: Johnson, 358, 

359, 827; Rusk, 825 
U.S. visit of the Shah of Iran, 358 
Iraq, U.S. travel restrictions amended, 

Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 

270, 438, 550, 845, 846 
Isolationism: Katzenbach, 815; Oliver, 
471 ; E. V. Rostow, 605, 608; Rusk, 
704, 807 
Israel : 
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli 

Cotton textile agreement with U.S., 

announcement, 243 
Existence of State of (Rusk), 160 
Jerusalem, extension of Israeli juris- 
diction {see also Jerusalem, status 
of), 60n 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 154, 
270, 309, 625, 661, 652, 810, 845, 

Israel — Continued 

U.S. economic and military aid: 
Goldberg, 9; McQoskey, 652; 
Rusk, 210 

U.S. tiavel restrictions amended, 41 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13 

Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc- 
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge, 

Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports 
reduced, 861 

San Marco satellite program (Frut- 
kin), 401 

Science cooperation agreement, an- 
nouncement, 80 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153, 
625, 809, 810 

U.S. relations (Rusk), 855 

U.S. visit of President Saragat, 500 
Ivory Coast, U.S. visit of President 
Houphouet-Boigny, 330 

Jacoby, Neil H., 214 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 590, 625 

U.S. Ambassador (Tobriner), confir- 
mation, 729 

U.S. cotton textile agreement, an- 
nouncement and text, 622 
James, Hatcher M., Jr., 288n 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 69 

Asian regional development, role in: 
452, 454, 745; Gaud, 580; John- 
son, 32, 510, 742; Kaplan, 233; 
Rusk, 452; Sato, 744 

Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud, 

Bonin, Okinawa, and Ryukyu Islands, 
question of return to Japan: 745; 
Rusk, 457 

Economic progress: Gaud, 581 ; Kap- 
lan, 232; katzenbach, 688; Rusk, 

Former Prime Minister Yoshida, 
death of (Johnson), 660 

Kennedy Round tariff reductions : 97, 
93, 100; Johnson, 884; Katzen- 
bach, 688; Roth, 178; Trow- 
bridge, 128, 129 

Population growth control (Gaud), 

Trade (Bundy), 197 

U.S. replacement of interim staging 
arrangements by Kennedy Round 
staging, proclamation, 800 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153, 
309, 337, 378, 514, 549, 589, 625, 
662, 728, 729, 809 

U.S. interest equalization tax rate 
modification, 396 

U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical Sci- 
ence Committee, 3rd meeting, 172 

U.S. -Japan Joint Economic Commit- 
tee, 6th meeting: communique, 
452; Johnson, 453; Miki, 455; 
Rusk, 451,455 

U.S. mutual defense treaty: 745; map, 
460; Rusk, 563 

U.S. poultry exports, restrictions on 
reduced, 861 

Japan- — Continued 

U.S. -Soviet-Japan discussions on Pa- 
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield 
proposal (Rusk), 455 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Sato, 742 
World role (Brzezinski), 23 
Jaworski, Leon, 475 
Jay, John (quoted), 333 
Jeff'erson, Thomas: quoted, 336, 692; 

Johnson, 571 
Jenks, Sir Wilfred (Rusk), 91 
Jerusalem, status of: 60n; Goldberg, 
103, 110, 112, 149, 486; Johnson, 
33, 60; E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk, 
88, 149 
U.N. resolution, text, 113 
Johnson, Lyndon B.: 

Addresses, remarks, and statements: 
Alliance for Progress, 31, 499 

Science and technology multilat- 
eral program, 717 
Sixth anniversary, remarks, 287 
American ideals, 303, 631, 653 
Arab-Israeli conflict, 33, 35, 37, 40 

Jerusalem, status of, 33, 60 
Regional cooperation, 453, 508, 

612, 632, 743, 852 
U.S. role and relations, 453, 614, 
Atomic energy, 25th anniversary, 862 
Big-power responsibilities, 35, 38, 

59, 325, 853 
Chamizal settlement, 683 
China, report of U.S. scientific 

team, 585 
Collective security, importance of 

U.S. commitments, 16, 779, 851 
Communism, 519, 522, 851 

OAS role, 498 
East- West relations, 16, 32 
Economic and social development, 
principles for and importance of, 
16, 32, 42, 59, 325, 330, 499, 570, 
631, 655, 707, 753, 763, 778, 851 
Education, importance, 303, 569 
Food and population crisis, 78, 762 
Foreign assistance act of 1967, cut- 
backs, effects of, 753, 777 
Foreign policy: 

1967 accomplishments, 32, 776, 

Principles and objectives, 303, 

325, 753, 778, 851 
Responsibilities for, 336 (quoted), 
Freedom of speech and press, 59, 778 
Hollybush, meeting with Soviet 
Chairman Kosygin, 35, 36, 37, 
38, 59 
India, additional wheat shipments 

authorized, 430 
Inter-American Development Bank, 

U.S. pledge, 499 
International Grains Agreement, 

signature, 716 
International Monetary Fund, new 

reserve facility, 392 
Italy-U.S. relations, 500, 501 

Former Prime Minister Yoshida, 

death of, 660 
U.S. relations, 453, 742, 743 
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto 
Rican economic commission, an- 
nouncement, 620 



Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued 

Kennedy Round, 32, 717, 852, 884 

Laos, 653, 752 

Lee Kuan Yew, tribute to, 614 

Lord Attlee, regret at death of, 568 

Marine resources cooperative de- 
velopment, 723 (quoted) 

Meetings with heads of state, im- 
portance and results of, 31, 35, 
36, 38, 39, 59, 329 

Mexico-U.S. flood control project 

agreement concluded, 147 
U.S. relations, 673, 675 

Middle East emergency relief pro- 
grams, U.S. support, 64 

NATO, 327 

Nuclear weapons proliferation draft 
treaty, 315, 863 

Outer space treaty, provisions and 
importance, 567 

Regional cooperation, 34, 632, 655 

Self-determination, 59, 295, 519 

Soviet Chairman Kosygin, meetings 
with, 35, 36, 37, 39 

Tciriff Commission study on eco- 
nomic condition of U.S. textile 
and apparel industries, request for, 

Trade, 573, 633, 716, 717, 877 
(quoted), 883 

U.K. devaluation of pound sterling, 

Viet-Nam (Jor details, see Viet-Nam): 
Civilian service awards, 288 
Enterprise proposal, 747, 775 
Political progress, 289, 290, 421, 

521, 776, 779 
Situation reports, 32, 775 
U.N. role, 780 
U.S. commitment, 59, 519, 614, 

776, 777, 779, 851 

U.S. position, 37, 59, 209, 498, 

509, 519, 775 
U.S. public opinion, 519, 776, 

777, 778 

U.S. willingness to negotiate for 
peace, 32, 39, 521, 632, 775 
War on hunger, 762 
World order, 631, 633, 655 
World peace, 16, 31, 35, 38, 328, 
522, 571, 631, 747, 851 
Correspondence and messages: 
Gabon, death of President Mba, 

U.S. condolences, 867 
Iran, U.S. economic aid terminated, 

Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary, 16 
Soviet Union, 50th anniversary, 705 
Viet-Nam Chief of State, congratu- 
lations, 421 
World Food Problem, foreword, 78 
Leadership (Oliver), 474 
Meetings with Heads of State and 
officials of, remarks and joint 
communiques: Cameroon, 654; 
Denmark, 40; Germany, 325; 
Ghana, 571; Iceland, 201; Iran, 
358; Italy, 40, 500; Ivory Coast, 
330; Japan, 742; Laos, 653, 752; 
Lesotho, 568; Malawi, 42; Malay- 
sia, 578; Mexico, 673; Nepal, 706; 
Niger, 541; Rwanda, 290; Singa- 
pore, 612; Soviet Union, 35; 
ThaUand, 61; U.K., 40 

Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued 

Messages, letters, and reports to 
Congress : 
Asian Development Bank, U.S. 

financial support, 508 
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal 
Study Commission, 3rd annual 
report, transmittal, 302 
Communications policy, 296 
Food aid programs, 1966, report, 

transmittal, 762 
Internationa) Educational and Cul- 
tural Exchange Program, Annual 
Report, transmittal, 303 
Kennedy Round trade agreement, 

transmittal, 883 
OAS Charter amendments, ratifi- 
cation recommended, 78 
State of the budget and the econ- 
omy, 266 
Trade agreements progi-am, 11th 

annual report, transmittal, 717 
Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands, commission for study of 
status, recommendation, 363 
News conference, transcript, 775 
Outer space tieaty, negotiations for: 

Johnson, 567; Rusk, 565 
Policies of: Oliver, 474; W. W. Ros- 
tow, 67; Rusk, 736 
Support, desirability of (Gronouski), 

Viet-Nam: Bundy, 275; Lodge, 464 
Responsibilities: Johnson, 40; Rusk, 
Johnson, U. Alexis, 455 
Joint Canada-US. Ministerial Com- 
mittee on Trade and Economic 
Affairs, 1 1th meeting, communique, 
Joint U.S. -Japan Committee on Trade 

and Economic Aff'airs, 746 
Jonathan, Leabua, 568 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 362 
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli 

U.S. aid: McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 163, 

210, 400 
U.S. Ambassador (Symmes), creden- 
tials, 625 
U.S. travel restrictions, 41n, 459 
Juarez, Benito (quoted), 321, 498, 680, 

Judicial and extrajudicial documents in 
civil or commercial matters, ser\'ice 
abroad, convention (1965); U.S., 


Kalb, Bernard, 416 

Kaplan, Harold, 230 

Karlovy Vary Conference (Cleveland), 

Kashmir. See India-Pakistan relations 
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 333, 462, 

530, 602, 686, 794, 815; Johnson, 32 
Kavibanda, Gregoire, 290 
Kearney, Richard D., 719 
Kellogg, Arthur Remington, 586 
Kennan, George (quoted), 265 
Kennedy, John F.: quoted, 254, 279; 

Bundy, 280 
Kennedy, Robert F., 350 

AID programs (Rusk), 212 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662, 
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 326, 327, 328 
Killian, James R., Jr. : 717; McNamara, 

448; Oliver, 757 
Kim, Eva Soonhe, 288n 
King Mahendra, 707, 708 
Kistiakowsky, George B. (McNamara), 

Kleiman, Robert, 465 
Knappstein, Heinrich (Johnson), 328 
Komer, Robert: Bunker, 750; Mc- 
Namara, 169 
Military demarcation line (Kaplan), 

Unification, U.N. resolution and U.S. 
support (Broomfield), 844 
Korea, North: 
DMZ violations (Goldberg), 692 
U.N. Command report, text, 692 
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow), 
Korea, Republic of: 
Economic progress and role of U.S. 
aid: Gaud, 581, 582; Kaplan, 232; 
Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 214, 804, 
Population growth control (Gaud), 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222, 

405, 589, 625, 845 
U.S. mutual defense commitments: 
Brown, 232 (quoted); map, 460; 
Rusk, 563 
Viet-Nam, military and other aid: 
Bunker, 782; McNamara, 169; 
Park (quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92, 
391, 555; Taylor, 259; Westmore- 
land, 788 
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 
and Taylor, 256 
Korean conflict: Bundy, 277; Kaplan, 

232; E. V. Rostow, 607 
Korean Institute of Science and Tech- 
nology (Bundy), 197 
Korry, Edward M., 337 
Kosygin, Aleksei N.: 36, 37, 38; 
Goldberg, 47, 109, 110; Rusk, 159, 
Krag, Otto, 41 
Kristol, Irving, 285 
Kuchel, Thomas H., 147 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 477, 514, 

U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41 
Ky, Nguyen Cao: 260 (quoted), 789; 
Bundy, 260, 354; Bunker, 421; 
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556 

Labor : 

Adjustment assistance, Trade Ex- 
pansion Act: Johnson, 885; Kat- 
zenbach, 689; Reynolds, 139; 
Roth, 174, 179, 576; Solomon, 
183, 537 

African-U.S. relations, role of or- 
ganized labor (Palmer), 658 

Asian Labor Ministers, Conference 
(Bundy), 198 

Kennedy Round, importance to 
(Reynolds), 137 



Labor — Continued 
Labor standards below U.S. levels, 
legislation (Dent bill) proposed to 
restrict imports of products pro- 
duced under (Roth), 574 
Micronesia, employee benefits (Nor- 
wood), 375 
Labor Organization, International, sta- 
tus of women report (Tillctt), 220 
Lacouture, Jean, 279 
Laise, Carol (Johnson), 707 
Lake Champlain, 107 
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, 507 
Lamb, Charles, 35 

Landlocked states, transit trade, con- 
vention (1965): Mali, 697; Yugo- 
slavia, 26 
Communism, threat of: 654; Johnson, 
520, 653; Rusk, 164, 214, 347, 
560, 563, 597, 822 
Geneva accords: Bundy, 280; Rusk, 
386, 387 
Communist violations (Rusk), 92, 
386, 601,740 
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 198 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 855 
U.S. aid, importance (Rusk), 214, 804 
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968 
appropriations request (Rusk), 208 
U.S. visit of Crown Prince Vong 

Savang, 752 
U.S. visit of Prince Souvanna Phouma 

Viet-Nam, military and other aid 
(Rusk), 561, 563 
Larsen, Stanley, 346, 557 
LASO. See Latin American Solidarity 

Latin America {see also Alliance for 
Progress, Organization of American 
States, and indivudial countries): 
Communism, danger of: Katzenbach, 
797; Linowitz, 322, 617; Oliver, 
473, 757, 871; Rusk, 252, 490, 
493, 805 
OAS resolution and text of final 
act, 491 
Defense expenditures: Katzenbach, 
797; Linowitz, 619; Oliver, 473, 
Economic and social development. 

See Alliance for Progress 
Inter-American Export Promotion 

Center (Oliver), 756 
Political stability (Oliver), 870 
Science and technology multilateral 

program: 717; Oliver, 757 
Economic integration: 681; John- 
son, 31, 632; Linowitz, 518; 
Oliver, 104, 471, 755; W. W. 
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211, 559; 
Solomon, 184, 534 
U.S. generalized trade preferences: 
Oliver, 756, 870; Solomon, 196 
U.S. protectionist trade legislation, 
probable effects of: 681 ; Diaz 
Ordaz, 677; Oliver, 758 
Latin American Common Market. 
See Latin America: Economic inte- 
Latin American Free Trade Associa- 
tion: Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 105, 
471, 755, 870; Solomon, 534 

Latin American Solidarity Organiza- 
tion: 497: Linowitz, 322, 617; 
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 491 
Laurel Langley Trade Agreement, 78, 

Law, international. Set International 

Law of the sea. See Safety of life at sea 
Le Defi Amirkain, 712 
Treaiies, agreements, etc., 153, 845 
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 171 
Leddy,John M., 759 
Lee Kuan Yew: quoted, 68, 287, 614; 

Johnson, 614 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 477, 

478, 770 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Jonathan, 
Less developed countries: 
Agriculture, importance of moderni- 
zation. See Agriculture 
Communications satel.itcs, impor- 
tance to (Johnson), 298 
Communism, threat of (Brzezinski), 

Economic and social development: 
Germany, aid (Kiesinger), 327 
Importance of: 45; Fowler, 527; 
Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson, 59; 
E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk, 208 
Industrialized nations, role of: 329, 
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32, 
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876; 
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon, 
183, 185; Waters, 767 
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; John- 
son, 16, 763; Katzenbach, 530; 
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 90, 209, 
254, 389, 801 
Food and population crisis. See Food 

and population crisis 
International patent system, impor- 
tance to (Trowbridge), 506 
Ocean resource development, U.S. 

cooperation (Humphrey), 228 
Science and technology, importance 

to (NAC), 15 
Space research, value to (Frutkin), 

Kennedy Round, importance to: 
45, 95, 101, 503; Freeman, 134, 
135; Johnson, 135 (quoted), 633, 
884; Roth, 126, 577; Solomon, 189 
Preferential trade arrangements: 
OECD, 882; Oliver, 472, 756; 
Rusk, 856; Solomon, 185 
Trade problems: 45, 454, 497, 725; 
OECD, 882; Roth, 178; Solomon, 
180; Woods (quoted), 678 
Lewis, Geoffrey W., 478 
Lewis, Verne B., 476 
V Express, 713 
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 337, 
Treaties, agreements, etc. 153, 337, 

U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229 
Lilienthal, David, 360, 864 
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), 9, 679, 743 

Lindsey, Edward M. (Rusk), 87 

Linowitz, Sol M., 321, 586, 616 

Lisagor, Peter, 465 

Load lines, convention (1966), inter- 
national: Denmark, 221; Israel, 
270; Liberia, 221; Netherlands 
(including Surinam and Nether- 
lands .Antilles), 270; Sweden, 661; 
U.K., 270; U.S., 404 

Loc, Nguyen Van (Bunker), 784 

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 349, 464; John- 
son, 290 

London Times, cited, 393 

Lopez, Fernando, 582 

Lord Attlee, death of (Johnson), 568 

Lost Revolution, The, 275 

Luce, Charles F., 46 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 770 
U.S. Ambassador (Feldman), cre- 
dentials, 625 


Macao, 729 

Macauley, Thomas B., 580 (quoted) 
Macedo Soares, Edmundo, 799 
Malagasy Republic: 
Foreign Minister Sylla, death of 

(Rusk), 159 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337, 

Ambassador to U.S. credentials, 507 ' 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309, 

U.S. visit of President Banda, 42 
Malaya. See Malaysia 
Malaysia (see also Association of South- 
east Asia) : 
Economic and political progress: 

Gaud, 581; Kaplan, 232 
Narcotic drugs, single convention 

(1961), accession, 270 

Science and mathematics regional 

education center, proposed (Gaud), 


U.K. proposed withdrawal from area 

(Taylor), 259 
U.S. visit of Minister of Finance Tun, 


Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role, 520 

Visit of Vice President Humphrey, 


Maldive Islands, treaties, agreements, 

etc., 54, 404 
Mali, transit trade of land-locked 
states, convention (1965), accession, 
Cotton textile agreement, announce- 
ment, 23 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 270, 662 
U.S. Ambassador (Smythe), con- 
firmation, 625 
Manescu, Corneliu, 483n 
Mann, Fredric R., 478 
Mansfield, Mike: 357; Goldberg, 667; 

Rusk, 456, 739 
Mantilla Ortega, Carlos, 431 
Margolies, Daniel F., 585 
Marine resources {see also Fish and 
fisheries), 23 
Cooperative exploration and use of 
ocean floor, U.N. role in develop- 
ment of principles for: Goldberg, 
723; Johnson (quoted), 723 



.Marine resources — Continued 
Fish protein concentrate: Gold- 

schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228 
International cooperation for: 747; 
Humphrey, 227 
Marine Sciences Council (Humphrey), 

Maritime Consultative Organization, 
Intergovernmental (Goldberg), 723 
Convention (1948): Hong Kong, 221; 

Maldive Islands, 54 
Convention (1965), amendment to 
Article 28: Algeria, Mexico, 885 
Maritime matters {see also Safety of life 
at sea and Ships and shipping): 
Exploration of the Sea, International 
Council for. Convention (1964); 
Belgium, 378 
Maritime traffic, international, con- 
vention (1965) on facilitation of, 
with annexes: Canada, Germany, 
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands 
(including Surinam and Nether- 
lands Antilles), 624; Romania, 
Singapore, Sweden, 337 
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights 
in, international convention, 1962; 
Liberia, 337 
Marriage and family, status of women, 
U.N. Commission, report of 20th 
session (TiUett), 219 
Marshall, George (quoted), 251, 534 
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary: Har- 

riman, 17; Johnson, 16 
Martin, Edwin M., 808 
Martin, William McChesney, Jr., 392« 
Martola, Ilmarai (Goldberg), 52 
Matsui, Akira, 670 

Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened, 698 
Mba, President of Gabon, U.S. con- 
dolences on death of (Johnson), 857 
Mbekeani, Nyemba VVjiles, 507 
McCall, Thomas, 349 
McCarthy, Eugene (Palmer), 659 
McCloskey, Robert, 16, 652 
McConnell, John P., 355 
McHugh, J. Laurence, 586 
McKernan, Donald L., 172, 475, 685, 

McKinney, Robert M., 476, 828 
McLuhan, Marshall (W. W. Rostow), 

McNamara, Robert S.: 167, 443, 544 
(quoted); Lodge, 465; Rusk, 208, 
Viet-Nam DMZ barrier (Rusk), 385, 
Mekong Valley development: Bundy, 
198; Gaud, 580; Johnson, 509, 510, 
752; Kaplan, 233; Lilienthal, 867; 
W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 214 
MentschikoflT, Sola, 475 
Meteorological research: Frutkin, 402; 
Goldberg, 723; Humphrey, 227; 
Rusk, 739 
North Atlantic ocean weather stations 
agreement (1955), with annexes: 
India. 770 
Polar cap ionosphere, NASA-CNRC 
cooperative study, agreement with 
Canada, 337 
World Meteorological Organization 
convention (1947): Barbados, 438; 
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438 

Air transport agreement, announce- 
ment, 589 
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text), 
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684 
Economic development: Diaz Ordaz, 

677; Rusk, 211 
Fishery zones and fishery rights, dis- 
cussions and agreement, 475, 681, 
Flood control agreement concluded 

(Johnson), 147 
Pious Fund claim, settlement of, 261 
Presidents' action program, text, 681 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 625, 

662, 698, 728, 770, 845, 855 
U.S. relations: 680; Diaz Ordaz, 
677; Johnson, 673, 675; Linowitz, 
U.S. visit of President Diaz Ordaz, 673 
Michalowski, Jerzy, 431 
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the 

Pacific Islands 
Middlcton, Drew, 68, 231, 287 
Mikhail Frunze, Soviet vessel, 170 
Miki, Takeo; 455; Gaud, 580 
Military aircraft. See under Aviation 
Military assistance [see also ."Armaments), 
Soviet arms budget increases (Rusk), 
Militai-y assistance, U.S.: 
Appropriations request FY 1968 

(Rusk), 208, 214 
Europe, effect on balance of payments 

(E. V. Rostow), 881 
India, Pakistan, U.S. aid policy 

(Katzenbach), 795 
Jordan, review of: McCloskey, 652; 

Rusk, 163, 210 
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair), 

Principles for, and policy objectives: 
Katzenbach, 530; McCloskey, 
652; Oliver, 757; Rusk, 208, 215, 
387, 806 
Military bases: 
Outer space treaty prohibition of: 

Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566 
Philippines, exploitation of natural 
resources of U.S. bases, agree- 
ment, 405 
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, 745 
U.S. use of Thai bases (Rusk), 92 
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Mills, Wilbur D., 529, 647 
Miner, Robert G., 729 
Missiles (see also Armaments and Nu- 
clear weapons): 
Antiballistic missiles: 
Agreement, proposed : Cleveland, 
143; Goldberg, 487; Johnson, 
32; Rusk, 385 
Soviet and U.S. deployment: Fisher, 
543 ; McNamara, 44 7 ; Rusk 1 66 
U.S., Chinese-oriented: Fisher, 543; 
Goldberg, 488 ; McNamara, 449 
Hawk and Nike Hercules missiles 
system, agreement with Japan re- 
production of in Japan, 729 
Modesti, Girolamo, 596 
Monetary Fund, International: Katzen- 
bach, 335; Rusk, 214; Solomon, 
184, 539 
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 477 
Ministerial meeting, Washington, 
communique, 369 

Monetary Fund, International — Con, 
Ministerial meeting — Continued 

U.S. delegation, 392, 392n 
Special drawing rights facility, im- 
portance and U.S. position: 329, 
392, 393, 454, 503; Fowler, 394. 
523; Johnson, 392; E. V. Rostow, 
877; Rusk, 558, 856 
22nd annual meeting, Rio de Janeiro: 
Fowler, 523 ; text of resolution, 529 
Mora, Jose A., 494 
Moreno, Mario (Diaz Ordaz), 675 
Morgenthau, Hans (quoted), 279 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 550, 770 
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41 
Morrison, Alice A., 218n 
Morse, Wayne, 667 
Moseman, Albert H., 585 
Murphy, George, 349 
Muskie, Edmund S., 349 
Mutual defense: 
Bilateral agreements with: Japan, 54; 
Norway, 846 
Map, 460 
U.S. commitments: Johnson, 853; 
Rusk, 89, 704, 823 


NAC. See North Atlantic Council 
Nam Ngum Dam: Bundy, 198; Gaud, 

58! ; Johnson, 509 
Narcotics. See Drugs 
NASA. See National Aeronautics and 

Space ."Administration 
Nasser, Gamal (Goldberg), 5, 6 
National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
Cooperative satellite programs 

(Frutkin), 401 
Polar cap ionosphere study, agree- 
ment with Canada re cooperation 
with Canadian National Research 
Council, 337 
National Science Foundation, 23, 80 
Nationalism (Brzezinski), 20, 22 
Asia (Hilsman), 280 
Indonesia (Bundy), 287 
Philippines, dangers of economic na- 
tionalism (Blair), 206 
Nationality, acquisition of, Vienna con- 
vention, optional protocol re: Nor- 
way, 769 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Near and Middle East {see also Arab- 
Israeli conflict): 
Arms shipments. See Armaments 
Economic development: Goldberg, 
148, 487; Johnson, 359, 632; W. 
W. Rostow, 69; Rusk, 210 
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on 
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign 
policy implications (E. V. Ros- 
tow), 236 
Emergency relief programs, U.S. 

pledge: Johnson, 64; Rusk, 210 
Military assistance, U.S. position {see 
also Armaments): Goldberg, 9; 
McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 160, 210, 
387, 803 
Oil exports (Udall), 641 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41, 
171, 229, 459, 799 



Treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 810 
U.S. visit of King Mahendra, 706 
Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports 

reduced, 861 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 270, 
478, 550, 624, 625, 770 
Neutrality and nonalinement: 
Cambodia: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89, 

412, 558, 597 
King Mahendra, 709 
Laos (Souvanna Phouma), 654 
Malawi (Banda), 43 
New York Times, 68, 231, 287, 603 
New Zealand: 

Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13 
Observers for Viet-Nam elections 

(Lodge), 350 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 1 1 7, 

Viet-Nam, military and other aid: 
520; McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91, 
92, 391 
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 
and Taylor, 256 
Newly independent nations (see also 
name of country): 
Africa: Johnson, 32; W. W. Rostow, 

68; Rusk, 212, 803 
Anticolonialism (Kaplan), 231 
Asia (Bundy), 278 

Economic problems and U.S. aid: 

Katzenbach, 530; Rusk, 212, 801 

International law, importance to 

(Bundy), 200 
U.N., importance to (Goldberg), 265 
Man Dan, 672 
Sea-level canal feasibility study, com- 
mission, 3rd aimual report: 302; 
Johnson, 302 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 662, 697 
U.S. Ambassador (Crockett), con- 
firmation, 246 
Nieuwenhuis, Willebrond, 595 
International telecommunications con- 
vention (1965), with annexes, 
ratification, 309 
U.S. visit of President Diori, 541 
AID program under review (Rusk), 

EEC trade agreement (Solomon), 185 
Soviet arms supply, U.S. position, 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 221, 
728, 730 
Nike Hercules missiles, 729 
Nonintervention, U.S. position: Brze- 
zinski, 22; Buff'um, 152; Rusk, 821 
Norstad, Lauris, 465 
North Atlantic Council, ministerial 
meetings, Washington (1957): text 
of communique, 14; U.S. dele- 
gation, 16 
Resolution on international techno- 
logical cooperation, text, 15 
North Atlantic Treaty: Leddy, 422; 

map, 460 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(Johnson), 32 
Armed forces, strength and deploy- 
ment: Johnson, 327; Kiesinger, 
327; Rusk, 166 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization — 

Deterrent role: 329, 503; Cleveland, 
141; Johnson, 325; Kiesinger, 
326; Leddy, 759; E. V. Rostow, 
427; Waters, 767 
Global interests (Cleveland), 145 
Italy, support of (.Saragat), 502 
Nonproliferation treaty, position on 

(Cleveland), 144 
Technological cooperation, NAC res- 
olution, 15 
U.S. commitments and support: 
Cleveland, 145; Kaplan, 234; 
Katzenbach, 335, 532; E. V. 
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 91, 598, 599, 
856, 857; Schaetzel, 715 
U.S. 1968 appropriations request 

(Rusk), 208 
Viet-Nam, position on (Rusk), 599, 601 
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 

81, 378, 625, 769,845, 846 
Norwood, William R., 366 
NS Savannah, operation by a private 
company, bilateral agreements re 
U.S. liability: China, 245; Yugo- 
slavia, 270 
NSF (National Science Foundation), 23, 

Nuclear blackmail: 744; Fisher, 544; 
Foster, 293; Goldberg, 487; Mc- 
Namara, 449 
Nuclear nonproliferation : 
Nonnuclear states, Foster, 316; Rusk, 

Treaty, draft: 319; Foster, 315, 317; 
Goldberg, 487, 488 ; Johnson, 315; 
Rusk, 559; text, 319 
Safeguards, U.S. position on : Foster, 
292, 293, 317; Johnson, 863 
Treaty, need for: 503, 744; Cleveland, 
144; Fisher, 291, 545; Goldberg, 
488; Johnson, 36, 291, 315; 
Kosygin, 38; McNamara, 449; 
NAC, 14; Rusk, 388 
Nuclear test ban: 
Comprehensive treaty, need for 

(Foster), 293 
Outer space treaty, provision of, 567 
Treaty (1963), ratification: Costa 
Rica, 153 
Nuclear war, dangers of and U.S. efforts 
to prevent: 319; Brzezinski, 19; 
Fisher, 544; Johnson, 520, 863; 
Rusk, 87, 251, 253, 704, 737, 824. 
857, 859 
Nuclear weapons: 
Communist China, threat of and ques- 
tion of guarantees against: Mc- 
Namara, 449; Rusk, 164 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty 

Outer space, prohibition of: Johnson, 

567; Rusk, 566 
Tests. See Nuclear test ban 
25th anniversary (Johnson), 863 
U.S. capabilities and policv: Brzezin- 
ski, 2 1 ; McNamara, 443 
World peace, stabilizing effect (Brze- 
zinski), 20 
Nugent, Patrick L., (Johnson), 40, 41 


O'Brien, John R., 337 
Oceanography. See Marine resources 

O'Conor, Herbert R., Jr., 489 
ODECA (Organization of Central 

American States), 697 
OECD. See Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development 
Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., 245 
O'Hara, Barratt (Palmer), 659 
Ohin, Alexandre, 202 
Arab-Egyptian economic sanctions 

(E. V. Rostow), 237 
Iran, production (Rusk), 825 
Micronesia, production and develop- 
ment (Norwood), 370 
Prevention of pollution of the sea by, 
international convention (1954), 
with annexes: Japan, 549; Leb- 
anon, 153 
U.S. oil import control program 
(Udall), 639 
Okinawa, question of return to Japan 

(Rusk), 458 
Okun, Arthur M. (Fowler), 393 
Old, Bruce S., 585 
OUvcr, Covey T., 102, 470, 698, 754, 

O'Neill, Joseph P., 288n 
Organization for African Unity: W. W. 

Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development: 861; Harriman, 
17; NAC, 15; Oliver, 756; E. V. 
Rostow, 428; Roth, 178; Rusk, 856; 
Solomon, 181 ; Trowbridge, 72 
Development Assistance Committee 

chairman (Martin), 808 
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary 

(Johnson), 16 
Ministerial council meeting, Paris, 
1967: E. V. Rostow, 876; text of 
communique, 881 
Temporary tariff advantages for less 
developed countries: OECD, 882; 
Rusk, 856 
Organization of American States: Lino- 
witz, 321, 616; OUver, 871 ; Rusk, 88 
Charter (1948): 
Current actions : Barbados, Trinidad 

and Tobago, 846 
Protocol of amendment (1967): 190; 
Argentina, 245 

U.S. ratification urged (Johnson), 
Foreign Ministers meeting, Washing- 
ton: Johnson, 498; Katzenbach, 
533; Linowitz, 617 
U.S. representative (Oliver) on Inter- 
American Economic and Social 
Council, designation, 698 
Venezuelan complaint against Cuba: 
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 383, 490, 493 
OAS Final Act, text, 491 
OAS resolutions, 495 
Organization of Central American 
States, agreement with U.S. for 
economic and technical assistance, 
current actions: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, 597 
Ortana, Egidio, 13 
Osorio-Tafall, B. F., 52 
Outer space (Rusk), 253 
International law, application to 

(Dean), 555 
Surveyor V lunar landing, report, 
transmittal (Goldberg), 769 



Outer Space — Continued 
Treaty on principles of exploration 
and use of ( 1 967) : Goldberg, 263 ; 
Johnson, 295; Rusk, 558, 738 

Current actions: Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, 589; Finland, 153; 
France, 514; Hungary, Jamaica, 
81; Japan, Korea, 589; Nepal, 
810; Pakistan, 438; Peru, 81; 
Sierra Leone, 190; Soviet Union, 
Sweden, 589; Trinidad and To- 
bago, 514; U.A.R., 624; U.K., 
U.S., 589 

Entry-into-force: 589, 747; Dean, 
565; Dobrvnin, 565; Johnson, 
567; Rusk, 566 

Johnson, role in negotiation of: 
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566 

Pacific communitv, U.S.-So\iet-Japan 
d!scu.':sions, Mansfield proposal 
(Rusk), 456 
Pacific Islands Trust Territory, fe Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands and 
individual islands 
Paddock, Paul: 583 (quoted); Gaud, 

Paddock, WiUiara: 583 (quoted); Gaud, 

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 359, 

Cotton textile agreement, announce- 
ment, 114 
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583; 

Rusk, 802 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154. 222, 

309, 438, 845, 846 
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 

211, 802 
U.S. .Embassador (Oehlert), con- 
firmation, 246 
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz- 
enbach), 795 
Pakistan Aid Consortium (Rusk), 212, 

Palmer, Joseph, 2d, 656 
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal 
Studv Commission, 3rd annual 
report: 302; Johnson, 302 
Canal treaties, agreement on: Oliver, 

474; Rusk, 165; texts, 65 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 438, 
477, 624 
Political progress (Oliver), 871 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 662 
Park, Chung Hee (quoted), 520 
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504 
Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, 253 
Paulos, Kirsten C, 218n 
Pautzke, Qarence F., 172 
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman (Goldberg), 

Peace Corps: 
Africa: Pahner, 658; Rusk, 212 
Agreements establishing: Dahomey, 

154; Guyana, 54; Lesotho, 478 
"Exchange peace corps". Volunteers 

to America, 235 
Micronesia: Norwood, 358, 369; 
SaUi, 376 
Pearson, Drew, 262 

Peck, William (Norwood), 372 

Pedersen, Richard F., 46, 52 

Pembina river basin project, IJC 

report, 874 
Pepin, Jean-Luc, 46 
Perkins, James A., 294; Jolmson, 569 
Peru (Solomon), 536, 540 
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on 
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of 
(E. V. Rostow), 237 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 221, 
309, 590, 723 
Peterson, Rudolph A., 294 
Petroleum. See Oil 
Pham Van Dong (quoted), 671 
Philippines {see also Association of 
Southeast Asia): 
Agriculture graduate study and re- 
search institute, proposed (Gaud), 
.Esia, role in (Blair), 205 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117, 

337, 405, 550, 625, 661 
U.S. cotton textile arrangements, 

exchange of notes, 51 1 
U.S. mutual defense treaty: map, 

460; Rusk, 563 
U.S. Presidential advisers Clifford and 
Taylor, reason for not visiting 
(Qifford), 259 
U.S. relations (Blair), 203 
U.S. trade agreement, discussions, 78, 

Viet-Nam, military and other support: 
Blair, 206; Marcos (quoted), 520; 
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91, 391 
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico), settle- 
ment, 261 
Poland : 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 550, 

730, 846 
U.S. policy, attitude of Congress 
(Gronouski), 434 
Pollack, Herman, 246, 476 
Pollution, water pollution, problem of 

(Humphrey), 227 
Pollution of the sea by oil, prevention 
of, convention, international (1954), 
with annexes: Japan, 549; Lebanon, 
Population growth: 
Family planning programs: Gaud, 
583; Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson, 
763; Rusk, 212; Tillett, 220 
Food supply, relation to. See Food and 

population crisis 
India (Paddock, quoted), 583 
Latin America (Oliver), 472 
Less developed countries (Rusk), 736 
Angola, use as base for Congo mer- 
cenaries (Buffum), 808 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 625, 
729, 845, 846 
Postal matters: 
Parcel post agreement with Ethiopia, 

54, 270 
Postal Union of the Americas and 
Spain, convention, money order 
agreement, parcel post agreement, 
and final protocols: Argentina, 
Mexico, Peru, U.S., 728 

Postal Union, Universal, constitution 
with final protocols: Hungaiy, 26; 
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho, 
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra 
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo, 
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404 
President, The: Office and Powers, 333n 
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.N. resolution 

on treatment of, 11, 112 
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat- 
ment of: Congo (Brazzaville), 81; 
Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514; Zam- 
bia, 698 
U.S. application to Viet-Nam war 
prisoners, 170 
Proclamations by the President: 
Human Rights Week and Human 

Rights Year (3814), 660 
National UNICEF Day {3817), 718 
Trade agreements, interim, with Can- 
ada, U.K., and Japan, termina- 
tion of further staging of certain 
concessions {3818), 800 
United Nations Day, (1967) {3797), 

World Law Day, 1967 {3791), 171 
Propaganda (Goldberg), 262 
Public Law 480 (Johnson), 763 

Commerce Department, Technological 
Innovation: Its Environment and 
Management, 70n 
Congressional documents relating to 
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147, 
215, 239, 364, 511,718, 807, 885 
International exchange of, conven- 
tion (1958): Finland, U.S. 221 
Official publications and government 
documents, exchange of between 
states, convention (1958): Fin- 
land, U.S., 221 
State Department: 
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu- 
ments, 1964, released, 550 
Foreign Relations oj the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I, 
General: The United Nations, re- 
leased, 729 
Lists of recent releases, 81, 117, 154, 
222, 246, 310, 338, 364, 405, 590, 
626, 662, 730, 886 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 
released, 366» 
United Nations: 
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242, 

308, 404, 438, 694, 726 
Programme jor the Liberalisation and 
Expansion of Trade in Manufactures 
and Semi-Mamtfactures of Interest to 
Developing Countries, 189n 
Question of the Granting and Extension 
of Preferences in Favour of Developing 
Countries, 188n 
World Food Problem, The, released, 76n; 
Johnson, 78 
Puerto Rico, Joint Dominican Repub- 
lic-Puerto Rican Economic Com- 
mission, announcement, 620 


Quint, Bert, 417 
Quintanilla, Luis, 462 

Rabasa, Oscar, 475, 685 



Rabb, Maxwell, 476 
Racial discrimination (sec also Civil 
Africa: Goldberg, 488; Palmer, 659 
Convention, international (1965), on 
the elimination of all forms of: 
Argentina, 378; Guatemala, Mo- 
rocco, 550; Nigeria, 728; Panama, 
438; Philippines, 550; Sierra 
Leone, 378; Trinidad and Tobago, 
117; Venezuela, 662; Yugoslavia, 
U.N. role in solution (Goldberg), 264 
Amateur radio stations, agreement 
with Austria re operation of, 846 
Licensed amateur radio operators, 
agreements re reciprocal granting 
of authorizations to operate in 
either country: Chile, 846; New 
Zealand, 117; Norway, 81; Vene- 
zuela, 550 
Loran-A stations, agreement with 
Canada re loan of additional 
equipment, 885 
Partial revision of radio regulations 
(Geneva, 1959) to put into effect 
revised frequency allotment plan 
for aeronautical mobile (R) serv- 
ice and related information: Bel- 
gium, 478; China, 309; Iceland, 
222; India, 662; Japan, 309; 
Kenya, 662; Netherlands, 478; 
New Zealand, 309; Singapore, 
222; Tanzania, Uganda, 662; 
U.K., 309; U.S., 270, 404; 
Yugoslavia, 222 
Partial revision of radio regulations 
(Geneva, 1959) with annexes and 
additional protocol: Korea, 222 
Standard (AM) radio broadcasting 
stations, agreement with El Sal- 
vador re pre-sunrise operation, 54 
Rajaratnam, S.J. (quoted), 231 
Ramev, James T., 476 
Rasminsky, Louis, 46 
Reciprocal assistance, Inter-American 
treaty, 1947, acceptance: Trinidad 
and Tobago, 54 
Red Cross, International: 170, 401; 

Johnson, 65 
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights 
in, international convention, 1962: 
Liberia, 337 
Refugees, Arab-Israeli conflict. See 

Arab-Israeli conflict 
Regional cooperation and development: 
Brzezinski, 20; Rajaratnam, 231 
(quoted); Solomon, 184 
Asia. See under Asia 
Europe (Trowbridge), 75 
Inter-American system (see also Alli- 
ance for Progress) : Linowitz, 321 ; 
Solomon, 537 
Middle East, U.S. proposals: Gold- 
berg, 218; Johnson, 34, 632; 
W. VV. Rostow, 69 
U.S. support: Johnson, 32, 632, 655; 
Katzenbach, 335; VV. VV. Rostow, 
67; Rusk, 91, 209, 212, 803 
Reporter, 68 
Research. See subject 
Reston, James, 280 
Rey, Jean: Roth, 125; Schaetzel, 715 
Reynolds, James J., 137 

Rice, research in: Gaud, 582; Lilien- 

thal, 866 
Richardson, Egerton Rudolf, 431 
Rio Treaty (map), 460 
Ritchie, A. E., 46 
Road vehicles: 
Private, customs convention on the 
temporary importation of, ac- 
cession: Ireland, 438 
Road-use ta.\es, Kennedy Round re- 
ductions: 98, 100; Roth, 127. 
576; Trowbridge, 131 
Robert R. Nathan and Associates, study 

on Micronesia (Norwood), 368 
Roberts, Edmund, 63 
Robinson, H. F., 76, 874 
Robinson, Thomas E. (Johnson), 36 
Rockefeller, John D., Ill (Rusk), 737 
Rockefeller Foundation: Diaz Ordaz, 
676; Gaud, 582; Lilienthal, 866 
Rockne, Knute (quoted), 752 
Rogers, Will (quoted), 675 
Rolz-Bennett, Jose, 859, 860 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202 
Exchanges and visits, 1968 program, 

agreement, 875 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337 
Romney, George: Lodge, 467; Rusk, 

Roosevelt, Eleanor, 151, 660 
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (quoted), 522, 

Roosevelt, Theodore (quoted), 736 
Roshchin, Alexei (Foster), 293 
Rostow, E. v., 236, 301n, 397, 422, 

476, 605. 876 
Rostow, W. W., 66 
Roth, William M.: 95, 123, 173, 455. 

574, 648, 725; Solomon, 189 
Rovere, Richard, 603 
Ruge, Gerd, 595 
Rusk, Dean: 
Addresses, remarks, and statements: 
Africa, U.S. aid policy, 212, 803 
Alliance for Progress, 90, 210, 254, 

410 492 493 805 
American ideals,' 251, 255, 348, 741 
Antiballistic missiles, 166, 385 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 
Jerusalem, status of, 88, 149 
Refugees, U.S. position, 388, 416 
Soviet arms shipments, 561 
U.N. role, 165, 387, 559 
U.S. position, 88, 159, 165, 210, 
387, 388, 561 
Arms race, economic burden of, 

Middle East, supply to, 88, 160, 
210, 215, 561 

U.S. policy under review, 387 
British proposed reduction of forces 

in, 160 
Communism, threat of, 253, 555, 

560, 563, 596, 597, 821, 857 
Regional cooperation, 214, 347, 

452, 563, 736, 804, 822 
U.S. aid programs, 214 
U.S. commitments, 160, 458, 555, 
563, 596, 599, 703, 821, 823, 857 
Asian Development Bank, 452, 456, 

Australia, military aid to Vict-Nam, 

Rusk, Dean — Continued 
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued 

Bonin Islands, 457, 459 

Brazil, former President Castello 
Branco, death of, 159 

Chamizal setdement, 684 

Collective security, 252, 347, 598, 
704, 857 

Countermeasures, 214, 490, 493, 

U.S. role against, 344, 704, 741, 

806, 824 
Wodd goals, 92, 252, 491, 600 

Communist China: 
Containment, question of, 598, 

Internal situation, 389, 415 
Threat of, 164, 347, 563, 564, 596, 

U.N. membership, U.S. position, 

389, 390 
U.S. relations and efforts to im- 
prove, 390, 739 

Congress, public hearings, advisa- 
bility of, 560 

Cuba, subversion and intervention 
by, 490, 493 

Disarmament, 90, 215, 738 

East-West relations, 90, 600 

Europe, U.S. interests and relations, 

Food and population crisis, 254, 736 

Foreign aid, principles for, 90, 209, 
253, 389, 735, 801 

Foreign policy, 90, 251, 348, 736, 

Four freedoms, 855 

Glassboro talks, 159 

Guevara, "Che", 561 

India, U.S. aid, 211, 802 

International cooperation, need for, 

Iran, U.S. direct economic aid 
terminated, 825 

Japan-U.S. joint Economic Com- 
mittee, 6th meeting, 451, 455 

Jordan, U.S. economic and militziry 
aid under review, 163 

Kennedy Round, 456, 457 

Laos accords, 386, 387, 601 

German and U.K. armed forces, 

proposed cutbacks in, 166 
U.S. commitments, 91, 598, 599, 

1967, constructive developments, 
558, 736, 856 

Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 388 

Nuclear war, danger of, 704, 737, 
824, 859 

Okinawa, 457 

Outer space treaty, provisions of 
ancf importance, 565 

Pacific Ocean problems, U.S.- 
Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans- 
field proposal, 456 

Pakistan, U.S. aid, 212, 802 

Panama Canal treaties, 165 

President, responsibilities of, 348, 

Ryukyu Islands, 458 

SEATO, 13th anniversary, 391 

Secretary McNamara, 416 



Rusk, Dean — Continued 
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued 
Soviet Union: 
U.S. relations, 159, 252, 564, 600 
Viet-Nam, position on, 558, 596, 
Suez Canal, 164 
Japan-U.S., 451,457 
U.S. protectionist trade legisla- 
tion, 634 
Turkey, U.S. aid, 212 
U.N. Charter, principles and U.S. 
support, 87, 252, 344, 564, 704, 
U.S. economy, 255 
Viet-Nam {for details, see Viet-Nam) : 
AID program, goals, 213 
Armaments, Communist Chinese 

and Soviet supplies, 558, 598 
Bombing pauses, prospects from: 

89, 161, 163, 253, 347, 384, 412, 
556, 560, 562, 595, 597, 599 

"Brainwashing", question of, 383, 

Communist use of Chinese air- 
bases, 389, 416 
Congress, position on, 560, 563 
DMZ barrier, question of, 385, 

Geneva conference, prospects for, 

"Intellectuals", views on, 559 
National Liberation Front, 91, 

93, 94, 386, 390, 558 
N.\TO position, 601 
Negotiations for peaceful settle- 

Chinese Communist and Soviet 
inauence, 596, 597, 598, 601 

U.S. willingness, 93, 161, 163, 
253, 346, 384, 411, 452, 458, 

555, 557, 560, 597, 599, 705, 

Viet-Nam role, 384, 386, 411, 

556, 558 

Peace, prospects for, 162, 555, 

Political developments, 94, 161, 
163, 166,345,385,412,557,822 

President- and Vice-President- 
elect, difficulties between, 385 

Situation reports, 91, 161, 164, 
555, 557, 595, 600 

"Stalemate", question of, 161, 
346, 557 

Summit conference, prospects for, 
165, 561 

UJJ. role, 383, 559 

U.S. bombing, effect of, 413 

U.S. commitments, importance, 

90, 91, 163, 253, 344, 347, 388, 

415, 555, 564, 596, 597, 599, 
601-602, 703, 740, 821, 823, 

U.S. forces, morale, 348, 704 
U.S. national interest, 555, 599, 

703, 821 
U.S. position, 89, 252, 344, 412, 

416, 452, 601, 740, 821 

U.S. public opinion, 345, 387, 559, 

World order, U.S. role, 735, 807 
World peace, importance, 87, 215, 

252, 564, 704, 739, 821, 824, 


Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued 

"Yellow peril", 596 
Foreign policy briefing conference, 

speaker, 586 
Four freedoms award, 855n 
Meetings with Soviet Minister 

Gromyko (Johnson), 36, 37 
NAC meeting, chairman, U.S. delega- 
tion, 16 
News conferences, transcripts of, 91, 

159, 383, 455, 555 
OAS meeting of consultation, U.S. 

delegate, 494 
Readers' Digest interview, transcript, 

TV-radio interviews, transcripts, 411, 

Investment guaranties agreement with 

U.S., 54 
U.S. visit of President Kayibanda, 290 
Ryukyu Islands: 
Advisory Committee to the High 
Commissioner, establishment, 746 
Japanese administration, 745 
Residual sovereignty of Japan (Rusk), 

Sachar, Abram L., 332 
Safety of life at sea : 
Convention (1960), international, on: 
Bulgaria, 770; Czechoslovakia, 
309; Nicaragua, 662; U.K., 550 
Amendments to chapter II : France, 
117; Ghana, 810; Iceland, 
117; Israel, 810; Malagasy, 
337; Pakistan, 309; Sweden, 438 
International regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea: 
Czechoslovakia, 270 
St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes, 
coordination of pilotage services, 
agreement with Canada, 625 
St. Vincent, universal copyright con- 
vention (1952), extension to, 661 
Salii, LawTence, 376 
San Marco satellite program (Frutkin), 

San Marino, supplementary convention 
(1956) on the abolition of slavery 
and similar practices, ratification, 
Sanchez-Vilella, Roberto, 620 
Sanders, William, 494 
Sanz de SantamarSa, Carlos (Oliver), 

Saragat, Guiseppe, 501, 502 
Satellites (see also Communications: 
Satellites, Meteorological research, 
and Outer space): 
Geodetic satellite observation station 
on Isla Socorro, agreement with 
Mexico, 698 
Navigational aids for civilian use 

(Humphrey), 228 
U.S. cooperative programs (Frutkin), 
Sato, Eisaku, 742, 743 
Saudi Arabia: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 54, 153, 

U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41 
Savage, Francis S. : 288n ; Johnson, 288 
Scalapino, Robert A., 332 

Schaetzel, J. Robert, 710 
Schliesingcr, Arthur, 599, 603 
Schoenbrun, David, 411, 412 
Science and technology: 
Agricultural research and develop- 
ment, 77 
China, U.S. study team, report, 585 
Cooperation in, U.S. (Rusk), 91 
Cooperative program, agreement with 

Italy, 54, 80 
Europe, technological gap: Brzezin- 
ski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V. Rostow, 
880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 712; 
Trowbridge, 70 
Korean Institute of Science and Tech- 
nology (Bundy), 197 
Latin American multilateral program, 

Marine science research (Humphrey), 

Patent reform, importance to (Trow- 
bridge), 505 
Technological Innovation: Its Environ- 
ment and Management, 70n 
U.S., effects of (Brzezinski), 21 
Science and Technology, Advisory 
Committee on (Goldschmidt), 305 
Scotton, Frank W., 288n 
Sea-level canal, Atlantic-Pacific Inter- 
oceanic Canal Study Commission, 
3rd annual report; 302; Johnson, 
Seaborg, Glenn T., 476 
SEAMES. See Asian, Southeast, Ministers 

of Education Secretariat 
Security Council, U.N. : 
Congo mercenaries, use of Angola as 

base (Buffum), 807 
Documents, lists of, 1 13, 153, 404, 726 
Korean DMZ violations (Goldberg), 
U.N. Command report, text 692 
Middle East, role in. See Arab- 
Israeli conflict 
Peacekeeping operations, primary re- 

sponsibiUty (Goldberg), 13 
Resolutions : 
Arab-Israeli conflict: 
Cease-fire, call for, 1 1 
Civilian population, treatment of, 
Congo, foreign interference in, 153 
Congo mercenaries, condemnation 

of use of Angola as base, 808 
Cyprus peacekeeping force, 6-month 

extension, 53n 
Middle East: 
Cease-fire, 692 

U.N. special representative, 843 
Veto, Soviet use of: Goldberg, 6; 

Lodge, 469 ; Rusk, 559 
Role in (see also under United Na- 
tions): Goldberg, 667; Rusk, 559 
U.S. draft resolutions, texts (Gold- 
berg), 669, 671 
Segonzac, .Adalbert de, 597 
Self-defense. See Defense 
Self-determination : 
Micronesia: Johnson, 363; Norwood, 

375; SaUi, 378 
Middle East (Johnson), 33 
U.N. principles and U.S. support: 

Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252 
U.S. position and support: 171; 
Goldberg, 488; Johnson, 59, 519 



Self-determination — Continued 

Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam 
Sen, B. R. (quoted), 766 
Senegal, international telecommunica- 
tions convention (1965), with an- 
nexes, ratification, 222 
Servan-Schreiber, 712 
Seydoux, Roger (quoted), 670 
Shaplen, Robert, 275 
Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 362 
Sharp, Mitchell, 46 
Shepley, Steven C, 288n 
Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 478 
Shimoda, Takeso, 69 
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime 
Consultative Organization, Inter- 
governmental) : 
Sea-level canal feasibility study; 302; 

Johnson, 302 
Soviet ships, allegations of U.S. 
attacks and U.S. replies, 44, 170 
Treaties, agreements, etc.: 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Seaway pilotage services, agree- 
ment with Canada re coordina- 
tion of, 625 
Maritime traffic, international, con- 
vention (1965) on facilitation of, 
with annex: Canada, Germany, 
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands 
(including Surinam and Nether- 
lands Antilles), 624; Romania, 
Singapore, Sweden, 337 
NS Savannah, U.S. liability during 
operation by private company, 
agreements with: China, 245; 
Yugoslavia, 270 
LT.S. vessels, loan of, agreements 

with: Brazil, 81 ; Japan, 309 
USS Tellowstone, agreement with 
Malta re deployment of, 270 
U.S. Navy Navigation Satellite Sys- 
tem, use by civilian ships (Hum- 
phrey), 228 
U.S. oceanographic research vessel 

Anton Bruun, loan to India, 23 
U.S. research vessels denied passage 

through Soviet waters, 362 
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involve- 
ment in Middle East crisis, and 
U.S. replies (Goldberg), 3 
USS Liberty, Israeli attack (Goldberg), 
Sierra Leone: 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 378, 

U.S. Ambassador (Miner), confirma- 
tion, 729 
Singapore : 
English language center, proposed 

(Gaud), 580 
Family planning programs (Gaud), 

Political progress (Kaplan), 232 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 337 
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Lee, 612 
Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role in, 
Sino-Soviet relations: Bundy, 280; 

Rusk, 252 
Sipila, HelviL., 218 
Sisco, J. J., 46 

Slaves and slavery, abolition of slavery, 
the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery, supple- 
mentary convention (1956): San 

Slaves and Slavery — Continued 

Marino, 438; Spain, 885; U.S., 697, 
846, 885 
Small, David H., 218™ 
Smith, Robert S., 586 
Smyth, Henry DeWolf, 476 
Smythe, Hugh H., 625 
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea 
Solomon, Anthony M.: 46, 180, 534, 

586; Fowler, 393 
Somali Republic, treaties, agreements, 

etc., 190, 405 
Sorensen, Theodore (quoted), 280 
South Afirica, Republic of: 
Racial problems, U.N. role in solution 

of (Goldberg), 264 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 270, 
309, 845, 885 
Southeast .^sia Treaty Organization: 
Background and U.S. commitments 
under: Bundy, 276; Jolinson, 852; 
Rusk, 344, 414, 415, 703 
Map, 460 

13th anniversary (Rusk), 391 
U.S.-Thai support, 64 
Viet-Nam, U.S. commitments under. 
See Viet-Nam 
Southern Yemen, U.S. diplomatic rec- 
ognition, 861 
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 653 
Souza Costa (quoted), 529 
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Com- 
munism, and Sino-Soviet relations): 
Air services technical talks with U.S. 

completed, 820 
Antiballistic missiles: 
Deployment: Fisher, 543; McNa- 

mara, 447; Rusk, 166 
Discussions with U.S., proposed 
(Rusk), 385 
Arab-Israeli conflict: Goldberg, 5; 
Rusk, 159 
Draft resolutions : 12; Goldberg, 5, 6 
Soviet arins shipments, problem of: 
Katzenbach, 532, 796; McClos- 
key, 652; Rusk, 159, 561 
Arm.s supply to Nigeria, U.S. position, 

Chancery sites, U.S.-Soviet exchange 

of, 540 
50th anniversary : Johnson, 705; Katz- 
enbach, 815 
Fisheries agreements, with U.S., re- 
view, 873 
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for Soviet 

participation in (Johnson), 300 
Nuclear weapons strength and policy 
compared with U.S. (McNa- 
mara), 444 
Soviet vessels, U.S. replies to allega- 
tions of attacks on, 44, 1 70 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662, 

Propaganda, utilization for: Gold- 
berg, 6, 9, 263, 691 
Veto, use in: Goldberg, 6; Lodge, 
469; Rusk, 559 
U.S. -Japan-Soviet discussions on Pa- 
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield 
proposal (Rusk), 456 
U.S. relations and efforts to improve 
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 32, 36 
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 818 
Kosygin, 37, 38; E. V. Rostow, 
430; Rusk, 90, 159, 558, 564 

Soviet Union — Continued 

U.S. relations and eflorts to im- 
prove — Continued 
Arms budget, increase, effect on 

(Rusk), 558 
Glassboro meeting, eflfect of. See 

Glassboro meeting 
Viet-Nam, effect of (Rusk), 90 
U.S. research vessels denied passage 

through Soviet waters, 362 
Viet-Nam, position on and aid to: 
Brzezinski, 20; Goldberg, 668; 
Kosygin, 38; Lodge, 469; E. V. 
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 558, 562, 
596, 598 
World relations and goals: Cleveland, 
143; E. V. Rostow, 428; Rusk, 
159, 252 
Space. See Outer space and Satellites 
Cotton textile agreement with U.S., 

announcement, 726 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 309, 
625, 845, 846, 885 
Spivak, Lawrence, 352, 464 
Sputnik: Dobrynin, 565; Johnson, 567; 

Katzenbach, 818; Rusk, 566 
Stainless steel flatware, termination of 
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573 
Stanton, Frank, 294 
State Department (see also Foreign 
Service) : 
Appointments and designations, 246, 

337, 661, 698 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 

Affairs (Kaplan), 231 
Publications. See under Publications 
Viet-Nam, preoccupation with, ques- 
tion of (Bundy), 356 
Work of (Rusk), 91 
Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), 151, 262 
Straits of Tiran (see also International 
waterways): Goldberg, 49, 50; 
Johnson, 33 
Agricultural sales agreement with U.S. 

AID program, suspended (Rusk), 212 
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on 
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign 
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229 
Suez Canal (see also International water- 
ways): Goldberg, 5; Rusk, 164 
Suffridge, James (Johnson), 631 
Sugar, international sugar agreement 
Nonoperation (Solomon), 182 
Protocol for further prolongation: 
Barbados, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Tunisia, 550 
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 873 
Sunday Telegraph, London, 231 
Surveyor V lunar landing (Goldberg), 

Swaziland, investment guaranties agree- 
ment with U.S., 590 
Sweden : 
Kennedy Round tariff reductions, 97, 

Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, 
transcript of Secretary Rusk inter- 
view, 91 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 438, 
589, 625, 661, 809, 810 



Kennedy Round tariff reductions; 97, 

98; Trowbridge, 131 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 405, 

549, 845, 846 
U.S. poultry exports, restrictions re- 
duced, 861 
Sylla, Albert, death of (Rusk), 159 
Symmes, Harrison M., 625 
Syria : 
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli 

Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160 

Taiwan {see also China, Republic of): 
Asian students in : Bundy, 199; Gaud, 

Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581, 
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach, 
531; Rusk, 214, 822 
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 662, 
729, 885 
Tape, Gerald F., 476 
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic 
policy and relations: Tariffs and 
trade, general agreement on; and 
American Selling Price, modifica- 
tions: 95, 97, 98; Johnson, 884; 
Roth, 124, 173, 175, 575; Trow- 
bridge, 131 
Escape-clause provisions, value of: 
Rusk, 637; Trowbridge, 649 
Import quota bills, probable adverse 
effect on U.S. trade and Kennedy 
Round prospects: Fowler, 650 
Freeman, 642 ; Katzenbach, 686 
Oliver, 758; Roth, 574, 648 
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645 
Udall, 638 
Japan, interests in (Miki), 457 
Kennedy Round. See Tariffs and 

bade, general agreement on 
Most-favored-nation basis (Solomon), 

Presidential authority for protective 

action (Roth), 173, 576 
Tariff Commission study of impact of 
imports on textile and apparel 
industries requested: Johnson, 
529; Roth, 577 
Trade barriers, elimination of (John- 
son), 573 
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on : 
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and 
protocols : 
Accessions to, current actions on: 
Protocol: Austria, Portugal, 

Spain, Turkey, 846 
Provisional, 3rd proces-verbal : 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, 405 

Protocol: Austria, Iceland, Paki- 
stan, Spain, Turkey, 846 
Provisional, proces-verbal: 
Cuba, 405 
Ireland, protocol: Austria, Ire- 
land, Spain, Turkey, 846 

Tariffs and trade, general agreement 
on — Continued 
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and 
protocols — Continued 
Accessions to, current actions on — 
Korea, protocol: Austria, U.K , 

Poland, protocol: Austria, 846; 
Poland, 550; Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, 846 
Spain, protocol: Pakistan, 846 
Switzerland, protocol: Cuba, In- 
donesia, 405; Pakistan, 846 
Tunisia, provisional, 3rd proces- 
verbal: Cuba, 405 
U.A.R. provisional, 2nd proces- 
verbal: Czechoslovakia, 405 
Yugoslavia, protocol: Cuba, 405; 
Pakistan, 846 
French text, protocol of rectifica- 
tion to: Barbados, 590 
Part IV on trade and development, 
introduction of, and amendment 
of annex I, protocol amending: 
Argentina, 846 
Schedule XX, renegotiation of, 
bilateral agreements with: Can- 
ada, Japan, U.K., 337 
Contracting parties, 24th session, 725 
Kennedy Round: 147, 861; Rusk, 558 
Histoi-y (Roth), 123 
Importance and results: 45, 454, 
725; Freeman, 132; Harriman, 18; 
Johnson, 32, 633, 716, 717, 852, 
883; Katzenbach, 688; Miki, 457; 
OECD, 882; Reynolds, 135; E. 
V. Rostow, 876; Roth, 123, 173, 
577; Rusk, 451, 456, 457, 637, 
856; Solomon, 189; Trowbridge, 
Signature, announcement, 95 
U.S. protectionist trade bills, ad- 
verse effect of: Fowler, 650 
Freeman, 642; Johnson, 633 
Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634 
Trowbridge, 645; UdaU, 638 
U.S. replacement of interim staging 
in agreements with Canada, U.K. 
and Japan, proclamation, 800 
U.S. tariff reductions: 96; Freeman, 
133; Trowbridge, 130 
U.S. proposed elimination of import 
duties on extra-long-staple cotton, 
effect of (E. V. Rostow), 238 
Double taxation, conventions for 
avoidance of. See Double taxation 
Estate-tax protocol with Greece, sup- 
plementary, 698, 809, 810 
Income and property tax convention 

with France, 268, 270 
Income tax administration, agree- 
ment with Viet-Nam, 54 
Interest equalization tax rates modi- 
fied. Executive order, 396 
Latin America, development of ef- 
fective systems (Oliver), 104 
Personal and corporate income taxes, 
proposed 10-percent surcharge: 
Johnson, 266; E. V. Rostow, 879: 
Trowbridge, 504 
Taylor, Geoffrey (quoted), 794 
Taylor, Maxwell D., 256 

Technical assistance: 
Afiica : 

Chinese programs (Bundy), 199 
U.S. programs (Rusk), 213 
Less developed countries, need for, 78 
Technical cooperation: 
Bilateral agreements with: Afghanis- 
tan, 270; Somalia, 190, 405 
Eastern Asia (Bundy), 198 
Technology. See Science and technology 
Telecommunications {See also Radio) 
Convention (1965), international, 
with annexes: Argentina, 221 
Bcirbados, 404; Ethiopia, 476 
France, 222; Iceland, 221; Japan 
662; Laos, 729; Malagasy, 662 
Nepal 309; New Zealand (in- 
cluding Cook, Niue, and Tokelau 
Islands), 26; Niger, 309; Pakistan, 
222; Paraguay, 662; Senegal, 
Spain (including Spanish prov- 
inces in Africa), 222; Tanzania, 
729; Togo, 478; U.S., 54 
TV system establishment, agreement 
with Saudi Arabia, 54 
Thailand {see also Association of South- 
east Asia) : 
Airbases, use by U.S. (Rusk), 92 
Amity and economic relations treaty, 

Senate approval, 477 
Asian institute of technologv, pro- 
posed (Gaud), 580 
Asian students in (Bundy), 199 
Communism, threat of: Johnson, 520; 
Rusk, 92, 164, 347, 560, 597, 822; 
Taylor, 258 
LT.S.aid asacountermeasure:Bundy, 
285; Rusk, 214,804 
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583; 

Kaplan, 232 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 662, 

U.S. Ambassador (Unger), confirma- 
tion, 310 
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968 
appropriations request (Rusk), 
U.S. relations: Bhumibol Adulyadej, 

63; Johnson, 61 
U.S. visit of King Bhumibol Adulyadej 

and Queen Sirikit, 61 
Viet-Nam, military and other aid: 
64, 520, 792; Johnson, 61; Rusk, 
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 
and Taylor, 256 
Thanat Khoman (quoted), 477 
Thieu, Nguyen Van: 414 (quoted), 789; 
Bundy, 260; Bunker, 416, 418; 
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556 
Thompson, Llewellyn E. (Johnson), 36 
Thoreau, Henry David (quoted), 680 
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 864 
TiUett, Gladys A., 218 
To Move A Nation, 219n 
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago 
Tobriner, Walter N., 729 
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 378 

478, 730 
U.S. Ambassador (Sherer), confirma- 
tion, 478 
Tonkin Gulf incident (Goldberg), 668 



Touring and tourism: 
Canada, 45 

Customs facilities for, convention 
(1954): Ireland, 438; Uruguay, 
East Europe (Rusk), 6(X) 
Italy (Johnson), 500 
Japan, 454 

Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677 
Micronesia (Salii), 377 
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses; 
Economic policy; Exports; Imports; 
and Tariff policy, U.S.): 
Antidumping regulations: 95, 97, 99; 
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 884; 
Roth, 124, 575; Trowbridge, 131, 
Cotton textiles. See Cotton textiles 
European Economic Community 

(Schaetzel), 713 
Expansion, need for: 746; Fowler, 
524; Johnson, 633, 883; Roth, 577 
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com- 
mittee on Trade and Economic 
-MTairs, 11th meeting, communi- 
que, 44 
Landlocked states, convention (1965) 
on transit trade: Mali, 697; 
Yugoslavia, 26 
Latin America. See Latin America and 
Latin American Free Trade Asso- 
Less developed countries. See Less 

developed countries 
Micronesia (Salii), 376 
NontarifT trade barriers: 860; Roth, 

179, 577 
Oil, importance of, and import-export 

patterns (Udall), 640 
Technological progress, relation 

(Troubridge), 506 
Trade and Development, U.N. Con- 
ference, 2nd: 45, 454; OECD, 
882; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 188 
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo, 

1968 (Freeman), 136 
.•\rgentine-U.S., joint Trade and 
Economic Committee, 2nd meet- 
ing, joint communique, 146 
Canada-U.S. joint ministerial com- 
mitttee on trade and economic 
affairs, 11th meeting, communi- 
que, 44 
East Asian countries (Bundy), 197 
Eastern Europe, trade policy, 454 
Elimination of import quotas for 
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign 
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236 
Japan-U.S. Joint Economic Com- 
mittee, 746 
6th meeting: 452; Miki, 455; 
Rusk, 451, 457 
Kennedy Round. See under Tariffs 
and trade, general agreement on 
Mexico: 681, 682; Diaz Ordaz, 
Philippines trade agreement, dis- 
cussions, 78 
Policy (Johnson), 883 
Comprehensive study request: 
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 573; 
Roth, 127, 173, 178, 577; 
Solomon, 189 
Preferential imports: Oliver, 472; 
Solomon, 186 

Trade — Continued 
U.S. — -Continued 
Protectionist trade bills, probable 
adverse effect on: Diaz Ordaz 
678, 631; Fowler, 650: Freeman 
642; Johnson, 877 (quoted) 
Katzenbach, 686; Roth, 574, 648 
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645 
Udall, 638 
Trade agreements program, 11th 
annual report, transmittal to 
Congress (Johnson), 717 
Trinidad and Tobago, trade agi'ee- 
ment, 698, 729 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962: 
Adjustment assistance program: John- 
son, 885; Katzenbach, 689; 
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 174, 179, 
576; Solomon, 183, 537 
Continuation, need for: Katzenbach, 
689; Roth, 173, 576, 649; Rusk, 
.Asia, Asian Development Bank role 

in development (Gaud), 581 
Micronesia, needs (Norwood), 371 
U.S. -Japan study, proposed, 453 
Viet-Nam (McNamara), 168 
Travel (see also Touring and tourism): 
Cuba, to, O.-^S resolution, 496 
East Asia-U.S., increases in (Bundy), 

Middle East travel restrictions amend- 
ed, 41, 171, 229, 459, 799 
Special travel task force, appointment, 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 
Current actions, 26, 54, 80, 117, 153, 
190, 221, 245, 270, 309, 337, 378, 
404, 438, 477, 514, 549, 589, 624, 
661, 697, 728, 769, 809, 845, 885 
U.N. draft convention on law of 
treaties, U.S. position (Kearney), 
Trimble, James W., 476 
Trinidad and Tobago: 
OAS membership (Oliver), 871 
Treaties, agieements, etc., 54, 117, 

190, 514, 698, 729, 846 
U.S. Ambassador (Costello), confir- 
mation, 478 
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 46, 70, 70n, 

127, 455, 504, 645 
Truman policies (E. V. Rostow), 607 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: 
Economic, social, and political devel- 
opment: Anderson, 365; Johnson, 
363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376 
U.S. Commission on status of: 363; 
Johnson, 363 
Congress of Micronesia: Johnson, 
363; Norwood, 375; Salii, 377 
Trusteeship Council, U.N., documents, 

list of, 309 
Tubby, Roger W., 625 
Tun Tan Sieiv Sin, 578 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 405, 

550, 728, 770 
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41 
Turkestan, Soviet ship, 44 
Turkey (see also Cyprus) : 
Cotton textile agreement, armounce- 
ment, 1 1 6 

Turkey — Continued 
Economic development and U.S. aid 
program: Katzenbach, 532; Rusk, 
211, 212, 803 
Greece, relations (NAC), 14 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222, 
270, 846 
Typewriter ribbon cloth, termination of 
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573 
Typhoon damage, Micronesia (Nor- 
wood), 367 


U Thant, Viet-Nam negotiations, pro- 
posals for (Rusk), 162 
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic 
Udall, Stewart L., 455, 638 
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 378, 652 
UNCTAD. See United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development 
UNEF (United Nations Emergency 

Force): Goldberg, 6, 50, 110 
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, U.N.): 
Goldberg, 723;Tillett, 219 
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force 

in Cyprus 
Unger, Leonard, 310 
UNICEF. See United Nations ChUdren's 

United Arab Republic: 
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli 


Elimination of U.S. import quotas on 

extra-long-staple cotton, foreign 

policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236 

Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160 

Treaties, agreements, etc., 404, 405, 

624, 625 
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 799 
United Kingdom: 
Asian forces, proposed reduction in: 

Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259 
Edinburgh and Liverpool posts ele- 
vated to consulates general, 310 
European Economic Community, 
membership, questions of: Harri- 
man, 18; Katzenbach, 688; Rusk, 
858; Schaetzel, 715; Solomon, 187 
Farm-income support system (Free- 
man), 134 
Kennedy Round tariff reductions: 97, 
98, 99, 100; Johnson, 884; Roth, 
178, 576; Trowbridge, 128, 130 
NATO forces, commitment (Rusk), 

Pound sterling devaluation: Fowler, 
793; Johnson, 793; OECD com- 
munique, 882; E. V. Rostow, 876; 
Rusk, 856 
Trade, U.S. replacement of interim 
staging arrangements by Kennedy 
Round staging, proclamation, 800 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 309, 
337, 405, 550, 589, 625, 845, 846 
United Nations: 
Charter. See United Nations Charter 
Communist Chinese conditions for 

membership (Fountain), 831 
Cyprus threat of war lifted, U.N. role: 

Johnson, 859; Vance, 860 
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242, 
308, 404, 438, 694, 726 



United Nations — Continued 
European Office of, U.S. representa- 
tive (Tubby), confirmation, 625 
Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Dif>lomatic Pafiers, 1945, Volume /, 
General: The United Mations, re- 
leased 729 
Forum, as': Goldberg, 151, 262; E. V. 

Rostow, 606 
International education year, pro- 
posed (Johnson), 571 
International Human Rights Year, 

1968, 660 
Korean unification, resolution, and 

U.S. support (Broomfield), 844 
Marine resources development, role 

in (Goldberg), 723 
Membership : 
Communist China, U.S. position: 

Fountain, 829; Rusk, 389, 390 
Important-question resolution, U.S. 

position (Fountain), 829 
Responsibilities and significance 
(Goldberg), 4, 265, 483 
Middle East emergency relief pro- 
grams, U.S. support (Johnson), 65 
Peacekeeping operations (see also 
Arab-Israeli conflict. General As- 
sembly, and Security Council): 
303, 615, 744; Goldberg, 216; 
Rusk, 383, 559; Saragat, 502 
Importance and U.S. support: 
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 34, 295 
Specialized agencies, work of (Gold- 
berg), 263 
Viet-Nam, role in. See Viet-Nam 
United Nations Charter: 
Article 109, amendment; Burma, 81; 
Denmark, 54; France, 729; Ku- 
wait, 770; Libya, 405; Nigeria, 
117; Paraguay, 405; Philippines, 
625; Poland, 54; U.S., 54 
Obligations, binding nature of: Gold- 
berg, 667; E. V. Rostow, 426, 607 
Principles and U.S. support: Gold- 
berg, 216, 264; Humphrey, 790; 
Lodge, 468; Rusk, 87, 252, 344, 
560, 564, 704, 737, 824 
Viet-Nam, application of principles 
to (Goldberg), 667 
United Nations Children's Fund: 113; 
Rusk, 805 
National UNICEF Day, proclama- 
tion, 713 
United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
(Humphrey), 229 
United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development, 2nd: 45, 454; 
OEGD, 882; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 
United Nations Day, 1967, proclama- 
tion, 295 
United Nations Development Program, 
U.S. financial support (Rusk), 805 
LTnited Nations Economic Commission 
for Asia and the Far East (Bundy), 
United Nations Emergency Force, Mid- 
dle East, effect of withdrawal 
(Goldberg), 6, 50, 110 
United Nations Force in Cyprus 
(N.\C), 15 
Extension of, and U.S. pledge: 53n; 
Pederson, 52 

United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees, 1 1 3 
U.S. financial support: 400; Gold- 
berg, 9, 65, 111; Rusk, 210 

United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization (Goldberg), 1 10 

United States citizens and nationals: 
Claims. See Qaims 
Foreign policy, role of intellectuals 

(Gronouski), 432 
Israel, private support for (Goldberg), 

U.S. public image, role in: Hum- 
phrey, 791; Oliver, 753 

United States Information Agency, 827 

United States-Japan Joint Economic 
Committee, 6th meeting: commu- 
nique, 452; Johnson, 453; Miki, 
455; Rusk, 451, 455 

United States-Mexico Commission for 
Border Development and Friend- 
ship, 682 

Universal copyTight convention, St. 
Vincent, 661 

Universal Postal Union, constitution 
with final protocols: Hungary, 26; 
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho, 
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra 
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo, 
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404 

UNRWA. See United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine 

UNTSO (United Nations Truce Super- 
vision Organization), 1 10 

Upp>er Volta, geodetic survey agreement 
with U.S., 478 

Urban development: 453; Johnson, 453 

Uruguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 

USS Irwin, 81 

USS Lewis Hancock, 8 1 

USS Liberty, Israeli attack on (Gold- 
berg), 8 

USS Tellowstone, agreement with Malta 
re deployment of, 270 

Van Deerlin, Lionel, 1 47 
Vance, Cyrus, 859, 860 
Vance, Sheldon B., 310 
Vandenberg, Arthur (Oliver), 102 
Vatican City State, wheat trade con- 
vention, 770 
Communism, danger of Cuban threat : 
Johnson, 683; Kaplan, 230; Kat- 
zenbach, 533; Oliver, 473; Rusk, 
210, 383, 490, 493 
OAS Final Act and resolutions, 
tests, 493 
Economic progress (Rusk), 211 
OU exports to U.S. (Udall), 641 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 550, 
Viet-Nam, North: 
Haiphong harbor: Lodge, 468; 

Taylor, 259 
Soviet vesseb, allegations of U.S. 
attacks on, and U.S. replies, 44, 
U.S. position: Bundy, 284; Goldberg, 
484, 485; Katzenbach, 602; E. V. 
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 89, 92, 253, 
415, 823 

Viet-Nam, North — Continued 
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow), 
Viet-Nam, Republic of: 
Amnesty program. See Chieu Hoi 
Background: Bundy, 275; Westmore- 
land, 785 
Bombing, U.S. See U.S. air actions 
Bombing pauses: 

Communist activity during U.S. 
ceasefires: Bundy, 355; Johnson, 
521; Lodge, 464; Rusk, 162, 335, 
412, 557, 562, 595 
Communist position: 462; Gold- 
berg, 484; Johnson, 521; Rusk, 
411, 556, 557, 560, 562, 595, 600 
1965-1967 (Goldberg), 669, 671 
Prospects from: Clifford, 258; Gold- 
berg, 484; Lodge, 464, 468; 
Rusk, 89, 161, 163, 384, 411, 413, 
556, 562, 595, 597, 593 
Reciprocal, U.S. willingness: 671; 
Bunker, 751; Goldberg, 484; 
Johnson, 521 ; Rusk, 90, 162, 347, 
385, 412, 560, 562, 595, 599 
Viet-Nam government negotiations, 
prospects and U.S. position: 
Bundy, 353, 354; Bunker, 416, 
417; Rusk, 411, 556 
"Brainwashing", question of: Lodge, 

467; Rusk, 383, 414 
Chieu Hoi program: Bunker, 782; 
Lodge, 466; Rusk, 93, 386, 557; 
Westmoreland, 785 
Civilian service awards (Johnson), 288 
Coalition government, Vietnamese re- 
jection of (Bundy), 354 
Communism, rejection of: Lilienthal, 

866; Rusk, 557, 823 
Communist aggression and subver- 
Casualties: Bundy, 353; Johnson, 
289, 521; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 164, 
346, 414 
Chinese air bases, question of use of 

(Rusk), 389, 416 
Civil war, distinguished from: Katz- 
enbach, 602; Rusk, 89, 252, 345, 
Communist China: 
Military aid: Bundy, 356; E. V. 
Rostow, 426, 603; Rusk, 598, 
Position on: Bundy, 283; Gold- 
berg, 672; Marcos (quoted), 
520; Rusk, 164, 558 
Communist defections. See Chieu 

Hoi program 
Communist forces, problems of 
maintenance and recruitment: 
Bunker, 751, 782; Lodge, 468; 
Westmoreland, 786 
Communist position: 462; Katzen- 
bach, 602; Lodge, 465; E. V. 
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 163, 556 
Communist responsibility for situa- 
tion: Blair, 203; Bundy, 279, 290, 
356; Johnson, 519, 632; Katzen- 
bach, 602, 818; E. V. Rostow, 
425, 607; Rusk, 89, 91, 161, 252, 
344, 412, 556, 558, 559, 601-602, 
Deescalation, mutual, U.S. willing- 
ness: Johnson, 32; Rusk, 92, 253, 
346, 412, 740 



V'iet-Nam, Republic of — Continued 
Communist aggression and subver- 
sion — Continued 
Danger of: Bundy, 283, 357; 
Bunker, 420; Johnson, 37; 
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 603; 
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 555, 564, 823 
One-sided concept of (Rusk), 89, 
93, 253, 346 
Guerrilla warfare: Bunker, 419; 
Johnson, 289; Lodge, 465, 466, 
468 ; Rusk, 345 ; Westmoreland, 785 
International law aspects (E. V. 

Rostow), 607 
Prisoners, U.S. position, 170 
Propaganda, failure of (Lodge), 465 
Refugees (Rusk), 213 
Test case for: Bundy, 283; Johnson, 
632; Katzenbach, 819; E. V. 
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 90, 387, 
703, 823 
Communist reliance on U.S. dissent: 
Johnson, 522; Katzenbach, 602; 
Rusk, 555, 556, 600, 705, 824; 
Westmoreland, 785 
Demilitarized zone: 671; Goldberg, 
485; Rusk, 412, 558 
Barrier, proposed (Rusk), 385, 414 
Extension of. Communist rejection 
(Rusk), 89, 597 
Economic and social development: 
Industrialization (Lilienthal), 866, 

Off-shore fisheries development 

project, 222 
Prospects: Johnson, 519; McNa- 

mara, 167; Rusk, 93 
Social and land reforms, obligations 
of new government: Bunker, 783; 
Rusk, 413 
U.S. aid: Bundy, 277, 284; Bunker, 
781, 784; Rusk, 213, 804 
Communist participation: Gold- 
berg, 485; Johnson, 33; Rusk, 
601, 823 
Vietnamese role: Bunker, 584, 783; 
Lilienthal, 864; Rusk, 413 
Geneva conference: 361, 671, 709; 
Bundy, 276, 280; Goldberg, 383 
(quoted), 484, 485, 671 ; Rusk, 93, 
383, 413, 558, 559, 598 
Inflation: Bunker, 784; Lodge, 466; 
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 161, 213; 
Taylor, 258 
Japan, position of, 745 
Korea, compared to: Katzenbach, 

603; Westmoreland, 788 
Military and other aid from foreign 
countries: 64, 520, 792; Bundy, 
285; Bunker, 782; Johnson, 61, 
520, 632; NcNamara, 169; Park 
(quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92, 391, 
555, 561, 599, 822; Taylor, 258, 
259; Westmoreland, 788 
National Liberation Front: Bunker, 
782 ; Department, 854 ; Fedorenko 
(quoted), 670; Goldberg, 672; 
Rusk, 91, 93, 94, 386, 390, 558; 
Westmoreland, 786 
National reconciliation (pacification) 
program: 854; Bundy, 284, 353; 
Bunker, 418, 419, 748, 750, 783; 
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 386, 
557; Taylor, 257 

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued 
Negotiations for peaceful settlement: 

Ashmore-Baggs contacts (Depart- 
ment), 462 

Channels: 462; Goldberg, 484; 
Johnson, 775; Rusk, 162 

Communist China and Soviet 
Union, influence on: E. V. Ros- 
tow, 608; Rusk, 596, 597, 598, 

Communist rejection: 462; Bundy, 
284, 357; Bunker, 784; Goldberg, 
671; Johnson, 521, 632, 775; 
Rusk, 89, 94, 163, 253, 346, 383, 
384, 391, 411, 556, 558, 705, 740, 

Enterprise proposal (Johnson), 747, 

Geneva conference. See Geneva 

International conference, U.S. sup- 
port for, 671 

National Liberation Front par- 
ticipation: 854; Bundy, 353, 
417; Department, 854; Rusk, 93, 
94, 390, 558 

Norstad proposal (Lodge), 465 

Peace efforts of other countries : 
Goldberg, 669; Lee, 615; Rusk, 

Prior to U.S. presidential elections, 
question of (Bunker), 419 

U Thant proposals (Rusk), 162 

U.S. willingness: 745, 854; Bundy, 
284; Bunker, 417, 418, 781, 784; 
Goldberg, 48, 484; Gronouski, 
432; Johnson, 32, 39, 521; 
Lodge, 464; Rusk, 89, 162, 163, 
346, 384, 555, 556, 595, 600, 705, 

Vict Cong participation, LT.S. posi- 
tion: 854; Johnson, 775 

Vietnamese role: 854; Bundy, 352, 
353; Bunker, 416; Rusk, 384, 

411, 412, 556, 558 
Wilson-Kosygin talks, London: 

463 ; Rusk, 562 

Without conditions, U.S. willing- 
ness: Katzenbach, 602; Rusk, 9(5, 
93, 162, 253, 346, 384, 557, 705 
Peace : 

Geneva accords as a basis for: 
361, 671, 709; Goldberg, 484; 
Rusk, 93, 383 

Prospects for: Bunker, 416, 781; 
Clifford, 258; Johnson, 32; Rusk, 
93, 162, 164, 411, 412, 458, 556, 
558, 599, 601, 823 

U.S. goal: Bundy, 357; Bunker, 584, 
784; Goldberg, 483; Johnson, 37, 
39, 632, 775, 777, 851; Lodge, 
465; Rusk, 384, 452, 555, 560, 
562, 564, 740, 823 

Vietnamese position: Goldberg, 
485 ; Lilienthal, 866 
Political development: Bundy, 284, 
354; Bunker, 417, 748, 781; 
Goldberg, 485; Johnson, 289, 521, 
776, 779; Lodge, 350, 466, 467; 
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 94, 161, 

412, 557, 705; Taylor, 257 
Communist participation: Gold- 
berg, 485; Rusk, 386, 601 

Corruption, prevention of (Bunker), 

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued 
Political development— Continued 
Military leadership (Bundy), 260 
President- and Vice-President-elect, 
relations, question of: Bunker, 
421; Rusk, 385 
Presidential elections: 
Campaign, problems and inci- 
dents: Bundy, 260, 352, 354; 
Bunker, 749; Johnson, 290; 
Lodge, 350 
Communist interference: Bunker, 
749 ; Johnson, 52 1 ; Rusk, 345, 
414, 557, 740; Westmoreland, 
Conduct of, and percent of 
Vietnamese voters: 391 ; Bunker, 
417, 420, 749, 783; Johnson, 
421, 776; Rusk, 557, 822; 
Westmoreland, 786 
Inauguration ceremonies (Hum- 
phrey), 789 
Prospects from: Bundy, 353, 357; 
Bunker, 416, 417, 419, 420, 751, 
783; Johnson, 421, 521 ; Katzen- 
bach, 603; Lodge, 465; Rusk, 
94, 163, 166, 385 
U.S. observers: 349, 671 ; Johnson, 
421 ; Lodge, 349; Rusk, 345 
Port and harbor facilities (Mc- 
Namara), 167 
Reunification: 671; Bundy, 277, 279; 

Goldberg, 485 
Security {see also National reconcili- 
ation): Bundy, 353; Johnson, 521, 
776; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 557 
Following U.S. withdrawal, ques- 
tions of: Bundy, 355 ; Rusk, 93 
Self-determination: 361, 854; Bundy, 
195; Bunker, 781; Chfford, 257; 
Goldberg, 485; Humphrey, 789; 
Johnson, 33, 59, 498, 519, 779; 
Rusk, 90, 94, 345, 452, 703, 823 
Soviet position and aid: Brzezinski, 
20; Goldberg, 668; Kosygin, 38; 
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 426, 
608; Rusk, 558, 562, 596, 598 
Summit conference, prospects for: 
Bunker, 750; Clifford, 258; Rusk, 
165, 561 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 310, 

404, 590, 729 
U.N. action: 
Communist rejection: 671; Gold- 
berg, 669; Rusk, 383,413 
Soviet position (Goldberg), 668 
NLF participation, 854 
U.S. support: Bundy, 357; Gold- 
berg, 483, 667; Johnson, 521, 780; 
Lodge, 468, (U.N. role), 469; 
Rusk, 383, 559 
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 264, 

670; Rusk, 559 
U.S. air actions: 
Military targets only : 44, 171; 

Lodge, 468; Rusk, 414 
Results {see also U.S. military 
actions): Bundy, 355; Lodge, 464, 
465; McNamara, 168; Rusk, 413 
U.S. commitment: 745; Bunker, 420, 
584, 784; Goldberg, 484; John- 
son, 33, 59, 508, 519, 614, 776; 
Lodge, 465; Rusk, 163, 388, 555, 
596, 600, 823 
Asia, importance to. See under Asia 



Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued 
U.S. commitment — Continued 

Congressional support: E. V. Ros- 
tow, 605 ; Rusk, 555, 560, 563, 599, 

"Credibility gap" (Rusk), 414, 555, 
740, 824 

Importance of dependability: 
Bunker, 781; Johnson, 519, 777, 
779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V. 
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 90, 91, 253, 
599, 703, 704, 740, 821, 857 

SEATO: Bundy, 277, 285; John- 
son, 779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V. 
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 414, 555, 
563, 703, 821 
U.S. Embassy, dedication (Bunker), 

U.S. information, sources and supply 

of (Bunker), 781 
U.S. military forces: 

Leadership (Johnson), 776 

Manpower levels and deployment: 
Bundy, 353; Johnson, 267, 522, 
775; McNamara, 169; Rusk, 
344, 821; Taylor, 258, West- 
moreland, 786 

Morale and public support: 
Bunker, 585; Johnson, 267, 522; 
Rusk, 348, 704 

Withdrawal, conditions for: Bundy, 
356; Rusk, 89, 92, 345, 563, 
597, 823 
U.S. military operations: 

Consultations and reviews: Bunker, 
749, 750; Clifford, 256; E. V. 
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 414, 561 

Costs: Johnson, 266; Trowbridge, 

Logistics (MACONOMY): West- 
moreland, 787 

Phases of, survey (Westmoreland), 

Responsibility for decisions : Bunker, 
750; Rusk, 414, 741 

Results: Bundy, 355; Bunker, 748, 
781; Clifford, 257; Johnson, 521, 
776; Lodge, 465; McNamara, 
168; Rusk, 92, 346, 413, 821 

Stalemate, question of: Bimker, 
418, 783; McNamara, 168; Rusk, 
161, 346, 557 

Strategy: Bundy, 284, 355; Clif- 
ford, 257; Lodge, 466; Mc- 
Namara, 168; Taylor, 257, 259 
U.S. national interests: Bundy, 278, 
285; Johnson, 519, 779, 851; 
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 607; 
Rusk, 555, 563, 599, 703, 821 
U.S. objectives: Blair, 206; Brzezinski, 
22; Bundy, 283; Bunker, 584, 781 ; 
Goldberg, 483; Humphrey, 789, 
790; Johnson, 290, 498, 519, 
779; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 
602; Lodge, 469; Rusk, 92, 345, 
416, 452, 555, 601, 823; Taylor, 

Allies, support for: ClifTord, 256; 
Johnson, 522; Taylor, 257 

Congressional support: Johnson, 
519, 790; Katzenbach, 603; Rusk, 
91, 560, 563 
U.S. officials, preoccupation with, 

question of (Bundy), 356 
U.S. politics, bipartisan issue under: 
Lodge, 467; Rusk, 415 

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued 

U.S. presidential elections, effect on 
Communist position : Johnson, 
777; Lodge, 468 

U.S. public opinion: Bunker, 750; 
Gronouski, 432; Johnson, 519, 
776, 777, 778; Lodge, 464; 
E. V. Rostow, 605, 607; Rusk, 
345, 387, 555, 559, 600 

U.S.-Vietnamese relations: Lilienthal, 
867; Rusk, 557-558; Westmore- 
land, 787 

Vietnamese Army: Bundy, 284, 353; 
Bunker, 750, 782; Johnson, 777; 
Katzenbach, 603; Lodge, 466, 
468; Rusk, 346; Westmoreland, 

Vietnamese character and goals: John- 
son, 521 ; Lilienthal, 865, 866 

Visit of presidential advisers Clifford 
jmd Taylor, 256 

Visit of Vice-President Humphrey, 789 

World opinion: 745; Johnson, 520; 
Rusk, 347, 705 

World peace, importance to: Gold- 
berg, 671; Johnson, 520, 852; 
Rusk, 564 
Viklund, Daniel, 91 

Romania, agreement re issuance of 
visas to diplomatic and non- 
diplomatic personnel, 81 

U.S. travel restrictions to Middle 
East amended, 41 
Volunteer Service, International Secre- 
tariat for. Executive order, 207 
Volunteers to America: 235; Palmer, 


War on Hunger (set also Food and pop- 
ulation crisis): Johnson, 762; Rusk, 
209, 254, 801; Waters, 765 
War on Poverty: Linowitz, 323, 618; 

Rusk, 857; Trowbridge, 504 
Warsaw Pact: Cleveland, 143; Leddy, 

Washington, George (quoted), 333 
Watanabe, Takeshi (Rusk), 458 
Water resources: 
Management of, need for coopera- 
tion (Rusk), 738 
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in develop- 
ment of water resources, 682 
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865 
Water for Peace Office, interim 
director (Woodward), 245 
Waters, Herbert J., 764 
West Point (Johnson), 780 
Western European Union (Rusk), 856 
Western Samoa, International Wheat 
Agreement, 1967 protocol for the 
extension of, ratification, 270 
Westmoreland, William C: 785; Bunk- 
er, 750, 751; Lodge, 466; Mc- 
Namara, 168 
International convention (1946), 
amendments to schedule, en- 
trance into force, 590 
Whaling Commission, International, 
U.S. commissioner, announce- 
ment, 586 
Research, Mexico: Diaz Ordaz, 675; 
Gaud, 582; Johnson, 674, 683 

Wheat — Continued 
Treaties, agreements, etc. : 
EEC, agreement re suspension of 
agreements concerning quality 
wheat and other grains, 245 
International Grains Agreement: 45, 
95; Freeman, 133; Johnson, 716; 
Roth, 124 
International Wheat Agreement 
Protocol for further extension of: 
Germany (including Berlin), 26 
1967 protocol for further exten- 
sion of: Australia, 153; Bar- 
bados, 190, 309; Belgium (for 
Belgium-Luxembourg Eco- 
nomic Union), 117; Canada, 
153; Ecuador, 190; Germany, 
Guatemala, 153; Haiti, 270; 
Israel, 153, 662; Italy, Japan, 
153; Korea, 117; Libya, 153, 
337; Mexico, 26; Nigeria, 770; 
Peru, 590; Portugal, 190; Spain, 
309; Tunisia, 190; Venezuela, 
405; Western Samoa, 270 
Wheat trade convention (1967): 
Johnson, 716 
Current actions: Argentina, 845; 
Australia, 728; Belgium, 769; 
Canada, 728; Denmark, 809, 
845; EEC, Finland, France, 
845; Germany, 769; Greece, 
India, Ireland, Israel, 845, 
Italy (as EEC member State), 
809; Japan, 728; Korea, Leb- 
anon, 845; Luxembourg, 770; 
Mexico, 845; Netherlands, 770; 
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Spain, 845; Sweden, 809; Switz- 
erland, 845; Tunisia, 728; U.K., 
845; U.S., 728 
U.S. additional shipments to India 

authorized (Johnson), 430 
U.S. stocks, decrease in (Gold- 
schmidt), 305 
White, William Allen (E. V. Rostow), 

Whitman, Walt (quoted), 571 
WHO. See World Health Organization 
Wiesner, Jerome B. (McNamara), 448 
WUlis, David K., 353 
Winters, Robert, 46 
Wirtz, W. Willard, 455 
WMO. See World Meteorological Or- 
Political rights, convention (1953): 

Chile, 729; Costa Rica, 405 
Status of women: 
Iran (Shah Pahlavi), 361 
U.N. commission, 20th session, 
report (TUlett), 218 
Woods, George D. (quoted), 678 
Woodward, Robert R., 245 
World Bank. See International Bank 
of Reconstruction and Develop- 
World Food Problem, The: 76n, 307n, 874n; 
Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533 
World Food Program (Goldschmidt), 

World grains arrangement. See Inter- 
national grains arrangement 







World Health Organization: 
Constitution, 1946, as amended: 

Lesotho, 270 

Amendment to article 7: Barbados, 

270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica, 

117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 26 

World Law Day, 1967, proclsimation, 

World Meteorological Organization : 
Goldberg, 723; Rusk, 739 
Convention (1947): Barbados, 438; 
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438 
World order: 615, 709; Brzezinski, 19; 
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 631, 633, 
655; Linowitz, 616; E. V. Rostow, 
609; W. W. Rostow, 66; Rusk, 
Interdependence of modern world: 
Hammarskjold (quoted), 265; 
Johnson, 325; Katzenbach, 334; 
E. V. Rostow, 423, 605; Rusk, 
252, 452, 735, 807 
U.S. influence: Brzezinski, 21; 
Humphrey, 790; Johnson, 303; 
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 735 
World peace: 745; Goldberg, 483; E. 
V. Rostow, 425; Rusk, 87, 91, 704, 
735; Sato, 744 
Arab-Israeli conflict, threat to: Gold- 
berg, 4, 13, 108, 216; Johnson, 
33; E. V. Rostow, 237 

World peace — Continued 

Economic considerations: Humphrey, 
792; Katzenbach, 334; Linowitz, 
323; Rusk, 254, 737; Waters, 765 

Inter-American system, importance to 
(Linowitz), 321 

Law of treaties, importance to (Kear- 
ney), 721 

NATO, importance to, 329 

U.N. Charter principles and U.S. 
support: Goldberg, 216, 264; 
Rusk, 252, 560, 564, 737, 824 

U.S. commitments, importance to: 
Johnson, 519; Kaplan, 234; Katz- 
enbach, 604; E. V. Rostow, 608; 
Rusk, 255, 347, 703, 704, 857 

U.S.-Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans- 
field proposal (Rusk), 456 

U.S.-Soviet responsibilities: Johnson, 
35, 38, 59; Katzenbach, 819; E. 
V. Rostow, 428; Rusk, 160 

U.S. support: Johnson, 16, 31, 328, 
522, 571, 747, 851, 853; Katzen- 
bach, 820; E. V. Rostow, 237, 
605; Rusk, 215, 452, 564, 739, 821 

Viet-Nam, importance of U.S. com- 
mitments (Johnson), 520 

World Law Day, 1967, proclamation, 
World War II, lessons of (Rusk), 251, 
253, 343, 704, 737, 824, 857 

World Weather Watch (Rusk), 739 
Worsthorne, Peregrine (quoted), 231 
Wyndham White, Eric (Roth), 125 

Xauthopoulos-Palamas, Christian, 507 

Yemen, U.S. travel restrictions 

amended, 459 
Yemen, Southern, U.S. diplomatic 

recognition, 861 
Yingling, Raymond T., 475 
York, Herbert F. (McNamara), 448 
Yoshida, Shigeru (Johnson), 660 
Young, Stephen M. (Johnson), 42 
Yugoslavia : 
Ambassador to U.S., 362 
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 222, 

270, 405, 589, 625, 846 
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an- 
nouncement, 586 

Zambia, Geneva convention (1949) re 
protection of civilian persons in 
time of war, adherence, 698 








Vol. LVII, No. U62 

July S, 1967 


Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Texts of Resolutions 3 


by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harrhnan 17 


by Zbigniew Brzezinshi 19 

For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1462 Publication 8255 
July 3, 1967 

For sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Proposal Condemning Israel Rejected 

Following are statements made on June 10, 
IS, and 14. in the U.N. Security Council hy U.S. 
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg'^ and the 
text of a letter he sent to the Secretary-General 
on June 9, together with texts of resolutions 
adopted hy the Council on June 12 and H, a 
revised U.8. draft resolution subnvitted on 
June 14 which remain^s before the Council, and a 
revised Soviet draft resolution submitted on 
June 13 which failed to obtain the required votes 
for adoption. 


U.S./U.N. press release 98 

Mr. President, it has been the consistent view 
of my Government from the very beginning of 
this conflict that this Security Council should 
have a single goal : to quench the flames of war 
in the Near East and to begin to move toward 
peace in the area. And throughout our delib- 
eration of this subject, we have attempted by all 
the means at our disposal to expedite the action 
of this Council and the action of the United Na- 
tions in this direction. This is our task. This is 
what we should be devoting ourselves to with 
all of the resources at our command. 

Instead of that, Mr. President, much of the 
time of this Council is devoted to diatribes 
against my country about alleged involvement 
in this conflict. I have stated many times, and 
I again wish to state, that the United States is 
in no way involved in this conflict but on the 
contrary has used its influence here and diplo- 
matically in the interests of first avoiding the 
conflict and then bringing it to an end. 

' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg In 
the Security Council on June 6, 8, and 9, see BtrLLETiN 
of June 26, 1967, p. 934. 

We have done more than make statements to 
the Council in this regard. We have offered to 
have unpartial observers of the United Nations 
make a determination with respect to the charges 
that have been made. I have not heard from 
those who make the charges any willingness on 
their part to subscribe to this point of view. And 
yet, what better proof can there be of lack of 
involvement than a willingness to have charges 
of this type, which are false and which are mali- 
cious, put to the test of impartial observation? 

In fact, I pointed out what was quite clear — 
that, with respect to the canard that the 6th 
Fleet was involved in this exercise, there was 
another country with naval craft in the vicinity 
which could enlighten the Council about this 
situation. It is perfectly obvious what I was 
referring to in that connection. 

Here again tonight we have another illustra- 
tion of this, and all I can say again, and I wiU 
continue to say it, is that there is no involve- 
ment on the part of the United States, that we 
are quite willing to have the charges that were 
made investigated impartially, and that it does 
not serve the cause of peace to repeat these base- 
less charges. 

Now, Mr. President, we were the ones who 
proposed last night that we should receive re- 
ports and we welcome very much the reports 
that we are receiving. We very much appreciate 
the straightforward way in which our distin- 
guished Secretary-General has rendered these 
reports, in which he has pointed out the facts 
and pointed out their limitations and has urged 
for further facts so this Council can act 

We do, however, have some facts before us, 
and we have indicated throughout a willingness 
to act upon such facts and to act in an even- 
handed and impartial way. Indeed, we have 
tried to make it very clear that it is the obliga- 

JULT 3, 1967 

tion of both Israel and Syria to strictly comply 
with the cease-fire order. This is the first fact. 
It is not the final task of this Council, but it is 
the essential first task. 

We have a very grave situation in the Middle 
East. To rebuild the fabric of peace in the area 
is going to be very difficult. We all know that. 
To quench the flames of war is very difiicult. We 
ought first of all to have a stopping of all mili- 
tary activity, an end to the conflict. This is the 
first and primary task and not the last task. 
We will have to go on to other matters which 
were mentioned in the resolution ^ we tabled 
before the Security Council. 

Now, it does not help to have invective in this 
situation. Invective does not take the place of 
progress. And I should like to make it very 
clear that it has not been my practice at any 
time in the United Nations to impugn the ve- 
racity or integrity of any representative of the 
U.N. representing his country. But when 
charges are made against the United States 
that have no foundation, it is the plain obliga- 
tion of the representative of the United States 
to rebut those charges and to place before the 
Council the facts — or the means of verifying 
the facts. 

There is another thing which I mentioned 
earlier which I think is very clear, and that is 
that I respect the right of every member of this 
Council to represent his coimtry. I do not im- 
ply that any member of tlie Council in appear- 
ing here represents anybody else other than his 
country. Wlien remarks are made that tlie rep- 
resentative of the United States speaks for 
some country other than his own, it is that type 
of remark to which I take strong exception — 
and I think justifiably so. Such a remark is 
not one which should be countenanced by an 
international organization. We speak for our 
countries. We state their policies, and we at- 
tempt to the best of our abilities to present the 
point of view of our countries to this Coimcil. 
That is the responsibility of every member, and 
I respect any member wlio does that with all 
the energy and vigor at his command. 

Now, that is all I meant when I made the 
statement that I made this morning. I will not 
accept from anybody a concept that in speak- 

' U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 2 ; for backgrounfl, see Bul- 
letin of June 26, 1967, pp. 941 and 943 ; for text of a 
third revision, see p. 12. 

ing here I speak from any other basis than the 
interests of the United States of America, 
whom I proudly represent before this Council, 
and any indication to the contrary I will not 
t-olerate; nor do I think any diplomatic body 
should tolerate it, because it is inconsistent with 
the attitude that we owe each other as col- 
leagues at the United Nations. 

Now, we are dealing with the cease-fire order 
immediately. That is the problem we have at 
hand. That is why we have been called into 
session twice today. And our concern must be 
that that cease-fire must be recognized. Both 
Syria and Israel have given General Bull [Lt. 
Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization] 
solemn assurances that they accept the cease- 
fire and will fully implement it. 

It is a source of encouragement to me that, 
from the Secretary-General's reports, inci- 
dents of violation — except those that occurred 
possibly within a few minutes after this agree- 
ment was made witli General Bull — are not 
being repeated. I sincerely hope that this is so, 
and I await more detailed reports of the Secre- 
tary-General so that we can determine that 
hopefully now at least — and it should have 
been earlier — ^the cease-fire is in effect. 

Now, this morning I was prepared to table a 
resolution, even on the basis of the fragmen- 
tary information we had, condemning any 
violation of the cease-fire by any source. It is 
interesting to me that while we are accused of 
being involved — which we are not — those who 
make that accusation never make reference to 
their condemnation of a violation of the cease- 
fire if it comes from any source other than those 
whose cause they advocate. We are advocating 
the cause of peace in this Security Council, and I 
we are advocating the cause of respect for the 
cease-fire orders of this Council. And my Gov- J 
ernment takes the position that the cease-fire I 
orders must be complied with — I repeat, must f 
be complied with. To that end, Mr. President, ' 
I table the following resolution : ' 

The Security Council, 

Having heard the reports of the Secretary-General 
on the current situation, 

Gravely concerned at reports and complaints it has ' 
received of air attaclts, shelling, ground activities and i 
other violations of the cease-fire between Israel and ' 

' U.N. doc. S/7971. 


1. Condemns any and all violations of tbe cease-fire ; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to order a full in- 
Testigation of all reports of violations and to report to 
the Security Council as soon as possible; 

3. Demands that the parties scrupulously respect its 
cease-fire appeals contained in resolutions 233, 234 and 

4. Calls on the Governments concerned to issue cate- 
goric instructions to all military forces to cease all 
firing and military activities as required by these 


U.S./D-N. press release 102, Corr. 1 

The United States has introduced a draft 
resolution (S/7952) which we believe holds the 
hope of the lasting peace in the Near East. The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has sub- 
mitted a revised draft resolution (S/7951) 
which its distinguished representative has 
talked about today. 

I propose, in the interests of furthering the 
debate and consideration by the Council today, 
to discuss both resolutions — not in the spirit of 
invective which regrettably has characterized 
our debates of the past several days but on the 
merits, because of the grave seriousness of the 
problem and because of the necessity for this 
Council to arrive at a sober and considered 
judgment of what its responsibilities are in the 

Throughout the 19 years since the admission 
of Israel to the United Nations, the United 
States has supported many attempts to resolve 
the underlying causes of tension and instability 
between the Arab states and Israel. We have 
sought to assure acceptance of the political in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of all states 
in the area — Arab states and Israel alike — all 
members entitled to the protection of the char- 
ter. And we have also sought for an end to acts 
of force of whatever kind, acts which also are 
hostile to the spirit and intent of the charter. 

We have sought an equitable and humani- 
tarian solution of the problem of the Palestin- 
ian refugees; we have supported plans for the 
development of the resources of the Jordan 
Eiver in a way which will help all states and 
do harm to none. We have pressed for recogni- 
tion of the rights of all nations, including 
Israel, to free and innocent passage of the Suez 

Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. And, above all, 
we have sought the conversion of the armistice 
of 1949 into a permanent peace, as contemplated 
in the General Armistice Agreements them- 

And we have not changed our views or poli- 
cies about the entire situation because of the un- 
fortunate events which have occurred recently. 
Virtually all our efforts, as we know, have not 
succeeded. The Near East has lived for 19 years 
in a state of tension which now, for the third 
time, has erupted into war. The evenhanded ef- 
forts of the United States to prevent and end 
the present violence and the past violence are 
spread on the record of the United Nations and 
of international diplomacy for all to read. 

The depth of our commitment was made man- 
ifest in 1956 at the time of the Suez crisis. And 
more recently it was made evident again in the 
evenhanded approach of the United States to- 
ward border incidents in 1966. We supported 
a call in the Security Council, also supported 
by the great majority of the members, on the 
Syrian Government to restrain terrorist raids 
laimched from its territory.^ Then in November 
1966 we joined in the unanimous censure of 
Israel for its retaliatory raid against Es-Samu 
in Jordan.^ I need scarcely recall to this Coun- 
cil that it was the Soviet veto which prevented 
the milder action of the Council directed against 
Syria from being adopted. 

It may also be instructive to recall one as- 
pect of the course of events in the past month 
leading directly to the outbreak of the fighting, 
an aspect which has not been fully or adequately 
discussed in the Council but which I am im- 
pelled to do by virtue of some of the remarks 
by the distinguished representative of the So- 
viet Union today. 

In early May of this year reports were cir- 
culated in Syria and the United Arab Republic 
of a supposed Israeli buildup on the borders of 
Syria, allegedly backed by the United States 
and aimed at the overthrow of the Syrian 

President Nasser recently revealed one source 
from which his Government heard this inflam- 
matory rumor; namely, Moscow. Yet, Secre- 
tary-General U Thant on May 19 ' stated that 

* For texts, see Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 947. 

' For background, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969. 

' Ibid., p. 974. 

' U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1. 

JULY 3, 1967 

United Nations observers had found no evidence 
to support the charges of an alleged Israeli mili- 
tary buildup in the area. And indeed, he could 
not have reported any complicity on the part of 
the United States, for such complicity was non- 

And let me remind this Council that wliile 
these inflammatory charges, inspired by Mos- 
cow, were inciting the situation in the Near 
East, the Soviet representative's only answer to 
my country's call for urgent action by this 
Council was a complaint that we were "drama- 
tizing" the situation. He should know better 
than anybody what "dramatizing" means. 

This totally false accusation of a U.S.-Israeli 
plot helped substantially to inflame the crisis 
in which Israel and Egypt confronted each 
other for the first time in 10 years across bor- 
ders no longer patrolled by the United Nations. 

On May 17, as the world well remembers, 
President Nasser, citing the supposed danger 
of an Israeli invasion of Syria, requested the 
withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency 
Force. And when UNEF vacated Sharm el- 
Sheik, the United Arab Republic immediately 
reimposed its blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, 
after 10 years of free and peaceful navigation. 
Now, these are the facts, Mr. President. The 
whole world community knows this. We in 
the Council, above all others, are fully conver- 
sant with them. 

Throughout this entire period, the United 
States of America in the Security Council, as 
its reports disclose, and in all its diplomatic 
activity urged the utmost restraint on all par- 
ties. We exerted every effort to prevent an out- 
break of hostilities and to assure that vital 
international maritime rights in the Gulf of 
Aqaba would be respected. 

Unfortunately, our urgent efforts to convene 
the Security Council and to get the Security 
Council to act before an outbreak of hostilities 
were stalled by other powei-s who chose to ridi- 
cule the seriousness of the situation, who failed 
to support our urgent efforts to find a peaceful 
solution. And as a result, largely through Soviet 
obstruction, the Security Council — ^between its 
first meeting on May 24 and the outbreak of 
fighting on June 5 — was unable to pass a single 
resolution or take any effective action to j^revent 
an outbreak. 

And throughout this time, the whole area re- 
mained a tmderbox ; armies were mobilized and 

poised for war, and inexorably war came. And 
from the outset of the fighting, the United 
States immediately sought a cease-fire, and sup- 
ported efforts made by our distinguished Presi- 
dent and others in the same direction. The 
record of the meetings of the Security Council 
shows clearly who obstructed the cease-fire — the 
first indispensable step to bringing the conflict 
to an end — and why it took 2 days to adopt a 
simple cease-fire resolution, wliich should have 
been adopted immediately and without debate. 

The record also shows that, regardless of the, 
sponsor, the United States speedily supported 
the second cease-fire resolution, which was pro- 
posed by the Soviet Union. After that, however, 
again precious time was wasted in protracted 
debate and in negotiations before a tliird cease- 
fire resolution applying to the situation in Syria i 
could be adopted. This was true even though 
here also the United States was ready to acti 
inmiediatfily and had in fact sought to antici- 
pate the situation the previous day by support- 
ing a resolution condemning violations of thei 
cease-fire and, indeed, proposing to sponsor such i 
a resolution. 

Now, fortimately — and belatedly — a cease-fira 
is in effect. But we cannot rest there. The cease-i 
fire, as we have repeatedly said, is no more than 
the first essential step in this Council's duty. 
Our charter responsibility is the maintenance 
of international peace and security. The guns 
are mercifully silent in the Near East today. Bui 
that region is still a long, long way from the 
true peace or from true security. 

The question now facing the Security Coun- 
cil, therefore, is simply this : Wliat is the next 
step we must take toward peace and security 
for the nations of the Near East ? Wliere do we 
go from here ? Not where do we further debate, 
or exchange recriminations or invective — but 
where do we go from here? | 

There are two answers to this question pro- I 
posed before the Council. That is, that of the ' 
Soviet Union in its resolution and that of the | 
United States. 

Before stating the case for my Government's 
proposal, I would like to comment briefly on 
that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet's proposal j 
could be stated in simple terms as follows : Con- I 
demn Israel for its aggression ; Israel, with- 
draw your troops and let everything go back to / 
exactly where it was before the fighting began j 
on Jime 5. In other words, the film is to be rim j 



backward through the camera to that point in 
the early morning on June 5 when hostilities 
had not yet broken out. 

But what would the situation be? 

Once again, opposing forces are to stand m 
direct confrontation poised for combat. Once 
again, there is to be no international machinery 
to keep them apart. Once again, Aqaba is to be 
blockaded for the free and innocent passage of 
all maritime nations. And once again, nothing 
is to be done to resolve the deep-lying griev- 
ances on both sides that have fed the fires of 
conflict in the Near East for 20 years. And 
significantly, once again, there is no bar to an 
arms race in the area which has so substantially 
contributed to tension in that region. 

If there was ever a prescription for renewed 
hostilities, the Soviet resolution is that prescrip- 
tion. I do hope that the U.S.S.R. does not con- 
template with equanimity the prospect of a 
fourth round in the Arab-Israel struggle. This 
is precisely what this Council should concert its 
eiforts to avoid. 

Let us recall that the General Armistice 
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that 
their purpose is, and I quote : ". . . to facilitate 
the transition from the present truce to penna- 
nent peace" — I repeat, "permanent peace" — "in 

We all know that there has been no transition 
and there is no permanent peace in that area at 
all. On the contrary, there is war. A bandage 
was applied to the wound 18 years ago, but the 
wound has never been allowed to heal. It is still 
an open and festering wound today. All of the 
18 years of the armistice regime have witnessed 
virtually no progress on any of the basic issues 
from which the conflict arose. As long as these 
issues are unresolved, they will continue to en- 
venom the political life of the Near East. 

The Soviet proposal does not encompass a 
genuine approach to their solution; it cannot 
lead toward peace. Mr. President, it is rather a 
big step backward toward another war. 

What the Near East needs today are new steps 
toward real peace, not just a cease-fire, which 
is what we have today ; not just a fragile and 
perilous armistice, which is what we have had 
for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which is nec- 
essary but insufficient. 

Real peace must be our aim. And in that con- 
viction my delegation submitted last Thurs- 
day — even before the cease-fire became fully 

effective — a draft resolution [S/7952/Rev. 2] 
from which I shall now read the most important 
provision : 

The Security Council, . . . 

Calls for discussions promptly thereafter (that is, 
after the cease-fire) among the parties concerned, using 
such third party or United Nations assistance as they 
may wish, looliing toward the establishment of viable 
arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and dis- 
engagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of 
force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital 
international rights and the establishment of a stable 
and durable peace in the Middle East. 

Our objective in making this proposal is to 
encourage a decision by the warring parties to 
live together in peace and to secure interna- 
tional assistance to this end. It is necessary to 
begin to move — not some day but now, 
promptly, while the memory of these tragic 
events is still vivid in our minds — toward a full 
settlement of all outstanding questions. And I 
again repeat "all outstanding questions" be- 
tween the parties, such as the resolutions the 
United Nations has contemplated for nearly 
20 years. 

There are legitimate grievances on all sides of 
this bitter conflict, and a full settlement should 
deal equitably with all legitimate grievances and 
all outstanding questions, from whichever side 
they are raised. In short, Mr. President, a new 
foundation for peace must be built in the Middle 

Doubtless, agreements between the parties on 
these profoundly contentious matters will take 
a long time, but the United Nations, speaking 
through this Council, has an urgent obligation 
to facilitate them and to rebuild an atmosphere 
in which fruitful discussions will be possible. 
That is the purpose of the resolution we have 

Mr. President, the Security Council is now 
faced with a clear-cut issue : We can either at- 
tack the causes of the disease which has 
plagued the Near East with war three times in 
a generation or we can go back to the treatment 
of symptoms, which has proved such a dismal 
failure in the past. And, in this, we should 
adopt a simple pragmatic rule from what the 
medical advisers of all of us tell us, "You can't 
cure cancer with a band-aid." 

Now, Mr. President, in this grave situation, 
fraught with so many differences of opinions 
and attitudes, the tendency is to say that it de- 
fies solution. But we cannot accept this type of 

JtJLT 3, 1967 

counsel. Let us rather say that no one can say 
that sohitions are impossible. The sad fact is 
that for many years they have not been really 
fearlessly tried. And now, at the end of this 
tragic week of war, let us remember the death 
and suffering of all the parties of war, and let 
us open the way for solutions that will be suf- 
ficiently enduring and sufficiently just to be an 
acceptable monument to their sacrifice and to 
the pledge that is contained in the Charter of 
the United Nations. 

Now, Mr. President, in dealing with this sub- 
ject, since we are here in New York, we are 
constantly reminded by various spokesmen, in- 
cluding my good friend the distinguished 
representative of Jordan, Ambassador [Mu- 
hammad H.] El-Farra, of American public 
opinion. And, again, I should like to make 
something very explicitly clear. I do not apolo- 
gize in any sense for the expression by any 
American group of their point of ^aew about 
this problem, whether it is the Action Commit- 
tee on American- Arab Kelations headed by Dr. 
[M. T.] Mehdi, who met with me, or by the 
head of any Zionist organization. 

Our Constitution- — and we are very proud of 
it — permits free expression of opinion by our 
citizens. The other day we witnessed a vivid 
demonstration of the character of the American 
Constitution. The Arab-American Society had 
its demonstration, peaceful demonstration, in 
front of the White House, and so did various 
Zionist and Jewish groups. Both were per- 
mitted, both took place peaceably under our 
Constitution; and both are permissible under 
our system of government. We are proud of this. 
We do not in any way apologize for this, and 
we do not in any way apologize for what any 
person says in our country about any matter 
of public opinion. 

I should say, for Ambassador El-Farra's in- 
formation, that very often public opinion ex- 
pressed in America is not public opinion which 
is exactly complimentary of our Government; 
and yet whether it is complimentary or not, it is 
the entire basis of our society that our citizens 
should have a right to express themselves freely 
on all issues. "The right of comment, the right 
of dissent," our Supreme Court said, "is a right 
of American citizens both in times of peace and 
in times of war, and is our most precious 

I should also like to say again in this Council 
that I do not think it appropriate — and I shall 

say it again and again — or that it serves the 
causes of debate to refer to comments made by 
various citizens or individuals or public officials. 
It is legitimate, I have said, and I repeat, to 
comment upon the foreign policy of our Gov- 
ernment, the declarations made by the Presi- 
dent, the Secretary of State, myself, and others 
who have responsibility for enunciating the for- 
eign policy of our Government. 

When other officials in the American Govern- 
ment, in the legislative branch — and I will be 
very precise, Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy, 
Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller, or anybody 
else — express themselves, they are also exercis- 
ing their rights as public officials and American 
citizens. And I don't think the time of the Coim- 
cil ought to be spent in debating the views of 
our officials or entering into our domestic affairs. 
What is more relevant, if I may say so, with due 
respect to them, is the decision that is stated in 
this Council on behalf of the American 

Now, reference has been made to the attack on 
our ship Liberty. I stated in this Council, in the 
strongest terms, the protest of our Government 
against that attack, and we have renewed that 
protest in the strongest terms to the Israeli au- 
thorities. We regard that attack to be an un- 
justified attack. And I have welcomed expres- 
sions made by some, but not by all, of the 
members of the Council expressing regret about 
the lives we have lost in this conflict, just as I 
have expressed regret about the lives of all other 
personnel lost in this conflict, including the lives 
of the combatants themselves. Because, surely, 
we must express regret about all bloodshed and 
loss of life in this conflict. 

And now I should like also to address myself 
to some other comments that have been made. 

We do have, in the aftermath of the fighting, 
an urgent responsibility to see that the Council 
takes all action within its jiower to protect those 
already victimized by this war. There are solemn 
obligations which we must recall concerning the 
treatment of victims of war under the 1949 
Geneva convention; in particular, the obliga- 
tions concerned with civilian populations, as the 
distinguished representative of Argentina, Dr. 
[Jose Maria] Ruda, pointed out on June 11. 
These are particularly relevant in light of the 
reports we have heard of the movement from 
their homes of civilian populations, many of 
them refugees from earlier conflicts. 

I have already expressed in this Council my 


Government's concern for the welfare and 
safety of the populations of the west bank of the 
Jordan. Our concern includes all who might find 
themselves in areas of the Near East disrupted 
by this conflict and, particularly, those who now 
find themselves in areas under Israeli control. 

The United Nations, through its resolutions 
establishing the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency, assumed particular responsi- 
bility for the refugees of the 1947-48 fighting. 
We supported this resolution and the subsequent 
resolutions renewing its mandate. We have been 
the principal contributor to the work of 
UNRWA and, therefore, have a legitimate con- 
cern that the refugees of the 1947—48 conflict be 
treated with the humanitarian concern to which 
they are entitled. And we also have the equal 
concern that other civilians displaced during the 
recent conflict from their homes, and particu- 
larly those on the west bank of the Jordan, will 
be allowed and encouraged to return to their 
homes and that all civilians will be provided 
with adequate assurance of their safety in the 
same locations in which they resided before hos- 
tilities began. We urge all concerned, and par- 
ticularly the Government of Israel, to exert 
every possible effort to this end. 

Mr. President, we have taken the first step 
in the cease-fire, and, commendably, the cease- 
fire is holding. We have many tasks to perform 
in bringing about a just and equitable solution, 
which the Secretary-General has so strongly 
stressed to us in his report, so needed in this 
troubled area of the world. Let us pursue these 
tasks in a spirit of perhaps the greatest Ajner- 
ican President, Abraham Lincoln : "With mal- 
ice toward none, with charity for all." And let 
us bind up the wounds of this conflict and bring 
peace, the most precious gift of all, to all the 
people in the area. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 103 

I shall try to be very brief. The representa- 
tive of the United Arab Republic, our esteemed 
friend and colleague Ambassador El Kony, this 
evening repeated unwarranted allegations that 
the United States supported and encouraged the 
recent hostilities in the Middle East and was 
guilty of collusion. That is simply not true. No 
member of this Council has made greater efforts 
than the United States, both in the Coimcil and 

outside the Council, to prevent this conflict. The 
United States simply has not intervened in any 
way in this conflict. That, perhaps, is also my 
reply to what our friend and colleague Ambas- 
sador El-Farra has said. I had not assumed that 
any intervention of any sort by the United 
States would have been regarded as appropriate 
or proper in the circumstances of the present 

As for the remarks of the representative of 
Syria, Ambassador [George J.] Tomeh, who has 
asserted the idea that the Israeli military estab- 
lishment has been sustained by United States 
military and economic aid, the fact is that 
United States military aid to the Arab states in 
the last 20 years has been more than 10 times 
the amount of United States military aid to 
Israel. I repeat, more than 10 times the amount. 
As for economic aid afforded by the United 
States Government, the amount given to Arab 
states in the past 20 years has been almost three 
times that given to Israel ; and this aid has been 
made available as part of our desire to main- 
tain friendly and cooperative relations with all 
countries in the area. 

It is true that many United States citizens 
have made generous gifts to Israel. That is their 
right as individuals. And it is also true, if we 
want to keep the record completely straight, 
that the Arab states have received substantial 
aid, both economic and military, from the Soviet 
Union, which Israel has not. This is also a joart 
of the record of the past 20 years. 

But really, all of these things have no bearing 
immediately on the basic point : that tlie United 
States Goverimient, as a matter of public pol- 
icy, has helped both the Arab states and Israel 
over the past 20 years and that the amount 
accorded to the Arab states has been substan- 
tially greater than that accorded to Israel. 

It is our desire — and I said this earlier in the 
debate — to have the economic conditions of the 
whole area improved and to play a constructive 
role in the improvement of those economic con- 
ditions in the entire area. 

With respect to the statements made by our 
colleague Ambassador Fedorenko [Nikolai T. 
Fedorenko, of the Soviet Union], he has given 
a most distorted interpretation to our draft 
resolution. If I heard him correctly, he said that 
unless the territorial demands of Israel on the 
United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan are 
met, there will be an explosive situation and 
war — that this is the effect of our draft resolu- 

JtTLT 3, 1967 

tion. This is, to say the least, a gross and flagrant 
distortion of our draft resolution and the state- 
ment I made to the Council, which speaks for 
itself, and our desire to bring about the condi- 
tions that can create the basis for a just, equi- 
table, and peaceful solution to the conflict. 


D.S./U.N. press release 104 

Mr. President, I shall be very glad to respond 
to your request. There are, in fact, three United 
States proposals before the Council. 

One is in document S/7916/Eev. 1,* to which 
you, Mr. President, have referred, which was our 
initial proposal designed to prevent the out- 
break of hostilities by endorsing the appeal of 
the Secretary-General. A number of members 
at that time were unwilling to support the Sec- 
retary-General's appeal and the subsequent out- 
break of hostilities has put this resolution out 
of date. "We vtdll not press it to the vote. 

The second is in document S/7971. We intro- 
duced it last Saturday to demand scrupulous re- 
spect for the cease-fire and to call for categoric 
instructions to military commanders. It was de- 
nounced by the Soviet Union for reasons I 
foimd inexplicable at the time — and still find 
inexplicable. A resolution with identical ob- 
jectives was adopted the next day " at the recom- 
mendation of you, Mr. President. The United 
States will therefore not press this resolution 
(S/7971) to the vote, either. 

The third United States resolution is our 
substantive proposal contained in document 
S/7952/Kev. 2. We have just submitted a tliird 
revision to this draft, which has just been cir- 
culated and has just been referred to by our 
distinguished colleague Ambassador Ignatieff 
[George Ignatieff, of Canada] . 

This United States proposal, whose purpose 
I explained in detail yesterday, is still before 
the Security Council. My delegation will not 
ask for a vote on this resolution today, because 
several delegations have indicated to us that 
they desire more time for all members to con- 
sider carefully enough all of tlie complicated 
ingredients which must go into a truly mean- 

■ For text, see Bulletin of .Tune 26, 1967, p. 948. 
'U.N. doc. S/RES/236 (1967) ; for text, see p. 11. 

ingful next step toward peace in the Middle 
East. And some members have indicated that 
they will wish to suggest certain changes in our 
text. The distinguislied representative of Ethi- 
opia [Lij Endalkachew Makonnen] has made a 
particularly eloquent plea earlier today that we 
not press this resolution to a vote. 

Mr. President, I want the Council to know 
that although we have proposed a resolution 
which expresses our sincere convictions in the 
matter, we are open minded and will be glad 
to consider constructive suggestions for im- ■ 
provement in the United States text. Indeed, 
many constructive contributions liave been made 
in the course of our debate as to how best we 
may deal with this subject, and we have been 
carefully weighing and considering these pro- 
posals which have been made. 

Our objective is what we have achieved so 
far, and that is not to force votes but to achieve 
unanimity on the best course of action that the 
Council can follow to bring about peace in the 
Middle East, just as we have been able to achieve 
unanimity under difficult conditions on the 
cease-fire resolutions we have adopted. 

We must remember that a cease-fire is in 
effect, and admittedly the process of consulta- 
tion, conciliation, and accommodation of view- 
points as to the next important steps takes time, 
and we are ready to agree that the appropriate 
time should be granted for this purpose. 

We recognize the urgency of the matter, and 
I think we have demonstrated for 3 weeks our 
willingness to deal urgently with this situation. 
But we think it perfectly apparent to all con- 
cerned that the Council has far from exhausted 
its possibility of contributing to the construction 
of a stable peace in the Middle East. The fact 
is that we are not at the end of our work. We 
are only at the beginning. 

Now, despite this, we are not going to stand 
in the way of a request by a permanent mem- 
ber of the Security Council for consideration 
of a resolution that a permanent member puts 
before the Security Council. This is quite con- 
sistent with the views that the United States 
delegation has always taken — that if a member, 
permanent or nonpermanent, desires an urgent 
meeting, an urgent meeting should take place; 
if a member, permanent or nonpermanent, de- 
sires to put to a vote a proposition, that is its 
privilege. We are prepared to vote on the resolu- 
tion put to us by the distinguished representa- 
tive of the Soviet Union [S/7951/Rev. 2]. 





U.S./U.N. press release 90 dated June 9 

June 9, 1967 

Dear Mk. Secretary General : My Govern- 
ment wishes to make it umnistakably clear to all 
members of the United Nations that the United 
States has not engaged in any form of military 
operations on behalf of the Government of 
Israel during the present crisis in the Middle 
East. On Jmie 6, 1967 I stated in the Security 
Coimcil : " 

"During the past twenty-four hours, fantastic allega- 
tions have been made about United States aircraft be- 
ing involved in the hostilities in the Near East. These 
allegations are totally v^ithout foundation in fact. They 
are made up out of w^hole cloth. 

"I take this opportunity in the Security Coimcil on 
the complete authority of the United States Govern- 
ment to deny them categorically without any ifs, ands 
or huts. Indeed, yesterday morning June 5, within 
hours after first hearing such charges my Government 
denied them in a formal statement issued by the De- 
partment of Defense which I now quote : 

'There have been reports that U.S. aircraft from 
aircraft carriers assigned to the Sixth Fleet have flown 
to Israeli airfields. Other reports have stated that Sixth 
Fleet aircraft have participated in air activities else- 
where in the area of conflict. All such reports are 
erroneous. All Sixth Fleet aircraft are and have been 
several hundred miles from the area of conflict.' " 

To establish the good faith of my Govern- 
ment, I stated : 

"In these circumstances, my Government considers it 
necessary to take prompt steps to prevent the further 
spread of these dangerous falsehoods. With this in 
mind, I am authorized to announce in this Council and 
propose two concrete measures : 

"The United States is prepared, first, to cooperate in 
an immediate impartial investigation of these charges 
by the United Nations, and to offer all facilities to the 
United Nations in this investigation. And second, as a 
part of, or in addition to such an investigation, the 
United States is prepared to invite United Nations 
personnel aboard our aircraft carriers in the Mediter- 
ranean today, tomorrow, or at the convenience of the 
United Nations to serve as impartial observers of the 
activities of our planes in the area and to verify the 
past activities of our planes from our official records 
and from the log that each ship carries. These ob- 
servers in addition will be free to interview air crews 
on these carriers without inhibition so as to determine 
their activities during the days in question. Their 
presence as observers on these carriers will be wel- 
comed throughout the period of this crisis and so long 

as these ships are in the Eastern waters of the 

I should like to request that you circulate this 
letter to all members of the United Nations as a 
Security Council docmnent. 

With the highest consideration. 
Kespectfully yours, 

Abthur J. Goldberg 


Resolution of June 12^^ 

The Security Council, 

Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary- 
General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made 
at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and 
the supplemental information supplied in documents 
S/7930 and Add. 1^, 

1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire ; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his 
investigations and to report to the Council as soon as 
possible ; 

3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and dis- 
continuance of all military activities includes a pro- 
hibition of any forward military movements subse- 
quent to the cease-fire ; 

4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire posi- 
tions of any troops which may have moved forward 
subsequent to 1630 GMT on 10 June 1967 ; 

5. Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff 
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
in Palestine and the observers in implementing the 
cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate 
communications facilities. 

Resolution of June 14^ 

The Security Council, 

Considering the urgent need to spare the civil popu- 
lations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict 
in the Middle East from additional sufferings, 

Considering that essential and inalienable human 
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes 
of war. 

Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the 
parties Involved in the conflict, 

1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the 
safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the 
areas where military operations have taken place and 
to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have 
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ; 

2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the 

" S/RES/236 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June 


" Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 934. 

"S/RES/237 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June 


JULY 3, 1967 

B65-73S— 67- 


scrupulous resi)eet of the humanitarian principles gov- 
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro- 
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the ef- 
fective implementation of this resolution and to report 
to the Security Council. 


The Security Council, 

Recalling its resoluUons 233, 234, 235 and 236, and 
the understanding formulated by the President of the 
Council at its 1353rd meeting," 

Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United 
Arab Republic have accepted and implemented the 
Council's demand for a cease-fire, and that military 
operations and any forward military movements have 
been discontinued. 

Desirous of taking steps toward the achievement of 
a stable peace in the Near East, 

1. Insists on the continued scrupulous implementa- 
tion by all the parties concerned of the Council's 
repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all 
military activity as a first urgent step toward the 
establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East ; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to 
report to the Council on compliance with the cease- 

3. Calls for discussions promptly among the parties 
concerned, using such third party or United Nations 
assistance as they may wish, looking toward the 
establishment of viable arrangements encompassing 
the withdrawal and disengagement of armed person- 
nel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, 
the maintenance of vital international rights and the 
establishment of a stable and durable peace in the 
Middle East ; 

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide 
such assistance as may be required in facilitating the 
discussions called for in paragraph 3. 

tion of the United Nations Charter and generally recog- 
nized principles of international law ; 

2. Demands that Israel should immediately and un- 
conditionally remove all its troops from the territory 
of those States and withdraw them behind the armi- 
stice lines and should respect the status of the demili- 
tarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice 

U.S. Does Not Concur in Request 
for U.N. General Assembly Session 


Following is the text of a letter from Arthur 
J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant. 

U.S./tJ.N. press release 108 dated June 15 

June 15, 1967 

Deae Mr. Secretary General: I have the 
honor to refer to your telegram of June 14, 1967 
which inquires whether the United States Gov- 
ernment concurs in the request, set forth in 
Document A/6717, for the convening of an 
Emergency Special Session of the General 

Your telegram refers to Kule 9b of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly as setting forth 
the responsibilities of the Secretary General in 
dealing with a request by a Member for an 
Emergency Special Session. This Eule and Rule 
8b, which provides for the convening of an 
Emergency Special Session within 24 hours of 
the receipt by the Secretary General of a request 


The Security Council, 

Noting that Israel, in defiance of the Security Coun- 
cil's resolutions on the cessation of military activities 
and a cease-fire (S/RES/233 of 6 June 1967, 
S/RES/234 of 7 June 1967 and S/RES/235 of 9 June 
1967), has seized additional territory of the United 
Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, 

Noting that although military activities have now 
ceased, Israel is still occupying the territory of those 
countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defy- 
ing the United Nations and all peace-loving States, 

Considering unacceptable and unlawful Israel's ter- 
ritorial claims on Arab States, 

1. Vigorously condemns Israel's aggressive activities 
and continued occupation of part of the territory of 
the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regard- 
ing this as an act of aggression and the grossest viola- 

" U.N. doc. S/7952/Eev. 3. The U.S. draft resolution 
still remains before the CounciL 

" At the conclusion of the meeting on June 9, the 
President of the Security Council (Hans R. Tabor, of 
Denmark) stated: ". . . it appears that we all agree 
that we should request the parties concerned to extend 
all possible cooperation to United Nations Observers in 
the discharge of their responsibilities, that we should 
request the Government of Israel to restore the use of 
Government House to General Odd Bull, and should 
ask the parties to reestablish freedom of movement." 

" U.N. doc. S/7951/Rev. 2. On June 14 at the request 
of the representative of Nigeria, the U.S.S.R. draft 
resolution was voted upon by parts : 4 votes were cast 
in favor of operative paragraph 1 and none against, 
with 11 abstentious (U.S.) ; 6 votes were cast in favor 
of operative paragraph 2 and none against, with 9 
abstentious (U.S.). Accordingly, the draft resolution 
was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required 



for such a session from a majority of the mem- 
bers of the United Nations, refer to General 
Assembly Kesolution 377 A (V) entitled "Unit- 
ing for Peaco".^ The Uniting for Peace resolu- 
tion and Rules 8b and 9b of the General Assem- 
bly's Rules of Procedure constitute the only 
source of authority and the basis for the holding 
of an Emergency Special Session. 

General Assembly Resolution 377A (V) pro- 
vides that an Emergency Special Session may 
be called "If the Security Council, because of 
lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members, 
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and se- 
curity in any case where there appears to be a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 

As you know, the Security Council is seized 
of the question of the Middle East situation.^ 
The Council has already adopted four resolu- 
tions calling for a cease-fire by the parties to the 
recent hostilities in the area, and a fifth resolu- 
tion of a humanitarian character dealing with 
the aftermath of the hostilities. All jBve of these 
resolutions were adopted unanimously. A sixth 
resolution was voted on at the Council meeting 
on June 14 and failed of adoption because it did 
not receive sufficient votes. Several other resolu- 
tions are pending before the Council as well as 
other suggestions to deal with this complex 

With respect to the draft resolution proposed 
by the United States in Document S/7952 Rev. 
3, 1 indicated on June 14 that the United States 
would be prepared to consider constructive sug- 
gestions and revisions. With respect to the draft 
resolution submitted by Canada, its distin- 
guished representative indicated that revisions 
were being considered. 

The present situation is therefore that mem- 
bers of the Security Council are still engaged 
in consultation looking toward further action 
by the Council on this matter. 

The processes of consultation, negotiation and 
search for measures to harmonize the actions of 
nations enjoined by the Charter therefore have 
not been exhausted. For these reasons, the 

" For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823. 
" See p. 3. 

United States Government does not believe that 
a situation has arisen in which the Security 
Council, in the words of the General Assembly 
Resolution 377 A (V), "fails to exercise its pri- 
mary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security." Accordingly, 
the United States is not able to concur in the 
request for the holding of an Emergency Special 
Session at this time. 

If, nevertheless, a majority of the Members 
decides to convene such an Assembly, the United 
States hopes that any discussion will have a 
helpful influence in encouraging and enabling 
all states concerned to deal effectively with the 
underlying causes of tension and conflict in the 
Middle East. The establishment of a firm and 
just peace would be a boon to all peoples of the 
area and would have a most favorable effect on 
general peace and security througliout the 
world. There is imperative need not for invec- 
tive and inflammatory statements, but for con- 
structive proposals and deliberative diplomacy. 

I request that this letter be circulated as a 
document of the Security Council and of the 
General Assembly. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances 
of my highest consideration. 
Sincerely yours, 

Arthur J. Goldbeeg 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Italy, 
Egidio Ortona, presented his credentials to 
President Jolinson on June 14. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated Jime 14. 

New Zealand 

The newly appointed Ambassador of New 
Zealand, Frank H. Corner, presented his creden- 
tials to President Johnson on June 14. For texts 
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press re- 
lease dated June 14. 


North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg 

The North Atlantic Council held its spring 
ministerial meeting at Luxenibourg June 13- 
llf.. Follmoing is the text of a communique is- 
sued at the close of the meeting on June H, to- 
gether with a list of the members of the U.S. 


Press release 143 dated June 15 

The spring ilinisterial Meeting of the NATO 
Council was held in Luxembourg on 13th and 
14th June, 1967. 

Reviewing the international situation in the 
light of recent developments, Ministers took 
note of the high degree of instability and uncer- 
tainty still existing in the world. The Council 
once again aiRrmed that the cohesion of its mem- 
bers remains essential for their own security and 
for the maintenance of peace. 

In accordance with their practice of consult- 
ing together. Ministers held an exchange of 
views on the Middle East situation following 
the hostilities which have once again occurred 
in this region. They noted with satisfaction that 
a cease-fire had now taken place and stressed the 
urgency of humanitarian efforts to alle^date the 
sufferings caused by the war. Member govern- 
ments expressed their determination to support 
all efforts to establish a lasting peace in this area 
and resolve the outstanding problems in a spirit 
of equity and in accordance with the legitimate 
interests of all concerned. 

The Council discussed the questions of East- 
West relations. With a view to improving rela- 
tions and lowering tensions in Europe, govern- 
ments have continued in every way jiossible 
their declared policy of seeking to develop con- 
tacts and mutually advantageous exchanges 
with the countries of Eastern Europe. These ef- 
forts have not always met with success. The 
Council, therefore, recorded its view that the de- 

tente should be extended for the benefit of all 
members of the Alliance. Ministers agreed to 
continue close consultation on the ways in which 
the policies of member countries can contribute 
to improved East-West relations in a framework 
of peace, security and stability. The special 
group on future tasks of the Alliance was asked 
to make a thorough study of these and related 

Ministers again emphasized that the peaceful 
settlement of the German question on the basis 
of the free expression of political will by the 
German people was an essential factor for a just 
and lasting i^eaceful order in Europe. Ministers 
were informed by their German colleague of the 
state of relations between the two parts of Ger- 
many. They welcomed the efforts by the Federal 
Government to increase human, economic and 
cultural contacts between both parts of Ger- 
many, and were agreed that this internal Ger- 
man process was to be considered an important 
contribution to the search for a detente in Eu- 
rope. On Berlin, Ministers agreed that the ques- 
tion of ensuring the viability of that city re- 
quires special attention. They confirmed the 
declaration of the Council of 16th December, 

Ministers expressed their concern to see prog- 
ress made in the field of disarmament and arms 
control, including steps directed towards pre- 
venting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of 
forces by the East and West could be a signifi- 
cant step toward security in Europe. A contri- 
bution on the part of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European countries towards a reduc- 
tion of forces would be welcomed as a gesture 
of peaceful intent. 

Regarding Greek-Turkish relations. Minis- 
ters noted the Secretary General's report on his 
"Watching Brief" and invited him to continue 

" For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 52. 



his activities in this sphere. They expressed the 
hope that Greece and Turkey would resume 
their discussions on the Cyprus question and on 
Greek-Turkish relations and that these would 
rapidly produce positive results. They re- 
affirmed the importance which they attach to 
preserving peace and improving the situation 
on the Island, as well as to the continued pres- 
ence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus 
while an agreed solution is being sought. 

Ministers took note of an interim report of 
the Permanent Council on the studies being 
undertaken on the future tasks of the Alliance 
pursuant to the Ministerial Kesolution ^ of 22nd 
December, 1966. They noted with satisfaction 
that the keen interest displayed in this study 
was further evidence of the vitality with which 
the Alliance is determined to face its tasks in the 
years ahead. Ministers look forward to receiving 
the substantive results of this study. 

Ministers examined the report which, at their 
request, the Permanent Representatives have 
prepared on the ways and means of implement- 
ing the proposals of the Italian Government for 
reducing disparities in the technological devel- 
opment of different countries. They adopted the 
attached resolution recommending the intensi- 
fication both of member countries' own efforts 
and of international cooperation at the Euro- 
pean and Atlantic levels and in a wider frame- 
work. The Permanent Representatives have 
been invited to keep under review the specific 
role which the Alliance can play in the field of 
teclmology and to report their findings to the 
next Ministerial Meeting. 

The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council 
will be held in Brussels in December 1967. 

Resolution on Intebnational Technological 

Ministers, having considered the report submitted 
to them by the Council in permanent session on the 
procedure which might be followed for further exami- 
nation and implementation of the Italian proposals for 
closer international co-operation in technology : 

(1) Noted that: (a) The discrepancies in the rate 
of technological progress vary considerably between 
the different countries and also between one sector and 
another; they are apparent not only between North 
America and Europe, but also within Europe, and, on 
a world scale between the more Industrialized countries 
and those which are still developing ; 

(b) While some disparities are inevitable in dynamic 
societies, in order to avoid that they become a source 


of tension, every effort should be made in scientific, 
technical and industrial areas simultaneously on both 
national and international levels and special consider- 
ation should be given to the problems of the less 
developed countries of the Alliance ; 

(c) On the international level, some tasks are par- 
ticularly suitable for co-operation between a small 
number of countries while others may necessitate wider 
co-operation, either on a European scale, an Atlantic 
scale or in a wider framework. 

(2) Recommended as far as efforts on a national 
level were concerned that the governments of member 
countries should: 

(a) Ensure that sufficient resources be devoted to 
education, to scientific and technical training, and to 
research and development; 

(b) Seek to determine and put into practice in a 
co-ordinated manner the various courses of action 
liable to contribute to the success of a long-term tech- 
nological policy which would define both the areas 
suitable for national realization, and the role which 
the country concerned could play in international co- 
operation, it being understood that the less developed 
members of the Alliance will be helped to the extent 
possible in the fulfilment of this recommendation. 

(3) As far as co-operation at the European level 
was concerned : 

(a) Agreed that closer co-operation between the 
European countries was an essential way of reducing 
the disparities in technology between Europe and North 
America ; 

(b) Noted that various existing organizations were 
already pursuing studies and implementing certain 
forms of co-operation between their member countries ; 

(c) Recognized that research and development po- 
tential, and homogeneity and size of market are essen- 
tial factors relevant to technical progress; 

(d) Noted that interested governments would benefit 
from considering together all possible ways and means 
of facilitating technological co-operation between them. 

(4) As far as general co-operation at the Atlantic 
level or in a wider framework was concerned : 

(a) Recognized that the studies and consultations 
undertaken in the OECD constituted a most useful 
starting point and should be continued and intensified 
without prejudice to the possibility of setting up new 
procedures if they should prove necessary ; 

(b) Noted that member governments should be 
ready to examine in a constructive spirit, new pro- 
posals which may be put forward with a view to arriv- 
ing at measures for mutual collaboration including, 
where appropriate, specific agreements, in particular 
between countries which are in advance in certain 
fields of technology and other countries; 

(c) Recommended that, in the light of studies un- 
derway in OECD, further exchanges of views, and 
negotiations as appropriate, should be undertaken to 
examine : 

(i) Schemes for reducing obstacles which hinder 
technological exchange ; 

(ii) Acceptable ways for facilitating access for 


firms to patents and technological data, Including 
those owned by governments ; 

(ill) Whether international co-operation on govern- 
ment research and development contracts can be 
expanded ; 

(iv) These and other ways for reducing the phe- 
nomenon of the "Brain-Drain". 

(5) As far as the role of the Alliance itself was 
concerned : 

(a) Noted with satisfaction that the various scien- 
tific and technological activities already undertaken 
by NATO had contributed, in the spirit of Article II of 
the North Atlantic Treaty, to the speeding-up of the 
spread of scientific and technical progress in member 
countries, while reinforcing the cohesion and military 
power of the Alliance ; 

(b) Invited the Council in permanent session to pur- 
sue its studies, and to report at the next Ministerial 
Meeting in December on the role which the Alliance 
could play in the field of technology, Including pos- 
sibly the application of defense technology to civil 
needs, to encourage co-operation between its members, 
and to contribute towards narrowing the technological 
disparities which may exist between them. 


Press release 140 dated June 10 


Dean Rusk (chairman) , Secretary of State 

United States Representative on the North Atlantic 

Harlan Cleveland 

Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State 

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

Philip J. Farley, Deputy United States Representative 
on the North Atlantic Council 

Patricia R. Harris, American Ambassador to Luxem- 

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and 
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs 

Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs 

Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic Politi- 
cal-Military Affairs 

George S. Springsteen, Jr. (coordinator). Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 

George S. Vest (deputy coordinator) , Deputy Director, 
Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military 

Brig. Gen. John G. Wheelock, III, USA, Director, Eu- 
ropean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for International Security Affairs 

Secretary o/ Delegation 

William G. Jones, Director, Office of International Con- 
ferences, Department of State 

The Peaceful Revolution 
of the 20th Century 

Following is a message from President John- 
son to the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and DevelopTnent on the 20th anniversary 
of the Marshall Plan, which was read iy Am- 
bassador at Large W. Averell Harriman at a 
commemoratvve dinner at Paris on Jv/ne 5. 

Twenty years ago a great American Secretary 
of State, George Marshall, stated the peaceful 
revolution of the 20th century. His proposal 
that the United States join with Europe in the 
enormous task of rebuilding that war-ravaged 
continent marked the beginning of a bold new 
experiment in international cooperation. "Our 
policy," he said, "is directed not against any 
coimtry or doctrine but against poverty, hunger, 
desperation, and chaos." ^ 

Working together, Europe and America de- 
feated these ancient enemies and laid the foun- 
dation for an era of prosperity and growth 
unmatched in history. Success was not inevi- 
table. It took energy, imagination, and courage 
on both sides of the Atlantic. 

These qualities still abound, both in Europe 
and America. Our task now is to mobilize them 
in the battle against the "poverty, hunger, des- 
peration, and chaos" that still afflict most of 
mankind. Today's challenge is more stubborn, 
more complex, and fully as urgent as that of 

We must continue to improve the interna- 
tional economic and financial arrangements 
which have served us so well and are so impor- 
tant to our continued prosperity. 

We must maintain the vitality of the institu- 
tions we have created for the maintenance of 
peace and security throughout the world and the 
commitments in which they are rooted. 

We must continue to work to bridge the gap 
that still divides East from West. 

We must join hands to promote the growth, in 
peace and freedom, of the developing countries. 
It is here that the challenge is most urgent and 
the penalties of failure most painful. 

Together we built a new Europe from the 
ruins of war. Let us now resolve to work to- 
gether for a world at peace, free of poverty, 
hunger, and disease. 

' BinxETiN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159. 



The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction to the Construction of Europe 

hy Ainbassador at Large W. Averell Harriman ^ 

I wish to express my gratitude to '■'■Opinion en 
S4 heures" for having brought us together and 
for inviting me to join this most interesting dis- 
cussion of the Marshall Plan and your theme, 
"From the Reconstruction to the Construction 
of Europe." Then, too, it is always a delight for 
me to have an excuse to come to Paris. 

It is hard for me to draw a line dividing re- 
construction and construction. From the very 
inception of the Marshall Plan, those of us who 
were involved in carrying it out — Europeans 
and Americans alike — thought in terms of con- 
struction as well as reconstruction, not simply 
recovery but the building of a foundation on 
which Europe would grow and prosper. 

There was a distinct change in our emotions 
as the program was conceived and got under 
way. At the time of General Marshall's speech,^ 
there was the gravest concern over the plight 
of Europe, due to the destruction and disloca- 
tions of the war and aggravated by the dis- 
astrous crop failures and the desperately cold 
winter of 1947. These conditions inspired Gen- 
eral Marshall's words to describe our policy as 
"against himger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos." His proposal and the quick response of 
the Western European governments, followed 
by prompt action by the American Congress, 
brought a feeling of hope by the spring of 1948. 
Hope was converted increasingly into confi- 
dence with the extraordinary progress made 
through the combined efforts of those partici- 
pating in this great cooperative enterprise. 
Now, after 20 years, with Europe more 
dynamic and prosperous than ever before in its 

'Address made at a luncheon sponsored by "L' opi- 
nion en 24 heurea" at Paris on June 6 (press release 

' For text, see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159. 

history, we miglit say there is a sense of fulfill- 
ment. But we camiot afford complacency, as 
there is more to be done. 

For my part, I feel that the spirit of the 
Marshall Plan is still very much alive. Many 
of the goals of today were conceived and prog- 
ress toward them gained momentum during the 
early years of the plan. May I recall a few of 
them to you ? 

First of all, the basic concepts, not only of 
self-help but, equally emphasized, of mutual 
aid, led rapidly to a call for the integration of 
Europe. The initiative came from both sides 
of the Atlantic. The Congress strengthened the 
language in the enabling legislation in the sec- 
ond year (1949) by including in the preamble 
this statement : "It is declared to be the policy 
of the people of the United States to encourage 
the unification of Europe." This policy guided 
the American actions throughout. 

In Europe, initiatives of fundamental impor- 
tance were taken by the OEEC [Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation]. At our 
request, the organization undertook the respon- 
sibility of dividing the available American aid 
among the participants. This led to the system 
of annual country reviews, in which for the fii'st 
time in history the policies and programs of 
each participating goverimient were analyzed 
and criticized by their peers because all recog- 
nized the effects of national policies on com- 
mon objectives. Revolutionary programs for 
increased productivity and capital mvestment 
for an expanding economy were accepted as 
essential goals. Procedures for concerted action 
continue today in the successor organization— 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Coop- 
eration and Development] . 

A drive to break down trade barriers, partic- 
ularly quantitative restrictions, was imple- 
mented through the intra-European payments 

JUIiT 3, 1967 


system and later given impetus by the European 
Payments Union. 

These actions made possible the development 
of the Coal and Steel Community and other 
bodies, followed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome 
and the European Economic Conmiunity, which 
added new dimensions to the structure of Euro- 
pean integration. Now Great Britain as well as 
Deimiark, Ireland, and possibly other countries 
are taking steps toward membership. 

American support for European unity has 
been consistently recorded from the begimiing 
of tlie Marshall Plan to this day. President 
Jolinson last October reaffirmed our position, 
saying: "We look forward to the expansion and 
further strengthening of the European com- 
mimity." ^ 

The view that we Americans have of the need 
for unity in Western Europe is not based on 
abstractions. It is based on our experience that 
our own achievements could not have been re- 
alized except on a continent of freedom of move- 
ment of people, trade, and ideas. We see Western 
European unity as an indispensable step in the 
attaimnent of the overriding objectives that 
Europeans and Americans share together. 

Speaking of a unified Europe, President Ken- 
nedy once said : * 

The United States looks on tliis vast new enterprise 
with hope and admiration. . . . We see in such a 
Europe a partner ... in all the great and burdensome 
tasks of building and defending a community of free 

President Johnson last October spoke of a 
imified Europe as "an equal partner in helping 
to build a peaceful and just world order." 

I feel that it is important for Europeans to 
understand that the United States has consist- 
ently applauded European initiatives for inte- 
gration. We firmly believe that it strengthens 
the Atlantic partnership. 

Of the other tasks ahead, I would underline 
the responsibilities we share toward the develop- 
ing areas of the world — those nations whose 
people are aspiring to be freed from man's 
ancient enemies, ignorance and poverty. 

" Ihid.. Oct. 24, 19G6, p. 622. 
* Ihid., July 23, 1962, p. 131. 

These tasks also found their origin in the co- 
ojoerative work begun during the Marshall Plan, 
The OECD and its subcommittees are making 
progress m coordinating assistance, but much 
more needs to be done. The World Bank esti- 
mates that the developing nations badly need 
and can effectively absorb twice the amount of 
capital that is now being made available. This 
gap must be filled. Our own continuing prosper- 
ity and security are closely linked with the 
achievement of the aspirations of the peoples of 
the developing areas. 

The agreement achieved in the Kennedy 
Round is a milestone in encoui'aging world trade 
particularly for the industrialized nations. Our 
endeavors now should be directed toward in- 
creasing the trade of the developing nations. 

Furthermore, let us not forget General Mar- 
shall's offer was to the whole of Europe, in- 
cluding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
It was Molotov who walked out of the Paris 
meeting of ministers called to consider the pro- 
posal, forcmg Czechoslovakia and Poland to 
withdraw as well. It was Stalin who organized 
the Cominform and declared war on the Mar- 
shall Plan, branding it an American device "to 
subjugate Europe." 

Today, the people of Eastern Europe see a 
prosperous Western Europe, strong and inde- 
pendent, with a high degree of integration. The 
unnatural division continues to partition Eu- 
rope. As President Johnson has pointed out, 
"We must turn to one of the great unfinished 
tasks of our generation : making Europe whole." 
Progress toward this goal, along the lines he 
outlined, certainly will add to the prosperity 
and security of both Eastern and Western 
Europe and, in fact, of the world as a whole. 

And so, in closing, let me suggest that we are 
not gathered here to commemorate the Marshall 
Plan as a thing of the past but to celebrate its 
conception. Its concepts are as alive today and 
as valuable today as ever. There is much ahead 
to be done to continue the construction of Eu- 
rope. At the same time, our overriding task lies 
in using our combined material and spiritual 
resources to seize the opportunities and respon- 
sibilities to help build a world of expanding 
opportunity for all. 



^'■What is really changing in international politics?" In his 
remarks before the Department of State''s national foreign pol- 
icy conference for editors and broadcasters on May 22, Mr. 
Brzezinski, a member of the Departments Policy Planning 
Council, analyzed five major changes in international politics 
and their implications for U.S. foreign policy. His remarks were 
made on a ''''background'''' basis, and he has edited them for 
publication in the Bulletin. 

The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy 

by Zbigniew Brzezinski 

International politics is dominated by crises. 
The result is that we often mistake these crises 
for the reality of international politics. Gomg 
from crisis to crisis, we simply lose sight of the 
more basic and often more important changes 
that imperceptibly reshape the world in which 
we live. 

It is useful, therefore, sometimes to pause 
and ask in a detached way : Wliat is the nature 
of our era? What is really changing in inter- 
national politics? By posing these questions we 
become better equipped to discuss the implica- 
tions of historical trends for U.S. foreign 
policy. Definition of a broad framework of that 
kind in turn enables us to see in sharper relief 
our true interests and goals in specific regions 
of the world, such as Europe or Asia. Accord- 
ingly, in these remarks I would like to first turn 
to the problem of change in international 
politics and then discuss the implications of 
these changes for the U.S. posture in world 

As I look at international politics, I see five 
major changes taking place, together funda- 
mentally altering the nature of international 
relations in our day. The changes are not ob- 
vious, because they are slow ; but their cumula- 
tive impact is most important. 

Waning of Ideological Conflicts 

1. The first involves the loaning of ideological 
conflicts among the more developed nations of 
the world. 

Since the time of the French Revolution, 

conflicts between states have been profoundly 
emotionalized by mass struggles induced by a 
mixture of ideology and nationalism. "Where 
that mixture was particularly intense, as in the 
case of nazism, the conflicts which resulted were 
particularly bloody and destructive. By and 
large, during the last 150 years or so relations 
among the more advanced states, particularly 
in Europe, have been poisoned by the emotional- 
izing impact of absolute doctrinal answers 
concerning most of the basic issues of humanity. 

Tliis condition is waning due to a variety of 

First of all, nuclear weapons have necessi- 
tated greater and greater restraint in relations 
among states. The realization of the enormous 
destructiveness of nuclear conflict has had a 
most sobering effect on statesmen. Hitherto one 
could calculate the cost and the potential ad- 
vantages of war ; today, this simply is no longer 
possible, and thus even the most bitter ideologi- 
cal hatreds have to be restrained by common 


Secondly, just as important, we are realizing 
more fully that social change is such an enor- 
mously complex and interrelated process, with 
so many variables, that it cannot be reduced to 
a few simple ideological formidas, as was the 
case in the early stages of industrialization. 
Ideological attitudes are thus giving way to a 
problem-solving, engineering approach to social 

Thirdly, communism, the principal, and until 
recently the most militant, revolutionary ideol- 

JULT 3, 1967 


ogy of our day, is dead — communism is dead as 
an ideology in the sense that it is no longer 
capable of mobilizing unified global support. 
On the contrary, it is increasingly fragmented 
by conflicts among constituent vmits and par- 
ties. This has contributed to ideological disil- 
lusionment among its members. Commimist 
states. Communist movements, and Commimist 
subversion are still very important on the in- 
ternational scene, but Commmiist ideology as a 
vital force is no longer with us. 

Kevolutionary movements in different parts 
of the world instead relate themselves more 
specifically to local radical traditions and try to 
exploit local opportunities. Thus, the common 
doctrine and its alleged universal validity are 
being diluted by specific adaptations. The proc- 
ess is destroying the universal appeal and glo- 
bal effectiveness of ideology. 

All of that, cumulatively, prompts the waning 
of the ideological age in relations, particularly 
among the developed nations. The role of ideol- 
ogy is still quite important in relations among 
the less developed states, where problems are 
simpler, where issues can be translated into 
black-and-white propositions, and where abso- 
lute doctrinal categories still appear superfi- 
cially relevant. 

Shift in Focus of Violence 

2. Closely connected with the loaning ideolog- 
ical conflicts ainong the more developed nations 
of the world is the decline of violence among 
these states. During approximately the last 150 
years, the international scene has been domi- 
nated by conflicts fought principally among the 
more advanced and largely European nations of 
the world. The focus of violence today is shift- 
ing to the third world. Increasingly, conflicts 
are either between some of the developed nations 
and the less developed nations ; or increasingly, 
instability in the imderdeveloped world is itself 
the source of global tensions. It is thus a basic 
reversal of the dominant pattern of the recent 

The new restraint on violence displayed by 
the more advanced states in relations among one 
another is also largely due to the nuclear age. 
It should be acknowledged that without the 
presence of nuclear weapons a major war prob- 
ably would have erupted in the course of the 
last 20 years. Given the range of conflicts, the 

frequent tensions, and the occasional clashes 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
in almost any other era in history a war between 
them probably would have ensued. The pres- 
ence of nuclear weapons has introduced an over- 
riding factor of restraint into relations among 
the more advanced states and has helped to 
preserve world peace. 

This restraint is still largely absent insofar 
as relations among the less developed states are 
concerned. Moreover, the ideological passions 
and the nationalist tensions have not yet run 
their full course ; and consequently the propen- 
sity toward total reactions, total commitment, 
and total violence is still quite high. 

Without discussing the pros and cons of the 
Vietnamese war, it offers a good example of the 
generalization made above. It reflects the shift 
of focus in global affairs from conflicts between 
the developed states to a conflict that involves 
a wealthy and higlily advanced country in an 
effort to create regional stability. The unwill- 
ingness of the Soviet Union to become totally 
involved in the conflict stems from the greater 
realization of its own interest in preserving 
peace in the nuclear age and also from the grad- 
ual waning of its ideology, which weakens its 
sense of total identification with every revo- 
lutionary movement in the world. 

Trend Toward Postnationalism 

3. The third generalization is the proposition 
that we are witnessing the end of the supremacy 
of the nation-state on the international scene. 
This process is far from consummated, but 
nonetheless the trend seems to me to be irre- 
versible. It is not only a matter of security 
interdependence among allied states. It is also 
a matter of psychological change. People 
through history have expanded their sense of 
identification. At first, men identified them- 
selves with their families, then with their vil- 
lages, then with their towns, then with their 
regions and provinces, then with their nations. 
Now increasingly people are beginning to 
identify with their continents and regions. 
This change has been induced by the necessities 
of economic development and of the technologi- 
cal revolution, by changes in the means of 
conmiunication — all of which cause people to 
identify themselves more and more with wider, 
more global human interests. 



Global Power of the United States 

4. The fourth rnajor change which has tahen 
place in our times is the emergence of the United 
States as the preponderant world poioer. The 
conventional view is that since 1945 we have 
seen three basic stages of international develop- 
ment: First of all, U.S. nuclear monopoly; 
secondly, bipolarity, based on two homogeneous 
alliances rigidly confronting each other; and 
now increasingly polycentrism, with many 
states playing tlie international game. 

I submit that this is a wrong perspective; 
in fact, the sequence has been the opposite. The 
first postwar era — 1945-50 — was essentially a 
polycentric era. The United States was largely 
disarmed. It had a nuclear monopoly, to be sure, 
but its nuclear power was essentially apocalyp- 
tic; it was not applicable— it was only usable 
in circumstances which everyone wished to 
avoid — hence it was not politically relevant. 
The United States was disarmed, it was only 
beginning to be involved in Europe, hardly in- 
volved in Asia — and there were still two major 
empires on the scene, the French and the Brit- 
ish. The Russians were asserting their regional 
control over Central Europe, but they were not 
yet involved in Asia. Asia itself was in turmoil. 
This truly was the polycentric era. 

It gave way to the era of bipolarity, of di- 
chotomic confrontation, if you will, between 
two alliances — one led by the Soviet Union, one 
led by the United States. The Soviet Union 
during this time acquired nuclear capacity, and 
under Khrushchev it misjudged its nuclear 
power and attempted to pursue between 1958 
and 1962 a policy designed to assert Soviet 
global su)5remacy. These years were dominated 
by the Soviet effort to throw the West out of 
Berlin, to put missiles in Cuba and to force a 
showdown. However, Khrushchev discovered in 
1962 that the Soviet Union still had only apoca- 
lyptic power. Its nuclear power was not relevant 
when faced with U.S. power, which by then had 
become much more complex and much more 
usable in a far greater diversity of situations. 

Thus in the last few years the United States 
successfully stared Khrushchev down in Cuba, 
it protected its interests in the Dominican Re- 
public and in the Congo— and today it is doing 
it in Viet-Nam. Yet the Soviet Union did not 
dare to react even in the area of its regional 
domination: Berlin. Today, the Soviet Union 
is in effect a regional power, concentrating pri- 

marily on Europe and on the growing danger 
from China. Our power during this ensuing 
period has become applicable power, with a 
long-range delivery system, with the means of 
asserting itself on the basis of a global reach. 
Moreover, recent years — and this is much 
more important — have witnessed continued eco- 
nomic growth in this country; they have seen 
the expansion and appearance on the world 
scene of U.S. technological know-how. Increas- 
ingly, the U.S. way of life, our styles, our pat- 
terns of living, are setting the example. Today, 
if there is a creative society in the world, it is 
the United States — in the sense that everyone, 
very frequently without knowing it, is imitating 
it. However, paradoxically because the United 
States is the only global power, it finds it in- 
creasingly difiicult to concentrate its resources 
or its policy on any specific region of the world. 
This often creates sharp dilemmas and difficul- 
ties, difficulties with which we will have to live 
because our involvement is also a major factor 
of stability in the world. 

The Growing Fragmentation of the World 

5. The fifth major change involves the grow- 
ing fragmentation of the loorld, not only 
between the developed states and the under- 
developed — lohich is, of course, miich talked 
about — hut the increasing fragmentation of the 
developed loorld. I have particularly in mind 
the growing difference between the United 
States and the rest of the advanced world. The 
United States is becoming a new society, a soci- 
ety no longer shaped by the impact of the 
industrial process on social, economic, and polit- 
ical life. That impact still shapes European 
life ; if you look at the changes in the nature of 
the European political elite, if you look at prob- 
lems of employment or unemployment or wel- 
fare, if you look at efforts to create greater 
access to education in Europe — all of these are 
manifestations of the imjjact of the industrial 
process on a formerly rural and traditional 

The United States is no longer in this kind 
of historical era. Increasingly, our social di- 
lemmas are of leisure, well-being, automation, 
psychic well-being, alienation of the youth 
(usually from well-to-do middle-class families). 
All of that is connected with a standard of liv- 
ing which has become relatively stable and lugh, 
connected with a society which is well-to-do but 

JULT 3, 1967 


in many respects has new dilemmas of purpose 
and meaning. We are becoming, in effect, a post- 
industrial society, in which computers and com- 
munications are shaping more and more our 
way of life. Our education and our image of 
the world are shaped more by television and 
less and less by sequential, logical media such 
as books and newspapers. If the Europeans are 
today experiencing the automobile revolution — 
which extends physical mobility — Americans 
are undergoing an electronic revolution, which 
extends our senses and nervous systems. 

All of this induces new perspectives and new 
attitudes and sharpens the difference between 
us and the rest of the developed world. It also 
creates underlying tension, in addition to the 
ob^aous problems of foreign policy, such as the 
Kennedy Eound, the problem of NATO, the 
problem of East- West relations, and so forth. 

U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Change 

If there is any merit in this highly general- 
ized analysis of the nature of change in our 
time, what are its implications for U.S. foreign 
policy ? 

First of all, we should not become ideological 
latecomers. We have traditionally been the prag- 
matic society, free of ideological shackles. It 
would be unfortunate if now we succumbed to 
internal and external ideologization, either be- 
cause of belated anti-Communist rigidity at a 
time when the Commimist world is becoming 
fragmented or because of radical reactions to 
internal dilemmas, the new dilemmas of our 
society that I spoke about. It would be unfor- 
tunate if these new dilemmas, inherent in the 
United States' becoming a new type of society, 
were responded to on the basis of essentially ir- 
relevant, outmoded, 19th-century ideological 
formulations. Yes, this is the great danger, par- 
ticularly with the New Left, which is looking 
for ideological guidance and only too often 
turns to outmoded anarchistic, Trotskyite, or 
nihilistic doctrines, doctrines completely irrele- 
vant to the new dilemmas of our society. 

Secondly, in our foreign policy we ought to 
avoid the prescriptions of the extreme right or 
the extreme left. The right only too often says, 
erroneously, that to protect a better America 
we ought to stay out of the world. The New Left 
says that to build a better America we have to 
stay out of the world. Both are wrong, because 
today our global involvement and our prepon- 

derance of power is such that our disinvolve- 
ment would create international chaos of enor- 
mous proportions. Our involvement is an his- 
torical fact — there is no way of ending it. One 
can debate about the forms it ought to take, 
about its scope and the way it is applied, but 
one cannot any longer debate in absolutist terms 
should we or should we not be involved. 

Thirdly, we should not imderestimate, be- 
cause of our own historical formation, the role 
of revolutionary nationalism in the world. 
While we have to pursue the task of building a 
world of cooperative communities, we have to 
realize that revolutionary nationalism is a stage 
of development which in many cases cannot be 
avoided. We should therefore be very careful 
not to get overinvolved in conflicts, with the re- 
sult that we are pitched against revolutionary 
nationalisms, making us appear as impediments 
to social change. 

This raises the extremely complicated issue of 
intervention. Under what conditions should we 
or should we not intervene ? It is extraordinarily 
difficult to define clear-cut criteria; but as a 
broad generalization, it might be said that in- 
tervention is justified whenever its absence will 
create regional instability of expanding propor- 
tions. It has to be judged largely on its inter- 
national merits and not in terms of specific 
domestic consequences within individual states. 
It is that distinction which justifies interven- 
tion — it is that distinction which warrants our 
involvement today in the effort to create re- 
gional stability in Southeast Asia. 

Fourthly, in seeking ties with the developed 
nations of the world, particularly with Western 
Europe, we have to emphasize in addition to 
specific political and security arrangements, in- 
creasingly efforts addressed to the fundamental 
social dilemmas which are inherent in the 
widening gap between the United States and 
Western Europe. We ought to try to share and 
distribute our new knowledge and teclmological 
skills, because this is the unique asset of the 
postindustrial society. At the same time we 
should try to make the industrial societies more 
aware of the novel character of our problems. 
By learning from us they can perhaps avoid 
some of our difficulties. We have to forge new 
social bonds, especially between our yoimger 
generation and the younger Europeans — and 
urgently so, for we are at a time in histoiy when 
the two continents find themselves in different 
historical eras. 



Finally, to apply these remarks cumulatively 
and briefly to Europe : Since the ideological age 
is waning, since the developed world is increas- 
ingly becoming the zone of tranquillity, since 
the United States is playing a predominant role 
in the world, and since we are in a new historical 
era which gives us special assets, it is our task 
to develop a broader approach for Europe, the 
purpose of which, as the President said on Octo- 
ber 7th,^ is to end gradually through reconcilia- 
tion the cold war, a remnant of the civil war 
that has divided the most advanced parts of the 
world for the last 150 years. 

Thus we need to adapt the Atlantic concept 
to the post-cold-war era. We should strive in- 
creasingly to shape a community of the de- 
veloped nations which will contain four basic 
components: The United States; a more homo- 
geneous and integrated Western Europe in close 
ties with the United States but also in increas- 
ingly close linkage with Eastern Europe; an 
Eastern Europe which will gradually begin to 
stand on its own feet and engage in subregional 
integration more independently of the Soviet 
Union while in turn retaining its ties with the 
Soviet Union; a Soviet Union which would 
also be drawn into constructive relationships 
with Western Europe and the United States. 

Only by developing such a community of the 
developed nations, of which Japan should natu- 
rallj' be a member, can we try to assure a meas- 
ure of order to a world which otherwise will be 
increasingly dominated by chaos. 

If we look 20 years ahead, we can see clearly 
a challenge to the survival of organized society 
in several parts of the world. "When we look 20 
years ahead in the developed parts of the world 
and particularly in the United States, where the 
scientific, tecluiological, medical, and chemical 
revolutions are progressing most rapidly, we 
can increasingly see a challenge to the individ- 
ual as a mysterious, autonomous human being. 

We cannot effectively respond to these twin 
challenges if we are at the same time pre- 
occupied with ideological and doctrinal con- 
flicts which no longer have much relevance to 
the fundamental concerns of our day. Given 
the traditional American quest for human free- 
dom and today's U.S. global power, we have the 
opportunity and the responsibility to take the 
lead in responding to these twin challenges. 

U.S. Offers Indian Government 
Oceanographic Research Vessel 

Presa release 138 dated June 8 

The Department of State and the National 
Science Foundation on June 8 announced that 
the President has approved a proposal to trans- 
fer the RV Anton Bruiin, an oceanographic 
research vessel owned and operated by the Na- 
tional Science Foundation, to the Government 
of India. The arrival of Indian representatives 
to survey the ship and conduct technical discus- 
sions with NSF relating to the proposed trans- 
fer is expected in the near future. The transfer 
itself would take place later this year. 

The Bnmn, formerly the Presidential yacht 
Williamsburg, was built in 1930 and has in re- 
cent years been operated as a biological oceano- 
graphic research ship. During 1963-1964 she 
participated in the International Indian Ocean 
Expedition, in which 13 nations including the 
United States and India cooperated in the first 
comprehensive study of the Indian Ocean. The 
Anton Bruun will be used by the Indian Gov- 
ernment for scientific research in oceanography. 

The Bruun carries the name of Dr. Anton 
Bruun, a Danish oceanographer who, until his 
death in 1961, was one of the world's most dis- 
tinguished marine biologists and proponents of 
international cooperation in science. Dr. Bioiun 
was the first chaii-man of the Intergovernmental 
Oceanographic Commission, which sponsored 
the International Indian Ocean Expedition. 

United States and Malta Conclude 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
June 15 (press release 142) that notes had been 
exchanged at Valletta, Malta, on June 14 be- 
tween the Government of Malta and the Amer- 
ican Embassy, on behalf of the Government of 
the United States, which provide for controls 
over the exports of cotton textiles from Malta to 
the United States. 

As reflected in the notes,^ the comprehensive 
understanding shall remain in force for a period 

' For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y., 
on Oct. 7, 1966. see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

^ For text of the U.S. note, see Department of State 
press release 142 dated June 15. 


of 4 years, retroactively from January 1, 1967, 
through December 31, 1970. 

The understanding establishes an overall 
limit for the first agreement year of 12.7 million 
square yards equivalent. Within this aggregate 
limit, three group limits are provided : the first 
covers all yarn categories, at 9 million square 
yards equivalent; the second covers fabrics, 
made-up goods, and miscellaneous, at 200 thou- 

sand square yards equivalent; and the third 
covers all apparel categories, at 3.5 million 
square yards equivalent. Specific ceilings are 
provided within the apparel group ceiling for 
three categories. 

Provisions on growth, swing, carryover, con- 
sultation, spacing, system of categories and con- 
version factors, and administrative arrange- 
ments are also included. 


Calendar of International Conferences ^ 

Scheduled July Through September 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on World Trade in Steel 

IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes 

FAO Study Group on Rice: 11th Session 

IBE Council: 32d Session 

UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session 

ICAO Panel of Experts To Consider Limits of Liability for Passengers 

Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol. 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session 

Fifth International Film Festival 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Legal Status of Gas Pipelines 

OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees 

OECD Energy Committee 

UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 30th 


OECD Tourism Committee 

lATC Technical Committee on Research and Organization: 5th 


ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation 

CENTO Ministerial Council: 15th Session 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 4 

Geneva July 3-5 

London July 3-7 

Rome July 3-7 

Geneva July 4-5 

Geneva July 4-14 

Montreal July 4-17 

Geneva July 4-21 

Moscow July 5-20 

Geneva July 6-7 

Paris July 6-7 

Paris July 6-7 

Geneva July 6-15 

Paris July 7 (1 day) 

Mexico July 10-13 

Geneva July 10-14 

London July 10-14 

London July 11-12 

Paris July 11-12 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, 1967, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-September 
1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these 
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and 
Intellectual Property; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and 
Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lATC, Inter-American Travel Congresses; 
IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International 
Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele- 
communication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAIGH, Pan American 
Institute of Geography and History; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health 
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 



International Seed Testing Association: Executive Committee Cambridge, July 11-20 


WMO Worldwide Conference on Meteorological Training Leningrad .... July 11-22 

Economic and Social Council: 43d Session Geneva July 11-Aug. 4 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 3 Paris July 17-18 

OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel Paris July 17-19 

U.N. Committee of 24 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial New York .... July 17-Aug. 25 

Countries and Peoples. 

International Wheat Council London July 18-21 

lATC Technical Committee on Removal of Travel Barriers: 5th Managua July 18-21 


OECD Development Assistance Committee: High-Level Meeting . . . Paris July 19-20 

lATC Technical Committee on Travel Plant: 5th Meeting Quito July 24-27 

lATC Teclmical Committee on Tourist Travel Promotion: 5th Lima July 31-Aug. 3 


ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Construction of Vehicles Geneva July 31-Aug. 4 

FAO Technical Conference on Fisheries of West African Countries. . . Dakar July 31-Aug. 4 

FAO Fertilizer Industry Advisory Panel: 13th Session Rome July 

ECOSOC Regional on Political and Civic Education for Women. Helsinki Aug. 1-14 

Inter-American Statistical Institute: 5th General Assembly Caracas Aug. 7-18 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 5th Session Geneva Aug. 15-Sept. 8 

ECAFE Seminar on Financial Aspects of Trade Expansion Bangkok Aug. 21-28 

ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec- New York .... Aug. 21-Sept. 1 

tion of Minorities. 

International Coffee Council London Aug. 21-Sept. 8 

ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 1 

United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee on the Effects of Atomic Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 8 


UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Paris August 

Group on Marine Pollution. 

21st Edinburgh International Film Festival Edinburgh .... August 

ECAFE Asian Industrial Development Council: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 1-8 

PAIGH Directing Council: 10th Meeting Washington .... Sept. 1-10 

ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 11th Session . . . Sydney Sept. 4-9 

U.N. Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. . . . Geneva Sept. 4-22 

ICAO Legal Subcommittee Paris Sept. 5-26 

ILO Joint Maritime Commission: 20th Session Geneva Sept. 10-20 

FAO Animal Production and Health: 6th Inter-American Meeting . . Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 10-20 

IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution London Sept. 11-15 

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting on the Wood Working Industries . . Geneva Sept. 11-22 

ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 8th Session Bangkok Sept. 11-22 

3d ICAO South American/South Atlantic Regional Meeting Buenos Aires . . . Sept. 12-Oct. 6 

ECE Group of Rapporteiu-s on Intercontinental Transport by Containers Geneva Sept. 18-20 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working The Hague .... Sept. 18-20 

Group on an International Aspect for the Implementation of the U.N. 

Resolution on Resources of the Sea. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection London Sept. 18-22 

ECE Codex Alimentarius Group of E.xperts on Standardization of Quick- Rome Sept. 18-23 

Frozen Foods. 

ECAFE Working Party on Shipping and Ocean Freight Rates .... Bangkok Sept. 18-25 

ITU World Administrative Maritime Mobile Conference Geneva Sept. 18-Nov. 4 

U.N. General Assembly: 22d Session New York .... Sept. 19-Dec. 15 

FAO Expert Panel on Animal Breeding and Climatology Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 21-26 

ECE Committee on Coal Geneva Sept. 25-27 

ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs Geneva Sept. 25-29 

FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 5th Session Amman Sept. 25-30 

International Rubber Study Group: 19th Assembly Sao Paulo .... Sept. 25-30 

ILO Technical Experts on Organization and Planning of Vocational Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6 


ILO Meeting of Experts on Minimum Wage Fixing Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6 

ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 26-Oct. 3 

IAEA General Conference: 11th Session Vienna Sept. 26-Oct. 6 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Sept. 27 (1 day) 

International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL): 36th General Kyoto Sept. 27-0 ct. 4 


ECAFE Seminar on the Development of Building Materials Bangkok Sept. 28-Oct. 4 

U.N. Conference on Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . Vienna September 

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 18th Meeting . . . Taipei September 

BIRPI Working Group on International Cooperation Geneva September 

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna September 

BIRPI Paris Union: Executive Committee Geneva September 

JULY 3, 1967 25 


Current Actions 


Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963.* 
Ratification deposited: Cameroon, May 22, 1967. 


Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World 
Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended 
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965." 
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 26, 1967. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal TJnion with final 
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and 
convention with final protocol and regulations of ex- 
ecution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into 
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 
Ratification deposited: Hungary, May 2, 1967. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 

global commercial communications satellite system. 

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into 

force 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Accession deposited: Tanzania, June 16, 1967. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 

Signature: East African External Telecommunica- 
tions Company Limited, June 16, 1967. 


International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered 
into force January 1, 1967.* 

Ratification deposited: New Zealand, including Cook 
Lslands, Niue and Tokelau Islands, April 13, 1967. 

' Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 

Trade, Transit 

Convention on transit trade of landlocked states. Done 
at New York July 8, 1965.* 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, May 10, 1967. 
Entry into force: June 9, 1967. 


1967 protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 
1967, inclusive." 

Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de- 
posited: Mexico, June 13, 1967. 

Protocol for the further extension of the International 
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for sig- 
nature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966. 
Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I and parts 
III to VII ; August 1, 1966, for part II. TIAS 6057. 
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany 
(including Berlin) , June 1, 1967. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.O. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed 
at Reykjavik June 5, 1967. Entered into force June 5, 


Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington June 2, 1967. 
Entered into force June 2, 1967. 


Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 4, 1967. 
Entered into force: June 8, 1967. 


Agreement concerning the use of the Special Fund for 
Education for the School Building Construction Proj- 
ect, 1967-1968. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Manila May 18, 1967. Entered into force May 18, 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under 
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as 
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1 736D), with annex. Signed 
at Khartoum June 3, 1967. Entered into force June 3, 



INDEX July 3, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U62 

Communism. The Implications of Change for 
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19 

Diplomacy. The Implications of Change for 
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19 

Economic Affairs 

The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction 
to the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . 17 

United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement 23 


The Implications of Change for United States 

Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19 

The Marshall Plan : From the Reconstruction to 

the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . . 17 
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg 

(communique) 14 

The Peaceful Revolution of the 20th Century 

(Johnson) 16 

Foreign Aid. The Peaceful Revolution of the 
20th Century (Johnson) 16 

India. U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceano- 
graphic Research Vessel 23 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences ... 24 

Italy. Letters of Credence (Ortona) .... 13 

Malta. United States and Malta Conclude Cotton 
Textile Agreement 23 

Near East. U.N. Security Council Continues De- 
bate on Near East ; Soviet Proposal Condemn- 
ing Israel Rejected (Goldberg, texts of 
resolutions) 3 

New Zealand. Letters of Credence (Corner) . . 13 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North At- 
lantic Council Meets at Luxembourg (com- 
munique) 14 

Presidential Documents. The Peaceful Revolu- 
tion of the 20th Century 16 


North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg 

(communique) 14 

U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceanographic 
Research Vessel 23 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 26 

United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex- 
tile Agreement 23 


The Implications of Change for United States 

Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19 

U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near 
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel 
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3 

United Nations 

U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near 
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel 
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3 

U.S. Does Not Concur in Request for U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly Session (Goldberg) .... 12 

Name Index 

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 19 

Corner, Frank H 13 

Goldberg, Arthur J 3, 12 

Harriman, W. Averell 17 

Johnson, President 16 

Ortona, Egidio 13 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 1 2-1 8 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to June 12 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 135 of June 
6, 138 of June 8, and 140 of June 10. 



142 6/15 




Corry sworn in as Ambassador to 
Ceylon and the Maldive Islands 
(biographic details). 

U.S.-Malta cotton textile agree- 
ment (rewrite). 

NATO communique. 

National foreign policy confer- 
ence for educators, Washington, 
June 19-20. 

■ Not printed. 


Superintendent of Docume 
u.s. government printing of 
washington. d.c. 

ssvw NOi9oa 

oQE X09 

Ayvyan onond 

iN3WiyVd30 30N310S IV OOS 
•0 030-9GQ 











JUL 21 1957 


July 10, 1967 


Address hy President Johiison 31 


Statements hy Ambttssador Arthur J. Goldherg Ji.7 


Statements After the Meetings at Glassiwo, N.J. 35 


Excerpt From an Address hy President Johnson 38 

For index see inside hack cover 




Vol. LVII, No. 1463 Publication 8256 
July 10, 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Single copy 30 cents 

Use of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is Indexed in 
the Readers' Quide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a vceekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
tlie field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service, 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy , issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other offieers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to tvhich tlie United 
States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter' 
national relations are listed currently. 

Five principles for peace in the Middle East were outlined hy 
President Johnson in his address before the Department of 
State foreign policy conference for educators on June 19. These 
principles are: recognized rights of national life, progress in 
solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime 
passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political 
independence and territorial integrity. '■'■Taken together," the 
President said, '■'■they point the way from uncertain armistice 
to durable peace?'' 

Principles for Peace in the Middle East 

Address by President Johnson 

White House press release dated June 19 

Secretary Rusk, ladies and gentlemen : I wel- 
come the chance to share with you this morning 
a few reflections of American foreign policy, as 
I have shared my thoughts in recent weeks with 
representatives of labor and business and with 
other leaders of our society. 

During the past weekend at Camp David, 
where I met and talked with America's good 
friend, Prime Minister [Harold E.] Holt of 
Australia, I thought of the General Assembly 
debate on the Middle East that opens today in 
New York.i 

But I thought also of the events of the past 
year in other continents in the world. I thought 
of the future, both in the Middle East and in 
other areas of American interest in the world 
and in places that concern all of us. 

So this morning I want to give you my esti- 
mate of the prospects for peace and the hopes 
for progress in these various regions of the 

I shall speak first of our own hemisphere, then 
of Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia, 
and lastly of the two areas that concern us most 
at this hour — Viet-Nam and the Middle East. 

Let me begin with the Americas. 

Last April I met with my fellow American 
Presidents in Pimta del Este.'' It was an en- 

' See p. 47. 

"For background, see BuiiETiN of May 8, 1967, p. 

couraging experience for me, as I believe it was 
for the other leaders of Latin America. For they 
made, there at Punta del Este, the historic deci- 
sion to move toward the economic integration 
of Latin America. 

In my judgment, their decision is as im- 
portant as any that they have taken since they 
became independent more than a century and a 
half ago. 

The men I met with know that the needs of 
their 220 million people require them to mod- 
ernize their economies and expand their trade. 
I promised that I would ask our people to co- 
operate in those efforts and in giving new force 
to our great conmion enterprise which we take 
great pride in — the Alliance for Progress. 

One meeting of chiefs of state, of course, can- 
not transform a continent. But where leaders 
are willing to face their problems candidly and 
where they are ready to join in meeting them 
responsibly, there can be only hope for the 

The nations of the developed world — and I 
am speaking now principally of the Atlantic 
alliance and Japan — have in this past year, I 
think, made good progress in meeting their com- 
mon problems and their common responsibili- 

I have met with a number of statesmen — 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson in Canada just 
a few days ago,' and the leaders of Europe in 

• Ihid., June 19, 1967, p. 908. 

JULY 10, 1967 


Bonn shortly before that.* We discussed many 
of the issues that we face together. 

We are consulting to good effect on how to 
limit the spread of nuclear weapons. 

We have completed the Kennedy Kound of 
tariff negotiations ' in a healthy spirit of part- 
nership, and we are examining together the vital 
question of monetary reform. 

We have reorganized the integrated NATO 
defense, with its new headquarters in Belgium. 

We have reached agreement on the crucial 
question of maintaining Allied military 
strength in Germany. 

Finally, we have worked together — although 
not yet with sufficient resources — to help the 
less developed countries deal with their prob- 
lems of hunger and overpopulation. 

We have not by any means settled all the 
issues that face us, either among ourselves or 
with other nations. But there is less cause to 
lament what has not been done than to take 
heart from what has been done. 

Relations With Eastern Europe 

You know of my personal interest in improv- 
ing relations between the Western World and 
the nations of Eastern Europe. I believe the 
patient course we are pursuing toward those 
nations is vital to the security of our nation. 

Through cultural exchanges and civil air 
agreements; through consular and outer space 
treaties ; through what we hope will soon become 
a treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons, and also, if they will join us, an agree- 
ment on antiballistic missiles — we have tried to 
enlarge, and have made great progress in enlarg- 
ing, the arena of common action with the Soviet 

Our purpose is to narrow our differences 
where they can be narrowed and thus to help 
secure peace in the world for the future genera- 
tions. It will be a long, slow task, we realize. 
There will be setbacks and discouragements. 
But it is, we think, the only rational policy for 
them and for us. 

In Africa, as in Asia, we have encouraged the 
nations of the region in their efforts to join in 
cooperative attacks on the problems that each 
of them faces: economic stagnation, poverty, 
hunger, disease, and ignorance. Under Secretary 
Nicholas Katzenbach just reported to me last 

' IMd., May 15, 1967, p. 751. 

" For background, see ibid., June 12, 1967, p. 879. 

week on liis recent extended trip throughout 
Africa. He described to me the many problems 
and the many opportunities that exist in that 

Africa is moving rapidly from the colonial 
past toward freedom and dignity. She is in the 
long and difficidt travail of building nations. 
Her pioud people are determined to make a new 
Africa, according to their own lights. 

They are now creating institutions for politi- 
cal and economic cooperation. They have set 
great tasks for themselves — whose accomplish- 
ments will require years of struggle and 

We very much want that struggle to succeed, 
and we want to be responsive to the efforts that 
they are making on their own behalf. 

I can give personal testimony to the new 
spirit that is abroad in Africa from Under Sec- 
retary Katzenbach's report — and in Asia from 
my own travels and experience there. 

In Asia my experience demonstrated to me a 
new spirit of confidence in that area of the 
world. Everywhere I traveled last autumn, from 
the conference in Manila to other countries of 
the region, I found the conviction that Asians 
can work with Asians to create better conditions 
of life in every country. Fear has now given way 
to hope in millions of hearts. 

Asia's immense human problems remain, of 
course. Not all countries have moved ahead as 
rapidly as Thailand, Korea, and the Republic of 
China. But most of them are now on a promising 
track, and Japan is taking a welcome role in 
helping her fellow Asians toward much more 
rapid development. 

A free Indonesia — the world's fifth largest 
nation, a land of more than 100 million people — 
is now struggling to rebuild, to reconstruct and 
reform its national life. This will require the 
understanding and the support of the entire in- 
ternational community. 

We maintain our dialog with the authorities 
in Peking, in preparation for the day when they 
will be ready to live at peace with the rest of the 

The Situation in Viet-Nam 

I regret that this morning I cannot report any 
major progress toward peace in Viet-Nam. 

I can promise you that we have tried every 
possible way to bring about either discussions 
between the opposing sides or a practical de- 
escalation of the violence itself. 


Thus far there has been no serious response 
from the other side. 

We are ready— and we have long been ready — 
to engage in a mutual deescalation of the fight- 
ing. But we cannot stop only half the war, nor 
can we abandon our commitment to the people 
of South Viet-Nam as long as the enemy attacks 
and fights on. And so long as North Viet-Nam 
attempts to seize South Viet-Nam by force, we 
must, and we will, block its efforts so that the 
people of South Viet-Nam can determine their 
own future in peace. 

We would very much like to see the day 
come — and come soon — when we can cooperate 
with all the nations of the region, including 
North Viet-Nam, in healing the wounds of a 
war that has continued, we think, for far too 
long. When the aggression ends, then that day 
will follow. 

Crisis in the Middle East 

Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East — 
and to the tumultuous events of the past months. 
Those events have proved the wisdom of five 
great principles of peace in the region. 

The first and greatest principle is that every 
nation in the area has a fundamental right to 
live and to have this right respected by its 

For the people of the Middle East the path 
to hope does not lie in threats to end the life 
of any nation. Such threats have become a bur- 
den to the peace, not only of that region but a 
burden to the peace of the entire world. 

In the same way, no nation would be true to 
the United Nations Charter or to its own true 
interests if it should permit military success to 
blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights 
and its neighbors have interests of their own. 
Each nation, therefore, must accept the right 
of others to live. 

This last month, I think, shows us another 
basic requirement for settlement. It is a human 
requirement: justice for the refugees. 

A new conflict has brought new homelessness. 
The nations of the Middle East must at last ad- 
dress themselves to the plight of those who have 
been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides 
have resisted the best efforts of outside media- 
tors to restore the victims of conflict to their 
homes or to find them other proper places to 
live and work. There will be no peace for any 
party in the Middle East unless this problem is 
attacked with new energy by all and, certainly, 

primarily by those who are immediately con- 

A third lesson from this last month is that 
maritime rights must be respected. Our nation 
has long been committed to free maritime pas- 
sage through international waterways ; and we, 
along with other nations, were taking the neces- 
sary steps to implement this principle when 
hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was 
more responsible for this explosion than any 
other, I think it was the arbitrary and danger- 
ous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran 
would be closed. The right of innocent maritime 
passage must be preserved for all nations. 

Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated 
the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of 
the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must 
rest not only on those in the area but upon the 
larger states outside the area. We believe that 
scarce resources could be used much better for 
teclmical and economic development. We have 
always opposed this arms race, and our own 
military shipments to the area have conse- 
quently been severely limited. 

Now the waste and futility of the arms race 
must be apparent to all the peoples of the world. 
And now there is another moment of choice. 
The United States of America, for its part, will 
use every resource of diplomacy and every 
coimsel of reason and prudence to try to find a 
better course. 

As a beginning, I should like to propose that 
the United Nations immediately call upon all of 
its members to report all shipments of all mili- 
tary arms into this area and to keep those ship- 
ments on file for all the peoples of the world to 

Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of 
respect for political independence and terri- 
torial integrity of all the states of the area. We 
reaffirmed that principle at the height of this 
crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of 
all. This principle can be effective in the Middle 
East only on the basis of peace between the 
parties. The nations of the region have had only 
fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. 
What they now need are recognized boundaries 
and other arrangements that will give them 
security against terror, destruction, and war. 
Further, there just must be adequate recogni- 
tion of the special interest of three great 
religions in the holy places of Jerusalem. 

These five principles are not new, but we do 
think they are fundamental. Taken together, 
they point the way from uncertain armistice to 

JXTLT 10, 1967 


durable peace. We believe there must be prog- 
ress toward all of them if there is to be progress 
toward any. 

Seftlement Depends on Nations of the Area 

There are some who have urged, as a smgle, 
simple solution, an immediate return to the sit- 
uation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished 
and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has 
already said, this is not a prescription for peace 
but for renewed hostilities.^ 

Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but 
there must also be recognized rights of national 
life, progress in solving the refugee problem, 
freedom of innocent maritime passage, limita- 
tion of the arms race, and respect for political 
independence and territorial integrity. 

But who will make this peace where all others 
have failed for 20 years or more ? 

Clearly the parties to the conflict must be 
the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is 
they who must make a settlement in the area. 
It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to 
live together in peace if they cannot learn to 
reason together. 

But we must still ask. Who can help them? 
Some say it should be the United Nations ; some 
call for the use of other parties. We have been 
first in our support of effective peacekeeping in 
the United Nations, and we also recognize the 
great values to come from mediation. 

We are ready this morning to see any method 
tried, and we believe that none should be ex- 
cluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be 
useful and all will be needed. 

I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view 
on these matters. I offer assurance to all that 
this Government of ours, the Government of 
the United States, will do its part for peace in 
every forum, at every level, at every hour. 

Yet there is no escape from this fact: The 
main responsibility for the peace of the region 
depends upon its own peoples and its own lead- 
ers of that region. What will be truly decisive in 
the Middle East will be what is said and what 
is done by those who live in the Middle East. 

They can seek another arms race — if they 
have not profited from the experience of this 
one — if they want to. But they will seek it at a 
terrible cost to their own people — and to their 

* For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg 
In the U.N. Secnrity Council on June 13, see ibid., July 3, 
1967, p. 5. 

very long neglected human needs. They can live 
on a diet of hate, though only at the cost of 
hatred in return. Or they can move toward peace 
with one another. 

The world this morning is watching, watch- 
ing for the peace of the world, because that is 
really what is at stake. It will look for patience 
and justice, it will look for humility and moral 
courage. It will look for signs of movement 
from prejudice and the emotional chaos of con- 
flict to the gradual, slow shaping steps that lead 
to learning to live together and learning to help 
mold and shape peace in the area and in the 

The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its 
people and in its resources. It has no need to live 
in permanent civil war. It has the power to 
build its own life as one of the prosperous re- 
gions of the world in which we live. 

U.S. Will Help in Works of Peace 

If the nations of the Middle East will turn 
toward the works of peace, they can count with 
confidence upon the friendship and the help of 
all the people of the United States of America. 

In a climate of peace we here will do our full 
share to help with a solution for the refugees. 
We here will do our full share in support of 
regional cooperation. We here will do our 
share — and do more — to see that the peaceful 
promise of nuclear energy is applied to the criti- 
cal problem of desalting water and helping to 
make the deserts bloom. 

Our country is committed — and we here re- 
iterate that commitment today — to a peace that 
is based on five principles. 

— first, the recognized right of national life ; 

— second, justice for the refugees; 

— third, innocent maritime passage ; 

— fourth, limits on the wasteful and destruc- 
tive arms race; and 

— fifth, political independence and territorial 
integrity for all. 

This is not a time for malice, but for magna- 
nimity; not for propaganda, but for patience; 
not for vituperation, but for vision. 

On the basis of peace we offer our help to the 
people of the Middle East. That land, known to 
every one of us since childhood as the birthplace 
of great religions and learning, can flourish 
once again in our time. We here in the United 
States shall do all in our power to help make 
it so. 



President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 
International Problems 

President Johnson and Aleksei N. Kosygin, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the So- 
viet Union, conferred at Glasshoro, N.J., on 
June 23 and again on Jtine 25. The two meetings 
were held at '"''Hollyhush^'' the residence of the 
president of Glassboro State College. Premier 
Kosygin traveled to Glassboro from, New York 
City, where he ivas heading the Soviet delega- 
tion to the fifth emergency special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly. 

Following are texts of a toast made hy Presi- 
dent Johnson at a luncheon for Premier Kosy- 
gin at ^'■Hollyiusli''' on June 23, statements made 
iy the Pi^esident and the Premier on June 23 
and June 25 at the conclusion of each of their 
meetings, and a hrief report to the Nation made 
hy President Johnson upon his return to the 
White House from Glassboro on June 25, to- 
gether with a statement made hy Premier Kosy- 
gin regarding his meeting with President John- 
son which was delivered as part of his opening 
remarks at a neios conference he held at United 
Nations Headguarters on the evening of Ju/ne 25. 


White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. For- 
eign Minister [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
A. Gromylco], Mr. Ambassador [Soviet Ambas- 
sador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin] : We are de- 
lighted that you have had a chance to even 
briefly visit our country, and we are especially 
pleased that you have come here today for a 
meeting with us. 

We both have special responsibilities for the 
security of our families, and over and beyond all 
our families is the security of the entire human 
family inhabiting this earth. We must never 
forget that there are many peoples in this world, 
many different nations, each with its own his- 
tory and ambitions. There is a special place, 
however, in tliis world and a special responsibil- 
ity placed upon our two countries because of our 
strength and our resources. 

This demands that the relations between our 
two countries be as reasonable and as construc- 
tive as we know how to make them. It is also our 
obligation that we make it possible for other 
countries to live in peace with each other if this 
can be done. And that is why today we have 
here discussed with you some questions affecting 
the peace of the entire human family of 3 bil- 
lion people. 

I want to inform Secretary Rusk, Minister 
Gromyko, and Secretary [of Defense Robert 
S.] McNamara and the other distinguished 
guests present here that you and I have dis- 
cussed various aspects and possibilities for 
strengthening peace in the world, such as the 
nonproliferation agreement, and certain ques- 
tions arising out of the Middle East situation. 

We also agreed that both of us, as well as our 
two nations, made some small contribution to 
bringing about a cease-fire in the Middle East. 
We only regret that this contribution between us 
had not made it possible to prevent the out- 
break of hostilities — although we tried. 

I want to emphasize that the results of today's 
meeting will be judged by what we can achieve 
in the future in order to achieve peace. 

I quoted to the Chairman the story about the 
author, Charles Lamb, who threw down in dis- 
gust a book he had been reading. To his sister's 
question of whether he knew the author, he said, 
"No, because if I did, I would like him." 

And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope 
that today's meeting has contributed to getting 
us to know each other better, and therefore to 
like each other better, just as our Ambassadors 
in Moscow and Washington have become more 
acquainted and liked by the people they deal 
with. And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to 
thank you for coming here. We thank you for 
coming. We want very much to resolve some of 
these questions. 

We would like to have the opportunity to sit 
down further and discuss some aspects of the 
antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation, 
perhaps some questions arising out of the Mid- 
dle East situation, and at least explore the situ- 


ation in Southeast Asia, as well as questions of 
mutual interest in Europe and the Western 

And now I would like to ask each of you to 
stand and raise your glass to the health of the 
Chairman, the Soviet Union, and to peace in 
the world. 


White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23 

President Johnson 

The Chairman and I have met since we ar- 
rived here a little after 11 :00 today. 

Our meeting gave us an opj^ortunity to get 
acquainted with each other. We have exchanged 
views on a number of international questions. 
Among these problems were the Middle East, 
Viet- Nam, and the question of nonproliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 

We agreed that it is now very important to 
reach international agreement on a nonpro- 
liferation treaty. 

We also exchanged views on the questions of 
direct bilateral relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States of America. 

Finally, we agreed that discussions on these 
questions should be continued in New York be- 
tween Secretary Kusk and Mr. Gromyko during 
next week. 

This meeting today was a very good and very 
useful meeting. We are in the debt of the great 
Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality. 

We are in^dting ourselves to return here again 
at 1 :30 on Sunday afternoon. We will continue 
our discussions here then. Those of you who 
have Sunday afternoon off, we will be glad to 
have you come, too. 

Premier Kosygin ^ 

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I wish first 
of all to thank the President for arranging this 
meeting, and all the more so that he has ar- 
ranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful 
a locality and town. 

I also want to thank the hosts, the masters 
of the house who have given us these facilities, 
have given us a roof over our heads under which 
we could meet. 

I suppose you can get the impression from 

' Premier Kosygin spoke in Russian. 

what the President has said that we have 
amassed such a great number of questions that 
we weren't able to go through them all today, 
which is why we have decided to meet again this 

As regards the statement which the President 
just made to you, I have nothing whatsoever to 
add. I think it was very correctly drawn up. 

I hope you won't be offended with us if we 
have kept you here for all this time and have 
not told you very much. Please excuse us. 


White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 25 

President Johnson 

The Chairman and I met again today and 
talked somewhat more than 4 hours, beginning 
at lunch and working through until just now. 

We have gone more deeply than before into a 
great number of the many questions before our 
two countries in the world. We have also 
agreed to keep in good communication in the 
future, through Secretary Rusk and Foreign 
Mmister Gromyko, through our very able Am- 
bassadors Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Thompson 
[American Ambassador to the U.S.S.E. Llewel- 
lyn E. Thompson], and also directly. We have 
made further progress in an effort to improve 
our understanding of each other's thinking on a 
number of questions. I believe more strongly 
than ever that these have been very good and I 
very useful talks. The Chairman and I join in ■ 
extending our thanks to Governor [of New 
Jersey Richard J.] and Mrs. Hughes, to Presi- 
dent [of Glassboro State College Thomas E.] 
and Mrs. Robinson, and to the good people of 
Glassboro for the contribution that they have 
made in making these good meetings possible. 
Now I should like to ask the Chairman to say a 
word or two. 

Premier Kosygin 

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I would like 
first of all to thank all the citizens of Glassboro 
and the Governor and the president of the col- 
lege for having created a very good atmosphere 
for the talks that we were able to have here with 
your President. 

I think altogether we have spent and worked 
here for about 8 or 9 hours, and we have come to 
become accustomed to this place. We like the 



town and we think the people of Glassboro are 
very good people. We have come to like them. 
We have been very favorably impressed by the 
time we have spent here. 

As during the first meeting which took place 
on June 23, the exchange of views between the 
President and myself touched upon several in- 
ternational issues. Also in the course of these 
conversations we had a general review of the 
state of bilateral Soviet- American relations. On 
the whole, these meetings provided the Govern- 
ments of the Soviet Union and the United 
States with an opportunity to compare their 
positions on the questions under discussion, and 
this both sides believe is useful. 

And once again, on my own behalf and on 
behalf of all those who have come here with me, 
I wish to extend my profound gratitude to you 
all. Goodby. 

Premier Kosygin 

I want to thank you all very sincerely for this 
very warm welcome. May I salute friendship 
between the Soviet and American peoples, and 
to all of you I want to wish every success and 
happiness and express the hope that we shall go 
forward together for peace. 

President Johnson 

You good people of Glassboro have done your 
part in helping us make this a significant and a 
historic meeting. 

We think that this meeting has been useful, 
and we think it will be helpful in achieving 
what we all want more than anything else in 
the world — peace for all humankind. 

Thank you very much. 


White House press release dated June 25 

On my return tonight to the White House 
after 2 days of talks at Hollybush, I want to 
make this brief report to the American people. 

We continued our discussions today in the 
same spirit in which we began them on Friday — 
a spirit of direct face-to-face exchanges between 
leaders with very heavy responsibilities. 

We wanted to meet again because the issues 

before us are so large and so difBcult that one 
meeting together was not nearly enough. The 
two meetings have been better than one, and at 
least we learned — I know I did — from each hour 
of our talks. 

You will not be surprised to know that these 
two meetings have not solved all of our prob- 
lems. On some, we have made progress — great 
progress in reducing misunderstanding, I think, 
and in reaffirming our common commitment to 
seek agreement. 

I think we made that kind of progress, for 
example, on the question of arms limitation. We 
have agreed this afternoon that Secretary of 
State Rusk and Mr. Gromyko will pursue this 
subject further in New York in the days ahead. 

I must report that no agreement is readily in 
sight on the Middle Eastern crisis and that our 
well-known differences over Viet-Nam con- 
tinue. Yet even on these issues, I was very glad 
to hear the Chairman's views face to face and to 
have a chance to tell him directly and in detail 
just what our purposes and our policies are — 
and are not — in these particular areas. 

The Chairman, I believe, made a similar 
effort with me. 

Wlien nations have deeply different positions, 
as we do on these issues, they do not come to 
agreement merely by improving their under- 
standing of each other's views. But such im- 
provement helps. Sometimes in such discussions 
you can find elements — beginnings — hopeful 
fractions — of common ground, even within a 
general disagreement. 

It was so in the Middle East 2 weeks 
ago when we agreed on the need for a prompt 
cease-fire. And it is so today in respect to such 
simple propositions as that every state has a 
right to live, that there should be an end to the 
war in the Middle East, and that in the right 
circumstances there should be withdrawal of 
troops. This is a long way from agreement, but 
it is a long way also from total difference. 

On Viet-Nam, the area of agreement is 
smaller. It is defined by the fact that the dan- 
gers and the difficulties of any one area must 
never be allowed to become a cause of wider con- 
flict. Yet even in Viet-Nam, I was able to make it 
very clear, with no third party between us, that 
we will match and we will outmatch every step 
to peace that others may be ready to take. 

As I warned on Friday - — and as I just must 

' See p. 38. 

JULY 10, 1967 


■warn again on this Sunday afternoon — meet- 
ings like these do not themselves make peace in 
the world. We must all remember that there have 
been many meetings before and they have not 
ended all of our troubles or all of our dangers. 

But I can also report on this Simday after- 
noon another thing that I said on last Friday : 
That it does help a lot to sit down and look at a 
man right in the eye and try to reason with him, 
particularly if he is trying to reason with you. 

We may have differences and difficulties 
ahead, but I think they will be lessened, and not 
increased, by our new knowledge of each other. 

Chairman Kosygin and I have agreed that 
the leaders of our two countries will keep in 
touch in the future, through our able secre- 
taries and ambassadors, and also keep in touch 

I said on Friday that the world is very small 
and very dangerous. Tonight I believe that it is 
fair to say that these days at HoUybush have 
made it a little smaller still — but also a little less 


TTnofflclal translation 

On June 25 a second meeting between the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
U.S.S.E., Mr. Kosygin, and President Jolmson 
of the United States, was held in the town of 
Glassboro, not far from New York. At the sec- 
ond meeting, as at the first, which took place on 
June 23, the exchange of views touched upon 
several international problems. 

In connection with the situation in the Middle 
East, the two sides set forth their respective 
positions. It was stated on the Soviet side that 
the main thing now is to achieve the prompt 
withdrawal behind the armistice lines of the 
forces of Israel, which has committed aggression 
against the Arab states. Tliis question is of 
signal importance for the restoration of peace 
in the Middle East, and it is in the center of the 
attention of the emergency special session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, and 
it must be positively resolved without delay. 

The exchange of views on the Viet-Nam 
problem once again revealed profound dif- 
ferences in the positions of the Soviet Union 

and the Unit«d States. It was emphasized on 
the Soviet side that settlement of the Viet-Nam 
problem is possible only on the condition of an 
end to the bombing of the territory of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the with- 
drawal of American forces from South 

Both sides reaffirmed that they believe it im- 
portant to promptly achieve understanding on 
the conclusion of an international treaty on the 
nonprolif eration of nuclear weapons. 

In the course of the talks, a general review 
was made of the state of bilateral Soviet and 
American relations. On the whole, the meetings 
offered the Governments of the Soviet Union 
and the United States an opportunity to com- 
pare their positions on the matters discussed, an 
opportimity both sides believe to have been 

The Spirit of Hollybush 

FoUotoing is an excerpt from remarks made 
hy President Johnson at a Presidenfs Club 
Dinner at Los Angeles, Oalif., on June 23 in 
xohich lie discusses his meeting at Glassboro, 
N.J., that morning with Aleksei N. Kosygin, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the 
Soviet Union.^ 

White House press release dated June 23 

This morning I found myself in a house that 
had been visited before by Presidents — Theo- 
dore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. So 
it was in no partisan party spirit that we went 
to Hollybush, We went to serve what we be- 
lieved to be a great national purpose, the pur- 
pose of peace for human beings. 

I said to the Chairman that we have 200 mil- 
lion people. ... I said that we not only had 
a responsibility to our 200 million and their 
more than 200 million — the 400 million to- 
gether^ — but we had a responsibility to 3 billion 
people in the world because of our strength and 
obligations as great powers ; that responsibility 
was peace and trying not only to secure it for 
ourselves but to secure it for all human beings. 

The world's peace now hangs heavily tonight 
upon the wisdom, judgment, and understanding 

' See p. 35. 


of these two very great states — the United States 
of America and tlie Soviet Union. 

Tliere are deep and very serious differences 
in our two societies, but one tiling we do liave 
in common, as Chairman Kosygin himself said 
when he addressed the United Nations, is a 
grave responsibility for world peace in a nu- 
clear age. Every crisis in the last 20 years has 
necessarily invoked that common responsibility, 
and repeatedly we have seen the dangerous con- 
sequences of incomplete understanding. 

We have also repeatedly seen that when others 
are irresponsible in word or in deed, a very s^De- 
cial burden for care seems to always fall upon 
America. So I was glad to meet with Chairman 
Kosygin this morning. We talked throughout 
the day quietly and straightforwardly. 

I am glad to say to you that I found he came 
to our meeting in the same spirit. He had some 
seniority on me. He had been a grandfather for 
over 18 years, and I had been a gi-andfather for 
only 18 hours, but he and I agreed that we both 
very nmch wanted a world of peace for our 

We talked about the problems of the Middle 
East in detail. We shall continue to talk about 
them. We talked about the problems of South- 
eastern Asia. We talked about the arms race 
and about the need for new agreements there. 
We talked about the need for common action on 
constructive initiatives for peace. We reached 
no new agreements — almost, but not quite. New 
agreements are not always reached in a single 
conversation. So we are going to eat lunch 
and spend Smiday together again at Hollybush. 

I don't want to overstate the case. I don't 
want to get your hopes too high. I do think, 
though, that we understand each other better. 
I do think that I was able to make it vei-y clear 
indeed that the strength and the determination 
of our coimtiy and the Government are fully 
matched by our persistent eagerness to talk and 
to work, to fight for peace and friendship with 
all who will work and talk with us. 

But all of you must remember that one meet- 
ing does not make a peace. I don't think there 
is anyone in the world who ever wanted peace 
more than the leaders in the world of countries 
who are not at peace. You must all remember 
that there have been many meetings before and 
they have not ended our troubles nor have they 
ended our danger. There is not a nation in the 
world we would trade places with tonight. 

These meetings just have not ended our trou- 
bles and our dangers, and I cannot promise you 
that that will not happen again. The world re- 
mains a very small and very dangerous one. All 
nations, even the greatest of them, have hard 
and painful choices ahead of them. What I can 
tell you tonight — and I have no doubt about it 
at all — is that it does help a lot to sit down and 
look at a man in the eye all day long and try to 
reason with him, particularly if he is trymg to 
reason with you. That is why we went to Holly- 
bush this morning, and reasoning together there 
today was the "spirit of Hollybush." 

I think you know me well enough to recognize 
that that is my way of doing things — "Come 
now," as Isaiah said, "and let us reason to- 
gether." What I think is even more important — 
that is the way I think we must finally achieve 

Those who do not smell the powder or hear 
the blast of cannon, who enjoy the luxury and 
freedom of free speech and the right to exercise 
it most freely, at times really do not understand 
the burdens that our marines are carrying there 
tonight, who are dying for their country, or the 
burdens that their commanders are carrying, 
who wish they were all home asleep in bed or 
even carrying a placard of some kind. 

But they can't be and still retain our national 
honor. They can't be and still preserve our free- 
dom. They can't be and still protect our system. 
Wlien they can be — with honor — they will be — 
at the earliest possible moment. 

Sometimes I think of my friends who don't 
understand all of the cables I read from all of 
the 122 countries. They don't hear all the voices 
of despair and of all the chaotic conditions that 
come to us through the day. Sometimes I think 
of that Biblical injunction, when I see them ad- 
vising their fellow citizens to negotiate and say- 
ing we want peace and all those things. 

I try to look with understanding and charity 
upon them, and in the words of that Biblical 
admonition, God forgive them, for they know 
not really what they do. 

I can just say this to you : There is no human 
being in this world who wants to avoid war 
more than I do. There is no human being in this 
world who wants peace in Viet-Nam or in the 
Middle East more than I do. 

When they tell me to negotiate, I say, "Amen." 
I have been ready to negotiate and sit down 
at a conference table every hour of every day 

JTTLY 10, 1967 
267-786 — 67- 


that I have been President of this country, but 
I just cannot negotiate with myself. 

And these protestors haven't been able to de- 
liver Ho Chi Minh anyplace yet. 

I was not elected your President to liquidate 
our agreements in Southeast Asia. I was not 
elected your President to run out on our com- 
mitments in the Middle East. If that is what you 
want, you will have to get another President. 

But I am going — as I have said so many 
times — any time, any place, anywhere, if in my 
judgment it can possibly, conceivably, serve the 
cause of peace. That is why I went to that little 
farmhouse way up on the New Jersey Pike to- 
day to spend the day, and that is why I am 
going to get over to see my grandson by day- 
light in the morning. 

European Leaders Meet 
With President Johnson 

On June 22 President Johnson held separate 
meetings at the White House with Prime Min- 
ister Jens Otto Krag of Denmark, with Prime 
Minister Aide Moro and Foreign Minister 
Amintore Fanfani of Italy, and with Foreign 
Secretary George Brown of Great Britain. Fol- 
lowing is an exchange of toasts between the 
President and Prime Minister Krag at a White 
House luncheon on that day honoring the Euro- 
pean leaders. 

White House press release dated June 22 


Senator [Mike] Mansfield has asked me to 
request the Senators to leave in time to be at the 
Senate Chamber at 3 o'clock. So in order to 
avoid any misunderstanding, I don't want to 
create the impression that the reason that Sena- 
tor [Everett M.] Dirksen leaves my table rather 
abruptly is because he doesn't like what I am 
saying or he doesn't like what I feed him. But 
I am going to depend on Senator Dirksen, as 
the coleader of the Senate, at the appropriate 
time to give the signal. I am sure, as you usually 
do, all of you will follow him. We are very 
grateful, though, that the Members of the Sen- 
ate would join us on such short notice. I did not 
know until yesterday that we could have this 
group here together today. It has been hur- 
riedly arranged. 

I apologize for not giving you more time, 
but I know you can understand the problems 
of a grandfather. 

But the pace of change in our time is almost 
too swift for men to comprehend or to really 
adjust to it. Two days ago, I was a parent — only 
a parent. Yesterday, my role changed drasti- 
cally — I became a grandfather. I did not seek 
that high office, but now that I have been chosen, 
the path of duty is clear — and I shall serve. 

And at this moment of great and critical 
change, I am blessed with the presence of good 
friends and strong partners in this house. My 
own happiness is the greater because you have 
come here today to share your strength and 
your friendship with us. 

I recognize that other events, Mr. Prime Min- 
isters, Mr. Foreign Ministers, have brought you 
here — events that threaten the peace and chal- 
lenge the intelligence and forbearance of all 

This is not the first time we have faced a cri- 
sis together, and it will not be the last. We have 
weathered past storms because we have con- 
sulted and because we have acted together, and 
we shall weather this storm for this very same 

Each of us must play his part in helping to 
build a permanent peace in the Middle East. I 
said on Monday that the main responsibility for 
the peace of the region depends upon its people 
and its own leaders.^ 

What will be truly decisive in the Middle East 
will be what is said and what is done by those 
who live in the Middle East. There may well be 
helpful roles for others — the United Nations or 
outside mediators — but I said that we are ready 
to see any method tried. We believe none should 
be excluded altogether. 

I have appealed to all to adopt no rigid view. 
For our own part, we have promised that the 
Government of the United States would do its 
part for peace in every forum at every level at 
every hour. I know that you share our eager- 
ness to help find the path to peace in the Middle 
East. We value this chance to hear your views 
on how it may be found. 

Our responsibilities are very great and so, of 
course, are our opportunities. We think and we 
work and we act not only for the millions whom 

' See p. 31. 



we serve at this moment but for their children 
and those who will come after them. 

I can tell all of you that I am more acutely 
aware of this now than ever before, now that I 
have achieved grand fatherhood. I would like to 
help make a world for young Patrick Nugent 
and his contemporaries in every land that will 
be safer, more prosperous, more hopeful, and 
certainly more peaceful by far than the world 
that I have inhabited. 

So working together and reasoning together 
and planning together — being patient and un- 
derstanding together — I believe that we can 
achieve such a world. 

So just as I am grateful to you statesmen who 
have come from across the waters, I am grateful 
to the leaders in the field of foreign affairs and 
relations in our Congress, in our courts, in our 
press, and others who have come here today to 
help me honor these leading spokesmen of great 

So now I should like to ask you to join me in 
toasting the King of Denmark, the Queen of 
England, and the President of Italy. The King, 
the Queen, the President. 


Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express 
my gratitude, sir, for giving this luncheon 

All our guests around these tables know how 
hospitable you are. Once again, we enjoy the 
honor and pleasure of being with you in the 
White House. It has been a period of some very 
hectic weeks in international politics for all of 
us, but inevitably the burdens fall most heavily 
on the shoulders of the great powers. 

We all marvel at the way in which you carry 
your great responsibilities, Mr. President. 

I should like to say that it is a great comfort 
for all of us to know that the United States, un- 
der your leadership, is steering a course of mod- 
eration and reconciliation in the present situa- 
tion in the Middle East. 

No doubt the coming months will present us 
with a multitude of international problems. It 
is our hope that the climate of good will and 
common sense will prevail eventually. 

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the three 
European Governments represented here will 
do whatever is in our power to bring this about. 

We all know that yesterday was a very im- 
portant and happy day in your life and for 
Mrs. Johnson, because your daughter Luci gave 
birth to your first grandson. I am sure he will 
have the same high qualities as his grandfather. 

On behalf of the three European nations be- 
ing guests here, I would like to propose, ladies 
and gentlemen, that we all toast the President 
of the United States. 

U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions 
Resulting From Near East Conflict 

Press release 148 dated June 21 

The Department of State announced on June 
21 that U.S. passports are now valid, without 
special endorsement, for travel of U.S. citizens 
to the following countries : Israel, Kuwait, Mo- 
rocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.^ 

The Department also announced that because 
of conditions resulting from the recent hos- 
tilities in the Near East it was continuing in 
effect for the present a restriction upon travel 
to the remaining countries listed in the Depart- 
ment's announcement of June 5.^ U.S. citizens 
desiring to go to the following countries are, 
therefore, until further notice still required to 
obtain passports specifically endorsed by the 
Department of State for such travel : Algeria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Sudan, the 
Syrian Arab Eepublic, the United Arab Ee- 
public, and Yemen. However, in accordance with 
existing regulations, validations for travel to 
these countries will be granted, as the situation 
permits, to persons whose travel may be re- 
garded as being in the interest of the United 
States. These restrictions will be lifted as soon 
as conditions warrant. 

^ The Department spokesman announced later on 
June 21 that the action of lifting travel restrictions 
applies precisely to the same geographical areas on 
which these restrictions were originally imposed : U.S. 
citizens wishing to travel to the west bank of the Jor- 
dan River must secure specially validated passports 
to do so; U.S. citizens wishing to travel to the holy 
places in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, however, need not 
make special application for validation and are given 
permission to do so. 

* BXJ1.LETIN of June 26, 1967, p. 952. For texts of Pub- 
lic Notices 269 and 270 of June 22, 1967, see 32 Fed. 
Reg. 9175. 

JTJLY 10, 1967 


President of Malawi Visits the United States 

H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic 
of Malawi^ made a private visit to the United 
States June S-11. He met with President John- 
son and other officials at Washington June 8-10. 
Following is an exchange of toasts between 
President Johnson and President Banda at a 
luncheon at the White House on June 8. 

White House press release dated June 8 


We are honored today to visit once again with 
the distinguished President of the Kepublic of 

We hope that for President Banda — as for 
us — this visit is like a homecoming. Dt. Banda 
was educated in the United States of America. 
He has spent a great deal of time here in our 
country. We are delightfully encouraged that 
he keeps returning despite the fact that he 
knows us reasonably well. 

Since Dr. Banda's arrival, he and I have 
been engaged in a very fruitful discussion of the 
problems of Africa and the problems of the 
world. The doctor has provided me with his 
insights on a very wide range of concerns. I 
must say to my colleagues here today and citi- 
zens of my country that I am very pleased to 
find such broad agreement between us on the 
international questions of the day. 

But while Malawi's attention is rightly fo- 
cused on the future, on the problems of inter- 
national development, President Banda leads 
a new nation — a nation which is worlring very 
hard to offer its people, the citizens of its land, 
a better future tomorrow. 

Gibbon called independence "the first of 
earthly blessings." Malawi's independence is 
well established. But President Banda and his 
countrymen realize, recognize, and know that 
nationhood is much more. 

They know, as we learned a long time ago, 
that ringing speeches count very little unless 

they are accompanied by economic advance. 
They know that development is just another 
word for work, for planning, and for long, hard 

They know that the future of Malawi is 
largely a product of a people's faith in them- 
selves. The real test is the amount of effort that 
they put behind that faith. 

Americans, Mr. President, as you know, im- 
derstand these truths. We, too, are a very young 
nation. We, too, faced an uphill economic fight 
in the early years of our independence. 

I am reminded of an observation of one of 
my predecessors in the Presidency, President 
Grant. The Pilgrims, he said, found they had 
to make a living in a climate "where there were 
nine months of winter and three months of cold 

Of course, I realize that this does not pre- 
cisely describe your problem. 

But our challenge, Mr. President, in many 
ways is very similar to the challenge that you 
face. It is this experience which has taught us a 
lesson that you know well. That lesson is that 
the ingredients of economic growth are not just 
physical resources, not just a good climate, not 
just fertile soil. 

The critical elements are people — human be- 
ings — their dreams, their application, their ded- 
ication, their persistence. 

I know that the people of Malawi — and their 
distinguished President — have these qualities 
in abundance. How do I know it? We broke 
ground for a pulpmill in the last hour and we 
built 300 miles of highways already. 

So my good friends from throughout the Na- 
tion, particularly from the State of Indiana 
where the distinguished President went to 
school, the State of Ohio — represented here by 
Senator [Stephen M.] Young today — where the 
distinguished President took his education, I 
ask all of you to rise and join me in a toast to 
our most honored guest. Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda 
of the Republic of Malawi. 




I am tricked ! "VVlien I came here, as a matter 
of fact, I did not know that the lunclieon was 
going to be like this. I was told in Zomba by the 
American Ambassador that the President 
wanted to have just a quiet lunch with me, you 

So when I came here this morning, all I ex- 
pected was that it would be just probably the 
three of us — the President himself and the Sec- 
retary of State, somewhere, not in a gathering 
of this kind. 

However, I would like to thank you very 
much, Mr. President, for your kindness in ar- 
ranging a fimction of this kind to give me an 
opportimity to meet you and your colleagues 
and those that work with you. 

As you have rightly said, when I come here I 
feel the homecoming spirit, because I was edu- 
cated in this country. 

I had my high school in this country at Wil- 
berforce Academy just outside of Xenia — about 
9 or 10 miles from Xenia. Then from there I 
went to the University of Indiana in Blooming- 
ton, Indiana; from there to the University of 
Chicago, where I got my first degree ; and then 
Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennes- 
see, after which I went to Edinburgh. 

So, you see, I feel at home here. That is prob- 
ably why I behave as I do, I speak as I do, I act 
as I do — many, many times when others don't 
exactly see my point. 

You see, I came here at the most impression- 
able age. If I went back home after I was a 
doctor, gave up my medical practice in London 
and began to fight for my people's political 
freedom, it was because you, your country, 
taught me. 

"I know not what course others may take ; as 
for me, give me liberty or give me death." That 
saying, which my high school teacher taught 
me, rang in my mind when I went back home. 

Anyway, I don't come here to talk politics. 
But what I would like you to know is that what 
you have said is exactly what I am telling my 
people. From the very day I went back home, 
I told my people : "Independence does not mean 
money and wealth will rain on our heads like 
manna from heaven. No. It means hard work." 

It so happens that we have no gold or copper 
or diamonds or oil there. So I say to my people, 
"Here we have no mines, no factories. Our mines 
and factories is the ground — the soil. From the 

soil every penny we have in this country comes, 
in the form of maize, groimdnuts, tobacco, cot- 
ton, and other products of the soil." 

My people know my policy. Hard work. And 
I am happy to tell you, Mr. President, that my 
people listened to me. 

I said to my people, "We have won our in- 
dependence now, but we have to build this coun- 
try. And to build this country we have to have 
money. If I am to be listened to by the President 
of the United States, by the Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom, by the President of the 
Eepublics of France or Germany, you, my peo- 
ple, must work hard so that when I go to Wash- 
ington, to London, go to Paris, go to Bonn, I 
will say to them, 'Look, ]Mr. President, my peo- 
ple have cleared the road. All the bush are 
cleared, all the trees. But there is the river, the 
Shire Eiver. They cannot bridge it with their 
f emiir — with their legbone. It requires steel and 
steel requires money.' If I tell my friends in the 
West that you, my people, are working hard but 
there are things we cannot do with our hands, we 
need money, they will listen to me." 

As a result, these boys, women, everywhere 
work very, very hard. I come here now to say 
I want a road. My people have cleared the grass 
and the trees. We need good bridges. Therefore, 
the kind of road that my people can build can- 
not do it. You have to persuade your banks, or 
your international development association and 
other organizations like that, to help us. That 
is why I am asking for that. 

At the same time, we have trees. We are plant- 
ing trees. We can't turn them into anything 
else unless you help us. That is why I am asking 
you to ask "Mr. Chase Manhattan" and other 

You have mentioned that since I have been 
here this morning we have broken ground on 
a number of points. I am not going to go into 
detail about that, but I would like you to know, 
Mr. President, that whatever it may cost me, 
I always do what I think is the right thing 
according to my own conscience. 

In 1960-61 I was asked to lecture at Yale. 
I told the students there— when they asked me 
what was going to be Malawi's foreign policy 
when we became independent — that Malawi's 
policy when we became independent would be 
this : "Discretional alinement and nonalinement. 
No automatic alinement, because," I said, "no 
nation or a group of nations is always right 
and no nation or a group of nations is always 

wrong. Therefore, Malawi's policy, foreign pol- 
icy, will be to associate with any power that is, 
on a particular given international problem, ac- 
cording to my view, in the right." 

And it so happens that most of the time, ac- 
cording to my understanding anyway, the West 
is right. 

Therefore, Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, 
Mr. Secretary of State, if you read in the papers 
or hear that I am unpopular, or the unpopular 
man number one in Africa, you will understand 
now why. 


The President and I had just concluded our 
conversation before lunch, but in the light of 
what he said about his people listening to him, 
I am pleased to observe that he has a formula 
that I would like to inquire more definitely into. 

So as you go your own way, I will be talking 
with President Banda. 

U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts 
on Air Actions at Cam Pha 

Following is the text of a U.S. note which iva^s 
delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington 
on June 20. 

Press release 147 dated June 20 

Juste 20, 1967. 

The Government of the United States of 
America refers to its note dated June 3, 1967,' 
to the Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics concerning the incident in- 
volving the Soviet ship "Turkestan" off Cam 
Pha on June 2. 

Further information concerning this incident 
was received on June 18 from the United States 
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force. This 
information was conveyed orally to the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington shortly after its 
receipt. The new facts indicate that in addition 
to the two flights of United States F-105 air- 
craft which conducted strikes against military 
targets in the vicinity of Cam Pha on June 2, as 
described in the United States note of June 3, 
a third flight of F-105 aircraft passed through 

^ BuiiETiN of June 26, 1967, p. 953. 

the area of Cam Pha at the general time of the 
incident. It now appears that aircraft from this 
third flight directed 20 mm cannon suppressive 
fire against a North Vietnamese anti-aircraft 
site at Cam Pha and that some of this fire may 
have struck the "Turkestan." 

As indicated in the United States note of 
Jime 3, the United States regrets the damage 
to the "Turkestan" that any such action may 
have caused, particularly the death of one mem- 
ber of the crew and injuries to others. Through- 
out the course of the tragic struggle in Vietnam, 
United States military pilots have operated un- 
der strict instructions to avoid engagement with 
any vessels which are not identified as hostile. 
The Soviet Government may be assured that 
United States authorities will make every effort 
to insure that such incidents do not occur. 

U.S.-Canada Economic Committee 
Concludes Eleventh Meeting 

Text of Communique, June 22 

The Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Canada- 
United States Ministerial Committee on Trade 
and Economic Affairs was held in Montreal 
June 20-22. 

The Committee exchanged views on current 
economic developments. They reviewed the suc- 
cess achieved in both countries in moderating 
excessive demand pressures during the past year 
and noted that a more djTiamic pace of expan- 
sion of real output was expected in coming 
months. Recovery of the residential construc- 
tion industry, an end to the inventory correc- 
tion, modest expansion of private investment 
expenditures, higher Federal, State and local 
government purchases, and renewed vigor in 
consumer spending were cited as the major an- 
ticipated sources of strength in the U.S. outlook 
for the coming year. Similar forces were also 
expected to lead to stronger growth in Canada. 
The Committee emphasized the need for flex- 
ible and responsive fiscal policy in both coun- 
tries during the coming months. They recog- 
nized the need for dealing with the problem of 
achieving greater stability in costs and prices, 
especially as the two economies resume rates of 
advance more in line with their potentials. 

In a world of growing trade and develop- 
ment assistance Committee members affirmed 



the intention of their Governments to press for 
general agreement at the 1967 annual meeting of 
the Governors of the International Monetary 
Fund on the structure and major provisions of 
a contingency plan for the creation of a new in- 
ternational reserve asset. They stressed the need 
for an asset which monetary authorities could 
include in their reserves. 

The Committee also reviewed the balance of 
payments prospects of the two countries. United 
States members reiterated the continued deter- 
mination of the United States to make as much 
progress toward equilibrium in its world-wide 
balance of payments as the costs of Vietnam per- 
mit. The Committee discussed capital move- 
ments between the two countries and took note 
of the benefits to both countries of existing ar- 
rangements relating to access by Canadian bor- 
rowers to the United States capital market. 

The Committee welcomed the successful con- 
clusion of the Kennedy Round of trade negoti- 
ations which will provide an important stimu- 
lus to world trade as well as to trade between the 
United States and Canada. They discussed 
prospects for future trade liberalization, noted 
that both countries are conducting studies 
on this matter and agreed to continue close 

The Committee devoted special attention to 
the trade problems of the developing countries, 
recognizing the importance of positive and con- 
structive measures in support of efforts by the 
developing countries to accelerate their own 
economic development. This will be the main 
theme of the second United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development early next year. 

The Committee was concerned about the fail- 
ure of development aid to expand in line with 
the growing requirements of the developing 
countries. In this context early and substantial- 
ly enlarged replenishment of International De- 
velopment Association resources must have a 
high priority. The Committee welcomed the new 
multilateral food aid programme agreed upon 
in the Kennedy Round which will help expand 
food aid and will result in a more equitable shar- 
ing of the cost. The amount and character of 
food assistance must be improved as well as the 
degree of self-help by the recipient nations. 

The Committee recognized the importance of 
close and effective cooperation between the two 
countries in respect of wheat marketing poli- 
cies, including wheat flour, particularly in the 
context of the new Cereals Agreement con- 
cluded in the Kennedy Round. They agreed to 

strengthen consultative arrangements concern- 
ing wheat marketing and food aid. 

United States members reiterated their con- 
cern over those aspects of the Canadian Bank 
Act which in their view have the effect of dis- 
criminating retroactively against a bank in Can- 
ada owned in the United States. Canadian Min- 
isters took a different view of the effect of the 
Bank Act, and stressed the importance of effec- 
tive Canadian ownership of major financial in- 
stitutions. They reiterated Canada's intention 
to encourage increased participation by Ca- 
nadians in the ownership and control of Cana- 
dian industry while continuing to maintain a 
hospitable climate for foreign investment. 

Canadian members also drew attention to the 
problem arising from the effect which certain 
United States laws and regulations may have 
upon Canadian companies, especially as regards 
securities regulation and foreign assets control 
but noted that good progress had been made in 
dealing with particular aspects of the problem. 
The Committee agreed on the desirability of an 
exchange of information in the securities field 
that would benefit investors in both countries. 

The Committee examined results achieved 
under the Automotive Agreement of 1965.^ De- 
spite fluctuations in demand and the continuing 
process of adjustment the industry is making 
progress in rationalization and efficiency, and 
trade in automotive products between the two 
countries has expanded substantially to the 
benefit of both producers and consumers. They 
noted that a comprehensive review of the Agree- 
ment was to begin later this year. 

The Committee discussed energy relations 
between the two countries. They recognized the 
common interest in the orderly expansion of 
trade in energy resources and discussed the 
kinds of facilities which might be needed to 
serve efficiently the development of this trade. 
The Committee noted the recent decision of the 
Federal Power Commission which, in approv- 
ing the transmission of natural gas to Eastern 
Canadian and border state customers, referred 
to the community of interest in this project and 
to its security advantages. 

The Committee discussed a number of bilat- 
eral questions of current interest to the two 
countries. United States members urged that 
Canadian tourists returning to Canada from the 
United States be given duty-free allowances 
equivalent to those given Canadian tourists re- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193. 

JULY 10, 196T 


turning from overseas areas. They also re- 
quested that Canada accord official recognition 
to Bourbon whisky as a distinctive product of 
the United States. 

Canadian Ministers referred to the desirabil- 
ity of expanding the area of free trade in agri- 
cultural machinery, tractors and equipmentand 
it was agreed that this matter should be ex- 
amined jointly with a view to working out 
mutually satisfactoi-y arrangements. They also 
urged the elimination of the manufacturing 
clause in United States copyright legislation 
and the relaxation of restrictions on United 
States imports of aged Canadian cheddar 
cheese. Canadian members drew attention to the 
problem created from time to time because of 
the cross-border movement of relatively small 
quantities of agricultural products at depressed 
prices usually at or near the end of the market- 
ing season. The Committee agreed that con- 
tinued efforts would be made to work out ac- 
ceptable solutions to these jiroblems. Other 
topics discussed included trade in lead and zinc, 
and the Saint John River development. 

The Committee expressed pleasure that agree- 
ment had been reached regarding winter main- 
tenance for the Haines Cutoff portion of the 
Alaska Highway and discussed possible im- 
provements in the Alaska Highway system. 

The Committee took note of the studies at 
present being undertaken by the International 
Joint Commission which, at the request of the 
two Governments, is investigating a number of 
questions of economic and general public in- 
terest relating to boundary waters and pollution 
of air and water. 

Meetmgs of the Joint Ministerial Committee 
have in the past been held alternately in Ottawa 
and "Washington. On the occasion of the Cen- 
tennial of Canada's Confederation, this meeting 
was held in Montreal which provided an ojipor- 
tunity for members of the Committee to visit 
EXPO '67. 

The United States Secretary of State, the 

Honorable Dean Rusk and the Canadian Secre- 
tary of State for External Affairs, the Honour- 
able Paul IMartin were unable to participate in 
the meeting as planned because of the Emer- 
gency Session of the United Nations General 

The United States was represented by Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, the Honorable Henry H. 
Fowler (Chairman of the Delegation) ; United 
States Ambassador to Canada, the Honorable 
W. Walton Butterworth ; Secretary of Agricul- 
ture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman ; Secre- 
tary of Commerce, the Honorable Alexander B. 
Trowbridge; Under Secretary of the Interior, 
the Honorable Charles F. Luce; Chairman of 
the President's Council of Economic Advisers, 
the Honorable Gardner Ackley ; Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for Economic Affairs, the Hon- 
orable Anthony M. Solomon. 

The Canadian Delegation was headed by the 
Honourable Robert Winters, Minister of Trade 
and Commerce, and included the Honourable 
Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance ; the Hon- 
ourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of In- 
dustry; the Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin, Min- 
ister of Energy, Mines and Resources; the 
Honourable J. J. Greene, Minister of Agricul- 
ture; Mr. Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the 
Bank of Canada; and Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Ca- 
nadian Ambassador to the United States. 

U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session 
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed 

The Senate on June 19 confirmed the nomina- 
tions of the following to be representatives to 
the fifth emergency special session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations: 

Arthur J. Goldberg 
Joseph John Siseo 
WiUiam B. Buffum 
Richard F. Pedersen 




U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency Session; United States 
Offers Proposals for Peace in the Middle East 

Following are statements made hy U.S. Rep- 
resentative Arthur J. Goldberg in the fifth 
emergency special session of the U.N. General 
Assembly, which convened at Neio York on 
June 17. 


U.S. delegation press release 109. Corr. 1 

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, the 
United States has already stated in its letter of 
June 15 ^ to the Secretary-General reservations 
as to the propriety, in light of the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution ^ of the General Assembly, of 
convening an emergency special session under 
the prevailmg circumstances. A majority of the 
members have nonetheless indicated their con- 
sent that such a session should be convened. In 
view of this fact, the United States, without 
further belaboring the points and without yield- 
ing the principle, will do all within its power 
to the end that this session may yield construc- 
tive results. 

Yesterday the distinguished Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. 
[Aleksei N.] Kosygin — whom we welcome in 
this Assembly today, along with other distin- 
guished leaders of government — according to 
the French press said : "I am going to New York 
with the sole aim of finding a peaceful solution." 
If that is indeed his sole aim, and it is shared 
by others, he will find the United States pre- 
pared, as I explicitly stated in the Security 
Council, to consider all proposals with an open 
mind and a fervent desire for peace in this 
troubled area and for a just and equitable solu- 

* For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12. 

* For text, see iUd., Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823. 

tion to the grave problems which confront us. 

Mr. President, on behalf of my Government, 
I wish to make it clear that the United States 
is participating in this session on the explicit 
understanding that everything, every problem 
and every proposal, that was before the Secu- 
rity Council in its proceedings on the crisis in 
the Near East is now before the General Assem- 
bly. The only legitimate conceivable purpose 
for this session is to search for reasonable, just, 
and peaceful solutions to the situation in the 
Near East. The United States will devote its 
own participation solely to that purpose. 

It is worth noting in this connection that 
the Soviet Union, which based its request for 
this session on the theory that the Security 
Council was unable to deal with any of the pro- 
posals before it, went to the extreme of trying 
to prove its theory true by threatening in ad- 
vance to veto draft resolutions of the Council 
which were not yet even in final form and thus 
could not even be evaluated. The plain import 
of this assertion was that all questions before 
the Council were to be transferred to this 

To the end of seeking a reasonable, just, and 
peaceful solution to the situation in the Near 
East, I, on behalf of my Government, appeal to 
all delegations to spare the General Assembly 
from the hot words, destractive propaganda 
diatribes, and disrespect for facts which unfor- 
tunately characterized so many of the recent 
sessions of the Security Council. 

Peace is at stake in the Middle East. So, as 
our distinguished President of the General As- 
sembly, His Excellency Ambassador [Abdul 
Eahman] Pazhwak, has just reminded us, is the 
good name and reputation of the United Nations 
itself, sorely put to question during the past sev- 
eral days. My delegation and I earnestly hope 
all members who jointly share with us the power 

JTJLT 10, 1967 


and responsibility for peace under the charter 
will seek to use this session only for the pursuit 
of what the Secretary-General in his recent re- 
port has called reasonable, peaceful, and just 
solutions for the problems of the Near East. 
This is the proper business — the only proper 
business — of the present session of the General 


U.S. delegation press release 110 

Mr. President, distinguished delegates, today 
we have listened with great interest and close 
attention to the statements made by the dis- 
tinguished Chairman of the Council of Min- 
isters of the Soviet Union. Mr. Kosygin, and 
the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. [Abba] 

I do not wish to take the time of this Assem- 
bly today for a detailed answer to the remarks 
made by Mr. Kosygin about my country. The 
basic position of the United States has been 
stated this morning by the President of our 
country," and I am content to leave it to all here 
to compare the temper and content of what 
these two leaders have said. 

Tomorrow I shall elaborate our position in 
detail, but today, briefly, I shall respond to 
statements of the Chairman that cannot be rec- 
onciled with the facts and must be dealt with 
immediately. I shall do so both today and to- 
morrow in the spirit of President Johnson's 
statement of this morning : that our purpose is 
to narrow our differences with the Soviet Union 
where they can be narrowed and to try to en- 
large the arena of common action with the 
Soviet Union, all in the interests of helping 
secure peace in the world for ourselves and our 

I deeply regret, however, that the leader of 
a great nation should repeat the entirely false 
charge that my Government incited, encour- 
aged, and prompted Israel to conflict. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. Every resource 
of the United States, inside and outside the 
United Nations, was devoted to an effort to 
prevent the recent war. Mr. Kosygin, perhaps 
better than any world statesman, should know 
what these efforts have been, and he must also 
know of our efforts to stop the fighting as soon 
as it started. 

It is particularly incomprehensible that he 
should allege that we sought to gain time in the 
Security Council to permit Israel to consoli- 
date its military operations; it is just the con- 
trary, as the records of the Security Council 
show.* As soon as the war broke out, we joined 
with others in the Security Council in seeking 
an immediate end to the military conflict. It 
was not the United States but others that de- 
layed action for more than 36 hours on that 
simple demand. 

The charge that United States participation 
in international efforts to assure freedom of 
innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba 
was an encouragement of Israeli aggression is 
a particularly topsy-turvy version of history. 
Since closing the Gulf clearly increased tension 
and ran the risk of starting the conflict, our 
efforts to de-fuse the situation were obviously 
designed to forestall war. not to promote it. 

More generally, the description of the origins 
of the conflict, the denigration of U.S. efforts 
to avert it, the misstatement about the efforts 
of the Security Council to prevent it and then 
stop it, were plainly partisan presentations. 

Let me say only that I must categorically 
reject the unfounded and unworthy insinuation 
that the United States had any part whatever 
in the recent conflict in the Middle East, except 
to try to stop it by every means at every stage. 
And tomorrow I shall set the record straight 
in all respects to corroborate this statement. 

As for Viet-Nam, I have only a very simple 
statement to make. I would innate the distin- 
guished Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
to cooperate with the Security Council of the 
United Nations or with the Geneva machinery 
to bring peace to Viet-Nam. The United States 
is ready to join with him in such an effort — 
and to join with him today. But I do not believe 
that our debate is furthered by discussing in 
this Special Assembly irrelevant subjects — 
Viet-Nam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and 
Germany. Tomorrow I shall deal with the real 
question on our agenda, which is the need for 
a just and stable peace in the IVIiddle East, so 
ardently desired by all people of the world. 

' See p. 31. 

* For statements made b.v Ambassador Goldberg dur- 
ing the Security Council debates on the Near East 
crisis, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 871 ; June 19, 
1967, p. 920 ; June 26, 1967, p. 934 ; and July 3, 1967, 
p. 3. 




U.S. delegation press release 112 

The General Assembly has been convened 
under the resolution known as "Uniting for 
Peace." The choice before the Assembly is clear : 
We can unite for peace, or we can divide in 

The text of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution 
includes a direct quotation from the United 
Nations Charter, setting forth the fundamental 
purposes of the United Nations : first, "To main- 
tain international peace and security" ; and sec- 
ond, "to develop friendly relations among 
nations." These purposes must guide our pro- 
ceedings here. The United States of America 
pledges its devoted efforts to this end. Yester- 
day President Johnson spoke for the American 
people when he said : "I offer assurance to all 
that this Government of ours, the Government 
of the United States, will do its part for peace 
in every forum, at every level, at every hour." 

As the troubles of the Middle East are great, 
so also must our purposes be great. It is not 
enough to de-fuse the bomb of hostility; we 
must remove the explosive itself. Our ultimate 
aim must be nothing less than a stable and du- 
rable peace in the Middle East. 

Our task is far from easy. We may all "unite 
for peace" in the abstract ; but our real task is, 
for the sake of peace, to unite upon a course of 
action. This course must be rooted both in 
fidelity to the princiijles and purposes of the 
charter and in a clear grasp of the historical 
events which have led to the present situation. 

There have been more meetings of the Secu- 
rity Council on the recurrent crises in the Middle 
East than on any other issue in the history of 
the United Nations. The record of two decades 
reveals clearly that trouble and ci-isis have been 
constant because of the failure of the parties 
concerned to come to grips with the underlying 
causes of tension in the area and to seek per- 
manent solutions. 

Five Essentials of Peace 

Yesterday the President of the United States 
stated what are, in the view of my Grovernment, 
five essentials of peace in the area. 

First, and greatest among them, is that every 
nation in the area has a fundamental right to 
live and to have that right respected by all, in- 
cluding its immediate neighbors. 

The second essential for peace is the simple 
human requirement that there be justice for the 
refugees — that the nations of the area must at 
last address themselves, with new energy and 
new determination to succeed, to the plight of 
those who have been rendered homeless or dis- 
placed by the wars and conflicts of the past, both 
distant and recent. 

The third requirement for peace, as clearly 
demonstrated by events of the past weeks, is 
that there be respect for international maritime 
rights — the right of innocent maritime passage 
for all nations. 

Fourth, peace in the Middle East requires 
steps to avert the dangers inherent in a renewed 
arms race, such as has occurred during the past 
12 years. The responsibility for such steps rests 
not only on those in the area but also upon the 
larger states outside the area. 

Fifth and finally, peace in the Middle East 
requires respect for the political independence 
and territorial integrity of all the states of the 
area. It is a principle which can be effective only 
on the basis of peace between the parties — only 
if the fragile and violated truce lines of 20 years 
are replaced by recognized boundaries and other 
arrangements that will provide the nations of 
the area security against terror, destruction, 
war, and violence of all kinds. 

These principles, if implemented, offer a solid 
basis for a durable peace in the future. If they 
had been accepted and adhered to in the past, 
there could have been peace. But they were not 
adhered to. Instead, the world has witnessed 
tlxree tragic wars. And today the Assembly is 
faced with the aftermath of the latest of these 

Tensions Rise; Efforts To Avert Clash Fail 

The essential facts are clear. In the spring of 
this year the tension of many years became even 
greater ; acts of violence became more frequent ; 
threats and declarations became more ominous 
and bellicose. Then on May 17, President Nasser 
demanded the withdrawal of the United Na- 
tions Emergency Force and immediately moved 
large U.A.R. forces into the Gaza Strip, the 
Sinai Peninsula, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Within 
a few days thereafter, the U.A.R. declared a 
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait 
of Tiran, which had been open to free and in- 
nocent passage by the ships of all nations under 
accepted principles of international law. 

JITLT 10, 1967 

The major insulator, the United Nations 
Emergency Force, by -which the United Nations 
had for so many years protected the Middle 
East against full-scale war, was stripped away. 
Hostile forces stood in direct confrontation 
within plain sight of each other. Threats of war 
filled the air. Peace hung suspended by a thread. 

At this point the Secretary-General made a 
journey to Cairo in the interest of maintaining 
peace. He reported to the Security Council on 
May 26 " that he had "called to the attention of 
the Government of the United Arab Kepublic 
the dangerous consequences which could ensue 
from restricting innocent passage of ships in the 
Strait of Tiran," and that he had expressed his 
"hope that no precipitate action would be 
taken." In the same report the Secretary-Gen- 
eral made his plea to all the parties for a 
"breathing spell" which would allow tension to 
subside from its explosive level. He urged all 
concerned "to exercise special restraint, to 
forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions 
wliich could increase tension, to allow the Coun- 
cil to deal with the underlying causes of the 
present crisis and to seek solutions." 

In the spirit of this wise plea, my Govern- 
ment and some others made strenuous efforts 
both inside and outside the United Nations to 
find ways to avert a clash. In the Security Coun- 
cil on May 31, the United States delegation pro- 
posed a resolution' to provide the "breathing 
spell" which the Secretary-General had so 
urgently requested. It is a matter of profound 
regret that this proposal, aimed at preventing 
bloodshed and suffering, was not agreed to by 

Security Council Obtains a Cease-Fire 

Early on Jime 5 the thread of peace was 
broken. From that moment, the first and most 
urgent necessity was to stop the fighting be- 
fore its dimensions were enlarged. 

Within hours of the outbreak of fighting — 
even before we had confirmation of any major 
movement of troops across truce lines — my Gov- 
ernment joined with some others in the Security 
Council in seelring to obtain, without debate, a 
call for an immediate cease-fire. If a cease-fire 
and a standstill had actually occurred at that 
point, the problems we now face would be far 

• U.N. doc. S/7906. 

• For background, see BuxLETrN of June 19, 1967, 
p. 927. 

less formidable. But again, others resisted this 
effort, and it was not imtil 36 hours later — on 
the evening of June 6, after prolonged discus- 
sion — that the Security Council finally reached 
a unanimous decision on a simple cease-fire.^ 

And when, in the following days, we sought 
to secure a cease-fire on the Syrian front, we en- 
countered the same kind of obstruction. Here, 
too, the United States was prepared, without de- 
bate and without delay, to bring the hostilities 
to a halt. But others did not see the matter the 
same way. For hours they engaged in imseemly 
bickering which, to say the least, did no credit 
to this organization. 

Charges of U.S. Intervention Rejected 

Now, Mr. President, a good deal of this time 
was consumed in the elaboration of totally false 
accusations against my country. The United 
States was accused of having plotted, incited, 
encouraged, and prompted Israel to conflict; 
and it was even charged that our armed forces 
had intervened in the hostilities on the side of 

Thiring the debates in the Security Council, 
and once again yesterday in the General Assem- 
bly, it was my duty to reject categorically all 
these charges, in whichever of their many and 
changing forms they appeared. Today I re- 
affirm, on the full authority of the United 
States Government, that no United States sol- 
dier, sailor, airman, ship, airplane, or military 
instrument of any kind — including radar jam- 
ming — pertaining to the armed forces or to any 
agency of the United States intervened in this 
conflict. Furthermore, whatever they may say, 
all the governments concerned are well aware of 
the true facts. We had nothing whatever to do 
with the fighting except to try to prevent it and, 
once it occurred, to use every effort at our com- 
mand to bring it to a speedy end. 

Wlien these false and inflammatory charges 
were first made, I offered on behalf of the 
United States our full cooperation with any 
United Nations or other impartial investiga- 
tion of them — including the proposal to open 
the logs of our aircraft carriers in the 6th Fleet 
to United Nations investigators.' This offer of 
ours has not been answered or even referred to 
by the accusers. 

' For background and text of Security Council Reso- 
lution 233, see md., June 26, 1967, p. 934. 

* For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on June 7, 
see Hid. 



It is perfectly clear why these charges have 
been spread. They were spread in an attempt 
to find a scapegoat for what occurred — and 
perhaps for an even more sinister purpose: to 
engage the great powers with each other. The 
United States will not lend itself to such 

Despite all this diversionary propaganda, the 
Security Council was able to achieve a cease- 
fire ; and the cease-fire is holding. Aiid now the 
problem of peace in the Middle East has come 
before the General Assembly. 

Analysis of Soviet Proposal 

Yesterday the Soviet Union introduced a 
resolution," essentially the same as that which 
it also proposed in the Security Council, and 
which tlie overwhelming majority of the Council 
refused to accept.^" 

Under this Soviet proposal, Israel alone is 
to be condemned as an aggressor ; though surely, 
in the light of all the events, both recent and 
long past, that led up to the fighting, it would 
be neither equitable nor constructive for this 
organization to issue a one-sided condemnation. 

Tlaen, second — and this is the heart of their 
proposal — ^the Soviet Union asks this Assembly 
to recommend, in effect, as follows: "Israel, 
withdraw your troops, and let everything go 
back to exactly where it was before the fighting 
began on June 5." In other words, the fihn is 
to be rim backward through the projector to 
that point in the early morning of June 5 when 
hostilities had not yet broken out. 

But what would the situation then be ? 

Once again, opposing forces would stand in 
direct confrontation, poised for combat. Once 
again, no international machinery would be 
present to keep them apart. Once again, in- 
nocent maritime passage would be denied. Once 
again, there would be no bar to belligerent acts 
and acts of force. Once again, there would be 
no acceptance of Israel by her neighbors as a 
sovereign state, no action to solve the tragic 
refugee problem, no effective security against 
terrorism and violence. 

Once again, in short, notliing would be done 
to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both 
sides that have fed the fires of war in the 
Middle East for 20 years. And once again, there 
would be no bar to an arms race in the area. 

Surely, no one in this hall can contemplate 
with equanimity the prospect of a fourth round 
in the Arab-Israel struggle. Yet if ever there 
was a prescription for renewed hostilities, the 
Soviet resolution is that prescription. Surely, it 
is not an acceptable approach for the United 

U.S. Offers Plan for Permanent Peace 

Wliat approach, then, ought to be taken? It 
may be well to recall that the General Armistice 
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that 
their purpose is, and I quote, ". . . to facili- 
tate the transition from the present truce to 
permanent peace." I repeat, '■^permanent feaceP 

We all know that there has been no transition 
and there is no permanent peace in that area. 
All of the 18 years of the armistice regime have 
witnessed virtually no progress on any of the 
basic issues from which the conflict arose. As 
long as these issues are unresolved, they wiU 
continue to poison the political life of the 
Middle East. 

Wliat the Middle East needs today are new 
steps toward real peace; not just a cease-fire, 
which is what we have today; not just a fragile 
and perilous armistice, which is what we have 
had for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which 
is necessary but insufficient. 

Real peace must be our aim. In that convic- 
tion I now propose, on behalf of the United 
States, a resolution ^^ which I now read : 

The General AssemMy, 

Bearing in mind the achievement of a cease-fire in 
the Middle East, as called for by the Security Council 
in its Resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 (1967)," 

Having regard to the purpose of the United Nations 
to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations, 

1. Endorses the cease-fire achieved pursuant to the 
resolutions of the Security Council and calls for its 
scrupulous respect by the parties concerned ; 

2. Decides that its objective must be a stable and 
durable peace In the Middle East ; 

3. Considers that this objective should be achieved 
through negotiated arrangements with appropriate 
third-party assistance based on : 

a. Mutual recognition of the political independence 
and territorial integrity of all countries in the area, 
encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrange- 
ments, including disengagement and withdrawal of 
forces, that vriU give them security against terror, 
destruction and war; 

b. Freedom of innocent maritime passage; 

• U.N. doc. A/L. 519. 

"For text of the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/ 
Rev. 1) , see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12. 

" U.N. doc. A/L. 520. 

"For texts, see Bulletin of July 26, 1967, p. 947, 
and July 3, 1967, p. 11. 

JULY 10, 1967 


c. Just and equitable solution of the refugee prob- 

d. Registration and limitation of arms shipments 
into the area ; 

e. Recognition of the right of all sovereign nations 
to exist in peace and security ; 

4. Requests the Security Council to keep the situa- 
tion under careful review. 

This resolution embodies the five principles 
■which President Johnson yesterday identified 
as fundamental to durable peace, and which I 
listed at the outset. 

Our objective in offering this resolution is to 
encourage a decision by the warring parties to 
live together in peace and to secure international 
assistance to this end. It is necessary to begin 
to move — not some day, but now, promptly, 
while the memory of these tragic events is still 
vivid in our minds — toward a settlement of the 
outstanding issues; and truly, "there must be 
progress toward all of them if there is to be 
progress toward any." ^^ 

The Issue Facing the United Nations 

There are legitimate gi-ievances on all sides 
of this bitter conflict, and a full settlement 
should deal equitably with legitimate griev- 
ances and outstanding questions, from which- 
ever side they are raised. In short, Mr. Presi- 
dent, a new foundation for peace must be built 
in the Middle East. 

Agreements between the parties on these pro- 
foundly contentious matters will not come easy. 
But the United Nations has an urgent obliga- 
tion to facilitate them and to help rebuild an 
atmosphere in which fruitful discussions will 
be possible. That is the purpose of the resolu- 
tion we have submitted. 

Mr. President, the United Nations is now 
faced with a clear-cut issue: We can either 
attack the causes of the disease which has 
plagued the Middle East with war three times 
in a generation or we can go back to the treat- 
ment of symptoms, which has proved such a 
dismal failure in the past. 

In any grave situation, fraught with so many 
differences of opinions and attitudes, the tend- 
ency is to say that it defies solution. But we 
cannot accept this counsel. Let no one say that 
solutions are impossible. 

The proposal we offer this morning is in- 
spired not by the despairing doctrines of per- 
petual enmity but by the hopeful doctrine from 

which we in the United Nations have always 
drawn our major inspiration : the doctrine en- 
shrined in our charter, pledging all nations and 
peoples, all cultures and religions, "to practice 
tolerance and live together in peace with one 
another as good neighbors." 

Sometimes that doctrine is called Utopian or 
unrealistic. But the greatest unrealism is that 
which relies on hatred and enmity. The great- 
est realism is the doctrine of peace and concili- 
ation and mutual forbearance. From that true 
realism, let this organization find the strength 
to make a new beginning toward peace in the 
Middle East. To this cause the United States 
pledges its most dedicated efforts. 

U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus 
Again Extended for 6 Months 

Statement hy Richard F. Pedersen ^ 

Mr. President, we are all indebted to the Sec- 
retary-General for the clear, complete, and per- 
ceptive report ^ he has put before the Council. 
He has described in forthright language the 
problems which confront us all and his distin- 
guished representative on the island. It is evi- 
dent that ]Mr. [B. F.] Osorio-Tafall has under- 
taken his latest assignment with energy and 
imagination. And we have no doubt that he, 
General [Umarai Armas Eino] Martola, and 
the officers and men of the United Nations 
Force m Cyprus will continue to serve the cause 
of peace with courage, patience, skill, and the 
determination to fulfill their mandate im- 

We would also like to note our appreciation 
for the services rendered by the distinguished 
Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador [Carlos A.] 
Bemardes, as the previous representative of the 
Secretary-General. Ambassador Bernardes, who 
formerly was a colleague of ours on the Security 
Coimcil, has shown a dedication to the high 
aims of the United Nations and a true devotion 
to the best interests of all the people of Cyprus 
in carrying out the heavy responsibilities given 

' See p. 31. 

' Made in the Security Council on June 19 (U.S./U.N. 
press release 111). Mr. Pedersen is Deputy U.S. Repre- 
sentative in the Security Council. 

" U.N. doc. S/7969. 



him by the Secretary-General with respect to 
the difficult situation there. 

The mandate of the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus is being extended for the 11th time. 
Given present conditions, we believe that tliis 
was the only realistic and prudent course of ac- 
tion ; and accordingly, we voted for the resolu- 
tion.' However, as the Secretary-General has 
noted, all parties must bear in mind the in- 
escapable fact that UNFICYP cannot remain 
in Cyprus mdefinitely. The lack of progress on 
fimdamental issues requires those concerned 
to seek new areas of accommodation even more 
urgently than before. All parties should extend 
full cooperation in accordance with this new 
resolution to the Secretary- General, his special 
representative, and UNFICYP, so that prog- 
ress may be made toward settling the long- 
standing problems on the island. 

The essence of UNFICYP's mandate is to 
prevent a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus and 
to restore and maintain law and order. And it is 
evident that this mandate cannot be fulfilled if 
the parties concerned do not give full coopera- 

The United States shares the Secretary-Gen- 
eral's concern regarding restrictions imposed on 
UNFICYP in the discharge of its normal 
duties. We deplore any use or threat of force 
against UNFICYP by anyone, and we hope that 
UNFICYP will receive cooperation in the im- 
plementation of its authorized activities. The 
Force must, in the first instance, have freedom 
of movement, and we note that the Secretary- 
General has reminded all parties that such free- 
dom is explicitly provided for in written agree- 
ment. Neither can any sort of harassment of 
United Nations personnel or of UNFICYP be 

The United States also continues to believe, 
as Ambassador Goldberg stated before the 
Council last December,* that the importation of 
arms can only be a source of insecurity. The 
United States fully concurs in the Secretary- 
General's view that any influx of arms and mili- 

'In a resolution (S/RES/238 (1967)) adopted 
unanimously on June 19, the Security Council extended 
"the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force . . . for a further period of six months 
ending 26 December 1967, in the expectation that suf- 
ficient progress towards a solution by then will make 
possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the 

* BirLMjnN of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 179. 

tary equipment is a cause for concern to 
UNFICYP in the execution of its mandate. In 
this connection, the United States is gratified by 
paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General's report 
concerning the results of inspections made of 
certain arms by the Commander of the United 
Nations Force, and we welcome the assurances 
in this respect given by the Government of 

The allegations of the distinguished repre- 
sentative of the Soviet Union of a hostile NATO 
design against Cyprus are, of course, a fantasy. 
A more positive contribution to our debate 
would have been to express tangible support 
for the United Nations Force on the island. 

We will not comment on the digression made 
in the understandable need to defend the recent 
recourse to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. 
Our own views on the relative responsibilities of 
the General Assembly and of the Security Coun- 
cil are well known and unchanged.' 

Despite our disappointment at the lack of 
progress toward solving the fundamental issues 
and the many problems which have beset the 
United Nations in its efforts to maintain peace 
and promote a settlement, the United States 
continues fully to support UNFICYP. As evi- 
dence of this statement, I wish to announce on 
behalf of the United States a pledge of up to $4 
million toward the cost of maintaining 
UNFICYP for the next 6 months. This pledge, 
as has been true of our previous pledges, will 
depend upon the amounts contributed by other 
governments toward the cost of the operation. 
The United States pledges toward the cost of 
UNFICYP, including the amount I have just 
announced, now total over $32 million. 

Mr. President, the United States hopes that 
the knowledge that UNFICYP will continue 
for another 6 months will encourage those most 
directly concerned to renew and intensify their 
efforts to reach a just and lasting solution. This 
extension should be regarded as an opportunity 
for progress, not as a reason for inaction. We 
hope that when the Security Council next meets 
on this matter we shall have evidence that the 
time provided by this extension has been well 
used. A wise man has said that time cools, time 
clarifies, and no mood can be maintained for- 
ever. Let us hope that these words will be 
justified by the course of events during the next 
6 months. 

' For background, see ibid., July 3, 1967, p. 12. 

OXTLT 10, 1967 



Current Actions 



International convention and protocol for the suppres- 
sion of counterfeiting currency. Done at Geneva 
April 20, 1929.' 
Accession deposited: Ceylon, June 2, 1967. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Maldive Islands, May 31, 1967. 

Reciprocal Assistance 

Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance. Done 
at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947. Entered into 
force December 3, 1948. TIAS 1838. 
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, June 12, 


International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1967. 
Ratification deposited: United States and Territories 

of the United States, May 29, 1067. 
Entered into force as to the United States: May 29, 

Proclaimed ip the President: June 20, 1967. 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United 
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20, 

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, May 31, 1967; 
Poland, May 22, 1967; United States, May 31, 



Agreement amending the air transport agreement of 
September 29, 1948 (TIAS 5507). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at La Paz May 4 and 17, 1967. 
Entered into force May 17, 1967. 


Agreement relating to a special operating program for 
the Duncan Reservoir, constructed under the Co- 
lumbia River Treaty. Effected by exchange of notes 

' Not In force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 

at Ottawa May 8 and 18, 1967. Entered into force 
May 18, 1967. 
Agreement relating to pre-sunrise operation of certain 
standard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31 and 
June 12, 1967. Entered into force June 12, 1967. 

El Salvador 

Agreement relating to the granting of authorizations to 
permit licensed amateur radio operators of either 
country to operate their stations in the other 
country. Effected by exchange of notes at San 
Salvador May 24 and June 5, 1967. Entered into 
force Jime 5, 1967. 


Parcel post agreement, with regulations of execution. 
Signed at Addis Ababa and Washington June 3 
and 15, 1967. Enters into force on a date to be 
mutually agreed upon by the respective competent 
authorities of the two countries. 


Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Guyana. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Georgetown May 31 and June 7, 1967. En- 
tered into force June 7, 19i67. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement amending the agreement of August 26, 1966, 
relattng to trade in cotton textiles (TIAS 6088). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong May 
31, 1967. Entered into force May 31, 1967. 


Agreement for a cooperative program in science. Signed 
at Washington June 19, 1967. Entered into force 
June 19, 1967. 


Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for 
United States administrative and related expenses 
for Japanese fiscal year 19G7 pursuant to the mutual 
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Tokyo June 2, 1967. Entered into force June 2, 1967. 


Agreement amending the air transport agreement of 
March 31, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1932 and 2551). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Jvme 5, 
1967. Entered into force June 5, 1967. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Kigali July 6 and August 
9, 1965. 
Entered into force: April 27, 1967. 

Saudi Arabia 

Agreement amending the agreement of December 9, 
1963, and January 6, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5659, 
6071), relating to the establishment of a television 
system in Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Jidda May 23 and 27, 1967. Entered into 
force May 27, 1967. 


Agreement regarding income tax administration. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 31 and 
May 3, 1967. Entered into force May 3, 1967. 



INDEX July 10, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. H63 

Africa. Principles for Peace in the Middle East 
(Johnson) 31 

Asia. Principles for Peace in the Middle East 

(Johnson) 31 

Canada. U.S.-Canada Ek;onomic Committee Con- 
cludes Eleventh Meeting (communique) . . 44 

Congress. U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session 
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed ... 46 

Cyprus. U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Ex- 
tended for 6 Months (Pedersen) 52 

Denmark. European Leaders Meet With Presi- 
dent Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40 

Economic Affairs. U.S.-Canada Economic Com- 
mittee Concludes Eleventh Meeting (com- 
munique) 44 

Europe. Principles for Peace in the Middle East 

(Johnson) 31 

Italy. European Leaders Meet With President 
Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40 

Malavn. President of Malawi Visits the United 
States (Banda, Johnson) 42 

Near East 

European Leaders Meet With President Johnson 

(Johnson, Krag) 40 

President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35 

Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John- 
son) 31 

The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38 

U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency 
Session; United States Offers Proposals for 
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47 

U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Resulting From 
Near East Conflict 41 

Passports. U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Re- 
sulting From Near East Conflict 41 

Presidential Documents 

European Leaders Meet With President John- 
son 40 

President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 

International Problems 35 

President of Malawi Visits the United States . 42 
Principles for Peace in the Middle Bast ... 31 
The Spirit of Hollybush 38 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 54 


President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35 

The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38 

U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency 
Session ; United States Offers Proposals for 
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47 

U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac- 
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44 

United Kingdom. European Leaders Meet With 

President Johnson (Johnson, Krag) .... 40 

United Nations 

President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 

International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35 
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency 

Session; United States Offers Proposals for 

Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47 
U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Extended for 

6 Months (Pedersen) 52 

U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session of U.N. 

General Assembly Confirmed 46 


President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss 

International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35 

Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John- 
son) 31 

The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38 

U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac- 
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44 

Name Index 

Banda, H. Kamuzu 42 

Buffum, William B 46 

Goldberg, Arthur J 46, 47 

Johnson, President 31,35,38,40,42 

Kosygin, Aleksei N 35 

Krag, Jens Otto 40 

Pedersen, Richard F 46,52 

Sisco, Joseph John 46 

Check List of Department of State 


Releases: June 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 

of News, Department of State, Washington, 

D.C. 20520. 






U.S.-Italian science cooperation 



Meeting of the Joint United 
States-Canadian Committee on 
Trade and Economic Affairs. 



U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning 
incident at Cam Pha. 



Revision of travel restrictions re- 
sulting from Near East hostili- 



Amendment to program for visit 
of King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
of Thailand. 


*Not printe 

tHeld for a 

later issue of the BtiLLETiN. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 





Boston Public Li^-^^"^ . 
A r,t nf Documents 
Superintendent ot ^"- 

- 2 3 ia^7 






Vol. LVII, No. 1464 

Jvly 17, 1967 


Excerpts From an Address hy President Johnson 59 


hy W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 66 


T)y Secretaiy of Commerce Alexander B. Troxobndge 70 

For index see inside hack cover 



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July 17, 1967 

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tr.S. Government Printing OflBce 

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The Right of All Peoples to Self -Determination 

Eemarks hy President Johnson {Excerpt) ' 

I want to conclude now by just quietly say- 
ing a word to you about this larger world that 
we all live m. I think it is on your mind and in 
your heart — as it is on mine and in mine. 

We are in South Viet-Nam today because we 
want to allow a little nation self-determination. 
We want them to be able to go and vote for the 
kind of leaders they want and select the type of 
government they want. We want them to be free 
of terror and aggression in doing that — as we 
want it for ourselves. 

We made a contract. We had an agreement. 
We entered into a treaty that was confirmed by 
our Senate, 82 to 1, saying that in the face of 
common danger we would come and help. 

We came. We are helping. We are doing our 
best. I solicit the cooperation of each of you to 
the extent that you can give it. 

We Americans are deeply concerned about 
the recognition of the right of self-determina- 
tion. That is what each of you demands for 
yourself. So let us help your fellow man in other 
parts of the world enjoy it, too. 

Self-determination is really the right to live. 
That is what we ask for all of the nations of the 
Middle East — not just for some of them. 

We believe that for the peoples of the 122 na- 
tions of the world— speaking now of the under- 
developed nations of the world specifically — 
real self-determination only comes when hun- 
ger and disease and ignorance and poverty are 
overcome. We believe that the peoples of all of 
these nations are entitled to that self-determi- 
nation. They won't have it until we can conquer 
those ancient enemies: illiteracy, ignorance, 
disease, and poverty. 

Just as it is here in our home, we believe in 
the first amendment, in free speech and in a 
fi-ee press. We believe in the Bill of Rights. 
We believe what matters abroad is also freedom 

' Made before the National Convention of the Junior 
Chamber of Commerce at Baltimore, Md., on June 27 
(White House press release) . 

from fear and freedom from want — the free- 
dom to make choices and not just to submit to 
a brutal destiny. 

Two days ago, not very far from here, I met 
with Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union.^ 
The nations we spoke for are two of the most 
powerful nations in all of the world. In the 
family of nations, two of the strongest have two 
of the greatest responsibilities. 

For my part, and for your nation, that re- 
sponsibility involves helping other nations to 
choose their own future as they see it. 

We seek as well maximiun understanding be- 
tween these two great powers. For 10 hours we 
looked at each other with only the interpreters 
present in a very small room. 

Though our differences are many, and though 
they rim very deep, we knew that in the world's 
interest it was important that we imderstand, if 
we could, the motivations as well as the com- 
mitments of each other. We religiously, dedi- 
catedly, and determinedly worked at that as- 
signment for those 2 days. 

That is why we met in the house called Holly- 
bush. To bring about better understandings and 
to discuss respective goals and commitments we 
came there. 

When we left I believe we had achieved that. 
We agreed we would continue to maintain con- 
tact through diplomatic channels, through 
other means of communication, and direct 

In Saigon, in the Sinai, at Hollybush in New 
Jersey, in the slums of our cities, in the prairies 
of our land, in the hollows of Appalacliia, in 
scores of underdeveloped countries all around 
the world where men struggle to make their 
own future and to secure their little families, 
that is what we are about. 

If the young leadership of our country sup- 
ports us over the long hard pull that lies ahead, 

"For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967, 
p. 35. 


if you can endure the tensions, if you can under- 
stand that the air is going to be rough and 
the road is going to be bumpy, you can, in the 
words of your own creed, "Help us unlock 
earth's great treasure — human personality." 
Then the cussers and the doubters will be rele- 
gated to the rear; the doers and the builders 
will take up the front lines. 

Now you are going to return to your homes. 
You have engaged in looking at yourselves and 
at your country. I have been able to discuss it 
for only a vei-y brief time. 

I am going back to attend a 1 o'clock meet- 
ing with Secretary Rusk and Secretary Mc- 
Namara and others who are giving everything 
they have to your country. We are not only 
going to talk and plan and work and pray to 
develop ways and means of keeping your coun- 
try and your families secure, but we are going 
to do our dead level best to bring peace to every 
human being in the world. 

Our problems are many. Our solutions are 
few. I am not as concerned about the individual 
differences which we have with other nations, 
because with few exceptions I think those can 
be reconciled; but I am concerned that every 
boy and girl, that every man and woman who 
enjoys citizenship and freedom and prosperity 
and the blessings of this land know what they 
have and are determined to build upon it, to 
improve it — and by all means to keep it. 

United States Reiterates Policy 
on Status of Jerusalem 


White House press release dated June 28 

The President said on June 19 that in our 
view "there . . . must be adequate recognition 
of the special interest of three great religions 
in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^ On this prin- 
ciple he assumes that before any unilateral ac- 
tion is taken on the status of Jerusalem there 

will be a^jpropriate consultation with religious 
leaders and others who are deeply concerned. 
Jerusalem is holy to Christians, to Jews, and to 
Moslems. It is one of the great continuing trag- 
edies of history that a city which is so much 
the center of man's highest values has also been, 
over and over, a center of conflict. Eepeatedly 
the passionate beliefs of one element have led 
to exclusion or unfairness for others. It has 
been so, unf ortimately, in the last 20 years. Men 
of all religions will agree that we must now do 
better. The world must find an answer that is 
fair and recognized to be fair. That could not 
be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the 
President is confident that the wisdom and 
good judgment of those now in control of Je- 
rusalem will prevent any such action. 


The hasty administrative action taken today ' 
cannot be regarded as determining the future of 
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in re- 
lation to them. 

The United States has never recognized such 
unilateral actions by any of the states in the 
area as governing the international status of 

The policy of the United States will be gov- 
erned by the President's statement of June 19 
and the Wliite House statement this morning. 

The views of the United States have been 
made clear repeatedly to representatives of all 
govermnents concerned. 

' Btjixetin of July 10, 1967, p. 31. 

' Read to news correspondents by the Department 

' On June 27, the Israeli Parliament approved three 
bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdic- 
tion, and public administration over the Old City of 
Jerusalem and other territory of the former mandate 
of Palestine which has been under the control of Jor- 
dan since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On 
June 28, the Government of Israel took administrative 
action under the new legislation to extend its munic- 
ipal services and controls over the entire city of 




United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue 
Close Cooperation To Promote Peace 

Their Majesties King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
ancl Queen Sirikit of Thailand visited the 
United States and Canada June 6-29, conclud- 
ing with a 3-day oificial visit to Washington 
June 27-29. Following are texts of an exchange 
of greetings between President Johnson and the 
King at an amval ceremony on the South Lawn 
of the White Hou^e on June 27, their exchange 
of toasts at a dinner at the White Rouse that 
evening, and a joint statement released on 
June 29. 


White House press release dated June 27 

President Johnson 

Your Majesties: On behalf of the people of 
the United States, I welcome you once again 
to my country. 

All of us who had the pleasure of meeting 
you when you were here in 1960 remember that 
visit with a very special warmth and with great 

Since that time, Mrs. Jolmson and I both 
have had the privilege of visiting Your Majes- 
ties in Thailand. We will never forget your 
hospitality nor the friendship of the Thai peo- 
ple themselves and the warmth with which they 
welcomed us to your country when we were 
there last fall during our trip to Asia. 

That our heads of state and government have 
met often in recent years I think is a symbol of 
the changing times and the changing relation- 
ships. Until very recently, the United States 
and Thailand were thought of as the most dis- 
tant of lands. They were widely separated by 
both geography and interests. Today, we look 
at it from an entirely different viewpoint. We 
see ourselves as your neighbors. We are only 
hours apart. We are neighbors who share the 
problems and the opportunities of a great com- 
mon Pacific frontier. 

We welcome Your Majesties as the beloved 
leaders of a gallant nation which has not only 
the desire to be free — because all nations have 
that — ^but the wisdom and the courage to do 
what is necessary to be free. 

There was a time not long ago when some of 
our friends in Asia were deeply concerned about 
their future. They wondered whether they were 
destined to be dominated by an aggressive alien 

They wondered whether they would have to 
face that power alone, imaided by friends who 
wished them well but whose wishes could not be 
translated into reality. 

Those days are gone. Throughout Asia there 
is a new spirit. It is a spirit of faith in the fu- 
ture. It has brought in its wake confidence, con- 
fidence that the future of Asia is not something 
that is preordained but is something that can 
be built and shaped to Asian desires by Asian 

I am glad to say that the people of your na- 
tion of Thailand have led the way. Thailand 
never gave in to despairs. Thailand never as- 
sumed that its independence could not be 

Your people knew that men are not the vic- 
tims of history but are the makers of history. 

You were among the first to send your sons to 
fight for liberty in Korea. Without hesitation, 
you took your stand as a charter member of the 
SEATO alliance. 

Now, today, you are making an invaluable 
contribution to the struggle of freedom in Viet- 

I have no doubt about the outcome of those 
efforts in which we have joined as Pacific part- 
ners. Wlien the free men of Asia's future write 
the history of the present, the gallantry and the 
courage of the Thai nation will be a luminous 

Your Majesties, Mrs. Johnson and I are so 
delighted that we could welcome you once again. 
We look forward to very useful and fruitful 

JXTLT 17, 1967 


discussions with you and a happy evening in the 
Wliite House together tonight. 
Thank you. 

His Majesty the King 

Mr. President, I am veiy thankful for your 
kind words of welcome. This welcome is really 
a warm welcome. 

We come on this visit to the United States on 
a people-to- people visit. That means we have 
had the opportunity to meet people of different 
walks of life and that we have had the occasion 
to know a little more about your country's as- 
pirations and also that we may present our 
views and bring our ideas to you directly. 

This visit is drawing to its end. It is a very 
suitable conclusion that we should come here to 
Washington to meet the President and Mrs. 
Johnson. We meet you both not only as head 
of state but as old friends. That is part of our 
people-to-people visit. 

We hope the result of this kind of visit, which 
is not only a visit of protocol and red carpets, but 
it is a meeting of people who have the same ideas 
and ideals — so that we can cooperate better and 
we can bring better understanding between the 
people of your great nation and the people of 
Thailand, so that we may work in cordiality 
toward world everlasting peace. 

In coming here, we bring the greetings and 
the wishes of our people to the people of this 
great country. We want to share with you all 
the hopes for future progress of the world and 
future peace of the world. 

Thank: you. 


White House press release dated June 27 

President Johnson 

Your Majesties, distinguished guests, ladies 
and gentlemen : I'm sure that you have read the 
story of His Majesty's remarkable address at 
Williams College. A speech had been prepared 
for his approval and for his use upon that oc- 
casion. But evidently he foimd it not to his 
liking. So he spoke extemporaneously — and the 
judges, I am told, would have given him the 
annual speaking prize if visitors had been 

When His Majesty finished, someone asked 
if he had been able to see his wife's face and 

to read her reaction to his address. His Majesty 
is said to have replied : "Confidentially, I wasn't 
looking at my wife. I was watching my Minister 
of Foreign Affairs." 

Secretary Katzenbach [Nicholas deB. Katz- 
enbach. Under Secretaiy of State] I am care- 
fully observmg your reactions. 

We feel a very special bond of kinship with 
Your Majesty because you were born among us. 

I have heard that during your early years 
you used to go from Cambridge to an island off 
the Massachusetts coast known as Martha's 

Some members of my Cabinet, some members 
of my staff, have been known to disappear into 
the fogs of the Vineyard for long stretches of 
time. Some of them even claim that the fog ob- 
scures not only land and sea but the sound of 
the Wliite House telephone. 

We are delighted that you were able to find 
your way back from that isolated and mysteri- 
ous place. 

We are delighted, as well, that we have this 
opportunity to repay, in some small measure, 
the warm hospitality bestowed on us in Bang- 
kok last October. 

The world is a good deal smaller than it was 
when our United States President Jackson sent 
our first diplomatic mission across the seas to 
Siam, as it was then called, in 1833. 

But the nearness of two countries is not meas- 
ured by the flight time of jet planes. It is meas- 
ured more by imderstanding and by shared pur- 
poses. And though we have different customs, 
different histories, and different religions, what 
we share. Your Majesty, far surpasses our dif- 

Part of our conunon heritage is a passionate 
belief in man's right to decide his own destiny, 
a love of freedom and independence, and a de- 
termination to secure their blessings. 

Wlaen I learned on my first trip to your coun- 
try that "Thailand" in your language means 
"Land of the Free," I thought of those words 
in our national anthem : "the land of the free 
and the home of the brave." 

The people of the United States and the peo- 
ple of Thailand have always understood that 
those who would remain free must first be brave. 

In the past. Your Majesty, brave Thai and 
brave Americans have stood shoulder to shoul- 
der in the cause of freedom. Today, we face to- 
gether another test of man's will and determina- 
tion to be free. We shall meet that test with 
courage and determination imtil the tide of 



aggression recedes and our people can live in 
peace once more. 

Your Majesty's people have been brave in 
time of war. You have helj^ed men forge a shield 
against the disciples of violence. 

You have also been equal to the demanding 
tasks of peace. You have asserted your leader- 
ship in the works of peaceful construction that 
always must be carried on behind that shield. 

I am confident, Your Majesty, that from our 
mutual commitment will someday flow peace 
and order and development in prosperity for 
the people of a free Asia. 

Tonight we are called upon to make addi- 
tional sacrifices. In the days ahead, we are go- 
ing to have requests made of vis that are going 
to be difficult to honor. But we approach these 
requests with confidence, knowing that our al- 
lies will face them with courage and with fair- 

And those who love peace will be eternally 
in your debt. Your Majesty, for the contribu- 
tion that you and your country have made. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and 
toast Their Majesties the King and Queen of 

His Majesty the King 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: This 
time the machine came to me. You spoke about 
looking at my Foreign Minister. Today I won't 
look at him. I will look at my text. 

You mentioned my trip to Martha's Vineyard 
and wondered how I came back. I had nothing 
to do with the coming back, because I was too 
small. It was because my parents were very 
good and went home, and they took me home, 

But apart from this, there are other things 
that are to be said. 

First, I must thank you for the kind invita- 
tion to visit this great city of Washington and 
for the warm welcome and hospitality which 
we have received during this our second visit to 
the United States. 

Wlien we came here on our first visit, we 
came to make friends with the people whom 
we had admired for their freedom, fairness, 
and generosity. We were received with the great 
warmth and cordiality that only Americans can 

Your visit to my country in October last, Mr. 
President, is still a happy memory with us; 
and we are most gratified to be with you tonight, 

because we know that we are once again among 

We are happy to see Mrs. Johnson with us 
tonight. Your presence here is a good surprise. 
Although ourselves we are still quite far re- 
moved from having the honor and the dignity 
of being grandparents, not to mention the ir- 
responsible enjoyment that accompanies such 
a privilege, we do imderstand and appreciate 
the thrill and anxiety of a new grandmother — 
and grandfather, also. 

It is a source of gratification for me to hear 
the kind words that you have spoken and your 
reiteration of the friendship that the United 
States Government and people extend to my 
country and my people. 

Allow me to say again that we on our part 
sincerely and wholeheartedly reciprocate the 
very same sentiments — the firm belief that on 
your part you earnestly and sincerely desire 
peace and a better way of life for the people of 
all nations. 

The happy association between the United 
States and Thailand is to us a matter of historic 

You already mentioned the mission of Mr. 
Edmimd Roberts, who was received by my 
august ancestor Kmg Rama the Third. 

In spite of his pet aversion to receiving for- 
eign envoys from abroad that was due to our 
past unfortimate experiences, my ancestor was 
somehow won over by the American honesty of 
purpose and decided to extend a very warm 
welcome to the emissary of your early predeces- 
sor President Jackson. 

Mr. Edmund Roberts arrived in Bangkok in 
February of 1833. Within a period of less than 
a month and in spite of linguistic disadvan- 
tages — every sentence spoken by either side had 
to imdergo four successive translations, from 
English to Portuguese, and from Portuguese 
to Chinese, from Chinese to Thai, and vice 
versa — in spite of all these difficulties, a treaty 
of friendship and commerce was agreed upon 
and signed on the 20th of March 1833. 

This agreement constituted the first treaty 
ever signed by the United States with any 
country in Asia. Thus my country came to be 
the first country in Asia to recognize and to ex- 
tend the hand of friendship to the newly inde- 
pendent United States of America. 

War, the punctuation of human history, 
brought a new sentence in American-Thai re- 
lationships. President Woodrow Wilson, who 
genuinely understood our difficulties and dis- 

JTILT 17, 1967 


advantages in our relations with foreign 
countries, agreed at Versailles after World 
War I to revise the U.S.-Thai treaty of friend- 
ship by abrogating all obnoxious clauses con- 
taining the one-sided ijnposition of extraterri- 
toriality and fiscal restrictions as contained in 
earlier treaties which had no terminating 

Other gi'eat nations, at that time, later fol- 
lowed the American example of justice and 
broadmindedness. Thailand thus gained an im- 
proved standing. 

World War II brought about another sen- 
tence in the history of American-Thai friend- 
ship. The United States has shown real concern 
over the security and development of Thai- 
land — and gave not only good advice but also 
several forms of aid and assistance of material 
nature, both in the military and in the economic 

This last sentence is not completed yet. We 
can only hope that it may end happily for the 
sake of beginning another one. 

We can only say that at present we are proud 
in the knowledge that it is being written with 
our mutual good will and cooperation. 

Ladies and gentlemen, may I invite you all 
now to rise and join me in a toast to the happi- 
ness of President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson 
and to the prosperity and progress of the people 
of the United States. 

gional economic and political cooperation in South- 
east Asia. 

In their review of the situation in Southeast Asia, 
the President reaffirmed that the United States regards 
the preservation of the independence and integrity of 
Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United 
States and to world peace. His Majesty and the Presi- 
dent agreed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- 
tion is the foundation of collective security in the area 
and that both nations are determined to strengthen the 
role of the organization in protecting the area against 
aggression and subversion. 

The President stated his admiration and apprecia- 
tion for the generous and courageous assistance of 
Thailand to the common effort to protect the Republic 
of Vietnam and the entire Southeast Asia region 
against Communist aggression and for the resolute 
measures of the Royal Thai Government against the 
subversion directed against Thailand itself. 

His Majesty stated the appreciation of the Thai 
people for the efforts of the U.S. and expressed the 
determination of Thailand not only to maintain its 
historic independence but to continue to contribute 
to the maintenance of the freedom and independence 
of others threatened by Communist aggression. 

His Majesty and the President reaffirmed the his- 
torical bonds of friendship between the United States 
and Thailand and, confident that this is the heartfelt 
desire of the people of the two countries, pledged to 
continue close and cordial collaboration, directly and 
through international organizations, to promote mutual 
security and world peace. 

U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief 
Programs for the Middle East 


White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated June 29 

Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand 
have concluded a three-day official visit to Washington 
at the invitation of President Johnson. His Majesty 
discussed with the President at the White House 
affairs of mutual concern to Thailand and the United 

The President welcomed His Majesty again to the 
United States and .stated the deep appreciation of Mrs. 
Johnson and himself for the gracious hospitality ex- 
tended to them by Their Majesties during the Presi- 
dent's visit to Thailand in October 1966. 

The President expres.sed admiration for the rapid 
economic development and improvement in education 
and social services that have taken place in Thailand 
under His Majesty's leadership. The President voiced 
deep respect for His Majesty's concern that the benefits 
of this progress extend to every part of the Kingdom. 

His Majesty and the President recalled the warm 
traditional friendship of the United States and Thai- 
land which is solidly based on common ideals and desire 
for lasting peace and a world order based on justice 
and respect for the independence and sovereignty of 
individual nations. The President noted his admiration 
for the constructive role of Thailand in furthering re- 

Following is a statement ty President John- 
son released hy the White House on June ^, 
together with the text of a letter dated June 29 
from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative 
to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary- 
General U Thant. 


White nouse press release dated June 27 * 

The recent hostilities in the Middle East took 
their inevitable toll in human suffering. Wliile 
we are urgently searching for a lasting settle- 
ment of the Middle East problem, we must bear 
in mind that the first humanitarian task and the 
first task of reconstruction is to bind up the 
wounds of conflict — to begin to find homes for 
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medical 
care for the sick and wounded. 

The American people have always responded 
generously to human suffering anywhere in the 



world. In tliis humanitarian tradition, the 
United States will join with other nations in a 
special effort to provide emergency assistance 
in the Middle East now. I have directed the es- 
tablishment of a reserve of $5 million from con- 
tingency funds, to meet urgent relief needs in 
the period immediately ahead. We will allocate 
these funds through a number of channels in 
whatever ways best help the war victims and 
encourage contributions from others, including 
the countries within the area. 

As a first step, I have directed that our Gov- 
ernment ^participate in the appropriate United 
Nations emergency programs of food and 
medical relief. In addition, we are offering 
$100,000 to the American Bed Cross for imme- 
diate use by the International Red Cross to as- 
sist all victims of the conflict. 

The Secretary of State will keep emergency 
needs under constant review and will cooperate 
fully with the intergovernmental and private 
organizations now at work. 

I must emphasize that this is an emergency 
relief program. Even while we are joining in 
this effort to meet urgent needs, we must look 
toward a permanent and equitable solution for 
those who have been displaced by this and previ- 
ous wars. It will not be enough simply to fall 
back on the relief arrangements of the past. 
There will be no peace for any party in the Mid- 
dle East unless this problem is attacked with 
new energy by all and, certainly, primarily by 
those who are inmiediately concerned. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 115 

June 29, 1967. 
Dear Mr. Secretary General: I have the 
honor to call to your attention the June 27 state- 
ment of President Johnson on emergency as- 
sistance for war victims in the Middle East. The 
text of the statement is as follows : 

[Text of President Johnson's statement.] 

You will note that the President has stated 
that funds will be allocated through a number 
of channels, in whatever ways best help the war 
victims and encourage contributions from 
others, including the countries within the area. 

The United States has been the major con- 
tributor to UNRWA [United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees] 

since its establishment seventeen years ago. I 
am pleased to inform you now that, in accord- 
ance with the President's announcement that a 
reserve of $5,000,000 has been established to 
meet urgent relief needs in the Middle East, the 
Government of the United States is making 
available a special contribution of $2,000,000 to 
UNRWA to help meet these urgent needs in 
the period immediately ahead. We are under- 
taking immediate consultations with the Com- 
missioner-General of UNRWA with a view to 
ascertaining how best and in what form this 
contribution could be made so as to be of maxi- 
mum utility in meeting these urgent relief needs 
in the area. 

I would appreciate it if this letter could be 
distributed as a Document of the current Emer- 
gency Session of the General Assembly. 

Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement 
on Texts of New Canal Treaties 

White House Announcement 

WhUe House press release dated June 26 

President Johnson announced on June 26, 
jointly with President Marco A. Robles of 
Panama, that the negotiating teams of the 
United States and of Panama had reached 
agreement on the form and content of new trea- 
ties relating to the present canal and a j^ossible 
new sea-level canal in the future. The proposed 
texts of the treaties are being submitted to their 
respective Governments by the negotiators with 
their recommendations and conclusions. 

Wlien approved by the two Presidents, ar- 
rangements will be made for signature. The 
treaties will then be presented to each country's 
legislative body for consideration in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes. 

Three separate but closely related treaties 
have been negotiated: (1) Treaty Between the 
Republic of Panama and the United States of 
America Concerning the Panama Canal, (2) 
Treaty Between the Republic of Panama and 
the United States of America Concerning a Sea 
Level Canal Connecting the Atlantic and Pa- 
cific Oceans, and (3) Treaty on the Defense of 
the Panama Canal and of its Neutrality. 

OXTLT 17, 1967 


". . . we are now actively supporting the building of regional 
institutions and regional cooperation in Latin A7nerica, Asia, 
and Africa as well as in EuropeP Mr. Rostow, who is Special 
Assistant to the President, discussed the ''''spreading regional 
impulse''^ in his commenceinent address at Middlebwy College, 
Middlebury, Vt., on June 12. 

Regionalism and World Order 

by W. W. Rostow 

It may have occurred to those of you receiv- 
ing degi-ees on this 12th day of June 1967 that 
there were better times to graduate and possibly 
even better worlds into which to go. Under the 
circumstances, you might expect me — a working 
bureaucrat from Washington — to shout across 
the generational gap, pointing out that things 
are not as bad as they seem and ending with the 
approved commencement doctrine, that great 
challenges await you in the world outside 

But I am by profession a teacher and an his- 
torian. That means I would not deny the gen- 
erational gap. I welcome it and recognize it, 
and even treasure it, as the enormous force for 
vitality and good it is in human affairs. It is 
essentially by judging skeptically what the last 
generation takes for granted — selecting what 
seems viable — rejecting what is irrelevant — that 
the human race makes such progress as it does 

Far from denying the generational gap, I am 
here to use it, in a way, as my theme. Far from 
denying the cliche that challenges await you, 
I shall try to offer a kind of roadmap to one 
particular major challenge. 

For I am 50 years old — my generation met its 
most formative challenge just before you were 
born and while you were staggering through the 
rigors of early childhood. 

Your average age, I am told, is 211/0. You 
belong, therefore, to a second and quite different 
postwar generation, whose tasks and challenges 
are only now beginning to emerge. 

I should like to discuss this morning what I 
believe is one of those tasks, but only you will in 

fact decide. That task is the building of effective 
regionalism as a component of world order. 

The concept of regionalism began for me in 
1945 when I was a junior officer in the State De- 
partment, where I was put to work on German- 
Austrian economic affairs when I was not yet 
out of uniform. That work initially involved 
such issues as reparations ; the provision of food 
and shelter and clothing to peoples of war-dev- 
astated nations; and the revival of the German 
coal industry, on which the recovery of Western 
Europe then heavily depended. 

In the midst of these urgent postwar house- 
keeping problems, a distinguished young 
French diplomat — named [Maurice] Couve de 
Murville — came to Washington m November 
1945, after visits to Moscow and London. He 
argued that, because of its importance for all of 
Europe, the Rulir should be detached from Ger- 
many and separately administered. I had the 
privilege of sitting in on his exposition of what 
was then French policy. His challenging pro- 
posal stirred my mind because the question he 
posed was real, but as an historian I instinc- 
tively felt the proposed answer would not be 

I concluded by deciding that the right answer 
was to bring about the economic revival of 
Europe on the basis of economic unity, which 
would make even a fully revived German econ- 
omy part of a larger whole and which would 
provide to the small Austrian economy, about 
which I was also concerned, a market environ- 
ment large enough for it to find a prosperous 
and orderly place. 

And so, like all bureaucrats when seized with 



an idea, I wrote a memorandum. That bureau- 
cratic effort has, perliaps, a very small i)lac6 in 
the stream of American thought of that time, 
and happily many other bureaucrats in many 
other places were doing the same. But, in fact, 
the concept of Western European unity which 
gradually emerged in the succeeding months 
and years was the product of deep roots, power- 
ful forces, and many men — mainly Europeans : 

— The Second World War had demonstrated 
to many Europeans the almost suicidal danger 
of Europe's continuing with its traditional 
rivalries ; 

— The postwar power of the Soviet Union and 
the United States made many Western Euro- 
peans look toward imity as a way of acquiring 
a dignity which was no longer possible on the 
basis of traditional European statehood; 

— The inevitable interconnections between the 
United States and Western Europe were seen as 
better conducted between a united Western 
Europe and the United States than on the basis 
of inherently unequal bilateral relations. 

Quite aside from the economic and technolog- 
ical advantages of a big European market, 
many Europeans perceived that, if Western 
Europe was to maintain a stature and responsi- 
bility appropriate to its tradition and capacity, 
unity was the right road. To the credit of our 
country, we decided to throw our full weight 
behind this movement and look to a great if 
not always compliant partner rather than to 
the superficially greater influence we might 
have wielded in Western Europe on a divide- 
and-nile basis. 

The first major articulation of our support 
for Western European economic miity was in 
Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at 
a graduation ceremony in another New England 
college 20 years and 1 week ago today. 

Since that time the movement toward West- 
ern European unity has by no means been 
smooth or easy. The process is evidently in- 
complete. Nevertheless, it moves forward ; and I 
believe it will continue to move forward as the 
logic of European interest and the character of 
the world environment in which Europe must 
live press in this direction. 

In the last few years we have seen essentially 
this same logic beginnijig to take hold in the de- 
veloping parts of the world. If I were address- 
ing you in 1961, for example, I might have 
talked about our support for Western European 

unity and the Atlantic partnership and then 
referred to the conmion responsibilities of the 
Atlantic community for the nations and peoples 
of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America. And at that time, representatives of 
those nations and regions tended to think in 
terms of the common interests of developing 
nations. But quietly, slowly, almost imper- 
ceptibly, there has been a change. 

It is, I believe, one of the most important, if 
minoticed, transitions in policy under President 
Jolmson — and transitions of thought in the 
world community — that we are now actively 
supporting the building of regional institutions 
and regional cooperation in Latin America, 
Asia, and Africa as well as in Europe. And we 
are doing this because, despite the continuing 
power of nationalism, men and governments in 
those regions are becoming seized with the same 
kind of thoughts that gripped Western Europe 
in the late 1940's and early 1950's. 

Economic Unity in Latin America and Africa 

For example, between the Punta del Este con- 
ference of 1961 and the meeting of Presidents in 
Punta del Este in 1967, the gi-eatest change — 
aside from an increase in confidence in Latin 
America's destiny under fi'eedom — was the rise 
in emphasis on the movement toward Latin 
American economic integration. 

I have had in recent years the privilege of 
working with Latin Americans as closely as I 
was permitted to work with Western Europeans 
in the immediate postwar years. I have found 
emerging in Latin America underlying forces 
and thoughts quite similar to those which moved 
Europeans a generation earlier. Latin Ameri- 
cans understand the technical advantages of 
economic integration ; they understand that they 
can solve more problems for themselves and ac- 
quire a position of greater strength and dignity 
on the world scene through economic integra- 
tion ; and they understand that they will be able 
to work as a strong partner to the United States 
only if they move in this direction. 

As in Western Europe, the economic integra- 
tion movement in Latin America is drawing to 
it some of the best and proudest minds and 
spirits in that continent. 

In Africa, of course, the movement toward 
economic unity and cooperation is much less 
well developed. The nations of the region are at 
an earlier stage of economic and social growth. 

JUI^T 17, 1967 



Indeed, in some cases the nations bom out of 
colonialism have not been able to maintain their 
initial unity against the pull of tribal and re- 
gional differences. Nevertheless, in counter- 
point, there are the first begmnings of regional 
spirit and organization: the Organization for 
African Unity ; the Economic Commission for 
Africa ; and the African Development Bank. 

In the first speech wholly devoted to Africa 
ever given by an American President, President 
Johnson on ]\Iay 26, 1966, threw our weight be- 
hind African regionalism.^ 

We have been particularly heartened by the impetus 
toward regional cooperation in Africa. 

The world has now reached a stage where some of 
the most effective means of economic growth can best 
be achieved in large units commanding large resources 
and large markets. Most nation-states are too small, 
when acting alone, to assure the welfare of all of their 
people. . . . 

Above all, we wish to respond in ways that will be 
guided by the vision of Africa herself, so that the prin- 
ciples we share — the principles which underlie the OAU 
Charter — come to life in conformity with the culture 
and aspirations of the African peoples. 

One simply cannot build first-rate universities 
and tecluiical schools or bring in modem tele- 
communications on the basis of states as small 
as many of the African coimtries. There is, 
therefore, wisdom in trying even now to de- 
velop regional and subregional ajjproaches to 
African problems. But, as in "Western Europe 
and Latin America, the path will be long, un- 
even, and frustrating. 

Surge of Cooperative Effort in Asia 

The most dramatic emergence of a new 
regional spirit and policy is, of course, in Asia. 

In a speech at Jolins Hopkins University on 
April 7, 1965, President Johnson said: ". . . 
there must be a much more massive effort to im- 
prove the life of man" in Asia ; and he went on 
to observe that the "first step is for the countries 
of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a 
greatly expanded cooperative effort for 
development." ^ 

In the 26 months since the President spoke, 
we have seen in Asia a quite remarkable trans- 
formation of attitudes and action. 

While the war in Viet-Nam goes on, with all 
its suffering, the peoples of Asia have begim to 
define for themselves a new future. That future 

' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914. 
' lUd., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

hinges on a conviction that we are serious about 
seeing it through in Viet-Nam. Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore has, on a number 
of occasions, spoken in the vein in which he was 
recently quoted in the Reporter magazine. He 
asked of Americans: "Are your people really 
serious in Vietnam? If you are, we are with 
you." They are with us because they know that 
the failure of aggression from Hanoi against 
South Viet-Nam and Laos is essential to the se- 
curity of the region and only the American 
commitment — along with others — can establish 
this foundation for the future of Asia. 

But they are looking not to us but primarily 
to themselves to define their future and to build 
it. In the words of this same Asian statesman, 
we are "buying tune" for them in Viet-Nam — 
time for them to do a job only they can do. 

Literally for the first tune in history — thou- 
sands of years of history — the governments and 
peoples of Asia are coming together in a spirit 
of cooperation to begin to map the future of the 

The list of Asian meetings that have occurred 
in the past 2 yeare is too long to repeat here. But 
they have met in various groupings among 
themselves — without us — to consider regional 
programs in the fields of education, agriculture, 
banking, and transportation. In addition, the 
Mekong Committee, working on the very edge 
of the battlefields, is carrying forward with a 
new vitality ; and the Asian Development Bank 
is in operation in Manila, led by a distinguished 

In the proportions of its initial capital stock, 
that Bank foreshadows the kind of cooperation 
that may be possible in the future: We have 
put in 20 percent ; the Japanese, 20 percent ; the 
other Asian nations, 40 percent ; and the balance 
comes from many sources outside the region. 

This surge of cooperative effort in the new 
Asia takes place against the background of re- 
markable momentum in South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Malaysia, as well as in Japan; while 
Indonesia moves at last to find its feet after 
years of stagnation or worse. 

On April 30, the Sunday New York Times 
ran a story from Bangkok by Drew Middleton 
discussing the mood of the new Asia and the 
reasons for Asian support for our Viet-Nam 
policy. It contained this observation by an Asian 
Foreign Minister, which I have heard, in dif- 
ferent forms, from Seoul to Kuala Lumpur, 
from Tokyo to Bangkok: 



For youth, anticolonialism is part of history and 
Communism has split and lost its appeal in the process. 
Perhaps regionalism with its promise of stability and 
economic progress will be youth's big concept for the 

Divisions in the Middle East 

The one region in the non-Communist world 
where regional institutions and spirit have not 
yet begim to emerge is, of course, the Middle 
East. During the whole postwar period, that 
region has been bedeviled by multiple splits and 
quarrels : not only between the Arab states and 
Israel but also by divisions among the Arab 
states and between certain Arab and other 
Moslem states. 

No one from outside a region can create a 
spirit of determination to face and solve prob- 
lems by regional cooperation. No one outside a 
region can build regional institutions. But we 
would hope that out of the frustrations and 
tragedies of postwar Middle Eastern history we 
might see emerge a new desire to achieve dig- 
nity and stability and progress for all through 
regional cooperation. 

I am sure we and others outside the region 
will be prepared to be helpful if the peoples 
and governments of that area themselves decide 
that this is the right road and if they begin to 
move — in their own ways — along the path al- 
ready taken by Western Europe, Latin Amer- 
ica, and Asia. 

As we look from the past to the future, this 
spreading regional impulse has a particular 
meaning for our country, its policy, and its 
future position on the world scene ; for, despite 
Professor [Marshall] McLuhan's skepticism, 
policy in Washington is not made in a rearview 
mirror. Speaking at Lancaster, Ohio, on Sep- 
tember 5, 1966, President Johnson said : ^ 

Our purpose in promoting a world of regional part- 
nerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow 
in strength inside a strong United Nations, we can 
look forward to a decline in the burden that America 
has had to bear In this generation. 

We are finding, then, in regionalism, a new 
relationship to the world community somewhere 
between the overwhelming responsibility we 
assumed in the early postwar years — as we 

" Ibid., Sept. 26, 1966, p. 453. 

moved in to fill vacumns of power and to deal 
with war devastation — and a return to isolation- 
ism. From the beginning our objective was not 
to build an empire of satellites but to strengthen 
nations and regions so that they could become 

And in this we are being true to ourselves, 
our tradition, and our practical experience as a 

Eegionalism is built into the Federal Consti- 
tution of this continental democracy. It is one 
way we have learned to share power and re- 
sponsibility. We have, therefore, found it easy 
and natural to work with those in other parts 
of the world who committed themselves to 
building regional order and assimiing regional 

To fulfill this vision of regional partnerships 
will take time and patience. Above all, it will 
take dogged, stubborn pride and effort by the 
peoples of the various regions of the world. 
Moreover, many problems can only be solved 
on a global, rather than a regional, basis. 

But, in the great inherently federal task we 
all assumed in 1945 with the acceptance of the 
United Nations Charter, we have learned that 
regionalism has a large and hopeful place. 

The record of regional architecture in the 
first postwar generation is on the whole good 
and promising; but it is evidently incomplete. 

As you take stock of the tasks ahead — in your 
coming time of responsibility — I am reasonably 
confident that the development of regionalism 
will engage your generation as much or more 
than it has mine. I trust and believe this is one 
part of my generation's effort you will not 
reject and set aside — but pick up and do better. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Japan, 
Takeso Shimoda, presented his credentials to 
President Jolmson on June 28. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated June 28. 

JULY 17, 1967 

The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the Future 

hy Alexander B. Trowbridge ^ 

I am very happy to be here. Paris is as en- 
chanting as ever, and I would be grateful to you 
for no other reason but that your generous invi- 
tation to join you here today has given me the 
opportunity to visit again this queen of cities. 

But I am also grateful for another, far more 
substantial, reason. This occasion also gives me 
the opportunity to contribute, I hope, a meas- 
ure of understanding to a subject of great im- 
portance to both Europe and the United States. 
Unfortunately, it is a subject that for too long 
has been distorted by the catch phrase that has 
become its label. I refer to the so-called "tech- 
nological gap." 

It is indeed a catchy phrase and has the 
proper ring of crisis that such phrases must 
have if they are to pass into popular usage. But 
like all such phrases, it catches only the more 
visible aspects of the problem it is intended to 
describe and obscures its true dimensions. 

To a nonspecialist, for example, it would have 
to be explained that the gap is, on the surface, 
the industrial disparity that exists between 
Europe and the United States and not the vast 
technological gulf of centuries that measures 
the economic distance between industrialized 
countries and those in the early stages of devel- 
opment. The technological gap — or perhaps 
"technological lag" is a more precise term — is 
a much less formidable problem, and one that 
we can do something about. 

The first step should be to describe the prob- 
lem in realistic terms in order to establish a per- 
spective on which all involved can agree. 

In one very real and basic sense, every indus- 
trialized nation, the United States included, 

seems to suffer from technological lag within 
its own industrial complex. By this I mean the 
undue and unnecessary time lost in bringing the 
processes of invention and innovation to produc- 
tive fulfillment. And whether tliis delay is re- 
flected in comparisons with the progress of 
other nations is actually incidental to the en- 
demic problem of the lag itself. 

We have been much concerned with techno- 
logical lag within the United States, and just 
last January the Department of Commerce is- 
sued a report by a high-level advisory commit- 
tee which reviewed the problem in depth.^ I 
would like to read to you one of the key recom- 
mendations of this report, which I think may 
shed some much-needed light on the subject 
of technological lag, whether internal or 

It has to do with what the report calls "the 
abundance of ignorance about the processes of 
invention, innovation and entrepreneurship." 

. . . there is too little appreciation and understand- 
ing (the report states), of the process of technological 
change in too many crucial sectors : 

— Throughout much of the Federal Government. 

— In some Industries. 

— In many banks. 

— In many universities. 

— In many cities and regions. 

More important, therefore, than any specific recom- 
mendation concerning antitrust, taxation, the regula- 
tion of industry, or venture capital, is one central 
proposal : 

The major effort should be placed on getting more 
managers, executives, and other key individuals — both 
in and out of government — to learn, feel, understand 
and appreciate how technological innovation is 
spawned, nurtured, financed, and managed into new 

' Address made at Paris on June 2 before the Amer- 
ican Chamber of Commerce in France. Mr. Trowbridge 
was then Acting Secretary of Commerce ; he was sworn 
in as Secretary of Commerce on June 14. 

' Technological Innovation: Its Environment and 
Management. Copies of the 83-page report are for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ($1.25). 



technological businesses that grow, provide Jobs, and 
satisfy people. 

I wholly subscribe to this evaluation of the 
situation in the United States, and I think we 
should keep it firmly in mind as we analyze the 
specific set of disparities we are discussing here 

The "Definition Gap" 

The European view of the gap, as expressed at 
the political level, where much of the discussion 
has taken place, frequently gives the impression 
that there is an across-the-board gap. This view 
asserts that the gap is caused essentially by the 
large expenditures for research and develop- 
ment in the United States, especially those 
financed by the govermnent for space explora- 
tion, military purposes, aviation, and other ad- 
vanced techiiologies, with attendant spin-off 
benefits for the economy in general. This, some- 
how, constitutes what is considered an unfair 
advantage, and as a result the United States 
should take steps to remedy the situation. 

The points of the argument, as stated by one 
high-level European official, nm something like 
this : Between 1920 and 1940, Europe had an in- 
comparable potential in scientists, scholars, and 
research workers. This was largely destroyed by 
totalitarian regimes and war. The rest was 
drained away by the United States and the 
Soviet Union after the war. Since the war, the 
United States has spent increasingly large 
amounts on research and development and in 
1965 spent two or three times more, in real re- 
sources, than did Western Europe. Again, 
United States Government assistance to in- 
dustry in connection with military and space 
programs is much higher than in Europe. And 
the United States enjoys a favorable techno- 
logical balance of payments with Europe, which 
indicates its dominance. Another factor is the 
"brain drain," the siphoning of educated Euro- 
peans to work for much higher salaries in 

The effect of this teclmological deficit, the 
argument continues, is to create grave disadvan- 
tages for both parties in the Atlantic commu- 
nity. For Europe the disadvantages are eco- 
nomic. For the United States they are political. 
The European official whom I have been para- 
phrasing cites the risk — and I am quoting di- 
rectly now — "the risk of a scientific colonization 
of the old continent by the new" — which would 

threaten the viability of the Atlantic com- 

On the opposite end of the argument, the en- 
tire notion of the technological gap is dismissed 
as a strategic competitive device in many quar- 
ters of American business where keen competi- 
tion from European products preempts con- 
sideration of what is regarded as historical and 
inevitable disparities among nations. 

Basic science can and does flow freely across 
national boundaries — this latter position as- 
serts — but teclmology, wliich is the inventive 
application of this basic knowledge for practi- 
cal purposes, may or may not be shared; it is 
usually private property and its disposition de- 
pends on the wishes of those who own it. Fur- 
thermore, this argument continues, different 
countries historically apply technology in dif- 
ferent ways. A landlocked country, for example, 
will use it differently than a maritime nation. 
Therefore, there will always be technological 
disparities or gaps between nations. Only identi- 
cal nations would have identical technology. 

In effect, tliis argument states that what mat- 
ters most is how the teclmology is applied, the 
extent to which it is utilized, and not the relative 
presence or absence of the technology itself. 

Obviously, on opposite sides of the Atlantic, 
the definition gap is immeasurably greater than 
the technological gap we are seeking to define 
and describe. 

One thing is clear, however. To reject the 
problem out of hand is as unrealistic as to limit 
our investigation of it to the purely techno- 
logical aspects. 

These two approaches can result only in ex- 
treme, and equally absurd, solutions. One is to 
do nothing and accept the results as the inex- 
orable verdict of history, as though history were 
a supernatural force unaffected by the actions 
of men. The other extreme is to insist that the 
United States is somehow obligated to engage in 
a giveaway program of technology. Otherwise, 
it is argued, there will be a relative decline in 
Europe's power, economically, militarily and 
politically, that will result in a weak grouping 
of states relative to the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

Happily, these are not really the alternatives. 
In the first place, the United States could not 
give away its teclmology if it wanted to, because, 
as I have indicated, most of the technology is 
the private property of individuals or business 
establishments. And in the second place, even if 


this were not the case, the gift of American tech- 
nology would not relieve the problem, because 
the basic factors involved go much deeper than 

Let us examine not only the disparities in the 
current levels of productivity between the 
United States and Euroi^e, which are cited as 
evidence of the technological gap, but also the 
essentially nontechnological factors that so 
radically affect the utilization of the teclmology 
that could reduce these disparities. 

Using comparative GNP dollar values per 
civilian employee in 1964 as a basis for com- 
parison, it appears that the productivity levels 
of most of the countries of northwestern Eu- 
rope were a little over half that of the United 
States, with Italy's a little over one-third. To 
achieve parity with the United States, the pro- 
ductivity of these countries would have to in- 
crease, on the average, about 80 percent, while 
Italy's would have to triple. Japan's produc- 
tivity, incidentally, is slightly more than one- 
fourth that of the United States and would 
have to quadruple. 

Some Causes of the Disparities 

To sum up adequately the underlying 
causes — and that is plural — causes of these 
disparities requires a vehicle far more expan- 
sive than a single speech, let alone a smgle 
phrase. But I will try to touch briefly on what 
I consider to be principal factors. 

One appears to be differences in the use of 
fixed business capital stock per worker. Pre- 
liminary estimates indicate that Western Euro- 
pean countries, relative to the United States, 
use less capital per pei-son employed by about; 
the same proportion as the lag in output per 
person employed. In other words, there is more 
intense utilization of capital stock in the 
United States than in Europe. On the average, 
plants and equipment in the United States are 
utilized longer hours per year. Another big 
difference lies in the smaller use of mechaniza- 
tion in materials handling and other "indirect" 
operations in industry, mming, and fanning in 
Europe than in the United States, even tliough 
Europe has the technology for mechanizing 
these operations. The explanation probably lies 
in the lower relative prices of labor versus capi- 
tal in Europe. In short, there appears to be a 
lack of economic incentive to substitute capital 
for labor in Europe compared to the United 

Another disparity factor is the greater per- 
centage of the European work force employed 
in agriculture. In 1962, the Unit«d States had 
8.2 percent of its working population in agri- 
culture while France had 19.8 percent; and 
Italy, 27.4 percent. And the productivity of 
European agriculture lagged further behind the 
United States than did their economies as a 
whole. Our high agricultural productivity is 
largely due to efforts that began more than 100 
years ago, during the presidency of Abraham 
Lincoln, to apply science and teclmology to 
agriculture. I should add that virtually none of 
this science and technology is or has been exclu- 
sive to the United States. 

A third factor is the economics of scale. In 
the United States, business enterprises are 
much larger than the family-owned firms of 
Europe, and the gains from specialization are 
greater, more efficient capital-intensive tech- 
nologies are used, and there is fuller utilization 
of overhead. 

A fourth, and much overlooked, factor is edu- 
cation. I am not referring to the quality of 
European universities, which is, of course, ex- 
ceptional, but rather to the relatively narrow 
educational base in most European countries. An 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] study showed that the 
United States in 1957-58 had a much higher 
enrollment ratio than Europe: 66.2 percent in 
the 15-19 age group were enrolled in the United 
States compared to only 30.8 percent in France 
and less than 20 percent in West Germany, 
Italy, and the U.K. At the higher 20-24 year 
level, the United States had 12 percent enrolled, 
whereas West Germany led France, Italy, and 
Britain with only 4.6 percent. Significantly, at 
the university level, the United States had four 
to five times as many science and engineering 
graduates per million of population, except for 
France, where the U.S. advantage was still two 
to one. 

Technological Lag Not Uniform 

Natural resources endowment is certainly an- 
other factor, but because it is so obvious and in- 
alterable a one, I would rather pass over it to 
the factor that has received the most notice, or 
perhaps I should say "notoriety." That is the 
apparent European lag in new teclmology. 

On analysis, this lag is neither as dramatic 
nor as uniform as might be expected. There are 
many sectors in which European technology is 



predominant. Europe appears to lag only mod- 
erately in seven significant areas. These are: 
nuclear reactors, pipeline freight transporta- 
tion, automatic railroad yard classification and 
car scheduling, and in the manufacture of large- 
capacity generator equipment, numerically con- 
trolled machine tools, jet aircraft, and semicon- 
ductors. The lag is admittedly greater in a few 
other areas such as computer manufacture and 
solid-state microcii'cuitry. 

There are various reasons for the lag in know- 
how and the use of know-how in these fields. It 
takes some innovations a long time to spread. 
For example, the oxygen steel process and ex- 
tra-high-voltage transmission of electric energy 
were a long time in reaching the United States, 
just as the taconite process and solid-state cir- 
cuitry have taken time to come into use in 

The lack of a large home market in European 
countries to support the application of tech- 
nology is also a factor in some areas, such as 
jets, which originated in the United Kingdom 
and Germany. In other cases, economic incen- 
tives are lacking; the laborsaving advantages 
of numerically controlled machine tools have 
much less attraction to the labor-intensive in- 
dustries of Western Europe than in the United 

As for the spin-oflF advantages from space and 
defense programs in the United States, I can 
only say that this is an awfully high priced 
way to get new industrial technology. 

The importance of another much-cited fac- 
tor is also open to question. This is the smaller 
European investment in research and develop- 
ment. If you discount U.S. expenditures for 
military and space purposes, the United States 
is seen to spend 1.5 percent of its GNP on re- 
search and development. This compares with 
1.4 percent for Britain, 1.2 percent for France, 
1.1 percent for Germany, and 1.5 percent for 

Of course, the difference in absolute terms is 
enormous. But if realism is allowed sway over 
wishful thinking and resentment and each coun- 
try fits its scientific effort to its scientific re- 
sources, it becomes readily apparent that there 
is plenty of room in the vast field of science and 
technology for nations of all sizes, however lim- 
ited. Not every effort has to fall into the cate- 
gory of "big science and big teclinology." This 
is wasteful, although even here, smaller nations 
can participate by combining their efforts inter- 

The wise allocation of resources has always 
been a cardmal rule of international economics. 
Participation in science and technology is ex- 
pensive at best, and all countries have to budget 
their resources with care, even the largest. 

Management Policies and Practices 

A much more important factor in technologi- 
cal progress, indeed a crucial factor, is the man- 
agement of teclinology, the industrial response 
to technology. 

Let me quote for you the statement of a dis- 
tinguished European speaker at a symposium 
on teclinology and world trade which we held 
last November at the Department of Ck)mmerce. 
"I believe," he said "that the fundamental rea- 
son for the (technological) gap is more a ques- 
tion of mentality and attitude. . . . Science and 
technology have been present in Europe many 
years. What we'd like is the attitude necessary 
for the creation of more big industries with 
leaders who know how to make use of science 
and teclinology." 

It is primarily a question of the organiza- 
tional environment, another European stated — 
of management, and of the training of execu- 
tives to accept and adapt what already exists. 

These two views suggest, as do others ex- 
pressed at the symposium, that European in- 
dustry must review its management policies and 
practices in order to improve its vital industrial 
response in the processes of innovation. 

This is heavily underscored by a look at the 
origins of some of the major advances in tech- 
nology since World War II— such things as 
"wonder" drugs, synthetic detergents and fibers, 
plastics, electronics and communications, data 
processing, steelmaking, and so on. Of a hun- 
dred or more major advances, Western Europe 
accoimted for 49 percent, the United States for 
31 percent. 

It would seem that the reasons for any indus- 
trial lag in these fields must be something other 
than a lack of teclmological know-how. 

Moreover, it bears notmg that the overall 
economic growth of Western Europe, despite 
disparities in productivity, has been greater than 
that of the United States in recent years — with 
the exception of the United Kingdom. This 
rapid rate of development has put Europe in an 
excellent position to compete with the United 
States in the export of teclinologically intensive 
commodities such as chemicals, nonelectric ma- 
chinery, electric machinery, and transport 

JITLT 17, 19C7 


equipment. In fact, in total export of manufac- 
tures, the U.S. sliare of the world market 
dropped from 18.1 percent in 19G0 to 16.G per- 
cent in 1964. And it dropped in each major 
category. Western Europe during this same 
period maintained a sizable 54.3 percent share. 

Problem of the "Brain Drain" 

Paralleling the problem of the technological 
gap has been the so-called "brain drain." There 
has been almost as much concern expressed over 
the loss of talented people to the United States 
as over the differences in our teclmological 

In a very real sense, there is nothing new 
about the emigration of skilled people from 
Europe to the United States, and indeed from 
every part of the world. It has been going on 
since the earliest days of our settlement, when 
trained artisans of every kind — shipwrights, 
ironworkers, glassblowers, some of the world's 
best farmers, and many others — arrived in 
search of freedom, greater opportunity, greater 
challenge. And essentially, some of these are 
the factors that still attract skilled people to 
the United States or, for that matter, to any 
otlier country. 

The question today is, Wliat is the magnitude 
of this movement, and what is the impact on 
the countries from which they come? Would 
the talents of the migrants be fully utilized if 
they stayed home ? Are tliey lured to the United 
States in the beginning as students under gov- 
ernment programs and then remain to enter the 
work force ? Wliat can be done about the prob- 
lem as a whole? 

As to the number, 30,039 skilled persons of 
all types migrated to the United States in fiscal 
year 1966. More than 70 percent of these came 
from the developed countries and the remainder 
from the less developed nations. As a percent- 
age of total immigrants, the number of skilled 
personnel was very small — only about 15 

As for the number of students who come to 
the United States for training and remain, the 
Interagency Council on International Educa- 
tion and Cultural Affairs found that they are 
an exceedingly small part of the problem. 
Among those who come under exchange pro- 
grams supported and financed by the United 
States Government, less than 1 percent even- 
tually become permanent residents. Among 
those who pay their own way, only 8.3 percent 

remained as permanent residents during the 
past 5 years. 

Most of our skilled immigrants are trained 
adults recruited by American industries, re- 
search organizations, hospitals, and universities. 

What can be done about the problem? 

Is there a free nation that would restrict the 
right of its citizens to migrate in search of 
greater opportunities? 

Should the United States specifically restrict 
by law the immigration of people with skills 
and talents? Already our immigration laws 
contain provisions that encourage students and 
visitors to return home. For example, for cer- 
tain categories, the visitor must leave the 
United States after a specified date and is not 
eligible to apply for inunigration for 2 years 
thereafter. But for us to bar talented people 
would be a form of discrimination, and we only 
recently revised our immigration law to elimi- 
nate disci'imination. Besides, if we did bar 
them, would this insure that they would remain 
in their home countries? 

The problem presents many of the same 
tangled aspects that we fiind in the technologi- 
cal gap. 

The solutions seem to lie largely in tlie home 
countries. In the case of the "brain drain," in- 
centives must be pro^-ided that encourage edu- 
cated people to remain at home and students to 
return home. To interfere with the free move- 
ment of such people by legislation would be 
contrary to the principles that are the founda- 
tion of a free society. 

Technology Alone Is Not the Key 

In the case of the technological gap, the basic 
problem goes much deeper than technology. It 
involves all the factors that affect productivity, 
of which technology is only one. 

The fact that teclmology alone is not the key 
solution is illustrated by conditions within the 
United States itself. 

There are wide disparities, for instance, in 
the ability of our various States to attract the 
latest teclmology. Some States have a lower 
level of education and fewer scientists and engi- 
neers as a percentage of population. They also 
lose many of their most promising scientific 
and engineering graduates to other States offer- 
ing increased opportunities. There is a serious 
"brain drain," for example, from the Midwest 
to both coasts. 

Even some of our largest cities have prob- 



lems attracting new industries employing the 
most advanced teclinologj'. The cause would 
appear to involve not a lack of scientists, but 
other factors. A study by our Commerce De- 
partment Teclmical Advisory Board indicates 
that universities in these cities fail to play a 
leading role in bringing in such firms and banks 
in the area are not inclined toward financing 
small, science-based companies. 

Solutions to Technological Disparities 

What, then, are the solutions to the techno- 
logical disparities between Europe and the 
United States? 

The things which can be done that lie deep 
in the social and economic systems of Europe, 
only Europeans can do. 

Only Europeans can create an educational 
system that raises the level of competence 
among the general population and that also 
offers the best training in science and tech- 
nology to the more capable students. Only 
European industry can create an aggressive 
managerial structure that encourages the inno- 
vation which leads to the use of more advanced 
technology and finally to increased productiv- 
ity. Only Europeans can create the tax and 
monetary incentives which foster the more 
rapid use of advanced technology by industry. 

The increasing economic integration of Eu- 
rope and the mass markets it creates also are 
important factors in the spread of advanced 
technology. For this permits industry to effect 
the economies of scale that makes its use 

There also are a number of areas where the 
United States can collaborate to improve the 
transfer of technology across international 

To the extent that teclmology lies in the 
public domain, its transfer can be facilitated by 
improving its dissemination among govern- 
ments, including organizational arrangements, 
and by industry-to-industry transfer. Wliere 
technology is subject to patents, closer inter- 
national cooperation on patent practices can 
vastly improve its transfer. The time is pro- 
pitious because of work already underway 
internationally in the patents field and because 
of reconunendations recently made in the 
United States by the President's Commission 
on the Patent System. Efforts can also be made 
to minimize or eliminate any other restrictions 
hampering the flow of teclmological informa- 

tion across international boimdaries. 

Another field which is beginning to receive 
renewed attention is industrial standardiza- 
tion. Efforts at both the national and interna- 
tional levels can contribute a great deal to the 
flow of technology. 

Improved utilization of scientific and tech- 
nological information can be enhanced by 
positive action to establish conferences, utiliza- 
tion centers, training programs, personnel and 
materials exchanges, and consultative services. 
The Office of State Teclmical Services in the 
United States Department of Commerce has 
had impressive success in its first year and a 
half in such a program of teclmical services. 

There is no reason why industry-to-industry 
contacts should not yield results of great bene- 
fit for all participants. There was much of this 
in the first years after World War II, and with 
important gains for all concerned. 

The United States already has a policy of 
sharing peaceful know-how and cooperating in 
peaceful international endeavors in those areas 
where the United States has an important posi- 
tion. A few examples are: Antarctic studies, 
atomic energy, meteorology, telecommunica- 
tions, space exploration, oceanography, and 
such long-term programs as the International 
Geophysical Year and the International Co- 
operation Year. This kind of cooperation will 
be continued and expanded as needed. President 
Johnson himself made clear last fall our inten- 
tion to cooperate in this field when he stated : 
"We are exploring how best to develop science 
and teclmology as a common resource." ^ 

I believe there should be contmuing cross 
fertilization in industrial technology and I 
offer an invitation to French industrialists to 
come to the United States with their know-how 
and invest in our economy. We have recently 
welcomed a new plant in our Pacific Northwest, 
built by a French- American joint venture in- 
volving Pechiney, and I am told it is technically 
without equal in its ability to produce alummum 
at low cost. French engineering and design 
have made this plant highly productive at low 
operating cost and have developed a highly 
significant air pollution control system at the 
same time. We in the United States welcome this 
technological advance made possible by French 
industry, and we favor the freedom of invest- 
ment which allows such transfers to take place. 

' For President Jolmson's address at New York, N.T., 
on Oct. 7, 1966, see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 


Progress comes by reducing, not creating, bar- 
riers to such flows of technology and investment. 
There is evei-y reason to believe that Europe, 
with its traditional ingenuity and ability, will 
take the kind of action needed to overcome its 
present difficulties. And there is no question but 
that the United States will in the future, as in 
the past, cooperate willingly and effectively in 
this effort which will mean so much to the 
United States as well as to Europe. After all, 
who makes better friends, allies, trading part- 
ners — countries with stagnating or under- 
developed economies, or those with a high level 
of economic activity and purchasing power? 
The question needs no answer. 

White House Panel Completes 
Study of World Food Problem 


White House press release dated June 17 

Kesults of a comprehensive study of the world 
food problem by the World Food Panel of the 
President's Science Advisory Committee were 
made public on June 17. The first volume of 
a three-part Committee report was released by 
the Wliite House.^ 

The report of the year-long study concludes 
that the scale, severity, and duration of the 
world food problem are so great that a massive, 
long-range, innovative effort will be required 
to master it. 

The report stresses the "reality of the food 
shortage that will occur during the next 20 
years" unless agricultural production in the de- 
veloping countries can be mcreased through the 
use of fertilizer, new plant varieties, pesticides, 
and farm machinery, and adaptive research to 
develop and to apply new cropping systems for 

1 The World Food Prohlcm, a. Report of the Presi- 
dent's Science Advisoi-y Committee. Two volumes of the 
Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply have 
been released and are for sale by the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402 : vol. I, summary of the world 
food problem and recommendations for policy and ac- 
tion, 123 pp., 60 cents; vol. II, snbpanel reports, 772 
pp., $2.75. 

each country's climate and soil. In addition, if 
"subsistence f armmg" is to be transfonned into 
"commercial agriculture," improved transpor- 
tation, marketing, farm credit, storage, and dis- 
tribution systems will be needed on a huge scale. 
The problem of increasing food production, the 
Panel concludes, is actually the overall problem 
of economic development and cannot be consid- 
ered in isolation from other problems of the 
new nations of the world. 

In the foreword to volume I of the report, 
President Jolmson states : 

The World Food Problem is one of the foremost chal- 
lenges of mankind today. The dimension of the chal- 
lenge will define the dimension of our response and 
the means for that response. We must join with others 
in a massive effort to help the less fortunate of the 
earth to help themselves. 

The complete report will be published in 
three volumes. The fijial volume, comprised 
mainly of technical reports, is expected to be 
issued in July. 

The study was carried out by more than 100 
experts and consultants drawn from the Fed- 
eral Government, universities, foimdations, and 

The study chairman was Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., 
Deputy Director of the Office of Science and 
Technology, Executive Office of the President; 
H. F. Eobinson, administrative dean for re- 
search of the University of North Carolina, 
Raleigh, served as executive director.^ 

Summary of the Report 

The report concludes that the solution to the 
world food problem during the next 20 years is 
biologically, teclmologically, and economically 
possible. It makes clear however, that it will re- 
quire the institution of major programs to ac- 
complish the job. 

A maximum effort will be required from all nations, 
developing and developed alike, if the pangs of hun- 
ger are to be alleviated . . . and if the growing threat 
of outright mass starvation is to be turned aside. 

Food and population: While overall world 
food requirements will rise by about 50 per- 
cent, the requirements in the developing nations 
are expected to double by 1985. The report rec- 
ommends that voluntary programs of family 
plamiing be supported and expanded in the de- 
veloping countries to assure a long-range ad- 

' For a list of members of the panel, see White House 
press release dated June 17. 



justment of food needs in conjunction with pop- 
ulation control. 

Food shortage and rapid population growth are sep- 
arate, but interrelated problems. The solutions, like- 
wise, are separate, but related. The choice is not to 
solve one or the other; to solve both is an absolute 
necessity. . . . 

The twin problems of food and population balance 
have one feature in common that adds immeasurably 
to the difficulties of achieving control. Their eventual 
solution is crucially dependent upon success in con- 
vincing millions of citizens in developing nations to 
take individual action. . . . The provision of these per- 
sonal incentives Is a task that encompasses a vast array 
of social, economic, and political considerations which 
differ between countries and within countries. Indeed, 
the very fabric of traditional societies must be re- 
woven if the situation is to change permanently. 

Food synthesis : The report warns against the 
false hope that some "panacea" will appear as 
an easy answer to worldwide food shortages and 
decries the publicity accorded to synthesis of 
food from petroleum, food from algae, and 
similar processes as raising false hopes and un- 
doubtedly lessening public concern about the 
seriousness of the food supply in the develop- 
ing nations. Strong support for research and 
development on food synthesis is recommended, 
but it is pointed out that it will be several years 
before any decision about the usefulness of new 
processes will be possible because of teclmical 
problems as well as questions of cost and con- 
sumer acceptability. 

Agricultural development : Stressing agricul- 
ture within the needy countries as the main 
source of food during the next 20 years, the re- 
port states : 

Agricultural development has never been a particu- 
larly appealing or inspiring national goal ; it is politi- 
cally unglamorous, unrecognized, and unrewarding. It 
does not raise visions of the 20th century, the age of 
technological revolution, in the minds of people. 

Until agricultural development is accorded its right- 
ful place by both donors and recipients of foreign aid, 
the imbalance between the world's food supply and its 
population will continue to outpace our efforts to meet 
the increasing need. 

Capital investment and economiG health: The 
report details the huge investments of capital 
that will be needed for irrigation, fertilizer, 
new seed varieties, pesticides, and agricultural 
machinery if the "subsistence" farming in the 
developing countries is to be transformed into 
modem commercial fanning, emphasizing addi- 
tional needs for improved farm credit, market- 
ing, storage, and distribution systems, and 
improved transportation. Commercial food pro- 
duction for the market is dependent upon total 
economic development. There must be a balance 

between modernization of the agricultural sec- 
tor and the industrial sector of any economy if 
either is to flourish and to achieve sustained 

Economic assistance: The report emphasized 
heavily the need for long-term support of over- 
all economic assistance in the hungry countries : 

The eventual alleviation of world hunger will require 
many years. It is dependent on far-reaching social re- 
forms and long-range programs of hard work which 
offer no promises of quick and dramatic results of the 
type so helpful in maintaining enthusiasm for a con- 
certed, difficult undertaking. The results cannot be 
seen as a dedication of new buildings, as a successful 
launching into space, or as other spectacular, "news- 
worthy" events to punctuate the year in and year out 
toil. . . . 

. . . long-term commitment of substantial resources 
is an absolute necessity. The fallacious notion that for- 
eign aid's tnain business is to put itself out of business 
should be dropped for the remainder of this century. 
All programs based upon this thesis have succeeded 
only in proving otherwise. When one program of assist- 
ance has terminated, others have had to take over. 

Research and development: Pleading for 
abandonment of the "know-how, show-how" 
idea of "practical help" for agriculture in the 
developing countries, the Panel states emphati- 
cally that agricultural technologies are not di- 
rectly transferable to different soils and cli- 
mates, and the report underlines the need for 
adai^tive research in devising agricultural sys- 
tems for each region of the world: 

A blueprint for a bicycle or a steel mill can be 
shipped overseas and utilized without alteration but 
the blueprints and architecture for a food crop must be 
developed overseas. There, as in the United States, 
new plant varieties, each better than the last, must be 
produced frequently to increase plant resistance to in- 
sects and disease. 

There is an urgent need to carry out this adaptive 
research, to establish strong indigenous institutions, 
and develop the manpower that will enable the poor, 
food-deficit nations to carry out the self-sustaining, 
continuing programs of research and development that 
are essential to modem food production. 

Manpower: The Panel's analysis of the food 
problem points out that it is not nutritional 
need alone but effective economic demand which 
stimulates increased food production. Aggregate 
calculations indicate that the annual capital in- 
vestment that will be required to increase food 
demand to the levels required to meet needs is 
approximately 4 percent of the GNP of tlie de- 
veloping countries, amounting to about $12 bil- 
lion for 1965-66. Despite these enormous re- 
quirements for capital investment, the report 
warns that the greatest problem to be faced is 
the shortage of trained manpower and urges a 

JTJLY 17, 1967 


renewed emphasis upon teclinical assistance to 
the developing countries : 

The scarcest and most needed resource in, the devel- 
oping countries is the scientific, technical, and manage- 
rial skill needed for systematic, orderly decision-making 
and implementation. Through technical assistance 
programs, the United States should emjAasize guid- 
ance, education, and the development of indigenous 
capabilities — for the long term — because the task in 
the developing nations has only just begun and will 
continue for many decades to come. 


In all of recorded history, none have sur- 
passed the American people in "willingness to 
share their abiuidance with others. We have 
given unstintingly of our material wealth and 
our precious human resources to benefit the less 
fortmiate of this earth. We have sought to re- 
store those whom war has shattered. We have 
sought to provide assistance to the newly inde- 
pendent members of the family of nations who 
are making the effort to break the shackles of 
tradition and achieve a better life for their 

But as success in programs to eradicate dis- 
ease and to improve health have given more and 
more millions the opportunity to live out their 
natural span of life, the problem of hunger has 
lingered on and the shadow of starvation and 
impending famine has grown ever darker. 

Hunger's unceasing anguish drains hope, 
crushes aspirations, and obstructs the genera- 
tion of programs of self-help. The threat of 
starvation sets man against man and citizen 
against government, leading to civil strife and 
political unrest. 

Our programs to help these new countries to 
increase food production have brought about 
striking improvement in a few instances. But in 
the total balance, food has not kept pace with 
population and the developing world continues 
to lose ground in this race. 

The World Food Problem is one of the fore- 
most challenges of mankind today. The dimen- 
sion of the challenge will define the dimension 
of our response and the means for that response. 
We must join with others in a massive effort to 
help the less fortunate of the earth to help them- 
selves. I am making this report public because 
of its significance for the American people and 
people all over the world. 

U.S. and Philippines To Discuss 
New Trade Agreement 

White House press release dated June 20 

President Jolmson on June 20 announced the I 
composition of the U.S. team to conduct inter- ■ 
governmental discussions with representatives 
of the Govenunent of the Republic of the 
Philippines on the concepts underlying a new 
instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley Trade 
Agreement ^ after its scheduled expiration in 

The members of the U.S. team are Deputy 
Assistant Secretax-y for Economic Affairs Eu- 
gene M. Braderman, Department of State 
(chairman) ; Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Trade Policy Robert L. McNeill, Department 
of Commerce ; Assistant Legal Adviser George 
H. Aldrich, Department of State; and Philip- 
pines Country Director Richard M. Service and 
Philippines Economic Desk Officer Dawson S. 
Wilson, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Department of State. 

The undertaking of early discussions was 
agreed upon by President Jolmson and Presi- 
dent Marcos in paragraph 12 of the joint com- 
munique^ issued in Washington following 
talks September 14 and 15, 1966. 

President Recommends Ratification 
of OAS Charter Amendments 

Message to tlie Senate ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I request the advice and consent of the Senate 
to ratification of the protocol of amendment to 
the Charter of the Organization of American 
States — the "Protocol of Buenos Aires" — signed 
at the Third Special Inter-American Confer- 
ence at Buenos Aires on February 27, 1967.* 

The signing of the protocol of Buenos Aires 
was a major development for the inter- Ameri- 
can system. The amendments to be effected in 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348 ; 
for background and text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 
195.5, p. 463. 

" For text, see iUd., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531. 

» Congressional Record, June 12, 1967, p. S8076. 

* Exec. L. 90th Cong., 1st sess. ; for background, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 472. 



the Charter of the Organization of American 
States by the protocol of amendment, the first 
such amendments since the adoption of the 
charter in 1948, will go far toward the neces- 
sary modernization of the structure of the 
Organization and the strengthening of its ca- 
pacity to act effectively in the interest of 
hemispheric cooperation and solidarity. The 
amendments gi-ant certain fuller responsibili- 
ties to some of the organs of the Organization, 
for instance, in the field of peaceful settlement. 
They establish new and specific objectives and 
standards for the promotion of economic, social, 
and cultural development. 

Following in general the guidelines prepared 
at the Second Special Inter- American Confer- 
ence at Eio de Janeiro in November 1965, and 
the draft amendments prepared by the OAS 
Special Committee which met in Panama in 
March 1966 and by the Inter- American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council which met in 
Washington in June 1966, the Buenos Aires 
Conference adopted the amendments which are 
embodied in the protocol of amendment. 

Among the more significant changes in the 
amendments relating to the structure of the Or- 
ganization and to the responsibilities of its or- 
gans are those concerning (1) the provision in 
the charter of procedures for the Organization 
to authorize the admission of new members; 
(2) the replacement of the Inter- American Con- 
ference which meets every 5 years by a General 
Assembly which meets annually and which as- 
sumes certain functions now performed by the 
OASCoimcil; (3) the redesignation of the OAS 
Coimcil as the Permanent Council, and the 
granting of additional responsibilities to the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
and Inter-American Council for Education, Sci- 
ence, and Culture — formerly the Inter-Amer- 
ican Cultural Council — which become organs 
directly responsible to the General Assembly as 
is the Permanent Council ; (4) the elimination 
of the Inter- American Council of Jurists and 
the upgrading of the Inter- American Juridical 
Committee; (5) the assignment to the Perma- 
nent Council of specific additional authority 
in the field of peaceful settlement; (6) the in- 
corporation of the Inter- American Commission 
on Human Rights into the OAS Charter as an 
organ with fimctions to be later determined by 
an inter- American convention on human rights ; 
and (7) the election of the OAS Secretary Gen- 
eral and Assistant Secretary General by the 

General Assembly for 5-year terms, rather than 
by the OAS Council for 10-year terms as pres- 
ently provided. 

The expanded economic standards under- 
scoi-e the importance of self-help eilorts and 
reiterate the present charter undertaking of 
members to cooperate with one another in the 
economic field "as far as their resources permit 
and laws may provide." The amendments pro- 
vide that States should make individual and 
united efforts to bring about improved condi- 
tions of trade in basic commodities and a reduc- 
tion of trade barriers by importing countries. 
Several articles deal with efforts to accelerate 
Latin American economic integration. 

The social and the educational, scientific, and 
cultural standards elaborate on the principles 
in the present charter in these areas. 

The various amendments are dealt with in de- 
tail in the enclosed report by the Secretary of 
State and summary of amendments. 

I believe it to be in the national interest of 
the United States to ratify the proposed amend- 
ments. I therefore urge that the Senate consent 
to ratification by the United States of these 
amendments to the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, June 12, 1967. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

90th Congress, 1st Session 

Government, Science, and International Policy. Pro- 
ceedings of the eighth meeting of the Panel on Sci- 
ence and Technology of the House Ckimmittee on Sci- 
ence and Astronautics ; January 24-26, 1967 ; 220 pp. 
Compilation of papers prepared for the eighth meet- 
ing of the panel ; April 1967 ; 81 pp. [Committee 

United States Armament and Disarmament Problems. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disarmament 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb- 
ruary 3-March .3, 1967. 186 pp. 

The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. Part II. February 15-April 5, 1967. 204 pp. 

U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program. Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
S. 1030. March 21 and April 25, 1967. 122 pp. 

Policy Planning for Technology Transfer. Report of the 
Subcommittee on Science and Technology to the 
Senate Select Committee on Small Business. S. Doc. 
15. April 6, 1967. 192 pp. 

JTJLT 17, 1967 



United States and Italy Sign 
Science Cooperation Agreement 

Press release 145 dated June 19 

All Agreement for a Cooperative Program in 
Science between the United States and Italy 
was concluded on June 19 at a ceremony at the 
Department of State. Eugene Rostow, Under 
Secretary of State for Political Ailairs, and 
Donald Hornig, Special Assistant to the Presi- 
dent for Science and Teclmology, signed the 
agreement on behalf of the Government of the 
United States. Ambassador Egidio Ortoiia; 
Leopoklo Rubinacci, Mmister for Coordination 
of Science and Technology ; and Vincenzo Ca- 
glioti, President of the National Research Comi- 
cil (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) signed 
on behalf of the Government of the Republic 
of Italy. 

The agreement provides that the two coim- 
tries will midertake a broad-range program of 
scientific cooperation for peaceful purposes. 
Each country will provide financial support to 
its respective portion of the program. 

The aim of the program is to strengthen 
cooperation between the scientists of the two 
countries and to provide additional opportuni- 
ties for them to exchange ideas, skills, and tech- 
niques, to attack problems of particular mutual 
interest, to work together in unique environ- 
ments, and to utilize special facilities. 

Activities under this program will involve 
participation by scientists of both countries 
and may include exchange of scientists, pursuit 
of joint research projects, and seminars to ex- 
change information. Scientific information 
derived from these activities shall be made 
freely available to the world scientific commu- 
nity through customary channels. 

Tlie agreement makes provision for the par- 
ticipation of scientists of other countries m the 
jomt projects and encourages extension of the 
cooperation to a multilateral basis. 

The agreement provides for the designation 
by each Government of an "executive agency" 
with responsibility for coordinating the imple- 
mentation of its side of the program. The Na- 

tional Science Foimdation (NSF) in the United 
States and the Consiglio Nazionale delle 
Ricerche (CNR) in Italy will serve as the 
respective executive agencies. 

The cooperative program is being initiated 
with three jarojects which have been approved 
by the NSF and the CNR : 

1. Establishment of an international grad- 
uate school of molecular biology through coop- 
eration between the University of California 
and the International Laboratory of Genetics 
and Biophysics (ILGB) at Naples, Italy. The 
ILGB is governed and supported by the CNR. 
Under an NSF grant to the University of Cali- 
fornia, the university will furnish some teach- 
ing staff and laboratory equipment. The 
classroom and laboratory facilities and ad- 
ditional staff will be provided through the 
ILGB, which is a large, well-equipped, and 
experienced research institution. The school will 
accept students from all countries and will 
award the Ph. D. degree on the basis of a cur- 
riculum designed on the American system but 
employing some experimental variations. The 
school can serve as a prototype for international 
graduate schools in other fields. 

2. A scientific exchange progi-am between the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the 
University of Palermo. Laboratories at both 
institutions have conducted significant research 
in molecular developmental biology. The ex- 
change is expected to result in the coordination 
of effort and the establishment of a core of sim- 
ilar teclmical and theoretical competence in 
laboratories at the two institutions. Program 
emphasis will be on support of the research and 
training of professional scientists, graduate stu- 
dents, and technical personnel between the two 
institutions. NSF has awarded a grant to the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to sup- 
port the U.S. portion of this program, and the 
CNR is funding the University of Palermo 

3. Extension of collaboration between scien- 
tists at the Department of Zoology, Washington 
University, St. Louis, Mo., and the Center for 
Neurobiology of the Istituto Superiore di 
Sanita and the Institute of Experimental Medi- 
cine of the CNR in Rome. The work involves 
study of a nerve growth factor which induces 
increased growth of specific nerve cells of birds : 
and mammals as well as of embryonic sensory 
cells. This activity is also being supported by 
NSF and CNR. 



Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement between the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States and Indonesia for the appli- 
cation of safeguards. Signed at Vienna June 19, 1967. 
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency 
shall have received from the two Governments writ- 
ten notification that they have complied with all 
statutory and constitutional requirements for its 
entry into force. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 23, 1963. 
Entered into force: March 19, 1967.' 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan- 
uary 27, 1967." 

Ratification deposited: Hungary, June 26, 1967. 
Signatures: Jamaica, June 29, 1967 ; Peru, June 30, 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United 
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20, 
Ratification deposited: Burma, June 8, 1967. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea ; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per- 
sons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 

October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2, 

1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively. 

Notification that it considers itself iound: Congo 

(Brazzaville), January 30, 1967. 


Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation 
in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA) 

Agreement relating to services and facilities for air- 
craft operated by or on behalf of the United States 
Government, with exchange of letters. Signed at 
Paris June 22, 1967. Entered Into force June 22, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel 
(U.S.S. Lewis Bancock) to BrazU. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington June 15 and 28, 1967. 
Entered into force June 28, 1967. 

Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel 
(U.S.S. Irtvin) to Brazil. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington June 23 and 28, 1907. Entered 
into force June 28, 1967. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Valletta June 14, 1967. 
Entered into force June 14, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio oper- 
ators of either country to operate their stations in the 
other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo 
May 27 and June 1, 1967. Entered into force June 1, 


Agreement amending the agreement of April 20, 
May 14 and 26, 1962 (TIAS .5063), relating to the 
issuance of visas to diplomatic and nondiplomatic 
personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucha- 
rest May 31 and June 17, 1967. Entered into force 
June 19, 1967. 


Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.G. 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders 
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi Novem- 
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force November 21, 1966. 
Effective July 1, 1966. TIAS 6153. 15 pp. 10<f. 

Education — Commission for Educational Exchange 
and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with 
Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro 
October 5 and 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19, 
1966. TIAS 6163. 11 pp. 10(>. 

Treaties — Continued Application to Botswana of Cer- 
tain Treaties Concluded Between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Agreement with Botswana. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Gaberones September 30, 
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6165. 
3 pp. 5(t. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo — Signed at Kinshasa October 3, 1966. Entered 
into force October 3, 1966. Witt exchange of notes. 
TIAS 6166. 11 pp. 10^. 

* Not in force for the United States. 

• Not in force. 

JTJLT 17, 1967 


Desalination. Agreement with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of No- 
vember 18, 1964. Exchange of notes — Dated at Moscovir 
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into force 
December 3, 1966. TIAS 6174. 2 pp. 5(t. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree- 
ment with Italy, amending the agreement of Decem- 
ber 18, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Rome October 5, 1966. Entered into force October 5, 
1966. TIAS 6179. 5 pp. 54. 

Military Bases in the Philippines — Relinquishment of 
Certain Land Areas in Camp John Hay. Agreement 
with the Philiijpines. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Manila December 13, 1966. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 13, 1966. TIAS 6180. 3 pp., map. 30(5. 

General Agreement on Tarififs and Trade. Protocol for 
the accession of Yugoslavia to the agreement of Oc- 
tober 30, 1947. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered 
into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 6185. 28 pp. 15«(. 

Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with 
Jamaica. Exchange of notes — Signed at Kingston De- 
cember 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 1966. 
TIAS 6187. 3 pp. 5(f. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Iraq — Signed at Baghdad Decem- 
ber 19, 1966. Entered into force December 19, 1966. 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 6188. 14 pp. 10(J. 

Trade — Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From 
Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Washington October 19, 
1966. Entered into force October 19, 1966. Effective 
January 1, 1966. TIAS 6191. 3 pp. 50. 

Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for De- 
fense Purposes. Agreement with the United Kingdom 
of Great IJritain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered 
into force December 30, 1966. TIAS 6196. 15 pp. 100. 

Tracking Stations — Facility on the Island of Mahe 
(Seychelles). Agreement with the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered 
into force Decemt>er 30, 1966. With agreed minute. 
TIAS 6197. 30 pp. 150. 

Settlement of United States Claim for Postwar Eco- 
nomic Assistance. Agreement with the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg December 29, 1966. 
Entered into force December 29, 1966. With related 
notes — Dated at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg Jan- 
uary 4 and 20, 1967. TIAS 6204. 5 pp. 50. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Dominica. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Bridgetovra December 16, 1966, and 
at Dominica January 11, 1967. Entered into force 
January 11, 1967. TIAS 6206. 3 pp. 50. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with St. Christopher Nevis 
and Anguilla. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bridge- 
town and St. Kitts December 19, 1966, and January 10, 
1967. Entered into force January 10, 1967. TIAS 6209. 
3 pp. 50. 

Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band. 

Protocol with Mexico, amending the agreement of 
January 29, 1957— Signed at Mexico April 13, 1966. 
Entered into force January 12, 1967. TIAS 6210. 4 pp. 

Peace Corps. Agreement vnth St. Vincent. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Bridgetown December 16, 1966. and 
at St. Vincent January IS, 1967. Entered into force 
January 18, 1967. TIAS 6211. 3 pp. 50. 

Customs Administration. Agreement with the Philip- 
pines — Signed at Washington January 4, 1967. Entered 
into force January 4, 1967. TIAS 6212. 9 pp. 100. 

Defense — Disposition of Equipment and Materiel. 

Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of note.s — Signed 
at Rio de Janeiro January 27, 1967. Entered into force 
January 27, 1967. TIAS 6213. 5 pp. 50. 




INDEX J'uJ'y 17, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. llfiU 

Africa. Regionalism and World Order (Ros- 
tow) 66 

American Principles. The Right of All Peoples 
to Self -Determination (Johnson) 59 

Asia. Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . 66 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 79 

President Recommends Ratification of OAS 

Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78 

Developing Countries 

Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . . 66 
White House Panel Completes Study of World 
Food Problem 76 

Ek;onomic A£Fairs 

The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to 

the Future (Trowbridge) 70 

Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66 
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of 

New CanaJ Treaties 65 


The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to 

the Future (Trowbridge) 70 

Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66 

Foreign Aid. White House Panel Completes 
Study of World Food Problem 76 

Italy. United States and Italy Sign Science Co- 
operation Agreement 80 

Japan. Letters of Credence (Shimoda) ... 69 

Latin America 

President Recommends Ratification of OAS 

Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78 
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66 

Near East 

Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66 

United States Reiterates Policy on Status of 

Jerusalem 60 

U.S. To Join in Emergency ReUef Programs for 

the Middle East (Johnson, Goldberg) ... 64 

Panama. U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on 
Texts of New Canal Treaties 65 

Philippines. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss 
New Trade Agreement 78 

Presidential Documents 

President Recommends Ratification of OAS 

Charter Amendments 78 

The Right of All Peoples to Self-Determina- 

tion 59 

United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue 

Close Cooperation To Promote Peace ... 61 
U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief Programs for 

the Middle East 64 

White House Panel Completes Study of World 

Food Problem 76 

Publications. Recent Releases 81 


The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the 
Future (Trowbridge) 70 

United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera- 
tion Agreement 80 

Thailand. United States and Thailand Pledge 
To Continue Close Cooperation To Promote 
Peace (Bhumibol Adulyadej, Johnson, joint 
statement) 61 

Trade. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New 
Trade Agreement 78 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 81 

United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera- 
tion Agreement 80 

U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of 
New Canal Treaties 65 

U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New Trade 
Agreement 78 

U.S.S.R. The Right of All Peoples to Self-De- 
termination (Johnson) 59 

United Nations. U.S. To Join in Emergency 
Relief Programs for the Middle East (John- 
son, Goldberg) 64 

Viet-Nam. The Right of All Peoples to Self- 
Determination (Johnson) 59 

Name Index 

Bhumibol Adulyadej 61 

Goldberg, Arthur J 64 

Johnson, President 59,61,64,76,78 

Rostow, W. W 66 

Shimoda, Takeso 69 

Trowbridge, Alexander B 70 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 26-July 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Release issued prior to June 26 which appeal's 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 145 of 
June 19. 

No. Date Subject 

*150 6/30 Oliver sworn in as Assistant Secre- 
tary for Inter-American Affairs 
and U.S. Coordinator for the 
Alliance for Progress (biographic 

tl52 7/1 Rusk: replies to questions sub- 
mitted by Daniel Viklund, Dagens 
Nyheter, Stockholm. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 










Vol. LVJI, No. 1465 

July U, 1967 




Address by Secretary Rusk 87 


hy Assistant Secretary Oliver 102 


Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Tests of Resolutions 108 

Svmvmary of Agreements 95 

For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1465 Publication 8265 
July 24, 1967 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Oovemment Printing OfBce 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
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the Readers' Ouide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
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The Road to a Lasting Peace 

Address by Secretary Rusk ' 

It's a high privilege to meet with this great 
international organization, especially as you 
celebrate your golden anniversary year. Few 
of your members in 1917 could have predicted 
that in 60 years you would have more than 
829,000 members in moi'e than 21,350 clubs in 
137 countries or geographic areas. Your re- 
markable growth is proof of the value of the 
purposes and programs of Lionism. ^Ind your 
large membership in other lands on six conti- 
nents is compelling evidence that free men 
everywhere — free men of all races and re- 
ligions — share the same basic aspirations and 
ideals. I am glad to have this chance to con- 
gratulate Lions International on its splendid 
achievements in so many important fields in 
the past and on its plans and prospects for 
the future. 

As Secrtary of State, I am of course espe- 
cially interested in the contributions of Lions 
International to better international under- 
standing. It is i^articularly gratifying and 
encouraging to know that you have put at the 
center of your future endeavors the search for 
peace. I have read the excellent article by Presi- 
dent [Edward M.] Lindsey in the January is- 
sue of the Lion on "A Generation of Peace." 
And only a few days ago I read, as a judge in 
your peace essay contest, some very moving es- 
says on peace. 

The search for peace is, I believe, the most 
momentous challenge before the human race. 
It must succeed. The nations and peoples of the 
world must establish a lasting peace — not just 
because war is barbarous and horrible but be- 
cause frail man now possesses weapons capable 
of demolishing most of civilization in a few 
hours. The organization of an enduring peace 
is the great imperative of our time. 

^ Made before the golden anniversary convention of 
Lions International at Chicago, 111., on July 6 (press 
release 154). 

A lasting peace cannot be achieved merely by 
wishing for it or by talking about it or by pass- 
ing resolutions. It has to be organized and built, 
and there must be effective means of enforcing 

Wliat are the essential ingredients of lasting 
world peace? I know of no better answer than 
the United Nations Charter — particularly the 
preamble and article 1. Those paragraphs rep- 
resented what the authors of the charter be- 
lieved to be the lessons of history, especially the 
lessons taught by the events which led to the 
Second World War. They were written while 
the fires of that most destructive of wars still 
raged, when men were tliinking hard and pray- 
erfully about the millions of dead and how "to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought 
untold sorrow to mankind." 

Article 1 of the charter speaks : 

— Of effective collective measures to prevent 
and to remove threats to the peace and to sup- 
press acts of aggression and other breaches of 
the peace ; 

— Of the peaceful adjustment or settlement 
of disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace ; 

— Of developing friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 

— Of international cooperation in solving in- 
ternational problems of economic, social, cul- 
tural, or humanitarian character ; 

— And of promoting respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all, without dis- 
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 

Those are the basic purposes of the United 
Nations as set forth in article 1. They are also 
an accurate smmnary of the abiding goals of 
the foreign policy of the United States. That 
identity of purposes should not surprise any- 

JULY 24, 19G7 
269-166 — 67 


body, for we joined with others to share the 
lead in organizing the United Nations and in 
drafting the charter. Leaders of both our major 
parties joined in this enterprise, and our com- 
mitment to the charter was approved by the 
United States Senate with only two dissenting 

After the charter was adopted at San Fran- 
cisco came the fission bomb — followed in a few 
years by thermonuclear warheads and long- 
range missiles. These transformed the "scourge 
of war" into the possibility of destroying civi- 
lization. We shall not have an opportunity to 
learn the lessons from a third world war — there 
will not be enough left. We must apply the 
lessons we have already learned to prevent a 
catastrophe for the human race. 

The First Requirement for Building Peace 

If a lasting peace is to be achieved, the fii'st 
requirement is collective action to prevent or 
remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts 
of aggression or other breaches of tlie peace. 
The charter put that first for the clearest of 
reasons: Unless this requirement is met, all 
other efforts to build peace will come tumbling 

Unhappily, some members of the United Na- 
tions have been unwilling to discharge this pri- 
mary responsibility. That possibility was fore- 
seen when the charter was drafted. Article 51 
specifically affirms the inherent right of individ- 
ual or collective self-defense against armed 

The charter also provides for regional ar- 
rangements or agencies to deal with matters re- 
lating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. And it makes plain that resort to 
the United Nations is not intended to supplant 
other means of settling disputes. 

The founding fathers of the United Nations 
understood that inflammatory debate can make 
a settlement more difficult. So, they specified in 
article 33 that parties to a dispute "shall, first of 
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, me- 
diation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle- 
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrange- 
ments, or other peaceful means of their own 

Although the United Nations has been able 
to deal effectively with many situations and has 
assisted in dealing with still more, some of the 
burden of preventing or repelling aggression 
and of settling disputes since the Second World 

War has been borne outside the United Nations. 
The Organization of American States has 
dealt with problems in the Western Hem- 
isphere. The young Organization for African 
Unity has been helpful in situations arising in 
the great continent of Africa. Certain disputes 
have been referred to the World Court. Others 
have been settled by quiet diplomacy — in some 
cases by direct negotiations, in others with help 
of mediation. 

Basis for Settlement in the Middle East 

Regi'ettably, some disputes have remained 
unsettled. Recently one of them once again 
flared into war. We can impose no blueprint 
for peace in the INIiddle East; the primary re- 
sponsibility rests upon those who live there and 
upon their governments. But President Johnson 
has set forth the principles which we think any 
settlement must encompass : ^ 

First, recognition that every nation in the 
area has a fundamental right to live. This 
means an end to belligerency and terrorism. 

Second, justice for the Arab refugees. 

Third, free navigation through international 

Fourth, an end to the Middle East arms race. 
This requires the cooperation of larger states 
outside the area. 

Fifth, respect for the political independence 
and territorial integrity of all the states of the 
area. This requires recognized boundaries and 
other arrangements to provide security against 
terrorist raids and war. 

Further, as President Johnson has empha- 
sized, we believe there should be adequate rec- 
ognition that three great religions have a deep j 
interest in the holy places of Jerusalem. 

Some have urged an immediate return to the 1 
situation as it was on June 4. But that, as my 
distinguished colleague. Ambassador Goldberg i 
[U.S. Representative to the United Nations f 
Arthur J. Goldberg], has said, is a prescription 
not for peace but for renewed hostilities.^ We 
believe that the goal must be a lasting 

' For an address by President Johnson at Washing- 
ton, D.C., on June 19, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967, 
p. 31. 

' For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg 
in the U.N. Security Council on June 13, see ibid., July 
3, 1967, p. 5. 



As President Jolmson has said : 

If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward 
the worlv of peace, they can count with confidence upon 
the friendship and the help of all the people of the 
United States of America. 

In a climate of peace, we . . . will do our full share 
to help with a solution for the refugees . . . our full 
share in support of regional cooperation . . . (and) to 
see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is ap- 
plied to the critical problem of desalting water and 
helping to make the deserts bloom. 

The main burden of deterring or repelling 
major aggression has been borne by the armed 
forces and defensive alliances of the free world. 
Since the Second World War, the armed forces 
of the United States alone have incurred more 
than 240,000 casualties in the defense of 

In addition to our general commitments un- 
der the United Nations, we are pledged specifi- 
cally to the defense of more than 40 nations. We 
are presently honoring such a pledge in South 

Misconceptions About the Viet-Nam Conflict 

To clear away all the underbrush of miscon- 
ception about the struggle in Viet-Nam would 
take more time than you or I have this morning. 
But I shall discuss briefly a few main points. 

The conflict there has often been called a 
civil war. There is a genuine South Vietnamese 
element among the Viet Cong. But that is not 
why American combat forces are in South Viet- 
Nam. They are there because of what North 
Viet-Nam has been putting into the South: 
cadre, arms, men, and, since late 1964, major 
organized units of the Regular Army of North 
Viet-Nam. It has continued to infiltrate regi- 
ments and divisions as well as replacements for 
the Viet Cong main forces. 

If the Federal Republic of Germany were to 
send 20 to 25 regiments into East Germany, 
you may be sure that the Soviet Union would 
not call it a civil war — just a family affair 
among Germans. 

I can assure you that if the North Koreans 
were to send 20 or 25 regiments into South 
Korea, we would not look upon that as just a 
family affair among Koreans, no more than we 
did before. 

If there had been no aggression by North 
Viet-Nam, there would have been no American 
combat forces in South Viet-Nam. And if every- 
one who has come down from the North were 
to go home, our armed forces would come home. 

It is sometimes asserted that we are asking for 
"unconditional surrender."' We are not asking 
North Viet-Nam to surrender an acre of ground 
or a man, or to modify their regime or to change 
their relations with the Communist world. All 
we are asking them to do is to stop sending their 
men and arms into Laos and South Viet-Nam 
for the purpose of seizing those countries by 
force. To call that "unconditional surrender" 
is a serious abuse of language. 

Then, there is that word "escalation" — which 
seems to be reserved for the United States and 
our allies. 

For nearly a year, the other side has been 
mining the port of Saigon and the channel lead- 
ing into it. That, apparently, is not escalation. 
But if we were to take those same mines back 
home — to Haiphong — I imagine we would be 
widely charged with escalating the war. 

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are 
using Cambodian territory for infiltration into 
South Viet-Nam and as a base and sanctuary. 
So far as I am aware, few have called that es- 
calation or widening the war. But if we were to 
send troops into Cambodia to go after those base 
areas, I imagine that we would be accused of 

North Viet-Nam has had three or four divi- 
sions of its Regular Army in or near the demili- 
tarized zone. It harshly rejected our proposals * 
that the zone be genuinely dimilitarized and be 
extended 10 miles on both sides to create a 
buffer area. In the last few days. North Viet- 
Nam has again attacked in force across the 
DMZ. So far as I am aware, few have called 
that escalation. 

Upside-Down Comments on Peace Moves 

There have been a good many upside-down 
comments on peace moves also. We have tried 
unremittingly to bring the other side to the ne- 
gotiating table. We have made many proposals 
ourselves and have supported the initiatives of 
many other governments and individuals. 
Hanoi has said "No" to all of them. 

Periodically, we have been urged to stop 
bombing the is'orth, on the ground that that 
would make peace talks possible. Well, we have 
tried that several times, once for as long as 37 
days. In fact, Hanoi chose to regard a pause 
in the bombings as an ultimatum. 

*For a Department statement of Apr. 19, see iJ)id., 
May 15, 1967, p. 750. 

JULY 24, 19G7 


We think reciprocity is essential. Suppose 
that we were to say that we would negotiate 
only if the Communists stopped all the violence 
in South Viet-Nam, while we continued to bomb 
North Viet-Nam. Everybody would say we 
were crazy. But when North Viet-Nam makes 
the same proposition the other way around, 
some people seem to think it is reasonable. 

We stand ready to talk with the other side 
without conditions or about conditions. We are 
ready to discuss the terms of a settlement and 
then work out the steps for reaching it. We are 
willing to discuss any piece of the problem, such 
as the territorial integrity of Cambodia or de- 
militarizing the so-called demilitarized zone. 
Or we are ready to take reciprocal steps to de- 
escalate the conflict. 

But we shall stay in Viet-Nam until the right 
of the South Vietnamese people to work out 
their own future under a government of their 
own free choice has been secured. More is at 
stake than self-determination for the South 
Vietnamese, important as that is. Even more is 
at stake than the security of other nations in 
Southeast Asia, impoi-tant as that is. The 
greater question is whether aggression is to be 
allowed to succeed, thus opening the way for 
further aggi'ession. And tied to that is the in- 
tegrity of the commitments of the United 
States. Our commitments in the Pacific are 
just as binding as our commitments in the At- 
lantic. If those who wish to pursue world revo- 
lution by force should come to believe that the 
United States will not do what it has promised, 
the prospects of peace would rapidly vanish. 

Improving Relations With Eastern Europe 

It is sometimes said that the war in Viet- 
Nam stands in the way of a detente between the 
Soviet Union and the West. 

President Joluison is deeply intent on trying 
to improve our relations with the Soviet 
Union and the smaller nations of Eastern 
Europe. The fact is that the war in Viet-Nam 
has not prevented the Soviet Union and the 
United States from concluding a civil air agree- 
ment and a consular agreement and from sign- 
ing the treaty on peaceful uses of space. It has 
not prevented consideration of a nonprolifera- 
tion treaty. It did not prevent useful direct 
communication between the heads of the two 
Governments during the recent fighting in the 
Middle East. And it did not prevent President 
Johnson and Premier Kosygin from engaging 

in long and frank exchanges of views at 

We will continue to do our full share to try 
to improve relations with the Soviet Union and 
other Communist nations. We will continue to 
do our full share to try to settle or narrow the 
differences which separate us and especially to 
achieve agreements or arrangements which 
would reduce the danger of another world war. 
We are eager to make headway in controlling 
and reducing armaments. 

We hope for genuine peaceful coexistence, a 
genuine detente. But if today the West is at the 
beginning of a detente with the Soviet Union, 
we did not get there by forgetting the require- 
ments for maintaining the peace in many a 
crisis since 1945. 

If we and certain of our adversaries are grow- 
ing in prudence this may be related to the 
knowledge that resort to force is a very risky 
business for all. 

International Cooperation for Peace 

The foreign policy of the United States is 
concerned not only with the adversaries of free- 
dom but even more with its friends and 

We seek ever-closer partnerships with other 
economically advanced countries of the free 
world. And we are grateful that these include 
three nations which were our enemies in the 
Second World War — now three thriving democ- 
racies which add immensely to the strength of 
the free world and which we are proud to have 
as close friends and allies. 

In the Western Hemisphere we are fully com- 
mitted to the great cooperative enterprise in 
economic development and social progress: the 
Alliance for Progress. 

We have provided large resources to assist 
developing countries in other parts of the world 
to increase their production and living stand- 
ards. Here I would emphasize our deep concern 
about the war on hunger. President Johnson 
has alerted the world to the fact that only 
comprehensive all-out efforts to deal with the 
food-population problem can avert extensive 
starvation a decade hence. 

We have worked to strengthen and expand 
useful international institutions. And we have 
welcomed such activities by others. In the past 

" For background, see iUa., July 10, 1967, p. 37. 


2 years we have been especially pleased to see 
the steps toward regional cooperation taken by 
the free nations of East Asia and the Western 

The major part of our work at the Depart- 
ment of State is quiet and little noticed — con- 
cerned with the daily business of man wliich re- 
quires some form of international cooperation. 
We take part in more than 600 international 
conferences a year with other governments. We 
belong to many international institutions. We 
have approximately 4,500 treaties and other 
international agreements. Gradually there is 
developing what Sir Wilfred Jenks of the In- 
ternational Labor Organization has called the 
"common law of mankind." 

We have fostered cooperative international 
undertakings in science, education, and tech- 
nology. We strongly favor more people-to- 
people contacts. Here I would applaud again 
the major contribution made by Lions Interna- 
tional. All of these activities help to build 

The road to a lasting world peace is filled with 
obstacles and surrounded by frightful dangers. 
But we — all of us — must do our best. As Presi- 
dent Johnson has said, the search for peace is 
"the assignment of the century."' ® We must not 
fail. For on the organization of a lasting peace 
depends the survival of all that free men, and 
most men everywhere, cherish or aspire to for 
themselves and their posterity. 

Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions 
on Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper 

Following are replies hy Secretary Rusk to 
questions submitted hy Daniel Viklund of 
Dagens Nyheter, StocJcTiolm. 

Press release 152 dated July 1 

1. Which were the decisive reasons for the 
original U.S. decision to intervene militarily in 
Viet-Nam, and do you think that those reasons 
have in any way been affected hy later develop- 
ments, in terms of direct American interests, 
locally in Southeast Asia or internationally? 

Secretary Rush: The simplest way to an- 
swer this question is to remind you that we 
had a promise to keep. Since the Geneva con- 

ference of 1954 and the SEATO agreement of 
the same year, three American Presidents have 
pledged that the United States will help South 
Viet-Nam defend itself against Communist ag- 
gression. AVe have undertaken similar pledges 
for the mutual defense of the NATO area. We 
believe that it is important to the prospects for 
peace that it be fully understood that, on such 
matters, we mean what we say. 

We had hoped that the defense of South 
Viet-Nam would not require the participation 
of United States military forces in combat op- 
erations. For more than 6 years the South 
Vietnamese managed to withstand an unrelent- 
ing and extremely efficient political and mili- 
tary aggression. By the spring of 1965, how- 
ever, the armed agents of Hanoi in the South 
were being massively supplemented by reg- 
ularly constituted units of the North Viet- 
namese army in virtually open armed attack 
against South Viet-Nam. At that point, only 
the military support of South Viet-Nam's 
friends could save it from conquest. That is 
why our troops, along with 45,000 Koreans and 
thousands of Australians, New Zealanders, 
Filipinos, and Thais, are in South Viet-Nam. 

As for our interests in Southeast Asia, we 
have declared them on many occasions. As late 
as August 1964 our Congress, with only two 
dissenting votes in the entire Congress, declared 
that "The United States regards as vital to its 
national interest and to world peace the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security in 
southeast Asia." " We do not see how a durable 
peace can be achieved unless all nations, large 
and small, have a chance to live in safety and 
in peace. This applies quite specifically to those 
countries with whom we have undertaken 
mutual defense alliances. 

2. What is your opinion of the vieio, fre- 
quently voiced in Europe, that both North Viet- 
Na7n and NLF [National Liberation Front"] 
(Viet Cong) hold independent positions on the 
issues of the war, not necessarily always the 

A. It is curious, if true, that this view should 
gain currency in Europe, with its sopliistica- 
tion and experience regarding Communist 
fronts. Neither the history of the origin of the 
NLF nor intelligence based on Communist 
statements, NLF documents, and prisoner in- 

• lUd., Oct 19, 1964, p. 555. 

^ For text of a joint congressional resolution of 
Aug. 7, 1964, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268. 

JULY 24, 1967 


terrogations sui>ports this view. A concerted ef- 
fort has of course been made, particularly 
abroad, by Hanoi to create the illusion that the 
NLF is an independent organization, but this 
does not convince many South Vietnamese — 
nor many knowledgeable foreign observers, for 
that matter. If you examine with care Hanoi's 
programs and those issued by the NLF, you 
will agi-ee, I am sure, that there is no substan- 
tial difference in what they are proposing to 
do to South Viet-Nam. Tactics on occasion de- 
mand differences in emphasis, particularly for 
foreign consumption. But Hanoi's control of 
the NLF has been amply demonstrated over the 
years. Were this not so, the NLF has had many 
chances to demonstrate it and has not done so. 

Military Situation in Viet-Nam 

3. What is your assessment of the military 
situation in Viet-Nam as of today, and do you 
think that there is any possibility of any U.S. 
troop toithdrawals within the next 6 months f 

A. You will recall the address of General 
Westmoreland to the Congress on April 28,- in 
which he compared the situation today with 
what it was some time ago. Although no one 
foresees any United States troop withdrawals 
within the next 6 months, the United States 
is confident that the efforts by South Viet-Nam 
and its allies will continue to bring improve- 
ment, although there may be ups and downs. 
The important point to bear in mmd is that 
the military and nonmilitary developments are 
inextricably intertwined in South Viet-Nam, 
even more than elsewhere, so that the most 
significant indicators of military success may be 
found not in battle reports and casualty statis- 
tics but in the evidence that the country is 
moving forward, creating political institutions, 
holding village and hamlet elections, improv- 
ing communications and stabilizing the econ- 
omy. You are aware of the many proposals 
which we and others have made for a deescala- 
tion of the violence in Viet-Nam. We have of- 
fered to put on the table a schedule of with- 
drawal of United States forces if North Viet- 
Nam would do the same. 

4. // the Viet-Nam war should continue for 
a long time, hoio seriously do you judge the 
risk that it might lead to a direct confrontation 
between the U.S. and Russia or China? 

A. It is prudent always to keep such pos- 

sibilities in mind. Our objective in Viet-Nam 
remains limited to forestalling the aggression 
from the North, and our military response re- 
mains a measured one calculated to reach this 
goal. We have repeatedly made it clear that 
our ends do not include the destruction of the 
North Vietnamese Government or the occupa- 
tion of the country. In any event, while the 
common defense requires in some instances the 
taking of risks, we believe that there is a far 
greater risk in shirking responsibility and al- 
lowing aggression to go unchallenged. 

5. Do you think that the American air bases 
in Thailand ivill increase or reduce the risk that 
that country might be drawn in and that the 
war will spread f 

A. Let me make it clear, first of all, that there 
are no American bases in Thailand. The Royal 
Thai Government, recognizing the common 
danger, allows us to use jointly with its forces 
certain of its defense facilities. That Tliailand 
itself is on the Communist timetable for the 
new kind of warfare the Communists dub 
"wars of national liberation" is sufficiently doc- 
umented. Peking has said this, publicly and 
often. But the Thais are not waiting passively 
for the blow to fall. They are actively cooperat- 
ing today in the defense of Southeast Asia. 
In addition to making their facilities avail- 
able to us in Thailand, they have sent air and 
naval training units to South Viet-Nam, and 
they are presently training and equipping an 
augmented battalion of ground troops to join 
the Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders, and 
Americans who are fighting side by side with 
the South Vietnamese troops to defend the 

Agreements on Laos Ignored by Hanoi 

6. In retrospect, do you think that there was, 
at any time, a reasonable chance to end the 
fighting on conditions acceptable to all parties 
involved, and, if so, why was an agreetnent 

A. We thought such an opportunity had 
come with the accords on Laos in 1962. At that 
conference we accepted the nominee of the Com- 
munist side as the Prime Minister for Laos, 
as well as a coalition government worked out 

' For text, see ibid.. May 15, 1967, p. 738. 



among the so-called "Three Factions." Presi- 
dent Kennedy was bitterly disappointed with 
the results of those accords. Hanoi refused (a) 
to withdraw its forces from Laos, (b) to cease 
using Laos as an infiltration route into South 
Viet-Nam, (c) to permit the coalition govern- 
ment to exercise authority in the Communist- 
held areas of Laos, and (d) to permit the In- 
ternational Control Commission to exercise its 
functions in those same areas. All of these were 
specificallj^ required by the accords themselves. 
Performance and good faith of the agreements 
of 1962 would have represented a giant step 
toward peace throughout Southeast Asia. Since 
then we have not seen any indication that 
Hanoi is prepared to stop its effort to seize 
South Viet-Nam by force. Were they to do so, 
peace could come very fast. 

7. Which are the main reasons for the Amer- 
ican refusal to recognize NLF {Viet Cong) as 
an independent representative for a part of the 
pojmlation of South Viet-Nam? 

A. The WLF does not say that it represents 
a part of the people of South Viet-Nam but 
rather that it is the sole legitimate representa- 
tive of aU these people. The Catholics, Bud- 
dhists, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Montagnards, ethnic 
Cambodians, all making up an overwhelming 
majority of the people of South Viet-Nam, 
reject this pretension of the NLF. Obviously, 
we cannot "recognize" the NLF on their terms. 
Nevertheless, as President Johnson has said,^ 
"The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in 
being represented and having their views pre- 
sented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants 
to cease aggression." 

8. What measures loould you consider neces- 
sary to protect the civilian population of South 
Viet-Nam, following the toithdrawal of Amer- 
ican troops within 6 montlis of a peaceful solu- 
tion, as visualized iy the President? 

A. It is too early to discuss this in any mean- 
ingful detail. Perhaps a final settlement would 
include some type of continuing international 
assistance. We believe, however, that once 
North Viet-Nam withdraws its leadership, its 
troops, and its supplies, the Republic of Viet- 
Nam will be able to make further progress in 
assuring economic and social betterment for 
the South Vietnamese people and to handle any 

insurgency situation which might persist or 
arise subsequently. As you know, the South 
Vietnamese have offered full amnesty and rec- 
onciliation to the South Vietnamese who are 
now assisting Hanoi. 

U.S. Ready To Negotiate 

9. Is your willingness to negotiate with 
North Viet-Nam unchanged in spite of the es- 
calation of tlie hombing of the North, and wJiat 
would you say are now the minhnum Ameri- 
ican conditions for negotiations? 

A. I find it very curious that the word "es- 
calation" seems to be reserved for actions taken 
by the United States and its allies and is not 
applied to actions taken by North Viet-Nam. 
For example, for almost a year North Vietnam- 
ese mines have been placed in the Saigon River 
approaches to Saigon harbor. Viet Cong and 
North Vietnamese forces today are using Cam- 
bodian territory. Has the Dagens Nyheter 
called either of these "escalation" ? I would sug- 
gest that if we picked up North Vietnamese 
mines in the Saigon River and simply took 
them home to their point of origin, namely 
Haiphong, that there would be a great outcry 
about "escalation." 

As for our conditions for negotiations, we 
have none. We have stated many times that 
we are ready to negotiate at once without con- 
ditions. Since the other side has imposed con- 
ditions, such as stopping the bombing, we have 
said we will negotiate about the conditions 
themselves. As for the shape of a final settle- 
ment, our views have been set forth many times 
in such summaries as our Fourteen Points * and 
our reminder of the 28 proposals made by our- 
selves and others which Hanoi has rejected.^ 
Fundamentally, we believe that the Geneva 
agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate 
basis for peace in Southeast Asia. But no one 
has been able to produce anyone from the other 
side with whom to talk — either without condi- 
tions or about conditions. 

10. How do you assess the possihilities to win 
the population of South Viet-Nam for a gov- 
ernment friendly to the United States, and 
which elements of the pacification and de- 
mocratization program appear to you most es- 
sential in that context? 

' At a news conference on July 28, 1965. 

• Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 284. 
= IhUl., May 22. 1967, p. 770. 

JULY 24, igGI 


A. It is not a question of winning the South 
Vietnamese people's support for a government 
friendly to the United States but of relieving 
them of the burden of North Vietnamese ag- 
gression and subversive insurgency. Security is 
the element basic to pacification, and with se- 
curity the broad progi'am of revolutionary de- 
velopment can accelerate its forward move- 
ment. The remarkable progress being made in 
the direction of a constitutional government 
augurs well for tiie future if security can be 
maintained. Our basic interest is that the South 
Vietnamese people have a chance to decide for 
themselves what kind of government they want 
and what their international orientation should 

11. If free elections., including some form of 
de facto NLF participation, were held in South 
Viet-Nam now, how big a part of the voters do 
you thinJc would back the present government 
and NLF, respectively? 

A. If Hanoi were to abandon its attempt to 
take over South Viet-Nam, it is conceivable 
that those indigenous elements who have co- 
operated with the Front would wish to parti- 
cipate in politics in some way. Their right to 
do so would appear to be present in the Doan 
Ket or national reconciliation program. How 
many votes they might get would depend on 

many factors, such as whether these per- 
sons integi-ated with other political groupings, 
what support these groupings might have in 
various areas of the country, and so on. How- 
ever, a recent poll undertaken independently in 
South Viet-Nam by CBS News shows clearly 
that the South Vietnamese people do not want 
communism and/or a government dominated by 
the NLF. 

12. Do you think that Sioeden could contrib- 
ute in any way to establish contacts leading to 
a peaceful solution of the Yiet-Nam conflict? 

A. We have frequently stated that we wel- 
come the efforts of any country which would 
advance the course of peace. But I would be 
less than frank if I did not add two points: 
We see no sign that Hanoi is willing to move to 
an honorable settlement, and we do not believe 
that the prospects for such a settlement are 
enhanced by proposals which ask us to stop half 
the war while the other side continues unabated 
its half of the war. Suppose that the United 
States were to say that we would negotiate only 
if the other side stopped all of the violence in 
South Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb 
the North. Everyone would say that we were 
crazy. Wlien the other side makes exactly the 
same proposal in reverse, why do many people 
say that their proposal is reasonable and ought 
to be accepted ? 



Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva 

The Office of the Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations announced at Washington 
on June 29 that, by direction of the President, 
W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Rep- 
resentative for Trade Negotiations, would sign 
the multilateral agreements negotiated in the 
Sixth Round of Trade Negotiations at Geneva 
June 30. 

The signing ceremony concluded the most 
comprehensive assault on barriers to interna- 
tional trade that has ever taken place. The nego- 
tiations, known as the Kennedy Round in rec- 
ognition of the late President's leadership in 
inaugurating the effort, formally opened in 
May 1964. 

The important elements of the Kennedy 
Romid package are : 

Tariff cuts of 50 percent on a very broad 
range of industrial goods and cuts in the 30 to 
50 percent range on many more. 

Agricultural concessions to which the United 
States attaches great value because they create 
new trading opportunities for our farmers and 
because they support our contention that inter- 
national negotiation on trade m farm products 
can accomplish something. 

A world grains arrangement guaranteeing 
higher minimum trading prices and establish- 
ing a program under wliich other nations will 
share with us in the vital but burdensome task 
of supplying food aid to the undernourished 
people in the less developed countries. 

Nontariff barrier (NTB) liberalization in- 
cluding a very significant accord on antidump- 
ing procedures as well as European NTB modi- 
fications in the American Selling Price (ASP) 

Useful, if limited, progress on the complex 
and sensitive problems in the steel, aluminum, 
pulp and paper, and textile sectors, including 
a 3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton 
Textile Arrangement (LTA).^ 

An agreement on the treatment of chemical 
products that deals with the American Selling 

Price issue in a manner that provides major 
chemical traders with mutually advantageous 
concessions in the main Kennedy Round agree- 
ment and a separate and balanced package that 
makes additional concessions available to the 
United States if it abandons the American Sell- 
ing Price system. 

Significant assistance to the less developed 
coxmtries through permitting their participa- 
tion in the negotiations without requiring recip- 
rocal contributions from them, through special 
concessions on products of particular interest 
to them, and through the food aid provisions of 
the grains arrangement. 

U.S. participation was made possible through 
authority granted the President by the Congress 
through the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.^ The 
late Christian A. Herter directed U.S. partici- 
pation as the Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations until his death in late 1966. He 
was succeeded by William M. Roth, who con- 
tinues to serve as Special Representative. 

The agreements signed June 30 comprise : 

1. A Final Act, which authenticates the texts 
of the agreements described in paragraphs 2-5 
below and which expresses the intention of all 
the signatories to take appropriate steps, sub- 
ject to their constitutional procedures, to put 
these agreements into effect. 

2. The Geneva (1967) Protocol to the Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which 
embodies most of the tariff and other conces- 
sions exchanged in the negotiations. 

3. An agreement relating primarily to chemi- 
cals, which provides for the elimmation of the 
American Selling Price system. 

4. A memorandimi of agreement on basic ele- 
ments for a world grains arrangement. 

* Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5240 ; 
for background and text of the Long-Term Cotton Tex- 
tile Arrangement, see BtTLUETiN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 430. 

' For a summary of the act, see iWd., Oct. 29, 1962, 
p. 6o5. 


5. An agreement on implementation of article 
VI of the GATT, in the form of a code of anti- 
dumping practices. 

The negotiations were concluded in all essen- 
tial respects in INIay at a series of high-level 
meetings in Geneva. Since that time, the nego- 
tiators liave been putting the details of their 
concessions and understandings into the final 
conference documents. 

It is estimated that the agreements will apply 
to about $40 billion of world trade. In industry, 
the United States and the other countries have 
agreed on cuts averaging about 35 percent. In 
agriculture, the average cut is less, but the 
United States has obtained important conces- 
sions covering a substantial volume of trade. 

Full details of the specific tariff reductions 
granted and obtained will be published in a 
final report on the negotiations to be issued by 
the Office of the Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations in mid-July. This final re- 
port will give information on all changes in 
U.S. import duties and on the concessions of 
principal interest to the United States made by 
other participants in the negotiations. The 
schedules of concessions annexed to the agree- 
ment will contain more than 4,000 pages. 

U.S. tariff reductions will not enter into 
force until proclaimed by the President. It is 
expected that their effective date will be Jan- 
uary 1, 1968. In accordance with the require- 
ments of the Trade Expansion Act, most U.S. 
duty reductions will be made in five equal 
annual stages starting January 1. 

In overall trade terms, covering both indus- 
trial and agricultural products, the tariff cuts 
made by the United States are in balance with 
those of the other industrialized countries. In 
terms of 1966 trade the United States is giving 
tariff cuts on about $71/2 billion to $8 billion of 
industrial and agricultural imports and is ob- 
taining tariff' concessions on about the same 
amount of U.S. exports. 

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gave the 
President authority to make the tariff conces- 
sions to which the Kennedy Round agreement 
will commit the United States. 

None of the multilateral agreements nego- 
tiated in the Kennedy Round will require con- 
gressional action except the agreement provid- 
ing for the elimination of the ASP system with 
^ respect to chemicals. The world grains arrange- 
ment envisaged by the memorandum of agree- 
ment on grains will require consent of two- 
thirds of the Senate. 

Industrial Negotiations 

Import duties are being cut in half on a broad 
range of industrial products in international 
trade. Cuts in the 35 to 50 percent range are be- 
ing made on many more products. Categories of 
products on which the principal negotiating 
countries, including the United States, have 
made cuts that in the aggregate average over 
35 percent include: machinery, both electrical 
and nonelectrical ; photographic equipment and 
supplies; automobile and other transport equip- 
ment; optical, scientific, and professional in- 
struments and equipments; paper and paper 
products; books and other printed material; 
fabricated metal products; and lumber and 
wood products, including furniture. 

Steel Sector 

Negotiations on steel were conducted against 
a backgroiuid of tariff rates where U.S. duties 
are generally lower than those of other par- 
ticipants. These negotiations, held bilaterally 
and multilaterally, resulted in closer harmoni- 
zation of tariffs among the major steel pro- 
ducing countries. Virtually all the peaks in 
these countries' tariffs were eliminated, so that 
almost all rates will be no higher than 15 per- 
cent and most will be well below 10 percent. 

Except for U.S. rates, most steel tariffs have 
not heretofore been boimd. In the final nego- 
tiating package, however, almost all rates of 
other countries were bound and many were 

The international harmonization of steel 
tariffs should also reduce the tendency for ex- 
ports to be deflected to the U.S. market in in- 
stances where U.S. tariffs were much lower 
than those of other countries. Although the 
United States is primarily an importer rather 
than an exporter of steelmill products, lower 
tariffs abroad will also provide opportunities 
for U.S. exporters. 

The European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) adoj^ted a miified tariff and agi-eed to 
reduce rates to an arithmetic average of 5.7 
percent. The European Economic Community 
(EEC) agreed to reduce rates within its juris- 
diction correspondingly so that a tariff relation- 
ship would be maintained between more highly 
fabricated EEC steel items and primary and 
less fabricated ECSC items. The ECSC/EEC 
concessions are a 23 percent reduction from 
existing rates (a 10 percent reduction from the 
pre-February 1964 rates on 1964 imports from 
the United States) . 



The United Kingdom is reducing most of its 
rates by 20 percent. Japan is reducing its rates 
by 50 percent except for a few alloy steel items. 
Sweden is binding its rates at existing low 
levels. Austria is harmonizing its tariffs with 
the ECSC/EEC at a somewhat higher level. 

Tlie U.S. reductions average 7 percent on 
1964 imports. It is generally harmonizing its 
tarilfs with the ECSC/EEC where they have 
been above those rates. U.S. rates higher than 
ECSC/EEC rates are to be reduced to ECSC/ 
EEC levels, but no cuts are to be made where 
rates are now below ECSC/EEC concession 
levels. U.S. concessions take account of differ- 
ences between the United States f.o.b. and 
ECSC/EEC c.i.f. customs valuation systems so 
that, nominally, U.S. rates would be somewhat 
higher than ECSC/EEC rates. Also, the differ- 
ential in the U.S. tariff between ordinary and 
alloy steel is being reduced by 50 percent but is 
not being eliminated as complete harmonization 
would have required. 

Aluminmn Sector 

The Community offer consisted of a binding 
of a 130,000-ton annual quota at 5 percent. The 
EEC had previously bound in the GATT a 9 
percent rate of duty on ingot aluminum. Some 
imports were allowed entry amiually under a 
tariff quota at 5 percent, but neither the amount 
of the quota nor the lower rate had been bound. 
The United States is making a 20 percent cut 
on ingot aluminum, of benefit primarily to 
Canada and Norway. 

On unwrought aluminum (further advanced 
than ingot), tariff cuts by the United States 
averaged less than 30 percent. The EEC aver- 
age cut was about one-third, while the tariff 
cuts by the U.K. and Canada were larger than 
those of the EEC. Other EFTA [European 
Free Trade Association] countries and Japan 
also made substantial cuts in the alimiinum sec- 
tor. Of special interest to U.S. aluminiun ex- 
porters will be the adoption by Canada of an 
injury requirement in its antidumping legisla- 
tion to conform to the new antidumping 

Chemical Sector 

The chemical sector negotiations were cen- 
tered on the American Selling Price issue. 
European countries maintained from the start 
that any more than token reductions in their 
chemical tariffs were conditional on U.S. elimi- 
nation of the ASP valuation system. Since elim- 

ination of ASP would require congressional 
action, U.S. negotiators insisted that chemical 
concessions be implemented in two packages: 
first, a balanced settlement in the Kennedy 
Round ; second, reciprocal concessions by other 
countries in return for abolition of ASP. 

The pattern and volume of chemical trade is 
such that the outcome of negotiations in this 
sector inevitably played a major role in the 
outcome of the entire Kennedy Round. U.S. 
dutiable chemical imports fi-om countries with a 
major stake in world chemical trade (EEC, 
United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland) were 
$325 million in 1964; these countries' dutiable 
chemical imports fi'om the United States 
totaled nearly $900 million. 

In the end, all major Kennedy Round partici- 
pants made concessions in the chemical sector. 
Many concessions have been agreed on uncon- 
ditionally, while certain other concessions are 
conditional on United States elimination of the 
American Selling Price valuation system. 

The concessions on chemicals are, therefore, 
in two parts : first, the Kennedy Round chemical 
package, and second, the ASP package. 

The Kennedy Round Chemical Package : Un- 
conditional obligations undertaken in the Ken- 
nedy Roimcl are as follows: 

1. The United States agreed to duty reduc- 
tions on products accounting for nearly all (95 
percent) of U.S. dutiable chemical imports. 
Tariffs will be reduced 50 percent on most items 
with rates above 8 percent ; 20 percent on items 
8 percent and below. These commitments will 
result in a weighted average duty reduction of 
43 percent in United States chemical tariffs on 
$325 million of dutiable imports from the EEC, 
U.K., Japan, and Switzerland. The combined 
tariff' reduction made by these four participants 
averages 26 percent on nearly $900 million of 
U.S. chemical exports, and the United States 
retains the ASP method of valuation for ben- 
zenoid chemicals. 

2. The European Economic Community 
agreed to duty reductions on tariff items ac- 
counting for 98 percent of its dutiable chemical 
imports from the United States. Most duties 
will be reduced by 20 percent. Certain items, 
however, will be subject to reductions of 30 per- 
cent and 35 percent, while some others will be 
reduced less than 20 percent. These commit- 
ments will result in a weighted average reduc-*' 
tion of 20 percent in EEC tariffs on $460 mil- 
lion of 1964 chemical imports from the United 

JULY 24, 1967 


3. The United Kingdom agreed to duty re- 
ductions on virtually all chemical imports from 
the United States except certain plastics. Most 
British plastics duties are curi-ently 10 percent, 
a level considerably lower than other major 
trading countries. The United Kingdom has 
agreed to reduce tariffs at rates of 25 percent 
and above by 30 percent, and rates below 25 
percent by 20 percent. These commitments will 
result in a weighted average reduction of 24 
percent in United Kingdom imports of more 
than $100 million of chemicals from the United 

4. Japan agreed to tariff reductions which on 
a weighted a.verage basis amount to 44 percent 
on dutiable chemical imports from the United 
States. These imports were over $200 million 
in 1964. 

5. Switzerland agreed to tariff reductions 
which on a weighted average basis amoimt to 
49 percent on $45 million of chemical imports 
from the United States. 

6. Other participants, notably Canada and 
the Scandinavian countries, agreed to reduc- 
tions in their chemical tariffs as part of their 
Kennedy Roimd concessions. 

The ASP Package: The following conces- 
sions are contingent on U.S. elimination of 
the ASP valuation system : 

1. The United States would eliminate ASP 
and replace rates currently based on ASP with 
rates that have been proposed by the Tariff 
Connnission to be applied on the valuation as 
normally calculated for other U.S. imports and 
yielding the same revenue as the pi'evious rates. 
These "converted" rates would be reduced by 
stages, generally by 50 percent or to an ad 
valorem equivalent of 20 percent, whichever is 
lower. The principal exceptions to this formula 
are dyes and sulfa drugs, duties on which would 
be reduced to 30 percent and 25 percent, respec- 
tively. In addition, the United States would 
reduce the 8 percent and below rates subject to 
the 20 percent cut in the Kennedy Round pack- 
age by a further 30 percent and further reduce 
by more than 50 percent a few other items to the 
20 percent level. These reductions would pro- 
vide a combined weighted average cut on U.S. 
chemical tariffs in the Kennedy Round and 
ASP packages of about 48 percent on $325 
million of imports. 

2. The European Economic Community 
■would reduce its chemical tariffs by an addi- 

tional amoimt so as to achieve a combined Ken- 
nedy Round-ASP package reduction of 46 
percent on $460 million of chemical imports 
from the United States. Virtually all EEC 
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 121/2 per- 
cent or below. Belgium, France, and Italy would 
also modify road-use taxes so as to eliminate 
discrimination against American-made auto- 

3. The United Kingdom would reduce most 
of its chemical tariffs according to the following 
formula: Items at present dutiable at 25 per- 
cent and above would be reduced to a level of 
121/2 percent, for a 62 percent combined Ken- 
nedy Round and ASP package reduction. Tariff 
items with duties of less than 25 percent would 
generally be reduced by the amoimt necessary 
to achieve a combined reduction of 50 percent 
in the two packages. U.K. plastics tariffs which 
would be above the reduced EEC rate on the 
same item would be cut to that level and bound. 
The combined weighted average reduction in 
the level of British chemical tariffs on U.S. 
trade would be approximately 47 percent on 
$170 million of imports from the United States. 
After these reductions virtually all British 
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 12i/^ percent 
or below. The United Kingdom would also re- 
duce by 25 percent its margin of preference on 
imports of tobacco. 

4. Switzerland would eliminate limitations 
on imports of canned fruit preserved with com 

Textile Sector 

Most importing countries reduced tariffs on 
cotton, manmade, and wool textiles less than 
their average reduction in other industrial prod- 
ucts as a whole. The United States agreed to 
tariff reductions which, on a weighted trade 
basis, averaged approximately 14 percent for 
the three fibers. Cotton textiles were reduced 
21 percent; manmade textiles, 15 percent; and 
wool textiles, 2 percent. 

Negotiations on cotton textiles involved three 
elements : the extension of the Long-Term Cot- 
ton Textile Arrangement, more liberal access 
to import markets protected by the LTA, and 
tariff reductions. The principal concessions by 
exporting countries of interest to importing 
countries was the extension of the LTA in its 
present form until September 30, 1970. In re- 
turn, importing countries agreed to enlarged 



quotas under LTA provisions and to tariff 

Within the context of the LTA, the United 
States negotiated bilateral agi-eements with its 
main supplying countries. Tliese agreements 
typically provided for a 5 percent annual in- 
crease in LTA quotas, a one-time bonus for 
LTA extension, and certain other administra- 
tive improvements. 

The United States agreed to cotton textile 
tariff reductions that amounted to a weighted 
average reduction of 21 percent. Keductions on 
apparel items averaged 17 percent; fabrics 
tariffs were reduced 24 percent; and yarn, 28 

The EEC reduced cotton textile tariffs by 
about 20 percent. It also reached bilateral 
understandings with major suppliers provid- 
ing for improved access to the EEC market. 
Noting that it already accorded liberal access 
for imports from Hong Kong, India, and other 
Commonwealth sources, the United Kingdom 
made token cotton textile tariff reductions 
toward other suppliers. 

The United States agreed to a weighted aver- 
age tariff reduction of 15 percent on imports of 
manmade-fiber textiles, excluding fibers. Man- 
made-fiber apparel duties were reduced by an 
average of approximately 6 percent ; fabrics, by 
18 percent; yarn, by 37 percent. Other coun- 
tries made significant reductions on these 

The United States agreed to tariff reductions 
on very few wool textiles. The weighted aver- 
age duty reduction on wool fabric was about 1 
percent; on wool apparel, about 2 percent. On 
total wool textile imports the average duty 
reduction was 2 jaercent. Other coimtries made 
considerably greater reductions on wool 

Paper, Pulp, and Lumber 

Multilateral sector negotiations were 
planned for paper and pulp, largely in an effort 
to get the EEC to make meaningful tariff 
reductions of interest to'the Nordic countries 
and Canada as well as the United States. 
Although some multilateral discussions were 
held, negotiations were essentially bilateral. A 
long series of discussions resulted in EEC cuts 
of 50 percent on pulp and about 25 percent on 
paper. Canada and the EFTA countries also 
made significant concessions on pa.per products 

exjDorted by the United States. In return, the 
United States made comparable concessions. 

NontarifF Barriers 

Antidwm/ping Code 

A major accomplishment in the field of non- 
tariff barriers was the negotiation of an anti- 
dumping code. In addition to the United States, 
the major participants in this negotiation were 
the United Kingdom, the European Economic 
Community, Japan, Canada, and the Scandi- 
navian countries. 

Negotiation of the antidumping code cen- 
tered on the consideration of international 
standards. Although U.S. legislation is consist- 
ent with the GATT, foreign complaints wei-e 
directed against U.S. procedures. These con- 
cerned, particularly, the frequent withholding 
of appraisement during antidumping investi- 
gations and the length of time taken in 
investigations. (Withholding of appraisement 
postpones the final determination of customs 
duties until an antidumping investigation is 
completed. However, imports may be released 
under bond from customs custody after 
appraisement is withheld.) 

The antidumping code supplements the pro- 
visions of article VI of the GATT with rules 
and procedures to be followed in antidumping 
actions. U.S. legislation and administrative 
reg-ulations contain detailed provisions relating 
to the determination of sales at less than fair 
value and injury, but most countries' proce- 
dures lack such specificity. 

The principal advantages of the antidumping 
code to the United States will be the adoption 
by other countries of fair and open procedures 
along the lines of present U.S. practices. The 
code will provide both an opportunity and a 
basis for U.S. exporters to defend their interests 
in foreign antidumping actions. In particular, 
the new common antidumping regulations that 
are being developed by the European Economic 
Community will conform with the code. 

Of special benefit to the LTnited States will be 
the adoption by Canada of an injury require- 
ment in its antidumping legislation. The lack of 
such a requirement has impeded U.S. exports 
for many years. 

Because the antidumping code is consistent 
with existing U.S. law, no legislative changes 
are required. However, the Treasury Depart- 

JTJLT 24, 1967 

ment will revise its regulations to conform with 
the code. The principal change in present proce- 
dures will concern limiting the time period dur- 
ing which appraisement is withheld to a maxi- 
mum of 90 days m most cases. Both foreign ex- 
porters and domestic importers and j^roducers 
favor a reduction of the time taken in antidump- 
ing cases. Also, invest) gations will not be initi- 
ated unless there is evidence of injury. 

Other Nontarif Barriers 

In addition to the negotiation of an anti- 
dumping code, the principal nontariff accom- 
plishment is the agreement to take action on the 
nontariff barriers included in the conditional 
chemical package; that is, the elimination for 
certain chemicals of the American Selling Price 
system of valuation by the United States, the 
elimination of the discriminatory aspects of 
automobile road-use taxes in France, Italy, and 
Belgium, and the modification by Switzerland 
of regulations on canned fruit, as well as a re- 
duction by the United Kingdom m the margin 
of preference on unmanufactured tobacco. 

There were also a few other nontariff achieve- 
ments as a result of bilateral discussions. In the 
negotiations Austria agi-eed to eliminate the 
discriminatory effect of automobile road-use 
taxes on larger engined U.S. automobiles. 
Canada eliminated a restriction prohibiting im- 
ports of fresh fruits and vegetables in s^-bushel 
baskets. Canada also ceased applying the Cana- 
dian sales tax to the full value of aircraft en- 
gines repaired in the United States. The 11 per- 
cent sales tax is now applied only to the value of 
the repairs. In addition, Canada modified re- 
strictive standards applying to aircraft engines 
repaired abroad. 

Although not a subject for negotiation, quan- 
titative restrictions were eliminated or modified 
by several countries. Of particular importance 
to the United States are the elimination of re- 
strictions in the United Kingdom on fresh 
grapefruit and in Denmark and Finland on 
many agricultural products. Japan agreed to 
liberalize quota restrictions on some products. 

Several developing countries specified action 
on various nontariff measures as part of their 
contributions to the negotiations. These included 
the introtluction of certain tariff reforms, the 
liberalization of licensing systems and foreign 
exchange controls, and the elimination or reduc- 
tion of prior-deposit requirements and tariff 


The United States originally set as a goal in 
the agricultural negotiations the same broad 
trade coverage and depth of tariff cuts as 
achieved for industrial products. This did not 
prove negotiable, however. The European Eco- 
nomic Community, when the negotiations got 
miderway, was still in the process of developing 
its Common Agi'icultural Policy. It was reluc- 
tant to make substantial cuts in the level of pro- 
tection at the same time it was formulating a 
Common Agricultural Policy among the six 
members. The results of the agricultural nego- 
tiations with the Community are therefore con- 
siderably moi'e modest than the results achieved 
in industry. Nevertheless, progress was made in 
the negotiations in reducing barriers to agri- 
cultural trade. 

The United States was able to obtain signif- 
icant agricultural concessions from Japan, 
Canada, and the U.K., the Nordic countries, and 
Switzerland. The EEC made tariff cuts on 
agricultural items of trade value to the United 
States of over $200 million. 

No progress was made in negotiating down 
the trade restrictive effects of the variable-levy 
system of the EEC. Offers made by the Com- 
munity on the basis of this system were not 

The agricultural negotiations were divided 
into so-called commodity groups and nongroup 
or tariff items. The commodity groups included 
meats, dairy products, and grains. Of the com- 
modity groups only grams yielded positive 


A new grains arrangement was negotiated 
that establishes a minimum price for U.S. No. 
2 hard red winter ordinary wheat f.o.b. Gulf 
ports at $1.73 per bushel. Tliis represents an 
increase of about 21.5 cents per bushel over the 
equivalent minimum price for U.S. hard red 
winter ordinai-y under the present International 
Wheat Agreement.^ There will be a comparable 
increase in the minimum price of other grades 
and qualities of wheat under the new 

Market prices are currently above the mini- 
mum prices of the new arrangement, but the new 
minimum prices should establish an effective 
floor under U.S. wheat exports for the 3 years 

» TIAS 5240, 605T. 



of the arrangement. Adequate provision is made 
for adjusting differentials for various grades 
and qualities of wheat as required if trading 
prices should fall to the minimum. There is 
nothing in the arrangement that will prevent 
U.S. wheat from being priced competitively as 

Participating countries have agreed to con- 
tribute 4I/2 million tons of cereals to a multi- 
lateral food aid program. The U.S. share of 
this program will be 42 percent of the total, or 
slightly less than 2 million tons. Importing 
countries as a whole will contribute about 2 
million tons of the total. The grains arrange- 
ment thus represents further progress toward 
one of the United States' key objectives of 
foreign aid, the multilateral sharing of the food 

Meat and Dairy Products 

During most of the Kennedy Round, the 
countries principally involved in world trade 
in fresh, chilled, and frozen beef and veal, and 
in butter, cheese, and dry milk, sought to 
negotiate general international arrangements 
for these products. The purpose of these negoti- 
ations was to provide for acceptable conditions 
of access to world markets in furtherance of a 
significant development and expansion of world 
trade in agricultural products, consistent with 
tlie principle agreed by the GATT ministers at 
the outset of the negotiations. Although these 
negotiations continued until late in the Ken- 
nedy Round, it was not possible to work out an 
acceptable multilateral arrangement. Countries 
then shifted to bilateral negotiations, through 
which they were able in some cases to negotiate 
improved access to important markets. 

The United States made no offers on fresh, 
chilled, or frozen beef or veal. The duty on 
canned ham was bound but no reduction made. 
We did not reduce the duty on domestic types of 
raw wool. No offers were made on any products 
subject to quotas, including butter, dry milk, 
and certain types of cheese. On certain nonquota 
cheese, cuts averaging 13 percent were made. 

Agricultural Tariff Items 

Tlie United States achieved a wide range of 
concessions from its principal negotiating 
partners, which should improve the export op- 
portunities for such products as soybeans, 
tallow, tobacco, poultry, and horticultural 
products, including citrus and camied fruit. 

In particular, the United States and Canada 
negotiated a balance of agricultural concessions 
covering a substantial range of products. 

The Developing Countries 

The United States negotiated with the de- 
veloping countries on the basis of the plan 
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee, 
the steering committee of the Sixth Round. 
One of the objectives of the negotiations, that 
of reducing barriers to exports of developing 
countries to the maximum extent possible, was 
taken into account in the plan. The plan also 
took into accoimt the ministerial decisions to 
the effect that developed countries could not 
expect to receive full reciprocity from the 
developing countries in trade negotiations and 
that the contributions of developing countries 
should be considered in the light of the develop- 
ment, trade, and fuiancial needs of those 

Accordingly, the United States made conces- 
sions of benefit to developing coimtries, includ- 
ing nonparticipants, which cover over $900 
million of their exjDorts. Included in these con- 
cessions will be the complete elimination of the 
duty on more than $325 million of imports from 
these countries. Moreover, the elimination of 
duties on $45 million of these products does not 
need to be staged over a 4-year period and thus 
meets one of the more important desiderata of 
the developing countries. Since many of the con- 
cessions on tropical products were negotiated in 
the context of joint action by industrialized 
countries, the total benefits which developing 
countries will receive were further increased. 

Ten developing countries made concessions 
benefiting the United States. 

JTILT 24, 1967 


Institution-Building and the Alliance for Progress 

ty Covey T. Oliver 

Assistant Secretary -designate for Inter- American Affairs ^ 

I am delighted to have this opportunity to 
share with my fellow members of the World 
Affairs Council of Philadelpliia a few thoughts 
on Latin American development and the Al- 
liance for Progress. 

When we think of Latin America and the Al- 
liance, the characterizing word is "change" — 
urgent, basic, needed change. The Alliance was 
created to answer the needs of swiftly chang- 
ing times, and indeed the Alliance already has 
been the engine for vast and sweeping changes 
in this hemisphere. 

Sometimes changes are completely unex- 
pected : Wlien, on May 16, 1967, I accepted the 
invitation to talk here, I certainly did not fore- 
see the rather substantial change that has since 
occurred in my own relationship with Latin 
America ! 

The nature of the change between my former 
professional responsibilities and my new official 
ones recalls to my mind an experience of more 
than 20 years ago, when I was a member of the 
American delegation at the Paris Peace Con- 
ference. During one session, I, as a Govei-nment 
"expert," sat directly behind a distinguished 
congressional member of that delegation. Sen- 
ator Arthur Vandenberg. The Soviet bloc was 
blocking. There were long speeches repeating 
endlessly the same dreary Marxistese (we were 
just learning how dully repetitive the Red dele- 
gates could be). During most of the long, bor- 
ing, irritating session, Senator Vandenberg, 
smoking cigar after cigar, listened quietly and 

' Address made before the World Affairs Council at 
Philadelphia, Pa., on June 7. Mr. Oliver was sworn in 
on June 30 as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American 
Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for 

kept his pencil moving — working on an elabo- 
rate doodle of the Great Seal of the United 
States with fine draftsmanship and beautiful 
shadings. As the session droned on, the Senator 
finally pushed his chair back and, as he rose to 
leave, briefly turned to me and said, "Young 
man, life was a lot simpler for me when I was 
an isolationist." 

Life was simpler for me as a professor speak- 
ing on what ought to be done about development 
than ever it will be as U.S. Coordinator of the 
Alliance, trying actually to get things done. 

But I look forward to these new duties with 
optimism and with sober awareness of our 
country's interests and opportunities in helping 
the New World to become a better place for all 
its people to live in. It has been my good fortune 
to have spent some memorable years in various 
roles in the Alliance area and to have worked 
closely with our good neighbors to the south. I 
am happy that so many of these good neighbors 
are also good friends, whose aspirations I be- 
lieve I understand, whose views I respect, whose 
amistad — even carino — I cherish. 

Thus, with considerable development-oriented 
field experience with one of the larger AID 
[Agency for International Development] pro- 
grams, with familiarity with the languages and 
cultures of Alliance coimtries, with a firm be- 
lief in the need for development, I approach 
with a measure of confidence the big and difficult 
job of directing the United States programs in 
support of the Alliance. So while there are ties 
that will always link me fraternally with this 
city and with the university, I could not have 
let go by this unexpected opportunity to return 
once again for a while to Government service — 
particularly at this time, when a spirit of change 
characterizes inter-American affairs. 



Embarking Upon "the Decade of Urgency" 

It is clear that we are entering a new era in 
the Americas — an era of renewal of expecta- 
tions, of sighting new horizons, of moving on 
toward them. The Summit Meeting of the Presi- 
dents of America ^ focused world attention anew 
on the Alliance for Progress. It will stand his- 
torically as a milestone in hemispheric history. 
It marks the turning point between what might 
be called the first phase of the Alliance and this 
new, second phase we have now embarked upon 
in the "decade of urgency," as President John- 
son has called it. 

Standing where we are today, looking back to 
where we have been and ahead toward where 
we must go with the development, I see three 
phases of the Alliance for Progress. 

First, there was the organization, mobiliza- 
tion, and cori'ection, or "feedback," phase. The 
hemisphere had to agree on the nature of the 
problems and the goals of our Alliance. It had 
to mobilize its efforts — in money, manpower, 
and will. But it also had to deal with serious 
distortions which impeded economic and social 
growth: rampant inflation that robbed middle 
and lower income groups of initiative; heavy 
debt burdens that could not be amortized with 
current income ; currency, balance-of-payments, 
and other difficulties that made economic and 
social growth almost impossible. These prob- 
lems are still with us, but Latin America has a 
much better grip on them, and they now seem 

The adjustments which Latin American 
countries have made in the early years of the 
Alliance have been painful, demanding in per- 
sonal and political courage. As I participated 
in the development and execution of Alliance 
policies from 1964 to 1966, I can attest that the 
task of development is not easy for them. But I 
can also attest that our neighbors truly want to 
better themselves in lasting and self-reliant 
ways. They are too much men and women at- 
tuned to human dignity to be satisfied with doles 
and relief. For them and for us the goals are 
the same, and we move together along the road 
to them, helping each other over the rough 
places. As we travel this road, we come to places 
from which, across the valleys ahead, we also 
see the peaks we would attain, glimpsed sudden- 

' For statements by President .Johnson and text of 
the Declaration of the Presidents of America, see 
Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 706. 

ly in such splendor as not to be forgotten as we 
move on. 

The Summit Meeting was such a place on the 
road. There the hemisphere's highest political 
leaders met, assessed our modest but encourag- 
ing progi'ess, and gave direction for vigorous 
new steps forward. 

Thus — to leave my metaphor — while we are 
still working in many places on the first phase 
of the Alliance, the Presidents clearly outlined 
both the second and third phases : a major effort 
on institution-building and concrete measures 
to achieve a Common Market by 1985. 

Intermediate Phase of the Alliance 

While we should never lose sight of the ulti- 
mate goals tied to hemispheric unity, it is the 
new, intermediate phase that I want to discuss 
with you. 

Latin America has many dreams but probably 
none that its people more passionately seek to 
fulfill than those of democratic growth and 
social justice. We share that dream, for nothing 
is more precious to us than human dignity, the 
worthwhileness of the individual person as a 
child of God ; free and democratic institutions ; 
and, as our great Declaration bravely given in 
this City of Brotherly Love puts it, "the pur- 
suit of Happiness." 

We must, therefore, help create, strengthen, 
modify, and build institutions that provide: 

— the opportunity for all to share equitably 
in the cost of building their country with the 
assurance that their contributions are used wise- 
ly and honestly. 

— the opportunity for the farmer to own land, 
to obtain credit, and to market his production at 
fair prices. 

— the opportimity for youth to obtain an edu- 
cation and to make an intelligent and meaning- 
ful contribution to society while preparing also 
to lead it witliin short years. 

— the opportunity for the worker to get work 
and to be rewarded properly for his labor. 

— the opportunity for business to invest im- 
der just and equitable laws and earn fair 

— the opportunity for all to stand equally be- 
fore the law without fear or favor and to live 
out their years in peace, honor, and social 

Let me be specific: Improved productivity 
and greater monetary stability alone are not 

JTJIiT 24, 1967 


enough; there must be modernization of exist- 
ing institutions and the development of new 
ones. Many of these changes there, as here, re- 
quire state action — legishition, law, public ad- 
ministration. There must be changes in distri- 
bution, in the processes for meeting the exj^ec- 
tations of various groups in the social structure. 

As we move into an intermediate stage of the 
Alliance, wherein human needs and hopes, in- 
stitution-building, and modernization will be 
principal themes, we note with satisfaction that 
our Alliance-oriented operations in the first, or 
stability-seeking, phase have themselves had im- 
portant relationships to social and politicocul- 
tural goals. A good example is taxation. The 
development of fair, effective, and respected 
systems of taxation is a major objective of exist- 
ing development programs in a number of 
countries. From one point of view, "technical 
assistance" is involved, as we have made avail- 
able experts and tax technology. Technical as- 
sistance is an original and still useful aspect of 
development help — at one time the only civilian 
kind we offered to Latin America. The "tax 
projects" are also related to fiscal stability — a 
short-range, or "precondition," goal — and to a 
number of middle-phase goals, ranging from 
distributive justice to more local currency re- 
sources for social service budgets related to ed- 
ucation, health, and the like. 

We of the Alliance community have done and 
are doing well with "tax reform." Improved 
revenue-raising is a mutually recognized devel- 
opment objective. We all talk to each other (now 
through our experts mainly) about tax matters; 
and as to tax issues and ideas, we deal with each 
other in ways that in a more traditional era 
would have been regarded as improper even for 
dialog between different nations. 

Land reform is another example. Here, we of 
North America have had to disabuse ourselves 
of our tendency to generalize about landholding 
conditions as if they were the same throughout 
the rest of the hemisphere ; and we have had to 
reconsider some of our simplistic, though well- 
intentioned, notions about the per se virtues of 
small holdings, regardless of their relationship 
to the subsistence needs of owners and to na- 
tional productivity. But here again we have been 
working intimately with our neighbors ; and as 
part of our programs to increase agricultural 
production the landownership, land-develop- 
ment, colonization problems are getting intelli- 
gent, frank, and continuous attention. 

Land utilization, on the other hand, is hardly 
in the realm of discourse between us. Regard- 
less of who owns them, what should the good 
lands — those that are capable of bountiful pro- 
duction of a wide range of crops — be used for ? 
What is the relationship of land utilization to 
nutrition and dietary habits; between govern- 
mental policies and incentives for increased ag- 
ricultural production ? 

Modernizing the Conditions of Rural Life 

The Presidents called at Punta del Este for 
modernization of the conditions of rural life. It 
may be that much that needs to be done along 
lines I have just mentioned can be related to this 
Presidential sujjport for further study and 
work. Additionally, m most countries there lie 
ahead : 

(a) The development of food processing and 
food storage ; 

(b) Improved physical facilities for urban- 
rural exchanges of goods and services, 

(c) Institutional changes in the marketing 
process itself. 

The first two of these are mainly the business 
of private enterprise, whose role in development 
is exceedingly important especially in this sec- 
ond stage of the development process. The inter- 
national agencies and the United States can 
help with ideas, feasibility-study financing, and 
the supplying of marketing experts under 
teclinical assistance. Much of the capital, most 
of the risk-taking and innovating initiatives 
must come from the private sector in a combina- 
tion that is suitable to the times and the fair 
needs of all groups involved. Also, the United 
States seeks constructive opportunities to help 
in the financing of more cooperatives for both 
production and marketing, more agricultural 
credit mechanisms, and more private investment 
funds which can help agroindustry. President 
Jolmson has stated he will seek new funds to 
help the modernization of agriculture in these 

The program of action agreed by the Presi- 
dents at Punta del Este emphasized the need 
for "multinational infrastructure projects" as 
steps toward economic integration and the Com- 
mon Market. One essential for modernization 
of the market jirocess in Latin America is 
roads — and more roads. Although waterway im- 
provement is important in some countries, it 



is roads, from through highways to rural ac- 
cess routes, that are the greatest single need for 
increased velocity and efficiency in the exchange 
of goods and services within a country and, in- 
deed, for exi:)ort and regional trade improve- 
ment as well. Intensive roadbuilding programs, 
moreover, give jobs to unskilled and semiskilled 
labor in countries where far too few of those 
seeking work can find it. 

The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development has been doing laudable de- 
velopment work of this nature in particular 
countries. At the Summit, the Presidents en- 
dorsed the leading role of the Inter- American 
Development Bank in studying and financing 
multinational projects in such fields as trans- 
portation, telecommunications, and hydroelec- 
tric power. 

Changes in Marketing Process 

Institutional changes in the marketing pro- 
cess itself are parts of social change. This means 
that, first, attitudes and, ultimately, the legal 
order must guide the developing countries into 
modem patterns of distribution. In the develop- 
ing countries there must be more awareness of 
free-world experience with the "mix" between 
laissez-faire and enforced competition, counter- 
vailing power and public regulation, that char- 
acterizes developed free economies — and so- 
cieties — today. 

No single, "all-countries, all-times," mechan- 
ical adjustment of public-sector, private-sector 
relationships is possible. Each country, each 
community, has to work out its own "mix." But 
for that to happen in the less developed world 
there has to be in that world more awareness 
and evaluation of these problems than there has 
been. Note, for example, that unlike the Treaty 
of Rome creating the European Economic Com- 
munity, neither the LAFTA [Latm American 
Free Trade Association] nor the Central Amer- 
ican Common Market arrangements deal with 
monopoly problems. 

Does this mean that our AID missions in 
Latin America should become involved with 
"antitrust" in about the same manner as they 
have been with tax reform ? My tentative view 
is that our bilateral involvement should be lim- 
ited to developing a dialog, giving information, 
and sharing research techniques, because in this 
field, unlike taxation, there is now such a wide 
variety of models in developed country experi- 
ence as to encourage caution in putting forward 

our own antitrust system as if we thought it the 
only approach to coping with restrictive trade 
practices and monopolies. But Latin America 
must assure competition in the national market- 
place if the area is to develop and compete in 
world markets. 

And we should consider more effective en- 
couragement for cooperative and community de- 
velopment movements, because these are "of the 
peojile" programs that hold promise for wide 
popular involvement in all aspects of develop- 
ment — social and j^olitical as well as economic. 

Educating the "Decisionmakers-To-Be" 

Institution-building is now a national process 
and must eventually become a community proc- 
ess. The dynamism, the know-how, for social 
change has to come from within the system. 

This means, above all, education of the de- 
cisionmakers-to-be. All education is an Alliance 
goal, but good university education is an imme- 
diate, absolute necessity for the articulate, dis- 
satisfied young people who, through their own 
energies and frequently over very great diffi- 
culties, have made their ways to the public uni- 
versities of Latin America with eventual public 
leadership in mind. These public universities 
are, right now, turning out the decisionmakers 
of tomorrow. They are the major civilian en- 
gines of social mobility in Latin America — the 
only way a poor but energetic and determined 
young person can rise in society without joining 
the military services. Communists and other ex- 
tremists know this quite well. The public uni- 
versities are prime targets of the extremist ele- 
ments. I consider public university betterment 
very urgent. 

The greatest substantive needs of the univer- 
sities as I now see them are: (a) more full-time 
teachers, better trained and with more time to 
give to students, and (b) more extensive and 
more modern social studies curricula. Students 
should have opportunities to study and appraise 
all the roads to social justice, not just the illu- 
sory — and outdated — Marxist one. As a result 
of lack of information as to how societies really 
work in developed countries, including even the 
U.S.S.R., far too many young Latin Americans 
tend to choose some brand of Marxism over free- 
world systems, which they mistakenly assume to 
be sometliing these systems never were — com- 
pletely dominated by heartless, mechanistic con- 
cepts of pure laissez-faire capitalism. The stu- 
dents should be led to inquiry — factual, scien- 

JULT 24, 1967 


tific inquirj'. The universities themselves should 
be enabled to undertake sociocultural, self-dis- 
covery, research projects, such as "attitude 
studies," for greater understanding of how total 
development may occur. 

Inter-American studies need almost every- 
where in Latin America to be developed, es- 
pecially now that economic unification is specifi- 
cally foreseen. In universities in the United 
States, Latin American studies is a standard 
field for teaching and research, and President 
Johnson promised his colleagues at Punta del 
Este that he would seek further enlargement of 
university work here in this sector. 

But for the future we all want, we must make 
sure that scholarly study and teaching of inter- 
American relations is truly a hemispherewide 
matter and not one confined to the United States. 

University development along the lines that I 
have described should not be delayed until the 
country has "taken off" in the economic sense, 
thus being able to support the improvements 
needed out of increased social capital. Many of 
these should come sooner by additions to univer- 
sity operating budgets to support properly 
planned changes in teaching, curriculum, li- 
braries, and research. 

After some years as a universitarian, I know 
how delicate and difficult university changes in- 
volving faculty and courses can be. They will be 
so in Latin America, in part because in some 
quarters there is satisfaction with present ways 
of doing things. But every day there are more 
intelligent Latin Americans coming to see that 
their universities must be modernized as to the 
substance of what they teach and how they teach 
it. In such a delicate area as this, a bilateral ap- 
proach is not as promising as a transnational 
one, provided that the latter is vigorous, scien- 
tific, and effective. We must, all of us, look 
around for the right institution or institutions 
to spearhead the important work of university 
substantive modernization ; and if we do not find 
it, or them, among our existing hemispheric 
agencies, we must create one adequate to the 

Latin America cannot modernize demo- 
cratically without modernized political leaders, 
administrators, businessmen. And the mod- 
ernization of men should be mainly a national 
and regional process, not one that relies too 
heavily on sending the leaders-to-be off to the 
United States or Europe to be educated, valu- 
able though such experiences are. One danger 

of the latter course is that he might not come 
home — the "brain drain" problem. Another is 
that he will not have lived through — grown up 
intellectually with — the change of his own 
counti-j' and thus be too remote from change 
underway when his generation assumes leader- 

Spirit and Purpose of the Alliance 

As President Johnson has pointed out, there 
is no exact science of development yet. All of us 
in the Americas are learning development on 
the job. We have learned that hemispheric de- 
velopment is not a short-term matter, and our 
plans and policies have now recognized that it 
is not. We know that the Alliance, although it 
springs from past development operations else- 
where, has a highly differentiated spirit and 
purpose — very special neighborhood character- 
istics — of its own. In this country, our apprecia- 
tion of the special nature of the AlimiBa is 
visible m the broad, bipartisan support the pro- 
gram has always had from Congress. Again, a 
welcome and significant development was the 
addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966 
of a section known as title IX, which directs 
that, as to the Alliance for Progress, "emphasis 
shall be placed on assuring maximum participa- 
tion in the task of economic development on the 
part of the people of developing countries. . . ." 

As we enter a new phase of the Alliance for 
Progress, the spirit and mood of inter- American 
affairs is encouraging, exciting, and challenging. 
The Presidents of America at Punta del Este 
laid out a wide-ranging but specific program 
of action, based on careful factual studies that 
required many months and high and dedicated 

All of us recognize, especially following the 
meeting of Presidents, that the burden of solv- 
ing these problems falls mainly upon the Latin 
Americans themselves. The helping hand that 
we of the United States can and do offer rep- 
resents only a small part of the effort required 
of the hemisphere if we are to move forward to- 
gether toward the ultimate Alliance for Prog- 
ress goal of bringmg a better life to all the peo- 
ples of the Americas. 

Throughout the Americas there is renewed ac- 
tivity, new confidence. Many and difficult are the 
tasks ahead of us. The war on poverty and un- 
derdevelopment in the neighborhood is not yet 
won. But the strategy for victory has been given 



to us by our Presidents. The challenge of great 
opportunity is before us. Let us all give in our 
respective ways the best we have to give. 

As I approach my new role in a Great Em- 
prise, I recall great words from a towering 
American figure, Justice Louis D. Brandeis: 
"If we would guide by the light of Keason, we 
must let our minds be bold." 

IJC Issues Report on Improvement 
of Champlain Waterway 

Press release 155 dated July 7 

The Department of State announced on July 
7 that the United States Government is giving 
active consideration to the observations and 
recommendations contained in the report on 
"Improvement of International Champlain 
Waterway for Commercial Navigation" pre- 
pared by the International Joint Commission, 
United States-Canada. The report was released 
by the Commission on July 7. 

The report of the Commission finds that the 
construction of an improved waterway from 
the St. Lawrence Eiver in Canada through Lake 
Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany, 
N.Y., would present no insurmomitable engi- 
neering problems. 

On the other hand, the Commission found 
that the development of such an improved 
waterway for purposes of commercial naviga- 
tion is not economically feasible. 

Because of the wide disparity between the 
benefits and costs of improving the waterway 
for commercial navigation, the Commission be- 
lieves no further studies of this project are 

The Commission also recommended that the 
United States and Canadian Governments "pur- 
sue policies designed to preserve and enhance 
the natural beauty, the water quality and the 
recreational potential of the Champlain-Riche- 
lieu area." The Water Resources Council, es- 
tablished under the Water Resources Planning 
Act of 1965, has underway an active program 
of comprehensive water and related land re- 
sources planning, including the United States 
portion of Lake Champlain and adjacent 
United States areas. This study will undoubt- 
edly address itself to this reconmaendation. 

The Commission noted that the best route 
for a canal requiring only minimum improve- 
ment would be along the existing waterway. 
The most practicable route for a modern barge 
canal or deep-draft ship channel would be along 
the existing waterway in the United States, the 
Richelieu River in Canada to the vicinity of 
St. Jean, and then by a direct overland route 
to La Prairie Basin. 

Copies of the Commission's report are avail- 
able at the offices of the United States Section 
of the International Joint Commission, 1711 
New York Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

90th Congress, 1st Session 

Collective Defense Treaties. Maps, texts of treaties, a 
chronology, status of forces agreements, and com- 
parative chart. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
April 10, 1967. 523 pp. [Committee print.] 

War or Peace in the Middle East? Report to the Sen- 
ate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator 
Joseph S. Clark on a study mission to Greece, the 
United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Israel. April 10, 
1967.22 pp. [Committee print] 

Encouraging Private Participation in International 
Activities. Hearings before the Subcommittee on In- 
ternational Organizations and Movements of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7484. 
Part I, Testimony of Members of Congress. April 18 
and 20, 1967. 85 pp. 

The United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma. Report to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Sen- 
ator Clifford P. Case, member of the U.S. delegation 
to the 21st U.N. General Assembly. April 1967. 37 pp. 
[Committee print.] 

The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round. 
Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic 
Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
May i, 1967. IS pp. [Subcommittee print] 

Expansion of Livestock Exports. Report of the Senate 
Select Committee on Small Business on Potentials 
and Problems of Expanding Trade in U.S. Quality 
Meat Products Together With Additional Views. S. 
Rept 343. June 12, 1967. 43 pp. 

U.S. Committee for the International Human Rights 
Tear. Report to accompany S. 990. S. Rept 344. Jtme 
13, 1967. 5 pp. 

Modern Communications and Foreign Policy. Report 
No. 5 of the Subcommittee on International Orga- 
nizations and Movements of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, together with hearings before the 
subcommittee February 8-9, 1967, part X, "Winning 
the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive." 
H. Rept. 362. June 13, 1967. 240 pp. 

JULY 24, 19CT 



U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and Status of Jerusalem; 
Rejects Other Resolutions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis 

Following are statements made on July 3 and 
Jj. l)y U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldierg 
during the fifth emergency special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly, together with the texts 
of resolutio-ns on ^^humanitarian assistance" and 
'■''measures taken hy Israel to change the status 
of the City of Jerusalem" which tcere adopted 
hy the Assembly on July }^. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 117, Corr. 1 

As we approach a vote on the pending resolu- 
tions, this General Assembly can have but one 
overriding purpose in the spirit of our common 
charter: a stable, enduring, and just peace in 
the Middle East. 

Wliat must be done to achieve this purpose 
of peace? The essential steps, as my Govern- 
ment sees them, can be suimned up in 10 points : 

1. Without delay, armed forces should be dis- 
engaged and withdrawn to their own ter- 
ritories; and without delay, any claims to a 
state of war or belligerency should be 

2. The right of every member of the United 
Nations in the area to maintain an independ- 
ent national state of its own and to live in peace 
should be respected by every other member. 

3. The territorial integrity and political in- 
dependence of all the states in the area should 
be respected and assured by appropriate 

4. Vital security interests of all states in the 
area should be protected. 

5. All states in the area should refrain in 
their mutual relations from the threat or use 
of force in any manner whatsoever. 

6. The rights of all nations to freedom of 

navigation and of innocent passage through in- 
ternational waterways should be respected. 

7. A just and permanent settlement of the 
refugee problems should be conchided. 

8. The development of national economies 
and the improvement of the living standards 
of the jieople should take precedence over a 
wasteful arms race in the area. 

9. The safeguarding of the holy places, and 
freedom of access to them for all, should be in- 
ternationally guaranteed; and the status of 
Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided 
not unilaterally but in consultation with all 

10. International arrangements should be 
made to help the parties achieve all these re- 
sults, including appropriate assistance from the 
United Nations or other thii'd parties. 

U.S. Position on Pending Resolutions 

It is in the light of these views that we have 
decided the position of the United States on 
the two major resolutions which are about to 
come to a vote. I wish to state that position ex- 
plicitly and our reasons for it. 

The United States will vote for the resolu- 
tion presented by the 19 Latin American 

The United States will vote against the res- 
olution presented by Yugoslavia and 16 other 

A basic diiference exists between these two 
resolutions — a difference which no embellish- 
ments or details can obscure. 

The Yugoslav text proposes to deal with the 
problem of peace and security in the Middle 
East by calling basically for one fundamental 

' U.N. doc. A/L. 523/Rev. 1. 

" U.N. doc. A/L. 522/Rev. 3/Corr. 1. 



action : the witlulruwal of Israel's forces "to the 
positions they held prior to 5 June 1967." It 
leaves untouched the other half of the problem 
which must be immediately addressed if the de- 
mands of the charter are to be satisfied : namely, 
the persistent claim by certain members of this 
organization of the right to annihilate another 
member. This claim, which directly affronts the 
charter and every sense of fairness, is to be left 
imimpaired — and those who assert it are to be 
left free, at a time of their own choosing, to 
make good on it by force. 

Indeed, the Yugoslav text contains no clear 
provision to deal with any of the longstanding 
grievances and causes of conflict which have 
kept the Middle East in a fever of tension for 
20 years. 

Let me emphasize that the successive revi- 
sions of paragi-aph 6 in the Yugoslav draft have 
not cured the basic defects of this resolution. 
Paragraph 1, concerning withdrawal, could not 
be more clear and definite. Paragraph 6, con- 
cerning "all aspects of the situation'* is vague 
in the extreme. 

The effect of this Yugoslav text, as revised, 
is obvious. It calls for withdrawal now, and 
every other essential step is left to the uncertain 
future. In particular it makes no connection 
whatever between withdrawal and the end of 
claims of belligerency — claims which are among 
the leading causes of all of the troubles of the 

The Latin American text, on the other hand, 
treats at one and the same time both of the most 
vital necessities of peace. Its first paragraph 
combines, on an equal basis, the withdrawal of 
Israel's forces with the ending of all claims to 
a state of belligerency and with efforts to create 
"conditions of coexistence based on good neigh- 
bourliness." It recognizes that we face a situa- 
tion whose two aspects are interdependent, that 
neither aspect can be solved in isolation from 
the other. 

Certainly any fair and meaningful reading 
of our charter must lead to the same conclusion. 
If the charter is to be invoked — as indeed it 
must — to require withdrawal of troops in the 
name of territorial integrity, then surely it 
must be invoked also — and equally and at the 
same time — to require an end to claims of the 
right to wage war. 

Unless the governments in the area are pre- 
pared to refrain from these totally unfounded 
claims of belligerency, there obviously can be no 

peace. Cooperation to assure troop disengage- 
ment and withdrawal — and the other essentials 
of peace — must by definition be a two-way 
street. The Assembly can hardly endorse a for- 
mula in which one side is free to assert that 
there is a state of war and the other side is 
asked to behave as if there were not. 

A choice must be made between the claims of 
war and the claims of peace. 

Of all the claims of peace, none is more fun- 
damental, as every member of this Assembly 
must recognize, than the right of a sovereign 
state, a member of the United Nations, to have 
its existence and its independence respected. In 
no other case in the history of the United Na- 
tions have members of this organization failed 
to accord this elemental right to another 

This right has been the subject of important 
statements during this debate from a wide 
range of speakers. On June 19, in fact, in the 
opening statement of the debate, we heard 
Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union de- 
clare, as "one of the fundamental principles" of 
his country's policy, that "every people enjoys 
the right to establish an independent national 
state of its own." We do not see this point re- 
ferred to in the Yugoslav resolution. 

Again, at our very last meeting on Friday, 
we heard the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Dr. 
[Hector] Luisi, declare among the first condi- 
tions of peace "the recognition by the parties 
to this dispute of the irrevocability of their ex- 
istence as sovereign states." We do not see this 
point either in the Yugoslav resolution. 

In fact, we can search the Yugoslav text 
from start to finish without finding any words 
about respect for the elemental right of national 
existence, the absence of which is the very bot- 
tom of the trouble in the Middle East. Instead, 
we find vague references to legal and political 
problems and charter principles to be consid- 
ered at some time in the future. And this fuzzy 
treatment stands in strong contrast to the Yu- 
goslav resolution's clear and concrete call for 
immediate withdrawal of Israel's troops to the 
positions held before June 5. That withdrawal, 
if it could be brought about at all under such 
conditions, can scarcely bring more than a pause 
between rounds in this long and terrible conflict. 

In candor let me say that we of the United 
States, and no doubt many others, would have 
preferred a still clearer and more explicit state- 
ment on the right of national existence than that 

JULY 24, 1967 


which appears in the Latin American text. But 
our careful reading of that text has led us to 
conclude that its urgent call for an end to claims 
of belligerency, and the other provisions of 
paragraph 1 (b), clearly comprehend respect 
for national existence and constitute a major 
step in the right direction. This is one of our 
reasons for supporting the Latin American 
draft and for finding it infinitely preferable 
to the Yugoslav draft. 

There are other reasons also for this prefer- 
ence. Tlie Latin American text ofl'ers concrete 
guidelines for dealing with many of the other 
essentials of peace in the Middle East. More- 
over, it deals with just grievances on both 
sides — and there have been just grievances on 
both sides. Unfortunately, neither of these 
claims can be made for the Yugoslav draft. 

Reasons for U.S. Preference 

Let me specify our grounds for this 
evaluation : 

— On the refugee problem, the Latin Ameri- 
can text calls unambiguously for "an appro- 
priate and full solution of the problem of the 
refugees." My Government has taken the view 
that a fair and lasting solution of the refugee 
question is vitally necessary. Indeed, it has been 
made all the more urgent by the events of recent 
weeks. Yet the sole allusion to this problem in 
the Yugoslav text is in the single abstract word 

— On international maritime rights, the 
Latm American text calls for a guarantee of 
"freedom of transit on the international water- 
ways in the region." This problem is not men- 
tioned in the Yugoslav text. And yet it was this 
veiy problem that provided the spark which 
led directly to the explosion of Jime 5. Mr. 
President, wliy do the sponsors of this resolu- 
tion glide over this vital issue with vague, 
evasive words and with corridor hints about a 
possible willingness to deal with the matter? 
On this crucial issue, involving not only the 
states immediately concerned but also vital 
international rights, the Yugoslav text is 
altogether deficient. 

■ — On the question of Jerusalem, again the 
Latin American text contains explicit lan- 
guage whereas the Yugoslav text is silent. Tlie 
United States view on this subject has been 
stated at the highest levels of our Government 
in the past few days ' and is reflected in the 10 

points which I listed at the outset of this state- 
ment. In particular, the United States does not 
recognize the recent administrative action 
taken by Israel as determining the future of 
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in 
relation to them. We do not recognize unilateral 
actions in this connection. With regard to the 
provision on Jerusalem in the Latin American 
text, our support is against the background of 
tliis policy. 

— On security arrangements, the Latin 
American text calls for measui-es to guarantee 
the territorial integrity and political inde- 
pendence of the states of the region. Among 
these measures, it specifies the establisliment of 
demilitarized zones and aai appropriate United 
Nations presence. But the Yugoslav text con- 
tains nothing more on this subject than a refer- 
ence to the existing UNTSO [United Nations 
Truce Supervision Organization] machineiy. 
UNTSO has performed, and is still perform- 
ing, a valiant service. But surely we all recog- 
nize, and the Secretary- General himself has 
reported, that the removal of a still more sub- 
stantial United Nations presence — the United 
Nations Emergency Force — created, in the 
Secretary-General's words, "a new situation." 
The situation was altered still further by the 
recent hostilities. It is a situation which 
UNTSO with its present resources and struc- 
ture carmot adequately manage. 

Finally, on the tasks of the Security Coun- 
cil, the Latin American draft makes concrete 
recommendations concerning all of the points 
I have mentioned. But the Yugoslav text con- 
fines its recommendations to the broadest 

Arms Limitation a Major Issue 

Although, for all these reasons, we find the 
Latin American text acceptable and the Yugo- 
slav text unacceptable, I must express regret 
that neither of these resolutions touches on the 
major issue of arms limitations in the Middle 
East. This issue has been discussed during this 
debate by a number of speakers, including those 
of the Soviet Union and the United States. On 
June 19 we listened with interest to Chairman 
Kosygin when he warned that nations of the 
Middle East, "in order to enhance their secu- 

° For statements released on June 28 by the White 
House and the Department of State, see Bulletin of 
July 17, 1967, p. 64. 



rity . . . may embark on the jjath of an arms 
buildup and increase their military budg- 
ets. . . . Those who cherish peace cannot and 
must not allow events to take this course." 

This statement was very much in our minds 
when my Government stated here the next day, 
June 20,* that "peace in the Middle East re- 
quires steps to avert the dangers inherent in a 
renewed arms race. . . . The responsibility for 
such steps rests not only on those in the area 
but also upon the larger states outside the area." 
And we proposed in our own draft resolution,^ 
as a first step in discharging this responsibility, 
a system of "registration and limitation of arms 
shipments into the area." 

We i-emain very much interested in exploring 
this concept, not in order to crystallize any 
military imbalance in the area but rather to 
maintain a balance at the lowest possible se- 
curity level. Our aim is twofold: that this 
source of danger shall be controlled and that 
scarce resources shall be devoted to a better 
cause than armaments — the technical and eco- 
nomic progress of the peoples of the Middle 

The Refugee Problem 

Mr. President, I now wish to cormnent briefly 
on one specific aspect of the situation in the 
Middle East : We have before us, in addition to 
the draft resolutions I have discussed, another 
draft resolution ® submitted by Sweden and 
several cosponsors dealing with the refugee 
problem. Indeed, no task is more urgent than 
to bind up the wounds of war, to find shelter for 
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medicine 
for the sick. 

To this end the United States supported in 
the Security Comicil the resolution put f orwa,rd 
by Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia, which the 
Council unanimously adopted on June 14.^ To 
the same end we now strongly support the draft 
resolution presented by Sweden and other mem- 
bers, which is now before the Assembly. 

Last week the United States Government al- 
located $5 million to help meet the urgent needs 
of this situation, and from tliis siun we are 
making a special contribution to UNRWA 

* Ibid., July 10, 1967, p. 49. 

Tor text of the U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc. 
A/L. .520), see tfiirf., p. 51. 
° U.N. doc. A/L. .526 and Add. 1-3. 
' For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 11. 

[United Nations Eelief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East] to help 
finance its operations in the immediate future.* 
There have been reports of the movement of 
civilians from their homes — many of them refu- 
gees from earlier conflicts. We have heard these 
reports with much concern. All civilians in the 
area affected should be assured of their safety, 
welfare, and security in the same locations in 
which they resided before hostilities began. We 
welcome the assurances recently given and hope 
that they will be implemented with regard to 
the population of the West Bank of Jordan and 
that they be encouraged to remain in their 
homes or return to them. We welcome the news 
that a representative of the Secretary-General 
is now to go to the area, and we urge all con- 
cerned, particularly the Goverament of Israel, 
to give him the fullest cooperation. 

The Key Question Before the United Nations 

In conclusion, Mr. President, I return to the 
major choice which faces this Assembly. It is 
the key question before us. It is a choice between 
a tragic past and a better future. In the Yugo- 
slav resolution we are asked to return the situa- 
tion to where it stood on the eve of conflict ; and 
only in some indefinite future would we try 
again to cope with underlying causes, including 
the claimed right to do away with a sovereign 
state by armed foi'ce. This proposal cannot lead 
toward peace but only toward more trouble and 
danger. It is unconstructive, and it should be 

In the Latin American resolution we are 
asked to deal forthrightly with the great ob- 
stacles to peace : above all and first of all, with 
the withdrawal of Israel's forces and with the 
need for all states in the area, all members of 
the United Nations, to respect each other's right 
to live in peace. 

The Latin American text treats at one and the 
same time both of the most vital necessities of 
peace. Its first paragraph combines on an equal 
basis the withdrawal of Israel's forces with the 
ending of all claims to a state of belligerency 
and with efforts to create conditions of coexist- 
ence based on good neighborliness. It recognizes 
that we face a situation whose two aspects are 
interdependent and that neither aspect can be 
solved in isolation from the other. 

' For background, see ibid., July 17, 1967, p. 64. 

JULY 24, 1967 


Peace is worth sacrifices, and all must sacri- 
fice for it. In the wake of conflict there must be 
readiness on both sides to acknowledge the 
rights and feelings of others. There must be a 
willingness to refrain from pressing temporary 
advantages and to take a long-range view. 
There must be an end to malice, to bitter 
thoughts of revenge, to vain threats to end the 
life of other nations. There must be, on every 
side, a willingness to accept at long last, and 
act upon, the admonition in our common char- 
ter : "to practice tolerance and live together in 
peace with one another as good neighbors." 

Thousands of years ago it was written: 
""VVliere there is no vision, the people perish." 
Let us in this Assembly, in what we decide here, 
offer to the suffering peoples of the Middle East 
a new vision of peace, a vision by which all can 
live in peace and security.^ 


U.S. /U.N. press release 118 

The United States abstained on the six-power 
resolution dealing with the city of Jerusalem 
contained in document A/L.527/Eev. 1. 

Insofar as the six-power resolution expresses 

" The Assembly had before it five draft resolutions 
submitted by the United States, the U.S.S.R., Albania, 
Yugoslavia, and a group of Latin American nations. 
The United States did not press its draft resolution 
(A/L.520) to a vote, having decided to support the 
Latin American draft resolution. On July 4 the As- 
sembly voted on the remaining four resolutions, as fol- 
lows : 

The U.S.S.R. draft resolution (A/L.519), which 
called for condemnation of "Israel's aggressive ac- 
tivities" and for withdrawal of Israeli forces "to posi- 
tions behind the armistice demarcation lines," was put 
to a vote paragraph by paragraph, and all parts were 

The Albanian draft resolution (A/L.521), which 
called for condemnation of Israel for "its armed ag- 
gression" and for condemnation of the United States 
and the United Kingdom for "their incitement, aid and 
direct participation in this aggression," was rejected 
by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 22, with 27 abstentions. 

The Yugoslav draft resolution ( A/L.522/Rev.3/Corr. 
1) obtained 53 votes to 46 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions, 
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re- 
quired two-thirds majority. 

The Latin American draft resolution ( A/L.523/Rev. 
1) obtained 57 votes (U.S.) to 43, with 20 abstentions, 
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re- 
quired two-thirds majority. 

the sense of the General Assembly that no uni- 
lateral action should be taken that might preju- 
dice the future of Jerusalem, the United States 
is in agreement. We were prepared to support a 
resolution to this effect. Some, if not all, of the 
sponsors were aware that tlie United States 
made a serious effort to get such a change in- 
corporated in the resolution in the hope that we 
would be able to vote affirmatively. Regrettably, 
our suggested change was not accej)ted. 

The views of the United States on the situa- 
tion involving Jerusalem are contained in three 
recent statements. On June 28, in a statement 
issued by the White House on behalf of the 
President, the United States expressed the view 
that there "must be adequate recognition of the 
special interest of three great religions in the 
holy places of Jerusalem." On the same day the 
Department of State said the following: "The 
United States has never recognized . . . unilat- 
eral actions by any of the states in the area as 
governing the international status of Jerusa- 
lem." I reiterated in the Greneral Assembly yes- 
terday: that the "safeguarding of the holy 
places and freedom of access to them for all 
should be internationally guaranteed; and the 
status of Jerusalem in relation to them should 
be decided not imilaterally but in consultation 
with all concerned." 

These statements reflect the considered views 
and serious concern of the United States Gov- 
ernment about the situation in Jerusalem. 


Humanitarian assistance 

The General Assembly, 

Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering 
inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a re- 
sult of the recent hostilities in the Middle East, 

1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Coun- 
cil resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby 
the Council : 

(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil 
populations and the prisoners of war in the area 
of conflict in the Middle East additional .sufferings ; 

(6) Con.sidered that essential and inalienable human 
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes 
of war ; 

(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 

"° U.N. doc. A/RES/2252 ( ES-V ) /Corr.l ( A/L.526 and 
Add. 1-3) ; adopted on July 4 by a vote of 116 (U.S.) to 
0, with 2 abstentions. 



War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the 
parties involved in the conflict ; 

(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure 
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of 
the areas where military operations had taken place 
and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who 
had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ; 

( c) Recommended to the Governments concerned the 
scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles gov- 
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro- 
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ; 

(/) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the 
effective implementation of the resolution and to report 
to the Security Council ; 

2. Notes with gratitude and satisfaction and en- 
dorses the appeal made by the President of the Gen- 
eral Assembly on 26 June 1967 ; 

3. Notes tcith gratification the work undertaken by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary or- 
ganizations to provide humanitarian assistance to 
civilians ; 

4. Notes further with gratification the assistance 
which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing 
to women and children in the area ; 

5. Commends the Commissioner-General of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue 
the activities of the Agency in the present situation 
with respect to all persons coming within his mandate ; 

6. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of the 
above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the ef- 
forts of the Commissioner-General of the United Na- 
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, 
as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a 
temporary measure, to other persons in the area who 
are at present displaced and are in serious need of 
immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostili- 

7. Welcomes the close co-operation of the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East and the other organiza- 
tions concerned for the purpose of co-ordinating 
assistance ; 

8. Calls upon all the Member States concerned to 
facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in 
which assistance is being rendered ; 

9. Appeals to all Governments, as well as organiza- 
tions and individuals, to make .special contributions 
for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East, as well as to the other inter-governmental and 
non-governmental organizations concerned ; 

10. Requests the Secretary -General, in consultation 
with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East, to report urgently to the General As- 
sembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and 
6 above ; 

11. Further requests the Secretary-General to fol- 
low the effective implementation of the present resolu- 
tion and to report thereon to the General Assembly. 


Measures taken hy Israel to change the status of the 
City of Jerusalem 

The General AssemMy, 

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in 
.lerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel 
to change the status of the City, 

1. Considers that these measures are invalid ; 

2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already 
taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action 
which would alter the status of Jerusalem ; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
General Assembly and the Security Council on the 
situation and on the implementation of the present 
resolution not later than one week from its adoption. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na- 
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated April 4 from the representative of the 
U.S.S.R. transmitting a memorandum of the U.S.S.R. 
Government concerning "United Nations Operations 
for the Maintenance of International Peace and Se- 
curity." S/7841. April 5, 1967. 9 pp. 

Reports by the Secretary-General on the situation in 
the Near East. S/7S96 ; May 19, 1967 ; 6 pp. S/7906 ; 
May 26, 1967 ; 6 pp. 

Supplemental information received by the Secretary- 
General concerning the Near East and the status of 
the United Nations Emergency Force. S/7930. June 
5, 1967. 6 pp. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

Information furnished by the United States on ob- 
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.lOo/INF. 
1.52-154, March 31, 1967; A/AC.lO.o/INF.1.55-159, 
April 3, 1967; A/AC.105/INF.162-163, May 29, 
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. on objects 
launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.160. 
April 12, 1967. 
Budget Performance of the United Nations for the Fi- 
nancial Year 1966. Report of the Secretary-General. 
A/6666. April 7, 1967. 39 pp. 
Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Emergency Force. A/6669. May 18, 1967. 
10 pp. 

"U.N. doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V) (A/L.527/Rev. 1) ; 
adopted on July 4 by a vote of 99 to 0, with 20 absten- 
tions (U.S.). 




Pakistan to the United States effected by an ex- 
change of notes dated November 21, 19C6. 1 con- 

U.S. and Pakistan Conclude 
New Cotton Textile Agreement 


Tlie Department of State amiounced on July 
3 (press release 153) that diplomatic notes were 
exchanged at Washington on that day consti- 
tuting a new bilateral cotton textile agreement 
between Pakistan and the United States. The 
agreement replaces the cotton textile agreement 
signed at Rawalpindi on November 21, 1966.^ It 
is based on the undei'standing that the protocol 
extending the Long-Term Arrangement ^ on in- 
ternational trade in cotton textiles through 
September 30, 1970, will enter into force be- 
tween Pakistan and the United States on Octo- 
ber 1, 1967. 

Most of the provisions of the new agreement, 
except for the levels, are identical to those in 
the 1966 agreement it replaces. A new provision 
concerning the identification of cotton textiles 
is added, and a provision allowing 5 percent 
carryover of shortfalls is also included. 


JuLT 3, 1967 
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to 
the decision of the Cotton Textiles Committee 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
approving a Protocol to extend through Sep- 
tember 30, 1970, the Long-Term Arrangement 
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex- 
tiles, done in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (here- 
inafter referred to as "the Long-Term Arrange- 
ment"). I also refer to recent discussions be- 
tween representatives of our two Governments 
and to the agreements between our two Govern- 
ments concerning exports of cotton textiles from 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6153 ; 
for text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1966, p. 938. 

' For text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see ibid., 
Mar. 12, 1062, p. 431. 

'Annexes A and B to the U.S. note are not printed 
here; for texts, see press release 153 dated July 3. 

firm on behalf of my Government, the under- 
standing that the 1966 agreement is replaced 
with the following agreement. This agreement 
is based on our understanding that the above- 
mentioned Protocol will enter into force for 
our two Goverimients on October 1, 1967. 

1. The term of this agreement shall be from 
July 1, 1966 through June 30, 1970. During the 
term of this agreement, annual exports of cot- 
ton textiles from Pakistan to the United States 
shall be limited to aggregate, group and specific 
limits at the levels specified in the following 
paragraphs. It is noted that these levels reflect 
a special adjustment for the first agreement 
year. The levels set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4 for the second agreement year are 5% 
higher than the limits for the preceding year 
without this special adjustment; thus the 
growth factor provided for in paragraph 6 has 
already been applied m arriving at these levels 
for the second agreement year. 

2. For the first agreement year, constituting 
the 12-month period beginning July 1, 1966, 
the aggregate limit shall be 57.5 million square 
yards equivalent. For the second agreement 
year, the aggregate limit shall be 68.25 million 
square yards equivalent. 

3. Within the aggregate limit, the foUowmg 
group limits shall apply for the first and second 
agreement years, respectively : 


I (Categories 1-27) 
II (Categories 28-64) 

First Agreement Second Agree' 
Year merU Year 

(i7i 5yds. equivalent) 

50, 225, 000 59, 74,5, 000 
7, 275, 000 S, 505, 000 

4. Within the aggregate limit and the appli- 
cable group limits, the following specific limits 
shall apply for the first and second agreement 
years : 

Group I 


Category 9 (Sheeting, 

Category 15 (Poplin & 

broadcloth, carded) 
Print Cloth (Categories 

18, 19 and parts of 

Category 26)* 
Category 22 (Twill 

and Sateen) 
Barkcloth Type 

Fabrics (Parts of 

Category 26)* 
Duck (Parts of 

Category 26) 

First Second 

Agreement Agreement 

Year Year 

{in syds. equivalent) 

24, 375, 000 29, 925, 000 

2, 125, 000 2, 625, 000 

10, 000, 000 10, 500, 000 

2, 350, 000 

3, 125, 000 

6, 250, 000 
2, 000, 000 

3, 570, 000 
3, 675, 000 

7, 350, 000 
2, 100, 000 



Group II 


First Agreement Year 


Square Yards 

Shop Towels (Part of 

Cfategory 31) 
T Shirts (Categories 

41 and 42) 

3, 900, 000 pes. 
270, 735 doz. 

1, 357, 200 
1, 958, 497 
3, 959, 303 

Sectmd Agreement Year 


Square Yards 

Shop Towels (Part of 

Category 31) 
T Shirts (Categories 

41 and 42) 

4, 095, 000 pes. 
349, 589 doz. 

1, 425, 060 

2, 528, 926 
4, 551, 014 

5. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for 
Group I may be exceeded by not more than 10 
percent and the limit for Group II may be ex- 
ceeded by not more than 5 percent. Within the 
applicable group limit, as it may be adjusted 
under this provision, specific limits may be ex- 
ceeded by not more than 5 percent. 

6. In succeeding 12-month periods for which 
any limitation is in force under this agreement, 
the level of exports permitted under such limi- 
tation shall be increased by 5 pei'cent of the cor- 
responding level for the preceding 12-month 
period, the latter level not to include any ad- 
justments under paragraphs 5 or 14. 

7. In the event of undue concentration in ex- 
ports from Pakistan to the United States of 
cotton textiles in any category not given a spe- 
cific limit, the Government of the United States 
of America may request consultation with the 
Government of Pakistan to determine an ap- 
propriate course of action. Until a mutually sat- 
isfactory solution is reached, exports in the 
category in question from Pakistan to the 
United States starting with the 12-montli pe- 
riod beginning on the date of the request for 
consultation shall be limited. The limit shall be 
105 percent of the exports of such products from 
Pakistan to the United States durmg the most 
recent 12-month period pi'eceding the request 
for consultation and for which statistics are 
available to our two Governments. 

8. The Govenmient of Pakistan shall use its 
best efforts to space exports from Pakistan to 
the United States within each category evenly 
throughout the agreement year, taking into con- 
sideration normal seasonal factors. 

*Print Cloth and Bark Cloth type fabrics are further 
described in Annex A. [Footnote in original.] 

**These "other" categories are not subject to specific 
limits. Hence, within the aggregate and the applicable 
group limits, as they may be adjusted under paragraph 
5, the square yard equivalent of shortfalls in exports in 
categories with specific limits may be used in these 
"other" categories subject to the provisions of para- 
graph 7. [Footnote in original.] 

9. The two Governments recognize that the 
successful implementation of this agreement 
depends in large part upon mutual cooperation 
on statistical questions. The Government of the 
United States of America shall promptly sup- 
ply the Government of Pakistan with data on 
montlily imports of cotton textiles from Paki- 
stan. The Government of Pakistan shall 
promptly supply the Government of the United 
States of America with data on montlily ex- 
ports of cotton textiles to the United States. 
Each government agrees to supply promptly 
any other available relevant statistical data re- 
quested by the other government. 

10. In the implementation of tliis agreement, 
the system of categories and the rates of con- 
version into square yard equivalents listed in 
Annex B hereto shall apply. In any situation 
where the determination of an article to be a 
cotton textile would be affected by whether the 
criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long- 
Term Arrangement is used or the criterion pro- 
vided for in paragraph 2 of Amiex E of the 
Long-Term Arrangement is used, the chief 
value criterion used by the Government of the 
United States of America in accordance with 
paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply. 

11. The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Pakistan agree 
to consult on any question arising in the imple- 
mentation of the agi'eement. 

12. Mutually satisfactory administrative ar- 
rangements or adjustments may be made to re- 
solve minor problems arising m the implemen- 
tation of this agi-eement including differences 
in points of procedure or operation. 

13. If the Government of Pakistan considers 
that as a result of limitations specified in this 
agreement, Pakistan is being placed in an in- 
equitable position vis-a-vis a third comitry, the 
Govenunent of Pakistan may request consulta- 
tion with the Government of the United States 
of America with the view to taking appropriate 
remedial action such as a reasonable modifica- 
tion of this agreement. 

14. (a) For any agreement year immediately 
following a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in 
wliich cotton textile exports fi-om Pakistan to 
the United States were below the aggi-egate 
limit and any group and specific limits appli- 
cable to the category concerned) the Govern- 
ment of Pakistan may permit exports to exceed 
these limits by carryover in the following 
amounts and maimer: 

(i) The carryover shall not exceed the 

JTJLT 24, 1967 


amount of the shortfall in either the aggregate 
limit or any applicable group or specific limit 
and shall not exceed either 5% of the aggregate 
limit or 5% of the applicable group limit in the 
year of the shortfall, and 

(ii) In the case of shortfalls in the categories 
subject to specific limits tlie cari-yover shall 
not exceed 5% of the specific limit in the year 
of the shortfall, and shall be used in the same 
category in which the shortfall occurred, and 

(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attribut- 
able to categories subject to specific limits, the 
carryover shall be used in the same group in 
which the shortfall occurred, shall not be used 
to exceed any applicable specific limit except in 
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5, 
and shall not be used to exceed the limits in 
paragraph 7 of the agreement. 

(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph 
(a) of this paragraph are without any adjust- 
ments under this paragi'aph or paragraph 5. 

(c) The canyover shall be in addition to the 
exports pennitted in paragraph 5. 

15. During the term of this agreement, the 
Government of the United States of America 
will not request r&straint on the export of cotton 
textiles from Pakistan to the United States 
mider the procedures of Article 3 of the Long- 
Term Arrangement. The applicability of the 
Long-Term Arrangement to trade in cotton 
textiles between Pakistan and the United States 
shall otherwise be unaffected by this agree- 

16. The Government of the United States 
of America may assist the Government of 
Pakistan in implementing the limitation pro- 
visions of this agreement by controlling the 
imports of cotton textiles covered by the agree- 
ment initil agreement is reached that Pakistan 
will control these exports in accordance with 
the limitations of the agreement. 

17. Either government may terminate this 
agreement effective at the end of an agreement 
year by written notice to the other government 
to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of 
such agreement year. Either government may 
at any time propose revisions in the terms of 
this agreement. 

If the above conforms with the understand- 
ing of your Government, this note and your 
Excellency's note of confirmation * on behalf 
of the Government of Pakistan shall constitute 

an Agreement between our Governments. Ac- 
cept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my 
highest consideration. 

For the Secretary of State: 
Anthoxt M. Solomon 

His Excellency 
Agiia Hilalt, 
Ambassador of Pakistan. 

United States and Turkey Extend 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press rele:ise 151 dated July 3 

The United States and Turkey exchanged 
notes at Washington on June 30, extending 
without change the bilateral cotton textile 
agreement between the two countries signed at 
Washington on July 17, 1961^} The extension 
takes ejfect on July 1, 1967, and is valid through 
June 30, 1970. Following is the text of the 
United States note. 

June 30, 1967 

Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the 
cotton textile agreement between our two Gov- 
ernments effected by an exchange of notes dated 
July 17, 1964, and to recent discussions in 
Washington between representatives of our two 
Governments concerning exports of cotton tex- 
tiles from Turkey to the United States. 

As a result of these discussions I propose that 
the agreement be amended by changing "1967" 
in paragraph 7 to "1970". 

If this proposal is acceptable to the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Turkey, this note and 
your Excellency's note of acceptance - on behalf 
of the Govenmient of the Republic of Turkey 
shall constitute an amendment to the agreement 
between our Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances 
of my highest consideration. 

For the Secretary of State : 
Anthony M. Solomon 

His Excellency 

Meliii Esenbel 

Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey 

' Not printed here. 

'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5619; 
for text, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 293. 
' Not printetl here. 



Current Actions 



Convention on offenses and certain otlier acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Toljyo September 
14, 1963.' 
Signature: Netherlands, June 9, 1967. 


International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. 
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Notification that it does not consider itself hound: 
Barbados, May 25, 1967. 


Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 
1808, 4613). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.' 
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, June 15, 1967. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly December 21, 
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, June 9, 1967. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to chapter II of the international conven- 
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). 
Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London Novem- 
ber 30, 1966.' 

Acceptances deposited: France, June 6, 1967 ; Ice- 
land, May 15, 1967. 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United 
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20, 
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, June 15, 1967. 


1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 
1967, inclusive.' 

Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de- 
posited: Belgium (for Belgian-Luxembourg Eco- 
nomic Union), June 26, 1967. 
Ratification deposited: Korea, July 6, 1967. 



Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, sup- 
plementary to the agreement of February 20, 1967 
(TIAS 6221), under title I of the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended 
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D), 
with annex. Signed at New Delhi June 24, 1967. En- 
tered into force June 24, 1967. 

New Zealand 

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au- 
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op- 
erators of either country to operate their stations in 
the territory of the other. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Wellington June 21, 1967. Entered into force 
June 21, 1967. 


Agreement relating to the Special Fund for Education 
Textbook Production Project 1967-1968. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Manila June 26, 1967. Entered 
into force June 26, 1967. 

Agreement on the settlement of claims for pay and 
allowances of recognized Philippine guerrillas not 
previously paid in full and for erroneous deductions 
of advanced salary from the backpay of eligible 
Philippine veterans. Signed at Manila June 29, 1967. 
Entered into force June 29, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agreement of July 17, 1964 
(TIAS 5619), concerning trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 
30, 1967. Entered into force June 30, 1967. 


'Not in force. 

Recent Releases 

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C., S0402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders 
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, 1967 
(revised). Complete and official listing of foreign con- 
sular offices in the United States, together with their 
jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. De- 
partment and Foreign Service Series 128. 88 pp. 35<i'. 

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States 
(revised). Booklet for the information of men and 
women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the For- 
eign Service of the United States. Pub. 7924. Depart- 
ment and Foreign Service Series 132. 27 pp., illus. 35^. 

The Country Team: An Illustrated Profile of Our 
American Missions Abroad. A comprehensive descrii> 
tion of the work of American diplomatic and consular 
missions, including the activities of the Agency for In- 
ternational Development, the United States Informa- 
tion Agency, the Department of Defense, and other 
U.S. agencies operating overseas. Includes many exam- 
ples of the recent experiences of Foreign Service per- 
sonnel. Pub. 8193. Department and Foreign Service 
Series 136. 80 pp., illus. $1.00. 

Social Usage Abroad: A Guide for American Officials 
and Their Families. This publication is intended pri- 
marily to provide for members of the Foreign Service 
an understanding of the rules of protocol and official 
conduct. Pub. 8219. Department and Foreign Service 
Series 138. 23 pp. 25^. 

JULY 24, 1967 


Commitment for Progress: The Americas Plan for a 
Decade of Urgency. Illustrated pamptilet on the meet- 
ing of the Chiefs of State of the OAS nations at Punta 
del Bste, which includes the Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America, statements made by President John- 
son during the conference, and his Pan American Day 
proclamation. Pub. 8237. Inter-American Series 93. 40 
pp., illus. 30<!. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Washington January 27, 
1967. Entered into force January 27, 1967. Effective Oc- 
tober 1, 1966. TIAS 6214. 12 pp. 10<f. 

Cultural Relations. Agreement with Morocco — Signed 
at Washington February 10. 1967. Entered into force 
February 10, 1967. TIAS 6215. 6 pp. 5<J. 

Maritime Matters — Liability During Private Opera- 
tion of N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Greece. Ex- 
change of notes — Dated at Athens November 22, 1966, 
and January 12, 1967. Entered into force January 12, 
1967. TIAS 6216. 3 pp. 5<t. 

Fisheries — King Crab. Agreement with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of 
February 5, 1965 — Signed at Washington February 13, 
1967. Entered into force February 13, 1967. With ex- 
change of letters. TIAS 6217. 7 pp. 10<f. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Iran, amending the agreement of March 5, 
1957 — Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Entered into 
force January 26, 1967. TIAS 6219. 6 pp. 5«S. 

Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement 
with Mexico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico and 
Tlatelolco January 27 and 28, 1967. Entered into force 
January 28, 1967. TIAS 6220. 6 pp. 5(^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India — 
Signed at New Delhi February 20, 1967. Entered into 
force February 20, 1967. TIAS 6221. 14 pp. 10<f. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Ghana, sup- 
plementing the agreement of September 30, 1958. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Accra and Osn March 3, 
1967. Entered into force March 3, 1967. TIAS 6222. 3 
pp. 5<t. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Addi- 
tional agreement with the Netherlands. Exchange of 
notes— Signed at The Hague June 22, 1966. Entered 
into force February 28, 1967. Effective January 1, 1965. 
TIAS 6223. 6 pp. 5«!. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procfes- 
Verbal extending the declaration of November 18. 1962, 
as extended, on the provisional accession of the United 
Arab Republic to the General Agreement. Done at 
Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January 
18, 1967. TIAS 6225. 4 pp. 5(J. 

Status of the Korean Service Corps. Agreement with 
the Republic of Korea — Signed at Seoul February 23, 
1967. Entered into force March 10, 1967. With agreed 
understandings. TIAS 6226. 24 pp. 15^. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Lesotho^ 
Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967. Entered into force 
March 7, 1967. TIAS 6227. 3 pp. 5f 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Poland.. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 15, 
1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967. Effective 
March 1, 1967. TIAS 6228. 9 pp. 10<!. 


The Editor of the Bttlletin wishes to call 
attention to a printer's error in the IssTie of June 
12, 1967, p. 889. The first sentence in the para- 
graph beginning at the bottom of the first column 
should read : 

"The greatest disservice to that resolution, and 
to its effective implementation, would be for us 
to create an impression in South Africa and in 
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided 
on how these principles are to be achieved." 



INDEX Jvly 2^, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 11^5 

Canada. IJC Issues Report on Improvement of 
Champlain Waterway 107 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 
Foreign Policy 107 

Economic AEFairs 

IJC Issues Report on Improvement of Cham- 
plain Waterway 107 

Institution-Building and the Alliance for Prog- 
ress (Oliver) 102 

Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95 

U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile 
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114 

United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile 
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116 

Europe. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87 

Foreign Aid. Institution-Building and the Alli- 
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102 

Latin America. Institution-Building and the Alli- 
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102 

Near East 

The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87 
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and 
Status of Jerusalem ; Rejects Other Resolu- 
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis 
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108 

Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cot- 
ton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . 114 

Publications. Recent Releases 117 

Sweden. Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on 
Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper (tran- 
script) 91 

Trade. Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at 
Geneva 95 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 117 

Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95 
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile 

Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114 

United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile 

Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116 

Turkey. United States and Turkey Extend Cotton 

Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . . 116 

U.S.S.R. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 113 

U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and 
Status of Jerusalem; Rejects Other Resolu- 
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis 
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108 


The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87 
Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on Viet- 
Nam for Swedish Newspaper (transcript) . . 91 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J 108 

Oliver, Covey T 102 

Rusk, Secretary 87,91 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 3-9 

Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Release Issued prior to July 3 which appears in 
this issue of the Buixetin is No. 152 of July 1. 

No. Date 




7/3 U.S.-Turkey cotton textile agreement. 

7/3 U.S.-PaMstan cotton textile agree- 
ment (rewrite). 

7/5 Rusk : Lions International, Chicago. 

7/7 International Joint Commission re- 
port on Improvement of Champlain 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 










Of r, ^O- 









Vol. LVII, No. 1466 

Jvly 31, 1967 

Jyy WUUa/m M. Roth, Specie^ Representative for Trade Negotiations 1S3 

hy Secretary of Com/merce Alexander B. Trowbridge 127 


hy Secretary of Agriculture OrvUle L. Freeman 132 

iy Under Secretary of Labor James J. Reynolds 137 

For index see inside bach cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1466 Publication 8267 
July 31, 1967 

For sale by tbe Saperlotendent of Documents 

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The Kennedy Round: Proud Chapter in the History 
of International Commerce 

The multilateral agreements negotiated in the Sixth Round of 
Trade Negotiations {the Kennedy Round) under the auspices of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were signed at Geneva on 
June 30. President Johnson, in his message to the signing ceremony, 
hailed the negotiations as a '■'■'proud chapter in the history of inter- 
national comvfierceP 

A national conference on the Kennedy Round, held at Washington 
July 7 and sponsored hy the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, provided the first occasion for a formal and informal ex- 
change of views between Government officials and representatives of 
the business community on the outcome of the negotiatio-m. Follow- 
ing are addresses made during the formal sessions by William M. 
Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the chief U.S. 
negotiator; Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge, Sec- 
retary of Agriculture Orville B. Freeman; and Under Secretary of 
Commerce James J. Reynolds. 


Address by Ambassador Roth 

I must say this Friday morning was an easier 
one for me than last Friday morning. Then — 
it was June 30th — I was in the office at 3:30 
a.m. talking to my deputy, Ambassador Mike 
Blumenthal, in Geneva, where it was 8 :30 a.m. 
The hour of signing the Kennedy Round agree- 
ment was 2 hours away. Even at that time we 
were apprehensive that a last-minute crisis 
would intervene — as they had with agonizing 
regularity in the preceding 2 weeks. Now — fi- 
nally — the last crises appeared to be under con- 
trol. It was not imtil that early hour in still-dark 
Washington that we were entirely certain that 
an agreement would be signed. 

It \oas signed on schedule. At an enormous 
expense in time, energy, and emotion, roe — the 
more than 50 participating nations — wrot« what 
President Jolmson has hailed as "a proud 
chapter in the history of international com- 

The President's message to the signing cere- 
mony went on to say : 

It will open important new trading opportunities to 
each nation, and contribute to the prosi>erity of all. I 
salute . . . the architects of this historic landmark 
in cooperation among nations. 

The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] Secretariat has made preliminary 
estimates that the agreement covers more than 
$40 billion in world trade, that 70 percent of 
dutiable imports of the major particii^ants is 
affected, that two-thirds of the tariff reductions 
were 50 jDercent or more, and that the nations 
making concessions account for 75 percent of 
world trade. This is an accomplishment of far 
greater magnitude than that of any previous 
trade negotiation in history. 

Perhaps I should at this point go back in 
time to give you a brief history of this endeavor. 

In 1962 the 87th Congress passed the Trade 
Expansion Act in response to President Ken- 
nedy's request for bargaining power to launch 
a major assault on barriers to international 
commerce. He was authorized to cut our tariffs 
by half in exchange for equally advantageous 
benefits from our trading partners. 

The legislation also created the position of 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 
an iimovation placing resijonsibility for the 

JULY 31, 1907 


conduct of such negotiations in the Executive 
Office of the President. To this new post Presi- 
dent Kennedy appointed the distinguished 
former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, 
who directed the Kennedy Eound with great 
spirit and wisdom until his death 6 montlis ago. 

Armed with the new negotiating authority, 
the United States encouraged the convening of 
an international negotiating conference. An ini- 
tial ministerial-level meeting was held in Ge- 
neva in May 1963. Negotiations formally began 
a year later. 

Most of the major participants agreed to pro- 
ceed on the basis of a 50 percent linear — that is, 
across-the-board — cut in tariff levels on nonag- 
ricultural products. Exceptions, or those items 
not to be subjected to the full cut, were to be 
limited to those required by reasons of over- 
riding national interest. Exceptions lists on non- 
agricultural products were exchanged on 
November 16, 1964. There followed a period of 
intensive exammation of exceptions both on a 
multilateral and bilateral basis — each country 
making known its interest in the proposals of 
the other participants. Negotiators appeared to 
be horror-stricken at the protectionism of their 
trading partners. 

In a few industrial areas of particular im- 
portance and complexity — chemicals, textiles, 
steel, aluminum, pulp and paper — negotiations 
took place on a sector basis. 

The importance of agriculture in the Sixth 
Round was emphasized by the United States 
from the outset. We repeatedly insisted that the 
objective of the agricultural negotiations should 
be effective trade liberalization. The European 
Economic Community, however, sought a more 
limited negotiation essentially aimed at the 
freezing of present agricultural support levels 
on an item-by-item basis. 

An early attempt to get agreement on rules 
to govern agricultural negotiations proved 
futile. For this reason, and because the Euro- 
pean Economic Community's offers were not yet 
prepared, agricultural offers were not tabled at 
the same time as industrial offers. The EEC took 
the position it could not make agricultural offers 
in the Kennedy Round until its major Common 
Agricultural Policy regulations were agreed 
upon, and this work was not yet completed. 

On grains, however, the GATT ministers had 
decided that the Cereals Group should under- 
take the negotiation of an international grains 
arrangement. Accordingly, in May 1966 major 

cereals trading nations exchanged proposals for 
an international cereals arrangement. 

Nontariff Barriers Attacked 

Bilateral and multilateral discussions cen- 
tered on such nontariff barriers as discrimina- 
tory taxation, customs valuation practices, and 
quantitative import restrictions. Notable prog- 
ress was achieved in two areas, antidumping 
and the American Selling Price system of cus- 
toms valuation as it applies to imports of ben- 
zenoid chemicals. 

The negotiations on antidumping were 
directed at elaborating and refining existing 
international rules on the procedural and sub- 
stantive aspects of levying antidumping duties 
on goods which are dumped and thereby cause 
material injury to a domestic industry. Our 
exporters complained of some countries' pro- 
cedures that seriously deterred imports which 
could in no real sense be considered as "inju- 
rious dumping." In other countries, the prin- 
cipal difficulty was the lack of any well-defined 
procedure or legal recourse. The principal com- 
plaint against the United States was that its 
procedures were excessively prolonged. Finally, 
a very satisfactory agreement was concluded, 
which I will describe later. 

The American Selling Price system of cus- 
toms valuation concerning benzenoid chemicals 
came under attack from our trading partners 
early in the Keimedy Round. These countries 
considered this procedure an unjustified anom- 
aly in our tariff structure. They cited the fact 
that this valuation system was first imposed in 
1922 to protect our then infant chemical indus- 
try and that the considerations of the twenties 
are hardly applicable today. They pointed out 
that this system results in the imposition of 
very high or prohibitive actual rates of duty 
on many benzenoid chemicals, even though the 
duty rates listed in our tariff schedules may 
appear moderate. They also stressed the con- 
siderable uncertainty beforehand as to the 
amount of duty that will be assessed. 

Accordingly, the principal producers of 
benzenoid chemicals — the Common Market 
countries, the United Kingdom, and Switzer- 
land — heatedly demanded the abolition of 
ASP. We responded that any conversion to the 
normal valuation system would require special 
counterconcessions and that Congress would 
have to approve such a conversion. We would 



enter into negotiations concerning ASP only 
on the condition that other participants agree 
tliat there be substantial chemical concessions 
by all principal trading nations in the context 
of the Kennedy Round agreement and a special 
package of concessions, including abolition of 
ASP, in a separate agreement. 

It was only in the final hours of the May 
showdown that our conditions were accepted 
and a separate ASP agreement was negotiated. 

Let me return and conclude my brief his- 
torical account. 

Negotiations Reach Crisis 

A breach among the six members of the 
European Economic Community in mid-1965 
resulted in an almost complete suspension of 
the Geneva negotiations lasting until the late 
spring of 1966. 

The major decisions necessary to permit the 
Community to resume its Kennedy Round 
participation — particularly the adoption of the 
basis of a Common Agricultural Policy — were 
taken by mid-July 1966 enabling the tabling 
of the EEC agricultural offer in early August. 
This step set the stage for the beginning of 
concentrated multilateral and bilateral activity 
in Geneva beginning in September 1966. 

Talks proceeded through the fall, progress 
was laboriously made, but at the end of the 
year all of the toughest problems remained. In 
fact, by mid-March we had still not begun the 
intensive bargaining needed to resolve the 
central problems of the Kennedy Round. 

After almost 3 years of effort, the prospects 
of success began to dim. A March 30 deadline 
gave way to an April 30 deadline. I began com- 
muting to Geneva. 

As late as mid-April, the urgency of the situa- 
tion was not fully recognized by other major 
participants, particularly the European Eco- 
nomic Community. Our deadline was not taken 
seriously. The Community negotiators were still 
without sufficient authorization to participate 
effectively. Many knowledgeable observers be- 
lieved it would be impossible to conclude the 
Kennedy Round before midnight on June 30. 
Others, however, were certain that the political 
will was there. 

April led into May with the discussions gen- 
erating increasing heat but little light. A series 
of major crises erupted. By the weekend of 
May 13 we were meeting around-the-clock m an 

atmosphere of very high tension. On Monday, 
May 15, in the early evening, Commissioner 
[Jean] Rey and I found the basis for overall 
agreement in a compromise proposal put for- 
ward by Eric Wyndliam White, the extraordi- 
nary Director General of the GATT. Other 
pieces fell rapidly into place, and by the end 
of the evenuig the Director General could an- 
nounce that a Kennedy Round agreement was 

We soon learned, however, that between as- 
surance of agreement and signature of that 
agreement lay formidable obstacles. Unex- 
pected hitches developed to threaten seriously 
the successful conclusion of the negotiation. To 
the final hour, there were uncertainties. 

This last-minute bargaining was extremely 
difficult. Positions became hardened. Negotiat- 
ing flexibility had been largely exhausted in the 
mid-May showdown that produced the main 
outlines of the agreement. 

Delegations were tired, t«nse, and some- 
times querulous, yet dealing with a mass of 
numbers and detail and of varied and often 
conflicting considerations that were almost 

Inevitably there were misunderstandings 
about what had been agreed to. There were 
errors made that had to be corrected. Negotia- 
tors hopefully or imwittingly exceeded their 
authority ; in some cases they failed to get ap- 
proval back home and later had to adjust their 

As each coimtry made necessary modifica- 
tions, the multilateral balances changed and re- 
newed negotiations became necessary. I had to 
make a hurried return to Geneva only 2 weeks 
before the signing date. 

On the 29th of June, with my outer office 
crowded with reporters waiting for our advance 
release on the details of the agreement, I was 
on the telephone to Geneva and several capitals 
trying to resolve not one but several crises that 
had the potential of blowing up the whole 

Let me now turn to the nature of this agree- 
ment itself. 

Of course, uppermost in your minds is 
whether this agreement is a good deal for the 
United States. This was the question the Presi- 
dent had to decide, based on the advice of those 
responsible for United States participation. 

On March 10 of this year, I told tlie Senate 
Finance Committee that the United States 

JULY 31, 19G; 


would accept no Kennedy Round agreement 
unless it was a balanced package which included 
an exchange of both industrial and agricultural 
concessions. During this appearance, I was 
questioned as to my willingness to quit the nego- 
tiating table if the stakes weren't fair and I 
answered, "In a negotiation you have to be will- 
ing and ready to walk away from the table if 
you don't feel that what you are getting is a 
balanced deal." 

Basing my judgment on the hard-nosed 
appraisal of my Government colleagues and 
their expert staffs, I am con\-inced that we have 
received commitments equal in value to those 
we have made. Moreover, I believe that this 
balance of mutual exchanges of trading 
opportunities should stimulate appreciably 
larger volumes of international trade. Eco- 
nomic growth at home should result. 

Throughout this negotiation, we have had 
designated members of the Congress and rep- 
resentatives of the public drawn from industry, 
labor, farmers, and consumers acting as mem- 
bers of their officially accredited delegation. 
Through this means, we have taken to the bar- 
gaining tables an acute sense of the need for 
a fair and balanced deal promoting growth in 
all segments of the American economy. 

Our Washington organization, in developing 
basic policy and strategy jDositions, has made 
a conscientious effort to seek expert guidance 
from business, labor, and farm leaders in the 
formulation of negotiating policy. The Presi- 
dent appointed a 45-member public advisory 
committee to the Special Representative for 
Trade Negotiations. This group has met regu- 
larly with the Special Representative, and 
many of its members have traveled to Geneva 
to take a firsthand look at the negotiations. A 
roster of 300 technical specialists has served as 
a constantly available source of advice and 
assistance on day-to-day technical problems. 

Six Members of Congress are regular con- 
gressional delegates. Almost all have been to 
Geneva for important meetings at least once, 
and all meet with the Special Representative 
on a regular basis. 

Consideration of public views did not cease 
with the original hearings on proposed U.S. 
Kennedy Round offers. We continued to accept 
from any interested party oral and written 
testimony concerning any matter relevant to 
the negotiations. This included updating and 
revision of previous testimony, testimony from 
interests not previously heard, and new infor- 

mation relating to foreign import restrictions. 
Indeed, moi-e time and effort than ever before 
have gone into the calculation of the value and 
probable effect of the concessions we have of- 
fered and received. 

Principal Accomplishments 

The substance of the Kemiedy Round agree- 
ment will, of course, be the subject of our dis- 
cussions throughout the day. I will only 
summarize what I regard as the principal 

Tariff' cuts on industrial products will be of 
a magnitude far greater than any previously 
negotiated. While concessions offered to us have 
not justified full use of the authority of the 
Trade Expansion Act, we have exchanged with 
major tradmg partners a very significant num- 
ber of tariff reductions of 50 percent and many 
more in the 30 to 50 percent range. 

We have succeeded in securing concessions 
on a wide variety of farm products. Of greatest 
significance is the successful negotiation of a 
world grains agreement guaranteeing higher 
minimum world trading prices as well as estab- 
lishmg a program under which other nations 
will share with us in the task of supplying food 
aid to the undernourished people in the less 
developed countries. 

A major accomplishment was the negotiation 
of the antidumping code committing other 
countries to fair and open procedures along 
the lines of present United States practices. 
The new common antidumping regulations that 
are being developed by the European Economic 
Community will conform with the code. Of 
special benefit to the United States will be the 
adoption by Canada of an injury requirement 
in its antidumping legislation. The lack of such 
a requirement has impeded United States ex- 
ports for many years. 

For our part, we agreed to certain viseful re- 
finements of the concepts we presently use in 
our antidumping investigation and to speedier 
completion of such investigations once prelimi- 
nary measures are taken against allegedly 
dumped imports. I would emphasize — con- 
trary to what you may have read in the news- 
papers lately — that all our obligations in the 
agreement are consistent with existing law and, 
in particular, that we have not agreed to a si- 
multaneous consideration of price discrimina- 
tion and injury. 

In addition to the negotiation of an anti- 



dumping code, an agreement was concluded 
providing for the elimination of the American 
Selling Price system for benzenoid chemicals 
and the liberalization of other countries' trade 
barriers. For the domestic benzenoid chemical 
industry — a strong and efficient industry which 
has long demonstrated its international competi- 
tive strength — we are confident that the new 
rates of duty in the agreement will provide a 
sufficient level of tariff protection — one, by the 
way, well above that of the other major chem- 
ical producing countries. For this and the other 
sectors of the overall chemical industry in this 
country, which has an export surplus of about 
$1.7 billion, the agreement affords very sig- 
nificant new export opportunities into rapidly 
expanding markets in Europe. 

Moreo^'er, the ASP agreement provides for 
the elimination of discriminatory automobile 
road-use taxes in France, Italy, and Belgium, 
which have long hampered exports of the larger 
U.S. cars to those countries. Finally, under the 
agreement the United Kingdom midertakes to 
make a significant reduction in the margin of 
tariff preference on inimanufactured tobacco, 
which should be of real assistance to one of our 
biggest export industries. I would only add that 
we fully exi^ect, and indeed welcome, the most 
careful examination of the merits of the agree- 
ment. I do hope, however, that such an exami- 
nation will be made objectively by all concei'ned 
and not in the heat of what has all too often been 
purely an emotional issue. 

Regarding the particularly sensitive sectors 
other than chemicals, useful if limited progress 
was made on the complex problems in steel, 
aluminum, pulp and paper, and textiles, includ- 
ing a .3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton 
Textile Arrangement. 

Finally, the Kennedy Round agreement has 
given significant assistance to the less developed 
countries through having permitted their par- 
ticipation in the negotiations without requiring 
reciprocal contributions from them, through 
special concessions on products of particular in- 
terest to them, and through the food aid pro- 
visions of the grains arrangement. 

And now, in conclusion, where do we go 
from here ? The President has asked me to un- 
dertake a comprehensive study of trade policy 
to determine what the next steps should be. 
The problems are many. What further should 
be done about nontariff barriers ? What are the 
possibilities for further tariff reductions? "Wliat 
can be done to lunit the proliferation of discrim- 

inatory trading arrangements among small 
groups of countries, which threatens the basic 
most-favored-nation principle mider which so 
much progi'ess in tariff reductions has been 
made? How should policy on international 
financial flows be related to U.S. trade policies? 

Another set of problems of extreme impor- 
tance in the next few years relates to what the 
policies of highly industrialized countries ought 
to be toward the developing countries. The 
developing countries have been pressing for 
special trade policies tailored to their specific 
needs. Some of them have been receiving spe- 
cial benefits from certain mdustrialized coun- 
tries, in some cases in exchange for special ac- 
cess provisions for their industrialized partners. 
The specialized limited arrangements threaten 
the interests of nonparticipants. As the Presi- 
dent noted in his speech at Punta del Este,^ 
we are now exploring with other countries the 
possibilities of a common approach to develop- 
ing-country trade policies which could subsume 
these specialized narrow arrangements. 

In looking to the future, we shall be lean- 
ing heavily on advice from industry. Your own 
work in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on 
future trade policy will be extremely valuable 
to us in making plans for new departures in 
the trade field. 


Address by Secretary Trowbridge 

I think the first and most important thing 
we all kiaow about the Kennedy Round is that 
the end of the negotiations is not the end at 
all ; it is really only the beginning. Many years 
of extraordinary labor lie behind us, but dec- 
ades of even hai'der work lie ahead if we are 
to fulfill the promise that this great trade 
liberalization effort holds for the entire fi-ee 

It goes without saying, of course, that the 
same high degree of cooperation between Amer- 
ican industry and government that produced 
the Kennedy Round will be required to reap 
its benefits. But the major burden of responsi- 
bility for seizing the opportunity offered must 
be shouldered by our matchless system of free 
enterprise. The individual initiative and 

' BuLMTiN of May 8, 1967, p. 708. 

JULY 31, 1967 


energy that this system and its rewards release 
are what, in the end, are the wellspring of all 
our achievement. In this instance, only business 
and labor, working together, can produce and 
sell the goods abroad that mean more profits, 
more jobs, and the rising standard of living 
that is the hallmark of our dynamic economy. 

One tiling I'm sure is fully understood : The 
name of the game is "A Good Offense." Defen- 
sive driving may be the safest technique for to- 
day's motorist, but for the trader in the post- 
Kennedy Round age of trade the only safe 
course is to sell abroad with the same aggressive 
skill that is applied to the domestic market. I 
think single-minded efforts to defend a position 
in the home market, with concomitant failure 
to take advantage of sales opportunities abroad, 
can only lead to trouble. 

For the Kennedy Round, to a greater degree 
than anything that has ever gone before prob- 
ably in the entire history of trade, represents 
a very large step toward the thing we've heard 
so much about in the postwar years : the truly 
one- world market. 

And more than anything else, we in the 
United States must luiderstand and appreciate 
in all its ramifications the full meaning of the 
global market concept. 

It means, for one thing, that the American 
domestic market — the greatest and most lucra- 
tive market in the world — is no longer the pri- 
vate preserve of the American businessman. We 
are but one corner, one segment, of that market. 

We are, however, the most competitive part 
of that market. And as a general rule, if you can 
meet the competition here you can meet it in 
many other countries of the world. And we must 
sell there, we must make the effort now, if we 
are to get in on the ground floor of what hope- 
fully will be the greatest surge in international 
trade in our history, as a result of the Kennedy 
Round negotiations. To fail to do so can hurt 
both a company and the Nation. 

Certainly our American businessmen have the 
tools to do the job — an unequaled bag of tools 
that can unlock the doors to burgeoning mar- 
kets everywhere. You have the managerial skills, 
the capital resources, the advanced technology, 
the sales and marketing ability, the skilled 
workmen, the higher productivity, the econo- 
mies of scale, a more intense utilization of cap- 
ital stock, and the greatest array of scientific 
talent the world has ever seen. If these aren't the 

elements that make for success in selling in the 
world market, I'd like to know why not. 

But the Kennedy Round results should be 
the signal to maximize the use of those tools. 
And my task today is to give you an overall 
view of the flashing green lights in the indus- 
trial area. 

Gains for U.S. Exporters 

Probably the uppermost question in your 
minds is, Just what did American business get 
out of the Kennedy Round and what did we pay 
for it ? I would like to talk at some length about 
this, but as you can appreciate, I cannot talk 
about the thousands of individual items that are 
affected by the final agreement. 

First, what did we get ? On the basis of trade 
coverage, the United States received tariff con- 
cessions of mostly 50 percent reductions on about 
$7 billion of our exports. Close to another $1 
billion were bound in a duty-free status, so that 
the total package runs close to $8 billion. 

These concessions are spread proportionately 
among our major export markets. Over $5 bil- 
lion of our exports are subject to concessions in 
the European Economic Community, the EFTA 
[European Free Trade Association] countries, 
and Japan. Another $1..3 billion will benefit by 
concessions made by Canada, with the remain- 
der spread out among a number of smaller 

To assess the meaning of these concessions, 
let me take you back about 5 or 6 years to when 
the foreign traders of this country were alarmed 
at the prospects for their markets once internal 
tariffs were eliminated in the EEC and EFTA. 
To many U.S. businessmen the choice seemed 
to be between getting into one or both of these 
blocs with plant and sales organizations or run- 
ning the risk of being excluded from the vast 
European market by external tariff barriers. 
Passage of the Trade Expansion Act gave them 
some hope that the two blocs might be per- 
suaded, if the other large trading nations joined 
in, to move toward freer trade rather than 
adopt an inward-looking attitude. At the time, 
you will recall, the schedule for eliminating the 
internal tariffs between countries of the two 
blocs was being accelerated so that the element 
of time was very important. The facts are that 
the EFTA countries eliminated internal duties 
completely on industrial goods at the beginning 



of this year, while the EEC will complete its 
customs union and remove internal tariffs com- 
pletely in July 1968. 

Now, these tariff walls are to come down 
sharply. For the EEC it will be a reduction by 
35 percent in all major trade categories. Most 
of the duties of the EEC's common external 
tariff, which is effective next July, are in the 
medium-low-range rate, that is, 10 to 15 percent. 
Next July they will start to come down. In the 
EFTA countries the national tariffs apply to 
goods outside of the free trade area. For most 
countries in the EFTA, duties were already 
low. with the United Kingdom having the high- 
est rates. These are also coming down, with the 
high U.K. rates, generally 33 percent, being 
reduced by 50 percent. 

I believe that in this context the United States 
has been able to reconcile its political and eco- 
nomic objectives in Western Europe. At times 
it seemed that we were supporting political in- 
tegration at the expense of our economic well- 
being. The Kennedy Round, I feel, has reduced 
any fear that we are sacrificing American eco- 
nomic interest for a political objective. In fact, 
I think that the gains for our exporters in the 
Western European markets as a result of the 
Kennedy Round surpass anything that was 
realistically hoped for when this problem was 
before the Nation in 1962. 

Approximately one-quarter to one-third of 
our exports move to Western Europe, so that 
it is fairly obvious what the implications for 
U.S. exporters might be without the Kennedy 
Round now that the internal barriers of the 
European countries are in the final stage of 
elimination. Now that the Kennedy Round is 
over, the challenge passes to you men of busi- 
ness to take advantage of the new opportimities 
which will be opening up over the next few 

Canadian Tariff Reductions 

Let me now speak of Canada, which is our 
largest single trading partner. Our trade with 
Canada continues to rise to the mutual benefit 
of both countries, and our agreement with 
Canada in the Kennedy Round is a sweeping 
reduction of tariff barriers. Duties were elimi- 
nated on a number of categories of goods, most 
significant of which are softwood lumber, some 
hardwood lumber, wood flooring except oak. 

most fresh or frozen fish, and a variety of other 
products. Canada eliminated her duty on coal, 
and the United States eliminated its duty on 

In the field of manufactures the United 
States was able to obtain a reduction in the 
protective level of the Canadian tariff by about 
one-fourth. Protective duties generally rim to 
20 to 25 percent in Canada's tariff ; and Canada, 
which at the outset of the negotiations said that 
it could not join in a 50 percent linear tariff cut 
because of her relatively lower industrial status 
as compared with the advanced countries, has 
reduced this level to about 15 to I7i/^ percent. 
This is a major contribution by Canada, 
which heretofore has not found it politically 
or economically feasible to make significant 
reductions in its protective tariff rates. 

One of the most important Canadian conces- 
sions to the United States, which will affect 
hundreds of American exporters, is the reduc- 
tion in the Canadian tariff on production ma- 
chinery from 22% percent to 15 percent. For 
machinery which is "not made in Canada" the 
current duty of 7^2 percent will be eliminated. 
When these concessions are implemented, all 
machinery which is not available in Canada 
will benefit from duty-free treatment. In this 
one sector, namely, production machinery, the 
Canadians have told us that their import entries 
number over 2-10,000 per year ; so from this one 
concession, duty reductions will most signifi- 
cantly assist a broad range of U.S. exporters. 

There are many more concessions from Can- 
ada which will benefit American exporters 
which I cannot cover in detail here today. How- 
ever, a wide variety of goods is affected, and 
duty eliminations were numerous. I should also 
mention that in our negotiations with Canada 
we were able to negotiate away a number of 
relatively small but irritating problems which 
have resulted from differential treatment by 
the two countries on items which are traded 
both north and south. 

Japan's willingness to participate substan- 
tially and actively in the Kennedy Roiuid was 
a welcome surprise to us. since many felt that 
Japan's rationale would be that since she was 
doing well with the present setup, why join in 
a tariff-cutting exercise? I think the answer 
probably is that Japan's export boom has led 
it to the conclusion that its economic prosperity 
covdd increase enormously if it could develop 

JULY 31, 


the markets for its products in countries other 
than the United States. 

Japan did join in and agree to mostly 50 per- 
cent reductions in her tariffs. It is our hope that 
these reductions by the Japanese will open up 
areas for our products which have heretofore 
been closed to us because of high duties. We 
sometimes hear it said by United States manu- 
factui-ers that they camiot sell in Japan because 
of low-price competition. The fact is that we 
do sell large volumes of manufactured goods 
in Japan, and Japan's increasing prosperity, 
which should gi-ow with the Kennedy Round 
settlement, creates a demand for more Amer- 
ican products. We hope U.S. exporters will 
redouble their efforts to introduce new products 
to Japan and take another healthy look at the 
market for their current products. 

A Reciprocal Bargain 

All of these benefits carried a price tag, and 
I am not going to stand before yovi and say that 
our negotiators gave the otliers a good shellack- 
ing. This is rarely the case for any country's 
negotiators, but in the Kennedy Round I think 
the United States negotiators did a very good 
job indeed. The Kennedy Round package is 
balanced. We came out with a reciprocal bar- 
gain, which was our goal. If the fuial agreement 
had not included benefits of roughly equal 
value for all concerned, it just wouldn't have 
been completed. 

I would like to take you back to the begin- 
ning of the negotiations. The President's 
authority was to reduce all United States tariffs 
by 50 percent. This was the prospect for almost 
every U.S. business that must compete with 
imports. The result, however, is that we reduced 
all our tariffs by an average of about 35 percent. 
Other countries' average tariff reductions are 
in this same area. 

The items excluded from our tariff cuts are 
basically those which are experiencing severe 
import competition and those which in our 
judgment woidd be likely to suffer adversely if 
they were subject to a 50 percent reduction. So 
the United States removed a large number of 
articles from negotiation or made less than 50 
percent cuts when it judged such a reduction 
was called for in light of import sensitivity. 

I have been troubled in the last few days to 
I'ead some very critical statements coming from 
some of our major industries. These statements 
have characterized the Kennedy Round as "one- 
sided" and have declared that actions taken on 

cutting U.S. tariffs will be "ruinous" in certain 
areas. I think we have to evaluate the results in 
Geneva as to what coidd have happened, what 
did happen, why the actions were taken, and 
what will be the impact. Let's look at three 
major sectors. 

In steel, the weighted average reduction in 
United States tariffs coming out of the Kennedy 
Round was 7.5 percent on dutiable imports in 
1964. A total of 54 percent of our steel imports 
was not subject to any duty reduction ; only 1 
percent of our steel imports was subject to a 50 
percent reduction. This small reduction will 
bring our average tariff level down from a 7.4 
percent weighted average to about 6 percent. 

The reductions in tariff's were part of an 
attempt to harmonize tariffs on steel hj produc- 
ing countries. While we reduced by 7 percent, 
the EEC and the United Kingdom reduced by 
about 20 percent and Japan by nearly 50 per- 
cent. As you are aware, steel has a large dollar 
volume, with two-way trade totaling almost 
$1.4 billion in 1964. It was not an element which 
could be excluded from the negotiations, but the 
actual settlement was of minimal impact on our 

Wliat we have done is to try to make steel 
import duties a common factor in international 
trade. Prior to the Kennedy Round the United 
States had the lowest rates. Now the rates of the 
major countries are approximately even, 
averaging between 6 and 8 percent. Perhaps 
more important than the duty reductions is that 
for the first time the steel tariff's of all major 
producing countries will be bomid against in- 
crease. I am not claiming that all problems in 
steel have been negotiated away. On the con- 
trary, many remain; but the Kennedy Round 
agreement has come a good way toward remov- 
ing unequal competitive conditions for trade 
in st«el. 

Textiles is similarly a very large sector of our 
international trade, and the gi-owth of textile 
imports has been particularly strong in recent 
years. In return for a 3-year extension of the 
Long-Term Arrangement for cotton textiles on 
the part of the exporting countries, the coun- 
tries importing textiles agreed to reductions of 
about 15 to 20 percent and certain adjustments 
in import quota levels. Extension of the Long- 
Term Arrangement has been one of our chief 
goals in the negotiation, and we are very 
pleased with this settlement, as are the leaders 
of our cotton textile industry. 

In manmade-fiber textiles our overall reduc- 



tion was about 14 to 15 percent. Our reduction 
varied by sensitivity, with yarn reduced by 37 
percent, fabric by 18 percent, and apparel by 6 

Our reductions on wool textiles averaged 2 
percent. Virtually every major sensitive item 
was excepted from negotiations. Items on which 
tariffs were reduced were mostly low-trade, 
nonsensitive items. 

So we can again say that in a trade area of 
large dollar value, with heavy pressure from 
many sources for expanded entry into our huge 
market, we came to a level of agreement in 
which all parties found benefit, and our nego- 
tiators were responsive to the serious problems 
faced by this key industry. 

Probably the most publicized and perhaps the 
most controversial part of the Kennedy Round 
agreement is in the chemical sector. This agree- 
ment is in two parts, the first of which stands 
by itself as an integral part of the Kennedy 
Round package. Within the Kennedy Round 
package, the United States agreed to reduce its 
duties on chemicals by an average of 43 percent. 
The EEC is reducing by an average of about 20 
percent, the U.K. by about 23 percent, Japan 
44 percent, and Switzerland 49 percent. United 
States exports of chemicals benefiting by these 
concessions amounted to about $900 million in 
1964, while our dutiable imports from those 
countries in 1964 amounted to about $325 mil- 
lion. The favorable trade balance here is nearly 
3 to 1, while the depth of tariff reduction, with 
the exception of the U.K. and EEC, is about 
equal to ours. 

The second part of the chemicals agreement 
involves the American Selling Price — a system 
where the duty rate is levied not against the 
foreign invoice value of the imported product 
but against the U.S. selling price of the com- 
petitively produced domestic product. In this 
part the United States, provided the Congi'ess 
enacts the necessary legislation, will eliminate 
the American Selling Price on benzenoid chemi- 
cals and reduce all rates in its chemical tariff 
above 20 percent down to that level with certain 
exceptions. These are dyes, pigments, and 
azoics, which the United States would reduce 
to 30 percent, and sulfa drugs, which the 
United States would reduce only to about 25 
percent. The EEC and the U.K. will then 
place into effect the remaining portion of 
their reductions so that the EEC total reduc- 
tion on chemicals will equal about 46 percent 
and the U.K. 50 percent. Some U.K. rates will 

be reduced by as much as 62 percent. The end 
result will be that virtually all chemical rates 
in the EEC and U.K. will be at 121^^ percent or 
below, whereas the United States will have 
many rates, as noted above, at considerably 
higher levels. 

As a further element of the second part of the 
chemicals agi-eement, Belgium, France, and 
Italy will liberalize the discriminatory aspects 
of their road-tax system, Switzerland will 
modify its regulation limiting imports of camied 
fruit preserved in corn syrup, and the U.K. 
will reduce its margin of preference on imports 
of tobacco. Action on these nontariff barriers 
will be taken as reciprocity for the United 
States elimination of ASP. 

The chemicals negotiation was the most diffi- 
cult to conclude, but at the same time it was one 
of the most successful. We believe the United 
States has an excellent bargain in both pack- 
ages, and we are prepared to present the second 
package to Congress for approval as soon as 
time and conditions permit. The Kennedy 
Round chemical package is self-contained and 
will in no way be affected by congressional ac- 
tion, which bears only on the second part. The 
benzenoid chemical industi-y is a strong and effi- 
cient industry which, in our judgment, will be 
adequately protected by the rates provided for 
in the ASP agreement. 

Antidumping Rules 

I might conclude by mentioning our attempts 
at removing nontariff barriers. Here we have 
not achieved everything we wanted, but on the 
other hand we certainly did not give others all 
they wanted. Our biggest accomplishment, of 
course, was the negotiation of international 
rules for dumping. These spell out article VI of 
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade], which covers this subject, and our ac- 
complishment here is twofold. First, we have 
negotiated rules which do not require changes 
in our legislation and very little change in our 
administrative regulations on dumping. Sec- 
ondly, we have achieved international agree- 
ment for fair and open procedures for United 
States exporters who are charged with dump- 
ing abroad. Canada probably made the biggest 
contribution in this area by agreeing to require 
an injury fuiding before dumping duties are 

We must recognize that beyond the ASP 
package and the antidumping code relatively 
little was accomplished toward reduction of 

JULT 31, 1967 


nontariff barriers, though what was done 
amounts to a substantial beginning. The whole 
problem of nontariff barriers will be a major 
portion of future GATT agendas, and we will 
be persistent in seeking effective solutions to 
problems we know trouble many American 

These, then, are the broad outlines of the re- 
sults in the industrial sector of the historic 
Geneva negotiations so skillfully handled by 
Bill Roth, the late Christian Herter, and their 
able associates. 

Thousands of individual barriers have been 
cleared from the avenues of world trade. But 
only you — the dynamic business leadei'S of 
America — can take advantage, for your com- 
panies and the whole Nation, of the opportunity 
offered. I was delighted to see a full-page adver- 
tisement by a major U.S. airfreight carrier an- 
nouncing some forthcoming reductions on air 
cargo rates which are described as comple- 
mentary to the tariff reductions in Europe. It is 
this kind of aggressive marketing that will lead 
more American companies to take advantage of 
increased trade opportunities abroad. The name 
of the game is "A Good Offense," and I know 
that American business will be even more skilled 
as they play it on a field which has fewer bar- 
riers as a result of the Geneva agreements. 


Address by Secretary Freeman 

I'm happy to be reporting to you today, be- 
cause I have a strong personal interest in the 
subject we are talking about. For almost 7 years 
now, I have worked hard to expand our coun- 
try's foreign agriculture trade. And it has been 
gratifying work. I have had the satisfaction of 
seeing our country's agricultural exports grow 
from $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1960, the year 
before I took office, to a new record of $6.8 bil- 
lion in the 1967 fiscal year that ended June 30. 
Exports for dollars climbed from $3.2 billion to 
$5.4 billion in the same period. 

The other day I was talking to my Cabinet 
colleague Joe Fowler. Secretary [of the Treas- 
ury Henry H.] Fowler, as you know, fights hard 
and effectively to strengthen the balance-of- 
payments position of the United States. Our 
country has many tough economic problems, but 
none is tougher than the balance-of -payments 

problem — and it affects all the others. It is com- 
plicated by the fact that what other countries 
and international bankers do affects us strongly 
yet is largely beyond our control. 

Secretai'y Fowler said to me, 'T don't know 
what we would do today if the annual agricul- 
tural exports for dollars hadn't increased $2.2 
billion since 1960." He went on to say that we 
would long since have faced a national economic 
crisis of grave proportions, that the value of the 
dollar would have been seriously undermined, 
were it not for the substantial flow of dollars 
into the Treasury from agricultural exports. 

Wliat he said is certainly true. Had dollar 
exports of farm products not continued to climb 
during these 1960's, we would not have had $7.3 
billion in cumulative dollar earnings that have 
been added to our balance of payments. 

All this means that I approach this matter 
of trade negotiations and trade expansion with 
a deep personal sense of participation and 

American agriculture came to the Kennedy 
Round in a spirit of expectation. We sought a 
general lowering of agricultural trade barriers 
which would give efficient farmers, ours and in 
other countries, a greater opportunity to sell 
competitively in the world's expanding mar- 
kets. We looked on the Kennedy Round as a 
means of helping world trade in general and 
our own export drive in particular. 

To some extent our expectations were 
realized. Considering the problems encovm- 
tered, we emerged with far better results than 
we thought possible during some of the darkest 
days when negotiations almost broke off. 

We also saw fii-sthand why agricultural trade 
negotiations are so difficult. We learned that 
when our trading partners resisted lowering 
their trade barriers on agricultural products, 
in most instances they were pressed bj' the need 
to protect the income of their farmers. 

The Kennedy Round experience confirmed 
my conviction that the difficulty of agricultural 
trade negotiations lies first and foremost in the 
universal farm-income problem. As a rule of 
thumb, around the world a farmer gets only 
about one-half as much income for his labor 
and investment as the nonfarm sectors of the 
respective countries enjoy. 

Governments, of course, are responsive to this 
discriminatory situation. The lowering of agri- 
cultural trade barriers will continue to be 
exceptionally difficult as long as fann incomes 
lag so far behind other incomes. This farm- 



income problem is not peculiar to foreign coun- 
tries. It is our problem, too. In many cases it 
determines our own trade positions. 

The last 2 months the Secretary of Agricxd- 
ture and senior members of the Department of 
Agriculture have been holding shirtsleeve ses- 
sions with American farmers all around the 
country, discussing the farmer's position in our 
economy and how to reinforce it. It was obvious 
at these meetmgs that farmers across the nation 
are deeply and understandably concerned that 
they are not getting a fair share in our Ameri- 
can prosperity. 

Our farm prices today are lower than they 
were 20 years ago. Yet the cost of what the 
farmer buys has gone up 35 percent. Only by 
increasing his labor productivity 6 percent an- 
nually, more than twice the improvement made 
by American industry, has the American farmer 
managed to survive. It is true that Government 
payments have helped some, but even so our 
per capita farm income is only two-thirds of our 
nonf arm income. 

And it would be ever so much worse if our 
agricultural exports had not been steadily 
climbing to a point where today they absorb 
the production from one acre out of every four 
of his cropland and make a substantial contri- 
bution to his total receipts. Agricultural exports 
are of vital importance to every American 

Tangible Benefits for U.S. Farmers 

I would like to turn now to what we actually 
got out of the agricultural phase of the Ken- 
nedy Round. 

"We benefited in two ways : 

First, we obtained from it some modest trade 
liberalization. The Kennedy Round will give 
us better access to some important foreign agri- 
cultural markets. Concessions won at Geneva 
will mean larger export sales in the years ahead 
for many of our farm products. 

Second, the Kennedy Roimd made us aware 
of the problems we still face in bringing more 
order into world agricultural trade. It pin- 
pointed the problems. To me, this is a very im- 
portant result — and I would like to return to it 

As to tangible benefits from the Kennedy 
Round, we gained considerably in our trade 
in fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, tobacco, va- 
riety meats, tallow, and a number of other 

products. The concessions granted by other 
countries covered more than $900 million in 
their imports of such products from the United 
States, 1964 basis. On agricultural products ac- 
coimting for over $700 million — in which we 
have an important export interest — they cut 
their duties an average of more than 40 

The Kennedy Round also is giving us a new 
grains arrangement which will provide ad- 
ditional price insurance to U.S. wheat pro- 
ducers. This arrangement contains significant 
food aid provisions completely unprecedented 
in any multilateral accord of which I am aware. 
Apart from their intrinsic humanitarian 
worth — and this in itself is adequate justifica- 
tion for them— these provisions should open 
new commercial outlets for wheat and, to some 
extent, feed grains. 

Reciprocally, the United States cut its duties 
on some agricultural products, and imports of 
such items can be expected to increase mod- 
erately. Duties covering around $500 million of 
the products we import were cut by an average 
of 39 percent. The existing duty or duty-free 
status of an additional $290 million worth of 
import products was bound against upward 
change. Man}' of our concessions relate to tropi- 
cal products which we do not produce and were 
granted for the benefit of the developing 

While bargaining is never without its "give" 
as well as "take," to the best of my knowledge 
no American agricultural producer will be ex- 
posed to serious economic injury as a result of 
the Kemiedy Round. American farmers as a 
whole, because of their comparative efficiency, 
will be better off than they would have been had 
the Kennedy Round not taken place. 

Concessions won at Geneva will mean in- 
creased foreign markets for a niunber of our 
farm commodities. Our agricultural exports 
are inevitably on an upward trend and would 
increase had there been no Kennedy Round. But 
the rate of increase unquestionably will be 
faster because of our negotiation successes. 

Now I would like to return to my second 
point: our awareness of the problems we still 
face in further reducing world trade barriers. 

The Kennedy Round has shown the trouble 
in trying to buy, with reductions in duties, re- 
moval of the major barriers still standing in the 
way of international agricultural trade. 

The Kennedy Round has also shown that a 

JULY 31, 196T 


massive multilateral trade negotiation involving 
all countries and all products may not be the 
best way to get at the root of agricultural trade 
problems. It i:)rovidos too much opportunity for 
sidestepping the real busmess at hand. 

It has shown with startling clarity the com- 
plex and exasperating nature of the trade bar- 
riers in agricultiu-e, and most disturbing of all, 
it has shown a fundamental difference among 
the major trading partners as to international 
trade philosophy. Let me explain this. 

A concept of orderly trade is basic to a nego- 
tiation. Unless parties can agree on objectives, 
they rarely accomplish anything. There must 
be a mutuality of interest. There must be com- 
mon ground in agricultural negotiations. 

During this negotiation, all parties said they 
were trying to bring about more orderly agri- 
cultural trade, but I detected at least three dif- 
ferent ideas of what "more orderly" meant. 
Each idea was put forward by a negotiating 
bloc powerful enough to prevent consensus. 

The first said : Let those who can, produce — 
whether the production is efficient or not. The 
only test is : Are we physically capable of turn- 
ing out the product and are we able and willing 
to bear the cost ? 

The second said : Let those who can produce 
efficiently, produce. The test ought to be based 
upon who can produce abundantly, inexpen- 
sively, and well, and not upon who has physical 
capacity and strength of treasury. 

The third said : Let those produce who must 
produce to exist. Whether inefficient or not, if 
we can only produce a few products, let us pro- 
duce them and sell them because we must. This 
last view, of course, is put forward with increas- 
ing intensity by the less developed countries, 
which, in many cases, have neither the resources 
to produce cheaply and well nor the financial 
capacity to subsidize heavily. 

Given these three major conflicting views, is 
it any wonder that we were unable to make in 
this negotiation all the changes we desired? 

The Kennedy Round was primarily a tariff 
negotiation. Tariffs I'emain an important means 
of protecting producers in many parts of the 
world. But in agriculture, particularly, other 
barriers are numerous and complex. Negotiators 
met with only limited success in removing or 
lowering them — and on the really hard-core 
products had no success at all. 

Overall, as I said earlier, the problem of liber- 
alizing trade st«ms from the almost general 

disparity in income between farm and nonfarm 
people. That disparity jooses an obligation on 
evei-y govermnent to protect the incomes of its 
farmers and still make sure that all the people 
have enough food and fiber and other products 
of agriculture. It is an obligation that has called 
forth price and income programs in every 
country in the world. These take many different 
forms and they all affect world trade in one 
way or another. 

Different Systems of Farm-Income Support 

The European Economic Community at- 
tempts to keep domestic agricultural prices 
high for most products through a variable-levy 
system. The EEC sets the prices, and the vari- 
able levies remove the effect of outside compe- 
tition. This is truly a fonnidable barrier to 

The United Kingdom favors the deficiency- 
payment support system. Internal consumer 
prices ai"e allowed to seek their own level. But 
producer returns are kept at government-set 
levels through producer payments. The impact 
of this system on exporters is more obscure, but 
severe nevertheless. 

We have our support programs in the United 
States, also. In some cases — in cotton and 
wool — the program is a combination of defi- 
ciency payments and tariffs or quotas. In dairy, 
it is a combination of a support price and quotas 
and tariff's. In grains, we use a certificate pro- 
gram. Our system is different from others in 
that in many cases we tie payments to acreage 
reduction. In this manner we prevent price- 
depressing surpluses. The United States is the 
only country in the world that has taken on the 
exceedingly difficult, politically hazardous, yet 
im]:)ortant task of limiting production. If we 
didn't do so, there would be a growing world 
surplus in the grains, cotton, and tobacco, with 
resultant international trade chaos. Yet this 
major contribution to orderly world trade goes 
largely unnoticed. 

Government support programs oft«n lead not 
only to import control but also to export assist- 
ance. The EEC has such export assistance. 
Denmark uses a two-price system in which 
prices for products marketed at home are held 
at one level, while exports are marketed well 
below that. Other countries use marketing 
boards that have great flexibility in price 



Because of such programs, just the other clay 
I had to make the very difficuU decision to 
recommend sharp restrictions on imports of 
dairy products into tlie United States." This 
was not a pleasant decision. A country which 
exports as much as we do must be prepared to 
import as well. 

But the dairy trade had become sick. Under 
the EEC system of high dairy support prices 
protected by variable levies, production has 
increased to the point tliat heavy surpluses of 
butter and cheese are a glut on the EEC market. 
Under such circumstances, an EEC export pro- 
gram operates almost automatically to move 
these suri^luses out of the EEC, regardless of 
their impact on the trade of more efficient sup- 
pliers or on the economies of importing coun- 
tries. EEC butter, produced at a price of 60 to 
65 cents per pound, was being sold in the 
United States for around 22 cents per pound. 
It was entering the United States as a butter- 
fat/sugar mixture in circumvention of existing 
U.S. import controls on butter and in quantities 
that were interfering with the operation of our 
own support program. 

You will recall that not too many years ago 
the United States also had burdensome sur- 
pluses of dairy products. But we didn't dump 
ours indiscriminately into the international 
market. We stored them and used them at home 
in school lunch programs and to feed our 
needy. We moved them abroad only when 
demand was such that they did not disturb the 
international market. It is a pity that other 
major producers have not practiced similar 

Orienting Trade to Production Efficiency 

It can be seen, then, that even if countries 
were agreed on the kind of order they wanted 
to put into the international trading system, 
the task of reshaping its numerous and compli- 
cated systems and barriers would be a formid- 
able one. Even to catalog and understand them 
is difficult. To deal with them all at one time 
in a comprehensive way is virtually impossible. 
This also we learned from the Kennedy Round. 

How then can we deal with these barriers? 
What kind of plan can be used? What should 
our agricultural trade policy be? Ambassador 
Roth has mentioned the trade policy study 

" For text of Presidential proclamation 3790 amend- 
ing the import restrictions on certain dairy products, 
see 32 Fed. Reg. 9808. 

which he will undertake next year. This will 
help us decide. I cannot, of course, anticipate 
it. I can suggest, however, that he explore care- 
fully the following princijales, which I think 
are essential. 

The underlying objective in U.S. agricultural 
trade policy must continue to be one of orient- 
ing agricultural trade to production efficiency. 
In other words, those who can produce abun- 
dantly, inexpensively, and well should produce 
and should be leaders in trade. 

There will be exceptions, of course. If some 
countries insist on f)roducing at heavy cost 
simply because they are so inclined and have the 
money, we can't prevent them. But we can 
try in every way we laiow to show them that 
they are wrong and where they are wrong and 
try to get them to move toward the pi'inciple 
of comparative advantage. 

We should start by focusing our attention 
on individual products or, at most, product 
groups, and we should seek to deal in depth 
with the barriers affecting them. I think we 
should start such explorations among key coun- 
tries in the very near future. 

Helping the Less Developed Countries 

In the work that lies ahead we need also to 
recognize that the Kennedy Round had more 
significance for the industrialized nations than 
it had for the developing countries. 

The United States tried hard to make the 
Kennedy Round meaningful for the less de- 
veloped countries. In agriculture we cut, and 
in many cases eliminated, duties on tropical 
products valued at almost $120 million — prod- 
ucts such as Indian cashew nuts, Brazil nuts, 
Philippine desiccated coconut, and so on. We 
committed ourselves not to put duties on fresh 
bananas and other products now duty free to 
the amount of another $140 million. And we 
cut duties on some temperate products in which 
the developing countries have a trade interest 
approaching $70 million. I know of no other 
area of the world that did as much in this way 
as the United States. 

And much more needs to be done along these 
lines by all tradmg partners. President Jolmson 
said last April at Punta del Este : 

We are ready to explore with other industrialized 
countries — and with our own people — the possibility 
of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all 
developing countries in the markets of all the indus- 
trialized countries. 

JULY 31, 1967 


In other words, there may need to be special 
trade pi'ograms in addition to the special aid 
programs through which we have been ex- 
tending tecluiical, food, and other forms of 
assistance for a number of years. 

This is not something that will come about 
quickly. But as part of the complex problem 
of helping the less developed countries to 
emerge, we do need to be openminded about 
their obvious need for remunerative markets 
for what they produce. Only by having such 
markets can they ever hope to pay their own 

It is in our own interest that these nations 
grow to a trade basis. We are spending millions 
upon millions of dollars today in carrying out 
our worldwide teclinical, economic, and food aid 
programs. Our objective must be to turn this 
one-way flow into a two-way trade flow- — and 
the only way this can happen is for the less de- 
veloped countries to become stronger trading 

The largest potential market in the world 
lies in the less developed countries, with their 
large populations and largely undeveloped re- 
sources. We see evidence of this market's awak- 
ening. There needs to be — and can be — a general 
springing to life in country after country. 
Modem man is an economic being. There is no 
tonic more powerful in bringing about this ac- 
tion than available markets for what the less 
developed countries have to sell — which, in turn, 
will make it possible for them to buy the things 
they need from us. 

Growing Influence of American Agriculture 

In this trading world of the future — which 
the Kennedy Round and its lessons will help 
to shape — I see American agriculture playing 
an even more extensive role in feeding and 
clothing the world than it is playing today. And 
I see this role carried out increasingly through 
commercial, dollar-earning export trade. 

As I said earlier, during the fiscal year just 
ended we exported a new record value of $6.8 
billion worth of agricultural products. A record 
$5.4 billion of this was in dollar-earning 
commercial sales. 

A total of $8 billion in U.S. agricultural ex- 
ports by 1970 is a target we expect to reach. 
And we will go on from there, I predict, with 
$10 billion in U.S. agricultural exports by 1980. 

Further, I look for the big increases to take 
place in the dollar-earning type of exports 

which, as my friend Secretary Fowler has said, 
are givi:ig timely and strategic assistance to our 
nation's balance of payments. 

Part of this continuing advance in our agri- 
cultural exports will come about through con- 
tinued lowering of trade barriers throughout 
the world. Our products are competitive and 
they are needed. In many countries the continu- 
ing pressure for supplies will override pressures 
for self-sufficiency. 

And as trade barriers are eased, we will con- 
tinue — as we are doing — to follow up with ag- 
gressive market development actions. The De- 
partment of Agi'iculture is teamed today with 
U.S. trade and agricutural groups to promote 
sales of our farm products in more than 70 
countries. This work is effective and is one of 
the strong reasons for my optimistic predictions. 

As an example of this export promotion, I 
am announcing today that the Department of 
Agriculture and our many trade and agricul- 
tural cooperators will present a major agricul- 
tural trade exhibit in Tokyo next spring — 
April 5 to 21, 1968. This will be one of our 
largest overseas promotion events in our largest 
export market. Japan, as you may know, now 
buys nearly $1 billion worth of our farm prod- 
ucts annually. From this exhibition we will 
strengthen further Japan's obvious good will 
toward U.S. food and agricultural products. 
And, more tangibly, we hope to see Japan con- 
tinue to increase its purchases fi'om us, with $1 
billion only an interim milestone. 

American agriculture has immense and grow- 
ing influence in world affairs today. This influ- 
ence will grow as world population and incomes 
rise and demand is strengtliened for the food 
and fiber we can produce with such efficiency. 

But trade, ultimately, is the conduit through 
which the bounty we produce can reach foreign 
consumers. Fundamental to that trade is the 
extent to which the world allows comparative 
advantage to function. 

The Kennedy Round resolved only some of 
agriculture's trade problems. Many remain. But 
I think the Kennedy Round did help to clarify 
the thinking of our own participants and of 
our trading partners. It gave us new insight 
and perspective as we try again. 

And we must try again and keep trying. Only 
as trade in food and agricultural products is 
allowed to flow in a relatively unrestricted man- 
ner will the world's people sliare, as they should 
and must, in all the good things that modern 
science and technology can make available. 




Address by Under Secretary Reynolds 

Our business in the Labor Department is em- 
ployment — and every billion dollars of goods 
we export supports close to 100,000 jobs. We 
are encouraged with the outcome of the Ken- 
nedy Round. "We believe that the substantial 
tariff reductions which will become effective 
over the next 5 years will encourage expansion 
of U.S. exports and enable us to preserve and 
expand export-related employment opportuni- 
ties in the United States. 

In total, we do not anticipate any unmanage- 
able situations of labor dislocation resulting 
from the stimulus of increased imports, al- 
though it could be that particular firms and 
groups of workers may be adversely affected. 
The combination of gi-adual implementation of 
tariff reductions over a 5-year period and rap- 
idly expanding manpower programs, in addi- 
tion to adjustment assistance, will enable work- 
ers and firms to adjust to increased imports with 
minimum personal and corporate losses. 

Our current balance-of-payments difficulty is 
not the only reason for U.S. industry to make 
special efforts to increase U.S. exports. 

Another reality with significant implications 
for domestic employment lies in the fact that 
over the years, as U.S. productivity and effi- 
ciency improve, the American manufacturer 
uses less and less labor per unit of manufacture. 
Consequently, we have to accelerate output in 
manufacturing just to maintain employment 
growth in manufacturing. For example, be- 
tween 1960 and 196.5 output in manufacturing 
increased by about 34 percent. However, during 
the same period employment in manufacturing 
only increased by about 7 percent. 

We are not complaining, mind you ! We are 
aware that employment patterns are constantly 
undergoing change. During that same period, 
while the U.S. labor force was increasing by 
about .5 million workers, the number of unem- 
ployed dropped almost one-half million and 
the unemployment rate declined a full per- 
centage point to an average of 4.5 percent in 
1965. We did considerably better in 1966, when 
the unemployment rate dropped to 3.8 per- 
cent — the first time it has averaged below 4 
percent for a year since 1953. And we hope to 
improve upon that in the future. 

The efficiency of American labor and industry 
showed vip closer to home, also. Productivity 

improvements in the 1960-65 period permitted 
U.S. workers to realize most of their increased 
earnings in increased real income, since price 
levels remained relatively stable while gross 
weekly earnings increased considerably. 

The efficiency of American labor and industry 
shows up in another critical measure, particu- 
larly in reference to our ability to benefit from 
the reciprocal elimination of trade barriers. Be- 
tween 1960 and 1965, unit labor costs in manu- 
facturing declined by about 2 percent in the 
United States. Only Canada showed signs of 
matching that performance. For our other ma- 
jor trading partners, we note that unit labor 
cost increased about 16 percent for the United 
Kingdom, about 8 percent for Sweden, 20 per- 
cent for Japan, and between 25 and 37 percent 
for France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 

But the considerable economic gi-owth and in- 
tegration achieved by the countries of the 
European Economic Community and the Euro- 
pean Free Trade Association suggest that they 
will also achieve the ability to improve their 
cost perfonnance in the future. 

We are confident, however, that we can con- 
tinue to improve our relative competitive posi- 
tion in world markets under our free economic 
and political institutions. 

Developments in the Common Market and 
the European Free Trade Association made it 
increasingly imperative to successfully conclude 
the Kennedy Round negotiations. Both trading 
blocs have made considerable progress in the 
elimination of internal barriers to trade. EFTA 
has no tariffs between member countries, and 
the Common Market is scheduled to eliminate 
all internal tariff barriers on July 1, 1968. In 
1966, the combined GNP of both of these re- 
gional trading blocs exceeded $500 billion. 
Their internal markets are expanding and, like 
the United States market, offer tremendous op- 
portunities for manufacturers to increase out- 
put at lower costs. 

Both of the trading blocs maintain tariff and 
nontariff barriers against U.S. exports which, 
in conjunction with productivity impovements 
to be expected from economic development and 
integration, could have serious implications for 
the expansion of U.S. exports and the degree 
and nature of import competition in U.S. 

It seems reasonable to assume that the tariff 
and nontariff barrier reductions negotiated in 
the Kennedy Round, and the dynamic impetus 
created for the elimination of remaining tariff 

JULY 31, 1967 


and nontariff barriers in the future, will prevent 
both export restriction and trade diversion fi'oin 

We are trying here to identify labor's stake 
in the Kennedy Round witliin a dynamic world 
of changing political and economic conditions. 

We cannot afford to be complacent in such 
a changing world. In fact, we stand to benefit 
considerably by participating in and shaping 
the changes that take place. I say again that 
we expect the benefits of the Kennedy Eomid 
to outweigh the cost of such temporary dis- 
locations as may occur when competition 
increases. Our present stake in foreign trade is 

Export-Related Employment in Manufacturing 

In 1965, about 2.4 million jobs in manufac- 
turing were attributable to U.S. exports of 
merchandise and another half million at- 
tributable to exports of services. Nearly 7 
percent of total manufacturing employment 
was related to the export of goods and services. 
In the manufacturing sector, about 10 percent 
of the machinery industries' employment is 
export related — for the engine and turbine seg- 
ment the ratio is 20 percent. About 10 percent 
of industry employment was export related in 
the lumber and paper industries; 9 percent for 
scientific and measuring instrinnents industry; 
10 percent for aircraft; and 14 and 16 percent, 
respectively, for the chemical and synthetic 
materials industries. 

We emphasize manufacturing employment 
because it is generally high-wage employ- 
ment compared to other industry employment 
and because it constitutes about 30 percent 
of total nonagricultural employment. 

In 1966, gross weekly earnings in manu- 
facturing averaged about $112, compared to 
an average of $61 and $79, respectively, for 
employment in personal service occupations 
and wholesale and retail trade, which together 
constituted about 36 percent of total nonagri- 
cultural employment. 

Further, wages in our chief export indus- 
tries, such as the chemicals, aircraft, and 
machinery industries, are about 10 to 30 percent 
higher than the average weekly earnings for 
manufacturing as a whole. 

So if the past and the present are any 
guide to the future, the stake we have 

in the Kennedy Round is high-wage and 
high-quality employment opportunities and 
everything that implies for a better standard 
of life for all Americans. 

The role of imports is another area which 
we want to discuss frankly and constructively. 

We sometimes hear the viewpoint expressed 
that if we cut off or sharply reduce imports of 
a competitive product, employment and output 
in the domestic industry concerned would auto- 
matically increase. By implication, this argu- 
ment could be read to suggest an increase in 
overall employment as well. 

A complex and dynamic economy such as ours 
does not operate quite that simply. There may 
be particular cases where such a simple rela- 
tionship might hold, but in an environment in 
which national policies are geared to achieve 
and maintain full employment and economic sta- 
bility, such generalizations cannot be sustained. 

Trade flows fi'om countiy to country in the 
free world are reciprocal in nature. A restric- 
tive act taken by one country tends to be 
matched by a restrictive response by other coun- 
tries. The net effect of such acts is most often 
a contraction in world trade. 

The economic effects of such a contraction 
would ultimately be a reduction, relative or ac- 
tual, in exports from the United States, the 
country with the world's largest trade volume. 

Foreign countries generally pay for goods in 
dollars which they acquire directly or indirectly 
from the United States as a result of foreign 
goods being sold to the United States. By re- 
stricting foreign access to U.S. markets, we 
would limit the dollars that are available to 
buyers who are potential customers of U.S. busi- 
ness. The effects could also extend to the loss of 
overseas markets where U.S. businessmen are 
now facing more aggressive competition from 
third countries and from domestic industry in 
the countries involved. 

In this era of close and complex interna- 
tional trade and economic relationships, conse- 
quences of measures which restrict imports are 
most likely to have a detrimental impact on 
U.S. exports and, by extension, on employment 
in export industries, where wages tend to be 

My point is that consideration of proposals 
to restrict imports for the benefit of a single 
industry must be examined in the perepective 



of the total national interest as it relates to 
emploj'ment, prices, and output. 

We must always be alert to situations which 
migfht culminate in widespread and umnanage- 
able unemployment. Fortunately, our experience 
suggests that serious employment dislocation 
which can be attributed to import competition 
is relatively rare and can be accommodated by 
the present national and international trade 

Imports play a critical role in our complex 
economy. Not long ago layoffs were reported 
in the copper and brass products industry be- 
cause of tight supplies of copper. Considerable 
price pressures were reported to exist in the 
stainless steel industry because of nickel short- 
ages. We note also a tendency for imports to 
increase when there is a possibility of an inter- 
ruption to output arising from collective bar- 
gaining negotiations or other causes. 

Therefore, we find it difficult to accept the 
simple relationship that is implied in a state- 
ment tliat total employment can be increased 
if we produce domestically what we now import 
in considerable quantities, even if we do have 
the capability of making the product. 

Benefits to Labor and Nation as a Whole 

Import competition, like any competition, 
stimulates change. Such change may cause dis- 
placement of labor which will vary in duration 
depending on the speed of the change, the 
adaptability of the displaced worker, and 
the availability of alternative emisloyment 

While we think it reasonable to assume that 
imports, as a competitive factor, may contribute 
toward displacements of labor and capital, the 
analytical arts have not advanced sufficiently 
to permit us to measure with any precision the 
impact of imports. In a sense Congress recog- 
nized this when it included the adjustment 
assistance provisions in the Trade Expansion 
Act. These provisions are based on the premise 
that no single group should bear the burden 
of injury that might result from an interna- 
tional policy that benefits the nation as a whole 
and that the determination of possible injury 
due to imports can best be made after close 
examination of particular cases. 

Aside from the employment opportunities 
which are related to the international exchange 

of goods and services, there are the benefits that 
accrue to consumers with respect to the variety 
of products available in the marketplace and the 
less obvious benefits which accrue f i-om the stim- 
ulus of worldwide competition on the basis of 
price, quality, and technology. 

The conclusion we reach is that the benefits 
which accrue to labor and the Nation as a whole 
as a consequence of our foreign trade are such 
that we look to future trade expansion resulting 
from the Kennedy Round agreements with op- 
timism that the net result will be more employ- 
ment at higher wages than would otherwise have 
been the case had the agreement been anything 
less than it is. 

Programs To Assist Vulnerable Industries 

Before closing, I want to remind you of two 
programs which we think equitably protect and 
assist the legitimate interests of industries most 
viilnerable to import competition and which fa- 
cilitate the expansion of world trade. 

The first and more active program is that 
required as a result of our participation in 
the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement 
(LTA). A 3-year extension of the LTA was 
negotiated within the framework of the Ken- 
nedy Round. The Arrangement, over the years, 
has permitted a limited and gradual growth of 
imports in a mamier which avoided disruption 
in the domestic market. The LTA has been an 
important factor in stabilizing emplojanent 
conditions in the industr}' and in encouraging 
considerable imi^rovements in teclmology and 
capital investment to be reflected in improved 
productivity and wages of workers in the in- 

The second program I would note is the ad- 
justment assistance program for firms and 
groups of workers, one of the major innovations 
of the Trade Expansion Act. 

The adjustment assistance concept is that it 
makes more sense to try to improve the pro- 
ductivity of resources displaced or subject to 
displacement as a consequence of import com- 
petition than to restrict imports by means of 
higher tariffs or quotas — since under the latter 
there is no assurance that the necessary improve- 
ments will be made to allow the firm or indus- 
try and associated workers to compete with im- 
ports or other domestic competition. 

Adjustment assistance for woi'kers consists of 
a combination of monetary payments called 

JULY 31, 1967 


trade readjustment allowances, which are based 
on the worker's past earning experience and 
limited to a maximum of 65 jjercent of tlie aver- 
age weekly wage in manufacturing employ- 
ment; training and retraining opportunities; 
and relocation allowances to assist heads of 
houseliolds to move to new locations where there 
is certainty of employment. 

Tlie desire to encourage improved produc- 
tivity is illustrated by the emphasis Congress 
placed on training. Under the act, if a worker 
refuses to avail himself of suitable available 
training opportmiities, he can be denied other 
adjustment assistance. The emphasis on train- 
ing is well placed. We all know from experience 
that the worker who is able to adapt to, and 
take advantage of, change has the best chance 
to enjoy a lifetime of rising income and stable 
employment. This program benefits all of us in 
the long run since by improving skills and 
worker productivity we increase our ability to 
expand the national product and thus make pos- 
sible liigher living standards for us all. 

Under the Trade Expansion Act, the Tariff 
Commission is responsible for making the in- 
itial decisions which determine whether firms 
or workers might be eligible to receive adjust- 
ment assistance. Only five worker groups and 
five firms attempted to obtain adjustment as- 
sistance under the Trade Expansion Act, and 
none of these groups or firms were found by 
the Tariff Commission to meet the criteria for 
eligibility for adjustment assistance presently 
in the act. This experience has made both the 
administration and the Congress aware of the 
need to modify the criteria so that the objective 
of the program relating to workers and firms 
can be more fully achieved. 

We have had experience with the adjustment 
assistance program under the Automotive Prod- 
ucts Trade Act which implements the U.S.- 
Canadian auto agreement. In 18 months of op- 
eration of the program, about 2,000 individual 
workers filed for benefits, of whom about 1,100 
were found to satisfy the eligibility require- 
ments and subsequently received adjustment 
assistance benefits. 

The adjustment assistance benefits available 
to workers under the auto act are identical to 
those provided in the Trade Expansion Act, 
although the procedures for gaining access to 
the program and the criteria for determining 
worker and firm eligibility are substantially dif- 
ferent. Under the auto act, the Tariff' Commis- 
sion conducts an investigation as to the facts of 
the situation. The Automotive Adjustment As- 
sistance Board, made up of the Secretaries of 
Labor, Commerce, and Treasury, makes the de- 
terminations of eligibility for groujas of work- 
ers and firms. 

We believe that adjustment assistance is an 
effective way to assist workers and firms to 
adapt to changing economic conditions. It is in 
this spirit that the administration will be ask- 
ing the Congress to amend the Trade Expan- 
sion Act to insure that the intent and promise 
of the adjustment assistance program can be 
realized by workers and firms who have been 
displaced because of import competition. 

To conclude, I would like to leave you with 
this brief summary of our stake in the Kennedy 
Round : job opportunities ; higher wages ; stable 
and rising incomes; and in the case of disloca- 
tions resulting from import competition, the 
opportunity to improve the skills and earnings 
potential of displaced workers. 



". . . NATO is not only moving, tag and haggage, from the 
Porte Dauphine in Paris to the old Evere airfield in Brussels; 
NATO is also moving from, peaceJeeeping to peacemaking, from 
the mMnageTTient of a cold war to the management of detente!''' 

The Golden Rule of Consultation 

hy Ilarlan Cleveland 

U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council'^ 

In the Paris suburb of Versailles a few 
months ago, a touring company put on Peter 
Ustinov's aging allegorical play The Love of 
Four Colonels. You may recall that m this play 
four officers — French, British, Ajnerican, and 
Soviet colonels — vie for a lady's hand ; the lady 
is perfection. Each fails, because perfection is 
unattainable; and Dr. Diabolikov, who is 
Ustinov's version of the Devil, offers them a 
new proposition. They can, he says, go to sleep 
for a hundred years and awaken with perfec- 
tion in their grasp. 

As they debate the issue, the Soviet officer 
says he is a pragmatist; he is intei'ested not in 
horizons but in breathing. The American is 
attracted to oblivion; he is disgusted with his 
wife and, anyway, he needs the rest. Yet as he 
considers the choice, he thinks of one good rea- 
son to stay alive in the world of today. 
""V^Tierever you have a Russian," he says, "it's a 
good idea to have an American." 

In the Versailles production this line was 
greeted with spontaneous and sustained ap- 
plause. A member of the road-show company 
said afterward that it invariably evokes a cheer 
from French audiences, even in cities where the 
Communist vote is strong. 

There is a little mystery about this applause 
line in the French version of The Love of Four 
Colonels. It is not in the published play and was 
apparently added somewhere along the line — 
perhaps with the object of stirring up the audi- 

' Made before the American Business Men's Club at 
Bonn on June 20. 

ence and making a political point. But what- 
ever its origin, its anonymous a.uthor captured 
in a short, simple sentence what most Euro- 
peans and most Americans know has been the 
practical basis for peace in our time : "Wherever 
you have a Eussian, it's a good idea to have an 

This sure-fire applause line is still, regret- 
tably, as relevant as ever. As long as the Rus- 
sians continue to invest an impressive propor- 
tion of their whole budget in the most modern 
machinery of war, Americans are obliged to as- 
sume that the only sure restraint on Soviet 
leaders is their continuing to feel that recourse 
to force or the threat of force risks setting in 
motion an escalator beyond their control and 
leading to military retaliation against the So- 
viet Union itself. 

Wliat makes it possible for Americans to stay 
in Europe and work with Europeans for Euro- 
pean security is a complex of transatlantic rela- 
tionships called NATO. You all know about 
NATO — or don't you ? I find that almost every- 
body I know has touched NATO at one time or 
another and come away with some image in his 
mind about the Atlantic alliance. 

But most of these images date from 5 or 10 
or 15 years ago. There are "experts" who have 
written sensibly about NATO but who are writ- 
ing nonsense these days because they haven't 
bothered to glance recently at the enormous 
changes which time and circumstances and At- 
lantic politics have wrought in the past 2 years. 
How often have I read the words of a lazy com- 
mentator, who has not been near the NATO 
building for years, telling the alliance not to be 

JTJLT 31, 1967 


so lazy ? How often have we heard some critic, 
cherishing his archaic notion of what NATO is, 
filling his allotted space in the newspaper with 
exhortations to bring the Atlantic alliance up 
to date ? 

Nobody seems to doubt that NATO has bril- 
liantly succeeded in its tirst task, which was to 
persuade the Soviets that military militancy 
would not pay oif in Europe. Not long ago the 
President of the United States called NATO the 
world's greatest peacekeeping force. Yet now 
some people of the Atlantic world, especially 
yoimg people, it is said, are bored by the mili- 
tary security of Europe; they don't remember 
the last war, and they are repelled by the cold 
war. What has this antique alliance done for 
us lately? they ask. NATO is somehow con- 
demned by the 18-year-olds because it is 18 
years old. 

Must NATO die so young in the hearts of the 
young? Surely one should ask first what it is 
about our Nortli Atlantic alliance that remains 
relevant to this final third of the 20th century — 
who would perform its peacekeeping function 
if it were to disappear — and what new tasks this 
group of European and North American allies 
are already beginning to tackle in its new and 
unfamiliar environment of cUtente. 

For NATO is not only moving, bag and bag- 
gage, fi-om the Porte Dauphine in Paris to the 
old Evere airfield in Brassels; NATO is also 
moving from peacekeeping to peacemaking, 
from the management of a cold war to the 
management of detente. 

The Deterrent Force of NATO 

To those who feel that peace is already as- 
sured by Soviet statements and current Soviet 
behavior, I can only recommend they lay off the 
tranquilizers and take a wake-vip pill instead. 
Once the eyes are fully opened, I suggest a close 
look at the raw facts of Soviet military power 
and the rising Soviet investments in the sophis- 
ticated machinery of war. The U.S.S.R. today 
has more strategic missiles, in better hardened 
sites, than ever before. It has more firepower 
in Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany, 
than it has ever had there before. It has a bigger 
naval presence in the Mediterranean this week 
than it has e^er had there before. All in all, a 
sober appraisal of what the Soviets could do to 
us is quite enough to justify maintaining and 

modernizing the deterrent that dissuades tliem i 
from doing it. 

NATO was built because the Soviet leaders of 
two decades ago plainly respected nothing but 
force in the realm of international affairs. The 
story goes that Stalin, when he w.xs informed 
of the interest of the Vatican in a certain matter, 
abruptly stopped the conversation by posing a 
question : How many divisions has the Pope ? 
The story may be apocryphal, but it accurately 
describes the reigning opinion in the ruling 
circles of the Kremlin in quite recent times. This 
illusory notion that force is everything was 
tested, and found wanting, by a whole genera- 
tion of Soviet leaders in a whole series of crises 
from Berlin to Korea to Cuba to Berlin again. 

Tlie critical reason these tests failed was 
NATO. Allied policy and integrated readiness 
proved several times over to Soviet leaders that 
military militancy does not pay off in Europe. 
They tested our force — three times in Berlin 
alone — and found there was enough of it to 
make armed adventure too dangerous a course 
to suit men of power who are also men of pru- 
dence. They tested our will, too — to see if we 
could hold together under pressure — and found 
that we could and would. 

As a result of these cold-war experiences — 
and in response to moderating trends witliin So- 
viet society — the Russian leaders of today are 
noticeably more restrained and less interested 
in working themselves into dangerous con- 
frontations. And so, without speculating on 
what else the current Soviet leaders may have 
come to respect, we can stress that the experience 
of i-ecent years confirms that the Soviet Union 
does, in fact, respect force and beliaves accord- 

As long as we maintain a credible peacekeep- 
ing force, we may reasonably expect the Soviet 
Union to maintain a policy of prudent restraint 
in the conduct of its European policy. And with 
a decent restraint prevailing on both sides, we 
have reason to liope that agreements are possible 
for making the present stalemate of forces in- 
creasingly stable, more tightly controlled; in 
time, perhaps, tlie stalemate can be maintained 
by agreement or example at lower levels of 
ready armed force, and thus at lower cost. And 
as this goes on we may reach a state of political 
detente in which, for the first time since before 
those impatient 18-year-olds were born, we may 
be able to tackle and resolve the fundamental 



political issues which still divide Europe and 
threaten the general peace. 

Thus the respect which Soviet leaders accord 
to the force represented by NATO becomes a 
startinij point for defining the changing tasks of 
the alliance in the years ahead. 

From Military Deterrent to Political Detente 

As we set about to parlay our credible military 
deterrent to a credible political detente, the first 
requirement is therefore to maintain the deter- 
rent itself during the period of detente. We will 
need our ready armed strength to persuade the 
Soviets to talk sense. We will need it to keep 
them talking when the going gets rough. And we 
will need it to keep honest whatever bargains 
can be struck for a durable peace in Europe. 

The first signs of detente — brought about by 
NATO and Conmiunist evolution — are welcome 
indeed, if not yet very impressive. So far, the 
change in East-AVest relations is mostly atmos- 
pheric, compounded of one part Commiuiist cos- 
metics and two parts Western wish-thinking. 
In the North Atlantic Council the other day, we 
took the pulse of this detente and concluded that 
it is not a marriage nor an engagement, or even 
a liaison, but a kind of flirtation, with the West 
taking most of the initiative. 

It is always dangerous, of course, to act in the 
present as if the desired future had already 
arrived. Our desire for permanent peace in 
Europe is so strong in the West that we tend to 
overreact to what our would-be Eastern friends 
say and do from month to month. If they smile, 
we are elated. If they frown, we are depressed. 
A year ago, the prevailing opinion in Europe 
was that instant detente was just aroiuid the 
corner; nothing very exciting had happened 
yet, but it did seem that the Soviets and Eastern 
Europeans wei'e less belligerent and more ready 
to talk sense than they had been at any time 
since the Second World War. 

But then the willingness in the West was 
blunted by a series of Communist counter- 
measures — the East German and Soviet re- 
action to the resumption of relations Ijetween 
Romania and the Federal Republic, the bog- 
ging-down of proposals for a code of conduct on 
East -West relations, the lack of Soviet response 
so far to our efforts to engage them in talks on 
antiballistic missiles, and the hard line of 
Brezhnev's [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec- 

retary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.] 
speech at the Karlovy Vary Conference toward 
the end of April. 

It was in that speech, you recall, that Brezh- 
nev asked us to dissolve NATO and said they 
would in turn dissolve the Warsaw Pact. The 
Soviets may well close down the Wai-saw Pact 
anyway ; it has never been anything but a cover 
for Soviet military domination of its neighbors, 
and it has no political role. I can well under- 
stand why Mr. Brezhnev would want us to 
abolish NATO; it's the same reason that per- 
suades us to maintain it: that in the face of 
Soviet military power a durable East-West 
detente can be built only on a durable Western 

These disappointments in Europe are now 
compounded by Soviet involvement in the Mid- 
dle East crisis. While the two main subjects of 
international attention were a limited war in 
Viet-Nam and a limited peace in Europe, it was 
just barely possible to believe in a Soviet Union 
that relaxes tensions in Europe while helping 
to maintain them in the Far East. But with 
Soviet involvement in two crises outside the 
NATO area, plus all the signs of a hardening 
line on Europe and nuclear issues, the optimists 
who heralded detente last year have become 
the pessimists who now fear that detente is indi- 
visible after all. 

I suggest that the earlier elation and the cur- 
rent depression are equally overdrawn. We 
were not as close to enduring peace with the 
Soviets as many people thought we were a year 
ago. And we are not as far from peace with the 
Soviets today as this season's events would make 
it appear. It is futile to take the temperature of 
Eastern intentions every hour on the hour and 
keep adjusting our Western moods and actions 
accoi'dingly. Onr problem is to move steadily 
along the rough and erratic road toward East- 
West conciliation and a lasting European set- 
tlement. The zigzag course of Soviet behavior 
is not all the Machiavellian tactics of leaders 
who know exactly wha.t they are doing. Some of 
it is sunply a reflection of how very hard it is for 
totalitarian leaders to relax and normalize their 
international relations. On the whole, friendly 
relations with one's neighbors come more 
naturally to us in the West ; but for the Com- 
munists, friendly relations with the West re- 
quire a radical wrench from the progrannnatic 

JULY 31, 1967 


hostility whicli has been for so long a way of 
life in Eastern Europe. 

In spite of zigs and zags, we all feel in our 
bones that it makes sense to work toward a Euix)- 
pean security system which rests on something 
better than military standoff. And it is not too 
soon to ask what NATO, while it maintains and 
modernizes our military deterrent, can do about 
Mtente. The answer is simple, and has already 
been given in actions by the North Atlantic 
Council during the past few months: for the 
Atlantic alliance is the natural Western agency 
for managing our side of the detente. 

The Management of Detente 

Hubert Humphrey, who visited Europe and 
this city just 2 months ago, has been talking 
about substituting an Open Door for the Iron 
Curtain in Europe. The North Atlantic Council 
is already deep in the business of directing 
traffic through the rusty, creaky, slowly opening 
door of East-West relations. 

It is none to soon. 

For each ally has its own ideas about how to 
relax with the Soviets. The British have been 
talking in Moscow about a friendship treaty; 
the Germans are trying to arrange diplomatic 
relations with the Eastern Europeans; the 
French are negotiating scientific and military 
cooperation with the Soviets ; the Poles are woo- 
ing the Belgians; the Yugoslavs are promoting 
East-West relations in their own specialized 
way; the Romanians are reminding the Italians 
of their common Latin culture. And the Amer- 
icans are talking directly with the Soviets about 
antiballistic missiles and the nonproliferation 
of nuclear weapons — among other things. 

These various, mostly bilateral, discussions 
do not have to be contradictory or at cross- 
purposes. Detente managers can do several 
things at once ; indeed, we shall have to work for 
a better climate of relations through cultural, 
technical, commercial, and economic arrange- 
ments even as we begin to talk seriously about 
the underlying political and secui-ity issues. 

But each of these new East-West relation- 
ships soon touches the vital interests not only of 
the two nations doing the talking but of their 
allies as well. We should certainly try to get to 
each stage of agreement together. That is why 
each of these relationships needs to be — and 
most of them have been — discussed in the North 
Atlantic Council. 

The management of detente will test the ca- 
pacity of the best minds and the largest spirits 
in all the Allied nations. Already this year the 
North Atlantic Council has recruited a number 
of scholars and statesmen to make a wholesale 
review of the future tasks of the alliance. They 
are finding it not easy to mold a common policy 
out of elements which until now have been con- 
sidered as almost unrelated to each other: the 
unity of Western Europe and the reunification 
of Gei-many, the relationship of Europe to 
America and the relationship of Europe with 
Russia, the impact of massive and dramatic 
events outside the NATO defense perimeter on 
relationships within the NATO circle. To bring 
into a single framework all the different kinds 
of peace and relaxation we have all been saying 
we favor is as challenging a political puzzle as 
any of us could want to tackle. 

It was quite to be expected that the first re- 
sults of detente should have been a rise in ten- 
sions among allies. As long as the nonprolifera- 
tion treaty seemed an academic matter, because 
the Soviets were not really interested in it, we 
could all afford to be loudly in favor of it. As 
soon as the Soviets showed signs of interest, 
every political leader in the West had to ask 
himself hard questions about his real attitude 
toward a real treaty banning the further spread 
of nuclear weapons. There were 3 years of 
desultory NATO consultation before the treaty 
looked real ; but starting last winter, 3 months 
of very intensive consultation were required to 
make sure that the treaty would appeal to each 
ally as protecting its vital interests. This com- 
plex and interesting negotiation in the North 
Atlantic Council and with the Soviets still 
goes on. 

NATO consultation on the nonproliferation 
treaty, which has given rise to so much comment 
in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, is a good 
example of the organization's role and of its 
enhanced value in a period of xa'A.'^h^-dHente. 
The fact that the United States has signed the 
North Atlantic Treaty and sits on the North 
Atlantic Council is our guarantee, aaid Europe's 
assurance, that we are not going to make deals 
with the Soviet Union behind the backs or 
against the interests of our allies. And the con- 
verse is a.lso true : That is why the German For- 
eign Minister explained at the NATO meeting 
in Luxembourg last week just what the Federal 
Republic is trying to do to increase contacts be- 



tween both parts of Germany — and drew a 
unanimous endorsement from his 14 colleagues 
tha.t "this internal German process was to be 
considered an important contribution to the 
search for a detente in Europe." ^ And it was in 
this spirit of moving together toward detente^ 
and not letting the Soviets use steps toward 
detente as another way of discriminating 
against the Federal Eepublic, that the North 
Atlantic Council last week "recorded its view 
that tlie detente should be extended for the ben- 
efit of all members of the Alliance." 

In short, membership in the North Atlantic 
Council is every ally's assurance that he will not 
have to deal with the Soviet Union aJone. If 
NATO did not exist, there would indeed be 
danger of separate negotiations enabling the 
Soviets to play one Western ally off against the 
others — to use detente as a device for discrimi- 
nation. If NATO did not exist, Europeans 
might have some reason to be alarmed by the 
prospect that the two superpowers might some- 
how divide the world between them. But NATO 
does exist and is available to manage the detente 
as it has so successfully managed the deterrent 
for all these years. 

The political phase of NATO has thus begim. 
We are ready to consult intimately with our 
partners at every stage of this new and fascinat- 
ing game. We ask in return only a reasonably 
strict application of the Golden Rule — that our 
NATO partners consult us as early, as frankly, 
and as often as they would themselves wish to 
be consulted. In this respect detente, like deter- 
rence, is indivisible. 

NATO's Global Agenda of Consultation 

What about NATO consultation outside the 
so-called "NATO area"? The crisis in the Mid- 
dle East has brought the question sharply to 
center stage. 

NATO's integrated defense sj^stem, of course, 
is limited by its political geography ; the Allies 
have accepted the common obligation to defend 
together a perimeter that includes the territory 
of every NATO member and necessarily the 
Mediterranean and Baltic seas and the North 
Atlantic Ocean as well. But when it comes to 
political consultation, the agenda of the North 

' For text of a communique issued at the close of the 
North Atlantic Coiuicil meeting on June 14, see Bul- 
letin of July 3, 1967, p. 14. 

Atlantic Council is global — which is just an- 
other way of saying that the world is round. 
Thus at the NATO ministerial meeting in 
Luxembourg last week, a prime topic of consul- 
tation was, of course, the breakdown of the 
always precarious peace in the Middle East. 
That did not mean the alliance itself can or 
should operate in the Middle East; but it did 
reflect the reality that turbulence next door to 
NATO afi'ects the interests and could affect the 
treaty obligations of every member of the alli- 
ance. The distinction is between the arena for 
international action, which is the United Na- 
tions, and the place where allies consult about 
their broadest interests among themselves, 
which is the North Atlantic Council. 

Americans' Stake in NATO Endeavors 

As we measure the fluctuating chances of de- 
tente against the risks of Western disarray, I 
think we have to say that this past year has been 
good for the alliance. 

— We have stopped asking ourselves whether 
we need a NATO defense system and have set 
about to modernize it. 

This spring we approved the first new agreed 
NATO strategy in 11 years; and this month we 
are starting to send messages through the new 
NATO communications satellite system. 

— We have stopped talking about 1969 and are 
planning actively for the 1970's. 

We have begun in earnest this year to share 
among NATO govermnents the responsibility 
for the nuclear portion of our common deter- 
rent. The force plans we are now working on 
this summer extend to 1973 ; and the studies of 
political settlement in Europe may extend even 
farther into the future. 

— We have stopped wishing for detente and 
have set about to seek it actively. Our problem 
is to stay steady on our peacemaking course, 
keeping everlastingly at it desipte the tactical 
zigs and zags of Soviet diplomacy. 

In all these endeavors we Americans have a 
stake ; and so we have a contribution to make, a 
voice to raise, a lead to take. 

To those who doubt that we will stay the 
course, I can only cite our record for fidelity to 
what we have said we would do — which leads 
us, indeed, to make good on our commitments 
farther from home, for a longer time, at a 

JTJLT 31. 196'; 


greater cost, tlian some of our friends think 

To those who thinli that because of these far- 
away commitments we have lost interest in the 
future of Europe, I suggest the simplest pos- 
sible test: Ask yourself whether there is any 
matter of vital interest to Europeans in which 
Americans and their Government are not deeply 
enough involved. 

And to tliose — back home as well as in 
Europe — who find the frustrations of peace- 
making too uncertain and the burdens of peace- 
keeping too great, I can only prescribe a daily 
reading of one short passage from the philo- 
sophical memoirs of Dag Hammarskjold: 

''You have not done enough, you have never 
done enough, so long as it is still possible that 
you have something of value to contribute. This 
is the answer when you are groaning under what 
you consider a burden and an uncertainty. . . ." 

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee 
Holds Second Meeting 

Following is the text of a joint com/munique 
rohicli was released at Buenos Aires on. July 5 
at the close of a 3-day meeting of the Joint U.S.- 
Argentine Trade and Economic Coinmittee. 

The Joint Argentine-United States Trade 
and Economic Committee held its second meet- 
ing in Buenos Aires from July 3 to July 5, 1967. 
The first meeting was held in Washington in 
May 1966.1 

The Delegation of Argentina was headed by 
Sr. Enrique Gaston Valente, Undersecretary of 
Foreign Commerce, and the American Delega- 
tion by Mr. Edward E. Fried, Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for International Re- 
sources and Food Policy. 

The meeting was opened by the Minister of 
Foreign Aifairs and Worship, Dr. Nicanor 
Costa Mendez and was conducted in an atmos- 
phere of complete cordiality. The two Delega- 
tions noted that these talks reflected the spirit 
of Chapter III of the Declaration of the Presi- 
dents of America signed in Punta del Este in 
April 1967.= The Delegations agreed that every 

' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 944. 
' For text, see ihid., May 8, 1967, p. 712. 

opportunity should be taken to increase mutu- 
ally beneficial trade in both directions. 

The Argentine Delegation expressed concern 
over legislation pending in the United States 
Congress which, if enacted, could provide for 
certain restrictions on meat imports into the 
United States. It was pointed out that the Ar- 
gentine packing industry has made substantial 
investments with a view to developing export 
markets for prepared meats such as cooked and 
frozen. The United States Delegation expressed 
its understanding of the importance of the meat 
trade to the Argentine economy and gave assur- 
ances tliat the views expressed by the Argentine 
Delegation would be given full consideration. 
It was noted with satisfaction that market con- 
ditions for beef were improving. 

In response to the concern ex])ressed by the 
Argentine Delegation about additional restric- 
tions on dairy imports into the United States, 
the United States Delegation noted that the 
Presidential Proclamation concerning imports 
of dairy products, issued on June 30,=* did not 
affect United States imports of Argentine 

The Argentine Delegation was pleased to 
note that the United States had recently sus- 
pended its export subsidies on flaxseed and lin- 
seed oil. The Delegations exchanged views on 
current problems confronting the tung oil 
market and explored possible ways of improv- 
ing the situation. 

The Argentine Delegation advised that the 
Argentine Government had accepted the invita- 
tion of the United States Government to send a 
delegation to Washington to discuss an agree- 
ment for the avoidance of double taxation. 

The Argentine Delegation informed the 
United States Delegation of its interest in ex- 
panding cotton textile exports to the United 
States. The United States Delegation explained 
the provisions of the Intergovernmental Long- 
Term Cotton Textile Arrangement,^ which aims 
at providing growth for the cotton textile ex- 
ports of developing countries so long as such 
exports do not disrupt the markets of the im- 
porting countries. This matter will be explored 
further before the next meeting of the Joint 

The Argentine Delegation offered to consider 
the possibilities of simplifying the consular 

' Proclamation 3790 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 9803. 
* For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 



legalization procedure applicable to commer- 
cial invoices covering United States exports to 
Argentina, The discussions also covered some 
aspects of import regulations of Argentina, 
such as the system of prior deposits and the 
customs clearance procedure. 

Argentina's interest in improving the possi- 
bilities of diversifying its exports to the United 
States was also discussed. The Delegations con- 
sidered various ways in which the United States 
might assist toward this end. The discussions 
a,lso covered problems relating to the Argentine 
motion picture and television industries. It was 
agreed to facilitate Argentine contacts with the 
appropriate United States industries. 

The two Delegations reviewed the continuing 
cooperation of both coimtries toward the nego- 
tiating of an International Grains Agreement. 
They noted with satisfaction the agreement on 
wheat prices and food aid reached in Geneva in 
the context of the Kennedy Eound and dis- 
cussed some of the problems before the negoti- 
ating conference called by the International 
Wlieat Council for July 12 of tliis year. 

U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement 
on Flood Control Project 

Statement hy President Johnson 

White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated July 6 

The Governments of the United States and 
Mexico have concluded an agreement for the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of an 
international flood control project for the Ti- 
juana River in California and in Baja Califor- 
nia, Alexico. Agreement was reached through 
the International Boundary and "Water Com- 
mission, United States and Mexico, which will 
now proceed to supervise joint design and con- 
struction of the project. 

Once again we join with our sister Republic 
of Mexico for the solution of a border problem. 
The normally small Tijuana River, flowing 
through the Mexican city of Tijuana and the 
cities of San Diego and Imperial Beach to the 
Pacific Ocean, is subject to severe floods. By 
channelizing the river, the two countries can 
confine its floodwaters in those cities to a nar- 
row, concrete-lined waterway. These cities will 
be able to develop the river's flood plains with- 

out a continual threat to lives, homes, and busi- 
nesses. Since tlie new river channel in the United 
States will be moved southward to a location 
just north and generally parallel to the interna- 
tional boundary, the United States cities will 
not have to contend with this river running 
through their developed areas. 

Each counti-y will pay for that part of the 
project within its own territory, thus sharing 
costs proportionally in accordance with the 
benefits received. It is estimated that the United 
States portion will cost $15,400,000 on the basis 
of current prices. Of this amount, the local bene- 
ficiaries w^ould pay $4,500,000 and the Federal 
Government would pay $10,900,000. This ar- 
rangement for local participation is the same 
as though the project were domestic instead of 

I want to thank the many Members of Con- 
gress who supported the legislation last year to 
authorize this project, and particularly Senator 
[Thomas H.] Kucliel and Representative 
[Lionel] Van Deerlin for their valuable 

At three widely separated points along our 
almost 2,000-mile boundary with Mexico, in the 
lower Rio Grande Valley, at El Paso, and now 
in California, we have new projects underway 
designed to improve the border region where so 
many of the citizens of both countries live and 
share common aspirations. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

90th Congress, 1st Session 

Special Report of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Policies. Let- 
ter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of 
the Council, transmitting the Council's Special Re- 
port on U.S. Participation in a Proposed Increase in 
the Resources of the Fund for Special Operations 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, and on a 
Proposed Modification of Provisions for the Election 
of the Bank's Executive Directors. H. Doc. 117. 
May 3, 196T. 67 pp. 

The Techniques of Soviet Propaganda. A study pre- 
sented by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Revised 
1967. S. Doc. 34. June 12, 1967. 63 pp. 

Seventeenth Annual Report of the Senate Select Com- 
mittee on Small Business, together with minority 
views. S. Rept. 345. June 14. 1967. 51 pp. 

JULY 31. 1967 



U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem; Urges 
Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near East 

Following is a sfateinent made on July I4 iy 
U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldherg in the 
fifth emergency special session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly., together with the text of a reso- 
lution adopted hy the Assembly that day. 


U.S./tJ.N. press release 124 

Mr. President, the goal of the United States 
in the Middle East, one we believe shared by 
the great preponderance of the world commu- 
nity, is a durable peace and enduring settle- 
ment. We conceive of this goal as requiring 
throughout the area far more than a return to 
the temporary and fragile truce which erupted 
into tragic conflict on June 5. 

We are convinced, both by logic and the un- 
forgettable experience of a tragic history, that 
there can be progress toward the durable peace 
in the entire area only if certain essential steps 
are taken. One immediate, obvious, and impera- 
tive step is the disengagement of all forces and 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces to their own 
territory. A second and equally immediate, ob- 
vious, and imperative step is the termination 
of any claims to a state of war or belligerency 
on the part of Arab states in the area. 

These two steps are essential to progress to- 
ward a durable peace. They are equally essential 
if there is to be substance and concrete mean- 
ing to the basic charter right of every state in 
the area, a right to which the United States re- 
mains firmly committed: the right to have its 
territorial integrity and political independence 
respected by all and free from the threat or use 
of force by all. 

The United States stands ready to give its 
full support to practical measures to help bring 

about these steps — withdrawal of forces and 
the termination of belligerent acts or claims as 
soon as possible. 

But if our goal is a durable peace, it is imper- 
ative that there be greater vision both from this 
organization and from the parties themselves. 
It is imperative that all look beyond the imme- 
diate causes and effects of the recent conflict. 
Attention must also be focused, and urgently : 

— on reaching a just and permanent settle- 
ment of the refugee problem, which has been 
accentuated by recent events; 

• — on means to insure respect for the right of 
every member of the United Nations in the area 
to live in peace and security as an independent 
national state; 

- — on arrangements so that respect for the ter- 
ritorial integrity and political independence of 
all states in the area is assured ; 

— on measures to insure respect for the rights 
of all nations to freedom of navigation and 
of innocent passage through international 
waterways ; 

— on reaching agreement, both among those 
in the area and tliose outside, that economic de- 
velopment and the improvement of living stand- 
ards should be given precedence over a wasteful 
arms race in the area. 

In each and every one of the separate but re- 
lated imperatives of peace, we recognize fully 
that agreement cannot be imposed upon the 
parties from outside. At the same time, we also 
believe that the machinery, experience, and re- 
sources of the United Nations can be of im- 
measurable help in implementing agreements 
acceptable to the parties. 

The offer of such assistance by this organiza- 
tion is dictated not only by the roots of United 
Nations responsibility and involvement in the 



Middle East, which have grown deep and strong 
over two decades; it is also dictated by our com- 
mon determination, even dnty, under the charter 
to save succeeding generations in tlie Middle 
East from the scourge of another war. 

It is against the background of this overall 
I)olicy that my Government has developed its 
attitudes toward the question of Jerusalem, and 
I wish to mal%:e that attitude very explicit. The 
views of my Government on Jerusalem have 
been expressed by the President of the United 
States and other high-level officials. 

On June 28, the White House released the fol- 
lowing statement : ^ 

The President said on June 19 tliat in our view "tliere 
. . . must be adequate recognition of the special interest 
of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^ 
On this principle he assumes that before any unilateral 
action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be 
appropriate consultation with religious leaders and 
others who are deeply concerned. Jerusalem is holy to 
Christians, to Jews, and to Moslems. It is one of the 
great continuing tragedies of history that a city which 
is so much the center of man's highest values has also 
been, over and over, a center of conflict. Repeatedly 
the passionate beliefs of one element have led to ex- 
clusion or unfairness for others. It has been so, un- 
fortunately, in the last 20 years. Men of all religions 
will agree that we must now do better. The world must 
find an answer that is fair and recognized to be 
fair. . . . 

The second statement, released on the same 
day by the Department of State, read : ^ 

The hasty administrative action taken today can- 
not be regarded as determining the future of the holy 
places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them. 

The United States has never recognized such uni- 
lateral actions by any of the states in the area as 
governing the international status of Jerusalem. . . . 

During my own statement to the General 
Assembly on July 3,* I said that the "safe- 
guarding of the holy places, and freedom of 
access to them for all, should be internation- 
ally guaranteed; and the status of Jerusalem 
in relation to them should be decided not uni- 
laterally but in consultation with all concerned." 
These statements represent the considered and 
continuing policy of the United States Govern- 

With regard to the specific measures taken 
by the Government of Israel on June 28, 1 wish 

United States Repeats Concern 
for Future of Jerusalem 

statement by Secretary Rusk 

Press release 163 dated July 14 

The United States has abstained today on a 
General Assembly resolution concerning Jeru- 
salem. As Ambassador Goldberg indicated in 
his statement earlier today, this abstention was 
necessary because in our view the resolution as 
presented did not fully reflect either the existing 
situation or the best means of dealing with it. 
But it would be wrong for any people or gov- 
ernment to assume that this abstention indicates 
that the United States is indifferent to the fu- 
ture of Jerusalem. 

The United States deeply regrets the adminis- 
trative actions on Jeru.salem which have been 
taken by the Government of Israel in recent 
weeks. As we said on June 28' these adminis- 
trative decisions cannot be regarded as deter- 
mining the future of the holy places or the status 
of Jerusalem in relation to them. We have made 
this position clear to the Government of Israel 
both before and after these decisions were taken. 
We understand the deep emotional concerns 
which move the people and Government of Israel 
on this matter, but we are bound to point out 
the need for understanding of the equal con- 
cerns of others. 

As we have observed before, Jerusalem is holy 
to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and it is gen- 
uinely tragic that this city of the highest spirit- 
ual meaning has so often been a cause of conflict 
in the past. Surely the lesson from this experi- 
ence is that we must all do better now. 

The United States Government continues to 
hope that a generous and fair-sighted view will 
prevail among all concerned, and its own influ- 
ence will be directed to that end. It is our belief 
that means of reason and of persuasion are most 
likely to be successful in this purpose. 

' For a Department statement of June 28, see 
Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60. 

' For text, see Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60. 

" Ibid.. July 10, 1967, p. 31. 

' For text, see iWd., July 17, 1967, p. 60. 

• For text, see Hid., July 24, 1967, p. 108. 

to make it clear that the United States does not 
accept or recognize these measures as altering 
the status of Jerusalem. My Government does 
not recognize that the administrative measures 
taken by the Government of Israel on June 28 
can be regarded as the last word on the matter, 
and we regret that they were taken. We in- 
sist that the measures "taken cannot be con- 
sidered other than interim and provisional, and 
not prejudging the final and permanent status 
of Jerusalem. Unfortunately and regrettably, 

JTJLT 31, 1967 


the statements of the Government of Israel on 
this matter have thus far, in our view, not ade- 
quately dealt with this situation. 

Many delegations are aware that we were 
prepared to vote for a separate resolution on 
Jerusalem which would declare that the Assem- 
bly would not accept any unilateral action as 
determining the status of Jerusalem and calling 
on the Govenmient of Israel to desist from any 
action purporting to define permanently the 
status of Jei'usalem. However, the sponsors 
made clear then, as was their right, that they 
preferred to proceed with their own text in 
document A/2253,= and now with their resolu- 
tion in A/L. 528/Rev. 2. 

The latter draft does include changes which 
we consider represent a marked improvement 
over the original version, particularly in that 
it no longer tends to prejudge action in the 
Security Council. Nevertheless, since the resolu- 
tion just adopted ex])ressly builds on Resolution 
2253 on whicli we abstained for reasons which 
we stated publicly, consistent with that vote 
we also abstained today. 

Even as revised, the resolution does not fully 
correspond to our views, particularly since it 
appears to accept by its call for recision of 
measures that the administrative measures 
which were taken constitute annexation of Jer- 
usalem by Israel, and because we do not believe 
the problem of Jerusalem can realistically be 
solved apart from the other related aspects of 
Jerusalem and of the Middle Eastern situa- 
tion. Therefore, the United States abstained. 

We have, of course, recMitly expressed our- 
selves in a more formal sense by voting for a 
resolution dealing with the question of Jeru- 
salem. This was the Latin American resolution 
contained in document A/L. 523/Rev. l,'^ which 
dealt with Jerusalem as one of the elements 
involved in a peaceful settlement in the Middle 

It is in the treatmeiit of one aspect of the 
jiroblem of Jerusalem as an isolated issixe, sep- 
arate from the other elements of Jerusalem and 
of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, 
that we were unable to support Resolution 2253. 
Certainly, Jerusalem, as has been pointed out 

^ For a .statement made by Ambassador Goldberg 
on .Tilly 4 in explanation of the U.S. abstention on 
A/RES/225.'?(ES-V) and text of the resolution, see 
f6!rf..pp. 112andll3. 

° For background, see i1)id., p. 108. 

miiversally, I think, by every speaker, is an 
important issue and, in our opinion, one which ' 
must necessarily be considered in the context 
of a settlement of all problems arising out of 
the recent conflict. In Jerusalem there are tran- 
scendent spiritual interests. But there are also 
other important issues. And we believe that the 
most fruitful approach to a discussion of tlie 
future of Jerusalem lies in dealing with the en- 
tire problem as one aspect of the broader ar- 
rangements that must be made to restore a just 
and durable peace in the area. And we believe, 
consistent with the resolution we were ready to 
sponsor, that this Assembly should have dealt 
with the problem by declaring itself against 
any imilateral change in the status of Jerusalem. 

Mr. President, since we are approaching the 
end of this session on this important subject, 
in which remarks were made not relating spe- 
cifically to Jerusalem but ranging very broadly 
on other subjects, I cannot let this occasion pass 
without reference to some of tlie allegations 
made regarding my Government's role in the 
recent conflict in the INIiddle East. The charges 
that the United States instigated, encouraged, 
or in any way participated in this tragic strug- 
gle are too unfoundecl to dignify by individual 
comment. I dealt with many of these falsehoods 
explicitly in the Security Council and will not 
take the time of the Assembly to go over the 
same ground here. I reaffirm what I said to the 
Security Council with respect to each and every 
one of these charges.' 

I will merely say that one positive note in 
this session has been the abandonment of the 
most vicious falsehood of all — which could have 
been productive of the most disastrous conse- 
quences — that United States planes and mili- 
tary personnel participated in the war on the 
side of Israel. Before the war broke out, we 
sought to prevent it by all means at our com- 
mand. And once it began, we did everything in 
our power to bring it to an early end. The rec- 
ord of our diplomacy is very clear in this mat- 
ter, despite comments which have been read 
from newspapers which scarcely characterize 
that diplomacy. And the record of the Security 
Council is plain and clear for everyone to read 
as to the actions we took, supported, and initi- 
ated in the Security Council to bring the con- 
flict to an end. 

' For background, see ibid.. June 19, 19fi7, p. 920 ; 
June 26, 1967, p. 934; and July 3, 1967, p. 3. 



There is one charge about our position to 
which I believe no nation in tlus liall faithful 
to the charter would feel any necessity to plead. 
That is the charge that we support the right 
of every sovereign state member of the United 
Nations to an independent national existence, 
its right to live in a spirit of peaceful coexist- 
ence and good neighborliness with all in the 
area. That is a charge which the Charter of the 
United Xations places on us all and which we 
should all readily accept and acknowledge. 

Our view has remained steadfast — before, 
during, and now after the conflict. We extend 
the hand of friendship to all states in the I\Iid- 
dle East and express the fervent hope that as 
time heals the scars of war, we can soon again 
join our common efforts in helping build a bet- 
ter, more enduring order in every state and 
throughout the area, with peace, justice, secu- 
rity, and liberty for all. 

Mr. President, so much vituperation has 
taken place in tliis Assembly, so unseemly in a 
world forum, that I could not help recalling 
today a statement made by my distinguished 
predecessor, who died 2 years ago today in the 
cause of peace. Adlai Stevenson. Adlai Steven- 
son, talking about our bolo\'ed Eleanor Roose- 
velt, said, ''She would rather light candles than 
curse the darkness.'' And I share that spirit. I 
do not see that anything is gained in the cause 
of peace in the Middle East by the ^atuperation 
which has taken place, vituperation not only 
against my country but against other, small 
countries, vituperation which has no place in 
this foinun. 

The time has come — indeed, the time is long 
overdue — for \dtuperation and bitterness to be 
tempered by sober realization of the difficulties 
ahead and the willingiiess to face them squarely 
and to do something about them. 

"Wliat is needed is the wisdom and statesman- 
ship of all those directly concerned and the 
members of the United Nations so that condi- 
tions of hate, too much ventilated in this hall, 
can be eventually replaced by conditions of good 

'\Aniat is needed, above all, in the area is a 
spirit of reconciliation which will someday 
hopefully make possible a peace of reconcilia- 
tion. I fervently hope that all in the area and 
all in this hall wiD approach the days ahead 
in this spirit. 


Measures taken by Israel to chaitgc the status of the 
City of Jerusalem 

The General Assembly, 

Recalling its resolution 22.53 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 

Having received the report submitted by the Sec- 

Taking note icith the deepest regret and concern of 
the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) ; 

2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to 
rescind all measures already taken and to desist 
forthwith from taking any action which would alter 
the status of Jerusalem ; 

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Security Council and the General Assembly on the 
situation and on the implementation of the present 

U.N. Security Council Condemns 
Recruitment of Mercenaries 

The V.N. Security Council met on July 6 and 
10 to con-^ider a complaint ^ from, the Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo. FoUoioing are 
statements made in the Council on July 6 and 
10 hy UjS. Deputy Representative William B. 
Buffum, together with the text of a resolution 
adopted iy Council on July 10. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 119 

We readily agreed this afternoon to an urgent 
meeting of the Security Council to consider the 
complaint from the Government of the Demo- 
cratic Rejiublic of the Congo charging that 
forces from outside its own country have fo- 
mented disturbances in the eastern jaortion of 
the Congo and, with the cooperation of dis- 
sident local military elements, apparently 
gained control of several important cities. The 
charges are indeed serious ones, and they deserve 

*A/RES/22.>i (ES-V) (A/L. 52S/Rev. 2) : adopted 
by the Assembly on July 14 by a vote of 100 to 0, with 
18 abstentions (U.S.). 

' U.X. docs. A/67o3 and S/8052. 

' U.N. doc. S/8031. 

JULY 31, 1967 


our most careful consideration. Certainly the 
type of action that has been alleged would con- 
travene not only the spirit but also the letter of 
the United Nations Charter. 

The strong opposition of the United States 
Government to intervention by one state in the 
internal affairs of another has been demon- 
strated repeatedly. Such interference, whether 
it be with armed forces or throvigh subversion or 
other less obvious means, cannot be counte- 
nanced. If any foreign government is in fact 
aiding and abetting those in the Congo who are 
seeking by force to wrest control of certain areas 
from the legitimate authorities, such action 
would violate the charter and accepted princi- 
ples of internntional law. All U.X. member 
states, in our judgment, should refrain from any 
such activities and should take appropriate 
measures to discourage their nationals from par- 
ticipation in them. 

Inasmuch as these charges are serious ones, 
the Council will naturally wish to be fully in- 
formed of the facts of the situation. We trust 
that the Government of the Congo will make 
every effort to ascertain the full facts and keep 
us informed of developments as they occur. In 
the meantime the United States believes it is 
incumbent on all of us to do nothing that will 
further exacerbate the situation there. 

Since the day when the Congo became inde- 
pendent the United States has been prominent 
among those that have supported and assisted 
the government of that nation to develop 
strength and stability in order to insure the se- 
curity and well-being of the Congolese people. 
We have made these efforts both through the 
United Nations and through mutually agreed 
bilateral arrangements. This record, if I may 
say in all humility, Mr. President, is one of 
which my Government is proud. 

And it is for this reason, as well, that we are 
deeply disturbed over any threats to the steady 
progress which has been made in the Congo and 
we firmly support the efforts of the Central Gov- 
ernment in the Congo to restore order and to 
exercise its legitimate authority throughout the 
country. We deplore any attempts by outside 
forces to interfere with those efforts. I am sure 
that this will also prove to be the attitude 
of other members of this Council and feel con- 
fident that within a short time it will again be 
possible for all of the people in the Congo to live 
in peace and free from fear, as they so richly 


U.S. /U.N. press release 122 

Mr. President, although the drnft resolution ^ 
which has just been introduced by the distin- 
guished representative of Nigeria does not co- 
incide with our preferences in every respect, the 
United States will vote affirmatively. We will 
do so because we fully support the efforts of the 
Democratic Kepublic of the Congo to exercise 
its legitimate authority throughout the country 
and to restore order wherever order is disrupted. 

Mr. President, in our view, if any foreign gov- 
ernment aids or abets any elements in the 
Congo, whether these be mercenaries or irregu- 
lar forces seeking to overthrow the Government 
or to gain control of any part of the country, 
such action would be in clear violation of the 
United Nations Charter and deserving of our 
condemnation. This was our policy, sir, 3 years 
ago when secessionist elements in the eastern 
Congo were engaged in large-scale conflict, with 
substantial support from the Chinese Com- 
munists, to wrest control from the Central Gov- 
ernment ; and this remains our policy today. 

We will vote for the resolution this evening 
because we support the principle of noninter- 
ference in the internal affairs of the Congo. In 
doing so, we do not consider that by this reso- 
lution the Council is making any specific finding 
with regard to any specific government. 

Mr. President, the United States has not been 
content to give merely moral support to the 
principles endorsed in this resolution this 
evening. On the contrary, we have sought to 
provide the Government of the Congo with some 
of the tools which it needs to do the job in 
protecting its integrity and its political 

It was in this connection that over the past 
weekend the United States, in response to a 
request from President Mobutu and consistent 
with previous United Nations resolutions deal- 
ing with the Congo problem and calling foi' 
assistance in helping that government to main- 
tain its independence and territorial integrity, 
dispatched three C-130 transport aircraft and 
crews to Kinshasa. These are aircraft, I should 
like to make clear to the Council, which are 
designed to provide long-range logistic support 
for the Congolese Government in meeting the 

' U.N. doc. S/8050. 



mercenarj'-led rebellion. They will be there in 
a noncombatant status. 

This action reflects our longstanding policy 
of supporting the Central Government and the 
unity of the Congo, and it is in this spirit that 
we will support the resolution sponsored by 
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, and India. 


Current Actions 


The Security Council, 

Saving taken cognizance of the mefsage of the 
Congolese Government contained in document S/S031, 

Eaving discusxed the serious developments in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

Concerned by the threat posed by foreign interfer- 
ence to the independence and territorial integrity of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 

1. Reaffirms in particular paragraph 2 of Security 
Council resolution 226 (1960) of 14 October 1966;' 

2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting 
or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the 
provision of facilities to them, with the objective of 
overthrowing the Governments of States Members of 
the United Nations ; 

3. Calls upon Governments to ensure that their ter- 
ritory and other territories under their control, as 
well as their nationals, are not used for the planning 
of subversion, and the recruitment, training and 
transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Gov- 
ernment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ; 

4. Decides that the Security Council shall remain 
seized of the question ; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely 
the implementation of the present resolution. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those 
listed helow) may he consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may be 
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, 
United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Operation in Cyprus for the period December 6, 
1966, to June 12, 1967. S/7969. June 13, 1967. 74 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Coun- 
cil in pursuance of operative paragraph 3 of the 
Council's resolution of June 14 (S/RES/237 (1967) ) 
concerning the civil population and prisoners of war 
in the area of conflict in the Middle East. S/8021. 
June 29, 1967. 6 pp. 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as 

amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at New York 

October 20, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. 

Notification of icithdrawal: Honduras, effective June 

19, 1967. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New 
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 
13, 1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967. 
Proclaimed by the President: July 12, 1967. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, 
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow 
August 5, 1963. Entered Into force October 10, 1963. 
TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 10, 1967. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollution 
of the sea by oil, with annexes, as amended (TIAS 
4900, 6109). Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered 
into force for the United States December 8, 1961. 
Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, May 31, 1967. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa- 
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow January 
27, 1967.1 
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 12, 1967. 


1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement. 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 
1, 1967, inclusive.' 
Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 12, 1967; 

Canada, July 14, 1967. 
Accessions deposited: Japan, July 10, 1967; Saudi 

Arabia, July 13, 1967 ; Austria, July 14, 1967. 
Notification of undertaking to seek approval de- 
posited: Switzerland, July 6. 1967. 
Notifications of undertaking to seek ratification de- 
posited: Federal Republic of Germany, July 12, 
1967; Guatemala, July 7, 1967; Israel, July 13, 
Notifications of undertaking to seek accession de- 
posited: Italy, July 14, 1967; Libya, July 10, 1967. 

'S/RES/239 (1967) (S/8050) ; adopted unanimously 
on July 10. 

* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 760. 

' Not in force. 

JTJLT 31, 1967 




Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in Dahomey. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Cotonou June 30 and July 3, 1907. En- 
tered into force July 3, 1967. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton July 13, 1967. Entered into force July 13, 1967. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS 
6052, 6074, 612.5, 6194). Effected by an exchange of 
notes at Rawalpindi and Islamabad June 28, 1967. 
Entered into force June 28, 1967. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with 
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington July 3, 1967. Entered into force July 3, 1967. 


Recent Releases 

For sale hj/ the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders 
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium, 
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 
1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Brussels February 
2 and 22, 1967. Entered into force February 22, 1967. 
TIAS 6229. 3 pp. 5(S. 

Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement 
with Japan, amending the agreement of September 12 
and 19, 1966. Exchange of notes — Dated at Tokyo 
February 21 and March 14, 1967. Entered into force 
March 14, 1967. TIAS 6230. 4 pp. 5«i. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Cameroon. 

Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 7, 
1967. Entered into force March 7, 1967. TIAS 6231. 5 

pp. 5<f. 

Educational Commission. Agreement with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
amending the agreement of May 10, 1965. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at London February 16, 1967. Entered 
into force February 16, 1967. TIAS 6232. 2 pp. 5<f. 

Cultural Relations. Agreement with Romania. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Bucharest February 18, 
1967. Entered into force February 18, 1967. TIAS 6233. 
8 pp. 10<S. 

Education — Commission for Educational and Cultural 
Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs. 

Agreement with the United Arab Republic. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Cairo January 5 and February 21, 
1967. Entered into force February 21, 1967. TIAS 6234. 
11 pp. io«;. 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem- 
bourg, amending Annex B to the agreement of Janu- 
ary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Luxem- 
bourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into force March 
14, 1967. TIAS 6235. 3 pp. 5<#. 

Saint Lawrence Seaway — Tolls for the Montreal/Lake 
Ontario Section Lockage Fee on the Welland Canal. 

Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of 
March 9, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Ottawa March 31, 1967. Entered into force March 31, 
1967. TIAS 6236. 3 pp. 54. 

Defense — C-47 Aircraft. Agreement with Mali. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Bamako January 5, 1967. 
Entered into force January 5, 1967. TIAS 6238. 4 pp. 

Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of 
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Israel, amending 
the agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21 
and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967. TIAS 
6240. 4 pp. 5(f. 

Extradition — Correction of Text of the Convention of 
December 10, 1962. Agreement with Israel. Exchange 
of notes — Dated at Jeru.salem and Tel Aviv April 4 and 
11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967. TIAS 6246. 
2 pp. 54. 



INDEX 'luMl 31, 1967 Vol. LVH, No. U66 

Agriculture. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chap- 
ter in the History of International Commerce 
(Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) . . 123 

Argentina. U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee 
Holds iiecond Meeting (communique) . . . 146 

Congo (Kinshasa). U.N. Security Council Con- 
demns Recruitment of Mercenaries (BufEum, 
text of resolution) 1-51 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 

Foreign Policy 147 

Developing Countries. The Kennedy Round : 
Proud Chapter in the History of International 
Commerce (Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trow- 
bridge) 12.3 

Economic Affairs 

The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His- 
tory of International Commerce (Freeman, 
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123 

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second 
Meeting (communique) 146 

U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con- 
trol Project (Johnson) 147 

Europe. The Golden Rule of Consultation (Cleve- 
land) 141 

Labor. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in 
the History of International Commerce ( Free- 
man, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) .... 123 

Mexico. U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on 
Flood Control Project (Johnson) 147 

Near East 

U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem ; 
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near 
East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148 

United States Repeats Concern for Future of 
Jerusalem (Rusk) 149 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Golden 

Rule of Consultation (Cleveland) .... 141 

Presidential Documents. U.S., Mexico Conclude 
Agreement on Flood Control Project . . . 147 

Publications. Recent Releases 154 


The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His- 
tory of International Commerce (Freeman, 
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123 

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second 

Meeting (communique) 146 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 153 

The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His- 
tory of International Commerce (Freeman, 

Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123 

U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con- 
trol Project (Johnson) 147 

U.S.S.R. The Golden Rule of Consultation 

(Cleveland) 141 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 153 

U.N. Security Council Condemns Recruitment of 

Mercenaries (BufCum, text of resolution) . 151 

U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolutions on Jerusalem ; 
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near 

East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148 

Name Index 

BufEuni, William B 1.51 

Cleveland, Harlan 141 

Freeman, Orville L 123 

Goldberg, Arthur J 148 

Johnson, President 147 

Reynolds, James J 123 

Roth. William M 123 

Rusk, Secretary 149 

Trowbridge, Alexander B 123 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 10-16 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

No. Date Subject 

tl56 7/10 Restrictions on travel to Lebanon 

*157 7/11 Hernandez sworn in as Ambassador 
to Paraguay (biographic details). 

tl58 7/13 U.S.-Israel Cotton Textile Agree- 

tl59 7/i:;! U.S.- Japan Cooperative Medical 
Science Committee. 

*160 7/14 Pollack appointed Director of Inter- 
national Scientific and Techno- 
logical Affairs; Joyce, Deputy 
Director (biographic details). 

*161 7/14 Program for visit of President 
Asgeir Asgeirsson of Iceland 

tl62 7/15 U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning 
incident in the port of Haiphong 
on June 29. 
163 7/14 Rusk : U.N. resolution on Jerusalem. 

*Not printed. 

tHeld for a later issue of the Bdli.etin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 










Vol. LVII, No. 1467 

August 7, 1967 


Statement hy William M. Roth 173 


Statement 1>y Assistant Secretary Solomon 180 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1467 Publication 8273 
August 7, 1967 

Fot sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Oovemment Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


62 Issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00 
Single copy 30 cents 

TJse of funds for printing of this publication 
approved by tbe Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget (January U, 1966). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
<!opyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN es the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
tbe Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the Government 
with information on developments in 
the field of foreign relations and on 
the work of the Department of State 
and the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements and addresses 
made by the President and by the 
Secretary of State and other officers 
of the Department, as well as special 
articles on various phases of interna- 
tional affairs and the functions of the 
Department. Information is included 
concerning treaties and international 
agreements to which the United 
States is or may become a parly 
and treaties of general interruitional 

Publications of the Department, 
United Nations documents, and leg- 
islative material in the field of inter- 
national relations are listed currently. 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 

Press release 164 dated July 19 

I'd like to welcome to the conference today 
a group of college interns who are working with 
us in the Department this summer. We always 
greatly value the contribution which they make, 
and we hope that their experience here will in- 
fect some of them with the desire to take on 
careers in the field of foreign affairs. 

I would like to express our very great dis- 
tress at the death of former President Castello 
Branco of Brazil in an airplane accident. I 
think when the history of Brazil is written for 
this period, historians will find that he made 
a very substantial contribution to his country 
and to the hemisphere, not only in pulling 
Brazil away from the slippery slope into un- 
controlled and disastrous inflation but also in 
maintaining the options for Brazil in moving 
toward a sound constitutional system. We very 
greatly regret his death in an airplane accident 

Also, I've sent condolences to the Govern- 
ment of the Malagasy Republic because of the 
death of my distinguished colleague the For- 
eign Minister, Mr. Albert Sjdla who has been 
Foreign Minister since 1960, who also was lost 
in an airplane accident yesterday. 

And I'm ready for your questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary^! how do you assess the state 
of U.S. -Soviet relations in the light of the 
Glassioro conference ^ and Soviet arvfis ship- 
ments to the Aral) states in the continuing 
Middle East crisis? 

A. There's been no dramatic change in our 
relations with the Soviet Union in recent weeks. 
I think the Glassboro talks were highly useful. 
They were hard-working talks. The President 
and Chairman Kosygin had a chance, over a 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967, 
p. 35. 

period of 9 or 10 hours, to go over the world 
situation in considerable detail. 

I think that the fact that they did meet was 
a plus. There would have been general dis- 
aiDpointment throughout the world and in this 
country had they not found it possible to meet. 
The fact that they were able to expose to each 
other their points of view in considerable de- 
tail at least made it possible for each side to 
understand somewhat more clearly the respec- 
tive views of the two Governments. 

We did not expect miracles to emerge from 
the Glassboro talks. The net effect of those talks 
will be manifested in the weeks and months to 
come as we try to find agreement on particular 

As far as we're concerned, we are prepared 
to try to find points of agreement with the 
Soviet Union — on small points such as cultural 
exchanges and on large points such as Viet-Nam 
or the Middle East. 

But there are obvious differences which are 
far reaching between our two countries. The 
basic objectives of the Soviet Union continue 
to be to support the world revolution. The ques- 
tion of means is important. We hope that the 
Soviet Union will understand the importance 
of prudence in a world situation in which frail 
human beings have weapons of mass destruc- 
tion at their disposal. So we do not approach 
our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis 
of total hostility on the one side or any illusions 
about the depth and the importance of the ques- 
tions which separate us. 

Now, this is a matter which requires continual 
work day after day, week after week, on par- 
ticular questions. 

On the Middle East, I think from what Mr. 
Kosygin has said in the General Assembly and 
what we know of their general attitude in the 
case, there are certain points on which we and 
the Soviet Union are agreed, even though the 
states in the area may not agree. The Soviet 

ATTGTJST 7, 1967 


Union, for example, accepts the existence of the 
State of Israel ; and we would suppose that that 
carries with it certain consequences. 

Now, certain of the Arab states have been 
unwilling thus far to take the step of accepting 
the State of Israel as an established fact in 
international relations, and that has compli- 
cated somewhat the attitude of the various 
parties in the present United Nations General 

But we're conscious of the fact that relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
are very important to the general structure of 
world peace, and we are prepared to sit down 
with them on whatever point we can find to 
move toward agreement rather than controversy 
and to find ways to reduce the impact of dis- 
agreements which we might have on important 

So this is a matter of continuing concern that 
will fuid us ready to move toward a stabilization 
of the world situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes. 

Q. — would you have any concern that Brit- 
ain's disclosure of her plans to reduce and 
eventually fhase out her forces in the Far East 
might encourage the Communists in the area, 
^particularly , to hang on longer in Viet-Nam or 
to increase their infiltration and subversion in 
the other countries of that area? 

A. Well, my inclination is to be primarily 
concerned with the situation in Asia and the 
Pacific and Southeast Asia. I regret any deci- 
sion by Britain to reduce substantially its pres- 
ence in the area. This is a decision which the 
British themselves have to make in terms of 
their own national requirements and national 
necessities. And it is known that many of us 
who have responsibilities in that area have re- 
gretted the idea tliat there would be any sig- 
nificant British withdrawal. I'm glad to note 
that Britain has projected its withdrawal into 
the 1970's and that it is prepared to take into 
account the general situation in Southeast Asia 
which might obtain at that time. 

But that does not, I think, mean that the 
Communists can take any comfort from this 
particular step. Those of us who are committed 
in that area, and those who live in the area, are 
determined that they shall maintain their own 
national independence and their national se- 
curity. And so we will get on with the job. 

Middle East Arms Race 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the 
Soviet Union is continuing to ship arms into the 
Middle East and in view of the fact that the 
logic of American policy in this area has always 
been to maintain a relative equilibrium on arms, 
does this place a great pressure and burden on 
the United States to perhaps lift its arms 

A. Well, in the first place, we very much re- 
gret this neighborhood arms race in the Middle 

In 1962, when I appeared at the Geneva dis- 
armament conference,^ I pressed the conference 
to give attention not just to the overriding arms 
race, say, between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but also to give its attention to the 
lesser arms races m different parts of the world. 
Unfortunately, we encoimtered considerable in- 
difference to these neighborhood anns races. 

Now, the intrusion of major arms into the 
Middle East by the Soviet Union in such coun- 
tries as Egypt and Syria and Algeria raised 
problems not only affecting the security of 
Israel but also affecting the security of neigh- 
boring Arab countries. 

We have ourselves tried not to become a 
principal supplier of arms in that region. But 
we are committed to the political independence 
and the territorial integrity of the states of the 
Middle East. And when imbalances of a major 
proportion occurred, we felt it was necessary 
for us to supply some limited military assistance 
to certain of the Arab countries and to Israel. 

Now, the answer to this ought to be some 
understanding among the arms recipients and 
the arms suppliers to put some sort of ceiling on 
the arms race in the Middle East. Because 
whatever one thinks about it otherwise, these 
burgeoning military establisliments do divert 
important resources and scarce resources away 
from the economic and social development of the 
countries of that area. President Jolinson has 
emphasized this point among his five principles 
with respect to a permanent settlement in the 
Middle East.^ We would like very much to see 
some arrangement by which defense establish- 
ments in the Middle East are kept within rea- 
sonable bounds in order that there not be that 
diversion of resources and in order that arms 

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 15, 1962, 
see ihid., Apr. 2. 1962, p. 531. 
•/6i(J., July 10, 1967, p. 31. 



themselves not be a major source of tension 
which could set off additional hostilities. 

We will continue to work at this in the United 
Nations and in capitals. I would not be able to 
say today that I am encouraged about the pros- 
pects, because the resupply of certain of the 
countries by the Soviet Union has been going 
on apace, and this will raise security questions 
for not only Israel but also certain of the Arab 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoio do you view the con- 
tinuing Soviet arms shipments to the Arab 
counti-ies at this time? Do you look at it as a de- 
cision to try and replace most of the Soviet 
arms that were lost or destroyed during the 
war? Or do you look on it as more or less a 
stopgap move hy the Soviet Union? 

A. Well, I can't really interpret what has 
happened thus far. There has been some signif- 
icant resupply of arms to certain of the coun- 
tries there following the recent hostilities. 

What the long-range purpose of the Soviet 
Union would be in this matter, I am not in a 
position to say. 

Wliat we would like to see is some under- 
standing, perhaps through the United Nations, 
about the supply of arms. We would be glad to 
make our own arms shipments to that area pub- 
lic — to register them in some suitable fashion if 
others would do the same. We, as a matter of 
fact, don't keep these things secret ourselves on 
a unilateral basis, so that these matters become 

What we would like to have is some sort of 
understanding — whether in general or in detail 
(because details are difficult to work out) — that 
the arms-supplying nations will not themselves 
be responsible for a major renewal of an arms 
race in the JMiddle East. Because down that 
trail lies a possible catastrophe. 

Progress in Vief-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your 
assessment of the situation in Viet-Nam now 
and lohat the most imperative needs, in your 
opinion, may be? 

A. Well, I must say that I am encouraged by 
the reports which I have had from Secretary 
McNamara and General [William C] West- 
moreland and Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker 
about progress in Viet-Nam. 

I note that the word "stalemate" has come into 
discussion. I have the impression that that word 

has been used by those who would like to do 
something drastically different than what we 
are now doing. But at that point they split off 
into two directions: Those who would like to 
increase the military action by major increase 
in bombing of the North, for example, want 
apparently to justify their position by talking 
about a "stalemate." Those who want to do a 
great deal less — withdrawal to enclaves or with- 
drawal from our obligations to Viet-Nam — are 
also tempted to talk about a "stalemate." 

I don't see a stalemate there. I think that there 
is military progress. There is, clearly, economic 
progress in dampening down the rate of infla- 
tion. We are seemg at the present time, despite 
some of the difficulties — we are seeing a major 
effort by the South Vietnamese to do some- 
thing which is extremely difficult to do under 
the conditions of a mean and dirty guerrilla 
war; that is, move toward an elected govern- 
ment and some sort of a constitutional process. 

Now, all these things mean that we are mov- 
ing ahead. 

Now, when you talk about the — when you ask 
about the critical factors involved, I think the 
most important single fact is the attitude of 
Hanoi and tlie question whether Hanoi is pre- 
pared to abandon its effort to seize South Viet- 
Nam by force. This is looked upon by some as 
a trite expression, but it is the heart of the 

If Hanoi is prepared to abandon that effort, 
there can be peace within hours. But so long 
as they attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by 
force, the struggle will continue, and there will 
be some tough days ahead. 

U.S. Position on Bombing Pause 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a new round 
of speculation about the possibility of another 
bombing pause or a halt in Viet-Nam. Is there 
any variation in the U.S. position on the condi- 
tions which toould warrant a pause or a halt? 

A. Well, that roimd of speculation hasn't 
come from me. We've made it very clear that 
we are prepared to stop the bombing of North 
Viet-Nam as a step toward peace. If anyone 
anywhere in the world can demonstrate that 
stopping the bombing is a step toward peace, 
they will have no difficulty in Washington. 

Now, we have stopped the bombing on a num- 
ber of occasions without any response from the 
other side. What we would like to know is 
whether the other half of the war can be 

ATTGUST 7, 1967 


stopped if we stop the bombing of North Viet- 
Nam. "Wliat we would like to know is what will 
happen if we stop the bombing of North Viet- 
Nam. And thus far no one has been able or 
willing to tell us, even by a whisper behind his 
hand, as to what the effect would be. 

We do not accept the view that we should 
stojD the bombing on the suggestion of the 
Hanoi Foreign Minister, Mr. [Nguyen Duy] 
Trinh, that there could be talks. I've said 
this until you gentlemen are bored with it, but 
if we were to say that we would negotiate only 
if all of the violence in South Viet-Nam were 
stopped while we continue to bomb the North, 
most people would say we are crazy. And they 
probably would be right. 

Now, when the other side makes exactly the 
same proposition in reverse, it is hard for me 
to understand why there are people who say, 
"That sounds like a good proposition. Why 
don't you accept it?" 

Now, I have illustrated — and apparently this 
has led to some little confusion or misunder- 
standing — I have illustrated this point with an 
operational example. There are three or four 
North Vietnamese divisions in and near the 
demilitarized zone, 4 or 5 miles away from our 
Marines. Now, if we stopped the bombing of 
North Viet-Nam, can anyone tell us that those 
three or four divisions of North Vietnamese 
regular forces will not attack ovir IMarines? 
Thus far no one has been able or willing to say 
that. Now, we can't tell our Marines that, "You 
must wait until these fellows get within 2 miles 
of you before you hit them. But don't hit them 
when they are 9 miles away, because that would 
be rude." We are not children. 

There is a way to make peace in this situation. 
But both sides have to make a contribution 
toward peace. And President Johnson has 
pointed out over and over again that we will 
meet the other side more than halfway if they 
are prepared to talk about peace. We are pre- 
pared to talk today without any conditions 
whatever. We are prepared to talk today about 
what kind of conditions would open the possi- 
bilities for talks. 

In March of this year Secretary-General 
U Thant made some proposals, basically three 
points — that there be a military standstill, that 
there be preliminary political discussions, and 
that there be a meeting of the Geneva confer- 
ence. We replied to U Thant that we are pre- 
pared to enter immediately into a discussion of 
a military standstill, that we are prepared to 

take part in preliminary discussions; we are 
prepared to go to a Geneva conference.* 

Now, you can't have a standstill without some 
discussion. The South Vietnamese Government, 
for example, holds all of the provincial capitals, 
43 of them, and with the exception of three or 
four, all of the district towns — the district 
capitals — some 240. Now, in a standstill you 
have got to know whether it is clearly under- 
stood that the Government of South Viet-Nam 
continues to maintain its communications and its 
contact with, and its supply of, these provincial 
and district capitals. I'm using this simply as 
an example. The fact that some guerrillas may 
be along the highways here and there may lead 
the other side to think that somehow that con- 
tact is to be prevented. 

Now, one has to understand the circum- 
stances in which a standstill can occur before it 
has any chance whatever of success. Now, if 
North Viet-Nam had responded to the Secre- 
tary-General in as forthcoming a way as did 
we, we at least would have been in discussions 
straightaway about the arrangements by which 
a general military standstill could occur. 

So we are prepared to move toward peace. But 
we are not prepared to stop half the war while 
the other half goes on unrestricted, unimpeded, 
and with maximum violence. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, diflomatic traffic through 
the diplomatic channels to Hanoi has heen ir- 
regular in the -past. Whafs it like today? 

A. Well, the problem is not now and it never 
has been diplomatic channels. The problem re- 
mains the question whether the South Viet- 
Nam — whether North Viet-Nam is prepared to 
talk seriously about peace. Now, there is no 
problem of channels. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes, sir ? 

Q. To %ohat extent, if any, do you believe that 
our support of South Viet-Nam should he condi- 
tioned on the type of government which is de- 
veloped there? I ask the question in the context 
of the current political maneuvering s in Saigon. 

A. Well, there are two quite different ques- 
tions. The one question is whether North Viet- 
Nam is entitled to overrun South Viet-Nam by 

* For texts of the Secretary-General's aide memoire 
of Mar. 14 and U.S. replies, see iUd., Apr. 17, 1967, 
p. 624. 



force. Our answer to that is "No." That answer 
was given in the Southeast Asia Treaty, which 
was ratified by our Senate with only one dis- 
senting vote in 1955. 

The second question is what kind of institu- 
tions the South Vietnamese themselves can con- 
struct. We have been very much encouraged that 
the military leadership there in Februaiy of last 
year took the initiative to launch a program for 
a constitutional government and free elections. 
That was endorsed by us in later meetings, and 
we give it our full support. 

Now, they elected their Constitutional Assem- 
bly. That Assembly remains in being to make 
arrangements for the elections. There are 11 
slates of candidates that have been approved by 
the Assembly. We think that the South Viet- 
namese people themselves ought to have a 
choice, but that is a matter for them to work 
out. They will have a wide choice. 

But I would think that these political proc- 
esses will give the South Vietnamese people 
an opportunity to make their own decisions 
about the governments that they — the govern- 
ment that they wish to have in power. 

U.S. Aid to Jordan Under Review 

Q. Mr. Secretary, loliat are your present in- 
tentions on providing either economic or mili- 
tary aid to King Hussein of Jordan^ 

A. Well, the question of aid is under review. 
I have no announcements to make on that sub- 
ject. We have, as you know, over a good many 
years provided economic assistance to Jordan 
and some military assistance to Jordan, as well 
as to other states in that area. Those questions, 
of course, are a matter of great preoccupation at 
the present time. But from time to time an- 
nouncements will be made on that subject. I have 
no generalization to make at the moment. It's 
a matter in which we are very much interested. 

U.S. Prepared To Negotiate With Hanoi 

Q. Mr. Secretary, coidd you comment on the 
proposal made by the eight House Republicans 
on a possible staged deescalation of the bombing 
of North Yiet-Nam? Do you find merit in that 

A. Well, we are glad to have suggestions from 
any source about how this matter can be made — 
can be moved toward a peaceful solution. The 
problem of our stopping the bombing is not a 

serious one as far as we are concerned as a 
matter of policy. Wliat we are interested in is 
what would happen if we stopped the bombing. 

Now, there are those — and I'm not now re- 
ferring to this particular group of Congress- 
men — there are those who thinli that we should 
stop the bombing to increase the prospect that 
the other side will do A, B, or C. Well, now, 
we don't have to rely on hunches or on specula- 
tion on a matter of that sort. We can ask 
Hanoi- — and we do ask Hanoi — "If we stop the 
bombing, what will you do? Will you do A, B, 

And if they come back and say, "No," then we 
know what the answer is. We don't have to fish 
in the dark for this kind of thing. We can find 

Now, so far as we know. Ho Clii Minh's letter 
to the President, which was made public in 
February, represents still the present position 
of Ho Chi Minh.= We will be glad to see some 
change in their attitude, not only on this par- 
ticular point but upon dozens, literally dozens, 
of proposals made by ourselves or other govern- 
ments or groups of governments that might help 
move this matter toward peace. 

You have seen my summary of some 28 pro- 
posals ® made by ourselves or others in this 
situation, all of which have been rejected by 
Hanoi. So these are not questions for the United 
States. They are questions for Hanoi. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in — 

A. I have noted in recent weeks that there 
are those who are talking about the slogan 
"Negotiate now." I hoj^e they realize they are 
not talking to Washington. They are talking to 
Hanoi. Now, if they adopt some other slogan, 
"Stop half the war," then they will be talking 
to us. But we are prepared to negotiate at any 
moment with the authorities in Hanoi. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in April when General 
Westmoreland was here, he described the war 
as one of attrition. That doesn't seem to be a 
characterisation that has been endorsed by the 
administration. Would you object to it? And 
if yoit would, why? and how would you charac- 
terize it othenoise? 

A. Oh, I think there is no basis for great 

' For texts of letters exchanged by President Johnson 
and Ho Chi Minh, see ihid., Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595. 

' For an address made b.v Secretary Rusk on May 1, 
see ma., May 22, 1967, p. 770. 

AUGUST 7, 1967 


argument or discussion about a particular word 
of that sort. Obviously, if you see a regiment 
coming down the road with guns in its hands, 
you have got to decide whether you get out of 
its way or whether you shoot at it. Now, we are 
going to shoot at it. And so long as those regi- 
ments come down the road, they are going to 
get shot at. 

Now, they have suffered very substantial 
losses. They have not been able last year to cut 
the country in two, as they rather thought they 
might. They have not been able to launch a 
major offensive in June and July, as all indica- 
tions indicated they planned to. So they are 
hurting. But there is still a long, tough job 
ahead until Hanoi gets to the point where — 
unless Hanoi gets to the point where they are 
prepared to talk seriously about peace. 

No, this is not a problem that could be de- 
scribed by a single word. I don't object to Gen- 
eral Westmoreland's word, but I think that 
there is no particular point in trying to build 
a pyramid on top of it. 

Now, the other side is hurting, and they are 
hurting very badly. And we believe that they 
are not in a position to achieve their objectives 
in South Viet-Nam. Now, when they recognize 
that and accept the consequences of it is a polit- 
ical judgment in Hanoi to which we are not 
pri\^. But that time will come. That time will 

Communist Chinese Behavior 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. Is it possible to assess the importance or 
the motivation of Chinese Communist behavior 
in Hong Kong and Burma and all these areas? 

A. I think I would not want to speculate too 
much about that. I think that it's perfectly clear 
that the authorities in Peking are not very good 
neighbors these days anywhere. I think it would 
be hazardous for anyone to try to predict what 
the outcome will be. But it is not very surpris- 
ing that Peking would get very grumpy about 
Burma when the Burmese people objected to 
the attempt to import the cultural revolution 
into Burma itself. 

We Ivuow that Peking has been giving polit- 
ical and other kinds of support to the attempt 
to seize Laos and South Viet-Nam by force. We 
know that Poking has publicly announced that 
Thailand is next on the list and that tliey are 

doing things themselves to train and to encour- 
age certain subversive elements in northeast 
Thailand. But I think the attitude there, at 
least officially, so far as we can tell, continues 
to be that of supporting the world revolution by 
militant means, and they should not be sur- 
l^rised if other people object to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes? 

Q. Understandably, since the explosion of 
this latest nuclear bomb, there has been con- 
siderable discussion in India and elsewhere 
about the consequences xohich arise. And there 
is also growing fear. So what is your thinking 
on this, particularly in view of the fact that 
India is now seeJcing apparently, both from 
you and the Soviet Union, some amount of 

A. Well, I think no one would think that the 
development of nuclear power in mainland 
China is a contribution toward peace. As far 
as we are concerned, one nuclear power was too 
many, and I think history will record that the 
rejection of the Baruch proposals in 1946 was 
a great tragedy for all of mankind, because had 
they been accepted, there would have been no 
nuclear powers. 

This question of guarantees is a matter of 
considerable importance, because empty guar- 
antees are of no particular value. Real guar- 
antees are very serious and solemn questions for 
the governments concerned. I have no doubt this 
question will come up in Geneva in the discus- 
sions of the nonproliferation treaty and perhaps 
in the Security Council of the United Nations. 
But there are no conclusions drawn by govei-n- 
ments so far that I know of. That is a matter 
that we are continuing to give thought to. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, the Suez Canal, I think, 
is a national property of Egypt. How do you 
feel about international efforts to tell Egypt — 
or force Egypt — how to run the caned? Do you 
think that is in the international field, or is it 
pretty much up to them? 

A. Well, the Suez Canal, just like other in- 
ternational waterways, is a matter of inter- 
national concern. We have clearly expressed our 
view that there should be innocent passage of 
international waters, and that includes the 
canal. Now, this is one of the questions, im- 
doubtedly, that will be discussed in detail in 
the Security Council and with the jiarties after 



the conclusion of this present session of the 
General Assembly. But this is a matter still that 
is unresolved, and some answer will have to be 

The Middle East Problem 

Q. Mr. Secretary^ Israel maintains that the 
most effective, prohahly the only effective, way 
to settle its frohlems is through direct talks 
with the Arabs. I wonder hoio you feel about 
this contention and whether you think it is a 
realistic apfroach? 

A. Well, there obviously are some problems 
about that. One can understand why Israel be- 
lieves that the time has come to sit down and 
make final peace settlements with its neighbors. 

Now, this is a matter of great political sensi- 
tivity among its immediate neighbors, and there 
is some question as to whether any of the gov- 
ernments in that area can, in fact, do that and 
survive. So that you have some problems. 

I would suppose that the United Nations has 
a very important role to play in beginning the 
process of working out a permanent peaceful 
settlement on a basis that would involve some 
reconciliation among all of the governments 
who are in that area. 

I wouldn't want to be dogmatic about tech- 
niques at this point. There is still a lot of work 
to be done. The Security Council, when it first 
had the Middle East question in front of it, was 
able to bring about a cease-fire through a series 
of unanimous resolutions,' but I would suppose 
that quiet, patient work, not only at the table 
but behind the scenes in the Security Council, 
might find an answer to this particular kind of 
question. But it's a complicated question. I don't 
see a quick and easy answer for it today. 

New Treaties on Panama Canal 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the new treaties we have 
negotiated concerning the Panama Canal * have 
come under criticism on Capitol Hill on the 
ground that they compromise U.S. sovereignty 
over the Canal Zone, operation of the canal, its 
defense, and so forth. Could you comment on 
that criticism? 

' For background and texts of resolutions, see Hid., 
June 26, 1067, p. 934, and July 3, 1967, p. 3. 

* For a White House announcement of June 26, see 
iMd., July 17, 19G7, p. 65. 

A. Well, I think that it might be well for 
people to restrain their discussions until the full 
texts of the treaties are available. These matters 
are now before the two Governments for review. 
The negotiators completed their work ad refer- 
endum to Governments. The Governments are 
studying these treaties at the present time, 
pending their signature and public disclosure. 

I have, myself, no doubt at all that these first 
drafts represent a major step toward a peaceful 
and honorable settlement of the problem of the 
canal. I think they insure the effective opera- 
tion of the canal and they insure the security 
of the canal. 

I would hope that judgments could be with- 
held until full information is available and 
discussion of the bases upon which these dis- 
cussions would follow. After all — 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. — after all, there is a difference between 
1903 and 1967— 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. — and we must take those differences into 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any discussions 
underway on plans for a summit conference on 
Viet-Nam following up the Manila Conference? 

A. I have no doubt that there will be other 
meetings of the heads of govermnent of the 
countries with forces involved in Viet-Nam. 
That was discussed at the last meeting in 
Manila. And it was indicated that the chiefs 
of government might meet again and that they 
would meet again from time to time through 
their foreign ministers. 

We have had the foreign ministers of those 
governments meeting here in Washington, for 
example, on the occasion of the last SEATO 
meetmg. There are no dates or specific plans 
at the present time, but this is not a question 
of policy. It's a question of timing and con- 
venience of those concerned in relation to devel- 
opments in Viet-Nam itself. So I suppose that 
in due course there will be further annoimce- 
ments made on any such plans. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been many months 
since you raised the subject loith the Soviet 
Union about talks on a freeze on strategic 
missiles. Lacking any agreement hy the Rus- 
sians actually to talk with the United States, 




do you think ferhaj)s the admiinistration should 
go ahead ivith a decision to defloy at least a 
small system? 

A. Well, first, we have in our defense budget 
for the next fiscal year funds to support those 
steps which we would in any event be taking, 
so that we are not diverting or slowing down 
our own plans in that regard. 

Secondly, we do not have yet a definitive 
answer from the Soviet Union which would let 
us make any judgment as to whether some 
understanding can be reached on this point. 
They told us a little more than 3 months ago 
that they were prepared to discuss this subject. 

Now, this is a very complex subject, but it's 
a very important one, and we would like to ini- 
tiate these discussions just as soon as the Soviet 
Union is prepared to do so. 

I noted that Mr. Kosygin, in his press con- 
ference at the United Nations following the 
Glassboro talks, referred to our interest solely 
in defensive missiles. Now, this is not the case. 
We are prepared to talk about both offensive 
and defensive missiles, because at the heart of 
this is a very simple problem. 

If both sides deploy ABM's in any significant 
way, then both sides will be compelled to mul- 
tiply their offensive missiles for the purpose of 
saturating such defenses, because neither side 
can accept the consequences of unilateral in- 
capability of inflicting very great damage upon 
the other. 

Now, the effect of all tliis is that we could 
take two paths. We could, without any under- 
standings and without any joint action in this 
field — we could go down the road of deploying 
ABM systems and multij^lying offensive missile 
systems at the cost of tens upon tens of billions 
of dollars and come out strategically about 
where we are today. Or we could fuid some un- 
derstanding which would avoid that course and 
save those tens upon tens of billions of dollars. 

Now, we think the second course is the course 
of prudence and is a course which is more in 
keeping with our obligations to our own peoples 
in both countries to prevent a radical escalation 
of the levels of defense budgets and to save 
those resources for the unfinished business 
which both we and the Russian people have in 
our own societies. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Q. Mr. Secretary., there was a question earlier 
on the matter of the British defense cutback. 

Of G0U7'se, there is also the matter pending of the 
German defense cutiack. Do you see both of 
these develojMnents adding up to a general 
shaking down of defense costs and a reori- 
entation of defense strategy among the Allied 

A. Well, as far as NATO is concerned, it does 
not seem to me that that is involved yet at this 
stage. Britain, for example, indicates her readi- 
ness to continue to maintain European forces 
indefinitely into the future and in substance and 
in substantial numbers. 

As far as the German budget decision is con- 
cerned, we were aware of the fact that they have 
been faced with a major budget problem. As a 
matter of fact, it was the problem which caused 
the postponement of Chancellor Kiesinger's 
visit to the United States. 

In their budget considerations they indicated 
they would expect to cut back on the projections 
of the defense budget which were made in, I 
think, 1966. So they are talking about reduc- 
tions of projections, and these are more sub- 
stantial than reductions of actual levels as we 
know them at the present time. 

I have the very definite impression, based on 
information fi'om the Government of the Fed- 
eral Republic, that the talks about very sub- 
stantial cuts in troop numbers were premature. 
During the summer, tliey will be working out 
the question of how they would apply some 
reductions in their defense budgets to their de- 
fense establislunents. And this will be a matter 
of consultation in NATO and with us as it 
affects the defense capabilities of the NATO 
area. So I would think that this is still some- 
thing that is ahead of us and that it would not 
be possible to make a real judgment on your 
question until we see where it comes out. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. I think over here. 

Q. There has heen — 

Q. Do we have any vieios on whether or not 
the military authorities should ie subordinate 
to the civilian authority in South Viet-Nam, 
and is this an issue, in your judgment, in the 
coming election campaign? 

A. Oh, I think under the constitutional ar- 
rangements, the elected President and the Prime 
Minister would have primary responsibility — 
would have responsibility for the entire effort 



Now, that question is going to be decided by 
the Vietnamese people when tJaey have a chance 
to look at these 11 slates and decide among them. 
Obviously, in a situation of war, in which the 
South Vietnamese people are involved, the mili- 
tary establishment is an important part of the 
national unity and the capacity of the country 
to defend itself. 

But I think the question is not whether the 
elected President is a military or a civilian but 
whether the processes of government proceed 
on a constitutional basis and in response to the 
choices of the South Vietnamese people in a 
free election. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary McNamara Discusses 
the Situation in Viet-Nam 

Secretary of Defense Roiert S. McNamara, 
together with Under Secretary of State 
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Gen. Earle G. 
'Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
met with President Johnson on July 12 to report 
on their factfinding trip to Viet-Nam. Follow- 
ing is Secretary McNamara's opening statement 
at a news conference he held at the White House 
after the meeting with the President} 

Mr. Katzenbach, General Wheeler, and I 
spent an hour and a half reviewing with the 
President every aspect of U.S. operations in 
South Viet-Nam and all of the factors influenc- 
ing them. 

We examined and discussed the political 
situation, the status of the economy, and mili- 
tary operations. We covered everything from 
the operations of the ports to the pacification 
program, to food, the medical care, the leader- 
ship of U.S. personnel, and all of the details of 
the very complex operation that we are a part 

The political scene has changed substantially 
since my last visit to South Viet-Nam last 
September and early October. 

The constituent assembly, as you know, has 
completed its work during that period. The na- 

^ For transcript of question-and-answer portion of tlie 
news conference, see 3 Weekly Compilation of Presi- 
dential Documents, p. 1006. 

tion now has a Constitution. Preparations for 
the elections are advancmg rapidly. 

As you are well aware, the election for the 
Chief Executive and the Vice President will be 
held within about 45 days, and that will be fol- 
lowed vei-y shortly thereafter — witliin the next 
45 or 60 days — by the completion of elections for 
the legislative branch of the government. 

This is tremendous progress when one looks 
back at the situation that existed 9 months ago. 

Improvement in the Vietnamese Economy 

As to the economy, there has been dramatic 
change. One of my missions in September, as it 
had been in July, was to seek to find means to 
break the bottleneck in the port of Saigon — a 
bottleneck which at that time was not seriously 
impeding military operations but which was a 
serious drag on the development of the 

There were in September and October, for 
example, when I went down to the port and in- 
spected it, between 800 and 900 barges which 
were serving as floating warehouses because of 
the inability to luiload the ships even in the ex- 
tended period that they spent in the harbor — 
inability to unload ships during that period and 
move the merchandise into the warehouses. 

This was not only clogging the port, but it 
was, of course, denying the economy the goods 
that it needed to sop up the increasing purchas- 
ing power. This blockage of the port was, there- 
fore, one of the factors contributing to a peril- 
ous state of the economy. The danger of a run- 
away inflation, a disorderly inflation, was very 
great indeed. 

Elimination of the bottleneck in the port has 
done much to reduce the pressure on prices. 
There are today simply a normal number of 
barges being used to facilitate the off-loading of 
the cargo vessels in the port. I would guess some- 
thing on the order of 40 as compared to tlie 800 
or 900 floating warehouses of last October. 

A number of other factors have contributed 
to easing of the price pressure. I don't mean to 
say that prices aren't continuing to rise — of 
course they are— but at a much more reasonable 
rate than was true midyear last year. 

And I think the danger of runaway inflation 
has been veiy greatly reduced. In particular, the 
price of necessities — fish, kerosene, fish sauce, 
charcoal, for example — has not increased sig- 
nificantly and has not increased out of line with 
the incomes of those who buy such necessities. 




So there has been a very substantial improve- 
ment ill the economy and a much more stable 
basis for future development of that economy. 

Military Progress Continuing 

On the military field, let me say to start with, 
the military commanders I met with — and I met 
with all of the senior military commanders in 
the field, all of the senior Vietnamese com- 
manders, many of the Allied commanders, 
Korean, and New Zealanders, for example, and 
many of the middle-ranking and junior U.S. 
officers — all of the military commanders stated 
that the reports that they read in the press of 
military stalemate were, to use their words, the 
"most ridiculous statements that they had ever 

In their view military progress had occurred 
and was continuing. How did they measure this ? 
They measured it in particular by the success 
of what they called the large-unit actions. These 
are battalion-sized and larger actions. 

They felt that these actions that General 
[William C] Westmoreland had organized and 
carried on over the past several months, partic- 
ularly in II and III Corps, had a spoiling effect 
on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Before 
they could concentrate their troops to launch an 
offensive, Westmoreland, through his intelli- 
gence sources, had obtained information about 
the intended enemy plans and had struck the 
troop concentrations as they were developing, 
spoiling the potential of the enemy for carrying 
out these offensive actions. 

Moreover, as you know, it has been General 
Westmoreland's strategy over the past several 
months to attack the base areas, particularly 
those in the II and III Corps, using B-62 strikes 
in some cases but in particular using a coordi- 
nated ground and air attack against these base 
areas to destroy the facilities, the stocks — the 
recuperation areas that the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese had used. 

The military commanders felt, as a result 
of this combination of spoiling attacks and at- 
tacks on the base areas, the pressure had been 
so great on the North Viet Cong that they had 
tended to shift their area of activity. Wliereas 
up until very recently, the activity had been con- 
centrated primarily in the II and III Corps, the 
offensive activities more recently — they had 
moved their area of action to the I Corps. 

This is understandable because in the II and 

III Corps — with the loss of their base areas — 
they were at the end of a very long line of com- 
munication over which their men and supplies 
moved from the supply centers in North Viet- 
Nam. This line of communications moved down 
the panliandle of North Viet-Nam across into 
Laos, down Laos to the Cambodian border, and 
across into South Viet-Nam — a very, very long 
line of communication that was under very in- 
tense air attack, as a matter of fact. 

And because this was a handicap to them — 
particularly so in connection with the strategy 
that Westmoreland was carrying out against 
them — they shifted their area of activity to I 

This accoiuits for their military actions there 
m the past several weeks. Now they have the 
advantage of short lines of communication ex- 
tendmg down to the southern border of Viet- 
Nam, very close to the point where the troops 
are now very active. 

Roads Open to Traffic 

Perhaps the most dramatic change that I saw 
that reflects the military situation was the 
opening of the roads. 

Highway No. 1, which is the coastal route that 
runs from the I7th parallel — the line of demar- 
cation between North Viet-Nam and South 
Viet-Nam — clear south to Saigon, has been bro- 
ken for many, many months in literally hun- 
dreds of places, and traffic on the route has been 

But within the past several months, as a result 
of these military actions — plamied and carried 
out by the free-world forces — that route has 
gradually been reopened in large segments. 

As a matter of fact, day before yesterday, the 
route from the southern border of the II Corps 
up to Dong Hai, which is veiy close to the 
DIklZ — just a few miles south of the DRIZ — was 
opened for traffic. 

There will continue to be ambushes, I pre- 
sume, and Viet Cong strikes against it, but as 
I flew over the road after this long stretch was 
opened, literally himdreds of bicycles and scores 
of cars and trucks — civilian cars and trucks — 
were using it. 

The same thing is tiiie of many of the feeder 
roads in III and IV Corps — roads that are of 
importance to move vegetables or rice to mar- 
ket or otherwise serving as an underpinning of 
the day-to-day life of the society. 



I don't want to exaggerate this or imply all 
roads are open — far from it. I don't even want 
to suggest that many of tlie roads being used 
can be used freely night and day. They can't. 
But there has been a very, very notice- 
able — when I say "noticeable," I mean one fly- 
ing over the area can notice a very substantial 
increase in the miles of roads that are open to 
traffic and the volmne of traffic on the roads. 

Perhaps a word about the air operations is in 

We have suffered materially in air operations 
because of night vision — the difficulty of acquir- 
ing targets at night. 

There have been some very significant changes 
in technology. I don't want to go into the details 
of them other than to say they have greatly 
increased the capability of our forces to carry 
on all-weather attacks on the lines of com- 
munication, both in South Viet-Nam and in 
North Viet-Nam. 

These, in conjunction with new weapons, new 
types of ordnance, that have been designed and 
developed in recent j'ears and brought into pro- 
duction in recent months in combination have 
increased the effectiveness of the airstrikes. As 
a matter of fact, they have reduced the losses of 
both planes and pilots. Tlie losses of planes, for 
example, are rather significantly lower than we 
had previously estimated. 

The Pacification Program 

Now a word on the pacification program. You 
are all aware that within the past few weeks 
there has been a reorganization of the American 
effort in pacification, an integration of the civil- 
ian and military staffs. 

The responsibility for pacification has been 
assigned to General "Westmoreland, whose dep- 
uty, Mr. Robert Komer, has been placed in 
direct charge of it. I was very pleased with what 
I saw. 

The frictions that I had read about in the 
paper perhaps existed at one time but certainly 
have been dampened down, if not completely 
eliminated. Both civilian and military officers 
that I visited at the sector level, the provinces, 
and the subsector levels of the villages and ham- 
lets, were working effectively together and ap- 
peared to have benefited from this integration 
and reorganization of the pacification efforts. 

However, having said that, I should state to 
you that to be candid I must report the progress 

in pacification has been very slow. I think tliat 
the momentum will increase as the new organi- 
zation gains in experience, but what we are 
really trying to do here is engage in nation- 
building. It is an extraordinarily complex 
process. I would anticipate progress in what is 
really a very significant field would continue to 
be slow. 

Additional Military Personnel 

I am sure that the first question you would 
ask me, if I didn't anticipate it, would be about 
additional military personnel ; so I will address 
myself to that. I think some more U.S. mili- 
tary personnel will be required. I am not sure 
how many. I am certain of one thing : that we 
must use more effectively the personnel that are 
presently there. 

Wlien I say that, I am speaking of all free- 
world personnel. As you know, the Vietnamese, 
the Koreans, tlie Australians, the New Zealand- 
ers, the Filipinos, as well as we, have all con- 
tributed forces to the support of the operations 
in Viet-Nam. 

There has been a very rapid buildup of those 
forces. We now have in uniform of the free- 
world forces over 1,300,000 men. As you might 
expect in any organization that has expanded 
as fast as this one has, there are bound to be 
areas of waste and inefficiency that can be cor- 
rected and eliminated — that must be corrected 
when we are considering additional troop re- 

We expect to take action to do that, and we 
expect other nations will want to do likewise. 
We discussed that with some of their representa- 
tives while we were in South Viet-Nam. Before 
we determine exactly how many additional U.S. 
troops must be sent, we must discuss the whole 
problem of troop strength with our allies. 

This is not a decision one nation can make 
alone, nor is it a burden tha.t one nation should 
carry alone. So both of these issues will have to 
be considered in the determination of the num- 
ber of additional U.S. troops to be sent. 

We haven't arrived at any conclusion yet. We 
don't have any precise schedule on which we 
will arrive at such conclusion. We have about 
480,000 U.S. military personnel authorized for 
assignment to Viet-Nam at the present time, and 
we have a strength of something in the order 
of 450,000 or 460,000 men there now. So there 
are an additional 20,000 or 30,000 men to be 


added under the present program before any 
new jjrogram might take effect. 

Although the decision, particularly as to the 
number of troops, has not yet been made, I think 
I can tell you I foresee no need to call the Re- 
serves to meet the currently anticipated future 

U.S. Expresses Concern at Plight 
of Prisoners in North Viet-Nam 

Wliite House Statement 

White House press release dated July 17 

The United States Government has been 
greatly concerned at the plight of Americans 
held prisoner by the National Liberation Front 
and North Viet-Nam. More than 20 American 
soldiers and several American civilians are be- 
lieved held by the National Liberation Front. 
We know that more than 160 American mili- 
tary personnel are confined in North Viet-Nam. 
Several hundred more are considered missing 
because the National Liberation Front and 
North Viet-Nam withhold the names of prison- 
ers and generally prohibit most prisoners from 
sending letters. We are gravely concerned that 
some of these prisoners may not be treated hu- 
manely. The claims of the National Liberation 
Front and the North Vietnamese that they are 
treated humanely cannot be verified, because 
neutral observers or organizations such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross have 
not been allowed to visit the prisoners and in- 
spect tlieir places of detention. 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners 
held by the Government of Viet-Nam are con- 
fined in camps inspected regularly by the ICRC. 
These prisoners include many captured by U.S. 
forces and turned over to the Government of 
Viet-Nam for safekeeping under the provisions 
of the Geneva convention. Their treatment and 
the conditions of their confinement have been 
humane and in accord with the convention, as 
verified by these neutral observers. 

On several occasions prisoners, including se- 
riously sick and wounded, have been released by 
the Govermnent of Viet-Nam witliin South 
Viet-Nam and to North Viet-Nam. Additional 
seriously sick and wounded prisoners who may 
be captured in the future and who wish to be 

repatriated will be given the same opportunity, 
as required by tlie Geneva convention. 

The United States calls on the National Liber- 
ation Front and North Viet-Nam to permit im- 
partial inspection of all prisoners and urges 
them to repatriate those sick and wounded 
prisoners who qualify for repatriation under 
the convention. 

The Govermnents of the United States and 
Viet-Nam have repeatedly made clear both pub- 
licly and privately through many channels their 
desire to bring about an exchange of prisoners. 
The Govermnent of the United States reiterates 
this desire and its willingness to discuss such 
exchanges at any time and in any appropriate 
way, using intennediaries or directly, by public 
means or privately. 

U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident 
involving Soviet Ships at Haiphong 

Press release 162 dated July 15 

Follotoing is the text of a U.S. note delivered 
l>y the U.S. Etnbassy in Moscow to the Soviet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs July 13. 

July 13, 1967. 

The Government of the United States of 
America refers to its note of July 1^ and to the 
note of the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics of Jime 30 ^ concerning a 
reported incident involving the Soviet merchant 
ship "Mikliail Frunze" in the port of Haiphong 
on June 29. 

The investigation referred to in the United 
States note indicates that on June 29 at approx- 
imately the time mentioned in the Soviet note, 
United States aircraft were engaged in an oper- 
ation against a petroleum storage installation 
in the vicinity of Haiphong. In that operation, 
two United States aircraft attacked an ac- 
tively firing anti-aircraft site located approx- 
imately 600 yards from the area in which the 
Soviet ship is reported to have been moored. 
Wliile the investigation produced no positive 
indication that these or other aircraft damaged 
the Soviet vessel, from the evidence available 
the possibility cannot be excluded that some of 
the ordnance aimed at the anti-aircraft site fell 

' Not printed here. 



on or near the vessel. The investigation has, 
however, established beyond doubt that any 
damage that may have been sustained was in- 
advertent and resulted solely from the difficult 
combat conditions tliat existed. There is no 
evidence of any violation of the strict instruc- 
tions applicable to all United States military 
pilots to make every effort to avoid inflicting 
damage on vessels which are not hostile. 

In the course of military operations for the 
collective self-defense of the Republic of Viet- 
Nam against the continued armed aggression 
by North Viet-Nam, the United States Govern- 
ment has taken extraordinary measures to min- 
imize damage to non-hostile shipping. The 
measures taken to this end are under contmumg 
review to ensure that they are as effective as 
possible. The United States Government regrets 
that it has been impossible to eliminate com- 
pletely the risk that foreign vessels entering or 
remaining in an area of active hostilities may 
sustain unintentional damage as a result of the 
actions of one or the other side. 

Time Limit on Copyright Filings 
Extended for German Citizens 

White House press release dated July 12 

President Johnson on July 12 signed a procla- 
mation ^ giving German citizens 1 year to bring 
certain literary, artistic, and musical works 
within the protection of the United States copy- 
right law. 

Citizens of many nations were unable to com- 
ply with the requirements of the copyright law 
for several years during and after World War 
II because of disruption or suspension of copy- 
right facilities. This proclamation would permit 
German citizens who were unable to apply for 
United States copj'right registration or renewal 
from September 3, 1939, through May 5, 1956, 
to do so during the year followmg the date of 
the proclamation. 

The United States copyright law authorizes 
such a proclamation in favor of nationals of 
countries which accord reciprocal treatment to 
United States copyright owners. This reciproc- 
ity exists between the Governments of the Fed- 

eral Republic of Germany and the United 

The proclamation gives copyright owners the 
same rights they would have enjoyed had the 
work been registered or renewed between 1939 
and 1956. 

Restrictions on Travel 
to Lebanon Lifted 

The Department of State announced on July 
10 (press release 156) that U.S. passports are 
now valid, without special endorsement, for 
travel of American citizens to Lebanon. 

Travel restrictions remain in effect, however, 
for eight countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa : Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, the 
Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United 
Arab Republic, and Yemen. These restrictions 
will be lifted as soon as conditions warrant. 

On June 21 the Department removed the ban 
on American travel to Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, 
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. 

World Law Day, 1967 


Our Nation is committed to the Rule of Law. A gov- 
ernment of laws, rather than of men, is the very es- 
sence of our society. 

The Rule of Law, in our tradition, demands that 

— Men be entitled to the government and the repre- 
sentatives of their choice. 

— No citizen be above the law. 

— Justice be administered by an independent judicial 

— Disputes be fairly resolved by peaceful means. 

We wish that relations among nations, as among in- 
dividual citizens, were always governed by the Rule 
of Law — that disputes among nations were always ad- 
judicated peacefully — that nations could learn to live 
with their differences as law-abiding neighbors. 

One step in making this vision a reality is the join- 
ing together of the best judicial and legal minds of 
many nations. Many men of such eminence will assem- 
ble in Geneva on July 10, 1967, for the World Confer- 
ence of World Peace Through Law. While other meet- 
ings will command more headlines, none will meet for 
a more important purpose. 

' No. 3792 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 10341. 

^ No. 3791 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 10047. 

AUGUST 7, 196 7 


It is especially fitting in these times of strife that 
we salute those who seek to establish the Rule of Law 
as a standard for the world. 

Our best wishes are with this conference, as it as- 
sembles to promote the role of law and legal institu- 
tions in the resolution of international disputes and the 
maintenance of world peace. We join our fellow men 
throughout the world in reaffirming our commitment to 
the principles of international justice — and our hope 
that all men may find the wisdom to implement them. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President of 
the United States of America, in order to advance the 
great goal of achieving and securing world peace, do 
hereby proclaim July 10, 1967, as World Law Day, and 
I call upon all public and private ofiicials, members of 
the legal profession, citizens, and all men of good will 
to demonstrate the importance of the law in mankind's 
quest for world peace by appropriate observances and 
ceremonies in courts, schools, universities, and other 
public places. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
this third day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen 
hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of 
the United States of America the one hundred and 

LyjL»«>AM/ U *wfa« " ■ 

U.S.-Japan Medical Science 
Committee Holds Third Meeting 

The Department of State announced on July 
13 (press release 159) that the third meeting of 
the United States-Japan Cooperative Medical 
Science Committee would be held at Palo Alto, 
Calif, on July 29.^ Distinguished medical scien- 
tists of the two coimtries are members of this 

' For names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese 
delegations, see Department press release 159 dated 
July 13. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, 
p. 133. 

joint committee, which has met previously in 
Honolulu in 1965 and in Japan last year. 

The Committee developed out of discussions 
in January 1965 between President Jolmson 
and Prime Minister Sato.^ At that time they 
agi-eed to undertake a greatly expanded pro- 
gram of cooperation in medical science. 

Attention has concentrated on six disease 
problems: cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, para- 
sitic diseases, certain virus diseases, and mahiu- 
trition. The Committee is assisted by panels of 
scientific experts in both countries. At the com- 
ing meeting the Committee will hear reports by 
these panels, review progress in the research ef- 
forts underway, and consider future activities. 

On July 26-28, just before the Committee 
meeting, the panels on cholera and parasitic 
diseases will convene at Palo Alto to discuss the 
present status of their efforts and consider fur- 
ther research. 

Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section 
of Great Lakes Fishery Commission 

President Jolinson annoimced on July 5 
(White House press release) his appointment 
of Clarence F. Pautzke as a Commissioner of 
the United States Section of the Great Lakes 
Fishery Commission. Mr. Pautzke succeeds 
Donald L. McKernan, whose resignation has 
been accepted because of the press of his duties 
as Special Assistant for Fish and Wildlife to 
the Secretary of State. 

Mr. Pautzke is Commissioner, Fisj and Wild- 
life Service, and Dejiuty Assistant Secretary of 
the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks. 
He also is a U.S. Commissioner of the U.S. 
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Com- 
mission and the International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission. 




Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 

Statement hy William M. Roth 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^ 

I regard as a distinct honor your invitation 
to be the opening witness before this subcom- 
mittee. I can say witli great sincerity that I wel- 
come this series of hearings reassessing U.S. 
foreign trade policy. The President has ordered 
a major review of our trade policies. The delib- 
erations of this subcommittee and the testimony 
and papers presented before it will be of enor- 
mous benefit to us in preparing for and under- 
taking the study for the President. 

In trying to decide on what aspects of the 
Kennedy Round and the future I could most 
productively concentrate this morning, Mr. 
Chairman, I have concluded that an extended 
review of the Kennedy Round and its result 
would not, perhaps, be in order. 

A great deal has already been written and 
said on the Kennedy Round conclusion, and 
until the President's report to the Congress is 
completed we will not have a definite analysis 
of the agreement. I would propose for your con- 
sideration, therefore, insertion in the record of 
our initial report on the agreement. It is a fairly 
detailed account of what happened. I would 
then focus my remarks on the immediate fu- 
ture to include, first, the issues that we face as 
a result of the Kennedy Round and, second, the 
question of what we envision as the means of 
meeting the President's request for a major ad- 
ministration review of trade policy. 

If this approach is agreeable to you Mr. 
Chairman, I will proceed to the discussion of our 
immediate post-Kennedy Round problems. 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee on 
July 11. 

These problems are essentially three : 

1. The negotiating authority of the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962 has expired, leaving the 
United States without an important means of 
conducting its normal international trade 
relations ; 

2. The criteria for making available the ad- 
justment assistance provided for in the Trade 
Expansion Act appears to be so stated as to 
make such assistance more difficult to obtain 
than we expected ; and 

3. In order to bring into effect a valuable 
package of concessions worked out during the 
Kennedy Round, Congress is to be asked to 
agree to the abandonment of the American 
Selling Price system of customs evaluation. 

Need for Negotiating Authority 

In regard to negotiating authority, we do not 
contemplate any further major initiative in 
trade liberalization in the immediate future. 
With the Kennedy Round just over, we believe 
that the present need is for review and reflection 
in preparation for any renewed effort to stim- 
ulate and expand international commerce. A 
major review of trade policy will be undertaken 
for the President. 

Nevertheless, some minimal negotiating au- 
thority is needed during this period. 

May I take an example. Under section 351 of 
the Trade Expansion Act — the so-called escape- 
clause provision — the President has authority 
to increase a duty or to impose a quota if he de- 
termines that such action is necessary to prevent 
or to remedy serious injury to a domestic in- 

ATJGUST 7, 1967 


dustry that is caused by increased imports that 
in turn have resulted from tariff concession. 
Under the established rule, we would be obliged 
to see that some further adjustment was made 
to compensate the supplying countries for their 
loss through this emergency action by the Tariff 
Commission. The preferred method would be 
to lower one or more tariffs on other goods im- 
ported into the United States. If we were not 
able to make such comjDensatory tariff conces- 
sions, we would have to face the retaliatory 
withdrawal by the supplying countries of tariff 
concessions which they have granted on goods 
which we export to them. 

In order to be in a position to make compensa- 
tory tariff concessions in connection with the 
escape-clause actions which we may have to 
take, we should have authority under the Trade 
Expansion Act to negotiate compensatory tariff 

Let me take one more example. There may be 
times in the future when we may wish to revise 
upward one or more tariff concessions. Tliis has 
been necessary in the past when legislation has 
been enacted to change tariff classifications with 
the effect of increasing duties. Although these 
cases may be rare, they do pose the problem of 
negotiating a settlement with the other coun- 
tries. Just as in the example I cited above, there 
are two basic alternative adjustments that may 
be made : for us to lower one or more duties on 
other products in compensation to the other 
countries or to face retaliatory tariff increases 
against our exports. Our preference is obvious- 
ly to negotiate for compensatory tariff reduc- 
tions. This again makes desirable the existence 
of some negotiating authority. 

The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] rules have brought a large measure 
of order mto international trading relations. 
The cost of the obligations they place upon the 
United States are far outweighed by the bene- 
fits we derive as the world's biggest trader. 

It is m order to maintain our GATT obliga- 
tions and to be able to act with initiative and 
flexibility within the GATT framework that we 
need some negotiating authority. It need not be 
very substantial. It has been suggested, al- 
though no final decision has yet been taken, that 
the Trade Expansion Act negotiating authority 
simply be extended, giving us the use of that 
part of it that was not exhausted in the 
Kennedy Eound. 

Adjustment Assistance Modification 

Turning to the adjustment assistance ques- 
tion, we find ourselves dealing with the proba- 
bility that the Congress in writing the pro- 
visions of the Trade Expansion Act intended 
far more readily available recourse to adjust- 
ment assistance than has proved possible. 

These provisions were designed to authorize 
quick and substantial assistance to any worker 
or firm mjured as a result of increased imports 
caused by tariff concessions. The vmderlying 
concept was that rather than restrict imports it 
was far preferable to help firms and workers 
meet problems created by import competition 
through improved productivity. 

Unfortunately, however, the adjustment as- 
sistance provisions have not had the expected 
beneficial effect, because in practice the present 
test of eligibility to apply for the assistance has 
proved too strict. In fact, in no case brought 
under the act have any firms or workers been 
able to prove eligibility. 

The present test of eligibility requires (1) 
that tariff concessions be shown to be the major 
cause of increased imports and (2) that such in- 
creased imports be shown to be the major cause 
of injury to the petitioner. 

In the complex environment of our modern 
economy, a great variety of factors affect the 
productive capacity and competitiveness of 
American producers, making it virtually impos- 
sible to single out increased imports as the ma- 
jor cause of injury. In fact, it has usually been 
impossible to prove that tariff concessions were 
the major cause of increased imports. 

Under these circumstances, it is apparent that 
action must be taken to make the intended 
assistance a reality. We now have under con- 
sideration several formulations that might meet 
the requirements of the situation. No final deci- 
sions have yet been taken, but it is the intention 
of the administration to propose congressional 
action to modify the present provisions of the 

The new test of eligibility would insure that 
adjustment assistance would be available only 
in those cases of injury which are the result of 
tariff concessions. The specific kmds and levels 
of benefits would remain unchanged. 

Also unchanged would be the provisions for 
relief for entire industries — as distinguished 
from individual workei'S and firms — which suf- 
fer serious injury through tariff concessions. 



The so-called escape clause makes possible the 
imposition of quotas and increased tariffs. How- 
ever, this is a drastic form of relief and one 
which costs other industries either tariff protec- 
tion at home or export opportunities abroad, as 
I have suggested in my earlier discussion of 
GATT provisions for compensation and retalia- 
tion in the event of increased tariffs. We believe 
that the standards for escape-clause relief 
should be retained in their present form. 

After this rather siunmary discussion of the 
first two of the three post-Kemiedy Round 
problems, I would like to go mto more detail on 
the question of the American Selling Price 
(ASP) system, which, as I have said, will be a 
matter for congressional consideration. 

The ASP Issue 

ASP, as it applies to chemicals, is often re- 
ferred to by critics abroad as the symbol of non- 
tariff barriers (NTB). I should like to confine 
my comments to only three aspects of ASP. Let 
me comment now on why it appears to us to be 
an undesirable impediment to trade, what the 
effects of its removal will probably be, and 
finally, how we appraise the balance of what we 
gave and received in this area in the recent trade 

In 1922 the Congress determined that our 
then infant chemical industry, specifically that 
part of it which manufactures products derived 
from coal tars, required extraordinary protec- 
tion. The Congress was apparently reluctant to 
raise the statutory duties to the levels it deemed 
necessary to provide adequate protection under 
the circumstances then existing. Instead, the 
Congress provided that any imported coal tar 
product, now referred to as benzenoid, which is 
competitive with a similar domestic product 
should be valued on the basis of the latter's 
American wholesale price. This statute has re- 
mained in effect for 45 years, although the 
American chemical industry has grown rapidly 
since then and is today one of the largest and 
strongest not only in this country but in the 
world — and even though coal tars are now less 
frequently involved, the major raw materials 
now being byproducts of our petroleum in- 
dustry, itself the largest and probably most ef- 
ficient in the world. 

Tliis system has long been criticized by other 
countries, and for various reasons. Some of them 
can be summarized as follows : 

1. It provides extraordinaiy protection, both 
in comparison with the duties which now apply 
to other U.S. industries and in comparison with 
duties in effect abroad. The statutory rates for 
benzenoids alone are already higher than those 
applying to most other products entering the 
United States and higher than those typical of 
other nations' tariff schedules. Wlien further 
applied to American wholesale prices, these 
rates produce effective rates often many times 
higher than the apparent duty. Some are actu- 
ally above 100 percent, and the peak, as recently 
determined by a Tariff Commission study, is 
172 percent. 

2. The system is inconsistent with the customs 
practices of all our trading partners for non- 
agricultural goods. Moreover, it would be in 
violation of the standards of customs valuation 
laid down by the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade but for the fact that its use in this 
country antedates our adherence to the GATT 
and was made permissible under a "grand- 
father" clause. 

3. Under the ASP system a domestic manu- 
facturer has unique and unfair advantages. 
Within the limits of the effectiveness of com- 
petitive forces in the U.S. market, a manu- 
facturer can adjust the level of his tariff protec- 
tion against his foreign competitor by the 
wholesale price he sets for his product. More- 
over, if he is not actually making a "like or 
similar" product to one currently imported, he 
can decide to produce or merely to "offer to sell" 
a "like" or "similar" product and thereby he 
triggers an increase, usually substantial, in the 
tariff wall that imports must surmount. 

4. Tlie foreign exporter of a product potenti- 
ally subject to ASP consequently cannot know 
at the time he signs a contract and sliips the 
product whether it will be subject to ASP nor 
what the ASP will be until it has passed through 
our customs. This uncertainty as to the amount 
of duty is a burden on trade with no counter- 
part in the vast bulk of other international com- 
merce in industrial goods. 

The normal method of valuation, I might add, 
which applies to virtually all other U.S. imports 
as well as to imports into all other countries, is 
export value; that is, the wholesale price of the 
product as offered in the country of origin. For 
the reasons I have cited and the fact that this 
particular system deviates so sharply from the 
common practice, other coimtries consider it an 

AUGUST 7, 1967 


unjustified anomaly in our trade policy. From 
the very beginning of the negotiations they 
made it a major issue, even though we made it 
crystal clear that we had no authority to change 
it under the authority of the Trade Expansion 

Because of the validity of those complaints 
and because our national stake in world trade 
in chemicals is so large — we export some $2.7 
billion in chemicals and our net export surplus 
is no less than $1.8 billion so that we have much 
to gain from liberalization of barriers through- 
out the world in this industry — we undertook a 
series of intensive studies over a 2-year period 
of this issue. 

And now I come to my second point : what the 
effects of the removal of ASP and its conversion 
to the normal basis of valuation would be. 

Effects on Chemical Industry 

I recognize that there are those who would 
have the Congress and the public believe that 
the economic effects on this industry would, and 
I quote, be "disastrous." So serious a charge 
properly merits a painstaking examination. I 
am sure when the Congress examines the legis- 
lation which the President will be submitting 
that a vital and objective review of all the facts 
will be made. We shall at the appropriate time 
provide all of the reasons we have found that 
lead us to conclude that no disaster lies ahead. 
I can understand the self-interest of those who 
have benefited for 45 years from an extraordi- 
nary system of tariff adjustment and from the 
very lilgh level of protection it creates in per- 
petuating that system. Nevertheless, the national 
interest and the posture of our trade policy 
throughout the world require a full evaluation 
of all pertinent considerations. 

Very briefly, what our studies found was a 
remarkable record of growth and a well below 
average problem with imports. And, I might 
add that the studies were based on evidence sub- 
mitted by the industry in four separate public 
hearings, two of which dealt entirely with the 
ASP issue, as well as on extensive consultations 
with firms in the industry. 

Let me cite but a few figures, both for all of 
the chemical industry and for that portion pro- 
tected specially by ASP. It is not always mean- 
ingful, I should note, to attempt to concentrate 
only on the benzenoid portion of the chemical 
industry. Useful data are not always available 
for benzenoid activities only. Perhaps more im- 
portant, we found that some of the major chemi- 

cal companies — large, integrated, and diversi- 
fied firms — also dominate the benzenoid sector, 
though their benzenoid production and sales are 
often but a small fraction of their total cor- 
porate activity. In such cases it is not reasonable 
to examine only the small fraction and overlook 
eitlier the largest area of their activity or the 
close interrelationships between the parts. 

We found tliat in 1964, the base year for data 
for our negotiations, the chemical industry sold 
products worth $36 billion, of which $3 billion 
were protected by ASP. ASP imports, in turn, 
were $50 million, of which only about half were 
deemed by the Customs Bureau to compete with 
American-made chemicals. This works out to an 
import "penetration" less than 1 percent 
of our domestic market for competitive prod- 
ucts, far below the national average for all 

We found furtlier that not only has the chem- 
ical industry generally been one of our fastest 
growing industries, as is well known, but also 
that its benzenoid segment has a growth rec- 
ord — overall from 7 percent to 8 percent per 
year — that is impressive indeed. I probably 
need not detail our export record in cliemicals. 
The average increase has been no less tJian 10 
percent per year. We have not only the signifi- 
cant export surplus I noted earlier but a surplus 
with each of our major trading partners — with 
Japan, with Canada, the EEC [European Eco- 
nomic Community], and the United Kingdom. 

Our chemical exports, further, have grown 
even faster than average into those foreign mar- 
kets where the local firms have an advantage 
over our producers by virtue of customs unions 
or free trading areas, such as the EEC and the 
EFTA [European Free Trade Association] na- 
tions. Our share of the EEC import market, for 
example, is equal to that of Germany, our 
strongest competitor and one with favored tariff 
treatment in selling into the other EEC mem- 
ber states. 

The picture for benzenoids alone, though the 
figures are less complete, is much the same. Our 
exports in 1964 probably exceeded $300 million. 
We exported at least six times as mucli as we 
imported, or better than a tenth of production. 
We exported more than we imported, substan- 
tially more in most cases, in each of the major 
benzenoid product groups, in intermediates, in 
dyes, in pigments, to name the presumedly more 
sensitive ones ; and clearly more in those groups 
where our competitive strength is seldom called 
into question, in plastics, in pesticides, plasti- 
cizers, and surface active agents. 



We also found great concentration of eco- 
nomic interest, of production, and sales in the 
hands of a few large firms. While small firms, 
often specializing in a few products or special 
services, are found in many benzenoid product 
lines, we also found, for example, that five 
integrated and diversified companies account 
for two-thirds of total U.S. production of ben- 
zenoid intermediates. Imports of all intermedi- 
ates, by the way, were less than 2 percent of 
sales in 1964, and exports were well in excess of 
$100 million. 

Much has been heard about our dye industry. 
We foimd that four firms make more than half 
of all sales in our domestic market. Ten have 
three-quarters of the total. We found also that 
sales have experienced an average growth of 
8 percent per year and that imports of competi- 
tive dyes were again less than 2 percent in 1964. 

Another area of which much has been said 
is the pigment sector of this industry. Here we 
found that a single large firm has 25 percent 
of all sales ; another four bring the share up to 
60 percent of the market. Again, the growth 
rate has been well above the national average. 
Imports were almost all deemed not competitive 
with U.S. pigments and barely accounted for 1 
percent of total consumption. 

These are but a few of our specific findings. 
In reaching our conclusions both on conversion 
of the ASP system and on the rate reductions 
that we negotiated in the Kennedy Round or 
those we shall be submitting to the Congress, 
we applied the same standards as we observed 
in determining the reductions we could offer on 
all other products of American agriculture and 
industry. We examined carefully all available 
evidence on the individual companies and their 
workers, the prospects for future growth, the 
ability to adjust to increased competition, and 
the potential for benefiting from new opportu- 
nities to expand exports. We reached a judg- 
ment on whether tariff reduction would cause 
serious injury and whether the industry has the 
competitive strength to adjust to such conces- 
sions, taking into account the adjustment provi- 
sions of the Trade Expansion Act. In the end 
we found that most parts of the benzenoid in- 
dustry would not be seriously injured by elimi- 
nation of ASP and reduction by 50 percent in 
the equivalent duties computed on the normal 
basis of valuation. For others, we found that 
elimination of ASP would have no adverse 
effect but that reduction of duties by 50 percent 
would. In such cases, we have proposed lesser 
tariff reductions. 

I cannot leave this subject without taking note 
of the criticism which has been made of the 
manner in which we achieved a satisfactory ne- 
gotiation of the ASP issue. AVe insisted, you 
may recall, that any negotiation would have to 
be separate and distinct from the chemical ne- 
gotiations in the Kennedy Round so that the 
Congress would have a full and free opportu- 
nity to judge the issue on its merits and to de- 
termine as well whether reciprocity would be 
obtained in return for abolishing the system. 
We also insisted that a satisfactory balance of 
concessions in chemicals be achieved within the 
Kennedy Round, in keeping with the purposes 
of the Trade Expansion Act, as well as to pre- 
vent "overloading" the separate ASP package 
and thereby impairing the free deliberation on 
its merits by the Congress. 

These results were not easily achieved. Until 
virtually the last week, our negotiating partners 
refused to spin off, so to speak, what they con- 
sidered to be a major negotiating objective or to 
pay additional coin in return for its elimination. 
In the end we were able to achieve a separate 
ASP package, as well as a balanced deal within 
the chemical sector in the Kennedy Round. 

Balance of Benefits 

This brings me to my third point. A proper 
appraisal of the benefits gained and given in a 
trade negotiation necessarily involves a com- 
posite judgment based on the nature and volume 
of the trade subject to concessions, an evalua- 
tion of the potentials thereby created for future 
trade expansion, and on the depth of the conces- 
sions made. Combining all these factors, the 
United States negotiated a balanced exchange 
with each major participant within the Kennedy 
Round while retaining ASP, and should the 
Congress approve legislation eliminating ASP, 
we shall obtain further valuable concessions 
both to the chemical and other industries. To- 
gether, the two packages commit the major na- 
tions to make the same average overall percent- 
age reductions in chemical tariffs and to 
eliminate significant nontariff barriers against 
the trade of their partners. 

In each of the two packages, the concessions 
received by the United States cover a substan- 
tially larger volume of our exports than the 
volume of imports on which concessions were 
granted. Taking into account both trade covered 
by concessions and the depth of the concessions, 
the United States thus stands to benefit on bal- 
ance in each package. This positive balance also 

ATJGUST 7, 1967 


holds in our bilateral trade with each major 
participant. Our chemical industry, in short, 
stands to derive substantial benefits. 

AYe should derive substantial benefits not only 
on balance but, critically, in the areas where it 
most counts. Foreign tariffs on our most rapidly 
growing export products will be drastically re- 
duced, while the exceptions to 50 percent con- 
cessions by others should not adversely affect 
our future trade to any significant degree. Tar- 
iffs on plastics, for example, will almost all be 
10 percent or less in the rapidly growing EEC 
and U.K. markets if ASP is eliminated. In 1964 
we exported nearly $150 million of plastics to 
these two markets alone. Another of our bur- 
geoning overseas market is in organic chemicals, 
other than jjlastics. The U.K. here will bring 
its many 33% percent rates down to 12.5 per- 
cent. Some $50 million of U.S. exports of or- 
ganics go to the U.K. alone. The EEC, in turn, 
will be cutting by nearly 50 percent on an even 
larger volume of our exports. 

Finally, our negotiations will result in tariffs 
abroad being uniformly reduced to extremely 
low levels, thereby providing very considerable 
opportunities for our chemical industry. With 
very few exceptions, there will be no rate in the 
U.K. or in the EEC above 12.5 percent. Most 
Japanese duties will be below 15 percent, as 
will Canadian rates. By comparison, U.S. tar- 
iffs in certain key benzenoid sectors will still be 
20 percent, while sulfa drugs will be 25 percent 
and dyes and pigments will be dutiable at 30 
percent, substantially above comparable rates in 
other countries. 

We are confident rates such as these will pro- 
vide a sufficient level of tariff protection for the 
U.S. benzenoid mdustry, a strong and efficient 
industry with a demonstrated record of inter- 
national competitive ability. On the other hand 
the concessions we have gamed should permit 
it, in turn, and the rest of the chemical industry, 
as well, to continue to expand significantly their 
already substantial export surpluses. 

Now I would like to turn to the future. 

There are many ways the United States could 
move on from the Kennedy Round. We could 
simply seek another general round of tariff re- 
ductions. We could pursue specialized negotia- 
tions on certain products or with certain coun- 
tries. We could concentrate on some, or on all, 
nontariff barriers. There is a very wide range 
of alternatives. 

The President recently asked me to undertake 

for him a major study of U.S. trade policy to 
determine which courses of action would be de- 
sirable in the coming years. Tliis study will give 
us all a chance to catch our breath and to give 
close scrutiny to the likely effects of the Ken- 
nedy Romid while evaluating what remains to 
be done. It is my hope that members of Congress 
will take an active interest in this study. 

Wide Range of Issues 

The range of issues which will require care- 
ful thought, and on which we shall be seeking 
your advice, is wide. 

Many of these issues relate to the special trade 
problems of the developing countries. These 
coimtries are acutely conscious of the need for 
expanding their exports and have been pressing 
in recent years for a new, general kind of dis- 
criminatory treatment. What they want is pref- 
erential access for all developing countries into 
all major industrialized countries. Such a step 
would, the developing countries claim, give them 
reasonable opportunity to export, while putting 
all of the developing countries on an equal basis. 
These countries have pressed their desire for 
preferences very hard, and many developed 
countries now appear to be willing to provide 
such preferred access. The President indicated 
at Punta del Este that he was willing to con- 
sider whether a common effort among the de- 
veloped countries was desirable and feasible.^ 
Exploratory discussions along these lines are 
now underway in the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] . 

Proliferation of special trading arrangements 
between developed and developing countries, 
meanwhile, continues. These arrangements tend 
to harm many countries while favoring only a 
few and thus thi-eaten to offset many of the good 
effects of general most-favored-nation tariff 
reductions such as those achieved in the Ken- 
nedy Round. Proliferation of discrimination if 
carried further could hurt, most of all, the de- 
veloping coimtries themselves, with a chosen few 
receiving modest benefits from certain highly 
industrialized countries, while many others are 
being left as orphans. Somehow, a way must 
very soon be found to halt this trend. 

Looking at trade more generally, tariffs will 
in the future be much lower and in a number of 
cases remain only at nuisance levels, wliich 

" For background, see Bulletin of May S, 1967, 
p. 706. 



raises a fundamental question of aiiproach. 
Should future trade negotiations adojjt the same 
across-the-board basis as the Kennedy Bound, 
or should they now be focused upon particular 
commodities? In the agricultural field, tariffs 
are becoming even less important relative to 
other impediments or artificial stimulants to 
trade. We must try to see if the United States 
can obtain significant liberalization of agricul- 
tural trade for our exporters, but at the same 
time we shall have to ascertain what present 
U.S. protection we might have to give up to buy 
such liberalization. A major effort may be 
needed to limit the use of export subsidies, es- 
pecially in countries where high price supports 
are in operation. 

One of the most difficult, complex, and far- 
reaching areas with which our future trade 
policy must deal is that of nontariff trade bar- 
riers. The obstacles to the unimpeded, nondis- 
criminatory flow of goods other than tariffs 
take many forms. Moreover, they have deep 
roots in the fiscal, social, and economic policies 
of each nation and by that token can be only 
slowly and painfully removed through interna- 
tional negotiations. Their impact on trade and 
their distorting effects on international com- 
petition are often not readily apparent, which 
makes them all the more arduous to negotiate 
and eradicate. 

A difficult question that we shall face is what 
of our own NTB's we will be prepared to give 
up in exchange for the dropping of other na- 
tions' barriers. 

As part of our study, we shall attempt to com- 
pile a complete index and analysis of all non- 
tariff barriers, both foreign and domestic. In 
tliis effort, we shall be seeking the cooperation 
of business. We are pleased to find that the Na- 
tional Chamber of Commerce has recognized 
the inadequacy of data in this field and is work- 
ing on its own compilation. 

It may well prove useful to us in this project, 
as well as in other aspects of our study, to hold 
public hearings. 

There is need for careful thought about what 
can and should be done toward improving 
American export performance. In particular, 
we must see whether American exporters are 
disadvantaged in any way in comparison with 
foreign exporters working under the benefit of 
their governments' export programs or tax sj's- 
tems. We need to consider whether new U.S. 
export incentives are feasible and consistent 
with orderly development of world trade. At 

the same time we should consider what actions 
may be necessary to control the unjustified use 
of export incentives by other countries. 

Export incentives are only one aspect of ex- 
port performance. A good deal more thought is 
needed concerning the relationship between ex- 
ports and foreign investment by American firms. 
We shall also need to know more about the ex- 
tent to which tariffs will act as an incentive to 
invest abroad to get behind tariff walls despite 
the Kennedy Eound reductions. The trade flows 
within major international firms, many of which 
have lost their national identities, is another 
area about which we need to know much more. 
The worldwide flow of teclinology, investment, 
and trade within some industries may very well 
provide appropriate conditions for free trade 
in the products of that industry. 

The many interrelationships between trade 
and investment in economic growth and de- 
velopment today have another crucial bearing 
upon our trade policies. As the importance of 
the truly international corporation grows and 
the two-way flow of trade, capital, and tech- 
nology accelerates, what is done in one field or 
in one geographic area inevitably affects our 
policies and our performances in others. If, for 
example, we would have other countries wel- 
come our subsidiaries and our steadily growing 
direct investments and if our investors abroad 
are to expect continued equal and reasonable 
treatment, then we must see to it that the legiti- 
mate economic interests of other comitries are 
also taken into account in the determination of 
our own policies here at home. xVn industry with 
as large and promising a stake in foreign mar- 
kets as the chemical industry, for instance, 
should be aware of the intensity of the griev- 
ances abroad over the barriers we have erected 
against the chemical products of other countries. 

Domestic Adjustments 

We must give further thought to means by 
which our domestic economic adjustments to in- 
creased trade are facilitated. It is clear that im- 
proved adjustment assistance provisions are 
needed to ease the plight of those adversely af- 
fected by increased imports resulting from con- 
cessions which are of more general benefit. There 
has been a tendency m the past to turn to pro- 
tectionism when economic dislocations threat- 
ened to occur. Ad hoc measures to protect cer- 
tain products may continue to be needed from 
time to time, in emergencies. On the whole, how- 

AUGTJST 7, 1967 


ever, if international trade is to be further ex- 
panded, the beneficiaries of this trade, including 
the United States, must strenuously resist adop- 
tion of special protectionist devices. At home we 
shall have to give much thought to finding the 
desirable balance of trade-promoting and pro- 
tective devices designed to ease the process of 
economic dislocation. And finally, we should 
have another look at existing restrictive import 
programs to see whether they can be adapted 
to the 1970's or whether they should be grad- 
ually phased out. 

In these remarks I have touched upon some 
of the problems which need to be studied in com- 
ing months. There are many more, because, as 
you know, trade policy is extremely complex. 
In order to grasp this wide range of issues, we 
are planning to establish a number of task forces 

within the executive branch, which will include 
consultants from universities and from industry. 
We intend to mamtam close ties with various 
industry, labor, and agi'iculture groups aroimd 
the country. JMost important, we welcome your 
active interest in all aspects of the trade policy 

Our intention is to consult members of Con- 
gress as we proceed with the study for the 
President. New steps will inevitably require leg- 
islation, making it a matter of paramoimt im- 
portance that the views of the Congress be fully 
considered in the formative stages of recommen- 
dations. In this way, we can plan new steps to- 
ward increased world trade and prosperity with 
the knowledge that our policies and our actions 
represent the best interests of the nation as a 

United States Foreign Trade Policy 
and the Developing Countries 

Statement hy Anthony M. Solomon 
Assistant Secretary for Economic Ajfairs ^ 

"Tlie developing countries," as that phrase is 
now commonly used, consist of well over 100 
political entities. There are marked differences 
among them in size, population, degree of indus- 
trialization and economic growth — so much so 
that it is misleading to speak of them in aggre- 
gate terms as though they were a homogeneous 
group of countries. But they do share certain 
characteristics in common : Their per capita in- 
come is low; their level of industrialization is 
low ; a large part of their labor force is engaged 
in agriculture, with low productivity per acre 
and per man; and they all want to modernize 
their economies. Indeed, economic growth has 
become a symbol of national worth and dignity. 
In human terms, the overwhelming majority of 
their people face the kind of grinding day-m- 

' Read before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic 
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee on July 12 by 
Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Trade Policy. Four tables which were 
submitted with the statement are not printed here. 

day-out, year-in-year-out poverty that leads to 
the "harsh, brvitish and sliort" lives which are 
the prevailing condition in most of the world. 

These countries are moving forward with 
varying degrees of success. A few are sprinting 
ahead; a few are stagnating. On the average 
there has been progress, but the pace of im- 
provement is uneven and slow. In the first half 
of the sixties, proclaimed by the United Na- 
tions as the De\elopment Decade, there has been 
no acceleration in the rate of economic growth 
of the developing countries as a whole. The rate 
of growth of per capita income, about 2 percent 
in 1960-65, was lower than in the preceding 
decade owing to an acceleration in the rate of 
population increase. Thus the gap between the 
per capita incomes of industrialized and devel- 
oping countries has continued to widen during 
the first half of the Development Decade. 

Trade is a means to economic growth. I would 
like to talk to you today about United States 
trade policy and the contribution it can make to 



the economic i)rogi-ess of the developing coun- 

The developing countries are far more heavily 
dependent on foreign trade than the United 
States and most other industrialized countries. 
For the equipment needed to build a modern 
economic structure and, all too often, even to 
import the necessary food to avert starvation, 
the developing countries are heavily dependent 
on imports from the industrialized countries. 
To pay for these imports, the developing coun- 
tries must export. And trade is clearly the senior 
partner to foreign aid— about 80 percent of the 
developing countries' foreign exchange receipts 
stems from export proceeds. Wliile foreign aid 
is a welcome and most important addition to 
the developing countries' ability to acquire the 
goods and services they need for their economic 
gro-\vth — and often the margin which avoids 
their slipping backward — their growth pros- 
pects depend critically on the extent to which 
they can increase their foreign exchange earn- 
ings through exports. 

"\^nule the total value of their aggregate ex- 
ports has been increasing vear by year, from $21 
billion in 1953 to $27.3'billion "in 1960 to $36.5 
billion in 1965, the developing countries have 
not shared proportionately in the dramatic 
growth-promoting spurt of world trade during 
the postwar era. Thus while the developing 
countries accounted for about 27 percent of 
world exports in 1953, this figure dropped to 
about 22 percent in 1960 and dropped further 
to less than 20 percent in 1965. 

The root causes of this situation have been 
well documented in numerous academic studies 
as well as reports of various intergovernmental 
institutions. First and foremost is the heavy 
dependence of the developing countries on ex- 
ports of primary commodities. Aboiit 85 percent 
of the export earnings of the developing coun- 
tries as a whole is accounted for by exports of 
nonmanufactured primary agricultural com- 
modities, crude minerals and metals, and petro- 
leum. The dependence of particular developing 
countries on exports of a single product is even 
more striking ; e.g., coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugar, 
cotton account for very heavy percentages — up 
to 80 percent — of the total export receipts of 
particular countries. 

"With the exception of petroleum, these com- 
modities are not a dynamic and dependable 
source of foreign exchange. They are by and 
large subject to a low income-elasticity of de- 
mand ; their prices fluctuate sharply because of 

variations in supply or cyclical changes in de- 
mand; several of them face growing competi- 
tion from synthetic substitutes; and many are 
being produced in increasing quantities in the 
industrialized countries themselves. 

In this situation, it is not at all surprising that 
the developing countries have been focusing 
their attention on an acceleration of industriali- 
zation and industrialization for export. Growth 
of world trade in manufactures has consistently 
exceeded the growth of world trade generally. 
The developing countries are anxious to break 
out of the straitjacket of dependence on a nar- 
row range of products with an unpromising 
outlook, in hopes of rapidly increasing the for- 
eign exchange earnings they need to pay for 
their ever-increasing imports. 

The develoj)ing countries have already 
acliieved a measure of success in this regard. 
An analysis of imports of manufactures to the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] countries combined ^ 
reveals a yearly rate of increase of 15.5 percent 
between 1960 and 1964 and an increase of 16 
percent from 1964 to 1965. An analysis of 49 
commodity groupings over the 10-year period 
1956-65 indicates an increase of 215 percent. 
This relatively favorable picture, however, must 
be interpreted with some caution. First, ex- 
ports of manufactures from developing coun- 
tries are still only the small visible part of the 
iceberg— 85 percent of their earnings is still ac- 
counted for by the unpromising primary or 
crude materials sector; secondly, the commodity 
composition is fairly narrow and concentrated 
on certain products, such as textiles, where they 
cannot expect large increases — indeed, the 
whole textile sector is fairly rigidly regulated 
at the present time under the international 
Long-Term Arrangement governing trade in 
cotton textiles;^ and finally, only a relative 
handful of the 100-plus developing countries 
are currently benefiting from the recent rapid 
increase in exports of manufactures and semi- 
manufactures — African countries, for example, 
are almost totally absent from the figures on ex- 
ports of manufactures. 

At the present time and for the decade ahead, 
trade m primary products will continue to be 

' United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. 
[Footnote in original.] 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5240 ; 
for text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 

AUGUST 7, 1967 


the main source of export earnings of the de- 
veloping countries. If we want to help these 
countries improve their trade earnings as a 
means to development, commodity trade is the 
place to begin. 

Problems of Primary-Product Trade 

This trade is plagued by a variety of prob- 
lems : by persistent overproduction in some key 
products; by wide and destabilizing price 
swings m other key products ; by severe compe- 
tition from both natural and synthetic products 
produced in the mdustrialized comitries, often 
under highly protectionist regimes; and by 
preferential arrangements in certain advanced 
countries that favor one group of primary pro- 
ducers over others. 

There is no one solution to this range of prob- 
lems. Wliat is needed is a multif aceted approach 
tailored to the problems of specific commodity 

In the case of cojfee, which is the single most 
important agricultural commodity in the trade 
of the developing countries and absolutely criti- 
cal to Latin America and ceitain African coun- 
tries, the key problem is structural overproduc- 

The International Coffee Agreement,^ which 
we helped to develop and actively support, has 
conducted a valuable holding operation. It 
averted a disastrous collapse of prices that 
threatened coffee trade in the early 1960's, and 
it has kept coffee prices reasonably stable by 
supply control; that is, by keeping exports in 
line with demand. But more coffee is being pro- 
duced than the world wants to consume; land, 
labor, and capital are being wasted in surjjlus 
production ; and this very surplus i^roduction is 
undemiining the agreement. 

The critical next step is to help the producing 
countries move resources out of surphis produc- 
tion into more rewarding uses. We would hope 
to see a diversification fund become an integral 
part of the coffee agreement. Access to the fund 
would be open to countries pursuing appropri- 
ate policies to curb coffee overproduction, and 
the funds themselves would be used for invest- 
ment in products with a more promising future, 
including importantly food for domestic con- 
sumption where this is feasible. 

At the Latin American Summit Meetinsr in 

Pmita del Este,^ President Johnson made clear ' 
our willingness to lend $15 million to help ini- 
tiate a cofl'ee diversification f mid that would be 
financed on a continuing basis by the producing 
countries themselves and to match the contribu- 
tions of other consuming countries by an addi- 
tional loan of up to $15 million. The Interna- 
tional Coffee Organization is working closely 
with the World Bank in developing the main 
features of the diversification fund. 

Cocoa, a critical export earner for Ghana, 
Nigeria, and other African and Latin countries, ' 
is notoriously subject to wide swings in price 
because of variations in supply due to weather 
and insect attack. Cocoa prices averaged 17 
cents a pound last year, 36 cents in 1959, 29 cents 
a few months ago. We cannot disregard the im- 
pact of these price fluctuations on the economic 
and political stability of the producing coun- 

Negotiations looking toward an international 
cocoa agreement foundered in 1963 on the ques- 
tion of price. Producers wanted a price range 
that consumers believed would encourage over- 
production, saddle the market with burdensome 
stocks, check consumption, and encourage the 
shift to substitutes. In the years since then fur- 
ther consultations have been held both on price 
and on the mechanics and financing of a work- 
able buffer-stock scheme. Differences have nar- 
rowed appreciably, and there is reasonable pros- 
pect that an agreement can be consummated in 
the near future that would give producing 
countries steady, growing earnings and assure 
consumers a stable supply at reasonable prices. 

The outlook is less promising in the case of 
sugar. The International Sugar Agreement lias 
not been operative for many years — in fact since 
Cuba refused to accept the rules. Our own trade 
is governed by our domestic sugar legislation, 
which provides premium prices for supplying 
countries to the extent of their import quotas in 
our market. But the world market price has 
been seriously depressed for some years and ad- 
versely affects many low-income suppliers that 
sell a substantial volume of their output at the 
world market price. 

Efforts to negotiate an international agree- 
ment that would strengthen the world price 
have proved to be very difficult, complicated by 

•TIAS 5505. 

° For statements by President Johnson and texts of 
the conference documents, see Bitlletin of May 8, 1967, 
p. 706. 



Cuba's intransigence on the matter of supply 
control and by the unwillingness of certain ad- 
vanced countries to provide reasonable access. 

For many primary products of importance to 
the trade of the poor countries, improved access 
to the mai'kets of developed countries is a major 
concern. Indeed, more than half of their com- 
modity trade, petroleum apart, competes with 
similar or identical products produced and ex- 
ported by the rich countries. Their mineral ores 
and metal exports face few trade barriers in the 
industrialized countries; demand is buoyant 
and future prospects are reasonably good. Nat- 
ural rubber and some tropical fibers are simi- 
larly traded freely, but the markets for these 
products have been eroded by the development 
of synthetics. For the developing countries de- 
pendent on these products the central objective 
must be to increase the efficiency of their pro- 
duction and marketing so as to meet the compe- 
tition of synthetic substitutes on a price and 
quality basis. 

Temperate Agricultural Products 

There is, however, a wide range of temperate 
agricultural products in which the poor coun- 
tries face an array of protective tariff and quota 
barriers that limit their access to the markets of 
the rich countries, and of subsidized exports 
from the rich countries that compete against 
them in third markets. 

The developing countries are pressing for 
trade liberalization in these products. The pros- 
pects for substantial liberalization are not good. 
In virtually all developed countries, domestic 
agriculture is insulated in varying degrees from 
the free play of demand and supply by high 
price supports, direct subsidies, and import 
controls. The average income of the farm sector 
in the rich countries tends to be below that of 
other sectors in their economies, and the array 
of protective measures is intended to maintain 
and increase the income of this sector as a 
matter of equity. 

The developing countries do not challenge the 
desirability of maintaining farm incomes in the 
advanced countries, but they ask that measures 
to protect such incomes not be applied in ways 
that stimulate excessive production. Thus they 
urge that in lieu of high price supports, farm- 
ers' incomes be maintained by direct payments 
that do not inhibit consumption or unduly 
stimulate production. 

We have recognized that agricultural support 
policies can have restrictive and disruptive 
effects on international trade. In the case of cot- 
ton, wheat, and feed grains, we have slufted 
from high price supports to direct payments 
and we have made our farm payments contin- 
gent on producers' cooperation with acreage 
control. Where surpluses have developed, we 
have stored them rather than dump them or 
made them available on concessional terms to 
iniprove the diet and assist the development 
of low-income comatries miable to purchase food 
on commercial terms. And we have taken pre- 
cautions to insure that these food aid programs 
do not interfere with the normal pattern of 
international trade. 

The developing countries have also asked the 
rich importing countries so to manage their 
farm economies as to give them a share in their 
markets and a share in the growth of these 

Wlaile existing U.S. legislation restricts sugar 
imports, we have set aside 35^0 percent of U.S. 
sugar requirements for imports. And in the case 
of meats, the present law permits imports equal 
to about 5 percent of domestic production be- 
fore quotas would come into play. 

The developing countries have urged the rich 
countries to assist their farmers by some form 
of adjustment assistance of the kind applicable 
in industry, rather than through protective de- 
vices. We are to a considerable extent using a 
form of adjustment assistance in the farm sec- 
tor. Thus we are helping marginal farmers to 
move out of agriculture through our cropland 
adjustment program and through training pro- 
grams to enable them to develop skills in 
industrial employment. 

Liberalization of Agricultural Trade 

We would hope that the increased effective- 
ness of the supply management and flexible 
pricing progi-ams, the continuing shift of mar- 
ginal farmers to nonagricultural occupations, 
and the increased role of food aid will make it 
possible for us progressively to liberalize 
agi-icultural trade. 

This will necessarily be a slow process. The 
Kemiedy Round has demonstrated that sub- 
stantial liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products is not easy to achieve. But it is im- 
portant that we work together with other de- 
veloped comitries in the years ahead to consider 

AUGUST 7, 1967 


how to deal effectively with all major bar- 
riers to less developed countries' agricultural 

In the case of tropical products produced 
solely in the low-income countries, we have no 
barriers to trade or consumption. Some devel- 
oped countries do subject these products to high 
revenue duties that inhibit consmnption or to 
preferential tariffs that discriminate against 
certain low-income suppliers in favor of otliers. 
We believe the developing countries have a 
legitimate case that commodities produced 
solely in the tropical zone should not be a source 
of revenue to the rich countries at their expense. 
They have suggested that where such fiscal 
levies caimot be removed, a share of the receipts 
be turned back to them. 

As to tariffs and quotas that restrict trade in 
tropical products or discriminate among pri- 
mary producers, we would hope that all the rich 
countries would provide duty-free access for 
these products from all the poor countries. We 
shall continue our efforts in this matter. 

A review of our trade policy as it affects the 
primary-commodity trade of the poor countries 
would be incomplete witliout noting the impor- 
tant role that compensatory financing can play 
in assisting low-income countries whose export 
earnings fall off for reasons beyond their con- 
trol. We have supported the liberalization of the 
compensatory financing facility in the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, and developing coun- 
tries are making increasing use of that facility. 
We are also considering the feasibility of sup- 
plementing that facility in the case of deep or 
protracted shortfalls in the export earnmgs of 
developing countries that are disruptive of their 
development and that may require longer term 
assistance than the 5Ionetai-y Fund facility 
provides. The World Bank has' developed a pro- 
posal for such a supplementary facility. The 
specifics of the Bank scheme raise a number of 
serious questions and we are not prepared to 
endorse it as formulated, but we are studying 
variants of the proposal that we may be able 
to support. 

Even if everything were done that could 
reasonably be done to improve conditions of 
access for the primary-product trade of the 
developmg countries, to stabilize commodity 
prices at reasonable levels, and to supplement 
export earnings when shortfalls occur, the de- 
veloping countries would still be vulnerable 
because with a few notable exceptions the com- 
modities on which they depend are not dynamic. 

Demand is not likely to grow commensurately 
with the increase in world trade and world 

The fimdamental answer to the trade prob- 
lems of the developing countries is to diversify 
their output and their exports and thus reduce 
their excessive dependence on a few traditional 
commodities. Some benefit can come from a 
more diversified commodity base and from a 
substantial attack on their food problem to les- 
sen their dependence on food imports. But they 
must also industrialize. "Wliile continuing to 
produce raw materials for the world market and 
increasing the range of materials they produce, 
they must expand their industry. 

Regional Integration 

The developmg countries have tried to de- 
velop industry — on a national basis — each 
country shielding its infant enterprises behind 
protective walls. The result, by and large, has 
been high-cost inefficient industry with little 
growth potential. However, by joining together 
with their neighbors and dismantling the trade 
barriers among them, they can produce for a 
wider regional or subregional market. In the 
larger market, their industry would not be 
limited as it is today to light consumer goods. 
They could move in time to more complex inter- 
mediate and capital goods. Shielded for a time 
by their outer tariff walls from the export com- 
petition of the advanced countries, enterprises 
would be exposed to more tolerable competition 
within the broader regional market and would 
reach a competitive position in international 
markets much earlier and more effectively. And 
not imimportantly, foreign investment would be 
stimulated to locate within the grouping. 

Recognizing the benefits that could come from 
a continent-wide market such as the United 
States enjoys and spurred by the example of the 
European Common Market, low-income coun- 
tries have been moving together to develop free 
trade areas and common markets. 

At the Latin American Summit Meeting in 
Punta del Este, the countries of Latin America 
tmdertook a commitment of major significance 
to move forward toward a full Latin American 
common market. And the United States under- 
took a parallel commitment to help them with 
adjustment assistance when the common market 
gets underway. 

We would hope to see similar movements 
among developing countries in other hemi- 



spheres. We believe that regional integration 
among neighboring less developed countries that 
are at roughly the same level of development 
can be a positive force for economic growth and 
stability. It can also be a force for political 
coliesion. The difficulties in such undertakings 
are formidable, includmg the resistance of 
protected enterprises to exposure to increased 
competition and the concern of each country in 
the group to get a fair share of new enterprises. 
The benefits of integration can be realized only 
if the governments have the political will to 
push ahead. But if the political will is there, en- 
couragement and support by the rich countries 
could be quite fruitful. 

With respect to trade in manufactured goods, 
the princiiDal point I wish to discuss with the 
committee is the question of trade preferences 
for developing countries. 

Trade Preferences for Developing Countries 

Tliere is nothing very new or startling about 
trade preferences. We have had preferential 
trade ties with the Philippines for decades. The 
extensive network of British Commonwealth 
preferences dates from 1931. The French and a 
few other European nations had similar ar- 
rangements with African areas for many years. 
What is new is that the developing countries 
themselves have recently become dissatisfied 
with this uneven situation, and with good rea- 
son. Neigliboring coimtries of the developing 
world who frequently produce the same kinds 
of products face discrimination in developed- 
country markets when one receives a preference 
and the other does not simply because of the 
historical fact of colonial relationships. The 
system pits the poor against the poor and has 
neocolonial overtones. It is made to order for 
creating friction and tensions among the very 
countries M-ho most of all need to cooperate with 
each other economically and for their mutual 
prosperity. And one area of the world — Latin 
America — has historically had no trade pref- 
erences in any market; instead, it has had to 
cope with discrimination against its exports 
nearly everywhere. IMoreover, developed coun- 
tries, including the United States, frequently 
face discrimination because many of these pref- 
erential arrangements are reciprocal. 

A new situation arose several years ago, how- 
ever, when it became apparent that discrimina- 
tory trade arrangements of this kind were on 
the increase. The preferences which individual 

African countries enjoyed in their former 
metropoles were extended to all of the six mem- 
ber states of the European Common Market. 
An association agreement between Nigeria and 
the EEC [European Economic Community] 
was concluded last year after lengthy negotia- 
tions, thus extending preferences to a single 
African coimtry which had previously had such 
advantages only in the Commonwealth markets. 
A large number of other African countries — the 
Maghreb and three East African countries — 
have been seeking some kind of special trade 
arrangement with the European Common 

This growing risk of further proliferation of 
trade arrangements which discriminate among 
developing countries was from our viewpoint a 
most unfortunate development both politically 
and economically. It threatened to fragment 
world trade; it increased the pressures from 
Latin America for exclusive trade arrangements 
with the United States; it was a retrogression 
toward special spheres of influence. 

Exploration of Trade Preference Issues 

We have always felt that the best way to assist 
the developing countries is for all industrialized 
countries to join together in a common effort to 
help all of the low-income countries. The de- 
veloping countries themselves felt that a more 
desirable course of action would be to replace 
the network of existing preferences which are 
selective as to product and coimtries by a gen- 
eral system of trade preferences by all industri- 
alized countries for the benefit of all developing 
countries and without reciprocal preferences. 

In early 1966 the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany began to explore some of the issues in- 
volved in trade preferences pursuant to a man- 
date from the OECD ministers. Our own partic- 
ipation in this exercise was, of course, severely 
circumscribed by our own position of skepticism 
concerning the workability of any scheme of 
preferences and, indeed, our basic reservation on 
the idea as a matter of principle. It became quite 
apparent to us in the executive branch that this 
posture which the United States had maintained 
since the issue of trade preferences first arose 
in 1964 was ill suited to our political and eco- 
nomic interests. Politically, we found ourselves 
virtually isolated from all the developing coun- 
tries and most of the industrialized countries as 
well. Economically, our reservation in principle 

ATTGUST 7, 1967 


and skepticism precluded our having much in- 
fluence over the proliferation of discriminatory 
arrangements and also reduced our influence 
with regard to the specific workings of a pref- 
erence scheme which other industrialized coun- 
tries indicated they might put into effect 
whether or not the United States took part. An 
important precedent in this regard was the uni- 
lateral announcement by Australia in 1965 that 
it intended to apply a system of trade prefer- 
ences of its own for developing countries. 

This, then, was the general situation con- 
fronting President Johnson when he undertook 
to meet with his fellow chiefs of state of the 
inter- American sj^stem at Punta del Este last 
April : a trend toward proliferation of discrim- 
inatory preferences which our own adherence 
to the principle of most-favored-nation treat- 
ment had done little to check and an awareness 
that the Latin American countries, like other 
developing countries, are anxious to improve 
their opportunities for access to the markets of 
all industrialized countries. 

After a searching examination and analysis 
within the executi^'e branch and preliminary 
consultations with the Congress, the President 
agreed that he would indicate to the Latin 
Americans that we are prepared to explore the 
feasibility of a system of generalized prefer- 
ences. The President told his fellow chiefs of 
state : 

We have been examining the kind of trade initiatives 
that the United States should propose in the years 
ahead. We are convinced that our future trade policy 
must pay special attention to the needs of the de- 
veloping countries in Latin America and elsewhere in 
the world. 

We have been exploring with other major industrial- 
ized countries what practical steps can be taken to in- 
crease the export earnings of all developing countries. 
We recognize that comparable tariff treatment may not 
always permit developing countries to advance as 
rapidly as desired. Temporary tariff advantages for all 
developing countries by all industrialized countries 
would be one way to deal with this. 

We think this idea is worth pursuing. We will be 
discussing it further with members of our Congress, 
with business and labor leaders, and we will seek the 
cooperation of other governments in the world trading 
community to see whether a broad consensus can be 
reached along these lines. 

The present hearings are very timely since it 
gives us in the executive branch an opportunity 
to discuss further with the Congress — as the 
President promised would be done — how we 
presently believe the question of trade prefer- 

ences will evolve in the coming months and 
years. I wish to stress that the President has 
committed the United States only to an explo- 
ration of preferences to see whether a consensus 
can be reached. There are many difliculties — 
both technical and policy — to be overcome if we 
are to reach a consensus. We also need the ad- 
vice of Congress and our business and labor 
leaders as this matter is pursued. 

Duty-Free Quotas for Preferential Imports 

Multilateral discussion of the preference 
question thus far has indicated two different 
kinds of approach in order to deal with three 
interrelated issues: depth of cut, the means to 
insure that any preferences actually extended 
would in fact be temporary, and safeguards for 
domestic interests in the industrialized coun- 
tries. These are by no means the only outstand- 
ing issues but they are, we believe, the really 
crucial ones. 

One approach envisages the establishment of 
duty-free quotas for preferential imports from 
developing countries. Under this ai:)proach, the 
industrialized countries would agree to permit 
the importation of some fixed percentage of do- 
mestic production or consumption of products 
from developing countries on a duty-free basis. 
This approach contains its own built-in safe- 
guard against excessive adverse impact on in- 
dustrialized countries — depending, of course, on 
the size of the percentage which might be agreed 
upon — since, in setting the percentage figures, 
govermnents would presumably take into ac- 
count the extent to which their own domestic 
interests could absorb increased imports from 
the developing countries without serious injury. 

There are, however, a number of difficult 
problems with this approach. One is the absence 
of any mechanism for insuring that preferences 
thtis established would in fact be temporary. It 
has been suggested that such a scheme might 
operate for, say, 10 years, after which the situa- 
tion could be reviewed to see whether it should 
or could be extended, modified, or terminated. 
We are not sure this is politically realistic, be- 
cause it is easy to anticipate the pressures that 
would be exerted when the time for review oc- 
curred to extend the system rather than raise 
duties against the products of developing coun- 
tries. Moreover, during such a 10-year period 
reductions of barriers among the industrialized 



countries themselves might be inhibited because 
of vested interests in maintaining margins of 

The "Advance Cuf" Approach 

An alternative appi-oach to this range of 
issues might be to visualize preferences for 
developing countries as the extension in advance 
to developing countries of trade-barrier reduc- 
tions whicJi tlie industrialized countries them- 
selves would be prepared to luidertake on a 
most-favored-nation basis over a longer period 
of time. If an agreement could be reached with 
other industrialized countries for this kind of 
approach, the jaroblem of insuring that prefer- 
ences would in fact be temporary would auto- 
matically take care of itself since the preference 
margins would erode as trade barriers were 
reduced on an MFN basis. 

There are numerous difficulties with this 
approach as well, however. First, there is the 
question of whether any industrialized country, 
including the United States, is prepared so 
quickly after the major reductions of trade bar- 
riers recently concluded in the Kennedy Roimd 
to enter into any kind of commitment to elimi- 
nate duties. I believe the realistic answer to this 
is "No." This has accordingly led to the sugges- 
tion that the margin of preference under what 
has been called the "advance cut" approach 
would have to be something otlier than duty- 
free treatment across the board. This, of course, 
might reduce the attractiveness of the scheme 
to the developing countries. The question of 
safeguards under this approach would no doubt 
have to encompass the traditional devices such 
as exclusion of products deemed to be particu- 
larly sensitive, and an escape-clause procedure 
in the event imports from developing countries 
threaten or cause serious injui-y to domestic 

The case of cotton textiles, of course, is a spe- 
cial one in that the developing countries are 
already highly competitive in industrialized- 
country markets and therefore do not need pref- 
erences. Moreover, so long as cotton textiles are 
subject to quantitative restrictions, tariff pref- 
erences would not be of any significant benefit 
to developing countries. In this particular sec- 
tor, the developing countries will have to look 
for a gradual liberalization of quantitative 
restrictions rather than tariff preferences if 

they are to capitalize on the competitive 
advantage they already have. 

I would like to draw the committee's attention 
to an important aspect of the second approach 
I summarized a moment ago ; namely, the link 
between reductions of trade barriers for devel- 
oping countries and the future of trade-barrier 
reductions among the industrialized countries 
themselves. As you all Imow, the future pattern 
of our trade relations with the industrialized 
countries of Western Europe is difficult to pre- 
dict with any certainty. We have of course given 
our full support and encouragement to the 
European Communities and, as the Presi- 
dent stated last October,® we look forward 
to a strong, united Europe — with Great Britain 
a part of it. We tluis hope the British will suc- 
ceed in their current efforts to join the Euro- 
pean Communities. We are also aware that if 
the British effort succeeds, it is likely that a 
number of other European countries will join 
the Common Market or possibly associate with 
the Communities in some manner or other. 

The precise geographic dimensions and form 
of membership or association by the various 
European countries simply camiot be predicted 
at this stage. It is clear, however, that as trade 
barriers are reduced among a major gi-ouping 
of European countries without the benefits of 
such reductions being extended to the United 
States, our own competitive position in tliis 
enlarged market will be adversely affected. We 
have accordingly felt that it will be necessary 
at some stage in the not too distant future — 
albeit after the Kennedy Eound reductions 
have been digested — to visualize further reduc- 
tions to the mutual benefit of both the United 
States and Western Europe, and tlie other 
major trading countries of the industrialized 
world. This is one reason why we have been giv- 
ing close attention to the fe;xsibility of establish- 
ing some kind of meaningful link between the 
establishment of a possible temporai-y prefer- 
ence scheme and the future reductioii of barriers 
among the industrialized countries as a whole. 

Another major policy issue involved in the 
preference question is what is to be the disposi- 
tion of existing preferential arrangements. As 
I mentioned earlier, there are many such ar- 
rangements curi-ently in force, witli the notable 

° For an address by President Johnson at New York, 
N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622. 

AUGUST 7, 1967 


exception of L.atm Ameiica. Latin America has 
been particularly critical of this situation ; and 
this, indeed, was a contributing factor to the 
President's decision at Punta del Este to com- 
mit us to an exploration of the feasibility of a 
generalized system of preferences. It has been 
our thought that we could develop a scheme 
which would subsume the existing preferences 
enjoyed by particular developing countries in 
particular markets. Some difficulties have come 
to light on this point, however, and we may suc- 
ceed in only partially achieving our objectives. 
For example, the developing countries of the 
Commonwealth and the African countries as- 
sociated with the European Communities all 
enjoy duty-free access to these respective mar- 
kets. If a generalized preference scheme does not 
take the form of duty-free entry, existing bene- 
ficiaries might feel they are obtaining lesser 
benefits than they now have, even though this 
point is debatable. 

There is also the question of reverse pref- 
erences; that is, the preferences currently en- 
joyed by some industrialized counti'ies in the 
developing countries to whom they accord pref- 
erential treatment. We for our part have made 
it clear that such arrangements must be termi- 
nated as part of any generalized scheme since 
we do not consider it reasonable that the United 
States should be expected to accord preferred 
treatment to developing countries discriminat- 
ing against U.S. exports. These arrangements, 
moreover, convey no benefits to the developing 
countries who are denied the opportunity to buy 
in the most favorable market. 

Even if it should not prove possible to elimi- 
nate completely the preferential access to cer- 
tain developed-countiy markets that certain 
favored poor countries now enjoy, agreement on 
a new system of preferences extended on a non- 
reciprocal basis by all developed to all develop- 
ing countries would be a major achievement. It 
would check the further proliferation of special 
discriminatory arrangements, the thiiist toward 
new bilateral trading blocs ; and it would reduce 
the range and significance of existing 

There are other policy and technical issues 
related to preferences that I could discuss with 
the committee, but I believe the foregoing is suf- 
ficient to indicate the range of the complexities 
which are involved. 

I would like to invite the committee's atten- 
tion to an excellent recent survey by the 
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on 

Trade and Development] Secretariat of the key 
issues. I will make available to the committee 
copies of this document (appendix 1)^ and 
would have no objection if the committee wishes 
to incorporate it in its report on these hearmgs. 
This particular document is being discussed at 
this very moment in Geneva, where the 
UNCTAD Group on Preferences, on which the 
United States and 33 other governments are rep- i. 
resented, began its meetings on July 4. The |' 
docmnent to which I have referred and the 
specific proposals advanced therein illustrate 
some of the complexities and the options open 
to us and other countries. 

Differences in Approach To Be Considered 

The United States will not enter into any kind 
of commitment on any of the key details of the 
suggestions presented by the UNCTAD Secre- 
tariat at the meeting now in progress. We be- 
lieve, however, that the discussions based on this 
very competent review should ser\e to clear the 
air a bit and give us a better appreciation of how 
the developing countries themselves view the 
operation of a possible preference scheme. We 
need such an understanding because a workable 
scheme of preferences — if it is to be woi'th the 
effort which would have to go into it — would 
have to be one which has the support not only 
of the industrialized countries but of the de- 
veloping countries themselves. 

With the President's announcement at Punta 
del Este, the work of the small group of coun- 
tries in the OECD entered a new phase since 
the United States no longer maintamed a basic 
reservation on the principle of preferences. Still 
it appears that there are important areas of dif- 
ference between the approaches to some of the 
key issues involved in preferences. The 
UNCTAD document to which I have referred 
gives a succinct and quite accurate expose of 
these differences in approach. 

The time sequence of events is that a report by 
the small group will be considered within the 
regular OECD framework this fall, culminat- 
ing in the meeting of OECD ministers No- 
vember 30-Deccmber 1. If, at that time, a gen- 
eral consensus can be reached, there might well 
be a joint OECD proposal to be put before the 
second United Nations Conference on Trade and 

' "The Question of the Granting and Extension of 
Preferences in Favour of Developing Countries." U.N. 
doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.1/7, May 31, 1967. [Not printed 



Development to be held in New Delhi beginning 
February 1, 1968. On the other hand, there may 
be no jomt proposal but alternative ideas pre- 
sented for consideration at that conference. 

No matter wliich course of action may develop, 
the United States for its part does not ex- 
pect that any proposal or proposals will be pre- 
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but that, 
instead, the views of developing countries and 
I detailed discussions to develop a workable 
scheme will require many meetings over a pe- 
riod of many months both during and after the 
New Delhi conference. During this period, of 
course, the United States will have to be refining 
its own views in consultations with business and 
labor and with the Congress, since, of course, 
the United States will not be in a position to 
extend trade preferences without new enabling 
legislation. The actual mechanism for ascertain- 
ing these views will be part of the long-range 
study of trade policy which the President has 
charged Ambassador Eoth [William M. Roth, 
Special Eepresentative for Trade Negotiations] 
to carry out. 

U.S. Kennedy Round Concessions 

j Let me conclude my presentation by a brief 
commentary on our trade policy as it relates to 
both primary products and manufactured 
goods. The United States has been the prime 
, mover in the worldwide eifort to reduce unnec- 
[ essary barriers to trade. Tliis long effort has re- 
cently been crowned with success in the outcome 
of the Kermedy Round negotiations. There has 
been some imfortunate — and in our view inac- 
curate — press commentary to the effect that the 
Kennedy Round accomplished little or nothing 
for the developing countries. Let me give you 
our own appraisal of this situation. 

One of the principal objectives throughout 
the Kennedy Round negotiation was to reduce 
barriers to exports of developing countries to 
the maximum extent possible. The United 
States' position throughout the negotiation was 
conditioned by its commitment to this objective. 
The United States concessions benefiting the de- 
veloping countries cover $900 million of their 
exports to the United States in 1964. Of this 
total, the United States is completely eliminat- 
ing the duty on more than $325 million, either 
under section 202 or section 213 of the Trade 
Expansion Act. Provisions of the act are such 
that eliminations under section 213, accounting 
for at least $45 million of imports from develop- 

ing countries, do not need to be staged over a 
4-year period. A substantial portion of U.S. 
concessions — nearly $500 million — is on manu- 
factured and semimanufactured products from 
developing countries. This represents a signif- 
icant reduction of our tariffs on items of mter- 
est to the developing countries. We made these 
concessions, moreover, without seeking recipro- 
cal tariff reductions by the developing countries, 
m keeping with the negotiatmg principle ac- 
cepted by all the industrialized coxmtries that 
full reciprocity could not be expected from the 
low-income countries. 

We have recently completed a detailed anal- 
ysis of United States concessions in relation to 
a list of the products which the developing coun- 
tries themselves have declared to be of export 
interest. This list (see appendix 2)' covers 1,376 
different tariff classifications of the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States, in which the 
1964 trade interest of the developing countries 
was $622.7 million. The United States is making 
tariff concessions on 1,160 of these items, ac- 
counting for $489.8 million of their 1964 trade 
interest. Thus the U.S. concessions will cover ap- 
proximately 84 percent of the items requested 
and 79 percent of the developing countries' trade 
interest in the items contained in this composite 

We do not yet have shnilar detailed analyses 
of the significance for developing countries of 
concessions made by other industrialized coun- 
tries, but we know that in general they are of a 
comparable order of magnitude. The composite 
effect of the vast reductions by all industrialized 
comitries is that the trade opportimities open 
to the developing countries are substantially bet- 
ter than ever before. 

I would not wish these comments to be mis- 
construed as implying that developmg countries 
will obtain the major benefits from the Kennedy 
Round. It is quite clear that trade between the 
United States and other industrialized countries 
will be the major beneficiary. But the implica- 
tion that nothing was done for the developing 
countries is very much wide of the mark. 

We in the executive branch are delighted with 
the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round. 
We recognize that a period of reflection will be 
needed to assess — and digest — the results and 
that it may be some time before the United 

' "Programme for the Liberalization and Expansion 
of Trade in Manufactures and Seml-Manufactures of 
Interest to Developing Countries." U.N. doc. TD/B/ 
C.2/20, March 20, 1967. [Not printed here.] 

ATTGTTST 7, 1967 



States and other major industrialized countries 
will be ready to undertake another assault on 
the remaining barriers to trade. But I also 
would not wish to end this presentation by im- 
plying that the Kemiedy Round is the end of 
the road. Indeed, as the President stated at 
Punta del Este : 

The process of freeing trade from unnecessary re- 
strictions will not come to an end when the current 
and important Kennedy Round negotiations are 

Not all of the issues we and our negotiating 
partners had hojied to come to grips with during 
the Kennedy Eound could be dealt with during 
the marathon sessions of the final months. One 
issue in particular of major interest to the de- 
veloping countries has been left over for further 
consideration next fall. That is the question of 
extending the benefits of the Kennedy Round 
reductions to the developing coimtries without 
the normal staging requirement. The United 
States has not taken a firm position on this 
point. It would, of course, require specific legis- 
lative authority. If this were done in a preferen- 
tial way, i.e., covering all products but for de- 
veloping countries only, it would constitute a 
precedent for the longer term problem of tem- 
porary tariff advantages. We will be exploring 
this issue with our major trading partners over 
the coming months and, of course, with the 


Current Actions 



Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington 
April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. 
TIAS 4397. 

Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, July 10, 1967. ! 

Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, July 10, 

Organization of American States 

Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza- 
tion of American States — the "Protocol of Buenos 
Aires." Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967. 
Enters into force when two-thirds of the states signa- 
tory to the charter have deposited their instruments 
of ratification. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of states 
in the exploration and use of outer space, including 
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig- 
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow Janu- 
ary 27, 1967." 
Ratification deposited: Sierra Leone, July 14, 1967. 


Protocol for the further extension of the International 
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for sig- 
nature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966. En- 
tered into force July 16, 1966, for Part I and Parts III 
to VII ; August 1, 1966, for Part II. TIAS 6057. 
Accession deposited: Barbados, July 19, 1967. 

1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna- 
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open 
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1, 
1967, inclusive. 

Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 15, 1967. 
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de- 
posited: Portugal, July 14, 1967. 
Notification of undertaking to seek accession de- 
posited: Ecuador, July 15, 1967. 
Entered into force: July 16, 1967. 


Agreement amending the convention on Great Lakes 
fisheries of September 10, 19.54 (TIAS 3326). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 5, 1966, and 
May 19, 1967. Entered into force May 19, 1967. 
Proclaimed hy the President: July 19, 1967. 

Congo (Kinshasa) 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of March 15, 1967, as amended 
Effected by an exchange of notes at Kinshasa June 
16 and 26, 1967. Entered into force June 26, 1967. 

Somali Republic 

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961, 
as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 550S, 5738, 5814, 6148, 
6199). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio 
June 29 and 30, 1967. Entered into force June 30, 

" Not in force. 



INDEX Auffust 7, 1967 Vol LVH, No. U67 

Brazil. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
July 19 159 

Canada. Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section of 
Great Lakes Fishery Commission 172 

China. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
July 19 159 


Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 

(Roth) 173 

United States Foreign Trade Policy and the 

Developing Countries (Solomon) 180 

Developing Countries. United States Foreign 
Trade Policy and the Developing Countries 
(Solomon) 180 

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of July 19 159 

Economic Affairs 

Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 

(Roth) 173 

Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section of Great 

Lakes Fishery Commission 172 

United States Foreign Trade Policy and the 

Developing Countries (Solomon) 180 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Time Limit on 
Copyright Filings Extended for German 
Citizens 171 

Foreign Aid. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of July 19 159 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159 
Time Limit on Copyright Filings Extended for 
German Citizens 171 

Health. U.S.-Japan Medical Science Committee 
Holds Third Meeting 172 

International Law. World Law Day, 1967 
(proclamation) 171 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Medical Science Committee 
Holds Third Meeting 172 

Jordan. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
July 19 159 

Lebanon. Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon 
Lifted 171 

Malagasy Republic Secretary Rusk's News Con- 
ference of July 19 159 

Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Discusses 
the Situation in Viet-Nam 167 

Near East 

Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon Lifted . . . 171 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159 

Panama. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
July 19 159 

Passports. Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon 
Lifted 171 

Presidential Documents. World Law Day, 1967 . 171 


Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 

(Roth) 173 

United States Foreign Trade Policy and the 
Developing Countries (Solomon) 180 

Treaty Information, Current Actions .... 190 


Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159 
U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident Involving 
Soviet Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) . 170 

United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of July 19 159 

United Nations. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of July 19 159 


Secretary McNamara Discusses the Situation in 

Viet-Nam 167 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159 
U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident Involving 

Soviet Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) . 170 
U.S. Expresses Concern at Plight of Prisoners 

in North Viet-Nam 170 

Name Indetc 

Johnson, President 171 

McNamara, Robert S 167 

Pautzke, Clarence F 172 

Roth, WilUam M 173 

Rusk, Secretary 159 

Solomon, Anthony M 180 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 

Releases issued prior to July 17 which appear 
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 156 of 
July 10, 159 of July 13, and 162 of July 15. 

No. Date Subject 

164 7/19 Rusk: news conference of July 19. 

Superintendent of I 



i.1 120 SSW NOiSOa 

982 xoa 

iN3Wiytfd3Q 3DN313S "IVIDOS 








Vol. LVII, No. 1468 

August 14, 1967 


hy Assistant Secretary Bundy 195 


hy Ambassador William, McCormick Blair, Jr. 203 


Statement hy Secretary R-usk 208 


Statement hy Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 216 

For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LVII, No. 1468 Publication 8278 
August 14, 1967 

For siile by tbe Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfBce 

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approved by the Director of the Bureau of 
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toit/i information on developments in 
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and the Foreign Service, 
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Partnership in East Asia and the Pacific 

hy William, P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Ajfairs ^ 

Many years ago, in 1959, I was assigned as a 
member of the American delegation to a foreign 
ministers conference in Geneva on the Berlin 
problem. Few of you may now recall that con- 
ference, but at the time — coming after Khru- 
shchev's first direct threats to Berlin — it seemed 
to many to carry with it the whole fate of the 
world, to be decisive whether or not there would 
be a third world war. 

I traveled to that conference on one of the 
early jets to London, and on my arrival at Lon- 
don Airport ran into an old friend who works 
for one of the major New York international 
banks. We both looked at each other in surprise 
at what we might be doing there. Finally, I 
spoke first and said that I was going to "the 
conference in Geneva." He casually replied: 
"Oh, is there some conference in Geneva ? The 
hankers are meeting here." 

I have always regarded that episode as a, use- 
ful reminder of the limits of my adopted pro- 
fession of diplomacy. For it behooves all of us 
who work in the area of foreign policy to remind 
ourselves constantly of the difference between 
the things we try to affect in any direct sense, 
and the things we do not affect, other than 
marginally, and indeed exist only to make pos- 
sible. Your meeting, with its emphasis on law 
as an avenue to communication among nations, 
falls in tliat latter category. 

The latoyers are meeting here. I was trained 
in the law and practiced it briefly. I have not 
done an honest day's legal work in the last 16 
years, although I have never for a moment re- 
gretted my legal training and experience and, 

' Address made before the Federal Bar Association at 
San Francisco, Calif., on July 28 (press release 170). 

indeed, have found them invaluable in the con- 
stant struggle to sort out the essentials of a 
problem and to frame ways of tackling it. 

Today, I would like to talk to you about what 
seems to me to be the wider significance of 
gatherings such as this, particularly with the 
presence of your distinguished guests from 

Specifically, I want to talk about the evolving 
partnership between the United States and the 
nations of East Asia and the Pacific and more 
especially about the rapidly growing partner- 
ship of the free nations of this area among them- 
selves. At the end, I will ti-y to relate these 
themes to the role of lawyers and the law, not 
merely in deference to this gathering but be- 
ca,use I believe that role can in fact be impor- 
tant and in a sense special. 

The headlines today are focused on the prob- 
lem of security in East Asia and on the specific 
and crucial test case of Viet-Nam. We are play- 
ing a major role in that conflict, because we 
believe it important that the people of South 
Viet-Nam should have the right to determine 
their own future without external interference 
and beca,use we believe — in common with the 
great body of responsible opinion throughout 
Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia — that, 
unless South Viet-Nam and its supporters stand 
firm, the ability of the other nations of South- 
east and South Asia to develop their own 
national lives would surely be jeopardized by 
external and externally supported threats that 
would grow and tend to flow over them. 

We believe that our role is essential both to 
our own national interest and to the aspirations 
of the area itself. We seek no specific position 
for ourselves in the Southeast Asia of the future. 

AUGUST 14, 1967 


Rather, -we believe deeply that the fabric of 
peace in Asia cannot endure unless the indi- 
vidual nations of the area are secure from the 
threat of aggression. The only way to prevent 
wider and greater wars that would surely in 
the end threaten our own most specific national 
interests is to help, as we can, the nations of the 
area to work for their own national survival 
and self-determination. They seek many things 
but, above all, the right to be themselves and 
to assist their peoples to enjoy a better life. 

So security is a part of the common task, and 
a part from which we could walk away only if 
we were prepared to let nature take its course. I 
think it would not be a very lovely course. 

But security is still only a part of the job and 
in an enduring sense perhaps the least signifi- 
cant part. Security is only the essential means 
to an end, and that end is nothing less than the 
sum total of all that the peoples and nations of 
Asia can do for themselves to improve the wel- 
fare of their people, to establish and strengthen 
political and social structures that fit the needs 
and desires of each people, to use for construc- 
tive ends the progress of science and technology, 
and to knit up their ties with each other. 

Government and Private Channels 

In that greatest of all efl'orts we have tried 
to be partners through governmental programs 
and assistance, where we were wanted and where 
a reasonable basis of domestic programs and 
policies existed. And the results in many cases 
have proved — if it needs proving — the talent 
and potential of Asia. On any historic perspec- 
tive, the gains in the last 22 years among the 
free nations of Asia — in bedrock terms of 
human life and fulfillment — have been extraor- 
dinary. Tremendous problems remain, but 
surely the overall historical judgment on this 
period must be that the peoples and nations of 
East Asia, given conditions of security, have 
shown the capacity to get on top of their prob- 
lems; and performance of their political and 
economic systems has far outstripped the per- 
formance of the totalitarian regime of main- 
land China. 

All this is still in the realm of our relation as 
a government to East Asia and the Pacific. But 
surely it is time to recognize far more strongly 
than we have done that all that governments 
can do is to provide a framework and that the 

imderlying and lasting results will to a very 
large extent be achieved through those private 
channels which, once unleashed, will dwarf all 
that governments can do. 

Unquestionably, a great part of the history 
of Asia today is the impact of Western ideas — 
and perhaps, in recent times particularly, Amer- 
ican ideas — on Asian concepts and practices. 
The Western colonial past in Asia both brought 
these ideas and often distorted them, for the 
very existence of a colonial relationsliip is a 
vast distortion. Today, colonialism has ended, 
and I hope that we have seen the end, also, of 
the patronizing attitudes associated with it. I 
hope, too, and indeed I believe, that the per- 
formance of Asian nations has given these na- 
tions a justified confidence and self-esteem that 
enable them to look objectively at what the 
West, and America, have to offer, neither adopt- 
ing nor rejecting simply because an idea or way 
of doing thmgs is Western or American but, 
rather, fitting what seems useful into the frame- 
work of their own deeply rooted cultures. One 
heare little in Asia today of the only recent 
slogan of "neocolonialism." And all signs indi- 
cate that we have turned a corner and are enter- 
ing upon a new era deserving the name of 
partnership. Certainly that is what we want. 

And the essence of this is private and takes 
place through the host of personal relationships 
that have grown so rapidly in the past 15 years. 

Part of this is general understanding. Asian 
study of America and American study of Asia 
have multiplied fantastically in the last 20 years 
from the day when — as I personally recall 
vividly — there simply were only a handful of 
Southeast Asian experts available in this coun- 
try to man the intelligence organizations we 
required during the Second World War. 

Part of it is personal contact, on a generalized 
basis. The 3,000 Americans who have gone to 
Asia since 1949 under Government grants and 
the 11,500 Asian students and leaders who have 
come to us are only a small fraction of the per- 
sonal contacts that now take place. 

This is, if you will, "people to people" — a good 
term but an inadequate one. For the core of these 
personal relationships, in my judgment, is pro- 
fessional: scientist to scientist, businessman to 
businessman, scholar to scholar, student to stu- 
dent, and lawyer to lawyer. 

I have tried to get figures on the extent to 
which these professional ties have multiplied 



in the past 20 years. We have certain broad 
measures such as the growth of trade between 
the United States and East Asian countries. In 
1956 this trade amounted to $3.8 billion, of 
which our trade with Japan was $1.5 billion. 
By 19G6 the total United States trade with the 
area had grown to $10.1 billion, of which our 
trade with Japan was more than $5.25 billion. 

Another broad measure is the extent of travel 
between East Asia and the United States. In 
1956, 205,000 Americans and 125,000 non- Amer- 
icans crossed the Pacific by sea or air — a total 
of some 330,000. A decade later, 672,000 Amer- 
icans and 493,000 non-Americans crossed — a 
total of over 1,100,000, or a nearly fourfold 
growth in a decade. Surely the greatest part 
of the non- Americans were Asians, and, as you 
can see, their proportion to the total has grown 

But when it comes to gettmg the exact figures 
for professional ties, they do not seem to be 
available. This may, of course, be a good sign, 
for it shows the basic spontaneity of the whole 

Importance of Intellectual Ties 

And surely the evidence in many respects is 
all around us, in Berkeley, in Stanford, and 
throughout our universities, where today there 
are thousands upon thousands of Asian students, 
whereas in my time in college, before the war, 
there were almost none. The East-West Center 
in Honolulu provides a particular drawing to- 
gether. There and elsewhere the students who 
come to us from Asia represent an increasingly 
broad cross section of their countries and, one 
ventures, a fair proportion of their future lead- 
ers. They not only learn from us but teach us. 

Yet, if all this were only curiosity, or the 
availability of spaces in universities, it would 
pass quickly from the historic scene. Surely it 
goes much deeper than this, to the sense that we 
have indeed something to say to each other. 

In the realm of techniques this is obvious 
enough. Rice is an overpowering need in Asia, 
and it is a source of pride that private initia- 
tive in America, in full cooperation with the 
Philippine Government, should now be bring- 
ing forth new and promising rice strains, from 
Asian stock, at the Los Baiios Institute in the 

We are working together in numerous scien- 

tific fields, from medicine to population con- 
trol to volcanology to plant protection to ocean- 
ography to earthquake engineering to weather 
study and outward to space technology. 

We are working together, too, in the social 
sciences, in education, and in economics. The pio- 
neering work of such men as Russell Davis at 
Harvard may be putting us in a position to make 
a greater contribution to the educational prob- 
lems of Asia ; I have no doubt that it is adding 
to our own store of knowledge of what can be 
done in parallel situations at home. And surely 
we have all learned together how crucial the 
development of education is as the essential 
imderpinning not only of economic progress but 
of wider social development. 

In economics the international trade miion of 
economists seems to be doing very nicely indeed. 
Like the bankers, they seem able to use a common 
language in almost any circumstances, even 
when disagreeing. Perhaps a lot of the credit 
should go to the World Bank and the Monetary 
Fund, and we should certainly recognize that 
today's economics has come from many diverse 
strands in the West as a whole. But today every- 
body, from nations all over the world, is in the 

One could go on and on, and the importance 
of these intellectual ties is fundamental. They 
are not without their own problems, however, 
and one of these — deeply serious in a few coun- 
tries — is the "brain drain." Foreign students 
come to the United States and find themselves 
not only with greater monetary rewards than 
they can get at home but with unique prospects 
of pursuing their professional work here. I do 
not know the answer to this one, but part of it 
will surely come from the steady growth of local 
opportimity, including local institutions in 
science and teclxnology, which can provide a base 
for solid work so that professionals will be 
attracted to stay in their own coimtries. An ex- 
ample of this is the Korean Institute of Science 
and Technology, announced jointly by President 
Johnson and President Park 2 years ago and 
now really getting underway.^ 

But it would be a distorted picture indeed if 
I were to stop merely with tliis discussion of 
the ties between America, and the West in gen- 
eral, and the nations of East Asia. For we 

" For test of a joint communique, see Bulletin of 
June 14, 1965, p. 952. 

AUGUST 14, 1967 


have seen in recent years the beginnings of what 
could become a tremendously significant growth 
in the ties among and between East Asian and 
Pacific countries. 

This is, in a very real sense, something new in 
history. For such ties, historically, were few, 
except for those provided by the overseas Chi- 
nese. Perhaps this was in part because of dis- 
tance. Perhaps it was in part because of the 
great cultural differences between the indi- 
vidual nations of East Asia. Perhaps it had a 
little to do with colonial ties or special ties to 
the West, which may have been at tlae expense of 
Asians seeking similarities among themselves. 

In any case, it was the fact. But it is a fact 
rapidly fading into the past. 

Economic Cooperation in East Asia 

Again, the outward and visible sign has been 
in the area of government cooperation. In the 
field of security, governmental arrangements 
still include our own major role or that of other 
major outside nations. This may change over 
time but seems unlikely to do so in the near 

Rather, it has been in the area of economic, 
technical, and cultural cooperation that the 
great strides of the last 3 years have taken place. 
First, there has been the great body of tech- 
nical cooperation efforts spawned through years 
of prior devoted work in the U.N.'s Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE). One of these is the Mekong Valley 
Coordinating Committee, under which a major 
dam in Laos — Nam Ngum — is already under- 
way, and others are being explored. 

ECAFE played a crucial role in the creation 
of the Asian Development Bank, which went 
into business last December. The ADB bids fair 
to become not merely a source of conventional 
loans but a steady and trusted reservoir of man- 
agerial and advisory skills and the administra- 
tor of special funds for concessional aid to 
which many nations contribute. Nineteen area 
governments have pledged $615 million of the 
Bank's authorized capital of $1,100,000,000. 

Tliere have been a host of other Asian initia- 
tives. The first ministerial conference on South- 
east Asian development met in Tokyo in April 
1966. At the conference, Japan stated its inten- 
tion to devote 1 percent of its national income 
to development assistance. A second conference 
was held in Manila in April of this year. Plans 

were announced relating to regional develop- 
ment programs for transport and communica- 
tions, and agreement on the founding of a fish- 
eries development center. 

Formation of tlie Southeast Asian Ministers 
of Education Secretariat (SEAMES) was 
authorized in November 1966 by the Ministers 
of Education from six area countries, and it is 
actively devotmg itself to promoting regional 
cooperation in education and related fields. 

The Conference of Asian Labor Ministers 
was established in Manila, with 11 area partici- 
pants, to promote regional cooperation in labor 

Interest in cooperative efforts within the area 
is expanding. The expansion of the membership 
of existing organizations is also being discussed. 
Consideration is already being given to the need 
to avoid duplication of activity. As yet, however, 
there is plenty of work for all comers to do. 

All of these are functional efforts, reflecting 
the natural tendency to look first to tlie practi- 
cal common problems shared by the nations of 
the area irrespective of their international 
posture. And this is as it should be. We for our 
part believe that regional economic cooperation 
along these lines can play a major constructive 
role. We have supported these Asian initiatives, 
and we are contributing assistance wherever 
that is approi^riate. Much more needs to be done, 
and we shall play our part. 

Broader Associations 

In addition to these functional organizations 
directed to specific and defuied economic pur- 
poses, the last 2 years have seen two great strides 
in the association of Asian governments on a 
broader basis. 

The first of these is the Asian and Pacific 
Council (ASPAC), which held its first meeting 
in Seoul a year ago, met recently in Bangkok, 
and will meet in Canberra in 1968. This organi- 
zation, composed of nine area states plus one 
observer, brings together Asian and Pacific 
countries with differing political outlooks but 
with a shared interest in finding a common 
ground of useful cooperation. 

Secondly, the Association of Southeast Asia 
(ASA) — comprising Thailand, the Philippines, 
and Malaysia — was revived in 1966 as a going 
organization among the nations of Southeast 
Asia in particular. A wider grouping in this 
area is now under consideration. 



Let me emphasize that in these broader 
governmental groupings we play no part what- 
ever. These are wholly Asian initiatives and, to 
the extent tliat such organizations have a politi- 
cal aspect, it must be wholly in accord with the 
desires of East Asian and Pacific participants. 
As they see it, the major purpose is to develop a 
sense of working and thinking together about 
their own problems. 

So there is in the East Asia today a new spirit 
of regional cooperation among governments. 
Yet the ties among the nations of East Asia and 
the Pacific extend also into the private sphere, 
most notably in the growth of trade within the 
area but also through the same sort of personal 
exchange that characterizes the relations be- 
tween East Asia and the United States. 

Here, again, figures are hard to come by. 
There is no tracing the exact number of delega- 
tions now visiting from one Asian country to 
another, but any observer in Asia can testify 
that they are today a commonplace, where a 
decade ago they were a rarity. 

We do have a few figures on students. Japan, 
for example, in 1965, had more than 2,300 area 
students studying in the country. Of these, the 
greatest number were from the Republic of 
China (1,586). Next in order came Indonesia 
(345), Thailand (169), Malaysia (166), and the 
remainder were scattered among Australia, the 
Philippines, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Burma, and 

To take another example, the Government of 
the Republic of China during 1965-66 had over 
2,000 area students studying on Taiwan. The 
greatest number of these were overseas Chinese 
(1,575). The remainder were from Viet-Nam 
(253), Korea (43), Japan (29), Thailand (28), 
Malaysia (24)— and the United States (64). I 
might add parenthetically that the Republic of 
China is also providing technical assistance to 
approximately 25 countries in Africa, chiefly 
in connection with rice growing and other agri- 
cultural activities. 

In the South Pacific, Australia in 1965 had 
more than 4,000 area students within its bor- 
ders. The greatest number came from Malaysia 
(3,620). Other foreign students came from In- 
donesia (238), Thailand (166), Viet-Nam (78), 
and smaller numbers from Burma, the Republic 
of China, Cambodia, Japan, Korea, and the 

In Thailand, 300 Lao students are being 

trained under our AID program, and Thailand 
is also funding a Lao teachers program which 
the United States had originally financed. 

The Colombo Plan activities in this field must 
also be mentioned. From 1950 to 1965, training 
opportunities under the plan were provided for 
more than 20,000 persons by the plan's partici- 
pating countries, including several Asian states, 
as well as the United States and others. The 
original distinction between donor and recip- 
ients has become blurred as countries have be- 
come both. 

These seem to be the only figures one can 
readily get. But I am sure they are only the 
visible top of a growing body of exchange of all 
sorts among the nations of East Asia and the 
Pacific. For all over Asia, nations have found 
their way of doing things, and this way is quite 
likely to be far more applicable to the condi- 
tions in other nations of Asia than anything 
that we have to offer in the West and in the 
United States. And I suspect that contacts 
among Asians will henceforth grow more — 
relatively, if not absolutely — than contacts be- 
tween Asia and ourselves. For this too is surely 
a tide of history. 

Law a Reflection of National Life 

I am sure you recognize what I have said as 
merely a set of notes on what is taking place. It 
would take someone with a broader grasp of his- 
tory than I can claim to assess the significance 
of all this, and particularly the significance in 
terms of the effect on underlying values in 
Asian nations and in our own country. New 
studies need to be made of the relation today 
between East and West, and they will surely be 
very different from any past studies. For over 
the last 20 years — I venture, more than in all the 
preceding centuries of our contact — we have be- 
come members one of another. 

How then do you as lawyers, the law, and the 
Federal Bar Association relate to this growing 
partnership in East Asia and the Pacific ? 

The law is many things. It is a specific set of 
techniques for the arrangement and ordering 
of living in society. It is the embodiment of cus- 
tom and of deep-rooted historical experience. In 
both aspects it reflects the moral and indeed the 
religious basis of national life itself. 

I am frankly skeptical that the techniques of 
our own domestic legal system can be readily 

AUGUST 14, 1967 


applied in Asian nations or indeed in any other 
nation. Certainly this application must be 
highly selective, for in law — as in the broader 
processes of government, including constitu- 
tions — it would be a very dangerous fallacy to 
suppose that blueprints can be transferred from 
one nation to another. As Justice Holmes was 
the first to ijoint out, our own law rests deeply 
on customs dating from the past, and it rests 
also on social policies developed in a particular 
moral ethic and in the light of particular eco- 
nomic circumstances. 

So lawyers may exchange techniques, but not 
in the same sense that economists can do so. The 
lawyers meeting here cannot find as full a basis 
of shared experience and applicability as the 
economists, or even the bankers, might do. 

Yet, in the wider sense, lawyers must have a 
tremendous amount to impart to each other. 
Though our religious and moral backgrounds 
differ, we share the sense that what we believe to 
be right should be reflected in law to the extent 
that this is practicable and that the law itself 
should be something on which people can rely. 
It is thus no idle phrase to speak of the rule of 
law — as the distinguished Minister of Justice of 
South Viet-Nam, for one, has done in this gath- 
ering — or to compare notes to the fullest on what 
the rule of law means in each of our nations. 

The Role of Lawyers 

Lawyers by the very nature of their craft are 
social engineers. Their aim is to produce some- 
thing that works in practice and forms the un- 
derpinning of the whole structure of govern- 
ment in a nation. The role of lawyers may differ 
from one society to another; in few is it more 
pervasive than in our own. But all lawyers share 
with each other the sense of doing a job for 
society, with different tecluiiques and from dif- 
ferent historical and moral premises, but to the 
same underlying ends of meeting man's age-old 
desire for justice. 

Finally, there is work to be done in the body 
of law that we all share — international law. If 
you will look in our standard international law 
textbooks, you will find but scant reference to 
practices, precedents, treatises from the Asian 
area. The great body both of precedent and com- 
mentary is Western. Here is an area to which 
lawyers, particularly international lawyers, 
might usefully direct more attention. 

One Asian writer has complained about "an ^ 
attitude of ill-concealed self-righteousness on 
the part of old States who claim that they them- 
selves abide by 'established rules of interna- 
tional law,' implying that the new States act as 
irresponsible and young members of the family 
of nations . ..." I need not, of course, remind 
you that not all Asian states are new and young 
and that, even among those which are newly 
emerging, there are cultures and customs which 
long predate Grotius. 

A second suggestion in the area of interna- 
tional law is that of one of the distinguished 
American former judges on the World Court, 
Judge Hudson, who called attention several 
years ago to the need for an element of equity 
in international law — even as an element of 
equity helps to season our common law proceed- 
ings. We need in any case an imaginative ap- 
proach in dealing with some of the legal prob- 
lems which the emerging nations are facing in 
meeting the conditions of the world today. 

Thirdly, lawyers have a role in the unceasing 
effort which is being made to find alternatives 
to the use of force as a means of settling interna- 
tional disputes. 

As the same Asian writer has pointed out: 
"The greatest factor . . . which should link these 
two worlds (Asia and the West) today is the 
realization that they have a common interest in 
the establisloment of a legal system which would 
provide them with prescriptions for their con- 
tinual and renewed interactions." 

In discussing the "path of the law" toward the 
turn of the century, Justice Holmes wrote : 

The remoter and more general aspects of the law 
are those which give it universal interest. It is through 
them that you not only become a great master m your 
calling, but . . . catch an echo of the iniiuite, a glimpse 
of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal 

This is a large prescription, but it has even 
greater application now than at the time it was 
written. The times now call for a reaching out 
toward ever-wider legal horizons and a ceaseless 
drive to find deeper understanding and the basis 
for a more peaceful world. 

So the role of the law can indeed be special. 
And the historian of the future may well find 
that this gathering, and others like it, have been 
crucial pioneering efforts in that drawing to- 
gether of nations that history may come to re- 
cord as the central event that began in the last 
half of the 20th century. 



President Johnson Confers 
With President of Iceland 

President Asgeir Asgeirsson of Iceland vis- 
ited the United States and Canada July 17- 
Aug-ust 5. During an informal visit to Washing- 
ton July 17-19 he met with President Johnson 
and other Government officials. FoUoioing is an 
exchange of toasts between President Johnson 
and President Asgeirsson at a White House 
hincheon on July 18. 

White House press release dated July 18 


Mr. President, I greet you as the latest, but 
far from the first, Icelander to visit these shores. 

You came by air in a matter of hours. But 
over 900 years ago another band of brave Ice- 
landers sailed west in longboats to discover a 
land they called "Vinland." 

It has been alleged on very liigh political — 
rather than historical — authority that they 
traveled inland, settled, and voted. In fact, the 
distinguished Vice President, in one of his rare 
expansive moments, has been known to claim 
them as the founders of the Minnesota Demo- 
cratic Party. I haven't confirmed that from 
Ambassador Rolvaag [Karl F. Rolvaag, U.S. 
Ambassador to Iceland] , but he is here for con- 

The land that they found was far different 
from the one you see today. Yet Iceland and 
America have a great deal in common. Both 
were built by pioneers, by men who journeyed 
into the unknown across a forbidding sea or an 
imcharted wilderness. Both of our peoples came 
to find freedom. Both founded nations that to- 
day have a long and honored tradition of liberty 
and of justice. 

America has the world's oldest written con- 
stitution; Iceland has the world's oldest parlia- 
ment. It occurs to me, Mr. President, that expe- 
rience with parliaments might help me solve 
some of the problems that I have today. 

It is symbolic of our common history that 
only last week 24 of our finest young men, our 
brave American astronauts— the real pioneers 
of our day — returned from a training mission 
to your country. The cordial reception they re- 
ceived from your people reminded me of my 
own visit to Iceland in 1963. 

I have never forgotten that visit. I learned 
how much Iceland can teach the world about 
the fruitful life of people who live in freedom: 

— Iceland has the highest literacy rate in the 

— Iceland has eliminated extreme poverty. 

— Iceland has a free democratic government 
in which all of her citizens take part. 

Iceland is known as the land of ice and fixe. 
I saw your great snowfields and glaciers, your 
volcanoes and your warm springs. But ice and 
fire refer not only to these. There is ice in the 
cold determination of your people to preserve 
and protect the democratic institutions that we 
all cherish so much. And there is fire — and a 
great deal of fire — always in your support of 
peace and freedom. 

Ladies and gentlemen, Iceland and America 
are alike in their origins — and alike in their 
objectives. I should like for all of you to now 
join me in a toast to the President of an old 
counti-y and a firm friend. 


I thank President Johnson for the kind words 
that he has spoken about my country and my 

It is with gratitude that I have accepted the 
invitation to meet the President and his wife 
here at the White House. I recall with pleasure 
the visit that you as Vice President and Mrs. 
Jolmson paid to Iceland a few years ago. Such 
visits and personal contacts are most valuable 
for promoting friendship and understanding 
between nations. 

Our country is the nearest European neigh- 
bor to America. Thus it was not only by chance 
that an Icelander became the first white man 
to set foot on American shores, as you men- 
tioned, and that an Icelandic family made the 
first attempt to settle here in the New World. 

These historical facts are commemorated by 
the statues of Leif Eriksson in Reykjavik and 
Newport News — that statue in Reykjavik is a 
gift of the United States Congress on the Ice- 
landic Parliament's 1,000-years anniversary — 
and the statues of Thorfinnur Karlsefni, who 
tried to settle here in this country, are in Phila- 
delphia and also in Reykj avik. 

A thousand years ago the Nordic population 

AUGUST 14, 1961 


was too small to sustain the beacHaeads they 
had established on the American shores. But as 
you mentioned, nearly 900 years later, and since, 
many Icelanders have established themselves in 
this country. The Icelandic immigrants and 
their descendants have helped to further friend- 
ship and good relations between our nations. 

The Second World War brought our two na- 
tions much closer together than ever before; 
and close, friendly relations have been main- 
tained since. Our small nation was isolated for 
centuries in the middle of the Atlantic, out of 
sight and touch with other lands, somewhat like 
the people of the Midwest, M'ho did not see the 
oceans. Like the midwest«rners, we tended to be- 
lieve in the security of isolation. 

But times and conditions have changed. Iso- 
lation, language, and literature protected the 
Icelandic nationality for centuries. Now isola- 
tion is a thing of the past in Iceland as in most 
other countries. The revolution in transporta- 
tion and communications has made all coun- 
tries neighbors. No country can be isolated and 
self-sufficient in times of crisis. Friendly rela- 
tions and security arrangements are necessary 
under present conditions. The lesson of the 
Second World War should certainly not be for- 
gotten. Short memory is a serious fault. 

We had certainly wished that the United Na- 
tions could have been sufficiently strong to pro- 
tect world peace. Although the United Nations 
has proven to be a valuable international forum 
with substantial accomplishments to its account, 
it has been handicapped by the lack of a strong 
executive power. 

Such was the system of government during 
the first 300 years of Icelandic history, which 
also led to the downfall of the old republic. The 
disunity and lack of power of the United Na- 
tions has necessitated the formation of such de- 
fense agreements as the NATO, in wliich we 
both are partners. 

Our cooperation in defense matters is good 
and close. We are fortunate to have only good 
neighbors in the North Atlantic. I like to re- 
call the lend-lease agreement wliich we made in 
1941, subsequent to our fii*st defense agreement 
with the United States. We who negotiated that 
agreement had often daily meetings in the State 
Department and remember seeing in the corri- 
dors the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese negotiators. 
While in Halifax on our way back home, we 
heard the news about the attack on Pearl Har- 
bor. That was a moment none of us will forget. 

I recall also with gratitude the Marshall Plan, 
which provided Iceland, together with other 
European countries, with much needed eco- 
nomic aid. The Marshall Plan was impressive 
and unique and achieved its goal of European 
recovery. We, like so many other countries, have 
a good reason to recall what the United States 
has done for the defense of national independ- 
ence and democracy and for economic develop- 
ment all over the world. 

This has been possible only because the vigor 
and wealth of the United States has been 
matched by the intelligence and imagination of 
its political leaders. We follow with admiration 
your ceaseless efforts, Mr. President, in provid- 
ing better and fairer living for all your citizens 
in the true liberal traditions of your country. 

It is vital for a small country to have good 
neighbors. Historical and natural rights are not 
always sufficient. We live m the middle of the 
North Atlantic, on both sides of which are the 
oldest and soundest democracies. We are closest 
to these countries geographically, historically, 
and culturally. In our times, the North Atlantic 
is the Mediterranean of the free world. 

Mr. President, I want again to extend to you 
and your cliarming wife my deepest thanks for 
your hospitality. Your invitation is a great 
honor to me and the Icelandic people. 

Allow me to propose a toast to the President 
of the United States. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Socialist Eepublic of Romania, Corneliu 
Bogdan, presented his credentials to President 
Johnson on July 27. For texts of the Ambas- 
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated July 27. 


The newly apjDointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Togo, Alexandre Ohin, presented 
his credentials to President Johnson on July 27. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, sec Department of State press 
release dated July 27. 



The Depth and Durability of U.S.-Philippine Relations 

iy William McConnick Blair, Jr. 
Ambassador to the Philippines ^ 

I am profoundly grateful for Rotary's invi- 
tation to be your guest speaker on Philippine- 
American Friendship Day. 

There are those who question the so-called 
special relations between our two countries, but 
the indisputable fact is that our relationship 
has been a long one and, for both of us, a 
imiquely close and deep one. The intimacy of 
our association for almost 70 years means that 
our relations must be special, even though the 
specific content of those special relations is con- 
tinuously changing. You would like to see the 
relationship changed in particular ways. So 
would we. 

At times there are those who wish to see those 
emotional elements eliminated. This is impos- 
sible. You cannot make the Bataan march to- 
gether and not have a highly emotional content 
to certain aspects of these relations. They range 
over an extensive area of mutual interest and 
today are particularly significant because the 
ideals of human freedom and the objective of 
human progress shared by both nations are 
being tested not far from here. The free peoples 
of Asia are locked in mortal conflict with the 
forces of a Communist tyranny which seeks to 
expand its totalitarian empire through ideologi- 
cal subversion and military force. 

Let us not forget that the United States is a 
Pacific power and that it has an enormous stake 
in the outcome of Asia's struggle against tyr- 
anny. It also has a stake in the drive which ani- 
mates Asia's people to strive for a brighter 

The United States looks out westward to Asia 
from its Pacific coast, and within embattled 
Asia there is no people whom we know as well 

or who understand us as well as the people of 
the Philippines. Thus, in this moment of history 
when events in Asia are so crucial and critical 
and when the United States' involvement is so 
great, the condition of the relationship of the 
Philippines and the United States is indeed im- 
portant and significant to both nations. 

I think that the state of our relationship is 
good — on the whole, very good. 

Periodically during the course of the Philip- 
pine-American relationship, public forums and 
public media have resounded with the clash of 
polemics, with the expression of grievances. 
Some of these grievances have been honestly 
felt and honestly uttered. Some have been simu- 
lated, with no particularly sinister end in mind. 
All too many have been stimulated for a variety 
of reasons, none of them intended to benefit 
either nation. 

Significantly, however, throughout these pub- 
lic storms, qualified and dedicated public serv- 
ants of both Governments have continued their 
quiet work at conference tables, evolving mu- 
tual programs, advancmg mutual projects, mov- 
ing steadily forward toward mutually sought 
goals — all unfiurried, never distracted from 
their constructive common effort. This, to me, 
best illustrates the depth and durability of our 
special relations. 

Through our joint efforts a number of issues 
have been resolved in the past 3 years or are well 
on the way toward mutually satisfactory 

We have reached agreement on the question 
of criminal jurisdiction with respect to inci- 
dents involving United States military person- 
nel in the Philippines.^ There are bound to be 

' Address made before the Rotary Club of Manila on 
June 29. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5851 ; 
for a Department announcement of the agreement, see 
Bttlletin of Aug. 30, 1965, p. 358. 

AUGUST 14, 1967 


incidents when, for example, we have, as we do, 
at Clark Field a family of 60,000 people, in- 
cluding American servicemen, their dependents, 
and our Filipino friends and coworkers — 25,000 
at Subic, 5,000 at Sangley, and over 2,000 at 
Mactan. But I submit that these incidents have 
been relatively few and far between. 

We have entered into agreements relinquish- 
ing some of the base lands which are no longer 
needed for military purposes by United States 
forces : 25,000 acres at Clark Field ^ and one- 
fourth of Camp Jolin Haj'.* 

The Rusk-Eamos Agreement, signed in Wash- 
ington last September, reduced the term of the 
United States use of the bases here in the Philip- 
pines to a period of 25 years.'* 

We recently have taken action on veterans 
benefits and claims." Since last December almost 
all eligible Filipino veterans and their depend- 
ents have been receiving almost twice as much 
money in their monthly benefit checks. 

We have just completed two agreements in- 
volving almost $16 million for the implementa- 
tion of projects under the $28 million Special 
Fund for Education and are hard at work on 
the remaining project proposals.' 

The United States is increasing its military 
and economic assistance to the Philippines. This 
assistance has included such notable items as 
high-speed boats to help in the antismuggling 
campaign, new modern aircraft for the Philip- 
pine Air Force, the turnover a few days ago of 
engineering equipment for the Engineering 
Construction Battalions, and an increasing par- 
ticipation by AID in the very encouraging pro- 
gram which is now going forward in the 
Philippines in the field of rural development 
and increased agricultural productivity. 

In enumerating these instances of our re- 
sponse to your requests for assistance or of our 
cooperation in ventures of mutual interest, it 
definitely is not my purpose to brag of our gen- 
erosity or solicit your gratitude. It is rather to 
illustrate the scope and diversity of concrete and 
tangible cooperation characteristic of the spe- 
cial relationship some are inclined to dismiss as 
a euphemism. 

' TIAS 5924. 
• TIAS 6180. 

" TIAS 6084 ; for text, see Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966, 
p. 548. 

" For background, see iliid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 684. 
' For background, see ibid., June 5, 1967, p. 850. 

It might also be useful and pertinent at this 
point to reaffirm the basic philosophy of our 
various aid programs as stated by our highest 
ranking Government officials over the years, as 
well as by my predecessors and myself. We do 
not regard aid, whether grant or loan, as a gift 
or reward or token of esteem. If the American 
foreign aid program laimched after World 
War II is noted by historians as an imprec- 
edented multibillion-dollar humanitarian ex- 
periment in international relations, we take 
pride in that judgment. 

But our own view of aid is that of a practical 
investment in developing the kind of world in 
which we prefer to live, the kind of world in 
which we are likely to flourish — a world of 
peace and freedom devoted to the well-being 
of man and to the protection of his individual 
right to realize to the fullest his human poten- 
tial as a creature of God. We are investing in 
the world's economic growth and political sta- 
bility, in its education and public health, to 
make of it a community in which our own peo- 
ple, as well as all others, can find happiness and 

As a practical investment, therefore, it is 
clear that our aid programs are guided by prac- 
tical criteria. First, we welcome and enlist the 
participation of all other nations whose re- 
sources peimit. Second, as sound investment 
practice dictates, we direct the flow of our aid 
investment to those areas where it can be 
promptly and efficiently made jDroductive in re- 
alizing the larger objectives or where it is 
needed urgently to protect an endangered exist- 
ing investment. 

Common U.S.— Philippine Interests 

There is more to be done here in the Philip- 
pines and more changes to come. The period 
ahead will not be an easy one. Our negotiations 
on bilateral issues will, of course, be carried out 
against the background of conflict and confla- 
gration in Southeast Asia. And these negotia- 
tions coming up in the near future are impor- 
tant and complex. There will be those who will 
attribute unworthy motives, and there will be 
those who will seek to distort and demean the 
efforts we both are making. 

But I think the record of the past augurs well 
for the future, when we will be entering into 
negotiations on such comprehensive matters as 
the regulation of our trade and investment re- 
lationships after the expiration of the Laurel- 



Langley Agreement ^ in 1974. And negotiations 
will be continuing on various matters pertain- 
ing to the U.S. military bases in order to insure 
that our agreements concerning these bases are 
kept up to date and in tune with the times. 

It is, I suppose, customary in talking of Phil- 
ippine-American relations to concern oneself 
primarily with the bilateral aspects of those re- 
lations. But there are other perspectives one 
should examine if we are to appreciate the full 
dimensions of the interrelationships between 
our two countries. 

The United States looks out over the Pacific 
area from roughly 120° west longitude, while 
the Philippines views the Pacific from roughly 
120° east longitude. Both have vital interests in 
what transpires in the vast rim of the Pacific 
and i