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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
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THE
DEPARTMENT
I OF
STATE
BULLETIN
/
/
Volume LVII, Nos. 1462-U87
July S-December 25, 1967
BOSTON PUBLfCLlBRAR,
INDEX
Number
Date of Issue
Pages
Number
Dat
' of Issue
Pages
1462
July 3, 1967
1- 28
1475
Oct.
2, 1967
409-440
1463
July 10, 1967
29- 56
1476
Oct.
9, 1967
441Ht80
1464
July 17,1967
57- 84
1477
Oct.
16, 1967
481-516
1465
July 24, 1967
85-120
1478
Oct.
23, 1967
517-552
1466
July 31, 1967
121-156
1479
Oct.
30, 1967
553-592
1467
Aug. 7, 1967
157-192
1480
Nov.
6, 1967
593-628
1468
Aug. 14, 1967
193-224
1481
Nov.
13, 1967
629-664
1469
Aug. 21, 1967
225-248
1482
Nov.
20, 1967
665-700
1470
Aug. 28, 1967
249-272
1483
Nov.
27, 1967
701-732
1471
Sept. 4, 1967
273-312
1484
Dec.
4, 1967
733-772
1472
Sept. 11, 1967
313-340
1483
Dec.
11,1967
773-812
1473
Sept. 18, 1967
341-380
1486
Dec.
18, 1967
813-848
1474
Sept. 25, 1967
381^08
1487
Dec.
25. 1967
849-888
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Publication 8360
Released April 1968
For sale by the Siiperintendenl of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 30 cents (single copy). Subscription Price: $10 per year; $5 additional for foreign mailing.
INDEX
Volume LVII, Numbers 1462-1487, July 3-December 25, 1967
1667
oc
Abel, I. W., 489
Ackley, Gardner, 46, 392n, 455
Adams, Henry (quoted), 303
Adams, John Quincy (quoted), 605
Advisory Committee on Science and
Technology (Goldschmidt), 305
Afghanistan :
Agricultural commodities, agree-
ment with U.S. for sales of, 270
Technical cooperation program agree-
ment, with U.S., 270
Africa (see also individual countries):
Chinese technical assistance programs
(Bundy), 199
Contributions to U.S.: Johnson, 571 ;
Palmer, 656
Economic cooperation and develop-
ment and U.S. support for re-
gional efforts: Johnson, 32, 330,
632; W. W. Rostow, 67
Organization for African Unity:
W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88
Peace Corps activities (Palmer), 658
Preferential trade arrangements (Sol-
omon), 185
Southern, racial discrimination in
(Goldberg), 488
U.S. aid policy (Rusk), 212, 803
Visit of Under Secretary Katzenbach
(Johnson), 32
African Development Bank: W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 210, 212
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Sol-
idarity Organization: 495, 496;
Rusk, 491
Agency for International Development
(see also Foreign aid policy, U.S.):
Africa, policies for aid to (Rusk), 212,
803
Appropriations request fiscal year
1968 (Rusk), 208
Iran economic aid, termination:
Johnson, 827; Rusk, 825
Latin American programs. See Alli-
ance for Progress
Objectives and budget (Katzenbach),
531
Philippines (Blair), 204
Agency for the Safety of Air Naviga-
tion in Africa and Madagascar, 81
Aggression (see also China, Communist;
Communism; and Soviet Union):
OAS, final act and resolutions, 496
Prevention and suppression: Johnson,
779, 851; Katzenbach, 604, 818;
E. V. Rostow, 425; Rofere and
Schlesinger (quoted), 603; Rusk,
88,252, 348, 564, 821, 857
Aggression — Continued
U.N. Charter principles for suppres-
sion of (Lodge), 469
Viet-Nam. See Viet-Nam
Agricultural surpluses, U.S. use in over-
seas programs, agreements with
Afghanistan, 270; Brazil, 625, 698
Congo (Kinshasa), 190; Ghana
729; Iceland, 26; India, 117, 514
Indonesia, 590, 846; Israel, 309
Liberia, 698; Mexico, 770; Pakistan
154, 309; Sudan, 26; Tunisia, 770
Viet-Nam, 310, 590, 729
U.S. policy: Katzenbach, 531; Solo-
mon, 183
A.griculture (j« aha Agricultural sur-
pluses, Food and Agriculture Orga-
nization, and Food for Freedom):
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo
1968 (Freeman), 136
.\sia (Gaud), 582
Asian Development Bank Fund for
Agriculture (Gaud), 580
Europe: Schaetzel, 713; Trowbridge,
72
Farm-income problem: Freeman, 132;
Solomon, 183
India: Gaud, 583; Rusk, 211, 802
Iran: Johnson, 360; Rusk, 826
Ivory Coast (Johnson), 330
Kennedy Round concessions : 95,100;
Freeman, 132; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 577
Micronesia, land management (Salii),
377
Modernization, importance of (see
also Food and population crisis):
Fowler, 528; Gaud, 582; Gold-
schmidt, 305; Johnson, 762;
Rusk, 254; Sen (quoted), 766
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756
World Food Panel report, 76
Nepal, 709
Screwworm fly, elimination of, U.S.-
Mexico, 682
Trade problems: Freeman, 642 ; Nor-
wood, 369; Oliver, 756; Solomon,
181, 183
Viet-Nam (LUienthal), 865, 866
Water. See Water resources
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 654
AID. See Agency for International De-
velopment
Albania:
Communist China representation in
U.N., draft resolution: Fountain,
829, 830; text, 833
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Algeria:
Intergovernmental Maritime Consult-
ative Organization, convention
(1965), amendment to article 28,
885
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Alianza paral el Progreso. See Alliance for
Progress
Alliance for Progress (see also Inter-
American Development Bank):
Accomplishments, goals, and U.S.
support: 717; Diaz Ordaz, 678;
Johnson, 31, 499, 717 (quoted);
Linowitz, 617; Oliver, 105, 754,
868; Rusk, 90, 210, 254, 490
Eliinination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of
(E. y. Rostow), 238
Multinational infrastructure projects:
Oliver, 104, 755, 757, 873; Rusk,
211; Solomon, 536
Sixth anniversary: Johnson, 287; Lin-
owitz, 321
Summit meeting, results and pros-
pects: 681; Johnson, 31, 498,
499; Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 103,
470, 755, 869; E. V. Rostow, 238;
W. W. Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211,
492, 493, 805; Solomon, 534
U.S. Ambassador Coerr, request by
Ecuador for recall of, 621
U.S. financial support: Oliver, 869;
Rusk, 208
Cutback in aid, probable adverse
eff'ects: Oliver, 471; Rusk, 805
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
American ideals: Blair, 207; Johnson,
303,631,653; E. V. Rostow, 609;
Rusk, 251, 255, 348, 741
Amistad Dam, 681
Amity and economic relations, treaty
of: Thailand, 438, 477, 662
Andean Common Market (Solomon),
537
Anderson, Eugenie, 365
Anderson, Robert B. (Oliver), 474
Angola, Congo mercenaries, use as
base for (Buffum), 807
Ankrah, Joseph A., 572
Antiballistic missiles. See under Missiles
Anton Bruun, RV, U.S. research vessel, 23
ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, U.S.)
treaty, map, 460
Apartheid (Goldberg), 488
Apple, R. W., Jr., 416
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
891
Arab-Israeli conflict: Johnson, 325;
NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 425;
Rusk, 559
Cease-fire, importance of: 11, 12;
Goldberg, 3, 6, 9, 10, 50, 263,
690, 691; Johnson, 35, 37
Khartoum conference, prospects from
(Rusk), 388
NATO interests (Cleveland), 145
Refugees:
U.N. resolution, text, 112
U.S. aid: 400; Goldberg, 65
Johnson, 64, 65
U.S. position: U, 52; Goldberg, 8;
49, 108, 110, 111, 148, 218, 486
834, 839; Johnson, 33; E. V
Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 210, 388
416
Soviet draft resolutions: 12n, 112n
Goldberg, 5, 6, 51, 217, 842, 843
te-xt, 10, 12
Soviet position: Goldberg, 47, 109
110, 263, 834, 836; Johnson, 38
Rusk, 159
U.N. resolutions, U.S. position: Gold
berg, 108, 148, 691; Rusk, 149
U.N. role and U.S. support: 361
709; Goldberg, 3, 6, 10, 13, 47
49, 52, 110, 148, 216, 487, 690
691, 834, 840; Johnson, 33; Rusk
165, 387, 559, 561
U.N. special representative, need for
835«; Goldberg, 835, 840, 842
U.S. draft resolutions: 12«, 112n, 691.
Goldberg, 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 51, 834,
836, 838; texts, 4, 7, 12, 51
Soviet position on (Goldberg), 9, 10
U.S. involvement, allegations of, and
U.S. replies: 112n; Goldberg, 3,
5, 9, 11, 48, 50, 150, 217, 262;
E. V. Rostow, 237
U.S. position: Goldberg, 3, 5, 9, 10,
47, 48, 108, 148, 216, 486, 690,
691, 834, 836, 841; Johnson, 33,
37, 39, 40; E. V. Rostow, 237,
425; Rusk, 88, 160, 210, 387, 561
U.S. press and public opinion (Gold-
berg), 8, 691
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41,
171,229,459,799
Arab states. See Arab-Israeli conflict.
Near and Middle East, and indi-
vidual countries
Argentina:
Joint U.S.-Argentine Trade and Eco-
nomic Committee, 2nd meeting,
joint communique, 146
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 245,
378, 405, 728, 845, 846
U.S. consulate at Cordoba, closure,
246
Armaments {see also Military assistance.
Missiles, ani/ Nuclear weapons):
Arms race:
International arms traffic, problem
of: Katzenbach, 532, 795; Rusk,
733
Latin America, question of: Katzen-
bach, 797; Linowitz, 619, Oliver,
473, 757, 871
Middle East: 52; Goldberg, 7, 49,
110, 148, 486, 834, 837, 843;
Johnson, 33; Katzenbach, 532,
796; McCloskey, 652; E. V.
Rostow, 237; Rusk, 88, 160, 210,
215, 387, 561
Armaments — Continued
Arms race — Continued
U.S. -Soviet nuclear arms race:
Fisher, 543; McNamara, 445
Control {see also Disarmament):
Communist China, position on
(Fountain), 832
Deep ocean floor, need for arms
control measures (Goldberg),724
Cyprus, importation of (Pedersen), 53
East Europe and Soviet weapons,
threat to Western Europe: 14;
E. V. Rostow, 607; Rusk, 600
Middle East, U.S. arms shipments
policy : McCloskey, 652 ; Rusk, 387
Nigeria, Soviet supply to, U.S. posi-
tion, 320
Nuclear. See Nuclear headings
Outer space treaty, provisions: John-
son, 567; Rusk, 566
Soviet arms budget (Rusk), 558
Viet-Nam {see also Viet-Nam), Soviet
and Communist China supply of
arms (Rusk), 598
Armed forces:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S. position.
See Arab-Israeli conflict.
Congo (Kinshasa), foreign mercenar-
ies, U.N. resolution and U.S. sup-
port (Buflum), 151, 152, 807
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat-
ment of in time of war:
Congo (Brazzaville), 81; Kenya,
698; Kuwait, 514; Zambia, 698
NATO. ^fNATO
Philippines, settlement of claims for
pay and allowances of recognised
Philippine guerrillas, not previ-
ously paid in full, and for errone-
ous deductions of advanced salary
from the backpay of eligible Phil-
ippine veterans, agreement re,
117
U.K., proposed reduction of Asian
forces: Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259
U.S., tribute to (Johnson), 747
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Arnold, Thurman W., 475
ASA (Association of Southeast Asia):
Bundy, 198; Kaplan, 233
ASE.\N (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations): Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822
ASECNA (Agency for the Safety of Au-
Navigation in Africa and Madagas-
car), 81
Asgeirsson, Asgeir, 201
Ashmore, Harry, 462
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia
{see also Asian entries. Association of
Southeast Asia, Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, and individual
countries):
Communism, danger of: 64; Bundy,
278, 286; Johnson, 325; Katzen-
bach, 604; Marcos (quoted), 520;
Rusk, 253, 555, 560, 563, 597, 857
Economic and social development {see
also names oj countries and Regional
cooperation, infra): Gaud, 581;
Johnson, 32 61; Kaplan, 231;
Rusk, 822
Thailand, role of, 64
U.S. role: Bundy, 196; Rusk, 802
Food and population crisis. See Food
and popvuation crisis
Asia — Continued
Japan, role of: 452, 454, 745; Gaud,
581; Johnson, 32, 510, 742;
Kaplan, 233 ; Rusk, 452 ; Sato, 744
Philippines, interests and role (Blair),
205
Regional cooperation and develop-
ment: 452, 578, 615, 792; Bundy,
198, 285; Gaud, 579; Johnson,
453, 508, 612, 632, 743, 852;
Kaplan, 233; W. W. Rostow, 68;
Rusk, 214, 347, 563, 736, 804, 822
SEATO, importance to. See SEATO
U.S. commitments: Blair, 203; Bundy,
276; Johnson, 453, 852; Rusk
160, 458, 555, 563, 596, 599, 703,
821, 823, 857
Viet-Nam, importance to security
of: Blair, 206; Bundy, 195, 278,
285; Bunker, 781; Clifi"ord, 257,
258; Johnson, 520, 614, 777, 779,
851; Kaplan, 231, 234; Lee, 613;
E. V. Rostow, 426, 608; W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 90, 252, 344,
347, 740, 857 ; Souvanna Phouma,
654; Taylor, 259
U.S. relations and role: Bundy, 195;
Gaud, 580; Johnson, 614, 615;
Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach, 819
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
World peace, importance to (Gaud),
580
"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604;
Rusk, 596
Asian, Southeast, Ministerial Confer-
ence for Economic Development:
454; Rusk, 452
Asian, Southeast, Ministers of Educa-
tion Secretariat: Bundy, 198; Gaud,
580; Johnson, 509
Asian and Pacific Council: Bundy, 198;
Gaud, 597; Johnson, 509; Kaplan,
233; Rusk, 822
Asian Development Bank: Bundy, 198;
Kaplan, 233; Katzenbach, 335;
Rusk, 214, 559, 822
Japan, support of: 454; Johnson, 510,
742 ; W. W. Rostow, 68 ; Rusk, 452
Special funds for, U.S. support: 454,
578; Gaud, 580, 581; Johnson,
508; Rusk, 210, 456, 458
Asian Labor Ministe.s, Conference of:
Bundy, 198; Gaud, 579
ASPAC. See Asian and Pacific Council
Association of Southeast Asia: Bimdy,
198; Kaplan, 233
Association of Southeast Asian Nations:
Gaud, 579; Rusk, 822
Astronauts, envoys of mankind (Dean),
566
Atlantic Alliance. See North Atlantic
Treaty Organization
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, 3rd annual re-
port: 302; Johnson, 302
Atlantic partnership: Harriman, 18;
Leddy, 762
Atomic energy, peaceful uses of:
Agreements re application of safe-
guards. See under Atomic Energy
Agency, International
Civil uses, bilateral agreements with:
Norway, 26; South Africa, 222,
309
892
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Atomic energy — Continued
Middle East programs, U.S. support
(Goldberg), 218
Nonproliferation treaty, draft, pro-
visions for peaceful nuclear ex-
plosions: 319; Foster, 316
PLOWSHARE nuclear craterin^ ex-
periments re interoceanic sea-level
canal feasibility study (Johnson)
302
Safeguards. See Atomic Energy
Agency, International
U.S. -Japan cooperation, 747
Atomic Energy Agency, International:
lltli general conference, U.S. delega-
tion, 476
Safeguards:
-Agreement with U.S. and Indonesia
for application of, 81
Agreements re application of safe-
guards to existing bilateral agree-
ments: Japan, 809; South Africa,
270
U.S. nuclear activities, proposal for
application of: 319; Johnson, 863
Statute (1956) as amended: Honduras,
153; Uganda, 378
Attlee, Lord, death of (Johnson), 568
Australia (ice also Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization):
Asian students in (Bundy), 199
Observers for Viet-Nam election
(Lodge), 350
Trade preference arrangements with
less developed counti-ies (Solo-
mon), 186
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 589,
625, 728
LT.S. exports, probable effect of U.S.
preferential trade legislation :
Fowler, 651; Rusk, 635
U.S. military alliance (Rusk), 563
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
Holt (quoted), 520; McNamara,
169; Rusk, 91, 92, 391, 599
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Austria:
Kennedy Round tariff reductions,
97, 100
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 625,
846
Automotive products, U.S. -Canada
Automotive Agreement, 1965: 45;
Reynolds, 140
Automotive traffic. See Road traffic
Aviation:
Air services technical talks vdth Soviet
Union completed, 820
Air transport, Micronesia, needs
(Norwood), 370
Aircraft:
G-130 transport aircraft, U.S. aid
to Congo (Kinshasa) : Buffum, 1 52
U.S. accidental overflights of Com-
munist China: Bundy, 355;
Bunker, 421
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Air navigation equipment, agree-
ment with Germany re lease of, 8 1 0
Air navigation services, joint fi-
nancing services in:
Greenland and the Faroe Islands,
current actions: India, 769
Iceland, current actions: India,
769
Aviation — Continued
Treaties — Continued
Air transport agreements with:
Bolivia, 54; Mexico, 589, 625;
Panama, 54
Aircraft, international recognition
of rights in, convention (1948);
Thailand, 697
Aircraft, offenses and certain other
acts committed on board, con-
vention (1963): Netherlands, 117
Aircraft operated on or on behalf of
the U.S., agreement with ASE-
CNA re services and facilities for,
81
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
B
Babbidge, Homer Daniels, Jr., 332
Baggs, William, 462
Bahamas, industrial property conven-
tion (1883, as revised), application
to, 662
Bahamas Proving Ground, agreement
with U.K., re withdrawal of the
senior member of the British Armed
Forces posted there, 309
Balagucr, Joaquin, 620
Balance of payments:
Japan, 452, 746
Latin America (Solomon), 537, 533
U.K. pound devaluation, cooperative
adjustments to offset effect of:
Fowler, 793; OECD communique,
882; E. V. Rostow, 879
U.S.: 452, 746; Freeman, 132; John-
son, 266, 852; Reynolds, 137
Foreign aid programs, effect on:
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V.
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209
Foreign travel, effect on: 828; E. V.
Rostow, 879
U.S. exports, effect on: Fowler, 650;
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 688;
Udall, 638
Viet-Nam, effect of: 45; E. V.
Rostow, 879
World monetary system, adjustments
(Fowler), 524, 526
Ball, George, 462, 661, 759 (quoted)
Banda, H. Kamuzu, 43
Barbados:
GAS membership (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 190,
270, 309, 404, 438, 550, 590, 846.
U.S. Ambassador (Mann), confirma-
tion, 478
Harnett, Peter, 596
Harnett, Robert W., 586
Bator, Francis: 392n; Fowler, 393
Belgium:
Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc-
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge,
131
Observers for Viet-Nam elections
(Lodge), 350
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 378,
478, 625, 769, 770
Benjamin, Robert S., 489
Bennett, Ivan L., Jr., 76, 874
Berlin (see also Germany): Hrzezinski,
21; Cleveland, 142; Katzenbach,
335; NAG, 14; Rusk, 600
Bernardes, Carlos A. (Goldberg), 52
Bhumibol Adulyadej, 62, 63
Big-power responsibility: Brzezinski, 22;
Bundy, 285; Bunker, 781; Johnson,
35, 38, 59, 325, 853; Kaplan, 234;
Katzenbach, 334, 534, 604, 818;
Kiesinger, 329; Lee, 613; Oliver,
474; E. V. Rostow, 423, 428, 606,
609; Rusk, 251, 348, 564, 735, 807;
Sato, 744
BIRPI (International Bureaus for the
Protection of Industrial and Intel-
lectual Property), Trowbridge, 505
Bismarck, Kail Otto (quoted), 328
Black, Eugene (Johnson), 508
Blair, William McCormick, Jr., 203
Bogdan, Corneliu, 202
Boggs, Neil, 352, 464
Bolivar, Sim6n (quoted), 618
Bolivia:
Communism, danger of: Johnson,
683; Kaplan, 230; Katzenbach,
533; Rusk, 210, 490, 493
OAS final act and resolutions, texts,
493
Guevara, Ernesto "Che", report of
death (Rusk), 561
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 697
Bolton, Frances (Palmer), 658
Bonin Islands, question of return to
Japan: 745; Rusk, 457, 459
Botswana :
World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund membership (Fowler),
523
World Meteorological Organization
convention, 1947, accession, 624
Bowers, Raymond, 585
Bowie, Robert R., 16
Bowles, Chester (quoted), 583
Boyd, Alan S., 455
Braderman, Eugene M., 78
Brandeis, Louis D. (quoted), 107
Brazil:
Former President Castello Branco,
death of (Rusk), 159
International coffee agreement exten-
sion, U.S. -Brazil discussions: 799;
Oliver, 756
Nonproliferation treaty, reservations
to (Rusk), 388
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 625, 698
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 211
Brezhnev, Leonid I. (Cleveland), 143
Brodie, Henry, 725
Broomfield, Wilham S., 489, 844
Brosio, Manlio, 859, 860
Brown, Harold (McNamara), 448
Brown, L. Dean, 625
Hrown, Winthrop G. (quoted), 232
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 19
Buffum, William B., 46, 151, 152, 489.
807
Bulgaria:
Safety of life at sea, international
convention (1960), acceptance,
770
U.N. role in Viet-Nam negotiations,
position on (Goldberg), 670
Bull, Odd: 12n; Goldberg, 4
Bundy, William P., 195, 260, 275, 352,
462
Bunker, Ellsworth: 416, 584, 748, 781;
Johnson, 707; Rusk, 557
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
893
Burma:
Communism, danger of: Johnson,
520; Rusk, 164, 560, 563, 597, 822
U.N. Charter amendments to article
109, ratification, 81
Bushy, Horace, 476
Butler, Samuel, 794
Butterworth, W. Walton, 46
Callahan, James, 396, 793
Cambodia:
Communist use as base for Viet-Nam
infiltration (Rusk), 89, 412
Neutrality: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89,
412, 558, 597
Cameroon:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 514
U.S. visit of President Ahidjo: 654;
Palmer, 657
Canada:
Asian Development Bank, support for:
Gaud, 580; Johnson, 510
Champlain waterway, IJC feasibility
study, report, 107
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
Aflairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
Kennedy Round:
Antidumping legislation: 97, 99;
Roth, 126; Trowbridge, 131
Tariff reductions: 98, 99, 100;
Johnson, 884; Katzenbach, 688;
Roth, 178; Trowbridge, 128
U.S. replacement of interim staging
arrangements by Kennedy Round
staging, proclamation, 800
Oil exports to U.S. (Udall), 641
Pembina river bjisin, IJC report, 874
Trade restrictions on U.S. exports
reduction, 860, 861
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
190, 337, 378, 549, 589, 625, 698,
728, 770, 885
Canadian Bank Act, 45
Cantinflas (Johnson), 674
Carrillo Flores, Antonio, 684
Castello Branco, President, death of
(Rusk), 159
Castroism {see also Cuba) : Johnson, 498;
Linowitz, 322, 616; Oliver, 473, 757;
Rusk, 210, 490, 805
Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, 462
Central African Republic, U.S. Ambas-
sador (Lewis), confirmation, 478
Central American Common Market:
Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 1 05, 47 1 , 870;
Rusk, 211; Solomon, 534
Central American States, Organization
of, 697
Ceylon, treaties, agreements, etc., 54,
404, 661
Chad, U.S. Ambassador (Vance), con-
firmation, 310
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text),
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684
Chancellor, John, 390
Chandrasekhar, S. (Gaud), 583
Chile:
Inflation control (Solomon), 539
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 846
U.S. aid (Katzenbach), 531
Chile — Continued
U.S. Ambassador (Korry), confirma-
tion, 337
China, Communist {see also Aggression
and Communism) :
Asia, throat to: 744; Fountain, 831;
Katzenbach, 604, 796; Marcos,
520 (quoted); Rusk, 164, 347, 563,
564, 596, 821
Containment of: Katzenbach, 819;
Rusk, 598, 704
Leadership and policy, problems:
Bundy, 356; Bunker, 421; Kaplan,
230; Rusk, 347, 389, 415, 563
Military bases, use by North Viet-
Nam planes, question of (Rusk),
389, 416
Nuclear potential and U.S. strategy:
Fisher, 543; Katzenbach, 819;
McNamara, 449; E. V. Rostow,
610; Rusk, 164, 563
U.N. membership:
Communist conditions for (Foun-
tain), 831
U.N. resolutions, texts, 833
U.S. position: Fountain, 829; Rusk,
389, 390
U.S. accidental overflights: Bundy,
355; Bunker, 421
U.S. involvement as a result of Viet-
Nam, questions of: Bundy, 283,
357; Bunker, 420; Kaplan, 234;
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 564
U.S. relations: Johnson, 32; Kaplan,
234; Katzenbach, 820; E. V.
Rostow, 430; Rusk, 390, 415, 739
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Viet-Nam :
Military aid: Bundy, 3.56; Gold-
berg, 672; Lodge, 467; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 598, 600
Position on: Fountain, 832; Rusk,
164, 558
"Yellow peril": Katzenbach, 604;
Rusk, 596
China, Republic of:
Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581,
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 214, 822
Population control (Gaud), 583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309,
625
U.N. membership, question of ex-
pulsion from (Fountain), 829, 830
Draft resolution, text, 833
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement and text, 694
U.S. mutual defense treaty, map:
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. scientific team, report of: 585;
Johnson (quoted), 585
Christian, George, 349, 864
Churchill, Sir Winston (quoted), 251,
263, 530, 791
Civil emergency planning, agreement
with Canada re cooperation on, 378
Civil rights {see also Human rights and
Racial discrimination) :
U.S.: Goldberg, 488; Linowitz, 322,
618; E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk,
491, 856; Waters, 765
Women. See Women
Civilian persons in time of war, Geneva
convention (1949) re: Congo
(Brazzaville), 81; Kenya, 698; Ku-
wait, 514; Zambia, 698
Claims:
Lake Ontario international arbitral
tribunal, immunities as inter-
national organization, Executive
order, 507
Micronesia, post World War II
damage claims: Anderson, 365;
Norwood, 373
Philippine veterans and recognized
guerrillas, agreement re, 117
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico),
settlement, 261
Clark, Robert E., 411
Cleveland, Harlan, 16, 141
aifford, Qark M., 256
Cocoa, international agreement, im-
portance: Oliver, 756; Solomon, 182
Coerr, Wymberley DeR., 621
Cofi'ee:
Diversification fund, U.S. support
(Solomon), 182
International coffee agreement
(1962), with annexes:
Current actions: Barbados, 117;
Bolivia, 697; Israel, 661
Extension, need for: Brazil-U.S. dis-
cussions, 799; Mexico-U.S. sup-
port, 682; Oliver, 756
Collective security {see also Mutual
defense) :
Asia-U.S.: Bundy, 278; Johnson, 852;
Rusk, 415, 458, 555, 563, 596,
598, 703, 823, 857; Souvanna
Phouma, 654
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, U.S.
bases, 745
U.N. principles and U.S. support
(Rusk), 87, 252
U.S. collective defense arrangements
(map), 460
U.S. commitments, importance:
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 16, 779,
853; Katzenbach, 336; E. V.
Rostow, 608; Rusk, 91, 252, 704,
857
U.S. national interests: Katzenbach,
334; E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 597
U.S. nuclear strategic policy: Gold-
berg, 488; McNamara, 443
Collisions at sea, international regula-
tions (1960) for prevention of:
Czechoslovakia, 270
Colombia:
Communism, threat of (Katzenbach)
533
Cotton textiles, arrangement re inter-
national trade, protocol, accept-
ance, 625
Inflation control (Solomon), 539
Interoceanic canal study commission,
3rd annual report: 302; Johnson,
302
Colombo Plan (Bundy), 199
Colonialism {see also Self-determina-
tion), Viet-Nam, French colonial
period, review (Bundy), 275
Commerce, Department of, 70n
Commodity trade problems: Norwood,
369; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 181
894
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Common markets. See name of market
Communications, {see also Radio and
Telecommunications):
Asia, role of Asian Development Bank
in development (Gaud), 581
Satellites:
Domestic svstems, importance (John-
son), 299
Global commercial communications
satellite system:
Interim arrangements: Kenya,
589; Panama, 624; Tanzania, 26
Special arrangements: East Airi-
can External Telecommunica-
tions Co., Ltd., 26, 589; Panama,
624
Importance of and U.S. policy
(Johnson), 296
Italv: Johnson, 500; Saragat, 501
N.VrO: Cleveland, 145; E. V.
Rostow, 428
U.S. policy task force, appointment:
301n; Johnson, 301
Communications Satellite Corporation
(Johnson), 297
Communism (see also Aggression ; China,
Communist; and Soviet Union):
Asia. See under Asia
Coexistence: Goldberg, 483, 791;
Rusk, 563, 564
Cold v/ar (see also East-West relations) :
Katzenbach, 817
Domino theory : Bundy, 281 ; Johnson,
851; Rusk, 347, 560
Economic and social conditions, effect
on: 496; Johnson, 851 ; Linowitz,
322; Katzenbach, 530
Increasing fragmentation of militant
ideological movements : Brzezinski,
19;Leddy, 761
Rejection and countermeasures;
Humphrey, 789; Linowitz, 617;
Ohver, 473; Rusk, 214, 490, 493,
563
O.AS final act and resolutions,
texts, 493
U.S. foreign policy: Brzezinski, 22;
Katzenbach, 817; E. V. Rostow,
606
U.S. role: Blair, 207; Johnson, 519,
522; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach,
530; Rusk, 344, 563, 704, 741, 806,
824
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Wars of national liberation: Bundy,
283; E. V. Rostow, 426, 608;
Rusk, 92, 252, 601, 703
World goals: Kaplan, 230; Katzen-
bach, 819; Rusk, 491, 600
Corapton, Arthur (quoted), 862
COMSAT. See Global communications
satellite system under Commuica-
tions: Satellites
Conferences, international (^see also
subject), calendar, 24, 435
Confucius (quoted), 614
Congo, Democratic Republic of the
(Kinshasa) :
Agricultural commodities sales agree-
ment with U.S., 190
Intervention in, U.N., resolutions and
U.S. support (Buffum, 151, 152,
807
Congo, Republic of (Brazzaville), Ge-
neva convention (1949) re pro-
tection of civilian persons in time
of war, current actions, 81
Congress, U.S.:
Africa, interest in (Palmer), 658
Documents relating to foreign policy,
lists, 79, 107, 147, 215, 239, 364,
511, 718, 807, 885
Foreign policy responsibilities (Kat-
zenbach), 333
Joint resolutions, Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, status of, text,
363
Legislation:
Alliance for Progress, U.S. financial
support: Linowitz, 619; Olivei',
755; Rusk, 805
Foreign aid, 1967, cutback in:
Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver, 471,
758; Rusk, 208
Inter-American Development Bank,
U.S. financial support (Johnson),
499
Micronesia, budget (Norwood), 366
Military aid poHcies (Oliver), 757
Poland, tariff legislation (Gro-
nouski), 434
Legislation, proposed:
American Selling Price system of
customs evaluation: Johnson, 885;
Roth, 173, 575; Trowbridge, 131
Asian Development Bank, Special
Fund: 454, 578; Gaud, 531;
Johnson, 503; Rusk, 210, 458
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, additional
funds and time extension re-
quests: 302; Johnson, 302
Import quotas on extra long staple
cotton, elimination of (E. V.
Rostow), 236
Kennedy Round implementation :
Johnson, 885; Katzenbach, 688;
Roth, 575
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504
Tax increase (Johnson), 266
Trade Expansion Act negotiating
authority, restoration of: Kat-
zenbach, 689; Roth, 576, 649;
Rusk, 636
Trade protectionist bills, adverse
effect on Kennedy Round re-
sults and U.S. trade: Diaz Ordaz,
677, 681; Freeman, 642; Fowler,
650; Johnson (quoted), 877;
Katzenbach, 686; E. V. Rostow,
877; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634;
Trowbridge, 645 ; Udall, 638
Legislative schedule, determination of
(Rusk), 458
Presidential messages, letters, and re-
ports. See under Johnson, Lyndon
B.
Public hearings, problems of (Rusk),
560
Senate advice and consent:
International grains arrangement
(Johnson), 716, 885
OAS Charter amendments (John-
son), 78
Senate concurrent resolution, U.N.
role in Viet-Nam solution (Gold-
berg), 667
Senate confirmations, 46, 246, 310,
337, 478, 489, 625, 729
Congress, U.S. — Continued
Viet-Nam, position on: Johnson, 780;
Katzenbach, 603; Rusk, 560, 563
Conservation and development of nat-
ural resources, U.S. -Japan coop-
eration: 454; Rusk, 452
Consular relations:
Argentina, U.S. Cordoba consulate
closed, 246
France, U..S. consular convention rati-
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885
Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened,
698
U.K., Edinburgh and Liverpool ele-
vated to consulates general, 310
U.S. Embassy at Saigon, dedication
(Bunker), 584
Vienna convention (1963): Cam-
eroon, 26; Panama (and optional
protocol), 477
Entry into force, 81
Cooper, John Sherman, 562
Copyright convention, international
(1952), extension to St. Vincent, 661
Corner, Frank H., 13
Corona, Achille (Rusk), 855
Corwin, Edward S. (quoted), 333
Costa Mendez, Nicanor, 146
Costa Rica:
Sea-level canal study commission, 3rd
annua] report: 302 ; Johnson, 302
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 153,
405, 697
Costello, William A., 478
Cotton, extra long staple cotton exports
to U.S., proposed closure of (E. V.
Rostow), 236
Cotton textiles:
Argentine imports to U.S., 146
Bilateral agreements with: China,
625, 694; Hong Kong, 54; India,
378, 398; Israel, 154, 243
Jamaica, 590, 622; Malta, 23, 81
Mexico, 26; Pakistan, 114, 154
PhUippines, 511, 550; Portugal
548, 625; Spain, 625, 726
Turkey, 116, 117; U.A.R., 625
Yugoslavia, 506, 625
International trade arrangements
(1962), Poland, 770
E.xtension of: 95, 98; Johnson, 884;
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 127;
Solomon, 181; Trowbridge, 130,
647
Protocol, current actions: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, India,
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, 624; Paki-
stan, 222; Poland, 770; Portugal,
624, 729; Spain, Sweden, 624;
Turkey, 222; U.A.R., U.K. (in-
cluding Hong Kong), 624
Less developed countries, trade con-
siderations (Solomon), 187
Council of Europe (Rusk), 856
Counterfeiting, international convention
(1929) and protocol for the suppres-
sion of counterfeiting currency,
Ceylon, 54
Couve de Murville, Maurice (W. W.
Rostow), 65
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
895
Crnobrnja, Bogdan, 362
Crockett, Kennedy M., 246
Cruz, J. V. (quoted), 832
CSDI (Center for the Study of Demo-
cratic Institutions), 462
Cuba:
Alliance for Progress, U.S. position on
participation (Linowitz), 617
Free-world and Communist trade:
OAS, 496; Rusk, 491, 493
GATT provisional accession agree-
ments, current actions, 405
International Sugar Agreement, lack
of support for (Solomon), 182
Subversion and insurgency: Johnson,
683; Katzcnbach, 532, 797; Lino-
witz, 322, 617; Oliver, 473; Rusk,
210, 252, 383, 490,493
OAS final act and resolutions, texts,
493
U.S. trade embargo: E. V. Rostow,
236; Rusk, 492
Cuban missile crisis: Brzezinski, 21;
Katzenbach, 818
Cultural relations and programs {set also
Educational exchange programs and
Foreign students in the U.S.):
African contributions to U.S.: John-
son, 571; Palmer, 659
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials:
Importation of, UNESCO agree-
ment (1950), and protocol, Kenya,
697
International circulation of visual
and auditory materials, agreement
(1949) for facilitating, Malawi,
245
International Education and Cultural
Exchange Program, annual report
(Johnson), 303
International fairs program. Execu-
tive order, 827
Mexico-U.S., 682
Philippines, cultural development
tiust fund, agreement re use of
Special Fund for Education for
establishment of, 337
Romania, 1968 exchanges program,
agreement, 875
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cultural
Affairs, members confirmed, 332
Customs:
Garnets, TIR, customs convention on
the international transport of
goods under, Ireland, 270
Road vehicles, private, convention
(1954) on the temporary importa-
tion of, Ireland, 438
Touring, customs facilities, convention
(1954) on: Ireland, 438; Uruguay,
514
U.S. -Canada duty-free allowances,
proposals, 45
Cyprus (NAG), 15
Threat of war lifted, U.S. and U.N.
roles: Johnson, 859; Vance, 860
UNFIG\T, 6-month extension, 53n
U.S. pledge (Pedersen), 52
Czechoslovakia, treaties, agreements,
etc., 270, 309, 405
D
Daane, J. Dewey: 392n; Fowler, 393
Dagens Nyheler, transcript of Secretary
Rusk interview, 91
Dahomey, Peace Corps program, agree-
ment re establishment of, 154
Davis, Spencer, 385
De Oliveira, J. G., 881
De Tocqueville (quoted), 328
Dean, Sir Patrick, 565
Debrah, Ebenezer Moses, 578
Defense (see also Collective security and
Mutual defense):
National security, oil import control
program (Udall), 639
Nuclear strategy (McNamara), 443
Defense, Department of:
Defense expenditures review (John-
son), 267
Military assistance appropriations,
proposed transfer to budget of
(Rusk), 208
Deming, Frederick L.: 392n; Fowler,
393
Democracy and democratic processes
Humphrey, 791 ; Johnson, 522, 572
Linowitz, 618, 620; Norwood, 374
E. V. Rostow, 606
Nepal (King Mahendra), 708
Denmark:
Farm-income support practice (Free-
man), 134
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221,
589, 625, 809, 845, 845
Desalination (Rusk), 738
Iran: 361; Johnson, 360; Shah
Pahlavi, 360
Middle East: Goldberg, 487; John-
son, 34
U.S. -Mexico cooperative projects, 682
d'Estaing, Giscard (quoted), 710
Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo: 674, 675, 677;
Johnson, 683
Diori Hamani, 541, 542
Diplomatic relations and recognition:
Ecuador, recall of U.S. Ambassador
requested, 621
Retaliatory trade legislation, proposed
(E. V. Rostow), 236
Southern Yemen, 861
Vienna convention (1961): Nigeria,
221 ; Norway, 769
Diplomatic representatives abroad. See
Foreign Service
Diplomatic representatives in the U.S.,
presentation of credentials: Ecua-
dor, 431 ; Ghana, 578; Greece, 507;
Italy, 13; Jamaica, 431; Japan, 69;
Jordan, 362; Malawi, 507; New
Zealand, 1 3 ; Poland, 43 1 ; Romania,
202; Togo, 202; Yugoslavia, 362
Dirksen, Everett M. (Johnson), 40
DiSaUe, Michael, 476
Disarmament {see also Armaments and
Nuclear weapons), U.S. position;
319, 744; Foster, 317; Goldberg,
488; Johnson, 295; Leddy, 761;
NAC, 14; Rusk, 90, 738
Disaster relief, Rio Grande floods: 680;
Diaz Ordaz, 674; Johnson, 673
Disputes, compulsory settlement of,
optional protocol on Vienna con-
vention, Norway, 769
Disputes, pacific settlement of {see also
Investment disputes, convention):
171; Dean, 566; Rusk, 87
Dobrynin, Anatoliy, 565
Dominican Republic:
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto
Rican Economic Commission, an-
nouncement, 620
Political stability (Oliver), 871
U.S. role (Rusk), 211
Double taxation, income, agreements
and conventions for the avoidance
of: Canada, 698, 770; France, 268,
270; Malawi, 337; Trinidad and
Tobago, 698, 729
Drugs, narcotic:
Single convention (1961), on: Malay-
sia, 270; Philippines, 661; U.S.,
153
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in control of,
682
Drury, Charles M., 46
Duncan Reservoir, agreement with
Canada re special operating pro-
gram, 54
Dzu, Truong Dinh, 416
E
East-West Center for Technical Inter-
change, Hawaii (Norwood), 372
East-West relations: Brzezinski, 23;
Goldberg, 483; Katzenbach, 817;
NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow, 610;
Schaetzel, 711; Waters, 767
Detente: 14; Cleveland, 142; Kie-
singer, 326, 327; Leddy, 760;
Rusk, 90, 600
NATO role: E. V. Rostow, 427;
Rusk, 600
U.S. efforts to improve: 454; Gro-
nouski, 434; Harriman, 18; John-
son, 16, 32; Rusk, 600, 856
Viet-Nam, effect of (Kaplan), 234
East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966
(Rusk), 600
Eastwind, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker,
362
EGA (Economic Commission for Africa) :
Goldschmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow,
68
ECAFE (Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East): Gaud, 579;
Goldschmidt, 304
EGLA (Economic Commission for
Latin America): Goldschmidt, 304
Economic and Social Council, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 308, 404, 438, 694
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials, importation of, agree-
ment ( 1 950), and protocol, Kenya,
697
Food aid for developing countries,
U.S. support for resolution on
(Goldschmidt), 304
Economic and social development {set
also Economic and technical aid.
Foreign aid programs. Organization
for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, and name of cvuntry):
Jolinson, 32, 330; W. W. Rostow, 67
Asia. See Asia
Bonin Islands, 459
Communism, as a countermeasure to:
496; Johnson, 851; Katzenbach,
530; Linowitz, 322, 618
Education, importance to (Bundy),
197
Europe: Brzezinski, 22; Schaetzel, 710;
Trowbridge, 72
896
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic and social development —
Continued
Hunger, disease, ignorance, key fac-
tors: Hiimpiirev, 792; Johnson,
59, 325, 570, 632, 655, 707, 753,
851 ; Linowitz, 617; E. V. Rostow,
424, 610; Rusk, 209, 255
Industrialized countries, role of: 329,
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32,
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876;
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon.
183, 185; Waters, 767
Internal stability, relation to, U.S.
military assistance role: Katzen-
bach, 533, 795; Oliver, 758, 871;
Rusk, 215, 806; Waters, 764
Latin America. See Alliance for Prog-
ress
Less developed countries. See Less
developed countries
Micronesia: Anderson, 365; Johnson,
363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376
Middle East, U.S. position and sup-
port: Goldberg, 9, 108, 148, 218;
Rusk, 210
Multilateral coordination, need for:
Johnson, 331, 763; Katzenbach,
334
Nepal: 709; Johnson, 706, 707
PhUippines (Blair), 205
Political stability, importance: John-
son, 632, 778, 851; Katzenbach,
334; Rusk, 210, 214, 806; Waters,
764
Principles for: Johnson, 42; Oliver
472,872; Rusk, 208
Private enterprise, role of: Gaud, 581 ;
Linowitz, 324; Oliver, 104; Rusk,
209
Self-help: 745; Fowler, 527; Gaud,
582 ; Johnson, 499 ; Linowitz, 618 ;
Oliver, 470
Singapore (Johnson), 612, 614
U.S.: Brzezinski, 21; Johnson, 267;
E. V. Rostow, 878; Rusk, 255
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; Johnson,
16, 632; Katzenbach, 335, 530;
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 801
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Economic and technical aid (see also
Agency for International Develop-
ment, Agricultural surpluses. Alli-
ance for Progress, Economic and
social development. Foreign aid pro-
grams, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, International Bank, and
Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development) :
Organization of Central American
States, agreement with U.S. for,
current actions: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, 697
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair),
204
Economic Commission for Africa: Gold-
schmidt, 304; W. W. Rostow, 68
Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East: Gaud, 579; Goldschmidt,
304
Economic Commission for Europe (E.
V. Rostow), 428
Economic Commission for Latin Amer-
ica (Goldschmidt), 304
Economic policy and relations, U.S.:
Domestic policy:
Farm programs geared to pressing
foreign needs (Johnson), 763
Farmers, benefits to, of Kennedy
Round concessions (Freeman),
133, 642
Great Society program, need for
(E. V. Rostow), 61 1
Income taxes, proposed 10-percent
surcharge: Johnson, 266; E. V.
Rostow, 878; Trowbridge, 504
State of the budget and the economy
(Johnson), 266
Foreign policy:
Agricultural trade policy objectives:
Freeman, 135, 642; Roth, 179;
Solomon, 183
Kennedy Round [see under Tai-iffs
and trade, general agreement on)
U.S. business, effect on: Reynolds,
137; Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 127
ECOSOC. See Economic and Social
Council, U.N.
ECSC. See European Coal and Steel
Community
Ecuador:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 337
U.S. Ambassador, recall requested,
621
Eden, Anthony, 276
Edisto, U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker, 362
Education, 303
Education {see also Cultural relations
and programs; Educational ex-
change programs, international;
Foreign students in the U.S.):
AID technical training programs
(Katzenbach), 532
Asia: Bundy, 197; Gaud, 579, 580
Benito Juarez-Abraham Lincoln schol-
arships, 681
"Brain drain": 585; Bundy, 197;
Oliver, 1 06 ; Schaetzel, 712; Trow-
bridge, 71, 74
Communications satellites, importance
to (Johnson), 296
Importance (Johnson), 303, 569
Iran (Johnson), 358
Labor adjustment assistance program,
training opportunities (Reynolds),
140
Latin America (Oliver), 105, 472, 757
Micronesia: Norwood, 371, 373;
Salii, 377
Nepal (Johnson), 707
OECD study (Trowbridge), 72
Philippines, Special Fund for Educa-
tion, agreements re uses of, 26,
117. 337
Science cooperation agreement with
Italy, 80
Southeast Asian Ministers of Educa-
tion Secretariat (Bundy), 198
Thailand, 64
TV and other new media: Johnson,
570, 614; Linowitz, 619; Norwood
370; Oliver, 757
U.S. Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs, members confirmed,
332
U.S. intellectuals, foreign policy role
(Gronouski), 432
Education — Continued
Women, U.N. Commission on the
status of, report of 20th session
(Tillett), 219
Educational, scientific, and cultural
materials:
Agreement (1949) for facilitating in-
ternational circulation of visual and
auditory materials: Malawi, 245
Importation of, UNESCO agreement
(1950), and protocol: Kenya, 697
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization, U.N. :
Long-term program for advancement
of women, report (Tillett), 219
Oceanographv development (Gold-
berg), 723
Educational exchange programs, inter-
national (Rusk), 91
Agreements with: Italy, 80; Romania,
875; Turkey, 270
International Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange Program, annual
report (Johnson), 303
International fairs program. Executive
order, 827
Volunteers to America, 235
EEC (Economic Commission for Eu-
rope), E. V. Rostow, 428
Egypt. See United Arab Republic
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee, draft treaty on nuclear
nonproliferation {see also Nuclear
proliferation): Foster, 291, 315;
Johnson, 315; text, 319
Einstein, Alfred (Rusk), 559
EI Salvador, treaties, agreements, etc.,
54, 697
Embassies, U.S.-Soviet proposed ex-
change of chancery sites, 540
Emerson, Ralph W. (quoted), 303, 327,
359
ENDC. See Eighteen-Nation Disarma-
ment Committee
Energy resources, U.S.-Canada trade
in, 45
ESRO (European Space Research
Organization), Frutkin, 401
Ethiopia:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 270, 478
U.S. Ambassador (Hall), confirma-
tion, 478
EURATOM, (European Atomic En-
ergy Community), Rusk, 856
Europe {see also Atlantic and European
headings, East-West relations. North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
individual countries):
Eastern :
Increasing independence: Leddy,
761; Rusk, 252
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for East-
ern Europe participation in
(Johnson), 300
U.S. economic relations. See East-
West relations
Unification: NAC, 14; E. V. Rostow,
428; Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 711,
715
U.N. European Office, U.S. repre-
sentative (Tubby), 625
Western :
Germany, policy of (Kiesinger), 326
Marshall Plan: Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 16
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
897
E urope — Continued
Western — Continued
Middle East war (E. V. Rostow),
425
Nonagricultural imports from U.S.,
restrictions reduced, 860
Technological gap with U.S.:
Brzczinski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V.
Rostow, 880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel,
712; Trowbridge, 70
Unification: 329; Cleveleuid, 144;
Harriman, 17; E. V. Rostow,
429; W. VV. Rostow, 66; Rusk, 857
U.S. commitments [see also NATO") :
Qeveland, 146; Leddy, 761
U.S. import quotas, probable ef-
fect: Fowler, 651; Rusk, 637
U.S. relations and interests: 503;
Brzezinski, 21; Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 16, 328; Leddy, 762;
E. V. Rostow, 422, 879; W. W.
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 855; Schaet-
zel, 710
U.S. role in Viet-Nam, position on:
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 857
European Atomic Energy Community
(Rusk), 856
European Coal and Steel Community:
Harriman, 18; Rusk, 856; Solomon,
538
Tariff reductions, 96
European Common Market. See Euro-
pean Economic Community
European Economic Community:
Johnson, 632; E. V. Rostow, 429;
Rusk, 856; Schaetzel, 710; Solomon,
537
Africa, preferential trade arrange-
ments (Solomon), 185
Farm-income support practices (Free-
man), 134
Kennedy Round negotiations: 96,
97, 98, 100; Johnson, 884; Kat-
zenbach, 688; Reynolds, 137;
Roth, 124, 125, 178; Trowbridge,
128, 130
Membership increases, questions of:
Harriman, 18; Katzenbach, 687;
Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 715; Solo-
mon, 187
Surpluses, export program for (Free-
man), 643
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 809,
810,845,846
U.S. balance of payments imbalance,
problem of: OECD, 832; E. V.
Rostow, 879
U.S. protectionist tariflFs, probable
effects on (Katzenbach), 687
European Free Trade Association
(Rusk), 856
Kennedy Round tariff reductions:
97, '99; Katzenbach, 688; Reyn-
olds, 137; Roth, 576; Trow-
bridge, 128
U.K. relations (Solomon), 538
European Payments Union (Harriman),
18
European Space Research Organiza-
tion (Frutkin), 401
Evans, Rowland, 353
Executive orders:
Interest equalization tax rates modi-
fied (11368), 396
International fairs program {11380),
827
Executive orders — Continued
International Secretariat for Volun-
teer Service, designation as a
public international organization
(11363), 207
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, im-
munities as international organi-
zation (11372), 507
Expo 70, 454
Export-Import Bank (Katzenbach), 531
Exports (see also Export-Import Bank;
Imports; Tariffs and trade, general
agreement on; and Trade):
Asian countries, increases in (Gaud),
581
Less developed countries:
Importance to: OECD, 882; Oliver,
756; Solomon, 181; Woods
(quoted), 678
Promotion services and technical
assistance, GATT-UNGTAD pro-
posed merger, 725
U.S.: Katzenbach, 687; Roth, 179
Agricultural: Freeman, 132, 642;
Rusk, 636
,\rgentine-U.S., 146
Automobiles, Kennedy Round elim-
ination of certain road-use taxes
(Roth), 127
Chemicals (Roth), 176
Nontariff trade restrictions, reduc-
tions in, 860
Technological progress, relation to
(Trowbridge) , 506
Trade restrictions of other countries
in retaliation for proposed LT.S.
import quotas, discussions of:
Diaz Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler,
650; Freeman, 642; Katzenbach,
686; Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 635;
Trowbridge, 645; Udall, 638
Extradition, Malawi, agreement re
continuance of force of existing
U.S.-U.K. agreement, 337
Family planning. See Population growth
Famine 1975 (Gaud), 582
FAO. S'e Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation.
Far East. See Asia and names of individual
countries
Faulkner, William (quoted), 631
Federal Communications Commission
(Johnson), 297
Federalist, The, 333
Fedorenko, Nikolai T., (quoted), 670
Feldman, George J., 625
Fermi, Enrico (Johnson), 502, 862
Finland, treaties, agreements, etc.,
153, 221, 625, 845, 846
Fish and fisheries:
Fish protein concentiate: Gold-
schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228
Great Lakes Fishery Commission,
U.S. commissioner (Pautzke), ap-
pointment, 172
International Whaling Commission,
U.S. commissioner (McHugh),
announcement, 586
Mexico-U.S. discussions on 12-mile
zone, 475
Micronesia (Norwood), 370
Soviet-U.S. fisheries agreements, re-
view, 873
Fish and fisheries — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Atlantic tunas, conservation of,
international convention (1966):
Gabon, 885; Japan, 514; South
Africa, 885
Great Lakes fisheries convention
(1954) with Canada, amendment,
proclamation, U.S., 190
High seas in the western areas of
the middle Atlantic Ocean, agree-
ment with Soviet L'nion on certain
fishery problems, 846
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, convention, 1949:
Canada, 549; Ecuador, 337
North Adantic, conduct of fishing
operations in, convention (1967)
with annexes: U.S., 885
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, con-
vention (1965), international, pro-
tocols on measures of control and
entry into force: Soviet Union, 661
Traditional fisliing in the exclusive
fishery zones contiguous to the
territorial seas, agreement with
Mexico, 662,681, 685
Viet-Nam off-shore fishery develop-
ment project, agreement with
FAO re fund-in-trust grant, 222
Fisher, Adrian S., 489, 543
Fisk, James B., 585
Flood control:
Rio Grande floods: 680; Diaz Ordaz,
674; Johnson, 673
U.S. -Mexico agreement concluded
(Johnson), 147
Food aid convention (1967): 716;
Johnson, 716
Ciu'rent actions: Argentina, 846;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 770;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 810, 846;
EEC, Finland, France, 846; Ger-
many, 770; Italy (as EEC member
State), 810; Japan, 728; Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, 770; Norway,
846; Sweden, 810; Switzerland,
U.K., 846; U.S., 728
Food and Agriculture, The State of, 1967,
(cited), 766
Food and Agriculture Organization
(Goldschmidt), 305
Fishery conservation studies (Gold-
berg), 723
Offshore fishery development project
for Viet-Nam, agreement re fund-
in-trust grant, 222
Food and population crisis: Fowler, 528;
Johnson, 762; OECD, 882; Rusk,
90, 254, 737; Sen (quoted), 766;
Waters, 764
Asia (Gaud), 582
Famine 7975, William and Paul
Paddock (Gaud), 582
India: Gaud, 583; Johnson, 763;
Kaplan, 235; Rusk, 211, 802
Latin America (Oliver), 472, 756
Marine resources, food potentijJ
(Humphrey), 228
U.N. agencies, role in (Goldschmidt),
304, 307
World Food Panel, report: 76;
Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533
World Food Problem, The, vol. Ill,
announcement and summary, 874
898
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Food for Freedom: Katzenbach, 531;
Rusk, 212; Waters, 767
Food resources {see also Agriculture):
Edible protein, U.S. support for in-
creased development, production,
and use (Goldschmidt), 307
Food synthesis, prospects, 77
Force, use of. See Aggression
Foreign Ajfairs, 285
Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see also
Agency for International Develop-
ment, Alliance for Progress, Eco-
nomic and technical aid, Food for
Freedom, and Peace Corps):
Houphouet-Boigny, 331
Balance of payments considerations:
Fowler, 528; Johnson, 510; E. V.
Rostow, 881; Rusk, 209
Cutbacks, impact of: Johnson, 753,
777; Oliver, 758; Rusk, 389, 801
Education, U.S. aid for (Jolmson),
570
Food aid programs, 1966, report
(Johnson), 762
Foreign Advisory Programs, General
Advisory Committee, appointment
of new members, 294
Foreign policy aspects of: Johnson,
753, 778; Katzenbach, 530, 795;
Rusk, 253, 735, 801; Waters, 767
GATT multilateral food aid program:
101 ; Freeman, 133
GNP, percentage of: Katzenbach,
531; Oliver, 870
Matching-funds principle (Johnson),
430
Multilateral aid, coordination with:
Johnson, 508, 763; Rusk, 209,
212, 803; Waters, 767
Principles: 77; Blair, 204; Johnson,
78, 763, 767; Katzenbach, 531;
Rusk, 90, 389, 821
Regional efforts, support for (Rusk),
209, 212, 803
Self-help principle: Harriman, 17;
Johnson, 510, 763; Oliver, 499;
Rusk, 209, 212, 254, 803; Waters,
767
Foreign aid programs of other countries:
Asian development, need for increased
multilateral aid (Kaplan), 233
European (U.K. and France) aid to
Africa (Rusk), 212, 803
Germany (Kiesinger), 327
Japan: 745; Gaud, 581
Thailand (Gaud), 583
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, cut-
backsin: Johnson, 753, 777; Oliver,
471, 758; Rusk, 389, 801
Foreign Assistance Programs, General
Advisory Committee, new members,
294
Foreign policy, U.S. {see also Com-
munism, Viet-Nam, and World
peace):
Alliance for Progress as an instrument
of (Linowitz), 617
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
Briefing conferences, regional: Boston
586; Kansas, 397; Reading, 586i
St. Louis, 476
Congressional documents relating to
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147,
215, 239, 364, 511, 718, 807, 885
Foreign policy, U.S. — Continued
Consultations on, as opposed to public
hearings (Rusk), 560
Evolution of (Brzczinski), 19
Foreign aid as an instrument of:
Johnson, 753, 778; Katzenbach,
530, 795; Rusk, 253, 735, 801;
Waters, 767
1967 constructive developments:
Johnson, 32, 776, 852; Rusk, 558,
736, 856
Principles, objectives, and problems:
Brzezinski, 22; Johnson, 303, 852;
Katzenbach, 794; E. V. Rostow,
606; Rusk, 348, 736
Responsibilities:
President, primary role: Johnson,
780; Katzenbach, 333, 336; E. V.
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 348, 741
President and Congress compared:
Johnson (quoted), 336; Katzen-
bach, 333
Security of U.S., central purpose:
Johnson, 851; Katzenbach, 334;
E. V. Rostow, 605; Rusk, 251
Tariff policies, U.S. national interest
considerations: Rusk, 634; Udall,
639
U.N. Charter, based on: Humphrey,
790; Rusk, 87
U.S. citizens, role in: Gronouski, 432;
Rusk, 824
Foreign Relations of the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I,
General: The United Nations, released,
729
Foreign Service {see also State Depart-
ment): Johnson, 780; Ambassadors,
confirmation, 246, 310, 337, 478,
625, 729
Foreign students in the U.S. {see also
Cultural relations, Education, and
Educational exchemge programs,
international):
Africa (Palmer), 657
Asian (Bundy), 197
Fosdick, Raymond (quoted), 740
Foster, John S. (McNamara), 448
Foster, William C, 291, 315
Fountain, L. H., 489, 829
Fowler, Henry H., 46, 132 (quoted),
455, 523, 650, 793
France:
Consular convention with U.S., rati-
fication, 478, 514, 875, 885
Germany, relations (Kiesinger), 326
Income tax convention, signature, 268
Kennedy Round road-use tax re-
ductions: 98; Roth, 127; Trow-
bridge, 131
NATO withdrawal, adjustments to:
Leddy, 760; Rusk, 856
Treaties, agreements, etc., 1 1 7, 222,
270, 378, 478, 514, 625, 729,
845, 846, 885
Viet-Nam colonial era, review
(Bundy), 275
Frederick, Pauline, 466
Freedom: Blair, 207 ; Johnson, 777
Four freedoms (Rusk), 855
Freedom of speech and press, U.S.:
Goldberg, 264, 691; Johnson, 59,
778; Rusk, 855
Arab-Israeli conflict (Goldberg), 8,
691
Freeman, Fulton, 475
Freeman, Orville L., 46, 132, 455, 642
Fried, Edward R., 146
Frutkin, Arnold W., 401
Fulbright, J. William: 559; Linowitz,
619
Fulbright-Hays Act, 235
Gabon:
Conservation of Atlantic tunas, inter-
national convention (1966), 885
President Mba, death of, U.S. con-
dolences (Johnson), 867
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 280
Gambia:
Treaties, agreements, etc, 477, 624,
810
U.S. Ambassador (Brown), confirma-
tion, 625
World Bank and International Mon-
etary Fund membership (Fowler),
523
Garcia, Hector P., 489
Gaston, Valente, Enrique, 146
GATT. See Tariffs and trade, general
agreement on
Gaud, William S., 455, 579
General Advisory Committee on Foreign
Assistance Programs, appointment
of new members, 294
General and the President, The, cited, 603
General Assembly, U.N.:
Documents, lists of, 113, 242, 404,
438, 694, 726
Emergency special session :
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 46
U.S. position (Goldberg), 12, 47,
216
Marine resources committee, pro-
posed (Goldberg), 723
Middle East crisis, resolutions on and
U.S. position {see also Emergency
special session, supra; and Arab-
Israeli conflict): Goldberg, 49,
51, 108, 112, 148, 216, 486; Rusk
387, 559
Resolutions:
Aid to refugees, 1 12
Jerusalem, status of, 113, 151
Korean unification, 845
Membership:
Communist China, Albanian draft
resolution, 833
Important-question, 833
Middle East situation, 218
22nd session:
Agenda, 239, 545
President Manescu, 483n
U.S. delegation, confirmation, 489
Geneva conference, Laos. See Laos
accords
Geneva conference, Viet-Nam. See
under Viet-Nam.
Geneva conventions (1949) re treatment
of prisoners of war, wounded and
sick, armed forces, and civilians
in time of war:
Arab-Israeli conflict, application to:
11, 112; Goldberg, 8
Current actions : Congo (Brazzaville),
81; Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514;
Zambia, 698
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
899
Genocide, convention (1951) on the
prevention and punishment of:
Uruguay, 309
Geodetic survey, agreement with Upper
Volta, 478 ■
Germany reunification: Cleveland, 144;
Kiesinger, 326, 328; Leddy, 760;
Rusk, 600; Schaetzel, 711
Importance to peace of Europe:
329; Johnson, 325; NAG, 14;
E. V. Rostow, 428
Germany, Federal Republic of:
East Germany, relations: 14; Cleve-
land, 144; Rusk, 600
NATO forces, proposed reductions:
Johnson, 327; Rusk, 166
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, prob-
lem of (Foster), 292, 294
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 153,
337, 625, 769, 770, 810
U.S. copyright time limit on filings,
extended for German citizens,
171
U.S. pork exports restrictions reduced,
861
U.S. visit of Chancellor Kiesinger, 325
Ghana:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 578
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 810
U.S. visit of General Ankrah, 571
Glassboro meeting of President Johnson
and Soviet Chairman Kosygin; 35,
36, 37, 38; Rusk, 159
Goethe, Johann (quoted), 328
Gold standard, U.S.: Fowler, 523;
Johnson, 793; E. V. Rostow, 877
Goldberg, Arthur J.:
Addresses, correspondence, and state-
ments:
ABM limited deployment, 487
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Jerusalem, status of, 149, 486
U.N. role and U.S. support, 3, 5,
10, 47, 49, 110, 216, 263, 690,
691, 834, 836, 841, 842
U.S. position, 9, 49, 108, 112, 148,
216, 486, 690, 691, 834
U.S. reply to allegations of U.S.
involvement, 11, 48, 150, 217
East-West relations, 483
Geneva agreements, 485
Korean DMZ violations, 692
Nuclear weapons draft treaty, im-
portance, 487
Ocean floor, cooperative explora-
tion and use, 723
Racial discrimination, 488
Self-determination, 488
Surveyor V lunar landing, trans-
mittal of report, 769
U.N. debate, value of, 262
U.N. General Assembly, convening
of emergency special session, U.S.
position, 12, 216
UNRVVA, U.S. pledge, 65
Viet-Nam:
Bombing pauses, 484, 669
Peaceful settlement, U.S. position
and U.N. role, 48, 483, 667, 671
World peace, 216, 264, 483
International Platform Association
awEu'd, 262
Outer space treaty, role in negotia-
tions (Johnson), 567
Goldberg, Arthur J. — Continued
U.N. General Assembly, U.S. repre-
sentative, confirmation:
Special emergency session, 46
22nd session, 489
Goldschmidt, Arthur E., 304
Goralski, Robert, 354
Grains. See International Grains Ar-
rangement, Rice, and Wheat
Grant, U.S. (quoted), 42
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway,
coordination of pilotage services,
agreement with Canada, 625
Great Lakes fisheries agreement (1954),
amendment: U.S., 190
Great Lakes Fishery Commission, U.S.
Commissioner (Pautzke), appoint-
ment, 172
Great Society: Johnson, 268; E. V.
Rostow, 61 1
Greece {see also Cyprus):
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 507
Estate-tax protocol, supplementary,
entry into force, 809
Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 698,
810, 845
Turkey, relations (NAC), 14
Greene, J. J., 46
Gronouski, John \., 432
Group of Ten: 454; Fowler, 526; Rusk,
456 _
Ministerial meeting, Washington;
392; text of communique, 396
U.S. delegation, 392, 392n
Guatemala:
Communism, threat to (Katzenbach),
533
Political stability (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 550,
697
Guevara, Ernesto "Che" (Rusk), 561
Guinea, agricultural sales agreement
with U.S., 729
Gulf of Aqaba (Goldberg), 5, 6, 7, 49
Gullion, Edmund, 276
Gut Dam, Lake Ontario claims tribunal,
507
Guy, William, 349
Guyana, Peace Corps program, agree-
ment re establishment, 54
H
Haines Road winter maintenance agree-
ment with Canada, 46
Haiti, International Wheat Agreement
(1962), 1967 protocol for further
extension of, 270
Hall, William O., 478
Hammarskjold, Dag (quoted), 146, 265
Harmel, Pierre, 422
Harriman, W. Averell, 16, 17
Harris. Patricia Roberts, 16, 489
Harsch, Joseph C, 411
Hawk missiles, 729
Health and medical research:
Communications satellites, impor-
tance to (Johnson), 296
Edible protein, production and use
of, importance (Goldschmidt),
307
Micronesia: Norwood, 372; Salii, 377
Romania, 1968 exchange program,
agreement, 875
U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Committee, 3rd meeting,
172
Health and medical research — Con.
World Health Organization constitu-
tion (1946), as amended: Lesotho,
270
Amendment to article 7: Barbados,
270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica,
117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 27
Herter, Christian A.: Johnson, 885;
Roth, 124
Hesburgh, Theodore M., 294
He.'5s, Frederic O., 504
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 349
Hightower, John, 458
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 478
Hilsman, Roger, 279, 559
Hilton, James (quoted), 817
Historical summaries:
U.S. foreign policy (Katzenbach), 815
Viet-Nam, U.S. policy development
(Bundy), 275
Hollybush [see also Glassboro meeting),
35, 38
Holmes, Justice (quoted), 200
Holt, Harold (quoted), 520
Honduras, treaties, agreements, etc.,
153, 697
Hong Kong:
Communist China, threat of (Rusk),
164
Family planning programs (Gaud),
583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 221, 625
Hornig, Donald F.: 585; McNamara,
448
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix, 331
Houssay, Bernardo, 717
Hubbard, Charlotte Moton, 586
Hughes, Richard: 349; Johnson, 36
Hull, Cordell (Rusk), 634
Human rights {see also Civil rights and
Great Society):
Human Rights Week and Human
Rights Year, proclamation, 660
OAS resolution, 496
Status of Women, U.N. Commission
on, report of 20th session (Tillett),
219
U.N. principles and U.S. support:
112; Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252
Human Rights International Confer-
ence (Tillett), 221
Humphrey, Hubert H.:
Addresses and remarks:
Oceanographic research and devel-
opment, international cooperation
for, 227
World order, 790
Visit to Europe, results (Cleveland),
141
Visit to Southeast Asia, 789
Humphrey, Ralph, 343n
Hungary:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 81
U.S. Ambassador (Hillenbrand), con-
firmation, 478
Hussey, William B., 698
Hydrographic Organization, Interna-
tional, Convention (1967) with
annexes: U.S., 477
IAEA. Set Atomic Energy Agency,
International
IBRD. See International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
900
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ICC. See International Control Com-
mission
Iceland.
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117,
222, 405, 846
U.S. visit of President Asgeirsson, 201
IDA. See International Development
Association
ILO (International Labor Organiza-
tion), 220
IMCO. See Maritime Consultative
Organization, International
IMF. See Monetary Fund, International
Imports {see also Customs; Exports; Tar-
iffs and trade, general agreement
on; and Trade):
Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, importation of,
UNESCO agreement (1950), and
protocol: Kenya, 697
Road vehicles, private, convention
(1954) on the temporary impor-
tation of: Ireland, 438
U.S.:
Argentine exports, U.S. restrictions,
14G
Cotton, foreign policy aspects of pro-
posed elimination of import quotas
(E. V. Rostow), 236
Dairy and meat imports, problem
of, and U.S. controls (Freeman),
135, 643
Escape clause tariffs on typewriter
ribbon cloth and stainless steel
flatware, termination (Johnson),
573
Import quota legislation, proposed,
probable adverse effects of: Diaz
Ordaz, 678, 681; Fowler, 650;
Freeman, 642; Katzenbach, 686;
E. V. Rostow, 877; Roth, 574,
648; Rusk, 635; Trowbridge, 645;
Udall, 638
Oil imports (Udall), 641
Textile and apparel industries, Tar-
iff Commission study requested:
Johnson, 529; Trowbridge, 647
Income:
Conventions for relief of double taxa-
tion. See Double taxation
Income and property tax convention
with France, 268, 270
Income tax administration, agreement
with Viet-Nam, 54
India:
Agricultural modernization: Gaud,
583; Rusk, 211,802
Communist China, question of guar-
antees against: Foster, 293; Rusk,
164
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.
announcement and text, 398
Food and population problems: Gaud,
583; Johnson, 763; Kaplan, 235;
Rusk, 211,802
Sikkim border (Rusk), 563, 597
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 378,
514, 625, 662, 769, 770, 845
U.S. additional wheat shipments
authorized (Johnson), 430
U.S. aid: Johnson, 763; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 211, 802
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz-
enbach), 795
U.S. oceanographic research vessel,
announcement of transfer to, 23
India Aid Consortium: Johnson, 431;
Rusk, 211, 802
India-Pakistan relations: Goldberg, 264;
Kaplan, 235; Katzenbach, 796;
Rusk, 212
Indonesia:
Communism, rejection of: Bundy,
287; Johnson, 520; E. V. Rostow,
608; Rusk, 560, 597, 822
Economic and political progress:
Gaud, 582; Humplu-ey, 791;
Johnson, 32; W. \V. Rostow, 68;
Rusk, 214,804
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 405,
590, 846
Visit of Vice President Humphrey,
789, 790
Joint communique, 792
World Bank role in economic stabiliza-
tion (Fowler), 523
Industrial property (Trowbridge), 75,
504
Convention (1883, as revised) for the
protection of, 1958: Bahamas,
662; Malta, 662; Togo, 337
U.S. copyright filings, time limit ex-
tended for German citizens, 171
Inflation: Katzenbach, 688; OECD,
882; E. V. Rostow, 879; Solomon,
539
Information activities and programs:
International fairs program. Executive
order, 827
U.N. specialized agencies, communi-
cation with developing countries
re aid in food and population
problems (Goldschmidt), 304
Institute for Technical Interchange at
East-West Center, Hawaii (Nor-
wood), 372
INTELSAT (International Telecom-
munications Satellite Consortium):
402; Johnson, 297
Inter-American Development Bank:
Linowitz, 321; Oliver, 105, 471;
Rusk, 211
Agreement (1959) establishing, with
annexes, acceptance: Trinidad
and Tobago, 190
U.S. support: Johnson, 499; Oliver,
755; Rusk, 210, 805
Interest equalization tax rates modified.
Executive order, 396
International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development: 476; Harriman,
18; Johnson, 509; Katzenbach,
335; Oliver, 105; Solomon, 184
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 624
Indonesia, role in : Fowler, 523 ; Gaud,
582
International Boundary and Water
Commission, U.S.-Mexico, 681, 684,
770
International Control Commission: E.
V. Rostow, 608; Rusk, 93, 386, 412,
558, 597
International cooperation: Ahidjo, 655;
Linowitz, 616; Rusk, 87, 90, 738
East Asian-U.S. (Bundy), 197
Japan-U.S., 746
Law of treaties, importance to
(Kearney), 721
Nuclear energy development for
peaceful purposes: 319; Foster,
317
International cooperation — Continued
Oceanographic and marine resource
development: Goldberg, 723;
Humphrey, 227
Outer space treaty provisions: John-
son, 567; Rusk, 566
Patent systems (Trowbridge), 506
Satellite and space research programs:
Frutkin, 401 ; Johnson, 297
Technological development, NAC res-
olution, text, 15
Water for Peace, 245
International Development Association,
increase in and U.S. support: 45;
Fowler, 527, 528; Katzenbach, 335,
531 ; Rusk, 210; Solomon, 536
International Education Act of 1966
(Johnson), 303
International Educational and Cultural
Affairs, U.S. Advisory Commission,
members confirmed, 332
International Finance Corporation
(Fowler), 527
International grains arrangement
(1967): 146, 716; John.son, 716, 884
Current actions: Argentina, 845, 846;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 769, 770;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 809, 810,
846; EEC, Finland, France, 845,
846; Germany, 769, 770; Greece,
India, Ireland, Israel, 845; Italy
(as EEC member), 809, 810;
Japan, 728; Korea, Lebanon, 845;
Luxembourg, 770; Mexico, 845;
Netherlands, 770; Norway, 845,
846; Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Spain, 845;
Sweden, 810; Switzerland, 845,
846 ; Tunisia, 728 ; U.K., 845, 846 ;
U.S., 728
International Indian Ocean Expedition,
23
International Joint Commission, U.S.-
Canada, 107
Pembina river basin report, 874
International law:
Ocean floor, development (Goldberg),
724
Rule of law: Bundy, 200; Dean, 565;
Goldberg, 2G4; Johnson, 295;
Rusk, 252, 735
Treaties, ILC draft convention, U.S.
position (Kearney), 719
U.S. advisory panel members, an-
nouncement, 661
World Law Day, 1967, proclamation,
171
International monetary system, 45
Convertibility of U.S. dollars into gold
(Fowler), 523
Special drawing rights facility:
Fowler, 393, 523; Johnson, 392;
Rusk, 456
U.K. devaluation of pound sterling,
effect: Fowler, 793; Johnson, 793;
OECD communique, 882; E. V.
Rostow, 877
International organizations (see also
name of organization ) :
Calendar of international conferences,
24, 435
International Secretariat for Volun-
teer Service, designation as, 207
Lake Ontario Claims Tribunal, desig-
nation as, 507
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
901
International organizations — Con.
U.S. support: Katzenbach, 335; Rusk,
90, 209, 805
International Red Cross, 170
International Rice Institute: Gaud, 582;
Lilienthal, 866
International Secretariat for Volunteer
Service, Executive order, 207
International Telecommunications Sat-
ellite Consortium: 402; Johnson,
297
International waterways, free mari-
time passage, U.S. position: 51,
362; Goldberg, 5, 6, 7, 49, 108, 110,
148, 486, 834, 839; Johnson, 33;
E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk, 83, 164,
210
International Year on Human Rights
(TiUctt), 221
Investment disputes, international cen-
ter for the settlement of (Fowler),
527
U.S. panel members named, 475
Investment disputes between states and
nationals of other states, conven-
tion (1963) on: Ceylon, 404, 661;
Finland, 221; France, Japan, Nor-
way, Togo, 378; Switzerland, 549
Investment guaranties, agreements re:
Gambia, 810; Indonesia, 405; Mal-
awi, 309; Rwanda, 54; Swaziland,
590
Investment of private capital abroad
(Roth), 179
Asia (Gaud), 581
Europe: E. V. Rostow, 880; Schaetzel,
712
Indonesia (Gaud), 582
Iran (Rusk), 826
Japan, 453
Korea (Brown), 232 (quoted)
Latin America: Oliver, 470; Solomon,
537
Less developed countries, importance
to: Fowler, 525; Johnson, 763;
OECD, 882
Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677
Micronesia: Norwood, 369; Salii, 376
Trinidad and Tobago, agreement with
U.S., 698, 729
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865
Iran:
Desalination, U.S. study team: 361;
Johnson, 360; Shah Pahlavi, 360
Economic development: Johnson, 358,
359, 827; Rusk, 825
U.S. visit of the Shah of Iran, 358
Iraq, U.S. travel restrictions amended,
459
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc., 221,
270, 438, 550, 845, 846
Isolationism: Katzenbach, 815; Oliver,
471 ; E. V. Rostow, 605, 608; Rusk,
704, 807
Israel :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.,
announcement, 243
Existence of State of (Rusk), 160
Jerusalem, extension of Israeli juris-
diction {see also Jerusalem, status
of), 60n
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 154,
270, 309, 625, 661, 652, 810, 845,
845
Israel — Continued
U.S. economic and military aid:
Goldberg, 9; McQoskey, 652;
Rusk, 210
U.S. tiavel restrictions amended, 41
Italy:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13
Kennedy Round road-use tax reduc-
tions: 98; Roth, 127; Trowbridge,
131
Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports
reduced, 861
San Marco satellite program (Frut-
kin), 401
Science cooperation agreement, an-
nouncement, 80
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
625, 809, 810
U.S. relations (Rusk), 855
U.S. visit of President Saragat, 500
Ivory Coast, U.S. visit of President
Houphouet-Boigny, 330
Jacoby, Neil H., 214
Jamaica:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 590, 625
U.S. Ambassador (Tobriner), confir-
mation, 729
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement and text, 622
James, Hatcher M., Jr., 288n
Japan:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 69
Asian regional development, role in:
452, 454, 745; Gaud, 580; John-
son, 32, 510, 742; Kaplan, 233;
Rusk, 452; Sato, 744
Asian students in: Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Bonin, Okinawa, and Ryukyu Islands,
question of return to Japan: 745;
Rusk, 457
Economic progress: Gaud, 581 ; Kap-
lan, 232; katzenbach, 688; Rusk,
822
Former Prime Minister Yoshida,
death of (Johnson), 660
Kennedy Round tariff reductions : 97,
93, 100; Johnson, 884; Katzen-
bach, 688; Roth, 178; Trow-
bridge, 128, 129
Population growth control (Gaud),
583
Trade (Bundy), 197
U.S. replacement of interim staging
arrangements by Kennedy Round
staging, proclamation, 800
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 153,
309, 337, 378, 514, 549, 589, 625,
662, 728, 729, 809
U.S. interest equalization tax rate
modification, 396
U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical Sci-
ence Committee, 3rd meeting, 172
U.S. -Japan Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 6th meeting: communique,
452; Johnson, 453; Miki, 455;
Rusk, 451,455
U.S. mutual defense treaty: 745; map,
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. poultry exports, restrictions on
reduced, 861
Japan- — Continued
U.S. -Soviet-Japan discussions on Pa-
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield
proposal (Rusk), 455
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Sato, 742
World role (Brzezinski), 23
Jaworski, Leon, 475
Jay, John (quoted), 333
Jeff'erson, Thomas: quoted, 336, 692;
Johnson, 571
Jenks, Sir Wilfred (Rusk), 91
Jerusalem, status of: 60n; Goldberg,
103, 110, 112, 149, 486; Johnson,
33, 60; E. V. Rostow, 237; Rusk,
88, 149
U.N. resolution, text, 113
Johnson, Lyndon B.:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Alliance for Progress, 31, 499
Science and technology multilat-
eral program, 717
Sixth anniversary, remarks, 287
American ideals, 303, 631, 653
Arab-Israeli conflict, 33, 35, 37, 40
Jerusalem, status of, 33, 60
Asia:
Regional cooperation, 453, 508,
612, 632, 743, 852
U.S. role and relations, 453, 614,
851
Atomic energy, 25th anniversary, 862
Big-power responsibilities, 35, 38,
59, 325, 853
Chamizal settlement, 683
China, report of U.S. scientific
team, 585
Collective security, importance of
U.S. commitments, 16, 779, 851
Communism, 519, 522, 851
OAS role, 498
East- West relations, 16, 32
Economic and social development,
principles for and importance of,
16, 32, 42, 59, 325, 330, 499, 570,
631, 655, 707, 753, 763, 778, 851
Education, importance, 303, 569
Food and population crisis, 78, 762
Foreign assistance act of 1967, cut-
backs, effects of, 753, 777
Foreign policy:
1967 accomplishments, 32, 776,
852
Principles and objectives, 303,
325, 753, 778, 851
Responsibilities for, 336 (quoted),
780
Freedom of speech and press, 59, 778
Hollybush, meeting with Soviet
Chairman Kosygin, 35, 36, 37,
38, 59
India, additional wheat shipments
authorized, 430
Inter-American Development Bank,
U.S. pledge, 499
International Grains Agreement,
signature, 716
International Monetary Fund, new
reserve facility, 392
Italy-U.S. relations, 500, 501
Japan:
Former Prime Minister Yoshida,
death of, 660
U.S. relations, 453, 742, 743
Joint Dominican Republic-Puerto
Rican economic commission, an-
nouncement, 620
902
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Kennedy Round, 32, 717, 852, 884
Laos, 653, 752
Lee Kuan Yew, tribute to, 614
Lord Attlee, regret at death of, 568
Marine resources cooperative de-
velopment, 723 (quoted)
Meetings with heads of state, im-
portance and results of, 31, 35,
36, 38, 39, 59, 329
Mexico:
Mexico-U.S. flood control project
agreement concluded, 147
U.S. relations, 673, 675
Middle East emergency relief pro-
grams, U.S. support, 64
NATO, 327
Nuclear weapons proliferation draft
treaty, 315, 863
Outer space treaty, provisions and
importance, 567
Regional cooperation, 34, 632, 655
Self-determination, 59, 295, 519
Soviet Chairman Kosygin, meetings
with, 35, 36, 37, 39
Tciriff Commission study on eco-
nomic condition of U.S. textile
and apparel industries, request for,
529
Trade, 573, 633, 716, 717, 877
(quoted), 883
U.K. devaluation of pound sterling,
793
Viet-Nam (Jor details, see Viet-Nam):
Civilian service awards, 288
Enterprise proposal, 747, 775
Political progress, 289, 290, 421,
521, 776, 779
Situation reports, 32, 775
U.N. role, 780
U.S. commitment, 59, 519, 614,
776, 777, 779, 851
U.S. position, 37, 59, 209, 498,
509, 519, 775
U.S. public opinion, 519, 776,
777, 778
U.S. willingness to negotiate for
peace, 32, 39, 521, 632, 775
War on hunger, 762
World order, 631, 633, 655
World peace, 16, 31, 35, 38, 328,
522, 571, 631, 747, 851
Correspondence and messages:
Gabon, death of President Mba,
U.S. condolences, 867
Iran, U.S. economic aid terminated,
827
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary, 16
Soviet Union, 50th anniversary, 705
Viet-Nam Chief of State, congratu-
lations, 421
World Food Problem, foreword, 78
Leadership (Oliver), 474
Meetings with Heads of State and
officials of, remarks and joint
communiques: Cameroon, 654;
Denmark, 40; Germany, 325;
Ghana, 571; Iceland, 201; Iran,
358; Italy, 40, 500; Ivory Coast,
330; Japan, 742; Laos, 653, 752;
Lesotho, 568; Malawi, 42; Malay-
sia, 578; Mexico, 673; Nepal, 706;
Niger, 541; Rwanda, 290; Singa-
pore, 612; Soviet Union, 35;
ThaUand, 61; U.K., 40
Johnson, Lyndon B. — Continued
Messages, letters, and reports to
Congress :
Asian Development Bank, U.S.
financial support, 508
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission, 3rd annual
report, transmittal, 302
Communications policy, 296
Food aid programs, 1966, report,
transmittal, 762
Internationa) Educational and Cul-
tural Exchange Program, Annual
Report, transmittal, 303
Kennedy Round trade agreement,
transmittal, 883
OAS Charter amendments, ratifi-
cation recommended, 78
State of the budget and the econ-
omy, 266
Trade agreements progi-am, 11th
annual report, transmittal, 717
Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, commission for study of
status, recommendation, 363
News conference, transcript, 775
Outer space tieaty, negotiations for:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 565
Policies of: Oliver, 474; W. W. Ros-
tow, 67; Rusk, 736
Support, desirability of (Gronouski),
434
Viet-Nam: Bundy, 275; Lodge, 464
Responsibilities: Johnson, 40; Rusk,
343
Johnson, U. Alexis, 455
Joint Canada-US. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
Affairs, 1 1th meeting, communique,
44
Joint U.S. -Japan Committee on Trade
and Economic Aff'airs, 746
Jonathan, Leabua, 568
Jordan:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 362
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
U.S. aid: McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 163,
210, 400
U.S. Ambassador (Symmes), creden-
tials, 625
U.S. travel restrictions, 41n, 459
Juarez, Benito (quoted), 321, 498, 680,
683
Judicial and extrajudicial documents in
civil or commercial matters, ser\'ice
abroad, convention (1965); U.S.,
378
K
Kalb, Bernard, 416
Kaplan, Harold, 230
Karlovy Vary Conference (Cleveland),
143
Kashmir. See India-Pakistan relations
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 333, 462,
530, 602, 686, 794, 815; Johnson, 32
Kavibanda, Gregoire, 290
Kearney, Richard D., 719
Kellogg, Arthur Remington, 586
Kennan, George (quoted), 265
Kennedy, John F.: quoted, 254, 279;
Bundy, 280
Kennedy, Robert F., 350
Kenya:
AID programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662,
698
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 326, 327, 328
Killian, James R., Jr. : 717; McNamara,
448; Oliver, 757
Kim, Eva Soonhe, 288n
King Mahendra, 707, 708
Kistiakowsky, George B. (McNamara),
448
Kleiman, Robert, 465
Knappstein, Heinrich (Johnson), 328
Komer, Robert: Bunker, 750; Mc-
Namara, 169
Korea:
Military demarcation line (Kaplan),
232
Unification, U.N. resolution and U.S.
support (Broomfield), 844
Korea, North:
DMZ violations (Goldberg), 692
U.N. Command report, text, 692
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Korea, Republic of:
Economic progress and role of U.S.
aid: Gaud, 581, 582; Kaplan, 232;
Katzenbach, 531; Rusk, 214, 804,
822
Population growth control (Gaud),
583
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222,
405, 589, 625, 845
U.S. mutual defense commitments:
Brown, 232 (quoted); map, 460;
Rusk, 563
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
Bunker, 782; McNamara, 169;
Park (quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92,
391, 555; Taylor, 259; Westmore-
land, 788
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Korean conflict: Bundy, 277; Kaplan,
232; E. V. Rostow, 607
Korean Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (Bundy), 197
Korry, Edward M., 337
Kosygin, Aleksei N.: 36, 37, 38;
Goldberg, 47, 109, 110; Rusk, 159,
562
Krag, Otto, 41
Kristol, Irving, 285
Kuchel, Thomas H., 147
Kuwait:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 477, 514,
770
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Ky, Nguyen Cao: 260 (quoted), 789;
Bundy, 260, 354; Bunker, 421;
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556
Labor :
Adjustment assistance, Trade Ex-
pansion Act: Johnson, 885; Kat-
zenbach, 689; Reynolds, 139;
Roth, 174, 179, 576; Solomon,
183, 537
African-U.S. relations, role of or-
ganized labor (Palmer), 658
Asian Labor Ministers, Conference
(Bundy), 198
Kennedy Round, importance to
(Reynolds), 137
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
903
Labor — Continued
Labor standards below U.S. levels,
legislation (Dent bill) proposed to
restrict imports of products pro-
duced under (Roth), 574
Micronesia, employee benefits (Nor-
wood), 375
Labor Organization, International, sta-
tus of women report (Tillctt), 220
Lacouture, Jean, 279
Laise, Carol (Johnson), 707
Lake Champlain, 107
Lake Ontario claims tribunal, 507
Lamb, Charles, 35
Landlocked states, transit trade, con-
vention (1965): Mali, 697; Yugo-
slavia, 26
Laos:
Communism, threat of: 654; Johnson,
520, 653; Rusk, 164, 214, 347,
560, 563, 597, 822
Geneva accords: Bundy, 280; Rusk,
386, 387
Communist violations (Rusk), 92,
386, 601,740
Nam Ngum Dam (Bundy), 198
Treaties, agreements, etc., 729, 855
U.S. aid, importance (Rusk), 214, 804
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968
appropriations request (Rusk), 208
U.S. visit of Crown Prince Vong
Savang, 752
U.S. visit of Prince Souvanna Phouma
653
Viet-Nam, military and other aid
(Rusk), 561, 563
Larsen, Stanley, 346, 557
LASO. See Latin American Solidarity
Organization
Latin America {see also Alliance for
Progress, Organization of American
States, and indivudial countries):
Communism, danger of: Katzenbach,
797; Linowitz, 322, 617; Oliver,
473, 757, 871; Rusk, 252, 490,
493, 805
OAS resolution and text of final
act, 491
Defense expenditures: Katzenbach,
797; Linowitz, 619; Oliver, 473,
757,871
Economic and social development.
See Alliance for Progress
Inter-American Export Promotion
Center (Oliver), 756
Political stability (Oliver), 870
Science and technology multilateral
program: 717; Oliver, 757
Trade:
Economic integration: 681; John-
son, 31, 632; Linowitz, 518;
Oliver, 104, 471, 755; W. W.
Rostow, 67; Rusk, 211, 559;
Solomon, 184, 534
U.S. generalized trade preferences:
Oliver, 756, 870; Solomon, 196
U.S. protectionist trade legislation,
probable effects of: 681 ; Diaz
Ordaz, 677; Oliver, 758
Latin American Common Market.
See Latin America: Economic inte-
gration
Latin American Free Trade Associa-
tion: Linowitz, 618; Oliver, 105,
471, 755, 870; Solomon, 534
Latin American Solidarity Organiza-
tion: 497: Linowitz, 322, 617;
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 491
Laurel Langley Trade Agreement, 78,
332
Law, international. Set International
law
Law of the sea. See Safety of life at sea
Le Defi Amirkain, 712
Lebanon:
Treaiies, agreements, etc., 153, 845
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 171
Leddy,John M., 759
Lee Kuan Yew: quoted, 68, 287, 614;
Johnson, 614
Lesotho:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 477,
478, 770
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Jonathan,
568
Less developed countries:
Agriculture, importance of moderni-
zation. See Agriculture
Communications satel.itcs, impor-
tance to (Johnson), 298
Communism, threat of (Brzezinski),
20
Economic and social development:
Germany, aid (Kiesinger), 327
Importance of: 45; Fowler, 527;
Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson, 59;
E. V. Rostow, 424; Rusk, 208
Industrialized nations, role of: 329,
454; Fowler, 527; Johnson, 32,
763; E. V. Rostow, 429, 876;
Rusk, 254, 389, 801; Solomon,
183, 185; Waters, 767
U.S. support: Harriman, 18; John-
son, 16, 763; Katzenbach, 530;
E. V. Rostow, 610; Rusk, 90, 209,
254, 389, 801
Food and population crisis. See Food
and population crisis
International patent system, impor-
tance to (Trowbridge), 506
Ocean resource development, U.S.
cooperation (Humphrey), 228
Science and technology, importance
to (NAC), 15
Space research, value to (Frutkin),
403
Trade:
Kennedy Round, importance to:
45, 95, 101, 503; Freeman, 134,
135; Johnson, 135 (quoted), 633,
884; Roth, 126, 577; Solomon, 189
Preferential trade arrangements:
OECD, 882; Oliver, 472, 756;
Rusk, 856; Solomon, 185
Trade problems: 45, 454, 497, 725;
OECD, 882; Roth, 178; Solomon,
180; Woods (quoted), 678
Lewis, Geoffrey W., 478
Lewis, Verne B., 476
V Express, 713
Liberia:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 221, 337,
698
Libya:
Treaties, agreements, etc. 153, 337,
405
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Lilienthal, David, 360, 864
Lincoln, Abraham (quoted), 9, 679, 743
Lindsey, Edward M. (Rusk), 87
Linowitz, Sol M., 321, 586, 616
Lisagor, Peter, 465
Load lines, convention (1966), inter-
national: Denmark, 221; Israel,
270; Liberia, 221; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands .Antilles), 270; Sweden, 661;
U.K., 270; U.S., 404
Loc, Nguyen Van (Bunker), 784
Lodge, Henry Cabot: 349, 464; John-
son, 290
London Times, cited, 393
Lopez, Fernando, 582
Lord Attlee, death of (Johnson), 568
Lost Revolution, The, 275
Luce, Charles F., 46
Luxembourg:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 625, 770
U.S. Ambassador (Feldman), cre-
dentials, 625
M
Macao, 729
Macauley, Thomas B., 580 (quoted)
Macedo Soares, Edmundo, 799
Malagasy Republic:
Foreign Minister Sylla, death of
(Rusk), 159
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337,
662
Malawi:
Ambassador to U.S. credentials, 507 '
Treaties, agreements, etc., 245, 309,
337
U.S. visit of President Banda, 42
Malaya. See Malaysia
Malaysia (see also Association of South-
east Asia) :
Economic and political progress:
Gaud, 581; Kaplan, 232
Narcotic drugs, single convention
(1961), accession, 270
Science and mathematics regional
education center, proposed (Gaud),
580
U.K. proposed withdrawal from area
(Taylor), 259
U.S. visit of Minister of Finance Tun,
578
Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role, 520
Visit of Vice President Humphrey,
789
Maldive Islands, treaties, agreements,
etc., 54, 404
Mali, transit trade of land-locked
states, convention (1965), accession,
697
Malta:
Cotton textile agreement, announce-
ment, 23
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 270, 662
U.S. Ambassador (Smythe), con-
firmation, 625
Manescu, Corneliu, 483n
Mann, Fredric R., 478
Mansfield, Mike: 357; Goldberg, 667;
Rusk, 456, 739
Mantilla Ortega, Carlos, 431
Margolies, Daniel F., 585
Marine resources {see also Fish and
fisheries), 23
Cooperative exploration and use of
ocean floor, U.N. role in develop-
ment of principles for: Goldberg,
723; Johnson (quoted), 723
904
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
.Marine resources — Continued
Fish protein concentrate: Gold-
schmidt, 307; Humphrey, 228
International cooperation for: 747;
Humphrey, 227
Marine Sciences Council (Humphrey),
229
Maritime Consultative Organization,
Intergovernmental (Goldberg), 723
Convention (1948): Hong Kong, 221;
Maldive Islands, 54
Convention (1965), amendment to
Article 28: Algeria, Mexico, 885
Maritime matters {see also Safety of life
at sea and Ships and shipping):
Exploration of the Sea, International
Council for. Convention (1964);
Belgium, 378
Maritime traffic, international, con-
vention (1965) on facilitation of,
with annexes: Canada, Germany,
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles), 624; Romania,
Singapore, Sweden, 337
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights
in, international convention, 1962;
Liberia, 337
Marriage and family, status of women,
U.N. Commission, report of 20th
session (TiUett), 219
Marshall, George (quoted), 251, 534
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary: Har-
riman, 17; Johnson, 16
Martin, Edwin M., 808
Martin, William McChesney, Jr., 392«
Martola, Ilmarai (Goldberg), 52
Matsui, Akira, 670
Mauritius, U.S. consulate reopened, 698
Mba, President of Gabon, U.S. con-
dolences on death of (Johnson), 857
Mbekeani, Nyemba VVjiles, 507
McCall, Thomas, 349
McCarthy, Eugene (Palmer), 659
McCloskey, Robert, 16, 652
McConnell, John P., 355
McHugh, J. Laurence, 586
McKernan, Donald L., 172, 475, 685,
873
McKinney, Robert M., 476, 828
McLuhan, Marshall (W. W. Rostow),
69
McNamara, Robert S.: 167, 443, 544
(quoted); Lodge, 465; Rusk, 208,
416
Viet-Nam DMZ barrier (Rusk), 385,
414
Mekong Valley development: Bundy,
198; Gaud, 580; Johnson, 509, 510,
752; Kaplan, 233; Lilienthal, 867;
W. W. Rostow, 68; Rusk, 214
MentschikoflT, Sola, 475
Meteorological research: Frutkin, 402;
Goldberg, 723; Humphrey, 227;
Rusk, 739
North Atlantic ocean weather stations
agreement (1955), with annexes:
India. 770
Polar cap ionosphere, NASA-CNRC
cooperative study, agreement with
Canada, 337
World Meteorological Organization
convention (1947): Barbados, 438;
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438
Mexico:
Air transport agreement, announce-
ment, 589
Chamizal settlement: 681, 684 (text),
770; Johnson, 673, 683; Rusk, 684
Economic development: Diaz Ordaz,
677; Rusk, 211
Fishery zones and fishery rights, dis-
cussions and agreement, 475, 681,
685
Flood control agreement concluded
(Johnson), 147
Pious Fund claim, settlement of, 261
Presidents' action program, text, 681
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 625,
662, 698, 728, 770, 845, 855
U.S. relations: 680; Diaz Ordaz,
677; Johnson, 673, 675; Linowitz,
321
U.S. visit of President Diaz Ordaz, 673
Michalowski, Jerzy, 431
Micronesia. See Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands
Middlcton, Drew, 68, 231, 287
Mikhail Frunze, Soviet vessel, 170
Miki, Takeo; 455; Gaud, 580
Military aircraft. See under Aviation
Military assistance [see also ."Armaments),
Soviet arms budget increases (Rusk),
558
Militai-y assistance, U.S.:
Appropriations request FY 1968
(Rusk), 208, 214
Europe, effect on balance of payments
(E. V. Rostow), 881
India, Pakistan, U.S. aid policy
(Katzenbach), 795
Jordan, review of: McCloskey, 652;
Rusk, 163, 210
Philippines, U.S. aid increased (Blair),
204
Principles for, and policy objectives:
Katzenbach, 530; McCloskey,
652; Oliver, 757; Rusk, 208, 215,
387, 806
Military bases:
Outer space treaty prohibition of:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566
Philippines, exploitation of natural
resources of U.S. bases, agree-
ment, 405
Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, 745
U.S. use of Thai bases (Rusk), 92
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Mills, Wilbur D., 529, 647
Miner, Robert G., 729
Missiles (see also Armaments and Nu-
clear weapons):
Antiballistic missiles:
Agreement, proposed : Cleveland,
143; Goldberg, 487; Johnson,
32; Rusk, 385
Soviet and U.S. deployment: Fisher,
543 ; McNamara, 44 7 ; Rusk 1 66
U.S., Chinese-oriented: Fisher, 543;
Goldberg, 488 ; McNamara, 449
Hawk and Nike Hercules missiles
system, agreement with Japan re-
production of in Japan, 729
Modesti, Girolamo, 596
Monetary Fund, International: Katzen-
bach, 335; Rusk, 214; Solomon,
184, 539
Articles of agreement: Gambia, 477
Ministerial meeting, Washington,
communique, 369
Monetary Fund, International — Con,
Ministerial meeting — Continued
U.S. delegation, 392, 392n
Special drawing rights facility, im-
portance and U.S. position: 329,
392, 393, 454, 503; Fowler, 394.
523; Johnson, 392; E. V. Rostow,
877; Rusk, 558, 856
22nd annual meeting, Rio de Janeiro:
Fowler, 523 ; text of resolution, 529
Mora, Jose A., 494
Moreno, Mario (Diaz Ordaz), 675
Morgenthau, Hans (quoted), 279
Morocco:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 550, 770
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Morrison, Alice A., 218n
Morse, Wayne, 667
Moseman, Albert H., 585
Murphy, George, 349
Muskie, Edmund S., 349
Mutual defense:
Bilateral agreements with: Japan, 54;
Norway, 846
Map, 460
U.S. commitments: Johnson, 853;
Rusk, 89, 704, 823
N
NAC. See North Atlantic Council
Nam Ngum Dam: Bundy, 198; Gaud,
58! ; Johnson, 509
Narcotics. See Drugs
NASA. See National Aeronautics and
Space ."Administration
Nasser, Gamal (Goldberg), 5, 6
National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration:
Cooperative satellite programs
(Frutkin), 401
Polar cap ionosphere study, agree-
ment with Canada re cooperation
with Canadian National Research
Council, 337
National Science Foundation, 23, 80
Nationalism (Brzezinski), 20, 22
Asia (Hilsman), 280
Indonesia (Bundy), 287
Philippines, dangers of economic na-
tionalism (Blair), 206
Nationality, acquisition of, Vienna con-
vention, optional protocol re: Nor-
way, 769
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Near and Middle East {see also Arab-
Israeli conflict):
Arms shipments. See Armaments
Economic development: Goldberg,
148, 487; Johnson, 359, 632; W.
W. Rostow, 69; Rusk, 210
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy implications (E. V. Ros-
tow), 236
Emergency relief programs, U.S.
pledge: Johnson, 64; Rusk, 210
Military assistance, U.S. position {see
also Armaments): Goldberg, 9;
McCloskey, 652; Rusk, 160, 210,
387, 803
Oil exports (Udall), 641
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41,
171, 229, 459, 799
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
905
Nepal:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 309, 810
U.S. visit of King Mahendra, 706
Netherlands:
Restrictions on U.S. poultry exports
reduced, 861
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 270,
478, 550, 624, 625, 770
Neutrality and nonalinement:
Cambodia: Goldberg, 668; Rusk, 89,
412, 558, 597
King Mahendra, 709
Laos (Souvanna Phouma), 654
Malawi (Banda), 43
New York Times, 68, 231, 287, 603
New Zealand:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 13
Observers for Viet-Nam elections
(Lodge), 350
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 1 1 7,
309
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
520; McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91,
92, 391
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Newly independent nations (see also
name of country):
Africa: Johnson, 32; W. W. Rostow,
68; Rusk, 212, 803
Anticolonialism (Kaplan), 231
Asia (Bundy), 278
Economic problems and U.S. aid:
Katzenbach, 530; Rusk, 212, 801
International law, importance to
(Bundy), 200
U.N., importance to (Goldberg), 265
Man Dan, 672
Nicaragua:
Sea-level canal feasibility study, com-
mission, 3rd aimual report: 302;
Johnson, 302
Treaties, agreements, etc., 662, 697
U.S. Ambassador (Crockett), con-
firmation, 246
Nieuwenhuis, Willebrond, 595
Niger:
International telecommunications con-
vention (1965), with annexes,
ratification, 309
U.S. visit of President Diori, 541
Nigeria:
AID program under review (Rusk),
212
EEC trade agreement (Solomon), 185
Soviet arms supply, U.S. position,
320
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 221,
728, 730
Nike Hercules missiles, 729
Nonintervention, U.S. position: Brze-
zinski, 22; Buff'um, 152; Rusk, 821
Norstad, Lauris, 465
North Atlantic Council, ministerial
meetings, Washington (1957): text
of communique, 14; U.S. dele-
gation, 16
Resolution on international techno-
logical cooperation, text, 15
North Atlantic Treaty: Leddy, 422;
map, 460
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Johnson), 32
Armed forces, strength and deploy-
ment: Johnson, 327; Kiesinger,
327; Rusk, 166
North Atlantic Treaty Organization —
Continued
Deterrent role: 329, 503; Cleveland,
141; Johnson, 325; Kiesinger,
326; Leddy, 759; E. V. Rostow,
427; Waters, 767
Global interests (Cleveland), 145
Italy, support of (.Saragat), 502
Nonproliferation treaty, position on
(Cleveland), 144
Technological cooperation, NAC res-
olution, 15
U.S. commitments and support:
Cleveland, 145; Kaplan, 234;
Katzenbach, 335, 532; E. V.
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 91, 598, 599,
856, 857; Schaetzel, 715
U.S. 1968 appropriations request
(Rusk), 208
Viet-Nam, position on (Rusk), 599, 601
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc., 26,
81, 378, 625, 769,845, 846
Norwood, William R., 366
NS Savannah, operation by a private
company, bilateral agreements re
U.S. liability: China, 245; Yugo-
slavia, 270
NSF (National Science Foundation), 23,
80
Nuclear blackmail: 744; Fisher, 544;
Foster, 293; Goldberg, 487; Mc-
Namara, 449
Nuclear nonproliferation :
Nonnuclear states, Foster, 316; Rusk,
388
Treaty, draft: 319; Foster, 315, 317;
Goldberg, 487, 488 ; Johnson, 315;
Rusk, 559; text, 319
Safeguards, U.S. position on : Foster,
292, 293, 317; Johnson, 863
Treaty, need for: 503, 744; Cleveland,
144; Fisher, 291, 545; Goldberg,
488; Johnson, 36, 291, 315;
Kosygin, 38; McNamara, 449;
NAC, 14; Rusk, 388
Nuclear test ban:
Comprehensive treaty, need for
(Foster), 293
Outer space treaty, provision of, 567
Treaty (1963), ratification: Costa
Rica, 153
Nuclear war, dangers of and U.S. efforts
to prevent: 319; Brzezinski, 19;
Fisher, 544; Johnson, 520, 863;
Rusk, 87, 251, 253, 704, 737, 824.
857, 859
Nuclear weapons:
Communist China, threat of and ques-
tion of guarantees against: Mc-
Namara, 449; Rusk, 164
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
Outer space, prohibition of: Johnson,
567; Rusk, 566
Tests. See Nuclear test ban
25th anniversary (Johnson), 863
U.S. capabilities and policv: Brzezin-
ski, 2 1 ; McNamara, 443
World peace, stabilizing effect (Brze-
zinski), 20
Nugent, Patrick L., (Johnson), 40, 41
o
O'Brien, John R., 337
Oceanography. See Marine resources
O'Conor, Herbert R., Jr., 489
ODECA (Organization of Central
American States), 697
OECD. See Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr., 245
O'Hara, Barratt (Palmer), 659
Ohin, Alexandre, 202
OU:
Arab-Egyptian economic sanctions
(E. V. Rostow), 237
Iran, production (Rusk), 825
Micronesia, production and develop-
ment (Norwood), 370
Prevention of pollution of the sea by,
international convention (1954),
with annexes: Japan, 549; Leb-
anon, 153
U.S. oil import control program
(Udall), 639
Okinawa, question of return to Japan
(Rusk), 458
Okun, Arthur M. (Fowler), 393
Old, Bruce S., 585
OUvcr, Covey T., 102, 470, 698, 754,
868
O'Neill, Joseph P., 288n
Organization for African Unity: W. W.
Rostow, 68; Rusk, 88
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development: 861; Harriman,
17; NAC, 15; Oliver, 756; E. V.
Rostow, 428; Roth, 178; Rusk, 856;
Solomon, 181 ; Trowbridge, 72
Development Assistance Committee
chairman (Martin), 808
Marshall Plan, 20th anniversary
(Johnson), 16
Ministerial council meeting, Paris,
1967: E. V. Rostow, 876; text of
communique, 881
Temporary tariff advantages for less
developed countries: OECD, 882;
Rusk, 856
Organization of American States: Lino-
witz, 321, 616; OUver, 871 ; Rusk, 88
Charter (1948):
Current actions : Barbados, Trinidad
and Tobago, 846
Protocol of amendment (1967): 190;
Argentina, 245
U.S. ratification urged (Johnson),
78
Foreign Ministers meeting, Washing-
ton: Johnson, 498; Katzenbach,
533; Linowitz, 617
U.S. representative (Oliver) on Inter-
American Economic and Social
Council, designation, 698
Venezuelan complaint against Cuba:
Oliver, 473; Rusk, 383, 490, 493
OAS Final Act, text, 491
OAS resolutions, 495
Organization of Central American
States, agreement with U.S. for
economic and technical assistance,
current actions: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, 597
Ortana, Egidio, 13
Osorio-Tafall, B. F., 52
Outer space (Rusk), 253
International law, application to
(Dean), 555
Surveyor V lunar landing, report,
transmittal (Goldberg), 769
906
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Outer Space — Continued
Treaty on principles of exploration
and use of ( 1 967) : Goldberg, 263 ;
Johnson, 295; Rusk, 558, 738
Current actions: Australia, Canada,
Denmark, 589; Finland, 153;
France, 514; Hungary, Jamaica,
81; Japan, Korea, 589; Nepal,
810; Pakistan, 438; Peru, 81;
Sierra Leone, 190; Soviet Union,
Sweden, 589; Trinidad and To-
bago, 514; U.A.R., 624; U.K.,
U.S., 589
Entry-into-force: 589, 747; Dean,
565; Dobrvnin, 565; Johnson,
567; Rusk, 566
Johnson, role in negotiation of:
Johnson, 567; Rusk, 566
Pacific communitv, U.S.-So\iet-Japan
d!scu.':sions, Mansfield proposal
(Rusk), 456
Pacific Islands Trust Territory, fe Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands and
individual islands
Paddock, Paul: 583 (quoted); Gaud,
532
Paddock, WiUiara: 583 (quoted); Gaud,
582
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 359,
360
Pakistan:
Cotton textile agreement, announce-
ment, 114
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583;
Rusk, 802
Treaties, agreements, etc., 154. 222,
309, 438, 845, 846
U.S. aid: Katzenbach, 531; Rusk,
211, 802
U.S. .Embassador (Oehlert), con-
firmation, 246
U.S. military assistance policy (Katz-
enbach), 795
Pakistan Aid Consortium (Rusk), 212,
802
Palmer, Joseph, 2d, 656
Panama:
Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Studv Commission, 3rd annual
report: 302; Johnson, 302
Canal treaties, agreement on: Oliver,
474; Rusk, 165; texts, 65
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 438,
477, 624
Paraguay:
Political progress (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 662
Park, Chung Hee (quoted), 520
Patent reform (Trowbridge), 504
Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, 253
Paulos, Kirsten C, 218n
Pautzke, Qarence F., 172
Pazhwak, Abdul Rahman (Goldberg),
483
Peace Corps:
Africa: Pahner, 658; Rusk, 212
Agreements establishing: Dahomey,
154; Guyana, 54; Lesotho, 478
"Exchange peace corps". Volunteers
to America, 235
Micronesia: Norwood, 358, 369;
SaUi, 376
Pearson, Drew, 262
Peck, William (Norwood), 372
Pedersen, Richard F., 46, 52
Pembina river basin project, IJC
report, 874
Pepin, Jean-Luc, 46
Perkins, James A., 294; Jolmson, 569
Peru (Solomon), 536, 540
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, effect of
(E. V. Rostow), 237
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 221,
309, 590, 723
Peterson, Rudolph A., 294
Petroleum. See Oil
Pham Van Dong (quoted), 671
Philippines {see also Association of
Southeast Asia):
Agriculture graduate study and re-
search institute, proposed (Gaud),
580
.Esia, role in (Blair), 205
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 117,
337, 405, 550, 625, 661
U.S. cotton textile arrangements,
exchange of notes, 51 1
U.S. mutual defense treaty: map,
460; Rusk, 563
U.S. Presidential advisers Clifford and
Taylor, reason for not visiting
(Qifford), 259
U.S. relations (Blair), 203
U.S. trade agreement, discussions, 78,
332
Viet-Nam, military and other support:
Blair, 206; Marcos (quoted), 520;
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 91, 391
Pious Fund claim (U.S.-Mexico), settle-
ment, 261
Poland :
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 550,
730, 846
U.S. policy, attitude of Congress
(Gronouski), 434
Pollack, Herman, 246, 476
Pollution, water pollution, problem of
(Humphrey), 227
Pollution of the sea by oil, prevention
of, convention, international (1954),
with annexes: Japan, 549; Lebanon,
153
Population growth:
Family planning programs: Gaud,
583; Goldschmidt, 304; Johnson,
763; Rusk, 212; Tillett, 220
Food supply, relation to. See Food and
population crisis
India (Paddock, quoted), 583
Latin America (Oliver), 472
Less developed countries (Rusk), 736
Portugal:
Angola, use as base for Congo mer-
cenaries (Buffum), 808
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 625,
729, 845, 846
Postal matters:
Parcel post agreement with Ethiopia,
54, 270
Postal Union of the Americas and
Spain, convention, money order
agreement, parcel post agreement,
and final protocols: Argentina,
Mexico, Peru, U.S., 728
Postal Union, Universal, constitution
with final protocols: Hungaiy, 26;
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho,
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo,
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404
President, The: Office and Powers, 333n
Prisoners:
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.N. resolution
on treatment of, 11, 112
Geneva conventions (1949) re treat-
ment of: Congo (Brazzaville), 81;
Kenya, 698; Kuwait, 514; Zam-
bia, 698
U.S. application to Viet-Nam war
prisoners, 170
Proclamations by the President:
Human Rights Week and Human
Rights Year (3814), 660
National UNICEF Day {3817), 718
Trade agreements, interim, with Can-
ada, U.K., and Japan, termina-
tion of further staging of certain
concessions {3818), 800
United Nations Day, (1967) {3797),
295
World Law Day, 1967 {3791), 171
Propaganda (Goldberg), 262
Public Law 480 (Johnson), 763
Publications:
Commerce Department, Technological
Innovation: Its Environment and
Management, 70n
Congressional documents relating to
foreign policy, lists, 79, 107, 147,
215, 239, 364, 511,718, 807, 885
International exchange of, conven-
tion (1958): Finland, U.S. 221
Official publications and government
documents, exchange of between
states, convention (1958): Fin-
land, U.S., 221
State Department:
American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments, 1964, released, 550
Foreign Relations oj the United States:
Diplomatic Papers, 1945, Volume I,
General: The United Nations, re-
leased, 729
Lists of recent releases, 81, 117, 154,
222, 246, 310, 338, 364, 405, 590,
626, 662, 730, 886
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
released, 366»
United Nations:
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242,
308, 404, 438, 694, 726
Programme jor the Liberalisation and
Expansion of Trade in Manufactures
and Semi-Mamtfactures of Interest to
Developing Countries, 189n
Question of the Granting and Extension
of Preferences in Favour of Developing
Countries, 188n
World Food Problem, The, released, 76n;
Johnson, 78
Puerto Rico, Joint Dominican Repub-
lic-Puerto Rican Economic Com-
mission, announcement, 620
Q
Quint, Bert, 417
Quintanilla, Luis, 462
Rabasa, Oscar, 475, 685
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
907
Rabb, Maxwell, 476
Racial discrimination (sec also Civil
right?):
Africa: Goldberg, 488; Palmer, 659
Convention, international (1965), on
the elimination of all forms of:
Argentina, 378; Guatemala, Mo-
rocco, 550; Nigeria, 728; Panama,
438; Philippines, 550; Sierra
Leone, 378; Trinidad and Tobago,
117; Venezuela, 662; Yugoslavia,
589
U.N. role in solution (Goldberg), 264
Radio:
Amateur radio stations, agreement
with Austria re operation of, 846
Licensed amateur radio operators,
agreements re reciprocal granting
of authorizations to operate in
either country: Chile, 846; New
Zealand, 117; Norway, 81; Vene-
zuela, 550
Loran-A stations, agreement with
Canada re loan of additional
equipment, 885
Partial revision of radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959) to put into effect
revised frequency allotment plan
for aeronautical mobile (R) serv-
ice and related information: Bel-
gium, 478; China, 309; Iceland,
222; India, 662; Japan, 309;
Kenya, 662; Netherlands, 478;
New Zealand, 309; Singapore,
222; Tanzania, Uganda, 662;
U.K., 309; U.S., 270, 404;
Yugoslavia, 222
Partial revision of radio regulations
(Geneva, 1959) with annexes and
additional protocol: Korea, 222
Standard (AM) radio broadcasting
stations, agreement with El Sal-
vador re pre-sunrise operation, 54
Rajaratnam, S.J. (quoted), 231
Ramev, James T., 476
Rasminsky, Louis, 46
Reciprocal assistance, Inter-American
treaty, 1947, acceptance: Trinidad
and Tobago, 54
Red Cross, International: 170, 401;
Johnson, 65
Red Sea, maintenance of certain lights
in, international convention, 1962:
Liberia, 337
Refugees, Arab-Israeli conflict. See
Arab-Israeli conflict
Regional cooperation and development:
Brzezinski, 20; Rajaratnam, 231
(quoted); Solomon, 184
Asia. See under Asia
Europe (Trowbridge), 75
Inter-American system (see also Alli-
ance for Progress) : Linowitz, 321 ;
Solomon, 537
Middle East, U.S. proposals: Gold-
berg, 218; Johnson, 34, 632;
W. VV. Rostow, 69
U.S. support: Johnson, 32, 632, 655;
Katzenbach, 335; VV. VV. Rostow,
67; Rusk, 91, 209, 212, 803
Reporter, 68
Research. See subject
Reston, James, 280
Rey, Jean: Roth, 125; Schaetzel, 715
Reynolds, James J., 137
Rice, research in: Gaud, 582; Lilien-
thal, 866
Richardson, Egerton Rudolf, 431
Rio Treaty (map), 460
Ritchie, A. E., 46
Road vehicles:
Private, customs convention on the
temporary importation of, ac-
cession: Ireland, 438
Road-use ta.\es, Kennedy Round re-
ductions: 98, 100; Roth, 127.
576; Trowbridge, 131
Robert R. Nathan and Associates, study
on Micronesia (Norwood), 368
Roberts, Edmund, 63
Robinson, H. F., 76, 874
Robinson, Thomas E. (Johnson), 36
Rockefeller, John D., Ill (Rusk), 737
Rockefeller Foundation: Diaz Ordaz,
676; Gaud, 582; Lilienthal, 866
Rockne, Knute (quoted), 752
Rogers, Will (quoted), 675
Rolz-Bennett, Jose, 859, 860
Romania:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202
Exchanges and visits, 1968 program,
agreement, 875
Treaties, agreements, etc., 81, 337
Romney, George: Lodge, 467; Rusk,
383,414
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 151, 660
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (quoted), 522,
817
Roosevelt, Theodore (quoted), 736
Roshchin, Alexei (Foster), 293
Rostow, E. v., 236, 301n, 397, 422,
476, 605. 876
Rostow, W. W., 66
Roth, William M.: 95, 123, 173, 455.
574, 648, 725; Solomon, 189
Rovere, Richard, 603
Ruge, Gerd, 595
Rusk, Dean:
Addresses, remarks, and statements:
Africa, U.S. aid policy, 212, 803
Alliance for Progress, 90, 210, 254,
410 492 493 805
American ideals,' 251, 255, 348, 741
Antiballistic missiles, 166, 385
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Jerusalem, status of, 88, 149
Refugees, U.S. position, 388, 416
Soviet arms shipments, 561
U.N. role, 165, 387, 559
U.S. position, 88, 159, 165, 210,
387, 388, 561
Armaments:
Arms race, economic burden of,
738
Middle East, supply to, 88, 160,
210, 215, 561
U.S. policy under review, 387
Asia:
British proposed reduction of forces
in, 160
Communism, threat of, 253, 555,
560, 563, 596, 597, 821, 857
Regional cooperation, 214, 347,
452, 563, 736, 804, 822
U.S. aid programs, 214
U.S. commitments, 160, 458, 555,
563, 596, 599, 703, 821, 823, 857
Asian Development Bank, 452, 456,
458
Australia, military aid to Vict-Nam,
599
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Bonin Islands, 457, 459
Brazil, former President Castello
Branco, death of, 159
Chamizal setdement, 684
Collective security, 252, 347, 598,
704, 857
Communism:
Countermeasures, 214, 490, 493,
563
U.S. role against, 344, 704, 741,
806, 824
Wodd goals, 92, 252, 491, 600
Communist China:
Containment, question of, 598,
704
Internal situation, 389, 415
Threat of, 164, 347, 563, 564, 596,
822
U.N. membership, U.S. position,
389, 390
U.S. relations and efforts to im-
prove, 390, 739
Congress, public hearings, advisa-
bility of, 560
Cuba, subversion and intervention
by, 490, 493
Disarmament, 90, 215, 738
East-West relations, 90, 600
Europe, U.S. interests and relations,
855
Food and population crisis, 254, 736
Foreign aid, principles for, 90, 209,
253, 389, 735, 801
Foreign policy, 90, 251, 348, 736,
821
Four freedoms, 855
Glassboro talks, 159
Guevara, "Che", 561
India, U.S. aid, 211, 802
International cooperation, need for,
738
Iran, U.S. direct economic aid
terminated, 825
Japan-U.S. joint Economic Com-
mittee, 6th meeting, 451, 455
Jordan, U.S. economic and militziry
aid under review, 163
Kennedy Round, 456, 457
Laos accords, 386, 387, 601
NATO:
German and U.K. armed forces,
proposed cutbacks in, 166
U.S. commitments, 91, 598, 599,
856
1967, constructive developments,
558, 736, 856
Nuclear nonproliferation treaty, 388
Nuclear war, danger of, 704, 737,
824, 859
Okinawa, 457
Outer space treaty, provisions of
ancf importance, 565
Pacific Ocean problems, U.S.-
Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans-
field proposal, 456
Pakistan, U.S. aid, 212, 802
Panama Canal treaties, 165
President, responsibilities of, 348,
741
Ryukyu Islands, 458
SEATO, 13th anniversary, 391
Secretary McNamara, 416
908
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Rusk, Dean — Continued
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
Soviet Union:
U.S. relations, 159, 252, 564, 600
Viet-Nam, position on, 558, 596,
598
Suez Canal, 164
Trade:
Japan-U.S., 451,457
U.S. protectionist trade legisla-
tion, 634
Turkey, U.S. aid, 212
U.N. Charter, principles and U.S.
support, 87, 252, 344, 564, 704,
737
U.S. economy, 255
Viet-Nam {for details, see Viet-Nam) :
AID program, goals, 213
Armaments, Communist Chinese
and Soviet supplies, 558, 598
Bombing pauses, prospects from:
89, 161, 163, 253, 347, 384, 412,
556, 560, 562, 595, 597, 599
"Brainwashing", question of, 383,
414
Communist use of Chinese air-
bases, 389, 416
Congress, position on, 560, 563
DMZ barrier, question of, 385,
414
Geneva conference, prospects for,
383.413,558,597,598
"Intellectuals", views on, 559
National Liberation Front, 91,
93, 94, 386, 390, 558
N.\TO position, 601
Negotiations for peaceful settle-
ment:
Chinese Communist and Soviet
inauence, 596, 597, 598, 601
U.S. willingness, 93, 161, 163,
253, 346, 384, 411, 452, 458,
555, 557, 560, 597, 599, 705,
740
Viet-Nam role, 384, 386, 411,
556, 558
Peace, prospects for, 162, 555,
558,562,601,740,823
Political developments, 94, 161,
163, 166,345,385,412,557,822
President- and Vice-President-
elect, difficulties between, 385
Situation reports, 91, 161, 164,
555, 557, 595, 600
"Stalemate", question of, 161,
346, 557
Summit conference, prospects for,
165, 561
UJJ. role, 383, 559
U.S. bombing, effect of, 413
U.S. commitments, importance,
90, 91, 163, 253, 344, 347, 388,
415, 555, 564, 596, 597, 599,
601-602, 703, 740, 821, 823,
857
U.S. forces, morale, 348, 704
U.S. national interest, 555, 599,
703, 821
U.S. position, 89, 252, 344, 412,
416, 452, 601, 740, 821
U.S. public opinion, 345, 387, 559,
600
World order, U.S. role, 735, 807
World peace, importance, 87, 215,
252, 564, 704, 739, 821, 824,
857
Addresses, remarks, etc. — Continued
"Yellow peril", 596
Foreign policy briefing conference,
speaker, 586
Four freedoms award, 855n
Meetings with Soviet Minister
Gromyko (Johnson), 36, 37
NAC meeting, chairman, U.S. delega-
tion, 16
News conferences, transcripts of, 91,
159, 383, 455, 555
OAS meeting of consultation, U.S.
delegate, 494
Readers' Digest interview, transcript,
821
TV-radio interviews, transcripts, 411,
595
Rwanda:
Investment guaranties agreement with
U.S., 54
U.S. visit of President Kayibanda, 290
Ryukyu Islands:
Advisory Committee to the High
Commissioner, establishment, 746
Japanese administration, 745
Residual sovereignty of Japan (Rusk),
458
Sachar, Abram L., 332
Safety of life at sea :
Convention (1960), international, on:
Bulgaria, 770; Czechoslovakia,
309; Nicaragua, 662; U.K., 550
Amendments to chapter II : France,
117; Ghana, 810; Iceland,
117; Israel, 810; Malagasy,
337; Pakistan, 309; Sweden, 438
International regulations for pre-
venting collisions at sea:
Czechoslovakia, 270
St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes,
coordination of pilotage services,
agreement with Canada, 625
St. Vincent, universal copyright con-
vention (1952), extension to, 661
Salii, LawTence, 376
San Marco satellite program (Frutkin),
401
San Marino, supplementary convention
(1956) on the abolition of slavery
and similar practices, ratification,
438
Sanchez-Vilella, Roberto, 620
Sanders, William, 494
Sanz de SantamarSa, Carlos (Oliver),
756
Saragat, Guiseppe, 501, 502
Satellites (see also Communications:
Satellites, Meteorological research,
and Outer space):
Geodetic satellite observation station
on Isla Socorro, agreement with
Mexico, 698
Navigational aids for civilian use
(Humphrey), 228
U.S. cooperative programs (Frutkin),
401
Sato, Eisaku, 742, 743
Saudi Arabia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 54, 153,
845
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Savage, Francis S. : 288n ; Johnson, 288
Scalapino, Robert A., 332
Schaetzel, J. Robert, 710
Schliesingcr, Arthur, 599, 603
Schoenbrun, David, 411, 412
Science and technology:
Agricultural research and develop-
ment, 77
China, U.S. study team, report, 585
Cooperation in, U.S. (Rusk), 91
Cooperative program, agreement with
Italy, 54, 80
Europe, technological gap: Brzezin-
ski, 22; NAC, 15; E. V. Rostow,
880; Rusk, 858; Schaetzel, 712;
Trowbridge, 70
Korean Institute of Science and Tech-
nology (Bundy), 197
Latin American multilateral program,
717
Marine science research (Humphrey),
227
Patent reform, importance to (Trow-
bridge), 505
Technological Innovation: Its Environ-
ment and Management, 70n
U.S., effects of (Brzezinski), 21
Science and Technology, Advisory
Committee on (Goldschmidt), 305
Scotton, Frank W., 288n
Sea-level canal, Atlantic-Pacific Inter-
oceanic Canal Study Commission,
3rd annual report; 302; Johnson,
302
Seaborg, Glenn T., 476
SEAMES. See Asian, Southeast, Ministers
of Education Secretariat
Security Council, U.N. :
Congo mercenaries, use of Angola as
base (Buffum), 807
Documents, lists of, 1 13, 153, 404, 726
Korean DMZ violations (Goldberg),
692
U.N. Command report, text 692
Middle East, role in. See Arab-
Israeli conflict
Peacekeeping operations, primary re-
sponsibiUty (Goldberg), 13
Resolutions :
Arab-Israeli conflict:
Cease-fire, call for, 1 1
Civilian population, treatment of,
11
Congo, foreign interference in, 153
Congo mercenaries, condemnation
of use of Angola as base, 808
Cyprus peacekeeping force, 6-month
extension, 53n
Middle East:
Cease-fire, 692
U.N. special representative, 843
Veto, Soviet use of: Goldberg, 6;
Lodge, 469 ; Rusk, 559
Viet-Nam:
Role in (see also under United Na-
tions): Goldberg, 667; Rusk, 559
U.S. draft resolutions, texts (Gold-
berg), 669, 671
Segonzac, .Adalbert de, 597
Self-defense. See Defense
Self-determination :
Micronesia: Johnson, 363; Norwood,
375; SaUi, 378
Middle East (Johnson), 33
U.N. principles and U.S. support:
Johnson, 295; Rusk, 87, 252
U.S. position and support: 171;
Goldberg, 488; Johnson, 59, 519
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
909
Self-determination — Continued
Viet-Nam. See under Viet-Nam
Sen, B. R. (quoted), 766
Senegal, international telecommunica-
tions convention (1965), with an-
nexes, ratification, 222
Servan-Schreiber, 712
Seydoux, Roger (quoted), 670
Shaplen, Robert, 275
Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, 362
Sharp, Mitchell, 46
Shepley, Steven C, 288n
Sherer, Albert W., Jr., 478
Shimoda, Takeso, 69
Ships and shipping (see also Maritime
Consultative Organization, Inter-
governmental) :
Sea-level canal feasibility study; 302;
Johnson, 302
Soviet ships, allegations of U.S.
attacks and U.S. replies, 44, 170
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Seaway pilotage services, agree-
ment with Canada re coordina-
tion of, 625
Maritime traffic, international, con-
vention (1965) on facilitation of,
with annex: Canada, Germany,
337; Israel, 846; Netherlands
(including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles), 624; Romania,
Singapore, Sweden, 337
NS Savannah, U.S. liability during
operation by private company,
agreements with: China, 245;
Yugoslavia, 270
LT.S. vessels, loan of, agreements
with: Brazil, 81 ; Japan, 309
USS Tellowstone, agreement with
Malta re deployment of, 270
U.S. Navy Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem, use by civilian ships (Hum-
phrey), 228
U.S. oceanographic research vessel
Anton Bruun, loan to India, 23
U.S. research vessels denied passage
through Soviet waters, 362
U.S. 6th Fleet, allegations of involve-
ment in Middle East crisis, and
U.S. replies (Goldberg), 3
USS Liberty, Israeli attack (Goldberg),
8
Sierra Leone:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 378,
477
U.S. Ambassador (Miner), confirma-
tion, 729
Singapore :
English language center, proposed
(Gaud), 580
Family planning programs (Gaud),
583
Political progress (Kaplan), 232
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 337
U.S. visit of Prime Minister Lee, 612
Viet-Nam, support for U.S. role in,
520
Sino-Soviet relations: Bundy, 280;
Rusk, 252
Sipila, HelviL., 218
Sisco, J. J., 46
Slaves and slavery, abolition of slavery,
the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery, supple-
mentary convention (1956): San
Slaves and Slavery — Continued
Marino, 438; Spain, 885; U.S., 697,
846, 885
Small, David H., 218™
Smith, Robert S., 586
Smyth, Henry DeWolf, 476
Smythe, Hugh H., 625
SOLAS. See Safety of life at sea
Solomon, Anthony M.: 46, 180, 534,
586; Fowler, 393
Somali Republic, treaties, agreements,
etc., 190, 405
Sorensen, Theodore (quoted), 280
South Afirica, Republic of:
Racial problems, U.N. role in solution
of (Goldberg), 264
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 270,
309, 845, 885
Southeast .^sia Treaty Organization:
Background and U.S. commitments
under: Bundy, 276; Jolinson, 852;
Rusk, 344, 414, 415, 703
Map, 460
13th anniversary (Rusk), 391
U.S.-Thai support, 64
Viet-Nam, U.S. commitments under.
See Viet-Nam
Southern Yemen, U.S. diplomatic rec-
ognition, 861
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 653
Souza Costa (quoted), 529
Soviet Union (see also Aggression, Com-
munism, and Sino-Soviet relations):
Air services technical talks with U.S.
completed, 820
Antiballistic missiles:
Deployment: Fisher, 543; McNa-
mara, 447; Rusk, 166
Discussions with U.S., proposed
(Rusk), 385
Arab-Israeli conflict: Goldberg, 5;
Rusk, 159
Draft resolutions : 12; Goldberg, 5, 6
Soviet arins shipments, problem of:
Katzenbach, 532, 796; McClos-
key, 652; Rusk, 159, 561
Arm.s supply to Nigeria, U.S. position,
320
Chancery sites, U.S.-Soviet exchange
of, 540
50th anniversary : Johnson, 705; Katz-
enbach, 815
Fisheries agreements, with U.S., re-
view, 873
INTELSAT, U.S. hopes for Soviet
participation in (Johnson), 300
Nuclear weapons strength and policy
compared with U.S. (McNa-
mara), 444
Soviet vessels, U.S. replies to allega-
tions of attacks on, 44, 1 70
Treaties, agreements, etc., 589, 662,
846
U.N.:
Propaganda, utilization for: Gold-
berg, 6, 9, 263, 691
Veto, use in: Goldberg, 6; Lodge,
469; Rusk, 559
U.S. -Japan-Soviet discussions on Pa-
cific Ocean problems, Mansfield
proposal (Rusk), 456
U.S. relations and efforts to improve
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 32, 36
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 818
Kosygin, 37, 38; E. V. Rostow,
430; Rusk, 90, 159, 558, 564
Soviet Union — Continued
U.S. relations and eflorts to im-
prove— Continued
Arms budget, increase, effect on
(Rusk), 558
Glassboro meeting, eflfect of. See
Glassboro meeting
Viet-Nam, effect of (Rusk), 90
U.S. research vessels denied passage
through Soviet waters, 362
Viet-Nam, position on and aid to:
Brzezinski, 20; Goldberg, 668;
Kosygin, 38; Lodge, 469; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 608; Rusk, 558, 562,
596, 598
World relations and goals: Cleveland,
143; E. V. Rostow, 428; Rusk,
159, 252
Space. See Outer space and Satellites
Spain:
Cotton textile agreement with U.S.,
announcement, 726
Treaties, agreements, etc., 222, 309,
625, 845, 846, 885
Spivak, Lawrence, 352, 464
Sputnik: Dobrynin, 565; Johnson, 567;
Katzenbach, 818; Rusk, 566
Stainless steel flatware, termination of
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573
Stanton, Frank, 294
State Department (see also Foreign
Service) :
Appointments and designations, 246,
337, 661, 698
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs (Kaplan), 231
Publications. See under Publications
Viet-Nam, preoccupation with, ques-
tion of (Bundy), 356
Work of (Rusk), 91
Stevenson, Adlai (quoted), 151, 262
Straits of Tiran (see also International
waterways): Goldberg, 49, 50;
Johnson, 33
Sudan:
Agricultural sales agreement with U.S.
26
AID program, suspended (Rusk), 212
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow),
236
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 229
Suez Canal (see also International water-
ways): Goldberg, 5; Rusk, 164
Suffridge, James (Johnson), 631
Sugar, international sugar agreement
(1958):
Nonoperation (Solomon), 182
Protocol for further prolongation:
Barbados, Ireland, Netherlands,
Tunisia, 550
Sukhoruchenko, M. N., 873
Sunday Telegraph, London, 231
Surveyor V lunar landing (Goldberg),
769
Swaziland, investment guaranties agree-
ment with U.S., 590
Sweden :
Kennedy Round tariff reductions, 97,
98
Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter,
transcript of Secretary Rusk inter-
view, 91
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 438,
589, 625, 661, 809, 810
910
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Switzerland:
Kennedy Round tariff reductions; 97,
98; Trowbridge, 131
Treaties, agreements, etc., 153, 405,
549, 845, 846
U.S. poultry exports, restrictions re-
duced, 861
Sylla, Albert, death of (Rusk), 159
Symmes, Harrison M., 625
Syria :
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
Taiwan {see also China, Republic of):
Asian students in : Bundy, 199; Gaud,
579
Economic progress: 585; Gaud, 581,
582; Kaplan, 232; Katzenbach,
531; Rusk, 214, 822
Tanzania:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 662,
729, 885
Tape, Gerald F., 476
Tariff policy, U.S. (see also Economic
policy and relations: Tariffs and
trade, general agreement on; and
Trade):
American Selling Price, modifica-
tions: 95, 97, 98; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 173, 175, 575; Trow-
bridge, 131
Escape-clause provisions, value of:
Rusk, 637; Trowbridge, 649
Import quota bills, probable adverse
effect on U.S. trade and Kennedy
Round prospects: Fowler, 650
Freeman, 642 ; Katzenbach, 686
Oliver, 758; Roth, 574, 648
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645
Udall, 638
Japan, interests in (Miki), 457
Kennedy Round. See Tariffs and
bade, general agreement on
Most-favored-nation basis (Solomon),
187
Presidential authority for protective
action (Roth), 173, 576
Tariff Commission study of impact of
imports on textile and apparel
industries requested: Johnson,
529; Roth, 577
Trade barriers, elimination of (John-
son), 573
Tariffs and trade, general agreement on :
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and
protocols :
Accessions to, current actions on:
Argentina:
Protocol: Austria, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, 846
Provisional, 3rd proces-verbal :
Austria, Czechoslovakia, 405
Iceland:
Protocol: Austria, Iceland, Paki-
stan, Spain, Turkey, 846
Provisional, proces-verbal:
Cuba, 405
Ireland, protocol: Austria, Ire-
land, Spain, Turkey, 846
Tariffs and trade, general agreement
on — Continued
Agreements, exchanges of notes, and
protocols — Continued
Accessions to, current actions on —
Continued
Korea, protocol: Austria, U.K ,
405
Poland, protocol: Austria, 846;
Poland, 550; Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, 846
Spain, protocol: Pakistan, 846
Switzerland, protocol: Cuba, In-
donesia, 405; Pakistan, 846
Tunisia, provisional, 3rd proces-
verbal: Cuba, 405
U.A.R. provisional, 2nd proces-
verbal: Czechoslovakia, 405
Yugoslavia, protocol: Cuba, 405;
Pakistan, 846
French text, protocol of rectifica-
tion to: Barbados, 590
Part IV on trade and development,
introduction of, and amendment
of annex I, protocol amending:
Argentina, 846
Schedule XX, renegotiation of,
bilateral agreements with: Can-
ada, Japan, U.K., 337
Contracting parties, 24th session, 725
Kennedy Round: 147, 861; Rusk, 558
Histoi-y (Roth), 123
Importance and results: 45, 454,
725; Freeman, 132; Harriman, 18;
Johnson, 32, 633, 716, 717, 852,
883; Katzenbach, 688; Miki, 457;
OECD, 882; Reynolds, 135; E.
V. Rostow, 876; Roth, 123, 173,
577; Rusk, 451, 456, 457, 637,
856; Solomon, 189; Trowbridge,
127
Signature, announcement, 95
U.S. protectionist trade bills, ad-
verse effect of: Fowler, 650
Freeman, 642; Johnson, 633
Roth, 574, 648; Rusk, 634
Trowbridge, 645; UdaU, 638
U.S. replacement of interim staging
in agreements with Canada, U.K.
and Japan, proclamation, 800
U.S. tariff reductions: 96; Freeman,
133; Trowbridge, 130
U.S. proposed elimination of import
duties on extra-long-staple cotton,
effect of (E. V. Rostow), 238
Taxation:
Double taxation, conventions for
avoidance of. See Double taxation
Estate-tax protocol with Greece, sup-
plementary, 698, 809, 810
Income and property tax convention
with France, 268, 270
Income tax administration, agree-
ment with Viet-Nam, 54
Interest equalization tax rates modi-
fied. Executive order, 396
Latin America, development of ef-
fective systems (Oliver), 104
Personal and corporate income taxes,
proposed 10-percent surcharge:
Johnson, 266; E. V. Rostow, 879:
Trowbridge, 504
Taylor, Geoffrey (quoted), 794
Taylor, Maxwell D., 256
Technical assistance:
Afiica :
Chinese programs (Bundy), 199
U.S. programs (Rusk), 213
Less developed countries, need for, 78
Technical cooperation:
Bilateral agreements with: Afghanis-
tan, 270; Somalia, 190, 405
Eastern Asia (Bundy), 198
Technology. See Science and technology
Telecommunications {See also Radio)
Convention (1965), international,
with annexes: Argentina, 221
Bcirbados, 404; Ethiopia, 476
France, 222; Iceland, 221; Japan
662; Laos, 729; Malagasy, 662
Nepal 309; New Zealand (in-
cluding Cook, Niue, and Tokelau
Islands), 26; Niger, 309; Pakistan,
222; Paraguay, 662; Senegal,
Spain (including Spanish prov-
inces in Africa), 222; Tanzania,
729; Togo, 478; U.S., 54
TV system establishment, agreement
with Saudi Arabia, 54
Thailand {see also Association of South-
east Asia) :
Airbases, use by U.S. (Rusk), 92
Amity and economic relations treaty,
Senate approval, 477
Asian institute of technologv, pro-
posed (Gaud), 580
Asian students in (Bundy), 199
Communism, threat of: Johnson, 520;
Rusk, 92, 164, 347, 560, 597, 822;
Taylor, 258
LT.S.aid asacountermeasure:Bundy,
285; Rusk, 214,804
Economic progress: Gaud, 581, 583;
Kaplan, 232
Treaties, agreements, etc., 438, 662,
697
U.S. Ambassador (Unger), confirma-
tion, 310
U.S. military assistance, FY 1968
appropriations request (Rusk),
214
U.S. relations: Bhumibol Adulyadej,
63; Johnson, 61
U.S. visit of King Bhumibol Adulyadej
and Queen Sirikit, 61
Viet-Nam, military and other aid:
64, 520, 792; Johnson, 61; Rusk,
91,92,391,561,563
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
and Taylor, 256
Thanat Khoman (quoted), 477
Thieu, Nguyen Van: 414 (quoted), 789;
Bundy, 260; Bunker, 416, 418;
Johnson, 290, 421; Rusk, 556
Thompson, Llewellyn E. (Johnson), 36
Thoreau, Henry David (quoted), 680
Thuc, Vu Quoc, 864
TiUett, Gladys A., 218
To Move A Nation, 219n
Tobago. See Trinidad and Tobago
Tobriner, Walter N., 729
Togo:
Ambassador to U.S., credentials, 202
Treaties, agreements, etc., 337, 378
478, 730
U.S. Ambassador (Sherer), confirma-
tion, 478
Tonkin Gulf incident (Goldberg), 668
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
911
Touring and tourism:
Canada, 45
Customs facilities for, convention
(1954): Ireland, 438; Uruguay,
514
East Europe (Rusk), 6(X)
Italy (Johnson), 500
Japan, 454
Mexico (Diaz Ordaz), 677
Micronesia (Salii), 377
Trade (see also Agricultural surpluses;
Economic policy; Exports; Imports;
and Tariff policy, U.S.):
Antidumping regulations: 95, 97, 99;
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 884;
Roth, 124, 575; Trowbridge, 131,
649
Cotton textiles. See Cotton textiles
European Economic Community
(Schaetzel), 713
Expansion, need for: 746; Fowler,
524; Johnson, 633, 883; Roth, 577
Joint Canada-U.S. Ministerial Com-
mittee on Trade and Economic
-MTairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
Landlocked states, convention (1965)
on transit trade: Mali, 697;
Yugoslavia, 26
Latin America. See Latin America and
Latin American Free Trade Asso-
ciation
Less developed countries. See Less
developed countries
Micronesia (Salii), 376
NontarifT trade barriers: 860; Roth,
179, 577
Oil, importance of, and import-export
patterns (Udall), 640
Technological progress, relation
(Troubridge), 506
Trade and Development, U.N. Con-
ference, 2nd: 45, 454; OECD,
882; Oliver, 756; Solomon, 188
U.S.:
Agricultural trade exhibit, Tokyo,
1968 (Freeman), 136
.•\rgentine-U.S., joint Trade and
Economic Committee, 2nd meet-
ing, joint communique, 146
Canada-U.S. joint ministerial com-
mitttee on trade and economic
affairs, 11th meeting, communi-
que, 44
East Asian countries (Bundy), 197
Eastern Europe, trade policy, 454
Elimination of import quotas for
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236
Japan-U.S. Joint Economic Com-
mittee, 746
6th meeting: 452; Miki, 455;
Rusk, 451, 457
Kennedy Round. See under Tariffs
and trade, general agreement on
Mexico: 681, 682; Diaz Ordaz,
677
Philippines trade agreement, dis-
cussions, 78
Policy (Johnson), 883
Comprehensive study request:
Freeman, 135; Johnson, 573;
Roth, 127, 173, 178, 577;
Solomon, 189
Preferential imports: Oliver, 472;
Solomon, 186
Trade — Continued
U.S. — -Continued
Protectionist trade bills, probable
adverse effect on: Diaz Ordaz
678, 631; Fowler, 650: Freeman
642; Johnson, 877 (quoted)
Katzenbach, 686; Roth, 574, 648
Rusk, 634; Trowbridge, 645
Udall, 638
Trade agreements program, 11th
annual report, transmittal to
Congress (Johnson), 717
Trinidad and Tobago, trade agi'ee-
ment, 698, 729
Trade Expansion Act of 1962:
Adjustment assistance program: John-
son, 885; Katzenbach, 689;
Reynolds, 139; Roth, 174, 179,
576; Solomon, 183, 537
Continuation, need for: Katzenbach,
689; Roth, 173, 576, 649; Rusk,
636
Transportation:
.Asia, Asian Development Bank role
in development (Gaud), 581
Micronesia, needs (Norwood), 371
U.S. -Japan study, proposed, 453
Viet-Nam (McNamara), 168
Travel (see also Touring and tourism):
Cuba, to, O.-^S resolution, 496
East Asia-U.S., increases in (Bundy),
197
Middle East travel restrictions amend-
ed, 41, 171, 229, 459, 799
Special travel task force, appointment,
828
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
Current actions, 26, 54, 80, 117, 153,
190, 221, 245, 270, 309, 337, 378,
404, 438, 477, 514, 549, 589, 624,
661, 697, 728, 769, 809, 845, 885
U.N. draft convention on law of
treaties, U.S. position (Kearney),
719
Trimble, James W., 476
Trinidad and Tobago:
OAS membership (Oliver), 871
Treaties, agieements, etc., 54, 117,
190, 514, 698, 729, 846
U.S. Ambassador (Costello), confir-
mation, 478
Trowbridge, Alexander B., 46, 70, 70n,
127, 455, 504, 645
Truman policies (E. V. Rostow), 607
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands:
Economic, social, and political devel-
opment: Anderson, 365; Johnson,
363; Norwood, 366; Salii, 376
U.S. Commission on status of: 363;
Johnson, 363
Congress of Micronesia: Johnson,
363; Norwood, 375; Salii, 377
Trusteeship Council, U.N., documents,
list of, 309
Tubby, Roger W., 625
Tun Tan Sieiv Sin, 578
Tunisia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 190, 405,
550, 728, 770
U.S. aid (Rusk), 210, 212
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 41
Turkestan, Soviet ship, 44
Turkey (see also Cyprus) :
Cotton textile agreement, armounce-
ment, 1 1 6
Turkey — Continued
Economic development and U.S. aid
program: Katzenbach, 532; Rusk,
211, 212, 803
Greece, relations (NAC), 14
Treaties, agreements, etc., 117, 222,
270, 846
Typewriter ribbon cloth, termination of
escape clause tariff (Johnson), 573
Typhoon damage, Micronesia (Nor-
wood), 367
U
U Thant, Viet-Nam negotiations, pro-
posals for (Rusk), 162
U.A.R. See United Arab Republic
Udall, Stewart L., 455, 638
Uganda:
AID bilateral programs (Rusk), 212
Treaties, agreements, etc., 378, 652
UNCTAD. See United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development
UNEF (United Nations Emergency
Force): Goldberg, 6, 50, 110
UNESCO (Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, U.N.):
Goldberg, 723;Tillett, 219
UNFICYP. See United Nations Force
in Cyprus
Unger, Leonard, 310
UNICEF. See United Nations ChUdren's
Fund
United Arab Republic:
Arab-Israeli conflict. See Arab-Israeli
conflict
Elimination of U.S. import quotas on
extra-long-staple cotton, foreign
policy aspects (E. V. Rostow), 236
Soviet supply of arms to (Rusk), 160
Treaties, agreements, etc., 404, 405,
624, 625
U.S. travel restrictions amended, 799
United Kingdom:
Asian forces, proposed reduction in:
Rusk, 160; Taylor, 259
Edinburgh and Liverpool posts ele-
vated to consulates general, 310
European Economic Community,
membership, questions of: Harri-
man, 18; Katzenbach, 688; Rusk,
858; Schaetzel, 715; Solomon, 187
Farm-income support system (Free-
man), 134
Kennedy Round tariff reductions: 97,
98, 99, 100; Johnson, 884; Roth,
178, 576; Trowbridge, 128, 130
NATO forces, commitment (Rusk),
166
Pound sterling devaluation: Fowler,
793; Johnson, 793; OECD com-
munique, 882; E. V. Rostow, 876;
Rusk, 856
Trade, U.S. replacement of interim
staging arrangements by Kennedy
Round staging, proclamation, 800
Treaties, agreements, etc., 270, 309,
337, 405, 550, 589, 625, 845, 846
United Nations:
Charter. See United Nations Charter
Communist Chinese conditions for
membership (Fountain), 831
Cyprus threat of war lifted, U.N. role:
Johnson, 859; Vance, 860
Documents, lists of, 113, 153, 242,
308, 404, 438, 694, 726
912
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United Nations — Continued
European Office of, U.S. representa-
tive (Tubby), confirmation, 625
Foreign Relations of the United States:
Dif>lomatic Pafiers, 1945, Volume /,
General: The United Mations, re-
leased 729
Forum, as': Goldberg, 151, 262; E. V.
Rostow, 606
International education year, pro-
posed (Johnson), 571
International Human Rights Year,
1968, 660
Korean unification, resolution, and
U.S. support (Broomfield), 844
Marine resources development, role
in (Goldberg), 723
Membership :
Communist China, U.S. position:
Fountain, 829; Rusk, 389, 390
Important-question resolution, U.S.
position (Fountain), 829
Responsibilities and significance
(Goldberg), 4, 265, 483
Middle East emergency relief pro-
grams, U.S. support (Johnson), 65
Peacekeeping operations (see also
Arab-Israeli conflict. General As-
sembly, and Security Council):
303, 615, 744; Goldberg, 216;
Rusk, 383, 559; Saragat, 502
Importance and U.S. support:
Goldberg, 265; Johnson, 34, 295
Specialized agencies, work of (Gold-
berg), 263
Viet-Nam, role in. See Viet-Nam
United Nations Charter:
Article 109, amendment; Burma, 81;
Denmark, 54; France, 729; Ku-
wait, 770; Libya, 405; Nigeria,
117; Paraguay, 405; Philippines,
625; Poland, 54; U.S., 54
Obligations, binding nature of: Gold-
berg, 667; E. V. Rostow, 426, 607
Principles and U.S. support: Gold-
berg, 216, 264; Humphrey, 790;
Lodge, 468; Rusk, 87, 252, 344,
560, 564, 704, 737, 824
Viet-Nam, application of principles
to (Goldberg), 667
United Nations Children's Fund: 113;
Rusk, 805
National UNICEF Day, proclama-
tion, 713
United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Humphrey), 229
United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 2nd: 45, 454;
OEGD, 882; Oliver, 756; Solomon,
188
United Nations Day, 1967, proclama-
tion, 295
United Nations Development Program,
U.S. financial support (Rusk), 805
LTnited Nations Economic Commission
for Asia and the Far East (Bundy),
198
United Nations Emergency Force, Mid-
dle East, effect of withdrawal
(Goldberg), 6, 50, 110
United Nations Force in Cyprus
(N.\C), 15
Extension of, and U.S. pledge: 53n;
Pederson, 52
United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees, 1 1 3
U.S. financial support: 400; Gold-
berg, 9, 65, 111; Rusk, 210
United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization (Goldberg), 1 10
United States citizens and nationals:
Claims. See Qaims
Foreign policy, role of intellectuals
(Gronouski), 432
Israel, private support for (Goldberg),
9
U.S. public image, role in: Hum-
phrey, 791; Oliver, 753
United States Information Agency, 827
United States-Japan Joint Economic
Committee, 6th meeting: commu-
nique, 452; Johnson, 453; Miki,
455; Rusk, 451, 455
United States-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friend-
ship, 682
Universal copyTight convention, St.
Vincent, 661
Universal Postal Union, constitution
with final protocols: Hungary, 26;
Kuwait, 477; Laos, 885; Lesotho,
477; Maldive Islands, 404; Sierra
Leone, 477; Tanzania, 885; Togo,
770; U.A.R., Viet-Nam, 404
UNRWA. See United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization), 1 10
Upp>er Volta, geodetic survey agreement
with U.S., 478
Urban development: 453; Johnson, 453
Uruguay, treaties, agreements, etc., 309,
514
USS Irwin, 81
USS Lewis Hancock, 8 1
USS Liberty, Israeli attack on (Gold-
berg), 8
USS Tellowstone, agreement with Malta
re deployment of, 270
Van Deerlin, Lionel, 1 47
Vance, Cyrus, 859, 860
Vance, Sheldon B., 310
Vandenberg, Arthur (Oliver), 102
Vatican City State, wheat trade con-
vention, 770
Venezuela:
Communism, danger of Cuban threat :
Johnson, 683; Kaplan, 230; Kat-
zenbach, 533; Oliver, 473; Rusk,
210, 383, 490, 493
OAS Final Act and resolutions,
tests, 493
Economic progress (Rusk), 211
OU exports to U.S. (Udall), 641
Treaties, agreements, etc., 405, 550,
662
Viet-Nam, North:
Haiphong harbor: Lodge, 468;
Taylor, 259
Soviet vesseb, allegations of U.S.
attacks on, and U.S. replies, 44,
170
U.S. position: Bundy, 284; Goldberg,
484, 485; Katzenbach, 602; E. V.
Rostow, 607; Rusk, 89, 92, 253,
415, 823
Viet-Nam, North — Continued
U.S. trade embargo (E. V. Rostow),
236
Viet-Nam, Republic of:
Amnesty program. See Chieu Hoi
Background: Bundy, 275; Westmore-
land, 785
Bombing, U.S. See U.S. air actions
Bombing pauses:
Communist activity during U.S.
ceasefires: Bundy, 355; Johnson,
521; Lodge, 464; Rusk, 162, 335,
412, 557, 562, 595
Communist position: 462; Gold-
berg, 484; Johnson, 521; Rusk,
411, 556, 557, 560, 562, 595, 600
1965-1967 (Goldberg), 669, 671
Prospects from: Clifford, 258; Gold-
berg, 484; Lodge, 464, 468;
Rusk, 89, 161, 163, 384, 411, 413,
556, 562, 595, 597, 593
Reciprocal, U.S. willingness: 671;
Bunker, 751; Goldberg, 484;
Johnson, 521 ; Rusk, 90, 162, 347,
385, 412, 560, 562, 595, 599
Viet-Nam government negotiations,
prospects and U.S. position:
Bundy, 353, 354; Bunker, 416,
417; Rusk, 411, 556
"Brainwashing", question of: Lodge,
467; Rusk, 383, 414
Chieu Hoi program: Bunker, 782;
Lodge, 466; Rusk, 93, 386, 557;
Westmoreland, 785
Civilian service awards (Johnson), 288
Coalition government, Vietnamese re-
jection of (Bundy), 354
Communism, rejection of: Lilienthal,
866; Rusk, 557, 823
Communist aggression and subver-
sion:
Casualties: Bundy, 353; Johnson,
289, 521; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 164,
346, 414
Chinese air bases, question of use of
(Rusk), 389, 416
Civil war, distinguished from: Katz-
enbach, 602; Rusk, 89, 252, 345,
740
Communist China:
Military aid: Bundy, 356; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 603; Rusk, 598,
601
Position on: Bundy, 283; Gold-
berg, 672; Marcos (quoted),
520; Rusk, 164, 558
Communist defections. See Chieu
Hoi program
Communist forces, problems of
maintenance and recruitment:
Bunker, 751, 782; Lodge, 468;
Westmoreland, 786
Communist position: 462; Katzen-
bach, 602; Lodge, 465; E. V.
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 163, 556
Communist responsibility for situa-
tion: Blair, 203; Bundy, 279, 290,
356; Johnson, 519, 632; Katzen-
bach, 602, 818; E. V. Rostow,
425, 607; Rusk, 89, 91, 161, 252,
344, 412, 556, 558, 559, 601-602,
740,821,823
Deescalation, mutual, U.S. willing-
ness: Johnson, 32; Rusk, 92, 253,
346, 412, 740
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
913
V'iet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Communist aggression and subver-
sion— Continued
Escalation:
Danger of: Bundy, 283, 357;
Bunker, 420; Johnson, 37;
Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach, 603;
Rusk, 92, 390, 415, 555, 564, 823
One-sided concept of (Rusk), 89,
93, 253, 346
Guerrilla warfare: Bunker, 419;
Johnson, 289; Lodge, 465, 466,
468 ; Rusk, 345 ; Westmoreland, 785
International law aspects (E. V.
Rostow), 607
Prisoners, U.S. position, 170
Propaganda, failure of (Lodge), 465
Refugees (Rusk), 213
Test case for: Bundy, 283; Johnson,
632; Katzenbach, 819; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 90, 387,
703, 823
Communist reliance on U.S. dissent:
Johnson, 522; Katzenbach, 602;
Rusk, 555, 556, 600, 705, 824;
Westmoreland, 785
Demilitarized zone: 671; Goldberg,
485; Rusk, 412, 558
Barrier, proposed (Rusk), 385, 414
Extension of. Communist rejection
(Rusk), 89, 597
Economic and social development:
Industrialization (Lilienthal), 866,
867
Off-shore fisheries development
project, 222
Prospects: Johnson, 519; McNa-
mara, 167; Rusk, 93
Social and land reforms, obligations
of new government: Bunker, 783;
Rusk, 413
U.S. aid: Bundy, 277, 284; Bunker,
781, 784; Rusk, 213, 804
Communist participation: Gold-
berg, 485; Johnson, 33; Rusk,
601, 823
Vietnamese role: Bunker, 584, 783;
Lilienthal, 864; Rusk, 413
Geneva conference: 361, 671, 709;
Bundy, 276, 280; Goldberg, 383
(quoted), 484, 485, 671 ; Rusk, 93,
383, 413, 558, 559, 598
Inflation: Bunker, 784; Lodge, 466;
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 161, 213;
Taylor, 258
Japan, position of, 745
Korea, compared to: Katzenbach,
603; Westmoreland, 788
Military and other aid from foreign
countries: 64, 520, 792; Bundy,
285; Bunker, 782; Johnson, 61,
520, 632; NcNamara, 169; Park
(quoted), 520; Rusk, 91, 92, 391,
555, 561, 599, 822; Taylor, 258,
259; Westmoreland, 788
National Liberation Front: Bunker,
782 ; Department, 854 ; Fedorenko
(quoted), 670; Goldberg, 672;
Rusk, 91, 93, 94, 386, 390, 558;
Westmoreland, 786
National reconciliation (pacification)
program: 854; Bundy, 284, 353;
Bunker, 418, 419, 748, 750, 783;
McNamara, 169; Rusk, 386,
557; Taylor, 257
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Negotiations for peaceful settlement:
Ashmore-Baggs contacts (Depart-
ment), 462
Channels: 462; Goldberg, 484;
Johnson, 775; Rusk, 162
Communist China and Soviet
Union, influence on: E. V. Ros-
tow, 608; Rusk, 596, 597, 598,
601
Communist rejection: 462; Bundy,
284, 357; Bunker, 784; Goldberg,
671; Johnson, 521, 632, 775;
Rusk, 89, 94, 163, 253, 346, 383,
384, 391, 411, 556, 558, 705, 740,
823
Enterprise proposal (Johnson), 747,
775
Geneva conference. See Geneva
conference
International conference, U.S. sup-
port for, 671
National Liberation Front par-
ticipation: 854; Bundy, 353,
417; Department, 854; Rusk, 93,
94, 390, 558
Norstad proposal (Lodge), 465
Peace efforts of other countries :
Goldberg, 669; Lee, 615; Rusk,
94
Prior to U.S. presidential elections,
question of (Bunker), 419
U Thant proposals (Rusk), 162
U.S. willingness: 745, 854; Bundy,
284; Bunker, 417, 418, 781, 784;
Goldberg, 48, 484; Gronouski,
432; Johnson, 32, 39, 521;
Lodge, 464; Rusk, 89, 162, 163,
346, 384, 555, 556, 595, 600, 705,
740
Vict Cong participation, LT.S. posi-
tion: 854; Johnson, 775
Vietnamese role: 854; Bundy, 352,
353; Bunker, 416; Rusk, 384,
411, 412, 556, 558
Wilson-Kosygin talks, London:
463 ; Rusk, 562
Without conditions, U.S. willing-
ness: Katzenbach, 602; Rusk, 9(5,
93, 162, 253, 346, 384, 557, 705
Peace :
Geneva accords as a basis for:
361, 671, 709; Goldberg, 484;
Rusk, 93, 383
Prospects for: Bunker, 416, 781;
Clifford, 258; Johnson, 32; Rusk,
93, 162, 164, 411, 412, 458, 556,
558, 599, 601, 823
U.S. goal: Bundy, 357; Bunker, 584,
784; Goldberg, 483; Johnson, 37,
39, 632, 775, 777, 851; Lodge,
465; Rusk, 384, 452, 555, 560,
562, 564, 740, 823
Vietnamese position: Goldberg,
485 ; Lilienthal, 866
Political development: Bundy, 284,
354; Bunker, 417, 748, 781;
Goldberg, 485; Johnson, 289, 521,
776, 779; Lodge, 350, 466, 467;
McNamara, 167; Rusk, 94, 161,
412, 557, 705; Taylor, 257
Communist participation: Gold-
berg, 485; Rusk, 386, 601
Corruption, prevention of (Bunker),
751
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Political development— Continued
Military leadership (Bundy), 260
President- and Vice-President-elect,
relations, question of: Bunker,
421; Rusk, 385
Presidential elections:
Campaign, problems and inci-
dents: Bundy, 260, 352, 354;
Bunker, 749; Johnson, 290;
Lodge, 350
Communist interference: Bunker,
749 ; Johnson, 52 1 ; Rusk, 345,
414, 557, 740; Westmoreland,
786
Conduct of, and percent of
Vietnamese voters: 391 ; Bunker,
417, 420, 749, 783; Johnson,
421, 776; Rusk, 557, 822;
Westmoreland, 786
Inauguration ceremonies (Hum-
phrey), 789
Prospects from: Bundy, 353, 357;
Bunker, 416, 417, 419, 420, 751,
783; Johnson, 421, 521 ; Katzen-
bach, 603; Lodge, 465; Rusk,
94, 163, 166, 385
U.S. observers: 349, 671 ; Johnson,
421 ; Lodge, 349; Rusk, 345
Port and harbor facilities (Mc-
Namara), 167
Reunification: 671; Bundy, 277, 279;
Goldberg, 485
Security {see also National reconcili-
ation): Bundy, 353; Johnson, 521,
776; Lodge, 466; Rusk, 557
Following U.S. withdrawal, ques-
tions of: Bundy, 355 ; Rusk, 93
Self-determination: 361, 854; Bundy,
195; Bunker, 781; Chfford, 257;
Goldberg, 485; Humphrey, 789;
Johnson, 33, 59, 498, 519, 779;
Rusk, 90, 94, 345, 452, 703, 823
Soviet position and aid: Brzezinski,
20; Goldberg, 668; Kosygin, 38;
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 426,
608; Rusk, 558, 562, 596, 598
Summit conference, prospects for:
Bunker, 750; Clifford, 258; Rusk,
165, 561
Treaties, agreements, etc., 54, 310,
404, 590, 729
U.N. action:
Communist rejection: 671; Gold-
berg, 669; Rusk, 383,413
Soviet position (Goldberg), 668
NLF participation, 854
U.S. support: Bundy, 357; Gold-
berg, 483, 667; Johnson, 521, 780;
Lodge, 468, (U.N. role), 469;
Rusk, 383, 559
U.N. inability to act: Goldberg, 264,
670; Rusk, 559
U.S. air actions:
Military targets only : 44, 171;
Lodge, 468; Rusk, 414
Results {see also U.S. military
actions): Bundy, 355; Lodge, 464,
465; McNamara, 168; Rusk, 413
U.S. commitment: 745; Bunker, 420,
584, 784; Goldberg, 484; John-
son, 33, 59, 508, 519, 614, 776;
Lodge, 465; Rusk, 163, 388, 555,
596, 600, 823
Asia, importance to. See under Asia
914
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
U.S. commitment — Continued
Congressional support: E. V. Ros-
tow, 605 ; Rusk, 555, 560, 563, 599,
821
"Credibility gap" (Rusk), 414, 555,
740, 824
Importance of dependability:
Bunker, 781; Johnson, 519, 777,
779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V.
Rostow, 426; Rusk, 90, 91, 253,
599, 703, 704, 740, 821, 857
SEATO: Bundy, 277, 285; John-
son, 779; Katzenbach, 603; E. V.
Rostow, 426, 607; Rusk, 414, 555,
563, 703, 821
U.S. Embassy, dedication (Bunker),
584
U.S. information, sources and supply
of (Bunker), 781
U.S. military forces:
Leadership (Johnson), 776
Manpower levels and deployment:
Bundy, 353; Johnson, 267, 522,
775; McNamara, 169; Rusk,
344, 821; Taylor, 258, West-
moreland, 786
Morale and public support:
Bunker, 585; Johnson, 267, 522;
Rusk, 348, 704
Withdrawal, conditions for: Bundy,
356; Rusk, 89, 92, 345, 563,
597, 823
U.S. military operations:
Consultations and reviews: Bunker,
749, 750; Clifford, 256; E. V.
Rostow, 427; Rusk, 414, 561
Costs: Johnson, 266; Trowbridge,
504
Logistics (MACONOMY): West-
moreland, 787
Phases of, survey (Westmoreland),
786
Responsibility for decisions : Bunker,
750; Rusk, 414, 741
Results: Bundy, 355; Bunker, 748,
781; Clifford, 257; Johnson, 521,
776; Lodge, 465; McNamara,
168; Rusk, 92, 346, 413, 821
Stalemate, question of: Bimker,
418, 783; McNamara, 168; Rusk,
161, 346, 557
Strategy: Bundy, 284, 355; Clif-
ford, 257; Lodge, 466; Mc-
Namara, 168; Taylor, 257, 259
U.S. national interests: Bundy, 278,
285; Johnson, 519, 779, 851;
Lodge, 469; E. V. Rostow, 607;
Rusk, 555, 563, 599, 703, 821
U.S. objectives: Blair, 206; Brzezinski,
22; Bundy, 283; Bunker, 584, 781 ;
Goldberg, 483; Humphrey, 789,
790; Johnson, 290, 498, 519,
779; Kaplan, 234; Katzenbach,
602; Lodge, 469; Rusk, 92, 345,
416, 452, 555, 601, 823; Taylor,
257
Allies, support for: ClifTord, 256;
Johnson, 522; Taylor, 257
Congressional support: Johnson,
519, 790; Katzenbach, 603; Rusk,
91, 560, 563
U.S. officials, preoccupation with,
question of (Bundy), 356
U.S. politics, bipartisan issue under:
Lodge, 467; Rusk, 415
Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
U.S. presidential elections, effect on
Communist position : Johnson,
777; Lodge, 468
U.S. public opinion: Bunker, 750;
Gronouski, 432; Johnson, 519,
776, 777, 778; Lodge, 464;
E. V. Rostow, 605, 607; Rusk,
345, 387, 555, 559, 600
U.S.-Vietnamese relations: Lilienthal,
867; Rusk, 557-558; Westmore-
land, 787
Vietnamese Army: Bundy, 284, 353;
Bunker, 750, 782; Johnson, 777;
Katzenbach, 603; Lodge, 466,
468; Rusk, 346; Westmoreland,
787
Vietnamese character and goals: John-
son, 521 ; Lilienthal, 865, 866
Visit of presidential advisers Clifford
jmd Taylor, 256
Visit of Vice-President Humphrey, 789
World opinion: 745; Johnson, 520;
Rusk, 347, 705
World peace, importance to: Gold-
berg, 671; Johnson, 520, 852;
Rusk, 564
Viklund, Daniel, 91
Visas:
Romania, agreement re issuance of
visas to diplomatic and non-
diplomatic personnel, 81
U.S. travel restrictions to Middle
East amended, 41
Volunteer Service, International Secre-
tariat for. Executive order, 207
Volunteers to America: 235; Palmer,
658
w
War on Hunger (set also Food and pop-
ulation crisis): Johnson, 762; Rusk,
209, 254, 801; Waters, 765
War on Poverty: Linowitz, 323, 618;
Rusk, 857; Trowbridge, 504
Warsaw Pact: Cleveland, 143; Leddy,
761
Washington, George (quoted), 333
Watanabe, Takeshi (Rusk), 458
Water resources:
Management of, need for coopera-
tion (Rusk), 738
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in develop-
ment of water resources, 682
Viet-Nam (Lilienthal), 865
Water for Peace Office, interim
director (Woodward), 245
Waters, Herbert J., 764
West Point (Johnson), 780
Western European Union (Rusk), 856
Western Samoa, International Wheat
Agreement, 1967 protocol for the
extension of, ratification, 270
Westmoreland, William C: 785; Bunk-
er, 750, 751; Lodge, 466; Mc-
Namara, 168
Whaling:
International convention (1946),
amendments to schedule, en-
trance into force, 590
Whaling Commission, International,
U.S. commissioner, announce-
ment, 586
Wheat:
Research, Mexico: Diaz Ordaz, 675;
Gaud, 582; Johnson, 674, 683
Wheat — Continued
Treaties, agreements, etc. :
EEC, agreement re suspension of
agreements concerning quality
wheat and other grains, 245
International Grains Agreement: 45,
95; Freeman, 133; Johnson, 716;
Roth, 124
International Wheat Agreement
(1962):
Protocol for further extension of:
Germany (including Berlin), 26
1967 protocol for further exten-
sion of: Australia, 153; Bar-
bados, 190, 309; Belgium (for
Belgium-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union), 117; Canada,
153; Ecuador, 190; Germany,
Guatemala, 153; Haiti, 270;
Israel, 153, 662; Italy, Japan,
153; Korea, 117; Libya, 153,
337; Mexico, 26; Nigeria, 770;
Peru, 590; Portugal, 190; Spain,
309; Tunisia, 190; Venezuela,
405; Western Samoa, 270
Wheat trade convention (1967):
Johnson, 716
Current actions: Argentina, 845;
Australia, 728; Belgium, 769;
Canada, 728; Denmark, 809,
845; EEC, Finland, France,
845; Germany, 769; Greece,
India, Ireland, Israel, 845,
Italy (as EEC member State),
809; Japan, 728; Korea, Leb-
anon, 845; Luxembourg, 770;
Mexico, 845; Netherlands, 770;
Norway, Pakistan, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Spain, 845; Sweden, 809; Switz-
erland, 845; Tunisia, 728; U.K.,
845; U.S., 728
U.S. additional shipments to India
authorized (Johnson), 430
U.S. stocks, decrease in (Gold-
schmidt), 305
White, William Allen (E. V. Rostow),
606
Whitman, Walt (quoted), 571
WHO. See World Health Organization
Wiesner, Jerome B. (McNamara), 448
WUlis, David K., 353
Winters, Robert, 46
Wirtz, W. Willard, 455
WMO. See World Meteorological Or-
ganization
Women:
Political rights, convention (1953):
Chile, 729; Costa Rica, 405
Status of women:
Iran (Shah Pahlavi), 361
U.N. commission, 20th session,
report (TUlett), 218
Woods, George D. (quoted), 678
Woodward, Robert R., 245
World Bank. See International Bank
of Reconstruction and Develop-
ment
World Food Problem, The: 76n, 307n, 874n;
Johnson, 78; Katzenbach, 533
World Food Program (Goldschmidt),
306
World grains arrangement. See Inter-
national grains arrangement
INDEX, JULY TO DECEMBER 1967
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402
OFFICIAI. BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
World Health Organization:
Constitution, 1946, as amended:
Lesotho, 270
Amendment to article 7: Barbados,
270; Cameroon, 514; Costa Rica,
117; Peru, 221; Saudi Arabia, 26
World Law Day, 1967, proclsimation,
171
World Meteorological Organization :
Goldberg, 723; Rusk, 739
Convention (1947): Barbados, 438;
Botswana, 624; Panama, 438
World order: 615, 709; Brzezinski, 19;
Bundy, 285; Johnson, 631, 633,
655; Linowitz, 616; E. V. Rostow,
609; W. W. Rostow, 66; Rusk,
91,600
Interdependence of modern world:
Hammarskjold (quoted), 265;
Johnson, 325; Katzenbach, 334;
E. V. Rostow, 423, 605; Rusk,
252, 452, 735, 807
U.S. influence: Brzezinski, 21;
Humphrey, 790; Johnson, 303;
Kaplan, 234; Rusk, 735
World peace: 745; Goldberg, 483; E.
V. Rostow, 425; Rusk, 87, 91, 704,
735; Sato, 744
Arab-Israeli conflict, threat to: Gold-
berg, 4, 13, 108, 216; Johnson,
33; E. V. Rostow, 237
World peace — Continued
Economic considerations: Humphrey,
792; Katzenbach, 334; Linowitz,
323; Rusk, 254, 737; Waters, 765
Inter-American system, importance to
(Linowitz), 321
Law of treaties, importance to (Kear-
ney), 721
NATO, importance to, 329
U.N. Charter principles and U.S.
support: Goldberg, 216, 264;
Rusk, 252, 560, 564, 737, 824
U.S. commitments, importance to:
Johnson, 519; Kaplan, 234; Katz-
enbach, 604; E. V. Rostow, 608;
Rusk, 255, 347, 703, 704, 857
U.S.-Soviet-Japan discussions, Mans-
field proposal (Rusk), 456
U.S.-Soviet responsibilities: Johnson,
35, 38, 59; Katzenbach, 819; E.
V. Rostow, 428; Rusk, 160
U.S. support: Johnson, 16, 31, 328,
522, 571, 747, 851, 853; Katzen-
bach, 820; E. V. Rostow, 237,
605; Rusk, 215, 452, 564, 739, 821
Viet-Nam, importance of U.S. com-
mitments (Johnson), 520
World Law Day, 1967, proclamation,
171
World War II, lessons of (Rusk), 251,
253, 343, 704, 737, 824, 857
World Weather Watch (Rusk), 739
Worsthorne, Peregrine (quoted), 231
Wyndham White, Eric (Roth), 125
Xauthopoulos-Palamas, Christian, 507
Yemen, U.S. travel restrictions
amended, 459
Yemen, Southern, U.S. diplomatic
recognition, 861
Yingling, Raymond T., 475
York, Herbert F. (McNamara), 448
Yoshida, Shigeru (Johnson), 660
Young, Stephen M. (Johnson), 42
Yugoslavia :
Ambassador to U.S., 362
Treaties, agreements, etc., 26, 222,
270, 405, 589, 625, 846
U.S. cotton textile agreement, an-
nouncement, 586
Zambia, Geneva convention (1949) re
protection of civilian persons in
time of war, adherence, 698
a U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE ; 1968 O — 289-936
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. U62
July S, 1967
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONTINUES DEBATE ON NEAR EAST;
SOVIET PROPOSAL CONDEMNING ISRAEL REJECTED
Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Texts of Resolutions 3
THE MARSHALL PLAN: FROM THE RECONSTRUCTION
TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harrhnan 17
THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
by Zbigniew Brzezinshi 19
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1462 Publication 8255
July 3, 1967
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and the Foreign Service,
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U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near East; Soviet
Proposal Condemning Israel Rejected
Following are statements made on June 10,
IS, and 14. in the U.N. Security Council hy U.S.
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg'^ and the
text of a letter he sent to the Secretary-General
on June 9, together with texts of resolutions
adopted hy the Council on June 12 and H, a
revised U.8. draft resolution subnvitted on
June 14 which remain^s before the Council, and a
revised Soviet draft resolution submitted on
June 13 which failed to obtain the required votes
for adoption.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 10
U.S./U.N. press release 98
Mr. President, it has been the consistent view
of my Government from the very beginning of
this conflict that this Security Council should
have a single goal : to quench the flames of war
in the Near East and to begin to move toward
peace in the area. And throughout our delib-
eration of this subject, we have attempted by all
the means at our disposal to expedite the action
of this Council and the action of the United Na-
tions in this direction. This is our task. This is
what we should be devoting ourselves to with
all of the resources at our command.
Instead of that, Mr. President, much of the
time of this Council is devoted to diatribes
against my country about alleged involvement
in this conflict. I have stated many times, and
I again wish to state, that the United States is
in no way involved in this conflict but on the
contrary has used its influence here and diplo-
matically in the interests of first avoiding the
conflict and then bringing it to an end.
' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg In
the Security Council on June 6, 8, and 9, see BtrLLETiN
of June 26, 1967, p. 934.
We have done more than make statements to
the Council in this regard. We have offered to
have unpartial observers of the United Nations
make a determination with respect to the charges
that have been made. I have not heard from
those who make the charges any willingness on
their part to subscribe to this point of view. And
yet, what better proof can there be of lack of
involvement than a willingness to have charges
of this type, which are false and which are mali-
cious, put to the test of impartial observation?
In fact, I pointed out what was quite clear —
that, with respect to the canard that the 6th
Fleet was involved in this exercise, there was
another country with naval craft in the vicinity
which could enlighten the Council about this
situation. It is perfectly obvious what I was
referring to in that connection.
Here again tonight we have another illustra-
tion of this, and all I can say again, and I wiU
continue to say it, is that there is no involve-
ment on the part of the United States, that we
are quite willing to have the charges that were
made investigated impartially, and that it does
not serve the cause of peace to repeat these base-
less charges.
Now, Mr. President, we were the ones who
proposed last night that we should receive re-
ports and we welcome very much the reports
that we are receiving. We very much appreciate
the straightforward way in which our distin-
guished Secretary-General has rendered these
reports, in which he has pointed out the facts
and pointed out their limitations and has urged
for further facts so this Council can act
appropriately.
We do, however, have some facts before us,
and we have indicated throughout a willingness
to act upon such facts and to act in an even-
handed and impartial way. Indeed, we have
tried to make it very clear that it is the obliga-
JULT 3, 1967
tion of both Israel and Syria to strictly comply
with the cease-fire order. This is the first fact.
It is not the final task of this Council, but it is
the essential first task.
We have a very grave situation in the Middle
East. To rebuild the fabric of peace in the area
is going to be very difficult. We all know that.
To quench the flames of war is very difiicult. We
ought first of all to have a stopping of all mili-
tary activity, an end to the conflict. This is the
first and primary task and not the last task.
We will have to go on to other matters which
were mentioned in the resolution ^ we tabled
before the Security Council.
Now, it does not help to have invective in this
situation. Invective does not take the place of
progress. And I should like to make it very
clear that it has not been my practice at any
time in the United Nations to impugn the ve-
racity or integrity of any representative of the
U.N. representing his country. But when
charges are made against the United States
that have no foundation, it is the plain obliga-
tion of the representative of the United States
to rebut those charges and to place before the
Council the facts — or the means of verifying
the facts.
There is another thing which I mentioned
earlier which I think is very clear, and that is
that I respect the right of every member of this
Council to represent his coimtry. I do not im-
ply that any member of tlie Council in appear-
ing here represents anybody else other than his
country. Wlien remarks are made that tlie rep-
resentative of the United States speaks for
some country other than his own, it is that type
of remark to which I take strong exception —
and I think justifiably so. Such a remark is
not one which should be countenanced by an
international organization. We speak for our
countries. We state their policies, and we at-
tempt to the best of our abilities to present the
point of view of our countries to this Coimcil.
That is the responsibility of every member, and
I respect any member wlio does that with all
the energy and vigor at his command.
Now, that is all I meant when I made the
statement that I made this morning. I will not
accept from anybody a concept that in speak-
' U.N. doc. S/7952/Rev. 2 ; for backgrounfl, see Bul-
letin of June 26, 1967, pp. 941 and 943 ; for text of a
third revision, see p. 12.
ing here I speak from any other basis than the
interests of the United States of America,
whom I proudly represent before this Council,
and any indication to the contrary I will not
t-olerate; nor do I think any diplomatic body
should tolerate it, because it is inconsistent with
the attitude that we owe each other as col-
leagues at the United Nations.
Now, we are dealing with the cease-fire order
immediately. That is the problem we have at
hand. That is why we have been called into
session twice today. And our concern must be
that that cease-fire must be recognized. Both
Syria and Israel have given General Bull [Lt.
Gen. Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United
Nations Truce Supervision Organization]
solemn assurances that they accept the cease-
fire and will fully implement it.
It is a source of encouragement to me that,
from the Secretary-General's reports, inci-
dents of violation — except those that occurred
possibly within a few minutes after this agree-
ment was made witli General Bull — are not
being repeated. I sincerely hope that this is so,
and I await more detailed reports of the Secre-
tary-General so that we can determine that
hopefully now at least — and it should have
been earlier — ^the cease-fire is in effect.
Now, this morning I was prepared to table a
resolution, even on the basis of the fragmen-
tary information we had, condemning any
violation of the cease-fire by any source. It is
interesting to me that while we are accused of
being involved — which we are not — those who
make that accusation never make reference to
their condemnation of a violation of the cease-
fire if it comes from any source other than those
whose cause they advocate. We are advocating
the cause of peace in this Security Council, and I
we are advocating the cause of respect for the
cease-fire orders of this Council. And my Gov- J
ernment takes the position that the cease-fire I
orders must be complied with — I repeat, must f
be complied with. To that end, Mr. President, '
I table the following resolution : '
The Security Council,
Having heard the reports of the Secretary-General
on the current situation,
Gravely concerned at reports and complaints it has '
received of air attaclts, shelling, ground activities and i
other violations of the cease-fire between Israel and '
Syria,
' U.N. doc. S/7971.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIII
1. Condemns any and all violations of tbe cease-fire ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to order a full in-
Testigation of all reports of violations and to report to
the Security Council as soon as possible;
3. Demands that the parties scrupulously respect its
cease-fire appeals contained in resolutions 233, 234 and
235;'
4. Calls on the Governments concerned to issue cate-
goric instructions to all military forces to cease all
firing and military activities as required by these
resolutions.
FIRST STATEMENT OF JUNE 13
U.S./D-N. press release 102, Corr. 1
The United States has introduced a draft
resolution (S/7952) which we believe holds the
hope of the lasting peace in the Near East. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has sub-
mitted a revised draft resolution (S/7951)
which its distinguished representative has
talked about today.
I propose, in the interests of furthering the
debate and consideration by the Council today,
to discuss both resolutions — not in the spirit of
invective which regrettably has characterized
our debates of the past several days but on the
merits, because of the grave seriousness of the
problem and because of the necessity for this
Council to arrive at a sober and considered
judgment of what its responsibilities are in the
area.
Throughout the 19 years since the admission
of Israel to the United Nations, the United
States has supported many attempts to resolve
the underlying causes of tension and instability
between the Arab states and Israel. We have
sought to assure acceptance of the political in-
dependence and territorial integrity of all states
in the area — Arab states and Israel alike — all
members entitled to the protection of the char-
ter. And we have also sought for an end to acts
of force of whatever kind, acts which also are
hostile to the spirit and intent of the charter.
We have sought an equitable and humani-
tarian solution of the problem of the Palestin-
ian refugees; we have supported plans for the
development of the resources of the Jordan
Eiver in a way which will help all states and
do harm to none. We have pressed for recogni-
tion of the rights of all nations, including
Israel, to free and innocent passage of the Suez
Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. And, above all,
we have sought the conversion of the armistice
of 1949 into a permanent peace, as contemplated
in the General Armistice Agreements them-
selves.
And we have not changed our views or poli-
cies about the entire situation because of the un-
fortunate events which have occurred recently.
Virtually all our efforts, as we know, have not
succeeded. The Near East has lived for 19 years
in a state of tension which now, for the third
time, has erupted into war. The evenhanded ef-
forts of the United States to prevent and end
the present violence and the past violence are
spread on the record of the United Nations and
of international diplomacy for all to read.
The depth of our commitment was made man-
ifest in 1956 at the time of the Suez crisis. And
more recently it was made evident again in the
evenhanded approach of the United States to-
ward border incidents in 1966. We supported
a call in the Security Council, also supported
by the great majority of the members, on the
Syrian Government to restrain terrorist raids
laimched from its territory.^ Then in November
1966 we joined in the unanimous censure of
Israel for its retaliatory raid against Es-Samu
in Jordan.^ I need scarcely recall to this Coun-
cil that it was the Soviet veto which prevented
the milder action of the Council directed against
Syria from being adopted.
It may also be instructive to recall one as-
pect of the course of events in the past month
leading directly to the outbreak of the fighting,
an aspect which has not been fully or adequately
discussed in the Council but which I am im-
pelled to do by virtue of some of the remarks
by the distinguished representative of the So-
viet Union today.
In early May of this year reports were cir-
culated in Syria and the United Arab Republic
of a supposed Israeli buildup on the borders of
Syria, allegedly backed by the United States
and aimed at the overthrow of the Syrian
Government.
President Nasser recently revealed one source
from which his Government heard this inflam-
matory rumor; namely, Moscow. Yet, Secre-
tary-General U Thant on May 19 ' stated that
* For texts, see Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 947.
' For background, see ibid., Dec. 26, 1966, p. 969.
' Ibid., p. 974.
' U.N. doc. S/7896 and Corr. 1.
JULY 3, 1967
United Nations observers had found no evidence
to support the charges of an alleged Israeli mili-
tary buildup in the area. And indeed, he could
not have reported any complicity on the part of
the United States, for such complicity was non-
existent.
And let me remind this Council that wliile
these inflammatory charges, inspired by Mos-
cow, were inciting the situation in the Near
East, the Soviet representative's only answer to
my country's call for urgent action by this
Council was a complaint that we were "drama-
tizing" the situation. He should know better
than anybody what "dramatizing" means.
This totally false accusation of a U.S.-Israeli
plot helped substantially to inflame the crisis
in which Israel and Egypt confronted each
other for the first time in 10 years across bor-
ders no longer patrolled by the United Nations.
On May 17, as the world well remembers,
President Nasser, citing the supposed danger
of an Israeli invasion of Syria, requested the
withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency
Force. And when UNEF vacated Sharm el-
Sheik, the United Arab Republic immediately
reimposed its blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba,
after 10 years of free and peaceful navigation.
Now, these are the facts, Mr. President. The
whole world community knows this. We in
the Council, above all others, are fully conver-
sant with them.
Throughout this entire period, the United
States of America in the Security Council, as
its reports disclose, and in all its diplomatic
activity urged the utmost restraint on all par-
ties. We exerted every effort to prevent an out-
break of hostilities and to assure that vital
international maritime rights in the Gulf of
Aqaba would be respected.
Unfortunately, our urgent efforts to convene
the Security Council and to get the Security
Council to act before an outbreak of hostilities
were stalled by other powei-s who chose to ridi-
cule the seriousness of the situation, who failed
to support our urgent efforts to find a peaceful
solution. And as a result, largely through Soviet
obstruction, the Security Council — ^between its
first meeting on May 24 and the outbreak of
fighting on June 5 — was unable to pass a single
resolution or take any effective action to j^revent
an outbreak.
And throughout this time, the whole area re-
mained a tmderbox ; armies were mobilized and
poised for war, and inexorably war came. And
from the outset of the fighting, the United
States immediately sought a cease-fire, and sup-
ported efforts made by our distinguished Presi-
dent and others in the same direction. The
record of the meetings of the Security Council
shows clearly who obstructed the cease-fire — the
first indispensable step to bringing the conflict
to an end — and why it took 2 days to adopt a
simple cease-fire resolution, wliich should have
been adopted immediately and without debate.
The record also shows that, regardless of the,
sponsor, the United States speedily supported
the second cease-fire resolution, which was pro-
posed by the Soviet Union. After that, however,
again precious time was wasted in protracted
debate and in negotiations before a tliird cease-
fire resolution applying to the situation in Syria i
could be adopted. This was true even though
here also the United States was ready to acti
inmiediatfily and had in fact sought to antici-
pate the situation the previous day by support-
ing a resolution condemning violations of thei
cease-fire and, indeed, proposing to sponsor such i
a resolution.
Now, fortimately — and belatedly — a cease-fira
is in effect. But we cannot rest there. The cease-i
fire, as we have repeatedly said, is no more than
the first essential step in this Council's duty.
Our charter responsibility is the maintenance
of international peace and security. The guns
are mercifully silent in the Near East today. Bui
that region is still a long, long way from the
true peace or from true security.
The question now facing the Security Coun-
cil, therefore, is simply this : Wliat is the next
step we must take toward peace and security
for the nations of the Near East ? Wliere do we
go from here ? Not where do we further debate,
or exchange recriminations or invective — but
where do we go from here? |
There are two answers to this question pro- I
posed before the Council. That is, that of the '
Soviet Union in its resolution and that of the |
United States.
Before stating the case for my Government's
proposal, I would like to comment briefly on
that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet's proposal j
could be stated in simple terms as follows : Con- I
demn Israel for its aggression ; Israel, with-
draw your troops and let everything go back to /
exactly where it was before the fighting began j
on Jime 5. In other words, the film is to be rim j
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
backward through the camera to that point in
the early morning on June 5 when hostilities
had not yet broken out.
But what would the situation be?
Once again, opposing forces are to stand m
direct confrontation poised for combat. Once
again, there is to be no international machinery
to keep them apart. Once again, Aqaba is to be
blockaded for the free and innocent passage of
all maritime nations. And once again, nothing
is to be done to resolve the deep-lying griev-
ances on both sides that have fed the fires of
conflict in the Near East for 20 years. And
significantly, once again, there is no bar to an
arms race in the area which has so substantially
contributed to tension in that region.
If there was ever a prescription for renewed
hostilities, the Soviet resolution is that prescrip-
tion. I do hope that the U.S.S.R. does not con-
template with equanimity the prospect of a
fourth round in the Arab-Israel struggle. This
is precisely what this Council should concert its
eiforts to avoid.
Let us recall that the General Armistice
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that
their purpose is, and I quote : ". . . to facilitate
the transition from the present truce to penna-
nent peace" — I repeat, "permanent peace" — "in
Palestine."
We all know that there has been no transition
and there is no permanent peace in that area at
all. On the contrary, there is war. A bandage
was applied to the wound 18 years ago, but the
wound has never been allowed to heal. It is still
an open and festering wound today. All of the
18 years of the armistice regime have witnessed
virtually no progress on any of the basic issues
from which the conflict arose. As long as these
issues are unresolved, they will continue to en-
venom the political life of the Near East.
The Soviet proposal does not encompass a
genuine approach to their solution; it cannot
lead toward peace. Mr. President, it is rather a
big step backward toward another war.
What the Near East needs today are new steps
toward real peace, not just a cease-fire, which
is what we have today ; not just a fragile and
perilous armistice, which is what we have had
for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which is nec-
essary but insufficient.
Real peace must be our aim. And in that con-
viction my delegation submitted last Thurs-
day— even before the cease-fire became fully
effective — a draft resolution [S/7952/Rev. 2]
from which I shall now read the most important
provision :
The Security Council, . . .
Calls for discussions promptly thereafter (that is,
after the cease-fire) among the parties concerned, using
such third party or United Nations assistance as they
may wish, looliing toward the establishment of viable
arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and dis-
engagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of
force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital
international rights and the establishment of a stable
and durable peace in the Middle East.
Our objective in making this proposal is to
encourage a decision by the warring parties to
live together in peace and to secure interna-
tional assistance to this end. It is necessary to
begin to move — not some day but now,
promptly, while the memory of these tragic
events is still vivid in our minds — toward a full
settlement of all outstanding questions. And I
again repeat "all outstanding questions" be-
tween the parties, such as the resolutions the
United Nations has contemplated for nearly
20 years.
There are legitimate grievances on all sides of
this bitter conflict, and a full settlement should
deal equitably with all legitimate grievances and
all outstanding questions, from whichever side
they are raised. In short, Mr. President, a new
foundation for peace must be built in the Middle
East.
Doubtless, agreements between the parties on
these profoundly contentious matters will take
a long time, but the United Nations, speaking
through this Council, has an urgent obligation
to facilitate them and to rebuild an atmosphere
in which fruitful discussions will be possible.
That is the purpose of the resolution we have
submitted.
Mr. President, the Security Council is now
faced with a clear-cut issue : We can either at-
tack the causes of the disease which has
plagued the Near East with war three times in
a generation or we can go back to the treatment
of symptoms, which has proved such a dismal
failure in the past. And, in this, we should
adopt a simple pragmatic rule from what the
medical advisers of all of us tell us, "You can't
cure cancer with a band-aid."
Now, Mr. President, in this grave situation,
fraught with so many differences of opinions
and attitudes, the tendency is to say that it de-
fies solution. But we cannot accept this type of
JtJLT 3, 1967
counsel. Let us rather say that no one can say
that sohitions are impossible. The sad fact is
that for many years they have not been really
fearlessly tried. And now, at the end of this
tragic week of war, let us remember the death
and suffering of all the parties of war, and let
us open the way for solutions that will be suf-
ficiently enduring and sufficiently just to be an
acceptable monument to their sacrifice and to
the pledge that is contained in the Charter of
the United Nations.
Now, Mr. President, in dealing with this sub-
ject, since we are here in New York, we are
constantly reminded by various spokesmen, in-
cluding my good friend the distinguished
representative of Jordan, Ambassador [Mu-
hammad H.] El-Farra, of American public
opinion. And, again, I should like to make
something very explicitly clear. I do not apolo-
gize in any sense for the expression by any
American group of their point of ^aew about
this problem, whether it is the Action Commit-
tee on American- Arab Kelations headed by Dr.
[M. T.] Mehdi, who met with me, or by the
head of any Zionist organization.
Our Constitution- — and we are very proud of
it — permits free expression of opinion by our
citizens. The other day we witnessed a vivid
demonstration of the character of the American
Constitution. The Arab-American Society had
its demonstration, peaceful demonstration, in
front of the White House, and so did various
Zionist and Jewish groups. Both were per-
mitted, both took place peaceably under our
Constitution; and both are permissible under
our system of government. We are proud of this.
We do not in any way apologize for this, and
we do not in any way apologize for what any
person says in our country about any matter
of public opinion.
I should say, for Ambassador El-Farra's in-
formation, that very often public opinion ex-
pressed in America is not public opinion which
is exactly complimentary of our Government;
and yet whether it is complimentary or not, it is
the entire basis of our society that our citizens
should have a right to express themselves freely
on all issues. "The right of comment, the right
of dissent," our Supreme Court said, "is a right
of American citizens both in times of peace and
in times of war, and is our most precious
heritage."
I should also like to say again in this Council
that I do not think it appropriate — and I shall
say it again and again — or that it serves the
causes of debate to refer to comments made by
various citizens or individuals or public officials.
It is legitimate, I have said, and I repeat, to
comment upon the foreign policy of our Gov-
ernment, the declarations made by the Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, myself, and others
who have responsibility for enunciating the for-
eign policy of our Government.
When other officials in the American Govern-
ment, in the legislative branch — and I will be
very precise, Senator [Robert F.] Kennedy,
Governor [Nelson] Rockefeller, or anybody
else — express themselves, they are also exercis-
ing their rights as public officials and American
citizens. And I don't think the time of the Coim-
cil ought to be spent in debating the views of
our officials or entering into our domestic affairs.
What is more relevant, if I may say so, with due
respect to them, is the decision that is stated in
this Council on behalf of the American
Government.
Now, reference has been made to the attack on
our ship Liberty. I stated in this Council, in the
strongest terms, the protest of our Government
against that attack, and we have renewed that
protest in the strongest terms to the Israeli au-
thorities. We regard that attack to be an un-
justified attack. And I have welcomed expres-
sions made by some, but not by all, of the
members of the Council expressing regret about
the lives we have lost in this conflict, just as I
have expressed regret about the lives of all other
personnel lost in this conflict, including the lives
of the combatants themselves. Because, surely,
we must express regret about all bloodshed and
loss of life in this conflict.
And now I should like also to address myself
to some other comments that have been made.
We do have, in the aftermath of the fighting,
an urgent responsibility to see that the Council
takes all action within its jiower to protect those
already victimized by this war. There are solemn
obligations which we must recall concerning the
treatment of victims of war under the 1949
Geneva convention; in particular, the obliga-
tions concerned with civilian populations, as the
distinguished representative of Argentina, Dr.
[Jose Maria] Ruda, pointed out on June 11.
These are particularly relevant in light of the
reports we have heard of the movement from
their homes of civilian populations, many of
them refugees from earlier conflicts.
I have already expressed in this Council my
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Government's concern for the welfare and
safety of the populations of the west bank of the
Jordan. Our concern includes all who might find
themselves in areas of the Near East disrupted
by this conflict and, particularly, those who now
find themselves in areas under Israeli control.
The United Nations, through its resolutions
establishing the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency, assumed particular responsi-
bility for the refugees of the 1947-48 fighting.
We supported this resolution and the subsequent
resolutions renewing its mandate. We have been
the principal contributor to the work of
UNRWA and, therefore, have a legitimate con-
cern that the refugees of the 1947—48 conflict be
treated with the humanitarian concern to which
they are entitled. And we also have the equal
concern that other civilians displaced during the
recent conflict from their homes, and particu-
larly those on the west bank of the Jordan, will
be allowed and encouraged to return to their
homes and that all civilians will be provided
with adequate assurance of their safety in the
same locations in which they resided before hos-
tilities began. We urge all concerned, and par-
ticularly the Government of Israel, to exert
every possible effort to this end.
Mr. President, we have taken the first step
in the cease-fire, and, commendably, the cease-
fire is holding. We have many tasks to perform
in bringing about a just and equitable solution,
which the Secretary-General has so strongly
stressed to us in his report, so needed in this
troubled area of the world. Let us pursue these
tasks in a spirit of perhaps the greatest Ajner-
ican President, Abraham Lincoln : "With mal-
ice toward none, with charity for all." And let
us bind up the wounds of this conflict and bring
peace, the most precious gift of all, to all the
people in the area.
SECOND STATEMENT OF JUNE 13
U.S. /U.N. press release 103
I shall try to be very brief. The representa-
tive of the United Arab Republic, our esteemed
friend and colleague Ambassador El Kony, this
evening repeated unwarranted allegations that
the United States supported and encouraged the
recent hostilities in the Middle East and was
guilty of collusion. That is simply not true. No
member of this Council has made greater efforts
than the United States, both in the Coimcil and
outside the Council, to prevent this conflict. The
United States simply has not intervened in any
way in this conflict. That, perhaps, is also my
reply to what our friend and colleague Ambas-
sador El-Farra has said. I had not assumed that
any intervention of any sort by the United
States would have been regarded as appropriate
or proper in the circumstances of the present
conflict.
As for the remarks of the representative of
Syria, Ambassador [George J.] Tomeh, who has
asserted the idea that the Israeli military estab-
lishment has been sustained by United States
military and economic aid, the fact is that
United States military aid to the Arab states in
the last 20 years has been more than 10 times
the amount of United States military aid to
Israel. I repeat, more than 10 times the amount.
As for economic aid afforded by the United
States Government, the amount given to Arab
states in the past 20 years has been almost three
times that given to Israel ; and this aid has been
made available as part of our desire to main-
tain friendly and cooperative relations with all
countries in the area.
It is true that many United States citizens
have made generous gifts to Israel. That is their
right as individuals. And it is also true, if we
want to keep the record completely straight,
that the Arab states have received substantial
aid, both economic and military, from the Soviet
Union, which Israel has not. This is also a joart
of the record of the past 20 years.
But really, all of these things have no bearing
immediately on the basic point : that tlie United
States Goverimient, as a matter of public pol-
icy, has helped both the Arab states and Israel
over the past 20 years and that the amount
accorded to the Arab states has been substan-
tially greater than that accorded to Israel.
It is our desire — and I said this earlier in the
debate — to have the economic conditions of the
whole area improved and to play a constructive
role in the improvement of those economic con-
ditions in the entire area.
With respect to the statements made by our
colleague Ambassador Fedorenko [Nikolai T.
Fedorenko, of the Soviet Union], he has given
a most distorted interpretation to our draft
resolution. If I heard him correctly, he said that
unless the territorial demands of Israel on the
United Arab Republic, Syria, and Jordan are
met, there will be an explosive situation and
war — that this is the effect of our draft resolu-
JtTLT 3, 1967
tion. This is, to say the least, a gross and flagrant
distortion of our draft resolution and the state-
ment I made to the Council, which speaks for
itself, and our desire to bring about the condi-
tions that can create the basis for a just, equi-
table, and peaceful solution to the conflict.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 14
D.S./U.N. press release 104
Mr. President, I shall be very glad to respond
to your request. There are, in fact, three United
States proposals before the Council.
One is in document S/7916/Eev. 1,* to which
you, Mr. President, have referred, which was our
initial proposal designed to prevent the out-
break of hostilities by endorsing the appeal of
the Secretary-General. A number of members
at that time were unwilling to support the Sec-
retary-General's appeal and the subsequent out-
break of hostilities has put this resolution out
of date. "We vtdll not press it to the vote.
The second is in document S/7971. We intro-
duced it last Saturday to demand scrupulous re-
spect for the cease-fire and to call for categoric
instructions to military commanders. It was de-
nounced by the Soviet Union for reasons I
foimd inexplicable at the time — and still find
inexplicable. A resolution with identical ob-
jectives was adopted the next day " at the recom-
mendation of you, Mr. President. The United
States will therefore not press this resolution
(S/7971) to the vote, either.
The third United States resolution is our
substantive proposal contained in document
S/7952/Kev. 2. We have just submitted a tliird
revision to this draft, which has just been cir-
culated and has just been referred to by our
distinguished colleague Ambassador Ignatieff
[George Ignatieff, of Canada] .
This United States proposal, whose purpose
I explained in detail yesterday, is still before
the Security Council. My delegation will not
ask for a vote on this resolution today, because
several delegations have indicated to us that
they desire more time for all members to con-
sider carefully enough all of tlie complicated
ingredients which must go into a truly mean-
■ For text, see Bulletin of .Tune 26, 1967, p. 948.
'U.N. doc. S/RES/236 (1967) ; for text, see p. 11.
ingful next step toward peace in the Middle
East. And some members have indicated that
they will wish to suggest certain changes in our
text. The distinguislied representative of Ethi-
opia [Lij Endalkachew Makonnen] has made a
particularly eloquent plea earlier today that we
not press this resolution to a vote.
Mr. President, I want the Council to know
that although we have proposed a resolution
which expresses our sincere convictions in the
matter, we are open minded and will be glad
to consider constructive suggestions for im- ■
provement in the United States text. Indeed,
many constructive contributions liave been made
in the course of our debate as to how best we
may deal with this subject, and we have been
carefully weighing and considering these pro-
posals which have been made.
Our objective is what we have achieved so
far, and that is not to force votes but to achieve
unanimity on the best course of action that the
Council can follow to bring about peace in the
Middle East, just as we have been able to achieve
unanimity under difficult conditions on the
cease-fire resolutions we have adopted.
We must remember that a cease-fire is in
effect, and admittedly the process of consulta-
tion, conciliation, and accommodation of view-
points as to the next important steps takes time,
and we are ready to agree that the appropriate
time should be granted for this purpose.
We recognize the urgency of the matter, and
I think we have demonstrated for 3 weeks our
willingness to deal urgently with this situation.
But we think it perfectly apparent to all con-
cerned that the Council has far from exhausted
its possibility of contributing to the construction
of a stable peace in the Middle East. The fact
is that we are not at the end of our work. We
are only at the beginning.
Now, despite this, we are not going to stand
in the way of a request by a permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council for consideration
of a resolution that a permanent member puts
before the Security Council. This is quite con-
sistent with the views that the United States
delegation has always taken — that if a member,
permanent or nonpermanent, desires an urgent
meeting, an urgent meeting should take place;
if a member, permanent or nonpermanent, de-
sires to put to a vote a proposition, that is its
privilege. We are prepared to vote on the resolu-
tion put to us by the distinguished representa-
tive of the Soviet Union [S/7951/Rev. 2].
10
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUI-LETIlf
i
LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
TO U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL
U.S./U.N. press release 90 dated June 9
June 9, 1967
Dear Mk. Secretary General : My Govern-
ment wishes to make it umnistakably clear to all
members of the United Nations that the United
States has not engaged in any form of military
operations on behalf of the Government of
Israel during the present crisis in the Middle
East. On Jmie 6, 1967 I stated in the Security
Coimcil : "
"During the past twenty-four hours, fantastic allega-
tions have been made about United States aircraft be-
ing involved in the hostilities in the Near East. These
allegations are totally v^ithout foundation in fact. They
are made up out of w^hole cloth.
"I take this opportunity in the Security Coimcil on
the complete authority of the United States Govern-
ment to deny them categorically without any ifs, ands
or huts. Indeed, yesterday morning June 5, within
hours after first hearing such charges my Government
denied them in a formal statement issued by the De-
partment of Defense which I now quote :
'There have been reports that U.S. aircraft from
aircraft carriers assigned to the Sixth Fleet have flown
to Israeli airfields. Other reports have stated that Sixth
Fleet aircraft have participated in air activities else-
where in the area of conflict. All such reports are
erroneous. All Sixth Fleet aircraft are and have been
several hundred miles from the area of conflict.' "
To establish the good faith of my Govern-
ment, I stated :
"In these circumstances, my Government considers it
necessary to take prompt steps to prevent the further
spread of these dangerous falsehoods. With this in
mind, I am authorized to announce in this Council and
propose two concrete measures :
"The United States is prepared, first, to cooperate in
an immediate impartial investigation of these charges
by the United Nations, and to offer all facilities to the
United Nations in this investigation. And second, as a
part of, or in addition to such an investigation, the
United States is prepared to invite United Nations
personnel aboard our aircraft carriers in the Mediter-
ranean today, tomorrow, or at the convenience of the
United Nations to serve as impartial observers of the
activities of our planes in the area and to verify the
past activities of our planes from our official records
and from the log that each ship carries. These ob-
servers in addition will be free to interview air crews
on these carriers without inhibition so as to determine
their activities during the days in question. Their
presence as observers on these carriers will be wel-
comed throughout the period of this crisis and so long
as these ships are in the Eastern waters of the
Mediterranean."
I should like to request that you circulate this
letter to all members of the United Nations as a
Security Council docmnent.
With the highest consideration.
Kespectfully yours,
Abthur J. Goldberg
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
Resolution of June 12^^
The Security Council,
Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-
General on the situation between Israel and Syria, made
at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and
the supplemental information supplied in documents
S/7930 and Add. 1^,
1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his
investigations and to report to the Council as soon as
possible ;
3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and dis-
continuance of all military activities includes a pro-
hibition of any forward military movements subse-
quent to the cease-fire ;
4. Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire posi-
tions of any troops which may have moved forward
subsequent to 1630 GMT on 10 June 1967 ;
5. Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff
of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
in Palestine and the observers in implementing the
cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate
communications facilities.
Resolution of June 14^
The Security Council,
Considering the urgent need to spare the civil popu-
lations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict
in the Middle East from additional sufferings,
Considering that essential and inalienable human
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes
of war.
Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the
parties Involved in the conflict,
1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the
safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the
areas where military operations have taken place and
to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have
fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ;
2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the
" S/RES/236 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June
12.
" Bulletin of June 26, 1967, p. 934.
"S/RES/237 (1967) ; adopted unanimously on June
14.
JULY 3, 1967
B65-73S— 67-
11
scrupulous resi)eet of the humanitarian principles gov-
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro-
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the ef-
fective implementation of this resolution and to report
to the Security Council.
REVISED U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION, JUNE 14''
The Security Council,
Recalling its resoluUons 233, 234, 235 and 236, and
the understanding formulated by the President of the
Council at its 1353rd meeting,"
Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United
Arab Republic have accepted and implemented the
Council's demand for a cease-fire, and that military
operations and any forward military movements have
been discontinued.
Desirous of taking steps toward the achievement of
a stable peace in the Near East,
1. Insists on the continued scrupulous implementa-
tion by all the parties concerned of the Council's
repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all
military activity as a first urgent step toward the
establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East ;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to
report to the Council on compliance with the cease-
fire;
3. Calls for discussions promptly among the parties
concerned, using such third party or United Nations
assistance as they may wish, looking toward the
establishment of viable arrangements encompassing
the withdrawal and disengagement of armed person-
nel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature,
the maintenance of vital international rights and the
establishment of a stable and durable peace in the
Middle East ;
4. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide
such assistance as may be required in facilitating the
discussions called for in paragraph 3.
tion of the United Nations Charter and generally recog-
nized principles of international law ;
2. Demands that Israel should immediately and un-
conditionally remove all its troops from the territory
of those States and withdraw them behind the armi-
stice lines and should respect the status of the demili-
tarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice
Agreements.
U.S. Does Not Concur in Request
for U.N. General Assembly Session
I
Following is the text of a letter from Arthur
J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.
U.S./tJ.N. press release 108 dated June 15
June 15, 1967
Deae Mr. Secretary General: I have the
honor to refer to your telegram of June 14, 1967
which inquires whether the United States Gov-
ernment concurs in the request, set forth in
Document A/6717, for the convening of an
Emergency Special Session of the General
Assembly.
Your telegram refers to Kule 9b of the Rules
of Procedure of the Assembly as setting forth
the responsibilities of the Secretary General in
dealing with a request by a Member for an
Emergency Special Session. This Eule and Rule
8b, which provides for the convening of an
Emergency Special Session within 24 hours of
the receipt by the Secretary General of a request
REVISED SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, JUNE 13 ""
The Security Council,
Noting that Israel, in defiance of the Security Coun-
cil's resolutions on the cessation of military activities
and a cease-fire (S/RES/233 of 6 June 1967,
S/RES/234 of 7 June 1967 and S/RES/235 of 9 June
1967), has seized additional territory of the United
Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria,
Noting that although military activities have now
ceased, Israel is still occupying the territory of those
countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defy-
ing the United Nations and all peace-loving States,
Considering unacceptable and unlawful Israel's ter-
ritorial claims on Arab States,
1. Vigorously condemns Israel's aggressive activities
and continued occupation of part of the territory of
the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regard-
ing this as an act of aggression and the grossest viola-
" U.N. doc. S/7952/Eev. 3. The U.S. draft resolution
still remains before the CounciL
" At the conclusion of the meeting on June 9, the
President of the Security Council (Hans R. Tabor, of
Denmark) stated: ". . . it appears that we all agree
that we should request the parties concerned to extend
all possible cooperation to United Nations Observers in
the discharge of their responsibilities, that we should
request the Government of Israel to restore the use of
Government House to General Odd Bull, and should
ask the parties to reestablish freedom of movement."
" U.N. doc. S/7951/Rev. 2. On June 14 at the request
of the representative of Nigeria, the U.S.S.R. draft
resolution was voted upon by parts : 4 votes were cast
in favor of operative paragraph 1 and none against,
with 11 abstentious (U.S.) ; 6 votes were cast in favor
of operative paragraph 2 and none against, with 9
abstentious (U.S.). Accordingly, the draft resolution
was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required
majority.
12
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
for such a session from a majority of the mem-
bers of the United Nations, refer to General
Assembly Kesolution 377 A (V) entitled "Unit-
ing for Peaco".^ The Uniting for Peace resolu-
tion and Rules 8b and 9b of the General Assem-
bly's Rules of Procedure constitute the only
source of authority and the basis for the holding
of an Emergency Special Session.
General Assembly Resolution 377A (V) pro-
vides that an Emergency Special Session may
be called "If the Security Council, because of
lack of unanimity of the Permanent Members,
fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity in any case where there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression."
As you know, the Security Council is seized
of the question of the Middle East situation.^
The Council has already adopted four resolu-
tions calling for a cease-fire by the parties to the
recent hostilities in the area, and a fifth resolu-
tion of a humanitarian character dealing with
the aftermath of the hostilities. All jBve of these
resolutions were adopted unanimously. A sixth
resolution was voted on at the Council meeting
on June 14 and failed of adoption because it did
not receive sufficient votes. Several other resolu-
tions are pending before the Council as well as
other suggestions to deal with this complex
problem.
With respect to the draft resolution proposed
by the United States in Document S/7952 Rev.
3, 1 indicated on June 14 that the United States
would be prepared to consider constructive sug-
gestions and revisions. With respect to the draft
resolution submitted by Canada, its distin-
guished representative indicated that revisions
were being considered.
The present situation is therefore that mem-
bers of the Security Council are still engaged
in consultation looking toward further action
by the Council on this matter.
The processes of consultation, negotiation and
search for measures to harmonize the actions of
nations enjoined by the Charter therefore have
not been exhausted. For these reasons, the
" For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.
" See p. 3.
United States Government does not believe that
a situation has arisen in which the Security
Council, in the words of the General Assembly
Resolution 377 A (V), "fails to exercise its pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Accordingly,
the United States is not able to concur in the
request for the holding of an Emergency Special
Session at this time.
If, nevertheless, a majority of the Members
decides to convene such an Assembly, the United
States hopes that any discussion will have a
helpful influence in encouraging and enabling
all states concerned to deal effectively with the
underlying causes of tension and conflict in the
Middle East. The establishment of a firm and
just peace would be a boon to all peoples of the
area and would have a most favorable effect on
general peace and security througliout the
world. There is imperative need not for invec-
tive and inflammatory statements, but for con-
structive proposals and deliberative diplomacy.
I request that this letter be circulated as a
document of the Security Council and of the
General Assembly.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances
of my highest consideration.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur J. Goldbeeg
Letters of Credence
Italy
The newly appointed Ambassador of Italy,
Egidio Ortona, presented his credentials to
President Jolinson on June 14. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated Jime 14.
New Zealand
The newly appointed Ambassador of New
Zealand, Frank H. Corner, presented his creden-
tials to President Johnson on June 14. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press re-
lease dated June 14.
13
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
The North Atlantic Council held its spring
ministerial meeting at Luxenibourg June 13-
llf.. Follmoing is the text of a communique is-
sued at the close of the meeting on June H, to-
gether with a list of the members of the U.S.
delegation.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE
Press release 143 dated June 15
The spring ilinisterial Meeting of the NATO
Council was held in Luxembourg on 13th and
14th June, 1967.
Reviewing the international situation in the
light of recent developments, Ministers took
note of the high degree of instability and uncer-
tainty still existing in the world. The Council
once again aiRrmed that the cohesion of its mem-
bers remains essential for their own security and
for the maintenance of peace.
In accordance with their practice of consult-
ing together. Ministers held an exchange of
views on the Middle East situation following
the hostilities which have once again occurred
in this region. They noted with satisfaction that
a cease-fire had now taken place and stressed the
urgency of humanitarian efforts to alle^date the
sufferings caused by the war. Member govern-
ments expressed their determination to support
all efforts to establish a lasting peace in this area
and resolve the outstanding problems in a spirit
of equity and in accordance with the legitimate
interests of all concerned.
The Council discussed the questions of East-
West relations. With a view to improving rela-
tions and lowering tensions in Europe, govern-
ments have continued in every way jiossible
their declared policy of seeking to develop con-
tacts and mutually advantageous exchanges
with the countries of Eastern Europe. These ef-
forts have not always met with success. The
Council, therefore, recorded its view that the de-
tente should be extended for the benefit of all
members of the Alliance. Ministers agreed to
continue close consultation on the ways in which
the policies of member countries can contribute
to improved East-West relations in a framework
of peace, security and stability. The special
group on future tasks of the Alliance was asked
to make a thorough study of these and related
questions.
Ministers again emphasized that the peaceful
settlement of the German question on the basis
of the free expression of political will by the
German people was an essential factor for a just
and lasting i^eaceful order in Europe. Ministers
were informed by their German colleague of the
state of relations between the two parts of Ger-
many. They welcomed the efforts by the Federal
Government to increase human, economic and
cultural contacts between both parts of Ger-
many, and were agreed that this internal Ger-
man process was to be considered an important
contribution to the search for a detente in Eu-
rope. On Berlin, Ministers agreed that the ques-
tion of ensuring the viability of that city re-
quires special attention. They confirmed the
declaration of the Council of 16th December,
1958.1
Ministers expressed their concern to see prog-
ress made in the field of disarmament and arms
control, including steps directed towards pre-
venting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
If conditions permit, a balanced reduction of
forces by the East and West could be a signifi-
cant step toward security in Europe. A contri-
bution on the part of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries towards a reduc-
tion of forces would be welcomed as a gesture
of peaceful intent.
Regarding Greek-Turkish relations. Minis-
ters noted the Secretary General's report on his
"Watching Brief" and invited him to continue
" For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 9, 1967, p. 52.
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtrLUETnf
his activities in this sphere. They expressed the
hope that Greece and Turkey would resume
their discussions on the Cyprus question and on
Greek-Turkish relations and that these would
rapidly produce positive results. They re-
affirmed the importance which they attach to
preserving peace and improving the situation
on the Island, as well as to the continued pres-
ence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus
while an agreed solution is being sought.
Ministers took note of an interim report of
the Permanent Council on the studies being
undertaken on the future tasks of the Alliance
pursuant to the Ministerial Kesolution ^ of 22nd
December, 1966. They noted with satisfaction
that the keen interest displayed in this study
was further evidence of the vitality with which
the Alliance is determined to face its tasks in the
years ahead. Ministers look forward to receiving
the substantive results of this study.
Ministers examined the report which, at their
request, the Permanent Representatives have
prepared on the ways and means of implement-
ing the proposals of the Italian Government for
reducing disparities in the technological devel-
opment of different countries. They adopted the
attached resolution recommending the intensi-
fication both of member countries' own efforts
and of international cooperation at the Euro-
pean and Atlantic levels and in a wider frame-
work. The Permanent Representatives have
been invited to keep under review the specific
role which the Alliance can play in the field of
teclmology and to report their findings to the
next Ministerial Meeting.
The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council
will be held in Brussels in December 1967.
Resolution on Intebnational Technological
Co-Opebation
Ministers, having considered the report submitted
to them by the Council in permanent session on the
procedure which might be followed for further exami-
nation and implementation of the Italian proposals for
closer international co-operation in technology :
(1) Noted that: (a) The discrepancies in the rate
of technological progress vary considerably between
the different countries and also between one sector and
another; they are apparent not only between North
America and Europe, but also within Europe, and, on
a world scale between the more Industrialized countries
and those which are still developing ;
(b) While some disparities are inevitable in dynamic
societies, in order to avoid that they become a source
'Ibid.
of tension, every effort should be made in scientific,
technical and industrial areas simultaneously on both
national and international levels and special consider-
ation should be given to the problems of the less
developed countries of the Alliance ;
(c) On the international level, some tasks are par-
ticularly suitable for co-operation between a small
number of countries while others may necessitate wider
co-operation, either on a European scale, an Atlantic
scale or in a wider framework.
(2) Recommended as far as efforts on a national
level were concerned that the governments of member
countries should:
(a) Ensure that sufficient resources be devoted to
education, to scientific and technical training, and to
research and development;
(b) Seek to determine and put into practice in a
co-ordinated manner the various courses of action
liable to contribute to the success of a long-term tech-
nological policy which would define both the areas
suitable for national realization, and the role which
the country concerned could play in international co-
operation, it being understood that the less developed
members of the Alliance will be helped to the extent
possible in the fulfilment of this recommendation.
(3) As far as co-operation at the European level
was concerned :
(a) Agreed that closer co-operation between the
European countries was an essential way of reducing
the disparities in technology between Europe and North
America ;
(b) Noted that various existing organizations were
already pursuing studies and implementing certain
forms of co-operation between their member countries ;
(c) Recognized that research and development po-
tential, and homogeneity and size of market are essen-
tial factors relevant to technical progress;
(d) Noted that interested governments would benefit
from considering together all possible ways and means
of facilitating technological co-operation between them.
(4) As far as general co-operation at the Atlantic
level or in a wider framework was concerned :
(a) Recognized that the studies and consultations
undertaken in the OECD constituted a most useful
starting point and should be continued and intensified
without prejudice to the possibility of setting up new
procedures if they should prove necessary ;
(b) Noted that member governments should be
ready to examine in a constructive spirit, new pro-
posals which may be put forward with a view to arriv-
ing at measures for mutual collaboration including,
where appropriate, specific agreements, in particular
between countries which are in advance in certain
fields of technology and other countries;
(c) Recommended that, in the light of studies un-
derway in OECD, further exchanges of views, and
negotiations as appropriate, should be undertaken to
examine :
(i) Schemes for reducing obstacles which hinder
technological exchange ;
(ii) Acceptable ways for facilitating access for
15
firms to patents and technological data, Including
those owned by governments ;
(ill) Whether international co-operation on govern-
ment research and development contracts can be
expanded ;
(iv) These and other ways for reducing the phe-
nomenon of the "Brain-Drain".
(5) As far as the role of the Alliance itself was
concerned :
(a) Noted with satisfaction that the various scien-
tific and technological activities already undertaken
by NATO had contributed, in the spirit of Article II of
the North Atlantic Treaty, to the speeding-up of the
spread of scientific and technical progress in member
countries, while reinforcing the cohesion and military
power of the Alliance ;
(b) Invited the Council in permanent session to pur-
sue its studies, and to report at the next Ministerial
Meeting in December on the role which the Alliance
could play in the field of technology, Including pos-
sibly the application of defense technology to civil
needs, to encourage co-operation between its members,
and to contribute towards narrowing the technological
disparities which may exist between them.
U.S. DELEGATION
Press release 140 dated June 10
Representative
Dean Rusk (chairman) , Secretary of State
United States Representative on the North Atlantic
Council
Harlan Cleveland
Advisers
Robert R. Bowie, Counselor, Department of State
C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
Philip J. Farley, Deputy United States Representative
on the North Atlantic Council
Patricia R. Harris, American Ambassador to Luxem-
bourg
Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State
Eugene V. McAuliffe, Director, Office of NATO and
Atlantic Political-Military Affairs
Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of NATO and Atlantic Politi-
cal-Military Affairs
George S. Springsteen, Jr. (coordinator). Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
George S. Vest (deputy coordinator) , Deputy Director,
Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military
Affairs
Brig. Gen. John G. Wheelock, III, USA, Director, Eu-
ropean Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Secretary o/ Delegation
William G. Jones, Director, Office of International Con-
ferences, Department of State
The Peaceful Revolution
of the 20th Century
Following is a message from President John-
son to the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and DevelopTnent on the 20th anniversary
of the Marshall Plan, which was read iy Am-
bassador at Large W. Averell Harriman at a
commemoratvve dinner at Paris on Jv/ne 5.
Twenty years ago a great American Secretary
of State, George Marshall, stated the peaceful
revolution of the 20th century. His proposal
that the United States join with Europe in the
enormous task of rebuilding that war-ravaged
continent marked the beginning of a bold new
experiment in international cooperation. "Our
policy," he said, "is directed not against any
coimtry or doctrine but against poverty, hunger,
desperation, and chaos." ^
Working together, Europe and America de-
feated these ancient enemies and laid the foun-
dation for an era of prosperity and growth
unmatched in history. Success was not inevi-
table. It took energy, imagination, and courage
on both sides of the Atlantic.
These qualities still abound, both in Europe
and America. Our task now is to mobilize them
in the battle against the "poverty, hunger, des-
peration, and chaos" that still afflict most of
mankind. Today's challenge is more stubborn,
more complex, and fully as urgent as that of
1947.
We must continue to improve the interna-
tional economic and financial arrangements
which have served us so well and are so impor-
tant to our continued prosperity.
We must maintain the vitality of the institu-
tions we have created for the maintenance of
peace and security throughout the world and the
commitments in which they are rooted.
We must continue to work to bridge the gap
that still divides East from West.
We must join hands to promote the growth, in
peace and freedom, of the developing countries.
It is here that the challenge is most urgent and
the penalties of failure most painful.
Together we built a new Europe from the
ruins of war. Let us now resolve to work to-
gether for a world at peace, free of poverty,
hunger, and disease.
' BinxETiN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUXLETrN
The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction to the Construction of Europe
hy Ainbassador at Large W. Averell Harriman ^
I wish to express my gratitude to '■'■Opinion en
S4 heures" for having brought us together and
for inviting me to join this most interesting dis-
cussion of the Marshall Plan and your theme,
"From the Reconstruction to the Construction
of Europe." Then, too, it is always a delight for
me to have an excuse to come to Paris.
It is hard for me to draw a line dividing re-
construction and construction. From the very
inception of the Marshall Plan, those of us who
were involved in carrying it out — Europeans
and Americans alike — thought in terms of con-
struction as well as reconstruction, not simply
recovery but the building of a foundation on
which Europe would grow and prosper.
There was a distinct change in our emotions
as the program was conceived and got under
way. At the time of General Marshall's speech,^
there was the gravest concern over the plight
of Europe, due to the destruction and disloca-
tions of the war and aggravated by the dis-
astrous crop failures and the desperately cold
winter of 1947. These conditions inspired Gen-
eral Marshall's words to describe our policy as
"against himger, poverty, desperation, and
chaos." His proposal and the quick response of
the Western European governments, followed
by prompt action by the American Congress,
brought a feeling of hope by the spring of 1948.
Hope was converted increasingly into confi-
dence with the extraordinary progress made
through the combined efforts of those partici-
pating in this great cooperative enterprise.
Now, after 20 years, with Europe more
dynamic and prosperous than ever before in its
'Address made at a luncheon sponsored by "L' opi-
nion en 24 heurea" at Paris on June 6 (press release
lo5).
' For text, see Bulletin of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.
history, we miglit say there is a sense of fulfill-
ment. But we camiot afford complacency, as
there is more to be done.
For my part, I feel that the spirit of the
Marshall Plan is still very much alive. Many
of the goals of today were conceived and prog-
ress toward them gained momentum during the
early years of the plan. May I recall a few of
them to you ?
First of all, the basic concepts, not only of
self-help but, equally emphasized, of mutual
aid, led rapidly to a call for the integration of
Europe. The initiative came from both sides
of the Atlantic. The Congress strengthened the
language in the enabling legislation in the sec-
ond year (1949) by including in the preamble
this statement : "It is declared to be the policy
of the people of the United States to encourage
the unification of Europe." This policy guided
the American actions throughout.
In Europe, initiatives of fundamental impor-
tance were taken by the OEEC [Organization
for European Economic Cooperation]. At our
request, the organization undertook the respon-
sibility of dividing the available American aid
among the participants. This led to the system
of annual country reviews, in which for the fii'st
time in history the policies and programs of
each participating goverimient were analyzed
and criticized by their peers because all recog-
nized the effects of national policies on com-
mon objectives. Revolutionary programs for
increased productivity and capital mvestment
for an expanding economy were accepted as
essential goals. Procedures for concerted action
continue today in the successor organization—
the OECD [Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development] .
A drive to break down trade barriers, partic-
ularly quantitative restrictions, was imple-
mented through the intra-European payments
JUIiT 3, 1967
17
system and later given impetus by the European
Payments Union.
These actions made possible the development
of the Coal and Steel Community and other
bodies, followed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome
and the European Economic Conmiunity, which
added new dimensions to the structure of Euro-
pean integration. Now Great Britain as well as
Deimiark, Ireland, and possibly other countries
are taking steps toward membership.
American support for European unity has
been consistently recorded from the begimiing
of tlie Marshall Plan to this day. President
Jolinson last October reaffirmed our position,
saying: "We look forward to the expansion and
further strengthening of the European com-
mimity." ^
The view that we Americans have of the need
for unity in Western Europe is not based on
abstractions. It is based on our experience that
our own achievements could not have been re-
alized except on a continent of freedom of move-
ment of people, trade, and ideas. We see Western
European unity as an indispensable step in the
attaimnent of the overriding objectives that
Europeans and Americans share together.
Speaking of a unified Europe, President Ken-
nedy once said : *
The United States looks on tliis vast new enterprise
with hope and admiration. . . . We see in such a
Europe a partner ... in all the great and burdensome
tasks of building and defending a community of free
nations.
President Johnson last October spoke of a
imified Europe as "an equal partner in helping
to build a peaceful and just world order."
I feel that it is important for Europeans to
understand that the United States has consist-
ently applauded European initiatives for inte-
gration. We firmly believe that it strengthens
the Atlantic partnership.
Of the other tasks ahead, I would underline
the responsibilities we share toward the develop-
ing areas of the world — those nations whose
people are aspiring to be freed from man's
ancient enemies, ignorance and poverty.
" Ihid.. Oct. 24, 19G6, p. 622.
* Ihid., July 23, 1962, p. 131.
These tasks also found their origin in the co-
ojoerative work begun during the Marshall Plan,
The OECD and its subcommittees are making
progress m coordinating assistance, but much
more needs to be done. The World Bank esti-
mates that the developing nations badly need
and can effectively absorb twice the amount of
capital that is now being made available. This
gap must be filled. Our own continuing prosper-
ity and security are closely linked with the
achievement of the aspirations of the peoples of
the developing areas.
The agreement achieved in the Kennedy
Round is a milestone in encoui'aging world trade
particularly for the industrialized nations. Our
endeavors now should be directed toward in-
creasing the trade of the developing nations.
Furthermore, let us not forget General Mar-
shall's offer was to the whole of Europe, in-
cluding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
It was Molotov who walked out of the Paris
meeting of ministers called to consider the pro-
posal, forcmg Czechoslovakia and Poland to
withdraw as well. It was Stalin who organized
the Cominform and declared war on the Mar-
shall Plan, branding it an American device "to
subjugate Europe."
Today, the people of Eastern Europe see a
prosperous Western Europe, strong and inde-
pendent, with a high degree of integration. The
unnatural division continues to partition Eu-
rope. As President Johnson has pointed out,
"We must turn to one of the great unfinished
tasks of our generation : making Europe whole."
Progress toward this goal, along the lines he
outlined, certainly will add to the prosperity
and security of both Eastern and Western
Europe and, in fact, of the world as a whole.
And so, in closing, let me suggest that we are
not gathered here to commemorate the Marshall
Plan as a thing of the past but to celebrate its
conception. Its concepts are as alive today and
as valuable today as ever. There is much ahead
to be done to continue the construction of Eu-
rope. At the same time, our overriding task lies
in using our combined material and spiritual
resources to seize the opportunities and respon-
sibilities to help build a world of expanding
opportunity for all.
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
^'■What is really changing in international politics?" In his
remarks before the Department of State''s national foreign pol-
icy conference for editors and broadcasters on May 22, Mr.
Brzezinski, a member of the Departments Policy Planning
Council, analyzed five major changes in international politics
and their implications for U.S. foreign policy. His remarks were
made on a ''''background'''' basis, and he has edited them for
publication in the Bulletin.
The Implications of Change for United States Foreign Policy
by Zbigniew Brzezinski
International politics is dominated by crises.
The result is that we often mistake these crises
for the reality of international politics. Gomg
from crisis to crisis, we simply lose sight of the
more basic and often more important changes
that imperceptibly reshape the world in which
we live.
It is useful, therefore, sometimes to pause
and ask in a detached way : Wliat is the nature
of our era? What is really changing in inter-
national politics? By posing these questions we
become better equipped to discuss the implica-
tions of historical trends for U.S. foreign
policy. Definition of a broad framework of that
kind in turn enables us to see in sharper relief
our true interests and goals in specific regions
of the world, such as Europe or Asia. Accord-
ingly, in these remarks I would like to first turn
to the problem of change in international
politics and then discuss the implications of
these changes for the U.S. posture in world
affairs.
As I look at international politics, I see five
major changes taking place, together funda-
mentally altering the nature of international
relations in our day. The changes are not ob-
vious, because they are slow ; but their cumula-
tive impact is most important.
Waning of Ideological Conflicts
1. The first involves the loaning of ideological
conflicts among the more developed nations of
the world.
Since the time of the French Revolution,
conflicts between states have been profoundly
emotionalized by mass struggles induced by a
mixture of ideology and nationalism. "Where
that mixture was particularly intense, as in the
case of nazism, the conflicts which resulted were
particularly bloody and destructive. By and
large, during the last 150 years or so relations
among the more advanced states, particularly
in Europe, have been poisoned by the emotional-
izing impact of absolute doctrinal answers
concerning most of the basic issues of humanity.
Tliis condition is waning due to a variety of
factors.
First of all, nuclear weapons have necessi-
tated greater and greater restraint in relations
among states. The realization of the enormous
destructiveness of nuclear conflict has had a
most sobering effect on statesmen. Hitherto one
could calculate the cost and the potential ad-
vantages of war ; today, this simply is no longer
possible, and thus even the most bitter ideologi-
cal hatreds have to be restrained by common
sense.
Secondly, just as important, we are realizing
more fully that social change is such an enor-
mously complex and interrelated process, with
so many variables, that it cannot be reduced to
a few simple ideological formidas, as was the
case in the early stages of industrialization.
Ideological attitudes are thus giving way to a
problem-solving, engineering approach to social
change.
Thirdly, communism, the principal, and until
recently the most militant, revolutionary ideol-
JULT 3, 1967
19
ogy of our day, is dead — communism is dead as
an ideology in the sense that it is no longer
capable of mobilizing unified global support.
On the contrary, it is increasingly fragmented
by conflicts among constituent vmits and par-
ties. This has contributed to ideological disil-
lusionment among its members. Commimist
states. Communist movements, and Commimist
subversion are still very important on the in-
ternational scene, but Commmiist ideology as a
vital force is no longer with us.
Kevolutionary movements in different parts
of the world instead relate themselves more
specifically to local radical traditions and try to
exploit local opportunities. Thus, the common
doctrine and its alleged universal validity are
being diluted by specific adaptations. The proc-
ess is destroying the universal appeal and glo-
bal effectiveness of ideology.
All of that, cumulatively, prompts the waning
of the ideological age in relations, particularly
among the developed nations. The role of ideol-
ogy is still quite important in relations among
the less developed states, where problems are
simpler, where issues can be translated into
black-and-white propositions, and where abso-
lute doctrinal categories still appear superfi-
cially relevant.
Shift in Focus of Violence
2. Closely connected with the loaning ideolog-
ical conflicts ainong the more developed nations
of the world is the decline of violence among
these states. During approximately the last 150
years, the international scene has been domi-
nated by conflicts fought principally among the
more advanced and largely European nations of
the world. The focus of violence today is shift-
ing to the third world. Increasingly, conflicts
are either between some of the developed nations
and the less developed nations ; or increasingly,
instability in the imderdeveloped world is itself
the source of global tensions. It is thus a basic
reversal of the dominant pattern of the recent
past.
The new restraint on violence displayed by
the more advanced states in relations among one
another is also largely due to the nuclear age.
It should be acknowledged that without the
presence of nuclear weapons a major war prob-
ably would have erupted in the course of the
last 20 years. Given the range of conflicts, the
frequent tensions, and the occasional clashes
between the United States and the Soviet Union,
in almost any other era in history a war between
them probably would have ensued. The pres-
ence of nuclear weapons has introduced an over-
riding factor of restraint into relations among
the more advanced states and has helped to
preserve world peace.
This restraint is still largely absent insofar
as relations among the less developed states are
concerned. Moreover, the ideological passions
and the nationalist tensions have not yet run
their full course ; and consequently the propen-
sity toward total reactions, total commitment,
and total violence is still quite high.
Without discussing the pros and cons of the
Vietnamese war, it offers a good example of the
generalization made above. It reflects the shift
of focus in global affairs from conflicts between
the developed states to a conflict that involves
a wealthy and higlily advanced country in an
effort to create regional stability. The unwill-
ingness of the Soviet Union to become totally
involved in the conflict stems from the greater
realization of its own interest in preserving
peace in the nuclear age and also from the grad-
ual waning of its ideology, which weakens its
sense of total identification with every revo-
lutionary movement in the world.
Trend Toward Postnationalism
3. The third generalization is the proposition
that we are witnessing the end of the supremacy
of the nation-state on the international scene.
This process is far from consummated, but
nonetheless the trend seems to me to be irre-
versible. It is not only a matter of security
interdependence among allied states. It is also
a matter of psychological change. People
through history have expanded their sense of
identification. At first, men identified them-
selves with their families, then with their vil-
lages, then with their towns, then with their
regions and provinces, then with their nations.
Now increasingly people are beginning to
identify with their continents and regions.
This change has been induced by the necessities
of economic development and of the technologi-
cal revolution, by changes in the means of
conmiunication — all of which cause people to
identify themselves more and more with wider,
more global human interests.
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BX7LLETIN
Global Power of the United States
4. The fourth rnajor change which has tahen
place in our times is the emergence of the United
States as the preponderant world poioer. The
conventional view is that since 1945 we have
seen three basic stages of international develop-
ment: First of all, U.S. nuclear monopoly;
secondly, bipolarity, based on two homogeneous
alliances rigidly confronting each other; and
now increasingly polycentrism, with many
states playing tlie international game.
I submit that this is a wrong perspective;
in fact, the sequence has been the opposite. The
first postwar era — 1945-50 — was essentially a
polycentric era. The United States was largely
disarmed. It had a nuclear monopoly, to be sure,
but its nuclear power was essentially apocalyp-
tic; it was not applicable— it was only usable
in circumstances which everyone wished to
avoid — hence it was not politically relevant.
The United States was disarmed, it was only
beginning to be involved in Europe, hardly in-
volved in Asia — and there were still two major
empires on the scene, the French and the Brit-
ish. The Russians were asserting their regional
control over Central Europe, but they were not
yet involved in Asia. Asia itself was in turmoil.
This truly was the polycentric era.
It gave way to the era of bipolarity, of di-
chotomic confrontation, if you will, between
two alliances — one led by the Soviet Union, one
led by the United States. The Soviet Union
during this time acquired nuclear capacity, and
under Khrushchev it misjudged its nuclear
power and attempted to pursue between 1958
and 1962 a policy designed to assert Soviet
global su)5remacy. These years were dominated
by the Soviet effort to throw the West out of
Berlin, to put missiles in Cuba and to force a
showdown. However, Khrushchev discovered in
1962 that the Soviet Union still had only apoca-
lyptic power. Its nuclear power was not relevant
when faced with U.S. power, which by then had
become much more complex and much more
usable in a far greater diversity of situations.
Thus in the last few years the United States
successfully stared Khrushchev down in Cuba,
it protected its interests in the Dominican Re-
public and in the Congo— and today it is doing
it in Viet-Nam. Yet the Soviet Union did not
dare to react even in the area of its regional
domination: Berlin. Today, the Soviet Union
is in effect a regional power, concentrating pri-
marily on Europe and on the growing danger
from China. Our power during this ensuing
period has become applicable power, with a
long-range delivery system, with the means of
asserting itself on the basis of a global reach.
Moreover, recent years — and this is much
more important — have witnessed continued eco-
nomic growth in this country; they have seen
the expansion and appearance on the world
scene of U.S. technological know-how. Increas-
ingly, the U.S. way of life, our styles, our pat-
terns of living, are setting the example. Today,
if there is a creative society in the world, it is
the United States — in the sense that everyone,
very frequently without knowing it, is imitating
it. However, paradoxically because the United
States is the only global power, it finds it in-
creasingly difiicult to concentrate its resources
or its policy on any specific region of the world.
This often creates sharp dilemmas and difficul-
ties, difficulties with which we will have to live
because our involvement is also a major factor
of stability in the world.
The Growing Fragmentation of the World
5. The fifth major change involves the grow-
ing fragmentation of the loorld, not only
between the developed states and the under-
developed— lohich is, of course, miich talked
about — hut the increasing fragmentation of the
developed loorld. I have particularly in mind
the growing difference between the United
States and the rest of the advanced world. The
United States is becoming a new society, a soci-
ety no longer shaped by the impact of the
industrial process on social, economic, and polit-
ical life. That impact still shapes European
life ; if you look at the changes in the nature of
the European political elite, if you look at prob-
lems of employment or unemployment or wel-
fare, if you look at efforts to create greater
access to education in Europe — all of these are
manifestations of the imjjact of the industrial
process on a formerly rural and traditional
society.
The United States is no longer in this kind
of historical era. Increasingly, our social di-
lemmas are of leisure, well-being, automation,
psychic well-being, alienation of the youth
(usually from well-to-do middle-class families).
All of that is connected with a standard of liv-
ing which has become relatively stable and lugh,
connected with a society which is well-to-do but
JULT 3, 1967
21
in many respects has new dilemmas of purpose
and meaning. We are becoming, in effect, a post-
industrial society, in which computers and com-
munications are shaping more and more our
way of life. Our education and our image of
the world are shaped more by television and
less and less by sequential, logical media such
as books and newspapers. If the Europeans are
today experiencing the automobile revolution —
which extends physical mobility — Americans
are undergoing an electronic revolution, which
extends our senses and nervous systems.
All of this induces new perspectives and new
attitudes and sharpens the difference between
us and the rest of the developed world. It also
creates underlying tension, in addition to the
ob^aous problems of foreign policy, such as the
Kennedy Eound, the problem of NATO, the
problem of East- West relations, and so forth.
U.S. Foreign Policy in a Time of Change
If there is any merit in this highly general-
ized analysis of the nature of change in our
time, what are its implications for U.S. foreign
policy ?
First of all, we should not become ideological
latecomers. We have traditionally been the prag-
matic society, free of ideological shackles. It
would be unfortunate if now we succumbed to
internal and external ideologization, either be-
cause of belated anti-Communist rigidity at a
time when the Commimist world is becoming
fragmented or because of radical reactions to
internal dilemmas, the new dilemmas of our
society that I spoke about. It would be unfor-
tunate if these new dilemmas, inherent in the
United States' becoming a new type of society,
were responded to on the basis of essentially ir-
relevant, outmoded, 19th-century ideological
formulations. Yes, this is the great danger, par-
ticularly with the New Left, which is looking
for ideological guidance and only too often
turns to outmoded anarchistic, Trotskyite, or
nihilistic doctrines, doctrines completely irrele-
vant to the new dilemmas of our society.
Secondly, in our foreign policy we ought to
avoid the prescriptions of the extreme right or
the extreme left. The right only too often says,
erroneously, that to protect a better America
we ought to stay out of the world. The New Left
says that to build a better America we have to
stay out of the world. Both are wrong, because
today our global involvement and our prepon-
derance of power is such that our disinvolve-
ment would create international chaos of enor-
mous proportions. Our involvement is an his-
torical fact — there is no way of ending it. One
can debate about the forms it ought to take,
about its scope and the way it is applied, but
one cannot any longer debate in absolutist terms
should we or should we not be involved.
Thirdly, we should not imderestimate, be-
cause of our own historical formation, the role
of revolutionary nationalism in the world.
While we have to pursue the task of building a
world of cooperative communities, we have to
realize that revolutionary nationalism is a stage
of development which in many cases cannot be
avoided. We should therefore be very careful
not to get overinvolved in conflicts, with the re-
sult that we are pitched against revolutionary
nationalisms, making us appear as impediments
to social change.
This raises the extremely complicated issue of
intervention. Under what conditions should we
or should we not intervene ? It is extraordinarily
difficult to define clear-cut criteria; but as a
broad generalization, it might be said that in-
tervention is justified whenever its absence will
create regional instability of expanding propor-
tions. It has to be judged largely on its inter-
national merits and not in terms of specific
domestic consequences within individual states.
It is that distinction which justifies interven-
tion— it is that distinction which warrants our
involvement today in the effort to create re-
gional stability in Southeast Asia.
Fourthly, in seeking ties with the developed
nations of the world, particularly with Western
Europe, we have to emphasize in addition to
specific political and security arrangements, in-
creasingly efforts addressed to the fundamental
social dilemmas which are inherent in the
widening gap between the United States and
Western Europe. We ought to try to share and
distribute our new knowledge and teclmological
skills, because this is the unique asset of the
postindustrial society. At the same time we
should try to make the industrial societies more
aware of the novel character of our problems.
By learning from us they can perhaps avoid
some of our difficulties. We have to forge new
social bonds, especially between our yoimger
generation and the younger Europeans — and
urgently so, for we are at a time in histoiy when
the two continents find themselves in different
historical eras.
22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN I
Finally, to apply these remarks cumulatively
and briefly to Europe : Since the ideological age
is waning, since the developed world is increas-
ingly becoming the zone of tranquillity, since
the United States is playing a predominant role
in the world, and since we are in a new historical
era which gives us special assets, it is our task
to develop a broader approach for Europe, the
purpose of which, as the President said on Octo-
ber 7th,^ is to end gradually through reconcilia-
tion the cold war, a remnant of the civil war
that has divided the most advanced parts of the
world for the last 150 years.
Thus we need to adapt the Atlantic concept
to the post-cold-war era. We should strive in-
creasingly to shape a community of the de-
veloped nations which will contain four basic
components: The United States; a more homo-
geneous and integrated Western Europe in close
ties with the United States but also in increas-
ingly close linkage with Eastern Europe; an
Eastern Europe which will gradually begin to
stand on its own feet and engage in subregional
integration more independently of the Soviet
Union while in turn retaining its ties with the
Soviet Union; a Soviet Union which would
also be drawn into constructive relationships
with Western Europe and the United States.
Only by developing such a community of the
developed nations, of which Japan should natu-
rallj' be a member, can we try to assure a meas-
ure of order to a world which otherwise will be
increasingly dominated by chaos.
If we look 20 years ahead, we can see clearly
a challenge to the survival of organized society
in several parts of the world. "When we look 20
years ahead in the developed parts of the world
and particularly in the United States, where the
scientific, tecluiological, medical, and chemical
revolutions are progressing most rapidly, we
can increasingly see a challenge to the individ-
ual as a mysterious, autonomous human being.
We cannot effectively respond to these twin
challenges if we are at the same time pre-
occupied with ideological and doctrinal con-
flicts which no longer have much relevance to
the fundamental concerns of our day. Given
the traditional American quest for human free-
dom and today's U.S. global power, we have the
opportunity and the responsibility to take the
lead in responding to these twin challenges.
U.S. Offers Indian Government
Oceanographic Research Vessel
Presa release 138 dated June 8
The Department of State and the National
Science Foundation on June 8 announced that
the President has approved a proposal to trans-
fer the RV Anton Bruiin, an oceanographic
research vessel owned and operated by the Na-
tional Science Foundation, to the Government
of India. The arrival of Indian representatives
to survey the ship and conduct technical discus-
sions with NSF relating to the proposed trans-
fer is expected in the near future. The transfer
itself would take place later this year.
The Bnmn, formerly the Presidential yacht
Williamsburg, was built in 1930 and has in re-
cent years been operated as a biological oceano-
graphic research ship. During 1963-1964 she
participated in the International Indian Ocean
Expedition, in which 13 nations including the
United States and India cooperated in the first
comprehensive study of the Indian Ocean. The
Anton Bruun will be used by the Indian Gov-
ernment for scientific research in oceanography.
The Bruun carries the name of Dr. Anton
Bruun, a Danish oceanographer who, until his
death in 1961, was one of the world's most dis-
tinguished marine biologists and proponents of
international cooperation in science. Dr. Bioiun
was the first chaii-man of the Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission, which sponsored
the International Indian Ocean Expedition.
United States and Malta Conclude
Cotton Textile Agreement
The Department of State announced on
June 15 (press release 142) that notes had been
exchanged at Valletta, Malta, on June 14 be-
tween the Government of Malta and the Amer-
ican Embassy, on behalf of the Government of
the United States, which provide for controls
over the exports of cotton textiles from Malta to
the United States.
As reflected in the notes,^ the comprehensive
understanding shall remain in force for a period
' For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y.,
on Oct. 7, 1966. see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
^ For text of the U.S. note, see Department of State
press release 142 dated June 15.
23
of 4 years, retroactively from January 1, 1967,
through December 31, 1970.
The understanding establishes an overall
limit for the first agreement year of 12.7 million
square yards equivalent. Within this aggregate
limit, three group limits are provided : the first
covers all yarn categories, at 9 million square
yards equivalent; the second covers fabrics,
made-up goods, and miscellaneous, at 200 thou-
sand square yards equivalent; and the third
covers all apparel categories, at 3.5 million
square yards equivalent. Specific ceilings are
provided within the apparel group ceiling for
three categories.
Provisions on growth, swing, carryover, con-
sultation, spacing, system of categories and con-
version factors, and administrative arrange-
ments are also included.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences ^
Scheduled July Through September
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on World Trade in Steel
IMCO Subcommittee on Bulk Cargoes
FAO Study Group on Rice: 11th Session
IBE Council: 32d Session
UNCTAD Group on Preferences: 2d Session
ICAO Panel of Experts To Consider Limits of Liability for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 2d Session
Fifth International Film Festival
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Legal Status of Gas Pipelines
OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees
OECD Energy Committee
UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 30th
Session.
OECD Tourism Committee
lATC Technical Committee on Research and Organization: 5th
Meeting.
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation
CENTO Ministerial Council: 15th Session
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 4
Geneva July 3-5
London July 3-7
Rome July 3-7
Geneva July 4-5
Geneva July 4-14
Montreal July 4-17
Geneva July 4-21
Moscow July 5-20
Geneva July 6-7
Paris July 6-7
Paris July 6-7
Geneva July 6-15
Paris July 7 (1 day)
Mexico July 10-13
Geneva July 10-14
London July 10-14
London July 11-12
Paris July 11-12
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 15, 1967, lists inter-
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period July-September
1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these
are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and
Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; lATC, Inter-American Travel Congresses;
IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International
Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Tele-
communication Union; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAIGH, Pan American
Institute of Geography and History; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
24
DEPABTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
International Seed Testing Association: Executive Committee Cambridge, July 11-20
England.
WMO Worldwide Conference on Meteorological Training Leningrad .... July 11-22
Economic and Social Council: 43d Session Geneva July 11-Aug. 4
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party 3 Paris July 17-18
OECD Special Committee for Iron and Steel Paris July 17-19
U.N. Committee of 24 on the Granting of Independence to Colonial New York .... July 17-Aug. 25
Countries and Peoples.
International Wheat Council London July 18-21
lATC Technical Committee on Removal of Travel Barriers: 5th Managua July 18-21
Meeting.
OECD Development Assistance Committee: High-Level Meeting . . . Paris July 19-20
lATC Technical Committee on Travel Plant: 5th Meeting Quito July 24-27
lATC Teclmical Committee on Tourist Travel Promotion: 5th Lima July 31-Aug. 3
Meeting.
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Construction of Vehicles Geneva July 31-Aug. 4
FAO Technical Conference on Fisheries of West African Countries. . . Dakar July 31-Aug. 4
FAO Fertilizer Industry Advisory Panel: 13th Session Rome July
ECOSOC Regional Semin.ar on Political and Civic Education for Women. Helsinki Aug. 1-14
Inter-American Statistical Institute: 5th General Assembly Caracas Aug. 7-18
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 5th Session Geneva Aug. 15-Sept. 8
ECAFE Seminar on Financial Aspects of Trade Expansion Bangkok Aug. 21-28
ECOSOC Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protec- New York .... Aug. 21-Sept. 1
tion of Minorities.
International Coffee Council London Aug. 21-Sept. 8
ECE Working Party on Road Traffic Safety Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 1
United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee on the Effects of Atomic Geneva Aug. 28-Sept. 8
Radiation.
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working Paris August
Group on Marine Pollution.
21st Edinburgh International Film Festival Edinburgh .... August
ECAFE Asian Industrial Development Council: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 1-8
PAIGH Directing Council: 10th Meeting Washington .... Sept. 1-10
ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 11th Session . . . Sydney Sept. 4-9
U.N. Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. . . . Geneva Sept. 4-22
ICAO Legal Subcommittee Paris Sept. 5-26
ILO Joint Maritime Commission: 20th Session Geneva Sept. 10-20
FAO Animal Production and Health: 6th Inter-American Meeting . . Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 10-20
IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution London Sept. 11-15
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting on the Wood Working Industries . . Geneva Sept. 11-22
ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 8th Session Bangkok Sept. 11-22
3d ICAO South American/South Atlantic Regional Meeting Buenos Aires . . . Sept. 12-Oct. 6
ECE Group of Rapporteiu-s on Intercontinental Transport by Containers Geneva Sept. 18-20
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working The Hague .... Sept. 18-20
Group on an International Aspect for the Implementation of the U.N.
Resolution on Resources of the Sea.
IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection London Sept. 18-22
ECE Codex Alimentarius Group of E.xperts on Standardization of Quick- Rome Sept. 18-23
Frozen Foods.
ECAFE Working Party on Shipping and Ocean Freight Rates .... Bangkok Sept. 18-25
ITU World Administrative Maritime Mobile Conference Geneva Sept. 18-Nov. 4
U.N. General Assembly: 22d Session New York .... Sept. 19-Dec. 15
FAO Expert Panel on Animal Breeding and Climatology Gainesville, Fla . . Sept. 21-26
ECE Committee on Coal Geneva Sept. 25-27
ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs Geneva Sept. 25-29
FAO Near East Forestry Commission: 5th Session Amman Sept. 25-30
International Rubber Study Group: 19th Assembly Sao Paulo .... Sept. 25-30
ILO Technical Experts on Organization and Planning of Vocational Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6
Training.
ILO Meeting of Experts on Minimum Wage Fixing Geneva Sept. 25-Oct. 6
ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners: 3d Session Bangkok Sept. 26-Oct. 3
IAEA General Conference: 11th Session Vienna Sept. 26-Oct. 6
OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Sept. 27 (1 day)
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL): 36th General Kyoto Sept. 27-0 ct. 4
Assembly.
ECAFE Seminar on the Development of Building Materials Bangkok Sept. 28-Oct. 4
U.N. Conference on Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . . Vienna September
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 18th Meeting . . . Taipei September
BIRPI Working Group on International Cooperation Geneva September
IAEA Board of Governors Vienna September
BIRPI Paris Union: Executive Committee Geneva September
JULY 3, 1967 25
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.*
Ratification deposited: Cameroon, May 22, 1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World
Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965."
Acceptance deposited: Saudi Arabia, May 26, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal TJnion with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and
convention with final protocol and regulations of ex-
ecution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Ratification deposited: Hungary, May 2, 1967.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite system.
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into
force Augu.st 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Tanzania, June 16, 1967.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Signature: East African External Telecommunica-
tions Company Limited, June 16, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered
into force January 1, 1967.*
Ratification deposited: New Zealand, including Cook
Lslands, Niue and Tokelau Islands, April 13, 1967.
' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
Trade, Transit
Convention on transit trade of landlocked states. Done
at New York July 8, 1965.*
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, May 10, 1967.
Entry into force: June 9, 1967.
Wheat
1967 protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive."
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Mexico, June 13, 1967.
Protocol for the further extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966.
Entered into force July 16, 1966, for part I and parts
III to VII ; August 1, 1966, for part II. TIAS 6057.
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany
(including Berlin) , June 1, 1967.
BILATERAL
Iceland
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as
amended; 7 U.S.O. 1691-1736D), with annex. Signed
at Reykjavik June 5, 1967. Entered into force June 5,
1967.
Mexico
Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington June 2, 1967.
Entered into force June 2, 1967.
Norway
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 4, 1967.
Entered into force: June 8, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement concerning the use of the Special Fund for
Education for the School Building Construction Proj-
ect, 1967-1968. Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila May 18, 1967. Entered into force May 18,
1967.
Sudan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1 736D), with annex. Signed
at Khartoum June 3, 1967. Entered into force June 3,
1967.
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 3, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U62
Communism. The Implications of Change for
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19
Diplomacy. The Implications of Change for
United States Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) . 19
Economic Affairs
The Marshall Plan: From the Reconstruction
to the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . 17
United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 23
Europe
The Implications of Change for United States
Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19
The Marshall Plan : From the Reconstruction to
the Construction of Europe (Harriman) . . 17
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
(communique) 14
The Peaceful Revolution of the 20th Century
(Johnson) 16
Foreign Aid. The Peaceful Revolution of the
20th Century (Johnson) 16
India. U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceano-
graphic Research Vessel 23
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences ... 24
Italy. Letters of Credence (Ortona) .... 13
Malta. United States and Malta Conclude Cotton
Textile Agreement 23
Near East. U.N. Security Council Continues De-
bate on Near East ; Soviet Proposal Condemn-
ing Israel Rejected (Goldberg, texts of
resolutions) 3
New Zealand. Letters of Credence (Corner) . . 13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. North At-
lantic Council Meets at Luxembourg (com-
munique) 14
Presidential Documents. The Peaceful Revolu-
tion of the 20th Century 16
Science
North Atlantic Council Meets at Luxembourg
(communique) 14
U.S. Offers Indian Government Oceanographic
Research Vessel 23
Treaty Information
Current Actions 26
United States and Malta Conclude Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement 23
U.S.S.R.
The Implications of Change for United States
Foreign Policy (Brzezinski) 19
U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3
United Nations
U.N. Security Council Continues Debate on Near
East ; Soviet Proposal Condemning Israel
Rejected (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) . . 3
U.S. Does Not Concur in Request for U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Session (Goldberg) .... 12
Name Index
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 19
Corner, Frank H 13
Goldberg, Arthur J 3, 12
Harriman, W. Averell 17
Johnson, President 16
Ortona, Egidio 13
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 1 2-1 8
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to June 12 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 135 of June
6, 138 of June 8, and 140 of June 10.
No.
*141
Date
6/14
142 6/15
143
*144
6/15
6/17
Subject
Corry sworn in as Ambassador to
Ceylon and the Maldive Islands
(biographic details).
U.S.-Malta cotton textile agree-
ment (rewrite).
NATO communique.
National foreign policy confer-
ence for educators, Washington,
June 19-20.
■ Not printed.
2.1120
Superintendent of Docume
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POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
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BULLETIN
Voi.Lv/i^i^S.%W"'
JUL 21 1957
DEPOSiTORY
July 10, 1967
PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Address hy President Johiison 31
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY HOLDS FIFTH EMERGENCY SESSION;
UNITED STATES OFFERS PROPOSALS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Statements hy Ambttssador Arthur J. Goldherg Ji.7
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PREMIER KOSYGIN
DISCUSS INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS
Statements After the Meetings at Glassiwo, N.J. 35
THE SPIRIT OF HOLLYBUSH
Excerpt From an Address hy President Johnson 38
For index see inside hack cover
i|
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1463 Publication 8256
July 10, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is Indexed in
the Readers' Quide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a vceekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
tlie field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy , issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other offieers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to tvhich tlie United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter'
national relations are listed currently.
Five principles for peace in the Middle East were outlined hy
President Johnson in his address before the Department of
State foreign policy conference for educators on June 19. These
principles are: recognized rights of national life, progress in
solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime
passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political
independence and territorial integrity. '■'■Taken together," the
President said, '■'■they point the way from uncertain armistice
to durable peace?''
Principles for Peace in the Middle East
Address by President Johnson
White House press release dated June 19
Secretary Rusk, ladies and gentlemen : I wel-
come the chance to share with you this morning
a few reflections of American foreign policy, as
I have shared my thoughts in recent weeks with
representatives of labor and business and with
other leaders of our society.
During the past weekend at Camp David,
where I met and talked with America's good
friend, Prime Minister [Harold E.] Holt of
Australia, I thought of the General Assembly
debate on the Middle East that opens today in
New York.i
But I thought also of the events of the past
year in other continents in the world. I thought
of the future, both in the Middle East and in
other areas of American interest in the world
and in places that concern all of us.
So this morning I want to give you my esti-
mate of the prospects for peace and the hopes
for progress in these various regions of the
world.
I shall speak first of our own hemisphere, then
of Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia,
and lastly of the two areas that concern us most
at this hour — Viet-Nam and the Middle East.
Let me begin with the Americas.
Last April I met with my fellow American
Presidents in Pimta del Este.'' It was an en-
' See p. 47.
"For background, see BuiiETiN of May 8, 1967, p.
706.
couraging experience for me, as I believe it was
for the other leaders of Latin America. For they
made, there at Punta del Este, the historic deci-
sion to move toward the economic integration
of Latin America.
In my judgment, their decision is as im-
portant as any that they have taken since they
became independent more than a century and a
half ago.
The men I met with know that the needs of
their 220 million people require them to mod-
ernize their economies and expand their trade.
I promised that I would ask our people to co-
operate in those efforts and in giving new force
to our great conmion enterprise which we take
great pride in — the Alliance for Progress.
One meeting of chiefs of state, of course, can-
not transform a continent. But where leaders
are willing to face their problems candidly and
where they are ready to join in meeting them
responsibly, there can be only hope for the
future.
The nations of the developed world — and I
am speaking now principally of the Atlantic
alliance and Japan — have in this past year, I
think, made good progress in meeting their com-
mon problems and their common responsibili-
ties.
I have met with a number of statesmen —
Prime Minister Lester Pearson in Canada just
a few days ago,' and the leaders of Europe in
• Ihid., June 19, 1967, p. 908.
JULY 10, 1967
81
Bonn shortly before that.* We discussed many
of the issues that we face together.
We are consulting to good effect on how to
limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
We have completed the Kennedy Kound of
tariff negotiations ' in a healthy spirit of part-
nership, and we are examining together the vital
question of monetary reform.
We have reorganized the integrated NATO
defense, with its new headquarters in Belgium.
We have reached agreement on the crucial
question of maintaining Allied military
strength in Germany.
Finally, we have worked together — although
not yet with sufficient resources — to help the
less developed countries deal with their prob-
lems of hunger and overpopulation.
We have not by any means settled all the
issues that face us, either among ourselves or
with other nations. But there is less cause to
lament what has not been done than to take
heart from what has been done.
Relations With Eastern Europe
You know of my personal interest in improv-
ing relations between the Western World and
the nations of Eastern Europe. I believe the
patient course we are pursuing toward those
nations is vital to the security of our nation.
Through cultural exchanges and civil air
agreements; through consular and outer space
treaties ; through what we hope will soon become
a treaty for the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons, and also, if they will join us, an agree-
ment on antiballistic missiles — we have tried to
enlarge, and have made great progress in enlarg-
ing, the arena of common action with the Soviet
Union.
Our purpose is to narrow our differences
where they can be narrowed and thus to help
secure peace in the world for the future genera-
tions. It will be a long, slow task, we realize.
There will be setbacks and discouragements.
But it is, we think, the only rational policy for
them and for us.
In Africa, as in Asia, we have encouraged the
nations of the region in their efforts to join in
cooperative attacks on the problems that each
of them faces: economic stagnation, poverty,
hunger, disease, and ignorance. Under Secretary
Nicholas Katzenbach just reported to me last
' IMd., May 15, 1967, p. 751.
" For background, see ibid., June 12, 1967, p. 879.
week on liis recent extended trip throughout
Africa. He described to me the many problems
and the many opportunities that exist in that
continent.
Africa is moving rapidly from the colonial
past toward freedom and dignity. She is in the
long and difficidt travail of building nations.
Her pioud people are determined to make a new
Africa, according to their own lights.
They are now creating institutions for politi-
cal and economic cooperation. They have set
great tasks for themselves — whose accomplish-
ments will require years of struggle and
sacrifice.
We very much want that struggle to succeed,
and we want to be responsive to the efforts that
they are making on their own behalf.
I can give personal testimony to the new
spirit that is abroad in Africa from Under Sec-
retary Katzenbach's report — and in Asia from
my own travels and experience there.
In Asia my experience demonstrated to me a
new spirit of confidence in that area of the
world. Everywhere I traveled last autumn, from
the conference in Manila to other countries of
the region, I found the conviction that Asians
can work with Asians to create better conditions
of life in every country. Fear has now given way
to hope in millions of hearts.
Asia's immense human problems remain, of
course. Not all countries have moved ahead as
rapidly as Thailand, Korea, and the Republic of
China. But most of them are now on a promising
track, and Japan is taking a welcome role in
helping her fellow Asians toward much more
rapid development.
A free Indonesia — the world's fifth largest
nation, a land of more than 100 million people —
is now struggling to rebuild, to reconstruct and
reform its national life. This will require the
understanding and the support of the entire in-
ternational community.
We maintain our dialog with the authorities
in Peking, in preparation for the day when they
will be ready to live at peace with the rest of the
world.
The Situation in Viet-Nam
I regret that this morning I cannot report any
major progress toward peace in Viet-Nam.
I can promise you that we have tried every
possible way to bring about either discussions
between the opposing sides or a practical de-
escalation of the violence itself.
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
Thus far there has been no serious response
from the other side.
We are ready— and we have long been ready —
to engage in a mutual deescalation of the fight-
ing. But we cannot stop only half the war, nor
can we abandon our commitment to the people
of South Viet-Nam as long as the enemy attacks
and fights on. And so long as North Viet-Nam
attempts to seize South Viet-Nam by force, we
must, and we will, block its efforts so that the
people of South Viet-Nam can determine their
own future in peace.
We would very much like to see the day
come — and come soon — when we can cooperate
with all the nations of the region, including
North Viet-Nam, in healing the wounds of a
war that has continued, we think, for far too
long. When the aggression ends, then that day
will follow.
Crisis in the Middle East
Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East —
and to the tumultuous events of the past months.
Those events have proved the wisdom of five
great principles of peace in the region.
The first and greatest principle is that every
nation in the area has a fundamental right to
live and to have this right respected by its
neighbors.
For the people of the Middle East the path
to hope does not lie in threats to end the life
of any nation. Such threats have become a bur-
den to the peace, not only of that region but a
burden to the peace of the entire world.
In the same way, no nation would be true to
the United Nations Charter or to its own true
interests if it should permit military success to
blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights
and its neighbors have interests of their own.
Each nation, therefore, must accept the right
of others to live.
This last month, I think, shows us another
basic requirement for settlement. It is a human
requirement: justice for the refugees.
A new conflict has brought new homelessness.
The nations of the Middle East must at last ad-
dress themselves to the plight of those who have
been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides
have resisted the best efforts of outside media-
tors to restore the victims of conflict to their
homes or to find them other proper places to
live and work. There will be no peace for any
party in the Middle East unless this problem is
attacked with new energy by all and, certainly,
primarily by those who are immediately con-
cerned.
A third lesson from this last month is that
maritime rights must be respected. Our nation
has long been committed to free maritime pas-
sage through international waterways ; and we,
along with other nations, were taking the neces-
sary steps to implement this principle when
hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was
more responsible for this explosion than any
other, I think it was the arbitrary and danger-
ous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran
would be closed. The right of innocent maritime
passage must be preserved for all nations.
Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated
the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of
the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must
rest not only on those in the area but upon the
larger states outside the area. We believe that
scarce resources could be used much better for
teclmical and economic development. We have
always opposed this arms race, and our own
military shipments to the area have conse-
quently been severely limited.
Now the waste and futility of the arms race
must be apparent to all the peoples of the world.
And now there is another moment of choice.
The United States of America, for its part, will
use every resource of diplomacy and every
coimsel of reason and prudence to try to find a
better course.
As a beginning, I should like to propose that
the United Nations immediately call upon all of
its members to report all shipments of all mili-
tary arms into this area and to keep those ship-
ments on file for all the peoples of the world to
observe.
Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of
respect for political independence and terri-
torial integrity of all the states of the area. We
reaffirmed that principle at the height of this
crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of
all. This principle can be effective in the Middle
East only on the basis of peace between the
parties. The nations of the region have had only
fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years.
What they now need are recognized boundaries
and other arrangements that will give them
security against terror, destruction, and war.
Further, there just must be adequate recogni-
tion of the special interest of three great
religions in the holy places of Jerusalem.
These five principles are not new, but we do
think they are fundamental. Taken together,
they point the way from uncertain armistice to
JXTLT 10, 1967
33
durable peace. We believe there must be prog-
ress toward all of them if there is to be progress
toward any.
Seftlement Depends on Nations of the Area
There are some who have urged, as a smgle,
simple solution, an immediate return to the sit-
uation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished
and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has
already said, this is not a prescription for peace
but for renewed hostilities.^
Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but
there must also be recognized rights of national
life, progress in solving the refugee problem,
freedom of innocent maritime passage, limita-
tion of the arms race, and respect for political
independence and territorial integrity.
But who will make this peace where all others
have failed for 20 years or more ?
Clearly the parties to the conflict must be
the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is
they who must make a settlement in the area.
It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to
live together in peace if they cannot learn to
reason together.
But we must still ask. Who can help them?
Some say it should be the United Nations ; some
call for the use of other parties. We have been
first in our support of effective peacekeeping in
the United Nations, and we also recognize the
great values to come from mediation.
We are ready this morning to see any method
tried, and we believe that none should be ex-
cluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be
useful and all will be needed.
I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view
on these matters. I offer assurance to all that
this Government of ours, the Government of
the United States, will do its part for peace in
every forum, at every level, at every hour.
Yet there is no escape from this fact: The
main responsibility for the peace of the region
depends upon its own peoples and its own lead-
ers of that region. What will be truly decisive in
the Middle East will be what is said and what
is done by those who live in the Middle East.
They can seek another arms race — if they
have not profited from the experience of this
one — if they want to. But they will seek it at a
terrible cost to their own people — and to their
* For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
In the U.N. Secnrity Council on June 13, see ibid., July 3,
1967, p. 5.
very long neglected human needs. They can live
on a diet of hate, though only at the cost of
hatred in return. Or they can move toward peace
with one another.
The world this morning is watching, watch-
ing for the peace of the world, because that is
really what is at stake. It will look for patience
and justice, it will look for humility and moral
courage. It will look for signs of movement
from prejudice and the emotional chaos of con-
flict to the gradual, slow shaping steps that lead
to learning to live together and learning to help
mold and shape peace in the area and in the
world.
The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its
people and in its resources. It has no need to live
in permanent civil war. It has the power to
build its own life as one of the prosperous re-
gions of the world in which we live.
U.S. Will Help in Works of Peace
If the nations of the Middle East will turn
toward the works of peace, they can count with
confidence upon the friendship and the help of
all the people of the United States of America.
In a climate of peace we here will do our full
share to help with a solution for the refugees.
We here will do our full share in support of
regional cooperation. We here will do our
share — and do more — to see that the peaceful
promise of nuclear energy is applied to the criti-
cal problem of desalting water and helping to
make the deserts bloom.
Our country is committed — and we here re-
iterate that commitment today — to a peace that
is based on five principles.
— first, the recognized right of national life ;
— second, justice for the refugees;
— third, innocent maritime passage ;
— fourth, limits on the wasteful and destruc-
tive arms race; and
— fifth, political independence and territorial
integrity for all.
This is not a time for malice, but for magna-
nimity; not for propaganda, but for patience;
not for vituperation, but for vision.
On the basis of peace we offer our help to the
people of the Middle East. That land, known to
every one of us since childhood as the birthplace
of great religions and learning, can flourish
once again in our time. We here in the United
States shall do all in our power to help make
it so.
34
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems
President Johnson and Aleksei N. Kosygin,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the So-
viet Union, conferred at Glasshoro, N.J., on
June 23 and again on Jtine 25. The two meetings
were held at '"''Hollyhush^'' the residence of the
president of Glassboro State College. Premier
Kosygin traveled to Glassboro from, New York
City, where he ivas heading the Soviet delega-
tion to the fifth emergency special session of the
U.N. General Assembly.
Following are texts of a toast made hy Presi-
dent Johnson at a luncheon for Premier Kosy-
gin at ^'■Hollyiusli''' on June 23, statements made
iy the Pi^esident and the Premier on June 23
and June 25 at the conclusion of each of their
meetings, and a hrief report to the Nation made
hy President Johnson upon his return to the
White House from Glassboro on June 25, to-
gether with a statement made hy Premier Kosy-
gin regarding his meeting with President John-
son which was delivered as part of his opening
remarks at a neios conference he held at United
Nations Headguarters on the evening of Ju/ne 25.
TOAST BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 23
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23
Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, Mr. For-
eign Minister [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
A. Gromylco], Mr. Ambassador [Soviet Ambas-
sador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin] : We are de-
lighted that you have had a chance to even
briefly visit our country, and we are especially
pleased that you have come here today for a
meeting with us.
We both have special responsibilities for the
security of our families, and over and beyond all
our families is the security of the entire human
family inhabiting this earth. We must never
forget that there are many peoples in this world,
many different nations, each with its own his-
tory and ambitions. There is a special place,
however, in tliis world and a special responsibil-
ity placed upon our two countries because of our
strength and our resources.
This demands that the relations between our
two countries be as reasonable and as construc-
tive as we know how to make them. It is also our
obligation that we make it possible for other
countries to live in peace with each other if this
can be done. And that is why today we have
here discussed with you some questions affecting
the peace of the entire human family of 3 bil-
lion people.
I want to inform Secretary Rusk, Minister
Gromyko, and Secretary [of Defense Robert
S.] McNamara and the other distinguished
guests present here that you and I have dis-
cussed various aspects and possibilities for
strengthening peace in the world, such as the
nonproliferation agreement, and certain ques-
tions arising out of the Middle East situation.
We also agreed that both of us, as well as our
two nations, made some small contribution to
bringing about a cease-fire in the Middle East.
We only regret that this contribution between us
had not made it possible to prevent the out-
break of hostilities — although we tried.
I want to emphasize that the results of today's
meeting will be judged by what we can achieve
in the future in order to achieve peace.
I quoted to the Chairman the story about the
author, Charles Lamb, who threw down in dis-
gust a book he had been reading. To his sister's
question of whether he knew the author, he said,
"No, because if I did, I would like him."
And by the same spirit, Mr. Chairman, I hope
that today's meeting has contributed to getting
us to know each other better, and therefore to
like each other better, just as our Ambassadors
in Moscow and Washington have become more
acquainted and liked by the people they deal
with. And so, Mr. Chairman, I should like to
thank you for coming here. We thank you for
coming. We want very much to resolve some of
these questions.
We would like to have the opportunity to sit
down further and discuss some aspects of the
antiballistic missile system, nonproliferation,
perhaps some questions arising out of the Mid-
dle East situation, and at least explore the situ-
35
ation in Southeast Asia, as well as questions of
mutual interest in Europe and the Western
Hemisphere.
And now I would like to ask each of you to
stand and raise your glass to the health of the
Chairman, the Soviet Union, and to peace in
the world.
STATEMENTS AT CONCLUSION
OF FIRST MEETING, JUNE 23
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 23
President Johnson
The Chairman and I have met since we ar-
rived here a little after 11 :00 today.
Our meeting gave us an opj^ortunity to get
acquainted with each other. We have exchanged
views on a number of international questions.
Among these problems were the Middle East,
Viet- Nam, and the question of nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons.
We agreed that it is now very important to
reach international agreement on a nonpro-
liferation treaty.
We also exchanged views on the questions of
direct bilateral relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States of America.
Finally, we agreed that discussions on these
questions should be continued in New York be-
tween Secretary Kusk and Mr. Gromyko during
next week.
This meeting today was a very good and very
useful meeting. We are in the debt of the great
Governor of New Jersey for his hospitality.
We are in^dting ourselves to return here again
at 1 :30 on Sunday afternoon. We will continue
our discussions here then. Those of you who
have Sunday afternoon off, we will be glad to
have you come, too.
Premier Kosygin ^
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I wish first
of all to thank the President for arranging this
meeting, and all the more so that he has ar-
ranged a meeting in so pleasant and beautiful
a locality and town.
I also want to thank the hosts, the masters
of the house who have given us these facilities,
have given us a roof over our heads under which
we could meet.
I suppose you can get the impression from
' Premier Kosygin spoke in Russian.
what the President has said that we have
amassed such a great number of questions that
we weren't able to go through them all today,
which is why we have decided to meet again this
Sunday.
As regards the statement which the President
just made to you, I have nothing whatsoever to
add. I think it was very correctly drawn up.
I hope you won't be offended with us if we
have kept you here for all this time and have
not told you very much. Please excuse us.
STATEMENTS AT CONCLUSION
OF SECOND MEETING, JUNE 25
White House press release (Glassboro, N.J.) dated June 25
President Johnson
The Chairman and I met again today and
talked somewhat more than 4 hours, beginning
at lunch and working through until just now.
We have gone more deeply than before into a
great number of the many questions before our
two countries in the world. We have also
agreed to keep in good communication in the
future, through Secretary Rusk and Foreign
Mmister Gromyko, through our very able Am-
bassadors Mr. Dobrynin and Mr. Thompson
[American Ambassador to the U.S.S.E. Llewel-
lyn E. Thompson], and also directly. We have
made further progress in an effort to improve
our understanding of each other's thinking on a
number of questions. I believe more strongly
than ever that these have been very good and I
very useful talks. The Chairman and I join in ■
extending our thanks to Governor [of New
Jersey Richard J.] and Mrs. Hughes, to Presi-
dent [of Glassboro State College Thomas E.]
and Mrs. Robinson, and to the good people of
Glassboro for the contribution that they have
made in making these good meetings possible.
Now I should like to ask the Chairman to say a
word or two.
Premier Kosygin
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen : I would like
first of all to thank all the citizens of Glassboro
and the Governor and the president of the col-
lege for having created a very good atmosphere
for the talks that we were able to have here with
your President.
I think altogether we have spent and worked
here for about 8 or 9 hours, and we have come to
become accustomed to this place. We like the
36
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
town and we think the people of Glassboro are
very good people. We have come to like them.
We have been very favorably impressed by the
time we have spent here.
As during the first meeting which took place
on June 23, the exchange of views between the
President and myself touched upon several in-
ternational issues. Also in the course of these
conversations we had a general review of the
state of bilateral Soviet- American relations. On
the whole, these meetings provided the Govern-
ments of the Soviet Union and the United
States with an opportunity to compare their
positions on the questions under discussion, and
this both sides believe is useful.
And once again, on my own behalf and on
behalf of all those who have come here with me,
I wish to extend my profound gratitude to you
all. Goodby.
Premier Kosygin
I want to thank you all very sincerely for this
very warm welcome. May I salute friendship
between the Soviet and American peoples, and
to all of you I want to wish every success and
happiness and express the hope that we shall go
forward together for peace.
President Johnson
You good people of Glassboro have done your
part in helping us make this a significant and a
historic meeting.
We think that this meeting has been useful,
and we think it will be helpful in achieving
what we all want more than anything else in
the world — peace for all humankind.
Thank you very much.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S REPORT
TO THE NATION, JUNE 25
White House press release dated June 25
On my return tonight to the White House
after 2 days of talks at Hollybush, I want to
make this brief report to the American people.
We continued our discussions today in the
same spirit in which we began them on Friday —
a spirit of direct face-to-face exchanges between
leaders with very heavy responsibilities.
We wanted to meet again because the issues
before us are so large and so difBcult that one
meeting together was not nearly enough. The
two meetings have been better than one, and at
least we learned — I know I did — from each hour
of our talks.
You will not be surprised to know that these
two meetings have not solved all of our prob-
lems. On some, we have made progress — great
progress in reducing misunderstanding, I think,
and in reaffirming our common commitment to
seek agreement.
I think we made that kind of progress, for
example, on the question of arms limitation. We
have agreed this afternoon that Secretary of
State Rusk and Mr. Gromyko will pursue this
subject further in New York in the days ahead.
I must report that no agreement is readily in
sight on the Middle Eastern crisis and that our
well-known differences over Viet-Nam con-
tinue. Yet even on these issues, I was very glad
to hear the Chairman's views face to face and to
have a chance to tell him directly and in detail
just what our purposes and our policies are —
and are not — in these particular areas.
The Chairman, I believe, made a similar
effort with me.
Wlien nations have deeply different positions,
as we do on these issues, they do not come to
agreement merely by improving their under-
standing of each other's views. But such im-
provement helps. Sometimes in such discussions
you can find elements — beginnings — hopeful
fractions — of common ground, even within a
general disagreement.
It was so in the Middle East 2 weeks
ago when we agreed on the need for a prompt
cease-fire. And it is so today in respect to such
simple propositions as that every state has a
right to live, that there should be an end to the
war in the Middle East, and that in the right
circumstances there should be withdrawal of
troops. This is a long way from agreement, but
it is a long way also from total difference.
On Viet-Nam, the area of agreement is
smaller. It is defined by the fact that the dan-
gers and the difficulties of any one area must
never be allowed to become a cause of wider con-
flict. Yet even in Viet-Nam, I was able to make it
very clear, with no third party between us, that
we will match and we will outmatch every step
to peace that others may be ready to take.
As I warned on Friday - — and as I just must
' See p. 38.
JULY 10, 1967
37
■warn again on this Sunday afternoon — meet-
ings like these do not themselves make peace in
the world. We must all remember that there have
been many meetings before and they have not
ended all of our troubles or all of our dangers.
But I can also report on this Simday after-
noon another thing that I said on last Friday :
That it does help a lot to sit down and look at a
man right in the eye and try to reason with him,
particularly if he is trying to reason with you.
We may have differences and difficulties
ahead, but I think they will be lessened, and not
increased, by our new knowledge of each other.
Chairman Kosygin and I have agreed that
the leaders of our two countries will keep in
touch in the future, through our able secre-
taries and ambassadors, and also keep in touch
directly.
I said on Friday that the world is very small
and very dangerous. Tonight I believe that it is
fair to say that these days at HoUybush have
made it a little smaller still — but also a little less
dangerous.
STATEMENT BY PREMIER KOSYGIN
AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, JUNE 25
TTnofflclal translation
On June 25 a second meeting between the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
U.S.S.E., Mr. Kosygin, and President Jolmson
of the United States, was held in the town of
Glassboro, not far from New York. At the sec-
ond meeting, as at the first, which took place on
June 23, the exchange of views touched upon
several international problems.
In connection with the situation in the Middle
East, the two sides set forth their respective
positions. It was stated on the Soviet side that
the main thing now is to achieve the prompt
withdrawal behind the armistice lines of the
forces of Israel, which has committed aggression
against the Arab states. Tliis question is of
signal importance for the restoration of peace
in the Middle East, and it is in the center of the
attention of the emergency special session of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and
it must be positively resolved without delay.
The exchange of views on the Viet-Nam
problem once again revealed profound dif-
ferences in the positions of the Soviet Union
and the Unit«d States. It was emphasized on
the Soviet side that settlement of the Viet-Nam
problem is possible only on the condition of an
end to the bombing of the territory of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the with-
drawal of American forces from South
Viet-Nam.
Both sides reaffirmed that they believe it im-
portant to promptly achieve understanding on
the conclusion of an international treaty on the
nonprolif eration of nuclear weapons.
In the course of the talks, a general review
was made of the state of bilateral Soviet and
American relations. On the whole, the meetings
offered the Governments of the Soviet Union
and the United States an opportunity to com-
pare their positions on the matters discussed, an
opportimity both sides believe to have been
useful.
The Spirit of Hollybush
FoUotoing is an excerpt from remarks made
hy President Johnson at a Presidenfs Club
Dinner at Los Angeles, Oalif., on June 23 in
xohich lie discusses his meeting at Glassboro,
N.J., that morning with Aleksei N. Kosygin,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Soviet Union.^
White House press release dated June 23
This morning I found myself in a house that
had been visited before by Presidents — Theo-
dore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. So
it was in no partisan party spirit that we went
to Hollybush, We went to serve what we be-
lieved to be a great national purpose, the pur-
pose of peace for human beings.
I said to the Chairman that we have 200 mil-
lion people. ... I said that we not only had
a responsibility to our 200 million and their
more than 200 million — the 400 million to-
gether^— but we had a responsibility to 3 billion
people in the world because of our strength and
obligations as great powers ; that responsibility
was peace and trying not only to secure it for
ourselves but to secure it for all human beings.
The world's peace now hangs heavily tonight
upon the wisdom, judgment, and understanding
' See p. 35.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of these two very great states — the United States
of America and tlie Soviet Union.
Tliere are deep and very serious differences
in our two societies, but one tiling we do liave
in common, as Chairman Kosygin himself said
when he addressed the United Nations, is a
grave responsibility for world peace in a nu-
clear age. Every crisis in the last 20 years has
necessarily invoked that common responsibility,
and repeatedly we have seen the dangerous con-
sequences of incomplete understanding.
We have also repeatedly seen that when others
are irresponsible in word or in deed, a very s^De-
cial burden for care seems to always fall upon
America. So I was glad to meet with Chairman
Kosygin this morning. We talked throughout
the day quietly and straightforwardly.
I am glad to say to you that I found he came
to our meeting in the same spirit. He had some
seniority on me. He had been a grandfather for
over 18 years, and I had been a gi-andfather for
only 18 hours, but he and I agreed that we both
very nmch wanted a world of peace for our
grandchildren.
We talked about the problems of the Middle
East in detail. We shall continue to talk about
them. We talked about the problems of South-
eastern Asia. We talked about the arms race
and about the need for new agreements there.
We talked about the need for common action on
constructive initiatives for peace. We reached
no new agreements — almost, but not quite. New
agreements are not always reached in a single
conversation. So we are going to eat lunch
and spend Smiday together again at Hollybush.
I don't want to overstate the case. I don't
want to get your hopes too high. I do think,
though, that we understand each other better.
I do think that I was able to make it vei-y clear
indeed that the strength and the determination
of our coimtiy and the Government are fully
matched by our persistent eagerness to talk and
to work, to fight for peace and friendship with
all who will work and talk with us.
But all of you must remember that one meet-
ing does not make a peace. I don't think there
is anyone in the world who ever wanted peace
more than the leaders in the world of countries
who are not at peace. You must all remember
that there have been many meetings before and
they have not ended our troubles nor have they
ended our danger. There is not a nation in the
world we would trade places with tonight.
These meetings just have not ended our trou-
bles and our dangers, and I cannot promise you
that that will not happen again. The world re-
mains a very small and very dangerous one. All
nations, even the greatest of them, have hard
and painful choices ahead of them. What I can
tell you tonight — and I have no doubt about it
at all — is that it does help a lot to sit down and
look at a man in the eye all day long and try to
reason with him, particularly if he is trymg to
reason with you. That is why we went to Holly-
bush this morning, and reasoning together there
today was the "spirit of Hollybush."
I think you know me well enough to recognize
that that is my way of doing things — "Come
now," as Isaiah said, "and let us reason to-
gether." What I think is even more important —
that is the way I think we must finally achieve
peace.
Those who do not smell the powder or hear
the blast of cannon, who enjoy the luxury and
freedom of free speech and the right to exercise
it most freely, at times really do not understand
the burdens that our marines are carrying there
tonight, who are dying for their country, or the
burdens that their commanders are carrying,
who wish they were all home asleep in bed or
even carrying a placard of some kind.
But they can't be and still retain our national
honor. They can't be and still preserve our free-
dom. They can't be and still protect our system.
Wlien they can be — with honor — they will be —
at the earliest possible moment.
Sometimes I think of my friends who don't
understand all of the cables I read from all of
the 122 countries. They don't hear all the voices
of despair and of all the chaotic conditions that
come to us through the day. Sometimes I think
of that Biblical injunction, when I see them ad-
vising their fellow citizens to negotiate and say-
ing we want peace and all those things.
I try to look with understanding and charity
upon them, and in the words of that Biblical
admonition, God forgive them, for they know
not really what they do.
I can just say this to you : There is no human
being in this world who wants to avoid war
more than I do. There is no human being in this
world who wants peace in Viet-Nam or in the
Middle East more than I do.
When they tell me to negotiate, I say, "Amen."
I have been ready to negotiate and sit down
at a conference table every hour of every day
JTTLY 10, 1967
267-786 — 67-
89
that I have been President of this country, but
I just cannot negotiate with myself.
And these protestors haven't been able to de-
liver Ho Chi Minh anyplace yet.
I was not elected your President to liquidate
our agreements in Southeast Asia. I was not
elected your President to run out on our com-
mitments in the Middle East. If that is what you
want, you will have to get another President.
But I am going — as I have said so many
times — any time, any place, anywhere, if in my
judgment it can possibly, conceivably, serve the
cause of peace. That is why I went to that little
farmhouse way up on the New Jersey Pike to-
day to spend the day, and that is why I am
going to get over to see my grandson by day-
light in the morning.
European Leaders Meet
With President Johnson
On June 22 President Johnson held separate
meetings at the White House with Prime Min-
ister Jens Otto Krag of Denmark, with Prime
Minister Aide Moro and Foreign Minister
Amintore Fanfani of Italy, and with Foreign
Secretary George Brown of Great Britain. Fol-
lowing is an exchange of toasts between the
President and Prime Minister Krag at a White
House luncheon on that day honoring the Euro-
pean leaders.
White House press release dated June 22
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Senator [Mike] Mansfield has asked me to
request the Senators to leave in time to be at the
Senate Chamber at 3 o'clock. So in order to
avoid any misunderstanding, I don't want to
create the impression that the reason that Sena-
tor [Everett M.] Dirksen leaves my table rather
abruptly is because he doesn't like what I am
saying or he doesn't like what I feed him. But
I am going to depend on Senator Dirksen, as
the coleader of the Senate, at the appropriate
time to give the signal. I am sure, as you usually
do, all of you will follow him. We are very
grateful, though, that the Members of the Sen-
ate would join us on such short notice. I did not
know until yesterday that we could have this
group here together today. It has been hur-
riedly arranged.
I apologize for not giving you more time,
but I know you can understand the problems
of a grandfather.
But the pace of change in our time is almost
too swift for men to comprehend or to really
adjust to it. Two days ago, I was a parent — only
a parent. Yesterday, my role changed drasti-
cally— I became a grandfather. I did not seek
that high office, but now that I have been chosen,
the path of duty is clear — and I shall serve.
And at this moment of great and critical
change, I am blessed with the presence of good
friends and strong partners in this house. My
own happiness is the greater because you have
come here today to share your strength and
your friendship with us.
I recognize that other events, Mr. Prime Min-
isters, Mr. Foreign Ministers, have brought you
here — events that threaten the peace and chal-
lenge the intelligence and forbearance of all
nations.
This is not the first time we have faced a cri-
sis together, and it will not be the last. We have
weathered past storms because we have con-
sulted and because we have acted together, and
we shall weather this storm for this very same
reason.
Each of us must play his part in helping to
build a permanent peace in the Middle East. I
said on Monday that the main responsibility for
the peace of the region depends upon its people
and its own leaders.^
What will be truly decisive in the Middle East
will be what is said and what is done by those
who live in the Middle East. There may well be
helpful roles for others — the United Nations or
outside mediators — but I said that we are ready
to see any method tried. We believe none should
be excluded altogether.
I have appealed to all to adopt no rigid view.
For our own part, we have promised that the
Government of the United States would do its
part for peace in every forum at every level at
every hour. I know that you share our eager-
ness to help find the path to peace in the Middle
East. We value this chance to hear your views
on how it may be found.
Our responsibilities are very great and so, of
course, are our opportunities. We think and we
work and we act not only for the millions whom
' See p. 31.
40
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
we serve at this moment but for their children
and those who will come after them.
I can tell all of you that I am more acutely
aware of this now than ever before, now that I
have achieved grand fatherhood. I would like to
help make a world for young Patrick Nugent
and his contemporaries in every land that will
be safer, more prosperous, more hopeful, and
certainly more peaceful by far than the world
that I have inhabited.
So working together and reasoning together
and planning together — being patient and un-
derstanding together — I believe that we can
achieve such a world.
So just as I am grateful to you statesmen who
have come from across the waters, I am grateful
to the leaders in the field of foreign affairs and
relations in our Congress, in our courts, in our
press, and others who have come here today to
help me honor these leading spokesmen of great
nations.
So now I should like to ask you to join me in
toasting the King of Denmark, the Queen of
England, and the President of Italy. The King,
the Queen, the President.
PRIME MINISTER KRAG
Mr. President, allow me, first of all, to express
my gratitude, sir, for giving this luncheon
today.
All our guests around these tables know how
hospitable you are. Once again, we enjoy the
honor and pleasure of being with you in the
White House. It has been a period of some very
hectic weeks in international politics for all of
us, but inevitably the burdens fall most heavily
on the shoulders of the great powers.
We all marvel at the way in which you carry
your great responsibilities, Mr. President.
I should like to say that it is a great comfort
for all of us to know that the United States, un-
der your leadership, is steering a course of mod-
eration and reconciliation in the present situa-
tion in the Middle East.
No doubt the coming months will present us
with a multitude of international problems. It
is our hope that the climate of good will and
common sense will prevail eventually.
I can assure you, Mr. President, that the three
European Governments represented here will
do whatever is in our power to bring this about.
We all know that yesterday was a very im-
portant and happy day in your life and for
Mrs. Johnson, because your daughter Luci gave
birth to your first grandson. I am sure he will
have the same high qualities as his grandfather.
On behalf of the three European nations be-
ing guests here, I would like to propose, ladies
and gentlemen, that we all toast the President
of the United States.
U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions
Resulting From Near East Conflict
Press release 148 dated June 21
The Department of State announced on June
21 that U.S. passports are now valid, without
special endorsement, for travel of U.S. citizens
to the following countries : Israel, Kuwait, Mo-
rocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.^
The Department also announced that because
of conditions resulting from the recent hos-
tilities in the Near East it was continuing in
effect for the present a restriction upon travel
to the remaining countries listed in the Depart-
ment's announcement of June 5.^ U.S. citizens
desiring to go to the following countries are,
therefore, until further notice still required to
obtain passports specifically endorsed by the
Department of State for such travel : Algeria,
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Sudan, the
Syrian Arab Eepublic, the United Arab Ee-
public, and Yemen. However, in accordance with
existing regulations, validations for travel to
these countries will be granted, as the situation
permits, to persons whose travel may be re-
garded as being in the interest of the United
States. These restrictions will be lifted as soon
as conditions warrant.
^ The Department spokesman announced later on
June 21 that the action of lifting travel restrictions
applies precisely to the same geographical areas on
which these restrictions were originally imposed : U.S.
citizens wishing to travel to the west bank of the Jor-
dan River must secure specially validated passports
to do so; U.S. citizens wishing to travel to the holy
places in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, however, need not
make special application for validation and are given
permission to do so.
* BXJ1.LETIN of June 26, 1967, p. 952. For texts of Pub-
lic Notices 269 and 270 of June 22, 1967, see 32 Fed.
Reg. 9175.
JTJLY 10, 1967
41
President of Malawi Visits the United States
H. Kamuzu Banda, President of the Republic
of Malawi^ made a private visit to the United
States June S-11. He met with President John-
son and other officials at Washington June 8-10.
Following is an exchange of toasts between
President Johnson and President Banda at a
luncheon at the White House on June 8.
White House press release dated June 8
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
We are honored today to visit once again with
the distinguished President of the Kepublic of
Malawi.
We hope that for President Banda — as for
us — this visit is like a homecoming. Dt. Banda
was educated in the United States of America.
He has spent a great deal of time here in our
country. We are delightfully encouraged that
he keeps returning despite the fact that he
knows us reasonably well.
Since Dr. Banda's arrival, he and I have
been engaged in a very fruitful discussion of the
problems of Africa and the problems of the
world. The doctor has provided me with his
insights on a very wide range of concerns. I
must say to my colleagues here today and citi-
zens of my country that I am very pleased to
find such broad agreement between us on the
international questions of the day.
But while Malawi's attention is rightly fo-
cused on the future, on the problems of inter-
national development, President Banda leads
a new nation — a nation which is worlring very
hard to offer its people, the citizens of its land,
a better future tomorrow.
Gibbon called independence "the first of
earthly blessings." Malawi's independence is
well established. But President Banda and his
countrymen realize, recognize, and know that
nationhood is much more.
They know, as we learned a long time ago,
that ringing speeches count very little unless
they are accompanied by economic advance.
They know that development is just another
word for work, for planning, and for long, hard
application.
They know that the future of Malawi is
largely a product of a people's faith in them-
selves. The real test is the amount of effort that
they put behind that faith.
Americans, Mr. President, as you know, im-
derstand these truths. We, too, are a very young
nation. We, too, faced an uphill economic fight
in the early years of our independence.
I am reminded of an observation of one of
my predecessors in the Presidency, President
Grant. The Pilgrims, he said, found they had
to make a living in a climate "where there were
nine months of winter and three months of cold
weather."
Of course, I realize that this does not pre-
cisely describe your problem.
But our challenge, Mr. President, in many
ways is very similar to the challenge that you
face. It is this experience which has taught us a
lesson that you know well. That lesson is that
the ingredients of economic growth are not just
physical resources, not just a good climate, not
just fertile soil.
The critical elements are people — human be-
ings— their dreams, their application, their ded-
ication, their persistence.
I know that the people of Malawi — and their
distinguished President — have these qualities
in abundance. How do I know it? We broke
ground for a pulpmill in the last hour and we
built 300 miles of highways already.
So my good friends from throughout the Na-
tion, particularly from the State of Indiana
where the distinguished President went to
school, the State of Ohio — represented here by
Senator [Stephen M.] Young today — where the
distinguished President took his education, I
ask all of you to rise and join me in a toast to
our most honored guest. Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda
of the Republic of Malawi.
42
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
PRESIDENT BANDA
I am tricked ! "VVlien I came here, as a matter
of fact, I did not know that the lunclieon was
going to be like this. I was told in Zomba by the
American Ambassador that the President
wanted to have just a quiet lunch with me, you
see.
So when I came here this morning, all I ex-
pected was that it would be just probably the
three of us — the President himself and the Sec-
retary of State, somewhere, not in a gathering
of this kind.
However, I would like to thank you very
much, Mr. President, for your kindness in ar-
ranging a fimction of this kind to give me an
opportimity to meet you and your colleagues
and those that work with you.
As you have rightly said, when I come here I
feel the homecoming spirit, because I was edu-
cated in this country.
I had my high school in this country at Wil-
berforce Academy just outside of Xenia — about
9 or 10 miles from Xenia. Then from there I
went to the University of Indiana in Blooming-
ton, Indiana; from there to the University of
Chicago, where I got my first degree ; and then
Meharry Medical College in Nashville, Tennes-
see, after which I went to Edinburgh.
So, you see, I feel at home here. That is prob-
ably why I behave as I do, I speak as I do, I act
as I do — many, many times when others don't
exactly see my point.
You see, I came here at the most impression-
able age. If I went back home after I was a
doctor, gave up my medical practice in London
and began to fight for my people's political
freedom, it was because you, your country,
taught me.
"I know not what course others may take ; as
for me, give me liberty or give me death." That
saying, which my high school teacher taught
me, rang in my mind when I went back home.
Anyway, I don't come here to talk politics.
But what I would like you to know is that what
you have said is exactly what I am telling my
people. From the very day I went back home,
I told my people : "Independence does not mean
money and wealth will rain on our heads like
manna from heaven. No. It means hard work."
It so happens that we have no gold or copper
or diamonds or oil there. So I say to my people,
"Here we have no mines, no factories. Our mines
and factories is the ground — the soil. From the
soil every penny we have in this country comes,
in the form of maize, groimdnuts, tobacco, cot-
ton, and other products of the soil."
My people know my policy. Hard work. And
I am happy to tell you, Mr. President, that my
people listened to me.
I said to my people, "We have won our in-
dependence now, but we have to build this coun-
try. And to build this country we have to have
money. If I am to be listened to by the President
of the United States, by the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom, by the President of the
Eepublics of France or Germany, you, my peo-
ple, must work hard so that when I go to Wash-
ington, to London, go to Paris, go to Bonn, I
will say to them, 'Look, ]Mr. President, my peo-
ple have cleared the road. All the bush are
cleared, all the trees. But there is the river, the
Shire Eiver. They cannot bridge it with their
f emiir — with their legbone. It requires steel and
steel requires money.' If I tell my friends in the
West that you, my people, are working hard but
there are things we cannot do with our hands, we
need money, they will listen to me."
As a result, these boys, women, everywhere
work very, very hard. I come here now to say
I want a road. My people have cleared the grass
and the trees. We need good bridges. Therefore,
the kind of road that my people can build can-
not do it. You have to persuade your banks, or
your international development association and
other organizations like that, to help us. That
is why I am asking for that.
At the same time, we have trees. We are plant-
ing trees. We can't turn them into anything
else unless you help us. That is why I am asking
you to ask "Mr. Chase Manhattan" and other
bankers.
You have mentioned that since I have been
here this morning we have broken ground on
a number of points. I am not going to go into
detail about that, but I would like you to know,
Mr. President, that whatever it may cost me,
I always do what I think is the right thing
according to my own conscience.
In 1960-61 I was asked to lecture at Yale.
I told the students there— when they asked me
what was going to be Malawi's foreign policy
when we became independent — that Malawi's
policy when we became independent would be
this : "Discretional alinement and nonalinement.
No automatic alinement, because," I said, "no
nation or a group of nations is always right
and no nation or a group of nations is always
wrong. Therefore, Malawi's policy, foreign pol-
icy, will be to associate with any power that is,
on a particular given international problem, ac-
cording to my view, in the right."
And it so happens that most of the time, ac-
cording to my understanding anyway, the West
is right.
Therefore, Mr. President, Mr. Vice President,
Mr. Secretary of State, if you read in the papers
or hear that I am unpopular, or the unpopular
man number one in Africa, you will understand
now why.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
The President and I had just concluded our
conversation before lunch, but in the light of
what he said about his people listening to him,
I am pleased to observe that he has a formula
that I would like to inquire more definitely into.
So as you go your own way, I will be talking
with President Banda.
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts
on Air Actions at Cam Pha
Following is the text of a U.S. note which iva^s
delivered to the Soviet Embassy at Washington
on June 20.
Press release 147 dated June 20
Juste 20, 1967.
The Government of the United States of
America refers to its note dated June 3, 1967,'
to the Government of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics concerning the incident in-
volving the Soviet ship "Turkestan" off Cam
Pha on June 2.
Further information concerning this incident
was received on June 18 from the United States
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air Force. This
information was conveyed orally to the Soviet
Embassy in Washington shortly after its
receipt. The new facts indicate that in addition
to the two flights of United States F-105 air-
craft which conducted strikes against military
targets in the vicinity of Cam Pha on June 2, as
described in the United States note of June 3,
a third flight of F-105 aircraft passed through
^ BuiiETiN of June 26, 1967, p. 953.
the area of Cam Pha at the general time of the
incident. It now appears that aircraft from this
third flight directed 20 mm cannon suppressive
fire against a North Vietnamese anti-aircraft
site at Cam Pha and that some of this fire may
have struck the "Turkestan."
As indicated in the United States note of
Jime 3, the United States regrets the damage
to the "Turkestan" that any such action may
have caused, particularly the death of one mem-
ber of the crew and injuries to others. Through-
out the course of the tragic struggle in Vietnam,
United States military pilots have operated un-
der strict instructions to avoid engagement with
any vessels which are not identified as hostile.
The Soviet Government may be assured that
United States authorities will make every effort
to insure that such incidents do not occur.
U.S.-Canada Economic Committee
Concludes Eleventh Meeting
Text of Communique, June 22
The Eleventh Meeting of the Joint Canada-
United States Ministerial Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs was held in Montreal
June 20-22.
The Committee exchanged views on current
economic developments. They reviewed the suc-
cess achieved in both countries in moderating
excessive demand pressures during the past year
and noted that a more djTiamic pace of expan-
sion of real output was expected in coming
months. Recovery of the residential construc-
tion industry, an end to the inventory correc-
tion, modest expansion of private investment
expenditures, higher Federal, State and local
government purchases, and renewed vigor in
consumer spending were cited as the major an-
ticipated sources of strength in the U.S. outlook
for the coming year. Similar forces were also
expected to lead to stronger growth in Canada.
The Committee emphasized the need for flex-
ible and responsive fiscal policy in both coun-
tries during the coming months. They recog-
nized the need for dealing with the problem of
achieving greater stability in costs and prices,
especially as the two economies resume rates of
advance more in line with their potentials.
In a world of growing trade and develop-
ment assistance Committee members affirmed
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the intention of their Governments to press for
general agreement at the 1967 annual meeting of
the Governors of the International Monetary
Fund on the structure and major provisions of
a contingency plan for the creation of a new in-
ternational reserve asset. They stressed the need
for an asset which monetary authorities could
include in their reserves.
The Committee also reviewed the balance of
payments prospects of the two countries. United
States members reiterated the continued deter-
mination of the United States to make as much
progress toward equilibrium in its world-wide
balance of payments as the costs of Vietnam per-
mit. The Committee discussed capital move-
ments between the two countries and took note
of the benefits to both countries of existing ar-
rangements relating to access by Canadian bor-
rowers to the United States capital market.
The Committee welcomed the successful con-
clusion of the Kennedy Round of trade negoti-
ations which will provide an important stimu-
lus to world trade as well as to trade between the
United States and Canada. They discussed
prospects for future trade liberalization, noted
that both countries are conducting studies
on this matter and agreed to continue close
consultations.
The Committee devoted special attention to
the trade problems of the developing countries,
recognizing the importance of positive and con-
structive measures in support of efforts by the
developing countries to accelerate their own
economic development. This will be the main
theme of the second United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development early next year.
The Committee was concerned about the fail-
ure of development aid to expand in line with
the growing requirements of the developing
countries. In this context early and substantial-
ly enlarged replenishment of International De-
velopment Association resources must have a
high priority. The Committee welcomed the new
multilateral food aid programme agreed upon
in the Kennedy Round which will help expand
food aid and will result in a more equitable shar-
ing of the cost. The amount and character of
food assistance must be improved as well as the
degree of self-help by the recipient nations.
The Committee recognized the importance of
close and effective cooperation between the two
countries in respect of wheat marketing poli-
cies, including wheat flour, particularly in the
context of the new Cereals Agreement con-
cluded in the Kennedy Round. They agreed to
strengthen consultative arrangements concern-
ing wheat marketing and food aid.
United States members reiterated their con-
cern over those aspects of the Canadian Bank
Act which in their view have the effect of dis-
criminating retroactively against a bank in Can-
ada owned in the United States. Canadian Min-
isters took a different view of the effect of the
Bank Act, and stressed the importance of effec-
tive Canadian ownership of major financial in-
stitutions. They reiterated Canada's intention
to encourage increased participation by Ca-
nadians in the ownership and control of Cana-
dian industry while continuing to maintain a
hospitable climate for foreign investment.
Canadian members also drew attention to the
problem arising from the effect which certain
United States laws and regulations may have
upon Canadian companies, especially as regards
securities regulation and foreign assets control
but noted that good progress had been made in
dealing with particular aspects of the problem.
The Committee agreed on the desirability of an
exchange of information in the securities field
that would benefit investors in both countries.
The Committee examined results achieved
under the Automotive Agreement of 1965.^ De-
spite fluctuations in demand and the continuing
process of adjustment the industry is making
progress in rationalization and efficiency, and
trade in automotive products between the two
countries has expanded substantially to the
benefit of both producers and consumers. They
noted that a comprehensive review of the Agree-
ment was to begin later this year.
The Committee discussed energy relations
between the two countries. They recognized the
common interest in the orderly expansion of
trade in energy resources and discussed the
kinds of facilities which might be needed to
serve efficiently the development of this trade.
The Committee noted the recent decision of the
Federal Power Commission which, in approv-
ing the transmission of natural gas to Eastern
Canadian and border state customers, referred
to the community of interest in this project and
to its security advantages.
The Committee discussed a number of bilat-
eral questions of current interest to the two
countries. United States members urged that
Canadian tourists returning to Canada from the
United States be given duty-free allowances
equivalent to those given Canadian tourists re-
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193.
JULY 10, 196T
45
turning from overseas areas. They also re-
quested that Canada accord official recognition
to Bourbon whisky as a distinctive product of
the United States.
Canadian Ministers referred to the desirabil-
ity of expanding the area of free trade in agri-
cultural machinery, tractors and equipmentand
it was agreed that this matter should be ex-
amined jointly with a view to working out
mutually satisfactoi-y arrangements. They also
urged the elimination of the manufacturing
clause in United States copyright legislation
and the relaxation of restrictions on United
States imports of aged Canadian cheddar
cheese. Canadian members drew attention to the
problem created from time to time because of
the cross-border movement of relatively small
quantities of agricultural products at depressed
prices usually at or near the end of the market-
ing season. The Committee agreed that con-
tinued efforts would be made to work out ac-
ceptable solutions to these jiroblems. Other
topics discussed included trade in lead and zinc,
and the Saint John River development.
The Committee expressed pleasure that agree-
ment had been reached regarding winter main-
tenance for the Haines Cutoff portion of the
Alaska Highway and discussed possible im-
provements in the Alaska Highway system.
The Committee took note of the studies at
present being undertaken by the International
Joint Commission which, at the request of the
two Governments, is investigating a number of
questions of economic and general public in-
terest relating to boundary waters and pollution
of air and water.
Meetmgs of the Joint Ministerial Committee
have in the past been held alternately in Ottawa
and "Washington. On the occasion of the Cen-
tennial of Canada's Confederation, this meeting
was held in Montreal which provided an ojipor-
tunity for members of the Committee to visit
EXPO '67.
The United States Secretary of State, the
Honorable Dean Rusk and the Canadian Secre-
tary of State for External Affairs, the Honour-
able Paul IMartin were unable to participate in
the meeting as planned because of the Emer-
gency Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.
The United States was represented by Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the Honorable Henry H.
Fowler (Chairman of the Delegation) ; United
States Ambassador to Canada, the Honorable
W. Walton Butterworth ; Secretary of Agricul-
ture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman ; Secre-
tary of Commerce, the Honorable Alexander B.
Trowbridge; Under Secretary of the Interior,
the Honorable Charles F. Luce; Chairman of
the President's Council of Economic Advisers,
the Honorable Gardner Ackley ; Assistant Sec-
retary of State for Economic Affairs, the Hon-
orable Anthony M. Solomon.
The Canadian Delegation was headed by the
Honourable Robert Winters, Minister of Trade
and Commerce, and included the Honourable
Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Finance ; the Hon-
ourable Charles M. Drury, Minister of In-
dustry; the Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin, Min-
ister of Energy, Mines and Resources; the
Honourable J. J. Greene, Minister of Agricul-
ture; Mr. Louis Rasminsky, Governor of the
Bank of Canada; and Mr. A. E. Ritchie, Ca-
nadian Ambassador to the United States.
U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed
The Senate on June 19 confirmed the nomina-
tions of the following to be representatives to
the fifth emergency special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations:
Arthur J. Goldberg
Joseph John Siseo
WiUiam B. Buffum
Richard F. Pedersen
46
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency Session; United States
Offers Proposals for Peace in the Middle East
Following are statements made hy U.S. Rep-
resentative Arthur J. Goldberg in the fifth
emergency special session of the U.N. General
Assembly, which convened at Neio York on
June 17.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 17
U.S. delegation press release 109. Corr. 1
Mr. President, distinguished delegates, the
United States has already stated in its letter of
June 15 ^ to the Secretary-General reservations
as to the propriety, in light of the "Uniting for
Peace" resolution ^ of the General Assembly, of
convening an emergency special session under
the prevailmg circumstances. A majority of the
members have nonetheless indicated their con-
sent that such a session should be convened. In
view of this fact, the United States, without
further belaboring the points and without yield-
ing the principle, will do all within its power
to the end that this session may yield construc-
tive results.
Yesterday the distinguished Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr.
[Aleksei N.] Kosygin — whom we welcome in
this Assembly today, along with other distin-
guished leaders of government — according to
the French press said : "I am going to New York
with the sole aim of finding a peaceful solution."
If that is indeed his sole aim, and it is shared
by others, he will find the United States pre-
pared, as I explicitly stated in the Security
Council, to consider all proposals with an open
mind and a fervent desire for peace in this
troubled area and for a just and equitable solu-
* For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12.
* For text, see iUd., Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.
tion to the grave problems which confront us.
Mr. President, on behalf of my Government,
I wish to make it clear that the United States
is participating in this session on the explicit
understanding that everything, every problem
and every proposal, that was before the Secu-
rity Council in its proceedings on the crisis in
the Near East is now before the General Assem-
bly. The only legitimate conceivable purpose
for this session is to search for reasonable, just,
and peaceful solutions to the situation in the
Near East. The United States will devote its
own participation solely to that purpose.
It is worth noting in this connection that
the Soviet Union, which based its request for
this session on the theory that the Security
Council was unable to deal with any of the pro-
posals before it, went to the extreme of trying
to prove its theory true by threatening in ad-
vance to veto draft resolutions of the Council
which were not yet even in final form and thus
could not even be evaluated. The plain import
of this assertion was that all questions before
the Council were to be transferred to this
Assembly.
To the end of seeking a reasonable, just, and
peaceful solution to the situation in the Near
East, I, on behalf of my Government, appeal to
all delegations to spare the General Assembly
from the hot words, destractive propaganda
diatribes, and disrespect for facts which unfor-
tunately characterized so many of the recent
sessions of the Security Council.
Peace is at stake in the Middle East. So, as
our distinguished President of the General As-
sembly, His Excellency Ambassador [Abdul
Eahman] Pazhwak, has just reminded us, is the
good name and reputation of the United Nations
itself, sorely put to question during the past sev-
eral days. My delegation and I earnestly hope
all members who jointly share with us the power
JTJLT 10, 1967
47
and responsibility for peace under the charter
will seek to use this session only for the pursuit
of what the Secretary-General in his recent re-
port has called reasonable, peaceful, and just
solutions for the problems of the Near East.
This is the proper business — the only proper
business — of the present session of the General
Assembly.
STATEMENT OF JUNE 19
U.S. delegation press release 110
Mr. President, distinguished delegates, today
we have listened with great interest and close
attention to the statements made by the dis-
tinguished Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters of the Soviet Union. Mr. Kosygin, and
the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. [Abba]
Eban.
I do not wish to take the time of this Assem-
bly today for a detailed answer to the remarks
made by Mr. Kosygin about my country. The
basic position of the United States has been
stated this morning by the President of our
country," and I am content to leave it to all here
to compare the temper and content of what
these two leaders have said.
Tomorrow I shall elaborate our position in
detail, but today, briefly, I shall respond to
statements of the Chairman that cannot be rec-
onciled with the facts and must be dealt with
immediately. I shall do so both today and to-
morrow in the spirit of President Johnson's
statement of this morning : that our purpose is
to narrow our differences with the Soviet Union
where they can be narrowed and to try to en-
large the arena of common action with the
Soviet Union, all in the interests of helping
secure peace in the world for ourselves and our
posterity.
I deeply regret, however, that the leader of
a great nation should repeat the entirely false
charge that my Government incited, encour-
aged, and prompted Israel to conflict. Nothing
could be further from the truth. Every resource
of the United States, inside and outside the
United Nations, was devoted to an effort to
prevent the recent war. Mr. Kosygin, perhaps
better than any world statesman, should know
what these efforts have been, and he must also
know of our efforts to stop the fighting as soon
as it started.
It is particularly incomprehensible that he
should allege that we sought to gain time in the
Security Council to permit Israel to consoli-
date its military operations; it is just the con-
trary, as the records of the Security Council
show.* As soon as the war broke out, we joined
with others in the Security Council in seeking
an immediate end to the military conflict. It
was not the United States but others that de-
layed action for more than 36 hours on that
simple demand.
The charge that United States participation
in international efforts to assure freedom of
innocent passage through the Gulf of Aqaba
was an encouragement of Israeli aggression is
a particularly topsy-turvy version of history.
Since closing the Gulf clearly increased tension
and ran the risk of starting the conflict, our
efforts to de-fuse the situation were obviously
designed to forestall war. not to promote it.
More generally, the description of the origins
of the conflict, the denigration of U.S. efforts
to avert it, the misstatement about the efforts
of the Security Council to prevent it and then
stop it, were plainly partisan presentations.
Let me say only that I must categorically
reject the unfounded and unworthy insinuation
that the United States had any part whatever
in the recent conflict in the Middle East, except
to try to stop it by every means at every stage.
And tomorrow I shall set the record straight
in all respects to corroborate this statement.
As for Viet-Nam, I have only a very simple
statement to make. I would innate the distin-
guished Chairman of the Council of Ministers
to cooperate with the Security Council of the
United Nations or with the Geneva machinery
to bring peace to Viet-Nam. The United States
is ready to join with him in such an effort —
and to join with him today. But I do not believe
that our debate is furthered by discussing in
this Special Assembly irrelevant subjects —
Viet-Nam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and
Germany. Tomorrow I shall deal with the real
question on our agenda, which is the need for
a just and stable peace in the IVIiddle East, so
ardently desired by all people of the world.
' See p. 31.
* For statements made b.v Ambassador Goldberg dur-
ing the Security Council debates on the Near East
crisis, see Bulletin of June 12, 1967, p. 871 ; June 19,
1967, p. 920 ; June 26, 1967, p. 934 ; and July 3, 1967,
p. 3.
48
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
STATEMENT OF JUNE 20
U.S. delegation press release 112
The General Assembly has been convened
under the resolution known as "Uniting for
Peace." The choice before the Assembly is clear :
We can unite for peace, or we can divide in
discord.
The text of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
includes a direct quotation from the United
Nations Charter, setting forth the fundamental
purposes of the United Nations : first, "To main-
tain international peace and security" ; and sec-
ond, "to develop friendly relations among
nations." These purposes must guide our pro-
ceedings here. The United States of America
pledges its devoted efforts to this end. Yester-
day President Johnson spoke for the American
people when he said : "I offer assurance to all
that this Government of ours, the Government
of the United States, will do its part for peace
in every forum, at every level, at every hour."
As the troubles of the Middle East are great,
so also must our purposes be great. It is not
enough to de-fuse the bomb of hostility; we
must remove the explosive itself. Our ultimate
aim must be nothing less than a stable and du-
rable peace in the Middle East.
Our task is far from easy. We may all "unite
for peace" in the abstract ; but our real task is,
for the sake of peace, to unite upon a course of
action. This course must be rooted both in
fidelity to the princiijles and purposes of the
charter and in a clear grasp of the historical
events which have led to the present situation.
There have been more meetings of the Secu-
rity Council on the recurrent crises in the Middle
East than on any other issue in the history of
the United Nations. The record of two decades
reveals clearly that trouble and ci-isis have been
constant because of the failure of the parties
concerned to come to grips with the underlying
causes of tension in the area and to seek per-
manent solutions.
Five Essentials of Peace
Yesterday the President of the United States
stated what are, in the view of my Grovernment,
five essentials of peace in the area.
First, and greatest among them, is that every
nation in the area has a fundamental right to
live and to have that right respected by all, in-
cluding its immediate neighbors.
The second essential for peace is the simple
human requirement that there be justice for the
refugees — that the nations of the area must at
last address themselves, with new energy and
new determination to succeed, to the plight of
those who have been rendered homeless or dis-
placed by the wars and conflicts of the past, both
distant and recent.
The third requirement for peace, as clearly
demonstrated by events of the past weeks, is
that there be respect for international maritime
rights — the right of innocent maritime passage
for all nations.
Fourth, peace in the Middle East requires
steps to avert the dangers inherent in a renewed
arms race, such as has occurred during the past
12 years. The responsibility for such steps rests
not only on those in the area but also upon the
larger states outside the area.
Fifth and finally, peace in the Middle East
requires respect for the political independence
and territorial integrity of all the states of the
area. It is a principle which can be effective only
on the basis of peace between the parties — only
if the fragile and violated truce lines of 20 years
are replaced by recognized boundaries and other
arrangements that will provide the nations of
the area security against terror, destruction,
war, and violence of all kinds.
These principles, if implemented, offer a solid
basis for a durable peace in the future. If they
had been accepted and adhered to in the past,
there could have been peace. But they were not
adhered to. Instead, the world has witnessed
tlxree tragic wars. And today the Assembly is
faced with the aftermath of the latest of these
outbreaks.
Tensions Rise; Efforts To Avert Clash Fail
The essential facts are clear. In the spring of
this year the tension of many years became even
greater ; acts of violence became more frequent ;
threats and declarations became more ominous
and bellicose. Then on May 17, President Nasser
demanded the withdrawal of the United Na-
tions Emergency Force and immediately moved
large U.A.R. forces into the Gaza Strip, the
Sinai Peninsula, and Sharm el-Sheikh. Within
a few days thereafter, the U.A.R. declared a
blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait
of Tiran, which had been open to free and in-
nocent passage by the ships of all nations under
accepted principles of international law.
JITLT 10, 1967
The major insulator, the United Nations
Emergency Force, by -which the United Nations
had for so many years protected the Middle
East against full-scale war, was stripped away.
Hostile forces stood in direct confrontation
within plain sight of each other. Threats of war
filled the air. Peace hung suspended by a thread.
At this point the Secretary-General made a
journey to Cairo in the interest of maintaining
peace. He reported to the Security Council on
May 26 " that he had "called to the attention of
the Government of the United Arab Kepublic
the dangerous consequences which could ensue
from restricting innocent passage of ships in the
Strait of Tiran," and that he had expressed his
"hope that no precipitate action would be
taken." In the same report the Secretary-Gen-
eral made his plea to all the parties for a
"breathing spell" which would allow tension to
subside from its explosive level. He urged all
concerned "to exercise special restraint, to
forego belligerence and to avoid all other actions
wliich could increase tension, to allow the Coun-
cil to deal with the underlying causes of the
present crisis and to seek solutions."
In the spirit of this wise plea, my Govern-
ment and some others made strenuous efforts
both inside and outside the United Nations to
find ways to avert a clash. In the Security Coun-
cil on May 31, the United States delegation pro-
posed a resolution' to provide the "breathing
spell" which the Secretary-General had so
urgently requested. It is a matter of profound
regret that this proposal, aimed at preventing
bloodshed and suffering, was not agreed to by
others.
Security Council Obtains a Cease-Fire
Early on Jime 5 the thread of peace was
broken. From that moment, the first and most
urgent necessity was to stop the fighting be-
fore its dimensions were enlarged.
Within hours of the outbreak of fighting —
even before we had confirmation of any major
movement of troops across truce lines — my Gov-
ernment joined with some others in the Security
Council in seelring to obtain, without debate, a
call for an immediate cease-fire. If a cease-fire
and a standstill had actually occurred at that
point, the problems we now face would be far
• U.N. doc. S/7906.
• For background, see BuxLETrN of June 19, 1967,
p. 927.
less formidable. But again, others resisted this
effort, and it was not imtil 36 hours later — on
the evening of June 6, after prolonged discus-
sion— that the Security Council finally reached
a unanimous decision on a simple cease-fire.^
And when, in the following days, we sought
to secure a cease-fire on the Syrian front, we en-
countered the same kind of obstruction. Here,
too, the United States was prepared, without de-
bate and without delay, to bring the hostilities
to a halt. But others did not see the matter the
same way. For hours they engaged in imseemly
bickering which, to say the least, did no credit
to this organization.
Charges of U.S. Intervention Rejected
Now, Mr. President, a good deal of this time
was consumed in the elaboration of totally false
accusations against my country. The United
States was accused of having plotted, incited,
encouraged, and prompted Israel to conflict;
and it was even charged that our armed forces
had intervened in the hostilities on the side of
Israel.
Thiring the debates in the Security Council,
and once again yesterday in the General Assem-
bly, it was my duty to reject categorically all
these charges, in whichever of their many and
changing forms they appeared. Today I re-
affirm, on the full authority of the United
States Government, that no United States sol-
dier, sailor, airman, ship, airplane, or military
instrument of any kind — including radar jam-
ming— pertaining to the armed forces or to any
agency of the United States intervened in this
conflict. Furthermore, whatever they may say,
all the governments concerned are well aware of
the true facts. We had nothing whatever to do
with the fighting except to try to prevent it and,
once it occurred, to use every effort at our com-
mand to bring it to a speedy end.
Wlien these false and inflammatory charges
were first made, I offered on behalf of the
United States our full cooperation with any
United Nations or other impartial investiga-
tion of them — including the proposal to open
the logs of our aircraft carriers in the 6th Fleet
to United Nations investigators.' This offer of
ours has not been answered or even referred to
by the accusers.
' For background and text of Security Council Reso-
lution 233, see md., June 26, 1967, p. 934.
* For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on June 7,
see Hid.
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
It is perfectly clear why these charges have
been spread. They were spread in an attempt
to find a scapegoat for what occurred — and
perhaps for an even more sinister purpose: to
engage the great powers with each other. The
United States will not lend itself to such
purposes.
Despite all this diversionary propaganda, the
Security Council was able to achieve a cease-
fire ; and the cease-fire is holding. Aiid now the
problem of peace in the Middle East has come
before the General Assembly.
Analysis of Soviet Proposal
Yesterday the Soviet Union introduced a
resolution," essentially the same as that which
it also proposed in the Security Council, and
which tlie overwhelming majority of the Council
refused to accept.^"
Under this Soviet proposal, Israel alone is
to be condemned as an aggressor ; though surely,
in the light of all the events, both recent and
long past, that led up to the fighting, it would
be neither equitable nor constructive for this
organization to issue a one-sided condemnation.
Tlaen, second — and this is the heart of their
proposal — ^the Soviet Union asks this Assembly
to recommend, in effect, as follows: "Israel,
withdraw your troops, and let everything go
back to exactly where it was before the fighting
began on June 5." In other words, the fihn is
to be rim backward through the projector to
that point in the early morning of June 5 when
hostilities had not yet broken out.
But what would the situation then be ?
Once again, opposing forces would stand in
direct confrontation, poised for combat. Once
again, no international machinery would be
present to keep them apart. Once again, in-
nocent maritime passage would be denied. Once
again, there would be no bar to belligerent acts
and acts of force. Once again, there would be
no acceptance of Israel by her neighbors as a
sovereign state, no action to solve the tragic
refugee problem, no effective security against
terrorism and violence.
Once again, in short, notliing would be done
to resolve the deep-lying grievances on both
sides that have fed the fires of war in the
Middle East for 20 years. And once again, there
would be no bar to an arms race in the area.
Surely, no one in this hall can contemplate
with equanimity the prospect of a fourth round
in the Arab-Israel struggle. Yet if ever there
was a prescription for renewed hostilities, the
Soviet resolution is that prescription. Surely, it
is not an acceptable approach for the United
Nations.
U.S. Offers Plan for Permanent Peace
Wliat approach, then, ought to be taken? It
may be well to recall that the General Armistice
Agreements of 1949 state in article XII that
their purpose is, and I quote, ". . . to facili-
tate the transition from the present truce to
permanent peace." I repeat, '■^permanent feaceP
We all know that there has been no transition
and there is no permanent peace in that area.
All of the 18 years of the armistice regime have
witnessed virtually no progress on any of the
basic issues from which the conflict arose. As
long as these issues are unresolved, they wiU
continue to poison the political life of the
Middle East.
Wliat the Middle East needs today are new
steps toward real peace; not just a cease-fire,
which is what we have today; not just a fragile
and perilous armistice, which is what we have
had for 18 years; not just withdrawal, which
is necessary but insufficient.
Real peace must be our aim. In that convic-
tion I now propose, on behalf of the United
States, a resolution ^^ which I now read :
The General AssemMy,
Bearing in mind the achievement of a cease-fire in
the Middle East, as called for by the Security Council
in its Resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 (1967),"
Having regard to the purpose of the United Nations
to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations,
1. Endorses the cease-fire achieved pursuant to the
resolutions of the Security Council and calls for its
scrupulous respect by the parties concerned ;
2. Decides that its objective must be a stable and
durable peace In the Middle East ;
3. Considers that this objective should be achieved
through negotiated arrangements with appropriate
third-party assistance based on :
a. Mutual recognition of the political independence
and territorial integrity of all countries in the area,
encompassing recognized boundaries and other arrange-
ments, including disengagement and withdrawal of
forces, that vriU give them security against terror,
destruction and war;
b. Freedom of innocent maritime passage;
• U.N. doc. A/L. 519.
"For text of the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/
Rev. 1) , see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 12.
" U.N. doc. A/L. 520.
"For texts, see Bulletin of July 26, 1967, p. 947,
and July 3, 1967, p. 11.
JULY 10, 1967
61
c. Just and equitable solution of the refugee prob-
lem;
d. Registration and limitation of arms shipments
into the area ;
e. Recognition of the right of all sovereign nations
to exist in peace and security ;
4. Requests the Security Council to keep the situa-
tion under careful review.
This resolution embodies the five principles
■which President Johnson yesterday identified
as fundamental to durable peace, and which I
listed at the outset.
Our objective in offering this resolution is to
encourage a decision by the warring parties to
live together in peace and to secure international
assistance to this end. It is necessary to begin
to move — not some day, but now, promptly,
while the memory of these tragic events is still
vivid in our minds — toward a settlement of the
outstanding issues; and truly, "there must be
progress toward all of them if there is to be
progress toward any." ^^
The Issue Facing the United Nations
There are legitimate gi-ievances on all sides
of this bitter conflict, and a full settlement
should deal equitably with legitimate griev-
ances and outstanding questions, from which-
ever side they are raised. In short, Mr. Presi-
dent, a new foundation for peace must be built
in the Middle East.
Agreements between the parties on these pro-
foundly contentious matters will not come easy.
But the United Nations has an urgent obliga-
tion to facilitate them and to help rebuild an
atmosphere in which fruitful discussions will
be possible. That is the purpose of the resolu-
tion we have submitted.
Mr. President, the United Nations is now
faced with a clear-cut issue: We can either
attack the causes of the disease which has
plagued the Middle East with war three times
in a generation or we can go back to the treat-
ment of symptoms, which has proved such a
dismal failure in the past.
In any grave situation, fraught with so many
differences of opinions and attitudes, the tend-
ency is to say that it defies solution. But we
cannot accept this counsel. Let no one say that
solutions are impossible.
The proposal we offer this morning is in-
spired not by the despairing doctrines of per-
petual enmity but by the hopeful doctrine from
which we in the United Nations have always
drawn our major inspiration : the doctrine en-
shrined in our charter, pledging all nations and
peoples, all cultures and religions, "to practice
tolerance and live together in peace with one
another as good neighbors."
Sometimes that doctrine is called Utopian or
unrealistic. But the greatest unrealism is that
which relies on hatred and enmity. The great-
est realism is the doctrine of peace and concili-
ation and mutual forbearance. From that true
realism, let this organization find the strength
to make a new beginning toward peace in the
Middle East. To this cause the United States
pledges its most dedicated efforts.
U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus
Again Extended for 6 Months
Statement hy Richard F. Pedersen ^
Mr. President, we are all indebted to the Sec-
retary-General for the clear, complete, and per-
ceptive report ^ he has put before the Council.
He has described in forthright language the
problems which confront us all and his distin-
guished representative on the island. It is evi-
dent that ]Mr. [B. F.] Osorio-Tafall has under-
taken his latest assignment with energy and
imagination. And we have no doubt that he,
General [Umarai Armas Eino] Martola, and
the officers and men of the United Nations
Force m Cyprus will continue to serve the cause
of peace with courage, patience, skill, and the
determination to fulfill their mandate im-
partially.
We would also like to note our appreciation
for the services rendered by the distinguished
Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador [Carlos A.]
Bemardes, as the previous representative of the
Secretary-General. Ambassador Bernardes, who
formerly was a colleague of ours on the Security
Coimcil, has shown a dedication to the high
aims of the United Nations and a true devotion
to the best interests of all the people of Cyprus
in carrying out the heavy responsibilities given
' See p. 31.
' Made in the Security Council on June 19 (U.S./U.N.
press release 111). Mr. Pedersen is Deputy U.S. Repre-
sentative in the Security Council.
" U.N. doc. S/7969.
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
him by the Secretary-General with respect to
the difficult situation there.
The mandate of the United Nations Force in
Cyprus is being extended for the 11th time.
Given present conditions, we believe that tliis
was the only realistic and prudent course of ac-
tion ; and accordingly, we voted for the resolu-
tion.' However, as the Secretary-General has
noted, all parties must bear in mind the in-
escapable fact that UNFICYP cannot remain
in Cyprus mdefinitely. The lack of progress on
fimdamental issues requires those concerned
to seek new areas of accommodation even more
urgently than before. All parties should extend
full cooperation in accordance with this new
resolution to the Secretary- General, his special
representative, and UNFICYP, so that prog-
ress may be made toward settling the long-
standing problems on the island.
The essence of UNFICYP's mandate is to
prevent a recurrence of fighting in Cyprus and
to restore and maintain law and order. And it is
evident that this mandate cannot be fulfilled if
the parties concerned do not give full coopera-
tion.
The United States shares the Secretary-Gen-
eral's concern regarding restrictions imposed on
UNFICYP in the discharge of its normal
duties. We deplore any use or threat of force
against UNFICYP by anyone, and we hope that
UNFICYP will receive cooperation in the im-
plementation of its authorized activities. The
Force must, in the first instance, have freedom
of movement, and we note that the Secretary-
General has reminded all parties that such free-
dom is explicitly provided for in written agree-
ment. Neither can any sort of harassment of
United Nations personnel or of UNFICYP be
acceptable.
The United States also continues to believe,
as Ambassador Goldberg stated before the
Council last December,* that the importation of
arms can only be a source of insecurity. The
United States fully concurs in the Secretary-
General's view that any influx of arms and mili-
'In a resolution (S/RES/238 (1967)) adopted
unanimously on June 19, the Security Council extended
"the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-
keeping Force . . . for a further period of six months
ending 26 December 1967, in the expectation that suf-
ficient progress towards a solution by then will make
possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the
Force."
* BirLMjnN of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 179.
tary equipment is a cause for concern to
UNFICYP in the execution of its mandate. In
this connection, the United States is gratified by
paragraph 27 of the Secretary-General's report
concerning the results of inspections made of
certain arms by the Commander of the United
Nations Force, and we welcome the assurances
in this respect given by the Government of
Cyprus.
The allegations of the distinguished repre-
sentative of the Soviet Union of a hostile NATO
design against Cyprus are, of course, a fantasy.
A more positive contribution to our debate
would have been to express tangible support
for the United Nations Force on the island.
We will not comment on the digression made
in the understandable need to defend the recent
recourse to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.
Our own views on the relative responsibilities of
the General Assembly and of the Security Coun-
cil are well known and unchanged.'
Despite our disappointment at the lack of
progress toward solving the fundamental issues
and the many problems which have beset the
United Nations in its efforts to maintain peace
and promote a settlement, the United States
continues fully to support UNFICYP. As evi-
dence of this statement, I wish to announce on
behalf of the United States a pledge of up to $4
million toward the cost of maintaining
UNFICYP for the next 6 months. This pledge,
as has been true of our previous pledges, will
depend upon the amounts contributed by other
governments toward the cost of the operation.
The United States pledges toward the cost of
UNFICYP, including the amount I have just
announced, now total over $32 million.
Mr. President, the United States hopes that
the knowledge that UNFICYP will continue
for another 6 months will encourage those most
directly concerned to renew and intensify their
efforts to reach a just and lasting solution. This
extension should be regarded as an opportunity
for progress, not as a reason for inaction. We
hope that when the Security Council next meets
on this matter we shall have evidence that the
time provided by this extension has been well
used. A wise man has said that time cools, time
clarifies, and no mood can be maintained for-
ever. Let us hope that these words will be
justified by the course of events during the next
6 months.
' For background, see ibid., July 3, 1967, p. 12.
OXTLT 10, 1967
53
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Counterfeiting
International convention and protocol for the suppres-
sion of counterfeiting currency. Done at Geneva
April 20, 1929.'
Accession deposited: Ceylon, June 2, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Acceptance deposited: Maldive Islands, May 31, 1967.
Reciprocal Assistance
Inter-American treaty of reciprocal assistance. Done
at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947. Entered into
force December 3, 1948. TIAS 1838.
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, June 12,
1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. En-
tered into force January 1, 1967.
Ratification deposited: United States and Territories
of the United States, May 29, 1067.
Entered into force as to the United States: May 29,
1967.
Proclaimed ip the President: June 20, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965.'
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, May 31, 1967;
Poland, May 22, 1967; United States, May 31,
1967.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
September 29, 1948 (TIAS 5507). Effected by ex-
change of notes at La Paz May 4 and 17, 1967.
Entered into force May 17, 1967.
Canada
Agreement relating to a special operating program for
the Duncan Reservoir, constructed under the Co-
lumbia River Treaty. Effected by exchange of notes
' Not In force for the United States.
' Not in force.
at Ottawa May 8 and 18, 1967. Entered into force
May 18, 1967.
Agreement relating to pre-sunrise operation of certain
standard (AM) radio broadcasting stations. Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa March 31 and
June 12, 1967. Entered into force June 12, 1967.
El Salvador
Agreement relating to the granting of authorizations to
permit licensed amateur radio operators of either
country to operate their stations in the other
country. Effected by exchange of notes at San
Salvador May 24 and June 5, 1967. Entered into
force Jime 5, 1967.
Ethiopia
Parcel post agreement, with regulations of execution.
Signed at Addis Ababa and Washington June 3
and 15, 1967. Enters into force on a date to be
mutually agreed upon by the respective competent
authorities of the two countries.
Guyana
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Guyana. Effected by exchange of
notes at Georgetown May 31 and June 7, 1967. En-
tered into force June 7, 19i67.
Hong Kong
Agreement amending the agreement of August 26, 1966,
relattng to trade in cotton textiles (TIAS 6088).
Effected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong May
31, 1967. Entered into force May 31, 1967.
Italy
Agreement for a cooperative program in science. Signed
at Washington June 19, 1967. Entered into force
June 19, 1967.
Japan
Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for
United States administrative and related expenses
for Japanese fiscal year 19G7 pursuant to the mutual
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo June 2, 1967. Entered into force June 2, 1967.
Panama
Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
March 31, 1949, as amended (TIAS 1932 and 2551).
Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Jvme 5,
1967. Entered into force June 5, 1967.
Rv\^anda
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Kigali July 6 and August
9, 1965.
Entered into force: April 27, 1967.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement amending the agreement of December 9,
1963, and January 6, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5659,
6071), relating to the establishment of a television
system in Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of
notes at Jidda May 23 and 27, 1967. Entered into
force May 27, 1967.
Viet-Nam
Agreement regarding income tax administration. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 31 and
May 3, 1967. Entered into force May 3, 1967.
54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 10, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. H63
Africa. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Asia. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Canada. U.S.-Canada Ek;onomic Committee Con-
cludes Eleventh Meeting (communique) . . 44
Congress. U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session
of U.N. General Assembly Confirmed ... 46
Cyprus. U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Ex-
tended for 6 Months (Pedersen) 52
Denmark. European Leaders Meet With Presi-
dent Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40
Economic Affairs. U.S.-Canada Economic Com-
mittee Concludes Eleventh Meeting (com-
munique) 44
Europe. Principles for Peace in the Middle East
(Johnson) 31
Italy. European Leaders Meet With President
Johnson (Johnson, Krag) 40
Malavn. President of Malawi Visits the United
States (Banda, Johnson) 42
Near East
European Leaders Meet With President Johnson
(Johnson, Krag) 40
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John-
son) 31
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Resulting From
Near East Conflict 41
Passports. U.S. Amends Travel Restrictions Re-
sulting From Near East Conflict 41
Presidential Documents
European Leaders Meet With President John-
son 40
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems 35
President of Malawi Visits the United States . 42
Principles for Peace in the Middle Bast ... 31
The Spirit of Hollybush 38
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 54
U.S.SJI.
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session ; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac-
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44
United Kingdom. European Leaders Meet With
President Johnson (Johnson, Krag) .... 40
United Nations
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
U.N. General Assembly Holds Fifth Emergency
Session; United States Offers Proposals for
Peace in the Middle East (Goldberg) ... 47
U.N. Peace Force in Cyprus Again Extended for
6 Months (Pedersen) 52
U.S. Delegation to Emergency Session of U.N.
General Assembly Confirmed 46
Viet-Nam
President Johnson and Premier Kosygin Discuss
International Problems (Johnson, Kosygin) . 35
Principles for Peace in the Middle East (John-
son) 31
The Spirit of Hollybush (Johnson) 38
U.S. Informs U.S.S.R. of New Facts on Air Ac-
tions at Cam Pha (text of U.S. note) ... 44
Name Index
Banda, H. Kamuzu 42
Buffum, William B 46
Goldberg, Arthur J 46, 47
Johnson, President 31,35,38,40,42
Kosygin, Aleksei N 35
Krag, Jens Otto 40
Pedersen, Richard F 46,52
Sisco, Joseph John 46
Check List of Department of State
Press
Releases: June 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington,
D.C. 20520.
No.
Date
Subject
tl45
6/19
U.S.-Italian science cooperation
agi-eement.
»146
6/20
Meeting of the Joint United
States-Canadian Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs.
147
6/20
U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning
incident at Cam Pha.
148
6/21
Revision of travel restrictions re-
sulting from Near East hostili-
ties.
*149
6/22
Amendment to program for visit
of King Bhumibol Adulyadej
of Thailand.
a.
*Not printe
tHeld for a
later issue of the BtiLLETiN.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 0FFICEit»67
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PBINTINS OFFICE
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Boston Public Li^-^^"^ .
A r,t nf Documents
Superintendent ot ^"-
- 2 3 ia^7
DEPOSITORV
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1464
Jvly 17, 1967
THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION
Excerpts From an Address hy President Johnson 59
REGIONALISM AND WORLD ORDER
hy W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President 66
THE ATLANTIC INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY LOOKS TO THE FUTURE
T)y Secretaiy of Commerce Alexander B. Troxobndge 70
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1464 Publication 8263
July 17, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
tr.S. Government Printing OflBce
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $16.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In
the Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
Th^ Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
icith information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the JFhite House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative nuiterial in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Right of All Peoples to Self -Determination
Eemarks hy President Johnson {Excerpt) '
I want to conclude now by just quietly say-
ing a word to you about this larger world that
we all live m. I think it is on your mind and in
your heart — as it is on mine and in mine.
We are in South Viet-Nam today because we
want to allow a little nation self-determination.
We want them to be able to go and vote for the
kind of leaders they want and select the type of
government they want. We want them to be free
of terror and aggression in doing that — as we
want it for ourselves.
We made a contract. We had an agreement.
We entered into a treaty that was confirmed by
our Senate, 82 to 1, saying that in the face of
common danger we would come and help.
We came. We are helping. We are doing our
best. I solicit the cooperation of each of you to
the extent that you can give it.
We Americans are deeply concerned about
the recognition of the right of self-determina-
tion. That is what each of you demands for
yourself. So let us help your fellow man in other
parts of the world enjoy it, too.
Self-determination is really the right to live.
That is what we ask for all of the nations of the
Middle East — not just for some of them.
We believe that for the peoples of the 122 na-
tions of the world— speaking now of the under-
developed nations of the world specifically —
real self-determination only comes when hun-
ger and disease and ignorance and poverty are
overcome. We believe that the peoples of all of
these nations are entitled to that self-determi-
nation. They won't have it until we can conquer
those ancient enemies: illiteracy, ignorance,
disease, and poverty.
Just as it is here in our home, we believe in
the first amendment, in free speech and in a
fi-ee press. We believe in the Bill of Rights.
We believe what matters abroad is also freedom
' Made before the National Convention of the Junior
Chamber of Commerce at Baltimore, Md., on June 27
(White House press release) .
from fear and freedom from want — the free-
dom to make choices and not just to submit to
a brutal destiny.
Two days ago, not very far from here, I met
with Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union.^
The nations we spoke for are two of the most
powerful nations in all of the world. In the
family of nations, two of the strongest have two
of the greatest responsibilities.
For my part, and for your nation, that re-
sponsibility involves helping other nations to
choose their own future as they see it.
We seek as well maximiun understanding be-
tween these two great powers. For 10 hours we
looked at each other with only the interpreters
present in a very small room.
Though our differences are many, and though
they rim very deep, we knew that in the world's
interest it was important that we imderstand, if
we could, the motivations as well as the com-
mitments of each other. We religiously, dedi-
catedly, and determinedly worked at that as-
signment for those 2 days.
That is why we met in the house called Holly-
bush. To bring about better understandings and
to discuss respective goals and commitments we
came there.
When we left I believe we had achieved that.
We agreed we would continue to maintain con-
tact through diplomatic channels, through
other means of communication, and direct
contact.
In Saigon, in the Sinai, at Hollybush in New
Jersey, in the slums of our cities, in the prairies
of our land, in the hollows of Appalacliia, in
scores of underdeveloped countries all around
the world where men struggle to make their
own future and to secure their little families,
that is what we are about.
If the young leadership of our country sup-
ports us over the long hard pull that lies ahead,
"For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 35.
59
if you can endure the tensions, if you can under-
stand that the air is going to be rough and
the road is going to be bumpy, you can, in the
words of your own creed, "Help us unlock
earth's great treasure — human personality."
Then the cussers and the doubters will be rele-
gated to the rear; the doers and the builders
will take up the front lines.
Now you are going to return to your homes.
You have engaged in looking at yourselves and
at your country. I have been able to discuss it
for only a vei-y brief time.
I am going back to attend a 1 o'clock meet-
ing with Secretary Rusk and Secretary Mc-
Namara and others who are giving everything
they have to your country. We are not only
going to talk and plan and work and pray to
develop ways and means of keeping your coun-
try and your families secure, but we are going
to do our dead level best to bring peace to every
human being in the world.
Our problems are many. Our solutions are
few. I am not as concerned about the individual
differences which we have with other nations,
because with few exceptions I think those can
be reconciled; but I am concerned that every
boy and girl, that every man and woman who
enjoys citizenship and freedom and prosperity
and the blessings of this land know what they
have and are determined to build upon it, to
improve it — and by all means to keep it.
United States Reiterates Policy
on Status of Jerusalem
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JUNE 28
White House press release dated June 28
The President said on June 19 that in our
view "there . . . must be adequate recognition
of the special interest of three great religions
in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^ On this prin-
ciple he assumes that before any unilateral ac-
tion is taken on the status of Jerusalem there
will be a^jpropriate consultation with religious
leaders and others who are deeply concerned.
Jerusalem is holy to Christians, to Jews, and to
Moslems. It is one of the great continuing trag-
edies of history that a city which is so much
the center of man's highest values has also been,
over and over, a center of conflict. Eepeatedly
the passionate beliefs of one element have led
to exclusion or unfairness for others. It has
been so, unf ortimately, in the last 20 years. Men
of all religions will agree that we must now do
better. The world must find an answer that is
fair and recognized to be fair. That could not
be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the
President is confident that the wisdom and
good judgment of those now in control of Je-
rusalem will prevent any such action.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JUNE 28^
The hasty administrative action taken today '
cannot be regarded as determining the future of
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in re-
lation to them.
The United States has never recognized such
unilateral actions by any of the states in the
area as governing the international status of
Jerusalem.
The policy of the United States will be gov-
erned by the President's statement of June 19
and the Wliite House statement this morning.
The views of the United States have been
made clear repeatedly to representatives of all
govermnents concerned.
' Btjixetin of July 10, 1967, p. 31.
' Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman.
' On June 27, the Israeli Parliament approved three
bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdic-
tion, and public administration over the Old City of
Jerusalem and other territory of the former mandate
of Palestine which has been under the control of Jor-
dan since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On
June 28, the Government of Israel took administrative
action under the new legislation to extend its munic-
ipal services and controls over the entire city of
Jerusalem.
I
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue
Close Cooperation To Promote Peace
Their Majesties King Bhumibol Adulyadej
ancl Queen Sirikit of Thailand visited the
United States and Canada June 6-29, conclud-
ing with a 3-day oificial visit to Washington
June 27-29. Following are texts of an exchange
of greetings between President Johnson and the
King at an amval ceremony on the South Lawn
of the White Hou^e on June 27, their exchange
of toasts at a dinner at the White Rouse that
evening, and a joint statement released on
June 29.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White House press release dated June 27
President Johnson
Your Majesties: On behalf of the people of
the United States, I welcome you once again
to my country.
All of us who had the pleasure of meeting
you when you were here in 1960 remember that
visit with a very special warmth and with great
pleasure.
Since that time, Mrs. Jolmson and I both
have had the privilege of visiting Your Majes-
ties in Thailand. We will never forget your
hospitality nor the friendship of the Thai peo-
ple themselves and the warmth with which they
welcomed us to your country when we were
there last fall during our trip to Asia.
That our heads of state and government have
met often in recent years I think is a symbol of
the changing times and the changing relation-
ships. Until very recently, the United States
and Thailand were thought of as the most dis-
tant of lands. They were widely separated by
both geography and interests. Today, we look
at it from an entirely different viewpoint. We
see ourselves as your neighbors. We are only
hours apart. We are neighbors who share the
problems and the opportunities of a great com-
mon Pacific frontier.
We welcome Your Majesties as the beloved
leaders of a gallant nation which has not only
the desire to be free — because all nations have
that — ^but the wisdom and the courage to do
what is necessary to be free.
There was a time not long ago when some of
our friends in Asia were deeply concerned about
their future. They wondered whether they were
destined to be dominated by an aggressive alien
power.
They wondered whether they would have to
face that power alone, imaided by friends who
wished them well but whose wishes could not be
translated into reality.
Those days are gone. Throughout Asia there
is a new spirit. It is a spirit of faith in the fu-
ture. It has brought in its wake confidence, con-
fidence that the future of Asia is not something
that is preordained but is something that can
be built and shaped to Asian desires by Asian
efforts.
I am glad to say that the people of your na-
tion of Thailand have led the way. Thailand
never gave in to despairs. Thailand never as-
sumed that its independence could not be
maintained.
Your people knew that men are not the vic-
tims of history but are the makers of history.
You were among the first to send your sons to
fight for liberty in Korea. Without hesitation,
you took your stand as a charter member of the
SEATO alliance.
Now, today, you are making an invaluable
contribution to the struggle of freedom in Viet-
Nam.
I have no doubt about the outcome of those
efforts in which we have joined as Pacific part-
ners. Wlien the free men of Asia's future write
the history of the present, the gallantry and the
courage of the Thai nation will be a luminous
page.
Your Majesties, Mrs. Johnson and I are so
delighted that we could welcome you once again.
We look forward to very useful and fruitful
JXTLT 17, 1967
61
discussions with you and a happy evening in the
Wliite House together tonight.
Thank you.
His Majesty the King
Mr. President, I am veiy thankful for your
kind words of welcome. This welcome is really
a warm welcome.
We come on this visit to the United States on
a people-to- people visit. That means we have
had the opportunity to meet people of different
walks of life and that we have had the occasion
to know a little more about your country's as-
pirations and also that we may present our
views and bring our ideas to you directly.
This visit is drawing to its end. It is a very
suitable conclusion that we should come here to
Washington to meet the President and Mrs.
Johnson. We meet you both not only as head
of state but as old friends. That is part of our
people-to-people visit.
We hope the result of this kind of visit, which
is not only a visit of protocol and red carpets, but
it is a meeting of people who have the same ideas
and ideals — so that we can cooperate better and
we can bring better understanding between the
people of your great nation and the people of
Thailand, so that we may work in cordiality
toward world everlasting peace.
In coming here, we bring the greetings and
the wishes of our people to the people of this
great country. We want to share with you all
the hopes for future progress of the world and
future peace of the world.
Thank: you.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White House press release dated June 27
President Johnson
Your Majesties, distinguished guests, ladies
and gentlemen : I'm sure that you have read the
story of His Majesty's remarkable address at
Williams College. A speech had been prepared
for his approval and for his use upon that oc-
casion. But evidently he foimd it not to his
liking. So he spoke extemporaneously — and the
judges, I am told, would have given him the
annual speaking prize if visitors had been
eligible.
When His Majesty finished, someone asked
if he had been able to see his wife's face and
to read her reaction to his address. His Majesty
is said to have replied : "Confidentially, I wasn't
looking at my wife. I was watching my Minister
of Foreign Affairs."
Secretary Katzenbach [Nicholas deB. Katz-
enbach. Under Secretaiy of State] I am care-
fully observmg your reactions.
We feel a very special bond of kinship with
Your Majesty because you were born among us.
I have heard that during your early years
you used to go from Cambridge to an island off
the Massachusetts coast known as Martha's
Vineyard.
Some members of my Cabinet, some members
of my staff, have been known to disappear into
the fogs of the Vineyard for long stretches of
time. Some of them even claim that the fog ob-
scures not only land and sea but the sound of
the Wliite House telephone.
We are delighted that you were able to find
your way back from that isolated and mysteri-
ous place.
We are delighted, as well, that we have this
opportunity to repay, in some small measure,
the warm hospitality bestowed on us in Bang-
kok last October.
The world is a good deal smaller than it was
when our United States President Jackson sent
our first diplomatic mission across the seas to
Siam, as it was then called, in 1833.
But the nearness of two countries is not meas-
ured by the flight time of jet planes. It is meas-
ured more by imderstanding and by shared pur-
poses. And though we have different customs,
different histories, and different religions, what
we share. Your Majesty, far surpasses our dif-
ferences.
Part of our conunon heritage is a passionate
belief in man's right to decide his own destiny,
a love of freedom and independence, and a de-
termination to secure their blessings.
Wlaen I learned on my first trip to your coun-
try that "Thailand" in your language means
"Land of the Free," I thought of those words
in our national anthem : "the land of the free
and the home of the brave."
The people of the United States and the peo-
ple of Thailand have always understood that
those who would remain free must first be brave.
In the past. Your Majesty, brave Thai and
brave Americans have stood shoulder to shoul-
der in the cause of freedom. Today, we face to-
gether another test of man's will and determina-
tion to be free. We shall meet that test with
courage and determination imtil the tide of
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN"
aggression recedes and our people can live in
peace once more.
Your Majesty's people have been brave in
time of war. You have helj^ed men forge a shield
against the disciples of violence.
You have also been equal to the demanding
tasks of peace. You have asserted your leader-
ship in the works of peaceful construction that
always must be carried on behind that shield.
I am confident, Your Majesty, that from our
mutual commitment will someday flow peace
and order and development in prosperity for
the people of a free Asia.
Tonight we are called upon to make addi-
tional sacrifices. In the days ahead, we are go-
ing to have requests made of vis that are going
to be difficult to honor. But we approach these
requests with confidence, knowing that our al-
lies will face them with courage and with fair-
ness.
And those who love peace will be eternally
in your debt. Your Majesty, for the contribu-
tion that you and your country have made.
Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and
toast Their Majesties the King and Queen of
Thailand.
His Majesty the King
Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: This
time the machine came to me. You spoke about
looking at my Foreign Minister. Today I won't
look at him. I will look at my text.
You mentioned my trip to Martha's Vineyard
and wondered how I came back. I had nothing
to do with the coming back, because I was too
small. It was because my parents were very
good and went home, and they took me home,
also.
But apart from this, there are other things
that are to be said.
First, I must thank you for the kind invita-
tion to visit this great city of Washington and
for the warm welcome and hospitality which
we have received during this our second visit to
the United States.
Wlien we came here on our first visit, we
came to make friends with the people whom
we had admired for their freedom, fairness,
and generosity. We were received with the great
warmth and cordiality that only Americans can
offer.
Your visit to my country in October last, Mr.
President, is still a happy memory with us;
and we are most gratified to be with you tonight,
because we know that we are once again among
friends.
We are happy to see Mrs. Johnson with us
tonight. Your presence here is a good surprise.
Although ourselves we are still quite far re-
moved from having the honor and the dignity
of being grandparents, not to mention the ir-
responsible enjoyment that accompanies such
a privilege, we do imderstand and appreciate
the thrill and anxiety of a new grandmother —
and grandfather, also.
It is a source of gratification for me to hear
the kind words that you have spoken and your
reiteration of the friendship that the United
States Government and people extend to my
country and my people.
Allow me to say again that we on our part
sincerely and wholeheartedly reciprocate the
very same sentiments — the firm belief that on
your part you earnestly and sincerely desire
peace and a better way of life for the people of
all nations.
The happy association between the United
States and Thailand is to us a matter of historic
pride.
You already mentioned the mission of Mr.
Edmimd Roberts, who was received by my
august ancestor Kmg Rama the Third.
In spite of his pet aversion to receiving for-
eign envoys from abroad that was due to our
past unfortimate experiences, my ancestor was
somehow won over by the American honesty of
purpose and decided to extend a very warm
welcome to the emissary of your early predeces-
sor President Jackson.
Mr. Edmund Roberts arrived in Bangkok in
February of 1833. Within a period of less than
a month and in spite of linguistic disadvan-
tages— every sentence spoken by either side had
to imdergo four successive translations, from
English to Portuguese, and from Portuguese
to Chinese, from Chinese to Thai, and vice
versa — in spite of all these difficulties, a treaty
of friendship and commerce was agreed upon
and signed on the 20th of March 1833.
This agreement constituted the first treaty
ever signed by the United States with any
country in Asia. Thus my country came to be
the first country in Asia to recognize and to ex-
tend the hand of friendship to the newly inde-
pendent United States of America.
War, the punctuation of human history,
brought a new sentence in American-Thai re-
lationships. President Woodrow Wilson, who
genuinely understood our difficulties and dis-
JTILT 17, 1967
63
advantages in our relations with foreign
countries, agreed at Versailles after World
War I to revise the U.S.-Thai treaty of friend-
ship by abrogating all obnoxious clauses con-
taining the one-sided ijnposition of extraterri-
toriality and fiscal restrictions as contained in
earlier treaties which had no terminating
clause.
Other gi'eat nations, at that time, later fol-
lowed the American example of justice and
broadmindedness. Thailand thus gained an im-
proved standing.
World War II brought about another sen-
tence in the history of American-Thai friend-
ship. The United States has shown real concern
over the security and development of Thai-
land— and gave not only good advice but also
several forms of aid and assistance of material
nature, both in the military and in the economic
sphere.
This last sentence is not completed yet. We
can only hope that it may end happily for the
sake of beginning another one.
We can only say that at present we are proud
in the knowledge that it is being written with
our mutual good will and cooperation.
Ladies and gentlemen, may I invite you all
now to rise and join me in a toast to the happi-
ness of President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson
and to the prosperity and progress of the people
of the United States.
gional economic and political cooperation in South-
east Asia.
In their review of the situation in Southeast Asia,
the President reaffirmed that the United States regards
the preservation of the independence and integrity of
Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United
States and to world peace. His Majesty and the Presi-
dent agreed that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza-
tion is the foundation of collective security in the area
and that both nations are determined to strengthen the
role of the organization in protecting the area against
aggression and subversion.
The President stated his admiration and apprecia-
tion for the generous and courageous assistance of
Thailand to the common effort to protect the Republic
of Vietnam and the entire Southeast Asia region
against Communist aggression and for the resolute
measures of the Royal Thai Government against the
subversion directed against Thailand itself.
His Majesty stated the appreciation of the Thai
people for the efforts of the U.S. and expressed the
determination of Thailand not only to maintain its
historic independence but to continue to contribute
to the maintenance of the freedom and independence
of others threatened by Communist aggression.
His Majesty and the President reaffirmed the his-
torical bonds of friendship between the United States
and Thailand and, confident that this is the heartfelt
desire of the people of the two countries, pledged to
continue close and cordial collaboration, directly and
through international organizations, to promote mutual
security and world peace.
U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief
Programs for the Middle East
JOINT STATEMENT
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated June 29
Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand
have concluded a three-day official visit to Washington
at the invitation of President Johnson. His Majesty
discussed with the President at the White House
affairs of mutual concern to Thailand and the United
States.
The President welcomed His Majesty again to the
United States and .stated the deep appreciation of Mrs.
Johnson and himself for the gracious hospitality ex-
tended to them by Their Majesties during the Presi-
dent's visit to Thailand in October 1966.
The President expres.sed admiration for the rapid
economic development and improvement in education
and social services that have taken place in Thailand
under His Majesty's leadership. The President voiced
deep respect for His Majesty's concern that the benefits
of this progress extend to every part of the Kingdom.
His Majesty and the President recalled the warm
traditional friendship of the United States and Thai-
land which is solidly based on common ideals and desire
for lasting peace and a world order based on justice
and respect for the independence and sovereignty of
individual nations. The President noted his admiration
for the constructive role of Thailand in furthering re-
Following is a statement ty President John-
son released hy the White House on June ^,
together with the text of a letter dated June 29
from Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative
to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary-
General U Thant.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White nouse press release dated June 27 *
The recent hostilities in the Middle East took
their inevitable toll in human suffering. Wliile
we are urgently searching for a lasting settle-
ment of the Middle East problem, we must bear
in mind that the first humanitarian task and the
first task of reconstruction is to bind up the
wounds of conflict — to begin to find homes for
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medical
care for the sick and wounded.
The American people have always responded
generously to human suffering anywhere in the
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
world. In tliis humanitarian tradition, the
United States will join with other nations in a
special effort to provide emergency assistance
in the Middle East now. I have directed the es-
tablishment of a reserve of $5 million from con-
tingency funds, to meet urgent relief needs in
the period immediately ahead. We will allocate
these funds through a number of channels in
whatever ways best help the war victims and
encourage contributions from others, including
the countries within the area.
As a first step, I have directed that our Gov-
ernment ^participate in the appropriate United
Nations emergency programs of food and
medical relief. In addition, we are offering
$100,000 to the American Bed Cross for imme-
diate use by the International Red Cross to as-
sist all victims of the conflict.
The Secretary of State will keep emergency
needs under constant review and will cooperate
fully with the intergovernmental and private
organizations now at work.
I must emphasize that this is an emergency
relief program. Even while we are joining in
this effort to meet urgent needs, we must look
toward a permanent and equitable solution for
those who have been displaced by this and previ-
ous wars. It will not be enough simply to fall
back on the relief arrangements of the past.
There will be no peace for any party in the Mid-
dle East unless this problem is attacked with
new energy by all and, certainly, primarily by
those who are inmiediately concerned.
LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S. /U.N. press release 115
June 29, 1967.
Dear Mr. Secretary General: I have the
honor to call to your attention the June 27 state-
ment of President Johnson on emergency as-
sistance for war victims in the Middle East. The
text of the statement is as follows :
[Text of President Johnson's statement.]
You will note that the President has stated
that funds will be allocated through a number
of channels, in whatever ways best help the war
victims and encourage contributions from
others, including the countries within the area.
The United States has been the major con-
tributor to UNRWA [United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees]
since its establishment seventeen years ago. I
am pleased to inform you now that, in accord-
ance with the President's announcement that a
reserve of $5,000,000 has been established to
meet urgent relief needs in the Middle East, the
Government of the United States is making
available a special contribution of $2,000,000 to
UNRWA to help meet these urgent needs in
the period immediately ahead. We are under-
taking immediate consultations with the Com-
missioner-General of UNRWA with a view to
ascertaining how best and in what form this
contribution could be made so as to be of maxi-
mum utility in meeting these urgent relief needs
in the area.
I would appreciate it if this letter could be
distributed as a Document of the current Emer-
gency Session of the General Assembly.
Sincerely,
Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement
on Texts of New Canal Treaties
White House Announcement
WhUe House press release dated June 26
President Johnson announced on June 26,
jointly with President Marco A. Robles of
Panama, that the negotiating teams of the
United States and of Panama had reached
agreement on the form and content of new trea-
ties relating to the present canal and a j^ossible
new sea-level canal in the future. The proposed
texts of the treaties are being submitted to their
respective Governments by the negotiators with
their recommendations and conclusions.
Wlien approved by the two Presidents, ar-
rangements will be made for signature. The
treaties will then be presented to each country's
legislative body for consideration in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes.
Three separate but closely related treaties
have been negotiated: (1) Treaty Between the
Republic of Panama and the United States of
America Concerning the Panama Canal, (2)
Treaty Between the Republic of Panama and
the United States of America Concerning a Sea
Level Canal Connecting the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans, and (3) Treaty on the Defense of
the Panama Canal and of its Neutrality.
OXTLT 17, 1967
65
". . . we are now actively supporting the building of regional
institutions and regional cooperation in Latin A7nerica, Asia,
and Africa as well as in EuropeP Mr. Rostow, who is Special
Assistant to the President, discussed the ''''spreading regional
impulse''^ in his commenceinent address at Middlebwy College,
Middlebury, Vt., on June 12.
Regionalism and World Order
by W. W. Rostow
It may have occurred to those of you receiv-
ing degi-ees on this 12th day of June 1967 that
there were better times to graduate and possibly
even better worlds into which to go. Under the
circumstances, you might expect me — a working
bureaucrat from Washington — to shout across
the generational gap, pointing out that things
are not as bad as they seem and ending with the
approved commencement doctrine, that great
challenges await you in the world outside
Middlebury.
But I am by profession a teacher and an his-
torian. That means I would not deny the gen-
erational gap. I welcome it and recognize it,
and even treasure it, as the enormous force for
vitality and good it is in human affairs. It is
essentially by judging skeptically what the last
generation takes for granted — selecting what
seems viable — rejecting what is irrelevant — that
the human race makes such progress as it does
make.
Far from denying the generational gap, I am
here to use it, in a way, as my theme. Far from
denying the cliche that challenges await you,
I shall try to offer a kind of roadmap to one
particular major challenge.
For I am 50 years old — my generation met its
most formative challenge just before you were
born and while you were staggering through the
rigors of early childhood.
Your average age, I am told, is 211/0. You
belong, therefore, to a second and quite different
postwar generation, whose tasks and challenges
are only now beginning to emerge.
I should like to discuss this morning what I
believe is one of those tasks, but only you will in
fact decide. That task is the building of effective
regionalism as a component of world order.
The concept of regionalism began for me in
1945 when I was a junior officer in the State De-
partment, where I was put to work on German-
Austrian economic affairs when I was not yet
out of uniform. That work initially involved
such issues as reparations ; the provision of food
and shelter and clothing to peoples of war-dev-
astated nations; and the revival of the German
coal industry, on which the recovery of Western
Europe then heavily depended.
In the midst of these urgent postwar house-
keeping problems, a distinguished young
French diplomat — named [Maurice] Couve de
Murville — came to Washington m November
1945, after visits to Moscow and London. He
argued that, because of its importance for all of
Europe, the Rulir should be detached from Ger-
many and separately administered. I had the
privilege of sitting in on his exposition of what
was then French policy. His challenging pro-
posal stirred my mind because the question he
posed was real, but as an historian I instinc-
tively felt the proposed answer would not be
viable.
I concluded by deciding that the right answer
was to bring about the economic revival of
Europe on the basis of economic unity, which
would make even a fully revived German econ-
omy part of a larger whole and which would
provide to the small Austrian economy, about
which I was also concerned, a market environ-
ment large enough for it to find a prosperous
and orderly place.
And so, like all bureaucrats when seized with
66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
an idea, I wrote a memorandum. That bureau-
cratic effort has, perliaps, a very small i)lac6 in
the stream of American thought of that time,
and happily many other bureaucrats in many
other places were doing the same. But, in fact,
the concept of Western European unity which
gradually emerged in the succeeding months
and years was the product of deep roots, power-
ful forces, and many men — mainly Europeans :
— The Second World War had demonstrated
to many Europeans the almost suicidal danger
of Europe's continuing with its traditional
rivalries ;
— The postwar power of the Soviet Union and
the United States made many Western Euro-
peans look toward imity as a way of acquiring
a dignity which was no longer possible on the
basis of traditional European statehood;
— The inevitable interconnections between the
United States and Western Europe were seen as
better conducted between a united Western
Europe and the United States than on the basis
of inherently unequal bilateral relations.
Quite aside from the economic and technolog-
ical advantages of a big European market,
many Europeans perceived that, if Western
Europe was to maintain a stature and responsi-
bility appropriate to its tradition and capacity,
unity was the right road. To the credit of our
country, we decided to throw our full weight
behind this movement and look to a great if
not always compliant partner rather than to
the superficially greater influence we might
have wielded in Western Europe on a divide-
and-nile basis.
The first major articulation of our support
for Western European economic miity was in
Secretary of State George Marshall's speech at
a graduation ceremony in another New England
college 20 years and 1 week ago today.
Since that time the movement toward West-
ern European unity has by no means been
smooth or easy. The process is evidently in-
complete. Nevertheless, it moves forward ; and I
believe it will continue to move forward as the
logic of European interest and the character of
the world environment in which Europe must
live press in this direction.
In the last few years we have seen essentially
this same logic beginnijig to take hold in the de-
veloping parts of the world. If I were address-
ing you in 1961, for example, I might have
talked about our support for Western European
unity and the Atlantic partnership and then
referred to the conmion responsibilities of the
Atlantic community for the nations and peoples
of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America. And at that time, representatives of
those nations and regions tended to think in
terms of the common interests of developing
nations. But quietly, slowly, almost imper-
ceptibly, there has been a change.
It is, I believe, one of the most important, if
minoticed, transitions in policy under President
Jolmson — and transitions of thought in the
world community — that we are now actively
supporting the building of regional institutions
and regional cooperation in Latin America,
Asia, and Africa as well as in Europe. And we
are doing this because, despite the continuing
power of nationalism, men and governments in
those regions are becoming seized with the same
kind of thoughts that gripped Western Europe
in the late 1940's and early 1950's.
Economic Unity in Latin America and Africa
For example, between the Punta del Este con-
ference of 1961 and the meeting of Presidents in
Punta del Este in 1967, the gi-eatest change —
aside from an increase in confidence in Latin
America's destiny under fi'eedom — was the rise
in emphasis on the movement toward Latin
American economic integration.
I have had in recent years the privilege of
working with Latin Americans as closely as I
was permitted to work with Western Europeans
in the immediate postwar years. I have found
emerging in Latin America underlying forces
and thoughts quite similar to those which moved
Europeans a generation earlier. Latin Ameri-
cans understand the technical advantages of
economic integration ; they understand that they
can solve more problems for themselves and ac-
quire a position of greater strength and dignity
on the world scene through economic integra-
tion ; and they understand that they will be able
to work as a strong partner to the United States
only if they move in this direction.
As in Western Europe, the economic integra-
tion movement in Latin America is drawing to
it some of the best and proudest minds and
spirits in that continent.
In Africa, of course, the movement toward
economic unity and cooperation is much less
well developed. The nations of the region are at
an earlier stage of economic and social growth.
JUI^T 17, 1967
208-523—67-
67
Indeed, in some cases the nations bom out of
colonialism have not been able to maintain their
initial unity against the pull of tribal and re-
gional differences. Nevertheless, in counter-
point, there are the first begmnings of regional
spirit and organization: the Organization for
African Unity ; the Economic Commission for
Africa ; and the African Development Bank.
In the first speech wholly devoted to Africa
ever given by an American President, President
Johnson on ]\Iay 26, 1966, threw our weight be-
hind African regionalism.^
We have been particularly heartened by the impetus
toward regional cooperation in Africa.
The world has now reached a stage where some of
the most effective means of economic growth can best
be achieved in large units commanding large resources
and large markets. Most nation-states are too small,
when acting alone, to assure the welfare of all of their
people. . . .
Above all, we wish to respond in ways that will be
guided by the vision of Africa herself, so that the prin-
ciples we share — the principles which underlie the OAU
Charter — come to life in conformity with the culture
and aspirations of the African peoples.
One simply cannot build first-rate universities
and tecluiical schools or bring in modem tele-
communications on the basis of states as small
as many of the African coimtries. There is,
therefore, wisdom in trying even now to de-
velop regional and subregional ajjproaches to
African problems. But, as in "Western Europe
and Latin America, the path will be long, un-
even, and frustrating.
Surge of Cooperative Effort in Asia
The most dramatic emergence of a new
regional spirit and policy is, of course, in Asia.
In a speech at Jolins Hopkins University on
April 7, 1965, President Johnson said: ". . .
there must be a much more massive effort to im-
prove the life of man" in Asia ; and he went on
to observe that the "first step is for the countries
of Southeast Asia to associate themselves in a
greatly expanded cooperative effort for
development." ^
In the 26 months since the President spoke,
we have seen in Asia a quite remarkable trans-
formation of attitudes and action.
While the war in Viet-Nam goes on, with all
its suffering, the peoples of Asia have begim to
define for themselves a new future. That future
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 914.
' lUd., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
hinges on a conviction that we are serious about
seeing it through in Viet-Nam. Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore has, on a number
of occasions, spoken in the vein in which he was
recently quoted in the Reporter magazine. He
asked of Americans: "Are your people really
serious in Vietnam? If you are, we are with
you." They are with us because they know that
the failure of aggression from Hanoi against
South Viet-Nam and Laos is essential to the se-
curity of the region and only the American
commitment — along with others — can establish
this foundation for the future of Asia.
But they are looking not to us but primarily
to themselves to define their future and to build
it. In the words of this same Asian statesman,
we are "buying tune" for them in Viet-Nam —
time for them to do a job only they can do.
Literally for the first tune in history — thou-
sands of years of history — the governments and
peoples of Asia are coming together in a spirit
of cooperation to begin to map the future of the
region.
The list of Asian meetings that have occurred
in the past 2 yeare is too long to repeat here. But
they have met in various groupings among
themselves — without us — to consider regional
programs in the fields of education, agriculture,
banking, and transportation. In addition, the
Mekong Committee, working on the very edge
of the battlefields, is carrying forward with a
new vitality ; and the Asian Development Bank
is in operation in Manila, led by a distinguished
Japanese.
In the proportions of its initial capital stock,
that Bank foreshadows the kind of cooperation
that may be possible in the future: We have
put in 20 percent ; the Japanese, 20 percent ; the
other Asian nations, 40 percent ; and the balance
comes from many sources outside the region.
This surge of cooperative effort in the new
Asia takes place against the background of re-
markable momentum in South Korea, Taiwan,
Thailand, Malaysia, as well as in Japan; while
Indonesia moves at last to find its feet after
years of stagnation or worse.
On April 30, the Sunday New York Times
ran a story from Bangkok by Drew Middleton
discussing the mood of the new Asia and the
reasons for Asian support for our Viet-Nam
policy. It contained this observation by an Asian
Foreign Minister, which I have heard, in dif-
ferent forms, from Seoul to Kuala Lumpur,
from Tokyo to Bangkok:
68
DEPARTMEKT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
For youth, anticolonialism is part of history and
Communism has split and lost its appeal in the process.
Perhaps regionalism with its promise of stability and
economic progress will be youth's big concept for the
future.
Divisions in the Middle East
The one region in the non-Communist world
where regional institutions and spirit have not
yet begim to emerge is, of course, the Middle
East. During the whole postwar period, that
region has been bedeviled by multiple splits and
quarrels : not only between the Arab states and
Israel but also by divisions among the Arab
states and between certain Arab and other
Moslem states.
No one from outside a region can create a
spirit of determination to face and solve prob-
lems by regional cooperation. No one outside a
region can build regional institutions. But we
would hope that out of the frustrations and
tragedies of postwar Middle Eastern history we
might see emerge a new desire to achieve dig-
nity and stability and progress for all through
regional cooperation.
I am sure we and others outside the region
will be prepared to be helpful if the peoples
and governments of that area themselves decide
that this is the right road and if they begin to
move — in their own ways — along the path al-
ready taken by Western Europe, Latin Amer-
ica, and Asia.
As we look from the past to the future, this
spreading regional impulse has a particular
meaning for our country, its policy, and its
future position on the world scene ; for, despite
Professor [Marshall] McLuhan's skepticism,
policy in Washington is not made in a rearview
mirror. Speaking at Lancaster, Ohio, on Sep-
tember 5, 1966, President Johnson said : ^
Our purpose in promoting a world of regional part-
nerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow
in strength inside a strong United Nations, we can
look forward to a decline in the burden that America
has had to bear In this generation.
We are finding, then, in regionalism, a new
relationship to the world community somewhere
between the overwhelming responsibility we
assumed in the early postwar years — as we
" Ibid., Sept. 26, 1966, p. 453.
moved in to fill vacumns of power and to deal
with war devastation — and a return to isolation-
ism. From the beginning our objective was not
to build an empire of satellites but to strengthen
nations and regions so that they could become
partners.
And in this we are being true to ourselves,
our tradition, and our practical experience as a
nation.
Eegionalism is built into the Federal Consti-
tution of this continental democracy. It is one
way we have learned to share power and re-
sponsibility. We have, therefore, found it easy
and natural to work with those in other parts
of the world who committed themselves to
building regional order and assimiing regional
responsibilities.
To fulfill this vision of regional partnerships
will take time and patience. Above all, it will
take dogged, stubborn pride and effort by the
peoples of the various regions of the world.
Moreover, many problems can only be solved
on a global, rather than a regional, basis.
But, in the great inherently federal task we
all assumed in 1945 with the acceptance of the
United Nations Charter, we have learned that
regionalism has a large and hopeful place.
The record of regional architecture in the
first postwar generation is on the whole good
and promising; but it is evidently incomplete.
As you take stock of the tasks ahead — in your
coming time of responsibility — I am reasonably
confident that the development of regionalism
will engage your generation as much or more
than it has mine. I trust and believe this is one
part of my generation's effort you will not
reject and set aside — but pick up and do better.
Letters of Credence
Japan
The newly appointed Ambassador of Japan,
Takeso Shimoda, presented his credentials to
President Jolmson on June 28. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated June 28.
JULY 17, 1967
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the Future
hy Alexander B. Trowbridge ^
I am very happy to be here. Paris is as en-
chanting as ever, and I would be grateful to you
for no other reason but that your generous invi-
tation to join you here today has given me the
opportunity to visit again this queen of cities.
But I am also grateful for another, far more
substantial, reason. This occasion also gives me
the opportunity to contribute, I hope, a meas-
ure of understanding to a subject of great im-
portance to both Europe and the United States.
Unfortunately, it is a subject that for too long
has been distorted by the catch phrase that has
become its label. I refer to the so-called "tech-
nological gap."
It is indeed a catchy phrase and has the
proper ring of crisis that such phrases must
have if they are to pass into popular usage. But
like all such phrases, it catches only the more
visible aspects of the problem it is intended to
describe and obscures its true dimensions.
To a nonspecialist, for example, it would have
to be explained that the gap is, on the surface,
the industrial disparity that exists between
Europe and the United States and not the vast
technological gulf of centuries that measures
the economic distance between industrialized
countries and those in the early stages of devel-
opment. The technological gap — or perhaps
"technological lag" is a more precise term — is
a much less formidable problem, and one that
we can do something about.
The first step should be to describe the prob-
lem in realistic terms in order to establish a per-
spective on which all involved can agree.
In one very real and basic sense, every indus-
trialized nation, the United States included,
seems to suffer from technological lag within
its own industrial complex. By this I mean the
undue and unnecessary time lost in bringing the
processes of invention and innovation to produc-
tive fulfillment. And whether tliis delay is re-
flected in comparisons with the progress of
other nations is actually incidental to the en-
demic problem of the lag itself.
We have been much concerned with techno-
logical lag within the United States, and just
last January the Department of Commerce is-
sued a report by a high-level advisory commit-
tee which reviewed the problem in depth.^ I
would like to read to you one of the key recom-
mendations of this report, which I think may
shed some much-needed light on the subject
of technological lag, whether internal or
comparative.
It has to do with what the report calls "the
abundance of ignorance about the processes of
invention, innovation and entrepreneurship."
. . . there is too little appreciation and understand-
ing (the report states), of the process of technological
change in too many crucial sectors :
— Throughout much of the Federal Government.
— In some Industries.
— In many banks.
— In many universities.
— In many cities and regions.
More important, therefore, than any specific recom-
mendation concerning antitrust, taxation, the regula-
tion of industry, or venture capital, is one central
proposal :
The major effort should be placed on getting more
managers, executives, and other key individuals — both
in and out of government — to learn, feel, understand
and appreciate how technological innovation is
spawned, nurtured, financed, and managed into new
' Address made at Paris on June 2 before the Amer-
ican Chamber of Commerce in France. Mr. Trowbridge
was then Acting Secretary of Commerce ; he was sworn
in as Secretary of Commerce on June 14.
' Technological Innovation: Its Environment and
Management. Copies of the 83-page report are for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ($1.25).
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
technological businesses that grow, provide Jobs, and
satisfy people.
I wholly subscribe to this evaluation of the
situation in the United States, and I think we
should keep it firmly in mind as we analyze the
specific set of disparities we are discussing here
today.
The "Definition Gap"
The European view of the gap, as expressed at
the political level, where much of the discussion
has taken place, frequently gives the impression
that there is an across-the-board gap. This view
asserts that the gap is caused essentially by the
large expenditures for research and develop-
ment in the United States, especially those
financed by the govermnent for space explora-
tion, military purposes, aviation, and other ad-
vanced techiiologies, with attendant spin-off
benefits for the economy in general. This, some-
how, constitutes what is considered an unfair
advantage, and as a result the United States
should take steps to remedy the situation.
The points of the argument, as stated by one
high-level European official, nm something like
this : Between 1920 and 1940, Europe had an in-
comparable potential in scientists, scholars, and
research workers. This was largely destroyed by
totalitarian regimes and war. The rest was
drained away by the United States and the
Soviet Union after the war. Since the war, the
United States has spent increasingly large
amounts on research and development and in
1965 spent two or three times more, in real re-
sources, than did Western Europe. Again,
United States Government assistance to in-
dustry in connection with military and space
programs is much higher than in Europe. And
the United States enjoys a favorable techno-
logical balance of payments with Europe, which
indicates its dominance. Another factor is the
"brain drain," the siphoning of educated Euro-
peans to work for much higher salaries in
America.
The effect of this teclmological deficit, the
argument continues, is to create grave disadvan-
tages for both parties in the Atlantic commu-
nity. For Europe the disadvantages are eco-
nomic. For the United States they are political.
The European official whom I have been para-
phrasing cites the risk — and I am quoting di-
rectly now — "the risk of a scientific colonization
of the old continent by the new" — which would
threaten the viability of the Atlantic com-
munity.
On the opposite end of the argument, the en-
tire notion of the technological gap is dismissed
as a strategic competitive device in many quar-
ters of American business where keen competi-
tion from European products preempts con-
sideration of what is regarded as historical and
inevitable disparities among nations.
Basic science can and does flow freely across
national boundaries — this latter position as-
serts— but teclmology, wliich is the inventive
application of this basic knowledge for practi-
cal purposes, may or may not be shared; it is
usually private property and its disposition de-
pends on the wishes of those who own it. Fur-
thermore, this argument continues, different
countries historically apply technology in dif-
ferent ways. A landlocked country, for example,
will use it differently than a maritime nation.
Therefore, there will always be technological
disparities or gaps between nations. Only identi-
cal nations would have identical technology.
In effect, tliis argument states that what mat-
ters most is how the teclmology is applied, the
extent to which it is utilized, and not the relative
presence or absence of the technology itself.
Obviously, on opposite sides of the Atlantic,
the definition gap is immeasurably greater than
the technological gap we are seeking to define
and describe.
One thing is clear, however. To reject the
problem out of hand is as unrealistic as to limit
our investigation of it to the purely techno-
logical aspects.
These two approaches can result only in ex-
treme, and equally absurd, solutions. One is to
do nothing and accept the results as the inex-
orable verdict of history, as though history were
a supernatural force unaffected by the actions
of men. The other extreme is to insist that the
United States is somehow obligated to engage in
a giveaway program of technology. Otherwise,
it is argued, there will be a relative decline in
Europe's power, economically, militarily and
politically, that will result in a weak grouping
of states relative to the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Happily, these are not really the alternatives.
In the first place, the United States could not
give away its teclmology if it wanted to, because,
as I have indicated, most of the technology is
the private property of individuals or business
establishments. And in the second place, even if
71
this were not the case, the gift of American tech-
nology would not relieve the problem, because
the basic factors involved go much deeper than
technology.
Let us examine not only the disparities in the
current levels of productivity between the
United States and Euroi^e, which are cited as
evidence of the technological gap, but also the
essentially nontechnological factors that so
radically affect the utilization of the teclmology
that could reduce these disparities.
Using comparative GNP dollar values per
civilian employee in 1964 as a basis for com-
parison, it appears that the productivity levels
of most of the countries of northwestern Eu-
rope were a little over half that of the United
States, with Italy's a little over one-third. To
achieve parity with the United States, the pro-
ductivity of these countries would have to in-
crease, on the average, about 80 percent, while
Italy's would have to triple. Japan's produc-
tivity, incidentally, is slightly more than one-
fourth that of the United States and would
have to quadruple.
Some Causes of the Disparities
To sum up adequately the underlying
causes — and that is plural — causes of these
disparities requires a vehicle far more expan-
sive than a single speech, let alone a smgle
phrase. But I will try to touch briefly on what
I consider to be principal factors.
One appears to be differences in the use of
fixed business capital stock per worker. Pre-
liminary estimates indicate that Western Euro-
pean countries, relative to the United States,
use less capital per pei-son employed by about;
the same proportion as the lag in output per
person employed. In other words, there is more
intense utilization of capital stock in the
United States than in Europe. On the average,
plants and equipment in the United States are
utilized longer hours per year. Another big
difference lies in the smaller use of mechaniza-
tion in materials handling and other "indirect"
operations in industry, mming, and fanning in
Europe than in the United States, even tliough
Europe has the technology for mechanizing
these operations. The explanation probably lies
in the lower relative prices of labor versus capi-
tal in Europe. In short, there appears to be a
lack of economic incentive to substitute capital
for labor in Europe compared to the United
Sta)t©s.
Another disparity factor is the greater per-
centage of the European work force employed
in agriculture. In 1962, the Unit«d States had
8.2 percent of its working population in agri-
culture while France had 19.8 percent; and
Italy, 27.4 percent. And the productivity of
European agriculture lagged further behind the
United States than did their economies as a
whole. Our high agricultural productivity is
largely due to efforts that began more than 100
years ago, during the presidency of Abraham
Lincoln, to apply science and teclmology to
agriculture. I should add that virtually none of
this science and technology is or has been exclu-
sive to the United States.
A third factor is the economics of scale. In
the United States, business enterprises are
much larger than the family-owned firms of
Europe, and the gains from specialization are
greater, more efficient capital-intensive tech-
nologies are used, and there is fuller utilization
of overhead.
A fourth, and much overlooked, factor is edu-
cation. I am not referring to the quality of
European universities, which is, of course, ex-
ceptional, but rather to the relatively narrow
educational base in most European countries. An
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] study showed that the
United States in 1957-58 had a much higher
enrollment ratio than Europe: 66.2 percent in
the 15-19 age group were enrolled in the United
States compared to only 30.8 percent in France
and less than 20 percent in West Germany,
Italy, and the U.K. At the higher 20-24 year
level, the United States had 12 percent enrolled,
whereas West Germany led France, Italy, and
Britain with only 4.6 percent. Significantly, at
the university level, the United States had four
to five times as many science and engineering
graduates per million of population, except for
France, where the U.S. advantage was still two
to one.
Technological Lag Not Uniform
Natural resources endowment is certainly an-
other factor, but because it is so obvious and in-
alterable a one, I would rather pass over it to
the factor that has received the most notice, or
perhaps I should say "notoriety." That is the
apparent European lag in new teclmology.
On analysis, this lag is neither as dramatic
nor as uniform as might be expected. There are
many sectors in which European technology is
72
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIIf
predominant. Europe appears to lag only mod-
erately in seven significant areas. These are:
nuclear reactors, pipeline freight transporta-
tion, automatic railroad yard classification and
car scheduling, and in the manufacture of large-
capacity generator equipment, numerically con-
trolled machine tools, jet aircraft, and semicon-
ductors. The lag is admittedly greater in a few
other areas such as computer manufacture and
solid-state microcii'cuitry.
There are various reasons for the lag in know-
how and the use of know-how in these fields. It
takes some innovations a long time to spread.
For example, the oxygen steel process and ex-
tra-high-voltage transmission of electric energy
were a long time in reaching the United States,
just as the taconite process and solid-state cir-
cuitry have taken time to come into use in
Europe.
The lack of a large home market in European
countries to support the application of tech-
nology is also a factor in some areas, such as
jets, which originated in the United Kingdom
and Germany. In other cases, economic incen-
tives are lacking; the laborsaving advantages
of numerically controlled machine tools have
much less attraction to the labor-intensive in-
dustries of Western Europe than in the United
States.
As for the spin-oflF advantages from space and
defense programs in the United States, I can
only say that this is an awfully high priced
way to get new industrial technology.
The importance of another much-cited fac-
tor is also open to question. This is the smaller
European investment in research and develop-
ment. If you discount U.S. expenditures for
military and space purposes, the United States
is seen to spend 1.5 percent of its GNP on re-
search and development. This compares with
1.4 percent for Britain, 1.2 percent for France,
1.1 percent for Germany, and 1.5 percent for
Belgium.
Of course, the difference in absolute terms is
enormous. But if realism is allowed sway over
wishful thinking and resentment and each coun-
try fits its scientific effort to its scientific re-
sources, it becomes readily apparent that there
is plenty of room in the vast field of science and
technology for nations of all sizes, however lim-
ited. Not every effort has to fall into the cate-
gory of "big science and big teclinology." This
is wasteful, although even here, smaller nations
can participate by combining their efforts inter-
nationally.
The wise allocation of resources has always
been a cardmal rule of international economics.
Participation in science and technology is ex-
pensive at best, and all countries have to budget
their resources with care, even the largest.
Management Policies and Practices
A much more important factor in technologi-
cal progress, indeed a crucial factor, is the man-
agement of teclinology, the industrial response
to technology.
Let me quote for you the statement of a dis-
tinguished European speaker at a symposium
on teclinology and world trade which we held
last November at the Department of Ck)mmerce.
"I believe," he said "that the fundamental rea-
son for the (technological) gap is more a ques-
tion of mentality and attitude. . . . Science and
technology have been present in Europe many
years. What we'd like is the attitude necessary
for the creation of more big industries with
leaders who know how to make use of science
and teclinology."
It is primarily a question of the organiza-
tional environment, another European stated —
of management, and of the training of execu-
tives to accept and adapt what already exists.
These two views suggest, as do others ex-
pressed at the symposium, that European in-
dustry must review its management policies and
practices in order to improve its vital industrial
response in the processes of innovation.
This is heavily underscored by a look at the
origins of some of the major advances in tech-
nology since World War II— such things as
"wonder" drugs, synthetic detergents and fibers,
plastics, electronics and communications, data
processing, steelmaking, and so on. Of a hun-
dred or more major advances, Western Europe
accoimted for 49 percent, the United States for
31 percent.
It would seem that the reasons for any indus-
trial lag in these fields must be something other
than a lack of teclmological know-how.
Moreover, it bears notmg that the overall
economic growth of Western Europe, despite
disparities in productivity, has been greater than
that of the United States in recent years — with
the exception of the United Kingdom. This
rapid rate of development has put Europe in an
excellent position to compete with the United
States in the export of teclinologically intensive
commodities such as chemicals, nonelectric ma-
chinery, electric machinery, and transport
JITLT 17, 19C7
73
equipment. In fact, in total export of manufac-
tures, the U.S. sliare of the world market
dropped from 18.1 percent in 19G0 to 16.G per-
cent in 1964. And it dropped in each major
category. Western Europe during this same
period maintained a sizable 54.3 percent share.
Problem of the "Brain Drain"
Paralleling the problem of the technological
gap has been the so-called "brain drain." There
has been almost as much concern expressed over
the loss of talented people to the United States
as over the differences in our teclmological
capabilities.
In a very real sense, there is nothing new
about the emigration of skilled people from
Europe to the United States, and indeed from
every part of the world. It has been going on
since the earliest days of our settlement, when
trained artisans of every kind — shipwrights,
ironworkers, glassblowers, some of the world's
best farmers, and many others — arrived in
search of freedom, greater opportunity, greater
challenge. And essentially, some of these are
the factors that still attract skilled people to
the United States or, for that matter, to any
otlier country.
The question today is, Wliat is the magnitude
of this movement, and what is the impact on
the countries from which they come? Would
the talents of the migrants be fully utilized if
they stayed home ? Are tliey lured to the United
States in the beginning as students under gov-
ernment programs and then remain to enter the
work force ? Wliat can be done about the prob-
lem as a whole?
As to the number, 30,039 skilled persons of
all types migrated to the United States in fiscal
year 1966. More than 70 percent of these came
from the developed countries and the remainder
from the less developed nations. As a percent-
age of total immigrants, the number of skilled
personnel was very small — only about 15
percent
As for the number of students who come to
the United States for training and remain, the
Interagency Council on International Educa-
tion and Cultural Affairs found that they are
an exceedingly small part of the problem.
Among those who come under exchange pro-
grams supported and financed by the United
States Government, less than 1 percent even-
tually become permanent residents. Among
those who pay their own way, only 8.3 percent
remained as permanent residents during the
past 5 years.
Most of our skilled immigrants are trained
adults recruited by American industries, re-
search organizations, hospitals, and universities.
What can be done about the problem?
Is there a free nation that would restrict the
right of its citizens to migrate in search of
greater opportunities?
Should the United States specifically restrict
by law the immigration of people with skills
and talents? Already our immigration laws
contain provisions that encourage students and
visitors to return home. For example, for cer-
tain categories, the visitor must leave the
United States after a specified date and is not
eligible to apply for inunigration for 2 years
thereafter. But for us to bar talented people
would be a form of discrimination, and we only
recently revised our immigration law to elimi-
nate disci'imination. Besides, if we did bar
them, would this insure that they would remain
in their home countries?
The problem presents many of the same
tangled aspects that we fiind in the technologi-
cal gap.
The solutions seem to lie largely in tlie home
countries. In the case of the "brain drain," in-
centives must be pro^-ided that encourage edu-
cated people to remain at home and students to
return home. To interfere with the free move-
ment of such people by legislation would be
contrary to the principles that are the founda-
tion of a free society.
Technology Alone Is Not the Key
In the case of the technological gap, the basic
problem goes much deeper than technology. It
involves all the factors that affect productivity,
of which technology is only one.
The fact that teclmology alone is not the key
solution is illustrated by conditions within the
United States itself.
There are wide disparities, for instance, in
the ability of our various States to attract the
latest teclmology. Some States have a lower
level of education and fewer scientists and engi-
neers as a percentage of population. They also
lose many of their most promising scientific
and engineering graduates to other States offer-
ing increased opportunities. There is a serious
"brain drain," for example, from the Midwest
to both coasts.
Even some of our largest cities have prob-
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUI.LETIN
lems attracting new industries employing the
most advanced teclinologj'. The cause would
appear to involve not a lack of scientists, but
other factors. A study by our Commerce De-
partment Teclmical Advisory Board indicates
that universities in these cities fail to play a
leading role in bringing in such firms and banks
in the area are not inclined toward financing
small, science-based companies.
Solutions to Technological Disparities
What, then, are the solutions to the techno-
logical disparities between Europe and the
United States?
The things which can be done that lie deep
in the social and economic systems of Europe,
only Europeans can do.
Only Europeans can create an educational
system that raises the level of competence
among the general population and that also
offers the best training in science and tech-
nology to the more capable students. Only
European industry can create an aggressive
managerial structure that encourages the inno-
vation which leads to the use of more advanced
technology and finally to increased productiv-
ity. Only Europeans can create the tax and
monetary incentives which foster the more
rapid use of advanced technology by industry.
The increasing economic integration of Eu-
rope and the mass markets it creates also are
important factors in the spread of advanced
technology. For this permits industry to effect
the economies of scale that makes its use
profitable.
There also are a number of areas where the
United States can collaborate to improve the
transfer of technology across international
boundaries.
To the extent that teclmology lies in the
public domain, its transfer can be facilitated by
improving its dissemination among govern-
ments, including organizational arrangements,
and by industry-to-industry transfer. Wliere
technology is subject to patents, closer inter-
national cooperation on patent practices can
vastly improve its transfer. The time is pro-
pitious because of work already underway
internationally in the patents field and because
of reconunendations recently made in the
United States by the President's Commission
on the Patent System. Efforts can also be made
to minimize or eliminate any other restrictions
hampering the flow of teclmological informa-
tion across international boimdaries.
Another field which is beginning to receive
renewed attention is industrial standardiza-
tion. Efforts at both the national and interna-
tional levels can contribute a great deal to the
flow of technology.
Improved utilization of scientific and tech-
nological information can be enhanced by
positive action to establish conferences, utiliza-
tion centers, training programs, personnel and
materials exchanges, and consultative services.
The Office of State Teclmical Services in the
United States Department of Commerce has
had impressive success in its first year and a
half in such a program of teclmical services.
There is no reason why industry-to-industry
contacts should not yield results of great bene-
fit for all participants. There was much of this
in the first years after World War II, and with
important gains for all concerned.
The United States already has a policy of
sharing peaceful know-how and cooperating in
peaceful international endeavors in those areas
where the United States has an important posi-
tion. A few examples are: Antarctic studies,
atomic energy, meteorology, telecommunica-
tions, space exploration, oceanography, and
such long-term programs as the International
Geophysical Year and the International Co-
operation Year. This kind of cooperation will
be continued and expanded as needed. President
Johnson himself made clear last fall our inten-
tion to cooperate in this field when he stated :
"We are exploring how best to develop science
and teclmology as a common resource." ^
I believe there should be contmuing cross
fertilization in industrial technology and I
offer an invitation to French industrialists to
come to the United States with their know-how
and invest in our economy. We have recently
welcomed a new plant in our Pacific Northwest,
built by a French- American joint venture in-
volving Pechiney, and I am told it is technically
without equal in its ability to produce alummum
at low cost. French engineering and design
have made this plant highly productive at low
operating cost and have developed a highly
significant air pollution control system at the
same time. We in the United States welcome this
technological advance made possible by French
industry, and we favor the freedom of invest-
ment which allows such transfers to take place.
' For President Jolmson's address at New York, N.T.,
on Oct. 7, 1966, see Buixetin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
75
Progress comes by reducing, not creating, bar-
riers to such flows of technology and investment.
There is evei-y reason to believe that Europe,
with its traditional ingenuity and ability, will
take the kind of action needed to overcome its
present difficulties. And there is no question but
that the United States will in the future, as in
the past, cooperate willingly and effectively in
this effort which will mean so much to the
United States as well as to Europe. After all,
who makes better friends, allies, trading part-
ners— countries with stagnating or under-
developed economies, or those with a high level
of economic activity and purchasing power?
The question needs no answer.
White House Panel Completes
Study of World Food Problem
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release dated June 17
Background
Kesults of a comprehensive study of the world
food problem by the World Food Panel of the
President's Science Advisory Committee were
made public on June 17. The first volume of
a three-part Committee report was released by
the Wliite House.^
The report of the year-long study concludes
that the scale, severity, and duration of the
world food problem are so great that a massive,
long-range, innovative effort will be required
to master it.
The report stresses the "reality of the food
shortage that will occur during the next 20
years" unless agricultural production in the de-
veloping countries can be mcreased through the
use of fertilizer, new plant varieties, pesticides,
and farm machinery, and adaptive research to
develop and to apply new cropping systems for
1 The World Food Prohlcm, a. Report of the Presi-
dent's Science Advisoi-y Committee. Two volumes of the
Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply have
been released and are for sale by the Superintendent
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402 : vol. I, summary of the world
food problem and recommendations for policy and ac-
tion, 123 pp., 60 cents; vol. II, snbpanel reports, 772
pp., $2.75.
each country's climate and soil. In addition, if
"subsistence f armmg" is to be transfonned into
"commercial agriculture," improved transpor-
tation, marketing, farm credit, storage, and dis-
tribution systems will be needed on a huge scale.
The problem of increasing food production, the
Panel concludes, is actually the overall problem
of economic development and cannot be consid-
ered in isolation from other problems of the
new nations of the world.
In the foreword to volume I of the report,
President Jolmson states :
The World Food Problem is one of the foremost chal-
lenges of mankind today. The dimension of the chal-
lenge will define the dimension of our response and
the means for that response. We must join with others
in a massive effort to help the less fortunate of the
earth to help themselves.
The complete report will be published in
three volumes. The fijial volume, comprised
mainly of technical reports, is expected to be
issued in July.
The study was carried out by more than 100
experts and consultants drawn from the Fed-
eral Government, universities, foimdations, and
industry.
The study chairman was Ivan L. Bennett, Jr.,
Deputy Director of the Office of Science and
Technology, Executive Office of the President;
H. F. Eobinson, administrative dean for re-
search of the University of North Carolina,
Raleigh, served as executive director.^
Summary of the Report
The report concludes that the solution to the
world food problem during the next 20 years is
biologically, teclmologically, and economically
possible. It makes clear however, that it will re-
quire the institution of major programs to ac-
complish the job.
A maximum effort will be required from all nations,
developing and developed alike, if the pangs of hun-
ger are to be alleviated . . . and if the growing threat
of outright mass starvation is to be turned aside.
Food and population: While overall world
food requirements will rise by about 50 per-
cent, the requirements in the developing nations
are expected to double by 1985. The report rec-
ommends that voluntary programs of family
plamiing be supported and expanded in the de-
veloping countries to assure a long-range ad-
' For a list of members of the panel, see White House
press release dated June 17.
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
justment of food needs in conjunction with pop-
ulation control.
Food shortage and rapid population growth are sep-
arate, but interrelated problems. The solutions, like-
wise, are separate, but related. The choice is not to
solve one or the other; to solve both is an absolute
necessity. . . .
The twin problems of food and population balance
have one feature in common that adds immeasurably
to the difficulties of achieving control. Their eventual
solution is crucially dependent upon success in con-
vincing millions of citizens in developing nations to
take individual action. . . . The provision of these per-
sonal incentives Is a task that encompasses a vast array
of social, economic, and political considerations which
differ between countries and within countries. Indeed,
the very fabric of traditional societies must be re-
woven if the situation is to change permanently.
Food synthesis : The report warns against the
false hope that some "panacea" will appear as
an easy answer to worldwide food shortages and
decries the publicity accorded to synthesis of
food from petroleum, food from algae, and
similar processes as raising false hopes and un-
doubtedly lessening public concern about the
seriousness of the food supply in the develop-
ing nations. Strong support for research and
development on food synthesis is recommended,
but it is pointed out that it will be several years
before any decision about the usefulness of new
processes will be possible because of teclmical
problems as well as questions of cost and con-
sumer acceptability.
Agricultural development : Stressing agricul-
ture within the needy countries as the main
source of food during the next 20 years, the re-
port states :
Agricultural development has never been a particu-
larly appealing or inspiring national goal ; it is politi-
cally unglamorous, unrecognized, and unrewarding. It
does not raise visions of the 20th century, the age of
technological revolution, in the minds of mo.st people.
Until agricultural development is accorded its right-
ful place by both donors and recipients of foreign aid,
the imbalance between the world's food supply and its
population will continue to outpace our efforts to meet
the increasing need.
Capital investment and economiG health: The
report details the huge investments of capital
that will be needed for irrigation, fertilizer,
new seed varieties, pesticides, and agricultural
machinery if the "subsistence" farming in the
developing countries is to be transformed into
modem commercial fanning, emphasizing addi-
tional needs for improved farm credit, market-
ing, storage, and distribution systems, and
improved transportation. Commercial food pro-
duction for the market is dependent upon total
economic development. There must be a balance
between modernization of the agricultural sec-
tor and the industrial sector of any economy if
either is to flourish and to achieve sustained
gi'owth.
Economic assistance: The report emphasized
heavily the need for long-term support of over-
all economic assistance in the hungry countries :
The eventual alleviation of world hunger will require
many years. It is dependent on far-reaching social re-
forms and long-range programs of hard work which
offer no promises of quick and dramatic results of the
type so helpful in maintaining enthusiasm for a con-
certed, difficult undertaking. The results cannot be
seen as a dedication of new buildings, as a successful
launching into space, or as other spectacular, "news-
worthy" events to punctuate the year in and year out
toil. . . .
. . . long-term commitment of substantial resources
is an absolute necessity. The fallacious notion that for-
eign aid's tnain business is to put itself out of business
should be dropped for the remainder of this century.
All programs based upon this thesis have succeeded
only in proving otherwise. When one program of assist-
ance has terminated, others have had to take over.
Research and development: Pleading for
abandonment of the "know-how, show-how"
idea of "practical help" for agriculture in the
developing countries, the Panel states emphati-
cally that agricultural technologies are not di-
rectly transferable to different soils and cli-
mates, and the report underlines the need for
adai^tive research in devising agricultural sys-
tems for each region of the world:
A blueprint for a bicycle or a steel mill can be
shipped overseas and utilized without alteration but
the blueprints and architecture for a food crop must be
developed overseas. There, as in the United States,
new plant varieties, each better than the last, must be
produced frequently to increase plant resistance to in-
sects and disease.
There is an urgent need to carry out this adaptive
research, to establish strong indigenous institutions,
and develop the manpower that will enable the poor,
food-deficit nations to carry out the self-sustaining,
continuing programs of research and development that
are essential to modem food production.
Manpower: The Panel's analysis of the food
problem points out that it is not nutritional
need alone but effective economic demand which
stimulates increased food production. Aggregate
calculations indicate that the annual capital in-
vestment that will be required to increase food
demand to the levels required to meet needs is
approximately 4 percent of the GNP of tlie de-
veloping countries, amounting to about $12 bil-
lion for 1965-66. Despite these enormous re-
quirements for capital investment, the report
warns that the greatest problem to be faced is
the shortage of trained manpower and urges a
JTJLY 17, 1967
77
renewed emphasis upon teclinical assistance to
the developing countries :
The scarcest and most needed resource in, the devel-
oping countries is the scientific, technical, and manage-
rial skill needed for systematic, orderly decision-making
and implementation. Through technical assistance
programs, the United States should emjAasize guid-
ance, education, and the development of indigenous
capabilities — for the long term — because the task in
the developing nations has only just begun and will
continue for many decades to come.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOREWORD
TO THE REPORT
In all of recorded history, none have sur-
passed the American people in "willingness to
share their abiuidance with others. We have
given unstintingly of our material wealth and
our precious human resources to benefit the less
fortmiate of this earth. We have sought to re-
store those whom war has shattered. We have
sought to provide assistance to the newly inde-
pendent members of the family of nations who
are making the effort to break the shackles of
tradition and achieve a better life for their
peoples.
But as success in programs to eradicate dis-
ease and to improve health have given more and
more millions the opportunity to live out their
natural span of life, the problem of hunger has
lingered on and the shadow of starvation and
impending famine has grown ever darker.
Hunger's unceasing anguish drains hope,
crushes aspirations, and obstructs the genera-
tion of programs of self-help. The threat of
starvation sets man against man and citizen
against government, leading to civil strife and
political unrest.
Our programs to help these new countries to
increase food production have brought about
striking improvement in a few instances. But in
the total balance, food has not kept pace with
population and the developing world continues
to lose ground in this race.
The World Food Problem is one of the fore-
most challenges of mankind today. The dimen-
sion of the challenge will define the dimension
of our response and the means for that response.
We must join with others in a massive effort to
help the less fortunate of the earth to help them-
selves. I am making this report public because
of its significance for the American people and
people all over the world.
U.S. and Philippines To Discuss
New Trade Agreement
White House press release dated June 20
President Jolmson on June 20 announced the I
composition of the U.S. team to conduct inter- ■
governmental discussions with representatives
of the Govenunent of the Republic of the
Philippines on the concepts underlying a new
instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley Trade
Agreement ^ after its scheduled expiration in
1974.
The members of the U.S. team are Deputy
Assistant Secretax-y for Economic Affairs Eu-
gene M. Braderman, Department of State
(chairman) ; Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Trade Policy Robert L. McNeill, Department
of Commerce ; Assistant Legal Adviser George
H. Aldrich, Department of State; and Philip-
pines Country Director Richard M. Service and
Philippines Economic Desk Officer Dawson S.
Wilson, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State.
The undertaking of early discussions was
agreed upon by President Jolmson and Presi-
dent Marcos in paragraph 12 of the joint com-
munique^ issued in Washington following
talks September 14 and 15, 1966.
President Recommends Ratification
of OAS Charter Amendments
Message to tlie Senate ^
To the Senate of the United States:
I request the advice and consent of the Senate
to ratification of the protocol of amendment to
the Charter of the Organization of American
States — the "Protocol of Buenos Aires" — signed
at the Third Special Inter-American Confer-
ence at Buenos Aires on February 27, 1967.*
The signing of the protocol of Buenos Aires
was a major development for the inter- Ameri-
can system. The amendments to be effected in
^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348 ;
for background and text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19,
195.5, p. 463.
" For text, see iUd., Oct. 10, 1966, p. 531.
» Congressional Record, June 12, 1967, p. S8076.
* Exec. L. 90th Cong., 1st sess. ; for background, see
Bulletin of Mar. 20, 1967, p. 472.
78
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Charter of the Organization of American
States by the protocol of amendment, the first
such amendments since the adoption of the
charter in 1948, will go far toward the neces-
sary modernization of the structure of the
Organization and the strengthening of its ca-
pacity to act effectively in the interest of
hemispheric cooperation and solidarity. The
amendments gi-ant certain fuller responsibili-
ties to some of the organs of the Organization,
for instance, in the field of peaceful settlement.
They establish new and specific objectives and
standards for the promotion of economic, social,
and cultural development.
Following in general the guidelines prepared
at the Second Special Inter- American Confer-
ence at Eio de Janeiro in November 1965, and
the draft amendments prepared by the OAS
Special Committee which met in Panama in
March 1966 and by the Inter- American Eco-
nomic and Social Council which met in
Washington in June 1966, the Buenos Aires
Conference adopted the amendments which are
embodied in the protocol of amendment.
Among the more significant changes in the
amendments relating to the structure of the Or-
ganization and to the responsibilities of its or-
gans are those concerning (1) the provision in
the charter of procedures for the Organization
to authorize the admission of new members;
(2) the replacement of the Inter- American Con-
ference which meets every 5 years by a General
Assembly which meets annually and which as-
sumes certain functions now performed by the
OASCoimcil; (3) the redesignation of the OAS
Coimcil as the Permanent Council, and the
granting of additional responsibilities to the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council
and Inter-American Council for Education, Sci-
ence, and Culture — formerly the Inter-Amer-
ican Cultural Council — which become organs
directly responsible to the General Assembly as
is the Permanent Council ; (4) the elimination
of the Inter- American Council of Jurists and
the upgrading of the Inter- American Juridical
Committee; (5) the assignment to the Perma-
nent Council of specific additional authority
in the field of peaceful settlement; (6) the in-
corporation of the Inter- American Commission
on Human Rights into the OAS Charter as an
organ with fimctions to be later determined by
an inter- American convention on human rights ;
and (7) the election of the OAS Secretary Gen-
eral and Assistant Secretary General by the
General Assembly for 5-year terms, rather than
by the OAS Council for 10-year terms as pres-
ently provided.
The expanded economic standards under-
scoi-e the importance of self-help eilorts and
reiterate the present charter undertaking of
members to cooperate with one another in the
economic field "as far as their resources permit
and laws may provide." The amendments pro-
vide that States should make individual and
united efforts to bring about improved condi-
tions of trade in basic commodities and a reduc-
tion of trade barriers by importing countries.
Several articles deal with efforts to accelerate
Latin American economic integration.
The social and the educational, scientific, and
cultural standards elaborate on the principles
in the present charter in these areas.
The various amendments are dealt with in de-
tail in the enclosed report by the Secretary of
State and summary of amendments.
I believe it to be in the national interest of
the United States to ratify the proposed amend-
ments. I therefore urge that the Senate consent
to ratification by the United States of these
amendments to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House, June 12, 1967.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Government, Science, and International Policy. Pro-
ceedings of the eighth meeting of the Panel on Sci-
ence and Technology of the House Ckimmittee on Sci-
ence and Astronautics ; January 24-26, 1967 ; 220 pp.
Compilation of papers prepared for the eighth meet-
ing of the panel ; April 1967 ; 81 pp. [Committee
print.].
United States Armament and Disarmament Problems.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb-
ruary 3-March .3, 1967. 186 pp.
The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round.
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. Part II. February 15-April 5, 1967. 204 pp.
U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program. Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
S. 1030. March 21 and April 25, 1967. 122 pp.
Policy Planning for Technology Transfer. Report of the
Subcommittee on Science and Technology to the
Senate Select Committee on Small Business. S. Doc.
15. April 6, 1967. 192 pp.
JTJLT 17, 1967
79
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Italy Sign
Science Cooperation Agreement
Press release 145 dated June 19
All Agreement for a Cooperative Program in
Science between the United States and Italy
was concluded on June 19 at a ceremony at the
Department of State. Eugene Rostow, Under
Secretary of State for Political Ailairs, and
Donald Hornig, Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Teclmology, signed the
agreement on behalf of the Government of the
United States. Ambassador Egidio Ortoiia;
Leopoklo Rubinacci, Mmister for Coordination
of Science and Technology ; and Vincenzo Ca-
glioti, President of the National Research Comi-
cil (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche) signed
on behalf of the Government of the Republic
of Italy.
The agreement provides that the two coim-
tries will midertake a broad-range program of
scientific cooperation for peaceful purposes.
Each country will provide financial support to
its respective portion of the program.
The aim of the program is to strengthen
cooperation between the scientists of the two
countries and to provide additional opportuni-
ties for them to exchange ideas, skills, and tech-
niques, to attack problems of particular mutual
interest, to work together in unique environ-
ments, and to utilize special facilities.
Activities under this program will involve
participation by scientists of both countries
and may include exchange of scientists, pursuit
of joint research projects, and seminars to ex-
change information. Scientific information
derived from these activities shall be made
freely available to the world scientific commu-
nity through customary channels.
Tlie agreement makes provision for the par-
ticipation of scientists of other countries m the
jomt projects and encourages extension of the
cooperation to a multilateral basis.
The agreement provides for the designation
by each Government of an "executive agency"
with responsibility for coordinating the imple-
mentation of its side of the program. The Na-
tional Science Foimdation (NSF) in the United
States and the Consiglio Nazionale delle
Ricerche (CNR) in Italy will serve as the
respective executive agencies.
The cooperative program is being initiated
with three jarojects which have been approved
by the NSF and the CNR :
1. Establishment of an international grad-
uate school of molecular biology through coop-
eration between the University of California
and the International Laboratory of Genetics
and Biophysics (ILGB) at Naples, Italy. The
ILGB is governed and supported by the CNR.
Under an NSF grant to the University of Cali-
fornia, the university will furnish some teach-
ing staff and laboratory equipment. The
classroom and laboratory facilities and ad-
ditional staff will be provided through the
ILGB, which is a large, well-equipped, and
experienced research institution. The school will
accept students from all countries and will
award the Ph. D. degree on the basis of a cur-
riculum designed on the American system but
employing some experimental variations. The
school can serve as a prototype for international
graduate schools in other fields.
2. A scientific exchange progi-am between the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
University of Palermo. Laboratories at both
institutions have conducted significant research
in molecular developmental biology. The ex-
change is expected to result in the coordination
of effort and the establishment of a core of sim-
ilar teclmical and theoretical competence in
laboratories at the two institutions. Program
emphasis will be on support of the research and
training of professional scientists, graduate stu-
dents, and technical personnel between the two
institutions. NSF has awarded a grant to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to sup-
port the U.S. portion of this program, and the
CNR is funding the University of Palermo
participation.
3. Extension of collaboration between scien-
tists at the Department of Zoology, Washington
University, St. Louis, Mo., and the Center for
Neurobiology of the Istituto Superiore di
Sanita and the Institute of Experimental Medi-
cine of the CNR in Rome. The work involves
study of a nerve growth factor which induces
increased growth of specific nerve cells of birds :
and mammals as well as of embryonic sensory
cells. This activity is also being supported by
NSF and CNR.
80
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement between the International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States and Indonesia for the appli-
cation of safeguards. Signed at Vienna June 19, 1967.
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency
shall have received from the two Governments writ-
ten notification that they have complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements for its
entry into force.
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 23, 1963.
Entered into force: March 19, 1967.'
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig-
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow Jan-
uary 27, 1967."
Ratification deposited: Hungary, June 26, 1967.
Signatures: Jamaica, June 29, 1967 ; Peru, June 30,
1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965."
Ratification deposited: Burma, June 8, 1967.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field ;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian per-
sons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950 ; for the United States February 2,
1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notification that it considers itself iound: Congo
(Brazzaville), January 30, 1967.
BILATERAL
Agency for the Safety of Air Navigation
in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA)
Agreement relating to services and facilities for air-
craft operated by or on behalf of the United States
Government, with exchange of letters. Signed at
Paris June 22, 1967. Entered Into force June 22, 1967.
Brazil
Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel
(U.S.S. Lewis Bancock) to BrazU. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington June 15 and 28, 1967.
Entered into force June 28, 1967.
Agreement relating to the loan of an additional vessel
(U.S.S. Irtvin) to Brazil. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington June 23 and 28, 1907. Entered
into force June 28, 1967.
Malta
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Valletta June 14, 1967.
Entered into force June 14, 1967.
Norway
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio oper-
ators of either country to operate their stations in the
other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo
May 27 and June 1, 1967. Entered into force June 1,
1967.
Romania
Agreement amending the agreement of April 20,
May 14 and 26, 1962 (TIAS .5063), relating to the
issuance of visas to diplomatic and nondiplomatic
personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Bucha-
rest May 31 and June 17, 1967. Entered into force
June 19, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Oovemment Printing Office, Washington, D.G. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Rawalpindi Novem-
ber 21, 1966. Entered into force November 21, 1966.
Effective July 1, 1966. TIAS 6153. 15 pp. 10<f.
Education — Commission for Educational Exchange
and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with
Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de Janeiro
October 5 and 19, 1966. Entered into force October 19,
1966. TIAS 6163. 11 pp. 10(>.
Treaties — Continued Application to Botswana of Cer-
tain Treaties Concluded Between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Agreement with Botswana.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Gaberones September 30,
1966. Entered into force September 30, 1966. TIAS 6165.
3 pp. 5(t.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with the Democratic Republic of the
Congo — Signed at Kinshasa October 3, 1966. Entered
into force October 3, 1966. Witt exchange of notes.
TIAS 6166. 11 pp. 10^.
* Not in force for the United States.
• Not in force.
JTJLT 17, 1967
81
Desalination. Agreement with the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of No-
vember 18, 1964. Exchange of notes — Dated at Moscovir
November 18 and December 3, 1966. Entered into force
December 3, 1966. TIAS 6174. 2 pp. 5(t.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Agree-
ment with Italy, amending the agreement of Decem-
ber 18, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Rome October 5, 1966. Entered into force October 5,
1966. TIAS 6179. 5 pp. 54.
Military Bases in the Philippines — Relinquishment of
Certain Land Areas in Camp John Hay. Agreement
with the Philiijpines. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Manila December 13, 1966. Entered into force Decem-
ber 13, 1966. TIAS 6180. 3 pp., map. 30(5.
General Agreement on Tarififs and Trade. Protocol for
the accession of Yugoslavia to the agreement of Oc-
tober 30, 1947. Done at Geneva July 20, 1966. Entered
into force August 25, 1966. TIAS 6185. 28 pp. 15«(.
Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with
Jamaica. Exchange of notes — Signed at Kingston De-
cember 20, 1966. Entered into force December 20, 1966.
TIAS 6187. 3 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Iraq — Signed at Baghdad Decem-
ber 19, 1966. Entered into force December 19, 1966.
With exchange of notes. TIAS 6188. 14 pp. 10(J.
Trade — Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From
Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington October 19,
1966. Entered into force October 19, 1966. Effective
January 1, 1966. TIAS 6191. 3 pp. 50.
Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for De-
fense Purposes. Agreement with the United Kingdom
of Great IJritain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered
into force December 30, 1966. TIAS 6196. 15 pp. 100.
Tracking Stations — Facility on the Island of Mahe
(Seychelles). Agreement with the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London December 30, 1966. Entered
into force Decemt>er 30, 1966. With agreed minute.
TIAS 6197. 30 pp. 150.
Settlement of United States Claim for Postwar Eco-
nomic Assistance. Agreement with the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg December 29, 1966.
Entered into force December 29, 1966. With related
notes — Dated at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg Jan-
uary 4 and 20, 1967. TIAS 6204. 5 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Dominica. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Bridgetovra December 16, 1966, and
at Dominica January 11, 1967. Entered into force
January 11, 1967. TIAS 6206. 3 pp. 50.
Peace Corps. Agreement with St. Christopher Nevis
and Anguilla. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bridge-
town and St. Kitts December 19, 1966, and January 10,
1967. Entered into force January 10, 1967. TIAS 6209.
3 pp. 50.
Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band.
Protocol with Mexico, amending the agreement of
January 29, 1957— Signed at Mexico April 13, 1966.
Entered into force January 12, 1967. TIAS 6210. 4 pp.
50.
Peace Corps. Agreement vnth St. Vincent. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Bridgetown December 16, 1966. and
at St. Vincent January IS, 1967. Entered into force
January 18, 1967. TIAS 6211. 3 pp. 50.
Customs Administration. Agreement with the Philip-
pines— Signed at Washington January 4, 1967. Entered
into force January 4, 1967. TIAS 6212. 9 pp. 100.
Defense — Disposition of Equipment and Materiel.
Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of note.s — Signed
at Rio de Janeiro January 27, 1967. Entered into force
January 27, 1967. TIAS 6213. 5 pp. 50.
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967
INDEX J'uJ'y 17, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. llfiU
Africa. Regionalism and World Order (Ros-
tow) 66
American Principles. The Right of All Peoples
to Self -Determination (Johnson) 59
Asia. Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . 66
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 79
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78
Developing Countries
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) . . 66
White House Panel Completes Study of World
Food Problem 76
Ek;onomic A£Fairs
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to
the Future (Trowbridge) 70
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of
New CanaJ Treaties 65
Europe
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to
the Future (Trowbridge) 70
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
Foreign Aid. White House Panel Completes
Study of World Food Problem 76
Italy. United States and Italy Sign Science Co-
operation Agreement 80
Japan. Letters of Credence (Shimoda) ... 69
Latin America
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments (message to Senate) . 78
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
Near East
Regionalism and World Order (Rostow) ... 66
United States Reiterates Policy on Status of
Jerusalem 60
U.S. To Join in Emergency ReUef Programs for
the Middle East (Johnson, Goldberg) ... 64
Panama. U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on
Texts of New Canal Treaties 65
Philippines. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss
New Trade Agreement 78
Presidential Documents
President Recommends Ratification of OAS
Charter Amendments 78
The Right of All Peoples to Self-Determina-
tion 59
United States and Thailand Pledge To Continue
Close Cooperation To Promote Peace ... 61
U.S. To Join in Emergency Relief Programs for
the Middle East 64
White House Panel Completes Study of World
Food Problem 76
Publications. Recent Releases 81
Science
The Atlantic Industrial Community Looks to the
Future (Trowbridge) 70
United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera-
tion Agreement 80
Thailand. United States and Thailand Pledge
To Continue Close Cooperation To Promote
Peace (Bhumibol Adulyadej, Johnson, joint
statement) 61
Trade. U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New
Trade Agreement 78
Treaty Information
Current Actions 81
United States and Italy Sign Science Coopera-
tion Agreement 80
U.S. and Panama Reach Agreement on Texts of
New Canal Treaties 65
U.S. and Philippines To Discuss New Trade
Agreement 78
U.S.S.R. The Right of All Peoples to Self-De-
termination (Johnson) 59
United Nations. U.S. To Join in Emergency
Relief Programs for the Middle East (John-
son, Goldberg) 64
Viet-Nam. The Right of All Peoples to Self-
Determination (Johnson) 59
Name Index
Bhumibol Adulyadej 61
Goldberg, Arthur J 64
Johnson, President 59,61,64,76,78
Rostow, W. W 66
Shimoda, Takeso 69
Trowbridge, Alexander B 70
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 26-July 2
Press releases may be obtained from the Ofllce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release issued prior to June 26 which appeal's
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 145 of
June 19.
No. Date Subject
*150 6/30 Oliver sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for Inter-American Affairs
and U.S. Coordinator for the
Alliance for Progress (biographic
details).
tl52 7/1 Rusk: replies to questions sub-
mitted by Daniel Viklund, Dagens
Nyheter, Stockholm.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFF
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY KECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVJI, No. 1465
July U, 1967
OtPOi>»
:unT-
THE ROAD TO A LASTING PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 87
INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS
hy Assistant Secretary Oliver 102
,N. ADOPTS RESOLUTIONS ON AID TO REFUGEES AND STATUS OF JERUSALEM;
REJECTS OTHER RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
Statements hy Ambassador Goldberg and Tests of Resolutions 108
KENNEDY ROUND AGREEMENTS SIGNED AT GENEVA
Svmvmary of Agreements 95
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1465 Publication 8265
July 24, 1967
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The Road to a Lasting Peace
Address by Secretary Rusk '
It's a high privilege to meet with this great
international organization, especially as you
celebrate your golden anniversary year. Few
of your members in 1917 could have predicted
that in 60 years you would have more than
829,000 members in moi'e than 21,350 clubs in
137 countries or geographic areas. Your re-
markable growth is proof of the value of the
purposes and programs of Lionism. ^Ind your
large membership in other lands on six conti-
nents is compelling evidence that free men
everywhere — free men of all races and re-
ligions— share the same basic aspirations and
ideals. I am glad to have this chance to con-
gratulate Lions International on its splendid
achievements in so many important fields in
the past and on its plans and prospects for
the future.
As Secrtary of State, I am of course espe-
cially interested in the contributions of Lions
International to better international under-
standing. It is i^articularly gratifying and
encouraging to know that you have put at the
center of your future endeavors the search for
peace. I have read the excellent article by Presi-
dent [Edward M.] Lindsey in the January is-
sue of the Lion on "A Generation of Peace."
And only a few days ago I read, as a judge in
your peace essay contest, some very moving es-
says on peace.
The search for peace is, I believe, the most
momentous challenge before the human race.
It must succeed. The nations and peoples of the
world must establish a lasting peace — not just
because war is barbarous and horrible but be-
cause frail man now possesses weapons capable
of demolishing most of civilization in a few
hours. The organization of an enduring peace
is the great imperative of our time.
^ Made before the golden anniversary convention of
Lions International at Chicago, 111., on July 6 (press
release 154).
A lasting peace cannot be achieved merely by
wishing for it or by talking about it or by pass-
ing resolutions. It has to be organized and built,
and there must be effective means of enforcing
it.
Wliat are the essential ingredients of lasting
world peace? I know of no better answer than
the United Nations Charter — particularly the
preamble and article 1. Those paragraphs rep-
resented what the authors of the charter be-
lieved to be the lessons of history, especially the
lessons taught by the events which led to the
Second World War. They were written while
the fires of that most destructive of wars still
raged, when men were tliinking hard and pray-
erfully about the millions of dead and how "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind."
Article 1 of the charter speaks :
— Of effective collective measures to prevent
and to remove threats to the peace and to sup-
press acts of aggression and other breaches of
the peace ;
— Of the peaceful adjustment or settlement
of disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace ;
— Of developing friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
— Of international cooperation in solving in-
ternational problems of economic, social, cul-
tural, or humanitarian character ;
— And of promoting respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all, without dis-
tinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Those are the basic purposes of the United
Nations as set forth in article 1. They are also
an accurate smmnary of the abiding goals of
the foreign policy of the United States. That
identity of purposes should not surprise any-
JULY 24, 19G7
269-166 — 67
87
body, for we joined with others to share the
lead in organizing the United Nations and in
drafting the charter. Leaders of both our major
parties joined in this enterprise, and our com-
mitment to the charter was approved by the
United States Senate with only two dissenting
votes.
After the charter was adopted at San Fran-
cisco came the fission bomb — followed in a few
years by thermonuclear warheads and long-
range missiles. These transformed the "scourge
of war" into the possibility of destroying civi-
lization. We shall not have an opportunity to
learn the lessons from a third world war — there
will not be enough left. We must apply the
lessons we have already learned to prevent a
catastrophe for the human race.
The First Requirement for Building Peace
If a lasting peace is to be achieved, the fii'st
requirement is collective action to prevent or
remove threats to the peace and to suppress acts
of aggression or other breaches of tlie peace.
The charter put that first for the clearest of
reasons: Unless this requirement is met, all
other efforts to build peace will come tumbling
down.
Unhappily, some members of the United Na-
tions have been unwilling to discharge this pri-
mary responsibility. That possibility was fore-
seen when the charter was drafted. Article 51
specifically affirms the inherent right of individ-
ual or collective self-defense against armed
attack.
The charter also provides for regional ar-
rangements or agencies to deal with matters re-
lating to the maintenance of international peace
and security. And it makes plain that resort to
the United Nations is not intended to supplant
other means of settling disputes.
The founding fathers of the United Nations
understood that inflammatory debate can make
a settlement more difficult. So, they specified in
article 33 that parties to a dispute "shall, first of
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, me-
diation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments, or other peaceful means of their own
choice."
Although the United Nations has been able
to deal effectively with many situations and has
assisted in dealing with still more, some of the
burden of preventing or repelling aggression
and of settling disputes since the Second World
War has been borne outside the United Nations.
The Organization of American States has
dealt with problems in the Western Hem-
isphere. The young Organization for African
Unity has been helpful in situations arising in
the great continent of Africa. Certain disputes
have been referred to the World Court. Others
have been settled by quiet diplomacy — in some
cases by direct negotiations, in others with help
of mediation.
Basis for Settlement in the Middle East
Regi'ettably, some disputes have remained
unsettled. Recently one of them once again
flared into war. We can impose no blueprint
for peace in the INIiddle East; the primary re-
sponsibility rests upon those who live there and
upon their governments. But President Johnson
has set forth the principles which we think any
settlement must encompass : ^
First, recognition that every nation in the
area has a fundamental right to live. This
means an end to belligerency and terrorism.
Second, justice for the Arab refugees.
Third, free navigation through international
waterways.
Fourth, an end to the Middle East arms race.
This requires the cooperation of larger states
outside the area.
Fifth, respect for the political independence
and territorial integrity of all the states of the
area. This requires recognized boundaries and
other arrangements to provide security against
terrorist raids and war.
Further, as President Johnson has empha-
sized, we believe there should be adequate rec-
ognition that three great religions have a deep j
interest in the holy places of Jerusalem.
Some have urged an immediate return to the 1
situation as it was on June 4. But that, as my
distinguished colleague. Ambassador Goldberg i
[U.S. Representative to the United Nations f
Arthur J. Goldberg], has said, is a prescription
not for peace but for renewed hostilities.^ We
believe that the goal must be a lasting
settlement.
' For an address by President Johnson at Washing-
ton, D.C., on June 19, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 31.
' For a statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
in the U.N. Security Council on June 13, see ibid., July
3, 1967, p. 5.
88
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
As President Jolmson has said :
If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward
the worlv of peace, they can count with confidence upon
the friendship and the help of all the people of the
United States of America.
In a climate of peace, we . . . will do our full share
to help with a solution for the refugees . . . our full
share in support of regional cooperation . . . (and) to
see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is ap-
plied to the critical problem of desalting water and
helping to make the deserts bloom.
The main burden of deterring or repelling
major aggression has been borne by the armed
forces and defensive alliances of the free world.
Since the Second World War, the armed forces
of the United States alone have incurred more
than 240,000 casualties in the defense of
freedom.
In addition to our general commitments un-
der the United Nations, we are pledged specifi-
cally to the defense of more than 40 nations. We
are presently honoring such a pledge in South
Viet-Nam.
Misconceptions About the Viet-Nam Conflict
To clear away all the underbrush of miscon-
ception about the struggle in Viet-Nam would
take more time than you or I have this morning.
But I shall discuss briefly a few main points.
The conflict there has often been called a
civil war. There is a genuine South Vietnamese
element among the Viet Cong. But that is not
why American combat forces are in South Viet-
Nam. They are there because of what North
Viet-Nam has been putting into the South:
cadre, arms, men, and, since late 1964, major
organized units of the Regular Army of North
Viet-Nam. It has continued to infiltrate regi-
ments and divisions as well as replacements for
the Viet Cong main forces.
If the Federal Republic of Germany were to
send 20 to 25 regiments into East Germany,
you may be sure that the Soviet Union would
not call it a civil war — just a family affair
among Germans.
I can assure you that if the North Koreans
were to send 20 or 25 regiments into South
Korea, we would not look upon that as just a
family affair among Koreans, no more than we
did before.
If there had been no aggression by North
Viet-Nam, there would have been no American
combat forces in South Viet-Nam. And if every-
one who has come down from the North were
to go home, our armed forces would come home.
It is sometimes asserted that we are asking for
"unconditional surrender."' We are not asking
North Viet-Nam to surrender an acre of ground
or a man, or to modify their regime or to change
their relations with the Communist world. All
we are asking them to do is to stop sending their
men and arms into Laos and South Viet-Nam
for the purpose of seizing those countries by
force. To call that "unconditional surrender"
is a serious abuse of language.
Then, there is that word "escalation" — which
seems to be reserved for the United States and
our allies.
For nearly a year, the other side has been
mining the port of Saigon and the channel lead-
ing into it. That, apparently, is not escalation.
But if we were to take those same mines back
home — to Haiphong — I imagine we would be
widely charged with escalating the war.
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are
using Cambodian territory for infiltration into
South Viet-Nam and as a base and sanctuary.
So far as I am aware, few have called that es-
calation or widening the war. But if we were to
send troops into Cambodia to go after those base
areas, I imagine that we would be accused of
escalation.
North Viet-Nam has had three or four divi-
sions of its Regular Army in or near the demili-
tarized zone. It harshly rejected our proposals *
that the zone be genuinely dimilitarized and be
extended 10 miles on both sides to create a
buffer area. In the last few days. North Viet-
Nam has again attacked in force across the
DMZ. So far as I am aware, few have called
that escalation.
Upside-Down Comments on Peace Moves
There have been a good many upside-down
comments on peace moves also. We have tried
unremittingly to bring the other side to the ne-
gotiating table. We have made many proposals
ourselves and have supported the initiatives of
many other governments and individuals.
Hanoi has said "No" to all of them.
Periodically, we have been urged to stop
bombing the is'orth, on the ground that that
would make peace talks possible. Well, we have
tried that several times, once for as long as 37
days. In fact, Hanoi chose to regard a pause
in the bombings as an ultimatum.
*For a Department statement of Apr. 19, see iJ)id.,
May 15, 1967, p. 750.
JULY 24, 19G7
89
We think reciprocity is essential. Suppose
that we were to say that we would negotiate
only if the Communists stopped all the violence
in South Viet-Nam, while we continued to bomb
North Viet-Nam. Everybody would say we
were crazy. But when North Viet-Nam makes
the same proposition the other way around,
some people seem to think it is reasonable.
We stand ready to talk with the other side
without conditions or about conditions. We are
ready to discuss the terms of a settlement and
then work out the steps for reaching it. We are
willing to discuss any piece of the problem, such
as the territorial integrity of Cambodia or de-
militarizing the so-called demilitarized zone.
Or we are ready to take reciprocal steps to de-
escalate the conflict.
But we shall stay in Viet-Nam until the right
of the South Vietnamese people to work out
their own future under a government of their
own free choice has been secured. More is at
stake than self-determination for the South
Vietnamese, important as that is. Even more is
at stake than the security of other nations in
Southeast Asia, impoi-tant as that is. The
greater question is whether aggression is to be
allowed to succeed, thus opening the way for
further aggi'ession. And tied to that is the in-
tegrity of the commitments of the United
States. Our commitments in the Pacific are
just as binding as our commitments in the At-
lantic. If those who wish to pursue world revo-
lution by force should come to believe that the
United States will not do what it has promised,
the prospects of peace would rapidly vanish.
Improving Relations With Eastern Europe
It is sometimes said that the war in Viet-
Nam stands in the way of a detente between the
Soviet Union and the West.
President Joluison is deeply intent on trying
to improve our relations with the Soviet
Union and the smaller nations of Eastern
Europe. The fact is that the war in Viet-Nam
has not prevented the Soviet Union and the
United States from concluding a civil air agree-
ment and a consular agreement and from sign-
ing the treaty on peaceful uses of space. It has
not prevented consideration of a nonprolifera-
tion treaty. It did not prevent useful direct
communication between the heads of the two
Governments during the recent fighting in the
Middle East. And it did not prevent President
Johnson and Premier Kosygin from engaging
in long and frank exchanges of views at
Glassboro.^
We will continue to do our full share to try
to improve relations with the Soviet Union and
other Communist nations. We will continue to
do our full share to try to settle or narrow the
differences which separate us and especially to
achieve agreements or arrangements which
would reduce the danger of another world war.
We are eager to make headway in controlling
and reducing armaments.
We hope for genuine peaceful coexistence, a
genuine detente. But if today the West is at the
beginning of a detente with the Soviet Union,
we did not get there by forgetting the require-
ments for maintaining the peace in many a
crisis since 1945.
If we and certain of our adversaries are grow-
ing in prudence this may be related to the
knowledge that resort to force is a very risky
business for all.
International Cooperation for Peace
The foreign policy of the United States is
concerned not only with the adversaries of free-
dom but even more with its friends and
practitioners.
We seek ever-closer partnerships with other
economically advanced countries of the free
world. And we are grateful that these include
three nations which were our enemies in the
Second World War — now three thriving democ-
racies which add immensely to the strength of
the free world and which we are proud to have
as close friends and allies.
In the Western Hemisphere we are fully com-
mitted to the great cooperative enterprise in
economic development and social progress: the
Alliance for Progress.
We have provided large resources to assist
developing countries in other parts of the world
to increase their production and living stand-
ards. Here I would emphasize our deep concern
about the war on hunger. President Johnson
has alerted the world to the fact that only
comprehensive all-out efforts to deal with the
food-population problem can avert extensive
starvation a decade hence.
We have worked to strengthen and expand
useful international institutions. And we have
welcomed such activities by others. In the past
" For background, see iUa., July 10, 1967, p. 37.
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
2 years we have been especially pleased to see
the steps toward regional cooperation taken by
the free nations of East Asia and the Western
Pacific.
The major part of our work at the Depart-
ment of State is quiet and little noticed — con-
cerned with the daily business of man wliich re-
quires some form of international cooperation.
We take part in more than 600 international
conferences a year with other governments. We
belong to many international institutions. We
have approximately 4,500 treaties and other
international agreements. Gradually there is
developing what Sir Wilfred Jenks of the In-
ternational Labor Organization has called the
"common law of mankind."
We have fostered cooperative international
undertakings in science, education, and tech-
nology. We strongly favor more people-to-
people contacts. Here I would applaud again
the major contribution made by Lions Interna-
tional. All of these activities help to build
peace.
The road to a lasting world peace is filled with
obstacles and surrounded by frightful dangers.
But we — all of us — must do our best. As Presi-
dent Johnson has said, the search for peace is
"the assignment of the century."' ® We must not
fail. For on the organization of a lasting peace
depends the survival of all that free men, and
most men everywhere, cherish or aspire to for
themselves and their posterity.
Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions
on Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper
Following are replies hy Secretary Rusk to
questions submitted hy Daniel Viklund of
Dagens Nyheter, StocJcTiolm.
Press release 152 dated July 1
1. Which were the decisive reasons for the
original U.S. decision to intervene militarily in
Viet-Nam, and do you think that those reasons
have in any way been affected hy later develop-
ments, in terms of direct American interests,
locally in Southeast Asia or internationally?
Secretary Rush: The simplest way to an-
swer this question is to remind you that we
had a promise to keep. Since the Geneva con-
ference of 1954 and the SEATO agreement of
the same year, three American Presidents have
pledged that the United States will help South
Viet-Nam defend itself against Communist ag-
gression. AVe have undertaken similar pledges
for the mutual defense of the NATO area. We
believe that it is important to the prospects for
peace that it be fully understood that, on such
matters, we mean what we say.
We had hoped that the defense of South
Viet-Nam would not require the participation
of United States military forces in combat op-
erations. For more than 6 years the South
Vietnamese managed to withstand an unrelent-
ing and extremely efficient political and mili-
tary aggression. By the spring of 1965, how-
ever, the armed agents of Hanoi in the South
were being massively supplemented by reg-
ularly constituted units of the North Viet-
namese army in virtually open armed attack
against South Viet-Nam. At that point, only
the military support of South Viet-Nam's
friends could save it from conquest. That is
why our troops, along with 45,000 Koreans and
thousands of Australians, New Zealanders,
Filipinos, and Thais, are in South Viet-Nam.
As for our interests in Southeast Asia, we
have declared them on many occasions. As late
as August 1964 our Congress, with only two
dissenting votes in the entire Congress, declared
that "The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the mainte-
nance of international peace and security in
southeast Asia." " We do not see how a durable
peace can be achieved unless all nations, large
and small, have a chance to live in safety and
in peace. This applies quite specifically to those
countries with whom we have undertaken
mutual defense alliances.
2. What is your opinion of the vieio, fre-
quently voiced in Europe, that both North Viet-
Na7n and NLF [National Liberation Front"]
(Viet Cong) hold independent positions on the
issues of the war, not necessarily always the
same?
A. It is curious, if true, that this view should
gain currency in Europe, with its sopliistica-
tion and experience regarding Communist
fronts. Neither the history of the origin of the
NLF nor intelligence based on Communist
statements, NLF documents, and prisoner in-
• lUd., Oct 19, 1964, p. 555.
^ For text of a joint congressional resolution of
Aug. 7, 1964, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
JULY 24, 1967
91
terrogations sui>ports this view. A concerted ef-
fort has of course been made, particularly
abroad, by Hanoi to create the illusion that the
NLF is an independent organization, but this
does not convince many South Vietnamese —
nor many knowledgeable foreign observers, for
that matter. If you examine with care Hanoi's
programs and those issued by the NLF, you
will agi-ee, I am sure, that there is no substan-
tial difference in what they are proposing to
do to South Viet-Nam. Tactics on occasion de-
mand differences in emphasis, particularly for
foreign consumption. But Hanoi's control of
the NLF has been amply demonstrated over the
years. Were this not so, the NLF has had many
chances to demonstrate it and has not done so.
Military Situation in Viet-Nam
3. What is your assessment of the military
situation in Viet-Nam as of today, and do you
think that there is any possibility of any U.S.
troop toithdrawals within the next 6 months f
A. You will recall the address of General
Westmoreland to the Congress on April 28,- in
which he compared the situation today with
what it was some time ago. Although no one
foresees any United States troop withdrawals
within the next 6 months, the United States
is confident that the efforts by South Viet-Nam
and its allies will continue to bring improve-
ment, although there may be ups and downs.
The important point to bear in mmd is that
the military and nonmilitary developments are
inextricably intertwined in South Viet-Nam,
even more than elsewhere, so that the most
significant indicators of military success may be
found not in battle reports and casualty statis-
tics but in the evidence that the country is
moving forward, creating political institutions,
holding village and hamlet elections, improv-
ing communications and stabilizing the econ-
omy. You are aware of the many proposals
which we and others have made for a deescala-
tion of the violence in Viet-Nam. We have of-
fered to put on the table a schedule of with-
drawal of United States forces if North Viet-
Nam would do the same.
4. // the Viet-Nam war should continue for
a long time, hoio seriously do you judge the
risk that it might lead to a direct confrontation
between the U.S. and Russia or China?
A. It is prudent always to keep such pos-
sibilities in mind. Our objective in Viet-Nam
remains limited to forestalling the aggression
from the North, and our military response re-
mains a measured one calculated to reach this
goal. We have repeatedly made it clear that
our ends do not include the destruction of the
North Vietnamese Government or the occupa-
tion of the country. In any event, while the
common defense requires in some instances the
taking of risks, we believe that there is a far
greater risk in shirking responsibility and al-
lowing aggression to go unchallenged.
5. Do you think that the American air bases
in Thailand ivill increase or reduce the risk that
that country might be drawn in and that the
war will spread f
A. Let me make it clear, first of all, that there
are no American bases in Thailand. The Royal
Thai Government, recognizing the common
danger, allows us to use jointly with its forces
certain of its defense facilities. That Tliailand
itself is on the Communist timetable for the
new kind of warfare the Communists dub
"wars of national liberation" is sufficiently doc-
umented. Peking has said this, publicly and
often. But the Thais are not waiting passively
for the blow to fall. They are actively cooperat-
ing today in the defense of Southeast Asia.
In addition to making their facilities avail-
able to us in Thailand, they have sent air and
naval training units to South Viet-Nam, and
they are presently training and equipping an
augmented battalion of ground troops to join
the Koreans, Australians, New Zealanders, and
Americans who are fighting side by side with
the South Vietnamese troops to defend the
country.
Agreements on Laos Ignored by Hanoi
6. In retrospect, do you think that there was,
at any time, a reasonable chance to end the
fighting on conditions acceptable to all parties
involved, and, if so, why was an agreetnent
impossible?
A. We thought such an opportunity had
come with the accords on Laos in 1962. At that
conference we accepted the nominee of the Com-
munist side as the Prime Minister for Laos,
as well as a coalition government worked out
' For text, see ibid.. May 15, 1967, p. 738.
92
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BULLETIN
among the so-called "Three Factions." Presi-
dent Kennedy was bitterly disappointed with
the results of those accords. Hanoi refused (a)
to withdraw its forces from Laos, (b) to cease
using Laos as an infiltration route into South
Viet-Nam, (c) to permit the coalition govern-
ment to exercise authority in the Communist-
held areas of Laos, and (d) to permit the In-
ternational Control Commission to exercise its
functions in those same areas. All of these were
specificallj^ required by the accords themselves.
Performance and good faith of the agreements
of 1962 would have represented a giant step
toward peace throughout Southeast Asia. Since
then we have not seen any indication that
Hanoi is prepared to stop its effort to seize
South Viet-Nam by force. Were they to do so,
peace could come very fast.
7. Which are the main reasons for the Amer-
ican refusal to recognize NLF {Viet Cong) as
an independent representative for a part of the
pojmlation of South Viet-Nam?
A. The WLF does not say that it represents
a part of the people of South Viet-Nam but
rather that it is the sole legitimate representa-
tive of aU these people. The Catholics, Bud-
dhists, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Montagnards, ethnic
Cambodians, all making up an overwhelming
majority of the people of South Viet-Nam,
reject this pretension of the NLF. Obviously,
we cannot "recognize" the NLF on their terms.
Nevertheless, as President Johnson has said,^
"The Viet Cong would have no difficulty in
being represented and having their views pre-
sented if Hanoi for a moment decides she wants
to cease aggression."
8. What measures loould you consider neces-
sary to protect the civilian population of South
Viet-Nam, following the toithdrawal of Amer-
ican troops within 6 montlis of a peaceful solu-
tion, as visualized iy the President?
A. It is too early to discuss this in any mean-
ingful detail. Perhaps a final settlement would
include some type of continuing international
assistance. We believe, however, that once
North Viet-Nam withdraws its leadership, its
troops, and its supplies, the Republic of Viet-
Nam will be able to make further progress in
assuring economic and social betterment for
the South Vietnamese people and to handle any
insurgency situation which might persist or
arise subsequently. As you know, the South
Vietnamese have offered full amnesty and rec-
onciliation to the South Vietnamese who are
now assisting Hanoi.
U.S. Ready To Negotiate
9. Is your willingness to negotiate with
North Viet-Nam unchanged in spite of the es-
calation of tlie hombing of the North, and wJiat
would you say are now the minhnum Ameri-
ican conditions for negotiations?
A. I find it very curious that the word "es-
calation" seems to be reserved for actions taken
by the United States and its allies and is not
applied to actions taken by North Viet-Nam.
For example, for almost a year North Vietnam-
ese mines have been placed in the Saigon River
approaches to Saigon harbor. Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese forces today are using Cam-
bodian territory. Has the Dagens Nyheter
called either of these "escalation" ? I would sug-
gest that if we picked up North Vietnamese
mines in the Saigon River and simply took
them home to their point of origin, namely
Haiphong, that there would be a great outcry
about "escalation."
As for our conditions for negotiations, we
have none. We have stated many times that
we are ready to negotiate at once without con-
ditions. Since the other side has imposed con-
ditions, such as stopping the bombing, we have
said we will negotiate about the conditions
themselves. As for the shape of a final settle-
ment, our views have been set forth many times
in such summaries as our Fourteen Points * and
our reminder of the 28 proposals made by our-
selves and others which Hanoi has rejected.^
Fundamentally, we believe that the Geneva
agreements of 1954 and 1962 are an adequate
basis for peace in Southeast Asia. But no one
has been able to produce anyone from the other
side with whom to talk — either without condi-
tions or about conditions.
10. How do you assess the possihilities to win
the population of South Viet-Nam for a gov-
ernment friendly to the United States, and
which elements of the pacification and de-
mocratization program appear to you most es-
sential in that context?
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.
• Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1967, p. 284.
= IhUl., May 22. 1967, p. 770.
JULY 24, igGI
93
A. It is not a question of winning the South
Vietnamese people's support for a government
friendly to the United States but of relieving
them of the burden of North Vietnamese ag-
gression and subversive insurgency. Security is
the element basic to pacification, and with se-
curity the broad progi'am of revolutionary de-
velopment can accelerate its forward move-
ment. The remarkable progress being made in
the direction of a constitutional government
augurs well for tiie future if security can be
maintained. Our basic interest is that the South
Vietnamese people have a chance to decide for
themselves what kind of government they want
and what their international orientation should
be.
11. If free elections., including some form of
de facto NLF participation, were held in South
Viet-Nam now, how big a part of the voters do
you thinJc would back the present government
and NLF, respectively?
A. If Hanoi were to abandon its attempt to
take over South Viet-Nam, it is conceivable
that those indigenous elements who have co-
operated with the Front would wish to parti-
cipate in politics in some way. Their right to
do so would appear to be present in the Doan
Ket or national reconciliation program. How
many votes they might get would depend on
many factors, such as whether these per-
sons integi-ated with other political groupings,
what support these groupings might have in
various areas of the country, and so on. How-
ever, a recent poll undertaken independently in
South Viet-Nam by CBS News shows clearly
that the South Vietnamese people do not want
communism and/or a government dominated by
the NLF.
12. Do you think that Sioeden could contrib-
ute in any way to establish contacts leading to
a peaceful solution of the Yiet-Nam conflict?
A. We have frequently stated that we wel-
come the efforts of any country which would
advance the course of peace. But I would be
less than frank if I did not add two points:
We see no sign that Hanoi is willing to move to
an honorable settlement, and we do not believe
that the prospects for such a settlement are
enhanced by proposals which ask us to stop half
the war while the other side continues unabated
its half of the war. Suppose that the United
States were to say that we would negotiate only
if the other side stopped all of the violence in
South Viet-Nam while we continued to bomb
the North. Everyone would say that we were
crazy. Wlien the other side makes exactly the
same proposal in reverse, why do many people
say that their proposal is reasonable and ought
to be accepted ?
94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva
The Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations announced at Washington
on June 29 that, by direction of the President,
W. Michael Blumenthal, Deputy Special Rep-
resentative for Trade Negotiations, would sign
the multilateral agreements negotiated in the
Sixth Round of Trade Negotiations at Geneva
June 30.
The signing ceremony concluded the most
comprehensive assault on barriers to interna-
tional trade that has ever taken place. The nego-
tiations, known as the Kennedy Round in rec-
ognition of the late President's leadership in
inaugurating the effort, formally opened in
May 1964.
The important elements of the Kennedy
Romid package are :
Tariff cuts of 50 percent on a very broad
range of industrial goods and cuts in the 30 to
50 percent range on many more.
Agricultural concessions to which the United
States attaches great value because they create
new trading opportunities for our farmers and
because they support our contention that inter-
national negotiation on trade m farm products
can accomplish something.
A world grains arrangement guaranteeing
higher minimum trading prices and establish-
ing a program under wliich other nations will
share with us in the vital but burdensome task
of supplying food aid to the undernourished
people in the less developed countries.
Nontariff barrier (NTB) liberalization in-
cluding a very significant accord on antidump-
ing procedures as well as European NTB modi-
fications in the American Selling Price (ASP)
package.
Useful, if limited, progress on the complex
and sensitive problems in the steel, aluminum,
pulp and paper, and textile sectors, including
a 3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton
Textile Arrangement (LTA).^
An agreement on the treatment of chemical
products that deals with the American Selling
Price issue in a manner that provides major
chemical traders with mutually advantageous
concessions in the main Kennedy Round agree-
ment and a separate and balanced package that
makes additional concessions available to the
United States if it abandons the American Sell-
ing Price system.
Significant assistance to the less developed
coxmtries through permitting their participa-
tion in the negotiations without requiring recip-
rocal contributions from them, through special
concessions on products of particular interest
to them, and through the food aid provisions of
the grains arrangement.
U.S. participation was made possible through
authority granted the President by the Congress
through the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.^ The
late Christian A. Herter directed U.S. partici-
pation as the Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations until his death in late 1966. He
was succeeded by William M. Roth, who con-
tinues to serve as Special Representative.
The agreements signed June 30 comprise :
1. A Final Act, which authenticates the texts
of the agreements described in paragraphs 2-5
below and which expresses the intention of all
the signatories to take appropriate steps, sub-
ject to their constitutional procedures, to put
these agreements into effect.
2. The Geneva (1967) Protocol to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which
embodies most of the tariff and other conces-
sions exchanged in the negotiations.
3. An agreement relating primarily to chemi-
cals, which provides for the elimmation of the
American Selling Price system.
4. A memorandimi of agreement on basic ele-
ments for a world grains arrangement.
* Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5240 ;
for background and text of the Long-Term Cotton Tex-
tile Arrangement, see BtTLUETiN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 430.
' For a summary of the act, see iWd., Oct. 29, 1962,
p. 6o5.
95
5. An agreement on implementation of article
VI of the GATT, in the form of a code of anti-
dumping practices.
The negotiations were concluded in all essen-
tial respects in INIay at a series of high-level
meetings in Geneva. Since that time, the nego-
tiators liave been putting the details of their
concessions and understandings into the final
conference documents.
It is estimated that the agreements will apply
to about $40 billion of world trade. In industry,
the United States and the other countries have
agreed on cuts averaging about 35 percent. In
agriculture, the average cut is less, but the
United States has obtained important conces-
sions covering a substantial volume of trade.
Full details of the specific tariff reductions
granted and obtained will be published in a
final report on the negotiations to be issued by
the Office of the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations in mid-July. This final re-
port will give information on all changes in
U.S. import duties and on the concessions of
principal interest to the United States made by
other participants in the negotiations. The
schedules of concessions annexed to the agree-
ment will contain more than 4,000 pages.
U.S. tariff reductions will not enter into
force until proclaimed by the President. It is
expected that their effective date will be Jan-
uary 1, 1968. In accordance with the require-
ments of the Trade Expansion Act, most U.S.
duty reductions will be made in five equal
annual stages starting January 1.
In overall trade terms, covering both indus-
trial and agricultural products, the tariff cuts
made by the United States are in balance with
those of the other industrialized countries. In
terms of 1966 trade the United States is giving
tariff cuts on about $71/2 billion to $8 billion of
industrial and agricultural imports and is ob-
taining tariff' concessions on about the same
amount of U.S. exports.
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gave the
President authority to make the tariff conces-
sions to which the Kennedy Round agreement
will commit the United States.
None of the multilateral agreements nego-
tiated in the Kennedy Round will require con-
gressional action except the agreement provid-
ing for the elimination of the ASP system with
^ respect to chemicals. The world grains arrange-
ment envisaged by the memorandum of agree-
ment on grains will require consent of two-
thirds of the Senate.
Industrial Negotiations
Import duties are being cut in half on a broad
range of industrial products in international
trade. Cuts in the 35 to 50 percent range are be-
ing made on many more products. Categories of
products on which the principal negotiating
countries, including the United States, have
made cuts that in the aggregate average over
35 percent include: machinery, both electrical
and nonelectrical ; photographic equipment and
supplies; automobile and other transport equip-
ment; optical, scientific, and professional in-
struments and equipments; paper and paper
products; books and other printed material;
fabricated metal products; and lumber and
wood products, including furniture.
Steel Sector
Negotiations on steel were conducted against
a backgroiuid of tariff rates where U.S. duties
are generally lower than those of other par-
ticipants. These negotiations, held bilaterally
and multilaterally, resulted in closer harmoni-
zation of tariffs among the major steel pro-
ducing countries. Virtually all the peaks in
these countries' tariffs were eliminated, so that
almost all rates will be no higher than 15 per-
cent and most will be well below 10 percent.
Except for U.S. rates, most steel tariffs have
not heretofore been boimd. In the final nego-
tiating package, however, almost all rates of
other countries were bound and many were
reduced.
The international harmonization of steel
tariffs should also reduce the tendency for ex-
ports to be deflected to the U.S. market in in-
stances where U.S. tariffs were much lower
than those of other countries. Although the
United States is primarily an importer rather
than an exporter of steelmill products, lower
tariffs abroad will also provide opportunities
for U.S. exporters.
The European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) adoj^ted a miified tariff and agi-eed to
reduce rates to an arithmetic average of 5.7
percent. The European Economic Community
(EEC) agreed to reduce rates within its juris-
diction correspondingly so that a tariff relation-
ship would be maintained between more highly
fabricated EEC steel items and primary and
less fabricated ECSC items. The ECSC/EEC
concessions are a 23 percent reduction from
existing rates (a 10 percent reduction from the
pre-February 1964 rates on 1964 imports from
the United States) .
96
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The United Kingdom is reducing most of its
rates by 20 percent. Japan is reducing its rates
by 50 percent except for a few alloy steel items.
Sweden is binding its rates at existing low
levels. Austria is harmonizing its tariffs with
the ECSC/EEC at a somewhat higher level.
Tlie U.S. reductions average 7 percent on
1964 imports. It is generally harmonizing its
tarilfs with the ECSC/EEC where they have
been above those rates. U.S. rates higher than
ECSC/EEC rates are to be reduced to ECSC/
EEC levels, but no cuts are to be made where
rates are now below ECSC/EEC concession
levels. U.S. concessions take account of differ-
ences between the United States f.o.b. and
ECSC/EEC c.i.f. customs valuation systems so
that, nominally, U.S. rates would be somewhat
higher than ECSC/EEC rates. Also, the differ-
ential in the U.S. tariff between ordinary and
alloy steel is being reduced by 50 percent but is
not being eliminated as complete harmonization
would have required.
Aluminmn Sector
The Community offer consisted of a binding
of a 130,000-ton annual quota at 5 percent. The
EEC had previously bound in the GATT a 9
percent rate of duty on ingot aluminum. Some
imports were allowed entry amiually under a
tariff quota at 5 percent, but neither the amount
of the quota nor the lower rate had been bound.
The United States is making a 20 percent cut
on ingot aluminum, of benefit primarily to
Canada and Norway.
On unwrought aluminum (further advanced
than ingot), tariff cuts by the United States
averaged less than 30 percent. The EEC aver-
age cut was about one-third, while the tariff
cuts by the U.K. and Canada were larger than
those of the EEC. Other EFTA [European
Free Trade Association] countries and Japan
also made substantial cuts in the alimiinum sec-
tor. Of special interest to U.S. aluminiun ex-
porters will be the adoption by Canada of an
injury requirement in its antidumping legisla-
tion to conform to the new antidumping
agreement.
Chemical Sector
The chemical sector negotiations were cen-
tered on the American Selling Price issue.
European countries maintained from the start
that any more than token reductions in their
chemical tariffs were conditional on U.S. elimi-
nation of the ASP valuation system. Since elim-
ination of ASP would require congressional
action, U.S. negotiators insisted that chemical
concessions be implemented in two packages:
first, a balanced settlement in the Kennedy
Round ; second, reciprocal concessions by other
countries in return for abolition of ASP.
The pattern and volume of chemical trade is
such that the outcome of negotiations in this
sector inevitably played a major role in the
outcome of the entire Kennedy Round. U.S.
dutiable chemical imports fi-om countries with a
major stake in world chemical trade (EEC,
United Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland) were
$325 million in 1964; these countries' dutiable
chemical imports fi'om the United States
totaled nearly $900 million.
In the end, all major Kennedy Round partici-
pants made concessions in the chemical sector.
Many concessions have been agreed on uncon-
ditionally, while certain other concessions are
conditional on United States elimination of the
American Selling Price valuation system.
The concessions on chemicals are, therefore,
in two parts : first, the Kennedy Round chemical
package, and second, the ASP package.
The Kennedy Round Chemical Package : Un-
conditional obligations undertaken in the Ken-
nedy Roimcl are as follows:
1. The United States agreed to duty reduc-
tions on products accounting for nearly all (95
percent) of U.S. dutiable chemical imports.
Tariffs will be reduced 50 percent on most items
with rates above 8 percent ; 20 percent on items
8 percent and below. These commitments will
result in a weighted average duty reduction of
43 percent in United States chemical tariffs on
$325 million of dutiable imports from the EEC,
U.K., Japan, and Switzerland. The combined
tariff' reduction made by these four participants
averages 26 percent on nearly $900 million of
U.S. chemical exports, and the United States
retains the ASP method of valuation for ben-
zenoid chemicals.
2. The European Economic Community
agreed to duty reductions on tariff items ac-
counting for 98 percent of its dutiable chemical
imports from the United States. Most duties
will be reduced by 20 percent. Certain items,
however, will be subject to reductions of 30 per-
cent and 35 percent, while some others will be
reduced less than 20 percent. These commit-
ments will result in a weighted average reduc-*'
tion of 20 percent in EEC tariffs on $460 mil-
lion of 1964 chemical imports from the United
States.
JULY 24, 1967
97
3. The United Kingdom agreed to duty re-
ductions on virtually all chemical imports from
the United States except certain plastics. Most
British plastics duties are curi-ently 10 percent,
a level considerably lower than other major
trading countries. The United Kingdom has
agreed to reduce tariffs at rates of 25 percent
and above by 30 percent, and rates below 25
percent by 20 percent. These commitments will
result in a weighted average reduction of 24
percent in United Kingdom imports of more
than $100 million of chemicals from the United
States.
4. Japan agreed to tariff reductions which on
a weighted a.verage basis amount to 44 percent
on dutiable chemical imports from the United
States. These imports were over $200 million
in 1964.
5. Switzerland agreed to tariff reductions
which on a weighted average basis amoimt to
49 percent on $45 million of chemical imports
from the United States.
6. Other participants, notably Canada and
the Scandinavian countries, agreed to reduc-
tions in their chemical tariffs as part of their
Kennedy Roimd concessions.
The ASP Package: The following conces-
sions are contingent on U.S. elimination of
the ASP valuation system :
1. The United States would eliminate ASP
and replace rates currently based on ASP with
rates that have been proposed by the Tariff
Connnission to be applied on the valuation as
normally calculated for other U.S. imports and
yielding the same revenue as the pi'evious rates.
These "converted" rates would be reduced by
stages, generally by 50 percent or to an ad
valorem equivalent of 20 percent, whichever is
lower. The principal exceptions to this formula
are dyes and sulfa drugs, duties on which would
be reduced to 30 percent and 25 percent, respec-
tively. In addition, the United States would
reduce the 8 percent and below rates subject to
the 20 percent cut in the Kennedy Round pack-
age by a further 30 percent and further reduce
by more than 50 percent a few other items to the
20 percent level. These reductions would pro-
vide a combined weighted average cut on U.S.
chemical tariffs in the Kennedy Round and
ASP packages of about 48 percent on $325
million of imports.
2. The European Economic Community
■would reduce its chemical tariffs by an addi-
tional amoimt so as to achieve a combined Ken-
nedy Round-ASP package reduction of 46
percent on $460 million of chemical imports
from the United States. Virtually all EEC
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 121/2 per-
cent or below. Belgium, France, and Italy would
also modify road-use taxes so as to eliminate
discrimination against American-made auto-
mobiles.
3. The United Kingdom would reduce most
of its chemical tariffs according to the following
formula: Items at present dutiable at 25 per-
cent and above would be reduced to a level of
121/2 percent, for a 62 percent combined Ken-
nedy Round and ASP package reduction. Tariff
items with duties of less than 25 percent would
generally be reduced by the amoimt necessary
to achieve a combined reduction of 50 percent
in the two packages. U.K. plastics tariffs which
would be above the reduced EEC rate on the
same item would be cut to that level and bound.
The combined weighted average reduction in
the level of British chemical tariffs on U.S.
trade would be approximately 47 percent on
$170 million of imports from the United States.
After these reductions virtually all British
chemical tariffs would be at rates of 12i/^ percent
or below. The United Kingdom would also re-
duce by 25 percent its margin of preference on
imports of tobacco.
4. Switzerland would eliminate limitations
on imports of canned fruit preserved with com
syrup.
Textile Sector
Most importing countries reduced tariffs on
cotton, manmade, and wool textiles less than
their average reduction in other industrial prod-
ucts as a whole. The United States agreed to
tariff reductions which, on a weighted trade
basis, averaged approximately 14 percent for
the three fibers. Cotton textiles were reduced
21 percent; manmade textiles, 15 percent; and
wool textiles, 2 percent.
Negotiations on cotton textiles involved three
elements : the extension of the Long-Term Cot-
ton Textile Arrangement, more liberal access
to import markets protected by the LTA, and
tariff reductions. The principal concessions by
exporting countries of interest to importing
countries was the extension of the LTA in its
present form until September 30, 1970. In re-
turn, importing countries agreed to enlarged
98
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quotas under LTA provisions and to tariff
reductions.
Within the context of the LTA, the United
States negotiated bilateral agi-eements with its
main supplying countries. Tliese agreements
typically provided for a 5 percent annual in-
crease in LTA quotas, a one-time bonus for
LTA extension, and certain other administra-
tive improvements.
The United States agreed to cotton textile
tariff reductions that amounted to a weighted
average reduction of 21 percent. Keductions on
apparel items averaged 17 percent; fabrics
tariffs were reduced 24 percent; and yarn, 28
percent.
The EEC reduced cotton textile tariffs by
about 20 percent. It also reached bilateral
understandings with major suppliers provid-
ing for improved access to the EEC market.
Noting that it already accorded liberal access
for imports from Hong Kong, India, and other
Commonwealth sources, the United Kingdom
made token cotton textile tariff reductions
toward other suppliers.
The United States agreed to a weighted aver-
age tariff reduction of 15 percent on imports of
manmade-fiber textiles, excluding fibers. Man-
made-fiber apparel duties were reduced by an
average of approximately 6 percent ; fabrics, by
18 percent; yarn, by 37 percent. Other coun-
tries made significant reductions on these
textiles.
The United States agreed to tariff reductions
on very few wool textiles. The weighted aver-
age duty reduction on wool fabric was about 1
percent; on wool apparel, about 2 percent. On
total wool textile imports the average duty
reduction was 2 jaercent. Other coimtries made
considerably greater reductions on wool
textiles.
Paper, Pulp, and Lumber
Multilateral sector negotiations were
planned for paper and pulp, largely in an effort
to get the EEC to make meaningful tariff
reductions of interest to'the Nordic countries
and Canada as well as the United States.
Although some multilateral discussions were
held, negotiations were essentially bilateral. A
long series of discussions resulted in EEC cuts
of 50 percent on pulp and about 25 percent on
paper. Canada and the EFTA countries also
made significant concessions on pa.per products
exjDorted by the United States. In return, the
United States made comparable concessions.
NontarifF Barriers
Antidwm/ping Code
A major accomplishment in the field of non-
tariff barriers was the negotiation of an anti-
dumping code. In addition to the United States,
the major participants in this negotiation were
the United Kingdom, the European Economic
Community, Japan, Canada, and the Scandi-
navian countries.
Negotiation of the antidumping code cen-
tered on the consideration of international
standards. Although U.S. legislation is consist-
ent with the GATT, foreign complaints wei-e
directed against U.S. procedures. These con-
cerned, particularly, the frequent withholding
of appraisement during antidumping investi-
gations and the length of time taken in
investigations. (Withholding of appraisement
postpones the final determination of customs
duties until an antidumping investigation is
completed. However, imports may be released
under bond from customs custody after
appraisement is withheld.)
The antidumping code supplements the pro-
visions of article VI of the GATT with rules
and procedures to be followed in antidumping
actions. U.S. legislation and administrative
reg-ulations contain detailed provisions relating
to the determination of sales at less than fair
value and injury, but most countries' proce-
dures lack such specificity.
The principal advantages of the antidumping
code to the United States will be the adoption
by other countries of fair and open procedures
along the lines of present U.S. practices. The
code will provide both an opportunity and a
basis for U.S. exporters to defend their interests
in foreign antidumping actions. In particular,
the new common antidumping regulations that
are being developed by the European Economic
Community will conform with the code.
Of special benefit to the LTnited States will be
the adoption by Canada of an injury require-
ment in its antidumping legislation. The lack of
such a requirement has impeded U.S. exports
for many years.
Because the antidumping code is consistent
with existing U.S. law, no legislative changes
are required. However, the Treasury Depart-
JTJLT 24, 1967
ment will revise its regulations to conform with
the code. The principal change in present proce-
dures will concern limiting the time period dur-
ing which appraisement is withheld to a maxi-
mum of 90 days m most cases. Both foreign ex-
porters and domestic importers and j^roducers
favor a reduction of the time taken in antidump-
ing cases. Also, invest) gations will not be initi-
ated unless there is evidence of injury.
Other Nontarif Barriers
In addition to the negotiation of an anti-
dumping code, the principal nontariff accom-
plishment is the agreement to take action on the
nontariff barriers included in the conditional
chemical package; that is, the elimination for
certain chemicals of the American Selling Price
system of valuation by the United States, the
elimination of the discriminatory aspects of
automobile road-use taxes in France, Italy, and
Belgium, and the modification by Switzerland
of regulations on canned fruit, as well as a re-
duction by the United Kingdom m the margin
of preference on unmanufactured tobacco.
There were also a few other nontariff achieve-
ments as a result of bilateral discussions. In the
negotiations Austria agi-eed to eliminate the
discriminatory effect of automobile road-use
taxes on larger engined U.S. automobiles.
Canada eliminated a restriction prohibiting im-
ports of fresh fruits and vegetables in s^-bushel
baskets. Canada also ceased applying the Cana-
dian sales tax to the full value of aircraft en-
gines repaired in the United States. The 11 per-
cent sales tax is now applied only to the value of
the repairs. In addition, Canada modified re-
strictive standards applying to aircraft engines
repaired abroad.
Although not a subject for negotiation, quan-
titative restrictions were eliminated or modified
by several countries. Of particular importance
to the United States are the elimination of re-
strictions in the United Kingdom on fresh
grapefruit and in Denmark and Finland on
many agricultural products. Japan agreed to
liberalize quota restrictions on some products.
Several developing countries specified action
on various nontariff measures as part of their
contributions to the negotiations. These included
the introtluction of certain tariff reforms, the
liberalization of licensing systems and foreign
exchange controls, and the elimination or reduc-
tion of prior-deposit requirements and tariff
surcharges.
Agriculture
The United States originally set as a goal in
the agricultural negotiations the same broad
trade coverage and depth of tariff cuts as
achieved for industrial products. This did not
prove negotiable, however. The European Eco-
nomic Community, when the negotiations got
miderway, was still in the process of developing
its Common Agi'icultural Policy. It was reluc-
tant to make substantial cuts in the level of pro-
tection at the same time it was formulating a
Common Agricultural Policy among the six
members. The results of the agricultural nego-
tiations with the Community are therefore con-
siderably moi'e modest than the results achieved
in industry. Nevertheless, progress was made in
the negotiations in reducing barriers to agri-
cultural trade.
The United States was able to obtain signif-
icant agricultural concessions from Japan,
Canada, and the U.K., the Nordic countries, and
Switzerland. The EEC made tariff cuts on
agricultural items of trade value to the United
States of over $200 million.
No progress was made in negotiating down
the trade restrictive effects of the variable-levy
system of the EEC. Offers made by the Com-
munity on the basis of this system were not
accepted.
The agricultural negotiations were divided
into so-called commodity groups and nongroup
or tariff items. The commodity groups included
meats, dairy products, and grains. Of the com-
modity groups only grams yielded positive
results.
Grains
A new grains arrangement was negotiated
that establishes a minimum price for U.S. No.
2 hard red winter ordinary wheat f.o.b. Gulf
ports at $1.73 per bushel. Tliis represents an
increase of about 21.5 cents per bushel over the
equivalent minimum price for U.S. hard red
winter ordinai-y under the present International
Wheat Agreement.^ There will be a comparable
increase in the minimum price of other grades
and qualities of wheat under the new
arrangements.
Market prices are currently above the mini-
mum prices of the new arrangement, but the new
minimum prices should establish an effective
floor under U.S. wheat exports for the 3 years
» TIAS 5240, 605T.
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of the arrangement. Adequate provision is made
for adjusting differentials for various grades
and qualities of wheat as required if trading
prices should fall to the minimum. There is
nothing in the arrangement that will prevent
U.S. wheat from being priced competitively as
required.
Participating countries have agreed to con-
tribute 4I/2 million tons of cereals to a multi-
lateral food aid program. The U.S. share of
this program will be 42 percent of the total, or
slightly less than 2 million tons. Importing
countries as a whole will contribute about 2
million tons of the total. The grains arrange-
ment thus represents further progress toward
one of the United States' key objectives of
foreign aid, the multilateral sharing of the food
burden.
Meat and Dairy Products
During most of the Kennedy Round, the
countries principally involved in world trade
in fresh, chilled, and frozen beef and veal, and
in butter, cheese, and dry milk, sought to
negotiate general international arrangements
for these products. The purpose of these negoti-
ations was to provide for acceptable conditions
of access to world markets in furtherance of a
significant development and expansion of world
trade in agricultural products, consistent with
tlie principle agreed by the GATT ministers at
the outset of the negotiations. Although these
negotiations continued until late in the Ken-
nedy Round, it was not possible to work out an
acceptable multilateral arrangement. Countries
then shifted to bilateral negotiations, through
which they were able in some cases to negotiate
improved access to important markets.
The United States made no offers on fresh,
chilled, or frozen beef or veal. The duty on
canned ham was bound but no reduction made.
We did not reduce the duty on domestic types of
raw wool. No offers were made on any products
subject to quotas, including butter, dry milk,
and certain types of cheese. On certain nonquota
cheese, cuts averaging 13 percent were made.
Agricultural Tariff Items
Tlie United States achieved a wide range of
concessions from its principal negotiating
partners, which should improve the export op-
portunities for such products as soybeans,
tallow, tobacco, poultry, and horticultural
products, including citrus and camied fruit.
In particular, the United States and Canada
negotiated a balance of agricultural concessions
covering a substantial range of products.
The Developing Countries
The United States negotiated with the de-
veloping countries on the basis of the plan
adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee,
the steering committee of the Sixth Round.
One of the objectives of the negotiations, that
of reducing barriers to exports of developing
countries to the maximum extent possible, was
taken into account in the plan. The plan also
took into accoimt the ministerial decisions to
the effect that developed countries could not
expect to receive full reciprocity from the
developing countries in trade negotiations and
that the contributions of developing countries
should be considered in the light of the develop-
ment, trade, and fuiancial needs of those
countries.
Accordingly, the United States made conces-
sions of benefit to developing coimtries, includ-
ing nonparticipants, which cover over $900
million of their exjDorts. Included in these con-
cessions will be the complete elimination of the
duty on more than $325 million of imports from
these countries. Moreover, the elimination of
duties on $45 million of these products does not
need to be staged over a 4-year period and thus
meets one of the more important desiderata of
the developing countries. Since many of the con-
cessions on tropical products were negotiated in
the context of joint action by industrialized
countries, the total benefits which developing
countries will receive were further increased.
Ten developing countries made concessions
benefiting the United States.
JTILT 24, 1967
101
Institution-Building and the Alliance for Progress
ty Covey T. Oliver
Assistant Secretary -designate for Inter- American Affairs ^
I am delighted to have this opportunity to
share with my fellow members of the World
Affairs Council of Philadelpliia a few thoughts
on Latin American development and the Al-
liance for Progress.
When we think of Latin America and the Al-
liance, the characterizing word is "change" —
urgent, basic, needed change. The Alliance was
created to answer the needs of swiftly chang-
ing times, and indeed the Alliance already has
been the engine for vast and sweeping changes
in this hemisphere.
Sometimes changes are completely unex-
pected : Wlien, on May 16, 1967, I accepted the
invitation to talk here, I certainly did not fore-
see the rather substantial change that has since
occurred in my own relationship with Latin
America !
The nature of the change between my former
professional responsibilities and my new official
ones recalls to my mind an experience of more
than 20 years ago, when I was a member of the
American delegation at the Paris Peace Con-
ference. During one session, I, as a Govei-nment
"expert," sat directly behind a distinguished
congressional member of that delegation. Sen-
ator Arthur Vandenberg. The Soviet bloc was
blocking. There were long speeches repeating
endlessly the same dreary Marxistese (we were
just learning how dully repetitive the Red dele-
gates could be). During most of the long, bor-
ing, irritating session, Senator Vandenberg,
smoking cigar after cigar, listened quietly and
' Address made before the World Affairs Council at
Philadelphia, Pa., on June 7. Mr. Oliver was sworn in
on June 30 as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for
Progress.
kept his pencil moving — working on an elabo-
rate doodle of the Great Seal of the United
States with fine draftsmanship and beautiful
shadings. As the session droned on, the Senator
finally pushed his chair back and, as he rose to
leave, briefly turned to me and said, "Young
man, life was a lot simpler for me when I was
an isolationist."
Life was simpler for me as a professor speak-
ing on what ought to be done about development
than ever it will be as U.S. Coordinator of the
Alliance, trying actually to get things done.
But I look forward to these new duties with
optimism and with sober awareness of our
country's interests and opportunities in helping
the New World to become a better place for all
its people to live in. It has been my good fortune
to have spent some memorable years in various
roles in the Alliance area and to have worked
closely with our good neighbors to the south. I
am happy that so many of these good neighbors
are also good friends, whose aspirations I be-
lieve I understand, whose views I respect, whose
amistad — even carino — I cherish.
Thus, with considerable development-oriented
field experience with one of the larger AID
[Agency for International Development] pro-
grams, with familiarity with the languages and
cultures of Alliance coimtries, with a firm be-
lief in the need for development, I approach
with a measure of confidence the big and difficult
job of directing the United States programs in
support of the Alliance. So while there are ties
that will always link me fraternally with this
city and with the university, I could not have
let go by this unexpected opportunity to return
once again for a while to Government service —
particularly at this time, when a spirit of change
characterizes inter-American affairs.
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Embarking Upon "the Decade of Urgency"
It is clear that we are entering a new era in
the Americas — an era of renewal of expecta-
tions, of sighting new horizons, of moving on
toward them. The Summit Meeting of the Presi-
dents of America ^ focused world attention anew
on the Alliance for Progress. It will stand his-
torically as a milestone in hemispheric history.
It marks the turning point between what might
be called the first phase of the Alliance and this
new, second phase we have now embarked upon
in the "decade of urgency," as President John-
son has called it.
Standing where we are today, looking back to
where we have been and ahead toward where
we must go with the development, I see three
phases of the Alliance for Progress.
First, there was the organization, mobiliza-
tion, and cori'ection, or "feedback," phase. The
hemisphere had to agree on the nature of the
problems and the goals of our Alliance. It had
to mobilize its efforts — in money, manpower,
and will. But it also had to deal with serious
distortions which impeded economic and social
growth: rampant inflation that robbed middle
and lower income groups of initiative; heavy
debt burdens that could not be amortized with
current income ; currency, balance-of-payments,
and other difficulties that made economic and
social growth almost impossible. These prob-
lems are still with us, but Latin America has a
much better grip on them, and they now seem
manageable.
The adjustments which Latin American
countries have made in the early years of the
Alliance have been painful, demanding in per-
sonal and political courage. As I participated
in the development and execution of Alliance
policies from 1964 to 1966, I can attest that the
task of development is not easy for them. But I
can also attest that our neighbors truly want to
better themselves in lasting and self-reliant
ways. They are too much men and women at-
tuned to human dignity to be satisfied with doles
and relief. For them and for us the goals are
the same, and we move together along the road
to them, helping each other over the rough
places. As we travel this road, we come to places
from which, across the valleys ahead, we also
see the peaks we would attain, glimpsed sudden-
' For statements by President .Johnson and text of
the Declaration of the Presidents of America, see
Bulletin of May 8, 1967, p. 706.
ly in such splendor as not to be forgotten as we
move on.
The Summit Meeting was such a place on the
road. There the hemisphere's highest political
leaders met, assessed our modest but encourag-
ing progi'ess, and gave direction for vigorous
new steps forward.
Thus — to leave my metaphor — while we are
still working in many places on the first phase
of the Alliance, the Presidents clearly outlined
both the second and third phases : a major effort
on institution-building and concrete measures
to achieve a Common Market by 1985.
Intermediate Phase of the Alliance
While we should never lose sight of the ulti-
mate goals tied to hemispheric unity, it is the
new, intermediate phase that I want to discuss
with you.
Latin America has many dreams but probably
none that its people more passionately seek to
fulfill than those of democratic growth and
social justice. We share that dream, for nothing
is more precious to us than human dignity, the
worthwhileness of the individual person as a
child of God ; free and democratic institutions ;
and, as our great Declaration bravely given in
this City of Brotherly Love puts it, "the pur-
suit of Happiness."
We must, therefore, help create, strengthen,
modify, and build institutions that provide:
— the opportunity for all to share equitably
in the cost of building their country with the
assurance that their contributions are used wise-
ly and honestly.
— the opportunity for the farmer to own land,
to obtain credit, and to market his production at
fair prices.
— the opportimity for youth to obtain an edu-
cation and to make an intelligent and meaning-
ful contribution to society while preparing also
to lead it witliin short years.
— the opportunity for the worker to get work
and to be rewarded properly for his labor.
— the opportunity for business to invest im-
der just and equitable laws and earn fair
returns.
— the opportunity for all to stand equally be-
fore the law without fear or favor and to live
out their years in peace, honor, and social
effectiveness.
Let me be specific: Improved productivity
and greater monetary stability alone are not
JTJIiT 24, 1967
103
enough; there must be modernization of exist-
ing institutions and the development of new
ones. Many of these changes there, as here, re-
quire state action — legishition, law, public ad-
ministration. There must be changes in distri-
bution, in the processes for meeting the exj^ec-
tations of various groups in the social structure.
As we move into an intermediate stage of the
Alliance, wherein human needs and hopes, in-
stitution-building, and modernization will be
principal themes, we note with satisfaction that
our Alliance-oriented operations in the first, or
stability-seeking, phase have themselves had im-
portant relationships to social and politicocul-
tural goals. A good example is taxation. The
development of fair, effective, and respected
systems of taxation is a major objective of exist-
ing development programs in a number of
countries. From one point of view, "technical
assistance" is involved, as we have made avail-
able experts and tax technology. Technical as-
sistance is an original and still useful aspect of
development help — at one time the only civilian
kind we offered to Latin America. The "tax
projects" are also related to fiscal stability — a
short-range, or "precondition," goal — and to a
number of middle-phase goals, ranging from
distributive justice to more local currency re-
sources for social service budgets related to ed-
ucation, health, and the like.
We of the Alliance community have done and
are doing well with "tax reform." Improved
revenue-raising is a mutually recognized devel-
opment objective. We all talk to each other (now
through our experts mainly) about tax matters;
and as to tax issues and ideas, we deal with each
other in ways that in a more traditional era
would have been regarded as improper even for
dialog between different nations.
Land reform is another example. Here, we of
North America have had to disabuse ourselves
of our tendency to generalize about landholding
conditions as if they were the same throughout
the rest of the hemisphere ; and we have had to
reconsider some of our simplistic, though well-
intentioned, notions about the per se virtues of
small holdings, regardless of their relationship
to the subsistence needs of owners and to na-
tional productivity. But here again we have been
working intimately with our neighbors ; and as
part of our programs to increase agricultural
production the landownership, land-develop-
ment, colonization problems are getting intelli-
gent, frank, and continuous attention.
Land utilization, on the other hand, is hardly
in the realm of discourse between us. Regard-
less of who owns them, what should the good
lands — those that are capable of bountiful pro-
duction of a wide range of crops — be used for ?
What is the relationship of land utilization to
nutrition and dietary habits; between govern-
mental policies and incentives for increased ag-
ricultural production ?
Modernizing the Conditions of Rural Life
The Presidents called at Punta del Este for
modernization of the conditions of rural life. It
may be that much that needs to be done along
lines I have just mentioned can be related to this
Presidential sujjport for further study and
work. Additionally, m most countries there lie
ahead :
(a) The development of food processing and
food storage ;
(b) Improved physical facilities for urban-
rural exchanges of goods and services,
(c) Institutional changes in the marketing
process itself.
The first two of these are mainly the business
of private enterprise, whose role in development
is exceedingly important especially in this sec-
ond stage of the development process. The inter-
national agencies and the United States can
help with ideas, feasibility-study financing, and
the supplying of marketing experts under
teclinical assistance. Much of the capital, most
of the risk-taking and innovating initiatives
must come from the private sector in a combina-
tion that is suitable to the times and the fair
needs of all groups involved. Also, the United
States seeks constructive opportunities to help
in the financing of more cooperatives for both
production and marketing, more agricultural
credit mechanisms, and more private investment
funds which can help agroindustry. President
Jolmson has stated he will seek new funds to
help the modernization of agriculture in these
ways.
The program of action agreed by the Presi-
dents at Punta del Este emphasized the need
for "multinational infrastructure projects" as
steps toward economic integration and the Com-
mon Market. One essential for modernization
of the market jirocess in Latin America is
roads — and more roads. Although waterway im-
provement is important in some countries, it
1(M
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUIXETIN
is roads, from through highways to rural ac-
cess routes, that are the greatest single need for
increased velocity and efficiency in the exchange
of goods and services within a country and, in-
deed, for exi:)ort and regional trade improve-
ment as well. Intensive roadbuilding programs,
moreover, give jobs to unskilled and semiskilled
labor in countries where far too few of those
seeking work can find it.
The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development has been doing laudable de-
velopment work of this nature in particular
countries. At the Summit, the Presidents en-
dorsed the leading role of the Inter- American
Development Bank in studying and financing
multinational projects in such fields as trans-
portation, telecommunications, and hydroelec-
tric power.
Changes in Marketing Process
Institutional changes in the marketing pro-
cess itself are parts of social change. This means
that, first, attitudes and, ultimately, the legal
order must guide the developing countries into
modem patterns of distribution. In the develop-
ing countries there must be more awareness of
free-world experience with the "mix" between
laissez-faire and enforced competition, counter-
vailing power and public regulation, that char-
acterizes developed free economies — and so-
cieties— today.
No single, "all-countries, all-times," mechan-
ical adjustment of public-sector, private-sector
relationships is possible. Each country, each
community, has to work out its own "mix." But
for that to happen in the less developed world
there has to be in that world more awareness
and evaluation of these problems than there has
been. Note, for example, that unlike the Treaty
of Rome creating the European Economic Com-
munity, neither the LAFTA [Latm American
Free Trade Association] nor the Central Amer-
ican Common Market arrangements deal with
monopoly problems.
Does this mean that our AID missions in
Latin America should become involved with
"antitrust" in about the same manner as they
have been with tax reform ? My tentative view
is that our bilateral involvement should be lim-
ited to developing a dialog, giving information,
and sharing research techniques, because in this
field, unlike taxation, there is now such a wide
variety of models in developed country experi-
ence as to encourage caution in putting forward
our own antitrust system as if we thought it the
only approach to coping with restrictive trade
practices and monopolies. But Latin America
must assure competition in the national market-
place if the area is to develop and compete in
world markets.
And we should consider more effective en-
couragement for cooperative and community de-
velopment movements, because these are "of the
peojile" programs that hold promise for wide
popular involvement in all aspects of develop-
ment— social and j^olitical as well as economic.
Educating the "Decisionmakers-To-Be"
Institution-building is now a national process
and must eventually become a community proc-
ess. The dynamism, the know-how, for social
change has to come from within the system.
This means, above all, education of the de-
cisionmakers-to-be. All education is an Alliance
goal, but good university education is an imme-
diate, absolute necessity for the articulate, dis-
satisfied young people who, through their own
energies and frequently over very great diffi-
culties, have made their ways to the public uni-
versities of Latin America with eventual public
leadership in mind. These public universities
are, right now, turning out the decisionmakers
of tomorrow. They are the major civilian en-
gines of social mobility in Latin America — the
only way a poor but energetic and determined
young person can rise in society without joining
the military services. Communists and other ex-
tremists know this quite well. The public uni-
versities are prime targets of the extremist ele-
ments. I consider public university betterment
very urgent.
The greatest substantive needs of the univer-
sities as I now see them are: (a) more full-time
teachers, better trained and with more time to
give to students, and (b) more extensive and
more modern social studies curricula. Students
should have opportunities to study and appraise
all the roads to social justice, not just the illu-
sory— and outdated — Marxist one. As a result
of lack of information as to how societies really
work in developed countries, including even the
U.S.S.R., far too many young Latin Americans
tend to choose some brand of Marxism over free-
world systems, which they mistakenly assume to
be sometliing these systems never were — com-
pletely dominated by heartless, mechanistic con-
cepts of pure laissez-faire capitalism. The stu-
dents should be led to inquiry — factual, scien-
JULT 24, 1967
105
tific inquirj'. The universities themselves should
be enabled to undertake sociocultural, self-dis-
covery, research projects, such as "attitude
studies," for greater understanding of how total
development may occur.
Inter-American studies need almost every-
where in Latin America to be developed, es-
pecially now that economic unification is specifi-
cally foreseen. In universities in the United
States, Latin American studies is a standard
field for teaching and research, and President
Johnson promised his colleagues at Punta del
Este that he would seek further enlargement of
university work here in this sector.
But for the future we all want, we must make
sure that scholarly study and teaching of inter-
American relations is truly a hemispherewide
matter and not one confined to the United States.
University development along the lines that I
have described should not be delayed until the
country has "taken off" in the economic sense,
thus being able to support the improvements
needed out of increased social capital. Many of
these should come sooner by additions to univer-
sity operating budgets to support properly
planned changes in teaching, curriculum, li-
braries, and research.
After some years as a universitarian, I know
how delicate and difficult university changes in-
volving faculty and courses can be. They will be
so in Latin America, in part because in some
quarters there is satisfaction with present ways
of doing things. But every day there are more
intelligent Latin Americans coming to see that
their universities must be modernized as to the
substance of what they teach and how they teach
it. In such a delicate area as this, a bilateral ap-
proach is not as promising as a transnational
one, provided that the latter is vigorous, scien-
tific, and effective. We must, all of us, look
around for the right institution or institutions
to spearhead the important work of university
substantive modernization ; and if we do not find
it, or them, among our existing hemispheric
agencies, we must create one adequate to the
task.
Latin America cannot modernize demo-
cratically without modernized political leaders,
administrators, businessmen. And the mod-
ernization of men should be mainly a national
and regional process, not one that relies too
heavily on sending the leaders-to-be off to the
United States or Europe to be educated, valu-
able though such experiences are. One danger
of the latter course is that he might not come
home — the "brain drain" problem. Another is
that he will not have lived through — grown up
intellectually with — the change of his own
counti-j' and thus be too remote from change
underway when his generation assumes leader-
ship.
Spirit and Purpose of the Alliance
As President Johnson has pointed out, there
is no exact science of development yet. All of us
in the Americas are learning development on
the job. We have learned that hemispheric de-
velopment is not a short-term matter, and our
plans and policies have now recognized that it
is not. We know that the Alliance, although it
springs from past development operations else-
where, has a highly differentiated spirit and
purpose — very special neighborhood character-
istics— of its own. In this country, our apprecia-
tion of the special nature of the AlimiBa is
visible m the broad, bipartisan support the pro-
gram has always had from Congress. Again, a
welcome and significant development was the
addition to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966
of a section known as title IX, which directs
that, as to the Alliance for Progress, "emphasis
shall be placed on assuring maximum participa-
tion in the task of economic development on the
part of the people of developing countries. . . ."
As we enter a new phase of the Alliance for
Progress, the spirit and mood of inter- American
affairs is encouraging, exciting, and challenging.
The Presidents of America at Punta del Este
laid out a wide-ranging but specific program
of action, based on careful factual studies that
required many months and high and dedicated
talent.
All of us recognize, especially following the
meeting of Presidents, that the burden of solv-
ing these problems falls mainly upon the Latin
Americans themselves. The helping hand that
we of the United States can and do offer rep-
resents only a small part of the effort required
of the hemisphere if we are to move forward to-
gether toward the ultimate Alliance for Prog-
ress goal of bringmg a better life to all the peo-
ples of the Americas.
Throughout the Americas there is renewed ac-
tivity, new confidence. Many and difficult are the
tasks ahead of us. The war on poverty and un-
derdevelopment in the neighborhood is not yet
won. But the strategy for victory has been given
106
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to us by our Presidents. The challenge of great
opportunity is before us. Let us all give in our
respective ways the best we have to give.
As I approach my new role in a Great Em-
prise, I recall great words from a towering
American figure, Justice Louis D. Brandeis:
"If we would guide by the light of Keason, we
must let our minds be bold."
IJC Issues Report on Improvement
of Champlain Waterway
Press release 155 dated July 7
The Department of State announced on July
7 that the United States Government is giving
active consideration to the observations and
recommendations contained in the report on
"Improvement of International Champlain
Waterway for Commercial Navigation" pre-
pared by the International Joint Commission,
United States-Canada. The report was released
by the Commission on July 7.
The report of the Commission finds that the
construction of an improved waterway from
the St. Lawrence Eiver in Canada through Lake
Champlain to the Hudson River at Albany,
N.Y., would present no insurmomitable engi-
neering problems.
On the other hand, the Commission found
that the development of such an improved
waterway for purposes of commercial naviga-
tion is not economically feasible.
Because of the wide disparity between the
benefits and costs of improving the waterway
for commercial navigation, the Commission be-
lieves no further studies of this project are
warranted.
The Commission also recommended that the
United States and Canadian Governments "pur-
sue policies designed to preserve and enhance
the natural beauty, the water quality and the
recreational potential of the Champlain-Riche-
lieu area." The Water Resources Council, es-
tablished under the Water Resources Planning
Act of 1965, has underway an active program
of comprehensive water and related land re-
sources planning, including the United States
portion of Lake Champlain and adjacent
United States areas. This study will undoubt-
edly address itself to this reconmaendation.
The Commission noted that the best route
for a canal requiring only minimum improve-
ment would be along the existing waterway.
The most practicable route for a modern barge
canal or deep-draft ship channel would be along
the existing waterway in the United States, the
Richelieu River in Canada to the vicinity of
St. Jean, and then by a direct overland route
to La Prairie Basin.
Copies of the Commission's report are avail-
able at the offices of the United States Section
of the International Joint Commission, 1711
New York Avenue, NW., Washington, D.C.
20440.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Collective Defense Treaties. Maps, texts of treaties, a
chronology, status of forces agreements, and com-
parative chart. House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
April 10, 1967. 523 pp. [Committee print.]
War or Peace in the Middle East? Report to the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senator
Joseph S. Clark on a study mission to Greece, the
United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Israel. April 10,
1967.22 pp. [Committee print]
Encouraging Private Participation in International
Activities. Hearings before the Subcommittee on In-
ternational Organizations and Movements of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7484.
Part I, Testimony of Members of Congress. April 18
and 20, 1967. 85 pp.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma. Report to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Sen-
ator Clifford P. Case, member of the U.S. delegation
to the 21st U.N. General Assembly. April 1967. 37 pp.
[Committee print.]
The Foreign Policy Aspects of the Kennedy Round.
Report of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
May i, 1967. IS pp. [Subcommittee print]
Expansion of Livestock Exports. Report of the Senate
Select Committee on Small Business on Potentials
and Problems of Expanding Trade in U.S. Quality
Meat Products Together With Additional Views. S.
Rept 343. June 12, 1967. 43 pp.
U.S. Committee for the International Human Rights
Tear. Report to accompany S. 990. S. Rept 344. Jtme
13, 1967. 5 pp.
Modern Communications and Foreign Policy. Report
No. 5 of the Subcommittee on International Orga-
nizations and Movements of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, together with hearings before the
subcommittee February 8-9, 1967, part X, "Winning
the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive."
H. Rept. 362. June 13, 1967. 240 pp.
JULY 24, 19CT
107
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and Status of Jerusalem;
Rejects Other Resolutions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
Following are statements made on July 3 and
Jj. l)y U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldierg
during the fifth emergency special session of the
U.N. General Assembly, together with the texts
of resolutio-ns on ^^humanitarian assistance" and
'■''measures taken hy Israel to change the status
of the City of Jerusalem" which tcere adopted
hy the Assembly on July }^.
STATEMENT OF JULY 3
U.S. /U.N. press release 117, Corr. 1
As we approach a vote on the pending resolu-
tions, this General Assembly can have but one
overriding purpose in the spirit of our common
charter: a stable, enduring, and just peace in
the Middle East.
Wliat must be done to achieve this purpose
of peace? The essential steps, as my Govern-
ment sees them, can be suimned up in 10 points :
1. Without delay, armed forces should be dis-
engaged and withdrawn to their own ter-
ritories; and without delay, any claims to a
state of war or belligerency should be
terminated.
2. The right of every member of the United
Nations in the area to maintain an independ-
ent national state of its own and to live in peace
should be respected by every other member.
3. The territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of all the states in the area should
be respected and assured by appropriate
arrangements.
4. Vital security interests of all states in the
area should be protected.
5. All states in the area should refrain in
their mutual relations from the threat or use
of force in any manner whatsoever.
6. The rights of all nations to freedom of
navigation and of innocent passage through in-
ternational waterways should be respected.
7. A just and permanent settlement of the
refugee problems should be conchided.
8. The development of national economies
and the improvement of the living standards
of the jieople should take precedence over a
wasteful arms race in the area.
9. The safeguarding of the holy places, and
freedom of access to them for all, should be in-
ternationally guaranteed; and the status of
Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided
not unilaterally but in consultation with all
concerned.
10. International arrangements should be
made to help the parties achieve all these re-
sults, including appropriate assistance from the
United Nations or other thii'd parties.
U.S. Position on Pending Resolutions
It is in the light of these views that we have
decided the position of the United States on
the two major resolutions which are about to
come to a vote. I wish to state that position ex-
plicitly and our reasons for it.
The United States will vote for the resolu-
tion presented by the 19 Latin American
states.^
The United States will vote against the res-
olution presented by Yugoslavia and 16 other
members.^
A basic diiference exists between these two
resolutions — a difference which no embellish-
ments or details can obscure.
The Yugoslav text proposes to deal with the
problem of peace and security in the Middle
East by calling basically for one fundamental
' U.N. doc. A/L. 523/Rev. 1.
" U.N. doc. A/L. 522/Rev. 3/Corr. 1.
108
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
action : the witlulruwal of Israel's forces "to the
positions they held prior to 5 June 1967." It
leaves untouched the other half of the problem
which must be immediately addressed if the de-
mands of the charter are to be satisfied : namely,
the persistent claim by certain members of this
organization of the right to annihilate another
member. This claim, which directly affronts the
charter and every sense of fairness, is to be left
imimpaired — and those who assert it are to be
left free, at a time of their own choosing, to
make good on it by force.
Indeed, the Yugoslav text contains no clear
provision to deal with any of the longstanding
grievances and causes of conflict which have
kept the Middle East in a fever of tension for
20 years.
Let me emphasize that the successive revi-
sions of paragi-aph 6 in the Yugoslav draft have
not cured the basic defects of this resolution.
Paragraph 1, concerning withdrawal, could not
be more clear and definite. Paragraph 6, con-
cerning "all aspects of the situation'* is vague
in the extreme.
The effect of this Yugoslav text, as revised,
is obvious. It calls for withdrawal now, and
every other essential step is left to the uncertain
future. In particular it makes no connection
whatever between withdrawal and the end of
claims of belligerency — claims which are among
the leading causes of all of the troubles of the
past.
The Latin American text, on the other hand,
treats at one and the same time both of the most
vital necessities of peace. Its first paragraph
combines, on an equal basis, the withdrawal of
Israel's forces with the ending of all claims to
a state of belligerency and with efforts to create
"conditions of coexistence based on good neigh-
bourliness." It recognizes that we face a situa-
tion whose two aspects are interdependent, that
neither aspect can be solved in isolation from
the other.
Certainly any fair and meaningful reading
of our charter must lead to the same conclusion.
If the charter is to be invoked — as indeed it
must — to require withdrawal of troops in the
name of territorial integrity, then surely it
must be invoked also — and equally and at the
same time — to require an end to claims of the
right to wage war.
Unless the governments in the area are pre-
pared to refrain from these totally unfounded
claims of belligerency, there obviously can be no
peace. Cooperation to assure troop disengage-
ment and withdrawal — and the other essentials
of peace — must by definition be a two-way
street. The Assembly can hardly endorse a for-
mula in which one side is free to assert that
there is a state of war and the other side is
asked to behave as if there were not.
A choice must be made between the claims of
war and the claims of peace.
Of all the claims of peace, none is more fun-
damental, as every member of this Assembly
must recognize, than the right of a sovereign
state, a member of the United Nations, to have
its existence and its independence respected. In
no other case in the history of the United Na-
tions have members of this organization failed
to accord this elemental right to another
member.
This right has been the subject of important
statements during this debate from a wide
range of speakers. On June 19, in fact, in the
opening statement of the debate, we heard
Chairman Kosygin of the Soviet Union de-
clare, as "one of the fundamental principles" of
his country's policy, that "every people enjoys
the right to establish an independent national
state of its own." We do not see this point re-
ferred to in the Yugoslav resolution.
Again, at our very last meeting on Friday,
we heard the Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Dr.
[Hector] Luisi, declare among the first condi-
tions of peace "the recognition by the parties
to this dispute of the irrevocability of their ex-
istence as sovereign states." We do not see this
point either in the Yugoslav resolution.
In fact, we can search the Yugoslav text
from start to finish without finding any words
about respect for the elemental right of national
existence, the absence of which is the very bot-
tom of the trouble in the Middle East. Instead,
we find vague references to legal and political
problems and charter principles to be consid-
ered at some time in the future. And this fuzzy
treatment stands in strong contrast to the Yu-
goslav resolution's clear and concrete call for
immediate withdrawal of Israel's troops to the
positions held before June 5. That withdrawal,
if it could be brought about at all under such
conditions, can scarcely bring more than a pause
between rounds in this long and terrible conflict.
In candor let me say that we of the United
States, and no doubt many others, would have
preferred a still clearer and more explicit state-
ment on the right of national existence than that
JULY 24, 1967
109
which appears in the Latin American text. But
our careful reading of that text has led us to
conclude that its urgent call for an end to claims
of belligerency, and the other provisions of
paragraph 1 (b), clearly comprehend respect
for national existence and constitute a major
step in the right direction. This is one of our
reasons for supporting the Latin American
draft and for finding it infinitely preferable
to the Yugoslav draft.
There are other reasons also for this prefer-
ence. Tlie Latin American text ofl'ers concrete
guidelines for dealing with many of the other
essentials of peace in the Middle East. More-
over, it deals with just grievances on both
sides — and there have been just grievances on
both sides. Unfortunately, neither of these
claims can be made for the Yugoslav draft.
Reasons for U.S. Preference
Let me specify our grounds for this
evaluation :
— On the refugee problem, the Latin Ameri-
can text calls unambiguously for "an appro-
priate and full solution of the problem of the
refugees." My Government has taken the view
that a fair and lasting solution of the refugee
question is vitally necessary. Indeed, it has been
made all the more urgent by the events of recent
weeks. Yet the sole allusion to this problem in
the Yugoslav text is in the single abstract word
"humanitarian."
— On international maritime rights, the
Latm American text calls for a guarantee of
"freedom of transit on the international water-
ways in the region." This problem is not men-
tioned in the Yugoslav text. And yet it was this
veiy problem that provided the spark which
led directly to the explosion of Jime 5. Mr.
President, wliy do the sponsors of this resolu-
tion glide over this vital issue with vague,
evasive words and with corridor hints about a
possible willingness to deal with the matter?
On this crucial issue, involving not only the
states immediately concerned but also vital
international rights, the Yugoslav text is
altogether deficient.
■ — On the question of Jerusalem, again the
Latin American text contains explicit lan-
guage whereas the Yugoslav text is silent. Tlie
United States view on this subject has been
stated at the highest levels of our Government
in the past few days ' and is reflected in the 10
points which I listed at the outset of this state-
ment. In particular, the United States does not
recognize the recent administrative action
taken by Israel as determining the future of
the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in
relation to them. We do not recognize unilateral
actions in this connection. With regard to the
provision on Jerusalem in the Latin American
text, our support is against the background of
tliis policy.
— On security arrangements, the Latin
American text calls for measui-es to guarantee
the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of the states of the region. Among
these measures, it specifies the establisliment of
demilitarized zones and aai appropriate United
Nations presence. But the Yugoslav text con-
tains nothing more on this subject than a refer-
ence to the existing UNTSO [United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization] machineiy.
UNTSO has performed, and is still perform-
ing, a valiant service. But surely we all recog-
nize, and the Secretary- General himself has
reported, that the removal of a still more sub-
stantial United Nations presence — the United
Nations Emergency Force — created, in the
Secretary-General's words, "a new situation."
The situation was altered still further by the
recent hostilities. It is a situation which
UNTSO with its present resources and struc-
ture carmot adequately manage.
Finally, on the tasks of the Security Coun-
cil, the Latin American draft makes concrete
recommendations concerning all of the points
I have mentioned. But the Yugoslav text con-
fines its recommendations to the broadest
generalities.
Arms Limitation a Major Issue
Although, for all these reasons, we find the
Latin American text acceptable and the Yugo-
slav text unacceptable, I must express regret
that neither of these resolutions touches on the
major issue of arms limitations in the Middle
East. This issue has been discussed during this
debate by a number of speakers, including those
of the Soviet Union and the United States. On
June 19 we listened with interest to Chairman
Kosygin when he warned that nations of the
Middle East, "in order to enhance their secu-
° For statements released on June 28 by the White
House and the Department of State, see Bulletin of
July 17, 1967, p. 64.
110
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rity . . . may embark on the jjath of an arms
buildup and increase their military budg-
ets. . . . Those who cherish peace cannot and
must not allow events to take this course."
This statement was very much in our minds
when my Government stated here the next day,
June 20,* that "peace in the Middle East re-
quires steps to avert the dangers inherent in a
renewed arms race. . . . The responsibility for
such steps rests not only on those in the area
but also upon the larger states outside the area."
And we proposed in our own draft resolution,^
as a first step in discharging this responsibility,
a system of "registration and limitation of arms
shipments into the area."
We i-emain very much interested in exploring
this concept, not in order to crystallize any
military imbalance in the area but rather to
maintain a balance at the lowest possible se-
curity level. Our aim is twofold: that this
source of danger shall be controlled and that
scarce resources shall be devoted to a better
cause than armaments — the technical and eco-
nomic progress of the peoples of the Middle
East.
The Refugee Problem
Mr. President, I now wish to cormnent briefly
on one specific aspect of the situation in the
Middle East : We have before us, in addition to
the draft resolutions I have discussed, another
draft resolution ® submitted by Sweden and
several cosponsors dealing with the refugee
problem. Indeed, no task is more urgent than
to bind up the wounds of war, to find shelter for
the homeless, food for the hungry, and medicine
for the sick.
To this end the United States supported in
the Security Comicil the resolution put f orwa,rd
by Argentina, Brazil, and Ethiopia, which the
Council unanimously adopted on June 14.^ To
the same end we now strongly support the draft
resolution presented by Sweden and other mem-
bers, which is now before the Assembly.
Last week the United States Government al-
located $5 million to help meet the urgent needs
of this situation, and from tliis siun we are
making a special contribution to UNRWA
* Ibid., July 10, 1967, p. 49.
Tor text of the U.S. draft resolution (U.N. doc.
A/L. .520), see tfiirf., p. 51.
° U.N. doc. A/L. .526 and Add. 1-3.
' For text, see Bulletin of July 3, 1967, p. 11.
[United Nations Eelief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East] to help
finance its operations in the immediate future.*
There have been reports of the movement of
civilians from their homes — many of them refu-
gees from earlier conflicts. We have heard these
reports with much concern. All civilians in the
area affected should be assured of their safety,
welfare, and security in the same locations in
which they resided before hostilities began. We
welcome the assurances recently given and hope
that they will be implemented with regard to
the population of the West Bank of Jordan and
that they be encouraged to remain in their
homes or return to them. We welcome the news
that a representative of the Secretary-General
is now to go to the area, and we urge all con-
cerned, particularly the Goverament of Israel,
to give him the fullest cooperation.
The Key Question Before the United Nations
In conclusion, Mr. President, I return to the
major choice which faces this Assembly. It is
the key question before us. It is a choice between
a tragic past and a better future. In the Yugo-
slav resolution we are asked to return the situa-
tion to where it stood on the eve of conflict ; and
only in some indefinite future would we try
again to cope with underlying causes, including
the claimed right to do away with a sovereign
state by armed foi'ce. This proposal cannot lead
toward peace but only toward more trouble and
danger. It is unconstructive, and it should be
rejected.
In the Latin American resolution we are
asked to deal forthrightly with the great ob-
stacles to peace : above all and first of all, with
the withdrawal of Israel's forces and with the
need for all states in the area, all members of
the United Nations, to respect each other's right
to live in peace.
The Latin American text treats at one and the
same time both of the most vital necessities of
peace. Its first paragraph combines on an equal
basis the withdrawal of Israel's forces with the
ending of all claims to a state of belligerency
and with efforts to create conditions of coexist-
ence based on good neighborliness. It recognizes
that we face a situation whose two aspects are
interdependent and that neither aspect can be
solved in isolation from the other.
' For background, see ibid., July 17, 1967, p. 64.
JULY 24, 1967
111
Peace is worth sacrifices, and all must sacri-
fice for it. In the wake of conflict there must be
readiness on both sides to acknowledge the
rights and feelings of others. There must be a
willingness to refrain from pressing temporary
advantages and to take a long-range view.
There must be an end to malice, to bitter
thoughts of revenge, to vain threats to end the
life of other nations. There must be, on every
side, a willingness to accept at long last, and
act upon, the admonition in our common char-
ter : "to practice tolerance and live together in
peace with one another as good neighbors."
Thousands of years ago it was written:
""VVliere there is no vision, the people perish."
Let us in this Assembly, in what we decide here,
offer to the suffering peoples of the Middle East
a new vision of peace, a vision by which all can
live in peace and security.^
STATEMENT OF JULY 4
U.S. /U.N. press release 118
The United States abstained on the six-power
resolution dealing with the city of Jerusalem
contained in document A/L.527/Eev. 1.
Insofar as the six-power resolution expresses
" The Assembly had before it five draft resolutions
submitted by the United States, the U.S.S.R., Albania,
Yugoslavia, and a group of Latin American nations.
The United States did not press its draft resolution
(A/L.520) to a vote, having decided to support the
Latin American draft resolution. On July 4 the As-
sembly voted on the remaining four resolutions, as fol-
lows :
The U.S.S.R. draft resolution (A/L.519), which
called for condemnation of "Israel's aggressive ac-
tivities" and for withdrawal of Israeli forces "to posi-
tions behind the armistice demarcation lines," was put
to a vote paragraph by paragraph, and all parts were
rejected.
The Albanian draft resolution (A/L.521), which
called for condemnation of Israel for "its armed ag-
gression" and for condemnation of the United States
and the United Kingdom for "their incitement, aid and
direct participation in this aggression," was rejected
by a vote of 71 (U.S.) to 22, with 27 abstentions.
The Yugoslav draft resolution ( A/L.522/Rev.3/Corr.
1) obtained 53 votes to 46 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions,
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re-
quired two-thirds majority.
The Latin American draft resolution ( A/L.523/Rev.
1) obtained 57 votes (U.S.) to 43, with 20 abstentions,
and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the re-
quired two-thirds majority.
the sense of the General Assembly that no uni-
lateral action should be taken that might preju-
dice the future of Jerusalem, the United States
is in agreement. We were prepared to support a
resolution to this effect. Some, if not all, of the
sponsors were aware that tlie United States
made a serious effort to get such a change in-
corporated in the resolution in the hope that we
would be able to vote affirmatively. Regrettably,
our suggested change was not accej)ted.
The views of the United States on the situa-
tion involving Jerusalem are contained in three
recent statements. On June 28, in a statement
issued by the White House on behalf of the
President, the United States expressed the view
that there "must be adequate recognition of the
special interest of three great religions in the
holy places of Jerusalem." On the same day the
Department of State said the following: "The
United States has never recognized . . . unilat-
eral actions by any of the states in the area as
governing the international status of Jerusa-
lem." I reiterated in the Greneral Assembly yes-
terday: that the "safeguarding of the holy
places and freedom of access to them for all
should be internationally guaranteed; and the
status of Jerusalem in relation to them should
be decided not imilaterally but in consultation
with all concerned."
These statements reflect the considered views
and serious concern of the United States Gov-
ernment about the situation in Jerusalem.
RESOLUTION ON AID TO REFUGEES '°
Humanitarian assistance
The General Assembly,
Considering the urgent need to alleviate the suffering
inflicted on civilians and on prisoners of war as a re-
sult of the recent hostilities in the Middle East,
1. Welcomes with great satisfaction Security Coun-
cil resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, whereby
the Council :
(a) Considered the urgent need to spare the civil
populations and the prisoners of war in the area
of conflict in the Middle East additional .sufferings ;
(6) Con.sidered that essential and inalienable human
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes
of war ;
(c) Considered that all the obligations of the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
"° U.N. doc. A/RES/2252 ( ES-V ) /Corr.l ( A/L.526 and
Add. 1-3) ; adopted on July 4 by a vote of 116 (U.S.) to
0, with 2 abstentions.
112
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the
parties involved in the conflict ;
(d) Called upon the Government of Israel to ensure
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of
the areas where military operations had taken place
and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who
had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities ;
( c) Recommended to the Governments concerned the
scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles gov-
erning the treatment of prisoners of war and the pro-
tection of civilian persons in time of war, contained in
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 ;
(/) Requested the Secretary-General to follow the
effective implementation of the resolution and to report
to the Security Council ;
2. Notes with gratitude and satisfaction and en-
dorses the appeal made by the President of the Gen-
eral Assembly on 26 June 1967 ;
3. Notes tcith gratification the work undertaken by
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary or-
ganizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
civilians ;
4. Notes further with gratification the assistance
which the United Nations Children's Fund is providing
to women and children in the area ;
5. Commends the Commissioner-General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East for his efforts to continue
the activities of the Agency in the present situation
with respect to all persons coming within his mandate ;
6. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of the
above-mentioned Security Council resolution, the ef-
forts of the Commissioner-General of the United Na-
tions Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance,
as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a
temporary measure, to other persons in the area who
are at present displaced and are in serious need of
immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostili-
ties;
7. Welcomes the close co-operation of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East and the other organiza-
tions concerned for the purpose of co-ordinating
assistance ;
8. Calls upon all the Member States concerned to
facilitate the transport of supplies to all areas in
which assistance is being rendered ;
9. Appeals to all Governments, as well as organiza-
tions and individuals, to make .special contributions
for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, as well as to the other inter-governmental and
non-governmental organizations concerned ;
10. Requests the Secretary -General, in consultation
with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East, to report urgently to the General As-
sembly on the needs arising under paragraphs 5 and
6 above ;
11. Further requests the Secretary-General to fol-
low the effective implementation of the present resolu-
tion and to report thereon to the General Assembly.
RESOLUTION ON STATUS OF JERUSALEM"
Measures taken hy Israel to change the status of the
City of Jerusalem
The General AssemMy,
Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in
.lerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel
to change the status of the City,
1. Considers that these measures are invalid ;
2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already
taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action
which would alter the status of Jerusalem ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
General Assembly and the Security Council on the
situation and on the implementation of the present
resolution not later than one week from its adoption.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated April 4 from the representative of the
U.S.S.R. transmitting a memorandum of the U.S.S.R.
Government concerning "United Nations Operations
for the Maintenance of International Peace and Se-
curity." S/7841. April 5, 1967. 9 pp.
Reports by the Secretary-General on the situation in
the Near East. S/7S96 ; May 19, 1967 ; 6 pp. S/7906 ;
May 26, 1967 ; 6 pp.
Supplemental information received by the Secretary-
General concerning the Near East and the status of
the United Nations Emergency Force. S/7930. June
5, 1967. 6 pp.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Information furnished by the United States on ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.lOo/INF.
1.52-154, March 31, 1967; A/AC.lO.o/INF.1.55-159,
April 3, 1967; A/AC.105/INF.162-163, May 29,
1967.
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. on objects
launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.160.
April 12, 1967.
Budget Performance of the United Nations for the Fi-
nancial Year 1966. Report of the Secretary-General.
A/6666. April 7, 1967. 39 pp.
Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Emergency Force. A/6669. May 18, 1967.
10 pp.
"U.N. doc. A/RES/2253 (ES-V) (A/L.527/Rev. 1) ;
adopted on July 4 by a vote of 99 to 0, with 20 absten-
tions (U.S.).
JULY
113
TREATY INFORMATION
Pakistan to the United States effected by an ex-
change of notes dated November 21, 19C6. 1 con-
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude
New Cotton Textile Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
Tlie Department of State amiounced on July
3 (press release 153) that diplomatic notes were
exchanged at Washington on that day consti-
tuting a new bilateral cotton textile agreement
between Pakistan and the United States. The
agreement replaces the cotton textile agreement
signed at Rawalpindi on November 21, 1966.^ It
is based on the undei'standing that the protocol
extending the Long-Term Arrangement ^ on in-
ternational trade in cotton textiles through
September 30, 1970, will enter into force be-
tween Pakistan and the United States on Octo-
ber 1, 1967.
Most of the provisions of the new agreement,
except for the levels, are identical to those in
the 1966 agreement it replaces. A new provision
concerning the identification of cotton textiles
is added, and a provision allowing 5 percent
carryover of shortfalls is also included.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE'
JuLT 3, 1967
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to
the decision of the Cotton Textiles Committee
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
approving a Protocol to extend through Sep-
tember 30, 1970, the Long-Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles, done in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (here-
inafter referred to as "the Long-Term Arrange-
ment"). I also refer to recent discussions be-
tween representatives of our two Governments
and to the agreements between our two Govern-
ments concerning exports of cotton textiles from
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 6153 ;
for text, see Bulletin of Dec. 19, 1966, p. 938.
' For text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see ibid.,
Mar. 12, 1062, p. 431.
'Annexes A and B to the U.S. note are not printed
here; for texts, see press release 153 dated July 3.
firm on behalf of my Government, the under-
standing that the 1966 agreement is replaced
with the following agreement. This agreement
is based on our understanding that the above-
mentioned Protocol will enter into force for
our two Goverimients on October 1, 1967.
1. The term of this agreement shall be from
July 1, 1966 through June 30, 1970. During the
term of this agreement, annual exports of cot-
ton textiles from Pakistan to the United States
shall be limited to aggregate, group and specific
limits at the levels specified in the following
paragraphs. It is noted that these levels reflect
a special adjustment for the first agreement
year. The levels set forth in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4 for the second agreement year are 5%
higher than the limits for the preceding year
without this special adjustment; thus the
growth factor provided for in paragraph 6 has
already been applied m arriving at these levels
for the second agreement year.
2. For the first agreement year, constituting
the 12-month period beginning July 1, 1966,
the aggregate limit shall be 57.5 million square
yards equivalent. For the second agreement
year, the aggregate limit shall be 68.25 million
square yards equivalent.
3. Within the aggregate limit, the foUowmg
group limits shall apply for the first and second
agreement years, respectively :
Group
I (Categories 1-27)
II (Categories 28-64)
First Agreement Second Agree'
Year merU Year
(i7i 5yds. equivalent)
50, 225, 000 59, 74,5, 000
7, 275, 000 S, 505, 000
4. Within the aggregate limit and the appli-
cable group limits, the following specific limits
shall apply for the first and second agreement
years :
Group I
Category
Category 9 (Sheeting,
carded)
Category 15 (Poplin &
broadcloth, carded)
Print Cloth (Categories
18, 19 and parts of
Category 26)*
Category 22 (Twill
and Sateen)
Barkcloth Type
Fabrics (Parts of
Category 26)*
Duck (Parts of
Category 26)
Other**
First Second
Agreement Agreement
Year Year
{in syds. equivalent)
24, 375, 000 29, 925, 000
2, 125, 000 2, 625, 000
10, 000, 000 10, 500, 000
2, 350, 000
3, 125, 000
6, 250, 000
2, 000, 000
3, 570, 000
3, 675, 000
7, 350, 000
2, 100, 000
114
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
Group II
Category
First Agreement Year
UnUi
Square Yards
Equivalent
Shop Towels (Part of
Cfategory 31)
T Shirts (Categories
41 and 42)
Other**
3, 900, 000 pes.
270, 735 doz.
1, 357, 200
1, 958, 497
3, 959, 303
Sectmd Agreement Year
Uniti
Square Yards
Equivalent
Shop Towels (Part of
Category 31)
T Shirts (Categories
41 and 42)
Other**
4, 095, 000 pes.
349, 589 doz.
1, 425, 060
2, 528, 926
4, 551, 014
5. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for
Group I may be exceeded by not more than 10
percent and the limit for Group II may be ex-
ceeded by not more than 5 percent. Within the
applicable group limit, as it may be adjusted
under this provision, specific limits may be ex-
ceeded by not more than 5 percent.
6. In succeeding 12-month periods for which
any limitation is in force under this agreement,
the level of exports permitted under such limi-
tation shall be increased by 5 pei'cent of the cor-
responding level for the preceding 12-month
period, the latter level not to include any ad-
justments under paragraphs 5 or 14.
7. In the event of undue concentration in ex-
ports from Pakistan to the United States of
cotton textiles in any category not given a spe-
cific limit, the Government of the United States
of America may request consultation with the
Government of Pakistan to determine an ap-
propriate course of action. Until a mutually sat-
isfactory solution is reached, exports in the
category in question from Pakistan to the
United States starting with the 12-montli pe-
riod beginning on the date of the request for
consultation shall be limited. The limit shall be
105 percent of the exports of such products from
Pakistan to the United States durmg the most
recent 12-month period pi'eceding the request
for consultation and for which statistics are
available to our two Governments.
8. The Govenmient of Pakistan shall use its
best efforts to space exports from Pakistan to
the United States within each category evenly
throughout the agreement year, taking into con-
sideration normal seasonal factors.
*Print Cloth and Bark Cloth type fabrics are further
described in Annex A. [Footnote in original.]
**These "other" categories are not subject to specific
limits. Hence, within the aggregate and the applicable
group limits, as they may be adjusted under paragraph
5, the square yard equivalent of shortfalls in exports in
categories with specific limits may be used in these
"other" categories subject to the provisions of para-
graph 7. [Footnote in original.]
9. The two Governments recognize that the
successful implementation of this agreement
depends in large part upon mutual cooperation
on statistical questions. The Government of the
United States of America shall promptly sup-
ply the Government of Pakistan with data on
montlily imports of cotton textiles from Paki-
stan. The Government of Pakistan shall
promptly supply the Government of the United
States of America with data on montlily ex-
ports of cotton textiles to the United States.
Each government agrees to supply promptly
any other available relevant statistical data re-
quested by the other government.
10. In the implementation of tliis agreement,
the system of categories and the rates of con-
version into square yard equivalents listed in
Annex B hereto shall apply. In any situation
where the determination of an article to be a
cotton textile would be affected by whether the
criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long-
Term Arrangement is used or the criterion pro-
vided for in paragraph 2 of Amiex E of the
Long-Term Arrangement is used, the chief
value criterion used by the Government of the
United States of America in accordance with
paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.
11. The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Pakistan agree
to consult on any question arising in the imple-
mentation of the agi'eement.
12. Mutually satisfactory administrative ar-
rangements or adjustments may be made to re-
solve minor problems arising m the implemen-
tation of this agi-eement including differences
in points of procedure or operation.
13. If the Government of Pakistan considers
that as a result of limitations specified in this
agreement, Pakistan is being placed in an in-
equitable position vis-a-vis a third comitry, the
Govenunent of Pakistan may request consulta-
tion with the Government of the United States
of America with the view to taking appropriate
remedial action such as a reasonable modifica-
tion of this agreement.
14. (a) For any agreement year immediately
following a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year in
wliich cotton textile exports fi-om Pakistan to
the United States were below the aggi-egate
limit and any group and specific limits appli-
cable to the category concerned) the Govern-
ment of Pakistan may permit exports to exceed
these limits by carryover in the following
amounts and maimer:
(i) The carryover shall not exceed the
JTJLT 24, 1967
115
amount of the shortfall in either the aggregate
limit or any applicable group or specific limit
and shall not exceed either 5% of the aggregate
limit or 5% of the applicable group limit in the
year of the shortfall, and
(ii) In the case of shortfalls in the categories
subject to specific limits tlie cari-yover shall
not exceed 5% of the specific limit in the year
of the shortfall, and shall be used in the same
category in which the shortfall occurred, and
(iii) In the case of shortfalls not attribut-
able to categories subject to specific limits, the
carryover shall be used in the same group in
which the shortfall occurred, shall not be used
to exceed any applicable specific limit except in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5,
and shall not be used to exceed the limits in
paragraph 7 of the agreement.
(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph
(a) of this paragraph are without any adjust-
ments under this paragi'aph or paragraph 5.
(c) The canyover shall be in addition to the
exports pennitted in paragraph 5.
15. During the term of this agreement, the
Government of the United States of America
will not request r&straint on the export of cotton
textiles from Pakistan to the United States
mider the procedures of Article 3 of the Long-
Term Arrangement. The applicability of the
Long-Term Arrangement to trade in cotton
textiles between Pakistan and the United States
shall otherwise be unaffected by this agree-
ment.
16. The Government of the United States
of America may assist the Government of
Pakistan in implementing the limitation pro-
visions of this agreement by controlling the
imports of cotton textiles covered by the agree-
ment initil agreement is reached that Pakistan
will control these exports in accordance with
the limitations of the agreement.
17. Either government may terminate this
agreement effective at the end of an agreement
year by written notice to the other government
to be given at least 90 days prior to the end of
such agreement year. Either government may
at any time propose revisions in the terms of
this agreement.
If the above conforms with the understand-
ing of your Government, this note and your
Excellency's note of confirmation * on behalf
of the Government of Pakistan shall constitute
an Agreement between our Governments. Ac-
cept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State:
Anthoxt M. Solomon
His Excellency
Agiia Hilalt,
Ambassador of Pakistan.
United States and Turkey Extend
Cotton Textile Agreement
Press rele:ise 151 dated July 3
The United States and Turkey exchanged
notes at Washington on June 30, extending
without change the bilateral cotton textile
agreement between the two countries signed at
Washington on July 17, 1961^} The extension
takes ejfect on July 1, 1967, and is valid through
June 30, 1970. Following is the text of the
United States note.
June 30, 1967
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the
cotton textile agreement between our two Gov-
ernments effected by an exchange of notes dated
July 17, 1964, and to recent discussions in
Washington between representatives of our two
Governments concerning exports of cotton tex-
tiles from Turkey to the United States.
As a result of these discussions I propose that
the agreement be amended by changing "1967"
in paragraph 7 to "1970".
If this proposal is acceptable to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Turkey, this note and
your Excellency's note of acceptance - on behalf
of the Govenmient of the Republic of Turkey
shall constitute an amendment to the agreement
between our Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances
of my highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State :
Anthony M. Solomon
His Excellency
Meliii Esenbel
Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey
' Not printed here.
'Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5619;
for text, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 293.
' Not printetl here.
116
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention on offenses and certain otlier acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Toljyo September
14, 1963.'
Signature: Netherlands, June 9, 1967.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters,
New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962.
Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Notification that it does not consider itself hound:
Barbados, May 25, 1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS
1808, 4613). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.'
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, June 15, 1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly December 21,
1965.'
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, June 9, 1967.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to chapter II of the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).
Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London Novem-
ber 30, 1966.'
Acceptances deposited: France, June 6, 1967 ; Ice-
land, May 15, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly at United
Nations Headquarters, New York, December 20,
1965.'
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, June 15, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive.'
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Belgium (for Belgian-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union), June 26, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Korea, July 6, 1967.
BILATERAL
India
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, sup-
plementary to the agreement of February 20, 1967
(TIAS 6221), under title I of the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended
(68 Stat. 454, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1736D),
with annex. Signed at New Delhi June 24, 1967. En-
tered into force June 24, 1967.
New Zealand
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op-
erators of either country to operate their stations in
the territory of the other. Effected by exchange of
notes at Wellington June 21, 1967. Entered into force
June 21, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the Special Fund for Education
Textbook Production Project 1967-1968. Effected by
exchange of notes at Manila June 26, 1967. Entered
into force June 26, 1967.
Agreement on the settlement of claims for pay and
allowances of recognized Philippine guerrillas not
previously paid in full and for erroneous deductions
of advanced salary from the backpay of eligible
Philippine veterans. Signed at Manila June 29, 1967.
Entered into force June 29, 1967.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agreement of July 17, 1964
(TIAS 5619), concerning trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June
30, 1967. Entered into force June 30, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
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Recent Releases
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Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Foreign Consular Offices in the United States, 1967
(revised). Complete and official listing of foreign con-
sular offices in the United States, together with their
jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. De-
partment and Foreign Service Series 128. 88 pp. 35<i'.
A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States
(revised). Booklet for the information of men and
women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the For-
eign Service of the United States. Pub. 7924. Depart-
ment and Foreign Service Series 132. 27 pp., illus. 35^.
The Country Team: An Illustrated Profile of Our
American Missions Abroad. A comprehensive descrii>
tion of the work of American diplomatic and consular
missions, including the activities of the Agency for In-
ternational Development, the United States Informa-
tion Agency, the Department of Defense, and other
U.S. agencies operating overseas. Includes many exam-
ples of the recent experiences of Foreign Service per-
sonnel. Pub. 8193. Department and Foreign Service
Series 136. 80 pp., illus. $1.00.
Social Usage Abroad: A Guide for American Officials
and Their Families. This publication is intended pri-
marily to provide for members of the Foreign Service
an understanding of the rules of protocol and official
conduct. Pub. 8219. Department and Foreign Service
Series 138. 23 pp. 25^.
JULY 24, 1967
117
Commitment for Progress: The Americas Plan for a
Decade of Urgency. Illustrated pamptilet on the meet-
ing of the Chiefs of State of the OAS nations at Punta
del Bste, which includes the Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America, statements made by President John-
son during the conference, and his Pan American Day
proclamation. Pub. 8237. Inter-American Series 93. 40
pp., illus. 30<!.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Israel. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Washington January 27,
1967. Entered into force January 27, 1967. Effective Oc-
tober 1, 1966. TIAS 6214. 12 pp. 10<f.
Cultural Relations. Agreement with Morocco — Signed
at Washington February 10. 1967. Entered into force
February 10, 1967. TIAS 6215. 6 pp. 5<J.
Maritime Matters — Liability During Private Opera-
tion of N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Greece. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Athens November 22, 1966,
and January 12, 1967. Entered into force January 12,
1967. TIAS 6216. 3 pp. 5<t.
Fisheries — King Crab. Agreement with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, extending the agreement of
February 5, 1965 — Signed at Washington February 13,
1967. Entered into force February 13, 1967. With ex-
change of letters. TIAS 6217. 7 pp. 10<f.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Iran, amending the agreement of March 5,
1957 — Signed at Washington June 8, 1964. Entered into
force January 26, 1967. TIAS 6219. 6 pp. 5«S.
Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement
with Mexico. Exchange of notes — Signed at Mexico and
Tlatelolco January 27 and 28, 1967. Entered into force
January 28, 1967. TIAS 6220. 6 pp. 5(^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India —
Signed at New Delhi February 20, 1967. Entered into
force February 20, 1967. TIAS 6221. 14 pp. 10<f.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Ghana, sup-
plementing the agreement of September 30, 1958. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Accra and Osn March 3,
1967. Entered into force March 3, 1967. TIAS 6222. 3
pp. 5<t.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. Addi-
tional agreement with the Netherlands. Exchange of
notes— Signed at The Hague June 22, 1966. Entered
into force February 28, 1967. Effective January 1, 1965.
TIAS 6223. 6 pp. 5«!.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Procfes-
Verbal extending the declaration of November 18. 1962,
as extended, on the provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement. Done at
Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered into force January
18, 1967. TIAS 6225. 4 pp. 5(J.
Status of the Korean Service Corps. Agreement with
the Republic of Korea — Signed at Seoul February 23,
1967. Entered into force March 10, 1967. With agreed
understandings. TIAS 6226. 24 pp. 15^.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Lesotho^
Signed at Maseru February 24, 1967. Entered into force
March 7, 1967. TIAS 6227. 3 pp. 5f
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Poland..
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 15,
1967. Entered into force March 15, 1967. Effective
March 1, 1967. TIAS 6228. 9 pp. 10<!.
Correction
The Editor of the Bttlletin wishes to call
attention to a printer's error in the IssTie of June
12, 1967, p. 889. The first sentence in the para-
graph beginning at the bottom of the first column
should read :
"The greatest disservice to that resolution, and
to its effective implementation, would be for us
to create an impression in South Africa and in
the world that the U.N. is fundamentally divided
on how these principles are to be achieved."
118
DEPAKTMBNT OF STATE BXJIiLETIN
INDEX Jvly 2^, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 11^5
Canada. IJC Issues Report on Improvement of
Champlain Waterway 107
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 107
Economic AEFairs
IJC Issues Report on Improvement of Cham-
plain Waterway 107
Institution-Building and the Alliance for Prog-
ress (Oliver) 102
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114
United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116
Europe. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87
Foreign Aid. Institution-Building and the Alli-
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102
Latin America. Institution-Building and the Alli-
ance for Progress (Oliver) 102
Near East
The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and
Status of Jerusalem ; Rejects Other Resolu-
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108
Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cot-
ton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . 114
Publications. Recent Releases 117
Sweden. Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on
Viet-Nam for Swedish Newspaper (tran-
script) 91
Trade. Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at
Geneva 95
Treaty Information
Current Actions 117
Kennedy Round Agreements Signed at Geneva . 95
U.S. and Pakistan Conclude New Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 114
United States and Turkey Extend Cotton Textile
Agreement (text of U.S. note) 116
Turkey. United States and Turkey Extend Cotton
Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . . 116
U.S.S.R. The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) . 87
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 113
U.N. Adopts Resolutions on Aid to Refugees and
Status of Jerusalem; Rejects Other Resolu-
tions Dealing With the Middle East Crisis
(Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 108
Viet-Nam
The Road to a Lasting Peace (Rusk) .... 87
Secretary Rusk Replies to Questions on Viet-
Nam for Swedish Newspaper (transcript) . . 91
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 108
Oliver, Covey T 102
Rusk, Secretary 87,91
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 3-9
Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release Issued prior to July 3 which appears in
this issue of the Buixetin is No. 152 of July 1.
No. Date
151
153
154
155
Snbject
7/3 U.S.-Turkey cotton textile agreement.
7/3 U.S.-PaMstan cotton textile agree-
ment (rewrite).
7/5 Rusk : Lions International, Chicago.
7/7 International Joint Commission re-
port on Improvement of Champlain
Waterway.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE; 1967
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
B,
'"Pe.
"'fo:,
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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1466
Jvly 31, 1967
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Jyy WUUa/m M. Roth, Specie^ Representative for Trade Negotiations 1S3
BUSINESS' STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
hy Secretary of Com/merce Alexander B. Trowbridge 127
AGRICULTUHE'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
hy Secretary of Agriculture OrvUle L. Freeman 132
LABOR'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
iy Under Secretary of Labor James J. Reynolds 137
For index see inside bach cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1466 Publication 8267
July 31, 1967
For sale by tbe Saperlotendent of Documents
U.S. Oavenimeat Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PEICE:
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed in
the Readers' Qulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Kennedy Round: Proud Chapter in the History
of International Commerce
The multilateral agreements negotiated in the Sixth Round of
Trade Negotiations {the Kennedy Round) under the auspices of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were signed at Geneva on
June 30. President Johnson, in his message to the signing ceremony,
hailed the negotiations as a '■'■'proud chapter in the history of inter-
national comvfierceP
A national conference on the Kennedy Round, held at Washington
July 7 and sponsored hy the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States, provided the first occasion for a formal and informal ex-
change of views between Government officials and representatives of
the business community on the outcome of the negotiatio-m. Follow-
ing are addresses made during the formal sessions by William M.
Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, the chief U.S.
negotiator; Secretary of Commerce Alexander B. Trowbridge, Sec-
retary of Agriculture Orville B. Freeman; and Under Secretary of
Commerce James J. Reynolds.
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Ambassador Roth
I must say this Friday morning was an easier
one for me than last Friday morning. Then —
it was June 30th — I was in the office at 3:30
a.m. talking to my deputy, Ambassador Mike
Blumenthal, in Geneva, where it was 8 :30 a.m.
The hour of signing the Kennedy Round agree-
ment was 2 hours away. Even at that time we
were apprehensive that a last-minute crisis
would intervene — as they had with agonizing
regularity in the preceding 2 weeks. Now — fi-
nally— the last crises appeared to be under con-
trol. It was not imtil that early hour in still-dark
Washington that we were entirely certain that
an agreement would be signed.
It \oas signed on schedule. At an enormous
expense in time, energy, and emotion, roe — the
more than 50 participating nations — wrot« what
President Jolmson has hailed as "a proud
chapter in the history of international com-
merce."
The President's message to the signing cere-
mony went on to say :
It will open important new trading opportunities to
each nation, and contribute to the prosi>erity of all. I
salute . . . the architects of this historic landmark
in cooperation among nations.
The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] Secretariat has made preliminary
estimates that the agreement covers more than
$40 billion in world trade, that 70 percent of
dutiable imports of the major particii^ants is
affected, that two-thirds of the tariff reductions
were 50 jDercent or more, and that the nations
making concessions account for 75 percent of
world trade. This is an accomplishment of far
greater magnitude than that of any previous
trade negotiation in history.
Perhaps I should at this point go back in
time to give you a brief history of this endeavor.
In 1962 the 87th Congress passed the Trade
Expansion Act in response to President Ken-
nedy's request for bargaining power to launch
a major assault on barriers to international
commerce. He was authorized to cut our tariffs
by half in exchange for equally advantageous
benefits from our trading partners.
The legislation also created the position of
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
an iimovation placing resijonsibility for the
JULY 31, 1907
123
conduct of such negotiations in the Executive
Office of the President. To this new post Presi-
dent Kennedy appointed the distinguished
former Secretary of State Christian A. Herter,
who directed the Kennedy Eound with great
spirit and wisdom until his death 6 montlis ago.
Armed with the new negotiating authority,
the United States encouraged the convening of
an international negotiating conference. An ini-
tial ministerial-level meeting was held in Ge-
neva in May 1963. Negotiations formally began
a year later.
Most of the major participants agreed to pro-
ceed on the basis of a 50 percent linear — that is,
across-the-board — cut in tariff levels on nonag-
ricultural products. Exceptions, or those items
not to be subjected to the full cut, were to be
limited to those required by reasons of over-
riding national interest. Exceptions lists on non-
agricultural products were exchanged on
November 16, 1964. There followed a period of
intensive exammation of exceptions both on a
multilateral and bilateral basis — each country
making known its interest in the proposals of
the other participants. Negotiators appeared to
be horror-stricken at the protectionism of their
trading partners.
In a few industrial areas of particular im-
portance and complexity — chemicals, textiles,
steel, aluminum, pulp and paper — negotiations
took place on a sector basis.
The importance of agriculture in the Sixth
Round was emphasized by the United States
from the outset. We repeatedly insisted that the
objective of the agricultural negotiations should
be effective trade liberalization. The European
Economic Community, however, sought a more
limited negotiation essentially aimed at the
freezing of present agricultural support levels
on an item-by-item basis.
An early attempt to get agreement on rules
to govern agricultural negotiations proved
futile. For this reason, and because the Euro-
pean Economic Community's offers were not yet
prepared, agricultural offers were not tabled at
the same time as industrial offers. The EEC took
the position it could not make agricultural offers
in the Kennedy Round until its major Common
Agricultural Policy regulations were agreed
upon, and this work was not yet completed.
On grains, however, the GATT ministers had
decided that the Cereals Group should under-
take the negotiation of an international grains
arrangement. Accordingly, in May 1966 major
cereals trading nations exchanged proposals for
an international cereals arrangement.
Nontariff Barriers Attacked
Bilateral and multilateral discussions cen-
tered on such nontariff barriers as discrimina-
tory taxation, customs valuation practices, and
quantitative import restrictions. Notable prog-
ress was achieved in two areas, antidumping
and the American Selling Price system of cus-
toms valuation as it applies to imports of ben-
zenoid chemicals.
The negotiations on antidumping were
directed at elaborating and refining existing
international rules on the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of levying antidumping duties
on goods which are dumped and thereby cause
material injury to a domestic industry. Our
exporters complained of some countries' pro-
cedures that seriously deterred imports which
could in no real sense be considered as "inju-
rious dumping." In other countries, the prin-
cipal difficulty was the lack of any well-defined
procedure or legal recourse. The principal com-
plaint against the United States was that its
procedures were excessively prolonged. Finally,
a very satisfactory agreement was concluded,
which I will describe later.
The American Selling Price system of cus-
toms valuation concerning benzenoid chemicals
came under attack from our trading partners
early in the Keimedy Round. These countries
considered this procedure an unjustified anom-
aly in our tariff structure. They cited the fact
that this valuation system was first imposed in
1922 to protect our then infant chemical indus-
try and that the considerations of the twenties
are hardly applicable today. They pointed out
that this system results in the imposition of
very high or prohibitive actual rates of duty
on many benzenoid chemicals, even though the
duty rates listed in our tariff schedules may
appear moderate. They also stressed the con-
siderable uncertainty beforehand as to the
amount of duty that will be assessed.
Accordingly, the principal producers of
benzenoid chemicals — the Common Market
countries, the United Kingdom, and Switzer-
land— heatedly demanded the abolition of
ASP. We responded that any conversion to the
normal valuation system would require special
counterconcessions and that Congress would
have to approve such a conversion. We would
124
DEPARTMEN'T OF STATE BULLETIN'
enter into negotiations concerning ASP only
on the condition that other participants agree
tliat there be substantial chemical concessions
by all principal trading nations in the context
of the Kennedy Round agreement and a special
package of concessions, including abolition of
ASP, in a separate agreement.
It was only in the final hours of the May
showdown that our conditions were accepted
and a separate ASP agreement was negotiated.
Let me return and conclude my brief his-
torical account.
Negotiations Reach Crisis
A breach among the six members of the
European Economic Community in mid-1965
resulted in an almost complete suspension of
the Geneva negotiations lasting until the late
spring of 1966.
The major decisions necessary to permit the
Community to resume its Kennedy Round
participation — particularly the adoption of the
basis of a Common Agricultural Policy — were
taken by mid-July 1966 enabling the tabling
of the EEC agricultural offer in early August.
This step set the stage for the beginning of
concentrated multilateral and bilateral activity
in Geneva beginning in September 1966.
Talks proceeded through the fall, progress
was laboriously made, but at the end of the
year all of the toughest problems remained. In
fact, by mid-March we had still not begun the
intensive bargaining needed to resolve the
central problems of the Kennedy Round.
After almost 3 years of effort, the prospects
of success began to dim. A March 30 deadline
gave way to an April 30 deadline. I began com-
muting to Geneva.
As late as mid-April, the urgency of the situa-
tion was not fully recognized by other major
participants, particularly the European Eco-
nomic Community. Our deadline was not taken
seriously. The Community negotiators were still
without sufficient authorization to participate
effectively. Many knowledgeable observers be-
lieved it would be impossible to conclude the
Kennedy Round before midnight on June 30.
Others, however, were certain that the political
will was there.
April led into May with the discussions gen-
erating increasing heat but little light. A series
of major crises erupted. By the weekend of
May 13 we were meeting around-the-clock m an
atmosphere of very high tension. On Monday,
May 15, in the early evening, Commissioner
[Jean] Rey and I found the basis for overall
agreement in a compromise proposal put for-
ward by Eric Wyndliam White, the extraordi-
nary Director General of the GATT. Other
pieces fell rapidly into place, and by the end
of the evenuig the Director General could an-
nounce that a Kennedy Round agreement was
assured.
We soon learned, however, that between as-
surance of agreement and signature of that
agreement lay formidable obstacles. Unex-
pected hitches developed to threaten seriously
the successful conclusion of the negotiation. To
the final hour, there were uncertainties.
This last-minute bargaining was extremely
difficult. Positions became hardened. Negotiat-
ing flexibility had been largely exhausted in the
mid-May showdown that produced the main
outlines of the agreement.
Delegations were tired, t«nse, and some-
times querulous, yet dealing with a mass of
numbers and detail and of varied and often
conflicting considerations that were almost
overwhelming.
Inevitably there were misunderstandings
about what had been agreed to. There were
errors made that had to be corrected. Negotia-
tors hopefully or imwittingly exceeded their
authority ; in some cases they failed to get ap-
proval back home and later had to adjust their
offers.
As each coimtry made necessary modifica-
tions, the multilateral balances changed and re-
newed negotiations became necessary. I had to
make a hurried return to Geneva only 2 weeks
before the signing date.
On the 29th of June, with my outer office
crowded with reporters waiting for our advance
release on the details of the agreement, I was
on the telephone to Geneva and several capitals
trying to resolve not one but several crises that
had the potential of blowing up the whole
effort.
Let me now turn to the nature of this agree-
ment itself.
Of course, uppermost in your minds is
whether this agreement is a good deal for the
United States. This was the question the Presi-
dent had to decide, based on the advice of those
responsible for United States participation.
On March 10 of this year, I told tlie Senate
Finance Committee that the United States
JULY 31, 19G;
125
would accept no Kennedy Round agreement
unless it was a balanced package which included
an exchange of both industrial and agricultural
concessions. During this appearance, I was
questioned as to my willingness to quit the nego-
tiating table if the stakes weren't fair and I
answered, "In a negotiation you have to be will-
ing and ready to walk away from the table if
you don't feel that what you are getting is a
balanced deal."
Basing my judgment on the hard-nosed
appraisal of my Government colleagues and
their expert staffs, I am con\-inced that we have
received commitments equal in value to those
we have made. Moreover, I believe that this
balance of mutual exchanges of trading
opportunities should stimulate appreciably
larger volumes of international trade. Eco-
nomic growth at home should result.
Throughout this negotiation, we have had
designated members of the Congress and rep-
resentatives of the public drawn from industry,
labor, farmers, and consumers acting as mem-
bers of their officially accredited delegation.
Through this means, we have taken to the bar-
gaining tables an acute sense of the need for
a fair and balanced deal promoting growth in
all segments of the American economy.
Our Washington organization, in developing
basic policy and strategy jDositions, has made
a conscientious effort to seek expert guidance
from business, labor, and farm leaders in the
formulation of negotiating policy. The Presi-
dent appointed a 45-member public advisory
committee to the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations. This group has met regu-
larly with the Special Representative, and
many of its members have traveled to Geneva
to take a firsthand look at the negotiations. A
roster of 300 technical specialists has served as
a constantly available source of advice and
assistance on day-to-day technical problems.
Six Members of Congress are regular con-
gressional delegates. Almost all have been to
Geneva for important meetings at least once,
and all meet with the Special Representative
on a regular basis.
Consideration of public views did not cease
with the original hearings on proposed U.S.
Kennedy Round offers. We continued to accept
from any interested party oral and written
testimony concerning any matter relevant to
the negotiations. This included updating and
revision of previous testimony, testimony from
interests not previously heard, and new infor-
mation relating to foreign import restrictions.
Indeed, moi-e time and effort than ever before
have gone into the calculation of the value and
probable effect of the concessions we have of-
fered and received.
Principal Accomplishments
The substance of the Kemiedy Round agree-
ment will, of course, be the subject of our dis-
cussions throughout the day. I will only
summarize what I regard as the principal
accomj)lishments.
Tariff' cuts on industrial products will be of
a magnitude far greater than any previously
negotiated. While concessions offered to us have
not justified full use of the authority of the
Trade Expansion Act, we have exchanged with
major tradmg partners a very significant num-
ber of tariff reductions of 50 percent and many
more in the 30 to 50 percent range.
We have succeeded in securing concessions
on a wide variety of farm products. Of greatest
significance is the successful negotiation of a
world grains agreement guaranteeing higher
minimum world trading prices as well as estab-
lishmg a program under which other nations
will share with us in the task of supplying food
aid to the undernourished people in the less
developed countries.
A major accomplishment was the negotiation
of the antidumping code committing other
countries to fair and open procedures along
the lines of present United States practices.
The new common antidumping regulations that
are being developed by the European Economic
Community will conform with the code. Of
special benefit to the United States will be the
adoption by Canada of an injury requirement
in its antidumping legislation. The lack of such
a requirement has impeded United States ex-
ports for many years.
For our part, we agreed to certain viseful re-
finements of the concepts we presently use in
our antidumping investigation and to speedier
completion of such investigations once prelimi-
nary measures are taken against allegedly
dumped imports. I would emphasize — con-
trary to what you may have read in the news-
papers lately — that all our obligations in the
agreement are consistent with existing law and,
in particular, that we have not agreed to a si-
multaneous consideration of price discrimina-
tion and injury.
In addition to the negotiation of an anti-
126
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
dumping code, an agreement was concluded
providing for the elimination of the American
Selling Price system for benzenoid chemicals
and the liberalization of other countries' trade
barriers. For the domestic benzenoid chemical
industry — a strong and efficient industry which
has long demonstrated its international competi-
tive strength — we are confident that the new
rates of duty in the agreement will provide a
sufficient level of tariff protection — one, by the
way, well above that of the other major chem-
ical producing countries. For this and the other
sectors of the overall chemical industry in this
country, which has an export surplus of about
$1.7 billion, the agreement affords very sig-
nificant new export opportunities into rapidly
expanding markets in Europe.
Moreo^'er, the ASP agreement provides for
the elimination of discriminatory automobile
road-use taxes in France, Italy, and Belgium,
which have long hampered exports of the larger
U.S. cars to those countries. Finally, under the
agreement the United Kingdom midertakes to
make a significant reduction in the margin of
tariff preference on inimanufactured tobacco,
which should be of real assistance to one of our
biggest export industries. I would only add that
we fully exi^ect, and indeed welcome, the most
careful examination of the merits of the agree-
ment. I do hope, however, that such an exami-
nation will be made objectively by all concei'ned
and not in the heat of what has all too often been
purely an emotional issue.
Regarding the particularly sensitive sectors
other than chemicals, useful if limited progress
was made on the complex problems in steel,
aluminum, pulp and paper, and textiles, includ-
ing a .3-year extension of the Long-Term Cotton
Textile Arrangement.
Finally, the Kennedy Round agreement has
given significant assistance to the less developed
countries through having permitted their par-
ticipation in the negotiations without requiring
reciprocal contributions from them, through
special concessions on products of particular in-
terest to them, and through the food aid pro-
visions of the grains arrangement.
And now, in conclusion, where do we go
from here ? The President has asked me to un-
dertake a comprehensive study of trade policy
to determine what the next steps should be.
The problems are many. What further should
be done about nontariff barriers ? What are the
possibilities for further tariff reductions? "Wliat
can be done to lunit the proliferation of discrim-
inatory trading arrangements among small
groups of countries, which threatens the basic
most-favored-nation principle mider which so
much progi'ess in tariff reductions has been
made? How should policy on international
financial flows be related to U.S. trade policies?
Another set of problems of extreme impor-
tance in the next few years relates to what the
policies of highly industrialized countries ought
to be toward the developing countries. The
developing countries have been pressing for
special trade policies tailored to their specific
needs. Some of them have been receiving spe-
cial benefits from certain mdustrialized coun-
tries, in some cases in exchange for special ac-
cess provisions for their industrialized partners.
The specialized limited arrangements threaten
the interests of nonparticipants. As the Presi-
dent noted in his speech at Punta del Este,^
we are now exploring with other countries the
possibilities of a common approach to develop-
ing-country trade policies which could subsume
these specialized narrow arrangements.
In looking to the future, we shall be lean-
ing heavily on advice from industry. Your own
work in the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on
future trade policy will be extremely valuable
to us in making plans for new departures in
the trade field.
BUSINESS' STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Secretary Trowbridge
I think the first and most important thing
we all kiaow about the Kennedy Round is that
the end of the negotiations is not the end at
all ; it is really only the beginning. Many years
of extraordinary labor lie behind us, but dec-
ades of even hai'der work lie ahead if we are
to fulfill the promise that this great trade
liberalization effort holds for the entire fi-ee
world.
It goes without saying, of course, that the
same high degree of cooperation between Amer-
ican industry and government that produced
the Kennedy Round will be required to reap
its benefits. But the major burden of responsi-
bility for seizing the opportunity offered must
be shouldered by our matchless system of free
enterprise. The individual initiative and
' BuLMTiN of May 8, 1967, p. 708.
JULY 31, 1967
127
energy that this system and its rewards release
are what, in the end, are the wellspring of all
our achievement. In this instance, only business
and labor, working together, can produce and
sell the goods abroad that mean more profits,
more jobs, and the rising standard of living
that is the hallmark of our dynamic economy.
One tiling I'm sure is fully understood : The
name of the game is "A Good Offense." Defen-
sive driving may be the safest technique for to-
day's motorist, but for the trader in the post-
Kennedy Round age of trade the only safe
course is to sell abroad with the same aggressive
skill that is applied to the domestic market. I
think single-minded efforts to defend a position
in the home market, with concomitant failure
to take advantage of sales opportunities abroad,
can only lead to trouble.
For the Kennedy Round, to a greater degree
than anything that has ever gone before prob-
ably in the entire history of trade, represents
a very large step toward the thing we've heard
so much about in the postwar years : the truly
one- world market.
And more than anything else, we in the
United States must luiderstand and appreciate
in all its ramifications the full meaning of the
global market concept.
It means, for one thing, that the American
domestic market — the greatest and most lucra-
tive market in the world — is no longer the pri-
vate preserve of the American businessman. We
are but one corner, one segment, of that market.
We are, however, the most competitive part
of that market. And as a general rule, if you can
meet the competition here you can meet it in
many other countries of the world. And we must
sell there, we must make the effort now, if we
are to get in on the ground floor of what hope-
fully will be the greatest surge in international
trade in our history, as a result of the Kennedy
Round negotiations. To fail to do so can hurt
both a company and the Nation.
Certainly our American businessmen have the
tools to do the job — an unequaled bag of tools
that can unlock the doors to burgeoning mar-
kets everywhere. You have the managerial skills,
the capital resources, the advanced technology,
the sales and marketing ability, the skilled
workmen, the higher productivity, the econo-
mies of scale, a more intense utilization of cap-
ital stock, and the greatest array of scientific
talent the world has ever seen. If these aren't the
elements that make for success in selling in the
world market, I'd like to know why not.
But the Kennedy Round results should be
the signal to maximize the use of those tools.
And my task today is to give you an overall
view of the flashing green lights in the indus-
trial area.
Gains for U.S. Exporters
Probably the uppermost question in your
minds is, Just what did American business get
out of the Kennedy Round and what did we pay
for it ? I would like to talk at some length about
this, but as you can appreciate, I cannot talk
about the thousands of individual items that are
affected by the final agreement.
First, what did we get ? On the basis of trade
coverage, the United States received tariff con-
cessions of mostly 50 percent reductions on about
$7 billion of our exports. Close to another $1
billion were bound in a duty-free status, so that
the total package runs close to $8 billion.
These concessions are spread proportionately
among our major export markets. Over $5 bil-
lion of our exports are subject to concessions in
the European Economic Community, the EFTA
[European Free Trade Association] countries,
and Japan. Another $1..3 billion will benefit by
concessions made by Canada, with the remain-
der spread out among a number of smaller
countries.
To assess the meaning of these concessions,
let me take you back about 5 or 6 years to when
the foreign traders of this country were alarmed
at the prospects for their markets once internal
tariffs were eliminated in the EEC and EFTA.
To many U.S. businessmen the choice seemed
to be between getting into one or both of these
blocs with plant and sales organizations or run-
ning the risk of being excluded from the vast
European market by external tariff barriers.
Passage of the Trade Expansion Act gave them
some hope that the two blocs might be per-
suaded, if the other large trading nations joined
in, to move toward freer trade rather than
adopt an inward-looking attitude. At the time,
you will recall, the schedule for eliminating the
internal tariffs between countries of the two
blocs was being accelerated so that the element
of time was very important. The facts are that
the EFTA countries eliminated internal duties
completely on industrial goods at the beginning
128
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of this year, while the EEC will complete its
customs union and remove internal tariffs com-
pletely in July 1968.
Now, these tariff walls are to come down
sharply. For the EEC it will be a reduction by
35 percent in all major trade categories. Most
of the duties of the EEC's common external
tariff, which is effective next July, are in the
medium-low-range rate, that is, 10 to 15 percent.
Next July they will start to come down. In the
EFTA countries the national tariffs apply to
goods outside of the free trade area. For most
countries in the EFTA, duties were already
low. with the United Kingdom having the high-
est rates. These are also coming down, with the
high U.K. rates, generally 33 percent, being
reduced by 50 percent.
I believe that in this context the United States
has been able to reconcile its political and eco-
nomic objectives in Western Europe. At times
it seemed that we were supporting political in-
tegration at the expense of our economic well-
being. The Kennedy Round, I feel, has reduced
any fear that we are sacrificing American eco-
nomic interest for a political objective. In fact,
I think that the gains for our exporters in the
Western European markets as a result of the
Kennedy Round surpass anything that was
realistically hoped for when this problem was
before the Nation in 1962.
Approximately one-quarter to one-third of
our exports move to Western Europe, so that
it is fairly obvious what the implications for
U.S. exporters might be without the Kennedy
Round now that the internal barriers of the
European countries are in the final stage of
elimination. Now that the Kennedy Round is
over, the challenge passes to you men of busi-
ness to take advantage of the new opportimities
which will be opening up over the next few
years.
Canadian Tariff Reductions
Let me now speak of Canada, which is our
largest single trading partner. Our trade with
Canada continues to rise to the mutual benefit
of both countries, and our agreement with
Canada in the Kennedy Round is a sweeping
reduction of tariff barriers. Duties were elimi-
nated on a number of categories of goods, most
significant of which are softwood lumber, some
hardwood lumber, wood flooring except oak.
most fresh or frozen fish, and a variety of other
products. Canada eliminated her duty on coal,
and the United States eliminated its duty on
nickel.
In the field of manufactures the United
States was able to obtain a reduction in the
protective level of the Canadian tariff by about
one-fourth. Protective duties generally rim to
20 to 25 percent in Canada's tariff ; and Canada,
which at the outset of the negotiations said that
it could not join in a 50 percent linear tariff cut
because of her relatively lower industrial status
as compared with the advanced countries, has
reduced this level to about 15 to I7i/^ percent.
This is a major contribution by Canada,
which heretofore has not found it politically
or economically feasible to make significant
reductions in its protective tariff rates.
One of the most important Canadian conces-
sions to the United States, which will affect
hundreds of American exporters, is the reduc-
tion in the Canadian tariff on production ma-
chinery from 22% percent to 15 percent. For
machinery which is "not made in Canada" the
current duty of 7^2 percent will be eliminated.
When these concessions are implemented, all
machinery which is not available in Canada
will benefit from duty-free treatment. In this
one sector, namely, production machinery, the
Canadians have told us that their import entries
number over 2-10,000 per year ; so from this one
concession, duty reductions will most signifi-
cantly assist a broad range of U.S. exporters.
There are many more concessions from Can-
ada which will benefit American exporters
which I cannot cover in detail here today. How-
ever, a wide variety of goods is affected, and
duty eliminations were numerous. I should also
mention that in our negotiations with Canada
we were able to negotiate away a number of
relatively small but irritating problems which
have resulted from differential treatment by
the two countries on items which are traded
both north and south.
Japan's willingness to participate substan-
tially and actively in the Kennedy Roiuid was
a welcome surprise to us. since many felt that
Japan's rationale would be that since she was
doing well with the present setup, why join in
a tariff-cutting exercise? I think the answer
probably is that Japan's export boom has led
it to the conclusion that its economic prosperity
covdd increase enormously if it could develop
JULY 31,
129
the markets for its products in countries other
than the United States.
Japan did join in and agree to mostly 50 per-
cent reductions in her tariffs. It is our hope that
these reductions by the Japanese will open up
areas for our products which have heretofore
been closed to us because of high duties. We
sometimes hear it said by United States manu-
factui-ers that they camiot sell in Japan because
of low-price competition. The fact is that we
do sell large volumes of manufactured goods
in Japan, and Japan's increasing prosperity,
which should gi-ow with the Kennedy Round
settlement, creates a demand for more Amer-
ican products. We hope U.S. exporters will
redouble their efforts to introduce new products
to Japan and take another healthy look at the
market for their current products.
A Reciprocal Bargain
All of these benefits carried a price tag, and
I am not going to stand before yovi and say that
our negotiators gave the otliers a good shellack-
ing. This is rarely the case for any country's
negotiators, but in the Kennedy Round I think
the United States negotiators did a very good
job indeed. The Kennedy Round package is
balanced. We came out with a reciprocal bar-
gain, which was our goal. If the fuial agreement
had not included benefits of roughly equal
value for all concerned, it just wouldn't have
been completed.
I would like to take you back to the begin-
ning of the negotiations. The President's
authority was to reduce all United States tariffs
by 50 percent. This was the prospect for almost
every U.S. business that must compete with
imports. The result, however, is that we reduced
all our tariffs by an average of about 35 percent.
Other countries' average tariff reductions are
in this same area.
The items excluded from our tariff cuts are
basically those which are experiencing severe
import competition and those which in our
judgment woidd be likely to suffer adversely if
they were subject to a 50 percent reduction. So
the United States removed a large number of
articles from negotiation or made less than 50
percent cuts when it judged such a reduction
was called for in light of import sensitivity.
I have been troubled in the last few days to
I'ead some very critical statements coming from
some of our major industries. These statements
have characterized the Kennedy Round as "one-
sided" and have declared that actions taken on
cutting U.S. tariffs will be "ruinous" in certain
areas. I think we have to evaluate the results in
Geneva as to what coidd have happened, what
did happen, why the actions were taken, and
what will be the impact. Let's look at three
major sectors.
In steel, the weighted average reduction in
United States tariffs coming out of the Kennedy
Round was 7.5 percent on dutiable imports in
1964. A total of 54 percent of our steel imports
was not subject to any duty reduction ; only 1
percent of our steel imports was subject to a 50
percent reduction. This small reduction will
bring our average tariff level down from a 7.4
percent weighted average to about 6 percent.
The reductions in tariff's were part of an
attempt to harmonize tariffs on steel hj produc-
ing countries. While we reduced by 7 percent,
the EEC and the United Kingdom reduced by
about 20 percent and Japan by nearly 50 per-
cent. As you are aware, steel has a large dollar
volume, with two-way trade totaling almost
$1.4 billion in 1964. It was not an element which
could be excluded from the negotiations, but the
actual settlement was of minimal impact on our
industry.
Wliat we have done is to try to make steel
import duties a common factor in international
trade. Prior to the Kennedy Round the United
States had the lowest rates. Now the rates of the
major countries are approximately even,
averaging between 6 and 8 percent. Perhaps
more important than the duty reductions is that
for the first time the steel tariff's of all major
producing countries will be bomid against in-
crease. I am not claiming that all problems in
steel have been negotiated away. On the con-
trary, many remain; but the Kennedy Round
agreement has come a good way toward remov-
ing unequal competitive conditions for trade
in st«el.
Textiles is similarly a very large sector of our
international trade, and the gi-owth of textile
imports has been particularly strong in recent
years. In return for a 3-year extension of the
Long-Term Arrangement for cotton textiles on
the part of the exporting countries, the coun-
tries importing textiles agreed to reductions of
about 15 to 20 percent and certain adjustments
in import quota levels. Extension of the Long-
Term Arrangement has been one of our chief
goals in the negotiation, and we are very
pleased with this settlement, as are the leaders
of our cotton textile industry.
In manmade-fiber textiles our overall reduc-
130
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion was about 14 to 15 percent. Our reduction
varied by sensitivity, with yarn reduced by 37
percent, fabric by 18 percent, and apparel by 6
percent.
Our reductions on wool textiles averaged 2
percent. Virtually every major sensitive item
was excepted from negotiations. Items on which
tariffs were reduced were mostly low-trade,
nonsensitive items.
So we can again say that in a trade area of
large dollar value, with heavy pressure from
many sources for expanded entry into our huge
market, we came to a level of agreement in
which all parties found benefit, and our nego-
tiators were responsive to the serious problems
faced by this key industry.
Probably the most publicized and perhaps the
most controversial part of the Kennedy Round
agreement is in the chemical sector. This agree-
ment is in two parts, the first of which stands
by itself as an integral part of the Kennedy
Round package. Within the Kennedy Round
package, the United States agreed to reduce its
duties on chemicals by an average of 43 percent.
The EEC is reducing by an average of about 20
percent, the U.K. by about 23 percent, Japan
44 percent, and Switzerland 49 percent. United
States exports of chemicals benefiting by these
concessions amounted to about $900 million in
1964, while our dutiable imports from those
countries in 1964 amounted to about $325 mil-
lion. The favorable trade balance here is nearly
3 to 1, while the depth of tariff reduction, with
the exception of the U.K. and EEC, is about
equal to ours.
The second part of the chemicals agreement
involves the American Selling Price — a system
where the duty rate is levied not against the
foreign invoice value of the imported product
but against the U.S. selling price of the com-
petitively produced domestic product. In this
part the United States, provided the Congi'ess
enacts the necessary legislation, will eliminate
the American Selling Price on benzenoid chemi-
cals and reduce all rates in its chemical tariff
above 20 percent down to that level with certain
exceptions. These are dyes, pigments, and
azoics, which the United States would reduce
to 30 percent, and sulfa drugs, which the
United States would reduce only to about 25
percent. The EEC and the U.K. will then
place into effect the remaining portion of
their reductions so that the EEC total reduc-
tion on chemicals will equal about 46 percent
and the U.K. 50 percent. Some U.K. rates will
be reduced by as much as 62 percent. The end
result will be that virtually all chemical rates
in the EEC and U.K. will be at 121^^ percent or
below, whereas the United States will have
many rates, as noted above, at considerably
higher levels.
As a further element of the second part of the
chemicals agi-eement, Belgium, France, and
Italy will liberalize the discriminatory aspects
of their road-tax system, Switzerland will
modify its regulation limiting imports of camied
fruit preserved in corn syrup, and the U.K.
will reduce its margin of preference on imports
of tobacco. Action on these nontariff barriers
will be taken as reciprocity for the United
States elimination of ASP.
The chemicals negotiation was the most diffi-
cult to conclude, but at the same time it was one
of the most successful. We believe the United
States has an excellent bargain in both pack-
ages, and we are prepared to present the second
package to Congress for approval as soon as
time and conditions permit. The Kennedy
Round chemical package is self-contained and
will in no way be affected by congressional ac-
tion, which bears only on the second part. The
benzenoid chemical industi-y is a strong and effi-
cient industry which, in our judgment, will be
adequately protected by the rates provided for
in the ASP agreement.
Antidumping Rules
I might conclude by mentioning our attempts
at removing nontariff barriers. Here we have
not achieved everything we wanted, but on the
other hand we certainly did not give others all
they wanted. Our biggest accomplishment, of
course, was the negotiation of international
rules for dumping. These spell out article VI of
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], which covers this subject, and our ac-
complishment here is twofold. First, we have
negotiated rules which do not require changes
in our legislation and very little change in our
administrative regulations on dumping. Sec-
ondly, we have achieved international agree-
ment for fair and open procedures for United
States exporters who are charged with dump-
ing abroad. Canada probably made the biggest
contribution in this area by agreeing to require
an injury fuiding before dumping duties are
imposed.
We must recognize that beyond the ASP
package and the antidumping code relatively
little was accomplished toward reduction of
JULT 31, 1967
131
nontariff barriers, though what was done
amounts to a substantial beginning. The whole
problem of nontariff barriers will be a major
portion of future GATT agendas, and we will
be persistent in seeking effective solutions to
problems we know trouble many American
companies.
These, then, are the broad outlines of the re-
sults in the industrial sector of the historic
Geneva negotiations so skillfully handled by
Bill Roth, the late Christian Herter, and their
able associates.
Thousands of individual barriers have been
cleared from the avenues of world trade. But
only you — the dynamic business leadei'S of
America — can take advantage, for your com-
panies and the whole Nation, of the opportunity
offered. I was delighted to see a full-page adver-
tisement by a major U.S. airfreight carrier an-
nouncing some forthcoming reductions on air
cargo rates which are described as comple-
mentary to the tariff reductions in Europe. It is
this kind of aggressive marketing that will lead
more American companies to take advantage of
increased trade opportunities abroad. The name
of the game is "A Good Offense," and I know
that American business will be even more skilled
as they play it on a field which has fewer bar-
riers as a result of the Geneva agreements.
AGRICULTURE'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Secretary Freeman
I'm happy to be reporting to you today, be-
cause I have a strong personal interest in the
subject we are talking about. For almost 7 years
now, I have worked hard to expand our coun-
try's foreign agriculture trade. And it has been
gratifying work. I have had the satisfaction of
seeing our country's agricultural exports grow
from $4.5 billion in fiscal year 1960, the year
before I took office, to a new record of $6.8 bil-
lion in the 1967 fiscal year that ended June 30.
Exports for dollars climbed from $3.2 billion to
$5.4 billion in the same period.
The other day I was talking to my Cabinet
colleague Joe Fowler. Secretary [of the Treas-
ury Henry H.] Fowler, as you know, fights hard
and effectively to strengthen the balance-of-
payments position of the United States. Our
country has many tough economic problems, but
none is tougher than the balance-of -payments
problem — and it affects all the others. It is com-
plicated by the fact that what other countries
and international bankers do affects us strongly
yet is largely beyond our control.
Secretai'y Fowler said to me, 'T don't know
what we would do today if the annual agricul-
tural exports for dollars hadn't increased $2.2
billion since 1960." He went on to say that we
would long since have faced a national economic
crisis of grave proportions, that the value of the
dollar would have been seriously undermined,
were it not for the substantial flow of dollars
into the Treasury from agricultural exports.
Wliat he said is certainly true. Had dollar
exports of farm products not continued to climb
during these 1960's, we would not have had $7.3
billion in cumulative dollar earnings that have
been added to our balance of payments.
All this means that I approach this matter
of trade negotiations and trade expansion with
a deep personal sense of participation and
involvement.
American agriculture came to the Kennedy
Round in a spirit of expectation. We sought a
general lowering of agricultural trade barriers
which would give efficient farmers, ours and in
other countries, a greater opportunity to sell
competitively in the world's expanding mar-
kets. We looked on the Kennedy Round as a
means of helping world trade in general and
our own export drive in particular.
To some extent our expectations were
realized. Considering the problems encovm-
tered, we emerged with far better results than
we thought possible during some of the darkest
days when negotiations almost broke off.
We also saw fii-sthand why agricultural trade
negotiations are so difficult. We learned that
when our trading partners resisted lowering
their trade barriers on agricultural products,
in most instances they were pressed bj' the need
to protect the income of their farmers.
The Kennedy Round experience confirmed
my conviction that the difficulty of agricultural
trade negotiations lies first and foremost in the
universal farm-income problem. As a rule of
thumb, around the world a farmer gets only
about one-half as much income for his labor
and investment as the nonfarm sectors of the
respective countries enjoy.
Governments, of course, are responsive to this
discriminatory situation. The lowering of agri-
cultural trade barriers will continue to be
exceptionally difficult as long as fann incomes
lag so far behind other incomes. This farm-
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
income problem is not peculiar to foreign coun-
tries. It is our problem, too. In many cases it
determines our own trade positions.
The last 2 months the Secretary of Agricxd-
ture and senior members of the Department of
Agriculture have been holding shirtsleeve ses-
sions with American farmers all around the
country, discussing the farmer's position in our
economy and how to reinforce it. It was obvious
at these meetmgs that farmers across the nation
are deeply and understandably concerned that
they are not getting a fair share in our Ameri-
can prosperity.
Our farm prices today are lower than they
were 20 years ago. Yet the cost of what the
farmer buys has gone up 35 percent. Only by
increasing his labor productivity 6 percent an-
nually, more than twice the improvement made
by American industry, has the American farmer
managed to survive. It is true that Government
payments have helped some, but even so our
per capita farm income is only two-thirds of our
nonf arm income.
And it would be ever so much worse if our
agricultural exports had not been steadily
climbing to a point where today they absorb
the production from one acre out of every four
of his cropland and make a substantial contri-
bution to his total receipts. Agricultural exports
are of vital importance to every American
fanner.
Tangible Benefits for U.S. Farmers
I would like to turn now to what we actually
got out of the agricultural phase of the Ken-
nedy Round.
"We benefited in two ways :
First, we obtained from it some modest trade
liberalization. The Kennedy Round will give
us better access to some important foreign agri-
cultural markets. Concessions won at Geneva
will mean larger export sales in the years ahead
for many of our farm products.
Second, the Kennedy Roimd made us aware
of the problems we still face in bringing more
order into world agricultural trade. It pin-
pointed the problems. To me, this is a very im-
portant result — and I would like to return to it
later.
As to tangible benefits from the Kennedy
Round, we gained considerably in our trade
in fruits and vegetables, oilseeds, tobacco, va-
riety meats, tallow, and a number of other
products. The concessions granted by other
countries covered more than $900 million in
their imports of such products from the United
States, 1964 basis. On agricultural products ac-
coimting for over $700 million — in which we
have an important export interest — they cut
their duties an average of more than 40
percent.
The Kennedy Round also is giving us a new
grains arrangement which will provide ad-
ditional price insurance to U.S. wheat pro-
ducers. This arrangement contains significant
food aid provisions completely unprecedented
in any multilateral accord of which I am aware.
Apart from their intrinsic humanitarian
worth — and this in itself is adequate justifica-
tion for them— these provisions should open
new commercial outlets for wheat and, to some
extent, feed grains.
Reciprocally, the United States cut its duties
on some agricultural products, and imports of
such items can be expected to increase mod-
erately. Duties covering around $500 million of
the products we import were cut by an average
of 39 percent. The existing duty or duty-free
status of an additional $290 million worth of
import products was bound against upward
change. Man}' of our concessions relate to tropi-
cal products which we do not produce and were
granted for the benefit of the developing
nations.
While bargaining is never without its "give"
as well as "take," to the best of my knowledge
no American agricultural producer will be ex-
posed to serious economic injury as a result of
the Kemiedy Round. American farmers as a
whole, because of their comparative efficiency,
will be better off than they would have been had
the Kennedy Round not taken place.
Concessions won at Geneva will mean in-
creased foreign markets for a niunber of our
farm commodities. Our agricultural exports
are inevitably on an upward trend and would
increase had there been no Kennedy Round. But
the rate of increase unquestionably will be
faster because of our negotiation successes.
Now I would like to return to my second
point: our awareness of the problems we still
face in further reducing world trade barriers.
The Kennedy Round has shown the trouble
in trying to buy, with reductions in duties, re-
moval of the major barriers still standing in the
way of international agricultural trade.
The Kennedy Round has also shown that a
JULY 31, 196T
133
massive multilateral trade negotiation involving
all countries and all products may not be the
best way to get at the root of agricultural trade
problems. It i:)rovidos too much opportunity for
sidestepping the real busmess at hand.
It has shown with startling clarity the com-
plex and exasperating nature of the trade bar-
riers in agricultiu-e, and most disturbing of all,
it has shown a fundamental difference among
the major trading partners as to international
trade philosophy. Let me explain this.
A concept of orderly trade is basic to a nego-
tiation. Unless parties can agree on objectives,
they rarely accomplish anything. There must
be a mutuality of interest. There must be com-
mon ground in agricultural negotiations.
During this negotiation, all parties said they
were trying to bring about more orderly agri-
cultural trade, but I detected at least three dif-
ferent ideas of what "more orderly" meant.
Each idea was put forward by a negotiating
bloc powerful enough to prevent consensus.
The first said : Let those who can, produce —
whether the production is efficient or not. The
only test is : Are we physically capable of turn-
ing out the product and are we able and willing
to bear the cost ?
The second said : Let those who can produce
efficiently, produce. The test ought to be based
upon who can produce abundantly, inexpen-
sively, and well, and not upon who has physical
capacity and strength of treasury.
The third said : Let those produce who must
produce to exist. Whether inefficient or not, if
we can only produce a few products, let us pro-
duce them and sell them because we must. This
last view, of course, is put forward with increas-
ing intensity by the less developed countries,
which, in many cases, have neither the resources
to produce cheaply and well nor the financial
capacity to subsidize heavily.
Given these three major conflicting views, is
it any wonder that we were unable to make in
this negotiation all the changes we desired?
The Kennedy Round was primarily a tariff
negotiation. Tariffs I'emain an important means
of protecting producers in many parts of the
world. But in agriculture, particularly, other
barriers are numerous and complex. Negotiators
met with only limited success in removing or
lowering them — and on the really hard-core
products had no success at all.
Overall, as I said earlier, the problem of liber-
alizing trade st«ms from the almost general
disparity in income between farm and nonfarm
people. That disparity jooses an obligation on
evei-y govermnent to protect the incomes of its
farmers and still make sure that all the people
have enough food and fiber and other products
of agriculture. It is an obligation that has called
forth price and income programs in every
country in the world. These take many different
forms and they all affect world trade in one
way or another.
Different Systems of Farm-Income Support
The European Economic Community at-
tempts to keep domestic agricultural prices
high for most products through a variable-levy
system. The EEC sets the prices, and the vari-
able levies remove the effect of outside compe-
tition. This is truly a fonnidable barrier to
trade.
The United Kingdom favors the deficiency-
payment support system. Internal consumer
prices ai"e allowed to seek their own level. But
producer returns are kept at government-set
levels through producer payments. The impact
of this system on exporters is more obscure, but
severe nevertheless.
We have our support programs in the United
States, also. In some cases — in cotton and
wool — the program is a combination of defi-
ciency payments and tariffs or quotas. In dairy,
it is a combination of a support price and quotas
and tariff's. In grains, we use a certificate pro-
gram. Our system is different from others in
that in many cases we tie payments to acreage
reduction. In this manner we prevent price-
depressing surpluses. The United States is the
only country in the world that has taken on the
exceedingly difficult, politically hazardous, yet
im]:)ortant task of limiting production. If we
didn't do so, there would be a growing world
surplus in the grains, cotton, and tobacco, with
resultant international trade chaos. Yet this
major contribution to orderly world trade goes
largely unnoticed.
Government support programs oft«n lead not
only to import control but also to export assist-
ance. The EEC has such export assistance.
Denmark uses a two-price system in which
prices for products marketed at home are held
at one level, while exports are marketed well
below that. Other countries use marketing
boards that have great flexibility in price
practices.
134
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BT7LLETIN
Because of such programs, just the other clay
I had to make the very difficuU decision to
recommend sharp restrictions on imports of
dairy products into tlie United States." This
was not a pleasant decision. A country which
exports as much as we do must be prepared to
import as well.
But the dairy trade had become sick. Under
the EEC system of high dairy support prices
protected by variable levies, production has
increased to the point tliat heavy surpluses of
butter and cheese are a glut on the EEC market.
Under such circumstances, an EEC export pro-
gram operates almost automatically to move
these suri^luses out of the EEC, regardless of
their impact on the trade of more efficient sup-
pliers or on the economies of importing coun-
tries. EEC butter, produced at a price of 60 to
65 cents per pound, was being sold in the
United States for around 22 cents per pound.
It was entering the United States as a butter-
fat/sugar mixture in circumvention of existing
U.S. import controls on butter and in quantities
that were interfering with the operation of our
own support program.
You will recall that not too many years ago
the United States also had burdensome sur-
pluses of dairy products. But we didn't dump
ours indiscriminately into the international
market. We stored them and used them at home
in school lunch programs and to feed our
needy. We moved them abroad only when
demand was such that they did not disturb the
international market. It is a pity that other
major producers have not practiced similar
restraint.
Orienting Trade to Production Efficiency
It can be seen, then, that even if countries
were agreed on the kind of order they wanted
to put into the international trading system,
the task of reshaping its numerous and compli-
cated systems and barriers would be a formid-
able one. Even to catalog and understand them
is difficult. To deal with them all at one time
in a comprehensive way is virtually impossible.
This also we learned from the Kennedy Round.
How then can we deal with these barriers?
What kind of plan can be used? What should
our agricultural trade policy be? Ambassador
Roth has mentioned the trade policy study
" For text of Presidential proclamation 3790 amend-
ing the import restrictions on certain dairy products,
see 32 Fed. Reg. 9808.
which he will undertake next year. This will
help us decide. I cannot, of course, anticipate
it. I can suggest, however, that he explore care-
fully the following princijales, which I think
are essential.
The underlying objective in U.S. agricultural
trade policy must continue to be one of orient-
ing agricultural trade to production efficiency.
In other words, those who can produce abun-
dantly, inexpensively, and well should produce
and should be leaders in trade.
There will be exceptions, of course. If some
countries insist on f)roducing at heavy cost
simply because they are so inclined and have the
money, we can't prevent them. But we can
try in every way we laiow to show them that
they are wrong and where they are wrong and
try to get them to move toward the pi'inciple
of comparative advantage.
We should start by focusing our attention
on individual products or, at most, product
groups, and we should seek to deal in depth
with the barriers affecting them. I think we
should start such explorations among key coun-
tries in the very near future.
Helping the Less Developed Countries
In the work that lies ahead we need also to
recognize that the Kennedy Round had more
significance for the industrialized nations than
it had for the developing countries.
The United States tried hard to make the
Kennedy Round meaningful for the less de-
veloped countries. In agriculture we cut, and
in many cases eliminated, duties on tropical
products valued at almost $120 million — prod-
ucts such as Indian cashew nuts, Brazil nuts,
Philippine desiccated coconut, and so on. We
committed ourselves not to put duties on fresh
bananas and other products now duty free to
the amount of another $140 million. And we
cut duties on some temperate products in which
the developing countries have a trade interest
approaching $70 million. I know of no other
area of the world that did as much in this way
as the United States.
And much more needs to be done along these
lines by all tradmg partners. President Jolmson
said last April at Punta del Este :
We are ready to explore with other industrialized
countries — and with our own people — the possibility
of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all
developing countries in the markets of all the indus-
trialized countries.
JULY 31, 1967
135
In other words, there may need to be special
trade pi'ograms in addition to the special aid
programs through which we have been ex-
tending tecluiical, food, and other forms of
assistance for a number of years.
This is not something that will come about
quickly. But as part of the complex problem
of helping the less developed countries to
emerge, we do need to be openminded about
their obvious need for remunerative markets
for what they produce. Only by having such
markets can they ever hope to pay their own
way.
It is in our own interest that these nations
grow to a trade basis. We are spending millions
upon millions of dollars today in carrying out
our worldwide teclinical, economic, and food aid
programs. Our objective must be to turn this
one-way flow into a two-way trade flow- — and
the only way this can happen is for the less de-
veloped countries to become stronger trading
partners.
The largest potential market in the world
lies in the less developed countries, with their
large populations and largely undeveloped re-
sources. We see evidence of this market's awak-
ening. There needs to be — and can be — a general
springing to life in country after country.
Modem man is an economic being. There is no
tonic more powerful in bringing about this ac-
tion than available markets for what the less
developed countries have to sell — which, in turn,
will make it possible for them to buy the things
they need from us.
Growing Influence of American Agriculture
In this trading world of the future — which
the Kennedy Round and its lessons will help
to shape — I see American agriculture playing
an even more extensive role in feeding and
clothing the world than it is playing today. And
I see this role carried out increasingly through
commercial, dollar-earning export trade.
As I said earlier, during the fiscal year just
ended we exported a new record value of $6.8
billion worth of agricultural products. A record
$5.4 billion of this was in dollar-earning
commercial sales.
A total of $8 billion in U.S. agricultural ex-
ports by 1970 is a target we expect to reach.
And we will go on from there, I predict, with
$10 billion in U.S. agricultural exports by 1980.
Further, I look for the big increases to take
place in the dollar-earning type of exports
which, as my friend Secretary Fowler has said,
are givi:ig timely and strategic assistance to our
nation's balance of payments.
Part of this continuing advance in our agri-
cultural exports will come about through con-
tinued lowering of trade barriers throughout
the world. Our products are competitive and
they are needed. In many countries the continu-
ing pressure for supplies will override pressures
for self-sufficiency.
And as trade barriers are eased, we will con-
tinue— as we are doing — to follow up with ag-
gressive market development actions. The De-
partment of Agi'iculture is teamed today with
U.S. trade and agricutural groups to promote
sales of our farm products in more than 70
countries. This work is effective and is one of
the strong reasons for my optimistic predictions.
As an example of this export promotion, I
am announcing today that the Department of
Agriculture and our many trade and agricul-
tural cooperators will present a major agricul-
tural trade exhibit in Tokyo next spring —
April 5 to 21, 1968. This will be one of our
largest overseas promotion events in our largest
export market. Japan, as you may know, now
buys nearly $1 billion worth of our farm prod-
ucts annually. From this exhibition we will
strengthen further Japan's obvious good will
toward U.S. food and agricultural products.
And, more tangibly, we hope to see Japan con-
tinue to increase its purchases fi'om us, with $1
billion only an interim milestone.
American agriculture has immense and grow-
ing influence in world affairs today. This influ-
ence will grow as world population and incomes
rise and demand is strengtliened for the food
and fiber we can produce with such efficiency.
But trade, ultimately, is the conduit through
which the bounty we produce can reach foreign
consumers. Fundamental to that trade is the
extent to which the world allows comparative
advantage to function.
The Kennedy Round resolved only some of
agriculture's trade problems. Many remain. But
I think the Kennedy Round did help to clarify
the thinking of our own participants and of
our trading partners. It gave us new insight
and perspective as we try again.
And we must try again and keep trying. Only
as trade in food and agricultural products is
allowed to flow in a relatively unrestricted man-
ner will the world's people sliare, as they should
and must, in all the good things that modern
science and technology can make available.
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
LABOR'S STAKE IN THE KENNEDY ROUND
Address by Under Secretary Reynolds
Our business in the Labor Department is em-
ployment— and every billion dollars of goods
we export supports close to 100,000 jobs. We
are encouraged with the outcome of the Ken-
nedy Round. "We believe that the substantial
tariff reductions which will become effective
over the next 5 years will encourage expansion
of U.S. exports and enable us to preserve and
expand export-related employment opportuni-
ties in the United States.
In total, we do not anticipate any unmanage-
able situations of labor dislocation resulting
from the stimulus of increased imports, al-
though it could be that particular firms and
groups of workers may be adversely affected.
The combination of gi-adual implementation of
tariff reductions over a 5-year period and rap-
idly expanding manpower programs, in addi-
tion to adjustment assistance, will enable work-
ers and firms to adjust to increased imports with
minimum personal and corporate losses.
Our current balance-of-payments difficulty is
not the only reason for U.S. industry to make
special efforts to increase U.S. exports.
Another reality with significant implications
for domestic employment lies in the fact that
over the years, as U.S. productivity and effi-
ciency improve, the American manufacturer
uses less and less labor per unit of manufacture.
Consequently, we have to accelerate output in
manufacturing just to maintain employment
growth in manufacturing. For example, be-
tween 1960 and 196.5 output in manufacturing
increased by about 34 percent. However, during
the same period employment in manufacturing
only increased by about 7 percent.
We are not complaining, mind you ! We are
aware that employment patterns are constantly
undergoing change. During that same period,
while the U.S. labor force was increasing by
about .5 million workers, the number of unem-
ployed dropped almost one-half million and
the unemployment rate declined a full per-
centage point to an average of 4.5 percent in
1965. We did considerably better in 1966, when
the unemployment rate dropped to 3.8 per-
cent— the first time it has averaged below 4
percent for a year since 1953. And we hope to
improve upon that in the future.
The efficiency of American labor and industry
showed vip closer to home, also. Productivity
improvements in the 1960-65 period permitted
U.S. workers to realize most of their increased
earnings in increased real income, since price
levels remained relatively stable while gross
weekly earnings increased considerably.
The efficiency of American labor and industry
shows up in another critical measure, particu-
larly in reference to our ability to benefit from
the reciprocal elimination of trade barriers. Be-
tween 1960 and 1965, unit labor costs in manu-
facturing declined by about 2 percent in the
United States. Only Canada showed signs of
matching that performance. For our other ma-
jor trading partners, we note that unit labor
cost increased about 16 percent for the United
Kingdom, about 8 percent for Sweden, 20 per-
cent for Japan, and between 25 and 37 percent
for France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
But the considerable economic gi-owth and in-
tegration achieved by the countries of the
European Economic Community and the Euro-
pean Free Trade Association suggest that they
will also achieve the ability to improve their
cost perfonnance in the future.
We are confident, however, that we can con-
tinue to improve our relative competitive posi-
tion in world markets under our free economic
and political institutions.
Developments in the Common Market and
the European Free Trade Association made it
increasingly imperative to successfully conclude
the Kennedy Round negotiations. Both trading
blocs have made considerable progress in the
elimination of internal barriers to trade. EFTA
has no tariffs between member countries, and
the Common Market is scheduled to eliminate
all internal tariff barriers on July 1, 1968. In
1966, the combined GNP of both of these re-
gional trading blocs exceeded $500 billion.
Their internal markets are expanding and, like
the United States market, offer tremendous op-
portunities for manufacturers to increase out-
put at lower costs.
Both of the trading blocs maintain tariff and
nontariff barriers against U.S. exports which,
in conjunction with productivity impovements
to be expected from economic development and
integration, could have serious implications for
the expansion of U.S. exports and the degree
and nature of import competition in U.S.
markets.
It seems reasonable to assume that the tariff
and nontariff barrier reductions negotiated in
the Kennedy Round, and the dynamic impetus
created for the elimination of remaining tariff
JULY 31, 1967
137
and nontariff barriers in the future, will prevent
both export restriction and trade diversion fi'oin
occurring.
We are trying here to identify labor's stake
in the Kennedy Round witliin a dynamic world
of changing political and economic conditions.
We cannot afford to be complacent in such
a changing world. In fact, we stand to benefit
considerably by participating in and shaping
the changes that take place. I say again that
we expect the benefits of the Kennedy Eomid
to outweigh the cost of such temporary dis-
locations as may occur when competition
increases. Our present stake in foreign trade is
impressive.
Export-Related Employment in Manufacturing
In 1965, about 2.4 million jobs in manufac-
turing were attributable to U.S. exports of
merchandise and another half million at-
tributable to exports of services. Nearly 7
percent of total manufacturing employment
was related to the export of goods and services.
In the manufacturing sector, about 10 percent
of the machinery industries' employment is
export related — for the engine and turbine seg-
ment the ratio is 20 percent. About 10 percent
of industry employment was export related in
the lumber and paper industries; 9 percent for
scientific and measuring instrinnents industry;
10 percent for aircraft; and 14 and 16 percent,
respectively, for the chemical and synthetic
materials industries.
We emphasize manufacturing employment
because it is generally high-wage employ-
ment compared to other industry employment
and because it constitutes about 30 percent
of total nonagricultural employment.
In 1966, gross weekly earnings in manu-
facturing averaged about $112, compared to
an average of $61 and $79, respectively, for
employment in personal service occupations
and wholesale and retail trade, which together
constituted about 36 percent of total nonagri-
cultural employment.
Further, wages in our chief export indus-
tries, such as the chemicals, aircraft, and
machinery industries, are about 10 to 30 percent
higher than the average weekly earnings for
manufacturing as a whole.
So if the past and the present are any
guide to the future, the stake we have
in the Kennedy Round is high-wage and
high-quality employment opportunities and
everything that implies for a better standard
of life for all Americans.
The role of imports is another area which
we want to discuss frankly and constructively.
We sometimes hear the viewpoint expressed
that if we cut off or sharply reduce imports of
a competitive product, employment and output
in the domestic industry concerned would auto-
matically increase. By implication, this argu-
ment could be read to suggest an increase in
overall employment as well.
A complex and dynamic economy such as ours
does not operate quite that simply. There may
be particular cases where such a simple rela-
tionship might hold, but in an environment in
which national policies are geared to achieve
and maintain full employment and economic sta-
bility, such generalizations cannot be sustained.
Trade flows fi'om countiy to country in the
free world are reciprocal in nature. A restric-
tive act taken by one country tends to be
matched by a restrictive response by other coun-
tries. The net effect of such acts is most often
a contraction in world trade.
The economic effects of such a contraction
would ultimately be a reduction, relative or ac-
tual, in exports from the United States, the
country with the world's largest trade volume.
Foreign countries generally pay for goods in
dollars which they acquire directly or indirectly
from the United States as a result of foreign
goods being sold to the United States. By re-
stricting foreign access to U.S. markets, we
would limit the dollars that are available to
buyers who are potential customers of U.S. busi-
ness. The effects could also extend to the loss of
overseas markets where U.S. businessmen are
now facing more aggressive competition from
third countries and from domestic industry in
the countries involved.
In this era of close and complex interna-
tional trade and economic relationships, conse-
quences of measures which restrict imports are
most likely to have a detrimental impact on
U.S. exports and, by extension, on employment
in export industries, where wages tend to be
higher.
My point is that consideration of proposals
to restrict imports for the benefit of a single
industry must be examined in the perepective
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of the total national interest as it relates to
emploj'ment, prices, and output.
We must always be alert to situations which
migfht culminate in widespread and umnanage-
able unemployment. Fortunately, our experience
suggests that serious employment dislocation
which can be attributed to import competition
is relatively rare and can be accommodated by
the present national and international trade
policies.
Imports play a critical role in our complex
economy. Not long ago layoffs were reported
in the copper and brass products industry be-
cause of tight supplies of copper. Considerable
price pressures were reported to exist in the
stainless steel industry because of nickel short-
ages. We note also a tendency for imports to
increase when there is a possibility of an inter-
ruption to output arising from collective bar-
gaining negotiations or other causes.
Therefore, we find it difficult to accept the
simple relationship that is implied in a state-
ment tliat total employment can be increased
if we produce domestically what we now import
in considerable quantities, even if we do have
the capability of making the product.
Benefits to Labor and Nation as a Whole
Import competition, like any competition,
stimulates change. Such change may cause dis-
placement of labor which will vary in duration
depending on the speed of the change, the
adaptability of the displaced worker, and
the availability of alternative emisloyment
opportunities.
While we think it reasonable to assume that
imports, as a competitive factor, may contribute
toward displacements of labor and capital, the
analytical arts have not advanced sufficiently
to permit us to measure with any precision the
impact of imports. In a sense Congress recog-
nized this when it included the adjustment
assistance provisions in the Trade Expansion
Act. These provisions are based on the premise
that no single group should bear the burden
of injury that might result from an interna-
tional policy that benefits the nation as a whole
and that the determination of possible injury
due to imports can best be made after close
examination of particular cases.
Aside from the employment opportunities
which are related to the international exchange
of goods and services, there are the benefits that
accrue to consumers with respect to the variety
of products available in the marketplace and the
less obvious benefits which accrue f i-om the stim-
ulus of worldwide competition on the basis of
price, quality, and technology.
The conclusion we reach is that the benefits
which accrue to labor and the Nation as a whole
as a consequence of our foreign trade are such
that we look to future trade expansion resulting
from the Kennedy Round agreements with op-
timism that the net result will be more employ-
ment at higher wages than would otherwise have
been the case had the agreement been anything
less than it is.
Programs To Assist Vulnerable Industries
Before closing, I want to remind you of two
programs which we think equitably protect and
assist the legitimate interests of industries most
viilnerable to import competition and which fa-
cilitate the expansion of world trade.
The first and more active program is that
required as a result of our participation in
the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement
(LTA). A 3-year extension of the LTA was
negotiated within the framework of the Ken-
nedy Round. The Arrangement, over the years,
has permitted a limited and gradual growth of
imports in a mamier which avoided disruption
in the domestic market. The LTA has been an
important factor in stabilizing emplojanent
conditions in the industr}' and in encouraging
considerable imi^rovements in teclmology and
capital investment to be reflected in improved
productivity and wages of workers in the in-
dustry.
The second program I would note is the ad-
justment assistance program for firms and
groups of workers, one of the major innovations
of the Trade Expansion Act.
The adjustment assistance concept is that it
makes more sense to try to improve the pro-
ductivity of resources displaced or subject to
displacement as a consequence of import com-
petition than to restrict imports by means of
higher tariffs or quotas — since under the latter
there is no assurance that the necessary improve-
ments will be made to allow the firm or indus-
try and associated workers to compete with im-
ports or other domestic competition.
Adjustment assistance for woi'kers consists of
a combination of monetary payments called
JULY 31, 1967
139
trade readjustment allowances, which are based
on the worker's past earning experience and
limited to a maximum of 65 jjercent of tlie aver-
age weekly wage in manufacturing employ-
ment; training and retraining opportunities;
and relocation allowances to assist heads of
houseliolds to move to new locations where there
is certainty of employment.
Tlie desire to encourage improved produc-
tivity is illustrated by the emphasis Congress
placed on training. Under the act, if a worker
refuses to avail himself of suitable available
training opportmiities, he can be denied other
adjustment assistance. The emphasis on train-
ing is well placed. We all know from experience
that the worker who is able to adapt to, and
take advantage of, change has the best chance
to enjoy a lifetime of rising income and stable
employment. This program benefits all of us in
the long run since by improving skills and
worker productivity we increase our ability to
expand the national product and thus make pos-
sible liigher living standards for us all.
Under the Trade Expansion Act, the Tariff
Commission is responsible for making the in-
itial decisions which determine whether firms
or workers might be eligible to receive adjust-
ment assistance. Only five worker groups and
five firms attempted to obtain adjustment as-
sistance under the Trade Expansion Act, and
none of these groups or firms were found by
the Tariff Commission to meet the criteria for
eligibility for adjustment assistance presently
in the act. This experience has made both the
administration and the Congress aware of the
need to modify the criteria so that the objective
of the program relating to workers and firms
can be more fully achieved.
We have had experience with the adjustment
assistance program under the Automotive Prod-
ucts Trade Act which implements the U.S.-
Canadian auto agreement. In 18 months of op-
eration of the program, about 2,000 individual
workers filed for benefits, of whom about 1,100
were found to satisfy the eligibility require-
ments and subsequently received adjustment
assistance benefits.
The adjustment assistance benefits available
to workers under the auto act are identical to
those provided in the Trade Expansion Act,
although the procedures for gaining access to
the program and the criteria for determining
worker and firm eligibility are substantially dif-
ferent. Under the auto act, the Tariff' Commis-
sion conducts an investigation as to the facts of
the situation. The Automotive Adjustment As-
sistance Board, made up of the Secretaries of
Labor, Commerce, and Treasury, makes the de-
terminations of eligibility for groujas of work-
ers and firms.
We believe that adjustment assistance is an
effective way to assist workers and firms to
adapt to changing economic conditions. It is in
this spirit that the administration will be ask-
ing the Congress to amend the Trade Expan-
sion Act to insure that the intent and promise
of the adjustment assistance program can be
realized by workers and firms who have been
displaced because of import competition.
To conclude, I would like to leave you with
this brief summary of our stake in the Kennedy
Round : job opportunities ; higher wages ; stable
and rising incomes; and in the case of disloca-
tions resulting from import competition, the
opportunity to improve the skills and earnings
potential of displaced workers.
140
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
". . . NATO is not only moving, tag and haggage, from the
Porte Dauphine in Paris to the old Evere airfield in Brussels;
NATO is also moving from, peaceJeeeping to peacemaking, from
the mMnageTTient of a cold war to the management of detente!'''
The Golden Rule of Consultation
hy Ilarlan Cleveland
U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council'^
In the Paris suburb of Versailles a few
months ago, a touring company put on Peter
Ustinov's aging allegorical play The Love of
Four Colonels. You may recall that m this play
four officers — French, British, Ajnerican, and
Soviet colonels — vie for a lady's hand ; the lady
is perfection. Each fails, because perfection is
unattainable; and Dr. Diabolikov, who is
Ustinov's version of the Devil, offers them a
new proposition. They can, he says, go to sleep
for a hundred years and awaken with perfec-
tion in their grasp.
As they debate the issue, the Soviet officer
says he is a pragmatist; he is intei'ested not in
horizons but in breathing. The American is
attracted to oblivion; he is disgusted with his
wife and, anyway, he needs the rest. Yet as he
considers the choice, he thinks of one good rea-
son to stay alive in the world of today.
""V^Tierever you have a Russian," he says, "it's a
good idea to have an American."
In the Versailles production this line was
greeted with spontaneous and sustained ap-
plause. A member of the road-show company
said afterward that it invariably evokes a cheer
from French audiences, even in cities where the
Communist vote is strong.
There is a little mystery about this applause
line in the French version of The Love of Four
Colonels. It is not in the published play and was
apparently added somewhere along the line —
perhaps with the object of stirring up the audi-
' Made before the American Business Men's Club at
Bonn on June 20.
ence and making a political point. But what-
ever its origin, its anonymous a.uthor captured
in a short, simple sentence what most Euro-
peans and most Americans know has been the
practical basis for peace in our time : "Wherever
you have a Eussian, it's a good idea to have an
American."
This sure-fire applause line is still, regret-
tably, as relevant as ever. As long as the Rus-
sians continue to invest an impressive propor-
tion of their whole budget in the most modern
machinery of war, Americans are obliged to as-
sume that the only sure restraint on Soviet
leaders is their continuing to feel that recourse
to force or the threat of force risks setting in
motion an escalator beyond their control and
leading to military retaliation against the So-
viet Union itself.
Wliat makes it possible for Americans to stay
in Europe and work with Europeans for Euro-
pean security is a complex of transatlantic rela-
tionships called NATO. You all know about
NATO — or don't you ? I find that almost every-
body I know has touched NATO at one time or
another and come away with some image in his
mind about the Atlantic alliance.
But most of these images date from 5 or 10
or 15 years ago. There are "experts" who have
written sensibly about NATO but who are writ-
ing nonsense these days because they haven't
bothered to glance recently at the enormous
changes which time and circumstances and At-
lantic politics have wrought in the past 2 years.
How often have I read the words of a lazy com-
mentator, who has not been near the NATO
building for years, telling the alliance not to be
JTJLT 31, 1967
141
so lazy ? How often have we heard some critic,
cherishing his archaic notion of what NATO is,
filling his allotted space in the newspaper with
exhortations to bring the Atlantic alliance up
to date ?
Nobody seems to doubt that NATO has bril-
liantly succeeded in its tirst task, which was to
persuade the Soviets that military militancy
would not pay oif in Europe. Not long ago the
President of the United States called NATO the
world's greatest peacekeeping force. Yet now
some people of the Atlantic world, especially
yoimg people, it is said, are bored by the mili-
tary security of Europe; they don't remember
the last war, and they are repelled by the cold
war. What has this antique alliance done for
us lately? they ask. NATO is somehow con-
demned by the 18-year-olds because it is 18
years old.
Must NATO die so young in the hearts of the
young? Surely one should ask first what it is
about our Nortli Atlantic alliance that remains
relevant to this final third of the 20th century —
who would perform its peacekeeping function
if it were to disappear — and what new tasks this
group of European and North American allies
are already beginning to tackle in its new and
unfamiliar environment of cUtente.
For NATO is not only moving, bag and bag-
gage, fi-om the Porte Dauphine in Paris to the
old Evere airfield in Brassels; NATO is also
moving from peacekeeping to peacemaking,
from the management of a cold war to the
management of detente.
The Deterrent Force of NATO
To those who feel that peace is already as-
sured by Soviet statements and current Soviet
behavior, I can only recommend they lay off the
tranquilizers and take a wake-vip pill instead.
Once the eyes are fully opened, I suggest a close
look at the raw facts of Soviet military power
and the rising Soviet investments in the sophis-
ticated machinery of war. The U.S.S.R. today
has more strategic missiles, in better hardened
sites, than ever before. It has more firepower
in Eastern Europe, including Eastern Germany,
than it has ever had there before. It has a bigger
naval presence in the Mediterranean this week
than it has e^er had there before. All in all, a
sober appraisal of what the Soviets could do to
us is quite enough to justify maintaining and
modernizing the deterrent that dissuades tliem i
from doing it.
NATO was built because the Soviet leaders of
two decades ago plainly respected nothing but
force in the realm of international affairs. The
story goes that Stalin, when he w.xs informed
of the interest of the Vatican in a certain matter,
abruptly stopped the conversation by posing a
question : How many divisions has the Pope ?
The story may be apocryphal, but it accurately
describes the reigning opinion in the ruling
circles of the Kremlin in quite recent times. This
illusory notion that force is everything was
tested, and found wanting, by a whole genera-
tion of Soviet leaders in a whole series of crises
from Berlin to Korea to Cuba to Berlin again.
Tlie critical reason these tests failed was
NATO. Allied policy and integrated readiness
proved several times over to Soviet leaders that
military militancy does not pay off in Europe.
They tested our force — three times in Berlin
alone — and found there was enough of it to
make armed adventure too dangerous a course
to suit men of power who are also men of pru-
dence. They tested our will, too — to see if we
could hold together under pressure — and found
that we could and would.
As a result of these cold-war experiences —
and in response to moderating trends witliin So-
viet society — the Russian leaders of today are
noticeably more restrained and less interested
in working themselves into dangerous con-
frontations. And so, without speculating on
what else the current Soviet leaders may have
come to respect, we can stress that the experience
of i-ecent years confirms that the Soviet Union
does, in fact, respect force and beliaves accord-
ingly.
As long as we maintain a credible peacekeep-
ing force, we may reasonably expect the Soviet
Union to maintain a policy of prudent restraint
in the conduct of its European policy. And with
a decent restraint prevailing on both sides, we
have reason to liope that agreements are possible
for making the present stalemate of forces in-
creasingly stable, more tightly controlled; in
time, perhaps, tlie stalemate can be maintained
by agreement or example at lower levels of
ready armed force, and thus at lower cost. And
as this goes on we may reach a state of political
detente in which, for the first time since before
those impatient 18-year-olds were born, we may
be able to tackle and resolve the fundamental
142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIiETIK
political issues which still divide Europe and
threaten the general peace.
Thus the respect which Soviet leaders accord
to the force represented by NATO becomes a
startinij point for defining the changing tasks of
the alliance in the years ahead.
From Military Deterrent to Political Detente
As we set about to parlay our credible military
deterrent to a credible political detente, the first
requirement is therefore to maintain the deter-
rent itself during the period of detente. We will
need our ready armed strength to persuade the
Soviets to talk sense. We will need it to keep
them talking when the going gets rough. And we
will need it to keep honest whatever bargains
can be struck for a durable peace in Europe.
The first signs of detente — brought about by
NATO and Conmiunist evolution — are welcome
indeed, if not yet very impressive. So far, the
change in East-AVest relations is mostly atmos-
pheric, compounded of one part Commiuiist cos-
metics and two parts Western wish-thinking.
In the North Atlantic Council the other day, we
took the pulse of this detente and concluded that
it is not a marriage nor an engagement, or even
a liaison, but a kind of flirtation, with the West
taking most of the initiative.
It is always dangerous, of course, to act in the
present as if the desired future had already
arrived. Our desire for permanent peace in
Europe is so strong in the West that we tend to
overreact to what our would-be Eastern friends
say and do from month to month. If they smile,
we are elated. If they frown, we are depressed.
A year ago, the prevailing opinion in Europe
was that instant detente was just aroiuid the
corner; nothing very exciting had happened
yet, but it did seem that the Soviets and Eastern
Europeans wei'e less belligerent and more ready
to talk sense than they had been at any time
since the Second World War.
But then the willingness in the West was
blunted by a series of Communist counter-
measures — the East German and Soviet re-
action to the resumption of relations Ijetween
Romania and the Federal Republic, the bog-
ging-down of proposals for a code of conduct on
East -West relations, the lack of Soviet response
so far to our efforts to engage them in talks on
antiballistic missiles, and the hard line of
Brezhnev's [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec-
retary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.]
speech at the Karlovy Vary Conference toward
the end of April.
It was in that speech, you recall, that Brezh-
nev asked us to dissolve NATO and said they
would in turn dissolve the Warsaw Pact. The
Soviets may well close down the Wai-saw Pact
anyway ; it has never been anything but a cover
for Soviet military domination of its neighbors,
and it has no political role. I can well under-
stand why Mr. Brezhnev would want us to
abolish NATO; it's the same reason that per-
suades us to maintain it: that in the face of
Soviet military power a durable East-West
detente can be built only on a durable Western
deterrent.
These disappointments in Europe are now
compounded by Soviet involvement in the Mid-
dle East crisis. While the two main subjects of
international attention were a limited war in
Viet-Nam and a limited peace in Europe, it was
just barely possible to believe in a Soviet Union
that relaxes tensions in Europe while helping
to maintain them in the Far East. But with
Soviet involvement in two crises outside the
NATO area, plus all the signs of a hardening
line on Europe and nuclear issues, the optimists
who heralded detente last year have become
the pessimists who now fear that detente is indi-
visible after all.
I suggest that the earlier elation and the cur-
rent depression are equally overdrawn. We
were not as close to enduring peace with the
Soviets as many people thought we were a year
ago. And we are not as far from peace with the
Soviets today as this season's events would make
it appear. It is futile to take the temperature of
Eastern intentions every hour on the hour and
keep adjusting our Western moods and actions
accoi'dingly. Onr problem is to move steadily
along the rough and erratic road toward East-
West conciliation and a lasting European set-
tlement. The zigzag course of Soviet behavior
is not all the Machiavellian tactics of leaders
who know exactly wha.t they are doing. Some of
it is sunply a reflection of how very hard it is for
totalitarian leaders to relax and normalize their
international relations. On the whole, friendly
relations with one's neighbors come more
naturally to us in the West ; but for the Com-
munists, friendly relations with the West re-
quire a radical wrench from the progrannnatic
JULY 31, 1967
143
hostility whicli has been for so long a way of
life in Eastern Europe.
In spite of zigs and zags, we all feel in our
bones that it makes sense to work toward a Euix)-
pean security system which rests on something
better than military standoff. And it is not too
soon to ask what NATO, while it maintains and
modernizes our military deterrent, can do about
Mtente. The answer is simple, and has already
been given in actions by the North Atlantic
Council during the past few months: for the
Atlantic alliance is the natural Western agency
for managing our side of the detente.
The Management of Detente
Hubert Humphrey, who visited Europe and
this city just 2 months ago, has been talking
about substituting an Open Door for the Iron
Curtain in Europe. The North Atlantic Council
is already deep in the business of directing
traffic through the rusty, creaky, slowly opening
door of East-West relations.
It is none to soon.
For each ally has its own ideas about how to
relax with the Soviets. The British have been
talking in Moscow about a friendship treaty;
the Germans are trying to arrange diplomatic
relations with the Eastern Europeans; the
French are negotiating scientific and military
cooperation with the Soviets ; the Poles are woo-
ing the Belgians; the Yugoslavs are promoting
East-West relations in their own specialized
way; the Romanians are reminding the Italians
of their common Latin culture. And the Amer-
icans are talking directly with the Soviets about
antiballistic missiles and the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons — among other things.
These various, mostly bilateral, discussions
do not have to be contradictory or at cross-
purposes. Detente managers can do several
things at once ; indeed, we shall have to work for
a better climate of relations through cultural,
technical, commercial, and economic arrange-
ments even as we begin to talk seriously about
the underlying political and secui-ity issues.
But each of these new East-West relation-
ships soon touches the vital interests not only of
the two nations doing the talking but of their
allies as well. We should certainly try to get to
each stage of agreement together. That is why
each of these relationships needs to be — and
most of them have been — discussed in the North
Atlantic Council.
The management of detente will test the ca-
pacity of the best minds and the largest spirits
in all the Allied nations. Already this year the
North Atlantic Council has recruited a number
of scholars and statesmen to make a wholesale
review of the future tasks of the alliance. They
are finding it not easy to mold a common policy
out of elements which until now have been con-
sidered as almost unrelated to each other: the
unity of Western Europe and the reunification
of Gei-many, the relationship of Europe to
America and the relationship of Europe with
Russia, the impact of massive and dramatic
events outside the NATO defense perimeter on
relationships within the NATO circle. To bring
into a single framework all the different kinds
of peace and relaxation we have all been saying
we favor is as challenging a political puzzle as
any of us could want to tackle.
It was quite to be expected that the first re-
sults of detente should have been a rise in ten-
sions among allies. As long as the nonprolifera-
tion treaty seemed an academic matter, because
the Soviets were not really interested in it, we
could all afford to be loudly in favor of it. As
soon as the Soviets showed signs of interest,
every political leader in the West had to ask
himself hard questions about his real attitude
toward a real treaty banning the further spread
of nuclear weapons. There were 3 years of
desultory NATO consultation before the treaty
looked real ; but starting last winter, 3 months
of very intensive consultation were required to
make sure that the treaty would appeal to each
ally as protecting its vital interests. This com-
plex and interesting negotiation in the North
Atlantic Council and with the Soviets still
goes on.
NATO consultation on the nonproliferation
treaty, which has given rise to so much comment
in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, is a good
example of the organization's role and of its
enhanced value in a period of xa'A.'^h^-dHente.
The fact that the United States has signed the
North Atlantic Treaty and sits on the North
Atlantic Council is our guarantee, aaid Europe's
assurance, that we are not going to make deals
with the Soviet Union behind the backs or
against the interests of our allies. And the con-
verse is a.lso true : That is why the German For-
eign Minister explained at the NATO meeting
in Luxembourg last week just what the Federal
Republic is trying to do to increase contacts be-
144
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
tween both parts of Germany — and drew a
unanimous endorsement from his 14 colleagues
tha.t "this internal German process was to be
considered an important contribution to the
search for a detente in Europe." ^ And it was in
this spirit of moving together toward detente^
and not letting the Soviets use steps toward
detente as another way of discriminating
against the Federal Eepublic, that the North
Atlantic Council last week "recorded its view
that tlie detente should be extended for the ben-
efit of all members of the Alliance."
In short, membership in the North Atlantic
Council is every ally's assurance that he will not
have to deal with the Soviet Union aJone. If
NATO did not exist, there would indeed be
danger of separate negotiations enabling the
Soviets to play one Western ally off against the
others — to use detente as a device for discrimi-
nation. If NATO did not exist, Europeans
might have some reason to be alarmed by the
prospect that the two superpowers might some-
how divide the world between them. But NATO
does exist and is available to manage the detente
as it has so successfully managed the deterrent
for all these years.
The political phase of NATO has thus begim.
We are ready to consult intimately with our
partners at every stage of this new and fascinat-
ing game. We ask in return only a reasonably
strict application of the Golden Rule — that our
NATO partners consult us as early, as frankly,
and as often as they would themselves wish to
be consulted. In this respect detente, like deter-
rence, is indivisible.
NATO's Global Agenda of Consultation
What about NATO consultation outside the
so-called "NATO area"? The crisis in the Mid-
dle East has brought the question sharply to
center stage.
NATO's integrated defense sj^stem, of course,
is limited by its political geography ; the Allies
have accepted the common obligation to defend
together a perimeter that includes the territory
of every NATO member and necessarily the
Mediterranean and Baltic seas and the North
Atlantic Ocean as well. But when it comes to
political consultation, the agenda of the North
' For text of a communique issued at the close of the
North Atlantic Coiuicil meeting on June 14, see Bul-
letin of July 3, 1967, p. 14.
Atlantic Council is global — which is just an-
other way of saying that the world is round.
Thus at the NATO ministerial meeting in
Luxembourg last week, a prime topic of consul-
tation was, of course, the breakdown of the
always precarious peace in the Middle East.
That did not mean the alliance itself can or
should operate in the Middle East; but it did
reflect the reality that turbulence next door to
NATO afi'ects the interests and could affect the
treaty obligations of every member of the alli-
ance. The distinction is between the arena for
international action, which is the United Na-
tions, and the place where allies consult about
their broadest interests among themselves,
which is the North Atlantic Council.
Americans' Stake in NATO Endeavors
As we measure the fluctuating chances of de-
tente against the risks of Western disarray, I
think we have to say that this past year has been
good for the alliance.
— We have stopped asking ourselves whether
we need a NATO defense system and have set
about to modernize it.
This spring we approved the first new agreed
NATO strategy in 11 years; and this month we
are starting to send messages through the new
NATO communications satellite system.
— We have stopped talking about 1969 and are
planning actively for the 1970's.
We have begun in earnest this year to share
among NATO govermnents the responsibility
for the nuclear portion of our common deter-
rent. The force plans we are now working on
this summer extend to 1973 ; and the studies of
political settlement in Europe may extend even
farther into the future.
— We have stopped wishing for detente and
have set about to seek it actively. Our problem
is to stay steady on our peacemaking course,
keeping everlastingly at it desipte the tactical
zigs and zags of Soviet diplomacy.
In all these endeavors we Americans have a
stake ; and so we have a contribution to make, a
voice to raise, a lead to take.
To those who doubt that we will stay the
course, I can only cite our record for fidelity to
what we have said we would do — which leads
us, indeed, to make good on our commitments
farther from home, for a longer time, at a
JTJLT 31. 196';
145
greater cost, tlian some of our friends think
wise.
To those who thinli that because of these far-
away commitments we have lost interest in the
future of Europe, I suggest the simplest pos-
sible test: Ask yourself whether there is any
matter of vital interest to Europeans in which
Americans and their Government are not deeply
enough involved.
And to tliose — back home as well as in
Europe — who find the frustrations of peace-
making too uncertain and the burdens of peace-
keeping too great, I can only prescribe a daily
reading of one short passage from the philo-
sophical memoirs of Dag Hammarskjold:
''You have not done enough, you have never
done enough, so long as it is still possible that
you have something of value to contribute. This
is the answer when you are groaning under what
you consider a burden and an uncertainty. . . ."
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds Second Meeting
Following is the text of a joint com/munique
rohicli was released at Buenos Aires on. July 5
at the close of a 3-day meeting of the Joint U.S.-
Argentine Trade and Economic Coinmittee.
The Joint Argentine-United States Trade
and Economic Committee held its second meet-
ing in Buenos Aires from July 3 to July 5, 1967.
The first meeting was held in Washington in
May 1966.1
The Delegation of Argentina was headed by
Sr. Enrique Gaston Valente, Undersecretary of
Foreign Commerce, and the American Delega-
tion by Mr. Edward E. Fried, Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary of State for International Re-
sources and Food Policy.
The meeting was opened by the Minister of
Foreign Aifairs and Worship, Dr. Nicanor
Costa Mendez and was conducted in an atmos-
phere of complete cordiality. The two Delega-
tions noted that these talks reflected the spirit
of Chapter III of the Declaration of the Presi-
dents of America signed in Punta del Este in
April 1967.= The Delegations agreed that every
' Bulletin of June 13, 1966, p. 944.
' For text, see ihid., May 8, 1967, p. 712.
opportunity should be taken to increase mutu-
ally beneficial trade in both directions.
The Argentine Delegation expressed concern
over legislation pending in the United States
Congress which, if enacted, could provide for
certain restrictions on meat imports into the
United States. It was pointed out that the Ar-
gentine packing industry has made substantial
investments with a view to developing export
markets for prepared meats such as cooked and
frozen. The United States Delegation expressed
its understanding of the importance of the meat
trade to the Argentine economy and gave assur-
ances tliat the views expressed by the Argentine
Delegation would be given full consideration.
It was noted with satisfaction that market con-
ditions for beef were improving.
In response to the concern ex])ressed by the
Argentine Delegation about additional restric-
tions on dairy imports into the United States,
the United States Delegation noted that the
Presidential Proclamation concerning imports
of dairy products, issued on June 30,=* did not
affect United States imports of Argentine
cheese.
The Argentine Delegation was pleased to
note that the United States had recently sus-
pended its export subsidies on flaxseed and lin-
seed oil. The Delegations exchanged views on
current problems confronting the tung oil
market and explored possible ways of improv-
ing the situation.
The Argentine Delegation advised that the
Argentine Government had accepted the invita-
tion of the United States Government to send a
delegation to Washington to discuss an agree-
ment for the avoidance of double taxation.
The Argentine Delegation informed the
United States Delegation of its interest in ex-
panding cotton textile exports to the United
States. The United States Delegation explained
the provisions of the Intergovernmental Long-
Term Cotton Textile Arrangement,^ which aims
at providing growth for the cotton textile ex-
ports of developing countries so long as such
exports do not disrupt the markets of the im-
porting countries. This matter will be explored
further before the next meeting of the Joint
Committee.
The Argentine Delegation offered to consider
the possibilities of simplifying the consular
' Proclamation 3790 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 9803.
* For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
146
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTIXiETIN'
legalization procedure applicable to commer-
cial invoices covering United States exports to
Argentina, The discussions also covered some
aspects of import regulations of Argentina,
such as the system of prior deposits and the
customs clearance procedure.
Argentina's interest in improving the possi-
bilities of diversifying its exports to the United
States was also discussed. The Delegations con-
sidered various ways in which the United States
might assist toward this end. The discussions
a,lso covered problems relating to the Argentine
motion picture and television industries. It was
agreed to facilitate Argentine contacts with the
appropriate United States industries.
The two Delegations reviewed the continuing
cooperation of both coimtries toward the nego-
tiating of an International Grains Agreement.
They noted with satisfaction the agreement on
wheat prices and food aid reached in Geneva in
the context of the Kennedy Eound and dis-
cussed some of the problems before the negoti-
ating conference called by the International
Wlieat Council for July 12 of tliis year.
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement
on Flood Control Project
Statement hy President Johnson
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.) dated July 6
The Governments of the United States and
Mexico have concluded an agreement for the
construction, operation, and maintenance of an
international flood control project for the Ti-
juana River in California and in Baja Califor-
nia, Alexico. Agreement was reached through
the International Boundary and "Water Com-
mission, United States and Mexico, which will
now proceed to supervise joint design and con-
struction of the project.
Once again we join with our sister Republic
of Mexico for the solution of a border problem.
The normally small Tijuana River, flowing
through the Mexican city of Tijuana and the
cities of San Diego and Imperial Beach to the
Pacific Ocean, is subject to severe floods. By
channelizing the river, the two countries can
confine its floodwaters in those cities to a nar-
row, concrete-lined waterway. These cities will
be able to develop the river's flood plains with-
out a continual threat to lives, homes, and busi-
nesses. Since tlie new river channel in the United
States will be moved southward to a location
just north and generally parallel to the interna-
tional boundary, the United States cities will
not have to contend with this river running
through their developed areas.
Each counti-y will pay for that part of the
project within its own territory, thus sharing
costs proportionally in accordance with the
benefits received. It is estimated that the United
States portion will cost $15,400,000 on the basis
of current prices. Of this amount, the local bene-
ficiaries w^ould pay $4,500,000 and the Federal
Government would pay $10,900,000. This ar-
rangement for local participation is the same
as though the project were domestic instead of
international.
I want to thank the many Members of Con-
gress who supported the legislation last year to
authorize this project, and particularly Senator
[Thomas H.] Kucliel and Representative
[Lionel] Van Deerlin for their valuable
leadership.
At three widely separated points along our
almost 2,000-mile boundary with Mexico, in the
lower Rio Grande Valley, at El Paso, and now
in California, we have new projects underway
designed to improve the border region where so
many of the citizens of both countries live and
share common aspirations.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Special Report of the National Advisory Council on
International Monetary and Financial Policies. Let-
ter from the Secretary of the Treasury, Chairman of
the Council, transmitting the Council's Special Re-
port on U.S. Participation in a Proposed Increase in
the Resources of the Fund for Special Operations
of the Inter-American Development Bank, and on a
Proposed Modification of Provisions for the Election
of the Bank's Executive Directors. H. Doc. 117.
May 3, 196T. 67 pp.
The Techniques of Soviet Propaganda. A study pre-
sented by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Revised
1967. S. Doc. 34. June 12, 1967. 63 pp.
Seventeenth Annual Report of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Small Business, together with minority
views. S. Rept. 345. June 14. 1967. 51 pp.
JULY 31. 1967
147
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem; Urges
Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near East
Following is a sfateinent made on July I4 iy
U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldherg in the
fifth emergency special session of the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly., together with the text of a reso-
lution adopted hy the Assembly that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
U.S./tJ.N. press release 124
Mr. President, the goal of the United States
in the Middle East, one we believe shared by
the great preponderance of the world commu-
nity, is a durable peace and enduring settle-
ment. We conceive of this goal as requiring
throughout the area far more than a return to
the temporary and fragile truce which erupted
into tragic conflict on June 5.
We are convinced, both by logic and the un-
forgettable experience of a tragic history, that
there can be progress toward the durable peace
in the entire area only if certain essential steps
are taken. One immediate, obvious, and impera-
tive step is the disengagement of all forces and
the withdrawal of Israeli forces to their own
territory. A second and equally immediate, ob-
vious, and imperative step is the termination
of any claims to a state of war or belligerency
on the part of Arab states in the area.
These two steps are essential to progress to-
ward a durable peace. They are equally essential
if there is to be substance and concrete mean-
ing to the basic charter right of every state in
the area, a right to which the United States re-
mains firmly committed: the right to have its
territorial integrity and political independence
respected by all and free from the threat or use
of force by all.
The United States stands ready to give its
full support to practical measures to help bring
about these steps — withdrawal of forces and
the termination of belligerent acts or claims as
soon as possible.
But if our goal is a durable peace, it is imper-
ative that there be greater vision both from this
organization and from the parties themselves.
It is imperative that all look beyond the imme-
diate causes and effects of the recent conflict.
Attention must also be focused, and urgently :
— on reaching a just and permanent settle-
ment of the refugee problem, which has been
accentuated by recent events;
• — on means to insure respect for the right of
every member of the United Nations in the area
to live in peace and security as an independent
national state;
- — on arrangements so that respect for the ter-
ritorial integrity and political independence of
all states in the area is assured ;
— on measures to insure respect for the rights
of all nations to freedom of navigation and
of innocent passage through international
waterways ;
— on reaching agreement, both among those
in the area and tliose outside, that economic de-
velopment and the improvement of living stand-
ards should be given precedence over a wasteful
arms race in the area.
In each and every one of the separate but re-
lated imperatives of peace, we recognize fully
that agreement cannot be imposed upon the
parties from outside. At the same time, we also
believe that the machinery, experience, and re-
sources of the United Nations can be of im-
measurable help in implementing agreements
acceptable to the parties.
The offer of such assistance by this organiza-
tion is dictated not only by the roots of United
Nations responsibility and involvement in the
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Middle East, which have grown deep and strong
over two decades; it is also dictated by our com-
mon determination, even dnty, under the charter
to save succeeding generations in tlie Middle
East from the scourge of another war.
It is against the background of this overall
I)olicy that my Government has developed its
attitudes toward the question of Jerusalem, and
I wish to mal%:e that attitude very explicit. The
views of my Government on Jerusalem have
been expressed by the President of the United
States and other high-level officials.
On June 28, the White House released the fol-
lowing statement : ^
The President said on June 19 tliat in our view "tliere
. . . must be adequate recognition of the special interest
of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." ^
On this principle he assumes that before any unilateral
action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be
appropriate consultation with religious leaders and
others who are deeply concerned. Jerusalem is holy to
Christians, to Jews, and to Moslems. It is one of the
great continuing tragedies of history that a city which
is so much the center of man's highest values has also
been, over and over, a center of conflict. Repeatedly
the passionate beliefs of one element have led to ex-
clusion or unfairness for others. It has been so, un-
fortunately, in the last 20 years. Men of all religions
will agree that we must now do better. The world must
find an answer that is fair and recognized to be
fair. . . .
The second statement, released on the same
day by the Department of State, read : ^
The hasty administrative action taken today can-
not be regarded as determining the future of the holy
places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.
The United States has never recognized such uni-
lateral actions by any of the states in the area as
governing the international status of Jerusalem. . . .
During my own statement to the General
Assembly on July 3,* I said that the "safe-
guarding of the holy places, and freedom of
access to them for all, should be internation-
ally guaranteed; and the status of Jerusalem
in relation to them should be decided not uni-
laterally but in consultation with all concerned."
These statements represent the considered and
continuing policy of the United States Govern-
ment.
With regard to the specific measures taken
by the Government of Israel on June 28, 1 wish
United States Repeats Concern
for Future of Jerusalem
statement by Secretary Rusk
Press release 163 dated July 14
The United States has abstained today on a
General Assembly resolution concerning Jeru-
salem. As Ambassador Goldberg indicated in
his statement earlier today, this abstention was
necessary because in our view the resolution as
presented did not fully reflect either the existing
situation or the best means of dealing with it.
But it would be wrong for any people or gov-
ernment to assume that this abstention indicates
that the United States is indifferent to the fu-
ture of Jerusalem.
The United States deeply regrets the adminis-
trative actions on Jeru.salem which have been
taken by the Government of Israel in recent
weeks. As we said on June 28' these adminis-
trative decisions cannot be regarded as deter-
mining the future of the holy places or the status
of Jerusalem in relation to them. We have made
this position clear to the Government of Israel
both before and after these decisions were taken.
We understand the deep emotional concerns
which move the people and Government of Israel
on this matter, but we are bound to point out
the need for understanding of the equal con-
cerns of others.
As we have observed before, Jerusalem is holy
to Christians, Jews, and Moslems, and it is gen-
uinely tragic that this city of the highest spirit-
ual meaning has so often been a cause of conflict
in the past. Surely the lesson from this experi-
ence is that we must all do better now.
The United States Government continues to
hope that a generous and fair-sighted view will
prevail among all concerned, and its own influ-
ence will be directed to that end. It is our belief
that means of reason and of persuasion are most
likely to be successful in this purpose.
' For a Department statement of June 28, see
Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60.
' For text, see Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 60.
" Ibid.. July 10, 1967, p. 31.
' For text, see iWd., July 17, 1967, p. 60.
• For text, see Hid., July 24, 1967, p. 108.
to make it clear that the United States does not
accept or recognize these measures as altering
the status of Jerusalem. My Government does
not recognize that the administrative measures
taken by the Government of Israel on June 28
can be regarded as the last word on the matter,
and we regret that they were taken. We in-
sist that the measures "taken cannot be con-
sidered other than interim and provisional, and
not prejudging the final and permanent status
of Jerusalem. Unfortunately and regrettably,
JTJLT 31, 1967
149
the statements of the Government of Israel on
this matter have thus far, in our view, not ade-
quately dealt with this situation.
Many delegations are aware that we were
prepared to vote for a separate resolution on
Jerusalem which would declare that the Assem-
bly would not accept any unilateral action as
determining the status of Jerusalem and calling
on the Govenmient of Israel to desist from any
action purporting to define permanently the
status of Jei'usalem. However, the sponsors
made clear then, as was their right, that they
preferred to proceed with their own text in
document A/2253,= and now with their resolu-
tion in A/L. 528/Rev. 2.
The latter draft does include changes which
we consider represent a marked improvement
over the original version, particularly in that
it no longer tends to prejudge action in the
Security Council. Nevertheless, since the resolu-
tion just adopted ex])ressly builds on Resolution
2253 on whicli we abstained for reasons which
we stated publicly, consistent with that vote
we also abstained today.
Even as revised, the resolution does not fully
correspond to our views, particularly since it
appears to accept by its call for recision of
measures that the administrative measures
which were taken constitute annexation of Jer-
usalem by Israel, and because we do not believe
the problem of Jerusalem can realistically be
solved apart from the other related aspects of
Jerusalem and of the Middle Eastern situa-
tion. Therefore, the United States abstained.
We have, of course, recMitly expressed our-
selves in a more formal sense by voting for a
resolution dealing with the question of Jeru-
salem. This was the Latin American resolution
contained in document A/L. 523/Rev. l,'^ which
dealt with Jerusalem as one of the elements
involved in a peaceful settlement in the Middle
East.
It is in the treatmeiit of one aspect of the
jiroblem of Jerusalem as an isolated issixe, sep-
arate from the other elements of Jerusalem and
of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East,
that we were unable to support Resolution 2253.
Certainly, Jerusalem, as has been pointed out
^ For a .statement made by Ambassador Goldberg
on .Tilly 4 in explanation of the U.S. abstention on
A/RES/225.'?(ES-V) and text of the resolution, see
f6!rf..pp. 112andll3.
° For background, see i1)id., p. 108.
miiversally, I think, by every speaker, is an
important issue and, in our opinion, one which '
must necessarily be considered in the context
of a settlement of all problems arising out of
the recent conflict. In Jerusalem there are tran-
scendent spiritual interests. But there are also
other important issues. And we believe that the
most fruitful approach to a discussion of tlie
future of Jerusalem lies in dealing with the en-
tire problem as one aspect of the broader ar-
rangements that must be made to restore a just
and durable peace in the area. And we believe,
consistent with the resolution we were ready to
sponsor, that this Assembly should have dealt
with the problem by declaring itself against
any imilateral change in the status of Jerusalem.
Mr. President, since we are approaching the
end of this session on this important subject,
in which remarks were made not relating spe-
cifically to Jerusalem but ranging very broadly
on other subjects, I cannot let this occasion pass
without reference to some of tlie allegations
made regarding my Government's role in the
recent conflict in the INIiddle East. The charges
that the United States instigated, encouraged,
or in any way participated in this tragic strug-
gle are too unfoundecl to dignify by individual
comment. I dealt with many of these falsehoods
explicitly in the Security Council and will not
take the time of the Assembly to go over the
same ground here. I reaffirm what I said to the
Security Council with respect to each and every
one of these charges.'
I will merely say that one positive note in
this session has been the abandonment of the
most vicious falsehood of all — which could have
been productive of the most disastrous conse-
quences— that United States planes and mili-
tary personnel participated in the war on the
side of Israel. Before the war broke out, we
sought to prevent it by all means at our com-
mand. And once it began, we did everything in
our power to bring it to an early end. The rec-
ord of our diplomacy is very clear in this mat-
ter, despite comments which have been read
from newspapers which scarcely characterize
that diplomacy. And the record of the Security
Council is plain and clear for everyone to read
as to the actions we took, supported, and initi-
ated in the Security Council to bring the con-
flict to an end.
' For background, see ibid.. June 19, 19fi7, p. 920 ;
June 26, 1967, p. 934; and July 3, 1967, p. 3.
150
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
There is one charge about our position to
which I believe no nation in tlus liall faithful
to the charter would feel any necessity to plead.
That is the charge that we support the right
of every sovereign state member of the United
Nations to an independent national existence,
its right to live in a spirit of peaceful coexist-
ence and good neighborliness with all in the
area. That is a charge which the Charter of the
United Xations places on us all and which we
should all readily accept and acknowledge.
Our view has remained steadfast — before,
during, and now after the conflict. We extend
the hand of friendship to all states in the I\Iid-
dle East and express the fervent hope that as
time heals the scars of war, we can soon again
join our common efforts in helping build a bet-
ter, more enduring order in every state and
throughout the area, with peace, justice, secu-
rity, and liberty for all.
Mr. President, so much vituperation has
taken place in tliis Assembly, so unseemly in a
world forum, that I could not help recalling
today a statement made by my distinguished
predecessor, who died 2 years ago today in the
cause of peace. Adlai Stevenson. Adlai Steven-
son, talking about our bolo\'ed Eleanor Roose-
velt, said, ''She would rather light candles than
curse the darkness.'' And I share that spirit. I
do not see that anything is gained in the cause
of peace in the Middle East by the ^atuperation
which has taken place, vituperation not only
against my country but against other, small
countries, vituperation which has no place in
this foinun.
The time has come — indeed, the time is long
overdue — for \dtuperation and bitterness to be
tempered by sober realization of the difficulties
ahead and the willingiiess to face them squarely
and to do something about them.
"Wliat is needed is the wisdom and statesman-
ship of all those directly concerned and the
members of the United Nations so that condi-
tions of hate, too much ventilated in this hall,
can be eventually replaced by conditions of good
neighborliness.
'\Aniat is needed, above all, in the area is a
spirit of reconciliation which will someday
hopefully make possible a peace of reconcilia-
tion. I fervently hope that all in the area and
all in this hall wiD approach the days ahead
in this spirit.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION*
Measures taken by Israel to chaitgc the status of the
City of Jerusalem
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 22.53 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
Having received the report submitted by the Sec-
retary-General,"
Taking note icith the deepest regret and concern of
the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253
(ES-V),
1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V) ;
2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to
rescind all measures already taken and to desist
forthwith from taking any action which would alter
the status of Jerusalem ;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council and the General Assembly on the
situation and on the implementation of the present
resolution.
U.N. Security Council Condemns
Recruitment of Mercenaries
The V.N. Security Council met on July 6 and
10 to con-^ider a complaint ^ from, the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo. FoUoioing are
statements made in the Council on July 6 and
10 hy UjS. Deputy Representative William B.
Buffum, together with the text of a resolution
adopted iy Council on July 10.
STATEMENT OF JULY 6
U.S. /U.N. press release 119
We readily agreed this afternoon to an urgent
meeting of the Security Council to consider the
complaint from the Government of the Demo-
cratic Rejiublic of the Congo charging that
forces from outside its own country have fo-
mented disturbances in the eastern jaortion of
the Congo and, with the cooperation of dis-
sident local military elements, apparently
gained control of several important cities. The
charges are indeed serious ones, and they deserve
*A/RES/22.>i (ES-V) (A/L. 52S/Rev. 2) : adopted
by the Assembly on July 14 by a vote of 100 to 0, with
18 abstentions (U.S.).
' U.X. docs. A/67o3 and S/8052.
' U.N. doc. S/8031.
JULY 31, 1967
151
our most careful consideration. Certainly the
type of action that has been alleged would con-
travene not only the spirit but also the letter of
the United Nations Charter.
The strong opposition of the United States
Government to intervention by one state in the
internal affairs of another has been demon-
strated repeatedly. Such interference, whether
it be with armed forces or throvigh subversion or
other less obvious means, cannot be counte-
nanced. If any foreign government is in fact
aiding and abetting those in the Congo who are
seeking by force to wrest control of certain areas
from the legitimate authorities, such action
would violate the charter and accepted princi-
ples of internntional law. All U.X. member
states, in our judgment, should refrain from any
such activities and should take appropriate
measures to discourage their nationals from par-
ticipation in them.
Inasmuch as these charges are serious ones,
the Council will naturally wish to be fully in-
formed of the facts of the situation. We trust
that the Government of the Congo will make
every effort to ascertain the full facts and keep
us informed of developments as they occur. In
the meantime the United States believes it is
incumbent on all of us to do nothing that will
further exacerbate the situation there.
Since the day when the Congo became inde-
pendent the United States has been prominent
among those that have supported and assisted
the government of that nation to develop
strength and stability in order to insure the se-
curity and well-being of the Congolese people.
We have made these efforts both through the
United Nations and through mutually agreed
bilateral arrangements. This record, if I may
say in all humility, Mr. President, is one of
which my Government is proud.
And it is for this reason, as well, that we are
deeply disturbed over any threats to the steady
progress which has been made in the Congo and
we firmly support the efforts of the Central Gov-
ernment in the Congo to restore order and to
exercise its legitimate authority throughout the
country. We deplore any attempts by outside
forces to interfere with those efforts. I am sure
that this will also prove to be the attitude
of other members of this Council and feel con-
fident that within a short time it will again be
possible for all of the people in the Congo to live
in peace and free from fear, as they so richly
deserve.
STATEMENT OF JULY 10
U.S. /U.N. press release 122
Mr. President, although the drnft resolution ^
which has just been introduced by the distin-
guished representative of Nigeria does not co-
incide with our preferences in every respect, the
United States will vote affirmatively. We will
do so because we fully support the efforts of the
Democratic Kepublic of the Congo to exercise
its legitimate authority throughout the country
and to restore order wherever order is disrupted.
Mr. President, in our view, if any foreign gov-
ernment aids or abets any elements in the
Congo, whether these be mercenaries or irregu-
lar forces seeking to overthrow the Government
or to gain control of any part of the country,
such action would be in clear violation of the
United Nations Charter and deserving of our
condemnation. This was our policy, sir, 3 years
ago when secessionist elements in the eastern
Congo were engaged in large-scale conflict, with
substantial support from the Chinese Com-
munists, to wrest control from the Central Gov-
ernment ; and this remains our policy today.
We will vote for the resolution this evening
because we support the principle of noninter-
ference in the internal affairs of the Congo. In
doing so, we do not consider that by this reso-
lution the Council is making any specific finding
with regard to any specific government.
Mr. President, the United States has not been
content to give merely moral support to the
principles endorsed in this resolution this
evening. On the contrary, we have sought to
provide the Government of the Congo with some
of the tools which it needs to do the job in
protecting its integrity and its political
independence.
It was in this connection that over the past
weekend the United States, in response to a
request from President Mobutu and consistent
with previous United Nations resolutions deal-
ing with the Congo problem and calling foi'
assistance in helping that government to main-
tain its independence and territorial integrity,
dispatched three C-130 transport aircraft and
crews to Kinshasa. These are aircraft, I should
like to make clear to the Council, which are
designed to provide long-range logistic support
for the Congolese Government in meeting the
' U.N. doc. S/8050.
152
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mercenarj'-led rebellion. They will be there in
a noncombatant status.
This action reflects our longstanding policy
of supporting the Central Government and the
unity of the Congo, and it is in this spirit that
we will support the resolution sponsored by
Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, and India.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
TEXT OF RESOLUTION'
The Security Council,
Saving taken cognizance of the mefsage of the
Congolese Government contained in document S/S031,
Eaving discusxed the serious developments in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Concerned by the threat posed by foreign interfer-
ence to the independence and territorial integrity of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
1. Reaffirms in particular paragraph 2 of Security
Council resolution 226 (1960) of 14 October 1966;'
2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting
or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the
provision of facilities to them, with the objective of
overthrowing the Governments of States Members of
the United Nations ;
3. Calls upon Governments to ensure that their ter-
ritory and other territories under their control, as
well as their nationals, are not used for the planning
of subversion, and the recruitment, training and
transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ;
4. Decides that the Security Council shall remain
seized of the question ;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely
the implementation of the present resolution.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed helow) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Operation in Cyprus for the period December 6,
1966, to June 12, 1967. S/7969. June 13, 1967. 74 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Coun-
cil in pursuance of operative paragraph 3 of the
Council's resolution of June 14 (S/RES/237 (1967) )
concerning the civil population and prisoners of war
in the area of conflict in the Middle East. S/8021.
June 29, 1967. 6 pp.
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at New York
October 20, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957.
Notification of icithdrawal: Honduras, effective June
19, 1967.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New
York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December
13, 1964 ; for the United States June 24, 1967.
Proclaimed by the President: July 12, 1967.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow
August 5, 1963. Entered Into force October 10, 1963.
TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 10, 1967.
Oil Pollution
International convention for the prevention of pollution
of the sea by oil, with annexes, as amended (TIAS
4900, 6109). Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered
into force for the United States December 8, 1961.
Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, May 31, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for signa-
ture at Washington, London, and Moscow January
27, 1967.1
Ratification deposited: Finland, July 12, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement. 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June
1, 1967, inclusive.'
Acceptances deposited: Australia, July 12, 1967;
Canada, July 14, 1967.
Accessions deposited: Japan, July 10, 1967; Saudi
Arabia, July 13, 1967 ; Austria, July 14, 1967.
Notification of undertaking to seek approval de-
posited: Switzerland, July 6. 1967.
Notifications of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Federal Republic of Germany, July 12,
1967; Guatemala, July 7, 1967; Israel, July 13,
1967.
Notifications of undertaking to seek accession de-
posited: Italy, July 14, 1967; Libya, July 10, 1967.
'S/RES/239 (1967) (S/8050) ; adopted unanimously
on July 10.
* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 760.
' Not in force.
JTJLT 31, 1967
153
BILATERAL
Dahomey
Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in Dahomey. Effected by exchange
of notes at Cotonou June 30 and July 3, 1907. En-
tered into force July 3, 1967.
Israel
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton July 13, 1967. Entered into force July 13, 1967.
Pakistan
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6052, 6074, 612.5, 6194). Effected by an exchange of
notes at Rawalpindi and Islamabad June 28, 1967.
Entered into force June 28, 1967.
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with
annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 3, 1967. Entered into force July 3, 1967.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale hj/ the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on orders
for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium,
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27,
1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Brussels February
2 and 22, 1967. Entered into force February 22, 1967.
TIAS 6229. 3 pp. 5(S.
Geodetic Satellite Observation Station. Agreement
with Japan, amending the agreement of September 12
and 19, 1966. Exchange of notes — Dated at Tokyo
February 21 and March 14, 1967. Entered into force
March 14, 1967. TIAS 6230. 4 pp. 5«i.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Cameroon.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington March 7,
1967. Entered into force March 7, 1967. TIAS 6231. 5
pp. 5<f.
Educational Commission. Agreement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
amending the agreement of May 10, 1965. Exchange of
notes — Signed at London February 16, 1967. Entered
into force February 16, 1967. TIAS 6232. 2 pp. 5<f.
Cultural Relations. Agreement with Romania. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Bucharest February 18,
1967. Entered into force February 18, 1967. TIAS 6233.
8 pp. 10<S.
Education — Commission for Educational and Cultural
Exchange and Financing of Exchange Programs.
Agreement with the United Arab Republic. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Cairo January 5 and February 21,
1967. Entered into force February 21, 1967. TIAS 6234.
11 pp. io«;.
Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem-
bourg, amending Annex B to the agreement of Janu-
ary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Luxem-
bourg March 1 and 14, 1967. Entered into force March
14, 1967. TIAS 6235. 3 pp. 5<#.
Saint Lawrence Seaway — Tolls for the Montreal/Lake
Ontario Section Lockage Fee on the Welland Canal.
Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of
March 9, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ottawa March 31, 1967. Entered into force March 31,
1967. TIAS 6236. 3 pp. 54.
Defense — C-47 Aircraft. Agreement with Mali. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Bamako January 5, 1967.
Entered into force January 5, 1967. TIAS 6238. 4 pp.
5^.
Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Israel, amending
the agreement of June 18 and 22, 1962. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem March 21
and 23, 1967. Entered into force March 23, 1967. TIAS
6240. 4 pp. 5(f.
Extradition — Correction of Text of the Convention of
December 10, 1962. Agreement with Israel. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Jeru.salem and Tel Aviv April 4 and
11, 1967. Entered into force April 11, 1967. TIAS 6246.
2 pp. 54.
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX 'luMl 31, 1967 Vol. LVH, No. U66
Agriculture. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chap-
ter in the History of International Commerce
(Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) . . 123
Argentina. U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds iiecond Meeting (communique) . . . 146
Congo (Kinshasa). U.N. Security Council Con-
demns Recruitment of Mercenaries (BufEum,
text of resolution) 1-51
Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to
Foreign Policy 147
Developing Countries. The Kennedy Round :
Proud Chapter in the History of International
Commerce (Freeman, Reynolds, Roth, Trow-
bridge) 12.3
Economic Affairs
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting (communique) 146
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con-
trol Project (Johnson) 147
Europe. The Golden Rule of Consultation (Cleve-
land) 141
Labor. The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in
the History of International Commerce ( Free-
man, Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) .... 123
Mexico. U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on
Flood Control Project (Johnson) 147
Near East
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on Jerusalem ;
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near
East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148
United States Repeats Concern for Future of
Jerusalem (Rusk) 149
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Golden
Rule of Consultation (Cleveland) .... 141
Presidential Documents. U.S., Mexico Conclude
Agreement on Flood Control Project . . . 147
Publications. Recent Releases 154
Trade
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Second
Meeting (communique) 146
Treaty Information
Current Actions 153
The Kennedy Round : Proud Chapter in the His-
tory of International Commerce (Freeman,
Reynolds, Roth, Trowbridge) 123
U.S., Mexico Conclude Agreement on Flood Con-
trol Project (Johnson) 147
U.S.S.R. The Golden Rule of Consultation
(Cleveland) 141
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 153
U.N. Security Council Condemns Recruitment of
Mercenaries (BufCum, text of resolution) . 151
U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolutions on Jerusalem ;
Urges Steps Toward Durable Peace in Near
East (Goldberg, text of resolution) .... 148
Name Index
BufEuni, William B 1.51
Cleveland, Harlan 141
Freeman, Orville L 123
Goldberg, Arthur J 148
Johnson, President 147
Reynolds, James J 123
Roth. William M 123
Rusk, Secretary 149
Trowbridge, Alexander B 123
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 10-16
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
No. Date Subject
tl56 7/10 Restrictions on travel to Lebanon
lifted.
*157 7/11 Hernandez sworn in as Ambassador
to Paraguay (biographic details).
tl58 7/13 U.S.-Israel Cotton Textile Agree-
ment.
tl59 7/i:;! U.S.- Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Committee.
*160 7/14 Pollack appointed Director of Inter-
national Scientific and Techno-
logical Affairs; Joyce, Deputy
Director (biographic details).
*161 7/14 Program for visit of President
Asgeir Asgeirsson of Iceland
tl62 7/15 U.S. note to U.S.S.R. concerning
incident in the port of Haiphong
on June 29.
163 7/14 Rusk : U.N. resolution on Jerusalem.
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bdli.etin.
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Superintendent of Documents
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1467
August 7, 1967
SECRETAEY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JULY 19 169
ISSUES IN FUTURE U.S. FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
Statement hy William M. Roth 173
UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Statement 1>y Assistant Secretary Solomon 180
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1467 Publication 8273
August 7, 1967
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tbe Readers' Oulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
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tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
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States is or may become a parly
and treaties of general interruitional
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Publications of the Department,
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national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19
Press release 164 dated July 19
I'd like to welcome to the conference today
a group of college interns who are working with
us in the Department this summer. We always
greatly value the contribution which they make,
and we hope that their experience here will in-
fect some of them with the desire to take on
careers in the field of foreign affairs.
I would like to express our very great dis-
tress at the death of former President Castello
Branco of Brazil in an airplane accident. I
think when the history of Brazil is written for
this period, historians will find that he made
a very substantial contribution to his country
and to the hemisphere, not only in pulling
Brazil away from the slippery slope into un-
controlled and disastrous inflation but also in
maintaining the options for Brazil in moving
toward a sound constitutional system. We very
greatly regret his death in an airplane accident
yesterday.
Also, I've sent condolences to the Govern-
ment of the Malagasy Republic because of the
death of my distinguished colleague the For-
eign Minister, Mr. Albert Sjdla who has been
Foreign Minister since 1960, who also was lost
in an airplane accident yesterday.
And I'm ready for your questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary^! how do you assess the state
of U.S. -Soviet relations in the light of the
Glassioro conference ^ and Soviet arvfis ship-
ments to the Aral) states in the continuing
Middle East crisis?
A. There's been no dramatic change in our
relations with the Soviet Union in recent weeks.
I think the Glassboro talks were highly useful.
They were hard-working talks. The President
and Chairman Kosygin had a chance, over a
' For background, see Bulletin of July 10, 1967,
p. 35.
period of 9 or 10 hours, to go over the world
situation in considerable detail.
I think that the fact that they did meet was
a plus. There would have been general dis-
aiDpointment throughout the world and in this
country had they not found it possible to meet.
The fact that they were able to expose to each
other their points of view in considerable de-
tail at least made it possible for each side to
understand somewhat more clearly the respec-
tive views of the two Governments.
We did not expect miracles to emerge from
the Glassboro talks. The net effect of those talks
will be manifested in the weeks and months to
come as we try to find agreement on particular
points.
As far as we're concerned, we are prepared
to try to find points of agreement with the
Soviet Union — on small points such as cultural
exchanges and on large points such as Viet-Nam
or the Middle East.
But there are obvious differences which are
far reaching between our two countries. The
basic objectives of the Soviet Union continue
to be to support the world revolution. The ques-
tion of means is important. We hope that the
Soviet Union will understand the importance
of prudence in a world situation in which frail
human beings have weapons of mass destruc-
tion at their disposal. So we do not approach
our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis
of total hostility on the one side or any illusions
about the depth and the importance of the ques-
tions which separate us.
Now, this is a matter which requires continual
work day after day, week after week, on par-
ticular questions.
On the Middle East, I think from what Mr.
Kosygin has said in the General Assembly and
what we know of their general attitude in the
case, there are certain points on which we and
the Soviet Union are agreed, even though the
states in the area may not agree. The Soviet
ATTGTJST 7, 1967
159
Union, for example, accepts the existence of the
State of Israel ; and we would suppose that that
carries with it certain consequences.
Now, certain of the Arab states have been
unwilling thus far to take the step of accepting
the State of Israel as an established fact in
international relations, and that has compli-
cated somewhat the attitude of the various
parties in the present United Nations General
Assembly.
But we're conscious of the fact that relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union
are very important to the general structure of
world peace, and we are prepared to sit down
with them on whatever point we can find to
move toward agreement rather than controversy
and to find ways to reduce the impact of dis-
agreements which we might have on important
questions.
So this is a matter of continuing concern that
will fuid us ready to move toward a stabilization
of the world situation.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. Yes.
Q. — would you have any concern that Brit-
ain's disclosure of her plans to reduce and
eventually fhase out her forces in the Far East
might encourage the Communists in the area,
^particularly , to hang on longer in Viet-Nam or
to increase their infiltration and subversion in
the other countries of that area?
A. Well, my inclination is to be primarily
concerned with the situation in Asia and the
Pacific and Southeast Asia. I regret any deci-
sion by Britain to reduce substantially its pres-
ence in the area. This is a decision which the
British themselves have to make in terms of
their own national requirements and national
necessities. And it is known that many of us
who have responsibilities in that area have re-
gretted the idea tliat there would be any sig-
nificant British withdrawal. I'm glad to note
that Britain has projected its withdrawal into
the 1970's and that it is prepared to take into
account the general situation in Southeast Asia
which might obtain at that time.
But that does not, I think, mean that the
Communists can take any comfort from this
particular step. Those of us who are committed
in that area, and those who live in the area, are
determined that they shall maintain their own
national independence and their national se-
curity. And so we will get on with the job.
Middle East Arms Race
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that the
Soviet Union is continuing to ship arms into the
Middle East and in view of the fact that the
logic of American policy in this area has always
been to maintain a relative equilibrium on arms,
does this place a great pressure and burden on
the United States to perhaps lift its arms
embargo?
A. Well, in the first place, we very much re-
gret this neighborhood arms race in the Middle
East.
In 1962, when I appeared at the Geneva dis-
armament conference,^ I pressed the conference
to give attention not just to the overriding arms
race, say, between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but also to give its attention to the
lesser arms races m different parts of the world.
Unfortunately, we encoimtered considerable in-
difference to these neighborhood anns races.
Now, the intrusion of major arms into the
Middle East by the Soviet Union in such coun-
tries as Egypt and Syria and Algeria raised
problems not only affecting the security of
Israel but also affecting the security of neigh-
boring Arab countries.
We have ourselves tried not to become a
principal supplier of arms in that region. But
we are committed to the political independence
and the territorial integrity of the states of the
Middle East. And when imbalances of a major
proportion occurred, we felt it was necessary
for us to supply some limited military assistance
to certain of the Arab countries and to Israel.
Now, the answer to this ought to be some
understanding among the arms recipients and
the arms suppliers to put some sort of ceiling on
the arms race in the Middle East. Because
whatever one thinks about it otherwise, these
burgeoning military establisliments do divert
important resources and scarce resources away
from the economic and social development of the
countries of that area. President Jolinson has
emphasized this point among his five principles
with respect to a permanent settlement in the
Middle East.^ We would like very much to see
some arrangement by which defense establish-
ments in the Middle East are kept within rea-
sonable bounds in order that there not be that
diversion of resources and in order that arms
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 15, 1962,
see ihid., Apr. 2. 1962, p. 531.
•/6i(J., July 10, 1967, p. 31.
160
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
themselves not be a major source of tension
which could set off additional hostilities.
We will continue to work at this in the United
Nations and in capitals. I would not be able to
say today that I am encouraged about the pros-
pects, because the resupply of certain of the
countries by the Soviet Union has been going
on apace, and this will raise security questions
for not only Israel but also certain of the Arab
countries.
Q. Mr. Secretary, hoio do you view the con-
tinuing Soviet arms shipments to the Arab
counti-ies at this time? Do you look at it as a de-
cision to try and replace most of the Soviet
arms that were lost or destroyed during the
war? Or do you look on it as more or less a
stopgap move hy the Soviet Union?
A. Well, I can't really interpret what has
happened thus far. There has been some signif-
icant resupply of arms to certain of the coun-
tries there following the recent hostilities.
What the long-range purpose of the Soviet
Union would be in this matter, I am not in a
position to say.
Wliat we would like to see is some under-
standing, perhaps through the United Nations,
about the supply of arms. We would be glad to
make our own arms shipments to that area pub-
lic— to register them in some suitable fashion if
others would do the same. We, as a matter of
fact, don't keep these things secret ourselves on
a unilateral basis, so that these matters become
known.
What we would like to have is some sort of
understanding — whether in general or in detail
(because details are difficult to work out) — that
the arms-supplying nations will not themselves
be responsible for a major renewal of an arms
race in the JMiddle East. Because down that
trail lies a possible catastrophe.
Progress in Vief-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your
assessment of the situation in Viet-Nam now
and lohat the most imperative needs, in your
opinion, may be?
A. Well, I must say that I am encouraged by
the reports which I have had from Secretary
McNamara and General [William C] West-
moreland and Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker
about progress in Viet-Nam.
I note that the word "stalemate" has come into
discussion. I have the impression that that word
has been used by those who would like to do
something drastically different than what we
are now doing. But at that point they split off
into two directions: Those who would like to
increase the military action by major increase
in bombing of the North, for example, want
apparently to justify their position by talking
about a "stalemate." Those who want to do a
great deal less — withdrawal to enclaves or with-
drawal from our obligations to Viet-Nam — are
also tempted to talk about a "stalemate."
I don't see a stalemate there. I think that there
is military progress. There is, clearly, economic
progress in dampening down the rate of infla-
tion. We are seemg at the present time, despite
some of the difficulties — we are seeing a major
effort by the South Vietnamese to do some-
thing which is extremely difficult to do under
the conditions of a mean and dirty guerrilla
war; that is, move toward an elected govern-
ment and some sort of a constitutional process.
Now, all these things mean that we are mov-
ing ahead.
Now, when you talk about the — when you ask
about the critical factors involved, I think the
most important single fact is the attitude of
Hanoi and tlie question whether Hanoi is pre-
pared to abandon its effort to seize South Viet-
Nam by force. This is looked upon by some as
a trite expression, but it is the heart of the
matter.
If Hanoi is prepared to abandon that effort,
there can be peace within hours. But so long
as they attempt to seize South Viet-Nam by
force, the struggle will continue, and there will
be some tough days ahead.
U.S. Position on Bombing Pause
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a new round
of speculation about the possibility of another
bombing pause or a halt in Viet-Nam. Is there
any variation in the U.S. position on the condi-
tions which toould warrant a pause or a halt?
A. Well, that roimd of speculation hasn't
come from me. We've made it very clear that
we are prepared to stop the bombing of North
Viet-Nam as a step toward peace. If anyone
anywhere in the world can demonstrate that
stopping the bombing is a step toward peace,
they will have no difficulty in Washington.
Now, we have stopped the bombing on a num-
ber of occasions without any response from the
other side. What we would like to know is
whether the other half of the war can be
ATTGUST 7, 1967
161
stopped if we stop the bombing of North Viet-
Nam. "Wliat we would like to know is what will
happen if we stop the bombing of North Viet-
Nam. And thus far no one has been able or
willing to tell us, even by a whisper behind his
hand, as to what the effect would be.
We do not accept the view that we should
stojD the bombing on the suggestion of the
Hanoi Foreign Minister, Mr. [Nguyen Duy]
Trinh, that there could be talks. I've said
this until you gentlemen are bored with it, but
if we were to say that we would negotiate only
if all of the violence in South Viet-Nam were
stopped while we continue to bomb the North,
most people would say we are crazy. And they
probably would be right.
Now, when the other side makes exactly the
same proposition in reverse, it is hard for me
to understand why there are people who say,
"That sounds like a good proposition. Why
don't you accept it?"
Now, I have illustrated — and apparently this
has led to some little confusion or misunder-
standing— I have illustrated this point with an
operational example. There are three or four
North Vietnamese divisions in and near the
demilitarized zone, 4 or 5 miles away from our
Marines. Now, if we stopped the bombing of
North Viet-Nam, can anyone tell us that those
three or four divisions of North Vietnamese
regular forces will not attack ovir IMarines?
Thus far no one has been able or willing to say
that. Now, we can't tell our Marines that, "You
must wait until these fellows get within 2 miles
of you before you hit them. But don't hit them
when they are 9 miles away, because that would
be rude." We are not children.
There is a way to make peace in this situation.
But both sides have to make a contribution
toward peace. And President Johnson has
pointed out over and over again that we will
meet the other side more than halfway if they
are prepared to talk about peace. We are pre-
pared to talk today without any conditions
whatever. We are prepared to talk today about
what kind of conditions would open the possi-
bilities for talks.
In March of this year Secretary-General
U Thant made some proposals, basically three
points — that there be a military standstill, that
there be preliminary political discussions, and
that there be a meeting of the Geneva confer-
ence. We replied to U Thant that we are pre-
pared to enter immediately into a discussion of
a military standstill, that we are prepared to
take part in preliminary discussions; we are
prepared to go to a Geneva conference.*
Now, you can't have a standstill without some
discussion. The South Vietnamese Government,
for example, holds all of the provincial capitals,
43 of them, and with the exception of three or
four, all of the district towns — the district
capitals — some 240. Now, in a standstill you
have got to know whether it is clearly under-
stood that the Government of South Viet-Nam
continues to maintain its communications and its
contact with, and its supply of, these provincial
and district capitals. I'm using this simply as
an example. The fact that some guerrillas may
be along the highways here and there may lead
the other side to think that somehow that con-
tact is to be prevented.
Now, one has to understand the circum-
stances in which a standstill can occur before it
has any chance whatever of success. Now, if
North Viet-Nam had responded to the Secre-
tary-General in as forthcoming a way as did
we, we at least would have been in discussions
straightaway about the arrangements by which
a general military standstill could occur.
So we are prepared to move toward peace. But
we are not prepared to stop half the war while
the other half goes on unrestricted, unimpeded,
and with maximum violence.
Q. Mr. Secretary, diflomatic traffic through
the diplomatic channels to Hanoi has heen ir-
regular in the -past. Whafs it like today?
A. Well, the problem is not now and it never
has been diplomatic channels. The problem re-
mains the question whether the South Viet-
Nam — whether North Viet-Nam is prepared to
talk seriously about peace. Now, there is no
problem of channels.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. Yes, sir ?
Q. To %ohat extent, if any, do you believe that
our support of South Viet-Nam should he condi-
tioned on the type of government which is de-
veloped there? I ask the question in the context
of the current political maneuvering s in Saigon.
A. Well, there are two quite different ques-
tions. The one question is whether North Viet-
Nam is entitled to overrun South Viet-Nam by
* For texts of the Secretary-General's aide memoire
of Mar. 14 and U.S. replies, see iUd., Apr. 17, 1967,
p. 624.
162
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
force. Our answer to that is "No." That answer
was given in the Southeast Asia Treaty, which
was ratified by our Senate with only one dis-
senting vote in 1955.
The second question is what kind of institu-
tions the South Vietnamese themselves can con-
struct. We have been very much encouraged that
the military leadership there in Februaiy of last
year took the initiative to launch a program for
a constitutional government and free elections.
That was endorsed by us in later meetings, and
we give it our full support.
Now, they elected their Constitutional Assem-
bly. That Assembly remains in being to make
arrangements for the elections. There are 11
slates of candidates that have been approved by
the Assembly. We think that the South Viet-
namese people themselves ought to have a
choice, but that is a matter for them to work
out. They will have a wide choice.
But I would think that these political proc-
esses will give the South Vietnamese people
an opportunity to make their own decisions
about the governments that they — the govern-
ment that they wish to have in power.
U.S. Aid to Jordan Under Review
Q. Mr. Secretary, loliat are your present in-
tentions on providing either economic or mili-
tary aid to King Hussein of Jordan^
A. Well, the question of aid is under review.
I have no announcements to make on that sub-
ject. We have, as you know, over a good many
years provided economic assistance to Jordan
and some military assistance to Jordan, as well
as to other states in that area. Those questions,
of course, are a matter of great preoccupation at
the present time. But from time to time an-
nouncements will be made on that subject. I have
no generalization to make at the moment. It's
a matter in which we are very much interested.
U.S. Prepared To Negotiate With Hanoi
Q. Mr. Secretary, coidd you comment on the
proposal made by the eight House Republicans
on a possible staged deescalation of the bombing
of North Yiet-Nam? Do you find merit in that
suggestion?
A. Well, we are glad to have suggestions from
any source about how this matter can be made —
can be moved toward a peaceful solution. The
problem of our stopping the bombing is not a
serious one as far as we are concerned as a
matter of policy. Wliat we are interested in is
what would happen if we stopped the bombing.
Now, there are those — and I'm not now re-
ferring to this particular group of Congress-
men— there are those who thinli that we should
stop the bombing to increase the prospect that
the other side will do A, B, or C. Well, now,
we don't have to rely on hunches or on specula-
tion on a matter of that sort. We can ask
Hanoi- — and we do ask Hanoi — "If we stop the
bombing, what will you do? Will you do A, B,
orC?"
And if they come back and say, "No," then we
know what the answer is. We don't have to fish
in the dark for this kind of thing. We can find
out.
Now, so far as we know. Ho Clii Minh's letter
to the President, which was made public in
February, represents still the present position
of Ho Chi Minh.= We will be glad to see some
change in their attitude, not only on this par-
ticular point but upon dozens, literally dozens,
of proposals made by ourselves or other govern-
ments or groups of governments that might help
move this matter toward peace.
You have seen my summary of some 28 pro-
posals ® made by ourselves or others in this
situation, all of which have been rejected by
Hanoi. So these are not questions for the United
States. They are questions for Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in —
A. I have noted in recent weeks that there
are those who are talking about the slogan
"Negotiate now." I hoj^e they realize they are
not talking to Washington. They are talking to
Hanoi. Now, if they adopt some other slogan,
"Stop half the war," then they will be talking
to us. But we are prepared to negotiate at any
moment with the authorities in Hanoi.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in April when General
Westmoreland was here, he described the war
as one of attrition. That doesn't seem to be a
characterisation that has been endorsed by the
administration. Would you object to it? And
if yoit would, why? and how would you charac-
terize it othenoise?
A. Oh, I think there is no basis for great
' For texts of letters exchanged by President Johnson
and Ho Chi Minh, see ihid., Apr. 10, 1967, p. 595.
' For an address made b.v Secretary Rusk on May 1,
see ma., May 22, 1967, p. 770.
AUGUST 7, 1967
163
argument or discussion about a particular word
of that sort. Obviously, if you see a regiment
coming down the road with guns in its hands,
you have got to decide whether you get out of
its way or whether you shoot at it. Now, we are
going to shoot at it. And so long as those regi-
ments come down the road, they are going to
get shot at.
Now, they have suffered very substantial
losses. They have not been able last year to cut
the country in two, as they rather thought they
might. They have not been able to launch a
major offensive in June and July, as all indica-
tions indicated they planned to. So they are
hurting. But there is still a long, tough job
ahead until Hanoi gets to the point where —
unless Hanoi gets to the point where they are
prepared to talk seriously about peace.
No, this is not a problem that could be de-
scribed by a single word. I don't object to Gen-
eral Westmoreland's word, but I think that
there is no particular point in trying to build
a pyramid on top of it.
Now, the other side is hurting, and they are
hurting very badly. And we believe that they
are not in a position to achieve their objectives
in South Viet-Nam. Now, when they recognize
that and accept the consequences of it is a polit-
ical judgment in Hanoi to which we are not
pri\^. But that time will come. That time will
come.
Communist Chinese Behavior
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. Yes, sir?
Q. Is it possible to assess the importance or
the motivation of Chinese Communist behavior
in Hong Kong and Burma and all these areas?
A. I think I would not want to speculate too
much about that. I think that it's perfectly clear
that the authorities in Peking are not very good
neighbors these days anywhere. I think it would
be hazardous for anyone to try to predict what
the outcome will be. But it is not very surpris-
ing that Peking would get very grumpy about
Burma when the Burmese people objected to
the attempt to import the cultural revolution
into Burma itself.
We Ivuow that Peking has been giving polit-
ical and other kinds of support to the attempt
to seize Laos and South Viet-Nam by force. We
know that Poking has publicly announced that
Thailand is next on the list and that tliey are
doing things themselves to train and to encour-
age certain subversive elements in northeast
Thailand. But I think the attitude there, at
least officially, so far as we can tell, continues
to be that of supporting the world revolution by
militant means, and they should not be sur-
l^rised if other people object to it.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. Yes?
Q. Understandably, since the explosion of
this latest nuclear bomb, there has been con-
siderable discussion in India and elsewhere
about the consequences xohich arise. And there
is also growing fear. So what is your thinking
on this, particularly in view of the fact that
India is now seeJcing apparently, both from
you and the Soviet Union, some amount of
guarantees?
A. Well, I think no one would think that the
development of nuclear power in mainland
China is a contribution toward peace. As far
as we are concerned, one nuclear power was too
many, and I think history will record that the
rejection of the Baruch proposals in 1946 was
a great tragedy for all of mankind, because had
they been accepted, there would have been no
nuclear powers.
This question of guarantees is a matter of
considerable importance, because empty guar-
antees are of no particular value. Real guar-
antees are very serious and solemn questions for
the governments concerned. I have no doubt this
question will come up in Geneva in the discus-
sions of the nonproliferation treaty and perhaps
in the Security Council of the United Nations.
But there are no conclusions drawn by govei-n-
ments so far that I know of. That is a matter
that we are continuing to give thought to.
Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, the Suez Canal, I think,
is a national property of Egypt. How do you
feel about international efforts to tell Egypt —
or force Egypt — how to run the caned? Do you
think that is in the international field, or is it
pretty much up to them?
A. Well, the Suez Canal, just like other in-
ternational waterways, is a matter of inter-
national concern. We have clearly expressed our
view that there should be innocent passage of
international waters, and that includes the
canal. Now, this is one of the questions, im-
doubtedly, that will be discussed in detail in
the Security Council and with the jiarties after
164
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the conclusion of this present session of the
General Assembly. But this is a matter still that
is unresolved, and some answer will have to be
found.
The Middle East Problem
Q. Mr. Secretary^ Israel maintains that the
most effective, prohahly the only effective, way
to settle its frohlems is through direct talks
with the Arabs. I wonder hoio you feel about
this contention and whether you think it is a
realistic apfroach?
A. Well, there obviously are some problems
about that. One can understand why Israel be-
lieves that the time has come to sit down and
make final peace settlements with its neighbors.
Now, this is a matter of great political sensi-
tivity among its immediate neighbors, and there
is some question as to whether any of the gov-
ernments in that area can, in fact, do that and
survive. So that you have some problems.
I would suppose that the United Nations has
a very important role to play in beginning the
process of working out a permanent peaceful
settlement on a basis that would involve some
reconciliation among all of the governments
who are in that area.
I wouldn't want to be dogmatic about tech-
niques at this point. There is still a lot of work
to be done. The Security Council, when it first
had the Middle East question in front of it, was
able to bring about a cease-fire through a series
of unanimous resolutions,' but I would suppose
that quiet, patient work, not only at the table
but behind the scenes in the Security Council,
might find an answer to this particular kind of
question. But it's a complicated question. I don't
see a quick and easy answer for it today.
New Treaties on Panama Canal
Q. Mr. Secretary, the new treaties we have
negotiated concerning the Panama Canal * have
come under criticism on Capitol Hill on the
ground that they compromise U.S. sovereignty
over the Canal Zone, operation of the canal, its
defense, and so forth. Could you comment on
that criticism?
' For background and texts of resolutions, see Hid.,
June 26, 1067, p. 934, and July 3, 1967, p. 3.
* For a White House announcement of June 26, see
iMd., July 17, 19G7, p. 65.
A. Well, I think that it might be well for
people to restrain their discussions until the full
texts of the treaties are available. These matters
are now before the two Governments for review.
The negotiators completed their work ad refer-
endum to Governments. The Governments are
studying these treaties at the present time,
pending their signature and public disclosure.
I have, myself, no doubt at all that these first
drafts represent a major step toward a peaceful
and honorable settlement of the problem of the
canal. I think they insure the effective opera-
tion of the canal and they insure the security
of the canal.
I would hope that judgments could be with-
held until full information is available and
discussion of the bases upon which these dis-
cussions would follow. After all —
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. — after all, there is a difference between
1903 and 1967—
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. — and we must take those differences into
account.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any discussions
underway on plans for a summit conference on
Viet-Nam following up the Manila Conference?
A. I have no doubt that there will be other
meetings of the heads of govermnent of the
countries with forces involved in Viet-Nam.
That was discussed at the last meeting in
Manila. And it was indicated that the chiefs
of government might meet again and that they
would meet again from time to time through
their foreign ministers.
We have had the foreign ministers of those
governments meeting here in Washington, for
example, on the occasion of the last SEATO
meetmg. There are no dates or specific plans
at the present time, but this is not a question
of policy. It's a question of timing and con-
venience of those concerned in relation to devel-
opments in Viet-Nam itself. So I suppose that
in due course there will be further annoimce-
ments made on any such plans.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been many months
since you raised the subject loith the Soviet
Union about talks on a freeze on strategic
missiles. Lacking any agreement hy the Rus-
sians actually to talk with the United States,
AUGUST
196^
165
do you think ferhaj)s the admiinistration should
go ahead ivith a decision to defloy at least a
small system?
A. Well, first, we have in our defense budget
for the next fiscal year funds to support those
steps which we would in any event be taking,
so that we are not diverting or slowing down
our own plans in that regard.
Secondly, we do not have yet a definitive
answer from the Soviet Union which would let
us make any judgment as to whether some
understanding can be reached on this point.
They told us a little more than 3 months ago
that they were prepared to discuss this subject.
Now, this is a very complex subject, but it's
a very important one, and we would like to ini-
tiate these discussions just as soon as the Soviet
Union is prepared to do so.
I noted that Mr. Kosygin, in his press con-
ference at the United Nations following the
Glassboro talks, referred to our interest solely
in defensive missiles. Now, this is not the case.
We are prepared to talk about both offensive
and defensive missiles, because at the heart of
this is a very simple problem.
If both sides deploy ABM's in any significant
way, then both sides will be compelled to mul-
tiply their offensive missiles for the purpose of
saturating such defenses, because neither side
can accept the consequences of unilateral in-
capability of inflicting very great damage upon
the other.
Now, the effect of all tliis is that we could
take two paths. We could, without any under-
standings and without any joint action in this
field — we could go down the road of deploying
ABM systems and multij^lying offensive missile
systems at the cost of tens upon tens of billions
of dollars and come out strategically about
where we are today. Or we could fuid some un-
derstanding which would avoid that course and
save those tens upon tens of billions of dollars.
Now, we think the second course is the course
of prudence and is a course which is more in
keeping with our obligations to our own peoples
in both countries to prevent a radical escalation
of the levels of defense budgets and to save
those resources for the unfinished business
which both we and the Russian people have in
our own societies.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Q. Mr. Secretary., there was a question earlier
on the matter of the British defense cutback.
Of G0U7'se, there is also the matter pending of the
German defense cutiack. Do you see both of
these develojMnents adding up to a general
shaking down of defense costs and a reori-
entation of defense strategy among the Allied
Powers?
A. Well, as far as NATO is concerned, it does
not seem to me that that is involved yet at this
stage. Britain, for example, indicates her readi-
ness to continue to maintain European forces
indefinitely into the future and in substance and
in substantial numbers.
As far as the German budget decision is con-
cerned, we were aware of the fact that they have
been faced with a major budget problem. As a
matter of fact, it was the problem which caused
the postponement of Chancellor Kiesinger's
visit to the United States.
In their budget considerations they indicated
they would expect to cut back on the projections
of the defense budget which were made in, I
think, 1966. So they are talking about reduc-
tions of projections, and these are more sub-
stantial than reductions of actual levels as we
know them at the present time.
I have the very definite impression, based on
information fi'om the Government of the Fed-
eral Republic, that the talks about very sub-
stantial cuts in troop numbers were premature.
During the summer, tliey will be working out
the question of how they would apply some
reductions in their defense budgets to their de-
fense establislunents. And this will be a matter
of consultation in NATO and with us as it
affects the defense capabilities of the NATO
area. So I would think that this is still some-
thing that is ahead of us and that it would not
be possible to make a real judgment on your
question until we see where it comes out.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
A. I think over here.
Q. There has heen —
Q. Do we have any vieios on whether or not
the military authorities should ie subordinate
to the civilian authority in South Viet-Nam,
and is this an issue, in your judgment, in the
coming election campaign?
A. Oh, I think under the constitutional ar-
rangements, the elected President and the Prime
Minister would have primary responsibility —
would have responsibility for the entire effort
there.
166
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Now, that question is going to be decided by
the Vietnamese people when tJaey have a chance
to look at these 11 slates and decide among them.
Obviously, in a situation of war, in which the
South Vietnamese people are involved, the mili-
tary establishment is an important part of the
national unity and the capacity of the country
to defend itself.
But I think the question is not whether the
elected President is a military or a civilian but
whether the processes of government proceed
on a constitutional basis and in response to the
choices of the South Vietnamese people in a
free election.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McNamara Discusses
the Situation in Viet-Nam
Secretary of Defense Roiert S. McNamara,
together with Under Secretary of State
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Gen. Earle G.
'Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
met with President Johnson on July 12 to report
on their factfinding trip to Viet-Nam. Follow-
ing is Secretary McNamara's opening statement
at a news conference he held at the White House
after the meeting with the President}
Mr. Katzenbach, General Wheeler, and I
spent an hour and a half reviewing with the
President every aspect of U.S. operations in
South Viet-Nam and all of the factors influenc-
ing them.
We examined and discussed the political
situation, the status of the economy, and mili-
tary operations. We covered everything from
the operations of the ports to the pacification
program, to food, the medical care, the leader-
ship of U.S. personnel, and all of the details of
the very complex operation that we are a part
of.
The political scene has changed substantially
since my last visit to South Viet-Nam last
September and early October.
The constituent assembly, as you know, has
completed its work during that period. The na-
^ For transcript of question-and-answer portion of tlie
news conference, see 3 Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents, p. 1006.
tion now has a Constitution. Preparations for
the elections are advancmg rapidly.
As you are well aware, the election for the
Chief Executive and the Vice President will be
held within about 45 days, and that will be fol-
lowed vei-y shortly thereafter — witliin the next
45 or 60 days — by the completion of elections for
the legislative branch of the government.
This is tremendous progress when one looks
back at the situation that existed 9 months ago.
Improvement in the Vietnamese Economy
As to the economy, there has been dramatic
change. One of my missions in September, as it
had been in July, was to seek to find means to
break the bottleneck in the port of Saigon — a
bottleneck which at that time was not seriously
impeding military operations but which was a
serious drag on the development of the
economy.
There were in September and October, for
example, when I went down to the port and in-
spected it, between 800 and 900 barges which
were serving as floating warehouses because of
the inability to luiload the ships even in the ex-
tended period that they spent in the harbor —
inability to unload ships during that period and
move the merchandise into the warehouses.
This was not only clogging the port, but it
was, of course, denying the economy the goods
that it needed to sop up the increasing purchas-
ing power. This blockage of the port was, there-
fore, one of the factors contributing to a peril-
ous state of the economy. The danger of a run-
away inflation, a disorderly inflation, was very
great indeed.
Elimination of the bottleneck in the port has
done much to reduce the pressure on prices.
There are today simply a normal number of
barges being used to facilitate the off-loading of
the cargo vessels in the port. I would guess some-
thing on the order of 40 as compared to tlie 800
or 900 floating warehouses of last October.
A number of other factors have contributed
to easing of the price pressure. I don't mean to
say that prices aren't continuing to rise — of
course they are— but at a much more reasonable
rate than was true midyear last year.
And I think the danger of runaway inflation
has been veiy greatly reduced. In particular, the
price of necessities — fish, kerosene, fish sauce,
charcoal, for example — has not increased sig-
nificantly and has not increased out of line with
the incomes of those who buy such necessities.
AUGUST
19G7
167
So there has been a very substantial improve-
ment ill the economy and a much more stable
basis for future development of that economy.
Military Progress Continuing
On the military field, let me say to start with,
the military commanders I met with — and I met
with all of the senior military commanders in
the field, all of the senior Vietnamese com-
manders, many of the Allied commanders,
Korean, and New Zealanders, for example, and
many of the middle-ranking and junior U.S.
officers — all of the military commanders stated
that the reports that they read in the press of
military stalemate were, to use their words, the
"most ridiculous statements that they had ever
heard."
In their view military progress had occurred
and was continuing. How did they measure this ?
They measured it in particular by the success
of what they called the large-unit actions. These
are battalion-sized and larger actions.
They felt that these actions that General
[William C] Westmoreland had organized and
carried on over the past several months, partic-
ularly in II and III Corps, had a spoiling effect
on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Before
they could concentrate their troops to launch an
offensive, Westmoreland, through his intelli-
gence sources, had obtained information about
the intended enemy plans and had struck the
troop concentrations as they were developing,
spoiling the potential of the enemy for carrying
out these offensive actions.
Moreover, as you know, it has been General
Westmoreland's strategy over the past several
months to attack the base areas, particularly
those in the II and III Corps, using B-62 strikes
in some cases but in particular using a coordi-
nated ground and air attack against these base
areas to destroy the facilities, the stocks — the
recuperation areas that the Viet Cong and the
North Vietnamese had used.
The military commanders felt, as a result
of this combination of spoiling attacks and at-
tacks on the base areas, the pressure had been
so great on the North Viet Cong that they had
tended to shift their area of activity. Wliereas
up until very recently, the activity had been con-
centrated primarily in the II and III Corps, the
offensive activities more recently — they had
moved their area of action to the I Corps.
This is understandable because in the II and
III Corps — with the loss of their base areas —
they were at the end of a very long line of com-
munication over which their men and supplies
moved from the supply centers in North Viet-
Nam. This line of communications moved down
the panliandle of North Viet-Nam across into
Laos, down Laos to the Cambodian border, and
across into South Viet-Nam — a very, very long
line of communication that was under very in-
tense air attack, as a matter of fact.
And because this was a handicap to them —
particularly so in connection with the strategy
that Westmoreland was carrying out against
them — they shifted their area of activity to I
Corps.
This accoiuits for their military actions there
m the past several weeks. Now they have the
advantage of short lines of communication ex-
tendmg down to the southern border of Viet-
Nam, very close to the point where the troops
are now very active.
Roads Open to Traffic
Perhaps the most dramatic change that I saw
that reflects the military situation was the
opening of the roads.
Highway No. 1, which is the coastal route that
runs from the I7th parallel — the line of demar-
cation between North Viet-Nam and South
Viet-Nam — clear south to Saigon, has been bro-
ken for many, many months in literally hun-
dreds of places, and traffic on the route has been
minimal.
But within the past several months, as a result
of these military actions — plamied and carried
out by the free-world forces — that route has
gradually been reopened in large segments.
As a matter of fact, day before yesterday, the
route from the southern border of the II Corps
up to Dong Hai, which is veiy close to the
DIklZ — just a few miles south of the DRIZ — was
opened for traffic.
There will continue to be ambushes, I pre-
sume, and Viet Cong strikes against it, but as
I flew over the road after this long stretch was
opened, literally himdreds of bicycles and scores
of cars and trucks — civilian cars and trucks —
were using it.
The same thing is tiiie of many of the feeder
roads in III and IV Corps — roads that are of
importance to move vegetables or rice to mar-
ket or otherwise serving as an underpinning of
the day-to-day life of the society.
168
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I don't want to exaggerate this or imply all
roads are open — far from it. I don't even want
to suggest that many of tlie roads being used
can be used freely night and day. They can't.
But there has been a very, very notice-
able— when I say "noticeable," I mean one fly-
ing over the area can notice a very substantial
increase in the miles of roads that are open to
traffic and the volmne of traffic on the roads.
Perhaps a word about the air operations is in
order.
We have suffered materially in air operations
because of night vision — the difficulty of acquir-
ing targets at night.
There have been some very significant changes
in technology. I don't want to go into the details
of them other than to say they have greatly
increased the capability of our forces to carry
on all-weather attacks on the lines of com-
munication, both in South Viet-Nam and in
North Viet-Nam.
These, in conjunction with new weapons, new
types of ordnance, that have been designed and
developed in recent j'ears and brought into pro-
duction in recent months in combination have
increased the effectiveness of the airstrikes. As
a matter of fact, they have reduced the losses of
both planes and pilots. Tlie losses of planes, for
example, are rather significantly lower than we
had previously estimated.
The Pacification Program
Now a word on the pacification program. You
are all aware that within the past few weeks
there has been a reorganization of the American
effort in pacification, an integration of the civil-
ian and military staffs.
The responsibility for pacification has been
assigned to General "Westmoreland, whose dep-
uty, Mr. Robert Komer, has been placed in
direct charge of it. I was very pleased with what
I saw.
The frictions that I had read about in the
paper perhaps existed at one time but certainly
have been dampened down, if not completely
eliminated. Both civilian and military officers
that I visited at the sector level, the provinces,
and the subsector levels of the villages and ham-
lets, were working effectively together and ap-
peared to have benefited from this integration
and reorganization of the pacification efforts.
However, having said that, I should state to
you that to be candid I must report the progress
in pacification has been very slow. I think tliat
the momentum will increase as the new organi-
zation gains in experience, but what we are
really trying to do here is engage in nation-
building. It is an extraordinarily complex
process. I would anticipate progress in what is
really a very significant field would continue to
be slow.
Additional Military Personnel
I am sure that the first question you would
ask me, if I didn't anticipate it, would be about
additional military personnel ; so I will address
myself to that. I think some more U.S. mili-
tary personnel will be required. I am not sure
how many. I am certain of one thing : that we
must use more effectively the personnel that are
presently there.
Wlien I say that, I am speaking of all free-
world personnel. As you know, the Vietnamese,
the Koreans, tlie Australians, the New Zealand-
ers, the Filipinos, as well as we, have all con-
tributed forces to the support of the operations
in Viet-Nam.
There has been a very rapid buildup of those
forces. We now have in uniform of the free-
world forces over 1,300,000 men. As you might
expect in any organization that has expanded
as fast as this one has, there are bound to be
areas of waste and inefficiency that can be cor-
rected and eliminated — that must be corrected
when we are considering additional troop re-
quirements.
We expect to take action to do that, and we
expect other nations will want to do likewise.
We discussed that with some of their representa-
tives while we were in South Viet-Nam. Before
we determine exactly how many additional U.S.
troops must be sent, we must discuss the whole
problem of troop strength with our allies.
This is not a decision one nation can make
alone, nor is it a burden tha.t one nation should
carry alone. So both of these issues will have to
be considered in the determination of the num-
ber of additional U.S. troops to be sent.
We haven't arrived at any conclusion yet. We
don't have any precise schedule on which we
will arrive at such conclusion. We have about
480,000 U.S. military personnel authorized for
assignment to Viet-Nam at the present time, and
we have a strength of something in the order
of 450,000 or 460,000 men there now. So there
are an additional 20,000 or 30,000 men to be
169
added under the present program before any
new jjrogram might take effect.
Although the decision, particularly as to the
number of troops, has not yet been made, I think
I can tell you I foresee no need to call the Re-
serves to meet the currently anticipated future
requirements.
U.S. Expresses Concern at Plight
of Prisoners in North Viet-Nam
Wliite House Statement
White House press release dated July 17
The United States Government has been
greatly concerned at the plight of Americans
held prisoner by the National Liberation Front
and North Viet-Nam. More than 20 American
soldiers and several American civilians are be-
lieved held by the National Liberation Front.
We know that more than 160 American mili-
tary personnel are confined in North Viet-Nam.
Several hundred more are considered missing
because the National Liberation Front and
North Viet-Nam withhold the names of prison-
ers and generally prohibit most prisoners from
sending letters. We are gravely concerned that
some of these prisoners may not be treated hu-
manely. The claims of the National Liberation
Front and the North Vietnamese that they are
treated humanely cannot be verified, because
neutral observers or organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross have
not been allowed to visit the prisoners and in-
spect tlieir places of detention.
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese prisoners
held by the Government of Viet-Nam are con-
fined in camps inspected regularly by the ICRC.
These prisoners include many captured by U.S.
forces and turned over to the Government of
Viet-Nam for safekeeping under the provisions
of the Geneva convention. Their treatment and
the conditions of their confinement have been
humane and in accord with the convention, as
verified by these neutral observers.
On several occasions prisoners, including se-
riously sick and wounded, have been released by
the Govermnent of Viet-Nam witliin South
Viet-Nam and to North Viet-Nam. Additional
seriously sick and wounded prisoners who may
be captured in the future and who wish to be
repatriated will be given the same opportunity,
as required by tlie Geneva convention.
The United States calls on the National Liber-
ation Front and North Viet-Nam to permit im-
partial inspection of all prisoners and urges
them to repatriate those sick and wounded
prisoners who qualify for repatriation under
the convention.
The Govermnents of the United States and
Viet-Nam have repeatedly made clear both pub-
licly and privately through many channels their
desire to bring about an exchange of prisoners.
The Govermnent of the United States reiterates
this desire and its willingness to discuss such
exchanges at any time and in any appropriate
way, using intennediaries or directly, by public
means or privately.
U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident
involving Soviet Ships at Haiphong
Press release 162 dated July 15
Follotoing is the text of a U.S. note delivered
l>y the U.S. Etnbassy in Moscow to the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs July 13.
July 13, 1967.
The Government of the United States of
America refers to its note of July 1^ and to the
note of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics of Jime 30 ^ concerning a
reported incident involving the Soviet merchant
ship "Mikliail Frunze" in the port of Haiphong
on June 29.
The investigation referred to in the United
States note indicates that on June 29 at approx-
imately the time mentioned in the Soviet note,
United States aircraft were engaged in an oper-
ation against a petroleum storage installation
in the vicinity of Haiphong. In that operation,
two United States aircraft attacked an ac-
tively firing anti-aircraft site located approx-
imately 600 yards from the area in which the
Soviet ship is reported to have been moored.
Wliile the investigation produced no positive
indication that these or other aircraft damaged
the Soviet vessel, from the evidence available
the possibility cannot be excluded that some of
the ordnance aimed at the anti-aircraft site fell
' Not printed here.
170
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
on or near the vessel. The investigation has,
however, established beyond doubt that any
damage that may have been sustained was in-
advertent and resulted solely from the difficult
combat conditions tliat existed. There is no
evidence of any violation of the strict instruc-
tions applicable to all United States military
pilots to make every effort to avoid inflicting
damage on vessels which are not hostile.
In the course of military operations for the
collective self-defense of the Republic of Viet-
Nam against the continued armed aggression
by North Viet-Nam, the United States Govern-
ment has taken extraordinary measures to min-
imize damage to non-hostile shipping. The
measures taken to this end are under contmumg
review to ensure that they are as effective as
possible. The United States Government regrets
that it has been impossible to eliminate com-
pletely the risk that foreign vessels entering or
remaining in an area of active hostilities may
sustain unintentional damage as a result of the
actions of one or the other side.
Time Limit on Copyright Filings
Extended for German Citizens
White House press release dated July 12
President Johnson on July 12 signed a procla-
mation ^ giving German citizens 1 year to bring
certain literary, artistic, and musical works
within the protection of the United States copy-
right law.
Citizens of many nations were unable to com-
ply with the requirements of the copyright law
for several years during and after World War
II because of disruption or suspension of copy-
right facilities. This proclamation would permit
German citizens who were unable to apply for
United States copj'right registration or renewal
from September 3, 1939, through May 5, 1956,
to do so during the year followmg the date of
the proclamation.
The United States copyright law authorizes
such a proclamation in favor of nationals of
countries which accord reciprocal treatment to
United States copyright owners. This reciproc-
ity exists between the Governments of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the United
States.
The proclamation gives copyright owners the
same rights they would have enjoyed had the
work been registered or renewed between 1939
and 1956.
Restrictions on Travel
to Lebanon Lifted
The Department of State announced on July
10 (press release 156) that U.S. passports are
now valid, without special endorsement, for
travel of American citizens to Lebanon.
Travel restrictions remain in effect, however,
for eight countries of the Middle East and
North Africa : Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, the
Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United
Arab Republic, and Yemen. These restrictions
will be lifted as soon as conditions warrant.
On June 21 the Department removed the ban
on American travel to Israel, Kuwait, Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.
World Law Day, 1967
A PROCLAMATION^
Our Nation is committed to the Rule of Law. A gov-
ernment of laws, rather than of men, is the very es-
sence of our society.
The Rule of Law, in our tradition, demands that
— Men be entitled to the government and the repre-
sentatives of their choice.
— No citizen be above the law.
— Justice be administered by an independent judicial
system.
— Disputes be fairly resolved by peaceful means.
We wish that relations among nations, as among in-
dividual citizens, were always governed by the Rule
of Law — that disputes among nations were always ad-
judicated peacefully — that nations could learn to live
with their differences as law-abiding neighbors.
One step in making this vision a reality is the join-
ing together of the best judicial and legal minds of
many nations. Many men of such eminence will assem-
ble in Geneva on July 10, 1967, for the World Confer-
ence of World Peace Through Law. While other meet-
ings will command more headlines, none will meet for
a more important purpose.
' No. 3792 ; for text, see 32 Fed. Reg. 10341.
^ No. 3791 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 10047.
AUGUST 7, 196 7
171
It is especially fitting in these times of strife that
we salute those who seek to establish the Rule of Law
as a standard for the world.
Our best wishes are with this conference, as it as-
sembles to promote the role of law and legal institu-
tions in the resolution of international disputes and the
maintenance of world peace. We join our fellow men
throughout the world in reaffirming our commitment to
the principles of international justice — and our hope
that all men may find the wisdom to implement them.
Now, THEREFORE, I, Ltndon B. Johnson, President of
the United States of America, in order to advance the
great goal of achieving and securing world peace, do
hereby proclaim July 10, 1967, as World Law Day, and
I call upon all public and private ofiicials, members of
the legal profession, citizens, and all men of good will
to demonstrate the importance of the law in mankind's
quest for world peace by appropriate observances and
ceremonies in courts, schools, universities, and other
public places.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
this third day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen
hundred and sixty-seven, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the one hundred and
ninety-first.
LyjL»«>AM/U*wfa«" ■
U.S.-Japan Medical Science
Committee Holds Third Meeting
The Department of State announced on July
13 (press release 159) that the third meeting of
the United States-Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Committee would be held at Palo Alto,
Calif, on July 29.^ Distinguished medical scien-
tists of the two coimtries are members of this
' For names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese
delegations, see Department press release 159 dated
July 13.
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965,
p. 133.
joint committee, which has met previously in
Honolulu in 1965 and in Japan last year.
The Committee developed out of discussions
in January 1965 between President Jolmson
and Prime Minister Sato.^ At that time they
agi-eed to undertake a greatly expanded pro-
gram of cooperation in medical science.
Attention has concentrated on six disease
problems: cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, para-
sitic diseases, certain virus diseases, and mahiu-
trition. The Committee is assisted by panels of
scientific experts in both countries. At the com-
ing meeting the Committee will hear reports by
these panels, review progress in the research ef-
forts underway, and consider future activities.
On July 26-28, just before the Committee
meeting, the panels on cholera and parasitic
diseases will convene at Palo Alto to discuss the
present status of their efforts and consider fur-
ther research.
Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section
of Great Lakes Fishery Commission
President Jolinson annoimced on July 5
(White House press release) his appointment
of Clarence F. Pautzke as a Commissioner of
the United States Section of the Great Lakes
Fishery Commission. Mr. Pautzke succeeds
Donald L. McKernan, whose resignation has
been accepted because of the press of his duties
as Special Assistant for Fish and Wildlife to
the Secretary of State.
Mr. Pautzke is Commissioner, Fisj and Wild-
life Service, and Dejiuty Assistant Secretary of
the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks.
He also is a U.S. Commissioner of the U.S.
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Com-
mission and the International North Pacific
Fisheries Commission.
172
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy
Statement hy William M. Roth
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^
I regard as a distinct honor your invitation
to be the opening witness before this subcom-
mittee. I can say witli great sincerity that I wel-
come this series of hearings reassessing U.S.
foreign trade policy. The President has ordered
a major review of our trade policies. The delib-
erations of this subcommittee and the testimony
and papers presented before it will be of enor-
mous benefit to us in preparing for and under-
taking the study for the President.
In trying to decide on what aspects of the
Kennedy Round and the future I could most
productively concentrate this morning, Mr.
Chairman, I have concluded that an extended
review of the Kennedy Round and its result
would not, perhaps, be in order.
A great deal has already been written and
said on the Kennedy Round conclusion, and
until the President's report to the Congress is
completed we will not have a definite analysis
of the agreement. I would propose for your con-
sideration, therefore, insertion in the record of
our initial report on the agreement. It is a fairly
detailed account of what happened. I would
then focus my remarks on the immediate fu-
ture to include, first, the issues that we face as
a result of the Kennedy Round and, second, the
question of what we envision as the means of
meeting the President's request for a major ad-
ministration review of trade policy.
If this approach is agreeable to you Mr.
Chairman, I will proceed to the discussion of our
immediate post-Kennedy Round problems.
' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee on
July 11.
These problems are essentially three :
1. The negotiating authority of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 has expired, leaving the
United States without an important means of
conducting its normal international trade
relations ;
2. The criteria for making available the ad-
justment assistance provided for in the Trade
Expansion Act appears to be so stated as to
make such assistance more difficult to obtain
than we expected ; and
3. In order to bring into effect a valuable
package of concessions worked out during the
Kennedy Round, Congress is to be asked to
agree to the abandonment of the American
Selling Price system of customs evaluation.
Need for Negotiating Authority
In regard to negotiating authority, we do not
contemplate any further major initiative in
trade liberalization in the immediate future.
With the Kennedy Round just over, we believe
that the present need is for review and reflection
in preparation for any renewed effort to stim-
ulate and expand international commerce. A
major review of trade policy will be undertaken
for the President.
Nevertheless, some minimal negotiating au-
thority is needed during this period.
May I take an example. Under section 351 of
the Trade Expansion Act — the so-called escape-
clause provision — the President has authority
to increase a duty or to impose a quota if he de-
termines that such action is necessary to prevent
or to remedy serious injury to a domestic in-
ATJGUST 7, 1967
173
dustry that is caused by increased imports that
in turn have resulted from tariff concession.
Under the established rule, we would be obliged
to see that some further adjustment was made
to compensate the supplying countries for their
loss through this emergency action by the Tariff
Commission. The preferred method would be
to lower one or more tariffs on other goods im-
ported into the United States. If we were not
able to make such comjDensatory tariff conces-
sions, we would have to face the retaliatory
withdrawal by the supplying countries of tariff
concessions which they have granted on goods
which we export to them.
In order to be in a position to make compensa-
tory tariff concessions in connection with the
escape-clause actions which we may have to
take, we should have authority under the Trade
Expansion Act to negotiate compensatory tariff
settlements.
Let me take one more example. There may be
times in the future when we may wish to revise
upward one or more tariff concessions. Tliis has
been necessary in the past when legislation has
been enacted to change tariff classifications with
the effect of increasing duties. Although these
cases may be rare, they do pose the problem of
negotiating a settlement with the other coun-
tries. Just as in the example I cited above, there
are two basic alternative adjustments that may
be made : for us to lower one or more duties on
other products in compensation to the other
countries or to face retaliatory tariff increases
against our exports. Our preference is obvious-
ly to negotiate for compensatory tariff reduc-
tions. This again makes desirable the existence
of some negotiating authority.
The GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] rules have brought a large measure
of order mto international trading relations.
The cost of the obligations they place upon the
United States are far outweighed by the bene-
fits we derive as the world's biggest trader.
It is m order to maintain our GATT obliga-
tions and to be able to act with initiative and
flexibility within the GATT framework that we
need some negotiating authority. It need not be
very substantial. It has been suggested, al-
though no final decision has yet been taken, that
the Trade Expansion Act negotiating authority
simply be extended, giving us the use of that
part of it that was not exhausted in the
Kennedy Eound.
Adjustment Assistance Modification
Turning to the adjustment assistance ques-
tion, we find ourselves dealing with the proba-
bility that the Congress in writing the pro-
visions of the Trade Expansion Act intended
far more readily available recourse to adjust-
ment assistance than has proved possible.
These provisions were designed to authorize
quick and substantial assistance to any worker
or firm mjured as a result of increased imports
caused by tariff concessions. The vmderlying
concept was that rather than restrict imports it
was far preferable to help firms and workers
meet problems created by import competition
through improved productivity.
Unfortunately, however, the adjustment as-
sistance provisions have not had the expected
beneficial effect, because in practice the present
test of eligibility to apply for the assistance has
proved too strict. In fact, in no case brought
under the act have any firms or workers been
able to prove eligibility.
The present test of eligibility requires (1)
that tariff concessions be shown to be the major
cause of increased imports and (2) that such in-
creased imports be shown to be the major cause
of injury to the petitioner.
In the complex environment of our modern
economy, a great variety of factors affect the
productive capacity and competitiveness of
American producers, making it virtually impos-
sible to single out increased imports as the ma-
jor cause of injury. In fact, it has usually been
impossible to prove that tariff concessions were
the major cause of increased imports.
Under these circumstances, it is apparent that
action must be taken to make the intended
assistance a reality. We now have under con-
sideration several formulations that might meet
the requirements of the situation. No final deci-
sions have yet been taken, but it is the intention
of the administration to propose congressional
action to modify the present provisions of the
act.
The new test of eligibility would insure that
adjustment assistance would be available only
in those cases of injury which are the result of
tariff concessions. The specific kmds and levels
of benefits would remain unchanged.
Also unchanged would be the provisions for
relief for entire industries — as distinguished
from individual workei'S and firms — which suf-
fer serious injury through tariff concessions.
174
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The so-called escape clause makes possible the
imposition of quotas and increased tariffs. How-
ever, this is a drastic form of relief and one
which costs other industries either tariff protec-
tion at home or export opportunities abroad, as
I have suggested in my earlier discussion of
GATT provisions for compensation and retalia-
tion in the event of increased tariffs. We believe
that the standards for escape-clause relief
should be retained in their present form.
After this rather siunmary discussion of the
first two of the three post-Kemiedy Round
problems, I would like to go mto more detail on
the question of the American Selling Price
(ASP) system, which, as I have said, will be a
matter for congressional consideration.
The ASP Issue
ASP, as it applies to chemicals, is often re-
ferred to by critics abroad as the symbol of non-
tariff barriers (NTB). I should like to confine
my comments to only three aspects of ASP. Let
me comment now on why it appears to us to be
an undesirable impediment to trade, what the
effects of its removal will probably be, and
finally, how we appraise the balance of what we
gave and received in this area in the recent trade
negotiations.
In 1922 the Congress determined that our
then infant chemical industry, specifically that
part of it which manufactures products derived
from coal tars, required extraordinary protec-
tion. The Congress was apparently reluctant to
raise the statutory duties to the levels it deemed
necessary to provide adequate protection under
the circumstances then existing. Instead, the
Congress provided that any imported coal tar
product, now referred to as benzenoid, which is
competitive with a similar domestic product
should be valued on the basis of the latter's
American wholesale price. This statute has re-
mained in effect for 45 years, although the
American chemical industry has grown rapidly
since then and is today one of the largest and
strongest not only in this country but in the
world — and even though coal tars are now less
frequently involved, the major raw materials
now being byproducts of our petroleum in-
dustry, itself the largest and probably most ef-
ficient in the world.
Tliis system has long been criticized by other
countries, and for various reasons. Some of them
can be summarized as follows :
1. It provides extraordinaiy protection, both
in comparison with the duties which now apply
to other U.S. industries and in comparison with
duties in effect abroad. The statutory rates for
benzenoids alone are already higher than those
applying to most other products entering the
United States and higher than those typical of
other nations' tariff schedules. Wlien further
applied to American wholesale prices, these
rates produce effective rates often many times
higher than the apparent duty. Some are actu-
ally above 100 percent, and the peak, as recently
determined by a Tariff Commission study, is
172 percent.
2. The system is inconsistent with the customs
practices of all our trading partners for non-
agricultural goods. Moreover, it would be in
violation of the standards of customs valuation
laid down by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade but for the fact that its use in this
country antedates our adherence to the GATT
and was made permissible under a "grand-
father" clause.
3. Under the ASP system a domestic manu-
facturer has unique and unfair advantages.
Within the limits of the effectiveness of com-
petitive forces in the U.S. market, a manu-
facturer can adjust the level of his tariff protec-
tion against his foreign competitor by the
wholesale price he sets for his product. More-
over, if he is not actually making a "like or
similar" product to one currently imported, he
can decide to produce or merely to "offer to sell"
a "like" or "similar" product and thereby he
triggers an increase, usually substantial, in the
tariff wall that imports must surmount.
4. Tlie foreign exporter of a product potenti-
ally subject to ASP consequently cannot know
at the time he signs a contract and sliips the
product whether it will be subject to ASP nor
what the ASP will be until it has passed through
our customs. This uncertainty as to the amount
of duty is a burden on trade with no counter-
part in the vast bulk of other international com-
merce in industrial goods.
The normal method of valuation, I might add,
which applies to virtually all other U.S. imports
as well as to imports into all other countries, is
export value; that is, the wholesale price of the
product as offered in the country of origin. For
the reasons I have cited and the fact that this
particular system deviates so sharply from the
common practice, other coimtries consider it an
AUGUST 7, 1967
175
unjustified anomaly in our trade policy. From
the very beginning of the negotiations they
made it a major issue, even though we made it
crystal clear that we had no authority to change
it under the authority of the Trade Expansion
Act.
Because of the validity of those complaints
and because our national stake in world trade
in chemicals is so large — we export some $2.7
billion in chemicals and our net export surplus
is no less than $1.8 billion so that we have much
to gain from liberalization of barriers through-
out the world in this industry — we undertook a
series of intensive studies over a 2-year period
of this issue.
And now I come to my second point : what the
effects of the removal of ASP and its conversion
to the normal basis of valuation would be.
Effects on Chemical Industry
I recognize that there are those who would
have the Congress and the public believe that
the economic effects on this industry would, and
I quote, be "disastrous." So serious a charge
properly merits a painstaking examination. I
am sure when the Congress examines the legis-
lation which the President will be submitting
that a vital and objective review of all the facts
will be made. We shall at the appropriate time
provide all of the reasons we have found that
lead us to conclude that no disaster lies ahead.
I can understand the self-interest of those who
have benefited for 45 years from an extraordi-
nary system of tariff adjustment and from the
very lilgh level of protection it creates in per-
petuating that system. Nevertheless, the national
interest and the posture of our trade policy
throughout the world require a full evaluation
of all pertinent considerations.
Very briefly, what our studies found was a
remarkable record of growth and a well below
average problem with imports. And, I might
add that the studies were based on evidence sub-
mitted by the industry in four separate public
hearings, two of which dealt entirely with the
ASP issue, as well as on extensive consultations
with firms in the industry.
Let me cite but a few figures, both for all of
the chemical industry and for that portion pro-
tected specially by ASP. It is not always mean-
ingful, I should note, to attempt to concentrate
only on the benzenoid portion of the chemical
industry. Useful data are not always available
for benzenoid activities only. Perhaps more im-
portant, we found that some of the major chemi-
cal companies — large, integrated, and diversi-
fied firms — also dominate the benzenoid sector,
though their benzenoid production and sales are
often but a small fraction of their total cor-
porate activity. In such cases it is not reasonable
to examine only the small fraction and overlook
eitlier the largest area of their activity or the
close interrelationships between the parts.
We found tliat in 1964, the base year for data
for our negotiations, the chemical industry sold
products worth $36 billion, of which $3 billion
were protected by ASP. ASP imports, in turn,
were $50 million, of which only about half were
deemed by the Customs Bureau to compete with
American-made chemicals. This works out to an
import "penetration" less than 1 percent
of our domestic market for competitive prod-
ucts, far below the national average for all
manufacturers.
We found furtlier that not only has the chem-
ical industry generally been one of our fastest
growing industries, as is well known, but also
that its benzenoid segment has a growth rec-
ord— overall from 7 percent to 8 percent per
year — that is impressive indeed. I probably
need not detail our export record in cliemicals.
The average increase has been no less tJian 10
percent per year. We have not only the signifi-
cant export surplus I noted earlier but a surplus
with each of our major trading partners — with
Japan, with Canada, the EEC [European Eco-
nomic Community], and the United Kingdom.
Our chemical exports, further, have grown
even faster than average into those foreign mar-
kets where the local firms have an advantage
over our producers by virtue of customs unions
or free trading areas, such as the EEC and the
EFTA [European Free Trade Association] na-
tions. Our share of the EEC import market, for
example, is equal to that of Germany, our
strongest competitor and one with favored tariff
treatment in selling into the other EEC mem-
ber states.
The picture for benzenoids alone, though the
figures are less complete, is much the same. Our
exports in 1964 probably exceeded $300 million.
We exported at least six times as mucli as we
imported, or better than a tenth of production.
We exported more than we imported, substan-
tially more in most cases, in each of the major
benzenoid product groups, in intermediates, in
dyes, in pigments, to name the presumedly more
sensitive ones ; and clearly more in those groups
where our competitive strength is seldom called
into question, in plastics, in pesticides, plasti-
cizers, and surface active agents.
176
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We also found great concentration of eco-
nomic interest, of production, and sales in the
hands of a few large firms. While small firms,
often specializing in a few products or special
services, are found in many benzenoid product
lines, we also found, for example, that five
integrated and diversified companies account
for two-thirds of total U.S. production of ben-
zenoid intermediates. Imports of all intermedi-
ates, by the way, were less than 2 percent of
sales in 1964, and exports were well in excess of
$100 million.
Much has been heard about our dye industry.
We foimd that four firms make more than half
of all sales in our domestic market. Ten have
three-quarters of the total. We found also that
sales have experienced an average growth of
8 percent per year and that imports of competi-
tive dyes were again less than 2 percent in 1964.
Another area of which much has been said
is the pigment sector of this industry. Here we
found that a single large firm has 25 percent
of all sales ; another four bring the share up to
60 percent of the market. Again, the growth
rate has been well above the national average.
Imports were almost all deemed not competitive
with U.S. pigments and barely accounted for 1
percent of total consumption.
These are but a few of our specific findings.
In reaching our conclusions both on conversion
of the ASP system and on the rate reductions
that we negotiated in the Kennedy Round or
those we shall be submitting to the Congress,
we applied the same standards as we observed
in determining the reductions we could offer on
all other products of American agriculture and
industry. We examined carefully all available
evidence on the individual companies and their
workers, the prospects for future growth, the
ability to adjust to increased competition, and
the potential for benefiting from new opportu-
nities to expand exports. We reached a judg-
ment on whether tariff reduction would cause
serious injury and whether the industry has the
competitive strength to adjust to such conces-
sions, taking into account the adjustment provi-
sions of the Trade Expansion Act. In the end
we found that most parts of the benzenoid in-
dustry would not be seriously injured by elimi-
nation of ASP and reduction by 50 percent in
the equivalent duties computed on the normal
basis of valuation. For others, we found that
elimination of ASP would have no adverse
effect but that reduction of duties by 50 percent
would. In such cases, we have proposed lesser
tariff reductions.
I cannot leave this subject without taking note
of the criticism which has been made of the
manner in which we achieved a satisfactory ne-
gotiation of the ASP issue. AVe insisted, you
may recall, that any negotiation would have to
be separate and distinct from the chemical ne-
gotiations in the Kennedy Round so that the
Congress would have a full and free opportu-
nity to judge the issue on its merits and to de-
termine as well whether reciprocity would be
obtained in return for abolishing the system.
We also insisted that a satisfactory balance of
concessions in chemicals be achieved within the
Kennedy Round, in keeping with the purposes
of the Trade Expansion Act, as well as to pre-
vent "overloading" the separate ASP package
and thereby impairing the free deliberation on
its merits by the Congress.
These results were not easily achieved. Until
virtually the last week, our negotiating partners
refused to spin off, so to speak, what they con-
sidered to be a major negotiating objective or to
pay additional coin in return for its elimination.
In the end we were able to achieve a separate
ASP package, as well as a balanced deal within
the chemical sector in the Kennedy Round.
Balance of Benefits
This brings me to my third point. A proper
appraisal of the benefits gained and given in a
trade negotiation necessarily involves a com-
posite judgment based on the nature and volume
of the trade subject to concessions, an evalua-
tion of the potentials thereby created for future
trade expansion, and on the depth of the conces-
sions made. Combining all these factors, the
United States negotiated a balanced exchange
with each major participant within the Kennedy
Round while retaining ASP, and should the
Congress approve legislation eliminating ASP,
we shall obtain further valuable concessions
both to the chemical and other industries. To-
gether, the two packages commit the major na-
tions to make the same average overall percent-
age reductions in chemical tariffs and to
eliminate significant nontariff barriers against
the trade of their partners.
In each of the two packages, the concessions
received by the United States cover a substan-
tially larger volume of our exports than the
volume of imports on which concessions were
granted. Taking into account both trade covered
by concessions and the depth of the concessions,
the United States thus stands to benefit on bal-
ance in each package. This positive balance also
ATJGUST 7, 1967
177
holds in our bilateral trade with each major
participant. Our chemical industry, in short,
stands to derive substantial benefits.
AYe should derive substantial benefits not only
on balance but, critically, in the areas where it
most counts. Foreign tariffs on our most rapidly
growing export products will be drastically re-
duced, while the exceptions to 50 percent con-
cessions by others should not adversely affect
our future trade to any significant degree. Tar-
iffs on plastics, for example, will almost all be
10 percent or less in the rapidly growing EEC
and U.K. markets if ASP is eliminated. In 1964
we exported nearly $150 million of plastics to
these two markets alone. Another of our bur-
geoning overseas market is in organic chemicals,
other than jjlastics. The U.K. here will bring
its many 33% percent rates down to 12.5 per-
cent. Some $50 million of U.S. exports of or-
ganics go to the U.K. alone. The EEC, in turn,
will be cutting by nearly 50 percent on an even
larger volume of our exports.
Finally, our negotiations will result in tariffs
abroad being uniformly reduced to extremely
low levels, thereby providing very considerable
opportunities for our chemical industry. With
very few exceptions, there will be no rate in the
U.K. or in the EEC above 12.5 percent. Most
Japanese duties will be below 15 percent, as
will Canadian rates. By comparison, U.S. tar-
iffs in certain key benzenoid sectors will still be
20 percent, while sulfa drugs will be 25 percent
and dyes and pigments will be dutiable at 30
percent, substantially above comparable rates in
other countries.
We are confident rates such as these will pro-
vide a sufficient level of tariff protection for the
U.S. benzenoid mdustry, a strong and efficient
industry with a demonstrated record of inter-
national competitive ability. On the other hand
the concessions we have gamed should permit
it, in turn, and the rest of the chemical industry,
as well, to continue to expand significantly their
already substantial export surpluses.
Now I would like to turn to the future.
There are many ways the United States could
move on from the Kennedy Round. We could
simply seek another general round of tariff re-
ductions. We could pursue specialized negotia-
tions on certain products or with certain coun-
tries. We could concentrate on some, or on all,
nontariff barriers. There is a very wide range
of alternatives.
The President recently asked me to undertake
for him a major study of U.S. trade policy to
determine which courses of action would be de-
sirable in the coming years. Tliis study will give
us all a chance to catch our breath and to give
close scrutiny to the likely effects of the Ken-
nedy Romid while evaluating what remains to
be done. It is my hope that members of Congress
will take an active interest in this study.
Wide Range of Issues
The range of issues which will require care-
ful thought, and on which we shall be seeking
your advice, is wide.
Many of these issues relate to the special trade
problems of the developing countries. These
coimtries are acutely conscious of the need for
expanding their exports and have been pressing
in recent years for a new, general kind of dis-
criminatory treatment. What they want is pref-
erential access for all developing countries into
all major industrialized countries. Such a step
would, the developing countries claim, give them
reasonable opportunity to export, while putting
all of the developing countries on an equal basis.
These countries have pressed their desire for
preferences very hard, and many developed
countries now appear to be willing to provide
such preferred access. The President indicated
at Punta del Este that he was willing to con-
sider whether a common effort among the de-
veloped countries was desirable and feasible.^
Exploratory discussions along these lines are
now underway in the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development] .
Proliferation of special trading arrangements
between developed and developing countries,
meanwhile, continues. These arrangements tend
to harm many countries while favoring only a
few and thus thi-eaten to offset many of the good
effects of general most-favored-nation tariff
reductions such as those achieved in the Ken-
nedy Round. Proliferation of discrimination if
carried further could hurt, most of all, the de-
veloping coimtries themselves, with a chosen few
receiving modest benefits from certain highly
industrialized countries, while many others are
being left as orphans. Somehow, a way must
very soon be found to halt this trend.
Looking at trade more generally, tariffs will
in the future be much lower and in a number of
cases remain only at nuisance levels, wliich
" For background, see Bulletin of May S, 1967,
p. 706.
178
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
raises a fundamental question of aiiproach.
Should future trade negotiations adojjt the same
across-the-board basis as the Kennedy Bound,
or should they now be focused upon particular
commodities? In the agricultural field, tariffs
are becoming even less important relative to
other impediments or artificial stimulants to
trade. We must try to see if the United States
can obtain significant liberalization of agricul-
tural trade for our exporters, but at the same
time we shall have to ascertain what present
U.S. protection we might have to give up to buy
such liberalization. A major effort may be
needed to limit the use of export subsidies, es-
pecially in countries where high price supports
are in operation.
One of the most difficult, complex, and far-
reaching areas with which our future trade
policy must deal is that of nontariff trade bar-
riers. The obstacles to the unimpeded, nondis-
criminatory flow of goods other than tariffs
take many forms. Moreover, they have deep
roots in the fiscal, social, and economic policies
of each nation and by that token can be only
slowly and painfully removed through interna-
tional negotiations. Their impact on trade and
their distorting effects on international com-
petition are often not readily apparent, which
makes them all the more arduous to negotiate
and eradicate.
A difficult question that we shall face is what
of our own NTB's we will be prepared to give
up in exchange for the dropping of other na-
tions' barriers.
As part of our study, we shall attempt to com-
pile a complete index and analysis of all non-
tariff barriers, both foreign and domestic. In
tliis effort, we shall be seeking the cooperation
of business. We are pleased to find that the Na-
tional Chamber of Commerce has recognized
the inadequacy of data in this field and is work-
ing on its own compilation.
It may well prove useful to us in this project,
as well as in other aspects of our study, to hold
public hearings.
There is need for careful thought about what
can and should be done toward improving
American export performance. In particular,
we must see whether American exporters are
disadvantaged in any way in comparison with
foreign exporters working under the benefit of
their governments' export programs or tax sj's-
tems. We need to consider whether new U.S.
export incentives are feasible and consistent
with orderly development of world trade. At
the same time we should consider what actions
may be necessary to control the unjustified use
of export incentives by other countries.
Export incentives are only one aspect of ex-
port performance. A good deal more thought is
needed concerning the relationship between ex-
ports and foreign investment by American firms.
We shall also need to know more about the ex-
tent to which tariffs will act as an incentive to
invest abroad to get behind tariff walls despite
the Kennedy Eound reductions. The trade flows
within major international firms, many of which
have lost their national identities, is another
area about which we need to know much more.
The worldwide flow of teclinology, investment,
and trade within some industries may very well
provide appropriate conditions for free trade
in the products of that industry.
The many interrelationships between trade
and investment in economic growth and de-
velopment today have another crucial bearing
upon our trade policies. As the importance of
the truly international corporation grows and
the two-way flow of trade, capital, and tech-
nology accelerates, what is done in one field or
in one geographic area inevitably affects our
policies and our performances in others. If, for
example, we would have other countries wel-
come our subsidiaries and our steadily growing
direct investments and if our investors abroad
are to expect continued equal and reasonable
treatment, then we must see to it that the legiti-
mate economic interests of other comitries are
also taken into account in the determination of
our own policies here at home. xVn industry with
as large and promising a stake in foreign mar-
kets as the chemical industry, for instance,
should be aware of the intensity of the griev-
ances abroad over the barriers we have erected
against the chemical products of other countries.
Domestic Adjustments
We must give further thought to means by
which our domestic economic adjustments to in-
creased trade are facilitated. It is clear that im-
proved adjustment assistance provisions are
needed to ease the plight of those adversely af-
fected by increased imports resulting from con-
cessions which are of more general benefit. There
has been a tendency m the past to turn to pro-
tectionism when economic dislocations threat-
ened to occur. Ad hoc measures to protect cer-
tain products may continue to be needed from
time to time, in emergencies. On the whole, how-
AUGTJST 7, 1967
179
ever, if international trade is to be further ex-
panded, the beneficiaries of this trade, including
the United States, must strenuously resist adop-
tion of special protectionist devices. At home we
shall have to give much thought to finding the
desirable balance of trade-promoting and pro-
tective devices designed to ease the process of
economic dislocation. And finally, we should
have another look at existing restrictive import
programs to see whether they can be adapted
to the 1970's or whether they should be grad-
ually phased out.
In these remarks I have touched upon some
of the problems which need to be studied in com-
ing months. There are many more, because, as
you know, trade policy is extremely complex.
In order to grasp this wide range of issues, we
are planning to establish a number of task forces
within the executive branch, which will include
consultants from universities and from industry.
We intend to mamtam close ties with various
industry, labor, and agi'iculture groups aroimd
the country. JMost important, we welcome your
active interest in all aspects of the trade policy
investigation.
Our intention is to consult members of Con-
gress as we proceed with the study for the
President. New steps will inevitably require leg-
islation, making it a matter of paramoimt im-
portance that the views of the Congress be fully
considered in the formative stages of recommen-
dations. In this way, we can plan new steps to-
ward increased world trade and prosperity with
the knowledge that our policies and our actions
represent the best interests of the nation as a
whole.
United States Foreign Trade Policy
and the Developing Countries
Statement hy Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Ajfairs ^
"Tlie developing countries," as that phrase is
now commonly used, consist of well over 100
political entities. There are marked differences
among them in size, population, degree of indus-
trialization and economic growth — so much so
that it is misleading to speak of them in aggre-
gate terms as though they were a homogeneous
group of countries. But they do share certain
characteristics in common : Their per capita in-
come is low; their level of industrialization is
low ; a large part of their labor force is engaged
in agriculture, with low productivity per acre
and per man; and they all want to modernize
their economies. Indeed, economic growth has
become a symbol of national worth and dignity.
In human terms, the overwhelming majority of
their people face the kind of grinding day-m-
' Read before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the Joint Economic Committee on July 12 by
Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Trade Policy. Four tables which were
submitted with the statement are not printed here.
day-out, year-in-year-out poverty that leads to
the "harsh, brvitish and sliort" lives which are
the prevailing condition in most of the world.
These countries are moving forward with
varying degrees of success. A few are sprinting
ahead; a few are stagnating. On the average
there has been progress, but the pace of im-
provement is uneven and slow. In the first half
of the sixties, proclaimed by the United Na-
tions as the De\elopment Decade, there has been
no acceleration in the rate of economic growth
of the developing countries as a whole. The rate
of growth of per capita income, about 2 percent
in 1960-65, was lower than in the preceding
decade owing to an acceleration in the rate of
population increase. Thus the gap between the
per capita incomes of industrialized and devel-
oping countries has continued to widen during
the first half of the Development Decade.
Trade is a means to economic growth. I would
like to talk to you today about United States
trade policy and the contribution it can make to
180
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the economic i)rogi-ess of the developing coun-
tries.
The developing countries are far more heavily
dependent on foreign trade than the United
States and most other industrialized countries.
For the equipment needed to build a modern
economic structure and, all too often, even to
import the necessary food to avert starvation,
the developing countries are heavily dependent
on imports from the industrialized countries.
To pay for these imports, the developing coun-
tries must export. And trade is clearly the senior
partner to foreign aid— about 80 percent of the
developing countries' foreign exchange receipts
stems from export proceeds. Wliile foreign aid
is a welcome and most important addition to
the developing countries' ability to acquire the
goods and services they need for their economic
gro-\vth — and often the margin which avoids
their slipping backward — their growth pros-
pects depend critically on the extent to which
they can increase their foreign exchange earn-
ings through exports.
"\^nule the total value of their aggregate ex-
ports has been increasing vear by year, from $21
billion in 1953 to $27.3'billion "in 1960 to $36.5
billion in 1965, the developing countries have
not shared proportionately in the dramatic
growth-promoting spurt of world trade during
the postwar era. Thus while the developing
countries accounted for about 27 percent of
world exports in 1953, this figure dropped to
about 22 percent in 1960 and dropped further
to less than 20 percent in 1965.
The root causes of this situation have been
well documented in numerous academic studies
as well as reports of various intergovernmental
institutions. First and foremost is the heavy
dependence of the developing countries on ex-
ports of primary commodities. Aboiit 85 percent
of the export earnings of the developing coun-
tries as a whole is accounted for by exports of
nonmanufactured primary agricultural com-
modities, crude minerals and metals, and petro-
leum. The dependence of particular developing
countries on exports of a single product is even
more striking ; e.g., coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugar,
cotton account for very heavy percentages — up
to 80 percent — of the total export receipts of
particular countries.
"With the exception of petroleum, these com-
modities are not a dynamic and dependable
source of foreign exchange. They are by and
large subject to a low income-elasticity of de-
mand ; their prices fluctuate sharply because of
variations in supply or cyclical changes in de-
mand; several of them face growing competi-
tion from synthetic substitutes; and many are
being produced in increasing quantities in the
industrialized countries themselves.
In this situation, it is not at all surprising that
the developing countries have been focusing
their attention on an acceleration of industriali-
zation and industrialization for export. Growth
of world trade in manufactures has consistently
exceeded the growth of world trade generally.
The developing countries are anxious to break
out of the straitjacket of dependence on a nar-
row range of products with an unpromising
outlook, in hopes of rapidly increasing the for-
eign exchange earnings they need to pay for
their ever-increasing imports.
The develoj)ing countries have already
acliieved a measure of success in this regard.
An analysis of imports of manufactures to the
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development] countries combined ^
reveals a yearly rate of increase of 15.5 percent
between 1960 and 1964 and an increase of 16
percent from 1964 to 1965. An analysis of 49
commodity groupings over the 10-year period
1956-65 indicates an increase of 215 percent.
This relatively favorable picture, however, must
be interpreted with some caution. First, ex-
ports of manufactures from developing coun-
tries are still only the small visible part of the
iceberg— 85 percent of their earnings is still ac-
counted for by the unpromising primary or
crude materials sector; secondly, the commodity
composition is fairly narrow and concentrated
on certain products, such as textiles, where they
cannot expect large increases — indeed, the
whole textile sector is fairly rigidly regulated
at the present time under the international
Long-Term Arrangement governing trade in
cotton textiles;^ and finally, only a relative
handful of the 100-plus developing countries
are currently benefiting from the recent rapid
increase in exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures— African countries, for example,
are almost totally absent from the figures on ex-
ports of manufactures.
At the present time and for the decade ahead,
trade m primary products will continue to be
' United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Japan.
[Footnote in original.]
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5240 ;
for text of the Long-Term Arrangement, see Bulletin
of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
AUGUST 7, 1967
181
the main source of export earnings of the de-
veloping countries. If we want to help these
countries improve their trade earnings as a
means to development, commodity trade is the
place to begin.
Problems of Primary-Product Trade
This trade is plagued by a variety of prob-
lems : by persistent overproduction in some key
products; by wide and destabilizing price
swings m other key products ; by severe compe-
tition from both natural and synthetic products
produced in the mdustrialized comitries, often
under highly protectionist regimes; and by
preferential arrangements in certain advanced
countries that favor one group of primary pro-
ducers over others.
There is no one solution to this range of prob-
lems. Wliat is needed is a multif aceted approach
tailored to the problems of specific commodity
markets.
In the case of cojfee, which is the single most
important agricultural commodity in the trade
of the developing countries and absolutely criti-
cal to Latin America and ceitain African coun-
tries, the key problem is structural overproduc-
tion.
The International Coffee Agreement,^ which
we helped to develop and actively support, has
conducted a valuable holding operation. It
averted a disastrous collapse of prices that
threatened coffee trade in the early 1960's, and
it has kept coffee prices reasonably stable by
supply control; that is, by keeping exports in
line with demand. But more coffee is being pro-
duced than the world wants to consume; land,
labor, and capital are being wasted in surjjlus
production ; and this very surplus i^roduction is
undemiining the agreement.
The critical next step is to help the producing
countries move resources out of surphis produc-
tion into more rewarding uses. We would hope
to see a diversification fund become an integral
part of the coffee agreement. Access to the fund
would be open to countries pursuing appropri-
ate policies to curb coffee overproduction, and
the funds themselves would be used for invest-
ment in products with a more promising future,
including importantly food for domestic con-
sumption where this is feasible.
At the Latin American Summit Meetinsr in
Pmita del Este,^ President Johnson made clear '
our willingness to lend $15 million to help ini-
tiate a cofl'ee diversification f mid that would be
financed on a continuing basis by the producing
countries themselves and to match the contribu-
tions of other consuming countries by an addi-
tional loan of up to $15 million. The Interna-
tional Coffee Organization is working closely
with the World Bank in developing the main
features of the diversification fund.
Cocoa, a critical export earner for Ghana,
Nigeria, and other African and Latin countries, '
is notoriously subject to wide swings in price
because of variations in supply due to weather
and insect attack. Cocoa prices averaged 17
cents a pound last year, 36 cents in 1959, 29 cents
a few months ago. We cannot disregard the im-
pact of these price fluctuations on the economic
and political stability of the producing coun-
tries.
Negotiations looking toward an international
cocoa agreement foundered in 1963 on the ques-
tion of price. Producers wanted a price range
that consumers believed would encourage over-
production, saddle the market with burdensome
stocks, check consumption, and encourage the
shift to substitutes. In the years since then fur-
ther consultations have been held both on price
and on the mechanics and financing of a work-
able buffer-stock scheme. Differences have nar-
rowed appreciably, and there is reasonable pros-
pect that an agreement can be consummated in
the near future that would give producing
countries steady, growing earnings and assure
consumers a stable supply at reasonable prices.
The outlook is less promising in the case of
sugar. The International Sugar Agreement lias
not been operative for many years — in fact since
Cuba refused to accept the rules. Our own trade
is governed by our domestic sugar legislation,
which provides premium prices for supplying
countries to the extent of their import quotas in
our market. But the world market price has
been seriously depressed for some years and ad-
versely affects many low-income suppliers that
sell a substantial volume of their output at the
world market price.
Efforts to negotiate an international agree-
ment that would strengthen the world price
have proved to be very difficult, complicated by
•TIAS 5505.
° For statements by President Johnson and texts of
the conference documents, see Bitlletin of May 8, 1967,
p. 706.
182
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cuba's intransigence on the matter of supply
control and by the unwillingness of certain ad-
vanced countries to provide reasonable access.
For many primary products of importance to
the trade of the poor countries, improved access
to the mai'kets of developed countries is a major
concern. Indeed, more than half of their com-
modity trade, petroleum apart, competes with
similar or identical products produced and ex-
ported by the rich countries. Their mineral ores
and metal exports face few trade barriers in the
industrialized countries; demand is buoyant
and future prospects are reasonably good. Nat-
ural rubber and some tropical fibers are simi-
larly traded freely, but the markets for these
products have been eroded by the development
of synthetics. For the developing countries de-
pendent on these products the central objective
must be to increase the efficiency of their pro-
duction and marketing so as to meet the compe-
tition of synthetic substitutes on a price and
quality basis.
Temperate Agricultural Products
There is, however, a wide range of temperate
agricultural products in which the poor coun-
tries face an array of protective tariff and quota
barriers that limit their access to the markets of
the rich countries, and of subsidized exports
from the rich countries that compete against
them in third markets.
The developing countries are pressing for
trade liberalization in these products. The pros-
pects for substantial liberalization are not good.
In virtually all developed countries, domestic
agriculture is insulated in varying degrees from
the free play of demand and supply by high
price supports, direct subsidies, and import
controls. The average income of the farm sector
in the rich countries tends to be below that of
other sectors in their economies, and the array
of protective measures is intended to maintain
and increase the income of this sector as a
matter of equity.
The developing countries do not challenge the
desirability of maintaining farm incomes in the
advanced countries, but they ask that measures
to protect such incomes not be applied in ways
that stimulate excessive production. Thus they
urge that in lieu of high price supports, farm-
ers' incomes be maintained by direct payments
that do not inhibit consumption or unduly
stimulate production.
We have recognized that agricultural support
policies can have restrictive and disruptive
effects on international trade. In the case of cot-
ton, wheat, and feed grains, we have slufted
from high price supports to direct payments
and we have made our farm payments contin-
gent on producers' cooperation with acreage
control. Where surpluses have developed, we
have stored them rather than dump them or
made them available on concessional terms to
iniprove the diet and assist the development
of low-income comatries miable to purchase food
on commercial terms. And we have taken pre-
cautions to insure that these food aid programs
do not interfere with the normal pattern of
international trade.
The developing countries have also asked the
rich importing countries so to manage their
farm economies as to give them a share in their
markets and a share in the growth of these
markets.
Wlaile existing U.S. legislation restricts sugar
imports, we have set aside 35^0 percent of U.S.
sugar requirements for imports. And in the case
of meats, the present law permits imports equal
to about 5 percent of domestic production be-
fore quotas would come into play.
The developing countries have urged the rich
countries to assist their farmers by some form
of adjustment assistance of the kind applicable
in industry, rather than through protective de-
vices. We are to a considerable extent using a
form of adjustment assistance in the farm sec-
tor. Thus we are helping marginal farmers to
move out of agriculture through our cropland
adjustment program and through training pro-
grams to enable them to develop skills in
industrial employment.
Liberalization of Agricultural Trade
We would hope that the increased effective-
ness of the supply management and flexible
pricing progi-ams, the continuing shift of mar-
ginal farmers to nonagricultural occupations,
and the increased role of food aid will make it
possible for us progressively to liberalize
agi-icultural trade.
This will necessarily be a slow process. The
Kemiedy Round has demonstrated that sub-
stantial liberalization of trade in agricultural
products is not easy to achieve. But it is im-
portant that we work together with other de-
veloped comitries in the years ahead to consider
AUGUST 7, 1967
183
how to deal effectively with all major bar-
riers to less developed countries' agricultural
exports.
In the case of tropical products produced
solely in the low-income countries, we have no
barriers to trade or consumption. Some devel-
oped countries do subject these products to high
revenue duties that inhibit consmnption or to
preferential tariffs that discriminate against
certain low-income suppliers in favor of otliers.
We believe the developing countries have a
legitimate case that commodities produced
solely in the tropical zone should not be a source
of revenue to the rich countries at their expense.
They have suggested that where such fiscal
levies caimot be removed, a share of the receipts
be turned back to them.
As to tariffs and quotas that restrict trade in
tropical products or discriminate among pri-
mary producers, we would hope that all the rich
countries would provide duty-free access for
these products from all the poor countries. We
shall continue our efforts in this matter.
A review of our trade policy as it affects the
primary-commodity trade of the poor countries
would be incomplete witliout noting the impor-
tant role that compensatory financing can play
in assisting low-income countries whose export
earnings fall off for reasons beyond their con-
trol. We have supported the liberalization of the
compensatory financing facility in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and developing coun-
tries are making increasing use of that facility.
We are also considering the feasibility of sup-
plementing that facility in the case of deep or
protracted shortfalls in the export earnmgs of
developing countries that are disruptive of their
development and that may require longer term
assistance than the 5Ionetai-y Fund facility
provides. The World Bank has' developed a pro-
posal for such a supplementary facility. The
specifics of the Bank scheme raise a number of
serious questions and we are not prepared to
endorse it as formulated, but we are studying
variants of the proposal that we may be able
to support.
Even if everything were done that could
reasonably be done to improve conditions of
access for the primary-product trade of the
developmg countries, to stabilize commodity
prices at reasonable levels, and to supplement
export earnings when shortfalls occur, the de-
veloping countries would still be vulnerable
because with a few notable exceptions the com-
modities on which they depend are not dynamic.
Demand is not likely to grow commensurately
with the increase in world trade and world
income.
The fimdamental answer to the trade prob-
lems of the developing countries is to diversify
their output and their exports and thus reduce
their excessive dependence on a few traditional
commodities. Some benefit can come from a
more diversified commodity base and from a
substantial attack on their food problem to les-
sen their dependence on food imports. But they
must also industrialize. "Wliile continuing to
produce raw materials for the world market and
increasing the range of materials they produce,
they must expand their industry.
Regional Integration
The developmg countries have tried to de-
velop industry — on a national basis — each
country shielding its infant enterprises behind
protective walls. The result, by and large, has
been high-cost inefficient industry with little
growth potential. However, by joining together
with their neighbors and dismantling the trade
barriers among them, they can produce for a
wider regional or subregional market. In the
larger market, their industry would not be
limited as it is today to light consumer goods.
They could move in time to more complex inter-
mediate and capital goods. Shielded for a time
by their outer tariff walls from the export com-
petition of the advanced countries, enterprises
would be exposed to more tolerable competition
within the broader regional market and would
reach a competitive position in international
markets much earlier and more effectively. And
not imimportantly, foreign investment would be
stimulated to locate within the grouping.
Recognizing the benefits that could come from
a continent-wide market such as the United
States enjoys and spurred by the example of the
European Common Market, low-income coun-
tries have been moving together to develop free
trade areas and common markets.
At the Latin American Summit Meeting in
Punta del Este, the countries of Latin America
tmdertook a commitment of major significance
to move forward toward a full Latin American
common market. And the United States under-
took a parallel commitment to help them with
adjustment assistance when the common market
gets underway.
We would hope to see similar movements
among developing countries in other hemi-
184
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
spheres. We believe that regional integration
among neighboring less developed countries that
are at roughly the same level of development
can be a positive force for economic growth and
stability. It can also be a force for political
coliesion. The difficulties in such undertakings
are formidable, includmg the resistance of
protected enterprises to exposure to increased
competition and the concern of each country in
the group to get a fair share of new enterprises.
The benefits of integration can be realized only
if the governments have the political will to
push ahead. But if the political will is there, en-
couragement and support by the rich countries
could be quite fruitful.
With respect to trade in manufactured goods,
the princiiDal point I wish to discuss with the
committee is the question of trade preferences
for developing countries.
Trade Preferences for Developing Countries
Tliere is nothing very new or startling about
trade preferences. We have had preferential
trade ties with the Philippines for decades. The
extensive network of British Commonwealth
preferences dates from 1931. The French and a
few other European nations had similar ar-
rangements with African areas for many years.
What is new is that the developing countries
themselves have recently become dissatisfied
with this uneven situation, and with good rea-
son. Neigliboring coimtries of the developing
world who frequently produce the same kinds
of products face discrimination in developed-
country markets when one receives a preference
and the other does not simply because of the
historical fact of colonial relationships. The
system pits the poor against the poor and has
neocolonial overtones. It is made to order for
creating friction and tensions among the very
countries M-ho most of all need to cooperate with
each other economically and for their mutual
prosperity. And one area of the world — Latin
America — has historically had no trade pref-
erences in any market; instead, it has had to
cope with discrimination against its exports
nearly everywhere. IMoreover, developed coun-
tries, including the United States, frequently
face discrimination because many of these pref-
erential arrangements are reciprocal.
A new situation arose several years ago, how-
ever, when it became apparent that discrimina-
tory trade arrangements of this kind were on
the increase. The preferences which individual
African countries enjoyed in their former
metropoles were extended to all of the six mem-
ber states of the European Common Market.
An association agreement between Nigeria and
the EEC [European Economic Community]
was concluded last year after lengthy negotia-
tions, thus extending preferences to a single
African coimtry which had previously had such
advantages only in the Commonwealth markets.
A large number of other African countries — the
Maghreb and three East African countries —
have been seeking some kind of special trade
arrangement with the European Common
Market.
This growing risk of further proliferation of
trade arrangements which discriminate among
developing countries was from our viewpoint a
most unfortunate development both politically
and economically. It threatened to fragment
world trade; it increased the pressures from
Latin America for exclusive trade arrangements
with the United States; it was a retrogression
toward special spheres of influence.
Exploration of Trade Preference Issues
We have always felt that the best way to assist
the developing countries is for all industrialized
countries to join together in a common effort to
help all of the low-income countries. The de-
veloping countries themselves felt that a more
desirable course of action would be to replace
the network of existing preferences which are
selective as to product and coimtries by a gen-
eral system of trade preferences by all industri-
alized countries for the benefit of all developing
countries and without reciprocal preferences.
In early 1966 the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of
Germany began to explore some of the issues in-
volved in trade preferences pursuant to a man-
date from the OECD ministers. Our own partic-
ipation in this exercise was, of course, severely
circumscribed by our own position of skepticism
concerning the workability of any scheme of
preferences and, indeed, our basic reservation on
the idea as a matter of principle. It became quite
apparent to us in the executive branch that this
posture which the United States had maintained
since the issue of trade preferences first arose
in 1964 was ill suited to our political and eco-
nomic interests. Politically, we found ourselves
virtually isolated from all the developing coun-
tries and most of the industrialized countries as
well. Economically, our reservation in principle
ATTGUST 7, 1967
185
and skepticism precluded our having much in-
fluence over the proliferation of discriminatory
arrangements and also reduced our influence
with regard to the specific workings of a pref-
erence scheme which other industrialized coun-
tries indicated they might put into effect
whether or not the United States took part. An
important precedent in this regard was the uni-
lateral announcement by Australia in 1965 that
it intended to apply a system of trade prefer-
ences of its own for developing countries.
This, then, was the general situation con-
fronting President Johnson when he undertook
to meet with his fellow chiefs of state of the
inter- American sj^stem at Punta del Este last
April : a trend toward proliferation of discrim-
inatory preferences which our own adherence
to the principle of most-favored-nation treat-
ment had done little to check and an awareness
that the Latin American countries, like other
developing countries, are anxious to improve
their opportunities for access to the markets of
all industrialized countries.
After a searching examination and analysis
within the executi^'e branch and preliminary
consultations with the Congress, the President
agreed that he would indicate to the Latin
Americans that we are prepared to explore the
feasibility of a system of generalized prefer-
ences. The President told his fellow chiefs of
state :
We have been examining the kind of trade initiatives
that the United States should propose in the years
ahead. We are convinced that our future trade policy
must pay special attention to the needs of the de-
veloping countries in Latin America and elsewhere in
the world.
We have been exploring with other major industrial-
ized countries what practical steps can be taken to in-
crease the export earnings of all developing countries.
We recognize that comparable tariff treatment may not
always permit developing countries to advance as
rapidly as desired. Temporary tariff advantages for all
developing countries by all industrialized countries
would be one way to deal with this.
We think this idea is worth pursuing. We will be
discussing it further with members of our Congress,
with business and labor leaders, and we will seek the
cooperation of other governments in the world trading
community to see whether a broad consensus can be
reached along these lines.
The present hearings are very timely since it
gives us in the executive branch an opportunity
to discuss further with the Congress — as the
President promised would be done — how we
presently believe the question of trade prefer-
ences will evolve in the coming months and
years. I wish to stress that the President has
committed the United States only to an explo-
ration of preferences to see whether a consensus
can be reached. There are many difliculties —
both technical and policy — to be overcome if we
are to reach a consensus. We also need the ad-
vice of Congress and our business and labor
leaders as this matter is pursued.
Duty-Free Quotas for Preferential Imports
Multilateral discussion of the preference
question thus far has indicated two different
kinds of approach in order to deal with three
interrelated issues: depth of cut, the means to
insure that any preferences actually extended
would in fact be temporary, and safeguards for
domestic interests in the industrialized coun-
tries. These are by no means the only outstand-
ing issues but they are, we believe, the really
crucial ones.
One approach envisages the establishment of
duty-free quotas for preferential imports from
developing countries. Under this ai:)proach, the
industrialized countries would agree to permit
the importation of some fixed percentage of do-
mestic production or consumption of products
from developing countries on a duty-free basis.
This approach contains its own built-in safe-
guard against excessive adverse impact on in-
dustrialized countries — depending, of course, on
the size of the percentage which might be agreed
upon — since, in setting the percentage figures,
govermnents would presumably take into ac-
count the extent to which their own domestic
interests could absorb increased imports from
the developing countries without serious injury.
There are, however, a number of difficult
problems with this approach. One is the absence
of any mechanism for insuring that preferences
thtis established would in fact be temporary. It
has been suggested that such a scheme might
operate for, say, 10 years, after which the situa-
tion could be reviewed to see whether it should
or could be extended, modified, or terminated.
We are not sure this is politically realistic, be-
cause it is easy to anticipate the pressures that
would be exerted when the time for review oc-
curred to extend the system rather than raise
duties against the products of developing coun-
tries. Moreover, during such a 10-year period
reductions of barriers among the industrialized
186
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
countries themselves might be inhibited because
of vested interests in maintaining margins of
preference.
The "Advance Cuf" Approach
An alternative appi-oach to this range of
issues might be to visualize preferences for
developing countries as the extension in advance
to developing countries of trade-barrier reduc-
tions whicJi tlie industrialized countries them-
selves would be prepared to luidertake on a
most-favored-nation basis over a longer period
of time. If an agreement could be reached with
other industrialized countries for this kind of
approach, the jaroblem of insuring that prefer-
ences would in fact be temporary would auto-
matically take care of itself since the preference
margins would erode as trade barriers were
reduced on an MFN basis.
There are numerous difficulties with this
approach as well, however. First, there is the
question of whether any industrialized country,
including the United States, is prepared so
quickly after the major reductions of trade bar-
riers recently concluded in the Kennedy Roimd
to enter into any kind of commitment to elimi-
nate duties. I believe the realistic answer to this
is "No." This has accordingly led to the sugges-
tion that the margin of preference under what
has been called the "advance cut" approach
would have to be something otlier than duty-
free treatment across the board. This, of course,
might reduce the attractiveness of the scheme
to the developing countries. The question of
safeguards under this approach would no doubt
have to encompass the traditional devices such
as exclusion of products deemed to be particu-
larly sensitive, and an escape-clause procedure
in the event imports from developing countries
threaten or cause serious injui-y to domestic
interests.
The case of cotton textiles, of course, is a spe-
cial one in that the developing countries are
already highly competitive in industrialized-
country markets and therefore do not need pref-
erences. Moreover, so long as cotton textiles are
subject to quantitative restrictions, tariff pref-
erences would not be of any significant benefit
to developing countries. In this particular sec-
tor, the developing countries will have to look
for a gradual liberalization of quantitative
restrictions rather than tariff preferences if
they are to capitalize on the competitive
advantage they already have.
I would like to draw the committee's attention
to an important aspect of the second approach
I summarized a moment ago ; namely, the link
between reductions of trade barriers for devel-
oping countries and the future of trade-barrier
reductions among the industrialized countries
themselves. As you all Imow, the future pattern
of our trade relations with the industrialized
countries of Western Europe is difficult to pre-
dict with any certainty. We have of course given
our full support and encouragement to the
European Communities and, as the Presi-
dent stated last October,® we look forward
to a strong, united Europe — with Great Britain
a part of it. We tluis hope the British will suc-
ceed in their current efforts to join the Euro-
pean Communities. We are also aware that if
the British effort succeeds, it is likely that a
number of other European countries will join
the Common Market or possibly associate with
the Communities in some manner or other.
The precise geographic dimensions and form
of membership or association by the various
European countries simply camiot be predicted
at this stage. It is clear, however, that as trade
barriers are reduced among a major gi-ouping
of European countries without the benefits of
such reductions being extended to the United
States, our own competitive position in tliis
enlarged market will be adversely affected. We
have accordingly felt that it will be necessary
at some stage in the not too distant future —
albeit after the Kennedy Eound reductions
have been digested — to visualize further reduc-
tions to the mutual benefit of both the United
States and Western Europe, and tlie other
major trading countries of the industrialized
world. This is one reason why we have been giv-
ing close attention to the fe;xsibility of establish-
ing some kind of meaningful link between the
establishment of a possible temporai-y prefer-
ence scheme and the future reductioii of barriers
among the industrialized countries as a whole.
Another major policy issue involved in the
preference question is what is to be the disposi-
tion of existing preferential arrangements. As
I mentioned earlier, there are many such ar-
rangements curi-ently in force, witli the notable
° For an address by President Johnson at New York,
N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see ibid., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
AUGUST 7, 1967
187
exception of L.atm Ameiica. Latin America has
been particularly critical of this situation ; and
this, indeed, was a contributing factor to the
President's decision at Punta del Este to com-
mit us to an exploration of the feasibility of a
generalized system of preferences. It has been
our thought that we could develop a scheme
which would subsume the existing preferences
enjoyed by particular developing countries in
particular markets. Some difficulties have come
to light on this point, however, and we may suc-
ceed in only partially achieving our objectives.
For example, the developing countries of the
Commonwealth and the African countries as-
sociated with the European Communities all
enjoy duty-free access to these respective mar-
kets. If a generalized preference scheme does not
take the form of duty-free entry, existing bene-
ficiaries might feel they are obtaining lesser
benefits than they now have, even though this
point is debatable.
There is also the question of reverse pref-
erences; that is, the preferences currently en-
joyed by some industrialized counti'ies in the
developing countries to whom they accord pref-
erential treatment. We for our part have made
it clear that such arrangements must be termi-
nated as part of any generalized scheme since
we do not consider it reasonable that the United
States should be expected to accord preferred
treatment to developing countries discriminat-
ing against U.S. exports. These arrangements,
moreover, convey no benefits to the developing
countries who are denied the opportunity to buy
in the most favorable market.
Even if it should not prove possible to elimi-
nate completely the preferential access to cer-
tain developed-countiy markets that certain
favored poor countries now enjoy, agreement on
a new system of preferences extended on a non-
reciprocal basis by all developed to all develop-
ing countries would be a major achievement. It
would check the further proliferation of special
discriminatory arrangements, the thiiist toward
new bilateral trading blocs ; and it would reduce
the range and significance of existing
preferences.
There are other policy and technical issues
related to preferences that I could discuss with
the committee, but I believe the foregoing is suf-
ficient to indicate the range of the complexities
which are involved.
I would like to invite the committee's atten-
tion to an excellent recent survey by the
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development] Secretariat of the key
issues. I will make available to the committee
copies of this document (appendix 1)^ and
would have no objection if the committee wishes
to incorporate it in its report on these hearmgs.
This particular document is being discussed at
this very moment in Geneva, where the
UNCTAD Group on Preferences, on which the
United States and 33 other governments are rep- i.
resented, began its meetings on July 4. The |'
docmnent to which I have referred and the
specific proposals advanced therein illustrate
some of the complexities and the options open
to us and other countries.
Differences in Approach To Be Considered
The United States will not enter into any kind
of commitment on any of the key details of the
suggestions presented by the UNCTAD Secre-
tariat at the meeting now in progress. We be-
lieve, however, that the discussions based on this
very competent review should ser\e to clear the
air a bit and give us a better appreciation of how
the developing countries themselves view the
operation of a possible preference scheme. We
need such an understanding because a workable
scheme of preferences — if it is to be woi'th the
effort which would have to go into it — would
have to be one which has the support not only
of the industrialized countries but of the de-
veloping countries themselves.
With the President's announcement at Punta
del Este, the work of the small group of coun-
tries in the OECD entered a new phase since
the United States no longer maintamed a basic
reservation on the principle of preferences. Still
it appears that there are important areas of dif-
ference between the approaches to some of the
key issues involved in preferences. The
UNCTAD document to which I have referred
gives a succinct and quite accurate expose of
these differences in approach.
The time sequence of events is that a report by
the small group will be considered within the
regular OECD framework this fall, culminat-
ing in the meeting of OECD ministers No-
vember 30-Deccmber 1. If, at that time, a gen-
eral consensus can be reached, there might well
be a joint OECD proposal to be put before the
second United Nations Conference on Trade and
' "The Question of the Granting and Extension of
Preferences in Favour of Developing Countries." U.N.
doc. TD/B/C.2/AC.1/7, May 31, 1967. [Not printed
here.]
188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Development to be held in New Delhi beginning
February 1, 1968. On the other hand, there may
be no jomt proposal but alternative ideas pre-
sented for consideration at that conference.
No matter wliich course of action may develop,
the United States for its part does not ex-
pect that any proposal or proposals will be pre-
sented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis but that,
instead, the views of developing countries and
I detailed discussions to develop a workable
scheme will require many meetings over a pe-
riod of many months both during and after the
New Delhi conference. During this period, of
course, the United States will have to be refining
its own views in consultations with business and
labor and with the Congress, since, of course,
the United States will not be in a position to
extend trade preferences without new enabling
legislation. The actual mechanism for ascertain-
ing these views will be part of the long-range
study of trade policy which the President has
charged Ambassador Eoth [William M. Roth,
Special Eepresentative for Trade Negotiations]
to carry out.
U.S. Kennedy Round Concessions
j Let me conclude my presentation by a brief
commentary on our trade policy as it relates to
both primary products and manufactured
goods. The United States has been the prime
, mover in the worldwide eifort to reduce unnec-
[ essary barriers to trade. Tliis long effort has re-
cently been crowned with success in the outcome
of the Kermedy Round negotiations. There has
been some imfortunate — and in our view inac-
curate— press commentary to the effect that the
Kennedy Round accomplished little or nothing
for the developing countries. Let me give you
our own appraisal of this situation.
One of the principal objectives throughout
the Kennedy Round negotiation was to reduce
barriers to exports of developing countries to
the maximum extent possible. The United
States' position throughout the negotiation was
conditioned by its commitment to this objective.
The United States concessions benefiting the de-
veloping countries cover $900 million of their
exports to the United States in 1964. Of this
total, the United States is completely eliminat-
ing the duty on more than $325 million, either
under section 202 or section 213 of the Trade
Expansion Act. Provisions of the act are such
that eliminations under section 213, accounting
for at least $45 million of imports from develop-
ing countries, do not need to be staged over a
4-year period. A substantial portion of U.S.
concessions — nearly $500 million — is on manu-
factured and semimanufactured products from
developing countries. This represents a signif-
icant reduction of our tariffs on items of mter-
est to the developing countries. We made these
concessions, moreover, without seeking recipro-
cal tariff reductions by the developing countries,
m keeping with the negotiatmg principle ac-
cepted by all the industrialized coxmtries that
full reciprocity could not be expected from the
low-income countries.
We have recently completed a detailed anal-
ysis of United States concessions in relation to
a list of the products which the developing coun-
tries themselves have declared to be of export
interest. This list (see appendix 2)' covers 1,376
different tariff classifications of the Tariff
Schedules of the United States, in which the
1964 trade interest of the developing countries
was $622.7 million. The United States is making
tariff concessions on 1,160 of these items, ac-
counting for $489.8 million of their 1964 trade
interest. Thus the U.S. concessions will cover ap-
proximately 84 percent of the items requested
and 79 percent of the developing countries' trade
interest in the items contained in this composite
list.
We do not yet have shnilar detailed analyses
of the significance for developing countries of
concessions made by other industrialized coun-
tries, but we know that in general they are of a
comparable order of magnitude. The composite
effect of the vast reductions by all industrialized
comitries is that the trade opportimities open
to the developing countries are substantially bet-
ter than ever before.
I would not wish these comments to be mis-
construed as implying that developmg countries
will obtain the major benefits from the Kennedy
Round. It is quite clear that trade between the
United States and other industrialized countries
will be the major beneficiary. But the implica-
tion that nothing was done for the developing
countries is very much wide of the mark.
We in the executive branch are delighted with
the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round.
We recognize that a period of reflection will be
needed to assess — and digest — the results and
that it may be some time before the United
' "Programme for the Liberalization and Expansion
of Trade in Manufactures and Seml-Manufactures of
Interest to Developing Countries." U.N. doc. TD/B/
C.2/20, March 20, 1967. [Not printed here.]
ATTGTTST 7, 1967
189
(
States and other major industrialized countries
will be ready to undertake another assault on
the remaining barriers to trade. But I also
would not wish to end this presentation by im-
plying that the Kemiedy Round is the end of
the road. Indeed, as the President stated at
Punta del Este :
The process of freeing trade from unnecessary re-
strictions will not come to an end when the current
and important Kennedy Round negotiations are
completed.
Not all of the issues we and our negotiating
partners had hojied to come to grips with during
the Kennedy Eound could be dealt with during
the marathon sessions of the final months. One
issue in particular of major interest to the de-
veloping countries has been left over for further
consideration next fall. That is the question of
extending the benefits of the Kennedy Round
reductions to the developing coimtries without
the normal staging requirement. The United
States has not taken a firm position on this
point. It would, of course, require specific legis-
lative authority. If this were done in a preferen-
tial way, i.e., covering all products but for de-
veloping countries only, it would constitute a
precedent for the longer term problem of tem-
porary tariff advantages. We will be exploring
this issue with our major trading partners over
the coming months and, of course, with the
Congress.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington
April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959.
TIAS 4397.
Signature: Trinidad and Tobago, July 10, 1967. !
Acceptance deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, July 10,
1967.
Organization of American States
Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States — the "Protocol of Buenos
Aires." Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967.
Enters into force when two-thirds of the states signa-
tory to the charter have deposited their instruments
of ratification.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig-
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow Janu-
ary 27, 1967."
Ratification deposited: Sierra Leone, July 14, 1967.
Wheat
Protocol for the further extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 4 through 29, 1966. En-
tered into force July 16, 1966, for Part I and Parts III
to VII ; August 1, 1966, for Part II. TIAS 6057.
Accession deposited: Barbados, July 19, 1967.
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive.
Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 15, 1967.
Notification of undertaking to seek ratification de-
posited: Portugal, July 14, 1967.
Notification of undertaking to seek accession de-
posited: Ecuador, July 15, 1967.
Entered into force: July 16, 1967.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement amending the convention on Great Lakes
fisheries of September 10, 19.54 (TIAS 3326). Effected
by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 5, 1966, and
May 19, 1967. Entered into force May 19, 1967.
Proclaimed hy the President: July 19, 1967.
Congo (Kinshasa)
Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri-
cultural commodities of March 15, 1967, as amended
Effected by an exchange of notes at Kinshasa June
16 and 26, 1967. Entered into force June 26, 1967.
Somali Republic
Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of January 28 and February 4, 1961,
as extended (TIAS 4915, 5332, 550S, 5738, 5814, 6148,
6199). Effected by exchange of notes at Mogadiscio
June 29 and 30, 1967. Entered into force June 30,
1967.
" Not in force.
190
DEPAKT3IENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX Auffust 7, 1967 Vol LVH, No. U67
Brazil. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
July 19 159
Canada. Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section of
Great Lakes Fishery Commission 172
China. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
July 19 159
Congress
Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy
(Roth) 173
United States Foreign Trade Policy and the
Developing Countries (Solomon) 180
Developing Countries. United States Foreign
Trade Policy and the Developing Countries
(Solomon) 180
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of July 19 159
Economic Affairs
Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy
(Roth) 173
Mr. Pautzke Named to U.S. Section of Great
Lakes Fishery Commission 172
United States Foreign Trade Policy and the
Developing Countries (Solomon) 180
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Time Limit on
Copyright Filings Extended for German
Citizens 171
Foreign Aid. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of July 19 159
Germany
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159
Time Limit on Copyright Filings Extended for
German Citizens 171
Health. U.S.-Japan Medical Science Committee
Holds Third Meeting 172
International Law. World Law Day, 1967
(proclamation) 171
Japan. U.S.-Japan Medical Science Committee
Holds Third Meeting 172
Jordan. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
July 19 159
Lebanon. Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon
Lifted 171
Malagasy Republic Secretary Rusk's News Con-
ference of July 19 159
Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Discusses
the Situation in Viet-Nam 167
Near East
Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon Lifted . . . 171
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159
Panama. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
July 19 159
Passports. Restrictions on Travel to Lebanon
Lifted 171
Presidential Documents. World Law Day, 1967 . 171
Trade
Issues in Future U.S. Foreign Trade Policy
(Roth) 173
United States Foreign Trade Policy and the
Developing Countries (Solomon) 180
Treaty Information, Current Actions .... 190
U.S.S.R.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159
U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident Involving
Soviet Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) . 170
United Kingdom. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of July 19 159
United Nations. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of July 19 159
Viet-Nam
Secretary McNamara Discusses the Situation in
Viet-Nam 167
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 19 . 159
U.S. Ends Investigation of Incident Involving
Soviet Ship at Haiphong (text of U.S. note) . 170
U.S. Expresses Concern at Plight of Prisoners
in North Viet-Nam 170
Name Indetc
Johnson, President 171
McNamara, Robert S 167
Pautzke, Clarence F 172
Roth, WilUam M 173
Rusk, Secretary 159
Solomon, Anthony M 180
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 17-23
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to July 17 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 156 of
July 10, 159 of July 13, and 162 of July 15.
No. Date Subject
164 7/19 Rusk: news conference of July 19.
Superintendent of I
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DEPARTMENT
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STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1468
August 14, 1967
PARTNERSHIP IN EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
hy Assistant Secretary Bundy 195
THE DEPTH AND DURABILITY OF U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONS
hy Ambassador William, McCormick Blair, Jr. 203
THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Statement hy Secretary R-usk 208
i'lFTH EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF U.N. GENERAI. ASSEMBLY ADJOURNS
Statement hy Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 216
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1468 Publication 8278
August 14, 1967
For siile by tbe Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing OfBce
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PRICE:
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of tliis publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
i«prmted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN .is the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
toit/i information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
Tlie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
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Publications of the Department,
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islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Partnership in East Asia and the Pacific
hy William, P. Bundy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Ajfairs ^
Many years ago, in 1959, I was assigned as a
member of the American delegation to a foreign
ministers conference in Geneva on the Berlin
problem. Few of you may now recall that con-
ference, but at the time — coming after Khru-
shchev's first direct threats to Berlin — it seemed
to many to carry with it the whole fate of the
world, to be decisive whether or not there would
be a third world war.
I traveled to that conference on one of the
early jets to London, and on my arrival at Lon-
don Airport ran into an old friend who works
for one of the major New York international
banks. We both looked at each other in surprise
at what we might be doing there. Finally, I
spoke first and said that I was going to "the
conference in Geneva." He casually replied:
"Oh, is there some conference in Geneva ? The
hankers are meeting here."
I have always regarded that episode as a, use-
ful reminder of the limits of my adopted pro-
fession of diplomacy. For it behooves all of us
who work in the area of foreign policy to remind
ourselves constantly of the difference between
the things we try to affect in any direct sense,
and the things we do not affect, other than
marginally, and indeed exist only to make pos-
sible. Your meeting, with its emphasis on law
as an avenue to communication among nations,
falls in tliat latter category.
The latoyers are meeting here. I was trained
in the law and practiced it briefly. I have not
done an honest day's legal work in the last 16
years, although I have never for a moment re-
gretted my legal training and experience and,
' Address made before the Federal Bar Association at
San Francisco, Calif., on July 28 (press release 170).
indeed, have found them invaluable in the con-
stant struggle to sort out the essentials of a
problem and to frame ways of tackling it.
Today, I would like to talk to you about what
seems to me to be the wider significance of
gatherings such as this, particularly with the
presence of your distinguished guests from
Asia.
Specifically, I want to talk about the evolving
partnership between the United States and the
nations of East Asia and the Pacific and more
especially about the rapidly growing partner-
ship of the free nations of this area among them-
selves. At the end, I will ti-y to relate these
themes to the role of lawyers and the law, not
merely in deference to this gathering but be-
ca,use I believe that role can in fact be impor-
tant and in a sense special.
The headlines today are focused on the prob-
lem of security in East Asia and on the specific
and crucial test case of Viet-Nam. We are play-
ing a major role in that conflict, because we
believe it important that the people of South
Viet-Nam should have the right to determine
their own future without external interference
and beca,use we believe — in common with the
great body of responsible opinion throughout
Asia and particularly in Southeast Asia — that,
unless South Viet-Nam and its supporters stand
firm, the ability of the other nations of South-
east and South Asia to develop their own
national lives would surely be jeopardized by
external and externally supported threats that
would grow and tend to flow over them.
We believe that our role is essential both to
our own national interest and to the aspirations
of the area itself. We seek no specific position
for ourselves in the Southeast Asia of the future.
AUGUST 14, 1967
271-549—67
195
Rather, -we believe deeply that the fabric of
peace in Asia cannot endure unless the indi-
vidual nations of the area are secure from the
threat of aggression. The only way to prevent
wider and greater wars that would surely in
the end threaten our own most specific national
interests is to help, as we can, the nations of the
area to work for their own national survival
and self-determination. They seek many things
but, above all, the right to be themselves and
to assist their peoples to enjoy a better life.
So security is a part of the common task, and
a part from which we could walk away only if
we were prepared to let nature take its course. I
think it would not be a very lovely course.
But security is still only a part of the job and
in an enduring sense perhaps the least signifi-
cant part. Security is only the essential means
to an end, and that end is nothing less than the
sum total of all that the peoples and nations of
Asia can do for themselves to improve the wel-
fare of their people, to establish and strengthen
political and social structures that fit the needs
and desires of each people, to use for construc-
tive ends the progress of science and technology,
and to knit up their ties with each other.
Government and Private Channels
In that greatest of all efl'orts we have tried
to be partners through governmental programs
and assistance, where we were wanted and where
a reasonable basis of domestic programs and
policies existed. And the results in many cases
have proved — if it needs proving — the talent
and potential of Asia. On any historic perspec-
tive, the gains in the last 22 years among the
free nations of Asia — in bedrock terms of
human life and fulfillment — have been extraor-
dinary. Tremendous problems remain, but
surely the overall historical judgment on this
period must be that the peoples and nations of
East Asia, given conditions of security, have
shown the capacity to get on top of their prob-
lems; and performance of their political and
economic systems has far outstripped the per-
formance of the totalitarian regime of main-
land China.
All this is still in the realm of our relation as
a government to East Asia and the Pacific. But
surely it is time to recognize far more strongly
than we have done that all that governments
can do is to provide a framework and that the
imderlying and lasting results will to a very
large extent be achieved through those private
channels which, once unleashed, will dwarf all
that governments can do.
Unquestionably, a great part of the history
of Asia today is the impact of Western ideas —
and perhaps, in recent times particularly, Amer-
ican ideas — on Asian concepts and practices.
The Western colonial past in Asia both brought
these ideas and often distorted them, for the
very existence of a colonial relationsliip is a
vast distortion. Today, colonialism has ended,
and I hope that we have seen the end, also, of
the patronizing attitudes associated with it. I
hope, too, and indeed I believe, that the per-
formance of Asian nations has given these na-
tions a justified confidence and self-esteem that
enable them to look objectively at what the
West, and America, have to offer, neither adopt-
ing nor rejecting simply because an idea or way
of doing thmgs is Western or American but,
rather, fitting what seems useful into the frame-
work of their own deeply rooted cultures. One
heare little in Asia today of the only recent
slogan of "neocolonialism." And all signs indi-
cate that we have turned a corner and are enter-
ing upon a new era deserving the name of
partnership. Certainly that is what we want.
And the essence of this is private and takes
place through the host of personal relationships
that have grown so rapidly in the past 15 years.
Part of this is general understanding. Asian
study of America and American study of Asia
have multiplied fantastically in the last 20 years
from the day when — as I personally recall
vividly — there simply were only a handful of
Southeast Asian experts available in this coun-
try to man the intelligence organizations we
required during the Second World War.
Part of it is personal contact, on a generalized
basis. The 3,000 Americans who have gone to
Asia since 1949 under Government grants and
the 11,500 Asian students and leaders who have
come to us are only a small fraction of the per-
sonal contacts that now take place.
This is, if you will, "people to people" — a good
term but an inadequate one. For the core of these
personal relationships, in my judgment, is pro-
fessional: scientist to scientist, businessman to
businessman, scholar to scholar, student to stu-
dent, and lawyer to lawyer.
I have tried to get figures on the extent to
which these professional ties have multiplied
196
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
in the past 20 years. We have certain broad
measures such as the growth of trade between
the United States and East Asian countries. In
1956 this trade amounted to $3.8 billion, of
which our trade with Japan was $1.5 billion.
By 19G6 the total United States trade with the
area had grown to $10.1 billion, of which our
trade with Japan was more than $5.25 billion.
Another broad measure is the extent of travel
between East Asia and the United States. In
1956, 205,000 Americans and 125,000 non- Amer-
icans crossed the Pacific by sea or air — a total
of some 330,000. A decade later, 672,000 Amer-
icans and 493,000 non-Americans crossed — a
total of over 1,100,000, or a nearly fourfold
growth in a decade. Surely the greatest part
of the non- Americans were Asians, and, as you
can see, their proportion to the total has grown
rapidly.
But when it comes to gettmg the exact figures
for professional ties, they do not seem to be
available. This may, of course, be a good sign,
for it shows the basic spontaneity of the whole
movement.
Importance of Intellectual Ties
And surely the evidence in many respects is
all around us, in Berkeley, in Stanford, and
throughout our universities, where today there
are thousands upon thousands of Asian students,
whereas in my time in college, before the war,
there were almost none. The East-West Center
in Honolulu provides a particular drawing to-
gether. There and elsewhere the students who
come to us from Asia represent an increasingly
broad cross section of their countries and, one
ventures, a fair proportion of their future lead-
ers. They not only learn from us but teach us.
Yet, if all this were only curiosity, or the
availability of spaces in universities, it would
pass quickly from the historic scene. Surely it
goes much deeper than this, to the sense that we
have indeed something to say to each other.
In the realm of techniques this is obvious
enough. Rice is an overpowering need in Asia,
and it is a source of pride that private initia-
tive in America, in full cooperation with the
Philippine Government, should now be bring-
ing forth new and promising rice strains, from
Asian stock, at the Los Baiios Institute in the
Philippines.
We are working together in numerous scien-
tific fields, from medicine to population con-
trol to volcanology to plant protection to ocean-
ography to earthquake engineering to weather
study and outward to space technology.
We are working together, too, in the social
sciences, in education, and in economics. The pio-
neering work of such men as Russell Davis at
Harvard may be putting us in a position to make
a greater contribution to the educational prob-
lems of Asia ; I have no doubt that it is adding
to our own store of knowledge of what can be
done in parallel situations at home. And surely
we have all learned together how crucial the
development of education is as the essential
imderpinning not only of economic progress but
of wider social development.
In economics the international trade miion of
economists seems to be doing very nicely indeed.
Like the bankers, they seem able to use a common
language in almost any circumstances, even
when disagreeing. Perhaps a lot of the credit
should go to the World Bank and the Monetary
Fund, and we should certainly recognize that
today's economics has come from many diverse
strands in the West as a whole. But today every-
body, from nations all over the world, is in the
act.
One could go on and on, and the importance
of these intellectual ties is fundamental. They
are not without their own problems, however,
and one of these — deeply serious in a few coun-
tries— is the "brain drain." Foreign students
come to the United States and find themselves
not only with greater monetary rewards than
they can get at home but with unique prospects
of pursuing their professional work here. I do
not know the answer to this one, but part of it
will surely come from the steady growth of local
opportimity, including local institutions in
science and teclxnology, which can provide a base
for solid work so that professionals will be
attracted to stay in their own coimtries. An ex-
ample of this is the Korean Institute of Science
and Technology, announced jointly by President
Johnson and President Park 2 years ago and
now really getting underway.^
But it would be a distorted picture indeed if
I were to stop merely with tliis discussion of
the ties between America, and the West in gen-
eral, and the nations of East Asia. For we
" For test of a joint communique, see Bulletin of
June 14, 1965, p. 952.
AUGUST 14, 1967
197
have seen in recent years the beginnings of what
could become a tremendously significant growth
in the ties among and between East Asian and
Pacific countries.
This is, in a very real sense, something new in
history. For such ties, historically, were few,
except for those provided by the overseas Chi-
nese. Perhaps this was in part because of dis-
tance. Perhaps it was in part because of the
great cultural differences between the indi-
vidual nations of East Asia. Perhaps it had a
little to do with colonial ties or special ties to
the West, which may have been at tlae expense of
Asians seeking similarities among themselves.
In any case, it was the fact. But it is a fact
rapidly fading into the past.
Economic Cooperation in East Asia
Again, the outward and visible sign has been
in the area of government cooperation. In the
field of security, governmental arrangements
still include our own major role or that of other
major outside nations. This may change over
time but seems unlikely to do so in the near
future.
Rather, it has been in the area of economic,
technical, and cultural cooperation that the
great strides of the last 3 years have taken place.
First, there has been the great body of tech-
nical cooperation efforts spawned through years
of prior devoted work in the U.N.'s Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE). One of these is the Mekong Valley
Coordinating Committee, under which a major
dam in Laos — Nam Ngum — is already under-
way, and others are being explored.
ECAFE played a crucial role in the creation
of the Asian Development Bank, which went
into business last December. The ADB bids fair
to become not merely a source of conventional
loans but a steady and trusted reservoir of man-
agerial and advisory skills and the administra-
tor of special funds for concessional aid to
which many nations contribute. Nineteen area
governments have pledged $615 million of the
Bank's authorized capital of $1,100,000,000.
Tliere have been a host of other Asian initia-
tives. The first ministerial conference on South-
east Asian development met in Tokyo in April
1966. At the conference, Japan stated its inten-
tion to devote 1 percent of its national income
to development assistance. A second conference
was held in Manila in April of this year. Plans
were announced relating to regional develop-
ment programs for transport and communica-
tions, and agreement on the founding of a fish-
eries development center.
Formation of tlie Southeast Asian Ministers
of Education Secretariat (SEAMES) was
authorized in November 1966 by the Ministers
of Education from six area countries, and it is
actively devotmg itself to promoting regional
cooperation in education and related fields.
The Conference of Asian Labor Ministers
was established in Manila, with 11 area partici-
pants, to promote regional cooperation in labor
matters.
Interest in cooperative efforts within the area
is expanding. The expansion of the membership
of existing organizations is also being discussed.
Consideration is already being given to the need
to avoid duplication of activity. As yet, however,
there is plenty of work for all comers to do.
All of these are functional efforts, reflecting
the natural tendency to look first to tlie practi-
cal common problems shared by the nations of
the area irrespective of their international
posture. And this is as it should be. We for our
part believe that regional economic cooperation
along these lines can play a major constructive
role. We have supported these Asian initiatives,
and we are contributing assistance wherever
that is approi^riate. Much more needs to be done,
and we shall play our part.
Broader Associations
In addition to these functional organizations
directed to specific and defuied economic pur-
poses, the last 2 years have seen two great strides
in the association of Asian governments on a
broader basis.
The first of these is the Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC), which held its first meeting
in Seoul a year ago, met recently in Bangkok,
and will meet in Canberra in 1968. This organi-
zation, composed of nine area states plus one
observer, brings together Asian and Pacific
countries with differing political outlooks but
with a shared interest in finding a common
ground of useful cooperation.
Secondly, the Association of Southeast Asia
(ASA) — comprising Thailand, the Philippines,
and Malaysia — was revived in 1966 as a going
organization among the nations of Southeast
Asia in particular. A wider grouping in this
area is now under consideration.
198
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Let me emphasize that in these broader
governmental groupings we play no part what-
ever. These are wholly Asian initiatives and, to
the extent tliat such organizations have a politi-
cal aspect, it must be wholly in accord with the
desires of East Asian and Pacific participants.
As they see it, the major purpose is to develop a
sense of working and thinking together about
their own problems.
So there is in the East Asia today a new spirit
of regional cooperation among governments.
Yet the ties among the nations of East Asia and
the Pacific extend also into the private sphere,
most notably in the growth of trade within the
area but also through the same sort of personal
exchange that characterizes the relations be-
tween East Asia and the United States.
Here, again, figures are hard to come by.
There is no tracing the exact number of delega-
tions now visiting from one Asian country to
another, but any observer in Asia can testify
that they are today a commonplace, where a
decade ago they were a rarity.
We do have a few figures on students. Japan,
for example, in 1965, had more than 2,300 area
students studying in the country. Of these, the
greatest number were from the Republic of
China (1,586). Next in order came Indonesia
(345), Thailand (169), Malaysia (166), and the
remainder were scattered among Australia, the
Philippines, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Burma, and
Laos.
To take another example, the Government of
the Republic of China during 1965-66 had over
2,000 area students studying on Taiwan. The
greatest number of these were overseas Chinese
(1,575). The remainder were from Viet-Nam
(253), Korea (43), Japan (29), Thailand (28),
Malaysia (24)— and the United States (64). I
might add parenthetically that the Republic of
China is also providing technical assistance to
approximately 25 countries in Africa, chiefly
in connection with rice growing and other agri-
cultural activities.
In the South Pacific, Australia in 1965 had
more than 4,000 area students within its bor-
ders. The greatest number came from Malaysia
(3,620). Other foreign students came from In-
donesia (238), Thailand (166), Viet-Nam (78),
and smaller numbers from Burma, the Republic
of China, Cambodia, Japan, Korea, and the
Philippines.
In Thailand, 300 Lao students are being
trained under our AID program, and Thailand
is also funding a Lao teachers program which
the United States had originally financed.
The Colombo Plan activities in this field must
also be mentioned. From 1950 to 1965, training
opportunities under the plan were provided for
more than 20,000 persons by the plan's partici-
pating countries, including several Asian states,
as well as the United States and others. The
original distinction between donor and recip-
ients has become blurred as countries have be-
come both.
These seem to be the only figures one can
readily get. But I am sure they are only the
visible top of a growing body of exchange of all
sorts among the nations of East Asia and the
Pacific. For all over Asia, nations have found
their way of doing things, and this way is quite
likely to be far more applicable to the condi-
tions in other nations of Asia than anything
that we have to offer in the West and in the
United States. And I suspect that contacts
among Asians will henceforth grow more —
relatively, if not absolutely — than contacts be-
tween Asia and ourselves. For this too is surely
a tide of history.
Law a Reflection of National Life
I am sure you recognize what I have said as
merely a set of notes on what is taking place. It
would take someone with a broader grasp of his-
tory than I can claim to assess the significance
of all this, and particularly the significance in
terms of the effect on underlying values in
Asian nations and in our own country. New
studies need to be made of the relation today
between East and West, and they will surely be
very different from any past studies. For over
the last 20 years — I venture, more than in all the
preceding centuries of our contact — we have be-
come members one of another.
How then do you as lawyers, the law, and the
Federal Bar Association relate to this growing
partnership in East Asia and the Pacific ?
The law is many things. It is a specific set of
techniques for the arrangement and ordering
of living in society. It is the embodiment of cus-
tom and of deep-rooted historical experience. In
both aspects it reflects the moral and indeed the
religious basis of national life itself.
I am frankly skeptical that the techniques of
our own domestic legal system can be readily
AUGUST 14, 1967
199
applied in Asian nations or indeed in any other
nation. Certainly this application must be
highly selective, for in law — as in the broader
processes of government, including constitu-
tions— it would be a very dangerous fallacy to
suppose that blueprints can be transferred from
one nation to another. As Justice Holmes was
the first to ijoint out, our own law rests deeply
on customs dating from the past, and it rests
also on social policies developed in a particular
moral ethic and in the light of particular eco-
nomic circumstances.
So lawyers may exchange techniques, but not
in the same sense that economists can do so. The
lawyers meeting here cannot find as full a basis
of shared experience and applicability as the
economists, or even the bankers, might do.
Yet, in the wider sense, lawyers must have a
tremendous amount to impart to each other.
Though our religious and moral backgrounds
differ, we share the sense that what we believe to
be right should be reflected in law to the extent
that this is practicable and that the law itself
should be something on which people can rely.
It is thus no idle phrase to speak of the rule of
law — as the distinguished Minister of Justice of
South Viet-Nam, for one, has done in this gath-
ering— or to compare notes to the fullest on what
the rule of law means in each of our nations.
The Role of Lawyers
Lawyers by the very nature of their craft are
social engineers. Their aim is to produce some-
thing that works in practice and forms the un-
derpinning of the whole structure of govern-
ment in a nation. The role of lawyers may differ
from one society to another; in few is it more
pervasive than in our own. But all lawyers share
with each other the sense of doing a job for
society, with different tecluiiques and from dif-
ferent historical and moral premises, but to the
same underlying ends of meeting man's age-old
desire for justice.
Finally, there is work to be done in the body
of law that we all share — international law. If
you will look in our standard international law
textbooks, you will find but scant reference to
practices, precedents, treatises from the Asian
area. The great body both of precedent and com-
mentary is Western. Here is an area to which
lawyers, particularly international lawyers,
might usefully direct more attention.
One Asian writer has complained about "an ^
attitude of ill-concealed self-righteousness on
the part of old States who claim that they them-
selves abide by 'established rules of interna-
tional law,' implying that the new States act as
irresponsible and young members of the family
of nations . ..." I need not, of course, remind
you that not all Asian states are new and young
and that, even among those which are newly
emerging, there are cultures and customs which
long predate Grotius.
A second suggestion in the area of interna-
tional law is that of one of the distinguished
American former judges on the World Court,
Judge Hudson, who called attention several
years ago to the need for an element of equity
in international law — even as an element of
equity helps to season our common law proceed-
ings. We need in any case an imaginative ap-
proach in dealing with some of the legal prob-
lems which the emerging nations are facing in
meeting the conditions of the world today.
Thirdly, lawyers have a role in the unceasing
effort which is being made to find alternatives
to the use of force as a means of settling interna-
tional disputes.
As the same Asian writer has pointed out:
"The greatest factor . . . which should link these
two worlds (Asia and the West) today is the
realization that they have a common interest in
the establisloment of a legal system which would
provide them with prescriptions for their con-
tinual and renewed interactions."
In discussing the "path of the law" toward the
turn of the century, Justice Holmes wrote :
The remoter and more general aspects of the law
are those which give it universal interest. It is through
them that you not only become a great master m your
calling, but . . . catch an echo of the iniiuite, a glimpse
of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal
law.
This is a large prescription, but it has even
greater application now than at the time it was
written. The times now call for a reaching out
toward ever-wider legal horizons and a ceaseless
drive to find deeper understanding and the basis
for a more peaceful world.
So the role of the law can indeed be special.
And the historian of the future may well find
that this gathering, and others like it, have been
crucial pioneering efforts in that drawing to-
gether of nations that history may come to re-
cord as the central event that began in the last
half of the 20th century.
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson Confers
With President of Iceland
President Asgeir Asgeirsson of Iceland vis-
ited the United States and Canada July 17-
Aug-ust 5. During an informal visit to Washing-
ton July 17-19 he met with President Johnson
and other Government officials. FoUoioing is an
exchange of toasts between President Johnson
and President Asgeirsson at a White House
hincheon on July 18.
White House press release dated July 18
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Mr. President, I greet you as the latest, but
far from the first, Icelander to visit these shores.
You came by air in a matter of hours. But
over 900 years ago another band of brave Ice-
landers sailed west in longboats to discover a
land they called "Vinland."
It has been alleged on very liigh political —
rather than historical — authority that they
traveled inland, settled, and voted. In fact, the
distinguished Vice President, in one of his rare
expansive moments, has been known to claim
them as the founders of the Minnesota Demo-
cratic Party. I haven't confirmed that from
Ambassador Rolvaag [Karl F. Rolvaag, U.S.
Ambassador to Iceland] , but he is here for con-
sultation.
The land that they found was far different
from the one you see today. Yet Iceland and
America have a great deal in common. Both
were built by pioneers, by men who journeyed
into the unknown across a forbidding sea or an
imcharted wilderness. Both of our peoples came
to find freedom. Both founded nations that to-
day have a long and honored tradition of liberty
and of justice.
America has the world's oldest written con-
stitution; Iceland has the world's oldest parlia-
ment. It occurs to me, Mr. President, that expe-
rience with parliaments might help me solve
some of the problems that I have today.
It is symbolic of our common history that
only last week 24 of our finest young men, our
brave American astronauts— the real pioneers
of our day — returned from a training mission
to your country. The cordial reception they re-
ceived from your people reminded me of my
own visit to Iceland in 1963.
I have never forgotten that visit. I learned
how much Iceland can teach the world about
the fruitful life of people who live in freedom:
— Iceland has the highest literacy rate in the
world.
— Iceland has eliminated extreme poverty.
— Iceland has a free democratic government
in which all of her citizens take part.
Iceland is known as the land of ice and fixe.
I saw your great snowfields and glaciers, your
volcanoes and your warm springs. But ice and
fire refer not only to these. There is ice in the
cold determination of your people to preserve
and protect the democratic institutions that we
all cherish so much. And there is fire — and a
great deal of fire — always in your support of
peace and freedom.
Ladies and gentlemen, Iceland and America
are alike in their origins — and alike in their
objectives. I should like for all of you to now
join me in a toast to the President of an old
counti-y and a firm friend.
PRESIDENT ASGEIRSSON
I thank President Johnson for the kind words
that he has spoken about my country and my
people.
It is with gratitude that I have accepted the
invitation to meet the President and his wife
here at the White House. I recall with pleasure
the visit that you as Vice President and Mrs.
Jolmson paid to Iceland a few years ago. Such
visits and personal contacts are most valuable
for promoting friendship and understanding
between nations.
Our country is the nearest European neigh-
bor to America. Thus it was not only by chance
that an Icelander became the first white man
to set foot on American shores, as you men-
tioned, and that an Icelandic family made the
first attempt to settle here in the New World.
These historical facts are commemorated by
the statues of Leif Eriksson in Reykjavik and
Newport News — that statue in Reykjavik is a
gift of the United States Congress on the Ice-
landic Parliament's 1,000-years anniversary —
and the statues of Thorfinnur Karlsefni, who
tried to settle here in this country, are in Phila-
delphia and also in Reykj avik.
A thousand years ago the Nordic population
AUGUST 14, 1961
201
was too small to sustain the beacHaeads they
had established on the American shores. But as
you mentioned, nearly 900 years later, and since,
many Icelanders have established themselves in
this country. The Icelandic immigrants and
their descendants have helped to further friend-
ship and good relations between our nations.
The Second World War brought our two na-
tions much closer together than ever before;
and close, friendly relations have been main-
tained since. Our small nation was isolated for
centuries in the middle of the Atlantic, out of
sight and touch with other lands, somewhat like
the people of the Midwest, M'ho did not see the
oceans. Like the midwest«rners, we tended to be-
lieve in the security of isolation.
But times and conditions have changed. Iso-
lation, language, and literature protected the
Icelandic nationality for centuries. Now isola-
tion is a thing of the past in Iceland as in most
other countries. The revolution in transporta-
tion and communications has made all coun-
tries neighbors. No country can be isolated and
self-sufficient in times of crisis. Friendly rela-
tions and security arrangements are necessary
under present conditions. The lesson of the
Second World War should certainly not be for-
gotten. Short memory is a serious fault.
We had certainly wished that the United Na-
tions could have been sufficiently strong to pro-
tect world peace. Although the United Nations
has proven to be a valuable international forum
with substantial accomplishments to its account,
it has been handicapped by the lack of a strong
executive power.
Such was the system of government during
the first 300 years of Icelandic history, which
also led to the downfall of the old republic. The
disunity and lack of power of the United Na-
tions has necessitated the formation of such de-
fense agreements as the NATO, in wliich we
both are partners.
Our cooperation in defense matters is good
and close. We are fortunate to have only good
neighbors in the North Atlantic. I like to re-
call the lend-lease agreement wliich we made in
1941, subsequent to our fii*st defense agreement
with the United States. We who negotiated that
agreement had often daily meetings in the State
Department and remember seeing in the corri-
dors the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese negotiators.
While in Halifax on our way back home, we
heard the news about the attack on Pearl Har-
bor. That was a moment none of us will forget.
I recall also with gratitude the Marshall Plan,
which provided Iceland, together with other
European countries, with much needed eco-
nomic aid. The Marshall Plan was impressive
and unique and achieved its goal of European
recovery. We, like so many other countries, have
a good reason to recall what the United States
has done for the defense of national independ-
ence and democracy and for economic develop-
ment all over the world.
This has been possible only because the vigor
and wealth of the United States has been
matched by the intelligence and imagination of
its political leaders. We follow with admiration
your ceaseless efforts, Mr. President, in provid-
ing better and fairer living for all your citizens
in the true liberal traditions of your country.
It is vital for a small country to have good
neighbors. Historical and natural rights are not
always sufficient. We live m the middle of the
North Atlantic, on both sides of which are the
oldest and soundest democracies. We are closest
to these countries geographically, historically,
and culturally. In our times, the North Atlantic
is the Mediterranean of the free world.
Mr. President, I want again to extend to you
and your cliarming wife my deepest thanks for
your hospitality. Your invitation is a great
honor to me and the Icelandic people.
Allow me to propose a toast to the President
of the United States.
Letters of Credence
Romania
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Socialist Eepublic of Romania, Corneliu
Bogdan, presented his credentials to President
Johnson on July 27. For texts of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated July 27.
Togo
The newly apjDointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Togo, Alexandre Ohin, presented
his credentials to President Johnson on July 27.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, sec Department of State press
release dated July 27.
202
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Depth and Durability of U.S.-Philippine Relations
iy William McConnick Blair, Jr.
Ambassador to the Philippines ^
I am profoundly grateful for Rotary's invi-
tation to be your guest speaker on Philippine-
American Friendship Day.
There are those who question the so-called
special relations between our two countries, but
the indisputable fact is that our relationship
has been a long one and, for both of us, a
imiquely close and deep one. The intimacy of
our association for almost 70 years means that
our relations must be special, even though the
specific content of those special relations is con-
tinuously changing. You would like to see the
relationship changed in particular ways. So
would we.
At times there are those who wish to see those
emotional elements eliminated. This is impos-
sible. You cannot make the Bataan march to-
gether and not have a highly emotional content
to certain aspects of these relations. They range
over an extensive area of mutual interest and
today are particularly significant because the
ideals of human freedom and the objective of
human progress shared by both nations are
being tested not far from here. The free peoples
of Asia are locked in mortal conflict with the
forces of a Communist tyranny which seeks to
expand its totalitarian empire through ideologi-
cal subversion and military force.
Let us not forget that the United States is a
Pacific power and that it has an enormous stake
in the outcome of Asia's struggle against tyr-
anny. It also has a stake in the drive which ani-
mates Asia's people to strive for a brighter
future.
The United States looks out westward to Asia
from its Pacific coast, and within embattled
Asia there is no people whom we know as well
or who understand us as well as the people of
the Philippines. Thus, in this moment of history
when events in Asia are so crucial and critical
and when the United States' involvement is so
great, the condition of the relationship of the
Philippines and the United States is indeed im-
portant and significant to both nations.
I think that the state of our relationship is
good — on the whole, very good.
Periodically during the course of the Philip-
pine-American relationship, public forums and
public media have resounded with the clash of
polemics, with the expression of grievances.
Some of these grievances have been honestly
felt and honestly uttered. Some have been simu-
lated, with no particularly sinister end in mind.
All too many have been stimulated for a variety
of reasons, none of them intended to benefit
either nation.
Significantly, however, throughout these pub-
lic storms, qualified and dedicated public serv-
ants of both Governments have continued their
quiet work at conference tables, evolving mu-
tual programs, advancmg mutual projects, mov-
ing steadily forward toward mutually sought
goals — all unfiurried, never distracted from
their constructive common effort. This, to me,
best illustrates the depth and durability of our
special relations.
Through our joint efforts a number of issues
have been resolved in the past 3 years or are well
on the way toward mutually satisfactory
resolution.
We have reached agreement on the question
of criminal jurisdiction with respect to inci-
dents involving United States military person-
nel in the Philippines.^ There are bound to be
' Address made before the Rotary Club of Manila on
June 29.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5851 ;
for a Department announcement of the agreement, see
Bttlletin of Aug. 30, 1965, p. 358.
AUGUST 14, 1967
203
incidents when, for example, we have, as we do,
at Clark Field a family of 60,000 people, in-
cluding American servicemen, their dependents,
and our Filipino friends and coworkers — 25,000
at Subic, 5,000 at Sangley, and over 2,000 at
Mactan. But I submit that these incidents have
been relatively few and far between.
We have entered into agreements relinquish-
ing some of the base lands which are no longer
needed for military purposes by United States
forces : 25,000 acres at Clark Field ^ and one-
fourth of Camp Jolin Haj'.*
The Rusk-Eamos Agreement, signed in Wash-
ington last September, reduced the term of the
United States use of the bases here in the Philip-
pines to a period of 25 years.'*
We recently have taken action on veterans
benefits and claims." Since last December almost
all eligible Filipino veterans and their depend-
ents have been receiving almost twice as much
money in their monthly benefit checks.
We have just completed two agreements in-
volving almost $16 million for the implementa-
tion of projects under the $28 million Special
Fund for Education and are hard at work on
the remaining project proposals.'
The United States is increasing its military
and economic assistance to the Philippines. This
assistance has included such notable items as
high-speed boats to help in the antismuggling
campaign, new modern aircraft for the Philip-
pine Air Force, the turnover a few days ago of
engineering equipment for the Engineering
Construction Battalions, and an increasing par-
ticipation by AID in the very encouraging pro-
gram which is now going forward in the
Philippines in the field of rural development
and increased agricultural productivity.
In enumerating these instances of our re-
sponse to your requests for assistance or of our
cooperation in ventures of mutual interest, it
definitely is not my purpose to brag of our gen-
erosity or solicit your gratitude. It is rather to
illustrate the scope and diversity of concrete and
tangible cooperation characteristic of the spe-
cial relationship some are inclined to dismiss as
a euphemism.
' TIAS 5924.
• TIAS 6180.
" TIAS 6084 ; for text, see Bulletin of Oct. 10, 1966,
p. 548.
" For background, see iliid., Oct. 31, 1966, p. 684.
' For background, see ibid., June 5, 1967, p. 850.
It might also be useful and pertinent at this
point to reaffirm the basic philosophy of our
various aid programs as stated by our highest
ranking Government officials over the years, as
well as by my predecessors and myself. We do
not regard aid, whether grant or loan, as a gift
or reward or token of esteem. If the American
foreign aid program laimched after World
War II is noted by historians as an imprec-
edented multibillion-dollar humanitarian ex-
periment in international relations, we take
pride in that judgment.
But our own view of aid is that of a practical
investment in developing the kind of world in
which we prefer to live, the kind of world in
which we are likely to flourish — a world of
peace and freedom devoted to the well-being
of man and to the protection of his individual
right to realize to the fullest his human poten-
tial as a creature of God. We are investing in
the world's economic growth and political sta-
bility, in its education and public health, to
make of it a community in which our own peo-
ple, as well as all others, can find happiness and
security.
As a practical investment, therefore, it is
clear that our aid programs are guided by prac-
tical criteria. First, we welcome and enlist the
participation of all other nations whose re-
sources peimit. Second, as sound investment
practice dictates, we direct the flow of our aid
investment to those areas where it can be
promptly and efficiently made jDroductive in re-
alizing the larger objectives or where it is
needed urgently to protect an endangered exist-
ing investment.
Common U.S.— Philippine Interests
There is more to be done here in the Philip-
pines and more changes to come. The period
ahead will not be an easy one. Our negotiations
on bilateral issues will, of course, be carried out
against the background of conflict and confla-
gration in Southeast Asia. And these negotia-
tions coming up in the near future are impor-
tant and complex. There will be those who will
attribute unworthy motives, and there will be
those who will seek to distort and demean the
efforts we both are making.
But I think the record of the past augurs well
for the future, when we will be entering into
negotiations on such comprehensive matters as
the regulation of our trade and investment re-
lationships after the expiration of the Laurel-
204
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Langley Agreement ^ in 1974. And negotiations
will be continuing on various matters pertain-
ing to the U.S. military bases in order to insure
that our agreements concerning these bases are
kept up to date and in tune with the times.
It is, I suppose, customary in talking of Phil-
ippine-American relations to concern oneself
primarily with the bilateral aspects of those re-
lations. But there are other perspectives one
should examine if we are to appreciate the full
dimensions of the interrelationships between
our two countries.
The United States looks out over the Pacific
area from roughly 120° west longitude, while
the Philippines views the Pacific from roughly
120° east longitude. Both have vital interests in
what transpires in the vast rim of the Pacific
and in the area which it encompasses. Both have
crucial roles to play in that enormous area, and
both have vital national objectives to achieve
there.
Our interests interlock at many points, and
there are also many points at which they do
not even touch ; but there is no point, of which
I am aware, at which our vital interests are in
conflict. I can see no prospect of conflicting in-
terests as the Philippines moves out, as it has
been doing in the past few years, to take an in-
creasingly important role in this Asian scene.
Nor can there be any conflict of interest emerg-
ing from the future growth of the Philippine
economy and national strength.
President Johnson himself most eloquently
and precisely stated U.S. policy in Asia while
he was en route to the Manila Summit Confer-
ence. He said : ^
America can help. We must help. We are now help-
ing. But we see our role as helping, and not imposing
our will on Asia. . . .
Asia will provide its own leadership. ... we shall
cooperate with that leadership. . . . our role is that of
a neighbor among equals — a partner in the great adven-
ture of bringing peace, order, and progress to a part of
the world where much more than half of the entire
human race lives.
As long as danger threatens, our strength sliall back
our commitments in Asia. Yet we seek no special status
or privileges, no primacy, no territory, no base rights
in perpetuity.
If it can be said, as I assert here confidently
today, that there is a fundamental harmony
• TIAS 3348 ; for background and text, see Bulletin
of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 463.
' For President Johnson's address at Honolulu,
Hawaii, on Oct. 17, 1966, see ibid., Nov. 28, 1966, p. 812.
in Philippine and American foreign policy ob-
jectives, it can also be said, and with much
greater force, that there is a fundamental desire
on the part of Americans to see Filipinos
achieve at home what they want for themselves
and for their children.
Achieving Philippine Aspirations
During the years that I have been in the
Philippines, I have spent a great deal of time
traveling in the country and had many, many
enjoyable and rewarding experiences. I have
visited every province in the Philippines — at
least I had until they split them up so fast that
I couldn't keep up. Someone said that the rea-
son I have traveled so much is because I like to
review troops and pretend I am governor
general.
The only reason I have traveled throughout
the Philippines has been to see the people of
this country — ^to get to know them and to learn
about their hopes and fears. I have come to
understand the concern of both President
[Diosdado] Macapagal and President [Ferdi-
nand E.] Marcos for the millions and millions
of people in this coimtry who have not yet
received the full blessings of liberty.
I know and you know that the average Fili-
pino today is not having an easy time. I know,
too, that your Government wants to improve
the well-being of the average Filipino; to
increase his productivity and the income he
receives for his labor ; to make available to him
the benefits of modern scientific agriculture and
industry; and to give him improved public
health services, irrigation systems, highways,
schools; land reform — in short, to give him
confidence and hope in the future.
People who are the severest critics of the
United States hold the view, if I interpret them
correctly, that this progress must be achieved
in accordance with Philippine aspirations and
Pliilippme directives and under Philippine
administration and control. And of course we
agree with that. If one thing is clear it is that
only the Filipinos can solve their problems. We
can help. We want to help — and we are help-
ing. But that is all we want to do. Certainly we
don't want to tell you how to conduct your
affairs. We know we couldn't even if we wanted
to, and in any event, we have enough problems
of our own.
And this, too, is an American view which has
been stated again and again and again by
AtTGTTST 14, 1967
205
American leaders. Assistant Secretary of State
William Bundy in January 1965 said : ^^
Our objectives are those of the free nations of the
area — that they should develop as they see fit, in peace
and without outside interference. We would hope that
this development will be in the direction of increas-
ingly democratic institutions and that there will be
continued and expanded ties of partnership and con-
tact with ourselves and with other nations of the free
world. Yet we know that Asia will develop as the
leaders and the peoples of Asia wish it to develop, and
we would not have it otherwise.
Dangers of Economic Nationalism
There is another illusion I would like to try
to lay to rest. None of us are against the devel-
opment of a strong nationalistic movement in
this coimtiy. On the contrary, we are fully con-
vinced that you can never effectively set about
the tasks of nation-building except in the spirit
of nationalism. Without a strong nationalism,
you cannot possibly hope for the development
of a civic consciousness that will bridge the gap
between individual or family interests and that
of the nation, nor can you hope to develop the
vital spirit of self-sacrifice which has been an
essential ingredient in the creation of every
great nation.
Wliat we do think is an error is to feel, as
some Filipinos have candidly stated, that until
you destroy our good name or good record in
this country you cannot create a valid national
identity of your own. I would argue that this is
seriously misleading and directs the attention
of the nation to complamts, self-pity, and
destructive criticism rather than to sacrifice
and self-reliance.
One of our major differences is in the eco-
nomic content of your nationalism, as expressed
by some of its interpreters. Again, I think we
should be frank with one another. It is your
right, of course, to set the terms on which
American business operates here ; you can even
exclude it altogether.
But you cannot go it alone, unless you are
prepared to accept a standard of living that no
one here has yet dared to suggest should be
tolerable. There are several other countries
which you may be able to interest in assisting
you, but I can assure you that if their intention
is not subversion, they will ask for the veiy same
assurances that American capital has sought.
'/Sid., Feb. 8, 1965, p. 168.
We are often told young Filipinos have no
recollection of the United States' role in World
War II or in the immediate postwar period;
that they have little recall of the colonial
period; and that the United States cannot coast
on its reputation. I agree, and we don't want to.
But I would remind my friends that there is
also a new generation of Americans, of Ameri-
can businessmen. The capital which they control
is not inexliaustible, and it will go where it is
welcome. They are looking now and investing
heavily in Australia, Taiwan, South Korea,
Thailand, and Malaysia. They will invest in a
larger measure here also if the climate is at-
tractive. Of course it is your prerogative to
determine when and under what conditions you
will invite foreign capital. It is equally the pre-
rogative of foreign capital to make its decision
on the basis of where it is welcome.
Americans recognize, one might say almost as
an article of faith, that if the Philippines are to
succeed in strengthening their nation and
securing tlie blessings of liberty for all their
{jeople — not just some — it can come about only
through the enlightened efforts of Filipino
patriots to do that themselves and that our role
is only to help.
Communist Threat to Freedom in Asia
The strength of America's belief in the gen-
eral proposition that Asian nations should be
free and independent and able to conduct their
own affairs in their own way is proven and
demonstrated in the blood of our sons who are
dying in Viet-Nam and in the treasure which
we expend there. About half a million American
young men are in Viet-Nam today and billions
of American taxpayers' money has been spent
in Viet-Nam — not because we want to control
that country but because we want it to be free
and because, by helping Viet-Nam retain its
freedom, we are helping to guarantee the free-
dom of other countries in Asia and to defeat the
Communist tyranny which threatens that free-
dom. And I know that it is because the Philip-
pines believes in the same things that you
Filipinos have sent your PHILCAG [Philip-
pine Civic Action Group] contingent to Viet-
Nam.
Wliy does America evince this passion for the
freedom of other nations — nations across the
vast expanse of the Pacific from the United
States itself? It is because we believe that our
206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
own American way of life can thrive and pros-
per best in the environment of a world of free
nations, also aspiring to a world in which the
rights of the individual will be safeguarded and
his opportunities to develop his own full
potential will be cherished and enhanced.
It has been said that Americans have an obses-
sive fear of communism, that we are too preoc-
cupied with communism as an enemy. This view
is not supported by the record of our free dis-
cussion and examination of commimism, both
as theory and in practice, and it misses the point
in identifying the enemy we are committed to
fight. We do not like communism as a philo-
sophy of social organization any more than we
liked fascism or nazism, because it degrades
the individual to a material equation, his rights
and needs subordinate to an all-powerful state.
We reject conunimism because it has failed
miserably by comparison with free societies in
furthering the well-being of its citizens. In the
free mai'ket of ideas and under honest scrutiny
of its practice to date, we have no doubt that it
will be rejected in favor of an open society of
free men.
Wliat we are committed to fight against in our
own defense and in defense of our friends is the
Communist conspiracy, the conspiracy which
Communists themselves consider too evil and
treacherous to advance under their own banner.
We are conunitted to fight a Communist export,
the professional wrecking crews, the saboteurs
and manipulators who take on whatever guise
and whatever cause affords them invisibility
while they pursue their systematic weakening
and destruction of the very free institutions that
harbor them. We are committed to fight the pro-
fessional sowers of fear and distrust, of chaos
and unrest, those who goad free men to despera-
tion only to drive them into the arms of a coldly
materialist tyranny unprecedented in the his-
tory of despotic rule.
But what America is for is much more im-
portant than what America is against.
What we Americans have inherited from our
forefathers is the uniting strength of fidelity to
an idea. We were bom dedicated to the proposi-
tion that man must be free and our greatest
leaders — the Washingtons, the .Teffersons, the
Lincolns, the Roosevelts — were not great be-
cause they acheived purely American purposes
but because they were able to speak for humanity
at large and extend their vision to the whole
family of man.
This is the vision which finds the United
States pouring out its treasure in an effort to
help other people throughout the world. This is
the vision which finds our yoimg men fighting
and dying in Viet-Nam.
And this is the vision which I hope in the
years ahead wUl find the Philippines and the
United States working together and sacrificing
together in a joint effort to achieve a world free
from war and imtroubled by hunger or fear.
International Volunteer Service
Granted Organization Immunities
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Designating the International Secretariat for
Volunteer Service as a Pctblic International
Organization Entitled To Enjot Certain Privi-
leges, Exemptions, and Immunities
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1
of the International Organizations Immunities Act (59
Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), and having found that the
United States participates in the International Secre-
tariat for Volunteer Service under the authority of sec-
tion 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2221), section 628 of the Act of
September 4, 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2388), and section 14 of
the Act of September 22, 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2513), I here-
by designate the International Secretariat for Volun-
teer Service as a public international organization
entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and
immunities provided by the International Organiza-
tions Immunities Act.
The White House,
July 20, 1967.
' No. 11363 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 10779.
AFGUST 14, 19G7
271-549—67-
207
THE CONGRESS
The Foreign Assistance Program
Statement iy Secretary Rush '■
Thank you for the opportunity of appearing
before you in support of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1967 and the President's economic and
military assistance programs for fiscal year
1968.2
The President originally requested a total of
$2.53 billion in new appropriations to carry out
the AID program in economic assistance for
fiscal year 1968. In addition, as you know, he
has requested $100 million more for the Alli-
ance for Progress in connection with the recent
Organization of American States Summit
Conference. This brings the total request for
economic assistance funds to $2.63 billion. How-
ever, the $100 million was already included in
the President's general budget.
The President is also requesting $596 million
in new appropriations for military assistance.
This request excludes requirements for Laos,
Thailand, NATO infrastructure and inter-
national military headquarters, because the
President has proposed that these be trans-
ferred to the regular Defense Department
budget. I fully support this transfer. To insure
that these programs are consistent with our
overall political and economic interests, the De-
partment of State, by mutual agreement with
Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara,
will continue to coordinate them.
Mr. Chairman, this is the seventh formal
presentation which I have made to this com-
mittee on economic assistance. Over the past
' Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee on July 14. The complete hearings will be published
by the committee.
* For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on foreign aid, see Btjlletin of Mar. 6, 1967,
p. 378.
20 years five Secretaries of State serving four
Presidents have made broadly similar presen-
tations. The policy considerations have been
broadly similar, under Democratic or Repub-
lican Presidents or with Democratic or Re-
publican majorities in the Congress. There has
been one major shift in emphasis during the
past 20 years. At the begiiuiing there was strong
emphasis upon rebuilding the advanced but
war-torn economies of Western Europe and
Japan. This part of the task was completed and
these nations are now contributors to the rest
of the world's need for external resources. Dur-
ing the past decade, the weight of attention has
shifted to the less developed countries.
There are many ways in which one could
illustrate the frightening gap in productivity
between the economically advanced countries
and the less developed countries. One would be
to recall that 29 percent of the world's popu-
lation has 83 ijerccnt of the world's gross
national product, for an average per capita
income of just under $1,800: 71 percent of the
world's population has 17 percent of the world's
gross national product, a per capita income of
roughly $154. The prospect is that this gap will
continue to widen unless productivity in the
developing countries can be sharply stimulated.
Our experience in our own country suggests
that where there is a great disparity of income
the gap cannot be effectively reduced by redis-
tribution or by some general leveling off, but
by increasing the earnings and productivity of
the vast numbers at the lower end of the scale.
I suggest that the same is true internationally.
External resources available to the developing
countries are likely to be only a tiny fraction
of their own gross national product. External
resources can fill certain crucial gaps and can
208
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXETIN
energize national economies but cannot be a
substitute for local production, enterprise, and
modernization.
It is quite obvious that the less developed
countries liold in their own hands the keys to
their own economic future. It is their efforts —
not ours or those of other donor countries — that
will open the doors to better lives for their peo-
ples. That is why we and the multilateral in-
stitutions with whicli we work insist on self-
help. This is not only because it is important
that the taxpayer's dollar yield a dollar's worth
of return but because without self-help develop-
ment is not possible.
To put this problem in another framework,
let us recall the astonishing economic growth
and capability of the United States. Our gross
national product equals that of all the rest of
NATO and Japan combined; it is twice that of
the Soviet Union, with the gap continuing to
widen; it is 10 times that of mainland China
with its 700 million people ; it is 10 times that of
all Latin America. Economic assistance requests
for fiscal year 1968, including the Peace Corps,
Public Law 480, and contributions to the In-
ternational Development Association and the
Inter- American Development Bank, total about
six-tenths of 1 percent of our gross national
product. We must be very careful, it seems to
me, that we not through neglect or indifference
about the rest of the world find ourselves in the
position of a voracious nation calling upon
everyone else to feed our own economy in order
to widen the gap between us and our fellow
human beings. We cannot accept so stark a con-
trast between the future we wovild ask for our-
selves and the future to which others can aspire.
If we are not to become isolated by the choice
of others, we must make it clear that we are
prepared to engage in their problems, help to
share their burdens, and be a good-citizen na-
tion in the community of nations.
There have been substantial adjustments in
the AID program to lessen our halance-of-'pay-
ments problems. In fiscal year 1959 only 40 per-
cent of AID funds were spent for U.S. goods
and services. In fiscal year 1968 it is estimated
that 87 percent of AID expenditures will be
for U.S. goods and servnces and that the net
adverse impact of the program on our balance
of payments will be about $107 million. The
United States must continue to watch carefully
its balance of payments. That is why the AID
program today transfers mainly U.S. skills and
commodities — not U.S. dollars — to the less de-
veloped countries.
Governmental actions are important, but
without private sector support the job cannot
be done. That is why the AID program works
both with and through U.S. business and other
private organizations in helping to build strong
private sectors in the developing countries.
We cannot do everything everywhere. The
task is too big. That is why we concentrate our
programs in a few key countries and on a few
key problems — education, health, and most im-
portant, the war on hunger. Food production
and family planning are of prime importance
if development is to improve standards of liv-
ing. I wish to express my appreciation, Mr.
Chairman, to you and this committee for your
strong interest in the population problem.
Multilateral Coordination
The United States is not the only advanced
country which recognizes its stake in develop-
ment. Other developed nations now have strong
aid programs. It is to our advantage to coordi-
nate our programs with theirs. Multilateral co-
ordination under the leadership of such institu-
tions as the World Bank leads not only to more
effective aid programs but also to increased sup-
port from other donor nations. That is why we
prefer to provide most of our development loans
in a multilateral framework. Under the pro-
posed fiscal year 1968 programs, more than 85
percent of the development loan program would
be provided in a multilateral framework.
Cooperation among the less developed coun-
tries themselves can lead to faster progress.
Many of them face the same challenges; by
pooling resources and energies they will be bet-
ter able to meet these challenges. That is why
the United States actively encourages and sup-
ports regional ejforts, and that is why develop-
ing countries in several areas of the world have
been taking new initiatives in regional coopera-
tion. We are hopeful that this trend will gain
momentum in the next few years.
The AID programs are, of course, only one
part of the U.S. effort to help less developed
countries. Equally important is the strong sup-
port that the LTnited States lias given and will
continue to give to multilateral institutions.
Actions this year by the United States include :
—the request by the President for congres-
sional authorization of a $900 million replenish-
ATJGITST 14, 1967
209
ment for the Inter-American Development
Bank's Fund for Special Operations;
— the U.S. proposal for a substantial increase
in resources for the International Development
Association; and
— the statements by the President in the for-
eign aid message supporting special funds for
the Asian and African Development Banks.
The various multilateral institutions are
playing an increasingly important role in the
development process, both as coordinators of
aid and as direct lenders. From 1961 to 1966
their commitments increased from $1.2 billion
to $2.2 billion.
Both the AID programs and those of the
multilateral agencies are important to our na-
tional interest. We knovf that time is short, and
we must use it to our best advantage. If we
have inadequate aid programs, if progress in
most developing countries is not visible and
continuous, we shall be living in a less stable
world.
Our policy, including our aid programs, can-
not guarantee stability and progress in the less
developed world. Other factors — within and
outside of the developing countries — have a
large impact on events, as was illustrated by
the recent violence in the Middle East.
Situation in the Middle East
Several weeks ago, the President offered a
constructive approach for moving toward a
permanent settlement of the problems in the
Middle East.^ His approach included five
points :
— first, the recognized right of national life ;
— second, justice for the refugees;
— third, innocent maritime passage;
— fourth, limits on the wasteful and destruc-
tive arms race; and
— fifth, political independence and territorial
integrity for all.
We are hopeful that reason will prevail and
that the countries in the Middle East, with help
from economically advanced countries, will
concentrate their energies on building a better
life for their peoples.
In the meantime we have suspended planned
assistance programs in the Middle East coun-
tries which have broken diplomatic relations
with the United States, except for certain food
programs for humanitarian purposes. AID and
other economic assistance to Tunisia and Mo-
rocco and other economic aid to Israel and
Lebanon is continuing. In Jordan, activities are
being resumed as the situation permits, and
more funds than originally proposed may be
needed to help restore the economy and provide
opportunities for refugees. In addition, $5 mil-
lion is being made available, in accordance with
the President's recent annoimcement,* to pro-
vide, through UNRWA [United Nations Relief
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East], the International Committee
of the Red Cross, and other agencies, for the
immediate needs of the refugees.
In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the de-
veloping world, there should be no higher
priority than building economic and social
strength. There is increasing evidence that
most developing countries are accepting this
challenge.
The Alliance for Progress
In Latin America the Alliance for Progress,
now 6 years old, is in some ways a touchstone
of our efforts in the less developed areas of the
world. The Alliance is taking hold. Most Latin
American nations are making healthy strides
toward stability and future self-sufficiency. In
all but a few, governments are now working to
meet the needs of all the people. Much has been
done to improve tax structures and tax admin-
istration, to fight inflation, and to strengthen
institutions required for more productive pri-
vate enterprise. A start has been made to expand
educational and health facilities, and a number
of countries have instituted far-ranging agri-
cultural and land reforms. Of course, much
remains to be done.
We know the perils to our own security of
economic or political instability and social in-
justice in Latin America. While the Castro
regime in Cuba has made a mockery of the
aspirations of the Cuban people, it continues
to be a reminder of the urgency of our common
tasks in Latin America. Castro-supported sub-
version and insurgency have been quashed in
a number of countries. But recent outbreaks in
Venezuela and Bolivia indicate a continuing
' For text of President Johnson's address at Wash-
ington, D.C., on June 19, see ibid., July 10, 19G7, p. 31.
* Ibid., July 17, 1967, p. 64.
210
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
potential for disorder and violence, which
■warns against apathy. In the Dominican Re-
public we are working now to help repair a
legacy of injustice and violence.
The recent Summit Conference in Uruguay "
expressed an understanding of the tasks ahead,
not only reaffirming the basic tenets of the Alli-
ance for Progress but placing new emphasis on
accelerated progress in the vital areas of agri-
culture, health, education, and science. It also
made an historic decision to undertake the
economic integration of the countries of Latin
America.
Long before the Summit, President Johnson
said,''
We are ready ... to work in close cooperation toward
an integrated Latin America. ... To my fellow Presi-
dents, I pledge : Move boldly along this path and the
United States will be at your side.
At long last, there is a concrete commitment
to create a Latin American common market. A
tinaetable and technical procedures for moving
ahead have been agreed upon.
I am confident that the discussions at the
Summit will lead to a greatly increased number
of regional development projects in Latin
America. "With the cooperation of the Inter-
American Development Bank, we will support
promising initiatives. The future of Latin
America depends to a considerable degree on the
growth of effective multinational projects —
transportation and communications links, edu-
cational and training centers, joint industrial
ventures, and river basin development projects.
Last year the Congress, on the initiative of
this committee, enacted the "CIAP [Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for Prog-
ress] amendment," requiring that Alliance
loans be made only for projects and programs
that are consistent with the findings and recom-
mendations of CIAP in its annual i-eview of
national development activities. I am pleased
to report that this has been a very helpful
amendment in a number of ways and that we
and the Latin Americans look forward to
CIAP's playing an increasingly important role
in the Alliance.
A number of Latin American countries are
particularly well placed to influence favorably
^ For background, see ihid., May 8, 1967, p. 706.
" For an address by President Johnson at Washing-
ton, D.C., on Aug. 17, 1966, see ibid., Sept. 5, 1966, p.
330.
the future course of the Alliance. Brazil, for ex-
ample, is so large that its performance strongly
influences events in the rest of the hemisphere.
Some countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela,
are now in a position to help their neighbors to
speed their development. The Central American
countries are setting the pace in economic
integration.
Our largest program in Latin America is for
Brazil. Its landmass is larger than the conti-
nental United States, and its people comprise
one-half of all South Americans. A healthy
Brazil is essential to a prospering Alliance. In
the last 3 years, efforts to stabilize Brazil's
economy and curb the inflation which had dis-
torted national life for many years have
achieved an encouraging measure of success.
The annual rate of inflation has dropped from
a peak of 140 percent in early 1964 to the current
level of about 25-30 percent. Our large fiscal
year 1968 AID program will help a new govern-
ment to sustain improvements in agriculture,
housing, and health, while stemming continuous
inflationary pressures.
Near East and South Asia
The countries of the Near East and South
Asia are more distant but hardly less important
than those in Latin America to the establish-
ment of a reliable and durable peace. For this
reason, I regard economic assistance to these
countries as a vital necessity.
We are pleased that the three major aid re-
cipients there — India, Pakistan, and Turkey —
have increasingly turned their great talents to
the domestic challenges of modernization. These
three countries will get about 90 percent of fiscal
year 1968 development assistance planned for
this region.
Excepting only Viet-Nam, the India program
is our largest economic aid program, although
we provide less than half of India's external
aid. Members of the Consortium for India have
pledged more than $6 billion for the third
5-year plan and the first year of the fourth plan.
Our share has been 42 percent.
Indian development efforts are sharply fo-
cused on the food and population problem.
More than 40 percent of the proposed AID
funds will be used to help India improve food
output. The Indian Government plans to dou-
ble its outlays for agriculture over the next 5
AUGUST 14, 1967
211
years and to quadruple spending for family
planning programs. During the past year, it has
increased fertilizer purchases 85 percent, initi-
ated crash programs in farm land development,
and enlarged the supply of improved seeds and
pesticides. I think it is imperative that we
continue to give India the backing it requires
in its days of difficulty.
We hope that India and Pakistan can find
a way to achieve genuine cooperation in the
subcontinent. Such cooperation would produce
a fonnidable bulwark for the free world.
Pakistan is well on its way to realizing its
potentials. Its economic performance has been
very good. Our planned program for Pakistan
is also one of our largest, although again our
assistance is part of a consortium led by the
World Bank and is more than matched by
others.
The strategic importance of Turkey has been
obvious for generations, poised as it is on the
flanks of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
and the Near East. Our large but declining
level of economic assistance there is designed
to facilitate the Turkish Government's goal of
self-sustaining growth by 1973. Turkey's per-
formance has been impressive. For example, in
1966 its GNP increased by more than 8 percent,
its agricultural production by 11 percent, and
its foreign exchange earnings by more than 15
percent.
India, Pakistan, and Turkey are slated to
receive, among them, $665 million of fiscal year
1966 development loan funds. This is nearly
four-fifths of the total proposed development
loan program. Obviously, then, a reduction in
available fimds would affect primarily the rate
of development in these three countries. Be-
cause the future of each of these countries is
so important, I hope and strongly recommend
that the Congress make available our full de-
velopment loan request.
New Aid Policy for Africa
Our sympathies run deep for African aspira-
tions for their new nations. We fully realize
the importance of Africa in our contemporary
world. Its landmass is more than three times
our own, and it holds 300 million people. It is
rich in natural resources important to the entire
world.
There continues to be political instability in
Africa. Some 35 countries are experiencing the
growing pains of new independence. In these
formative years help from us and others can
be important in determining the type of soci-
eties that will develop in Africa and the role
they will play in world affairs.
While we give close attention to African de-
velopments, other advanced nations, mainly
Great Britain and France, with long historical
relations with Africa, have provided the most
assistance, along with mternational institutions.
For a number of years AID's African program
has been less than $200 million a year. Other
U.S. programs, such as Food for Freedom and
the Peace Corps, bring our total share to about
25 percent of annual free-world assistance to
Africa.
We have tried to make our aid in Africa more
effective and efficient. In the last year, we have
reexamined our approach and have recast our
AID policies and programs in Africa along
lines which will emphasize regional projects
and multilateral participation and will reduce
the number of African countries with bilateral
AID progi-ams. The details of this policy are
set forth in the summary presentation volume
that has been submitted to this committee. In
brief, AID had regular bilateral assistance pro-
grams in 34 countries in Africa in fiscal year
1967. The new policy calls for AID to continue
bilateral programs — coordinated in most cases
with other donors — in 10 African countries:
Tunisia. Morocco, Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, the
three countries of East Africa (Kenya, Tan-
zania, and Uganda), Nigeria, and the Sudan.
However, the program for Nigeria is under
continuous review because of internal difficul-
ties in that country, and the program in Sudan
is suspended pending review of our relations.
In other African countries, as existing activities
are completed over the next few years, AID
expects to sliift most assistance to regional and
multilateral projects and reduce the number of
bilateral programs substantially. An indispen-
sable part of this policy will be our continued
use of a modest self-help fund in each country
for short-term, high-impact projects.
This new aid policy should prove effective in
serving both our interests and the development
needs of the Africans. If adjustments in the
policy prove necessary, we will make them. The
Africans themselves recognize the need for
multinational efforts to overcome the limitations
of natural resources and boundaries. Nowhere
is the idea of regional cooperation more relevant
for achieving the commonly shared goal of a
better future. We are encouraged by the prog-
ress initiated by the Africans in instituting the
African Development Bank, which was con-
212
DEPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ceived and organized and is capitalized entirely
by Africans. We and other donors plan to pro-
vide help to a new special fund of the Bank.
Kegional development schemes should receive
in fiscal year 1968 twice the funds from AH)
that they received in fiscal year 1966. These in-
clude projects for agricultural production, dis-
ease control, regional training, and education.
The reduction of bilateral country programs
in Africa must be gradual to avoid the waste
involved in stopping teclonical assistance proj-
ects that are only partially completed and in
not going ahead with development loans that
have reached an advanced stage of joint plan-
ning. For these and other important reasons,
I do not think it is wise to impose arbitrary
ceilings on the number of countries eligible for
aid and I hope that the limitations put in the
Foreign Assistance Act last year will be re-
moved by the Congress.
Primarily because of the new Africa policy,
there is a considerable reduction proposed in the
number of regular AID bilateral programs. We
made development loans to 24 countries in fiscal
year 1967 — five fewer than we had planned
earlier in the fiscal year. We do not expect to
make new development loans to more than 22
countries in fiscal year 1968, and the number
should drop to 20 in fiscal year 1969 — the 10
countries in Africa where we will continue reg-
ular AID programs and 10 countries outside
of Africa. For teclinical assistance, aside from
the small self-help funds, our fiscal year 1968
program as presented to the Congress includes
42 countries, although that number will be re-
duced as a result of the Middle East situation.
After fiscal year 1968, the number will be below
40. At this time we propose supporting assist-
ance programs for only nine countries in fiscal
year 1968. About 90 percent of the supporting
assistance program is for East Asia.
Progress in Viet-Nam
In East Asia, Viet-Nam and her Southeast
Asian neighbors are a crucial battleground in
the struggle for world order. As I have said
before, our economic assistance programs, while
smaller in scale, are as important as our mili-
tary efforts in the achievement of our objectives.
For fiscal year 1968 we plan to use $550 million
in AID funds for Viet-Nam. These funds will
serve four vital purposes.
— First, in a most literal sense, they will sup-
port the drive to build a viable nation, piece
by piece, area by area, in which all the South
Vietnamese may identify themselves with na-
tional purposes and national programs to
achieve security and order. Our aid helps with
the task of reconstruction and development for
the future and helps to sustain the morale of
the South Vietnamese today.
— Second, another sizable portion of our
funds wiU help maintain economic stability in
the midst of the war. The commercial import
program which we finance has dampened dan-
gerous inflationary pressures.
— Third, we conduct programs to relieve war-
time suffering and dislocation. AID personnel
and our military forces work in close partner-
ship to cope directly with the human and mate-
rial destruction of war.
— Fourth, we are building for the future, with
a growing program of long-term development
in electrical power, transportation, agriculture,
medicine, and other fields.
The conditions under which we conduct our
economic assistance are obviously difficult. In
1965, rapidly increasing military expenditures
threatened the South Vietnamese economy with
crippling inflation which might well have
undercut the military effort. Rather than risk
this threat, we decided to expand quickly and
sizably the AID commercial import program.
We made this necessary decision knowing full
well that for a while there would be some theft
and diversion and that we would encounter
enormous problems stemming from logistics
limitations. AID simply did not have a large
enough staff, at the time ; there were not enough
end-use inspectors or auditors, and it would take
time to get them out to Viet-Nam ; port facili-
ties, storage and transportation facilities, and so
on, were at that time inadequate to the expan-
sion of the import program. We knew all that
and went ahead anyway because the only alter-
native was to risk the real threat of ruinous
inflation.
Thefts and diversions of goods, corruption,
and other serious dislocations are inevitable in
some measure imder wartime conditions. But we
have made important progress over the last
year, and particularly the last 6 months, in over-
coming these difficvilties. We have placed certain
U.S. military personnel in operational control of
handling commodities in transit between port
and warehouse; the AID Mission has doubled
its audit staff; it has instituted an automated
accounting system, sent a U.S. Bureau of Cus-
toms team to assist the Viet-Nam Customs Office,
and much more. We are keeping a close watch on
AUGUST 14, 19G7
213
all aspects of the aid program, and we are en-
couraged by the rapidly growing effectiveness
of the necessary controls.
New Vitality in East Asia
I believe that we are already witnessing the
dividends of our stand in Viet-Nam. A few
years ago, it was assumed by many in Southeast
Asia and the Western Pacific that mainland
China was the wave of the future. Now through-
out all the free nations of East Asia, we sense a
new vitality and confidence. Most of them are
making impressive economic progress. They are
also working together more and more effectively.
Nowhere is the momentum of regional co-
operation more evident than in East Asia and
the Western Pacific. The Asian Development
Bank is now established and in business. De-
velopment of the INIekong Valley is proceeding
despite the war. Throughout East Asia and the
Western Pacific a variety of regional associa-
tions are taking root, all founded on a common
interest to foster development in a climate of
peace. Cooperative arrangements in education,
agriculture, transportation, and communica-
tions are coming into existence rapidly.
In Thailand and Laos, it is necessary to con-
duct substantial economic aid programs to
thwart increased Communist subversion and
insurgency. Other nations are helping. We ex-
pect that requirements for more conventional
types of development assistance to Thailand
over the next several years will be met by a
combination of governments and international
institutions.
Korea is now growing at an average annual
rate of 8 percent and may well repeat the grati-
fying economic and social successes achieved in
Taiwan. Both nations show what can be accom-
plished in a relatively few years. Dean Jacoby
in his newly published study on Taiwan de-
velopment ' has concluded that, while vigorous
self-help efforts were the key to success, it would
nonetheless have taken Taiwan as much as 40
years to achieve self-supporting growth, not 15,
without substantial American assistance.
Indonesia, under General Suharto, has made
a clean break with the bankrupt policies of the
Sukarno regime and has embarked on a coura-
' TJ. 8. Aid to Taiwan: a Study of Foreign Aid, Sclf-
Eelp, and Development by Neil H. Jacoby (F. A. Prae-
ger, New York, 1967).
geous program to restore the country to political
and economic health. In December 1966 we
agreed with other creditor countries to re-
schedule Indonesia's overwhelming debt bur-
den. In Amsterdam in February of this year we
undertook to provide one-third of a multina-
tional program to meet Indonesia's foreign as-
sistance needs for the current calendar year. In
the fall we will be meeting again with the same
group of countries to consider Indonesia's needs
for 1968. Indonesia, with the assistance of the
IMF [International Monetary Fund], is help-
ing itself by pursuing a vigorous stabilization
policy which encourages private initiative and
foreign investment and places reliance on mar-
ket forces to determine the allocation of re-
sources. Indonesia can make a major contribu-
tion to free-world economic and political
strength in the emerging new Asia, and we wish
to continue to play a part in the multilateral as-
sistance effort by providing our full share of the
continuing and probably increasing amounts of
foreign aid needed by this major Asian nation.
Military Assistance Program
Let me now turn to the military assistance
request, which is $596 million for fiscal year
1968. Secretary McNamara will meet w-ith you
to discuss this program in greater detail.
For two decades now we have suT^ported the
ability of free nations adjacent to the Soviet
Union or Communist China to defend against
external military threats. This free-world
strength has been indispensable in keeping the
peace. Over tliree-quarters of this year's pro-
gram is needed to continue our investment in
this proven form of insurance. Nothing has yet
happened to let us reduce our side of the bal-
ance of power. Indeed, the proposed programs
are the minimum essential to maintain the de-
fense posture of these allies.
The second major foreign policy function of
the program is to help selected developing na-
tions protect themselves against internal vio-
lence and thereby provide the stability that is
essential to development. A related purpose is
to help some of the developing nations which
are faced with relatively small but important
defense expenditures from having to divert re-
sources urgently needed for development. Our
programs for our own Western Hemisphere,
as it continues its struggle against Castro-
exported insurgency and terrorism and as it
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
seeks to move more quickly toward human prog-
ress, reflect our efforts to meet these joressures
throughout the world.
Through these programs we support not only
freedom and progress but also try to foster
political stability within the various i-egions
of the world. This program is tailored to help
discourage arms races and to try to stabilize
regional arms balances, and to keep the military
exi^enditures of ourselves and of our friends to
the minimum necessary.
The nature and scale of the needs we help
to fill are not within our sole control. The mod-
erate and progressive governments which seek
to follow peaceful courses in their relations with
their neighbors have to be able to protect them-
selves from expansionist or subversive threats
that all too often confront them, frequently
with Communist support.
At the opening meeting of the Geneva dis-
armament conference in 10G2, 1 mj-self outlined
the fact that disarmanent is not just a question
between the Soviet Union and the United States
but is a problem for the lesser neighborhood
arms races in various parts of the world.* I
urged that Geneva conference to give serious
attention to these unnecessary and expensive
arms races in otlier parts of the world which
divert resources from economic and social de-
velopment. Quite frankly, we have been dis-
appointed that more progress has not been made
in this direction. TVe are intensely interested,
at this moment, in the arms race in the Middle
East. President Jolmson has pressed very hard
both publicly and privately for understandings
among arms suppliers and arms recipients for
prudence in the levels of arms which have cre-
ated so much tension in that area. We shall
continue to work on this, both in the United
Nations and in our bilateral contacts with the
governments concerned.
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 15,
1962, see ibid., Apr. 2, 1962, p. 531.
In conclusion, Sir. Chairman, I would urge
that we consider these requests for economic
and military assistance in the framework of the
kind of world in which this nation wishes to
live. Those who would like to forget the rest
of the world must face the fact that there is
no place to hide. Isolation may be a nostalgic
sentiment — it has no reality in the modern
world. There may be some who are growing
weary — but we must never weary of trying to
build a durable peace in a world in which frail
human beings can literally destroy themselves.
There may be some who think we cannot afford
0.6 percent of our gross national product to
help shape a world in which our democratic
institutions can survive and flourish. I do not
accept this. This nation cannot quit; it cannot
afford to let the world situation be determined
by others while we abandon the field. Wliether
we reflect upon past experience or upon our
hopes for the future, a responsible effort on our
part is demanded. We should consult our hope
and confidence, and not our fears and irrita-
tions, and proceed with the effort proposed by
the President.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Mainland China in the World Economy. Report of the
Joint Economic Committee, together with supple-
mental views. S. Rept. 318. June 19, 1967. 25 pp.
Extension of Public Law 89-175 (79 Stat. 672) To
Provide for Exemptions From the Antitrust Law To
Assist in Safeguarding the Balance-of-Payments
Position of the United States. Report to accompany
H.R. 8630. H. Rept. 388. June 26, 1967. 9 pp.
Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to ac-
company H.R. 3652, S. Rept. 356. June 26, 1967. 3 pp.
Temporary Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 5615. S. Rept. 359. June 26,
1967. 4 pp.
AUGUST 14, 1961
215
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Fifth Emergency Special Session of U.N. General Assembly Adjourns
Following is a statement made in the fifth
emergency special session of the V.N. General
Assembly on July 21, together with the text of
a resolution adopted that day.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG
D.S./D.N. press release 126, Corr. 1
As every representative here knows, the
United States had its reservations about the
advisability, in the circumstances, of convening
the General Assembly in this emergency session.
Nevertheless, from the moment the decision was
taken, we endeavored to the best of our ability
to cooperate in the hope of brmging about a
constructive outcome.
In the further consideration of this matter
by the Security Council, I pledge the best efforts
of the United States — sharing as we do the con-
viction voiced by the Secretary-General nearly
2 months ago ^ "that with the co-operation of
all parties concerned the United Nations, and
the Security Council in particular, must con-
tinue to seek, and eventually to find, reasonable,
peaceful and just solutions." Indeed, the pro-
ceedings of this Assembly during the past month
have clearly shown, above all otlier things, that
such solutions are needed by the parties and by
all the world.
The United States profoundly believes that
sucli solutions must be founded on the cardinal
principle of all international peace — the prin-
ciple of live and let live, the principle which our
charter expresses in the simple injunction to
member states and their peoples "to practice tol-
erance and live together in peace."
The necessary corollary of that principle is
also found in the charter ; namely, that all states
must "refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of
any state."
From the outset of these debates, both in the
Security Council and here in the General As-
sembly, we of the United States have taken
those charter principles as our guide. We have
held — and we still hold — to the view that, if
the United Nations is to keep faith with these
principles, more must be achieved in the Middle
East than a return to the precarious armistice
of 18 years. More must be acliieved than the
withdrawal of Israel's forces from territories
occupied during the recent conflict, necessary
though that is. Wliat is required is to deal cre-
atively with all the underlying issues, and all
departures from basic charter principles, that
have troubled the Middle East for a genera-
tion— and to resolve those issues in a new spirit
of conciliation.
In short, the structure of a stable and just
peace must at last be built in the Middle East.
The elements of such a structure were well
summed up by President Johnson in his address
on June 19, in which he said : '
Certainly troops must be withdrawn ; but there must
also be recognized rights of national life, progress in
solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent mari-
tirap passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect
f. i- political independence and territorial integrity.
In building this structure of peace the pri-
mary task fails to the parties themselves, with
such outside assistance as they may find desir-
able and necessary. But we, the members of the
United Nations, also have a deep interest in the
growth of peace in the area and an inescapable
charter responsibility to do all in our power
to promote it.
As this session comes to a close, we must can-
didly face the fact that the General Assembly
has not resolved the fundamental differences
that have plagued the Middle East for 20 years.
' U.N. doc. 7906.
' Bulletin of July 10, 1967, p. 31.
216
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
It is not surprising — nor is it a derogation from
the efforts made by nearly all the members of
the Assembly — that this has proved to be the
case. Even before the recent conflict, the prob-
lems were many and complex ; the differences of
view were deep and genuine; the commitments
to one course or another on all sides were strong.
And now there has been added the intensely
emotional aftermath of the recent tragic conflict.
It would be contrary to all historical experience
to expect that, in such circumstances, the foun-
dations for peace in the area could be easily or
quickly laid, despite this Assembly's best ef-
forts. Still less could the Assembly, through a
resolution, attempt to draw a detailed blueprint
for peace.
My Government fully recognized, neverthe-
less, that there was a strong desire among mem-
bers to reach agreement on some resolution
which could serve as a general guide for peace —
both for the parties and for the United Na-
tions— in the difficult period which lies ahead.
And we did all within our power to help trans-
form that sentiment into reality.
Now the allegation is made by the Foreign
Minister of the Soviet Union that the United
States stood in the way of a constructive reso-
lution. I shall not deign to reply to that com-
ment. The representative of the Soviet Union
more than any other man in this hall can bear
witness that the United States made every effort,
even at the last minute, to arrive at a meeting
of minds with which this Assembly could con-
cur. The United States has been flexible
throughout on the language of several draft
resolutions that have been proposed.^ We re-
main flexible to this very last hour.
But we could not be so flexible, nor could any
other member of this Assembly, as to give away
fundamental charter principles. We could not
go so far as to blind ourselves to the fact that
peace in the Middle East is indivisible and that
the withdrawal of troops must be linked to the
acknowledgment by every member of the United
Nations in the area that each enjoys the right to
maintain an independent national state of its
own and to live in peace and security and to a
renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent
therewith, including claims or acts flowing from
an asserted state of belligerency. We would
have been very glad to join in a resolution in this
Assembly stating that principle.
Surely those two principles of our charter
go hand in hand. Both as a practical matter
and as a matter of equity, one side cannot be
called upon to abide by the rules of peace while
the other side is left free to continue to assert
the rights of war. That was the belief which was
the foimdation of our view held at the begin-
ning of the Assembly and continuously held
throughout its deliberations, and that was the
belief which underlay the Latin American draft
resolution,* which the United States supported.
Reference has been made to the great states of
Latin America by the Foreign Minister of the
Soviet Union. The charge that he leveled that
the great states of Latin America could be pres-
sured by the United States scarcely warrants
comment by me. That is a ludicrous charge, as
anybody familiar with Latin America knows,
and its bizarre nature is demonstrated not only
by the history of the Latin American states in
their international relations but also by their
votes many times in this Assembly. Indeed, it
has been demonstrated tonight by the votes of
the Latin American countries on the resolution
which the Assembly just adopted. It was dem-
onstrated by their votes on the resolutions on
Jerusalem.
I think this Assembly has made constructive
contributions. We should and must realize that
there are times when the refusal to take a wrong
step is in itself an important achievement, and
this can truly be said of the Assembly's refusal to
adopt not only the Soviet draft resolution but
also the one-sided Yugoslav draft resolution
which was submitted. The basic defect of those
proposals was that they urged a return to the
situation as it was on June 4. Therefore they
were a prescription not for peace but for re-
newed hostilities, and their rejection was a wise
decision by this Assembly.
We in the United States look ahead, not back-
ward, and we owe the members of this Assembly
a statement of our own course in the future as
we deal with the situation in the Middle East
both in and outside the Security Council. We
shall persevere in our efforts to have good rela-
tions with all states in the Middle East.
Although our efforts toward this end in the
past, as our President has said, have not always
been successful, we continue to believe that our
differences with individual states in the area, as
well as the differences between them, can and
I ' For background and texts of resolutions adopted on
July 4, see ibid., July 24, 1967, p. 108.
' On July 4 the Assembly voted on the Latin American
draft resolution (A/L.523/Rev. 1) ; it was not adopted,
having failed to obtain the required two-thirds
majority.
AUGUST 14, 1967
217
must be worked out peacefully and in accord-
ance with international practice and the injunc-
tions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Guided by that spirit and belief, the United
States will do its full share to help find a just
and final solution to the refugee problem. The
United States will make a full contribution in
support of regional cooperation in the Middle
East. The United States will do its share, and
more, to see that the great promise of peaceful
nuclear energy is applied to problems of critical
importance to all the countries of the Near
East — the desalting of water, the irrigation of
arid deserts.
And this is perhaps most important for our
future deliberations: Wliile others may be
tempted to engage ii* vituperation and entirely
unfounded charges and accusations, we rather
would appeal to all to exercise vision. Wliile
some may feel malice, we would appeal to all
to be magnanimous. And we shall try, with de-
termination, to abide by what we ask of others.
In such a spirit, rather than in a spirit of hos-
tility to any nation, large or small, we offer our
help to all the peoples of the Middle East. If
others will do likewise, if the nations of the area
tliemselves will seek to make this their spirit in
the future, then we know that an area of the
world known to us all as the birthplace of great
religions and great teachings can and will flour-
ish once again in our time.
The United States will do all within its power
to help make it so.
TEXT OF RESOLUTION =
The situation in the Middle East
The General Assembly,
Having considered the grave situation in the Middle
East,
Considering that the Security Council continues to
be seized of the problem,
Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and the
proposals considered during the fifth emergency spe-
cial session of the General Assembly,
1. Requests the Secretary-General to forward the
records of the fifth emergency special session of the
General Assembly to the Security Council in order
to facilitate the resumption by the Council, as a matter
of urgency, of its consideration of the tense situation
in the Middle East ;
2. Decides to adjourn the fifth emergency special
session temporarily and to authorize the President of
the General Assembly to reconvene the session as and
when necessary.
U.N. Commission on the Status
of Women Holds 20th Session
byGladysA.Tllletf
The 20th session of the U.N. Commission on
the Status of Women, whicli met at New York
City February 1.3-March 6, adopted a series of
i-esolutions aimed at advancing the status of
women, with emphasis on education, better job
opportunities, and family planning. It also re-
vised the text of the Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women to
take into account amendments proposed in the
Economic and Social Council and in the Gen-
eral Assembly.
This was the first meeting with increased
membersliip from 21 to 32 countries, permitting
wider representation from less developed
countries.^
The Commission elected the following rep-
resentatives as officers for the 20th session:
chairman, Mrs. Helvi L. Sipila of Finland, a
lawyer who has also been active in the Inter-
national Association of Women Lawyers and
the International Girl Guides; 1st vice cliair-
man, Mrs. Aziza Hussein of the U.A.E., who
has been interested in the International Planned
Parenthood Association and helped to initiate
programs in Egypt; 2d vice chairman, Mrs.
Hanna Bokor, a lawyer from Hungary who
served as ra'pforteur in 1966; rapporteur, Mrs.
Mimi de Jadresic of Chile, a psychologist. To
head the drafting conmiittee on the declaration,
the chairman apjjointed Miss Maria Lavalle
Urbina of Mexico, a former Commission chair-
man, now Senator in the National Parliament
of Mexico.
The representatives also came from a wide
variety of backgrounds; some are members of
Parliament ; others are judges, educators, high
'A/RES/2256 (ES-V) (A/L. 529/Rev. 1) ; adopted
by the Assembly on July 21 by a vote of 63 (U.S.) to
26, with 27 abstentions.
' Mrs. Tillett is the U.S. Representative on the U.N.
Commission on the Status of Women. At this meeting
her advisers were Mrs. Alice A. Morrison, Mrs. Kir.sten
C. Panics, and David H. Small.
'^ The member nations of the Commission are : Aus-
tralia, Austria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Chile, China,
Finland, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras,
Hungary, Iran, Iraq, J.npan, Kenya. Liberia. Malaysia,
Mauritania, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru. Philippines,
Poland, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.S.S.R., United
Arab Republic. United Kingdom, United States,
Venezuela. At the 20th session observers also were
present from Canada, Dahomey, Dominican Republic,
Italy, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Romania, Sweden,
Yugoslavia.
218
DEPARTSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
government officials, or leaders of voluntary
organizations.
At the end of the session some of the repre-
sentatives visited Washington. They met high
Government officials and leaders of nongovern-
mental organizations and attended a hearing
of the Senate Foreign Eelations Committee on
the proposed U.S. ratification of three U.N.
conventions, two of which are of particular
importance to women; i.e., the Convention on
the Political Rights of Women and the Sup-
plementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery.
Political Rights and Family Law
The discussion of political rights focused on
tlie proposed scope and content of the seminar
on civic and political education of women to be
held in Finland Augiist 1-14, 1967, the first
seminar in the new series organized in response
to U.S. initiative at the 18th session in Tehran.^
It will be the first U.N. seminar on the status
of women to be organized on a worldwide,
rather than a regional, basis. The purpose of
the seminar in Finland is to work out a pattern
for training women in civic and political lead-
ership; hence nongovernmental organizations
will have a special contribution to make.
The U.S. statement called attention to the
outstanding work carried out by NGO's in
training women for leadership in the com-
munity and the nation. As an example, I de-
scribed the extensive progi-am of the AFL-
CIO through the Women's Activities Depart-
ment of its Political Education Conmiittee.
The Commission recognized the need for tak-
ing into account the negative, as well as the
positive, factors that affect women's exercise
of political rights. It was noted that women
now have the right to vote in nearly all coun-
tries and to participate in all aspects of public
life but that many women do not exercise these
rights effectively. The Commission adopted a
resolution asking the seminar in Finland to re-
view the "factors, obstacles and pressures" that
impede the progress of women and discourage
them from entering public life.
In the discussion of the agenda item on pri-
vate (family) law, the Commission had before
it the Secretary-General's revised report on
parental rights and duties and a study on dis-
crimination against persons bom out of wed-
lock prepared by the Subcommission on Pre-
' For background, see Bulletin of July 5, 1965, p.
39.
vention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. The report showed that major dis-
crimination against the mother with respect to
her children still exists in many countries and
that in some parental authority is still exercised
exclusively or primarily by the father. In the
case of a broken family, the mother may be at
a particular disadvantage, since in many coun-
tries virtually all parental rights and duties
devolve on the father.
In discussion on this item, sevei-al noted with
regret that progress in family law is much
slower than in political rights. They believed
that it is illogical to give women political rights
and to continue to deny the mother, who is re-
sponsible for caring for her children in the
home, the necessary legal "rights to protect her
interests and those of her children.
The Commission adopted a resolution which
called for equal rights and duties between the
spouses in the guardianship of minor children.
We supported this resolution, pointing out that
in our view the duties of parents are of equal
importance, although not identical. The sensi-
tivity of this subject was illustrated by the fact
that, although the Commission had not made
any recommendation on parental rights and
duties since its ninth session in 1955, some would
have preferred merely noting the report with-
out any recommendation as to action.
During the discussion of the Subcommission
study on discrimination against persons born
out of wedlock, reference was made to the
seminars on family law, which showed that un-
wed mothers are subject to grave injustices in
many countries. Since the Subcommission had
directed attention only to the rights of the child
born out of wedlock and the situation of the
unwed mother has never been fully studied in
the U.N., the United States introduced a res-
olution, cosponsored by Mexico, Chile, and
Guinea, placing the subject on the Commission's
agenda for an early session.
Education and Advancement
The Commission gave top priority to its dis-
cussion of access of women to higher education,
an agenda item proposed at the previous ses-
sion. The Commission had before it a compre-
hensive UNESCO [United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization]
report based on 104 replies to a questionnaire,
including information supplied by 82 govern-
ments.
AUGUST 14, 196
219
The UNESCO representative commented on
the long-term program for advancement of
women through access to education, science, and
culture. This program had been organized pur-
suant to the recommendations of a group of con-
sultants appointed in 1965 by the UNESCO
Director General on which two members of the
Commission had served, the representatives of
France and of the United States.
The UNESCO report showed that extra-
budgetary resources had been provided to carry
out a 10-year program relating to education of
women and girls. Moreover, mider a new policy,
UNESCO assistance for women's j^rojects will
be extended not only to NGO's whose member-
ship is composed solely or largely of women
but also to other organizations in consultative
status interested in women's advancement.
The UNESCO report on higher education
showed rapid increase in many countries in the
number of women attending college ; more than
a third of the women attending college today are
in the United States. At the other end of the
scale, illiteracy remains a problem.
In commenting on the UNESCO program,
I pointed out tliat illiteracy and poverty are
very closely related and described recent legis-
lation greatly expanding educational resources,
including training of teachers aides, Govern-
ment-financed student assistance, the national
Teachers Corps, and other programs. I also em-
phasized the value of effective career counsel-
ing in helping broaden ti-aditional attitudes in
the United States about suitable career choices
for women.
The Commission commended UNESCO on
its long-term program for women and urged
that functional literacy programs take due ac-
count of the needs of women, who still consti-
tute the majority of the illiterate population of
the world.
In a second resolution, cosponsored by the
United States, the Commission recommended
expansion in counseling and guidance; encour-
agement of higher education tlirough provision
of scholarships, evening courses, and other
measures; and equal access for women to all
jobs and professions for which their higher edu-
cation has qualified them.
As in recent sessions, there was heavy empha-
sis on practical measures to promote the ad-
vancement of women and to eliminate the ma-
jor discriminations revealed in the Commis- j
sion's continuing studies. 1
The Commission adopted a resolution incor-
porating major recommendations from the
seminar in the Philippines in December 1966
on measures required for the advancement of
women, at which I represented the United States
as official observer. The resolution invited
member states to establish national long-term
programs for the advancement of women, au-
thorized an inquiry to governments on the estab-
lislunent of national commissions for this
purpose, and urged greater priority for ad-
vancement-of- women projects in requests for
technical assistance.
During the discussion, the Secretary-General
asked for guidance on a proposed report on
family planning requested by the Commission
in a U.S. -sponsored resolution in 1966. In reply,
I suggested preparation of an interim report
summarizing U.N. and government policies.
Pressing this point, I noted that many official
U.N. pronouncements had been made which
would provide useful information to Commis-
sion members if compiled in one document. For
example, on Human Eights Day in 1966 the
Secretary-General had issued a Declaration on
Population signed by heads of states of 12 coun-
tries. In these suggestions, I had the support of
a majority of Commission members.
During the discussion of U.N. assistance for
advancement of women, the Commission also
adopted resolutions on encouraging more edu-
cational opportunity in rural areas and more
participation by women in community develop-
ment programs. Both resolutions call for re-
ports for consideration by the Commission at
forthcoming sessions.
Other Agenda Items
During the discussion of Periodic Reports,
the Commission adopted a resolution suggest-
ing, inter alia, that it would be helpful if re-
ports by governments and NGO's contained
more information on progress made in women's
rights. The discussion of Economic Op-portu-
nities for Women focused on a number of ILO
[International Labor Organization] reports,
including the ILO activities report which had
been postponed from the previous year and the
biennial report on equal pay. The ILO also made
220
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK
avcailable a study on the ILO standards which
had been requested by the Commission. The
Soviets pressed tlie ILO for the report requested
at Soviet initiative, dealing with the repercus-
sions of scientific and technical progress on the
status of women. The Commission adopted a
comprehensive resohition on economic oppor-
tunities, wliich included a request that the ILO
make an interim report on such repercussions.
It also urged consideration of more frequent
meetings of the ILO Consultants on Women
Workers Problems.
The Commission adopted a resolution on the
International Year on Hiunan Eights which
made recommendations with respect to material
to be considered by the preparatory committee
for the Hiunan Eights International Confer-
ence.
The Conmiission adopted two resolutions
under the agenda item of Advisory Services, one
looking forward to the organization of addi-
tional seminars on civic and political education
of women subsequent to the August 1967 semi-
nar in Helsinki and the other calling on NGO's
to give wide publicity among their members to
the possibility of fellowships on human rights.
The Declaration
During the entire session a small drafting
committee appointed by the Chairman carefully
reexamined the proposed text for the draft
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Agamst Women in the light of amendments
proposed at the meetings of ECOSOC and in
the 1966 General Assembly. Among the amend-
ments was one proposed by the United States
which provided for "educational information to
insure the health and well-being of families,"
a provision designed to furnish a broad stand-
ard for such information. The Commission
adopted this amendment. At the same time it
rejected a number of weakening amendments
proposed by various countries. As revised and
again unanimously adopted, the draft declara-
tion was sent by Commission resolution to the
Economic and Social Council for transmission
to the General Assembly.
The 1967 session again demonstrated the pene-
trating insight and constructive approach
brought to the Commission's work by members
from many different regions and cultures.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24,
1964.'
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, June 19, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done at
Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force Octo-
ber 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature: Finland, July 14, 1967.
Health
Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the World
Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20,
1965.=^
Acceptance deposited: Peru, June 20, 1967.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at
London April 5, 1966.'
Acceptances deposited: Denmark, June 28, 1967 ;
Liberia, May 8, 1967.
Maritime Matters
Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.
Territorial application: Hong Kong, June 6, 1967.
Publications
Convention concerning the international exchange of
publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.
Entered into force November 23, 1962.'
Ratifications deposited: Finland, May 26, 1967;
United States, June 9, 1967.
Convention concerning the exchange of official publi-
cations and government documents between states.
Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force
May 30, 1961.'
Ratifications deposited: Finland, May 26, 1967;
United States, June 9, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered
into force January 1, 1967; as to the United States
May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Ratifications deposited: Argentina, Ireland, May 17,
' Not in force for the United States.
° Not in force.
AUGtrST 14, 1967
221
1967 ; France, Group of territories represented by
French Overseas Post and Telecommunications
Agency, May 29, 1967; Paldstan, June 1, 1967;'
Senegal, June 5, 1967 ; Spain, Spanish Provinces
in Africa, June 6, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4S93), with annexes and additional
protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. En-
tered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notification of approval: Korea, May 12, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4893, 5603) so as to put into effect a
revised frequency allotment plan for the aeronauti-
cal mobile (R) service and related information, with
annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966. Entered into
force July 1, 1967, except for frequency allotment
plan contained in Appendix 27.'
Notifications of approval: Iceland, May 13, 1967;
Singapore, May 6, 1967 ; ' Yugoslavia, May 16, 1967.
Trade
Protocol extending the arrangement regarding inter-
national trade in cotton textiles of October 1, 1962
(TIAS 5240). Done at Geneva May 1, 1967.=
Acceptances: Pakistan, June 30, 1967 ; Turkey, June
21, 1967.
BILATERAL
Food and Agriculture Organization
Agreement relating to a Fund-in-Trust grant to the
FAO to supplement activities under the Off-Shore
Fishery Development Project for Viet-Nam. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington and Rome May
26, 1967. Entered into force May 26, 1967.
South Africa
Amendment to the agreement of July 8, 1957, as
amended (TIAS 3885, 5129), for cooperation concern-
ing the civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Wash-
ington July 17, 1967. Enters into force on the date on
which each Government .shall have received from the
other Government written notification that it has
complied with all statutory and constitutional re-
quirements for entry into force.
PUBLICATIONS
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" Not in force.
' With reservations.
Recent Releases
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Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. A 25 percent discount is made on orders for lOO
or more copies of any one publication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superinten-
dent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Profiles of Newly Independent States (revised). A
reference guide describing the status of sovereignty
of the world's 61 states that have acquired independ-
ence since 1943. A "profile" for each state highlights
the achievement of independence (such as oflicially
recognized date) and gives both present and former
status (including earlier names). Included is a table
of capitals, areas, populations, and nationality forms,
as well as a map. Geographic Bulletin No. 1 (revised
April 1967) . Pub. 7874. 32 pp. 25^.
The United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Co-
operation: The First Five Years: 1961-1966. An over-
all report on the work of this Committee, covering its
program and areas of cooperation for the eight work-
ing panels. The Committee, described as "an experi-
ment in direct bilateral cooperation among scientists
of two countries . . . financially supported by their
governments," has temporarily limited itself "to activ-
ities in the physical and biological sciences." Com-
mittee and panel membership, major activities, and
publications are listed in detailed appendixes. Pub.
8210. East Asian and Pacific Series 158. 70 pp., illus.
50(«.
Viet-Nam Information Notes. No. 6. Why We Fight in
Viet-Nam explains the principal reasons for U.S. in-
volvement in South Viet-Nam's struggle against Com-
munist aggression. Includes material on North Viet-
namese infiltration and aggression and Asian support
for U.S. action. Pub. 8245. East Asian and Pacific Series
161. 8 pp., iUus. 5<f.
222
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BlJLLETIlf
INDEX August U, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 1J^8
Africa. The Foreign Assistance Program
(Rusk) 208
Asia
The Foreign Assistance Program (Ruslt) . . . 208
Partnership in East Asia and the Pacific
(Bundy) 195
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 215
The Foreign Assistance Program (Rusk) . . . 208
Developing Countries. Partnership in Bast Asia
and the Pacific (Bundy) 195
Foreign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program
(Rusk) 208
Human Rights. U.N. Commission on the Status
of Women Holds 20th Session (Tillett) . . 218
Iceland. President Johnson Confers With Presi-
dent of Iceland (Asgeirsson, Johnson) . . . 201
International Law. Partnership in East Asia and
the Pacific (Bundy) 195
International Organizations and Conferences.
International Volunteer Service Granted Or-
ganization Immunities (Executive order) . . 207
Latin America. The Foreign Assistance Program
(Rusk) 208
Near East
Fifth Emergency Special Session of U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Adjourns (Goldberg, text of
resolution) 216
The Foreign Assistance Program (Rusk) . . . 208
Philippines. The Depth and Durability of U.S.-
PhiUppine Relations (Blair) 203
Presidential Documents
International Volunteer Service Granted Orga-
nization Immunities 207
President Johnson Confers With President of
Iceland 201
Publications. Recent Releases 222
Romania. Letters of Credence (Bogdan) . . . 202
Togo. Letters of Credence (Ohin) 202
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 221
United Nations
Fifth Emergency Special Session of U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Adjourns (Goldberg, text of
resolution) 216
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women Holds
20th Session (Tillett) 218
Viet-Nam. Tlie Depth and Durability of U.S.-
Philippine Relations (Blair) 203
Name Index
Asgeirsson, Asgeir 201
Blair, William McCormick, Jr 203
Bogdan, Corneliu 202
Bundy, William P 195
Goldberg, Arthur J 216
Johnson, President 201,207
Ohin, Alexandre 202
Rusk, Secretary 208
Tillett, Gladys A 218
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 24-30
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
No. Date
tl65 7/24
Subject
to America"
begin
"Volunteers
training.
*166 7/25 Porter sworn in as Ambassador to
Korea (biographic details).
tl68 7/28 Woodward named interim director.
Water for Peace Office (rewrite).
tl69 7/28 Income tax convention with France.
170 7/28 Bundy : "Partnership in East Asia
and the Pacific."
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
Superintendent of Documents
u.s. government printing office
washington. d.c.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND PEES PAID
U.S. OOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICC
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1469
August 21, 1967
INTERNATIONAIi COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE OCEANS
Address hy Vice President Humphrey 227
ASIAN PERSPECTIVES
hy Harold Kaplan 230
DEPARTMENT OPPOSES ELIMINATION OF IMPORT QUOTAS
ON EXTRA LONG STAPLE COTTON
Statement hy Under Secretary Rostow 236
PROVISIONAL AGENDA, TWENTY-SECOND SESSION
OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 239
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1469 Publication 8280
August 21, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Quide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication, issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
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the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
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ment, and statements and addresses
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Department. Information is included
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International Cooperation for Development of the Oceans
Address hy Vice President Humphrey^
I am particularly pleased to be able to talk to
the oceanography community today and to use
this occasion to make an announcement which
significantly affects our oceanographic en-
deavors.
During the past several days I have been visit-
ing our marine facilities and meetmg with lead-
ing marine scientists and engineers throughout
New England — scientists and engineers chart-
ing new courses to transform the latent promise
of the seas into practical treasures.
Maine, of course, has the longest coastline in
New England. The recent initiative of a num-
ber of your educational institutions in the Casco
Bay area to develop a joint progi'am for promot-
ing oceanographic activities will greatly con-
tribute to the renewed effort of this nation to
develop and use the resources of the oceans for
the benefit of mankmd.
I urge the State of Maine to mobilize its
public and private resources in support of this
fine initiative. For only through close coopera-
tion among industry, government, and universi-
ties can we continue to mobilize the resources,
the imagination, the knowledge, and the initia-
tive that have driven American science and
teclmology forward at such a rapid pace.
In view of your new emphasis on oceanog-
raphy, I would like to report to you — to the
people of Maine and to the people of the United
States — our latest progress in the marine field,
particularly the international aspects of our
progress.
One year ago Congress enacted and the Presi-
dent approved unprecedented legislation ^ which
established as the policy of the United States
' Made before the State of Maine Conference on
Oceanography at Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine,
on July 29.
' Public Law 89-454, the Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Act of 1966.
the development of a coordinated, comprehen-
sive, and long-range national progi'am in marine
science for the benefit of mankind. We have
moved rapidly during the past year to respond
to this challenging mandate:
— ^We have established a truly unified pro-
gram.
— ^We have begun to establish national goals.
— And we have selected major oceanic pro-
grams requiring immediate priority attention.
I have the privilege to serve as Chairman of
the National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development, which was estab-
lished last year to bring together the Cabinet-
level officials responsible for marine science
policies.
Challenges of the New Oceanography
We have quickly realized that oceanography
is in a state of transition. No longer is it a purely
scientific pursuit; it must now serve very con-
crete national and international needs.
Our new oceanography faces many chal-
lenges :
— The challenge of using vast food reserves of
the sea to help end the tragic cycle of famine and
despair which haunts much of the world today ;
— The challenge of pollution and erosion on
our seashores, bays, estuaries, and Great Lakes,
which threaten the health of our people and
destroy the resources of the sea;
— The challenge of understanding the effects
of the oceans on the weather so that we may im-
prove the long-term forecasting of storms and
sea conditions, protect life and property in
coastal areas, and improve the prediction of
rainfall in the interior;
— The challenge of gathering the mineral
wealth of the ocean floor;
AtrGTTST 21, 1967
227
— Finally, the challenge of international
understanding and cooperation in marine
affairs.
The oceans provide important opportunities
for peaceful international cooperation and de-
velopment.
They wash the coasts of many nations, from
East to "West. The phenomena of the oceans are
universal; also, many nations are intensifying
their use of the sea's resources.
Therefore, it is essential that we work with
all countries, including the Soviet Union, bi-
laterally and through international organiza-
tions in exploring, vmderstanding, and using the
seas and their resources.
During the past several months the President
and I have discussed cooperative marine science
with many leading government officials in West-
em Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Without
exception they are as enthusiastic as we are
about the unlimited potential for workmg to-
gether for the benefit of all.
We can work with the advanced nations to
jointly explore and develop ocean resources;
we can assist the less developed countries to
promote coastal development, open new water-
ways, and strengthen food economies; and we
can work with all nations to establish a frame-
work of laws which will encourage an ac-
celerated use of the oceans and their resources
by all nations.
In brief, through cooperative international
efforts we can foster economic development;
help raise the level of scientific competence;
promote regional cooperation; and strengthen
the bonds of understanding throughout the
world.
Tapping the Food Potential of the Oceans
At the top of our list of priorities, we must
help tap the abundant unused food potential
which the oceans hold.
We have heard repeated warnings about the
stark misery of hunger, the ravages of mahiutri-
tion, and the threats of political upheaval and
social strife posed by food shortages. We know
that more than one-half the world's population
is limigry — more than II/2 billion people. Yet
the world's food supply stretches thinner and
thinner in the face of a spiraling population.
The oceans can help alleviate this problem,
and we are determmed that they will.
We have embarked on an intensified, long-
range program to exploit the oceans as a source
of food to help feed the undernourished people
of the world — a pi-ogram wliich includes
— multiplying fivefold the present use of food
resources from the oceans;
— developing more effective regulatory
policies to maximize the worldwide fishing
yields and improve fishing efficiency;
— encouraging expanded participation by
private enterprise in harvesting the oceans' food
resources.
To fulfill this pledge, we are vigorously de-
veloping technologies for the production of fish
protein concentrate and for mapping the living
resources of the sea.
We call on the other advanced nations of the
world to join with us, through the agencies of
the United Nations and bilaterally, in this hu-
manitarian endeavor of unprecedented scope.
The dimensions of world hunger are too gi'eat
to be solved by any one countiy alone. Only
through a cooperative sharing of the burden by
all people and nations can our veiy survival on
this planet be insured.
We also anticipate developments in other
areas of marine technology which will provide
new opportunities for strengthening maritime
ties and contributing to a peaceful and stable
world. We are, for example, examining the
international aspects of mining in the deep
oceans, and deployment of unmanned ocean
stations for collecting environmental data of
benefit to many nations.
Navigational Aids for Civilian Use
Accurate navigation is fundamental to the
advancement of these oceanic endeavors. You,
as oceanographers, are fully aware of the neces-
sity for accurate positioning at sea in scientific
investigations.
Today, I am pleased to announce another step
in our efl'ort to strengthen worldwide naviga-
tional aids for civilian use. This step, which will
couple the technological achievements of our
space program to our endeavors in the ocean, is
doubly rewardmg for me since I also serve as
Chairman of the Space Council.
This week the President approved a recom-
mendation that the Navy's Navigation Satellite
System be made available for use by our civilian
ships and that commercial manufacture of the
required shipboard receivers be encouraged.
This recommendation was developed by the De-
l^artment of the Navy in support of initiatives
228
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
of the Marine Sciences Council to strengthen
■worldwide navigational aids for civilian use.
Our all-weather satellite system has been in
use since 196i by the Navy and has enabled fleet
units to pinpoint their positions anywhere on
the eartii. The same degree of navigational ac-
curacy will now be available to our nonmilitary
ships.
For the past year there has been an mcreas-
ing interest in this system in the oceanographic
community, among offshore oil exploration com-
panies, and among other segments of U.S. in-
dustry which require extremely accurate naviga-
tion or positioning. These users will be direct
beneficiaries of this new dividend from our mili-
tary research and development programs.
The system mcludes a ground station complex
of four tracking stations; satellites in polar
orbits; shipboard receivers and associated
computers.
There is, of course, no commitment by the
'Navy to maintain the system indefinitely for
nonmilitaiy use. However, recognizing the need
for strengthening our worldwide navigational
capabilities, tlie Marine Sciences Council has
requested the Department of Transportation to
prepare a recommended plan for meeting future
nonmilitary navigational requirements, with
consideration given to the role of land-based
radio systems and navigation satellites.
Internationally, the United Nations Com-
mittee on tlie Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is
considermg the need for a navigation services
satellite system, and several other nations have
expressed interest in developing their own
capabilities in this field. We anticipate that
there will be requests for purchase of U.S. re-
ceivers from our close allies, and the policy and
procedures for responding to tliese requests are
currently under consideration.
Tlie fabric of peace must be woven to stretch
unbroken from the outermost reaches of our
solar system to the bottom of the oceans.
During the past year we have made a good
beginning at the United Nations toward pre-
venting warlike activities in outer space and
creating conditions favorable to cooperation
among nations for the exploration and use of
outer space.
Now let us turn to the task of further insuring
the cooperative and productive use of the oceans.
They tie the nations of the world together. They
have from time immemorial been bonds of cul-
ture and commerce. In the words of Longfellow,
the sea "divides and yet imites mankind."
Restrictions on Travel to Algeria,
Libya, and the Sudan Lifted
Press release 172 dated August 1
United States passports are now valid, with-
out special endorsement, for travel of American
citizens to Algeria, Libya, and the Sudan.
Travel restrictions remain in effect, however,
for five countries in the Middle East: Iraq,
Jordan, the Syrian Arab Eepublic, the United
Arab Republic, and Yemen. In accordance with
existing regulations, validations for travel to
these countries will be granted to persons whose
travel may be regarded as being in the interest
of the United States. These restrictions will be
lifted as soon as conditions warrant.
On July 10, the Department removed the ban
on American travel to Lebanon.^ Earlier, on
June 21, the ban was removed on American
travel to Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia, and Tunisia.
' Bulletin of Aug. 7, 1967, p. 171.
AUGUST 21, 1967
229
Asian Perspectives
iy Harold Kaplan
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Aflairs ^
I should like to begin by confessing to some
perplexity about tlie subject of our discussion.
This, you may suspect, is merely a rhetorical de-
vice designed to get me underway and to allow
me, as it were, to wander at will. If so, you are
entirely right. But you must admit that there is
some ambiguity in the title you have chosen
for me today.
The Asians themselves have many perspec-
tives— traditional and modem, visionary and
practical — perspectives on themselves and on
the rest of the world. The insights, moods, and
aspirations of Buddhism, for example, consti-
tute an existential perspective on man, wherever
he may be; but Buddhism is surely an Asian
perspective, in the sense that it provides us with
perspective on Asia as well. Similarly, Lin
Piao's famous theory of the class struggle as
perpetual guerrilla warfare — transposing and
fusing into a sort of social myth the old
antagonism between city and country, between
developed north and underdeveloped south, be-
tween peasant folk and urban exploiter — prom-
ises, as the Bolivians and Venezuelans are learn-
ing to their sorrow, to have something of an
extra-Asian career. Yet even a Maoist must
admit that this theory tells us at least as much
about the present Chinese predicament as it
does about the rest of the world.
On the other hand, if we ask ourselves what
lies ahead for the Asians, about how things look
to us over there, we are also likely to find our-
selves talking more pertinently, more essen-
tially, about ourselves than about the Japanese,
say, or the Thais or the Indonesians.
So the most obvious thing about perspectives
is that they must start somewhere. They depend
upon a point of view. And what they tell us
' Address made in the summer lecture series at the
University of Maryland, College Park, Md., on July 11.
about reality is reflexive, so to speak — they
actually work both ways.
It follows that in thinking about Asia we are,
or should be, attentive to our own situation, our
motives, our ends; for these are also what we
are thinking about.
My own credentials are dubious enough to be
typical of an American Government official in
the mid-20th century. A few years ago I would
have had difficulty locating the city of Saigon
on a map. With the exception of a couple of
years in North Africa and 18 months in Viet-
Nam, my foreign service, and most of my adult
life, have been spent in such places as Paris,
London, Bonn, Berlin, and Geneva. In short,
I am very much what my colleagues in the
State Department call a European hand. Then
what business do I have discussing Asian
perspectives ?
One answer, of course, is that Asia, among
other things, has been a European, or at any
rate a Western, idea. This is not to pose the
philosoj^hical question of Asia's "own" reality,
in sich, as the Germans would put it. I am
merely stating a fact. For centuries we have
seen the Asians and the Asian elites have seen
themselves largely, although of course not ex-
clusively, in terms of a Europe-centered world.
Even the mighty gravitational pull of Cliinese
civilization seems to have declined after the 18th
century, so that the Javanese were in closer con-
tact with the Dutch, the Burmese with the
British, the Cambodians with the French, than
they — the Asians — were with each other.
"WHien I returned to Washington last year, the
State Department bureau headed by Assistant
Secretary of State [William P.] Bundy was
still called the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
Naturally, after all those hours in a jet aircraft,
it occurred to me to wonder: Far Eastern from
what ? And now, through no fault of mine, it is
230
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
known officially as the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs — a change which, if I may-
belabor my point, says more about the shift in
our perspective than it does about the Asians
and their recent travail.
Spirit of Hope and Growth in East Asia
Nevertheless — and here is the first substan-
tive point I would propose to you — it says a
great deal about the Asians, too. It reminds us
not only that the period of Western domination
is over but that the memories, the resentments,
the political reflexes which belong to that period
and its immediate aftermath should now become
increasingly irrelevant to Asian politics, should
now increasingly give way to other prospects,
other views, other aspirations — to other per-
spectives, if you will.
Is this in fact what is happening? I believe it
is and that it is possible to adduce a good deal
more evidence to this effect than the renaming
of Mr. Bundy's bureau.
For an impenitent "Westerner like myself it
may seem presumptuous to attempt to define an
Asian mood, yet it seems to me quite clear that
something has been stirring. We feel it in the
reports, the statistics, the people — in the coun-
tries situated on the eastern periphery of main-
land China : a positively tonic spirit of hope and
growth.
I am emboldened to make this point because
my impression is shared by competent observers
of quite different political persuasions. A
French friend of mine, a man who has spent
much of his life in the area, told me in January
that "the transformation of East Asia must be
seen to be believed." And Drew Middleton, in a
story from Bangkok in the New York Times on
April 23, has this to say: "Non-Communist
countries of Southeast Asia appear to be more
confident about their future as a result of the
United States' stand in Vietnam and the politi-
cal convulsions in Peking." Middleton then
proceeds to recoimt his talks with government
officials in Singapore, Laos, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Viet-Nam, and Thailand,
and everywhere finds the same themes: "For
youth, anticolonialism is part of history, and
Communism has split and lost its appeal in the
process," he says, quoting Foreign Mmister S.
J. Kajaratnam of Singapore. "Perhaps region-
alism with its promise of stability and economic
progress will be youth's big concept for the
future."
One must be wary with reports which please
us and with people who say what we want to
hear. But for those of us who have been read-
ing these reports and talking to these people —
along with the much less happy news from
Viet-Nam — for those of us in particular who
accompanied the President on his Asian tour
last October, it seems to me that the most elo-
quent summary is Mr. Peregrine Worsthome's,
in the November 6th issue of London's Simday
Telegraph :
Two years ago it was assumed that the hangover of
anti-colonialism and continuing suspicions about
superior Western strength were so deeply ingrained in
Asian hearts that no rational calculations about the
practical desirability of cooperating with America and
the West could ever outweigh those emotional prej-
udices. It was further assumed — and still is in
Britain — that America's involvement in the Viet-Nam
war could only still further fortify those ancient fears.
What was so fascinating about the President's tour
was the evidence it supplied that these assumptions are
proving blessedly false.
In fact, almost the opposite is proving true. The
pace of Asian adjustments to the reality of the con-
temporary world is outpacing American and Western
ideas for taking advantage of this dramatic change of
heart. Free Asia appears more than ready to respond
to Western initiatives; readier, indeed, to respond than
the West is to propose.
Now, what Mr. Worsthorne calls a "dramatic
change of heart" is, of course, a rather broad
sweep of history within which we can expect to
find a great variety of currents and eddies, of
boulders and snags. Indeed, our preoccupation
with our daily difficulties is such, and so absorb-
ing, that we are prone to lose sight of the broad
sweep of things entirely.
Here, too, we have an effect of perspective. We
forget that the Bandung conference took place
hardly more than a decade ago and that in 1965
Sukarno's Indonesia left the United Nations
and threatened to rally, with all its enormous
resources and potentialities, to Mao Tse-tung's
program of implacable and permanent warfare
against all those who reject the Maoist creed.
We may also forget that the changes we are
talking about are by no means irreversible; that
they are in part — in no small part — the result
of what we have done and what we are doing in
the area; and finally that they are bound, in
their specific manifestations, to reflect the
specific historical and social conditions of each
of the countries involved.
AUGUST 21, 1967
231
Nevertheless, they are happening, and they
are happening at a tempo which none of us
would have dared to predict a few years ago.
The Example of Korea
For a long time after World War II it was
fashionable to contrast the creative use to which
the Europeans put our economic assistance with
the relative stagnation of the less developed
areas, where the human and infrastructural
prerequisites for economic advance were said to
be lacking. In this sense, one wonders whether
it is still possible to include the Eepublic of
Korea, for example, among the economically
backward nations of the world. On the whole, I
tliink not. The trend, in any case, is unmistak-
able and will shortly make the very question
academic.
Korea, you will recall, was divided after
World War II at the 3Sth parallel so that most
of its people found themselves south of the
parallel and without access to the natural re-
sources of the north. The war, which devastated
the country and inflicted more than a million
casualties, has never been formally terminated ;
and substantial armed forces still face each
other at the military demarcation line, about
25 miles north of South Korea's capital city of
Seoul. The public knows little about North
Korea, but the press, in this country at least, has
duly and copiously recorded South Korea's
troubles : we are all vaguely aware that the Ee-
public has had several constitutions and mili-
tary coups and that the country has nevertheless
progressed to constitutional government.
What is perhaps less widely understood is
that South Korea has, in Walt Rostow's word,
reached the point of economic "takeoff." Am-
bassador Wjm [Winthrop G.] Brown, who re-
cently retuiiied from a tour of duty in Seoul,
describes the situation in the following terms:
Today Seoul is a bustling metro{5olis of almost 4 mil-
lion inhabitants, growing by leaps and bounds, full of
vitality and aetivity. Agricultural and industrial pro-
duction are increasing rapidly. Last year Korea had
one of the highest growth rates in the world, some 12
percent. Exports have quintupled in the last 4 years.
There is a relatively free press, public opinion firmly
influences the actions of government, and the country
has just completed its second nationwide election,
based on universal suffrage and certified by the United
Nations observers as being a free and fair election.
Investors from foreign countries are entering the Re-
public in increasing numbers. The atmosphere in the
country is one of hope and eager exi)ectation of the
future.
Now, how can it come to pass that there can be a
bustling industrial city 25 miles from a mighty con-
frontation of armed forces still only in a state of ar-
mistice and with a hostile Communist regime just
across the line? How does it come to pass that people
go about their daily business in seeming unconcern
about the nearness of the enemy and that foreigners
are willing to risk their capital in this apparently un-
certain situation?
The answer, very simply, is confidence. Confidence in
the support and protection of the United States. Con-
fidence based upon our physical intervention in June
1950; our continued military and financial aid since
that time ; confidence in our solemnly pledged word in
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. . . .
Asian Diversity and Pluralism
Korea, in short, is what we call a success story,
and by no means the only one — perhaps not even
the most striking one — in Asia today. But since
our concern this morning is with what lies
ahead, with Asian perspectives, rather than
with totting up the balance sheets of the past
few years, I propose to spare you a recital of
the things that went right, the sort of things
we government people like to recall when to-
day's things are going wrong, as they only too
frequently do: the remarkable postwar recon-
struction of Japan, the model land reform in
Taiwan, the accession of Malaysia and Singa-
pore to self-government, the promising begin-
nings of industrial development in Thailand —
all this and all the rest would take us far afield.
There is shadow, of course, as well as light in
the picture : The countries of East Asia have all
inlierited more than their share of economic and
social problems; and we can expect, if the
history of development elsewhere offers us any
guide, that their future will not be unidirec-
tional, ever onward and upward, that it will
have its ups and downs.
The point I would make, however, is not that
any or all of these countries have discovered
an infallible formula — that economic liberal-
ism, for example, is always and in every circum-
stance to be preferred to a controlled economy,
or even that the "dramatic change of heart"
which Peregrine Worsthorne discovered last
October and which Drew Middleton confirmed
in the spring is necessarily and exclusively re-
lated to the presence of American power. The
point is precisely that for various reasons, in-
cluding the presence of American power, diver-
sity has become respectable again in East Asia;
pluralism is felt to have a future. The great
changes which all feel must come are no longer
232
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
seen as necessarily coming in accordance with
some preordained pattern and without relation
to each country's history and traditions; and it
is this, I believe, which has changed the per-
spective. Anticolonialism, anti-Westernism,
"wars of national liberation,'' and similar
ideological nostrums no longer enter necessarily
or even significantly into the process by which
the Asian leaders — the Communists excepted,
of course — identify and define themselves. They
face the problems of modernizing their coun-
tries, each at his own tempo, each in his own
way.
Wliat does this mean? I had a Japanese
friend in Saigon, a brilliant young television
reporter, who used to argue that while all or
much of what we had done and were doing in
Asia might be right, it was nonetheless wrong
for ics to do it, since we were not Asians. We
were white, huge. Western, rich, and therefore
bound to raise all the old anticolonial hackles.
And indeed, discussing the matter in Saigon,
with the still-smoldering remnants of a colo-
nial regime all about us, the arguments put for-
ward by my Japanese friend seemed at times to
achieve a certain plausibility. Only it has not
worked out that way. It is not working out that
way. Not even in Viet-Nam. Certain Asian in-
tellectuals, to be sure, whether in countries like
India — because they were colonized — or in
countries like Japan — because they were not —
may experience a certain cultural lag on this
subject. One of the functions of intellectuals,
after all, is to preserve the past. But the Asian
leaders who are in practice responsible for the
very survival of the countries which must live
on the periphery of Communist China are far
more concerned today with the balance of
power than with the color of our skins.
Asian Regional Cooperation and Mutual Aid
This is not to say that many of them do not
look forward to the day when that balance may
be achieved without recourse to the United
States. Here is another Asian perspective, one
which the American taxpayer will most hope-
fully share. This implies the development of re-
gional cooperation, among other things; and,
indeed, the past few years have seen the emer-
gence of quite promising regional institutions
such as the Asian and Pacific Council, the Asian
Development Bank, the ASA [Association of
Southeast Asia] grouping of Thailand, Ma-
laysia, and the Philippines, and a good many
others which, by organizing cooperation in such
fields as transportation, education, and the de-
velopment of the Mekong Valley, are making
Asia — East Asia at any rate — into an Asian
idea.
It also implies that the relatively developed
countries of the area must take a more active
part; and this in fact is what they are beginning
to do. I used to tell my Japanese friend that we,
for all our detestable white skins — or black ones,
were by way of becoming more deeply involved
in the modernization of Asia than Japan her-
self. If we were condemned by nature to raise
anticolonial hackles, I told him, why did not
Japan take a more active hand in helping the
struggling new nations ? The question, of course,
was rhetorical, but I must admit that it has lost
a good deal of its effect. Japan, which promises
soon to become the third nation of the world in
terms of gross national product — although her
per capita income remains low for an indus-
trialized country — has now pledged 1 percent of
her GNP for aid to less developed countries,
mainly in East Asia. Japan has also played a
constructive role in organizing financial assist-
ance to Indonesia, in contributing to the Asian
Development Bank, and, after the signature of
the long-awaited treaty normalizing relations
with Seoul, in providing substantial funds for
Korean development.
All this, of course, is only a beginning. There
are easily imaginable circumstances which could
alter the trend. The Asian nations have long
been accustomed to relate themselves first to the
outside world and specifically to their principal
trading partners and only then, if at all, to their
neighbors. But the ideas of mutual aid and of
regional cooperation — free and uncoerced for
perhaps the first time in Asian history — are
growing all along the periphery of mainland
China. This, too, is an Asian perspective; and
there is no doubt that our presence in the area
has helped to create it— perhaps not so directly
as the institutions of European economic coop-
eration grew out of the Marshall Plan but none-
theless materially.
Our presence in the area — but there, you will
say, is the rub ! The perspectives we have thus
far discovered: economic dynamism, regional
cooperation, the pluralistic development of in-
dependent nations — these are all reassuring, all
promising, all clearly in our national interest.
But they all depend and will continue for a long
time to depend upon the security and economic
assistance which we provide, and none of this
AUGUST 21, 19G7
233
comes cheap. In World War II vre fought to
prevent a hostile nation from dominating Asia
and organizing its hungry masses and immense
resources against us. In Korea we sent Ameri-
can forces to the mainland of Asia in order to
preserve a small country's right to work out its
own future; and this, of course, is the essential
purpose of our presence in South Viet-Nam.
Our European friends, who see nothing
anomalous in the presence of six American di-
visions in West Germany, sometimes raise their
eyebrows at our involvement in the defense of
a pluralistic Asia. Since their own perspectives
proceed, like everyone else's, from their own his-
torical experience, they see us — these erstwhile
heirs of ancient Rome — mounting a sort of im-
perial guard on the remotest marches of the
civilized world. Pax Americana in Asia is fine
as long as it lasts, they say, but they have three
objections : First, it distracts us from the only
thing which matters, namely, the defense of
Europe and the organization of a detente with
the Soviet Union ; second, it must be frightfully
expensive; and third, it is dangerous, since it
must lead to a confrontation with Communist
China.
The first of these objections we can dismiss
out of hand, since we have continued to be quite
as actively engaged in the defense of the Atlan-
tic Treaty area, and in working toward better
relations with the Soviet Union, as the Euro-
peans have been themselves.
As for the other objections, life is indeed ex-
pensive in 1967, but since we still find ourselves
compelled to live, and to live in freedom, we
must contrive to do so as best we can. Is there
an alternative policy which promises to achieve
our ends at less cost and less risk? The odd thing
is that in all the welter of debate over our Asian
policy in recent years such an alternative has,
to say the least, scarcely become apparent, either
in Europe or the United States.
This is not to dismiss as frivolous the dismay
which has been and continues to be expressed at
the war in Viet-Nam. We understand and share
it; and our concern is to bring the war to an
honorable end as quickly as we can. Tliere has
also been criticism, both pertinent and imperti-
nent, of our tactics; and there has been general
frustration over the slow pace of operations and
the intractability of the enemy. Question has
been raised as to whether, witli a better grasp
of Vietnamese realities, we could or should liave
avoided combat on a terrain which offered the
Communists so many advantages. In short,
brilliant hindsight has been copiously brought
to bear. Nevertheless, although I believe that I I
have been reasonably attentive to the debate, I
have heard little or nothing which cogently
challenges the central propositions of our Asian
program.
Central Propositions of U.S. Asian Policy
Wliat are these propositions? I would hold
these to be fundamental :
First, that we are geographically and his-
torically a Pacific power, with a vital interest in
the independence and peaceful development of
the Asian nations. This implies, of course, that
we have an equally vital interest in preventing
the domination of the area by a hostile power
which — for whatever ideological or other rea-
sons— might seek to organize the human and
physical resources of Asia against us.
Second, that social and economic moderniza-
tion can occur in underdeveloped societies under
more rewarding and less destructive auspices
than the Maoist formula of the "war of national
liberation" and that we have an interest in
demonstrating that the Maoist formula is not,
in any event, an infallible road to power.
Third, that our situation in the world unposes
extraordinary responsibilities upon us, particu-
larly with respect to the preservation of man-
kind from nuclear warfare. In Asia, as else-
where, this means that people must come to
expect, as a matter of course, that we will honor
our commitments and keep our word, however
onerous the cost may seem in a purely local con-
text.
Finally, our problem in Asia is not that the
course we are pursuing may lead us into con-
flict with mainland China. That conflict exists,
and our present concern is how best to reduce,
contain, and finally end it. In other words, our
problem is so to manage our conflict with main-
land China that the chances of a world confla-
gration can be minimized and the possibilities
of peaceful development for China herself, as
well as for the nations which must live on
China's periphery, can be preserved. To be sure,
no policy can absolutely guarantee success, but
there is nothing in our 20th century experience
to suesest that allowing Communist China to
bully, blackmail, and subvert her neighbors
with impunity will in the long nm guarantee
peace in the area or hasten the day when the
Chinese Communist government will be ready
and willing to abandon its paranoid fantasies
234
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
and assume a peaceful posture in the world. Our
own interest, of course, is that this day should
come as quickly as possible.
Having reached this point, I am painfully
aware of the fact that my Asian perspectives
have someliow stopped short of the Indian sub-
continent. This is not to suggest that we are in-
terested only in the Asia which faces us direct-
ly across the Pacific or that the rivalries of the
Indians and tlie Pakistanis — and their im-
memorial miseries — are of no concern to us. But
it does suggest another sort of perspective. Even
American resources are not sufficient for the
task which challenges the entire developed
world in the subcontinent : the task, that is, of
helping the people of that area dispel the con-
stant menace of famine and build an economy
which can sustain human life at a truly human
level.
Here is an Asian perspective for all of us — ■
wherever we live, whatever our ideological bent.
I commend it to you without illusions but hope-
fully— in the belief that when conflict has been
blunted and confrontation has been disarmed
the chances for international understanding lie
in just such cooperative enterprises as the at-
tempt to alleviate and finally to solve the Indian
food and population problem.
Asia has many such problems, and of course
their solution cannot wait upon the peace. But
if we address ourselves to them now, and to-
gether, we may hasten the day when peace will
come.
"Volunteers to America" Begin
Training Programs
The Department of State annoimced on July
24 (press release 165) that the first group of
"Volunteers to America" had that day begun
training programs in Boston, Mass.; Brattle-
boro, Vt. ; and Los Angeles, Calif. Sixty-four
men and women from Africa, Asia, and Latin
America are engaging in 4- week programs prior
to undertaking a year of "exchange peace corps"
service in schools and community programs in
the United States.
This experimental program is based on the
idea that the demonstrated benefits to American
Peace Corps volunteers who have served in other
countries can also be obtained by foreign volun-
teers who come to this country. It is also based
on the idea that more Americans will gain an
opportunity to learn about other parts of the
world by having representatives of other coun-
tries live for limited periods in their commimi-
ties and contribute to school and community
life. Many of the volunteers have already taken
part in service programs in their own countries.
President Johnson proposed such a program
in his international education message of 1966,^
in which he said :
Our Nation has no better ambassadors than the
young volunteers who serve In 46 countries in the Peace
Corps. I propose that we welcome similar ambassadors
to our shores. We need their .special skills and under-
standing, just as they need ours.
The Department of State's Bureau of Educa-
tional and Cultural Affairs is administering the
program under provisions of the Mutual Edu-
cational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961
(Fulbright-Hays Act). There will be 100 vol-
unteers in all brought to the United States dur-
ing the first year, 1967-68. Of the first 64, six
are from Africa, 16 from Asia, and 42 from
Latin America. The average age of the volun-
teers is 23. Twelve countries are cooperating in
the program.
Financing comes from three main sources:
(1) The governments of the volunteers' coun-
tries have assumed the responsibility for inter-
national transportation. (2) Living allowances
are paid by schools or agencies receiving the
volunteers. (3) Travel within the United States,
4 weeks of training, health insurance, and ad-
ministrative and professional support, at an
estimated cost of $2,000 per person, are pro-
vided by the Department of State under the
exchange-of-persons authorizations of the Ful-
bright-Hays Act.
' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.
AUGUST 21, 1967
235
THE CONGRESS
Department Opposes Elimination of Import Quotas
on Extra Long Staple Cotton
Statement hy Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for Political Affairs '
I appreciate this opportunity to testify before
3'our committee on the foreign policy aspects of
H.E. 10915. As you know, the Department of
State has already submitted its comments on
this proposed legislation which would close U.S.
markets to extra long staple cotton exports of
any country which has severed diplomatic rela-
tions with us. In my remarks this morning, I
should like to enlarge upon the material con-
tained in that letter.^
H.E. 10915 raises two issues of foreign policy :
First, is it a sound way to deal with our prols-
lems in the Middle East, where the Sudan and
the United Arab Kepublic have chosen for the
moment to break diplomatic relations with us?
And secondly, is it consistent with our trade
policy and our obligations to other countries in
the field of international commerce ?
H.R. 10915 is predicated on the assumption
that the absence of diplomatic relations is alone
sufficient justification for the severance of trade
relations. But historically this has not been the
case in the conduct of U.S. foreign trade policy.
The United States traded with the Soviet Union
long before diplomatic relations were estab-
lished between the two Governments. In fact,
whenever a government comes to power which
we do not recognize immediately, there is a
temporary lapse in diplomatic relations; but we
normally continue trade as before.
At the present time, there are five countries
with which the United States neither trades nor
enjoys diplomatic relations. In eacli case there
are important specific circumstances that do not
apply, even remotely, to the U.A.R. or the
Sudan.
These five are:
North Viet-Nam, which is conducting aggi-es-
sive warfare against a friendly allied state and
is engaging our armed forces in combat ;
Nortli Korea, which waged aggressive war-
fare against the U.N. and still faces U.N. forces,
includmg American contingents, across a hos-
tile frontier;
Conununist China, condemned by the U.N.
as All aggressor in 1951;
Albania, the European outpost of Mao's
China; and
Castro's Cuba, against which the OAS
[Organization of American States] has imposed
a trade embai'go except for items of mercy.
A break in diplomatic relations does not and
should not lead automatically to disruption of
commerce. Each case is different and should be
examined on its own merits as a matter of policy.
This particular case — involving our imports
of extra long staple cotton — raises important
issues of policy concerning the future of our re-
lations with all the states in the Middle East
which have chosen to break diplomatic relations
with us in the wake of the recent hostilities be-
tween Israel and its neighbors. Onlj' the United
Arab Republic and the Sudan export extra long
staple cotton to the United States. But what we
do in this instance will be closely watched by all
the countries of the Middle East and North
Africa as a signal of our policy. If we take eco-
nomic reprisals against two of those countries
with regard to one commodity, it will be as-
sumed that we are embarking on a general pol-
icy of economic warfare against all of them.
Is it in the interest of the United States to
start down this road?
' Made before the House Committee on Agriculture on
July 12.
• Xot printPd here; for text, see H. Kept. 511, 90th
Cong;., 1st sess.
236
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I submit that such a course would be contrary
to our interests.
The United Arab Republic and other nations
of the Middle East and North Africa broke
diplomatic relations with the United States on
the basis of false charges that British and
American planes participated in those hostili-
ties aaid that we and the British had given
Israel military assistance in other ways as well.
These allegations have no foundation in fact.
They are known to be false. It is significant in
this connection that no country making these
accusations against us has taken up our offer to
examine the records and investigate the facts.
U.S. Efforts for Peace in Middle East
In the Middle Eastern crisis we have pursued
an even-handed course in behalf of our own
strong national interest in peace and stability in
the area. We have opposed acts of hostility and
acts likely to lead to war — the infiltration of
terrorists, the closing of the Strait of Tiran, the
menace of mobilization, the massive supply of
arms to certain countries. We did everything
in our power to find a peaceful solution of the
crisis before tlie fighting broke out. When the
crisis exploded into battle, early in June, we
bent every effort to obtain a cease-fire and then
to move toward a more durable i^eace. That
course is in the equal interest of Israel and of its
neighbors. The survival in the Middle East of
the claim that some countries are in a perpetual
state of war with Israel and have rights of
belligerency against Israel has become a burden
to world peace. All our energies are devoted to
finding the basis for a just and durable peace
in the Middle East, a peace which rests on
respect for the territorial integrity and political
independence of all the states in the area, justice
for the refugees, a status for Jerusalem which
protects the deep religious interests of the whole
world in that universal city, the assurance of
maritime rights, and an end of the arms race.
As we move toward peace in the area, we hope
that diplomatic relations will be restored with
the coimtries which have broken their ties with
us. We regret their decision. Diplomatic rela-
tions are needed particularly in times of strain,
when the risk is gi'eat that misunderstanding
can escalate into hostility. We have strong ties
of friendship, interest, and respect with all
the peoples of the Middle East and North
Africa. We wisli to do nothing at this stage
which would make the restoration of normal
relations more difficult when conditions evolve
sufficiently to permit that step.
Taking the ramifications of such a step into
account, we can see no useful purpose to be
served by preventing the United Arab Repub-
lic and Sudan from keeping their historic share
in our extra long staple cotton quota. Cutting
one of the oldest commercial ties between Egypt
and the United States would add an additional
obstacle to the many which will have to be re-
moved before normal relations can be restored
between the United States and the Government
of the United Arab Republic. We do not believe
it is in the interest of the United States to make
that high wall higher still.
The Governments of the United Arab Re-
public and of the Sudan face difficult decisions
as they begin to face the realities of the situa-
tion. We believe they and all the other govern-
ments of the area should know that the door to
friendly and peaceful relations with the United
States is always open if they wish to take the
indispensable steps toward peaceful coopera-
tion.
The economic sanctions that have been applied
by Arabs in terms of oil exports and by Egypt
in the closing of the Suez Canal have had com-
paratively little effect on the United States. The
burdens of these sanctions have fallen in major
proportion on the Arabs themselves. With this
fact becoming more apparent with each passing
day, it is questionable whether the United States
would gain by imposing a sanction against
Egypt. Such a move on our part would seem to
play into the hands of those who are seeking to
widen the breach between the Middle Eastern
countries and the United States, and indeed to
take positions of control in the internal affairs
of the United Arab Republic, Syria, and
Algeria.
Adverse Effect on Peru
H.R. 10915 would not only damage relations
with the U.A.R. and the Sudan ; it would also
have the undesirable side effect of penalizing
Peru, the other major exporter of ELS cotton.
The adverse effect on Peru follows from the
terms of the legislation establishing ELS cotton
import quotas. Annual import quotas are estab-
lished pursuant to section 22 of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933. Quotas are
global ; unlike the case of sugar, subquotas are
not established for each supplying country.
Thus, there is open competition for the limited
AUGUST 21, 1967
237
market available. Because of this and because
ELS cotton is an agricultural commodity sub-
ject to the vicissitudes of nature, the share of the
imports actually received from each supplier
varies widely from year to year. H.E. 10915
uses as the base year from which to calculate
future import quotas 1964-65, a year when im-
ports from the U.A.R. and the Sudan were at a
10-year high. Imports from Peru in that year
were only 15 percent of the total, a 10-year low.
In 1964-65 Peru supplied only about 13,000
bales; in 1965-66 Peru supplied nearly half our
imports, over 42,000 bales. Average imports
from Peru over the past 5 years were about
27,000 bales annually. H.E. 10915 would there-
fore represent a gross inequity toward our
friendly neighbor to the south, for which cotton
is a most important export crop.
Peru has a long history of supplying the
United States with extra long staple cotton.
During the Second "World War, when there was
an urgent need for extra long staple cotton for
strategic purposes, we were obliged to look to
Peru to satisfy our increased requirements. The
bilateral agreement with Peru of 1942 provided
that that country would "maximize produc-
tion" of long staple cotton to meet our needs.
In light of this history, legislative action reduc-
ing Peru's cotton export market in the United
States at a time when its fishmeal and sugar in-
dustries are both depressed, and it is facing se-
rious balance-of-payments problems, would be
most unfortunate indeed.
Effect on Alliance for Progress Commitments
Passage of H.R. 10915 would also conflict with
our commitments under the Alliance for
Progress.
In the protocol ^ to the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States all members agreed
to "individual and united efforts to bring about
a reduction or elimination of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect the exports of the
Members of the Organization." This commit-
ment has received the support of the United
States Government at the highest level. And at
the meeting of Presidents of the OAS countries
in April of this year, President Jolmson sub-
scribed to the declaration recommending action
to "ensure compliance with international com-
mitments to refrain from introducing or in-
creasing tariff and nontariff barriers that affect
exports of the developing coimtries, taking into
account the interests of Latin America." *
There can be no doubt that passage of this
bill would be considered a violation of this
pledge.
Trade a Two-Way Street
Its enactment would also do damage to our
foreign economic policy interests. The obvious
initial impact of H.E. 10915 would be a reduc-
tion in our imports of ELS cotton. However, its
potential adverse effect on our exports and
foreign investments should not be overlooked.
Trade is a two-way street, and a coimtry can
hardly be expected to maintain purchases from
us if we refuse to buy from it.
It is difficult to quantify the indirect adverse
trade effects of H.E. 10915, because we do not
know exactly how the Sudan, the U.A.E., and
their friends would react. What we do know is
that in 1966 our exports to the U.A.E. and the
Sudan totaled $202.9 million, while our imports
from the same two countries were valued at only
$24.2 million, leaving a net balance of trade in
our favor of $178.7 million. Out of the $202.9
million of exports, only $5.4 million represented
donations, while $75.6 million, or three times
the value of our imports from these two coun-
tries, were commercial, privately financed
operations. Of the remaining $121.9 million of
exports financed through CCC [Commodity
Credit Corporation] or under P.L. 480, $73.3
million is repayable in dollars and $43.2 million
is returnable to us in the form of goods and
services for which we otherwise might have to
expend foi-eign exchange. As the committee
knows, our P.L. 480 program to Egypt termi-
nated at the end of June 1966.
Conflict With Commitments Under GATT
The bill would also contravene our commit-
ments, under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, to administer quantitative restric-
tions in a nondiscriminatory manner.
In 1962 the U.A.E., with the support of the
United States, acceded provisionally to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) . The rights and obligations of GATT
contracting parties are not linked to the exist-
ence of diplomatic relations between such par-
' For text, see S. Ex. L, 90th Cong., 1st sess.
* For background and text of the Declaration of the
Presidents of America, see Bulletin of May 8, 1967,
p. 706.
238
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ties. Contracting parties' obligations can be
waived by a two-thirds vote of the contracting
parties, but it is not likely that tlie United
States could obtain a waiver in order to dis-
criminate against the U.A.R. Egypt thus would
be entitled to claim compensation for injury to
its trade that stemmed from the enactment and
administration of the bill. Since H.R. 10915
conflicts with both the most- favored-nation and
the nondiscrimination provisions of the GATT,
its enactment would concern all friendly coun-
tries that look to the United States to honor its
international commitments.
We must recognize that section 22 quotas are
not a concession on the part of the United States
but rather a concession on the part of the parties
to GATT which we are obligated not to reduce.
Our general commitments under GATT are to
abstain from quantitative restrictions. Other
contracting parties have given us a waiver from
this general commitment for the specific pur-
pose of permitting a rational administration of
the law.
This bill is troublesome for still another rea-
son. Its enactment would represent, so far as I
know, the first instance in which the United
States Government permitted international
political developments to interfere with the con-
sistent and judicious administration of section
22. The Department believes that this section of
the law should continue to be administered on
the basis of agricultural and economic consid-
erations alone, without arbitrary or capricious
amendment of the formula used successfully for
so long in establishing the import quotas for
ELS cotton.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
ILO [International Labor Organization] Recommenda-
tion 127. Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations transmitting the text of ILO
Recommendation 127 concerning the role of coopera-
tives in the economic and social development of de-
veloping countries, adopted by the International
Labor Conference at its 50th session at Geneva on
June 21, 1960. H. Doc. 135. June 19, 1967. 8 pp.
Communist Activities in Latin America, 1967. Report
of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the
House Committee on Foreign AfCairs. H. Rept. 481.
July 11, 1967. 24 pp.
Participation of the United States in the International
Criminal Police Organization. H. Rept. 507. July 24,
1967. 5 pp.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES
Provisional Agenda, Twenty-second
Session of U.N. General Assembly ^
U.N. doc. A/66S0/Rev. 1
1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the
delegation of Afghanistan.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-
second session of the General Assembly:
( a ) Appointment of the Credentials Committee ;
(b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election
of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article
12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United
Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the vrork of
the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the
Security Council.
16. Election of nine members of the Economic and So-
cial Council.
17. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial De-
velopment Board.
18. Election of the members of the Executive Board
of the United Nations Capital Development Fund.
19. Election of the members of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law.
20. Appointment of the members of the Peace Ob-
servation Commission.
21. United Nations Emergency Force :
( a ) Report on the Force :
(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the
Force.
22. Co-oi)eration between the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity: report of the
Secretary-General [resolution 2193 (XXI) of 15
December 1966].
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples :
report of the Special Committee on the Situation
with regard to the Implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples [resolutions 2134 (XXI) of
29 September 1966, 2138 (XXI) of 22 October 1966,
2145 (XXI) and 2146 (XXI) of 27 October 1966,
'To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept.
19, 1967.
ATJGUST 21, 1967
239
2151 (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2183 (XXI),
2184 (XXI) and 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966,
21S9 (XXI) of 13 December 1966, and 2226 (XXI),
2227 (XXI), 2228 (XXI), 2229 (XXI), 2230
(XXI), 2231 (XXI), 2232 (XXI) and 2238 (XXI)
of 20 December 1906].
24. Activities of foreign economic and other interests
whicli are impeding the implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rho-
desia, South West Africa and Territories under
Portuguese domination and in all other Terri-
tories under colonial domination [resolution 2189
(XXI) of 13 December 1966].
25. Installation of mechanical means of voting: report
of the Secretary-General [decision of 7 December
1966].
26. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a
conference for the purpose of reviewing the
Charter [resolution 2114 (XX) of 21 December
1965].
27. Question of holding further conferences on the
peaceful uses of atomic energy [resolution 2056
(XX) of 16 December 1965].
28. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons :
(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolu-
tion 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966] ;
(b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the
Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
[resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November
I960].
29. Question of general and complete disarmament :
(a) Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolu-
tion 2162 C (XXI) of 5 December 1966] ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General on the ef-
fects of the possible use of nuclear weapons
and on the security and economic Implications
for States of the acquisition and further de-
velopment of these weapons [resolution 2162
A (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
30. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear tests : report of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament [reso-
lution 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966].
31. Elimination of foreign military bases in the coun-
tries of Asia, Africa and Latin America : report of
the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee
on Disarmament [resolution 2165 (XXI) of 5
December 1966].
32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of
outer space : report of the Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space [resolutions 2222 (XXI)
and 2223 (XXI) of 10 December 1966].
33. The Korean question : report of the United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea [resolution 2224 (XXI) of 19 December
1966].
34. Report of the Commissioner-General of the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East [resolution 2154 (XXI)
of 17 November 1966].
35. The policies of apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa [resolution 2202 A
(XXI) of 16 December 1966] :
(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Pol-
icies of Apartheid of the Government of the I
Republic of South Africa ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General.
36. Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation [resolution 2213 (XXI) of 17
December 1966].
37. Comprehensive review of the whole question of
peace-keeping operations In all their aspects: re-
port of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping
Operations [resolution 2249 (S-V) of 23 May
1967].
38. United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment : report of the Trade and Development Board
[resolutions 2206 (XXI), 2207 (XXI), 2208 (XXI),
2209 (XXI) and 2210 (XXI) of 17 December 1966].
39. United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion : report of the Industrial Development Board
[resolutions 2152 (XXI) of 17 November 1966 and
2178 (XXI) of 9 December 1966].
40. United Nations Capital Development Fund: con-
firmation of the appointment of the Managing Di-
rector [resolution 2186 (XXI) of 13 December
1966].
41. United Nations Development Decade: report of
the Secretary-General [resolution 2218 (XXI) of
19 December 1966].
42. External financing of economic development of the
developing countries [resolutions 2169 (XXI) and
2170 (XXI) of 6 December 1966] :
(a) Accelerated flow of capital and technical as-
sistance to the developing countries : report of
the Secretary-General ;
(b) Outflow of capital from the developing coun-
tries : report of the Secretary-General.
43. Development of natural resources [Economic and
Social Council resolution 1218 (XLII) of 1 June
1967].
44. The role of the United Nations in training national
technical personnel for the accelerated industriali-
zation of the developing countries [resolution 2090
(XX) of 20 December 1965].
45. United Nations Institute for Training and Re-
search : report of the Executive Director [resolu-
tion 2187 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
46. Operational activities for development [resolutions
2179 (XXI) and 2180 (XXI) of 9 December 1966] :
(a) Activities of the United Nations Development
Programme : reports of the Governing
Council ;
(b) Activities undertaken by the Secretary-
General.
47. Regional development [decision of 24 September
1966].
48. Programme of studies on multilateral food aid :
report of the Secretary-General [resolution 21.55
(XXI) of 22 November 1966].
49. General review of the programmes and activities
in the economic, social, technical co-operation and
related fields of the United Nations, the specialized
agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the United Nations Children's Fund and all other
institutions and agencies related to the United
Nations system : report of the enlarged Com-
mittee for Programme and Co-ordination [resolu-
240
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion 2188 (XXI) of 13 December 1966].
50. World social situation : report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 2215 (XXI) of 19 December
1966].
51. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees :
(a) Report of the High Commissioner [resolution
2197 (XXI) of 16 December 1966] ;
(b) Question of the continuation of the Office of
the High Commissioner [resolution 1783
(XVII) of 7 December 1962].
52. Housing, building and planning : report of the Sec-
retary-General [resolution 2036 (XX) of 7 Decem-
ber 1965].
53. Town twinning as a means of international co-
operation : report of the Economic and Social
Council [resolution 2058 (XX) of 16 December
1965].
54. Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation against Women [resolution 2109 (XXI) of
16 December 1966].
55. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance:
(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Religious Intolerance [decision of 19
December 1966] ;
(b) Draft International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Religious Intolerance
[idetn^.
56. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination
[resolutions 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965 and
2142 (XXI) of 26 October 1966] :
(a) Implementation of the United Nations Decla-
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination : report of the Secretary-
General ;
(b) Status of the International Convention on the
Elimination of AH Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation : report of the Secretary-General ;
(c) Measures to be taken against nazism and ra-
cial intolerance [Economic and Social Council
resolution 1211 (XLII) of 29 May 1967] ;
(d) Measures for the speedy implementation of in-
ternational instruments against racial dis-
crimination [Economic and Social Council
resolution 1244 (XLII) of 6 June 1967].
57. Question of the violation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial
discrimination and segregation and of apartheid,
in all coimtries, with particular reference to co-
lonial and other dependent countries and territo-
ries: report of the Secretary-General [resolution
2144 (XXI) of 26 October 1966].
58. Status of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights and the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights : report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral [resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December
1966].
59. International Year for Human Rights :
(a) Programme of measures and activities to be
undertaken in connexion with the International
Tear for Human Rights : report of the Secre-
tary-General [resolution 2217 A (XXI) of 19
December 1966] ;
(b) Report of the Preparatory Committee for the
International Conference on Human Rights
[resolution 2217 C (XXI) of 19 December
1966].
60. Freedom of information [resolution 2216 (XXI) of
19 December 1966] :
(a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Information ;
(b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information.
61. Question of the punishment of war criminals and
of persons who have committed crimes against
humanity [Economic and Social Council resolution
1220 (XLII) of 6 June 1907].
62. Question concerning the implementation of human
rights through a United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights or some other appropriate inter-
national machinery [General Assembly decision of
19 December 1966 and Economic and Social Coun-
cil resolution 1237 (XLII) of 6 June 1967],
63. Capital punishment : report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 1918 (XVIII) of 5 December
1963].
64. Information from Xon-Self-Governing Territories
transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of
the United Nations [resolution 2233 (XXI) of
20 December 1966] :
(a) Report of the Secretary-General;
(b) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ-
ation with regard to the Implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
65. Question of South West Africa [resolutions 2145
(XXI) and 2146 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and
2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, and decision of 13 June
1967] :
(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ-
ation with regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ;
(b) Report of the United Nations Council for
South West Africa ;
(c) Appointment of the United Nations Commis-
sioner for South West Africa.
66. Special educational and training programmes for
South West Africa : report of the Secretary-General
[resolution 2236 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
67. Question of Territories under Portuguese adminis-
tration [resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December
1966] :
(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ-
ation with regard to the Implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General.
68. Special training programme for Territories under
Portuguese administration : report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 2237 (XXI) of 20 December
1966].
69. Question of the consolidation and integration of
the special educational and training programmes
for South West Africa, the special training pro-
gramme for Territories under Portuguese admin-
istration and the educational and training pro-
gramme for South Africans : report of the
Secretary-General [resolution 2235 (XXI) of
20 December 1966].
70. Question of Fiji : report of the Special Committee
on the Situation with regard to the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
AUGUST 21, 1967
241
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolu-
tion 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966].
71. Question of Oman [resolution 2238 (XXI) of 20 De-
cember 1966] :
(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Situ-
ation with regard to the Implementation of the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General.
72. Offers by Member States of study and training
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing
Territories : report of the Secretary-General [reso-
lution 2234 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
73. Financial reports and accounts for the financial
year ended 31 December 1966 and reports of the
Board of Auditors :
(a) United Nations;
(b) United Nations Development Programme;
(c) United Nations Children's Fund;
(d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East ;
(e) Voluntary funds administered by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
74. Supplementary estimates for the financial year
1967.
75. Budget estimates for the financial year 1968.
76. Pattern of conferences [resolution 2239 (XXI) of
20 December 1966] :
(a) Report of the Committee on Conferences;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General.
77. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership
of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:
(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions ;
(b) Committee on Contributions ;
(c) Board of Auditors ;
(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the
appointments made b.v the Secretary-General ;
(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal ;
(f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
78. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the
expenses of the United Nations : report of the
Committee on Contributions.
79. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized
agencies and the International Atomic Energy
Agency :
(a) Earmarliings and contingency authorizations
from the Technical Assistance Account of the
United Nations Development Programme ;
(b) Allocations from the Special Fund Account of
the United Nations Development Programme.
80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the
United Nations with the specialized agencies and
the International Atomic Energy Agency : report of
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions.
81. Implementation of the recommendations made by
the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the
Finances of the United Nations and the Special-
ized Agencies : report of the Secretar.v-General
[resolution 2150 (XXI) of 4 November 1066].
82. Publications and documentation of the United Na-
tions: report of the Secretary-General [resolution
2247 (XXI) of 20 December 1966].
83. Personnel questions :
(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of the
Secretary-General ;
(b) Other personnel questions.
84. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension
Board.
85. United Nations International School : report of the
Secretary-General [resolution 2176 (XXI) of 9
December 1966].
86. Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its nineteenth session.
87. Law of treaties [resolution 2166 (XXI) of 5 De-
cember 1966].
88. Consideration of principles of international law
concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations: report of the Special Com-
mittee on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States [resolution 2181 (XXI) of 12 December
1966].
89. Question of methods of fact-finding [resolution 2182
(XXI) of 12 December 1966].
90. Draft Declaration on Territorial Asylum [resolu-
tion 2203 (XXI) of 16 December 1966].
91. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the
Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Ap-
preciation of International Law : report of the
Secretary-General [resolution 2204 (XXI) of 16
December 1966].
92. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America [item proposed by Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela (A/6676 and Add. 1 and 2)].
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed telow) may he consulted at depository lihra/ries
in the United States. V.N. printed publicatioiis may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Law of Treaties. Guide to the draft articles on the law
of treaties adopted by the International Law Com-
mission at its 18th session. Prepared by the Secre-
tariat. A/C.6/376. May 11, 1967. 163 pp.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space :
Information furnished by the TTnited Stntes on ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.-
l&i. May 29, 1967.
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. on objects
launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.165.
June 14, 1967.
Satellite Communications : An Indian Study. A/
AC.10.-/36. June 20, 1967. 19 pp.
Information furnished by Ital.v on objects launched
into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.166. July 10,
1067.
242
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and Israel Sign
New Cotton Textile Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State announced on July
13 (press release 158) that the United States
and Israel had that day signed a new com-
prehensive bilateral cotton textile agreement
covering exports of Israeli cotton textiles to
the United States through September 30, 1970.
The new agreement, a result of negotiations
which took place in Geneva and Washington in
the early months of this year, was signed by
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Resources and Food Policy Edward R. Fried
on behalf of the U.S. Government, and by
Ambassador Avraham Harman on behalf of
the Government of Israel. It replaces an agree-
ment between the two coimtries signed on
January 27, 1967.^
The new agreement differs from the previous
one primarily in the following respects :
1. The yarn group and category limits have
been elimmated, thereby permitting Israel to
ship cotton yarn up to the aggregate limit by
the amount it did not ship in other group and
specific categories established in the agreement.
2. Yarn exports in categories 2, 3, and 4 are
subject to a provision under which they may be
limited in the event of undue concentration in
any of those categories.
3. Carryover of shortfalls of up to 5 percent
of applicable limits is provided.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE
Excellency : I refer to tlie decision of the Cotton
Textiles Committee of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade approving a Protocol to extend through
September 30, 1070, the Long-Term Arrangement re-
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done
in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Long-Term Arrangement"). I also refer to
recent discussions between representatives of our two
Governments and to the agreement between our two
Governments concerning exports of cotton textiles
from Israel to the United States effected by an exchange
of notes dated January 27, 1967. I confirm, on behalf
of my Government, the understanding that this agree-
ment is replaced by a new agreement as provided in
the following numbered paragraphs. This new agree-
ment is based on our understanding that the above-
mentioned Protocol will enter into force for our two
Governments on October 1, 1967.
1. The term of this agreement shall be from October 1,
1966 through September 30, 1970. During the term
of this agreement, the Government of Israel shall limit
annual exports of cotton textiles from Israel to the
United States to aggregate, group, and specific limits
at the levels specified in the following paragraphs.
2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12-
month period beginning October 1, 1966, the aggregate
limit shall be 23 million square yards equivalent.
3. Within the aggregate limit, the following group
limits shall apply for the first agreement year :
In Million
Square Yards
Equivalent
Group I Fabric and Miscellaneous
(Categories 5-38 and 64) 7. 5
Group II Apparel (Categories 39-63) 4.0
4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable
group limits, the following specific limits shall apply
for the first agreement year :
Group I Fabrics and Miscellaneous
Category 9/10 1 million square yards
Category 22/23 2 million square yards
Category 26/27 2.5 million square yards
(of which exports in duck may not exceed 1.75
million square yards.)
Category 64 220,000 pounds (1,012,000
square yards equiva-
lent)
Group II Apparel
Category 48
Category 52
Category 53
Category 62
Category 63
30, 098 dozens
25, 000 dozens
10, 000 dozens
220, 000 pounds
100, 000 pounds
In Square Yards
Equivalent
1, 504, 900
363, 250
453,000
1, 012, 000
460, 000
' For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 6, 1967, p. 389.
5. Within the aggregate limit, the limit for Group I
may be exceeded by not more than 10 percent, and
the limit for Group II may be exceeded by not more
than 5 percent. Within the applicable group limit, as
it may be adjusted under this provision, specific lim-
its may be exceeded by not more than 5 percent.
6. (a) Within the aggregate limit and any appli-
cable group limits the square yard equivalent of any
shortfalls occurring in exports in the categories given
specific limits may be used in any category not given
a specific limit, including the yarn categories.
(b) In the event of undue concentration in exports
from Israel to the United States of yam in Categories
2, 3 and 4, the Government of the United States of
AUGUST 21, 1967
243
America may request consultation with the Govern-
ment of Israel in order to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory solution to the problem. The Government of Israel
shall enter into such consultations when requested.
Until a mutually satisfactory solution is reached, the
Government of Israel shall limit the exports from
Israel to the United States of yarn in the category in
question starting with the twelve-month i)eriod be-
ginning on the date of the request for consultation.
This limit shall be one hundred five percent of the
exports from Israel to the United States in that cate-
gory of yarn during the most recent twelve-month
period preceding the request for consultation for which
statistics are available to our two Governments on
the date of the request.
(e) In the event the Government of Israel desires
to permit exports during any agreement year of more
than the level of the consultation limit specified herein
in any category in Groups I or II not having a spe-
cific limit, the Government of Israel shall request con-
sultations with the Government of the United States
of America on this question. For the first agreement
year the level of the consultation limit for each cate-
gory in Group I not having a specific limit shall be
500,000 square yards equivalent, and for each cate-
gory in Group II not having a specific limit shall be
300,000 square yards equivalent. The Government of
the United States of America shall enter into such
consultations and, during the course thereof, shall
provide the Government of Israel with information on
the condition of the United States market in the cate-
gory in question. Until agreement is reached the Gov-
ernment of Israel shall continue to limit exports In
that category for that agreement year to the consulta-
tion limit.
7. The Government of Israel shall use its best efforts
to space exports from Israel to the United States with-
in each category evenly throughout the agreement
year, taking into consideration normal seasonal fac-
tors.
8. In the second and succeeding 12-month periods for
which any limitations are in force under this agree-
ment, the level of exports permitted under such limi-
tations shall be increased by 5 percent of the corre-
sponding levels for the preceding 12-month period, the
latter levels not to include any adjustments under
paragraphs 5 or 16.
9. The two Governments recognize that the success-
ful implementation of this agreement depends in large
part upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions.
The Government of the United States of America shall
promptly supply the Government of Israel with
monthly data on the import of cotton textiles from
Israel. The Government of Israel shall promptly sup-
ply the Government of the United States of America
with data on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the
United States. Each Government agrees to supply
promptly any other available relevant statistical data
requested by the other Government.
10. In the implementation of this agreement, the sys-
tem of categories and the rates of conversion into square
yard equivalents listed in Annex A ' hereto shall apply.
In any situation where the determination of an article
to be a cotton textile would be affected by whether the /
criterion provided for in Article 9 of the Long-Term
Arrangement is used or the criterion provided for In
paragraiJh 2 of Annex E of the Long-Term Arrange-
ment is used, the chief value criterion used by the
Government of the United States of America In accord-
ance with paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.'
11. The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Israel agree to consult on any
question arising in the implementation of the agree-
ment.
12. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange-
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor
problems arising in the implementation of this agree-
ment including differences in points of procedures or
operation.
13. If the Government of Israel considers that as a
result of limitations specified in this agreement, Israel
is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a
third country, the Government of Israel may request
consultation with the Government of the United States
of America with the view to taking appropriate
remedial action such as reasonable modification of this
agreement.
14. During the term of this agreement, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America will not request
restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Israel
to the United States under the provisions of Article 3
of the Long-Term Arrangement. The applicability of
the Long-Term Arrangement to trade in cotton textiles
between Israel and the United States shall otherwise
be unaffected by this agreement.
15. In view of the special circumstances that existed
in 1966 the following special provisions apply :
(a) For the first agreement year only, exports in
Categories 9/10, 22/23 and 26/27 up to 60 percent in
excess of the specific limit for each such set of these
categories and of the specific limit for duck :
( i ) shall not be counted against the specific limits
specified in paragraph 4 or the Group II Umit specified
in paragraph 3, but
(ii) shall be counted against the aggregate limit
specified in paragraph 2.
The figures stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 for group and
sjjecific limits shall be used without any adjustments
authorized under paragraph 5 for the purpose of cal-
culating the amount of these exports that are not to
be counted against specific and group limits. The
amounts that may be exported under this subparagraph
(a) shall not be considered as adjustments of any
limits for purposes of paragraphs 5, S or 16 of this
agreement.
(b) During each of the second, third and fourth
agreement years, the two Governments will charge
against the specific, group and aggregate limits appli-
cable for each such year the following quantities as
compensation for overshipments during the 12-month
period beginning October 1, 1965 :
' Not printed here ; for text, see Department of State
press release 158 dated July 13.
' For text of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange-
ment, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Category Ind AgreemerU Year Srd Agreement Year ith Agreement Year
{In Square Tarda Equivalent)
22
26
(
62
(duck)
780, 000
(169, 565 lbs.)
160, 000
240, 000
50, 000
Total 1, 230, 000
780, 000
(169, 565 lbs.)
160, 000
240, 000
50, 000
1, 230, 000
780, 000
(169, 565 lbs.)
160,000
240, 000
50, 000
1, 2.30, 000
16. (a) For any agreement year Immediately fol-
lowing a year of a shortfall (i.e., a year m which ex-
ports from Israel to the United States were below the
aggregate limit and any group and specific limits ap-
plicable to the category concerned) the Government
of Israel may permit exports to exceed these limits by
carryover in the following amounts and manner :
( i ) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of
the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any ap-
plicable group or specific limits and shall not exceed
either 5 percent of the aggregate limit or 5 percent of
the applicable group limit in the year of the shortfall,
and
(ii) in the case of shortfalls in categories subject
to specific limits the carryover shall be used in the
same category in which the shortfall occurred, and
shall not exceed 5 percent of the specific limit in the
year of the shortfall, and
(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall
be used in the same group in which the shortfall oc-
curred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable spe-
cific limit except in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 5, and shall be subject to the provisions of
paragraph 6 of the agreement.
(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this
paragraph or paragraph 5.
(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports
permitted in paragraph 5. The carryover shall not be
considered in calculating growth under paragraph 8.
17. Either Government may terminate this agree-
ment, effective at the end of an agreement year, by writ-
ten notice to the other Government to be given at least
90 days prior to the end of such agreement year. Either
Government may at any time propose revisions in the
terms of the agreement.
If the foregoing conforms with the understanding
of your Government, this note and your Excellency's
note' of acceptance on behalf of the Government of
Israel shall constitute an agreement between our
Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State :
Edward R. Feied
His Excellency
AVRAHAM HaRMAN,
Ambassador of Israel.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Cultural Relations
Agreement for facilitating the international circulation
of visual and auditory materials of an educational,
scientific and cultural character, and protocol. Done
at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into force for
the United States January 12, 1067. TIAS 6116.
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 5, 1967.
Organization of American States
Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States — the "Protocol of Buenos
Aires." Signed at Buenos Aires February 27, 1967.'
Ratification deposited: Argentina, July 21, 1967.
BILATERAL
China
Agreement relating to United States liability during
operation of the NS Savannah by a private company.
Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei March 24 and
June 8, 1967. Entered into force June 8, 1967.
European Economic Community
Agreement concerning suspension of agreements con-
cerning qualit.y wheat and other grains (TIAS 5034,
5035). Effected by exchange of notes at Geneva June
30, 1967. Entered into force June 30, 1967.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Mr. Woodward Named Interim
Director of Water for Peace Office
The Department of State aimoimced on July
28 (press release 168) that Eobert R. Wood-
ward ^ has been named by Secretary Rusk as
interim director of the newly established "Water
for Peace Office.
The Water for Peace Office will provide a
central point within the Government for leader-
ship and coordination of the Water for Peace
program. Its establishment is evidence of the
American intent to foster international co-
' Not printed.
' Not in force.
"For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 168 dated July 28.
245
operation in water resources development. The
Water for Peace Office will perform the follow-
ing fmictions on a continuing basis :
Formulate comprehensive policy, plans, and
evaluations of the international water-related
activities of the Government.
Assist in the formulation, presentation, and
review of program and budgetary requirements
for such activities.
Assure appropriate consideration of "Water
for Peace programs in foreign policy decisions.
Maintain liaison with intergovernmental
bodies and nongovernmental organizations
dealing primarily with international water-re-
lated programs.
Provide information on Water for Peace
activities to the Congress and the public and
take appropriate action on their requests.
In carrying out these functions the Water for
Peace Office will work closely with the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the other agencies hav-
ing responsibilities and tecluiical competence
in the water resources field.
U.S. Consulate Closed
at Cordoba, Argentina
The Department of State announced on July 12
(Department Notice) that the consulate at Cordoba,
Argentina, was closed on June 30. Responsibility for
consular functions in the provinces formerly in the
Cordoba consular district was transferred to the
Embassy in Buenos Aires.
PUBLICATIONS
Confirmations
The Senate on July 27 confirmed the following
nominations:
Kennedy M. Crockett to be Ambassador to Nicaragua.
(For biographic details, see Department of State press
release 167 dated July 31. )
Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., to be Ambassador to Paki-
stan. ( For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 171 dated August 1.)
Designations
Herman Pollack as Director of International Scien-
tific and Technological Affairs, effective July 14. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press re-
lease 160 dated July 14.)
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Oovernment Printing Offlce, Washington, D.C. 20^02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100
or more copies of any one publication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superinten-
dent of Documents, must accompany orders.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government ofiicials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5^ each.
Albania. Pub. 8217. 4 pp.
Argentina. Pub. 7836. 5 pp.
Australia. Pub. 8149. 7 pp.
Barbados. Pub. 8242. 5 pp.
Brazil. Pub. 7756. 4 pp.
Burma. Pub. 7931. 6 pp.
Burundi. Pub. 8084. 8 pp.
Cambodia. Pub. 7747. 5 pp.
China, Republic of. Pub. 7791. 6 pp.
Cyprus. Pub. 7932. 5 pp.
Dominican Republic. Pub. 7759. 6 pp.
Ecuador. Pub. 7771. 5 pp.
France. Pub. 8209. 8 pp.
Jamaica. Pub. 8080. 4 pp.
Malta. Pub. 8220. 4 pp.
Nepal. Pub. 7904. 5 pp.
New Zealand. Pub. 8251. 6 pp.
Norway. Pub. 8228. 4 pp.
Saudi Arabia. Pub. 7835. 4 pp.
Seychelles. Pub. 8246. 3 pp.
Singapore. Pub. 8240. 5 pp.
South Viet-Nam. Pub. 7933. 6 pp.
Thailand. Pub. 7961. 5 pp.
Yemen. Pub. 8170. 3 pp.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Antigua. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Bridgetown and Antigua December
19 and 28, 1966. Entered into force December 28, 1966.
TIAS 6195. 3 pp. 5(J.
Technical Cooperation. Agreement with the Somali
Republic, extending the agreement of January 28 and
February 4, 1961, as extended. Exchange of notes —
Dated at Mogadiscio December 27 and 29, 1966. En-
tered into force December 29, 1966. TIAS 6199. 2 pp. 5«!.
Education-Exchange Commission and Financing of
Programs. Agreement with Colombia, amending the
agreement of January 9, 1957, as amended. Exchange
of notes — Signed at BogotA March 15 and April 8, 1963.
Entered into force April 8, 1963. TIAS 6200. 6 pp. 5(*.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India, ex-
tending the agreement of April 15, 1964, as amended
and extended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi
March 30, 1967. Entered into force March 30, 1967.
Effective October 1, 1966. TIAS 6241. 2 pp. 5^.
246
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX August 21, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. H69
Agriculture. Department Opposes Elimination
of Import Quotas on Extra Long Staple Cotton
(Rostow)
Algeria. Restrictions on Travel to Algeria, Libya,
and the Sudan Lifted
Argentina. U.S.
Argentina . .
Consulate Closed at Cordoba,
Asia. Asian Perspectives (Kaplan)
Congress
Confirmations (Crockett, Oehlert)
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy
Department Opposes Elimination of Import Quo-
tas on Extra Long Staple Cotton (Rostow) .
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Croclcett, Oeblert)
Designations (Pollack)
U.S. Consulate Closed at Cordoba, Argentina .
i Mr. Woodward Named Interim Director of Water
for Peace Office
Economic Affairs
Asian Perspectives (Kaplan)
Department Opposes Elimination of Import Quo-
tas on Extra Long Staple Cotton (Rostow) .
International Cooperation for Development of
the Oceans (Humphrey)
United States and Israel Sign New Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) ....
Educational and Cultural Affairs. "Volunteers to
America" Begin Training Programs ....
Israel. United States and Israel Sign New Cotton
Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . . .
Korea. Asian Perspectives (Kaplan) ....
Libya. Restrictions on Travel to Algeria, Libya,
and the Sudan Lifted
Near East. Restrictions on Travel to Algeria,
Libya, and the Sudan Lifted
Nicaragua. Crockett Confirmed as Ambassador .
Pakistan. Oehlert Confirmed as Ambassador .
Passports. Restrictions on Travel to Algeria,
Libya, and the Sudan Lifted
Pern. Department Opposes Elimination of Im-
port Quotas on Extra Long Staple Cotton
(Rostow)
Publications. Recent Releases
Science. International Cooperation for Develoi>-
ment of the Oceans (Humphrey)
Sudan
Department Opposes Elimination of Import Quo-
tas on Extra Long Staple Cotton (Rostow) .
236
229
246
230
246
239
236
246
246
246
245
230
236
227
243
235
243
230
229
229
246
246
229
236
246
227
Restrictions on Travel to Algeria, Libya, and the
Sudan Lifted 229
Trade. United States and Israel Sign New Cot-
ton Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) . S43
Treaty Information
Current Actions 245
United States and Israel Sign New Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement (test of U.S. note) .... 243
United Arab Republic. Department Opposes
Elimination of Import Quotas on Extra Long
Staple Cotton (Rostov) 236
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 242
Provisional Agenda, Twenty-second Session of
U.N. General Assembly 239
Viet-Nam. Asian Perspectives (Kaplan) . . . 230
Water for Peace. Mr. Woodward Named Interim
Director of Water for Peace Office .... 245
'Name Index
Crockett, Kennedy M 246
Humphrey, Vice President 227
Kaplan, Harold 230
Oehlert, Benjamin H., Jr 246
PoUack, Herman 246
Rostow, Eugene V 236
Woodward, Robert R 245
236
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 31-August 6
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to July 31 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 158 of July
13, 165 of July 24, and 168 of July 28.
No. Date Subject
*167 7/31 Crockett sworn in as Ambassador to
Nicaragua (biographic details).
*171 8/1 Oehlert sworn in as Ambassador to
Pakistan (biographic details).
172 8/1 Travel restrictions lifted for
Algeria, Libya, and the Sudan.
tl73 8/1 Settlement of Pious Fund claim.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
ill20
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECOKD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol LVII, No. U70
August 28, 1967
THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Address hy Secretary Busk 251
THE STATE OF THE BUDGET AND THE ECONOMY
/ - Message From the President to the Congress {Excerpts) 266
MR. CLIFFORD AND GENERAL TAYLOR REPORT ON TALKS
ON VIET-NAM WITH ALLIED LEADERS 266
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AT THE UNITED NATIONS
hy Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
For index see inside bach cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1470 Publication 8282
August 28, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing OfiSce
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $16.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is Indexed In
the Beaders' Oulde to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as icell as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg- .
islative material in the field of inter- i
national relations are listed currently.
The Central Purpose of United States Foreign Policy
Address hy Secretary Rusk ^
I'm very happy to see so many J^oung people
here this evening. Some of you miglit want to
ask me, "\Vliat is foreign policy all about? My
answer would be very simple. It is about you —
your future, your homes, your communities,
your safety, your opportunities. This business
of diplomacy is not a game of chess, played by
strange people in distant capitals with big
words ; it is toil, hour by hour, day by day, to try
to build a world which will be tomorrow a little
more decent than it is todaj^, a world in which
you will have a chance to grow up with the
great promises of freedom, as Americans en-
titled to the great heritage of this coimtry.
I want to remind the young people that we are
meeting here as veterans. I know that young
people never like to hear us older people say that
we, too, once were young. But when we think
of oiu-selves as veterans, we cannot help but re-
call that only yesterday we were young. When
the Catholic War Veterans was organized, we
were the generation of youth, and in those days
we were told that Manchuria was too far away ;
that Ethiopia was none of our business ; that if
Hitler took another bite, perhaps he would be
satisfied ; that we ought to tend to our own busi-
ness and not take a step, or join in the steps,
which could prevent World War II. And so that
generation of young people was called upon by
the tens of millions to go all over the earth — not
just to Manchuria but to Guadalcanal and
Burma, to the Ardennes Forest and to Iran —
in order to try to recover what was being done
to freedom and to build a little peace in the
world.
And so I want to reflect, just a little bit, about
some of the utter simplicities of what this nation
is all about. Because when times are troubled,
and men are being tested in their devotion to
' Made before the Catholic War Veterans convention
at Washington, D.C., on Aug. 5.
duty as they are being tested today, it is impor-
tant not to be too complicated or sophisticated
but to think rather simply and deeply about
what it's all about. Now the central purpose of
our foreign policy is the security of the United
States — in a familiar phrase in the preamble of
our Constitution, to ''secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Our
foreign policy also reflects our basic convictions,
the enduring values to which we a people are
dedicated: a belief in human dignity — not just
a phrase ; in government with the consent of the
governed, the most powerful and revolutionary
political idea in the world today; in freedom
of worship and other freedoms for all in the
brotherhood of man. Both our national security
and our basic convictions compel us to work for
a peaceful and orderly world and impel us to
help our fellow man to achieve a more decent
life.
In a speech in 1943 Prime Minister Winston
Churchill said this about the role of the United
States in the world :
One cannot rise to be in many ways the leading
community in the civilized world without being in-
volved in its problems, without being convulsed by its
agonies, and inspired by its causes.
Two years later, another great man called at-
tention to a fundamental change in the problem
of defending our coimtry, caused by new weap-
ons which appeared near the end of the Second
World War. In his final biennial report as Chief
of Staff, General of the Army George Marshall
wrote :
. . . The technique of war has brought the United
States — its homes and factories — into the front line
of world conflict. They escaped destructive bombard-
ment in the Second World War. They would not in a
third.
. . . We are concerned with the peace of the entire
world.
Now, that was written after intercontinental
AUGUST 28, 1967
273-001—67
251
bombers and atomic bombs, but before intercon-
tinental missiles with thermonuclear warheads.
Even before the first atomic bomb was ex-
ploded, we had evinced our concern with the
peace of the world and the welfare of the human
race by our role in organizing the United Na-
tions. Today it is literally impossible for us to
find safety apart from the I'est of the world. "We
cannot secede from our planet, and M'e cannot
preserve our security by policies and defenses
which are confined to North America or the
Western Hemisphere or just the North Atlantic
or which extend only to the islands oif the coast
of the Eurasian landmass.
World Peace the First Imperative
The first imperative of our time is world
peace, and no one has set this forth more elo-
quently than His Holiness Pope Paul VI and his
predecessor Pope John XXIII.
The goal of the foreign policy of the United
States is, and must be, a lasting peace in which
free societies can thrive, the kind of world order
sketched out in the preamble and article 1 of
the United Nations Charter: a world of inde-
pendent nations, each free to choose its own in-
stitutions but cooperating with each other to
prevent aggi'ession, to preserve peace, and to
promote their mutual interests; a world in
which all nations and people can make economic
and social and human progress; a world which
increasingly respects the rule of law; a world
which also encourages, in the words of the char-
ter, "respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion."
Now, this kind of world we strive for is not a
static world; change is the order of the day.
We expect and desire a changing world, one
which changes for the better and in which
change comes through peaceful means and not
through the violent use of force. Tragically, not
all governments have abided by the purposes
and principles of that charter. Some have not
respected the right of self-determination of
people, have not joined in collective measures
for the suppression of acts of aggression, but
have themselves promoted and indulged in acts
of aggression.
And so we and other peoples who value inde-
pendence and liberty have found it necessary to
make clear our determination to exercise the
right of individual and collective self-defense,
and all of us here are aware of the nature of the
threats to freedom and peace with which we
have had to deal since tlie end of the Second
World War. And all of us are aware of the crises
caused by the Communist threats or use of force
in such places as Iran, Greece and Turkey, the
Berlin blockade, Korea, Laos, and in the Cuban
missile crisis, and in Viet-Nam.
Now, the Communist world itself has been
evolving; the two largest Communist nations
are presently hostile to each other, and most of
the smaller Communist states have displayed
increasing independence.
Now, in the most recent years the Soviet
Union and we have manifested a certain pru-
dence in our mutual relations — a prudence
which we welcome and we try to reciprocate —
and we have earnestly sought and shall continue
to seek areas of common interest with our ad-
versaries, especially agreements or arrangements
which would reduce the danger of a great war.
I wish I could tell you that it would be safe
to relax our safeguards and our watchfulness,
but I can't. The leaders of the Soviet Union
remain committed to the Communist world revo-
lution and in principle to what the Commu-
nists call "wars of national liberation" but which
in reality are wars to impose Communist rule.
They are actively engaged in trying to extend
and increase their influence in the less developed
areas of the world. They continue to spend vast
amounts on armaments and to improve and en-
large their nuclear arsenals.
The Conflict in Viet-Nam
The Asian Communists are openly committed
to the use of force to impose Coimnunist rule on
other nations, and so are Castro and many of
his adherents in Latin America. And so it would
be imprudent for us and our allies and friends
to relax or to falter in our efforts to defend lib-
erty and to move the world toward a reliable
peace. And a first essential in organizing a last-
ing peace is of course to eliminate aggression —
hopefully, by deterring it. To that end, we have
defensive alliances with more than 40 other na-
tions, and to that end we are fighting now in
Viet-Nam.
Some people still claim or cling to the mis-
taken notion that the conflict in Viet-Nam is
just a civil war or an assertion of nationalism.
There is, of course, a local southern element in
the war against the Republic of Viet-Nam, but
that is not why the United States has combat
forces there. Our men are there because of the
252
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK
aggression from the North, and in accordance
with a treaty commitment approved by the
United States Senate with only one negative
vote. That this is an aggression is recognized
generally among the non-Communist govern-
ments of East Asia and the Western Pacific.
Every one of them would be dismayed if we
and our allies were to withdraw before securmg
the right of the people of Viet-Nam to live in
peace under a government of their own choice.
As one of the leading newspapers of Malaysia
put it just the other day, there is not a non-
Communist country in the area which is not
confronted by the barrel of a Communist gun.
It is important for us to try to be clear about
what is involved. It's not just a civil war; there
is an aggression. We're not asking for uncondi-
tional surrender; we're not asking North Viet-
Nam to surrender anything — an acre of ground
or a dozen men — or to change their regime ; we're
asking them simply to stop shooting at their
neighbors. If that is unconditional surrender,
I don't understand the English language.
The word "escalation" is usually reserved
only for what the United States and its allies
do. The other side can mine the rivers of the
Saigon harbor, they can put substantial forces
into Cambodia, they can disrupt the demili-
tarized zone, without having it called escala-
tion. We need to look at this with a certain
reciprocity.
There are those now who are using the slogan
"Negotiate now." Let us be quite clear about
that. The United States is prepared to talk
seriously about peace, literally tomorrow, with-
out an_y conditions whatsoever. If the other side
raises some conditions, as they have with re-
spect to the bombing, we're prepared to sit down
with them tomorrow and talk about the
conditions.
What we have felt that we could not do is to
stop one-half of the war while the other half
goes on full steam ahead. Surely the resources
of diplomacy are such that contacts, direct or
indirect, public or private, can ascertain when
the time comes for a serious talk with the other
side about peace. There have been many, many
opportunities for Hanoi to engage in such dis-
cussion, and thus far they have been unwilling
to do so. It is curious to me that after all that
has been done by our own government, by other
governments and groups of governments, and
by leading personalities all over the world that
no one at any time has been able to produce a
North Vietnamese anywhere in the world for
serious discussions about the possibilities of
peace.
Now, it is tragic that in 1967, after all that has
happened since World War II, it should still be
necessary for our young men to face the possibil-
ity of the ultimate sacrifice in the interests of
building a peace for the benefit of the rest of
us. This is why I referred to article 1 of the
United Nations Charter. I hope you young
people will read it over again at your earliest
opportunity — a little moi-e thoughtfully, per-
haps a little prayerfully — with two thoughts in
mind. The one is that the veterans assembled
here and their companions, including those who
did not return from World War II, went
through a world war in order to give us a chance
to write that article 1 of the United Nations
Charter and find a way to build a durable peace.
The cost requires respect for the simple propo-
sitions inscribed there. But there is a second
reason, even more compelling, and that is that
we shall not have a chance to learn the lessons
of world war III. We must remember what it
takes to organize a peace, in order to avoid the
catastrophe which the human race cannot bear.
Now, there are burdens still to be borne by
those who cherish liberty and who love their
country. These are substantial burdens. His
Eminence [Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, Arch-
bishop of Washington] has talked about the
great unfinished business here in our own coun-
try, and surely that unfinished business requires
our urgent attention. It requires much love and
understanding, and calm and determination, as
well as money. But surely we must support our
men who are struggling to stop a course of ag-
gression before it gathers major momentum off
there in Southeast Asia. Surely, for example, we
cannot abandon outer space as a potential
monopoly for those who would destroy freedom.
Economic and Social Assistance
I'd like to just say a few words, if I may,
about foreign aid. Because when budgets are
tight and we have problems here at home and
there are demands upon us for the war in Viet-
Nam, there is a tendency to think that we can
neglect some of these great undertakings which
all of mankind now faces in economic and social
development.
But I have no doubt that economic and social
assistance as an instrument of our foreign policy
is very important to the longer range safety of
this country. We now have more than a million
AUGUST 28, 1967
253
men in uniform outside the continental United
States in many different parts of the world.
Surely we would not begrudge six-tenths of 1
percent of our gross national product, and the
relatively small fraction of our own national
budget, to try to get that job done without com-
mitting those men to combat, if possible.
Now, it has served our long-range security
interests to provide this assistance, because the
prospects for enduring peace and stability would
die in a world in which a few nations are rich
and the rest live in poverty. It is true that poor
nations and peoples and the relatively rich na-
tions and peoples have lived side by side
throughout history. But today men everywhere
are realizing that they are not doomed by the
Almighty or by nature to live at a bare level of
subsistence, and they realize that science and
technology make it possible for them to improve
their living standards, and men everywhere are
resolved to make better lives for themselves and
their children.
Eighteen years ago President Truman pro-
posed that the United States help build a better
life for the peoples of the less developed na-
tions— and that was the famous Point 4^— in liis
inaugural address. The primaiy reason why we
have been extending technical and economic aid
to these countries was eloquently stated at an-
other inaugural 12 years later. I quote from the
late President Jolm F. Kemiedy :
To those people in the huts and villages of half the
globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery,
we pledge our best efforts to help them help them-
selves, for whatever period is required — not because
the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek
their vote, but because it is right.
President Kennedy was not speaking of
charity — although the American people will al-
ways respond generously to needs for charity —
he was speaking of helping our less fortunate
fellow men to help themselves. And in 18 years
we and others have learned that doing this in
coimtries without a middle class or an educated
working class, with a high rate of illiteracy, with
a low per capita income, is far different than
what was accomplished under the Marshall
Plan — the revival and reconstruction of the de-
veloped nations of Europe. We have learned that
development is a slow process; and we have
learned that our own role is secondary, that the
job must be done primarily bj' the governments
and peoples of the less developed nations; and
we have learned — indeed, we already knew from
our own experience — that modernization will be ;
very slow unless private enterprise is allowed to
flourish. We have learned that agricultural de-
velopment must be given first priority.
The Food-Population Problem
The fact is that underdeveloped countries
overall import today more food than they ex-
port, reversing the situation which existed be-
fore World War II. We have become aware that
the food-population problem is already acute
and that unless it is dealt with promptly and
effectively mass starvation lies only a decade or
two away from us.
As President Johnson said in his state of the
Union message in January this year : -
Next to the pursuit of peace, the really greatest chal- ,
lenge to the human family is the race between food I
supply and population increase. That race tonight is '
being lost.
The time for rhetoric is clearly past. The time for
concerted action is here and we must get on with the
job.
And it was that grim reality that caused
President Johnson to propose that United
States lead the world in a war against hunger.
As all of us here know, both Pope John
XXIII and Pope Paul VI have expressed their
deep personal concern with improving living .
standards in the less developed countries. Pope I
Paul has taken direct action to carry out a
prograna of assistance along the lines recom-
mended by the bishops of the Koman Catholic
Church assembled in Rome for the Vatican
council. In January of this year, he established
the pontifical commission for justice and peace.
As he said in his Easter encyclical on the de-
velopment of peoples, at stake are the survival
of so many innocent children and, for so many
families overcome by misery, the access to condi-
tions fit for human beings ; at stake are the peace
of the world and the future of civilization. It
is time for all men and all people to face up to
their responsibilities.
In the Western Hemisphere the great co-
operative economic and social enterprise, the
Alliance for Progress, has produced substantial
gains. The needs for development assistance are
too great tliroughout the world to be met by the
United States alone, and in fact other economi-
callj' developed nations have been shouldering
' Bulletin of Jan. 30, 1967, p. 158.
254
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
increasing shares of the load. But as by far the
richest and technically and economically most
advanced nation, the United States is properly
the largest single contributor.
We understand the great calls being made
upon us, for defense, for domestic burdens, for
space, for other purposes. We sometimes forget
how productive our economy is. We forget that
our gross national product is as large as all of
the NATO countries and Japan combined, that
it is 10 times the gross national product of all
of Latin America. We forget that our defense
budget this year is just about equal to the gross
national product of all of Latin America com-
bined. Our productivity is more than twice that
of the Soviet Union, and the gap is widening.
It is 10 times that of Communist China, with a
population of some 700 million people. So we
have to be a little careful that we not find our-
selves in tlie position of a voracious economy,
calling upon the peoples of the rest of the world
to send us their materials — their raw ma-
terials— their minerals and their services and
to absorb our own goods in their markets, while
we ourselves are neglectful or negligent about
their own most pressing needs.
So that is why we are asking for something
less than 1 percent of our gross national product
for foreign aid, why we believe that it is worth
the rest of the world coming up with something
like 2 percent of the gross national products of
the developing countries, in order to stimulate
and galvanize and make more productive the
98 percent which they themselves put into it.
And so there are burdens to be borne.
I'd like to close with one or two personal ob-
servations. I would hope that we could under-
stand what is really involved when the United
States pledges itself to work together with some-
one else in mutual security ; the integrity of the
American commitment is the principal support
of peace in the world. If those who are, or
woidd be, our adversaries should ever suppose
that our pledges are not worth very much, then
we shall be well on the way down the slippery
slopes of general war, and that we must not have.
This question of keeping our word is very
important — that is what is involved in Viet-
Nam, reaching beyond Viet-Nam itself and
beyond Southeast Asia — for we have been tested
time and again ; and it was gambling on the part
of aggressors that they would not encounter the
United States that led to some of our frightful
catastrophes in the past 25 or 30 years.
Secondly, please don't sell your country short
in terms of our basic purposes. There are cynics
abroad. There are those who would undermine
confidence in what we're all about. But if you
want to know what our foreign policy is all
about, look in your own homes and your own
communities, your own hearts. We're trying to
build a little peace in the world, where men can
live alongside of each other without being con-
stantly at each other's throats. We believe in
"Live and let live." We should like to see tomor-
row better than today for our families; we
should like to see the ancient burdens of illiter-
acy and misery, poor health, relieved from the
back of mankind. We should like to see free in-
stitutions in which there is no laiock of the ter-
rorist's hand on the door at midnight. In other
words, we should like to have a chance to build
upon the most elementary commitments of our
nation and to lend a hand to those abroad who
are trying to build a decent world of that type.
This should not be strange, because these
simple and decent ideas are shared by simple
and decent people throughout the world, in-
cluding many of them behind the so-called cur-
tains. That, too, is not strange because these
simple notions are perhaps a part of the very
character of man himself, the very nature of
man, and his most ancient commitments to his
God and to his spirit. And so these are the bases
for our common past with ordinary men, when
we set out to build some peace, to enlarge our
range of cooperation, to join hands in building
a world in which our young people will be glad
to have a chance to live, not overridden by terror,
not living imder the threat of destruction at
noonday. That's what it's all about, and on that,
thank you for your help.
AUGUST 28, 19G7
255
fl
Mr. Clifford and General Tay!or Report on Talks
on Viet-Nam With Allied Leaders
Presidential advisers Clark M. Clifford and
Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor reported to President
Johnson on August 5 upon their return from a
2-weeli, trip to Asia and the Pacific, where they
consulted with government leaders in nations
assisting South Viet-Nam toith military forces.
Following is a transcript of a press conference
they held at the White House after their meet-
ing with the President.
White House press release dated August 5
OPENING STATEMENTS
Mr. ClifTord
In each country that we went to — perhaps you
are familiar with the fact that we went to South
Viet-Nam, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,
and Korea — when we met with the press, we
made a brief statement of the purpose and the
idea behind the trip.
This is a time of stocktaking by the Allies.
It has been a period of some months now since
the Manila Conference in October of 1966.^
At the conclusion of that conference, the signa-
tory nations decided that they would keep in
close touch with each other so that there might
be a full exchange of views with reference to the
war.
This was the thought behind President Jolm-
son's decision to send General Maxwell Taylor
and me to visit these countries. It was consistent
with the agreement that had been made there;
that there would be this type of close contact
among the Allied nations.
I might say that part of the reason for stock-
taking was due to the trip that Secretary Mc-
Namara made, and came back and reported in
detail on to the President and his chief adviser.^
We had two major purposes: One was to ex-
H
' For background, see Buixetin of Nov. 14, 1966, p.
730.
' For background, see iliid., Aug. 7, 1967, p. 167.
press to the head of government in each of these
countries the President's views with reference
to the war. General Taylor in each instance gave
a full report on the present military status of
the conflict.
Then, perhaps even more important than that,
we solicited comments, observations, sugges-
tions, and recommendations from each of the
countries. So the purpose was to have a full
and free exchange of thought between the Allies.
It was exceedingly gratifying to General
Taylor and me to find the attitude of the various
countries. They appreciated the opportunity to
make their views Imown. They had a number
of views. We spent a great many hours in each
instance, usually with the head of government
and either his senior advisers or his entire Cab-
inet. At least a day was spent in conference,
sometimes in some countries 2 days.
So every phase of the war was discussed in
detail — military strategy, necessary strength
that was there, strength that was needed.
We discussed the economic situation that pre-
vailed in South Viet-Nam. We discussed the
pacification program.
At no time did either General Taylor or I
make any specific request for additional troops.
That was not the purpose of the visit. The pur-
pose was to bring to their attention the present I
status, to discuss with them where the Allies
went from here, so that they would have all of
the facts before them that our country had in
considering the action that should be taken by j
the Allies in the future. j
Naturally, in discussing that phase of the
activity in which we are all engaged, the ques-
tion of troops came into discussion. But I might
say that I think that has been given too much
prominence, because it was merely one subject
in this overall review that was held.
I think it is the feeling of President Johnson,
and certainly of all the leaders, that this type of
conference should be conducted more often in
the future. ,
I might say that, in that regard, the summit
256
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
was another subject for discussion. That was
gone into in considerable detail.
So this really constituted an opportunity to
have an interim exchange of views until a de-
cision is reached by the Allied Powers to have
another summit meeting.
General Taylor perhaps would have some-
thing to add to what I have said.
General Taylor
No, I have very little to add. I was impressed
by the comparative imanimity of views with
regard to the conduct of the war.
First, there was no disagreement as to the
basic purpose of a South Viet-Nam free from the
danger of aggression. Then we went over the
principal sectors of the strategy, the ground war
in the South, pacification, the air war against
the North, the political activity leading up to
the election.
We had a very frank exchange of views, al-
ways asking for suggestions. We got a few, but
not very many, which were not already included
in the program.
But to repeat, we were very much surprised
by the fact that we did not have major disagree-
ments on some of these points, which on our
domestic scene, as you know, are very hotly
debated.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Mr. Clifford: We are prepared for any ques-
tions, ladies and gentlemen.
Q. Where do tlie Allies go from here?
Mr. Clifford: The consensus expressed in
each instance, without any exception, was that
the Allies are headed on the right track. They
believe that the progress made on the ground in
South Viet-Nam has been appreciable. They be-
lieve that pressure should be built up in South
Viet-Nam.
In each instance, without exception, the Allies
agreed on the necessity and the value of the
bombing of North Viet-Nam. It is through
North Viet-Nam that the forces of the Viet
Cong and North Viet-Nam are being supplied in
South Viet-Nam. The Allies feel strongly that
those lines of supply should be interdicted to the
best of our ability.
So it is the general feeling, as I attempt to
synthesize their attitude, that we are headed in
the right direction. The maintenance of force
and the possibility of increased force and pres-
sure should bring the Allies out at the point
where we hope to come out.
They are all conscious in each instance of the
limited nature of the effort that we are making.
They each understand that the one goal that we
have there is to secure for South Viet-Nam the
right of self-determination. They understand it.
That is as far as they wish to go jointly with us.
In each instance, also, there was a clear recog-
nition on their part that their welfare and their
future, and the freedom of their nation, is in-
volved in this conflict. I think that, curiously
enough, as a matter of interest, we found again
and again the statement made that this war was
incorrectly described as the South Vietnamese
war. It should be called the "war of Southeast
Asia." That is what our allies thinlf is at stake
in the conflict that is taking place.
Q. General, what did you recommend to the
President on the hasis of what you fov/nd? Did
you make any recommendations?
General Taylor: Our recommendations were
largely in the field of how to proceed in the vari-
ous countries which we visited. We had many
discussions, certain points came up which need
followup action by the appropriate departments
of the Government, and I was rather flagging
these to the President so that the necessary fol-
lowup could be effected.
Q. Can either of you gentleme?i amplify on
the vieto about increased pressure in the %var?
General Taylor: xVbout increased pressure in
the war %
Q. Yes.
Unanimity on Need for Maximum EfFort
General Taylor: I would say we were for it.
The question is how to accomplish it. Certainly
every one of these nations that we visited feels
that now is the time for all of us to make a maxi-
mum effort, and then the question arises to define
what that maximum effort is on the part of all
the countries involved.
But the easy answer is that we must do better
on the ground in the big war against the major
units. We have done quite well in the last year,
but we are still having major engagements ; to do
much better in the pacification area, particu-
larly in providing that minimum level of secu-
AUGUST 28, 1967
257
rity which is necessary behind whicli one can
conduct long-term pacification, nation-building
operations.
Then, of course, the political front is of enor-
mous importance — the need to carry through
the constitutional procedures which are moving
forward in South Viet-Nam.
Then the question of tlie economic front, the
control of inflation, how much money we are
going to put in in order to shore up the forces
of inflation which are constantly present.
All of these things came in for discussion and
agreement that we should isolate each sector
and see what resources we should put in.
Q. While you have said, General, you are not
seeking more troops, can you say, sir, lohether
there are any more troops coming from any of
the countries you visited?
General Taylor: I wouldn't like to make any
prediction. We phrased the problem in this way :
that in order to do certain things, we will need
more troops. Everyone agrees to that. But we
never, in any country, said, "We think you
should produce n battalions," or something of
that sort. There will undoubtedly be followup
discussions after this visit which will get into
more specifics.
Q. Mr. Clifford, if these nations feel this is
the '■'■war of Southeast Asia," can we presume
they are going to back up that feeling with more
troops?
Mr. Clifford: In each instance in our talks
with each country, there was a recognition that
additional pressure should be exerted, and in
order to exert that additional pressure and pro-
vide our field commanders with what they need,
there is the understanding that all of the nations
will have to take this under consideration.
In no instance, in any one nation, is there one
man who can make this decision. It was not our
concept, nor the President's, tliat you go about
among the nations and then come back with a
list of countries and a new number of troops
that they are going to supply. That is not it. In
each instance the head of government stated
that the matter would be discussed with his
advisers, with the Cabinet.
In many instances it has to be taken up with
the council or the legislative body. This is the
attitude that each country is expressing: that
consideration will now be given to it and that
this appears to be the time that the Allies should
make a maximum effort.
Q. Mr. Clifford, from your opening statement
I gather thai the consensus of the nations was
against another halt in the hotribing. Is that a
correct assurmption?
Mr. Clifford: At no tune did we encounter
any suggestion, direct or imjDlied, tliat there be
a cessation in the bombing.
Q. Mr. Clifford, is it implicit in what you say
about the unanimity of opinion about increased
pressure that it is believed that that can be deci-
sive and within a relatively short time?
Mr. Clifford: No one expressed an opinion on ,
that. No one, I believe, is sufficiently well in- jj
foi-med on conditions that exist in North Viet-
Nam to be able to place any time limit on it,
whether it is soon or whether it is far off. The
Allies have the feeling that this is the means to
accomplish the ultimate end. "Wlietlier it would
occur suddenly or whether it would occur after
some period of time, no one ventures an opinion.
We did not get any idea of that kind. But there
is only the feeling that we must continue to do
what we are doing and that ultimately their
feeling is that the result will be obtained.
In each instance I might add, there is a clear
understanding of why the contest is being
waged. Each knows the danger that confronts it
if there should be an end result that permits a
Communist victory in Viet-Nam. Each under-
stands the effect that that will have not only on
their own country but on all the nations of
Southeast Asia, and that opinion is joined in by
the Pacific nations also. Tliey know that once
that pressure starts, the effect on them will be
inevitable.
Q. Mr. Clifford, toe hnow that the President
is going out to meet with some of our leaders in
Viet-Nam sometime probably around October,
but it is not quite clear to us whether this is go-
ing to be a siimmit meeting or not. Do you ex-
pect a summit meeting this year as a result of
your trip?
Mr. Clifford: I believe we cannot give an an-
swer to that. It is agreed among the Manila na-
tions that there should not be any summit prior
to the election in South Viet-Nam, wliich takes
place on September 3. There is an additional
election in South Viet-Nam for their Assembly,
the date of which, as I recall, is October 22. It
is the lower House — that will take place on
October 22.
Some feel that it would be advisable to wait
until all elections are over hi South Viet-Nam
258
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I before giving serious consideration to a summit
meeting. Each nation agrees that it should be
held, but none has any idea at the present time
as to the exact date of it. Each suggests that we
await developments ; and if a summit is held, it
would very likely be toward the end of the year.
Viet-Nam Problem Affects All Southeast Asia
Q. To characterize this as a "war of South-
east Asia,''^ does this also raise the possibility of
extending the warfare into other areas heyond
the present limitations?
General Taylor: No, I would say it does not.
It is simply a reminder of the fact that the out-
come in South Viet-Nam would have bearings
throughout all of Southeast Asia, and, as we all
know, the Thais have indications of minor out-
breaks of guerrilla activities. The Thais are wor-
ried about that situation, as they should be.
They understand thoroughly that if indeed
South Viet-Nam collapses, their problem will be
enormously enhanced. The same feeling exists
elsewhere with regard to Malaysia and the con-
dition which will exist if indeed the British
withdraw from that area.
So all of these countries are looking at the
problem not in terms of the real estate confined
by the boundaries of South Viet-Nam but the
entire Southeast Asia landmass.
Q. General, earlier you mentioned that some
of the leaders you had talked with on your trip
made some suggestions that were useful. I
wonder if you would he hind enough to spell
out some of these suggestions.
General Taylor: I don't think I would want
to. I don't think it appropriate that I do that,
except to say, for example, on the bombing some
would say we are not bombing enough, some
would say perhaps we are bombing a little too
much, variations of that kind, but no major dif-
ferences on strategy or tactics.
Q. Can you clarify this question of Korean
contract help or Korean reservists? During your
trip there were contradictory versions that came
out of Seoul: one saying that the Koreans plan
to send up to I7fi00 personnel; and another,
3 WO personnel.
General Taylor : We are baffled by that figure.
We know nothing about it.
Q. Mr. Clifford, why didn't you visit the
Philippines?
Mr. Clifford: After we started on our trip,
we had word from President Marcos that he had
been very recently to South Viet-Nam. He had
received a complete briefing there of all the
elements that we would have gone over had we
seen him. He indicated that he did not believe
that it would be worth the time and effort at this
time to go uito the subject, because he was com-
pletely up to date.
He indicated that later on, after we had made
this, and perhaps by the time of the summit,
there would be a reason then for our conferring
with him.
Q. General, I loonder on this business of in-
creased pressure and perhaps more bombing,
were they urging the United States to become
tougher? Did this come up in a general discus-
sion? Did they want the President to make new
bombing targets and broaden the war, so to
speak?
General Taylor: It really came up simply in
the exchange of views over the conduct of the
war. We urged them to come forward with any
comments they had, any suggestions they had.
So this was in response to our own request for
this kind of comment that we received it.
Q. General Taylor, did you find much sup-
port for your view on the need to blockade the.
harbor of Haiphong?
General Taylor: That was an area, some-
thing, of course, that we discussed, and there I
found the opinion just about as spread as here
in the United States. Everyone would lilte to
have the harbor of Haiphong closed, but, of
course, there is a price to pay for it.
Free-World Contribution in Viet-Nam
Q. General Taylor, I dorCt inean to be face-
tious, but 30 years ago m South Boston there
used to be a man called Moriarty who went
around starting barroom fghts. As soon as the
fight started, Moriarty would say, "■Tou fight
it out, boys, and I loill hold your coats.'''' I get
the impression that is exactly what happens out
there. They are all urging us to increase the
bombing. What are they doing for us? Where
are the other troops coming from? Where is the
added support?
General Taylor: I don't thmk we can be too
critical of the assistance we are getting from
many of these countries — Korea, for example.
AUGUST 28, 1967
273-001—67 —
259
where there are some 47,000 combat troops in
action today.
Q. We have 56,000 troops in Korea.
General Taylor: I think it would be very in-
teresting for you if you listed all of the large
contributions to South Viet-Nam and compared
them with Korea. You will find that the free-
world contribution on a percentage basis is
higher in South Viet-Nam than it was in Korea.
The fact that the Korean war was under the
U.N. flag gives us the feeling, perhaps, that
there was more international support for us
than in South Viet-Nam, whereas that is cer-
tainly not the case either in terms of total
number or the actual head count of nations
participating.
Q. Mr. CU-fford, did you carry to these na-
tions any significant changes in President John-
son's position from his views in Manila?
Mr. Clifford: No, we did not.
The press: Thank you, gentlemen.
Vietnamese Election Campaign
Following is a statement made to news cor-
respondents by William P. Bundy, Assistant
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, at
a briefing on August 11.
We are, of course, concerned over the prob-
lems that have arisen in the election campaign
in Viet-Nam. We are urging both the Govern-
ment and the candidates not members of the
Government to cooperate in solving these prob-
lems in the national interest of South Viet-Nam.
We have been continuously stressing to the
Government and all candidates that it is im-
portant that all those concerned in the election
recognize that the primary need is that the elec-
tions be free, honest, and effective so that the
country can unite beliind the government chosen
in the elections — and that government, of
course, will include both executive and legisla-
tive branches.
I have nothing to add to reports from Saigon
as to the exact situation and what has taken
place over the last 48 hours. But there are cer-
tain points that have been coming up on which
we have factual information that I would like
to be sure is available to you. Some of it is al-
ready known to you, but I think it's important
to pull it together.
These relate to four points, essentially :
(1) The first point is the statement that the
military leaders in Viet-Nam have in some man-
ner threatened a military coup if the election
produces results imacceptable to the military.
And the implication that those who make this
point draw from this is that only a military
\'ictory in the elections would be acceptable to
the military leaders.
I am sure most of you noted the press con-
ference of August 8, at which General [Nguyen
Van] Thieu and General [Nguyen Cao] Ky,
who were holding the conference jointly, were
questioned about this. Ky was asked about this
reported statement, and he said he had been
talking to a group of citizens and what he had
stressed was the absolute necessity of future
governments meeting the needs of the people
and that if a future government failed in this
responsibility the people would surely rise
against it. This is what he said at the press con-
ference. And he added that if he and Thieu were
elected and failed in their duty to the people,
they, too, could be overthrown.
Then at the same press conference the ques-
tion came ui> — was asked — ^whether he accepted
the electoral process. This happened to be Gen-
eral Ky speaking, and he replied, "If civilian
candidates win, we will uphold them." I might
just add that he has categorically denied to our
mission that he has ever made any statement
about an intention to mount a coup, anything
of that sort, and we have no indication that
present military leaders or any significant mili-
tary group have such an intention and every in-
dication that they understand the importance of
completing the electoral process and accepting
the resultmg government.
(2) The second point is that there was this
difficulty with an aircraft and the candidates go-
ing on the campaign trip, which had been
plaimed to land at Quong Tri. As you know, the
aircraft landed instead at Dong Ha — the air-
port is about 9 miles away, is in a very exposed
zone.
Wliat I have to add there is that our own ob-
servers definitely confirm that whereas it would
normally have been possible to put that aircraft
down at Quong Tri, there were in fact serious
crosswinds that constituted a valid reason for
the pilot not landing at Quong Tri, from which
all the rest of the confusion apparently flowed.
So that they landed at a point where they were
260
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
not expected; and transportation was dis-
patclied — local transportation was offered by
our own people, and rejected — and that's how
the incident came up. Apparently the province
chief — we have this confirmed— did dispatch a
convoy to pick up the candidates at Dong Ha,
but the candidates had departed before the con-
voy arrived. In other words, our reports in-
dicate no evidence that the difficulties were
caused by deliberate action on the part of the
Government.
Now at this same joint press conference of
August 8, General Thieu made clear again that
assistance in transportation and other facilitias
would be provided and that the Government
would assure adequate protection. This is what
they have repeatedly made clear and, of course,
they have entered into many other joint arrange-
ments for facilities. And both Ky and Thieu
have denied, and we have no evidence to support,
the charge that there was any deliberate sabo-
tage in respect to the plamied Quong Tri landing
or the campaign trip in the northern areas of
South Viet-Nam. In fact, all the information we
have is that very extensive preparations had
been made which, however, were thrown off be-
cause of the mischance of the landing in a
different spot because of high winds.
(3) The tliird point relates to newspaper ac-
counts which have stated that some military
leaders at least were thinking in terms of a so-
called military affairs conunittee, which would
retain power behind the scenes. I think you know
the Constitution does provide for an Armed
Forces Council, which has the function of advis-
ing the elected President on military matters
and which would operate imder the Constitu-
tion, under the control of constitutional
authorities.
On the facts, we ourselves have no indication
that any group in the military leaders has the
intention to establish any such inner group, as
the newspaper accounts have described. And I
am now in a position to add that General Ky has
given Ambassador [Ellsworth] Bunker a
categorical denial in this respect.
(4) The fourth question, which goes back
somewhat further, nearly 3 weeks more, is the
question of the certification of presidential
candidates and the fact that certain candidates
were barred. There, I think, the important facts
to know are that the actions taken with respect
to those candidacies were taken by the so-called
provincial assembly acting within the terms of
the Constitution and the relevant election laws.
The final decisions as to whether candidates met
the qualifications in respect, in the case of one
candidate, to the citizenship of the vice-presi-
dential candidate and other issues were taken by
vote in the assembly and, incidentally, were by
very large majorities.
As things turned out, and this again you
know, there are 11 presidential candidates and
480 senatorial candidates representing a very
broad spectrum of Vietnamese opinion, so that
the voters have a wide choice.
Tliose are the points I wanted to bring to your
attention for the record.
United States and Mexico Agree
on Settlement of Pious Fund Claim
Befartment Annoimcement
Press release 173 dated August 1
The Governments of the United States and
Mexico today [August 1] concluded an agree-
ment settling the Pious Fund claim. The agree-
ment, which ends a 55-year-old dispute between
the two Goveriunents, provides for a lump-sum
payment by the Government of Mexico of 719,-
546 United States dollars to the Government of
the United States in full and final settlement of
a claim presented by the Government of the
United States on behalf of the Archbishop of
San Francisco and the Bishop of Monterey to a
Panel of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague imder an agreement of May 22,
1902, between the respective Governments.
The agreement concluded today provides for
payment by Mexico of a limip sum, based upon
53 unpaid annual installments exclusive of an
installment paid in 1966, and takes into con-
sideration the dollar rate of exchange as of the
due date of each installment plus the present
capital value of installments in perpetuity based
upon a 6 percent rate of interest and a conver-
sion rate of 12.49 Mexican pesos to 1 United
States dollar.
The Government of the United States con-
siders the settlement of this longstanding con-
troversy as a notable achievement in inter-
American relations, a major contribution to the
peaceful settlement of international disputes,
and a further demonstration of the close and
friendly ties which characterize the relationship
between the United States and Mexico.
AUGUST 28, 1967
261
Public Diplomacy at the United Nations
hy Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
Let me thank the International Platform
Association most warmly for this plaque and
for the honor that goes with it. Wlaen my friend
Drew Pearson first asked me to accept this
award, he put me in a quandary because I
thought he said the award was for the best
speaker of the year. My problem was how to
say "Yes" to such an attractive proposition and
still claim to be a modest man. But Drew res-
cued me when he wrote to say the award was
for the "most challenging" speaker. My dic-
tionary says "challenge" means, among other
things, object to, call in question, summon to a
contest, call to action. After counting up ex-
actly 100 speeches, rebuttals, calls to action, and
other challenges which it has been my duty to
pronoimce in United Nations meetings during
the past year, I have concluded that no im-
modest pretensions are necessary ; I could prob-
ably be voted "most challenging," or at the very
least "most challenged," based on sheer
quantity.
Before we leave the word "challenge," let me
make one point m all seriousness. The diction-
ary also records, I regret to say, that this word
derived ages ago from the same root as
"calumny."
My practice in U.N. debates has been never
to start a fight. Wlienever calmnny has been
directed against the United States — which hap-
pened all too often in the last 2 months— I have
answered promptly and vigorously, and as
fairly and factually as I knew how. As Adlai
Stevenson said once in another context, "If my
opponent will stop telling lies about me, I
promise to stop telling the truth about him."
Another fact which I will not conceal from
' Address made before the Internation.Tl Platform
Association at 'Washington, D.C., on July 27 (U.S./
U.N. press release 127) .
you is that in all this oratorical effort I have
had the advantage of a great amoimt of coach-
ing from the sidelines. One of my first TV fan
messages, which was brought to me in the Secu-
rity Council during the Kaslunir crisis nearly
2 years ago, said : "Arthur, don't look down so —
keep your head up." This was from President
Johnson.
Many other citizens, especially during the
Middle East crisis, have been kind enough to
write, wire, or telephone to tell me that I talked
too long, not long enough, too often, too seldom,
too sharply, too mildly, and so on. Not only
have I been grateful for this criticism ; I have
been touched and encouraged by the thousands
of messages of interest ajid support. One of my
favorites was a telegram from a member of the
legislature of one of our leadmg states, as fol-
lows : "I never before held you in high esteem,
but I do now. Stay in there, I am proud of you."
That came on June 10, when the Security Coun-
cil met three times, beginning at 4 :10 a.m. and
ending at 2 :40 the next morning, and just plain
"staying in there" on a steady diet of cold sand-
wiches and hot words was beginning to be a
problem. Believe me, encouraging messages like
that really do help at such a time.
Nevertheless, a serious question may be asked
about the value of all this harsh debate at the
U.N. The messages we received during the Mid-
dle East debates showed that thousands of
Americans, watching on television, were ap-
palled by the bitterly offensive and inflamma-
tory speeches of some delegates. To give just
one of many examples, false charges of inter-
vention in the fighting — charges of the utmost
gravity — were made against the United States
without any supporting evidence whatever.
Our prompt and categorical and repeated de-
nials and our offer of a U.N. investigation were
262
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
scarcely mentioned by the accusers, just as if
we had never made tliem. The same false charge
was repeated again and again for weeks on end,
even after it was obvious that nobody at the
U.N. believed it^ — and in spite of the eloquent
silence of the Soviet Union on the subject.
"Diplomacy in a Goldfish Bowl"
It is hardly surprising that intelligent citi-
zens, obsei-ving such displays as this, should
wonder why they are tolerated at the U.N.,
whoso aim, after all, is peace. I can assure you
that sometimes a diplomat also asks himself the
same question. He longs secretly to escape from
this "diplomacy in a goldfish bowl" and go back
to the dear old days when — according to the
history books — diplomacy was more private and
more dignified. There was no need to worry
about public opinion or engage in unseemly pub-
lic debate. It is said that diplomats never spoke
rudely to each other in those days, even while
declaring war.
I am glad to say that we still have some cus-
toms remaining from that more courtly era.
Even the most sharp-tongued delegates at the
United Nations usually remember to call their
adversaries "distinguished." The trouble is,
having once spoken that word, they sometimes
proceed to speak any other word they like, no
matter how offensive.
Now, I happen to believe that diplomatic
courtesy has a very important place in the
search for peace. I entirely agree with those
who regard inflammatory debating tactics as a
blemish on our system of public diplomacy at
the U.N. Nevertheless, I hope we will not grow
too impatient with the system itself, imperfect
though it is in many ways. There are a number
of points in its favor which we should remember.
1. The old-style courtly diplomacy may have
been more agreeable and less strenuous for am-
bassadors than the U.N. is, but history does not
show that its achievements for peace were any
more impressive.
2. Acrimonious debate in the U.N. — deplora-
ble though it may be — does not prevent agree-
ments. For example:
— A year ago, while Moscow propaganda was
sharply attacking the United States over Viet-
Nam, as it still does, I was meeting with a Soviet
ambassador in a U.N. committee in Geneva to
negotiate the Outer Space Treaty. The treaty
was completed last December, has now been
ratified by all the major signatories, and is ex-
pected to enter into force very soon.
— Again, during the day-and-night Security
Council meetings over the Middle East crisis,
it may be that most TV watchers best remember
the barrage of words and false propaganda
charges — including those of the Soviet Union
against the United States. But the most impor-
tant moment came on June G when the Soviet
Union finally ended its stalling and joined in
a unanimous resolution for a cease-fire — with
which the warring parties complied in a matter
of days.
— Then 6 weeks later in the General As-
sembly, the Soviet Union — while still saying
harsh words about us in public — joined with us
in the search for an acceptable resolution to
conclude the Assembly and provide the general
guideline for a peace settlement. It provided
that the withdrawal of Israel's troops would be
linked with the acknowledgment by every
member of the U.N. in the arsa that each enjoys
the right to maintain an independent national
state of its own and to live in peace and security
and with a renunciation of all claims and acts
inconsistent therewith — meaning particularly
all claims or acts flowing from an asserted state
of belligerency. This formula was not acceptable
to all the parties that had fought against Israel,
but the readiness of the Soviet Union to propose
it for favorable consideration by the Arab states
was a very significant step even though it was
rejected.
Thinking about this mixture of vituperation
and negotiation, I am reminded of Sir Winston
Churchill's saying that "Jaw-jaw is better than
war-war." It sometimes seems that the agree-
ments needed to prevent or stop war cannot be
reached without a certain amount of "jaw" —
some of it quite unpleasant. But I do not think
this is too high a price to pay for the sake of
sound steps toward peace.
3. My third point is that while public atten-
tion at the United Nations is focused on the
noisy political debates, by far the biggest part
of the U.N.'s work is nonpolitical — and almost
unnoticed. U.N. programs continue year in and
year out to stimulate economic development,
trade, investment, human rights, care _ of
refugees and mothers and children, education,
agriculture, health, housing, family planning,
and countless other matters in which all mem-
bers, regardless of politics, have a common
interest. Often governments work together on
AUGUST 28, 1967
263
these programs even while their delegates in
some other meeting are quarreling bitterly over
political issues. Historians may some day con-
clude that this nonpolitical work was the U.N.'s
most enduring — and least noticed — contribution
to world peace.
4. Finally, I would point out that, however
exhausting and annoying the U.N.'s debates
may sometimes be, history has really given us
no choice except to try to make this system of
public diplomacy work. We cannot turn the
clock back. We live in an age of growing
literacy and of more and more popular interest
in public issues the world over. This trend is
accelerated by inass commmiications — includ-
ing instant worldwide radio and television linlcs
by satellite. In country after country, the
ordinary people carry more weight in politics
tlian ever before.
Self-Restraint the Only Wise Restraint
These trends have a powerful impact on di-
plomacy. The diplomacy of today must achieve
agreements which will be acceptable not only to
governments or to a small ruling class but to the
public opinion on which governments increas-
ingly depend. The best guarantee of that accept-
ance is public debate, including the debates at
the United Nations.
We should of course do all we can to raise the
quality of public debate, in the U.N. as in every
forum. But no matter how frustrating it is, we
cannot do without it. Any attempt to censor or
regulate it would not only offend the principle
of free speech; it would also deny expression
to genuine feelings of discontent and resent-
ment which exist in the world. To close our ears
to such expression would be like trying to reduce
the pressure in a boiler by discoimecting the
pressure gage.
For all tliese reasons I believe the only wise
restraint on free debate in the U.N. will con-
tinue to be self-restraint. Such self-restraint is
no more than the policy of enliglitened self-in-
terest, for, as the Middle East debates have
amply demonstrated, inflammatory propaganda
is not an effective way to win friends and in-
fluence votes.
Before closing I would like to share with you
in a somewhat broader sense my thoughts on the
progress of the United Nations. It happens that
it was 2 years ago, almost to the day, that I
entered on my present post as United States
Eepi"esentative to the United Nations, and the
impressions I have are in the pei'spective of
those 2 years.
Wlien I was first called to this post by Presi-
dent Johnson, I expressed the belief that the
effort to bring the rule of law to govern the re-
lations between sovereign states is the greatest
adventure in history. I still feel that way about
it. I must also admit that 2 years of participa-
tion in this adventure have given me a new re-
spect for its difKculty. Law in the international
realm scarcely ever operates by enforceable
court orders as it does in our domestic society.
The coercive powers of the United Nations are
limited enough on paper and even more limited
in reality. Yet history has required the U.N. to
face, over and over again, the deepest conflicts
of a turbulent age, conflicts in which the awe-
some power of sovereign states is marshaled
on every side.
In these circumstances the only force that has
made possible any success at all by the United
Nations has been the force of reason in the
minds of governments; after all, their rational
awareness that in this small and dangerous
world many necessary things — including sur-
vival itself — can only be had by cooperation.
The United Nations Charter is the highest ex-
pression of that awareness. When governments
act on it, the law of the charter succeeds; when
they do not, it fails.
The U.N.'s Services to Peace
More than once in my 2 years we have had to
face the fact of failure. Perhaps the greatest
single disappointment in these 2 years has been
the inability of the United Nations thus far to
help find a way to a just and peaceful solution
of the war in Viet-Nam. And there are other
situations in which, despite U.N. efforts, no sub-
stantial progress has yet been made. Among
these are the various stubborn problems of
racial discrimination and deprivation of rights
in southern Africa. In all these cases, the most I
can report is that we continue unremittingly to
try — indeed, we have no other rational choice.
But there have been important successes also
in these 2 years. The Outer Space Treaty is one
of these. Another is the restoration of a cease-
fire in Kashmir — my first big U.N. crisis. That
cease-fire, happily, is still in effect. And to this
list we can now add the renewed cease-fire in the
Middle East, which we hope and pray may
264
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
prove a step toward a more stable peace in that
tragic region.
People sometimes talk as if the U.N. were
notliing but a center of conflict. One might as
well say that a hospital is a center of sickness.
The important fact is that international con-
flicts find their way to the U.N. and that they
are sometimes healed or at least prevented from
becoming fatal.
In its 20 years the United Nations has done
services to peace which few would liave dared
to predict. It has been a source of important new
international law. It has operated major eco-
nomic and liumanitarian programs. It has stood
up for the independence of nations under attack,
from Iran and Greece to Korea and the Congo.
It has been the scene of growing diplomatic
cooperation across the most dangerous political
gulf of all, the cold war. And for some 50 new
nations emerging from the colonial age, the
U.N. has become both the symbol and the pro-
tector of sovereign membership in tlie family
of nations.
All these accomplishments, of course, are not
going to bring perpetual peace to the world. The
search for peace is not simple ; indeed, it is far
more complex than war, because it involves all
the nomial problems and disagreements that do
not arise among enemies but only among
friends.
A few years ago George Kennan expressed
the same thought in his book about Soviet re-
lations with the West, when he wrote :
People who have only enemies don't know what com-
plications are ; for that, you have to have friends ; and
these the Soviet government, thank God, now has.
I think we can all agree how apt this state-
ment is in relation to the Soviet Union and its
new friends in the Middle East. I think we can
all agree also that for the sake of peace, every
nation should be glad to accept more friends and
more complications. Wliere nations come up
against disagreements for wliich tliere is no
ready solution, they must learn to live with
these disagreements and, as the U.N. Charter
says, "practice tolerance and live together in
peace with one another as good neighbors."
Tliis United Nations philosojihy of tolerance
is not a counsel of perfection. On the contrary,
it is the highest realism for modern nations —
far more realistic than the obsolete method of
resolving disputes by armed force. That is why
I believe that the United Nations has such a
great future. It may fail again and again when
its members are not sufficiently faithful to its
purposes. But even after these failures it will
still be there, its principles will still be sound,
and its members will have no choice but to try
again.
Fourteen years ago Dag Hammarekjold, who
was then the new Secretary-General of the
United Nations, made a comment during the
very difficult crisis over the Korean armistice
talks, in which he expressed a faitli whicli I
think is still relevant to our situation. These
were his words :
Those are lost who dare not face the hasic facts of
international interdependence. Those are lost who per-
mit defeats to scare them back to a starting point of
narrow nationalism. Those are lost who are so scared
by a defeat as to despair about the future. For all
those, the dark prophecies may be justified. But not for
those who do not permit themselves to be scared, nor
for the Organization (the U.N.) which is the instru-
ment at their disposal in the fight — an instrument
which may be wrecked, but, if that happens, would
have to be, and certainly would be, re-created again
and again.
I agree with that pliilosophy. In the struggle
between chaos and order, the forces of chaos are
stubborn indeed. But I happen to believe that
the forces of order and justice which some-
times seem so feeble are actually the most stub-
born forces of all and that in the end they will
prevail.
AUGUST 28, 1967
265
THE CONGRESS
The State of the Budget and the Economy
Following are the introductory and conclud-
ing -paragraphs and the section on defense ex-
penditures from, President JohnsorCs message
to the Congress on the state of the 'budget and
the economy}
To the Congress of the United States:
The Hard and Inescapable Facts
Behind the accounts that make np the Na-
tion's budget lies the pursuit of America's re-
sponsibility and purpose at home and abroad.
As we enter this new Fiscal Year, the Con-
gress and the American people should have an
up-to-date report on the state of the budget,
and on the steps that must be taken to protect
the national security and to sustain the health
and vitality of this Nation.
Last January we submitted our budget for
Fiscal 1968.^ In that budget we estimated :
— Expenditures of $135 billion.
— Revenues of approximately $127 billion,
including income from a 6% surcharge on cor-
porate and individual taxes effective July 1.
— A resulting deficit of about $8 billion.
Since then much has happened to change
these prospects.
For several weeks, I have reviewed with my
advisers the entire economic and budgetary
situation. I have consulted with leaders of the
labor, farm and business communities. As a
result of that review I am submitting today a
financial plan for America's continued eco-
nomic well-being.
No President likes to report a significant re-
vision in the Nation's budget estimates. Treas-
ury, budget and economic experts tried to be
' H. Doc. 152, 90th Cong., 1st sess. ; transmitted on
Aug. 3.
° For excerpts, see Buixetin of Feb. 13, 1967, p. 230.
as realistic as possible in the estimates they
made late last year. Yet, no task is more
formidable than to try to predict — over 18
months in advance — a budget of around $135
billion and its related revenues for 200 million
Americans.
The Nation now faces these hard and ines-
capable facts for fiscal 1968 :
— Expenditures ai-e likely to be between the
January budget figure of $135 billion and
$143.5 billion — as much as $8.5 billion higher —
depending upon the determination and ability
of the Congress and the Executive to control
expenditures.
— Revenues are now estimated some $7 billion
lower than in January, even with a 6% tax
surcharge.
— These changes in the January budget esti-
mates would result in a deficit of $23.6 billion.
■ — Without a tax increase and tight expendi-
ture control, the deficit could exceed $28 billion.
And that does not include an estimated $700
million higher cost of interest on the public
debt that such a deficit would involve.
A deficit of that size poses a clear and present
danger to America's security and economic
health.
If left untended, this deficit could cause :
— A spiral of ruinous inflation which would
rob the poor, the elderly, the millions with fixed
incomes.
— Brutally higher interest rates and tight
money which would crijiple the home builder
and home buyer, as well as the businessman.
Interest rates have already turned up sharply
despite the relatively easy money policy of the
Federal Reserve System.
— An unequal and unjust distribution of the
cost of supporting our men in Vietnam.
— A deterioration in our balance-of-jjayments
by increasing imj^orts and decreasing exports.
266
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTILLETIN
This Congress and this Administration must
not accept so hxrge a deficit.
Under these circumstances, we must choose
between two alternatives:
1. The deficit could be accepted and totally
financed by additional borrowing, which itself
would drive up interest rates, or
2. The deficit could be reduced by rigidly
controlling expenditures, raising as much money
as possible through increased taxes, and then
borrowing the difference.
The first alternative would be fiscally and
financially irresponsible under present condi-
tions. The second alternative is the only way to
maintain a strong and healthy economy.
America in its strength and wisdom must
choose to travel a responsible fiscal and budget-
ary course.
That is why I present for your judgment and
action a fiscal program that is sensible and
sound. There are two essential elements to this
program :
— expenditure restraint, to which this Ad-
ministration is committed and which I urge
upon the Congress.
■ — tax measures to increase our revenues.
Fiscal 1968 Expenditures
2. Defense Expenditures
I have concluded, after considering the rec-
ommendations of Secretary McNamara, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and General [William C]
Westmoreland, that I should authorize an in-
crease of at least 45,000 in the number of men
to be sent to Vietnam this fiscal year.
This Nation has taken a solemn pledge — that
its sons and brothers engaged in the conflict
there shall never lack all the help, all the arms,
and all the equipment essential for their mis-
sion and for their very lives.
America must — and will — honor that pledge.
It is for this reason that expenditures for Viet-
nam— subject as they are to the variable de-
mands of military operations — may now exceed
our earlier estimates.
The Department of Defense has been a pace-
setter in the Federal Government for efficiency
and economy. Still, any organization that has
so greatly expanded in so short a time is bound
to have some areas in which further economies
can be achieved or less essential expenditures
stretched out.
/ have ashed Secretary McNamara, therefore,
to conduct a searching revieio of all defense ex-
penditures and to 'With hold all such expenditures
that are not now essential for national security.
By such action we will try to hold total de-
fense expenditures as near as possible to the level
budgeted in January. However, the histoi-y of
war teaches one clear lesson : the costs of con-
flict can never be precisely estimated nor fully
foreseen. Thus, the possibility remains that de-
fense spending in fiscal 1968, based on present
plans, may exceed the January budget by up
to $i billion.
Conclusion
Some may hear in this message a call to
sacrifice.
In truth, it is a call to the sense of obligation
felt by all Americans.
Americans in Vietnam stand in, and brighten,
the light of a proud tradition. They give their
service, and some give their lives, for their
country — and for us.
To this point, America has served them well
by supporting them unstintingly to the last of
their needs while building a strong and pros-
perous Nation at home.
I urge you to remember the following. Last
year:
— Eeal wages were the highest in history—
and the imemijloyment rate reached the lowest
point in 13 years;
— Total after-tax real income of American
families rose five percent;
— Corporate profits after taxes reached an
all-time peak, up nine percent last year ;
— Net income per farm increased more than
9 percent, even after adjusting for the higher
prices farmers paid;
— Our Gross National Product, valued in
constant prices, advanced 5.8 percent.
These gains were achieved without either
runaway inflation, or the imposition of the
wage and price controls which have been the
condition of American life in every conflict of
this century.
In significant part, this was the result of
responsibility and restraint exercised by the
business, farm, and labor communities.
AUGUST 2S, 1967
267
The current situation summons those groups
as never before to maintain that responsibility
in their wage and price decisions.
It summons all Americans to respond with
that same responsibility in the challenge of
their own lives.
The inconveniences this demand imposes are
small when measured against the contribution
of a Marine on patrol in a sweltering jungle,
or an airman flying through perilous skies, or
a soldier ten thousand miles from home, wait-
ing to join his outfit on the line.
There are times in a Nation's life when its
armies must be equipped and fielded, and the
Nation's business must still go on. For Ajnerica
that time is now.
The Nation's unfinished agenda here at home
must be pursued as well. The poor must be
lifted from the prisons of ])overty, cities must
be made safe and livable, sick and undernour-
ished bodies must be restored, our air and water
must be kept clean, and every hour of our future
must see new opportunities unfold.
TMs, then, is the story behind the facts and
forecasts, and the recommendations I submit
today.
Last January I told the Nation : ^
I wish I could report to .tou that the conflict in Viet-
nam is almost over. This I cannot do. We face more
cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet.
I cannot promise that it will come this year — or come
next year. Our adversary still believes, I thinii tonight,
that he can go on fighting longer than we can, and
longer than we and our allies will be prepared to stand
up and resi.st.
Our men in that area — there are nearly 500,000 now —
have borne well the "burden and the heat of the day."
Their efforts have deprived the Communist enemy of
the victory that he sought and that he expected a year
ago. We have steadily frustrated his main forces. Gen-
eral Westmoreland reports that the enemy can no
longer succeed on the battlefield.
I must say to you that our pressure must be sus-
tained— and will be sustained — until he realizes that
the war he started is costing him more than he can
ever gain.
I know of no strategy more likely to attain that end
than the strategy of "accumulating slowly, but inex-
orably, every kind of material resource" — of "labori-
ously teaching troops the very elements of their trade."
That, and patience — and I mean a great deal of
patience.
Those words are even more true today.
The test before us as a people is not whether
our commitments match our will and our cour-
age; but whether we have the will and the
courage to match our coimnitments.
I urge the Congress to respond to the fiscal
challenge that faces the Nation. I hope that in
the national interest you will act promptly and
favorably upon these recommendations.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House,
August 3, 1967.
TREATY INFORMATION
United States and France Sign
income Tax Convention
Press release 169 dated July 28
On July 28, 1967, the American Ambassador
and the Secretary General of the French Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs signed at Paris a con-
vention between the United States and France
with respect to taxes on income and property.
This convention, upon entry into force, will
replace in its entirety the existing income-tax
convention of July 25, 1939 (convention and
protocol for the avoidance of double taxation
and the establishment of rules of reciprocal
administrative assistance in the case of income
and other taxes), ^ and will replace, so far as
they concern taxes on income, capital, and stock
exchange transactions, the double taxation con-
vention of October 18, 1946,^ the supplementary
protocol of May 17, 1948," and the supplemen-
tary convention of June 22, 1956.^
The new convention was made necessary by
fundamental changes made in 1965 in the
French income tax structure and reflects changes
made in LTnited States law by the Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966. It also reflects devel-
opments in recent years in standardizing inter-
national tax relationships as a result of the work
'' For President Johnson's address to the Congress on
the state of the Union, see Bttlletin of Jan. 30, 1967,
p. 158.
• 59 Stat. 89.3.
-Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1982.
= TIAS 3844.
268
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of the Fiscal Committee of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
The convention contains articles specifying
the taxes to which it relates, defining various
terms found in the convention, prescribing rules
relating to exemptions or credits, subject to cer-
tain conditions or limitations, with respect to
various types of income, and dealing with
mutual exchange of information and other
administrative procedures.
The convention contains new provisions deal-
ing with items of investment income. Divi-
dends received by a United States company
from a French subsidiary will be subject to tax
at a, 5 percent rate instead of the 15 percent rate
applicable under the existing convention. For
this purpose, a parent-subsidiary relatioiiship
exists when 10 percent of the shares of a corpora-
tion paying a dividend are owned by the recijn-
ent corporation. Portfolio investors will
continue to be subject to the 15 percent rate.
Provision is also made for refund of the pre-
payment [precamjite) of tax required by the
1965 changes in French tax law. Interest income,
which is subject to a 15 percent tax rate in the
source countiy under the existing convention,
will be subject to tax at a 10 percent tax rate
under the new convention. Royalties, which are
now exempt from tax in the source country, will
be subject to a 5 percent tax, but copyright
royalties will continue to be exempt from tax.
Capital gains derived in one counti-y by a resi-
dent of the other continue to be exempt from
tax except in the case of gains on real estate
and in certain other cases.
The convention adopts a definition of "per-
manent establishment" similar to that contained
in the OECD model convention. In addition, it
provides that an insurance company in one
country which insures risks in the other coun-
try through an agent of independent status will
not be considered as having a permanent estab-
lishment in such other country. The existing
convention is silent on this point.
Industrial or commercial profits earned by
a resident of one country will be taxable in the
other country only if the profits are attributable
to a permanent establishment maintained by
such resident in the other country. Industrial
and commercial profits are defined to include
rentals from the distribution of motion picture
films.
The provision in the existing convention deal-
ing with private pensions and annuities has been
expanded to include alimony payments so that
alimony received by a resident of one of the
countries will be subject to tax only in that
country.
The elimination of double taxation is accom-
plished by the allowance of a credit by the
United States for taxes levied by France.
France, on the other hand, will exempt from tax
some items of income received by its taxpayers
from the United States. With respect to other
items of income, France will allow a credit for
United States tax imposed, but not in excess of
the French tax on such income.
Taxpayers receiving income from real prop-
erty may elect to be taxed on a net basis. This
provision is similar to the election afforded uni-
laterally to nonresident aliens by the Foreign
Investors Tax Act of 1966. France also has
agreed to waive its tax on imputed income based
on the rental value of property in certain cases
where a United States resident owns property
in France.
The administrative provisions of the conven-
tion include a mutual agreement procedure
whereby the authorities of both countries will
seek to reach agreement on various tax prob-
lems, including the uniform allocation of income
between related companies and a uniform de-
termination of the source of particular types of
income, and those authorities are authorized to
give effect to such agreements by making ap-
pro]iriate refunds or allowing appropriate tax
credits.
Geographical coverage of the convention is
extended to "Metropolitan Fi-ance and the Over-
seas departments (Guadeloupe, Guyane, Marti-
nique, and Reunion)" and may, pursuant to a
specified procedure, be extended to French over-
seas territories.
The convention will have effect with respect
to withholding taxes one month after the ex-
change of instruments of ratification. It will
be effective with respect to all other income
taxes in the case of the United States for tax-
able years beginning on or after January 1,
1967, and in the case of France for the assess-
ment year 1967.
The convention may be terminated by either
party by the giving of a notice of denunciation
through diplomatic channels at least 6 months
before the end of any calendar year after 1969.
The convention will be submitted to the
United States Senate for advice and consent to
ratification.
AUGUST 28. 19G7
269
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral
agreement between the United States and South
Africa of July S, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3885, 5129),
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic en-
ergy. Signed at Vienna July 26, 1967. Entered into
force July 26, 1967.
Customs
Customs convention on the international transport of
goods under cover of TIR carnets with modifications
of annexes. Done at Geneva January 15, 1959. En-
tered into force January 7, 1960.^
Accession deposited: Ireland, July 7, 1967.
Health
Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered
into force April 7, 1948; as to the United States
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Lesotho, July 7, 1967.
Amendment of article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 1808,
4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20. 1965.2
Acceptance deposited: Barbados, July 3, 1967.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at
London April 5, 1966.-
Acccptaiices deposited: Israel, July 5, 1967 ; Nether-
lands (including Surinam and Netherlands An-
tilles), July 21, 1967; United Kingdom, July 11,
1967.
Entry into force: July 21. 1968.
Narcotic Drugs
Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force Decem-
ber 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967.
TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Malaysia, July 11, 1967.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Approved by the International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea, London, Mav 17-June 17, 1960.
Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, July 5, 1967.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959 (TIAS
4893, 5603) , so as to put into effect a revised frequency
allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R)
service and related information, with annexes. Done
^ Not in force for the United States.
" Not in force.
at Geneva April 29, 1966. Entered into force July 1,
1967, except the frequency allotment plan contained
in appendix 27, which enters into force April 10, 1967.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: August 2,
1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement. 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Wa.shington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive. Entered into force July 16, 1967.
Accession deposited: Haiti, July 13, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Western Samoa, August 7,
1967.
BILATERAL
Afghanistan
Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities under
title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, as
amended; 7 U.S.C. 1691-1730D). with annex. Signed
at Kabul July 19, 1967. Entered into force July 19,
1967.
Agreement extending the technical cooperation program
agreement of June 30, 1953, as amended and extended
(TIAS 2856, 4670, 4979, 5243, 5477, 5714, 5807, 5901,
5993, 6123, 6253). Effected by exchange of notes at
Kabul June 21 and July 30, 1967. Entered into force
July 30, 1967.
Ethiopia
Parcel post agreement, with regulations of execution.
Signed at Addis Ababa and Washington June 3 and
15, 1967.
Enters into force: September 1, 1967.
France
Convention with respect to taxes on income and prop-
erty, with exchange of notes. Signed at Paris July 28,
1967. Enters into force one month after the exchange
of ratifications.
Malta
Agreement relating to the deployment of the U.S.S.
Yellowstone to Malta. Effected Ijy exchange of notes
at Valletta July 6 and 25, 1967. Entered into force
July 25, 1967.
Turkey
Agreement amending the agreement of December 27,
1949, as amended (TIAS 2111, 3737, 4458. 4766), for
the establishment of the United States Educational
Commission in Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes
at Ankara April 26 and May 2, 1967. Entered into
force May 2, 1967.
Yugoslavia
Agreement relating to United States liability during
operation of the NS Saimniiah by a private company.
Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade January 23
and April 24, 1967. Entered into force April 24, 1967.
270
DEPAKTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX August 28, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U70
American Principles. The Central Purpose of
United States Foreign PoUcy (Rusk) ... 251
Asia
The Central Purpose of United States Foreign
Policy (Rusl£) 251
Mr. Clifford and General Taylor Report on Tallcs
on Viet-Nam With Allied Leaders (transcript
of press conference) 256
Congress. The State of the Budget and the Econ-
omy (excerpts from President Johnson's
message to the Congress) 266
Diplomacy. Public Diplomacy at the United
Nations (Goldberg) 262
Economic Affairs
The State of the Budget and the Economy
(excerpts from President Johnson's message
to the Congress) 266
United States and France Sign Income Tax
Convention 268
Foreign Aid. The Central Purpose of United
States Foreign Policy (Rusk) 251
France. United Stateis and France Sign Income
Tax Convention 268
Mexico. United States and Mexico Agree on
Settlement of Pious Fund Claim 261
Presidential Documents. The State of the Budget
and the Economy (excerpts) 266
Treaty Information
Current Actions 270
United States and France Sign Income Tax
Convention 268
U.S.S.R, The Central Purpose of United States
Foreign Policy (Rusk) 251
United Nations. Public Diplomacy at the United
Nations (Goldberg) 262
Viet-Nam
The Central Purpose of United States Foreign
Policy (Rusk) 251
Mr. Clifford and General Taylor Report on Talks
on Viet-Nam With Allied Leaders (transcript
of press conference) 256
The State of the Budget and the Economy
(excerpts from President Johnson's message
to the Congress) 266
Vietnamese Election Campaign (Bundy) . . . 260
Name Index
Bundy, William P 260
Clifford, Clark M 256
Goldberg, Arthur J 262
Johnson, President 266
Rusk, Secretary 251
Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D 256
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 7—13
Press releases may be obtained from the Office
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to August 7 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 169 of July
28 and 173 of August 1.
No. Date Subject
*174 8/7 Sixth meeting of Joint United
States-Japan Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs, Washing-
ton, September 13-15.
*175 8/7 Program for visit of President
Gregoire Kayibanda of Rwanda.
*176 8/10 Program for visit of Chancellor
Kurt Georg Kiesinger of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
*Not printed.
U.S. QOVERHHENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1917
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OFFICIAU BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFK
•ma 0?77C1AL WEEKLY EEOORO OTUNITED fiTTATES FOBEION FOLICT
TK5
rrmiiYu
Vd. LV//. A^o. H71
SapnOat i, 1M7
THE PATH TO VIETNAM: A LESSOV IK INVOLVEMENT
6y AttittOTit Secretary BunJf T!S
SIXTH ANNIVEBSABY O? THE .VLUANCE FOB PROOBESS
THE QUESTION OP POOD AID IN THE PERSPECTIVE
OP THE PE0ELnn3 C7 THE DEVELOPING CODNTRIE3
SiaUz:^..: I J /Itihw E. Octdtehwudt S04
OOmiUNICATIONS POUCY
IVw»>iwtf JoJMicn'* MMtafft to C<»iffma fSJ?
f «r unitt ««( imU* 4«eib oarer
Tke Patk ta Vkt-Nui: A Unoi in iBTohremeBt
by WCUttm P. llmif
AtsitteBi Stervttfg for Sett Atisn md Peeifia Af«in '
Yoa hAT* takad nw to afuk tliia waonbig oa
tha topic "The Pkth to Vict-Nua: A Ttirm la
lovolvnMDt.'' I wdcoBM this oppartaitj to
rcTMw tb« wliol* hifltorf of Usitcd SUttt ac-
tions with raqwct to Vict-Nu»— making p«r-
(onally aa to the period ap to IWl, aarinf vhidi
I had no policy responaibitity, and of oouna
noeeaaarily mors officially for the period aiuoa
J«i>uai7 of 1^61.
Qnito apart from tha CBormotu pnacnt im-
portaaea of Sootb Viat-yain and our action
tlwrr, I have often refl2ctcd- as one who tras
tempted to biiaoiiii a jirofwaioBal hiatorias—
lliat the atof^ of ViH-Staai, of Sonthao* Aaia,
and of Amancaa policy there forma an eztrmor-
dinarily broad caaa hiatory involring almoat
all th« major problaau that ha«« afeetad tha
irorld aa a whole in tho part S3 yean. For tha
■tranda of the Tict-Nam hiaton inchide tha
diaraeteriatica of Fnock colo&kl control ooan-
puvd to colonial control daawhant; tha and of
the colonial [oiod; th* intarrabtion and ooia-
patition of natioBalixB and coaannaiam; onr
reiatioM to tha Soviat Union and Ooenansict
China and their relatianAipa with each othar;
our relation to the Eon^ieMi anlonial pewar,
Praaec; aad at ieaat ainca 19M-4ha Rktica
ol Yfat-Kam to (he wider ipwrtcn of national
iadapeodaaca and aalf-ditanniaatiaB in SotAh-
es£t Asia and indnd threnghoat Aaia.
Tha Viof -Xam siotj is afacwo- all a pwdact
AaftMa pavpaeva ne artlrrry
at tMW<M t* nt* Xattaaal 8i
I Am n I
tar saikea-
in».
of Vietnanaaa aq>intioaa and dccisiona. In tha
early period French daeiaiona wars crucial. Bot
I am sure yoa wnot ma to focua oa the Amer-
ican policy role, how aiul why wa becamo in-
rolred, and bow we raached tha praaent poai-
tk>n. tW ebottld not ba a purely hitforioal dia-
ctt!»ioa, of course, and I know that yoa hava
natural and valid concerns that focua partie-
ularly oa tha deeisioBa of tba last 2 yeara and
on the deeiaiona that confront oa now and in tha
future. So I ahall touch briefly on (heaa, fully
expoctiof that your qcurti^Bza will be quite
largdy ta this area.
For cur mutual oonTcaienca in aaalyaia, I
have tried to iaotato 10 major Amarlaa deei-
aiona going back to 1943. It u not for me to
defend, or acoeaiarily to justify, poiicy daci-
eiona taken before 1861, bat it is essential to
•xaBiine them if one b to understand tba pna-
•nt poaitian.
Onr firat dedaiona afactiBg Vlet-Nam waia
in IMS. Pftaidsat Booaevclt deeply baBevad
that French colonial ooatioi in IndeehiBa
ehould not ba raetored, aad thb attitndc led aa
in the daaisg aMotha ol Om war against mifi-
tartat Japan to adopt what tha Fianek hava
always oonddecad aa obatmctiva attkada to-
ward their ratnm. Sraantaly. wa briefly gae*
Btodsat aaritfanca to W> Chi ICnJi as aa aaaek
a/iainsl tba Japaaaaa^ lUs stcsy, tte ao naeh
cUa in tba wMa Tocord, b bat told ia Koben
Shaplaa's tha«ghtfbl 'The Last Karolntioa."
Sctsad. whe« Urn n«aeh bad lataraad, wa
etood aaida. Ia the critiaal y«ar IMa^ rad mw
tha nm S or 4 yaara, tl» Fnach liat oHd) tha
rantainebkaa Mrisaiiaa and then bnfct ft. ••
CT3
thai BMJor eonSicC Btatted. It hu often beaa
ugaid, by Sbspten among othei% that wa
oould hsTO •sartad graatar pi«iaai% F*riuip>
aven «Seetiv« pressun, on tha Fmich to go
thrao^ with tba FoDtaiaaUaaa agnBiaeataul
to set Vut-Nam en tha path to aai^ iadapend-
taca. TIta Idlnra to auK siiji p«niTa m^
thu3 ba construed aa » lugativa |»lky deeisum
on our part
I ayweU am skepdeal that va eoald oossair-
•bly hava aflaetad tha vafbrtaoata eotuna that
the FreaBh followed in thia pariod. It it k
aigufld that oar ofenrhabniag Manball Pian
•id to France thorH b-ivn fnvaB ns levaragai
thea it oust fca pc' ct tha aama tiioa
th&t tha llarshall I . _::: ^:._=3 eparativa only
early in 1M8 and th:;t by thea the di« waa
Urgdy eaat Uonovsr, I d^sht very much if
the |mom1 acd faraiaed French naticai would
have tceponded eras if we had tried to act to
end the colooial era, aa wa did to a major ex-
tent with tha Dotdi in Indonesia.
In a very rial aenae, tha tngedy of Viet-
Kam derives frooi tha hi} of Franca in IMO
and all the uadezstandable emotiont aracaad
by that «v«et among French leaders, including
notably Da Gaulle himself. Bestorod control
in Indochina waa a badge, however mistaken,
for a France that aaant to be otos again a
world power. Ahhongb it nny he argaed that
we ihoald at least hare tried, I doubt if thia
deep French attitude ooold have been shaken
by anything wa did or aajd uti kaat of all
by anything said or done in connection with
the wise and right policy of helping France
to gat back on hiw feet.
The third period of American decision be^n
in 1950, jaat befcte oar involvement in tha de-
fense of Kocea against Soviet-iBaptied aggns-
sicn. Thm Commonista had }ast taken control
in China and entered into the 1950 alliance with
the Soviet UnioB. CooimiiAiam did then appear
to oar poKcymakera aa wniBrthing approaching
a mendith, and wa came to aaa the French
stand in Indochina as part of a gfehal attempt
to rapel Commnniat militaiy adventurea. In
aaeooa, we acted on two lieaa of pdicy between
ItSO and MM: on the one hand, ecenamie
and growing military awirtanee to the French;
on the other hand, steady nrging that the
Fiench proceed rapidly to grant real independ-
enee to Indochina, beta for itaowa nke imd as
tha fae^ means «f preventing Coaununist
control.
Hera it hi* bean Ufoad that we Hi too
Boeh aerating or at laaal too little iu||si^
I find Bsndf syvpethtitie to this point «f vinr,
aa indtai it was espMBad at tha tina fef neh'
wise Ban as Edmnod GBaiia«» who aanad in
Viet>Nam end nadk iitar hMama rar di»-
tingniihed Awbaaaador fai tha Congo fiaa
IMl to 1M3.
Tet^Mgns I amnot tan whether a diffamt
United Stst^ pdky in this pniod oooU Ibm
bnmgfat abotA tho decind iMolt of a Fmc*
first auoueaiaftilW waging e eoatly and bioa<y
war to defend Viet-Nam and thai gnntint it
indq>endenea. Again, French attitaaes and ae-
ticms had de^ toots in the atill shaky sitoatioa
of Franoe and in tha oombiaatiao of a «nlid
ooocem for the Coomaniat threat and a teire
to maintain a atajar Fieach pRsscnoe and hoU
in Indochina. Even if the Ficnch had acted
wisely in every reapoet in thb period, they
might hsTe beat able to oebieve twthing niora
than a division of the orantry into OtfUBanisC
and non-Coeunoniat areas, "na vital diffenaca
might have been that valid noo-Coamiuniat na-
tionalism in Viet-Nam would have had a chaaee
to stand on iu feet and davalop respected
leadera before ISM; and if this had happened
the whda later atory night have mfouisd in
a very different way.
As it was, tha spring of 18M brought Fica^
defeat, in spirit if not in military two, and
Isft nca-Oonmoniat watiowalisni in Viet-Ham
almost bankrupt.
ilie rariod aff Iwe woaava Caanvaaea
The period of tha •Scnava Oanferenoa is tht
foQtth period of American derisiew That is a
complex stoiy, well told from a relatively <»•
tsched viewpoint t^ Anthony Edan, now Lord
Avon, in his oresioin.
Wa played o crii icftl badtatage rob at Oeaem.
We maintaiBed the poBiUlity of Military tntsr>
veation, which, aany obasrvew at the tims b»>
Heve, played a cmcial part in iadaeing tha
Sovieta and the Coaunoniat Chinese alUb to
nrga Hanoi to asttle for a taBp(»nry division of
Viet-Nam at the ITth parallel and for an in- -
dspendat C^hedia and l^ea. And wa began
to lay tha gioandwork for SEATO, as part of
tha effort to show strength and to coBtinea
Conmumist CUna that it woald not have a fna
hftcd in SoHtheaat Asia.
Yet wa wers nawilling to partieipato fa^y
2T8
wmrutnatn or n\T» witnat
m the tnmiag af the Qmmwm ■eeonh,* Mppar-
tatlj bacMM MV ■olicja&aken did not wkk
t« aanekte thmmmn in any wej with » km
4rf ttfriMy la Coaauniit x^^ttfraL So tht
Geneva eeeordi van fhuned iazsely lMfani<
Hanoi, CeamoBiit CSiina, and the Soviet Uoion
on the «ae nda iBd the Frach, who wen nndw
tha argnt tima piiaauia of their dwawtte
politiea, on tiie other. la the end we otmRmud
outatvea to nyiag two thinga: *
(a) T&at W3 wcdd view any tgputian is
vioSation of the accord* with grave ooaeBiB
and as 161100117 thrMtntiog inteniatioeal pMoa
aod aecority.
(b> Tltat we took the Mune poeition on the
reonifkataea of Viet-Nam thi^ w« took in other
'iiatioBa now divided agaihat thiir wilF*—
neening, then %iA now, Qermeny and Eonai —
end that wa would oootinoe to nek nnily
through frae eieetioBa sopHriied bj the Unitid
Nationa. In affect, wa thus interpreted the elee>
tion provision aa providing for a free deter-
minaticn hy the people of Viat-Kam ee to
whether th^ wiehad wrniiBcetion and in that
aenae eadornd it «wiwiataiit with the sa^ilar
poeitiona we had taken in Gcnnaay and Korea.
All aorta of things could be said aboaS; oar
dectaoaa in thet period. Seme am ol tha viow
that we shoold have takes military action and
tried to nail down at leaat a dear militaiy divi-
aion of Viet-Kaa, or e*«a to dehat Ho; I n^-
adf think that ^ tha qpring of ICM that coofn*
would have baai nataaoUe.
It may ako ha argosd— and I do not know
the oontemporaiy facton— (hat, involrad as wa
alcaady were by praoediag dacisKiBS, we ahoald
have paftictpatea foithrightly in the making
of tha acooraa and knt our weight to thm
from the ootaali didanng rigfat than that we
meant to slaaA— with the Fraaeh if potihle,
Imt atone if nrttmuj in aoppoitiftg noa-
Oenwniit natiwmlim ia SoiMh Viet-Maa. Wa
wadd Aan have aetad an wa had dsaa for aan-
Coaaaaaiat natiwiaHan in Kona, ahhongh
withoBt to being nMasMiy or dwrable for ua
to pot eantinaing foroee on tha gfonad aa w«
had to do ia tha face of the eon wtienal threat
to Korea.
•WmKxf, aw Amtrttm Ff^tm fWoR iMt-MO.
aaato Ommmnn. ml I. Dqaitmat tf aial* |ii»Wie
Hon aM^pwIBH
■ror >t>>iuB»a. «• »aujm]( af As» % tUt.
p. I«iL
At any fat^ in July ISM a 1
tity canw into bemg in So«th mat^Nam with
what aMMorad at the tima to he cxtnordiaaiiltf
■Bsll «ilU8oea of eorvival. At tha wy and, tita
EVendhi with a dcgiea of Anetican pieaMUa^
jr^llad the Mawddy nationaliat Kan aa Prima
Minister, hardly thafciBg that ha woald anrviva
and laoidqr aaihar to a dhoct patttd ia whidk
tha Frendt roold exit with aona mnManra of
(^Tioe and bt aalun taka itacaniaib
The fifth eat of America* daerriena came in
this setting and indeed overlapped the period of
tin Oenevn ConfiBtcnea. Tbs firA npeet of thva
decisiqcs waa onr leading rch b\ Cii ?'.-T~:ctticni
of tha 8EAT0 traaty,* si-^d ci IZz:.':.! in
Septemhec of 19M and r-' ': ] t7 cu2- Ssaata
ia Fbbraary ItSS by e v-i c: C3 to 1. In the
SEATO treaty Scr'b V: ". '3 end its terri-
tocy wera specific^I^j Lr:":f,;J n a "protocai
state"; and the aigci'-cr;^ e; -- "rrJT? fioespted
the oUi^tioa, if c±:d kj tl^ Civ-n-jasnt of
Sonth Viet-Nam, to tata tctioa in rr- -:-j3 to
anaed attack ^i&im:t ^Sseh Vi:vr~:- i c J to
"J c
eonsalt «n appnifviate
Kam vere anbjeeted to snbvc:
Qenevm aooorda had, of ooorr
iy ftoWdden acpaesiva acts f : ~i cl
Viet -Kam against the other h:
bc:3 CO obligatioa for act!
participating nations. SEA.
and setioas ahligatioa est
Viet-Kan and aisMd more wi^
of tha SootheaA Atian signx^:. '.-:,
cessor states of Indochina.
Tba saeoad a^Mct of oas c'
^Itoiad waa aa evolriag one. I
dent EiseniMwer wnmiitt-j
enaunnio sqjport for the nr-'
Diem waa ainady ahowing hi
ann able than aoyona had c
And ia early |89S, withost c
raent, we bagea to take over C
ariitaniiw 19 Sooth Vkt-Nac
namerical and eqnipRMnt Hn _.
the Ganen accords for faragn kI.
In shoit, in the ISSt-^ pericu
-■■:.i Vl;J-
.::■ 1.:.'.} c2
:> Sooth
— :ty
3
o
* VW tst tt tia e3on!«9st Sjia OdIs«!»» Dtftsaa
Tcr test c3 Frsf^ist Ctxsi^awn'B knar. ■»
«, 11
STT
into » major supporting rok wid nndertook a
major treaty commitment involving Sooth Viet-
Nam.
Thaae decisions, I repeat, are not mme to
deffsd. In tijo mood of the period, EtiU deeply
affected by a not unjustified view of raonolithu:
communistn, tiiey were *«crpted with very wide
support in the United States, a« the vote snd
the d<>bate in the Senate ahundantly proved.
And the S«»te documenta provs conclusively
that there was full undErstnnding of the jn^ve
implicationa of the SEATO obligations, par-
ticularly as tii^ related to aggression by mean^
of armed t>ttack.
"!>«: important point about tliese decioions—
and a point fervently debated vrifhin the nd-
miniatntion at the time, according to mnny
partkipwit*— i« that they reflected a policy not
merely toward Vlet-Nam but toward the whole
of Southeast Asia. In essence, the underlying
basic issue was felt, and I think nplitly. to lie
whether the United States should involve itself
much more directly in the Security of Soiitheast
Asia and the presenation of tba largely new
nations that had com* into being there since
World War II.
There could not be the kind of clear-cut policy
for SootfaeMt Asia ihat had by then evolved in
Northeast Am, where we had entered into
mutual •acuritjr treaties individually with
Japan, Kor«», tad the Republic of Chma. Some
of the Southeast Asian countries wished no as-
sochttion with an outside poorer; others-
Malaya, Singapore, and the northern areas of
Borneo, which were not thea independent-
continued to rely on the British tnd the Com-
monwealth. So the directly aCccted area m
which policy could operate conpnssd only
Thailand, tl*8 Philippines, and the non-Com-
munist nacetmm states of Indochina— South
Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia.
Yet it was felt at the time that unless the
United States participated in a major way in
prMBTving the independence and security of
thes» nations, they would be subject to prosres-
give pressures by the parallel efforts of North
Viet-Nam and Cocnmonist China.
Tlie iadgmeat that this threat of aggression
wa« t«il and valid wts the first h6.<a« of the
policy adopted. Two other judgments that lay
behind the policy were :
(a) That » HKceasful takaover by North
VietrNam or Communist diina of any of the
directly affect«d nations would not only be sen
ous in ifseJf hut would drastically weaken and
in a short time destroy the capacity of tha
other nations of Southeast Asia, whatever than
international po^ar«s, to maintain their own
indepestdesoe. .
(b) That while we oursslves had no wis*
for B special position in Southea* Aaia, th«
treaafer of the area, or Urga parts of it, tc
Communist control achieved by subvereion anc
sggression would mean a major addition ta
the power gtotus of hoetila and agsraarra Com
munist Chinese and North Vietnwneae regimes
It was believed that such a situation would no
only doom the peoples of the arta to condition:
of domination and virtual servitude over an in
definhe period but would create the very kin<
of aggrijssive domination of much of Asia tha
we had already fouj^ht the militarist Icadem o
Japan to prevent. It was widely end deepl;
b-slieved that such a situation was profound!
contrary to our national interests.
Hut llier? was still a third supporting jud^
ment that, like the others, ran through the ca^
culations of the period, TTili was that th
larj:cly new nations of Southeast Ana _*«• t
f.ict valid national entitica and that while the!
progress might ba halting and imperfect hot
politically ud economically, this progrese «i
worth backing. To put it another way, thei
was a constructive vtsion of the kind of Sont!
east Asia that could evolve and a sHiss thj
this constructive purpose was worth pursuing i \
a matter of oar own ideals, as a matter of-oi \
national intertst, and es a realistic hope oftl
possibilities of progress if external aggressic
and subversion couU be held at bay.
These I believe to have been the bedrock re
sons for the position we took in Viet-Nam ar
Southeast Asia at this time. They were ow
laid by what may appear to have been emotion
facton in our attitude toward communism
China and Asia. But the degree of support tb
this major policy undertaking received at tl
time went far beyond these who held the
emotions. And this b why I for «ie belie
that the bedrock reasons I have given were t
true and decisive ones.
So tlie United Statss became deeply jnvolr
in the security of Southetat Ashi and, wher«v
it was welcomed, in llie effort to achieve c(
nomio propresn a."* well. And the undertaking
support South Viet-Nam economically v
militarily and through tha protoed to t
SE.\TO t reaty must be seen as a part of the wi
ST8
t>e»A»nrE)rr or statb ■cuxt
Tww Ibftt tb« choice wM betwwn fairly deep
involvement inSootheast Asia or funding »si<]e
in the face of an estimate that to do » would
c*uss Conununiat Chinese and North Viet-
nanrtfae power and domination to davr throuj;li-
out the area.
Tke htv ef fv»* ElscMent
The nnfolding of this ptJicy between 19J4
and 1861 la a Ungled and difficult story. Mis-
takes, even serious mistakes, wpre undoubtedly
made then and later. Some of these, many be-
lieve, were in oar economic and particularly
in our military assistarce policies in Vif t-N'«m ;
and it has been arjjued — to me (lersuasively —
that wo ehonld have at least tried harder to
counter the growing authoritarian trends of the
Diem rtffsna in the political sphere.
What was not a mistake, but the logical
corollary of the basic policy, wm the handling
of the provision in the Geneva accords that
called for fiws elections in 1853. It ha.s been
argued that this provision, which was certainly
badly drafted, called for a single nalionwi<b
election, with reunification assumed. Our in-
terpretation— that what was meant wn.i in effect
a plebiscite as to whether reunitication was
desired — has strong support in reason and the
recollections of Geneva participant"?. Wiot
cannot be disputed is that the detertiiinalion
was lo he free; the word appear* three times
in the article of the accords.
Much hindsight nonsense has been written
aboQt wh.1t took place in 1953 on this issue,
and if any of yoa are planning a thesis subject.
I commend to you the examination of the con-
tfmpcrory K)uri-e9 and discission. You will, I
think. End clear confirmation that by 1958 two
propoeitiona were accepted: firrt. thnt South
Viet-Xam, contrary to most expectations in
10.")4. w:i"; sianding on its own feet and had
denmnsfraleit lluit the making? of a valid non-
Communist nationalism e.\isted there: nnd, *«-
ond, that North Viet-Nam — which hod gone
thmiicli a perio<l of Imrsh repre--ision in IfjS
and lO.V in which Bernard Fall estimates that
nearly .'■>O,0firt political opponent* were kilW
outright — would not conceivably have per-
mitted any supervision or any determination
that could remotely have been called free.
In the face of these facts. Diem refused to
go through with the elections, and we supported
him in that refusal. Incidentally, I am told that
we urged that he put the monkey on Hanoi's
back and force them to refoae superviaion or
frw eondition»— ca they would surely have
done. Diem proudly rejected this advice, which
did not change what would have happened but
did leave the etencnts of a propaganda argu-
ment that still f»gBs. It is, 1 repeat, hindsight
nonsense, and I would 'inly quote two contem-
porary statiment^— one by the then junior
.Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy,
the other by Ilrofesaor Hans Morgentliau.
Kennedy categorically rejected "an election
obviously stacked and subverted in advance,
urged upon us by thos* 'vhn ha ve already broken
their own pledges under the agreement they now
seek to enforce."
And Morgcnthan referred to the tremendous
change between 1954 and 1956 and the "miracle"
of what had been accomplished in South Viet-
Nam. He went on to say that the conditions for
free elections did not eaist in either North or
South Viet-Nam and concluded:
Actuxlly. tbe proniiloo for free elertlOBa whtrh
wosM ""iTr ulilm»tely (he protdia of Vlet-MaM wa*
a deTi,-,. lo biilc tbe iDconpatiblUty of the Commnalit
end Vir<m poaltloca, Drlther of wblcb can admit
tb» jC'imlnatton of all of VIM Nam b7 the other aid*.
It «!.• a i}?»lc* to dlKjtnlee the fact thtt tbe Hue of
tuilltarr di-axrratloo wu boond lo be a line of political
iliviAiofi %% well.
Unfortunately, the promise of South Viet-
Nam in 1956 vx;is not realized in the next 5
years. In the face of I)icm"s policic:'. discontent
grew— much as it grew in the same period in
Korea under Rhee. .\s in Korea, that discontent
might will have led to an internal revolution
in a more or less traditional Asian manner.
This is not what happened. Despite nil that
romantics like [.feani Lacouture may say, what
liappeno<l was that Hanoi moved in, from at
least 19.'«9 onward (Bernard Fall would say
from 1957), and provided a cutting edge of
dins'tiniLtmineil m^n from the North, and sup-
plies tlint transformed internal discontent into
• ma.'wive subversive effort guided and sup-
ported frran the outside in crucial ways.
The realistic view, then and later, has been
well summarised by Roger Hilsman in his re-
cent Iwok (with which, incidentally, I have
serious f:tctual differences on the period after
19*1). Hil.-man put* it thus tpage 471 of his
book):'
•ri ilnrr n Suli'm (I»ouM«l»y. 0»rdeD CItj. N.T..
1D67).
•XITKMH^m *. Ifli;'
279
\ Ivtoam, in troth, wu In tbt mtdjt ot two nniesl's>
■(It <«»• TJ>» foerrUl* warfar* WM not a cpootaneoM
ri-volBllon, «» Conununlst propeeanrta mould li«»e It.
but a rontrlvwl. <J«Ub»raie campaljn dlrntfd ami man-
»tr<i tToa HanoL But Vl»tn*o »«» al»o In the ttmm
of a tra» revolution, a aortal and natiaaalMte t«»olo-
(ion very miK-li akin to ttn "ntw natlOBfiUaDii'' that
prrradt^ Iwih the Conjo crlnla aud IndoooiU'a cos>-
froniatloo with Ualafala. Evra ithlls the atni(S)«
wTOt CO agalDit th« Vl»t Cnng. po»»r waa Is the pror-
r»9 of |ji\««lD« from tb» FrfB<*-»diicaf«<l Bandarln
. ln<i to repmntatlvr* of tha new DatlonalUm. th»
Huddhlsta, th» aiudenta. aad the "yoota TUrka" In
tbt; icilllar;.
CenMniMd insaoMMnt In loalkamt Asia
This, then, was the gjttiation es it confronted
(ho Kenjiedy ndministraf ion in January of 1981.
AU this is history. Reasonable men can and do
differ about what was dnne. But those who be-
lipve that serious mistakos 'rere mads, or even
that the l«sic policy was wrong, cannot escape
the fact ilat by 1961 we were, as a practic«l
mutter, deeply enptped in Southeast Asia and
specifically in the preserration of the jndepead-
ence of South Vict-Nam.
President Kennedy c«me to <^ce with a sub-
versive effort aptinst South Viet-Nam well un-
derway and with the situation in Ijaos deteri-
oratinp rjpidly. .\nd for a time the decisions on
L.ti» overshrtdowed Viet-Xam, nlthouffh of
course the two were always intimately related.
In T.Aoa, President Kennedy in the spring
of 1061 rejected the idea of stronp military ac-
tion in favor of seeking n settlement tlint would
install a neutralist government under Sotivanna
Phouma. a solution uniquely .ippropriate to
Laos. Under Governor [W." Avtrell] Harri-
man's astute handling, the negotiations finally
led to the Geneva accords of 19C2 for Ijmw; '
and the prcKess — a point not adequately no-
iice<)_le(l the United States to a much more
explicit and affirmati\-e endorsement of the
(ieneva accords of 1054, a positico we-have
since consistently maintained as the beistlmsis -
for peace in Viet-Xam.
In Viet Xam. the situstJon-at tiul il]i|i»wrf<. -
le<w critical, and the initial action* of lhe-I&i»
nedv administration were confined to w\ in-
crease in our military aid and a small incrMse
of a few hundred men in our military training;
personnel, a breach — it may be argued — to this
extent of the limits of the Geneva accords but
fully justified in response to the scale of North
' For te»ti. aM Bci irtin of An« 13. 10«2. p. 23».
Vietnamese violation of the basic noninterfrr-
enc« /rovisionr;,
AUhoo^ tlie details somewhat obecui-ed the
broad pattern, I think any fair historian of the
fctura must conclude that ta early asthe apriog
oJ lOfll President Kennedy hsd in efiact telwn
a Kventh United States policy decision: that
wa would continue to be deeply eogasod in
Soath«tt=t Asia, in South Viet-Nam, and undar
new ground rubs, in Laos aa welL
This was wof— despite the hindstpht «tmw-
man rsoantly erected by Proferaor [John Ken-
neth] Oalbraitli— because President Kenjwly
believed at all in a monolithic communism. Pro
feasor Galbraith forgeto a good deal, and nota-
bly tto Vienna meeting of June 1901 in wliich
President Kennedy Bet out deliberately to work
with the Soviet Union for the Laos isttlcmeiit—
even as at the very same time ho dispatched
Vice President Johnson to visit Viet-Nam and
Thailand and in effect to reaffirm oor courses
of ecUon there. The total pattern of United
Sieies policy toward Communist countries un-
der both Pr^ident John-son and President Ken-
nedy belies the Galbraith thesis.
No, neither President Kennedy nor any wnior
policymaker, then or later, believed the Soviet
Union was still united with Commuaist China
end Xorth Viet-Nam in o single sweeping Com-
munist threat to the world. Bat President Ken-
nedy did believe two other things that had, and ,
still hn\-ei, a vitnl bearing on our policy. |
First, he believed that a weakening in our
haaic resolve to help in 5wuthenst Asia would
fend lo tncourage separate Soviet pressures in
other areas.
James Rest on has stated, on tJtc basis of con-
tunporary conversations with the PrBsident,
that this concern specifically related to Khru-
shchev b aggressive designs on Berlin, which
were pushed hard all through 1061 and not luid
tare.<it tilUfterthe-eotanrmfaBiIe eriag «f WZ.
_ At any,i»t«» P««»den» I&nwK^pJMUjWftto^
Keve ^tot fkihw ♦»^toeg the hig^^gwi nC
ff> ..ja!iftiim»«»*ri^tw<Vie»XBnrMrfSaDtiaMt
JLaa hz£ b fcssring on the validity of onr emn-
mitmenta elawhere. As Theodoi* Sonosen h»i
summariied it (page 6ftl of A'«M»«^y) : "• • •
this nation's commitment (in Sooth Viet-Nam)
tn January, 1861 . . • >"»9 not one that Presi-
dent Kennedy felt he could aliandcn without
undesirable consequences throughout Asia and
the world."
Secondly, President Kennedy believed that
the Communist Chinese ttxre a major throat
280
nEF.MtxMCNT OT STATS icuxnir
to doniinata Soatlieut Asi&au'l specifirnlly that
It I'nited fitatM "withdravral m th« caae of Virt-
Nam &111I in the rase of Tlmil.iiu! niij^t mean k
oollapw in the MUira «re«." • Indeod, Preaidi'nt
Krnnedy in om> statrnifnt e^prewlj lupportcd
the "daniino tlifory." •
My own vifw, l>a«-d on participation and
KiiKsequvnt diMiission villi oilietH, Ls that the
uiidfriyiii;: vi*w of the relation betnwn Viet-
Nnm and the threat to Southeast Asia vas clear
and stmnply lielicvfHl Ihrouchout th» top ferels
of tha Kennedy ndminiatration. Wa knew, as
Kt> have always knn^a, tliat the action a^inst
S-inf h Viet N'niii reHerh'il lUieply hold omhilions
hy Hnnoi to vinify Viet-Nam iiniler Communist
ii.ntrol ami that Hanoi neeiioil and wanted only
Chinese aid to 'his end and ai-ihed to be ita
own master. And we knew, as nf^in we alwav!)
hare, that North Viet-N'nni would resist any
Commun!>^ Chines trtiBpassinj; on areas it con-
tpollesl. But thpFc two proposition'! were not
then, as they are not now, in<-on^i<;tent K^th the
hflief thit the apfire^ive r.mhitions of Com-
munis China and North VietNum- larp'ly
North VietnamM* in old Indochina, overlap-
pine in Thailind. Chinese in the n-st of Souih-
enst Asia— noiiM surely feed on earli other. In
f lio pye> of the rpst of Soalhea.<tt .V.sia. rvrtainly,
they were p.irt of a common and parallel (hreat.
.'^, in effect, (hp policy of 19.M-fll was ra-
affimieil in the early mnnthjj of lit?] by the
Kennedy administration. liPt me say right here
I do not mean to make thie a personal anah-^is
of President Kennedy nor to imply any view
whatever as to what he mii^ht or might not hare
done had he lived heyond November of 1!)<>3.
Bnt gonte unlnie iliinjp) have lieen '^aid .ibout
the \W>\ perfod. and I helicvf the recortj totally
siijiports the :iccount of policy, and ihe rea.v>ns
for it. that I have g;iven.
MBMlMtWtfWa
We then come to tl»e eighth period of deci-
sion—the fall of 1961. By then, the 'pierrilla
a^grereion"' (HiUman's phn-*) had a^auiied
tndy serions proportions, and morale in South
Vict-Nani had b<>ca shaken. It aeemed hi{;hly
doubtful tliat wiihoot major additional United
.States actions the North Vietnamese threat
coil Id be stemmed.
I'n-sident Kennedy took the decision to raise
the ante, through a system of advistrs, pik^
aiui aupporting military |)er^nnel that rose
gradually to the level of 25,009 iu the c«st 8
yeara.
1 do not think it is appropriate for me to go
into the detail of the discussions that aoccm-
panifd thi^t deci-sion. Fairly full, bat etiil inocra-
plete. acrount.s have been given in variotis of
the books on the period. What ran be avn, with-
out going into such detail, is that the oonm of
action that was chosen conadeircd and rejeded,
at lea.<!t for the lime bein|^ tha direct iatroduo-
tion of ground combat truopsnr thebonbiiif of
North Viet-Nam, slthongti (here was no doubt
evn (hen — asllilsman again makes clear — that
the bombing of North Viet-Nam could ha«-e been
stwtained under any reasonable legal view in
the fare of »hat North Viet-Nam was doing.
Rather, the cour% of action w hich waa adopted
rijrhtly sresaeJ that the South Vietnamese rola
must remain crucial and piimarj.
In effect, it was ileiided thai the United States
would take those additional actions that ap-
peared clearly required to mset the situation,
not knowiiiff for sure whether theae actions
would in fact prove to be adequate, trying —
despite the obvious and alwa>s recognized ef-
fect of momentum and inertia— not to cross the
bridge of still further action, and hoping
strongly that what was being undertaken would
provi' -uflicipiit.
^•Ulicoi Clnf>9« in South Vi«t-Nom
'»his was the policy followed frt)m early 1962
right up to February of 19€j. Within this pe-
riod, however, political deterioration in South
Viet-Nam compelled, in the fall of 19C3, d»-
cisions that I think must be counted as the
ninth critical point of United Stat«» policy-
making. It was decided at that tims^hat "while
the United SfateS'would do everything necee''
sary to support the war,-)t irould no loSger ed-~
her»4t>-ttspti6(areof«li-out support of the Diem
reisrime unless that regime made sweeping
changes in itn method of operation. The record
of thi"! period lias been described by Robert
Shaplen and now by Hilfsnan. Undoubtedly,
our new posture contributed to the o\Terthrow
of Dicm in November 1963.
I du nut myself think that we could in the
*A repi/ by Pmldeot Kennedr dartnc bU
conferi-m-* on June 14. 1*82.
* tor tranw-rtpt of an NBC Interrlpw witb Prt^limt
Kmnt^j OB SefK. S. lum. arv B<.Lij-r!:< uf S<-|>t. 30.
1»S3. p. 4sn
SCPTF.MHrR 4, l»«T
281
cod ha\-e done otberwiw, but the importmt his-
torical point is th»t our actions tended to doep«a
our involvement in South Vi«t-Najn and oar
coramitmont to the evolution of noo-CommuDist
nationalism, alweyt loreacen to b« diflcult, that
wouid follow the ovwthrow cf Diem.
Unfortunately, the fall of Diem, whils it hfid
X ov«r'^ helming popular support in South Viet-
nam, failed to produce an effpctive naw govern-
ment. For a year and o haSf South Vist-Nam
wallowed in political confusion; and poi^^
finally passed, with the agrcament of civilian
political leaders, to the Thieu-Ky miUUrjlcd
government of June 1065.
This political confusion was dishearteaing,
but it waa not Rirprising. For South Viet-Nam
had never been trained by the French to govern
itself, and above all, it was faced with steadily
rising Korth Viftnamess and Vict Ccaig ter-
rorist and nulit*i7 action. Intensification of that
liof ion began almost at once after the overthrow
of Diem and demonstrated — if it needed dcincn-
stniting— that the struggle was not over Diem,
despite Communist claims and honest liberal
qualms, but was in attempt to destroy non-Com-
munist nationalism of any sort ia South
Viet-N'am.
In early lOM riTsid<'nt Johnson expressly
reaffirmed all the ensential elements of tbi Ken-
nedy administration policies publidy through
every a>.lion and through finn internal diroc-
li\-es. It is simply not true to say that there
«Rs any cliango in policy in this period toward
gn-ater military etnphasis, mnuli less major traw' .
military actions. Further actions were not es-
cluded— as thcyliad not beefl-fn 1051 or 1001—
btrt President Johnson's firm object right up to
February 190J was to make the policy ado[)tcd
in kte lOCl work if it could possibly be done,
including the fulte^t [vos-sibte emphasis on pacifi-
cation and the whole political anil livilian
a.spect.
Tiie summer of H>ft4 did bring R new plmse,
though not a change lu [volicy. Tlie situation
was continuing to decline, and Xortli Viet-N'am
may ha\-e been emboldencvl by tlie ,rend. Cer-
tainly, infiltration was rising steadily ond, as
we now tnow more clearly, begun to include
substantial nnml*'^ of native North Vietnam-
ese. But, more dramaticnlly, .Vmerican naval
ships on patrol 'n the Oulf of Tonkiij were at-
tacked, and there were two responding United
States attacks on North Vietnamese naval bases.
This led President Johnson to seek, and the
CongTf- ' to approve overwhelmingly on Au-
gust 7, lim, a resolution '«— drafted in oaliaW*
ration with congressional leader*— that Mt only
approved such retsliatory stt&cka but sddsd
that:
Tl» I'nttKd 8i«t« ressrJs as vital lo tU natJ-ioal la-
e«mt and to wortd pea<» the aiaUittBaot* of lutee-
natlooaj pea™ and escozHj Ui tmtbesx Aala. Oa-
■ooesl with the ConUUatloa of tli» talttd WalW an*
the ChnrtiT of tli« Inlted Natlos* and la aeeortaaes
with Ita obUsattoss ondtr tin ■oarlHVt Aria OaUee
ore Defensa Treaty, ttw Oaltsd Btatw is. ttefstnte.
pitp* re<i. aa the Pteiiltot «etirm!B««. to tato aU oecM-
«rj ilepsu ItKlodtcs tlw an of ntani fotre, to s«Ut
807 fgetntier e» protocol «tat« of tba SaatkeaM Ail*
CoUeetlto DttnM Twatj N<|antb« a«d«ta»» ta «••
tesss of tea fiwduai.
U.S. D«cl«i«i» Csicd e« Ov«i«H VIsw
So tilings stood through the election period.
But as 1964 di«w to a close, the situation WM
moving steadily downward in wsry rcspaet,
both military and political. A review of policy
was undertaken, analyiing three basic cboiees:
to corainua the existing policy with every im-
provement that could be devised within its lim-
its; to take new and major militai^- measurwi,
while adhering to the same Int.'ic objectives that
had hsan followed al) along; or to move toward
withdrawal.
FriMn late N'o> ember onward, thess elwices"-
wer' intensively emmined, even na tho miritary
threat grew, th&-politicaI confnaioa iaSsitfT'"'
dwpaned, and all the indic«tor»^WBWed in-
creasingly sliafey'sioraleand'confidence not only
'.^in douth Viet-Nam but throngiant the deeply
cocremed countries of Soutliesat Asia. By late
January, it was the clear judgment .)f all those
concerned with policy and familiar with the
situation that the first choice was rapidly l»-
coirmg no choice at all— and not, to use th«
ph"!* of one rommentalor, a "const nul ire
altf 'native.' To "muddio through" (tluU rom-
mentntor's phrase ) was almost certainly to mud-
dle out and to accept that South Virt-Xam
would Iw tumc<l over to CommunUt control
achjeved through externally backed subversion
ana aggression.
Tbis was a straight practiral judgment. It
ran against the grain of every desire of tlie Pres-
idwit and his advisers. But I myself am sure it
was a riglit judgment — accepted at the time by
most sophisticated observers and, in th« light
of reflective examination, now accepted, J be-
■' Public Law g»-«OS; for text, »»• Bt uxn-i of Am«.
24, .mH. 11. w*.
2S2
Dtr.«TMT..MT o» STAT* amxcnJi
^-
liev*, by virtuallj CTciyoas nho knovs the sit-
uation at all et (Irt h<nd.
There irere, in sltort, only two choices, to
move toward nitlidrawA) or to do • lot more,
boll) for its military impact and, at the outset,
to prevent a jollapae of South Vietfiararae
mora In an-1 trill to continae.
And a.s (he dolitiffmtioM .-ontinued vithin tho
administration, the matter was brought to a
head by K esrcs 0} sharp cttaclca on American
instalktiam in particular. These attacks vers
wriui» in thcrawlvta. but above •]], thry oon-
firmed the OYerall analysis thnt North Viet-Ncin
was supremely confldent and w.is movinj; for
the kill. And b.<< they thus moved, it seemed cbar
that they would in fact Euccced and perhaps
in a matter of months.
lift nie pnuse here to riear up nnAtlier rurr»nt
historical inrn'oumcy. The \>Tfif fur the »in-ces-
sive derisions— in Felmiarv ti> start homtiio;?:-.
in Miipli to intrwhico ginall numbers of com-
l>al forrt"i : ond in July to move to major United
Stnle« roDilat forres — was ns I have staled it.
It ih'pi'ndi'd on an DvemH view of the situation
and on nn overall view that whirt had !*en po-
ind o*i for yt'or* wTia fftr nil pnu^iml pcirposes
acjrreasiBtt—snd indwd this t«mr dates-ifrom
lal« 1841 or early '19C3 in the statements of
Kwior admini^tation spokesmen.
Hut there is a feparato p'-'mt whether, as ha?
sometime.^ been asserted, it was the I'nited
States alone wlnrh nnilatprnlly rhanjjenl the
rharartrr of the war in thf diiv<-lion of a con-
vent ional conflict, ft is nilefjed that Hanoi was
adhering 10 a tacit afrreement that, ko lon^r as
we did not bomb N<»th Viet Nam, Hanoi would
not send in its regulars, at least in imits.
Multiple and roncInsi»-e evidence which be-
came available from the sprinir of I%3 onward
leeros to roe to refute the<* contentions. .Vs has
been repeatedly made public over the past 2
years, we know that one North Vietnamese rep-
ment entered South Viet-Nam by December
1904, and we kr.ow that srvenl other regiments
enlerMl in the aprinfr of \i>&i on timetables of
infihralion that caa only have re/locted com-
mand decisions taken in Hanoi prior to the be-
Ciiining of the bombing.
From the standpoint of tlie basis for U.S.
derision<». llii-i evidence simply reinforces the
February picture that Ilnnoi was moving for
tlie kill. Natire North Vietnamese, oloiie or in
rejm'ar units, were in thrm<elve« no more and
no less aggressive than the earlier native South
Vietnameea who had pone north and become
North Vietnamese nationals. The point is that
Hanoi, as tie suspected tlten and later proved,
bad taken major stefm to raise th« level of the
war befon the boosbing bewail.
As to any tacit agreement, then facts aks*
seem to disprove that there rvtr was one. Uox*-
over, students of North Vietnamese behavior,
and especially of tha recent major captarsd
North Vietnamesa documents, wotj'd in any
e\-ent find such an aliefpition hard to credit. Is
it not far mere reasonable to conclude that
Hanoi preferred to conceal its hand but was
prepared at all time* to put in whatever was
necessary to brinx aboot military victory— and
that the regular unita were simply a pari of that
policy, introduced after they had run out of
native goathemers and wanted to maintain and
.ttep up the pressnrct
But this historical point is le^ impoTtant than
the fundamental elements of the situotion as it
stood tit tha time. On the one hand, &D of what
I have earlier described asthehedrock elements
still remaim>d: a strong Cbin«e Commu;
and North Vi(>tnam«9»thr3arto Sootbeaat Asia,
a cnicial link bet«»n-the defense of .South
VietVam and the realization of that threat, and
the validity of non-Communist nationaliam,
whatever its imperfections, in South Viet-Nam
and in the other nations of 5>oufheast Asia.
\fon»over, the wider implications for our
commitments elsewhere appeared no less valid
than they had ever been. Viet-Nam still con-
stituted a major, perhaps even a decisive, test
caso of whether the Communist stratepy of
"wan of national li!>eration" or "people's wars"
could l)e met and countered even in the extraor-
ilinarilv difficult circumstances of Sooth Vicf-
Nam. Tlif n as now, it has l>ecn, I think, rightly
jiuipcd that a success for Hanoi in South Viet-
Nam could only encourape the ose of this tech-
nique by Hanoi, and over time by the Commn-
r.ist Chinese, and might well have tlie effect of
drawing the Soviets into competition with
Peking and Hanoi and away from the otherwise
promlsina twnds that have developed in Soviet
policy in the past 10 years.
Finallv, it wa« judp»<i from the outfipt that
stronper action by ns in Viet-Nam woiiM not
o|ierBte to hrinjr tJie .Soviet I'nion and Commu-
nist China closer tocefher and that the possi-
bility of major Chinese Communist interven-
tion could be kept to a minimum so long as w«
made it clear at all times, boith by worri and
deed, that our objective was confined solely to
frecinjj Soiith ^^et■Nam from e.vtemal inter-
•r.rrrinint 4, i««t
283
Urvnrv uid tk«t «• did not thretien Cotsioa-
nist ChioA but rather loohed to the oHizsai*
liope of what the Manila Declantioo," ci lost
fall, c&11e<i "reconciliation and peace throusfa-
ouf Asia."
On the othar hand, it waa rtcogniosd from
the outset that the takins of th^ saw ma-
jor militar? neaaam inrolTed hea^y casta and
hasards. The Sotit.; Vietaamese still had to play
!ho cnicial rote ir milit«7 aeenri^ aad, alwve
ajl, in politva) and Qrananie deralopment and
stitbilitj. A greater American role ves bound
to complies^ South Vietnamne erol-jtion. It
was liound to increase the acale of the war and
to eost significantly in lives and very heavily in
rceoarces. Even though the casualtiea and dam-
age of the war remain far below what was gof-
fered Ta"iCorB8, war is never anything but ugly
and J)ratal.
The balanoe was gtrock, after the most care-
fnl deliberation, in faror of the cnurst that has
since bwn followed. The key elements in the pol-
icy were stated in President Johnson's Balti-
more speech of April 1965," and the major com-
hftt-force comnjitment was explained in the
President's "statement of July 28, 1985." These
hai-e been the cornerstones of policy, and they
have been elahomted and eTp1aine<l repeatedly
•nd at length by all senior administration
spokesmen.
CmaafiHnai ef US- fMtf
In essence:
(a) Our objective remained solely tliat of
protecting the independence of South Viet-
\ara from estemal interference and force. We
declined, and Mill decline, to threaten the re-
sinie in North Viet-Xam itaelf or the territory
am) regime of Communiat China.
(h) We indicated in April of l%j that we
woi* prepared for discussions or nepotiations
without (ondition, and we have relentlessly
pursued oor own efforts to enter into meaning-
ful dipcnssions as well as following op on a
lujst of peace initiatives by others. Unfortu-
nately, Hanoi has clung firmly to the objective
of insuring a Communist takeover of South
Viet-Nam and has refu^ to enter into any
fruitful discussions. Indeed, Hanoi has rejeoled
any discussions whatever — initially i\nles« ita
baiio objective was accepted in advance throogh
th« so-called "third point," more recently nn-
leaa we agreed to a complete cessation of the
bonbing wilhmrt any tutpamiy aetioo oa their
part. Hanoi's )^flaM|diy towvd muntiatiaa
has now become aothoritatively enflnbla, fKf
ticuhtrly in the KCtion on "fightiRg «hil» wg»-
Hsting" in tha captond nmifa of one of tb*
North VietRamesa lotdera, ComrMfe Vinh.
(c) WacontinnedtopUraevarypaaubkflB-
phaais en tha crucial nonmilitary tspeois of tbt
'-onflict, greatly atmigthening oar own eeni-
tribation to the essentinliy Sooth YlatsanHB
tmsk o< restoring atability and rantrol in iIm
:?ountryiude and working for the ire1far« of tha
people!
(d) Militarily, oor actions were direrted to
provinff to North Viet-Xnm that its eiTort to
take over the South by iniUtarlr forra must fail
and to extending and enlarging th* arras in
which the vital business of bringing real ao-
curity and peace to the countryaide eould go
forwanl with all the strength we could hope
to give it. Tlie totnl effort in the .South rtimained
primary, even na the hombrn? of military tar-
gets in the North was carried on — initially to
demonstrate resolve bat alwn.i-s and liejically to
make Hanoi's infiltration far more diQcnlt and
costly aiwl to prevent levels of new men and
eqnipment that could only, in the arithmetic of
f^^erTill• warfare, multiply many timM over,
for each addition from \orth Viat-Xam. Ibe
requirement for forces in the South.
(c\ Weenfonrnp-d the .Sonth Vi«}nnme?« in
their own resolve to more to a con<4itutional
basis of government, a proce«i ret underway
formally by Prime Minister Ky in January
of 19r>d and followed eince tlmt.time in the faea
of all the difBcuhies and dangers of attempting
to create snch a hisis in a country without politi-
cal experience and ravaged by terrori^im and hy
guerrilla and conventitmal military action.
( f ) We encouraged the South Vietnamese ai
the same time to proceed on the tnck that hu
now become reconciliation, the hohUnc out to
members of the Viet C«ng of the poaibtUty of
rtientering the political life of their cuutitn
under peaceful conditions. In easenes, we aeck
and would accept a fuir determination of tbt
will of the people of ^outh Vist-Kam along the
lines well snmmarize<l by Ambaaaador Oold-
berg^^ Chicago speech of May 12, 1W7."
" Fnr text, »»« IbH.. Not. 14, 19M. p TSt
" For teit. we nn.. Apt 23. JBca. p. flRS.
° For tnt. cee ibid.. Am. Ifl, ISiB. p. 304.
" Tor test. Me Wtf.. lose 5. Iter. p. 838.
384
DEP'VRTKENT OT STATB aTLLanX
Tlicw were th» Sooth Vi«(iiameee cttpecu ot
our policy. Dut (hen, ta prcrioaily, th« policy
»Ks Kceo in the wider contezt of thit fotora of
Southeait Asia. So it wm tlot Prwwtent John-
Hon lent our strong mipport in April of lOSS
to tlic (iewlupoient of rrgiooal ooopcnttoB iiul
of cronomic project* cfwtad throa|^ Aaimn
initiative, bj this vital ctenunt ia our policy,
i»f mtd» dcsr s^in that oar underlying objec-
tive wu to do what we could to aaaat in the
constnictiv* task of bringing abont a Sootb-
east Asia of oooperAtiva and indepaidcnt na-
tions, whatei-sr thoir international postnrea
miffbt be.
We had a security job to do in V)<!t-\ani and
were joined over time by five other area nations
in supply inji military forrea to do that job. And
we are a&^istinj Thailand a^inat a eooeerted
("hinesa CommuniRt and Korib Vietnamese ef-
fort at extenial eubversjon, en e^ort bc|iun — to
keep tlio record straight — af early as 1063 and
clearly ami definitively by Deoember 1064, tie-
fora our major decisions in Vict-Nam. Our
SRATO and ANZUS undertakings raoiain
firm.
Rat ne looked beyond these, and we must
still look beyond thnv, to the trhole question
of liie future of Southeast Asia and to the role
tliat ne can play in a.^<!istiog the nations of the
arra to conxolidata their national independence
and to improva the welfare of their pcoplo.
Tins then, is a barebones accoimt of "The
Path to Viot-Nani." Kven within its osm terms,
it Diay otnit wluU others triiUld include. And,
long a- it may seem, if is still incomplete in two
resperf)! that it wouhi take far too muclt tuno
to oover.
Firet, it is plainly inadequate to focus solely
on onr policies toward Viet- Nam or even toward
SoTitheast Asia as a whole. Those policies are
intimately related to the rest of Asia; to (be im-
plications of Asian developments for other
ar^ts and, in the Ia£t analysis, for our own na-
tional ssctjrity; and to our central world pur-
pose— the creation of an international order of
independent states.
Secondly, I have frie<l to i.solate what I con-
sider to have been the major [xilioy decisions.
Obviously, policy is not just n matter of singla
decisions, howBT?T fully connidered. \ vast num-
ber of lesaer policy dacisions have accompanied
these basic ones, and tlie way in which a basic
policy is oatrnd out in the end affects its sab-
stanoai I iMv« not tried to cover, for e.zampla,
deeisioos oa the balance of effort within Sontb
Viet- Nam, decisions on putkular Begotiatiag
propoesls, dzcisicsts oa tM pace wid naturaof
the bnsibins of \orth Vict-Haia, or the (abtlc
and dilSenlt problem, over tb* year*, of Unitatl
Stfitcs influence toward poiitical progress In tha
8oQth. I knot? full w«ll that tlxa* ace uen io
witich many of yov undoubtedly hold Strang
views. I welcome dii^casion of tbein.
"Hia lestsit b% lnv*lv«a«at"
What, then, is "tha leawn in involvement"!
— Is it that we have been trapped into a diffi-
cult situation by aseriesof lesaerdeciaioniitaken
with no clear view of their implications i
— In it tliat W8 should never have become en-
gaj;ed in Southeast Asia!
— Is it (hat we should never have attemptod to
support .South VietNsmf
—Is it that, having sxipported South V'iet-
Xum in certain rv^iects (including a treaty)
and having become dseply pngaged in South-
cast Asia, we sliould nonethel«>s have decided —
or should now dfiJe — to limit the actions we
take or even to withdraw entirely ?
The first question 8rcms to me both separate
and difficult .\f wme point in the hisfoni- 1 have
recited we be<-aine committed, deliberately and
by formal cniisiitutinnal process, to the support
of thp freedom of South Viet-Kani from ex-
ternal interference. That commitment included
a iitronc treaty obligation, and tliat is a clear
part of the story. Dnt what is jierhaps more to
the point IS that great powers must face two
central points:
(a) As Irvine Kri.'^tol has pointed oat in his
rn^ent article in Foreign Affairs, th« very defini-
tion of a {Treat power is that not only its ac-
tions hut the cases in which it declines to act
have major consequences, .^t every stage in the
Viet -Nam story, it ha."; seemed clear to the lead-
ers of this country tliat not to set would have
the gnuprt effects. This is the w.iy that suatrs-
siv8 choices have apjieared to four saccessrve
Presidents.
(b) The second point that a preat power can-
not escape is that its actions in themselves affect
tha stakes. When great powers commit them-
aelvea, by treaty and by a total course of con-
duct extending over many yearr, an element of
r«liaiies comes into being, both within the area
and within other areM ia which conumtmenta
have also been undertaken.
Yet. all this being said, I do act think one
4, is«r
•2S5
can coficliid« that because we said or did «, w«
niust nMWBMrily My or do ^-in an old pbiMB
of Bumai«k1i. So L for ose, do not balicvo thU
tlw "Ifaaoo in hiTOlTtinrnt" is tliAt ^re tr> tli«
priaoi-.enof history.
Bather, I tbink «« ahculd b« foevsinj; on tha
second, third, ikOd fourth ^estioas 1 hava liatcd
above.
Thaw are bif qussticns, a£d if I hare tried
to do anjFthing today it is to atreas that the
matter has raaUy been kiokad at for at leaxt
lb« last 13 ycara in thia kind of larger frame-
work. Tha policies followed today are, aa they
must be, the policies of tbis^dministratioD. No
one can ny whether another administntios
woald have done the sama. What can ba said
is that the underlying viewpoint and analysis
of factors have bcMi largely similar throushovt
tha lost 18 yean, if not lon^r.
This does not prove, of coureo, thr^t thia
anal.vsis has been correct. The United States
has no divine dispensation from error, and the
most that yoar fcaders at any time can <lo is
to exert tha best human judgment and mora)
son* of w liich they are capabla. I, for one, aia
convinced that this has been done at all stagos.
Ill essence, the qnestion is not capable of geo-
metric proof. Like all policy, it is a judgnMHt.
Our b«t with hi^ory has been that Southaast
Asia does matlpr, that the indcpemieniae of
South Viet -Nam crucially affects Sonthsaat
Asia, and that non-Communi^ netionalisai in
.Southout Asia and in Viet-Nam has in it tlia
seeds of a peaceful, progressive, and st&bla area
that can take its place in a world at peace.
Hi^spanisats of n»*mt Asia
Other factors enter in, as I have tried to
siunmarize, and despite their variations from
time to tims remain of major general impor-
tance. But it is priaaarily fmin the standpoint
of Sonthesst Asia that I Would like to close my
remarks today. How do the tets I have dft-
scribed lo<4i today!
Sootheaat Asia surely matters more than
ever. A region which may havs held aa few as
30 million inhabitants ia inOO — and i^hich b
carried under the heading; of "periphcml areas"
in some teatbooka on E«st .\sia — now holds
more than 250 million people, more than Latin
America and almost as moch as ths popula-
tion of W«"sJern Europe. Tlie rfsourees of this
area ore large, and its people, while not yet
capable of the kind o< 4rMBittie prognas we
have sasD in tha aaiitmh puis ti Am, kun
gnat talsot, iatelligeon, ud faidHtvy. Itt
pegnnUed locatiao, whib it itKNihl aot bt ba
tho MOi of grart^posrar eollickaa, Is ctwdal for
r«M males tad m other respaets.
Fran tha standpotet of ow own isewrit^ luid
the kind of world In whkh «• wW> to l»v>, I
belicm W8 miat roatinm to ba dssply eoBeanaed
to do what WW can tokaip Soathassl AtMtnm
falling under esteraal drmtnttkn wd ton*-
sion that would contribote to sorb «k«iination.
And I belierealaothst wehavvswi.terconeam
in doing what wa can, and as wa are wsstad, to
BBsiat sound programs oa an individMl oodotrr
or regional basb and to imprevo tha «ai£an of
tba peoples of the ana. And I do not think that
yoo can do the htter tmhsi the forsMr is
achisred.
The second part of oar bet is that the indr-
pendance of South Viet-Kaa critloelly afferta
Sosthcaat Asia, i^ootb Vbt-5am end its 1'> mil-
lion people are important in tkeBOslves, hot
they aanuna an ftdditionel inpottsacs if the
jodgment b accepted that a soeeass for agjiiee
sion there would drastically weaksa the sitM<
ticn in Soatheast Asia and indeed btTood. Tbst
jodgaMnt cannot he defended aolely by refer-
ence to tha dyn&mica of major sggreasiTe pow-
ers and their prospfctivo victims in the fiM.
I myself believe that those panlMe have valid-
ity,'bat the qtieatiao ia alwaya what JoitMe
Holmes called "concrete caaeai" In this coa-
crete case 1 think the onderlying jodpoent has
been valid and remains valid lodsy.
None of IIS can say categorically lliat the
Co!nmuni.'5t Chinpse would In due eoorse more—
if opportunity offered — todnsninate wide trees
of Southeast ,\!iia throaph preaanre and sab-
version, nut that if wlial (he Chiaese and tlieir
maps say, and their Communist diMliiae ap-
pears to add vital additional cmnhanai It is
what they are doinir in Thailand today sad,
through local Communist allies, in Burma,
Camlodia. Malaysia, nr<' Sinjrapofs. And it is
what tliey woold like to .>o in Imlonena again.
Surely Adloi Stevensin was right thsf the
thfpot of Communiat China is not so fkndfal
that it ohnuld net wr\-8 as a valid asttmpdnn
of policy. And rtc can ba more categorical that
Hanoi intends to dominate at least the aacces^
9or states of Indochina and would move rapidly
to this end if it were to get practical eosttrol of
Sooth Viet-Nam.
««
DCTABTMItXT OT STSTS anXCTIW
IVrhtps the banlest point {or kmio to gnsp
b th« pqreholasic*! ispsct of a derelo\aoint
nucJt $a the fail of Sooth V'let-Xain id (Ins ast-
tiiur. Aa to Hanoi and IVliins, jad^msot end
pMt uparwoca point to the conclos^un thst it
irotitd gmttj tacaang^ them to pvsh farther.
As to tea thicatened nationa, tha view of their
Ickikm la a matter of racord. All over Sontheaat
Aula, whstever tha poatun at tha indiridnal at/-
tiin, tha great body of raaponaible aptiuoiv--«Dd
I invite jrou to chark thia asainst any iinthand
brvount— aceepta tKa judgment stated onl,* tha
oilier day by tha independent and nonalincd
Trima Minister of Slnj^apore, Mr. l.tt Kitaa
>'tfw: •'I ttsl the fate of Asi»— South and
iioatheast Asia — wiU be decided in the nest few
yearaby wh*t happens out in Vtcl-Xam Z*
I could multiply that quotation 10 times over
in public etatemcnta ana 10 ttmea more in pri-
rat« atatementa. Aa Drew Middleton of the
K«« York Tunea reported la* June after a trip
in the area:
IKnapIt* »"R>« mlaclrlngiL oa-ComiU'inlst \rsCfn
fma Takro to Ttrliran lirfrly lapswrt I niutf SUtn
IwlkhialDHsutbaail Soaibsait l^la.
This does nnt mean that every natioo accepts
nur rlioiceof military actions. Some wonld have
us do mora, some lexs. But it doea kad «;> the
clear cnncluaioa that our own view aroonb vith
the deep ecnse in Southeast Aaia, and indeed
eliwvhere In A&ia, that the •itru;^;;le in South
Viet-Nam Li cnirial to the inde|>eniience end
rootiauad ability to work for its people of each
and every nation for a wide are*.
Ijastly, thpre i* the que^ion wJMther a new
Soullieaitt Asia i« in ttci hc'mg built and can be
developed. On this point, surely the develcp-
ments of the last & years, and particularly the
1Mb 2 yeara, ha«« been vaatly encourafpng.
Whera Indonesia in 10C5 was drifting rapidly
to Commoate control and practical alinrment
with PekiAg, it BOW itands on a atanchly na-
tionalist basla, ahandoDing the threat to its
neinMiora and aeekinf to work out the chaotic
aroimmic probiama left by Sukarno — nitb the
multilataral help of oararjvm and ollirrs. Rt-
Rional wyacation within Southeast Asia, and
among Aaimn netiooi aa a whole, lias lalcen
ETvat and historic atridea. And it is the widely
arcepted view in the area — which I sliare — that
theas divelopmanta wo«ld ha\-o been far Iras
likely if w« had not acted as we did in 1966 and
if Cnnmianiat fonsa luid thua taken over in
Sooth Vict-Nam.
Ho ell o«-«r Southeast Asia there ia today a
sense of conttdeQC»— to which Drew Middltios
agtiin testified from his trip. Tims bea bsut
bodgbt and naed. Bat that eaafidrnca ta not
aolid or secure for tha future. It would mirelr
be divirpted if vre were, in Prtaident Moaon*
word.% to permit a Cammuniat takaovar in
.South Viel-.Vam either through withdrawal or
"under the cloak of a meaninglaasagreecnent." **
If, on the contrary, we proracd on oar preaant
eourss — vrith measured military actiona and
with every pcssible eonmilitary weaaiifa and
aearching always for sn avrnua to pcsea— tha
pras|icrt3 for a peaceful and vecufe Soutlieast
Asia now appear brighter than they have been
at any time einre the nations of the area were
establi.shf J on sn independent basis.
In "hort, I think tha stakes ere very gT»ve in-
deed. I'hr ccsts are large, and it is clear that wa
must 0e?l our national capacity and resolve to
ronfiiiue in a touch streg^Ie and etiil do those
thtnj^ that «re miiKt do to meet our problems at
home. I Tind it impossible to believe that we do
not have tiM national capacity ajid renolve to
do both.
Shdli Aiwtlvwicay
of th« AfliocMa lor
liemurti by Pmident Joknto**
It U right that we honor youth tonight as wa
celebrate the sixth anniversary of the .Mliance
for Ppopress.
Fur the more that vie learn about thi<t auda-
cious humon exp*riraenl we call tlw Aliania.
the more no know that it ia as our late beloved
I'roidcnt, .lohn Fitz^jerald Kennedy, really en-
visioned it. a plan for the youth of this hemi-
sphere. If someone asks "Is the .\lliaiKe a
success I" wo may very well answer, *K)iily our
children or our grandchildren will know if it is
a .MK^cess — but we ere all gt^ing to know if the
.\liiaDce 13« failure."
Ho as we meet hero this eveninjr, »e cannot
fUim victwTf for the Alliance. We ran only sjiy
"so far, Bi Rood" — that progma is l^iui; iimde,
"^/»M.. Apt 28. 1S83. p. eoa
' M«<l«a( rhr I'm -Varli-aa ) nl<ia. T\'i!<iiiB):t<m. I> C .
on Ang. 17 ( White B'turit pt^tm ttltam' i at a re<*vT<l<.q
bODortfur Ejiffn .\merl< an hiKb i^riMii'l student)* tnliuilt-
ttD# viauittg e«M«^9 .L- L-OGflfH-tlua m-llti tli* mnn\ret>mry.
*, 1»«T
287
thoufU tha diining l«lt»"I •*** '^ would le«ve
to our young remaiBi to be deliveivd.
We cMtk point with tegitimata pride to the
wAy -stops toward the succoss of th» Alliance;
we can point with prid» to a better hemisphere
for all of our childrtn.
—This baa been e ye»r in which no aingla
gDvemment in this hemisph«re was taken over
by force.
—11 countries of Latin Americ* equaled, or
iiiifiiwri. the per capita growth rate oJ a.5 per-
cent per year over the past year.
An ever- increasing ppc^rtion of pubhc i*-
souroes is now being spent each year on educa-
tion, on community development, on the thinja
that really count, like health and sisnitation.
—la the United States our Congress has
givem initial approval to an increased l*rel of
Alliance spending— to a rata that now exceeds
a billion doU»« per year.
But for all of that— for all the bold new
spirit that springs forth from the dynamic
leaders of Latin America, for all the progress
toward a Common Market, for all the promisw
of Punta del Est©— nothing of permanence can
be accomplished if w» look only to the events of
just one year.
If what we do is to really last, we must make
this commitment to ourselves and to all of Latin
America : We will persevere. There is no time
lunit to our commiUnfflt. We are in this fight to
stay all the way.
We will persevere when the prepress is ap-
parent. Wo will peraevers when tlie statistics of
the progreaa are not as rwy as we would wish
them. We will persevere when we have suifered
revorses as wa have this aftemcoa.
We will persevere in our conviction that
duinge can come about peacefully— thU, as one
of the young essayisto here put it, wa can make
a "revolution of sweat" rather than a revolution
of blood and tean.
We will persevere in our belief that what
happens in the Western Hemisphere, what hap-
pens in North and South America, will point
the ''sv ultimately to a more tranquil, more
just, mote fruitful world for all peopkk,
The American policy of persevwenoe in a j«*
ea&se is not exclusive to lAtin Americ*. It ap-
plies to our own country, where we hare many
problems. It applies particularly tonight to
Southeast Asia. .
If we do persevere at home and abroad, m
this hemisphere and in the other, I believe that
th« day of iustice and tnsism for mea on this
planet can be brought within gi^t. Otto ol tJi*
yowi.^ essayists here has laid it magoiSccntlyi
and 1 quote :
Latia AaMfkma rcWk 8a^««to tto ckaUam* of rte
(trwxte foe pncMBk coBKiaaa i( its mvamnv
teton bUUnj aad aatloa. . . . Ocr volcea. Aoctsa
froa tin Asdw . . . wlU ects dcst tta icci U tfie
vOTfcl:W«candi>ttI
Yes, you— you and we can do it— and ymi and
we are going to do it
Tliank you, and good night.
Vit^NcMit CMllon SotvIm Awofdb
PivMntad by Pimidwit JohnMii
Bemarln by Pretident Johnson •
Every evening on television, every day in the
newspaper, and every hour by cjj>l8, the im-
ports of military action in Viet-Kaa fiow in
h«i» to u& We Amoi leans know, far toon im-
mediately than otbw gmarKtioas hera at ban*
have ever known before, the bee of war abiMA
Yet most of us have aeea only caia face of
this war — the face of combat.
There is also the face of need: of hanger, of
sickness, of bewildered ignoiano& That face i»
just as real as the faoe of contlMt. lu demudi
are just as ufgent. Answering them will be jti*
t3 crucial to the outcome in Vitt-Naa.
Today, here in the East Boom of the Whit»
House, where on other days we have htmond
the heroism of American fighting men, we bafw
come hai« to salute six civilian Americans wt»
also ridced their Uvea for fteedctn hi VuC-Saio.
Ona whom we honot^Francis Sayego— last hia
life there.
He and th«« \mn men and wgaen MW>
me on the stage here this afternoon threatened
the enemy UMtly as they served the innoont
people of VietrNsm. They worked to hnild what
■Mag* at a i«w«atatloa t»nax»j In tlw TsA Vam
cf tl» WWte Himsa on Ab«. 18 (W^ fJS??J5[!I"
i«tMe). K«*tvii«tl»awa»*>w««! rra^. ^too.
■Kill P. OTWll. D«partn»e«t oJ Btata : and Hatrtw M.
Auum, Jr, Btevea a Btepter. and mm»mn.wmm
(uMtboiBoa*), AsaecT 'o» iBtMnatlooal Pcti1o>iwc
Mr. 8aT««e'f widow, two cUldicB. and Dotbar w«e
pfcwiit t» ac«pt bl» awart.
268
DEFABTMWrr OT STATB BPIXSTM
th» eatmy tad fought to destroy. They •ought
to itrenj|thea th» hands of tb« rery lescbrt
whom the tuuaj W)U|^t to kill.
SiQoa the fint of this year, the Vtet Cong hu
killed almoot 1,800 cwiliuta; it iuu irounded
•notbar 3,300, and it has kidnaped man than
S,S!0O.
The enemy's purpose is quite clear. It I3 t«
deprive South Viet- Nam of every iiamlet or
village leader — to deprive them of every teacher
and woikar — who tri^ to troprove the life
of his people. It b to so intunidata the Repub-
lic of Sooth Viet-Nam that at last it will sur-
render in hopeless desperation and frustration.
It is difilcult for most of as to understand
this kind of methodical brutality. It is haivi for
most of us to grasp the meaning of this gang-
atsrism or to know the courage that it requires
to build a natioa and to build it under the con-
stant thr^a of t«rn}r.
These men and Komen, no less than the
leaders in the hamlets, know what it it to work
within range of a sniper's rifle.
They, and thousands like them, fought a war
against disease and fear and hunger while a
war of combat raged about them. They faced
the frustrations and heartbreaks that always
aOGompany the building of a Jerent modem
society : they faced danger on hundreds of roads
and in thousands of hamlets; and still they
built and taught, healed and helped a poople
whom history hascmally served.
While the Viet Cong has carritd on its cam-
paign of terror, these men and women, and those
whc served with them :
— helped build classrooms for more than a
quarter million students; lielp«d supply them
with more than 11 million tesilxnks:
— built and stocked more than 12,000 healtli
stations;
— pave 17 million inocuttt iocs against cholera
and otiier diseases;
— treated 200,000 patients every month;
— helped to quadrople the production ot fish
and double the production of pigs ;
—helped to irrigate 100.000 iictro of land—
fourtimesittoretlvan in lOM.
Accomplishing these Ihin^is ha."( cost a grervt
deal of money, and we and the GoTemment of
South Viet-Xam have provided it. But it has
demanded something far more precious than
money. It has demanded a vvssionate devotion
to Hrvaig hnsanity, even it the risk of one's
owB life. It has required a willingness to live
in retnot* villages and provincial capitals; a
willins;i»ss to be lonely and afraid for long
periods of time, to endurs diszaas and dspriva-
tiod, to asek right answers in an alien culture,
to seek order in a land sluken by insurgency.
It r^nireit, in sliurt, a commitment as great
as that we iusve come to expect of our figbtiof
men in uniform in Vut-Nsm.
Because they have lived and worked tltere,
these men and womsn know that a free, secure,
and healthy society will never coma easily to
Viet-Kara. They kjfow there will te suffering
and mistakes in the days ahead, as there have
been in thspast.
And we Americans should understand that
that ia the p.iin of progress. For our nation was
not bom easily. Th«re were times m thoee years
of the 18th century when it seemed as if we
might not be bom at all.
During the hard days of the fighting for our
independence there were some who would not
fight at all. Some people would not pay tsies;
some States would not me«t their levies of men
and money ; some men were so dottted to colo-
nial power thit they fled abroad.
Hut there were— and we thank God for this —
enouph brave men and womea to bear the bur-
den: there r-ere enouph dedicated men and
women toendure year after year of war and suf-
fering; and thei« were allies who stood with
us all through those darkest hours until we fi-
nally prevailed. After IS years of war and poli-
tical strife, we here in America prevailed.
Given that ba''kgTound, we ought not to be
astonished that this strug^e in Viet-Nam con-
tinues. Wo ought not to he astonished that that
nation, nicked by a war of insurgency end beset
by its neighbors to the North, has not already
emerged, full-blown, as a jierfect model of two-
party democracy.
Instead, we might take heart that in the very
midst of that war. only a few months after
the enemy threatened to cut that nation in half :
— the Vietnamese people elected their own
repre^stativoa to a constituent assembly, not-
withstanding all the discouragements and ter-
ror that the Comrouni.tt i^orld could muster;
— that a.ssembly then wrote ft democratic coa-
ntitulion:
— local elections were then held In the villages
whore security permitted, and more are planned
for the near future ;
— a national campaign for President and Vic*
President is now underway: the members of a
4, l*8t
2S9
new Senate will be chosen at tin ama tinie, aii«l
members of a House of Rapressntatives in llie
following mondis.
It is with preat pridethat I acknowledge tlui
all through that ordeal and p&inful cmerginj;
process a preat American leader hel|)ed to piiile
those pnopio witli sound and solid advice. And
"6 honor him, too, here today — Ambassador
Henry Cabot Ixxlge.
Today's leaders in Viet -Nam. Chief of State
( Npiiyen Van] Thieii and Prinie Minister
[Vpiycn Cao] Ky, have given their veiy folernn
ple<l(ns that they will mipport the outcome of
fair elections, whoever wins.
I take !hnt pletljre most seriously.
In recent months I have conveyed to them —
throiiirh personal letters, ihi-oiiph Anili»ss«dor
[Kllsworth] Bunker, Secretary MoXamarH,
General [Maswell D.} Taylor and Mr. Clark
Clifford — my strong conviciion that it is vi-rv'
vital for the elections in Viet-Kam to be fi-ce
aiidtolx" f.iir.
Wo cannot pose impossible standanis for a
youn^ nation at war. But given cur concern and
commitment, we can, and we sliould, expect of
that nation every effort to make the elections
truly represent itive of the people's will.
We fight in Vie.t-N'am to free that people's
will from the prip of Communi"^ terror. We
fight so that the people themselves may choose,
undaunted, those whom they wish to lead them.
We fight to make election— instead of subniia-
sion — possible.
I believe that those who arc dismayed by the
progress of the campaign so far should bear at
least two things in mind :
In South Viet-Nam today, there are 11 candi-
dates for President — some military, some civil-
ian. They are free to attack the government, and
most of them have done so. They are free to take
their ca.se to the people, and most of them have
done so and are doing so at this hour.
In North Viet-Nam today — North Viet-
Nam — there are no candidates; there are no
elections; there are no attacka on the North
Viet-Nam government of which I am aware.
And it amuses me that they are not even attacked
here sometimes.
We also, I thint, should take judicial notice,
without being critical and without being fearful,
that by exercising our rights ander the fin^t
amendment that we should call to the attention
of the people that the folks that are doing tha
most to k«!p us from having » fair aitd fre*
elactiou in Viet-Nam today era tho Viet Ccng
and the North Vietnamese themsslvca. Thire
may be a time wbea their terroristic clTorta
could be brought to tha attention of the Ameri-
can people.
This is not to say that the campaign or t)>*
election in the South will go o9 witbost blemish.
This is only to say that an effort is boL^.g made,
and a St rong eiTort, with our very ttrona support
and ettdoreement, to conduct an open eleetwo in
a nation that is under fire from guerrillas and
from terrorists end from aj^rfcssors and in-
vsdera. It is to suggest that this effort that wo
are making ou^ht to be- welcomed and en-
couraged. It is to invite attention toaamacfthe
similarities between the fightrfcrdnnn.lMiyMii^-^
frecdom-in Viet Nam today and th»to«gh-cn<i "
confused strugpte to build a new nation od oar
own continent just two centuries ago.
The events in Viet-Nam do not eompriie a
neat package. They are the prodncts of a very
long and very bitter strug<rla. Th«y testify not
just to man's imperfect ions bet to his indomita-
ble spirit — that after decades of RufTering itill
seeks freedom, BL\\) seeks to ha\'G its voice heard,
still seeks to prevail over the voices of terrwr
that surround it.
Now, to those of yoa who have come here to
join me, 1 want to call to your attention these
courageous Americans and ask you to share this
honor with me of present mg to them on behalf
of their fellow citir.ens the highest eommrnda-
tions for their servico to their country and for
their service to freedom in Viet-Nam.
PntHant Kcrfliumda of Rwsnda
VIsIh tha Uni^ States
The Department of State announced on Au-
pu.st 7 (press release 175) that President
Orepoire Kayibanda of the Republic of Rwan-
da would visit the United States August 13 and
14.
President Knyibanda arrived in New York
City Angust 13. On August 14, after a brief
meeting with Secretary-General U Tfaant at
United Nations Headquarters, hs came to
Washington for an informal meeting with
President Johnson at the White House.
S90
i>EP\irrMENT or Fr.\TE amxcTOi -
AmboMOilor Fsdar Dikumm MwipioHiMiBHwi Tivcrty
Fdloviing ia the Irarueript of d prut confer-
ence held by Pretident JohnMH and WiBUm O.
Foiter, l/JS. RejurtietUativ* to tk$ Id-ffation
DiBcrmament Committ^a, at th$ White Eotae
on Au^iat 11.
wuu Bmm pn
I just fasd a very eztesdsd, iaterratmg nd^-I
thiah, vei7 wtlitiuAary end hopeful meeting
«rith Amliassador Fester. As you know, he is
one of our most devoted publie strv&cta. For
many years he has served his country with great
credit. He is rcturuicg to Oenev* tomorro'w.
We look forwerd to the c^aiclusion of a very
long exercise of wisdom, patienoe, end dodict-
tion upoD Ur. FoEter*» part. Thank yoo.
AMMSSAOOa rOSTR
Oentlemen, I have » very brief stetement.
As you have just learned, I have been diacus-
tiing with the President the progreas on the
negotiation of a nonproliferation treaty at Ge-
neva. In particular, I have been discussing with
him the fact that I have been advised that it
id possible we may very soon be able to table a
draft Donproliferatian treaty for the considera-
tion of the i8-Nation Disanaaaent Committee,
now raetting in Ooieva.
For that reason, I am retoming to Geneva in
the hope that we can work out the 6na] solution
of the problems concerning the tabling of a draft
nonproUferation treaty l^fore the Committes.
I will be happy to answer questions.
QUSSTtONS Kt^ ANSWERS
Q. Whtt do y«» wwran by "tabling'^f What
it the meaning of th* iemP
AwhaaMdorPo$ttr: The tabling in thic sense
is not ia the legislativ* senoe. It means that,
hopefully, the draft treaty will be preeented
before the plenary meeting of the 18-Nation I}i»-
armament Committfs by the two cochainnen of
the Committee, namely, the Soviet repn!8eat*>
tive and myself.
Q. Doe* it mtan \ehen yam- CaSS»— yoct
hav* tabled 18 draft* -by wiio-~tkat ytm'Ha'sa
teorteSthe bvgs <nttjSadyi>n aretomUf UtvUh
« eommoH-agreed treaty, on which tie «ther
•utfiofM are now invited to votef--
A. No. T%ey ere invited to oonsider, negoti-
ate, and pressnt their ideas, because this draft
has not yet bosn shown to anyone other than
the alli» of the two cochainnen.
Q. And the bugt of the Ivo cochainnen have
betu worked out t
A. Y»
Q. Ton toy you jvrt learnoi. l» thie eort of a
T%uh trip backf /« tomething neio happeninfT
A. I came back for some other reason. I am
testifying befora the Senatt Appropriations
Committ^ thb afternoon in order to attempt to
get money to continue the operations of my
agency .' But daring my visit here I got a mes-
sage that 1 should return urgently to Geneva.
Q. From the Soviet Vnionf
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Ambaieador, is this, then, the flret
time thai (he Soviet Union m>d the United
Statee have finally reached agreement «n thie
treaty?
A. We are in the process of the final solution
of the probfems. I hope very soon, as stated in
the statement, that this wilt be tabled as aa
agreed draft for consideration by the IS-NatioD
Disamament Cosomittesi
Q. LO* the provition for inipeetian, tehicK
tea* Ike prineijiai itfmibUng block, «t / muier-
ttand iL What are you going to do abmii tkMf
A. That would not aeceesarily be the major
' tmlwiiter rostflr li Dirertor vt the D.8. Arots
OoMroI end OtaaraiaBcnt AfCBcr.
nviuma 4, i««T
STI MO «? »
891
■toBibliof block. It ifl pnbsiib that the Oonaiit>
tee will net hkve egaunded that fall dkcnanoB
when it is t»bled.
Q. I didn't yidtt vndtrsttoid. T<m toSi itot
ha vt ootidttdtd on toipcatitn^
A. No, sir. I doubt that. I think^hat mil be
ahivck.
Q. The prollem ia $tSl vnfV3ok>ed a* to
whether thB intpecHon will ha dans at ths Bus-
ticru u^ni it, by iha [/tites-nsiumar] Atemio
Energy Agency in VieJcaay cr a* lh« Wetttm
P<ncer» want it, tkrough tU EUR ATOM
[ European A tomie Energy Cafmmiunity'] ; ia that
HgKtf
A. Thftt is still a matter of debate and
discussion.
Q. It ha* been vty vnderttandmg that lh«
United Stales and tht Sovitt Union i««f« fairly
cloie to agreement on thia. The problem ka* been
icitfi our alUee the Weai Oarmana. Can yov teU
va anything about what evr tituation mith the
Weat Oermana tat
A. I will let yon speculate ca th«t, sir. We are
now near to the> U.S.-U.S.S.R. tabling of the
proposed nonproliferation trtity.
Q. You haxe to leave a major reetion blank.
Why it tAia ruch a it»p forvxtrdf
A. It is a step forward to get another 10, 12,
or 15 pomta.
Q. Are there cfiy otherilcstJkit
A. The most important things are to (1) limit
the further spresj by the nuclear powers of
nuclear weapons to others ; and the second would
be the agrtement of the nonnuclear powers not
to acquire. Safeguards are important collater-
ally, out they arcnt the key items on thia
dJscnssion.
Q. Ur. AmbaaiadoT, I am n«( jitite clear on
vshat happeTta with a treaty that haa blanka in
it. Does thia mean that the other 18 nations vUl
b* alloved tofUin that blankf
A. We will sugj^est a continued discussion by
the o(x:haimien of that point.
Q. You toy that agreement hue been reached
en tioo poiati: to Kmit tht fwrthtr tpmd (y
taieUaTfovcp<>esuith»isstt«tt»anSef«etiai»KUar
p^teeranattoacg-Mre, _.
A. I am ssyiDg^^miattheB^re pTovtiions of-
ihe treaty . I m BOt Mjingthei* i> an>Kn«BMijt.
So agreeeaenMnr bniv nadtsd by the Bonno*
dair nationa. liia point is to get this before th»>
noBDuclMr iMCtMRSia they wilThare tlwir chuca
<o consider and oegotiata.
Q. You aof thia ka» otdy hten tten by tfi$
Soviet Unia» and the United State* oni tStir
aliiaa. Bow many of tha 18 nationt ioea thia
Uave that hmt»%ottetnthia yet?
A. Eight nonslioed, representing all theiion-
alined of tha world, and th«y were ehoaen b»-
cauae they represented the great geographie
areas: Asia, Africa, Latin America, the lliddle
East, and noaalined Westers Europe.
U.S. and UJ.SJ. Neorlng Afreiwawt
Q. Are you at liberty toaay vshai haa changed
tinea you eaane her* that brought about thia eaJl
for you to go baekt
A. This hasbeen a darelopmeBtprooesa which
appears to be nearing its conclusion. I left
Qenera on Wednesday to ccme back to testify. I
stated that I would probably be in the United
States soma time uiueet something developed,
in which ease I would return promptly. I am re-
taming promptly, after word from the Soviet
Union.
Q. Can yvii tell u* tchat that davdopment
vcat,tirf
A. Idon'tthickthisisadeTelopment.I think
this isacontinaousprooeaa.
Q. laitaconeeationf
A. No, I don't say it is a eonceesion. We are
nearing an agreement after many months of
discussion between the Soviet Union and tha
United States.
Q. Yo^ taid you vert rtturrung after viord
from the Soviet Union.
A. That is eorrect.
Q. ItrK' it eorreet, air, that tha Soviet Union
icas not in agreement lehen yov left Geneva on
mibmitting a draft treaty with thia inapectien
prooiaient
292
varaacntMirT or statb Buixrim
A. T^ iMfViiat jtt Mdwimi oS that they
won pi«p«rsd4o4Jfleu« this final tabling.
Q. What ertomJ* yo^t nov, «ir, from toying
that you vnii table thia rMoMion in O^ruvaf
A. I am faera lie is there. Defora xsr« can do
this, I Diust b» together with him.
Q. It ii only a g^eetion of formf
A. I will just leave it at 017 statennnt.
Q. Mr. Atkbii»t<^*r, iehat it the «(i«Mt of tKt
dUatnim ctaut an-tilt in»f$«tio» Mfwt tht
HaiM of «iMiM »eimHtt$ Kb lAe SiMditk eeien-
tuit toying it it not ntodtdf
A. This is a oorapreheosTe t«3t be&. "niis
would follow oa, hopefolly. Too ase, we have
always saiil that the achievement of a noopro-
liferation irpaty would form a base oa which
other measures luight taka place, one of wbidt
certainly would be the comprehensiTe test ban
which we have been pushing now for many
years.
Q. Mr. Ambatiaifor, there tww a quettion — /
btlirve !ndia in particular vxu coneemed about
{letting aomit kind of atmrcncet of -protertion
in caje the tigni thit agrtfinent. She ia con-
rtmtd about the Comwvnitt Chinete nuclear
il rvelopmertt . What lort of amnirancet art going
to he pat into tkt treaty for rountries likt
fndiaf Hare you crotied that bridge yetf
A. We have stated in our presentations at the
plenary conferenfss that we believe assurances
are too complicated a subject, since each nation
tins ft different problem, to be included in the
nonproliferation treaty but we are quits willin);
to discuss that as a separate project. In fact, we
hn\Fsaid thisat the GkBceral Assembly and have
said it for 2 or 3 ye&rs.
'We hav« also reiterated the fact that there is
on the table or thara is in existence — I wcn't oss
that word "table" a^in, because that is con-
fusing— an assurance by the President of the
United States which hs set forth in October of
1004 ' within 48 hoars of the fint Chineos ex-
plosion that the United States would provide
immediate aanstaitoe to those Donnuclear na-
tions thnatsned by nadaar blackmail that asked
for this assistance from the United States.
We have said further at the U.N. that we
• BclLmn of Not, 2, IBM, p. 612.
woakJ ba very happy to broaden that asiarance
by an eppropriete U.N. rraolution which reiter-
ates the U.N. obligations. To put this, however,
into a treaty becomes too cotaplicated, and both
we and th» Soviet Union have agreed that this
is an additional discussion whidi should take
place after the treaty ia tabled.
H«|M fsf iMorf AcrseMcnt en Treely
Q. Mr. Amhatsador, vhat ant the ttuxhaniet
after the retohUitm it tahledt
A. The first mechanics will ba to let the rest
of the world make comments on what is in
the treaty since, as I said, only th% allies of the
two onchsinnen have si^n tha actual draft.
There hare been many speculations which have
taken place, many of which have been mis-
directed or misinformed.
This for the first time will give an opyxir-
tunity for these other nations to see whether
the provi.sions of the treaty are imch that they
are con-siztent with their security and their
principles.
So that ths first thing will be an opportunity
to explore, explain, devdop, and consider and
hopefully to gst broad agreement on such a
tre-ity. Then I would hop* that the Committee
itself — the 18-Xntion Committee, in which only
17 nations ere pre-*nt — would recommend this
treaty to the General Assembly — that ia. the
first Committee of the General Assembly — vrif h
the view to pettin<» the broad signsttircs which
would be required before the treaty comes into
effect.
Q. But the treaty ^eovld be possibly Tteom-
m ended and even tigned teith thit protfition
blanks
A. I wouldn't say signed. I would hope that
befons it poes to the General Assembly the blank
would be filled. I am quite optimistic that it will
be.
Q. That is the blank on the intpe/rtionf
A. We can it "safeguard" rather than "in-
spection."'
Q. Mr. Amboitedor, you m-ntiotted a co-
chairman. Who it the cochairmanf
A. Ambassador Alesei Boehchin.
Q. Mr. Amiastador. I vxsrtS to be ittre that /
vndentood you right. Did you toy that when
SBPtsMxat 4, i»«r
S93
j/ou left Ofneva tha Saviat Onion at that point
had not yet advised yc^ thai they v»rt mlfin^
to table a treaty xcith the inspeetion prevtnon
left blank and that tinee tki% yo» Kavo been
advised that they ar$ wiOmg to do that novT
A. Ko, that ta not quits precise I said Lhat
when I left they were not able at that point to
Bay they were authorised to table a draft treaty.
Thst (iid not include tha other addition which
you mRde, because thsre are other qnestiona in
addition to the question of the blastk articles.
Q. Ccm you tell %i» tahai thot» other giseetiems
xcere that they havo hms taiit/Ud thta%ulv*e ont
A. No, this is part of the negotiating process.
Q. But the in>peetu>itpnyntion%BO^sld be one
of the Ihingtf
A. Yea.
Q. Them ieai alto ^it^ a deal of ipeotdatioH
eirrlier thit year abovt the altitude aif tfie Wat
German Oovemmcnt and the jrroblem it teaa
having with tome of it» own peojile roho v>er«
reluctant to eee it join in ruch a treaty. They
were concerned ahmit Oermany ahandonintj itt
right to home tntemaiional poxoer. Tou knovi
the people tn Germany who took that attitude.
Do you have any feeling no^o on what the prci-
peett are for the Kietinger government aectpt-
ing thief
A. As you tre aware, thia whole process has
been discussed estensively with all of oar allies
individually and also collectively at the North
Atlantic Council in Paris and now will be in
Brussels.
This present draft, which I hope will be
agrved on and praaented rery soon, ia one that
they are thorooghly eonvsrsant with and, aa
expressed by the various memben of the North
Atiantio Council, we had a gn«n light to table
this type of document.
Q. Vr. Atnba*$adcr, tehen wSl you la hack
inOeittvaf
A. Sunday at noon.
Q. Are you going to appear before the Svrsate
eommittae fintf
A. I am appealing before the Senate Appro-
priations Coimnittea this afternoon, that is. the
subcommittee.
The prtet: Thmi yov.
WMtt Bnn va nMtM «•!•< AuM U
Th* Proidmt uuKMnced on Aogut 17 ttw
appointment of thrw new iiMinbM| to hb On-
eral Advisory Coffimittse on Foi^^ AaugUam
Programs. ^
They are: \a
neodore M. Hecbargfa, praildest Cnlrcrettj tt K«tn
Dcme, Notre D&me, lad.
aadolpb A. PeteresD. pn3id£st, tts Heab of twwrtra,
San FrtDdRo, Calif.
Fraak Btaatoa, pnaldeat, OolsoUa Bnadraxtliia B;*'
ttra. New Tarfe. N.X.
The General .\dvi3ory Committee, chaired by
.Ta-nies A. Perkias, president of Cornell Univer-
sity, was catabliabed by the Preeident on
March S4, 1MS5, to adviae him, tb» Secretary
of Suto, the Saentary of Dofeoes, tha Director
of the Barton of the Budget, the Administra-
tor of the Agency for Interaational Derelop-
ment, and other departments «Ad agencies on
a continuing basis concerning policies, prob-
lems, and ifflplementation of foreif^ aaeistance
programs.
In addition to Chairman Perkins and the
new appomtees, Ihs other roembera of the Com-
mittee are:
Dwayce O. Andmn ctialrmaB, eXKUtlve commlCtK,
N'aUonal City Bank «f UloiMapoUa
Jo8eT>b A. Bterse, fualtoiit, CaoiBaBkaUaoa Workrrt
of Amartea
David & Bell, vice pmldrat. Hie Ford FooBdatloa
KoBaBa B. Black, Special Pmldeatltl Advlacr for
Bootb Eaat Aatan BccooBte aad Social DvT*io^
Mn. Ilrentt N. Caas, cbaiman. Board et TnHtm,
SUdaore Collate
Latber H. FVMter, pceaidvDt T(i*k«8(e iBStltat*
Geo. AUrad If. OnantlMr, fonsar snaMiBt «( tka
Aaertean Bed Ckeai
J. Oeorc* Banar, prcaUrot, tte BeetrtkMar IMada-
tloa
wuilaa B. Bairtatt. pnOdcnt. Bt«Mt-PadBn4 Ok
Bdward B. Maaoa, Leaont Oolvcratty pntaaor, Bai>
Tird Caivtratty
Oaofga Maay, tiiMlilnit. AflrOtO
rraakUn IX Matpky. «kaoc«ilor, Uolventtr tt OaU-
Ibnila at lioa Aatelea
David BodufrUcr, imaldeDt, Cbaaa Maakattaa Baafc
Wtiuaai J. XrilMtaek. pnaMnt. bUobaeb Payer Oil
The Coiranittoe conducts its stadias and re-
views in Washington end in the countries vfhcre
the assistance programs are curiad on. To dtt»,
almost all of the members have visited VS. mis-
sions abroad on bohaif of the Committc»; 8S
9M
tmstxnaart or aran khubbm
ftid-iweiTlns eoantriw have fatan Tiait«d by at
leut oca Bunber of tbe Ciisimitte&
Tba CotnmittM h«s hdd nine 8-day mwringi
to date, lodnding wani.m* with ths Saentary of
Stot«, SecTvtary oi Defense, SaoNtary of
Health, Education, and Welfare, Director of
the Peace Gorpa, president of the World Bank,
preeidnt of tbe Export-Import Baak, the Ad-
ministrator of AID, as well as ataff repreeenta-
tires of tl\ of tbeaa departmenta, agenciae, and
institntitsa. Tbe ninth meeting waa held en
Jane £0 and 21, 1967, and a tenth meeting ia
■chsduJed for SeptH&ber 11 and 12, 1967. No
ngnlar adtedule of meeunga haa been adopted,
thoogh they bare been held at approximately
qaartarly interraia.
UnMod Nations D<iy, 1967
A PBOOLAU&TIOM*
TweetT-tvo rc*n aaek tbe IJslM ttatw Jotaed In
fooiHKss tlM> Cnltcd Nfitlone, llae* that tUne, oar Na-
Uoa haa falthfollr hoaond lt> ccwltnifBta ta Um
world bodr, la pamltof a jBatacd laatlnf pcaee,
BTPfT PnaMast and Cnmw aiaee ta* time of
rnuiklto Delano Booaavclt feaa (Irca fall aapport to
the Uoilad NattooK Cater erarr Adeilnlawatlca, aad
wttboDt la^atd to party, ocr ecoatry haa:
— cooperated artlvety is Che tTalied Nitloea atardi
for peace ta tbe Middle Ba^ Kaakmlf. and other
troubled arMU anxmd th* wotid;
— aopportad tbe Ualted Natloaa aSoite ta atRBftban
the faprct of men and aaClOM fbr tbe mis of law,
aad for fuadaaMBlai hmaaa rtcfeta and frsedoma ;
— worked to Umit anaeawntu ladoduig niirlear
weapaan oader cBMtlva ialenatloBal faotro) :
— aapparted the principle of eeU-dBtcnninatlaB tor
areas eiserslss tma dcpeadeat atataa;
■ <j<ieMlftBt8j abundastlj ta Vwtbtt Nattaaa
Inrtaa aetlrttlMk and to Iti naffeim tt 4
Tlia aiiiiMrfel anKliiilIwi af a imitj lieimlni i
eoa of Baaa dalmliiju treat actar wada la aa oak'
atiBdlag mm ewntple of csr aesjant for the ITITa
work.
Tbe Vnlted NaUens baa aa masle formula for Kl^
Ins tta fill iiiaaliiilj coewlas probleoa of ocr ivrola-
tloa£:7 tgt. Ita tarana kara dlAearteacd thca wtio
aaw la It the oolj bopa for peace la a world tors bj
tout. Tct deaptti t0o« blliirra, It feaa aebloTed mocb
that eoQid Bot hart l<ea aAlcTcd wttboot It It ra-
malss the aynbol, aad tbe atandard. of naala daaiR ta
turn awaj Croa aadisf Qoamla and make peace with
Us aelcUwr.
I Bite AaMrtcaaa to (taCr the Unttrd Hationa— Ita
aceoapltabaiants, lla streocthah Ita llinltatioEft aad ita
■etotlal tor tba fntuvk Broad pvblle ksawladca tt
tbe Dnlted Natlosa cea prerlde a Bnn beaa far (atna
United BtsHa actloa In tbe eeCBnlaation.
Nov. TBuooaa, I, LTasen B. JoHsaoa, Pnetdaat tt
tke Ualted States ot Ametlca, do bertby prodala Tuae
day. Octoter S«. 1S8T, aa Ucltad Nadeaa Day, and am
the dUaeos of this Nation to obacrva Ibat day by ataaaa
of eoauBBBtt? paaiaiiia that «U1 eoatrlbnta to a
iv«31stle BBderetaadlaa af th« tlmt. problaaH^ and
acblereBMSti cf the United Metloas and Its aawlated
oiganlxatlona.
I tXao call Qpoa cScUls of tbe Pcderal and Stats
OoncBnnnta and apoa local aOdals to eoeoonse dtl-
seo groaps and afenclca of coaunnnlcatloa — preaa,
ndlo, teleTlHon, and moUon plctcrea— to encase ta
apedat aad appropriate obaervanee of United Nations
Day thia year In cooperation with the United Nations
Aaaodatloa of tbe United States of America aad other
brtsrssted orsaalaatlcna
In wimaa wsnzsr. I baes brretinto art my bead
this titt day of Ancut hs tbe year of oor Lord nineteen
hnadred and alxty-aeeen, and of tbe ladepecdecce of
tbe United Statee of America the one bandred and
nlaety'Beeond.
LjJi
' Na srer : S2 red. Bag. iitsd.
f
2S5
THE costessa
Commimicatiom PoUey
M«f*ag« Frtm PruUmt Jaknton to the Conffr»m
WUtt Boom pim ntmm <>t>d AsxnX 1<
To the Congrett of the Untied Statu:
Man's gmtest bops for world pwtM Um in
nndentanding his fellowmaD. Nations, like
iadividu&la, fear that which is Strang* and un-
faiujiar. Tha more we ar« asd hc^ of them
things which are oonimon lO all people, the leaa
likely we are to fight over thoae issties which set
us apart.
So the challen^ is to oommnnicata.
No technological adranee offers a greater op-
portunity for meeting this challenga thaz^ the
alliance of space exploratioa and coountmica-
ti<ms. Since the adrent of the communications
satellite, i' a linking of one nation to another is
no longer t'.ependent on telephone lines, micro-
waves or Biilas under the ssa. Jnst aa man has
orbited the cArth to explore the uniTerM beyond,
we can orbit salelliles to send onr voice* or tele-
vise our activities to all peoples of this globe.
Satellite communications has already meant
much in termi of human understanding.
—When Preeident Unroln was asBMBinated,
it took twelve days for the narwa to iwbch Lon-
don. Britons watched and griev«d with ua at
the funeral of John F. Kennedy.
—Europeans watched Pope Paul speak to the
United Nations in New York— and Americans
saw his pilgrimag* to Fatima.
— The peoptet of three eoatincota vritneaand
the meeting of an American Prciidait and a So-
viet Premier in Glasdx^xx.
Tha future of this uew technology (tira our
imagination.
In business and oommerc*—
Commercia] telephoaa c&lls wiD be carried
raotinely by satellite to every pait of the g!ob&
—Rapid and imivcnal exchange of data
through aatelUts-linkad eoiB|raten will e
oooragB intematioaa) oMBBsroa.
—Prodoctiv* machinery can be opsrated at
great difltanoea and bannea reoorda can be
transmittad iutantanaonsly.
In education and health —
— Schoola in all knds can ba coBMcted hj
televiaioB — so that tha children of «di nation
can aee and bear their ooatampomries thnrngb-
out the wwld.
— Tbe world community of acbolars can bi
brought together acroas gnat diitaaoes for ftwe-
to-face discuwdona via lateUita.
' —Global coaaaltationa, with «oic« aad pie-
tvroa, can bring great tpedalists to the bedsidtL
of patienta in every continent.
—Tbe ait, eultare, history, Htcratar* and
medical Kienca of all nationacan ba tnutmittad
by MtallUo to every natira.
Who can meaaure the impact of this live, di-
rect contact faatwera nationa and tl»ir peoplat
Who can Maoa the value of oar new-found
ability to witaeoi tfie hJatofyHBafciof ennts ol
thi* aget This much «• knov: beoansa com-
monieation aatelliiw esiat, we are almdy tiad
oloser to each otfaar than we ban vmt batz
befofe.
Bat this new technology— ezeitiBg as it i»-
doea not mean that all oar aarfaee eosaanmka'
tions faeflities have become ofaaolate. Indeed, «ai
of the challengea befote oa ia to intafrate^^
litea into a balaaoed commnnteatJone »y*ui
which will meet the needs of a dynamic and «i I
pandiag vrarld society. TK» Onit*d SttOeumml
rtvi0»U$fa»taetifntmmtii»IMi ami format'
laUtmatiimaecmmmHltatientpolieg.
er 0A1S
Tbt OxonnakatfoM Act of lOM baa pt^
tided Uw bluipriait for MmaI tavolTeBMOt in
the oonunnnieatioM liU. That Act, utd tha
Fedaral Commmiintf iwna Cnmmiarinn it craatad,
hsvB aen«d oar oaticsal fatcnak ««I) doriag
ooa-tlaird of a oantiu? of rapid oommoaica&ioaa
'*5srSo
OoiniDnnicatkBa SataOita At^ of 1SS2
eatob!i»' «i » tnuovcrack for oar nation's par-
ticipation ia aatallila coBMnnnfetf.iopa tyiitrm^
OoosKsa veighad with eara th« rclsiiTo merita
of poUie and orivaSa ownanhip of eomnarcial
aat^it» faciliue», Ilia Act aathoriwd craation
of tlaa CtBoauuueatioas Satellite Corpwotka
(COUSAT)— • priv«u oorpontioa tntb pub-
Uo raipaBaibiUtla*--to eetablish a oonuBercioi
nteOilafyataa.
In 19M we joineti with 10 otJier oomtries in
tlw formatioB of the Int2raatiooal Telocota-
muiucationa Safallit* Cccsortium (DTTEI^
SAT). 58 nbtiooa are dow memban. Each
member eootribotea inrTctszc:zi capital and
abarea io the oaa of tha er^'irn. ( OllSAT, the
U.S. r«pr*aantatiT«, ia ths c:i;x^raum msnacn
aad now eoatribntca S47o d C:^ total invait-
mmt All latallitaa managxid bj COMSAT are
owtMd by INTELSAT— «i> that commerdal
astdlito oommttnicatiana hr^j f rem its fcHTining
been a product of iaimrai.u-r.zl c-;r;;x..Jion.
ProfTcaa haa been rapid £;:'7 Eird wea
launched ia 1965. IToi lis iliiELSAT II
series eerres bcth tha .Itltntic »nd ti» Pacific
Twelve grooad ctilic-:^— Ca vital liaka for
mdingbcdrr r>— have been eon -
•tructod c':r i« anticipatad by
thaendof ltC3.
Today, just n?:^ ;-;:J.ni c.';:- t'.o parage of the
Commanicatiorj Cz'—ll.'Ji A-.l cs..\ thrro ytirs
after the INTELOA'ii" cjrc rr::^:, tLvJcj^mta
have exceeded oar espSkX&uuc^:
>-ThB mehnmooB italTiti^ which rotatee
with our grabe and thus maintaina a atationary
poaitk» in orbit, haa bean devalopad wall ahead
of achedole.
— Thoae raaponaibia for U.S. international
coBunonicationa— ^ith ownanhip divided
among a mmbar of anrfaoa earriara and COU-
SAT— now look forward to an integrmtad ^ya-
tem which will utiltn aatallito taeh&elqsy.
— Propoaals are batng diacoand for the eatab-
lishment of a domestie couBunieatioaa aatel-
lit*— either limited to TV tnnanisskB or aerv-
icing a variety of dwaeatie flnmmBniratioaa men.
» v« ha*« baea tl» leaden b ths devd*
and naa of lastallita oosuDOsieatioac,
other eoantriae ere deeply irtareetad in car
eouBtry^ poaition on ilie aontinaatian of IN-
TELSAT, end iu the impott&nce wa aaaign to
iillamatioDal cooperation in the field of atellita
(wnifflinifiat.innB.
On Fabmary 28, lOCT, I declir«d in & megaafa
to CongKO:
WoitaaizHat ct toes raB8« poUclca eeeetratac tke?*-
t«r» •( eeltlUM coBaaaketlfloa romiRe Ute aui^i in-
lalM aaa etapnbNil** itadj b7 ttie f icrotlT* bnwt
■ad tke riiiiinei I eodrtpata tkat the epptvprU'*
iiienilflmn of CgascH* *m bold bcarissi toccealder
Oav coBplra iMoie •( tmbiic polkrjr. TtM nanUf*
brmaeb vUl ttxrlHUj msAj tbeet heulssa f «• abap*
oor I
A nonbar of important caeuMmications is-
anaa are pnaaatly before the Federal Communi-
cationa CasuniaaioB for ooaeidaration. Some of
them have been ilkw iiiHid in the Scnata and
Hooae Commerce Committee heaiiags on the
Puhlie Television Act of 1967. COMSAT avd
the State Department have opened diecuasion of
the internet iowal qneafioni with our foreign
paitnan and their govaraaianta.
In «rd»r U pl«e» tKu imf«Hant policy area
inptnf«etive,liBaiUtksvi«vtofthtP*^tideHt
(o be «^ar. Thia mcenga includee a report of the
paat, a reoommeodatica for the presssit, and a
challenge for the futore.
Ovr emtniry is firmly committid to the con-
cept of « global «Mtem for eommeroial cov^
muiucatiotu. The Dadaration of Policy and
Purpose of the Commaucatioaa Satellitk Act of
1002 Bt forth Congnaaiiiiial intent :
n* OMcroe feeRbr dHfuw that tt to tke poller <<
the Oaltad Blalae to «iW>ni>i. >• eoaJncUoa aad to
coaptiatlaB with eUMt centrleik ■■ cspedltlooalr ta
pnctkaMa a iiiiiiwaritel caoanBlcattaM aetcUlte lya-
tea. ■■ pert of ea teprinred (lotal eeeuiaalcetlBaa
natwerk. wbkh will to napoulve to paMlc aaada aad
aatleaal ok|Ktl*«ik whieb wtB eMT* Oo cgaiinniitca-
Urn* aaate ad tke VUtui Btatae and otter cooatitai^
aad wkiefc wtil cootxlbata to world ptaee aad'
aaiJMBlaalllaa
The INTELSAT Agreement of 10S4— to
whidi 58 nations have now adhered — left no
doubt es to its purpoea.' Ita pnamfcle ezpreaaed
the dssira:
■ rir tMt o< tae asracBCBt, at* Brum* at Aag. H,
]te«.CLS81.
«, teat
2W
, . . *» «i>«Ml«> « itaflto tlat*l cwaaCTCtol c— ■wil-
eattena MMUIM ft»m ib part of u imprvrvd ■kiMl
eoouBOBUdoa* Dctwoik WUeli wUl pro*tdi expandM
telerommaulestloaa wrrleta to tU tiMa ot tb» wcrid
and whlcb wUl cootrlbnte ta wa7l4 pMM and ud*^
Of course, these agreenenta do not prechida
tha development and operation o} satellite ejs-
tems to meet unique national cesds. The United
States 'a det-eloping a dsfensa system— m will
others. But INTELSAT membsra did pW^'e
that commercial communications between na-
tions would be a product of international
coopwation.
Tod-iy I TeaiRrm the eomirutmenit made in
tS62 and ISC^. We ruppori tfu development of
a gl-obal »-y»tem of communication! tattllitie to
vuike modem communicatunu available to all
natums. A global system eliminates the need for
duplication in the space sfgnwnt of communi-
cations fscilities, reduces tb« cost to individual
nations, and provides the most efficient use
of tha electro-magnetic frequency spectrum
through which these communications must
travfJ.
A global system is particularly important for
less developed nations which do not receive the
benefits of speedy, direct international com-
munications. Instead, the present system of
communications—
— encourages indirect routing; through major
nations to the de\-elopinp countries,
— forces the dei-cloprng nations to remain
dependent on larger countries for their liala
with the rest of the world, and
— makes international communications esrv-
ioe to the^ developing nations more expensiva
and of lower qo&Iity.
A telephoae call from Rangoon to Djaksxrta
must still ^o through Tokya A call from Dabir,
Sen^gtkl to Lagos, Nigeria is routed through
Paria and Lonaon. A call irom American Sa-
moa to Tahiti goes by way of Oakland, Cali-
fornia. During the recent Punta del E^e con-
ference, I discovered that it usually oo<x Latin
American joumaliats more than thsir Amsricui
eolleacues to phone in their stories because most
of the calls had to be routed throu^ New York.
Snch an archaic ayatcm of international com-
munications ia no longer necesary. The com-
municationi ntellita knows no geographic
boundary, it dependent on no cable, owes eJle-
giance to no single langnage or politic&l philoao-
pby. Man now has it witMn his power to ^eak
dinetly to his fellow man in all x***"*^
Wt mpp»rt a fkM lyttsm of >
uOeOiU MmmttmeatioM wkieh ii momUaik U
all nation*- iaryt oni tmaU, ievtlopti oni
devetoptng—OH a mon-dioeriminatorp both.
To have aeoaas to a tatelHt* in the iky, a na-
tion most have acoev ta a groond at^Joa to
transjut and rec^ve its mMBages: Tliara is a
danger that smaller nations, unable to flaanea OF
util^ axpeniive cround stations, maj bccooa
orphans of this teoinological advanosk
We believe that c&teilita ground Mat ions
should be an essential part of tha iufrastructui*
of developing nations. Smaller n£t ions may coa-
sider joint planning for a ground ttatiMt to
serve the communications nesds of more than
one nfction in the san» gajgraphic area. T7» irilj
ctmtider technical aetiiUuxa that vnU aitUt
their plaruting effort.
Developing nfttiosa should b« encouraged to
oomoxenc) conatroction of an efficient i^stem of
groond statiai^ as soon as possible. Wlwn other
financing is n6t available, ve will aotuidor finiMr
eial a$iiitance to emerging naiiattM to btfibi $hs
faeHitie* that vnO. permit them to than in the
benefUt of a global ccmmunicaiiont uUeUite
system.
C«nt!noatfen of ffJTSlSAT
Tla 19M DTTELSAT agreement provides
otily interim arrangements — subject to renego-
tiatioa in 1969. Our reprgeentatives to the con-
sortium will soon begin diarasaioss for a perma-
eent artangement.
We mpport the eontiraiation of ISTEL8A T.
Each nfition or its representative eoatribntes to
its Tpanwa and benefits from ita Rr.enues iii
aoQordanca with its tclicipaiii \n^ c2 tl.j ty>
tem. Tha 68 ia2ni..ra incIcCo tx~r:."r.Jctiv'C3
frcm the major nations who t" "...^v^zilly have
been most active in int«mi;:c--l cr-rsmaBJca-
tions. It has been a euccesful vehicis for inter-
national cooperation in the owtterehij) and
operation of a complex oommnnicatianaiiystcin.
Wo will uTge the ooatinnation of tba eonsor-
tinm in 1&99. The present arrangsmants oiler a
firm foondation oa which a pennanantMnetan
can be built.
Some nations may feel that the United Stata
has too large a voice in the conseitiiDi. As heavy
users of intematiocal oommnnieationa, enr in-
vestment ia SQch an international undertaking
is fxceptionally larga. The eariy devdopmeat
of Mtdlita technology in the United States and
tha sin of oar investment haa Bade it logical
S98
DCPAxnoirr or stat* wmxMcm
that COMSAT «er»-e m consortium manager.
ir« ttfk no domination of aaieUitc communi-
eatumt to the exclxtiion of any other nation —
or any gnrup of ruitivn*. Uathsr, wo welcome in-
crcsaed participation in inlemationai communi-
cations by all INTKtSAT nierabers. We shall
approocli llie 1909 negotiations detenriined (o
9<H.'U ilie Lest poesible permani^nt orgnnizational
{rsmework.
—We trill consider ceilings on the voting
|w>«er of any single nation — including the
l.'iiileil Slates — !>o that the orpanuation will
miiintnm its international charao'fr.
— Wo will support the creation of a formal
asscmblj of n!l INTELSAT nripmbors— so tint
all may sharo in the consideration of policy.
— W>? favor efforts to make ilio servic<Si of per-
sonnel uf other nations available to COMSAT
as it carries out its management resp<>n'ibilii ies.
— We will continue tlie exchange of technicaj
information, i-iiare tichnolo):ical advance!), and
promote a wider distribution of pi'ocurement
contracts among members of llo con^orl iuni.
Il )< our earnest hope that every iiwmlwr
nation will join with us in finding an iHpntable
fomiuU for a [lermanent IXTKf.SAT
orgnnization.
Dsmattfc Ccmmunicotiena SeMlUl« Sytt«mi
Communications satellites have domestic a^
well as international applications. Satellites
that can beam telephone calU or television pro-
grams between New York and Paris c.nn do the
s«ma between New York and 1.^09 Angeles. I>ar-
in;; propos&l-s have already been made to tap the
va.«t U.S. domestic market.
Our awareness of the s«>cial ard economic
potential of this new technologA 'u met bv simi-
lar excitement arotind the plobc. Kach nation
will be making decisions about how <lomestic
communications needs can best be met. The posi-
tion taken by the United StatM is particularly
important because our domenic nuirket i.< so
large and oar role in international communica-
tions is so extensive.
There are important imanswered questions
concerning the oper»tioa of o domestic system.
Assuming these titjostiona Ar« answered favor-
ably, wc (till most taako the decision to mov«
forward with such a B7st«m consistent with our
international obligtUions.
The space Kginent of • communications satel-
lite', system is international by its very nature.
— A synchronous satellite occupies a perma-
nent orbital position in Uio iiitcmatiora! domain
of outer space.
— AH satellites radiate elwtro-magnetic
energy potentially capable of interference with
other comiuunicalion.s systems,
—.Ml satcliit'^ u-se the intemationally n-pu-
lutcii frequency spectrum.
InrUui of I he inJfmntional rtaturv of xn' ell He
commimu-atioM and o^xr ct^mmiJnienti under
the ISTELSAT a>}rtevi,-n> of 1064. v,- thmild
take no nctiiyn in the eita'jlinhment of a Jomestic
ti/ttem irhich M 'nromjialibU irith i/ur fuppott
fur a glohal tyitem.
This does not mean that the United .Srute^ —
or any other nation— will j^ive up Mial sover-
eignty over domestic communications. The flow
of satellite communications — both domestic and
international — is to and f'om ground stations
owned by the individual nation or Its repre-
sentatives. Each country will have to determine
for itself wlictlier it wants to use communica-
tions satellites for domer:.tic |iur(K)M>s. It must
1)6 prppariKi to briir the expense of such salellit*
u.se. just as it will derive any revenues.
It is the space ^eprifnt — not the ground stn-
tion — that is of legitimate international con-
cern How should a nation utilize satellites fop
domestic communications purpose-^?
There are Sfveral pos.sible choices:
— .\ nation can lease circuits from an interna-
tional I\TEI>'5.VT satellite.
— It could elect to oi>emte a separate satellite
for Its own domestic use.
— It could join with neighboring countries to
operate a separate satellite.
Ijogically, this decision should l)a based on
economic pround.s — whather do.^lestic require-
ments can lie met most cfTiciently .ind economi-
cally by a satellite owned by IXfEI>8.\T, or by
a separate satellite. Prcsint studies indicate tlmr
a high volume of domestic traffic is necessary
for a separate satellite to offset the cost advan-
tage of sharing the use of an international satel-
lite. The same considerations apply if domestic
needs are to be met by a satellite shai^ by eev-
eral nations.
If the regional satellite is to carry interna-
tional traffic 03 well, INTELS-iVT— the inter-
national commonicat ions consortium — has an
important stake in the i-esult. .\doqu&te provi-
sions must be made so that any international
traffic which is diverted will not jeopardize the
errTcmea 4, ifoT
29»
economic efficiency o« the INTELSAT syiton
or limit if» extension to developinff countries.
ISTELSAT mernben tktnld edhert to
INTELSAT g\ip«Tvmoii in eny M« of domet-
tic or regional tateUita.
Such supervision should inclado coonlmft-
tion of design so that eW communication by
commcrcinl satdlita ia compatible v^ifh the
glo)^ srstem. We must not saerifira onr goal oJ
direct communicfttiuQS links omcog all f aU«^
Domestic and intemation»l trafiic should bs able
to (low freely through the entire glohil system,
limited only by tlie techn<dogy itaalf.
Technical refrulation is also necraaarf so tluU
positions in orbit can be assigned, freqnimcaM
can be allocated, and enfrgy from satellites
docs not interfere with other communicatiois
* T^s altematJTe to this type of coordination
is international communications anarchy—lack
of inter-connection^ needleea expense, pollution
of frequencies, radio interfe.-ence, and nsarpv
tion of orbital spaces. Nations should hare no
hesiution in choosmg the route of international
cooperation.
forHclporteii by OH»er MrtHnu In IKTBISAT
/ urge the Soviet Union emd the natims of
Eoterrx Europe to join wifA «**,^"^'^/'^"
andourBT txirtneriaatnembtriof INl tUiAI.
INTELSAT is not a pol-tioal orgaiuzaUon. It
holds no ideological goal tjcept that U apod.
for nations to communicate efficiently with one
another. It seeks no diplomaUc advantage. It is
quite simply a cooperative undertaking of many
nations to finance an international oouunuBic*-
tions system which is of advantage to all .
In 1963 this inviUtion was exter^cd by the
govemmenU of those natiwis which joined in
^e creation of INTELSAT. Today, I renew
thst invitation on behalf of our government.
I have suted many times my hope that our
commercial acti viti« with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe will grow, tJrJit our contacts
will increase, and that we will emplvssiK. thoas
matters in which cur intereeU are common
rather than dwelling on tli'*. issoes which
divide us. .... .j:_
Her« is » ratw opportonity to ;om in an acUr-
ily to bring benefits to aU natim 3 and loes to
none. Reoentiy th» Sovi%t Union ratified the
tr««ty to the peaceful tisss of o«ter span.
Notbinie oodd better •ymboliss the tmth that
spae« belongs to all men, that an intemaUonal
undertaking that penuits the free flow of com-
municatianij. I earnestly hop* that ths Soriat
Union and the noUons of EasUm Korop« wiD
join ia this hiatorio ectioa.
The Soviet Union is a leader in sBtellit* tech-
nology. I am advised that ther« b no insur-
mounuble technical obstacle to en eveattial
Unking of the Soviet MOLNIYA syaera with
the INTELSAT system. The peoples of tho
world could rightfully rejoice if our advances
in satellite technology were accompur.icd by this
act of global cooperation.
Of courae, this participation would requu'e a
revision of in\-estment and voting ratios based
on Soviet anticipated use of the system. Our
representatives in IKTELSAT are ready to
participate in iminwlUte discusaons to make
that membcrthir rx-^>ble.
IntsnwiHensi Cotmtumtesflsns Ownardily
Most nations handle their intenifttion&l com-
munications through a "clioscn inatnuaent/J—
gonerally, a govenunent-ownad aatity. Tn»
United States has no chosen in^rument. Sev-
eral record carriers and one voice carrisr handis
international traffic. In addition, COMSAT
provides satellite circuits bo these earners.
Our normal instinct is to favor th* existence
of multiple companies in each comiaercial field.
We believe that competitive piuauie* wnong
technologies as well as companies— will osually
generate lower prices for tho ussr. CongTeas
r^Bcognizsd in the 19C2 Act that COMSAT
would be required to deftl with soveraJ intar-
natioaal carriers.
Yet, there is a legitimate (ptauao as to
whether the present division of ownwship ooar
tinucs to be in the public interest. Critics argue
that:
—International osanmanieations are provided
by an indiMtT7 which ia regulated in its rates
and practices. Price competition, as wa ntaally
usa that term, does not exist.
—Divided ownership haa reeolted fat the etm-
strtiction and maintenance of ezpenaive, dupli-
cating commtmicaUona fecilitiea which incieaae
opnating ooeta and result in higher rates for the
user.
— Our nation is in a relatively poor bergsui-
ing position on communications matters with
foreign counterpart* aince wo do not speak erith
— Dispntae have existed between COMSAT
and the surface carriers over who should owa
SOO
PCPABTICCNT or STAtm DtTLtXAn
tlie ground st«tions in the ioternationml ty^Um.
— Defense communications in tha futore
could be Bubjecte<t U) delay.
Sereral proposals have be«n advanced which
would affect our intematiooal conununications
posture. Legislation has been proposed to per-
mit a merger of one or more of the intercstional
carrier* It has been suggESted that COMSAT
ghoutd be jiermitted— in certain circumstance*—
to contract directly with users oilier than the
intrnutfional common carriers.
Questions have been raisod whether additional
conimuiiicationa capacity should be developed
throa(;h surface cables, utilize ion of Batellites,
or ot her technologies.
A continuation of Uio review of these issues
is desirable.
Teth Tttm es C*nunimt<at4eiu Potky
/ am appointing a 7 a^k Force of dittin-
gvUhed govemmeKi oficiuU to matt a compre-
hensive ttxtdy of commitmcaticm* policy.*
It will examine a number of ma)or questions :
— Are we making the best use of the electro-
magnetic frequency spectrum!
— How soon wLU a domestic satellite system
tie economically feasible!
—Should a domestic satellite system be gen-
eral piiqx>» or specialized, and should there be
more than one sjHem !
— How will these and other developments af-
fect COMSAT and the international communi-
cation carriers!
Tliesp are complex questions. Many of tlieni
are being presently weighed by the Federal
Communications Commission. Hut a long, hard
look must also be taken by all parties with re-
sponsibility in this area — for the ultimate de-
cisions will work a revolution in the communi-
cations system of our nat ion.
This Task Force wiU examine our entire
international commnnicafionspcsturp. It shouhl
inrc«tigate whether the present division of
owner^p in our international communications
facilitiea best ser^'es our needs, as well ns which
techiiolog>- can meet new commonicafion re-
qnir?ments in the most effective and ^cient
manner.
'Fnr B«nn of tlie meDber* of the Task Tare* on
Oommunlratlon.^ i^>UcT, ar* Wbltv Room iim releaac
«at«d AOKOt 14. Cwrae V. Roetow. Under SprRtaiT
of 8tat» tor PoUtkal ASain. was namfd cbalrmaa ot
(tie unk fofcp.
The task force may establish working group*
of government ard nongovenunent experts to
study various technical, economic and social
questions.
Ths task force eJiould also determiiM if th«
Communications Act of 1934 and theCotnintilu-
cations Satellite .Vet of 18C2 require rerisioQ. I
am asking the task force to report to me from
time to tune and to make its final tcport withis
one year.
OavamoMnt OrgaafzaMMi
Our government must be organized to carry
out its responsibilities in the communications
field. Present authority is widely dispersed. The
Federal Communications Commission has heavy
responsibilities under the 1834 and 19C2 Acts.
The President and many agencies have respon-
sibilities under those Act«, various Executive
Ordei-s, and as part of their general duties.
Communications is a vital public policy
area — and government organization must reflect
that challenge.
/ have aaked th« Bureau of the Budget to
mahe a thorough study of existing governmen-
tal organization in the field of communieatum
and to propote needed modiftcationt.
Condusiont
lliis messag* does not create a new communi-
cations policy for our nation. Rather, it pro-
poses the foundation for that policy.
— It rMffirms our intentions as a partne* in
INTELS.Vr.
— It considers the neH for nwdificatioiw in
our international commnni'-ations posture.
— It eet.-i in motion the n«essary studies for
a better undorstan<ling of policy needs in do-
mestic and international communications.
The challenge of this new technology is sim-
ple— it io to encourapie men to talk to each other
rather than fight one another.
Historians : ;ay write that the human race
survived or filtered because of how well it mas-
tered the t'i. nology of this age.
Communicntions satellites now permit man's
greatest gi/ts — sight, expreaiion, human
thoughts and ideas — to travel unfettered to any
portion of oiiT globe. The opportunity is within
cHir grasp. We must be prepared to act.
Ltmdon B. Johhsow
The Wiirn; Wacst, Aug^Mt li, 1967.
301
httaractonk Canal Stady Csmmitsien
Submits Thlffd Annual ProQrtn R«p«S
WHrn HOUSE AfMOUHOMOn
miM Bam* pr«M nku* Dated Aogsst >
The President on Augiist 8 sent Uie Tbirc
Annual Report of tha Atlantic-Pacific Inter
oceanic Canal Study Commission » to Conj»r«».
The report covers the period July 1, 16<!<5, t^'
June SO, 1967.
Tho Commission is collecting and evnlnaitnj,;
the engineering and t<!chnical data necessary 1<
determine the feasibility of constnicting n sea
lavel canaJ. It is also onnlyzinp many complex
political, military, and economic problems r?
Iftted to the location, construction, and opem-
tion of a sea-level canal.
During the past 6 months engineers and te*-!-!-
nician3 from the United States and Colombn
established facilities for on site investijrationo?
a saa-level canol route in the Atrato-Truando
rirw vallej-3 in northwest Colombia. This ii.
volved construction of l^a base camps, t« v
weather itations, 19 hydrology statioiv?, and ap
proximaUly 16 line camps. _
In Panama, where research facilities had b«» i
established prior to the start of the reporting
period. United SUtes and Pananumian peraw;-
nel collectetl data on the topography, geologp-
hydroloffv, meteorology, and ecology of tk*
routes under consideration during the full J2
months.
Tlie Commission re«'i\-e«l the tirst modepn
topographic maps of the canal nmte near tba
Nicaraguar-Cofita Rica bonier and had its engi-
neering agent make a conceptual evaluation of
this route. ■,,_,_,
The Commission continued its detaiie«l stntty
of long-range trends in eJiipping, the intorrrU-
tionships between a scs-Ievel canal and shipping
and finance, and the national defense implica-
tions of a sea-level canal. It is also evaluatirg
the effects of building ft new sea-level canal on
tha United States' relations with the canal-site
countries and the canal-using countries and t^
economic impact of aea-level canal alternsUTtS
on host countries.
• Rlmle coplfn of th* 70-pate rrport tiv «t«I1«««
npon rwjWMit from the Atlantl.- PartBc IntproOMOic
Cnnil Study Cnrnmlwlon, Room 601. 1815 H 8t . Wsslj-
Innton. DC. 20006.
The President estaldiahed the Commission on
April 13, ieC5, appointing five mm with a wide
range of experience and upstialiiation : Robert
B. Anderson, Chainimn ; Koliert O. Storey, ViM>
C^b&innan; Milton S. Eisenhower: Kenneth E.
Fields; and Raymond A. Hill. He anthorired
them to call noon any department or agency of
the executii-e brtnch for eipert advice and «-<-
eistafice in the conduct of the study.
The law «tablishing the Commission require-*
it to submit a progress report annually to the
Prvident for trsnsmiftal to the Congress. The
Commission, nnder existing Irgi-Jiaion, i» di-
rected to mt^e its final rrport, with recommen-
dations, not later than June .■», 196S. Becausa
of unavoiilnhle delays in conducting its studies,
tha Commission has asked tho Congress to ex-
tend tha deadline for the investigation until
December 1, lOTO. This request is now pemling
before the Congress.
LETTER or TRANSMITTAl
Wbit* Hon** VT**9 r*Ir*p« dat#d Auci** •
To thf Congress of the United Stutrt:
1 am truii-smitting tlio third anniml report of
the Atlantic Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study
Commission. The report covers the perio<l I
July 1 , 19S3 to June SO, 1867.
During the past twelw menths, the Conitnis-
sion has put ita progr«in into full operation.
The Bite nurrey a^sreMttent, signed with Colom-
bia on October 25, 1968, permitted tha Cooimis-
rlon to start the enginwring euney of the
alternate sea-level canal route in the northwest-
ern part of that country. In Panama, the Com-
mission completed the first full year of data
collect ion on the route.i tinder considerat ion. The
first modem topogmpliic maps of (lie jxitential
canal area near the border of Nicnragua and
Costa Rica were completed by the Inter-Aroer-
ican Oeodstic Sun-ey. The CommiffiionV Kn- |
gineering Agent made a preliminary evaluation
of this route on the ba.sis of fhr^e mape.
Inter-agency working groups fini-^lietl their
initial drafts of special studies on the bciad
national and international implic.itions of « «>n-
Jerel canal. Tliese studies cover foroign iH)licy,
narional defense, canal financing, slupplng pat-
tenis and engineering feasibility.
Bectnae of unavoidable delays in starting the
field ■work in Panama and Colombia, and be-
cau* the PT/)W.«?HARK nuclear crateriiig ex-
periments needed to determine the technical
302
DEPAWmSNT or STATS WCVLintl
f««a«ibilityof mtclwirexfttviition l.aveimn l>o>t-
poned, the Commission founU «l>af it would
roquire aelditionat tim» an.l fundi to roniplete
the mii^ion assigned to it in Pui>lic I^w 88-
(m. , , ,
An amendment for this purpose has alreaily
been approved by tho Senate. I re<oinmend it3
tcrly approval bv the Iloaso of Keprescnfatives.
There is liUledoiibt that the <onslnirlion of
a w-a-ieTfJ caaal is technically feasible. Tlie
major qnestiona to be ivMlvcd are
—when it will Y» needed,
—whether it would be financially feasible, and
—whore and hoiv it should he constructed.
\Vhile pa-st siodies have put the need around
the end of this century, nc-ent tra£Bc growth
ha.s been more r»])id than was earlier foreseen,
and tJie nee<l may deselop much sooner. \s legis-
latiop, plunninf;, and construction could require
fifteen .\-ean from the date a recommendation
to proc^i is made to the ("onfrrcsa, it is clearly
in the national interest for tho Comrai^ion'H
coniprelicnsive investipalinn to pro<ced lus
rapid! V ns possible.
This anniversary finds the canal inxeHlipa-
tinn well advanced on its planned course. I fake
preaf plea.-nre in forwardinj; the rei)Ort of l)rop-
rvss to date.
LTNDoy B. .lonx.ioN'
The Wiim; IInr.sK.
BafMrt on Educational ond Cultural
Exchongo Sent to Congrots
rresidenl .Jn\n*tm» Letter of Tmiitmittal
To the Con/jreni of the VnUerl ^M^.'(.•
1 am pleased to fraa-'niit the Annual Rejxirt
on tho Intenialional Kducjlioiml and Cultural
E.«lianKe rmjiram tonductwl during fiscal year
lOCe under the Mutual Educational and Cul-
tural ExchanjEe Act of lOfil (Public I.aw fi7-
i,">6, the Fulbrij^itllays Act ).
Thi3 report covers a iieriod which saw tli«
completion of two decades of international edu-
cational exchange and the laying of new foun-
dations for its future. The (rroundnorii done
this year led eventually to the passji;.T of the
International Education Act of 1966, a mile-
Btono in our efforts to improve our citizens
knowledge of their world.
To»!ay the I'nitecl Stat*« looks ahead con-
fidently to its relatiotw with the rest of the
world. It is o view in which there are great
hopM and many hazapd-i Were oar gcais no
more than maUrialistie, if we sought no more
than power and material abundEnce, if we
gained ao more than acicntiflc breiikthrouphs
and militarj rjperiorities, ours might soon be-
come a nation spiritually <lcprived and pfychf»-
lopically estranged from much of the world
around ns. . u
But it is to people, not thing<i— to the warmth
and generosity of the American people, not to
material things, that we turn in order to !>reak
the barriers of misunderstanding that forever
threaten to divide us from our fellow men. Tho
international exchange of students, teachers,
scholars and leading spwialists is one of the
nati'jn's most effective means for dispelling ig-
norance, prejudice and international saspicion.
Tlie educational and cultural exchange pro-
gram is a relatively small but highly effective
instntment in international relations. It enlists
the participation of talented indi iduals who
constitute a creative and influential minority in
Bociitv. Henrv A<lams said in hi^ Eil'iention.
"Thediffen-nce is slight I" the influence of an
author, whothe- he is read by five Uiindre<l read-
ers or bv five hundred thousand : if he can select
the five" hundred, lie readies the fivr hundred
thousand."
The |irogram is not a "cnu^h" one. but is de-
signed, like education it=oIf. to plant and culli-
vafe the seed of understanding, which, having
gemiin.ited and taken n-ol, quietly flourishes. _
Too often today men are tempted to think, in
Emerson's i.hra.'=o. that "things are in the sad-
dle." Educational and cultural exchange re-
minds us that it is not on things— not on ina-
chineri- and pidcetri-l.ul cu the niin.ls and
hearts" of men that the human fate depends.
Our educational and cultural exchange pro-
grams are person oriente<l. Tliey are our Amer-
ican testimonial to the Mief that, thwigh moun-
tains cannot meet, people always can.
I commend this report to the thoughtfid at-
tention of the Congreas.
Ltxoos B. JoiiNsow
Tub Wiirrr IIoirsE,
Avrpt-^t 7i, l'JG7.
SEPTT.JJBF.R 4, IHUT
303
Th* QuMtbn of Food ASd in tSio P«irspedhrs
of riw Prablwns off Iho D«vdof>lns Cowntrios
Statement by Arthur E.GoUiichmidl . „ ■ , r, it
UJS. Representative to the United Nailont Econamie and Social C^taunl
There is nothing inerit&ble about a world
food crisis. There does not have to be a shorUge
of necessary food on this planet. Mankind
knows enough about food product iej» end
human repnxjuction (o avoid now food crises,
now or )n the future. All we have to do is apply
what we know.
There's tha rub. I'm reminded of the farmer
who complained about all the young college-
bred experts telling him how to farm better:
"Why, I don't even farm as well as I know how
now." If we simply applied everywhere nliat is
ftlready known somewhere — the applicable tech-
niques of increasing food production. tran.sport,
and storage— there would be no wide.'^read
prol)lem in the intermedint« term. .Vnd if these
increases in productivity were matched by more
general acceptance of family planning tech-
niques, there would not be a longmn crisis
either.
Unfortunately, on both sides of the food-
population equation there are so many people
involved— substantially all of us— people who
must be reached to achieve an increa-^e in pro-
ductivity of food and a manageable growth in
the number of mouths to feed. Unlike such mat-
ters as planning or tax reform, education or
space technology, we mast reach 'oeyond the
government oi2cial and the scientists and pro-
fessional!". The messages necessary to achieve a
balance in the food-popolation equation must
reach to remote farms and villages — and into
the privacy of homes everywhere.
> Made htton the BC0800 Eroiif i|c Ommltte* •*
Oecsva on July 24 dnrlBg the 4M tssloa of the I'.N.
Eoooemlc and Social Coascll, wblob wa« held there
July ll-,iag. a
We have a problem of communication. For-
tunately, this Council has started on a line of
action that is bringing the whole family of I .N.
agencies to the tn.sk of communicating its con-
cern. I myself heard the resonance of this Coun-
cil's sounding off at ECAFE { Economic Com-
mi.s3ion for A.sia and the Far East] and K('.^
[Economic Commission for Africa], and we
know that ECLA [Economic Commission for
Uitin America], too, is acting in this field—
and governments are responding in tlieir de-
velopment plans.
T!ie proprtffis reports that the Council lia:
received, becausei of their hijjh caliber of iasight
and clarity, will make an important contribu-
tion to solving the problem of r..-inmunicating
witli the governments concerTv,'*'
They can assist those governments oonsider-
ably in preparing for decisions that will need to
lie t.iken when the progrsm of studies IB cosn-
pleted. These interim reports stipport the hope
that the completed U.N. studiea will make a
H. ior contribution tow.ird undcrstandia^ «nd
acuon.
The problem of food requirements and sup-
plies is primarily one for developinjr eQvnlrie-
Food aid is a relatively small part—bat fcr the
present it is an important part— and necessarily
mainly a short-term one. However, -s one short
period of time leads into another, the rtality for
an indefinite period may be that of continuing
."ihort term efforts to deal with short-lerm situa-
tions of changing magnitudes.
Food aid is not en independent cq<i.'\|ion. It
derives from and relates to population, income,
nutrition, production and production capabili-
ties, commercial trade, and other aid.
304
DEPABTlfENT OF STATE BllAmH
Wo hop* that the Seeretanr-Otmcnirs proR-
nm report on multil«ter»l food ftid • will re-
ceiva particularly closa attention in tha »p-
propriata agencies of all of the govemmonJa
concerned. It is an outitandinR document. It
emphaaiaas tha diract relationship of food quea-
tiona to all phaaas of economic and social de-
velopment and very wiaaly, wo believe, examinee
problems of food aid in the perspective of broad
development plans and the aggregate flow of
external reaonrooi
This report and the coroplemfniary docu-
ments of FAO fFood and Agriculture Organi-
tation], but'je^ed by the important study of
the Adrisory Committee on Science and Tecii-
nolojty on increasing the production and use of
edible protein,' provide a comprehensive outline
of the problems and possibilities for solving
Ihfni.
These studies sliouW h<'lp to bring the prob-
lem of food «'d into focus and lo correct the
distortions that have crept into o>ir view of
the matter aa a result of past American sur-
pluses and their use over the years as supple-
mentary a-isistance,
r.S. stocks of wheat have declined in the six-
tics, following an increase that occurred dur-
ing the fifties. The reduced carryover does bear
on some aspects of the international food situa-
tion. Hut the recent decrea.se of U..S. stocks
should not be credited with any necessary or
primary significance cotii-eming other aspects of
a complex problem.
Disappearance of wheat does not coincide
exactly with new supply in a given crop year.
It would not he corr«>ct, however, to think that
IJ>;. exports of wheat over a period of years
have been supplied from stocks. The bulk of
exports have come from current production.
The rate of U.S. exports in recent years would
long since have exhausted the stocks considered
surplus, or even total stocks »f their peak.
The fact that carryover stocks are now in the
lower r: -fit of a reasonable variation does not
meajj that U.S. exports of wheat cannot l)e con-
tinued at a high or rising volume. Production
can be planned to taks care of a large volume of
exporta, including food aid shipments; and this
ia, in fact, what the United States is prepared
todo.
But product ion nee<ls to b» planned in ad-
vance; and the present level of stocks provides
•I'.N. floe. E/«3S.
• v.x. rtoc. r/«4s.
less, and probably LUla, opportunity for c«ping
with an underMtimotion of requireraenta on
which prodoctloa plans are made. Earlier and
mora aoeurata asisrmenti of requirements,
therefore, become incfcrsinsly important. In-
desd, this becomes one of the key problems to
be tacklad in tha orderly planning of interna-
tional arrangements u> resolve the problcra.
NwcMlliit Fc«d leqvireiMnts and SvppUss
All importing and exporting coimtries, but
most especially tha countries receiving food
aid, have an interest in a continuing appraisal
and reappraisal of the prospects for production,
consumption, and trsde. Each year, and perhaps
more than once every year, national govern-
ments and the FAO need to examine closely a
detailed multilateral balarwa sheet that shows
actual supplies and r^juirements in the recent
past and the likely near-term prospects as best
these can be foreseen.
Forward i)roject ions of requirements for food
consumption, when carefully made, can be made
with a sufficient and workable degree of ac-
curacy even wiiea they extend into the future
for a number of years. Projected requirements,
however, cannot bo related directly to l lie magni-
tude of food aid ; this is affected also by the fore-
cast of production in developing countries and
normal trade
.Supplies, however, cannot be forecast aA con-
fidently as ro<iuireni<>nts, cspeciailv in the devel-
oping countries. Projections nee*l to lie reexam-
ined and revicwwl at frequent intervals as
additional informatiim becomes available
The larger marpin of error which is involved
in projections of future supplies is partly due
to the fact that pro<luctionoier any short period
of time may be aflecled consider.'\b1y by natural
catastrophes or abnormal weather. 0>er longer
periods, production in developing countries may
prove to be substantially lanrer or smaller than
the quantities previously estimated, depending
on the priorities actually given to the dex-elop-
ment of food productic.i in national plans and
the effectiveness with which those plans are
executcvl.
Commercial imports of food by developing
countries will depend in part on their impor-
tance as seen by tliese countries and the alloca-
tion of foreign excliange. Relative priorities
mu.1t be established when provision cannot be
made for all needed imports. No general rule
can be established, but as the Secretary-
■ErreMBza 4, lae?
305
Qenerara progress report emphasisen, the sop-
ply of essential foods is fundamental and each
developing country will seek to be ts mif-rtlient
ns possible, ua !<ooii »s possible; that is, celf-
siipporting althoufi^ not iiecrsaarilv sp|f-suQ-
cient. Even st a etsfie ^rhen full scIf-rt>liano« is
not feasible as rejfarda all national ih>eds, coun-
tries will want to be assured of tht-.t basic food
needs.
Feed Production in Doveloplito CeunMot
The developing countries, including those
now receiving food aid, have a larp« potential
for increaard production of food through the
cultivation of additional land and by increasing
output per unit of land. 0\-er the n.'nr term, per-
haps 3 to 5 venrs, increased yields oJer the
greatest opporfuniti.;; in many cases. Beyond
some such period of preparation, tha expansion
of productive land can compound the provrth
r;ite of food output. Many developing countries
also have rich opportunities for larger hanests
of food from t be sea.
Tisofar as natural, physical, and even fintin-
rial resources are concerned, the production of
food in develojiiiiR countries can, with appro-
priate priorities and policies and proj^rams, be
increased at a .substantial rate on a continuing
basis, beginning without apprp<'iable delay. The
recent laps in food production in many of the.se
areas can tie transformed into a strong upward
trend, with annual increa.ses in the order of 4 tn
5 percent or more. Such growth, if established
and sustainct! within 2 or 3 years, would ob-
viously dispel much of tiie present genera.
gUxim in only a few years.
I must emphasize again that the present justi-
fied anxiety does not reflect an absence of op-
portunities or capabilities. It stems from the
present trendsof population, nutrition.nnd pro-
duction, and the absence of any widespread be-
ginning or clear momentum toward corre<.tion.
That 13 why these reports are so import.int :
They should lead to action.
Increased production of food in most of the
developing world is not only desirable but
urgent. This urgency is being recognized by
those countries.
The development of agriculture is receiving
a higher priority in the plans and progranis of
many countries. International a-ssistance on an
increased scale is being mobilized and concen-
trated on the accompliahment of the goals of
increased production of food.
Althou^ the need for food aid is mibatsatial
and even increasing at prciient, tha tccUitie and
hopeful prospect b not for thft magnitndGt of
food Bid to gTovt continoosaly. Tba iiii«nm>
(ioiial community caa rcaaooal^y anticipat*
that the growing reqoirementa for food eoa*
sumption in developin^f countries will ha in-
creasingly satisfied locally or through trade. To
be sore, temporarj" or local esncrgsncics will
always be a danger «vni after productive capac-
ity IS effectively expanded to meet need*.
Food reserves as insurance against such tem-
porary disasters or sliortfalls will ultimately
be needed and should be considered further by
govomments in connection with the program
of studies now being completed. The establish-
ment of resenes in (he immediate future might
conflict with more urgent needs, and sizable
re.serves at any tirao would, of coun*, involve
a heavy investment and substantial cofits of
maintenance.
Another aspect of food aid should probably
ha borne in mind. .Vggrefmte aid resources are
inadequato and are ciirr^'ntly difficult to in-
crease. But for hunianilarian or other reasons,
food aid may in some coses be obtainable as an
addition to the aggregate of aid otherwise
available. With sufficient safeguards there is
every reason to take advantage of these addi-
tional resources. I 'n fortunately, this point in
not fully supported by the current eiperietu'o of
the World Fond Program as reported by the
Executive Director * and the Intergovernmental
Conunittee," which has not had access to re-
sources at the target leiel in the current operat-
ing period.
We hope that the proposed target of $200
million in cnmmodiiie.s, cash, and services for
1960-70 will have more widespread and tangible
support.
The Council is expected to act on the recom-
mendation which the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee h.ia made concerning an ameadmenl of
iho general regulation regarding the use of
World Food Program resources for emergency
food needs. This delegation is prepared to
support the approval of the amendment as
recommended.*
The program of studies concerning food prob-
lems and food aid which is being executed in
'VS. doc. E/43S2.
•U .N. doc. E/437&
"Hie ajnecJment was Bilopfrd nnanlionttsly by th*
Coim<Hl on Aug. 2 (K/URS/IJM (XI.HI)).
306
rAXnTENT OP STATE BULIXTIK
tha UJi. eystem and U» cereoU »rrM«««m«Dto
being ^Tcloped in tli« oonfewnca now prooced-
inff *t Rohm, toaethw with deTelopin«ta to
otSer orgmni«*tions which bear on future food
aid profijanis, stem to ua to BUgjrest very
strongly that scane now means or facilities for
coordination will be both nocassary and pr«v
ticabte by 1BC8 or soon th«r«aft«. Meanwhile,
w« can ba confident of e continuing important
rote for the World Food Program. Our wra-
fidenoe in this rwpcct is in no way dimmiSied
by the fact that w« are not yet able to foresee
all of the other eltmenia in the further evolo-
tion of food aid manageinent or the means that
might beat be employed for coordination of
bilateral and multilateral sctivitiee.
Somfl ports of tha Secretariat documenfa
seem to imply that the nest stage of tha work
on the studies could be assisted if the stiff of
llie United Mutiona and the FAO wore pro-
vided with additional opportunities for cosstU-
tation with experts from (rivemments who
mipht be able to bring additional information
and itisiphls to tha questions on which govern-
ments will soon need to make decisions.
It is desirable that these important studiea
should be completed in a manner that wonld
draw on all of the practical possibilities for
making the studiea most helpful to the formu-
lation of national and mtematioiial policies in
1D89 or soon thereafter. _ .
There is already pressure for official decision.?
on some of the queotions which t hese studies w ill
clarify. While there mipht be some difficulty if
p.vcrnment esperts were asked to anticipate
the positions of their governments at this stage,
we believe that the Council could consider lir-
rangements to bring experts from povcmmenta
into consultation with the U.N. tnd FAO dur-
ing the next few montlia to assist in the analysis,
including especially tho consideration of prob-
lema of coordination, without necessarily com-
mitting thsir governments.
The ProCtta PMbiwH
Added to this highly complex problem of as-
suring adequate quantities of fixnl to the
developing world, vn are faced with increasing
concern over the type or quality of food ncodsd,
especially to aasare the proper growth and de-
velopment of children. The report of the Ad-
visory Committee oo Science and Technology
pr«««s again the usef ulncea of that group to our
work. Its report syntheaiaoa for our u.<o recent
findlBgB in thif field Mid WpftiHy aognteats the
otlw matorial befbw » We caniK* ignor» Us^
wkmiagi except at oo» neril— or worse, at the
peril of our childrai and oor grandchildren.
Th« U.S. Govtmment shaiw the viewa ex-
pressEd by the Advisory Oommlttae concerning
tha urgency of increasing the prodacUon Md
ns9 of edible protein tad the neccasity for
gpsater action in dealing with the problem both
nationally and intamationany.
The immediate neai is to increeae the effotts
which are already being made throngfa many
programa and agencies concerned. That is what
we are doing domest ically.
In addition to other nutritional rwearch, ap-
proximately f2l million waa spent by the U.S.
Government in protein activities in fiscal year
1D67 These include reesrch and development
activities of various types throufrhfut the woHJ.
In fiscal year 19C8 the United States Goverii-
rocnt plans a IfHi peircnt increase in tha distn-
butioii of blendsd high-protein foods and :)(^
percent greater fund availability for other pro-
tein programs. Our interest in the protein
problem has bein hoightened by tha recent re-
lease of a comprehensive study by the Presi-
dent's Science AdviK)ry Committee.'
United States development programs have
sought to encourap:? the design of new protci :
foods based on indigenous, low-cost sources and
to determine the marketing conditions for their
successful di^ribution. Research, both public
and private, is examining tlie possibility and
developing conditions for production of edible
fish protein concentrate a-s wsll aa other tiew
sources of protein from micro-organisms. New
varieties of high lysine com could revolutionize
the role of com as a human food. Similar re-
search has l>C4;n instituted to increase and im-
prove the protein value of cereals, cottonseed,
and legumes. It appears that the protein prob-
lem is in part one of acceptability of new
protein forms— a. sort of -'edibility gap" which
calls for further study as well.
'The Unite.l Slates Government in its bilat-
eral pro-rranis la engajred in a vigorous effort to
e-iplore the i>r>teiitial of fortification of cereal
grains with aniin > nciils and protein concen-
' T*o M'orM Food rrnhlrm, a Rpport of the P«««i-
dertV Krt»n« Airlmf Commilw. For »ale D? «>»•
Sui.Tlni^n.leot ot DucmaeDt*. US. Govrnsnwnt rrUit-
li,« !.■.■>: Washlnston. VX: 2(M02- vol. 1. snmBUry
of tt)e .vorH food problem and reootumendatlonii for
l«,li.y u»<l ^irtl.in. 123 pp.. 60 cent.-; vol. II. »nbpan«l
reports, Tn; ri".. i^'^-
sErruiaca 4, i«s7
307
tmtes. On (he ndvire of the highest nufrition
mthorities in tlif United States w* ar? preking
to tJemonxtrate the feasibility of fortificntion
un<ler various national and Iocs! ronditions and
to determine to what extent these F;iine ap-
proaclies could be introdu<v<l in exports of ce-
real g-i-ams. Proce<lurea have lx>en (li-velo|H>d for
thf fr)rtifiiation of f^iun flours i»nd of forrncil
prains. Tins prosmm within a few yenrs rouW
be put into liirfc'e-s<-ftle pracliee and could im-
prove markeidly the protein value of all of the
cereal prains, some of wh'cli are now the major
vreaiunp food in many countries.
The United States will continue to work l)oth
with I'nited Xutions organizations and with in-
dividual conntriss to increase ths prixiuction
and U'sa of edible proteins. We will continue to
provi<lp food materials in support of emerjTK-i'.cy
pn^jrrams. We will continue to make mailable
to otliera the findings of our rew-arch and exper-
imentation and test ing in respect to the develop
ment, production, use, marketing, snd diFtribu-
tion of edible proteins. We will continue to pro
vide experts to work with United Nations or-
pa.niiation3 or individual countries on matters
relatinfr to increa'injr the production and use of
edible protein.
In its resolution 1165 fXLI) of .\uf:iist !>,
19W, this Council asked United Nations orpani-
lations to report by .Tanuary 1, 10f>8, on their
current or planned propmms and activities de-
sitrned to intensify and accelerate the world sup-
ply of edible protein. The present report on
edible protein, and the .\dvi=or>- CommilJee's
suppestions. will liave an important bearing on
those reports.
It would further seem desirable, in the
United Slates view, for the Secretary-General,
in consultation with the apencie-s concerned, to
submit to the Council, preferably at its HXW
Mimmer session and not later than its 19fi9 sum-
mer session, his recommendalions as to the
nectssity or desirability of further work in this
field.
To this end. the expansion of the present
WHO-FAO-TTNICEF Protein Advisory
Group, u.s re«^minended by the Committee, and
which we support, should be helpful in giving
the Secretary-General further insights into the
problems of biochemistry, food science, «ogi-
neering, marketing, and economics which mre
part of the protein picture.
We would hope (hat those responsible for the
allocation of already available rraonrces, inter-
national and bilateral, will b« giving sufficient
priority to protein proprams. Jf, in other wonbi
the urgency of ths problem is coinmtmjcated to
the decisionmakers in go«mi! -its u *♦!! as to
tiie international oficiala, the r«w*ary work in
this field can be undertaken through institu-
tions that have available fuuds. A rtaolulion of
this Council should be valuable for that pur-
pos.". The United States is therefore gUd to co-
sponsor the resolution that has been submitted
to the Economic Comroitteo.'
In conclusion, I first went to work for my
Government during the great depression when
the problem of food wa3 paratno»mt in my own
country. We were concerned with ill-fed mil-
lions despite the productivity of the country.
Th? phrase on everyone's mind was "Poverty in
til" midst of plenty," which we botrowed un-
knowingly, I believe, from WaH Whitman, who
coined it as an editorial writer to berate an ear-
lier depression of the last century.
There were many wh<i believed that such ft
state of affairs was inevitable. Hut wc proved
that this is not so. Thi.s is the bi«<is for my own
firm conviction—and that of our Goi-emment—
that with will and wit the world will solve the
problem of food, quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to achieve for future generations free-
dom from fear of famine.
Cuntii U.N. DecunMntK
A SttlMtsd Bibliography
mmrofrtpked er preeetitd toatmmU Ineh m «•«•
Htttd betow) may be tontvUsi at ttfOtUort l»nritt
in lae V*UU Bfta. D.W. prmtU mMicaUon* <— »»
puivAated from «»• Salet Beotiem of tie U«*
riiM«4 Katiant Plaza. X.V.
s [tioUcd VaMoM,
Econstnic end S«dai C«iind!
Comial«»lon on Human BlRjitJi Hepcrt of the Worktin
Group To Stndj th» Pmgoa\ To Creati tb* Urtlto-
tion of a ln(t«l Nations High ComminHmr for
Homan RIebta. E/C.V4/05* KebnjaryS. !9«I. » W
Economic CoiBin!»»loa tor AbIb and tte Fbt OfM.
Watrr B«^jrr<>a IJe»elopment ia tli« ECAFB Beglon.
ActiviUes oX Um •etn>tarl«t !n tie fcrejMBwnt of
water roaoorcea durtng l»oa BAIM-lVTOa. iebra-
•ry 21. 1»«T. SiVP. ^ ^ ,._j,^ ^ n...i«»
ABtUlcatlOD o» ScWnce and TechDOlofT *f^^^*!^
ment Arraneements tor tbe Ttanafer of Operattre
Tackooloty to Deratoniisc Coontrtsa Froti»a» upon
•CJI." aoc. E/AC.(?/T*8S2/EeT. 1: •*)»»«« lB»a»»-
mously by the Ecoaomle Commute* on J»ly 2S (ad by
U» EcoooMlr and Boelal CoanrtI on Aoc. 3 (R/SM/
IZl (XLIID).
808
OBPAKTinWT or BTAIC BTnxRni
I.y thv !«e<rrt«r,-<3«wf«l. E/*31» Man* 27. 1»UT.
rcf^reui-* tu m«>>' *.»rtwl«a«>t« in ISIM. E/«U7.
INvciowaeot and ItlUMtlon .it Human IlOToarr«j! In
l.,v»lo|^nii Couolrl.--. Report of »be S«nsurj-<:^n-
li.i.niuiwnal Flow of Ixin* Ttna tui-iwl «nd OfflcWl
l.i..4tlou». liWl-lOW li'l-"" ot tbe 8«.mar}-Geo-
^r... !■ ICI. U«y 23. Itt67. 3» pp. ^^
I„.rea.lr,K th. ... luc.ou .."d l« of bUlbl. Pro***";
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tiun at lMeu.-e «r«l Te<hnoloR to lerelojiawat
K.'tm. May ;'.'.. 1W7 IW pp.
|.X«i«»»<r Coniml.«lon for Uttlca A^"'"' , K^P^J
Summary preparvd by ti» S«.rvtary (antral E/«M
(Hnuimary). June 7, iwi* 7 pn
tiooomlr CommliM'ioii fur Ijtin Amfrtca Annual K«-
port Bomnuiry pfni«r«J ^.v tlie 8«-r«tary-GeMral
K/«i3» (SuBUMfl). Joue ". 1967. H pp.
TivtlMtM^ Cevndi
Truat T»rHtoa «' «>» P^'»'^« laUnd". 1007. T/l&A
Moy IS. 1967. IM [V^
Cwncfit Actions
MULTRATPtAl
OviMdd*
O.n^rnuon on tb* pntfeotLm aod I?^''«'*»* "^il^
crime of jfnoclde. Duns at I'arU L>«t-uiU-r ». IWS.
Emer«llnt3for'e3aniui.-y li l!»il
JBali/«CTilt« drpojOfd. LTngnay. July 11. 180..
Soiaty e» &»a
liitrrDalluaal i-uov^utlon for l^-c «if^t.v of llf» at sea.
lUaO. Dow? at Londnn Jul»- IT. laua KnletWj loto
forv«Mayitt.I'.HB.TI.V8 0Ts<l ,„,. » to<w
ilcceaM««« drK>j«t<. OuetmHo^tkin. Joly 5. 1W7.
tlaatu^ MfttTof llf« at »». 1»«0 (T(A9 5780).
Adopted by tb* IMOO Aaaembly at L-ooSod Notuj*-
ik^ai^ rff»oW»ed.- ratttatao. July e. 1867 ; Pen,
July 14. 1«07.
iBlrraMloMl ttteeOTBBOniiatlOB ™»'""'"-„*2!*
uumt-a. L«otje at MoBtrrui No»eiBb«r U. Il*a5- ,^
t»r«J into forw J»B««ry J. 1967; a. to lb* United
States M ay 79, IWT. TIA» 8287
/M<Jk«l<oM d<»o*ttt4; S*P»1 ««»'t«i r«ierT«tloo).
July 1. IMT ; Ntgrr. June ^O, M8T.
PartUl nTtxIoo of ih* r«4«o t«rsl«t!oo» <0«n«^
lS5a» (TIAB «(«. 6808) to pttt loio eSw.'t « /e»f™
frrauencj Utotawnt vUd ftw tb* «f "^^J^ Jf" "ff
I Ki «r»lc« atid RUtcd luformatloa. isliS oniieiiBi.
iSae arS4»a April ». laaa Ez«»ed >«>» '""^
July 1. 1B87. except that the frtqnascy •U«»*ot
liJ, wetalMd la MP«idii ZT ataaU enter into for.-*
Xalljttd »» 'k« rre»iin«l.- Aujost 10. 1SS7.
Ao"/te>Mo« 0/ •w^en»i■• Cblaa, JiuiaJ, m7 ; Japja.
JuoTlO. 1*17 ; s™ Ze«UBd. J»M a* ^ = .^."^"^
KiuKdom. InclodlBa CbaoB«» Waoaa »nd lale of
Msn (KtTsesrt Terrltorle- for the iBterMttonal
nutions of which t!w Liiltwl Ki!i«dom are ropoir
alUe. Jane 'J3. ItKSi.
Whmrt
1907 Protocol for the farther eaieOHloo -t tbe Inter-
natlocdl Wheat Agreement, l«U (TIAJ, oUot. Oion
for al«naiur« at WarfjlBpoo Uay 15 tJ^^usb Joce 1.
1987. laelOBlT*. Entered Into foix-e July »* >8b7.
Ane.sioM ,lepo>ilci: Ba.-Oadoa, July 19. 18»T ; Spala.
Auga>t 11, 1S87.
SaATEBAJ.
Itrael
Airevment for i«l*9 of ejrtcultural ««iBHM>ditles on*T
tiUe I of tbe Agricxiltarai T'»*e »»'*^^f^' "^
A"«l'<taace Act of 18-'>*. a» amended (68 Stat. <M, »»
amended 7 U B.C. l(ffll-lT3aO>. with aoiicsea.
Sifmcd at Waahlngton Auson 4. 1967. Kntered Into
fon-e Aapii't 4. 1967.
Jopon
Aireemeot reUtlnj to the retoro to the t nlted SUtea
Of aeven t«s«U loaned to Japan P"""!^' '°_^*
agreemeBt of May U, 39.-H, a» amended (TlAa 2m
3182. 4J71. 5K34). Kflected by eachenje of notM at
Tokyo Auju't 8, 1987. Enteiod Into force Aa«u»t 8.
19<S7.
A«ieea>ent relating to InventBient yaaranttei. Effected
by cjchaniw of uoiM at Blantyre May 1 and Jul>- il,
I8«7. rJinTed Info force July 21, 1967.
Peiitttan
Affreemcnt for xalei of asricultoral cominedUlcs. ™i^
pleinent«ry to tbe agreeoreot of May »1- I^'^IA?
Sss). u.iJer litis 1 uf the A«rletilSttral TradeDet^-
n,.m.'ni und A.iKooce Act of 1964, as amended (68
sITIm. .» amended, 7 L'.S.C. 1®1- "i?0» ■ ,*"^,
anors. Signed at Ulamaba-* Au«iJ»t 3, lS»b<. Lntered
Into fo«-e Aujusl 3, 19tf7.
South Africo
Amendment to tbe agreeraaal of ■'"'L-** «^^'«.n'
ati«nd«l (TIAS 3fcS& 11129). for wope""f» "*°-
cemlng civil osea of atoiai* t^nzj- Signed at Wath-
ln«ton July 17, 1987.
falsred m»W /orc«: Aujtist 17, 1937.
United Ktfisitom
Anwoeat »a>endln« tbe Bahttnas Lon«B»««e Pro^
^^^undajreeSent of July 21. UKU. aa amended
» Not m for« for the Cnlted SUtes.
' Not la (acce.
30»
(TIAS MOD. 8609), to aa to provH* for the wlth-
(Jnwal of th« wnlor mfrabcr of th» nrltlaii Anced
Totvei ported there. Effected by excbaii(« of notes
■t W««hla«!on July 17. 160T. Bntared Into torca
July 17. 19a7. operative Julj ], 1907.
\grcem«iit smendlnn the nsreement for Mies of aert-
cultnral conuiKxilllea of March 13, 1987 (TIASKTl*.
Effected h.v eicbanceof note^et Salfon July 28.1007.
Kntered Into furce Julf 28, 1067.
OEPARTMmr AND FOIEiCN SERVICE
Edinburgh and Liverpool PosH
Eievoted to Contukitcs Goiwrai
Pr«M r,fl«ai<« IR2 JaTPd Auirii^t 19
The Deivinmert of State nnnounoeil <"i .Vuguit IS
the elevation of Its consular establlsbmenta at Edln-
bargh and Llrerpool to the etatus of ctjnsulalea reo-
eral. This artloo la being taken In reoiixnitloB of (he
expanded arraa of re*:ponKit)llity of Iht-ne inwts and tlie
subsuntlal lni-n>a8e In Ihe Vdljme of imiaulHr eer\lie^
cow heln^t oerfortned b.T each otUce. These designuttoii;*
wer« effectlre Aufni^^t IS.
Cenflrmations
The Senate oii .\uguijt 11 cuitfirojed the fuUowini:
nniiilaationa :
Iveonard I'nger to be Aiubasjuidor to Thailand- ( Fnr
liloffraphic dtialls, »ee White Ucuae preKa release dutiO
July 19)
M>eldoa B Van<e to be Ambansador to the Kei'uWlc
of Chad, (for liogrnpbic ditalls. .«e» nepartnii'iit >it
State press rt Iciise 17t>(l:ttt'd .tugunt 17 )
Rac*nt S«l8asM
For ««!« tsr tk« BitfrriKtmdc%t of OscaiiMHe*, VJl.
aavtmrnnt PrinUng ogiet. Wathfuglmi, D.V.
tOtOZ. Aidrru nqurtli 4irrcl to tkt enptrintenilcnt
of Docvmenlt. A t't-iivrctM tfiaeouni it m»*« OM ardrrf
for 100 or morr copiii of any one puUieuttom mailed
to (A« tame cidrrtt HcmilUUKft, |«|rat!« t* Ikt Bn-
perintende*! of Donmetitt, mtul acconpeity ordert.
Trwic in Cotton Tactile*. Asrom^nt <nt& Portocal,
Exchange of notes— Slined at I.lslx'O March 23, 1067.
Entered Into force Uarcb 23, iatS7. ESecUve Jauuary 1,
1087. TIAS £»?. U pp. 10#.
Mariiaj*— DeeomeBUrr RcqalrcmfRt* tu Uailad
Statefi CiUseas in IUI7. AcreeiBfnt wltb ItAtr. Rs-
ckaoge of notes — Slgtwd at Rome July 20 and ▲iKtut
18. IDM. Entersd Into foive Marrh », 1066. T1A3
6239. 4 pp. 5(f.
Defense— Donges-Meta Rptlin* System. A«r...itieiit
with rrance— Signed at Parts Uarrb 2^. ISCi. Kntered
Into force April 1. 10<r7. With protocol and ercUange
of letters. TIAS 6242. 9 pp. 104.
Asriccltursl ComUKditiea. Agreem»tH with Ohann —
Signed at Accra March 3. 10B7. KiKereU Into fore*
Usrcb 3, 1967. And amending agreemeot. KicbasgC
of notes — Sljoed at Accra April B, lOtrf. Knietfd faU»
fore* .\pHl 0, 1087. Tl.va 621i 13 pi>. 10*.
Uae rf Veterans Memorial Hoapjtal— Granla-ln-.*id
for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and
Kekahilitation of (he Hoapilal Ptaat Ajrreement Kith
tl)e Philippines— Signed at Manila April 2.\ 1967. Kn-
tered Into force April a. 1807. T1A8 CS-iK 0 p|i. lOf.
Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Ciril Uaaa. Agroe-
mi nt with Ausiraliii. ameodinf the agreenienr of June
2'J IXiii. aa ajiieoded. KIgoed at Washington Apiil 11.
l^mr. Entered Into force May .">. lOtJT. TIAS KJOa W'
pp. i<H.
Facilitati'm of Inlomational Maritime Trcfie. Con-
vention. Kith Annex, with Other Govemmrstii — Done
nt Liindon Aprtl '.1. lOii.". t:nlered Into fon-e with re-
slieit to Ihe 1 nlte<l Sinccs of AnuTlcu May 111, I!HJ7.
TIASUli.-.I .-.7 W-'^Xf-
310
I>EP.\I1TMENT OF 8TATB BUUXTtN
INDEX lierit,rA*r ],, m7 Vol. LVU, No. HTl
AtoBk Energy. AiDh««<«Jor l^>«ter D.«n..w«
Noni.rollf»r«tloD TTMtj ^u^^nM■v\fl ot V'^-' ^^
cnDtirvaet)
Qui Venae ponflracd as AmbMoadnr . . .
Colombia. lBt«r«f«Blc Canal StodJ C«mmteBlon
SiiliniUa Ttilrd Annuol 1'niijr.M Heport (Jonn-
Mm t ...
ComraunloUion*. CoinmuntcatloLD roUcy ll're»
lrtia(» imiiMje to C'ongreM)
Consnea . , .,
r.nmnunlfatlon- I'ollcy i rr<'«l'l«'nt •
S!0
302
296
U!e'««OKe to
2M
310
r..i.nriintU>ii» (trxer. VaTMTl . „ , ■,,:
Inrcmrfanli- Cnoal Snidy r,.n,ml«.l'>o SubmlU
Thlri ArmilBl I'rourc"-' R'l)"rt (Johnsnol .
Uftv,rt <m F^luratlonal and Cultural Enhangc
Sen* to Congrem (Johcunn) •''"
IVpartmmt twi Foreign Scrrice
• •niiflmiatlniw ctnirer. Xancrl • ■
K.llnS.urch •xid l.lveriiool iN«l« tWiatcd to C«d-
^.^llale8 r.weral ■ • • ;. ■,•
Viet Nam Civilian Serrio* Awards Prewntea 1)7
I^realdent Jnhnaoo
S02
310
310
2W
P»»«*»ina Couitries. The Question of Fond Aid
.11 the l-erMKN-'Ke <•« l*>- Irotleina of ll)»
lVTe!oi>lr» Count rios (Gold><hmldl» . . •
DiMrmament. Amb««^<»dor Kc»J»r ni«-u««e«
NM.j.rollferntlon Treatr ilrao-crlpt of prtas
ronference)
Ecenoiaic Affaira „ , ■.
Iiilf-naTonl.- Cuc.il Slililv Coitiii,l-lon Rnliroiti
Tliird Annui.1 l'rosre-<» Report t Johnson I .
Tbe QoeKllon .f Fo.«1 Aid In the IVr»|iee(l<i! of
the ProhleMf "f >lio Devel.'pliiK Conntrlea
(Oold'chmldtl
EdiKaiional and Calloral Affair*. Report on Wn-
.nllonal end Culiunil Kxrhai.se .Hent to Coo-
gresa (Johnson) •""
Foreism Aid „ , . , .
(;i iMTiil Advisory C.immlitee on Kiirelgn AMl^t-
BiKf rntmniK ■ , ■ »
The Qui-»fiirfi of Food Aid In the rer«pprtl<e of
the Pml.len.a of the De?elorlnK Couoirlrt
(Ooldscbmldt)
Lalifi America. PlJth AnnifWiarT of the Al-
liance for P?OKreT<« (Johnaon)
Paaasia. Interoceanle Canal Stod.? Ommlaelon
siiim,li» Third Anouiil IToja's^- Beport ( John-
hon)
PaWI«slleB». lUoeat n«le««e»
Rwanda. l>re»l(leot Koj Ibanda ot Bwand* Vlalts
the lalted .siutefi
ThaiUiA I'njer /-onnrmed as AmbaflWdor - .
Treaty Infonnaiion. Current Actloot . . . •
United Kingiaa. Edlnbor»h and I-lveriwol Posts
Elevated to Con'Uialea General
(!mtrd Natlona
The Q>ie«tlon of F.«^ AM In the Perapcetlve
of the Pn^MeioM of the lJ.veloplo» Countries
(Goldrwhiiiidl)
Vniled Neil'in» Uny. 18fi7
MH
201
V»2
S04
•.■M
Mi
2»7
.•UK!
no
280
310
309
sio
rresidratial Doraiscnts
Ai"Ui— u'lor K.-f)er Ki'u-n^diw S. nprollferiitloa
Trem.T (rrnnMTlpf .f preHS confennx-el . Wl
rornoiinif:ltionfl IVUley ^3W
Inierocennlr Canal Hiud.T Ooniail».«Ion Submits
Third Annual ProjreiM Report 308
R.|»irt on FxJuratloiial and Cultural Eiehang*
Sent to ConjtreM ^
S1.X1I. AntiltirMirTof the Alllaniefor ProfreM . 287
I I,lli-<1 Nntlonx Put. HWI ^^
Vl.tXnw rivlllnn f»er»!w Awards Preaented by
Preaklest Johnson '"*
308
sot
■JXm
1 \ letN:un ; .V I<e~«oD In Involrenient
2W
Viet-Mara
The I'ulli to
vlI-lAamClvMlanWrvic*' Awards Prewoled l.y
rre>lileiit JoLnaoo
Same latlLJ"
.... ITT.
. . Wl
■ ' ' ' . . . ;«x
. . 2>>1.
■ o^ ;K)i.»r,. 2WI. 30a, :iOS
2S0
Knjlbnnrta. Cregoire |j^
I nger. {^•'^"^ „ ; ; ; 310
Vunre. Sheldm "
nundr. XVmiam P .
Foster-. Wltllani C
OoidfH.hmii'.i. Arthur
Johnson, President .
n
Check Urt e* Dtporlnwnt of Slotw
Pms SeUosas: Augwst 14-20
l>re.» rv\ea«.s m>r be ..l.tsined from the Offlce
„r .%•.■«:•. Ix-puriuK nt ..f stai.'. Washington. Dt.
Jlt."
.JU
N
o.
D<«
1
7
K 15
•1
-7,
A S/15
• IT^ >*. 1."
•1T9
•IKI
t»M
IS2
8/ IS
8/18
SatilMt
IlundT. Niitioiial Student As-o-
.iaiion, follcge Park. Md.
Bundy ■ additional remarlu before
National Student Association.
Prop-am f^r vlelt of President
Felix U..opLoueiliol«ny of
Ivory Coast
Vance awom In a* Ambnasador 'O
llind ( hlocraphl-' Jeiulisj
l>r<*ram lor visit of the Shsb of
Iran. _
Kntaiibai h . Senate F^wUcn Re-
latious fommlttee.
PO.IS nt Kdinbursh and Mvcr|«Kil
elevated to cunsulatei general.
•Not BrloteJ.
tUeld for a later l.«ue of the BfLLTtis.
■.■ ••««»«<
t WiMOM ••#>«. *M»
V -
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. im
September 11, 1967
DRAFT TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAH WEAPONS
SUBMITTED TO GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
Statements hy President Johnson and William, C. Foster
and Text of Draft Treaty 316
COMPARATIVE ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Statements iy Under Secretary Katsenbach 333
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: DRAMATIC START AND HOPEFUL FUTURE
by Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz 3^1
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVIl, No. 1472 Publication 8286
September 11, 1967
For sale by the Supeiint«adent ot Documents
U.S. Goveminont Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PKICE:
62 Issues, domestic $10.00, foreign $15.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January 11, 1960).
Note: Contents ot this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Ouide to Periodical Literature,
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various piloses of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of tlie
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg'
islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Submitted to Geneva Disarmament Conference
Following are statements made on August 24
by President Johnson and hy William C. Foster,
U.S. Representative to the Conference of the
Eighteen-Natlon Disarmament Committee, to-
gether with the text of the draft treaty.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated August 24
Today at Geneva the United States and the
Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the Eighteen-
Nation Disarmament Committee, are submitting
to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons.
For more than 20 years, the world has watched
with growing fear as nuclear weapons have
spread.
Since 1945, five nations have come into pos-
session of these dreadful weapons. We believe
now — as we did then — that even one such na-
tion is too many. But the issue now is not
whether some have nuclear weapons while others
do not. The issue is whether the nations will
agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming
worse.
Today, for the first time, we have within our
reach an instrument which permits us to make
a choice.
The submission of a draft treaty brings us to
the final and most critical stage of this effort.
The draft will be available for consideration by
all governments and for negotiation by the
Conference.
The treaty must reconcile the interests of na-
tions with our interest as a community of human
beings on a small planet. The treaty must be
responsive to the needs and problems of all
the nations of the world— great and small,
alined and nonalined, nuclear and nonnuclear.
It must add to the security of all.
It must encourage the development and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
It must provide adequate protection against
the corruption of the i>eaceful atom to its use
for weapons of war.
I am convinced that we are today offering
an instrument that will meet these requirements.
If we now go forward to completion of a
worldwide agreement, we will pass on a great
gift to those who follow us.
We shall demonstrate that — despite all his
problems, quarrels, and distractions — man still
retains a capacity to design his fate rather than
be engulfed by it.
Failure to complete our work will be inter-
preted by our children and grandchildren as a
betrayal of conscience in a world that needs all
of its resources and talents to serve life, not
death.
I have given instructions to the United States
Eepresentative, William C. Foster, which re-
flect our determination to insure that a fair and
effective treaty is concluded.
The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Dis-
armament now has before it the opportunity to
make a cardinal contribution to man's safety
and peace.
STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FOSTER ^
A major milestone on the path toward
achievement of a nonproliferation treaty is
marked today.
An important initial milestone was the unani-
mous adoption of the Irish resolution in 1961.^
Public debate, here and in New York, private
negotiations and additional action by the Gen-
eral Assembly and the U.N. Disarmament Com-
mission followed in the succeeding years.
1965 was marked by the public presentation
' Made in plenary session of the Conference of the
Eighteen-Natlon Disarmament Committee at Geneva
on Aug. 24.
' U.N. doc. A/BBS/1665 ; adopted Dec. 4, 1961.
SEPTEMBER 11, 196 7
315
of concrete treaty texts, by the submission of an
eight-nation joint memorandum on nonprolifer-
ation, and by the adoption of General Assembly
Eesolution 2028.^ As a result, multilateral nego-
tiations in this Committee and in the General
Assembly took on new meaning.
Given this new direction and impetus, the
1966 negotiations in this Committee succeeded in
identifyhig with greater clarity tlie major ob-
stacles to agreement. At the end of the ENDC
session that year, the eight-nation joint memo-
randum made the following comment :
The eight delegations regret that it has not so far
been possible to arrive at an agreement on a treaty
acceptable to all concerned. They are deeply conscious
of the danger inherent in a situation without an agree-
ment that i^revents proliferation of nuclear weapons.
They view with apprehension the possibility that such
a situation may lead not only to an increase of nu-
clear arsenals and to a spread of nuclear weapons
over the world, but also to an increase in the number
of nvielear weapon Powers, thus aggravating the ten-
sions between States and the risk of nuclear war.
The eight delegations are aware that a main ob-
stacle to an agreement has so far been constituted by
differences concerning nuclear armaments within al-
liances, a problem mainly disoussed between the major
Powers and their allies.
Today, for the first time, conclusion of a non-
proliferation treaty is within reach. The mem-
bers of this Committee, all of whom Iielped
bring the negotiations to this point, share in
the achievement we mark today. As will be seen
from a careful examination of the draft, it is
based upon the principles enunciated in the
joint memoranda and Eesolution 2028.
The draft nonproliferation treaty we are
presenting today is a recommendation for dis-
cussion and negotiation in the ENDC and for
the consideration of all governments. We have
worked long and hard over it. We liave sought
to take into account the interests of all poten-
tial adherents. This draft reflects constructive
suggestions made by other delegations here and
by other governments. We could not, of course,
expect governments to be committed to this
draft at this point, since all governments would
want to be able to consider improvements wliich
might be suggested liere.
We recognize the interest of governments not
represented on this Committee to have their
views on the nonproliferation treaty draft made
known during this next and crucial stage in the
elaboration of the treaty. A procedure already
' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 884.
exists for the circulation within the Committee
of the views of nonmembers.
Let me now present a brief explanation of the
provisions of the draft.
Obligations of Nuclear and Nonnuclear States
Article I deals with the obligations of nuclear-
weapon states. First, they caimot transfer nu-
clear weapons, or control over them, to any
recipient whatsoever. Second, they cannot as-
sist non-nuclear-weapon states to manufacture-
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Third,
these prohibitions are applicable not only to
nuclear weapons but also to other nuclear
exj^losive devices.
Article II deals with the obligations of non-
nuclear-weapon states and is the obverse of
article I. First, such states cannot receive the
transfer of nuclear weapons, or control over
them, from any transferor whatsoever. Second,
they cannot manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or seek or receive assistance for
such manufacture. Third, these prohibitions are
applicable not only to miclear weapons but also
to other nuclear explosive devices.
We have already made clear the reasons for
including such devices in the prohibitions of the
treaty. These devices could be used as nuclear
weapons and the technology for making them is
essentially indistinguishable from that of nu-
clear weapons.
Provision on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
The United States recognizes that the benefits
which may some day be realized from nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes sliould be
available to the nonnuclear states. In his mes-
sage of February 21 to the ENDC, President
Johnson stated : *
The United States is prepared to make available
nuclear explosive services for peaceful purposes on a
non-discriminatory basis under appropriate interna-
tional safeguards. AA'e are prepared to join other nuclear
states in a commitment to do this.
My delegation has elaborated on this proposal
in interventions at our 295th and 303d meetings.
We arc pleased that the preamble of the draft
nonproliferation treaty contains a forthright-
provision on peaceful nuclear explosions. It
states :
* For text, see Hid., Mar. 20, 1967, p. 447.
316
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
. . . potential benefits from any peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear explosions should be available through
appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to this Treaty on a non-discrimi-
natory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the
explosive devices used should be as low as possible and
exclude any charge for research and development.
Article III, the safeguards article, has been
left blank, although there are several references
to safeguards in the preamble. The article is
blank because the cochairmen have not yet been
able to work out a formula which would be ac-
ceptable to all states which wish to support this
treaty. The cochairmen are continuing their con-
sultations with a view to drafting an agreed
text for this article. In the meantime, I hope that
ENDC plenary discussion will focus on the pro-
visions which have been submitted today, with
the safeguards discussion bemg deferred for
the time being while the cochainnen work on the
problem.
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Encouraged
Article IV results from many suggestions by
non-nuclear-weapon countries that the treaty
contain an article on peaceful uses of atomic
energy. Indeed, the idea for such an article was
originally derived from tlic treaty of Tlatelolco,
Mexico.''
The article describes two recognized rights of
parties with res^ject to peaceful uses. First, it
makes clear that nothing in the treaty draft
interferes with the right of the parties to develop
their research, production, and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes in compliance with
articles I and II, which, of course, include pro-
visions on peaceful nuclear explosive devices.
Second, it recognizes the right of the parties to
participate in the fullest possible exchange of
information for, and to contribute alone or in
cooperation with other states to, the further de-
velopment of the applications of nuclear energy
for peaceful jDurposes.
These two rights are specific elaborations of
the principle, stated in the preamble that "the
benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear tech-
nology . . . should be available for peaceful
purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether
nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States."
As the preamble also makes clear, this prin-
ciple includes not only modern reactor tech-
nology and the like, but "any technological
" For background, see ibid., ilar. 13. 1967, p. 436.
by-products wluch may be derived by nuclear-
weapon States from the development of nuclear
explosive devices."
These provisions make clear that the treaty
would promote, not discourage, national de-
velopment and international cooperation with
respect to peaceful applications of atomic
energy. This applies to research, production, and
use as well as to information, equipment, and
materials.
AmencJments and Review
Article V deals with amendments and review.
Paragraph 1 states how amendments may be
initiated and is derived from the test ban treaty.
Paragraph 2 describes how amendments enter
into force.
It provides that an amendment must be ap-
proved by a majority of the parties who are
members of the IAEA [International Atomic
Energy Agency] Board of Governors.
The last paragraph of article V provides for
a conference after 5 years to review the treaty's
operation with a view to assuring that its pur-
poses and provisions are bemg realized. This
will provide an opportunity for nonnuclear and
nuclear-weapon states alike to assess whether
the treaty is accomplishing its primary purpose
of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
and also its purposes of easing international ten-
sions and facilitating agreement on cessation
of the nuclear arms race and on disarmament.
The review conference is thus relevant to the
question of further measures of disarmament, a
question which has been of such interest to many
members of this Conmiittee.
Arms Control and Disarmament
The draft, also contains preambular provi-
sions on arms control and disarmament, includ-
ing a declaration of intention to achieve a cessa-
tion of the nuclear arms race at the earliest pos-
sible date. The "declaration of mtention" form
was, of course, suggested in the eight-nation
joint memorandum on nonproliferation of last
August.. In a similar vein, a later preambular
paragraph calls for the cessation of production
of nuclear weapons and the elimination of nu-
clear weapons and delivery vehicles from na-
tional arsenals, pursuant to a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
317
These preambular provisions state the pur-
poses of the treaty. Steps toward achievement of
these purposes would be reviewed by the review
conference to which I have referred. Thus,
while no specific obligation for nuclear disarma-
ment would appear, the preambular provisions,
combined with the review paragraph in article
V, would provide the most realistic approach
to this problem.
We share the general desire for early progress
to halt the nuclear arms race and to begin the
process of reducing and ultimately eliminating
nuclear weapons from national arsenals. The
United States has proposed, and will continue
to pursue, various measures to achieve these
objectives. But we all know why it would not be
feasible to incorporate specific obligations to
this end in the treaty itself. The differences that
have prevented agi'eement on these measures
have not as yet been resolved. Any attempt to
incorporate specific nuclear arms limitation
obligations in the treaty would inevitably also
inject these differences into the consideration of
the treaty itself and could only jeopardize its
prospects.
Let us therefore agree to pursue these nu-
clear arms limitations measures with a greater
sense of urgency and, I would hope, in a spirit
of greater cooperation. Let us also all agree
that this treaty must be regarded as a step to-
ward the achievement of these other necessary
measures. We are convinced that the treaty will
create a more favorable environment for agree-
ment on them. That is why we believe we must
concentrate now on ways to expedite and facili-
tate the conclusion of this treaty and avoid
actions which would delay or jeopardize it. The
situation requires that our efforts be focused on
achieving a realistic agreement as soon as
possible.
Other Treaty Provisions
Article VI contains signature and entry into
force provisions derived from those of the test
ban treaty. It would require that a certain nmn-
ber of non-nuclear- weapon states in addition to
the nuclear-weapon signatories would have to
ratify before the treaty would enter into force.
We have not expressed a view on the precise
number. The United States believes it should
be sufficiently large so that the treaty will be-
gin to achieve its purposes when it enters into
force.
Article VII states that the treaty shall be of
imlimited duration. It contains a withdrawal
clause similar to that of the test ban treaty, with
one significant improvement. The notice of
withdrawal, together with a statement of rea-
sons therefor, would be submitted to the U.N.
Security Council as well as to the parties. The
withdrawal provision is central to this treaty.
States will adhere to the treaty if they believe
it is consistent with their security interests.
Under the proposed clause, a party can cease to
be bound by the treaty if it decides that its su-
preme interests have been jeopardized by ex-
traordinary events related to the subject matter
of the treaty.
Article VIII provides depositary procedures ■
for the treaty text. It also states that the treaty ■
will be equally authentic in each of the five
official languages of the United Nations. J
Lessening the Danger of Nuclear War
We recognize that the problem of security as-
surances, which is of concern to some nonalined
countries, remains to be considered. The United
States maintains the view that this is a matter
which, because of its complexity and the diver-
gent interests involved, cannot be dealt with
in the treaty itself. We are, however, exploring
various possible solutions, including action
which could be taken in the context of the
United Nations, whose primary purpose is the
maintenance of peace and security. We expect
that the cochairmen will be exploring this prob-
lem further with a view to presenting recom-
mendations to this Committee in the course of
our consideration of the treaty.
Mr. Chairman, if the draft presented today
leads to a generally accepted treaty, our genera-
tion will pass on a gift to future generations.
Such a treaty will lessen the danger of nuclear
war. It will stimulate widespread, peaceful de-
velopment of nuclear energy. It will improve the
chance for nuclear disarmament. It will help
reduce tensions. Like the test ban and outer
space treaties, it will constitute a major step
toward a more peaceful world. It will be a
treaty for all of us— but most of all for our
children and our grandchildren.
Mr. Chairman, the future safety of mankind
requires prompt action to halt the spread of nu-
clear weapons. An unprecedented opportunity
to do so now awaits us. Let us seize this oppor-
tunity while we can.
318
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLIiETIN
TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY
August 24, 1967
Draft Treaty on the Non-Prolifeeation
OF Nuclear Weapons
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred
to as the "Parties to the Treaty,"
Considering the devastation that would be visited
upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent
need to make every effort to avert the danger of such
a war and to take measures to safeguard the security
of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war.
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agree-
ment on the prevention of wider dissemination of nu-
clear weapons.
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the applica-
tion of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
on peaceful nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development
and other efforts to further the application, within the
framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding
effectively the flow of source and special fissionable
materials by use of instruments and other techniques
at certain strategic points.
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any
technological by-products which may be derived by
nuclear- weapon States from the development of nuclear
explosive devices, should be available for peaceful pur-
poses to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-
weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that in furtherance of this principle, all
Parties to this Treaty are entitled to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for,
and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other
States to, the further development of the applications
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
Declaring their intention that potential benefits from
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should
be available through appropriate International pro-
cedures to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the
charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used
should be as low as possible and exclude any charge
for research and development.
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race.
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attain-
ment of this objective.
Desiring to further the easing of international ten-
sion and the strengthening of trust between States in
order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing
stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals
of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery
pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment under strict and effective international control,
Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right
of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons In
their respective territories.
Have agreed as follows :
Article J
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly ; and not in any way to assist, encourage,
or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to receive the transfer from any trans-
feror whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
explosive devices directly, or indirectly ; not to manu-
facture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices ; and not to seek or receive
any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
(International Control)
Article IV
Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as af-
fecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nu-
clear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimina-
tion and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty, as well as the right of the Parties to par-
ticipate in the fullest possible exchange of information
for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with
other States to, the further development of the ap-
plications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Article V
1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amend-
ments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amend-
ment shall be submitted to the Depositary Govern-
ments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the
Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one-third
or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depositary
Governments shall convene a conference, to which
they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to con-
sider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved
by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the
Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon
States Party to this Treaty and all other Parties
which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall
enter into force for all Parties upon the deposit of
instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of
all nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty and
all other Parties which, on the date the amendment
is circulated, are members of the Board of Gover-
nors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
319
3. Five years after the entry into force of this
Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be
held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that
the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being
realized.
Article VI
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signa-
ture. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before
its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this Article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be .subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and in-
struments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of , which are hereby desig-
nated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its rati-
fication by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this
Treaty, and other States signatory to this
Treaty, and the deposit of their instruments of rati-
fication. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-
weapon State is one which has manufactured and ex-
ploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive
device prior to .January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into
force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the
date of tlie deiiosit of their instruments of ratification
or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly in-
form all signatory and acceding States of the date
of each signature, the date of dejwsit of each instru-
ment of ratification or of accession, the date of the
entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt
of any requests for convening a conference or other
notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the De-
positary Goverimients pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article VII
This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it de-
cides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such
withdrawal to all of other Parties to the Treaty and
to the United Nations Security Council three months
in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of
the extraordinary events it regards as having jeop-
ardized its supreme interests.
Article VIII
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish
and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall
be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Gov-
ernments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be
transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized,
have signed this Treaty.
Done in at this day
of , .
U.S. Regrets Soviet Decision
To Supply Arms to Nigeria
Depariment Statement ^
Neither the United States nor the Soviet
Union has in the past been an important sup-
plier of arms to Nigeria. Consistent with that
fact, the United States decided for its part on
the outbreak of tlie current hostilities in Nigeria
that it would not sell or othersvise supi)ly arms
and ammunition to either side. To have done so
would have risked deepening the conflict and in-
troducing an element of great-power competi-
tion in the internal affairs of a friendly state.
Tlie United States has adhered fully to that
policy. Its refusal to supply arms has been stated
publicly and is well known to the Soviet Union.
In tliese circumstances, it is a matter of regret
to tlie United States that the Soviet Union has
not shown the same forbearance but, on the con-
trary, has decided to engage in the supply of
arms in this internal conflict.
"Wliile we do not know the reasons that
prompted the Soviet Union to take this decision
or the functions of So\det personnel reported to
have arrived in Nigeria, we believe all nations
have a responsibility to avoid any exploitation
of this situation for ideological or other i^olitical
purposes.
It remains the hope of the United States Gov-
ernment that the present destructive internal
conflict in Nigeria will yield to a peaceful settle-
ment and that all who wish that country well
will devote their energies to that end.
^ Read to news correspondents by the Department
spokesman on Aug. 21.
320
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Alliance for Progress: Dramatic Start and Hopeful Future
hy Sol M. Linowits
U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States ^
In this world of trial and turmoil, when we
are all groping to find the road to peace and
international understanding, it is worth recall-
ing the words of Mexico's own Benito Juarez :
"Respect for the rights of others," he said, "is
peace."
These words are particularly meaningful
here, for they describe the special friendship
that ties together the destimes of Mexico and
the United States in an atmosphere of mutual
respect.
We know that this was not always the case.
We know that bitterness once flourished where
respect for each other's rights now builds dams
no less than understanding. The United States
and ^lexico have demonstrated their ability to
look bej'ond the rivalries of the past, and we
are both the better for it.
On a hemispheric level, this same ability has
shown itself to be perhaps the greatest natural
resource of the Americas, one that has given life
to the entire inter- American system.
For three-quarters of a century now there
have been landmarks testifying to the viability
of that community — landmarks such as Monte-
video, Buenos Aires, Lima, Havana, Rio de
Janeiro, Mexico City, Bogota, and Punta del
Este.
In this time also, the International Union of
American Republics has become the Organiza-
tion of American States, and its various organs,
affiliates, and specialized commissions and agen-
cies, together with the Inter- American Develop-
ment Bank, now serve with distinction as the
basic imderpinning of our inter-American
system.
How vital this system is to the peace and
welfare of the entire world is underscored by
^ Address made before the American Chamber of
Commerce of Mexico at Mexico City on Aug. 21 (press
release 1S4).
the special provision in the U.N. Charter that
preserves its unique character. Moreover, the
rich experience of those nations that are mem-
bers of the OAS has set both an example and
an inspiration for other regional organizations
that have since come into being, as well as for
the U.N. itself.
Inter-American System a Pioneer and Pacesetter
The inter- American system, in short, is a pio-
neer and a pacesetter in the effective and con-
structive use of a regional instrumentality to
buttress and strengthen a imiversal system of
law and order among the nations. And the two
systems are not only complementary ; they are,
in fact, indispensable to each other.
I emphasize this point because it is one of the
most important international developments of
the century, and because it points up the impor-
tance that we in North America attach to the
special ties that bind us to the countries of Latin
America. Today we are givmg our friendship,
our material help, our conviction that even as
we, the people of the United States, are not
prisoners of the status qiio, neither are the peo-
ple of Latin America. We have made clear our
belief that all of us must not only adapt to
changing times, but together we must lead the
way toward the social and economic transfor-
mation of the continent.
In the past, we have been far more successful
at expressing declarations than in getting down
to work and carrying them out. But this pro-
cedure is no longer good, if it ever was; and
we know that Latin America can no longer
be taken for granted. For if we do, the entire
hemisphere may be taken on a ride to oblivion.
It is precisely because we have come to under-
stand this fact — it is precisely because we know
that a successful inter-American system can
show the way to the future for other regional
SEPTESIBEK 11, 196 7
321
systems facing similar problems and difficulties,
both economic and social — that I remind you of
the past.
We have reached, I believe, a watershed in
terms of hemispheric unity and progress; but
the past can show us how far we have come. It
points up the significance, as nothing else can,
of the anniversary we marked a few days
ago ^ — on August 17th to be exact — the sixth
anniversary of the date when the American
Eepublics launched the Alliance for Progress,
the date when a charter of hope came into being
in this hemisphere, giving life to the most am-
bitious program of human betterment ever
undertaken, collectively, by any group of
nations.
It would be nice to say on this sixth anni-
versary that the Alliance is fulfilling all the
dreams of its founders ; that Latin America is
well on the road to prosperity ; that its people
have already succeeded in building new lives
for themselves and for their children ; that they
have overcome such problems as low standards
of living, soaring birth rates, lack of opportuni-
ties, underdeveloped industrial and agricultural
potential, insufficient housing, lack of schools,
high infant mortality rates, widespread disease,
short life expectancies. It would be nice to say,
but it would, of course, be untrue. For today,
6 years after the Alliance for Progress came
into being, Latin America is still in the grip
of far too many economic problems and social
conditions that conspire to arrest progress and
frustrate dreams.
The Record of the Alliance
But that is only part of the story. True, the
Alliance for Progress has not yet solved the
problems of Latin America, but a dramatic start
has been made ; and by any standard this is one
of the major accomplishments of the decade of
the sixties, if not of the century itself.
Indeed, the record of the Alliance, even with
all that remains undone, is perhaps the best
answer that can be given by the Republics of
Latin America to the recent meeting of the so-
called Latin American Solidarity Organization
in Cuba. (I say "so-called" because it obviously
reflected neither solidarity nor organization.)
It seems to me that the prime effect of the
' For remarks by President Johnson on Aug. 17, see
BiTLLETiN of Sept. 4, 1967, p. 287.
LASO confei'ence is not to be found in any
long-range threat to our free mstitutions, one
it desperately sought to foment. Rather, it will
be found in the hatred and the distortions it
encouraged among those who should know bet-
ter and among those who, regrettably, are not
being given the chance to know better.
We must not, of course, ignore the threat of
Castro intervention in Latin America. There
is ample evidence of its handiwork. But we must
well understand that communism in this hemi-
sphere will feed on poverty, despair, and social
inequality and that in the Alliance for Progress
we have the most potent weapon of all to coimter
it. For the Alliance is attacking those very con-
ditions that offer fei'tile ground for ideologies
foi'eign to our traditions, institutions, and the
character of our people. At the same time we
look forward to meaningful action by the Meet-
ing of Foreign Ministers in September, where
the more immediate problems of Cuban subver-
sion will be considered.
Seen in its true perspective, the LASO con-
ference represented a confused struggle among
Communists in Latin America over tactics,
rather than any deep difference over basic ob-
jectives. There is no doubt that communism in
Latin America remains a threat, and we must
not make the mistake of minimizing it. But, by
the same token, we must not make the equally
great mistake of regarding every dissatisfied
person, every leftist or activist in Latin Amer-
ica, as a Communist simply because he desires
a change for the better.
For many of these changes, while they may
be revolutionary in Latin American terms, are
hardly revolutionary in terms of our own his-
tory and development, or that of Mexico's. They
include changes that would give Latin Ameri-
can farmers the right to own their own land;
that would give Latin Americans a tax system
based on ability to pay; a chance for their
children to obtain a decent education; the op-
portunity to live in a decent home, to share in
the benefits of modern medicine — these are the
kinds of changes the people of Latin America
seek.
In the United States we ourselves are learning
that long-ignored social wrongs of the past can
erupt into civil wrongs of today. Impatience,
of course, is a poor substitute — indeed, it is no
substitute — for lawful process, particularly
when the laws are attempting to remove rem-
322
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nants of discrimination and we are trying to
wipe out poverty in order to give each man his
birthriglit of dignity and equality.
In a very real sense, these are the goals, too,
of the Alliance in Latin America — although it
must be said here that Latin America is one
region in the world in which the people have
the blessed ability to look each other in the face
and see not a color but another man. Indeed, we
in the United States can learn much about race
relations from our neighbors in Latin America.
Lessons To Be Learned From Latin America
Just as we camiot escape the responsibility
for bettering the lives of our own citizens,
neither can we escape the responsibility that is
peculiarly ours in this world because of our
great power and wealth. Indeed, our support of
the Alliance program points up how far we have
advanced since the days of the great depression
in our country when our concern was turned
only inward. Our support of the Alliance, even
as our previous support of the Marshall Plan,
extends to the international sphere what was in-
troduced in the United States at the national
level in the thirties : the concept that this is not
a world in which only the wealthiest should
survive, but a world in which those more fortu-
nate have responsibility toward those less for-
tunate, that prosperity or depression knows no
political frontier, that we cannot be an isolated
island of wealth in a sea of poverty, that the
welfare of this continent is a continental prob-
lem in which we all have equal responsibilities.
And the Alliance for Progress, far from being
a simple "aid program" is the blueprint for col-
lective effort and collective benefit.
There are many problems within this conti-
nent whose solution depends upon what we can
learn from each other. The United States, for
example, has reached a high level of prosperity.
But the problems faced by New York, Chicago,
Boston, and Los Angeles differ perhaps in de-
gree only from those confronting the large cities
of Latin America in housing, public services,
health, educational facilities, to mention a few
of the more obvious.
In meeting these, we are no longer business-
men, lawyers, engineers, economists, professors,
writers, and the like. We are all developers,
engaged in what is in essence still a grand im-
provisation. But we cannot impro\ase or build
development on any mechanistic models or
sterile statistics — not even on pure logic. For
development is fundamentally a human and cul-
tural experience. If development starts in the
minds of people, it must build and be buttressed
by its cultural heritage, its local and national
institutions, and its traditions.
Taking Stock
In taking stock on its sixth anniversary of
how far we have advanced in the Alliance for
Progress, then, we must look not only at the
enormous task still before us but also backward
at the tasks already done. We must look not only
at the speed of the journey but also at the
acceleration. Only thus can we see how far we
have come. And there have been more tax re-
fonns, land reforms, schools built, students
trained, roads built, new institutions created in
Latin America in the past 6 years than during
any previous decade. In land tenure, tax and
administrative reform, there has been greater
progress during the past 6 years than in the
previous 25 years.
"What does this mean in precise terms? Just
this : that while the statistician may tell us that
the "gap" is widening between the rich coun-
tries and the poor counti'ies — the haves and the
have-nots — the fact remains that the social wel-
fare "gap" in Latin America is narrowing. Al-
ready there have been sufficient redistribution
of income, school construction, increase in water
supply facilities, and advances in public health
services to suggest that it is, m fact, a shrinking
gap.
These are some of the reasons why I believe
we can feel justifiably encouraged at the prog-
ress of the Alliance. We have a right to be im-
patient; but our impatience must feed our
determination to get on with the job of what is,
in truth, one of history's great social experi-
ments: a peaceful revolution to transform a
continent, to telescope years of development and
create worthwhile lives for people whose hopes
and aspirations merit every assistance we are
capable of rendering.
If the Alliance is to succeed, it must hold true
to the original philosophy that gave it life : to
satisfy the basic needs of the Latin American
people for homes, work and land, health and
schools — teclio, trabajo y tierra, sahid y escuela.
If it is to do this in fact, it must stimulate the
profound social changes that are the prerequi-
sites of a life of dignity. Only thus will the gap
SBFTBMBBB 11, 1907
374-638—67 3
between the rich and the poor be narrowed in
any meaningful way. Only thns will the dams,
the highways, the housing projects, the new
schools, the integrated continentwide economy,
and all the other goals of the Alliance have any
lasting value or true meaning.
Because we know that the most efficient fac-
tory cannot justify a city's slums ; and economic
growth is to no avail if it serves only a fraction
of the people. It must serve them all. And that,
in sum, is the ultimate goal of the Alliance in
the years ahead, the goal to which the Presi-
dents of the American Eepublics pledged
themselves at Punta del Este in April.^
Role of American Business
I believe that much of the imagination and
vision to realize the opportunities before us can
be provided by private enterprise. With an in-
vestment of $10 billion in Latin America, Amer-
ican business has a vital stake in the Alliance
for Progress. Wliether American investments
will grow — and in some cases whether they will
be allowed to remain — may well depend on the
success or failure of the Alliance. Our business
firms, therefore, have an immense responsibility
and opportunity. They can do much to assist the
nations of Latin America attain their exciting
goals, goals which tJiey set for themselves at
Punta del Este.
I know that American business has already
done a great deal in fields ranging from heavy
investments to training for community develop-
ment. But I hope it will undertake to do even
more within the context of each country's indi-
vidual needs and policies. It can do this in part
by utilizing local people not merely for unskilled
or assembly-line work but by training them to
become siipervisors and part of management. It
can do this by giving special consideration to
becoming active in less developed parts of the
continent where efforts are under way to bring
the 20th century to areas which have for years
remained in darkness. It can do this by joining
with national private enterprise, as here in Mex-
ico, in joint undertakings to build new economies
and create work and opportunity for a rising
labor force.
I hope that our American business firms will
always recognize that the needs of the people
of Latin America must come first and that their
investments can be made most secure by build-
ing on solid foimdations for the future — taking
into account the needs of the community.
This involves, of course, much more than eco-
nomics. If we know all there is to know about all
the rich natural resources of Latin America
without knowing or understanding the conti-
nent's most important resource of all — its peo-
ple— we fail in our undertaking.
To know the statistics of Latin America's
gross national product without knowing, too,
its history and its culture is, in fact, to be ill
prepared for the challenges ahead.
Meeting the Challenges Ahead
The Alliance is meeting those challenges. It is
aimed at the right policies. It is attacking the
right obstacles. It is putting its emphasis where
the biggest efforts are required. It is the hopeful
begiiming of a really creative development pro-
gram. But it will be a long journey, and it will
need our continued understanding and support
of Latin America's own efforts. In our relations
with our Latin American neighbors, we will
need, above all, a sense of time, a sense of scale,
a sense of destiny.
This must be the highroad we will take, the
dream of destiny we will fulfill. How much bet-
ter, how much more fulfilling it will be than the
road being taken by those who have lost the
dream of destiny, of partnership, of shared
hopes and efforts, who have turned their backs
on a geography and history that unite us in this
hemisphere.
Success of the Alliance, moreover, will be a
testimony to the belief held by the free nations
of America in the power of peaceful and con-
structive change. The peaceful revolution it will
inspire will offer a better life, a life of dignity
for all who seek it. In contrast, the revolution of
chaos spawned by those who would intervene
in the affairs of the hemisphere offers hatred
and violence and no future.
But there is a future in the Alliance, a future
surely in keeping with the hopes of Latin Amer-
ica's growing millions, with the hopes of Juarez
and Bolivar, Marti and San Martin, and our
own Founding Fathers. In this future, the hemi-
sphere can and will grow and develop, in pros-
perity and confidence, into a model of how na-
tions, with all their diversity of culture and
difference of resources, can work together to im-
prove, enrich, and ennoble their common life.
On the sixth anniversary of the Alliance for
Progress this must be our wish and our resolve.
* For background, see iUd., May 8, 1967, p. 706.
324
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson Meets With German Chancellor
Kurt Oeorg Kiesinger, Chancellor of tJoe
Federal RejniMic of Germany, visited Wash-
i/ngton August 13-19. He met with President
Johnson and other Government officials August
15-16. Folloioing are an exchange of remarks
iy President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger
at a welcoming ceremony at the White House
on August 15, their statements to news cor-
respondents that afternoon, an exchange of
toasts at a dinner at the White House that eve-
ning, and a joint statement issued at the close of
the talks on August 16.
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
White Houie press release dated Angnat 15
President Johnson
Mrs. Johnson and I are delighted, Mr.
Chancellor, to welcome you and Mrs. Kiesinger
and your distinguished associates who have
come with you to the United States. We greet
you with the honors and respect due the leader
of a great free nation and with the very warm
aifection that we feel for close and trusted
friends.
The relationship between our peoples has a
long history. Our German ancestors helped to
build this country of ours. They contributed
much of this country's greatness. German poets
and scholars, philosophers and artists, scientists
and churchmen — whose work is the common
property of all mankind — have truly enriched
the national life of America.
In the past two decades, we have worked
shoulder to shoulder to build together a pros-
perous and a free Europe and a prosperous and
a free Germany. And, Mr. Chancellor, together
we have been remarkably successful.
Mr. Chancellor, I recall with pleasure our
first meeting at Bonn earlier this year. Then, as
on earlier visits to your country, I saw a great
democratic nation risen from the ruins of war.
I saw a free people living in prosperity and
dedicated to the cause of freedom. I saw a nation
pledged to protect that freedom and pledged
to protect that prosperity — and those of her
allies as well — through the alliance which for
almost two decades has sheltered us all.
Our meetings here in the White House today
and tomorrow will continue our earlier friendly
conversations in Bonn. They will give us an op-
portunity to discuss the important — yes — the
numerous problems facing our two countries,
facing the alliance, and facing the world.
Yesterday's triumphs can give us heart — and
direction — for today's challenges. We have
stood together to secure the safety of Europe.
Today we stand ready to assure its future. We
here in America are ready as well to work with
you in the great task of ending the artificial
division of your country.
Though Europe remains fixed in our atten-
tions, both of us, I know, must be aware of the
very urgent responsibilities that face us in other
parts of the world.
In Southeast Asia, aggression by terror and
warfare tests the proposition that nations have
the right to chart their own paths in peace.
Tensions now strain the stability of the
Middle East.
The oldest enemies that mankind knows —
poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance— con-
tinue to master vast areas of the world in which
we live.
These are problems that constantly press all
of us for attention, even beyond the borders of
our alliance. They can be ignored only at the
peril of our own security. For distance cannot
confine them. They threaten to erode the struc-
ture of peace throughout the world.
Mr. Chancellor, I look forward with great
pleasure to exchanging views and ideas with
you. I hope that our talks together will rein-
force the already great confidence and coopera-
tion that exists between the American people
and the German people.
We are so glad that you are here. We hope
that you will enjoy your stay.
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
325
Chancellor Kiesinger ^
Tranalatlon
Mrs. Kiesinger and I, Vice Chancellor
[Willy] Brandt, and my associates are most
cordially grateful to you, Mr. President, for the
solemn and warm reception you have been ex-
tending to us in this historic place, the official
residence of the President of the United States
of America.
I come here as the head of government of a
country, a friend and ally of the United States
of America. Our talks will certainly deal with
problems of interest to our two countries, but
they will certainly also touch upon those great
questions of peace, security, and justice in the
world.
In this way — you have pointed that out al-
ready, Mr. President — we are going to continue
the talks we had in Bonn earlier this year when
you came over ^ — and I may say that the German
people were very grateful to you, Mr. President,
for this gesture — to participate in the funeral
of Konrad Adenauer.
In Bonn, we were agreed that the North At-
lantic alliance, as an instrument of peace, must
preserve and will preserve and strengthen peace.
You may be convinced, Mr. President, that
the Federal Kepublic of Germany will, to the
best of its capacity and ability, make its contri-
bution. We know, and we have always been clear
in our minds, that this alliance is not of an ag-
gressive character but it serves to safeguard
peace.
We regret that conditions existing in the
world today make it necessary to maintain huge
armies, to maintain strong armaments. But
these conditions should not keep us from, on the
contrary they should encourage us to, pursue
together a policy of detente in order to settle
conflicts, in order to eliminate causes of con-
flicts, in order to overcome differences between
countries, in order to create a climate of trust
and confidence which will guarantee lasting
peace.
As regards these great objectives, I may say,
Mr. President, that I feel in full agreement
with yourself.
As regards the Federal Eepublic of Germany,
it will certainly do whatever it can do within its
field of activity and responsibility.
In Western Europe we have pursued a policy
of reconciliation and cooperation with France,
with whom for centuries we have been fighting
and warring. We are striving for unity of all
European coimtries, to the establishment of a
Europe which will then be a friend and partner
of the United States of America, and which
wants to be such a friend and partner of the
United States.
As regards Eastern Europe, I have, in my
government declaration, extended the hand of
reconciliation to these countries as well, and we
have already made efforts and have begun to
pave the way of understanding.
We have established diplomatic relations
with Eomania, which the Foreign Minister re-
cently visited. We have concluded the trade
agreement with Czechoslovakia, and we are also
striving for friendly and neighborly relations
also with Poland and the Soviet Union.
Of course, there is one great problem, one ob-
stacle, still in the way of these efforts and that is
the question of the division of our country. Mr.
President, I should like to thank you for the
understanding you have been showing for this
our problem and for the readiness to help us to
find a just solution to this problem. We will
never surrender our efforts to attain this objec-
tive, but we are also aware in doing that, in try-
ing to bring about the reunification of Germany,
of the responsibility for peace we have also in
the world. This may be a long and thorny way,
but we will never yield in our efforts.
Mr. President, I did not come over here to
speak to you only of our problems. We are fully
aware of the enormous problems, the enormous
worries and concerns with which the United
States of America is confronted, and we fully
see the heavy burden you have to carry on your
shoulders, Mr. President.
But you may be convinced, Mr. President,
that what we will be able to do we will certainly
contribute in order, at least a little bit, to miti-
gate or to take off some of the burden you have
to carry — fully aware of the responsibility we
have.
Earlier this year, we celebrated in Bonn the
20th anniversary of the initiation of the Mar-
shall Plan in the presence of distinguished
guests from the United States of America. The
German people know that they owe a great debt
of gratitude to the United States of America
for the assistance and support they have been
receiving at that time and later.
' The Chancellor spoke in the German langniage,
except for his final paragraph.
° For statements made by President Johnson and
Chancellor Kiesinger at Bonn on April 26, see Bdixetin
of May 15, 1967, p. 751.
326
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN"
And the German people want to repay at least
part of that debt of gratitude by helping to sup-
port those young countries in the world which
are not yet able to develop themselves to get
over their situation of misery, poverty, and dis-
tress. We want to pursue that policy, together
with the United States of America.
Let me conclude, Mr. President, by saying
that we want to strengthen the friendship and to
make this friendship with the United States of
America closer, bearing in mind the words of
your countryman, Emerson : "The only way to
have a friend is to be one." Thank you.
STATEMENTS TO NEWS CORRESPONDENTS
White Eoase press release dated Angnst 16
President Johnson
Ladies and gentlemen, the Chancellor and I
met alone, except for the presence of inter-
preters, for about 2 hours.
We discussed the problems that confront our
two nations and again expressed the strong
friendship of our people for the people of
Germany.
We reviewed the questions that are familiar
to all of you — the strength of the alliance. We
both agreed that we wanted to see that that
strength remained unimpaired.
We discussed the deployment of troops and
the strength of the commitments of each of our
nations. We are both anxious to maintain those
strengths.
We discussed the indications that there would
be substantial reductions on the part of Ger-
many, what problems we would have in this
country in that regard, and the suggestion that
there be reductions here. No decisions have been
made on the part of the German nation, and
none have been made here.
We agreed that we would consult fully with
each other and with our NATO allies before
making any decisions that would alter those
strengths and we would try to come into agree-
ment before any action was taken.
We talked about the nonproliferation treaty
that has been the subject of such concern
throughout the world for some time.
We discussed the relative economic condi-
tions in our two countries.
We talked about the problems that both
leaders face at home and abroad. I think we
had a very constructive, very friendly, and a
very productive meeting.
I look forward to every minute that I can
spend with the Chancellor and his party.
Secretary Kusk and Mr. Brandt, the Vice
Chancellor, were off together talking for some
time. In addition to that, the respective mem-
bers of our staffs met in the Cabinet Eoom and
exchanged viewpoints during the time that the
Chancellor was in my ofBce.
We have been looking forward to the Chan-
cellor and Mrs. Kiesinger's visit here for some
time since we were privileged to be in their home
in Bonn. Now that that day has come, we are
going to fully enjoy it.
We hope to make it a productive week for
both coimtries.
Mr. Chancellor, we would be glad to have you
make any observations.
Chancellor Kiesinger
I fully confirm what the President stated
about our discussions. We tried to get a clear
picture of the situation of our two countries
and nations.
I have read in the American papers that I am
the sort of a Chancellor who does want to make
an independent policy. I want it very strongly
indeed. But independence doesn't mean that we
leave the path of close cooperation and friend-
ship with the United States.
Despite many rimiors, this government is
firmly decided to preserve and strengthen
NATO, not only the alliance but the military
integrated system of NATO.
We are convinced that for a foreseeable time
we have to stick together. We have to try in
common to preserve freedom and peace. Main-
taining big armies does not mean that we do
not want to have detente and peace.
We have, on our side, decided to help what-
ever we can to beware and safeguard peace.
I explained to the President our policy in
Europe, our policy toward our Western neigh-
bors, toward France, toward Great Britain and
others.
I tried to explain to him our policy toward
our Eastern neighbors, where we are trying to
overcome by and by the old ideological and
political antagonisms and where we are trying
to establish better relations with our Eastern
neighbors.
At the same time, of course, we have to try
not to lose sight of the German question, the
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
327
great problem, how we can solve this problem,
how we will be able to reunify our people. That
process must go hand in hand with this process
of detente we are trying to follow in Europe.
Mr. President, I am looking forward to our
further discussions. I am quite convinced that
this visit will be very, very fruitful for our two
nations and will strengthen the bonds of friend-
ship and cooperation between us and our coun-
tries.
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
White Honse press release dated August IS
President Johnson
Mrs. Johnson and I welcome you to this house
tonight on your first visit as Chancellor.
While preparing this toast, Mr. Chancellor,
I asked an aide to find an appropriate phrase
from an illustrious German leader. He came
back a few minutes later with the following
words of Bismarck : "Not by speechifying and
counting majorities are the great questions of
the time to be solved . . . ."I stopped him right
there. It was obvious that neither he nor Bis-
marck had very much experience in running
for office.
Mr. Chancellor, we are so honored and so
pleased that we can have your charming daugh-
ter as a resident of our Capital.
We are very much in your debt for the ex-
tremely able service that is rendered to our
Government — and to your country — by your
most unusual and competent Ambassador, Am-
bassador [Heinrich] Knappstein, and his de-
lightful wife.
Mr. Chancellor, our talks today were im-
mensely valuable to the peoples of our two
countries. I deeply appreciate your coming here
and counseling with me, and the good advice
you gave me this morning which was both can-
did and understanding. This is a means of bet-
ter and stronger relations between our two
countries.
Germany's vitality and eminence among all
of the world's democratic nations today is clear
to all knowing people. Mr. Chancellor, we feel
that your own contribution to its progress has
been indispensable. The German people have
every right — indeed, an obligation — to be quite
proud of the very unusual accomplishments and
achievements that have been theirs in recent
years.
I should like for you to say to your country-
men that we find both pride and comfort in our
friendship with your people. We look forward
to our continuing partnership in the great tasks
that will face all of us in the months and years
ahead.
The goals that we all seek together are quite
clear. There is little difference between them.
We all want a stable Europe, a world at peace,
and freedom for all men to better the quality
of their lives. Charting the paths to those goals
is going to be exacting and require the very best
that is in all of us. It will test our patience, our
tolerance, and our understanding.
Borrowing a quotation from one of your great
poets, Goethe, we shall proceed, Mr. Chancellor,
"without haste — but without rest."
Mr. Chancellor and Mrs. Kiesinger, we are
very happy that you are in our city. Nothing
would please us more than to know that you en-
joyed your visit here, that you profited and
learned something about our people, and that
you would like to come back to see us sometime
again soon.
So, ladies and gentlemen, those of you who
have come here from across the country, we
want to tell you how happy we are that you
could be with us and get to meet this great
leader.
Now we should like to invite you to rise and
join me in a toast to the Chancellor of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
Chancellor Kiesinger
Translation
Mrs. Kiesinger and I — I may also here speak
on behalf of the Vice Chancellor — are deeply
and cordially grateful to you for this festive
and beautiful reception you have been extend-
ing to us.
You have been giving us the opportunity of
seeing many old friends again. I may also say
that during the hours we have spent together
with you here, Mr. President, we felt very
happy indeed.
Naturally, as you did, Mr. President, I was
looking for quotations for my speech. You got
to Bismarck and I got to De Tocqueville, who
wrote the history of the United States of Amer-
ica. When he wrote about the history of democ-
racy and discussed Parliament, he ridiculed
those people who ran for Parliament.
He said, "They are traveling about in their
constituency trying to get the votes of the peo-
328
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
pie, making speeches and canvassing there." He
said, "Well, what is it all about?" He stayed at
home and he said, "I wait to be elected. 1 don't
do anything." And he was elected.
Well, those were good times indeed. How long
ago that was.
And, of course, when I was looking for quota-
tions, I also came across Goethe. Of course, you
always find something suitable with Goethe. I
remember these lines he wrote about America
when he apostrophized America as the new con-
tinent which was much better off than our old
continent.
But I wonder, is this still true? When Goethe
wrote his lines, the United States of America
counted only a few million people. Today, it is
the most powerful nation in the world. This
country which once was far away from all the
quarrels and the conflicts of the world had found
its happiness in becoming the home country of
the free, self-sufficient, and a proud nation, has
become committed today all over the globe by
the mere power and strength of its existence.
Today this country has to carry the burden of
a gigantic responsibility on its shoulders.
No one who is entering this house here, which
is the center of decisions, can escape feeling that
with all intensity.
Mr. President, you have found very warm,
cordial, and encouraging words for us. Let me
thank you for that from the bottom of my heart,
as the whole German people wants to thank the
American people for the saving and salutary
help and assistance we have been receiving from
this country in very difficult years.
During the long years the friendship between
our two coimtries has stood the test. We agreed
today, Mr. President, in our talks that it is our
duty to preserve and to strengthen this precious
friendship.
We had very frank and friendly talks today,
for which I am grateful. I admired the fine
clear-sightedness you showed for the situation,
for conditions, and for the problems — the feel-
ing of responsibility you showed.
This filled me with hope and confidence for
the future of our two countries, for the future of
Europe, and for peace and justice in the world.
Mr. President, I wish you and the American
people the strength and the good luck which
must combine to enable you to fulfill your great
mission in the world.
Ladies and gentlemen, will you join me in a
toast to the health of the President of the
United States.
JOINT STATEMENT, AUGUST 16
White House press release dated August 16
President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger
issued the following joint statement at the con-
clusion of the visit which Chancellor Kissinger
and Vice Chancellor Willy Brandt made in
Washington on August 15-16:
We continued the exchange of views which we
began in Bonn on the occasion of the funeral of
Konrad Adenauer in April of this year. We
are convinced that these regular, frank and far-
reaching discussions of the international situa-
tion as well as of questions which are of par-
ticular concern to our two countries will solidify
and strengthen the friendly relationship and
trust that exists between us and between our
two nations.
Our most important common goal is the main-
tenance of peace. The North Atlantic Alliance
serves this goal. We agree fully that it must
continue and indeed it must be strengthened.
We share the view that a policy of relaxation
of tensions can help avoid conflicts. Such a pol-
icy can remove the causes of existing tensions,
can overcome differences and in this way lead to
mutual understanding and trust among peoples.
It is only by following such a policy that the
division of Europe and the division of Germany
can be ended and a just and permanent peace
be established in Europe.
We are fully convinced that the unification of
Western Europe will mark a significant con-
tribution to world peace and to the welfare of
all peoples. This requires continued cooperation
and lasting friendship among the nations of
Europe. Such a united Europe will be a friend
and partner to the United States.
We agree fully that Europe and the United
States are dependent upon one another for their
security. The planning of the common defense
in the years to come must remain in the hands
of NATO. We are in complete agreement that a
one-sided weakening in the ability of the West
to assure its security will not promote the relax-
ation of tensions, which is desired by both of us.
Both countries must sustain their defense efforts.
We are fully in accord that both countries
also bear a responsibility to help other peoples
in the world to attain economic growth and
prosperity.
We agreed on the gi-eat importance of reach-
ing international agreement at the September
meeting of the International Monetary Fimd
8BFTBMBES 11, 1967
329
in Rio de Janeiro on a meaningful plan to assure
adequate additions to international liquidity,
as and when needed, by a supplement to existing
reserve assets.
We also had a full exchange of views on the
general international situation, including the
Middle East, Southeast Asia and recent devel-
opments in the field of disarmament.
We concluded that personal meetings and
consultations between us make a significant
contribution to the friendsliip and mutual
understanding of our two countries. We agreed
that we would stay in close touch with each
other.
President Johnson Holds Meeting With President of Ivory Coast
President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the
Repuhlic of Ivory Coast visited the United
States August 17-22. He made an official visit to
Washington August 17-19., where he met with
President Johnson., Secretary Rush, and other
officials. Following are toasts exchanged hy
President Johnson and President Houfhouet-
Boigny at a luncheon at the White House on
August 17.
White House press release dated August 17
PRESIDENT JOHNSON
We are honored today to have with us one of
the most respected statesmen of our time.
President Houphouet-Boigny is the beloved
father of a thriving nation. He is a powerful
force for reason in the affairs of his gi'eat and
diverse continent. His presence here with us
today is a very fitting symbol of the strong
bonds of friendsliip and mutual respect which
unite his country, the Ivory Coast, and our
country, the United States of America.
Mr. President, as you so well know — and as
all of those of you here today know — most of
mankind is today engaged in a fateful race to
turn the restless energies of deprived people to
the peaceful works of economic development
rather than to violent self-destruction.
The President and I talked about affairs in
his continent. We talked about our problems
here in the United States. We looked at the
challenges that face us in this hemisphere, in
Europe, and in Asia.
We both were m agreement that there was so
much to be done, that this is such an exciting
period in which to do it, and we just hoped that
we would have time to make a contribution
together.
The world doesn't make progress in a straight
line. No nation is immune to failure and fnis-
tration. Nor does social change happen quickly.
It takes patience, and it takes very hard work.
Perhaps it is inevitable that some will lose
heart along the way and drop out. Some ob-
servers will regard temporary reverses as — and
the pressures of the moment will look like —
certain defeat. Some will announce morosely
that the developing countries are doomed.
"Why should we look at other parts of the
world, when we have so many problems of our
own?" Some will say that the arithmetic of de-
velopment is really beyond human capacity
after all — particularly in Africa.
To those that tell us that the developing
coimtries are really doomed, to those Cassan-
dras, Mr. President, we have a very simple
answer. We say to them: Look at the Ivory
Coast.
Economists have a rule of thumb that a
country needs an annual increase of somewhere
aroimd 5 to 6 percent in gross national product
in order to generate the forward momentum
essential to proper development. Over the past
3 years, the Ivory Coast has averaged not 5
percent but 9 percent.
Agricultural experts regard 4 percent as a
quite respectable grovrth in food production.
But over the past 3 years, the Ivory Coast has
averaged not 4 percent but nearly 8 percent.
Industrial output has risen during this period
by more than 16 percent per year.
These numbers and these achievements reflect
what are the real benchmarks of history. I
speak for every American, Mr. President, in
applauding your people.
330
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLBTIir
Mr. President, we are grateful to you for ex-
pressing to me this morning in most eloquent
terms your concern for the developmental proc-
ess and your feeling of distress that there has
not been more unification and coordination
among the nations that are able in the world to
bring this about through the presentation of a
unified program where better progress could be
made.
Those of us who are concerned, as you are,
with the developmental process have tried to
learn from your example. We have tried to
isolate the elements that you have put together
to produce the economic miracle in your own
country.
I think we have done fairly well at identify-
ing the meclianics of this process. AVe can de-
scribe them in mathematical terms, yet it is your
astute combination of land, labor, capital, and
entrepreneurship that has made this possible.
But, Mr. President, there is one element that
we cannot assign numbers to. This is vision.
The Bible tells us that "where there is no
vision, the people perish." You have proved
that wliere there is vision — and where there is
leadership — then the people can prosper.
My friends, the capacity to plan and to pro-
vide genuine leadership for his people are quali-
ties that distinguish our guest here today. We
are mindful of the great good that he has al-
ready done in the service of mankind. We are
grateful for his wise counsel. We look forward
with great pleasure to a close association with
him and with his people in the years ahead.
Above all, we bid him the warmest of
welcomes.
I ask those of you who have come from all
across this land to join me now in a toast to His
Excellency President Houphouet-Boigny, to
Madame Houphouet-Boigny, and to all of the
people of the Ivory Coast.
Translation
PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY ^
Allow me, first of all, to thank you for your
very kind invitation and, particularly, for the
very moving words that you have Just said with
regard to myself.
And those words, coming from a man who
holds in his hands the destiny of such a great
country, those words coming from you, Mr.
President, are, indeed, very moving and really
reach the very innermost part of my heart and
my mind.
This opinion that you have expressed regard-
ing the development of our yoimg country is an
opinion which we hold very dear and which we
consider most encouraging.
During the meeting we had earlier today, you
showed again, Mr. President, the considerable
interest that you attach to my country. You
showed a true interest and understanding of our
present problems.
I am very happy and gratified, indeed, that
the Ivory Coast is a country which has listened
to and which is appreciated by its friends, par-
ticularly by the United States, a country with
which we share the greatest and truest ideals
of freedom, peace, and progress, and a country
with which the ties of cooperation that exist are
developing in a most successful and satisfactory
manner.
And the fact that our friendship for the
democracy of the United States, and the fact
that we have the same concepts and we have
the same interests and purposes, explain very
well the reasons why at times we have taken
certain attitudes and certain positions, show-
ing fully our awareness of the responsibilities
of the United States and the very serious prob-
lems of your country.
We are happy and gratified, Mr. President,
to believe that this visit of ours to your great
and magnificent country is going to strengthen
evermore the very foundations of the friendship
that unites our two nations.
Also, we trust that this visit is going to
broaden even more the basis for our coopera-
tion, a basis which I myself want to extend to
its fullest measure.
I wanted only to say a few words, Mr. Presi-
dent, but there is something more that I have
to add. It is that the representatives of devel-
oping coimtries, such as my own, continue to
follow with great interest the considerable
efforts and great sacrifices that you are making
in your country in order to bring to the entire
world — a world which is torn by fear — a true
sense of freedom— a freedom for men, a free-
dom for mankind, and a freedom for peoples.
We have but limited means at our disposal,
but we are intending, as always, to make all the
contribution that you can expect from us.
Now, in a concluding note, I want to present
'President Houphouet-Boigny spoke in the French
language.
SEPTEMBER 11, 196 7
331
to you my most sincere wishes for success in all
those imdertakings so that all those great
efforts and all the sacrifices that you are making
will be, indeed, successful and will make it pos-
sible to extend throughout the world the king-
dom of peace and true human fraternity.
In concluding, may I propose a toast to your
own personal health and that of Mrs. Johnson
and to the growing prosperity of the United
States.
U.S. and Philippine Teams Prepare
for Economic Discussions
Defartment Announcement
Press release 183 dated August 21
The United States team appointed by Presi-
dent Johnson on June 20, 1967,^ to conduct inter-
governmental discussions with the Republic of
the Philippines on the concepts underlying a
new instrument to replace the Laurel-Langley
Trade Agreement - after its scheduled expira-
" Bulletin of July 17, 1967, p. 78.
" Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3348 ;
for background and text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19,
195.5, IX 463.
tion in 1974, will hold a formal organizational
meeting in Washington today [August 21]. The
Department understands that a formal organi-
zational meeting of the Philippine team is also
being held on this date in Manila. Members of
the U.S. team have, since June, been consulting
informally on matters r'elating to current U.S.-
Philippine economic relations.
It has been agreed that the initial joint meet-
ing of the United States and Philippine teams
will now take place in the Philippines on No-
vember 20.
Members of Advisory Commission
on Cultural Affairs Confirmed
The Senate on August 23 confirmed the
nominations of Homer Daniels Babbidge, Jr.,
Abram L. Sachar, and Robert A. Scalapino to
be members of the U.S. Advisory Conunission
on International Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs for terms expiring May 11, 1970, and luitil
their successors are appointed and have
qualified. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated August 7.)
332
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
THE CONGRESS
Comparative Roles of the President and the Congress
in Foreign Affairs
Statement by Lhider Secretary Katzeribach ^
Despite its brevity, the resolution before this
committee gi-apples simiihaneously with two of
the most impoitant, most enduring, and most
complex issues of state in American history.
One of these issues is the allocation of govern-
mental powers, as shaped by our Constitution
and by nearly 200 years of experience.
The second issue is the changmg role of this
nation in the affairs of a changing world.
It is not possible to comment intelligently on
the proposed resolution in only a current con-
text. I would like, therefore, to begin my state-
ment of the administration's views with a few
thoughts on the nature and history of both of
these issues.
The Constitution and Constitutional Practice
The framers of the Constitution recognized
the impossibility of compressing the idea of the
separation of powers into a simi^le fornmla.
They did not attempt to engrave clear lines of
demarcation.
With respect to diplomacy, they recognized
the complexity of foreign affairs even in the far
calmer climate of our nation's childhood — a
time when we took as our watchword Wasliing-
ton's declaration that "It is our true policy to
steer clear of permanent alliances with any por-
tion of the foreign world. . . ."
Hence the Constitution contains relatively
few details about how foreign policy decisions
shall be made and foreign relations conducted.
'■ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations on Aug. 17 (press release 181) during hearings
on S. Res. 151 relating to the definition of the term
"national commitment." The complete hearings will be
published by the committee.
It recognized that the voice of the United States
in foreign affairs was, of necessity, the voice of
the President. Consistent with that basic neces-
sity, it also provided for the participation of
Congress in a number of ways, direct and
indirect.
Jolui Jay observed in The Federalist that the
Presidency possesses great inherent strengths in
the direction of foreign affairs : the unity of the
office, its capacity for secrecy and speed, and its
superior sources of information.
But, as Professor Corwin has said : -
. . . despite all this, actual practice under the Con-
stitution has shown that while the President is usually
in a position to propose, the Senate and Congress are
often in a technical position at least to ilispose. The
verdict of history, in short, is that the power to deter-
mine the substantive content of American foreign policy
is a divided power, with the lion's share falling usually
to the President, though by no means always.
The Constitution left to the judgment and
wisdom of the Executive and the Congress the
task of working out the details of their relation-
ships. Disagreements susceptible of decision by
the Supreme Court have been rare. As a result,
controversies over the line of demarcation in
foreign affairs have been settled, in the end, by
the instinct of the Nation and its leaders for
political responsibility.
This has not been an easy formula to apply,
even early m our liistory. President Jolin Quincy
Adams' use of troops m the Mediterranean,
President Monroe's announcement of his re-
nowned doctrine. President Jefferson's Louisi-
ana Purchase, all were criticized at the time as
'Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and
Powers; 1787-1948; History and Analysis of Practice
and Opinion (Xew York University Press, 194S).
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
333
exceediiig the power of the Executive acting
without the support of a congressional vote.
Similarly, Presidents have frequently criti-
cized actions by Congress as invasions of their
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign
aflfairs.
But if the constitutional formula of flexibility
was not an easy one, it has surely proved to be a
practical and useful one. It has always seemed
to me that the genius of our Constitution rests
on the recognition of its drafters that they could
not provide precise resolution for all future
problems, foreseen and unforeseen. And I think
that the conduct of foreign affairs demonstrates
the validity of this approach.
Despite occasional differences and debates,
history has surely vindicated the wisdom of this
flexibility — of this essentially political ap-
proach to the conduct of our foreign affairs.
In the world we now live in, answers have not
become easier. And yet the constitutional alloca-
tion of powers continues to work well today.
Our Changing Role in a Changing World
Let me turn to the nature of our foreign pol-
icy and the role of the United States in the
world today — to the commitments of this nation
in foreign affairs.
The basic objective of our foreign policy is
the security of the United States and the pres-
ervation of our freedoms. How this objective
is achieved obviously depends upon the kind of
world in which we live and the extent to which
we can bring American power and influence to
bear upon it.
For most of our history, we had only spas-
modic foreign business. We lived in relative iso-
lation, content to allow the European powers to
maintain the balance of power on which, in fact,
our national security depended.
In recent years, there has been a revolutionary
change in the political structure of the world
and of the relative importance of foreign af-
fairs to the United States. T^Hiat has been per-
ceived by all^ — by Presidents, by the Congress,
and by the people — is that our independence
and our security can no longer be assured by
default. They depend in large measure on our
capacity to lead in the achievement of a sys-
tem of assured world peace. Within the broad
horizons of such a framework — and only within
such horizons — can American democracy and
American society be safe.
This framework, I believe, rests on three prop-
ositions. The -first is that events elsewhere can
have critical effects on this country; hence our
security is bound up with that of other
countries.
The second is that we must heed more than
power politics. For if we are true to our domes-
tic ideals and are concerned for our domestic
security, we cannot ignore the conditions in
which people aroimd the world must live — con-
ditions which can and do fuel reverberating
political explosions.
The third is that we cannot and should not
meet these first two needs alone, any more than
we could or should seek unilaterally to estab-
lish a pax Americana. We must develop inter-
national instrumentalities to help provide
collective security and to help create social
progress and eliminate the flammable conditions
of misery that embrace so much of the world's
population.
The United States has made serious, substan-
tial, and enduring efforts to act on all three of
these propositions. I do not think it is suscep-
tible of proof, but I firmly believe that the crises
we have avoided as a result of imaginative mili-
tary and political action are at least as impor-
tant as the crises we have survived.
Coordinate Action
The progress in our efforts has been substan-
tial, and it has been the result of a nnfion.al com-
mitment. And this has been possible in largel
measure because, of two factors.
This commitment has not been one of admin-
istration or of party, but of bipartisanship.!
One of the remarkable aspects of American I
foreign policy in the past 20 years is that itj
has become bipartisan. Partisan politics have,|
in fact, stopped at the water's edge.
The second factor is the consistent, coordinate!
action of the executive and legislative branches,!
each in their proper sphere, to propose and dis-|
pose, to create and carry out a national!
commitment.
As America's role in the world has mush-j
roomed so have the foreign affairs responsibil-
ities of both branches. Nothing could have made I
this more clear than the Vandenberg resolution I
of 1948, which established an enduring base forj
the conduct of our foreign relations.
There is a long series of other examples:
The resolution to support Greece and Turkey
334
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
was passed by the Congress. Under that reso-
lution, the administration provided military and
economic aid, with fimds appropriated by the
Congress. It also sent military advisers to help
the Greek army become a more effective force
and to conduct successful operations against
Communist guerrillas. Without this action, the
vast investment authorized by the Congress
might not have paid off.
The Marshall Plan was the result both of
congressional and executive action — in specify-
ing self-help conditions, in appointing U.S.
missions to advise aid recipients, and in agree-
ing to Eui'opean proposals regarding appor-
tionment of our aid.
Tlie NATO ti-eaty was approved by the Sen-
ate, and within its framework the executive
branch has joined other nations in creating an
integrated military structure, in contributing
to the cost of jointly owned military facilities,
and in other actions needed to translate that
treaty into effective deterrence.
Important to President Eisenhower's deci-
sion to use the U.S. Fleet in the Straits of Tai-
wan and his decision to send Marines to Leban-
on in 1958 were congressional resolutions ex-
pressing the security interests of the United
States in those areas.
President Kennedy's decision to call up Ke-
serve and National Guard units at the time of
the Berlin crisis accorded not only with our
NATO obligations biit also a series of con-
gressional actions in support of the security of
"Western Europe.
Beyond specific instances, the underlying
framework concerning collective security in the
past 20 years has been a series of treaty obliga-
tions and legislative provisions — the United
Nations Charter, coupled with treaties wdth 42
countries. On each of these, the President sought
and secured the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Let me emphasize the constitutional quality
of these commitments. By their nature, they set
only the boundaries within which the United
States will act. They cannot and do not spell
out the precise action which the United States
would take in a variety of contingencies. That
is left for further decision by the President and
the Congress.
In short, none of these incur automatic re-
sponse. But they do make clear our pledge to
take actions we regard as appropriate in the
light of all the circumstances — our view that
we are not indifferent to the actions of others
which disturb the peace of the world and
threaten the security of the United States.
Congress has been a full partner, as well, in
the great national effort to accelerate the pace
of economic and social progress elsewhere in
the world :
We have participated in global and regional
organizations like the various agencies of the
United Nations, the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the Asian Development
Bank, the International Development Agency,
and others.
We have revised our trade policies and
we have supported regional economic plan-
ning, common markets, and other forms of
development.
We have sent our young people abroad in the
Peace Corps, our food abroad under the P.L.
480 program, and our teclmical, fuaancial, and
development assistance abroad in the AID
program.
In all of these actions, the various committees
of Congress and the Congress as a whole have
participated fully in a variety of ways. In each,
there has been express approval and authoriza-
tion for executive action.
— Frequently, in adopting legislation related
to the conduct of foreigii affairs, the Congress
makes findings and declarations of policy which
express its views on broad policy issues and of-
fer guidance to the executive branch.
— On several occasions the Congress has
adopted joint or concurrent resolutions declar-
ing United States defense and foreign policy in
relation to particular troubled areas of the
world.
— The Congress also has a key role in interna-
tional agreements. In the case of treaties, the
Senate's advice and consent is required. In the
case of legislation to implement treaty commit-
ments or to authorize subsequent executive
agreements, both Houses give approval.
Finally, there is the central fiscal power. In
the exercise of its annual appropriations func-
tions, the Congress reviews and debates the for-
eign policies of the administration.
Beyond these formal methods of congres-
sional participation in foreign policy, there is
the process of informal consultation between the
Executive and the Congress. There are literally
SEPTEMBER 11, 1967
335
thousands of contacts each year between officers
of the executive branch and Members of
Congress.
Not only do the Secretary and other high offi-
cers of the Department of State consult regu-
larly and frequently with congressional leaders
and committees; the President has often con-
ducted such consultations personally and
extensively.
The Importance of Coordinate Action
As I noted at the outset, the drafters of the
Constitution recognized that the voice of the
United States in foreign aii'airs was that of the
President. Throughout our histoiy the focus
has always been upon the Presidency, and it is
difficult to imagine how it could be otherwise.
Jefferson put it succinctly : "The transaction of
business with foreign nations is Executive
altogether."
I think it is fair to say, as virtually every com-
mentator has in fact said throughout our his-
tory, that imder our constitutional system the
source of an effective foreign policy is Presiden-
tial power. His is the sole authority to commu-
nicate formally with foreign nations, to nego-
tiate treaties, to conrmand the Armed Forces of
the United States. His is a responsibility born
of the need for speed and decisiveness in an
emergency. His is the responsibility for con-
trolling and directing all the external aspects
of the Nation's power. To him flow all of the
vast intelligence and information connected
with national security. The President, of neces-
sity, has a preeminent responsibility in this field.
But to say this is not to denigrate the role of
Congi-ess. Whatever the powers of the President
to act alone on his own autliority — and I doubt
that any President has ever acted to the full lim-
its of that authority — there can be no question
that he acts most effectively when he acts with
the support and authority of the Congress.
And so it is that every President seeks in vari-
ous ways — fonnal and informal — the support
of Congress for the i:)olicies which the United
States pursues in its foreign relations.
In part, the Constitution compels such sup-
port. It gives the President the responsibilities
for leadership. It also gives the Congress spe-
cific powers which can on the one hand frustrate
and distort and on the other hand support and
implement.
Obviously, then, there are great advantages
to the nation in the conduct of its foreign policy
when circmnstances pennit the President and
the Congress to act together. The commitments
of this nation to the United Nations Charter
and to our allies are more than a matter of con-
stitutional process. It is essential that these basic
commitments should be clear, both to our
friends and to our potential adversaries. Fitful-
ness of policy and unpredictability of action
make for serious mternational instability, dis-
order, and danger.
In short, our safety and our success depend in
large measure on the confidence of foreign na-
tions that they can rely on our conduct and our
assurances.
It is, therefore, as important that the Con-
gress fill its constitutional role as it is that the
President fill his. The Congress is and must be
a participant in formulathig the broad outlines
of our foreign policy, in supporting those
fundamental and enduring commitments on
which the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy
depends.
But to say this is not to say that the Congress
can or should seek to substitute itself for the
President or even to share in those decisions
which are his to make.
As I have said, the Constitution relies not on
exjiress delineation to set the powers of the Ex-
ecutive and the Congress in this field, but
depends instead on the jjractical interaction
between the two branches. Today, these consid-
erations require that the President fill the
preeminent role:
— He alone has the sujiport of the adminis-
trative machinery required to deal with the
sheer volume of our foreign afl'airs problems.
— He alone is the focus of diplomatic com-
mmiications, intelligence sources, and other m-
formation that are the tools for the conduct of
foreign affairs.
— He alone can act, when necessary, with the
speed and decisiveness required to protect our
national security.
I see no need to revise the experience of our
history, or to seek to alter the boundaries of
Presidential or congressional prerogative re-
garduig foreign affairs. The need, as always, is
to make the constitutional scheme and the ex-
perience of history continue to work.
"For myself," President Jolmson has ob-
served, "I believe that this is the way our
system was uitended to function — not with
Presidents and Congresses locked in battle with
each other — ^but locked arm in arm instead,
battling for the people that we serve together."
336
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIX
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on August 23 confirmed tlie nomination
of Edward M. Kerry to be Ambassador to Chile. (For
biographic details, see White House press release dated
July 25.)
Designations
John R. O'Brien as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Public Affairs, effective August 7. (For biographic de-
tails, see Department of State press release dated Au-
gust 25.)
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force
January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification that it considers itself hound: Togo, July
11, 1967.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to chapter II of the international con-
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS
57S0). Adopted by the IMCO Assembly at London
November 30, 1966.'
Acceptance deposited: Malagasy Republic, August
9, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June
1, 1967, inclusive. Entered into force July 16, 1967.
TIAS 6315.
Accession deposited: Libya, August 23, 1967.
BILATERAL
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Fisheries
Convention for the establishment of an Inter-Amer-
ican Tropical Tuna Commission. Signed at Wash-
ington May 31, 1949. Entered into force March 3,
1950. TIAS 2044.
Denunciation received: Ecuador, August 21, 1967.
Maritime Matters
International agreement regarding the maintenance of
certain lights in the Red Sea. Done at London Feb-
ruary 20, 1962. Entered into force October 28, 1966.
TIAS 6150.
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, July 5, 1967.
Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965.
Entered into force for the United States May 16,
1967. TIAS 6251.
Acceptances deposited: Canada, July IS, 1967; Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, July 26, 1967 (with a
declaration) ; Sweden, July 28, 1967.
Accession deposited: Singapore, April 3, 1967.
Amendment to article 28 of the convention on the In-
tergovernmental Maritime Con.sultative Organiza-
tion (TIAS 4044). Adopted at Paris September 28,
1965.
Acceptance deposited: Romania, July 27, 1967.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
Canada
Agreement amending the interim agreement of Decem-
ber 17, 1965. relating to the renegotiation of schedule
XX (United States) to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5912) . Effected by exchange
of notes at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force
June 30, 1967.
Agreement relating to a cooperative study by the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration and
the Canadian National Re.seareh Council of the polar
cap ionosphere. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ottawa August 9 and 11, 1967. Entered into force
August 11, 1967.
Japan
Agreement amending the interim agreement of Septem-
ber 6, 1966, relating to the renegotiation of schedule
XX (United States) to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 6106). Effected by exchange
of notes at Geneva June 30, 1967. Entered into force
June 30, 1967.
Malawi
Agreement continuing in force between the United
States and Malawi the extradition treaty (TS 849)
and the double taxation convention, as amended
(TIAS 1.546, 3165, 4124, 4141, 5501), between the
United States and the United Kingdom. Effected by
exchange of notes at Zomba and Blantyre December
17, 1966, January 6 and April 4, 1967. Entered into
force April 4, 1967.
Philippines
Agreement relating to use of the Special Fund for Edu-
cation for establishment of the cultural development
trust fund. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
August 11, 1967. Entered into force August 11, 19G7.
United Kingdom
Agreement amending the interim agreement of April 5,
1966, relating to the renegotiation of schedule XX
(United States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (TIAS 5975). Effected by exchange of
notes at Geneva June 30, 1907. Entered into force
June 30, 1967.
' Not in force.
SEPTEIUBEK 11, 196^
337
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale iy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Oov-
emment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments. A 25-pcrcent discount is made on orders for 100
or more copies of any one puhlication mailed to the
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, m,ust accompany orders.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Argentina. Exchange of notes — Dated at Buenos Aires
March 31, 1967. Entered into force April 30, 1967. TIAS
6243. 4 pp. 5(J.
Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on
Behalf of Tiiird Parties. Agreement with Argentina.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Buenos Aires March 31,
1967. Entered into force April 30, 1967. TIAS 6244.
4 pp. 5<t.
Military Assistance for a Civic Action Program. Agree-
ment with Indonesia. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Djakarta April 14, 1967. Entered into force April 14,
1967. TIAS 6247. 4 pp. 5<f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of
December 7, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Nairobi March 14 and April 25, 1967. Entered
into force April 25, 1967. TIAS 6249. 3 pp. 5(f.
Boundary Waters — Pilotage Services on the Great
Lakes and the St. Lawrence Seaway. Agreement with
Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington
April 13, 1967. Entered into force April 13, 1967. Ef-
fective June 29, 1966. TIAS 6252. 14 pp. 10«J.
Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan,
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Kabul December 26,
1966, and April 16 and 29, 1967. Entered into force
April 29, 1967. Efitective December 31, 1966. TIAS 6253.
4 pp. 5^.
Canada Pension Plan. Agreement with Canada —
Signed at Ottawa May 5, 1967. Entered into force
May 5, 1967. Effective January 1, 1967. TIAS 6254.
7 pp. 10^.
Education — Educational Foundation and Financing of
Exchange Programs. Agreement with Australia,
amending the agreement of August 28, 1964. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Canberra May 12, 1967. Entered
into force May 12, 1967. TIAS 6255. 3 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco-
Signed at Rabat April 20, 1967. Entered into force
April 20, 1967. TIAS 6256. 14 pp. 10«f.
Extension of Loan of Vessel. Agreement with New
Zealand. Exchange of notes — Dated at Washington De-
cember 15, 1966, and May 5, 1967. Entered into force
May 5, 1967. TIAS 6257. 2 pp. 5(!.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement vrith Pakistan —
Signed at Islamabad May 11, 1967. Entered into force
May 11, 1967. TIAS 6258. 13 pp. 10!^.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Hon-
duras. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tegucigalpa De-
cember 29, 1966, and January 24 and April 17, 1967.
Entered into force April 17, 1967. TIAS 6259. 6 pp. 5<f.
Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Norway — Signed at Washington May 4, 1967.
Entered into force June 8, 1967. TIAS 6260. 12 pp. 10«f.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with Trini-
dad and Tobago. Exchange of notes — Signed at St.
Ann's and Port of Spain January 14 and March 16,
1967. Entered into force March 16, 1967. TIAS 6261.
3 pp. 5«;.
Loan of Vessel. Agreement with the Philippines. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Manila March 21 and 28,
1967. Entered into force March 28, 1967. TIAS 6263.
2 pp. 5«f.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Switzerland. Exchange of notes — Signed at Bern Jan-
uary 12 and May 16, 1967. Entered into force May
16, 1967. TIAS 6264. 4 pp. 54.
Air Transport Services for United States Government
Aircraft. Agreement with the Agency for the Safety
of Air Navigation in Africa and Madagascar
(ASECNA)— Signed at Paris June 22, 1967. Entered
into force June 22, 1967. With exchange of letters.
TIAS 6269. 7 pp. 10(J.
338
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX September 11, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. l^n
Atomic Energy. Draft Treaty on Nonprolifera-
tion of Nucjear Weapons Submitted to Geneva
Disarmament Conference (Johnson, Foster,
text of draft treaty) 315
Chile. Korry confirmed as Ambassador . . . 337
Congress
Comparative Roles of the President and the
Congress In Foreign Affairs (Katzenbach) . 333
Confirmations (Korry) 337
Members of Advisory Commission on Cultural
Affairs Confirmed 332
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Korry) 337
Designations (O'Brien) 337
Disarmament. Draft Treaty on NonproUfera-
tlon of Nuclear Weapons Submitted to Geneva
Disarmament Conference (Johnson, Foster,
text of draft treaty) 315
Economic Affairs. U.S. and Philippine Teams
Prepare for Economic Discussions .... 332
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Members of
Advisory Commission on Cultural Affairs Con-
firmed 332
Germany. President Johnson Meets With Ger-
man Chancellor (Johnson, Kiesinger) . . . 325
International Organizations and Conferences.
Draft Treaty on NonproUferation of Nuclear
Weapons Submitted to Geneva Disarmament
Conference (Johnson, Foster, text of draft
treaty) 315
Ivory Coast. President Johnson Holds Meeting
With President of Ivory Coast (Johnson,
Houphouet-Bolgny ) 330
Latin America. The Alliance for Progress :
Dramatic Start and Hopeful Future (Lino-
witz) 321
Nigeria. U.S. Regrets Soviet Decision To Sup-
ply Arms to Nigeria 320
Philippines. U.S. and Philippine Teams Prepare
for Economic Discussions 332
Presidential Documents
Draft Treaty on NonproUferation of Nuclear
Weapons Submitted to Geneva Disarmament
Conference 315
President Johnson Holds Meeting With Presi-
dent of Ivory Coast 330
President Johnson Meets With German Chan-
cellor 325
Public Affairs. O'Brien designated Deputy As-
sistant Secretary 337
Publications. Recent Releases 338
Treaty Information
Current Actions 337
Draft Treaty on NonproUferation of Nuclear
Weapons Submitted to Geneva Disarmament
Conference (Johnson, Foster, text of draft
treaty) 315
U.S. and Philippine Teams Prepare for Eco-
nomic Discussions 332
U.S.S.R.
Draft Treaty on NonproUferation of Nuclear
Weapons Submitted to Geneva Disarmament
Conference (Johnson, Foster, text of draft
treaty) 315
U.S. Regrets Soviet Decision To Supply Arms
to Nigeria 320
'Name Index
Babbidge, Homer Daniels, Jr 332
Foster, WilUam C 315
Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 330
Johnson, President 315, 325, 330
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB 333
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg 325
Korry, Edward M 337
Linowitz, Sol M 321
O'Brien, John R 337
Sachar, Abram L 332
Scalapino, Robert A 332
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 21-27
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release issued prior to August 21 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 181 of
August 17.
Subject
U.S.-Philippines economic rela-
tions.
Linowitz : American Chamber
of Commerce of Mexico.
Biography of Secretary Rusk.
No.
Date
183
8/21
184
8/21
*185
8/25
*Not printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTINC OFFICE: l»C7
iN3WiaVd30 33N310S IV 1 DOS
0 33Q-9SO
SUPEFelNTEl
U.S. GOVERN
WASHINGTON, D.C.
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFPI
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
I
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. U73
September IS, 1967
AMERICAN PURPOSES AJ^D THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN DIGNITY
Address by Secretary Rush 3^3
AMERICAN GROUP TO OBSERVE ELECTIONS IN VIET-NAil
Amhassador Lodge''s Press Interview 349
MR. BUNDY DISCUSSES VIETNAM ON "MEET THE PRESS" 352
For index see inside hack cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1473 PuLLicATiONS28fl
September 18, 1967
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The BVLLETIN includes selected
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1
American Purposes and the Pursuit of Human Dignity
Address hy Secretary Busk ^
It is a very great privilege indeed for me
to have a chance to visit with the great Na-
tional Convention of the American Legion. I
was last with you in Portland, 2 years ago. But
it gives me a chance to thank you for your
steady support for what it is necessary for our
country to do in this turbulent world situation
and to register my appreciation for the rela-
tionship of mutual respect between the Legion
and the Department of State.
We may not agree on every detail, but I
think that by a frank exchange of views
throughout the year we know that we are both
dedicated to the well-being of this great nation
of ours. And I would especially like to thank
you for an exhilarating experience which I have
each year, when the young men and women of
Boys Nation and Girls Nation visit me in the
Department of State. I want to congratulate
the Legion and its Auxiliary for tliis very dis-
tinguished public service.
I know that all of us are saddened by the fact
that ray presence here is due to the sorrow which
has fallen upon the family of my friend, our
very distinguished Vice President Hubert
Humphrey .= I know that everyone in this room
joins in sending our sympathy and our best
wishes to the Vice President and to liis family.
Under the circumstances, I do not have a
speech to read at you, which was prepared some
weeks ago by a squad of assistants. Therefore I
am going to talk to you, directly and personally,
about some of the things on my mind these days.
' Made before the American Legion National Conven-
tion at Boston, Mass., on Aug. 29.
'The Vice President's brother, Ralph Humphrey,
died on Aug. 27.
I'd like to start by reminding you of the
shared experience which we veterans have. I'd
like, for example, to see the hands of those who
are veterans of World War 11. Now, we who
were in that great catastrophe can remember
some things that are being forgotten. We can
remember a fiill decade in the thirties, in which
the governments of that day were unable and
unwilling either to take the steps to prevent
World War II or to prepare for it. The year in
which I graduated from college was the year in
which Manchuria was seized by an aggressive
military government in Japan. And they told us
at that time that Manchuria was too far away.
Very shortly thereafter, Ethiopia was invaded,
and they told us it was none of our business, at
a time when we were clinging to our neutrality
act.
And we can recall the occupation of the
Rhineland, the absorption of Austria, the rape
of Czechoslovakia, the attack on Poland. And
at each stage along the way, we were told that
we shouldn't believe, really, what was said in
Mein Kampf — "He doesn't really mean it" and
"Perhaps if we give him another bite, he will be
satisfied."
And while these events were moving us in-
evitably toward the great conflagration, the men
of my generation were not being trained and
equipped for the great tasks which lay ahead.
The regular Armed Forces were starved in ap-
propriations. The Reserves carried out most of
their training through correspondence schools.
When I took command of a company of the
Regular Army, before Pearl Harbor, we were
using wooden tubes in place of simple 60- and
81-millimeter mortars for our training.
And then came Pearl Harbor. And if Man-
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
343
churia was too far away, an entire generation
found itself in such places as Guadalcanal and
New Guinea and Burma and Iran and North
Africa and the Ardennes Forest, covering the
world in order to restore some peace and to pre-
vent tyranny from destroying freedom.
Now we should remember that, while we were
still in uniform, the nations of the world put
their heads together and tried to decide what
was necessary to prevent such a thing from hap-
pening again. And they wrote article 1 of the
United Nations Charter, in which they declared
that to maintain international peace and se-
curity, it is necessary "to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means ... a
settlement of international disputes. . . ."^ — the
lessons of World War II, for which a tremen-
dous price had been paid.
We can also remember what happened after
World War II, after Joseph Stalin set out on
his cold war and made it clear that he was in-
tent upon substituting for the kind of world
sketched out in the United Nations Charter a
new kind of world system based upon his brand
of world revolution. I'm not going to go into
these episodes in detail. It's too bad that so
many of our citizens tend to forget them, al-
though we can understand why our young
people — why they have had no chance to re-
member them.
Let me just ask you to redraw the map of the
world in your mind's eye if we and others had
not been concerned when Soviet forces at-
tempted to remain in the northern provinces of
Iran in 1946 ; when there were pressures, includ-
ing guerrilla operations, against Greece, against
both Greece and Turkey ; when an attempt was
made to steal Berlin by the blockade of 1948 ;
when it was necessary for this country on a bi-
partisan basis to respond to the crisis of West-
em Europe in an unprecedented Marshall Plan
and in the creation of NATO.
Think of the world's map had we not been
concerned about the invasion of Korea, the at-
tempt of the Huks to seize the Philippines, the
effort of the Communists to take over Malaya,
the pressures against Lebanon in the midfifties
and against the Congo at the beginning of this
decade. Or what might have happened had we
accepted those missiles in Cuba as good neigh-
bors. Or what might have happened had the
Indonesian people and their leaders not been
able to resist the attempted Communist coup
d'etat in that great country.
The Crisis in Southeast Asia
And now we have in front of us the crisis in
Southeast Asia — not a new crisis, because we
have seen it before, but a persistent course of
aggression. Now what is involved there? Let
me remind you of the simplest words of the
SEATO treaty,^ ratified by an overwhelming
vote of our Senate, with only one dissenting
voice. "Each Party," the treaty says, "recognizes
that aggression by means of armed attack in the
treaty area . . . would endanger its own peace
and safety, and agrees that it will in that event
act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." It is true that
each party makes its own decision, but the
standard of the treaty is to "act to meet the com-
mon danger" ; doing nothing would not meet our
obligation.
And tlien, almost 10 years later, the LTnited
States Congress in August 1964 declared with
an overwhelming vote — only two opposing
votes — that: "The United States regards as
vital to its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity in southeast Asia." And it declared that
"the United States is . . . prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom." *
Now, it is true that in August 1964 it was not
considered inevitable that a very large build-
up of our forces in Viet-Nam would be required.
That depended upon what the other side would
do. Well, what did the other side do? After
that resolution was passed, after our elections of
1964, North Viet-Nam moved, organized large
units of its regular armed forces into South
Viet-Nam, including the 325th Division, which
came into South Viet-Nam at the end of '64
and the beginning of '65. It was not until 6 or
7 months after tliat so-called Tonkin Gulf reso-
lution that the level of our forces in Viet-Nam
exceeded significantly the level of forces de-
termined by President Kennedy. The require-
' For test, see Buluetin of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.
•Public Law 88-^08; for text, see Bulletin of
Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
344
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nients there were determined by the aggres-
sion from the North, and wlien I met with you
2 years ago in Portland, we were at that point
blimting an effort by the North Vietnamese
forces to cut South Viet-Nam in two.
Now our purposes in Viet-Nam, in South-
east Asia, are very simple. There is no need for
people to be confused about them : It is to pre-
vent the seizure by force of South Viet-Nam by
North Viet-Nam. Now, that's not complicated —
we know that large numbers of men and large
quantities of arms have been sent from the
North to the South to effect that purpose. We
kjiow that that effort by the North runs directly
into the most solemn commitments of the
United States.
The Vietnamese Elections
And our purpose, further, is to give the
South Vietnamese themselves a chance to de-
termine their own government and their own
future, and we are this week in the midst of an
important national election in South Viet-Nam.
We should recall that it was the military leader-
ship itself which took the initiative to move to
a constitutional system back in January 1966
and that the South Vietnamese people — in a fair
election, observed by hundreds of foreigners,
including a skeptical press — -elected a con-
stituent assembly to draft a constitution and to
take over the management of the elections.
It is interesting that the registrations for this
election are 11 percent higher than the regis-
trations for the election of the constituent as-
sembly last year and that a very large turnout
is expected. Now we see active debate, mutual
exchanges of views in a free press, candidates
criticizing each other — all the paraphernalia of
an election. But we see something else which
somehow has been relatively ignored by the
critics of this process in this country, and that
is that the greatest obstacle to free elections in
South Viet-Nam are the Viet Cong and their
efforts tlirough terrorism to intimidate both
candidates and voters from participating in this
electoral process. Wliat the Viet Cong did last
Sunday, and what they undoubtedly will do
during the rest of this week, demonstrates that
the Viet Cong live in terror of the free choice
of free men. They will do their best to discredit,
prevent, interrupt the processes of free elections.
The South Vietnamese themselves, have gone
to extraordinary lengths to expose this process
of elections to fullest public view. The press —
and there will be hundreds of them — will have
every facility to go wherever they wish. The
embassies located in Saigon liave been invited
to cover the countryside, to see what is happen-
ing. The United Nations has been asked by the
Government in Saigon to send observers, an
invitation declined by the Secretary-General.
And many governments have been invited to
send groups, and there will be at least nine gov-
ernments sending groups, such as the one which
President Johnson has asked just this week to go
to Viet-Nam to be there during the process.®
There is no need to prejudge this election in
advance. There is, I think, a decent require-
ment that we give these people a chance to hold
their elections under the greatest of difficulties,
to demonstrate that they are not intimidated by
terror, and to make it clear that the Vietnamese
people want to make their own choices and have
their own government.
Confusion Injected Into Public Discussions
I have tried to talk about our purposes in
Viet-Nam in very simple terms, because they
are simple, and one hears a good deal about this
word "confusion." I don't believe myself that
the President of the United States is confused
about Viet-Nam. I don't believe that I am con-
fused about Viet-Nam. I am interested in some
of these elements which have been injected into
our public discussions and which can help to
create confusion.
For example, we are told that this is just a
civil war. Now, it is true tliat there are indige-
nous southern elements in the Viet Cong, but
those are not the reason why U.S. combat forces
are in South Viet-Nam today. We are there be-
cause North Viet-Nam has been sending its
armed forces and arms to South Viet-Nam to
seize that country by force. If those people
would go home, if that effort should cease, there
would be no requirement for U.S. combat forces
in that country, and we have indicated that we
would lay on the table a calendar of evacuation
of U.S. forces if it were matched by a calendar
of evacuation by the aggressors from the North.
I can assure you that if 20 regiments of West
Germans were to go into East Germany, or 20
regiments were to come into West Germany,
that that would not be looked upon as a civil
war.
' See p. 349.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
345
Those who call it only a civil war don't really
believe it, because if someone would take them
up on it, and if the South Vietnamese forces
were to move into North Viet- Nam, these same
people would be very unliappy indeed. We are
told that this is now a U.S. war, that somehow
we have taken over from the South Vietnamese.
I think it is understandable that our own press
and our own radio and television would con-
centrate on the activities of U.S. forces. It is
perfectly natural, because that is where the in-
terest of our people at home would properly lie.
But I think we are being somewhat unfair to
the Vietnamese and to other allies when we talk
about this being a U.S. war. There are more
non-U.S. forces today in Viet-Nam than there
were in Korea. Yesterday there were some 15
operations of battalion size or larger by U.S.
and Allied forces, and 20 by the South Viet-
namese. The casualty figures reflect a full South
Vietnamese engagement.
You may be interested as veterans, for exam-
ple, to know that when the South Vietnamese
report their wounded, they only report those
who appear in the hospitals. They do not re-
port lesser injuries or wounds. In our own case
we report them all. Now, some 84 percent of
the U.S. wounded return to duty. 71 percent
of our wounded return to duty within 30 days,
and something like 45 percent of our wounded
require no hospitalization. But the casualties
among the Vietnamese day after day and week
after week, not only military but civilian, make
it clear that the Vietnamese themselves are con-
cerned about what happens to their country and
their chances to be free.
Then we're told that the situation in Viet-
Nam is a "stalemate." Well, our men in uni-
form out there don't think it's a stalemate. Some
of you may have seen General [Stanley] Lar-
sen this morning on television, talking about the
situation in the II Corps area, which repre-
sents about half of the land area of South Viet-
Nam. During the 2 years in which he was in
command of U.S. forces in the corps area, he
saw 10 percent of the roads that were open
and usable become 90 percent. He saw railways
which were not in operation function better than
50 percent. He has seen no successful Viet Cong
action in this last year and a half, and his
personal estimate is that only 11 percent of the
people in that corps area can probably be called
under Viet Cong control. Those who visit Viet-
Nam and talk to our men in the field don't get
a feeling of stalemate, but a sense of steady
l^rogress toward the ultimate objective of se-
curing South Viet-Nam against this terror and
this aggression from the North.
And I'm intrigued by this word "escalation."
This seems to be a word reserved for our own
forces. When North Vietnamese and Viet Cong
forces use Cambodian territory, or when they
infiltrate through Laos in gross infraction of
the Laos accords of 1962, or when they mobilize
in the demilitarized zone despite a massive ef-
fort on the part of ourselves and others to re-
tain that zone as a demilitarized zone, there is
very little talk of escalation. But if we send two
battalions into the South Vietnamese portion of
the demilitarized zone, the word is we are invad-
ing something.
For quite a few months the other side has been
using mines in the river leading to Saigon — no
talk of escalation. If we were to pick up their
own mines and take them home to their source
of origin, Haiphong, there would be a great deal
of talk about escalation. The way to test this
notion is to ask the question, Wlio is willing to
deescalate ? Our Government and other govern-
ments and groups of governments have made
repeated efforts to engage the other side in a
reliable process of deescalation, to reduce the
violence and bring the situation to an end — thus
far without any response, however, from Hanoi,
Fallacy of the Slogan "NegoMate Now"
I'm intrigued by the calls for negotiation. At
the present time there apparently is a movement
being organized around the slogan, "Negotiate
now." I'm intrigued, because somehow those
people seem to think that they're calling upon
Washington to negotiate, rather than Hanoi.
Once in a while I see banners carried by pickets,
calling for peace in Viet-Nam. I do have to say
to them in all sincerity that they are coming to
the wrong address, that President Johnson has
carried the banner of peace in Viet-Nam into
every capital of the world over and over again.
We have made it clear that we wovdd negotiate
at any time about an honorable and peaceful
settlement in Southeast Asia, without any con-
ditions of any sort ; but if the other side brings
forward a condition, such as stopping the bomb-
ing, that we're prepared to discuss conditions
for a negotiation, what each side might do to
open up the possibilities of serious talks about
peace. Thus far, no response.
It's curious that in all of the efforts made by
our own Government or other governments,
346
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETTN
groups of governments such as the 17 nonalined
countries, world personalities, private citizens,
no one has yet been able to produce a real, live
representative of Hanoi with whom one can
talk. And so I'm inclined, therefore, to look at
the fine print when I see such a slogan as "Ne-
gotiate now." And it turns out that what they
want us to do is to stop the bombing without
any reciprocal act by the other side. In other
words, stop half the war while Ho Chi Minli's
half of the war goes on unabated. I suggest that
it would be more honest with the American
public if the slogan "Negotiate now" were
changed to the slogan "Stop half the war," in
order that American citizens can make their
judgments on the merits of the case.
And we sometimes are told that world opin-
ion is deeply concerned about Viet-Nam. That is
true; world opinion is always concerned about
the war and the dangers of a larger war, but
world opinion is also concerned about some-
thing else. Those nations of Asia and the far
Pacific who live under the threat of danger are
deeply encouraged by the determination of
United States and its allies in South Viet-Nam.
A New Spirit in Asia
If we could refrain from sitting in our arm
chairs over here and speaking for the Asians
long enough to listen to them and hear what
they say, we would discover that there is a new
spirit in Asia, that Ked China is no longer the
wave of the future, that confidence and hope
for the future mark the free nations of that
part of the world, and that there is nothing
more invigorating than what is happening now
as tliey move toward the next stages of their re-
gional cooperation in their great undertakings
in that part of the world. There are countries
in other parts of the world, particularly those
who are allied with us, who are deeply inter-
ested in the question of the fidelity of the United
States toward its security treaties. I think I
said to you in Portland 2 years ago — and I re-
peat today — that the principal support of peace
in the world situation is the loyalty of the com-
mitment of United States toward its security
treaties, and if those who become our adver-
saries should ever suppose that those treaties do
not mean what they say, then we and the rest
of the human race have not begun to see the
dangers which would appear immediately upon
the world scene.
Now, there are those who debate the "domino
theory." I myself do not talk about the domino
theory, because these matters are not games
played with little wooden blocks with dots on
them.
The Militancy of Peking
One doesn't need an esoteric theory like
the domino theory to understand that the theory
of aggression is coming out of the militancy of
Peking. One doesn't have to debate whether
Laos is next — ^there are already operations going
on today, and have been for years, against the
indei:)endence of Laos — or wonder whether
Thailand is on the list. There are today guer-
rillas operating in northeast Thailand, trained
in North Viet-Nam to organize resistance to the
established situation in that country and to take
it over for communism.
Now, this militancy out of Peking is so pro-
nounced that it has isolated the Chinese Com-
munist leaders within the Communist world.
Tliey seem to have only one close friend these
days — Albania. The rest of the Communist
world is concerned about the extent of that mili-
tancy, and apparently so are a good many peo-
ple in China itself, as mainland China goes
through a great agony over directions of policy
and the identity of leadership. And it is no
accident that in recent weeks the leaders of
Peking have managed to pick severe quarrels
with countries like Burma and Ceylon and
Kenya in East Africa and Switzerland — coun-
tries who could not, under any stretch of the
imagination, constitute a threat to China itself.
So the doctrine is there, and once again those
of us who share the experience of veterans must
ask ourselves what it means.
I must confess to you that I find it hard to
accept as fresh new ideas, in the late 1960's, the
same old ideas which led our generation into
the catastrophe of World War II.
Do you remember them ? "It's too far away" —
"It's not our business" — "Give him another
bite and perhaps he'll be satisfied" — "You don't
have to believe what he says; those are just
words, and perhaps he doesn't mean it" — step
by step toward catastrophe! And that is the
purpose of much of our effort in this postwar
world. There are those who object to analogies —
that Mao Tse-tmig is not a Hitler, that Ho Chi
Minh is not a Mussolini. Of course, no one sup-
poses they are. But one robber may be named
Jolm Doe, another robber may be named Rich-
ard Roe — there may be infinite differences be-
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
347
tween the two, but what they have in common,
namely robbery, is what sends them both to
prison. And our problem is the phenomenon of
aggression, of unbridled appetite, and the ques-
tion as to whether those who have such appetites
shall gather momentum, shall develop the psy-
chology of the wave of the future, shall have
their appetites grow on the very feeding, as we
watch one small country after another fall vic-
tim to their ambitions.
The Simple Purposes of This Nation
This is a great and powerful nation, with
more power than the mind of man can conceive,
with enormous wealth, with great scientific and
technical capacity, with great human resources.
It makes a difference, therefore, in what hap-
pens in the world, as to what our pui-poses are.
And I would suggest to you that this great
nation of ours is moved by very simple pur-
poses: to do our part in building a reliable
peace, to entertain no special ambitions of our
own, to covet no one's territory, to refrain from
taking away from anyone else anything that is
theirs, to live and let live, to build toward a
regime of law — the law which does not restrict
but which liberates by making it possible to
predict what the other fellow is going to do —
and to cooperate across national frontiers to get
on with the common, ordinary, daily tasks of
men and women in our own country and right
around the globe. Our purpose is to do our best
to create a chance for simple human dignity.
Now, these are purposes which j'ou recog-
nize in your own homes and in your own com-
munities. They are the purposes which our ]>eo-
ple share with ordinary people in all parts of
the earth, and they are purposes which are com-
pelling when great public policies and policy
decisions are being made. "We ought to pause for
a moment to recall that it is the President of the
United States who carries the greatest and awe-
some burden in leading our nation, in giving
effect to these purposes.
It is sometimes said that the President's job
is a lonely job, because the burden is very great,
the buck stops in that oval room, the responsi-
bility is his, and he camiot escape it, and the
Nation looks to him for wisdom and courage
and compassion. Although it's described as a
lonely job, let me say to you very sincerely:
Wlien these great decisions are made, almost
200 million Americans are present in that oval
room with him, and these decisions are not made
for artificial reasons, for fanciful imagination,
but in order to assure the safety and the well-
being of our own coimtry; and any President
carrying those great duties deserves our un-
derstanding, our sympathy, and our support.
Let me close with a very personal comment:
There are those these days to whom the word
"patriotism" is a bad word. I do not blush to
love a country that is trying to build some peace
in the world, to establish a regime of law, and
to get on with the great tasks of human dignity.
I can love a country which is trying to build a
peace and restrain unbridled appetites. I can
love a country which stretches out, with un-
paralleled generosity, a helping hand to those
who bear the great human burdens of disease
and ignorance and poverty and terror through-
out the world. So I have no trouble whatever,
in saying to you that I am not on Mt. Olympus,
looking down in lofty spirit upon the human
race, and drawing no distinctions between those
who would conquer and those who would live
under law, or drawing no distinctions between
those who would destroy freedom and those who
would nourish and sustain it. And so at the end
of the day, I am on our side.
Now, what shall we say to our veterans of
Viet-Nam and our men who are carrying the
battle for us? It is tragic that — after all that
has happened since 1945 — to demonstrate that
aggression shall not be permitted, it is neces-
sary once again that our joung men take on this
great task. It is also important that we combine
resolution with prudence, because any of these
crises since 1945 could have led us down the
slippery slope into a total and general confla-
gration. And that means we do not have a nation
which is aroused in the anger of the fever of
war — perhaps it is just as well, because there is
far too much power to let us become too angry.
But it does mean that our young men in Viet-
Nam have carried out their task with a gal-
lantly and a professional skill unmatched by
any of our Armed Forces in any of our earlier
wars.
I got a letter not long ago from a young man
out there who said he had been elected by his
battalion to write me a letter. And he said the
men in his battalion wanted me to say to certain
students that they identified : "We here in Viet-
Nam are also 19 and 20 years old, and we have
some views about this situation that we should
like to express." And then he set forth, for his
348
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
buddies, why they thought they were there and
the importance of the job which they were
doing.
And so today, Mr. National Commander,
when we have representative veterans of Viet-
Nani here at this great national convention, I
should lilve simply to turn to them and say, just
as directly and as simply as I can — This nation
is deeply in your debt, and all we can say is:
Gentlemen, thank you — thank you very much
indeed.
American Group To Observe
Elections in Viet-Nam
Stanford Smith, general manager of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association
Dave Sullivan, president of the Building Service Em-
ployee's International Union and a vice president
of the AFL-CIO
Whitney Young, president of the Urban League
Mr. Christian also announced on August 28
that the following panel of specialists in elec-
toral processes would accompany the group as
advisers :
Prof. Donald Herzberg, director of the Eagleton Insti-
tute of Politics, Rutgers University
Prof. Howard Penniman of Georgetown University
Richard M. Scammon, director of the Elections Re-
search Center, Washington, D.C., former Director
of the Census Bureau
BACKGROUND
On August 28 George Christian, Press Secre-
tary to the President, announced that Ambassa-
dor at Large Henry Cabot Lodge would serve
as adviser, coordinator, and escort officer, with
briefing responsibilities, for the group of Amer-
icans going to Viet-Nam to observe the Septem-
ber 3 elections.
The members of the group, as named by Mr.
Christian on August 23 and 28, included :
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Senator George Murphy
Senator Edmund S. Muskie
William Guy, Governor of North Dakota and chairman
of the National Governors' Conference
Richard Hughes, Governor of New Jersey
Thomas McCall, Governor of Oregon
Joseph Barr, Mayor of Pittsburgh and chairman of the
U.S. Conference of Mayors
Theodore McKeldin, Mayor of Baltimore
James Antell, president of the United States Jaycees
Dr. Edward L. R. Elson, pastor of the National Presby-
terian Church, Washington, D.C.
Werner P. Gullander, president of the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers
Eldon James, former national commander of the Amer-
ican Legion
Archbishop Robert E. Lucey, Diocese of San Antonio
John S. Knight, president of Knight Newspapers
Donald JIcGannon, president of Westinghouse Broad-
casting Co.
Ed Munro, president of the National Association of
Counties and Commissioner of King County, Wash.
Eugene Patterson, editor of the Atlanta (Ga.) Con-
stitution
Rabbi Jacob P. Rudin, president of the Synagogue
Council of America
Jo.iieph Scerra, incoming commander of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars
AMBASSADOR LODGE'S PRESS INTERVIEW
White House press release dated August 28
Mr. Christian: Ambassador Lodge has met
with the President and has agreed to talk with
you here a minute.
Ambassador Lodge: This is about the visit of
the observers to Viet-Nam. I am going out with
the commission as sort of a coordinator and to
be available to answer questions on the back-
ground of this election, because this election has
a background that is totally different from any-
thing we know in the United States or totally
different from the background which our
ancestors knew in the countries on the other
side of the Atlantic from which they came. So
the background is important. I will try to
answer questions on that from the members of
the commission.
As I think you know, tliis commission is going
out there to lend their presence and in response
to an invitation of the Government of Viet-
Nam. They are not going to interfere in the
internal affairs of Viet-Nam. Tliey are not going
to inspect or interrogate or do anything of that
kind. But they are going to observe, in response
to the invitation of the Government.
As you know, the Government of Viet-Nam
first invited the United Nations to send observ-
ers. Then, when that didn't work out, tliey in-
vited a number of other states. I think there are
five others, besides the United States, who will
send observers.
That is about, really, all there is to say at
this time. I don't know how well I can do on
questions.
SEFFEMBER 18, 1961
34:9
Q. What are the five others?
A. They have been announced. I don't liave
them all. I know Australia is one, New Zealand,
Belgium, I think Japan. I don't have the full
list.
Q. Mr. Anibassador, if you were laying out the
work schedule for this group when you get
there J what would you recoTnmend they do? How
could they most usefully spend their time?
A. I recommend that, first of all, they divide
themselves up into small grouj^s ; that they not
all go everywhere together; that they try to
assist at one of the candidate's press confer-
ences, for example; that they try to attend a
rally, because they would have to have inter-
preters with them.
Then I would recommend that tliey visit
some of the polling places on election day and
try to make sort of spot visits here and there
to get an impression and to be around where
people can talk to them.
That is what I would recommend.
Q. Mr. Ainba.ssador, when the group comes
hack, do you expect they are going to say they
found the election was fair, or interesting, or
different, or unfair, or come up toith any sort
of finding at all or a formal report?
A. That is a thing the members will have to
discuss, I think, on the plane coming home. I
don't think it is possible to answer that now.
Q. What do you expect the three experts on
the electoral process to do in connection with
the work of the commission?
A. I don't know. I just became aware of that
this morning. I don't know exactly.
Q. Are there any areas you think it will not
he safe for them to go?
A. There are lots of areas in Viet-Nam where
there is danger. It is a dangerous situation, there
is no doubt. Some 58 percent, I think, of the
people — maybe a little higher — are now enjoy-
ing the protection of the Government. They
can go into those places. But there is always
some risk, because this isn't a war like World
War II that had a front, flanks, and a rear.
The war is all around you, you know. There is
always some risk involved in doing this.
Q. Did the President give you any message
to give the observers?
A. He just said, in effect, what I have just
said — that they were going there to lend their
presence. He gave them no instructions at all —
to do these things I have just enumerated : try
to go to rallies and press conferences and visit
the polling places and be available.
Q. But to form a judgment about the fair-
ness of the election is not a part of their man-
date?
A. You can't stop them from having opinions.
But, of course, this is a sovereign state. It is
having to mamtain its sovereignty, but this is
a sovereign state. We don't interfere in their
internal affairs. This is an internal question.
You could imagine an election here and if a
foreign country sent observers here, their free-
dom of action — power to investigate or inter-
rogate— would be somewhat limited.
Q. But the President is not atoaiting a report
from them?
A. No, he is going to let them decide that
when they are through and on the way home.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, there has been quite a
bit of criticism so far about the campaign from
Congress. I am thinking of Senator [Robert
F.'\ Kennedy — if I recall correctly — saying it
is a fraud in some areas. What is your impres-
sion of this criticism?
A. I am not, of course, going to get into any
personalities at all. I haven't read what the
Senator said. I haven't seen his full text of his
statement. So I wouldn't want to comment on
what he said.
I was there when we had the elections in
September for delegates to the constitutional
convention. I thought that it was a good per-
formance. I thought it compared favorably
with what we do here.
These people have had thousands of years of
authoritarian government — for thousands of
years, first under their own local rulers, then
under the French colonial rule, and then under
the 8 or 9 years of President Diem. It was au-
thoritarian. The ruler tried to follow the advice
of Confucius — to be brave, to be unselfish, to
be intelligent and to do the very best. For that
the people owed him respect.
There was no such thing as being disrespect-
ful of a ruler — which gives you some idea of
how far they have come, because now they have
a free press, which in some countries there is a
350
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
little disrespect now and then toward rulers.
That is the background of this thing.
Q. Were you given any marching orders ty
the President?
A. No, I haven't been given any marching
orders. He wanted me to go along and be the
coordinator for this thing.
Q. If the observers don't interfere, inspect, or
interrogate, how can they ie sure of the fairness
of the election?
A. How can you be sure of the fairness of
any election ? How can you be sure in this coun-
try of the fairness of an election ? We have had
some interesting counts in this country.
Q. What is the purpose of this trip?
A. The purpose of this trip is to respond to
the invitation of the Government of South Viet-
Nam and have this commission lend its presence.
Q. Why do they loant them there?
A. Because they are, I think, preoccupied at
world opinion.
Q. Then the Government will he interested in
the final outside judgment?
A. The Government of Saigon, as I can vouch
for, having been there myself, is very much
aware of public opinion. That is one of the rea-
sons why these people have made this tremen-
dous effort to move toward constitutional gov-
ernment, which, in the light of their antecedents,
is a very dramatic and extraordinary thing.
There are several reasons for this. But one
reason why they are so anxious and eager to get
a constitutional government is precisely because
of their standing in world opinion and because
they think if their country can speak with one
voice and with a constitutional voice it will help
them. I think it will, too.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, how can these people,
who have been used to authoritarian r\de for
thousands of years, be ahle to change within a
year, whereas we say that to change Watts or
to change our ghetto areas is going to take us
decades?
A. You see, after all this authoritarianism,
you have had the fall of President Diem Novem-
ber 1, 1963 ; and then we had a year of unmiti-
gated chaos with the governments changing all
the time. It was a fantastic situation, almost
verging on the insane.
Because of the governmental situation in Sai-
gon at that time, nobody could stay in office long
enough to learn how to do their jobs. As the
governments succeeded each other, the Viet
Cong infiltrated the government more and more.
When I came out there on my second go in
the summer of 1965, you had three ways that
you could go: You could continue the chaos
which obviously was made, or you could turn
the country over to the tender mercy of the iron-
fisted police state that is operated in North
Viet- Nam, or you could try to go toward con-
stitutionalism.
Of course, we were very sympathetic. I agree
with you. It is a bold thing to try to do. It is
very bold. The wonder is that they have done as
well as they have.
I think when these elections are over and the
constitutional government is elected and in-
stalled— I don't think Ave can expect an era of
tranquillity. This is a war which is fought as
much by political means, by subversive means,
inflationary means, and every kind of under-
cover means as it is by military means.
You have some very, very clever people work-
ing at it. So I don't think we can feel that in our
lifetime this area is going to be tranquil. But I
think it can be much better than it has been.
Q. Do you expect the members of the com-
mittee to be received by the present govern-
ment?
A. I wouldn't be surprised. I don't know, but
I wouldn't be surprised.
Q. Will they also however go to other candi-
dates?
A. I think so, yes. That is very definitely
planned. I hope the members of the commission
will attend the rallies of all the 11 candidates,
not some of them.
The press: Thanh you.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
351
Mr. Bundy Discusses Viet-Nam on "Meet the Press"
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Assistant, Secretary for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs William P. Bundy on August 37.
Interviewing Mr. Bumdy on the National Broad-
casting Comfany''s radix) and television -pro-
gram '■'■Meet the Press^^ were Rowland Evans of
the Chicago Sun-Times; Robert Goralski of
NBC News; Latorence E. Spivak, a permanent
panel meniber; and David K. Willis of the
Christian Science Monitor. Neil Boggs of NBC
News was the moderator.
Mr. Boggs: Our guest today on "Meet the
Press" is the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P.
Bundy. His area of responsibility includes
South Viet-Nam, which next Sunday elects a
President and Vice President. . . .
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Bundy, you and other ad-
ministration ofEcials have said it is vital to have
a fair and free election in South Viet-Nam. Why
is it so important to have a fair and free elec-
tion while a country is at war?
Mr. Bundy: To show that the people are
supporting the government, to put the govern-
ment on a constitutional basis, and to open up
the possibility of a broadened government that
can do a great deal more effective job fighting
the war and be a major step forward toward
the kind of stable and self-governing South
Viet-Nam that the war is about.
Mr. Spivak: Well, is it so important that we
consider it our duty to insure a fair and free
election ?
Mr. Bundy: Mr. Spivak, this election has got
to be run by the South Vietnamese. We have
made clear, of course, how important we think
it is, but they know and they want it to be fair
and free, and it is their job to see that it is.
Mr. Spivak: Now, we have already gotten
involved in this election in a very important
way by the things you have said, what the
President has said, what a great number of
other administrations have said. "^^Hiat will our
position be if the election isn't fair and free?
What can we do?
Mr. Bundy: That is a speculative question,
Mr. Spivak. I think there is every hope at the
present time and, of course, there is a week to
go and there may be troubles and difficulties;
and I think one just can't foresee what would
happen if the election isn't reasonably fair and
free. We have every hope it will be.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Bundy, do you think that
the elections or the results of the election can
make an important contribution toward ending
the war?
Mr. Bundy: Yes, I do. I think, above all, in
the sense that the resiilting government, with a
constitutional base and a demonstration of pop- I
ular sujjport, will be in a stronger position to do *
all the things that need doing, not just those
measures that directly affect the war but deal-
ing with the problem of corruption, dealing
with such questions as land reform, building
the country; and secondly, I think a — and this
is the very strong feeling out there which you
get in the speeches of the candidates — the can-
didates are talking a great deal about peace,
and what all of them are saying — the civilian
candidates, [Nguyen Van] Thieu, and all the
rest — is that the government that emerges from
this election will be in a stronger position to
speak for South Viet-Nam. They have got the
feeling that we have been doing too much talk-
ing about the negotiating issues.
After all, it is their country that is at stake,
and this election could put a new government
in South Viet-Nam in a much stronger position ;
and this is the way they look at it and we do,
too.
Mr. Spivak: Now, with 11 candidates for
President and Vice President in the field, do
you see much likelihood that next week's elec-
tion will produce a majority ?
Mr. Bundy: That may or may not happen, j
The provision is that — it is decided by a plu-
rality ; that is, the man who gets the most votes
with no runoff. The present best thinking is that
it is quite likely that the winner will not have a
majority. However, you then look beyond that
to the question of the government that is
352
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
formed, and I think it is entirely possible that
whoever wins in the election will bring in lead-
ing members from the other major tickets so
that you will have a very much broader go\-ern-
ment that will speak for a very, very high per-
centage of people.
M): Spivak: Would this government of ours
like to have the new government deal directly
with North Viet-Nam toward peace ? "Would we
be happy about that ?
J/;\ Bvndy: We would be entirely happy to
see that. This is something that all candidates
have spoken of and, indeed, have mentioned the
possibility of bombing pauses if it would assist
in that, and this is a matter on which they are
entitled to speak and we would take very seri-
ously, indeed. That is already one of the possi-
bilities : direct dealings between the South Viet-
namese Government and Hanoi.
Mr. Spivak: Does that mean the United
States would be willing to stay out of
negotiations ?
Mr. Bundy : We could if they were ready to
resolve it between them. This would be an en-
tirely possible route.
The Military Situation
Mr. Evans : Mr. Secretary, one of the major
criticisms of the war in Viet-Nam in this coun-
try is that it is becoming Americanized; casu-
alties for the last 2 months, as you know, have
been higher among American fighters than
among the South Vietnamese Army. As a result
of the election that you spoke of a moment ago,
you said that they would be in a stronger posi-
tion— the new government in South Viet-Nam.
Does this mean that we can look forward to a
reduction of U.S. militaiy forces and a gradual
assumption of the military role by the South
Vietnamese, particularly, for instance, up along
the DMZ, where our casualties have been so
high?
Mr. Bundy : Mr. Evans, I think a great deal
depends on the pace that Hanoi forces the mili-
tary side. If they keep boring down in the DMZ
area as they have done roughly since last spring,
that will confront us with a continuing military
situation. I wouldn't say that our share can go
down. We have got to increase forces, as the
President has already announced we have plans
to do, by 45,000. while the South Vietnamese are
going up by 65,000. I think the major thing is
that a new South Vietnamese Government will
be in a position to strengthen the vital role of
the South Vietnamese armed forces in what
might be called local security, getting on with
the pacification job; and incidentally, their
casualties in the last 2 or 3 weeks have been
significantly higher than ours. In terms of men
in combat, it balances out.
Question of Talks With Liberation Front
Mr. Evans: Now, Mr. Bundy, on the diplo-
matic front you mentioned the possibility of
talks with Hanoi. Would we be in a position to
try to get this new government in Saigon to
open talks with the National Liberation Front ?
Mr. Bundy : That is a matter they would have
to work out, and the major candidates have all
spoken on this issue.
Mr. Evans : Now, how do we feel about that
in Washington ?
Mr. Bundy : I think this is a matter that they
could resolve for themselves. Wliat they have
said is that they would not talk formally with
the Liberation Front. They have spoken of other
forms of contact. This would be something for
them to work out.
Mr. Evans: You feel then that the new gov-
ernment, whoever is elected next Sunday, will
be in a position, if they choose to, to open nego-
tiations with the Viet Cong and the NLF and
possibly arrive at some arrangement — political
arrangement — with the Communists? Would
this be all right with us ?
Mr. Bundy: If they did it and could do it.
Now, frankly, all of them feel, as we do, that
the National Liberation Front is basically con-
trolled from Hanoi. The question is whether
there may be individuals in it who are more
southern than they are Communist and all that
kind of thing, and I think that is the sense in
which the South Vietnamese are talking. They
say flatly — the civilian candidates, as the mili-
tary ones have said — that they will not treat
with the NLF as an independent thing or much
less as the representative of the South Viet-
namese people, which it plainly is not.
Mr. W/IJis: Mr. Bundy, isn't it altogether
possible that once talks begin with even repre-
sentatives of the National Liberation Front that
the constitutional government in South Viet-
Nam as well as the government in Washington
will find themselves a lot nearer to recognizing
the NLF as an entity?
Mr. Bundy: It could be taken that way, Mr.
Willis. I think that is not the way they look
at it. They look at it as a question of honest
SEPTEMBER 18. 196'i
353
soutlierners working out the future; and inci-
dentally, they have rejected the idea of a coali-
tion. All the candidates have rejected that. Just
what could be talked about would be something
they would have to look into.
Mr. Willis: Well, you foreshadowed my next
question, and that is that what we have spoken
about so far seems to point toward some kind
of coalition, because it would be pointless talk-
ing to the NLF and perhaps to Hanoi if there
is going to be no prospect for either side to get
into a future government. So don't you think
that some kind of coalition would have to come
out of those talks?
Mr. Bundy : No, I can think of a great many
other things they might talk about if they got
together with individuals in some informal
fashion, and that appears to be what they are
talking about. They could talk about ways in
which the people who are now in the Viet Cong
or the Liberation Front could participate in the
political process, whether they would be free
to organize in some form and thereby to par-
ticipate in some political election in the future —
that kind of thing — whether they could as-
sume positions of responsibility that wouldn't
necessarily at all mean a coalition government.
There would be lots of things to talk about, and
of course the first and more immediate thing
would be whether they were prepared for a
cease-fire or a cessation of hostilities.
No Evidence of Illegal Campaigning
Mr. Goralskl: Mr. Bundy, I wanted to ask
you a question about the charges by the civilian
candidates for President about illegal cam-
paigning on the part of the military officers
who are running for office. It seems to me that
when the Ambassador of the United States in
Saigon, the President and Vice President of
the United States, and the Secretary of State
defend the military rulers on this point, we are
interfering in South Viet-Nam's elections by
opposing the civilian candidates.
Mr. Bundy: "Well, that charge was made very
briefly by one of the civilian candidates. It
hasn't been pushed, and it obviously hasn't
been taken up by the people out there, Mr.
Goralski. I think they understand that, particu-
larly with a lot of comment that was taking
place in this country 10 days, 2 weeks ago, it
was vitally important for our Ambassador and
for the high officials here to express what in our
eyes was the fact, and incidentally remains the
fact : that there are lots of rumors, there is the
possibility that there is some kind of rigging
going on, but to this point there is no evidence
of any significant activity of that sort at all.
And I think to make that clear was a job that
the Vietnamese understood our officials had
to do.
Mr. Goralskl: Premier [Nguyen Cao] Ky
himself said that he wondered whether South
Viet-Nam was ready for democracy. What are
your views on that Mr. Bundy?
Mr. Bundy: I think they want it desperately,
and they have done a remarkable job in moving
since January of '66 when it was Ky, actually,
who announced the whole plan for a constitu-
tion and for elections. There is a tremendous
aspiration for a constitutional and democrati-
cally elected government in that country.
Now, of course, they are not experienced in it
and they are going to have problems, as we have
seen in this campaign. I think those problems,
like the incident of landing at the wrong air-
field, don't reflect anything in the way of illegal
interference or anything of the sort by the gov-
ernment. There are charges made as there are in
any campaign, as there would be in a campaign
here, but to date nobody has brought forward
any evidence of real wrongdoing during this
thing. Now we have a week to go, and we will
see; we have got to suspend judgment, I think,
but at this point one can be hoj^eful that it is
going to be a reasonably fair and free election,
and that is a remarkable achievement.
Mr. JSpivak: Mr. Bundy, there have been
some stories to the effect that a new govermnent
would call again for a bombing pause. If a new
government does, would we go along with that ?
Mr. Bundy: I think we would take it very
seriously indeed, Mr. Spivak. I think we would
want to go over with them what was expected in
the way of any indication from Hanoi about
actions it might take, restraints it might take,
so that they couldn't take advantage of the situ-
ation— what the realistic possibilities were that
it would contribute to the opening of some kind
of viseful discussions.
The same questions are on their minds that
are on ours about this, but we would take it very
seriously indeed.
Mr. Spivak: You are saying then that our
position on bombing North Viet-Nam can be
changed by the new government?
Mr. Bundy: Well, we would considt with
them very closely on this. We have never ex-
cluded a pause, if you will. We have seen major
354
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
elements, the question of whether the other side
would take military advantage of it, whether
it would be used to string out the situation.
Their own — the Hanoi view — has been pretty
well spelled out, for example, in their captured
documents : that a negotiating situation, as they
see it, is one where you take the maximum possi-
ble advantage on the fighting front to get your
ends tlirough negotiation. And we would have
to be assured that that wasn't going to be the
case, and I think the South Vietnamese feel the
same way.
U.S. Not Threatening Communist China
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Bundy, the New York
Times today reports that North Vietnamese
MIG fighters were using Communist Chinese
air bases, according to informed sources. Does
the U.S. have any evidence of that?
Mr. Bundy: Yes, we do. Secretary McNa-
mara, in testifying in the Senate committee,
and giving a full explanation of the whole
bombing situation on Friday [August 25], re-
ferred to the fact that we now believe there
are only on the order of 20 MIG's in North
Viet-Nam. Now, the inventory we believe is
higher, and it is therefore a reasonable infer-
ence that the balance are in Chinese bases.
Now, that doesn't change anything. We are
not threatening China. Those aircraft are no
present military threat, but that does appear
to be the fact.
Mr. Spivak: Is that one of the reasons why
we are bombing so close to the Chinese border
now?
Mr. Bundy: That has nothing to do with it,
Mr. Spivak. Tliose attacks have been against
clearly marked rail yards and concentration
points for the supply route running to the south.
Wliat you have had has been a bunching up and
then a sprinting down from these installations
that are up to 10 miles fi'om the border, and
we have conducted a series of attacks which we
think have been very effective and which have
not led to any intrusions into China.
We have had in the last week two intrusions
into China and lost two aircraft as a result of
operations considerably further south, where
the pilots appear to have been under heavy air
attacks and there was a weather problem and
they strayed into China. We have had incidents
of that sort over a long period but none con-
nected with the attacks near the border.
Mr. Spivak : Why is it then that we have only
recently attacked so close to the border? Why
haven't we done it in the 2 years that we have
been bombing?
Mr. Bwuly: Two reasons : first, that the mili-
tary payoff, the gain in knocking out rolling
stock and assembled supplies, was getting stead-
ily greater as they concentrated and bunched up
for this sprinting-down process that I have
spoken of on the northeast rail line; and
secondly, that we have become progressively
more confident, with the experience of our pilots
and other elements that have come into the
picture, that we could do the precise job that
we set out to do, and this we seem to have done.
Mr. Evans: Mr. Secretary, General [John P.]
McConnell, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force,
told Congress that in his view 800,000 additional
U.S. troops would have to have been sent to
South Viet-Nam to fight in a ground war had it
not been for the bombing.
Two days later Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara said in his view the bombing had not
cut — it had made more difficult, but had not
provably reduced the infiltration of manpower.
Who is right?
Mr. Bundy: Tliose are two judgments on a
matter nobody can resolve, Mr. Evans. We don't
know whether they would have sent a lot more
down without the bombing. We do have indi-
cations, but they are certainly not conclusive.
For example, we have a high-level North Viet-
namese leader who said that they weren't get-
ting all the stuff they needed in the area just
north of the DMZ, and in the south, but you
can't be positive of it. I myself am inclined to
think that they would have sent substantially
more without the bombing.
Mr. Evans: You don't agree witli Mr. Mc-
Namara on that point ?
Mr. Bundy: He was talking capabilities, and
he was talking present levels. He didn't get
into the question — which nobody can answer —
on what would Hanoi have done without the
bombing.
Mr. Evans: Mr. Bundy, along those same
lines, what makes the administration in this
coimtry so sure that if we could control infiltra-
tion and there were no infiltration, the South
Vietnamese Government and Army could con-
trol the insurgency in the South? Our Manila
Declaration,^ of course, is based on that prop-
osition.
Mr. Bundy: Well, we said at Manila that we
* For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 14, 1966, p. 734.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
355
would withdraw as the North Vietnamese sub-
versive and military forces were withdrawn and
so on, and we felt m a situation of that sort the
nortliern leadership, the whole northern control
of this thing, as well as the major and very im-
portant fighting input of the regular North
Vietnamese — and it is growing proportionately
all the time — that if you pulled that out, you
wovild be left with a southern movement that
would be not onlj' much less numerically, but it
would have a serious morale factor to contend
with. And I think it is still valid that in this
case you put — of their really pullmg out the
North Vietnamese — the South Vietnamese could
cope with that.
Mr. Willh : Mr. Bundy, if I may broaden the
focus just for a minute. One hears it said in
Washington, up and down Embassy Row and
indeed in some offices in the State Department,
that the United States is preoccupied in its
diplomatic outlook with A^iet-Nam; that Viet-
Nam takes an undue amount of time of officials
such as yourself and even those on a higher
level; that perhaps policy failures that these
critics see in other parts of the world have been
caused by this excessive concentration on a small
corner of the world. Is that true ?
Mr. Bundy: I don't think so at all, Mr. Willis.
Just from my own job, I can say that while I
spend a substantial percentage on Viet-Nam, I
am equally concerned with relations with
Japan, with our relationship in the Philippines,
with the tremendous importance of doing our
part in the multilateral effort to assist Indo-
nesia. I can assure that on my plate Viet-Nam
takes its place alongside a great many other
things, and I am sure that is true at senior levels
where they have to look at the whole world.
We have got problems elsewhere, but it is
not for lack of focusing on them that we are
having problems. I think on the whole we have
managed to carry forward basic policies very
successfully.
Mr. Willis: This is one of the matters one
also hears it said that while officials such as
yourself who deal with that area of the world
are, of course, concentrating on these problems,
that when one gets to the executive decisions in
the State Department, the seventh floor, the
Secretary of State and other officials are almost
in the position of being Viet-Nam desk officers.
I take it you wouldn't agree with that?
Mr. Bundy: I certainly wouldn't. Of course,
they are intimately involved in all the major
decisions, but by no means in the way you
suggest.
Mr. GoralsM: Mr. Bundy, I am not sure you
answered one of ]\Ir. Evans' questions and that
is: If infiltration is stopped from the North,
whj' can we assume the South Vietnamese can
fight subversion in the South? They were los-
ing the war in February of 1965 without any
North Vietnamese Regulars in the South.
Mr. Bundy : Well, Mr. Goralski, the question
I did answer, I think, was the question of
whether the South Vietnamese could handle it
if the northerners got out, not merely a cessation
of infiltration.
Mr. GoralsM: Well, they couldn't do that in
1965.
Mr. Bundy: Yes, but in '65 you already had
40,000 men who were sent from the North who
were North Vietnamese citizens. Though they
happened to have been born in the South, they
were the so-called returnees, the cuttmg edge,
the leadership; a lot of the equipment; those
things were even then coming from the North,
and an impetus was added by Regular North
Vietnamese who started to come in units in late
'64. So that I don't think the fact that the sit-
uation was going downhill in '65 at all argues
against the conclusion I would reach, which is
a case where the North really pulls out.
Situation in Mainland China
Mr. GoralsM: In taking into account the atti-
tude of Communist China and Viet-Nam — the
possibility of intervention — what part does the
turmoil on the mainland of China contribute to
U.S. thinking today? How serious is it in terms
of Viet-Nam?
Mr. Bundy : Well, it is something that is very
hard to analyze, Mr. Goralski. It does seem to
be becoming somewhat more serious all the time.
It has not interfered, as far as we can tell, with
tlie flow of military equipment which for the
most part does move through China and over
these same rail lines that we have been hitting.
It has not had that direct efl'ect. Whether it has
had any effect behind the scenes is a matter one
can speculate on. One doesn't see any evidence
that it has to this point.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Bundy, when you were on
this program almost exactly a year ago you
saw no signs that Hanoi was prepared to nego-
tiate. Do you see any change at all today in the
attitude of Hanoi ?
356
DEPAUTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Bundy: No, I don't, Mr. Spivak, as of
now. We keep getting reports; it is a steady
thing all the time. We are following up every
lead we can get through third countries, and we
have continually held out the possibility of
direct contacts. At this point we have nothing.
Hanoi has shown no sign of being ready to call
it oif, and the election could affect that, of
course.
Mr. Spivak: Senator [Mike] Mansfield was
reported as saying the other day that he ex-
pected President Joluison to push for U.N. ac-
tion on Viet-Nani after the election in South
Viet-Nam. Do j- ou expect tliat, too ?
Mr. Bundy: I think this is a matter that we
have always been anxious to follow up if we
could and if it could be done effectively. As
you know, the Security Council at the United
Nations did inscribe the Vietnamese item in, I
think, late Febiniary of 1966, and there was
some consultation amongst the Security Coun-
cil members.
We are always interested in finding out
whether something more effective can be worked
out. I don't know just what will in fact be done
by ourselves or by others.
Mr. Spivak : Are we right, then, in concluding
that the administration will start some new
initiatives toward peace after the election ?
Mr. Bundy : I think this is a matter that we
will certainly be looking at — as we are all the
time, though, Mr. Spivak. I don't want to set a
particular date when you start thinking harder
about peace. We are thinking as hard as we
know how all the time.
Mr. Evans : Mr. Bundy, you spoke about the
benefits that would come out of this election.
What about — even if it is a good election — what
about the difficulties that will come out of it?
Won't the new government have more power,
won't it try to emphasize and influence us more
in the future than it has in the past on such
issues as bombing Haiphong, as increasing U.S.
troops in the South, as possibly even invading
the North ? A sovereign country built on a con-
stitutional base will have more influence on us
tlian it does today, is that not right ?
Mr. Bundy: It isn't that it will have more
l)ower on the face of things, but it is the fact, I
think, that this election, if it comes off success-
fully— and I do hope that it will, and the indi-
cations are that it will today — again I say one
must suspend judgment — but if it does, I think
there is no doubt that any Vietnamese govern-
ment, whoever it is, will be more self-confident,
more with the sense of speaking for the South
Vietnamese people, and that could affect our
relationship. In the long run this is what it is
about. It is to get this coimtry standing on its
own feet, and therefore I would view it net as a
clearly constructive development.
Mr. Willis: Mi'. Bundy, the administration
has been very firm that the downing of our
planes in China and the flights near the border
will not bring Communist China into the war.
Has this Government been in any private com-
mmiication with Peking? Has it sent or re-
ceived any messages to make you confident of
saying that?
Mr. Bundy: I wouldn't want to comment on
any private messages — which doesn't mean
anything one way or the other, Mr. Willis. We
look to the broader pictui'e of whether they
could possibly misunderstand what we are do-
ing. We don't believe they have. We don't be-
lieve they should, as long as we are doing very
clear things in clearly defined areas.
Mr. Boggs: I am sorry to interrupt, but our
time is up. Thank you for being with us today
on "Meet the Press."
SEPTEMBER IS, 1907
357
President Johnson and the Shah of Iran
Hold Talks at Washington
His Imperial Majesty Mohamonad Reza Shah
Pahlavi, Sluihanshah of Iran, made cm, ofjlcuil
visit to Washington August 22-2J!f. Following
are an exchange of remarks between President
Johnson and His Imperial Majesty at a wel-
coming ceremony on the South Lawn of the
White House on August 22, their exchange of
toasts at a dinner at the White House that eve-
ning, and a joint statement released on August
23 at the conclusion of their talks.
White House press release dated August 22
EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS
President Johnson
It is an honor and a very real pleasure to wel-
come you again to our country.
"When Your Majesty was here in Washington
3 years ago, you spoke of Iran's determination to
build "a society in which men may prosper and
feel happy and secure, a society in which the
benefits of a sound education and healthy econ-
omy are shared not by a few but by all." We have
admired Iran's steady progress toward that
goal wliich you announced.
The changes in Iran represent very genuine
progress. So far as economic growth rates tell
the story of a nation's achievements, Iran's
recent record- — an annual growth of about 10
percent — is surpassed by very few countries on
this earth. In the 5 years since we visited Iran,
6,500 village schools have been established by
your new Literacy Corps. In 1962 only 8 per-
cent of the rural population went to elementary
schools. Now, a short 5 years later under your
leadership, the figure is more than 20 percent
and still rising.
Iran has risen to the challenge of new times
and new generations, through its land reform,
through a drive against illiteracy, through a
sharp increase in private investment, and
through so many other vital reforms, all of
which you discussed with me in your planning
when I was privileged to visit tliere.
Iran is a different country now from the one
that we saw in 1962. The difference has sprung
from Your Majesty's dedicated inspirational
and progi-essive leadership.
I see another difference, another lesson that
your leadership provides for all who prize real
progress. Because you are winning progress
without violence and without any bloodshed, a
lesson that others still have to learn.
To destroy the existing order, to dismiss the
past without a plan for the present and future —
that is never enough.
We Americans challenge every propagandist
and demagog — whether he speaks on the radio
waves of the world or in the streets of our own
cities — to demonstrate his commitment to prog-
ress with the facts and figures. The people of
the world cry out for progress, not propaganda.
They hunger for results, knowing they cannot
eat rhetoric.
Progress in Iran has not meant discarding
the past; it has meant keeping the best of the
past and forging it to a brighter future.
Your Majesty, we understand this kind of
progress. We are proud to have seen you make
it, and we are pleased that we could help along
the way. But the accomplishments are yours.
You and your people, we think, have sown
good seed. I hope to hear a great deal more about
that harvest after we go to the office. I hope also
to draw on Your Majesty's very wise counsel —
so valuable to me in the past — as we discuss our
common interest in building peace and security,
particularly in the Middle East.
Mrs. Jolinson and I are very pleased that you
are with us here again. We hope to return now,
witli special warmth, the welcome that you have
so generously extended to many Americans over
many years, and particularly to us on our cher-
ished visit to Tehran 5 years ago.
358
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
His Imperial Majesty
Mr. President, I am overwhelmed by the
warmth of j'our words and your welcome.
Since the day I first met with you and Mrs.
Johnson, I developed a very special sense of
admiration for your personality, your ideas,
and what j'ou stood for.
I can say now that it is always a source of
inspiration to see someone defending his prin-
ciples and his ideals with such reserve, with
such steadfastness, which creates confidence in
the present and in the future.
I would like to thank you for the very kind
words you have had toward my country ; what
we have realized. We believe that what we do is
for the sake of the majority of our people.
That is why the economic steps are taken.
Thcj' present results of this magnitude, because
this is done not for a few but for the majority of
the people.
Our fight is against illiteracy, our fight is
against disease, and now in the future we hope
to be able to contribute to the fight that the
whole world — the community of nations — must
undertake against these same evils and short-
comings: illiteracy, shortage of food, aaid
diseases.
In many ways we have always found inspira-
tion in your great country, the ideals that you
have always represented, the humanitarian
aspects of the characteristics of your people, of
your policies, the wonderful principles of free-
dom, equity, that you have always upheld with
valor and dignity.
We also try to inspire ourselves in the better-
ment of the life of the individual. We put a
great deal of importance to the betterment of the
life of the society — but a society in which the
individual counts.
We shall try always to inspire ourselves by
the wonderful technology of your people — your
breaktliroughs in agriculture, science, and
technique.
We shall always remember that your country
and your office, yourself, Mr. President, have
stood for truth for the principles of justice and
intei'national equity — but also for the special
friendship that you have always had for us.
The only way we can repay you this debt of
gratitude is to remain true to the same prin-
ciples for which you are standing and
defending.
I would like to thank you once more for
affording me the opportunity of seeing you
again and visiting your wonderful country. I
am sure that during our exchange of views we
can discuss so many things of interest to both of
our countries and maybe to the world at large.
Thank you again, Mr. President.
White House press release dated August 22
EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
President Johnson
The poet Emerson has said that "The orna-
ment of a house is the friends who frequent it."
Our one regret this evening is that our warm
friend and honored guest has not been able to
ornament the occasion more — by bringing along
his very beautiful and charming Empress. We
miss her very much, because this administra-
tion champions beauty in all its fonns.
His Majesty's coronation will take place in
October, after a reign of nearly 26 years. This
gathering of friends offers you heartfelt good
wishes and prayers for still brighter success.
To them I must add special congratulations
on Your Majesty's superb sense of timing. You
have had the foresight to schedule your corona-
tion when your polls are up.
You also have the satisfaction of looking back
on a most impressive record of very progi'essive
leadership. You have taught Iran's people that
they have in their own strength and imagina-
tion the power to solve their own problems and
to realize their own dreams.
When I visited Iran with Mrs. Johnson, just
5 years ago next week, the land reform pro-
gram, that we discussed until late in the eve-
ning, was just beginning. Tonight, 50 percent of
Iran's rural families farm their own land. Some
7,000 or more rural cooperatives have already
been established, and more than 800 extension
corpsmen are out helping the farmers of that
country to acquii-e new agricultural skills.
This promise of new progress and dignity
beckons all the Middle East. The people of that
region have just suffered a very great shock.
But that shock should and must not obscure the
vision of what they can do to solve their prob-
lems constructively, peacefully — by working
together, by working with their neighbors.
We stand ready tonight, as before, to help
those who ask our help — to strengthen the inde-
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
275-359—67 3
359
pendence of all who seek it in purposeful part-
nership. Now, as always, America seeks no
domination — by force of arms, by influence of
wealth, by stealth or subversion.
We seek to build in brotherhood. We want to
continue giving and learning, as we will again
when Iranian and American scientists soon be-
gin to study ways to exploit Iran's water re-
sources and to employ the exciting new technol-
ogy of desalting. Our cooperation will continue
to grow in this and many other ways.
We take great pride in having with us this
evening Mr. David Lilienthal, who has done so
much to plan and develop our own land and
who is now giving his talented energies to your
country.
But turning the dreams we all share into a
shared reality asks a long journey of both our
countries. We take heart from the knowledge
that the people of Iran, under Your Majesty's
leadership, have the fortitude and vision to con-
tinue their advance and to so inspire all who
would follow in hope.
Ladies and gentlemen, I can conclude this
statement in no better way than to recall for you
the words of a great Persian poet :
Dig deep and sow good seed ;
Repay the debt yon owe your country's soil ;
You need not then be beholden to any man.
Our distinguished guest this evening has truly
sown good seed. I ask those of you who have
come from throughout our land to join me in a
toast to the architect of Iran's future, the dis-
tinguished sovereign and leader of the Iranian
people, and our most valued and trusted friend,
His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran.
His Imperial Majesty
This is the second time today, Mr. President,
that you have showered upon myself, my coun-
try, and my coxmtrymen such words of encour-
agement and friendship.
I want to thank you from the bottom of my
heart that you think this way and appreciate
what we are trying to do in our part of the
world.
As I said before, we have been inspired in so
many ways by the Americans — in your humani-
tarian approach to the problems of life, in the
wonderful achievements of your people in every
domain, also in many of your great leaders.
If I may say so, the pleasure of meeting you.
Mr. President, and Mrs. Johnson 5 years ago
coincides, incidentally, with the reforms that we
have undertaken in our recent history.
Wliat you represent, the morality that you
represent— and trying to really uphold it in our
world — the confidence that you have created
that your word can be taken as the word of a
man and a judgment, and so many other aspects
of your great qualities are a real contribution
to all of us.
So I will always take this as a nice augury
that your coming to our country coincided with
our great effort to bring our country, even after
2,500 years of history, into the modem age.
We are proud of our history, but we cannot
live only with the memory of our past glories.
We have to live with the present and live with
not only decency but with pride and, if possible,
with plenty, with happiness, and with joy.
Again, in that respect, your people and your
countrymen have done a great deal and can
still do a great deal.
I remember the first time I met and talked
with this distinguished gentleman of yours, Mr.
David Lilienthal. He spoke with me and talked
about things in my own country that I per-
sonally didn't know about.
Because of his knowledge, because of his ex-
perience, he told me what could be done in one
of tlie regions of my country, the fantastic pros-
pects of development, the happiness that could
be brought in that part of my country — in that
part of the world.
The plan has been initiated. We have made
some progress. But this progress cannot be as
rapid as we wish it to be. We cannot wait a
long time — neither for ourselves nor really the
world — we cannot wait a long time before see-
ing all its resources tapped, developed, and put
at the disposal of the human race.
Again, I think in that field, in the promotion
of agriculture, in the promotion of food produc-
tion, speaking of so many other aspects and
possibilities that exist in my country, you can
do a lot by showing us how to best develop a
land.
You have done it in your own country. Not
many people can come and see it for themselves.
But if you can do the same things in our part
of the world, many more people could succeed
and try maybe to do the same.
The interest that you show in the desaliniza-
tion of sea water is something of the utmost
360
DEPARTJIENT OP STATE BULLETIN
importance. Tliere must be an early solution to
the economic way of doing it. I am sure that
before long your scientists will come up with
the answers.
Then, again, our region of the world may be
one of the most interesting cases for experi-
encing this wonderful technological break-
though. Water is the essence of life. Today it is
needed more than ever.
I could continue on for a very, very long time
praising the unselfish, humanitarian contribu-
tion of the American people in our country.
That is the cause of this deep friendship exist-
ing between us — the trust that we have in you
and, I hope, the trust that you have in us.
I think we are both trying to serve the same
cause — the cause of human dignity, freedom,
decency — in what we do. That is why it is also,
again, a great pleasure for me to be once more in
your beautiful land, among such good friends,
and especially of having this opportunity of
seeing you again, Mr. President, and having the
friendly talks that we have had, as usual.
I would like to thank you, also, for the words
that you have had for my wife, who had to stay
back home. She has a lot to do, because, for the
first time, I tliink, a woman will be crowned in
our country.
Lately women have attained many rights —
first, franchise, then equality with men, and now
even equality in wearing a crown. We are con-
sidering now a change also in our Constitution
to automatically appoint the mother of the
Crown Prince as the Regent of the Reahn if
anything happens to the King before the Crown
Prince comes of age or is 20 years old.
This is to show that we are recognizing the
value and the qualities of the women in our
counti-y. I think that really we all, everywhere,
owe so much to the women of our country. I am
not going very far. I just want to mention what
Mrs. Johnson is doing in this country and the
great contribution that she is making for the
betterment of so many things.
As for the future, I can only say that I hope
that with God's help and will we shall make
the contribution that we can for the betterment
of our own people and also in the humble way
that we can for all the people in our world, and
especially cherish the unselfish, solid, reliable
friendship binding ovir two people together.
It is with the hope of good health to you, Mr.
President, and to Mrs. Johnson, success in your
work, the welfare of your Government and your
people that I would like to propose a toast to
the President of the United States of America.
JOINT STATEMENT
White House press release dated August 23
The Sliahanshah and the President had very
cordial and useful discussions covering a broad
range of topics of common interest. Their talks
reflected the long-standing fi'iendly relations
that exist between Iran and the United States.
The President congratulated the Shahanshah
on the progress of Iran's program of economic
development and social reform and reviewed
with the Shahanshah the scope for continued
United States Government collaboration with
Iran's development efforts. The two leaders also
had a useful exchange of views on world food,
water and illiteracy problems and the efforts
of both countries to enrich the lives of their
peoples.
In tliis connection, the Shahanshah and the
President reviewed preliminary plans for co-
operation in studying the development of water
resources in certain areas of Iran. A U.S. team
of water experts will join an Iranian team to
begin the study this fall. President Jolinson as-
sured His IMajesty that the United States Gov-
ernment stands ready to share the technology it
has developed so that adequate water may be
available to meet Iran's needs.
The Shahanshah and the President reviewed
the world situation and particularly the situa-
tion in the Middle East, and they agreed that a
solution to the current tensions in the area should
be sought in strict compliance with the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter. The two
leaders agreed to remain in close touch about
the Middle East situation. The Shahanshah also
reaffirmed Iran's determination to sustain ade-
quate modern defense forces to ensure Iran's
national security.
The Shahanshah and the President also dis-
cussed problems of building peace in other parts
of the world and the President informed the
Shahanshah about efforts of the United States
to achieve peace in Vietnam. The Shahanshah
and the President agreed on the importance of
avoiding a widening of hostilities and the need
to continue the search for a settlement on the
basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements which
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
361
would also respect the rights of the Vietnamese
people to determine their own destiny in
freedom.
The Shahanshah expressed his thanlcs for the
warm and friendly reception accorded him.
Both tlie Shahanshah and the President agreed
that the considerations which have motivated
Iranian and American cooperation are today
more pertinent than ever.
Soviet Union Bars Completion
of U.S. Scientific Voyage
Department Statement ^
On August 16 the United States Coast Guard
announced that the 269-foot Coast Guard ice-
breakers Edisto and Easttoind planned an 8,000-
mile circumnavigation of the Arctic Ocean,
conducting scientific research enroute. Their
itmerary called for them to travel north of the
Soviet islands of Novaya Zemlya, Sevemaya
Zemlya, and the New Siberian Islands.
The planned course was entirely on the high
seas and, therefore, the voyage did not require
any previous clearance with Soviet authorities.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Govermiient was offi-
cially infonned of these plans just prior to the
public announcement.
However, heavy ice conditions made it im-
possible for the vessels to proceed north of
Severnaya Zemlya. On August 24 our Embassy
in Moscow notified the Soviet Ministiy of For-
eign Affairs of this situation and stated it would
be necessary for the two vessels to pass through
Vilkitsky Straits south of Severnaya Zemlya in
order to complete their journey.
In response the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs made a statement to our Embassy that
the straits constituted Soviet territorial waters.
On August 28, as a result of a routine message
from the icebreakers to the Soviet Ministry of
the Maritune Fleet, the Soviet Ministry of For-
eign Affairs reaffirmed its declaration of August
24 and made it clear that the Soviet Govern-
ment would claim that passage of the ships
through the Vilkitsky Straits would be a viola-
tion of Soviet frontiers.
' Read to news correspondents on August 31 by the
Department spokesman.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5639 ;
for text, see Buij.etin of June 30, 1958, p. 1111.
Under these circumstances, the United States
considered it advisable to cancel the proposed
circiminavigation. The Edwto has now been
ordered to proceed directly to Baffin Bay, and
the Eastwind was ordered to remain in the area
of the Kara and Barents Seas for about a month
to conduct further oceanographic research.
On August 30 our Embassy in Moscow sent
a note strongly protesting the Soviet position.
The note pointed out that Soviet law cannot
have the effect of changing the status of mter-
national waters and the rights of foreign ships
with respect to them. These rights are set forth
clearly in the Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone of April 29, 1958,^ to
which the Soviet Union is a party.
There is right of mnocent passage for all
ships through straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas,
whether or not, as in the case of the Vilkitsky
Straits, they are described by the Soviet Union
as being overlapped by territorial waters, and
there is an unlimited right of navigation on the
high seas of straits comprising both high seas
and territorial waters. Clearly, the Soviet Gov-
ernment, by denying to U.S. vessels their rights
under international law, has acted to frustrate
a useful scientific endeavor and thus to deprive
the international scientific community of re-
search data of considerable significance.
Letters of Credence
Jordan
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Abdul Hamid
Sharaf, presented liis credentials to President
Jolmson on August 30. For texts of the Ambas-
sador's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated August
31.
Yugoslavia
The newly appointed Ambassador of the So-
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bogdan
Crnobrnja, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Johnson on August 30. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's re-
ply, see Department of State press release dated
Aujrust 31.
362
I
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Urges Study of Future
of Pacific Islands Trust Territory
The White House on August 21 released the
text of the following letter from President
Johnson to Hubert H. Humphrey^ President of
the Senate. An identical letter was sent to
John W. McCcrmack, Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
Atjgust 21, 1967
DEiVR Mk. President: The principle of gov-
ernment by consent of the governed is the foun-
dation of democracy.
Today, I urge the Congress to join me in tak-
ing a further step toward self-determination for
the 93,000 Micronesian people who live in the
Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands that
comprise the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands.
The United States administers this trust terri-
tory through a 1947 agreement with the United
Nations. Under that responsibility we have en-
couraged the Micronesians to participate fully
in determining their own future and shaping
their own free institutions.
I am sure the Congress shares my deep interest
in the status and well-being of Micronesia. Con-
gress approved the original trusteeship agree-
ment. It has supported an intensive program to
promote the political, economic, social and edu-
cational advancement of the islands.
In 1966, the people of the territory, acting
through their popularly elected legislature,
called upon the President of the United States
to create a Commission to consider their future
status.
I am happy to honor their request. The Joint
Resolution I am submitting would provide for
such a Conunission.
The Commission will study and assess all of
the factors bearing on the future of the trust
territory. It will consult with the people of Mi-
cronesia. And it will make its recommendations
to the President and to the Congress within
eight months after its work begins.
I ask the Congress to join with the Executive
Branch in this vital undertaking by authorizing
the appointment of eight members of the Con-
gress to serve on the Commission, along with
eight members and a chairman selected by the
President.
Through this Commission, we once again have
an opportunity to reaffirm our national commit-
ment to the ideals of democracy and self-deter-
mination.
I am attaching a detailed statement ^ of the
Secretary of the Interior who, together with the
Secretaries of State and Defense, join with me
in urging prompt approval of this important
resolution.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
TEXT OF JOINT RESOLUTION
JOINT RESOLUTION
Regarding the Status of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands
Whereas the United States is the administering au-
thority of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
pursuant to the Trusteeship Agreement between the
United States of America and the Security Council
of the United Nations ; and
Whereas the United States, in the Trusteeship Agree-
ment, undertook a solemn obligation to "foster the
development of such political institutions as are
suited to the trust territory" and to "promote the de-
velopment of the inhabitants of the trust territory
toward self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the
trust territory and its peoples and the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the people concerned ;" and
Whereas the United States, in the Trusteeship Agree-
ment, further undertook a solemn obligation to pro-
mote the economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the Trust Territory ; and
Whereas the United States is dedicated to the principle
of government by consent of the governed ; and
Whereas the Congress of Micronesia has petitioned the
President to "establish a commission to consult the
people of Micronesia to ascertain their wishes and
views, and to study and critically assess the political
alternatives open to Micronesia ; and
Whereas the President has proposed to establish a
commission in response to such petition and has in-
vited congressional participation ; and
Whereas the Congress by enacting Public Law 90-16
has evidenced its support for an intensive program
to promote the political, economic, social and educa-
tional advancement of the Trust Territory : Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assemMed,
That it is the sense of Congress that whatever steps
may be necessary shall be taken to provide for such a
degree of self-government as will permit the people of
' The statement was not included with the White
House press release.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
363
the Trust Territory freely to express their wishes as
soon as possible, and not later than June 30, 1972, on
the future status of the Trust Territory.
Sec. 2. In addition to eight members of the commis-
sion to be appointed by the President, the appointment
of eight members of Congress to serve on the President's
Commission on the Status of the Trust Territory is
hereby authorized. Four of such members shall be ap-
pointed by the President of the Senate, and four shall
be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives. An additional member shall be appointed by
the President, and shall serve as Chairman.
Sec 3. The commission shall study and assess all
factors bearing upon the future of the Trust Territory
and shall consult as appropriate with representatives
of the people of Micronesia. The commission shall, no
later than eight months after funds for the commis-
sion are appropriated and made available to the com-
mission, submit recommendations to the President and
to the Congress of the United States concerning the best
means to obtain the objective set forth in section 1.
Sec. 4. The commission is authorized to appoint and
fix the compensation of such personnel as may be neces-
sary to enable it to carry out its functions. Employees
of the executive branch may be detailed to assi.st in the
work of the commission, with or without reimburse-
ment. Any member of the commission who may be ap-
pointed by the President from among the public shall
be compensated $100 per diem for his services when
engaged on commission business, and all members
shall be entitled to reimbursement for actual travel and
per diem in lieu of subsistence when engaged on com-
mission business, as authorized by law for persons em-
ployed intermittently. The commission is authorized to
procure services as authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109.
Sec. 5. There is authorized to be appropriated out of
moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated
such funds as may be necessary for the purpose of
carrying out the provisions of this joint resolution, but
not to exceed $200,000, to be available until expended.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
90th Congress, 1st Session
Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 6098, S. Rept. 405, July 21,
1967, 35 pp. ; conference report to accompany H.R.
6098, H. Rept. 518, July 27, 1967, 8 pp.
Federal Maritime Discovery Procedures. Report to
accompany S. 706. S. Rept. 472. August 2, 1967. 8 pp.
Taxes. Message from the President transmitting recom-
mendations for taxes. H. Doc. 152. August 3, 1967.
8 pp.
Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1967. Report
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
to accompany S. 1155, together with individual views.
S. Rept. 493. August 4, 1967. 26 pp.
Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group. Re-
port to the Senate on the 10th meeting, held at
Ottawa and Montreal May 10-14, 1967, by Senator
George D. Aiken, chairman of the Senate delegation.
S. Doc. 42. August 7, 1967. 6 pp.
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Docuvients, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C.
S0402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.
Income Tax Administration. Agreement with Viet-
Nam. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon March 31
and May 3. 1967. Entered into force May 3, 1967. TIAS
6262. 6 pp. 5^.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Mexico.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington June 2,
1967. Entered into force June 2, 1967. Effective May 1,
1967. TIAS 626.J. 12 pp. 10^.
Mutual Defense Assistance — Cash Contribution by
Japan. Arrangement with Japan relating to the agree-
ment of March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Tok.vo June 2, 1967. Entered into force June 2, 1967.
TIAS 6266. 5 pp. 54-
Telecommunication — Pre-sunrise Operation of Cer-
tain Standard (AM) Radio Broadcasting Stations.
Agreement effected by exchange of notes — Signed at
Ottawa March 31 and June 12. 1967. Entered into force
June 12, 1967. TIAS 6268. 4 pp., diagram. 15(}.
Air Transport Services. Agreement with Panama,
amending the agreement of March 31, 1949, as amended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Panama June 5, 1967.
Entered into force June 5, 1967. TIAS 6270. 7 pp. 10(J.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam — Signed at Saigon March 13. 1967. Entered into
force March 13, 1967. TIAS G271. 9 pp. 10^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re-
public of Korea — Signed at Seoul March 25, 1967. En-
tered into force March 25, 1967. TIAS 6272. 13 pp. 10^.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Norway. Exchange of notes — Signed at Oslo May 27
and June 1, 1967. Eutered into force June 1, 1967. TIAS
6273. 3 pp. 5(t.
Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. Agree-
ment with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Ottawa May 10 and June 23, 1967. Entered into force
June 23, 1967. TIAS 6274. 3 pp. 5<f.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Malta.
Exchange of notes — Dated at Valletta June 14, 1967.
Entered into force June 14, 1967. Effective January 1,
1967. TIAS 6275. 10 pp. 10«*.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Guyana. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Georgetown May 31 and June 7, 1967.
Entered into force June 7, 1967. TIAS 6277. 3 pp. 5(!.
Loan of Vessel. Agreement with Brazil. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Washington June 15 and 28, 1967.
Entered into force June 28, 1967. TIAS 6278. 4 pp. 5tf.
361
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Folloxoing are statements made in the United
Nations Trusteeship Council on June 8 hy
Eugenie Anderson, U.S. Representative on the
Trusteeship Council; Williatn R. Norwood,
High Com7nissioner of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands and U.S. Special Representa-
tive on the Trusteeship Coimcil; and Lazarus
Salii, adviser to the U.S. delegation.
STATEMENT BY MRS. ANDERSON
The United States delegation is pleased to
participate once again in the Trusteeship Coun-
cil's consideration of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. I should like to express my Gov-
ernment's appreciation to the members of the
visiting mission for their probing and sympa-
thetic consideration of the problems of the trust
territory, while assessing both the achievements
and the shortcomings of our administration. In
particular, Madam President, I want to expi'ess
our appreciation to you as the chairman of the
visiting mission and to every member of the mis-
sion and to the members of the Secretariat also
for their very faithful and energetic discliarge
of their duties throughout their arduous tour.
Having myself had the pleasure of spending
several weeks in the territory, I know what a
marvelous experience this was for all of you,
and yet, at the same time, I know that this was
a strenuous period also and that many hours
were devoted, even beyond the call of duty, be-
cause you wanted to see as much as you could
within a short time and to take full advantage
of every opportunity. Believe me, I personally
appreciate the dedication of the mission to the
serious task and the serious way in which it
carried out its task.
My Govenmient welcomes constructive criti-
cism, and we will give — in fact we have already
given — serious consideration to the visiting mis-
sion's report ^ as well as to the Trusteeship
Council's comments and recommendations, and
the Council may be sure that the visiting mis-
sion's report, as well as the Council's delibera-
tions, will be of great help to my Government in
fornmlating further plans for the advancement
of the trust territory.
I should like to emphasize at the outset that
my Government takes its obligation to promote
the economic, political, and social development
of this f arflung territoiy most seriously. I stated
last year that much progress had been made but
that much more needed to be done.- Progress has
continued during the past year, but I am frank
to say that in teims of our goals and the needs of
the people of IVIicronesia, there still remains a
great deal yet to be acliieved. Perhaps this past
year could be best described as a period of plan-
ning and consolidation for the impending period
ahead.
The Special Representative will consider the
conditions in the territory in some detail, but I
should like, at this time, just to mention a few
of the more significant developments.
The Congress of Micronesia held its second
regular session durmg July and August 1966
and held a special session to deal with appro-
priations measures in August 1966. Interim
committees of both Houses were appointed in
December 1966, toured the territory to discuss
matters of interest with all Micronesians, and
met with the visiting mission while it was in the
territory. The second general election, on the
basis of universal adult suffrage, was held in
November. One of the Congressmen who was
reelected at that time is here with us today.
Those and other significant developments of the
past year will be discussed in detail very shortly
by the High Commissioner.
I would like at this time to comment briefly
on the question of compensation for property
damage and loss of life suffered by the Microne-
' U.N. doc. T/165S and Add. 1.
- For U.S. statements made in the Trusteeship Coun-
cil on June 27, 1966, see Bulletin of Sept. 12, 1966,
p. 387.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
365
sians in the Second World War — a question
wliich is familiar to members of the Council and
which, I know, is of special concern to all mem-
bers, as well as to the Micronesians themselves.
This question has been discussed in numerous
Council sessions and in the reports of several
visiting missions, including the one which just
recently returned from the trust territory. I am
pleased to report to this session that substantial
progress has been made toward a solution of tlris
problem.
As I reported to the Council last year, a spe-
cial United States representative was appointed
to examine the claims question, and he met with
representatives of the Government of Japan in
Tokyo last June. The visiting mission was in-
formed in January that we expected negotia-
tions to be resumed early in 1967. In March 1967,
further talks were held in Tolcyo, with encour-
aging results. We believe that prospects for solu-
tion of the problem are better now than at any
previous stage of negotiations. Discussions will
be resumed with the representatives of Japan in
the very near future. I can assure the Council
that every effort will be made to reach an early
agreement.
To conclude my brief introductory com-
ments, I would like to reiterate that the United
States is conscious of its responsibilities under
the charter and the trust agreement. The Coim-
cil and the people of the territory may be as-
sured that the United States will continue and,
indeed, increase its efforts to assist the people
of Micronesia to attain the level of political,
economic, social, and educational development
which is their right.
STATEMENT BY MR. NORWOOD
It is a distinct pleasure for me to be before
this body again this year, particularly in view
of the present experience that we had in having
the visiting mission with us. It is rewarding to
have this opportunity to meet with the members
of the mission again and to become re-
acquainted with the other members of the
Council.
Our annual report ^ which is before the
'' Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Department
of State publication 8205) ; for sale by the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 ($1.25).
Council provides information on the period
from July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1966. Inasmuch
as almost a year has elapsed since the latter
date, I shall discuss events occurring in the
period subsequent to that of the report. In so
doing, my remarks may overlap to some extent
the information supplied to the visiting mission
when it was in Micronesia last Febiiiary.
At the time of my report to you a year ago,
the administering authority had determined
that our responsibilities to the people of
Micronesia and our obligations under the
trusteeship agreement required an acceleration
of effort and a reorganized and revitalized pro-
gram of development.
Legislation was drafted requesting the Con-
gress of the United States to authorize and
appropriate funds for an expanded construction
program totaling $172 million over a 5-year
period, with corresponding increases in operat-
ing expenses.
Confronted with numerous other pressing
demands, the 89th Congress took the view that
the proposal was too ambitious and that a
scaled-down 2-year program would be more
realistic.
Accordingly, the legislation was revised to
raise the then existing trust territory ceiling of
$17.5 million to $32 million in fiscal 1967 and
$35 million for 1968.
This legislation received strong support in
both the United States Senate and the House of
Representatives. It passed the Senate but failed
to pass the House when it became involved in
a logjam of legislation in the closing hours of
the 89th Congress.
However, the momentum of support carried
over into the 90th Congress. New trust territory
legislation passed both Houses and was signed
into law [Public Law 90-16] by President
Johnson on May 10, 1967.
The new bill raised the ceiling to $25 mil-
lion for 1967 and to $35 million — double the
previous limit — for 1968 and 1969.
In a statement issued by President Jolmson
at the time he signed the bill, he said : *
We have made an appreciable start toward meeting
that obligation — though a great deal remains to be
done to raise living standards in the islands.
From my visit to American Samoa in October of
last year, and from conversations with leaders of the
trust territory in Guam last March," I know of the
urgency that attends this responsibility. I am happy
' Bulletin of June 5, 1967, p. 865.
" For background, see ibid., Apr. 10, 1965, p. 598.
366
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to sigu into law a measure that recognizes that urgency
and allows us to respond to it meaningfully.
I have already asked that the Congress appropriate
additional funds, both this year and next, so that
among other projects we can build schools, hospitals.
roads, airfields, and communication facilities, hire
teachers and doctors and nurses, and provide for the
economic development of the area. We are working to
help the people of the islands become self-reliant, and
ultimately joined in a full relationship with other
nations bordering the Pacific.
It should be emphasized, however, that tlie
passage of this legislation does not mean that
the trust territory now has available for its use
the total amounts of money indicated by the
new, higher ceilings.
These are merely upper limits. Requests for
appropriations within these limits must be
thorouglily and convincingly justified to gain
approval of the several committees of the Con-
gress which are responsible for reviewing and
evaluating the trust territory programs and
their costs.
Tlie committees of the Congress and the Bu-
reau of the Budget, before which we have
testified in quest of larger sums of money, have
stressed that while they recognize the expand-
ing financial requirements of the trust territoi-y,
they also expect to see more evidence of achieve-
ment, more progress in education, better health
programs, more economic development, more
evidence tliat the citizens of Micronesia are de-
veloping an increasing capability to share a
larger responsibility for shaping and directing
their destiny in a world that is rapidly closing
in upon them.
It is evident, therefore, that the United States
Congress and the Trusteeship Council of the
United Nations look upon our administrative
responsibilities in Micronesia in much the same
light.
This has the effect of bringing the scnttiny to
which our administration is subjected into a
binocular focus of attention. This should clarify
and sharpen our vision and lend a sense of im-
mediacy and urgency to our task.
A Period of Preparation
In the period that has elapsed sinc« I reported
to you a year ago, the main thrust of our effort
has been in the direction of reorganization and
preparation for program expansion and new
construction as the needed additional funds are
made available to us.
There have been a significant number of staff
changes which should add strength to our ad-
ministrative capability. Furtlier changes are
contemplated as we continue to assess our or-
ganizational and management requirements.
As a basic guideline for constructing new
facilities and improving or expanding those
presently existing, we believe that there should
be the maximum possible coordination and
plaiming.
Wliat is built, where and when it is built,
should depend largely on identified priorities
and planning.
Power, water, and sanitation requirements
were selected for first consideration. Through a
consulting contract, we have obtained power
studies and preengineering surveys of the is-
lands with the largest populations.
Similarly, through a separate consulting con-
tract, we have obtained water supply surveys of
Saipan, Koror, and Moen and sewer surveys for
Saipan and Koror.
Tlae object of these surveys is not only to pro-
vide reliable data on which to base construction
plans and budget projections as we seek to im.-
prove the residential areas of these various
islands, but an equally important purpose is also
to identify as far as possible the scope and cost
of services required to encourage economic
development.
We intend to prepare a comprehensive plan
for the entire territory to provide guidelines for
the highest and best use of the limited land
areas. The objective here is to shape the direc-
tion and character of future development so
that services and facilities are appropriately
related to community needs and so that require-
ments for economic growth, urban expansion,
and the protection of valuable resources are in
an orderly and mutually beneficial relationship.
Because Micronesia is subjected to periodic
typhoons, we occasionally are compelled by
circumstances beyond our control to shift our
administrative attention and our resources sud-
denly to meet emergencies.
The typhoon which devastated Koror and
Babelthuap early in March, causing damage es-
timated at $5 million, is an example of such an
emergency. All available food supplies, con-
struction materials, and medical assistance were
rushed to the stricken islands. The reconstruc-
tion progi'am, which will be financed in large
part from funds made available through the
United States Office of Emergency Planning, is
now underway.
Rather than limiting the rebuilding to res-
toration of the previously existing structures
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
367
and facilities, we decided to convert the disaster
into an opportunity to rebuild according to a
new development plan. This required adjust-
ing our 1967 budget projections to allocate an
additional $1,700,000 to supplement the Federal
disaster assistance which we expect to receive.
We look upon this as a sound investment, be-
cause the combination of reconstruction and
new construction should not only result in a
more desirable arrangement of buildings and
facilities, but they should be sturdy enough to
survive future typhoons.
The Peace Corps
TVliile we have been concentrating on efforts
to improve our administration and on program
planning, our ability to extend the reach and
the effectiveness of existing programs has been
strengthened substantially by the presence of
the Peace Corps in Micronesia.
There are presently about 450 volunteers as-
signed to various districts. More than half of
these are employed as teachers, principally in
English-language instruction. Almost 100
others are serving in health programs as health
aides, nurses, medical technicians, and X-ray
technicians. The remainder of the group, in-
cluding those serving as architects, lawyers,
surveyors, business advisers, are assigned to a
wide variety of activities including community
development and miscellaneous other cate-
gories.
A new gi-oujj of volunteers will begin training
this summer at the Peace Corps training center
on Udot Island in the Truk lagoon. By the end
of this calendar year, it is estimated that there
may be more than 700 Peace Corps volunteers in
service throughout Micronesia.
At the outset of the movement of the Peace
Corps into Micronesia a year ago, there was of
course some concern about administrative and
logistic support for the volunteers, as well as
concern about jurisdictional relations between
the Peace Corps and the Trust Territory Ad-
ministration. We have in fact experienced some
administrative growing pains. The visiting mis-
sion saw some evidence of this and has included
some constructive comments in its report which
we have taken into account in preparing train-
ing for the new group of vokmteers.
The Peace Corps and the High Commissioner
have initiated a basic agreement which places
the Peace Corps under the full authority of the
Trust Territory Administration. Peace Corps
programs are developed jointly between the '
Peace Corps and the High Commissioner. A
Micronesian advisory coimcil, composed of
members of the Congress of Micronesia, has
been formed to advise the High Commissioner
and the Peace Corps.
Tliere is one aspect of the Peace Corps in-
volvement which I wish to highlight as par-
ticularly useful and timely. The volunteers are
strongly service motivated. Their pliilosophy is
to work with people in need of their services.
Their desire to become directly involved in vil-
lage life has facilitated the establisliment of
constructive rapport with Micronesians. This
has enabled the volunteers to gain the con-
fidence and respect of Micronesians and thus
influence the plamiing of many useful com-
munity development projects by injecting a new
revitalized spirit of self-help and self-assurance
into the communities.
The administering authority and the citizens
of the territory have gained much from the
presence of the Peace Corps volunteei-s. Admin-
istrative and jurisdictional problems can and
are being resolved, and we look forward to a
full and compatible partnership that will benefit
the people of Micronesia.
Economic Development
One of our major objectives in Micronesia is
to identify ways and means of developing the
economy of these islands. This has been a prob-
lem of great concern to the Trusteeship Council,
the administering authority, the Congress of
the United States, and to the patient, deserving
people of Micronesia.
Earlier this year, we took delivery of an
economic development plan prepared by Robert
R. Nathan and Associates. The plan is based on
2 years' study of various factors, conditions, and
policies affecting economic development pros-
pects. This massive report makes certain basic
policy recommendations and establishes guide-
lines for coordinated program efforts to be im-
plemented as rapidly as possible.
The administering authority accepts the
validity of the great majority of the recom-
mendations of this report A few we accept with
i-eservations or modification of approach. For
example, we do not believe that it would be
politically practical to change the existing law
so that noncitizens could own land in Micro-
nesia, which was one of the recommendations in
the report. We feel that economic development
368
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
objectives can bo well served by long-term
leases.
We are already encouraging outside investors
to explore business opportunities in Micronesia.
The resulting enterprises, however, should pro-
vide employment opportunity for Micronesians
and make provision for Micronesian participa-
tion in management and ownership.
The need to import some selected skills not
locally available is recognized, but we doubt the
necessity and the political acceptability of any
large-scale importation of cheap foreign labor.
The preferable alternative is to accelerate train-
ing programs and vocational instruction as
rapidly as possible.
During the period of the Nathan study, the
economy of Micronesia did not stand still. Prog-
ress has been slow, but there have been some
gains. For example, we have experienced rapid
growth of credit unions and cooperatives. By
the end of the 1966 calendar year the niunber of
credit unions throughout Micronesia increased
from 26 to 41, or 57 percent. Their combined
assets rose to $y2 million, an increase of 87
percent.
Cooperative activity also expanded during
1966. At the end of the year there were 24 co-
operative associations in existence, an increase
of eight from the preceding year. These coop-
eratives had approximately 6,200 members, or
one member from every 2.5 families in Micro-
nesia. They had gross revenues approaching
$4 million.
Agriculture
Agriculture, with an estimated value product
of close to $12 million, is the largest source of
real income and support for the people in
Micronesia today. However, the administration,
well aware of the impending increase in de-
mand upon its limited labor supply and increas-
ing costs of living, is not satisfied with the
present level of agricultural production. A
critical evaluation of the total agricultural
program has been undertaken to determine ways
and means of increasing production of both
domestic and export crops and the subsequent
return to the producers.
Programs will be reviewed to improve the
technology of both home-garden and cash-crop
production. A fertilizer demonstration program
will be initiated. Funds have been set aside to
purchase both heavy equipment for land clear-
ing and machinery for demonstration farming
in those districts where mechanization is feasi-
ble and can provide the greatest impact. Con-
sideration is being given to redirecting the
empliasis of our agricultural stations away from
experimentation and toward demonstration
farming.
The rice, pepper, and cacao pilot projects are
being evaluated. Results of the cacao feasibility
study carried out by the Nathan team show that
cacao at the current scale of production is un-
economical. Eesults of a revised program, with
additional effort aimed at increasing production
through fiscal 1968, will determine whether we
will expand tliis program further or phase it
out in fiscal 1969.
The plant disease and pest control sections
are continuing their efforts to control the rhi-
noceros beetle in Palau and eradicate the melon
fly on Rota, and efforts are being continued to
determine the cause of the Pingelap disease
of breadfruit. This disease is prevalent in the
South Pacific, in the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk,
and Marianas districts, and is a serious problem.
The new trust territory-Peace Corps program
for agriculture, which will place major em-
phasis on increasing copra production has been
developed, and it is expected to be implemented
this fall with the arrival of the additional Peace
Corps manpower. The objective here is to in-
crease copra production by 30 percent in 2 to 4
years and possibly by more than 100 percent in
8 to 10 years.
During the year, 11 Micronesians have either
completed or are undergoing agricultural tech-
nical training outside the trust territory. These
include a plant quarantine and weed control
training pi'ogram at the East-West Center in
Hawaii, a paddy rice culture training program
in Taiwan, and a forestry training program at
the Bulolo Forestry Training Center in the
territory of Papua and New Guinea.
The administration is presently investigating
the possibility and the benefits which might
accrue from direct participation of the United
States Department of Agriculture in ongoing
trust territory agricultural programs.
We are anticipating a more than 100 percent
increase in the total domestic demand for mar-
ketable foods by 1973 and a shift away from
homegrown to marketed food items of some 50
percent by 1973- This could result in an in-
crease of from $5 million to $10 million in food
imports. Our objective here will be to increase
the ability of the local farmers to produce to
fill tliis anticipated gap. Consistent program
SEPTEMBER 18, 19G7
369
evaluation with redii'ection as necessary should
provide the local producers with the necessary
technical support to enable them to capture a
fair share of the projected domestic market.
Copra continues to be the largest export item
of the trust territory, with over 12.000 tons
valued at $2 million estimated to be exported
during the fiscal period. However, this amounts
to a decline in production and a decrease of
$600,000 in earnings fi'om the previous year.
This decline was largely the result of disruption
of field-trip vessel service in the Marshalls and
Truk districts and the low world market price
of copra, which continued to decline up through
November of 1966. Tlie Copra Stabilization
Fund now stands at a low of $383,000, having
paid the producers $355,000 during this period
while maintaining the price of a short ton of
copra at $102.50. In line with a resolution passed
by the Congress of Micronesia at its last ses-
sion, the membership of the board of directors
of the Copra Stabilization Board has been in-
creased to include a representative from each
district in the territory.
Regardless of the extent to which the world
price of copra may fluctuate, copra is, and as far
as we can determine will continue to be, a major
source of income to a large portion of the citi-
zens of the trust territory for some time to come.
In line with this reasoning, we are launching a
program to upgrade our copra production
through coconut grove rehabilitation in an ef-
fort to safeguard this very important source
of income and subsistence to the outisland
inhabitants.
A 2-year contract has been awarded to the
United Micronesian Development Association
to purchase and market copra in tlie territory.
This was the first territory-wide contract
awarded a Micronesian firm. Atkins-KroU and
Company of San Francisco has been the market-
ing agent for copra for the past 12 years.
Mobil Oil Micronesia, a corporation orga-
nized under the laws of the trust territory, was
granted a contract for the establishment of a
commercially operated petroleum supply, stor-
age, and distribution system throughout the
territoiy. The distribution of the petroleum had
previously been handled by the Government.
The contract has resulted in a reduction in fuel
costs generally approximating 15 percent, and
it will provide private enterprise with Micro-
nesian participation throughout the districts.
Micronesian district managers are currently
being trained in the Philippines. Stock owner-
ship by Micronesians is also available.
The Economic Development Loan Fimd is
presently capitalized at $700,000, and our goal
is to raise the capital level to $1 million. Since
last July, 19 direct loans totaling $193,000 (an
increase of $37,000 over 1966) have been granted
to individuals to assist in new enterprises or to
expand existing businesses.
Additionally, the Fund guaranteed 10 bank
loans for a total of $285,700. This was an in-
crease of $158,000 over the previous period. The
board of directors of the Fund is prepared to
provide technical assistance to borrowers for
the improvement of their projects. A loan spe-
cialist was hired to assist the board in carrying
out this program and in followmg up the vari-
ous loan applications and loan projects.
During the past year development of the ma-
rine resources of the territory continued. In
Palau the boatbuilding cooperative built a total
of 60 boats ranging up to 75 feet and valued
at approximately $150,000.
At the present time there are approximately
25 men participating in the Hawaii skipjack
fisheries training program, which gives each
man 2 years of commercial fishing experience.
Returning trainees are expected to participate
in commercial fishing in the trust territory.
The commercial tuna fishing vessels in Palau
landed 3,010 short tons of tuna valued at $280,-
000 during the year.
The Palau Fishermen's Cooperative, which
produced approximately three-quarters of a
million pounds of reef fish for local and export
sales, recently has completed some packaging
trials and is planning on setting up a small
packaging operation. The fishing cooperative on
Truk has purchased a small iceplant of its own
and is now erecting a cold storage facility. These
will make it possible to increase the production
of reef fish in the Truk lagoon.
In the meantime, we have received many ex-
pressions of interest in the possibility of estab-
lishing a marine biological and oceanic research
center in Palau. "We believe that a useful pro-
gram of pure and applied research can be
established on Koror if we can finance suitable
laboratories and buildings adequately equipped
for research purposes.
An islander's most precious possession is his
land. In Micronesia this attachment to the land
is magnified by the fact that, in this ocean area
of some 3 million square miles, the land area
370
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN'
of all the 2,000 islands combined totals only
some 700 square miles.
The Division of Land Management, which
has been established for nearly 2 years, is re-
sponsible for the administration of approxi-
mately 236,000 acres of public lands scattered
over hundreds of islands and atolls. Land ad-
ministration and land tenure problems are com-
plex. They are typical of most developing terri-
tories of the Pacific, where there is an increasing
requirement for land areas for expanding capi-
tal improvement programs. We need to estab-
lish criteria for determining Government re-
quirements in relation to the enduring demand
for return of lands to private ownership and
use.
Transportation
Our transportation services and equipment
are obsolete and critically inadequate. One of
our most pressing needs is to obtain new ships
properly designed for trade and travel within
and between the districts.
In this connection, I particularly noted the
visiting mission's statement that it ". . . can
think of no single step which would be better
calculated to invigorate the economy and en-
courage its growth than the improvement of
shipping services between the islands and the
districts and the outside world."
We are currently considering acquisition of
new vessels for administrative use so that our
doctors, nurses, educational administrators, and
other members of the staff do not have to depend
on the tight, commercial schedules of the trad-
ing ships to get the necessary work done in the
outlying islands.
The larger logistic ships on which we depend
for inward and outward movement of goods
and equipment also are obsolete. The present
contract for the operation of these ships will
expire at the end of August. We are at present
developing a new set of specifications and will
invite proposals from carriers who may be in-
terested in providing services with newer ships
better designed for our needs.
With respect to air transportation, the report
of the visiting mission noted that "services pro-
vided are neither sufficient nor sufficiently regu-
lar and there is a requirement for improved air
services."
The administration agi-ees, and we have is-
sued an invitation for proposals from qualified
air carriers to provide improved services with
better frequencies of flights and, we hope, bet-
ter equipment. Our timetable calls for such im-
proved services to be inaugurated no later than
January 1 of next year.
Education
The foregoing j>ortion of this review has
dwelt mainly on the material aspect of our
various activities; that is, upon money, eco-
nomic development, transportation, power,
water, land. In the concluding portion of this
report, therefore, I shall focus on the human
element — the people of Micronesia — on what is
being done to help them to cope with changing
conditions, to help them develop self-reliance,
a capacity for self-detemiination.
The program areas that have the most inter-
related influence on the Micronesian citizen and
his ability to deal successfidly with the chal-
lenges and uncertainties confronting liim are
education, health, community development, and
political action.
There is evidence that our approach to educa-
tion and the present system of instruction in
the elementary and secondary levels are not pro-
ducing the results that the people of Micronesia
deserve and that we had hoped to achieve.
Some statistics are impressive, showing a
steady increase in school enrollment, more class-
rooms built, more scholarships ofi'ered each year.
But we have other concerns : the quality and the
content of education. These need attention, as
noted in the report of the visiting mission.
These comments are not intended to minimize
the substantial achievement of those Micro-
nesians who have gone on to or through college
or those who ha,ve developed skills in trades
and professions. But it appears they have done
so because they have been individually moti-
vated and they cannot be claimed as typical
products of our present educational system.
Perhaps we should not be too discouraged by
what appears to be a lack of progress here, be-
cause it was as recent as 1961 — only 6 years
ago — that the administering authority under-
took to accelerate and coordinate a greatly ex-
panded educational program, including school
construction.
This past year, we have been reevaluating our
efl'orts. We are attempting to identify needs that
are not being met and devise new concepts and
new procedures to do a better job.
SEPTEMBER 18, 19G7
371
The Xathan study calls for more emphasis on
vocational and trade training. We are planning
to establish at least one polytechnic high school,
and we will be placing more emphasis on voca-
tional coui'ses in the existing high schools.
We have had a study made of the feasibility
of adapting educational television to our school
program. The conclusion of that study was that
educational television could be applied in some
of the districts ; but cost estimates were so sub-
stantial that we have tempoi-arily deferred any
decision or action.
Within the past few months we have con-
tracted witli the Stanford Research Institute to
do an overall evaluation of our educational sys-
tem. This will cover curriculum, goals, quality
of instruction, administrative organization, and
other related factors.
Meanwhile, during the year the number of
public elementary schools increased from 171 to
178, while the enrolbnents in grades 1 to 8
climbed from 18,788 to 20,087, or an increase of
1,299. Enrollments in private schools increased
706 in grades 1 to 8, and over 200 in grades 9 to
12. Total enrollment in both public and private
schools has increased during the past 4 years
from 20,813 in 1963 to 29,724— aknost 30,000—
in 1967. Three hundred and eighteen Micro-
nesian students are enrolled in the schools of
Guam. The total estimated number of trust ter-
ritory students who will graduate from high
schools this year is 544.
Of the 291 Micronesian students seeking
higher education abroad, 141 are on full-
support Government scholarships. Forty-two
of tliese are studying in medical or paramedical
fields. Sixty-eight students received partial
scholarship support in the form of tuition or
transpoi-tation assistance. The remaining 82 stu-
dents received assistance from various private
sources. Additionally, 141 Micronesians re-
ceived short-teiTn training in 36 different fields
at the Institute for Teclinical Interchange at
the East-West Center in Hawaii. Five students
were abroad under United Nations technical
assistance programs. Many other Micronesians
received technical training under various pro-
grams offered to the territory.
Major emphasis lias been placed on the teach-
ing of English as a second language. A system of
instruction which lias proved effective in other
Pacific islands is being adapted to our educa-
tional program in Micronesia. This is known as
the Tate Oral English Syllabus.
Some 19,000 public and 4,600 private school
children have benefited from programs under
the jDrovisions of tlie Elementary and Second-
ary Education Act. Special courses have been
offered in remedial English and reading, com-
mercial education, science instruction, and
"catch up" education for youths who have
dropped out of school. In addition, 41 experi-
enced American teachers were employed in a
project which emphasizes teaching English as
a second language.
In the meantime, within the budget limits
within which we were operating prior to the re-
cent new ceiling legislation, we have continued
some school construction. Ninety-six classrooms
were completed during the year ; 97 emergency
classrooms for public elementary schools are
expected to be completed by February of 1968.
Health
Health services and facilities in Micronesia
are far from satisfactory, as the visiting mission
noted. We have not achieved nearly as much
progress as we had hoped for following the
critical report of tlie World Health Organiza-
tion of more than a year ago. However, there
have recently been some encouraging develop-
ments which lead us to believe that a year hence
we shall have more to show for our efforts than
we do at this time.
The year-long quest for a new director of
health ended successfully a few weeks ago with
the hiring of Dr. William Peck, whose experi-
ence appears especially applicable to our needs.
Since 1964 Dr. Peck has been in Malawi in Cen-
tral Africa, supervising health programs con-
ducted in that country by the School of Public
Health of the University of North Carolina.
He has worked closely with the Malawi Ministry
of Health and has supervised 41 Peace Corps
volunteers, as well as African health workers.
From 1959 to 1964 he was head of the Division
of Public Health of the territory of Guam.
■While there, he helped coordinate health pro-
grams with the trust territory's medical di-
rector.
We are considering moving this position up to
cabinet level to strengthen responsibility for
health-program development and administra-
tion.
In tlie meantime, the departmental staff has
been augmented by a hospital administrator, an
administrative assistant, and a medical records
librarian. The recruitment of eight fully ac-
credited physicians has been authorized and
372
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
funded since 1964, but we have had great dif-
ficulty in filling tliese vacancies, largely because
of the worldwide shortage of doctors.
A serious epidemic of infantile gastro-
enteritis broke out in Ebeye late in April of
this year. Despite the imposition of rigorous
sanitation measures and the prompt dispatch of
medicines and a senior medical officer to the
scene, five deaths resulted among the more than
700 cases of this disease. A quarantine was in-
stituted, but it was not successful in preventing
the spread of the disease to nearby Likiep atoll
and to the district center of Majuro. In tlie two
latter areas the epidemic, I am glad to say, has
been milder in impact and less widespread, with
no deaths reported to date.
Once again the outbreak of communicable
disease on Ebeye has pointed up the urgency
for reducing the population of that crowded
island of some 72 acres. Plans are now under-
way to repatriate approximately 1,000 persons
who are not native residents of that atoll and
who we feel should return to their homes else-
where in the Marshalls or other districts.
Following upon a territory-wide health cen-
sus now 90 percent complete, plans have been
made, in cooperation with the University of
Hawaii, for surveys of the incidence of tuber-
culosis, leprosy, and filariasis. Peace Corps
volunteers will be utilized to a large extent in
this program.
During the past year the territory has been
visited by 26 public health consultants, repre-
senting swell agencies as the World Health
Organization, the University of Hawaii, the
University of Southern California, the National
Institutes of Health, the College of Guam, and
the Government of Guam.
Twelve students entered Central Medical
School, Fiji, in January and are enrolled in
medical, dental, and paramedical fields. These
are the first Micronesians to attend the school in
Fiji since the use of this institution was sus-
pended in 1962. Forty other Micronesians are
studying abroad at the present time on medical
scholarships. Three completed WHO fellow-
ships. Six members of the public health staff
participated in WHO seminars in the fields of
statistics, training of health workers, and en-
vironmental health.
The 13th annual medical survey of the people
of Rongelap was carried out in March by joint
teams representing the Atomic Energy Com-
mission and the trust territory. Fortunately, no
unusual findings were noticed during this sur-
vey. An exposed boy, who had not been ex-
amined during the past few years because he
was living on another island, had developed a
nodule in the thyroid gland. Hormone therapy
was prescribed rather than surgei-y.
Community Development
The community development program has
continued in rural and urban areas throughout
the territory, with increased emphasis on im-
proving services and self-imiDrovement efforts in
the territory's congested urban communities,
where more than 30 percent of the people of
Micronesia now reside.
Community action agencies have been chart-
ered in each of the six districts. These private,
nonprofit bodies have applied for more than
$200,000 in grants from the Office of Economic
Opportunity for the conduct of Head Start
programs for an estimated 1,500 preschool chil-
dren. An additional $500,000 has been requested
for other programs designed to mitigate the
effects of poverty in our island communities.
With such agencies actively functioning, it is
anticipated that the people of Micronesia will
be able to participate in other OEO-sponsored
programs next year.
The program of Government grants-in-aid
to communities has been active in all districts.
In a typical grant-in-aid project, a community
which has the manpower but insufficient fi-
nancial resources joins forces with the Govern-
ment to erect needed community facilities.
Grants-in-aid may also be used for the purchase
of capital equipment or otherwise unobtainable
social services. Since December of last year
over $92,000 in Government funds has been
awarded in grants ranging from $700 to $34,000
to 21 communities. As their share, the people
have pledged all labor, valued at $28,000, as
well as $5,600 of their meager cash resources.
Postwar Damage Claims
During the period September 21 to Novem-
ber 4, 1966, a three-man team appointed by the
Secretary of the Interior traveled throughout
the trust territory to conduct an investigation
of unpaid postsecure World War II damage
claims against the United States.
As a result of the investigation, the team re-
ported that there were a substantial number of
unpaid claims against the United States for
postwar damage to land, buildings, crops, trees,
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
373
and other personal property. A total of 889
claims lias been received. It is expected that a
small number of additional claims will be sub-
mitted, but it is believed that a substantial
majority of possible claims have now been
registered.
As a followup to the investigation, a claims
office is being established in the office of the
attorney general at trust territory headquarters.
The major task of this office will be to refine
the existing claims data to eliminate those re-
sulting from wartime activities, identify those
which appear to be duplications, and establish
identification of claimants or their heirs. Once
the claims data are evaluated and refined, the
Government should be in a position to recom-
mend a formula for settlement.
At the request of tlie Congress of Micronesia,
an investigation of Japanese postal savings and
Japanese yen currency conversion claims was
made during the year. The response to requests
for submission of such claims was negligible.
This categoiy of claims now appears to have
been satisfactorily settled in 1957, when the
Trust Territory Govermnent received postal
savings claims and paid out $25,000 to the Micro-
nesian claimants.
Political Affairs
If our record of achievement in Micronesia is
not studded with success in all areas of adminis-
trative responsibility, there is one where the
progress has been impressive.
In the relatively short time that tliey have
been encouraged to do so, the Micronesians have
demonstrated an ability to understand and use
the democratic political process.
With perception and quality standards, they
have selected some of the ablest individuals in
the teiTitory to represent them in the district
legislatures and in the Congress of Micronesia.
This not only reflects favorably on the growing
maturity and reliability of the Micronesian
voter, but it also credits, I believe, the prior
administration with solid achievement in the
area of political development.
From the administrative point of view, how-
ever, this progress presently tends to be some-
what paradoxically self-defeating. This is
because most of the ablest legislators selected by
the discriminating voters are also persons who
have been chosen for responsible positions in the
executive branch of government. Either the
legislative or the executive branches stand to
lose some top talent in the 1968 elections when
some Government employees who are also mem-
bers of the Congress must decide whether to con-
tinue to run for office or pursue a career as a
Government employee.
Fortunately, this day of decision will leave
neither the legislative nor executive arms of the
Government without reserves to draw upon to
replace losses which either side may suffer. There
are many promising persons in Government
who are not members of the legislatures, and
there should be opportunity for those with the
proper training to move into vacated positions.
This, of course, also points up the urgency of
developing the economy of the territory so that
there will be more employment opportunity out-
side of Government service. In addition, it un-
derscores the importance of better training for
Government employees. This is necessary to
have a reserve of qualified replacements for
Micronesians who seek employment elsewhere.
It is even more important in relation to our re-
sponsibility to prepare Micronesians adequately
for positions now held by Americans.
We are making progress in tliis direction. The
past year saw a start of a management intern
program. This is designed to identify, select,
and train young Micronesians for positions of
leadersliip in government. The selections are by
competitive examination to minimze personal
favoritism. The first year of employment has
been devoted to plamied, systematic training in
the fundamentals of the intern's field of
specialization.
A program to rotate Micronesian assistant
district administrators is being prepared. The
object here is to broaden their experience and
expose them to the differmg political environ-
ments and the geogi-aphical conditions which
distingiiish each district and result in adminis-
trative requirements peculiar to each district.
In addition, it is planned to assign one Micro-
nesian assistant district administrator as the
administrative assistant to the High Commis-
sioner. In this position lie will become familiar
with headquarters operations and have direct
administrative contact with all departments at
the headquarters level. The availability of such
a person should also help strengthen administra-
tive coordination between headquarters and the
districts.
We have also recently establislied a policy
to have representative Micronesian staff mem-
374
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
bers participate in cabinet meetings. The pur-
pose is not only to acquaint Micronesian
emploj'ees with major problems and issues con-
fronting the administration, but to bring them
actively into the planning and decisionmaking
process.
A revision of the Micronesian title and pay
plan will become effective July 1, 1967. This will
provide for substantial wage increases for
skilled craftsmen and craft supervisors. There
will also be significant increases for clerical
and administrative personnel.
Congress of Micronesia
The second regular session of the Congress,
wliich convened July 11, 1966, concluded its
30-day session on August 9. This was followed
by a short special session to reconsider certain
appropriation bills, a proposed election law, and
to review the trust territory budget prior to its
submission to Washington. Of the 149 bills in-
troduced during the Congress, 29 passed both
Houses, and 27 were signed into law.
One of the most important of these was the
Merit System Act, covering Micronesian em-
ployees. Among the features incorporated in
that important law were: (1) the appointment
of a territorial personnel board; (2) the pro-
tection against arbitrary and discriminatory
punisliment of employees through procedural
guarantees of due process and a system of ap-
peals; (3) a provision for competitive appoint-
ments through examinations; (4) an employee
coimcil to act as official spokesman for em-
ployees on matters affecting their pay, status,
and working conditions ; and (5) authorization
for a retirement system, group life insurance,
annual and sick leave, and other benefits.
Over 90 percent of all Micronesian and con-
tract employees are now covered by the group
life and accident insurance. Recommendations
for a complete social security plan, developed by
the Chief Actuary of the United States Social
Security Administration, providing retirement
benefits for wage earners in both public and
private employment are presently imder con-
sideration.
Our administration has been preparing a leg-
islative program to present to the third regular
session of the Congress of Micronesia, which
will open July 10. We have transmitted to the
Congress for advance study some 25 proposals
originated by department heads and district ad-
ministrators. Those proposals include the Gov-
ernment employees retirement plan previously
mentioned, laws to standardize and improve the
administration of elections, legislation for the
conservation of both land and marine resources
and for more effective tax collection, controls
or protection to trust territory citizens in the
areas of claims against the Government, laws
regulating the sale of securities and providing
for the standardization of weights and meas-
ures, and a law related to the acquisition of land
for public use.
In making these remarks, I have referred at
times to the report of the visiting mission. As
an independent audit of the administration of
the trust territory, this report was perceptive
and helpful. Those of us who had the pleasure
to meet the members of the visiting mission dur-
ing their tour of the islands last February were
impressed with the range and depth of their
interest and their evident concern for the peo-
ple of Micronesia, a concern which, I am sure,
is shared by other members of the Trusteeship
Council and by the administering authority.
In the foregoing report, I have sought to
speak with candor. It serves neither pride nor
purpose to gloss over failure or to overstate
accomplishment. That some progress has been
made is evident. That meaningful progress has
lagged in some areas is also evident.
The capability of the Trust Territoiy Admin-
istration has been strengthened and will be
strengthened further. The Congress and the
President of the United States have recognized
that we must have additional fimds and re-
sources to fulfill our responsibility to Micronesia
under terms of the trusteeship agi'eement. They
also insist that there must be a showing that re-
sults are being achieved. Members of the
Trusteeship Coimcil have provided an inde-
pendent, perceptive, and constructive surveil-
lance over our efforts.
The United Nations trusteeship agreement
has been in existence for some 20 years. We all
recognize that the time should be now approach-
ing for the citizens of Micronesia to decide for
themselves what future political and govern-
mental structure they prefer.
Wliatever this decision may be and whenever
it may come, it should be made in an environ-
ment which offers hope, health, and oppor-
timity to the citizens of Micronesia and assures
them that we have fulfilled our obligation to
them.
SEPTEMBER 18, 1967
375
STATEMENT BY MR. SALII
Madam President, I bring to you and to all
the other members of this august body greetings
from my colleagues in the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate of the Congress of Micro-
nesia and the people of the ti-ust territory. It is a
great privilege and honor for me to be accorded
the ojDportunity to appear before you today. I
shall always cherish the honor and the
experience.
Our High Commissioner, the Honorable Wil-
liam R. Norwood, has amply presented to this
Council the past accomplishments, the current
programs, and the future planning for the Trust
Territory Government, and there is no need for
me to impose on the time and indulgence of tliis
Council in repeating these matters.
There are three ways to view and to evaluate
problems and conditions in the trust territory
through the eyes of the United Nations visiting
missions to the trust territory, the most recent
such mission having visited tlie area earlier this
year; through the eyes of the administering
authority; or through the eyes of the Micro-
nesian people themselves.
I would like to address myself to the task of
presenting to this Council a brief review of some
of the major problems we have and areas of
progress which have been made, as I think the
Micronesians in general see these problems and
the areas of progress and, more specifically, as I
think the Congress of Micronesia sees them.
It should be pointed out at the outset that the
challenges in Micronesia are enormous in their
complexity and magnitude and nearly over-
whelming in their profusion and seeming ability
to multiply, while the tools, the equipment, and
the resources necessary to meet these chaJlenges
are not always available in either the quality or
quantity required.
The mission of developing a viable economy — •
a primary consideration in the total advance-
ment of the ten-itory — has been diiBcult, al-
though much has been accomplished and more
continues to be accomplished. "Wliile recogniz-
ing that many of the difficulties in developing a
viable economy in Micronesia are due to physical
factors which have built-in limitations on what
can be done, such as the islands' scattered loca-
tion, small size, and insularity, as well as their
deficiency in most of the natural resources gen-
erally considered essential for the development
of an island industry, we feel that there are
existing problems and conditions which can and
should be eliminated in order to accelerate fur-
ther economic development and growth.
Several of these are easily identifiable.
The existing tariff on Micronesian goods en-
tering the United States, the restrictions on
trade between ]\Iicronesia and foreign coun-
tries, the restrictive policies on immigration and
admission of non-United States citizens into the
trust territory, and the infusion of more United
States and foreign capital and skilled man-
power should at this time be examined and
evaluated in the light of present demands and
the future economic needs of the trust territory.
The role of the Government in the total econ-
omy of Micronesia must be tempered by the
increasing capacity of Micronesian entrepre-
neurs to assiune a more active role and partici-
pation in the economic development of the
Islands. Personally, I do not want to see the
Government dominating the whole field of
economic development programs merely be-
cause it has financial credit, monopoly of skilled
manpower, size, and organization. I prefer see-
ing the Government steering away from
economic development programs and providing
incentives to the private sector to wax and grow
in a lalssez faire atmosphere. If this means
bringing in foreign capital and labor, we should
like to see a movement in that direction by
abandoning certain restrictions with the ap-
proval of the Congress of Micronesia, maintain-
ing or creating, however, whatever safeguards
will be necessary to insure that the Microne-
sians will share in the resulting prosperity.
We should like to see in the trust territory
gi-eater progress in the modernization and ra-
tionalization of land development, agriculture,
forestrv, and fishery programs. Many Micro-
nesians feel that the trust territoi-y can benefit
from the technical assistance and expertise
available from other United States Government
agencies such as the Department of Agi'iculture,
Bureau of Land Management, Public Health
Service, the Department of Labor, and so forth.
The Peace Corps, on balance, has been a bless-
ing to Micronesia, and the programs under the
Office of Economic Opportimity which are just
beginning to get off the ground look very prom-
ising indeed. Perhaps more technical assistance
and experts could be obtained from South
Pacific countries such as Australia, New Zea-
land, and others.
The Government continues to hold title to and
control a great percentage of arable land in
376
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJIXETIN
Mici-onesica. The homestead program as a meth-
od of returning lands to Micronesians has not
kept abreast with modern land development
and land management practices, with the
steadily growing population, and the concur-
rent demand for planned agriculture, industrial,
and residential subdivisions. As land is basic to
a viable economy, it is essential that land man-
agement be staffed in each district with experi-
enced professional and teclmical personnel and
that training programs currently in operation
be enlarged.
In two and perhaps three districts the people
have shown an eagerness to develop tourism as
an industry, but such a proposition appears
saddled with difficulties such as land-use plan-
ning, poor water sj'stems, lack of power and
sewage systems, combined with poor roads and
a generally inadequate transportation system.
It is encouraging to the Micronesians to note,
however, that the administration is cognizant
of these difficulties and of the great potential of
tourism in Micronesia and has already taken
some of the necessary first steps in the direction
of developing this industry.
Wliile traveling through the six districts in
January and February, the interim committees
of the Senate and the House of the Congress of
Micronesia noted that public health services,
especially in the outer islands, continue to be
plagued by difficulties in communication and
transportation, inadequate supplies, acceptable
facilities, and properly trained manpower to do
a decent job.
In the field of education, high school grad-
uates are generally ill-prepared to earn a living
in Micronesia at present. That is because the
high school curriculum is primarily academic
and college preparatory, even though the great
majority of the high school graduates do not
go on to college. It is our hope that the current
study of our educational system will give
breath, scope, orientation, and direction as to
where our school program should head. It ap-
pears that we need Micronesians not only in
law, medicine, and the liberal arts but also —
and in greater numbers — those trained as tech-
nicians, administrative, executive, and man-
agerial personnel, bookkeepers, skilled machine
operators, craftsmen, and other skilled workers.
Thus, our educational system should at this
I stage be oriented toward high-level Micronesian
manpower for the critically important adminis-
trative, technical, and educational work of de-
velopment and nation-building, together with
intermediate-lcA^el supporting occupations and
toward making provision for training larger
numbers of skilled manpower, artisans, crafts-
men, and operatives required for an island
economic development.
In commerce, the business capacity of cor-
porations and businesses in the trust territory
lacks the standing and stature to secure loans
and financial credits on a par with like busi-
nesses and comjianies outside the territory at
the prevailing market level of economic ac-
tivity. The several credit unions and coopera-
tive associations which now serve as a mainstay
of commercial activity for many Micronesians
are only recently beginning to have any sig-
nificant influence on the stream of commerce
and would not have any overriding effect on the
total economy for some time to come.
By recounting all these things, I do not mean
to slight the progress that has been made in
Micronesia, nor do I intend to belittle the posi-
tive and ambitious plans and programs now
being carried out in the trust territory. Nor do
I mean to imply that these problems are the
problems of the administering authority
alone, and not of the Micronesians themselves
as well. Rather, by doing so I feel that this body
can better appreciate the many challenges,
problems, and tasks remaining before all of us
in Micronesia, despite unrelenting and sustained
efforts of the administering authority and the
people of Micronesia to seek and to explore new
avenues of solutions to meet those problems.
My colleagues in the House and the Senate
of the Congress of Micronesia place great trust
and confidence in our energetic High Commis-
sioner and in the United States as the acbnin-
istering authority for Micronesia. There is, I
believe, a genuine feeling of partnership be-
tween the administration and the Congress of
Micronesia. The development program for the
trust territory which our High Commissioner
has presented here has our explicit support. Tlie
newly raised ceiling of Federal grant expendi-
tures in the tiiist territory, coming shortly after
the release of the Nathan report and the eco-
nomic development plan for Micronesia, is a
timely blessing for the people of Micronesia.
The Congress of Micronesia intends to play
a key role in the direction and the manner
which the overall development of Micronesia
will take. Although circumscribed by the extent
of its legal authority and the resources available
at its disposal, the Congress strongly favors
more involvement and participation of ISIicro-
SEPTEMBER 18, IGei
377
nesians in the political and economic develop-
ment of the trust territory. There are already
some very encouraging signs that we are going
to move in this direction more rapidly in the
future.
But perhaps this brief presentation will not be
complete if I do not make mention of the politi-
cal future of Micronesia. "VVe in the Congress
of Micronesia are well aware of the urgency of
this question and have deliberated upon it dur-
ing the last two sessions of the Congress. We
recognize that Micronesia is but one of three
remainmg ti-usteeships, and the strides that
Nauru and New Guinea are making toward self-
determination and possible independence in the
next few years have not gone unnoticed by the
Congress of Micronesia. A number of bills and
resolutions were introduced in the last session
of the Congress proposing to create a commis-
sion to make a study and recommendations on
this question ; ^ others called upon designated
persons to make such a study and make known
their feelings. These expressions of interest,
however, are only tentative and perhaps prema-
ture at this point. We do not want to exercise, at
this time, our interest in the right of self-deter-
mination until our people have acquired a first-
hand knowledge of both the benefits and the
responsibilities under each of the possible alter-
natives available to us in the present 20th-
century context. We want a chance to learn the
issues so that we can wisely exercise our right of
self-determination. We hope that time is on our
side. We feel most fortunate that durmg tlus
interim period we have as our partner in the
development of our islands the United States of
America.
The Micronesians do not ask for much. We
do not want to see our islands as a political
buffer area, nor do we want to be buffeted
around in mternational politics. We would like
to have, however, a measure of economic well-
being, a measure of acceptable living standards,
and a measure of political stability so that what-
ever the decision will be regarding our future
political status, Micronesia can meaningfully
contribute to the peace and security of the
community of nations. This, after all, was the
purpose, if not the reason, why Micronesia came
under the Trusteeship Council of the United
Nations, and it is certainly the reason for which
I was selected by my colleagues in the Congress
of Micronesia to appear before you today.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at New York
October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957.
Acceptance deposited: Uganda, August 30, 1967.
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratifications deposited: France, August 21, 1967;
Japan, August 17, 1967 ; Norway, August 16, 1967 ;
Togo, August 11, 1967.
Judicial Procedure
Convention on the service abroad of judicial and ex-
trajudicial documents in civil or commercial mat-
ters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965.'
Ratification deposited: United States, August 24,
1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly December 21, 1965.'
Signature: Argentina, July 13, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Sierra Leone, August 2, 1967.
Sea
Convention for the International Council for the Ex-
ploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Septem-
ber 12, 1964.'
Ratification deposited: Belgium, July 20, 1967.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agreement relating to cooperation on civil emergency
planning, with statement of principles. Effected by
exchange of notes at Ottawa August 8, 1967. En-
tered Into force August 8, 1967.
India
Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with an-
nex. Effected by exchange of notes at Wa.shington
August 31, 1967. Entered into force August 31, 1967.
• See p. 363.
' Not In force.
378
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BtTLLETIN
INDEX September 18, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. U7S
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 364
President Urges Study of Future of Pacific
Islands Trust Territory (texts of letter and
draft joint resolution) 363
Iran. President Johnson and the Shah of Iran
Hold Talks at Washington (Johnson, Pah-
lavi) 358
Jordan. liCtters of Credence (Sharaf) .... 3C2
Non-Self -Governing Territories
President Urges Study of Future of Pacific
Islands Trust Territory (texts of letter and
draft joint resolution) 303
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(Anderson, Norwood, Salii) 365
Presidential Documents
President Johnson and the Shah of Iran Hold
Talks at Washington 358
President Urges Study of Future of Pacific
Islands Trust Territory 363
Publications. Recent Releases 364
Science. Soviet Union Bars Completion of U.S.
Scientific Voyage (Department statement) . 362
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 378
U.S.S.R- Soviet Union Bars Completion of U.S.
Scientific Voyage (Department statement) . 362
United Nations. The Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (Anderson, Norwood, Salii) . 365
Viet-Nam
American Group To Observe Elections in Viet-
Nam (Lodge) 349
American Purposes and the Pursuit of Human
Dignity (Rusk) 343
Mr. Buudy Discusses Viet-Nam on "Meet the
Press" 352
Yugoslavia. IjCtters of Credence (Crnobrnja) . 302
Name Index
Anderson. Eugenie 365
Bundy, William P 352
Crnobrnja, Bogdan 302
Johnson, President 358,363
Lodge, Henry Cabot 349
Norwood, William R 365
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah 358
Rusk, Secretary 343
Salii. Lazarus 305
Sharaf, Abdul Hamid 362
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Aug. 25-Sept. 3
Press releases may be obtained from the OflBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
No. Date Subject
tlSO 8/31 U.S.-India cotton textile UKveement.
tHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
U.S. GOVEBHMENr POINTING. 0?flCE; 198'
Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office
WASHINGTON. D.C.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICI]
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. U74
September 25, 1967
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 8 383
GROUP OF TEN AGREES ON PLAN FOR CREATION
OF NEW INTERNATIONAL MONETARY RESER^HE ASSET
Statements hy President Johnson
and Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler 392
Text of Group of Ten Gommwnlque 396
For index see inside back cover
1
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1474 Publication 8292
September 25, 1967
For sale by tlio Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Ottice
W.ishington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
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Single copy 30 cents
Use of funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of llie Bureau of
the Budget (.January 11, IflCG).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source wlU be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
Tlie Department of State BULLETm,
a tceefc/y publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
tvith information on developments in
the field of foreign rela tions and on
the icork of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of tlie Department, as tt<el{ as special
articles on various phases of inter rui-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States IS or may become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative nutterial in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of September 8
Press release 190 dated September 8
Secretary Rusk : We're coming into a period
of considerable activity in the international
political field, certainly as far as I personally
am concerned. Next week we'll be having our
annual meeting of the Japanese-American Cab-
inet Connnittee here in Washington; and Mr.
[Takeo] Miki, the Foreign Minister, and I will
have a joint press conference at the conclusion
of that meeting.
Then on the 22d, the foreign ministers of the
OAS [Organization of American States] will
be convening here in Washington to take up
the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba; and
at the conclusion of that meeting I will go to
New York for the opening period of the Gen-
eral Assembly, where I customarily go in order
to meet with my colleagues, the foreign min-
isters, who come in large numbers at the open-
ing stages of the Assembly ; so the days ahead
will be rather full.
I don't thiak I'll take your time with an open-
ing statement this morning beyond simply mak-
ing reference to this schedule ; so I'm ready for
your questions.
Q, Mr. Secretary, Governor Rom/ney has
charged the Johnson administration with a
consistent l<wk of candor with the American
people; and he made this charge in connection
with saying that he had been brainwashed on
Viet-Nam. Ho\o do you feel about this?
A. Well, I tliink comments by others have
adequately taken care of that point. Certainly
I fully support Secretary McNamara's state-
ment yesterday that Ambassador Lodge and
General Westmoreland do not attempt to brain-
wash distinguished visitors who go out there,
and you could check with a very laroe number
of the distuiguished visitors who go out and
ask questions and get candid and factual state-
ments from our Ambassador and our Com-
mander in Cliief in Viet-Nam. I don't think
I want to get into what might be called pre-
campaign oratory at this stage.
Q. Mr. Secretary, why is the United States
sounding out other countries about the possi-
bility of taking Viet-Nam to the United Na-
tions? Do you have any reason to believe that
siich an effort would be more fruitful this time
than it has on previous attempts?
World Responsibilities of the U.N.
A. Well, this happens periodically. As you
know, the last time this was before the Security
Council was in January 1966; and we have
sounded out this situation since then, and we are
doing so at the present time. We believe that
the United Nations has a responsibility under
its charter to deal with any situation affecting
international peace and security, and we would
welcome any contribution which the United
Nations can make toward peace in Southeast
Asia.
Now, you know already what the complica-
tions have been. When the Soviet Union — I
think in 1965 [1964] was it? — moved to invite
Hanoi and Saigon to the conference table, we
supported that resolution, and Hanoi refused
to come. You've seen the statements of the
Secretary-General on this point, who feels that
this is not an appropriate matter for the United
Nations under present circumstances. With the
refusal of Hanoi to accept the jurisdiction of
the United Nations, there are a number of mem-
bers of the U.N. who feel that if the U.N. should
take this question up, it might possibly get in the
way of the use of other machinery — for ex-
ample, the Geneva machinery.
In one of the last debates in the Security
Coimcil on this subject, the Soviet representa-
tive made this point, and Ambassador Gold-
berg [U.S. Eepresentative to the United Na-
tions Arthur J. Goldberg] said, "All right, if
that's your view, then let's invoke the Geneva
SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
276-050 — 67
machinery." But when we turned to the Geneva
machinery, the other side won't play on that.
Now, we believe this is a proper concern of
the United Nations. The fact that one party, or
one or two parties, refused to accept the juris-
diction of the United Nations has nothing to do
with the world responsibilities of the U.N. un-
der its own charter. So we'd be glad to have this
matter considered in the U.N.
So we're consulting — we're now in the process
of consulting members, particularly the mem-
bers of the Security Council, to see whetlT^r
there's any way in which the United Nations can
make a contribution toward bringing this mat-
ter to a peaceful conclusion. This is not the
first time, and my guess is it won't be the last
time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a conceivable, practical
possibility that tlie prospective new government
in Saigon could talce the issue of the Viet-Nam
war into a conference somewhere, without the
United States having any part at all — merely
sitting on the sidelines?
A. Well, you remember that during the course
of the Tet cease-fire, the Government in Sai-
gon, Prime Minister Ky, offered to meet repre-
sentatives of Hanoi in the demilitarized zone to
talk about an extension of the cease-fire. We
were completely in favor of that possibility. We
don't stand on ceremony or on channels or make
a decisive question as to whether we ourselves
should take part. We supported, for example,
the idea of an all-Asian conference that would
take up this question, in which we would not
directly participate, so that if Hanoi is prepared
to respond to any opportunities for discussions
with Saigon, we would have no objections
whatever.
Some Reciprocal Action From Hanoi Needed
Q. Mr. Secretary, President-elect Thieu has
said after he''s installed as President he might
ask the United States to institute a bombing
pause. What inight the American reaction be?
A. Well, we keep in close touch with the Gov-
erimient in Saigon on such questions. We cer-
tainly would take very seriously any proposals
made along that line. But he also said — Chair-
man Thieu said — that we needed some response
fi-om Hanoi, we needed some reciprocal action.
Now, we will be in touch with him further
on such questions, as we have been in the past ;
and if we get any kind of response from Hanoi
that would move us toward peace, then we can
take these matters up as an active question.
Now, we've been very disappointed since the
conclusion of the Laos conference in 1962 by the
fact that there's been no response on any occa-
sion through any channel on anyone else's
initiative on the part of Hanoi to move this
situation toward a peaceful settlement.
Now, we want that time to come. We have not
been marking time simply because there's been
an electoral process going on in Viet-Nam, and
the fact that an election of the President is con- i
eluded in Viet-Nam does not basically change "
the situation.
No one wants peace in the situation more than
President Johnson. And all channels, all con-
tacts, all procedures, all mechanisms, have been ||
fully opened and tested at all stages to see
whether Hanoi is prepared to talk seriously
about peace; but thus far we haven't had any
response.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
U.S. Prepared To Talk With Hanoi
Q. Mr. Secretary, General Thieu seemed to
be suggesting that he would ask for a bombing
pause if Hanoi loould simply agree to talk,. Does
the United States still stand on the position that
Hanoi would have to agree to a mutual deesca-
lation?
A. Well, we're prepared to talk about those
questions with Hanoi. Now, there's no point in
my negotiating with them here today. If we are
prepared to stop the bombing as a first step, we ,
would like to Imow very much what the second
step is going to be.
I've said before in my meetings with you
gentlemen that we're rather interested in know-
ing what those divisions of North Vietnamese
troops in and near the demilitarized zone are
going to do if we stop the bombing. I use that
as an example.
Now, we're prepared to talk with Hanoi about
these questions, as I have indicated over and
over again until you gentlemen are bored with
it — we are prepared to negotiate today without
any conditions whatever, and we're prepared to
negotiate about conditions if the other side
wants to raise conditions.
Now, it's just as simple as that; and details
have to be left for the point — for the time when
there's somebody to talk to.
384
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Q. Mr. Secretary, can I put that question in
a slightly different form? The govei"nment in
Hanoi has in the last couple of days said again
that the United States must stop the homhing
and all other acts of war indefinitely and that
it cannot expect any reciprocity. Are those terms
totally unacceptable to the United States?
A. Well, again, I don't want to get into detail.
So far as we can tell, the attitude of Hanoi
remains that expressed by Ho Chi Minh in his
letter to the President,^ which he published
earlier this yeai*. Now, if they are talking about
stopping our half of the war while they con-
tinue their half of the war unabated, then this
is not on, because we can't avoid a very simple
question : Here comes a North Vietnamese regi-
ment down the road ; somebody has got to decide
whether you get out of its way or shoot at it.
Now, we can't avoid that question; and if a
North Vietnamese regiment comes down the
road, we're going to shoot at it.
Now, how you translate that into discussions
about a possibility of a peaceful settlement is
for discussion with those who can stop the shoot-
ing, and we are prepared to discuss these ques-
tions with them.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, does the barrier zone
discu.ssed hy Secretary McNamara yesterday
conte?nplate extension into Laos; and, if so,
what in your judgTnent are the international
consequences, if any?
A. Well, Secretary McNamara yesterday
made a specific statement on that question and
did not amplify it by taking further questions.
I'm going to follow his example and refer you
to his statement and not take further questions
on the subject of the barrier.
Q. Mr. Secretary, tlie American officials have
placed great stress on the importance of effective
performance hy the neiv govenfiment in Saigon
and, in that context, on the importance of a
productive relationship l)etween the new Presi-
dent- and Vice-President-elect. There are some
sigyis today from Saigon that they are already
having a falling out. Would deterioration in
that relationship affect Ainerican policy?
A. Oh, I don't think I would attach much
importance to that. I myself have been involved
in a good many negotiations with networks, with
whom I might appear on a program; and my
refusal to appear with individuals does not
mean I have fallen out with them. I just don't
like the hurly-burly of a multiple performance.
I rather enjoy a monopoly rather than sharmg
it with a lot of other people [Laughter], par-
ticularly when there are several questioners. No,
you'll have to ask the principals involved there,
including the network and the two individuals.
I just have no information on that.
Eight here. I'll come to you next.
Q. Mr. Secretary, ifs heen several months
since the subject of the ABM^s has been brought
up. I think at Glassboro the President again
approached Premier Kosygin about it. Is7i't
time beginning to 7'un out a bit on how long the
U.S. can wait?
A. Time is becoming urgent. We'd like to have
discussions about both offensive and defensive
missiles just as soon as possible. We would hope
very much that the Soviet Union would set a
date for such discussions and that both sides
would be prepared to put in specific and detailed
proposals that would bring this matter under
control.
I would like to say to you today that no such
date has been established. We'll continue to try
and we'll see what happens, but this is a matter
of some urgency.
Mr. Davis [Spencer Davis, Associated Press] .
The New Government in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you assess the results
of the Viet-Nain election, and, particularly, the
prioi^ity of problems that this poses for the
United States in helping Viet-Nam?
A. Well, I think we ought to recall that this
most recent election was neitlier the beginning
nor the end but a part of a political process that
has been going on for some time and will con-
tinue to reach into the future.
You will recall that Prime Minister Ky, in
January 1966, on his own initiative announced
that the military leadership wished to move to
a constitutional government ; and that we our-
selves, in the Declaration of Honolulu,- on Feb-
ruary 8th, embraced that idea and said that we
thought this would be a very good idea indeed.
Since that time they have organized their
' For background and text, see Bulletin of Apr. 10,
1067, p. 595.
" For text, see jfti'f?., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305.
385
elections for a constituent assembly, a Constitu-
tion has been drafted and adopted, electoral
procedures have been establislied for the election
of President, Vice President, Senate, a Lower
House, and extensive village and hamlet elec-
tions have occurred.
Now we have had the election of a President,
Vice President, and a Senate. There will shortly
be elections for a Lower House.
Now there are formidable tasks still ahead.
The newly elected President must be installed ;
he must constitute a Cabinet. Wo would hope
that that Cabinet would reflect a broad base of
political support throughout the country. It will
be necessary to install the new Parliament and
establish effective working relationships be-
tween the Executive and the Legislature, and
then together these two branches of the Govern-
ment must address themselves to some of the
major issues that we all know about : stabiliza-
tion of the economy, the issue of corruption,
prosecuting the war as effectively as possible;
such questions as land reform, other matters to
which the new government can address itself, I
think, with new confidence, with a new man-
date, and with renewed vigor.
So we are in the middle of a process here. We
are not ending anything or beginning anything.
This election, I think, was a demonstration of
the capacity of the South Vietnamese to hold
an election under the most adverse conditions :
direct threats against candidates that they
would be assassinated, intimidation of the voters
if they should vote. And yet the performance of
the South Vietnamese people in coming to the
polls and carrying out this election, I think,
was pretty impressive.
That doesn't mean that all the questions have
been answered. It means that the newly elected
government and the representatives in the
Parliament have a new chance to address them-
selves to these great problems that we all know
about.
Q. Mr. Secretary, various people from time
to time have suggested that in Viet-Nam some-
thing akin to the Greek arrangement, after the
Greek civil war, might emerge in Viet-Nam. By
that, they seem to -mean that the Communist
Party in Greece toas disianded after the civil
ivar there and then surfaced in another form.
Would such a. solution he acceptable in South
Viet-Nam, with the NLF [National Liheration
Front^ form/tlly disbanding again and continu-
ing under another name?
A. That would be primarily for the South '
Vietnamese to determine. As you know, there
have been two major programs announced in
order to bring elements of the Viet Cong back
into the body politic. One, the Chieu Hoi pro-
gram, in which those who have embraced the
open-arms policy are twice those that came in
last year under that program. We know, for
example, that in the village and hamlet elec-
tions, some of those who were former Viet Cong
have been elected to village and hamlet respon-
sibility. And, then, the reconciliation program,
in which an offer was made that those wlio were
with the Viet Cong who wished to rejoin the
body politic can do so and that efforts will be
made to find them jobs and find them suitable
positions in accordance with their training and
background and experience.
Now whether there are further developments
along this line with the newly elected govern-
ment will be primarily for that government to
determine. But we would ourselves hope that the
people of South Viet-Nam would find a way to
adjust their own difficulties and eject these in-
traders from the North who are trying to im-
pose a political solution on them by force. And
the ways and means are under constant study,
and I have no doubt that the new government
will address itself to that question.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would you be willing —
Compliance With Laos Agreement Urged
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the Geneva Laos agree-
ment considered as being still valid and binding
on the United States Government?
A. It is valid and binding, and there is
nothing that we would prefer more than to see
it complied with 1,000 percent.
One of the great disappointments that Presi-
dent Keimedy had was the failure to obtain com-
pliance with the 1962 agreement on Laos.^ In
every major respect North Viet-Nam refused to
permit that agreement to take effect. It did not
withdraw its forces from Laos. It did not stop
the infiltration through Laos into Viet-Nam.
It did not permit the ICC [International
Control Commission] to operate in those areas
of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao, and it
' For text of the Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos and accompanying protocol, see ibid.. Aug. 13,
1962, p. 259.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BrLLETIN
did not permit the coalition government to
operate in those areas.
Now, we would fully support in every par-
ticular, line by Ime and word by woi'd, the full
application of the Laos agreement of 1962. We
worked that out at Geneva in good faith. But
we did not get any good-faith compliance by
the authorities in Hanoi. And it is one of the
disappointments, the bitter disappointments, in
these recent years.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if we could turn to the
Middle East. For some time you have heen say-
ing that the question of arms shipments into the
area was under continuing review. More re-
cently, you said it toas under intensive review.
I iDonder if this seeming semantic escalation
means you are preparing to resume arms ship-
ments into the area?
A. No, I think it is not quite as dramatic as
that. [Laughter.] It is under review. It is not
onlj- under review here in the executive branch ;
it is under review m the Congress. As you loiow,
we have had some complications on such ques-
tions in the recent hearings and actions by the
Senate and the House of Representatives, on our
aid bill, and on the Ex-Im Bank legislation.
Now, this matter is still up for consideration
in the Congress. There will be a conference meet-
ing on the aid bill, for example, and military
assistance. So we want to be sure that we know
where we are and what our legislative capability
is, and what is possible, before we try to decide
what we should do under certain circumstances.
We don't want to find ourselves in a position of
trying to make some decisions that would be
undercut by the refusal of Congress to give us
the legislative authority to carry them out.
So this is still imder review — continuing, in-
tensive, interested — but it is still under review.
Principles for Peace in the Near East
Q. Mr. Secretary, with the V.N. reconvening,
would you give u^ yot/r assessment of what you
see as a prospect on the Middle East crisis?
A. Our own position remains that stated by
President Johnson on June 19,^ and the five
principles which we have announced.
We do believe that those who live in the area
have the primary responsibility for finding an-
swers to the question. We do not believe that a
*/6((7., July 10, 1067, p. 31.
state of belligerency or a state of war is consis-
tent with peace in the Near East. And we know
that those who have to face the prospect of liv-
ing there for generations to come certainly for
the next decades have got to find some basis on
which coexistence is tolerable, and that applies
to both sides. We would hope that now that
everybody has had a chance to catch his breath
and to reflect upon the situation that the United
Nations would be able — when the General As-
sembly convenes and the Security Council takes
up this question again — that the voices of mod-
eration would make it possible to stabilize a
peace in an area where peace has been long
delayed and where it is desperately needed.
So we will be doing everything we can, both
in the U.N. and in capitals and through private
diplomacy, to fibnd a basis for an enduring peace
there. Our approach is that announced by Pres-
ident Jolmson in his five principles on June 19.
Q. Mr. Secretary, picking up from the ear-
lier question on Laos, if the Communists con-
tinue to violate the treaty, xoould we regard that
as relieving us of our responsibilities under the
treaty in the future?
A. Our interest is not so much in escaping
from the treaty as getting it complied with. We
have no desire to avoid our share of the respon-
sibility imder the Laos arrangements. We
would support it fully. What we would like to
do is to have others who signed it carry out their
part of the responsibility. So that I would hope
that the agreement of 1962 would be considered
as remaining in effect by all parties and that we
work toward a time when all parties will com-
ply with it in the most literal sense, as it was
worked out in 1962.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in these last several
months, there have heen a number of changes in
public opinion here at home in connection with
Viet-Nam,. Some have suggested that the great-
est changes in the situation have been those here
in the United States. Do you think the Ameri-
can people are losing patience toith the Viet-
Nam xvar?
A. Oh, I can understand impatience; and
that impatience is shared by a good many of us
who carry responsibility. Because it is tragic,
when one reflects upon it — it is tragic that it
should be necessary in 1967 for our young peo-
ple to be tested and to be called upon to sacrifice,
still once again after all that has happened since
1945, to organize a durable peace and to make it
SEPTEMBER 2.". 1967
387
clear that a course of aggression is not accept-
able to the rest of the world.
Now, I can understand the disappointment
and the impatience of the American people that
this should be necessary once again. But I do
believe myself that when we reflect upon the
consequences of the alternatives, primarily the
alternative of abandoning Viet-Nam or of
translating this into a large war, that the over-
whelming majority of the American people
would prefer to see us attempt to bring this to
a i^eaceful conclusion without abandoning
Southeast Asia and without generating a gen-
eral war, if it is at all possible. And that is what
we are trying to do.
We have been in these situations before. And
my own feeling is — looking back over the past
and thinking about the commitments of this
country and the kind of country we are — that
when the United States puts its hand to some-
thing of this sort, something gives and we move
toward a stabilization of the peace.
Nonproliferation Treaty
Q. Mr. Secretary^ in Geneva, Brazil and some
other countries have heen expressing reserva-
tions about the fossiMe draft text of the non-
proliferation treaty.^ How soon do you think it
might ie before we have a complete treaty and
before signatures might start to come on the
dotted lines?
A. It's a little hard to put a date on that. The
two cochairmen are continuing to discuss article
III on safeguards, and in that process we are
keeping in touch with the good many govern-
ments who are interested particularly in that
question. And I would hope that the two co-
chairmen would be able to find some agreed
formula that would comi^lete the actual draft.
Now, the draft that is on the table at Geneva
is a very serious document, and it raises some
very serious questions for many governments.
The decision to forgo the option of nuclear
weapons is not a trivial decision, and we have
known all along that if tlie two cochairmen
could table a draft, there was going to be full
discussion and a good many governments would
raise important points in connection with it.
That process has started. Brazil and others
have expressed reservations on one or another
point. We believe that there should be a full ex-
' For background and text of draft treaty, see iiid.,
Sept. 11, 1967, p. 315.
pression of views, that all governments who
contemplate the possibility of signing the treaty
would make their views known. I am sure the
two cochairmen want to do their best to facili-
tate a rapid conclusion of a full treaty.
I can't put a date on that. We would hope this
could move along without too much delay here
during the autumn.
The Geneva Conference will probably remain
in session, perhaps beyond the opening of the
General Assembly. These disarmament ques-
tions are normally talked about in Committee
I, the Political Committee of the General As-
sembly, and those committees usually don't start
tlieir work until after 3 or 4 weeks of general
debate at the opening of the Assembly. So we
still have a good deal of time for the Geneva
Conference to work at it before the matter will
be discussed further and fully in the General
Assembly. So we will do all we can to move this
thing forward. We think it is urgent and im-
portant, and I am sure President Johnson
would like nothing better than to be able to
present to our Senate a nonproliferation treaty,
which would have wide acceptance throughout
the world.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go bach to the Middle
East and the necessity of moderation. Did you
detect a sense of moderation cojn,ing out of the
Khartoum conference?
A. I think in general there were some signs
of encouragement from the Khartoum confer-
ence, but we have to, I think, defer judgments
until we get down to the hard business of or-
ganizing a peace in the Middle East. I think
that some of the realities are becoming more
apparent on both sides and that this will per-
haps make some contribution toward the pos-
sibilities of peace.
Arab Refugees
Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, the
United States has said several times it would
like to see the return of all those Arab refugees
from East Jordan to West Jordan who want to
go back. The total has now been set at 20,000 by
Israel. Is the United States satisfied or—
A. Well, we think that these ordinary people,
displaced by war, ought to have a chance to re-
turn to their homes. We hope that these refugees
who fled from the West Bank would have a
chance to come back to their homes. The events
388
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which overwhelmed them were not really of
their making. They had notliing much to do
with the ordinary people on either side. And we
think it would be a contribution toward a peace-
ful settlement if these people could return to
their homes.
"We have made our views known on this sub-
ject. It is for the future to decide, to determine
how far we can get in this regard.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there have 'been reports in
recent weeks that North Vietnamese planes have
iec7i opei^ating to some degree out of Chinese
Communist bases. Are these reports accurate?
A. I haven't heard any reports that planes
have been operating over North Viet-Nam on
military missions from bases in China.
Q. Are they based in China?
A. Well, we know that some North Viet-
namese planes have gone to China, and if I
were involved with the North Vietnamese Air
Force, I think that would be a pretty good place
for them. But we have not had any indication
that they are operating out of Chinese bases
into North Viet-Nam.
Internal Situation in China
Q. Sir, what is your latest thinking on the
internal situation in China?
A. One of intense interest. We try to follow
the situation as closely as we can. We do not
try to predict what the outcome would be. I
have not pressed my own colleagues to give me
a prediction on something that I suspect no one
can know at the present time.
But, frankly, I am not much embarrassed by
ignorance on this point. Liu Shao-chi, ]\Iao
Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai probably don't
know what is going to happen there. So we are
watching it very closely, but I cannot pretend
that we know how it is likely to come out. It is
a most impoi'tant historical development in the
present period.
Q. Mr. Secretary, wonxld we oppose Red
China's adinission to the U.N. again?
A. I would think so — just a minute, I will
come back to you in just a minute.
Q. Mr. Secretary, we know that some North
Vietnamese planes have gone to Chiiia. Could
you amplify a little bit? Could you say, for
example, whether this introduces a new element
into this situation, or is there anything that is
different noto perhaps as a result of U.S. bomb-
ing attacks?
A. No, I wouldn't attach too much signifi-
cance to it. It is my impression that the inven-
tory actually in North Viet-Nam has been re-
duced, because planes have, in fact, gone to
China — whether for repair or for other pur-
poses, there is a relatively small inventory of
aircraft in North Viet-Nam itself at the present
time. But we haven't seen anything that would
indicate this is very significant from a general
political or other point of view.
There was a question back here that I inter-
rupted.
The Foreign Aid Program
Q. Mr. Secretary, Congress has given some
severe cuts in the foreign aid program. The
possibility has been raised of doing away with
foreign aid altogether during the next couple
of years. How real a possibility is this?
A. I can't imagine that the Congress will do
away with the foreign aid program. This is a
vital element in our total relationship with the
rest of the world. There is a deep moral question
involved here, as well as a practical and political
question.
Here we are, with an economy which is ap-
proaching a gross national product of $800
billions a year, trading with the rest of the
world by the tens of billions. Now, if we, with
this extraordinary wealth, act as though we
are a voracious economy drawing upon the rest
of the world for their goods and raw materials
and filling their markets with our goods, in-
difTerent to what happens to their economies
and their future, then we are going to be iso-
lated by the choice of the rest of the world — and
properly so.
AVe and other developed countries have got
to take a concern in the capacity of the so-called
developing countries to get on with their job
more rapidly than they could without assistance
from the outside.
Now, we ourselves have gone through our
basic development in the last two generations —
since the turn of the century. It is not true that
these countries have to wait for a hundred years
or 200 years to improve their situation. This can
be done much more rapidly with the application
of science and teclinology and capital invest-
ment and education.
SEPTEMBER 2 5, 196 7
389
Aiid we have an obligation to help them do
it, because they have discovered — these teeming
millions all over the world — they have discov-
ered that illiteracy and disease and hunger are
not necessarily imposed by providence, but they
are burdens which human beings can do some-
thing about. And they have discovered it because
they can see us and see what has happened to
the economy of this and other developed coun-
tries.
Now, we have an obligation to do something
about it, and I hope very much that the Congress
would see fit to give us the bulk of the funds that
the President has requested. Wlien we put them
together, foreign aid and P.L. 480, Peace Corps,
that sort of thing, it amounts to about six-
tenths of 1 percent of our gross national prod-
uct. And if we can't mobilize the will to commit
that small proportion of our total resources to
the organization of a peace in the world, and
some decency in the developing countries, then
there is a failure of character in this country
that will have the most far-reaching conse-
quences for our future.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on —
A. Mr. Chancellor [John Chancellor, NBC
News] .
Q. Sir, if you are not ashamed of your igno-
rance about Ohina, could you tell us on ivhat you
hose your assessment that the Chinese tvouM not,
given our bombing close to the border, come into
the war?
A. I don't draw any flat conclusions on that
point. I think it would be most ill-advised for
the authorities in Peiping to come into this war.
We hope they will stay out of it. Our own ob-
jectives are limited. We have no designs on
China. As a matter of fact, we don't even have
designs on North Viet-Nam, if they would just
stop trying to take over some neighbors by
force.
But I wouldn't be able to offer any gold-
plated guarantees on this subject. There are ele-
ments of risk, and we have tried to move with
the prudence that would minimize such risks.
And those who would have us greatly increase
those risks by actions that we ourselves take,
I think, are on a very dangerous path.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you, ain.flify yoiir
earlier answer on Chinese entry into the V.N.?
Do you mean, sir, that events inside China have
made it more easy in the United Nations to hold '
the line indefinitely against Chinese entry?
A. Oh, there are many elements in this which
affect the attitude of members of the U.N. One
of the important elements is that Peiping has
made it very clear that it itself is not interested
in joining the United Nations unless the Kepub-
lic of China is expelled.
Now, the Republic of China is a charter mem-
ber of the U.N., and it has been a good member
of the U.N. And a substantial majority of the
membership of the United Nations simply is not
going to expel the Republic of China.
We have had the same problem in our bi-
lateral contacts with Peiping. They tell us there
is nothing to discuss unless we are prepared to
surrender Formosa. Now, we are not going to
surrender these 15 million people on that island
against their will to some authoritarian regime.
But under those circumstances, Peiping says,
then there is nothing to discuss in terms of ex-
changes or any otlier amelioration of our bilat-
eral relationships. So this is a question that has
many ramifications and complications, and I
don't expect that anything much will change on
that at this session of the General Assembly.
Q. What is our jyolicy now with regards to
the NLF? Would we regard that as a separate
■political entity in any negotiations?
A. We wouldn't recognize them as a govern-
ment or as someone who had a veto on a settle-
ment in a formal conference.
There are ways in which the attitudes of the
NLF and the views of the NLF can be ascer-
tained. We have indicated that is not an insuper-
able problem. President Johnson has made that
clear. Now, basically, the situation of the Viet
Cong, the NLF, is for the authorities in Saigon.
I have no doulit that they would welcome some
basis on which there could be a general recon-
ciliation among the people of South Viet-Nam
on a tolerable basis. But that doesn't mean that
the NLF has a status as a government — no one
recognizes it as a government — or that it should
bo given a veto on the possibility of pulling
North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam apart
militarily.
Now, in the interstices here, there are many
possibilities, but those are thuigs which should
be discussed with those who can stop the
shooting.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
390
DBIPAETSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Thirteenth Anniversary of SEATO
Press release 192 dated September 8
Secretary Rush on September 8 sent the fol-
lowing message to Bangkok on the occasion of
'■'■SEATO Day^'' marking the 13th anniversary
of the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty and the dedication of SEATO^s
new headqttarters building in Bangkok.
Today, on the thirteenth anniversary of
SEATO, I wish to send my greetings and those
of President Johnson to SEATO, to its dis-
tinguished Secretary-General, Jesus Vargas,
and to the Member Countries and their leaders.
SEATO is playing an important role today
in our common struggle to bring peace, freedom
and progress to Asia. Five SEATO members —
Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and the United States — joined by one non-
member, Korea, are giving military assistance
to the Vietnamese people in their defense of
freedom against Communist aggression. The
unity of purpose of these countries sustains our
determination that a just peace may be achieved.
The United States was honored this spring to
be host to the twelfth SEATO Council Meeting.
The Final Communique ^ of that meeting
eloquently noted the vigorous growth of the
spirit of cooperation within the Asian and
Pacific region, the economic and political prog-
ress that has been achieved, and the importance
of SEATO in deterring and repelling aggres-
sion in all its forms. The meeting reaffirmed the
Members' resolve to persist tirelessly in the
search for a just and lasting peace in Viet-Nam,
and expressed disappointment that Hanoi has
so far rejected all opportimities open to it for
negotiations on a reasonable basis.
The United States considere SEATO to be
vital to collective security in the area and is
determined to continue to give full support to
the Organization in protecting the area against
Communist aggression and subversion.
There is no more fitting symbol of the unity
and resolve of all SEATO Member Nations than
the beautiful new headquarters building in
Bangkok that is being dedicated today. I send
warmest congratulations on this happy and
auspicious event and trust that the work of the
Organization will flourish in its new and more
ample official home.
U.S. Hails Viet-Nam Elections
as Major Step Forward
Department StatcTnent^
The large turnout in the face of a massive Viet
Cong effort to disrupt the elections is a further
manifestation of the courage of the South Viet-
namese people. It also demonstrates their desire
to establish an elected constitutional govern-
ment.
It is an important and heartening fact that
83 percent who registered actually voted — a
much higher proportion than in our presidential
election of 1964.
We note the consensus of the American and
other foreign observers that the election was
conducted remarkably smoothly and fairly in
light of the wartime conditions and Viet Cong
harassment.
The results of the election are not yet final.
However, the people of South Viet-Nam have
expressed their choice and deserve our support.
They are determining their own future, and an
elected government, constitutionally based, is a
major step forward.
' For text, see Bulletin of May 15, 1967, p. 745.
^ Issued by the Department spokesman on Sept. 4.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
276-050 — 67 2
891
Group of Ten Agrees on Plan for Creation
of New International Monetary Reserve Asset
The Grouf of Ten — the 10 countries of the International Monetary
Fund participating in the General Arrangements To Borrow — held
a ministerial meeting at London August 26 at which the Ten ' agreed
on the text of an Outline of a Contingency Plan for establishing a
new facility, in the form of special drawing rights, to meet the need
for a supplement to existing reserve assets. Secretary of the Treasury
Henry H. Fowler was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting.*
Following are excerpts from opening statements made hy President
Johnson and Secretary Fowler at a hriefing at the White House on
August 28; a statcTnent made hy Secretary Fowler at a press con-
ference at the Treasury Department on August 29; and the text of a
corrumunique issued at London on August 26 at tlie close of the Group
of Ten ministerial meeting.
WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING, AUGUST 28
White House press release dated August 28
Statement by President Johnson
We are delighted to welcome back Secretary
Fowler, Cliairman Martin, Secretary Deming,
and those who have been traveling with them.
We want to commend them on a job done
with distinction. They have brought us over the
hump of a very long, difficult, and decisive in-
ternational negotiation.
Secretary Fowler, you have returned with in-
surance that the world will experience orderly
and adequate growth of monetary reserves in
the years to come. The plan for creation of a
new reserve facility at the International Mone-
tary Fmid marks the greatest forward step in
world financial cooperation in the 20 years since
^ Member countries of the Group of Ten are Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
' Other members at the U.S. delegation were : William
McChesney Martin, Jr.. Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System ; Gardner
Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers ;
Francis Bator, Deputy Si)ecial A.sslstant to the Presi-
dent ; J. Dewey Daane, member of the Federal Reserve
Board ; and Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick
L. Deming.
the creation of the International Monetary Fund
itself.
The details of the plan agreed upon in Lon-
don are primarily the concern of financial ex-
perts. But the basic plan and what it represents
advances the welfare of all Americans. This
much should be clear :
— All the major industrial nations of the free
world have shown their clear and sincere intent
to build strongly and securely on the base of
our current international monetary system.
— A firm foundation has been developed for
another reserve asset to join gold, dollars, and
other reserve currencies as the needed means of
payment for a world of growing trade and
commerce.
— Gold and exchange markets can now reflect
a new sense of confidence in the adequacy of
future reserve supplies. With the United States
unquestionably committed to convert gold into
dollars at $35 an ounce and with the availability
of a new facility to draw on when needed, there
can be no reasonable basis to fear a shortage of
reserves.
Certainly no human being today can fully
appraise the potential of this new development
in the international monetary field. But we can
893
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
bo sure that this agreement will stand out in the
history of international monetary cooperation.
And so will the brilliant and determined efforts
that made the agreement possible under the
leadership of Secretary Fowler.
Saturday morning, concerning these negotia-
tions, the Times of London said :
The eyes of the world should be focused on today's
meeting. . . . For it is almost certainly the last
chance ... to reach agreement on the basic features
of a scheme for the deliberate creation through the
I.M.F. of a new kind of asset which all countries will
be able to use and count as part of their official re-
.serves. Without such a scheme, the increasing inade-
quacy of the world's money supply will make It pro-
gres.sively harder for national governments to follow
liberal trade and employment policies. The livelihood
and even the lives of literally hundreds of millions of
people over the next decade or two could be at issue,
especially in less developed countries.
As you can observe, we are very pleased that
this agreement has been reached. We are glad
to welcome those home who contributed so much
to it.
Statement by Secretary Fowler
I won't add anything at this time to what the
President has said, except to thank him and ex-
press our gratitude for the understanding and
support he has given to us in the course of these
2 years of negotiation.
It was in July 1965 that President Johnson
authorized me to take the initiative in propos-
ing the international negotiation on this par-
ticular subject to be initiated following several
years of study by the tecluiicians and experts
in the field.
Since that time, he has followed with deep in-
terest the rather painful and tortuous course
that these negotiations have followed. We are
glad to see them finally resolved at least in one
very meaningful step by this agreement on an
outline of a plan that was announced Saturday
by the Group of Ten countries, the Ministers of
Finance and Central Bank Governors.
I, too, want to express my appreciation to
Under Secretary Deming and Governor Daane,
Francis Bator and Art Okun [Arthur M. Okun,
member of the Council of Economic Advisers] ,
and Assistant Secretary [Anthony M.] Solo-
mon at the State Department, who is with the
Interagency Steering Group on this effort.
But basically the management of interna-
tional money and credit is an idea whose time
has arrived. It became clear to all enlightened
financial experts, I believe, in the free world —
certainly to the overwhelming majority— that
the uncertainties surrounding the future growth
of reserves with the means now at hand are
great and are growing. Yet the need for in-
creased liquidity to finance the growth of
world trade and financial movement was defi-
nite and certain.
Thus, the urgency of having new means
available to create reserves as and when needed
became uncontestable and compelling.
There is much work to be done from here on
out following the considerations at the Rio meet-
ing,^ in which we hope the Governors of the
other 92 countries will find it desirable to ap-
prove this proposal.
There will be work to be done after that in
putting it into legal form, and then it will be
up to governments through their appropriate
legislative processes to adopt the proposed
agreement or not.
So there is much work ahead of us. But I
think it is fair to say that the major industrial
nations have responded with unity to meet the
very clear need for a f arsighted and cooperative
plan which in my judgment is the most sig-
nificant and promising step in the field of inter-
national financial cooperation since Bretton
Woods.
There have been other significant steps along
the way. Indeed, I think the pattern of inter-
national financial cooperation has developed
over the last 20 years as one of the great en-
couraging signs of the times.*
STATEMENT BY SECRETARY FOWLER,
AUGUST 29
Treasury Department press release dated Angust 29
I am highly gratified that the INIinisters and
Governors of the Group of Ten countries have
taken a major step forward in the constructive
development of the international monetary
system. August 26 was indeed one of the great
days in the history of international financial
cooperation. It marks the successful culmina-
tion of 4 years of study and 2 years of intensive
•The Board of Governors of the International Mone-
tary Fund will hold its annual meeting at Rio de
Janeiro Sept. 25-29.
'A question-and-answer period followed; for tran-
script, see White House press release dated Aug. 28.
SBFTEMBER 25, 1967
393
negotiation. Both Cliairman William McChes-
ney Martin, Jr., and I, representing the United
States, have been privileged to participate.
Our work this year — in the joint meetings and
in the meetings of the Group of Ten — has rep-
resented the most ambitious and significant ef-
fort in the area of international monetary
affairs since Bretton "Woods. The results are, of
course, subject to further consideration and final
approval by the Governors of the 106 comitries
of the International Monetary Fund at the an-
nual meeting at Rio. I expect the Governors to
authorize the Executive Directors to take the
outline plan and convert it into the necessary
legal amendment, or amendments, to the IMF
Charter within a short period following the an-
nual meetings so that the process of final ap-
proval by governments can bring this new
facility into existence.
The agreement reached in London on Au-
gust 26 demonstrates that the monetary au-
thorities of the major countries are prepared to
continue and strengthen their established record
of international monetary cooperation and, in
particular, to take a imique step in international
cooperation by creating a reserve asset, in the
form of special drawing rights in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, to supplement gold and
foreign exchange. Thus, the existing bases for
the monetary system, including the established
price of gold, are reaffirmed. In my view, the
essence of what we have been seeking to do can
well be expressed by putting together two sen-
tences from the outline we have agreed upon.
The first sentence appears in the introduction
to the outline and is as follows :
The facility described in this Outline is intended
to meet the need, as and when it arises, for a supple-
ment to existing reserve assets.
The second sentence appears later in the outline,
in the section dealing with reconstitution, under
the general heading of Use of Special Drawing
Rights. It reads as follows :
Participants will pay due regard to the desirability
of pursuing over time a balanced relationship between
their holdings of special drawing rights and other
reserves.
That is, the new facility will create special
drawing rights to supplement the holdings of
existing reserve assets and to provide the
dynamic element of growth in the world's re-
serves for the future — a growth element of a
deliberate character, subject to joint, collective,
and responsible processes of international
decision. And the new reserve is to be treated,
in a general way, on the basis of a "balanced
relationship" with other reserves. That is, the
relationship to be sought is one of equivalence
between the new reserve asset and the traditional
reserve assets. While there are transitional
problems to be surmounted through careful
management, cooperation, and experience, the
objective is, thus, clearly the establishment of
the full stature of the new asset, alongside the
traditional reserve assets.
A new facility with the objective of achieving
full equivalence with traditional reserve assets —
that is the essence of what we have agreed upon.
I am very pleased that we have been able to
agree on these essential elements of the approach
and on the substance of the mechanism by which
they can be carried forward. Given this agree-
ment, I am confident as I look ahead to the fu-
ture of the international monetary system and
of international financial cooperation centered
in the International Monetary Fund.
In order that Saturday's event may be viewed
in the perspective of the long and arduous
studies and negotiations that preceded it, it may
be useful to review that background from the
point of view of the United States.
The negotiations and discussions leading to
this agreement have been long and intense. In
October 1963 the Ministers and Central Bank
Governors of the Group of Ten countries asked
their deputies to "undertake a thorough exami-
nation of the outlook for the functioning of the
international monetary system and of its future
needs for liquidity." ^
On the basis of the very thorough study and
report that resulted from this directive, the
Ministers and Governors concluded, in a state-
ment of August 1964,^ that "the supply of gold
and foreign exchange may prove to he inade-
quate for the over-all reserve needs of the world
economy."
Having reached the conclusion that there was
a possibility of a shortage of reserves, the Minis-
ters and Governors took the next logical step,
authorizing a study of how to go about remedy-
ing this prospective shortage through the
creation of a new reserve asset. Since there was
little knowledge on this point, the Ministers and
Governors asked for a thorough report on the
technicalities of possible ways in which mone-
' Bulletin of Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615.
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323.
S94
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BT7LLETIN
tary reserves might be deliberately brought into
being.
From the summer of 1964 through the sum-
mer of 19G5, a group of tecluiical experts from
treasuries and central banks labored to bring
into being a body of knowledge in this area.
The result of this pioneering effort was the Re-
port of the Study Group on the Creation of
Reserve Assets — better known as the Ossola
Group Report — made public in August 1965.
This report provided an inventory of the tech-
niques by which reserves could be deliberately
created and an analysis of the arguments for
and against the use of each of these techniques.
It was at this point that President Johnson
authorized me to announce, in a speech at Hot
Springs, Virginia, in July 1965,' that the United
States was ready to participate in negotiations
of a political nature on reserve creation, thereby
launching the initiative that culminated in Sat-
urday's agreement.
At about the same time, there became avail-
able a report by the Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Financial Affairs of the Joint Economic
Committee of the Congress of the United States,
under the chairmanship of Congressman Henry
Reuss of Wisconsin, called "Guidelines for Im-
proving the International Monetary System."
Wliere the Ossola report, by request of the
Ministers and Governors, stuck to the technical
aspects of the problem, the guidelines report
performed the invaluable service of providing
a legislative estimate of the urgency and dimen-
sions of the problem under the highly respected
imprint of the Joint Economic Committee. Its
basic conclusion was :
World liquidity needs cannot adequately be met by
existing sources of reserves (gold, dollars, and pounds
sterling) or even by tbe addition of new reserve cur-
rencies. New ways of creating international reserves
must be sought
The report stated, further, that : "The need for
action is pressing."
It was on the very solid footing of President
Johnson's initiative, the Ossola study of ways
and means, and of the Joint Committee's un-
equivocal assessment of the urgent need for a
new kind of reserve asset that the United States
proposed the opening of formal negotiations
looking toward international agreement on a
contingency plan for deliberate reserve creation.
In order to ascertain the views of other coun-
tries, I followed up my suggestions by personal
' For text, see iUd., Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209.
and individual consultations with the European
Ministers and Governors of the Ten, having
previously consulted with the JajDanese and
Canadian Ministers in Washington. These in-
dividual consultations revealed a basis for imi-
fied progress.
As a result, at the time of the annual meet-
ing of the Fund in September 1965, it was agreed
that the deputies of the Group of Ten countries
should examine the various proposals for re-
serve creation to ascertain whether or not there
was a basis for agreement of major points. In
the meantime, the Executive Directors and staff
of the International Monetary Fund were
carrying on constructive studies of the problem.
Their findings were published in the annual re-
port of the Fund for 1966.
At a ministerial meeting of the Group of
Ten, July 25-26, 1966, in The Hague, the Min-
isters and Governors of the Ten considered a
report of their deputies that represented a year
of search for the essential elements of agree-
ment upon a plan for deliberate reserve creation.
In addition to these elements of agreement, the
deputies' report contained five workable schemes
for the ways and means of reserve creation.
Basing their work on this report, the Minis-
ters and Governors, in their Hague communi-
que, agreed on basic principles for reserve cre-
ation. They reiterated their earlier conclusion
that existing sources of reserves would not pro-
vide an adequate basis for world trade and pay-
ments in the longer run. They instructed their
deputies to begin a second stage of negotiations
in which the views of the whole world would
be represented, thi-ough a series of joint meet-
ings between the deputies of the Ten and the
Executive Directors of the Fund, rei^resenting
the 106 nations who are members of the Inter-
national Monetary Fimd.
In the past year there have been four such
joint meetings of the deputies and Executive
Directors, beginning in the fall of 1966 in Wash-
ington. It is upon the basis of this worldwide
canvass of opinion that the July meeting of
Ministers and Governors of the Group of Ten
held its deliberations in London. At the July
meeting the Ministers and Governors tackled
the difficult task of disposing of the unresolved
issues. Wliile it proved impossible to settle all
the issues, the Ministers and Governors did an-
nounce, on July 18, that "it is expected that
agreement will be reached on an Outline plan
to be embodied in a resolution at the forthcom-
ins Annual Meeting of the Governors of the
SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
395
International Monetary Fund in Rio de
Janeiro."
Tlae world was entitled to no less from the
responsible financial officials of the Group of
Ten countries meeting in London on Saturday.
They delivered.
TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, AUGUST 26
Treasury Department press release dated August 28
1. In order to complete the discussions which they
had begrun at their previous meeting in London on the
17th and 18th July, the Ministers and Central Banks
Governors of the ten countries participating in the
General Arrangements to Borrow met again in Lon-
don on 26 August under the chairmanship of Mr. James
Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United
Kingdom. Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Di-
rector of the International Monetary Fund, took part
in the meeting, which was also attended by repre-
sentatives of the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development and of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements, as well as by the President of
the National Bank of Switzerland.
2. The Ministers and Governors had before them a
revised Outline of a Contingency Plan for establishing
a new facility, in the form of special drawing rights,
which is intended to meet the need, as and when it
arises, for a supplement to existing reserve assets. This
Outline was drawn up at the Fourth Joint Meeting in
Paris of the Executive Directors of the IMF and the
Deputies of the Group of 10. It was revised in the last
few weeks by the Deputies to clear up some differences
of view remaining after the July Ministerial Meeting.
3. The Ministers and Governors agreed on the text
of an Outline of a Contingency Plan which they would
be prepared to support at the forthcoming annual
meeting of the Governors of the IMF in Rio De Janeiro.
This Outline will now be considered by the Executive
Directors of the Fund. It is expected that the Outline as
approved by them will be embodied in a Resolution at
the forthcoming annual meeting of the Governors of
the IMF in Rio De Janeiro.
4. The Ministers and Governors concentrated their
discussions at this meeting on a number of key features
of the plan, on which differences had not previously
been resolved. In particular, they agreed on the follow-
ing points : Decisions on the basic period for, timing of,
and amount and rate of allocation of the new drawing
rights should be taken by the Board of Governors of
the IMP by a majority of 85 percent of the total voting
power. Members which use their new drawing rights
would incur an obligation to reconstitute their position
in accordance with principles which will take account
of the amount and duration of the use. For drawings
made In the first basic period of five years, the principal
rule of reconstitution should be that over any period
of five years a member's net average use of the new
facility should not exceed 70 percent of its total
allocation. Participants should also pay due regard to
the desirability of pursuing, over time, a balanced re-
lationship between their holdings of special drawing
rights and other reserves. The reconstitution rules
would be reviewed before the end of this first period.
5. The Ministers and Governors had an exchange of
views on the form and content of the Resolution to be
submitted to the Governors of the IMF in Rio De
Janeiro. The Ministers also considered ways of bring-
ing rapidly to a conclusion the studies to be made
in parallel with a view to making such changes and
improvements in the present rules and practices of
the IMF as would appear appropriate in the light of
experience.
6. The Ministers and Governors agreed to meet
again at the occasion of the annual meeting of the IMF
in Rio De Janeiro.
President Modifies Rates
of Interest Equalization Tax
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER*
MoDiFYiNQ Rates of Interest Equalization Tax and
Amending Executive Obdeb No. 11211
Whereas section 4911(b) (3) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 fixes the rates of the interest equalization
tax generally applicable in the case of acquisitions of
stock and debt obligations made after January 25,
1967 and before August 30, 1967 at approximately 150
percent of the rates set forth in section 4911(b) (1) of
the Code ; and
Whereas the rates set forth in section 4911(b) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would, in the
absence of a determination made by the President
under .section 4911(b) (2), be generally applicable in
the case of acquisitions made on or after August 30,
1967; and
Whereas I have determined that the rates of tax
prescribed in section 4911(b)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 are lower than the rates of tax
necessary to limit the total acquisitions by United States
persons of stock of foreign issuers and debt obligations
of foreign obligors within a range consistent with the
balance-of-payments objectives of the United States;
and
Whereas it is now appropriate that Executive Order
No. 11211,' dated April 2, 1965 (effective April 5, 1965),
relating to the exclusion from the interest equalization
tax for original or new Japanese issues as required for
international monetary stability, be modified ;
Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in
me by sections 4911(b) (2) and 4917(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, by section 301 of title 3 of the
United States Code, and as President of the United
States, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Rates of Taw.
(a) Rates applicable to acquisitions of stock. The
tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 on the acquisition of stock shall be equal
to 18.75 percent of the actual value of the stock.
* No. 11368 ; 32 Fed. Reg. 12549.
' BtnxETiN of May 3, 1965, p. 667.
396
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
(b) Rates applicable to acquisitions of debt obliga-
tions. The tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 on the acquisition of a debt
obligation shall be equal to a percentage of the actual
value of the debt obligation measured by the period
remaining to its maturity and determined in accordance
with the following table :
The tax, as a
percentage of
actual value,
If the period remaining to maturity Is : Is :
At least 1 year, but less than 1^ years . . 1. 31 percent
At least IVi years, but less than li^ years . 1. 63 percent
At least 1V4 years, but less than 1% years . 1. 88 percent
At least 1% years, but less than 2^4 years . 2. 31 percent
At least 2>4 years, but less than 2% years . 2. 88 percent
At least 2% years, but less than 3% years . 3. 44 percent
At least 31^ years, but less than 4% years . 4. 44 percent
At least iVi years, but less than 5% years . 5. 44 percent
At least 5% years, but less than 6% years . 6. 38 percent
At least 61^ years, but less than 7% years . 7. 25 percent
At least IVi years, but less than 8y2 years . 8. 13 percent
At least 8^4 years, but less than 9^^ years . 8. 88 percent
At least 9% years, but less than 10% years . 9. 63 percent
At least 10^4 years, but less than 11 "(4
years 10. 38 percent
At least 11% years, but less than 13%
years 11. 38 percent
At least 13% years, but less than 16%
years 12. 88 percent
At least 16% years, but less than 18%
years 14. 19 percent
At least 18% years, but less than 21%
years 15. 31 percent
At least 21% years, but less than 23%
years 16. 31 percent
At least 23% years, but less than 26%
years 17. 19 percent
At least 26% years, but less than 28%
years 17. 94 percent
28% years or more 18. 75 percent
Sec. 2. Authority of Secretary of Treasury. The
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate is authorized
to prescribe from time to time such regulations, rul-
ings, directions, and instructions (not inconsistent with
the provisions of section 4911 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954) as he shall deem necessary to carry out
the purposes of section 1 of this order.
Sec. 3. Amendment to Executive Order No. 11211.
Executive Order No. 11211 of April 2, 1965, as amended
as follows :
(a) by striking out so much of the text of section 1
as precedes subsection (a) and inserting in lieu
thereof, "The tax imposed by section 4911 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 shall not apply to an acquisi-
tion by a United States person of a debt obligation (as
deflned in section 4920(a) (1) of the (3ode) repayable
exclusively in Uniled States currency which is (i) is-
sued or guaranteed as to payment of principal and in-
terest by the Government of Japan, or (ii) issued, with
the prior approval of the Government of Japan, by a
corporation organized under the laws of Japan which
is neither a company regulated under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. &17 ; 15 U.S.C. 80a-l to
80a-52) nor formed or availed of for the principal
purpose of acquiring stock or debt obligations of a
Japanese or other foreign issuer or obligor, other than
stock or debt obligations described in section 4916(a)
of the Code, provided that — "
(b) by Inserting after section 1 the following new
section —
"Section lA. The tax imposed by .section 4911 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall not apply to an
acquisition by a United States person of stock acquired
pursuant to the exercise of a right (without the pay-
ment of additional consideration) to convert into stock,
a debt obligation which was acquired under the ex-
emption created by section 1, provided that—
"(a) such debt obligation had never been acquired
by a person other than a United States person ; and
"(b) such stock is acquired as all or part of an orig-
inal or new issue as to which there is filed such notice
of acquisition as the Secretary of the Treasury or his
delegate may prescribe by regulation."
Sec. 4. Effective Date. Sections 1 and 2 of this order
shall be effective with respect to acquisitions of stock
of foreign issuers and debt obligations of foreign
obligors made after August 29, 1967, other than
acquisitions described in paragraphs (2) and (4) of
section 3(e) of the Interest Equalization Tax Exten-
sion Act of 1967. Section 3 of this order shall be effec-
tive with respect to acquisitions made after November 1,
1967.
The White House,
August 28, 1967.
Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Lawrence, Kansas
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 8 (press release 189) that Eugene V.
Kostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
would be the principal speaker in a tristate
foreign policy conference in Lawrence, Kans.,
on October 17. The conference is being co-
sponsored by the University of Kansas and the
Department of State. Invitations are being ex-
tended to civic and community leaders, educa-
tors, and representatives of the news media in
Kansas, Nebraska, and western Missouri.
The 1-day conference will feature special in-
terest discussion groups led by senior officers
of the Department of State and the Agency for
International Development. These groups will
discuss foreign policy issues in Europe, Asia,
the Middle East, and Latin America and the
foreign aid program.
In addition to Under Secretary Eostow, the
following State Department officers are now
scheduled to participate : Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European
SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
897
Affairs ; John K. Emmerson, State Department
Senior Fellow, Stanford University, and for-
merly Minister-Counselor, U.S. Embassy,
Tokyo; John E. Homer, country director for
Cyprus, Bureau of Near Eastern and South
Asian Affaire, and formerly Counselor of Em-
bassy, Jidda ; Eeuben Sternfeld, Alternate U.S.
Executive Director, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, and Special Assistant to the U.S.
Coordinator, Alliance for Progress.
for yarns and fabrics ; 15 million square yards
for all other categories ;
c. Specific ceilings for six fabric and five
made-up categories;
d. Other provisions, for "swing," growth,
consultation, spacing, p)rovision of statistics,
categories and conversion factors, definition
of cotton textile articles, equity, and carry-
over similar to those in other U.S. bilateral
agreements.
United States and India Sign
New Cotton Textile Agreement
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Department of State announced on Au-
gust 31 (press release 186) that notes had been
exchanged in Washington on that day which
constitute a new U.S.-Indian bilateral cotton
textile agi'eement. Anthony M. Solomon, Assist-
ant Secretary for Economic Affairs, and M. G.
Kaul, Minister for Coordination of the Lidian
Embassy, signed on behalf of their respective
Governments.
The new agreement replaces an agreement
signed on April 15, 1964, and amended and ex-
tended several times since that date.^ Unlike the
1964 agreement, which established limits only
on fiA'e fabric and one made-up category, this
agreement is comprehensive, covermg Indian
exports of cotton textiles in all 64 categories.
(Certain hand-loomed fabrics produced by In-
dian cottage industry are exempted.) The agree-
ment is retroactive to October 1, 1966, and will
expire on September 30, 1970. It is based on the
understanding that the protocol extending the
Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Interna-
tional Trade in Cotton Textiles (the LTA) will
enter into force for India and the United States
on October 1, 1967. (The LTA is bemg ex-
tended so as to expire on September 30, 1970.)
The agreement's major features are as
follows :
a. An overall ceiling of 79 million square
yards for the first agreement year ;
b. Group ceilings of 64 million square yards
* Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5559,
6151, 6190.
TEXT OF U.S. NOTE
Excellency : I have the honor to refer to the decision
of the Cotton Textiles Committee of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade approving a Protocol
to extend through September 30, 1970 the Long-Term
Arrangement regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles done in Geneva on February 9, 1962 (herein-
after referred to as "the Long-Term Arrangement"). I
also refer to recent discussions between representatives
of our two Governments and to the agreements between
our two Governments concerning exports of cotton tex-
tiles from India to the United States effected by ex-
changes of notes dated October 21, and December 30,
1966 and March 30, 1967. I confirm, on behalf of my
Government, the understanding that these agreements
are replaced by a new agreement as provided in the
following numbered paragraphs. This new agreement
is based on our understanding that the above-mentioned
Protocol will enter into force for our two Governments ■
on October 1, 1967. |
1. The term of this agreement shall be from October
1, 1966 through September 30, 1970. During the term
of this agreement, the Government of India shall limit
annual exports of cotton textiles from India to the .
United States to aggregate, group, and specific limits |
at the levels specified in the following paragraphs. It '
is noted that these levels reflect a special adjustment
for the first agreement year. The levels set forth in
paragraph 2, 3 and 4 for the second agreement year
are 5% higher than the limits for the preceding year
without this special adjustment; thus the growth fac-
tor provided for in paragraph 6 has already been ap-
plied in arriving at these levels for the second agree-
ment year.
2. For the first agreement year, constituting the 12-
month period beginning October 1, 1966, the aggregate
limit shall be 79 million square yards equivalent. For
the second agreement year the aggrega.te limit shall be
S8.2 million square yards equivalent.
3. Within this aggregate limit, the following group
limits shall apply for the first and second agreement
years, respectively :
Ornujy
I. (Categories 1-27)
II. (Categories 28-64)
In Square Yards Eguivalettt
First Agrfement Second Agreemenl
Year Year
64 million
15 million
71.4 million
16.8 million
4. Within the aggregate limit and the applicable
group limits, the following specific limits shall apply
for the first and second agreement years, respectively :
398
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A.
Group I
Categories 9/10
18/19
Category 22
Category 26 (duck only)
" (other than duck)
B.
Group II
Categories 28/29 =
Category 31
Categories 34/35 '
First Agrctment Year
20,150,000 syds.
3,925,000 "
8,850,000 "
6,000,000 "
20,150,000 "
First Agreement Year
Uniti (.Pa.) Sj. Yds. Eq.
2, 508, 764 2, 719, 500
3, 905, 172 1, 359, 000
662, 903 4, 109, 999
Second Agreement Year
22,470,000 syds.
4,383,750 "
10,867,500 "
6,300,000 "
22,470,000 "
Second A'^reement Year
Units (Pes.) Sq. Yds. Eq.
2, 905, 904 3, 150, 000
4, 525, 861 1, 575, 000
762, 097 4, 725, 001
5. ^Vithin the aggregate limit, the limit for Group I
may be exceeded by not more than 10 iiercent and the
limit for Group II may be exceeded by not more than
6 percent. Within the applicable group limit, as it may
be adjusted under this provision, specific limits may
be exceeded by not more than 5 percent'
6. In the succeeding 12-month periods for which any
limitation is in force under this agreement, the level
of exports permitted under such limitation shall be
increased by 5 percent of the corresponding level for
the preceding 12-month period, the latter level not to
include any adjustments under paragraphs 5 or 15.
7. Within group limits for each group and the fol-
lowing concentration provision, the square yard equiv-
alent of any shortfalls occurring in exports in the cat-
egories given specific limits may be used in any category
not given a specific limit. In the event of undue con-
centration in exports to the United States of cotton
textiles from India in (a) any category not given a
specific limit or (b) any combed category of any part
of merged combed and carded categories under para-
graph 4, the Government of the United States of
America may request consultation with the Government
of India to determine an appropriate course of action.
Until a mutually satisfactory solution is reached, the
Government of India shall limit exports in the categoi'y
in question to the United States starting with the
12-month period beginning ou the date of the request
for consultation. This limit shall be 105 percent of the
exports of such products to the United States during
the most recent 12-month period preceding the request
for consultation for which statistics are available to
our two governments.
8. The Government of India shall use its best efforts
to space exports of cotton textiles from India to the
United States within each category evenly throughout
the agreement year, taking into consideration normal
seasonal factors.
9. The two Governments recognize that the successful
implementation of the agreement depends in large part
upon mutual cooperation on statistical questions. The
" In view of the special circumstances described by
the representatives of the Government of India during
the negotiations, India, for the first agreement year only
and within the aggregate and the Group II limit, may
export up to 2,250,000 pieces in excess of the level for
Categories 28/29 and up to (500,000 pieces in excess of
the level for Categories 34/35. With respect to these
categories the 5 percent flexibility provision in para-
graph 5 shall not apply for the first agreement year.
[Footnote in original.]
Government of the United States of America shall
promptly supply the Government of India with data
on monthly imports of cotton textiles from India in
accordance with the categories listed in the appendix.
The Government of India ^all ixromptly supply the
Government of the United States of America with data
on monthly exports of cotton textiles to the United
States, in accordance with the categories listed in the
appendix. Each Government agrees to supply promptly
any other available relevant statistical data requested
by the other Government.
10. In the implementation of this agreement, the
system of categories and the rates of conversion into
square yard equivalents listed in the Annex hereto
shall apply.^ In any situation where the determination
of an article to be a cotton textile would be affected by
whether the criterion provided for in Article 9 of the
Long-Term Arrangement is used or the criterion pro-
vided for in paragraph 2 of Annex E of the Long-Term
Arrangement is used, the chief value criterion used by
the Government of the United States of America in
accordance with paragraph 2 of Annex E shall apply.^
11. The Government of the United States of Amer-
ica and the Government of India agree to consult on
any question arising in the imijlementation of this
agreement.
12. Mutually satisfactory administrative arrange-
ments or adjustments may be made to resolve minor
problems arising in the implementation of this agree-
ment including differences in i)Oints of procedure or
operation.
13. If the Government of India considers that as a
result of limitations specified in this agreement, India
is being placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a
third country, the Government of India may request
consultation with the Government of the United States
of America with the view to taking appropriate reme-
dial action such as a reasonable modification of this
agreement.
14. During the term of this agreement, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America will not request
restraint on the export of cotton textiles from India to
the United States, under the procedures of Article 3
of the Long-Term Arrangement. The applicability of
the Long-Term Arrangement to trade in cotton textiles
between India and the United States shall otherwise be
unaffected by this agreement.
' Not printed here ; for text, see Department of State
press release 186 dated Aug. 31.
' For text of the Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrange-
ment, see BuiiETiN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
SEPTEJIBER 25, 1967
399
15. (a) For any agreement year subsequent to the
first agreement year and immediately following a year
of a shortfall (i.e., a year in which cotton textile ex-
ports from India to the United States were below the
aggregate limit and any group and specific limits ap-
plicable to the category concerned) the Government
of India may permit exports to exceed these limits by
carryover in the following amounts and manner :
(i) The carryover shall not exceed the amount of
the shortfall in either the aggregate limit or any ap-
plicable group or specific limit and shall not exceed
either 5% of the aggregate limit or 5% of the applicable
group limit in the year of the shortfall, and
(ii) in the case of shortfalls in the categories sub-
ject to specific limits the carryover shall be used in
the same category in which the shortfall occurred and
shall not exceed 5% of the specific limit in the year of
the .shortfall, and
(iii) in the case of shortfalls not attributable to
categories subject to specific limits, the carryover shall
be used in the same group in which the shortfall oc-
curred, shall not be used to exceed any applicable spe-
cific limit except in accordance with the provisions in
paragraph 5 and shall be subject to the provisions of
paragraph 7 of the agreement.
(b) The limits referred to in subparagraph (a) of
this paragraph are without any adjustments under this
paragraph or paragraph 5.
(c) The carryover shall be in addition to the exports
permitted in paragraph 5.
16. Either Government may terminate this agreement
effective at the end of an agreement year by written
notice to the other Government to be given at least 90
days prior to the end of such agreement year. Either
Government may at any time propose revisions in the
terms of this agreement.
If the above conforms with the understanding of your
Government, this note and your Excejlency's note of
confirmation ° on behalf of the Government of India
shall constitute an Agreement between our Govern-
ments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
For the Secretary of State :
Anthony M. Solomon
His Excellency
Braj Kumab Xehru
Ambassadoi- of Iiulia
' Not printed.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Informs United Nations
of Aid to Near East Refugees
The United States Mission to the United
Nations made jmblic on August 30 {U.S. /U.N.
press release 130) the text of the following note
which had ieen transmitted that day to the
U.N. Secretary-General.
The Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations presents his
compliments to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and has the honor to reply to
his note of July 10, 1967 drawing attention to
operative paragraphs 8 and 9 of General
Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-V) ^ dealing
with humanitarian assistance and requesting
information on the measures taken by the
United States Government in the light of this
resolution.
The United States Government responded
immediately to the basic needs of the persons
displaced by the recent conflict by airlifting an
initial 5,000 tents to Jordan to provide tempo-
rary shelter for the homeless. In addition, the
United States has airlifted to Jordan 5,000
more tents and offered blankets, household uten-
sils and stoves to help relieve the hardships in
the area. The offer of blankets and household
utensils has not yet been accepted and these
items have not yet been furnished. The total
cost of the tents and other items and their
transport to Jordan by air is estimated at
approximately $1,675,000.
It will be recalled that the United States
pledged for the support of the United Nations
Eelief and Works Agency a contribution of
$22.2 million for the year ended June 30, 1967.
The pledge included $13.3 million in cash and
$8.9 million in foodstuffs. At the time of the
outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East, the
last shipments of these foodstuffs were on the
' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of July 24,
1967, p. 112.
400
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULUITIJf
high seas enroute to the Middle East. In some
cases vessels were forced to discharge their cargo
in Mediterranean ports because of the inaccessi-
bility of Middle East ports. The United States
Government arranged for the onward transpor-
tation of these cargoes destined for use by
UNRWA and bore the extra costs of storage
in transit and trans-shipment.
As the Representative informed the Secretary-
General in his letter of June 29, 19G7,- tlae
United States made a special contribution of $2
million in cash to UNRWA to help meet the
emergency needs of victims of the conflict. Sub-
sequently, the United States informed the Com-
missioner-General of UNRWA that it would
provide 24,000 metric tons of wheat flour and
1,200 tons of vegetable oils for use in UNRWA's
relief services during the next several months.
The world market value of these commodities,
including transportation to Middle Eastern
ports, amounts to approximately $4,284,000.
The United States Government expects shortly
to make a second allocation of commodities to
UNRWA of about the same magnitude.
In late June, the United States Government
transmitted $100,000 to the American Red Cross
for contribution to the International Committee
of the Red Cross for the latter organization's
activities on behalf of the victims of the recent
hostilities.
The United States Government also provided
funds estimated at $40,000 for the shipment, by
air, to the Middle East of medical supplies
(antibiotics and vitamins) donated by the
American Red Cross to the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross.
The United States Government is also con-
tinuing to donate, at rates prevailing prior to
the outbreak of hostilities, foodstuffs to Ameri-
can voluntary agencies for their programs of
assistance to needy persons in the Gaza Strip
and on the West Bank. The value of such com-
modities at world market prices, exclusive of
transportation cost, is approxunately $1,779,000
annually.
The United States is keeping the emergency
needs of those persons affected by the recent
hostilities under constant review and will
cooperate fully with intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations now at work
in the area as well as with the governments
directly concerned.
Recent Advances in International
Cooperation in Space
Statement by Arnold W. Frutkin ^
I think it appropriate, as other delegate,s have
done, to review some of the practical advances in
cooperation in space exploration which have oc-
curred since our last meeting 17 months ago.
This, after all, is the main business of this sub-
committee.
With respect to cooperation in the launching
of satellites, 1967 has been a busy year. The San
Marco B and the Ariel III satellites, prepared
respectively by Italy and the U.K., were success-
fully launched in the course of cooperative pro-
grams with NASA, bringing to eight the total
number of such joint projects successfully con-
summated. A failure in the launch vehicle oc-
curred, as happens in this work, in our effort to
orbit the ESRO II satellite. However, it is part
of the U.S. commitment to this program to pro-
vide another booster for a second attempt at no
cost to ESRO [European Space Research Or-
ganization]. A launching of the ESRO I satel-
lite may come later this year.
Before going to other joint enterprises, I
want to say something more about the San
Marco case to illustrate for the subcommittee
and other interested member states the actual
significance of such a project to our cooperative
purposes.
San Marco began with an Italian concept and
proposal based on a scientific objective. That
objective was to make direct measurements of
local variations in atmospheric density at satel-
lite height. Its importance is clear, since pres-
ent measurements of this basic parameter differ
by a factor of two. From this objective every-
thing else followed. The orbit must be equato-
rial to eliminate latitudinal variations. To ac-
commodate an equatorial launch, platforms at
sea were proposed by Italy. Italy developed the
satellites entirely independently and also de-
veloped the launch site. An illustration of the
close character of the joint effort is the fact that
Italy also built the complex and detailed ground
test and control equipment which was used to
' For text, see ibid., July 17, 1967, p. 65.
'Made before the Scientific and Technical Subcom-
mittee of the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space on Aug. 29 (U.S./U.X. press release 129).
Mr. Frutkin is the U.S. Representative to the sub-
committee.
SEPTEMBER
19C7
401
check out and launch the U.S. booster. Clearly,
to link Italian checkout and control equij^ment
to a U.S. booster, through a maze of cables and
sophisticated electronic controls, required the
closest collaboration and the fiillest exchange of
detailed design information. The training re-
quired was provided by NASA and its contrac-
tors i2i the States.
Obviously, the scientific and teclinical re-
wards of svich a joint effort are real and exten-
sive. They are not, however, limited to projects
of the size of San Marco. The pattern is appli-
cable to smaller projects as well as to larger ones,
to bilateral or unilateral efforts.
The essential ingredients of such a project
are a useful scientific objective of mutual in-
terest, serious interest and contributions by both
sides, close integration of the respective respon-
sibilities, and the necessary training and tech-
nical assistance.
Precisely the same principles apply where an-
other cooperating country, such as India, em-
ploys our smaller sounding rockets to launch
payloads designed and fabricated in India.
These facts will become further evident as I
continue this brief account of some few illus-
trative examples of cooperation since our last
meeting.
During this period, NASA continued its prac-
tice of inviting foreign scientists to propose ex-
periments to fly alongside those of our scientists
in any of our satellites and probes. For example,
the first material which we can retrieve from the
moon's surface will be shared with 29 scientists
from Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Switz-
erland, and the U.K. The scientists will conduct
34 separate experiments on these materials. Such
opportunities continue open and are advertised
regularly, directly to all countries which have
established some space authority and to the
Secretariat here.
Examples of new and continuing cooperation
in the use of sounding rockets for scientific pur-
poses are far more numerous, but I will cite only
a few. In the period since our last meeting we
have moved together with Argentina and Brazil
tx3 implement a program of meteorological
soimding rocket launchings on a regular and co-
ordinated basis in order to develop basic weather
knowledge throughout the Americas. We are
encouraged by the expressed intention of sev-
eral other countries to join us. Cooperation in the
launching of barium vapor experiments among
Germany, Canada, Brazil, and the United States
has produced wholly new scientific data of the i
upper atmosphere and the aurora.
One final example : We have flown Argentine
and Japanese scientific sounding rockets from
our Wallops Station to provide test data to these
countries. In the Argentine case there was the
first known helicopter recovery in air of a
sounding rocket payload, while in the other case
U.S. and Japanese weather rocket systems were
successfully intercompared so that data obtained
by each may be used with the other.
In the field of practical applications I note
that since April 1966, 10 additional countries
have joined INTELSAT, the international con-
sortium which is bringing space communications
into i^ractical use. The last of these 10 countries
to join is Tanzania. Six additional countries
have had quotas approved and are expected to
sign shortly. This will bring INTELSAT'S total
membership to 64, over half the membership
of the United Nations. As President Johnson
recently pointed out, membership is open to all.^ i
Progress in spreading the benefit of direct |
access to LTnited States weather satellites has
also continued. Since our last meeting, approxi-
mately 40 additional APT [automatic picture
transmission] equipments have been established
in other countries, making the total now 80. I
may say also that the cost of purchasing such
equipment for direct receipt of satellite cloud
cover data is now only $5,000. It is possible,
quite easily, to construct sets for far less.
The distinguished representative of France
has spoken in some detail of extensive coopera-
tion in geodesy based on French and United
States satellites ; so I will not repeat that. I will
conclude this very sketchy account of recent
practical cooperation by congratulating the
member states of the Outer Space Committee
for defining and implementing a plan for a
United Nations Conference on Outer Space
which is oriented firmly and constructively to
practical applications of interest to developing
countries and which avoids the ininecessary
duplication of other scientific activities in this
field.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I should like to turn
briefly to various injunctions which this sub-
committee and its parent Committee have placed
upon all of us in the recent past. It is our inten-
tion to be fully responsive to each.
' For President Johnson's message to Congress on
Aug. 14 on communications policy, see Bulletin of
Sept. 4, 1067, p. 296.
402
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In response to the Committee recommenda-
tion calling for "descriptive material on
national space progi'ams," we have made avail-
able a comprehensive and detailed national
report.^ We commend this report to the attention
of member states, particularly since it contains
detailed infonnation on each esperunent we
are conducting and describes its instrumenta-
tional approach. It also identifies the principal
experimenters. Such information should make
it increasingly feasible for other nations to
bring their interested scientists into touch with
this activity.
With respect to the resolutions askmg us to
encourage international cooperative programs,
I believe the account I have just given is suffi-
cient evidence of our serious and -wholehearted
compliance. I might add that the little "blue
book," * to be distributed to you shortly, records
our cooperative programs in detailed summary
form. You will note that scientists from 84
countries are in fact participating with us in one
way or another in space research.
Member states have also been asked to pursue
their studies of navigation satellites in the gen-
eral interest. Delegates will recall that at our
last meeting we reported fully on our activities
and views. Since then, we joined with others in
the working group on this subject and again
reported fully on our work. As time and experi-
ence further crystallizes a need for a system,
we are prepared to continue our active involve-
ment and would hope that others would do
so, too.
We are further asked to press forward with
applications of practical value to the develop-
ing nations. As our Canadian colleague stated
at yesterday's session, activities in space meteor-
ology and communication have become widely
established in the world community, and we take
pride in our role in this process. But in no way
is this early success limiting our sense of urgency
for pushing forward with advanced experiments
and conceptual studies to increase further these
capabilities. We are also currently studying how
technology produced by space activity can be
matched to and made directly applicable to the
specific needs of a developing country. It is
much too early to know whether there will be
positive results from such a study, and we do
' U.N. doc. A/AC.105/L. 36.
'International Programs (July 1967), prepared by
tbe Office of International Affairs, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
not wish to raise false or premature hopes.
Neither do we wish to neglect any constructive
possibility to make maximum use of our work
in the space field for the benefit of others.
In regard to assistance for continued develop-
ment of the Thumba Kange, it is timely to note
that at a recent meeting in London we agreed
with other members of the Eange Advisory
Committee to assist further by jDroviding addi-
tional equipment to expand the utility of the
range's radar.
On the subject of expanded opportunities for
education and training, we can report now hav-
ing given technical and academic training in
the space field, in institutions where space exper-
imentation or operations are actually in process,
to 745 foreign nationals of 37 countries. Addi-
tional opportunities for others remain open.
Lastly, we are asked to devote "utmost effort
to ensure the success" of the United Nations
Space Conference scheduled for next year. We
have already begun to organize our participa-
tion, directing and confining ourselves faith-
fully to the stipulated subject matter. Papers
have already been invited from United States
scientists and experimenters. These will be care-
fully screened for submission to the panel of
experts, which will make final selections for the
confei-ence.
Mr. Chairman, I apologize for having been
more lengthy than I wished. We do, neverthe-
less, feel it important to be concretely responsive
to the actions of this subcommittee and its
parent Committee.
Now, Mr. Chairman, as we move forward to
discuss the five subject areas on the agenda
which you read out to us yesterday, the United
States delegation will be prepared to comment
in more detail on each. We believe it will be
helpful to our work, however, if we approach
these discussions with three guiding principles
firmly in mind : first, that our actions should be
clear and specific rather than generalized; sec-
ond, that we should test each action against the
existence of a real need ; third, and finally, that
we should be guided by the principle that each
of our actions should offer the possibility of
practical application in the real world.
It seems clear, Mr. Chairman, that there are
subjects on our agenda for which a need exists
and concerning which we can take clear, specific,
and feasible action. We therefore look forward
to useful and constructive results from this
meeting.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
403
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents {such as those
listed holow) may he consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. V.N. printed publications may be
purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations,
United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report
of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands covering the period from July 27,
1966, to June 30, 1967. S/S020. August 8, 1967. 81 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the observation of
the cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector covering the
period from July 11 to August 5, 1967. S/8053/Add.l.
August 10, 1067. 9 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General concerning the situ-
ation which has arisen between Guinea and the Ivory
Coast as a result of the detention of Guinean na-
tionals in the Ivory Coast. S/8120. August 14, 1967.
48 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General under General Assem-
bly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security Council
Resolution 237 (1967) giving additional information
on the humanitarian aspects of the situation in the
Middle East. S/8124. August 18, 1967. 13 pp.
Development and Co-Ordination of the Activities of the
Organizations Within the United Nations System.
Expenditures of the United Nations system in rela-
tion to programmes. Report of the Administrative
Committee on Co-Ordination. E/4351. June 1, 1967.
72 pp.
Multilateral Food Aid. Fifth annual report of the
United Nations/FAO Intergovernmental Committee
of the World Food Programme ; note by the Secre-
tary-General; E/4378; May 31, 19G7 ; 16 pp.; and
Progress Report by the Secretary-General ; E/4352 ;
June 6, 1967 ; 96 pp.
Report of the Industrial Development Board. Note by
the Secretary-General. E/4385. June 2, 1967. 266 pp.
Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various
Countries in the Middle East. E/4361 (Summary).
June 8, 1967. 14 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
General Assembly
International Year for Human Rights. Report of the
Preparatory Committee for the International Con-
ference on Human Rights. A/6670. June 12, 1967.
54 pp.
Contributions to emergency relief In the Middle East.
Letter from the representative of Canada, A/67.35,
June 29, 1967, 2 pp. ; letter from the representative
of the United States, A/6736, June 29, 1967, 2 pp.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space :
Information furnished by the U.S.S.R. on objects
launched into orbit or beyond during period of April
27 to June 17, 1967. A/AC.105/INF/167. July 10,
1967. 3 pp.
Information furnished by France on objects launched
into orbit or beyond on February 8 and 15, 1967.
A/AC.105/INF.163. August 16, 1967. 1 p.
Report of the Working Group on a Navigation Serv-
ices Satellite System. A/AC.105/38. August 3, 1967.
8 PI).
United Nations Emergency Force. Report of the Secre-
tary-General. A/6672. July 12, 1967. 48 pp. and maps.
Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance. Note
by the Secretary-General. A/6660. July 25, 1067. 16 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Economic Commission for Latin America. The Eco-
nomically Relatively Less Developed Countries and
Latin American Integration. E/CN.12/774. April 8,
1967. 129 pp.
Economic Commission for Africa. Science and Technical
Education in Africa. E/CN.14/308. April 20, 1967.
53 pp.
External Financing of Economic Development of the
Developing Countries. Outflow of capital from the
developing countries. A progress report by the Secre-
tary-General. E/4374. May 26, 1067. 85 pp.
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Signature : Ceylon, August 30, 1067.
Load Lines
International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at
London April 5, 1966. Enters into force July 21, 1968.
Proclaimed by the Presidetit: September 7, 1067.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and
convention with final protocol and regulations of
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 19(>4. Entered
into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Adherence deposited: Maldive Islands, August 15,
1967.
Ratifications deposited: United Arab Republic, June
30, 1067 ; Viet-Nam, June 5, 1967.
Telecommunications
International telecommunication convention, with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered
into force January 1. 1967; as to the United States
May 20, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Accession deposited: Barbados, August 16, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959) (TIAS 4803, 5603) to put into effect a revised
frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile
(R) service and related information, with annexes.
Done at Geneva April 20, 1066. Entered into force
July 1, 1067, except the frequency allotment plan
404
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
contaiued in appendix 27 shall enter into force
April 10, 1070.
Ratification deposited: United States, August 23,
19G7.
Entered into force for the United States: August 23,
19G7.
Proclaimed hy the President: September 1, 1967.
Trade
Procfes-verbal extending the declaration on the pro-
visional accession of Iceland to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 5687). Done at
Geneva December 14, 1965. Entered into force De-
cember 2S, 1965 ; for the United States December 30,
1965. TIAS 5943.
Acceptance: Cuba, July 18, 1967.
Third proc6s-verbal extending the declaration on the
provisional accession of Tunisia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 4498), as
extended (TIAS 4958, 5809). Done at Geneva De-
cember 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6, 1966.
TIAS 6005.
Acceptance: Cuba, July 18, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Switzerland to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Ge-
neva April 1, 1966. Entered into force August 1, 1966.
TIAS 6065.
Acceptances: Cuba, July 18, 1967 ; Indonesia, June 26,
1967.
Protocol for the accession of Yugoslavia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
Julv 20. 1966. Entered into force August 25. 1966;
for'the United States January 17, 1967. TIAS 6185.
Acceptance: Cuba, July IS, 1967.
Third proc6s-verbal extending the declaration on the
provisional accession of Argentina to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
November 17, 1966. Entered into force January 9,
1967. TIAS 6224.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, May 25, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 29, 1967.
Second procfes-verbal extending the declaration on the
provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS
5309). Done at Geneva November 17, 1966. Entered
into force January 18, 1967. TIAS 6225.
Acceptance: Czechoslovakia, May 25, 1967.
Protocol for the accession of Korea to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
March 2, 1967. Entered into force ApiJ 14, 1967;
for the United States April 21, 1967. TIAS 6293.
Acceptances: India, June 27, 1967; South Africa,
July 4, 1967 ; United Kingdom, July 11, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Austria, July 17, 1967.
United Nations
Amendment to article 109 of the Charter of the United
Nations. Adopted at New York December 20, 1965.'
Ratifications deposited: Libya, August 3, 1967 ; Para-
guay, August 7, 1967.
Wheat
1967 Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington May 15 through June 1,
1967, inclusive. Entered into force July 16, 1967.
TIAS 6315.
Acceptance deposited: Venezuela, September 5, 1967.
Women — Political Rights
Convention on the political rights of women. Done at
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7,
1954.=
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 25, 1967.
BILATERAL
Indonesia
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected
by exchange of notes at Djakarta January 7, 1967.
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SEPTEMBER 25, 1967
405
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406
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX September 25, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. H7^
China. Secretary Rusk's News Confereuce of
Septembers 383
Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of September 8 383
Economic Affairs
Group of Ten Agrees on Plan for Creation of
New International Monetary Reserve Asset
(Johnson, Fowler, text of communique) . . 392
President Modifies Rates of Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax (Executive order) 396
United States and India Sign New Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) .... 398
Foreign Aid
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem-
ber 8 383
U.S. Informs United Nations of Aid to Near East
Refugees (text of note) 400
India. United States and India Sign New Cotton
Textile Agreement (text of U.S. note) ... 398
International Organizations and Conferences.
Group of Ten Agrees on Plan for Creation of
New International Monetary Reserve Asset
(Johnson, Fowler, text of communique) . . 392
Japan. President Modifies Rates of Interest
Equalization Tax (Executive order) . . . 396
Near East
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem-
ber 8 383
U.S. Informs United Nations of Aid to Near East
Refugees (text of note) 400
Presidential Documents
Group of Ten Agrees on Plan for Creation of
New. International Monetary Reserve Asset . 392
President Modifies Rates of Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax 396
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be
Held at Lawrence, Kansas 397
Publications. Recent Releases 405
Refugees
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem-
ber 8 383
U.S. Informs United Nations of Aid to Near East
Refugees (text of note) 400
Science. Recent Advances in International Coop-
eration in Space (Frutkln) 401
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Thirteenth
Anniversary of SEATO (Rusk) 391
Treaty Information
Current Actions 404
United States and India Sign New Cotton Tex-
tile Agreement (text of U.S. note) .... 398
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 404
Recent Advances in International Cooperation
in Space (Frutkin) 401
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem-
ber 8 383
U.S. Informs United Nations of Aid to Near East
Refugees (text of note) 400
Viet-Nam
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of Septem-
ber 8 383
U.S. Hails Viet-Nam Elections as Major Step
Forward (Department statement) .... 391
'Name Index
Fowler, Henry H 392
Frutkin, Arnold W 401
Johnson, President 392, 396
Rusk, Secretary 383, 391
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases; September 4—10
Press releases may be obtained from the OfBce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Release issued prior to September 4 which
ajjpears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 186
of August 31.
No. Date Subject
*187 9/7 Unger sworn in as Ambassador
to Thailand (biographic de-
tails).
*188 9/7 Program for visit of King Con-
stantine of Greece.
189 9/8 Regional foreign policy confer-
ence, Lawrence, Kans., Oct. 17
(rewrite).
190 9/8 Rusk : news conference.
*191 9/8 Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs
(program and members of
delegations).
192 9/8 Rusk: 13th anniversary of
SEATO.
*Not printed.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. U75
October 2, 1967
SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER DISCUSS VIET-NAM
IN TV-RADIO INTERVIEWS m
THE INTELLECTUAL AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
hy Ambassador John A. Gronouski Ji32
CONCERT AND CONCILIATION: THE NEXT STAGE
OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
hy Under Secretary Rostow 4^2
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1475 Publication 8296
October 2, 1967
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STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tveekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service,
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
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Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker Discuss Viet-Nam
in TV-Radio Interviews
Secretary Rush appeared on the American
Broadcasting Company''s program '■'■Issues and
Answers'''' on September 10, and on the same day
an interview filmed in Saigon with Elhxoorth
Bunher, the American Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam, ivas broadcast on the Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Systeni's program '•'■Face
the NationP Following are transcripts of the
two interviews.
"ISSUES AND ANSWERS"
Mr. Clarh [Robert E. Clarh, ABO Capitol
Hill conr.spondent'] : Mr. Secretaiy, welcome
back to "Issues and Answers."
Secretary Rusk: Thank you, Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clarh : South Viet-Nam 's new President-
elect, General Thieu, says when he takes office he
will suggest peace talks to Hanoi. These are his
words. "If Hanoi demands a gesture of good
will," he said, he would like to have a bombing
pause of 1 week. Would we agree to such a re-
quest from General Thieu?
Secretary Rush: I think both from the point
of view of General Thieu and the point of view
of the United States a good deal turns on the at-
titude of Hanoi. In the program which just pre-
ceded this one, David Schoenbnin reported that
Pham Van Dong, the Prime IMinister of North
Viet-Nam, demanded that we stop the bombing
unconditionally. Now, all of our information is
that that means a permanent and unconditional
cessation of the bombing, and Pham Van Dong
added in that interview, "There will be no reci-
procity, there will be no bargaining."
Now, I think President-elect Thieu has ex-
pressed his interest in some sort of response from
Hanoi; so I think the important thing here is
not Saigon and Washington. We want peace.
The important thing is the attitude of Ilanoi. I
regret very much the liai-shness of the statements
attributed to Pham Van Dong by Mr. Schoen-
bnm, because, among other things, statements
like that on the public record make it more dif-
ficult for the Prime Minister of Hanoi to take
another view in private discussions. So every-
thing turns on Hanoi, not on Saigon and
Washington.
Mr. Earsch [Joseph C. Harsch, ABC News'] :
Mr. Secretaiy, isn't there one question there
though about the freedom of Saigon to conduct
its own affairs? Suppose they actually re-
quested us to do a 1-week pause in the bombing.
If we say "No," it lays us open to the charge of
not letting them iiin their own affairs.
Secretary Rush: This really isn't the question,
Mr. Harsch. I am sure we and Saigon will be
in very close touch with each other on all mat-
ters of this sort. We have in the past ; we will
in the future.
President-elect Tliieu has not said that, re-
gardless of the attitude of Hanoi, he would ask
for a cessation of the bombing or for a pause
in the bombing. Now again, he was talking
about a pause, 1 week. From everything that we
know, Hanoi considers a 1 week's pause, or a
pause of any sort, as an ultimatum. We have had
several pauses in the past, a half dozen of them.
One of them lasted as long as 37 days. During
the Tet pause this year. Prime Minister Ky of-
fered to meet representatives of Hanoi in the de-
militarized zone to discuss the extension of that
cease-fire, and Hanoi refused. So again, you see,
everything turns on Hanoi, not on Saigon and
Washington, who both want peace as much as
anybody in the world.
Hanoi's Rejection of Peace Negotiations
Mr. Clarh: Well, are you saying, Mr. Secre-
tary, you think it is unlikely Saigon will ever
get to a point in feeling out Hanoi where it wiU
ask us for a bombing pause ?
Secretary Rusk: No, I would suppose that
Saigon will feel out Hanoi, because everybody
does that, not only Saigon — they have done it
in the past — we have done it many times — other
governments and gi-oups of governments and
personalities and private visitors have felt out
OCTOBER 2, 1967
411
Hanoi. Bui, iipiiin, yf)u sec, the point is Hanoi,
not Sainjon and not Wiishinj^ton.
Mr. Vliirh: Yes, sir, but what I mean is do
you feci it is uiililccly Saigon will get any re-
sponse from Hanoi I hat would even bring them
to the point ol" asking us to accept a bombing
pause ?
Secretanj Rusk: Well, we would hope (hat
they would. Now, you do have in South Viet-
Nam an eleclcd governiucnt Ihat is going to be
forming a Cabinet and taking responsibility.
We think that such a- government would have
a cliance to procu'cd with somewhat more free-
dom of action, with a certain mandate from the
Vietnamese people, a numdato to try to work
out an honorable peace, among other things, if
an hono7-able peace is possible. We also tliink
it is just [)ossible. We see no signs of this: that
Hanoi may realize that the election of a gov-
ernment in South Viot-Nam cliangos at least one
aspect of (licir own pi'(>dictions. 'Tliey have been
hoping that South Viet-Nam would collapse
l)olitiral]y, internally. Now, that isn't going to
happen. There is going to be an elected govern-
ment taking ofPice theiv, and ])erhaps that could
have some iuMuence on Hanoi. ]>ut we have no
problem with President-elect 'I'hieu on these
matters. Wo are as interested in peace as anyone.
And on other occasions they have oil'ered to bo
in (oucli with Hanoi and try to work out a
peace, and Hanoi has consistently rejected it.
Mr. Ilarseh : Mr. Secretary, this matter of the
bombing pause once more, please: You say it
is up to Hanoi, but isn't it unrealistic to think
that they would ever tell us in advance what
they might do in return? Don't you have to
try a pause again to find out whether there
might be a res]ionse?
Secreliiri/ Uiisk: Well, this is not something
tliat we feel wo have to speculate about, Mr.
Ilarsch. A good many people say, "Stop the
bombing and something might happen." Now,
we can ask Hanoi, we do ask Hanoi what will
hajipen if we slo]) tlie bombing, and I hey tell
us "Nothing." Now Pham Van Dong a})parently
told David Schoenbrun: "There will be no reci-
procily, thei'o will be no bargaining." No one
has been able to whisper behind his hand that
those North Vietnamese divisions in tlie demili-
tarized zone won't attack our Marines if we
stop the bombing.
I am not suggesting here we are resistant to
the idea of deescalation. We have tried it on
many occasions. Time and lime again, we have
put to the otlier side: What will you do if we
ourselves begin to decscalatc? So we are pre-
pared to do it. After all, wo wanted to demili-
tarize the demilitarized zone. We did our best
to get the International Control Commission
in there for that purpose. We wanted to guaran-
tee Princo Sihanouk that there would be no
hostile forces using the territory of Cambodia.
We have tried on a munber of occasions to bring
about some de facto deescalat ion of the violence.
We have had no response wliatever from Hanoi.
Role of the New Saigon Government
I\[r. Clark: Well, in the face of this, as you
note, very hard lino from Hanoi, what do you
see as the proper role the new Saigon govern-
ment could or should play in trying to work out
some peaceful settlement of tho war?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in the first in-
stance to mobilize the people and the resources
of Soulii Viet-Nam, to make it clear to Hanoi
that South Viet-Nam itself, the people of South
Viot-Nam, under no circumstances will accept
the seizure of their countiy by force from the
North.
Secondly, to make it very clear that as far as
Saigon, the United States, and the other allies
who have forces in Viet-Nam ai'e concerned —
that as far as our side is concerned — there can
bo peace very promi)tly if North Viot-Nam is
interested in peace.
Now, if Hanoi is still determined to take over
South Viet-Nam, if they are not interested in
peace, then we have some problems. That is
what the war is all about. That is why there is
shooting in tho first place. Hanoi was deter-
mined in 105!) and 'GO to move in there and
seize South Viot-Nam by force.
Mr. Ilnrnvh : Mr. Secretary, how do you con-
ceive tho proper role of tho United States vis-a-
vis tho new government in Saigon? They have
had an election. It seems to have been fair and
free. How much should we influence the forma-
tion of that go\ernment toward tho broader po-
litical base, for example?
Secretary Rusk: Well, T think the actual con-
stitution of tho go\'ernment is for the South
Vietnamese themselves to work out. They do
not ask us to nominate candidates for posts in
the Cabinet, for examiile, but we do know that
they are consulting diiTerent elements in their
political structure. They are studying very care-
fully tho basis on which they would foi-m a now
Cabinet. My guess is that there will be a very
considerable number of civilians in that Cabinet
412
DEPARTMENT OF STAITS BULLETIN
and that difTcront f^roups in the population will
be represcntod.
The Senate and the Plouse of Representatives
to bo elected next montli will themselves reflect
dilToronl olonicnts in the population. So they are
on till' riii'lit trade, and thoy don't need our
coachino: in detail from (he sidelines. Tfthey iisic
us for advice, wo will bo glad to give it, but this
is basically their job because they have got to
get a governniont which represents them and
their aspirations, Uieir people, and I thinlc they
are going aiK)u( it, and I am reasonably optimis-
tic about the possibilities.
Mr. Clark: Do you feel the new government
is obligated to carry out the fundamental social
and land reforms and clean up tiie corruption
that has been widespread in the past?
Secrciary RuhJc: Yes. They have committed
themselves to those programs, and as a matter
of fact, ])rior to the election, a good many stei)s
have been taken in that direction. We think tluit
the election will itself open up new chapters
in getting on with some of the basic reforms that
they recognize are necessary and that wo would
be glad to see thcTU undertake. I think we will
see a good deal of that in tlie months ahead.
Mr. Ilarsch: Mr. Secretary, we have just had
a bulletin in here. It says, from Tokyo: "Com-
nuniist North Viet-Nam has sharply criticized
American ell'orts to use the United Nations as
a channel for entering the war." It calls it a U.S.
move to legalize the war and prolong the divi-
sion. Have you any comment on that?
Secretary Rusk: This Jias been the consistent
attitude of Hanoi for a very long time.
Mr. Ilarsch: Nothing new in it?
Secretary Iiuxk: No; and this is one of the
reasons why some members of the U.N. believe
therefore tiie U.N. should not take this nuitter
up but should leave it to the Geneva machinery.
Now, we could accejit that, but the other side
won't even accept the Geneva machinei-y. So
this is the same deadlock we arc familiar with.
Mr. 11 arse h: I want to go back to tlie question
of bombing and ask you if tlierc isn't an honest
difference of opinion in Washington as to the
im[)ortancc of bombing to us. I cite, for ex-
ample, what you said on Friday : ' "If they are
talking about stojiping our half of the war" —
that is, yon appeared to bo saying the bombing
represented pretty much our half of the war —
whereas Mr. McNamara on August 25 says
' For tin- trnnscript of Socretary Rusk's iiew.s con-
ference of Si'i)t. 8, .see Huj.letin of Sept. 25, 19G7, p. 381.
"There is no basis to believe that any bombing
campaign, short of one which had j)opulation
as its target, would by itself force Ho Chi
Minh's regime into submission."
Secretary Rusk: There is no contradiction
there. Secretary McNamara was talking about
a dramatically steppcd-up bombing ])r<)graiii as
distinct from the kind of bombing that wo are
doing now. One of the problems is that opera-
tionally we cannot say to our soldiers and our
Marines that they must not strike the enemy
that is coming at them until they are 2 miles
away. Wo can't say to our Alarines "Don't hit
them when they are 9 miles away, that would
bo too rude, that is across the I7th parallel."
I don't myself quite see what Hanoi's incen-
tive for peace would be, if they were sitting
there completely safe, undisturbed, able to send
men and arms into South Viet-Nam at their
pa('o for the next ;50 or 40 years. Now, the con-
centration of Hanoi on the bombing, and the
international campaign which they and other
Communist capitals have organized to get the
bombing stopped, indicates that the bombing
is a very important element in this situation. We
hear much more about the bombing than wo do
about four points and five points and all the
paraphernalia of political discussion. Now this,
therefore, is important to tJicm.
Now, we can stop it very quickly, but what we
want to know is what will happen if we do stop
it, and so far they have not been able to tell us
anything that they would do.
Mr. Ilarsch: I can understand your not want-
ing to stop it if you are sure it really is having
an effect on the war in the South. But if it ceases
to have much appreciable efl'oct, as I thought
Mr. McNamara was saying, then the reason for
not stopping is certainly a good deal smaller,
isn't it?
Secretary Riisk: No, I don't tliink he was say-
ing it had no effect on it. I think it has had a
considerable effect on lines of communication,
the capacity of the North to maintain a war at
certain magnitudes.
]\Ir. SchoenbruTi in the earlier program talked
about all these people in North Viet-Nam who
are there to repair railways and repair bridges
and things of that sort. If all those people were
frcMj to bring arms piggyback to support men in
South Viet-Nam, the situation would be quite
dilferent. So that there is no doubt at all that
the bombing has had some real effect on their
capacity to sustain a particular level of opera-
tions in the South. But in any event, it also
413
brings home to them that peace is a matter of
reciprocal action on both sides and that they
camiot expect to sit there in a sanctuary while
they launch these wicked attacks on South
Viet-Nam.
U.S. Bombing Military Targets
Mr. Clark : President-elect Thieu said yester-
day, and again, these are his words : "Any tar-
get in North Viet-Nam wliicli can help the Com-
munist invader to continue the war should be
destroyed." Would you agree with this ?
Secretary Rush: Well, the selection of targets
has to take into account very many things. We
have been bombing militai-y targets extensively
in North Viet-Nam. There are very few mili-
tary targets which have not been hit. We have
no desire to take on the civilian population.
'\Vlien people like David Schoenbrun and Har-
rison Salisbury visit Hanoi, they find Hanoi
and they wander around the city, and they have
to go out looking for bomb damage. That itself
demonstrates we are not after civilians up there.
In a broadcast just yesterday from Hanoi
they announced that we had killed 500 civilians
in North Viet-Nam by our bombing in the past
6 months — the first 6 months of 1967. Now that
figure of 500 is just about the same number of
South Vietnamese civilians killed by the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces in the South
during the election campaign which has just
closed — during about 4 weeks. And this is a
matter of policy on the part of the Viet Cong.
They were ordered to do so, whereas the civilian
casualties in the North were unfortunate by-
products of attacks on military targets.
Mr. Clarh: Would it be correct to say that we
are gomg to contmue to make basic military de-
cisions in the war, including decisions on what
is or is not going to be bombed, despite the new
civilian government in Saigon?
Secretary Rush: Well, I think we do that in
consultation with the Government in Saigon,
and in consultation with our other allies who
are involved in Viet-Nam. The general bombing
policy is a matter we discuss with them. The
selection of actual targets is a matter that the
Commander in Chief has to take as his respon-
sibility in terms of those that might be sensitive.
It is not something that Senators or correspond-
ents or very many people can get into with any
effectiveness.
Mr. Harsch : Mr. Secretary, Secretary McNa-
mara has announced the policy of attempting to
build a military barrier of sorts between North
and South Viet-Nam. He did not say that it
could go all the way across to Thailand. Would
you discuss the political problem of extending
that barrier right across so that we really could
cut the Ho Chi Minh trail ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Secretary McNamara
did make a statement on that. There has been a
great deal of speculation, hut he refused to take
additional questions. I don't think it is for me
to take up that question and speculate about it
for the future. We don't want to give that kind
of information to North Viet-Nam. I just prefer
to stay out of that, quite frankly.
Mr. Harsch: Can't j'ou tell us anything about
the attitude of the people on our side in Laos to
the idea of putting it across?
Secretary Rusk: If there is a story there, it
will be a story some weeks and months from
now, and there is no point in my trying to make
it a story today.
Mr. Harsch: Can you tell us this, whether if
a barrier became militarily effective it would
reduce the importance of the bombing to the
extent that it was effective ?
Secretary Rusk : No. Again, if I were a regi-
mental commander up there, to prevent the
intrusion of these forces from North Viet-Nam
across the DMZ, I would be glad to have my
men reinforced by materiel. That is the basic
element in the situation.
Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretai-y, Governor Romney
has now offered a further explanation of his
charge that he was "brainwashed" by the ad-
ministration into supporting its Viet-Nam
policy, at least for a time. He says he wasn't
talking about the Russian type of brainwashing ■
but what he calls the LB J kind. What he meant,
he says, is the credibility gap, the snow job, or
just manipulating the news. Would you like to
reply to any or all of these?
Secretary Rusk: If you ask me if I would like
to, the answer is "No," but I don't know which
Eomney to answer and which statements to
answer. Certainly the charge that the Jolmson
administration has been trying to mislead the
American people is nonsense. We are trying to
give effect to a Southeast Asia Treaty, which
was negotiated and ratified mider a liepublican
administration, with broad bipartisan sujiport,
with only one dissenting vote in the Senate. And
everyone understood at that time what that
treaty meant. The Senate Foreign Relations
414
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Committee at that time understood what it
meant, and we are now giving effect to the com-
mitments we made in support of the security
of the countries that are covered by that treaty.
Now, Mr. Eomney, I thinlv, has some prob-
lems about sorting this out witliin his own party
and, altliougli the Secretary of State has many
responsibilities, what happens in the Republi-
can Party is not one of them.
Mr. Clark: Are you disturbed by all the re-
cent politicking over the Viet-Nam issue, which
many politicians have been saj-ing for 2 years
they hoped could be kept out of politics?
Secretary Busk: Well, naturally we would
hope, and I think there are some leaders in both
parties who would hope, that in an issue of this
sort, which has been bii^artisan in the past and
is bipartisan in terms of the future stakes of
this country in the results, could be kept out of
politics. But we are pretty lusty in our country
and pretty boisterous when we start moving
into presidential elections; so it is inevitable,
at least, some discussion of it.
The Situation in China
il/r. Ilarsch: Mr. Secretaiy, has the chaos in
China yet reached the point where you can
begin to see some outline, to draw some conclu-
sion about what is happening and what may
come of it?
Secretary Rtisk: It is very difficult for us to
try to predict exactly what is happening in
China. Xow, we are very much interested in the
outcome there. We have great stakes in it, and
we have interests in their attitudes toward their
neighbors from Korea all the way around from
Southeast Asia to India.
We try to watch very carefully the actual
events there, the groups that seem to be oppos-
ing each other, the issues on which they oppose
each other — militancy against peaceful coexist-
ence, for example. We take into full accomit our
private discussions with them in Warsaw. We
watch their economic problem. Here is a comi-
try where the gross national product is one-
tenth that of the United States, on which they
have to feed and take care of some 700 million
people. We watch closely their relations with
the Soviet Union, with Britain, with India,
with Burma, with Hanoi — even with such coun-
tries as Kenya and Switzerland, with whom
they have had great difficulties lately. We watch
also the disposition of their forces and their
force deployments.
We caimot honestly tell you exactly what the
outcome inside China is going to be. I don't
think anyone knows that, particularly the lead-
ers m China. We are interested in whether they
are going to intrude themselves into adjacent
areas, such as Southeast Asia or India. I can tell
you that we do not have present indication that
tliey are disposing their forces for a significant
intervention in these border areas.
Now, we can't guarantee that for the future.
There is a risk in all of these situations, but
there has been a risk in all of them since the end
of the war, and that risk has to be taken into
account. Now, we can't say that there is no risk
whatever of China involving itself in some of
these problems, but it is a risk which we antici-
pated. We could not say that alliances dissolve
simply because we recognize there might be a
risk, because it was the presence of the risk that
caused the alliance to be formed. When the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955 rec-
ommended the SEATO Treaty, it said :
The committee is not imperviou.s to the risks which
this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance
of these additional obligations commits the United
States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the
Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own
highest interests. There are greater hazard.? in not ad-
vising a potential enemy of what he can expect of us,
and in failing to disabuse him of assumptions which
might lead to a miscalculation of our intentions.
And we have gone to great lengths, Mr.
Harsch, to make it clear to China that we have
no designs on China. We are not trying to stim-
ulate a pretext for a preventive war against
China. We want to live at peace with mainland
China, and we have done the same thing as far
as North Viet-Nam is concerned. We have no
desire to destroy North Viet-Nam.
As far as we are concerned, we could leave
North Viet-Nam alone tomorrow afternoon if
they would join with us in making some peace
in Southeast Asia. So we hope the leaders in
Peking will miderstand that we have no designs
on them and that they will exercise prudence,
as they have thus far with respect to Sovitheast
Asia.
Mr. Clark: Well, Mr. Secretary, in our rela-
tions with China, in these very hazardous and
delicate areas involving the Viet-Nam war, we
are obviously taking some serious chances, and
chances that have disturbed Congress and the
American people.
Would you, for instance, consider it an act of
aggression by China if some of those North
OCTOBER 2, 19G1
415
Vietnamese MIG's that are now on Chinese
bases flew into combat against American planes
over North Viet-Nam ? That is an iffy question,
I know, but it is the sort of thing —
Secretary Rush: At my last press conference,
out of 23 questions, 19 questions had to deal
with the future. Now, I can deal with the future
one day at a time in terms of what happens.
Now, we don't anticipate that this will happen.
If it should begin to happen, that is a question
that we and Peking would have to grapple with.
Mr. Clark: You don't think we are taking
any unnecessary risk in the current air war in
bombing within 10 miles — •
Secretary Rush: I think that our actions —
none of our actions in Southeast Asia are un-
necessary. Now, there are some risks involved,
of course, but remember there are risks also for
the other side. We have limited our objective
there, we have limited our military operations,
we have made it very clear that we have no hos-
tile intentions toward mainland China. Now, we
cannot guarantee what their decisions will be,
but we see no basis at the present time for sup-
posing that they are moving toward a major
intervention in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Harsch: Mr. Secretary, another ques-
tion— I think this is a quick one. You said on
Friday that you would ask Israel to allow more
Arab refugees to go to their homes on the Israeli
side of the Jordan Eiver. Has there been any
response ?
Secretary Rush: We haven't had a real re-
sponse on that. We made our views known to a
nmiiber of governments. I think the events will
give us our response.
Mr. Harsch: One last, very quick question.
It has been suggested that maybe you and Mr.
McNamara would both be happier if you could
change jobs. Is there any merit in the idea ?
Secretary Rush : No, I think the Department
of Defense has never had a more brilliant Sec-
retary of Defense, and no Secretary of State has
ever been more blessed with a Secretary of De-
fense than I have been with Secretary
McNamara.
Mr. Clarh: You sound like a man who is
quite happy in your present job, then.
Secretary Rush: Yes, yes, I am trying to do
my duty.
Mr. Clark: We are very happy to have had
you with us on "Issues and Answers." Thank
you very much for being our guest.
"FACE THE NATION"
Mr. Kalh: Mr. Ambassador, two-thirds of
South Viet-Nam's almost 5 million voters cast
their ballots not for the military but for the
civilians. Do you regard this as a repudiation
of the military and as a call for peace?
Amhassador Bunher: No, I don't regard it as
a repudiation of the military. I think with 11
candidates in the field and a vote of something
over 35 percent for the winning ticket, it is
evidence that the winning ticket has a demon-
strable democratic base.
Announcer: In Saigon, capital of South Viet-
Nam, in color, "Face the Nation," a spontaneous
and unrehearsed news interview, filmed in the
American Embassy on Thursday [September 7]
with the U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam, Ells-
worth Bunker. Ambassador Bunker will be
questioned by CBS News correspondent Bert
Quint, R. W. Apple, Jr., Saigon bureau chief
of the New York Times, and CBS News corre-
spondent Bernard Kalb.
Mr. Kalh: Do you think, Mr. Ambassador,
that General Thieu will follow through on his
campaign pledge to call for a 1-week suspen-
sion of the bombing over North Viet-Nam ?
Anibassador Bunher: Well, I thmk that Gen-
eral Thieu of course has this in mind. I think
that whatever is done will be done, of course, as
the result of consultation between the Govern-
ment of Viet-Nam, our own Government, and
the other governments who supply troops here.
I am sure that whatever move is made in any
direction will be a considered move.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, the strong race
made by Mr. [Truong Dinh] Dzu, the peace-at-
any-price candidate, has been interpreted by
many people as a repudiation of the Govern-
ment, as almost a shout for peace by the South
Vietnamese people. AVould you so interpret it?
Ambassador Bunher: No. I don't interpret it.
I think the vote for the Government, as I say,
which was more than twice the vote for Mr.
Dzu, is a demonstration that people here, in ad-
dition to wanting peace, want stability and se-
curity, and continuity is another factor. I think
Mr. Dzu's strong showing is probably due to a
number of factors, including, of course, his
advocacy of peace but also the fact that he was
an articulate speaker, a very vigorous cam-
paigner, sharp critic of the Government. In any
election, whether it is in the United States or
416
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
anywhere else, there is always a substantial ele-
ment of the people who are "agin" the govern-
ment. And I think that also is another element
in the strength of his showing.
Mr. Quint: The United States has said that it
hopes that this election will make it easier to
negotiate with North Viet-Nam. But if the
North Vietnamese consider this not a represent-
ative election and the same generals who
headed South Viet-Nam before head it now,
what makes you think that it will be easier to
achieve negotiation and peace?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, of course, it takes
two to negotiate. I mean the North Vietnamese
have got to show some willingness to come to
negotiation. But it seems to me that with an
elected government, a constitutional, function-
ing government, there is evidence then, as far as
the North Vietnamese are concerned, that there
is stability here, permanence here, to a degree
that did not exist before, that there is a consti-
tutional government which came about as a
result of a very large vote and a very large pro-
portion of the population voting. And therefore
there is a goverament with whom they can ne-
gotiate. Wliat the reaction of Hanoi will be, of
course, is difficult to say now, but it seems to me
that there should be an improved prospect of
coming to negotiation.
Mr. Quint: Are you — ^is the United States
willing to negotiate — take into consideration in
the negotiations the Viet Cong?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think we have
made it clear, the Secretary has, the President,
too, that there would be no problem about hav-
ing the views of the Viet Cong represented in
negotiations.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, what about the
possibility of the United States encouraging di-
rect negotiations between the new elected gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam and the Viet Cong ?
Wouldn't this really offer a better hope than
trying to get the United States and Hanoi to
the bargaining table ?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I tliink we have
made it clear that if the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment and Hanoi can settle this problem
themselves, we would be very happy to see it.
General Thieu —
Mr. Apple: How about the South Vietnamese
Government and the Viet Cong?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, the Viet Cong, we
must remember in the first place, is controlled
by Hanoi. There is no question about that, I
think. I think the evidence of captured docu-
ments and everything else indicates that very
clearly. Consequently, I doubt that the Viet
Cong as such is a free agent. But as General
Thieu has said, he is ready to talk to the Viet
Cong individually, guarantee any of them safe
conduct here, and has indicated that he is ready
to make an approach to the Viet Cong.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, has the United
States encouraged the new leaders of South
Viet-Nam in any direction toward negotiations,
whether an approach toward Hanoi, whether
an approach toward the Viet Cong or any kind
of approach ?
A Constant Search for Peace
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know that
there has been any specific effort. We are always
looking for ways to negotiate. I think the last
rejection by Hanoi of approaches — I think some
41 efforts have been made toward opening up
negotiations; all of them have been rejected by
Hanoi. So that it is not a question of doing
something at a specific time. It is a constant
search for peace. And we would, of course, en-
courage the Vietnamese Government to make
their own approaches.
Mr. Kalb : Mr. Ambassador, the winning mil-
itary ticket managed to capture only 35 percent
of the vote, and a good deal of that, though,
came from the military, which is composed of
about 620,000 voters. Do you think that this new
military government will be able to win the
confidence of the people, the great majority of
the people, in fact two-thirds of the voting
population?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, in the first place,
Bernie, I am not— about your first premise,
there is no telling how many of the military
voted for the military ticket. I think that the
chances are that many of the military — in fact,
we find evidence — supported other candidates.
But I think this present government, by enlarg-
ing their administration, by, as I presume they
will, including in it elements of other political
parties and the civilian sectors of the country,
of the population, could very well establish
quite a broad base here on which to command
popular support. And I would think that would
be probably the way in which they would pro-
ceed, although obviously it is their government
OCTOBER 2, 1967
417
and they will make their own detennination.
But certainly that is a very — it seems to me a
very reasonable assumption.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, you spoke a
moment ago of the Diem regime. One of the
reasons that that regime was brought down
was the overrepresentation of Roman Catholics
in it, which created great resentment among the
Buddhists. Now we have a new President who
is a Roman Catholic, and wo have a Senate in
which at least half and perhaps more than half
of the Members are Roman Catholics. The
Catholics make up 10 percent of the popula-
tion. Do you think this could again cause trouble
with the Buddhists, and jDarticularly the mili-
tant Buddhists?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know
what the attitude of the militant Buddhists may
be, but I should doubt it very much. I think
there is not only the Senate but also the lower
House to be elected. I don't Iniow how the com-
position of the Lower House may turn out. That,
as you know, is selected by constituencies, and
I think that the local interests will be much
more in evidence in the campaign for the lower
House. Again, I think certainly General Thieu
is an exti-emely reasonable, open-minded man,
and I don't look for trouble on that score.
Mr. Kalb : Mr. Ambassador, there is now an
elected government, and you have great skill as
a negotiator, as you demonstrated in the Domin-
ican Republic and in Indonesia on the West
Irian settlement. Does the fact that there is now
an elected leadership in this country open the
way for Ambassador Bunker to use his skills as
a negotiator to possibly find a way to end the
war? This, as you know, has been one of the
suppositions when you first arrived here, one
of the speculations.
Arnbassador Bunker: No — well, I don't think
that I can really answer that. I don't know what
the opportunities are going to be. We are always
looking for opportunities — not only I, but
everybody in our administration is looking for
opportunities.
Mr. Kalb : Have you, in your months out here.
Ambassador Bunker, detected anything at aU
that might indicate a vulnerability on the part,
of the other side toward responding to negotia-
tions, or has it all been one blank wall ?
AmhcLSsador Bunker: I must confess that so
far I have not seen any indication of Hanoi's
readiness yet to come to negotiations. But then
it is very difficult to know what is gomg on in
the minds of the people in Hanoi.
Mr. Quint: Mr. Ambassador, the United
States Government has denied with some ve-
hemence several times lately that there is a stale-
mate, either in the militai-y or in the pacifica-
tion progi-am. Do you have any evidence of real
l^rogress toward winning either militarily or
Ijolitically, say, in the last 6 montlis?
Steady Progress Being Made
Ambassador Bunker: Yes, I think we are
making steady progress — not spectacular prog-
ress— it is not that kind of situation. I think
we are making steady progress. This is a situa-
tion which cannot be solved overnight. It takes
time. It takes patience. It takes steady applica-
tion of pressure. As I say, it is not a situation
where you have spectacular things happening.
It is a question of keeping on the pressure,
gradually moving ahead.
Mr. Quint: Do you feel today that the end is
any closer in sight than it was, say, a year ago ?
Ambassador Bunker: Yes, I do, very defi-
nitely. I think that we have made very steady
progress. I think we are now beginning to see
light at the end of the tunnel.
Mr. Quint: Mr. Ambassador, you talk about
light at the end of the tunnel. How long is this
tmmel ?
Ambassador Blinker: I don't think that you
can put it into any particular time frame, a
situation like this. It is very difficult to say that.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, how do you
Imow that you've made — that you are further
along the road than you were a year ago if you
don't laiow how long the road is ?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think by bench
marks on the road. I tliink the voting is one of
them. The number of hamlets and villages that
are coming under protection and under secure
areas is another indication. And these are all — ■
you loiow what the final objective is, as far as
pacification or security: It is to get all of the
population under it, of course. Now, another
thing — and why I say I don't think it is profit-
able to try to pin it down to any definite time
frame, because I think it is very possible — in
my view quite probable — that the process will
accelerate, and as we increase the pressure and
as pacification gets better organized, into gear,
that that also will accelerate. Now, if pacifica-
418
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion succeeds, obviously it cuts the ground from
under the North Vietnamese; there is nothing-
left here for them to support.
Mr. Kalh : That is an extraordinary assump-
tion— if pacification succeeds. We have been
hearing about pacification since —
Ambassador Bunker: I don't think it is an
extraordinary assumption, Bemie, because pac-
ification— there is another thing, I think, that
you have got to remember — first, and m its pres-
ent concej^t, is relatively new. This present gov-
ernment, which has been in 2 years, took the
first year to reestablish order and get some sem-
blance of stability. Remember, 2 yeare ago the
country was close on the brink of defeat. Now,
it took that time — it was not possible, really, to
initiate programs of tliis kind in the first year of
the administration. Consequently, it has only
been going for a year. As I said in the begin-
ning, it takes a vast amount of organization, a
vast amount of trainmg. But once you get peo-
ple trained and once you get the organization
functioning, then it is perfectly reasonable to
expect acceleration, it seems to me.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Ambassador, to put this in
historical perspective a little bit — you talk
about pacification succeeding, about beating the
main forces. Can you cite an insurgency within
the last 20 years, within the last 25 years, that
has been defeated witli a long, open frontier like
this one? I can think of several that have been
defeated, none that has ever succeeded, no
coimterinsurgency effort that has ever succeeded
when the enemy was able to keep pouring more
and more people in.
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I don't know that
we have ever had — this is, I think, a rather
unique situation and a difficult situation, of
course, because of the sanctuaries which Laos
and Cambodia provide. And that makes it in-
creasingly difficult. And I think that new meth-
ods probably have to be devised to choke down
the infiltration.
Mr. Kalb : Mr. Ambassador, how do you think
this will eventually end ? I think your predeces-
sor, Ambassador Lodge, once said he thought it
would simply fade away. What is your own
guess, having sat through —
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I haven't any firm
opmion about it. That is one possibility, of
course. The other possibility is that it will come
to negotiations. And I hope it will.
Mr. Kalb: Do you think negotiations might
take place before the presidential elections in
the United States ?
Ambassador Bunker: It seems to me it is pos-
sible, yes.
Mr. Kalb : You think it is possible ?
Ambassador Bunker: I think it is possible.
Mr. Kalb : What gives you that hope, sir ?
Ambassador Bunker: Nothing very tangible,
except that I think several factors could con-
tribute to it. One I have already mentioned, and
that is a realization on the part of Hanoi that
there is permanence here, there is stability,
there is a functioning constitutional govern-
ment, and a realization of the futility, there-
fore, of going on indefinitely with the fighting.
Another thmg is the fact — the psychological
effect of the elections here, which indicate, it
seems to me, to the Viet Cong, to all the Viet-
namese people, including the Viet Cong, that
there is now a government to which they can
adhere, under which their rights can be pro-
tected under the constitution, and under which
they can become integrated into the social and
political structure of the counti-y.
Evolution of the Constitutional Process
3Ir. Kalb: Do you think the putting of sev-
eral million pieces of paper in ballot boxes es-
sentially to choose a President and Vice Presi-
dent here will have this dramatic, dynamic,
magnetic impact?
Ambassador Bunker: I think it is a very sig-
nificant development, a very significant devel-
opment. I think that — two things: that the
evolution of the constitutional process and the
development of the pacification program is as
important as the military aspect of this war.
Mr. Kalb : Do you think all of this could dove-
tail together to produce a negotiation possibly
before next November — '68 ?
Ambassador Bunker: I think it could very
well, yes.
Mr. Kalb : Do you know something, Mr. Am-
bassador, that we don't about negotiations?
Am,ba,ssador Bunker: I doubt if I know any-
thing the press doesn't know, Bernie. I was
hoping to get information from you on that
score.
Mr. Apple: What about Hanoi's statement
yesterday that it would turn down any peace
offer from any government headed by General
Thieu?
419
Ambassador Bunker: That is a negative fac-
tor, obviously. But I don't say that that is neces-
sarily something that is conclusive, that will
always be the attitude of Hanoi.
Mr. Quint: Are you hoping that —
Ainbassador Bunker: I don't think you can
put any fixed premises into a situation of this
kind.
Mr. Quint: Are you basing your hopes on
progress in the pacification program and the
military, progress that you hope to see for the
future, or are you basing it on something that
you can see now ?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I am basing it on
what I think is happening now and what I
therefore feel that I have reason to believe may
happen in the future.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, do you detect
any anxiety on the part of the South Vietnam-
ese leaders that there might be a drastic
change or even a minor change in American
policy toward Viet-Nam because of the Novem-
ber 1968 presidential elections in the U.S. ?
Ambassador Bunker: I have not observed
any, no.
Mr. Kalb : Are they then taking it for granted
that the American commitment is that long-
range at the present time ?
Ambassador Bunker: I don't know what they
are taking for commitment — as a commitment,
Bernie — or taking for granted, as you say. I
think you would have to ask them. I really have
not had any discussion with them about the
forthcoming elections in the United States.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, in talking about
the possibility of negotiations before November
1968, you introduced a possibility or a factor
that an elected government could rally the con-
fidence of the people. Now, the fact is that the
election returns show that two-thirds of the 5
million people — almost 5 million — who voted,
voted for civilians and not for the military. Ob-
viously, there is a sense of dejection and disap-
pointment that the military won by that great
majority of voters. Now, why should one believe
that these people will rally to the side of a mili-
tai-y ticket that in effect has been repudiated by
them, if you choose to interpret it that way;
certainly they voted for civilians and not for
the military. There seems to be a contradiction
in all this.
Ambassador Bunker: I don't think there is a
contradiction. I think that with 11 candidates
people are bound to exercise a choice, and that
is what we want to see them do — exercise a free
choice. That is what the whole electoral process
is about. The reason — the fact that I vote for
Jolin Doe instead of Henry Jones does not mean
that I am disaffected, it does not mean that in
case of war I won't back Heniy Jones. I mean
we have it all the time in the United States and
in every country. In the last war — I mean there
is no reason to suppose, I think, because people
vote for a certain individual that they won't
back a duly constituted government, and, as I
said a while ago, particularly if the government
does broaden its base, does include opposition
members in the government, or a broad spec-
trum of the civilian elements in the country.
The country is at war, after all. I think there is
every reason why now the elements who were
opposition should close ranks, as we do and as
is done elsewhere and everywhere, with a threat
to the country.
Mr. Apple: Mr. Bunker, several of the lead-
ing civilian candidates, among them Mr. [Tran
Van] Huong, Mr. [Truong Dinh] Dzu, and Mr.
[Phan Khac] Suu, have said that they and their
followers would accept no part in the Thieu
government. You said a few moments ago that
you hoped that the government would draw ele-
ments of the defeated slates into it. Are there
other meaningful people who could — other
meaningful candidates — who could make a sig-
nificant contribution ?
Ambassador Bunker: I don't say it has to be
the candidates themselves, but their representa-
tives or members of their party. And I don't
know either, Johnny — certainly I think it is our
experience that what may be said in the heat of
the campaign is not always a considered opin-
ion. So I would want to see what develops in
that respect.
Attitude of Communist China
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, have you ever
had any restless nights wondermg about
whether the Chmese Communists might re-
spond to American bombing very close to the
North Vietnamese-Chinese border?
Ambassador Bunker: I have been sleeping
quite well, Bernie.
Mr. Apple :'Wha.t is your ajjpraisal of the
probable Chinese attitude toward such a move?
I am sure you have thought about it.
420
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN' I
Ambassador Bunker: Oh, we are very care-
ful, I think, in the bombing pattern to keep
away from China itself. They seem to be having
a good many problems of their own at the pres-
ent moment. And I don't anticipate — I see no
evidence that there is any indication of their in-
volvement. I am not even sure that Hanoi would
welcome their involvement.
M?: Apple: We have had a plane shot down
over China.
Ambassador Bunker: Yes, that was a stray
plane. And obviously — two planes, yes. The Chi-
nese reaction was quite moderate, as a matter of
fact.
Mr. Kalb: There is always the chance you
may get a stray Chinese response. Mr. Ambas-
sador, I wonder if I could ask you this question,
please. We all know about the lack of romance
between General Thieu and Marshal Ky, the
newly elected President and Vice President of
South Viet-Nam. Do you think this lack of
camaraderie in all senses between the two lead-
ers of South Viet-Nam poses any danger of
instability for this country?
Ambassador Bunker: Well, I think that is a
pretty sweeping statement. You say "lack of
camaraderie in all senses." I think they have
worked together quite well in the last 2 years.
They have both said they intend to do so in the
futui'c. I would expect so.
Mr. Kalb: You don't see any particular
threat, as a result of the —
Ambassador Bunker: No, I do not. I think —
as a matter of fact, I think they have worked
well together and I think they worked well to-
gether through the campaign, and I think they
both have said that they look forward to work-
ing together.
Mr. Kalb: Thank you very much, Ambassa-
dor Bunker, for being with us here to "Face the
Nation."
Ambassador Bunker: Thank you very much,
Bernic, too — all of you. You put me on the
griddle, but I have always enjoyed that among
friends.
President Sends Congratulations
to Vietnamese Chief of State
The following text of a message from Presi-
dent Johnson to Chief of State Nguyen Van
Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam was made
public at Saigon on September 10.
Dear Mr. Chairman : I extend my warm con-
gratulations to you and to Prime Minister Ky
on your victory in the election of a President
and Vice President.
I have just received a detailed and most mov-
ing accomit of your election from the distin-
guished Americans whom you invited to
Viet-Nam as observers. They returned believing
in the fairness of the procedures and observed
the intense interest of the Vietnamese people in
this major step toward creating your own
popularly chosen and constitutionally based
government.
Their individual reports were a testimonial to
the courage and determination of the Vietnam-
ese people to remain free and to create their
own political institutions in their own way.
The election was a milestone along the path
toward the goal you have set for yourselves — a
free, secure and peaceful Viet-Nam. But it is
not the end of the journey. Many hard tasks
remain. Not the least of these now is the cre-
ation of a strong, effective and broadly based
government that will help you and your country
achieve the objectives you set forth in your
campaign.
The American Government and I, personally,
look forward to continued close cooperation
with you and your colleagues in the days and
months ahead. I am confident that our efforts —
joined with those of our other allies — will be
crowned with success and that imder your
leadership, a peaceful democratic, strong and
prosperous Viet-Nam will emerge.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
OOrOBER 2, 1967
421
'''■Our chance for achieving order and fr ogress in the world
looidd he greater if Europe and North America were to develop
their relationship in close concert. Such association among us
could iecoine the nucleus of broader relationships with other
free nations, which could deal with the varied problems of world
politics affecting their common interests.''''
Concert and Conciliation: The Next Stage
of the Atlantic Alliance
by Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^
I am happy to address the general assembly
of the Atlantic Treaty Association. The asso-
ciation is one of the most influential among the
private groups whose function it is to propagate
ideas. Such bodies are the pride and glory of
free societies. Their watchword — the sound
motto of responsible democratic citizenship
always — -is that policy is too important to be
left to governments. The Atlantic Treaty Asso-
ciation is not a large company. But it has proved
to be an effective catalyst of opinion, helping to
overcome the inherent inertia of governments
and stirring them to undertake some, at least,
of the many tasks they should be doing.
What brings us together today is our convic-
tion that Europe and North America, which
share a common civilization, also share common
interests, common responsibilities, and a com-
mon destiny. We believe that a vital, politically
more active Atlantic system is the surest road
to peace and progress, both for our own coun-
tries and for the world at large.
The North Atlantic Treaty was a formal first
expression of the Atlantic idea. But, as Presi-
dent Jolinson said last October : ^
. . . we know that the world is changing. Our policy
must reflect the reality of today — not yesterday. In
every part of the world, new forces are at the gates :
new countries, new aspirations, new men. In this spirit,
let us look ahead to the tasks that confront the Atlan-
tic nations.
The members of the alliance are now engaged
in a year-long study of its future political tasks
and of its procedures for carrying out those
tasks. The resolution ' defining the terms of ref-
erence for that study was proposed by the dis-
tinguished Foreign Mmister of Belgium, M.
Pierre Harmel. It was drawn in comprehensive
terms. It requires the alliance to consider its
political responsibilities as "a factor for a dur-
able peace" in the light of the changes which
have taken place in the political condition of
the world smce 1949 and those which are in
prospect for the years ahead. The Belgian
initiative followed one of comparable import
proposed by the Canadian Government some
time earlier.
The United States Government welcomed
M. Harmel's proposal last fall, and it welcomed
the strong support the resolution received from
all our allies. It is our hope tliat the report of
the alliance study group next December will
signal a new birth of vitality for the alliance —
a period of innovation as creative as that of the
late forties and early fifties.
For the times do require a new start for the
political work of the alliance. We are not on
the brink of disaster as we were 20 years ago.
But there are stresses in our system of security,
serious stresses it would be wise to face now and
to resolve together before they become acute.
We have proved many times that we can co-
operate to deal with crises. The challenge of
events today is that of preventive statesman-
ship : Can we bring ourselves to act together in
' Address made before the Atlantic Treaty Associa-
tion at Luxembourg on Sept. 11 (press release 194).
^ For President Johnson's address at New York, N.Y.,
on Oct. 7, 1966, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.
' For text, see iUa., Jan. 9, 1967, p. 52.
422
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the absence of a full crisis, to use all our re-
sources of influence to further our common
interests in order and progress in the world?
For the United States, the Atlantic relation
is a first principle of our foreign policy.
It seems self-evident to us that the alliance
will continue to be needed for the indefinite
future. The agenda of world politics is formi-
dable. A new system of assured order must be
achieved. And conditions of harmonious prog-
ress must be organized by the developed and
the developing countries working together. As
a practical matter the tasks ahead cannot be
dealt with except by the cooperative efforts of
the nations or groups of nations primarily
concerned.
Naturally, the varied issues which concern
world politics will involve different sets of
nations. But almost all affect the common inter-
ests of Europe and North America.
I propose to talk today about those interests
and about the future of the relationship between
Europe and North America.
Paradoxes in U.S.-Europeon Affairs
Our affairs are in a posture of paradox. Let
me mention four aspects of that posture.
We have never been stronger, better orga-
nized, or more secure. Yet we are in jeopardy
still. It does not take Cassandra's eye to see
danger beyond the comforting array of our
missiles and tanks. There is a popular yearning
to believe that danger has already passed. But
the facts do not justify that belief. Our societies
can flourish only in a reasonably open and stable
world environment. Such stability is hardly
assured, even in Europe itself, as the recent
explosion in the Middle East — on the flank of
Europe — reminded us only a few weeks ago.
Resistance to Idea of Interdependence
Secondly, we are being drawn together and
drawn apart at the same time. Our interde-
pendence has never been more obvious. In every
realm, our lives are inextricably interwoven.
Wlierever we look, the trend is the same and the
degree of our interdependence is being steadily
accelerated — in the field of security; in educa-
tion, science, and teclinology; in economic
affairs; and above all, in politics.
Yet we do not fully accept interdependence
as the premise of our political relationship : On
both sides of the Atlantic, strong voices resist
the idea of interdependence and call for recip-
rocal withdrawal and isolation.
For Europe, there has been resentment at its
dependence upon the United States. Believed of
the burden of empire, there is a current of Euro-
pean feeling against any involvement in security
problems outside Europe and some even against
involvement in the security problems of Europe
itself. "Good riddance," these men say. "Let
America take care of security, or better still,
let security take care of itself."
Such impulses are strengthened by the com-
l)lex of problems surrounding the development
of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union and the
United States move ahead in this field at an
accelerating pace. In consequence, Europe is
still dependent on American nuclear protection.
That fact finds expression in a mood of fatalism
which reinforces impulses of withdrawal.
Instead of seeking solutions of shared respon-
sibility, the victims of this mood protest against
what they call American domination and fall
back on policies of nonparticipation in world
affairs.
Some Europeans wonder whether the United
States is now so powerful that Europe has
become irrelevant in world affairs or at least
irrelevant in American thought about the secu-
rity problem. That suspicion is a source both
of relief and of concern. Some victims of this
doubt justify withdrawal because of the gap in
power between Europe and the United States.
Others see the United States preoccupied with
efforts to pacify Southeast Asia and to master
grave domestic problems. They are tempted to
conclude that the United States has lost interest
in Europe.
On the American side, the pattern of protest
has mirrored that in Europe.
The first and most fundamental source of
protest in America is the fact that the United
States now necessarily shares with Europe
responsibility for maintaining a balance of
power in the world. During the 19th century
the United States lived safely within a system
of order which others exerted themselves to
preserve. The existence of that system was
largely invisible to American opinion. We
objected to the very idea of the balance of
power and associated it with the blackest
aspects of imperialism.
American thought has most unwillingly faced
the fact that the society of nations, like any
other society, rests on accepted arrangements
governing the use of force. From the moment
OCTOBER 2, 19G7
276-580— G7—
423
in 1947 when President Truman announced our
policy of supporting "free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures," * there has
been a continuing and sometimes fierce debate
in the United States. On one side of that debate
are those who recognize that our own national
security requires us to accept direct responsi-
bility for the balance of power because the
Concert of Europe can no longer do so. The
other part consists of men who insist that we
should avoid corrupting involvement in the
problem of power and confine ourselves to
domestic affairs.
Thus, when some Americans see Europeans
restricting their concerns to local problems and
aspirations, they complain that Europe fails to
carry a fair share of the burden of building a
peaceful and progressive world. Wlien others
see Europeans indifferent to some non-European
problems, they are encouraged to emulate them.
The Paradox of Increasing Poverty
Let me note a third paradox in our common
affairs.
Our societies today are more successful, and
more nearly just, than at any previous moment
in history. I do not mean to suggest that we in
the West have solved all our social problems.
Not at all. Speaking only for my own country,
we know that progress and social change gen-
erate new problems almost as rapidly as old
ones are met. And we know, too, that we in the
United States have not yet fully achieved equal
justice for our Negro citizens, the command of
conscience which President Johnson has
insisted be taken up as a major program of
action.
But our Western social systems have made
unmistakable progress during the last 20 years.
Our economies are governed by ideas and
institutions which have given the West, and
the world, 20 years without a major depression,
20 years of rapid growth and of spreading
wealth. As the ideas and institutions of capital-
ist planning are perfected, they should offer
man a new degree of control over his social
destiny and a new opportunity to build an
environment in which his human and political
freedom can be assured.
' For President Truman's message delivered before
a 5oint session of Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see ibid.,
Mar. 23, 1947. p. 534.
Yet precisely because social freedom and
affluence are now felt to be within reach, pov-
erty has never been a more serious social prob-
lem. Tlius far the industrialized countries have
failed to harness our rich economies and social
systems to those of the developing world. The
pattern of progress in the developing world is
mixed. Some countries have been spectacularly
successful. Others have been sluggish or lagged
behind. We know enough about the process of
development to be certain that sustained growth
is possible in a developing coimtry under condi-
tions of freedom. But we know, too, that by and
large, real income for each person in the de-
veloping world may well be falling.
All that we have done to improve our own
societies can be lost unless we confront and help
to overcome the rising tide of hunger, disease,
and illiteracy in the world.
I used the word "rising" deliberately. This is
the fact, and it is the most shocking statistic
with which we live, more shocking even than the
nuclear statistics or those of arms expenditure.
Hunger, disease, and illiteracy are increasing in
the world as a whole, not declining. This fact,
and not ideology, is the specter which haunts
mankind today.
Contrast Between Ideals and Reality
Finally, let me mention the contrast between
the rational and humane ideals of our civiliza-
tion, and the world in which we have no choice
but to live.
After his experience with the barbarisms of
this century, civilized man is sickened by war
and cruelty and longs for brotherhood. The
progress of many advanced societies nourishes
his brave, unquenchable hope that a Utopian
world is not, may not be, need not be, far off.
Yet, if we look back at the history of this
century, it would be difficult to name an epoch
in history more tortured by war and by the fear
of war, by tyranny and indeed by chaos — a
period more deeply riven by hatreds and by the
spirit of destruction for its own sake.
The ethical feeling of our common civiliza-
tion rebels at believing that irrationality and
aggression are social forces which nearly match
in influence those of progress and reform. We
find it hard to accept that Freud and Hobbes
were nearer to the heart of tilings than Locke
or Rousseau. It is not remarkable that many of
our finest spirits turn from the burdens of world
424
DEPAKT5IENT OF STATE BTJLLETIK
responsibility to the refuge of private concerns
or of purely local problems.
It is difficult not to sympathize with these
impulses. Western man has been tormented by
crises for at least half a century. No wonder he
is tired of the security problem, after a series
of wars which failed to produce peace or even
to exorcise the threat of further war.
But fatigue cannot be the basis for policy.
Hopes and wishes are no substitute for reality.
And responsible statesmen should not live by
the rule of Micawber or Pollyanna.
Process of Redefining Common Interests
In this context, I should like to turn now to
certain practical problems. Is the Atlantic idea
a valid basis for policy for the year 1968 or for
the decade of the 1970's? If so, for what poli-
cies— for all our foreign policies or only for
some? For safeguarding equilibrium in Eu-
rope? In the Middle East and North Africa?
In the world at large? For nuclear affairs or
for all security problems except those concerned
with nuclear weapons?
Outside the realm of security, should we ap-
proach economic problems as collaborators or
as rivals? Should Atlantic solutions be sought
in the realms of trade and monetary policy?
In aid to the developing world?
In short, do our long-term interests really
coincide or coincide as closely as they did some
years ago?
These are legitimate questions. It is right to
ask and re-ask them. The essence of our relation
is the process of defining the interests we have
in common and then considering together what
we can and should do to promote them.
This process of redefinition is particularly
appropriate at a time when two major interna-
tional crises have posed in many minds the
question whether the interests of Europe and
those of the United States are necessarily the
same.
The hostilities in Viet-Nam have been and
remain deeply troubling to some of you in Eu-
rope, as they are to some Americans. These men
and women find it difficult to recognize the issues
in the Vietnamese conflict wliich justify an
American military effort, with all its attendant
tragedy and loss.
The other recent crisis I have in mind is the
continuing crisis in the Middle East.
The Middle East war was an occasion of
concern to thoughtful Europeans. For the first
time in centuries a major conflict was fought
on the shores of the Mediterranean without any
of the traditional Mediterranean powers of
Europe, or Western Europe as a whole, able to
exercise significant influence upon it.
This was certainly not the desire of the United
States. In the weeks immediately before the
outbreak of violence in June, the United States
and the United Kmgdom sought to engage their
allies in collective measures aimed at preventing
the clash of arms in the Middle East. We cannot
know whether peace might have been preserved
had we acted together and in time. But we do
know that we did not prevent the war.
About Viet-Nam, let me start with the prem-
ise that the first task of those who wish peace is
to build and secure a reasonable balance of
power — a balance of power capable of deterring
both attack and the threat of attack.
During these last 20 years of tension, a pru-
dent rule of reciprocal safety has emerged, first
in Europe and then in Asia. It is a simple rule
and therefore minimizes uncertainty and mis-
calculation. I should put the rule this way : The
possibility of equilibrium and therefore the pos-
sibility of detente requires mutual respect for
the principle that there be no unilateral changes
in the frontiers of the systems by force, or by the
threat of force. Such action, imlike certain other
forms of change, threatens the general equilib-
rium and therefore risks a confrontation be-
tween gi'eat powers.
This principle is the essential idea of the Tru-
man doctrine, announced 20 years ago in de-
fense of Greece and Turkey. It has been tested
in a long cycle of episodes, from Berlin to
Korea. We can hope it has been accepted by the
Soviet Union and its allies as essential to peace
on the continent of Europe, although the flow
of Soviet arms into the Middle East casts a
shadow on that hope.
We regard the conflict in South Viet-Nam as
an episode of this kind — an attempt at takeover
by force challenging the rule of prudence on
which the general equilibrium depends — more
serious than most of its predecessors, since guer-
rilla warfare, and especially guerrilla warfare
sustained by arms, munitions, and men moving
across international frontiers, has always been
so difficult to control.
I can illustrate the point I wish to make by a
recent experience at a meeting of one of the
subsidiary organs of the United Nations. The
OCTOBER 2, 1967
425
speakers from Communist coimtries all stressed
two propositions as self-evident : First, we had
to accept the division of Germany as a fact of
nature and admit the representatives of the
East German regime forthwith. Their second
proposition was treated as equally manifest —
we had to acknowledge the inherent right of
North Viet-Nam to unite the Vietnamese jDeople
by force.
There surely is a basic contradiction between
these two jDropositions. I suspect that everyone
in this room, and all informed opinion in Eu-
rope, would regard any efforts to unify Ger-
many by force as the gravest kind of threat to
the general peace.
Viet-Nam a Test of the American Guarantee
Does the same reasoning apply to the conflict
in Viet-Nam ?
Whatever view one takes of the disputed ori-
gins of the war in Viet-Nam — whether it is con-
sidered an insurrection against tlie authority of
the South Vietnamese state aided by North
Viet-Nam or, as we believe, an mfiltration and
invasion from North Viet-Nam — the issue of in-
ternational law and politics is the same. In
either view of the facts, North Viet-Nam is
waging war against South Viet-Nam. And
South Viet-Nam has the right to ask for the
help of the international community in resist-
ing the North Vietnamese attack.
Neither South Viet-Nam nor the United
States is interested in conquering North Viet-
Nam or in overturning its Communist regime.
The central issue of the war is whether North
Viet-Nam will be allowed to conquer South
Viet-Nam.
But, men ask, does the United States have
any national interest in South Viet-Nam ? Does
the conflict in Viet-Nam threaten the general
balance of power or otherwise justify interven-
tion ? Or is it the kind of local conflict, unfortu-
nate for the participants, which the world
should pass by on the other side?
There are several answers to the question
from the point of view of the United States.
The United States is loyal to the SEATO
treaty, as it is to NATO itself. We regard the
commitments of that treaty as controUmg in
this case, and we are acting accordingly.
Secondly, the obligations of the United Na-
tions Charter are not suspended when perma-
nent members of the Security Council disagree.
The principles of the charter are still binding
on signatories as rules of international law, even
though neither the Security Council nor the As-
sembly has been willing as yet to act officially.
Those principles condemn the attack of North
Viet-Nam on South Viet-Nam and authorize the
members of the organization to offer South
Viet-Nam assistance in its efforts of self-defense.
Thirdly, it has seemed to us all along that
the preservation of the independence of South
Viet-Nam was directly related to the fate of
Southeast Asia as a whole. If South Viet-Nam
were to be taken over, the parallel expansionist
designs of Conamunist China and North Viet-
Nam would surely be encouraged and the re-
sistance to these designs seriously weakened
throughout the area and perhaps beyond. In
Asian terms, and as responsible opinion virtu-
ally throughout Southeast Asia sees it, the
stakes in Viet-Nam involve the most drastic al-
ternatives for Southeast Asia and for Asia as a
whole. One only has to look at what is now hap-
pening in Laos, Thailand, and Burma to under-
stand this.
Finally, it is obvious that both the Soviet
Union and China regard the conflict in Viet-
Nam as a test for a teclinique of revolution. As
Soviet spokesmen have made clear, nuclear war-
fare is unthinkable, and massed frontal attacks
of the Korean type are too dangerous to be tried.
The spread of communism, they have said, must
therefore depend on what they call "wars of na-
tional liberation," that is to say, insurrections
supported from abroad or wars among others
which they incite. On their present scale, the
hostilities in Viet-Nam could hardly continue
for any length of time without large-scale aid
from China and the Soviet Union. Deescalation
of the fighting should follow logically if that
aid were to be reduced.
So far, however, the Soviet Union has not re-
sponded either to proposals of this kind or to re-
quests that it join with the United Kingdom in
reactivating the enforcement procedures for the
Geneva agreements dealing with Laos or
Viet-Nam.
However the war began, it has been made a
test of the American guarantee and therefore a
matter of importance to the network of security
arrangements on which the equilibrium of the
world depends.
It does not follow that as members of the
alliance we must agree and act together in every
situation affecting peace in every region of the
world. We should not expect a perfect identity
of concerns and policies among us outside the
426
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BtTLLETIN
area protected by the North Atlantic Treaty.
Such unity has never existed and never will
exist. We are not a bloc, and we do not wish to
become one.
What the confident intimacy of our alliance
does require is that we understand each other
and exert every effort to consult at length about
our general views of policy. Out of that con-
sultative process we can hope and expect
harmonization will emerge as the Wise Men's
report of 1956 ' recommended and that dis-
agreement can be confined to difference.
The Alliance and Changing Conditions
Let me turn now from issues of stress to the
fundamental elements of common interest
which are at the heart of our relationship. The
Atlantic alliance is a living organism. It is
growing in response to changing conditions. A
basic responsibility of our peoples and of our
governments is to nurture that process of adap-
tation so that the bonds between the United
States and its Atlantic partners, m President
Johnson's phrase, continue to provide "the
strength on which the world's security
depends."'
When the crosscurrents of conflicting opinion
on both sides of the Atlantic are analyzed, only
one conclusion is possible : Our interdependence
is an objective fact and will remain the starting
point of policy for as far ahead as we can fore-
see. The decisions we face are not whether we
have common interests in security, in economic
affairs, or in education, science, and teclinology,
but how we deal with those interests: not
whether we make a joint effort for defense but
how great an effort and of what kmd; not
whether we pursue East-West reconciliation but
how; not whether we should cooperate in eco-
nomic affairs but how we organize that coopera-
tion; not whether we work together in science
and technology but how to improve the govern-
ment of science in order to assure the most
fruitful possible development of science as a
resource of humanity.
One way to answer these questions is to try
to describe the goals we seek — to fill in a mental
picture of the Atlantic system we wish to build.
Let me offer an American view of some of
the main elements we see as implicit in the
evolution of the alliance over the years ahead.
In the early postwar years an equilibrium of
° For text, see ibid., Jan. 7, 1957, p. 18.
sorts was constructed around the fact of NATO-
Soviet confrontation in Europe. It was not a
satisfactory equilibrium. But it did give West-
ern Europe a breathing spell and made its
resurgence possible.
Politically and psychologically, we are begin-
ning to move away from that cold-war equilib-
rium. The boundary line in Central Europe still
bristles with menace. At the same time, however,
leaders of almost evei"y country of Europe,
East and West, are reexamining previously fixed
relationships and experimenting with new ap-
proaches to old issues. Pragmatic adjustments
are the order of the day.
The SociaJist countries of Eastern Europe are
experimenting with new economic policies in-
tended to release energies previously unavail-
able. Students and tourists are opening doors,
and opening minds, to new possibilities by way
of coexistence. Their instinctive goal is a new
design for Europe, better suited to the realities
of European recovery and to the needs of the
postwar generation.
"Wliat are the principal features of the new
Europe, and the new Atlantic system, which
are likely to emerge from this process ?
NATO's Military Mission
First, naturally, we must consider the issue
of safety.
Thus far, the main institution of the alliance
has been the NATO military system. NATO was
born in the cold war with a military mission :
to deter either massive or local aggression
against Western Europe and North America.
That mission remains valid. The Soviet imple-
ments of war arrayed in Europe or pointed at
Europe are more powerful today than ever
before. Europe alone cannot defend the West.
Nor can the United States. The business of se-
curity remains a common enterprise. That
security requires both conventional and nuclear
forces, established and maintained at stable,
agreed levels.
Aggression has been deterred by the collective
defensive potential of the West. It is not reason-
able to argue that because aggression has been
stayed for 18 years the instrument of deterrence
can now be dispensed with. Moreover, the power
and resolution which NATO symbolizes will be
needed to reach the peaceful goals to which we
aspire. We can never advance — nor control —
the process of making Europe whole unless we
retain the power to deter.
OCTOBER 2, 19 67
427
We should use NATO as a military organiza-
tion to provide the greatest protection at the
least cost. This was one major reason for an
integrated command. But we are only just be-
ginning to seize other opportunities to increase
efficiency. NATO's force planning exercise, now
far advanced, will be an important step toward
placing the deployment and design of our de-
fense forces on a more rational, long-term basis.
A nuclear planning group has been established
to make the first international study of nuclear
deterrence and plan for the management of the
Western deterrent. Within the last year the first
test messages have been sent through an experi-
mental NATO communications satellite system ;
they announce a revolution in the processes of
control and command in the alliajice. A new
NATO mechanism to exploit opportunities for
joint development and the production of arma-
ments— long a neglected area — has just begun
work.
But the NATO military organization does
not exist for its owii sake. It has always been
conceived as a defensive force, which should in
time make possible the negotiation of detente
and an end of the cold war. If we succeed in our
political efTorts, the military arm of NATO in
the 1970's should look quite different from the
institution which has served us and the cause
of peace so well.
That transformation will depend on the
progress we can make in ending the risk that
Western Europe be attacked or threatened from
the East, directly or indirectly, frontaUy or
from its flanks.
Healing the Division of Europe
For 20 years now, Europe has been the main
issue between the Soviet Union and the United
States. We have had differences with the Soviet
Union in other parts of the globe — in the Far
East and the Middle East, for example, and in
Cuba, too. But the principal element in the con-
frontation between the Soviet Union and the
United States, with all its risks, has been the
possibility that the independence of Western
Europe be compromised. It has been clearly
understood that such a change in the balance
of power would be too serious to be tolerated.
How can the risk in Europe be resolved?
How, that is to say, can the division of Ger-
many and of Europe be ended, thus eliminating
the most dangerous point of friction between
the Soviet Union and the United States?
Let me say at once that we do not see the
coming together of the peoples of Europe, and
of the Soviet Union and the United States, as
an event, but as a process. Under the best of
circumstances, it is likely to be a long process.
Surely it is a matter for us to pursue together
as allies, for our common interests are deeply
and directly involved. We need not negotiate
together as an entity. But our chances for suc-
cess in conducting a campaign of reconciliation
will be considerably greater if we remain in
parallel courses. They will surely be less if we
follow conflicting paths. Such policies could
even imperil the security of the West as a whole.
Planning and coordinating such a campaign
of reconciliation should be one of the main
political tasks of the alliance in the years before
us. It is one of the subjects on which we expect
the study of the future of the alliance to make
practical suggestions this fall.
We are all agreed, I think, on the two re-
lated propositions President Johnson stated
last October : that until the division of Germany
has been resolved, peace in Europe will not be
secure, and that the division of Germany must
be healed peacefully and with the consent of
Eastern European countries and the Soviet
Union. "This will happen," he said, "only as
East and West succeed in building a surer foun-
dation of mutual trust." None of us has a magic
formula for healing the division of Europe. But
clearly Germany cannot end either its essential
role in the political and economic life of West-
ern Europe or its geographic and historical ties
with the East. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many has embarked on a new and promising
diplomacy of peace in Eastern Europe, which
we strongly support. Other European countries
are also exploring the possibilities of coopera-
tion, in many fields. And both the OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] and the Economic Commission
for Europe are pursuing useful multilateral
initiatives in the same direction.
In our own dialog with the Soviet Union,
we shall continue to use every resource, both in
words and in acts, to maintain a fair and open
alternative of agreement. We believe the two
nations, by reason of their size and power, owe
special duties of reciprocal cooperation to their
own peoples and to the world community. Such
cooperation should be a force for peace, welcome
in every nation. But cooperation between the
United States and the Soviet Union will never
be arranged over the heads of our allies nor at
428
DErARTMENT OF STATE BUILLETIN
the expense of their interests. Quite the con-
trary, we can envision such a transformation
taking place only as part of a broader process
of reconciliation between East and West
achieved in consultation with our allies and in
large part through their own efforts and those
of international bodies.
A More Deeply Unified Western Europe
A third vital aspect of the Atlantic system of
the future which we see as likely and desirable
is a more deeply unified Western Europe.
To us, this seems not only right but inevitable.
After 10 years, the Common Market can no
longer be described as an experiment or a hope.
No one could participate in the Kennedy Round
negotiations or the monetary talks without
realizing that economic Europe exists, and
flourishes, and that in this realm the Atlantic
partnership among equals is a functioning
reality. Its atmosphere is bracing. Its bargain-
ing is not easy. But its accomplishments are
impressive.
The European Community will evolve and
grow. It should continue to radiate a dynamic
influence on the economic and social systems of
all of Europe, of Africa and the Middle East,
and of the world at large. The countries of
Eastern Europe feel the magnetic pull of West-
ern Europe's economic strength. They are not
indifferent to the advantages of economic co-
operation with the West.
The emergence of a political Europe within
the Atlantic alliance would be — I venture to say
that it will be — a step of capital importance for
the security and prosperity of all our countries
and for the peace and stability of the whole
world. Such a step will not occur automatically.
The formation of a political Europe requires
an act of will on the part of Europe, a decision
to resume her rightful place in the responsible
politics of the larger world.
A voice speaking for Europe in our Atlantic
dialog and in the assembly of the nations would
of itself transform the balance of influence in
the world and transform it in ways altogether
favorable to conciliation and peace. So far as
the United States is concerned, you may be sure
that such a step would be regarded as natural
and welcome.
Perhaps a decision on intra-European polit-
ical cooperation within the alliance will be made
in the course of the study of the future political
tasks of the alliance to which I referred earlier.
It may be that the time is not yet ripe for that
decision. It is, in any event, a decision for
Europeans to make.
We believe, however, that the effective pro-
tection of our common interests — and the effec-
tive dischai'ge of our common responsibilities —
does call now for more European participation
in the broader processes of decisionmaking on
the part of those European nations which wish
to undertake it. Either the institutions of the
alliance or new procedures which may be pro-
posed by its members are needed to define and
coordinate our common interests outside Europe
itself. This is where the greatest threats to our
tranquillity seem likely to arise. It is also where
we have been least effectively coordinated. I
have already alluded in this regard to the frus-
trations of the Middle Eastern crisis. To our
mind, that experience defines a problem which
we hope will be solved by a prompt reform in
the consultative procedures of the alliance.
Relations With the Developing World
Let me mention one further area where we
anticipate change in the pattern of alliance dur-
mg the next few years: that of our relations
with the developing world. Members of the
alliance, together with Japan and other coun-
tries, have cooperated effectively in a large num-
ber of multilateral programs of continuing
assistance to developing countries. These power-
ful and constructive programs are the prototype
of efforts on a new scale which will clearly be
required before the rich and the poor societies
of the world are knit together in a state of
harmony.
We have had nearly 20 years of experience
with the process of economic assistance to
developing countries. Some of those programs
have been successful. Others have failed. "What
is needed now is agreement between the devel-
oped and the developing coimtries as to the
meaning of that experience, and a cooperative
effort to base the next round of such programs
on what we have learned together from the
trials and errors of the past.
The world's need for European talent and
resources will increase in the years ahead. The
looming crisis of population, food supply, and
economic growth in the developing lands chal-
lenges all mankind to a vast multilateral effort.
To undertake responsibilities beyond one's
immediate environment may prove to be an
OCTOBEK 2, 1967
expensive and seemingly thankless venture. Yet
given our ethos and our interests, Europe and
America have no other choice.
Achieving Order and Progress
We are a long way from the new system
toward which we are beginning to grope. But
the call to define our future tasks is itself a
step forward. The effort will surely generate
impulses for action.
We already have an array of instruments
ready at hand, in the multilateral institutions
built up over the last generation: NATO,
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] , OECD, the European Community, the
United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe, and a host of specialized international
bodies. They stand ready to be adapted, ex-
panded, or transformed as the needs of the
future require.
When we agree on ends, means will be fomid
to achieve them.
My purpose today has been to present an
American view of some of the more difficult
issues we face together in the years ahead. The
list is not complete, I know. I have not had time
today to discuss nuclear problems nor those of
our economic relations.
But I hope I have said enough to define a
general thesis. Let me summarize that thesis in
these terms: Our chance for achieving order
and progress in the world would be greater if
Europe and North America were to develop
their relationship in close concert. Such asso-
ciation among us could become the nucleus of
broader relationships with other free nations,
which coidd deal with the varied problems of
world jDolitics affecting their common interests.
Under such circumstances, our combined influ-
ence and that of Japan and other like-minded
countries could be brought to bear effectively in
behalf of security, conciliation, economic devel-
opment, and aid to tlie developing world. On
such a footing, we could seek with renewed zeal
to persuade the Soviet Union to accept the
reconciliation of Europe and to give up adven-
tures like its recent policies in Cuba and the
Middle East. We could once more and together
affirm our invitation that the Soviet Union join
us in a regune of peaceful and competitive
coexistence or, better still, of cooperation for
peace. On such a footing, too, we could seek to
bring China into the world community with
more assurance of success.
We cannot meet our responsibility as citizens
or as public officials if we evade the challenge
of Soviet or Chinese rivalry or pretend it isn't
there. But we camiot meet even higher responsi-
bilities if we abandon for a moment the effort
to transmute such rivalry into the rivalry of
peaceful emulation.
President Authorizes Additional
Wheat Shipments to India
Statement hy President Johnson ^
La.st March the Congress authorized ship-
ment to India of up to 3 million tons of U.S.
wheat, "provided it is appropriately matched"
by contributions from other industrialized
countries.^
Last May our efforts to mobilize other
donors — and our painstaking measures to assure
tha.t their donations were large and real enough
to fulfill the matching criterion established by
the Congress — brought us to tlie point where the
United States agreed to send half this wheat —
1.5 million tons. That action was taken m the
light of more than $96 million in contributions
from other donors.
For the past few weeks, relevant senior officers
of the U.S. Government have been engaged in a
deep and detailed review of Lidia's current food
needs and the performance of other donors dur-
ing the past 3 months. This review has included
careful documentation of food production and
consumption conditions in Lidia, as well as a
thorough assessment of our ability to help, con-
sistent with the letter and spirit of the
resolution.
On the basis of this review, the President has
today authorized a, new agreement, providing a
fuT-ther 1 million tons of U.S. wheat to India.
This decision reflects the following facts :
1. The food situation in India contmues
desperate. Public stocks ai'e at their lowest
point in living memory. Private stocks are com-
pletely exhausted. Food rations in major cities
are at subsistence level and are the object of
^ Made at his news conference on Sept. 1 and also is-
sued as a White House press release that day.
- For background and text of joint resolution ( H.J.
Res. 267; Public Law. 90-7), see Bulletin of May 1,
1967, p. 700.
430
DEPARTMENT OF ST.ATE BULLETIN
increasing political unrest. The immediate
future of the world's largest democracy is
greatly threatened. Free and peaceful develop-
ment of Asia hangs in the balance.
2. However, this is only the short-term out-
look. Current reports on the monsoon rains
suggest that 2 years of severe drought are over
and that, with luck, India can look forward to
a record grain crop next crop year, with the
fruits reaching Indian markets beginning in
December of this year.
3. Since last May, India has received pledges
from other industrialized nations totaling
$122.2 million in new aid which provides food,
food-related resources, or frees Indian foreign
exchange to buy food. If it could be counted
in full against the matching criterion, it would
justify nearly 2 million tons in additional
United States wheat.
4. However, in order to be meaningful, the
new aid from other donors must be a real incre-
ment to Indian resources and it must be addi-
tional to regular contributions to the India Aid
Consortium. No one's interests are served by a
charade in which real American wheat is
"matched" by meaningless financial transac-
tions or by funds which would otherwise be pro-
vided through the Consortium anyway and are
merely earmarked for this purpose.
5. In all franlaiess, we do not now know pre-
cisely how much of the $122 million in new
pledges meets these additional criteria. There
is strong evidence that much of it does. If only
about half of it does, we have a basis for pro-
viding 1 million tons of United States wheat.
6. We will not be able to make a precise esti-
mate of how much of this aid is eligible for
matching until the next meeting of the India
Consortium, which will probably be held in
October.
But starvation and threat of political chaos
cannot wait. Therefore, I have determined to
authorize now a further 1 million tons on the
expectation that at least half of the new con-
tributions from others will in fact be proven
real and additional to normal Consortium
contributions.
However, in order to assure that this Govern-
ment behaves in strict accordance with the terms
of the congressional resolution, I have also
determined that the size of the United States
contribution to the Consortium will not be
finally determined until it is clear how much of
the new aid contributions meets these criteria. If
there is any shortfall between the cost of the
grain authorized today and the amount of real
and additional aid supplied by other donors
since last May, the United States contribution
to the Consortium can be reconsidered.
Letters of Credence
Ecuador
The newly appointed Ambassador of
Ecuador, Carlos Mantilla Ortega, presented his
credentials to President Jolmson on Septem-
ber 12. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated September 13.
Jamaica
The newly appointed Ambassador of Jamaica,
Egerton Eudolf Kichardson, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on September 12.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the
President's reply, see Department of State press
release dated September 13.
Poland
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Polish People's Republic, Jerzy Michalowski,
presented his credentials to President Johnson
on September 12. For texts of the Ambassador's
remaxks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated September 13.
OCTOBER 2, 190 1
431
The Intellectual and American Foreign Policy
hy John A. Gronouski
Ambassador to Poland'^
My subject tonight is the role of the intel-
lectual in the development of American foreign
policy. As a diplomat I always try to stay with
the safe, nonexplosive subjects!
I should begin by saying that I do not pre-
tend to have a precise definition of an intel-
lectual. Certainly he is a person who is likely to
be reasonably well educated, comfortable in the
world of ideas and abstractions, and possessed
of scholarly traits. He is also a person who has
an interest in issues outside his professional
field, interests to which he devotes a significant
part of his energies and about which he formu-
lates judgments.
Since most members of a university consider
themselves intellectuals or aspire to become
intellectuals, I would think that the topic I have
chosen is appropriate for the audience.
Whether it will be popular or not is an
entirely different question. For I am about to
suggest that because of their emotional pre-
occupation with a single foreign policy issue —
Viet-Nam — academic intellectuals are in danger
of becoming one of the most ineffectual seg-
ments of our society. And I am not going to
soften this comment by suggesting that the fault
lies either in the Wliite House or in Foggy
Bottom.
It is not the issue of Viet-Nam that disturbs
me. Nor is it the intellectuals' dissent. God help
the intellectual if he ever ceases to probe and
analyze — and disagree when he believes the
facts warrant it.
What bothers me is not the intellectuals' posi-
tion on Viet-Nam, but the fact that there seems
to be just one position^ — prefabricated, official,
inviolate, and all too often followed by rote.
This is puzzling. It is puzzling because in an
issue so inherently difficult to evaluate, where
' Address made before the Wisconsin Union Forum
Committee at Madison, Wis., on Aug. 8.
judgments must be based on so many un-
proved— and often unprovable — assumptions,
one would certainly expect more diversity of
thought within the intellectual community.
An observer cannot be blamed for suspecting
that all too many intellectuals have become
reluctant to express views and opinions that are
in conflict with those expounded by the articu-
late, self-designated leaders of the intellectual
elite. And even those who do stray from the
accepted paths seem to do so in a voice too soft
to be distinctly heard.
I am suggesting that dissent may be an
acceptable tool of the intellectual community
but, on the subject of Viet-Nam, it is no longer
acceptable within the intellectual community. If
you doubt me — as I'm sure many of you do —
ask yourself one question : What would happen
to your standing among your peers if tomorrow
you were to defend Lyndon Johnson's policy in
Viet-Nam as a reasonable course of action ?
I am suggesting, also, that out of such con-
formity of thought have come not reasonable
alternatives but valueless slogans.
Is "Stop the Bombing" really a substitute for
a reasoned intellectual position? Or "Negotiate
Now" or "Get Out of Viet-Nam" or "Defy the
Draft"?
I submit that America has a right to expect
something better than vague slogans offering
easy solutions to complicated issues from the
most trained and disciplined minds it possesses.
Let me give you another example. From the
tone of prevailing intellectual comment, the
President, the Secretary of State, and all of
their advisers are bent only on escalating the
war and winning total victory — that they really
are not interested in a negotiated settlement.
I happen to know tliis to be false. The entire
administration — from the President down —
would move heaven and earth, if that were pos-
432
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
siblc, to end the shooting and achieve a nego-
tiated settlement. I happen to know that for the
simple reason that I have been personally en-
gaged in a part of the massive and unceasing
effort to work out such a settlement.
But among the intellectual community,
neither my judgment nor my word count for
very much these days. For whatever I may have
been for 20 years before joining the State De-
partment, I am now a member of the "establish-
ment" and am automatically suspect. I am no
longer a free agent, for my job depends on
supporting the President. It is implicitly as-
sumed that whatever I was before, having
joined the Department of State, I will now
compromise any and every principle.
It is curious to me that intellectuals, who
value so highly their intellectual integrity, hold
in such low esteem the integrity of those from
their own ranks who have assumed positions of
responsibility in the execution of American
foreign policy. Former university deans, former
professors of economics, philosophy, political
science, law, and international affairs from our
most respected universities — these are among
the chief Presidential advisers in the conduct
of foreign policy. These men have explicitly
expressed our Government's wish for a cease-
fire and for the immediate start of negotiations.
But they are now a part of the establishment
and have thereby forfeited their intellectual
credentials and all claim to personal and intel-
lectual integrity.
By the same token, any of you in the audience
tonight would fall victim to the same fate if
you were to join the State Department tomor-
row. You would have "sold out." There would
be no possibility that you had joined the Gov-
ernment to make your own voice and your own
convictions more strongly felt.
Again, I am not suggesting that any aspect of
the nation's foreign policy should be off limits
to critical analysis. Men of integrity can be
wrong — in the establishment as well as out of
the establishment — and members of the intel-
lectual community have the obligation to offer
constructive criticism to positions they deem
ill advised.
But engaging in the popular sport of im-
pugning the integrity of those in policymaking
roles is no substitute for analysis. Nor is the
implicit assumption that once a member of the
intellectual community assumes responsibility
in the conduct of foreign affairs he loses his
capacity to intelligently and objectively eval-
uate the vast amount of information available
to him.
This attitude stems in part from different
ground rules which govern intellectuals in their
various capacities. For example, when academic
intellectuals decide that a specific course of ac-
tion offers promise of resolving the Viet-Nam
conflict, they have no reservations about pub-
licizing their proposal to the fullest extent
possible. Use of the full-page newspaper ad for
this purpose has become standard practice.
But it may well be — in fact, it has often been
the case — that their proposal has already been
advanced by their Government and rejected by
the Hanoi regime. But the establishment intel-
lectual is precluded from publicly stating this
fact, for a U.S. peace proposal — past, present,
or future — has not the slightest chance of suc-
cess unless it is offered confidentially and is
devoid of propaganda overtones.
Thus, being unable to state where responsibil-
ity lies for the failure of an idea, which may have
appeared promising to those in Government as
well as those in academic life, the establishment
intellectual becomes fair game to the charge of
rigidity and intransigence. And he must take
the criticism without defending himself except
in the most general and unconvincing terms, for
to succumb to the urge to verify his credibility
in the eyes of his peers would automatically
discredit him and his Government among those
to whom the proposition was originally offered.
Failure of academic intellectuals to appreciate
this necessity for tactful silence is behind much
of the conflict and distrust that has grown
up between the academic and establishment
intellectuals.
The academic intellectual is quick to react to
this silence by disparaging members of the es-
tablishment as timid, imimaginative, and in-
capable of advancing or even recognizing a
fresh peace initiative. The Government policy-
makers and their advisers are accused of in-
tellectual dishonesty, stupidity, or worse. Those
charged with the conduct of foreign policy, in
turn, find it difficult to maintain an attitude of
rapport with a group which incessantly chal-
lenges their motives and morality.
Thus do academic intellectuals become more
and more alienated from their own Govern-
ment's decisionmaking process. This alienation
would be serious enough if it was confined to
the issue of Viet-Nam and Viet-Nam was the
only critical problem of immediate concern to
American foreign policy.
OCrOBER 2, 1967
433
Unfortimately, neither of these conditions
reflect the real world. We are faced today with
several major foreign policy problems, in addi-
tion to Viet-Nam, which are of vital concern to
the United States. How wisely we respond to the
challenges they present will be the basis on
which future historians will measure our present
contribution to world peace.
Yet, academic intellectuals have become so
preoccupied with their attack on our Viet-Nam
policy and, in the process, so alienated from
those charged with formulating American for-
eign policy that they seem totally uninterested
in generating support for any administration
foreign policy program, however much it ac-
cords with their own professed foreign policy
objectives. It is a tragedy of major proportions
when the best trained minds in America volun-
tarily withdraw from exercismg influence over
eveiy aspect of United States foreign policy save
one.
I do not believe, for example, that a philos-
ophy professor legitimately can become so con-
cerned over Viet-Nam that he will sign his name
to a formal protest and yet feign complete in-
difference to what is happening in the rest of
the world. But that is just what is occurring
with depressing regularity on campus after
campus across the nation.
Nowhere are the consequences of this with-
drawal more apparent than in its effect on the
President's policy of "building bridges" with
Eastern Europe. In a landmark statement on
American foreign policy, the President on Oc-
tober 7 last year flatly rejected cold war and
containment as elements of our policy toward
the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
allies.^ He articulated instead a policy of "peace-
ful engagement," designed to reduce tensions
and, through increased trade, exchanges, and
other modes of cooperation, immediately reduce
and ultimately eliminate the threat of a thermo-
nuclear war which would devastate manliind
and pale mto insignificance the tragedies of
Viet-Nam.
Wliere were the intellectuals when the pro-
grams introduced by the President to implement
this policy shift ran into deep trouble mider the
sustained attack of those to whom peaceful en-
gagement is being "soft on communism" and
who would intensify rather than ameliorate the
cold war?
- For President Johnson's address at New York,
N.T.. on Oct. 7, 196G, see Bulletin of Oct. 24, 1966,
p. 622.
Where are the full-page ads now that the
East-West trade bill, the cornerstone of our new
and enlightened policy, is in danger of congres-
sional extinction ?
And where are the full-page ads supporting
the President's decision, which is now under
serious attack, to extend Government credit
guarantees to U.S. companies participating in
the construction of a Fiat automobile plant in
the Soviet Union and for other projects in
Eastern Europe?
What expressions of concern came from the
intellectual conmaunity when Congress recently
refused to provide $10 million for renewal of a
program which has provided the people of
several countries, including Poland, with the
means to buy American books, journals, maga-
zines, newspapers, plays, movies, and TV pro-
grams? Wliat did they say to some of their
congressional allies who voted to kill this
program ?
And where are the intellectuals now when a
single Congressman threatens to undermine the
foundation of our policy toward Poland and
Eastern Europe, and the confidence of our
Western allies in the sincerity of our engage-
ment policy, by passing legislation to deprive
Poland of most-favored-nation tariff treatment ?
But I need not limit my questions to Eastern
Europe — or even to foreign affairs. Where were
the full-page ads last spring when Congress
refused to approve a resolution strengthening
the President's hand — and his nation's sincer-
ity— at Punta del Este? And where was the
voice of the intellectual last month when the
President's rat extermination bill was voted
down ; or last year when his open housing bill
was allowed to die ; or a few days ago when his
model cities program was sliced in half ?
Can it be that Viet-Nam is the sole legitimate
concern of the entire intellectual community?
That intellectuals evaluate a President's pro-
gram on the basis of whether or not they like
his "style" or his accent rather than on the basis
of the program's content? Or that because of
frustration with the President's Viet-Nam posi-
tion they are prepared to sit on their hands and
permit a whole series of enlightened programs
which he has advanced to suffer defeat with
hardly a murmur of protest, simply because of
his sponsorship ?
I hope this is not the case, for if it is we will
all be the loser. In a world trying desperately to
accommodate two competing social systems,
each one suspicious and fearful of the other;
434
DEPAETSIENT OF STATE BULLETIN
■with millions of people struggling to throw off
the bonds of ignorance, poverty, subservience,
and despair; with the shadow of the hydrogen
bomb clouding our vision and distorting our
perspective — no group, least of all the com-
munity of mtellectuals, can be afforded the lux-
ury of abdicating from responsibility.
I do not ask you to perform as a rubber stamp
for this or any other administration. But I do
ask you to serve as a thoughtful, responsible
contributor to the full development of Amer-
ican policy — foreign and domestic — unfettered
by either personal antagonisms or professional
conformity.
I ask you to defend your own intellectual
integrity whether or not you agree with your
Government's policies.
I ask you to defend the intellectual integrity
of your colleagues even when you disagree with
them and even when they have moved from the
campus to the center of power.
I ask you to not stand silent when a fellow
intellectual goes before the television cameras
and disdamfully dismisses a responsible official
of your Government as a "loon."
Most of all, I ask you to express yourself
independently, even though it might cost you
the ephemeral respect of your fellow intel-
lectuals.
Looking back, I suppose I should have added
one more definition of an intellectual. I should
have said he is a person who has the courage
of his conclusions ; who is unintimidated by the
possible alienation of his peers.
If you can meet that test, I have no quarrel
with you. If after reexamining your foreign
policy positions you can still say that you
arrived at your conclusions objectively and
honestly, uninfluenced by emotion, slogans, or
the prevailing opinion among yovir colleagues —
if you can do that, then you will have fulfilled
your obligation as an mtellectual.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
CaEendar of International Conferences ^
Scheduled October Through December 1967
Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (resumed Geneva
May 18, 1967).
ECE Inland Transport Committee: Group of Rapporteurs on Sanitary Geneva
Control at Frontiers.
FAO Ad Hoc Committee on Food Production Resources Rome
ECE Senior Economic Advisers Geneva
IMCO Working Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels London
NATO Science Committee Rome
ILO International Symposium on Ergonomics in Machine Design .... Czechos
Mar
• 1-i,
1962
Oct.
2-4
Oct.
2-4
Oct.
2-6
Oct.
2-6
Oct.
2-6
lovakia .
Oct.
2-7
' This schedule, wliich was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Sept. 15, 1967, lists inter-
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate ofEcially in the period October-December
1967. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interested in these
are referred to the ]Vorld List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library of Congress and available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wasliington, D.C. 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and
Intellectual Property; EC A, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and
Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariflfs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy
Agency: lA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IBE, International Bureau of Education;
ICAO," Internation.al Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern-
mental M.aritimc Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, ^orth At-
lantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan
American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD. United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United
N.ations Industrial Development Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization;
WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
OCTOBER
1967
435
Calendar of International Conferences — Continued
Scheduled October Through December 1967 — Continued
FAO North American Forestry Commission: 4th Session ....
South Pacific Commission: 7th Conference
BI RPI Committee of Experts on International Patent Cooperation . . .
ECOSOC Population Commission
PAHO Directing Council: 17th Meeting and 19th Meetmg of the Re-
gional Committee of the WHO for the Americas.
OECD Worliing Parties on Primary Commodities and LDC Regional
Arrangements.
FAO International Rice Commission: 10th Session
FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: 12th
Session.
International Lead and Zinc Study Group
U.N. Development Program: Pledging Conference
ECE Timber Committee
OECD Working Party VI: Industry Committee
FAO Study Group on Bananas: 2d Session
ILO Technical Meeting on Rights of Trade Union Representatives at the
Level of Undertaliings.
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 55th Statutory
Meeting.
5th Inter-American Statistical Conference
ECE Conference of European Statisticians: Working Group on National
Accounts and Balances.
UNESCO Executive Board: 77th Session
OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee
ECE Group of Rapporteurs of the Worlcing Party on Customs ....
ILO Meeting of Consultants on Young Workers Problem
South Pacific Commission: 30th Session
OECD Special Committee for Oil
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Group on Short-Term
Prospects.
ECE Rapporteurs on World Market for Iron Ore
OECD Group for Research on Water Management
UPU Management Council of the Consultative Committee on Postal
Studies.
OECD Working Party on German Border Taxes
ECAFE Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower
Mekong.
UNCTAD Exploratory Meeting on Copper
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: Working
Group on Mutual Assistance.
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on General
Principles.
International Rubber Study Group
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions
ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and Planning: 5th Session . .
OECD Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Far East)
IMCO Assembly: 5th Session
ECE Steel Committee: 35th Plenary Session
FAO Committee on Forest Development in the Tropics: 1st Session . .
OECD Trade Committee
FAO Conference on Fish Behavior
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 5th Session .
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
IAEA Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage . .
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on the Legal Protection of Gas Pipelines . .
lA-ECOSOC Inter-American Telecommunications Commission ....
FAO Conference Technical Committees
EGA Conference of African Statisticians: 5th Session
OECD International Conference on Employment Stabilization in a
Growth Economy.
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Africa)
ECE Group of Raijporteurs on Natural Gas Resources
FAO Subgroup on Cocoa: 21st Session
ECAFE Subcommittee on Water Transport: 8th Session
FAO Council: 49th Session
ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods
Mexico City.
Noum(5a, New
Caledonia
Geneva . . .
Geneva . . .
Port-of-Spain
Paris . ,
New Delhi
Rome
Geneva
New York
Geneva
Washington
Canary Islands
Geneva
Hamburg
Caracas
Geneva .
Paris . .
Paris . .
Geneva
Geneva
Noumea
Paris . .
Paris . .
Geneva
Paris . .
Bogotd .
Geneva
Bangkok
Geneva
Paris . .
Paris .
Sao Paulo
Italy . .
Geneva
Paris . .
Brussels
London
Geneva
Rome .
Paris . .
Bergen .
Paris . .
Montreal
Vienna .
Geneva
Mexico .
Rome . .
Addis Ababa
Munich
Brussels
Geneva
Rome .
Bangkok
Rome .
Geneva
Oct. 2-7
Oct. 2-7
Oct. 2-10
Oct. 2-13
Oct. 2-13
Oct. 3-6
Oct. 3-8
Oct. 5-14
Oct. 6-12
Oct. 9 (1 day)
Oct. 9-13
Oct. 9-13
Oct. 9-17
Oct. 9-18
Oct. 9-18
Oct. 9-19
Oct. 9-20
Oct. 9-Nov. 3
Oct. 10-12
Oct. 10-13
Oct. 10-18
Oct 10-23
Oct. 11-12
Oct. 11-12
Oct. 11-13
Oct. 11-13
Oct. 11-27
Oct. 12-13
Oct. 12-18
Oct. 13-14
Oct. 16-18
Oct. 16-20
Oct 16-
Oct. 16-
Oot. 16-
Oct. 17-
Oct. 17-
Oct. 17-
Oct. 18
Oct. 18-
Oct. 19
Oct. 19
Oct. 19-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 23-
Oct. 24-
21
21
-27
-19
-20
-31
-21
-21
-20
-27
-28
26
■27
27
■27
Nov. 3
Nov. 3
26
Oct. 24-27
Oct. 25-27
Oct. 26-27
Oct. 26-Nov.
Oct. 30-Nov.
Oct. 30-Nov. 3
436
DEPABTMENTT OF STATE BULLETIJ
ITU World Plan Committee Mexico .
GATT Contracting Parties: 24th Session Geneva
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee Paris . .
UNCTAD Preparatory Meeting for Sugar Conference Geneva
FAO Conference: 14th Session Rome .
13th World Koad Congress Tokyo .
ECE Preparatory Group for the 2d Symposium on Urban Renewal . . Geneva
OECD Agriculture Committee Paris . .
IMCO Subcommittee on Life Saving Appliances London .
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: Annual Meeting . . Tokyo .
and Scientific Committee Meeting.
ECAFE Working Group on National Accounts: 3d Session Bangkok
ILO Governing Body: 170th Session Geneva .
ECE Joint Working Party of Agriculture and Inland Transport Commit- Geneva .
tees on Perishable Foodstuffs.
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Latin America) Brussels.
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Eastern Europe) Brussels.
ECAFE Railway Subcommittee and Coordination Committee on Rail- Bangkok
way Research.
OECD Working Party II (Economic Growth) Paris. .
International Whaling Commission: Special Meeting of the North Pacific Honolulu
Commissioners.
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Soviet Policy) Brussels.
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea .... London.
ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science and Technology Paris . .
to Development: ISth Session.
ECE Working Party on Standardization of FoodstufiFs Geneva .
NATO Regional Expert Meeting (Middle East) Brussels.
ICAO Air Navigation Conference Montreal
OECD Industry Committee Examination of U.S. Policies Paris . .
Inter- American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly Montevideo
ECAFE Working Group of Experts on Water Codes Bangkok
WMO Commission for Agriculture Meteorology Manila .
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee Brussels.
ECE Electric Power Committee Geneva.
ECE Subcommittee on Road Transport Geneva .
IMCO Legal Committee London .
ECE Group of Experts on the Situation and Development of Water Re- Geneva.
sources.
ECAFE/WHO Inter- Regional Seminar on Hydrology Bangkok
UNESCO Meeting of Experts to Review the Florence and Beirut Agree- Geneva.
ments on the Free Flow of Information.
ILO Meeting of Heads of Official Services for Occupational Safety and Geneva
Health.
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in Rangoon
South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan) : 18th Ministerial and
Official Conference.
FAO Council: 50th Session Rome .
ECAFE Seminar on the Organization and Conduct of Census of Popula- Bangkok
tion and Housing.
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability London
ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 16th Session Geneva
ECE Gas Committee: Ad Hoc Group of Experts on the Forecasting of Geneva
Gas Demand.
UNIDO International Symposium on Industrial Development .... Athens .
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: Kith Session Port-of-Spain
Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Congress Montevideo
ECOSOC Preparatory Committee of Experts for the Conference of New York
Ministers of Social Welfare.
ILO Advisory Committee on Salaried Employees and Professional Geneva
Workers: 6th Session.
ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: 20th Plenary Meeting . . . Geneva
ECE Working Party on Customs Questions Affecting Transport . . . Geneva
IMCO Subcommittee on Tonnage Measurement London
FAO Committee on Wood-Based Panel Products: 1st Session Rome . .
IBE Council: 33d Meeting Geneva .
UNESCO International Coordination Group for the Cooperative Study Honolulu .
of Kuroshio Current: 5th Meeting.
UNESCO Executive Committee of International Campaign To Save the Paris . . .
Monuments of Nubia.
BIRPI ^d i/oc Conference of the Madrid Agreements on Trademarks . Geneva
International Wheat Council London
NATO Ministerial Council: 40th Meeting Brussels .
Oct. 30-Nov. 15
Oct. 30-Nov. 17
October
October
Nov. 4-23
Nov. 5-11
Nov. 6-8
Nov. 6-8
Nov. 6-10
Nov. 6-11
Nov. 6-13
Nov. 6-17
Nov. 7-10
Nov. 7-10
Nov. 7-10
Nov. 8-15
Nov. 9-10
Nov. 13 (tenta-
tive)
Nov. 13-16
Nov. 13-17
Nov. 13-24
Nov. 14-17
Nov. 14-17
Nov. 14-Dec.'15
Nov. 15-17
Nov. 15-25
Nov. 15-29
Nov. 15-29
Nov. 16-18
Nov. 20-23
Nov. 20-24
Nov. 20-24
Nov. 20-24
Nov. 20-25
Nov. 20-29
Nov. 20-29
Nov. 21-Dec. 8
Nov. 24 (1 day)
Nov. 24-Dec. 1
Nov. 27-Dec. 1
Nov. 27-Dec. 4
Nov. 28-30
Nov. 29-Dec. 20
Dec. 4-9
Dec. 4-13
Dec. 4-14
Dec. 4-15
Dec. 11-15
Dec. 11-15
Dec. 11-15
Dec. 12-14
Dec. 13-15
December
December
December
December
December
OCTOBER 2, 19G7
437
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected BibSiography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed iclow) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Na-
tions, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space :
Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its
sixth session. A/AC.105/37. July 14, 1967. SI pp.
Information furnished by the United States on ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond. A/AC.105/INF.
169-170. September 5, 1967.
Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
on the work of its fifth session. A/AC.105/39. Sep-
tember 6, 1967. 13 pp.
United Nations Programme of Assistance in the Teach-
ing. Study, Dissemination and Wider Appreciation
of International Law. Register of experts and
scholars in international law. A/6677. July 25, 1967.
109 pp.
Draft Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women. Note by the Secretary-General.
A/6678. July 28, 1967. 10 pp.
International Tear for Human Rights. Note by the
Secretary-General. A/6687. August 9, 1967, 3 pp.
The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa. Correspondence from the
representative of South Africa concerning his Gov-
ernment's reply to articles printed in the March and
May 1967 issues of the United Nations Monthly
Chronicle. A/66S8. August 11, 1967. 33 pp.
Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion. Report of the Secretary-General. A/6691. Au-
gust 30, 1967. 66 pp.
Law of Treaties. Report of the Secretary-General.
A/6827. August 31, 1967. 32 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Evaluation of Technical Co-Operation Programmes.
Report of the Administrative Conunlttee on Co-
ordination. E/4338. June 9, 1967. 62 pp.
Annual Report of the Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East. Summary prepared by the Secre-
tary-General. E/4358 (Summary). June 9, 1967. 8 pp.
Annual Report of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees. E/4390. June 12, 1967. 122 pp.
General Discussion of International Economic and
Social Policy — Economic Survey of Europe in 1966.
E/ECE/656 (Summary). June 12, 1967. 15 pp.
External Financing of Economic Development of the
Developing Countries. International Flow of Capital
and Assistance. Factors Affecting the Ability of the
Developed Countries To Provide Resources to the
Developing Countries. Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral. E/4375. June 14, 1967. 61 pp.
Development and Co-Ordination of the Activities of the
Organizations Within the United Nations System.
Report of the Committee for Programme and Co-
ordination. E/4395. June 20, 1967, 24 pp.
Transfer to the United Nations of the Responsibilities
and Assets of the International Relief Union. Report
by the Secretary-General. E/4402. June 22, 1967. 9 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Customs convention on the temporary importation of
private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.
Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.
Accession deposited: Ireland, August 14, 1967.
Convention concerning customs facilities for touring.
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force
September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited: Ireland, August 14, 1967.
Meteorology
Convention of the World Meteorological Organization.
Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accessions deposited: Barbados, March 22, 1947;
Panama, September 12, 1967.
Racial Discrimination
International convention on the elimination of all forms
of racial discrimination. Adopted by the United Na-
tions General Assembly December 21, 1965.'
Signature: Belgiimi, August 17, 1967.
Ratification deposited: Panama, August 16, 1967.
Safety at Sea
Amendments to Chapter II of the international conven-
tion for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).
Adopted at London November 30, 1966.'
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, August 18, 1967.
Slavery
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery,
the slave trade and institutions and practices similar
to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956."
Ratification deposited: San Marino, August 29, 1967.
Space
Treaty on principles governing the activities of states
in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the moon and other celestial bodies. Opened for sig-
nature at Washington, London, and Moscow January
27, 1967.'
Signature: Paliistan, September 12, 1967.
BILATERAL
Thailand
Treaty of amity and economic relations. Signed at
Bangkok May 29, 1966.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem-
ber 11, 1967.
' Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.
438
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
INDEX Octoh&r £, 1967 Vol. LVII, No. 14.76
China. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker
Discuss Vlet-Nam in TV-Radio Interviews
(transcripts) 411
Developing Countries. Concert and Conciliation :
The Next Stage of the Atlantic Alliance
(Rostow) 422
Ecuador. Letters of Credence (Mantilla) . . . 431
Europe. Concert and Conciliation: The Next
Stage of the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) . . 422
Foreign Aid. President Authorizes Additional
Wheat Shipments to India (Johnson) . . . 430
India. President Authorizes Additional Wheat
Shipments to India (Johnson) 430
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences . . . 435
Jamaica. Letters of Credence (Richardson) . . 431
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Concert and
Conciliation : The Next Stage of the Atlantic
Alliance (Rostow) 422
Poland. Letters of Credence (Mi chalowski) . . 431
Presidential Documents
President Authorizes Additional Wheat Ship-
ments to India 430
President Sends Congratulations to Vietnamese
Chief of State 421
Public Affairs. TTie Intellectual and American
Foreign Policy (Gronouski) 432
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 438
United Nations. Current U.N. Docvunents . . 438
Viet-Nam
Concert and Conciliation : The Next Stage of
the Atlantic Alliance (Rostow) 422
President Sends Congratulations to Vietnamese
Chief of State 421
Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker Dis-
cuss Viet-Nam in TV-Radio Interviews
(transcripts) 411
Name Index
Bunker, Ellsworth 411
Gronouski, John A 432
Johnson, President 421, 430
Mantilla Ortega, Carlos 431
Michalowskl, Jerzy 431
Richardson, Egerton Rudolf 431
Rostow, Eugene V 422
Rusk, Secretary 411
Check List of Department of State
Press
Releases: September 11-17
Press releases may be obtained from the OflSce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
No.
Date
Subject
tl93
9/11
U.S.-Thailand treaty of amity and
economic relations approved by
the Senate.
1*4
9/11
Rostow : "Concert and Conciliation :
The Next Stage of the Atlantic
Alliance."
tl95
9/13
Oliver : "The Business of Develop-
ment."
tl96
9A2
Revision of Middle East travel
restrictions.
tl97
9/15
Regional foreign policy conference,
St. Louis, Mo., Oct. 17-18.
tl98
9/13
Rusk: opening statement. Joint
U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs (revised).
tl99
9/15
Joint U.S.-Japan Committee: joint
communique.
*200
9/15
Program for visit of President
Guiseppe Saragat of Italy.
i201
9/15
Secretary Rusk and Japanese
Foreign Minister Takeo Miki:
joint news briefing.
ted.
* Not prin
t Held for
a later issue of the Bui.i.iwrN.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:1967
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washington, d.c.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
:'.s»ston Public Library
OCl 2 6 1957
DEPOSITORY
Vol. LVII, No. 1U76
October 9, 1967
U.S.-JAPAN JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE HOLDS SIXTH MEETING
Opening Statement by Secretary Busk and Text of Joint Gommuniqiie 4^1
News Conference of Secretary Busk and Foreign Minister Miki 456
THE BUSINESS OF DEVELOPMENT
by Assistant Secretary Oliver Jf70
UNITED STATES COLI.ECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS (MAP) 460
THE DYNAillCS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara jU3
For index see inside back cover
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LVII, No. 1476 Publication 8299
October 9, 1967
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing OCBce
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE:
62 issues, domestic $10.00, loieign $15.00
Single copy 30 cents
Use ot funds for printing of this publication
approved by the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget (January U, 1966).
Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a tveekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the Government
with information on developments in
the field of foreign relations and on
the work of the Department of State
and the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy , issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
nuide by the President and by the
Secretary of State and otlter officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of interna-
tional affairs and the functions of the
Department. Information is included
concerning treaties and international
agreements to which the United
States is or nuiy become a party
and treaties of general international
interest.
Publications of the Department,
United Nations documents, and leg-
islative material in the field of inter-
national relations are listed currently.
The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy
iy Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense ^
I want to discuss with you this afternoon the
gravest problem that an American Secretary of
Defense must face: the planning, preparation,
and policy governing the possibility of thermo-
nuclear war.
It is a prospect most of mankind would pre-
fer not to contemplate. That is understandable.
For technology has now circmnscribed us all
with a conceivable horizon of horror that could
dwarf any catastrophe that has befallen man in
his more than a million years on earth.
Man has lived now for more than 20 years in
what we have come to call the atomic age. What
we sometimes overlook is that every future age
of man will be an atomic age.
If, then, man is to have a future at all, it will
have to be a future overshadowed with the per-
manent possibility of thermonuclear holocaust.
About that fact, we are no longer free. Our
freedom in this question consists rather in fac-
ing the matter rationally and realistically and
discussing a,ctions to minimize the danger.
No sane citizen, no sane political leader, no
sane nation, wants thermonuclear war. But
merely not wanting it is not enough. We must
understand the difference between actions which
increase its risk, those which reduce it, and those
which, while costly, have little influence one way
or another.
Now this whole subject matter tends to be
psychologically unpleasant. But there is an even
greater difficulty standing in the way of con-
structive and profitable debate over the issues.
And that is that nuclear strategy is exceptionally
complex in its technical aspects. Unless these
complexities are well understood, rational dis-
decisionmaking
a.re simply not
' Address made before the annual convention of
United Press International editors and publishers at
San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 18 (Department of
Defense press release) .
cussion and
possible.
Wliat I want to do this afternoon is deal with
these complexities and clarify them with as
much precision and detail as time and security
permit.
"Assured Destruction Capability"
One must begin with precise definitions. The
cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to
be to deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the
United States, or its allies, by maintaining a
highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable
degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or
combination of aggressors, at any time during
the course of a strategic nuclear exchange — even
after our absorbing a surprise first strike. This
can be defined as our "assured destruction
cai^ability."
Now, it is imperative to understand that as-
sured destruction is the very essence of the whole
deterrence concept.
We must possess an actual assured destruction
capability. And that actual assured destruction
capability must also be credible. Conceivably,
our assured destruction capability could be ac-
tual without being credible — in which case it
might fail to deter an aggressor. The point is
that a potential aggressor must himself believe
that our assured destruction capability is in fact
actual and that our will to use it in retaliation
to an attack is in fact unwavering.
The conclusion, then, is clear: If the United
States is to deter a nuclear attack on itself or on
its allies, it must possess an actual and a credible
assured destruction capability.
Wlien calculating the force we require, we
must be "conservative" in all our estimates of
both a potential aggressor's capabilities and his
intentions. Security depends upon taking a
OCTOBER 9, lOfiT
443
"worst plausible case" — and having the ability
to cope with that eventuality.
In that eventuality we must be able to absorb
the total weight of nuclear attack on our coun-
try— on our strike-back forces ; on our command
and control apparatus ; on our industrial capac-
ity; on our cities; and on our population — and
still be fully capable of destroying the aggres-
sor to the point that his society is simply no
longer viable in any meaningful 20th-century
sense.
That is what deterrence to nuclear aggi-ession
means. It means the certainty of suicide to the
aggressor — not merely to his military forces but
to his society as a whole.
"Firsf-Sfrike Capability"
Now let us consider another term : "first-strike
capability." This, in itself, is an ambiguous
term, since it could mean simply the ability of
one nation to attack another nation with nuclear
forces first. But as it is normally used, it con-
notes much more : the substantial elimination of
the attacked nation's retaliatory second-strike
forces. This is the sense in which "firet-strike
capability" should be understood.
Now, clearly, such a first-strike capability is
an important strategic concept. The United
States cannot — and will not — ever permit itself
to get into the position in which another nation
or combination of nations would possess such a
first-strike capability, which could be effectively
used against it.
To get into such a position vis-a-vis any other
nation or nations would not only constitute an
intolerable threat to our security, but it would
obviously remove our ability to deter nuclear
aggression — both against ourselves and against
our allies.
Now, we are not in that position today — and
there is no foreseeable danger of our ever get-
ting into that position.
Our strategic offensive forces are immense:
1,000 Minuteman missile launchers, carefully
protected below ground; 41 Polaris submarines,
carrying 656 missile launchers — with the major-
ity of these hidden beneath the seas at all times ;
and about 600 long-range bombers, approxi-
mately 40 percent of which are kept always in
a high state of alert.
Our alert forces alone carry more than 2,200
weapons, averaging more than 1 megaton each.
A mere 400 1-megaton weapons, if delivered on
the Soviet Union, would be sufficient to destroy
over one-third of her population and one-half
of her industry.
And all of these flexible and highly reliable
forces are equipped with devices that insure
their penetration of Soviet defenses.
Now, what about the Soviet Union ? Does it
today possess a powerful nuclear arsenal ?
The answer is that it does.
Does it possess a first-strike capability against
the United States?
The answer is that it does not.
Can the Soviet Union, in the foreseeable fu-
ture, acquire such a first-strike capability
against the United States ?
The answer is that it cannot. It cannot because
we are determined to remain fully alert and we
will never permit our own assured destruction
capability to be at a point where a Soviet first-
strike capability is even remotely feasible.
Is the Soviet Union seriously attempting to
acquire a fixst-strike capability against the
United States?
Although this is a question we cannot answer
with absolute certainty, we believe the answer
is "No." In any event, the question itself is, in
a sense, irrelevant. It is irrelevant since the
United States will so continue to maintain — and
where necessary strengthen — our retaliatory
forces that, wliatever the Soviet Union's inten-
tions or actions, we will continue to have an
assured destruction capability vis-a-vis their
society in which we are completely confident.
But there is another question that is most
relevant. And that is: Do we — the United
States — possess a first-strike capability against
the Soviet Union?
The answer is that we do not.
And we do not, not because we have neglected
our nuclear strength. On the contrary, we have
increased it to the point that we possess a clear
superiority over the Soviet Union.
We do not possess first-strike capability
against the Soviet Union for precisely the same
reason that they do not possess it against us.
And that is that we have both built up our
"second-strike capability" ^ to the point that
a first-strike capability on either side has become
unattainable.
There is, of course, no way in which the
-\ "second-strike capability" is the capability to
absorb a surprise nuclear attack and survive with suf-
ficent power to inflict unacceptable damage on the
aggressor. [Footnote in original.]
444
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
United States could have prevented the Soviet
Union from acquiring its present second-strike
capability — short of a massive preemptive first
sti'ike on the Soviet Union in the 1950's.
The blunt fact is, then, that neither the Soviet
Union nor the United States can attack the other
without being destroyed in retaliation ; nor can
either of us attain a first-strike capability in the
foreseeable future.
The further fact is that both the Soviet Union
and the United States presently possess an ac-
tual and credible second-strike capability
against one another — and it is precisely this
mutual capability that provides us both with
the strongest possible motive to avoid a nuclear
war.
U.S. Nuclear Superiority
The more frequent question that arises in this
connection is whether or not the United States
possesses nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union.
The answer is that we do.
But the answer is — like everythmg else
in this matter — technically complex. The com-
plexity arises in part out of what measurement
of superiority is most meaningful and realistic.
Many commentators on the matter tend to
define nuclear superiority in terms of gross
megatomiage or in terms of the number of mis-
sile launchers available.
Now, by both these two standards of measure-
ment, the United States does have a substantial
superiority over the Soviet Union in the weap-
ons targeted against each other.
But it is precisely these two standards of
measurement that are themselves misleading.
For the most meaningful and realistic measui-e-
ment of nuclear capability is neither gross
megatonnage nor the number of available mis-
sile launchers, but rather the number of sep-
arate warheads that are capable of being deliv-
ered with accuracy on individual high-priority
targets with sufficient power to destroy them.
Gross megatonnage in itself is an inadequate
indicator of assured destruction capability, since
it is unrelated to survivability, accuracy, or pen-
etrability and poorly related to effective elimi-
nation of multiple high-priority targets. There
is manifestly no advantage in overdestroying
one target at the expense of leaving undamaged
other targets of equal importance.
Further, the number of missile launchers
available is also an inadequate indicator of as-
sured destruction capability, since the fact is
that many of our launchers will carry multiple
warheads.
But by using the realistic measurement of the
number of warheads available, capable of being
reliably delivered with accuracy and effective-
ness on the appropriate targets in the United
States or Soviet Union, I can tell you that the
United States currently possesses a superiority
over the Soviet Union of at least three or four
to one.
Furthermore, we will maintain a superiority —
by these same realistic criteria — over the Soviet
Union for as far ahead in the future as we can
realistically plan.
I want, however, to make one point patently
clear: Our current nimierical superiority over
the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate, and effec-
tive warheads is both greater than we had orig-
inally planned and in fact more than we require.
Moreover, in the larger equation of security,
our "superiority" is of limited significance;
since even with our current superiority, or in-
deed with any numerical superiority realistic-
ally attainable, the blunt, inescapable fact re-
mams that the Soviet Union could still — with its
present forces — effectively destroy the United
States, even after absorbing the full weight of
an American first strike.
I have noted that our present superiority is
greater than we had planned. Let me explain to
you how this came about ; for I think it is a sig-
nificant illustration of the intrinsic dynamics of
the nuclear arms race.
In 1961, when I became Secretary of Defense,
the Soviet Union possessed a very small opera-
tional arsenal of intercontinental missiles.
However, they did possess the technological and
industrial capacity to enlarge that arsenal very
substantially over the succeeding several years.
Now, we had no evidence that the Soviets did
in fact plan to fully use that capability. But as I
have pointed out, a strategic planner must be
"conservative" in his calculations; that is, he
must prepare for the worst plausible case and
not be content to hope and prepare merely for
the most probable.
Since we could not be certain of Soviet inten-
tions— since we could not be sure that they
would not undertake a massive buildup — we had
to insure against such an eventuality by under-
taking ourselves a major buildup of the Minute-
man and Polaris forces.
OCTOBER 9, 1967
445
Thus, in the course of hedging against wliat
was then only a theoretically possible Soviet
buildup, we took decisions which have resulted
in our current superiority in numbers of war-
heads and deliverable megatons.
But the blunt fact remains that if we had had
more accurate information about planned Soviet
strategic forces we simply would not have
needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we
have today.
Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not say-
ing that our decision in 1961 was unjustified. I
am simply saying that it was necessitated by a
lack of accurate information. Furthermore, that
decision in itself — as justified as it was — in the
end could not possibly have left unaifected the
Soviet Union's future nuclear plans.
What is essential to miderstand here is that
the Soviet Union and the United States mutu-
ally influence one another's strategic plans.
Wliatever be their intentions, whatever be our
intentions, actions — or even realistically poten-
tial actions — on either side relating to the
buildup of nuclear forces, be they either offen-
sive or defensive w^eapons, necessarily trigger
reactions on the other side. It is precisely this
action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms
race.
Nonnuclear Forces Required
Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry the arms
race involves a particular irony. Unlike any
other era in military history, today a substan-
tial numerical superiority of weapons does not
effectively translate into political control or
diplomatic leverage.
While thermonuclear power is almost incon-
ceivably awesome, and represents virtually un-
limited potential destructiveness, it has proven
to be a limited diplomatic instrument. Its
uniqueness lies in the fact that it is at one and
the same time an all-powerful weapon and a
very inadequate weapon.
The fact that the Soviet Union and the United
States can mutually destroy one another — re-
gardless of who strikes first — narrows the range
of Soviet aggression which our nuclear forces
can effectively deter.
Even with our nuclear monopoly in the early
postwar period, we were unable to deter the
Soviet pressures against Berlin or their sup-
port of aggression in Korea. Today, our nuclear
superiority does not deter all forms of Soviet
support of Communist insurgency in Southeast
Asia.
Wliat all of this has meant is that we, and
our allies as well, require substantial nonnu-
clear forces in order to cope Mutli levels of ag-
gression that massive strategic forces do not in
fact deter.
This has been a difficult lesson both for us and
for our allies to accept, since there is a strong
psychological tendency to regard superior nu-
clear forces as a simple and unfailing solution
to security and an assurance of victory under
any set of circumstances.
Wliat is important to understand is that our
nuclear strategic forces play a vital and ab-
solutely necessary role in our security and that
of our allies but it is an intrinsically limited
role.
Thus, we and our allies must maintain sub-
stantial conventional forces fully capable of
dealing with a wide spectrum of lesser forms of
political and military aggression — a level of ag-
gression against which the use of strategic nu-
clear forces would not be to our advantage and
thus a level of aggression which these strategic
nuclear foi'ces by themselves cannot effectively
deter. One cannot fashion a credible deterrent
out of an incredible action. Therefore, security
for the United States and its allies can only arise
from the possession of a whole range of grad-
uated deterrents, each of them fully credible in
its own context.
Now, I have pointed out that in strategic j
nuclear matters the Soviet Union and the i|
United States mutually influence one another's
plans. In recent years the Soviets have sub-
stantially increased their offensive forces. We
have, of course, been watching and evaluating |
this very carefully.
Clearly, the Soviet buildup is in part a reac-
tion to our own buildup since the beginning of |
this decade. Soviet strategic planners undoubt- j
edly reasoned that if our buildup were to con-j
tinue at its accelerated pace, we might conceivJ
ably reach, in time, a credible first-strik|
capability against the Soviet Union.
That was not in fact our intention. Our inten-
tion was to assure that they — with their theo-
retical capacity to reach such a first-strike
capability — would not in fact outdistance us.
But they could not read our intentions with
any greater accuracj^ than we could read theirs.
And thus the result has been that we have both
built up our forces to a point that far exceeds
a credible second-strike capability against the
forces we each started with.
In doing so, neither of us has reached a first-
446
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTTLLETIN
strike capability. And the realities of the situa-
tion being what they are — whatever we believe
their intentions to be and whatever they believe
our intentions to be — each of us can deny the
otlier a first-strike capability in the foreseeable
future.
Now, how can we be so confident that this is
the case? How can we be so certain that the
Soviets cannot gradually outdistance us — either
by some dramatic teclmological breakthrough
or simply through our imperceptively lagging
behind, for wliatever reason: reluctance to
spend the requisite funds, distraction with mili-
tary problems elsewhere, faulty intelligence, or
simple negligence and naivete?
All of these reasons — and others— have been
suggested by some commentators in this coun-
try, who fear that we are in fact falling behind
to a dangerous degree.
The answer to all of this is simple and
straightforward. We are not going to permit
the Soviets to outdistance us, because to do so
would be to jeopardize our very viability as a
nation. No President, no Secretary of Defense,
no Congress of the United States— of whatever
political party and of whatever political per-
suasion— is going to permit this nation to take
that risk.
Hope for Arms Limitation Agreement
We do not want a nuclear arms race with the
Soviet Union — primarily because the action-re-
action phenomenon makes it foolish and futile.
But if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union
from obtaining first-strike capability over us is
to engage in such a race, the United States pos-
sesses in ample abundance the resources, the
technology, and the will to run faster in that
race for whatever distance is required.
But what we would much prefer to do is to
come to a realistic and reasonably riskless
agreement with the Soviet Union which would
effectively prevent such an arms race. We both
I have strategic nuclear arsenals greatly in excess
of a credible assured destruction capability.
These arsenals have reached that point of excess
in each case for precisely the same reason : We
each have reacted to the other's buildup with
very conservative calculations. We have, that is,
each built a gi'eater arsenal than either of us
needed for a second-strike capability, simply
because we each wanted to be able to cope with
the "worst plausible case."
But since we now each possess a deterrent in
I excess of our individual needs, both of our na-
tions would benefit from a properly safe-
guarded agreement first to limit, and later to
leduce, both our offensive and defensive strate-
gic nuclear forces.
We may, or we may not, be able to achieve
such an agreement. We hope we can. And we
believe such an agreement is fully feasible,
since it is clearly in both our nations' interests.
But reach the formal agreement or not, we can
be sure that neither the Soviets nor we are go-
ing to risk the other obtaining a first-strike ca-
pability. On the contrary, we can be sure that
we are both going to maintain a maximum
effort to preserve an assured destruction
capability.
It would not be sensible for either side to
launch a maximum effort to achieve a first-
strike capability. It would not be sensible be-
cause, the intelligence-gathering capability of
each side being what it is and the realities of
leadtime from technological breakthrough to
operational readiness being what they are,
neither of us would be able to acquire a first-
strike capability in secret.
Now, let me take a specific case in point.
The Soviets are now deploying an anti-ballis-
tic-missile system. If we react to this deploy-
ment intelligently, we have no reason for alarm.
The system does not impose any threat to our
ability to penetrate and inflict massive and un-
acceptable damage on the Soviet Union. In other
words, it does not presently affect in any signif-
icant manner our assured destruction capabil-
ity.
It does not impose such a threat because we
have already taken the steps necessary to assure
that our land-based Minuteman missiles, our
nuclear submarine-launched new Poseidon mis-
siles, and our strategic bomber forces have the
requisite penetration aids and, in the sum, con-
stitute a force of such magnitude that they
guarantee us a force strong enough to survive
a Soviet attack and penetrate the Soviet ABM
deployment.
Deployment of an ABM System
Now, let me come to the issue that has received
so much attention recently: the question of
whether or not we should deploy an ABM sys-
tem against the Soviet nuclear threat.
To begin with, this is not in any sense a new
issue. We have had both the technical possibility
and the strategic desirability of an American
ABM deployment under constant review since
the late 1950's.
OCTOBER 9, 190 7
447
Willie we liavo siibsliiiitially iin])rov(Ml oiii-
({'(•linnl()<j;y in (ho, (icld, il is iriipoi-liiiii (o iiiulcr-
stand that none of the systems at, the present or
forespoable state of the art would provide an
iiiipeiu'lrahle shield over the llnilecl Slates.
Were such a shield possible, we would cei'lainly
want it — aiul we would certainly build i(.
And at lids point, let me dispose of an ob-
jection (hat is totally iri-elevaiit (o (his issue.
It has been aliejied (ha( we are ()]>posed to de-
ploying^ ft large-scale ABM system because it
would carry the heavy price tajj of $10 billion.
I id uie nuiko it very clear (hat. (he $10 billion
is not the i.ssue. If we could build a.nd deploy a
pienuiiu^ly impenetrable sliield over (lie United
States, we would be willing? to spend not $40
billion but any reasonable multiple of that
amount (hat was necessary. Tiie money in itself
is not the probl(>ni : 'I'lie peiu'trability of tlie
proposed shield is the ])roblein.
'I'hei-e is clearly no point, however, in spend-
in<; $40 billion if it is not f:cf>ini;: to buy us a
sifjnitica.nt im|)i'ovement in our security. If it is
not, then wo should use the substantial resources
it represents on something tluit will.
Kvery A15M system that is now feasible in-
volves (ii-ini:: defensive missiles at incomini;; of-
fensive warheads in an elTort (o destroy (hem.
But what ma,ny conmientators on this issue over-
loolc is (hat any such system can rathei- obviously
bo defeatinl by an enemy simply sendini;; uu)re
offensive warheads, or dummy warlieads, than
there are defensive missiles caiiable of disposing
of them.
And this is the whole crux of the nuclear ac-
tion-react ion phencuueiu)!!.
Were we to deploy a heavy ABM system
(hrou^hout tlie United States, the Soviets would
clearly be si ronjily mo( ivated (o so increase their
ofTensive capability as to ca.ncol out our defen-
sive adva.ntafje.
It is futile for each of us (o spend $4 billion,
$40 billion, or $400 billion— and at {h(^ end of all
the spendino;, and at (he end of a.ll (he deploy-
n\eut, and at the end of all the elfort, to lie
relatively at the same point of balance on the
security scale that we a.re tiow.
In ])oint of fact, we have already initialed
olVensive weapons ])roi!:rams costino- several bil-
lions in order to offset the small present Soviet
ABAF de]>loyment and the ])ossibly more exten-
sive future Soviet AliM (Ie])loymenls. That is
money well spent ; and it is necessary. But we
should bear in mind (hat it is money spent be-
cause of the action-reaction ])henomeuou.
If we in turn opt for heavy ABM deploy-
ment— at whatever price — we can be certain that
the Soviets will react to oli'set the advantage we
would hope to gain.
It is ])recisely because of this certainly of a
correspondiTig Soviet reaction that the four
prominent scieni isls — men wlio have served with
distinction as the Science Advisers to Presidents
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson — and the
three outstaiuling men who have served as Di-
rectors of Keseart'h and Engineering to three
Secretaries of Defense have unanimously rec-
ommended against the deployment of an A15M
system designed to protect our population
against a Soviet attack.
These men are Doctors [James E.] Killian,
[George B.] Kistiakowsky, [Jerome B.] Wies-
ner, [Donald F.] H(unig, [Herbert F.] York,
[Harold] Brown, ajul [John S.] Foster.
Offensive and Defensive Capabilities
Tiiei)lain fact of liie matter is that we are now
facing a situat ion analogous to llio one we faced
iu 1!)()1: AVo a,re uncertain of the Soviets'
intentions.
At that time we wore concerned about their
poteidial oifensive capahilities; now we are
coucenu'd about (heir potential defensive capa-
bilities. But the dynamics of the concern are
the same.
We must continue to be cautious and con-
servative in our estimates, leaving no room in
our calculations for unnecessary risk. And at
the same time, we must measure our own re-
sjwnse in such a maniuu- that it does not trigger
a senseless spiral upward of nuclear arms.
Now, as I have emphasized, we have already
taken the necessary steps to guarantee that our
olfensive strategic weapons will be able to pene-
trate future, nuire advanced, Soviet defenses.
Keeping in miiul the careful clockwork of
loa,dtime, we will be forced to continue that effort
over the next few years if the evidence is that the
Soviets intend (o tui'u what is now a light and
modest ABM deployment into a massive one.
Should they elect to do so, we have both the
leadlime and the technology available to so in-
ci-easo both the quality and (piantity of our of-
fensive strategic forces — willi particular atten-
tion to highly reliable penetration aids — that
their expensive defensive otTorts will give them
no edge in (he nuclear balance whatever.
But wo would prefer not to have to do that.
For it is a. prolitless waste of resouives, pro-
vided we and the Soviets can come to a realistic
strategic arms limitation a<.':reenient.
448
OUPAUrJtKNT 01' SrATE UVUJ.ETIN
As you know, wo liiivo projiosod TT.S. -Soviet
tiilks on this inattcr. yiioiikl these tiilics fail, we
are fully prepared to take the appropriate meas-
ures that such a faihii'ei would make necessary.
The point for us (o keep in mind is that should
the talks fail — and the Soviets decide to expand
their present modest AHM deployment into a
massive one — our response must be realistic.
There is no point whatever in our respondinir
by fi'oiui;- to a massive AHM deployment to i>ro-
tect our po])ulation, wlien such a system woidd
be ineU'ective a{2;ainst a sophisticated Soviet
ofl'ense.
Instead, realism dictates that if the Soviets
elect to deploy a heavy ABM system, we must
further expand our sophisticated offensive
forces and thus preserve our overwhelmine; as-
sured destruction capability.
Hut the intractable fact is that should the
talks fail, both the Soxiots and ourselves would
be forced to continue on a foolish and feckless
coTuse. It would be foolish and feckless because,
in the end, it wonld provide neither the Soviets
nor us with any p;reater relative nuclear capa-
bility. The time has como for us both to realize
that and to act reasoiuibly. It is clearly in our
own inutiuil interest to do so.
Ilavinjj said that, it is important- to distin-
guish between an ABM system designed to pro-
tect against a Soviet attack on our cities and
ABM systems which have other objectives.
Communist China's Nuclear Threat
One of the other uses of an ABM system
which wo should seriously consider is the
greater protection of our strategic offensive
forces. Another is in relation to the emerging
nuclear capability of Connnunist ('hina.
There is evidence that tlio Chinese are devot-
ing very substantial resources to the develop-
ment of both nuclear warheads and mi.ssile
deUvery systems. As I stated last January, in-
dications are that they will have medium-range
ballistic missiles within a year or so, an initial
intercontiiuMital ballistic missile capability in
the early 1970's, and a modest force in the
midseventies.
Up to now, the leadtime factor has allowed us
to postpone a decision on whether or not a light
AB^I deployment might be advantageous lus a
countermeasure to Communist (/hina's unclear
development. But the time will shortly be righl
for us to hiitiatc production if we desire such a
system.
China at the moment is caught up in inteinal
strife, but it seems likely that her basic nu)tiva-
tion in developing a strategic nuclear capability
is an attempt to provide a basis for threatening
her neighbors and to clothe herself with the
dubious prestige that the world pays to nuclear
weaponry. Wo deplore her development of these
weapons, just as wo deplore it in other coun-
tries. We oppose nuclear proliferation because
we believe that in the eiul it only increases the
risk of a common and calaclysniic holocaust.
President Johnson has made it clear that the
United States will oppose any efforts of China
to employ nuclear blackmail against hei-
neighbors.
Wo possess now, and will continue to possess
for as far ahead as we can foresee, an over-
whelming (irst-striko capability with respect to
China. And despite the shrill and raucous prop-
aganda directed at lier own people that "the
atomic bomb is a paper tiger," there is ample
evidence that China well appreciates the de-
structive power of nuclear weapons.
China has been cautious (o avoid any action
that might end in a nuclear clash with the
United States — however wild her words — and
understandably so. We have the power not only
to destroy completely her euliro nuclear offen-
sive forces but to devastate her society as well.
Is there any possibility, then, that by the
mid-1970's China might l)ecome so incautious
as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United
States or our allies? It would be insane and
suicidal for her to do so, but one can conceive
conditions under which China might miscalcu-
late. We wish to reduce such possibilities to a
minimum.
Advantages of Light Deployment of U.S. ABM's
And since, as I have lujted, our strategic
planning must always be conservative and take
into consideration even the possible irrational
boiiavior of potential adversaries, thei-o are
marginal grounds for concluding that a light
deployment of U.S. ABM's against this possi-
bility is prudent.
The system would be relatively inexpensive —
preliminary estimates place the cost at about
$5 billion — and would have a nuich higher de-
gree of reliability against a Chinese attack than
the much more massive and complicated system
that some have reconnnended against a possible
Soviet attack.
Moreover, such an A15M deployment designed
against a possible Chinese attack would have
a number of other advantages. It would provide
OCTOREn i), l!)(i7
449
an additional indication to Asians that we in-
tend to deter China from nuclear blackmail and
thus would contribute toward our goal of dis-
couraging nuclear weapon proliferation among
the present nonnuclear countries.
Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM deploy-
ment would enable us to add — as a concurrent
benefit — a further defense of our Mmuteman
sites against Soviet attack, which means that
at modest cost we would in fact be adding even
greater effectiveness to our offensive missile
force and avoiding a much more costly expan-
sion of that force.
Finally, such a reasonably reliable ABM
system would add protection of our population
against the improbable but possible accidental
launch of an intercontinental missile by any
one of the nuclear powers.
After a detailed review of all these consid-
erations, we have decided to go forward with
this Chinese-oriented ABM deployment; and
we will begin actual production of such a system
at the end of this year.
Psychological Dangers
In reaching this decision, I want to empha-
size that it contains two possible dangers, and
we should gxiard carefully against each.
The first danger is that we may psychologi-
cally lapse mto the old oversimplification about
the adequac}^ of nuclear power. The simple
trutli is that nuclear weapons can serve to deter
only a narrow range of threats. This ABM
deployment will strengthen our defensive pos-
ture and will enhance the effectiveness of our
land-based ICBM offensive forces. But the in-
dependent nations of Asia must realize tliat
these benefits are no substitute for their main-
taining, and where necessary strengthening,
their own conventional forces in order to deal
with the more likely tlireats to the security of
tlie region.
The second danger is also psychological.
There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to
the development of all new nuclear weaponry.
If a weapon system works — and works well —
there is strong pressure from many directions
to procure and deploy the weapon out of all
proportion to the pnident level required.
The danger in deploying this relatively light
and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM system is
going to be that pressures will develop to ex-
pand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM
system.
We must resist that temptation firmly, not
because we can for a moment afford to relax our
vigilance against a possible Soviet first strike
but precisely because our greatest deterrent
against such a strike is not a massive, costly,
but higlily penetrable ABM shield but rather a
fully credible offensive assured destmction
capability.
The so-called heavy ABM shield — at the pre-
sent state of tecluiology — would in effect be no
adequate shield at all against a Soviet attack
but rather a strong inducement for the Soviets
to vastly increase their own offensive forces.
That, as I have pointed out, would make it nec-
essary for us to respond in turn ; and so the arms
race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible
purpose on either side.
Let me emphasize — and I cannot do so too
strongly — that our decision to go ahead with
a limited ABM deplojTnent in no way indicates
that we feel an agreement with the Soviet Union
on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive
and defensive forces is any the less urgent or
desirable.
Tlie road leading from the stone ax to the
ICBM, though it may have been more than a
million years in the building, seems to have run
in a single direction. If one is inclined to be
cynical, one might conclude that man's history
seems to be characterized not so much by con-
sistent periods of peace, occasionally punctuated
by warfare, but rather by ])ersistent outl^reaks
of warfare, wearily put aside from time to time
by periods of exhaustion and recovery that
parade under the name of peace.
I do not view man's history with that degree
of cynicism, but I do believe that man's wisdom
in avoiding war is often surpassed by his folly
in promoting it.
However foolish unlimited war may have
lieen in the past, it is now no longer merely
foolish, but suicidal as well.
It is said tliat nothing can prevent a man from
suicide if he is sufficiently determined to com-
mit it. The question is what is our determina-
tion in an era when unlimited war will mean
the death of hundreds of millions — and the
possible genetic impairment of a million gen-
erations to follow?
Man is clearly a compound of folly and wis-
dom, and history is clearly a consequence of the
admixture of those two contradictor}' traits.
History has placed our particular lives in an
era when the consequences of human folly are |
450
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
waxing more and more catastrophic in the mat-
ters of war and peace.
In the end, tlie root of man's security does not
lie in his weaponry. Li the end, the root of man's
security lies in his mind.
"\yiiat the world requires in its 22d year of
the atomic age is not a new race toward arma-
ment. What the world requires in its 22d year
of the atomic age is a new race toward reason-
ableness.
We had better all run that race — not merely
we the administrators but we the people.
U.S.-Japan Joint Economic Committee Holds Sixth Meeting
The sixth meeting of the Joint United States-
Japan Cominittee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs was held at Washington Beptetriber 13-15.
Following are texts of an opening statement
TTUide by Secretary Busk on September 13 and a
final coTumunigue issued at the close of the
meeting, together loith the transcript of a news
conference held by Secretary Rush and Japa-
nese Foreign Minister Taheo MiJci on Septem-
ber 15.
MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMIHEE
Opening Stafemenf by Secretary Rusk
Press release 198 (revised) dated September 13
I now declare the sixth meeting of the Joint
United States-Japan Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs open. At the very beginning,
I should like to extend a very warm welcome
indeed to our colleagues the ISIinisters of Japan
and to other distinguished officials and visitors
who are with us in Washington at this time. It
has been my privilege to have participated in
each meeting since this Committee was estab-
lished in 1961 ;^ and I see at the table, on both
sides, Ministers who have attended more than
one of these earlier meetings. So, as relations
between nations go, this Committee has had a
remarkable continuity. Over the years we have
conducted an increasingly free and frank dia-
log based on growing friendship and greater
understanding. These friendships formed in the
course of our meetings are very pleasant in
themselves, but they are also an important in-
' For texts of joint communiques issued at the con-
elusion of the five previous meetings, see Bulletin of
Nov. 27, 1961. p. 891 ; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959 ; Feb. 17, 1964,
p. 235 ; Aug. 9, 1965, p. 247 ; and Aug. 1, 1966, p. 178.
gredient in the successful conduct of business
between our two great nations wliich share so
many common interests.
This Joint Committee has made a substantial
contribution to understanding between Japan
and tlie United States, two countries diverse in
history and culture but so alike in many ways —
with enei-gy and inventiveness, ideals — and
which share a common dedication to a free and
peaceful and prosperous world.
Since our first meeting at Hakone in 1961, the
nature of our economic relations has changed
almost beyond recognition. Only two trends
have been consistent : an ever-increasing volume
of trade in goods and services between our two
countries and a steady lessenmg in irritations in
our bilateral economic problems.
At the time of our first meeting our Japanese
colleagues were concerned about a large and
seemingly chronic trade deficit with the United
States. Recently, some of my colleagues have
been concerned that the sizable United States
trade deficit with Japan miglit become chronic.
This year the trend aj)pears to be in the direc-
tion of closer balance.
Our two-way trade has grown at a gi-eater
rate than our overall trade. Contrai-y to many
expectations, the United States share of Japan's
rapidly expanding market has remained rela-
tively constant, although the pattern of our ex-
ports has shown major shifts over the years.
Japan's share of the United States market has
been growing steadily, and the pattern of its
exports has shown an even more remarkable
change and diversity. With the successful con-
clusion of the Kennedy Round we look forward
to an even greater increase in mutually profit-
able trade.
Some members of our delegations, Mr. Min-
ister, do not work on a day-to-day basis with the
OCTOBER 9, 1967
451
usual international questions but are immersed
in domestic concerns. But one lesson of the mod-
ern world is clear: There are no longer any
purely domastic concerns. We share the same
earth and atmosphere; we exploit the same lim-
ited resources of the seas. Meteorological condi-
tions do not respect national boundaries;
typhoons and hurricanes lash many countries
alike. The recent Water for Peace Conference ^
miderlined that the human race as a whole has
a stake in the conservation of water to meet
growing needs for human consumption and for
industry and agriculture. And, as the popula-
tion of our planet continues to grow, it becomes
more and more apparent that we have a com-
mon interest in, and a common responsibility
for, the wise use of world resources to increase
the production of the basic necessities of life.
Mr. Minister, we applaud Japan's rapidly
growing leadership in promoting regional co-
operation. An outstanding example is its calling
of the Ministerial Conference for Southeast
Asian Economic Development, which recently
held its second meeting. Japan has had a major
role in the founding of the Asian Development
Bank. It made a large initial capital contribu-
tion. It has committed resources for special
funds to permit the Bank to carry out urgent
activities not encompassed in conventional bank-
ing. These actions have all helped to make this
regional institution an important catalyst of
economic development in Asia.
The United States and Japan are working in
close consultation in rendering assistance to
Asian regional institutions. We are developing
a real partnership in the process of carrying out
our mutual responsibilities in the area. And in
all good partnerships, each partner contributes
individual talents and strengths but the com-
bined contribution can be greater than the sum
of the parts.
I would add, Mr. Minister, that the United
States also appreciates Japan's leadership in the
U.N. and other world councils in the search for
peace. The United States is committed to peace.
That is the objective of the United States and
our allies in Viet-Nam, in Southeast Asia, in the
Western Pacific, and in the world as a whole.
We have committed our blood and treasure to
secure a lasting peace in which the people of the
world can live in freedom and security under
institutions of their choice. We impose no con-
" For background, see iUd., June 19, 1967, p. 902.
ditions on peace except the honoring of the basic
right of every people to choose its own destiny
and not be absorbed by force.
And so, Mr. Minister and gentlemen, we are
looking forward to these discussions, both at this
table and in our coimterpart discussions. I have
no doubt that they will be valuable not only to
us as individual officials carrying heavy respon-
sibilities and to our two Governments but also
to the peoples of our two countries. So you are
most welcome, sir, and we are delighted to have
you with us.
Joint Communique
Press release 199 dated September 15
The Sixth Meeting of the Joint United States-
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs was held in Washington on September 13,
14, and 15, 1967, under the Chairmanship of the
Secretary of State, Dean Eusk.
The Committee reviewed the general world
situation with particular emphasis on the con-
tinuing conflicts in Asia and tensions in the
Middle East. The Committee welcomed initia-
tives and concrete achievements by Asians in
strengthenmg regional cooperation within Asia.
It agreed that these developments were for the
region and the world, a significant contribution
to stability, prosperity and peace. Conscious of
the numerous and complex difficulties, dangers,
and anxieties which burden mankind, particu-
larly men, women and children in developing
countries, the two Governments pledged con-
tinuing partnership in strengthening Asia-
Pacific cooperation.
II
1. The Committee noted that both countries
were enjoying prosperity but that both faced
economic adjustment problems requiring the at-
tention of their Governments. The delegations
agreed on the importance of a steady but sus-
tainable expansion of both economies which
will also contribute to the continuing growth
in trade between the United States and Japan
which already had surpassed $5 billion in 1966.
2. The Committee took note of recent Jap-
anese actions to strengthen Japan's balance of
payments as well as the determination of the
United States to bring its balance of payments
into equilibrium by measures consistent with
452
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
world economic growth and progress. The
Committee recognized that there had been much
useful consultation between the two Govern-
ments in dealing with their respective balance
of payments difficulties in recent years. It was
agreed that this balance of payments consulta-
tion should be continued.
3. The Committee discussed a wide range of
problems involved in trade and economic rela-
tions between Japan and the United States,
including specific difficulties faced by particular
industries in both nations. Satisfaction was ex-
pressed on the overall growth of United States-
Japanese trade, and the close relationship be-
tween the two countries which enables both
Governments to deal constructively with poten-
tial reductions of trade barriers in a friendly
atmosphere. Both Governments undertook to
examine jointly problems presently at hand or
likely to arise.
4. The Committee considered international
investment problems. The Japanese Delegation
reported on its program to liberalize the entry
of private investment into Japan which had
been put into effect July 1, 1967, and stated that
it w'as the intention of Japan to review the pro-
gram at intervals of one or two years for further
liberalization in substantially wider areas of its
economy by early 1972. The United States ex-
pressed appreciation for the effort that went
into the formulation of the Japanese program
as a first, although somewhat disappointing,
step, and expressed the hope that liberalization
be accelerated as soon as possible. It also ex-
pressed concern over recent measures which ap-
pear adversely to affect the operations of exist-
ing United States businesses in Japan. The
United States Delegation reiterated that
Japanese investment in the United States is
actively encouraged and expressed pleasure at
Japan's growing interest in investments which
contributed to the development of Alaska.
5. The Committee discussed matters related
to fisheries and noted that mutually acceptable
arrangements had been made between the two
countries in the past year with respect to some
problems concerning fisheries.
6. The Committee examined developments
during the past year in shipping, aviation and
travel matters, and agreed to continue close con-
sultations. The Committee agreed on close con-
sultation particularly with respect to study of
and cooperation on developments pertaining to
I urban transportation problems; sea, air and
President Johnson Welcomes
Japanese Cabinet Ministers
Following is a toast hy President Johnson
at a White House luncheon on September 13 in
honor of the Japanese Cabinet Ministers attend-
ing the sixth meeting of the Joint U.S.-Japan
Committee on Trade and, Economic Affairs.
White House press release dated September 13
It is a very great i)lea.sure to welcome you here.
These meeting.? are testimony to the friendship
that unites two great nations. They are infused
with a sense of urgency and of confidence. The
problems of Asia and the Pacific provide the
urgency ; the record of America and Japan in
these past years inspires the confidence.
Each of us can learn from the other's experi-
ence with the problems of modern urban socie-
ties : how to cleanse the environment, how to
transport and house our people, how to enrich
the lives of individual men and women.
We share other problems as well, inherited
from the past. We in America welcome the op-
portunity to explore those problems with you.
Together, we face the vast problems of an
Asia straining to achieve a better and more
secure life. We have seen hope stir in hungry
land.s — and we have responded to it. The world's
future stability demands that the peoples of the
Pacific find their way, in peace, out of the agonies
of the past.
One heartening development is the growing
spirit of regional cooperation in Asia — a spirit
which Japan has strongly helped to promote.
America's own commitment to Asia is firm.
Our two nations do not always see our respon-
sibilities in the same light. But we in America
will always welcome your wisdom and counsel.
There is much that we can do together. We
share the experience of growth and prosperity.
And out of that, we share a knowledge which
can change and enrich the future of our neigh-
bors. It is our task to work in partnership toward
a goal worthy of the greatness of our people :
the progress, the peace and security of the
Pacific. These meetings help show us the way.
I ask you now to join with me in a toast :
Gentlemen, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor
of Japan.
land transportation technology and safety ; and
environmental pollution related to transporta-
tion. Tlie Committee agreed to establish an ap-
propriate panel to study methods to facilitate
sea and air travel and cargo movement between
the two nations. Particular note was taken of
the need to develop improved techniques for
handling passengers because of the requirements
OCTOBER 9, 196 7
453
generated by Expo 70 at Osaka as well as the
Visit USA program.
Ill
1. Continuing close cooperation between the
United States and Japan in multilateral eco-
nomic forums designed to minimize inhibitions
on the free flow of goods and services, capital
and persons among nations was empliasized by
the Committee. The Committee welcomed the
outstanding success of the Kennedy Eoimd as
an example of what can be accomplished to
expand world trade through reciprocal under-
standing and patient negotiations. While
recognizing the major contribution to the expan-
sion of world trade made by the Kennedy
Bound, the Committee pointed out that much
remains to be done through the GATT [Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in reduc-
ing tariff and non-tariff' liarriers to trade and in
increasing the participation of the developing
areas of the world in trade as a requisite for
their development. Both Governments will be
studying what future trade measures might be
taken in cooperation with other countries to
achieve these objectives.
2. The Committee devoted special attention
to the trade problems of the developing coun-
tries, recognizing the importance of construc-
tive measures to support the efforts by the devel-
oping countries to accelerate their economic
development. The Committee noted that the
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment constitutes an important forum for
the consideration of trade problems of the de-
veloping countries. The Committee agreed that
the question of preferential tariffs would be a
principal theme at the Second Meeting of
UNCTAD at New Delhi next year and the
Japanese Delegation empliasized the prob-
lems involved for Japan if tariff preferences
were to be extended and stated that Japan was
seriously studying the problem. The Commit-
tee agreed to continue consultations on this
matter.
3. The two delegations discussed problems in
East-West trade relations and the respective
policies of their Governments. The United
States Delegation stated that its policies on
trade in non-strategic goods with Eastern
European countries and the U.S.S.R. are under
continuous review as part of its efforts to open
useful avenues of communication and contact
with these countries. It reviewed the reasons for
having no economic relations with Communist
China, North Korea and North Viet-Nam and
for economic embargo of Cuba by the Organi-
zation of American States. The Japanese Dele-
gation explained the current situation in its
trade with Communist China and stated its in-
tention to develop further trade relations with
the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European
countries.
4. The Committee welcomed the important
step that has been taken in the Group of Ten ^
and within the International Monetary Fund in
developing an Outline Plan for Special Draw-
ing Rights in the Fund to provide supplemen-
tary reserves wdien needed, so as to assure that
a shortage of world reserves will not inhibit the
growth of international trade and investment.
The delegations expressed the hope that this
Plan will be approved at the Rio de Janeiro
meeting of the International Monetai-y Fund.
IV
1. The Committee observed the growing
awareness among Asian countries of the need
for self-help and regional cooperation reflected
in the Second Ministerial Conference for Eco-
nomic Development in Southeast Asia held in
Manila m April 1967 and in other important
regional meetings.
2. The Committee noted that the Asian De-
velopment Bank is now an operating institution
contributing to the economic development of the
area. The United States Delegation noted i^ar-
ticularly Japan's strong and consistent support
of the Bank and its leadership in emphasizing
the importance of agriculture to the develop-
ment of Asia. The Conunittee noted that Japan
had decided to make a contribution amounting
to $100 million to a Special Fund primarily for
agriculture to be administered by the Asian
Development Bank. The Committee also noted
that the President intended to request the
United States Congress to authorize a contribu-
tion of $200 million to Asian Development Bank
Special Funds for various jjurposes, mcluding
agriculture, over a period of four years.
The Committee received its annual progress
report on United States-Japan cooperation in
development and utilization of natural re-
sources. Recognizing the contribution that this
' For background, see Hid., Sept. 25, 1967, p. 392.
454
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
bilateral cooperation program had made to
broadening exchanges in the fields of science,
technology, and conservation between the
United States and Japan, the C'onnnittee agreed
to joint examination of a current problem of
reconciling conservation and trade interests in-
volved in nuitual United States and Japanese
concern in the use of timber resources of the
Pacific Northvrest and Alaska.
VI
The Committee expressed satisfaction with
the agreement between the two countries to
undertake a joint study of employment and
observed that tJie study was expected (o make a
significant contribution to the full utilization
of human potential in both countries.
VIT
The United States Delegation accepted the
invitation of the Japanese Delegation to hold
the next meeting in Japan.
VIII
The United States was represented by Dean
Rusk, Secretary of State; Henry H. Fowler,
Secretary of the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall,
Secretary of Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Sec-
retary of Agriculture; Alexander B. Trow-
bridge, Secretary of Commerce; W. Willard
Wirtz. Secretary of Labor; Alan S. Boyd, Sec-
retary of Transportation; and Gardner Ackley,
Chairman of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. U. Alexis Jolmson, United
States Ambassador to Japan; William M. Roth,
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations;
William S. Gaud, Administrator, Agency for
International Development; and advisers from
the various departments concerned were also
present.
Japan was represented by Takeo Miki, Min-
ister for Foreign All'airs; Alikio Mizuta, Min-
ister of Finance; Tadao Kuraishi, Minister of
Agriculture and Forestry : Wataro Kanno, Min-
ister of International Trade and Industry;
Takeo Ohashi, Minister of Transportation;
Takashi Ilayakawa, Minister of Labor; and
Kiichi Miyazawa, Director General, Economic
Planning Agency. Takeso Siiimoda, Japanese
Ambassador to the United States; Shinichi
Kondo, Deputy Vice Slinister for Foreign Af-
fairs; and advisers from the Ministries con-
cerned were also present.
NEWS CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 15
Press release 201 dated September 16
Secretary Eu.ik: Good morning, ladies and
gentlemen. I am delighted to have a chance to
meet you in the company of my distinguished
colleague the Foreign JNlinister of Japan, Mr.
Miki.
I would invite Mr. Milci to make some open-
ing observations.
There will be translation of both languages
on this occasion.
Minister Miki [In Englisli] : I was intro-
duced by Secretary Rusk. I am the Japanese
Foreign Minister.
[Inferpretation] : This is the third time that
I have had the pleasure of taking part in the
meetings of the Joint United States-Japan
Coniiuitteo on Trade and Economic AlFairs. My
experiences with these meetings make me feel
that, as we continue to meet annually, personal
friendship as well as nuitual understanding te-
tween your American Secretaries and our Min-
isters from Japan deepen, creating an atmos-
phere conducive to free, candid, and active
dialog between us. This is no less than a signifi-
cant indication of ever-closer relationship be-
tween tiio United States and Japan.
Naturally, there are various problems of
trade and economy that arise as our trade and
economic relations between the United States
and Japan further progress, but oiir mutual
understanding, and good M'ill, will undoubtedly
solve these problems.
Wliile we recognize the importance of these
problems that lie between the ITnited States and
Japan, this meeting has seen discussions of not
only problems pertaining to trade and economic
affaii's but also discussions of international
problems pertaining to trade and economy in
the whole world in which the United States and
Japan have common interests. We have
strongly felt the need for furthering our mu-
tual cooperation, based not only on a bilateral
basis but on a nnich wider basis.
Common enthusiasm was expressed to fur-
ther our cooperation in order to promote Asia's
economic and social development for peace and
sta,bility in Asia.
This 3-day meeting betweeji your American
Secretaries and the Japanese Ministers has seen
a discussion of a multitude of problems. How-
ever, as we look at the outcome of the entire
conference, I am happy to report to you that
OCTOBER 9, 19G7
455
throughout the discussions we have constantly
endeavored to pursue the patli toward the
worldwide stability and prosperity. We have
also discussed the means — possible means ajid
methods of achieving such stability and pros-
perity for the entire world. I would say through-
out the conference, during the past 3 days, both
sides expressed deep interest in achieving such
goals. The 3-day conference has thus helped to
deepen mutual understanding between the
United States and Japan.
I would attach a specific and special signifi-
cance to the outcome in this fashion of this
particular conference.
This meeting has, also, been conducted under
the able ajid competent leadership and chair-
manship of your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean
Rusk. All of the Ministers representing the Gov-
ernment of Japan at this particular conference
ai'e extremely grateful for the wonderful lead-
ership which your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean
Rusk, has shown throughout the conference.
We also would like to add, at this point, that
all of the Ministers representing the Govern-
ment of Japan will certainly look forward to
our next joint meeting on trade and economic
affairs, which is to be held in 1968 in Japan.
Thank you.
Secretary Rusk: Thank you very much,
Mr. Miki.
As a veteran of all six of our joint Cabinet
meetings, I should like to recall that these meet-
ings were initiated by the late President Ken-
nedy and the late Prime Minister Ikeda.* It
was not intended that these discussions be looked
upon as formal negotiations for the purpose of
tiking specific decisions on specific points. Those
are matters which will be dealt with by the
ministries on both sides in the usual fashion, and
through the normal channels through which our
Governments do business. Nonetheless, these
meetings are a most important opportunity for
these two great trading partners to come togeth-
er to look both at bilateral economic relation-
ships and at the general world economic
situation.
Since our last meeting, last year, there have
been some very dramatic developments which
we should recall.
The Kennedy Round has been completed.
And Japan and the United States took an active
and leading part in the successful conclusion of
those important trade negotiations.
The Group of Ten has reached agreement on
the creation of new facilities in reserves to help
free international trade from the artificial limi-
tations deriving from the quantity of gold.
The Asian Development Bank is a living in-
stitution. Japan and the United States each
contributed 20 percent of its capital stock, and
each country plans to make important resources
available to the Special Fund of the Asian De-
velopment Bank in order to stimulate and ex-
pedite the economic and social development of
the Asian countries members of that bank.
So we have some important steps forward
that we could report to each other on this
occasion.
I would simply add that it is always a privi-
lege for me to meet with my colleague the For-
eign Minister and to have a chance in our — what
we call our counterpart discussions to have a
broad review of the world situation, and j)ar-
ticularly the situation in Asia, in order that we
can luiderstand each other better and work to-
gether more closely in the great common inter-
ests which do, in fact, link ovir two countries.
Now, gentlemen, we have time for a few ques-
tions. Since this is a joint press conference, I
would suggest that we alternate between Japa-
nese correspondents and all the rest. But, please,
in asking your questions indicate to whom the
question is addressed. May I have your
questions ?
Q. Secretary Busk, would you give v-s your
reaction, please, to the proposal of Senator
[Mike^ Mansfield in Japan yesterday — that the
United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union
should all get together to discuss the questions
of security and peace?
Secretary Rusk: Senator JMansfield made it
clear that he was speaking individually and
not for the Government. We have the most ex-
tensive conversations with our friends in Japan
about common interests in security and other
problems in the Pacific Ocean area, and of
course, we are also in touch with the Soviet
Union on jooints of agreement or points of dis-
agi'eement. Wliether there is any point in bring-
ing these three Governments together for com-
bined talks is something that I have not I'eally
taken up. So I really don't want to go into that.
It is a suggestion by the Senator. We will think
about it. But I am not at all clear that this is
the way in which these great questions are going
to be resolved.
' For background, see iT)ld., July 10, 1961, p. 57.
45G
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN'
•1
Q. [Interpretation] : Mr. Secretary, I would
like to pose this quefition at this point. This is in
relation to the question, that has just been raised.
Senator Mansfield made a statement on the 15th
of this -month in Shim,oda that he did not helieve
it xoould he difficult, nor would it take much
time, for the United States to return the Bonin
Islands to the sovereignty of Japan. I am inter-
ested, Mr. Secretary, at this point in knowing
what your thoughts are on this point.
Secretary Rusk; This was not a subject on
the agenda of the Cabinet meeting on trade
and economic aifairs. Tliis is a matter which
Mr. Miki and I have discussed. We have dis-
cussed this and simiLir problems in some of our
earlier meetings. We expect to continue these
discussions on Saturday, and perhaps while he
and I are together at the United Nations. This
is a matter on which our two Governments will
continue to be in close contact.
But I would not wish to suggest any conclu-
sions at this point. Again, Senator Mansfield
was speaking for himself.
Q. I wonder —
Secretary Rusk: We must have interpreta-
tion. [Interpretation followed.]
Q. [Interpretation] : Mr. Miki, I wonder if
you could tell us what you regard as the most
important problem between Japan and tJie
United States in the realm of trade and eco-
nomics?
Minister Miki [Interpretation^ : In response
to your question, I would like to advance the
following reply.
The Government of Japan today is vitally
interested m the post-Kennedy Round United
States trade policies. Since the negotiations
have now been brought to a successful conclu-
sion, the Government of Japan sincerely hojDes
that in formulating and implementing the fu-
ture trade policies vis-a-vis the rest of the world
the Government of the United States will con-
tinue to pursue the principles of free and non-
discrimmatory treatment for the goods that are
traded among the nations of the world.
The Government of Japan has sho\vn a great
concern over some visible tendencies in the
United States and among American industry
toward protectionist movements. In this regard
the Govermnent of Japan during the course of
this meeting requested the continued coopera-
tion of the United States Government m inform-
ing the American industries that protectionist
movements are not desirable; and especially
with regard to the products and merchandise
of the textile and steel industries that are ex-
ported from the United States we specifically
requested the understanding and continued co-
operation on the part of the United States
Government in curbing and controlling such
protectionist movements.
Secretat^ Rusk: I might add a comment on
this question, because it involves some of our
problems here.
I think our immediate task here is to consoli-
date gains of the Kennedy Round. Now, I sup-
pose it's only human that those who benefit from
the Kennedy Round remain rather satisfied but
also quiet, while those who feel themselves
under some disadvantage or some pressure as
a result of the Kennedy Round will si^eak with
a loud voice and will try to enlist action of the
Congress to revise in some way the conclusions
of the Kennedy Round. Our administration
thinks this would be a great mistake.
In our relations with Japan, there has been a
dramatic increase in two-way trade. Two years
ago, something like four billions ; last year, five
billions. This year, we are reaching toward six
billions. So those figures themselves show that a
great deal is right in the relations between our
two countries.
Now, there are some trading problems on
both sides and we have had very frank discus-
sions of those problems at this meeting. But it
is the policy of this country to liberalize inter-
national trade ; and I would hope that we would
be able to avoid the mistake of retreating on the
Kennedy Roimd and find ways to keep the
channels of international trade continually ex-
panding, because this would be important to
our own prosperity, quite apart from the eco-
nomic interests of other coimtries.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Secretary Rusk: We are alternating.
Q. [Interpretation] : Pd like to pose this
question to Mr. Secretary. This pertains to the
question of a possible return of Okinawa to
Japanese sovereignty. I would like to know if
it is iinpossible to return Okinawa to Japanese
sovereignty, or is there any possibility open
for such return of Okinawa to Japanese sov-
ereignty, now or sometime in the future, under
certain specific conditions?
I would greatly appreciate your response to
OCTOBER 9, 190 1
457
this question, Mr. Secretary, loithin tlte context
of wluitever information you feel you can di-
vulge at this particular point.
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is a question that
has to do with the future. We, of course, as you
know, recognize the residual sovereignty of
Japan in the Ryukyu Islands. We have kept in
close touch with our friends in Japan about
those islands and what is happening there and
the well-being of the people in those islands for
a period of some years.
Now, we are aware of a lively interest in the
question of possible reversion. These are mat-
ters which we are discussing between our two
Governments.
In diplomacy, we don't use words like "im-
possible" or "possible"' very often. These are
matters of frank and friendly exchanges be-
tween our two Governments. We have no
annoimcements to make on that subject today.
If we had such amaomicements, we would make
them ; but we will be in touch with each other
on that matter. I think I cannot give you a more
specific reply at this point.
The United States carries very heavy re-
sponsibilities for security in the Pacific Ocean
area, not only in our treaty relationship with
Japan but also with Korea, the Philippmes, the
Republic of China, and with certain countries in
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.
So these are matters which I think are well
understood on both sides, and these are matters
which we will continue to discuss.
Perhaps we have time for one more question
on each side. Mr. Hightower [John Hightower,
Associated Press].
Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the subjects you
have leen discussing here, at least in general
terms, is the state of the tvar in Viet-Nam and
the prospects for a diplomatic way out of that
conflict. There have been in the la.st day or so
some reports from Hanoi, including one through
the Canadian Government, that there loas an
increasing interest in the possibility of discus-
sions or contacts on peace talks. Can you tell us
how you assess these reports?
Secretary/ Busk: I have read these reports. I
would be interested in learning what might be
behind them, if anything. So far as I know, the
situation has not changed since my last press
conference.
Q. [Interpretation] : Mr. Secretary, usually
when th£ questions are a^ked by the Japanese
correspondents at conferences such as this, we
oftentimes attempt to deviate from the main
current of the discussion. However, at this
point, Pd like to ask you a specific question
which is related directly to the contents of the
conference.
I have had the pleasure of reading your com-
munique, and one of the items that I notice in
this communique pertains to the paragraph 2
under section IV. It says that '■^The Committee
noted that Japan had decided to make a contri-
bution amounting to $100 million to a Special
Fund primarily for agricidture to be adminis-
tered by the Asian Development Bank.''''
Now, it says that '■'■The Committee also noted
that the President'''' — President Johnson, that
is — '■'■intended to request the United States Con-
gress to authorize a co7itribution of $200 million
to Asian Development Bank Special Funds for
various purposes, including agriculture, over a
period of four yearsP
Now, my question is, Mr. Secretary: At tohat
specific point is President Johnson likely to
make such a request to the United States
Congress?
Secretary Rusk: I cannot give you an actual
time on that. We have veiy important legisla-
tion before our Congress at the present time. We
are providing somethmg on the order of $5 bil-
lion of resources for foreign aid, not only in our
aid bill but in appropriations for international
institutions and the Food for Freedom pro-
gram, the Peace Corps, so that we have to con-
sult with the leadership of the Congress in order
to determine just what the legislative schedule
ought to be. So I can't give you a time.
I3ut the President has already made it known
in the state of the Union message and elsewhere
that he expects to ask the Congress to rein-
force the Asian Development Ba,nk, which is
under the leadership of your distinguished
countryman, Mr. [Takeshi] Watanabe, with
important funds for this purpose.
Well, gentlemen, thank you very much for
being here today. Oh, excuse me.
Q. [Interpretation'] : Mr. Secretary, my ques-
tion is not entirely finished at this point — if I
may have a slight indulgence on. their part, may
I continue my question?
458
DKPAETMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Rush : Yes, please.
Q. [Interpretation'] : Thanh you. Mr. Secre-
tary, if I may he allowed to pursue my question
further at this point, getting bach to this ques-
tion of the possible reversion of Benin Islands
to Japanese sovereignty, article 3 of the peace
treaty says that the people living on the Bonin
Islands are to be given the same status and treat-
ment and privileges as the people irho reside on
the Island of Okinawa. Legally, this signifies,
Mr. Seci'etary, that they are entitled to sitnilar
or the same status. My understanding is that
currently there are 200 persons living on the
Bonin Islo/nds, 200 people of Japanese
nationality.
My question at this point, Mr. Secretary;, is
whether the United States has been and is pro-
viding the same degree of education, same privi-
leges of education, welfare, and health? Has the
United States been providing similar services in
these areas to the Japanese nationals living on
Bonin Islands as it has been providing for the
residents of the Ohinawa Islands? Also, has
there been Japanese language service offered to
the children of these residents living on the
Bonin Islands? Has it also been possible for
fishermen operating out of this Bonin Island to
have access to the central fish market in Tokyo?
[Laughter.'] Also, is the United States Govern-
nnent willing, or is the United States Govern-
ment prepared, to provide such services to the
residents and their children on the Bonin Islands
in the future?
Secretary Rush: I thought we were having
the second part of a question on the Asian De-
velopment Bank. [Laughter.] I think in the
House of Commons wlien a minister is asked a,
question that plows new groimd to this extent,
that the minister usually says that he must
have notice of that question.
Quite frankly, the answer to some of your
questions, I don't know. But, in any event, we
will be discussing this between Mr. Miki and
myself. I liave nothing more to say on this.
Q. Thanh you.
U.S. Passports Valid for Travel
to Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen
Press release 196 dated September 12
United States passports are now valid, with-
out special endorsement, for travel to Iraq,
Jordan, and Yemen. United States citizens wish-
ing to travel to Iraq and Yemen are warned,
however, that customary protection services af-
forded to United States citizens abroad by con-
sular officials cannot be provided.
Travel restrictions remain in effect for two
countries in the Middle East : the Syrian Arab
Republic and the United Arab Republic. In ac-
cordance with existing regulations, validations
for travel to these countries will be granted to
persons whose travel is regarded as being in the
interest of the United States.
This araiouncement is part of the Depart-
ment's previously declared policy of lifting re-
strictions to the coimtries involved in the recent
Middle East hostilities as soon as conditions
warrant. On June 21 the ban on travel to Israel,
Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia
was removed; on July 10 the restriction on
travel to Lebanon was lifted ; and on August 1
the Department announced that travel to
Algeria, Libya, and the Sudan was permitted.
OCTOBER 9, 196 7
277-095 — 67—
459
I UNITED STATES COLLEaiVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMEh
57001 9-67
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)
A treaty signed April 4, 1949, by which
"the parties agree that an ftrmed attacJc
against one or more of them In Europe
or North America shall be considered an
attaek against them all: and . . . each of
them . . . win assist the . . . attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parlies, suc£i
action as It deems necessary including
the use of armed force . . ."
RIO TREATY
(22 NATIONS)
A treaty signed September 2. 1947. which
provides that an armed attack against
any American State "shall be considered
as an attack against all the American
States and . . . each one . . . undertakes
to assist In meeting the attack . . ."
I INIUD STAKS 22 El SAIVADDR 30 BRAZIl
1 UNITED STATES
2 CANADA
3 ICELAND
< OTSWAY
5 UIIITED XINCDOM
6 NETHERLANDS
] DENMARK
8 BELGIUM
9 lUXEMBCURS
ID PORTUGAL
11 TRANCE
12 ITALY
13 GREECE
14 TURKEY
15 TEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY
16 UEXICO
1 7 CUBA
II HAITI
19 DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
2D HONDURAS
21 GUATEMALA
23 NICARAGUA
24 C0S1A RICA
25 PANAMA
26 COLOMBIA
27 VENEZUELA
28 ECUADOR
29 PERU
31 BOLIVIA
32 PARAGUAY
33 CHILE
34 ARGENTINA
35 URUGUAY
i4TillHII!A(AND
TOMGO
ANZUS (Australia-New I
Zealand-United States) |
TREATY
(3 NATIONS)
A treaty signed Septem-
ber 1, 1951, whereby each
of the parties "recognizes
that an armed attack Ir
the Pacific Area on any ol
the Parties would be dan-
gerous to Its own peac;
and safety and declarer
that It would act to meet
the common danger tr
accordance with Its con-
stitutional processes."
r UNITED STATES
36 NEW 2EALAKD
37 AUSTRALIA
460
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ithe
ihat
'the
: ol
lan-
lace
act)
:vm
;ion
Jnce
inal
JAPANESE TREATY
(BILATERAL)
A treaty sipied January 19,
1960, whereby each party "rec-
ognizes that an armed attack
against either Party in the terri-
tories under the administration
of Japan would be dangerous
to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to
meet the common danger in ac-
cordance with its constitutional
provisions and processes." The
treaty replaced the security
treaty ngned September 8. 1951.
UHIUD STATES
39 JAPAN
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
(South Korea) TREATY
(BILATERAL)
A treaty signed October
1, 1953. whereby each
party "recognizes that aa
armed attack In the Pa-
cific area on either of the
Parties . . . would be dan-
gerous to Its own peace
and safety" and that each
Party "would act to meet
the common danger In.
accordance with Its con-
stitutional processes."
1 UNIIfD STATES
40 REPUBLIC OF KOREA
SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY
(8 NATIONS)
A treaty signed Septem-
ber 8. 1954, whereby each
Party "recognizes that
aggression by means of
armed attack. In the
treaty area against any of
the Parties . . . would en-
danger Its own peace and
safety" and each will "In
that event act to meet
the common danger In
accordance with Its con-
stitutional processes."
1 UNITED STATES
5 UNITED KtN£DOM
II TRANCE
36 NEW ZEALAND
37 AUSTRALIA
3B PHILIPPINES
41 THAILAND
42 PAKISTAN
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Formosa) TREATY
(BILATERAL)
A treaty signed Decem-
ber 2. 1954. whereby each
of the parties "recognizes
that an armed attack In
the West Pacific Area di-
rected against the terri-
tories of either of the
Parties would be danger-
ous to its own peace and
safety," and that each
"would act to meet the
common danger in ac-
cordance with Its consti-
tutional processes." The
territory of the Republic
of China is defined as
"Taiwan (Formosa) and
the Pescadores."
1 UNITED STATES
43 REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(FORMOSA}
OCTOBER 9, 19G"
461
Department Gives Facts Regarding
Ashmore-Baggs Contacts With Hanoi
Department Statement
Press release 202 dated September IS
We have had a number of inquiries concern-
ing news stories published today [September
18], based on an article by Mr. Harry Ashmore
in a publication of the Center for the Study
of Democratic Institutions (CSDI) .
The facts concerning the Department's con-
tacts with Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs ai-e as
follows :
1. During the summer of 1966, Mr. William
Baggs told the Department that CSDI was
planning a major conference in May of 1967 in
Geneva, to follow up on the first Pacem, in Terris
meeting held in New York in February of 1965.
Mr. Baggs disclosed to us efforts that the Center
was making to invite North Viet-Nam to at-
tend, and the Department responded sympathet-
ically to the idea of the conference and to these
efforts. These initial contacts were -with Mr.
George Ball [then Under Secretary of State]
and Mr. William Bundy [Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs]. The Presi-
dent and Secretary Rusk were informed, and
Mr. Ball was directed to handle contacts with
Mr. Baggs on behalf of the U.S. Government.
2. In mid-November and again in early
December, Mr. Baggs was joined by Mr. Ash-
more in calls at the Department. In these calls,
the progress of the conference plans was re-
viewed, and the two visitors indicated that they
had a tentative invitation to go to Hanoi, with
Mr. Luis Quintanilla of Mexico. Messrs. Baggs
and Ashmore also suggested that, if they were
able to visit Hanoi, they might be able to con-
duct useful explorations of North Vietnamese
views toward peace. Mr. George Ball having
then left the Department, the primary respon-
sibility for these conversations passed to his suc-
cessor, Mr. [Nicholas deB.] Katzenbach, who
kept the President and the Secretary of State
informed as a matter of course.
In these conversations. Department represent-
atives accepted the Baggs- Aslimore suggestion
and undertook to cooperate fully. Accordinglj',
the position of the United States Government
on key issues relating to peace was discussed
at some length, so that Baggs and Ashmore
could represent it accurately in Hanoi.
3. On December 23, Baggs visited the Depart-
ment just prior to the departure of the thre«-
man group on December 28. At that meeting,
the basic understanding of the United States
Government position was reaffirmed, and it was
further agreed tliat Baggs and Aslmiore would
report confidentially what they were able to pick
up in Hanoi.
4. Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore visited Hanoi
from January 6 to January 14. They then re-
turned to the United States and on January 18
dictated for the Department a full and con-
fidential account of their conversations. This
covered in particular a conversation with Presi-
dent Ho on January 12. In this conversation,
Ho had insisted that there could be no talks
between the United States and Hanoi unless the
bombing were stopped, and unless also the
United States stopped all reinforcements during
the period of the talks. Ho was reported to be
adamant against any reciprocal military re-
straint by North Viet-Nam. The record does not
show that he solicited any U.S. Government re-
sponse to these remarks.
5. Concurrently, prior to January 18, on
United States initiative and without any connec-
tion to the Baggs-Ashmore actions. United
States Government representatives had estab-
lished a direct channel for coimnunication with
North Vietnamese representatives in Moscow.
With the apparent agreement of both sides, this
channel was being kept wholly confidential, and
was therefore not revealed to Messrs. Baggs and
Ashmore in their discussions at the Department.
It is, of course, fimdamental to the United
States Government dealings with Messrs. Baggs
and Ashmore that there existed at the time this
direct and secret channel. Exchanges through
this direct channel continued through Janu-
ary and early February and culminated in Presi-
dent Jolmson's letter to President Ho of Febru-
ary 8 ^ (mistakenly stated by Mr. Ashmore as
February 2). As has been stated by representa-
tives of th& Department, a wide variety of pro-
posals was put before Hanoi in these Moscow
contacts, without at any time producing any
useful response.
6. Towai'd the end of January, Messi"s. Baggs
and Ashmore returned to Washington and ex-
pressed to the Department the strong hope that
they could be given a message for transmission
' For texts of President Johnson's letter and Presi-
dent Ho's rei)ly, see Bulletin of Apr. 30, 1067, p. 595.
462
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to Hanoi. The Department decided that, wliile
the direct channel in Moscow was crucial and
must at all costs be preserved, it would be use-
ful to send a more general message through
Messrs. Baggs and Ashmore, which would be
consistent with the important messages being
exchanged in Moscow. In view of this channel
(of which Baggs-Ashmore were unaware) there
was some question as to the further utility of
detailed informal communications. It seemed
clear from the account given by Messrs. Baggs
and Ashmore that their channel of communi-
cation had been established with the primary
purpose of exchanges concerning North Viet-
namese attendance at the May conference.
Nevertheless, Baggs and Ashmore said they
could send any messages for Hanoi through the
regular mail to a North Vietnamese representa-
tive in Phnom Penh, who in turn would relay it
to a North Vietnamese official who had been tlae
principal contact of ISIessrs. Baggs and Aslunore
in Hanoi. Accordingly, the letter now published
by Mr. Ashmore was worked out with the repre-
sentatives of tlie Department, and authorized
to be sent on February 5. We were subsequently
informed by Mr. Aslimore that this letter
reached Plinom Penh on February 15.
7. No useful purpose could be served by giv-
ing further details on what took place in the
Moscow chamiel. We can say, however, that on
February 7, while that channel was still open
and in operation, separate discussions were ini-
tiated in London between Prime Minister Wil-
son and Premier Kosygin of the U.S.S.K. The
combined reading of the Moscow channel and of
these discussions led to the dispatch on Febm-
ary 8 of President Johnson's letter to President
Ho. This letter was of course published uni-
laterally by Hanoi on March 21, and is a matter
of public record. It rested on, and was of course
read by Hanoi in relation to, the various pro-
posals that had been conveyed in the Moscow
chaimel. There was no change of basic position
whatever between February 5 and February 8,
but President Joluison's letter did include a spe-
cific action proposal that speaks for itself, as
does the tone of his communication.
8. As already noted, Hanoi had not responded
in any useful way to the variety of suggestions
conveyed in the Moscow channel. Its sole and
api^arently final response was reflected on Feb-
ruary 13, in a letter by President Ho to Pope
Paul VI. This letter, in the words of one press
account today, "coupled an unconditional end
to the bombing with the withdrawal of Ameri-
can forces and the recognition of the National
Liberation Front." On February 15, President
Ho replied formally to the Pre,sident in similar
terms. At the same time, Hanoi broke off the
Moscow chaimel.
9. Hanoi's attitude remained negative
throughout. The Baggs-Ashmore efforts were
necessarily handled by the Department with an
eye to the direct and then-confidential channel
that existed concurrently to Hanoi. The latter
appeared to be by far the more reliable and
secure method of ascertaining Hanoi's views.
10. Fmally, we note with regret that Mr. Ash-
more is apparently ignorant of the subsequently
published reports of the Moscow contacts, and
of their confirmation by Department representa-
tives. We note with still greater regret that at
no time since has he consulted with the Depart-
ment in order to attempt to understand the inter-
relationship that necessarily obtained between
the Moscow chamiel and his own efforts. As
this case shows, the administration has been
prepared at all times to cooperate with private
individuals who may be in contact with Hanoi
in any way, and who are prepared to act respon-
sibly and discreetly. This policy continues, al-
though it seems cle^ar that the present disclosure
will not reassure Hanoi that such private con-
tacts will be kept secret.
OCTOBER 9, 19 61
463
Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam
in Interview on "Meet the Press"
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Ambassador at Large Henry Cabot Lodge
on the National Broadcasting Co7npany''s radio
and television frogrwm '■'•Meet the Press'''' on
September 17. Intervieiving Ambassador Lodge
were Pauline Frederick, NBC News; Robert
Kleiman, New York Times; Peter Lisagor,
Chicago Daily News; and Lawrence Spivak, a
permanent member of the panel. Neil Boggs,
NBC News, was tJie moderator.
Mr. Boggs: Our guest today on "Meet the
Press" is Henry Cabot Lodge, who served two
tours as the U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam and
is now Ambassador at Large. . . .
Mr. Spivak: Ambassador Lodge, there are an
increasing number of Americans who are in dis-
agreement witli tlie President on Viet-Nam. Are
you still in basic complete agreement with him
on his policy in Viet-Nam?
Ambassador Lodge: I completely support his
policy of warding off the aggression and doing
it in such a way as to avoid world war III.
Mr. Spivak: Does that mean that there are
some things that you are in disagreement with
him on, but the basic —
Ambassador Lodge: I agree on the basic
policy. It is not human to expect complete agree-
ment on every detail of tactics and strategy. You
could only get that in a police state.
Mr. Spivak: Nothing, however, that is funda-
mental ?
Ambassador Lodge: No.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, Secretary-
General Thant expressed the opinion again yes-
terday that if the U.S. stops the bombing of
North Viet-Nam — and these were his words —
"there will be meaningful talks between Hanoi
and Washington in 3 or 4 weeks." Don't you
think the time has come to accept that assur-
ance?
Ambassador Lodge: I would like to say two
things in reply to that question. First of all, the
bombing of the North is of very great impor-
tance to our soldiers, with whom, of course, all
of us must feel ourselves very closely identified.
The bombing of the North means that 175,000
North Vietnamese are devoted to air defense —
antiaircraft artillery and rockets — that another
325,000 North Vietnamese are devoted to re-
pairing bridges and roads. This is 500,000 men.
If those 500,000 men, because of the stopping
of the bombing, were to be put into North Viet-
Nam, it would have a very tragic effect on our
soldiers. I have heard figures as high as 20,000
as the American casualties that would be caused.
Now that is one point.
The second point is that of course nobody
stands to gain more than our American soldiers
if we can get peace. Therefore the question is :
If, in return for stopping this program which
is of such great value to our troops, we can get
some significant, some meaningful, some solid
indication that peace will result, then of course
that would be very much worth looking at.
Frankly, I don't think such an indication has
yet occurred.
Mr. Spivak : I am not talking about a perma-
nent stoppage, I am just talking about stopping
for a while to see if what Kosygin has said and
what U Thant has said will come true and that
there will be meaningful negotiations. What
possible risk do we take if we stojD the bombing
for a little while again ?
Ambassador Lodge : We take the risk that the
hostile activities of the enemy against our troops
will increase and that they will move and get
themselves into favorable positions as they have
done on other occasions when the bombing has
been suspended. We suspended the bombing for
37 days when I was out there in January '66.
They just took advantage of the pause to move
themselves into advantageous positions. Now,
that is just no good.
]\[r. Spivak : At one time you were reported as
believing that negotiations could not be under-
taken until the political situation in South Viet-
Nam is stronger. Do you think that the recent
election makes the political situation in South
Viet-Nam strong enough to undertake —
464
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Ambassador Lodge: I think it does make it
stronger, and I think it means that we are on
the way to getting a government the legitimacy
of which cannot be questioned and which can
speak with much greater authority in interna-
tional affairs than the provisional government
could.
Basis for Negotiations
Mr. Splvak: If you don't think we are going
to get a negotiation by stopping the bombing,
how are we going to get negotiations ?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, there are many
things that could cause them to conclude that
this aggression of theirs hasn't worked out and
that it would be advantageous to them to stop
it. One thing which could make them think
that is if we and the South Vietnamese learned
how to overcome the guerrilla terrorist, the
hard-core guerrilla, what Ho Chi Minli calls the
"guerrilla infrastructure." That is one thing.
Another thing would be if they were really
persuaded that their propaganda doesn't work
in America and that American will and persist-
ence were beyond question.
Mr. Spivak: Everybody has been talking
about the importance of negotiations to bring
peace to Viet-Nam, but not much on what to
negotiate on. Now, what would we negotiate on,
since all we want is to have them stop the aggres-
sion ? What is there to negotiate ?
Ambassador Lodge: Let me say one thing I
should have said at the beginning and that is
that I recognize this is a very controversial
question, and I respect those who differ with
me. The thing that you would negotiate about
would be how to end the war. But in order to
do that, both sides must want to end it. Now,
at present we want to end the war — we want
peace and they want conquest. This isn't a ques-
tion of a misunderstanding that needs to be
elucidated by a third party. They want funda-
mentally different things from us. Now, their
state of mind has got to change before you can
have negotiations.
Mr. Kleiman: Ambassador Lodge, you have
probably noticed this morning that General
Lauris Norstad has proposed a plan for ending
the war in "Viet-Nam. His suggestion is that the
bombing be stopped without setting a iime limit
on how long it would be suspended and that the
President go to Geneva, announcing beforehand
that he was prepared to meet there with anyone
who wanted to come to discuss peace; and the
suggestion was that he send emissaries on ahead
who would be jjrepared to have preliminary
meetings, determine an agenda, and try to ar-
range a peace conference. What do you think of
this proposal?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, I just said what I
thought about bombing suspension ; so I won't
duplicate that. I have great admiration and re-
gard for General Norstad, and any idea of his I
would want to study very carefully. Beyond
that, I can't say. I haven't had an opportunity to
study it yet.
Mr. Kleiman.: The interesting thing — and on
this I would like to ask you further about the
bombing suspension that General Norstad pro-
poses. As you laiow, he was an Air Force com-
mander in the Pacific and in EurojDe during the
last war. He was the Supreme Commander of
the NATO alliance in Europe for many years.
He was an appointee of General Eisenhower's.
Secretary McNamara has also in recent days,
as you know, stated that the bombing can neither
reduce the infiltration to the South nor can it
bring Hanoi to the conference table to sue for
peace. He has pointed out that only a few trucks
per day carry all the supplies that North Viet-
Nam sends to the South and they have been able
to increase this manyfold under the bombing.
In these circumstances, isn't it really a psycho-
logical question rather than something that
really affects casualty levels among American
troops in the South?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, if the bombing is
keeping 500,000 North Vietnamese out of South
Viet-Nam where our troops don't have to cope
with them, that is a definite gain for our troops,
and that shouldn't be given up without some
kind of a solid assurance of peace.
I agree with you that the problem is very
largely psychological, too, and it is a question of
getting four or five men in Hanoi to make up
their minds to stop what they are doing. I don't
disagree with anything that Secretary McNa-
mara said in that regard, but what I said doesn't
contradict what he said.
Mr. Lisagor: Ambassador Lodge, there have
been stories, apparently administration-inspired
stories, in the last week that we are doing re-
markably well in Viet-Nam, that the South
Vietnamese and the Allied forces are controlling
more of the population, that the Viet Cong de-
fections are up, and so on. In fact, the suggestion
is that they are just hanging on. Do you agree
with that?
Ambassador Lodge : I think we are doing bet-
OCTOBEK 9, 1967
465
ter than we were. I think there has been a very
great gain covering the period beginning in
August of '65 when I went out there for my
second tour. At that time wc used to worry about
the coimtry being cut in two at Highway 19. We
don't worry about it. We used to worry about
tlie Connnunists taking a provincial capital and
establishing a Communist government center
there. We never tliink about that. We used to
worry about a wildcat runaway inflation where
people wouldn't have enough to eat. We don't
think about that. We used to worry about tlie
Communist coup taking over the Govermnent
from the inside and telling us to get out. We
don't worry about that.
On the positive side, the country has moved
toward constitutional government. The Chieu
Hoi rate — that is, the defectors from the Viet
Cong who come into these camps — was double in
'66 what it was in '65, and it is double in '67 what
it was in '60. The Viet Cong weapons loss is up.
The ARVN [Army of the Republic of Viet-
Nam] desertions are down. The open roads are
up. The secure population is up.
Mr. Lisagar: Yet, Mr. Ambassador, we are
still—
Ambassador Lodge: In other words — Just a
moment; let me finish. You asked me a big
question, and I have got to give you a big
answer.
So we have accomplished a great deal, and
there is still a great deal more to accomplish.
Mr. Lisagar: I was going to ask you : The
casualties go up for the Americans as well as the
South Vietnamese, and the war still goes on.
Do you have any estimate at all of how long it
will be before the Viet Cong and Hanoi get the
message ?
Amhassador Lodge: The thing that is going
wrong is — I have listed the things that are
going right — the things that are going wrong
are that the infiltration still continues and that
the hard-core terrorists still are assassinating
village chiefs, schoolteachers, health workers,
and so on. I have considerable faith that, as we
get nation-building well organized, these in-
filtraters will be picked up — in the best place
to catch them of all, and that is in the com-
munity, when you have solid political institu-
tions under which a police program can be con-
ducted. I think that is coming.
Mr. Liaagor: You have often said that
the tough problem will be the guerrilla
infrastructure.
Ambassador Lodge : Yes.
Mr. Lisagor: I assume that is what you mean,
there. Now, we have heard it said, and you may
have heard it said yourself, that the South
Vietnamese themselves will have to do this. And
yet there are stories today in the papei' — an
Associated Press story that says South Viet-
namese troops are on a 5i/2-day week, that they
won't fight at night, still. Are we making any
headway at all?
Ambassador Lodge: Now, the man who said
that is in flat contradiction with the opinion of
a very distinguished American, who is also a
general and is also very truthful and who has
a whole staff all over the counti-y on which to
base his judgments — and that is General [Wil-
liam C] Westmoreland. He disagrees flatly with
that stoiy.
I'd like to remind you that at tliis correspond-
mg time in the Korean war, the Korean Army
had many problems and yet it turned out to
be, today, one of the finest armies in the world.
Also, I remember at least 50 occasions when
the young West Point-graduate captains in our
army who advised the Vietnamese battalions
have told me that the Vietnamese soldier is a
brave, long-suffering man, but the trouble is
that the organization isn't right. If the organiza-
tion had been right, this Viet Cong tiling would
never have gotten started. So I don't take that
story very seriously.
Military Shield for Nation-Building
Miss Frederick : Ambassador Lodge, does the
United States want a militarv victoi-y in Viet-
Nam?
Ambassador Lodge : You can't solve the Viet-
Nam war exclusively by military means. You
must have military success as a shield behind
which you do your nation-building.
Miss Frederick : In other words, you —
Ambassador Lodge: This is different from
World War II in which when you defeated the
German Army the war was over. In this war you
defeat the Army of North Viet-Nam and the
main forces of the Viet Cong, and you still must
go ahead and ferret out the hard-core terrorists.
Mi'^s Frederick : How do you defeat this army
only by killing Vietnamese and not necessarily
taking real estate ?
Amhassador Lodge: They are killing Viet-
namese.
3Iiss Frederick : But you are killing — •
Ambassador Lodge: We are killing Viet
Cong, yes. We are killing Viet Cong.
466
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
M-iss Frederich : Isn't this the basis of —
Ambassador Lodge : I have the latest figures :
It is a nine-to-one ratio.
Miss Frederich : But isn't this the basis of our
progress, of our reports on progress, not tlie
taking of real estate, and how can you have a
victory wlien there is still such great manpower
in Viet-Nam still not in —
Amhassador Lodge: Because the land in tlie
war in Viet-Nam is comparable to the ocean in
naval war. It is something you move around on,
but it is not something which is intrinsically
important as such, the way land was in Europe
in World War II. "\^niat you are trying to do
is to build your nation around the population
centers.
MUs Frederich: Secretary-General Thant
spoke yesterday of information about an agi-ee-
ment between Hanoi and some of its friends for
supplying voluntary air crews, pilots, ginmers,
and engineers to North Viet-Nam. Can j'ou tell
us an_y thing about that ?
Amhassador Lodge: We know notliing of
that, and we haven't found any personnel other
than North Vietnamese.
Miss Frederich: Mr. Ambassador, if the
United States does not know anything about
this, how can we be absolutely sure that the
United States knows that Communist China
will not come into the war when we are bombing
within seconds of the border ?
Amhassador Lodge: Well, they have 40,000
Communist Chinese in Nortlr Viet-Nam, now —
line-of -communication troops that have been
there right along.
Mr. Spivah: Mr. Ambassador, Governor
Eomney was reported as saying the other day
that the Republican Party will be the peace
party in 1968 if the Viet-Nam war is still in
progress. Do you think it is possible for the
Republican Party to carve out a role as the
peace party in opposition to tlie position —
Ainhassador Lodge: I would rather discuss
that question without going into personalities.
I think everybody is for peace. Both parties are
for peace. All of the responsible officials that I
know of are for peace. The difference of opin-
ion is in how to get it.
Mr. Spi/vah: Well, do you think it is possible
to get out of Viet-Nam both with honor and
speed?
Ambassador Lodge: I don't think "speed" in
the American sense. Now, speed in the Viet-
namese sense — you have seen an illustration of
it in the way they moved toward a constitution.
They held elections in September '66 for dele-
gates, they drafted the constitution, and then
on September 3, '67, they had elections. Now that
is going very fast for Viet-Nam. As a matter
of fact, that is going pretty fast here in this
country.
There is a limit to how fast a country with
these antecedents, with this kind of a past, can
go. If you try to huri-y them too much, it is like
tightening the fanbelt on an automobile engine.
If you tighten it too much, the thing just spins
around and there is no traction.
Mr. Spivah: Mr. Ambassador, you occupied
an important position in the Republican Party
and for many years you have played a significant
role in Viet-Nam. "\Vliat position would you like
to see the Republican Party take in 1968 on the
issue of Viet-Nam?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, I think the Re-
publicans in Congress have in general taken a
very good, very patriotic attitude —
3Ir. Spivak: Which Rexjublicans ?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, you might ask me
which Democrats, as far as that goes. I am not
going to go into personalities. But this is a ques-
tion which transcends party politics. Party
politics are very important and the two-party
system is a great thing, but when young Ameri-
cans are in combat, then it ceases to be a Re-
publican-Democratic question. World War II
wasn't a Republican-Democratic question, and
neither is this war.
Mr. Spivah: Mr. Ambassador, have you to
date made any commitment to any Republican
for the 1968 nomination ?
Ambassador Lodge: No, sir.
3Ir. Spivah: Would you get into the cam-
paign if a Republican took a position on
Viet-Nam —
Ambassador Lodge: For the nomination — I
don't plan to get into the campaign for the
nomination.
3Ir. Spivah: Suppose the issue of Viet-Nam
became an important one.
Ambassador Lodge: I am an American citi-
zen who has a right to express his opinion. I
intend to exercise that right if it becomes
necessary.
Mr. Kleiinan: Mr. Ambassador, Governor
Romney said when he was in Viet-Nam some
years ago he was brainwashed by yourself and
by General Westmoreland. Can you tell us any-
thing about that ?
A7nbassador Lodge: Well, IMr. Kleiman, in
Viet-Nam we briefed several hundred distin-
OCTOBER 9, igGI
467
guished Americans. Governors, Senators, ad-
mirals, generals. Cabinet officers, subcabinet,
foreign statesmen, and many distinguished
journalists like yourself. And it was always
entirely factual. And these briefings were done
under my overall direction. We presented the
facts. We didn't argue. We didn't harangue ; we
didn't try to persuade, and we let the person
being briefed draw his own conclusions. There
was never any brainwashing of anybody by
anybody.
Mr. Kleiman: We know that there are now
300,000, approximately, Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam. Yet
when the American military activities began
6 years ago, there only were, as I believe official
reports indicate, some 12 or 14 thousand Viet
Cong. Do you think we can reduce the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese forces back to that level
of 12 or 14 thousand, and if we do so, will we be
in any better position than we were in in 1961
when we felt we had to intervene ?
Ambassador Lodge : The big change that has
taken place is that the South Vietnamese Viet
Cong, who a year and a half ago were carrying
80 percent of the load of combat, are now carry-
ing something between 40 and 50 percent and
that the main load of combat is now being
carried by the North Vietnamese troops who
have come in as overt aggressors. That is the big
change. I think there isn't any doubt that we can
overcome the main-force units and the main
units of the Army of North Viet-Nam whenever
we can find them. The problem is still the terror-
ist, and I think we are better organized on that
than we ever have been, and I expect to see real
progress on that.
Mr. Kleiman: But the Government figures, as
I understand them, are that there are 50,000
North Vietnamese troops and 260,000 Viet
Cong, which is roughly 20 times the force they
had in '62.
Ambassador Lodge: And yet 250,000 South
Vietnamese Viet Cong today are only carrying
40 percent of the load of combat. That gives you
some idea of what has happened.
Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Ambassador, on the bomb-
ing in the North, would you favor hitting other
targets such as the dikes, which would make a
shambles of the North Viet-Nam economy, as I
understand it ?
Amhassador Lodge: Well, I have never
thought that would be a good thing to do. I have
favored military targets, lines of communica-
tion, that sort of thing, as support for our
troops. I don't believe escalating the bombing
is going to produce very sensational results, nor
do I think diminishing the bombing is going to
produce very sensational results so far as peace
is concerned. I think they do have a great effect
on our infantry and our soldiers in South
Viet-Nam.
Mr. Lisagor: One of the key issues on the
bombing is Haiphong Harbor. Now, that is a
transport, it is a center of supply. Would you
favor closing off Haiphong Hai'bor ?
Ambassador Lodge: That involves making a
judgment on the effect that that would have on
a worldwide scale, and that is a judgment that
I don't feel competent to make. I assume — and
I have every reason to believe — that it is being
intelligently done.
Mr. Lisagor: Wlien you were still Ambas-
sador, you thought that the Viet Cong would
hold on at least until after the congressional
elections of 1966 to see how those turned out.
Now do you believe they will hold on until after
the presidential elections of 1968 to see how that
turns out in the hopes they might get a better
deal out of it ?
Ambassador Lodge: I think they would like
to if they could, yes.
Viet-Nam and the United Nations
Miss Frederick: Mr. Ambassador, when you
were head of the United States delegation to the
United Nations, as a member of the Cabinet
you advised President Eisenhower to make great
use of his moral leadership by coming to the
United Nations. Do you think it might be useful
for President Johnson to come to the United
Nations, particularly to explain the Viet-Nam
policy which, as you know, is not very popular
at the U.N. ?
Ambassador Lodge: Well, I have been away
from the U.N. for so long that I hesitate to ex-
press an opinion about that. When I was ad-
vising President Eisenhower to come, I was
there every day, as you kiaow, and I was in
close touch with everybody, and on a question
of that kind I would rather get Ambassador
Goldberg's opinion.
Miss Frederick: Have you lost faith in the
U.N., or do you think Viet-Nam would be
pretty difficult to explain there ?
468
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Amha^sador Lodge: I don't think Viet-Nam
is difficult to explain anywhere. I believe our
policy in Viet-Nam is morally right; I think
it is legally sound ; I think it is sagacious and
pnideut. I think it is in our own national in-
terests and in the interests of freedom-loving
people everywhere. So I am not afraid to ex-
plam the policy in Viet-Nam on any platform.
Miss Frederick : The United Nations Charter
pledges all members to settle their international
disputes by peaceful means. Now, when you
were there, you know the Suez war occurred,
and you were very active in trying to prevent
the use of force, and this has been true in many
other areas — Kaslimir, Cyprus, and so on.
How do you justify one of the most powerful,
if not the most powerful, member of the United
Nations using force in Viet-Nam when it has
this other attitude —
Amia,9sador Lodge: Because the Charter of
the United Nations contains a provision with
which I am sure you are familiar, and that is the
suppression of aggression; and that is a word
I don't hear coming out of the United Nations
much these days.
Now, what we are trying to do is suppress
aggression in accordance with the charter, and I
can remember World War I and World War II,
when people said it is international anarcliy,
we have got to get some kind of a peace organi-
zation that is going to put down aggression;
and now people would have you believe that it
only applies to aggression when it is transat-
lantic and it doesn't apply to aggression when it
is transpacific. When they wrote the charter,
they didn't exclude the countries on the trans-
pacific.
Miss Frederick : But the United Nations has
never called this aggression, and besides the
term "aggression" has never been defined legally.
Ambassador Lodge: Well, the United Na-
tions has never enacted the Ten Commandments,
but that doesn't mean the Ten Commandments
don't apply.
Mr. Spivak: Mr. Ambassador, you, as you
said, had a long experience in the United Na-
tions. Do you think the United Nations can play
any useful role in bringing peace to Viet-Nam?
Ambassador Lodge : Oh, it could if it wanted
to. I would like to see them undertake the re-
sponsibility for the whole thing, but there hasn't
been the will there to do it, and when there isn't
the will then they haven't got the tools. If they
had the will, they might get the tools ; but there
isn't the will.
Mr. Spivak: Is there no way of bringing it
before the General Assembly ?
Ambassador Lodge: Oh, I suppose there is,
and there is a way to bring it before the Secu-
rity Council, but —
Mr. Spivak : Do you think that —
Ambassador Lodge : But you know very well
that the Soviet Union and the countries that
follow the lead of the Soviet Union would
exercise— probably exercise — the veto.
Mr. Spivak : Do you think the United States
would be ready to leave the whole issue to the
United Nations ?
Ambassador Lodge: If the United Nations
had the muscle and had the will to cope with
it, I think it would be a fine thing.
Mr. Spivak : You think they would let them
make the decision on the whole business?
Ambassador Lodge : I think it would be a fine
thing if the United Nations were able and will-
ing to take this responsibility, which is in com-
plete harmony with the charter.
Mr. Boggs: I am sorry to interrupt but our
time is u]). Thank you, Ambassador Lodge, for
being with us today on "Meet the Press."
OCTOBER 9, 1967
4G9
The Business of Development
hy Covey T. Oliver
Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ^
I am delighted to have this opportunity to
pay tribute to a figure of rising eminence and
growing importance in this hemisphere: the
modern business leader, as represented in this
room and every day increasingly in the develop-
ing countries of tlie Western Hemisphere.
You who have done business in Latin Ameri-
ca for years know far better than I the history —
and the potential — of U.S. investments and
partnerships among our neighboring nations to
the south. "We all recognize that our private-
sector relationships have been generally of mu-
tual benefit — providing needed capital, jobs,
and benefits to many thousands of workers, as
well as returning profits to the investor and aid-
ing the transfer of modern managerial skills to
Latin Americans.
But we recognize with equal clarity that, fair
or not, even today many Latin Americans still
associate foreign investment with such concepts
as "exploitation" or "imperialism," rather than
partnership or local benefit. The Council for
Latin America recognizes this problem and is
doing something about it.
So in representation of our Govenunent, I
salute the prototype American businessman of
today and tomorrow, who is proving to the
world that good corporate citizenship aaid real
service to the local comminiity and to the host
country are not only moral obligations but good
business as well. And because this modern style
of doing business abroad is a growing phe-
nomenon, especially in Latin America, I believe
that private capital — so necessary for develop-
ment— will be increasingly welcome in our
neighbor nations.
"Wliat happens in Latin America during the
next few years will be crucial to all of us — in
government, in business, in whatever walk of
life. I should like to take the next few minutes
to review with you the scene m our hemisphere
today, as we begin the seventh year of the Alli-
ance for Progress, and to offer some comments
as to the future.
Already, 1967 has been a notable year in
inter-American affairs. The most significant
single event, of course, was the Summit Meeting
of American Presidents at Punta del Este in
April.^
Wliy so significant? For at least two main
reasons: First, because thanks to thorough
preparation, the Presidents made decisions and
recommendations that unquestionably changed
the course of development in this hemisphere.
And secondly, it was especially important be-
cause at that meeting the fundamental spirit of
the Alliance came into its own: the spirit of
"self-help."
Self-help is Icnown to be basic — psychologi-
cally, politically, and economically- — to develop-
ment assistance. At the Summit there was
strong new evidence of the recognition by the
Latin American leaders that the future of their
peoples lies primarily in Latin American
hands. This is not mere rhetoric ; this self-help
determination is real — and the attitudes it
symbolizes, the potential for motivation it con-
tains, are more significant than any figures I
could cite to you today.
The next question is, "What progress has
been made since the Summit ?"
Here in the United States, we have seen some
gains and some setbacks. The President already
is making good his promises made to colleagues
at the Summit that lie within Executive author-
' Address made before the Council for Latin America
at Chicago, 111., on Sept. 13 (press release 19.5).
^ For statements by President Johnson and text of
the Declaration of the Presidents of America, .see
Bulletin of Ma.v 8, 1967, p. 706.
470
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BTJLLETIN
ity. Where feasible, under existing legislative
authority, we have souglit to increase Alliance
for Progress programs in agriculture, science
and technology, education, and health. The
Congress has granted the President's request for
20 percent higher support to the Inter- American
Development Bank, from $250 to $300 million
a year for 3 years. At the same time, Latin
iVmerican contributions to the Bank have been
stepped up even more significantly.
Despite these positive developments, the
recent cuts made by both the Senate and the
House in the foreign aid bill "hit" (as headline
■writers put it) the Alliance for Progress,
though Alliance programs were not cut so much
as other assistance programs. There continues
to be widespread public support especially for
the Alliance, as is shown by editorials I have
seen from across the nation. One can readily
understand the mood for economy of the Con-
gress, concerned as they have to be by expendi-
tures for our country's obligations abroad and
at home. But I believe that the enduring qual-
ity of the foreign aid program, and particularly
the Alliance for Progress, will over time con-
tinue to be recognized by our citizenry; and I
am hopeful that in the appropriation stage of
legislation this year the program might be
spared further cuts.
There are a few in this country — and, alas,
more in Latin America — who say that these con-
gi-essional actions represent a kind of national
puUing-back, a neoisolationism. I doubt this.
And if you will pardon a somewhat professorial
afterthought, let me point out that even in its
heyday the old isolationism did not apply to
our Western Hemisphere neighborhood.
So we who believe in the Alliance for Prog-
ress have only one course : As the President said
the other day, "We will persevere." ^ We will
keep on trying, because we Imow the Alliance is
in the vital interests of this nation and of the
whole neighborhood.
"While these cuts in U.S. funding have hurt,
their greatest damage is perhaps to the spirit,
rather than to the achievements, of the Alliance.
To many thoughtful Latin Americans, for ex-
ample, the rescission of the multiyear authori-
zation is seen as more damaging than the loss of
assistance funds. Knowing that authorizations
do not automatically bring appropriations — -
' For remarks by President Johnson at the Pan
American Union, Washington, D.C., on Aug. 17, see
ibid., Sept. 4, 1967, p. 2S7.
how well that is known ! — they ask "Wliy ?" For
they know that progress within the Alliance de-
pends not so much upon outside tangible assist-
ance as upon the confidence and verve of Latin
Americans themselves.
As to self-help, our friends in the south have
made a good record and it is getting better. Let
me give you two examples :
One is in domestic savings. At the birth of the
Alliance, it was exjiected that some 80 percent
of total gross of some $20 billion investment
would have to come from Latin American do-
mestic savings. In fact, they have bettered
this — at 87 percent. The second example con-
cerns improved collection of taxes: Total cen-
tral government revenues have risen by about 25
j)ercent in real terms since the beginning of the
Alliance.
Trade and Development
Another milestone of Latin American action
since the Summit was the meeting in Paraguay
about 2 weeks ago of the Latin American Free
Trade Association and the Central American
Common Market.
"Latin America will create a common mar-
ket," reads the first item in the Declaration of
the Presidents at Punta del Este; and these men
were meeting in Paraguay to come to grips with
the problems of economic integration. They
made important decisions to form a subregional
market of the west coast comitries, and they
took stock of the obstacles to integration which
they will meet again soon to reexamine.
We can look back to the experience of the
European Economic Community and recall the
time it took, and is still taking, the advanced
Western European comitries to work out ar-
rangements for wider new markets. We know
that the process of adjustment to Latin Ameri-
can economic integration will not be quick or
easy. We are encouraged by these first, realistic
steps being taken with determination by our
Latin American friends toward establishing a
common market by 1985.
Wliere does the United States stand in this
undertaking? We are an interested observer,
ready to do what we can to help. We wish to see
an economically strong, mcreasingly independ-
ent neighbor in Latin America as a I'egion. As
discussions at Pvmta del Este show, we wish to
see increased trade among the Latin American
coimtries, as well as between them and the
United States. We have urged more effective
OCTOBER 9, 19G7
471
trade promotion toward this end. The benefits
of increased and diversified trade are unques-
tionable. Sometimes, however, we see statements
that "trade not aid" is the key to development.
In this context we must look at trade in another
perspective.
In the first place, the items that underdevel-
oped countries have to trade are not in all in-
stances sufficient in terms of attractiveness to
the world market to guarantee that more liberal
terms for their trading would automatically
bring in all that such a country needs to give its
people better lives.
Secondly, development is not only economic.
It is social and distributive as well ; and in look-
ing over the world scene it is not difficult to find
situations in which exports are flourishing with-
out there being much more than a too slow
trickle-down of benefits within. Development
means not only increased capital, including espe-
cially private capital from domestic and world
savings; it means modernization, reform, and
social improvement as well, as the Charter of
Punta del Este well shows.
But with the above perspective taken into ac-
count, trade is vital.
The question of trade preferences is one of
special interest to our Latin American friends.
Until recently, the United States has tradition-
ally oj^posed preferences of any kind. A poten-
tially vast change is seen in the offer made by
President Johnson at Punta del Este to con-
sider with other developed countries the estab-
lislmient of generalized nonreciprocal prefer-
ential treatment for all developing countries.
Food Production and Population Growth
Here in Chicago, the center of our nation's
vast, rich, high-production farming area, one
feels strongly the importance of agriculture to
a nation's well-being. Citizens of this area might
be interested in farm production in Latin Amer-
ica for four reasons:
1. Latin American export food products that
do not duplicate your production are on local
dinner tables every day ;
2. Growing numbers of more prosperous
Latin American farmers are in the market for
modern farm machinery — much of it produced
in this area ;
3. Per capita caloric intakes are on a down-
ward trend in some Latin American countries;
4. Some foodstuffs that are parts of customary
diets, such as wheat, cannot be grown efficiently
in a number of Latin American countries.
It is not that food production has not
increased during the Alliance years. It has —
nearly 9 percent in real terms. But this rate of
increase is not enough to keep up with the num-
ber of mouths to feed, which increases at 3
percent yearly — the highest rate in the world.
Forecasts are that if present birth rates con-
tinue the 237 million Latin Americans of today
will be 650 millions by the end of this century.
It is asked whether the birth rate might go
down in the foreseeable future. This is difficult
to predict. Many countries now — this is a fairly
recent development — do have family planning
groups or movements, whose long-range effects
remain to be seen. As you laiow, the policy of
the U.S. Government in this matter is to provide
information and assistance only to those coun-
tries which request it.
The food-population problem in Latin Amer-
ica is not — yet — a matter of starvation or sur-
vival. Though the caloric intake is declining in
some countries, it still compares favorably with
that of many other underdeveloped areas of the
world. Our Food for Peace program is pro-
viding some stopgap assistance, of course. What
is alarming is the projection of present trends
of population versus production into the next
generation. Clearly, farming methods are going
to have to be modernized quickly and drasti-
cally if the basic needs of a gi'owing population
are going to be met.
Greater numbers of people will bring with
them greater problems of many kinds. One of
them concerns education, so essential to the
progress of peoples.
Today, more than 40 percent of the people of
Latin America are under 15 years old, and the
average age becomes steadily younger. Present
educational facilities are woefully inadequate
for these youngsters — and it will take a mighty
effort merely to keep pace with the population
growth.
The highest priority, I believe, is in the uni-
versity. To be sure, there are some excellent insti-
tutions of higher learning in Latin America
with many wise and dedicated teachers. But
much more needs to be done to modernize the
uiiiversities, where tomorrow's leaders, upon
whom so much depends, are now preparing
themselves for the challenge of leadership.
Many of these young people of real ability and
potential have overcome great personal obstacles
472
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to get to the public universities, only to discover
in all too many cases that the curriculum is out-
dated, the professors are part-timers who do not
really care, and there is nowhere to turn for
help — except to the extremist political agitators.
Castro Regime's Attempts on Its Neighbors
The frustrations of youth in any country, in
any generation, are many and part of the human
condition. But one can have great sympathy
with the Latin American young person who
sincerely, passionately, wants to help his people
and his countiy but does not always find the con-
structive way to do it. It is no wonder that the
blandishments of extremism, the promise of easy
solutions and perhaps somewhat glamorous ad-
venture, do appeal to some of these youngsters.
What is remarkable, and a testimony to the good
sense of the young people, is that so few axe
really taken in by the shrill, long-winded toot-
ing blown around the hemisphere by that aging
professional "young revolutionary," Fidel
Castro.
Castro can sound very emotional on the sub-
ject of "U.S. imperialism," et cetera; but this
does not deter him from preaching and practic-
ing intervention into the affairs of other nations.
The meeting a few weeks ago of the ironically
named Latin American Solidarity Organization
showed there is anything but solidarity among
the Communists of Latin America,, but it also
offered proof that Fidel is still bent on exporting
violence.
One of the major effects of all the sound and
fury out of Havana is that the rest of the hem-
isphere is united against the Castro regime's
attempts on its neighbors. This will come into
public focus later this month when the foreign
ministers of member countries of the Organiza-
tion of American States meet in Washington to
hear Venezuela's charge against Castro Cuba
for armed intrusion with intent to subvert pro-
gressive democracy with violence and terror.
Castro-inspired subversion and guerrilla vio-
lence is not a major menace on the general Latin
American scene today, but it is serious enough
to merit constant vigilance by all countries of
the hemisphere.
Continuing problems of internal disorder or
the danger thereof require many of our neigh-
bors to face the need of modernizing their or-
ganized security forces — new training methods,
replacement of wornout or obsolete equipment.
et cetera. When nations begin to think about
replacing outmoded equipment, this makes in-
ternational news ; headlines proclaim that there
is an "arms race" going on in Latin America;
and many well-meaning persons in our country
fail to see the matter in its true perspective. Let
there be reason here.
In fact, there is today no such "arms race";
Latin America as a whole spends a lower per-
centage of its GNP on military affairs than
most, if not all, other developing areas. The
percentage of national budgets devoted to de-
fense has actually declined 50 percent over the
last 20 years. Today the total annual military
equipment expenditures of all Latin America
are only half of what New York City spends
each year to operate a police department.
True, the acquisition of replacement equip-
ment is a difficult problem, one in which the
United States is necessarily involved because
of our economic assistance role under the Alli-
ance for Progress.
Our position is clearly defined : We subscribe
to the Action Program signed at Punta del Este,
which urges the maximum utilization of scarce
national resources for developmental purposes
and recommends limitation of the purchase of
sophisticated, expensive military equipment.
We recognize that cases must be judged indi-
vidually. We are hopeful that through realistic
planning and good will, each nation will find the
way to utilize wisely its own resources and those
obtained from outside its borders so that an
optimum balance can be struck between self-
protection and forward development.
U.S. Policy Based on Positivism
Our policy in Latin America is based on this
kind of positivism. The Alliance for Progress
is the keystone of our whole hemispheric inter-
national relations policy. That is why I am
Coordinator of our Alliance effort as well as
Assistant Secretary. Our desire is not to main-
tain the status quo but to support meaningful
reform, modernization, and betterment of the
conditions of life. We wish not to exploit but
to join hands with our neighbors as strong and
equal partners in the world community of
nations. Our number-one concern is to help
bring improved living conditions to millions
who require assistance. We believe we must do
this not only because of humanitarian concern,
but because we know the United States cannot
continue indefinitely to be a palace of affluence
OCTOBER 9, 19G7
473
in a neighborhood of need. Let us keep in mind
that the average per capita income in Latin
America is only about $300.
What we know as the Alliance for Progress
miglit well be called our war on poverty in the
neighborhood of this hemisphere. Recent ex-
periences in our own coimtry with the destruc-
tive and irrational violence that frustration and
a sense of injustice sparked have had and could
have far worse parallels in our international
neighborhood, Latin America.
To those who question whether we can afford
to be involved in this hemispheric war on pov-
erty in view of our other foreign and domestic
obligations, the answer must be: We cannot
afford not to. In terms of our productivity,
there is no question about it, with about six-
tenths of 1 f)ercent of our GNP designated for
all foreign aid. In terms of budgeting, the
answer is likewise affirmative.
No one supposes it will be easy or brief, tliis
struggle to create better lives through the
Alliance for Progress. President Jolnison has
said this : *
If wh<at we do is to really last, we must make this
commitment to ourselves and to all of Latin America :
We will persevere. Tliere is no time limit to our com-
mitment. We are in this fight to stay all the way.
Time does speed by. It is startling to realize
that of the 6 j'ears of the Alliance for Progress,
four of them have been under the leadership
in this country of President Johnson.
Let me make a personal observation. His
steady, consistent direction during these years
and his personal commitment to the support of
the Alliance have been recognized by govern-
ment leaders in the hemisphere. But until this
year and Punta del Este, the public liad per-
haps not come to appreciate fully these quali-
ties— perhaps because ideas are associated with
men and tlie tragic death of John Kennedy
meant to many the end of his bold venture, the
Alliance for Progress. With President Jolm-
son's personal visit to Latin America during the
Summit, I think, Latin Americans have come
to see our President in a more personal way — ■
as a AVestern Hemisphere leader and a warmly
human man, deeply committed to a better future
for all Americans, North and South.
We are on solid ground. The Alliance is not a
partisan issue. The policies laid down by the
President these last 4 years follow general lines
' Ibid.
established by the Kennedy administration,
which in turn go back to the Act of Bogota,
during the Eisenhower years. Historically, all
these ideas had Latin American origins: an
inter- American bank, a union for development,
a common market. Constantly, we have sought
to refine and improve, to modernize institutions
and relationships, all with the view to bring the
goals of the Alliance closer to more people.
Modernization must occur as to certain of our
political relationships in our neighborhood deal-
ings with each other. We mi;st remember that
the world's most powerful superstate is in the
Western Hemisphei'e. The overwhelming pre-
ponderance of the United States is for us the
single most significant fact about political rela-
tionships with our neighbors.
In folklore, giants were always a problem for
normal-sized people. Most giants were terrible
monsters. Some were good, but so clumsy that
they hurt people without intending to do so. A
few were very wise, very understanding, very
careful about putting their weight down. This,
until an economically integrated Latin Amer-
ica begins to equal us in strength, is the kind of
giant we ought to be.
Our 1903 arrangements with Panama are out
of date. I do not see how there could be much
doubt about that. Today I cannot, even if time
permitted, go into the details of the three closely
related treaties that would modernize our rela-
tions with Panama beyond saying that under the
President's directive a very able and wise negoti-
ating team headed by President Eisenhower's
Secretary of the Treasury [Robert B. Anderson]
has worked with a Panamanian delegation of
great integrity and skill for 3 years to find new
bases of agreement. These new bases were ration-
ally arrived at. They are designed to modernize
U.S.-Panamanian relationships in a way that
befits two sovereign and independent nations.
They look toward the needs of woi-ld commerce
in a not verj^ distant future. They are in keeping
with fine and much admired pages of our his-
tory, such as giving independence to the Philip-
pines and the freedom of choice given to Puerto
Rico.
Finally, I offer for your evaluation the con-
clusion that there is no cause for pessimism or
desperation regarding the future. There has not
been enough social or economic progress yet to
eliminate basic problems, but there lias been
enough to prove that we are on the riglit track —
enough progress to help people now as well as
to brighten their hopes for the future. Demo-
474
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
cratic processes and institutions are not yet uni-
versal, but it is a pleasure to note that there
have been no extraconstitutional changes in
government for more than a year in Latin
America.
The general situation is hopeful. But there
is no room for complacency. We must all get on
with the job.
I believe that the ideology of the AVanza —
the feeling that "we can do it, in peace and in
freedom" — this is catching on and growing, and
it will dominate in the end.
A new generation of Latin Americans, devel-
opment-orientated and positive of will, is com-
ing into positions of leadership and decision.
They, too, have a rendezvous with destiny. They
will determine the ultimate success of this
"revolution of sweat, rather than of blood or
tears."
U.S. and Mexico Discuss
Fisheries in 12-Mile Zone
Press release 206 dated September 21
Mexican and United States Government
officials completed discussions on fishery prob-
lems of common concern at Mexico City on
September 19 and have submitted a report, to
their Governments.^ Fishing industry represent-
atives from both countries also attended the
meetings as observers. The delegations agreed
on recommendations to their Governments
which would regulate the fisheries of each
coimtry operating within the contiguous fishery
zone of the other.
It is contemplated that after study of the re-
port the two Governments will conclude a
formal executive agreement, if they consider it
appropriate.
The discussions just concluded arose out of the
action of the Government of Mexico late in 1966
extending its jurisdiction over fisheries in ad-
jacent waters to a distance of 12 nautical miles
from shore. Like the Mexican law on the ex-
clusive fishery zone, the United States law of
1966 ^ which extended the Nation's fishery juris-
diction to 12 nautical miles from shore also pro-
vides for continuation of such traditional fish-
' For a s-tatement issued on Jlay 25 at the close of
U.S.-Mexican talks at Washington, see Bulletin of
June 19, 1967, p. 919.
' Public Law S9-65S.
ing within the zone as may be recognized by the
Govermnent having jurisdiction.
The delegation of Mexico was headed by
Ambassador Oscar Rabasa, Legal Adviser to the
Secretary of State for External Relations, and
included Antonio Gonzalez de Leon, Director
General of the Diplomatic Service, Ministry of
External Relations; Enrique Azuara Salas, Di-
rector General of Internal Revenue, Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit; Jorge Echaniz
Ruvalcaba, Director General of Fisheries and
Related Industries, Ministry of Industry and
Commerce; and Comdr. Gilbert© Lopez Lira,
Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Navy.
Cochairmen of the U.S. delegation were Am-
bassador Donald L. McKeman, Special As-
sistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secre-
tary of State, and the U.S. Ambassador to
Mexico, Fulton Freeman. The U.S. delegation
also included Raymund T. Tingling, Legal Ad-
viser for Special Functional Problems, Depart-
ment of State; William M. Terry, Assistant Di-
rector for International Affairs, Bureau of
Commercial Fisheries [United States Fish and
Wildlife Service] ; Seton H. Thompson, South-
eastern Regional Director, Bureau of Commer-
cial Fisheries; Gerald V. Howard, Pacific
Southwest Regional Director, Bureau of Com-
mercial Fisheries ; Milton J. Lindner, Director,
Galveston Biological Laboratory; Lt. Comdr.
C. J. Blondin, Law Enforcement Division,
LTnited States Coast Guard; and Philip M.
Roedel, State of California Department of Fish
and Game.
President Names U.S. Members
to Investment Disputes Panels
White House press release dated September 20
The President on September 20 designated
eight members to serve for 6-year tenns on the
Panel of Arbitrators and the Panel of Concili-
ators of the International Center for Settlement
of Investment Disputes.
The Panel of Arbitrators includes Thurman
W. Arnold, Washington attorney and former
associate justice of the the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia; Leon
Jaworski, Houston, Tex., attorney and banker
and director of the ximerican Red Cross ; Soia
IMentschikoff, professor of law at the University
OCTOBER 9, 19G7
475
of Chicago Law School and chairman of the
Committee on Commercial Arbitration and Con-
ciliation of Investment Disputes of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law; and Michael
DiSalle, former Governor of Ohio.
Designated members of the Panel of Concil-
iators are Horace Busby, Washington manage-
ment consultant and former Special Assistant
to the President and Secretary of the Cabinet
(1963-65) ; Maxwell Eabb, New York attorney
and former Presidential Assistant and Secre-
tary to the Cabinet (1954-58) ; Eobert M. Mc-
Kinney, Santa Fe, N. Mex., newspaper pub-
lisher and former U.S. Ambassador to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and former
Ambassador to Switzerland; and James W.
Trimble, former Congressman from Arkansas.
The International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes is an international organi-
zation affiliated with the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development with head-
quarters in Washington, D.C. The Center offers
facilities for the arbitration and conciliation of
investment disputes between private investors
of one country and the governments of other
countries. The Center maintains panels of arbi-
trators and conciliators from which the parties
to a dispute may choose persons to sit on an
Arbitral Tribunal or a Conciliation Com-
mission.
The International Center for Settlement of
Investment Disputes was established in 1966 by
a multilateral international treaty. The Center
opened its doors on February 2, 1967. The Con-
vention has been ratified by 36 countries and
signed preparatory to ratification by an addi-
tional 18 countries. Each country which has
ratified the Convention is authorized to name
four persons to each of the two panels to serve
for a term of 6 years.
Members of U.S. Delegation
to IAEA Conference Confirmed
The Senate on September 20 confirmed the
nomination of Glenn T. Seaborg to be the repre-
sentative of the United States to the 11th session
of the General Conference of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
The nominations of the following-named
persons to be alternate representatives of the
United States to the 11th session of the IAEA
General Conference also were confirmed on that
date:
Verne B. Lewis
Herman Pollack
James T. Ramey
Henry DeWolf Smyth
Gerald F. Tape
Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at St. Louis
The Department of State announced on Sep-
tember 15 (press release 197) that Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
would be the principal speaker in a regional
foreign policy conference in St. Louis, Mo.,
October 17-18. The conference is being co-
sponsored by the St. Louis Council on World
Affairs and the Department of State. Invita-
tions are being extended to civic and commu-
nity leaders, educators, and representatives of
the news media in eastern Missouri and western
Illinois.
The o^Dening session will convene at 8 :00 p.m.
on October 17, and the final luncheon session is
expected to adjourn at 2 :15 p.m. on October 18.
The program will feature an address by Under
Secretai-y Rostow on overall U.S. foreign policy
and discussions by senior State Department
officers on foreign policy issues in Europe, Asia,
Latin America, and the Middle East. All ses-
sions will be on the record and will include ques-
tion-and-answer periods.
In addition to Under Secretary Rostow, the
following State Department officers are now
scheduled to participate : Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretaiy for European
Affairs; John K. Emmerson, diplomat-in-
residence, Stanford University, and recently
Minister- Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo;
.Tohn E. Horner, country director for Cyprus,
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Af-
fairs; and Reuben Sternfeld, Alternate U.S.
Executive Director, Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, and Special Assistant to the U.S.
Coordinator, Alliance for Progress.
This will be one of a series of regional con-
ferences on foreign policy conducted by the De-
partment of State at the request of and in co-
operation with local organizations.
476
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUI.I.ETIN'
TREATY INFORMATION
Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty
of Amity and Economic Relations
Press release 193 dated September 11
The new Treaty of Amity and Economic Rela-
tions with Thailand ^ which was approved by
the Senate on September 11, 1967, is one of a
number of agreements negotiated in response
to congressional policy on facilitating trade and
investment as expressed in the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961. It is aimed at the promotion of
mutually beneficial investment, trade, and cul-
tural relations between our two countries on a
basis of equality, security, freedom, and
friendship.
This treaty is the latest and most complete of
a series of commercial treaties between the
United States and Thailand beginning with the
Treaty of Amity and Commerce of March 20,
1833. That treaty provided : ". . . trade shall
be free on both sides, to sell, or buy, or exchange,
on the terms and for the prices the owners may
think fit," and began with the declaration that :
"the Siamese and the Citizens of the United
States of America, shall, with sincerity, hold
commercial intercourse in the Ports of their
respective nations, as long as Heaven and Earth
shall endure." Subsequent revisions of that
treaty, in 1856, 1920, and 1937, have maintained
the same principles of equality between our two
nations. In the Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation of 1920, the United
States was the first Western power to surrender
all rights of extraterritoriality. The FCN treaty
of 1937 ^ and the latest treaty have maintained
the same spirit of mutual respect and friendship.
In commenting on the Senate's advice and
consent to ratification. Secretary Rusk empha-
sized the value which the United States places
on its close and historic ties with Thailand and
referred to the remarks of Foreign Minister
Thanat Khoman on the occasion of the signing
of the treaty on May 29, 1966. The Foreign Min-
^ For background, see Bulletin of June 20, 1966, p.
991.
' 53 United States Statutes at Large 1731.
ister described the relationship between our two
countries as a "partnership which will not
smother or jeopardize the free existence of the
smaller party, but rather enhance the latter's
growth and development," and expressed the
hope that this "close association between our
two nations . . . will serve as a model to an
orderly and peaceful development between the
nations, large and small, in this part of the
world, a relationship which will not entail sub-
servience of one to the other but rather a
mutually trustworthy and fruitful partnership
and cooperation." The Secretary observed that
Americans can justly take pride in the Foreign
Minister's remarks, which epitomize the rela-
tionship which the United States seeks with
friendly nations everywhere.
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19,
1967.'
Ratification deposited: Panama, August 28, 1967.
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular
relations concerning the compulsory settlement of
disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered
into force March 19, 1967.'
Ratification deposited: Panama, August 28, 1967.
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington Decem-
ber 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945.
TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Gambia, September 21,
1967.
Hydrography
Convention on the International Hydrographic Organi-
zation, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967.^
Signature: United States (subject to ratification),
September 13, 1967.
Postal Matters
Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and
convention with final protocol and regulations of
execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964. Entered into
force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.
Adherence deposited: Lesotho (with reservation),
September 6, 1967.
Ratifications deposited: Kuwait, August 16, 1967;
Sierra Leone, August 24, 1967.
' Xot in force for the United States.
^ Not in force.
OCTOBER 9, 1967
477
Telecommunications
International telecommmiication convention, with an-
nexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. Entered
into force .January 1, 1967 ; as to the United States
May 20, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Ratifications deposited: Ethiopia, July 29, 1967;
Togo, August 8, 1967.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
19.^9), as amended (TIAS 4S93, 5603), to put into
effect a revised frequency allotment plan for the
aeronautical mobile (R) service and related informa-
tion, with annexes. Done at Geneva April 29, 1966.
Entered into force July 1, 1967 ; as to the United
States August 23, 1967, except the frequency allot-
ment plan contained in appendix 27 shall enter into
force April 10, 1970. TIAS 6332.
Notifications of approval: Belgium, Netherlands,
July 20, 1967.
William O. Hall to be Ambassador to Ethiopia. ( For
biographic details, see White House press release dated
August 17. )
Martin J. Hillenbrand to be Ambassador to Hungary.
(For biographic details, see White House press release
dated July 25.)
Geoffrey W. Lewis to be Ambassador to the Central
African Republic. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated August 17.)
Fredric R. Mann to be Ambassador to Barbados.
(For biographic details, .see White House press release
dated August 17.)
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Togo. (For biographic details, see White
House press rejease dated August 17.)
BILATERAL
France
Con.sular convention. Signed at Paris July 18, 1966."
Senate advice and consent to ratification: September
18, 1967.
Lesotho
Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace
corps yirogram in Lesotho. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington September 22, 1967. Entered
into force September 22, 1967.
Upper Volta
Arrangement relating to a geodetic survey along the
12th parallel arc. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ouagadougou June 28 and August 21, 1967. Entered
into force August 21, 1967.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on September 13 confirmed the following
nominations :
William A. Costello to be Ambassador to Trinidad
and Tobago. ( For biographic details, see White House
press release dated August 17.)
' Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 18-24
Press releases may be obtained from the OfiSce
of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C.
20520.
Releases issued prior to September 18 which
appear in this issue of the Btn.LETiN are Nos. 195
of September 13, 196 of September 12, 197 of
September 15, 198 of September 13, and 199 and
201 of September 15.
No. Date Subject
202 9/18 Department statement on Ashmore
article on contacts with Hanoi.
*203 9/18 Mann sworn in as Ambassador to
Barbados (biographic details).
1204 9/20 U.S. and Mexico amend route sched-
ule to air transport agreement
( rewrite ) .
*205 9/21 Program for visit of Chief Leabua
Jonathan, Prime Minister of
Lesotho.
206 9/21 U.S.-Mexican fishery talks.
t207 9/23 Rusk : 12th meeting of consultation
of OAS foreign ministers.
t208 9/22 U.S.-PhiJippine cotton textile ar-
rangements.
*209 9/22 Program for visit of President Diori
Hamani of Niger.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
478
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
INDEX yol LVII, No. U76 October 9, 1967
Atomic Energy
The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy (Mc-
Namara) 443
Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference
Confirmed 470
Barbados. Mann confirmed as Ambassador . . 478
Central African Republic. Lewis confirmed as
Ambassador 478
China. The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy
(McNamara) 443
Congress
Confirmations (Costello, Hall, Hillenbrand,
Lewis, Mann, Sherer) 478
Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference
Confirmed 476
Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Costello, Hall, Hillenbrand. Lewis, Mann,
Sherer) 478
Economic Affairs
The Business of Development (Oliver) . . . 470
President Names U.S. Members to Investment
Disputes Panels 475
Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations 477
U.S. and Mexico Discuss Fisheries in 12-Mile
Zone 475
Ethiopia. Hall confirmed as Ambassador . . . 478
Hungary. Hillenbrand confirmed as Ambas-
sador 478
International Organizations and Conferences
Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference
Confirmed 476
President Names U.S. Members to Investment
Disputes Panels 475
United States Collective Defense Arrangements
(map) 460
Iraq. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq,
Jordan, and Temen 459
Japan
President Johnson Welcomes Japanese Cabinet
Ministers 453
U.S.-Japan Joint Economic Committee Holds
Sixth Meeting (Rusk, Miki, communique) . 451
Jordan. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq,
Jordan, and Yemen 459
Latin .\merica. The Business of Development
(OUver) 470
Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Discuss Fisheries in
12-Mlle Zone 475
Military Affairs. The Dynamics of Nuclear
Strategy (McNamara) 443
Near East. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to
Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen 459
Passports. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to
Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen 459
Presidential Documents. President Johnson Wel-
comes Japanese Cabinet Ministers .... 453
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To Be
Held at St. Louis 476
Thailand. Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations 477
Togo. Sherer confirmed as Ambassador . . . 478
Treaty Information
Current Actions 477
Senate Approves U.S.-Thai Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations 477
Trinidad and Tobago. Costello confirmed as
Ambassador 478
U.S.S.R. The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy
(McNamara) 443
United Nations. Ambassador Lodge Discusses
Viet-Nam in Interview on "Jleet the Press" . 464
Viet-Nam
Ambassador Lodge Discusses Viet-Nam in Inter-
view on "Meet the Press" 464
Department Gives Facts Regarding Ashmore-
Baggs Contacts With Hanoi (Department
statement) 462
Yemen. U.S. Passports Valid for Travel to Iraq,
Jordan, and Yemen 459
Name Index
Costello, William A 478
Hall, William O 478
Hillenbrand, Martin J 478
Johnson, President 453
Lewis, Geoffrey W 478
Lodge, Henry Cabot 464
McNamara, Robert S 443
Mann, Fredric R 478
Miki, Takeo 451
Oliver, Covey T 470
Rusk, Secretary 451
Seaborg, Glenn T 476
Sherer, Albert W., Jr 478
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